CHINESE INFORMATION WARFARE:

A PHANTOM MENACE OR EMERGING

THREAT?

Toshi Yoshihara

November 2001
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ISBN 1-58487-074-5

ii
FOREWORD

Mao Tse-tung counseled, “To achieve victory we must as

far as possible make the enemy blind and deaf by sealing his

eyes and ears, and drive his commanders to distraction by

creating confusion in their minds.” Few concepts mesh so

contextually with Mao than the Chinese approach to

Information Warfare (IW). As the People’s Republic of

China struggles with its national military strategy, IW

offers opportunities to win wars without the traditional

clash of arms.

In this monograph, Mr. Toshi Yoshihara explores what

he perceives to be China’s pursuit of IW as a method of

fighting asymmetric warfare against the United States.

Largely imitative of U.S. thoughts, literature, and practices

on IW, he believes the Chinese are seeking ways to adapt it

to their own style of warfare. Paradoxically, he observes

that the Chinese have not gleaned their intelligence

through espionage, but through careful scrutiny of U.S. IW

in practice. The Persian Gulf War and Kosovo conflict have

provided ample largess to the Chinese archives.

Mr. Yoshihara examines those aspects of IW—PSYOPS,

Denial, and Deception—that China believes provides the

greatest prospects for victory in a conflict. Not surprisingly,

Sun Tzu is interwoven into this emerging theory. Targeting

the enemy’s “nervous system” at all levels, that is, his ability

to gather and assess information and then transmit orders,

provides significant advantages in the prosecution of a

campaign. Targeting the enemy’s homeland defenses and

its citizens can potentially end a war before it even starts.

He concludes that the extent of Chinese advances or intent

regarding IW is difficult to ascertain given its closed society.

Chinese IW may still be nascent, but the menacing intent is

there and only vigilance will protect the United States.

iii
Much in the realm of IW remains speculative and

conceptual. Aspiring nations can take advantage of the

Revolution in Military Affairs by skipping generations of

technology and becoming a modern, sophisticated threat,

obviating the need for significant financial investments.

The consequences of the threat are of great import to today’s

strategic leaders and thinkers. The Strategic Studies

Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as a topic of

debate that will continue into the millennium.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iv
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

TOSHI YOSHIHARA is a Research Fellow and the resident

expert on security issues in the Asia-Pacific region at the

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. His research areas at

the Institute include American alliances in the Asia-Pacific,

China’s military modernization, China-Taiwan relations,

Japan’s security policy, critical infrastructure protection,

and energy security in the Persian Gulf. Mr. Yoshihara was

an analyst focusing on China’s security policy and military

modernization at the RAND Corporation and the American

Enterprise Institute. He was a Visiting Fellow at the

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

(1998-2000). Mr. Yoshihara received a B.S. in International

Affairs from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign

Service and an M.A. in International Affairs from Johns

Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International

Studies (SAIS). He is currently a doctoral candidate at the

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University,

working on his dissertation on Chinese military innovation

and information warfare.

v
 SUMMARY

In recent years, China has demonstrated an intense

fascination with information warfare (IW). The potential

advances in Chinese IW doctrine and capabilities have

direct implications for U.S. national security. The ability of

China to conduct information warfare against the United

States in peacetime, confrontation, or conflict could pose

severe challenges to defense planners. Yet, American

understanding of China’s approaches to IW within the

academic and defense communities remain shallow. This

lack of understanding, both stemming from the extreme

secrecy surrounding China’s military programs in general

and the nascent stage of development in IW in particular,

could invite ugly strategic and operational surprises for the

United States.

As an initial step to clarify the future direction of

Chinese IW and to identify new areas for further research,

this monograph explores Chinese perspectives of

information warfare through a sampling of the burgeoning

open literature circulating in China. The monograph

provides a preliminary assessment of these Chinese

writings and analysis. It demonstrates some linkages and

parallels to America’s current debates on IW, the

Soviet-U.S. competition, Clausewitz’s classic dictums, and

Chinese strategic culture. The monograph concludes with

implications of future developments in Chinese IW for

American policy.

vi
CHINESE INFORMATION WARFARE

A PHANTOM MENACE OR EMERGING

THREAT?

Dazzled by Information Warfare.

In the past decade, China’s military modernization and

growing interest in the revolution in military affairs (RMA)

have increasingly attracted international attention. Like

many other military powers, China has exploited the

unprecedented general peace in the international security

environment to reexamine and experiment with its own

defense capabilities and doctrine. In particular, the concept

of information warfare (IW) has emerged as a subject of

great interest in Chinese military discourse. The intense

discussions and debates within China’s defense community

suggest that Beijing may be harnessing the political will to

devote substantial resources to developing IW doctrines and

capabilities. China’s potential ability to leverage the

information revolution accompanied by its gradual rise as a

major military power have led many observers to speculate

whether China might succeed in becoming one of the global

leaders in IW.

China’s appreciation for the centrality of information as

a tool of statecraft and military power has significant

implications. Given the tremendous advances in

information technologies both in terms of the rate of

innovation and quality of improvements, China is well

positioned to exploit this revolution. Just as China has

surprised skeptical observers with its rapid developments

in nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and space programs,

the Chinese may similarly come to the forefront in IW. More

importantly, China’s focus on IW presents a potentially

daunting challenge for American defense planners. In two

cyber-attack exercises in 1997 and 1999, the U.S. military

found that a group of hackers “using publicly available

1
resources was able to prevent the United States from

waging war effectively.” The Pentagon premised the first

drill on a military crisis on the Korean Peninsula. The result

of the exercise was sobering: the series of attacks against

civilian and military networks had a paralyzing effect on

American command and control at the highest levels of

leadership. It is therefore conceivable that IW could provide

China with the capacity to hinder American military

operations in the Asia-Pacific, a region of central

importance to U.S. national security interests. Hence, the

direction of China’s IW strategy has direct policy relevance

to the United States.

In recent years, the Chinese have demonstrated a

voracious appetite for examining IW. Arguably, only the

United States and Russia rival China’s analytical work in

IW. The exotic concepts and capabilities of IW have

seemingly captivated the imagination of Chinese futurists

and military strategists alike. Indeed, a virtual cottage

industry has developed around the topic in Chinese

literature on military affairs. How China will translate

theoretical discussions on IW into practice will be an

increasingly important policy question for the United

States. 

The author first explores Chinese thinking on IW

through a literature survey of primary sources. Strategists

have demonstrated a keen interest in understanding the

theoretical concepts, requirements, and capabilities

necessary to conduct IW in future conflict. The second

component of the monograph assesses the existing Chinese

IW literature. While Chinese thinkers have clearly begun to

grapple with the opportunities and challenges of waging

IW, the analytical gaps in their writings suggest that China

still has a long way to go before it can embark on the quest

for information supremacy (if that is, in fact, Beijing’s goal).

Finally, the author speculates on how Chinese thinking on

IW could impact its future application. While the evidence

remains scant at present, how the Chinese might use IW to

achieve their political objectives may have unsettling

2
consequences for the United States. This monograph is not a

call to arms for American defense planners. However, the

potential path that China might pursue in IW and the

associated risks to U.S. national interests warrant careful

observation and preparation against surprise.

What is IW?

Since the concept of IW emerged in the mid-1990s as a

topic of heated debate, its definition remains in a state of

continual flux. Scholars, think tanks, and the U.S.

Government have all struggled to provide an intellectual

construct for the study of IW. Efforts to grapple with this

“exotic” type of warfare continue today, and little consensus

has yet emerged. The intellectual fever to come to grips with

IW has also spread to China, resulting in similar degrees of

disagreement over the meaning of IW. The

conceptualization of IW in the Chinese context has been

even more confused given that Beijing, by the nature of its

opaqueness, has not published any official documentation of

IW as a guide for national policy. There is no discernible

taxonomy that can be meaningfully used to accurately

depict Chinese IW. Only China’s open sources, many of

which are of dubious quality or reliability, have offered

some clues on Chinese thinking.

While not an exact scientific measure, a sampling of U.S.

doctrinal writings on IW could provide a useful frame of

reference and possibly some context for comparison

between Chinese and American thinking. According to a

document on U.S. joint doctrine entitled Information

Operations, IW is “actions taken to affect an adversary’s

information and information systems while defending one’s

own information and information systems.” The Pentagon’s

Joint Vision 2020 adds that, “Information operations also

include actions taken in a noncombat or ambiguous

situation to protect one’s own information and information

systems as well as those taken to influence target

3
information and information systems.”

3 These vague

definitions of IW clearly require further clarification.

At the heart of IW is information. Information guides

decisionmaking in peacetime and war at the strategic (a

decision to declare war), operational (a decision to move a

division of forces forward for an attack), or tactical (a

decision to order an aircraft to engage) levels. These

decisions in turn trigger action. The purpose of IW is to

affect the adversary’s decisionmaking process and

associated actions to one’s own advantage. The outcome for

the enemy can be wrong decisions, late decisions, or no

decisions at all. This enables the attacker to control the

opponent or, failing that, to prevent the adversary from

carrying out a decision. To succeed in IW, one must achieve

information superiority over the enemy. Joint Vision 2010

defined information superiority as “the capability to collect,

process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of

information, while exploiting or denying an adversary’s

ability to do the same.”

4

 Information superiority requires

both offensive and defensive components. In Joint Vision

2020, information superiority is simply understood as an

“imbalance in one’s favor in the information domain.”

5

There are six central pillars of IW in the current

American lexicon:

6

• Physical Attack/Destruction: The use of kinetic force,

such as cruise missiles, to inflict damage on enemy systems

or personnel sufficient to render them unusable. This type of

IW can be used defensively to prevent the adversary from

using offensive IW.

• Electronic Warfare (EW): The control of the

electromagnetic spectrum to undermine the enemy’s

electronic warfare capabilities through electromagnetic

energy, directed energy, and antiradiation weapons.

• Computer Network Attack (CNA): The use of

computers and telecommunications equipment to disrupt,

4
deny, degrade, and destroy enemy computers, computer

networks, and the information being transmitted.

• Military Deception: The manipulation, distortion, and

falsification of information to mislead or deceive the

adversary’s military commander, thereby forcing the enemy

to act (or not act) to its own disadvantage.

• Psychological Operations (PSYOPS): The use of

communications (such as propaganda) and actions intended

to mislead to influence the perceptions, motives, and

emotions of the enemy.

• Operations Security (OPSEC): Security measures that

prevent the enemy from collecting or analyzing information

that may be useful to it.

A recent study uses U.S. joint doctrine as a construct to

highlight the differences between Chinese and American

IW. Kate Farris argues that, “the U.S. tends to focus on the

CNA aspect of IW, while the Chinese take a more broad

perspective, emphasizing pillars such as PSYOP, Denial,

and Deception.”

7 While the author’s selection of Chinese

literature persuasively supports this assessment, the

current state of Chinese IW is simply too immature and not

well enough understood to reach any definitive conclusion.

As Farris herself admits, “the Chinese debate on IW is still

evolving, there is some uncertainty remaining over how

they will incorporate IW into their military doctrine and

strategy.”

8

 Clearly, more data and continued observation of

Chinese developments are required. Her analysis

nevertheless highlights the potential utility of comparative

analysis for better understanding Chinese thinking on IW.

Indeed, subsequent sections of this monograph show how

closely Chinese interpretations dovetail with (if not copy)

America’s ongoing examination of IW.

Triumph of the Information Revolution?

What explains China’s intense interest in IW? At the

broadest level, the Chinese clearly realize the implications

5
of the information revolution. First, China recognizes the

importance of high technology and the growing power of

information in the era of globalization and interdependence.

Second, China aspires to become a major political and

economic player in a global community where information

power retains a critical place in dictating interstate

relations. Given that economic development remains its

highest national priority, China’s integration into the

information-based international economic system has in

turn magnified the appeal of information. Third, as a

corollary to the previous point, the Chinese believe that, as

China increases its comprehensive national power, the

world will eventually shift from a unipolar to a multipolar

world, in which the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will be

a coequal.

9 In sum, the ability to compete economically and

wage high-technology warfare with information

technologies will be critical components of China’s national

strength. 

From a strategic and military perspective, IW promises

to compensate for China’s largely antiquated conventional

armed forces. First, IW could enable the Chinese to fight

from a position of relative weakness, particularly against

far superior military powers like the United States and

Japan. In recent defense parlance, information technologies

provide “asymmetric capabilities” to state and nonstate

actors. While definitions of asymmetric warfare have varied

and evolved over time, the basic concept is the use of

unorthodox methods and capabilities that avoid or undercut

an adversary’s strengths while inflicting disproportionate

damage on the enemy’s weaknesses.

10

 In a hypothetical

confrontation between China and the United States, the

backwardness of Chinese forces would undoubtedly invite

defeat. Since the Chinese cannot possibly hope to fight on

American terms, they must therefore find other means to

deter or defeat the United States. IW provides Beijing with

the potential capacity to reach directly into the American

homeland, which has been far beyond the very limited

power projection capabilities of China’s military. The

6
Chinese could attack vulnerable critical infrastructures in

the United States to influence or manipulate domestic

public perceptions and, in turn, weaken America’s political

will to intervene or fight. This need to leverage weakness in

order to defeat a superior foe, a central and still influential

philosophy of Mao Zedong’s people’s war concept, has a

powerful hold on Chinese thinkers.

Second, many Chinese believe that IW is one of the few

technological arenas where the contest for supremacy

among the great powers remains undetermined. By

exploiting the information revolution, China hopes to

leapfrog generations of obsolescent technologies in order to

catch up with the developed world.

11

 The Chinese believe

that IW could offer a low-cost, quick fix to their backward

forces, especially when compared to a full-fledged military

build-up. America’s conventional military supremacy, a

critical benchmark for the Chinese military, further

underscores the difficulties of overcoming conventional

military inferiority. Chinese strategists hope to capitalize

on the integrative powers of information technologies to

improve the performance of existing equipment without

incurring prohibitive expenses.

12

 A prominent phenomenon

in the information technology revolution (popularly known

as “Moore’s Law”) is that, while information processing

power has accelerated over the last 2 decades, the costs per

unit capacity have plummeted at an exponential rate.

13

However, this proposition holds true only for specific

items and capabilities. The costs of systems or architectures

that support the warfighting end of the military force have

actually risen significantly relative to conventional military

items. As Martin van Creveld points out, “even as the

per-bit cost of data processing fell by a factor of ten over each

of the three decades from 1950 to 1980, the cost of command

systems rose so much that it now threatens to swallow up

entire defense budgets.”

14

 He presciently concludes, “Given

the problem of rising costs, the dilemma is likely to become

even more important in the future.”

15 Similarly, the pace of

Chinese development in IW will largely “hinge on” the costs

7
of IW capabilities that Beijing hopes to exploit. Depending

on how broadly the Chinese conceptualize IW and which

aspect(s) they want to pursue, some items or systems may

be beyond China’s reach at present. For example,

information-gathering tools, such as reconnaissance

satellites and the associated support systems, require

substantial and sustained financial commitments. Beijing

has not tangibly demonstrated the political will to embark

on such an ambitious modernization effort. While China’s

economic growth has been spectacular in the past 2 decades,

stagnant trends in recent years have already defied the

euphoric linear projections of some economists. Hence, IW

as an alternative to conventional military power may not be

sustainable or realistic in the long term. Nevertheless, this

line of reasoning on the benefits of information technologies

has remained compelling for Chinese military thinkers.

China has therefore not discounted itself from this

technological race.

Third, the Gulf War highlighted the growing centrality

of IW. The high-tech weaponry (supported by sophisticated

information systems) showcased during the conflict and the

wholesale destruction of advanced weapons (largely

Russian and Chinese in origin) shocked and galvanized the

military leadership. Similar to America’s “Vietnam

Syndrome,” China was just emerging from the deep malaise

in the aftermath of the bloody and inconclusive war against

Vietnam in 1979. The apparent inferiority, perhaps even

irrelevance of Chinese equipment compared to American

weaponry during the Gulf War finally spurred the People’s

Liberation Army (PLA) to embrace the study of

high-technology war and, particularly, IW. In 1993, General

Liu Huaqing, the former Vice Chairman of the Central

Military Commission and the vocal military leader credited

with starting China’s current military modernization,

lamented the failure of the PLA to meet the standards of

modern warfare. He pointed specifically to the Gulf War

conflict as the model for the Chinese when studying future

8
wars.

16 Chinese interest in this area intensified further in

the aftermath of the NATO air campaign over Kosovo.

17

The appreciation for information and its potential

advantages in future warfare led Chinese analysts to

speculate and theorize on how they might acquire their own

set of doctrine and capabilities. Subsequent writings since

the mid-1990s have demonstrated a keen interest (though

not necessarily the analytical capacity) among strategists to

explore, study, and absorb IW. Similar to the vague

descriptions of IW currently circulating in America’s

defense community, China’s evolving and fluid debates on

IW have thus far remained abstract. At present no clear

consensus has yet emerged in China on the specific aspects

of IW the Chinese hope to develop. As a latecomer to the

realm of IW, China has little foundation on which to base its

intellectual discourse. As a result, the Chinese have often

mimicked unclassified American works and security

debates on IW as the literature survey below illustrates.

More interestingly, many have tried to express their views

by applying or comparing Sun Tzu’s Art of War to IW. These

efforts to adopt IW by finding new expression in strategic

tradition could have profound influences on how the

Chinese approach IW. The intersection between Beijing’s

own conception of IW, which is still in the embryonic stages,

and China’s strategic culture may produce strategies that

are uniquely Chinese. The resulting degree of divergence

from Western understanding of IW could enable China to

harness the potential for unleashing ugly surprises against

its adversaries.

The Chinese Buy into the RMA.

China’s analysis of the RMA was the central starting

point for recent Chinese discussions on IW in the 1990s and

the early 21st century. Chinese military strategists have

devoted significant energy in the study of the RMA for more

than a decade. For example, analysts monitored closely

Soviet Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov’s work on America’s

9
revolution in technical military affairs in the 1980s.

However, the notion of an RMA did not gain genuine

currency in Chinese military circles until after the Gulf

War. The Kosovo air campaign further reinforced the

growing awareness of IW.

As a result of these two major high-technology conflicts

waged in the past decade, Chinese military analysts

generally recognize and accept that some type of revolution

in warfare is afoot. One strategist noted that the command

and control capabilities demonstrated during Desert Storm

represented a “great transformation.”

18

 One article

marveled at the perfect execution of the conflict. Another

writer declared, “The unfolding of the new military

revolution worldwide is a prominent feature of the

international security situation . . . [It] involves such fields

as military thinking, military strategy, operational

doctrine, military organization, and arms development.”

19

One analyst further elaborated on this new military

revolution stating that, “. . . there will be an overall

qualitative leap in the military field of all countries—the

possession by the military forces of high-quality personnel,

integrated C4I systems, high-level training and education,

intelligent arms, scientific organization, and creative

military doctrines.”

20

 A Chinese commentator made an even

more sweeping claim that “the beginning of the 1990s

opened the curtain on the information war era and marked

the sudden appearance of the third military revolution.”

21

As the last observation hinted, the Chinese recognize

that information technologies are an integral part of the

so-called RMA. Chinese strategists clearly identify the

direct link between information superiority and victory in

conflict. One article noted that the information technology

revolution is the

core and foundation of this military revolution, because

information and knowledge have changed the previous practice

of measuring military strength by simply counting the number

of armored divisions, air force wings, and aircraft carrier battle

10
groups. Nowadays, one must take into account some invisible

forces, such as computing capabilities, communications

capacity, and system reliability. 22

According to another analyst, “Information technology has .

. . become an indispensable means for better command and

communication. Combat between opposing forces is, firstly,

between their capabilities in gathering, processing, and

analyzing information.”

23 The author argues that the ability

to decide and act faster and better than the enemy—a

central concept of American information superiority—is a

prominent part of modern conflict. In future wars, weapons

systems and military units will be increasingly

“information-intensified.”

24

These statements on the characteristics of the RMA

demonstrate a strong conviction among some Chinese

military analysts that information technologies will be the

critical foundation for success in future wars. Recent

Chinese literature on IW also suggests that strategists have

gradually developed a deeper understanding of IW. Indeed,

some general conclusions on the future of IW may be

coalescing among Chinese analysts.

Chinese Views on IW Strategies.

Major General Wang Pufeng, widely recognized as the

founder of Chinese IW, produced a sweeping working

definition of IW. According to the author:

Information war is a product of the information age which to a

great extent utilizes information technology and information

ordnance in battle. It constitutes a “networkization”

(wangluohua)of the battlefield, and a new model for a

complete contest of time and space. At its center is the fight to

control the information battlefield, and thereby to influence or

decide victory or defeat.

25 

Another definition synthesizes a more concrete Chinese

understanding of IW:

11
IW is combat operations in a high-tech battlefield environment

in which both sides use information- technology means,

equipment, or systems in a rivalry over the power to obtain,

control, and use information. IW is a combat aimed at seizing

the battlefield initiative; with digitized units as its essential

combat force; the seizure, the control, and use of information as

its main substance, and all sorts of information weaponry

[smart weapons] and systems as its major means.

26

More specifically, the main objective of information war

is to attack the adversary’s information systems while

protecting the information infrastructure of one’s own

forces. Based on a large collection of Chinese primary

sources, James Mulvenon argues that, “the aim of IW in the

Chinese literature is information dominance

[zhixinxiquan].”

27

 Similar to the American concept of

“information superiority,”

28 Chinese IW seeks to disrupt the

enemy’s decisionmaking process by interfering with the

adversary’s ability to obtain, process, transmit, and use

information. The paralysis of the opponent’s information

system and decisionmaking cycle would, in turn, destroy the

adversary’s will to resist or fight on. For instance, IW would

attack the enemy’s command and control systems in order

to confuse or blind enemy forces. This notion of attacking

the adversary’s command and control systems mirrors the

strategies employed during the Gulf War and the Kosovo air

campaign. In both conflicts, American forces launched an

intensive effort to destroy and bring down the enemy’s

“nervous system” in order to weaken the ability of the

enemy’s kinetic weapons force to respond or fight. However,

Chinese discussions broaden IW further. Some analysts

argue that an effective information attack could completely

disrupt an adversary’s military operations and therefore

preclude the need for a direct military confrontation. The

author examines at length whether the Chinese have

mistakenly lost sight of the need to field a kinetic weapons

force in tandem with command and control warfare.

This IW concept of attacking and destroying the enemy’s

command and control capabilities has received great

12
attention among Chinese commentators. One analyst

argues that IW combat is a struggle between the command

and control systems of the opposing forces. He asserts, “A

winning force enters the battle after already winning the

battle . . . The goal that confrontation of command pursues is

to ‘win in strategy,’ because only by doing so can one win a

war or even stop a war.”

29 In other words, the side that wins

in the struggle for battlefield command determines the

outcome of wars. He observes that the multinational forces

in the Gulf War defeated Iraq by first destroying its ability

to command its forces. “Without the power to ‘win in

strategy,’ they [the Iraqis] also lost the power to ‘win in

battle’.”

30 The author argues that the duel over command

must precede combat on the ground. More intriguing, the

analyst’s approach to warfare suggests that information

dominance offers the potential to overawe the enemy into

surrendering, hence negating the need for actual physical

engagement. This type of psychological intimidation

through IW—essentially aimed at scaring the enemy into

dropping their swords—is deeply embedded in Sun Tzu’s

philosophy. Strategic advantage (shih), a central feature of

the Art of War, connotes the release of latent energy, both

physical and psychological, in order to ride the forces of

circumstances to victory. Whether the Chinese genuinely

believe that command warfare has eclipsed kinetic force

combat remains to be seen.

According to one author, “In waging IW, ‘the best combat

method is to attack by strategy’ . . . to obstruct or upset the

enemy’s decisionmaking procedure, so as to make the

enemy unable to adopt coordinated actions. To be more

precise, the main objective of IW is to hit the enemy’s

cognitive system as well as information system.”

31

 In terms

of the actual application of force, the writer conjures the

notion of hitting the enemy’s vital points. “The salient

feature of IW is that high-precision, high-speed,

over-the-horizon attacks become its basic fire application

pattern and that the nonstylized ‘vital point’-styled

structural destruction will replace the traditional-stylized

13
battles.”

3 2

 The author equates the enemy’s main

vulnerabilities to its ability to process information and

make decisions. Identifying, locating, and then attacking

such centers of gravity (cognitive and information systems)

are central to this concept of IW.

According to theLiberation Army Daily, “an attacker can

go around the enemy’s solid works he has long labored for

and, by way of ‘surgical removal’ and ‘digital acupoint

pressure’ (selective attacks), launch precision raids to

destroy the enemy’s war resources and shatter his will to

resist.”

33

 Similar to U.S. military thinking, this focus on

targeting the opponent’s will hints at a very broad

conception of IW, including psychological operations.

Another writer describes the ability of IW to seek out and

destroy the enemy’s vital points in much more vivid terms.

“Information intensified combat methods are like a Chinese

boxer with a knowledge of vital body points who can bring

an opponent to his knees with a minimum of movement.”

34

 A

Chinese Defense University publication issued a similar

prescription on IW. “Paralyze the enemy by attacking the

weak link of his C3I as if hitting his acupuncture point in

kungfu combat.” The foregoing analyses again suggest that

the Chinese believe a successful attack against vital points

would cripple the adversary and negate the need to engage

in further combat.

35

 The notion that centers of gravity, a

traditional concept in warfare, might be informationrelated is a major driving force behind the current debates

on the new RMA worldwide. The Chinese have clearly

grasped the significance of the relationship between

information and center of gravity.

Chinese discussions on IW have centered on the strategy

of disrupting the command and control capabilities of the

adversary. The literature often presumes that locating and

then successfully attacking the enemy’s centers of gravity is

achievable. Interestingly, this concept of crippling the

opponent’s ability to act or gain initiative on the battlefield

by targeting information systems parallels (if not parrots)

the American notion of information dominance, which

14
overlays traditional kinetic weaponry as a force multiplier.

Another subtheme that emerges in the literature is the

influence of Chinese strategic tradition. The recurrent

notion of attacking the enemy’s strategy without actually

engaging in combat reflects the indelible imprint of Sun

Tzu’s philosophy and demonstrates Chinese efforts to

internalize IW within a familiar strategic framework.

Interestingly, Western militaries, particularly the

American armed forces, have also become enamored with

Sun Tzu.

36

 Beyond the broad strategies that the Chinese

have developed, strategists have also distilled very specific

conclusions on how IW would be applied in the future.

Chinese Views on IW Capabilities.

Despite the offensive nature of the IW strategies

outlined above, the Chinese divide IW into two broad

categories of offensive and defensive capabilities. In the

offense, IW seeks to attack directly the enemy’s information

systems. This includes the physical destruction and

suppression of the enemy’s information operations, such as

jamming, weakening, or shutting down the adversary’s

command and control. Analysts recognize that as China

becomes more dependent on IW in future conflicts, Chinese

systems would likely be subject to attack as well. Indeed,

Chinese observers have scrutinized the Kosovo conflict with

great interest to distill lessons learned on potential

defensive strategies. Strategists unanimously concur that

enhancing resistance to interference and heightening

defense against physical attacks are critical requirements

for Chinese IW.

37

 Defending one’s own platforms and

ensuring the normal functioning of command and control

have become equally important compared to the offense.

Chinese strategists agree that both the offensive and

defensive elements of IW require a robust and effective

command and control system. IW and any other type of

warfare depend on command and control as the architecture

and central nervous system. According to one author,

15
All activities of information operations are centering around

command and control. Command and control cover all areas of

information operations and work throughout the whole process

of operation, affecting and regulating the overall situation. Any

mistakes in command and control will seriously jeopardize an

information operation. Therefore, in the study of information

operations, we must pay close attention to command and control

as the core.

38

One major objective of C2 is to “obtain timely information, to

understand the enemy and ourselves, and to achieve clarity

about our situation with great determination.”

39

 As

mentioned above, command and control warfare also seeks

to destroy the enemy’s ability to acquire, transmit, process,

and use information while protecting one’s own systems in

order to achieve information superiority. For example,

command and control systems would coordinate precision

strikes and electronic warfare by locating, tracking,

attacking, and assessing the damage to enemy targets.

An effective command and control capability requires a

wide range of information technologies aimed at increasing

the reliability of remote sensing and reconnaissance

systems. One author predicts that, “The 21st century will

see broad use of high-resolution photography in

surveillance satellites, combined air-ground early warning

systems for guided missiles, infrared detection systems,

deep strike surveillance and control planes, and much use of

unmanned reconnaissance planes.”

40

 The specific tools of

offensive and defensive IW include: (1) physical destruction;

(2) dominance of the electromagnetic spectrum; (3)

computer network warfare; and (4) psychological

manipulation. Interestingly, these capabilities almost

mirror U.S. doctrine on IW. While the views on specific

types of IW differ somewhat between various analysts,

several discrete IW applications have dominated recent

discourse from the late 1990s to the present. The following

briefly discusses the four main aspects of IW:

• Precision Strike Warfare. The Chinese envision “hard”

weapons that would physically destroy the enemy’s

16
headquarters, command posts, and C2 facilities. Smart,

stealthy, and over-the-horizon weapons would be able to

perform precise and “clean” deep strikes. The delivery

systems include guided bombs, guided artillery shells,

cruise missiles, and antiradiation missiles. Sound waves,

electric waves, visible light, infrared waves, lasers, and

gases would guide the weapon’s sensors.

41

• Electronic Warfare. The Chinese concur that the

contest for the electromagnetic spectrum to gain battlefield

initiative is a crucial phase of warfare. The objective is to

dominate the spectrum while denying the enemy’s effective

use of electronic equipment. For the offense, one would

utilize electronic jamming, electronic deception,

directed-energy weapons, and electromagnetic pulse

weapons. Hardening of facilities, dispersion,

countermeasures, and physical retaliation would constitute

the defense. Microelectronics will become a key

technological area for investment.

42

• Computer Network Warfare. Chinese strategists cover

a wide range of technologies and capabilities in computer

warfare. Networked computers would digitize the

battlefield, increase the transparency of the battlefield to

commanders, and provide real-time data. Computer

warfare can manifest itself in more exotic forms such as

cyber and hacker wars. Analysts discuss virtual warfare as

a means to deceive enemy forces with simulated false

commands.

43 Virtual simulations would also prepare

Chinese forces prior to actual combat.

44

• Psychological Warfare and Deception. This mode of

warfare involves the transmission of information or

misinformation to influence the intended audiences’

emotions, mode of thinking, and ultimately their behavior.

Aimed at both the military and public as the audience,

psychological warfare would exert pressure and weaken the

enemy’s will to carry on the fight.

45

 The primary tools

include media propaganda (television and radio), leaflet

distribution, e-mail, and other forms of communication.

17
While the existing literature lacks details on specific

programs, some recent articles hint at Chinese interest in

developing certain technologies, particularly in the areas of

remote sensing and reconnaissance. A Chinese researcher

at the Huabei Photo-electronics Technology Research

Institute offered a rare interview on the military utility of

photo-electronics. The researcher outlined various ongoing

projects in photo-electronic technologies that would aid

China in future conflicts. These include the display of

clearer imagery; increase in information transmission

speed; higher storage densities; miniaturized

photo-electronic devices and systems; and fusion of

microwave technologies with photo-electronics.

46

Another article revealed Chinese interest in airborne

and space-based synthetic aperture radar. The system

would be used to detect enemy dispositions and to assess

battle damage to enemy forces. According to the author,

China is expected to launch its first space-based radar in

2003.

47

 A Liberation Army Daily published an extensive

interview with experts on military mapping. This

distinguished group of engineers, professors, and

researchers discussed remote sensing and navigation

satellites; multi-resolution, three-dimensional digitized

imagery; and all-weather, real-time reconnaissance

capabilities, among other topics.

48 Clearly then, remote

sensing and reconnaissance, a central component of modern

command and control, have attracted increasing attention

within the Chinese scientific and defense communities.

A Preliminary Evaluation of Chinese IW Literature.

While China’s IW literature and American

interpretations of Chinese writings cover a broad range of

concepts and capabilities, most analyses lack concrete

evidence on the future direction of Chinese IW. Chinese IW

doctrine and force structure have remained frustratingly

elusive. The writings often theorize on the benefits of IW

and tend to present a wish list of capabilities that the

18
Chinese hope to acquire. These abstractions reveal the

extent to which the Chinese are still struggling with a

highly amorphous and ill-defined concept in warfare.

However, some preliminary assessments can be made about

the existing literature on IW.

Are the Chinese Copy Cats? As noted earlier, Chinese

interpretations of IW dovetail closely with the notion of

information dominance in American military doctrine. In

many cases, the Chinese have borrowed heavily from (and

even outright plagiarized) open literature and security

debates within the United States.

49

 Mulvenon identifies

several Chinese writings that are virtually identical to the

U.S. Air Force’s “Six Pillars of IW” and Joint Vision 2010.

For example, one author’s definition of IW as “electronic

warfare, tactical deception, strategic deterrence,

propaganda warfare, psychological warfare, computer

warfare, and command and control warfare” mirrors the Air

Force’s conception of IW.

50

 The Chinese have also

translated in full the Joint Doctrine for Command and

Control Warfare (JP3-13.1) and Field Manual (FM)-100-3.

51

This peculiar tendency to reproduce American doctrine

further evidences the daunting theoretical and analytical

difficulties that the Chinese have encountered in studying

IW. Indeed, this phenomenon of intellectual imitation is

highly reminiscent of Soviet literature on nuclear strategy

and doctrine in the 1960s and 1970s.

52

 If the Chinese are

merely mimicking American discourse, then the writings

further obscure China’s real intentions and capabilities in

IW. More importantly, the intellectual debates raging in the

United States are simply incompatible with the current

capabilities and needs of the Chinese. The primitive critical

infrastructure in China, while rapidly expanding in recent

years, is not nearly as vulnerable as the American

counterpart. The Chinese also do not have the advanced

systems to conduct offensive IW on the scale of the United

States. 

Why, then, are the Chinese engaged in a potentially

fruitless exercise? It may be that China is simply extracting

19
the benefits and lessons from the American experience in

IW through imitation. However, such a conclusion would be

an oversimplification of Chinese realities that could cloud

better understanding of China’s developments in IW. In the

preface of China Debates the Future Environment, Michael

Pillsbury points to a prominent and recurring problem in

the American study of Chinese security policy:

Some Americans wrongly believe Chinese views reflect a mirror

image of their own. This study suggests instead that the

Chinese have their own unique perceptions, which may be

difficult to appreciate.

The risk of mirror imaging our own views was an issue also

present in the study of the Soviet Union. Andrew Marshall,

Director of the Office of Net Assessment, cautioned against

assuming that a foreign nation’s strategic assessment is merely

a reflection of America’s: “Soviet calculations are likely to make

different assumptions about scenarios and objectives . . .

perform different calculations, use different measures of

effectiveness, and perhaps use different assessment processes

and methods. The result is that Soviet assessments may

substantially differ from American assessments.” Marshall’s

cautionary note also applies to understanding Chinese

assessments of the future.

53

The study of Chinese IW could similarly succumb to such

temptations of mirror imaging. The following analysis

suggests some probable explanations as to why Chinese

strategists have so assiduously copied American literature

on IW.

The Chinese may have fallen prey to the intellectual

“noise” generated within the United States. In an

environment where the free flow of ideas, both good and bad,

is encouraged and valued at a premium, the American

system often produces an over abundance of information. As

Greg Rattray illustrates, the entire array of conceivable

institutions on national security, ranging from the military

services to think tanks to commissions mandated by the

president, have all chimed in on IW.

54

 Each of these bodies

has also prescribed a dizzying set of responses and policies

20
in conducting IW.

55

 As one American columnist recently

commented on the Bush administration’s mixed signals on

U.S. policy toward Taiwan, “Cacophony in the form of

conflicting statements is America’s most effective form of

disinformation.”

56

 The Chinese may have convinced

themselves that the euphoric descriptions of “full spectrum

dominance,” “information superiority,” or “system of

systems” are genuinely accepted in the United States as

truisms or have been achieved.

57

 For example, an analyst at

the Chinese National Defense University examining the

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Joint Vision 2020 believes that

the United States will achieve “all-round information

superiority” as touted by the document and warns that

China should maintain vigilance to counter such a

hegemonic trend.

58

 Accepting America’s apparent ability to

achieve such ambitious (if not questionable) military

capabilities at face value risks under-rating China’s own

potential. 

Another more ominous explanation of China’s apparent

acceptance of American IW discourse at face value is that

the effort is deliberately intended to mislead the audience in

the United States. Indeed, it is entirely conceivable that the

Chinese government may be releasing some of the current

IW discussions in an extensive deception campaign. China

may believe that by actively fostering a burgeoning

literature on IW, the outside world would be convinced that

the PLA is vigorously pursuing the formidable potential of

IW. Such a calculated strategy could be intended to unnerve

potential adversaries, disguise China’s actual intentions

and growing capabilities to maximize the element of

surprise, or to hide Chinese weaknesses and vulnerabilities

in IW. Beijing’s successes in whipping up nationalistic

fervor among the public through the state-controlled media

in the aftermath of the accidental Belgrade embassy

bombing and the April 2001 reconnaissance plane accident

highlight China’s ability to centrally orchestrate and

manage domestic and foreign perceptions. Turning the

previous point on its head, the Chinese may be generating

21
their own set of intellectual “noise” to confuse and to keep

American defense planners off-balance. The diplomatic

maneuvers and the public relations contest between the

United States and the Soviet Union in the early years of the

space race provide a vivid historical example of mutual

noise making. Khrushchev repeatedly exaggerated the

capabilities of the Soviet space program to boost the Soviet

Union’s (and his own) image.

59

 The Soviets also deliberately

overstated the advances in strategic arms in order to

disguise the actual inferiority of their forces.

60

This deception effort is only possible given the

authoritarian nature of the regime and the relative

insularity of Chinese society. However, China is undergoing

rapid social and economic change that has gradually

undermined the capacity of the authorities to control the

flow of ideas. For example, while heavily monitored by

Chinese authorities, the proliferation of Internet access has

opened a potential new avenue for bypassing government

control over information. The flourishing publishing

businesses not under direct government control have also

produced many controversial works that would have been

unthinkable a decade ago. For example, the release of

Unrestricted Warfare

61

 (through a semi-independent

publishing house) caused a major sensation in Washington.

62

The authors, two PLA senior colonels, advocated the

indiscriminate use of military and nonmilitary means to

attack the United States during conflict. The publisher’s

affiliation with the PLA suggested that at least some

elements of the military leadership endorsed the radical

ideas contained in the book. Interestingly, the publication

also spurred an intense and often divisive debate in China’s

military circles. There were fears that the authors may have

divulged too much information on Chinese thinking to the

outside world.

63

 In short, China’s gradual internal opening

will curtail the government’s ability to influence the media.

However, as China’s blatant news manipulation in the

aftermath of the April 2001 spy plane incident revealed, the

22
state-controlled media’s impact will still be felt in Chinese

society for some time to come.

Falling in Love with the “Information Edge.” The IW

writings clearly demonstrate the powerful conviction

among Chinese analysts about the power of information.

The literature tightly fuses the accumulation of knowledge

with military success. Indeed, some authors describe the

relationship between information aided by advanced

technologies and victory almost in absolute terms. Many

writers declare that the accretion of knowledge and early

preparations would make victory inevitable. In other words,

information power determines the outcomes of wars. The

recurring references to the dictum that proper knowledge

would obviate the need to engage in actual combat

demonstrate the profound influence of Sun Tzu’s

philosophy. Moreover, there is an implicit and prevalent

assumption in the analyses that such knowledge is

attainable both prior to and during war. In short, the ability

to gather and process information appears to have become a

panacea in warfare for many Chinese IW strategists. This

belief in knowledge follows closely with Admiral William

Owen’s concept of a system of systems. He declares, “when

technology is correctly applied to the traditional military

functions—to see, to tell, and to act—a powerful synergy is

created, producing an effect much greater than the sum of

the components.”

64

 Premised on the power of information

technologies, he argues that “dominant battlespace

knowledge,” “near-perfect mission assignment,” and

“immediate/complete battlespace assessment” would create

the requisite conditions for victory.

What does not appear in the Chinese literature (and

Owen’s work) regarding knowledge and information is

equally instructive. Most analysts generally ignore the

harsh reality that data is not always accessible or perfect.

Accumulation of knowledge particularly under the duress of

war is often a haphazard and unreliable exercise. Indeed,

the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade

in 1999 should have demonstrated quite clearly that even

23
the most sophisticated military power remains subject to

the Clausewitzian fog of war. Beijing’s stubborn conviction

that the bombing was not an accident may in part reflect

Chinese illusions that technology does have the power to lift

the fog (although the real motive for the diplomatic bluster

may well be to extract political capital from the incident).

On a related point, most IW strategists tend to skirt the

practical application and hence the limitations of IW.

Chinese analysts do not discuss how one gathers, analyzes,

and disseminates information as a process. They similarly

exclude from their analyses the difficulties in assessing and

verifying data. The ability to harness knowledge is simply

accepted at face value as the solution to eliminating

uncertainty in war and the key to victory.

What accounts for this apparent blind faith in

information? First, Sun Tzu’s influence as a strategic

tradition remains very palpable. The literature survey for

this monograph demonstrates that the notion of winning

without fighting through superior knowledge is highly

appealing as a theoretical concept. Second, given that the

current discussions are conceptual exercises, most of the

writings understandably focus on the abstract and the most

ideal situations for information war. This tendency to

describe IW within the vacuum of theory often has the effect

of exaggerating the power of knowledge. Third, the defense

community in China remains deeply divided over the future

form of warfare. IW advocates must contend with

supporters of the traditional people’s war concept, still a

dominant force in the PLA, and the more conventional

high-tech warfare school of thought.

65

 As representatives of

a tiny minority view, they must present their case in the

most favorable terms. Hence, radical thinkers (like Owens)

are naturally compelled to promote the highly appealing

notion that knowledge will make winning without fighting

possible. The emergence of internal debates and political

infighting owing to the introduction of new concepts and

technologies is a prevalent if not inevitable phenomenon in

any defense community around the world. New ideas often

24
challenge the entrenched interests of military

organizations, which are by nature conservative and

resistant to radical change. Authors sometimes must

produce provocative writings in order to propel the debate in

the hopes of breaking the status quo or changing the

existing order. The current literature on Chinese IW is

clearly no exception. Regardless of which explanation is

preferred for it, the general acceptance that knowledge is

the key to mastering IW could have direct consequences for

Chinese developments in IW.

Forgetting Clausewitz. Chinese writings on IW ignore

the inherently interactive nature of combat. The ability to

gather and utilize knowledge is always seen from the

perspective of the self rather than from the enemy’s

position. It assumes that the enemy does not enjoy the same

type of access to information or has not devised parallel IW

strategies. In concrete terms, “The notion that one can

expect to attack an enemy’s satellite and computer

networks while the enemy will not have thought to do so

against oneself, or that the enemy will not have tried to take

precautions against such an attack, is dangerously naïve.”

66

The failure to appreciate the enemy’s IW strategies could

magnify the problems that result from an unquestioning

faith in knowledge as mentioned previously. The

assumption that the adversary has not devised counter

measures to deceive, mislead, or misinform could lead to

disastrous consequences. It might inflate Chinese

confidence in their ability to gather and process accurate

information about the enemy and thereby open themselves

to terrible blunders or miscalculations.

In Keeping the Edge, Victor A. DeMarines highlights the

inherent interactive nature of cyber information operations:

A difficulty inherent in CND [Computer Network Defense] is

that the attacker has the initiative, and the defender cannot

know the time and place of the next attack . . . A critical

characteristic of CNA [Computer Network Attack], which

creates numerous problems in planning its use, is its fragility.

Many forms of CNA are most effective when the enemy does

25
not realize that it is under attack, because they can readily be

countered once the enemy knows exactly how the attack is being

carried out.

67

In other words, computer network attack or defense,

while highly appealing, are fraught with uncertainty.

Without careful planning with the enemy constantly in

mind, the attack could be ineffective or the defense could be

circumvented by deception and surprise.

DeMarines also comments on the dilemmas that the

policymaker faces when employing computer network

defense or attack:

There is an inherent conflict between the requirements for

effective CND and the requirements for CNA. This conflict

arises whenever we discover a potential vulnerability in a

computer network. If we keep this vulnerability secret, and if a

future enemy does not independently discover the vulnerability

and protect against it, then we can exploit it for CNA. But if we

develop a defense against the vulnerability and deploy it widely

in our networks, we make it highly likely that the future enemy

will learn about the vulnerability and the defense, and we will

be unable to use it for CNA. However, if a future enemy

discovers this vulnerability independently, and we have done

nothing to protect our own networks against it, the enemy can

use it to attack us.

68

The complex interactive process in IW means that the

action taken by one side could potentially be negated

immediately if the adversary is alert or aware. The linear

approach to IW that the Chinese appear to have adopted

ignores the Clausewitzian implications of a duel between

two opposing forces.

The Ghost of Sun Tzu Still Lingers. The presence of Sun

Tzu’s philosophy is inescapable in the IW literature. As

noted earlier, Sun Tzu’s notion of winning without fighting

and attacking the enemy’s strategy (command and control

systems) resonates powerfully with Chinese strategists. In

addition, Chinese discussions of IW as a tool for deception

carry a distinct overtone of Sun Tzu’s influence. As

26
suggested above, Sun Tzu’s philosophy tends to reinforce an

unwarranted perception among Chinese commentators

that knowledge or information can become a panacea in

warfare. In short, traditional frameworks for

understanding strategy could have a distorting affect on

Chinese views of IW. However, some observers have

concluded that China’s strategic culture might in fact help

the Chinese benefit more from IW than the West. According

to an early study on Chinese IW, “Despite our technological

edge, we in the West may have much to learn from Chinese

views of conflict in the information age. Indeed, Sun Tzu,

with his emphasis on the power of ‘knowing’, may be more

relevant in the future than Clausewitz, for whom ‘friction’,

not information, was of overarching importance.”

69

 They

suggest that this cultural difference may in fact enable

China to achieve high levels of sophistication faster and

earlier than Western analysts have generally predicted.

Whether Chinese strategists have something useful to

contribute analytically by looking through the lens of Sun

Tzu or whether they have deluded themselves into

accepting the capacity of information power to lift the fog of

war remains to be seen. However, China’s ancient strategic

culture, which is deeply imbedded in contemporary

strategic thinking, will likely impact the future direction of

Chinese IW. More specifically, a combination of practical

considerations and strategic traditions will determine the

course and uniqueness of China’s IW program.

Notwithstanding the steady boosts in defense spending,

China’s military establishment still faces severe resource

constraints. In light of the economic uncertainty in the

coming years, China would not attempt or be able to

duplicate American efforts in IW. Moreover, Chinese

weakness in conventional capabilities vis-à-vis the United

States will force the PRC to focus on asymmetric strategies,

which might involve certain aspects of IW (although the

specifics remain unclear). In addition, Mao’s people’s war

tradition and Sun Tzu’s philosophy will likely exert both

conscious and subconscious influences on Chinese thinking

27
on IW. For example, denial and deception and the notion of

fighting from a position of weakness will undoubtedly

dominate much of the discourse. Regardless of which

elements of IW Beijing choose to exploit, the Chinese will

likely pursue their own brand of IW that could deviate

radically from Western conceptions and models. The

pursuit of a unique IW strategy, which would not likely be

well understood in the West, could be a perfect formula for

achieving surprise (or abysmal failure) against China’s

adversaries. 

How Different from American Thinking? The literature

suggests that Chinese strategists tend to conceptualize IW

in the broadest terms possible. Similar to U.S. thinking, the

Chinese expand IW to the psychological realm. However,

strategists broaden IW attacks beyond warfighting

purposes. They often discuss attacking the adversary’s

social, economic, and internal political structures.

According to one analyst, “The soul of informationized

warfare is to ‘subdue the enemy force without battle.’ Its

essence is to force the opponent to give up the wish to resist

and thereby to end confrontation and stop fighting by

ultimately attacking their perception and belief, using

information energy as the main means of action.”

70

 The

Chinese essentially hope to elevate IW to a higher level of

operational military art form. These strategists believe that

by tapping into the enemy’s thought processes, values, and

motives one can identify, manipulate, and reduce the

adversary’s will to resist and hence achieve victory without

actual combat. In concrete terms, IW attacks intended to

inflict pain on the adversary’s society might be employed to

impact public opinion and increase the political costs of

fighting against China (much like the use of strategic

airpower during World War II). The Chinese could direct IW

against America’s increasingly vulnerable and sprawling

critical infrastructure in order to complicate Washington’s

decisionmaking process. The Chinese could apply indirect

pressure on certain segments of the American population to

induce broader public panic in the hopes of reducing

28
Washington’s political will to act in the event of crisis. For

example, consider the potential impact of tainting processed

food by infiltrating the manufacturing process via

computers.

71 Whether the Chinese would take such action

without fear or in spite of potential American retaliation

and escalation will be the subject of analysis in the following

section.

In any case, it is clear that an assessment of Chinese IW

literature produces more questions than answers. Whether

the Chinese have reached the wrong conclusions on IW

within their unique political context remains unclear.

Whether certain aspects of the literature are intended to

mislead the outside world is equally unanswerable. The

environment of rapid change and innovation inherent to

information technologies compounds the uncertainties.

Moreover, China confronts the United States, its

designated potential adversary, who holds a dauntingly

tremendous lead. Chinese analysts are constantly

bombarded by the seemingly endless production of

American analysis on IW. The confluence of all these factors

may have shaped the sweepingly ambitious—and at times

seemingly unrealistic or naïve—analysis of IW among

Chinese strategists.

Assessing the Chinese IW Threat to the United

States.

Given the intense Chinese interest in IW, China will

likely devote substantial resources to studying the use of

and acquiring state-of-the-art information technologies. In

particular, China will seek capabilities that would help

gather, process, and exploit information on the battlefield to

establish an information-based military force. Command

and control systems, such as reconnaissance satellites and

surveillance systems will become important elements in

China’s force structure. Moreover, as a “latecomer” to the

information revolution, China may be able to reap the

hard-earned fruits of nations that pioneered IW warfare.

29
The diffusion and availability of technologies could allow

China to leapfrog generations of obsolescent technologies

within the Chinese force structure.

Beyond the technological implications, future

developments in IW could have broader effects on Chinese

policy and strategy. Unfortunately, predicting the future

path of Chinese IW remains a haphazard exercise. As noted

above, the current Chinese literature itself reveals a

yawning gap between theory and practice. Since China is

notorious for shrouding any shred of data on defense

capabilities in absolute secrecy, it is unclear how the

Chinese might apply newly acquired IW capabilities. This

level of uncertainty on when and how China would master

IW adds greater urgency to understanding Chinese

strategic thought on IW.

One of the enduring puzzles is how China might employ

IW in the event of crisis involving the United States. An

area that deserves close study is the apparent attraction

among Chinese strategists to IW as a preemptive weapon.

Chinese strategists uniformly recognize that they are likely

to fight from a position of weakness. Hence when a conflict

with a superior foe occurs, China must seek to achieve its

political objectives while precluding an actual clash of arms

that would likely result in defeat. The literature suggests

strongly that IW capabilities might provide the “silver

bullet” for such a scenario. In essence, these strategists are

exploring IW as a tool to preempt conflict by attacking and

crippling the enemy’s vital points (command and control

systems) in order to reduce the adversary’s will to fight at

the very outset of war. Again, this concept dovetails closely

with Sun Tzu’s dictum of winning without fighting and

Mao’s people’s war concept of overcoming the superior with

inferior forces.

Mulvenon argues that the Chinese obsession with IW as

a preemptive weapon pose the most worrisome and

unpredictable policy challenge for the United States. He

paints a stark scenario:

30
When one imagines scenarios in which the PLA would be

concerned with preemptively striking U.S. forces during the

deployment phase for early strategic victory, it is difficult to

avoid the obvious conclusion that the author is discussing a

Taiwan conflict. For the PLA, using IW against U.S.

information systems to degrade or even delay a deployment of

forces to Taiwan offers an attractive asymmetric strategy.

American forces are highly information-dependent, and rely

heavily on precisely coordinated logistics networks . . . If PLA

information operators using PCs were able to hack or crash

these systems, thereby delaying the arrival of a U.S. carrier

battle group to the theater, while simultaneously carrying out

a coordinated campaign of short-range ballistic missile

attacks, “fifth column,” and IW attacks against Taiwanese

critical infrastructure, then Taipei might be quickly brought

to its knees and forced to capitulate to Beijing.

72

Mulvenon notes that the incentives for employing such a

strategy are three-fold. First, the proliferation of

information technologies enables China to gain access to

and develop such capabilities in a relatively short period of

time, especially when compared to a full-fledged

conventional buildup. Second, IW negates the need to use

China’s precious few air and naval assets for an invasion

campaign or massive attack against Taiwan, both of which

would likely result in severe Chinese losses or failure for at

least the next 10 years. Finally, IW, if sophisticated enough,

could create adequate levels of plausible deniability.

Mulvenon concludes that, “IW may currently offer the PLA

some attractive asymmetric options, some of which may be

decisive in narrowly circumscribed situations [emphasis

added].”

73

Despite its theoretical appeal, preemption as an IW

strategy represents a double-edged sword. As Mulvenon

suggests, under certain circumstances, IW could lead to

decisive results. However, in the worst-case scenario,

preemption could be highly destabilizing and escalatory. As

Rattray argues, an escalatory response from the United

States is possible should the damage to U.S. critical

infrastructures prove to be extensive.

74

 Is it likely then, for

31
China to unleash an IW attack that could invite escalation

in kind? If Beijing does intend to preclude U.S. intervention

in a Taiwan crisis, it is entirely conceivable that China and

the United States might find themselves in a dangerous

tit-for-tat face off. To successfully preempt an opponent, the

strike must be decisive and overwhelming. Once such

powers of IW are unleashed in a preemptive attack, the

ability to control and calibrate forces becomes extremely

difficult. Indeed, de-escalation may not be an option once

the Chinese order such an IW attack. Decisiveness of this

kind requires almost near-perfect knowledge of the enemy

and a very high degree of confidence in the ability to

successfully destroy the adversary’s vital points (both

extremely questionable propositions). Should such a high

risk attack fail due to faulty information or prudent

anticipation on the part of the adversary, the enemy may

not be deterred and may respond with even greater force.

Rather than the deterrent effect expected from IW (much as

the Japanese planners of the surprise attack against Pearl

Harbor had hoped), a reckless application of information

operations could provoke massive retaliation.

The literature survey on Chinese views of IW and its

convergence with preemption also leads to some other

unsettling conclusions. Notably, the apparent belief that

information is a panacea in warfare could breed dangerous

attitudes. In the tradition of Sun Tzu, Chinese analysts of

IW assert that knowledge can be assembled together in a

rational and coherent manner that would produce

inevitable victory. The assumption that superior

information can overcome the fog of war could encourage the

Chinese to devise ambitious IW strategies that might

backfire terribly when employed. For example, confidence

in attaining accurate knowledge prior to war and the

emphasis on preplanning often leads to inflexibility. As

John Keegan persuasively argued, the faith in war plans

among the belligerents of World War I led to what he called

“a tragic and unnecessary conflict.”

75

 Those war plans

meticulously laid out a very specific course of action that

32
brooked little deviation. The underlying assumption was

that proper information and planning would determine the

outcome of wars. Indeed, all the plans anticipated quick

victories in a short war. The actual course of events led to

prolonged stalemate and mass slaughter. Europe’s hubris

at the time could similarly infect Chinese defense planners.

It is clear then, that the use of IW for preemptive

purposes could be highly escalatory and unstable in crisis

situations. The consequences of such a strategy could be

dangerously explosive, particularly in a conflict involving

the United States over a Taiwan crisis. This extreme

scenario of course assumes that the Chinese IW strategy

actually works. Beijing may also be equally unable to cope

with a massive and complete failure to achieve its political

objectives through IW. Given that an “IW Pearl Harbor”

remains untested and the means to assess damage are

underdeveloped and inherently difficult, it is entirely

possible that the attack would end in a pathetic fizzle.

China’s reliance on IW to conduct warfare at the expense of

other traditional capabilities could lead to a multitude of

unintended consequences.

If on the other hand, the Chinese are acutely aware of the

counter productive and possibly disastrous results of an IW

Pearl Harbor, they may be self-deterred from exercising

such an option. Is Chinese IW as an asymmetric threat

therefore a phantom menace? To what extent should the

uncertainty and ambiguity of the Chinese threat dictate

how the United States responds to China’s IW

developments? Examining and weighing the likelihood of

Beijing resorting to IW against the United States is

therefore a policy-relevant and extremely elusive task. Greg

Rattray’s formula for understanding strategic IW is a useful

model for assessing the Chinese IW threat to the United

States. Rattray states, “Despite the availability of

technological tools for digital warfare, the utility of

engaging in strategic IW for U.S. adversaries will vary

based on their political objectives, likely campaign

strategies, and willingness to risk retaliation and

33
escalation.”

76

 He outlines four conditions for achieving

success in strategic warfare: (1) offensive advantage; (2)

significant vulnerability of centers of gravity to attack; (3)

minimal prospects for retaliation and escalation; and (4)

identifiability and targetability of enemy vulnerabilities

and assessibility of damage inflicted. Rattray argues that

strategic IW can only reasonably achieve an offensive

advantage. Given the uncertainties surrounding the

probability of success in employing IW, the Chinese might

also be constrained by these considerations.

Does this mean that China is not likely to employ IW? A

Chinese decision to use IW will depend on Beijing’s

perceptions of the external security environment and

internal politics. As Rattray argues, the broader political

context is the central starting point for understanding IW.

Clearly, Beijing would not likely use IW to reinforce its

territorial sovereignty over Tibet. However, on an issue as

explosive as the fate of Taiwan, self-deterrence could come

under severe strain. Therefore, the United States cannot

assume that since the Chinese face similar strategic and

operational constraints in the use of IW that Beijing will be

dissuaded from taking a risky course of action. Indeed, if the

stakes are high enough, such as losing Taiwan and, in the

process, destroying the Communist Party’s legitimacy, the

Chinese might be more tolerant of failure and/or escalation.

If a desperate Chinese leadership is sufficiently convinced

that they no longer have anything to lose from taking action,

reliance on IW as a preemptive “use it or lose it” option may

not seem so unattractive or dangerous. While the

probability of China using strategic IW is low at present or

in the short-term, the political context may change

sufficiently in the future to warrant caution and

preparation on the part of the United States.

We’ve Only Just Begun.

The policy implications in this analysis are clearly less

than sanguine. However, it is important to note as a caveat

34
that the lack of reliable sources and the opaqueness of

China’s defense community preclude sufficient certainty on

the future direction of Chinese IW. As suggested above, the

Chinese may simply be following a familiar U.S.-Soviet

pattern of rhetorical theatrics. The Chinese are still

grappling with a nascent concept that even the most

developed countries are also struggling with. Moreover,

China’s capabilities are still too primitive to compete

against advanced military powers such as the United

States. In short, China will not be able to achieve the much

touted information dominance for some time to come.

However, it would be dangerous and naïve to simply

disregard the potential Chinese threat. Historically, the

concept of offensive IW has been a tightly held secret even

within the United States itself. The seemingly excessive

secrecy surrounding offensive capabilities has three root

causes. First, the United States kept this concept secret in

deference to the political sensitivities among allies. Second,

there were fears that touting offensive IW might engender

enmity on the part of adversaries in an act of self-fulfilling

prophesy. Third, as mentioned before, the frailties of

offensive and defensive IW strategies make them

vulnerable to countermeasures. Hence, even the most

transparent countries developing IW have been very

reluctant to reveal their strategies and capabilities. In other

words, the lack of evidence on IW has no bearing on whether

it exists or not or whether the country is proficient at it or

not.

77

 China is no exception.

As a final cautionary note, the oftentimes reflexive

response among some scholars to discount discussions of the

“China threat” as mere paranoia or hawkishness must be

tempered with some historical perspective. In many ways,

the post-Cold War period resembles the interwar

interregnum, during which military powers experimented

with new technologies, organizations, and doctrine. As

World War II approached, the balance of forces heavily

favored the Allied powers. The political will of the

leadership and the public mood in London and Paris had

35
shifted from reluctance to surprising enthusiasm to fight. In

contrast, Nazi Germany did not field the best or the most

advanced military hardware. Yet, the hand wringing,

bumbling generals led by a madman and backed by a

German public with little appetite for war unleashed the

blitzkrieg that would shatter the French and British forces

in less than 7 weeks. How could this have happened? In

Strange Victory, Ernest May argues convincingly that the

devastating defeat resulted from the Allied failure to

anticipate German plans and to appreciate the magnitude

of British/French miscalculations. He concludes:

In sum, the essential thread in the story of Germany’s victory

over France hangs on the imaginativeness of German war

planning and the corresponding lack of imaginitiveness on the

Allied side. Hitler and his generals perceived that the weakness

of their otherwise powerful enemies resided in habits and

routines that made their reaction times slow. They developed a

plan that capitalized on this weakness. French and British

leaders made no effort to understand how or why German

thinking might differ from theirs. They neglected to prepare for

the possibility of surprise, and, as German analysts and

planners predicted, they could not react promptly once events

began to be at odds with expectations.

78

The lesson from this analysis is that constant vigilance is

the only answer to avoiding ugly surprises. Further

analysis is clearly required but this preliminary study

suggests that China’s evolving attitudes toward IW could

pose an increasingly daunting and unpredictable challenge

for American policymakers.

ENDNOTES

1. James Adams, “Virtual Defense,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 3,

May/June 2001, pp. 100-101.

2. The Joint Staff, Enabling the Joint Vision, Washington, DC: The

U.S. Department of Defense, May 2000; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, Information Operations: A Strategy for Peace . . . The Decisive

Edge in War, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, March

1999, p. 3.

36
3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020,

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, June 2000, p. 28.

4. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010,

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, July 1997, p. 16.

5. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,

Communications, and Intelligence, Information Superiority: Making

the Joint Vision Happen, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense,

2000, p. 5.

6. Information Operations, pp. 10-11.

7. Kate Farris, “Chinese Views of Information Warfare,” Defense

Intelligence Journal, Vol. 10, No. 1, Winter 2001, p. 38.

8. Ibid., p. 37.

9. Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security

Environment, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press,

2000, pp. 3-61. Sponsored by Andrew Marshall’s Office of Net

Assessment, this landmark study is a comprehensive analysis and

synthesis of over 200 Chinese writings published from 1994-99. The

Chinese authors are mostly from prestigious government-funded

research institutes.

10. Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., The Revenge of the Melians:

Asymmetric Threats and the Next QDR, Washington, DC: Institute for

National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2000) 1-2.

11. Pillsbury, China Debates, p. 286.

12. June Teufel Dreyer, The PLA and The Kosovo Conflict, Carlisle

Barracks: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, May

2000, pp. 12-15.

13. Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, Best Truth:

Intelligence in the Information Age, New Haven: Yale University Press,

2000, pp. 14-15.

14. Martin Van Creveld, Command in War, Cambridge, MA:

Harvard University Press, 1985, p. 4.

15. Ibid., p. 5.

37
16. Liu Huaqing, “Unswervingly March Along the Road of Building

a Modern Army With Chinese Characteristics,” Jiefangjun Bao, August

6, 1993, in FBIS-CHI, November 20, 1996.

17. Wang Baocun, “Information Warfare in the Kosovo Conflict,”

Jiefangjun Bao, May 25, 1999, in FBIS-CHI, June 23, 1999; and Yao

Yunzhu, “Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Crisis Shows Need to

Strengthen PLA: Discussion of the Kosovo Crisis Among Experts and

Scholars,” Jiefangjun Bao, April 13, 1999, inFBIS-CHI, April 28, 1999.

18. James Mulvenon, “The PLA and Information Warfare,” in The

People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age, James Mulvenon and

Richard H. Yang, eds., Washington, DC: RAND, 1999, p. 178.

19. Pillsbury, China Debates, p. 264.

20. Ibid., p. 286.

21. Ch’en Huan, “The Third Military Revolution,” in Chinese Views

of Future Warfare, Michael Pillsbury, ed., Washington, DC: National

Defense University Press, 1997, p. 389.

22. Hai Lung and Chang Feng, “Chinese Military Studies

Information Warfare, Kuang Chiao Ching, January 16, 1996, in

FBIS-CHI, February 21, 1996, pp. 33-34.

23. You Ji, “The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Evolution of

China’s Strategic Thinking,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, No. 21,

December 1999, p. 351.

24. Michael Pillsbury, “Chinese Views of Future Warfare,” in

China’s Military Faces the Future, James R. Lilley and David

Shambaugh, eds., Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute,

1999, p. 69.

25. John Arquilla and Solomon M. Karmel, “Welcome to the

Revolution . . . in Chinese Military Affairs,” Defense Analysis, Vol. 13,

No. 3, December 1997, p. 259.

26. Wang Baocun and Li Fei, “Information Warfare,” in Chinese

Views of Future Warfare, Michael Pillsbury, ed., Washington, DC:

National Defense University Press, 1997, p. 328.

27. Mulvenon, p. 180.

28. According to Joint Vision 2010, information superiority is

defined as: “the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an

38
uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an

adversary’s ability to do the same.”

29. Huang Youfu, Zhang Bibo, and Zhang Song, “New Subjects of

Study Brought About by Information Warfare,” Jiefangjun Bao,

November 11, 1997, in FBIS-CHI, December 20, 1997, p. 3.

30. Ibid.

31. Shen Weiguang, “Checking Information Warfare—Epoch

Mission of Intellectual Military,” Jiefangjun Bao, February 2, 1999, in

FBIS-CHI, February 15, 1999, p. 5.

32. Ibid.

33. “Where Should Attention be Focused in Preparing for Military

Struggle,” Jiefangjun Bao, July 25, 2000, in FBIS-CHI, July 25, 2000, p.

3.

34. Chang Mengxiong, “Information Intensified—A Mark of 21st

Century Weapons and Military Units,” Guoji Hangkong, March 5, 1995,

in FBIS-CHI, March 5 1995, p. 5.

35. Chong-Pin Lin, “Info Warfare Latecomer,” Defense News, April

12, 1999, p. 23.

36. In the United States, the National Defense University (NDU),

the service schools, and the command and staff colleges all teach the Art

of War as a part of the core curriculum. See NDU course description of

Fundamentals of Military Thought and Strategy at

http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/nwc/AY00/5602SYL/Topic10.html.

Recently, the Institute for National Strategic Studies at NDU dedicated

its 1997-98 annual writing competition on information warfare to Sun

Tzu. See introduction to the research competition at

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/siws/intro.html. 

37. Wang Pufeng, “The Challenge of Information Warfare,” in

Chinese Views of Future Warfare, Michael Pillsbury, ed., Washington,

DC: National Defense University Press, 1997, pp. 322-323.

38. Yuan Bangen, “Setting Eyes on Development, Stepping Up

Research in Information Warfare Theories and Construction of Digital

Forces and Digital Battlefields,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, February 20,

1999, in FBIS-CHI, July 6, 1999, p. 4.

39. Wang Baocun and Li Fei, p. 320.

39
40. Xie Guang, “Year-end Report: Wars Under High-Tech,” Renmin

Ribao, December 27, 1997, in FBIS-CHI, January 30, 2000, p. 2.

41. Wang Baocun and Li Fei, p. 332.

42. Wang Baocun, “A Preliminary Analysis of Information

Warfare,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, November 11, 1997, in FBIS-CHI,

March 29, 1998, p. 3.

43. Major General Dai Qingmin, “Innovating and Developing Views

on Information Operations,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, August 20, 2000,

in FBIS-CHI, September 11, 2000, p. 10.

44. Zeng Sunan and Zhu Xiaoning, “Virtual Reality: An Important

Medium in Theoretical Innovation,” Jiefangjun Bao, May 16, 2000, in

FBIS-CHI, May 16, 2000.

45. Xu Hezhen, “Focus on Psychological War Under the Background

of Larger Military Strategy,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, October 20, 2000,

in FBIS-CHI, December 11, 2000, p. 11.

46. Xu Dexin, “Military Photo-electronics Technology,” Kexue

Shibao, June 6, 1999, in FBIS-CHI, September 14, 1999, pp. 1-3.

47. Zhang Zhizhong, “Remote Sensing Application Techniques,”

Huokong Leida Jishu, March 1, 2000, inFBIS-CHI, October 16, 2000, p.

4.

48. “Experts Discuss Military Mapping Support in Information

Era,” Jiefangjun Bao, May 17, 2000, in FBIS-CHI, May 17, 2000, pp.

1-5.

49. Mulvenon, p. 182.

50. Su Enze, “Logical Concepts of Information Warfare,” Jiefangjun

Bao, March 19, 1996.

51. Mulvenon, p. 181.

52. Nikolai Sokov, Russian Strategic Modernization: The Past and

Future, New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000, p. 34.

53. Michael Pillsbury, China Debates, No. xv, cites Andrew W.

Marshall, “A Program to Improve Analytic Methods Related to Strategic

Forces,” Policy Sciences, November 1982, p. 48.

40
54. Greg Rattray, Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace, Cambridge, MA:

MIT Press, 2001, pp. 8-14.

55. Ibid., pp. 314-342.

56. Jim Hoagland, “Creating a New Tone,” Washington Post, April

29, 2001, p. B-7.

57. See Admiral William Owens and Ed Offley, Lifting the Fog of

War, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, April 2000; or Joseph S. Nye

and William A. Owens, “America’s Information Edge,” Foreign Affairs,

Vol. 75, No. 2, March/April 1996, pp. 20-36. See also Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020, Washington, DC: U.S.

Department of Defense, June 2000; The Joint Staff, Enabling the Joint

Vision, Washington, DC: The U.S. Department of Defense, May 2000;

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Information Operations: A

Strategy for Peace . . . The Decisive Edge in War, Washington, DC: U.S.

Department of Defense, March 1999; Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, Information

Superiority: Making the Joint Vision Happen, Washington, DC: U.S.

Department of Defense, 2000; and The Joint Staff, J-6, Information

Assurance through Defense in Depth, Washington, DC: U.S.

Department of Defense, February 2000.

58. Cui Shizeng, “Reading the US Military’s Joint Vision 2020,”

Jiefangjun Bao, August 23, 2000, in FBIS-CHI, August 23, 2000, p. 2.

59. Matthew J. Von Bencke, The Politics of Space, Boulder, CO:

Westview Press, 1997, pp. 12, 16, 47, 65.

60. Christoph Bluth, Soviet Strategic Arms Policy Before SALT,

Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 51-58.

61. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, Beijing:

PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999.

62. John Pomfret, “Rewriting the Rules of War: Two Colonels

Propose Terrorism, Drugs and Computer Viruses as Strategic

Weapons,” Washington Post, August 16, 1999, p. 15.

63. Kao Chienh-chien, “What Limits has ‘Unrestricted Warfare’

Exceeded,” Ta Kung Pao, June 21, 2000, in FBIS-CHI, June 21, 2000;

and Gao Yan, “ Dangerous ‘Unrestricted Warfare’: And What to Make of

the Current International Order and Rules,” Ta Kung Pao, March 13,

2000, in FBIS-CHI, March 13, 2000.

64. Owens, Lifting the Fog of War, p. 100.

41
65. Pillsbury, China Debates, pp. 268-275.

66. Dreyer, p. 15.

67. Victor A. DeMarines, “Exploiting the Internet Revolution,” in

Keeping the Edge Managing Defense for the Future, Ashton B. Carter

and John P. White, eds., Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and

International Affairs, 2000, pp. 91-92.

68. Ibid., pp. 92-93.

69. Arquilla and Karmel, p. 266.

70. Wang Baocun, “New Military Revolution in the World,”

Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, May 4, 1999, in FBIS-CHI, August 23, 1999, p.

6. 

71. William C. Triplett II, “Potential Applications of PLA

Information Warfare Capabilities to Critical Infrastructures,” in

People’s Liberation Army After Next, Susan M. Puska, ed., Carlisle

Barracks: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2000, p.

92.

72. Mulvenon, pp. 183-185.

73. Ibid., p. 185.

74. Rattray, p. 477.

75. John Keegan, The First World War, New York: Alfred A. Knopf,

1999, pp. 24-47.

76. Rattray, p. 476.

77. Triplett, p. 80.

78. Ernest R. May, Strange Victory: Hitler’s Conquest of France,

New York: Hill and Wang, 2000, p. 460.

42
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Commandant

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STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

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Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

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