P

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Foreword

In the span of ninety agonizing minutes on 

11 September 2001, four groups of terrorists 

armed with only knives and box cutters 

inflicted more damage and wreaked more 

havoc on American soil than any near-peer, 

conventional threat had ever done before. 

The sobering events of that tragic day

compel American military and civilian

leaders to reassess force protection programs 

to identify and negate vulnerabilities. The 

contemporary operational environment

requires leaders to plan for threats across the 

full spectrum and to instill awareness in all 

members of our workforce, both civilian and 

military, that force protection begins with 

each of us. 

Force protection starts at home. It must be an integral part of the way we 

live and train at TRADOC installations as well as a mainstay of power 

projection and deployed force operational considerations. This handbook is 

designed to provide installation commanders and their staffs some of the 

key tools to assess and enhance force protection readiness in and around 

their installations. It is not intended to be a single-source guide for

techniques and procedures, but it focuses important staff functions and 

enhances force protection programs at TRADOC schools and centers. It 

provides the azimuth needed to guide proactive and comprehensive efforts 

to thwart terrorist operations, disrupt terrorist planning and timing, detect 

and defeat attacks on communications systems, and deter potential threats.

JOHN N. ABRAMS

General, U.S. Army

Commanding

JOHN N. ABRAMS

General, U.S. Army

Commanding
iii

Installation Commander’s

Force Protection Handbook

Contents

Foreword

Chapter 1 Introduction

Scope......................................................................................1-1

Purpose...................................................................................1-1

Application..............................................................................1-2

Definitions ...............................................................................1-2

Focus.......................................................................................1-2

Goal.........................................................................................1-3

Objectives...............................................................................1-3

Spectrum.................................................................................1-3

Antiterrorism Critical Tasks ..................................................1-3

Elements .................................................................................1-5

Chapter 2 Security

Overview.................................................................................2-1

Three-Ringed Security System 

(Operational Construct)........................................................2-1

Installation Major Security Missions ...................................2-4

Intelligence Gaps (Three Concentric Rings).....................2-4

Chapter 3 Antiterrorist Critical Tasks

Task 1: 

Establish an Antiterrorism Program....................................3-1

Task 2: 

Collect, Analyze, and 

Disseminate Threat Information..........................................3-4

Task 3: 

Assess and Reduce Critical Vulnerabilities 

(Conduct Antiterrorism Assessments)...............................3-7 
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Task 4: 

Increase Antiterrorism Awareness 

in Every Soldier, Civilian, 

and Family Member..............................................................3-9 

Task 5: 

Maintain Installation Defenses 

IAW Force Protection Conditions.....................................3-10

Task 6: 

Establish Civil/Military Partnership 

for Weapons of Mass Destruction Crisis .......................3-11

Task 7: 

Develop Plans for Reporting and 

Responding to a Terrorist Threat/Incident......................3-13

Task 8: 

Conduct Exercise and 

Evaluate/Assess Plans ......................................................3-14

Chapter 4 Functions and Planning 

Considerations

Introduction.............................................................................4-1

Command and Control.........................................................4-1

Operations ..............................................................................4-1

Logistics ..................................................................................4-2 

Health Services......................................................................4-3

Resource Management........................................................4-4

Engineering............................................................................4-4

Contracting and Purchasing................................................4-5

Communications and Information Systems ......................4-5

Personnel................................................................................4-6

Army Community Service.....................................................4-6 

Special Staff Functions.........................................................4-6

Chapter 5 Critical Information

Overview.................................................................................5-1

Commander’s Critical Information Requirements ............5-1

Chapter 6 Tiered Response Capabilities

Overview.................................................................................6-1

Internal Assets .......................................................................6-1

External Assets ......................................................................6-9
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Chapter 7 Installation Operations Center

Overview.................................................................................7-1

Capability................................................................................7-1

Mission....................................................................................7-1

Characterists..........................................................................7-2

Chapter 8 Information Operations

Overview.................................................................................8-1

Information Assurance..........................................................8-1

Threats....................................................................................8-4

Approved Information Assessment Tools..........................8-5

Information Operations Conditions .....................................8-6

Installation Commander’s 

Information Assurance Guide..............................................8-9

Chapter 9 Lessons Learned

Security...................................................................................9-1

First Responders ...................................................................9-3

Intelligence.............................................................................9-3

Command, Control, and Communications ........................9-4

Bomb Threat...........................................................................9-6

Appendix A The Military 

Decision-Making Process.................................................A-1

Appendix B Decision Support Template.............................................B-1

Appendix C Synchronization Matrix.....................................................C-1

Appendix D Execution Matrix.................................................................D-1

Appendix E Running Estimates ............................................................E-1

Appendix F Troop-Leading Procedures...............................................F-1

Appendix G Warning Order ....................................................................G-1

Appendix H Risk Management...............................................................H-1 

Appendix I Training and Planning Assistance ..................................I-1

Appendix J Rules for the Use of Force................................................J-1

Appendix K Installation Watch Card....................................................K-1

Appendix L Force Protection Conditions 

Measure Tracking Chart ....................................................L-1
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Appendix M News Release......................................................................M-1

Appendix N Suspicious Mail ..................................................................N-1

Appendix O Family Media Guide ...........................................................O-1

Appendix P Suspicious Incident Reporting Procedures................P-1

Glossary...................................................................Glossary-1

Bibliography .....................................................Bibliography-1
1-1

Chapter 1

Introduction

SCOPE

1-1. This handbook provides techniques and procedures governing the

conduct of force protection (FP) measures at TRADOC installations. It 

provides a basis for understanding TRADOC policies and objectives related 

to FP. More importantly, this handbook provides installation commanders 

and their staffs some needed tools to help organize, plan, train for, and 

implement effective FP programs utilizing the resources at their disposal (in 

conjunction with available local, state, and federal support). The primary 

documents that provide the basis for the FP handbook (FPHB) are the draft 

FP operational and organizational (O&O) concept, Army Regulation (AR) 

525-13, United States Army Installation Commanders’ Guide

(Antiterrorism and Force Protection) and United States Army Installation 

Commanders’ Blueprint (Installation Preparedness for Weapons of Mass 

Destruction), and AR 380-19 (which will be replaced by AR 25-IA and DA 

Pam 25-IA). The FPHB is not intended to be all-inclusive, nor does it 

relieve commanders and their staffs from their obligation to comply with 

statutory and regulatory requirements.

PURPOSE

1-2. This handbook has four purposes—

??To explain important aspects of FP.

??To serve as an FP information source and quick reference for 

installation commanders and their staffs.

??To operationalize the antiterrorism (AT) tasks.

??To consolidate current key FP guidelines that are detailed in other 

references.

1-3. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of

installation commanders from organizing resources or undertaking any

measures deemed necessary to enhance FP program effectiveness.
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APPLICATION

1-4. This handbook was compiled for TRADOC installation commanders 

and their staff elements. The material was extracted from regulations,

guidance, and lessons learned applicable to FP. The FPHB aids TRADOC 

commanders in developing their FP plan and procedures to deter and defend 

against attackers and in establishing an effective response that saves lives 

and contains damage.

DEFINITIONS 

1-5. JP 3-0 and FM 3-0 define FP as “actions taken to prevent or mitigate 

hostile actions against DOD personnel (to include family members),

resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the

force’s fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place, 

and incorporates the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive 

measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while 

degrading opportunities for the enemy. FP does not include actions to defeat 

the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease.” AR525-13 

adds futher detail, explaining that FP is a “security program to protect 

soldiers, civilian employees, family members, information, equipment, and 

facilities in all locations and situations. This is accomplished throught the 

planned integration of combating terrorism (Cbt-T), physical security (PS), 

information operations (IO), high-risk personnel (HRP) security, and law 

enforcement operations; all supported by foreign intelligence,

counterintelligence, and other security programs.” 

1-6. AR 525-13 defines Cbt-T as the combination of “all actions, including 

AT, counterterrorism, consequence management and intelligence support 

taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectum, to include 

terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear materials or highyield explosive devices (CBRNE).”

1-7. AR 525-13 defines AT as “defensive measures used to reduce

vunerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited 

response and containment by local military forces.” 

FOCUS

1-8. Clearly, FP is a broad subject that includes many functions outside the 

installation commander’s span of control. The focus of this handbook is on 

those proactive measures that the installation commander can implement to 
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build an FP program. A critical element of the installation’s proactive FP 

program includes activities to thwart terrorist operations, disrupt terrorist 

planning and timing, detect and defeat attacks on communications systems, 

and deter potential threats.

GOAL

1-9. The goal of FP is to protect soldiers, DA civilians, their family 

members, facilities, information, and other materiel resources from

terrorism.

 OBJECTIVES

1-10. DOD’s FP objectives are—

??To deter incidents.

??To employ countermeasures. 

??To mitigate effects.

??To recover from an incident. 

SPECTRUM

1-11. The spectrum of FP includes pre-incident, incident, and post-incident 

tasks and activities. To achieve a comprehensive FP program requires that 

the full cycle of planning, preparation, execution, and continuous

assessment be accomplished before, during, and after a threat event. A 

complete FP operation crosses the entire spectrum from pre-incident to 

post-incident. 

ANTITERRORISM CRITICAL TASKS

1-12. AR 525-13 establishes eight AT critical tasks commanders must

implement to obtain DOD’s FP objectives. The eight AT critical

commander’s tasks are—

??Establish an AT program.

??Collect, analyze, and disseminate threat information.

??Assess and reduce critical vulnerabilities.

??Increase AT awareness in every soldier, civilian, and family member.

??Maintain installation defenses in accordance with (IAW) FP

conditions (FPCON).

??Establish civil/military partnership for weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD) crisis. 
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??Plan terrorist threat/incident response.

??Conduct exercises and evaluate/assess AT plans.

1-13. Figure 1-1 provides a clear understanding of how the FP goal,

objectives, spectrum, and AT critical tasks fit together. It illustrates two 

important points—first, the relationship between AT tasks and FP

objectives and, second, it emphasizes the AT tasks across the entire

spectrum of FP, from pre-incident to post-incident. One key aspect is the 

effect that accomplishing five of the AT tasks has on the deterrence

 Figure 1-1. FP Goal, Objectives, Spectrum, 

and AT Tasks Relationships 

Protect soldiers, DA civilians, their family members, GOA facilities, and other materiel resources from terrorism.

L

Deter

Incident

Employ

Countermeasures

Mitigate

Effects

Incident

Recovery

Objectives

Conduct exercises

and evaluate/assess

AT plans

Increase AT

awareness in every

soldier, civilian,

and family member

Assess and reduce

critical vulnerabilities

Establish an

AT program

Establish civil/military

partnership for

WMD crisis

Maintain installation

defenses IAW

FPCON

Plan response to

threat/incident

Pre-Incident Incident Post-Incident

AT Tasks

Collect, analyze,

and disseminate

threat information
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1-5

objective. To ensure these tasks are effective requires asymmetric thinking, 

making sure your threat assessment is more than a mechanical process,

blending a campaign quality into your FP process, achieving a reliable 

command and control (C2) capability, and determining the required

resources. Chapter 3 focuses on these tasks and how their integration 

achieves FP. 

ELEMENTS 

1-14. An FP program synchronizes five elements: AT, PS, HRP security, 

IO, and law enforcement. By integrating these components with intelligence 

support, the level of FP is raised thus reducing the number of vulnerabilities 

and the abilities of threats to plan and conduct attacks against US forces and 

installations. Security is the total spectrum of procedures, facilities,

equipment, and personnel employed to provide a secure environment. AT is 

the defensive element of combating terrorism to reducing vulnerabilities 

and includes limited response and containment by local military forces. PS 

is those physical and procedural measures designed to deter, detect, and 

defend personnel, property, equipment, facilities, information, and material 

against espionage, terrorism, sabotage, damage, misuse, theft, and other

criminal acts. HRP security is those additional security measures provided 

to designated individuals who by virtue of their rank, assignment, symbolic 

value, vulnerabilities, location, or specific threat are at a greater risk than 

the general population. IO encompasses those continuous military

operations that enable, enhance, and protect the friendly force’s ability to 

collect, process, and act on information to achieve an advantage across the 

full spectrum of military operations. This includes providing for the

restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, 

and reduction capabilities. The fifth element of FP is law enforcement that 

includes a visible deterrent to threats; the initial response to security-related 

incidents; investigation of incidents; a valuable resource for the collection, 

processing, and dissemination of criminal intelligence; and formal liaison 

with civilian and other military law enforcement agencies.
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1-15. Figure 1-2 portrays the relationship of the AT tasks to the whole FP 

program. The FP goal factors (personnel, critical resources, and

information) are in the center encircled by the FP elements. The outer ring 

of boxes is the AT tasks. When these tasks are accomplished, an effective 

FP program is in place to protect personnel, information, and critical 

resources from threat incidents. 

Figure 1-2. FP Goals, Elements, and AT Tasks Relationship

High-Risk

Personal

Security

Physical

Security

Critical

Personnel Resources

Law

Enforcement

Information

INFO Operations

FP

Plan

Establish an

AT program

Conduct exercises

and evaluate/assess

AT plans

Assess and reduce

critical vulnerabilities

Plan response to

terrorist

threat/incident

Establish civil/military

partnership for

WMD crisis

Increase AT

awareness in every

soldier, civilian,

and family member

Maintain installation

defenses IAW

FPCONs

Collect, analyze,

and disseminate

threat information
2-1

Chapter 2

Security

OVERVIEW

2-1. The essence of security on installations, at locations off post where 

military personnel reside, and during in-transit operations, is nested in the 

integration of policy, doctrine, personnel, materiel, training, intelligence, 

and planning. This integration achieves the maximum return on investment 

while allowing the installation commander to accept certain risks yet

capitalize on optimum countermeasures. The history of shortcomings found 

in previous FP and PS regulatory compliance inspections has continued in 

the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Army FP 

assessments following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World 

Trade Center and Pentagon. Many of these shortcomings are procedural 

faults, compounded by constraints on materiel and personnel resourcing 

priorities. Viewing installation security as a three-ringed or three-layered 

environment focused on major security missions improves FP by shifting 

the focus from physical to full-spectrum security. 

THREE-RINGED SECURITY SYSTEM 

(OPERATIONAL CONSTRUCT) 

2-2. The draft FP O&O plan introduces the concept of an installation 

battlespace that is analogous to the battlespace for combat operations as 

defined in FM 3-0 (Figure 2-1). The battlespace of an installation 

commander is based on his concept of the operation, accomplishing the 

mission, and protecting the force. A higher commander will not assign 

battlespace; rather, the installation commander uses experience,

professional knowledge, and understanding of the situation to visualize and 

change his battlespace as current operations transition to future operations. 

The installation boundary is the area of operations (AO). The AO consists 

of the inner ring that must be protected, such as:

??Mission-Essential Vulnerable Areas (MEVA)—Facilities or

activities within the installation that, by virtue of their function, are 

evaluated by the commander as vital to the successful
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2-2

accomplishment of the installation, state National Guard, or major 

US Army Reserve command mission. This includes areas

nonessential to the operational mission of the installation or facility 

but which, by the nature of the activity, are considered vulnerable to 

theft, trespass, damage, or other criminal activity. 

Force

Projection

Base

Home

Station

Area of

Operations

Information

Environment

Area of

Influence

Area of

Interest

Outer Ring

Area of Influence

Inner Ring

Area of Operations

Middle Ring

Area of Operations

NSA

FBI

Customs

Army Counter

Intelligence Center

State

Police

Area of

Interest

Information

Environment

MEVA/

HVT

Interior Guard

Sensors

MPI

CI

Sheriff

DIA

Border

Patrol

INS

Local FBI

CID

Soldiers

PROACTIVE

Figure 2-1. Installation Battlespace
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2-3

??High-Risk Personnel (HRP)—Personnel who, by their grade,

assignment, symbolic value, or relative isolation, are likely to be 

attractive or accessible terrorist targets.

??High-Risk Targets (HRT)—Resources/facilities considered to be at 

risk as potential terrorist targets because of mission sensitivity, ease 

of access, isolation, symbolic value, and/or potential for mass

casualty. 

2-3. Also part of the AO is the middle ring, which includes the rest of the 

installation confines such as housing, ammunition storage areas, etc. The 

outer ring does not have a finite boundary and must be defined by the 

installation commander as the area of influence. The installation area of 

influence includes areas that the commander can directly influence through 

such activities as contacts with local government officia ls, law enforcement 

agencies, emergency management agencies, and through public affairs 

command information channels. In addition to an area of influence, there is 

an area of interest. The area of interest is that area of concern to the

commander that includes the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and 

areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment 

of the mission.

2-4. Although this handbook does not directly address the area of interest, it 

may include areas distant from the installation where events may occur 

indicating changes in the threat to the installation. It could include facilities 

that provide services to the installation such as power, water, sewage, waste 

disposal, etc., and/or the seaports of embarkaton (SPOE)/aerial ports of 

embarkation (APOE) used by units deploying from the installation. It may 

also include contacts or information received from national and state law 

enforcement and intelligence or emergency management agencies relating 

to the area of influence or AO of the installation. All military operations 

take place within an information environment that is largely outside the 

control of military forces. The information environment is the aggregate of 

individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, store, display, 

and disseminate information, as well as the information itself. National, 

international, and non-state actors use this environment to collect, process, 

store, display, and disseminate information. Also the media actions could 

become part of a commander’s area of interest. The media’s use of real-time 

technology affects public opinion, both in the US and abroad, and alters the 

conduct and perceived legitimacy of military operations.
Force Protection

2-4

INSTALLATION MAJOR SECURITY MISSIONS 

2-5. The following are the major implied security missions that support the 

installation’s FP mission: 

??Intelligence assessment.

??Command, control, and communications.

??Access control.

??Security of MEVAs, HRTs, and HRPs.

??Securing off-post personnel and materiel in coordination with law 

enforcement agencies.

??Tiered response capabilities.

??In-transit security operations.

??SPOE security operations.

??APOE security operations. 

??Command information and community interfaces.

INTELLIGENCE GAPS 

(THREE CONCENTRIC RINGS) 

2-6. There are sizeable seams throughout the security posture of the United 

States (Figure 2-2). These gaps exist between military services, military and 

civilian authorities, intelligence and law enforcement organizations, various 

national agencies, and within the echelons of law enforcement. For

installations, seams between military and civilian law enforcement, and 

between law enforcement and military intelligence, leave installations

vulnerable to domestic and international terrorism within the United States. 

Liaison with the local police is the role of the installation provost marshal 

and the military police (MP) (paragraphs 12-9 and 12-11, FM 3-19.1). 

Military intelligence (MI) and MP/criminal investigation division (CID) 

must coordinate obtaining sensitive law enforcement information and

disseminating it to commanders via an installation fusion cell.
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2-5

Figure 2-2. Seams in Threat Warning

2-7. Because of the current lack of coordinated plans, resources, and

realistic joint training exercises, installations are vulnerable to terrorist 

methods. Bridging the gaps between organizations and creating analytical 

structures that answer the commander’s tailored information needs provide 

a seamless flow of information that supports decision-making and

appropriate FP measures. An installation commander normally has

intelligence assets to assist in accomplishing these tasks. The intelligence 

officer and his staff perform intelligence operations in the United States in a 

manner that is consistent with the Constitution, applicable laws,

implementing directives, and Army regulations. Specifically, the

Cell1

Cell 2

Limited by

regulation

and policy

Terrorist cells operate within the entire sphere . . .

capitalizing on the seams and gaps

Law enforcement

focused CONUS

Intelligence

focused

OCONUS

• Early warning to deter or react

• Update and share priority information requirements
Force Protection

2-6

intelligence officer and his staff must be thoroughly familiar with

EO 12333, EO 12863, DOD Directive 5200.27, DOD Directive 5240.1, 

DOD Directive 5240.1-R, DOD Directive 5148.11, AR 381-10, AR 525-13, 

and applicable US legislation. Additionally, the intelligence officer and his 

staff must be familiar with AR381-12 and AR 381-20 for

counterintelligence (CI) activities. 

2-8. A critical part of the guidelines in these publications concerns

intelligence activities in relation to US persons. Contrary to popular belief, 

there is no absolute ban on intelligence collection on US persons.

Intelligence components may collect US persons’ information (through

overt means) when the component has the mission (or function) to do so, 

and the information falls within one of the categories listed in

DOD Directive 5240.1-R and AR 381-10. Two important categories are

foreign intelligence and CI. Both categories include the involvement of US 

persons engaged in or about to engage in international terrorist activities. 

2-9. The definition of collect within AR 381-10 differs from the common 

usage of the term collect. Within AR 381-10, collect includes the intent to 

use or retain the information received and to use information from

cooperating sources. Procedure 2.B of AR 381-10 explains collect. The rest 

of this manual is written under the assumption that TRADOC installations 

have received the mission (function) from the proper authority and meet the 

criteria in Procedures 2, 3, and 4 of AR 381-10. Then the intelligence 

officer and his staff can collect (through overt means), retain, and

disseminate intelligence that includes US persons’ information. (Procedure 

2.E establishes the conditions to meet to collect through other than overt 

means.) However, even if the intelligence officer and his section do not 

have the proper mission (function) to meet Procedures 2, 3, and 4,

intelligence personnel can and must receive information that includes US 

persons’ information—

??To determine its intelligence value and whether it can be collected. 

(See AR 381-10 for retention guidelines.)

??To deliver it to an appropriate recipient (for example the provost 

marshal’s office) per Procedures 4 and 12, AR 381-10.
3-1

Chapter 3

Antiterrorist Critical 

Tasks

TASK 1: 

ESTABLISH AN 

ANTITERRORISM PROGRAM 

3-1. The installation commander takes charge of his AT program by 

providing policies, standards, and procedures to implement the FP

objectives to deter incidents, employ countermeasures, mitigate effects, and 

conduct incident recovery.

SUBTASKS

3-2. The installation commander—

??Develops throughout his command a working knowledge of AT 

policies.

??Ensures AT program includes tenets of countersurveillance, CI, and 

other specialized skills. 

??Personally chairs the installation AT committee.

??Establishes clear operational responsibilities and assigns key staff 

members.

??Appoints an AT officer (minimum grade of 0-3 or equivalent civilian 

grade) to coordinate the AT program. 

??Develops an executable plan focused on the installation’s specific 

mission and unique environment (Appendices A-H).

??Develops and executes an effective training plan (Appendix I).

??Ensures the AT plan is exercised.

??Ensures daily actions are on going to improve AT. (An AT plan must 

be a living document that is updated and adjusted continuously as the 

environment and internal/external changes occur.)
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??Prioritizes resource allocations.

??Ensures that an installation’s military units/members and civilians 

understand their roles and responsibilities. Battalion units and above 

are required to have a Level II trained AT officer (sergeant first class 

or higher) who is the unit commander’s AT planner, advisor, and 

Level I unit trainer.

??Ensures AT standards are incorporated into all aspects of deployment 

planning and execution. (All AT plans must be approved by the next 

higher command, minimum battalion commander.)

??Ensures the installation intelligence team is not overwhelmed with 

additional duties.

??Clearly understands how the FPCON and information operations 

conditions (INFOCON) are implemented, both up and down the

chain of command, and who has authority to change them.

ANTITERRORISM COMMITTEE 

3-3. This is the commander’s team to plan, coordinate, and execute the 

installation commander’s AT intent (Appendices A-H). The committee—

??Guides the AT program by developing strategy (Figure 3-1), 

conducting risk analysis, and coordinating resources.

??Integrates initiatives with other installation priorities.

??Adjusts priorities.

??Develops installation preparedness strategy for CBRNE events.

??Assesses internal hazardous material response capabilities.

??Updates and evaluates latest threat. 

??Reviews memorandums of understanding (MOU) and memorandums 

of agreement (MOA).

??Ensures all tenant and supported reserve comp onent units/activities 

are participants in the AT planning process and are included in AT 

plans, providing guidance and assistance as required.
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3-3

Figure 3-1. Strategy Development

3-4. Resource coordination is a critical AT committee function. 

Specifically, the committee—

??Determines and prioritizes installation resources for Program

Objective Memorandum submission.

??Uses a holistic approach (a wide range of possibilities).

??Submits requests for management decision execution program

funding. (Programs and materials having multiple uses, such as

communications and medical equipment, are more competitive.)

3-5. During a regularly scheduled meeting, that is posted on both the short 

and long-range training calendar, the AT committee follows a set agenda. 

Also, identifying working groups for specific actions is a technique used 

effectively in AT committee meetings. Some specific working group

examples are PS, threat, MEVA security, and funding working groups.

Vision

Where We

Want to Go

Strategy

How We

Get There

Assessment

Where We Are

• Orient on the threat

• Identify steps to achieve the vision

• Identify objectives for each step

• Establish main and supporting

efforts for each step

• Determine specific measures

to track progress
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3-4

Additionally, it is important to include tenant organizations and local, state, 

and federal agencies participants in AT committee meetings to ensure all 

players and their resources are identified to implement a workable AT plan. 

A suggested format for a meeting includes—

??Purpose and deliverables.

??Current AT strategy phase.

??Threat assessment update.

??Brief progress report from each working group on assigned tasks. 

(Establish a measurement matrix for each task so that progress can be 

tracked.)

??Progress report on training, exercises, resources acquired, and

lessons learned from after action reviews.

??Review of future events (near term, within the next six months, and 

long term, up to five years).

??Funding status and funding priorities.

??Commander’s summary (higher headquarters guidance and priority 

of effort).

TASK 2: 

COLLECT, ANALYZE, AND 

DISSEMINATE THREAT INFORMATION 

3-6. The second critical commander’s task is to provides a system to collect, 

analyze, and disseminate terrorist threat information and apply the

appropriate FPCON.

 SUBTASKS 

3-7. The commander or his designated representative— 

??Designates intelligence focal point.

??Establishes an intelligence fusion cell (along with installation staff 

members, be sure to include local law enforcement personnel, CID, 

902d MI representative, Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], and 

nearby DOD installation members).

??Determines threats.
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??Integrates foreign, domestic, and crimal intelligence based on

priority intelligence requirement (PIR).

??Insures timely information dissemination and incorporates current 

intelligence into AT training.

??Develops a threat-based information system (based on higher

headquarters guidance) to raise or lower the FPCON. Subordinate 

commanders can raise but not lower a higher-level commander’s 

FPCON.

??Informs and updates periodically higher headquarters of all threat 

attacks (Appendix J). 

??Insures that any domestic intelligence activities are IAW—

??Applicable Army regulations (AR 381-10, AR 381-13).

??DOD Directive (DODD) 5200.27. 

??Federal law.

??Consults an intelligence-trained staff judge advocate representative 

to ensure domestic intelligence activities are IAW the law.

INTELLIGENCE FOCAL POINT

3-8. Designating an office as the intelligence focal point is a key aspect to 

an efficiently structured AT team. Recommended considerations for a

successful intelligence focal point include— 

??Adhering to AR 381-10 and restrictions.

??Designating a specific office (director of plans, mobilization, and 

security, MI or G/S-2) as the focal point.

??Not using the AT officer as the intelligence focal point (AT officer 

assists but should not be in charge of intelligence functions). 

??Assigning the following responsibilities to the intelligence focal 

point—

??Leading the intelligence functions.

??Collecting and disseminating the intelligence data.

??Liaisoning with local, state, and federal law and intelligence

agencies.
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??Assessing threat and vulnerability.

??Preparing intelligence portion of the installation AT plans.

??Providing operational impacts of changing intelligence situations.

??Making recommendations (random antiterrorism measures

program [RAMP], intelligence priority changes, OPORD planning 

assumption changes, strategies awareness program modifications, 

resource allocation to the commander, etc.).

??Meeting frequently with membership of intelligence fusion cell.

??Disseminating (up, down, and laterally) information aggressively 

(e-mail, spot reports, secure internet, protocol router network,

INTELINK, etc.).

??Seeking access to the closest classified internet source or intelligence 

source.

??Using threat modeling and templating to determine all available 

intelligence and information sources that apply to the installation.

??Using the following information sources and developing partnerships 

with—

??Antiterrorism Operations and Intelligence Cell at Department of 

the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Law Enforcement 

Division.

??Local, state, and federal agencies (obtain key specific information 

for your AO).

??Nearby DOD installations. 

??Major command threat assessments updates.

??Defense Intelligence Agency threat assessments.

??State Department travel warnings.

??Nearest CID special agent and CI agent.

??Installation fire prevention and safety offices.
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TASK 3: 

ASSESS AND REDUCE CRITICAL 

VULNERABILITIES 

(CONDUCT ANTITERRORISM ASSESSMENTS)

3-9. The third critical commander’s task is to assess and reduce critical 

vulnerabilities by continuously conducting reviews of the overall AT 

program, identifying physical and procedural security improvements, and 

analyzing unit predeployment procedures and plans. Four steps can be used 

in this process. 

STEPS

3-10. Step one is to determine MEVAs and HRTs. (Those activities/areas 

on which everything depends, i.e. C2 facilities, water systems, information 

systems, power generation facility, transportation network, airfield, post 

troop concentrations, schools, hospitals, commissaries, housing areas,

mobilization center, etc. Remember, some vulnerabilities will be outside the 

installation.) 

3-11. Step two is to identify threats and assess vulnerabilities (prioritize 

threats within installation functions and include terrorist use of CBRNE). 

The US Army Corps of Engineers AT Planner CD-ROM is a recommended 

tool to assess structural and area vulnerabilities

(WGATPLAN@WES.ARMY.MIL).

3-12. Step three is to incorporate the consequences assessment tool set 

(CATS) into your assessment and management operations. Developed for 

the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, CATS is one of two Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)-endorsed tool sets for man-made 

and natural disasters. Planners can use CATS to assess blast radii,

recommend traffic/access control locations, conduct effects predictions, etc. 

It can be used for AT plan development, installation operations center

exercises, and (using real-time weather) for actual incidents. CATS is 

distributed free of charge to US military organizations and can be ordered 

from http://cats.saic.com/ .

3-13. Step four is to mitigate risks and vulnerabilities by—

??Using a prioritized list of functions and their vulnerabilities to focus 

priority of work and reduce risk.

??Determining by function—

??Protection measures needed to reduce vulnerabilities.
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??Resources necessary to achieve an adequate level of protection.

??Resources availability to mitigate risk.

??Location (local, state, federal) of resources. 

??Coordination required.

??Coordinating actions with community officials, police, emergency 

responder agencies, etc.

??Developing strategy that sequences the actions and resources to 

achieve protection and/or mitigate impact on the installation.

??Developing a strategy timeline that achieves a preparedness end 

state.

??Writing a formal incident response plan.

??Implementing temporary fixes (increased site monitoring, temporary 

fencing, short-term adjustments to procedures, and/or increased

emergency response assets) until permanent solutions are

implemented.

??Continually reevaluating for effectiveness based on updated situation 

and/or threat. (Installation commanders must conduct, IAW

Appendix C, AR 525-13, a self-assessment of their AT program 

within 60 days of assumption of command and annually thereafter.)

??Using external (joint staff integrated vulnerability assessment [VA], 

and major command teams) and internal assessments to adjust plan. 

??Implementing RAMP to prevent installation security operations from 

becoming predictable.

UPDATE 

3-14. It is important to continuously update the threat and VAs. Presidential 

Decision Directive 63 directs all federal agencies to implement a critical 

infrastructure assurance program that defines a process to assess

infrastructure assets for criticality based on mission and threats, to perform 

assessment of these critical nodes of vulnerability, and to develop a

remediation/mitigation plan to resolve deficiencies. Utilities managed by 

off-post companies are especially vulnerable due to the lack of military 

control. DOD AT construction standards provide specific guidance

regarding stand off, barrier plans, access control to MEVAs, and access 

control-point facilities.

3-15. Installation commanders will prioritize, track, and report all

vulnerabilities documented by installation and any higher headquarters VA 
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3-9

to TRADOC IOC within 60 days of the receipt of the VA final report. 

Headquarters TRADOC will track all reported installation vulnerabilities to 

resolution/closure. Assessment results will be retained on file for no less 

than three years. 

TASK 4: 

INCREASE ANTITERRORISM AWARENESS IN 

EVERY SOLDIER, CIVILIAN, AND FAMILY MEMBER

3-16. The fourth critical commanders AT task is to increase AT awareness

through training and a multidimensional awareness program.

TRAINING

3-17. Conducting and increasing participation in mandatory training as

delineated in AR 525-13 is required. (Commanders will identify in writing 

the key AT positions that require formal or refresher training and ensure 

formal training is received at the TRADOC-designated course within 180 

days of assumption of duties.) The levels of training are—

??Level I: Individual awareness.

??Level II: AT officer training.

??Level III: Battalion/brigade pre-command course.

??Level IV: Installation commander training (colonels and above who 

have responsibility for AT policy, planning, and execution). 

AWARENESS

3-18. A multidimensional approach should be used to increase and maintain 

awareness consistent with the application of OPSEC measures. Suggested 

measures to ensure awareness are—

??Include AT program in newcomers’ orientation briefings. 

??Discuss at town hall meetings.

??Include AT measures and standards in post newspapers and post 

access channels on cable television, electronic bulletin boards, and 

command web sites.

??Include in quarterly training briefings.

??Combine AT actions with other events, i.e.100% ID/vehicle checks 

combined with random driving-under-the-influence screenings. 
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3-10

??Incorporate AT lessons learned in sergeant-time tasks, i.e.

personnel/vehicle search, manning a checkpoint, emergency medical 

procedures, use of force rules (See Appendix J), etc.

??Combine FPCON and road conditions into a single notice at

installation access points.

??Post AT awareness information at high traffic areas (post exchange, 

commissary, shopettes, theaters, libraries, and hospitals).

??Provide AT preparedness and response overviews to all tenant and 

contractor personnel.

??Review and educate tenant and senior tactical commanders on AT 

regulatory requirements.

??Develop AT awareness guide for family members (Appendix K).

3-19. Commanders are reminded to include the Army Air Force Exchange 

System; Defense Commissary Agency; morale, welfare, recreation

directors; Department of Defense dependents school; and Medical

Command representatives in AT planning.

TASK 5: 

MAINTAIN INSTALLATION DEFENSES 

IAW FORCE PROTECTION CONDITIONS

3-20. The fifth critical commander’s task is to maintain installation defenses 

IAW FPCON (See Appendix L).

TENETS

3-21. A sucessful installation FPCON has two primary tenets. Number one 

is achieving an increased FPCON understanding at all levels.

(DOD Instruction 2000.16 mandates progressive levels of security actions 

in response to potential threats.) Number two is maintaining an awareness 

of the following FPCON system aspects: 

??Each FPCON produces a detection, assessment, and response

capability equal to the threat.

??Increased FPCON levels send a clear message of increased readiness.

??The AT officer and operations staff are the commander’s key 

intelligence advisors.
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??FPCON implementation considerations include—

??After hours, weekend, and holiday notification plan. 

??Chemical, biological, and/or radiological detection equipment

employment plan.

??Pre-positioned equipment employment plan.

??FPCON impact (notification, lodging, transportation, etc.) on HRP.

??Effectiveness of past FPCON implementations as captured in Joint 

Staff, Department of the Army, major command, and internal 

assessments.

??Manpower and resource requirements and sourcing options. 

??On-hand assets.

??RAMP implementation increases alertness and awareness and 

prevents hostile elements from predicting installation actions. 

??The installation is assumed to be under hostile surveillance (learn to 

detect s uch activity).

IN-TRANSIT

3-22. Commanders of units in-transit will develop site-specific measures or 

actions for each FPCON which supplement those in Appendix L.

RAMP

3-23. Installation commanders will have a formally documented RAMP, 

under the supervision of the AT officer. The RAMP must be an integral part 

of the AT program and must test, at least annually, implementation of all 

FPCON measures. 

TASK 6: 

ESTABLISH CIVIL/MILITARY PARTNERSHIP 

FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION CRISIS 

3-24. The sixth critical commander’s task is to create civil/military

partnership to combat and defend against terrorism.
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STEPS 

3-25. The steps include—

??Maintaining a relationship with local community and nearby DOD 

installations by—

??Establishing a civilian liaison officer position within the

installation operation center (Share information IAW legal and 

policy guidelines).

??Meeting and frequently interacting with external installation

community officials (city mangers, law enforcement personnel,

hospital directors, fire chiefs, etc.). 

??Inviting local, state, and federal law enforcement and emergency 

agencies to join your AT committee.

??Using every opportunity to engage key community leaders

(community orientations, installation activity days, civic meetings, 

festivals, celebrations, and exercises) (Appendix M).

??Learning how civic authorities are organized and their security 

systems for AT.

??Discussing and ensuring a complete understanding of how and 

what services (power, water, telephone repair, etc.) can be

provided to your installation in the event of a WMD crises.

??Establishing MOA and/or MOU to expand your AT tools

(specialized training; communications; first responders equipment; 

and chemical, radiological, and biological detection and

decontamination capabilities).

??Using staff/command judge advocate to advise on legal aspects of 

domestic operations/support to civil authorities such as MOAs,

MOUs, and status-of-forces agreements (for installations with

international liaison officers and/or students), federal law

enforcement jurisdiction, etc.

??Establishing provost marshal office/CID liaisons with civil law 

enforcement agencies. 

??Exchanging response capability (first responders: law enforcement, 

fire, explosive ordnance disposal [EOD], medical) information.

??Seeking and leveraging training opportunities by—
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3-13

??Including surrounding community in all AT exercises and

activities.

??Participating in external community emergency response exercises 

(airport disasters, hospital mass casualty events, domestic

preparedness programs).

TASK 7: 

DEVELOP PLANS FOR REPORTING AND 

RESPONDING TO A TERRORIST THREAT/INCIDENT 

3-26. The seventh critical commander’s task is to develop reactive plans that 

prescribe appropriate actions for reporting terrorist threat information,

responding to threats/actual attacks, and reporting terrorist incidents. 

IMPLEMENTATION

3-27. Ensure plans address management of the FPCON system,

implementation of all FPCON measures, and include the requirement for 

terrorist-related reports. Commanders will conduct periodic reviews with 

appropriate responders of reactive plans to ensure response procedures are 

understood and integrated. Additionally, each installation will develop an 

attack warning system and use during exercises. In conjunction with the 

alarms exercises, commanders will drill emergency evacuation procedures, 

test FBI threat incident notification plans, and evaluate actions to prevent 

loss of life and/or mitigate property damage. Recommended actions include 

the following: 

??Determining necessary capabilities—

??Do as part of threat assessment.

??Determine personnel, equipment, and functions required.

??Evaluate post event calendar for off-post events.

??Coordinate mutual aid agreements.

??Determine redundant systems and effective options. 

??Develop an effective list of planning considerations unique to your 

installation.

??Acquiring necessary capabilities by—
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3-14

??Assessing internal resources.

??Establishing local community and/or other DOD installation

MOUs/MOAs. 

??Achieving connectivity with state and regional federal response

agencies.

??Ensuring communications compatibility and interoperability with 

local community, state, and federal agencies. 

??Developing a long-range strategy (five-year plan).

??Evaluating and adjusting FP capability by—

??Evaluating the status of preparedness and identifying necessary 

improvements.

??Coordinating to insure external agencies participate in all

evaluations.

??Establishing installation mission-training plan based on AT plan 

needs.

??Identifying metrics to measure incident-response capability

strengths and weaknesses.

??Conducting AARs and capturing what went right/wrong and

specific functions needing improvement.

TASK 8: 

CONDUCT EXERCISE AND

EVALUATE/ASSESS PLANS

3-28. The eighth critical commander’s task is to conduct the exercise and 

evaluate and assess AT plans. 
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FIVE STAGES 

3-29. There are five stages to exercising and evaluating the installation plan. 

Specific tasks include the following: 

??First, determine necessary exercises and resources. (Use FM 25-101 

as a guide for setting up exercises.) Accomplish the following in the 

exercise planning process: 

??Schedule AT scenario-driven exercises on the installation

long-range calendar. (Incorporate AT planning into all major

training exercises, combined training center events, and battle

command training program events.)

??Use AT committee to recommend exercise training objectives and 

tasks to the installation commander.

??Use installation operations staff elements to conduct scheduling 

and to coordinate resource actions.

??Include hospital mass casualty annual exercises, commu nity 

events, mobilization tests, and tactical unit events in your AT

exercise program. (WMD response measures and mass casualty 

scenarios may be sensitive to local civil authorities. Commanders 

will coordinate with local authorities prior to conducting such 

exercises if held in a location visible to the public.)

??Include first responders early in planning phase.

??Expand to no-notice events as confidence builds and expertise 

improves.

??Consider the impact on mission, costs, and availability of

personnel and resources. (Use small and concise vignette scenarios 

to exercise a specific part of the AT program.) 

??Take appropriate operations security measures to prevent

disclosure of vulnerabilities during the planning, conducting, and 

evaluation of the exercise. 

??Second, develop evaluation criteria for the installation functions,

tenants, and local/state/federal activities participating.

??Third, execute the plan and ensure the following is incorporated:
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3-16

??Stress to normal operations to duplicate confusion that occurs 

during crisis situations.

??The entire community to fully test the installation capability to 

react effectively.

??Notification to both internal and external communities/agencies 

before, during, and after each exercise.

??Trained external evaluators.

??Fourth, examine and evaluate the results based on—

??AT incident response plan.

??Written comments captured as exercise is conducted.

??Fifth, develop a strategy for improvements, insert adjustments into 

the plan, establish a timeline for completing each action item, and 

track each action to completion.
4-1

Chapter 4

Functions and 

Planning Considerations

INTRODUCTION 

4-1. Although not all-inclusive, the below functions and planning

considerations provide a start point for planning procedures.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

4-2. Command and control techniques to incorporate include— 

??Establishing command procedures and roles.

??Structuring installation operations center (IOC) procedures.

??Standardizing reports.

??Maintaining copies of plans in the IOC.

??Designating a battle captain.

??Ensuring that sufficient primary and alternate IOC workspaces are 

provided.

??Instituting and publishing a succesion of command.

??Planning for redundant, compatible, and interoperable

communication systems for the IOC and interfacing with first

responders, the community, higher headquarters, other command 

elements, and residents.

??Liaisoning with civilian organizations.

OPERATIONS

4-3. Operation techniques and functions to incorporate include—

??Completing threat and VAs.

??Planning and assessing exercises (Use concise scenarios focused on 

specific aspects of the FP program).

??Establishing intelligence liaison support.

??Learning and drilling operations center procedures.
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4-2

??Establishing agreements with tenant organizations (civilian and

military).

??Developing alert notification procedures.

??Establishing reporting requirements.

??Reviewing and throroughly understanding each FPCON measure.

??Synchronizing response capabilities.

??Developing and initiating security procedures.

??Identifying and protecting critical infrastructure.

??Identifying and exercising alternate operations centers.

??Updating weather information frequently.

??Preparing a deception plan to increase deterrence.

??Developing detection and monitoring procedures. 

??Coordinating for EOD capability.

??Establishing procedures for receiving and integrating, based on a

specific incident, responding lead federal agency per Presidential 

Decision Directive 39 (CONUS).

??Tracking post and off-post events involving military personnel

and/or their families.

LOGISTICS

4-4. Logistics services techniques and functions to incorporate include—

??Identifying required and available alternate life-support sources

(water, food, shelter).

??Planning for mortuary, laundry, and food services.

??Stockpiling barrier and lighting equipment and material.

??Considering emergency services (transportation, environmental, 

utilities, locksmith, etc.) requirements.

??Planning for emergency supplies of Class I, III, IV, V, and IX.

??Stocking protective equipment.

??Determining possible heavy lift equipment requirements.

??Identifying possible facilities and staging areas for displaced 

operations and supporting/augmenting agencies or organizations.

??Developing materiel and baggage holding areas.

??Providing maintenance for security systems.
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4-3

HEALTH SERVICES

4-5. Health services techniques and functions to incorporate include—

??Initiating MOUs/MOAs, IAW installation procedures, with local, 

state, and federal health service providers to support and augment 

unavailable or incomplete installation capability.

??Establishing an emergency preparedness plan to include ground/air 

lift assets.

??Maintaining necessary Class VIII stockpiled IAW US Army Medical 

Command (MEDCOM) policy and guidance.

??Creating an effective communications capability with the IOC, 

installation support team, and surrounding community hospitals.

??Identifing follow-on pharmaceutical requirements and streamlined 

acquisition processes IAW MEDCOM policy and guidance.

??Developing a security system for the hospital during crisis.

??Understanding that there is limited patient decontamination at the 

medical treatment facility (MTF) and working alternatives.

??Conducting periodic water and food checks in coordination with 

public health officials in the surrounding community.

??Establishing MOUs/MOAs with surrounding community hospitals to 

provide additional resuscitative surgical and critical care capabilities.

??Maintaining medical surveillance for unusual trends in patient

complaints in conjunction with surrounding community hospitals and 

clinics as an early warning that a CBRN attack may have occurred.

??Estimating the surgical and critical care capabilities of the MTF and 

surrounding community hospitals. (Frequency of the estimates must 

be tailored to the FPCON. Capabilities must be stated as number of 

patients needing immediate resuscitative surgery that the hospital can 

manage over the next 12 hours and number of ventilator-dependent 

nonsurgical patients that the hospital can manage over the next 12 

hours.) 

??Planning for increased requirements for laboratory testing and

handling of specimen samples and establishing MOUs and MOAs 

with local/state medical laboratories for specimen testing.

??Coordinating for mortuary affairs, autopsies, and storage and

transport of contaminated remains as part of an emergency

preparedness plan.
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4-4

??Planning for veterinarian services for animal control to maintain 

public health.

??Publicizing an after-duty-hours phone number that military

beneficiaries can dial when they have questions.

??Developing strip maps to surrounding community hospitals.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

4-6. Resource management techniques and functions to incorporate

include—

??Coordinating with agencies for long term FP budget estimates.

??Capturing costs for reimbursement.

??Identifying funding sources.

??Preparing MOUs and MOAs.

??Coordinating funding source for deployment and mobilization orders 

when mobilization or deployment occurs.

??Developing and maintaining a mobilization TDA for implementation 

when necessary and specifying target sources for resources

(manpower and equipment).

??Maintaining interservice support agreements.

ENGINEERING

4-7. Engineering techniques and functions to incorporate include—

??Developing emergency services response plans.

??Initiating MOUs/MOAs, IAW installation procedures, with

local/state/federal law agencies to support and augment unavailable 

or incomplete installation capability.

??Assessing, procuring, and maintaining emergency assets.

??Developing a temporary housing plan.

??Identifying mass parking areas for consolidated parking plans (park 

and ride).

??Planning decontamination capability.

??Establishing a hazardous material (HAZMAT) and CBRNE response 

capability.

??Determining barrier plan design and execution requirements.

??Planning for structural evaluations.
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4-5

??Planning for obstacle clearing.

??Conducting critical structures vulnerability analysis.

??Accomplishing terrain analysis to determine access vulnerabilities.

??Planning for search/rescue and rubble clearing operations.

??Determining possible environmental remediation requirements.

??Developing physical design and structure FP requirements for

sensitive areas and MEVAs.

??Conducting installation shelter surveys using approved guidance 

from the Corps of Engineers and/or FEMA.

??Recommending shelter options.

CONTRACTING AND PURCHASING

4-8. Contracting and purchasing techniques and functions to incorporate

include—

??Identifying requirements for emergency contracting (transportation, 

communications, protective equipment, etc).

??Preparing for emergency contracting.

??Estimating emergency costs required to fill gaps in resources.

??Identifying sources for potential contracting.

COMMUNICATIONS AND 

INFORMATION SYSTEMS

4-9. Communications and information systems techniques and functions to 

incorporate include—

??Planning and providing for communications and information

systems, to include required security equipment and programs, with 

local community, higher headquarters, command elements, special 

reaction teams (SRT), and quick reaction forces (QRF).

??Establishing an information assurance program and performing VAs 

to determine network vulnerabilities.

??Resolving communications compatibility concerns with local

community, higher headquarters, command elements, SRT, and

QRF.

??Providing for and testing redundant communications.

??Developing an emergency phone directory.
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4-6

??Planning and preparing for emergency reconfiguration of existing 

local area networks to support the IOC.

??Implementing and managing the INFOCON program IAW

TRADOC Cir 25-01-1, Chapter 8.

??Determining mail screening operations and the needed resources

(Appendix N).

??Establishing communication between IOC and incident commanders.

??Developing a detailed communication plan for all organizations 

(military and nonmilitary).

??Planning and providing for mass/public notification capability.

PERSONNEL

4-10. Personnel systems techniques and functions to incorporate include—

??Preparing a casualty assistance plan.

??Providing for civilian employee assistance.

??Participating in identification of emergency shelters.

??Providing for next-of-kin notification.

??Providing for crisis counseling.

??Identifying linguists for emergency notifications and interview

requirements.

??Preparing orders IAW mobilization or deployment instructions.

??Consolidating installation personnel accountability reporting.

ARMY COMMUNITY SERVICE 

4-11. An Army community service function that is important to the FP 

program is developing a family assistance center plan. 

SPECIAL STAFF FUNCTIONS

4-12. The functions of the special staff are as follows:
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4-7

CHAPLAIN

4-13. The chaplain—

??Provides crisis counseling.

??Coordinates sufficient pastoral assistance.

??Provides pastoral care.

LEGAL

4-14. The legal office—

??Advises the commander and staff on all legal matters related to 

FP, including, but not limited to, intelligence law, domestic

operations/support to civil authorities, federal law enforcement

jurisdiction, use of force, contracting, claims, environmental law, and 

government ethics.

??Reviews MOUs/MOAs. 

??Advises the command and assists in the development, training, and 

certification of rules for the use of force (RUF).

??Reviews and advises the command on all intelligence-gathering 

efforts to ensure statutory and policy limits are complied with.

??Reviews and advises the command on all requests for support to law 

enforcement and civil authorities to ensure that the requested

assistance falls within the limited statutory authority for allowable 

support.

??Ensures resolution of UCMJ jurisdiction issues over mobilized 

reserve component personnel.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

4-15. The public affairs office—

??Spearheads the command information program using available assets 

(post newspaper, command web site, electronic bulletin boards, etc.).

??Accommodates requests for information from civilian news

organizations.

??Advises the commander on all public affairs-related issues.

??Prepares and issues news releases for the command.

??Serves as the installation spokesperson.
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4-8

??Develops and implements media awareness training for soldiers, 

civilians, and family members (Appendix O).

??Considers the establishment of an information center standing

operating procedure.

PROVOST MARSHAL

4-16. The provost marshal office—

??Develops and implements installation physical security plan and 

barrier plan.

??Plans for installation traffic circulation.

??Protects identified individuals.

??Trains police in first-response responsibilities.

??Conducts crime scene preservation and evidence collection.

??Maintains physical security.

??Implements MEVAs protection.

??Accomplishes restricted area protection.

??CID/military police investigations coordinate with civil law

enforcement departments.

??Initiates MOUs/MOAs, IAW installation procedures, with

local/state/federal law enforcement agencies to support and augment 

unavailable or incomplete installation capability.

SAFETY

4-17. The safety office—

??Ensures commanders conduct risk and VAs for the health and

welfare of affected individuals.

??Incorporates risk management techniques into first responder

operations.
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4-9

DOIM/DPTM

4-18. The DOIM/DPTM office—

??Establishes redundant systems for critical AOs.

??Monitors pre-incident exercises to ensure an evaluation of the

interoperability capability between procedures, systems, and

equipment is provided.

ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES

4-19. Environmental services—

??Provides HAZMAT response and remediation requirements.

??Provides CBRN support to the incident commander.

INSPECTOR GENERAL

4-20. The inspector general—

??Checks and verifies correct execution of FP program per

commander’s guidance.

??Provides trend analysis of FP processes.

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL TEAM

4-21. The EOD team—

??Provides expertise in proper procedures to resolve suspected

package/explosive hazard incidents.

??Is the subject-matter expert in planning multiple/large scale

explosive hazards procedures.
5-1

Chapter 5

Critical Information

OVERVIEW

5-1. Critical information directly affects the successful execution of

operations. The commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR)

include information the commander requires that directly affects his

decisions and dictates the successful execution of operations. The

commander alone decides what information is critical and continuously 

reviews the CCIR during the planning process (military decision-making 

process [MDMP]) and adjusts them as situations change. The staff’s role is 

to nominate information requirements for the CCIR. The CCIR generates 

two types of supporting information requirements: 

??Friendly force information requirements (FFIR).

??PIR. 

5-2. Figure 5-1 illustrates the relationship between CCIR, PIR, and FFIR. In 

addition to CCIR, essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) 

become a commander’s priority when he states them. Intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) are used to provide indications,

warning, and predictive products to support FP and to manage PIR and 

request information tailored to installation needs. 

COMMANDER’S CRITICAL

INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

5-3. When commanders receive a mission, they and their staffs analyze it 

using the MDMP (Appendix A). As part of this process, commanders 

visualize the battlespace and the fight. CCIR are those key elements of 

information commanders require to support decisions they anticipate.

Information collected to answer the CCIR either confirms the commander’s 

vision of the threat or indicates the need to issue a fragmentary order or to 

execute a branch or sequel. CCIR directly supports the commander’s vision
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5-2

Figure 5-1. CCIR Elements

of the threat. Commanders develop them personally. The following are key 

characteristics of CCIR:

??Directly linked to the present and future operational situations.

??Situation dependent.

??Predicable events or activities.

??Specified by the commander for each operation (recommend limiting 

to 10 or less to better focus the collection effort).

??Time -sensitive information that mu st be immediately reported to the 

commander, staff, and subordinate commanders.

Key Question:

What does the commander need to know in a

specific situation to make a particular decision in a

timely manner?

Commander’s critical

information requirements are—

• Approved by the commander

• Used to make critical decisions

• Reviewed continuously

• Limited

Examples of commander’s

critical information requirements are—

• Major degradation or interruption of C4I

• Inability to sustain installation missions

• Inability to maintain FPCON

• Change in threat assessment that indicates

a likely attack on installation or

surrounding community

• Change in FPCON directed by

higher headquarters

• CBRNE event

• Loss of major military equipment

(aircraft, weapon system, ammunition)

• Employment of SRTand/or QRF

COMMANDER’S

CRITICAL

INFORMATION

REQUIREMENTS
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5-3

??Always included in operation order or operation plan.

??Transmitted by a communications system IAW standing operating 

procedures (SOP).

??Used to drive decisions at decision points.

??Generates FFIR and PIR.

??Focuses collection effort of units, individuals, and systems.

PIR

5-4. PIRs are those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an 

anticipated and stated priority in his task of planning and decision-making. 

PIRs are associated with a decision that will affect the overall success of the 

commander’s mission. PIRs determine what the commander wants or needs 

to know about the threat, the enemy’s purpose, capabilities, and/or

operating methods (how the commander sees the threat). Figure 5-2 shows 

the characteristics of PIR and provides some examples of FP PIR.

Figure 5-2. PIR Characteristics

• Provide intelligence required to support a single decision

• Ask only one question

• Focus on specific time, place, and enemy unit

A Good PIR

PIR Examples

FM 34-2, Mar 94

FM 3-0, Jun 01

• Is installation and/or surrounding community the target of intelligence

gathering activities? Describe pattern, capability, possible intentions.

• Does threat assessment indicate that an attack is likely, imminent, or

ongoing? Describe possible method of attack and objectives.

• Are there any indications of possible terrorist incidents that could cause

a CBRNE event that would impact safety and continuity of

installation operations?
Force Protection

5-4

FFIR

5-5. FFIR is the information the commander and staff need about the forces 

available for the operation. This includes personnel, maintenance, supply, 

ammunition, and experience/leadership capabilities. FFIR allows the

commander to determine the internal and external capabilities (how the 

commander sees his status). Figure 5-3 shows the characteristics of FFIR 

and provides some examples of FP FFIR.

Figure 5-3. FFIR Characteristics

EEFI

5-6. EEFIs are not part of CCIR but are critical aspects of friendly

operations that, if known by the enemy, would subsequently compromise, 

lead to failure, or limit success of the operation and, therefore, must be 

protected from enemy detection. EEFIs allow the commander to determine 

how to protect his resources from the threat’s information-gathering 

systems (how the commander can prevent the threat from determining his 

• Information about key forces available to specific operations

• Information on forces critical to the successful accomplishment

of the mission

• Limited in number

A Good FFIR

FFIR Examples

• Activity that renders part of command information plan obsolete and

requires prompt release of revised information

• Training cancelled to maintain force protection levels

• Notification to expand training base to support partial mobilization

• Significant degradation in an installation’s ability to perform power

projection platform functions

• Prescribed FPCON level cannot be maintained

• Force protection measures that restrict ability to meet mission requirements

FM 101-5-1, Sep 97

FM 3-0, Jun 01
Force Protection

5-5

capabilities). Figure 5-4 shows the characteristics of EEFI and provides 

some examples of FP EEFI.

Figure 5-4. EEFI Characteristics

ISR

5-7. ISR is a key aspect of the intelligence-fusion process that assists in 

achieving information superiority. Thoroughly integrated ISR operations 

add many collection services. Also, ISR integration curtails functional

stovepipes for planning, reporting, and processing information to produce 

intelligence. The mission of ISR is to provide timely, relevant, and accurate 

early warning and predictive intelligence products to enable proactive

FPCON decisions by the commander and actions by installation entities. 

Twelve key ISR tasks are—

??Provide timely indications, warnings, and predictive products to

support FP.

??Maintain threat situational awareness and understanding throughout 

the area of influence.

• Intentions, capabilities, and activities that we want hidden from

enemy/threat collection

• Compromise would jeopardize the success of the operation

• Objective is to degrade the threat’s situational understanding

A Good EEFI

EEFI Examples

• Location, schedule, and security of command group

• Security and configuration of the information network

• Installation plans and ability to respond to a threat

• Designation of MEVAs

• Designation of HRTs

• Measures being taken to reduce vulnerabilities and

projected completion date

FM 101-5-1, Sep 97

FM 3-0, Jun 01
Force Protection

5-6

??Manage PIR and request information tailored to installation needs.

??Prepare and execute an ISR collection plan.

??Conduct all-source analysis to support predictive assessments.

??Maintain connectivity with joint, national, combined, and service 

intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

??Fuse criminal information to present a seamless threat picture.

??Conduct analysis of local information to determine threat patterns.

??Collaborate with other installations and the major command.

??Conduct local liaison to gather information and ensure connectivity.

??Provide timely information to all levels to ensure common

awareness.

??Disseminate intelligence to support current and future operations.

5-8. Figure 5-5 illustrates how CCIR, PIR, FFIR, EEFI, and ISR support the 

task of gaining and maintaining information superiority.

Figure 5-5. Information Superiority

• Fight for information and

develop intelligence

• Fuse intelligence

developed across echelons

and battlefield operating

systems

• Predict threat COAs and

environmental

effects/activities

• Focus relevant

information and

build common

operating picture

• Enhance knowledge,

understanding, and

visualization

• Improve quality and

speed of decision

making

• Shape adversary and

other perceptions/action

• Impact adversary C2

and information systems

• Protect friendly

information, information

systems, and C2

Offensive and defensive

information operations,

public affairs, and

civil military operations

ISR IM IO

Integration Integration

Relevant Information

Information

Superiority

See First

Understand First

Act First

Proactive not reactive

Information Systems

PIR Other IR FFIR EEFI
6-1

Chapter 6 

Tiered Response Capabilities

OVERVIEW

6-1. A tiered response to installation incidents is required to ensure an 

effective capability that can resolve the incident. Tiering consists of internal 

and external assets. 

INTERNAL ASSETS 

6-2. The internally resourced organizations described in this chapter are the 

ideal. Installations, especially small ones, will need to tailor as appropriate 

to meet their needs and may need to coordinate with local activities and 

other regional DOD installations to pool resources in order to meet the FP 

requirements.

FIRST RESPONDERS

6-3. First responders are those individuals and organizations that by virtue 

of their duty position are either on the scene when an incident occurs or are 

immediately available to respond to the incident without needing time to 

recall personnel or to obtain additional equipment.

Manning 

6-4. The following are first reponders that are available on most

installations:

??Guard forces.

??Emergency medical services.

??Fire department.

??Law enforcement patrols.

??Protective services detail (if an HRP is on the installation).

??Others (photographer, linguist, public affairs officer, chaplain, etc.), 

as required.
Force Protection

6-2

Missions

6-5. Working together, first responders execute the following missions:

??Respond to, contain, and resolve any incident.

??Identify and report the nature of the situation.

??Establish and seal perimeter around incident.

??Maintain observation (subjects, escape routes).

??Establish command post.

??Apprehend the perpetrators.

??Conduct investigation in conjunction with applicable agencies.

??Safeguard property and HRP.

??Submit serious incident reports.

Concepts

6-6. The following concepts guide employment of first responders:

??Provide first layer of security and response.

??Utilize basic capabilities.

??Available 24/7.

??Integrate functions (MP desk sergeant notifies post commander and 

IOC IAW established procedures.).

??Utilize positions of cover and concealment.

??Request as needed CID; hostage negotiators; SRT; QRF; chemical, 

biological, radiological, and nuclear installation support team

(CBRN-IST); chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear rapid 

response team (CBRN-RRT); special medical augmentation response 

team (SMART); EOD team; and FBI. 

Training

6-7. The following are the minimum training requirements for first

responders:

??Certification for their unique specialty to specified standards.

??Hands-on training on all equipment to proficiency levels.
Force Protection

6-3

??Unit collective tasks.

??IOC interfaces.

??Communications procedures.

??Rules on the use of force.

??Cross training as specified by installation commander.

SPECIAL REACTION TEAM

6-8. The SRT is a unit of specially trained military or DOD police personnel 

(operating under the auspices of the provost marshal, chief of security, or 

chief of security police) armed and equipped to respond to and resolve 

special threat situations above and beyond the scope of standard or usual 

law enforcement capabilities.

Manning

6-9. Figure 6-1 depicts the recommended composition of the SRT.

Installation commanders may need to tailor this organization based on

available resources.

Figure 6-1. SRT Organization 

NCOIC (995B40)

Entry Team

Leader/Pointman/Defense

1X95B30

1X95B20

3X95B10

Marksman/Observer

1X95B20

1X95B10

Marksman/Observer

1X95B20

1X95B10

• Precision operations

• Highly trained

• Readily available regardless

of FPCON level
Force Protection

6-4

Missions

6-10. The SRT is manned, trained, and equipped to perform the following 

missions:

??Precision high-risk entry for barricaded persons.

??Apprehend dangerous suspect.

??Counter sniper operations.

??Precision marksmanship.

Concepts

6-11. The following concepts guide employment of the SRT:

??Provides special response IAW set timeframe based on FPCON 

level.

??Maintains high readiness level.

??Organizes, trains, equips, and maintains an SRT by an MP unit IAW 

stated mission requirements. 

??Requires threat analysis to identify SRT-needed level-of-response 

capability.

??Activates a CCIR item when employed.

??Deploys to designated forward assembly areas (FAA) upon

incident/on-scene commander request.

??Provides SRT operational control to incident/on-scene commander 

upon assembly and ready to deploy.

Training

6-12. The following are the recommended SRT training standards:

??Train IAW FM 3-19.11, MP SRT.

??Attend two-phase SRT course at Fort Leonard Wood, MO.

??Cross train each team member in an alternate position.

??Train each team member as a combat lifesaver.

QUICK REACTION FORCE

6-13. The QRF is an uncommitted, battle-rostered organization; trained and 

certified on individual and collective tasks; fully equipped with individual 

weapons, light crew served weapons, robust secure communications,

personal ballistic protection, lethal and nonlethal capabilities; and with 

mounted mobility.
Force Protection

6-5

Manning 

6-14. Figure 6-2 depicts the recommended composition of the QRF. The 

QRF has the following characteristics:

??Recommended baseline of 31 personnel. Actual size and number of 

platoons determined by installation commander. 

??Headquarters element (OIC, NCOIC, RTO, medic).

??Platoon (three 9-man squads).

??One combat lifesaver or medically trained equivalent per squad.

Figure 6-2. QRF Organization

Missions

6-15. The QRF is manned, trained, and equipped to perform the following 

missions:

??React to breaches at access control point.

??Reinforce MEVA force.

??Establish perimeter for an incident site.

??Patrol.

??Respond to very important person or other hostage situations.

Platoon

1 X OIC

1 X SFC Platoon Sergeant

1 X RTO

1 X Medic

Squad

1 X SSG Squad Leader

2 X Sergeant Team Leader

6 XSPC-PVT Team Mbrs
Force Protection

6-6

??Respond to sniper incidents.

??Conduct riot-control operations.

??Clear and secure facilities.

Concepts

6-16. The following concepts guide employment of the QRF:

??Quickly generate combat power. 

??Activate and employ items of CCIR.

??Tactically mobile.

??Deploy to designated FAA upon incident commander request.

??Placed under operational control of incident commander.

??Operate IAW FM 3-11xx (available May 2002), FM 3-19, and

FM 7-8.

Training

6-17. The QRF is to be trained IAW training support package 191-95B-004 

available from US Army Military Police School.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, 

RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR 

INSTALLATION SUPPORT TEAM 

6-18. The CBRN-IST is a matrixed organization composed of assigned,

tenant, and local agency assets that provides an installation commander an 

organic CBRN capability. (Note: The CBRN-IST O&O plan approved,

31 January 2002, by HQ TRADOC.)

Manning

6-19. Figure 6-3 depicts the recommended composition of the CBRN-IST. 

Installation commanders may need to tailor this organization based on

available resources.
Force Protection

6-7

Figure 6-3. CBRN-IST Organization

Missions

6-20. The CBRN-IST is manned, trained, and equipped to perform the

following missions:

??Conduct early warning using standoff and/or network-point sensors.

??Detect chemical, biological, and radiological hazards.

??Perform identification of chemical, bio logical, and radiological

hazards.

??Locate and mark chemical, biological, and radiological hazards.

??Communicate directly with the installation commander, incident 

commander, and IOC via secure-voice communications.

??Calculate hazard predictions.

??Triage and emergency medical procedures.

??Coordinate evacuation of casualties.

??Coordinate administrative and logistical support.

??Coordinate security support.

??Conduct limited decontamination.

Detection

and Surveillance

CBRN - IST

5 personnel 8 personnel 4 personnel

Decontamination

CBRN

Operations

Admin/Log Medical

2 personnel 5 personnel
Force Protection

6-8

Concepts

6-21. The following concepts guide employment of the CBRN-IST:

??Activated by installation commander once indications are received 

that a CBRN attack may occur or once first responders suspect or 

determine that a CBRN incident has occurred.

??Organized as an element of the installation response capability.

??Tailored from on-call assets.

??Integrates CBRN-IST/CBRN-RRT/SMART/Chemical Corps and

other government assets.

??Reports directly to the installation commander if activated prior to an 

incident. Once an incident occurs, reports directly to incident

commander. 

??Trains and exercises continuously to ensure success.

??Requires support from installation MTF, Directorate of Logistics, 

Directorate of Public Works, and community support agencies.

??Sustains operations for no more than 24 hours after an incident 

without augmentation.

??Provides support to civil authorities provided it remains within 

supporting distance of parent installation.

??Reinforced by CBRN-RRT.

??Activates reconnaissance and surveillance section before an incident 

at named areas of interest as part of collection plan.

??Performs the following tasks once hazard is detected:

??Alert and recall (assuming CBRN-IST is not already assembled).

??Brief IOC mission.

??Deploy to incident site.

??Detect and identify CBRN hazard, if not already identified.

??Assess, decontaminate, treat, and facilitate casualty evacuations.

??Provide hazard predication warning to IOC.

??Determine the physical boundaries of the hazard and mark the 

area.
Force Protection

6-9

??Establish initial decontamination operation—

??Establish initial hot line procedures.

??Decontaminate.

??Coordinate additional decontamination capability.

??Provide first aid.

??Continue surveillance of the hazard.

??Conduct handover as required.

??Advise the installation commander.

Training

6-22. CBRN-IST training is based on the following concepts:

??Appropriate individual certification for duty position.

??Hands-on equipment training.

??FM 3-11xx multiservice tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) 

for ISTs/RRTs (Chemical School working). 

??Training via Chemical School mobile training teams, Fort Leonard 

Wood resident course, and distance learning course (all in planning 

stage of development). 

??Medical section members attend the following courses: Basic Life 

Support, Advanced Trauma Life Support, Advanced Cardiac Life 

Support, Medical Management of Chemical and Biological

Casualties. 

EXTERNAL ASSETS

6-23. External response forces with regional responsibilities are available to 

fill gaps in the capabilities provided by internally resourced response forces 

or to provide reinforcing capability for the internal response forces. 

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, 

RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR RAPID RESPONSE TEAM

6-24. The CBRN-RRT provides a full-time, dedicated capability to rapidly 

augment and reinforce installations following a CBRN incident. (Note: The 

CBRN-RRT O&O plan approved, 31 January 2002, by HQ TRADOC.) 
Force Protection

6-10

MANNING

6-25. Figure 6-4 depicts the recommended composition of the CBRN-RRT.

Figure 6-4. CBRN-RRT Organization

Missions

6-26. The CBRN-RRT is manned, trained, and equipped to perform the 

following missions:

??Augment and reinforce installation once a CBRN incident occurs.

??Pre-position and/or deploy to an incident site.

??Conduct en route planning.

??Maintain secure communications with incident site.

??Detect chemical, biological, and radiological hazards.

??Mark boundaries of a hazard.

??Communicate with the installation commander/incident 

commander/and the major command via secure means.

??Conduct casualty decontamination.

??Conduct administrative and logistical operations.

??Conduct coordination with MTF.

??Conduct limited personnel decontamination.

??Conduct limited equipment decontamination to sustain operations.

??Advise installation commander.

??Sustain operations for 48 hours.

??Collect and prepare samples for DOD and Department of Justice 

laboratories.

CBRN-RRT

Command

Section

Support Operations

Section

Operations

Section

Survey

Section

2 personnel 5 personnel 6 personnel 8 personnel
Force Protection

6-11

Concepts

6-27. The following concepts guide employment of the CBRN-RRT:

??Strategically locates eight teams in CONUS and Hawaii with

regional responsibilities.

??Deploys to incident site, augments CBRN-IST, assesses hazards, and 

advises installation/incident commander.

??Integrates into CBRN-IST.

??Provides operational control to the incident commander.

??Responds no earlier than 2 hours and no later than 12 hours after 

notification.

??Coordinates remediation operations to restore the installation to fully 

mission-capable status.

??Arrives first at incident site sometimes.

??Deploys by most expedient means (air or land).

??Conducts handover to DOD, Department of Energy, or Department 

of Justice organization.

Training

6-28. CBRN-RRT training is based on the following concepts:

??Appropriate individual certification for duty position.

??Hands-on equipment training.

??Wear of Level A CBRN suit (self-contained breathing apparatus).

??FM 3-11xx MTTPs for ISTs/RRTs (Chemical School working). 

??Team members attend two-week Fort Leonard Wood course 

(Chemical School working).

SPECIAL MEDICAL 

AUGMENTATION RESPONS E TEAM 

6-29. The SMART provides short-duration medical augmentation to local, 

state, federal, and defense agencies for disasters, civil-military cooperative 

actions, humanitarian assistance, and WMD incident response. There are a 

total of 43 SMARTs in the Army under MEDCOM. Each SMART is 

configured to provide one of the following capabilities:

??Trauma/critical care.

??Nuclear/biological/chemical incident response. 
Force Protection

6-12

??Stress management.

??Medical command, control, communication, and tele-medicine 

services.

??Pastoral care.

??Preventive medicine.

??Burn treatment.

??Veterinary services.

??Health systems assessment and assistance.

??Aero-medical isolation.

Manning

6-30. Manning of SMART is dependent on the capability of the individual 

team and may be tailored by the commander, MEDCOM, to meet the

specific mission requirements.

Missions

6-31. SMARTs are manned, trained, and equipped to perform the following 

missions:

??Provide medical augmentation to DOD, local, state, and other federal 

agencies.

??Support/augment available medical capabilities.

??Provide technical advice.

??Assess incidents.

??Educate.

Concepts

6-32. The following concepts guide employment of the SMARTs:

??Task-organized based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops 

and support available, time available, and civil considerations

(METT-TC), and medical mission/risk analysis.

??MEDCOM tasks teams. (However, the regional medical command 

can respond directly to the MTF commander’s request for a

SMART.)
Force Protection

6-13

??Provide subject-matter experts. 

??Deploy with in-house, off-the-shelf resources in 

backpacks/man-portable kits.

??Sustain themselves for up to 72 hours.

??Provide operational control to the incident commander.

??Provide short-duration medical augmentation (normally up to 72 

hours).

??Alerted, assembled, and deployed within 12 hours after notification.

??Arrive at incident site, link-up, coordinate, integrate, synchronize, 

support, hand-off, and depart after release by incident commander.

??MEDCOM subordinate commands organize, train, equip, and deploy 

SMARTs.

??Deploy using DOD and non-DOD transportation assets.

??Do not compete with nor supplant federal emergency agencies and/or 

US Army TOE units.

??Deploy with local intra-team radios.

Training

6-33. SMART training is based on the following:

??Overall responsibility of Assistant Surgeon General, Force 

Projection.

??Maintain-to-standard professional credential and licensing 

requirements.

??Basic life support.

??Maintain compliance IAW standards in—

??DODI 1322.24.

??FM 8-42.

??MEDCOM Regulation 350-4.

??FM 100-19.

??Certification on SMART equipment.

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL TEAM 

6-34. EOD teams support the accomplishment of the FP mission by

providing for the detection, identification, on-site evaluation, rendering 

safe, recovery, and final disposal of unexploded explosive ordnance.
Force Protection

6-14

Manning

6-35. The standard light EOD team consists of a team leader (staff sergeant) 

and one or two assistants. 

Missions

6-36. The EOD teams are manned, trained, and equipped to perform the 

following missions:

??Detect, identify, render safe, and dispose of—

??Unexploded conventional munitions. 

??Improvised explosive devices (IED).

??CBRNE.

??Mechanical fusing (booby-trap) devices.

??Sophisticated sensor technology (microwave, active/passive

infrared accoustic, ultrasonic photo-electric, magnetic, seismic,

etc.) used in devices containing CBRNE materiel.

??Provide incident commander technical advice, tools, and reach-back 

intelligence and technical capability.

??Provide recommendations for—

??Protective measures.

??Predicting effects.

??Identifying threat materiel.

??Render-safe options.

??Disposition actions.

??Provide first responders, mail handlers, and leaders training for—

??Recogniting and reporting of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and 

IEDs.

??Search and evacuation procedures for bomb threats.

??Site vulnerability assessments.

??Reviews and validations.
Force Protection

6-15

Concepts

6-37. The following concepts guide employment of EOD teams:

??Commander, US Army Forces Command provides EOD support to 

CONUS land mass except other services’ installations.

??52nd Ordnance Group (EOD) provides C2.

??Each EOD company is assigned a specific geographical response

area.

??Installations are responsible for contacting and integrating the

supporting EOD company into their FP program.

??Installations not assigned an EOD company must contact the EOD 

Ordnance Group for support.

??Teams are detached from an EOD company to handle most

conventional ordnance incidents and can operate independently up to 

72 hours.

??Several light response teams can be grouped to work large multiUXO, large IED, and/ or WMD.

??A heavy response team with special and/or one-of-a-kind tools and 

equipment can augment light teams.

??For nuclear incidents, the team leader must be an EOD-qualified 

officer.

??100% mobile and equipped with organic equipment.

??Normal sequence of events to handle a suspect device/package—

??Evacuate the area.

??Report incident to MP.

??Activate the alert procedures (MP desk sergeant) (normally

includes IOC, security team, medical facility, fire department, 

engineers, EOD team, and public affairs officer).

??Dispatch EOD response team which reports to incident

commander.

??Brief all responders (incident commander).

??IAW EOD procedures, develop a plan (detonation and mitigation 

procedures included) and coordinate support with incident

commander. 
Force Protection

6-16

??Begin EOD operations (render-safe procedures or item moved to 

remote area). 

??Once device rendered safe, continue actions by the responsible law 

enforcement agency. 

??In Army emergencies, the closest Army EOD unit responds with the 

understanding that the responsible Service retains operational control 

in their areas of responsibility (Responsibilities: Army -their 

installations, land-mass areas except Navy, Marine Corps, or Air 

Force installations; Navy-their installations, oceans, canals, enclosed 

bodies of water and up to high-water mark of sea coasts, inlets, bays, 

and harbors; Marine Corps-their installations; Air Force-their 

installations).

6-38. Figure 6-5 lists 24-hour EOD contact telephone numbers.

Figure 6-5. EOD 24-Hour Contact Headquarters Telephone Numbers

Training

6-39. EOD teams are trained on the following, with recurring refresher 

training for teams and individuals:

??EOD procedures, tools, and equipment.

??Performance of EOD tasks in CBRN environments.

??Basic EOD diagnostic procedures.

??EOD access techniques.

??Safety policies for ammunition and explosives.

Department of the Army Operations Center (703) 697-0218/0219 DSN 227

Forces Command Operations Center (404) 464-5222 DSN 367

52d Ordnance Group (404) 469-3333 DSN 797

3d Ordnance Battalion, Fort Lewis, WA (253) 937-1971 DSN 357

63d Ordnance Battalion, Fort Dix, NJ (609) 562-5940 DSN 944

79th Ordnance Battalion, Fort Sam Houston, TX (210) 221-1308 DSN 944

184th Ordnance Battalion, Fort Gillem, GA (404) 469-5225 DSN 797

EOD 24-Hour Contact Headquarters Telephone Numbers
7-1

Chapter 7

Installation 

Operations Center

OVERVIEW

7-1. The C2 functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, 

equipment, commnications, facilities, and procedures. The IOC is a key 

component of the FP C2 structure. Through the IOC, the commander is 

assisted in integrating all the FP functions and systems toward the common 

goal of FP mission accomplishment. Listed below are the aspects to

consider in establishing an IOC. 

CAPABILITY

7-2. The IOC must be able—

??To identify and be proactive to changing situations.

??To provide a continuous, interactive process of reciprocal influence 

between the commander, the staff, and available support personnel 

and teams.

??To mitigate chaos and reduce uncertainty.

??To maintain an accurate and reliable common operating picture 

(COP) commensurate with FPCON.

MISSION

7-3. The missions include—

??Monitoring the security status based on the FP plan.

??Reacting to internal and external crises by providing information and 

issuing guidance to subordinate elements, agencies, higher

headquarters, and civilian agencies.

??Issuing operation orders and fragmentary orders based on command 

guidance.

??Serving as the tasking office (director of plans, training, and

mobilization [DPTM] may do this function externally to the IOC). 
Force Protection

7-2

??Receiving and disseminating specific information requirements, spot 

reports, and operational reports (Appendix P).

??Maintaining force tracking of all units/organizations on post.

??Tracking the task organization for different levels of FP and 

mobilization.

??Identifying and tracking participation in disaster relief operations.

CHARACTERISTICS

7-4. In the current operating environment, the following characteristics

should be incorporated:

??Maintaining accountability and positive control of personnel.

??Operating the IOC like a tactical operations center with a 24/7 cycle.

??Determining additional manning based on FPCON. 

??Manning with installation staff representatives, non-DOD agencies, 

and liaison officers with decision-making ability. Include the

following agencies:

??DPTM.

??Public affairs office.

??Provost marshal office.

??Director of information management.

??Department of public works.

??Director of logistics.

??CID. 

??MI.

??Staff judge advocate.

??Medical department activity/dental activity 

(MEDDAC/DENTAC). 

??Adjutant general.

??Chaplain.

??Non-DOD agencies—

??FBI.

??State Emergency Management Agency or equivalent.

??FEMA.
Force Protection

7-3

??Local law enforcement.

??Others as situation dictates.

??Liaison officers—

??Tenant organizations.

??Tactical units.

??Resourcing adequately for 24/7 operations.

??Incorporating battle hand-off procedures.

??Incorporating a chain of command.

??Organizing along functional staff lines to include (Figure 7-1):

??Operations officer.

??Battle captains.

??Battle trackers.

??Communications cell.

??CBRNE cell.

??Fusion cell (MI/CID). 

Figure 7-1. Recommended IOC Manning

Note: Actual IOC manning subject to TDA resourcing limitations.

IOC Operations Chief

Battle Captain

Battle Staff

COMM/ELEC Monitors

CBRN Specialist*

Intelligence Supervisor**

Intelligence Analyst**

CID Analyst**

Total Personnel

1

5 (24/365 ops)

5 (24/365 ops)

5 (24/365 ops)

2

1

5 (24/365 ops)

5 (24/365 ops)

29

GS 11

GS 9

GS 7

GS 5

E7/03

GS 13

GS 11

E6/W02

Duty Day

8-Hour Shift

8-Hour Shift

8-Hour Shift

Duty Day

Duty Day

8-Hour Shift

8-Hour Shift

Title Number Grade Duty Period

Part of CBRN-IST

Fusion cell

*

**
Force Protection

7-4

??Organizing the area to include—

??Brief area.

??Work area.

??Communications area.

??Using battle tracking tools. For example:

??Event log.

??Installation security plan overlay.

??Tracking visually the mission, personnel, equipment, incidents, and 

taskings with status boards. 

??Establishing an effective and user friendly IOC plan/SOP.

??Ensuring facilities have a redundant power source, secure location, 

and a secure alternate location.

??Communications and information capabilities (Figure 7-2) must be—

??Multi-modal with redundancy and flexibility.

??Secure. 

??Able to provide an on-post emergency services net. 

??Expandable.

??Interoperable with non-DOD communications and information 

systems.

??Minimized to reduce operations security requirements.

??Incorporating an after action report process.
Force Protection

7-5

Figure 7-2. FP C4 Operational Architecture

Data

Voice and Conference

Legend:

Voice

Voice and Data

SRT, QRF, CBRN-IST

and MPs

Incident

Commander’s

Command Post

Tenant Units

Installation

Commander and

IOC

Army and

Joint HQ and

EOC

MACOM HQ

and EOC

SATCOM

Secure

Nonsecure

Mobile

Video
8-1

Chapter 8

Information Operations

OVERVIEW

8-1. Commanders conduct IO to apply the information element of combat 

power. IO comprises two components, offensive IO and defensive IO, also 

known as information assurance (IA). The goal of IO is to gain and 

maintain information superiority, a condition that allows commanders to 

seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. It facilitates more effective decisionmaking and faster execution. IO involves a constant effort to deny

adversaries the ability to detect and respond to friendly operations, while 

simultaneously retaining and enhancing friendly force freedom of action.

8-2. IO in support of FP at the installation level centers on IA, specifically 

network and information system security, as installations lack the resources 

to conduct offensive IO. This chapter provides a brief description of IA 

(network security, TRADOC IA program, risk management, and

vulnerability assessments), threats, approved IA software tools, INFOCON, 

and a network security checklist to assist installation commanders in 

protecting the installation network infrastructure.

INFORMATION ASSURANCE 

8-3. IA is the defensive component of IO to ensure the availability, 

integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation of information 

and information systems. This includes providing for restoration of

information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction 

capabilities. 

NETWORK SECURITY 

8-4. Installation commanders have the responsibility of ensuring that all 

networks and information systems are protected. Implementation of IA 

countermeasures is through the IA personnel structure from the installation 

IA manager (IAM) to the TRADOC IA program manager (IAPM) IAW 

AR 380-19. 
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8-2

8-5. Network security is the process of preventing and detecting

unauthorized users on the network. Prevention measures help stop

unauthorized users (intruders) from accessing any part of your network 

infrastructure. Network security involves—

??Protection. Protect the information network from malicious threats, 

such as computer viruses or software programs that compromise or 

damage data and systems, and unauthorized users.

??Detection. Use network security tools to detect security policy 

violations, intrusion attempts, events or occurrences (such as

numerous log-in attempts within a specified period).

??Reaction. React accordingly to correct the problem. Operate during 

periods of degraded operations due to hostile attacks. Report and 

restore destroyed and/or compromised data.

INFORMATION ASSURANCE 

MANAGER COUNTERMEASURES 

8-6. The IAM is responsible for implementing network security

countermeasures to prevent unauthorized entry or denial of service of the 

network. The following are essential in network protection: regularly

scheduled self-assessments to determine network vulnerabilities, firewalls 

to block unauthorized intruders, current virus definitions on installationcontrolled devices, access control list to restrict access to networked 

devices, implementing information assurance vulnerability alert (IAVA) 

countermeasures, and incident reporting procedures IAW AR 380-19. 

Directors of information management (DOIM) support the intrusion

detection systems (IDS) managed by the CONUS-Theater Network

Operations and Security Center. 

USER COUNTERMEASURES

8-7. The user may implement countermeasures to prevent an intrusion or 

report an intrusion/incident to the information assurance security officer 

(IASO) or supervisor. Typical, and critical, user countermeasures include 

password control (i.e., not sharing passwords, ensuring passwords meet 

AR 380-19 format standards, and changing passwords at least every 6 

months for unclassified systems), locking workstations when not in use for 

10 or more minutes, reporting system anomalies and data corruption to the 

IASO, using only government-authorized tools and system services (no 

modems, no unauthorized software, scanning disks for viruses, etc). Annual 
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8-3

information awareness training is an important tool to meet and maintain 

user certification. User countermeasures are effective when users (military, 

civilians, and government contractors) assume an active IA role and are 

properly trained and certified. 

INFORMATION ASSURANCE 

MANAGER RESPONSIBILITIES 

8-8. The IAM is responsible, to the installation commander, for ensuring all 

systems (networked and stand-alone) have current software change

packages and fixes, have current antivirus definitions, and are IAVA 

compliant. In addition, the IAM is responsible for verifying DOIM and 

tenant devices have applied all IAVAs; checking and ensuring no

unauthorized modems are in use; conducting vulnerability self-assessments; 

maintaining audit log files on all critical devices (DOIM- and tenantcontrolled devices); ensuring all systems have met security certification and 

accreditation requirements; supporting vulnerability assessments requested 

by the installation commander, DCSIM TRADOC, or the Army Computer 

Emergency Response Team (ACERT), or regional computer emergency 

response team (RCERT); and using only Department of the Army -approved 

IA software tools.

ARMY INFORMATION ASSURANCE PROGRAM 

8-9. Installation commanders are responsible for implementing the Army 

information assurance program (AIAP). The AIAP is focused on securing 

information and its associated systems and resources. The AIAP will ensure 

availability, confidentiality, and integrity of the networks. AIAP will—

??Provide a unified approach to protecting classified and sensitive but 

unclassified information.

??Provide a risk analysis approach for identifying vulnerabilities and 

providing the appropriate safeguards.

??Identify vulnerabilities that occur as a result of the lack of security or 

ineffective safeguards.

??Ensure networks receive protection by implementing AIAP.

RISK MANAGEMENT 

8-10. Organizational and operational dynamics demand a continuous review 

of the risk management program for effectiveness. Commanders must be 
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8-4

assured that network security controls are providing the desired results. A 

risk management assessment will—

??Ensure documented security techniques have not created a more 

serious vulnerability or risk.

??Ensure collective effectiveness of applied countermeasures for future 

security actions.

??Identify problem areas and additional security requirements.

VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS

8-11. An installation commander may request a VA be conducted on their 

installation network under the computer defense assessment program

(CDAP). Commanders must submit a formal request through the TRADOC 

IAPM to Department of the Army DCSOPS for approval indicating intent, 

scope, and requested assessment dates. The CDAP is conducted by the 

ACERT or applicable RCERT. In addition, the ACERT has initiated the doit-yourself vulnerability assessment program (DITY VAP). DITY VAP 

decentralizes the assessment process and provides a library of tools,

technical support, training, and other forms of assistance to requesting 

commands and activities desiring to conduct their own VAs. The goal of 

DITY VAP is to provide unit- and command-level systems administrators 

and network managers an organic capability to perform self-assessments. 

Before the installation or tenant representative conducts a DITY VAP, he 

must first receive DITY VAP certification training through RCERTCONUS. DITY VAPs provide a detailed level of security awareness down 

to an appropriate organizational level. Access to state-of-the-art VA tools 

and techniques and other technical support will be provided from the 

ACERT-CDAB (computer defense assistance branch) as the central

authority and from the RCERT-CONUS, as needed. To request a CDAP 

assessment, or for more information on the DITY VAP, see the Land 

Information Warfare Activity ACERT NIPRNET web site at

https://www.acert.belvoir.army.mil/cdap/.

THREATS

8-12. Threats to systems and networks can be generalized into the following 

categories:

??Intentional/deliberate.

??Attacks on a computer system’s ability to process or on its 

resources (software and data).
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8-5

??Theft (e.g., cryptographic keys, userids and/or passwords).

??Corruption of databases, control programs, and physical 

destruction of information systems.

??Unintentional. Not malicious. Accidental loss of confidentiality,

availability, passwords, or integrity of information and systems. 

??Structural. Flaws in the construction of the physical environment, the 

physical configuration, or the system or application software. 

??Natural. Natural threats such as earthquakes, flood, dust,

temperature, and humidity vary greatly between locations and must 

be considered.

??Physical. Destruction and damage of components.

APPROVED INFORMATION

ASSESSMENT TOOLS

8-13. The IA tools list is developed and maintained by the Department of 

the Army chief information officer/G6. IA tools include CIO/G6-approved 

security software and products. The Communications Security Logistics 

Activity (CSLA) is the Army's executive agent for procuring 

communications security (COMSEC) and information security IA products 

(network security tools). CSLA has established 10 blanket purchase

agreements (BPA) for procuring IA products/tools. The CLSA BPAs

include firewalls, intrusion detection systems, network vulnerability

scanners, high assurance guard, purge tools, and DOD information

technology security certification and accreditation process (DITSCAP) tool. 

More information on IA-approved tools can be found at

http://www.us.army.mil. The following IA tools are national information 

assurance partnership tested and approved by Director of Information 

Systems for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers

(DISC4):

??Firewalls. 

??Raptor/VelociRaptor E-ppliance. 

??Cisco PIX. 

??Lucent-managed firewall. 

??Gauntlet/WebShied E-ppliance.

??Sidewinder. 

??Sunscreen. 

??Firewall-1.
Force Protection

8-6

??IDS.

??Intruder Alert (host-based IDS).

??RealSecure Engine (network-based IDS).

??Cybercop Monitor (host-based IDS).

??Network Vulnerability Scanners.

??Security test and analysis tool (STAT).

??STAT with the government IAVA key.

??Internet security systems scanner.

??Cybercop scanner.

??High Assurance Guard.

??Defense Message System/Defense Information Infrastructure 

Guard.

??Purge Tools.

??Shred (Uniplexed Information and Computing System (UNIX)-file 

tool–BETA).

??Unishred Pro (UNIX-hard drive tool).

??No*Trace (Windows 95/98, 2000, NT hard drive tool).

?? DITSCAP tool.

??Web certification and accreditation.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS 

CONDITIONS

8-14. The INFOCON system is implemented by the Secretary of Defense 

and administered through the Director for Operations, Joint Staff (J-3). 

Subordinate and operational unit commanders will use the INFOCON 

procedures developed by their higher headquarters (e.g., combatant

commands or Services). Existing policy and procedures on COMSEC may 

be integrated into local INFOCON procedures at the commander’s

discretion. TRADOC Cir 25-01-1 contains TRADOC implementation

procedures and countermeasures for each INFOCON level. The DCSIM 

TRADOC determines the TRADOC INFOCON level. Installation

commanders may raise their INFOCON level to a higher level, as needed, 

to protect against threats directed towards a specific installation.
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8-7

8-15. The purpose of INFOCON is to recommend actions to uniformly 

heighten or reduce defensive posture, defend against computer network 

attacks, and to mitigate sustained damage to the TRADOC information 

infrastructure, including computer and telecommunications networks and 

systems. The INFOCON system impacts all personnel who use DOD and 

Army information systems, protects systems while supporting mission

accomplishments, and coordinates the overall defensive effort through

adherence to standards.

8-16. INFOCON presents a structured, coordinated approach to defend

against and react to adversarial attacks on TRADOC computer and

telecommunication networks and systems. 

8-17. There are five levels within INFOCON, with each level reflecting a 

defensive posture based on the risk of impact to military operations.

INFOCON levels are—

??Normal.

??Alpha.

??Bravo.

??Charlie.

??Delta.

INFOCON NORMAL (NORMAL ACTIVITY) 

8-18. This day-to-day condition warrants established routine security

procedures. Typical threat IO activity at this level includes random probes 

on TRADOC’s information infrastructure as detected by network automated 

IDS. Vu lnerabilities are assumed to be consistent with those documented in 

the systems security documentation for each computer network or in

previous assessments of other communications systems. At this level, daily 

information systems security measures apply. 

INFOCON ALPHA 

(INCREASED RISK OF ATTACK) 

8-19. This condition is declared when an increased risk of attack on 

TRADOC information systems exists. Typical threat IO activity at this level 

includes computer network scans, probes, or mapping. INFOCON ALPHA 
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8-8

is also established when military operations, contingencies, or exercises 

require—

??Increased security of information systems.

??Response to indications and warning or intelligence indicators

identifying increased surveillance or reconnaissance against

TRADOC’s information infrastructure.

??Response to special alerts or advisories that have been received from 

DOD agencies indicating a general threat or new vulnerabilities may 

be existent. 

INFOCON ALPHA measures must be capable of being maintained

indefinitely.

INFOCON BRAVO 

(SPECIFIC RISK OF ATTACK)

8-20. This condition is declared when a specific risk of attack against 

TRADOC information systems exists. This condition may be prompted by 

an information warfare threat warning assessment indicating specific

adversary capabilities with evidence of intent. Typical threat IO activity at 

this level includes limited computer network attacks with minor operational 

impact. Other indicators may include—

??A significant increase in detected viruses.

??Limited denial of service attacks. 

At this level, new or existing vulnerabilities must be identified and actions 

taken to mitigate them. These measures should be maintained for several 

weeks without undue personal hardships or degrading TRADOC’s ability to 

operate.

INFOCON CHARLIE 

(LIMITED ATTACK) 

8-21. This condition applies when an actual information attack occurs or 

when intelligence indicates the possibility of an imminent information 

attack that could result in a significant operational impact. Typical threat IO 

activity at this level includes—

??Actual or threatened attempts to gain access to TRADOC computer 

network systems for the purpose of massive data destruction, false 

data creation, wide denial of service, or gaining control of critical 

systems.
Force Protection

8-9

??The injection across several networks of malicious code, viruses, 

Trojan horses, and e-mail bombs all fall into this INFOCON. 

Response measures at this INFOCON are focused at protecting critical 

systems. When implemented for even short periods of time, response

measures at this INFOCON could create personal hardship, affect peacetime 

capabilities, and have the potential for increased operational costs.

INFOCON DELTA 

(GENERAL ATTACK)

8-22. This condition applies when general attacks against TRADOC

information systems and networks significantly degrade readiness and

operations. This condition may be prompted when extensive coordinated 

regional and global information attacks by entities with hostile intent

toward/against the US and its allies are expected. Response measures at this 

INFOCON are focused on maintaining or restoring TRADOC's ability to 

operate its minimum critical systems. As with INFOCON CHARLIE, the 

response measures will likely result in personal hardships, increased

operational costs (both time and dollars), and a degradation in peacetime 

capabilities.

8-23. Countermeasures at each level include preventive actions, actions

taken during an attack, and damage control/mitigating actions and are 

contained in TRADOC Cir 25-01-1. 

INSTALLATION COMMANDER’S 

INFORMATION ASSURANCE GUIDE

8-24. Ultimately, the commander of the installation is responsible to ensure 

adequate resources are applied to the IA program and that it is successful. 

The commander’s IA checklist is as follows:

??IA training certification is in compliance with CIO/G6 guidance on 

IA certification for all levels (users [contractors, military, civilian, 

and approved foreign nationals], system administrators, network 

managers, and IA personnel).

??Software security controls are in place to protect system software 

from compromise; only authorized licensed software is in use; disks 

are scanned for viruses before installing on government devices; 

existing, new and upgraded have completed security certification and 
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8-10

accreditation documentation; and only CIO/G6-approved IA security 

software is used.

??Security objectives and safeguards are maintained for classified 

electronic media IAW AR 380-5.

??Network security includes the correct configuration of firewalls, 

routers, switches, servers (to include web and proxy servers),

workstations, and related devices.

??Antivirus definitions are current and are only from DOD or ACERT.

??Network self-assessments are conducted periodically IAW

Chapter 1-7(e), AR 380-19.

??IAVA reporting process is in place that documents all corrective 

actions accomplished, and IAM conducts periodic random checks to 

verify compliance. 

??Information systems security monitoring certification notification is 

applied to all electronic devices (to include computer warning 

banners), DD Form 2056 is on all telephones (except tactical

telephones), and telephone or communications directory notice is 

IAW AR 380-53. Also, commanders will ensure confirmation of 

compliance with AR 380-53, paragraphs 2-4 and 2-5, not later than 1 

July of each odd-numbered year to DCSIM TRADOC.
9-1

Chapter 9

Lessons Learned

SECURITY

9-1. Installation security policies and procedures historically have been 

oriented on crime prevention. In the future, they must also be threat-based.

9-2. Friction between security and convenience will always be an issue.

9-3. High standards at access control points must be maintained. Soldiers 

must—

??Remain alert.

??Maintain appearance and bearing.

??Not establish a routine.

??Be briefed on any information regarding potential threats.

??Receive initial and sustainment training on RUF.

9-4. Personnel are trained to recognize fake or altered ID cards and drivers 

licenses. Information is available at http://www.driverslicenseguide.com/

and http://www.counterfeitlibrary.com/cl/articles/barbook.asp.

Note: The appearance of commercial web sites does not constitute 

endorsement by the US Army or the information, products, or

services contained therein. The US Army does not exercise any 

editorial control over the information found at these locations. Such 

commercial web sites are provided consistent with the stated

purpose of this handbook.

9-5. Develop procedures for screening packages and other deliveries to the 

installation. Consider procedures for potential large-scale vehicle entry 

(e.g., moving vans during the summer PCS season, railroad access to and/or 

upwind of the installation). 

9-6. Focus security resources on protecting military capability, not the

installation (develop acceptable risks).

9-7. Perform personal security vulnerability assessments on all HRP.

Remove all personal data (home address, name of school attended by 

children, etc.) from official biographies appearing in open-source material.

9-8. Assign both a criticality (importance, effect, and responsibility) and 

vulnerability (accessibility, recoverability, and construction) score for each 
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9-2

installation critical capability to help develop a prioritized protective areas 

list (part of threat and vulnerability assessment).

9-9. Do not let the threat use the installation web site as a source of 

sensitive information. Maps and pictures of the installation and its facilities, 

personal information on key staff, detailed information on housing units, 

and listings of special events and activities are exa mples of the types of 

information that should not be made available to anyone with Internet 

access. Potential solutions include security awareness training for personnel 

responsible for maintaining web sites, placing access controls on web sites, 

such as placing password restrictions on certain pages or recognizing access 

only from authorized .mil servers, and creating an installation-exclusive 

intranet.

9-10. View the installation from the enemy’s perspective.

9-11. Ensure tactics, techniques, and procedures are focused on countering 

future threats, not just past terrorist attacks (bottom line: threat-based).

9-12. Poorly secured vehicles make convenient weapons platforms for

terrorists.

9-13. Review contract privileges for vendors. Never allow the use of post 

facilities for overnight parking or storage.

9-14. Gymnasium activities and sporting events are attractive targets.

9-15. As you progress to higher FPCON levels, consider requiring

installation employees and contractors to bus to the main gate, thus

decreasing access-point manpower requirements, delays, and possible

concealed car bombs.

9-16. Establish specific procedural inspection standards for contract fuel 

and water trucks.

9-17. Give careful consideration to FPCON changes during a hostage

situation. The terrorist will undoubtedly be monitoring TV and radio 

broadcasts. The garrison commander should consider restricting the

movement of military and dependents on the installation during hostage

situations.

FIRST RESPONDERS

9-18. Increase protection for first responders.

9-19. Ensure responders (QRF)—

??Are highly qualified personnel.

??Are provided detailed and quality guidance for each potential threat.

??Have effective capabilities (communications, transportation, personal 

protective gear, etc.). 

??Have an embedded medical capability (combat life saver training and 

medics).
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9-3

??Exercise regularly with realistic scenarios.

??Receive initial and sustainment training on RUF.

9-20. Change installation TDA to include authorization for necessary

personnel and equipment to support responders.

INTELLIGENCE 

9-21. Intelligence manpower assets within garrisons are extremely limited. 

Subsequently, installation threat assessment management groups lack the 

organic capability to produce strong, full-spectrum threat assessments.

Potential sources of additional expertise include—

??Individual mobilization augmentees.

??Borrowed military manpower from tenant organizations.

??Requested TDA increases.

9-22. Intelligence assets assigned to the IOC become the nexus for the 

fusion cell.

??Work to eliminate intelligence sharing gaps between—

??Military and civil law enforcement.

??Law enforcement and MI.

??MI and CID.

??Military and civilian agencies.

??Using—

??Exchange of liaison officers.

??Compatible communications systems.

??Regular updates.

??Joint participation in exercises.

??Establishment of MOUs/MOAs.

??Create an intelligence fusion cell—

??Include military, federal, state, and local agencies.

??Solicit input from private businesses on criminal behavior and 

critical infrastructure.

??Share the CCIR and PIR within the fusion cell to enable all 

agencies to collect needed information.

??Establish a single all-source intelligence product (maximizes 

interagency coordination while reducing duplication of effort).

??As a standing entity, not one that has to be recreated every time the 

FPCON is raised above normal.
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9-4

COMMAND, CONTROL, 

AND COMMUNICATIONS

9-23. Make the antiterrorism officer (ATO) a priority position (recommend 

the same level as the IOC operations officer) with clearly defined

responsibilities. The MP School at Fort Leonard Wood offers a two-week 

ATO course.

9-24. Structure FP response as a military operation.

9-25. IOC SOP must be periodically reviewed, revised, and rehearsed to 

remain functional and relevant.

??Ensure IOC SOPs have an operational focus.

??Borrow tactical SOP ideas, adapt to the installation’s needs, and 

continue to revise as required.

??Create an IOC SOP annex for each staff section with procedures 

describing how the staff section operates in an increased FPCON 

situation, to include continuous operations (24/7) for an indefinite 

period, and procedures and tools for tracking information. Ensure 

SOPs include procedures for conducting both internal and external 

coordination Ask the question, Who else needs to know?

??Conduct periodic, rigorous training exercises for IOCs and

installation staff using their SOPs. Integrate federal, state, and local 

agencies into the training.

??Develop and implement a plan for regular and continuous updating 

of IOC SOPs based on experience, lessons learned, and new

information. Examples of events that could trigger IOC SOP updates 

are—

??Change in type of threat.

??Change in laws.

??Change in technology.

??Change in mission.

??Change in surrounding community.

??Change in external agency mission/capabilities.

9-26. Installations are not resourced adequately to man IOC positions 24/7. 

To run continuous operations over extended periods requires five assigned 

personnel for each IOC position. Options available to installation

commanders in the near-term are to have assigned personnel work extra 

shifts, which leads to burnout, or to task tenant organizations to provide the 

additional manpower required. Manpower borrowed from tenant

organizations needs to be trained and verified before working in the IOC. In 

the long-term, the baseline IOC manning identified in the FP O&O must be 

added to installation TDAs and resourced.
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9-5

9-27. IOC communications systems are ineffective, insufficient, and

vulnerable to single point failures.

??Cell phones should be considered as backup/alternate means of radio 

communications.

??SIPRNET/NIPRNET should be provided with redundant,

independent circuits.

9-28. The C2 relationship and communications between the QRF and the 

chain of command at MEVA sites are not well defined. If there are multiple 

events, the QRF will be rendered useless quickly. MEVA guard forces will 

be the first QRF until the backup QRF arrives.

??Establish a clear chain of command for each MEVA site and for the 

QRF in the garrison SOPs.

??Ensure the QRF can reliably communicate with the chain of

command at each MEVA.

??Establish a mission folder for each MEVA site.

9-29. Visibility of senior leaders checking their command, demonstrating 

calm, resolute leadership, and interacting with personnel at all levels is a 

key element that reinforces leader development and sustains morale.

9-30. Failure to get the word out in a crisis situation leads to the

proliferation of rumors and increases stress and anxiety among soldiers, 

civilians, and their families. 

??Frequent senior leader visits are key. They should—

??Target small groups.

??Inform and allow people to ask questions.

??Listen to the concerns of the soldiers and parents.

??Use a question-and-answer format to get the message across.

??Employ chain of command to get the word out.

??Utilize family readiness groups.

BOMB THREAT

9-31. Understand capability of the EOD team.

9-32. Incident commander, and his tasks, needs to be clearly identified in 

FP plans for each possible threat scenario.

9-33. Ensure EOD team can communicate with forward command post.

9-34. Be careful not to create a larger target by consolidating the forward 

command post in the vicinity of the bomb.

9-35. MOUs/MOAs need to support communication requirements with 

local law enforcement. Specify type of incidents about which they will be 

notified and the possible impact of the incident on the local community.
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9-6

9-36. Ensure facilities in the vicinity of the incident area are checked for 

bombs.

9-37. Determine who helps the garrison commander to develop courses of 

action at the forward command post. Consider using your AT officer who, 

in turn, needs to use the FP program as a play book.
A-1

Appendix A

The Military 

Decision-Making Process

OVERVIEW

A-1. The MDMP provides a common framework for the IOC staff to do 

parallel planning. It provides a logical sequence of decisions and

interactions between the commander and the staff. Figure A-1 depicts the 

definition, the sequential seven-step analytical process, and characteristics 

of this tool. 

Figure A-1. MDMP

STEP 1

MISSION RECEIPT

A-2. The MDMP begins when a mission is received by higher

headquarters or is deduced by the commander/staff.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

Receipt of Mission

Mission Analysis

COA Development

COA Analysis (war gaming)

COA Comparison

COA Approval

Orders Production

MDMP defined as—

• A single, established, and proven analytical process

• A tool to assist in developing estimates and plans

• Flexible

• Continuous

• Comprehensive

• Sequential

• Proven process

• Time consuming

MDMP helps the commander and staff examine a

battlefield situation and reach logical decisions.
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A-2

STEP 2

MISSION ANALYSIS

A-3. The following are components of mission analysis (IAW AR 381-10 

and AR 525-13):

??Analyze higher order.

??Complete intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) by—

??Defining the installation AO (three concentric circles).

??Describing incident effects.

??Evaluating the threat (AR 381-10 considerations).

??Developing threat courses of action.

??Identify specified, implied, and essential tasks.

??Review available assets.

??Determine constraints.

??Identify critical facts and assumptions.

??Conduct risk assessment.

??Determine initial CCIR: PIR and FFIR.

??Determine, as required, EEFI.

??Prepare initial reconnaissance annex (inner, middle, and outer rings).

??Plan use of available time.

??Write the restated mission.

??Do mission analysis brief.

??Obtain restated mission approval.

??Obtain commander’s intent.

??Obtain commander’s guidance.

??Issue warning order (Appendix G).

??Review facts and assumptions.

A-4. Briefing format—

??Mission and intent two levels up.

??Mission, intent, and concept of higher.

??Commander’s guidance.

??IPB products.

??Specified, implied, and essential tasks.
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A-3

??Constraints.

??Forces available.

??Hazards and their risks.

??Recommended initial CCIR.

??Recommended timeline.

??Proposed restated mission.

A-5. Products (IAW AR 381-10 and AR 525-13)— 

??Situation template (SITEMP) and event template.

??Restated mission.

??Commander’s intent.

??Commander’s guidance—

??Friendly/enemy courses of action.

??CCIR.

??Reconnaissance guidance and deception.

??Combat support/combat service support priorities.

??Timeline and type order/rehearsal.

??Warning order (Appendix G).

STEP 3 

COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

A-6. The components (IAW AR 381-10 and AR 525-13) for course of 

action (COA) development are—

??Analyze relative combat power.

??Generate options (suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and 

complete).

??Array forces (first responders, SRT, QRF, CBRN-IST).

??Develop scheme of maneuver—

??Purpose.

??Risk.

??Critical events.

??Purpose of main effort.
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A-4

??Purpose of secondary effort. 

??Purpose of reserve (CBRN-RRT, SMART, EOD team, others).

??Inner, middle, outer installation rings.

??Responsibilities, graphics.

??Assign headquarters.

??Prepare COA statement and sketch.

A-7. Briefing format— 

??IPB update.

??SITEMPs.

??Restated mission.

??Mission and intent two levels up.

??COA statement and sketches.

??COA rationale.

A-8. Products (IAW AR 381-10 and AR 525-13)— 

??COA statements and sketches.

??SITEMPSs.

STEP 4 

COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS

A-9. The components (IAW AR 381-10 and AR 525-13) are— 

??Gather the tools.

??List friendly forces.

??Make assumptions.

??Develop critical events and decision points.

??Evaluate criteria.

??Select wargame method (zone, areas, perimeters).

??Select recording method (narrative, sketch, synchronization matrix, 

execution checklist).

??Wargame.

??Assess results.

A-10. Briefing format—

??Higher headquarters mission, intent, and deception.

??Updated IPB.
Force Protection

A-5

??COAs wargamed.

??Assump tions.

??Techniques used.

??For each COA identify—

??Critical events.

??Actions/reactions.

??Pros and cons.

A-11. Products (IAW AR 381-10 and AR 525-13)—

??Refined/detailed COA and synchronization matrix.

??Location and timing of combat power at decisive point.

??Detailed task organization.

??Refined event template.

??CCIR and collation plan.

??Concept for reaction teams, engineer, and support.

??Subordinate tasks.

??Risk assessment (Appendix H).

STEP 5 

COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON

A-12. Components (IAW AR 381-10 and AR 525-13) are— 

??Post criteria matrix.

??Weight criteria.

??Evaluate COA strengths and weaknesses.

??Consider each staff estimate.

A-13. Briefing format—

??Higher headquarters mission and intent two levels up.

??Restated mission.

??Status of forces.

??Updated IPB.

??For each COA list—

??Assumptions.

??Effects on staff estimates.
Force Protection

A-6

??Advantages/disadvantages.

??Risk (Appendix H).

??Recommended COA.

A-14. Products (IAW AR-381-10 and AR 525-13) are completed staff

estimates.

STEP 6 

COURSE OF ACTION APPROVAL

A-15. Products (IAW AR 381-10 and AR 525-13) are—

??Approved COA.

??Commander’s guidance.

??Warning order (Appendix G).

STEP 7 

PRODUCE ORDERS 

A-16. Five paragraph orders format includes—

??Situation—

??Enemy forces.

??Friendly force.

??Attachments/detachments.

??Assumptions.

??Mission.

??Execution with the commander’s intent for the following:

??Concept of operations (maneuver and reaction teams).

??Tasks to response teams.

??Tasks to support units.

??Coordinating instructions.

??Service support.

??Command and signal.
Force Protection

A-7

MILITARY DECISION-MAKING 

PROCESS OPERATIONALIZED

A-17. Figure A-2 operationalizes the FP MDMP processes by highlighting 

the integration of FP actions in the MDMP model. Also, using the MDMP 

system provides an efficient framework for planning, preparing, and

executing the FP operational missions. Lastly, using MDMP simplifies the 

translation of the commander’s FP vision through planning guidance and 

intent into plans and orders. 

Figure A-2. MDMP Operationalized

Mission

Analysis

COA

Development

COA

Analysis

COA

Comparison

COA

Approval

OPLAN/

OPORD

Rehearsal Execution

Threat Identification,

Risk and Vulnerability Assessments

Risk Management:

Countermeasure Development

Implement Countermeasures:

• OPSEC

• Personnel Security

• Physical Security

• Awareness

• Education and Training

• Information Operations

Evaluate

Provide Feedback
B-1

Appendix B

DECISION SUPPORT TEMPLATE

OVERVIEW

B-1. A decision support template (DST) graphically represents the

projected situation and identifies where a decision must be made to initiate 

a specific activity or event. It does not dictate decisions, but indicates when 

and where the need for a decision is most likely to occur.

B-2. DST graphically integrates—

??Time -phased lines and threat events, activities, and targets.

??Friendly events, activities, schemes of maneuver, and control

measures from the synchronization matrix and the operation overlay.

??CCIR.

??Time estimates (calculations of times required to implement

decisions).

B-3. FM 34-1 and FM 34-130 explain the elements of the DST. The 

process as explained in these references is designed for use by units

operating in a field environment and must be modified when used to

support installation FP planning. 

OPERATIONALIZED 

FOR FORCE PROTECTION

B-4. The following six DST steps are used to support installation FP 

planning:

??Develop access control obstacle/avenue of approach (AA) overlay.

??Develop enemy situation event template.

??Develop event template.

??Develop target areas of interest (TAIs).

??Develop friendly course of action.

??Develop decision points (DPs) and critical events.
Force Protection

B-2

STEP 1 

DEVELOP ACCESS CONTROL 

OBSTACLE/AVENUE OF APPROACH OVERLAY

B-5. The access control obstacle overlay/AA overlay helps the commander 

to visualize the enemy’s means to gain access to the installation and how 

obstacles can be employed to deter or defeat the enemy’s attempts.

Obstacles can be physical (e.g., barriers), electronic (e.g., firewalls), or 

procedural (e.g., ID checks). Actions needed to develop the overlay

include—

??Determine AAs.

??Ground–pedestrian, privately owned vehicles, public 

transportation, delivery services (rail, postal, package services, 

etc.).

??Air.

??Electronic.

??Determine resources available.

??Determine possible obstacle locations and types that minimize

impact on mission. Also locate obstacles a sufficient distant from 

MEVAs/HRTs to prevent enemy from attacking without having to 

breach the obstacle.

STEP 2 

DEVELOP ENEMY 

SITUATION EVENT TEMPLATE

B-6. The enemy situation event template is used to develop possible enemy 

COAs. As a minimum, the template should depict the most probable and 

most dangerous enemy COAs. Each COA must include the following:

??Who–enemy.

??What–type of operation.

??When–time action expected.

??Where–sector, zone, AA, enemy objectives.

??How–method enemy will employ assets.

??Enemy high-value targets.
Force Protection

B-3

STEP 3 

DEVELOP EVENT TEMPLATE

B-7. The event template is a description of the indicators and activity 

expected to occur in each named area of interest (NAI). It normally

cross-references each NAI and indicator with the times they are expected to 

occur and the COAs they will confirm or deny. The event template is used 

to—

??Wargame enemy COAs.

??Identify where enemy activity in each COA distinguishes it from 

other COAs.

??Establish NAIs.

??Focus on NAIs that help detemine and identify which COA the 

enemy selects.

??Guide development of ISR collection plan.

??Determine when and where to collect information.

STEP 4 

DEVELOP TARGET 

AREAS OF INTEREST

B-8. TAIs depict engagement points or areas where interdiction of an 

enemy force will reduce or eliminate particular enemy capabilities or cause 

him to abandon, modify, or adopt another COA.

STEP 5 

DEVELOP FRIENDLY 

COURSES OF ACTION

B-9. Based on the installation mission and the enemy situation event

template, the staff develops friendly COAs. Each COA must be suitable

(accomplish the mission), feasible (within the installation’s capabilities), 

acceptable (in terms of resources, especially casualties), distinguishable

(from other COAs), and complete. The steps for friendly COA development 

are—

??Assess available forces.

??Generate options.

??Array initial forces.
Force Protection

B-4

??Develop scheme of maneuver.

??Select control measures.

??Assign headquarters.

??Prepare COA statements and sketches.

STEP 6 

DEVELOP DECISION POINTS 

AND CRITICAL EVENTS

B-10. A DP is the point in space and time where the commander or staff 

anticipates making a decision concerning a specific friendly COA. Critical 

events are those that directly influence mission accomplishment. DPs relate 

to identified critical events and are linked to NAIs and TAIs. Wargaming 

the enemy and friendly COAs identify DPs and critical events. For the 

selected friendly COA, the event template and the identified TAIs become 

the DST.
C-1

Appendix C

SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX

OVERVIEW

C-1. A synchronization matrix provides a visible, clear method for ensuring 

the staff addresses all operating systems as they develop and record COAs. 

The matrix shows relationships between activities, units, support functions, 

and key events.

EXAMPLE

C-2. Figure C-1 illustrates an FP synchronization matrix. The tasks in the 

left column are the major tasks of an FP program. The FPCON (Alpha 

through Delta) are the conditions that are dealt with during the planning 

process and execution of the FP program. The numbers are the FP measures 

from AR 525-13 (see Appendix L for list), which are the minimum

standards. As the FP guidance process migrates from an operation plan to 

an operation order and is then changed with fragmentary orders, the

synchronization matrix must be updated. Also based on METT-TC, changes 

will need to be incorporated into the matrix. 

Figure C-1. Synchronization Matrix

Task

Intelligence

C3

Security/

Response Forces

Access Control

MEVA/HRP/HRT

Security

CMD/CMTY

Information Operations

Conditions

A B C D

9 28

(OPSEC Part)

2, 3, 7 12, 13, 20,

21, 28

30, 31 41, 47, 49

4

5

6, 8

1

19, 26 35 42

17, 18, 22,

23

32, 38, 39 44, 45, 46,

50

14, 15, 16,

25

33, 34, 36,

37

43, 48

11, 24, 27

FPCON
D-1

Appendix D

Execution 

Matrix

OVERVIEW

An execution matrix is a visual and sequential representation of the critical tasks and responsible

organizations by phase of an FP operation used as a staff tool. It depicts when and where specific 

supporting actions must occur. FMs 71-123 and 101-5 provide a more detailed explanation. 

EXAMPLE

Figure D-1 is a sample execution matrix for an installation access control point.
Force Protection

B-2

 Figure D-1. Access Control Point Execution Matrix
E-1

Appendix E

Running Estimates

OVERVIEW

E-1. The MDMP (Appendix A) is based on estimates that must be

continually updated. The process of continuous updating of estimates is 

commonly referred to as maintaining running estimates.

EXAMPLE

E-2. As Figure E-1 illustrates, the elements of the MDMP are dependent 

upon one another. For example, a change in countermeasures will have an 

impact on threat capabilities, which in turn will affect the vulnerability of 

installation assets, which may in turn require new countermeasures. For this 

reason, the commander and his staff must continuously update their

estimates of those variables upon which the MDMP is based.

Figure E-1. Running Estimate

Develop Appropriate

Force Protection

Measures

Update Threat

Information

Vulnerability

Assessment

Assess

Countermeasures

Mission Receipt and Analysis

COA Analysis

Threat

Assessment

Develop

Countermeasures

Running

Estimates

COA Development

COA Comparison

and Decision
F-1

Appendix F

Troop-Leading Procedures

(Reaction Team Example)

OVERVIEW

F-1. Troop leading is the process a leader goes through to prepare his 

reaction team to accomplish an FP mission. It begins when he is alerted for 

a mission. It starts again when he receives a change or a new mission. The 

troop-leading procedure comprises the steps listed below. Many of them 

may be accomplished concurrently. During FP events, rarely will leaders 

have enough time to go through each step in detail. Leaders must use the 

procedure as outlined, if only in abbreviated form, to ensure that nothing is 

left out of planning and preparation, and that their team members

understand the mission and prepare adequately. They continuously update 

their estimates throughout the preparation phase and adjust their plans as 

appropriate.

EIGHT STEPS

F-2. Step 1. Begin planning—

??Estimate the situation and analyze the mission. 

??Plan the use of available time and issue warning order.

??Continue estimate of the situation—

??Analyze terrain maps, installation sketch, and/or aerial photograph 

of all three concentric rings of the installation AO for observation 

and field of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain 

features, and avenues of approach.

??Analyze enemy strength, possible locations, dispositions, and 

capabilities.

??Develop, analyze, and compare COAs.

??Make preliminary plan
Force Protection

F-2

F-3. Step 2. Arrange for—

??Movement of team (where, when, how).

??Reconnaissance (select route, persons to take along, use of

subordinates).

??Issuance of order (notify subordinate leaders of time and place).

??Coordination (adjacent and supporting units, agencies, and other 

DOD installations).

F-4. Step 3. Make reconnaissance (complete analysis of threat and terrain).

F-5. Step 4. Complete plan (confirm preliminary plan/estimate).

F-6. Step 5. Issue order.

F-7. Step 6. Supervise activities.

F-8. Step 7. Execute the mission.

F-9. Step 8. Debrief and turn in equipment.
G-1

Appendix G

WARNING ORDER

(REACTION TEAM EXAMPLE)

OVERVIEW

G-1. The team leader provides initial instructions in a warning order. The 

warning order contains enough information to begin preparation as soon as 

possible. Reaction team standing operating instructions should prescribe 

who will attend all warning orders and the actions they must take upon 

receipt: for example, drawing ammunition, rations, and water, and checking 

communications equipment. The warning order has no specific format. One 

technique is to use the format below. The leader issues the warning order 

with all the information available at the time. Updates are provided as often 

as necessary.

WARNING ORDER FORMAT

G-2. Brief statement of the situation.

G-3. Mission of the team.

G-4. General instructions—

??General and special organization.

??Uniform and equipment common to all.

??Weapons, ammunition, and equipment.

??Chain of command.

??Time schedule for the team’s guidance.

??Time, place, uniform, and equipment for receiving the order.

??Times and places for inspections and rehearsals.

G-5. Specific instructions—

??To subordinate leaders.

??To special purpose components in the team and/or key individuals.

??RUF.
H-1

Appendix H

Risk Management

DEFINITIONS

H-1. FM 3-100.12 (formerly FM 100-14) defines risk management as “a

process that assists decision makers in reducing or offsetting risk (by 

systematically identifying, assessing, and controlling risk arising from

operational factors) and making decisions that weigh risks against mission 

benefits.” 

BENEFITS

H-2. Risk management assists the commander or leader by—

??Enhancing operational mission accomplishment.

??Supporting well-informed decision making to implement a COA.

??Providing assessment tools to support operations.

??Enhancing decision-making skills based on a reasoned and

repeatable process.

??Providing improved confidence in unit capabilities. Adequate risk 

analysis provides a clearer picture of unit readiness.

??Preserving and protecting personnel, facilities, critical systems, and 

related support equipment while avoiding unnecessary risk.

??Providing an adaptive process for continuous feedback through the 

planning, preparation, and execution phases of military operations.

??Identifying feasible and effective control measures where specific 

standards do not exist.

PROCESS

H-3. FM 3-100.12 provides a cyclical five-step conceptual framework for 

risk management. The five steps are—

??Identify the threat.

??Assess the threat.

??Develop controls and make risk decision.

??Implement controls.

??Supervise and evaluate.
Force Protection

H-2

H-4. Subsequent cycles of the risk management process augment and refine 

the control measures in order to reduce risk to acceptable levels.

H-5. Figure H-1 depicts the five-step risk management process.

Figure H-1. Risk Management Process

Determine risk level for

each threat and overall

mission risk

Make risk

decision

Step 3.

DevelopControls and Make

Risk Decision

Develop controls and

determine residual

risk controls

Review

Step 1. Identify the Threats

Analyze Mission List Threats List causes

Step 2.

Assess the Threat

Assess Threat

Severity

As controls for hazards

are identified and

selected,

the assess threats

process is repeated.

Step 4.

Implement Controls

Step 5.

Supervise and Evaluate

Supervise

MISSIONS

New

Hazards

Lessons

Learned

Assess Threat

Probability

Feedback

Make

Implementation

Clear

Establish

Accountability

Provide

Support

New

Controls
Force Protection

H-3

TOOLS

H-6. DA Pam 190-51 provides guidance for conducting and documenting 

risk analyses for critical installation assets using a risk-level worksheet 

(DA Form 7278-R). The procedures (six steps) for completing the

worksheet contained in DA Pam 190-51 provide a practical means of

accomplishing step two (assess the threat) of the risk management process. 

The six steps for completing the worksheet are—

??Identify organization or unit that is responsible for the critical asset.

??Identify specific asset needing protection and appropriate asset

category. For example: 

??A-Aviation aircraft, facilities, and components.

??B-Vehicles, carriage, or towed weapons and motor pools.

??M-Critical or high-risk personnel.

??N-Military/civilian population.

??See Paragraph 2-3, DA Pam 190-51, for complete list.

??Determine asset value IAW Chapter 3, DA Pam 190-51.

??Determine likelihood of aggression IAW Chapter 4, DA Pam 190-51.

??Determine the risk levels for the asset IAW Table 2-2, Chapter 2, 

DA Pam 190-51. 

??Determine required protection measures IAW AR 190-51 and

AR 190-11.

H-7. Figure H-2 is an example of a completed risk-level worksheet.
Force Protection

H-4

Figure H-2. Risk-Level Worksheet (Motor Pool Example)

H-8. This process does not apply for sensitive or classified information and 

nuclear and chemical materials. 
I-1

Appendix I

Training and Planning 

Assistance

OVERVIEW

I-1. The Department of Defense has mandated FP training requirements for 

all military personnel, DOD civilians, and their family members under

specific circumstances. Appendix F of AR 525-13 outlines AT awareness 

training, training for AT officers, AT pre-command training, and AT

executive-level training. The following paragraphs list training and planning 

tools to assist in accomplishing training and planning requirements.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION-CHEMICAL, 

BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR (WMDCBRN)

I-2. The United States Army Chemical School (Fort Leonard Wood, MO) 

provides Basic Capability and Operator CBRN Training to DOD military 

and civilian students serving in installation CBRNE first responder,

CBRNE planner, Operations Center, Emergency Disaster Planning Officer, 

Emergency Response Working Group, or incident command positions.

I-3. The WMD-CBRN Installation Planners Course (40 hours) includes 

familiarization on:

??Federal regulations and DoD policies.

??Federal Response Plan.

??Military support to civilian authorities.

??Basic concepts of terrorism.

??Recognition, detection, and identification of CBRN agents and other 

hazardous materials.

??Personal protective equipment.
Force Protection

I-2

I-4. The Weapons of Mass Destruction Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

and Nuclear (WMD-CBRN) Installation Emergency Responders Training 

Course (WMD-IERTC) (40 hours) includes familiarization on:

??Basic first responder techniques.

??Federal regulations.

??Recognition, detection, and identification of CBRN agents and other 

hazardous materials.

??Clandestine lab awareness.

??Toxicology.

I-5. The Joint Senior Leaders Course (20 hours) includes the following 

activities:

??Classified threat brief.

??Presentations featuring keynote speakers.

??Full dress-up exercise with live chemical agent training at the

Chemical Defense Training Facility.

??CBRN wargame.

I-6. Registration information for the WMD-CBRN Installation Planners 

Course and the WMD-IERTC can be found at the following website:

http://www.wood.army.mil/84chem/HHC/TTD/WMD/wmd.htm. Personnel 

interested in attending the Joint Senior Leaders Course should contact 

the Office of the Course Director at DSN 676-8076 or Commercial: 573-

396-0131 ext 38076. 

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 

INSTALLATION PREPAREDNESS 

PROGRAM SERVICES 

I-7. US Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM) 

assists installations in developing WMD preparedness programs. The

SBCCOM program is tailored to military installations, special facilities, and 

public or private venues. Mobile teams provide on-site delivery of the

assistance. Products available through this program include the following:

??Command and staff workshop. 

??Baseline assessment. 

??Customized training program courses—
Force Protection

I-3

??Employee Awareness – 30-minute video.

??Responder Awareness – 4 hours.

??Responder Operations – 4 hours.

??Technician–HAZMAT – 16 hours.

??Technician–EMS – 8 hours.

??Hospital Provider – 8 hours.

??Incident Command – 8 hours.

??Command Workshop – 4 hours.

??Planning workshops. 

??Chemical tabletop exercises.

??Biological tabletop exercises.

??Chemical weapons field exercises.

I-8. For more information on this program, contact the SBCCOM 

Homeland Defense Business Unit Leader at (403) 436-3674 or visit the 

SBCCOM website www2.sbccom.army.mil/hld/.

ADVANCED PHYSICAL 

SECURITY TRAINING PROGRAM

I-9. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) provides

training tailored to individuals requiring an in-depth knowledge of physical 

security. The training is conducted at its facility in Glynco, GA. Depending 

on individual needs, the training can be focused on any combination of the 

following subjects:

??Conceptual security considerations.

??Vulnerability assessment.

??Crime prevention theory and application.

??Risk assessment.

??Information and computer security.

??Bomb threat procedures.

??Facility security profiles.
Force Protection

I-4

??Security information and resources.

??Perimeter protection.

??Contingency planning.

??Legal issues.

??Guard force management.

??Security design.

??Intrusion detection systems.

I-10. The training may also include practical exercis es.

I-11. For more information on this program, contact the Program Manager, 

FLETC, (812) 267-2354, or visit the FLETC website

http://63.117.243.216/ssd/ssd_home.htm.

INSTALLATION ANTITERRORISM 

PROGRAM AND PLANNING TOOL

I-12. J34’s Deputy Directorate for Operations (Combating Terrorism)

maintains an installation planning template that provides formats for key 

aspects of an FP plan IAW DODI 2000.16. The template is available on CD 

ROM by contacting J-34 (DSN 223-7562, x104).

BATTLE COMMAND TRAINING PROGRAM

I-13. The battle command training program (BCTP) at Fort Leavenworth, 

KS, has a three-phase training program that is available by contacting the 

BCTP staff at (913) 684-5918 (DSN 552-5918). Proponency for this

program will transfer to CASCOM. Future plans are for the Army

Management Staff College to develop a single course for the staff of an 

installation operation center, a garrison chief of staff course, and to expand 

the current pre-command courses to include an FP simulation exercise.) The 

current three-phased BCTP for installations includes—

??Phase I. FP leader training conducted at Fort Leavenworth, KS, for 

two days. The audience is the garrison commander and key staff 

members.
Force Protection

I-5

??Phase II. Crisis decision making conducted at the installation for two 

days. The audience is the garrison staff, installation staff, virtual 

staff, and local civilian agencies.

??Phase III. Crisis response conducted at the installation for two days. 

The audience is the garrison staff, IOC staff, installation staff, and 

virtual staff.

US ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

I-14. IAW AR 190-13, the Corps of Engineers maintains centers of

expertise for protective design and intrusion detection systems. The centers 

may assist installations in developing solutions to FP vulnerabilities. 

Additionally, the Joint Program Office for Special Technology

Countermeasures manages DOD critical infrastructure protection plans and 

may provide installation vulnerability studies. To use their services, contact 

one of the following:

??Army Engineering District, Omaha (402) 221-3817. 

??Huntsville Engineering Support Center (256) 895-1756.

??Joint Program Office for Special Technology Countermeasures

(450) 653-8589.

FORCE PROTECTION MODELING

I-15. The Technology Development Division serves as the field agent for 

FP for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The agency develops 

software for FP modeling. For additional information, contact 

http://www.dtra.mil/td/td_index.html .
J-1

Appendix J

Rules for the Use of Force

OVERVIEW

J-1. RUF are different from the more familiar rules of engagement (ROE). 

RUF are escalating rules for US-based military personnel performing 

security duties when dealing with US citizens. ROE are directives

delineating the circumstances and limitations for military forces to initiate 

or continue combat engagement with other forces. AR190-14 prescribes 

RUF and any RUF published must be informed by its contents. It is 

recommended that the staff judge advocate review RUF prior to publishing.

EXAMPLE

J-2. An example of a RUF follows:

??A soldier has the inherent right of self-defense and the defense of 

others.

??Minimum force necessary and proportional to the threat is used.

??Deadly force is used only as a last resort—

??For immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury to self or 

others.

??For defense of persons under protection.

??To prevent theft, damage, destruction of firearms, ammunition, 

explosives, or property designated vital to national security.

??When the situation permits, security personnel will utilize escalating 

degrees of force. These degrees are defined as—

??SHOUT–verbal warnings to halt.

??SHOVE–nonlethal physical force.

??SHOW–intent to use weapon.

??SHOOT–deliberately aimed shots until threat no longer exists.

??Warning shots are not permitted.
K-1

Appendix K

Installation Watch Card

(For Soldiers and Families)

OVERVIEW

K-1. IAW AR 525-13 commanders will develop an awareness program to 

ensure visibility of the AT program and enhance awareness of all personnel. 

The more awareness a commander can inculcate in all personnel, the 

stronger the FP program will become. A multidimensional approach is

essential. One technique to use is to develop an installation watch card for 

installation personnel.

EXAMPLE

K-2. The installation watch card shown in Figure K-1 illustrates one

effective technique to increase AT awareness.

 Figure K-1. Installation Watch Card

Installation Watch Card

Awareness is key! Everyone is a sensor.

Do: Observe and Report—

Unusual or suspicious activity or suspected surveillance.

Unusual questions or requests for information relating to

capabilities, limitations, or operational information.

Unusual vehicles operating in or around the installation.

Unusual phone calls, messages, or e-mails.

Unusual contacts on or off post.

Unusual aerial activity near or around installation.

Any possible compromise of sensitive information.

Do Not—

Discuss any aspect of military operations or planning.

Discuss military capabilities or limitations.

Discuss FP measures, capabilities, or posture.

Disclose any information related to unit deployments.

Report any suspicious activity immediately to your

chain of command or to the military police.

Your call may save lives!
L-1

Appendix L

Force Protection Conditions 

Measure Tracking Chart

OVERVIEW

L-1.There are five FPCON levels, Normal and ALPHA through DELTA, 

and each has individual security measures established by AR 525-13. Staff 

elements, tenant organizations, and building managers will report

completion of each measure to the IOC IAW installation SOPs. Authority 

to increase FPCON level above command-directed level rests with the

installation commander. Changes to FPCON level will be reported to

TRADOC Operations Center via OPREP.

FPCON MEASURES TABLES

L-2. The specific measures by FPCON for installation commanders,

installation staff, and tenant organizations to complete are listed in the

following tables.

Table L-1. Individual Measures within FPCON Normal

AR 525-13 Requirements Sample Implementing Guidance

Routine security measures designed 

to defeat the criminal threat.

??C

2

 on call.

??MP patrols.

??Vulnerability and risk assessments.

??Security checks.

??SRT on call.
Force Protection

L-2

Table L-2. Individual Measures within FPCON ALPHA

AR 525-13 Requirements Sample Implementing Guidance

1. At regular intervals, remind all 

personnel, including family 

members, to report the following to 

appropriate law enforcement or 

security agencies—

(1) Suspicious personnel. 

(2) Unidentified vehicles.

(3) Abandoned parcels or 

suitcases.

(4) Any other activity considered 

suspicious.

Notes:

(1) Pay particular attention to 

personnel carrying suitcases or 

other containers or those 

observing, photographing, or 

asking questions about military 

operations or security measures.

(2) Emphasis on vehicles parked or 

operated in a suspicious manner.

2. (1) Personnel with access to 

building plans as well as the 

plans for area evacuations must 

be available at all times.

(2) Key personnel should be able 

to seal off an area immediately. 

(3) Key personnel required to 

implement security plans should 

be on call and readily available.

Note:

Ensure that law enforcement and 

security agencies have immediate 

access to building floor plans and 

emergency evacuation plans for HRT.

3. Secure buildings, rooms, and 

storage areas not in regular use. 

Maintain a list of secured facilities 

and areas at installation, 

directorate, or activity level.

4. Increase unannounced security 

spot checks.

Note: 

Inspection of personal identification; 

vehicle registration; and the contents 

of vehicles, suitcases, briefcases, and 

other containers at access control 

points for US installations

5. Reduce the number of access 

points for vehicles and personnel to 

minimum levels, consistent with the 

requirement to maintain a 

reasonable flow of traffic.
Force Protection

L-3

Table L-2. Individual Measures within FPCON ALPHA

(continued)

AR 525-13 Requirements Sample Implementing Guidance

6. As a deterrent, randomly apply 

measures from 14, 15, 17, or 18 in 

Table L-3, either individually or in

combination with each other.

7. Review all operation plans and 

orders and SOPs, which pertain to 

implementation of FPCONs 

BRAVO through DELTA.

8. Review security measures for HRP 

and implement additional 

measures warranted by the threat 

and existing vulnerabilities (for 

example, HRP should alter 

established patterns of behavior 

and wear inconspicuous body 

armor when traveling in public 

areas).

9. Increase liaison with local police, 

intelligence, and security agencies 

to monitor the threat to Army 

personnel, installations, and 

facilities. Notify local police 

agencies concerning FPCON 

BRAVO measures that, if 

implemented, could impact on their 

operations in the local community.

10. Spare for MACOM or installation

 use.
Force Protection

L-4

Table L-3. Individual Measures within FPCON BRAVO 

AR 525-13 Requirement Sample Implementing Guidance

In addition to the measures required by ALPHA, the following measures will be 

implemented:

11. Increase the frequency of 

warnings required by Measure 1 

in Table L-2.

Note: 

Also inform personnel of additional 

threat information, as appropriate.

12. Keep all personnel involved in 

implementing AT-related 

contingency plans on call.

QRF on 4-hour recall. Capability to 

provide augmentation force. 

Committee and FP working groups.

13. Review provisions of all 

documents associated with 

implementation of CHARLIE.

14. Move automobiles and objects, 

such as trash containers and 

crates, away from HRT and 

selected MEVAs.

Note:

If the configuration of the facility or 

area precludes implementation of this 

measure, take appropriate 

compensatory measures in 

accordance with local plans (frequent 

inspection by explosive detector dog 

[EDD] teams, centralized parking, 

controlled access to parking areas, 

etc.).

15. Secure and regularly inspect all 

buildings, rooms, and storage 

areas not in regular use. 

16. Inspect the interior and exterior of 

buildings in regular use for 

suspicious activity or packages, 

for signs of tampering, or for 

indications of unauthorized entry.

Note: 

At the beginning and end of each 

workday and at frequent intervals.
Force Protection

L-5

Table L-3. Individual Measures within FPCON BRAVO (continued)

AR 525-13 Requirement Sample Implementing Guidance

17. (1) Implement screening 

procedures for all incoming 

official mail to identify possible 

explosive or incendiary 

devices or other dangerous 

material. 

 (2) Encourage soldiers, civilian 

employees, and family 

members to inspect their 

personal mail, report 

suspicious items to local law 

enforcement agencies, and 

refrain from handling such 

items until cleared by 

appropriate authority.

Note: 

If available, use trained EDD teams 

for inspection of suspicious items and 

to conduct periodic screening of mail.

18. (1) Inspect all deliveries to 

common-use facilities to 

identify explosive and 

incendiary devices. 

 (2) Encourage family members to 

report suspicious packages to 

local law enforcement 

agencies and refrain from 

handling them until cleared by 

appropriate authority.

Notes: 

Some common-use facilities are 

messes, exchanges, guesthouses, 

clubs, libraries, schools, and others 

as locally designated. Use trained 

EDD teams for some inspections, 

when available.

19. Increase both overt and covert 

security force surveillance.

Notes: 

Surveillance at facilities such as 

messes, commissaries, exchanges, 

guesthouses, clubs, libraries, schools, 

chapel, and HRT to improve 

deterrence and build confidence 

among staff and family members.

20. Inform soldiers, civilian 

employees, and family members 

of the general threat situation to 

stop rumors and prevent 

unnecessary alarm. Periodically 

update all personnel as the 

situation changes.
Force Protection

L-6

Table L-3. Individual Measures within FPCON BRAVO (continued)

AR 525-13 Requirement Sample Implementing Guidance

21. Brief representatives of all units and 

activities on the installation 

concerning the threat and security 

measures implemented in response 

to the threat. Implement procedures 

to provide periodic updates for these 

unit and activity representatives.

22. Verify the identity of all personnel 

entering the installation, HRTs, and 

other sensitive activities specified in 

local plans (inspect identification 

cards or grant access based on 

visual recognition). Visually inspect 

the interior of all vehicles and the 

exterior of all suitcases, briefcases, 

packages, and other containers. 

Increase the frequency of detailed 

vehicle inspections (trunk, 

undercarriage, glove boxes, etc.) 

and the frequency of inspections of 

suitcases, briefcases, and other 

containers.

100% ID check at access control 

points and HRTs.

23. Increas e the frequency of random 

identity checks (inspection of 

identification cards, security badges, 

and vehicle registration documents) 

conducted by security force patrols 

on the installation.

Liberal use of random measures.

24. Increase security provided to 

off-post personnel in conjunction 

with local law enforcement 

agencies, where required and /or 

practicable, or transport off-post 

personnel to protected areas IAW 

local contingency plans. Remind all 

personnel to lock parked vehicles 

and inspect vehicles for suspicious 

items before entering and driving 

them.
Force Protection

L-7

Table L-3. Individual Measures within FPCON BRAVO (continued)

AR 525-13 Requirement Sample Implementing Guidance

25. Implement additional security 

measures for HRP.

Notes: 

For example, conduct of 

countersurveillance operations in 

accordance with existing plans. 

Consider providing 24-hour protective 

services protection for Level I HRP, if 

not already provided.

26. (1) Brief security personnel 

concerning the threat and 

policies governing use of 

force/ROE.

 (2) Repeat this briefing on a

 periodic basis.

Note: 

Security personnel include all law 

enforcement personnel, guards, and 

security augmentation force 

personnel.

27. (1) Increase liaison with local 

police, intelligence, and 

security agencies to monitor 

the threat to Army personnel, 

installations, and facilities. 

 (2) Notify local police agencies

 concerning FPCON CHARLIE 

 and DELTA measures that, if

 implemented, could impact on 

 their operations in the local

 community.

Interface regularly with external 

agencies.

28. Test attack warning system and 

supporting evacuation plans, 

ensuring proficiency and 

appropriate OPSEC.

29. Spare for MACOM or installation 

use.
Force Protection

L-8

Table L-4. Individual Measures within FPCON CHARLIE

AR 525-13 Requirement Sample Implementing Guidance

30. Continue all ALPHA and BRAVO 

measures.

31. Keep all personnel responsible for 

implementing AT plans at their 

place of duty.

32. Reduce installation and HRT 

access points to the absolute

minimum necessary for continued 

operation.

33. (1) Verify the identity of all 

personnel entering 

installations, facilities, and 

activities.

 (2) Visually inspect the interior of 

all vehicles and the exterior of 

all suitcases, briefcases, and 

other containers. 

 (3) Increase the frequency of 

detailed vehicle inspections.

34. (1) Remove vehicles parked 

within or near HRTs and 

MEVAs.

 (2) Implement centralized parking.

35. (1) Issue weapons.

 (2) Ensure that all personnel are 

briefed on use of force/ROE.

 (3) Ensure that ammunition is 

available.

Notes:

Applies to all law enforcement 

personnel, security guards, and guard 

force augmentation personnel, if not 

already accomplished.

Particular criteria for use of deadly 

force.

For immediate issue (for those 

personnel not already issued 

ammunition) and ensure that 

supervisory personnel are familiar 

with policies governing issuance of 

ammunition.
Force Protection

L-9

Table L-4. Individual Measures within FPCON CHARLIE 

(continued)

AR 525-13 Requirement Sample Implementing Guidance

36. Increase security patrol activity to 

the maximum level sustainable, 

weigh the effort toward HRTs.

37. Position guard force personnel in 

the vicinity of all HRTs and 

MEVAs.

38. Erect barriers to protect against 

vehicle bomb attacks.

Note:

Required to control direction of traffic 

flow and to protect facilities 

vulnerable to bomb attack by parked 

or moving vehicles.

39. Consult local authorities about 

closing roads and facilities.

Note:

Focus on those that might make sites 

more vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

40. Spare for MACOM or installation 

use.

Table L-5. Individual Measures within FPCON DELTA

AR 525-13 Requirements Sample Implementing Guidance

41. Continue all ALPHA, BRAVO, and 

CHARLIE measures or introduce 

those which have not already 

been implemented.

Response forces alerted and 

prepared to execute mission on order.

42. Augment guard forces to ensure 

absolute control over access to 

the installation, MEVAs, and 

HRTs.

43. Identify the owners of all vehicles 

already on the installation and 

OCONUS owners in the vicinity of 

soft targets off installations.

Note: 

In those cases where the presence of 

a vehicle cannot be explained (owner 

is not present and has no obvious 

military affiliation), inspect the vehicle 

for explosive or incendiary devices, or 

other dangerous items, and remove 

the vehicle from the vicinity of HRTs 

as soon as possible.
Force Protection

L-10

Table L-5. Individual Measures within FPCON DELTA (continued)

AR 525-13 Requirements Sample Implementing Guidance

44. Inspect all vehicles entering the 

installation, facility, or activity.

Note: 

Inspections should include cargo 

storage areas, undercarriage, glove 

boxes, and other areas where 

explosive or incendiary devices or 

other dangerous items could be 

concealed. Briefcases, suitcases, 

boxes, and other containers in 

vehicles should also be inspected.

45. Limit access to installations, 

facilities, and activities to those 

personnel with a legitimate and 

verifiable need to enter.

Installation lockdown.

46. Inspect all baggage, such as 

suitcases, packages, and 

briefcases brought on the 

installation.

Note: 

Check for presence of explosive or 

incendiary devices or other 

dangerous items.

47. Take measures to control access 

to all areas under the jurisdiction 

of the US command or agency.

48. Implement frequent inspections of 

the exterior of buildings (to 

include roof and subterranean 

areas) and parking areas.

Note: 

Security force personnel should 

conduct inspections at HRTs and 

MEVAs.

49. Cancel or delay all administrative 

movement that is not mission 

essential.

50. Request local authorities close 

those public roads and facilities in 

the vicinity of military installations, 

facilities, and activities that might 

facilitate execution of a terrorist 

attack.

Note:

Facilities in the vicinity of military 

installations, facilities, and activities.

51. Spare for MACOM or installation 

use.
M-1

Appendix M

News Release

The following is an example of a news release.

Alert Army Members Contribute 

to Effective Force Protection

FORT MONROE, Va. -- Soldiers, civilian employees, and family 

members can make valuable contributions to force protection measures 

throughout Training and Doctrine Command.

“The Army, along with the nation’s other military services, will 

become the world’s dominant antiterrorism and counterterrorism forces,” 

said General XXXXXX, commander.

“Our military installations at home and overseas will be targets for 

terrorists seeking revenge for our success in Operation Enduring Freedom,” 

he said. “Our security forces are taking measures to protect installations 

and our forces.

“Families and employees can help by being alert, looking out for 

individuals in places they don’t belong or who are asking for information 

they shouldn’t have. They should report these incidents to their provost 

marshals.

“Force protection measures will allow TRADOC to continue its

mission of training new soldiers and developing leaders,” XXXXXXX said.

“The Army’s role in responding to the terrorist attacks of 9-11 will be a 

long-term effort,” the general said. “President Bush has told the country not 

to expect a quick fix to the fight against terrorist organizations.

“The Army family must support each other so we can stay focused on 

the mission.”
Force Protection

M-2

Installation commanders will try to allow life to continue as normal on 

installations, while still taking effective force protection measures,

according to XXXXXX. People will see vendors allowed on post to 

support dining facilities; exchanges; commissaries; and morale, welfare, 

and recreation facilities.

“That does not mean that military operations are business as usual,” he 

said. “We will have security measures that ensure force protection, 

operational security, and the mission that are consistent with the threat 

assessment.

“Cooperation and assistance from the Army family will make our force 

protection measures even more effective,” XXXXXX said.
N-1

Appendix N

Suspicious Mail

INTRODUCTION

N-1. Mail historically has been used as an avenue of approach by our

enemies with the common practice of sending explosive devices through the 

mail system. Installation personnel now face a more widespread harm of 

biologically contaminated mail in the United States Postal System. The 

actions recommended below are provided to help mitigate the impact of this 

expanded threat. An in-depth discussion of the mail FP measures is

provided in TRADOC Cir 25-01-02. 

N-2. Some indicators of a suspicious envelope or package are—

??Threatening message.

??Loose shifting material.

??Excessive postage.

??Handwritten or poorly typed address.

??Stains.

??Odors. 

??No return address.

??Protruding wires.

??Lopsided or uneven envelope.

??Excessive weight.

??Unidentified powdery substances.

??Leaking fluids.

HANDLING

N-3. The following are actions recommended for addressees, mail handlers, 

and leader/supervisors.
Force Protection

N-2

ADDRESSEE

N-4. If received at work, the addressee will—

??Instruct others in the room to leave immediately.

??Slowly set the package down on a stable surface and not handle it 

any more.

??Not cover the package, even if leaking. Air movement from covering 

it could spread contamination. Also, covering the package makes it 

impossible to assess from a distance. 

??Call coworkers/supervisor, if available. Explain the situation, ask if 

the sender can be verified, or whether the package was expected.

??Turn off fans and air conditioners in the room. If the room is served 

by a central air system, turn off the system if you can. Close

windows and doors into the room as you leave.

??Go directly to the restroom and wash hands thoroughly with soap and 

water.

??Initiate emergency response by notifying MP/provost marshal.

??Clear the offices and restrooms in the immediate area of the room.

??Proceed to the evacuation rally point and direct departing personnel 

to the designated rally point.

??Make a list of personnel that were in the room and evacuated.

??Remain at evacuation rally point to provide information and for 

possible medical follow-up until released by incident command.

??Prevent reentry of unauthorized personnel into the immediate area.

N-5. If received at home, the addressee will—

??Instruct others in the room to leave immediately.

??Not shake or empty contents.

??Slowly set the package down on a stable surface and not handle it 

any more.

??Not cover the package, even if leaking. Air movement from covering 

it could spread contamination. Covering the package makes it

impossible to assess from a distance.

??Call leader/supervisor, if available, and explain situation.

??Turn off fans and air conditioners in the quarters. Close windows and 

doors into the room as you leave.
Force Protection

N-3

??Go directly to restroom and wash hands thoroughly with soap and 

water. Remove clothes and shower if any contents were spilled on 

yourself or children.

??If you have a central heating/cooling air system, turn it off.

??Get everyone out of the quarters and keep people from coming back 

in.

??Initiate emergency response by notifying MP/provost marshal.

??Leave quarters, but remain on the scene to provide information and 

to receive possible medical follow-up until released by incident 

command.

MAIL HANDLER

N-6. The mail handler will—

??Instruct others in the room to leave immediately.

??Not shake or empty contents.

??Slowly set the package down on a stable surface and not handle it 

any more. 

??Call coworkers, if available. Explain the situation, ask if the sender 

can be verified, or if a package is expected. If in doubt, assume it is 

suspicious.

??Call leader/supervisor, if available, and explain situation.

??Turn off fans and air conditioners in the room Close windows and 

doors into the room as you leave.

??Go directly to restroom and wash hands thoroughly with soap and 

water.

??Initiate leader actions if leader/supervisor not available.

??Evacuate facility to designated rally point. 

LEADER/SUPERVISOR

N-7. If the mail is suspicious, the leader or supervisor will—

??Initiate emergency response by notifying MP/provost marshal.

??Disable ventilation systems or notify department of public works to 

shutdown ventilation systems.
Force Protection

N-4

??Assign monitors to manage clearing the immediate area. Instruct the 

monitors—

??To clear the offices and restrooms in the immediate area of the 

room.

??To direct departing personnel to the designated rally point.

??To prevent reentry of unauthorized personnel into the immediate 

area.

??To direct employees in the room to go directly to the restroom, 

wash their hands, evacuate, and await instructions.

??Hold all personel at evacuation rally point to provide information 

until released by incident command.

??Make a list of all personnel in the area that were evacuated.

??Notify the installation leadership of the situation. 

N-8. Response preparation activities—

??Identify controls for ventilation systems and how to disable, if 

possible, by user.

??Identify evacuation routes and rally points and ensure all personnel 

are aware of them.

??Rehearse evacuation plan.

OPEN/LEAKING PACKAGE

N-9. Upon receipt of an opened or leaking envelope or package with an 

unidentifiable liquid, powder, or solid substance (as opposed to readily 

identifiable contents—soup mix, salad dressing, coffee creamer, etc.), treat 

the package as suspicious.

MAIL HANDLER

N-10. If a suspicious opened or leaking envelope or package is received, 

the mail handler will—

??Instruct others in the room to leave immediately. 

??Avoid touching his face or breathing in any of the powder.

??Not try to clean substance area.

??Not touch, smell, taste, or try to identify powder.
Force Protection

N-5

??Not shake or empty contents.

??Slowly set the package down on a stable surface and not handle it 

any more.

??Not cover a package, even if leaking. Air movement from covering it 

could spread contamination. Covering it makes it impossible to

assess from a distance.

??Gently remove any clothing contaminated with the substance and 

place on floor.

??Call leader/supervisor, if available, and explain situation.

??Initiate leader actions if leader/supervisor not available.

??Turn off fans and air conditioners in the room. Close windows and 

doors into the room as you leave.

??Go directly to restroom and wash hands thoroughly with soap and 

water.

??Evacuate facility to designated rally point.

??Shower as soon as possible and change clothes.

??Put clothes in plastic bag and maintain possession for turn-in to 

authorities or first responders.

LEADER/SUPERVISOR

N-11. The leader/supervisor will, if possible, determine whether the

package is safe by finding out if it is expected or can be identified by a 

sender known to the addressee. If in doubt, assume it is suspicious and—

??Initiate emergency response by notifying MP/provost marshal.

??Disable ventilation systems or notify department of public works to 

shutdown ventilation systems.

??Assign monitors to manage clearing the immediate area. Instruct the 

monitors—

??To clear the offices and restrooms in the immediate area of the 

room.

??To direct departing personnel to the designated rally point.

??To prevent reentry of unauthorized personnel into the immediate 

area.

??To direct the employee(s) in the room to go directly to the

restroom, wash their hands, evacuate, and await instructions.
Force Protection

N-6

??Hold all personnel at evacuation rally point to provide information 

until released by incident command.

??Make a list of all personnel in the area that was evacuated.

??Notify the installation leadership of the situation.

N-12. Response preparation activities—

??Identify controls for ventilation systems and how to disable, if 

possible, by user.

??Identify evacuation routes and rally points and ensure all personnel 

are aware of them.

??Rehearse evacuation plan.

??Provide utility coveralls to potentially contaminated personnel to 

change clothes.

??Provide plastic bags for contaminated clothes.
O-1

Appendix O

Family Media Guide

Note: It is command policy that the public affairs office 

coordinates all contact, on and off-post, between the 

media and service members/government employees. 

MEDIA

O-1. Mission readiness and family readiness are complementary concepts. 

Both rely on using information as a critical tool. Wide distribution of 

information can enhance recruiting, retention, and family readiness. At the 

same time, wide distribution of unfavorable information can damage the

image of the US Army and your unit and threaten the morale of family 

members. Incorrect or incomplete information can mislead family members 

and cause unnecessary concern during periods of mobilization and

deployment. The bottom line is this: Messages you want to send about 

family readiness can be aided by using the news media. 

O-2. You cannot dictate what the media says about you, nor can you 

necessarily attract their interest when you want it. There are times, however, 

when the media will be interested in your unit and your family members. If 

you are prepared, you can use the news media as a great tool to get your key 

messages out. Deployments and reunions are always newsworthy events 

that will attract press attention—so will bad news, such as casualties. 

O-3. The news media must always receive accurate, complete, and timely 

information, whether it comes from you, your unit, or your family members. 

Well-informed unit members and their families can be confident interview 

subjects capable of giving the press the full story. 

O-4. Learning to deal with the news media is vital for family members. 

Both the service member and the family members must understand their 

rights during interaction with the media. 
Force Protection

O-2

O-5. Everyone needs to plan for a media event (see Figure N-1 for media 

tips for family members) well before it occurs. You should identify the

three most favorable and three most unfavorable questions you might 

receive from the press. Prepare answers for those questions and rehearse 

how you would handle follow-up questions. Never forget—the press can 

serve as a highly effective conduit for information, which will boost the 

morale of not only the unit and its members, but other family members as 

well. 

O-6. The news media is an integral part of American society and should be 

cultivated on a continuing basis. Not only can it be used as a means of 

providing information during periods of deployment, but it can also be used 

to enhance the public’s image of the US Army, individual units, soldiers, 

and the families that support them. 

O-7. Media wants to talk with soldiers, commanders, and subject-matter 

experts and family members, not talking heads or PAOs. You are the ones 

with credibility who can best tell the Army’s story to the American people.

GUIDELINES FOR FAMILY MEMBERS

O-8. Know your rights. It is up to you whether or not to speak to reporters. 

If you do choose to speak, you may stop at any time. How much

information you choose to provide the media is up to you, but remember 

that anything you say is on-the-record, that is everything you say can be 

published or broadcasted and identifies you by name, title, etc. Based on 

your wishes, the PAO can provide as much or as little information to the 

media as you desire.

O-9. Know the role and purpose of the American press. They perform an 

important job in our democracy by keeping the public informed. It is not 

harassment if they call you at home or stop you out in public asking for an 

interview. It becomes harassment only when they persist after you have said 

NO.

O-10. Know the reporter’s identity. Write down the reporter’s name, 

telephone number, and news organization before answering any questions. 

Do this even if you are not going to comment; this will discourage the 

reporter from persisting after you have said NO.

O-11. Know your limits. It is best not to talk about anything of which you 

do not have first-hand knowledge. A response of “I don’t know” is perfectly 
Force Protection

O-3

fine in response to questions for which you have no answer. Do not 

speculate or engage in rumor or gossip.

O-12. Know who will hear what you say. Even family members might have 

sensitive information, which should not be released. With today’s

technology, unauthorized sources can access what you say the moment you 

say it. On a positive note, your enthusiastic response about your spouse’s 

mission can help build morale and show American resolve.

O-13. If you reside in government housing, you may not invite media to 

your home without prior clearance from the PAO. Media must be escorted 

when on post.

O-14. As a matter of courtesy, whether you live on or off post, please 

contact the PAO when media approaches you. The PAO is available to 

advise and assist you in any contact with the media.

O-15. Be careful about information you share. It would be typical terrorist 

tactics and asymmetric warfare to strike at the family members of deployed 

soldiers, especially for those who have gained a profile in the media. An 

attack on family members would be disastrous for the morale of deployed 

soldiers and that is precisely why such an attack is a possibility. 

O-16. If your spouse calls home with information about the unit’s return to 

the states, about casualties, or how the mission is going, remember that 

deployments spawn rumors. Some of what you are told could be sensitive, 

wrong, or subject to change. Unless information is verified, it is best to keep 

it to yourself. Keep in touch with your chain of command for accurate 

information.

O-17. For your own safety and security, as well as other family members, it 

is best not to announce to the general public that you are alone by giving out 

personal information such as your home address or telephone number. You 

may also want to consider not releasing your last name or the name of your 

children’s school.

O-18. When speaking to media, you need to understand that everything you 

say is on-the-record. Spelled out below are explanations of the media terms 

on-the-record, background, deep background, and off-the-record: 

??On-the-record. Everything you say can be published or broadcast, 

identifying you by name, title, etc.

??Background. Everything you say is subject to publication or

broadcast, identifying you by whatever ground rules are established, 

such as a spouse of..., a mother of..., etc., but not by name.
Force Protection

O-4

??Deep background. Everything you say is subject to publication or 

broadcast, identifying you by whatever ground rules are established, 

but ensuring that your identity is protected. Examples: A

knowledgeable family member, an on-post source, etc.

??Off-the-record. DON’T use this unless your life depends on it! First, 

reporters don’t like to use it. It is only valid if you and the reporter 

agree in advance of anything that is said is off-the-record. You 

cannot say something and retroactively declare or request that it is 

off-the-record. Assume that the reporter can and will make every 

attempt to get the same information elsewhere. Since you have 

already given the information, the reporter will merely use that as 

ammunition to confirm it with other sources.
P-1

Appendix P

Suspicious Incident 

Reporting Procedures

OVERVIEW 

P-1. Suspicious activities include such things as potentially hazardous

packages, mail, or substances. Additionally, suspicious activities include 

surveillance activities of military facilities or operations on/near

installations.

REPORTING PROCESS 

P-2. Report suspicious incidents to the IOC via the SPOTREP IAW IOC 

procedures.

P-3. Initial report will be submitted immediately upon discovery by e-mail 

or telephone, using the SPOTREP format. Telephonic report will be

followed with a written report within one hour. When written or electronic 

reports are used, call the IOC to confirm receipt. The report should cover 

the initial information available concerning each incident.

P-4. When reporting a suspicious incident, include the following

information:

??Initial response or action taken (e.g. evacuation, HAZMAT team, 

rescue/recovery, first responders, etc.).

??Initial determination or identification of substance if known.

??Whether media coverage occurred or is likely.

??Casualties as a result of incident (names of individuals, illness,

injury, or death).

P-5. After a final determination has been made for each incident—

??For incidents determined to be unfounded, provide telephonic report, 

followed by an operational report (OPREP), to the IOC.

??For incidents determined to be legitimate, provide telephonic report, 

followed by an OPREP, and official serious incident report IAW 

AR 190-40 in message format.
Glossary-1

Glossary

A

AA avenue of approach

ACERT Army Computer Emergency Response Team

AIAP Army information assurance program

AO area of operation

APOE aerial port of embarkation

AR Army regulation

AT antiterrorism

ATO antiterrorism office

B

BCTP Battle Command Training Program

BPA blanket purchase agreement

C

C

2

command and control

CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear 

materials as high-yield explosive devices

CBRN-IST chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

 installation support team

CBRN-RRT chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

rapid response team

Cbt-T combating terrorism

CCIR commander’s critical information requirement

CDAP computer defense assessment program

CI counterintelligence
Force Protection

Glossary-2

CID criminal investigative division

COA course of action

COMSEC communications security

COP common operating picture

CSLA Communications Security Logistics Activity

D

DITSCAP DOD information technology security 

certification 

and accreditation process

DITYVAP do-it-yourself vulnerability assessment program

DOD Department of Defense

DODD Department of Defense Directive

DOIM director of information mangement

DP decision point

DPTM director of plans, training, and mobilization

DST division support template

E

EDD explosive detector dog

EEFI essential elements of friendly information

EOD explosive ordnance disposal

F

FAA forward assembly area

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FFIR friendly force information requirement

FLETC Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

FP force protection

FPCON force protection condition

FPHB force protection handbook
Force protection

Glossary-3

H

HAZMAT hazardous material

HRP high-risk personnel

HRT high-risk target

I

IASO information assurance security officer

IAW in accordance with

IDS intrusion detection system

IED improvised explosive device

INFOCON information operations condition

IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

IA information assurance

IAM information assurance manager

IAPM information assurance program

IAVA information assurance vulnerability alert

IO information operations

IOC installation operations center

M

MDMP military decision-making process

MEDCOM US Army Medical Command

METT-C mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and 

support available, time available, and civil 

considerations

MEVA mission-essential vulnerable area

MI military intelligence

MOA memorandum of agreement

MOU memorandum of understanding
Force Protection

Glossary-4

MP military police

MTF medical treatment facility

MTTP multiservice tactics, techniques, and procedures

N

NAI named area of interest

O

O&O operational and organizational

OPREP operational report

P

PAO public affairs office

PIR piority intelligence requirement

PS physical security

Q

QRF quick reaction force

R

RAMP random antiterrorism measures program

RCERT regional computer emergency response team

ROE rules of engagement

RUF rules for the use of force 

S

SBCCOM Soldier and Biological Chemical Command

SITEMP situation template

SMART special medical augmentation response team

SOP standing operating procedure

SPOE seaport of embarkation
Force protection

Glossary-5

SRT special reaction team

STAT security test and analysis tool

T

TAI target areas of interest

TRADOC US Army Training and Doctrine Command

U

UNIX Uniplexed Information and Computing System

UXO unexploded ordnance 

V

VA vulnerability assessment

W

WMD weapons of mass destruction
Biblography-1

Bibliography

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http://www.fema.gov/library/stafact.htm

Public Law 104-201, Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, 

1996. http://fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1996/p1104-201-xiv.htm

10 USC 372-380, Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies, 

1956. http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/ch18.html

18 USC 1385, Use of Army and Air Force as posse comitatus, 1981. 

http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/1385.html

50 USC 36, Foreign Intelligence and Surveillance Act of 1978, 1978. 

http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/50/1801.html

EO 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, 1981. 

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EO 12863, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 1997. 

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PDD 39, US Policy on Counterterrorism, 3 June 1995. 

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PDD 62, Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and 

Americans Overseas, May 1998. http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd-62.htm

PDD 63, Critical Infrastructure Protection, May 1998. 

http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-i63.htm

DODD 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program, 

April 1999. http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/20012.htm

DODD 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities, January 1993. 

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/30251.htm

DODD 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities, February 1997. 

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/302515.htm
Force Protection

Biblography-2

DODD 3025.16, Military Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer 

Program, December 2000. 

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/302516.htm

DODD 3150.5, DOD Response to Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) 

Incidents, March 1987. 

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DODD 3224.3, Physical Security Equipment (PSE): Assignment of 

Responsibility for Research, Development, Testing, Evaluation, 

Protection, Procurement, Development, and Support, February 1989. 

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/32243.htm

DODD 4500.9, Transportation and Traffic Management, December 1993. 

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/45009.htm

DODD 5160.54, Critical Asset Assurance Program (CAAP), January 1998. 

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/516054.htm

DODD 5200.8, Security of DOD Installations and Resources, April 1991. 

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/52008.htm

DODD 5200.27, Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons, 

June 1979. http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/520027.htm

DODD 5240.1, DOD Counterintelligence (CI), May 1997. 

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p.pdf

DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials, 

December 1989. 

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/55255.htm

DODI 2000.14, DOD Combatting Terrorism Procedures, June 1994. 

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/200014.htm

DODI 2000.16, DOD Combatting Terrorism Program Standards, 

June 2001. http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/200016.htm

DOD Manual 0-2000.12-H, Protection of DOD Personnel and Activities 

Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulence, February 1993. 

(Hard copy only)
Force Protection

Biblography-3

Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 

Associated Terms, April 2001. 

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf

Joint Pub 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 

Antiterrorism, March 1998. 

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_07_2.pdf

Joint Pub 4-01, Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System, 

June 1997. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp4_01.pdf

AR 55-46, Travel Overseas, June 1994. 

http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/r55_46.pdf

AR 190-11, Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives, 

September 1993. http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/r190-11.pdf

AR 190-13, The Army Physical Security Program, September 1993. 

http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/r190-13.pdf

AR 190-14, Carrying of Firearms and Use of Force for Law Enforcement 

and Security Duties, April 1993. 

http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/r190_14.pdf

AR 190-16, Physical Security, May 1991. 

http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/r190_16.pdf

AR 190-30, Military Police Investigations, June 1998. 

http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/r190_30.pdf

AR 190-45, Law Enforcement Reporting, October 2000. 

http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/r190_45.pdf

AR 190-51, Security of Unclassified Army Property, September 1993. 

http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/r190-51.pdf

AR 190-56, The Army Civilian Police and Security Guard, June 1995. 

http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/r190_56.pdf

AR 190-58, Personal Security, March 1989. 

http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/r190_58.pdf

AR 195-2, Criminal Investigation Activities, October 1985. 

http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/r195_2.pdf
Force Protection

Biblography-4

AR 360-1, Army Public Affairs, Public Information, September 2000. 

http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/r360_1.pdf

AR 380-5, Department of the Army Information Security Program, 

September 2000. http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/r380_5.pdf

AR 380-13, Acquisition and Storage of Information Concerning 

Nonaffiliated Persons and Organizations, September 1974. 

http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/r380_13.pdf

AR 380-19, Information Systems Security, February 1998. 

http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/r380_19.pdf

AR 380-67, Personnel Security Program, September 1988. 

http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/r380_67.pdf

AR 381-10, The US Army Intelligence Activities, July 1984. 

http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/r381_10.pdf

AR 381-12, Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the US, 

January 1993. http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/r381_12.pdf

AR 381-20, The Army Counterintelligence Program, November 1993. 

(Hard copy only)

AR 381-100, Army Human Intelligence Collection Program (Secret), 

May 1988. (Hard copy only)

AR 525-13, Antiterrorism Force Protection AT/FP: Security, 

September 1998. 

https://akocomm.us.army.mil/usapa/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_b/r525-13.pdf

AR 525-20, Command and Control Countermeasures (C2CM), July 1992. 

http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/r525_20.pdf

AR 530-1, Operational Security, March 1995. (Hard copy only)

AR 550-51, Emergency Employment of Army and Other Resources, 

April 1998. http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/r550_51.pdf

TRADOC Reg 525-13, US Army Training and Doctrine Command 

(TRADOC), December 1997. 

http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/regs/52513frm.htm
Force Protection

Biblography-5

TRADOC Cir 25-01-1, Information Operations Condition (INFOCON) 

Program, August 2001. 

https://tradocsec.monroe. army.mil/tpubs/circular/c25-01-1.doc

TRADOC Cir 25-01-2, Leaders’ Guide for Identifying and Handling 

Hazardous Mail, December 2001. 

http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/cirs/c25-01-2/c25-01-2.doc

Blueprint, U.S. Army Installation Commander's Blueprint, May 2001. 

http://www.doms.pentagon.mil/Blueprint/blueprint.pdf

Commander’s Guide, US Army Antiterrorism and Force Protection 

Installation Commander’s Guide, March 2000. 

http://www.doms.pentagon.mil/AT%20FP%20Installation%20Cdr’s%2

0Guide/doms_new.pdf

DA Pam 50-6, Chemical Accident or Incident Response, May 1991. 

http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/p50_6.pdf

DA Pam 190-51, Risk Analysis for Army Property, September 1993. 

http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/p190-51.pdf

MEDCOM Pam 525-XX, Medical Emergency Management Planning, 

June 2002. (Hard copy only)

FM 3-0 (100-5), Operations, June 2001. 

http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/3-0/toc.htm

FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations (Final Draft), 

1 February 2002. http://www-cgsc.army.mil/cdd/index.htm

FM 3-4, NBC Protection, May 1992. 

http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/3-4/toc.htm

FM 3-5, NBC Decontamination, July 2000. 

http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/3-5/fm3-5.htm 

FM 3-19.1, Military Police Operation, March 2001. 

http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/3-19.1/toc.htm

FM 3-19.30 (19-30), Physical Security, January 2001. 

http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/3-19.30/toc.htm
Force Protection

Biblography-6

FM 3-100, Chemical Operations, Principles, and Fundamentals, May 1996. 

http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/3-100/toc.htm

FM 3-100.12 (100-14), Risk Management, March 2001. 

http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/3-100.12/fm3-

100.12.htm

FM 4-0, Combat Service Support (final draft), 22 August 2001. 

http://www.cascom.army.mil/Multi/Doctrine/FM_4-0_Combat_Service

_Support/

FM 8-10-7, Health Service Support in a Nuclear, Biological and Chemical 

Environment, April 1993.

http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/8-10-7/toc.htm

FM 8-55, Planning for Health Service Support, September 1994. 

http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/8-55/toc.htm

FM 8-285, Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional 

Military Chemical Injuries, December 1995. http://www.adtdl.army.mil

FM 19-10, The Military Police Law and Order Operations, 

September 1987.

http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/19-10/toc.htm

FM 19-20, Law Enforcement Investigations, November 1985. 

http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/19-20/toc.htm

FM 34-60, Counterintelligence, October 1995. 

http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/34-60/toc.htm

FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, July 1994. 

http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/34-130/toc.htm

FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operation, May 1997. 

http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/101-5/default.htm

SBCCOM Preparedness Guide, Improving Local and State Agency 

Response to Terrorist Incidents Involving Biological Weapons, 

September 2000. 

http://www2.sbccom.army.mil/hld/downloads/bwirp/bwirp_interim

_planning_guide. pdf
Force Protection

Biblography-7

CJCSI 3125.01, Military Assistance to Domestic Consequence Management 

Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosive Situation, August 2001. 

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsl/cjcsi/3125_01.pdf

CJCSM 3150.03A, Joint Reporting Structure Event and Incident Reports, 

November 2000. 

https://ca.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsl/limcjcsmdirectives.htm

CJCS Handbook 5260, Commander’s Handbook for Antiterrorism 

Readiness, January 1997. 

http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/force_protection/gdi.html

US Army War College Reference Handbook, How the Army Runs, 

January 2001.

http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/dclm/HTARRevised.pdf

CD ROM Set, J34 Level IV Antiterrorism Executive Seminar After Action 

Report and Antiterrorism Informational CD-ROM, 19-21 June 2001. 

Website, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/

Website, Center for Army Lessons Learned, http://call.army.mil/

Website, J-34 Combating Terrorism, 

http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/force_protection/

Website, DOMS, http://doms.pentagon.mil/

Website, NGB, http://www.ngb.dtic.mil/

Website, Army NGB, http://www.arng.army.mil/

Website, National Disaster Medical System, 

http://www.oep.dhhs.gov/NDMS/ndms.html

Website, Off of Emergency Preparedness Counter Terrorism Program, 

http://www.oep.dhhs.gov/CG_Program/ct_program.html

Website, Center for Disease Control and Prevention, http://www.cdc.gov/

Website, National Preparedness Office, http://www.ndpo.gov/

Website, Department of Justice, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
Force Protection

Biblography-8

Website, SBCCOM (Homeland Defense), 

http://www2.sbccom.army.mil/hld/

Website, DOT Library, http://isweb.tasc.dot.gov/library/library.htm

Website, National Trans Library, http://www.bts.gov/ntl/

Website, Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of 

Terrorism, http://www.mipt.org/rfp/

Note: The appearance of commercial web sites does not constitute 

endorsement by the US Army or the information, products, 

or services contained therein. The US Army does not

exercise any editorial control over the information found at 

these locations. Such commercial web sites are provided 

consistent with the stated purpose of this handbook.
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