NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

CHRISTOPHER SANTILLANES CEJA, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 21-30178 

D.C. Nos. 

1:19-cr-00141-SPW-1 

1:19-cr-00141-SPW 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Montana

Susan P. Watters, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted July 5, 2022

Seattle, Washington

Before: CLIFTON and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and CHEN,** District Judge.

Christopher Ceja appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss 

the indictment and motion to suppress. Because there is no Speedy Trial Act or 

Fourth Amendment violation, we affirm.

We review de novo a district court’s application of the Speedy Trial Act. 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Edward M. Chen, United States District Judge for the 

Northern District of California, sitting by designation.

FILED

JUL 18 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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United States v. Medina, 524 F.3d 974, 982 (9th Cir. 2008). In reviewing a district 

court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review the legal conclusions de novo and 

factual findings for clear error. United States v. Basher, 629 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th 

Cir. 2011). 

1. The district court properly denied Ceja’s motion to dismiss for a Speedy 

Trial Act violation. The Speedy Trial Act requires that a defendant’s trial generally 

start within 70 days of the filing of the indictment or information. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3161(c)(1). Pretrial motions requiring hearings automatically pause the clock 

“through the conclusion of the hearing on . . . such motion.” Id. § 3161(h)(1)(D); 

United States v. Tinklenberg, 563 U.S. 647, 655 (2011).

Ceja argues that more than 70 days elapsed because the district court 

improperly excluded 26 additional days between August 14, 2020, and October 15, 

2020. Ceja contends that this time period should be included in the Speedy Trial 

calculation because the delays were attributable to the government or the court. But 

Ceja filed a motion to suppress on June 15, 2020. The filing of the motion had the 

effect of pausing the clock while the motion was under the advisement of the court. 

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D), (H). See Medina, 524 F.3d at 979 (explaining that 

pretrial motions which require a hearing automatically pause the clock even when 

the delay is not “reasonably necessary”). The clock was thus paused between June 

15, 2020 and December 2, 2020 (30 days after the hearing on the suppression 
3 

motion). So the district court correctly calculated that only 69 days elapsed after 

Ceja’s arraignment and did not err in denying his motion to dismiss based on a

Speedy Trial Act violation.

2. The district court did not err in denying Ceja’s motion to suppress evidence. 

Police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Ceja’s car based on two independent 

grounds: (1) violation of drug trafficking laws, and (2) violation of a traffic 

regulation. Police officers had “specific, articulable facts” that Ceja’s car carried 

drugs based on information from a confidential informant. United States v. MonteroCamargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Other evidence 

corroborated the informant’s information. The corroborated evidence provided 

“objective and reasonable inferences” for a “particularized suspicion” to stop the 

car. Id. (emphasis omitted); see also Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 326, 331–32 (1990) 

(holding that an investigatory stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment when an 

anonymous tip was significantly corroborated). 

A police officer also witnessed Ceja committing a traffic violation and so Ceja 

could be stopped based on that violation alone. See Whren v. United States, 517 

U.S. 806, 810 (1996) (holding that “the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable 

where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has 

occurred”).

Ceja argues that the traffic stop was unlawfully prolonged because the traffic 
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citation and the drug investigation were not conducted simultaneously. But he cites

no authority requiring the drug investigation to be conducted at the same time as the 

traffic stop. Indeed, “[w]e [have] recognize[d] that an officer may prolong a traffic 

stop if the prolongation itself is supported by independent reasonable suspicion.” 

United States v. Evans, 786 F.3d 779, 788 (9th Cir. 2015). Here, since we conclude 

that independent reasonable suspicion supported both the traffic stop and the drug 

investigation, there was no unlawful prolongation of the stop. 

Because none of Ceja’s other arguments supports suppressing the drug 

evidence, the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.

AFFIRMED.