FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

July 12, 2011

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. No. 09-1533

EDWARD BENITO ARMIJO,

Defendant - Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

(D.C. NO. 1:09-CR-00247-PAB-1)

Jessica E. Yates (Neil Peck with her on the briefs), Snell & Wilmer L.L.P.,

Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.

James C. Murphy, Assistant United States Attorney (David M. Gaouette, United

States Attorney, with him on the brief), Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, HOLLOWAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
1

Armijo was sentenced pursuant to the 2008 version of the Sentencing

Guidelines. Unless otherwise noted, all further references to the Guidelines are to

the 2008 version.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Edward Benito Armijo pleaded guilty to a single count of being a felon

illegally in possession of a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The Presentence

Investigation Report (“PSR”) concluded Armijo’s base offense level was twentyfour because he had two prior felony convictions for crimes of violence. U.S.S.G.

§ 2K2.1(a)(2) (2008)1

 (setting base offense level of twenty-four for unlawful

possession of a firearm by a defendant with two previous felony convictions for

crimes of violence); id. § 4B1.2(a) (defining crime of violence). In support of the

application of § 2K2.1(a)(2), the PSR identified Armijo’s 1998 felony menacing

conviction, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-206, and his 2002 manslaughter conviction,

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-104(a). Armijo objected to the application of

§ 2K2.1(a)(2), asserting neither his felony menacing conviction nor his

manslaughter conviction constituted a crime of violence. The district court

rejected Armijo’s objections, concluding both predicate felonies were crimes of

violence for purposes of § 2K2.1(a)(2).

Armijo asserts the district court erred in treating his Colorado convictions

as crimes of violence for purposes of § 2K2.1(a)(2). Furthermore, for the first

time on appeal, he argues the district court erred in considering his felony

menacing conviction for the additional reason that the conviction is stale. See
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U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.10 (providing that for purposes of § 2K2.1(a)(2) “use

only those felony convictions that receive criminal history points under

§ 4A1.1(a), (b), or (c)”); id. § 4A1.2(e) (providing that prior convictions not

exceeding “one year and one month” that were not “imposed within ten years of

the defendant’s commencement of the instant offense” are not counted for

purposes of § 4A1.1); id. § 4A1.1 cmt. n.3 (same). Exercising jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), this court concludes

Armijo’s manslaughter conviction is not a crime of violence as that term is

defined in the Guidelines. Armijo’s felony menacing conviction, on the other

hand, is a crime of violence for purposes of the Guidelines. Because this matter

must be remanded for resentencing, and because the facts surrounding the

sentencing proceedings on the felony menacing conviction in Colorado state court

are not fully developed, we decline to resolve whether Armijo’s menacing

conviction is stale and thus not to be considered in calculating Armijo’s base

offense level. Instead, that matter can be fully adjudicated on remand to the

district court. Accordingly, we remand this matter to the district court to

conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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II. ANALYSIS

This court reviews sentences for reasonableness under a deferential abuseof-discretion standard. United States v. Sayad, 589 F.3d 1110, 1116 (10th Cir.

2009). “Reasonableness review is a two-step process comprising a procedural

and a substantive component.” United States v. Verdin-Garcia, 516 F.3d 884, 895

(10th Cir. 2008). For its sentencing decision to be procedurally reasonable, a

district court must, inter alia, correctly compute the applicable Guidelines range. 

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). “Review for substantive

reasonableness focuses on whether the length of the sentence is reasonable given

all the circumstances of the case in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a).” United States v. Friedman, 554 F.3d 1301, 1307 (10th Cir. 2009)

(quotation omitted). Each of the issues Armijo raises on appeal implicates only

the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. Accordingly, this court focuses

exclusively on the question whether the district court erred in calculating

Armijo’s advisory Guidelines range

A. Crime of Violence

Armijo contends the district court erred in concluding his Colorado state

felony menacing conviction and his Colorado state manslaughter conviction are

crimes of violence for purposes of § 2K2.1(a)(2). This court reviews de novo the

district court’s conclusion that Armijo’s Colorado state felony convictions

constitute crimes of violence for purposes of the Guidelines. United States v.
2

If, on the other hand, Armijo “committed any part of the instant offense

subsequent to sustaining one felony conviction of either a crime of violence or a

controlled substance offense,” his base offense level is 20. U.S.S.G.

§ 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). Assuming neither of Armijo’s prior Colorado state felony

convictions counts as a crime of violence, his base offense level is 14. Id.

§ 2K2.1(a)(6).

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Vigil, 334 F.3d 1215, 1218 (10th Cir. 2003). In interpreting the Guidelines, this

court looks “at the language in the guideline itself, as well as at the interpretative

and explanatory commentary to the guideline provided by the Sentencing

Commission.” United States v. McConnell, 605 F.3d 822, 824 (10th Cir. 2010)

(quotation omitted). “Commentary to the Guidelines is authoritative unless it

violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly

erroneous reading of, that guideline.” Id. (quotations omitted).

Section 2K2.1(a)(2) establishes a base offense level of twenty-four “if the

defendant committed any part of the instant offense subsequent to sustaining at

least two felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled

substance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2).2

 “‘Crime of violence’ has the

meaning given that term in § 4B1.2(a) and Application Note 1 of the Commentary

to § 4B1.2.” Id. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.1. Section 4B1.2, in turn, defines “crime of

violence” as follows:

(a) The term “crime of violence” means any offense under

federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a

term exceeding one year, that—

(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or

threatened use of physical force against the

person of another, or
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(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or

extortion, involves use of explosives, or

otherwise involves conduct that presents a

serious potential risk of physical injury to

another.

Id. § 4B1.2(a). The application notes to § 4B1.2(a) further provide that 

“Crime of violence” includes murder, manslaughter, kidnapping,

aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses, robbery, arson, extortion,

extortionate extension of credit, and burglary of a dwelling. Other

offenses are included as “crimes of violence” if (A) that offense has

as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical

force against the person of another, or (B) the conduct set forth ( i.e.,

expressly charged) in the count of which the defendant was convicted

involved use of explosives (including any explosive material or

destructive device) or, by its nature, presented a serious potential risk

of physical injury to another.

Id. § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1.

“In determining whether a conviction qualifies as a crime of violence under

§ 4B1.2, we apply a categorical approach that looks to the words of the statute

and judicial interpretations of it, rather than to the conduct of any particular

defendant convicted of that crime.” McConnell, 605 F.3d at 825 (quotations

omitted). “As the Supreme Court recently explained, under the categorical

approach we consider the offense generically, that is to say, we examine it in

terms of how the law defines the offense and not in terms of how an individual

offender might have committed it on a particular occasion.” United States v.

Rooks, 556 F.3d 1145, 1147 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). If the criminal

statute setting out the predicate felony “is ambiguous, or broad enough to
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encompass both violent and nonviolent crimes, we employ the so-called ‘modified

categorical approach’ which allows analysis of certain records of the prior

proceeding, such as the charging documents, the judgment, any plea thereto, and

findings by the sentencing court.” United States v. Charles, 576 F.3d 1060, 1067

(10th Cir. 2009) (quotations and citation omitted). Review under the modified

categorical approach “does not involve a subjective inquiry into the facts of the

case, but rather its purpose is to determine which part of the statute was charged

against the defendant and, thus, which portion of the statute to examine on its

face.” Id. (quotation omitted).

1. Felony Menacing

According to Colorado law, “[a] person commits the crime of menacing if,

by any threat or physical action, he or she knowingly places or attempts to place

another person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.” Colo. Rev. Stat.

§ 18-3-206. Menacing is a felony if it is accomplished by the use or threatened

use of a “deadly weapon.” Id. Colorado defines the term “deadly weapon”

broadly to include not only guns, knives, and bludgeons, but also “[a]ny other

weapon, device, instrument, material, or substance, whether animate or

inanimate.” Id. § 18-1-901(e).

As Armijo recognizes, this court previously concluded Colorado felony

menacing is categorically a violent felony for purposes of the Armed Career
3

The definition of “violent felony” under the first-prong of the ACCA and

“crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a) are nearly identical. Compare 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (defining “violent felony” as “any crime punishable by

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . that . . . has as an element the

use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of

another), with U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) (defining “crime of violence” as “any

offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term

exceeding one year, that . . . has as an element the use, attempted use, or

threatened use of physical force against the person of another”). Accordingly,

this court has looked to interpretations of the ACCA to guide our interpretation of

§ 4B1.2(a). United States v. Charles, 576 F.3d 1060, 1068 n.2 (10th Cir. 2009)

(“[T]he applicable Guidelines definition of a crime of violence[] is almost

identical to the ACCA’s definition of violent felony. Accordingly, we have said

. . . the Supreme Court’s analysis under the ACCA applies equally to the

sentencing guidelines.” (quotations and citations omitted)); see also United States

v. Williams, 559 F.3d 1143, 1147 n.7 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Dennis,

551 F.3d 986, 988-89 (10th Cir. 2008). Such an approach makes perfect sense

given that § 4B1.2’s current definition of crime of violence was “derived from 18

U.S.C. § 924(e)”. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 268.

-8-

Criminal Act (“ACCA”).3 United States v. Herron, 432 F.3d 1127, 1138 (10th

Cir. 2005). Herron recognized that the use-of-force element of Colorado felony

menacing is symmetrical with the ACCA’s use-of-force requirement:

[The defendant’s felony menacing] convictions were

undoubtedly for violent felonies. He “knowingly place[d] or

attempt[ed] to place another person in fear of imminent serious

bodily injury . . . by the use of a deadly weapon.” [Colo. Rev. Stat.

§ 18-3-206]. This conduct easily satisfies the requirement of “the

threatened use of physical force against the person of another,” under

the ACCA. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). “Knowingly placing

someone in fear . . . by the use of a deadly weapon” certainly

constitutes threatening someone. [The defendant] argues that

menacing cannot be a violent felony because under Colorado law the

term deadly weapon is defined so broadly as to include a fist, foot, or

whiskey bottle, so that menacing includes conduct such as telling

someone over the telephone “that one intends to punch or kick them

the next day, or within the next few hours, depending on the

interpretation of the phrase ‘imminent.’” But this observation is
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beside the point. A threat to kick or strike someone comes within the

ACCA definition regardless of whether a foot or bottle is a deadly

weapon.

Id. (citation omitted).

Armijo argues, however, that Herron does not control the outcome of this

appeal because it failed to recognize felony menacing could be committed through

the use of a material or substance such as poison or pathogen. See Colo. Rev.

Stat. § 18-1-901(e) (defining “deadly weapon” to include, inter alia, a “material[]

or substance, whether animate or inanimate”); People v. Shawn, 107 P.3d 1033,

1036 (Colo. App. 2004) (holding that HIV is a deadly weapon for purposes of the

Colorado felony menacing statute). In particular, Armijo asserts this court’s postHerron decision in United States v. Rodriguez-Enriquez, 518 F.3d 1191, 1195

(10th Cir. 2008), makes clear that “injury effected by chemical action on the body

(as in poisoning or exposure to hazardous chemicals) should not be described as

caused by physical force.”

We conclude Armijo’s reliance on Rodriguez-Enriquez is unavailing. 

Given that this court has concluded analysis under the ACCA applies equally to

§ 4B1.2(a), Charles, 576 F.3d at 1068 n.2, we specifically adopt the reasoning in

Herron to hold Colorado felony menacing is categorically a crime of violence

under § 4B1.2(a)(1). This is true despite the inclusion of poisons and pathogens

in Colorado’s definition of deadly weapon. In so holding, this court joins the

Eighth and Ninth Circuits in rejecting arguments regarding Colorado felony
4

Section 2L1.2, the Guideline relating to certain immigration offenses, also

utilizes the term “crime of violence” and defines it as, inter alia, an “offense

under federal, state, or local law that has as an element the use, attempted use, or

threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2

(continued...)

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menacing identical to those raised by Armijo on appeal. United States v.

Melchor-Meceno, 620 F.3d 1180, 1185-86 (9th Cir. 2010) (“One cannot

knowingly place another in fear of being poisoned [under Colorado law] without

threatening to force the poison on the victim.”); United States v. Forrest, 611

F.3d 908, 910-11 (8th Cir. 2010) (“A threat that creates a fear ‘of imminent

serious bodily injury’ is a threat of physical force.”).

Armijo asserts the Colorado Court of Appeals decision in Shawn stands for

the broad proposition that poisons or pathogens always satisfy the use-of-adeadly-weapon element of Colorado felony menacing, no matter how the poison

or pathogen is used or threatened to be used. He also asserts this court’s decision

in Rodriguez-Enriquez stands for the broad proposition that use, or threatened

use, of a poison or pathogen can never satisfy the physical force requirement of

§ 4B1.2(a)(1). Thus, according to Armijo, Colorado felony menacing is

categorically not a crime of violence. Armijo’s descriptions of the holdings of

these cases are less than accurate.

This court in Rodriguez-Enriquez was tasked with deciding whether the

Colorado crime of assault two (drugging a victim) is a crime of violence for

purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii).4

 518 F.3d at 1192. A person commits
4

(...continued)

cmt. n.1.(B)(iii). This aspect of § 2L1.2’s definition of crime of violence is

identical to the definition of crime of violence set out in § 4B1.2(a)(1).

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the crime of assault two (drugging a victim) if “[f]or a purpose other than lawful

medical or therapeutic treatment, he intentionally causes stupor, unconsciousness,

or other physical or mental impairment or injury to another person by

administering to him, without his consent, a drug, substance, or preparation

capable of producing the intended harm.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-203(1)(e). 

Importantly, there is no requirement that a drug or poison be delivered to the

victim through the use of physical force; instead, the surreptitious administration

of the substance through drink or food satisfies the elements of Colorado assault

two (drugging a victim). Rodriguez-Enriquez, 518 F.3d at 1194-95. Accordingly,

Rodriguez-Enriquez held as follows:

Turning to the statute at issue in this case, Colo. Rev. Stat.

Ann. § 18-3-203(1)(e), it criminalizes harm caused by the

nonconsensual administration of “a drug, substance, or preparation.”

The harm is caused by chemical action on the victim’s body.

Although there is no doubt that one could use physical force to drug

someone, as by forcing a drink down the victim’s throat, drugging by

surreptitious means does not involve the use of physical force.

Therefore, we hold that assault two (drugging a victim) is not a crime

of violence under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii).

Id. at 1195.

Unlike the statute at issue in Rodriguez-Enriquez, Colorado felony

menacing requires as an element the use or threatened use of physical force. 

Colo. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-206. This is true even if the deadly weapon in question is
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a poison or pathogen. In Shawn, the Colorado Court of Appeals determined that

HIV is a deadly weapon. 107 P.3d at 1036. It began by noting that “any object

or substance can be a deadly weapon within the meaning of [Colorado law] if it is

used in a manner capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.” Id. at

1035. Nevertheless, “the object or substance must be used or intended to be used

as a weapon.” Id. Shawn next noted that “the dangers of HIV are widely known”

and the virus is “capable of causing injury or harm to another person.” Id. at

1036. Finally, the Colorado Court of Appeals concluded a reasonable jury could

find the defendant’s statement that he was “HIV positive” during the course of a

physical altercation was a threat of imminent serious bodily injury through the

use of a deadly weapon. Id. at 1035-36. In reaching that conclusion, however,

the court “emphasize[d] that defendant made his menacing statement indicating an

intent to harm during a physical altercation.” Id. at 1036; see also id. at 1035

(“The victim . . . testified that defendant scratched and pinched the victim on both

arms with his fingernails; defendant broke the skin on the victim’s right arm;

defendant stated, ‘I’m HIV positive, let go of me, let go of me’; and defendant

repeated the assertion that he was HIV positive.”).

Thus, an examination of Rodriguez-Enriquez and Shawn refutes Armijo’s

broad assertion that this court can no longer consider Colorado felony menacing

as categorically a crime of violence because poisons and pathogens qualify as

deadly weapons under Colorado law. Instead, Rodriguez-Enriquez stands for the
5

The conclusion Armijo’s Colorado felony menacing conviction is

categorically a crime of violence does not fully resolve whether the district court

erred in utilizing the conviction to calculate his offense level. As set out more

fully below, Armijo also argues the district court plainly erred in considering the

felony menacing conviction because it is stale. See infra Section II.B.

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limited proposition that a Colorado provision criminalizing the surreptitious

drugging of a victim does not involve the use of physical force. 318 F.3d at 1195. 

Shawn stands for the limited proposition that a threat to infect the victim with a

potentially deadly virus during the course of a physical attack satisfies the

elements of Colorado felony menacing. Neither of these cases casts any doubt on

this court’s reasoning in Herron that led to the conclusion Colorado felony

menacing is a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA. 432 F.3d at 1138. 

Because this court looks to interpretations of the ACCA to guide our

interpretation of § 4B1.2(a), Charles, 576 F.3d at 1068 n.2, we thus conclude

Herron compels the determination Colorado felony menacing is a crime of

violence for purposes of § 4B1.2(a)(1). Accordingly, the district court correctly

resolved that Armijo’s Colorado felony menacing conviction is categorically a

crime of violence.5
6

Alternatively, a person commits manslaughter in Colorado if he

“intentionally causes or aids another person to commit suicide.” Colo. Rev. Stat.

§ 18-3-104(1)(b). This provision is not at issue in this case as the parties agree

Armijo was convicted under § 18-3-104(1)(a).

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2. Manslaughter

In Colorado, a person commits manslaughter if he “recklessly causes the

death of another person.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-104(1)(a).6

 To prove a charge

of manslaughter, “the prosecution must show that the defendant’s conduct caused

the death of another and that the defendant: 1) consciously disregarded 2) a

substantial and 3) unjustifiable risk that he would 4) cause the death of another.” 

People v. Hall, 999 P.2d 207, 217 (Colo. 2000) (emphasis omitted).

At sentencing, Armijo asserted Colorado’s version of manslaughter is not a

crime of violence for purposes of § 4B1.2(a) because it is not an intentional or

purposeful crime. Armijo relied on this court’s decision in United States v.

Zuniga-Soto for the proposition that a crime with a mens rea of mere recklessness

is not a crime of violence for purposes of the Guidelines. 527 F.3d 1110, 1123-24

(10th Cir. 2008). In response, the United States asserted the inclusion of

manslaughter in application note 1 to § 4B1.2 was definitive. The United States

relied on United States v. Barraza-Ramos for the proposition a felony

automatically qualifies as a crime of violence if it is specifically enumerated in

the application notes to a Guideline. 550 F.3d 1246, 1248-49 (10th Cir. 2008). 

The district court adopted the position advanced by the United States and
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concluded Colorado’s version of manslaughter, despite its lack of an element of

intent or purpose, constitutes a crime of violence because it is a crime delineated

in the commentary to § 4B1.2.

This issue comes before the court in a somewhat unusual posture. In

arguing Armijo’s Colorado manslaughter conviction is a crime of violence for

purposes of § 4B1.2(a), the United States neither cites to nor mentions the

language of the Guideline. That is, the United States does not contend Colorado’s

version of manslaughter “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened

use of physical force against the person of another.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). 

Likewise, the United States does not contend Colorado’s version of manslaughter

“is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or

otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury

to another.” Id. § 4B1.2(a)(2). Instead, the United States focuses exclusively on

the fact that the term “manslaughter” is listed as a qualifying crime in application

note 1 to § 4B1.2. The reason for the United States’s approach is clear: in

interpreting the language of, or language identical to that used in § 4B1.2(a), this

court has specifically held that only those crimes with a mens rea of intent or

purpose qualify as crimes of violence.

For instance, in Zuniga-Soto, this court analyzed whether assault on a

public servant in violation of the Texas penal code was a crime of violence for

purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. 527 F.3d at 1114. To qualify as a crime of
7

This court has reached the same conclusion regarding identical language in

the ACCA. United States v. Ramon Silva, 608 F.3d 663, 672-73 (10th Cir. 2010)

(holding “apprehension causing aggravated assault” under New Mexico law is a

violent felony because it is an intentional or purposeful crime that has as an

element the use or threatened use of physical force against the person of another).

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violence for purposes of § 2L1.2, the Texas assault crime had to have “as an

element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the

person of another.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii); Zuniga-Soto, 527 F.3d at

1115. This language is identical to the first of the two alternate definitions of

crime of violence set out in § 4B1.2(a). Compare U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt.

n.1(B)(iii), with id. § 4B1.2(a)(1). Relying on numerous Supreme Court and

circuit court authorities, Zuniga-Soto held unequivocally that “a mens rea of

recklessness does not satisfy use of physical force requirement under § 2L1.2’s

definition of ‘crime of violence.’” 527 F.3d at 1124 (collecting cases).7

Likewise, this court has specifically held that the residual clause of the second

definition of crime of violence set out in § 4B1.2(a)(2) (i.e., “conduct that

presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another”) “is intended to

reach purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct rather than merely negligent or

reckless acts.” United States v. Williams, 559 F.3d 1143, 1148 (10th Cir. 2009)

(holding battery on a police officer under Oklahoma law is a crime of violence);

see also McConnell, 605 F.3d at 827 (concluding Kansas crime of fleeing and

eluding a police officer is a crime of violence for purposes of § 4B1.2(a)(2)

because it involves purposeful, violent, and aggressive behavior); United States v.
8

This court has reached the same conclusion regarding identical language in

the ACCA. United States v. Ford, 613 F.3d 1263, 1272 (10th Cir. 2010)

(concluding criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied building or vehicle is a

violent felony under the ACCA’s residual clause “because it involves purposeful,

violent, and aggressive conduct”).

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Wise, 597 F.3d 1141, 1144-47 (10th Cir. 2010) (reaching same conclusion

regarding Utah crime of failure to stop at command of a police officer).8

 Other

circuits have similarly held that only crimes involving purposeful or intentional

behavior qualify as crimes of violence for purposes of § 4B1.2(a)’s residual

clause. See, e.g., United States v. Craig, 630 F.3d 717, 724-25 (8th Cir. 2011);

United States v. Ruvalcaba, 627 F.3d 218, 224-25 (6th Cir. 2010); United States

v. Coronado, 603 F.3d 706, 708 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. McDonald, 592

F.3d 808, 811 (7th Cir. 2010).

Perhaps recognizing, for those reasons set out above, that Colorado’s

version of manslaughter does not fall within either of the two definitions of crime

of violence set out in the text of § 4B1.2(a), the United States argues Armijo’s

manslaughter conviction is a crime of violence simply because manslaughter is a

listed crime in application note 1 to § 4B1.2. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1 (“‘Crime

of violence’ includes murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault,

forcible sex offenses, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of credit,

and burglary of a dwelling.”). Acknowledging Colorado’s choice in terminology
9

This acknowledgment represents a substantial deviation from the approach

advocated by the United States before the district court. Before the district court,

the United States argued the mere fact Colorado labeled the crime

“manslaughter,” coupled with application note 1 listing “manslaughter” as a crime

of violence definitively resolved the matter.

10This analytical approach is derived from the Supreme Court’s decision in

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). In Taylor, the Court undertook to

define the term “burglary” in the ACCA. 495 U.S. at 577. The Court observed

that the various states punish identical criminal conduct under different

definitions. Id. at 591. To avoid unwarranted disparities in the application of

federal law, the Court held that terminology in the ACCA “must have some

uniform definition independent of the labels employed by the various States’

criminal codes.” Id. at 592. The Court further concluded Congress “meant by

‘burglary’ the generic sense in which the term is now used in the criminal codes

of most States.” Id. at 598. To arrive at that generic definition, the Court

consulted a learned treatise and the Model Penal Code to determine the modern

understanding of the term “burglary.” Id.

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is not determinative,9 the United States further asserts this court should examine

whether Colorado’s manslaughter statute roughly corresponds to the definition of

manslaughter in a majority of state criminal codes.10 Finally, the United States

argues that the modern, generic view of manslaughter is that it requires, at a

minimum, a mens rea of recklessness. See United States v. Gomez-Leon, 545 F.3d

777, 791 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding California’s crime of vehicular manslaughter

while intoxicated is not a crime of violence for purposes of § 2L1.2(b)(1)(1)(iii)

because it requires only a mens rea of negligence). Because Colorado’s version

of manslaughter comports with the modern, generic view of manslaughter, the

United States argues it constitutes a crime of violence.
11See United States v. Peterson, 629 F.3d 432 (4th Cir. 2011). In Peterson,

the Fourth Circuit determined that North Carolina’s version of involuntary

manslaughter is not a crime of violence because it “did not have any requirement

of intent or mens rea.” Id. at 433. In so doing, however, the court determined the

generic version of manslaughter for purposes of application note 1 to § 4B1.2

“means a criminal homicide that is committed (1) recklessly (i.e., with a

conscious disregard of risk) or (2) intentionally if committed under the influence

of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable

explanation or excuse.” Id. at 436-37. Notably, however, having concluded

North Carolina’s version of involuntary manslaughter did not even fall within the

parameters of the generic understanding of manslaughter, the Fourth Circuit was

not forced to confront the question whether construing a crime set out in the

commentary to § 4B1.2 to include non-intentional, non-purposeful crimes was

consistent with its own rule that the text of § 4B1.2(a) itself only applies to

intentional, purposeful crimes. United States v. Clay, 627 F.3d 959, 965-66 (4th

Cir. 2010).

12In so holding, we note this court has conducted an unvarnished Taylor

analysis with regard to a crime set out in application note 1(B)(iii) to § 2L1.2. 

See United States v. Garcia-Caraveo, 586 F.3d 1230, 1232-33 (10th Cir. 2009)

(determining California’s version of robbery is the generic version of robbery set

out in application note 1(B)(iii) to § 2L1.2). There is however, a significant

structural difference between the definitions of crime of violence as used in

§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) and § 2K2.1(a). The only definition for the term “crime of

violence” in § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) is the definition set out in application note

1(B)(iii), which defines crime of violence by setting out a list of included crimes

followed by a residual clause. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii). Thus, there is

simply no possibility that reading the list of crimes in application note 1(B)(iii) to

include generic versions of crimes with a mens rea of mere recklessness could

conflict with the text of § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). In direct contrast to the structure of

(continued...)

-19-

Although the United States’s argument is not without some modicum of

analytical force,11 we conclude it is simply untenable to read manslaughter as set

out in application note 1 to § 4B1.2 as encompassing those versions of the crime

with a mens rea of recklessness, when this court has unequivocally held that the

text of § 4B1.2 only reaches purposeful or intentional behavior.12 See, e.g.,
12(...continued)

§ 2L1.2, the application notes to § 2K2.1 indicate “crime of violence” as used in

§ 2K2.1 has the meaning set out in § 4B1.2 and its application notes. Id. § 2K2.1

cmt. n.1. As noted above, this court has previously determined the text of

§ 4B1.2 only reaches purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct. In such a

circumstance, to read the crimes listed in application note 1 to § 4B1.2 as

reaching convictions involving reckless conduct would render the application note

inconsistent with the text of § 4B1.2. Given these structural differences between

§ 2L1.2 and § 2K2.1, the decision in Garcia-Caraveo simply does not speak to

the question before the court in this case. Likewise, our decision that the term

“manslaughter” as used in application note 1 to § 4B1.2 refers only to what has

historically been labeled as voluntary manslaughter does not necessarily apply to

the term manslaughter as used in application note 1(B)(iii) to § 2K1.2.

-20-

Williams, 559 F.3d at 1148; Zuniga-Soto, 527 F.3d at 1124. “[J]ust as the

Supreme Court limited the broad language in the ACCA to crimes involving

‘purposeful, violent and aggressive conduct,’ so too is it logical to construe the

reference to manslaughter [in the commentary to § 4B1.2(a)] as extending only to

those crimes involving the requisite mens rea.” United States v. Herrick, 545

F.3d 53, 60 n.8 (1st Cir. 2008); cf. United States v. Ossana, No. 10-2205, 2011

WL 1517492, at *4-*6 (8th Cir. April 22, 2011) (holding that crimes listed in

application note 1 to § 4B1.2 must be intentional or purposeful to qualify as

crimes of violence). To read application note 1 as encompassing non-intentional

crimes would render it utterly inconsistent with the language of § 4B1.2(a),

which, as set out at length above, only applies to purposeful or intentional

conduct. Cf. McConnell, 605 F.3d at 824 (holding that commentary to the

Guidelines is not authoritative if it is inconsistent with the Guideline it purports

to interpret); United States v. Morris, 562 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2009)
13The only other circuit to directly address and resolve this question

reached an identical result. United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 410-411 (7th

Cir. 2009) (concluding Illinois version of involuntary manslaughter is not a crime

of violence for purposes of § 4B1.2(a) because its mens rea is mere recklessness).

14Our decision in this regard is consistent with the Supreme Court’s recent

decision in Sykes v. United States, No. 09-11311, 2011 WL 2224437 (U.S. June 9,

2011). In Sykes, the Court concluded Indiana’s crime of using a vehicle to

intentionally flee from a law enforcement officer after being ordered to stop is a

violent felony for purposes of the ACCA. Id. at *3. In so doing, the Court held

that the benchmark for evaluating whether any given crime falls within the

ACCA’s residual clause is potential risk of serious injury to another. Id. at *6-*8. 

Because the Indiana fleeing crime was at least as risky in that regard as burglary

and arson, crimes set out in the text of the ACCA, the court concluded it was a

violent felony for purposes of the ACCA. Id. The Court rejected Sykes’s

argument that Indiana’s fleeing crime was not a crime of violence because it did

not involve “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” conduct similar to that at issue

in other ACCA cases. Id. at *8. According to the Court, its 

sole decision . . . concerning the reach of ACCA’s residual clause in

which risk was not the dispositive factor is Begay, which held that

driving under the influence (DUI) is not an ACCA predicate. There,

the Court stated that DUI is not purposeful, violent, and aggressive. 

But the Court also gave a more specific reason for its holding. “[T]he

(continued...)

-21-

(holding a Guideline and its commentary are inconsistent when “following one

will result in violating the dictates of the other” (quotation omitted)). Thus, this

court specifically holds that only those versions of manslaughter that involve

intentional or purposeful behavior qualify as crimes of violence for purposes of

§ 4B1.2(a).13 Because Colorado’s version of manslaughter involves only reckless

conduct, the district court erred in counting it as a crime of violence in

calculating Armijo’s offense level and the matter must be remanded to the district

court for resentencing.14 
14(...continued)

conduct for which the drunk driver is convicted (driving under the

influence) need not be purposeful or deliberate.” Begay v. United

States, 553 U.S. 137, 145 (10th Cir. 2008) (analogizing DUI to

strict-liability, negligence, and recklessness crimes). By contrast, the

Indiana statute at issue here has a stringent mens rea requirement. 

Violators must act knowingly or intentionally.

. . . .

Begay involved a crime akin to strict liability, negligence, and

recklessness crimes; and the purposeful, violent, and aggressive

formulation was used in that case to explain the result. The felony at

issue here is not a strict liability, negligence, or recklessness crime

and because it is, for the reasons stated and as a categorical matter,

similar in risk to the listed crimes, it is a crime that “otherwise

involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical

injury to another.” [18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)].

Id. at *8-*9 (quotation and citations omitted). Thus, Sykes makes clear that only

those crimes involving intentional conduct fall within the terms of the ACCA’s

residual clause. Because § 4B1.2’s definition of a crime of violence is almost

identical to the ACCA’s definition of violent felony, the Supreme Court’s

decision in Sykes applies equally to the resolution of this appeal. Charles, 576

F.3d at 1068 n.2.

-22-

B. Staleness

As discussed above, the Guideline relating to possession of firearms by

prohibited persons sets a defendant’s base offense level by reference to, inter

alia, the defendant’s criminal history. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a). Built into § 2K2.1,

however, is a limitation on considering “stale” convictions. Application note 10

to § 2K2.1 provides that for the purpose of increasing a defendant’s offense level

on the basis of past felony convictions, “only those felony convictions that

receive criminal history points under § 4A1.1(a), (b), or (c)” can be considered. 

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.10. Criminal history points are assigned based on the
15By necessity, Armijo’s argument also implies the district court erred in

calculating his criminal history category, because he was also assigned one

(continued...)

-23-

length of the sentence imposed upon a prior conviction. Id. § 4A1.1(a), (b), (c)

(assigning three criminal history points for “each prior sentence of imprisonment

exceeding one year and one month,” two criminal history points for “each prior

sentence of imprisonment of at least sixty days not counted in (a),” and one

criminal history point “for each prior sentence not counted in (a) or (b)”). A

sentence exceeding one year and one month is generally not counted if it was

“imposed more than fifteen years prior to the defendant’s commencement of the

instant offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1 cmt. n.1; id. § 4A1.2(e). Lesser sentences are

generally not counted if “imposed more than ten years prior to the defendant’s

commencement of the instant offense.” Id. § 4A1.1 cmt. nn.2, 3; id.

§ 4A1.2(e)(2).

For the first time on appeal, Armijo argues the district court erred in

utilizing his felony menacing conviction in calculating his base offense level

because that conviction is stale. The PSR establishes Armijo was sentenced to

three years’ probation on his felony menacing conviction on October 9, 1998. It

further establishes he commenced the instant offense on May 29, 2009, when he

was arrested in possession of a Smith and Wesson 9mm pistol. Based on these

facts, Armijo asserts the district court plainly erred in considering his felony

menacing conviction in calculating his offense level.15 In the alternative, should
15(...continued)

criminal history point for the felony menacing conviction. That single criminal

history point, however, makes no difference in Armijo’s criminal history

category. The PSR assigned to Armijo six criminal history points, including the

point assessed for the felony menacing conviction. This resulted in a criminal

history category of III. U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table). Criminal history

category III encompasses those defendants with 4, 5, or 6 criminal history points. 

Id. Thus, even assuming the district court erred in counting the felony menacing

conviction, and Armijo’s proper total of criminal history points is 5, his criminal

history category would remain unchanged. Id.

16Because Armijo did not raise this argument before the district court he

can prevail only if he can satisfy the exacting plain-error standard. To satisfy the

plain-error standard, Armijo must demonstrate (1) error, (2) that is clear and

obvious, (3) which affects substantial rights, and (4) which seriously affects the

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v.

Steele, 603 F.3d 803, 808 (10th Cir. 2010). To the extent Armijo argues it is

unnecessary to object to preserve procedural sentencing errors, his position is

clearly foreclosed by this court’s binding precedents. Id. (holding that when a

defendant does not raise a procedural sentencing objection before the district

court, this court’s review is limited to plain error).

-24-

this court conclude he can not satisfy the exacting four-part plain error standard,16

Armijo asserts his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue at

sentencing.

In its response brief, the United States concedes the probationary sentence

originally imposed in Colorado state court on October 9, 1998, is stale and thus

not counted under the terms of §§ 2K2.1 cmt. n.1 and 4A1.2(e)(2). It notes,

however, that the PSR reveals his probation was “reimposed for 3 years as

intensive supervision probation” on August 13, 1999. The United States asserts

this Colorado state court action on August 13, 1999, counts as a “prior sentence”

for purposes of § 4A1.2(e). Furthermore, because the August 13, 1999, sentence
-25-

was imposed within ten years of the commencement of the instant offense, the

United States argues Armijo’s felony menacing conviction was properly counted

as a prior crime of violence for purposes of § 2K2.1.

In reply, Armijo asserts the United States’s argument is inconsistent with

both the Guidelines and Colorado law. In particular, Armijo notes the very

limited information in the PSR reveals the following regarding the Colorado state

court’s actions on August 13, 1999: “Probation reimposed for 3 years as intensive

supervision probation.” Although the PSR does not say so specifically, it appears

this action followed the filing of a probation violation complaint on June 9, 1999.

The Colorado statues governing probation do not use the term “reimpose.” 

Instead, at the time in question, if a court determined a probationer violated a

condition of probation, the court had only two choices: “either revoke or continue

the probation.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-206(5) (1999). If probation was

revoked, the court could “then impose any sentence or grant any probation

pursuant to the provisions [of Colorado law] which might originally have been

imposed or granted.” Id. Even if the court chose to continue probation, it had the

inherent power to “reduce or increase the term of probation or alter the conditions

or impose new conditions.” Id. § 16-11-204(4) (1999). Thus, by operation of

Colorado law, the actions of the Colorado state court on August 13, 1999,

amounted to either a continuation of probation with a modified term, pursuant to

Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 16-11-204(4), -206(5), or the revocation of probation
17This is true even assuming the state court actually utilized the term

“reimposed,” a term that does not appear to have any basis in Colorado law. See

United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1057 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that this

court is “not bound by a state’s nomenclature in sentencing,” but must instead

determine the real world effect of state court action).

-26-

accompanied by the imposition of a new sentence of probation, pursuant to the

terms of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-206(5).17

Armijo argues that under either scenario, it is plain his menacing

conviction is stale under the terms of § 4A1.2(e)(2) and thus can not be

considered as a prior felony crime of violence for purposes of § 2K1.2(a)(2). If

his term of probation was simply continued with modification on August 13,

1999, it is clearly not a sentence imposed within ten years of the instant weaponpossession conviction for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e). On the other hand,

Armijo argues, if his sentence was actually revoked and a new probationary

sentence was imposed on August 13, 1999, the matter is controlled by U.S.S.G.

§ 4A1.2(k)(2)(B):

Revocation of probation . . . may affect the time period under which

certain sentence are counted as provided in [§ 4A1.2(e)]. For the

purposes of determining the applicable time period, use the

following: (i) in the case of an adult term of imprisonment totaling

more than one year and one month, the date of last release from

incarceration on such sentence . . . ; and (iii) in any other case, the

date of the original sentence.
18That is, both his original October 9, 1998, and any potentially new August

13, 1999, sentence was for a term of probation.

19The government admirably concedes that should this court conclude

Armijo has satisfied the first two components of plain error review, Armijo has

established his substantial rights were affected by the error and fundamental

fairness requires that he be resentenced.

-27-

Because he was never sentenced to imprisonment totaling more than thirteen

months,18 Armijo contends § 4A1.2(k)(2)(B)(iii) directs that for purposes of

determining recency pursuant to § 4A1.2(e)(2) the district court must consider

only the date of the original sentence of probation, not the date of any subsequent

revocation.

Armijo has made a convincing showing that (1) the district court erred in

considering his felony menacing conviction in arriving at his offense level and (2)

the district court’s error is plain on appeal.19 Nevertheless, in light of the

extremely limited record and the already explained necessity of remanding the

case to the district court for resentencing, see supra Section II.A.2., the better

course is to direct the parties to fully address, and the district court to resolve

upon a complete record and full briefing, this matter on remand. Such a course of

action has the additional salutary effect of mooting the claim of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel raised by Armijo in this appeal. On remand, the United

States will be entitled to come forward with additional support for its assertion

Armijo’s probationary sentence was neither continued nor revoked, but was
20Our mandate in this case is consistent with the general rule that “when a

defendant’s sentence is vacated on appeal and remanded for new sentencing, the

[district] court must begin anew with de novo proceedings.” United States v.

Keifer, 198 F.3d 798, 801 (10th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted). Nevertheless, we

have recognized that absent contrary direction in this court’s mandate, the district

court has discretion whether to allow further evidence on remand. Id. (“[D]e

novo resentencing permits the receipt of any relevant evidence the court could

have heard at the first sentencing hearing. As a consequence, the court on remand

has the discretion to entertain evidence that could have been presented at the

original sentencing even on issues that were not the specific subject of the

remand. (quotations and citation omitted)). In this case, however, it would be

fundamentally unfair to preclude the United States from presenting evidence to

support its assertion Armijo’s felony menacing conviction is not stale. If Armijo

had properly raised the issue before the district court in the first instance, the

United States could have mustered all relevant evidence on the issue prior to the

imposition of sentence. Armijo should not obtain a benefit, in the form of a

limited evidentiary record on remand, from the act of failing to properly and

timely raise the staleness issue in district court. Thus, on remand, the United

States is entitled to develop and present all relevant evidence and argument on the

question whether Armijo’s felony menacing conviction is stale. Cf. United States

v. Campbell, 372 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that because the

defendant “alerted the government to the deficiency in its evidence,” and because

the government “did not seek to cure the deficiency,” on remand the United States

was not entitled “to make the record that it failed to make in the first instance”).

-28-

instead “reimposed,” thus rendering U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(k)(2)(B)(iii) inapplicable.20

See United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1058 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding the

government has the burden of proving that a prior criminal conviction adds to a

defendant’s total of criminal history points).

III. CONCLUSION

This matter is REMANDED to the district court to VACATE Armijo’s

sentence and conduct further sentencing proceedings consistent with this opinion.
09-1533, United States v. Armijo

BRISCOE, Chief Judge, concurring.

I concur in the result. I join in the majority opinion, except for the

discussion of United States v. Rodriguez-Enriquez, 518 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir.

2008), and People v. Shawn, 107 P.3d 1033 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004), at pp. 9-13. I

would conclude simply that we are bound by our prior ruling in United States v.

Herron, 432 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2005), which squarely addresses the issue of

whether Colorado felony menacing is a crime of violence. See United States v.

Edward J., 224 F.3d 1216, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Under the doctrine of stare

decisis, [a] panel cannot overturn the decision of another panel of this court

barring en banc reconsideration, a superseding contrary Supreme Court decision,

or authorization of all currently active judges on the court.” (internal quotation

omitted)).