THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE IN JAPAN

IMPLICATIONS

FOR THE U.S.-CHINA-JAPAN STRATEGIC

RELATIONSHIP

Patrick M. O’Donogue

September 2000
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ii
FOREWORD

This study, written by Colonel Patrick M. O’Don

USMC, as a strategy research project, considers a to

key importance to U.S. national security Ja

agreement to cooperate with the United States o

development of a theater missile defense (TMD). 

vigorously opposes this plan and insists that 

development of TMD and national missile defense sy

will destabilize its strategic relationship with the U

States. China’s concerns center primarily on Japan

Korea’s development of deployable upper-tier m

defense capabilities and technology, along with equip

transfers of any kind to Taiwan.

Colonel O’Donogue, a member of the Army War C

Class of 2000, does a remarkable job of addressin

matter in a thoughtful, articulate, and comprehe

manner. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleas

publish his study as part of our Letort Paper series.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTH

PATRICK M. O’DONOGUE, a colonel, U.S. Marine C

is the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-7, I Marine Expediti

Force. From August 1999 to June 2000 he was a stud

the U.S. Army War College. His military career began 

he was commissioned a second lieutenant upon gradu

from Oregon State University. Lieutenant Co

O’Donogue is a Naval aviator and served in Oper

DESERT SHIELD, SOUTHERN WATCH, and SI

ASSURANCE. He earned an M.A. in National Strateg

Strategic Studies from the Naval War College in 199

iv
 THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE IN JAPA

IMPLICATIONS

FOR THE U.S-CHINA-JAPAN

STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP

Introduction.

The role of theater missile defense (TMD) i

U.S.-China-Japan strategic relationship has tak

increased importance as its development and deploy

by the United States and, most likely, Japan be

inevitable. The August 1999 agreement between the U

States and Japan to cooperate on research and develop

of a sea-based TMD system raised the stakes in wha

been, so far, a “war of words” on the need for TMD in J

between the United States and Japan, on one side

China, on the other. American and Chinese percepti

the efficacy and utility of theater missile defense in na

security planning differ radically. U.S. officials and sch

argue that missile defense promotes nationa

international security. The Chinese, however, reje

assumptions and logic of U.S. support for national m

defense (NMD) and TMD.

U.S. nuclear deterrent strategy relies on both th

strategic nuclear triad and U.S. ballistic missile def

with the latter reinforcing the stabilizing effe

deterrence. Unlike the United States, China 

exclusively on land-based missiles as deterrents. So 

perceives a strengthened U.S. defense agains

land-based missiles as destabilizing, because such def

deprive China of her power to deter. However, U.S. of

perceive a growing missile threat from “rogue nat

while the threats of accidental and unauthorized lau

remain. The United States also has an inherent oblig

to protect forward-based and forward-deployed 

against the threat of ballistic missile attacks. The 

1
North Korean Taepo Dong-1 launch gave credibility to 

threats.

1

Chinese officials argue, however, that these threa

not serious enough to justify NMD and TMD developm

They insist NMD and TMD pose serious neg

implications for global arms control and nonprolife

efforts, specifically the Strategic Arms Limitation 

(SALT) II, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the F

Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). U.S. officials counte

arms control and nonproliferation are in the interests 

community of nations, and are not threatened by NM

TMD.

3

Growing technological cooperation between th

nations means inevitable Japanese help with develop

and eventual deployment of TMD. At a minimum, lowe

TMD deployments in Japan will be continually upgra

protect U.S. troops and military assets. The Chinese 

expressed a willingness to accept lower-tier 

deployment that protects U.S. bases. But China oppos

development and deployment of upper-tier TMD sys

especially sea-based versions, which could be employ

protect Taiwan.

4

 Shu Zukang, Director General o

Chinese Foreign Ministry’s Department of Arms Co

best expresses the Chinese position:

We do not envisage a dispute concerning development of w

we would call genuine TMD. Here I am referring to th

anti-theater missile systems used solely in a limited area. W

China is opposed to is the development, deployment 

proliferation of antimissile systems with potential strat

defense capabilities in the name of TMD that violate the le

and spirit of ABM and go beyond the legitimate self-defens

relevant countries.

5

This statement lends de facto legitimacy to the s

Patriot PAC-3 missiles, a lower-tier capability, to Ta

The Chinese insist, however, that Taiwan’s status as p

China obviates its entitlement to the independent rece

2
arms. But China seems confident that it main

sufficient force, both in aircraft and ballistic missil

overwhelm any Taiwanese defense, which renders 

sales more an issue of principle than practicality.

Japanese adoption of TMD introduces new dyn

into the U.S.-Japan alliance. If brought to fruition 

rational way, TMD will precipitate a broad ran

operational initiatives, will require changes to bil

doctrine and will redefine the role of the Jap

Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). TMD poses the 

implications for bilateral integration at the operationa

support levels as the Defense Guidelines do, with even 

tangible consequences for the bilateral alliance. TM

undoubtedly influence the way the United States and J

plan, procure, consult, and operate in the future.

6

This study describes the historical precedence that 

a decision to develop TMD and seriously consid

deployment in Japan. It then explores the strategic s

that shapes the positions of Japan, China and the U

States with regard to TMD. Next, it analyzes po

effects of TMD on the U.S.-Japan alliance. It then re

Chinese objections to TMD and their implications f

U.S.-China relationship. Following this, it explores th

options for TMD development and deployment. The 

concludes with a discussion of the desirability of the U

States maintaining a firm, open dialogue with Chin

addresses cogent concerns that, if carefully handled

reasons for optimism.

Background.

Theater missile defense encompasses a ran

lower-tier (endo-atmospheric–within the atmosphere

upper-tier (exo-atmospheric–outside the atmosp

systems intended to intercept and destroy short (<100

and medium range (1000-3500 km) ballistic missiles

Table 1.) Relevant lower-tier U.S. systems u

development include the U.S. Navy Aegis Standard M

3
II, also known as Navy Area Wide, and the U.S. 

Patriot missile, PAC-3 variant (Table 2). These sy

advertise effectiveness against missiles with up 

1,500-km range.

They do not fall under the provisions of the 

Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty.

7 Upper-tier 

4

Type Missile Range

Short Range Ballistic Missile

(SRBM)

<1,000 km

Medium Range Ballistic

Missile (MRBM)

1,000 km to 3,500 km

Intermediate Range Ballistic

Missile (IRBM)

3,500 km to 5,500 km

Table 1. Types of Ballistic Missiles.

System Type Missile

Patriot PAC-3 Lower-tier Patriot

Navy Area Wide Lower-tier

Standard Mis

II Block IVA

Medium Extended

Air Defense

System (MEADS)

Lower-tier MEADS

Theater High

Altitude Air

Defense (THAAD)

Upper-tier THAAD

Table 2. U. S. Ballistic Missile Defense Syst
systems are in various stages of development. They in

the Navy Theater Wide system, again, an Aegis-

system using the Standard Missile III and the U.S. 

Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system

Table 2.) Both systems would incorporate hit-t

technology in an exo-atmospheric vehicle to intercept l

range, higher speed missiles.

9

U.S.-Japan dialogue on missile defense, espe

theater missile defense, is well-established. Li

discussions began as early as 1983, at the inception 

Strategic Defense Initiative (“Star Wars”).

10Give

impetus of the 1990-91 Gulf War and U.S. experience 

Iraqi SCUD ballistic missiles, in June 1992 the 

Administration proposed Japanese (and South Ko

TMD deployments. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin v

Tokyo in October 1993 and asked for formal Jap

participation in TMD. But trade tensions between th

countries limited the U.S. request for participation t

three options: joint development; buying TMD “of

shelf” (primarily from U.S. manufacturers); or engag

gradual technology exchanges.

11

 This approach met w

cool reception in Japan. In fact, the Japanese perceive

a blatant U.S. attempt to obtain their technology.

The TMD alliance revived in 1994 with 

establishment of the bilateral U.S.-Japan Theater M

Defense Working Group. The limited U.S. offers of 

faded from view while the partners concentrat

examining Japanese missile defense requirements an

potential for bilateral collaboration.

12

 But several ye

discussion produced no impetus to move talks beyon

exploratory phases. Then, in 1996, developments in 

Korean nuclear and ballistic missile programs an

steady growth of Chinese military capabilities, specific

significant ballistic missile force and its demonstrate

in the Straits of Taiwan, proved to be a catalyst: the U

States and Japan began serious TMD negotiations

event that most riveted Japanese attention to the t

from ballistic missiles, however, was the North Korea

5
of a three stage Taepo Dong-1 missile (See Table 

August 1998.

Table 3. North Korean Ballistic Missiles. 13

The Japanese concluded that the most logical pro

for bilateral technology cooperation would be a 

Theater Wide (NTW) program. The JSDF’s Mar

Self-Defense Force possessed the necessary plat

(Aegis cruisers), and the program lacked sufficient ma

that would guarantee meaningful participatio

Japanese industry. This pragmatic approa

development maximized potential profits and as

favorable bilateral technology cooperation for Jap

industry. The U.S. impetus for pressing the Japane

TMD was the presence of over 100,000 U.S. mi

personnel in Northeast Asia, with 55,000 of those stat

in Japan (to include Okinawa). The test of the North K

Taepo Dong-1 ballistic missile sharpened Japanese 

attention and underscored the apparent need for prot

from unpredictable nations. Thus in August 199

Japanese joined the United States in a 5-year de

6

Missile System Range/Payload

SCUD B

300 km/single conventio

or chemical warhead

SCUD C

550 km/single conventio

warhead

Nodong-1

1,300 km/single convent

chemical or nuclear war

Nodong-2

1,500 km/single convent

chemical or nuclear war

Taepo Dong-1

2,000 km/single convent

or nuclear warhead
program to cooperate on research and developmen

theater missile defense system.

14

7

Figure 1. Estimated Ranges of Curren

 and Potential North Korean Ballistic Missil
Likewise, the Japanese became more aware o

Chinese ballistic missile program. The Chinese thre

not seem as immediate as the one from North K

however, Japanese officials realized that missiles dir

at Taiwan could be redirected toward them and 

road-mobile missiles now under development in 

could be targeted against Japan. Should the Japan-

relationship change, the Japanese knew the risks.

The Strategic Setting.

East Asia in general, and Northeast Asia in parti

appears to be in a dangerous strategic setting. The reg

characteristics include major shifts in the balance of p

skewed distributions of economic and political power w

and between countries, political and cultural diversi

anemic security apparatus, and widespread terri

disputes over natural resource issues.

16Chanc

escalation of tension in the area seem great, espe

without a U.S. military presence in the region. The 

century history of East Asia proves that mistrust be

two or more potential adversaries can lead each side t

precautionary and defensively-motivated measures 

are perceived as offensive threats.

17These perception

lead to countermeasures in kind, begetting an a

reaction cycle that increases regional tensions and cre

self-fulfilling prophecy about the region’s volatilit

view of all these variables that might fuel insecurities

Asia appears quite dangerous. Not only could dramat

unpredictable changes in the distribution of mi

capabilities increase uncertainty and mistrust, bu

importance of sea-lanes and secure energy suppl

almost all regional actors could encourage a destabi

competition to develop power-projection capabilities o

seas and in the skies. Because of the perception as offe

threats, power-projection forces heighten spiraling ten

as opposed to weapons that can only defend a na

homeland. Perhaps even more important in East Asia 

these variables are psychological factors (such a

8
historical mistrust and animosity among regional a

and political geography issues relating to the Ta

question, which make defensive systems (such as TM

the region appear threatening to other nations’ secur

Policy Concerns. 

Japanese policy seeks to negotiate the delicate ba

among its own security; its political, diplomatic

economic alliance with the United States; and its pol

diplomatic, and economic relationship with China. J

still depends on American strategic security, although 

would argue this relationship approaches “normalcy

Japan’s long-term policy goal may be self-sufficiency

in matters of security. But would a TMD alliance be

the United States and Japan hasten self-sufficiency or 

it? Other questions quickly arise: Is TMD effective? 

much would it cost?

Chinese policy seeks to further the developme

China into the preeminent Western Pacific/Nort

Asian regional power.

21Broadly stated, China be

missile defense programs will undermine strategic sta

by weakening its one viable deterrent capability 

precipitate a new arms race. Specifically, the Chinese 

that Japanese TMD programs will obviate their ba

missile force; undermine their regional security; le

Japan’s eventual remilitarization; aid in the defen

Taiwan; and retard current global arms control effort

reduce or check stronger powers such as the United Sta

The United States would ideally like to participat

bilateral theater missile defense that protects its fo

deployed and forward based forces in Northeast Asia

protects the Japanese main islands, and that doe

precipitate a regional arms race. To this end, key 

concerns are proliferation of the ballistic missile t

compliance with agreed-to nonproliferation protocols

deployment of a viable TMD system without precipita

9
10

Figure 2. Estimated Ranges of Current Ch

Ballistic Missiles.

22
cycle of improvements and counter-improvemen

American and Chinese arsenals.

Considerations.

The United States and Japan estimate TMD wi

$15 billion for research, development and deployment 

on the U.S. Navy Theater Wide system. But investm

this magnitude (approximately 15 percent of the 

Japanese defense spending from 2000-2006) may adv

affect other necessary defense programs (such as FS

indigenous fighter program). Fiscal constraint beco

significant consideration in light of the stated Jap

policy of no increased defense spending over the n

years. 

The U.S. side expresses concerns that the Jap

partnership may lead to redistribution of monies with

internal U.S. defense budget among competing m

defense programs. In other words, now that the Jap

have committed to cooperative research and developm

an upper-tier naval system, the U.S. upper-tier land s

may not receive the planned and budgeted amounts n

so that the partnership with Japan on the naval syste

be kept on schedule.

23

Japan is also very worried over Chinese reaction 

pursuit of TMD. Chinese officials encourage some of Ja

fears by maintaining that TMD in Japan would trig

regional arms race. First, they argue TMD would re

China to build up its own missiles to overcome the m

defense system; they warn that this “action-reaction” 

could spin out of control.

24Second, they claim Japan 

use TMD technologies to manufacture offensive mi

The Chinese would consider this very provocative, req

a military response, most likely in the form of incr

inventories of Chinese missiles.

For its part, the United States views the deploym

the North Korean Nodong-1 and Nodong-2 SRBM’s an

11
development of the Taepo Dong-1 MRBM and Taepo D

ICBM (Table 3) as the most immediate and realistic th

12

Missile System

(U.S. Name in

Brackets)

Range/Payload

Estimate

Number 

Service

DF-3 (CSS-2)

2,800 km/single

nuclear or

conventional

warhead

38

DF-4 (CSS-3)

4,750 km/single

nuclear warhead

12

DF-5/5A (CSS-4)

13,000+ km/single

nuclear warhead

10

DF-21/21A (CSS-5)

1,800 km/single

nuclear or

conventional

warhead

8

DF-15/M-9 (CSS-6)

600 km/single

nuclear or

conventional

warhead

4

DF-11/M-11 (CSS-7)

300 km/single

nuclear or

conventional

warhead

unknown

DF-31

8,000 km/single or

MIRV nuclear

warhead(s)

unknown

DF-41

12,000 km/single or

MIRV nuclear

warhead(s)

unknown

Table 4. Chinese Ballistic Missiles.

25
in the region. Chinese CSS-5 and CSS-6 could also 

Japan, but Taiwan dominates Chinese targeteering. 

mobile missiles under development in China (DF-3

DF-41) (Table 4) are unlikely candidates for targ

Japan and by extension, U.S. forces, but they do reta

capability.

26

The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Theater Missile

Defense.

The current U.S.-Japan security relationship 

itself on the bilateral review that took place from Oc

1994 to April 1996, the resulting East Asia Strategy R

(Nye Initiative), and the follow-on U.S.-Japan 

Security Declaration. This declaration attempt

demonstrate that the 2-year review of the sec

relationship had produced an alliance with great po

and operational capability.

27An initiative in the 

Security Declaration called for a review of ex

Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, seeking to ex

them to include a focus on cooperation in respond

regional contingencies, as well as the direct defen

Japan. Concurrent negotiations quickly incorporated 

cooperation into the Guidelines review process, 

culminated in August 1999 when the United State

Japan signed a TMD cooperation agreement. 

agreement calls for shared fiscal and techn

responsibility in the development of a sea-based TMD

U.S. Positions. U.S. proponents of TMD argue 

regardless of its impact on U.S.-China relations, or its 

on global arms control, or its effects on atomic s

nuclear strategy, TMD remains essential to d

deployed U.S. forces overseas. Proponents further 

that Japanese TMD offers the potential to enhanc

bilateral security arrangement and provide fun

technology, and customers for an extremely costly 

complex system.

13
Advocates maintain that TMD provides a bulwa

U.S. extended nuclear deterrence against newly eme

“rogue states,” against emerging and established li

ballistic missile threats, and against chemica

biological threats for which nuclear deterrence alone 

not offer sufficient deterrence. Second, TMD pr

coalitions from intimidation. Third, TMD strengthen

reciprocal commitment for the United States to d

Japan and for Japan to defend forward-based U.S. f

Fourth, assuming the U.S. deployment of TMD to prot

globally-based forces, TMD cannot be deployed to p

U.S. personnel without also affording protection t

Japanese population. Fifth, without TMD, Japan ma

more vulnerable to limited ballistic missile attack an

become predisposed to develop its own nuclear deterre

Critics of Japanese TMD argue that the severity 

threat does not justify the cost. Further, they asser

TMD, as a tenant of counterproliferation, is faulty. 

will overwhelm Japan’s limited national sec

capabilities and leave Japan unprepared to hand

strategic responsibilities inherent to TMD. The cost of 

is prohibitive for Japan. And, finally, critics assert tha

arms reduction, not deterrence, guarantees security.

Japanese Positions. The advantages of TMD dom

the Japanese debate. The apparent lack of dissent r

from the exceptional concern engendered by the 

Korean Taepo Dong-1 missile flight test in August 199

the apparent benefit of TMD development to Jap

industry. Such solidarity will be temporary, however, 

high cost becomes clear.

Proponents of TMD stress that a viable missile t

exists from North Korea and China that must be conta

Second, they point out the potential for a significant am

of bilateral technology exchange with the United S

noting that industrial cooperation, to include lic

indigenous production of TMD components, will be 

billions of yen.

29

14
Opponents of TMD argue that the prohibitive cos

not allow funding for other essential defense prog

They point out that upper-tier TMD systems prohibi

the 1972 ABM Treaty will limit the usefulness of TM

Japan. Most importantly, adoption of TMD system

precipitate confrontation with China.

30

Alliance Implications. The complexity of TM

staggering. Each partner must contemplate a broad 

of detailed issues, not the least of which include formu

of an effective bilateral command and control strateg

potential for truly integrated combined missile de

operations; and bilateral military connectivity tha

outpaces what is now practical or even imagined i

alliance relationship.

31

TMD will be effectively employed only if there ex

seamless and unimpeded command and control of disp

sensors and weapons, commanded by both nations

controlled by a variety of interconnected mi

organizations, doctrinally linked; only if Japan’s indiv

Self-Defense Forces cooperate with each other and 

U.S. forces in unprecedented intimacy; and only if Ja

air defense system rebuilds from the ground up.

32

when all this happens, Japan will achieve a significan

in regional and global arms control and nonprolife

initiatives. Likewise, it will bolster the U.S. nu

umbrella. What may start as an alliance manage

initiative may become an alliance-defining initiative, 

leading edge of the revolution in military affairs as pa

system that boasts unprecedented connect

interoperability and seamless command and control.

Strategic Implications for the U.S.-China

Relationship.

TMD Transfers to Taiwan: “Umbrella over Taiwan

issue that arouses the most Chinese passion is Ta

Chinese nationalists vehemently claim Taiwan. 

deflect any outside influence with charges of “interfe

15
in internal Chinese affairs” and “an affront to Ch

sovereignty.” The rulers of the Chinese Communist 

(CCP) will address the Taiwan issue in terms of an “in

affair” and rebuff all attempts to legitimize other s

contact with Taipei. This approach serves, in turn, to u

the legitimacy of the mainland regime and further i

Taiwan from vital sources of economic, political

military support.

China worries that if it wavers the slightest on T

and the territory achieves viable independence, then 

regions of China seeking autonomy, such as Tibe

perhaps Xinjiang, would be encouraged in their stru

The specter of internal disruption always looms large 

CCP’s leadership calculus.

The possibility of Japanese TMD equipme

technology being sold or transferred to Taiwan eli

visceral, menacing reaction from the Chinese. C

maintains that TMD technology and equipment trans

to Taiwan would exacerbate missile proliferation, v

the spirit and intent of the MTCR, and enco

Taiwanese ambitions for independence. Furth

sea-based Japanese TMD might also be used to p

Taiwan in the event of a military confrontation be

Taiwan and mainland China, despite China’s abil

overwhelm Taiwan with sheer numbers of missiles

inclusion of Japan, and by extension the United Stat

any cross-strait conflict dramatically raises the str

stakes. This political issue, along with the potenti

quick escalation to crisis proportions, causes the gr

concern for the Chinese, not actual TMD m

performance. 

The importance of Taiwan in Chinese calculations 

TMD cannot be overstated. The nature of the cross-

conflict defies the usual arguments about the of

defense balance and the “security dilemma.” In sum

arguments that the buildup of defensive weapon

16
adoption of defensive doctrine should not be destabi

fall on deaf Chinese ears.

According to conventional wisdom, defensive we

destabilize because they shore up the territorial statu

by deterring or physically preventing aggressors 

achieving revisionist goals, whereas offensive we

destabilize because they threaten the status quo.

34C

however, retains as its primary policy objectiv

prevention of Taiwan declaring permanent indepen

from the Chinese nation. A cross-strait relationship 

would legalize and freeze the territorial status quo re 

the main threat to Chinese policy. China employs mi

and economic coercion as her primary means of coun

that threat. Beijing considers traditionally defe

weapons in the hands of Taiwan and any potential po

allies (the United States and Japan) as dangerous, be

they give Taiwan officials additional confidence in 

efforts to legitimize the territorial status quo.

35

TMD in Japan would reduce China’s ability to thr

Taiwan with ballistic missiles, her primary mea

coercion. Significantly, the ship-based system u

development causes acute worry because of its 

“footprint” and easy deployability. Effectiveness o

system aside, China agonizes about the psychologica

political effect the system would have on Taipei’s att

about seeking diplomatic latitude, as well as U.S

Japanese attitudes about cross-strait relations.

36

TMD Cooperation Will Lead to Japan’s Eve

Remilitarization. The Chinese perceive a shift i

U.S.-Japan alliance dating back to the mid-1980s. 

maintain that de facto licensed coproduction program

as the F-15J and Patriot PAC 2+, coupled with chan

alliance structure precipitated by the Nye Initiative an

subsequently revised Defense Guidelines, sh

willingness, perhaps even an eagerness, by the U

States and Japan to “normalize” Japan’s security.

17
TMD heightens this concern when viewed i

aggregate with other U.S.-Japan alliance developm

These include the new Japanese LST (landing ship, ta

ship capable of launching and recovering aircraf

family of Japanese space launch vehicles (SLV) regard

potential dual-use platforms; and the Japanese purch

Patriot PAC-3 missiles with their limited lowe

capability.

37China views such developments as precu

to the relaxing of Japanese law. 38

Indeed, U.S. pressures on Japan to accept a g

share of the burden of its own national defense in 

encourages Japan to become self-sufficient. Further, 

56 years since the end of World War II, it has b

inevitable that the post-war U.S.-Japan sec

relationship will change, especially in view of Ja

growth as a global economic power. Wealth beget

imminent potential for military power.

TMD and the prospect of meshing national com

and control systems, both for regional defense and 

“early warning” for proposed U.S. NMD, mean that J

will develop capabilities beyond what its pr

constitution allows.

39Complementary to TMD is a 

based sensor system to aid in early warning and detect

incoming missiles. Japanese law prohibits 

militarization of outer space. Satellite sensors to war

hostile missile launch and perhaps to help guid

intercept constitute a necessary part of a TMD syste

China recognized these overt harbingers of chan

also recognized the implications of the Japanese Minis

Foreign Affairs future diplomatic blueprint, Cha

2001.

40Accordingly, the Chinese assert that 

represents another, albeit significant, step by Japan t

its national security into its own hands. The implicatio

China of a militarized, self-sufficient Japan defy de

tion. Japan’s technical ability, industrial potential

geographic position would inhibit the Chinese des

remain militarily preeminent in Northeast Asia. The 

18
discussed development of any “remilitarization” of J

and the TMD implications of that action conce

independent Japanese ability to build and deliver offe

ballistic missiles. China maintains that the techn

transfers of TMD components are directly applica

offensive systems. Hence, China views U.S. coope

with Japan on TMD as nothing less than U.S. suppo

emergent Japanese military power. In response, the U

States reassures that all MTCR regimes would be foll

The United States contends that, in fact, Ja

indigenous space program and its family of SLVs e

more compatibility for this type of technology transfer 

TMD.

41

TMD Will Lead to an Independent Japanese N

Deterrent. The Japanese debate on security normaliz

and nuclear weapons development is in its infancy an

implications of self-sufficiency remain unspoken. A

only nation to endure nuclear attack, Japan can arti

the most compelling reasons for not developing s

capability.

But China maintains that Japan reveale

pragmatism regarding the use of nuclear devices w

proceeded with the commercial development of nu

power in the 1970s. Perceptual differences here again 

on exceptional significance. Old hostilities from th

years of the 1930s and 1940s do not allow for a Ch

acceptance of Japan’s benign use of nuclear power a

U.S. restraints.

More pragmatically, however, Japanese nuclear 

exhibits remarkable transparency (transparency add

the ability to verify that materials are not used for nu

weapons making, etc.). So mutual confidence measure

transparency exercises could keep the “nuclear genie 

bottle” and limit regional fears. Further, TMD obviat

need for an independent Japanese deterrent by shori

the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

42

19
TMD Undermines China’s Nuclear Deterrent. This 

central issue to the U.S.–China missile defense debat

United States relies on both offensive forces (the str

nuclear triad of land-based missiles, sea-based mi

and bombers) and defensive forces (ballistic m

defenses), with the latter providing reinforcement 

stabilizing influence of deterrence. China deriv

deterrence solely from an offensive land based missile 

These differences are stark. China’s reliance on on

form of nuclear deterrence makes any attempt to rest

destabilizing. China consistently maintains 

undermines its offensive nuclear deterrence. Ch

declared no-first use (NFU) of nuclear weapons contr

this argument, however, unless its declared policy is 

and China, in fact, targets Japan (active target

considered a violation of NFU protocols). So Ch

objections to TMD reveal a significant inconsisten

Chinese doctrine.

43

TMD Will Provoke Changes in Chinese Nuclear Do

Chinese responses to Japanese TMD suggest support f

evolution of Chinese nuclear doctrine from one of “min

deterrence” to one of “limited deterrence.” Min

deterrence, according to China, means possession of a 

number of nuclear warheads sufficient to i

unacceptable damage on a handful of enemy citie

truth, Chinese missiles can presently do little else. A

potential of Chinese weapons systems increases, how

there exist indications that the Chinese are building a 

robust limited nuclear deterrent. Limited nu

deterrence (in concert with the technological and eco

capability of the Chinese state) originally envisione

ability to inflict unacceptable damage with se

warheads aimed at enemy cities. It since matured 

more sharply defined concept that now promises li

counterforce warfighting capabilities. Limited deter

now means having enough capability to deter conven

theater and strategic nuclear war and to contro

suppress escalation during a nuclear conflict.

45

20
This shift invites several questions. Has the Ch

nuclear stockpile expanded beyond the commonly acc

75-100 warheads available for targeting against T

(and Japan) to a force that is more consistent with a li

deterrence capability (250-300 warheads)? We do not 

but remain convinced it has. The exceptional ci

spection of the Chinese about the size and capability o

ballistic missile force breeds mistrust. But doesn’t thi

to greater capability justify TMD? Japan rem

unconvinced of benign Chinese intentions, while 

insists its declared NFU policy and strictly defe

nuclear weapons offer indications of peaceful inten

should be accepted at face value.

China’s threat of building to “limited” nu

deterrence is a thinly veiled suggestion that Japanese 

may provoke an even greater increase in the num

Chinese missiles, the method by which they are dep

and the technical capabilities of the missiles (addit

Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles [MIRV], d

penetration aids, etc.). China developed and deploy

first generation of missiles in 11 years.

46The s

generation will take somewhat longer. Forecasted w

initial operating capability during the year 2000, C

move to modernize occurred well before TMD beca

significant issue.

On the other hand, it can be argued that Ch

progressing towards nuclear modernization anyw

came to the conclusion to do so independent of, or mini

affected by, TMD considerations. Thus all the rhetoric 

U.S.-Japan TMD could be viewed as a ploy to justi

expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal, which would h

anyway.

TMD Undermines Arms Control. The most arti

expression of Chinese sentiments comes from Ambas

Shu Zukang, who asserts that “the U.S. developm

missile defenses does not contribute to global stabili

will it serve the interests of the U.S. itself.”

47He con

21
that NMD/TMD violates the 1972 ABM treaty, consi

by the Chinese as “the most important arms control pr

being implemented,” and that the loss of this treaty wi

to a disruption of the strategic balance between the U

States and Russia.

48This will, in turn, result in a g

instability for all countries. Specifically, Sha asks, “Ho

you expect progress in arms control and nonprolife

while you yourself are developing NMD at full steam

just wishful thinking.”

49Shu also hinted that rather 

engaging in an arms race, should the United States pr

with its NMD/TMD deployments, “it would be quite po

for China to review its policies on various arms co

disarmament and nonproliferation issues, including F

negotiations.”

50Chinese officials also assert that 

deployments will lead to a complete halt in global 

control and nonproliferation, with direct implicatio

START II, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, M

Technology Control Regime and Fissile Material C

Treaty. Chinese officials have gone so far as to d

“NMD will also cause many nations to build up their nu

forces and further retard the disarmament process.”

Significantly, China avoids any overtures to parti

in multilateral ABM controls and continues to up

Soviet designed surface-to-air (SAM) missiles fo

ballistic missile defense role. Since the U.S.-Ru

agreement on threshold testing of missile defense sy

clarified permitted capabilities, Chinese arguments 

undermining the ABM Treaty have lost their relevan

China shows deep concern that should TMD/

undermine the ABM Treaty, then Russian ratificat

START II and participation in START III wou

obviated, with negative consequences for Be

Specifically, by withdrawing from the STAR

preliminaries, the Russian threat to the northern Ch

border would return, albeit on a smaller scale than d

the 1960s to 1990s rift between the two. This would 

Chinese resources from development and moderniz

22
and inhibit the current free flow of technology and c

between them.

53

TMD missile legitimacy also received a challenge 

the 1987 MTCR. Some states construed TMD develop

as a form of missile proliferation. The United S

maintains that TMD development protocols d

constitute a violation of the MTCR and will not contrib

missile proliferation.

54

For its part, the United States maintains that it 

rushing toward upper-tier TMD deployment in Japa

that it remains undecided about selling lower-tier TM

Taiwan. The only TMD deployment decision the U

States has made addresses lower-tier TMD deployme

Japan to protect U.S. troops and facilities. Taiwan c

“plug into” an existing TMD system, thus Chinese vie

TMD should not be based on the misperception tha

United States seeks to build a regional TMD architectu

Possibilities.

The United States has four viable options in reg

Northeast Asia theater missile defense. First, the U

States and Japan should continue to follow a pa

eventual deployment of a viable TMD system in Japa

South Korea. The essential U.S. obligation to prote

forward-based military personnel demands an eff

TMD in these two countries. Anything less cou

construed as gross negligence of a country’s obligat

adequately protect its forces from a known, viable t

that is economically and politically feasible to ad

Likewise, intermingling of the American and Jap

population in Japan renders it impossible to protec

without extending that protection to the other.

The alliance partners, however, should be exceptio

cognizant of the remaining alternatives that would 

this bilateral choice more palatable to China and thus 

escalating the arms race. The second alternative would 

23
pursue THAAD, rather than NTW. If effective, this 

provide the home islands and the U.S. forces protection

THAAD’s relative immobility and inability to exte

“footprint” to Taiwan would be less likely to exace

Chinese concerns about real or perceived alliance su

for Taiwanese independence.

56Of course, this would 

new U.S.-Japan concerns, particularly with coope

development and less Japanese industrial participatio

more mature system. But it may be worth this price 

overtly antagonize Beijing.

A third choice, less likely since August 19

production of TMD unilaterally by the United S

Chinese analysts have consistently pointed out 

U.S.-Japan coproduction of TMD carries a fundame

different and more provocative political meaning for 

than if the United States produced such systems w

Japanese help as part of the U.S. strategy of protecti

forward deployed forces. This directly challenge

“protect us, protect them” pillar of U.S.-Japan 

partnering. 

The fourth option calls for no deployment of TMD 

Proponents stress that this would obviate the Ch

arguments about arms control and nonproliferation an

real pressure on Beijing to be genuinely transparent 

missile development and deployment. Reconsiderat

deployment might also open up an opportunity to e

Chinese concerns and encourage Beijing to participat

formal trilateral security dialogue.

In contrast, the very real and more likely poss

envisions continued Chinese obfuscation on its m

affairs. The overwhelming desire to build, deploy

maintain the military trappings of a “great power” re

so engrained in the Chinese leadership’s psyche tha

risky attempt at placating Chinese fears with ge

measures of conciliation would more than likely be fru

Given the Taiwan problem and overwhelming superio

U.S. military power, China shows the deep-seated des

24
develop its missile capability to a significant d

regardless of U.S.-Japan TMD cooperation.

Conclusions.

By persistently increasing U.S. capabilities 

judiciously incorporating increased Japanese capabili

the U.S.-Japan alliance, the United States can fulf

obligation to its forward-deployed forces and all

Northeast Asia. The United States needs to be cau

however, about what new roles Japan plays in the all

for TMD will fundamentally change that relationship

ultimate responsibility of an American President 

provide for the safety of the American people and the a

forces by deterring attack on the homeland and allie

increasing U.S. capabilities, the United States will be 

able to handle future regional crises and prevent them 

happening. Consistent actions in the face of inflamm

rhetoric will avoid the destabilizing effects of an arm

and backsliding on arms control and nonprolifer

agreements. Ultimately, such actions will contr

mightily toward long-term peace and stability in Nort

China. 

ENDNOTES

Editor’s Note: For the reader/researcher seeking add

information on this subject, please review the following pu

article: Thomas J. Christensen, “Theater Missile Defense and T

Security,” Orbis, Winter 2000, pp. 79-90.

1. Barbara Opall-Rome, “One on One,” Defense News, Febr

1999, p. 22.

2. “Missiles, Theater Missile Defense, and Regional St

Second U.S.-China Conference on Arms Control, Disarmame

Nonproliferation,” linked from the Center for Nonproliferation 

at the Monterey Institute of International Studies; availab

http://www.cns.miis.edu/cns/projects/eanp/conf/uschina2/ind

Internet; accessed December 7, 1999, p. 2.

3. Ibid., p. 3.

25
4. “Japan Moves,” China Daily, November 18, 1998, p. 4.

5. “Pyongyang’s Missile Program Threatens Area Peace,” 

Express, October 9, 1998, sec. A, p. 1.

6. Patrick Cronin, Paul Giarra, and Michael Green, “A

Implications of Theater Missile Defense,“ in The U.S.-Japan A

Past, Present, and Future, Patrick Cronin and Michael Green, ed

York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999, pp. 171-172.

7.Cronin, Giarra, and Green, p. 172.

8. “Fact Sheets for Ballistic Missile Defense Systems” link

the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization availabl

http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/meads.html; In

accessed November 30, 1999.

 9. Cronin, Giarra, and Green, p. 172.

10. Robert Wall, “U.S.-Japan Agree on Cooperative 

Defense,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, August 23, 1999

11. Cronin, Giarra, and Green, p. 172.

12. Ibid., p. 173.

13. Ibid., p. 50.

14. Wall, p. 48.

15. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Thr

Response, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, No

1997, p. 7.

16. Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance 

Security Dilemma in East China,” International Security, V

Spring 1999, p. 49.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., pp. 49-50.

19. Ibid., p. 50.

20.Paul Giarra, “Interim Report from an Evolving All

Japan’s Changing Security Policy: Listening All These Years,” 

from unpublished book, furnished December 1999.

26
21. “Missiles, Theater Missile Defense . . .,” p. 13.

22. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Thr

Response, p. 11.

23. The ideas is this paragraph are based on remarks ma

speaker participating in the Commandant’s Lecture Series at th

War College, AY 1999-2000.

24. Giarra, p. 10.

25. “Chinese Ballistic Missiles” linked from the Cen

Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of Intern

Studies; available from http://www.cns.miis.edu/cns/pr

eanp/pubs/chinanuc/bmsl.htm; Internet; accessed December 5

26. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Thr

Response, p. 10.

27. Cronin, Giarra, and Green, p. ix.

28. Ibid., p. 174.

29. Ibid., p. 177.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., p. 180.

32. Ibid., pp. 181-182.

33. Ibid.

34. Christensen, pp. 64-65.

35. Ibid., p. 66.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Michael J. Green, “Theater Missile Defense and S

Relations with China,” in Restructuring the U.S-Japan A

Toward a More Equal Partnership, Ralph A. Costa, ed., Wash

DC: CSIS Press, 1997, p. 116.

27
40. Green, p. 116.

41. Green, pp. 116-117.

42. Ibid., p. 117.

43. Ibid., p. 115.

44. Alastair I. Johnston, “China’s New ‘Old Thin

International Security, Vol. 20, Winter 1995/1996, p. 10.

45. Ibid., p. 19.

46. Ibid., p. 36.

47. “Missiles, Theater Missile Defense . . .,” p. 4.

48. Ibid., p. 14.

49. Ibid., p. 4-5.

50. Ibid., p. 5.

51. Ibid.

52. Green, p. 116.

53. “Missiles, Theater Missile Defense . . .,” p. 14.

54. Evan A. Feigenbaum, “Who’s Behind China’s High-Tec

‘Revolution’?,” International Security, Vol. 24, Summer 1999, p

55. Ibid., p. 13.

56. Christensen, p. 76.

28
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Tr

International treaty whereb

signatories agree not to co

nuclear device testing of any ty

EPCI Enhanced Proliferation Co

Initiative. An initiative that en

the U.S. Government to re

export license of all items, even 

not on the control list in the E

Administration Regulations, 

exporter knows, has reason to 

or has been informed that the 

will be used in a nuclear missil

Endo-Atmospheric Within the earth’s atmosph

Generally regarded as less th

miles altitude.

Exo-Atmospheric Outside the earth’s atmosph

Generally regarded as greater 

60 miles altitude.

FMCT Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty

JTMD Joint Theater Missile Defense

integration of joint force capab

to destroy enemy theater missi

flight or prior to otherwise d

the enemy’s theater mi

operations though an approp

mix of mutually supportive pa

missile defense; active m

defense; attack operations

supporting command, con

communications, computers 

intelligence measures.

29

GLOSSARY
Lower Tier Those missile defense sys

developed for engaging th

ballistic missiles in 

endo-atmospheric role, usually 

descent phase of flight. Mi

engaged are usually shorter 

and lower speed (warheads trav

< 5 km/sec)

MTCR Missile Technology Control Re

An informal, non-treaty assoc

of states that have an estab

policy or interest in limitin

spread of missiles or mi

technology and of limiting the ri

proliferation of weapons of 

destruction by controlling tran

that could make a contribution 

delivery of such weapons.

NAW Navy Area Wide. A U.S. 

lower-tier missile defense sy

under development by the U

States. Deployed from Aegis

cruisers, it uses a modification 

existing surface-to-air miss

engage theater ballistic missile

NMD National Missile Defense. A 

Program, run by the Departm

Defense Ballistic Missile De

Office (BMDO) tasked 

developing a system(s) that 

protect the continental United S

from ballistic missile attack.

NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty. A t

designed to limit the formati

multinational nuclear forces 

prevent the uncontrolled spre

nuclear weapons.

30
NTW Navy Theater Wide. A U.S. 

upper-tier missile defense sy

under development by the U

States and Japan. Deployed 

Aegis-class cruisers, it us

modification of an exi

surface-to-air missile to en

theater ballistic missiles

PAC-3 Patriot Advanced Capability 3

upper-tier missile system u

development by modifying a ve

of the Patriot surface-to-air m

for intercepting theater ba

missiles.

SLV Space Launch Vehicle. T

vehicles whose primary purpos

launch into space with cargoes 

than weapons.

TBM Theater Ballistic Missile. A m

whose target may be within a 

theater of operations.

THAAD Theater High Altitude Air Defen

U.S. Army upper-tier missile de

system that utilizes an 

atmospheric “hit-to-kiss” missil

warhead to intercept theater ba

missiles.

Upper-tier Those missile defense sys

developed for engaging missiles 

exo-atmospheric role, either i

boost, ascent, or descent pha

flight. Missiles engaged are us

longer range and higher s

(warheads traveling > 5 km/sec

31
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

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STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

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Author

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