PLAN COLOMBIA:

THE VIEW FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE

Eduardo Pizano

May 2001
*****

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the

Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report

is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War

College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of this report

may be obtained from the Publications and Production Office by calling

commercial (717) 245-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or via the Internet at

Rita.Rummel@carlisle.army.mil

*****

Most 1993, 1994, and all later Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)

monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for electronic

dissemination. SSI’s Homepage address is: http://carlisle-www.army.

mil/usassi/welcome.htm

*****

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail

newsletter to update the national security community on the research of

our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming

conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a

strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are

interested in receiving this newsletter, please let us know by e-mail at

outreach@carlisle.army.mil or by calling (717) 245-3133.

ISBN 1-58487-051-6

ii
FOREWORD

This is one in the special series of monographs

emanating from the February 2001 conference on Plan

Co lom bia co spon sored by the Stra te gic Studies In sti tute of

the U.S. Army War Col lege and the Dante B. Fascell

North-South Cen ter of the Uni ver sity of Mi ami. This

mono graph is a tran scrip tion of a lun cheon speech de liv ered 

by Edu ar do Pizano, a for mer mem ber of the Co lom bian

Sen ate and now the Gen eral Sec re tary to the Pres i dent of

Co lom bia. In ef fect, it is a pres i den tial re but tal of var i ous

“mis con cep tions” stem ming from the un cer tainty and

con fu sion that per me ated con fer ence dis cus sions in volv ing

U.S. pol icy in Co lom bia and the im ple men ta tion of Plan

Co lom bia.

Mr. Pizano makes several points that are both

compelling and instructive. First, Colombia’s sovereignty is

being impinged by illegal narco-trafficking organizations

and insurgent allies that threaten democratic governance

from within. Thus, of necessity, Plan Colombia must

include strong military and counternarcotics components.

Second, Colombia has the military forces necessary to deal

with the violence in the country, but the armed forces and

the police need training, equipment, and mobility assets.

Third, Plan Colombia also includes a very strong social

component—as a matter of fact, the vast majority of the $7.5

billion being allocated for the plan is designated for social

and economic development purposes. Finally, President

Pastrana’s General Secretary argues that there are no

“cocksure” short-term answers to Colombia’s problems.

What is certain is that these problems are being dealt with

aggressively by Colombia and its friends.

The Strategic Studies Institute and the North-South

Center are pleased to offer the comments of Mr. Pizano to

help inform the ongoing national and international debates

concerning security issues that affect the vital interests of

iii
the United States, Colombia, and the entire global

community.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iv
PREFACE

The “insider” in this monograph is indeed a brave man. A

former Colombian senator who was forced to flee his country

with his family when targeted by the Cali Cartel, he has

returned to continue to work for a Colombia which its

citizens yearn to have. He gives us reason to hope.

Violence and guerrilla movements, he tells us, are

typical of the history, including recent history, of many

countries. In Colombia the current waves of violence started

in the 1940s, while the two major guerrilla movements, the

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the

Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional, come out of the 1960s. Yet,

he says, there is a major difference between these

movements and those which have wracked other Latin

American countries. That difference is drugs. In addition to

the guerrillas, the more recently-appearing “self-defense”

or “paramilitary” forces and their growth are also

attributable to their involvement in the drug trade.

Drugs not only provide the money to sustain these

violent movements; they also build a base of political

support. Since the growing of coca was shut down in Peru

and Bolivia, it began in Colombia, hence the involvement of

thousands of peasants who earn their livelihood from it.

That is a formidable political base. The FARC, therefore, he

tells us, have doubled their size in the 1990s.

What can be done? The “insider,” like the more

thoughtful outsiders, does not have a quick or easy solution.

It is obvious to him, however, thatPlan Colombia must have

a strong military component. Until it began to be

restructured, the Colombian army was simply losing the

war in serious military encounters. The author tells us that

“those who suggest that Plan Colombia should not have a

military component are not facing the realities on the

v
ground. . . .” This also includes the best equipment; the army

cannot continue to be outgunned by the FARC.

At the same time, he says, it is absolutely essential that,

through a military criminal court, the Colombian military

assure respect for human rights. This is now being done. He

argues against the many “misconceptions” about Colombia

held abroad, one of which is that the government and army

tacitly support the “paramilitaries” since they can fight the

“enemy” in ways which the army cannot. He offers a

resounding defense to that persistent charge.

What else should be emphasized to help Colombia? The

author tells us that “Colombia is confronting its challenges”

across the board and that economic measures, especially

membership in a hemispheric free trade area, would be a

great help. Colombia is helping itself, goes his message, and

it deserves the cooperation of the international community

in return.

Ambler H. Moss, Jr., Director

The Dante B. Fascell North-South

 Center

University of Miami

vi
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

EDUARDO PIZANO DE NARVAEZ studied through 8th

grade at the Colegio San Carlos in Bogotá, Colombia. He

finished high school in the United States at the Valley Forge

Military Academy in Pennsylvania. He also studied at the

Universidad de los Andes in Bogota, Colombia, and holds an

MPA from Harvard University. Among his areas of interest

are history, information technology, family, and the

countryside. At 19 Mr. Pizano was mayor of the county of

Chia in Colombia, and later served as a councilman for 12

years. He is owner and manager of Hortaexport, a food trade

company. He served for 6 years as presidential counsel for

the Shell Group in Colombia, dealing with governmental

issues, community relations, and business image. Mr.

Pizano was elected a national senator and represented the

New Democratic Force in the Colombian Congress from

1991 to 1998. From August 1996 to May 2000, he served as

president of the National Telecommunications Company.

Mr. Pizano now serves as General Secretary to the

President of Colombia.

vii
PLAN COLOMBIA:

A VIEW FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE

I begin by recollecting briefly what the guerrilla

movement has been doing in Colombia for the last 40 years.

More specifically, I shall glance at what the current

government is trying to do in its confrontation with the

violent actors in this nation. Guerrilla movements have

been active in Colombia going back to the early Sixties, with

1960 having been a particularly hard year. And even since

the late Forties, Colombia has been living with la violencia,

in which liberals and conservatives kill each other in order

to seize control of the government. Of course, there have

been efforts to reconcile the liberal and conservative camps.

A peace agreement permitted the Fruente Nacional to

develop in which liberals and conservatives shared power

until 1960. Thereupon, the Liberal Party decided to create

an armed group which came to be known as the

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Its

leader, Manuel Marulanda, initiated a guerrilla movement

which now after 40 years deploys a military force

numbering close to 18,000 armed guerrillas active in most of

the rural areas of Colombia.

The mid-Sixties brought a second armed group to

Colombia. Partially as a result of the economic blockade

against Cuba, the Cuban government under Fidel Castro

initiated a series of revolutionary movements in Latin

America. Thus arose in Colombia the Ejercito de Liberacion

Nacional (ELN), which continues to this day. A tenuous

peace agreement between this guerrilla group and the

government is in force at the present time. The government

is trying to initiate formal conversations.

What is the difference between FARC and the rest of the

guerrilla movements in Latin America or elsewhere? There

were guerrilla movements in Guatemala and Salvador.

They existed in the Far East in Malaysia. Such movements

1
have traditionally seemed to wax and wane, but in Colombia

the guerrilla movement seems to persist and grow. So, to

return to our question, what is the difference between what

is happening in Colombia and what is happening in the rest

of the world? The difference is drugs. Until the beginning of

the 1990s, virtually all the coca drug paste came from Peru

and Bolivia. Colombia was a transition country, containing

the processing labs. The cocaine paste came to Colombia,

where it was processed into a consumable powder and then

transshipped to the North American market.

Crop eradication programs were initiated in Peru and

Bolivia. Additionally, the United States, with the

permission of Colombia, installed a radar screen situated to

detect aircraft carrying cocaine paste into Colombia from

such sites as Peru and Bolivia. This radar screen hurt

considerably the traffic of drugs. In fact, though much of the

reduction has been attributed to the crop eradication

programs in Peru and Bolivia, it is my feeling that the

radars installed in Colombia were the most important tools

in reducing the drug flow into that country.

In response, the Cali Cartel headed by Rodriguez

Orejuela undertook to bring the cultivation of the coca crop

to Colombia itself. The Colombian government mustered

strong resistance to this tactic, especially after it was

augmented by assassinations of judges and ministers, and

attacks on Colombian society. But the nature of the struggle

was changed fundamentally by the massive shift of coca

cultivation onto Colombian territory.

Before, the struggle was essentially against expressly

criminal elements—those who operated the labs that

processed coca paste into powder cocaine. Now, however,

the Colombian peasantry entered the picture, for it was this

part of the population whom the drug lords called upon to

plant and harvest the coca crops. Whereas earlier the

antidrug policing effort consisted largely of jailing or

extraditing a relatively few lab entrepreneurs, the problem

now came to involve an entire economic class. Moreover,

2
this was an economic class traditionally marginalized in

Colombia and in behalf of which there was no agrarian

policy in place to provide attractive farm or employment

alternatives. This was a class for which the government had

no credible policy to provide good nutrition, good education,

and a decent quality of life. And the drug lords came upon

the scene with their coca crop initiative in Colombia itself at

precisely the right historical moment to implicate an entire

economic class, rendered vulnerable to exploitation by

centuries of governmental neglect.

Meanwhile, as the indigenous production of coca

expanded in the 1990s, U.S. Government crop eradication

efforts also expanded in an effort to control such production.

This meant that the coca growers needed protection. Thus a

marriage of convenience occurred between the guerrillas,

which are essentially armed bandits, and the cocaine

growers, including not only the farmers but all those

sponsoring the growers—those providing the seeds, the

fertilizers, the chemical precursors. These elements are

financed by the big drug lords. The drug lords cooperate

with the guerrillas in order to achieve protection of the labs

and the plantations when police arrive to disrupt the

operation or perform aerial spraying.

In exchange for protecting crop areas and labs, the

guerrillas receive a share of the income provided by sale of

the cocaine. In some cases, such as Guaviare Province, the

drug lords are pushed aside and the guerrillas grab control

over the entire process. Even where the drug lords and

cultivators remain, the guerrillas seem to be involving

themselves more and more in the cocaine business itself.

Gaining control over drug production in Colombia has

permitted the FARC to grow, in fact doubling its size in the

1990s. Obviously, the emergence of such a behemoth

cocaine engine in such a short time is seen as a threat by

everybody in the country.

To protect themselves from such erosion of their

position, the drug lords have recruited and organized

3
so-called “self-defense groups”—paramilitaries—which,

according to the Colombian Constitution and the law, are

illegal. They are not supported by the government, and they

are not supported by the armed forces. And what begins as

self-defense groups linked solely to drug lords later leads to

cattle ranchers and local businessmen adversely affected by

guerrillas organizing their own self-defense groups.

Carlos Castano has emerged as the leader of these

groups. He observed what the guerrilla was doing and what

the FARC was doing—how they were able to double their

forces—and he copied their model. He began to control

cocaine, cocaine trade, and chemical precursors, wherever

his so-called paramilitary—which are not paramilitary;

they are illegal self-defense groups—have a presence.

This movement is expanding rapidly. Today, for

example, in the Middle Magdalena in the Sierra de San

Lucas, close to 20,000 hectares of cocaine are planted. In

Catatumbo in the province of Norte de Santander, next to

Venezuela, there are today some 8,000 hectares in

cultivation. In Putumayo, which was a FARC stronghold

until mid-2000, the paramilitary is going in and trying to

take control of the cocaine business.

While the paramilitaries are moving, the FARC is

moving as well. Drugs and cocaine are moving to the Pacific

coast in Tumaco along the lower Colombia Pacific coast next

to Ecuador. Plantations are emerging there. In an episode

occurring as the year 2000 drew to a close, 70 ELN

guerrillas were shot, and the FARC began taking control

over Latso next to the Pacific coast of Colombia. Drugs have

become the gasoline fueling the war in Colombia.

Mr. Castano admits that more than 50 percent of the

income sustaining his illegal self-defense groups comes

from drugs. The FARC as well says that most of its income

comes from drugs, augmented by extortion and

kidnappings. This is the actual situation that confronted

Andres Pastrana when he assumed leadership of the

government. He took over a country in which guerrillas and

4
illegal self-defense groups are receiving between 500

million and a billion dollars a year in cash money from the

cocaine and heroin businesses.

So what is to be done? One should be extremely leery of

positing cocksure answers to that question. There are no

short-term answers. And even the most intelligently

conceived long-term approaches, while perhaps

unexceptionable in theory, will in practice face incredibly

long odds. I have lived in Colombia for some 40 years. I have

been in the Colombian Senate for 8 years. I’ve traveled all

over Colombia. I’ve been familiar with Colombia’s problems

for most of my life. And I still have fundamental doubts

about what we should do and how we should proceed. It’s an

extraordinarily complex and intricate situation.

Colombia is not Guatemala, it is not El Salvador.

Colombia presents an entirely different reality. The

guerrilla movement it faces does not have any political

support from abroad. Castro does not have any possibility of

assisting with a peace process in Colombia. The guerrillas

are completely independent of any foreign supporters.

There are reports that some governments are supporting

the guerrillas in Colombia, and it is possible that some

technical support has been or could be provided from

abroad. But the guerrilla organizations have all the money

they require. In talking about the FARC, one is talking

about an institution that controls close to a billion dollars a

year in income.

In deciding how to counter such a powerful force, it is

natural for the government to tend to its own military as

part of its early initiatives. Thus we concluded that the

armed forces needed to be restructured. After all, the armed

forces had experienced severe defeats in the initial months

of 1998. Their military bases had been overrun and seized,

armaments were looted, and soldiers were killed or

kidnapped. The FARC showed every sign of achieving

military ascendancy in those areas that mattered to it. In

fact, a reasonable estimate in 1998 was that if current

5
trends continued, the entire country would be lost in 5

years. The guerrilla movement had completed phase one of

revolutionary war, consisting of ambushes and hit-and-run

raids. Now they were entering phase two—the use of 300 to

500-man guerrilla units in seizures of small towns and

stand-up confrontations with regular units.

Thus Rodrego Llored, who was then the Minister of

Defense, made the decision to restructure the armed forces.

This effort has been continued by Luis Fernando Ramírez

and his team in the Ministry of Defense. We have received

strong support from the U.S. military, which has helped us

develop a plan for professionalizing the armed forces in

Colombia and increasing their numbers to 452,000 by

mid-2001 from the level of 12,000 that existed formerly. We

have moved from an infantry-based army to a

helicopter-transported army. We should have something in

excess of 265 helicopters carrying soldiers from one corner of

the country to the other.

Colombia’s geography is distinctly mountainous, which

entails transporting forces and materiel across the Andes at

very high altitudes. The country also contains jungle and a

coastal area. Such varied geography makes it difficult to

combat the guerrilla phenomenon.

As an adjunct to restructuring the armed forces, judicial

reform was undertaken, touching those aspects that dealt

with the war. A new military criminal court was created by

Congress. A law was passed granting the president

discretionary authority to fire and take to court any military

member who had compromising contacts with the

paramilitary or illegal self-defense groups. Moreover, what

we call “la desaparacion forzosa”—the forced abduction and

“disappearance” of a citizen at the hands of a member of the

armed forces—became classified as criminal conduct.

Perpetrators could be tried as criminals, not by military

courts but by the civil jurisdiction. In a similar vein, the

Constitutional Court produced a landmark decision, the

effect of which was to transfer jurisdiction from military

6
courts to civil courts for a range of civil rights offenses by

soldiers. That being done, the time is now ripe for direct

action against the violent actors standing at the heart of the

Colombian drug problem.

Colombia had been receiving support from the U.S.

Government since the early 1980s. Fumigation was

undertaken in the northern part of Colombia, initially

against marijuana plants in the Sierra de San Lucas and

Santa Marta, and every year funds were provided for the

police to attack the drugs. But all such efforts were as mere

pinpricks on the drug trade. There was never a decisive act

or resolve to end drug trafficking in Colombia. For example,

consider the case of Putumayo, whose territory represented

close to 50 percent of the area planted with coca in

Colombia. The former government of Colombia never went

into Putumayo. Anti-drug operations were prohibited there,

not because drugs were welcomed but rather because the

government lacked the projectible military power to

contend with the well-armed guerrillas and protect the

300,000 inhabitants. The FARC alone maintains five

guerrilla fronts in the state of Putumayo. In the state of

Putumayo today, there is roughly one guerrilla for every 150

inhabitants. Those who suggest that Plan Colombia should

not have included a military component are not facing the

realities of conditions on the ground in Colombia.

It was against such a backdrop that the government

decided to transform its armed forces. It needed the support

of fumigation aircraft, it needed the support of armed

helicopters to protect the aircraft while they were

eradicating the coca, and it needed a land force to enter

hostile areas and perform essential neutralization tasks on

the ground. Some 3 or 4 years ago when I was a Colombian

senator, there was a persistent rumor afoot that when the El

Salvadoran war ended, the remaining rebel antiaircraft

missiles were moved to Putumayo for the use of the

guerrillas there. That suspicion was an important reason

why the police never flew over Putumayo in a major

cocaine-eradication effort. I mention this to drive home the

7
point that the Colombian armed forces, if they are to be

successful in their war against the guerrillas, must among

other measures be equipped with the appropriate military

hardware.

In 1998, Putumayo had essentially been lost as part of

the territory of Colombia. Yes, there were some elected

politicians in the area, but the government did not have

control. Prospects improved, however, when Plan Colombia

was adopted. We asked for the hardware. We received

strong support from then Commander-in-Chief Southern

Forces General Charles Wilhelm and many concerned

authorities in the U.S. Government who grasped the gravity

of the situation in Colombia. During the year 2000, I saw at

least 50 or 60 U.S. Congressmen and Senators visit

Colombia. I accompanied some of them to Putumayo itself,

not to the city of Bogotá or to Cartegena. I’ve seen these

legislators sitting in the Putumayo fields taking a

first-hand look at the situation. That’s why enlightened

decisions on the question of Colombia have been issuing

from the halls of the U.S. Congress. Every time a ballot is

cast in the U.S. Senate or House of Representatives, it

becomes a matter of public record, and the elected official

has to go out to the streets of his or her home district to

defend the vote. To defend their votes, elected U.S. officials

need to learn the truth up close and personal. I have little

use for outsiders who come to Colombia and, as soon as they

get off the plane, announce that Colombia has not done its

job.

In the mid-1990s, I had to get away from Colombia for

awhile, taking my family with me. I had problems

specifically with the Cali Cartel leader, Mr. Santa Cruz,

who is now deceased. But I always had in my heart the idea

of coming back to Colombia. I am a Colombian, a proud

Colombian citizen. I love my country, and I want it to

survive for my children. I want to be able to live in Colombia

because I believe it is among the very best countries in the

world. If those such as myself, who had an opportunity to

obtain the finest education and so many avenues to success

8
in Colombia, did not take seriously the responsibility

thereby incurred to return to our homeland, there would

never be enough citizens of resolve to set things aright. I did

indeed come back to Colombia. The day after I returned, I

voted for a constitutional reform measure authorizing the

extradition of Colombian nationals implicated in the drug

trade. If we in Colombia are not able to subject such people

to the rigors of justice ourselves, then we should permit

some other concerned government to undertake that

essential role.

The last issue we decided to tackle in 1998 was the need

to get the international community involved. As soon as

President Pastrana was elected, he went to the United

States for consultations with President William Clinton. He

carried the message that there was a co-responsibility in

dealing with the drug problem—that it wasn’t Colombia’s

problem alone. President Clinton understood this

co-responsibility, and he was forthcoming in laying the

groundwork for the necessary assistance. Japan, the

European Union, and many other countries have also been

helpful, providing resources and support, particularly with

regard to the guerrilla problem posed by the ELN. One now

finds the ambassadors of helpful nations walking in the

middle of very dangerous guerrilla and self-defense group

controlled areas, trying to come up with solutions.

The international community today does indeed have an

important role to play in resolving the problems of

Colombia. Naysayers claim that Colombia loses its

sovereignty to the extent that outsiders share in important

decisions touching the nation’s fate. They forget that

Colombia has already lost its sovereignty to the extent that

inside power groups like the FARC control its territory.

They forget that we will not be able to achieve a peace

agreement with the FARC by ourselves. We need the

support of the international community, but achieving full

support will take time. What President Pastrana has in

mind is simply to start the process. Once the machinery is in

place and the process is securely and robustly in motion,

9
then nobody will be able to stop it. Only the international

community can provide the impetus to set the process in

motion. 

I would like now to address ten misconceptions that have

arisen with regard to the situation in Colombia. Only if the

facts are out on the table and known to all parties concerned

will we have a realistic chance for discovering solutions.

Misconception 1: Colombia has asked Europe to

contribute military support. That is false. Colombia never

sought military resources in Europe. It is true that with the

commencement of coca crop eradication programs in 1983,

the Colombian government was concerned for communities,

families, and farmers adversely impacted by the distruction

of their economic base. President Pastrana had the insight

to formally set aside a proportion of the international

resources dedicated to fight drugs to take care of that

proportion of the population economically victimized by the

war. Somehow this request became confused with a request

for military aid. Thus, to repeat, Colombia doesn’t want any

German or French helicopters. What Colombia is looking for

is support for specific rehabilitative programs.

The European Union will be providing resources to

address the area of the Middle Magdalena. We made a

decision to eradicate 20,000 hectares in that zone and

initiated rehabilitative agricultural programs there to be

funded by the European Union. There is even the possibility

that the People’s Republic of China will underwrite a

program in the Catatumbo area. We’re speaking with them

regarding that proposal. But we need the support of the

entire international community. Colombia cannot confront

such a gargantuan problem successfully on the basis of

piecemeal assistance from here and there.

We think we already have a military force able to take

care of eradication in the areas where cocaine is planted. We

fumigated or performed aerial spraying in 25,000 hectares

between December 19, 1999, and January 31, 2000, for

example. We expect to sign agreements with 26,000 families

10
in Putumayo. Today we have close to 5,000 families working

in programs where they are voluntarily weaned from

cultivating drugs, especially in the Puerto Asis area. The

Mayor of Puerto Asis is a strong man in his mid-sixties who

stood up to the illegal self-defense groups and the guerrillas.

He said, in effect, “I don’t want cocaine in my municipality,”

and he decided to work with the authorities to get rid of the

cocaine curse. He is somebody whose name will never be

known in the streets of New York or Chicago. But that man

has done a lot to prevent drugs from being transported and

sold to the children of American families. He is the kind of

hero I would like to see highlighted by the U.S. press so that

people who are so highly critical and skeptical about the

Colombian situation will know there are Colombians who

stand tall. This mayor probably deserves the Purple Heart,

not because of what happens to him but for what he does so

that nothing bad happens to others.

Misconception 2: Colombia is not a democratic country.

The truth is that if there is a democratic country in Latin

America, it’s Colombia. Since the enactment of the current

constitution, Colombia has had only one dictator, Rojas

Pinellia from 1953 to 1957, and even he was a man selected

by the political parties to assume power with a mandate to

end the bloodshed that had descended upon the country

because of la violencia in the early Fifties. Colombia, since

the end of that unfortunate turn, has enjoyed a robust

democratic system under which presidents, congressional

members, state senators, and city councilmen are always

duly elected. Colombia has never had a Pinochet, a Galtieri,

or a Noreiga, all types of authoritarian, illegitimate rulers

common to the rest of South and Central America. Colombia

has maintained a democratic tradition in which its

presidents, with the single exception noted above, have

always been elected. Elections were even held in the

demilitarized zone. Mayors who posted themselves as

candidates defeated the FARC candidates in the

demilitarized zone. Those who question democracy in

Colombia should take such facts into account.

11
Misconception 3: Colombians did not have the

opportunity to analyze Plan Colombia and rid it of

objectionable features such as deep U.S. involvement in

Colombia’s internal affairs. Nothing could be further from

the truth. Recall our earlier point that Colombia views the

United States as having co-responsibility for the drug war.

Plan Colombia is a broad plan to address that war,

recognizing the shared responsibilities. It is a 7.5 billion

dollar project that provides for aerial spraying along with

U.S.-made helicopters in Putumayo. But it is much more

than that. That hardware represents only 10-15 percent of

the total Plan Colombia project. Colombia has a

constitutionally-directed budget planning process based

upon inputs from the entire country, including the various

municipalities. Everything that dealt with Plan Colombia

was treated in this budget development process. No

Colombian can legitimately complain, 2 years after the

program was discussed in Congress and all around

Colombia, that there was no discussion. Moreover,

multinational polling companies have asked Colombians

whether they support Plan Colombia, and a majority

responded affirmatively.

Misconception 4: Plan Colombia does not carry a social

component. This is false. In the budget for the 2-year period

2001-2002, 900 million dollars are set aside for a social

safety net. When we came into Putumayo on December 19,

2000, to eradicate industrial crops, we had already tendered

100 million dollars in infrastructure for the state of

Putumayo. This sum addresses such needs as roads and

hospitals. More than ten hospitals will be constructed. A

road leading from Pitalito to Mocoa is being paved with

asphalt. We are putting in a complete electrical power

infrastructure connecting all localities. We are spending 25

million dollars in Putumayo alone to assist farmers replace

their illegal crops with maize, yucca, pigs, and cattle. We are

spending 25 million dollars on quality-of-life programs on

behalf of 26,000 families. Later, we will spend an additional

20 million dollars on crop and livestock subsidies for these

12
families. We are examining all the area entities that work

with the Ministry of Agriculture. We are looking for

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to develop

community projects and agricultural projects in the area of

Putumayo. We want communities to have the right to

develop themselves and have a decent quality of life. We

want the state of Putumayo to be re-integrated into the

nation of Colombia.

Misconception 5: Plan Colombia is a military plan solely

financed by the United States. The truth is that the United

States will contribute only 1.3 billion dollars of the 7.5

billion dollar package comprising Plan Colombia. The 1.3

billion dollars, to be provided over a 2-year period, will be

mostly in the form of transport helicopters and military

trainers that will help Colombian armed forces in their

battle against the drug crops. Some of the U.S. contribution

will also go to the judicial sector and the communities. The

balance of the 7.5 billion dollar Plan Colombia package will

mostly be lent to us by foreign governments and

international institutions. It will eventually have to be

repaid by Colombian citizens themselves, who will pay

special surtaxes for that purpose.

Colombia allocates 4.5 percent of its gross domestic

production to national security. Of our total national

security budget, 40 percent goes to fight the drug war.

Colombia is shouldering its share of the responsibilities,

including those for the welfare of its people.

Misconception 6: A military component in Plan

Colombia was unnecessary. This allegation defies common

sense. Crop eradication personnel cannot do their jobs in

hostile, isolated territory like Putumayo without transport

and security—it is as simple as that. U.S. trainers are not

providing the security. They are advising Colombian armed

forces personnel on security techniques. Perhaps more

important, they are providing advice on dealing with the

local population, that is, cultivating relations based on

mutual respect and cooperation. They are teaching respect

13
for human rights. Since December 19, 2000, when our aerial

spraying began in Putumayo, we haven’t had a single

complaint of human rights abuses in Putumayo.

Misconception 7: Plan Colombia is creating a regional

problem. This is false. Complaints are heard that the war

will be extending to the entire region, that there are one

million displaced people, that they will begin to move to

nearby countries, that immigration to the United States

and Europe has begun because of the war. All of that is false.

But if Colombia doesn’t do a thing against the cultivation of

cocaine, there will be a regional problem. We could see the

emergence of a narco-state. Such a development would have

incalculably adverse implications for the security of the

region and for the United States. What, for example, if

strong self-defense groups started to move into Panama or

Ecuador? 

Under President Pastrana, Colombia has decided to

fight the effort to turn it into a narco-state. It has decided to

internationalize the effort. It has decided to open the door

for discussions with the FARC. Mr. Pastrana is saying to the

FARC, if you sit at the table, everything is discussable. If

you feel there is inequity and injustice in Colombia, you

should sit at the table and help us create the country you

envision. But come to the table with a voice, not with a

weapon. To the extent that there is displacement of the

populace in Colombia, it is the violence perpetrated by the

guerrillas and self-defense groups causing it, not the

elimination of drugs.

According to the figures for year 2000, there were

126,000 people who registered as being displaced. There

probably were some additional people who never registered.

Moreover, we have been experiencing a severe economic

recession in Colombia which has not helped. We have lost a

large number of talented young men and women whom we

would have preferred to stay in their homeland but who left

because of business and employment opportunities abroad.

14
I very much regret that we are not able to offer these

young people the right conditions to persuade them to

remain in Colombia. We will not be able to improve the

Colombian economy, however, unless the violence ends.

When that day arrives, foreign investors and Colombians

themselves will start putting money into new businesses,

and an agricultural sector will emerge. That is why

President Pastrana strongly supports the pursuit of peace

through negotiations at the table.

There are some who say that a cessation of violence will

never be achieved at the negotiating table, that in order to

reach peace Colombia must win the war in the field. I can’t

agree with that. There’s no possibility in a country like

Colombia for the government to win a decisive war for

control over the entirety of its territory. Thus we need to

reach an agreement at the table.

The fact that Manuel Marulanda, leader of the FARC,

acceded to meeting with President Pastrana early in 2000

was very good news. That meeting, or possibly others like it,

could eventually lead to a restructuring of the peace process.

Misconception 8: Colombia will not be able to spend the

Plan Colombia money in the allocated 18-24 months. Here,

zealous hope is our best ally. We are creating the

infrastructure to do it. We are setting up the programs. We

are working with the mayors and governors. The plan is in

place. We have only to implement it.

Misconception 9: Colombia does not fight the illegal

self-defense groups. So far as the Colombian government

and its armed forces are concerned, the self-defense groups

are criminal organizations. They are being confronted by

the army and the police with full vigor. Under new

Colombian legislation, any member of the armed forces

linked by evidence to a paramilitary group can be dismissed

immediately by the president. Since 1997, close to 200

members of the illegal self-defense groups have been shot in

confrontations with the armed forces. Today there are close

to 700 members of the United Self-Defense Forces of

15
Colombia (AUC) in jail in Colombia. Prosecutions against

AUC members are 4.2 times more numerous than those of

guerrilla groups members. Detention orders or arrests are

3.8 times more numerous for members of the AUC compared

to those for the guerrilla members. Criminal investigations

are 2.7 times more numerous for AUC paramilitary

members than for the guerrillas. Since 1998 the office of the

Colombian Attorney General has initiated 1,213 criminal

processes against members of the AUC. With the support of

the police and the armed forces, 349 have been captured by

the authorities. Thus to claim that there is no interest on the

part of the Colombian government in prosecuting members

of the illegal self-defense groups simply has no basis in fact.

Misconception 10: U.S. support for Plan Colombia will

solve Colombia’s problem. This is false. Yes, such support

will contribute substantially in tackling the drug menace

which is funding the war in Colombia. But, as was noted

earlier, no one party can impose peace unilaterally. Peace

can emerge only if freely agreed upon by all parties at the

negotiating table. The search for peace can be greatly

facilitated if all concerned parties disabuse themselves of

the ten misconceptions discussed above.

So far as Colombian reconstruction is concerned, it

would help to have a North American Free Trade

Agreement (NAFTA)-type agreement for all of North and

South America. Such an agreement would lower tariffs for

Colombian products entering North America, thus

generating employment in Colombia itself based on

prosperous legal businesses. The U.S. Congress approved a

bill by which all the garment industry products from

Central America will enter the States with no tariff. This is

a good thing for Central America, but it bodes ill for the

garment industry in Colombia, which remains unprotected.

Nonetheless, Plan Colombia works, and it provides a

sound alternative for Colombia. With support from the

United States, we were able to eliminate in January 2001

alone 27,000 hectares of cocaine in Colombia. That means

16
that 39 million grams of cocaine were eliminated, cocaine

that will never reach the streets of America. We elected a

governor in Putumayo whose campaign slogan was

“Putumayo without cocaine.” He is working with the

national government to eradicate cocaine in his territory.

We were able to fumigate this area using a well-trained

military component, and with no casualties. There are no

complaints about human rights violations in Putumayo

perpetrated by the military brigade or the anti-narcotics

brigade, the two units that went into Putumayo. Since

mid-year 2000, we have been installing a strong

infrastructure in that area, which had traditionally been

neglected by the Colombian government.

In sum, Colombia is confronting its challenges. We are

promoting a comprehensive plan that lays out the strategic

actions to be followed. We have enacted aggressive legal

reform of the military judicial system. We have

strengthened our security forces. We are actively

collaborating with other national judicial systems. Our

security forces have compiled an impressive human rights

record compared with their record of the past. We have

strengthened our local governments. And we have assumed

a cooperative and collaborative posture with regard to the

international community. If these and similar measures

continue to be pursued aggressively, Colombians have every

right to be optimistic concerning the future of their beloved

country.

17
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Mr. Eduardo Pizano

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler