CONFERENCE REPORT

WINNING THE WAR BY WINNING THE PEACE:

STRATEGY FOR CONFLICT AND POST-CONFLICT 

IN THE 21st CENTURY

Fifteenth Annual Strategy Conference

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

April 13-15, 2004

Lloyd J. Matthews

December 2004

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iii

FOREWORD

 During each of the last 15 years, the U.S. Army War College 

has sponsored a broad-based strategy conference that addresses a 

major security issue of current relevance to the United States, its 

allies, and, indeed, the entire world. Bringing together some 150-

200 scholars, defense specialists, news media representatives, active 

and retired members of the military community, and uniformed and 

civilian faculty members of senior U.S. service colleges, the annual 

conferences are conceived to generate open, unfettered dialogue on 

the issue under discussion. Particular attention is paid to controversial 

or unresolved questions, always with the aim of surfacing practical 

answers based upon multiple perspectives and a dispassionate 

regard for reason and the attendant facts.

 The conference theme for year 2004 was “Winning the War by 

Winning the Peace: Strategy for Conflict and Post-Conflict in the 

2st Century.” Informed by the Korean, Vietnam, and Gulf wars 

fought by the United States and its allies during the last half of the 

20st century―wars in which, despite the qualitative superiority of 

our forces, the outcomes proved to be less than satisfactory―the 

conference theme for 2004 entailed a deep probe into the question 

of how can the West, in this new century of omnipresent terrorism, 

capitalize on its superior military and economic might to achieve a 

satisfying and enduring modus vivendi. The search for answers to this 

central question was lent added relevance and urgency by the fact 

that the allied anti-insurgency wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were 

transpiring even as the conference proceeded and, indeed, even as 

this report goes to press.

 The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to provide this summary 

of the 2004 conference presentations along with a distillation of 

conference findings and conclusions.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

LLOYD J. MATTHEWS is a retired U.S. Army colonel. His military 

assignments included command at platoon, company, and battalion 

level; advisory duty in Vietnam; editorship of Parameters, the Army 

War College quarterly; and the associate deanship of the U.S. 

Military Academy. Following retirement from the Army, he was a 

project manager in Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Colonel Matthews is 

the author of over 100 articles, features, reviews, and monographs 

on professional topics. Most recently, he contributed the entry on 

American military ideals appearing in The Oxford Companion to 

American Military History (Oxford University Press, 1999), and was 

coeditor, along with project directors Don M. Snider and Gayle L. 

Watkins, of The Future of the Army Profession (McGraw-Hill, 2002). 

A second edition is forthcoming in 2005. Colonel Matthews has a 

B.S. degree from the U.S. Military Academy, an M.A. from Harvard 

University, and a Ph.D. from the University of Virginia. He is also a 

graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and the U.S. Army War 

College.
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CONFERENCE AGENDA

Tuesday, April 13

11 a.m.-3 p.m. Pre-Conference Elective #1: 

Gettysburg Staff Ride

4:30 p.m.-7 p.m. Pre-Conference Elective #2: 

The Battle of Algiers Movie

Discussion

Wednesday, April 14

8:30 a.m.-10 a.m. Keynote Address, LTG Jay Garner, 

U.S. Army (Ret.), former Director of 

the Office of Reconstruction and

Humanitarian Assistance in 

Baghdad

10:30 a.m.-12 noon Panel I: American Grand Strategy in

 the Global War on Terrorism

Chair: COL John Martin, Deputy Director, Strategic Studies Institute, 

U.S. Army War College

Panelists: 

Prof. William C. Wohlforth, Dartmouth College

Prof. Robert Lieber, Georgetown University

Dr. Robin Dorff, Chairman, Dept. of National Security and Strategy, 

 U.S. Army War College

1:45 p.m.-3:15 p.m. Panel II: Fiscal and Political 

Sustainability

Chair: Dr. Stephen Biddle, Strategic Studies Institute, 

U.S. Army War College

Panelists:

Dr. Michael O’Hanlon, The Brookings Institution

Dr. Eric Labs, Congressional Budget Office

Dr. Alice Rivlin, The Brookings Institution
vi

3:45 p.m.-5:15 p.m. Panel III: Insurgency and Terrorism

Chair: Prof. David Haglund, Queens University 

Panelists:

Dr. Steven Metz, Director of Research, Strategic Studies Institute, 

 U.S. Army War College

Prof. Ian Beckett, Horner Professor of Military Theory, 

 U.S. Marine Corps University

Mr. Steven Simon, RAND

6:30 p.m.-8:30 p.m. Banquet Presentation, Mr. William

Kristol, Editor, Weekly Standard

Thursday, April 15

8:30 a.m.-10 a.m. Panel IV: Peacekeeping, Nation-Building,

and Stabilization

Chair: COL Michael J. Dooley, Director, U.S. Army Peacekeeping and 

 Stability Operations Institute

Panelists:

Dr. Conrad Crane, Director, U.S. Army Military History Institute

Ms. Bathsheba Crocker, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Mr. Jaque Grinberg, Chief of Staff to Special Representative 

 of the Secretary General for the Democratic Republic of the Congo

10:30 a.m.-12 noon Panel V: Democratization

Chair: Dr. Andrew Terrill, Strategic Studies Institute, 

 U.S. Army War College

Panelists:

Prof. Daniel Brumberg, Georgetown University

Dr. Larry Diamond, Stanford University

Prof. Andrew Reynolds, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
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12:15 p.m.-1:30 p.m. Luncheon Presentation, Dr. Lawrence J.

Korb, Former Assistant Secretary of 

Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, 

Installations, and Logistics)

1:45 p.m.-3:15 p.m. Panel VI: Implications for Military 

Capabilities and Force Structure

Chair: Prof. Douglas Lovelace, Director, Strategic Studies Institute, 

 U.S. Army War College

Panelists:

Dr. Daniel Goure, Lexington Institute

COL Richard Hooker, Planner, Army Staff

LTC Robert Cassidy, Member, U.S. Army, Europe, 

 Commanding General’s Initiatives Group

3:30 p.m.-4:30 p.m. Briefing, BG Kevin T. Ryan, Director, 

Plans and Policy, Office of the Deputy 

Chief of Staff, G-3

1

INTRODUCTION

Colonel Lloyd J. Matthews, U.S. Army Retired

 With little doubt, three of the most pressing and frequent problems 

grappled with in Western defense and geostrategic literature over 

the past 20-30 years have been how to fight asymmetric wars, how 

to win the hearts and minds of an enemy populace, and how to 

terminate wars and devise exit strategies successfully. None of these 

problems is new in the history of warfare, of course, but they have 

achieved particular saliency in the United States because of Korea, 

Vietnam, and the first Gulf war. 

 After that war, with an unrepentant Saddam Hussein still on the 

scene making threatening gestures, fourth and fifth problems―how 

to counter weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and how to conduct 

urban combat―came to the fore in the literature. Most recently, with 

the terrorist destruction of the twin towers of the World Trade Center 

in New York and our continuing wars of reprisal against the Taliban 

in Afghanistan and against al Qaeda in that country, Iraq, and 

elsewhere, sixth and seventh problems―how to neutralize terrorists 

and how to achieve homeland security―have come to monopolize the 

pages of the scholarly journals as well as the influential metropolitan 

dailies, except that now those problems face us and the West in 

general, not just Israel.

 But it is not our purpose here to conduct a review of the thematics 

of contemporary military literature. All serious students of national 

defense, plus even casual observers of newspaper front pages and 

the sound-bites of TV evening news programs, will attest that public 

analysis of asymmetric war, hearts and minds, exit strategies, urban 

warfare, WMD, terrorist activities, and homeland security has 

assailed their eyes and ears ad nauseam for the last several years. 

Unfortunately perhaps, but inevitably, these tired themes are now 

clichéd and hackneyed in the public consciousness.

 The remarkable aspect of these analyses is not their persistency or 

frequency, however, but rather that, despite their constant presence, 

the analyses seem so rarely to translate into operationalized success 

on the battlefield and afterward. The intellectual and scholarly 

community analyzes problems down to the last quark, but the 
2

analysis does not do us much good when payoff time rolls around 

and we need to apply in war the fruits of our peacetime cogitations.

 Observant readers will note that the seven thematic security issues 

broached above are interrelated to a large degree and that all have 

coalesced in an incredibly thorny problem complex as the second 

Gulf War now approaches its uncertain denouement. Tons have been 

written on asymmetric warfare, yet sectarian militias and masked 

gunmen armed with rifle-propelled grenades and roadside bombs 

still fight our modern war machine to a standstill. Skilled behavioral 

psychologists have delivered the final word on wooing hearts and 

minds, yet the oppressed whom we come to liberate despise us and 

cheer over the mangled bodies of our dead soldiers. Political scientists 

produce impressive studies on winding down wars successfully and 

extricating ourselves gracefully, yet we must leave large guaranty 

forces behind indefinitely. Military thinkers devise Solomonic tactics 

and weapons for conducting urban warfare, but our forces fail to 

apply them for fear of killing civilians and destroying sacred mosques 

that the enemy himself does not hesitate to profane. We as a nation 

fret about WMD in the hands of rogue states, but take decisive action 

only against the one state that apparently lacked them. We declare 

a global war against terrorism, yet fail to consolidate our initial 

victory over the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan where it all 

began. We preach homeland security to the high heavens, but fail to 

back our preachments with truly serious investment, government 

reorganization, and citizen sacrifice.

 The gap between our supposedly keen analytical solutions to 

problems of current wars on one hand, and our spotty record in 

applying those solutions on the other, raises important questions. Is our 

analysis any good? If it is, does our government pay any attention to 

it? For example, the so-called Weinberger doctrine counseled, among 

other things, that no military intervention be undertaken without 

decisive force. Yet, we conducted Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

on a shoestring, succeeding brilliantly in the initial assault against 

Saddam’s organized forces but never being able to muster the sort 

of widespread, smothering presence that would have snuffed out all 

significant resistance from the start. Moreover, despite the doctrine’s 

insistence on clear political objectives, it appears that the campaign 
3

plan was focused mainly on achieving a quick military victory, with 

relatively little attention to such politico-strategic concerns as postconflict consolidation and government reconstitution.

 Finally, the most sobering question raised by the continuing gap 

between theory and application is this: Within the parameters set 

by political realities, national attitudes, and cultural mind-sets in 

the United States today, are the seven problems posed by the openended war on terrorism in the 21st century even amenable to solution 

in any kind of decisive, conclusive sense? If not, then how will the 

United States and its allies defend themselves in the 21st century’s 

war on terrorism, and what should our aims be?

 The 22 conference presenters whose views are summarized in the 

following pages have assembled an impressive body of information 

and ideas bearing directly on the question of broadening our definition 

of victory in war to include the coequally valid desideratum of an 

acceptable peace. This idea is as old as Clausewitz, of course, and 

we may note further that, since the inauguration of the most recent 

Clausewitzian renaissance by Michael Howard and Peter Paret in 

1976, the nation’s political and military leaders have been literally 

drenched in recollections of the great philosopher’s enduring dictum. 

Yet, in an irony bordering on the surreal, we as a nation continue to 

celebrate the heroics and drama of battlefield victory as signaling 

war’s triumph, only later waking to disillusionment as the promised 

political rewards remain tantalizingly beyond reach.

 It is perhaps understandable that we fell into such strategic traps 

in Korea and Vietnam, conflicts arriving on the heels of a world 

war in which unconditional surrender of enemy arms seemed to 

be a sufficient goal. But it is far less understandable today, when 

the Clausewitzian nexus between war and politics is so indelibly 

engraved on every policymaker’s worldview―or so we thought.

 In the broad context of demonstrating that wars are won only if the 

peace is won, as well as suggesting concrete means of capitalizing on 

this axiomatic truth, our presenters also contribute seminal thought 

on the continuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and in the global 

antiterrorist war generally. Finally, readers will find precipitating 

from the collective discussion enlightening cues and insights 

regarding such macro issues as what Western aims should truly be in 
4

a new old kind of war that is global in scope, unlimited in duration, 

and uncertain in outcome. The 22 presentations, which―it is to be 

emphasized―represent the views of the speakers and not those of 

the editor or the Army War College, are commended for reading by 

all defense theoreticians, policymakers, and practitioners, not only 

to impart conceptual understanding, but in the ever-renewable hope 

that they will exercise constructive influence in some modest fashion 

on the actual conduct of American statecraft.
5

CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS AND DISCUSSION

Lieutenant General Jay Garner, Keynote Address.

 In Lieutenant General Garner’s view, “the American people have 

never come to realize what terrible shape the Iraqi economy was in 

nor the desperate plight facing the Iraqi people when the Coalition 

assumed control” following the U.S. march into Baghdad in January 

2003. For example, there was no operational civil communications 

system and little electricity and potable water. Sixteen of the twentythree government ministerial headquarters buildings were unusable. 

Infrastructure had crumbled through long neglect and lack of 

capitalization. Indigenous police and security forces had evaporated. 

Accumulated garbage was so voluminous, it required the immediate 

hiring of 11,000 trash collectors just to avert a threatened public 

health crisis.

 The situation could have become far worse, but four of the most 

seriously feared problems―Iraqi use of chemical weapons, massive 

flows of refugees, starvation-level food shortages, and disease 

epidemics―failed to materialize. Moreover, Coalition interagency 

planning had been very good, though the requirement to reconstitute 

the police forces and government ministerial staffs and civil workers 

presented formidably persistent problems. The organization of the 

Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance was seriously 

impeded in the early days by wrangling with the Department of 

Defense (DoD) over selection of the team members who would 

oversee reconstitution of the Iraqi ministries. Coalition difficulties 

were further compounded by bureaucratic impediments to timely 

letting of contracts with the large construction companies that 

would handle the actual rebuilding. Fortunately, the Iraqi school 

and university systems have remained functional throughout. The 

technical skill level among the population at large is more than 

sufficient for reconstituting and running the country if the insurgency 

can be contained.

 The insurgency that continues today is best thought of as a contest 

of wills. The United States has a track record of walking away in 
6

such situations. A majority of Iraqis are thankful to the United States 

for removing Saddam Hussein. The Shiites, however, who had most 

to gain from liberation, will be of little use in rebuilding the country 

because of their lingering resentment of the massive slaughter of 

Shiites (perhaps up to 500,000 deaths) that followed the first Gulf 

war, when Coalition forces pulled out of the country under terms 

and conditions enabling Saddam’s surviving forces to undertake a 

murderous reprisal. The Kurds in the north, whom we protected, 

remain a strong support.

 Iraq remains an incredibly unpredictable theater, but the Coalition 

can prevail. Toward that end, the Coalition must do five things: (1) 

destroy the insurgents; (2) rapidly reestablish the regular army; (3) 

stimulate the Iraqi economy by cash infusions disseminated directly 

to families; (4) share oil revenues equitably among all segments of the 

population; and (5) through a constitution written by Iraqis, establish 

a carefully contrived mechanism for national governance based on 

the federal system, with power distributed between a relatively 

weak central government and a number of empowered constituent 

territorial governments that reflect the ethnic and religious divisions 

of the country.

 Every Iraqi has an identification card so that fair elections are 

technically feasible. However, we cannot replicate Western-style 

democracy in Iraq or other states of the region. Foreign investment 

and a capitalist economy are pre-conditions for the growth of a 

democratic culture. The United States and its Western partners need 

to relieve the Iraqi people of the crushing financial debt incurred 

by Saddam. Moreover, the United States must have the stomach to 

see the conflict through, and both political parties must support the 

effort. Also, we need to trust the Iraqis: “It is better for the Iraqis to do 

it themselves imperfectly than for us to do it in their behalf perfectly.” 

There are good-news stories from Iraq, but they are crowded off 

the front pages by the news media’s fixation on firefights, roadside 

bombs, and American casualties. The writing of a constitution in 

9 months by fiercely divided Iraqi delegates, for example, was an 

incredible accomplishment, despite the reservations of Shiite cleric 

Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani.

 Two encouraging thoughts are worth keeping in mind: (1) the 

attitude of U.S. servicemembers in Iraq is positively inspiring; and 
7

(2) our soldiers, marines, and sailors will prevail if we as a nation 

back them up.

PANEL I: AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY IN THE GLOBAL WAR 

ON TERRORISM

Professor William Wohlforth.

 As the lead-off speaker in the first panel, Professor Wohlforth 

observed that the standard critique of the present U.S. grand 

strategy as propounded by the Bush administration can be summed 

up in two words borrowed from critiques of an earlier era: imperial 

overstretch. According to this critique, the war on terrorism is out 

of control; the preemption/prevention doctrine is dangerous and 

counterproductive; unilateralism undermines key alliances and 

partnerships; dissemination of democracy is beyond our means 

and wisdom; the doctrine of military dominance is provoking 

and inflammatory. Taken together, these criticisms coalesce in the 

judgment that the present U.S. grand strategy reflects a serious 

overestimation of American power.

 A sounder view, however, takes the opposite stance―namely, 

“that the main flaw of the current U.S. grand strategy is its failure to 

appreciate U.S. strengths and thus capitalize upon those strengths in 

fashioning its counter-terror strategy.” Based on any scale of power―

economic, military, technological, geographical, demographic, 

institutional―the United States “enjoys dominance on the world 

stage.” Globalization, far from undermining American power as is 

commonly alleged, actually enhances it―by reinforcing U.S. militarytechnological dominance, leveraging U.S. influence in the World 

Bank and International Monetary Fund, increasing U.S. goodwill in 

developing countries by opening up markets, and enabling the more 

flexible and better-positioned U.S. economy to reap the benefits of 

worldwide economic integration. True, globalization in combination 

with U.S. power and dominance adds to the resentment problem, 

but on a net basis the positives afforded the United States by the 

present strategic setting “massively outweigh the negatives.”

 Given such a strategic setting, three recommendations for 

revamping U.S. grand strategy follow. First, “emphasize the indirect 

approach rather than the direct approach in fighting terrorist threats,” 
8

that is, induce other governments to adopt policies that minimize 

terrorist threats to the United States. For example, by assisting 

Pakistan on debt relief, economic sanctions, aid, and a possible textile 

quota increase, the United States has been afforded unprecedented 

cooperation from President Musharraf in operations against al-Qaeda. 

There are a couple of reasons for the indirect approach: it plays to our 

strengths because they are usually better suited to influencing other 

governments than to finding and assaulting terrorists; and it is likely 

to be more effective because local governments are best equipped to 

police their own territory.

 Second, “increase the salience of economic statecraft in the 

war on terrorism.” To return to the Pakistan example, because of 

opposition from the domestic textile lobby, the U.S. Government 

reneged in its pledge to increase Pakistan’s textile import quota, 

thereby jeopardizing further cooperation from a leader who 

desperately needed the increase to bolster his own political standing. 

The Bush administration should emphasize the connection between 

unpopular economic policies and U.S. security, so that people come 

to understand that some domestic economic sacrifices must be made 

in the war on terrorism.

 Third, the United States should “overhaul its approach to 

multilateral cooperation.” The standard critique of the Bush 

administration in this regard is that it failed to defer to international 

institutions, thereby alienating allies and partners. This critique is 

partially correct, but it fails to acknowledge that those not our friends 

try to use international institutions to constrain the United States in 

its pursuit of security and national interests.

 The correct approach is to adopt a strategy consistent with U.S. 

power realities. There are two strategies that play to American 

strengths. Policy 1 is simply to resign from the national order, 

breaking free and reaping the advantages that total autonomy would 

bring. The downside is that we would forfeit what are often the very 

real benefits of association with other states―cooperation, assistance, 

and enhanced legitimacy. The other feasible strategy, Policy 2, is to 

participate vigorously in international institutions and seek to shape 

the world order toward our own ends. The downside is having 

to submit to constraints that run counter to our interests when, 

regardless of our power, we cannot carry the day in the governing 

forums.
9

 The key criticism of the Bush administration strategy is that it has 

followed a waffling middle course between Policies 1 and 2, suffering 

the disadvantages of both while harvesting the advantages of neither. 

Under what we might call Policy 3, it has exempted itself from 

institutional restraints at times, but later gone back to the institution 

with hat in hand, begging for help in exchange for willingness to be 

constrained. The result is the worst of both worlds―the United States 

increases the apparent importance of the international institutions 

even as it does nothing to reshape them in ways that will benefit us.

 Professor Wohlforth states that, while he lacks the research to 

back up a recommendation for either Policy 1 or Policy 2, he certainly 

recommends that “we move away from Policy 3.”

Dr. Robin Dorff. 

 Dr. Dorff takes the position “that a genuinely comprehensive 

approach to promoting legitimate national governance within the 

world’s community of nations is an appropriate and necessary U.S. 

grand strategy for achieving greater national and international 

security.”

 The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, 

followed by our subsequent military operations in Afghanistan and 

Iraq, have heightened awareness of and interest in both terrorism 

and so-called failed and failing states. This awareness has helped to 

broaden the security debate and forced a somewhat reluctant policy 

community in the United States to recognize the changing face of 

security. Whether we choose to call it nation-building, post-conflict 

reconstruction, or something else, the point is simply that we can no 

longer view security in strictly military terms (if that were ever the 

case), and we must accordingly engage the full array of national and 

international elements of power in pursuit of security. Economic, 

political/diplomatic, and informational tools must be coordinated 

and focused on the task of building an international assemblage 

of nations whose governments bask in the sunlight of legitimacy, 

human rights, and popular support. This task must be accomplished 

in an increasingly interdependent world and amidst an expanding 

number of global challenges. In short, “what the United States 
10

needs is a grand strategy that focuses on the global deficit of good 

governance.”

Professor Robert Lieber. 

 The threat environment is defined primarily in terms of the 

following three factors: (1) the implications of September 11, 2001; 

(2) the inherent weaknesses of international institutions; and (3) the 

necessity for U.S. self-help and a risk-acceptant posture. The day we 

have come to call 9/11 marked a watershed in the nation’s threat 

environment, one of those few genuinely apocalyptic moments such 

as the British torching of Washington during the War of 1812 and 

the destruction of the U.S. Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor in 1941. In 

9/11, the profound threat from WMD, terrorism, and radical Islamic 

movements coalesced in a single convulsive act. The weakness, 

paralysis, and ineffectuality of such multilateral responses to the 

threat as the United Nations (UN) and European Union might muster 

mandate an American policy of “self-reliance, independence, and 

even unilateralism.”

 The long-familiar strategy of containment is ill-adapted to provide 

security in the face of the new threat because the enemy is at once so 

amorphous and fragmented that American power cannot be applied 

in a deterrent role. Moreover, if deterrence fails, the consequences 

could be horrific. Thus a more aggressive strategy is indicated, 

allowing for preemptive and preventive attacks by the United States 

to forestall intended terrorist attacks. Like the Cold War, the war on 

terror is likely to be long and costly, but it is unavoidable.

 With regard to Iraq, “debate should focus not upon whether 

the war was legal (it was), but rather upon its wisdom.” In this 

regard, Saddam did constitute a strategic threat because of his past 

demonstrated willingness to employ WMD and because of his attacks 

against his neighbors, which could have destabilized the region. 

The dangers of not acting outweighed the dangers of acting, even 

in the presence of imperfect information. There are obvious difficult 

postwar issues to be dealt with, but they are resolvable if America 

stays the course. The Bush administration’s response is necessary in 

view of the genuine long-term threat.
11

PANEL II: FISCAL AND POLITICAL SUSTAINABILITY

Dr. Alice Rivlin. 

 All of the actions being discussed in the present conference―

coping with terror and insurgency, peacekeeping, nation-building, 

democratization―depend on resources as well as strategy and 

leadership. They depend on the strength of the American economy 

and the willingness of the public and their representatives to dedicate 

resources sufficient to implement them.

 The outlook for the U.S. economy is favorable, but the prospect 

for the federal budget is extremely worrisome. If current policies 

continue and the tax cuts are extended, the federal budget is likely to 

run large sustained deficits for the next decade, which will constrain 

military as well as domestic spending. After that, the situation gets 

worse as spending for retirement programs rapidly escalates. We are 

a wealthy, highly productive country. We can afford both a strong 

defense and adequate domestic public services. But “we can’t do it 

on borrowed money.”

 Looked at objectively, the current statistics about the economy 

give a mostly good-news story. Slow job growth, however, is 

very serious if you are out of work or worried that you might be. 

Optimism is justified on this score, first because of the economy’s 

strong job creation in the past decade, and second because of the 

impressive resilience of the economy in the face of such shocks as 

the stock market crash, 9/11, wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the 

wave of corporate scandals.

 There is no question that the federal deficit is high―about half a 

trillion dollars or about 4.5 percent of the Gross Domestic Product. 

But this deficit is not a problem now because the economy is operating 

below capacity, and inflation is tame. Depending on which level of 

economic growth one predicts for the balance of this decade, nearterm deficits could vanish or they could worsen. But after 2010, in 

Dr. Rivlin’s view, “rising demographic pressure will overwhelm the 

budget, no matter what growth rates are.”

 Deficits do matter, primarily because they eventually entail 

higher interest rates which can damage the economy, and because 

they transfer debt burden to future generations. Moreover, there is 
12

the additional worrisome uncertainty surrounding the huge amount 

of our public debt held by foreigners. Should they ever decide to 

dump their dollar-denominated investments, a financial crisis could 

ensue.

 Recently, a Brookings team conducted comparative studies of 

how the federal budget could be balanced in 10 years. Despite drastic 

(even draconian) spending cuts and despite shifting heavy burdens 

to state and local governments, not one of the three approaches 

adduced could balance the budget by 2014 without substantial 

additional infusions of new revenue.

 It thus becomes extremely important for those involved in 

discussions on U.S. grand strategy to think constructively about 

the wider context within which decisions on national security 

expenditures will be made. We are “in a deep hole, and it will get 

deeper soon.” We shall have to make difficult choices on both the 

spending side and the revenue side of the budget. Success will 

require a strong bipartisan consensus on the objective of getting to 

budgetary balance and on restoring budget decision rules requiring 

hard choices. Toward these ends, the study team made four 

proposals: (1) restoring caps on discretionary spending; (2) restoring 

pay-as-you-go rules for both entitlements and taxes―meaning that 

new entitlements and tax cuts have to be paid for; (3) imposing 

strict definitions of emergency exceptions; and (4) prohibiting the 

passage of sunset laws (those laws stipulating termination dates for 

government programs absent specific congressional reauthorization) 

just to make cost look smaller.

Dr. Eric Labs. 

 Long-term cost projections of resources for defense are trending 

higher, even overlooking the huge spike occasioned by the FY03 

Omnibus and Supplemental Appropriations Bills and the FY04 

Supplemental, which together were necessitated by the wars in 

Afghanistan and Iraq. Resources for defense include the categories 

Operations and Support (for the salaries of DoD’s military, civilian, 

and contractor employees, their benefits, the operating costs of DoD’s 

equipment, and the costs to operate and maintain defense facilities) 
13

and Investment (development and procurement of DoD’s weapon 

systems). DoD’s total obligational authority (TOA) grew rapidly 

from the early to mid-1980s, reaching a peak of $420 billion in 1985 

at the height of the Reagan defense buildup. Reflecting the end of 

the Cold War, TOA then generally declined during the late 1980s 

and into the 1990s, reaching its lowest point in 1997 at about $238 

billion.

 DoD’s obligational authority then began to rise again, reaching 

$304 billion by 2000 and then growing rapidly as U.S. forces became 

engaged in operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2003, DoD’s TOA 

reached $449 billion, including $74 billion in supplemental funding. 

The 2004 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) anticipated that defense 

resources (excluding supplementals) would rise from $383 billion 

in 2004 to $439 billion in 2009. If supplemental appropriations are 

included, obligations in 2004 will be some $450 billion, about the 

same amount that Congress appropriated for DoD in 2003.

 If the program in the 2004 FYDP is carried out as currently 

envisioned, the demand for defense resources, exclusive of 

contingency needs, would continue to increase through 2022. They 

would average $458 billion per year between 2010 and 2022―or about 

$75 billion more than the 2004 request, and about $8 billion more 

than the funding DoD received in 2004. The projection for 2010-22 

uses DoD’s cost estimates for its planned programs, and, consistent 

with the 2004 FYDP, excludes costs for continued operations in 

Afghanistan, Iraq, and other activities conducted in the global war 

on terrorism.

 Dr. Labs notes that various factors “could push the costs of current 

plans even higher”: for example, costs for weapons programs might 

grow as they have since the Vietnam War; operating costs for major 

equipment might increase as they have over the past 2 decades; and 

the United States might continue to conduct military operations 

overseas as part of the continuing global war on terrorism. Should 

these assumptions prove correct, and there is a high risk that they 

will, then resource demands would instead average about $473 

billion a year through 2009 (12 percent higher) and about $533 billion 

between 2010 and 2022 (16 percent higher).

 The Operation and Support basket accounts for about two-thirds 

of the DoD budget. Expenditures are projected to rise from $236 
14

billion in 2004, to $254 billion by 2009, to $292 billion by 2022, with 

health care costs (expected to nearly double between 2004 and 2022) 

and real pay raises accounting for the increase.

 The Investment basket, constituting about one-third of the DoD 

budget, is projected to grow from $137 billion in 2004 to $171 billion 

by 2009 to $186 billion by 2013, after which it would decline. Over 

the 2010-22 period, assuming that weapons costs do not grow as they 

have historically, investment demands would average about $175 

billion a year. These figures exceed the January 2003 projections of the 

Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the excess being accounted for 

by increases in procurement spending on the Army Future Combat 

System ($9 billion a year), defense agency funding increases ($8 

billion a year), a new transformation-related research, development, 

test, and evaluation (RDT&E) account ($5 billion a year), and Air 

Force and Navy investment increases (about $6 billion and $1 billion 

a year, respectively).

 The CBO projects that if the Army’s current plans are carried 

out, by 2012 the Army’s investment spending will exceed the $34 

billion spent in 1985, and by 2014 it will reach a peak of $42 billion. 

With the Future Combat System (FCS) driving the Army’s high cost 

projections, the CBO continues to project increased demands for Army 

investment over the next decade despite a number of retrenchments. 

These include canceling the Commanche reconnaissance helicopter 

program; terminating the planned upgrade programs for the Army’s 

current fleet of ground combat vehicles, including Abrams tanks and 

Bradley fighting vehicles; delaying the start of FCS procurement; and 

transferring funding for destruction of chemical munitions out of the 

Army’s budget.

Dr. Michael O’Hanlon. 

 Budgetarily, the United States had better prepare itself to make 

some very tough choices regarding the size and weaponry of its 

forces. Whoever wins the November 2004 election will have to get 

serious. The Army faces the gravest problems and needs to move 

now. If it waits, it will face a crisis without a quick solution.

 The Army, and possibly the Marines, needs an immediate 

increase in its active-duty troop level. The decision is badly overdue, 
15

with the problems worsening daily (the decision to increase should 

have been made in mid-2003 after it became obvious that the postSaddam stabilization mission in Iraq would be long and difficult).

 There is no definitive method for determining the appropriate 

size for the Army because “it is impossible to figure exactly how 

large a rotation base would be needed to continue the Iraq mission 

over a period of years, while avoiding unacceptable strain on the 

all-volunteer force that could drive large numbers of soldiers out of 

the military.” But we do know that today’s policies, if continued for 

long within today’s parameters, carry with them the very real risk of 

breaking the all-volunteer force.

 “Logic and a basic sense of fairness” suggest that we generally 

should not send active-duty troops back to Iraq after only a short 

respite at home between successive deployments. One year in Iraq, 

one year home, and then another year in Iraq constitute an extremely 

demanding pattern. Yet, that is exactly what the Army will soon 

need to do with some units. Moreover, the Chief of the Army 

Reserve has argued convincingly that reservists should not have to 

be involuntarily activated for more than a 9-to-12 month period once 

every 5-to-6 years.

 One simplified but illuminating way to approach the problem of 

estimating the necessary increase in troop strength is to figure how 

many new units would be needed to carry out the Army’s share of an 

entire rotation in all overseas missions―notably, Iraq, Afghanistan, 

and Korea―in 2006 (it would have been much safer to generate the 

respite in 2005, but given the Pentagon’s reluctance to espouse such a 

policy, it is now too late for that year). Providing a break for existing 

units in 2006 is now the absolutely minimal objective for relieving 

strain on the active and reserve forces in the coming years.

 Roughly speaking, the Army and Marines may have to provide 

85,000-110,000 ground troops for these missions in 2006, assuming 

a requirement for 50,000-75,000 in Iraq, 10,000 in Afghanistan, and 

25,000 in Korea. Perhaps on the order of 15,000 of these can be 

provided out of the combat brigades of the Army National Guard, 

leaving a need for 70,000-95,000 new soldiers and marines. Of that 

number, 10,000 should be generated from existing and planned 

Pentagon initiatives to privatize certain current military positions. 
16

Another 15,000 (plus or minus) active troops may be generated 

internally from force rebalancing measures by which high-demand 

units are augmented with soldiers from lower-demand units such as 

artillery. The resulting arithmetic indicates that about 45,000-70,000 

new troops would have to be added to present end strength.

 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld already is planning to use 

emergency powers to increase the size of the active ground troops 

by some 20,000, so that a net addition of 25,000-50,000 would be 

required according to the foregoing rough calculation. Some of the 

increase might need to go to the Special Forces. But given the nature 

of Special Forces―elite, older, very highly specialized and trained―

and considering the pressing need for additional combat and support 

units, most of the new ground troops should go to conventional 

Army formations.

 The increases in troop levels and the enormous expenses 

of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan will absolutely mandate 

economies, retrenchments, and scale-downs in certain other sectors 

of the total defense program. The likely candidates for reduction, 

according to Dr. O’Hanlon, are the following.

Missile Defense. By 2005, missile defense spending will be at the 

rate of about $10 billion a year, a figure expected to continue for the 

rest of the decade. This amount is roughly double the annual amount 

spent in 1991 during the elder Bush’s administration.

 Despite the expense and immaturity of the technology, deploying 

an interim missile defense capability in the coming months makes 

sense. The missile threat is real. Strategically speaking, the United 

States has absolutely no missile defense capability now. Even 

an imperfect system is better than the status quo. Rudimentary 

fortifications “based on throwing up barricades is preferable to 

leaving a city naked before invaders.”

 Since missile defense is not now the country’s top security priority, 

however, some sense of perspective is in order. Even as it continues 

to deploy an interim long-range missile defense capability, improve 

shorter-range missile defense systems, and work on technologies for 

better future systems, the United States should scale back its missile 

defense plans, perhaps to a level between that of the late Clinton 

years, when resources were devoted primarily to research and 
17

development, and the current Bush outlays. That would allow for 

deployment of perhaps a two-tier strategic defense system, designed 

to intercept a few dozen warheads or less, as well as theater missile 

defenses and continued intensive R&D efforts.

 Additionally, several specific economies should be considered 

such as reducing the $1 billion intended in 2005 for the Navy’s Aegis

destroyer platform for a long-range missile defense system; limiting 

any deployment of the main midcourse missile defense system to 

50-100 interceptors, enough to deal with the more plausible attack 

by North Korea; canceling the acquisition of certain ancillary 

technologies such as low-orbit tracking satellites; and stretching out 

the overall program.

Air Force. Open to serious doubt is the Air Force’s sustainment of 

two huge simultaneous main combat weapon programs―the stealthy 

air-supremacy/ground-attack F/A-22 and (in conjunction with the 

Navy and Marine Corps) the stealthy ground-attack Joint Strike 

Fighter (JSF). This is particularly true given that recent Air Force 

operations have succeeded with stunningly few losses; that improved 

electronics, sensors, targeting techniques, and communications have 

greatly increased the precision and thus the efficiency of existing 

aircraft; that refurbishing present aircraft or replacing them with 

newly produced versions (e.g., F-15s and F-16s) would produce 

enormous savings; and that the improved performance of unmanned 

aerial vehicles throughout the next decade promises that human 

pilots will be supplanted in some roles.

 There is thus a strong presumption that the F/A-22 Raptor is not 

needed and that refurbished or new F-15s would suffice for years to 

come. “Given the maturity of the Raptor program,” however, there is 

a case for its continuance on schedule. If that occurs, the JSF program 

should be delayed by at least 2 or 3 years, and the total purchase 

should be reduced from 3,000 to 1,000 aircraft. The net savings from 

these and associated changes would be about $50 billion, with over 

half accruing over the next 10 years, mostly for the Air Force.

 There are also sensible savings to be had in the Air Force (and 

Navy) budgets with regard to nuclear weapons. Russia and the 

United States are committed to reducing their numbers of operational 

strategic warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by 2012, with no 

other stipulations. Therefore, “the United States should do it sooner 
18

rather than later, and in a manner designed to save money.” With 

regard to platforms, we could retire 200 Minuteman missiles and 

convert six (instead of the planned four) Trident submarines to an 

all-conventional role, thus according to the CBO saving $1 billion 

per year.

Army. The Army’s prime candidate for economies is the Future 

Combat System (FCS), the next-generation replacement for the main 

battle tank as well as other elements of the current heavy divisions. 

It is conceived to weigh far less than an Abrams tank and therefore 

to be more deployable (fitting on a C-130 aircraft) and fuel-efficient, 

depending on information networking rather than heavy armor for its 

survivability. A production decision is planned for 2008, with initial 

operational capability by 2010 and one-third of the Army having 

fielded the FCS by 2020. The total cost of these efforts is estimated to 

be $92 billion.

 The concept is reasonable but “seems rushed,” given that the 

Stryker program is to form a half dozen medium-weight brigades 

and is itself in the process of implementation, with a sizable legacy 

heavy force still in existence. Slowing the main objectives of the FCS 

program by as much as a decade seems reasonable. That would space 

the Stryker and FCS generations 15 years apart, still a rapid pace for 

modernization, thus saving about $3 billion or more a year during 

the 10-year interim.

Navy and Marine Corps. Apart from the Joint Strike Fighter, 

Aegis destroyer, and Trident submarine issues broached earlier, 

the most expensive program of dubious value is the V-22 Osprey, 

a tilt-rotor aircraft long plagued by fatal accidents during trials. Its 

expected survivability in combat is only 10 to 20 percent better than 

a helicopter’s, and its crash-avoidance flight profile will probably 

not be feasible in combat conditions. Moreover, helicopters will still 

be necessary to carry the heaviest equipment during aerial assaults. 

Viewed as a niche-mission aircraft, and one still under development 

at that, the V-22 lends itself to a modest purchase of only a few 

dozen. The net savings would be about $10 billion over the life of the 

program.

 The Navy plans to buy 16 of the new DDX land-attack destroyers. 

But it could save nearly $1 billion a year over the next decade by 

obtaining only half that many, while basing four of those overseas or 
19

at least keeping four overseas for 2-year stretches at a time. Similarly, 

additional savings could safely be achieved by buying fewer Virginia

class submarines, compensating by forward-stationing up to a half 

dozen at such bases as Guam.

PANEL III: INSURGENCY AND TERRORISM

Dr. Steven Metz. 

 In taking up the topic of insurgency, Dr. Metz begins with 

definition: Insurgency is a strategy in which the weak use various 

forms of protracted asymmetric violence, psychological conflict, 

and a radical counterideology to alter the balance of power in their 

favor.

 Insurgency first pursues (through necessity) a protracted 

alteration of the power balance and only then an imposition of will 

on the target group or population. It aims to mobilize support for 

the insurgents’ cause at the same time it is eroding support for the 

existing power. It can target the balance of power within a nation (the 

most common practice during the mid-to-late 20th century), within 

an entire region, or even globally. It can seek outright victory or 

something less. Finally, insurgency “is usually a long-shot strategy 

adopted out of desperation.”

 The contemporary U.S.-dominated world order seethes with 

resentment and hatred in many quarters, but those opposed cannot 

alter the existing world through conventional military means. Hence 

they are seeking to alter that order through unconventional means, 

i.e., through insurgency. Insurgency has always existed because there 

have always been weak groups that wanted to supplant strong ones, 

but historically such challenges to the existing order have ebbed 

and flowed in strategic significance. Insurgency today has entered a 

period of enormous strategic import, one bold enough to challenge 

the most powerful nation on earth along with its Western allies.

 The 20th century was a “golden age for insurgency” because 

the breakup of the colonial empires left in its wake weak, unstable 

states seemingly ripe for the plucking, while the Cold War provided 

generous external sponsors of contending groups. Today, however, 
20

insurgency is different. Because of such technological advances as 

instant international news dissemination, television, cell phones, 

email, and the worldwide web, insurgents have the advantages of 

greater cohesiveness, unity of effort, and intra-group communication. 

Moreover, they can carry their message to like-minded groups 

throughout the world, seeking and often gaining support. Since they 

no longer can acquire the large state sponsors characteristic of the 

old bipolar world, they must generate their own revenue (though 

they can still at times obtain under-the-table financial backing from 

sympathetic or fearful states).

 But unlike the communist and nationalist ideologies of the Cold 

War era, which provided both a critique of existing orders and a 

countervision, radical Islam “issues a critique but can offer no 

acceptable alternative.” Thus insurgency born of Islam is entirely 

negative, and the flaws of its radical alternatives are laid bare before 

the world by the same modern communications that carry the 

insurgency’s message.

 The United States is in the process of working out its decision as to 

whether to pursue a strategy of victory or a strategy of management. 

It has declared a strategy of victory, but assumed it could successfully 

pursue such a strategy without a traumatic mobilization of means. 

It is discovering, however, that a successful strategy of victory 

would entail undertaking a second track of transformation, i.e., 

such difficult and painful measures as a truly cross-governmental 

effort (since counterinsurgency is 80 percent political, economic, 

and psychological); a professional core of regional security and 

development advisors; integrated national intelligence, strategy, 

and operational planning; culturally astute military units capable 

of protracted operations; effects-based planning and execution to 

eradicate the insurgency threat in all dimensions; and a sustained 

effort based on the full integration of contractors.

 A strategy of management, on the other hand, would “entail 

acknowledgment that so long as there are haves and have nots in 

the world, there will always be insurgencies.” The United States 

as the richest, most powerful, most resented, and secretly most 

envied nation in the world will never achieve absolute victory over 

insurgents in the sense of putting an end to their efforts. Faced 

with these realities, the strategy of management would reduce the 
21

scope, aggressiveness, and intensity of its overseas military actions 

against insurgents to a sustainable level, confining its major overseas 

initiatives to the political, diplomatic, and psychological realms. In 

this country, institutionalizing homeland security for the long haul 

would be the main concern.

 However, with the American declaratory policy of victory 

combined with a failure thus far to make the necessary material and 

organizational investment, we have a “means-ends mismatch,” with 

a level of effort more appropriate for a strategy of management.

 With respect specifically to the Iraq insurgency, three points are 

to be noted. First, the insurgency was bottled up at first, emerging 

only gradually as the Coalition began efforts to turn the government 

over to the Iraqis. There has thus been a 10-month learning contest 

between the insurgents and the Coalition. Second, following the 

American tradition, we have done better with the military dimension 

than with the political, social, and psychological. Insurgencies that 

morph into a nationalistic struggle increase their chances of success. 

That could happen in Iraq. Third, the key determinants of the future 

will be the degree of legitimacy of the new Iraqi government, the 

effectiveness of the security forces, and whether the insurgent 

factions can coalesce in a united front.

 In considering insurgency as a global phenomenon, Dr. Metz 

makes four observations. First, in the face of the U.S.-dominated and 

enforced global order, insurgency is now a major mode of conflict 

because those opposed to that order have no other means to alter 

it. We are in the midst of the first global insurgency, and it will be 

the dominant motif of U.S. grand strategy in the coming decade. 

Second, at one level the antagonists are the United States and its 

allies against radical Islam. But at a deeper level, the antagonists are 

the people and entities who have adapted to globalization against 

those who continue to oppose it. Third, the global insurgency will 

be extremely hard to eradicate, but it is built on a narrowly negative 

ideology which we have all the necessary conceptual tools to counter. 

Fourth, we need a psychologically astute grand strategy, one that 

can placate anger and frustration on a global scale, one that can give 

the disenfranchised a stake in and enable them to identify with the 

system.
22

 The vital questions:

 • Is it possible to ameliorate the widespread discontent with 

the American-dominated world order? This is an extremely 

difficult question. The liberal perspective holds that the root 

causes are manipulatable and thus subject to ameliorative 

reforms. The conservatives hold that the causes are cultural 

and immutable, and in any event are not remediable at an 

affordable cost.

 • Does a strategy of victory over global insurgency make 

sense given the great cost and risk? Thus far, despite having 

declared a strategy of victory, the United States has been loath 

to undertake the sort of fundamental cross-governmental 

transformation necessary to implement it. This means-ends 

mismatch is a “recipe for disaster.”

Professor Ian Beckett. 

 To place the insurgency in Iraq in an adequate historical 

perspective would suggest taking note of the Arab revolts against 

the British in Iraq in 1920 and in Palestine between 1936 and 1939; 

the U.S. Marines’ experience in Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican 

Republic in the 1920s and early 1930s, and in Vietnam with the 

Combined Action Program in the late 1960s; the successful Jewish 

insurgency in Palestine between 1945 and 1947 to force out the 

British; the largely secular National Liberation Front’s (FLN) ultimate 

success against the French in Algeria between 1956 and 1962; the 

Arab insurgency against the British in South Arabia, specifically, the 

actions leading to the British abandonment of Aden in the late 1960s 

and their successful Dhofar campaign in Oman during the period 

1965-75; the British experience in Northern Ireland since 1969; and 

the Palestinian tactics against the Israelis today, as well as the antiIsraeli attacks by Hezbollah in Lebanon in recent years.

 Islamic fundamentalism, “which might be regarded more as an 

ideology than an expressly religious conviction,” has emerged as a 

new imperative behind insurgency ranging from the struggle against 

the Soviets in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989 to the continuing 

conflicts in the Philippines, Indonesia, Algeria, Sudan, Kashmir, and 
23

Chad. Of course, some of these conflicts may also be characterized in 

other terms such as ethnic or separatist insurgencies.

 Notwithstanding new motivational impulses, however, and 

the fact that insurgents are increasingly better armed, perhaps 

more fanatical, and in some cases better attuned to the information 

revolution than in the past, it is still the case that much remains the 

same in terms of the basic requirements for successful insurgency. 

Insurgency remains a highly political act arising from some sense of 

grievance, or upon the exploitation and manipulation of grievance. 

An insurgent leadership is still likely to be better motivated than the 

rank and file. Insurgency will still be the recourse of those initially 

weaker than their opponents and, though perhaps less protracted 

than in the past, may still largely depend for its ultimate success on 

substantial external support. Above all, however, insurgency is still 

invariably a competition for governmental control and in perceptions 

of legitimacy.

 One fundamental question is whether what is being faced in 

Iraq is insurgency or terrorism or perhaps merely a traditional 

form of guerrilla warfare or resistance. Prior to the 20th century, 

guerrilla warfare was understood as a purely military form of 

conflict, with classic hit-and-run tactics employed by indigenous 

groups in opposition to foreign or colonial occupation. Rarely did 

such guerrillas display any wider comprehension of the potential of 

irregular modes of conflict, and it was only in the 1930s and 1940s 

that guerrilla warfare became truly revolutionary in both intent and 

practice. Thus, dissident groups that were initially in a minority and 

weaker than the authorities would seek power through a combination 

of subversion, propaganda, and military action. 

 More properly, therefore, modern revolutionary guerrilla 

warfare increasingly was termed insurgency, with guerrilla tactics 

being employed strategically to achieve a particular political and/or 

ideological end. The transition from guerrilla warfare to insurgency 

does not depend, therefore, upon the size of any particular group, 

but upon the intention to bring about fundamental political 

change through a political-military strategy of organized coercion 

and subversion, and, usually, also the attempt to mobilize a mass 

political base. While insurgents might routinely employ terror 
24

or intimidation in tactical terms, they have rarely done so at the 

strategic level. Consequently, it can perhaps be argued that terrorist 

groups, even if motivated by an ideology similar to that of insurgent 

groups, have tended to employ terrorism indiscriminately and as 

political symbolism without the same intention of taking over the 

state apparatus themselves.

 The absence of a real insurgency in Iraq, however, does not make 

the situation less dangerous, and whatever the motivation of any 

particular group, the aim is clearly to sow divisions both between 

the Iraqis and the Coalition and between Iraqis themselves, and to 

raise the costs of the U.S. and Western presence. There can be little 

expectation on the part of these various groups that they are capable 

of challenging the Coalition’s military superiority.

 The basic patterns of insurgency have not materially changed, 

and there are similarities between the emerging situation in Iraq 

and some earlier insurgencies in the Middle East. It follows that the 

essentials of counterinsurgency have also remained fairly constant 

and that the kind of basic requirements for success that can be 

identified in campaigns since 1945 still hold good. These requirements 

are, first, a recognition of the need for a political rather than a purely 

military response to insurgency; second, a need for coordination of 

the civil and military response; third, a need for the coordination of 

intelligence; fourth, a need to separate insurgents from the population; 

fifth, a need for the appropriate use of military force, which generally 

means the minimum necessary in any given situation; and, last, the 

need to implement long-term reform to address the grievances that 

led to support for the insurgency in the first place. These principles 

are as applicable to Iraq as they once were to the British mandate in 

Palestine, Aden, Algeria, and Oman. Where they were not adhered 

to, as in Palestine, Aden, and Algeria, counterinsurgency failed; 

where they were, as in the Dhofar, counterinsurgency succeeded.

Mr. Steven Simon. 

 The basic question is: “What happened to al-Qaeda?” Views differ 

as to whether it still exists in Afghanistan, and, even if it does, whether 

it is still an effective force. Most likely, it remains what it always was, 

a “unique hub-and-wheel organization” with the brains and money 
25

at the center loosely connected to independent elements operating 

along the rim, inspired and united by the charismatic leader Osama 

bin Laden at the center. Since our forces went into Afghanistan, the 

center is now a floating hub, embodied in a leadership that moves 

around to maintain safety in a succession of secret locations. Thus 

the amorphous al-Qaeda organization “resembles one of Salvador 

Dali’s melting wheels, an apt characterization in this increasingly 

surreal struggle.”

 The al-Qaeda emblem provides a very large tent for the driven, the 

outcast, the malcontents, the disaffected young Muslims of the world. 

It asks, are you an anti-colonial activist? It answers, join al-Qaeda. Or 

are you bereft of prestige and identity? Is your religion under attack? 

Is your country being robbed of its wealth by the wicked West? Do 

you hate your government because it has abandoned the true faith? 

Regardless of grievance, the answer in all such cases is to join alQaeda. It thus casts its agenda in protean terms, and its occasional 

spectacular successes, as in the destruction of the World Trade Center 

buildings in New York, are hugely inspiring and catalytic to young 

men and women of the Middle East who can find no other recourse. 

In this regard, an authoritative reference is Professor Alan Richards’ 

superb monograph titled Socio-Economic Roots of Radicalism? Towards 

Explaining the Appeal of Islamic Radicals, published by the Strategic 

Studies Institute in 2003.

 The grand ayatollahs, who appeal to the higher instincts of Islam 

in counseling a moderate course of restraint and reconciliation, find 

their voices ignored, while those of the firebrand mullahs, who cry 

jihad and incite their followers to insurrection, draw rapt, responsive 

crowds. In responding to what can only be called a global Islamic 

insurgency, American rhetoric frequently goes amiss. President 

Bush speaks of cutting off the head of the snake, while Central 

Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director George Tenent talks of breaking 

the back of the enemy. Such analogies betray a naïve judgment 

that an amorphous, widespread organization like al-Qaeda can be 

exterminated by a single devastating stroke at some presumed focal 

point of vulnerability.

 Similarly, U.S. attempts to influence Muslim populations are 

frequently beset by counterproductive messages. For example, an 

American propaganda video shown in Indonesia depicted a female 
26

Muslim in the United States jogging in shorts, presumably an effort 

to demonstrate the integration of Muslims into American life. But 

such a scene would be anathema in most parts of the Muslim world. 

Influence operations to win hearts and minds are very difficult 

and tricky. We don’t do them well. Al-Qaeda does them far better, 

often successfully portraying generous, constructive U.S. actions 

in the Middle East simply as ruses intended to conceal our hostile 

intentions.

 Mr. Simon finds three elements of the global war on terrorism 

as being especially important: (1) democratization, (2) alliances, and 

(3) homeland security. Spreading democracy to failed states, along 

with all the economic and social benefits that we associate with 

transparency, accountability, and consequent capital investment, is 

the only credible long-term solution to what ails the globe’s huge 

islands of poverty and discontent. Alliances are essential in combating 

terrorism, not because they are necessary to encourage direct attacks 

on terrorists―no country wants them on its soil―but rather for 

the broad-gauge programs designed to win hearts and minds and 

stimulate economic development in states that breed terrorism. 

The job is simply too big for America alone. Finally, we need to get 

truly serious about homeland security. There is an apocalyptic bent 

in terrorist insurgency that leads members toward WMD. We must 

get our house in order because otherwise something unspeakably 

dreadful could happen.

Mr. William Kristol, Banquet Address. 

 Mr. Kristol began with the declaration that September 11, 2001, 

marked a historic juncture in U.S. statecraft and the American sense 

of security. “Things will never be the same.” We will never return to 

the innocent, halcyon days of the 1990s.

 Three overriding concerns are reflected in President Bush’s 

foreign policy: terrorism, WMD, and dictatorial regimes. Together, 

in an intertwined way, they constitute the gravest threat to American 

security that we have faced in living memory. In reality, the President 

is focused on terror, not terrorism, and this is proper for the American 

people will never consent to living out their lives in constant fear of 

deadly attack from without. Given these three overriding concerns, 
27

the President looks to the Middle East as the source of the problem. 

The President is saying that we can’t go on the old way. We have to 

change the Middle East. We have to neutralize the sowers of terror; 

we have to find and eliminate WMD and prevent their reappearance; 

we have to facilitate the emergence of democratic regimes, for it is 

these that will maintain peace with their neighbors and redress the 

sense of privation and alienation that afflicts their people.

 With regard to concern that the President failed to mount his 

response to domestic terror with greater alacrity and in a more 

aggressive manner, Mr. Kristol noted that it took a while for the 

administration to digest the situation and devise a proper response. 

The proper response involved very big decisions.

 In Iraq, there are many measures we should have taken and failed 

to take. The situation is probably manageable, but we will have to 

send more troops. President Bush will send them, even in an election 

year, because he knows it is right and necessary.

 Despite concern that Senator Kerry has not taken a firmer, more 

resolute stand in support of the American war effort in Iraq, a 

case can be made that if he wins the presidential election, he will 

act responsibly, and things won’t change much. There is more 

underlying bipartisanship regarding the war than we realize, but it 

is obscured by “obsessive electioneering.”

 The next big threat to American security, in Mr. Kristol’s view, will 

come from China if that nation retains its antidemocratic character.

PANEL IV: PEACEKEEPING, NATION-BUILDING, 

AND STABILIZATION

Dr. Conrad Crane. 

 In the post-conflict posture following decisive military 

operations against a target state, we normally envision a transitional 

reconstruction period during which peace and a viable state are 

established. The reconstruction period is divided into four distinct 

phases: I, Provide Security; II, Stabilize; III, Build Institutions; and 

IV, Handover/Redeploy. This scheme appears perfectly reasonable 

from a conceptual point of view. Given the compressed timetable 
28

of recent rapid deployment operations, however, with the purely 

military victory often occurring within weeks, days, or even less, it 

is imperative that reconstruction planning begin earlier than in the 

past and that reconstruction efforts themselves be initiated during 

the period of decisive military operations. In fact, for conceptual 

clarity and a proper appreciation of relative priorities, we should 

dispense entirely with a Phase IV as such, instead conflating it with 

a newly designed Phase III, Build Institutions/Handover/Redeploy. 

In such a conflation, reconstruction tasks might have to be reshuffled 

somewhat among the three remaining phases, depending on whether 

the tasks are judged to be critical, essential, or merely important. Such 

a scheme would lend doctrinal sanction to the battlefield lesson that, 

with the rapidity of recent stability operations, certain reconstruction 

efforts must begin “even while the fighting is still in progress.”

 In sum, reconstruction embraces three vital objectives that must 

be met generally in the order shown: (1) achieve security within 

the target state; (2) stabilize local commerce, government, and 

services so that the populace can resume the rudiments of daily life; 

and, (3) rebuild the economy and the institutions of government 

while handing over the reins of authority to appropriate civilian 

institutions or indigenous officials, and redeploying forces as early 

as feasible. In the past, no part of post-conflict operations has been 

more problematic for American military forces than the handover 

to civilian agencies, which ideally should precede the handover to 

indigenous authorities. More specifically, to limit the potential for 

regional backlash from a perceived prolonged military occupation, it 

is highly desirable that U.S. civilian and international organizations 

assume coalition military responsibilities as soon as possible. 

Unfortunately, the reality usually seems to be that the handover is 

directly to the local government. Clearly, successful reconstruction is 

as important as winning the shooting war, but within reconstruction, 

a successful handover/redeployment is every bit as important as 

building institutions.

 State stabilization and reconstruction are missions the American 

military would prefer not to take on. It does not have the proper 

force structure or doctrine to perform such missions, and its warrior 

mentality and culture are seen to be at odds with the requirement 
29

for winning over a suspicious or hostile populace. Yet, of all national 

and international agencies, the American military is the best for such 

missions when properly motivated and resourced. The Army as the 

lead ground force will bear the brunt of such efforts. The superb 

warfighting force that produced victories in Operations DESERT 

STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM generated a professional mindset 

antithetical to the roles of counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, postconflict stabilization, and nation-building. But since these are 

precisely the roles the Army will most likely be called upon to 

perform in the global war on terrorism, it becomes the task of Army 

leaders to shape a force that can win the peace as well as win the 

war, and to do both willingly.

Ms. Bathsheba Crocker. 

 We need to think analytically and realistically about the U.S. 

capacity to do post-conflict reconstruction work. Some question 

“whether we really want to get better at it because, if we do get better, 

we’ll be called upon to do more of it.” The foregoing reasoning is 

not sound, however, because whether we like to do post-conflict 

reconstructions or not, we’ve done or tried to do about one every 

other year since 1990. Moreover, in view of the ongoing global 

war on terrorism, Iraq will not be the last. In fact, with the large 

commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq, not to mention continuing 

missions in Kosovo, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, Congo, and Haiti, as well 

as upcoming ones like Sudan, such interventions are overwhelming 

our national security apparatus. Unless we improve the capacities 

of the entire U.S. government (by institutionalizing and adequately 

resourcing functional entities specifically designed to undertake 

the various aspects of post-conflict reconstruction), then the 

overwhelming burden will continue to fall on the U.S. military 

because the “need won’t go away, and they will continue to be the 

only game in town.”

 The persistency of the problem has unleashed a frenzy of study 

groups, task forces, committees, and commissions, inside and outside 

government, all looking for solutions. Some consensus seems to 

be emerging, with such deficiencies as the following having been 

identified: (1) lack of strategic planning and coordination capacity 
30

on the civilian side; (2) lack of home office and leaders on the civilian 

side, including lack of a lead civilian agency; (3) no consistent and 

flexible funding stream; (4) no standby capacity on the civilian side, 

e.g., legal teams, civilian police, civil administration/elections/

constitution/rule of law experts; (5) lack of a targeted training 

capacity; (6) inadequate security apparatus for doing stabilization/

constabulary/public safety work; and (7) lagging civilian/military 

coordination. Legislation and other efforts would create some new 

authorities and offices, set up standing coordination mechanisms, 

create new sources of funding, generate ready rosters of relevant 

civilian experts, and establish training centers. Had these proposed 

reforms been in place before our interventions in Afghanistan and 

Iraq, however, it is doubtful whether we could have avoided some 

or any of the mistakes and problems occurring in those countries.

 Attention shifted from Afghanistan to Iraq fairly quickly, and it 

has not shifted back, despite some very real concerns. Our efforts in 

Afghanistan have been called “nation-building lite” or “on the cheap.” 

There are 13,000 U.S. troops plus 6,000 international troops in the 

country, equating to less than one peacekeeper per 1,000 Afghans―

nowhere close to the RAND-calculated requirement of 20 per 1,000 

citizens as having been pointed to by the Balkan experience.

 Problems in Afghanistan include an initial planning/strategy 

breakdown, with no standing mechanism in place to ensure adequate 

planning and interagency coordination; a months-long fight 

over appointing an Afghanistan coordinator; inability of aid and 

reconstruction workers, election officials, and commercial interests to 

enter large parts of the country because of poor security; rebounding 

poppy production; resurgence of Taliban and al-Qaeda; warlords’ 

continued control of most of the country outside of Kabul; and the 

undermining of Karzai’s government, authority, and legitimacy by 

our cozy relations with warlords and use of proxies. In sum, we tout 

the existence of government and the passing of the constitution as 

successes, but we essentially have only the trappings of government 

and the rule of law without building effective state institutions that 

will uphold them.

 So far as the situation in Iraq is concerned, the planning/strategy 

failures are legion: there was no plan to prevent looting (which was 

ignored), no plan for security/stabilization, no plan for running 
31

the country; bureaucratic warfare between the Department of State 

and DoD over team personnel and other issues was not reined in 

by the National Security Council; Presidential Envoy Bremer’s 

Coalition Provisional Authority and its predecessor “have been 

undermanned and operating with Team B from the beginning,” 

with no standby capacity and bodies having to be scrounged from 

the State Department; the international police, justice, and rule 

of law teams were never brought in; there was no planning for a 

stabilization force, there were not enough troops, and there was no 

mandate to perform stabilization tasks for what troops we had; the 

war has essentially continued throughout the reconstruction effort, 

with lack of security shutting down some contractor work; there is 

a lack of good intelligence; it is not clear to whom the government 

will be transferred, regardless of whether the June 30, 2004, deadline 

is retained; public information/psyops needs fixing; lack of greater 

international involvement hurts the legitimacy of our effort.

 The military has performed admirably under strained 

circumstances, and it is very good at institutionalizing lessons 

learned, “but asking the military to take on the enormous 

reconstruction burden without sufficient manpower, training, or 

civilian counterparts is not a long-term strategy for success.”

Mr. Jaque Grinberg. 

 The UN, according to Mr. Grinberg, “has a crucial role to play in 

peacekeeping and nation-building.” Its reputation in some quarters 

is considerably worse than its objective record. In his analysis, three 

themes are particularly relevant.

 First, peacekeeping is here to stay, and we should therefore review 

our diverse assets objectively. The UN has far more to contribute in 

these endeavors than might be apparent. It has unique legal authority 

and is the prime instrument for conferring legitimacy. It also has 

unique moral authority, with the UN Charter still the primary 

document encapsulating the collective aspirations of mankind. No 

party to a dispute has ever disputed the message of the Charter. 

Only the UN has a global membership from which appropriate 

assets can be gathered to form precisely tailored responses to the 
32

infinitely multifarious challenges that arise. Finally, the UN offers 

the advantage of visible group burden sharing, thus promoting a 

sense of equity and solidarity.

 Of course, no one can say that the UN is a flawless vehicle. In the 

last 15 years, all parties have had to climb a steep learning curve in 

handling international disorder. The UN had a head start and does 

some things better than other civilian organizations. In judging the 

UN’s assets and performance, one should take care to distinguish 

between its role as an operational organization that performs 

missions around the globe, and its role through the Security Council 

as a legislative and policy body.

 The second theme is the need to adjust policy and operational 

settings in approaching peacekeeping and nation-building endeavors. 

Several persistent problems have continued to elude satisfactory 

resolution (and these generally apply regardless of sponsor―UN, 

coalition, or national). There is a pressing need to improve civilian 

planning for peacekeeping operations, so that “every time doesn’t 

seem like the first time.” We must also resolve the conundrum of 

dealing with pressure to define an exit strategy, while at the same 

time maintaining and expanding local commitment and cooperation 

with the peacekeeping force. It seems better to identify realistic 

and understandable goals, but not put a definitive time limit on 

the intervention. Closely linked with the foregoing concern is the 

challenge facing democratic societies of maintaining the domestic 

commitment beyond their 3-to-4-year election cycles.

 Still another problem is how to handle the numerous peacekeeping 

“gaps”: the local leadership gap; the security gap; the rule-of-law gap; 

the jobs/expectations gap. Finally, there is the problem of reconciling 

the efforts of international financial institutions, development 

agencies, and national political priorities. The problem grows out 

of multiple diverging timetables and funding sources, both between 

organizations and within governments.

 The third and final theme consists of a snapshot of the UN’s vast 

and expensive peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic 

of the Congo (DRC). With an area of well over two million square 

kilometers, the DRC is a huge country about a quarter the size of 

the United States. It is also an economic powerhouse, with rich 

mineral resources (gold, diamonds, copper, and 70 percent of the 
33

world’s cobalt deposits), 50 percent of Africa’s hardwoods, and 10-

12 percent of the world’s hydroelectric capacity. But it is also a vast 

cauldron of human misery, with a long legacy of war, 3.5 million 

dead, 17 million with marginal food, 1.3 million infected with HIV, 

1,010 dead from land mines, 3.4 million internally displaced persons, 

350,000 refugees throughout Africa, and a ranking of 167th out of 

175 nations on the UN Human Development Index.

 The UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC is among the largest 

and most complex the world body has ever undertaken, with a 

$667.27 annual budget, 2,792 civilian personnel, and 10,700 military 

personnel. The number of UN member states contributing people 

is 109, with 52 of those contributing military personnel. The troop 

contingent strength is 9,940, plus 558 military observers and 202 staff 

and liaison officers.

 There are grounds for optimism, revolving around a growing 

national identity, war fatigue, a potential peace dividend, the 

interests of Congolese leaders, a changing regional dynamic, and 

international commitment. Mr. Grinberg concludes, nonetheless, 

that “the jury is still out.” The UN presence has been a determining 

factor in saving thousands of lives and giving hope for an end to 

”the world’s greatest living tragedy.” If the UN succeeds in the DRC, 

there is a fair chance it will have created the basis for stabilization 

and development in the entire Central Africa sub-region. 

PANEL V: DEMOCRATIZATION

Professor Daniel Brumberg. 

 In his November 6, 2003, speech before the National Endowment 

for Democracy, President Bush laid out an ambitious vision for a 

“forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East.” Though some 

observers attributed the speech to the White House’s desire to 

redefine the purpose of the Iraq war, in fact the administration’s 

neo-conservatives long have argued that the toppling of Saddam 

Hussein was the first shot in a long campaign to democratize the 

Middle East. Bush’s speech showed clearly that he has embraced the 

conviction that it is the “calling” of the United States to extend the 

global democratic revolution to that area of the world.
34

 Of course, it has been the practice of U.S. presidential 

administrations over the last 10 years to pursue a liberalization 

strategy in the region whereby various democracy aid programs 

were employed to encourage the emergence of political rights and 

civil liberties through civil society organizations. According to 

Professor Brumberg, of the 18 Muslim-majority Middle East states, 

“ten can be classified as liberalized, or partial, autocracies” (Algeria, 

Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, 

and Yemen). Unlike full autocracies, whose survival depends on 

quashing all political competition or opposition, the longevity of 

liberalized autocratic regimes depends on their acquiescing to, 

or even promoting, a measure of managed political openness and 

pluralism. Thus the American strategy of reinforcing civil society 

organizations in the hope that eventually they will push ruling 

elites to move beyond state-managed political liberalization is fully 

consonant with the regime survival strategies of Arab rulers. As the 

late Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat once put it, “Democracy is a 

safety valve so I know what my enemies are doing.”

 It should be noted, of course, that “no serious democratization 

strategy has the slightest chance of success so long as the PalestinianIsraeli conflict continues to simmer and periodically boil over.” 

Until the administration shows in deeds that the Palestinians are as 

deserving of independence and democracy as the Iraqis, “all talk of 

democratization in the Middle East will ring hollow in the minds of 

Arab youth.”

 Setting aside the case of Iraq for a moment, for the United States 

to go beyond its long-time strategy of encouraging piecemeal 

liberalization as a means of eventually achieving something like 

genuine democracy and representative government, it would have 

to tackle directly the key obstacle to democracy: the institutions and 

ruling ideologies of Arab states. Such a shift will be very difficult to 

achieve since it will require pressuring some of the same Arab leaders 

whose support the administration needs in the war on terrorism. 

Moreover, the administration would have to tread delicately and 

wisely in its choices of which countries to attempt to democratize, 

because it could conceivably open the door to Islamic hardliners 

capable of capitalizing on the instruments of democratic governance 

to create a radical Islamic state.
35

 The most likely candidates for a successful democratization 

strategy thus would be those who already boast an electoral system of 

such independence and competitiveness that, if and when Islamists 

do enter a genuinely open election, they must face, negotiate, and 

ultimately share power with non-Islamic parties. Morocco is one of 

the few countries in the Arab world where the risks of full-blown 

democratization might be worth taking. The leaders of Egypt, Jordan, 

Kuwait, and Bahrain would be very hesitant to embrace any strategy 

that moves them much beyond the limits of present liberalization.

 The Bush administration has chosen to forgo the path suggested 

for Morocco or a similar Arab state. Rather, it has hitched all its 

hopes on a policy of military intervention and forcible regime 

change in Iraq. Its guiding assumption appears to be that the legacy 

of authoritarianism is so deeply embedded in the social, economic, 

and political soil of the Arab world that there can be no hope of 

genuine political reform unless one prominent Arab country is 

given the chance to demonstrate for the entire region how to “get it 

right from the very beginning.” One can readily imagine that such a 

fortunate outcome might eventually inspire Arab leaders elsewhere 

to negotiate democratic solutions with their opponents.

 However, the experiment in Iraq may eventually produce the 

opposite result from that intended by the United States―more rather 

less autocracy in the Arab world. In Professor Brumberg’s view, 

the chances of avoiding such a result are diminishing because to 

prevail over the long term, any credible power-sharing arrangement 

between the Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis requires, among other things, 

“a long-term political and especially military commitment from the 

international community.” Unless the United States gets lucky and 

somehow achieves such a commitment, there is a high risk that the 

Shiites and Sunnis will drift into a temporary marriage of convenience 

under the nationalist banner (as they did in 1920 against the British) 

to expel the American invader. Viewing the resulting chaos in Iraq, 

many Arab leaders, both incumbents and those in opposition, would 

then decide to “let the present flawed system totter along since trying 

to fix it would likely only make the situation worse.”
36

Dr. Larry Diamond. 

 Anyone who has been watching or reading the news must know 

that things have been slipping badly in Iraq. Usually, the mass news 

media exaggerate the negatives and suppress the positives. We have 

not heard nearly enough about the good work that our mission 

there―the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)―has been doing 

to rebuild the country and its infrastructure and support democratic 

institutions, organizations, and values. But, unfortunately, the bad 

news indeed has been quite bad. Fallujah is not of overriding concern. 

The news there has been shocking and horrific, but this is a limited 

uprising from a minority section of the country. It does not threaten 

the overall viability of the political transition program in Iraq.

 The Shiite uprising in the south is another story, however. Many 

scholars and historians of Iraq long have warned that an uprising 

among the Shiite population would spell doom for the Coalition 

and for any hope of a peaceful transition to anything resembling 

democracy. No doubt this is true. But we are not yet facing a 

generalized Shiite resistance. Rather, we are locked in a confrontation 

with a ruthless young thug, leading a fascist political movement that 

is using religion in a twisted way to achieve its own crude ambitions 

for power.

 For the past year, we have been engaged in a difficult effort against 

great odds, to rebuild Iraq and foster a transition to democracy in 

that unfortunate country. It has been a turbulent road, littered with 

mistakes on our own part and obstacles posed by Iraq’s authoritarian 

neighbors, who are panicked at the thought of having an emerging 

Arab democracy (or, in the case of Iran, a predominantly Shiite 

democracy) on their own border. But we nevertheless have seen 

some inspiring progress.

 A variety of civil society organizations and think tanks are 

emerging and finding their legs. The Iraqi Governing Council has 

adopted an interim constitution which will distribute sovereign 

power in Iraq during the period from the transfer of authority to an 

Iraqi government on June 30, 2004, to the seating of a new elected 

government under a permanent constitution by the end of 2005. 

Around the country, local and provincial councils have been formed 
37

with varying degrees of popular involvement and support. In many 

cases these have achieved broad participation and consultation 

(and in a few, even direct elections) that have produced local 

governments with far more legitimacy than anything that preceded 

them. A vigorous campaign is underway to educate Iraqis about 

basic democratic principles and to draw them into dialogue.

 There are serious problems with the interim constitution. Iraqis 

complain that there was too little popular involvement in the 

process, and the document gives far too many veto rights to the 

Kurds and other minorities. They worry―quite mistakenly―that it 

will allow the United States to conclude a binding treaty with an 

unelected government. Some wish that the constitution was rooted 

more exclusively in Islam. But still, with all of the problems and 

controversies, the transitional law is a step forward for Iraq, and 

gives that country “the most progressive and liberal basic governance 

document of any country in the Arab world.”

 Preparations are underway to bring the political promise and 

timetable of this constitution to fruition. As a result of negotiations 

conducted by UN representative Lakhdar Brahimi in February 2004, 

a compromise agreement was reached providing for direct election 

of a transitional parliament by the end of 2004 or January of next year. 

Ambassador Brahimi is negotiating a framework for the Iraqi interim 

government that will assume power on June 30, 2004. A separate 

UN team led by its chief elections expert, Carina Perelli, is in Iraq 

consulting on and helping to define the structure for an independent 

electoral commission that will administer elections in the country, 

and on the crucial question of how to structure the electoral system 

that will select members of the transitional parliament.

 However, the political transition has been heading into a storm 

of violence and intimidation. The biggest cause for concern in this 

regard lies with the Shiite heartland of Iraq. Over the past year, a 

growing array of armed private militias―loyal to political parties 

and religious militants, and funded and encouraged by various 

power factions in Iran―have been casting a shadow over the political 

process. While we have been focusing on building civil society, 

educating for democracy, writing a basic law, and negotiating the 

future structure and timetable of transitional government, the militias 
38

have been building up their weaponry and recruiting fighters. The 

total number of these militia fighters in many provinces well exceeds 

the combined strength of the new Iraqi armed forces.

 Their armies have been stocking heavy arms, intimidating 

opponents, and preparing for the coming war in Iraq. This war will not 

fundamentally be a war against American occupation or international 

domination, though now that it has broken out prematurely, its first 

phase is being framed and justified in those demagogic terms. It is a 

war for something more primal: the acquisition of power.

 Some in the CPA who have seen this threat gather in recent 

months have warned that, unless the pseudo-religious militias are 

demobilized and disarmed―through negotiation, ideally, but through 

force where necessary―a transition to democracy in Iraq will become 

impossible. Rather, at every step of the way, from parties canvassing 

for supporters to the registration of voters to the election campaign 

to the casting and counting of votes, the democratic process will be 

thwarted by strong-arm methods and fraud, and the quest for a free 

and fair political process will fail.

 Fortunately, key officials within the CPA have quietly seized 

upon the issue of party militias as a priority. Over the last 3 months, 

a plan has been prepared and negotiated for the comprehensive 

disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of all the major 

militias. Using the lessons of other negotiated programs, this plan will 

offer members of the various militias generous financial incentives to 

lay down their private arms, disband, and be integrated either into 

one of the new Iraqi armed forces, such as the army, civil defense 

corps, or police, or into other sectors of the civilian economy, with 

training if necessary to prepare them accordingly.

 Experts have been developing and negotiating this disarmament 

plan with key national and local militia leaders. They believe they 

are making significant progress. But in this kind of effort, it is very 

nearly all or nothing. No party militia, Dr. Diamond emphasizes, 

“will disband if it believes it will risk collective suicide in doing 

so.” Party militias probably have an offensive intent: to ensure that 

they can seize by force and fraud what they cannot be confident of 

winning fairly at the ballot box. But they also have a defensive intent: 

to prevent such fraud by their enemies, to protect the lives of their 

leaders, candidates, and campaigners, and to maintain order in areas 
39

they control. Unless its rivals are demobilized at the same time it is, 

no serious militia will sincerely cooperate.

 The most dangerous impediment is Muqtada Sadr, abetted by a 

ruthless militia, which stands outside any process of negotiation and 

voluntary disarmament. A fiery 30-year-old mullah whose father and 

brothers were martyred in the Shiite resistance to Saddam, Muqtada 

has nothing of the Islamic learning and sophistication that would 

put him anywhere close to the religious stature and authority of an 

ayatollah. But he knows how to organize, mobilize, and intimidate. 

He has used the reputation of his father among the poor urban masses, 

and the language of historical resistance to external impositions to 

mobilize a growing following among young downtrodden urban 

men, in particular. His support is confined to a small minority among 

the Shiites of Iraq, but it is the kind of minority, demographically, 

that “makes revolutions and seizes power,” and its devotion to his 

declarations and obedience to his commands are strong.

 As with the Nazis, Muqtada has been guilty of brazen crimes 

well before his effort to seize power openly. A year ago, Sadr’s 

organization stabbed to death a leading moderate Shiite cleric, 

Ayatollah Abdel-Majdid al-Khoei, who would have been a force 

for peaceful democratic change and a dangerous rival to Sadr. The 

murder took place in the Imam Ali mosque, Shiite Islam’s holiest 

shrine. 

 Recently, Sadr’s propaganda, both in his oral statements and 

through his weekly newspaper, the Hawza, has become increasingly 

incendiary, propagating the most outrageous lies (for example, 

that the United States was responsible for recent deadly bombings) 

deliberately designed to provoke popular violence. Finally, on 

March 28, 2004, after months of costly delay, the Coalition began to 

move against him. Ambassador L. Paul Bremer ordered the closure 

of the newspaper and ordered the arrest of those responsible for the 

murder of al-Khoei.

 Sadr responded to these arrests by unleashing what can only 

be described as the beginning of a revolutionary campaign to seize 

power. Having already occupied numerous public building in recent 

months, his followers took over the offices of the Governor of Basra 

and assaulted police stations in several cities, including Karbala and 

Najaf, with their sacred Shiite religious shrines.
40

 In response, Ambassador Bremer declared Muqtada Sadr an 

“outlaw.” Now there is no turning back. If any kind of decent, 

democratic, and peaceful political order is to be possible in Iraq, the 

Coalition will need to crush Muqtada’s attempt to seize power by 

force, and dismantle his Mahdi army.

 This will only be the beginning of a campaign to control 

privatized violence and construct a rule of law in Iraq. Many 

additional forceful measures will be needed. These must include 

vastly enhanced security on Iraq’s borders with Iran, Syria, and 

Saudi Arabia, and blunt messages to the Iranian and Syrian regimes. 

The Iranian mullahs must understand that we will not stand by and 

watch them brazenly subvert the quest for democracy in Iraq. The 

Iranians must be made to know that two can play this game. They 

face a mounting resistance to oppression in their own country, and 

we can do much more to assist that resistance, in direct proportion 

to the irresponsibility of their actions in Iraq and to their disregard of 

international strictures against nuclear proliferation. The same goes 

for Syria, through which―Iraqi democrats are convinced―al-Qaeda 

terrorists are passing freely into Iraq, with the assistance of Syrian 

intelligence.

 At best, we are in for a rough period in Iraq. Tragically, there 

are going to be many more Iraqi, American, and other Coalition 

casualties. As the violence increases, more and more critics will 

be uttering the words “Vietnam” and “quagmire.” But this is not 

Vietnam―most Iraqis are disgusted with the violence and clearly 

want the chance to freely elect their own government.

 There is only one way out of the dilemma we confront, and it 

is not via retreat or “holding the line” at an untenable status quo. 

Instead, it is to move forward assertively, to commit all the troops 

and resources it will take to defeat the religious bolsheviks and 

common thugs, to build up the security elements of the new Iraqi 

state, and to give Iraqis a chance to democratize free of intimidation. 

Such renewed military resolve must be combined with a political 

strategy to produce a significantly more inclusive and representative 

interim government than the 25-member Governing Council with 

whom we have worked since the middle of last year. Only if we have 

a political strategy to draw in Ayatollah Sistani and the wavering 

bulk of the Shiite population can we prevail in this campaign.
41

 According to Dr. Diamond, President Bush is right to insist that 

the rising tide of violence will not shake our resolve, or alter our 

plan to transfer authority to an Iraqi interim government on June 30. 

Any delay in that transfer would further inflame the situation and 

feed suspicions that we are bent on permanent dominion in Iraq. But 

the Bush administration has not leveled with itself or the American 

people about the resources that will be needed to achieve any kind 

of victory in Iraq. Our mission in Iraq has been under-resourced 

from the start. We do not have enough troops there. We do not have 

enough secure transport, including helicopters. And we do not have 

enough armored cars, trained security personnel, and high-quality 

body armor to protect the many civilians―career diplomats, aid 

workers, and term consultants―who have been risking their lives 

for this cause.

 In the next few months, we could lose the new war for Iraq if we 

do not project the necessary resolve, combined with the right political 

strategy to generate a more inclusive and legitimate government. 

If we can neutralize the militias while building up the new Iraqi 

instruments of law, a small miracle could yet unfold by January 

2005: reasonably free and fair elections for a transitional government 

(which will also write a new permanent constitution). Then, what 

now appears to be a downward spiral into civil war could well be 

averted, and “this long-suffering country could be placed on a rocky 

but realizable path to democracy.”

Professor Andrew Reynolds. 

 Stating flatly that there is not a military solution in Iraq, 

Afghanistan, or Sudan, Professor Reynolds goes on to aver that only 

political measures abetted by military containment and neutralization 

of armed opposition will work. The primary instrument in achieving 

such a political solution is a national constitution. The art of 

constitutional design can be elaborated by resort to a series of medical 

analogies.

 First, “do no harm.” Constitutional engineering has lain at the 

heart of political settlements as diverse as the Dayton accords for 

Bosnia, the transition from apartheid in South Africa, the powersharing design for Fiji, and Northern Ireland’s second try at uniting 
42

the two sides in viable association. In those parts of the world where 

ethnic plurality prevails, the design of political institutions, including 

constitutions, has been seen as a useful tool “to encourage sociopolitical stability and to promote inter-ethnic accommodation.” 

Institutions must be inclusive, bringing under their ample folds all 

groups, leaving no outsiders. Getting the rules right, just as with 

getting the right medicine, is crucial. Particular attention must be 

paid to democratic design, that is, shaping the mechanisms that give 

effect to democracy and representative government.

 Just as doctors seek to diagnose and treat a sick or bleeding 

patient with a variety of drugs and behavioral modifications, the 

constitutional physician looks on an ailing society and attempts to 

determine what institutional medicines might best stem the blood 

flow and provide the long-term foundation for a return to health 

and vitality. Poor diagnosis leads to inappropriate treatment, but 

one can understand the prevalence of diagnostic error in view of 

the symptoms of inter-ethnic violence and hostility as well as state 

failure that could also result from other pathologies.

 Constitutional design should reflect structural analogies to the 

medical continuum of triage, emergency medicine, convalescence, 

and longer-term health management. What may be good for 

immediate conflict crisis management (or triage) may not be good 

for longer-term care and consolidation of a democratic political 

order. For example, the interim constitution for Iraq, written in the 

context of war and insurgency, will not be the most appropriate 

instrument for the eventual independent, democratic Iraq. Any 

healthy constitution must contain mechanisms for changing it in the 

light of future need.

 Like medicine, “governance must be approached holistically.” It 

is a mistake to treat a specific ailment (such as disputed elections) 

while failing to engage in a broader diagnosis which seeks to find 

and treat those underlying causes that may lie elsewhere in the body 

(e.g., addressing the accountability of those in power, the efficacy 

of the judiciary, etc.). Moreover, institutional drug prescriptions can 

work against each other, thus exacerbating the illness, if the elements 

of the treatment regimen are not complementary.

 Professor Reynolds warns against a “rush to surgery―or to 

elections.” They can be traumatic, thus only a relatively stable 
43

patient is a good candidate. In the absence of reasonable national 

stability, elections represent a threat to any peace process. For 

example, in Afghanistan, only 2.3 million of 10 million voters have 

been registered. Most are male Pashtuns concentrated in the same 

area. These deficiencies result from the “logistics of security.” A 

satisfactory election can hardly flow from such a skewed electorate. 

In many post-conflict situations, the infrastructure to facilitate 

legitimate elections is lacking, and a climate allowing for unfettered 

campaigning often is nonexistent. Moreover, doctors should not 

discharge the patient prematurely. All too often the first election is 

seen as the end goal, with the doctor then discharging the patient 

before any of the structural or civil foundations of a multiparty 

electoral democracy have had time to take root (think of Liberia, 

Cambodia, and now Afghanistan).

 Finally, it must be remembered that even the best medicine has its 

limits. Just as medicine cannot save the terminally ill, an excellently 

crafted set of political institutions cannot save a truly sick society. The 

soundest constitution can be overwhelmed by disintegrating security. 

Political institutions are just one part of the puzzle. Other instruments 

of the state need to be in good working order. For example, a fully 

functioning judiciary, a progressive education system, high levels of 

employment, energetic economic development, and internal security 

are all essential to provide the foundation of a healthy polity.

Dr. Lawrence Korb, Luncheon Speaker. 

 In conducting the global war on terrorism, the United States has 

essentially three strategic choices, in the opinion of Dr. Korb. The 

first is preventive war, a course usually associated with the neoconservatives and hardliners. It asserts the right to attack unilaterally 

known enemies at times and places of our choosing in order to 

forestall future attacks by depriving the enemy of the wherewithal 

to conduct them. It is not to be confused with anticipatory selfdefense, which suggests specific and certain intelligence of an 

imminent enemy attack in the process of initiation. Rather, it is a 

generalized response, based on the enemy’s credibly declared intent 

to attack and continue attacking, and on the enemy’s presumed 

possession of WMD which, if used, would inflict massive, grievous, 
44

and irremediable harm. Rather than simply waiting and attempting 

to intercept specific attacks once set in train, or attempting to deter 

such attacks by threatening to retaliate after the fact, the preventive 

strategy goes further by asserting the right to minimize the possibility 

of any future attack by destroying the enemy at his source, even if it 

means attacking the states that harbor him.

 Dr. Korb finds two corollaries emerging from the preventive 

strategy: the United States will maintain military dominance in the 

world regardless of cost (possibly a message to China as well), and it 

will work to make the world democratic (an important reason being 

to get rid of terrorists).

 The second strategy that America might choose is realpolitik, or 

political realism. Realpolitik is no less given to an appreciation of 

power than the preventive strategy, but “it believes that deterrence 

and containment still work,” even against rogue states and those that 

sponsor terrorism. Though no enemy of democracy, the school of 

realpolitik, where forced to choose between democracy and stability, 

would opt for the latter. To attempt to impose democracy around 

the globe would overextend our military and economic power as 

well as our political patience. There is a real risk that the American 

people, faced with the prospect of indefinite struggles around the 

globe to impose our vision of political salvation on other peoples, 

would resign from the game, insist on bringing our forces home, and 

withdraw into a cocoon of isolation and passivity.

 The third potential strategy goes under several names―

cooperative security, liberal internationalism, multilateralism, etc. 

Certainly it recognizes the global threat posed by the presence of 

WMD in terrorists’ hands. But its primary response would be to 

work diligently to improve the economic and social conditions in 

states that breed the terrorist mentality. Meanwhile, if we are forced 

to take military action, we should do so through the UN or under the 

umbrella of other suitable multilateral institutions. A fundamental 

and enduring solution, however, can be found only in economic and 

social redress, following which political alienation would subside.

 A fourth strategy, of course, would be to mix and match from 

among the three, fashioning a composite strategy that borrows the 

best from each and tries to avoid the worst.
45

 With regard to the situation in Iraq, which flows from our 

present proactive strategy, we must have more boots on the ground. 

We should therefore increase the active Army by at least two 

divisions and move more Military Police and Civil Affairs units 

from the reserves into the active force. Even if we formed a corps of 

reconstruction specialists apart from the Army, we would still need 

an increase in the number of troops. When the U.S. push to launch 

an attack against Iraq was being debated before the Security Council, 

we probably could have salvaged a greater degree of multilateral 

involvement, and thus legitimacy, had we worked at it longer, but it 

is impossible to know this for sure.

PANEL VI: IMPLICATIONS FOR MILITARY CAPABILITIES 

AND FORCE STRUCTURE

Dr. Daniel Goure. 

 Winning wars and winning the peace are not the same thing. They 

require different plans, capabilities, and skills, and they operate on 

different timelines. The argument that “the military is the institution 

best suited to performing peace and stability missions is not selfevidently true.” Granted, it has people, equipment, organization, 

and some training, but it is not clear that much of what we have 

is applicable to the problem. The military’s capabilities, including 

those of large troop formations, may be relevant, but they are also 

extremely expensive, scarce, and dwindling commodities.

 U.S. forces have been reduced by 40 percent since 1990, while 

the demand on those forces during the same period has more than 

doubled. It is one thing to propound peace operations when we 

have 18 Army divisions (which we had in 1990), but quite another to 

propound them when we have only 10 as today. Allied reductions 

have been even more severe, with their military budgets having 

shrunk more than that of the United States. Their forces essentially 

are unusable, barely able to handle even small-scale contingencies. 

Given the number, scale, and duration of commitments, plus the lack 

of substantial help from allies, American forces are over-stressed to 

an unsustainable degree.
46

 Thus the U.S. military can either “fight the nation’s wars, or 

achieve the peace.” It cannot do both. We need to stop looking to the 

military as the means to perform missions that are primarily political, 

legal, economic, social, and psychological in nature. Successful 

peacekeeping and nation-building efforts are the exception, not the 

rule. The military can support such efforts, but it cannot lead them 

and should not provide the bulk of the resources. The considerable 

time it takes for successful nation-building cannot be reconciled with 

the design and deployment tempo of the present force.

 For the global war on terrorism, the United States needs a different 

kind of force, though the precise nature of the changes needed is 

not clear. Modular light infantry forces integrated with intelligence, 

communications, civil affairs, and psychological operations seem 

indicated. Mobility, force protection, tactical intelligence, and 

superior firepower are the critical requirements. Mobile light forces 

are needed to hunt down insurgents in difficult terrain. Infantry is 

needed for close combat in urban terrain. The Israelis, however, have 

shown that heavy combat forces also do well, and actually may be 

safer than light forces.

 Our organization for counterterrorism is inadequate, with the 

CIA too light and the military too heavy and regimented. A new 

arm of the CIA is worth considering, one that can integrate human 

intelligence, clandestine operations, and field operations. Armed 

contractors would be useful in certain missions, while our allies, 

even with their depleted forces, could be highly useful in certain 

niche and specialty roles.

Colonel Richard Hooker. 

 With the enormous human and material investment the United 

States is making in military transformation, it is vital that we get it 

right and not fall victim to our own hype. There is much to admire 

about the goals of force transformation: it plays to American strengths 

in technology and engineering; it increases our capacity to apply 

lethal force while reducing the prospect for suffering casualties; it 

aims toward a reduced requirement for ground troops; it promises 

short, sharp campaigns; it does not necessarily rely on allies, who 
47

might prove uncooperative or unreliable. There is an element of risk, 

however, in embracing the transformation agenda entirely without 

noting and addressing its potential shortcomings.

 Transformation is focused on technology and the notion of the 

networked information grid. It envisions an interconnected sensor 

grid able to pass information and intelligence instantaneously to 

firing platforms. In theory, this grid will provide full situational 

awareness to commanders, who can then select and attack the most 

critical and vulnerable target sets for maximum effect. Information 

superiority, enabled by systems that can relay data seamlessly from 

sensors to shooters, thus produces faster decision cycles; forestalls 

enemy reactions; creates more friendly options; and minimizes risks. 

After several years of transformational work, however, the effort to 

put these concrete capabilities into the hands of actual warfighters 

deployed on the ground “has not progressed much beyond the 

powerpoint stage.”

 A basic flaw in transformation thinking is a misconception 

about the nature of war itself. Transformation proponents insist that 

certainty can be approached in war. They assume that war is a coldly 

logical process of action and reaction, and thus that given sufficient 

data, the enemy’s intentions can be calculated. They lose sight of 

the facts that war is a clash of wills, the relative strength of which 

will always lie hidden until after the fact, and that commanders are 

not purely rational automatons but rather human beings, blessed or 

cursed with all the infinitely variable passions to which man is heir.

 Rejecting the factors that have always rendered war so notoriously 

uncertain, the proponents of transformation anticipate not only 

the ability to see the enemy at all times and in all places, but to 

actually predict opposing moves, even when the enemy commander 

may not himself have decided yet what he will do. In the view of 

transformationists, full situational awareness will thus largely, if not 

completely, dissipate the fog and friction of war.

 The foregoing is a dangerous and unwarranted position for 

soldiers to take. The essence of this vision of future war is to reduce 

action on a battlefield to the level of a targeting drill. This technicist 

view reflects the experiences and intellectual predispositions of many 

transformation advocates with air and naval backgrounds. Their 
48

arguments reveal few conceptual distinctions between the levels 

of war; little understanding of war’s intensely human character; 

insufficient recognition of differences between the various warfighting 

domains of land, sea, air, and space; and a misunderstanding of 

service core competencies and their contributions to joint warfare.

 Uncritical acceptance of the notion that transformation constitutes 

a broad panacea for the problem of waging war leads to muddled 

thinking on almost every level. Official publications, for example, 

purport to see a nexus between nonstate actors like al-Qaeda and 

an urgent need to embrace network-centric warfare. But net-based 

war was first articulated years before 9/11 and is clearly more suited 

to attacking fixed modes and targetable centers of gravity than 

small cells of widely spread and loosely organized terrorists who 

communicate by messenger and encrypted e-mail.

 Colonel Hooker concluded with the observation that overemphasis 

on airpower, precision engagement, and information superiority at 

the expense of an ability to seize, hold, and control ground will pose 

grave risks for the United States in the future if allowed to crowd 

out, rather than complement, other critical capabilities.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert Cassidy. 

 Historically, the U.S. Army has enjoyed many successes in 

counterguerrilla war, even including some in Vietnam. However, 

overall failure in Vietnam caused the Army to turn its back on that 

war as soon as possible and refocus on the prospect of a big war in 

Europe, the scenario long preferred by the American military culture. 

The result has been that the hard lessons learned in Vietnam about 

fighting guerrillas were not preserved in the Army’s institutional 

memory. Under the mantra “No More Vietnams,” the Army simply 

lost interest.

 But since the Army and its Coalition partners now find themselves 

prosecuting counterguerrilla wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is useful 

to revisit the experiences of Vietnam and other counterinsurgencies 

involving American forces to rediscover those lessons that might 

be applicable in the Middle East. Lieutenant Colonel Cassidy finds 

that three operational programs employed by Military Assistance 
49

Command Vietnam (MACV) show particular promise as a source of 

ideas for adaptation and use today:

 • Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG). These groups, 

trained and organized by the Special Forces, were recruited 

from various ethnic tribes that inhabited the mountain and 

border areas. They conducted long-range reconnaissance and 

interdiction patrols along Viet Cong and North Vietnamese 

infiltration and supply routes; raided enemy base areas; 

employed hit-and-run guerrilla tactics against regular enemy 

units; and provided security in isolated areas.

 • Marine Combined Action Platoons (CAPs). In the Marine 

enclave in the north, CAPs were formed consisting of a Marine 

rifle squad combined with a platoon of indigenous forces. 

Living in their own local village or hamlet, and operating 

from it, the CAPs destroyed local Viet Cong infrastructure; 

provided security and helped maintain law and order; 

organized indigenous intelligence nets; conducted civic 

action projects; and disseminated propaganda against the 

Viet Cong.

 • Civil Operations and Revolutionary (later Rural) Development 

and Support (CORDS). This organization was established 

under MACV to unify and provide single oversight of the 

pacification effort. It provided support, advisers, and funding 

to the police and regional and popular forces, aiming to 

reinforce self-defense and self-government at the local level. 

Particular efforts, including the Phoenix program, were 

devoted to rooting out the Viet Cong infrastructure. 

 There is also a treasure trove of lessons to be drawn from the 

Banana Wars, the Philippine Insurrection, and the Indian Wars. 

The Marines’ Small Wars Manual (1940) codifies their experience in 

a particularly useful manner, and there are high-quality works by 

civilian scholars from which enduring principles of American-fought 

counterinsurgency wars can be drawn.

 Lieutenant Colonel Cassidy concluded with several recommendations: allot counterinsurgency warfare a more substantial share 

of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College curriculum; 
50

include the history of counterinsurgency warfare in Army officer 

education from precommissioning through the senior service college 

attendance; publish a counterinsurgency equivalent to U.S. Army 

Field Manual No. 3-90, Tactics (2001); consider fusion or greater 

collaboration between the Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, 

North Carolina, the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute 

at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, and the Combat Arms Doctrine 

Development and Force Modernization Office at Fort Leavenworth, 

Kansas; and consider the creation of a modular civilian civil and 

rural development corps subordinated to the commander of the joint 

task force during counterinsurgency campaigns.

Brigadier General Ryan, Closing Address. 

 Brigadier General Ryan briefed the Army Campaign Plan for 

“transforming” the service, which itself is part of the Army Plan. 

He first cites the mission: “Build a campaign-capable, joint, and 

expeditionary Army in this decade to provide relevant and ready 

landpower to combatant commanders and the joint force while 

sustaining operational support to combatant commanders and 

maintaining the quality of the all-volunteer force.”

 A summary notion of the comprehensiveness of the plan and the 

topics it addresses was conveyed through the following descriptive 

rubrics: Security Environment; Nesting Army Strategy; Strategic 

Planning Guidance Overview; Relationship (among National Security 

Strategy, Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, and Secretary 

of Defense’s Strategic Planning Guidance); Changing Operational 

Environment; Major (Anticipated) Changes; Reducing Deployment 

Tempo by Building Capabilities; Army Campaign Plan―Conceptual 

Framework; Army Campaign Plan Assumptions; Intent; Building a 

Joint and Expeditionary Army with a Campaign Capability; Major 

Decisions Affecting Program Objective Memorandum 06-11; Brigade 

Combat Team (Unit of Action) and Unit of Execution Synchronization 

Model; Army Macro Synchronization Matrix; Brigade Combat Team 

(Unit of Action)-Centric Organization; Echelons and Capabilities; 

and Army Campaign Plan Development Timeline.

 Brigadier General Ryan explained that the term “expeditionary” 

in current Army parlance carries its traditional meaning but implies 
51

“a rotational pattern of deployments.” Implicit in the Campaign Plan 

is the requirement that Army forces be able to “support two major 

combat operations simultaneously, one of which can be escalated 

to decisive victory.” The fighting force itself must become more 

cohesive, agile, and combat-ready, but within the context of a more 

stable, predictable lifestyle for Army members and their families. A 

reduced deployment tempo will be achieved by producing additional 

deployable active Army brigades (brigade combat teams/units of 

action) through such measures as restructuring present brigades 

and converting MOSs. Additionally, more high-demand units such 

as Military Police and Civil Affairs units will be formed. But such 

changes will be made “while the engine’s running.” It will not be 

business as usual. The aim is to reduce the percentage of active 

component brigade combat teams (units of action) deployed overseas 

from about 67 percent of the brigade pool at the end of 2004 to roughly 

33 percent by the end of 2007. Brigadier General Ryan cautioned, 

however, that full execution of the transformation campaign plan 

depends heavily upon assumed supplemental budgeting.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 The conference architecture did not provide for a canvass or 

survey of participants’ views on particular issues, so it is not feasible 

to arrive at consensus findings and recommendations. However, 

informal analysis of remarks by panelists and other speakers reveals 

such strong recurrent endorsements of some proposals that it will be 

useful to highlight them. While no claim to unanimity can be made 

regarding these positions, it can be said that a number of participants 

expressed support for them in one guise or another, and that few 

if any voices were raised in opposition. The positions in behalf of 

which significant support was expressed are as follows.

 • More troops are required for the war in Iraq. By a wide 

margin, this was the most frequently and emphatically voiced 

finding, often expressed in the soldier’s phrase, “We’ve got 

to get more boots on the ground.” In fact, many presenters 

spoke of the troop increase not as a need, but as a foregone 

conclusion: “There will be a troop increase.” And in stating this, 

they were not referring to Secretary Rumsfeld’s emergency 

increase of 20,000 soldiers announced several weeks ago.
52

 • The date September 11, 2001, marked a historic juncture in 

America’s collective sense of security. Our presumption of 

invulnerability has been irretrievably shattered.

 • We need greater international participation in the Iraqi 

nation-building effort, preferably under the aegis of the UN. 

Significantly, not a great deal was offered about how this step 

can now be achieved, although most participants appeared to 

favor greater multinational involvement.

 • As soon as possible, we need to turn the reins of Iraqi 

government over to an indigenous entity that will be viewed 

as legitimate and that will have the muscle to maintain order. 

However, it seemed to be assumed that for an indefinite period, 

a Coalition troop presence would continue to be necessary in 

an overwatch posture, even after an Iraqi government takes 

formal control.

 • A finding corollary to the foregoing was that the U.S. 

Government, under whichever political party, must summon 

the will to stay the course. To pull out prematurely, with 

Iraq still unstable, would be a catastrophe of unimaginable 

proportions.

 • Even with some troop increases, the U.S. strategy in Iraq will 

continue to be a moderate, hold-the-line approach until the 

presidential election of November 2004. After that, decisive 

changes can be expected.

 • The only credible institutions for mounting nation-building 

efforts are the Army and the Marine Corps, but even they 

are maladapted for such work. Faced with this dilemma, 

several conferees were inclined to explore the concept of 

constituting civil reconstruction corps (modeled after CORDS 

in the Vietnam War?) subordinate to the joint task force 

commander.

 • We cannot replicate Western-style democracy and 

representative government in Muslim-majority states of the 

Middle East. This was an oft-stated theme, despite the Bush 

administration’s declared determination to proceed with 

democratization. The implication was that when we propose 

democracy in a state like Iraq, we are, in fact, speaking of 
53

qualified democracy, at least at the national level, with 

embedded structural bars to the emergence of radical Islamic 

rule.

 • There can be no military solution in Iraq, only a political 

solution. This sentiment was expressed often but rarely 

explained. It seems to mean that the militarily victorious 

Coalition cannot successfully impose a reconstructed Iraqi 

government on the people by fiat and brute force. Rather, a 

successful reconstruction, i.e., one that is legitimate, viable, 

and appreciably democratic, can emerge only from the broadly 

inclusive participation and concurrence of a deliberative body 

representative of the country’s political, ethnic, and religious 

constituencies.

 • In the global war on terrorism, conclusive victory in the 

classic sense is probably unattainable. This sentiment was 

rarely expressed outright, but was implicit in the frequent 

use of such terms as “war of unlimited duration” and “war 

of uncertain outcome.” The sentiment was also present in 

the view of those who regarded the best attainable result as 

a gradual rapproachement between the haves and have nots 

of the world. Here, economic integration and equality, with 

a consequent dissipation of alienation and mutual hostility, 

offered the best chance of ultimately nudging the two camps 

to a peaceful modus vivendi.