THE PLA AND THE KOSOVO CONFLICT

June Teufel Dreyer

May 2000
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necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Departmen

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This essay appeared originally as: June Teufel Dreyer, “T

and Kosovo: A Strategy Debate,” in Andrew D. Marble, ed., 

Issue: The China Threat Debate, Issues and Studies, Vol. 36

January/February 2000.

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ii
The U.S. armed forces are not the only military th

sought to discern the lessons of the Kosovo campaign 

spring of 1999. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army 

has also analyzed the conflict and drawn its 

conclusions. In fact, as Dr. June Teufel Dreyer, Profes

Political Science at the University of Miami in Fl

observes, rather than reach a single set of conclu

different groups within the Chinese military drew dif

judgments. Dr. Dreyer argues that these differen

opinion reflect the considerable diversity of thinking 

defense modernization and future war that exists w

the PLA today. The analysis that follows therefore pro

an opportunity for readers to learn about the dif

strands in Chinese strategic thinking as that country e

the 21st century.

I would like to thank the editors of the journal Issu

Studies for kindly permitting the Strategic St

Institute to republish this essay, hence enabling a 

audience to benefit from its insights into Chinese ana

of Kosovo. The different views that Dr. Dreyer iden

remind us of the dangers of treating the PLA as a 

monolithic entity. Only through careful study and an

can we anticipate trends in the future direction of the P

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
JUNE TEUFEL DREYER is Professor of Political Scie

the University of Miami. She received her Ph.D. 

Harvard University. She is the author of China’s Po

System: Modernization and Tradition, published by 

and Bacon. Dr. Dreyer is a frequent writer 

commentator on Chinese military affairs.

iv
Introduction: The “China Threat” or a Threate

China?

The discussion of the “China Threat” in 

industrialized countries of the world, and especially 

United States, has been prompted by a number of fa

Although facing no external threat and having 

internal needs, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) h

a decade raised its defense budget between 12 a

percent a year. Moreover, numerous substantial mi

expenditures are not included in the defense budge

actual defense budget is generally estimated at three t

times the published figure. China has made major we

purchases, mainly from Russia and Israel, and has ach

advances in indigenous development as well. A 

congressional committee report issued in early 199

disclosed that several of these advances occurred as a 

of Chinese espionage operations in the United State

addition, a U.S. Defense Department report issued 

same time predicted that the balance of power acro

Taiwan Strait would shift in favor of the PRC in the ne

5 years.

2

 The PRC’s rhetoric has also become increa

militant.

As China appeared more threatening to the West a

Japan, its own media increasingly portrayed the P

menaced by an industrialized world bent on forci

ideology on the rest of the planet, and on Chi

particular. In China’s analysis, Washington, unable t

with the idea of a powerful PRC, wants to dismember 

so that the United States can remain the hegemon 

international system. This was the prism through whi

Chinese leadership viewed the Clinton administratio

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervent

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The ope

1
PRC. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), charged wi

defense of the ancestral land, debated with part

urgency what would be the most appropriate way to re

to foreign pressure. This monograph will summarize 

debates and analyze the strengths and weaknesses 

strategies advocated.

Kosovo and the “American Threat.”

For 78 days from March through June 1999, N

carried out a bombing campaign against the FRY. Its 

stated objective was to reverse Serb efforts to re

(“ethnically cleanse”) Muslims from Kosovo. The air 

of 13 NATO members participated, battering Yug

terrain daily until FRY President Slobodan Mil

agreed to withdraw his forces from Kosovo and allow a 

peacekeeping force into the territory.

The operation did not enjoy strong popular su

among the collective citizenries of the partic

countries.

3

 However, there was widespread sympat

the plight of Muslim Kosovars at the hands of their Se

antagonists. The Western media had for months pr

NATO’s military action reported stories of mass mu

and brutal torture; television news carried nightly re

of sad survivors huddling in the ruins of their hom

burying family members. The perception that fo

countries had no important interests in the FRY 

mitigated by the conviction that a higher humanit

purpose was being served. Moreover, the even

described as a technological marvel. Air power enthu

observed that this was the first time in history that a 

army had been defeated by air power alone. This victor

achieved, moreover, without the loss of a single life a

the allied forces.

4

In China, however, reactions were quite diff

Beijing did not see the intervention as a just cause to 

the ethnically and religiously oppressed from 

2
the United States—the main organizer of and contribu

the coalition—was bent on enforcing its vision of p

global order on the rest of the world, even if the attain

of this goal required armed aggression. China’s 

pretation derived from two sources—first, Washin

China policy, and second, U.S. international behavior 

post-Cold War era.

American actions were seen in light of a decade of h

behavior toward China beginning with the U.S. 

coverage of the pro-democracy demonstrations of 

Beijing leaders were, moreover, angry at the United S

for having imposed sanctions on the PRC afte

party/government killed unarmed demonstrato

Tiananmen Square in 1989. The treatment o

demonstrators and all other dissidents was, Beijing ar

a purely internal affair. The concept of sovereignty 

that the disposition of all affairs within a country’s bo

are the prerogative of that state alone. Althoug

articulated publicly, the Beijing leadership knew th

argue otherwise would set a dangerous precedent 

regard to the central government’s hold over such r

areas as Tibet and Xinjiang, as well as for the CCP’s pl

absorb Taiwan at some point in the future.

Only a few months after the Tiananmen inciden

Soviet Union began to disintegrate. Having become ad

playing one superpower off against the other to Be

benefit, the Chinese leadership was acutely aware 

resulting loss in its leverage over the United States

Chinese media began to remark uneasily that the worl

had only one superpower. Thus, the PRC soon began 

threatened by U.S. actions around the globe.

American aggression against Iraq, for instance, sh

that the sole superpower, now unrestrained by fear of S

retaliation, meant to bully the rest of the world 

accepting Western liberal values. In that con

Washington had worked through the U.N. to force I

3
border dispute and other disagreements. The fact th

United States worked through the U.N. put Beijing 

awkward, but not impossible, position in terms of the 

rigid adherence to an absolutist interpretati

sovereignty. China’s diplomats argued that, although 

certainly wrong for one sovereign state to co

aggression against another, it was equally wrong for 

parties to aggress against the aggressor. After exte

courting by U.S. President George Bush—which may 

included his promise to veto congressional efforts to en

PRC’s most-favored-nation status—China agre

abstain in the U.N. Security Council vote on taking mi

action against Iraq.

The situation in Kosovo was far more dangerous 

the PRC’s point of view, however. To create a precede

aggression within the territory of a sovereign state s

on humanitarian grounds was indeed an issue di

relevant to China. Virtually every high-ranking mai

leader who has traveled to the industrialized democ

over the past decade has been dogged by protestors w

banners that urge freedom for Tibet, and some

Xinjiang as well. By the mid-1990s, discontented T

Muslims moved their protests outside their own prov

and into Han areas. These “separatists” were believ

have been responsible for terrorist bomb explosio

several large Chinese cities. Most importantly, perh

precedent for intervention against aggression carrie

within the boundaries of a state was relevant t

mainland’s claims over Taiwan: the PRC has consis

refused to foreswear the use of force as an instrum

unification.

Moreover, the military operation in Kosovo show

degree of sophistication beyond that evinced during th

War. Chinese analysts contrasted the two by saying 

whereas the former had had some characteristics of m

high-tech war, the latter was a truly modern high-tec

with “hyperconventional” features that must be ana

4
properly.

5

 Information warfare (xinxi zhanzheng) w

wave of the future.

Russian leaders, for somewhat different reasons 

those of China, also opposed intervention in Kosovo. 

regarded the eastward expansion of NATO as di

against Moscow, and had considerable sympathy fo

Serbs, with whom they shared a common religion

Beijing, they were concerned about external intervent

humanitarian grounds, which would be relevant to con

within Russia such as Chechnya. Beijing and Moscow 

already agreed to cooperate in opposing Washin

efforts to develop a national missile defense system.

Knowing that, as permanent members of the 

Security Council, both Russia and China could

probably would, veto military intervention, the C

administration decided to work through NATO. This 

the Beijing leadership yet another grievance

industrialized liberal democracies were again conspir

force the U.S. value system on a Third World state. Aft

NATO bombing raids against the FRY began, the 

deputy chief of the General Staff General Xiong Guan

hosted a 1-day seminar to debate strategy again

“increasingly unstable international environment.

approximately 100 attendees, including economist

foreign policy experts as well as retired and active mi

figures, were said to have reached consensus that “u

military alliances” were being strengthened and “gu

policies are once again running rampant.” China 

develop plans to protect itself.

7

How to Counter the “American Threat”?

In this environment of fear of American unil

militarism, the PRC did become quite involved in discu

of how to counter this threat from the United Stat

particular, the Chinese armed forces—the PLA—

work analyzing the military lessons of the Gulf War. A

5
weapons” and tactics, the military soon discovered 

flaws in both. The PLA was helped in this endeav

Western analysts, who freely admitted such shortco

as Patriot missiles whose timing was off, incompatib

between certain naval and air force communica

equipment, and antiquated Iraqi mines that kept Ame

ships further offshore than planned.

8

PLA analysts discussed these vulnerabilities and 

they might be exploited. Some of their more ex

statements may be discounted as being motivated 

desire to project confidence against a vastly stronger e

There can be little doubt, however, that the PLA exp

considerable effort to study American vulnerabilitie

devise ways to ensure that the PLA would not be humi

in the event of confrontation. Military analysts pointe

for example, that technologically superior platforms 

be successfully attacked with low-tech equipment su

World War II-vintage mines.

By the time of the Kosovo confrontation, the conv

that the sole remaining superpower was not invincib

grown. A humanitarian relief operation in Somali

gone awry, resulting in casualties that were abhorr

the American people. This was a further vulnerability 

technologically weaker enemy could exploit: if faced 

the possibility that U.S. lives would be lost, the Ame

would back down.

As revealed by discussion in such periodica

Jiefangjun bao (Liberation Army Daily), Guofang (De

and the Hong Kong press, there was less consens

precisely what the PRC needed to do in order to p

itself. Not surprisingly, different factions of the 

learned different lessons from the U.S.-NATO eff

Kosovo. Although the actual debates are more nuance

there exists some overlap among them, opinions fell ro

into three categories:

6
were still relevant and should be applied;

2. those who believed that the PRC should 

strenuous efforts to develop high-tech weapons to eq

exceed those of the West and Japan; and,

3. those who advocated doing a better job with ex

weapons.

9

The remainder of this paper explores and eva

these three points of view in more detail.

On People’s War.

Advocates of People’s War stressed that, althoug

side with technologically superior equipment wil

appear to have the advantage, in a just struggle, the la

People’s War will prove decisive in the long run

example, proponents pointed out that in the first 10 d

the conflict the FRY army had managed to bring dow

planes, including an F-117 stealth fighter, as well as se

score cruise missiles.

10

They argued that the fact that the FRY populatio

maintained its resolve in the face of repeated attacks 

an immense psychological blow to “U.S.-led NATO.” 

acts as widespread war mobilization, the staging of 

concerts, the defiant cancellations of blackouts and cu

the formation of human shields to protect bridges, an

holding of mass sports events regardless of the bom

were given as examples of creative development of pe

war by the Yugoslav people. In addition, in terms of co

tactics, Yugoslavia had created what a contribu

Jiefangjun bao terms “guerrilla air defense.” Statistics 

produced showing that, using predominantl

equipment, Yugoslav forces had brought down 

percent of total U.S. sorties, compared to the 0.268 pe

attained by the Vietnamese during the Vietnam 

Although U.S.-NATO strikes had fairly good results 

first few weeks of the war, the success rate deterio

7
low-altitude activities had met with rebuffs, NATO p

were forced to use guided weapons, which operate 

higher altitude and longer distances, to attack from b

the range of Yugoslav ground air defenses. Hence pe

war had reduced the effectiveness of the strikes. 

strategists noted that by the time the air strike

entered their fourth week without achieving their obje

U.S.-NATO found itself in an increasingly difficult po

situation. Protracted war had begun to erode enemy m

and solidarity.

11

Other commentaries pointed out that hiding t

underground and concealing targets—including indu

installations—from enemy planes could play a positiv

in coping with an adversary’s superior firepower. The 

had preserved its military strength in this way, as ha

during the Gulf War. Thus, China should begin m

preparations by digging tunnels in potential battle

and constructing permanent fortifications and air 

shelters. A system of in-depth protection works mu

built in major cities and at strategic points, with tunn

the mainstay, complemented by fortifications for g

fighting. After the outbreak of war, command 

communications hubs, heavy-duty equipment

important materials should immediately go undergr

What could not go underground should be camouf

including airports, runways, missile positions, com

posts, communications hubs, and other vital ta

Temporary pits and other field works should be dug o

in order to conceal massed troops. Efforts must be m

locate and utilize all reconnaissance blind spots, su

those formed by steep cliffs, valleys, caves, ravines, ju

and other natural shelters.

As the FRY had done, China should set up false ta

and build false positions to confuse and deceive. 

should employ imitative materials and disguise ci

vehicles as military vehicles. Scrapped weapons 

equipment should be set up to look as if they wer

8
stations, and fake positions would cause the ene

dissipate his firepower and miss the real tar

Interestingly, although the author could have credite

Zedong for this sage advice, he chose instead to cite Su

maxim that “skilled defenders hide themselves u

ground.”

12

Yet another advocate of People’s War pointed ou

the “empty city” stratagem of ancient Chinese m

theorists would be effective: plans must be made to 

people and resources elsewhere. A resolute people 

defeat a high-tech enemy through creative r

Smokescreens could counter laser-guided bombs, 

could be sprayed over potential targets to reduce 

temperature and confuse infrared-guided bombs, civ

could mingle with military forces, and decoys and elec

deception tricks could be practiced.

13

Apart from proving once again the contin

applicability of People’s War, the lessons for the PRC 

that “the greatest deterrent to any enemy involves p

close attention to and doing a good job of national de

education and patriotic education and fostering a se

national pride and confidence.” There were efforts to p

above-mentioned suggestions into action. In May 199

Mobilization Committee of the Nanjing Military Regio

and discussed plans to upgrade the area’s militia 

expand the floor space for underground projects for pe

air defense.

14

 In mid-November, Xinhua, the o

Chinese news agency, reported that major breakthr

had been made in building shelters for integ

production, efficiency, fast reaction, and survival capa

These included technical innovations such as an auto

control system that would turn on power generators 

tunnels only a few seconds after the breakdown of ex

electricity supplies.

15

 At the same time, however, 

bomb shelters were being converted into underg

shopping malls and wine cellars.

16

9
 While the value of People’s War cannot easily be pu

questioned without risking serious harm to the career 

questioner,

17

 it was permissible to question the pa

between the FRY on the one hand and the PRC on the 

One general said pointedly that “China is not Yugosl

since the PRC has nuclear weapons and missiles with 

to retaliate, and therefore should not expect to emplo

same tactics in battle.

18

 Other generals were said to be 

the threat of a Chinese Kosovo—i.e., an attack on the 

by U.S.-NATO—to pressure the central government 

increase in the defense budget. Retired generals, w

advanced age and iconic status as heroes of the revo

allow them to speak more freely than officers on active 

were especially vocal in this regard. For inst

83-year-old Li Desheng was quoted as saying, “We 

have whatever new weaponry other countries have. E

they [other countries] don’t have them, we need to ac

them.”

19

There was considerable discussion of the need to de

high-tech weapons to counter those of the United State

other NATO countries. A participant in a forum on K

held by an unnamed group army in the Guangzhou Mi

Region held that science and technology were the 

available options for winning. Using what worked 

past, adhering to old conventions, and following presc

routines would not enable China to prevail in a high

conflict. Training that measured battlefield skills in 

of meters, seconds, or points (i.e., traditional indicat

battlefield success as calculated in territory gained w

time elapsed) would not allow the PLA to win a modern 

Another participant in the same gathering argued 

although the attacks on the Yugoslav Federation 

reprehensible acts of banditry, they had create

opportunity for China to learn how to fight a high-tech 

The most realistic and sensible choice would be to se

high tide of military training with science and techn

10
and draw on the beneficial experiences of others so 

China could “scale the heights and win on a borrowed l

of high technology.”

20

Such views were reinforced after American p

bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. The B

government rejected Washington’s explanations th

out-of-date map had been responsible for what U.S. of

termed a tragic accident. There were calls to boost mi

strength so that the PRC would not be bullied th

U.S.-NATO forces were attempting to bully the F

Advocates argued that the developmental tre

technology was shifting from platform-centr

network-centric, and that strategy based on attritio

giving way to strategy based on the speed of comm

Although proponents of this point of view did not exp

say so, the strategy of attrition is an important compon

People’s War: to describe attrition as outmoded is t

doubts on the strategy of People’s War as 

Network-centered warfare would increase the com

speed of various units and allow them to continu

monitor the battlefield.

A “system of systems” must be constructed that 

link all computers on the ground, in the air, and on th

through satellite communications. Concerning jus

branch of the armed force, antisubmarine operations, 

would be connected through main and auxiliary 

detecting devices and non-sonar detecting devices, s

processing, and command and control systems. 

systems would significantly enhance the users’ abi

search and attack enemy submarines. Not to possess 

capabilities might doom China to losing the war before 

a single shot was fired.

22

This emphasis on acquiring cutting-edge mi

technology and simultaneous denigration of the r

military platforms did not prevent proponents of acq

an aircraft carrier from advocating what they had al

11
acquisition of perhaps the most expensive platform 

Students at two of China’s most prestigious institu

higher learning, Beijing University and Qin

University, were reportedly demanding that “China 

build its own aircraft carriers. This is a necessi

safeguarding peace and national dignity. The ai

carrier is necessary equipment for winning local wars 

high-technology conditions.”

23

 An internet campaign 

by a woman former soldier was said to have collect

million yuan in donations. Advocates pointed out th

PRC was the only permanent member of the U.N. Se

Council without an aircraft carrier battle grou

handicap which fails to match China’s status.”

24

difficult to escape the implication in these and 

statements that they are motivated more by the symb

believed to be conferred by possession of a carrier than 

military efficacy. One aircraft carrier battle group 

limited utility; the three or four that could provide 

power projection would be proportionately more expen

Although proponents of large increases in the de

budget are mindful of the opportunity costs that would 

to be borne by other sectors of society, their attitude 

to be that such expenditures are necessary because su

is at stake. An aerospace official summed up 

arguments about the bombing of the Chinese em

succinctly: “The bloody lesson teaches us that a s

defense, not just a prosperous economy, is what ma

nation powerful.”

25

Doing More with Existing Equipment.

Still a third group took the position that China cou

be expected to catch up with U.S.-NATO capabilities 

near term, and that to try to do so would be extr

foolish. While China would not confront the U.S.-N

hegemonists, neither should China shrink 

confrontation if such a situation were forced on it. I

12
its economic strength. To engage in an arms race wi

West would be disastrous to the country’s future. Mor

such a race might be exactly the trap that the hegem

states were setting for the PRC. An unnamed sc

described as a moderate, was quoted as saying tha

Soviet economy was ruined partly because of exc

spending on new weapons.

26

 Others expanded on this 

The American purpose in bombing the PRC’s emba

Belgrade was to “probe” China’s capabilities and resp

A Hong Kong newspaper known to have ties with B

accused the West of hatching six major conspiracies ag

China. Conspiracy number one was to “lure China in

trap of increasing military spending so that the Ch

would step into the shoes of the former Soviet Union

Advocates of the “make do” school pointed out that 

could be done to improve military capability withou

vast expenditures that the “catch up with the West” g

plans would entail. In many cases, this group pointe

the advanced equipment the PLA already possessed w

being properly utilized. Some equipment stayed in st

Even when it did not, resources too often did not app

training exercises, which tended to proceed exactly a

had in decades past. Sometimes officers did take the tr

to learn how to use new weapons, but mistakenly th

that they had somehow automatically increased 

combat capability. In short, the military needed to 

more creatively about how to integrate men and weap

Members of this group asked rhetorically how 

acquisition of more new weapons could possibly bene

PLA, since the military had not even mastere

application of the new weapons it already had.

Another weak point in the PLA, they argued, wa

educational level of troops and officers. Here was an 

where low-cost and low-tech solutions could produ

benefits. The PLA needed “scholar generals,” and 

start by recruiting more officers who were univ

graduates.

29

 Several PLA branches set up scholarsh

13
understanding that the recipients would join the mi

after graduation. The military academy network 

revamped. Increased emphasis on science and techn

was to be part of the new curriculum. Other pro

reforms included more sophisticated training 

employed high technology.

30

For most members of this third group, doing more 

existing methods did not preclude the acquisition of 

effective weapons: they argued only that China woul

catching up with the United States in all areas impo

without destroying the country’s economy. In a situat

“one low and five insufficiencies” (the inform

component of armaments was low and there 

insufficient numbers of high-powered armaments; we

for launching attacks; precision-guided weapons; me

reconnaissance, early warning, command and contro

electronics armaments), certain “trump card” we

(sashou jian) were urgently needed. These trumps 

enable China to defeat the more technologically adv

enemy.

31

 In selected areas, the PRC could leapfrog (w

over intermediate stages already gone through by adv

Western powers and achieve state-of-the-art capab

without incurring huge expenses.

A favorite topic of these writers was the conc

asymmetric warfare (buduicheng zhanzheng): th

bringing a particular superiority of the PLA to bear ag

the enemy’s weak point. Using “acupuncture” ( dia

techniques, the aggressor’s satellites could be blinde

PLA laser, and his computers foiled by the insert

viruses.

A variant of this school suggested “unlimited wa

(chaoxian zhan). In a book by that name published in 

1999, the authors, two air force senior colonels, argu

the PRC must be prepared to act without regard fo

so-called rules of war. Colonels Qiao and Wang view 

rules as having been devised by the West and the

14
of technology in the developed world which may n

suitable for China. Another driver of the quest for mor

better weapons on the part of the West, and particular

United States, is the obsession with avoiding casualt

In Qiao and Wang’s analysis, as more weapon

developed and deployed, the value of each indiv

weapon in combat is diminished. As a corollary, 

reasoned, no single type of weapon can be decisive, s

the highly unlikely event of nuclear weapons in a tota

This proliferation in types and costs of weapons may 

cause the American economy to collapse. China, a 

poorer country, must use whatever means are 

disposal, unfettered by rules and codes devised witho

participation and which work against it. Biologica

chemical warfare, terrorism, and the manipulati

environmental conditions—for example, producing ha

climate changes in the enemy’s territory—must 

employed.

32

Proponents of this point of view seem to r

asymmetric warfare as a relatively low-cost quick fix f

PRC’s defense without adequately considerin

strategy’s deficiencies. In fact, asymmetric warfare 

the creation of contemporary Chinese military thinke

has been practiced from time immemorial. Such a str

is central to the myth of Achilles’ heel and the tale of 

and Goliath. The notion that one can expect to atta

enemy’s satellite and computer networks while the e

will not have thought to do so against oneself, or th

enemy will not have tried to take precautions agains

an attack, is dangerously naive.

Withal, there were evident efforts on the domestic 

in China to restrain the more militant from taking con

action. President Jiang Zemin appears to have been 

forefront of these. While careful not to appear so concil

as to invite criticism of cowardice from his dom

enemies, Jiang stated, although we know perfectly we

15
wolf. That is, we must “dance with the wolf.” This 

reality we must face and the diplomatic strategy we 

adopt.

33

He vowed to discuss the matter with U.S. Pre

Clinton at an appropriate time. A provincial party 

strongly supported Jiang’s contention vis-à-vi

hard-line military faction. Sichuan party head Xie 

took direct issue with those who would put economic g

and diplomatic relations in thrall to a stronger m

presence, saying that:

We must unify the safeguarding of state sovereignty 

national dignity with the continuation of the policy of openin

the outside world. The overall masses must different

between the authorities of the U.S.-led NATO bloc 

improvements in the investment environment. One hand m

court business and attract investments, while the other h

must increase exports.

34

Jiefangjun bao also used the wolf metaphor, notin

although the predator had yet to come, the sounds 

claws sharpening could be heard from time to 

Meanwhile, continuing efforts at preparedness 

needed.

35

Concern with the possibility of American ho

toward China—a fear that originated out of the eve

1989-91 and was rekindled by U.S.-NATO actio

Kosovo—was intensified by remarks made by Presiden

Teng-hui of the Republic of China just 2 months aft

bombing of the PRC embassy in Kosovo. Lee said 

relations between his country and the mainland sho

regarded as a “special state-to-state” relationship

Chinese media accused Washington of being behin

statement, and talk of war intensified. Generals wer

to be debating whether to “just bend the bow but not let 

the arrow” or to take actual military action.

36

 In the en

bow was bent in the direction of psychological wa

Military exercises were held and several mainland air 

16
Strait.

Advocates of the need to “dance with the wolf” app

have overcome those who wanted to take immediate a

By the end of a summer characterized by menacing beh

and even more militant rhetoric, the fervor began to a

Progress was made in Beijing-Washington talks on 

much reparations the United States should pay fo

bombing of the embassy, and the two sides struck a d

the PRC’s entry into the World Trade Organizatio

November 1999, there were cautious moves to

restoring military-to-military relations between th

sides. Discussion of how to apply the lessons of Kosovo 

unnamed enemy that could be only the United States 

from the Chinese press. The December issue of Qiu

periodical sponsored by the Central Committee o

Chinese Communist Party, opined that the interna

situation had “generally started to relax, while peac

development remain the main themes of the era.”

37

Conclusions.

Though the salience of the Kosovo conflict has rec

the underlying issues that caused such intense in

have not been resolved. Washington is unlikely to fore

the kind of behavior that so upset Beijing, and Beij

unlikely to foreswear the use of force against Taiwan, 

drifts ever further from the mainland’s ambit, or to 

the human rights concessions that China’s ethnic, reli

or other dissidents want. Chances are that confront

and the debate on how the PLA should respond, will fla

again in the near future.

In fact, each of the three approaches to dealing wi

United States militarily has its deficiencies. People’

techniques will be useful only to the extent tha

mainland is attacked by foreign forces, which is a h

unlikely scenario at best.

38

 Moreover, in the event 

most likely trigger for a Sino-American confrontation

17
Taiwan who will be able to exploit the advantag

People’s War. There is, for example, already an u

ground wartime command center beneath Taipei.

3

PRC’s Tibetan and Muslim dissidents have already s

that they are adept at guerrilla warfare and irre

warfare techniques. Efforts to catch up to the United S

militarily is, as its critics point out, extraordin

expensive and would have adverse effects on the 

economic development. The techniques of asymmetr

acupuncture warfare will be successful only to the e

that one’s enemy has not thought to attack one’s own 

points or to protect its own. This, too, is highly unlike

At present, the leadership seems to have decided o

time-honored bureaucratic technique of giving each 

PLA schools some resources to devote to its preferred o

This cannot automatically be assumed to be an u

dissipation of resources. The schools are not mu

exclusive, and their different techniques could supple

each other in time of conflict. Certain techniques of Pe

War, including deception and underground storag

being employed. An ambitious program of wea

development is occurring, some of it indigenous in n

and some helped by purchases from abroad, mainly 

Russia and Israel. At the same time, considerable effor

being devoted to asymmetric techniques such as 

“death rays.”

41

 How effective any of these would be in a

combat remains to be seen. What cannot be doubted i

the PLA is becoming an increasingly formidable foe.

ENDNOTES

1. Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Secur

Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of 

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999.

2. “Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY 1999 Approp

Bill,” February 26, 1999, available at: <www/defenselin

pubs/twstrait_02261999.html>.

18
to commit troops where they could see no compelling national i

others felt that the scope of violence did not justify intervention

citizens of Greece were sympathetic to the Serbs because 

common adherence to Eastern Orthodox Christianity.

4. There were many evaluations quite contrary to the offici

over victory, however. For one of the most articulate, see Earl H. 

Jr., “Operation Allied Force and the Continuing Relevance 

Power,” Parameters, Vol. 29, No. 4, Winter 1999-2000, pp. 24-

author is a retired air force major.

5. Su Size, “Kosovo War and New Military Theory,” Jiefang

(Liberation Army Daily, Beijing), June 1, 1999, p. 6, in United 

National Technical Information Service, Foreign Bro

Information Service (hereafter cited as FBIS), July 2, 1999, via in

6. Xiong is best known in the West for his suggestion tha

United States should back Taiwan in a confrontation w

mainland, the PRC would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons 

American cities such as Los Angeles.

7. Daniel Kwan, “Hawks’ Gathering Urges Steps to Guard 

‘Unholy Alliances’,” South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, A

1999, via internet.

8. See, e.g., House Armed Services Committee, Defense For 

Era: Lessons of the Persian Gulf War, Washington, DC

Government Printing Office, 1992; Michael Gordon and B

Trainor, The Generals’ War, Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1995; P

Hilts, “Dispute in Gulf War Debate Continues to Fester at M.I.T

York Times, February 24, 1996, p. A7.

9. These are somewhat similar to the categories found by M

Pillsbury in his study of PLA views of the revolution in military 

(1) the RMA school; (2) the “local war” school; and (3) the Peopl

school. Michael Pillsbury, “Taiwan’s Security and the Revolu

Military Affairs”, Paper presented at the International Forum o

and Security in the Taiwan Strait, Taipei, Taiwan, July 26-28, 

3.

10. Cui Changqi, “Reflections on NATO Air Strikes on Y

Federation,” Jiefangjun bao, April 8, 1999, p. 5, trans. in FBIS, A

1999, via internet.

11. Guo Anhua, “Evaluation and Thoughts on Kosov

Situation,” Jiefangjun bao, May 4, 1999, p. 6, in FBIS, May 21, 1

internet.

19
Attacks,” Jiefangjun bao, June 22, 1999, p. 6, in FBIS, July 12, 1

internet.

13. Song Xinzhi, “Transform Air Defense Concepts,” Jiefangj

April 27, 1999, p. 6, in FBIS, May 10, 1999, via internet.

14. Zhou Yinnan and Gang Boyu, “Nanjing PLA Mobi

Committee Meets,” Zhejiang ribao (Zhejiang Daily, Hangzhou)

1999, p. 1, in FBIS, May 19, 1999, via internet.

15. (No author), “PLA Reports Progress in Building De

Shelters,” Xinhua, Beijing, November 22, 1999.

16. Stan Sesser, “New Reds Emerge from Bars and Old 

Shelters,” Asian Wall Street Journal, Weekly edition, No

29-December 5, 1999, p. 7.

17. The efficacy of People’s War in the contemporary cont

been quietly questioned since at least as early as 1978 when art

the value of positional warfare, as opposed to the mobile warfare 

a key characteristic of People’s War, began to appear in Chinese m

writings. However, as a precious heirloom from Chairman Mao, P

War could not be publicly repudiated per se. It was deemed accep

advocate “People’s War Under Modern Conditions,” which is a 

different strategy.

18. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “One Country, Two Policies,” South 

Morning Post, April 21, 1999, via internet.

19. (No author), “Veteran Generals Demand World-Best We

Hong Kong Standard, May 17, 1999, via internet. See also Willy W

Lam, “Army Hawks Mimic Anti-NATO Sentiment,” South 

Morning Post, May 19, 1999, via internet.

20. Duan Zhiming, Mei Lijin, Liu Jianmin, and Xiang 

“Warning from the Flames of War in Kosovo—Summary of Foru

by a Certain Group Army of the Guangzhou Military R

Jiefangjun bao, April 20, 1999, p. 5, inFBIS, May 3, 1999, via inte

21. Ma Ling, “It Is Imperative to Have Powerful Military Str

Ta Kung Pao, Hong Kong, May 11, 1999, p. A2, in FBIS, May 1

via internet.

22. Wang Hua, “Future Maritime Network Center W

Xiandai junshi, Conmilit, Hong Kong, No. 266, March 11, 19

41-42, in FBIS, May 13, 1999, via internet.

20
Sovereignty,” Pingguo ribao, Apple Daily, Hong Kong, May 16, 

A16, in FBIS, May 18, 1999.

24. Oliver Chou, “Notes on China,” South China Morning Po

14, 1999, via internet.

25. Quoted by Oliver Chou, “First Spaceship One of Te

Projects,” South China Morning Post, May 19, 1999, via intern

26. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “Jiang Stresses Need for Hi-Tech G

South China Morning Post, June 4, 1999. via internet.

27. (No author), “PLA Must Prepare to Fight a World War,” S

jih-pao, Star Island Daily, Hong Kong, May 28, 1999, p. B14, i

June 2, 1999. A similar point is made by Chang Chien, “Beware 

Race When Building a High-Technology Army,” Ching Pao, Hon

September 9, 1999, pp. 50-51, inFBIS, September 8, 1999, via int

28. Tang Liuhui, “Work Hard to Explore Optimal Solution 

Weapon Integration,” Jiefangjun bao, July 15, 1999, p. 6, in FB

12, 1999, via internet.

29. Zhang Yajun, “Intellectual Military Calls for ‘S

Generals’,” Jiefangjun bao, February 2, 1999, p. 6, in FBIS, Fe

24, 1999, via internet.

30. Liu Senshan, “Various Aspects of Military Training 

Context of Science and Technology,” Jiefangjun bao, March 16, 

6, in FBIS, March 31, 1999, via internet.

31. An Weiping, “Thoughts on Developing Armaments by Le

Bounds,” Jiefangjun bao, April 6, 1999, p. 6, in FBIS, April 23, 1

internet.

32. Qiao Liang and Wang Xianghui, Chaoxian zhan (War 

Boundaries), Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Press, 1999.

33. Yu Ching-sheng, “Jiang Zemin Repeatedly Expounds 

Domestic and Foreign Policies in Three Internal Speeches G

Quick Response and Winning the Support of the Public,” Chi

July 1, 1999, p. 24-26, in FBIS, July 9, 1999, via internet.

34. Agence France Presse, “Forget Bombing, Court Inves

South China Morning Post, May 19, 1999, via internet.

35. Pan Shunrui, “War Is Not Far from Us,” Jiefangjun bao, 

1999, p. 6, in FBIS, July 6, 1999, via internet.

21
Pao, Bright Daily, Hong Kong, July 17, 1999, p. 12.

37. As summarized by Xinhua, December 1, 1999, via inter

38. Underground storage of planes and moving the populat

tunnels could have some value should there be retaliation ag

mainland attack on Taiwan’s territory. But this assume

retaliation would occur only in the area nearest Taiwan. Such re

on the part of one’s enemy cannot be guaranteed.

39. Monique Chu, “Disaster Response Center Likely to Get 

Headquarters,” Taipei Times, November 30, 1999, via internet

40. Brian Hsu, “Generals Warn of ‘Asymmetric Warfare’,” 

Times, December 4, 1999, via internet. An upgraded command, 

and communications system is scheduled to be deployed in Fe

2000. According to senior ROC military officials, it will strengt

country’s ability to intercept and jam enemy electronic system

Brian Hsu, “Army Upgrades C3 Systems,” Taipei Times, Novem

1999, via internet.

41. Barbara Opall-Rome, “PLA Pursues Acupuncture W

Defense News, Washington, DC, March 1, 1999. Ms. Opall-Rome 

extensively from Lin Chong-Pin, “Dianxue” (“Acupuncture Warf

Heba (Nuclear Hegemon), Taipei: The Student Publisher, 19

1-32. 

22
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Dr. June Teufel Dreyer

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler