UALPSIS OF 


DEEP ATTACK OPERATIONS 


OPEXATION BAGRATION 


BELORUSSIA 22 JUNE-29 AUGUST 1944 


Lieutenant Colonel William M. Connor 

Combat Studies Institute 


Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 


March 1987 

CONTENTS 

-

Title

1 

2 

3 

4 

Strategic Setti- 

~perational/Tactical Situaticn 

Conduct of Operations 

Conclusions 

Page 

1 

16 

37 

57 

Annexes 

A 

B 

C 

D 

E 

F 

Strategic Setting 

Soviet Force Structure (1944; 

Correlation of Forces 

Planning Sequence 

Major Elements of Front' Placs 

Disposition 
OPERATION BAGRATION 


22 June-28 August 1944 


1. Strategic Setting. 

a. Principal Events. 

Operation BAGRATION took place during what the Soviet analysts consider 

the third period of the war: that of thD Soviet strategic offensives which 

marked the ascendancy of the Soviet armed forces over the German Wehrmacht. 

During this period, the armed forces of the soviet Union held the strategic 

initiaitve and used it to defeat the Wehrmacht, gain control of Eastern 

Europe, 'and invade Germany proper, meeting Allied forces on the Elbe River 

on 25 April 1945. The period is regarded as beginning January 1944 and 

ending with the V-E Day, 7 May 1945. 

During the first two major periods of the war, the Red Army had had 

first to conduct a strategic defense, more through force of circumstances 

than through any rational plan. During this period of strategic defense, 

which lasted from 22 June 1941 to 19 November 1942, the Wehrmacht generally 

held the strategic initiative and used it to advantage. Their first 

offensive, from 22 June to 5 December 1941 had nearly ended with the capture 

of Moscow, as well as resulting in the defeat of the Soviet Army which the 

Wehrmacht saw before it on 22 June 1941. They had not, however, counted 

upon the Soviet ability to raise new formations and manpower nor the 

movement of the factories east. Given the strategic surprise of the German 

invasion, the Soviet government had shaken but not fallen, and the 

governmental reorganization which followed would be one of the major factors 
in the ability of the Soviet Union to decide strategy and conduct 

operations. Nor could the Soviet Union receive substantial help from 

potential allies during this first advance by the Germans, as Great Britain 

was just capable of defending her own territory against the Germans. 

Finally, the Gennans had not reckoned upon the soviets' use of their Far 

Eastern armg to reinforce their European forces, made possible by the 

Neutrality Fact signed between Japan, Germany's ally, and the Soviet Union 

in April 1941. . As strategic consumption of German forces proceeded and they 

met a reorganized and reinforced Red Army in the battle for Moscow, the 

German tide was halted, and the Soviet counteroffensive began on 6 December, 

growing out of local counterattacks which exposed the weakness of the 

forward German forces. In the spring of 1942, the Soviet forces again 

attempted an offensive, but they were defeated, and the Gennan forces used 

this event to launch their om offensive in southern Russia in summer 1942. 

This resulted in the Stalingrad campaign, in which the Gennan armies were 

halted at Stalingrad on the Volga River and in the Caucasus mountains by 

Russian defense and strategic consumption of their own forces again. 

The second period of the war began with the Soviet counteroffensive 

against the Ge wan forces surrounding Stalingrad. This time, however, the 

counteroffensive was not a development of events on the ground but rather 

had been planned by Stavka, the Soviet High Command. Tbe counteroffensive 

was successful, and the German Sixth Army was surrounded and destroyed by 

February 1943. However, when the Soviet forces attempted to exploit their 

success, they were defeated by the Germans in a counteroffensive by Manstein 

from 18 February to the end of March 1943. The lesson uas clear that the 
Red Army ma still not able to take the offensive against the Wehlmacht. 

Thus, for the summer campaign, the Stavka decided not to initiate offensive 

operations but to wait for the expected German offensive, defeat it, and 

then conduct a counteroffensive. Due to good intelligence from such HUMINT 

sources as Sorge in Tokyo, Lucy, and the Red Chorus and the battlefield 

preparations of the Germans, the Red Army determined the location, Kursk, 

and timing, July, of the German offensive. The Red Army' then prepared their 

positions and gathered reserves to meet the threat. The result was the 

complete defeat of the last strategic offensive effort to be made by the 

Geman Wehmcht on the Eastern Front. The Red Army followed up its 

successes with another counteroffensive which liberated the Ukraine east of 

the Dnieper River and its capitol Kiev by November 1943, and in December 

expanded its bridgeheads on the western bank of the Dnieper River, 

preparatory to freeing the rest of the Ukraine. . -

By 	 the beginning of 1944, the Red Army clearly had the initiative on the 

. 	 Eastern Front; moreover, since the beginning of the second .period, the 

Soviet Union also had strong allies who could provide assistance in two 

ways: the United States and Great Britain. The main factor in the alliance 

had been the entry of the United States into World War I1 since the Japanese 

attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. As the Soviet Union saw it, the 

most important contribution which these allies could make to her 

strategically would be to open a second Front against the Germans. Although 

this was not to happen during the first period, they did contribute in two 

other ways. They commenced Lend-Lease aid, although this would not amount 

to sufficient quantities to affect Soviet operations until late 1943 and 
1944. They also opened indiretct attacks on Germany through the initiation 

of the strategic bombing campaign against Germany proper and commencing 

offensives and landings against Axis forces in North Africa (at the 

beginning of the Soviet's second ~eriod). The invasions of Sicily and Italy 

followed in the second period, Imocking Italy out of its alliance with 

G e m and diverting German forces to defend in Italy. The invasion of 

Sicily may also have contributed to the German decision to break off its 

Kursk offensives as well in July 1943. Moreover, by the end of the second 

period of the war, the Allies had finalized their plans for the opening of 

the Second Front directly by landing in northern and southern France in May 

1944, and the Soviet leadership had been so informed at the Teheran 

Conference in November 1943. Indeed, just the threat of the invasion had 

. been sufficient to act as a distraction to the Germans by this time, and 

Lend-Lease aid had now entered the Soviet armed forces in quantity. 

In the third period of the war, therefore, the Soviet Union 'held the 

strategic initiative, and the year opened with the first two of what would 

come to be known as the "Ten Destructive Blows" of 1944: Leningrad and the 

Ukraine. The offensive at Leningrad commenced on 14 January 1944 and ground 

to a halt on 1March with the German siege of Leningrad broken,. the German 

Sixteenth and Eighteenth Armies defeated, Soviet advances of up to 200 

kilometers, and Soviet forces on the border o.f Estonia. The blow in the 

Ukraine commenced on 24 January 1944, lasting until mid-April, and involved 

all of the fronts in the Ukraine. Finally, the various fronts were ordered 

by Stavka to go on the defensive between 17 April and 6 May to prepare for 

the summer offensive. 
By the time operations halted, the Soviets had regained almost all of 

ths Ukraine and were threatening the borders of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and 

Rumania. In April-May, Soviet forces invaded and freed yet another German 

holding in the third blow of the year, the Crimea and Odessa. 

-

The Soviet offensives had smashed five German awies: two in the north, 

two in the south, and one in the Crimea. German personnel casualties may 

have amounted to as many as 1,000,000 in the south alone. German equipment 

losses claimed by the Soviets for the first half of 1944 amounted to 8,100 

guns, 3,500 mortars, 23,500 machine &a, 18,400 rifles, 1,000 tanks and 

assault guns, 3,300 tractors and prime movers, 61,300 vehicles, 11,700,000 

projectiles, and 2,300,000 mines. 

Finally, the German defeats had put pressure on two German allies, 

Finland and Rumania. The fourth blow of 1944 commenced on 10 June against 

Finland, and Viipuri fell within ten days. Fighting continued throughout . -

the summer, and Finland ended hostilities on 4 September. In addition, on 

other fronts, the Allied invasion of Europe had commenced on 6 June, and 

Rome had fallen on 4 June. 

b. Strategic objectives. 

(1) Soviet Union: 

(a) Recover Soviet territory from German occupation. 

(b) Destroy Genaan forces. 

(c) Liberate other European countries under German control. 

(d) Conduct strategic operations sequentially rather than 

simultaneou sly. 
The first look at strategic concept8 by which to accomplish the 

above objectives took place with a meeting of a commission of the State 

Defence. Committee beginning 5 April 1944. They appear to have considered 

three options: 

First, they could have continued their successful southern 

offensive southward into the Balkans, hopefully cutting off the German 

forces in the southern Ukraine. Besides destroying German forces, this 

would have freed Arropean countries, especially Rumania and Bulgaria, which 

were wavering in their alliance with Germany. But the direction was away 

fran Germany, and it would have had to be done with very powerful, 

undefeated Gennan farces on their flank and rear. Finally, the remaining 

Soviet territory lay north of the Pripet Marshes. 

The second option considerdd was that of a stroke north from 

the northern Ukraine toward the Baltic. If successful, such a strike would 

have encircled the German forces north of the Pripet Marshes, liberated the 

last major Soviet territory still remaining in-German hands, and been on the 

road to Berlin. But this course was regarded as beyond Soviet capability, 

and it would have also left major German foxes on its flanks, to say 

nothing of the encircled forces which would have to be reduced. 

'Ihis led to consideration of mounting the offensive directly 

against the German forces in Belorussia, which represented the last major 

undefeated German force on the Eastern knt. If the offensive were 

.successful, that would also lead to reconquest of the last remaining Soviet 

territory still in German hands. Following that, the possibility of a drive 

to the Baltic, to Konigsberg, in Eastern Prussia, or to Riga to encircle 
Army Group North still remained. Most important, from the Soviet point of 

view, while the goal was less decisive, immediately, than either of the 

other two courses, it was feasible, and it could lead to strategically 

deciaive results.. 

Stalin and the State Defense Committee approved the 

commission's recommendation by 12 April, and orders went out by 17 April 

directing the cessation of offensive operations described in paragraph la. 

The commission had also determined that simultaneous offensives were still 

not possible, either; therefore, the summer campaign would have to consist 

of sequential offensives. 

Thus, the strategic objectives were now as follows: 

(a) ~ecover/liberate Belorussia from Germany. 

(b) Destroy or defeat ~e-n forces in Belorussia, Army Group 

Center. 

(c) Liberate other Eumpean countries under German control. 

(d) Conduct strategic operations sequentially rather than 

simultaneously during the summer. 

(2) Germany: 

(a) Defeat Allied landings in France. 

(b) Win time for coalition to break up. 

(c) Defend territorial gains in East with forces in theater. 

(d) Defeat expected Soviet summer offensive in south with 

mobile reserves stationed in North Ukraine. 

(e) Hold Allied forces in Italy. 
In deciding its strategy, Germany had to consider the nature of 

all threats against it. As a result, Hitler had pointed out that the 

expected Allied landings in northern Rance were the most immediately 

dangerous threat to Germasy, with the Red Army over 1,000 kilometers from 

th.' German frontier but the Allies only 300-500 kilometers away after 

landing. Thus, the Eastern Front could expect no reinforcement until after 

the Allied landing had been defeated and thrown back into the sea or 

contained. Until the decision in the West, the forces on the Eastern Front 

would have to defend, and they would have to defend all positions. They 

would not be allowed to trade space for time. 

German ihtelligence had also identified the first two options 

described above which were available to the Soviets, and they felt that 

their forces, with strong armored forces in the northern Ukraine, could 

handle the defensive misaion. They were not worried about Army Group Center 

because it had been successful in the winter and spring; moreover, the 

force ratios in April were not those which the Soviets liked when they went 

on the offensive. Finally, the terrain in the sector of Army Group Center 

favored the defense and was especially a hindrance to the movement of large 

armored forces. One of the moat important indicators which the Gennans 

would use to predict the next offensive would be the location of the tank 

armies, all five of which were in the Ukraine as of April 1944. 

c. Allocation of ~esoumes/~orces. 

(1) Forces and force structure. (see Annex A) Ey the start of the 

summer, the Soviet forces had superiority in personnel of 1.7 times the 

Germad~xis forces, 1.8 times the artillery and mortars (with the Soviet 
artillery on average heavier than German artillery), 1.6 times the tanks and 

assault guns, and 4.9 times the operational aimraft. These ratios do not 

include the Stavka reserves or German OKV reservee; however, the Soviet 

Stavlca reserves vastly exceeded those of Germany, and the Soviet Stavka 

could count on uaing those reserves on the Eastern F'ront, whereas such 

Gennan Om reserves as existed were likely to go to the Western Front. 

Ihus, the ratios could be as high as 2:l in personnel, overall, 2: 1in 

artillery, 1.8:l in tanks, and 5.4:l in aricraft. These ratios led the 

Stavka to the conclusion that there were insufficient forces to undertake 

simultaneous offensive action over the whole front . 

(a) Gennan (see Annex A). 

By June 1944, the German armed forces counted some 9.1 million 

men, with 4.55 million in the field ~rmkand Waffen SS, organized into 324 

divisions: 258 infantry, 34 panzer, 17 panzer grenadier, and 6 parachute. 

Of these, some 3.13 million men were on the Eastern Front, in 179 divisions 

and 5 brigades, including 23 panzer and 7 panzer granadier divisions. 

Satellite countries provided an additional 800,000 men, 49 divisions, and 

. 	18 brigades, mostly infantry and stationed in the south, These divisions 

were 63% of all those available to Germany, while the manpower was more on 

the order of 7@ of all that available for field service in Germany and her 

satellites. The German forces on the Eastern Front also had the bulk of the 

armored forces and air forces: 5,250 tanks or assault guns and 2,796 

operational aircraft. Although the West Ront only had 1,550 tanks and 300 

assault guns, these numbers had risen from 650 and 220, respectively, in 

December 1943. The German forces in the east were supported by an estimated 
of all guns and mortars, 57% 

of all tanks and assault guns, and 51% of all operational aircraft. It has 

been estimated that Germany's other active theaters--Prance, Italy, and the 

air battle over Germany--consumed 30035% of Germany's overall combat power. 

Within the Eastern Front, also, the German force distribution 

was uneven. North of the Pripet Marshes, which constituted over 6G of the 

frontage, Germany had only about '409 of its divisions and only 10-159 of its 

mobile divisions, and the average division sector for an on-line division 

amounted to 19 kilometers. South of the Pripet Marshes, however, with only 

4@ of the frontage, Germany had 6@ of the Eastern Front divisions, 

including-moat of the satellite divisions and the three satellites armies, 

and 80085% of the mobile divisions. The average division frontage here was 

48,635 guns and mortars. These constituted ?l% 

. 
 8 kilometers. the Germans had lost some thirty divisions in the preceding 

winter offensives, and those divisions which remained were at varying levels 

of strength, although the lull of April-May gave those not in the active 

sectors some chance for reinforcement. Nevertheless, divisions remained at 

best at 6,000-8,000 men, with an infantry strength of only 2,000, or 300 men 

per infantry battalion. 

(b) Soviet (see hex A) . 

Although the Soviet Union, like Germany, had a two-front 

problem, strategically, they only had to devote about an estimated 7% of 

their combat power to their second front, against Japan in the Far East. 

This was due to the strategic depth provided by the distance from the Far 

East to European Russia and the Neutrality Pact signed in ~~rii 1941 between 

Japan and the Soviet Uniop. Xoreover, the proportion would fall, as new 
production and fomes went exclusively to the Eastern Ront opposite 

German/Axis forces until the last months of the war, when the Soviets 

started the build-up for the Manchurian campaign and the maneuver in 

Centeral Europe had compressed to the point that its forces would no longer 

fit on the terrain available. 

In spite of the losses suffered during the winter campaign, the 

Red Army had continued to grow. Although personnel had increased by only 

200,000 overall, this still meant that the losses had been made more than 

good. Moreover, the number of tanks and assault guns had increased by 

4,357, or 77%. enabling the Stavka reserves to be increased eight-fold, and 

aircraft increased by 5,969, or 6€$, increasing Stavka reserves by 

four-fold. While the number of artillery pieces overall had remained 

constant, its power had increased due €0 the replacement of lower-caliber 

guns and mortars with larger-caliber, more powerful weapons. 

Within the Eastern Front, the Soviet distribufion mirrored that 

of the German Forces described above, i.e., approximately 4C$ of the rifle 

divisions but 80-8s of the Mobile divisions south of the Pripet Marshes. 

In fact, in the winter campaign all of the Soviet tank armies (5) had 

participated in the south, and it was to be expected that their presence 

would identify future main efforts. In preparation for Operation BAGRATION, 

however, a substantial regrouping of forces would take place, as described 

in paragraph 2 below. Within the rifle divisions, the replacements had 

brought the divisions back up to 6,000-8,000 men per division compared to an 

authorized strength of 9,600 per rifle division. 

For force structure of Soviet formations, see Annex B. 
(2) Previous pezfonnance . 


All trends were down for the German forces. While the number of 


divisions had continuad to rise, the average number of men, especially 

infantry, in them had declined, both from reorganization, into regiments of 

- two battalions in infantry regiments, and from casualties. Nor were 

replacements to be had. By this period, Gemany had lost a cumulative total 

of 3.28 million men, and the Field Army was understrength as a whole by an 

estimated 2@. Of the one million men lost in the winter campaign, only 

100,000 had been replaced. The shortage of German manpower was acute, and 

draft requirements were not being met. In addition, the loss of territories 

meant the loss of populations averaging 500,000-600,000 per month, which 

populations usually became available to the Soviet Army. The German labor 

force had dropped from ten and 1/2 million in 1939 to seven and 3/4 million 

by the end of 1943, in spite of over 2 1/2 million women working in . . 

industry. The Allied air raids .and strategic bombing campaign kept the 

strength artificially high (and men away from the Eastern ~ront) in order to 

man antiaircraft defenses in Gennany. 

One bright spot was the continued increase of German production, 

which peaked during 1944. Butthis vas mitigated by the fact that the 

production could not make up the losses, nor could it catch up with the 

Soviet increases and Lend-Lease materials discussed below. The tank 

production in 1943 was 10,800, and it jumped in 1944 to 17,800. For the war 

as a whole it was 76,000. Likewise, artillery production rose from 12,000 

al-tillerg pieces in 1942 to 40,600 in 1944. Aircraft production increased 

from 25,200 in 1943 to 34,300 in 1944, but in 1943 17,400 aircraft had been 
destroyed, and the proportion was holding in 1944, especialli on the Western 

Front. More than replacing aircraft, however, the difficult factor for the 

Luftwaffe was replacing trained pilots, both due to personnel losses and to 

fuel shortages (which kept training flights down and grounded operational 

aircraft), which were groving in 1944. 

German doctrine was now exclusively controlled by Adolf Hitler, and 

he insisted upon holding all temtory taken by the Wehrmacht. He intended 

to accomplish this through declaring important communication centers or 

regions fortresses which must be held by troops who could not be moved by 

the Army Group commanders without Hitler' s personal approval. As a 

corollary, therefore, he would not allow the construction or preparation of 

lines to the rear, as he felt that such preparations became a 

self-fulfilling prophecy. Those commanders who would have contradicted him, 

and had done so in the past, had been relieved by now, the last being 

Manstein and Kleist in Harch. 

In contrast to the Germans, the trends were up for the Soviet 

forces. They were able to make up their manpower losses. Out of an 

available manpower pool of an estimated 35,000,000, they eventually called 

up 25,000,000, and 13,700,000 were killed, along with 7,000,000 civilians. 

By 1944, however, the reconquest of Soviet territories was adding some 

500,000-600,000 men per month -to the pool. Additionally, the annual class 

for the Soviet Union was about three times that of Germany. Thus, although 

the rifle divisions were not at. full strength, they were at least fuller 

than German divisions, and the prospects for replacements were better than 

for the Germans. 
In production, too, the Soviet Union was faring better than were the 

Gennans, For the war as a whole, Soviet industry produced 107,000 tanks and 

assault guns while German industry produced 76,000. On top of this 

production, the Soviet Union received another 13,000 armored vehicles 

through Lend-Lease. In 1943, the tank production was 24,000, and it 

increased to 29,000 in 1944. Artillerg production in 1943 was 45,000 field 

and antitank guns, rising to 56,000 field and AT guns in 1944. Aircraft 

were another major iten, with production of 30,000 in 1943, 32,200 in 1944 

(exceeded by Germany that year only), and Lend-Lease of 19,000 aircraft for 

the war as a whole. 

But .the most important Lend-Lease materiel provided by the US to the 

Soviet Union in the war were trucks, of four and six wheel drive 

construction. These trucks amounted to 220,817 through April 1944, and 

would total 427,000 for the war (of a 'soviet truck park of 665,000 trucks). 

These trucks had cross-country mobility superior to those of the Germans, 

and they enabled the quantities of infantry necessary to be motorized to 

support the tanks in tank and mechanized corps. They also provided good 

cross-countl-g mobility for supplies to accompany Soviet forces forward of 

the railheads. This quantity of trucks, which were already superior 

qualitatively to German trucks, exceeded the entire Germzn output of trucks 

for the years 1939-1945. 

Soviet doctrine had by this time matured, and Operation BAGRATION 

would reflect that maturity. It emphasized keeping the initiative, using 

maskirovka, or operational cover and deception, to conceal the main attacks 

of the Soviet forces, concentration at the selected points- to overwhelm the 
enemy with attacks throughout the depth of his position, and exploitation as 

soon as the tactical had been made to operational deptha, to 

defeat the enemy's operational reserves, and develop operational success 

into strategic success. In order to accomplish this success, the Soviets 

had developed both the numerical superiority (albeit not, in this period, 

overwhelming) and the force structures to achieve this aim. The force 

structures which were to lead to this operational success were the tank 

army, a corps-sized echelon composed of two or three tank corps 

(division-size elements) and/or one to two mechanized corps (see Annex 3). 

In fact, the structure of the tank army could vary with the operation, with 

fewer tank corps or more mechanized corps depending on the mission and 

enemy's situation. Another force structure used for deep attack operations . 

was the Cavalry-Mechanized Group, of wh5ch two muld be seen in Operation 

BAGRATION. This formation was usually temporary and intended for use in 

terrain which mula not support a tank army. 

Soviet doctrine called for almies or specially-reinforced armies 

called shock armies to be given the task of breaking through the enemy's 

tactical defenses. The fronts would reinforce armies making-the front main 

effort with tank or mechanized corps. These armies would then introduce 

these mobile groups into the battle to exploit to the depths of the tactical 

defenses or to reinforce success. Ihe tank armies or cavalry-mechanized 

groups were committed by the front commander on his own order (but in 

accordance with his approved plan) or with Stavka approval, either from 

Stavka in Moscow or from the Stavka representative sent out to coordinate 

the operations of a group of fronts. Ihe latter method was the nom for 

strategic operations. 

15 
2, ~~erational/Tactical Situation. 

a. Opposing Forces. For correlation of forces, see Annex C. 

(1) Soviet Forces. 

The Soviet forces assembled for Operation BAGEATION consisted of 166 

divisions, of which 124, including six cavalry divisions, took part in the 

initial assault. Mobile forces amounted to eight tank or mechanized corps 

(equal to German panzer or panzer grenadier divisions)--two tank cbrpa in 

5th Guards Tank Amy, one mechanized corps in each of two cavalrg-mechanized 

groups, and the other four tank corps separate--and two cavalry corps--one 

in each of the two cavalry-mechanized groups. Each of these corps had, 

however, about twice as many tanks as a companble German division; 

moreover, these fonnations included 4a-5@ of the tanks and assault guns in 

the Soviet forces. More than 6,000 aircraftl organized into five air annies, 

one supporting each front except 1st Belorussian where two air armies were 

allocated, would provide air support. Additionally, nearly 1,000 aircraft 

of Soviet Long Range Aviation would support the offensive from bases in 

southern Russia. Of these initial divisions, ninety-seven would make the 

Six main penetrations of the German front, On the penetration, or 

breakthrough, sectors, the Soviets would also concentrate 65%of the men, 

63% of the guns and mortars, 769 of the tanks and assault guns, and 73% of 

the aircraft (not including the front and army rear services, air force 

personnel, or the troops of the left wing of the 1st Bel0~SsiaI-i Front). 

This concentration would translate the overall 3:1 superiority in men and 

divisions, 8:l in guns, 10:l in tanks and assault guns, and 4:l in aircraft 

into tactical superiori ties of 10: 1in those sectors. These concentrations 
were not unnoticed by the Germans, but the cover and deception operations, 

called maakirovka by the Soviets, caused them to misinterpret them, as 

explained below. . 

The Soviet figures in Correlation of Forces do not reflect the 

left-wing armies and forces of the 1st Belorussian Front in the south. 

These forces amounted to another forty-two divisions in six combine6 arms 

armies, one tank army, and one air army. However, they would only enter the 

battle when the main BAGRATION forces passed Slonim on their way west. Nor 

do they count two whole combined armies in Stavka reserve, located at 

Smolensk to be sure, but unavailable to the front commanders for their 

commitment on their own authority. 

Moreover, the Soviet forces had some potentially exploitable 

realmesses. In the first place, the auihorized personnel strength of their 

rifle divisions was about one-third less than the German infantry division 

of the time, and the actual personnel strength of the rifle divisions was at 

about one-half of authorized strength. They had, however, been reinforced 

for this operation, so the strength may.have been up, although it was not 

full strength. Nor were their artillery units at division level as numerous 

or as capable as those at division level in the German division; rather, 

their artillery at division conducted.direct fire in support of infantry, 

and attached artillery units or artillery at corps fired indirect fire 

missions. This characteristic extended to other sugporting arms within the 

Soviet rifle division. They were not as numerous or as ca?able as like 

units in the German infantry division. The Soviet rifle division depended 

upon attachments from higher or support from corps to give them the 
capability and sustainability of German divisions. The number of 

idantmen, however, was about equal to that of the Geman infantry 

division of the time (2,000 infantrgmen at battalion level), which was also 

understrength. Thus, a Soviet rifle division was about half a German 

division in effectiveness, making the 118 Soviet rifle divisions equal to 

about fifty-nine German divisions. In another comparison, an American 

infantry division of 1944 with its habitual attachments was equal to a 

Soviet rifle corps of two to three divisions, and, therefore, a Soviet army 

was about equal to an American corps and a Soviet front equal to an American 

field amy. 

(2) German Forces. 

The German forces of Army'Group Center consisted of fifty divisions 

and three brigades. These included thi>t peight infantry divisions, one 

Panzer division, three panzer grenadier divisions (one of which was OKH 

reserve), three Hungarian divisions, and five security divisions in the 

rear. The two latter categories of divisions were not available to counter 

Soviet battle forces in the field. Of the rest, thirty-eight divisions, 

including two panzer grenadier divisions, were allocated to the front-line 

defense, while four divisions--the panzer division, the OKH reserve panzer 

grenadier division, and two infantry divisions--were in reserve for the 

armies. Immediately to the south of Army Group Center at Kowel lay the LVI 

Panzer Corps of two panzer divisions which had until May belonged to Army 

Group Center. By Soviet estimates, other forces which from north and south 

of Army Group Center which could reinforce brought the Cotel of divisions 

available to the defenders to 63-66 divisions. While in the Army Group 
Center proper there may have been as few as 200 tanks/assault guns, or as 

many as 400, but potential reinforcements brought the possible total up. to 

900 available to the Germans as committed forces or reinforcements. There 

were approximately 9,500 guns and mortars, and the 6th Air Fleet supported 

Army Group Center with 1,342 aircraft, although some sources report only 

forty fighters available to Army Group Center. Other participants reported 

seeing no German aircraft during the campaign. On the Eastern Front, 

Luftwaffe strength was declining due to the Allied bombing campaign and the 

air battle which it had engendered as the Luftwaffe defended Germany. The 

losses to the Luftwaffe in aircraft and pilots in April and May 1944 had 

been 5,000. Only from the Eastern Front could replacement aircraft and 

pilots be obtained. -


(3) Logistical. 

The Soviet forces had made substantial efforts to provide proper 

logistical support for the operation. For the size of forces involved, the 

movements had to be substantial, and they were. There were 90-100 railroad 

trains daily to the fronts involved in the operation before the' start of it, 

for a total of appmximately 5,000 trains, each of fifty cars average. Of 

the total, 2,000 trains were used to transport personnel or formations, and 

3,000 were employed for supplies. .Division stocks were brought up to five 

units .of fire (necessitating 13,500 rail cars) , fourteen days ' rations, and 

ten to twenty refills of POL. For the force as a whole, there were brought 

in 150,000 metric tons of rations, 900,000 metric tons of artillery 

ammunition, and 1,200,000 metric tons of POL, that is, approximately 

three-fourths of the total supply effort was taken up by just those three 

19 

classes of supply. In addition, the operation would need 45,000 metric tons 

per day of supplies in the advance, or an average of 275 metric tons per day 

per division. (B~ contrast, U.S. planners used 600 tons of supplies per day 

per division.) To care for casualties, there were 294,000 hospital beds, 

about equal to 18%of the force. (The Soviet planning figure seems to have 

averaged about 2% of the force for World War 11.) 

In order to move these supplies forward of the railheads, there were 

about 12,000 trucks, organized into four truck brigades of 1,275 trucks 

each, one per front, and one truck regiment of 348 trucks per army, an 

average of forty trucks per division. In addition to rail and road 

transport, air transport was employed during the operation. To be sure, it 

was not a mass carrier, but it helped. During the operation , aerial 

resupply delivered 1,182 metric tons of fuel, 1,240 metric tons of 

Ammunition, and around 1,000 tons of equipment and spare parts to forward 

units, pr$marilymobile groups. 

(4) Command, control, communications. 

lZle operation was centrally planned and controlled in the initial 

stages, but it became decentralized in execution in the latter stages. The 

planning echelons were Stavka in the first instance and the fronts in the 

second in an iterative process which also involved the supreme commander, 

Joseph Stalin himself. The primary executing. echelons were the armies and 

fronts. The dispatch of Stavka representatives to the fronts--Kershal 

Vasilevskg, Chief of the General Staff, to coordinate 1st Baltic and ?d 

Belorussian Fronts in the north, and Marshal Zhukov, Oeputy Su~reme 

commander, to coordinate 2d and 1st Belorussian Fronts in the south--would 
provide the key link between planning and execution and between Stavka and 

the fronts. These Stavka representatives would remain at the command posts 

of the fronts making the main efforts: 3d Belorussian for Vasilevsky and 

1st Belorussian for Zhukov. Later, Stavka representatives for coordination 

of aviation would also arrive at the fronts. 

There were also requirements for fronts to comunicate directly and 

immediately with the General staff in Moscow, and to this end, each front 

had a chief of operations communications links on the rolls of the front 

Main signals Directorate. Additionally, the headquarters organized 

operations groups, headed by the chief of operations section or deputy chief 

of staff and staffed by officers from the operations, intelligence, and 

cipher sections. Amy operations groups also included representatives from 

artillerg, armored/mechanize6 troops, and engineer troops. he front 

operations would have the commanders of those anus and selected members of 

their own staffs as well as the commander of the supporting air army. 

Operations groups were equipped with mobile communications centers, and they 

were expected to operate close to the front. 

Communications here conflicted with the cover and deception plan, or 

maskirovka, but solutions were to be found. As there were strict 

restrictions of the use of radio, wire was the primary zeans of 

comunication before the operation, and, below army, after it had begun. In 

order to help front commanders keep better informed, they were assigned 

detachments of special liaison officers equi~~ed with special radios, 

encryption gear, and even observation planes. These liaison officers had 

the mission of reporting back to their front commanders, acd they also had 
the authority to =port any negative information back to their front 

commanders as well as relay his instructions to subordinate commanders. Nor 

were their reports restricted just to the supported front commander; they 

could also communicate directly with Stavka (or the Stavka representative 

with the fronts). At each front were special purpose communication centers 

for communications directly back to Stavka. 

The availability of equipment had improved both quantitatively and 

qualitatively since the beginning of the war, and the Soviet forces' 

proficiency had also improved. HF multiplexing equipmezt was received and 

put into service at higher echelons. At lower echelons, troops had begun 

receiving ultra-short wave radios with a range of 10 kilometers. 

' Quantitatively, the availability of equipment had increased two-fold over 


the start of the year and six-fold sinc-e the start of the war. 


(5) Deception and intelligence. 

One of the most important. aspects of the BAGRATION planning was the 

cover and deception plan, called maskirovka by the Soviets. In the Soviet 

meaning, maskirovka covers much more than just cover and deception. It even 

has a connotation of positive or active control of the enemy. By 1544, 

maskirovka had come to be characterized by this scope and diversity. It 

included the use of reconnaissance on a wide front, simultaneously, active 

operations of aviation--on main and secondary fronts,. reparation of 

offensive operations in a number of strategic directiocs at once, switch to 

offensive from defense on secondary directions or fro~ts initially, and 

concentrated use of smoke, Above all, maskirovka was coordinated and 

integrated from the very top--Stavka--and implemented as the plan filtered 

down to the lower echelons. 
In the case of Operation BAGRATION, maskirovka led to some most 

impressive accomplishments. First, the magnitude and location of the 

movement of the supplies discussed earlier was hidden from the Germans. 

Second, the concentration or relocation of five combined arms armies, two 

tank armies, two mechanized corpa and two cavalry corps, eleven aviation 

corps, and 210,000 replacements for forces in place were successfully 

hidden. Nore important, the location, strength, and timing of the offensive 

were concealed strategically, the location, strength, and objectives of 

attacking forces were concealed operationally, and the penetration 

concentrations of forces and guns were concealed tactically. These 

successes were due to the use of maskirovka measures at the strategic, 

- operational, anti tactical levels. 

* 

The strategic measures undertaken were directed by Stavka and 

carried out by the respective fronts. In some cases, these measures fit 

into preparations for subsequent offensive operations by those fronts. One 

of the most important was the creation of diversionary, dummy concentrations 

of troops of the flanks of the theater,. to be "shown" duri'ng the period 

5-15 June. In the south, 3d Ukrainian Front created one such concentration, 

in the vicimty of Kishinev, and the 3d Baltic Front prepared another such 

concentration to its rear east of the Cherekha River. Each of these 

concentrations was to show a combined arms army of eight to nine rifle 

divisions reinforced by tanks and artillery. Second, offensives were timed 

and located to serve as diversions from the preparations in the center. 

Thus, the Crimea offensive in the south from 8 April-12 May created one such 

diversion. Likewise, the Karelian offensive against Finland was explicitly 
timed--commencing 10 June--to serve as another such diversion. Third, major 

formations which could serve as indicators of offensive reparations were 

shown in locations where the Germans expected then to be. For example, the 

three tank armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front were left in that front, 

reinforcing the German predisposition for offensive in the south. Of 

course, they also kept German mobile forces from Army Group Center; indeed, 

they probably led to the assignment of the lone panzer corps with panzer 

divisions, LVI Panzer Corps, in Army Group Center to Army Group North 

Ukraine in May. Additionally, the 5th Guards Tank Amy, which did transfer 

from the south to Operation EAGRATION, was first shown in the rear of 3d 

Ukrainian Front, further to the south, before its move. north, where it 

arrived only on 16 June. The Soviets also raised another tank army, for a 

total of 6 compared to the 5 for which the Gennans were looking. The 

Soviets also left the bulk of their Long Range Aviation air annies (6 of 8) 

in the south, reinforcing the German inclinations, while they could attack 

targets in the BAGRATION area from those locations. 

Among other measures which were employed to aid the maskirovka was 

the limitation of overall knowledge of the plan to five people besides 

Stalin: Zhukov (~e~ut~ SpremeComander) , Vasilevsky ( Chief, General

Staff ) , Antonov (Deputy Chief, General staff) , Shtemenko !~e~ut~ Chief of 

Staff, operations) , and his deputy. Although the number of personnel with 

access was later expanded, the access remained restricted to a few officers 

at front level and arms and services level. There was also public 

announcement of defensive aims, such as by Stalin at the Yay Day parade of 

1944, and troops were informed that they were to defelld in their sector and 
would join the expected offensive from the south after it commenced. Then, 

too, much of the personnel build-up consisted of reinfoming formations 

already in the sector, both with lower-echelon units and with personnel and 

equipment replacements, rather than major introduction af new units. This 

held except for mobile groups, and those were successfully hidden from the 

Germans. 

Operationalmaskirovka measures aimed at conceeling the front main 

attack areas and the forces to be employed in them as well as the timing of 

the attacks. Especially concealed were the shift of 6th Guards Army in 1st 

Baltic Front's sector from the right of the sector to the center-left , next 

to 43d Amy, to make the penetration and encirclement ncrth of Vitebsk, the 

arrival of 5th Guards Tank Army in the left rear of jd Eelomssian front, 

and the deployment of 28th Army as part 'of the penetration and encirclement 

of Bobruisk from the south. The Soviets did show their preparations for 

offensives at Orsha, Mogilev, and Bobruisk from the Rogachev. direction north 

of the city and east of the Beresina. They further simclated offensive 

action against Vitebsk on its face rather than at the shoulders of its 

salient where the main attacks were, in fact, located. In addition to 

concealing their efforts at the shoulders of Vitebsk, they also concealed 

their effort against Bobruisk from south of the city an:! west of the 

Beresina. 

Also, diversionary reconnaissances-in-force were conducted during 

the period 20-23 June by 2d and jd Baltic and 1st Ukraizian Fronts, 

initially, in reinforced compaoy and reinforced battalion strengths. They 

were joined in the latter stages by forces of the 1st Saltic and X, 2d, and 
1st Belorussian Fkonts. At its extent, this diversion involved 60 

detachments over 1,000 kilometers of frontage; moreover, the RIF'S of 1st 

Baltic &ont were so successful that the front commander exploited them and 

forswore his prepared attack. 

0ther operational measures included establishing a 25-kilometer 

security zone not only in the sector of Operation BAGRATION but also along 

the entire front. Special security was effected for all rail movements to 

Belorussia, with rifle divisions making joint--foot and rail--movements and 

at night, if possible. Soviet air superiority denied the Germans any use of 

aerial reconnaissance, and radio silence was decreed for major formations 

(front as well as army) and new formations which were not yet on line. A 

General Controllers' Senrice was established to regulate the concealment of 

9 

movements and camouflage of stationary troops, and they were headed by the 

Chief of Staff at front and by the military council at army and corps. 

Tactical maskirovka measures aimed at preventing the Germans from 

learning the identities of existence of mobile groups and reinforcements not 

already on line. Thus, wire or courier were the primary xeans of 

communication before the offensive began. In addition, within the 25 

kilometers security zone, ground reconnaissance was denied by vigorous 

patrolling. Ground and air movements by the Soviets were controlled forward 

of the front rear boundary, and main movements were made at night. At 

night, also, the troops worked on their camouflage, which was inspected 

daily and reported on to the front commander, and they used vertical masks 

or screens in front of trenches and works to help hiae them from 

observation. The Soviets did not try to hide everything from the Germans, 
however, as that would have been as revealing as having evergthing out in 

the open. Rather, they aimed at letting the Gemans see what they knew was 

there or what the Soviets wanted them to see. 

Soviet maskirovka and intelligence would be inmeasurably aided by the 

us; of the partisan forces of Belorussia. These partisans performed 

reconnaissance functions for the fronts, acting under orders put out from 

the Belomssian Partisan Staff in Gomel, and they would also perform 

interdiction functions in the German rear areas. In spite of two very heavy 

attacks by Gennan forces in the spring, the Belorussian partisans still 

numbered 143,000 in 150 brigades and 49 separate detachments. DuriQ3 the 

period 19-22 June, they attempted some 2,000 cuts of railways and succeeded 

in 1000 of them, setting some 10,000 individual charges per night. !hey -


also attacked some 26 headquarters. These activities affected German 

reinforcements arriving after the battle more than they did internal 

communications or resupply, the latter due to the speed with which the 

German defenses fell. Had they had to fight for an extended period, 

depending upon the lines for resupply, they might well have felt the effects 

in resupply as well. 

,Surprisingly, the Soviet air forces were not employed to any great 

extent in interdiction activities. Instead, their main tasks were to 

saintain air superiority over the battlefield, provide close air support to 

ground forces, especially those mobile forces which had outrun the mass of . Soviet artillery, and conduct reconnaissance for the ground forces. Soviet 

Long Range Aviation forces attacked likely German headquarters and air force 

icstallations rather than engaging in aerial interdiction. 
The Germans did obtain some of the picture, but, because of their 

predisposition toward a Soviet attack in the south, they read those 

indicators as reflecting a defensive rather than offensive intention in Army 

Group Center. OKH (the Geman High Command for the Eastern Front) did know 

tha-t all of the Soviet tank armies (which they believed to number five) were 

in the south; they were unaware that the Stavka had raised a sixth tank army 

which had replaced the 5th Guards Tank Army. They also saw the 2d Tank Army 

in the left wing of 1st Belorusian Front as belonging to the forces 

dedicated to the southern offensive rather than as part of BAGRATION. They 

did not know the location of the three armies which took part in the 

liberation of the Crimea--two of which, 2d Guards Army and 51st Army, would 

form Stavka reserve at Smolensk for BAGRATION. They saw that frontal 

aviation in the south, already the strokest part of the Soviet Air Forces, 

had increased, but they failed to notice that frontal aviation in the center 

had increased even more than in the south although the southern frontal 

aviation remained stronger. This estimate was strengthened by the presence 

of the bulk of Long Range Aviation assets in the south also. They saw aw 

preparations in the center as being, at worst, part of a diversionary 

offensive(s) to precede the main offensive in the north Ukraine. 

Army Group Center had a somewhat clearer picture, although it, too, 

did not have the whole picture. They had obtained a fairly good estimate of 

the Soviet order of battle in artillery and air forces, but they had vastly 

underestimated the enemy division and mobile forces facing them. lhey had 

only identified 140 enemy division and 3 tank/mechanized corps, a miss of 

409 in division and 30Qf in mobile forces. The error was also as bad when 
it came to numbers of Soviet tanks facing them: they estimated 400-1,800 

tanks facing then against the 4,000-5,200 actually available. They had, 

however, correctly placed the bulk of the tanks in the 3d and 1st 

Balorussian fronts. By 14 June, Army Group Center wes sufficiently 

concerned to raise the issue in a conference with OKH representatives, 

expressing their belief that there would be main attacks on their flanks and 

that it would commence soon. 

The armies had come closer to the mark with relation to the 

locations of enemy forces facing them although they underestimated the 

strength and failed to see enemy capabilities in a larger, or operational, 

context. The 3 Panzer Arm, in the north, had identified the chance of a 

- main attack to the southest of Vitebsk and, based upon identification of 3 

new divisions, 100 tanks, and new artillery, a supporting attack northwest 

of Vitebsk. Fram 13 June on, they had seen a further concentration north of 

the Smolensk-Hiask highway through Orsha. Actually this was a lapse in 

cmouflage discipline by 5th Artillery Breakthrough Corps. From 19 June an, 

they expected to be attacked at any time, with the main effort to be a local 

envelopement of Vitebsk; they did recognize that there was some significance 

to the concentration along the highway near Orsha, but they did not pursue 

it. 

The 4th Army, in the center, had early assessed that the 

concentration near Orsha could be a main attack, and frcm 16 June on, they 

were also aware of a buildup east of Mogilev itself. They had expected an 

attack from 11 June at any time, then on 16 June estimated one to occur at 
22 June. By 19 we, they expected an attack within. the aext 2-3 days, but 

they saw no larger significance to the attacks and locetions in their sector. 

In the south, the 9th Army had gained the clearest picture of all, 

but even they only saw a local significance. They had seen the attack 

preparations towards Bobruisk from Rosacheve from 30 Fag on, as the Soviets 

desired. From 7 June on they also saw a supporting att~zk west of the 

Beresina and south of Bobruisk, and by 12 June, they hat assessed both 

locations as main.attacks, with the one west of the Beresina the most 

dangerous. They did not realize, however, just how de-srous it was with 

the addition of 28th Ar y. On 13 June, they expected t=e Soviet attack 

either 15, 20 or 22 June; by 17 June, they estimated the time as 20 June, 

and on 20 June, they estimated 22 June, They saw the eremy objectives as . the seizure of Eobruisk, splitting the army and cutting off German forces 

east of the Beresina, 

In sum, then, the Soviet maskirovka had conceaied the location and 

strength of the summer offensive strategically . Operationally, Anny Group 

Center-had some disquiet feelings, but they had not iaer:ified the strength 

of the Soviet forces. While they had identified some of the eventual 

concentrations, they had not put them into any contert larger than 

tactical. The armies had a better idea of locations azi timings, but even 

they had not appraised the operational or strategic sigeficance of their 

knowledge . 

(6) Doctrine. 

(a) Soviet. 
By the third period of the war, Soviet doctrine had come to 

view the double envelopment as the best way to destroy large enemy 

fonuationa. 'hey viewed accomplishing these in five stages: penetration of 

the enemy'a tactical zone: exploitation and linkup by the encircling forces: 

formation of the inner am of the encirclement; formation of the outer arm: 

and continuation of subsequent operations. Generally, in order to 

concentrate the strength necessary for a large-scale double envelopment, the 

Soviets employed the forces of at least two fronts. Of thirty encirclement 

battles, twenty-two were carried out by groups of fronts. Indeed, during 

the planning for this operation, one point of contention is reported to have 

heen General Rokossovsky's insistence upon a double envelopment of Bobruisk 

by his front; he held this position with Stalin himself, even after Molotov 

had taken him from the room and asked if he remembered with whom he was 

arguing. Stalin agreed eventually, reminding Rokossovsky that it was now 

his responsibility . In encirclement operations each front organized its 

forces into "assault groups" and mobile groups. They employed combined arms 

armies, suitably reinforced and task organized, for the initial assault and 

tactical breakthrough and the mobile groups for the encircling force, the 

outer arm of the encirclement, and to continue further operations. me 

combined arms armies of the first echelon or the second echelon amies would 

also form the inner arm of the encirclement. 

In order to accomplish this they first concentrated their 

strength at the point of decision, zassed units to create high tactical 

densities, and echeloned their foxes to ensure depth. Soviet front 

commanders task organized their "assault groups" with infantry, tanks, 
artillery, and engineer units for the penetration and tactical 

breakthrough. The assault commanders might form special mobile groups in 

the lead rifle divisions, often consisting of a rifle battalion, tank 

regiment or brigade, engineers, and SP artillery commanded by the division 

deputy commander, to penetrate rapidly to seize deep tactical objectives, 

such as breaking through the tactical defense zone or seizing a river or 

obstacle crossing. In the third period of the war, Soviet assault forces 

usually penetrated the main positions of the enemy's tactical defense zones 

within the first day of an offensive, using divisions' forward detachments 

and quickly opening the way for second echelon units or mobile groups to 

pass through the gap, even while the tactical battle might be raging, into 

the enemy's rear areas. 

When combined-arms assault forces penetrated the enemy's 

tactical defenses, the decisive moment came with the commitment of front and 

srmg mobile groups to exploit -the breach, driving for deep operational 

objectives. The offensive entered a phase in which the mobility and 

maneuverability of units often meant the difference between victory and 

defeat. Front-level mobile groups were generally composed of tank armies 

and/or "cavalrg-mechanized groups," which consisted of a cavalry .corps 

(which had organic tanks) joined with a mechanized (less frequently, tank) 

corps. They were used where the terrain or weather precluded or limited the 

employment of large armored forces. Tank and/or mechanized corps made up 

the mobile group(s) of an army. Army and front commanders moved mobile 

groups through the gaps to go deep, disrupt, and destroy. hy mobile 

groups maneuvered within 50-100 kilometers of the front line to encircle 
tactically and destroy enany formations in cooperation with combined arms 

units. Front mobile groups ranged wider, with operational missions: smash 

operational reserves, disrupt communication and supply networks; seize 

important terrain features, such as crossroads or river crossings; overcome 

' positions in the operational defense zone; seize and hold bridgeheads; cut 

enemy retreat routes end threaten or accomplish encirclement; pursue enemy 

forces. Usually, mobile groups needed dedicated air support as they would 

outrun their nonnal front and army artillery support. 

(b) German. 

While the German military recognized the ceed for shortening 

their lines so they could form operational reserves with mobility, Adolf 

Sitler prevented this elastic defense. Therefore, the combination of linear 

and strongpoint defense which he prescAbed played directly into the Soviet 

doctrine. Moreover, the extended frontages which resulted caused the 

Germans' mobile forces to be too spread out, tactically, to allow much of a 

counterattack, whether tactically or operationally. The static defense, 

linear or fortress, also allowed the other great powerhouse of the Red Amy, 

t-he artillery, to wreak havoc upon the defenders before the assault forces 

even reached them. 

b. Filitarg 0 bjectives/2lissions/Tasks 

( 1) Missions of opposing forces. 

(a) Soviet. For a detailed outline of the planning sequence, 

see Annex D. 

-

1. 1st Baltic Front: 

--Penetrate enemy 's defense southwest of Gorodo k and 

cross to west bank of Western Dvina River. 

33 
--Encircle Vitebsk from west and south, seize Vitebsk, 

and destroy enerqp forces in Vitebsk region in conjunction with forces from 

3d Belorussian Front on left. 

--Advance on Lepel' (75-100 kilometers)' and along west 

bank of Western Dvina, protecting northern flank of the offensive. 

-

2. 3d Belorussian Front : 

--Penetrate enemy's defense southeast of Vitebsk and 

advance northwest to Western Dvina River. 

--&circle Vitebsk from east and south, seize Vitebsk, 

and destroy enemy forces in Vitebsk region in conjunction with forces from 

1st Baltic Front. 

--Seize city of Senno and continue advance to southeast. 

--Penetrate. enemy 's defense north of Smolensk-Minsk 

highway'to seize Orsha and destroy enemy forces. 

--Advance along axis of highway and destroy enemy forces 

in vicinity of Borisov. 

--Break'through to west bank of Beresina in vicinity of 

~orisov. 

--Concentrate main forces in Orsha-3orisov sector for 

further operations. 

-

3. 2d Belorussian Front. 

--Penetrate enemy forces defending Mogilev and destroy 

them. 

--Continue advance along Mogilev-Xinsk highway to 

Beresina River. 
-

4. . Ist Belorussian Ront . 

-Penetrate enemy defenses from Rogachev north of 

Bobruisk and east of Beresina River. 

--Penetrate enemy defenses from south of Bobruisk and 

west of Beresina River. 

--Encircle Bobruisk and destroy enemy forces in region. 

--Continue advance in two directions: Bobruisk-Minsk 

and 	Bobruisk-Baranovichi. 

--Commence advance of troops of left wing (near Kovel' ) 

after troops of right wing pass Slonim. 

(b) German forces. (see Haps at Tab 2$ The German forces were 

ordered to conduct a static defense along the Dnieper River east of the Drut 

and Western Dvina Rivers (~ap 2~).Specifically, they had to hold the 

cities of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Bobmisk, Borisov, and Minsk as fortified 

places, requiring a minimum of one division per city as the garrison. The 

German tactical zone included two lines of defense. Of the two, the line 

along the front was the better prepared because manpower and time only 

permitted work on the line closest to the enemy (i3ay 2~). The Germans also 

attempted to construct lines at depths of up to 250 kilometers, but Hitler 

had categorically forbidden construction on the line along the Beresina and 

Dnieper, feeling that it would become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The first 

line had two or three belts, each with two or three lines of trenches. The 

depth of this line was about 3.7 kilometers. The second iine only had one 

belt of two or three trenches, much of which was not finished. 
The terrain in Army Group Center's sector (Hap 1) favored the 

defense and, moreover, presented obstacles to the movement of mass armored 

formations. Most important of the natural features in the area were the 

numerous rivers which almost all ran north or south, the Dnieper, Drut, 

Beresina, Western Dvina, Svisloch, Ptich, and Neman. All were potential 

barriers, which unfortunately went unrealized by the defecders. The river 

system contri-buted to the second most important of the terrain features in 

the area: the marshes, bogs, and, finally, the Pripet Xarshes to the 

south. These bogs and marshes restricted cross-count rg aovement and made 

the roads, railroads, and cities more important than ever, especially those 

which passed through gaps in the bogs (~ap 2~): Molodechno and 

Baranovichi. Thus, the Soiriets would use only one tank army in this akea 

but two cavalry-echanized groups, and their deep objectives would be those 

key corpunications centers. 

c. Courses of action considered. 

(1) Soviet. See Annex D. 

Among the courses of action considered, and ever implemented-in the 

first Stavka draft, was that of a direct pincer move from north and south, 

through Vitebsk and Bobruisk, to Minsk, encircling the German forces 

entras~ed therein. The disadvantages to this plan were that it did not fix 

other German forces within the salient sufficiently, it aimed at locations 

at which the krmans were strong (and had proved it in t3e recent 

winter-spring campaign when they had stopped the Soviet forces at ViteSsk, 

Orsha, uld ~obruisk), and it did not provide enough altexatives to get the 

mobile groups out rapidly, before German 'countermeasures could seal off 
success at the gaps. Although the Minsk-Smolensk highway through Orsha was 

the main high-speed axis of advance through the Army Croup Center area, it 

narrowed at Borisov, -and the Germans had recognized the same factor. The 

original plan also aimed at a much shorter advance, 200-250 kilometers, and, 

therefore, it would not be a strategic success, even if it was an 

operational one. 

The revised plan, on the other hand, had the advantages of making 

its advances in stages, although with the various echelons aiming 

simultaneously at successively greater depths, fixing the Gerinan forces in 

place more securely, and providing for exploitation beyond the lines pla~ed 

if they were more successful than thought. It also took advantage of the 

tying of German forces to known localities, such as the 6 fortress cities. 

(2) GermanThe main alternative available to the Germans was how much to trade 

space for time, but this was not permitted by either resources or Hitler. 

Additionally, Hitler' s personal orders establishing 6 fortress cities 

reduced the Anny Group's options for selecting localities to defend and 

soaked up potential reserves, or thickening forces with which to weight the 

defense, by tying them to specific cities. The removal of LVI Panzer Corps 

then eliminated any operational reserves from the Army Group. Even locally, 

the German forces had a very thin defensive line, and any break or rupture 

would be catastrophic. 

3. Conduct of Operation. 

a. Disposition of forces. 
(1) Soviet. See Annex E for overall. groupings. See map for 

22 June 1944 at Tab 3 for locations. 

The Soviet dispositions concentrated tremendous combat power in the 

areas selected for the six penetrations and exercised economy of force -

elsewhere. Even so, the number of divisions and the length of the sector 

caused all four fronts to array themselves in a single echelon, with all of 

their combined anns armies on line; moreover, within the armies, the 

predominant attack formation was also single echelon. Only the 6th Guards 

Amy of the 1st Ealtic Front and the 3d and 65th Armies of the 1st 

Belorussian Front used two echelons, each army keeping one rifle corps in 

the second echelon. The desired concentration of combat power took place by 

narrowing the attack zone and breakthrough or penetration sectors of the 

assault rifle corps, who then attacked in two or even three echelons. See 

nap at Tab 3, Dispositions 0600, 22 June 1944, to follow the discussion of 

Soviet dispositions. Also, See Annex F for some figures on the 

concentrations achieved by the Soviets at selected penetration sectors. 

The mobile fornations were allocated only to axes of main effort. 

Armies had organic to them tank brigades, which they attached forward to 

rifle corps, usually those making the main effort. In turn, the rifle corps 

would attach those brigades to a lead rifle division which would then use 

them to form, with a rifle battalion and engineers, folrward detachments, 

often commanded by the division deputy commander. Tiie tank corps were 

attached to certain armies for their use in developing success or 

reinforcement. The cavalry-mechanized groups and the tank any were 

allocated to the fronts making the main effort, but their employment was a 
matter of Stavka concern, especially if it would deviate from the plan.- In 

general, the corps and army deep attacks by armies without tank corps were 

about 50-60 kilometers deep. But even they could be used for an important 

objective. For example, the encirclement of Vitebsk was effected by the 

forward detachments of 43d Army from the north and tank brigades of 39th 

army from the south. Tank corps were employed against c'cjectives up to 

100-150 kilometers deep, and front mobile groups would ?z&e deep attacks 

against objectives 200-250 kilometers deep. 

In 1st Baltic Front, 1st Tank Corps was attached to 6th Guards Army 

for use in developing success to the west once the Weste-n Dvina had been 

crossed. The 3d Belorussian Front attached its 2d Guards Tank Corps to the 

llth Guards Army, for use in exploitation along the Orsta-Borisov axis. The 

Oslikovksy Cavalry4ec hanized Group (CMG ) and 5t h Guards Tank Army remained 

under Front control, although the CMG was to be employed through 5th Army in 

the northern penetration by 3d Belorussian Front to develop success towards 

the Beresina and, beyond that, towards Minsk. The decision 0.n employment of 

the 5th Guards Tank Army had been a matter for Stavka az5 Stalin to decide. 

3ventually. they decided that it should be introduced ic llth Guards Army's 

sector, astride the Minsk-Smolensk highway, towards Borisov, and, after 

that, making the encirclement of German forces from the zorth passing east 

of Yinsk. There was provision, however, for it to enter battle through 5th 

Amy's sector. 

No major mobile formations had been allocated tc 2d Selorussisn 

Front. As a result, it took and of its organic tank brigades and attached 

it to the assault army, 49th Army, for use in developing success. The 1st 
Belorussian Front, making the other main effort at Bobruisk, attached its 

9th Tank Corps to 3d Army, of the northern group, for exploitation towards 

Bobruisk and Minsk. The other tank corps of the Front was attached to 65th 

Army in the south, with the same mission as 9th Tank Corps. The Pliyev CMG. -

was the Front mobile group, located in 28th Amy's sector, and had the 

objectives of Slutsk, Osipovichi (towards Minsk), or Bobruisk. 

The attack northwest of Vitebsk by 6th G~ards Axmy andqjd Army was 

to be made by three corps on an exceedingly narrow front : the left rifle 

corps of 6th Guards Army and the two right wing corps of 4X hy. These 

three corps, with 1st Tank Corps and two rifle corps in 6th Guards Army 

faced about 1 1/2 German divisions. South of Vitebsk, the adjoining corps 

of 39th and 5th Armies would launch an attack south of Vitebsk due west and 

southwest. The 39th Armg would swing its forces back north to complete the 

encirclement of Vitebsk while 5th Army would continue the attack westward. 

See Annex F, paragraphs 1 and 2, for examples of the concentration of combat 

power for the attacks of 5th Army and 5th Guards 3ifle Corps of 39th Army. 

In the Orsha-Mogilev sector, llth Guards Amy in the north would 

launch an attack on Orsha from north and east. It would employ two rifle 

corps in a very narrow sector to initiate the advance, basically along the 

main highway and railroad towards Orsha from the northeast. Again, see 

Annex F, paragraphs 1and 2 for examples of the concentration of combat 

power by llth Guards Army and one of its corps. After the first day of the 

operation, General Galitskg, the commander, had to alter his plan because of 

the German resistance. Indeed, he shifted four divisions and 2d Guards Tank 

Corps to his northern flank after the first day. The 31st Army south of 
llth Guards Army had its attack weighted to its right flank, where two rifle . 

corps would attack in concert with the two left flank corps of llth Guards 

Army. However, they had no mobile group. 

In 2d Belorussian Front area, only one assault was to be made, by 

49th Army directly east of Mogilev. This army had nearly half the combat 

power of the Front, and it had further concentrated its forces, three rifle 

corps on an exceedingly narrow front with divisions in three echelons in 

some cases. Wen though not allocated any major mobile forces, the army 

would use one of its organic tank brigades as a mobile group. See Annex F, 

paragraph 1, note a., for the relative combat power. The other two armies 

acted as holding forces with no distinct offensive mission. 

Further south, in the 1st Belorussian Front area, 3d Army, with two 

of its four corps concentrated in a very narrow sector on the left flank, 

would attack north of Rogachev, side-by-side with two corps of 48th Army, 

concentrated on 48th Army's right flank in narmw sectors also. See 

Annex F, paragraphs 1 and 2, for concentration of the forces of 3d Army and 

its two corps. The remainder of 48th Amy's front was held by a small rifle 

corps and a fortified region (a division-size force intended for holding, 

economy-of-force missions). For the southern assault against Bobruisk, 65th 

Army had its combat power developed on its left flank in tke 18th Rifle 

Corps of five divisions backed up by the 1st Guards Tank Corps. See 

Annex F, paregraphs 1 and 2, for concentration figures. CI? the left flarlk 

of the southern assault, 28th Amy deployed its combat power in two rifle 

corps on its right flank adjaceot to 65th Army's assault force. Located to 

its rear was the Front mobile group, the Pliyev CMG. These three corps with 
ten divisions, one tank corps, and the front CMG faced about one and 

one-half Gennan divisions, with the understrength 20th Panzer Division in 

reserve at Bobruisk. 

Because of the lengthy time of preparation, the Soviets had 

available a large number of infantry support tanks and artillery. Also, 

they did a lot of task organizing of low level units, including the creation 

of assault groups and tailored advanced battalions, including engineer 

support of substantial proportions. 

(2) Gennan forces. See Hap 2A. 

As seen on the referenced map, the German forces occupied positions 

with sectors of 10-20 kilometers per frontline division. The occupied 

positions were in a single echelon with only four divisions in reserve at 

army level, with other divisions as mentioned earlier. Because of the width 

of the individual sectors, even the divisions could not concentrate in vital 

sectors but had to deploy all of their battalions forward. Only in the 

Vitebsk sector was there an apparent concentration of divisions, but since 

they were holding a salient, as in the north, the troop density was still 

only 10 kilometers per division. There were one infantry division and two 

assault gun battalions, albeit at reduced strength, in tactical reserve. 

The defenses at Orsha appear to have been more concentrated, with 

78th Infantry Division and 25th Panzer Grenadier Division on line astride 

the main highway and another infantry division in reserve north cf Grsha. 

Yet, when 11th Guards Army (122,000 men, 2637 guns/mortars, and 

4W tanks/~G's) pressed, it eventually found the sector where the Germans 

had economized and pushed their assault through there. The divisions 
defending the Mogilev approach were supported only by one Panzer grenadier 

division, Feldhernhalle, which was understrength in its assault gun 

battalion and, further, required OKH approval for commitment. 

On.the Bobruisk approach, there was a panzer division in tactical 

reserve for Ninth Army, but it was understrength and inadequately armed in 

tanks. Moreover, the indecisiveness with which it was finally employed 

contributed greatly to its ineffectiveness. In the breakthrough sector of 

3d and 48th Annies, each Soviet corps opposed no more than one two-battalion 

German regiment, while Soviet forces of no more than equal size to the 

German forces held the sector between there and the southern breakthrough 

sector. There, again, the two German divisions in the sector defended 

against thirteen ~ivietRifle divisions, one tank corps of about 300 tanks 

and a CMG. !hat gave a Soviet superiority of about one division for each 

German battalion. 

b. Opening Moves. (see maps at Tab 3 for daily summaries-22 June13 July 19443 

Operation BAGRATION did not commence at one time, but rather, 

developed successively from north to south. The reconnaissance' phase of the 

attack commenced in the 1st Baltic, 3d Belorussian, and 2d Belorussian Front 

sectors on 22 June. In the 1st Baltic sector, the gains were so impressive 

that overnight, General Bagramyan, the commander, decided to dispense with 

hs formal attack on 23 June and exploited the gains of his RIF. By then, 

his assault forces, some fifteen battalions, were already 5 kilometers into 

the German defenses. The di-risions sent out forward detachments on 23 he, 

which had the mission of reaching the Dvina River as scon as possible. As 
you can see from the map of 23 June, some of them had reached it by 

nightfall, and the breach had reached 16 kilometers in depth and 50 

kilometers in width. Although Bagramyan ordered 1st Tank Corps forward, the 

condition of the roads prevented it from entering the bettle that day. -

The X and 2d Belorussian Fronts commenced their offensives on 

23 June 1944, with a massive artillery and air barrage followed by the new 

penetration tactics. In the X Belorussian Front sector, the 39th and 5th 

Armies obtained the greatest success on this day. They penetrated to a 

depth of 10-11 kilometers on a 50 kilometers front, and, in 39th Armyes 

sector, the tank and assault gun brigades supporting each assault division 

passed through and commenced their exploitation for the Dvina River and 

link-up with 433 Amy forces. In 5th Army's sector, conditions were ripe 

for the early commitment of the Oslikovsky CMG the next day. On the Orsha -

axis, however, things did not go so well. In spite of the numerical 

superiority of 11th Guards Army, its progress in the selected breakthrough 

sector was only a few kilometers, but the right flank corps was achieving 

success. Thus, the army commander, General Galitskg, decided to commit his 

army mobile group, 2d Guards Tank Corps, to the north, along with four rifle 

divisions from the south of his sector. Army Group Center committed the two 

divisions stationed in the Vitebsk and Orsha areas--95th and 14th Infantry 

Divisions--against the penetrations, but piecemeal. 

The 49th Amy of the 2d Eelorussian Front made the most significant 

advance of the day, penetrating 10-12 kilometers in its sector, albeit at 

heavy cost to the attacking infantry. It did, however, cause commitment of 
the German Feldherrnhalle Panzer Grenadier Division against it. The fomard 

detachments of the assault rifle divisions led this advance. 

On 24 June, the most important event of the operation occurred in 

the southern sector: 1st Belorussian Front opened i.ts offensive northeast -. 

and south of Bobruisk. The attack of 3d Army in the north gained only 2 

kilometers and bogged down in the designated breakthrough sector, but the 

northernmost corps of the army had had success, and the army commander 

decided to comit his mobile group, 9th Tank Corps, through it the next 

day. The southern attack by 65th and 28th Armies had been devastating, with 

. the artillery preparation alone nearly vaporizing the facing German 

divisions. The 65th Army committed its mobile group, 1st Guards Tank Corps, 

at 1600 hours that day. While the annies had breached the enemy's defenses 

on a front of 30 kilometers to a depth of 5-10 kilaneters, the 1st Guards 

Tank Corps pushed the advance t.0 20 .kilometers. The tank corps had the 

missions of cutting the road west of Bobrvisk and encircling the enemy along 

the Beresina south of Bobruisk. Zhe Germans comnitted their reserve, 20th 

Panzer Division, but indecisively. First, they ordered it north, and then 

they ordered it back south but minus some of its armor. As a result, it saw 

action in neither sector that day. 

To the north, 43l and 6th Guards Armies of 1st Baltic Front secured 

bridgeheads over the mna from the north and expanded the breakthrough to 

30 kilometers deep and 90 kilometers wide. The 39th Army advance elements 

reached the Dvina from the south. In 5th Army's sector, the CMG had just 

started to go into action, and 5th Tank Army had commenced its move towards 

the 5th Army sector for commitment. The CMG had positioned jd Guards 
Mechanized Corps on the north and 3d Guards Cavalry Corps to the south; the 

group's objective was the Beresina River. Further south, the Soviet 

penetration continued to develop in the northern part of the llth Army 

sector, with the additional rifle divisions coming into action and 2d Guards - Tank Corps moving north, also. The Stavka representative, Marshal 

Vasilevsky, decided to change the axis of 5th Guards Tank Army, also, from 

the Orsha axis to 5th Army's sector. This would take at least thirty-six 

hours to accomplish. 

In the 2d Belorussian Front sector, the advance on Mogilev 

continued, unimpeded by the FH Panzer Grenadier Division. The 49th Army had 

committed its own mobile group, built around organic units and the 22d 

Guards Tank Brigade, and this helped the advance drive deep. . On 25 June, the first encirclement closed on Vitebsk, at a depth of 

about 50 kilometers. Trapped were five divisions, and 3d Panzer Army had 

only two of its eleven divisions and one of three corps left. The 39th and 

4% Armi'es would take about three days to liquidate the pocket, accepting 

the surrender of about 15,000 of an estimated 30,000 in the units in the 

pocket or to its flanks. Nor were relief attempts to succeed, for on the 

south the CXG had begun its exploitation towards Borisov on the Beresina. 

Behind it, 5th Guards Tank Army was assembling and would be ready for 

commitment the following day. In llth Guards Army sector; 2d Guards Tads 

Corps would also be ready for commitment the following day. The 3 

Belorussian Front had broken the German defenses on z 100 kilometer front 

and moved forward 30-50 kilometers. The 49th Army continued to make steady, 

if costly progress, and approached the Dnieper on the north of Wogilev. In 
the 1st Belorussian Zkont, 3d Amy commander committed 9th Tank Corps where 

the best gains had been made with orders to move on Bobruisk and seize a 

blocking position east of the city. Meanwhile, 1st Guards Tank Corps moved 

northwards, trapping a part of 34th German Division against the Beresina. -

?he front commander, General Rokossovsky, ordered the commitment of his CMG 

(4th Guards Cavalry corps and 1st Xechanized Corps) with the mission to 

advance through the German defenses and turn west for Slutsk, south of 

Minsk, against the key communications junction of Baranovichi . 

By 26 June, Soviet forces in the north were chopping up the Vitebsk 

pocket while mobile groups were racing for the Beresina River and Borisov. 

5th Guards Tank Army entered action and deployed south of Oslikovskg CMG, 

putti~ga phalanx of four corps deployed with brigades abreast in column 

fonnation moving 'southwest on the Beresina- and Borisov. !be 2d Guards Tank 

Corps cut the Vitebak-Orsha road, swung south and cut German communications 

between Orsha and Minsk, at a depth of 50 kilometers. The 49th Army had 

reached and crossed the Dnieper north of Mogilev. In the south, 1st 

Belorussian Front closed on Bobruisk from the east, with 9th Tank Corps, 

canmitted to combat that day, driving about 50-75 kilometers to the 

outskirts of Bobruisk on the east. 1st Guards Tank Corps was just west of 

Bobruisk and preparing to cut the Eobruisk-Zinsk highway, and the Pliyev CMG 

had reached the Ptich River and was turning towards Slutsk to the west of 

Bobruisk. 

The first German reinforcements for Army Groug Center had just 

arrived, 5th Asnzer Division headed for Borisov, and 12th Panzer Division 
headed for Bobruisk. As they arrived by rail, they were dispatched 

piecemeal, and, thus, neither was especially effective in halting the 

onmshing juggernaut. 

On 27 June, the inevitable happened, and 1st Guards Tank Corps and -

9th Tank Corps linked up west and north of Bobruisk, trapping about 70,000 

in the pocket. Of these, some 8-15,000 managed to get out. The CT3G 

continued west for Slutsk. In the north, a major gap had opened between the 

remnants of 3d Panzer Army in the north and 4th Army in the center, and the 

CMG and 5th Guards Tank Army marched into the gap. Meanwhile, to the south, 

2d Guards Tank Corps completed the encirlement of 78th German Infantry 

Division in Orsha. Mogilev itself was now encircled, and 2d Belorussian 

Front had made its first assault upon it, only to be repulsed. 

By 28 June, the magnitude of the opportunities opening up caused . 

Stavka to revise its directions to the fronts. It essentially changed the 

original second phase from an encirclement east of Minsk by forcea from 

north and south to a wide encirclement west of Minsk, with strong mobile 

formations holding the shoulders and gaps northwest at Molodechno and 

southwest at Baranovichi while combined armies formed the inner encirclement 

east of Minsk around the formations of the center of Army Group Center. 

Specifically, 1st Ealtic Front was to turn further north but continue 

protecting the northern flank of the offensive. The 3d Belorussian Front 

was to direct its CNG to Molodechno and 5th Guards Tank Army to encircle 

Minsk to the west. The 2d Belorussian Front was to provide the direct 

pressure force against the German forces, moving on Minsk from the east. 
The 3d Belomssian %ant was to send both its tank corps towards Minsk, 

while its CMG continued west to Baranovichi. 

On the 28th, the forces in the north had reached the Beresina, with 

the CMG constantly outflanking the German 5th Panzer Division over terrain 

where the panzers could not follow. In the south, 12th Panzer Division did 

get a battle group in to the Bobruisk pocket long enough to effect the 

rescue of some 15,000, but the rest remained encircled. The CMG had reached 

Slutsk and was menacing Earanovichi, having advanced nearly 100 kilometers 

in three days. With the elimination of the Bobruisk pocket on 29 he, the 

first stage of Operation BAGRATION came to an end. The Germans had lost 

nearly 200,000 men killed or taken prisoner, two armies (3Panzer and 9th) 

were ineffective, a third was in daxiger of being encircled with another 

150,000 men, and the four eastern fortresses had fallen: Vitebsk, Orsha, 

Mogilev, and Eobruisk. The Red Army was nearly 120-150 kilometers into the 

sector. The success was operational and needed only one more success to 

raise it to a strategic success. 

c . Subsequent Phases. 

Subsequent phases of Operation BAGRATIOI? occurred as follows. From 

29 June to 4 July the Soviet forces conducted attacks to encircle the German 

4th Amy forces moving west from Xogilev towards Xinsk, with the deep 

attacks aimed at the capture of Minsk itself and at cutting Minsk off from 

outside help at the gaps of Xolodechno in the ncrth and Baranovichi in the 

south. Then, from 5-16 July the Soviet forces, in response to another set 

of orders from Stavka, exploited to the borders of Belorussia, taking the 

key cities of Vilnius and Earanovichi and creating the conditions for the 
1st Ukrainian Front to commence its L'vov-Sandomierz operation south of the 

Pripet Marshes. The next phases were the attack of the left wing of the 1st 

Belorussian Front, taking Lublin and Brest and crossing the Vistula at 

Warsaw (17-31 July) and the Kaunaa Operation into Lithuania by 'the Ist -

Baltic Front from 28 July-28 August. Although the Soviet forces concluded 

the Belorussian operation by 29 August on the Vistula, in East Prussia, and 

in the Baltic states, the deep attack operations had ended in 3d and 2d 

Belorussian Fronts with the withdrawal of their tank corps and tank army by 

13 July from the vicinity of Vilnius, in 1st Belorussian Front by 1August 

with its halt in Praga, a suburb of Warsaw, and in 1st Baltic Front with the 

end of the Kaunas operation on 28 August. Gains made during the periods 

after those cited above were made by the rifle armies with infantry support 

tank forces rather than by deep attack operations. 

By 28 June, the mobile groups of the north were moving in a phalanx .-

with the CMG at the Beresina River north of Borisov, 5th GTA with its two 

tank corps pressing the German 5th Panzer Division directly along the 

highway to Borisov, and 2d GTC moving on the Beresina River south of 

Borisov. While the fighting around Borisov by 5th GTA continued veq 

heavily on 29 and 30 June, the CMG north crossed the Eeresina and began to 

envelope the 5th Panzer Division from the north, while 2d GTC had reached 

and crossed the Beresina from the south. In the south, the tank corps were 

still helping with the encirclement of Bobruisk while the CRG advanced west 

towards Baranovichi, reaching Slutsk by 29 June, about 80 kilometers from 

Baranovichi. Moreover, the tank corps were disengaging from Bobruisk and 

beginning to advance up the Bobdsk-Minsk road. In the center, four 

50 

armies, 3lst, 33d, 49th.. and 50th, pursued the German 4th Army (with 

elements from 3d Panzer Army and 9th ~rmy)and began encircling it north and 

south, while the deep attack pincers from Borisov and Bobruisk muld 

preclude any escape or relief from Minsk. -

By 30 June, the defense of Borisov and the Beresina had collapsed as 

the 5th Panzer Division withdrew from Borisov to avoid encirclement from the 

CMG north and 2d GTC to the south, both of which had crossed the river along 

with 5th GTA at Borisov. Now orders reached the CMG to direct its advance 

upon Molodechno, approximately 100 kilometers away and to the northwest of 

Minsk, leaving the three tank colps of 5th GTA and 2d GTC to advance on 

Minsk. The Soviet concept here was to hold that gap for their own further 

operations as well as to prevent Germap reinforcements from interfering with 

the capture of Minsk and the encirclement of the 4th hy. While parts of 

4th Army had reached the Beresina, others were as many as 50 kilometers 

east, while Soviet forces were across it north and south and 50-80 

kilometers closer to Minsk with more.mobile forces than those available to 

the Germans. In the south, the Soviet forces were within 50 kilometers of 

Baranovichi, but resistance was stiffening, with the introduction of German 

4th Panzer Division and 28th Jager Division. The drive on Kinsk from the 

south now had the rifle armies, except 48th Amy which was withdrawn into 

front reserve, supporting the advance of the tank corps up the road to 

Xinsk, approximately 75-80 kilometers to the southeast. 

Although 1 July was essentially a day for regrouping for Soviet 

forces, Rokossovsicy in the south made an important decision, to send the 4th 

Guards Cavalry Corps of the CMG north of Baranovichi cross-country to cut 

51 

the railway into Minsk at Stolbtsy. He also- directed the 9th TC from the 

direct Bobruisk-Minsk road west to the Slutsk-Minsk road, from which it 

would outflank the resistance of 12th Panzer Division in the advance on 

Minsk. In the nqrth, the CMG =oriented itself for the drive on Molodechno - while 5th GTA prepared for the final drive on Minsk astride the 

Borisov-Ninsk Highway with 2d GTC on its left flank. In the center, the 

German 4th Army spent 1-2 July crossing the Beresina under pressure. 

!he Soviet drives renewed on 2 July, and by 3 July all major 

objectives had been achieved. In the north, the CMG had reached Molodechno 

and Smorgon (northwest of ~olodechno) , although Molodechno did not fall 

until elements of 5th Army could assist 4th GCC in the seizure. The drive 

on Minsk, led by 5th GTA and' 2d GTC on its left entered uinsk on July 3,-

covering 50 kilometers in two days, and the tank forces swept on through the 

city to positions west and southwest of it. Four hours later, the forces 

from the south entered, led by the converging of the 9th TC directly south 

and 1st GTC from southeast. No sooner did they reach the city than they 

were ordered to turn south for redeployment against Baranovichi. The -

Soviets had estimated that it would take them until 7 or 8 July to reach 

Minsk, and they had done it in two days. In the pocket thus formed were 

approximately 105,000 Germans, and it took the rifle armies of 2d 

Belomssian Front, 3lst (from 3d BRF), 333, 49th, and 5Cth, until 11 July to 

reduce it. They killed approximately 40,000 and paraded 57,000 through 

Moscow on 17 July on their way to internment in Siberia. The success was 

now strategic, with 3CO-350,000 German casualties and 25-28 divisions 

destroyed, leaving a gapping hole of nearly 400 kilometers in the German 

lines. 
With the magnitude of the strategic success clear now, Stavka on 4 

July issued new orders for the offensive, directing 1st Baltic Front on 

Kaur~asin Lithuania, X WF to Vilnius and then the rJeman River, 2d BRB to 

the - Neman, and 1st BRF to the western Bug, on the borders of Poland, finally 

bringing his left wing into action. The mobile groups were to lead off 

immediately, with the rifle armies to reduce any bypassed enemy forces. 

This decision represented a change from the usual Soviet style, as they had 

previously halted after an advance of 200 kilometers to regroup and bring up 

supplies and forces, and the advance to Minsk had been 200-250 kilometers, 

with some forces advancing up to 280 kilometers. 

The fronts jumped off on the third phase on 5 July with the same 

success which had met the first two pkses. On 5 July, they changed the 

task organization to conduct the new operation. In the north, they 

disbanded 'the CMG, using its 36 GMC to spearhead the advance of 5th Army on 

Vilnius, while the 5th GTA added its weight to 3d GCC's attacks on 

Molodechno, which fell that day. The 5th GTA would then spearhead the units 

of 11th GA. While 2d BRF was occupied by elimination of the 4th Army, 1st 

Ba moved its tank corps from Minsk into position for an attack on 

Baranovichi from the northeast and east. 

On-6 July the Soviet advance on Vilnius began with the 3d GMC 

leading the forward detachments of rifle divisions. This advance was 

virtuelly unopposed, and Soviet forces reached Vilnius on 7 July. The ' 5th

GTA reached Vilnius on 8 July and invested it from the south, having 

advanced another 100 kilometers in some two days from Eolodechno. At times, 
both fomes were some 30-40 kilometers ahead of their supporting rifle 

divisions. However, Vilnius did not fall immediately, and the Germans would 

make an effort to relieve the garrison. 

In the south, the attack on Baranovichi opened with the main attack 

coming from the northeast. and supporting attack from the east along the 

Bobruisk-Baranovichi road. The Gezman f ones resisting were good--4t h 

Panzer Division, 28th Jager Division, 12th Panzer Division, and two smaller 

cavalry units, all under the command of 26 Army as 9th Army was no longer 

capable of command. Nevertheless, they were worn down from the battles 

earlier for the defense of Baranovichi, and when the .full power of the right 

wing of 1st BiF was brought to bear on them, the resistance crumbled, with 

Baranovichi falling on 8 July. It fell to a Soviet force breaking through . to the north of Baranovichi, almost encircling the defenders and compelling 

them to withdraw to Slonim. In the center, 2d BRF was also reinforced with 

a mobile group, X GCC fmm the CMG. !bey used them to spearhead the 

advance to Lida, where they overcame the German defenders by 9 July. 

The fighting around Vilnius occasioned sane extremely hard work 

meeting German counterattacks as well as reducing the German pocket. As a 

result, the Soviet armor in the mobile groups was so used up that they began 

to be withdrawn. The first to go was 2d GTC on 10 July, and 5th GTA, down 

to about twent yeight tanks operational after repulsing the German 

counterattack on 13 July. The fronts did, however, have sufficient combat 

power and momentum to reach the Nernan River, a move of about 2 1;0 kilometers 

from Minsk for 2d 9RF and 180-200 kilometers for 3d BRr'. Meantime in the 

south, 1st BRF had pursued through Saranovichi to Slonh, which fell 

54 

quickly. By 10 July, the 61st Army, 1st BRP, which connected the right wing 

of 1st BRF with the left wing, came into play, and it liberated the city of 

Pinak on 14 July and linked up with 1st BRF, which -had advanced 150-170 

kilometers in twelve days. 

All of this success had drawn German divisions from other army 

groups, amounting initially to six divisions from Anny Group North Ukraine, 

including three panzer divisions. Later reinforcements totaled . twenty-eight 

divisions from Amy Group North, Army Group North Ukraize, and Army Group 

South Ukraine. That made conditions ripe for the next Great Blow, the 

L'vov-Sandomiercz Operation by the 1st Ukrainian Front commanded by Marshal 

Koniev. It commenced on 12 July to complicate further the Germans' 

strategic problems. Finally, the long,-awaited left ~ng of the 1st BRB 

attacked on 18 July, taking Lublin on 23 July and Brest on 28 July. The 2d 

Tank Anny reached Raga beside Warsaw on 31 July, and 8th Guards Anny under 

~eneralChuikov, the bulldog defender of Stalingrad, crossed the Vistula on 

1August. The advance-was some 300 kilometers in two weeks, a pace which 

met the best efforts of the rest of Operation BAGRATIOL. 

On the same date, Bagrtxqein in 1st BAF had reached the Baltic and 

cut Army Group North off from Army Group Center. Later advances by 3d and 

2d BRF would bring the front another 100 kilometers further west, into the 

eastern borders of Eastern Prussia and Poland, but these advances would be 

made by the rifle armies with such mobile groups as theye were providing 

infantry support. During this period, the 7th "Great Elow" commenced on 

20 August, the Jas sy-Kishinev Operation against Army Grcup South Ukraine. 

German counterattacks in the north, against 1st BAF at Shyualyai, and in the 
south, against the forces of 1st -Ukrainian Fkont across the San River nest 

of the Vistula, effectively ended Operation BAGRATION by 29 August 1944. 

d. Outcome. 

Operation BAGRATION had resulted in the reconquest of Belorussia and 

even the invasion of part of Germany itself, Eastern kssia, as well as 

penetrating Poland to the Vistula River and Warsaw. It had allowed the 

1iberatio.n of Lithuania and part of Latvia, and there were bridgeheads over 

the Vistula River, as well as the full crossing of the Neman and Narev 

Rivera on the way to East Pmssia. As a result of paving the way for later 

offensives, it indirectly led to the precipitate withdrawal of Rumania from 

the war, three days after the Jassy-Kishinev Operation commenced in the 

south. Later on in the year, Bulgaria,. Hungary, and Finland would also be 

taken out of the war. 

In the destruction of Army Group Center during the first two weeks 

of the operation, it had achieved stzktegic results, and the effects were 

also strategic. Its successes drew forces away from the other sectors of 

the front khich the Red Army planned to hit during the summer, making them 

more successful. It had also caused the destruction of thirty divisions and 

the diversion of twenty-eight divisions to its front. Three German armies 

had been wrecked and a fourth, the 16th in Army Group lorth, severely mauled. 

The Red Army had advanced almost 600 kilometers during the summer, 

approximately twice as far as the Allies and Patton advanced after the 

breakout from Normandy to the German frontier. It had encircled Geman 

forces at Vitebsk and Bobruisk, at Minsk, and at Vilnius and Brest-Litovsk. 

It had widened the advance frontage from 700 kilometers at its start to 
1,000 kilometers at its end and sucked in an estimated ninety-eeven German 

divisions and .thirteen brigades, piecemeal. Those German divisions faced an 

overall force of 2,500,000 men, 45,000 guns and mortars, 6,000 tanks and 

assault guns, and approximately 7,000 aircraft, 

The Soviet forces had accomplished their operations on a vaster 

scale than ever before, and it was their most successful strategic 

operation. They had taken only one week to reduce the Kinsk pocket, while 

the Stalingrad pocket of similar size had taken nearly two months to reduce 

eighteen months earlier. They had also used very sophisticated techniques 

of direct and parallel pursuit at a depth of 250 kilometers to close that 

pocket. Their operational art, in the matter of deep attacks, had been very 

much restricted to maneuver forces, led by tank or mobile forces or groups. 

They had used their rifle divisions to make the tactical breakthroughs, and 

had used forward detachments (made possible by the attachment of army 

separate tank brigades), tank corps (at army) and CMG or tank armies (at 

front), introduced even while the tactical battle was going on but no longer 

in doubt, to exploit as soon as possible. Sometimes they were committed as 

soon as the first day. The pace had averaged 20-25 kilometers per day 

before the withdrawal of the major tank formations in mid-July and 13-14 

kilometers per day after, although the left wing of 1st BRF had again 

averaged 20-25 kilometers per day in its rush to the Vistula. 

4. Conclusions. 

The deep operations in Operation EAGRATION ranged from 60-250 kilometers 

in depth of operations. Tbey were primarily conducted by maneuver elements; 
those elements depended upon tank forces for their success. A key to the 

use of those tank forces was the growing Soviet doctrine which emphasized 

carrying the battle to the enemy simultaneously throughout the depth of his 

position. Thus, assault rifle divisions making attacks in main directions 

could be reinfo~ced by a tank brigade and expected to form a forward 

detachment which could carry out operations-to the depth of the enemy's 

tactical defenses. As soon as it was clear that the enemy's defenses were 

crumbling, larger Soviet tank forces would be committed through the position 

to car- out their missions in the enemy's rear while the assault divisions 

might still be fighting their way through the tactical defenses. 

These larger Soviet force structures were organized to allow them to 

cam their operations progressively further into the enemy's rear, and they 

did so. The tank corps could carry about 100 kilometers into the rear, and 

the tank amy or CMC could'carry about 200 kilometers into the enemg's rear 

before they would need support. Moreover, the doctrine allowed these 

formations to run without maintaining connection with their following 

combined anns or rifle armies. Thus, the encirclement at Vitebsk could be 

made by tank brigades and forward detachments, while that at Bobruisk could 

be made by tank corps. However, the encirclement of Minsk, 250 kilometers 

deep could not have been made without the CWG or tank army. More 

remarkably, those formations still had enough combat power to continue 

operations for another 150-200 kilometers, past Vilnius and Earanovichi, 

before they were used up. 

The decline in the average rate of advance showed the effects of their 

withdrawal, yet they imparted enough momentum to the Soviet advance to allow 
the rifle or combined arms armies to advance another 200 kilometers before 

the advance ground to a halt, about 400 kilometers beyond where the Germans 

had expected them to halt. !llhat first advance of 300-400 kilometers took 

place in the first three weeks of the operation, leaving another five weeks -

of slower advances while the German defenses were rebuilding. Moreover, the 

failure to keep an encircled force bagged which had plagued the Red Army 

during the winter campaign in the Ukraine did not recur. Rather, the forces 

which had formed the outer encirclement kept moving out to prevent the 

rescue of the encircled force which had occurred at least twice the previous 

winter. 

The Soviets had developed the higher level force structure which allowed 

them to get so deep:. the tank army. The CMG also proved useful as a 

substitute in terrain not favorable to the employment of masses of annor. 

These formations were not to be committed to fight through the tactical 

defenses, but rather drove deep for operational or strategic objectives. 

Thus, one can see deep operations occurring at several echelons 

simultaneously. 

Of course, the Soviet concept of and conduct of masldrovka, or cover and 

deception (but more inclusive), also furnished a major factor in the success 

of the operation. The maskirovka plac was prepared at the highest levels 

and disseminated to all levels. Thus, it supported not only Operation 

BAGRATION but also the other offensives of the summer by disguising the 

. exact location of the next blow, or at least removing the Germans' ability 

to react effectively to the next move. In Operation BAGRATION, the Soviets 
achieved surprise at the strategic and operational levels at least, and they 

achieved some tactical surprise in the strength which they had to employ. 

Maskirovka was only one part of a very sophisticated plan which took the 

operation by bite-size pieces and only proceeded to the next piece when -

certain of success in the preceding stage. Thus, the decision for the 

encirclement of Minsk was finally made after the Vitebsk and Bobruisk 

pockets had occurred, and the exploitation to the borders of Belorussia was 

ordered only after the success of the Minsk pocket and the seizure of the 

main exits from it northwest and southwest. However, the Soviets had seen 

the liberation of Belorussia and the destruction of Amy Group Center as the 

ultimate aim of the operation, 

One manner in which the Red Army cquld have conducted deep attack 

operations was aerial interdiction, but they did not do so to any marked 

degree. In fact, throughout the war they only devoted about 5% of their 

sorties to interdiction as we understand it. Another means of deep attack 

which they did not use but which they possessed was airborne attack. They 

did, however, use partisans in support of this operation as a form of deep 

attack. This would be an anomaly, because in the Ukraine the partisans were 

not so reliable, some bands being quite antiSoviet. Lndeed, they killed 

Marshal Vatutin, a front commander in the spring of 1944. Nor would 

partisans necessarily be available in operations outside the countrg. 

The success of deep attack operations in Operation BAGRATION was abetted 

also by the German defensive dispositions and doctrine. Although the German 

military leaders did know how to practice defense in depth, Adolf Hitler 

would not allow withdrawals to shorten the lines in order to provide greater 
operational reserves, nor, even operationally, would he allow construction 

of works and lines to operational depth. !he latter stricture only 

aggravated the situation caused by lack of manpower to complete the second 

line of tactical defenses in the area of Amy Group Center. Thus, Army 

Group Center was left with inadequate forces and preparations for the 

frontage which it had to defend. The unit available to Army Group Center 

which might have provided operational reserves, LVI Panzer Corps, was 

removed from Army Group Center's control, and it was mal-positioned to react 

to the blows which eventually fell. 
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Washington, D .C. , 1968. 
ANNEX A 

Correlation of Porces (strategic) 

June 1944 

1,- Soviet. 

Perso~el Formations 

Armament Mil. Equip. 

Active Fronts 

and Fleets 

Stavka 

fieserves Total 

Ground Forces 5,691,000 386,000 6,077,000 

Air Forces 377,000 70,000 447,000 

Airborne Forces 

Total - .. 6,425,000 514,000 6,939,000 

Rifle, Motor-rifle 

Cavalry, and Airborne 

Divisions 

Detached Brigades 

Fortified Areas 

Tank and Mechanized Cows 22 15 

-

37 

Detached Tank Bdes 30 1 37 

Artillery and Mortar 

Divisions 
Personnel Formations 

Amament Nil. Equip. 

Active di?ronts 

and Fleets Total 

Detached Artillery 

and Mortar Bdes 

Aviation Divisions 132 21 153 

Guns and Xortars 92,557 4,4~3 97,050 

Tanks/~ssaultGuns 

Operational Aircraft 13,428 i,353 14.7~7 

2. German. 

Persomel 

Formations 

Armament 

Equipment 

Field 

ArmyEastern 

Front 

0ther 

Fronts 

dese,me 

or 

Satellite 

Total 

Ground Torces 3,130,000 1,420,000 ~80~,000) 4,550,WOU {GE) 

Air r'orce 1,800,a10 1,81)i),000 

Navy 80,000 80,000 

Total 3, 130,000 3,3oo,900 2,000,m0 d,43b,;00 

Infantrj 

Divisions 
-- 

Peraonne1 


Formations 


Armament 


Ruipment 


Parachute 

. Divisions 

Brigades 

Panzer 

Divisions 

Panzer Grenadier 

Divisions 

SS Divisions 

Guns and Mortars 

Tanks/Assault 


Guns 

Operational 


Aircraft 

Field Reserve 

by- 0ther or 'total 

Eastern Fronts Satellite 

Front 

9 

48,635 19,865 'Jnk 68,500 {GE) 
ANNEX B - SOVIET FORCE STRUCTURE (1944) 

1. SOVIET RIFLE FORCES 

Rifle Army 


3 rifle corps 


- 7-12 rifle divisions 


1artillery brigade 


2 gun artillery regiments 


1tank destroyer regiment 


1antiaircraft artillery regiment 


1mortar regiment 


1engineer/sapper brigade 


1tank regiment 


1 signal regiment 


1tank or mechanized corps 


(optional) 

strength: 80,000-120,000 men 

300-460 tanks (if tank/aech corps attached) 

1,700-2000 guns/mortars 

30-225 SP guns 

Rifle Corps 


3 rifle divisions 


1 artillery brigade (guard corps) 


1artillery regiment (regular corps) 


1self-propelled artillery regiment 


1guards mortar regiment 


1antiaimnft artillery battaGn 


1sapper battalion 


1signal battalion 


strength: 20,000-30,000.men 


Rifle Division 


3 rifle regiments (4 x 7h, 12 x 45ms) 


1artillery brigade 


1gun artillery regiment (32 x 76mm) 


1 howitzer artillery regiment (20 x 122mm) 


1 mortar reginent (20 x 12Qum) 


1 antiaircraft artillery battalion (12 x 37mm) ' ( in guards divisions) 


1 tank destroyez battalion (18 x 45, 57, 7h) 


I sapper battalion 


1signal compazy 


1reconnaissance company 

strength: 9,380 men* 

64 guns 

127 mortars 

12 AA guns 

54 AT guns 

*Bifle division strengths are by TOE - Actual strengths nuch smaller 

i 500-6,000) 

2. SOVIET CAVALRY FORCES 

Cavalry Corps 

3 cavalry divisions 

2 tank regiments (39 tanks each) 

I reconnaissance battalion 

1 tank destroyer regiment 

1mortar regiment 

1 guards mortar battalion 

1 self-propelled artillery regiment 

1 engineer regiment 

1 signal battalion 

strength: 14,000-15,000 men 

80-100 tanks, 

268 guns /mortHrs . 48 'AT guns 

34 AA guns 

Cavalry Division 

3 cavalry regiments (6 x 76mm. 6 x 45mm) 

1artillery regiment 

1reconnaissance battalion 

1antiaircraft squadron 

1engineer squadron 

1 signal squadron 

strength: 4,700 men 

42 guns 

18 AT guns 
3. TANK/MECHANIZEDFORCES 

Mechanized Corps 

3 mechanized brigades - 3 motorized rifle battalions 

1 tank regiment (35 tanks) 

1 tank brigade (65 tanks) 

- 1light self-propelled artillery regiment (sU--76) 

1 med self-propelled artillery regiment (SU-85) 

1heavy self-propelled artillery regiment (sU-152) 

(in some corps) 

1mortar regiment 

1antiaircraft artillery regiment 

1guards mortar battalion 

1motorcycle battalion 

1 signal battalion 

1 sapper, engineer battalion 

1medical battalion 

1 transport company 

1 repair, reconstruction company 

strength: 16,442 men 

183 tanks 

63 SP guns 

234guns/mortars 

8 multiple rocket launchers 

Tank Corps 

3 tank brigades (6 5 tanks each) . 

1motorized rifle brigade 

1mortar regiment 

1 antiaircraft artillery regiment 

1light self-propelled artillery regiment (SU-76) 

1med self-propelled artillery regiment (sU-85/122) 

1heavy self-propelled artillery regiment (SU-152) 

(in some corps) 

1 light artillery regiment 

1guards mortar battalion 

1motorcycle battalion 

1 transport company 

2 repair companies (artillery, tank) 

1 sedical battalion (Nay 1944) 

1 sappr battalion 

1 signal battalion 

1 aviation company 

1 chemical defense company 

strewth: 12,010 men 

207 tanks 

63 SP guns 

182 guns/mortars 

8 multiple rocket launchers 
Tank Army 


2 tank corps 


1mechanized corps (optional) 


1motorcycle regiment 


1 light artillery brigade 


2 	gun artillery regiments (76mm) 

- 1 gun artillery regiment (1OChm) 

1	light self-propelled artillery brigade 

3 light self-propelled artillery battalions (SU-76) 

1machine gun battalion 

1antiaircraft machine gun company 

2 mortar regiments 


1guards mortar regiments 


1antiaircraft artillery div 


4 	antiaircraft artillery regiments 

1	morotized engineer brigade 


2 motorized engineer bns 


1 pontoon bridge battalion 


1 signal regiment 


1aviation communications regiment 


1 transport regiment 


2 repair/reconstruction battalions 


strength: 50,000 men . 
 500-650 tanks, SP guns 

650-850 guns /mortars 
ABXEX. C 

CORRELATION OF FORCES 

BELORUSSIA - JUNE 1944 


SOVTET GERMAN 


1st Baltic -Front (3d Air ~rmy)(~BAF) .XPanzer Army (3Pz~) 

6th Gds Army [~GA) IX AC 

4th Shock Army (4sA) LII AC 

43d Army (4%) VI AC 

1st Tank Corps (1TC) 

227,000 men 120,000 men 

3d ~elorussiah-Front (1st Air Army) (33RF) 

39th Amy (3%) . 

5th Army (5~) 

Tank Army (SGTA) 

3d Gds Mech Corps XXVII AC 

CMG 

5th ~ds 4th Army (4~) 

3d Gds Cav Corps 

2d Gds Tank Corps (~GTC) 

389,500 men 165,000 men 

1,810 Tks/sPs 
2d Belorussisn -Front (4th Air Army) (2~R2) 

202,900 men 

1st Belorussian -Front 	(16th Air Army-Rt Wing; (l3Rlj 

(6th Air Amy - Left Xi%) 

48th Army (48A) 

65th Army (65A) 

28th Amy (28~) 	 LV AC 

9th Tank Corps (9TC) 	 120,000 men 

1st Mech Corps 


(CMG) 


4th %Is Cav Corps 

1st Cds Tank Corps (~GTC) 

5th Air Fleet 

Totals 

Initisl 1,250,000 men ( combat) 3x1 4G0, CWLJ 3en ( combat j 

(124 divisions, 9 TC/X) (3 x 1) <3613,5?Z/?~~r3iv,7 res) 

Total 2,400,000 men ( total) 3x1 303,000 ae3 (total) 

(166 divisions, 12 TC/YC) (3 x 1) (60 div) 

Initial 4,050 T"S/SPS 10 x 1 40d T~s/Si'a 

Total (5200 'Ilcs/SP 6x1 (900 '~lrs/s?j 

5,100 aircraft 4x1 	 1,324 aircraft 

33,000 guns/morters 8x1 	 4,000 gnns/mortars 
ANNEX D - PLANNING SEQUENCE 

5 April--Commission of GKO established to study Eastern Front for strategy. 

12 April--Commission reports; GKO decides for offensive in Belorussia and 

split of Western Front (controlline operations in ~elorussia) into 3 and 2d 

Belorussian Ronts. 

17-19 April--Stavka transmitted directives to all front commanders to assume 


the defense; establish 25 km "security zone." 


24 April--Western Front replaced by 2d and 3d Belorussian Fronts. 


30 April--Stavka completed initial draft of concept of operation. 

1-7 May--Planning directives based upon Stavka concept issued to front 

commanders. 

-Two phases: 

--Ehcirclement of German forces at Vietbsk and 3obruisk. 

--Exploitation to Minsk from Vitebsk and Bobruisk for encirclement of 

Army Group Center's main forces. 

--Main attacks to be made by jd Belorussian and 1st Zelorussian fronts 

against Vitebsk and Bobwisk,' respectively, then linking up at Minsk. 

--1st Baltic Front to make deep attack to Molodechno. 

-Four penetrations: 

--1st Baltic Front 

--3d Belorussian Pront 

--1st .~elorussianFront (2) 

15 Xay--Four front commanders submit plans to Stavka. 

20 May--Stavka draft plan completed and issued as a planning rnemorandun 

signed by Army General A. I. Antonov, DCS Ops for the 3ed Army and Saw. 

Named BAGRATION. 

22-23 May--Plan reviewed by Su?rerne Commander Joseph Stalin and nis deputies 

along with the four front commanders and their chiefs of staff. Changes: 
--1st Baltic Front to advance along Western Wina aiver to protect 

northern flank of offensive. 

--Phase one to include encirclement of Minsk (depth of 200-250 km); 

phase two to include left flank of 1st Belorussian Front after right flank 

forces reach Sloaim and advance of 550-600 km. 

. --Operation's first phase to be accomplished in stages: 

---1st--encirclements of enemy tactical defenses at Vitebsk by 1st 

Baltic and 3d Belorussian Fronts and Bobruisk by 1st Belorussian Front, witn 

secondary penetrations against Orsha and Mosilev to fix enemy forces (depth 

approximately 50-60 h) 

---2d--Mobile groups to encircle/destroy enemy 03erational reserves 

and encircle main body force by driving on Hinsk and cutting it off from 

north and south at Nolodechno and Baranovichi, respectively. 

--Forces making main efforts now 97 divisions, up from 77. 

-Six penetrations: 

--1st Baltic Zkont--northwest of, Vitebsk to encircle Vitebsk from 

north; exploitation force to Western Dvina River. 

0-3Belorussian Front--two penetrations. One southeast of Vi tebsk to 

encircle city from south, and the other to penetrate Gemn defenses at 

Orsha and destroy enemy forces there. Cavalry-Mechanized Group to follow 

northern penetration and seize Molodechno. 

--2d Belorussian- Front--east of Mogilev to destroy enemy forces in 

ares and break through to Beresina River. 

--1st Belorussian Front--two penetrations, north i3ogschev sector) and 

south of Bobruisk, one on each side of Beresina River. Tank corps of front 

to be used in encirclement of Bobruisk and/or encirclement of NLnsk; 

Cavalry-Mechanized Group to exploit to Baranovichi to iso1at.e Minsk from 

south. 

24-30 Fay--S tavka revised draft Plan. 

31 Yay--Stavka issued revised planning diretive to front commanders. 5th 

Guards Tank Army assigned to 3d Selomssian Front with sission of passing 

through Orsha penetration and attacking towards Borisov and ;dIinsk. 

041600 June--7lasilevsky arrives at 3 aelorussian Front to coordinate 

northern group of fronts. Chief Barshal of Avn A. A. Novikov to assist on 

aviation maters. 
050500 June--Zhukov arrives at 1st Belorussian Front to coordinate .southern 

group of fronts. Harshal of Avn Faiaieyev to assist on coordination of am 

matters. 

13 ~une--~talinagreed to four-day postponement of BAGRATION (i.e., from 

15-20 June to 19-23 ~une). 

14218 June--Army and corps plans wargamed before front commanders and Stavka 

representatives. -

15 June--front plans finalized and reviewed by Stavka. 

19 June--Partisan activities begin. Reisovaya voina, 10K detonations; 4OK 

for four days. Estimated 1000 cuts in rails and roads sade of 2000 planned. 

20-22 June--RIF (rein co & bn) conducted by 2d and 3 Saltic and 1st 

Ukrainian Fronts, as well as by BAGRATION Fronts. 

20 June-By this date, the four fronts had received all their reinforcing 

troops and completed training. 

22 June-RIF by BAGRATION fronts commenced; success in 1st Baltic Front 

converted into offensive. . 

23 June--3 & 2d Belorussian Fronts (northern and center) commence offensive. 

24 June--1st Belorussian Front (south) commences offensive. 

28 June-Stavka o'kders CAA of fronts to encircle German 4th Army east of 

Minsk and CMG' s of fronts to cut roads west of Minsk at Baranovichi and 

Xolodechno; 5 GTA to effect outer (X) encirclement of Hinsk. 

4 .Jul--Stavka orders pursuit to borders of Selorussia; 5 GTA & CKG (8) to . 

Vilnius, CMG (S) to Belostock. 

12 July--L8vov-Sandomiercz Operation (1st Ukrainian Front) starts. 

18 July--Left Wing of 1st Belorussian Front opens offensive toward Lublin 

and Warsaw; prsuit by rest of BAGRATION forces to Vistula River and 2. 

Prussia . 

ANNEX E 

Major Elements of Front Plans 

Total Width Formations 

Width of of Naking Exploitation 

Front Frontage Penetration Penetrations Force Bemarks 

(Kilometer) (~ilometer) 

1st Baltic 160 25 	 6th Guards Ist Tank 

Army; 43 Corps 

3-d Belorussian 130 18 a. Northern ;-Iechanizeci 5th Guards 

Shock Cavalry Tank Army 

Group Group (3d to be com39th Cavalry and mitted as 

Army; 3d Guards the front ' s 

5th Army M ecknized main excows) plo iting 

force in 

zone of 

group

enjoying 

greater 

success 

15 b. Southern 2d Guards 

Shock Tank Coqs 

Group 

llth 

Guards 

hy; 

31st h y 

2d Belorusaian 160 15 44th Army ist 3ifle Initially, 

Coqs this front 

limited. 

objective 

of seizing 

$iogilev 
Total Width Formations 

Width of of Xaking Exploitation 

Front Frontage Penetration Penetrations Force Remarks 

(Kilometer) (Kilometer) 

1st Belomssian 650 17 a. Northern 9th Tank Initially, 

(250) Shock 

Group 

corps only right 

wing of 

x hy; this front 

48th Army (four 

armies) 

were to be 

committed. 

Pour armies 

b. Southern la t Guards had a 

Shock Tank Corps frontage of 

Group 250 kilo65th Army; meters. 

28th 

Mechanized 

Cavalry 

Group 
Ai!i!NEX P 

Dispositions 

1. Army operations in breaking through enemy tactical zones. 

AFW/ Sector Width Depth Ava Dly Length of Op 


Front in km in h Advance in Dys Remarks 


Zone Pen End (hitial) 


5 hy/ 22 12 63 150 18-20 km 8 CXG; 5 GTL 

1st BR 22 tanics/~~ 

/km inf spt 

11Gds kmy/ 35 8 35 160 16-16 km 9 	 2GTC 

1st BR 	 1.1 ian/aiv; 

181 guns/km; 

22 tanks/A~ 

/km inf spt; 

46 tank/A~ 

/lan total 

49 Amy/ 50 12 45 60 12 km 5 See note a. 

2d BR 

3 hy/ 53 12 65 80 16 km 5 9TC; 

1st BR 16 taruts/~c; 

/km inf spt 

65 Army/ 	 lGTC 

1st BR 2 4 6 40 65 13 hn 5 	 75;b of personnel, a& 

or^ guns/nortars, 4% of 

tanks/AG ' s 

13 ta~uts/~~ 

/ainf spt 

Notes: 

a. 49 Army Concentration of Forces 
~orces/ Own Forces GE Pones delative 

Naterial Total Per km Total Per km Superiority 

Battalions 91 7.6 12 1.0 7.6: 1 

2. Tactical densities in Rifle Corps in Operation BAGRATION. 

Atk Pen - Density Per km Pen Sector 

Corps Zone Sector Rifle Bn Guns/i;lo rt Tanks/~~ 

1 i3R/ 18th 

55 Army 
3. Introduction of 2d Echelons and Xobile Groups of Armies. 

Name of 

Operation Army 

Day of Entry into Battle 

2d Echelon Mobile Group 

Immediate Task 

2d Echelon Mobile Group 

Orsha 11GA Rifle Div2d Day 2d GTC4th Day Seize 2d Def 

Line 

Seize army 

obj; develop 

tactical 

success 

into 

operational 

Bobruisk 3 Army Rifle Div2d Day; 

46 XC-3 3ay 

9th TC2d Day Seize 1st Obj 

Seize 2d Obj 

(46 XC> 

Seize 1st abj 

Bobruisk 65 Army Rifle Div1st Day 1st GTCIst Day Seize 1st Obj Seize 1st Obj