U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGIC PLANNING:

THE MISSING NEXUS

Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Thomas-Durell Young

September 1, 1995
LL

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The views expressed in this report are those of the authors

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

*******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may

be conveyed directly to the authors by calling Dr. Lovelace at

commercial (717) 245-3010 or DSN 242-3010; or Dr. Young at

commercial (717) 245-4058 or DSN 242-4058.
LLL

FOREWORD

This is the pilot in a series of reports on strategic

planning conducted within the U.S. Department of Defense. It

focuses on the strategic planning responsibilities of the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff because planning at that

level provides the critical nexus between the strategic direction

provided by the National Command Authorities and its

implementation by the unified combatant commands and military

departments. The authors’ thorough understanding of the statutory

requirements for strategic planning and the interactions between

the Chairman’s complex strategic planning process and other key

DOD planning systems enables them to explicate today’s strategic

planning challenges and offer insightful recommendations.

Strategic planning in the post-Cold War era has proven to be

exceptionally problematic. The plethora of national and

international tensions that the east-west confrontation of the

Cold War in large measure subdued combine now to create a world

replete with diverse challenges to U.S. interests. Equally

disturbing is the fact that these challenges are not as clearly

defined and easily articulated as was the monolithic Soviet

threat. The authors point out that the Cold War provided inherent

stability in U.S. strategic planning and that the basic elements

of a strategic military plan evolved over time. They go on to

argue that the elimination of the National Military Strategy

Document and the abandonment of the Base Case Global Family of

Operation Plans amounted to recision of the Chairman’s strategic

plan, and that nothing has been developed to take its place.

In this thought-provoking study, the authors define a formal

strategic plan: one that contains specific strategic objectives,

offers a clear and executable strategy for achieving objectives,

illuminates force capability requirements, and is harmonized with

the Future Years Defense Program. They discuss the reasons why a

strategic plan is needed and the value it would have in

coherently connecting the guidance provided by the National

Command Authorities to the integrated activities of the unified

commands, the Services, and other components of DoD. They

conclude by examining three alternatives to improve the strategic

planning processes and to facilitate efficient development of

strategic plans. They settle on a set of recommendations that

they believe would comprehensively link the major elements of
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current strategic planning, albeit modified in some cases, and

establish a clearer military foundation for DoD resource

decisions.

Thus, the National Military Strategic Plan, proposed by the

authors, would stand as the centerpiece of a system

incorporating:

• Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments;

• CINCs’ Integrated Priority Lists;

• The new Chairman’s Program Recommendation;

• The Unified Command Plan;

• The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan; and,

• Joint Military Net Assessments.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this

report as a contribution to the ongoing defense planning debate.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies

 Institute
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR. joined SSI in September 1994 on his

retirement from active duty with the U.S. Army. His Army career

included a combat tour in Vietnam and a number of command and

staff assignments. While serving in the Plans, Concepts and

Assessments Division and the War Plans Division of the Joint

Staff, he collaborated in the development of documents such as

the National Military Strategy, the Joint Strategic Capabilities

Plan, the Joint Military Net Assessment, NSD 74, PDD 25, and

others. He was also Director of Military Requirements and

Capabilities Management at the U.S. Army War College. He is a

contributor to The Conduct of the Persian Gulf War. He holds a

B.S. in aerospace management and an M.A. in business from Embry

Riddle Aeronautical University. He is also a graduate of the U.S.

Army Command and General Staff College and the National War

College.

THOMAS-DURELL YOUNG has held the Henry L. Stimson Chair of

Military Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S.

Army War College since 1992. From 1988 to 1992, he was a National

Security Affairs Analyst at the Institute. Prior to this

appointment, he was a country risk analyst for BERI, S.A., a

Swiss-based consulting firm. Dr. Young received his Ph.D. from

the Graduate Institute of International Studies, University of

Geneva, Switzerland, and is a 1990 graduate of the U.S. Army War

College. He has published extensively on U.S. alliance issues

with particular emphasis on Western Europe and the Southwest

Pacific.
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PRECIS

The development of strategic plans by the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff should provide the critical nexus in

connecting the National Command Authorities’ strategic direction

of the U.S. armed forces with the planning and operations

conducted by the combatant commands and the support provided by

the Services and defense agencies. Title 10, United States Code,

establishes a structured hierarchy for strategic direction,

strategic planning, and contingency planning for the Department

of Defense. The Chairman is responsible for assisting the

National Command Authorities in their strategic direction

endeavors, for preparing strategic plans, and for providing for

the preparation and review of contingency plans. The absence of

strategic plans in the post-Cold War era has precluded the

identification and establishment of priorities for specific

strategic objectives, inhibited planning for future military

capabilities, and has not allowed for the integration of the

operation planning and theater strategies of the combatant

commands. Additionally, without strategic plans, there is a void

in the underlying rationale for the assignment of service

functions and the development of joint doctrine. This essay

defines “strategic plans” and offers an approach to their

development.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

• The Chairman should develop a National Military Strategic

Plan.

• The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan should continue in

its current form, but the guidance, force apportionments, and

taskings it provides should be based on the National Military

Strategic Plan.

• The Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments should be

reoriented so they evaluate, integrate, and prioritize the CINCs’

requirements.

• The JROC should be divested of its oversight

responsibility for the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments

reaffirming its original charter. Oversight of the Joint

Warfighting Capability Assessments should become a Director of
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the Joint Staff responsibility on behalf of the Chairman and the

Vice Chairman.

• The Chairman’s Program Recommendation should be published

as a product of the reoriented Joint Warfighting Capability

Assessment process.

• Assessment of force capabilities, strengths and

deficiencies identified by the CINCs should be based on the

National Military Strategic Plan.

• The evaluation, integration, and establishment of

priorities for the CINCs’ requirements should be based upon the

National Military Strategic Plan.

• DoD should discontinue use of Defense Planning Guidance

scenarios in the development of service programs in favor of

conformance to the National Military Strategic Plan.

(Note: The full set of recommendations derived from this

study begins on page 31.)


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGIC PLANNING:

THE MISSING NEXUS

Introduction.

Strategic planning is a challenging, but necessary, endeavor

for any organization, small or large. For the U.S. Department of

Defense (DoD) it is a sacred responsibility to the Nation.

President Eisenhower said in 1958, “No military task is of

greater importance than the development of strategic plans which

relate our revolutionary new weapons and force deployments to

national security objectives.”1 In spite of its attention to

strategic planning, DoD has not enjoyed great success in this

area. For example, in 1985, a congressional staff report

characterized DoD’s strategic planning in the following manner:

Inattention to strategic planning has led to numerous

deficiencies, including a lack of clarity of DoD’s

strategic goals. The stated goals are vague and

ambiguous. In an organization as large as DoD, the

clear articulation of overall strategic goals can play

an important role in achieving a coordinated effort

toward these goals by the various components and

individuals within them. Clarity of goals can enhance

unity and integration. DoD loses the benefit of this

unifying mechanism through its failure to clarify its

strategic goals. To correct this problem and other

strategic planning deficiencies, DoD needs to establish

and maintain a well-designed and highly interactive

strategic planning process.2

Following up on this staff finding, Congress, in the

Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of

1986 (GNA), prescribed for DoD a hierarchical process for

strategic direction, strategic planning, and contingency planning

for the U.S. Armed Forces.3

 This process was designed to improve

strategic planning by harmonizing strategic direction and

planning with the development of defense programs that would

enable DoD to achieve its strategic goals. It was also designed

to integrate and rationalize the strategic and operational

planning conducted by the combatant Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs).

To these ends, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)

was assigned key and specific responsibilities.4 Since passage of


the GNA, which is now codified in Title 10, United States Code

(10 USC), the JCS and then the Chairman have developed,

implemented, and revised specific processes for fulfilling most

of these statutory responsibilities.

Enactment of the GNA notwithstanding, strategic planning

currently conducted by the Joint Staff, on behalf of the

Chairman, does not adequately establish and specify strategic

objectives nor does it integrate and establish priorities for

them. In short, current strategic planning for the U.S. Armed

Forces is of limited use in planning for future military

capabilities and integrating the planning conducted by the CINCs.

It should ensure that both of these efforts conform to national

military and security objectives. Equally disturbing, it does not

provide sufficient underlying rationale for the review of service

functions nor does it provide unequivocal and compelling bases

for the development and implementation of joint doctrine.

This essay will describe and assess the strategic direction

and planning processes used by the Chairman, identify and discuss

difficulties with the extant processes, and assess potential

solutions. It will focus on the strategic planning conducted at

the Chairman’s level because that planning should provide the

critical nexus between national security policy formulation and

the execution of that policy by the CINCs. It should also serve

as the critical link between the requirements of the CINCs and

the programs designed by the Services to meet those requirements.

We recognize that substantial and ultimate responsibility

for strategic direction and strategic planning resides with the

Secretary of Defense and President, and that the processes they

use and the products they produce affect the efforts of the

Chairman. Therefore, this essay will also examine and assess

aspects of the President’s National Security Strategy (NSS) and

the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) issued by the Secretary of

Defense to initiate the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting

System (PPBS).5

To provide a foundation for analysis, this essay will first

define “strategic plans” as used in the GNA and 10 USC. To frame

more clearly and describe the strategic planning responsibilities

of the Chairman, a brief review of the President’s and Secretary

of Defense’s roles in this arena will be conducted. Next an


examination of the current Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)

will be presented, followed by a discussion of many of the

strategic planning initiatives implemented since passage of the

GNA. Inadequacies within the current strategic planning processes

which inhibit their utility in assisting the Chairman in

providing integrated strategic advice to the National Command

Authorities (NCA)6

 will be identified and assessed to show that

these deficiencies result from the absence of a comprehensive

strategic plan. The current planning processes produce a plethora

of documents designed to provide unified strategic direction to

the Services, CINCs and defense agencies, and timely military

advice to the National Command Authorities. However, assessments

of those documents reveal significant inadequacies because the

prime integrating document, a strategic plan, is absent. The

essay concludes with recommendations for changes in the current

strategic planning system.

Strategic Planning Defined.

At the outset, one must begin with a clear definition of

strategic planning, particularly strategic planning at the 

Chairman’s level. Although 10 USC requires the Chairman to

prepare strategic plans, it provides no convenient definition.7

The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated

Terms defines a “strategic plan” simply as “the plan for the

overall conduct of a war.”8

 This definition is clearly deficient

since it is not in consonance with the statutory references to

strategic plans, nor does it allow for strategic planning, except

for war. One can, however, arrive at a useful definition by

determining the purposes for which strategic plans are intended.

The intent of the legislation can be determined by a review of

congressional action leading up to the passage of the GNA. Such a

review shows that strategic plans should enumerate specific

strategic objectives, identify fiscal and other constraints,

offer strategy for securing objectives, and play a key role in

determining force capability requirements.9

An amalgamation of the various specific references to

strategic plans within 10 USC provides a comprehensive

definition. These plans:

• are to be prepared by the Chairman and should conform to

the resource levels projected by the Secretary of Defense to be


available for the periods during which the plans are to be

effective;

• should be useful for assessing the capabilities of U.S.

and allies’ armed forces versus potential adversaries;

• are differentiated from, and are a level above,

contingency plans prepared by the CINCs;10

• should serve as a standard against which force capability

strengths and deficiencies are measured;11

• should contain strategic priorities that can be used to

assess contributions of service programs;12 and,

• should integrate the theater strategies and plans of the

CINCs to ensure conformance to national military and security

objectives.13

From the above, one can distill a succinct definition of a

strategic plan that is appropriate for the strategic planning

requirements specified in 10 USC. It is a plan that specifies, in

military terms, the national strategic objectives for the defense

planning period under consideration (the Future Years Defense

Program–FYDP period) and describes a strategy that rationalizes

the resources expected to be available during the FYDP with the

strategic objectives described in the plan.14

To support further the intent of 10 USC, a strategic plan

must be based on a global perspective and should also provide:

• a definitive statement of strategic priorities;

• a means of providing unified, strategic direction for the

combatant commands;

• a template for formulating and assessing changes in the

assignment of service functions; and,

• a basis for strategic concepts upon which joint doctrine

should be based.

This definition and description of strategic plans are 


crucial in understanding the strategic planning responsibilities

specified in 10 USC and current imperfections in strategic

planning at the Chairman’s level.

Strategic Planning of the National Command Authorities.

The President. Atop the strategic planning hierarchy

presented in section 153 of 10 USC, rests the strategic planning

responsibilities of the President and the Secretary of Defense.

The National Security Act of 1947 (as amended) requires the

President to transmit to Congress each year, along with the

budget for the next fiscal year, a comprehensive report on the

U.S. national security strategy.15 The statute requires the

national security strategy report (National Security Strategy

[NSS]) to present the national security strategy of the United

States and a comprehensive description and discussion of the

following:

• the worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the

United States that are vital to the national security of the

United States;

• the foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national

defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter

aggression and to implement the national security strategy of the

United States;

• the proposed short-term and long-term uses of the

political, economic, military, and other elements of the national

power of the United States to protect or promote the interests

and achieve the goals and objectives referred to above;

• the adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to

carry out the national security strategy, including an evaluation

of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of the

national power of the United States to support the implementation

of the national security strategy; and,

• such other information as may be necessary to help inform

Congress on matters relating to the national security strategy of

the United States.16

Traditionally, however, administrations to varying degrees


have been loath to use the NSS as the effective policy instrument

envisaged by Congress. The most recent strategy, published in

February 1995, is entitled A National Security Strategy of

Engagement and Enlargement.17 As much as 20 percent of the

document is devoted to describing accomplishments of the current

administration.18 (Although this is not a novel use of the NSS,

there are more appropriate fora for reporting administration

accomplishments.19) While this NSS provides useful definitions of

“vital,” important," and “humanitarian” interests, a noteworthy

improvement over its predecessors, it does not describe specific

areas where those interests are at stake. Moreover, it does not

offer policy guidance establishing clear priorities of national

interests.20 In essence, therefore, the NSS generally describes

what is to be accomplished, and to some extent how, but is not

sufficient to translate general policy into executable strategy.21

An assessment, therefore, of the NSS leads to the conclusion

that, in general, it is not the “comprehensive description and

discussion” required by the National Security Act of 1947 (as

amended by the GNA).22 While this is an important finding, it is

not damning with respect to the strategic planning for which the

Chairman is responsible. The NSS provides useful guidance for the

development of the National Military Strategy (NMS) and the

Chairman can develop the strategy in whatever degree of detail he

desires so long as it does not contradict any of the general

guidance contained in the NSS. The more general the NSS, the more

flexibility the Chairman enjoys in designing the NMS. Continuing

this logic a step further, one can conclude that the NSS would

not inhibit the development of strategic plans by the Chairman;

it is not sufficiently specific to have that effect.

The Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense is an

intended beneficiary, but not an author, of strategic plans.23

However, to complete an assessment of the policy guidance upon

which the Chairman bases his strategic planning, two of the

Secretary’s statutory responsibilities must be addressed. 10 USC

requires the “Secretary of Defense, with the advice and

assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, [to]

provide annually to the heads of the Department of Defense

components written policy guidance for the preparation and review

of program recommendations and budget proposals of their

respective components, including guidance on:


• national security objectives and policies;

• the priorities of military missions; and,

• the resource levels projected to be available for the

period of time for which such recommendations and proposals are

to be effective."24

To fulfill this responsibility, the Secretary publishes the

Defense Planning Guidance.25

It is a misperception that the strategic direction provided

in the National Security Strategy travels along two branches

within DoD, one to the Secretary of Defense who translates it

into the DPG, and the other to the Chairman who uses it to

develop the National Military Strategy. In actuality, the

branching of strategic direction occurs at the Chairman’s level,

and the DPG, although a Secretary of Defense document, is more

directly influenced by the Chairman’s strategy than by the NSS.26

Given this relationship, it can be concluded that the DPG neither

enhances nor inhibits the strategic planning of the Chairman.

However, the Secretary of Defense must provide the Chairman with

a realistic projection of the defense resource levels expected to

be available for the planning period under consideration.27 The

Chairman, in turn, is obliged to provide the Secretary of Defense

with key recommendations resulting from his strategic planning

which should inform the development of the DPG. The Chairman’s

strategic planning provides the foundation for the first “P” in

the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System.28

However, the very general nature of the National Military

Strategy precludes its use as the vehicle for transmitting

specific recommendations. The DPG, itself, is a much more

comprehensive document than the National Military Strategy. It

reflects a great deal of strategic decisionmaking. It provides

some, but not necessarily clear, guidance on regional priorities

as well as some overall priorities for force planning.29 It also

provides general programming priorities and specific programming

guidance.30 Since the DPG offers no further elaboration on the

national security and military strategies than that contained in

the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy,

one could reasonably question the basis for the strategic

planning and programming decisions it reflects. Absent the


influence of strategic plans, and since the National Military

Strategy is not sufficiently specific to provide such a basis,

the DPG features Illustrative Planning Scenarios (IPS).

The IPSs are interesting inventions. They postulate, for

illustrative purposes, scenarios in which the United States,

perhaps with allies, becomes embroiled in conflict with

hypothetical adversaries. The scenarios are described in the

Defense Planning Guidance as reflecting some of the military

challenges anticipated over the Future Years Defense Program, but

are neither predictive nor exhaustive regarding those challenges,

and they are not intended to reflect policy decisions. These

qualifiers notwithstanding, the scenarios purportedly illustrate

the types of military capabilities needed, enable DoD components

to perform detailed program planning, provide a basis for

ensuring consistency among various DoD component programs, and

serve as analytical tools for evaluating component programs after

they are submitted.31

From this analysis, one may conclude that DoD develops

defense programs based on an incomplete set of capability

determinants that do not presume to predict future conflicts and

do not necessarily reflect current policy. Alternatively, a

comprehensive strategic plan would derive from an actual

assessment of the strategic environment over the Future Years

Defense Program, establish a priority for specific strategic

objectives achievable within that time frame, describe an

executable strategy for achieving those objectives, and define

the military capability required to effect the strategy. Rather

than basing program planning on hypothetical scenarios, it should

be based on tangible requirements distilled from the actual

strategic plan DoD intends to implement over the Future Years

Defense Program.

10 USC also requires the Secretary of Defense, with the

approval of the President, and after consultation with the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “[to] provide annually to

the Chairman written policy guidance for the preparation and

review of contingency plans. Such guidance shall include

guidance on the specific force levels and specific supporting

resource levels projected to be available for the period of time

for which such plans are to be effective.”32 The vehicle used by

the Secretary of Defense to fulfill this responsibility is


entitled the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG).33

The CPG is a close-hold, highly classified document that is

significantly different in form and content from the Defense

Planning Guidance. Assessment of the CPG is limited by its

classification and restricted circulation. However, some

observations concerning its relationship to strategic planning

can be made. The CPG has limited direct impact on the Chairman’s

strategic planning. There is no traceable flow of strategic

direction from the CPG into the Chairman’s strategic planning

process. Additionally, there is no formal process by which

strategic planning conducted by the Chairman impacts the

Contingency Planning Guidance.34 The CPG is published annually

and, therefore, is a short range document.35 The annual policy

adjustments contained in successive CPGs may combine to indicate

the need for a renewed national military strategy but,

presumably, that need would have already been identified through

the Joint Strategy Review (JSR) process.36 Also, the highly

classified content of the CPG is directly translated into the

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and is not used as input

into the Chairman’s strategic planning process.37 Although the CPG

does not directly affect the Chairman’s strategic planning, it is

relevant in discerning the true nature of the JSCP.

The JSCP is the tool used by the Chairman to cause the CINCs

to prepare operation plans.38 10 USC assigns the Chairman the

responsibility for “providing for the preparation and review of

contingency plans which conform to policy guidance from the

President and the Secretary of Defense” and “[p]reparing joint

logistic and mobility plans to support those contingency plans

and recommending the assignment of logistic and mobility

responsibilities to the armed forces in accordance with those

logistic and mobility plans.”39 Policy set forth in the

Contingency Planning Guidance reaches the CINCs via changes to,

or republication of, the JSCP. The flow of strategic direction is

from the Contingency Planning Guidance to the JSCP, ultimately

resulting in new or revised operation plans.

After examining the significant National Command

Authorities’ influences on the Chairman’s strategic planning, we

find that while they may not provide comprehensive policy and

strategy guidance, they are not unduly constraining. We move now

to the crux of our assessment, the strategic planning conducted


by the Chairman.

The Chairman’s Strategic Planning.

During the period beginning with the passage of GNA in 1986

through the end of superpower confrontation in the early 1990s,

a series of events combined to render ineffectual the strategic

planning conducted at the Chairman’s level. Although the GNA

sought to improve strategic planning, by 1990 formal strategic

planning at the Chairman’s level was minimal.

The three principal strategic direction and planning

responsibilities assigned to the Chairman by GNA (codified in 10

USC) are to:

• “. . . [ assist] the President and the Secretary of

Defense in providing for the strategic direction of the armed

forces;”

• “[ prepare] strategic plans, including plans which conform

to the resource levels projected to be available for the period

of time for which the plans are to be effective” and to “. . .

[prepare] joint logistics and mobility plans to support those

strategic plans and recommending the assignment of logistic and

mobility responsibilities to the armed forces in accordance with

those logistics and mobility plans;” and,

• “[conduct] net assessments to determine the capabilities

of the armed forces of the United States and its allies as

compared with those of potential adversaries.”40

Nominally, strategic planning at the Chairman’s level is

conducted principally within the Joint Strategic Planning System

(JSPS).

The Joint Strategic Planning System. The formal process

established to assist the Chairman in strategic planning is the

JSPS. At the time of passage of the GNA, the JSPS was defined by

JCS Memorandum of Policy 84 (JCS MOP 84). This MOP, first

published in 1952, survived until 1990 when it was replaced by

CJCS MOP 7.41 The MOP 84 version of the JSPS was unwieldy,

complex, and bureaucratic and produced no less than 10 major

documents every 2-year planning cycle.42 It was roundly criticized


by Congress and others.43 Nevertheless, planning under the

provisions of MOP 84 produced the National Military Strategy

Document (NMSD) and the Base Case Global Family of Operation

Plans, which collectively approached a strategic plan.44

Although the 1990 version of the JSPS (CJCS MOP 7) sought to

streamline the JSPS in order to make it more responsive “in a

rapidly changing national security environment,” it did not

survive a single planning cycle.45 This streamlined JSPS envisaged

one strategic planning process and three primary products:

• Joint Strategy Review (JSR) process;

• National Military Strategy Document;

• Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan; and,

• Chairman’s Program Assessment.

The new Memorandum of Policy described a system that began

with the Joint Strategy Review. The review was to determine if

the National Military Strategy should be changed.46 The NMSD was

to include the National Military Strategy, written and published

by the Chairman, but approved by the President. Additionally, the

NMSD was to contain recommended national military objectives;

recommended fiscally constrained force levels; military strategy

and force options; and a risk assessment of the recommended

strategy, forces, and military options.47 The NMSD was also to

feature functional annexes to supplement the base document. The

annexes were to provide concise military taskings, priorities,

requirements, or additional guidance.48 The NMSD was to serve as

the Chairman’s advice to the Secretary of Defense with respect to

the development of the Defense Planning Guidance. The Joint

Strategic Capabilities Plan, retained in CJCS MOP 7 as a key

product of the Joint Strategic Planning System, continued to

serve as the principal vehicle by which the CINCs were tasked to

develop global and regional operation plans.49

The final document prescribed by CJCS MOP 7 was the

Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA). It was to provide the

Chairman’s assessment of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM)

forces proposed by the Services.50 The CPA was to assist the

Secretary of Defense in making decisions on the defense program


subsequent to receipt of the POMs from the military departments

and other DoD components. It was to accomplish this in two ways.

First, it was to contain the Chairman’s assessment of the extent

to which the various service POMs conformed to the priorities

established in strategic plans and for the priorities established

for the CINCs’ requirements. Second, the CPA was to contain

alternative program recommendations to achieve greater program

conformance to established priorities.51 The 1990 version of the

Joint Strategic Planning System was aborted before completion of

the Joint Strategy Review, which led to yet another revision of

the process.

In mid-1992, the Joint Staff began revising CJCS MOP 7 to

make it more accurately reflect the manner in which joint

strategic planning had been conducted during 1990 and 1991. The

intent was to make it a less precise, more open-ended process

that afforded the Chairman greater flexibility in forging the

National Military Strategy. Feeling somewhat dis- enfranchised

from the process that produced the 1992 version of that document,

the Services and many of the CINCs resisted the Joint Staff’s

efforts to dismantle the formal system.52 The compromise that

resulted retained many of the original CJCS MOP 7 provisions, but

also featured several important changes. The most significant

change was elimination of the National Military Strategy Document

in favor of an unclassified, generalized National Military

Strategy.53 This, combined with the abandonment of the Base Case

Global Family of OPLANs, effectively eliminated the elements that

collectively served as a strategic plan. To date, nothing has

filled this planning void.

The new National Military Strategy took a form radically

different from that envisioned by the original CJCS MOP 7.54

Whereas the classified National Military Strategy Document

provided national military objectives, policy, strategy, force

planning options and assessments, and risk evaluations; the

National Military Strategy, in its new form, did not address

national military objectives, but merely reiterated national

interests and objectives from the 1991 National Security

Strategy.55 While the national military strategy contained within

the National Military Strategy Document published in 1989

consisted of some 50-pages of text specifying strategic

objectives, assumptions, and priorities; the 1992 National

Military Strategy provided a 10-page discussion of what appears


to be national military doctrine, void of any specific strategic

objectives and priorities.56 It is interesting to note that

although the National Military Strategy, in its new form, lacks

the specificity of the strategy set forth in the National

Military Strategy Document, detailed operation planning guidance

and tasks continue to be given to the CINCs via the Joint

Strategic Capabilities Plan. Hence, one might ask what is the

basis for translating the National Military Strategy into the

specific tasks and guidance contained in the Joint Strategic

Capabilities Plan?

The Joint Staff began implementation of CJCS MOP 7 (Revision

1), even before the revision was officially approved. A concerted

effort was made to adhere to the established procedures and timelines as closely as possible. The Joint Strategy Review was

initiated in the fall of 1992. By mid-summer 1993 a Joint

Strategy Review report was provided to the Chairman and work

subsequently began on a new National Military Strategy. However,

a number of factors delayed publication of the new National

Military Strategy until February 1995.57 Although more brightly

colored and featuring some new lexicon, the 1995 National

Military Strategy is of the same form and not substantially

different from its predecessor.58

The Chairman’s Strategic Plans: Current Lacunae.

Unified action of the armed forces is predicated upon

unified direction.59 The National Security Act of 1947 (as

amended) states that “. . . it is the intent of Congress to . . .

provide for the unified strategic direction of the combatant

forces, for their operation under unified command, and for their

integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces

. . . .”60 In providing for the unified action and strategic

direction of the U.S. Armed Forces, the Chairman plays a critical

role as the key military advisor to the National Command

Authorities. His responsibilities in assisting the National

Command Authorities in this regard hinge upon his ability to

develop coherent strategic plans for the employment of the U.S.

Armed Forces. Effective strategic planning on the part of the

Chairman is a major determinant of the quality of the unified

strategic direction provided to the CINCs and the service

secretaries by the National Command Authorities.


Since the end of the Cold War, comprehensive strategic plans

 have not been developed. As a consequence, key planning

documents have not been based upon strategic plans of global

scope. Rather, they have been based upon ambiguous objectives and

a near term outlook.61 However, this is not to suggest that this

void in strategic planning be filled by a return to a global

family of operation plans and a national military strategy

document that contemplate global war. That is clearly

inappropriate. What is needed is a new type of strategic plan

that addresses the realities of the post-Cold War era.

For almost 50 years, the United States assumed the strategic

defensive in dealing with the containment of the monolithic

Soviet threat. Two generations of military strategic planners

have passed through this defensive strategic planning paradigm.

“Threat-based” planning became so inculcated into the military

culture that it became universally regarded as the only type of

military strategic planning that made sense.62 After the

dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the

Soviet Union, the U.S. military encountered great difficulty in

breaking out of the threat-based planning paradigm and entering

into a new era of objectives-based planning. The type of

strategic plan advocated in this essay is a proactive plan that

would enable the U.S. Armed Forces to contribute positively to

the international environment to further U.S. interests and

values. Such a proactive strategic plan would assist the Chairman

in fulfilling several of his statutory responsibilities.

The following analysis of current institutional tools for

achieving unified strategic direction of the U.S. Armed Forces

shows that their full potential must rest upon the Chairman’s

formulation of strategic plans.63

Unified Command Plan (UCP). 10 USC requires the Chairman to

“. . . review the missions, responsibilities (including

geographic boundaries), and force structure of each combatant

command; and . . . recommend to the President, through the

Secretary of Defense, any changes to such missions,

responsibilities, and force structures as may be necessary.”64 The

UCP establishes the broad missions, responsibilities, force

structure, and geographic areas of responsibility of the CINCs.65

The missions assigned by the UCP are significantly more general

than the specific tasks the Chairman assigns the CINCs in the


Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.66 Like the National Military

Strategy, the UCP is a relatively general document while the

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan is quite specific. The

Chairman’s task is to take the general strategic foundations and

principles presented in the National Military Strategy, translate

them into the broad CINC responsibilities presented in the UCP,

and then to further translate them into specific tasks to focus

the regionally oriented strategic and operational planning

conducted by the CINCs.67 The Chairman’s strategic planning should

point to the most appropriate combatant command structure; to

include assignment of geographic and functional areas of

responsibility, enduring missions, and forces. In doing so, this

planning would enable the Chairman to assist in providing

globally integrated, strategic direction to the CINCs. However,

such direction cannot be logically derived from discrete

assessments of each region, but must be based on a strategic plan

of global scope. As stated earlier, given the current and

projected national security environments, the strategic plan

would not necessarily contemplate global war, but would provide

overarching rationale for the most appropriate unified command

structure.

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The Chairman is

responsible for ensuring that the deliberate operation plans of

the CINCs are integrated at the national level to effect the

policy guidance promulgated by the National Command Authorities.68

Through the JSCP, the Chairman causes the CINCs to prepare

contingency (operation) plans in support of national objectives.69

The JSCP contains a précis of the National Military Strategy,

general planning guidance to the CINCs, Armed Services and the

Defense agencies, specific planning tasks for each CINC, a

listing and apportionment (for planning) of the forces expected

to be available at the beginning of the plans’ effective period,

an intelligence estimate for planning, and other forms of

specific planning guidance.70 A close comparison of the National

Military Strategy to the JSCP reveals that a tremendous amount of

interpretation of the National Military Strategy is required to

translate this very general document into one which is much more

specific. One might ask how this interpretation of the National

Military Strategy is accomplished and where it is documented.

Without an overarching strategic plan, the basis for this

translation of the National Military Strategy into specific JSCP

guidance and tasks is unclear.


The Joint Staff has asserted that the JSCP, as its name

implies, is a strategic plan. However, it does not satisfy the 10

USC description of a strategic plan. According to the Joint

Strategic Planning System (as described in CJCS MOP 7), the

purpose of the JSCP is to “[provide] strategic guidance,

including apportionment of resources, to the CINCs and the Chiefs

of the Services, to accomplish assigned strategic tasks based on

military capabilities existing at the beginning of the planning

period . . . [it is] the principal vehicle by which the CINCs are

tasked to develop global and regional OPLANs.”71 In revising CJCS

MOP 7 in 1993, the Joint Staff made no substantive changes in the

declared purpose of the JSCP, but added a provision that the JSCP

“fulfills the Chairman’s responsibility to ‘. . . prepare

strategic plans’ specified in 10 USC 153.”72 There was no such

claim made in the original CJCS MOP 7, nor in its predecessor,

JCS MOP 84.

In the JSCP itself, the Joint Staff describes the document’s

purpose: “. . . provides guidance to the CINCs and Chiefs of the

Services to accomplish tasks and missions based on near-term

(emphasis added) military capabilities.” There is no claim that

it fulfills the Chairman’s responsibility for preparing strategic

plans.73 Additionally, the revised CJCS MOP 7 points out that the

JSCP is directly impacted by the Contingency Planning Guidance, a

near-term document revised or republished annually.74 Clearly,

therefore, the JSCP is structured primarily to cause CINCs to

prepare contingency (operation) plans and, by itself, does not

meet the 10 USC requirement for a strategic plan. However,

strategic planning conducted by the CJCS should provide the basis

for the JSCP. The Chairman’s strategic plan is critical in

linking the strategic direction provided by the National Command

Authorities to the disparate deliberate planning efforts of the

CINCs.

Force Strengths and Deficiencies. Contained within the

Contingency Planning and Preparedness paragraph of Section 153 of

10 USC is the requirement for the CJCS to “[advise] the Secretary

of Defense on critical deficiencies and strengths in force

capabilities . . . identified during the preparation and review

of contingency plans and assessing the effects of such

deficiencies and strengths on meeting national security

objectives and policy and on strategic plans.”75 Here again,


strategic planning plays a key role. As the CINCs prepare their

operation plans and as the plans are reviewed, it is expected

that specific force capability strengths and deficiencies will be

illuminated. These strengths and deficiencies have relevance only

within the context of particular regional plans until the

Chairman performs an integrated assessment of them to determine

their impact on strategic plans, national defense policy, and

national security objectives. A strategic plan prepared by the

Chairman would provide the necessary standard against which force

capability strengths and deficiencies could be weighed from a

national perspective.

Integrating and Establishing Priorities for CINC

Requirements. Strategic plans would facilitate the fulfillment of

other responsibilities of the Chairman. If we combine the

responsibilities assigned in sections 153 and 163 of 10 USC, we

find the Chairman is responsible for soliciting the requirements

of the combatant commanders; evaluating, integrating, and

establishing priorities for their requirements; and advising the

Secretary of Defense of the commands’ requirements, individually

and collectively. Additionally, he is to advise the Secretary of

Defense on the extent to which service program recommendations

and budget proposals conform to the priorities established in

strategic plans and for the combatant commanders. This advice may

include alternative program recommendations that differ from

those submitted by the Services.76 By developing strategic plans,

the Chairman can establish appropriate rationale for the

priorities he assigns to the various requirements of the CINCs,

for his assessments of service programs, and for alternative

program recommendations he may submit to the Secretary of

Defense. The absence of strategic plans has caused the Chairman

to devise other means of underpinning his recommendations,

specifically the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments

(JWCAs), the Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR), and the

linking of the Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA) to the Joint

Requirements Oversight Council process.

Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). The revision of

the charter of the JROC and the initiation of Joint Warfighting

Capability Assessments by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff are recently implemented means for the Chairman to

develop and support recommendations concerning requirements for

military capability.77 Under its 1992 charter, the JROC was


oriented toward reviewing, validating and approving requirements

for future military capabilities identified by the CINCs,

Services, and others.78 The 1995 revision of the charter

significantly expanded the mission and functioning of the JROC.

It now “[assists] the Chairman . . . in carrying out his

responsibilities to assess warfighting capabilities . . .[and] .

. . to assess the extent program recommendations and budget

proposals of Military Departments and DOD components conform with

established priorities.”79 In assessing warfighting capabilities

in addition to requirements for future capabilities, the JROC now

appears to be also concerned with current force capability

strengths and deficiencies, an area previously assessed by other

means.80

Assessment of current force strengths and deficiencies, to

include their “effect . . . on meeting national security

objectives and policy and on strategic plans,” is a task quite

dissimilar from identifying future force requirements. It is

clear 10 USC places responsibility for assessing current

capability on the Chairman but it is equally clear the CINCs are

to be principal participants.81 Bringing the assessment of current

force capability under the auspices of the JROC can have the

effect of emphasizing Service perspectives while marginalizing

the participation of the CINCs.82

Assessment of current force capability can serve two

important purposes. First, and most immediately, it can provide a

strategic level risk assessment with respect to the use of the

military element of national power. Secondly, but equally

important, it can provide strategic relevance to force capability

strengths and deficiencies identified by the CINCs by pointing

out which strengths and deficiencies really matter given the

priority of strategic objectives.83

The difficulty with the JROC assessing current military

capability is that contemporary deficiencies do not necessarily

translate into requirements for future capabilities. A

significant current force deficiency, one that may warrant a

major program, would take perhaps 10 years to result in a

compensating fielded capability. However, in the intervening

period, changes in the strategic environment, U.S. interests, and

national military strategy may mitigate or eliminate the

deficiency. So we cannot base requirements for future


capabilities on current deficiencies. If we were to do so, we

would always be developing and procuring capabilities to fight

the last war. To the extent the JROC assesses future capability

requirements, it relies on scenarios to extrapolate current

deficiencies into the future.84 A better approach would be to base

requirements on a strategic plan that anticipates the future

national security environment, projects and establishes a

priority for national military objectives, and provides the basis

for a national military strategy that rationalizes anticipated

resources with objectives.

Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR). The Chairman

recently introduced a new document, the CPR, by which he provides

programming advice to the Secretary of Defense. The purpose of

the CPR is to inject the Chairman’s advice into the Planning,

Programming and Budgeting System early enough to influence the

Defense Planning Guidance. It is purported to be an integration

of the views of the CINCs with those of the Chairman regarding

military requirements.85 CINCs formally submit their program

priorities, in the form of Integrated Priority Lists (IPL),

through the Chairman to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Program Analysis and Evaluation (ASD [PA&E]).86 The Integrated

Priority Lists are keyed to the Future Years Defense Program

under consideration. For example, the Integrated Priority Lists

for the FY 94-99 Future Years Defense Program were required to be

submitted in the fall of 1991 so they could influence the FY 94-

99 Defense Planning Guidance. However, the CPR is not based

principally on the CINCs’ Integrated Priority Lists, but on the

Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments performed under the

auspices of the JROC.87 The CPR should be based principally on the

Chairman’s evaluation, integration, and prioritization of the

CINCs’ Integrated Priority List. It should not depend on the

consensus of the JROC membership. Development of the CPR and its

submission to the Secretary of Defense is a noteworthy

initiative. Nonetheless, by basing it on the Joint Warfighting

Capability Assessments, its focus is directed away from the

requirements of the CINCs and toward the desires of the Services.

Orienting the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments more on

the requirements of the CINCs could overcome this problem;

however, this too would require integration by the Chairman based

on the global strategic perspective contained in a strategic

plan.


Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA). In 1994, the JROC

became a principal participant in the development of the CPA.88

Prior to that time, no relationship between the JROC and the

Joint Staff’s CPA development efforts was apparent. In fact, they

were two separate and distinct activities. Notwithstanding this,

the CPA remains the Chairman’s principal tool for assessing the

extent to which the programs of the military departments and

other DoD components conform “. . . to the priorities established

in strategic plans . . .” and to the “. . . priorities

established for the requirements of the CINCs.”89 The CPA is also

a vehicle by which the Chairman can offer alternative program

recommendations. Formally, it is a product of the Joint Strategic

Planning System that nominally serves as an interface with the

Planning, Programming and Budgeting System. The statute calls for

the Chairman to use the priorities established in strategic plans

and those he establishes for the requirements of the CINCs as the

bases for this assessment. Without strategic plans, there are no

articulated and documented strategic priorities. The requirements

of the CINCs are made known to the Chairman via the Integrated

Priority Lists. But the Chairman does not require the lists, nor

is he the principal user of the information they contain.

However, he should be. He should evaluate, integrate, and

prioritize them so that the programming advice he provides to the

Secretary of Defense in the Chairman’s Program Recommendation

synthesizes the requirements of all the CINCs in accordance with

the strategic plan for the Future Years Defense Program under

consideration. The CPA, like the Chairman’s Program

Recommendation, should also be strongly influenced by the

Integrated Priority Lists.

Force Capability Net Assessments. The Chairman has another

assessment responsibility that warrants review. The Strategic

Planning paragraph of Section 153, 10 USC requires the Chairman

to “[perform] net assessments to determine the capabilities of

the armed forces of the United States and its allies as compared

with those of their potential adversaries.”90 This assessment

responsibility is distinct from, and in addition to, that

contained in the Contingency Planning and Preparedness paragraph

of 10 USC.91 To fulfill this statutory requirement, the Chairman

has prepared, and the Secretary has submitted to the Congress,

Joint Military Net Assessments (JMNAs).

While the JMNAs may be useful for Congress in considering


the merits of budget submissions and attendant Future Years

Defense Programs, they suffer from the same flaw as the Defense

Planning Guidance, i.e., they are scenario based. The placement

of this net assessment requirement in the Strategic Planning

paragraph of the Chairman’s functions section of 10 USC points

toward a congressional intent to have the assessments based on

strategic plans, not hypothetical scenarios. This makes eminent

sense. If a JMNA is based on an approved strategic plan, Congress

would be in a better position to judge the extent to which a

given Future Year Defense Program promises to achieve specific

national security and military objectives. Additionally, since

the scenarios do not reflect established policy, it is difficult

for Congress to discern how much weight the JMNAs should be

given. The less compelling Congress views the JMNAs, the more

difficult it will be for DoD to counter the congressional forces

that tend to suboptimize defense programs.

Roles, Missions, and Functions. 10 USC requires the 

Chairman triennially to “submit to the Secretary of Defense a

report containing . . . recommendations for changes in the

assignment of functions (or roles and missions) to the armed

forces to achieve maximum effectiveness . . . .” In preparing the

report, the Chairman is to consider, inter alia, changes in the

threat, unnecessary duplication, and changes in technology that

can be applied effectively to warfare.92 Two such reports have

been produced since passage of the GNA. The first received little

notice; however, the second generated considerable controversy.

It was not that the report proposed radical changes, but that it

was perceived to be, more or less, an affirmation of the status

quo. This led to the establishment of the congressionally

mandated, independent Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM).93

The present Chairman has indicated that identification of needed

changes may be a task too difficult for DoD.94 Some argue that the

task also proved too difficult for the CORM.95 If recommended

changes to roles, missions, and functions were based, in part, on

approved strategic plans, the task of identifying needed changes

would be less difficult and the Chairman’s recommendations could

be better supported.

Joint Doctrine. 10 USC also gives the Chairman the

responsibility for the development of joint doctrine.96 The

relationship of strategic planning and joint doctrine is somewhat

opaque but, nevertheless important. The value of joint doctrine


in improving joint (and unified)97 warfighting capability is

widely accepted. However, effective joint doctrine has additional

value. It can serve as information to senior civilian leadership

and governmental agencies as to how they may expect the armed

forces of the United States to be employed. It can also serve a

similar purpose for alliance and potential coalition governments

and armed forces, particularly apropos establishing the U.S.

national position for the development of multinational doctrine.98

The Chairman’s strategic planning can help uncover joint

doctrinal challenges, voids, and opportunities; thus providing

impetus for the development of new doctrine and revision of

extant doctrine. Additionally, the unifying effect of strategic

plans would enhance the implementation of joint doctrine across

Services and combatant commands.

Conversely, the absence of strategic plans gives rise to

disaggregated development of joint doctrine. Additionally,

without strategic plans the Services are less likely to implement

joint doctrine in a standardized fashion. Finally, without

strategic concepts that should be established in strategic plans,

there is no unified strategic basis for the development of joint

doctrine. Strategic plans would provide the critical linkage

between the National Military Strategy and the development and

implementation of joint doctrine.

The Missing Nexus in Strategic Planning.

Recent measures taken to overcome the inadequacies in

strategic planning have recognized and ameliorated some of the

difficulties resulting from the absence of strategic plans, but

they do not directly or fully address the problem. These

initiatives, including expansion of the responsibilities of the

JROC, the initiation of Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments, and linking the Chairman’s Program Assessment to the JROC

process, can be incorporated into a holistic solution and should

not be abandoned. Given the current state of the planning

processes at the Chairman’s level, there appear to be three

viable alternatives for correcting the deficiencies in strategic

planning:

• revising and expanding the National Military Strategy so

that it meets the requirements of a strategic plan;


• expanding the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan making it,

as its name implies, a joint strategic plan; or,

• creating a new document, the National Military Strategic

Plan (NMSP).

There may be other alternative solutions but these three are

directly supported by statute, are executable within the current

strategic planning framework, and do not require reengineering of

the Chairman’s strategic planning processes.

Option 1: National Military Strategy Expansion. Prior to the

end of the Cold War, the National Military Strategy Document,

coupled with the Base Case Global Family of OPLANs, closely

approximated a strategic plan. However, the mutation of the

national military strategy from the detailed and comprehensive

version contained in the National Military Strategy Document to

the unclassified, generalized form of the post-Cold War National

Military Strategy was by design, and for good reasons. The

arrival of a post-Cold War era of significantly diminished

military threats to U.S. national security and increased focus on

domestic social and fiscal issues brought with it an intense

demand on the part of Congress and the public for an explanation

of what changes in military force levels are required and why.

General Powell responded to the requirement for more widespread

communication of military strategy and the forces needed to

support it by publishing an easily understood, unclassified

National Military Strategy. This new National Military Strategy

was widely accepted because the Congress and the public were

generally unable to understand the new strategic environment with

any more clarity than it reflected. Nevertheless, the abandonment

of the National Military Strategy Document and shelving of the

Base Case Family of OPLANs were tantamount to inadvertent

abdication of the Chairman’s statutory strategic planning

responsibility.

Over half a decade has elapsed since the Berlin wall came

down. The “new world order,” or disorder as some have

characterized it, has taken sufficient form for critics to

suggest that it is time to develop a strategy for coping with

it.99 The question before us now is should the Chairman replace

the National Military Strategy with a comprehensive, classified,

modern version of the National Military Strategy Document? The


answer is no. The current National Military Strategy is not a

strategy per se, but a hybrid of national military doctrine and

policy. It is an institutionalized form of communication among

the Services, CINCs, OSD and other offices of the Executive

Branch, Congress, industry, academe, the public, and the

international community. It effectively informs all of the

general rationale for U.S. military forces, reaffirms national

security policies, encourages debate, reassures allies, and puts

potential adversaries on notice. This type of National Military

Strategy continues to serve the purposes for which it was created

and, therefore, warrants perpetuation. However, some measures

must be taken to fill the strategic planning void which resulted

from abandonment of the National Military Strategy Document and

the Global Family of OPLANs.

Option 2: Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan Expansion. An

alternative to changing the form and content of the National

Military Strategy is to expand the scope of the JSCP. As we noted

earlier, although the JSCP in its current form compiles planning

guidance, tasks, and force apportionments for all the CINCs under

one cover, it falls short of meeting the requirements of a

strategic plan. However, it could be expanded to contain a

strategic plan. This approach is appealing at first glance. The

précis of the National Military Strategy that appears at the

front of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan could be replaced

by a comprehensive strategic plan that specifies strategic

objectives and priorities, forces expected to be available for

each 2-year deliberate planning period, and the globally

integrated strategy for applying U.S and allied military

capabilities to accomplish the objectives. If this were done the

planning guidance, specific tasks, and force apportionments that

followed would be placed in an unambiguous strategic context.

This would allow the CINCs to devise more coherent and

interrelated theater strategies and develop operation plans that

collectively better reflect national level strategic priorities.

However, this alternative is unattractive for at least three

reasons. First, the JSCP in its current form is a large, complex

document and, as such, is difficult to produce. It must be

staffed with all the CINCs, Services, and agencies it directly

affects, and consensus-building is understandably problematic,

particularly given the JSCP’s near-term impact on service support

and training responsibilities and operational responsibilities of


the CINCs. A document that combined the strategic plan and the

derivative planning guidance, tasks, and force apportionments

would likely prove too unwieldy to produce or change in a timely

fashion.

Second, the JSCP, a near-term document by design, is

impacted annually by the Contingency Planning Guidance. In its

current form, it has been able to accommodate annual 

fluctuations in contingency planning policy. While this may

remain true for the planning guidance and tasks sections of an

expanded JSCP, it would be untrue for the strategic plan section.

If the Chairman is to realize any stability in strategic

planning, subjecting his strategic plan to annual adjustments may

be unwise. Additionally, the Chairman’s strategic plans should be

viewed, in part, as military advice that informs the development

of contingency planning policy, not the reverse.

Third, notwithstanding its substantial volume, the JSCP is a

coherent, focused document. It serves one purpose–to provide for

the preparation and review of contingency plans. Given its

longevity in joint strategic planning, its purpose and format are

clearly understood and it has genuine utility for combatant

command, Service, and defense combat support agency planners. If

it were enlarged to incorporate the Chairman’s strategic plan, it

could lose its central focus and its utility may be lessened. For

these reasons, we conclude that the expansion of the JSCP is not

the preferred alternative for developing and promulgating

strategic plans.

Option 3: The National Military Strategic Plan. The most

appropriate alternative is the creation of a new document, the

National Military Strategic Plan. It would be a product of the

Joint Strategic Planning System, developed by the Joint Staff in

consultation with the CINCs and Services, and published by the

Chairman. It would be updated or republished as required in

anticipation of changes in the geostrategic environment, revised

national security objectives and strategic priorities, and/or

significant changes in fiscal guidance. The plan would be

harmonized with the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System

and focused on the Future Years Defense Program, but would also

feature a long-range (FYDP + 14 years) section. It would derive

specific national military objectives from the broad national

security objectives expressed in the National Security Strategy


and present them in measurable terms. It would establish a

priority of national military objectives and clearly describe a

strategy for attaining them within the Future Year Defense

Program period and the long-range planning period, as

appropriate.

The National Military Strategic Plan would proactively

orchestrate and guide the development of CINC theater strategies

to ensure that, in combination, they conform to the U.S. global

strategy. It would undergird the planning guidance, tasks, and

force apportionments provided to the CINCs in the Joint Strategic

Capabilities Plan. It would be particularly useful since it would

contain near-, mid-, and long-term strategies. Additionally, it

would enable the Services and defense combat support agencies to

predict more effectively the type and amount of military

capability they must build into their respective programs to

support the requirements of the CINCs. The National Military

Strategic Plan would also give them a preview of the standard

against which their programs would be assessed. In short, the

National Military Strategic Plan would provide the critical nexus

connecting the strategic direction provided by the National

Command Authorities, the operation planning and requirements

determination by the CINCs, and the supporting military

capabilities developed by the Services and defense combat support

agencies.

Implementation of the National Military Strategic Plan

alternative would not be without difficulty, but is certainly

feasible within the current strategic planning framework. Much of

its basis would be developed during the Joint Strategy Review

process of the Joint Strategic Planning System. Having been

briefed on the results of the Joint Strategy Review, the Chairman

would issue guidance outlining the key elements of the plan. At a

minimum, the guidance would include national military objectives

and their priorities, anticipated resource levels for the Future

Year Defense Program period, and specific strategic elements that

should be reflected in the plan. Armed with the Chairman’s

guidance, the Joint Staff would develop the strategic plan and

coordinate it with the CINCs, Services, defense combat support

agencies, and selected officials within Office of the Secretary

of Defense. After approving the plan, the Chairman would present

it to the National Command Authorities in keeping with his

responsibility to provide military advice and assist in the


strategic direction of the armed forces. While there would be no

requirement for the National Command Authorities formally to

approve the plan, their endorsement would help ensure that the

plan was resourced by the Future Years Defense Program.

Development of the National Military Strategic Plan,

therefore, would not disrupt any of the joint strategic planning

processes or initiatives currently in place, but would modify

some. For example, the National Military Strategic Plan could

incorporate the Unified Command Plan and the latter’s biennial

review would become part of the strategic planning process.

Additionally, the National Military Strategic Plan would inform

the Chairman’s triennial review of roles, missions and functions.

The Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments would continue to be

performed. However, they would be guided by the military

capability requirements and strategic concepts reflected in the

National Military Strategic Plan. Additionally, each Joint

Warfighting Capability Assessment would no longer be a discreet

assessment but would be anchored to the National Military

Strategic Plan. The CINCs’ Integrated Priority Lists would be

submitted to conform to the National Military Strategic Plan and

thus have greater coherence. The Joint Warfighting Capability

Assessments would integrate and establish priorities for the IPLs

under the staff supervision of the Director of the Joint Staff.

The JROC would continue to be briefed on the integrated

priorities of the CINCs’ requirements, particularly those with

major program research and development implications. The

Chairman’s Program Recommendation would remain a Chairman’s

report to the Secretary of Defense. In conformance to the

military capability requirements reflected in the National

Military Strategic Plan, it would become the means of reporting

the CINCs’ integrated priorities.

 A National Military Strategy, similar in form and content

to today’s document, would be developed from unclassified

information extracted from the National Military Strategic Plan.

The Chairman would be prepared to disclose classified aspects of

the National Military Strategic Plan, as necessary, to assist

selected members of Congress in deliberations on the defense

budget. The Joint Planning Document (JPD) would be assimilated

into the National Military Strategic Plan. It would no longer be

published as stand alone volumes. Neither the Defense Planning

Guidance nor the Joint Military Net Assessment would be based on


scenarios, but on the National Military Strategic Plan. The

result would be a more efficient redirection of Joint Staff

energy toward strategic planning and not a net increase in the

Joint Staff’s work load. Finally, the National Military Strategic

Plan would provide the strategic basis for the development and

implementation of joint doctrine.

Conclusion.

This essay has argued that strategic plans should act as the

critical nexus connecting national security policy with operation

planning, military requirements determination, and military

capability development. Without strategic plans, joint strategic

planning will continue to be flawed by:

• inability to establish specific priorities for national

military objectives;

• unnecessary duplication in the development of military

capabilities;

• disaggregated, regionally-focused contingency plan- ning;

• inability to reach consensus on a more rational assignment

of service functions; and,

• continued difficulty in the development and implementation of joint doctrine.

10 USC, as amended by GNA, vests the Chairman with

responsibility for the development of “strategic plans.” The

Chairman holds the highest position in the strategic planning

hierarchy that is not directly constrained by political

considerations. This is not to infer that the Chairman is

oblivious or immune to political forces, but only to point out

that he may have greater political latitude than the Secretary of

Defense or the President. There is no statutory requirement for

the Secretary or the President explicitly to approve the

strategic plans prepared by the Chairman. The National Military

Strategic Plan should be considered part of his military advice

to the National Command Authorities. So advised, the National

Command Authorities may develop a clearer and more concise

approach toward implementing the National Security Strategy,


without openly risking the political capital that a more precise

NSS might risk.

 When Georgy Arbatov, Chairman of the U.S.A.-Canada

Institute, said in late 1989 “We are depriving you of an enemy,”

few realized the prescience of his comment.100 The dissolution of

the Warsaw Pact, demise of the Soviet Union, and end of the Cold

War unsuspectingly cut away the anchor that provided continuity

in strategic planning for the U.S. Armed Forces. Set adrift, the

ship of state has successfully defended itself from encroaching

menacing vessels. It defeated a corrupt government of Panama,

punished and ejected Iraq from Kuwait, and restored the

legitimate government of Haiti. However, the United States cannot

drift indefinitely lest it unexpectedly run aground or be caught

up in an unforeseen storm. The United States needs proactive

strategic plans that will equip the U.S. Armed Forces to face the

challenges of the 21st century. It is time to set sail and get

underway. The strategic planning machinery is already in place.

All that is needed is a star by which to steer.

Recommendations.

• The Chairman should implement the National Military

Strategic Plan option described above.

• The Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments should be

reoriented so they evaluate, integrate, and prioritize the CINCs’

requirements.

• The JROC should be divested of its oversight

responsibility for the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments,

reaffirming its original charter. Oversight of the Joint

Warfighting Capability Assessments should become a Director of

the Joint Staff responsibility on behalf of the Chairman and the

Vice Chairman. This would permit the assessments to be more

closely coordinated with the Joint Strategy Review.

• A principal input into the Joint Warfighting Capability

Assessment process should be the Integrated Priority Lists

submitted by the CINCs. This would help focus the identification

of military requirements on the CINCs, while continuing to ensure

their requirements are integrated with national level warfighting

concerns.


• Continue to publish the Chairman’s Program Recommendation,

but as a product of the reoriented Joint Warfighting Capability

Assessment process.

• Base the biannual review of the Unified Command Plan

primarily on the National Military Strategic Plan.

• Continue the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan in its

current form, but base the guidance, force apportionments, and

taskings on the National Military Strategic Plan.

• Base the assessment of force capability strengths and

deficiencies identified by the CINCs on the National Military

Strategic Plan.

• Integrate and establish priorities for the CINCs’

requirements based upon the National Military Strategic Plan.

• Use the National Military Strategic Plan as the basis for

assessing the OPLANs developed by the CINCs.

• Base Joint Military Net Assessments on the National

Military Strategic Plan, vice scenarios.

• Discontinue use of Defense Planning Guidance scenarios in

the development of service programs in favor of conformance to

the National Military Strategic Plan.

• Use the National Military Strategic Plan as input into the

triennial review of roles, missions and functions.

• The National Military Strategic Plan should guide the

development and revision of joint doctrine.

ENDNOTES

1. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Message to Congress,

April 3, 1958, cited in Directions for Defense (Advance Copy),

Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed

Forces, May 24, 1995, pp. 2-2.

2. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,


Defense Organization and the Need for Change, Staff Report, 99th

Congress, 1st Session, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing

Office, 1985, p. 8.

3. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, GoldwaterNichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Report

99-824, 99th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1986, pp. 5, 17.

4. Ibid., pp. 17-18.

5. The Secretary of Defense’s Planning, Programming, and

Budgeting System (PPBS) and the President’s National Security

Council System (NSCS) are critical to national level strategic

direction and planning and are certainly worthy of critical

analysis. However, we will address them in this essay only to the

extent necessary to facilitate our study of Chairman level

processes and products. For example, the National Security

Strategy (NSS), developed by the NSC, directly impacts and to

some extent predetermines the National Military Strategy

developed by the Chairman. While we will refrain from assessing

the NSCS, we must examine the NSS. Similarly, while a complete

assessment of the PPBS is beyond the scope of this study, we will

examine the Defense Planning Guidance and the manner in which it

relates to the strategic planning conducted by the Chairman.

Therefore, we will focus on the interfaces between the Chairman’s

Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and the PPBS and NSCS.

6. Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of

Military and Associated Terms, p. 253, defines the NCA as the

President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized

alternates or successors.

7. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on

Armed Services, Title 10, United States Code. Armed Forces, 103rd

Congress, 1st Session, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing

Office, April 1993, Section 153.

8. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1-02: Department of Defense

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, March 23, 1994, p. 364.


9. Defense Organization and the Need for Change, pp. 493-

500.

10. Title 10, U.S. Code. Armed Forces, sections 153(a)(1),

(2), (3).

11. Ibid., section 153(a)(3)(C).

12. Ibid., section 153(a)(4)(B), (C), and (E).

13. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-0: Doctrine for Joint

Operations, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,

September 9, 1993, p. III-1.

14. The Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) focuses on the

period from 2-8 years into the future. For example, the FY 98-99

Department of Defense budget would normally be submitted, as part

of the President’s Budget, to Congress by February 1997. This DoD

budget would represent the first 2 years of the FY 98-03 FYDP.

The FY 98-03 FYDP would be built largely during 1996, based on

Defense Planning Guidance nominally published in 1995. Thus, work

on the FYDP during late 1995 and 1996 would focus on the FY 98-03

time period.

15. U.S. Congress, National Security Act of 1947 (selected

provisions), inside U.S. Congress, House of Representatives,

Committee on Armed Services, Title 10, United States Code. Armed

Forces, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, April 1993, p. 1735. Although the

1995 National Security Strategy, in its preface, says it is

produced in accordance with section 603 of the GNA, that

provision of the GNA has been codified by amending the National

Security Act of 1947.

16. U.S. Congress, National Security Act of 1947, p. 1735.

17. White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement

and Enlargement, Washington, DC: February 1995, pp. 1-33.

18. Ibid., passim, particularly pp. 3-5, 8-9, 11, 13-16, 18-

25, 27-30.


19. Don M. Snider, The National Security Strategy:

Documenting Strategic Vision, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic

Studies Institute, March 1995, pp. 9-10. An example of other more

suitable fora, see The Annual Report to the President and the

Congress, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,

annual.

20. Ibid., p. 14. Dr. Snider came to a similar conclusion

concerning the 1994 NSS saying, “Equally noticeable by their

absence in this globalist approach are the priorities necessary

to make this strategy operative.”

21. To the current NSS’s credit, it does state unequivocally

that a two-war military capability is required–that is, armed

forces that can fight and win two nearly simultaneous major

regional conflicts. It then goes on to say that programmed forces

will do just that. This type of overt commitment to a specific

level of force capability is refreshing and contributes stability

to strategic planning. The NSS specifically declares that the

threat of intrusion into our military and commercial information

systems poses a significant risk to national security and must be

addressed. This also provides useful guidance to strategic

planners. Complementing the definitions of vital, important, and

humanitarian interests is a more complete set of intervention

criteria that now include “a clearly defined, achievable mission”

and an assessment of the “environment of risk.” The NSS provides

unambiguous guidance concerning the U.S. commitment to NATO and

the advisability of increasing its membership. So while the

current NSS has clear deficiencies, it also provides significant

policy guidance and certainly is not without value. Ibid., pp.

12-13, 26.

22. National Security Act of 1947 (selected provisions), p.

1735.

23. There is no requirement nor explicit authorization set

forth in 10 USC for the Secretary of Defense to prepare strategic

plans. That is an exclusive responsibility of the Chairman. The

preparation of strategic plans is one means by which the Chairman

assists the President and the Secretary of Defense in providing

strategic direction to the U.S. Armed Forces. Title 10, United

States Code, chapters 2-4.


24. Title 10, United States Code. Armed Forces, section

113(g)(1).

25. Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,

Memorandum of Policy No. 7, (1st Revision, March 17, 1993), Joint

Strategic Planning System, Washington, DC, p. VII-3.

26. The “advice” of the Chairman is currently provided

primarily through the NMS. The NMS is based on the same strategic

planning that the Chairman would use to assign tasks to the

CINCs.

27. The requirement in 10 USC, Section 153, for the Chairman

to prepare strategic plans that conform to resource levels

projected by the Secretary of Defense to be available during the

plans’ effective periods is based on recommendations contained in

A Quest for Excellence, the Final Report to the President by the

Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (Washington, DC:

1986), also known as the Packard Commission Report. The report

recommended (p. xix) that defense planning should start with a

comprehensive statement of national security objectives and

priorities by the President. The President would then provide the

Secretary of Defense provisional 5-year defense budget levels.

The Secretary of Defense would, in turn, direct the Chairman to

conduct strategic planning based on the provisional budget

levels.

28. Carl H. Builder and James A. Dewer, “A Time for

Planning? If Not Now, When?”, Parameters, Vol. 24, No. 2, Summer

1994, pp. 4-15.

29. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense Planning

Guidance FY 1996-2001, Washington, DC: May 23, 1994, pp. 4-11,

15-25.

30. Ibid., pp. 29-40.

31. Ibid., p. A-1.

32. Title 10, United States Code. Armed Forces, section

113(g)(2).

33. Memorandum of Policy No. 7, (1st Revision, March 17,


1993), Joint Strategic Planning System, p. VII-3.

34. There is, however, informal coordination between the

authors of the CPG in the Office of the Secretary of Defense

(OSD) and members of the Joint Staff’s Directorate for Strategic

Plans and Policy. This coordination normally amounts to members

of the OSD referring drafts of the CPG to Joint Staff officers

for comment. The authors of the CPG are normally not part of the

Joint Strategy Review process and the Joint Staff officers who

review the drafts of the CPG may or may not be.

35. Ibid., pp. V-2, VII-3.

36. Ibid., pp. II-1 through II-11.

37. Ibid., pp. II-1 through II-11, V-2, VII-3.

38. Ibid., p. V-1. Note that on page I-2 the Joint Staff

asserts that the JSCP fulfills the Chairman’s responsibility for

preparing strategic plans as well. We will show this to be

incorrect.

39. Title 10, United States Code. Armed Forces, section

153(a)(3)(A) and (B).

40. Title 10, United States Code. Armed Forces, section

153(a)(1), (2), (3).

41. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum of Policy No. 84,

(17th Revision–January 24, 1989), Joint Strategic Planning

System, Washington, DC, p. 1.

42. Ibid., p. 9.

43. The Senate Armed Services Committee identified the

inability of the JSPS to provide useful strategic planning advice

and to formulate military strategy as one of the causes of

ineffective strategic planning within the DoD. Admiral Zumwalt, a

former Chief of Naval Operations, commenting on a key JCS MOP 84

JSPS document remarked “. . . I found this particular document to

be almost as valueless to read as it was fatiguing to write. Some

of its prescriptions always were in the process of being

falsified by events. Others were so tortured a synthesis of


mutually contradictory positions that the guidance they gave was

minimal.” See, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed

Services, Defense Organization and the Need for Change, pp. 495-

496.

44. Memorandum of Policy 84, Joint Strategic Planning

System, pp. 30, 35. The Base Case Family of Operation Plans was a

grouping of OPLANs prepared individually by the CINCs in

accordance with the strategy and guidance presented in the

National Military Strategy Document and the specific tasks

assigned in the JSCP. Collectively, they served as the “Base

Case” for Chairman-level force capability determinations and

assessments as well as for identifying risks associated with

implementing national security policy and achieving national

security objectives. Each plan within the grouping related to

others with respect to force apportionments, assumptions, timing,

and objectives.

45. Memorandum of Policy No. 7, (Issued January 30, 1990),

Joint Strategic Planning System, p. 1. Based on the author’s

notes and experience as a member of the Joint Staff and the Joint

Strategy Review (JSR) Working Group from 1990 to 1993. Although

detailed JSR Administrative Instructions were published, they

were never implemented. The conduct of the JSR was deferred until

after the annual CINCs’ Conference (also see Harry Rothman,

Forging a New National Military Strategy in a Post-Cold War

World: A Perspective from the Joint Staff, Carlisle Barracks, PA:

Strategic Studies Institute, February 1992, pp. 12-15.) During

the 1990 conference, the Chairman achieved consensus on a broad

outline for a national military strategy for the post-Cold War

period. Therefore, in consultation with the Service Chiefs and

CINCs, the Chairman decided that the minutes of the conference,

or more specifically the message that summarized the conference

and resulting taskings, would suffice as Chairman’s Guidance and

no JSR was required. This is the point at which the formal JSPS

began to fall apart.

46. Memorandum of Policy No. 7, (Issued January 30, 1990),

Joint Strategic Planning System, pp. 20-31.

47. Ibid., pp. 24-25.

48. Ibid. , pp. 32-39.


49. Ibid., p. 40.

50. Each military department transmits its proposals for

resource allocations, in accordance with its interpretation of

the Defense Planning Guidance, to the Office of the Secretary of

Defense in the form of a document called the Program Objective

Memorandum (POM). It is the Secretary of Defense’s

responsibility, in consultation with the CJCS, CINCs, and

secretaries of the military departments, to rationalize and

integrate the POMs into a coherent defense program.

51. Memorandum of Policy No. 7, (Issued January 30, 1990),

Joint Strategic Planning System, pp. 48-49.

52. Based on one author’s experience as a member of the

Joint Staff working group formed to revise the JSPS. The Joint

Staff office of primary responsibility, J-5, initially attempted

to remove almost all of the structure from the process and

eliminate the regular publication of documents such as the

Chairman’s Guidance, NMS, and JSCP. The Services and several of

the CINCs resisted this since they believed regular document

publication would bring them into the process because of

standard Joint Staff coordination requirements for joint

documents.

53. Memorandum of Policy No. 7, (lst Revision, March 17,

1993), Joint Strategic Planning System, p. 1.

54. Although an NMSD was not published under either CJCS MOP

7 or CJCS MOP 7 (Revision 1), NMSD FY 92-97 was published in 1989

(JSSM-162-89, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject:

National Military Strategy Document FY 92-97, September 21, 1989)

in anticipation of revision of the JSPS.

55. The White House, National Security Strategy ofthe United

States, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August

1991, pp. 3-4. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National

Military Strategy of the United States, Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, January 1992, p. 5.

56. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

JSSM-162-89, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject:


National Military Strategy Document FY 92-97, September 21, 1989,

passim. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military

Strategy of the United States, Washington, DC: U.S. Government

Printing Office, January 1992, p. 5.

57. While the Joint Staff was involved in the JSR, the new

Secretary of Defense initiated the now well-documented “Bottom-Up

Review.” The BUR, intentionally conducted outside the JSPS,

served to delay publication of the new NMS. Additionally,

although his predecessor had given guidance for the development

of a new NMS, General Shalikashvili wanted the Joint Staff to

have the benefit of his guidance before proceeding. Another

factor is the delay by the new administration in publishing a new

National Security Strategy. It would have been poor form to

publish the new NMS before the new NSS.

58. National Military Strategy of the United States,

February 1995, passim. We make this statement cognizant of a

subtle difference between the NMS published by General Powell and

the current NMS published by General Shalikashvili. In his letter

transmitting the 1992 NMS, General Powell states, “This strategy

provides a rationale for . . . a capability which will serve the

nation well throughout the remainder of the 1990s. ” The 1992 NMS

was matched to the FY 94-99 FYDP. The comparable section of

General Shalikashvili’s letter transmitting the 1995 NMS says

“This new national military strategy describes the objectives,

concepts, tasks, and capabilities necessary in the near term . .

. . ” This NMS is matched to the FY 96-01 FYDP. The JSPS still

describes the NMS as a mid-range product. It is not completely

clear why the current Chairman infers his NMS is a near-term

document. However, this could be additional evidence of the need

for stability in strategic planning that could be brought about

by strategic plans.

59. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action of the Armed Forces, Pentagon,

Washington, DC, August 11, 1994, p. I-5.

60. National Security Act of 1947 (Selected Provisions) in

Title 10, United States Code. Armed Forces, pp. 1724-1725.

61. “This new national military strategy describes the

objectives, concepts, tasks, and capabilities necessary in the


near term to adapt the Armed Forces’ proven capabilities to meet

this challenge. John M. Shalikashvili, Transmittal letter,

National Military Strategy, February 1995.

62. It is interesting to note that after 20 years of effort,

the Australian Department of Defence has developed a threatambiguous defense planning and force development methodology. See

Thomas-Durell Young, “Capabilities-based Defense Planning: The

Australian Experience,” Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 21, No. 3,

Spring 1995, pp. 349-369.

63. Certainly strategic planning conducted by the Chairman

is important for reasons beyond those discussed in this essay.

However, we are focusing our analysis on these key areas because

they stand to benefit most from strategic planning directly under

the purview of the Chairman.

64. Title 10, United States Code. Armed Forces, Section

161(b).

65. The White House, Memorandum for the Secretary of

Defense, Subject: Unified Command Plan, Washington, DC: September

24, 1993, passim, and, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, MCM-144-93, Subject: Implementation of the Unified

Command Plan, Washington, DC: October 6, 1993, p. 1.

66. Unified Command Plan, passim.

67. Recall the Chairman’s responsibilities for strategic

planning and providing for the preparation and review of

contingency plans enumerated in Section 153 of 10 USC.

68. Title 10, United States Code, Section 153(a)(3).

Deliberate operation plans are those plans developed by the CINCs

during non-crises periods. They take approximately 18 months to

develop and describe, in detail, the actions the CINCs would take

if crises commensurate with the JSCP taskings were to develop.

They are based on assumptions and contrast with crisis action

plans that are developed in response to unanticipated crises.

Crisis action plans can be developed by modifying deliberate

operation plans or built from scratch in “no-plan” situations.

69. Deliberate operation planning within the Joint Operation


Planning and Execution System uses the term “operation plan” vice

10 USC’s use of the term “contingency plan. ” There is a history

behind this convention, but for the present it is sufficient to

point out that the plans tasked by the JSCP are of the type

referred to as “contingency plans” within 10 USC.

70. Memorandum of Policy No. 7, (1st Revision, March 17,

1993), Joint Strategic Planning System, pp. V-1 through V-7.

71. Memorandum of Policy No. 7 (January 30, 1990), Joint

Strategic Planning System, p. 40.

72. Memorandum of Policy No. 7, (1st Revision, March 17,

1993), Joint Strategic Planning System, pp. I-2, I-3.

73. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

Instructional Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, MCM-126-92,

Washington, DC: August 25, 1992, p. I-1.

74. Memorandum of Policy No. 7, (1st Revision, March 17,

1993), Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, p. VII-3.

75. Title 10, United States Code, section 153 (a)(3)(C).

76. Title 10, United States Code, sections 153(a)(4) and 163

(b)(2).

77. Joint Requirements Oversight Council, CINC Newsletter,

Vol. 1-94, Washington, DC: April 22, 1994, p. 1. Office of the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, MCM-76-95, Subject:

Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, Washington,

DC: February 7, 1995, pp. 1-2.

78. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

MCM-76-92, Subject: Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight

Council, Washington, DC: May 19, 1992, pp. 1-2.

79. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

MCM-76-95, Subject: Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight

Council, Washington, DC: February 7, 1995, p. 1.

80. See Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

Joint Pub 1-03. 31, Preparedness Evaluation System, January 1993,


pp. 2-1 thru 2-7 and 4-1 thru 4-3 for a discussion of the CINC’s

Preparedness Assessment Report (CSPAR) and the Chairman’s

Preparedness Assessment Report (PAR). Also see Office of the

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum of Policy No. 7, (1st

Revision, March 17, 1993) Joint Strategic Planning System, pp.

VII-2 thru VII-3 and Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, Memorandum of Policy No. 53 (1st Revision), Military

Capability Reporting, March 25, 1993, p. GL-3, for a discussion

of the Chairman’s Contingency Capabilities Assessment (CCA).

81. Title 10, United States Code, section 153(a)(3)(C) and

(D).

82. This observation is offered notwithstanding the recently

implemented Joint Monthly Readiness Reports (JMRRs) submitted by

the CINCs. While the JMRRs seem to be effective in highlighting

readiness strengths and deficiencies and can serve to inform the

JROC in its deliberations, they do not go so far as to assess the

 effect current force capability strengths and deficiencies have

on achieving national security objectives and implementing

national security policy.

83. Given the JROC membership, which includes all the vice

chiefs of the Services, there is a danger that these JROCsponsored assessments will rest largely on service consensus.

Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, MCM-76-95,

Subject: Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council,

Washington, DC: February 7, 1995, p. 2.

84. U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency, Ground Maneuver

Workshop III, workbook for participants, June 1995.

85. Robert Holzer, “Pentagon Chiefs Get New Policy Weapon,”

Defense News, January 30, 1995, p. 1.

86. The ASD (PA&E) requests the IPLs by a memorandum to the

CINCs. For example see the June 24, 1991, memorandum, Subject:

Submission of FY 1994-99 Integrated Priority Lists.

87. Information received from a member of the Joint Staff

Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate, the

directorate with staff responsibility for the JROC and CPR. The

officer informed us the CPR will not replace the IPLs and the


IPLs will continue to be submitted to ASD (PA&E).

88. William A. Owens, “JROC: Harnessing the Revolution in

Military Affairs,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 1994, pp. 56-

57.

89. Title 10 United States Code, sections 153(a)(4) and

163(b)(2).

90. Ibid., section 153(a)(2)(c).

91. Ibid., section 153(a)(3)(C).

92. Ibid., section 153(b)(1).

93. Robert Holzer, “U.S. Military Braces for Massive Mission

Review,” Defense News, Washington, DC, August 29 - September 4,

1994, p. 3.

94. “The Battle for Superiority in US Roles and Missions,”

Jane’s Defense Weekly, October 1, 1994, p. 27.

95. Gilbert A. Lewthwaite, “Armed Services Battle to

Standstill Over Roles,” Baltimore Sun, May 15, 1995, p. 1; and,

Mark Yost, “Mission Partly Accomplished,” Wall Street Journal,

May 24, 1995, p. 14.

96. Title 10, United States Code, section 153(a)(5).

97. “The concept of unified action highlights the integrated

and synchronized activities of military forces and non-military

organizations, agencies, and corporations to achieve common

objectives . . . ” Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations,

Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 9, 1993, p. II5.

98. Joint Pub 1-01, pp. I-1 thru I-2.

99. Don M. Snider, Daniel Goure, and Stephen A. Cambone,

Defense in the 1990s, Avoiding the Train Wreck, Washington, DC:

The Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 15,

1994, pp. 4-6, 17.


100. Georgy Arbatov, “We Are Depriving You of an Enemy, ”

USA Today, November 16, 1989, Sec. A, p. 7.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

*****

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Authors

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Dr. Thomas-Durell Young

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Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretary

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

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