PAX NATO: THE OPPORTUNITIES

OF ENLARGEMENT

Raymond A. Millen

August 2002
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ISBN 1-58487-098-2

ii
FOREWORD

Considering its long string of successes, it is curious that

NATO has so many critics chanting the mantra of

irrelevancy or decrying its post-Cold War initiatives.

Paradoxically, pan-Europeanists seem quite willing to

accept an ineffective security organization as long as it has a

European label on it. Applying parochial protectionist

practices on regional security may be irrevocable and

certainly ruinous.

In this monograph, Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Millen

examines NATO’s extraordinary performance and incisive

initiatives during the immediate post-Cold War years.

While other security organizations and concepts have faded

in importance and utility, NATO has made sweeping

changes to remain relevant, and its unique enforcement

mechanism means it has no security peer. Organizationally,

NATO remains the greatest cost effective hedge against

future threats and possesses the greatest potential for the

full spectrum of conflict, to include crisis management.

Notwithstanding its successes, NATO does need to conduct

simple reforms, which, if implemented, will result in

enormous cost savings and greater interoperability among

new and old members. Allied bickering may result, but if the

United States insists on their implementation, all members

will fall in line.

Lieutenant Colonel Millen scrutinizes the impact of

enlargement on the Alliance, not only from a military but

also a geopolitical perspective. He is quick to point out that,

without the needed reforms, new members will bring more

fat than muscle to the Alliance. However, the process of

enlargement has served to harmonize Central and Eastern

Europe with Western Europe in a remarkable manner. That

achievement alone has made enlargement worthwhile. He

goes beyond the next round of enlargement and makes a

case for a reorientation of NATO enlargement towards the

iii
Middle East and North African regions. They may never

receive the full security umbrella of NATO, but they can

enjoy the shade.

Lieutenant Colonel Millen provides a pragmatic

roadmap for the future of NATO. The Strategic Studies

Institute is pleased to offer this insightful and controversial

monograph as a topic of debate among European security

specialists.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iv
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

RAYMOND A. MILLEN is currently assigned as the

Director of European Security Studies at the Strategic

Studies Institute. A lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army, he

graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1982, was

commissioned as an infantry officer, and has held a variety

of command and staff assignments in Germany and

Continental United States. He commanded a light infantry

company during Operation JUST CAUSE, the invasion of

Panama in 1990. Lieutenant Colonel Millen has also served

as the U.S. Army Infantry School Liaison Officer to the

German Infantry School at Hammelburg, Germany;

Battalion Executive Officer, 3-502d Infantry, Fort

Campbell, Kentucky; and Chief of Intelligence Section and

Balkans Team Chief, Survey Section, SHAPE, Belgium. He

is a graduate of the U.S. Army’s Command and General

Staff College, and holds an M.A. degree in National Security

Studies from Georgetown University. He is a Foreign Area

Officer for Western Europe. Lieutenant Colonel Millen has

published articles in a number of scholarly and professional

journals, including Infantry Magazine and the Swiss

Military Journal. His book, Command Legacy, was

published by Brasseys in April 2002.

v
SUMMARY

In addition to choosing new members, the NATO summit

in Prague, to be held November 20-22, 2002, should strive to

resolve two burning issues—the continued relevance of

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the

Alliance’s future orientation. If managed well, the summit

could lay the foundation of European security and stability

for the next century.

NATO has made and continues to make a profound

contribution to European security and stability. Unlike all

other security organizations, NATO has evolved as the

strategic environment changed during the post-Cold War

period and is well-positioned to resolve near term

challenges. The Partnership for Peace (PfP), the

Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the Combined

Joint Task Force (CJTF), and NATO Enlargement

initiatives reflect a dynamic and vibrant organization.

Given its military component, NATO matches enforcement

with words, something the Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Western European

Union (WEU), and the much vaunted European Security

and Defense Policy (ESDP) cannot.

The variegated Balkan conflicts exposed the inherent

weaknesses of attempting to resolve conflicts with

diplomacy but without the enforcement mechanism of a

military arm. In each case, NATO broke the cycle of violence

in a matter of weeks and set the conditions for peace. One

fact has emerged that no others can lay claim to—NATO

produces results.

Critics are quick to point out that NATO’s relevance

must be tied irrevocably to an imminent threat: no threat,

no NATO. This simplistic approach to security presupposes

that threats will never arise again, or if they do, sufficient

time will exist for a coalition to form. Historically,

vi
aggressors are not so accommodating. NATO acts as a hedge

against future threats. Moreover, instability along Europe’s

border represents an insidious threat with an influx of

refugees burdening the economies as well as criminal and

terrorist organizations stressing the law enforcement and

legal systems.

NATO enlargement and the membership action plan

(MAP) enhance security and stability beyond expectations.

Assured security provided by collective defense is

responsible for creating the current conditions of stability in

Central and Eastern Europe. Enlargement with its intrinsic

transparency replaces the antiquated balance of power

system that had destabilized Europe for centuries. NATO

membership is a milestone process that permits candidates

to institute reforms gradually through participation in

OSCE, PfP, EAPC, and finally MAP. Participating in PfP

exercises and peacekeeping operations reinforces the

process. Selection for MAP is no guarantee for NATO

membership, but participation pays big dividends and

contributes to stability.

Since their induction into NATO, Poland, Hungary, and

the Czech Republic have been making a positive

contribution. In many areas, they are exceeding veteran

members’ contributions, and their inclusion has resulted in

greater budgetary burdensharing. Unfortunately, their

military contribution will lag until reforms and

modernization take root.

The current MAP participants—Albania, Bulgaria,

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Rumania, Slovakia,

and Slovenia—are in various stages of progress towards

membership. Slovakia and Slovenia have the greatest

chance of membership since they have made the greatest

progress, and their geographical position enhances NATO’s

tactical position. The prospects for the three Baltic states

are also favorable because they have made significant

progress, and membership paradoxically would end the

friction between them and Russia. Their geographic

vii
location detracts from NATO’s defensive disposition and

may require a greater naval presence in the Baltic Sea if a

crisis erupts. Bulgaria and Rumania’s chances more likely

depend on their geographical location than any other factor.

Although making progress, both need to continue with

reforms before they are completely ready for membership.

Nevertheless, they do provide a land bridge to Turkey and

by extension the Middle East. Since the European NATO

members rely heavily on road and rail for power projection,

this land bridge may become crucial for potential crisis

management operations in the Middle East. Albania and

Macedonia are not ready in any capacity for NATO

membership and are unlikely to become members in the

near term.

NATO needs to institute several substantial

organizational reforms that can harness the military

potential of new (and old) members and transform the

Alliance into a proficient expeditionary force.

The Alliance should rely on the Allied Rapid Reaction

Corps (ARRC) as its high readiness force, composed of 10

integrated multinational divisions (IMD). The IMD

comprises a host nation headquarters with member states

contributing designated units according to their relative

size and wealth. Integration is achieved by stationing allied

units together, permitting the various allies to train and

operate as a coherent whole. New members have the

opportunity to buy or lease western equipment for the

contributed units thereby allowing them to reduce domestic

military expenditures. Common stationing also results in

language immersion for soldiers and their families as well

as exposing them to western culture and values. NATO

members have the option of converting other divisions

outside of the ARRC as well, but the ARRC must comprise

IMDs. As a result, each member of the Alliance, from the

smallest to the largest, can participate in NATO operations

instead of allowing the few to shoulder the burden, and do so

without sovereignty and command authority becoming

issues.

viii
Even though the ARRC has sufficient depth to counter

all but the most dire threats, NATO must designate two

other corps headquarters (e.g., European Corps

[EUROCORP] and European Forces [EUROFOR]), fully

staffed and with modern, redundant command, control,

communications, and computers, intelligence, surveillance,

and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities to conduct

sustained contingency missions. Each member also

contributes combat support and combat service support

units to form an area support group to provide the ARRC

with a robust and sustainable logistical package. An

integrated Special Operating Forces group would greatly

enhance the shaping capabilities of NATO as well. Lastly,

rotating the ARRC commander every 2 years permits each

member country to experience the burden of command.

These reforms will allow members to lower the readiness

of their other divisions as appropriate to the reduced threat.

Behind the bulwark of the ARRC, member states can

conduct timely partial or full mobilization as the strategic

environment warrants.

With the reduced threat from the East, NATO can

reorient its focus to the North African and Middle East

regions to enhance their stability. In this regard, Croatia,

Bosnia, Serbia, Cyprus, and Malta gain greater importance

and should be considered for MAP. Additionally, Austria,

Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and Switzerland should receive

open invitations to join the Alliance at their convenience

because they will further strengthen the Alliance.

NATO enlargement and the structural reforms permit

the U.S. Army to downsize its forces in Europe without

downsizing its commitment to NATO. Although

enlargement beyond Slovakia and Slovenia does result in

geographical over-extension, the threat from the East is not

there and the benefits outweigh the risks. The reforms

permit greater interoperability between the United States

and its Allies without exorbitant military expenditures. In

ix
some future conflict, the U.S. Army will be gratified that

NATO made these decisions.

The following recommendations will strengthen NATO

and ensure that it remains the preeminent security

provider for Europe:

Offer NATO membership to Slovakia and Slovenia to

extend access to Hungary and improve NATO’s

defensive disposition.

Offer membership to the Baltic States to achieve

closure with this troubled spot, and allow Russia and

the Baltic States to move beyond a troubled past.

Offer membership to Romania and Bulgaria for

NATO to improve access to the Middle East region.

Make a standing offer of membership to Austria,

Finland, Ireland, Switzerland, and Sweden since they

will strengthen the Alliance.

Offer the MAP to Croatia, Bosnia, Cyprus, Malta, and

Serbia to enhance stability and security in the

Balkans and permit greater access to the

Mediterranean basin.

Convert the ARRC divisions into IMDs to assist in the

assimilation of new members into the Alliance.

Designate the ARCC as NATO’s high readiness force,

comprising 10 IMDs, an integrated area support

group, and an integrated Special Forces Group.

No other security organization can compete with NATO.

It is time for NATO to end the relevancy debate at the

Prague summit and focus on more important manners.

Enlargement will continue the wave of stability throughout

Europe and beyond. The structural reforms will pay

dividends beyond expectations. As in the past, a bold vision

from America will serve to energize Europe.

x
PAX NATO: THE OPPORTUNITIES

OF ENLARGEMENT

INTRODUCTION

Rarely has Europe enjoyed such security and stability in

its history as it does today. In contrast to Europe’s mercurial

past in which countries fielded dozens of active divisions,

today the number of divisions per country can be counted on

one hand. This unprecedented period of peace is a result of

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its

foundation of collective defense.

Protecting Europe was no mean feat. Confronted by the

powerful land and air forces of the Warsaw Pact, the NATO

Alliance provided a suitable shield without exorbitant costs,

permitting robust economic recovery and the maturation of

strong, enduring democratic institutions. NATO was not

just a military alliance, it was also an investment in Europe.

With the demise of the Soviet threat, the Alliance did not

remain idle, resting on its laurels. Adhering to the ethos of

adapt or die, NATO embraced a number of collective

security initiatives designed to enhance European security

and stability in the wake of significant military downsizing.

As the only European multinational organization with

military forces, NATO can exercise diplomacy backed by

enforcement, making the Alliance the most versatile and

effective security provider for Europe. Within this context,

NATO enlargement represents an extension of NATO’s

continuing security initiatives.

NATO enlargement dovetails with U.S. predominant

strategic goals regarding Europe: to nurture European

integration along democratic, prosperous, and peaceful

means; and to assist “allies and partners meet future

challenges to collective interests that no nation can confront

alone.”1 Enlargement is a natural extension of NATO’s core

1
mission of collective defense.2 Continuing with the Clinton

administration’s initiative, the Bush administration has

made it clear that NATO enlargement is an important

process for expanding security and freedom with no

artificial lines “eastward and southward, northward and

onward.”3

When NATO convenes for the next round of enlargement

at the Prague Summit on November 20-22, 2002, it will have

three goals: (1) assess NATO’s capabilities to meet emerging

threats, (2) extend membership to the new European

democracies, and (3) reaffirm NATO’s relationships with

Russia, Ukraine, and other Partners.4 During the

remaining time leading to the summit, the Alliance needs to

address and lay to rest the questions of NATO relevancy,

the proposals of alternative organizations, and the critical

views regarding enlargement.

This monograph assesses NATO’s continued relevance

to Europe’s future security environment by evaluating: (1)

NATO’s unique contribution to European security and

stability, (2) the benefits of enlargement and the

membership action plan, (3) the contributions of the newest

NATO members, (4) the attributes of the second round

candidates, and (5) the need for organizational reforms to

improve the integrated military structure. Lastly, this

monograph will briefly discuss the future orientation of

NATO and recommendations for future candidates.

Of all the organizations, NATO is the best positioned to

provide assured European security and stability. Through

NATO, North America and Europe can extend security and

stability beyond the region without expending exorbitant

costs and resources.

2
NATO’S UNIQUE CONTRIBUTION TO EUROPEAN

SECURITY

Adapt or Die.

Is NATO relevant? If its members did not believe it to be,

then NATO would have foundered long ago. The Alliance’s

vibrant vitality is a reflection of it past successes—a

powerful catalyst for future successes—as well as its ability

to adapt to the changing strategic environment.

NATO is the only organization that possesses the

capability and political will to enforce policy quickly and

decisively. The difference between NATO and all other

security organizations is that “NATO’s integrated

command arrangements, its common procedures and

doctrine, and the trust and bonds developed over decades of

cooperation are an irreplaceable force multiplier, and, if

coercive application of power is needed, they will ensure

that the requisite military capabilities are provided in a

politically effective multinational fashion.”5 During the

Cold War, the collective defense guarantee was the

rationale of the Alliance, but in the post-Cold War era,

greater security flexibility became apparent.

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has evolved to meet

the new security challenges. Although the Alliance remains

committed to the fundamental tasks of security,

consultation, deterrence and defense, it has added

partnership, conflict prevention, and crisis management as

part of its responsibilities. Partnership stresses

transparency as a confidence measure, and greater dialogue

and cooperation to increase joint action among allies.

Conflict prevention and crisis management to include peace

support operations represent a greater shift towards

collective security.6

Under the aegis of partnership, NATO initiated

Partnership for Peace (PfP) in January 1994 to enhance

stability and security beyond NATO’s borders. With a

membership of 46 members, PfP seeks to increase

3
transparency in national defense planning and military

budgeting, to ensure democratic control of national armed

forces, and to increase interoperability of the PfP forces. In

1997, PfP members assumed a greater role in

decisionmaking and planning, as well as greater political

consultation. The Alliance pursued even greater security

enhancements by concluding the NATO-Russia Founding

Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, the

NATO-Ukraine Charter, and NATO’s Mediterranean

Dialogue. Moreover, all PfP members (except Tajikistan)

belong to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC),

allowing them to discuss political and security issues, as

well as enhancing cooperation on a variety of issues.7

The Alliance’s adherence to arms control, disarmament,

and nonproliferation underscores its continued strategy to

reduce threats and enhance stability without endangering

collective defense. In these areas, cooperation among

NATO, the United Nations (U.N.), European Union (EU),

the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

(OSCE), and the Western European Union (WEU) is

mutually reinforcing.8

NATO has undertaken a number of supplemental

initiatives in support of its expanding mandate. In late

1993, it conceived the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) to

make NATO assets and capabilities, particularly command

and control, available for WEU-led operations, to include

humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and

collective defense. By extension, the CJTF concept assists in

the eventual development of the European Security and

Defense Policy (ESDP). NATO encourages the full

development of the ESDP within the Alliance because it

permits the European allies to assume greater

responsibility in security and defense of Europe without

necessarily involving the Alliance.9 Both CJTF and NATO’s

support for ESDP illustrate NATO’s desire for Europe to

assume a greater share of the security burden.

4
NATO enlargement represents the final initiative for

extending stability and security in Europe. With the

collapse of the Soviet Empire, the greatest threat to peace

was the reemergence of tensions among the countries in

Central and Eastern Europe where no conflict resolution

system existed.10 Both the NATO and EU enlargement

initiatives seek to defuse these potential powder kegs by

offering the inducements of NATO and/or EU membership

in exchange for internal reforms.

NATO enlargement is a continuation of Article 10 of the

North Atlantic Treaty, which permits new members to join

the Alliance upon the concurrence of all existing members.

Enlargement contributes to security and stability in two

ways. First, potential candidates seek membership in order

to enjoy the assured security of collective defense. Second,

the allure of NATO and EU membership is so great,

candidates have taken steps to reform their economies,

governments, and armed forces. No other initiative has

enhanced stability as quickly and assuredly as NATO

enlargement.

Compared to NATO, the OSCE and WEU cannot fulfill

the diverse demands of the emerging security environment.

OSCE and WEU reflect the European approach to security,

placing “faith in international institutions, regimes, and

norms to tackle problems of common concern.”11 The

European security approach has merits but lacks the

resoluteness of NATO.

NATO’s critics see little need for the Alliance’s

integrated military structure and place much credence on

consultations, agreements, and treaties. The vehicle for this

vision is the OSCE, which remains a valuable forum for

agreements on such matters as the “inviolability of state

frontiers, confidence- and security-building measures,

human rights, economic cooperation, and environmental

safeguards.”12 In the 1990s, OSCE broadened its mandate

to include crisis management and crisis prevention to

include organizing peacekeeping forces in crisis regions.13

5
Nevertheless, it suffers from two significant limitations: it

requires unanimous decisions before acting, and it lacks any

enforcement capability for resolving a crisis.14 OSCE

performs invaluable work in crisis regions, but the fact

remains it can only act once a crisis has stabilized.

Theoretically, the WEU complements the OSCE by

making available the armed forces of its member states for

collective security. Unlike the OSCE, the WEU requires

only a simple majority in its deliberative process.15 The

WEU represents the traditional approach to alliances,

which is an agreement among treaty members to form a

coalition in time of war. Formal European coalition warfare

dates back to The Thirty Years War and remained a balance

of power instrument even as recently as World War II. An

outgrowth of the 1948 Brussels Treaty Organization, the

WEU was initially intended as an armaments control

agency.16 With the establishment of NATO, it fell into the

shadow of irrelevance. Its resurgence in the 1980s

represented a European attempt to establish a security

identity. In 1992, the WEU expanded its role through the

Petersberg Declaration by adopting humanitarian and

rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and crisis management

tasks for combat forces. All WEU members pledged to make

their military forces available with the objective of

strengthening the defense component of the EU.17

The greatest and most enduring weakness of the WEU

lies in the operational status of its armed forces—none

exists. Despite declared aspirations, the WEU is a paper

army, possessing no standing military forces, command

structures, or logistical apparatus. Although it is easy

enough to evoke the Brussels Treaty for the commitment of

WEU member state forces, it must still reach consensus

from within NATO. Hence, WEU coalitions are ad hoc, slow

to form, and largely untested. The WEU lacks the structure

and agility to respond to crises quickly and is therefore

ill-suited for crisis response missions.18

6
The Revelations of the Balkan Conflicts.

The Balkan conflicts revealed the fallacy of relying on

talks, negotiations, and agreements without an

enforcement mechanism. They also exposed the deficiencies

and limitations of ad hoc coalitions with poor unity of

command. The efforts of the U.N., CSCE and the WEU

proved woefully inadequate in resolving the conflicts. The

litany of U.N. resolutions, talks, and peace initiatives did

little to stabilize the crisis. The insertion of the U.N.

Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) and creation of U.N.

Protection Areas (UNPA) did little to quell the fighting. The

numerous conflict resolution initiatives failed because the

aims of the warring factions were irreconcilable. Croatia

would not tolerate a Serb-controlled Krajina region, and the

Bosniacs (Bosnian Muslims) sought to regain all Bosnian

Serb (and Bosnian Croat if the opportunity arose) territory.

The Krajina and Bosnian Serbs were more amenable to a

negotiated settlement because they had attained their

territorial aspirations. Not surprising, the Croatians and

Bosniacs initiated the vast majority of fighting between fall

1993 and summer 1995.

Within this environment, the UNPROFOR tried to keep

the peace although hamstrung by an arcane command

authority system, stultifying rules of engagement, and

inadequate combat capabilities. The warring factions soon

exploited and victimized the UNPROFOR to gain political

capital, and made a mockery of the European crisis

management efforts. As the conflict dragged on, NATO

became increasingly involved. Finally, in summer 1995,

NATO launched Operation DELIBERATE FORCE, the air

campaign that broke the deadlock in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

compelling the Bosnian Serbs to the accept the Dayton

Accords. With NATO assistance, Croatia overran the

Krajina, expelled the Serbs, and ended its conflict. The

NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) enforced the peace

and set the conditions for inter alia OSCE and international

organizations to operate. Particularly noteworthy is the

7
vast number of PfP members who have participated in the

peacekeeping operations not only in Bosnia but also Kosovo

and Macedonia. The conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia

revealed that the Alliance was not only relevant but also

essential.19

The WEU attempted to implement the CJTF in

February 1997 when Albania slipped into anarchy in

January as a result of financial collapse. It failed because

the WEU could not reach consensus on whether to intervene

and how to execute the operation. Likewise, the OSCE and

the EU could not move beyond debate. In the end,

“Operazione Alba” (Operation DAWN) became an Italianled, ad hoc coalition, under the moniker Multinational

Protection Force (MPF) to render humanitarian relief to

Albania, starting May 21, 1997. That the Europeans

conducted this operation without U.S. or NATO support is

laudable, but the success was offset by WEU difficulties in

consensus-building and the slow reaction time of nearly 5

months.20

The Kosovo crisis from October 1998 to March 1999 once

again demonstrated the limitations of talks, agreements,

and peace plans. The capability and political will to use force

were the essential ingredients to conflict resolution. On

March 24, 1999, NATO launched the successful air

campaign entitled Operation ALLIED FORCE, eventually

forcing Serbian compliance of the Rambouillet Peace

Accords. The swift insertion of the NATO-led Kosovo Force

(KFOR) demonstrated the relative quick manner in which

the Alliance could execute policy on short notice.

Threat Assessment.

What is the threat? Well, thanks to the successful

conclusion of the Cold War, no immediate threat to Europe

exists. No analysis foresees a threat in the medium term.

However, the world has its share of Caesars, Napoleons,

and Hitlers. Their rise to power is a matter of circumstances

and opportunity. Whenever such leaders rise to power, it is a

8
surprise and hence unpredictable. NATO must maintain a

military component as a hedge against a genius for war.

Simply because a township has not had a recent fire is no

reason to dismantle the fire department. Prudence

demands precaution.

Instability along Europe’s borders is cause for concern as

well. Continual conflict in the Middle East, North Africa,

and the Caucus regions has resulted in economic disruption,

diasporas, and creation of a safe habitat for transnational

criminal and terrorist organizations. The critical economic

resource for Europe remains oil because even temporary

disruptions cause severe fluctuations in the stock market.

The flow of refugees into Europe places a severe strain on

European social welfare institutions, which results in

greater economic deficits and higher taxes. Criminal and

terrorist organizations are permitted to grow in regions

where law and order have broken down. Their expansion to

Europe and elsewhere resembles corporate growth. In fact,

“terrorism incorporated” better characterizes the array of

various terrorist organizations that have expanded their

offices into Europe. Whatever their goals, they act and

operate like a corporation. So despite no direct threat to

Europe, in many ways the instability along its borders is

more insidious and perhaps even lethal if left unchecked.

As hard as it is for critics to admit, NATO is a proven

commodity. It serves as a forum for North American and

European leaders to discuss military and nonmilitary

matters. It ensures that North America and Europe remain

in partnership on a host of issues.21 It would be the height of

folly to dismantle an established, integrated organization

and replace it with another’s notion of security.

THE BENEFITS OF ENLARGEMENT

AND THE MEMBERSHIP ACTION PLAN

The immediate benefit of NATO enlargement to

European security and stability is the allure of NATO

membership. The bedrock of the Alliance is collective

9
defense, and NATO candidates eagerly have complied with

the prerequisites for membership in order to enjoy its

protection. NATO enlargement represents a shift from the

traditional balance of power security system that has

destabilized Europe for centuries. NATO’s use of

transparency and other confidence- and security-building

measures (CSBM) assures members and permits them to

focus on domestic and economic issues rather than basic

security.22 Transparency is an important factor in

maintaining confidence among allies.

Under the old balance of power system, each country

maintained a large army and/or maintained secret alliances

with “friendly” countries in order to promote security. This

security system was inherently unstable because the

difference between an offensive army and a defensive army

lay in the intentions of the practitioner. Hence, each country

needed to maintain a large army as a hedge. The myriad of

secret war plans and treaties did little to inspire confidence,

and wars erupted more often from miscalculations,

misreading of intentions, and basic human error.

Transparency, a by-product of enlargement, has eliminated

this unstable state of affairs.

The mechanics of NATO enlargement reflect a measured

and progressive process for candidate membership. NATO

recognizes that few states can meet its prerequisites on

their own, so the Alliance prescribes gradual reforms and

participation in various, though not sequential or

hierarchical, organizations and programs—OSCE, PfP,

EAPC, and the Membership Action Plan (MAP). Through

these organizations, candidates can receive guidance and

gain experience that assist them with reforms and their

military capabilities.23 Participation in NATO-led

peacekeeping operations provides the opportunity to

operate with other NATO countries and enhance

interoperability.

OSCE, the most pervasive organization in Europe, is an

excellent one for laying the foundation of security and

10
confidence among its members. PfP directs that its

members adhere to the OSCE framework, and from there

allows its members to develop interoperability and prepare

their armed forces and military capabilities for Alliance

operations. Noteworthy is the opportunity for members to

participate in numerous PfP exercises, which greatly assist

in the orientation of their armed forces along Alliance lines.

The participation in numerous peacekeeping operations,

particularly in the Balkans, not only increases interoperability with NATO, but it also increases burdensharing.24

As the successor to the North Atlantic Cooperation

Council (NACC), the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council

(EAPC) seeks “to engage Partner countries, within limits, in

political consultations and decisionmaking, in operational

planning and in command arrangements for future

NATO-led operations in which they participate.”25 Among

other issues, EAPC focuses on “crisis management, arms

control, international terrorism, defence planning,

civil-emergency and disaster preparedness, armaments

cooperation and peace-support operations.”26

The MAP is the final but in many respects the most

important step towards membership. Its function is to help

candidates “with advice, assistance, and practical support

on all aspects of NATO membership.”27 Candidates submit

an annual report (National Annual Program) addressing

progress on political, economic, defense, resources, security,

and legal issues, and receive feedback as well as political

and technical advice. The MAP also serves as a clearing

house on defense and military issues between NATO and

the candidates, as well as an introduction to NATO defense

planning.

Each organization emphasizes the founding concepts

and principals of the other organizations and assists

members to implement political, economic, and military

reforms and capabilities at their own pace. In this manner,

the process results in greater security and stability even

before membership. The road to candidacy leads to a

11
winnowing process as NATO selects countries to join MAP,

currently consisting of nine countries—Albania, Bulgaria,

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia,

and Slovenia. Although participation in the MAP is not a

guarantee of eventual NATO membership, the process

alone underscores security and stability.

In making its selection, NATO assesses the suitability of

the MAP countries regarding their potential to contribute to

the Alliance, specifically, and the stability and security of

Europe, generally. In his exhaustive analysis on NATO

enlargement,28 Thomas Szayna of RAND identifies seven

areas for assessment:

1. GDP growth;

2. Per capita GDP;

3. Attainment of market economy;

4. Defense expenditure;

5. Defense expenditures per troop;

6. Attainment of democratic political institutions; and,

7. Strategic Rationale—strategic position and the armed

forces.29

The MAP assists candidates in the quest for

membership. NATO makes it clear that no roadmap to

NATO membership exists, and that attaining all the

prerequisites is no guarantee of membership. For NATO to

even consider a country for membership, specific political

and military prerequisites are required:

1. Peaceful resolution of ethnic, external territorial,

internal jurisdictional, and international disputes. Refrain

from using threats or force in international relations that

are inconsistent with the purposes of the U.N.

2. Institution of democratic and civilian control of the

armed forces.

12
3. Commitment to the PfP Framework Document and

active participation in PfP.

4. Establishment of free market economies and

democratic political systems based on the rule of law.

5. Initiation of steps that allow the armed forces to

operate seamlessly within the integrated military structure

with the emphasis on collective defense and interoperability.30

The dual approach of EU and NATO enlargement has

had the most positive effect on stabilizing and democratizing the former Warsaw Pact countries, each of which

could have easily reverted to its former balance of power

security formula. That both enlargement initiatives have

succeeded in stabilizing a potentially volatile region is a

remarkable achievement.

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE NEWEST NATO

MEMBERS

A natural concern was that Poland, Hungary, and the

Czech Republic would be incapable of meeting their

obligations to the Alliance. Once under the security

umbrella, they might slip into a parasite status and not

shoulder their fair share of the security burden. Their

emerging market economies and antiquated armed forces

might represent a drain on the Alliance. Once in the

Alliance, the new members might not be willing to

contribute to NATO’s crisis management missions,

especially peacekeeping.

Economic Contributions.

The forthwith economic contributions of Poland,

Hungary, and the Czech Republic have largely allayed the

majority of concerns. Each new member has made

significant progress transitioning to a market economy. The

gross domestic product (GDP) real growth rate of each new

member shows a relatively swift and strong transition to a

13
market economy (Table 1). By extension, continued positive

economic growth decreases the burden of military spending

and military modernization on their economies.

Table 1. General Wealth of NATO States.

NATO has established a goal of 2.0 percent of GDP as the

minimum apportionment for defense spending.31 Poland

spends 2.0 percent, Hungary spends 1.6 percent (U.S.

Congressional Budget Office report cites 1.7 percent),32 and

the Czech Republic spends 2.2 percent (Table 2). The three

new members maintain expenditures at or above the

Alliance’s median (Italy)—1.7 percent of GDP defense

spending. Comparatively, when over half of the current

members are failing to meet the established goal, the new

members are proving that they are trying to be responsible

allies.33 The 2.0 percent goal serves a useful purpose by

compelling candidates to devote the necessary funds to

make the transition to NATO’s integrated military

structure.

14

Source: CIA, The World Fact Book, 2001, Internet, http://www.odci.gov/cia/

publications/factbook/index.html.
15

Table 2. Defense Expenditures of NATO States.
Defense expenditures per troop indicate the general

sophistication of the respective armed forces. Ideally, small,

modernized active forces are the most use to the Alliance.

The larger the defense expenditure per troop, the greater

the potential of interoperability.34 This issue represents the

greatest shortfall for the new members. All three are in the

bottom fifth and need to invest more money into

modernization, but this expectation appears beyond their

means in the short term. Without assistance, the new

members cannot modernize quickly and hence be very

interoperable with NATO.

Contrary to initial estimates that NATO enlargement

would raise the Alliance’s common costs, overall

expenditures have declined. Three budgets constitute

NATO’s common costs:

The civil budget is designated for the civilian agency

headquarters, international staff, and economic and

scientific programs;

The military budget pays for NATO’s military

headquarters in Mons, Belgium, and its activities, as

well as the Airborne Early Warning and Control

System; and,

The infrastructure budget, officially entitled the

NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP), focuses

on projects to improve military readiness and

capability, such as command, control, communications, and intelligence facilities, as well as

transportation and storage facilities.35

The financial contributions of Poland, Hungary, and the

Czech Republic have lowered aggregate expenditures. Since

the United States pays the most of any Alliance member,

the effect of the three new members on its contribution is

illustrative. The U.S. share of the civil budget has decreased

from 23.5 percent to 22.5 percent, the military budget from

28.0 percent to 26.2 percent, and the NSIP budget from 28.3

16
percent to 25.2 percent. Although the three new members

lowered the civil and military budget expenditures, NATO

enlargement did require an increase of the NSIP budget to

$1.5 billion, mostly for infrastructure improvements, with

the U.S. contribution amounting to $400 million. Because

most of the NSIP budget is dedicated to U.S. activities and

facilities in Europe, the United States receives much more

of the budget than the 25 percent it contributes.36

Military Contributions.

In preparation for their inclusion in NATO’s integrated

military structure, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech

Republic continue restructuring and modernizing their

armed forces. The military reforms are progressing

reasonably well, but suffer from a lack of funding. As force

reductions take effect and economies strengthen, more

funding should be available for modernization.

All three members have retained conscription even

though they are downsizing their militaries. Despite

pledges of numerous units to NATO, deployable manpower

shortfalls will plague their armed forces in the near term.

Inadequate training proficiency and the profusion of

obsolete Soviet equipment make interoperability with other

Alliance members problematic. The prognosis is not

calamitous. Integration is assured, but it will be slow.37

The extant deficiencies provide cause to question the

value of the enlargement process. Granted, the process does

promote stability, but it appears NATO accepted the new

members before they were adequately prepared, and this

may be the case for the second round candidates, as well.

Basing denunciations on enlargement because of poor

military capabilities is too simplistic. An examination of the

candidate process and the qualifications of the second round

candidates illustrates that enlargement is beneficial to the

Alliance, but it is only the beginning of the process instead of

an end state.

17
THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE SECOND ROUND

CANDIDATES

Economic Contributions.

Having a positive GDP real growth rate was important

in the immediate post-Cold War period since many of the

former Communist countries needed an incentive to make

the transition to a market economy. It is becoming less

significant as non-EU and non-NATO countries make the

successful transition to market economies. High GDP per

capita and relatively small populations are much more

important because they permit higher defense

expenditures, easing the transition into NATO. A candidate

nation should have a GDP per capita figure at least equal to

the Turkey (6,800—Table 1), which has the lowest figure

among NATO members. 38 In this case, Estonia, Latvia,

Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia meet the standards

(Table 3).

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia have

fully functioning market economies and should be able to

function within the EU if the current reforms continue.

Bulgaria is making progress but is not yet ready to function

within the EU in the medium term, whereas Romania has

not made enough progress to have a fully functioning

market economy. Albania and Macedonia are not on the EU

membership track because both require substantial

assistance in establishing a market economy.39

Again, defense expenditures are expressed as a

percentage of GDP and provide a general portrayal of the

defense burden. Defense expenditures are relatively stable,

rarely changing by more than 0.2 percent of GDP per year.

NATO has made 2 percent of the GDP as the minimum level

for candidate nations because this apportionment to

defense helps them make the transition into NATO’s

integrated military structure more easily. In this category,

only Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Romania meet the standard

(Table 4).40

18
Table 3. General Wealth.

19

Source: CIA, World Fact Book 2001, Internet, http://www.odci.

gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html.

Table 4. Defense Expenditures.
Defense expenditures per troop depict the general

sophistication of the military. The NATO European median

is $82,602 (Italy), with Poland having the lowest

expenditure of $14,727 (Table 2). A low figure of defense

expenditures per troop indicates a lower level of

technological sophistication, hindering interoperability.

Taken together, these figures determine whether a

candidate nation is a potential contributor to, or a consumer

of, NATO security. 41 Only Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia,

and Slovenia meet or surpass Poland. Nevertheless, no

MAP candidate shows much promise in attaining

interoperability without significant assistance.

Democratic Reforms.

Except for Albania and Macedonia, all the MAP

countries have fully established democratic political

institutions. Romania and Slovakia still need to continue

with systemic reforms though. Albania and Macedonia are

only partly free, and neither is on the EU membership track,

requiring assistance in establishing democratic institutions

and the rule of law.42

Geopolitical Considerations.

Strategic rationale has the most immediate practical

impact on NATO missions. The geopolitical position of each

country remains relevant in formulating policy and

strategy. It affects how the Alliance projects power, the

ability to defend its members, the commitment risks of new

members to the Alliance, and Alliance cohesion. On the

other hand, the armed forces of the candidates will not have

an immediate, favorable impact on the capabilities of the

Alliance.43

Power projection is about access to a region or country.

Its relative value to the Alliance in a geopolitical sense

depends on the political milieu. In the past decade, the

regional environment has changed significantly. Central

and eastern Europe are no longer the threat they once posed

20
to security and stability. Given this new situation, access to

the East is less important than access to Southeast Europe,

the Mediterranean basin, and the Middle East, due to their

regional instability.

The United States possesses significant power

projection capabilities. Its sea- and airlift capabilities allow

it to gain access globally and sustain a Joint Task Force for a

considerable amount of time. European power projection

capabilities cannot compete with the United States, and the

EU will have no significant, dedicated air- and sealift within

the next decade. Europe’s power projection capabilities are

therefore largely confined to rail and road networks, as well

as commercial sea transports. This fact is not necessarily a

point of disparagement. Rail and road are still the greatest

medium for logistics, far eclipsing even the U.S. sea- and

airlift capacity. Europe can project significant power if a

land link exists to a crisis region. In this sense, geopolitical

considerations remain a significant strategic factor.

Slovakia and Slovenia provide significant geographical

advantages because they unite NATO’s central and

southern regions, permitting land access to Hungary, and

by extension access to the greater part of the Balkans.

Together, these countries enhance NATO’s collective

defense position by significantly shortening its border

region and enhancing interior lines of communication.

Militarily, NATO would be able to defend its eastern border

with fewer forces. None has any real commitment risks for

the Alliance. Except for minor disputes, they have good

relations with their neighbors. Because of their positive

western orientation, they will have a positive effect on the

cohesion of the Alliance.

A subsequent enlargement of Romania and Bulgaria

provides a land link to Turkey and Greece, permitting

greater access to the Black Sea and the Middle East. As the

Middle East conflict continues to fester and the region

remains unstable, the geopolitical relative value of

Romania and Bulgaria is a powerful incentive for NATO to

21
offer membership earlier than intended. With direct land

links to Turkey, European NATO members have a greater

opportunity to project significant forces into the Middle

East region for crisis management missions. On the

negative side, Romania and Bulgaria increase NATO’s

defensive borders substantially. Bulgaria still has

territorial disputes with Greece and Macedonia, and

Romania has territorial disputes with Moldova and

Hungary. These disputes are not heated but neither are

they resolved, and the potential of conflict remains in the

near term. Romania and Bulgaria’s orientation remains to

the east, and this penchant can have adverse effects on

Alliance cohesion. The relative value of their access to the

Mediterranean Basin and Black Sea is the strongest

argument for NATO membership.

The Baltic states offer few geopolitical advantages to the

Alliance. Russia poses no threat in the near term, and access

to the east is unnecessary. These states substantially

increase NATO’s border and because of their geographical

location would be much harder to defend in a conflict,

especially if Kaliningrad and Belarus are involved.

However, political considerations are likely to override

these disadvantages. NATO membership will deter Russia

from meddling into the sovereignty of the three states and

possible later revanchism. Paradoxically, membership will

smooth disputes between the Baltic States and Russia

because dialogue at the negotiating table would supercede

Russia’s traditional approach of intimidation and

subversion. Given their history and pro-Western

orientation, all three Baltic States would enhance Alliance

cohesion. As a final point, Russia currently is disposed not to

oppose Baltic States’ membership, but if membership is

offered, all three Baltic States should be included in one fell

swoop in order to end the issue.

Albania and Macedonia offer little to the Alliance in the

geopolitical sense. They increase NATO’s defensive border

and the mountainous terrain compounds the problems of

defense. The lines of communication, ports, and general

22
infrastructure are poor. Each has significant territorial

disputes with all its neighbors. Both teeter on the edge of

becoming failed states, and offering membership for the

purpose of stabilizing the region will saddle the Alliance

with two potential albatrosses. Given their other problems,

it is astounding that the Alliance accepted them into the

MAP. Even in the long term, accepting these two states into

the Alliance would detract from the Alliance. NATO

membership is unlikely in the near term, and probably not

before the other Balkan states are offered membership.

Military Contributions.

The armed forces of all candidates generally suffer from

poor readiness. Short-term conscription obligations, poor

levels of training, obsolete Soviet equipment, and the

relatively small size of the armed forces conspire to limit

military potential. The issue of Soviet equipment is not just

a matter of obsolescence. Because the Soviet Union exported

so much equipment during the Cold War, the probability of

future adversaries having the same equipment as the new

NATO members is high. In the interests of preventing

fratricide, it would behoove the candidates to buy Western

equipment.44

Modernizing and reforming the active force will result in

even smaller force structures and likely will require the

establishment of readiness categories. Attempting to

modernize existing large forces would result in exorbitant

defense budgets, which in turn would stymie economic

reforms. As NATO views the current candidate force

structures, it should factor in that force reductions will

result from modernization and reforms. Lastly, NATO must

realize that its current military structure does not permit a

swift or easy integration of new members.

Most Qualified Candidates.

Of the MAP states, Slovenia and Slovakia are the best

candidates. Despite their military shortfalls, their

23
government, economic, and military reforms earmark them

as making the transition into NATO most easily. Their

geographic location provides NATO with greater access to

the Balkans and physically joins Hungary with the

Alliance. Additionally, they shorten NATO’s borders and

strengthen the geographical defense. Consequently, they

would have a positive impact on NATO.

The Baltic States will likely join the Alliance as well, but

for mostly political reasons. NATO membership assures

their security against Russia encroachments and allows

them to focus on reforms. More subtley, membership also

offers closure to the era of Soviet occupation and

intimidation. On the negative side, their armed forces are

small and have obsolete Soviet equipment. Their

geographic location lengthens NATO’s border and

over-extends NATO’s central region. There is potential risk,

but Russia is unlikely to oppose membership and will not

pose a serious threat to their sovereignty in the future. In

short, their accession into NATO would have a neutral

impact.

Romania and Bulgaria are not quite ready for

membership. Their armed forces are too large and have

obsolete Soviet equipment. Although they are making

progress, their reforms need work. However, they form a

land bridge to Greece and Turkey and hence greater access

to the Middle East. If the relative value of access to these

regions increases, Romania and Bulgaria have a good

chance of membership because of the turmoil in the Middle

East. This alone makes the risk of lengthened borders and

weakened geographical defense worthwhile. Hence, their

membership would have a slight positive benefit the

Alliance.

Albania and Macedonia offer little to the Alliance in any

sense of the word. Their accession to NATO membership

would have a negative impact and will not likely occur in the

near term. Eventual membership likely will be tied to the

accession of other Balkan states into the MAP.

24
Regardless of the benefits of NATO enlargement,

persistent problems regarding new members will plague

the Alliance. Assimilating former Warsaw Pact forces in

NATO’s integrated military structure is laborious and slow.

Until interoperability and modernization problems are

improved, new members’ value to collective defense and the

new missions will remain dubious for some time. Increased

membership does not equate to increased combat

effectiveness, and a collection of disparate units does not

make a cohesive force. NATO has made great strides in the

last decade, but needs to take the next step in reform.

Assimilation of new members can be performed smoothly

and effectively with organizational restructuring.

REORGANIZING NATO

The Alliance must adopt a force structure that allows the

assimilation of new members into the integrated military

structure. The Cold War approach of separate national

forces within the Alliance was sufficient under pure

collective defense, but with the addition of collective

security tasks, interoperability and defense budget

austerity assume greater importance.

Integrated Multinational Divisions.

Through the establishment of integrated multinational

divisions (IMD), NATO can assimilate new members more

effectively and quickly, as well as integrating long-standing

members more cohesively. Under the IMD concept,

members contribute units and key personnel to the host

division in accordance with their relative size, specialization, and affordability. As with national divisions, the

units are stationed together under the host division

headquarters, operating under a uniform training and

maintenance regimen.

This system allows the smaller members to pool

resources and assign distinct, specialized units (armor,

mechanized infantry, artillery, etc.) ranging from a

25
company to a brigade in size. New members will also have

the opportunity to lease or buy existing equipment for their

IMD-designated units rather than invest in expensive

research and development enterprises. The IMD reduces

military expenditures because each country fields fewer

forces and uses the existing facilities and equipment. New

members are able to absorb NATO procedures, English

language, and western values much faster because of the

immersion process. In short, the IMD increases cohesion,

interoperability, and participation of all members at lower

cost and resources.45

Streamlining Corps.

Given the lack of an imminent threat and the expansion

of NATO’s mandate beyond collective defense, NATO can

streamline its corps structure by designating the Allied

Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) as the high readiness force

and reclassifying the remaining corps into a lower readiness

category. The ARRC would comprise 10 IMDs, with the

corps command position rotating among the Alliance

members every 2 years. The corps commander would have

command authority over training and readiness. The

Alliance members would contribute combat and combat

service support units into an area support group to provide

the ARRC with a robust and sustainable logistical support.

Moreover, two other standing corps headquarters (e.g.,

European Corps [EUROCORP] and European Forces

[EUROFOR]) are required for sustained contingency

missions. All three corps would require modern, redundant

command, control, communications, and computers,

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) as a

matter of course. Lastly, the ARRC needs to be rounded out

with a Special Forces Group comprising Special Forces

units from all member countries.46

The divisions of the remaining corps could operate with

reduced readiness without a significant impact on the

effectiveness of the Alliance. Except in extreme cases (e.g.,

26
mobilization for a major war), the ARRC with its 10

divisions would have the capacity to conduct multiple,

sustained operations. Activation of a lower readiness corps

(e.g., I German/Netherlands Corps) would be predicated on

the augmentation or rotation of deployed ARRC divisions in

a crisis region and would have at least a year for

preparation. Reducing the readiness of the remaining corps

permits the European allies to focus resources on their

ARRC IMD units. Naturally, countries will have the option

to reorganize other divisions or even brigades into

integrated units as well. The economic savings in essential

areas—lower manpower requirements, fewer units to

maintain, and fewer weapons and equipment to

field—permit a greater focus on modernization and

collective training. Although fewer divisions represent a

calculated risk, the smaller, integrated ARRC permits the

Europeans to field modern, interoperable forces at less cost

and manpower, and with fewer resources.

Despite NATO’s encouragement of the European

Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), any type of European

force that even hints of independence from NATO is being

counterproductive. Despite the rhetoric, ESDP has far to go

before becoming a functional security organization.

Significant shortfalls in manpower, air- and sealift,

command and control, combat support and combat service

support make it unlikely that ESDP will have a practicable

military capability within the end of the decade. Other than

those deficiencies, ESDP promises to be as effective as the

WEU.

All NATO members must recognize that future

successful contingency operations require the complete

involvement of the Alliance. Using hypothetical situations

to justify creating a European force is really a feeble excuse.

In the future, if the European partners really feel strongly

about a contingency operation, then they must address the

matter at Brussels and make the case for NATO

involvement. ESDP and the like simply undermine the

Alliance. If the above recommended structural reforms are

27
adopted, Europeans will automatically assume a greater

share of the security burden without the need to establish

their own security pillar.

WHITHER NATO?

The near and perhaps mid-term points of instability lay

in the Middle East and the Maghreb. NATO involvement in

these regions is necessary for the stability of Europe, even

though military intervention will not be needed in most

cases. NATO should consider Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia,

Cyprus, and Malta as the next MAP candidates. Except for

Malta, all have territorial disputes that require resolution

before NATO membership is considered; however,

membership is a significant incentive, especially if seen as a

stepping stone to EU membership. Moreover, a stable

Balkans permits the release of NATO and PfP forces as part

of a new focus beyond Europe.

NATO should extend an open invitation to Austria,

Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and Switzerland to join the

Alliance at their convenience. All are qualified to be

productive members of NATO and would underscore the

cohesion of western values. Austria is particularly

important because of its central geographical location and

superb east-west and north-south lines of communication.

Nevertheless, the initial dialogue should occur discreetly in

order for each country to debate the matter and prepare its

constituency for membership.

As NATO continues to mature as a security provider, it

must posture towards areas of instability in a clean break

from its Cold War orientation. Its stabilizing influence on

the Mediterranean basin can be profound and can have a

significant impact in curbing illegal immigration, crime,

and terrorism. It might be a while before NATO’s security

umbrella includes these regions, but at least they can enjoy

some of its shade.

28
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARMY

Generally, NATO enlargement permits the U.S. Army to

strengthen military ties with new partners. The integrated

multinational division initiative permits the Army to

downsize its forces in Europe without diminishing its

commitment. Integrated members will have the

opportunity to train closely with Americans, become

familiar with American English and military terminology,

and observe American values and democratic ideals. Over

time, both procedural and technical interoperability will

increase allowing allies to operate with American units

seamlessly. Under this approach, new members are more

apt to buy or lease American equipment once they become

familiar with it, thereby increasing interoperability even

more.

The scope of NATO enlargement can have a major

impact on U.S. ground forces. From a pure tactical point of

view, the inclusion of Slovenia and Slovakia represents the

most secure position. They provide a solid front, eliminating

the major salients and reentrants along NATO’s eastern

border. For contingency plans, such a military arrangement

is the most preferable. Adding the Baltic states complicates

defensive plans more than mere geographical extension.

The shifting of forces into any or all three of the states incurs

the risk of piecemeal deployment or precarious massing of

forces through the bottleneck formed by Belarus and

Kaliningrad Oblast. A visceral contingency plan would

include the seizure of the Kaliningrad Oblast. However,

without Russian acquiescence, such a move incurs extreme

strategic risks.

Although beyond the scope of this monograph, a more

prudent contingency plan relies heavily on naval power to

defend the states. Tactical prudence dictates that Slovakia

and Slovenia must become members before or at the same

time as Romania and Bulgaria to assure a land bridge. Even

so, Romania and Bulgaria create a demonstrable extension

of NATO’s borders, and the mountainous terrain that

29
characterizes these two countries could easily swallow

every existing NATO division and still be wanting.

Nevertheless, many of the tactical implications are

academic since Eastern Europe has never known such

stability and security. The military risk exists but is too

minor to warrant undue anxiety.

Enlargement also offers opportunities for the shift of

U.S. bases farther east. German domestic politics

increasingly has stifled U.S. training opportunities while

increasing expenses for the past decade. Any soldier

stationed in Germany will attest that U.S. barracks and

caserne facilities are little changed from World War II

despite the periodic renovations. The Army may find

casernes and training areas in Poland and the Czech

Republic to be more accommodating and easily modernized.

Certainly the potential, larger training areas and fewer

restrictions on military activities make such a move an

attractive proposition.

If such a move farther east is eventually envisioned, the

best opportunity would be as part of the conversion of the

two U.S. divisions in Germany to IMDs. The additional

manpower and resources of the new members permits the

Army to shift significant combat, combat support, and

combat service support units elsewhere without adversely

affecting the military capability of NATO if the

recommended reforms are instituted. The time is ripe for

the U.S. Army to act on these opportunities. A decade from

now may be too late.

CONCLUSION

The NATO Alliance is the most robust, flexible, and

proven security organization in Europe. OSCE may have

greater membership, but it lacks the ability to enforce its

declarations. WEU is the embodiment of obsolete coalition

systems, lacking a standing command structure, logistical

apparatus, and armed forces. NATO evolved successfully

during the past decade to meet the challenges of the

30
changing strategic environment. Its relevancy is no longer

in question, and now is the time to institute new structural

reforms. Alternative organizations are simply a waste of

resources and funding. The wheel has already been

invented.

NATO can improve its strategic position and cohesion by

pursuing the following:

Offer NATO membership to Slovakia and Slovenia to

extend access to Hungary and improve NATO’s

defensive disposition.

Offer membership to the Baltic States to achieve

closure with this troubled spot and allow Russia and

the Baltic States to move beyond a troubled past.

Offer membership to Romania and Bulgaria for

NATO to improve access to the Middle East region.

Make a standing offer of membership to Austria,

Finland, Ireland, Switzerland, and Sweden since they

will strengthen the Alliance.

Offer MAP to Croatia, Bosnia, Cyprus, Malta, and

Serbia to enhance stability and security in the

Balkans and permit greater access to the

Mediterranean basin.

Convert the ARRC divisions into IMDs to assist in the

assimilation of new members into the Alliance.

Designate the ARCC as NATO’s high readiness force,

comprising 10 IMDs, an integrated area support

group, and an integrated Special Forces Group.

NATO cannot afford to rest on its laurels and transform

the Alliance into a European country club. The Alliance

provides hope to nonmembers and security for members.

Under collective defense, NATO members have cast off the

divisive and detrimental balance of power pursuits and

31
focused on economic and political reform. Europe is a more

stable, secure, and prosperous continent because of NATO.

There is no good reason for this not to continue.

ENDNOTES

1. Stephen J. Blank, William T. Johnsen, and Thomas-Durell

Young, European Security: Washington’s Shaping Strategy In Action,

Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War

College, March 2000, p. 3.

2. Department of State, The Enlargement of NATO: Why Adding

Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO Strengthens

American National Security, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of

State, 1998, p. 13.

3. George W. Bush and Republicans About NATO, Internet, expand

NATO.org, http://store.yahoo.net/expandnato/repsnato.html, June

15, remarks by the President in Address to Faculty and Students of

Warsaw University, p. 2.

4. Prepared Statement of Marc Grossman, Under Secretary for

Political Affairs, Department of State, to the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee, May 1, 2002.

5. Thomas S. Szayna, NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015:

Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping,

Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001, p. 11. Hereafter referred

to as Szayna, Enlargement.

6. The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, April 24, 1999, Internet,

http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm, paras. 10 and 12.

Hereafter referred to as Concept.

7. Partnership for Peace—an Enhanced and more operational

partnership, September 6, 2000, Internet, http://www.saclant.nato.

int/pio/PFP/pfp-enh.htm, pp. 1-2; Concept, paras. 34-38.

8. Concept, para. 40.

9. The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), NATO Handbook,

Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001, p. 253; Concept,

paras. 18, 30, and 53.c.

32
10. Christopher Walker, “The Bigger It Gets, The Better NATO Is,”

Wall Street Journal Europe, August 17, 2001, Internet,

http://ebird.dtic.mil/Aug2001/e20010817thebigger.htm, p.1.

11. Ivo H. Daalder, “Are the United States and Europe Heading for

Divorce?” International Affairs, Vol. 77, Issue 3, 2001, p. 553.

12. Richard H. Ullman, Securing Europe, Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press, 1991, p. 64. In 1994, the Conference for Security and

Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) evolved into the OSCE.

13. The Organization For Security and Cooperation in Europe,

NATO Handbook, Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press,

2001, pp. 342-352. The achievements of CSCE/OSCE are impressive. Its

involvement in The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), the

Dayton Peace Agreement, numerous elections in Bosnia and Kosovo,

the Kosovo Verification Mission followed by the OSCE Mission in

Kosovo, and peacekeeping operations in Nagorno-Karabakh and

Chechnya have contributed significantly to peace and stability.

14. Ullman, p. 64.

15. Ibid., p. 65.

16. Ibid., pp. 50-53.

17. The Western European Union (WEU), NATO Handbook,

Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001, p. 361. Hereafter

referred to as WEU.

18. WEU, pp. 364-365; Ullman, p. 365; Concept, para. 30.

19. The author was a Balkans analyst at SHAPE, Belgium, from

1993 to 1996, including duty as the EUCOM/JTFPP liaison officer to

Bosnia-Herzegovina Command (UNPRFOR headquarters in Sarajevo)

from October 1995 to January 1996.

20. John G. McGinn and Timothy Liston, “Beyond the Rhetoric and

Acronyms: The Reality of European Military Capabilities,” National

Security Studies Quarterly, Vol. VII, Issue 1, Winter 2001, pp. 80-81.

21. “The Once and Future NATO,” Chicago Tribune, June 3, 2002,

Internet http://ebird.dtic.mil/Jun2002/e20020604theonce.htm, pp.

1-2.

22. Thomas-Durell Young, Reforming NATO’s Military Structure:

The Long-Term Study and Its Implications for Land Forces, Carlisle

33
Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, May

15, 1998, pp. 1, 20.

23. Szayna, Enlargement, pp. 26-34.

24. Partnership for Peace, NATO Handbook, Brussels: NATO Office

of Information and Press, 2001, pp. 67-70.

25. Robert E. Hunter, “Getting Cinderella to the Ball,” NATO

Review, Vol. 49, Autumn 2001, p. 11.

26. Hunter, p. 11.

27. Membership Action Plan, NATO Handbook, Brussels: NATO

Office of Information and Press, 2001, p. 65. Hereafter referred to as

MAP.

28. Szayna, Enlargement; and Thomas S. Szayna, “NATO

Enlargement: Forecasting the ‘Who’ and ‘When’,” National Security

Studies Quarterly, Summer 2001, Vol. VII, Issue 3, pp. 31-92. Hereafter

referred to as Szayna, “Forecasting.”

29. Szayna, Enlargement, pp. 51, 55-56, 61-62, and 72.

30. Enlargement Study, paragraphs 4-6, 70, 72-73; MAP, p. 65.

Although MAP countries have the latitude to establish their own

priorities and timelines, they must achieve the following goals: “settling

any international, ethic or external territorial disputes by peaceful

means; demonstrating a commitment to the rule of law and human

rights; establishing democratic control of their armed forces; and

promoting stability and well-being through economic liberty, social

justice, and environmental responsibility.”

31. Szayna, “Forecasting,” p. 44.

32. John J. Lis and Zachary Selden, Integrating New Allies Into

NATO, Congressional Budget Office; Internet http://www.cbo.gov,

Chapter 2, p. 1. Hereafter referred to as Lis and Selden, Integrating.

33. John J. Lis and Zachary Selden, NATO Burdensharing After

Enlargement, Congressional Budget Office, August 2001, Internet,

http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index-2976&sequence=0&from=0,

Chapter 1, p. 14. Hereafter referred to as Lis and Selden,

Burdensharing. Hungary is projected to increase its expenditure to 1.8

percent by 2001.

34
34. Szayna, “Forecasting,” pp. 44-45; Lis and Selden, Integrating,

chapter 2, p. 1.

35. Lis and Selden, Burdensharing, Summary, p. 4, and Chapter 3,

p. 1.

36. Ibid., Summary, p. 4-5, Chapter 3, pp. 2-4. In 1999, the civil

budget was $161 million, the military budget was $496 million, and the

NSIP was $458 million. The United States pays 25 percent of each

budget.

37. See Raymond A. Millen, Tweaking NATO: The Case for

Integrated Multinational Divisions, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 2002, pp. 16-17.

38. Szayna, “Forecasting,” pp. 40-42.

39. Ibid., pp. 54-56.

40. Ibid., pp. 44-45.

41. Ibid., pp. 45-46. The figures differ from Szayna’s original

calculations because he used older data files, but the conclusions remain

valid.

42. Ibid., pp. 50-55. Szayna uses the Freedom House

(www.freedomhouse.org/ratings) in reaching his conclusions.

43. Szayna, Enlargement, pp. 72-73.

44. See Millen, pp. 20-24. A detailed overview of new candidate

armed forces highlights the institutional problems.

45. See Ibid., pp. 24-30. The detailed analysis of the IMD concept

strengthens the argument for its adoption.

46. See Ibid., pp. 30-33.

35
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Author

Lieutenant Colonel Raymond A. Millen

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Ms. Kimberly A. Rockwell