PRECEDENTS, VARIABLES, AND OPTIONS

IN PLANNING A U.S. MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT 

STRATEGY FROM IRAQ

W. Andrew Terrill

Conrad C. Crane

October 2005

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 The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not 

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the 

Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public 

release; distribution is unlimited.

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 A number of people provided detailed and straightforward comments on 

earlier drafts of this work. The comments, which came from people with a variety 

of perspectives, both greatly helped the authors and reminded them of how 

controversial many aspects of these topics are and remain. The authors would 

particularly like to thank Ms. Sarah Womar; Dr. Jeffrey Record; Major David M. 

Burke, USAF; Dr. Sami Hajjar; Dr. Sherifa Zuhur; Dr. Larry Goodson; and Dr. 

Antulio Echevarria. Others who rendered help to Professor Terrill during his most 

recent research travel to the Middle East include Lieutenant Colonel(P) William D. 

(Dave) Huggins, USA, formerly of the U.S. Embassy in Bahrain; Commander John 

J. Arnold, USN, of the U.S. Embassy in Qatar; and Major Robert E. Paddock, USA, 

of the U.S. Embassy in Jordan. All mistakes in fact, interpretation, and judgment 

associated with this work are, of course, those of the authors. The authors’ 

information cut-off date is August 8, 2005.

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to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, 

Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. 

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iii

FOREWORD

 The United States is engaged in a massive effort to rehabilitate the 

government and political culture of Iraq, following the destruction of 

the Saddam Hussein regime in spring 2003. The U.S. goal and ideal for 

Iraq is the establishment and maintenance of a strong, self-sufficient, 

and forward-looking government. Currently, Iraq is in transition, as that 

country’s political leaders seek to establish a new, more representative 

form of government, while at the same time attempting to cope with a 

vicious ongoing insurgency. To accomplish these tasks, the government 

needs significant U.S. military support which will be reduced and then 

eliminated over time as the Iraqis hopefully become more self-sufficient. 

According to President George W. Bush in his June 25, 2005, address to 

the nation, “We will stay in Iraq as long as we are needed—and not a day 

longer.”

 The questions of how to empower the Iraqis most effectively and then 

progressively withdraw non-Iraqi forces from that country is a complex issue 

that often has been oversimplified in many of the current media debates. 

Often, political commentators of various stripes reduce complex arguments 

and multidimensional planning problems to simple slogans suggesting 

that victory is either inevitable or impossible. Under these circumstances, 

there are too few serious discussions of problems, opportunities, and 

meaningful precedents that might be useful in developing guidelines and 

considerations for U.S. policy in Iraq. In this monograph, Drs. W. Andrew 

Terrill and Conrad C. Crane seek to present the U.S. situation in Iraq in all 

of its complexity and ambiguity, with policy recommendations for how 

that withdrawal strategy might be most effectively implemented.

 The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as a 

contribution to the national security debate on this important subject as our 

nation continues to grapple with a variety of problems associated with the 

U.S. presence in Iraq and the new strategic reality created by the decision 

to seek to rehabilitate the Iraqi polity. This analysis should be especially 

useful to U.S. military strategic leaders as they address the complicated 

interplay of issues related to exiting Iraq in a politically acceptable and 

constructive manner. 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS

CONRAD C. CRANE is the Director of the U.S. Army Military History 

Institute. Before accepting that position, he served with the Strategic 

Studies Institute (SSI) at the U.S. Army War College, where he held 

the General Douglas MacArthur Chair of Research. He joined SSI 

after his retirement from active military service, a 26-year military 

career that concluded with 9 years as Professor of History at the U.S. 

Military Academy (USMA). Dr. Crane has authored or edited books 

and monographs on the Civil War, World War I, World War II, Korea 

and Vietnam, and has written and lectured widely on airpower and 

landpower issues. Before leaving SSI, he coauthored a prewar study 

on reconstructing Iraq with W. Andrew Terrill that influenced Army 

planners and has attracted much attention from the media. Dr. 

Crane holds a B.S. from USMA and an M.A. and Ph.D from Stanford 

University. He is also a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and 

General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College. 

W. ANDREW TERRILL joined the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) 

in October 2001, and is SSI’s Middle East specialist. Prior to his 

appointment, he served as a Middle East nonproliferation analyst for 

the International Assessments Division of the Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory (LLNL). In 1998-99, Dr. Terrill also served as a 

Visiting Professor at the U.S. Air War College on assignment from 

LLNL. He is a former faculty member at Old Dominion University in 

Norfolk, Virginia, and has taught adjunct at a variety of other colleges 

and universities. He is a retired U.S. Army Reserve lieutenant colonel 

and a Foreign Area Officer (Middle East). Dr. Terrill has published in 

numerous academic journals on topics including nuclear proliferation, 

the Iran-Iraq War, Operation DESERT STORM, Middle Eastern 

chemical weapons, and ballistic missile proliferation, terrorism, 

and commando operations. Since 1994, at U.S. State Department 

invitation, Dr. Terrill has participated in the Middle Eastern Arms 

Control and Regional Security (ACRS) Track 2 talks, which are part 

of the Middle East Peace Process. He holds a B.A. from California 

State Polytechnic University and an M.A. from the University of 

California, Riverside, both in Political Science. Dr Terrill also holds a 

Ph.D. in International Relations from Claremont Graduate University, 

Claremont, California.
v

SUMMARY

 The U.S. and coalition invasion of Iraq in spring 2003 has led to 

the most ambitious U.S. effort at nation-building since the end of 

World War II. Unlike the aftermath of World War II, however, the 

United States is faced with a ferocious insurgency that is threatening 

the emerging government of Iraq and its developing security forces. 

Moreover, this program of Iraqi political rehabilitation must be 

carried out in a part of the world that is well-known for its strong 

sensitivities about Western influence over that region. It must also be 

carried out without significant, in-country military support from the 

majority of U.S. allies, with the most important exception being the 

United Kingdom. Additionally, this transition must not only sweep 

aside an old society but build a new one based on the cooperation of 

Shi’ite Arabs, Sunni Arabs, Kurds, and other groups.

 Previous U.S. experience in coping with postwar problems 

has demonstrated that a military occupation resembles the major 

combat phase of a war in that both require maximum flexibility 

and adaptability on the part of military forces to meet consistently 

changing conditions. Moreover, past U.S. experience further 

illustrates that the population of a democratic country engaged 

in occupation duties can sometimes become first wary and then 

disillusioned as the enterprise continues into the indefinite future 

without clear and rapid progress. In the past, the United States has 

sometimes had to distinguish between optimal and acceptable end 

states in the countries being occupied, because the optimal end state 

is not always attainable, but worst case developments must still be 

prevented. These experiences are worthy of remembering as the 

United States struggles with the situation in Iraq. 

 This report views the empowerment of a viable Iraqi central 

government and a security force to defend its authority as vital to the 

future of that country. Thus, to be successful in Iraq, the United States 

must help empower a functioning and unified Iraqi government, 

support the effort to build an indigenous security force to protect 

that government and the Iraqi public, and help prevent a breakdown 

in those intercommunal relations necessary to foster power-sharing 

and avoid civil war. The U.S. Government must also do this in a 

time frame that is acceptable to both Iraqis and U.S. public opinion. 
vi

Furthermore, these tasks must be accomplished while coping with 

an ongoing and highly adaptive insurgency. The deeply challenging 

and multidimensional nature of this effort leaves little latitude for 

mistakes by the Iraqi government or in future U.S. dealings with Iraq. 

The United States must therefore decide how much it is prepared 

to sacrifice to help create and support a Western-style democratic 

government in Iraq. Since this is a finite commitment, the question 

arises as to when and how the United States is prepared to adjust its 

goals should it be faced with the prospect of less than full democracy 

in Iraq. A partially democratic system that can be encouraged to 

become more open even following a U.S. withdrawal would clearly 

be better than a variety of other plausible alternative regimes. 

 In Iraq, it may be especially difficult for the United States to discern 

the optimal time to begin withdrawing the majority of its troops. 

Balancing the goals of supporting stable Iraqi self-government and 

leaving Iraq in a timely manner has emerged as a major requirement 

for U.S. regional policy. It is particularly important that the United 

States does not insist on remaining in Iraq to support maximalist 

goals and then find itself unable to sustain an ongoing presence 

there. The danger of a serious decline in U.S. Army, Army Reserve, 

and National Guard recruiting and, perhaps at some point, retention 

is of concern, although the latter is not currently a serious problem. 

The potential for decreasing U.S. public support of the war also exists. 

While important indications of progress are coming from Iraqi statebuilding efforts, the public may ultimately judge the success of U.S. 

activities in Iraq based on whether these efforts allow U.S. troops to 

begin withdrawing in what to the public is an acceptable time frame. 

Finally, any prolonged presence of U.S. forces there will require the 

United States to cope with traditional Iraqi concerns about Western 

intentions in the region, especially regarding Iraq’s oil.

 The danger of a hasty, politically-motivated departure from 

Iraq is also a problem. Police and military forces with incomplete 

training will likely crumble in the face of the insurgent challenge, 

and all the effort to create these forces will be rendered meaningless. 

Likewise, a new and more democratic Iraqi government will need to 

be protected as various groups attempt to resolve their differences 

without being overpowered by their sectarian and ethnic grievances 

and drifting toward civil war. Empowering a legitimate government 
vii

to which both Iraqi security forces and citizens can give more than 

conditional legitimacy will be key to this process. This challenge is 

mostly an Iraqi one, although the United States will seek to protect 

emerging Iraqi institutions as a transitional step, while Iraqis prepare 

to protect themselves. 

Without minimizing the problems associated with the current 

situation, this report recommends strongly against the establishment 

of a fixed timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops, unless Iraq’s 

government fails and the situation becomes hopeless. Establishing 

the point at which Iraq can fend for itself with a declining U.S. troop 

presence will be a difficult challenge for U.S. intelligence analysts as 

they seek to remove a sometimes unpopular U.S./coalition presence, 

while not setting into motion the prospect of Iraqi government 

collapse, anarchy, and civil war. Potentially successful dates for 

beginning a withdrawal must be teased out by analysts weighting 

a miasma of complex political, military, and economic factors 

and cannot be established in a manner that bypasses intelligence 

judgments, destroys the option for flexibility, and risks a premature, 

haphazard withdrawal that may lead to the collapse of all efforts 

associated with the U.S. presence in Iraq. 

 The information cut off date for this study was August 8, 2005.
viii
1

PRECEDENTS, VARIABLES, AND OPINIONS 

IN PLANNING A U.S. MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT 

STRATEGY FROM IRAQ

Hussein is now deposed and no banned weapons were present. So why 

don’t we leave?

 

Gregg Easterbrook1

The New Republic

It’s only complete nonsense to ask the troops to leave in this chaos and 

this vacuum of power.

Ghazi al-Yawer2

Iraqi Vice President

As in Palestine, the occupation is the main cause of the current troubles.

Stanley Hoffman

Harvard University3

Introduction.

 Having invaded Iraq and deposed a tyrannical dictator in early 

2003, the United States assumed some important commitments to 

the Iraqi population, who were left without a government or viable 

security forces following the destruction of Saddam Hussein’s 

regime. The U.S. administration has defined a central part of its 

approach to the situation as “leaving Iraq better than we found it.”4

In its maximalist form, this statement calls for empowering a decent 

and accountable government and providing strong indigenous 

security forces to defend the country and maintain internal security. 

At a minimum, leaving Iraq better than we found it requires a stable 

government and the continued national unity of Iraq (rather than its 

separation into smaller warring territories), as well as the avoidance 

of civil war.5

 So long as Iraq remains unified with an acceptable degree of 

domestic stability, security, and harmony, it would be difficult to find 

a government worse than that of Saddam Hussein. A government 
2

that takes the interests of various tribes and religious and ethnic 

communities into account and shows respect for human rights would 

be dramatically better even if it does not immediately emerge as a 

fully functioning constitutional democracy. A withdrawal of most 

or all U.S. and coalition troops from Iraq under these circumstances 

would have achieved some important victories, although it would 

not immediately create a Western-style democracy or directly 

support the program of greater Middle East democratization.6 

 Yet, if the United States has a responsibility to support Iraqi 

efforts to establish a tolerant and pluralistic government, it also has 

a responsibility to return Iraqi decisionmaking to Iraqis as quickly 

as this can be responsibly done. Indeed, many Iraqis have shown 

strong interest in the rapid departure of U.S. forces from their 

country, although others are at least ambivalent about the timing 

of such a withdrawal.7

 A number of major Iraqi politicians have 

attempted to address this divide by noting the practical problems of 

immediate U.S. withdrawal, while stating that they would like to see 

the number of U.S. troops reduced within what is usually a relatively 

short time period.8 Still, the Iraqi population (with the almost certain 

exception of the Kurds) is likely to become more impatient with the 

U.S. presence over time, and it may not be possible for either the 

United States or the Iraqi government to ignore these sentiments 

indefinitely.9

 The U.S. obligation to depart Iraq in a timely and organized 

manner also is complicated by the practical problems of an ongoing 

and evolving insurgency, which includes a variety of diverse 

elements ranging from foreign Islamic extremists and terrorists to 

Iraqi Islamists and secular anti-American Iraqi nationalists.10 The 

departure from Iraq of substantial numbers of non-Iraqi troops 

may help to both legitimize the emerging Iraqi government and 

demotivate the nationalist component of these hostile coalitions. Such 

a weakening of insurgent motivation can be exploited by an Iraqi 

government shrewd enough to do so, provided that government also 

reaches out to all of Iraq’s major ethnic and sectarian communities. 

In the aftermath of a significant withdrawal of U.S. forces, the 

Iraqi government will face new conditions under which to address 

the twin challenges of co-opting and rehabilitating redeemable 

insurgents and waging war against largely irredeemable terrorist 
3

groups. Former Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi has referred to 

this process of reaching out to insurgent nationalists as rehabilitating 

“the fringes of the insurgents.”11 It remains to be seen if Allawi’s 

successors (and especially Islamist Shi’ites) will maintain his strong 

commitment to reaching out to Iraq’s Sunni Arabs, while waging 

unrelenting war against hard-core terrorists.12 Mixed signals exist 

here since the Ja’afari government has included a number of Sunnis 

in the Constitutional Convention but has also continued to favor 

sweeping de-Ba’athification measures, which have alienated large 

numbers of Sunni Arabs.13

 Later in this work, the authors will show that exit strategies 

following a military intervention often are notoriously difficult 

to implement.14 Having shattered the previous government, a 

responsible occupying power must seriously attempt to create a new 

political system acceptable to the citizens of that defeated power 

after the occupier departs. In Iraq, it may be especially difficult to 

discern the optimal time to leave. Balancing the goals of supporting 

stable Iraqi self-government and leaving Iraq in a timely manner 

has emerged as a central challenge of U.S. regional policy. The U.S. 

and Iraqi leaderships must decide when the government is capable 

of surviving and moving to consolidate its authority without the 

presence of large numbers of foreign troops. 

 The United States must also take special care to avoid leaving 

Iraq with a government and security system that will crumble in 

the aftermath, even if the disintegration process is not immediate. 

Such an eventuality is nothing more than a delayed failure. U.S. 

leaders do not have the option of departing Iraq by leaving a failed 

state in place, which in turn would become a haven for terrorists 

and almost certainly lapse into civil war.15 The only incontestable 

reason to accelerate a U.S. departure to a point that would otherwise 

seem imprudent would be in response to an official request by the 

Iraqi government for the coalition to do so. Such a request could 

only reasonably occur if the Iraqi government decides that it can 

survive without a substantial U.S. presence or at least that its chances 

are better without such a presence.

 Additionally, U.S. policy for remaining in Iraq or departing 

will not be decided solely on the basis of geopolitical factors 

and the dynamics of Middle Eastern politics. There are also 
4

important questions of American and coalition domestic political 

support for a continued major troop presence in Iraq, including public 

acceptance of the casualties and economic expenditures associated 

with these policies.16 Should continuing the Iraq War become deeply 

unpopular with the American public, pressure may develop for a 

hastily planned scramble from the country, leaving Iraq with a 

highly uncertain and frightening future. Thus, to be successful in 

Iraq, the United States must help empower a functioning and unified 

government, support the effort to build a security force to protect that 

government, and help prevent a breakdown in those intercommunal 

relations necessary to foster power-sharing and avoid civil war. The 

U.S. Government must also do this in a time frame acceptable both to 

Iraqis and to U.S. and coalition allies’ public opinion. Moreover, these 

tasks must be accomplished while coping with an ongoing and highly 

adaptive insurgency. The deeply challenging and multidimensional 

nature of this effort leaves little latitude for mistakes in future U.S. 

dealings with Iraq.

 The long-term dilemma of the U.S. position in Iraq can perhaps 

best be summarized as “We can’t stay, we can’t leave, and we can’t 

fail.” The longer that significant numbers of U.S. forces remain in 

Iraq, the more nationalist resentment builds and the more the United 

States appears to be an occupier. Additionally, the Army is strained 

more and the American public may become more uncertain about 

the wisdom of continuing to wage counterinsurgency war in Iraq. 

On the other hand, the United States cannot withdraw prematurely 

and risk a civil war or a return to unrestrained repression. Such a 

failed result would reinforce perceptions of American foreign policy 

ineptitude and lack of national will, and compromise the ability of the 

world’s remaining superpower to wield corresponding international 

influence.

Prior U.S. Efforts at Postwar Stabilization 

and Political Rehabilitation: The Historical Record.

 Historical examples reveal many of the problems that Americans 

have with postwar stabilization operations and how quickly they 

can become disillusioned with the process of rebuilding foreign 

societies. One of the continuing problems with the conduct of 
5

operations to stabilize and rebuild states after decisive combat 

operations is that civilian agencies lack the capabilities and resources 

to assume required missions from deployed military forces in a 

timely or effective manner, even in cases where security is not a major 

problem.17 As part of the effort to create a more robust American 

interagency capacity for such operations, the U.S. State Department 

recently has created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction 

and Stabilization (OCRS). The stated mission for this organization is 

to “Lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian 

capacity to prevent or prepare for postconflict situations, and to help 

stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil 

strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy 

and a market economy.”18 That closing vision is a laudable one, 

but the history of past American experiences with such operations 

suggests that proclaimed goals for endstates are best kept vague or 

modest. Rarely can the course of reconstruction be predicted, and 

the ultimate success or failure of such efforts is often predicated on 

the management of public expectations for their result. 

 Many sobering insights can be gained from our own national 

experience with Reconstruction after the American Civil War. Radical 

Republicans in Congress, supported by Army leaders like General 

Ulysses S. Grant, championed a vision of a South transformed 

socially, politically, and economically, but local resistance frustrated 

their lofty objectives. Despite early advances in expanding civil 

and political rights, by 1870 papers like the New York Tribune were 

proclaiming that the nation was “tired and sick” of Reconstruction, 

and pleaded for its end. James McPherson’s writings on the ensuing 

decade have titles like “The Retreat from Reconstruction” and 

“Reconstruction Unravels,” reflecting the disappointing course of 

reform efforts.19 A true two-party system did not reemerge in the 

South until the last third of the 20th century, and it took 100 years for 

African-Americans there to gain the civil rights and status promised 

them in the 1860s. 

 The nation’s next experience with rebuilding states came as a 

result of the Spanish-American War. America was not prepared 

for its first excursion into Empire, and President McKinley’s initial 

stated vision for endstates of conquered territories remained 

understandably vague. Goals for the Philippines evolved over time, 
6

and an independent democracy, of sorts, was only established after 

almost 50 years, and a real democracy did not emerge until the 1980s. 

The experience with Cuba is particularly revealing as to how flexible 

strategic goals can facilitate perceived success in occupation. The 

President’s first instructions to his occupation forces emphasized 

security for the populace along with protection of their personal 

rights, and, though implying a future “new order of things,” was 

overall very cautious about major changes. In his annual message to 

Congress in December 1898, McKinley stated that military occupation 

would continue until “complete tranquility and a stable government” 

had been achieved in Cuba. He added, “It should be our duty to assist 

in every proper way to form a government which shall be free and 

independent.” Military governors, most notably General Leonard 

Wood, used this leeway in an attempt to match their Progressive 

impulses with local realities and establish “good government” in 

Cuba. Though contemporary critics pointed out that Wood’s efforts 

brought into “sharp relief the danger involved in [attempting] to 

transplant institutions which are out of harmony with traditions of 

a people,” he was successful in transferring formal political control 

back to Cuban authorities in May 1902. The occupation was touted 

as a great success. It apparently had achieved public security and a 

stable indigenous government, demonstrated American beneficence, 

and ended fairly quickly. Since avowed occupation goals had been 

kept relatively modest, the public did not take much notice when 

American troops had to return to the island for brief periods to help 

quell insurrections in 1906, 1912, and 1917, and Wood’s electoral and 

humanitarian reforms were short-lived. Though little real progress 

had been made, and coups and revolutions continued until the advent 

of Fidel Castro, generally Cuba attracted little public or international 

attention for many decades.20

 A major reason that the continuing troubles in Cuba attracted so 

little notice was because the world was distracted by the series of 

crises in Europe that led to World War I. Though President Woodrow 

Wilson initially tried to keep the United States out of the war, after 

the nation became an active belligerent, he developed an ambitious 

postwar agenda that was known as the Fourteen Points. It emphasized 

liberal democratic values like free trade and self-determination for 

minorities, was generally a nonpunitive settlement, and relied upon 
7

the creation of a League of Nations to maintain international comity 

and ensure political independence of all states. The difficulties that 

Wilson faced in getting Allied approval for his idealistic agenda at the 

Versailles Conference in 1919 are well-known. One observer called 

his failure “one of the major tragedies of modern history,” as Wilson 

sacrificed most of his Fourteen Points to get Allied approval for his 

League of Nations, which failed to be ratified by the U.S. Senate due 

to Republican intransigence and his own stubbornness.21 Wilson, 

and other Allied leaders, also failed to appreciate the strength of 

anti-democratic forces in Germany and other European states that 

would produce civil strife and fuel another war.

 Allied considerations also influenced the American vision for 

endstates after World War II. However, while President Franklin D. 

Roosevelt appeared to echo Wilson’s desire for an international body 

that became the United Nations (UN), FDR’s public pronouncements 

of his vision for the postwar world were much less specific than 

Wilson’s, and behind the scenes he remained much more realistic 

about what he could achieve. The United States and its allies had 

an avowed goal of unconditional surrender in order to assure that 

German and Japanese militarism would never again threaten the 

world. This vision allowed a lot of postwar leeway as to how it 

would be accomplished. Interallied and interdepartmental disputes 

over how Germany should be treated during occupation continued 

right up to the actual surrender, and the actual occupation directive 

avoided hard issues or delayed their resolution. A really constructive 

policy direction for German occupation was not completed until 1947, 

and the beginnings of the Cold War adjusted it even more. The desire 

to rearm Germany as a buffer against communism overwhelmed 

any vestiges of the Morgenthau Plan to make the former Nazi state 

an agrarian backwater, and by then the Nuremburg trials and a 

thorough personnel vetting process appeared to have excised the 

cancer of Nazism from Germany.22 American occupation policies 

in the rest of Europe at the end of the war were usually just as 

incoherent. A recent conference in Vienna on the postwar recovery 

of Austria concluded that the emergence of a free democracy there 

occurred despite Allied occupation policies, not because of them.23

 The reconstruction of Japan did not face the same disputes 

between allies, but the vision for a specific endstate underwent the 
8

same sort of evolution. The crucial decision to keep the emperor was 

made only in August 1945 as the surrender was being finalized. By 

September, General Douglas MacArthur had received a directive 

which expanded upon the 1945 Potsdam Declaration and made 

clear that he was to micromanage an accelerated program of demilitarization and democratization throughout all aspects of 

Japanese life. Historian John Dower has called the agenda of almost 7 

years of American occupation “a remarkable display of arrogant 

idealism.” In the end, the Cold War again led to compromises with 

more conservative elements of Japanese society in order to establish 

another partner against Communism in the Pacific, but the ideals of 

peace and democracy did indeed take root in Japan. Even there, 

however, it would take many years for them to come to full 

flower.24

 Occupations in the rest of Japan’s lost empire were not as 

successful. In Korea, for example, Americans again displayed a lack 

of cultural awareness and attention to detail that contributed to the 

conditions that led to the outbreak of war there in 1950.25 Desires for 

Cold War security trumped any motivation to support democratic 

reform, and the United States bolstered authoritarian regimes of 

Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee. Only in the 1980s did real 

democracy begin to appear in South Korea. Lest we judge American 

reconstruction efforts there too harshly, it must be noted that its 

northern counterpart is today as far away from “demilitarization 

and democracy” as any state on earth. 

 In part to gain French support for the postwar rearming of 

Germany, the United States had to commit to supporting French efforts 

to retain its empire in Indochina, eventually drawing this nation into 

another war in Asia after the French withdrew. National Security 

Memorandum 288 in March 1964 established the American aim of 

“an independent, noncommunist South Vietnam” that could stand on 

its own, and this essential goal was emphasized continually 

throughout Lyndon Johnson’s presidency.26 That endstate vision 

appears to be an ideal model, being clear without imposing too many 

conditions or demonstrating “arrogant idealism,” but that is not 

always a guarantee of success, and it proved unachievable in this case. 

 The Vietnam case is particularly interesting and an important 

example of a U.S. attempt to stabilize an allied country and create a 
9

viable nation while waging war against a powerful enemy engaging 

in both conventional and irregular operations. Vietnam is also 

important because it represents a Herculean effort for the United 

States that failed to achieve the U.S. goal of maintaining a stable 

noncommunist regime in South Vietnam.27 Comparisons between 

Iraq and Vietnam have been increasingly cited by those who are 

angry or disillusioned with the current Iraqi conflict, but there is a 

severe danger of oversimplifying the similarities between these two 

conflicts. In Vietnam, the United States was not deeply concerned 

with advancing democracy. Rather, it sought to prop up an existing 

government and military rather than create a new one from the ashes 

of a deposed regime. The United States therefore was only interested 

in maintaining the status quo. In that respect, the effort in Iraq is much 

more ambitious. Additionally, in Vietnam, the United States faced a 

large, motivated, and exceptionally tough enemy military force that 

had strong and tangible international backing. North Vietnam also 

had a realistic strategy that ultimately proved successful in seizing 

control of South Vietnam. The mostly Sunni Iraqi insurgents have 

almost no prospect of seizing and controlling all of Iraq following 

a U.S. departure, but under some circumstances they may have a 

credible chance of toppling the existing Iraqi government following 

a U.S. withdrawal and then plunging the country into civil war. 

They apparently hope such a conflict could be concluded on terms 

favorable to them.

 The two aspects of Vietnam and Iraq that show the most 

similarities involve an effort at state-building in an alien culture that 

is poorly understood by the United States and the attempt to sustain 

U.S. domestic support for a prolonged war against an irregular 

enemy. Even here the similarities are incomplete. In Iraq, the newly 

created government must do what Vietnam failed to do, establish 

a viable governing structure and create the forces that are willing 

to defend that government, but under quite different conditions. 

While the Iraqis must cope with a deadly enemy insurgency while 

doing so, this enemy is dramatically less formidable than the Viet 

Cong Infrastructure (VCI) and the North Vietnamese. Also, during 

the Vietnam War, the United States attempted to maintain domestic 

support for a war that was waged with a conscript military, the use of 

which was much more likely to produce a strong antiwar movement. 
10

In Iraq, the United States is fighting the war with a volunteer military, 

without the political problems of a draft, but with the potential 

danger of running out of recruits.28

 American efforts at stabilization and reconstruction have not 

always come as a result of major wars. Since the end of the Cold 

War, the United States has participated in numerous interventions 

to repair failed or failing states with infusions of liberal democratic 

principles. The best planned was probably the 1994 incursion into 

Haiti to restore President Jean-Bertrande Aristide to power and 

finally establish a functional democratic state. Extensive interagency 

coordination established a list of tasks and responsibilities to achieve 

that laudable goal, but again local realities and a lack of long-term will 

by occupying powers precluded success.29 At a recent symposium on 

stability operations, attendees joked sarcastically about the repeated 

“successful reconstructions” of Haiti, highlighting the apparent 

intractability of the problems there.30

 Parties involved in recent stability operations in the Balkans have 

shown more willingness to stay the course, but long-term success 

remains elusive. There is peace in Bosnia and Kosovo because of 

strong military forces deployed there, but the ethnic tensions that 

spawned fratricidal warfare remain, and the pluralistic democracy the 

international community wishes to establish is still a dream. Kosovo 

experienced deadly ethnic rioting as recently as March 2004. After 5 

years of international control, that province elected as prime minister 

a former Albanian guerrilla leader who is being investigated for war 

crimes against Serbs by the International Criminal Tribunal for the 

Former Yugoslavia.31 A recent alarming report by the International 

Crisis Group on the lack of progress in achieving liberal democratic 

stability opens with “Time is running out in Kosovo. The status quo 

will not hold.”32

 According to Kimberly Zisk Marten, this result should not 

be surprising, as such recent failures to transplant democracy 

have much in common with similar efforts by colonial powers. 

The United States, Great Britain, and France have all repeated the 

aforementioned experience of Cuba in trying to relinquish control of 

colonial holdings, while leaving lasting positive change behind. The 

record of international attempts to impose democracy is especially 

dismal during the wave of such interventions in the 1990s. Looking 
11

at operations such as those in Haiti, the Balkans, and East Timor, 

Marten concludes “Nowhere have the liberal democratic military 

peacekeeping operations of the 1990s created liberal democratic 

societies. They did not even create much forward momentum in 

that direction, in any of the countries where they were deployed.” 

Her study emphasizes that recent interventions, like the imperial 

era, demonstrate the continuing ability of disciplined soldiers to 

establish order, but also shows that liberal democratic states rarely 

demonstrate the will, or coherent policy direction, to transplant their 

values to other cultures.33 

 This dismal historical record suggests some guidelines for 

policymakers: avoid setting the bar too high, or being too specific, 

when proclaiming visions for postwar endstates. It is relatively easy 

to remove threats or restore order, but changing values and cultures 

takes much longer. The same liberal democratic system that seems 

so worth transplanting also hinders such states from conducting the 

long-term occupations necessary to make it stick. And even after 

extended reconstructions, the endstate will still most likely be more 

a result of local realities than imposed structures. The best course of 

action appears to be to recognize these trends, and aim for generic 

peace and stability with unique regional characteristics rather than 

more specific reforms. This leads to quicker withdrawals and fewer 

heartaches, even if the result will not be as ideologically tidy as 

exporting U.S. types of democratic institutions.

The Issue of an Endstate for Post-Occupation Iraq.

 The historical examples noted above suggest the exceedingly 

complex nature of military occupation and the difficulty of 

empowering the population in question while achieving the endstate 

that the United States and its indigenous allies desire. These examples 

also demonstrate that a military occupation resembles the major 

combat phase of a war in that both require maximum flexibility 

and adaptability on the part of military forces to meet consistently 

changing conditions. The basis for this flexibility, however, must 

include detailed planning based on comprehensive information and 

intelligence about the country in question. Such planning must also 

be infused with a healthy sense of what can go wrong in the course 
12

of occupying the particular nation in question.34 Moreover, the 

above examples further illustrate that the population of a democratic 

country engaged in occupation duties can rapidly become first wary 

and then disillusioned as the enterprise continues into the indefinite 

future without clear and rapid progress. 

 A central question of any responsible occupation involves 

what goals must be achieved to allow the occupying powers to 

begin withdrawing most or all of their forces in a way that leaves 

a viable and cohesive society behind. The initial goals for the U.S. 

administration in invading and occupying Iraq involved removing 

the Saddam Hussein regime from power and disarming Iraq of its 

suspected weapons of mass destruction. Other goals favored by 

the U.S. administration included establishment of a multiethnic/

multisectarian democratic government with a market economy and 

a basically friendly outlook towards the United States and the West.35

The sweeping scope of these latter goals now seems especially 

challenging, and increasing calls are made for leaving Iraq as soon as 

it has a stable government, even if full democracy is not immediately 

established there.36 Given these differences, the question of what is 

an acceptable U.S./coalition supported endstate for Iraq needs to be 

considered.

 For reasons that will be discussed in detail later in this report, the 

United States almost certainly has only a limited amount of time that 

it can maintain large numbers of troops in Iraq (probably no more 

than an additional 3 years).37 The U.S. leadership, correspondingly, 

needs to consider what its minimum goals for Iraq are, and ensure 

that they are met before political pressures from both the Middle 

East and within the United States become untenable. These vital or 

core national interest goals must be met because they relate directly 

and significantly to the safety and future well-being of the United 

States and, as such, cannot be voluntarily subjected to compromise.38

Other subsidiary goals may be possible and desirable but may also be 

considered expendable if progress on them is deemed to be too costly 

and difficult or if efforts to implement them threaten core interest 

goals. To establish vital interest goals, it is probably best to start by 

considering what endstates in Iraq are clearly unacceptable. The most 

important of these threats is a large-scale Iraqi ethnic and sectarian 

civil war. Such a development would polarize major Iraqi groups 
13

forcing most individuals to choose sides, while giving extremists 

the chance to rise in warring communities. Such a crisis would also 

have a number of extremely serious ripple effects across the region, 

threatening U.S. political and economic interests regionally and not 

simply in Iraq.39 Thus, avoiding an Iraqi civil war is fundamental to 

U.S. interests and well-being in addition to being vital to the future 

of Iraq and the region. 

 An important ideological goal that the United States has set for 

Iraq involves creating the conditions that allow democracy or at 

least power-sharing with minority rights among key communities to 

flourish—if that is possible. The further advancement of democracy 

in Iraq will be a complex process that may or may not be aided 

by the continuing presence of U.S. and other foreign troops in 

that country beyond the point at which an Iraqi government can 

survive on its own. There is also a problem if nurturing democracy 

becomes the justification for a continuing U.S. presence in Iraq. The 

desire for democracy among at least certain Iraqis may be strong, 

but nationalism is also a powerful force to be considered. Arab 

and Iraqi nationalism may be especially powerful in this instance 

because of long-standing Arab and Iraqi grievances over Western 

domination.40 

 Considerable disagreement exists in foreign policy circles about 

the degree to which democracy in Iraq has become important to the 

U.S. national interest. U.S. vital interests have never demanded a 

democratic state in Iraq before 2003, and it remains uncertain if Iraq 

is going to be democratized as the result of a foreign presence in 

that country. Clearly, the successful consolidation of governmental 

authority will depend upon the degree to which most Iraqis make 

supporting and defending the new government a continuing 

priority. If they do not, it becomes important to ask if the United 

States can live with less than a Western-style democracy in Iraq and, 

if so, how much less? Furthermore, if a more modest set of goals 

becomes inevitable, what is the best way to implement them without 

abandoning the establishment of full Iraqi democracy in the long 

term after the departure of all or most U.S. troops? 

 According to President George W. Bush, one form of government 

that is not favored but is nevertheless acceptable to the United States 

is a Shi’ite-dominated Islamic government, so long as such a system 
14

does not become undemocratic or oppressive toward Sunni Muslims, 

Kurds, or other minorities.41 Religious Shi’ites are currently the 

most important leaders of post-Saddam Iraq, and these individuals 

already have been able to expand their political power dramatically 

through democratic means. Some observers wonder if the religious 

leadership of Iraq and its supporters are using democratic institutions 

to dominate that country without any deep commitment to those 

aspects of democracy that involve rule of law and minority rights. 

Moreover, if the Shi’ite religious parties consolidate control over 

elected institutions, concerns that they will also achieve control 

over the military and internal security organizations of the state 

exist. At such a point, very few domestic checks on their behavior 

regarding the Sunni Arabs, and perhaps secular Iraqis as well, will 

be available. 

 While there are troubling questions associated with Shi’ite 

religious party leadership, the United States cannot allow itself to 

be placed in the position of maintaining that too many Shi’ites voted 

in the last election or that Washington supports democracy so long 

as the countries involved elect leaders favored by Washington. The 

U.S. commitment to democracy dictates a relationship with the 

Shi’ite parties as long as they also support all of the central features 

of democratic government. U.S. support for minority rights and the 

rule of law is an important part of this relationship.

 It also seems possible that a partially democratic Iraq may emerge 

as a perhaps very long interim solution, if a viable Western-style 

democracy cannot be created and sustained by Iraqi leaders in the 

near term. A potentially acceptable, although not optimal, interim 

solution may include some of the same principles of governance as 

the current government of Yemen. While Yemen has a very different 

social and political history from Iraq, some of its governmental 

procedures appear to be at least an interesting source of ideas. Any 

comparison between the two countries, nevertheless, must not be 

drawn too rigidly, since Yemeni society is much less educated, much 

more tribal, and has no recent history of a strong central government 

anywhere near the level of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Additionally, 

while Yemen has large Sunni and Shi’ite elements within the 

population, the Yemeni form of Shi’ism often is considered to be 

quite close to Sunni Islam.42 Moreover, Yemeni political approaches 
15

are not techniques to be considered unless Iraq clearly fails to install 

a more fully democratic government and is descending into political 

collapse.

 Yemen is a mixed political system with both authoritarian and 

democratic aspects. An elected president and parliament often 

disagree on important issues. International observers have pronounced various national elections in the 1990s to have been fair, 

although more recent elections have been marred with serious 

problems, illustrating a retreat in the democratic process that hopefully 

would not be duplicated in Iraq, should the Iraqis move toward a 

partially democratic system.43 Additionally, domestic opponents of 

the regime in Yemen may find themselves with substantially less 

than the full range of constitutional protections found in Western 

Europe or the United States, and Yemeni security forces operate 

without many of the constraints found in a more liberal system. 

Since Yemen’s current president comes from a majority tribe and 

controls the most powerful political party, he can sometimes afford 

to support a majority rule political system. Interestingly, President 

Saleh has announced that he will not run for re-election in 2006.44

This announcement may be genuine, but in the Arab World is 

widely distrusted as a political tactic, upon which he will ultimately 

renege.45

 Yemen also exists with an authoritative national government 

and some extremely strong subnational units in the form of tribes, 

which often behave very independently, and are protected by wellarmed militias.46 Allowing the tribes to have some democratic input 

and domestic autonomy is often easier for the central government 

than efforts to impose strong political control over tribal areas. 

The drawback here is that highly autonomous Yemeni tribes are, 

under some circumstances, willing to protect terrorists from the 

central government unless they are given incentives not to do so.47

Moreover, in Yemen, tribes sometimes engage in uprisings against 

the government, although many of these are more theatrical than 

real and are aimed primarily at gaining government concessions.48

While Yemen maintains a workable political system, it is a delicate 

balance and its principles might not be applied too directly to other 

nations as anything more than a stopgap measure to prevent worse 

consequences. 
16

 Unfortunately, Iraq also has moved to a situation where almost 

every important political party has a militia, and the government 

(like that of Yemen) may have to accommodate itself to this fact and 

engage in a process of bargaining with powerful local leaders rather 

than seeking immediate central control. The instability of this type 

of situation is dangerous, but such a system is also a way to accept 

the reality of armed local interests and hopefully indefinitely defer 

any movement toward civil war. Ominously, militias also can serve 

as the building blocks of civil war, but efforts to disarm them too 

rapidly can quickly provoke a backlash by those who may consider 

themselves undefended without such institutions.49

 Interestingly, Iraq’s Kurdish President, Jalal Talabani, advocates 

some aspects of a decentralized militia-oriented system. Talabani 

stated in April 2005 that the insurgency could be ended immediately 

if the authorities could make use of Kurdish, Shi’ite, and other 

militias.50 The Kurdish leadership, in general, have for some time 

advocated a muscular form of “federalism” which is really more 

confederal. Talabani has also stated that without federalism, the 

Kurds will no longer consider themselves to be Iraqis.51 Additionally, 

the type of federalism of interest to the Kurds involves much more 

expansive borders than the current Kurdish area as well as Kurdish 

control over the disputed city of Kirkuk, which the Kurds refer to as 

their Jerusalem.52 

 Other possibilities for an Iraq unable to maintain viable democratic 

institutions are even less desirable, and any U.S. decision to accept a 

partial democracy in Iraq may involve efforts to stave off alternatives 

that are worse. A new, but less oppressive dictatorship (“Saddam 

lite”) would be a failure for the United States unless this system 

served only as an interim step (which would be difficult to guarantee). 

Additionally, an Islamic regime that adopts nondemocratic means 

would be a major failure by U.S. standards. Each of these types of 

systems would betray the promise of freedom to the Iraqis and fail 

to justify the massive cost of the war in U.S. lives, wounded, and 

resources. Such regimes also may lack legitimacy and may choose 

to assure their continuation in power through increasing efforts at 

repression. Nevertheless, a modernizing, non-Islamist strongman 

may not constitute an immediate threat to U.S. vital interests and 
17

still be pressured to democratize in order to maintain the flow of 

U.S.-supported international aid. A friendly but undemocratic Iraq 

that does not engage in massive human rights violations would 

look very similar to an array of current U.S. allies in the region, and 

this outcome, in most cases, would still be better than a sustained 

and bloody civil war should these two alternatives become the only 

available choices. Ongoing pressure to democratize could still be 

leveled at such a regime, even in the aftermath of a U.S. withdrawal, 

since there would be a strong Iraqi interest in maintaining the flow 

of U.S. aid for reconstruction. 

The Issue of Iraqi Governmental Legitimacy.

 As noted earlier, a central issue in establishing a U.S. disengagement policy is that of Iraqi government legitimacy as the basis for 

an authoritative government. To move this policy forward, the 

United States has the unenviable task of helping to empower 

an emerging government, while avoiding the appearance of 

dominating that government. Under Saddam Hussein, as well as a 

variety of his predecessors, repression was the bond that held the 

system together, and public order was maintained through fear and 

intimidation. Such an approach is now unacceptable, and a new 

system based on the rule of law is the ideal. Such a system requires 

a government with a high level of domestic legitimacy, which is 

usually based on meeting the needs of its citizens as they define 

those needs.

 In addressing the issue of Iraqi governmental legitimacy, U.S. 

civilian and military intelligence organizations will be forced to 

make periodic assessments about the government’s progress in 

gaining the support of its citizens. Such assessments can be used to 

help plan U.S. policy regarding exit strategy. Unfortunately, political 

legitimacy is an extremely difficult concept to measure.53 Often the 

degree of legitimacy enjoyed by a government is only demonstrated 

when that government either survives or crumbles in the face of a 

major challenge to its existence. Nevertheless, it is vital to attempt 

to understand the factors that influence whether a government is 

viewed as legitimate or not, considering both region-specific and 
18

more universal factors that can be expected to influence the Iraqi 

population on this issue.

 In the United States, both the January 2005 Iraqi elections and 

the expected follow-on elections are viewed as central elements 

for establishing governmental legitimacy. In Iraq, a government 

education campaign attempted to depict the January 2005 elections 

and the constitutional process set into motion by these elections as 

Iraq’s salvation.54 Moreover, the power of free elections, under the 

right conditions, should not be underestimated. Elections are a major 

source of legitimacy in a variety of countries throughout the world. 

In a backhanded compliment to democratic institutions, a number of 

dictatorships even feel the need to hold sham elections to keep up the 

pretense that they are acting democratically. Thus, elections should 

not be viewed as a Western concept without potential widespread 

appeal. Fair elections can serve as a legitimizing factor for many 

governments worldwide, provided all parties are willing to accept 

the electoral outcome and view the elections as legitimate. 

 A major problem for Iraq’s electoral process is that the numerically 

dominant Shi’ites, who have the most to gain in an election defined 

in sectarian terms, are the group most consistently enthusiastic about 

majority rule democracy. Consequently, the system is sometimes 

viewed by other Iraqis as empowering the Shi’ites at the expense of 

Sunni Muslims and Kurds.55 Grand Ayatollah Sistani, for example, 

issued a number of fatwas encouraging his supporters to vote while 

he also publicly favored the overwhelmingly Shi’ite United Iraqi 

Alliance (UIA) coalition of political parties.56 Some of these fatwas

are quite detailed and convey an urgency about voting that may 

have been designed to shame those of his Shi’ite followers who 

might have considered abstaining out of fear or disinterest.57 The 

Shi’ite and Kurdish communities also have strong political parties 

that helped achieve high voter turnout within their areas. The Sunni 

Arabs have no mass parties capable of serving in this role. 

 The January 2005 Iraqi election for a Transitional National 

Assembly (TNA) produced a turnout of around 58 percent of the 

electorate, despite a series of election day attacks that killed 44 

people and wounded a number of others.58 Turnout in Shi’ite and 

Kurdish areas was exceptionally heavy. This election was widely 

characterized as meeting international norms of fairness by a number 
19

of international observers. Additionally, many nations opposed to 

the U.S. invasion of Iraq publicly praised the election. Such nations 

included a variety of European, Arab, and non-Arab Muslim states.59

In a more homogenous society, such high levels of participation 

might serve as a strong legitimizing factor for the process, and it is 

still possible that most Iraqis will view the election process as a new 

source of pride and progress if Sunni Muslims can be brought into the 

system in ways that assuage the major concerns of that community.

 The Kurdish parties participated in the election with tremendous 

intensity as an important way to safeguard their interests, but 

they have also made it clear that they will not submit to potential 

majority decisions on certain key issues such as their demands 

for federalism and the continued separate existence of Kurdish 

military forces, even if these demands are made through democratic 

institutions. Sunni Arab leaders are even further outside of the 

political process. In the period leading up to January 2005, many 

demanded a boycott of the election, and insurgents were often 

able to intimidate prospective Sunni voters in the event they were 

not moved by the statements of the boycotters.60 As a result, Sunni 

Arab turnout was abysmal. Although Sunni Arabs comprise up to 

20 percent of Iraq’s population, only 17 were elected to the 275-seat 

transitional parliament. 

 Throughout the period leading up to the election, as well 

as during its aftermath, many Sunni groups raised pointed 

criticisms regarding the issue of electoral legitimacy.61 Their most 

important questions centered on how such elections can be fair if 

they are conducted while the country remains under foreign occupation.62 Elections under these conditions, they maintained, can 

be unduly influenced by the concerns and behavior of the 

occupying forces. Severe criticism also has been directed at the 

electoral process as a tool of U.S. hegemony with “made in 

Washington stamped all over it.”63 Thus, under this logic, the elections 

are illegitimate. Many Sunnis, of course, also point to the disorder 

in the areas where they reside. While all of these arguments have 

some salience, many Sunnis opposed the election because they knew 

that their sect was certain to lose in any election defined in sectarian 

terms. Nevertheless, some Sunni leaders who previously supported 
20

the boycott have now expressed regret about doing so in what is 

clearly a promising sign.64 

 A figure who might have helped bridge the Shi’ite-Sunni gap 

was Interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi (P.M.: June 2004-March 

2005), a secular Shi’ite, known for his interest in working with Sunni 

leaders including what he calls the “fringe of the insurgency”—that 

is, the redeemable supporters of the insurgents. His government 

took office with extremely strong popular backing, including an 

almost 73 percent public approval rating, partially based on a lack 

of any kind of visible subservience to the United States.65 He thus 

presented himself as an Iraqi nationalist, while promising to improve 

the security situation. His strong opposition to far-reaching deBa’athification reassured numerous Sunnis, who viewed these 

policies as a sectarian-based form of collective punishment and 

disempowerment.66

 Unfortunately, Allawi, who did not have a strong party 

organization behind him, did poorly in the 2005 elections, with his 

party taking only 40 seats in the 275 seat assembly.67 The Sistanibacked UIA, by contrast, has 140 seats, and the Kurdish parties have 

75.68 Allawi seemed to display an excellent combination of firmness 

and reconciliationism. His continuing efforts to reach out to the 

Sunni community correspondingly has set a high standard which 

one hopes the UIA leadership will find informative. At the time 

of this writing, Iraq’s Kurdish President Jalal Talabani has echoed 

Allawi’s words, but both the religious and secular Shi’ite leadership 

of the UIA continues to favor broad brush de-Ba’athification.69 More 

ominously, elements within the UIA, and particularly the Interior 

Ministry, may be seeking to mold the security forces so that they are 

completely dominated by Shi’ite Islamists.70 

 Correspondingly, an emerging problem for Iraqi government 

legitimacy is that the new leaders may be viewed by some Iraqis 

as representing and protecting the rights of only one portion of the 

population. The empowerment of Iraqi Shi’ites, including a number 

of powerful Islamists, by the election was an important exercise 

in democratic process, but the consolidation of Shi’ite power may 

only provide legitimacy for such a government within the Shi’ite 

community. The new Iraqi leadership has claimed it will seek to 

represent all Iraqis, but it is not clear how sincere these claims are 
21

or how seriously they are taken. Consistent efforts have been made 

to reassure the Sunni Arabs, but these efforts also have important 

and clear limits, such as those seen when Shi’ite Parliamentarians 

vetoed a series of Sunni candidates for Defense Minister prior to the 

appointment of returned exile, Saddon al Dulaimi.71 Unfortunately, 

in Iraq there is no towering national hero who stands above ethnic/

sectarian divides and can hold the country together such as a 

Washington, De Gaulle, or Ataturk. 

 Governmental legitimacy challenges may also remain for the 

loyalty of those Iraqis who initially were pleased with the result of 

the election. This situation has developed because the government 

is charged with the responsibility for establishing a constitution that 

will be at least minimally acceptable to all major Iraqi ethnic and 

sectarian communities. Although major Kurdish and Shi’ite leaders 

have displayed an ability to coordinate on common objectives, they 

have also differed strongly over key issues for the future government 

of Iraq.72 These differences will have to be addressed in the process of 

creating and agreeing upon a constitutional framework for governing 

the country. 

 Iraqi government dependence on U.S. support for its survival is 

another challenge for building legitimacy, although the intensity of 

this issue currently varies within the leadership of the various Iraqi 

communities. A professed belief among at least some sections of the 

Sunni Arab public has been that the United States is encouraging 

violence and instability in Iraq as an excuse to stay and control Iraqi 

oil.73 A related problem that has plagued the state-building process is 

the limited UN role in creating the post-Saddam order, which stands 

in sharp contrast to that organization’s involvement in Afghanistan.74

Many Arabs (including Iraqis) have a basically positive view of the 

UN and believe that a more robust UN role could help insulate Iraq 

from the danger of U.S. domination. These individuals do not seem 

to accept the explanation that the UN has remained outside of Iraqi 

reconstruction because of its own reluctance to become involved for 

political and security reasons. Rather, they view UN reluctance to be 

part of the process as a natural result of being offered a role on what 

they see as narrow U.S. terms.75

 Moreover, the regional environment has often been hostile to U.S. 

efforts to create and empower a new Iraqi government because the 
22

majority of the Arab media remains angry about the invasion of Iraq 

and the changing U.S. rationales for this invasion and occupation.76

The constant challenges of the U.S. role by the regional media 

may serve as an additional complication for the emerging Iraqi 

government as it seeks to establish its own legitimacy. More effective 

U.S. public diplomacy based on historical and cultural knowledge of 

the region almost certainly could help mitigate this problem, but the 

depth of regional opposition to the U.S. role in Iraq makes it unlikely 

that hostile news coverage and propaganda could be totally or even 

largely neutralized.77 

 Governmental corruption is also a problem for legitimacy, and can 

cause at least some citizens to feel alienated from the government.78

Iraq’s population has suffered under a system of government 

sanctioned corruption for over 30 years, and a new government will 

have to implement strong anti-corruption policies to distinguish 

itself from earlier forms of governmental abuse of power. At this 

point, it is not clear that the Iraqi government is moving decisively 

in this direction.79 Political favoritism based on sectarianism may 

help to ensure the loyalty of part of the population and the hostility 

of those portions that are not favored by the government.80 Many 

states worldwide are able to tolerate a certain amount of corruption, 

but at a point it threatens a government’s ability to function. 

 Another factor that may also have implications for the Iraqi 

government’s legitimacy involves the issue of exiles in that 

government.81 Iraqi exiles from a variety of countries have now 

returned to their homeland. Some of these, such as Deputy Prime 

Minister Ahmad Chalabi, have come from the United States, but a 

great many more have come from Iran. In many cases, the Iraqi 

population in general distrusts these exiles because of the fear 

that they may be subjected to undue influence from the countries 

that harbored them during the Saddam Hussein years. The strong 

involvement of exiles in Iraqi politics does, however, have an 

important positive effect for the health of the Iraqi political system in 

that many exile leaders became acquainted with each other during 

their years abroad. Many are, therefore, comfortable negotiating 

with each other and in some cases have working relationships with 

the leaders of other anti-Saddam political parties. 

 The Iraqi government’s current difficulty in addressing the basic 

public needs such as security is another problem for governmental 
23

legitimacy. Additionally, undermining public confidence in the new 

government is a central goal of the Iraqi insurgents’ campaign of 

assassination and intimidation, especially when it has been directed 

at government officials. Iraqi insurgents have killed a number of 

senior governmental and security officials, sometimes breaching 

strong security and numerous bodyguards.82 They have also 

kidnapped various officials or their family members, often with the 

goal of forcing them to resign and renounce all ties to the government. 

Some officials have, correspondingly, made accommodations with 

the insurgents to relieve the burden of having both themselves and 

their families remain targets of insurgent violence. Many are also 

aware that, years in the future, coalition troops may have departed, 

while members of the current insurgency may still wield the ability 

to strike at their enemies. 

The Post-Election Iraqi Government and the Writing 

of a New Constitution.

 Another challenge for Iraqi governmental legitimacy is the 

constitutional process itself, which has involved a large number of 

difficult transitional steps. The transitions began when the United 

States created an Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) under the Coalition 

Provisional Authority (CPA). This organization was followed by 

a formally sovereign, but U.S.-appointed, transitional government 

under Ayad Allawi. The Allawi government was followed by an 

elected transitional government created by long and painful factional 

negotiations after the January 2005 election. As a result of these 

transitions, the public and especially the security forces have been 

asked to give their loyalty to a government with rapidly changing 

institutions and personalities. These transitions are not yet concluded, 

and the most difficult tasks remain ahead. At the time of this writing, 

the current assembly was struggling to meet an August 15 deadline 

to propose a draft Constitution, which must then be submitted to 

a nationwide referendum no later than October 15, 2005. If the 

document is approved, new elections under the ratified Constitution 

will be held by December 15, 2005, and a new government will take 

office on December 31, 2005. 
24

 Until the ratification and enactment of the new Constitution, Iraq 

is supposed to be governed under institutions and timetables created 

by the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), sometimes referred 

to as the Interim Constitution.83 This situation places power in the 

Transitional National Assembly (TNA), which has 275 members. 

A two-thirds majority of 184 seats is needed for many of the most 

important decisions to be made by the new government, although it 

is possible that Iraqi leaders may look for ways to bypass these rules 

outside of the legal framework created by the TAL.84 

 Additionally, writing a new constitution and its supporting laws 

so that they can be accepted by most elements of a diverse society 

is never a simple task. Constitutions codify the principles by which 

a society is governed, and they also proscribe the ways in which 

power is to be allocated and used. The most difficult task for the 

creators of the prospective constitution will be to devise government 

institutions that unite the Iraqi people including, at a minimum, 

all of its major sectarian groups, while also avoiding government 

paralysis and deadlock. This effort will be a serious challenge since 

these objectives may not be fully compatible. Many Shi’ite leaders 

are expected to favor majoritarian institutions with a minimum of 

quotas and vetos for ethnic and religious minorities. Such a system 

of government, however, would be troubling for a number of Sunnis 

and Kurds, who understand that their own concerns could easily be 

bypassed without such measures.

 An array of exceptionally difficult issues also must either be 

addressed by the Constitution or deferred if this cannot be done 

and dealt with in later legislation. Many of these issues will remain 

controversial well after a constitution is put forward publicly, even if 

it eventually is ratified in the projected referendum. One of the most 

important involves Islam’s role in future Iraqi governance and the 

role of shariah (Islamic law) in the new Iraqi legal code. The prospect 

of enshrining shariah into the Constitution appears to be serious, 

and Prime Minister Ibrahim Ja’afari has told the German magazine, 

Der Spiegel, that he favors such an effort but with shariah as “one 

of several sources of jurisprudence” rather than the sole source of 

law.85 Islamic hardliners, such as Shi’ite radical Muqtada al-Sadr 

not surprisingly have demanded the imposition of shariah as the 
25

sole source of Iraqi law under his militant interpretation of shariah.

86

Sadr is not a member of the Assembly and has sought to maintain an 

image of aloofness from U.S.-backed institutions, but he does have 

an important following of about 20-25 “independents” within the 

Assembly.87 Additionally, hardliners, such as the Sadr supporters, 

are expected to clash with moderates in the constitutional process 

over the rights of women under a system of full or partial Islamic 

law.

 A March 2005 poll by the International Republican Institute 

found that 46 percent of the Iraqi population supports a separation 

between religion and state, and 48 percent believes that religion has a 

special role to play in the government.88 Statistically, this is an equal 

division suggesting that compromise may be difficult. Furthermore, 

divisions over religion have the potential to aggravate ethnicallybased disagreements. The Kurdish population of the north is much 

more secular than large sections of the south and central part of the 

country, and leading Kurdish politicians have called for a separation 

of religion and the state.89 President Talabani has indicated that, like 

federalism, the installation of an Islamic regime is a “red line” that 

will cause the Kurds to reconsider their decision to remain part of a 

unified Iraqi state.90

 The Kurds also have strongly endorsed what they refer to as 

“federalism” but is more aptly described as a highly decentralized 

confederation bordering on an association of sovereign entities. 

They do not seem prepared to compromise on any of the major 

aspects of this issue, including governmental structure, the borders 

of the Kurdish autonomous region, and the disputed status of the 

city of Kirkuk, which virtually all Iraqi Kurds consider to be a nonnegotiable part of Kurdistan.91 In an interview given before he was 

President, Kurdish leader, Jalal Talabani, stated “If the Arabs do not 

accept the principle of federalism, we will no longer be Iraqis.”92

These sentiments are echoed by virtually all major Kurdish leaders. 

Moreover, the Kurdish interest in including a conditional right to 

secession as a legal guarantee in the constitution underscores Kurdish 

intensity on this point.93 Many Iraqi Arabs view the implementation 

of a strong federal system along Kurdish lines as the first step in a 

Kurdish drive to achieve independence.94 
26

 Some Iraqi Arab leaders have spoken out strongly against 

federalism as defined by the Kurds. Rather than viewing federalism 

as a potentially hopeful form of government, they have portrayed 

it as a threat to the national unity of Iraq. 95 One leading cleric, 

Ayatollah Maqi al Modaresi, has even suggested that a decentralized 

federal system is “a time bomb that will spark a civil war in Iraq.”96

Furthermore, the Sunni leadership seems to be even more concerned 

about the dangers of federalism leading to the country breaking 

up than are the Shi’ite leaders.97 An amicable breakup of Iraq is 

virtually impossible to imagine since many of the most important 

areas, including Baghdad, are ethnically and religiously mixed, and 

since contradictory claims to oil producing regions are not subject to 

compromise.

 Additionally, many Kurds have watched the efforts of some 

Shi’ite extremists to impose a reactionary version of Islamic social 

mores on the southern part of the country. These policies are deeply 

offensive to most Kurds, who fear that an Islamic regime would 

seek to impose hard line behavior codes on the entire country.98

Furthermore, prior to 2003 up to several hundred thousand Shi’ites 

were sent to northern Iraq as part of the efforts to “Arabize” the 

northern part of the country, and some are known to be friendly 

to the Sadr movement, which is spearheading such efforts.99 While 

Sadr supporters are no more than a minor nuisance to the Kurds at 

present, the specter of newly empowered religious police operating 

with the support of a strong central government seriously concerns 

the Kurds and can only reinforce their desire for maximum autonomy 

from Baghdad. 

 Crucially, many of the difficulties of the constitutional process will 

echo in the security forces. Iraqi soldiers face the same uncertainty 

that other Iraqi citizens do regarding their government, but for 

them these problems are more pressing. It is not yet clear to many 

Iraqi soldiers what kind of government will actually be produced 

by the constitutional process. Yet, Iraqi security forces must first 

believe that the outcome will be worth fighting for if they willingly 

are to risk their lives to preserve it. Such a commitment is a serious 

demand on their faith in the process, and many Iraqi soldiers may 

only be able to give the government a conditional form of legitimacy, 
27

until they are certain that their own tribes, ethnic groups, and 

religious sects will be treated with dignity and power-sharing under 

the emerging government.100 Soldiers fighting under the banner of 

conditional legitimacy may not have the commitment to assume the 

dangers of confronting the current insurgency. Bolstering the Iraqi 

government’s legitimacy is therefore a vital military requirement, as 

well as an exercise in nation-building.

The Iraqi Security Forces.

 Closely related to the issue of governmental legitimacy is the 

development of a strong multiethnic/multisectarian Iraqi security 

force, including military, police, and border security forces. Any 

government views its first duty as safeguarding its own existence 

and ability to govern. Furthermore, an Iraqi government that could 

provide security for the population without consistently calling upon 

U.S. troops for assistance would support the government’s efforts to 

establish its own legitimacy, so long as the public views the security 

forces protecting rather than oppressing all major elements of the 

population. 

 It appears increasingly unlikely that U.S., Iraqi, and coalition forces 

will crush the insurgency prior to the beginning of a phased U.S. and 

coalition withdrawal from that country, although any damage done 

to the insurgency will improve the chances for the Iraqi government 

to survive a U.S. departure.101 According to Secretary of Defense 

Donald Rumsfeld, ”Insurgencies tend to go on 5, 6, 8, 10, 12 years. 

Foreign forces are not going to repress that [Iraqi] insurgency.“102

Under these circumstances, the Iraqi security forces that remain in 

place following a departure of the majority of U.S. forces will have to 

deal with the ongoing struggle. Iraq, therefore, will have to continue 

building a military while simultaneously waging an internal war.103

Hopefully, Baghdad will also seek to build security forces that are 

multiethnic and multisectarian, although this may be difficult to 

achieve. Shi’ite recruits previously have been much more interested 

than Sunni Arabs in participating in these forces and have joined the 

security services in much greater numbers.104

 Despite ongoing difficulties, the objective of creating multiethnic 

and multisectarian security forces is not a goal that should be casually 
28

discarded. Some leaders within the Sunni Arab community clearly 

fear the development of a security force that is composed heavily 

of Shi’ite Arabs with perhaps a number of Kurds as well. Such a 

force could more easily be used as an instrument to repress or even 

subjugate Sunni Arabs should a Shi’ite-dominated government 

issue orders for them to do so. In response to this concern, a number 

of major Sunni clerics, including some members of the powerful 

Association of Muslim Scholars, issued an April 2005 fatwa in which 

they urged young Sunni Arabs to join the security forces.105 It does 

not appear that this fatwa produced a significant response.106

 The prospects for increased Sunni Arab participation in the 

security forces has been further complicated by the problems of deBa’athification, and some of the requirements for vetting candidates 

for positions within the security forces.107 There is, however, a serious 

need for increasingly vigorous vetting of security applicants in order 

to disqualify disloyal individuals from serving. Infiltration of both 

military and police forces by pro-insurgent agents is a major problem 

that threatens the ability of those forces to function effectively.108

Even elite units have been infiltrated by pro-insurgent forces, 

while high-ranking officers throughout the security establishment, 

including generals, have been relieved from their positions or 

arrested for cooperation with the insurgents.109 The temptation to 

marginalize Sunni participation in the security forces may, therefore, 

be significant and based on real concerns, although doing so would 

almost certainly push the Sunni Arab community to provide greater 

support for the insurgency and further lay the groundwork for a 

sectarian war. Some Sunni Muslim leaders have already charged 

that various Shi’ite-dominated special police commando units have 

grown increasingly comfortable in brutalizing Sunni Arabs.110

 In addressing this myriad of difficulties, the Iraqi government 

has shown a strong interest in building elite forces such as the 6,000 

member Iraqi Intervention Force and police special commando 

units, the most well-known of which is the “Wolf Brigade.”111 This 

“quality over quantity” approach correctly assumes that a military 

unit that is both willing and prepared to fight is worth more than an 

interminable number who are not willing to do so. The attraction here 

is obvious since the U.S. and Iraqi governments can deemphasize the 
29

training of poor units and concentrate on units that seem to have 

the potential to grow into their new role.112 This approach sidesteps 

the problem of various police and perhaps Army units, which are 

sometimes deemed so corrupt and infiltrated by the insurgents that 

they cannot be redeemed.113

 For all of the important and undeniable advantages to developing 

elite military forces and special police units, there are problems with 

this approach. A disproportionate reliance on elite forces may cause 

them to be overused to the point that their capabilities are seriously 

eroded and their morale undermined. Conversely, the development 

and professionalization of only elite military units may cause the Iraqi 

government to withhold those units from combat on the assumption 

that they are vital to the government’s survival and should be 

preserved from all but direst threats. This approach would mean 

that a Praetorian force may soak up the best human and material 

resources while failing to actually engage in combat.

 Another problem is that emerging elite units often rise to a 

higher standard due to particularly able leaders serving in the key 

positions within these units and particularly as the commanders. 

Enemy insurgents consequently adapt to this situation by targeting 

key leaders within the security forces.114

 This tactic strongly reinforces the military requirement for junior 

leaders and subordinate commanders to be continually trained and 

mentored. While none of these concerns should be taken as an 

argument against building elite forces, the Iraqi government will have 

to take care to avoid overreliance on them. Moreover, if the Iraqi and 

U.S. Governments give up on large numbers of conventional units, 

these units will certainly give up on themselves. The government 

needs to be certain that a unit is irredeemable before labeling it as 

such.

 In order to support the Iraqi security forces, it is also necessary 

for the United States to overcome all serious delays and bureaucratic 

obstacles to providing them with modern weapons and equipment.115

Such assets cannot inspire an unmotivated military or redeem an 

irredeemable fighting force, but the lack of such systems can break a 

force that is hovering between hope and demoralization. Iraqi Army 

and National Guard units have been almost entirely composed of 
30

non-mechanized infantry with small arms. The Army was at least 

initially better trained and somewhat better armed than the National 

Guard (particularly with regard to mortars). Strong efforts are being 

made to overcome these discrepancies, as the Army and National 

Guard are merged into a single force.116

 Iraqi forces also are being asked to fight mostly without their own 

Air Force and are instead relying on coalition assets. This situation 

is acceptable so long as U.S. forces dominate the ground fighting. 

Nevertheless, aviation assets are expected to be valuable in fighting 

an insurgency, and U.S.-Iraqi efforts to stand up a reliable air force 

have been slow.117 A U.S. withdrawal strategy will need to consider 

how the airpower gap best may be filled following a departure of 

the majority of U.S. forces. Iraqi helicopter gunships and transport 

fixed-wing aircraft and transport helicopters would be especially 

useful in providing Iraqi forces with both mobility and firepower.118

Iraqi pilots from the Saddam era would have to be rehabilitated and 

reintegrated into the new air force to achieve this goal in a timely 

manner. 

 Some concern also exists that Iraqis of military age may no longer 

choose to join and remain part of the security forces in sufficient 

numbers to fill out the ranks so that a U.S. withdrawal is possible. 

Finding recruits is, nevertheless, not a major problem at the current 

time. The Iraqi recruits earn about $200 to $500 a month, which is 

viewed as a good salary within Iraq, and this contributes to a fairly 

large applicant pool.119 Additionally, between 1,500 and 3,000 police 

and military recruits join the Iraqi security forces each week.120

 Motivating Iraqi soldiers who are already in the service sometimes 

appears more difficult. Desertions and overstaying one’s leave have 

been common until fairly recently, and it is uncertain how the trend 

will develop.121 In the first year following the creation of the new 

Iraqi Army, the desertion rates were extremely heavy, especially 

during periods of intense combat. Most Iraqi men seem to join as a 

way of providing for their families, but it is not clear that the majority 

are willing to die to defend the new and evolving Iraqi government. 

They have been more likely to focus on keeping out of danger and 

staying alive if possible. This kind of mentality is a problem for unit 

effectiveness and, not surprisingly, leads to increased desertions 
31

at times of heightened insurgent activity.122 It should, however, 

be noted that the desertion rate has declined significantly over the 

last year, and some Iraqi soldiers do behave bravely. Additionally, 

the desertion and AWOL problems may be complicated by the 

requirement for Iraqi soldiers to return to their homes to give money 

to their families physically in some cases and to deal with family 

crises.

 U.S. Army Lieutenant General David Petraus, former commander 

of the program to train the Iraqi military, has stated that Iraqi units 

also have suffered personnel losses “due to severe intimidation.”123

At least some members of the Iraqi military wear ski masks to 

conceal their identities while on duty and mislead their neighbors 

by suggesting they have jobs that having nothing to do with the Iraqi 

government.124 This tactic is generally used to protect the individuals 

and their families, but is probably unlikely to lead to solid results. 

Insurgents make a strong effort to join the security forces and seem 

to have developed an impressive intelligence network about who 

else has joined these organizations. Even a relatively few enemy 

infiltrators can produce a bonanza of information on other members 

of the military and security organizations, despite operational 

security measures.

 Some special problems were seen with Iraqi security forces and 

especially the now renamed Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC, now 

the Iraqi National Guard) in April 2004, when radical cleric Muqtada 

Sadr’s clumsy and poorly-trained militia forces rose in rebellion 

against the Iraqi government. This action occurred simultaneously 

with coalition fighting against Sunni insurgents in Falluja. According 

to Major General Martin Dempsey, “About 40 percent of the Iraqi 

security forces fighting Sadr walked off the job because they were 

intimidated. And about 10 percent actually worked against us.”125

Dempsey described the later group as infiltrators. This description 

seems reasonable, but other explanations are also possible. The 

soldiers who changed sides may have been Shi’ites who viewed 

the mission of fighting the Sadrists as particularly onerous and 

unexpected. Many impoverished Shi’ites have joined both the 

government’s security forces and the Sadrist’s “Mahdi Militia.”

 Insurgents clearly understand that an effective security force is 

essential if the Iraqi government is to survive a U.S. withdrawal. 
32

Therefore they have waged strong and continuing war against the 

security forces in an effort to prevent their development into effective 

units. This struggle is comprehensive and displays a wide range of 

tactics to undermine the ability of the security forces to function. 

Insurgents have attacked police stations and consistently target long 

lines of applicants seeking to join the military and police forces.126

The south gate of the Muthanna Barracks in Baghdad, for example, 

has been bombed at least five times, and 198 people have been killed 

there since it became a recruiting center. Another 465 have been 

wounded.127 Overall, more than 1,300 Iraqi police officers have been 

killed between Saddam’s ouster in April 2003 and January 2005.128

According to March 2005 testimony by U.S. Chairman of the Joint 

Chief of Staff General Richard Meyers, Iraqi soldiers are dying at 

twice the rate of U.S. soldiers in Iraq.129

 Like the military, the effectiveness of the Iraqi police has been 

subject to disaster when challenged substantially by a serious enemy. 

In an especially serious encounter in November 2004, 4,000 out of 

about 5,400 Iraqi police in Mosul deserted the force in response to an 

insurgent uprising within the city.130 While the forces in Mosul are 

assessed to be much more professional now, this crisis is particularly 

important in illustrating how an effective enemy can roll back 

coalition progress in preparing the Iraqis to defend themselves. The 

Mosul battle and its implications for the future of Iraq will therefore 

be considered more comprehensively later in this monograph.

The Sustainability of U.S. Military Operations in Iraq.

A number of factors unrelated to progress in building a 

functioning Iraqi state may also influence the debate on when and 

how the United States will depart Iraq. Foremost is the willingness 

of American society to provide a continuous stream of volunteers 

to join the Army, Marine Corps, and their reserve components and 

accept the likelihood of possible combat duty in Iraq.131 Should 

the pool of military age volunteers permanently decline or even 

evaporate, there is almost certainly no political will to restart 

military conscription. Public opinion polls consistently demonstrate 

overwhelming opposition to a draft. This opposition will almost 
33

certainly become more intense should the prospect become more 

likely.132 Politicians embracing the idea of restarting the draft would 

be effectively ending their political careers. Furthermore, the process 

of resolving draft-related controversies on such issues as conscripting 

women, deciding what kinds of deferments to allow, and other such 

matters would probably require a significant amount of debate prior 

to congressional action. The Iraq situation may have fundamentally 

changed by the time a draft is organized and implemented, and the 

conscripted soldiers are trained and prepared for deployment.

U.S. public opinion about the Iraq War may also become an 

important factor influencing the nature and timing of an exit strategy, 

even without the possibility of a military draft. Most case studies of 

U.S. public opinion behavior suggest that the American public will 

endure ongoing military casualties and high monetary expenditures 

in a sustained but limited war if they are able to see progress towards 

military and political goals.133 Public support for the Iraq war peaked 

when the Saddam Hussein regime fell in April 2003 when 76 percent 

of those polled stated that the war was worth the sacrifice. By May 

2005, a USA Today/CNN/Gallup poll indicated that only 41 percent 

of the American public believed the war was worth the sacrifice; 57 

percent said that it was not.134 Support rebounded in July 2005 when 

53 percent of those surveyed by the same polling organization said 

the war was not a mistake and only 46 percent believed it was an 

error. Surprisingly, only 37 percent of those surveyed in the July 

poll believed that it would be possible to create a stable, democratic 

Iraq.135 It may also be significant that temporary spikes in public 

approval for the Iraq operation have been produced by events 

such as Saddam’s capture and the January 2005 elections, but these 

improvements failed to last due to the continuation of the insurgency 

and the inability of the United States to reduce its commitments in 

troops and resources to Iraq.

 Against this background, the U.S. public may see increased 

casualties or any requirement to boost troop strength in Iraq as 

indications of a faltering U.S. effort in meeting its goals. Increasing 

U.S. financial expenditures for the war, in addition to the hundreds of 

billions of dollars already spent, may also become a future problem 

for U.S. public opinion. As noted, a policy of “staying the course” in 
34

a democratic society is most effective when the public can see clear 

progress towards an acceptable result. If the public views the Iraq 

conflict as showing little or no progress, the conflict may become 

redefined by many U.S. citizens as a quagmire, and pressure to 

withdraw would become nearly irresistible. Moreover, while many 

hopeful signs of progress exist in Iraq, it is not clear that the public 

will find them compelling if such progress does not lead to a situation 

where the United States can begin withdrawing troops. 

 It has already been noted that a serious decline or even a 

collapse in recruiting and retention for the U.S. Army and Marine 

Corps could eventually influence the U.S. ability to sustain a large 

military presence in Iraq.136 A series of problems in recruiting (but 

not retention) started to appear in 2004 with the Army Reserve 

and National Guard and later spread to the regular Army.137 The 

most immediate impact of these problems involves a shortfall of 

newly enlisted recruits, but there are other less visible and longerterm effects should the United States accept large numbers of only 

marginally qualified applicants, and these individuals remain in the 

military as professional soldiers.138 Moreover, various journalists 

have stated that strong opposition to the Iraq war among some 

minority groups, and particularly African-Americans, has begun to 

influence the Army’s ability to recruit minority soldiers.139 Since a 

military draft appears politically unsustainable, it is not clear what 

will be done if the Iraq war becomes increasingly unpopular, and 

military enlistments take an even more dramatic fall. In response to 

these types of concerns, Army Vice Chief of Staff General Richard A. 

Cody has stated, “What keeps me awake at night is what will this all 

volunteer force look like in 2007?”140 

 Recruiting problems nevertheless may be at least partially 

reversible even under contemporary circumstances. In the face of 

current problems, the military recruiting system has expanded, 

and new methods to attract recruits have been implemented. Nearterm solutions currently being pursued have involved increasing 

enlistment and reenlistment incentives, making limited reductions 

on educational requirements to enter the Army or Army Reserve, 

seeking transfers from the Navy and Air Force, creating 15-month 

terms of enlistment, and raising the maximum age for U.S. Army 

Reserve recruits.141 
35

 U.S. Army retention (reenlistment, rather than first-time 

enlistment) is currently not a major problem when considering overall 

numbers, although there are shortfalls in various important military 

occupational specialties (MOS).142 Retention rates may remain high 

so long as troops and their families feel that their sacrifice is serving a 

long-term good. Nevertheless, some individuals may now be opting 

to leave military service after 20 years with the minimum retirement 

benefits, despite the fact that they had previously planned to stay 

in the service longer. On an even more threatening level, retention 

could collapse if a belief that the war is futile begins to dominate the 

society, and this outlook then begins to influence troops who might 

otherwise reenlist. Additionally, there are some disadvantages 

today’s troops have when compared to soldiers fighting in earlier 

wars. In Vietnam, for example, only those who volunteered to do 

so served a second tour in combat, except in rare instances involving 

career officers and soldiers. In Iraq (and Afghanistan), many troops 

are required to perform a second or even a third combat tour as part 

of normal unit rotations. These requirements increasingly could 

cause soldiers to rethink the disproportionate burden that society is 

placing on them, while the bulk of the population remains sheltered 

and in some cases indifferent to the war.143 

 Another related problem is the rate at which military equipment 

is worn out in combat conditions. According to some estimates, a 

sizable number of Army and Marine Corps vehicles, weapons, and 

equipment are wearing out at up to six times the rate provided by 

normal usage.144 Both regular and reserve units are experiencing 

this problem, and the equipment of these organizations will have to 

be recapitalized as a result. Furthermore, it is uncertain that efforts 

to maintain and replace worn-out equipment indefinitely can keep 

pace with the rate at which it is being expended and overutilized in 

Iraq.

 Sustainment difficulties for the United States will also be 

influenced by the decisions of various allied nations to remain in 

Iraq or withdraw their military forces from that country. The 

United States is correspondingly faced with the ongoing challenge of 

keeping the coalition of allied forces together and preventing more 

nations from reducing their forces in Iraq, or even withdrawing 

them altogether as the result of increased casualties and domestic 
36

pressures within their own countries.145 Such reductions will not 

be a major problem if Iraqi troops rise to the tasks they have been 

assigned. Should they fail to do so, allied troop withdrawals may 

place more stress and responsibility on U.S. forces. In early 2005, 

the United States contributed around 140,000 troops to Iraq, while 

a coalition of several dozen countries contributed around 23,000 

troops.146 

 The United Kingdom remains America’s most important and 

reliable partner at this time, with around 9,000 troops in Iraq in early 

2005.147 This force will probably be maintained at the current level 

for some time, despite the weakening of the Labour Party in the May 

5, 2005 British elections.148 The continued presence of other allied 

forces in Iraq may be more problematic. Spain withdrew its 1,300 

soldiers in April/May 2004.149 The Netherlands completed the full 

withdrawal of its last 800 troops in April 2005.150 Italy has plans to 

withdraw all of its 3,160 troops beginning in September 2005. Poland 

has announced that it will withdraw its 1,700 troops from Iraq when 

the UN mandate for the multinational force expires in December 

2005.151 All of the 1,600 Ukrainian troops are scheduled to depart Iraq 

by October 2005. Bulgaria plans to withdraw all 450 of its soldiers by 

the end of 2005. Australia, in contrast, has promised modest increases 

in the numbers of troops it is willing to deploy, from 950 to 1,400.152 If 

all currently announced withdrawal plans take place as envisioned, 

non-U.S./non-Iraqi coalition strength in Iraq is expected to dip to 

11,300 soldiers, the majority of which will be British.

Dangers of the Timetable Option.

 The ongoing uncertainty in Iraq has prompted considerable 

competing analysis on when and under what conditions the 

United States can safely begin to turn over full control of that 

country’s security to the Iraqis. This withdrawal will be conducted 

in phases whereby U.S. and allied forces are expected to be 

progressively withdrawn as the Iraqi security forces assume greater 

responsibilities. The transition to Iraqi forces is further expected 

to begin with those provinces least plagued by insurgent violence, 

although it will also be conducted in full knowledge of insurgent 

mobility. The decision to begin withdrawing forces, therefore, will 
37

need to be based on an assessment of governmental and security 

forces viability. The success or failure of the U.S. effort in Iraq will be 

directly linked to making this assessment correctly and then acting 

upon it.

 The idea of creating a timetable for a military withdrawal from 

Iraq sometimes has been presented as a solution for current troubles 

there.153 Milestones have already been set for the rehabilitation of 

the Iraqi army, but these milestones are event and process driven 

goals and do not contain rigid dates, which cannot be adjusted with 

circumstances.154 A timetable would be a much more public, formal, 

and dramatic option, which requires a withdrawal of U.S. forces at 

some defined point, apparently more or less regardless of the state of 

Iraqi readiness for self-government and self-defense. 

 Edward N. Luttwak, long-time scholar of national security affairs, 

has suggested that, in absence of public U.S. plans to withdraw, 

various radical Iraqi groups can polish their nationalist credentials 

by waging war against U.S. forces in preparation for the political 

competition following the eventual U.S. departure.155 There does 

seem to be some evidence supporting this assertion. Shi’ite radical 

Muqtada al-Sadr challenged U.S. forces in April 2004 with his militia 

force, the al Mahdi Army, in a haphazard way that nevertheless 

rebounded to his favor. In a series of one-sided battles, his al Mahdi

Army was severely mauled by U.S. forces, which themselves suffered 

only light casualties. Nevertheless, Sadr’s decision to confront the 

United States led to a significant jump in his public standing within 

Iraq and improved his ability to recruit new individuals for the al 

Mahdi Army.156 Sadr’s military failure was a political success, which 

he may have sought to repeat in brief November 2004 fighting, 

although with less success.

 Supporters of a withdrawal timetable further suggest that as the 

United States withdraws its forces from Iraq, the basis for a tactical 

alliance among diverse insurgent groups would begin to unravel.157

This assertion also appears to have some validity, since the Iraqi 

insurgency is highly diverse and composed of groups which do 

not appear to be natural allies. Islamic extremists, such as those 

associated with Abu Musab al Zarqawi’s al Qa’eda of Mesopotamia 

and Ba’athists formerly associated with Saddam Hussein, hold 

widely divergent views of how they would like to see Iraq governed. 
38

As the banner of anti-Western unity begins to fade, quarrels and 

power struggles can be expected to emerge among these groups. 

Yet, even if this set of assertions is correct and insurgent cooperation 

will be undercut by a U.S. withdrawal, there is still a danger. If the 

insurgents can hold themselves together long enough to defeat the 

Iraqi government, any subsequent division among them will have 

little meaning for U.S. and moderate Iraqi national interests in the 

region. Rather, victorious Sunni insurgents seeking to claim power 

would probably face a new fight against Shi’ite militias, in what 

could be expected to develop into a sectarian war. 

 It is also technically possible that convincing evidence of an 

upcoming U.S. withdrawal from Iraq will prod Iraqi ethnic and 

sectarian groups into redoubling their efforts to find common 

ground and avoid civil war. According to this line of thought, the 

imminent departure of U.S. forces that are currently helping to deter 

intercommunal conflict will remove a crutch that may help foster 

intransigence among groups. These groups know they can engage 

in brinkmanship with each other without consequence so long as 

U.S. military forces deter communal warfare. Nevertheless, Iraq’s 

factional dynamics are so complex that such linear reasoning seldom 

leads to the desired result. Rather than seek compromise, Iraqi 

factions may instead accelerate the development of their militias, 

seek foreign regional support, and position themselves for a civil 

war.

 Iraqis themselves are divided on the issue of a timetable.158 Much 

of the Sunni religious leadership, some of whom are sympathetic 

to the insurgency, has been particularly assertive about the need 

for a timetable, and the powerful Association of Muslim Scholars 

has made a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. forces their central 

demand before they are willing to cooperate with Iraqi government.159

This distrust of the United States is also apparent in the Sunni Arab 

community at large. In March 2005, for example, Zogby polling 

indicated that 82 percent of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs want the United States 

to leave “now” or “very soon.”160 Iraq’s Shi’ite Arab leadership has 

not yet shown the same impatience, with the exception of Muqtada 

al Sadr. Sadr seeks not only a timetable, but calls for an immediate 

withdrawal of U.S. forces.161 
39

 Yet, despite some potential advantages, catastrophic dangers lurk 

in announcing a timetable, and these dangers seriously outweigh any 

advantages that will accrue from such a policy. From the moment a 

timetable is announced, all Iraqis working with the U.S.-led coalition 

will calculate that U.S. protection is a declining asset, and they 

correspondingly will have to make a decision about how to safeguard 

themselves and their property. Some may choose to establish links 

to the insurgents, while others may seek the protection of a militia. 

Furthermore, leaving the country before the Iraqis have established 

a viable government with the forces able to provide for national 

security raises some alarming prospects. The Iraqi institutions that 

have been put into place may crumble under such conditions or 

dissolve into sectarian factions, and the lives and funds sacrificed to 

rebuild Iraq will not be redeemed. Additionally, an announcement 

of a U.S. withdrawal with an accompanying timetable might also 

encourage the insurgents to buildup their forces, bide their time, and 

wait for American forces to leave, just as the North Vietnamese did. 

 An early withdrawal scenario is equally problematic for the Iraqi 

security forces. When U.S. and coalition forces begin to withdraw, 

a security vacuum will start to develop and be filled by either Iraqi 

security forces or the Iraqi insurgents or local militias. If the Iraqi 

security forces can stand up to anti-government forces, a fundamental 

U.S. and Iraqi governmental goal will have been met. Conversely, 

if they cannot, Iraqi forces may be defeated by either a progressive 

erosion of their authority and capabilities or, in the worst case, Iraqi 

security forces would crumble rapidly in the face of the insurgent 

threat, with their individual members probably deserting and joining 

various ethnic and sectarian forces. In either case, previous efforts to 

train, equip, and professionalize Iraqi security forces will have been 

rendered meaningless, and the United States will almost certainly 

not have the resources or political will to restart the training and 

military rebuilding process from the beginning. 

 The case of Mosul in November 2004 may be of special importance 

in illustrating this point. U.S. troops present in that city were cut by 

two-thirds in early 2004 as part of a unit rotation scheme whereby 

the 101st Airborne Division was replaced by a Stryker brigade.162

Iraqi police forces in the area appeared competent, and the city itself 
40

also appeared calm enough to justify this fairly substantial reduction 

in the U.S. presence. The U.S. withdrawal became a serious problem 

in November 2004 when approximately 75 percent of the Iraqi police 

forces in the area deserted in the face of sustained insurgent attacks.163

It is at least an open question as to whether these forces could 

eventually have performed to a much higher standard had they not 

been asked to do too much too soon. While the situation in Mosul 

appears much better now, the example of an apparently effective 

security force unexpectedly crumbling is a worrisome precedent. 

Additionally, the abysmal performance of the Mosul police may 

indicate that a security unit should not be viewed as competent until 

it has proven itself in serious combat. This situation also suggests 

that the progress of all Iraqi units must be seriously monitored, and 

strong efforts must be made to avoid unwarranted optimism.

 There is also the problem of what to do next if a timetable is 

established, and troop withdrawals are scheduled to begin prior to 

the Iraqi government being able to function without the support of 

U.S./coalition troops. The United States will then have to choose 

between withdrawing on time and possibly allowing anarchy to 

develop or reversing itself and ignoring the timetable. Iraqi and 

wider Arab World distrust of the United States is likely to increase 

if the the United States makes promises to withdraw its troops and 

then does not keep them.

 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a timetable surrenders 

the judgment of military and intelligence professionals to that of an 

inflexible and arbitrary commitment. If Iraq is redeemable, but key 

goals are not accomplished in accordance with the timetable, the 

United States may end up abandoning a potentially hopeful situation 

and instead allowing that nation to plunge into civil war and anarchy. 

If it becomes obvious to intelligence professionals, regional experts, 

and other informed observers that Iraq is irredeemable, then why 

wait to withdraw according to a timetable? The timetable option can 

only serve in the gray area whereby the Iraqi government may have 

only a small chance to survive, but the U.S. leadership does not wish 

to announce publicly that we have basically given up on Iraq. The 

timetable option allows the United States to appear before the world 

community as having provided Iraq one last chance before allowing 

it to sink into anarchy.
41

The Danger of Seeking Permanent U.S. Military Bases.

 The United States is currently building a number of military 

facilities in Iraq, including 14 major installations sometimes 

referred to as “enduring bases” to be used by the Iraqi Army.164

Such construction is both necessary for the future effectiveness of 

the Iraqi military and not particularly surprising for a strategy that 

seeks to empower indigenous security forces since many of Iraq’s 

prewar bases and military infrastructure were in serious decline on 

the eve of U.S. intervention. Additionally, and more importantly, the 

widespread and often systematic looting that followed the ouster of 

Saddam Hussein caused massive and sometimes total destruction of 

those military facilities. In some cases, looters with cranes and trucks 

stole everything valuable at military sites.165 Rebuilding a totally 

shattered military infrastructure thus has become a necessity.

 Some suggest that the U.S. Government may be tempted to seek 

its own large and significant military bases to remain in that country 

after the departure of the majority of U.S. forces.166 The disadvantages 

associated with such a policy clearly have been recognized by the 

U.S. administration, and Secretary Rumsfeld has characterized the 

suggestion that the United States is interested in such facilities as 

“inaccurate and unfortunate.”167 President Bush has also made the 

statement that “We will stay in Iraq as long as we are needed, and 

not a day longer,” which some observers have interpreted as an 

indication that the administration is not seeking permanent bases.168

 The question naturally arises as to how long the United States 

will stay to help fight the Iraqi insurgents without enjoying 

“permanent” basing rights. If the insurgency lasts for 12 years, as 

Secretary Rumsfeld suggests it might, does the United States keep 

some forces in Iraq throughout that time while maintaining that 

such deployments are not permanent? Perhaps because of these 

ambiguities, a great deal of suspicion exists in the Middle East and 

elsewhere that the United States will reverse itself at some key point 

and seek military facilities in Iraq beyond those needed to assist the 

Iraqi government with its struggle against the insurgents.169

 Part of the suspicion of U.S. intentions is probably simply a general 

distrust of U.S. policy, but it may also reflect awareness by Middle 

Eastern publics of the calls by some neo-conservative commentators 
42

for U.S. basing rights in Iraq.170 Furthermore, the decision to 

relinquish U.S. bases in Saudi Arabia is sometimes seen as a factor 

driving the United States to seek Iraqi bases.171 There is some logic 

behind these worries. While the primary purpose of the Saudi bases 

was usually presented as deterring and containing Saddam Hussein, 

these facilities also entered into the strategic equation regarding Iran 

and other problematic Middle Eastern scenarios. Thus, the decision 

to leave the Saudi bases is sometimes viewed as a setback for U.S. 

strategic flexibility. 

 Within the Iraqi context, the primary justification for retaining 

U.S. bases would be to support the Iraqi governmental security 

forces after the majority of U.S. troops have withdrawn from that 

country. Moreover, it would signal a strong and continuing U.S. 

interest in the future of this country. Nevertheless, these reasons for 

staying in Iraq in most circumstances will be strongly outweighed by 

the disadvantages associated with such a policy if they involve U.S. 

military assets that remain after U.S. forces are no longer necessary 

to cope with the insurgency. 

 A basing agreement may also seriously hurt the legitimacy of 

the Iraqi government, which the United States must seek to support. 

Resistance to basing rights by Western powers traditionally has been 

a central characteristic of Arab nationalism, which cannot be casually 

disregarded by key Iraqi leaders.172 Even moderate Iraqi politicians 

fear that the United States may seek to dominate the post-Saddam 

Iraqi government.173 Bases could be seen as a central part of such a 

strategy. Additionally, anti-American radicals in both the Shi’ite and 

Sunni communities would be given the gift of a major issue with 

which to rally their followers. Shi’ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who 

has a strong following among Iraq’s most impoverished Shi’ites, has 

made opposition to U.S. influence in Iraq a central demand for his 

movement.

 Perhaps most significantly, large and important Arab countries 

are seldom the most optimal locations for Western military bases. 

The presence of such facilities is widely taken to imply a certain 

higher level of Western influence over the government in question. 

Such a relationship is not only embarrassing with the public, but it 

is also a serious obstacle to seeking regional and Arab leadership 
43

and regionwide respect, especially at a time when anti-Americanism 

is high. Smaller Arab states, by contrast, have no serious chance 

of claiming Arab leadership, and this factor is not a consideration 

for them. Additionally, small wealthy states, such as Kuwait, Qatar, 

the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain, clearly see U.S. bases as 

an important source of protection from bullying and perhaps even 

military invasion by larger regional neighbors.174 These states are 

much easier to work with in time of crisis, and their facilities can 

meet the same operational requirement as bases in Iraq.175

Conclusion.

 This monograph has sought to illustrate how challenging, 

multifaceted, and difficult it will be to devise an effective exit strategy 

for Iraq that can also serve as a victory strategy, leaving both the 

United States and Iraq better off than when the intervention was 

undertaken in 2003. While this goal is still attainable, remarkably 

little room exists for error, ideological dogmatism, or ignorance 

about the nature of the multiple problems associated with such an 

undertaking. Although the authors of this work understand that no 

one can generate a perfect plan for addressing the issue of an exit 

strategy, the following recommendations are offered in the hope that 

they will be of value to planners and policymakers grappling with 

this fundamental issue of U.S. strategic policy. 

1. U.S. Government leaders must never forget that the United 

States will achieve its key objectives once the Iraqi government is 

viewed by the majority of its people, regardless of sect or ethnicity, 

as a legitimate government that is worth fighting and dying for; 

and the Iraqi security forces have the training, know-how, and 

equipment to put these convictions into practice. Empowering 

the government and security forces is the key to an endstate in Iraq 

acceptable to the United States. The U.S. decision to avoid lingering 

in that country to eradicate the insurgency is therefore compatible 

with these priorities. All U.S. actions must be considered in light of 

the burden that they might place on Iraqi governmental legitimacy 

since this is the key to a government victory. 

 2. The United States must develop detailed plans for 

implementing a withdrawal of significant numbers of troops under 
44

a variety of much less than optimal conditions. This requirement 

means that the Iraqi government may not yet have a strong human 

rights record, and the security forces may not be able to destroy the 

insurgency when the United States begins withdrawing troops. If 

the government is legitimate enough to survive, it may be useful 

to consider withdrawing the bulk of coalition forces as a way 

of empowering the new government by giving it the status of a 

fully independent entity. The United States may also have to scale 

back its expectations for Iraq’s political future. If the United States 

withdraws and a civil war does not take place, Iraq is better than we 

found it. Any regime that respects the need to share power among 

all major Iraqi groups (and one hopes minor groups) is a great deal 

better than the Saddam Hussein regime. Moreover, some Iraqi 

governmental violations of human rights may be inevitable, so long 

as the government is locked in a death struggle with insurgents who 

are perfectly willing to bomb mosques and murder large numbers of 

children such as occurred in July 2005. The United States should be 

prepared to criticize Iraqi human rights violations, but it also must 

be aware of the context, and the possibility that the criticism will be 

more effective and meaningful at a point when the Iraqi government 

is no longer fighting for its existence.

 3. U.S. military and intelligence leaders must be painfully 

honest in addressing the question of when Iraqi security forces 

will be able to function without a coalition troop presence to 

prop them up. To answer this question incorrectly could cause the 

United States fail to meet its minimal objective of helping empower 

a functioning government in Iraq. One of the most serious threats 

to U.S. goals in Iraq is the danger of unrealistic optimism about the 

capabilities and élan of the Iraq security forces, and especially those 

units that have not actually been tested in combat. Such wishful 

thinking, if acted upon, could cause the Iraqi military to be given too 

much responsibility and then collapse in the face of enemy opposition 

which they are not yet prepared to address. The United States does 

not have the time or resources to build and then rebuild the Iraqi 

security force after a series of collapses. False or foolish optimism 

on the ability of forces may lead to a repeat of the November 2004 

Mosul disaster on a nationwide scale. 
45

4. Senior U.S. military leaders must resist the view that they 

are “grading themselves” when they are asked to train the security 

forces and to evaluate Iraqi readiness to assume more expanded 

duties for military and security operations. The viability of Iraqi 

units must be measured by a series of tough indicators, including 

real efforts to measure intangibles like morale and unit cohesion, as 

well as quantifying training and the distribution of weapons and 

equipment. Iraqi units that have not proven themselves in battle 

should remain suspect, units that have histories of heavy infiltration 

by insurgents and high rates of desertion should be even more 

suspect, units that have an internal culture where troops speak 

openly in favor of the insurgents or maintain publicly that they will 

desert to join an ethnic militia if their sectarian leaders ask them to 

should be especially suspect. While these military problems may not 

be easily corrected by U.S. trainers and advisors, neither should they 

be ignored when attempting to make an honest evaluation of Iraqi 

prospects for self-defense. 

5. The United States MUST NOT establish a timetable to 

withdraw from Iraq so long as U.S. leaders consider the situation 

in Iraq to be redeemable. If a timetable is established and rigidly 

adhered to regardless of the situation on the ground, then the United 

States has, in effect, given up on Iraq, and is engaged in what amounts 

to choosing a withdrawal date by lottery. It has also replaced the 

judgement of the U.S. military and intelligence leadership with an 

arbitrary decision on when Iraqi forces will be ready to assume the 

security duties necessary for that nation to survive intact. A timetable 

is not a strategy for even the most limited of form of success in Iraq; 

it is an excuse for allowing the system to collapse.

6. As a last resort for preventing near-term civil war, the United 

States may have to swallow the bitter pill of allowing local militias 

to retain a significant and ongoing role in Iraqi politics if the Iraqi 

government is interested in pursuing this option and if the Iraqi 

security forces cannot take full responsibility for the nation’s 

safety. It is no longer clear that the United States will be able to 

create military and police forces that can secure the entire country 

no matter how long U.S. forces remain. It is also doubtful that Sunni 

Muslims will trust the Shi’ite-dominated central government and 

security forces to the point that that they will give up their militias 
46

without a fight. Militias are better than anarchy, although the danger 

they may serve as the building blocks for civil war should cause them 

to be used only as a last resort. It is worth reiterating that this is only 

one step better than anarchy and should only be considered as a final 

choice. Once power is decentralized, it will be deeply difficult to 

recentralize. 

7. The United States needs to renounce interest in permanent 

bases in Iraq on a strong and continuing basis. Once a long-term 

basing agreement is formalized, it will become a festering grievance 

for Iraqi nationalists and will be criticized constantly by Iraqi and 

Arab World radicals. Since a primary U.S. goal is to empower the 

Iraqi government with legitimacy, such bases must be renounced as 

a way of reinforcing that legitimacy, which this monograph claims is 

a military necessity to achieve victory.

8. The United States needs to deemphasize rhetoric that may 

cause Iraqi citizens to believe their government has been put 

in place to wage war on U.S. enemies in the Muslim World and 

otherwise serve U.S. interests. If Iraq is the “central front” in the 

war on terrorism, then it is part of a campaign that mainstream 

Muslims view as including Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s 

actions against the Palestinians and Russian President Vladimir 

Putin’s campaign against Chechnya. The United States does not 

need to burden the Iraqi government with the specter of collusion in 

what may be seen as anti-Muslim policies.

9. U.S. leadership must recognize that it may still continue 

to support democracy after U.S. forces are withdrawn from Iraq, 

providing that the nation is stable when it leaves. The United 

States is expected to continue providing the Iraqi government with 

strong diplomatic and material support for its efforts. Following 

a U.S. departure, it is conceivable that the Iraqi military will be 

defeated if they show a lack of fighting spirit, but it is inconceivable 

that the United States should be willing to allow them to be defeated 

by a lack of military equipment and weaponry. As noted, materiel 

support will not save a failed military, but it might save a faltering 

military of a struggling government.

10. U.S. leaders should continually note the courage, 

commitment, and sacrifice of our troops in the field, while realizing 

that these same qualities are reasons to safeguard their lives even 
47

more carefully. All future wars should have carefully planned exit 

strategies based on something other than best case planning for the 

future of the countries involved. In undertaking such plans, the 

United States must take care to maintain realistic expectations of 

what it can actually achieve with military intervention, especially 

with regard to the imposition of market economies and democracy 

on states that we do not fully understand. Goals for intervention 

might at times be maintained at a limited level and adjusted upwards 

if conditions permit rather than held to lofty high standards (such 

as total “de-Ba’athification”) which conditions may later force the 

United States to compromise to extricate itself from a position of 

indefinite occupation.

ENDNOTES

 1. Gregg Easterbrook, “On Leave: The Case for Getting Out of Iraq,” The New 

Republic, August 30, 2004, internet.

 2. Miriam Fam, “Iraqi Leader Says Troops Should Stay,” Washington Times, 

February 2, 2005, internet. 

 3. Stanley Hoffman, “Out of Iraq,” The New York Review of Books, October 21, 

2004, internet.

 4. Joe Klein, “A Rush to War—Now a Rush Out of One?” Time, October 13, 

2003, p. 27.

 5. It would virtually impossible for Iraq to separate into multiple states without 

violence. For an examination of this issue in detail, see W. Andrew Terrill, Strategic 

Consequences of Intercommunal Warfare in Iraq, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 2005. 

 6. For a useful examination of U.S. concerns about Middle Eastern democracy, 

see International Crisis Group, Middle East and North Africa Briefing: The Broader 

Middle East and North Africa Initiative, Imperiled at Birth, Brussels/Amman: 

International Crisis Group, June 7, 2004.

 7. Traci Carl, “Calls Increase for U.S. to Leave Iraq,” Associated Press, April 

12, 2005, internet.

 8. Such politicians include Ibrahim Jaáfari, Ghazi al Yawer, Iyad Allawi, 

Hazem Sháalan, and others. See “Iraq PM urges ‘speedy’ US pullout,” BBC New: 

World Edition, July 27, 2005; “Iraq rules out US troop pullout,” BBC News Online, 

February 1, 2005, internet; “Iraq president insists U.S. troops should stay,” Daily 

Star, (Beirut), February 2, 2005, internet; and “US Forces Should Leave Iraq—

Chalabi,” Jordan Times, September 9, 2003, internet.
48

 9. The Kurds tend to view a U.S. presence as a deterrent against hostile actions 

by an Arab-dominated central government. See Adil Mahdi, “Talabani to Al 

Hayah: Coalition Force’ Presence is not Occupation,” Al Hayah (London), April 26, 

2005, p. 3, as translated by Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), April 26, 

2005, internet.

 10. “Multifarious Guerrilla Movement Underlies Iraq Violence,” Jordan Times, 

July 27, 2004, internet.

 11. As cited in Fareed Zakaria, “In Search of the Real New Iraq,” Newsweek, 

May 2, 2005, p. 35. 

 12. Iraq’s Kurdish president, Jalal Talabani, has been enthusiastic about 

engaging the potentially redeemable insurgents. The leaders of the predominantly 

Shi’ite religious parties in the Iraqi government also publicly maintain that they 

are interested in such reconciliation, although their commitment to such a policy 

is sometimes subjected to doubt. See Ellen Knickmyer, “Talabani Offers Amnesty 

to Insurgents,” Washington Post, April 8, 2005, p. 22; Jon Lee Anderson, “A Man of 

the Shadows: Can Iyad Allawi Hold Iraq Together?” The New Yorker, January 24 

and 31, 2005, pp. 64-65. 

 13. Stanford Professor and former senior U.S. democracy and governance 

advisor in Iraq, Larry Diamond had noted that in the early postwar period the 

Shi’ite Islamist party, SCIRI, conducted private “de-Ba’athification efforts at the 

point of a gun.” SCIRI is an important part of the current government. See Larry 

Diamond, Squandered Victory, New York: Times Books, 2005, p. 77. 

 14. Jeffrey Record, “Exit Strategy Delusions,” Parameters, Winter 2001-02, pp. 

21-27.

 15. One unclassified intelligence community assessment already maintains 

that Iraq has become a haven for terrorists and a proving ground for terrorist 

professionalization. See National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future, 

Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project, Washington, DC: U.S. 

Government Printing Office, December 2004, p. 94.

 16. Bill Nichols and Mona Mahoud, “Support for Iraq War at Lowest Level,” 

USA Today, May 4, 2005, p. 1. Also see Peter Grier, “The Rising Economic Cost of 

the Iraq War,” Christian Science Monitor, May 19, 2005, p. 1.

 17. For more on this issue, see Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, 

Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a PostConflict Scenario, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 

College, February 2003, pp. 3-11, 17, 43-47.

 18. Ambassador Carlos Pascual, Keynote Address to the Stability Operations 

Symposium conducted by the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations 

Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, December 13, 2004.

 19. Quote and chapter titles are from James M. McPherson, Ordeal By Fire: The 

Civil War and Reconstruction, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982, pp. 493-619.
49

 20. Jack C. Lane, Armed Progressive: General Leonard Wood, San Rafael, CA: 

Presidio Press, 1978, pp. 55-113; Thomas G. Patterson, et al., American Foreign 

Relations: Volume 2, A History, Since 1945, New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2000, pp. 

41-43.

 21. Patterson, p. 89; Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, New York: Grosset 

and Dunlap, 1965, p. 195. For a recent excellent book on the Versailles Conference, 

see Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World, New York: 

Random House, 2002.

 22. From conversation with Dr. Mark Stoler, Visiting Harold K. Johnson 

Professor of Military History, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle 

Barracks, PA, January 27, 2005; for a detailed discussion of the process that led 

to occupation policies in Germany, see Harold Stein, ed., American Civil-Military 

Decisions: A Book of Case Studies, Birmingham: University of Alabama Press, 1963, 

pp. 311-464.

 23. “Vom Krieg zum Frieden: Militarverwaltungen und Post-Conflict Nation 

Building,” Diplomatische Akademie, Vienna, Austria, May 2004, pp. 18-19.

 24. John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, New York: 

W. W. Norton and Company, 1999.

 25. Ronald Spector, “Failed Occupations: American, British, and Indian 

Soldiers and the End of Japan’s Asian Empire,” Perspectives in Military History 

Lecture, Carlisle Barracks, PA, December 15, 2004.

 26. Charles F. Brower IV, “American Strategy in the Vietnam War, 1965-68,” 

lecture to Naval War College Senior Course, Newport, RI, March 1992.

 27. An overview of the controversies surrounding the Vietnam War and the 

ways in which Americans view that war can be found in Jeffrey Record, The Wrong 

War, Why We Lost in Vietnam, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998.

 28. For a more in-depth analysis of these issues, see Jeffrey Record and W. 

Andrew Terrill, Iraq and Vietnam: Differences, Similarities, and Insights, Carlisle 

Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, May 2004. 

 29. For more on the Haitian example, see Crane and Terrill, pp. 5-8.

 30. Stability Operations Symposium conducted by the U.S. Army Peacekeeping 

and Stability Operations Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, December 13, 2004.

 31. “A Poor Choice in Kosovo,” editorial in the New York Times, December 24, 

2004.

 32. International Crisis Group, Kosovo: Toward Final Status, January 24, 2005, 

available at http://www.crisisgroup.org or http://www.crisisweb.org. 

 33. Kimberly Zisk Marten, Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past,

New York: Columbia University Press, 2004, pp. 13-17.

 34. On the need to avoid best case planning, see James Fallows, “The FiftyFirst State,” Atlantic Monthly, November 2002, p. 55. Note that well before the 
50

Iraq War, Fallows did a comprehensive survey on the public debate over whether 

invading Iraq was in the best interests of the United States. He stated, “The prowar group avoided questions about what would happen after a victory, because 

to consider postwar complications was to weaken the case for a preemptive strike. 

Some war advocates even said, if pressed, that the details of postwar life didn’t 

matter.” Obviously, such thinking cannot be allowed to even indirectly influence 

the military planning process.

 35. See Jeffrey Record, “The Limits and Temptations of America’s Conventional 

Military Primacy,” Survival, Spring 2005, p. 40. 

 36. Sheryl Stolberg, “‘Exit Strategy’ is More than a Whisper in Washington, 

With Lawmakers Speaking Out,” New York Times, June 16, 2005, internet; David 

Jackson, “Calls for Iraq Withdrawal Dogging Bush,” Dallas Morning News, June 16, 

2005, internet; Fouad Ajami, “Let’s Face It: Iraq Won’t be a Democratic Showcase,” 

Daily Star, May 29, 2004, internet.

 37. Please note that any estimates regarding this time frame must be at least 

somewhat speculative. For specific problems related to force rotations, see Lynn 

E. Davis, et al., Stretched Thin: Army Forces for Sustained Operations, Santa Monica, 

CA: RAND ARROYO Center, 2005; and U.S. Government Accountability Office 

(GAO), Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan is Needed to Address Personnel and Equipment 

Shortages, GAO-05-660, Washington, DC: GAO, July 2005.

 38. Michael G. Roskin, National Interest: From Abstraction to Strategy, Carlisle 

Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1994.

 39. One of the authors of this work has attempted to explore the dangers of 

such an eventuality in Terrill, Strategic Consequences of Intercommunal Warfare in 

Iraq.

 40. On Middle Eastern concerns about Western domination, see Shibley 

Telhami, The Stakes: America and the Middle East, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002, 

especially chapter 2; and Rashid Khalidi, Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints 

and America’s Perilous Path in the Middle East, Boston: Beacon Press, 2004, chapter 

5. 

 41. When asked about this possibility, Bush stated, “I will be disappointed. 

But democracy is democracy.” See “Bush: I Would Accept Islamic Iraq,” BBC News 

World Edition, October 19, 2004, internet.

 42. Paul Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 

University Press, 2000, p. 15.

 43. “Yemen Ruling Party Set for Win,” BBC News World Edition, April 30, 2003, 

internet, and “Yemenis Vote Amid Clashes,” BBC News: World Edition, February 

20, 2001, internet.

 44. “Yemen Leader Rules Himself Out of Polls,” Al Jazeera.net, July 17, 2005, 

internet.

 45. Brian Whitaker, “Yemen: Fed Up with Power?” Middle East International, 

July 22, 2005, p. 17.
51

 46. Peter Willems, “Yemen: The Right to Bear Arms,” The Middle East, March 

2005, pp. 32-33.

 47. Peter Willems, “Yemen: The Stakes are Higher,” The Middle East, March 

2003, pp. 24-27; “Yemen: Insecurity,” Middle East International, April 15, 2005, p. 

20.

 48. See Paul Dresch, Tribes, Government and History in Yemen, Oxford, UK: 

Oxford University Press, 1993, especially chapter 7.

 49. See Yochi J. Dreazen, “Shiites: Makeshift Militias are Formed to Thwart 

Sectarian Attacks in Iraq,” Wall Street Journal, July 26, 2005, p. 10; and “Iraq 

Worse—And Maybe Better,” The Economist, July 23, 2005, p. 42.

 50. Jim Muir, “Iraq Militias ‘Could Beat Rebels’,” BBC News World Edition, 

April 18, 2005, internet.

 51. Laurent Lozano, “Kurds Warn of Crossing Their “Red Lines’,” Jordan 

Times, January 26, 2005, internet. Also see “Talabani Defends Federalism, Asserts 

That It Is a Cure For All Iraqi Ills,” al Dustur (Baghdad), February 10, 2004, p. 1, as 

translated by FBIS, February 12, 2004, internet.

 52. George Packer, “The Next Iraqi War,” The New Yorker, October 4, 2004, 

pp. 64-77. Also see Iraq’s Kurds: Toward an Historic Compromise, Amman/Brussels, 

April 4, 2004, pp. 8-22.

 53. Cindy R. Jebb, Bridging the Gap: Ethnicity, Legitimacy and State Alignment in 

the International System, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004, especially pp. 293-301.

 54. “Iraqi Government’s Tough Mission—Luring Voters to the Polls,” Jordan 

Times, December 30, 2004, internet.

 55. “Iraqi Government Resigned to Partial Boycott of Elections,” The Daily Star, 

December 15, 2004, internet.

 56. Luke Baker, “Shiite Bloc May Win, But Not Sweep Iraq Polls,” Jordan Times, 

January 26, 2005, internet; Hannah Allam, “Shiites’ Sacred City Puts its Faith in 

Vote,” Philadelphia Inquirer, January 8, 2005, internet.

 57. “Al-Sistani Representative Urges All Groups to Participate in Election,” 

Baghdad al Diyar Television, January 15, 2005, as translated by FBIS, January 16, 

2005, internet; “Al-Sistani Regrets Not Voting in Elections Due to Iranian Origin,” 

Iraq for all News Network, January 31, 2005, as translated in FBIS, January 31, 2005, 

internet; Allam, “Shiites’ Sacred City Puts its Faith in Vote.”

 58. Peter Mackler, “Washington Breathes Easier after Iraqi Poll Gamble,” 

Jordan Times, January 31, 2005, internet. Note, however, that the violence occurred 

despite a massive increase in security procedures during the lead up to the election 

and on election day itself. 

 59. “World Leaders Urge Bring Iraqi Sunnis on Board,” Jordan Times, February 

2, 2005, internet.

 60. Dexter Filkins, “Low Voting Rate Risks Isolation for Sunni Iraqis,” New 

York Times, February 3, 2005, p. 1.
52

 61. Daily Star Staff, “Iraq’s Sunni Clerics Say Polls Tainted,” Daily Star, (Beirut), 

February 3, 2005, internet; Juan Cole, “Dead Wrong on the Iraqi Elections,” 

Electronic Iraq, November 30, 2004, internet.

 62. For a statement on this matter by the leader of Iraq’s Association of Muslim 

Scholars, see Mothanna Harith al Dhari, “Iraq’s Choice,” Al Ahram Weekly, April 

14-20, 2005, internet. Also see Mohammed al-Obaidi, “Why Iraqis Should Boycott 

Elections,” al Jazeera Net (in English), December 05, 2005, internet.

 63. Rami G. Khour, “Iraq’s Election of Ghosts,” Daily Star, January 26, 2005, 

internet.

 64. Mariam Fam, “Sunni Leaders Urge Community to Cast Ballots,” Jordan 

Times, July 15-16, 2005, internet; and “Sunnis Demand Say in Next Iraq Cabinet as 

Shiites Prepare for Power,” Jordan Times, February 21, 2005, internet.

 65. Robin Wright, “Iraqis Back New Leaders, Poll Says,” Washington Post, June 

25, 2004, A-19. The figure for Allawi’s then approval rating contains both those 

who strongly approve and those who somewhat approve, sub-totals not given.

 66. David L. Phillips, Losing Iraq, Colorado: Westview Press, 2005, p. 153.

 67. Adel Darwish, “A Blow for Democracy,” The Middle East, March 2005, 

pp. 12-13. Other reasons for Alawi’s poor performance may have included his 

distant Ba’athist past, his status as a longtime former exile, the reputation of his 

government for corruption, and the strong loyalty of many of Iraq’s urban poor to 

the guidance of their religious leadership.

 68. On the importance of Sistani’s support for this list of candidates, see Hamza 

Hendawi, “Sistani Key Figure in Iraq Vote, Despite not Being Candidate or Party 

Leader,” Jordan Times, January 25, 2005, internet.

 69. Ellen Knickmeyer, “Iraqi Proposes Broader Amnesty,” Washington Post, 

April 11, 2005, p. 1. 

 70. Trudy Rubin, “Sunnis’ Role in New Iraqi Government is Critical,” 

Philadelphia Inquirer, May 1, 2005, internet. Ahmad Chalabi is probably the most 

prominent secular leader of the UIA, and has been deeply involved in intensive 

de-Ba’athification.

 71. “Iraqi Leaders Struggle to Find Defense Minister,” Jordan Times, May 3, 

2005, internet; and Ellen Knickmeyer and Caryle Murphy, “Iraqi Government Fails 

to Fill Sunni Posts,” Washington Post, April 29, 2005, p. 1. Also see Larry Diamond, 

“Iraq’s Cabinet Needs More than a Few Tame Sunnis,” Wall Street Journal, April 

14, 2005, internet.

 72. An example of an important, long-standing, and unresolved Shi’iteKurdish difference is the competing views on various aspects of the Transitional 

Administrative Law (TAL). Most Iraqi Kurds viewed this document with favor due 

to its provisions protecting minority rights. Shi’ite leader Grand Ayatollah Sistani, 

however, firmly renounced the TAL partially due to its apparent concessions to 

the Kurds. These differences eventually were set aside, primarily because the TAL 
53

is a temporary document and Sistani was anxious not to become bogged down in 

problems that might further delay elections. See Diamond, Squandered Victory, pp. 

177-178.

 73. Trudy Rubin, “Democratizing Iraq will Help Get Troops Home,” 

Philadelphia Inquirer, November 7, 2003, internet. For a more general discussion of 

Arab distrust over Western intentions about oil, see Rashid Khalidi, Resurrecting 

Empire Western Footprints and America’s Perilous Path in the Middle East, Boston: 

Beacon Press, 2004, chapters 3, 5.

 74. Daniel Sneider, “Iraq Is No Afghanistan,” Miami Herald, October 25, 2004.

 75. Diamond, Squandered Victory, p. 55.

 76. See Hugh Miles, Al Jazeera: The Inside Story of the Arab News Channel that is 

Challenging the West, New York: Grove Press, 2005, especially chapters 7 and 8. 

 77. One specialist in the field of information operations has strongly 

recommended a strengthening of the Counter-Disinformation team at the U.S. 

State Department. This organization exposes and responds to conspiracy theories 

and disinformation aimed at the U.S. Government. Interview with Sarah E. Womar, 

July 23, 2005.

 78. On this issue and post-Saddam Iraq, see Steve Negus, “Iraq: Levels of 

Contact,” Middle East International, July 8, 2005, p. 7.

 79. Bassem Mroue, “Iraq Investigates Widespread Corruption,” Associated 

Press, August 2, 2005, internet; David S. Cloud, “Worry Grows As Iraq’s Defense 

Ministry Falls Short of Expectations,” New York Times, August 3, 2005, internet. 

 80. “Rumsfeld Visits Iraq, Warns Against Corruption,” New York Times on the 

Web, April 12, 2005, internet.

 81. Jeffrey Record, Dark Victory: America’s Second War Against Iraq, pp. 123-

124.

 82. CNN.com, “Baghdad Governor Assassinated,” January 4, 2005, internet; 

Erik Eckholm, “Rebels Inflict Heavy Losses on the Iraqis,” New York Times, 

December 29, 2004, internet; “Senior Judge Assassinated in Iraqi Ambush,” Jordan 

Times, January 26, 2005, internet.

 83. “Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period,” 

March 8, 2004, Coalition Provisional Authority Website, www.cpa-iraq.org/

government/TAL. 

 84. Hamza Hendawi, “Shi’ites Press for Elected Assembly,” Associated Press 

Web site, March 9, 2005, internet.

 85. “Al Ja’afari Interview,” Der Spiegel (Hamburg), March 21, 2005, as cited by 

FBIS, March 21, 2005, p. 999, internet; “Front-Runner Wants to Impose Shariah,” 

Washington Times, March 20, 2005, internet.

 86. Brian Knowlton, “President of Iraq Gives Support to U.S. Troops,” 

International Herald Tribune, April 11, 2005, internet.
54

 87. Yaroslav Trofimov, “Sadr’s Protesters Pose a Dilemma for Iraqi Rulers,” 

Wall Street Journal, April 11, 2005, internet; Knowlton, “President of Iraq Gives 

Support to U.S. Troops,” International Herald Tribune, April 11, 2005, internet; 

Hamza Hendawi, “Sadr Moves into Political Mainstream,” Jordan Times, June 6, 

2005, p. 4.

 88. “Iraqis Battle Over Role of Islam,” Jordan Times, March 29, 2005, internet. 

Also see Hannah Allam, “Secular Iraqis See Reasons for Hope,” Philadelphia 

Inquirer, May 2, 2005, p. 1.

 89. “Kurds Reject Islamic State,” Jordan Times, February 24, 2005, internet; 

Laurent Lozano, “Kurds Warn of Crossing Their ‘Red Lines’,” Jordan Times, 

January 26, 2005, internet; Jarjis Gulizada, “ A Secular Constitution to Protect 

Iraq,” Al Ittihad (Baghdad), February 25, 2005, as translated by FBIS, February 25, 

2005. Also see Hadi Ali, “The New Iraq-Between Secularism and Theocracy,” 

Arbil Yekgirtu (in Sorani Kurdish), April 10, 2005, as translated by FBIS, April 10, 

2005, internet.

 90. Laurent Lozano, “Kurds Warn of Crossing Their ‘Red Lines’.” 

 91. “Barzani Calls for Resolving Kirkuk Issue Now Based on Article 58 of State 

Law,” Dubai al-Arabiya Television, March 11, 2005, as translated by FBIS, March 

11, 2005, internet; Lina Sayawish, “Interview with Adnan al Mufti, Member of the 

Patriotic Union of Kurdistan’s Political Bureau, al-Hayah (London) February 11, 

2005, p. 3, as translated by FBIS, February 12, 2005, internet.

 92. Laurent Lozano, “Kurds Warn of Crossing Their ‘Red Lines’.” 

 93. Ellen Knickmeyer, “Iraqi Kurds Call for Referendum,” Washington Post, 

July 23, 2005, p. 14. Also see Kirk Semple, “Kurds Vow to Make No Concessions 

in Iraq Political Talks,” New York Times, August 7, 2005, internet.

 94. For public opinion data on this issue as a whole and broken down by 

Arab/Kurdish ethnicity, see “Survey Finds Hope in Occupied Iraq,” BBC News 

World Edition, March 16, 2004, internet. 

 95. Steve Negus, “Nearing Compromise,” Middle East International, June 2, 2005, 

pp. 15-16. Kurds, on the other hand, maintain that federalism is the alternative 

to secession. See Zuhayr Kazim Abbud, “The Call for Secession,” al Mu’tamar

(Baghdad), August 23, 2004, p. 6, as translated by FBIS, August 23, 2004, internet.

 96. John F. Burns, “Shiites May Demand Lifting of Limits on Their Power,” 

New York Times, March 10, 2004, internet. Other Shi’ite leaders are more willing to 

compromise on the federalism issue, providing that Shi’ites in southern Iraq enjoy 

a similar form of autonomy as in the Kurdish regions.

 97. “Sunni Leader Says Autonomy Calls Dangerous,” The Jordan Times, July 11, 

2005, internet.

 98. “Iraq: Sectarian Riddles,” The Economist, February 12, 2005, p. 46, and 

Thanassis Cambainis, “Corruption Pervades Government in Basra,” Boston Globe, 

August 8, 2005, internet.
55

 99. On “Arabization” see George Packer, “The Next Iraqi War?” The New 

Yorker, October 4, 2004, pp. 67-68.

 100. See Babak Dehghanpisheh, “Rebels With a Cause,” Newsweek, June 21, 

2004, p. 56.

 101. If the United States could help Iraq destroy the Zarqawi network before 

the beginning of significant military withdrawals, this would be exceptionally 

useful. See Jean-Charles Brisard, Zarqawi: The New Face of Al-Qaeda, New York: 

Other Press, 2005, especially chapter 10.

 102. “US Holds Talks with Iraq Rebels,” BBC News: World Edition, June 26, 

2005, internet.

103. Iraqi Major General M. N. Naqishbande stated in an interview that 

fighting an insurgency while attempting to rebuild a shattered military was 

like attempting to rebuild an aircraft engine in flight. General Naqishbande, 

nevertheless, expressed confidence that all obstacles to rebuilding the military 

could be overcome. Interview with author (Terrill), March, 2, 2005, Istanbul, 

Turkey.

 104. Ellen Knickmeyer, “Shiites, Kurds Filling Ranks of Critical Security Forces 

in the Making,” Jordan Times, January 27, 2005, internet.

 105. Baghdad Al Sharqiyah Television, “Sunni Scholars Issue Fatwa Urging 

Iraqis to Join Army, Police,” April 1, 2005, as cited by FBIS, April 1, 2005, internet; 

Ellen Knickmeyer, “Sunnis Urged by Clerics to Join Military,” Washington Post, 

April 2, 2005, p. 14.

 106. Mohamed Al-Anwar, “Long and Winding Road,” Al Ahram Weekly, April 

7-13, 2005, internet.

 107. GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Preliminary Observations on Challenges in Transferring 

Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Military and Police, GAO-05-431T, Washington DC:, 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, March 2005, p. 4. For some interesting 

considerations on vetting and militias, see Anthony Cordesman, “Military Options 

in Iraq: Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” Washington DC: 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 18, 2005, pp. 8-9.

 108. “Interview with Former Iraqi Defense Minister Hazim al Sha’lan by 

Usamah Mahdi,” June 7, 2005, as cited in FBIS, June 7, 2005, internet; Mark Mazzetti, 

“U.S. Sees Iraqi National Guard as the Ticket Home,” Los Angeles Times, August 

21, 2004, internet; John J. Lumpkin, “Poor Recruiting Plagues Police,” Washington 

Times, July 26, 2005, p. 19; Scott Johnson and Melinda Liu, “The Enemy Spies,” 

Newsweek, June 27, 2005, internet.

 109. David Zucchino, “US Joins Old Foes To Build New Iraqi Army,” Los 

Angeles Times, March 21, 2005, internet; Neil Barnett and Milan Vesely, “Chaos, 

Despair & Unthinkable Options,” The Middle East, November 2004, p. 10.

 110. John Burns, “10 Sunnis Suffocate in Iraqi Police Custody,” New York Times, 

July 13, 2005, internet.
56

 111. Michael Georgy, “Hope for Future Hinges on Special Forces,” Jordan 

Times, February 23, 2005, internet.

 112. A number of key observers have noted serious problems with the 

motivation level of Iraq military and security forces. According to a December 19, 

2004, statement by Senator John Warner (VA), “The raw material [Iraqi recruits] is 

lacking in the willpower and commitment after they receive this training to really 

shoulder the heavy responsibilities.” See “U.S. May Add Advisors to Aid Iraq’s 

Military,” New York Times, January 4, 2005, internet.

 113. John Hendren, “U.S. to Overhaul Training of Iraqi Forces,” Los Angeles 

Times, January 20, 2005, internet.

 114. “Iraq General Kidnapped in Baghdad,” BBC News World Edition, April 5, 

2005, internet.

 115. Jeffrey Fillishman, “Beleaguered Iraqi Police Maintain Sense of Honor,” 

Los Angeles Times, May 25, 2005, p. 1. “Pentagon Admits Shortfalls in Training Iraqi 

Forces,” Jordan Times, September 22, 2004, internet.

 116. Eric Schmitt, “Iraqi Army is About to Add National Guard to its Ranks,” 

New York Times, February 24, 2005, internet.

 117. “U.S., Coalition Partners Work to Stand Up Iraqi Air Force,” Inside the Air 

Force, July 29, 2005, p. 3.

 118. Most Middle Eastern nations include combat and transportation helicopters 

as part of their Air Force rather than as a separate Army aviation branch.

 119. Steve Fainaru, “Large Blast Hits Bus Carrying Iraqi Soldiers,” Washington 

Post, April 6, 2005, internet.

 120. Joseph Curl, “Bush Hails Recruitment in Iraqi Security Forces,” Washington 

Times, April 24, 2005, internet.

 121. “Heroes Wanted,” The Economist, June 18, 2005, p. 23.

 122. Oliver Poole, “Iraqi Forces Desert Posts as Insurgent Attacks Are Stepped 

Up,” London Daily Telegraph, April 25, 2005, p. 1.

 123. Robert Burns, “Intimidation is Eroding Iraqi Forces, General Says,” 

Philadelphia Inquirer, February 5, 2005, internet.

 124. Karl Vick, “Iraqi Security Forces: Hunters and Hunted,” Washington Post, 

January 11, 2005, internet.

 125. Connie Cass, “General: 10 percent of Iraqi Forces Turned on U.S. During 

Attacks,” USA Today, April 22, 2004, p. 4.

 126. “Insurgents in Iraq Increasingly Target Top Government Officials and 

Military Recruits,” Daily Star, April 20, 2005, internet; Steve Fainaru, “Blast at Iraqi 

Recruiting Center Kills 21 as Insurgency Mounts,” Washington Post, February 9, 

2005, internet.
57

 127. “Defiantly, They Ignore the Bombs and Queue to Join the Iraqi Army,” 

London Daily Telegraph, July 25, 2005, internet; and Neil MacDonald, “Iraq: The 

Scourge of the Bombers,” Middle East International, July 22, 2005, p. 5.

 128. “Iraq’s Security Forces to get $2.2 billion Boost,” The Jordan Times, January 

12, 2005, internet.

 129. “Iraqi Forces Dying at Twice Rate of U.S.,” New York Times on the Web, 

March 11, 2005, internet.

 130. Walter Pincus, “Iraqi Forces are Better Trained, Study Says,” Washington 

Post, December 22, 2004, p. 20.

 131. The U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy are not facing the same type of recruiting 

crisis. Rather, each of these services has long waiting lists of potential applicants. 

See Dave Moniz, “Recruits Swamp Navy, Air Force,” USA Today, January 24, 2005, 

p. 1. 

 132. Eric Zorn, “Draft Rumors Blow Chill Wind over Campaign,” Chicago 

Tribune, October 5, 2005; Bill Getz and Roman Scarborough, “Inside the Ring,” 

Washington Times, November 12, 2004, p. 5.

 133. For a fuller explanation of this issue, see Record and Terrill, Iraq and 

Vietnam: Differences, Similarities, and Insights, pp. 47-54. Also see Richard A 

Lacquement, Jr., “The Casualty Aversion Myth,” Naval War College Review, Winter 

2004, pp. 38-57; Gail Gibson and Ellen Gamerman, “Support for War Depends on 

Promise of Final Victory,” Baltimore Sun, January 27, 2005, internet.

 134. Bill Nichols and Mona Mahmoud, “Support for Iraq War at Lowest Level,” 

USA Today, May 4, 2005, p. 1.

 135. Susan Page, “Poll: USA Doubts Iraq Success, But Not Ready to Give Up,” 

USA Today, July 27, 2005, p. 1.

 136. Ann Scott Tyson, “Army Having Difficulty Meeting Goals in Recruiting,” 

Washington Post, February 21, 2005, p. 1; Damien Cave, “For Recruiters, A Hard 

Toll From A Hard Sell,” New York Times, March 27, 2005, p. 1; Mark Mazzetti, 

“Recruiting Goals are in Harm’s Way,” Los Angeles Times, March 17, 2005, 

internet.

 137. Eric Schmitt, “Guard Reports Serious Drop in Enlistment,” New York 

Times, December 17, 2004, internet; Hal Bernton, “Officer Crisis Hits Army 

Reserve,” Seattle Times, December 9, 2004, p. 1. Also, for a variety of difficulties 

facing the Reserve Forces at this time, see Government Accountability Office, 

Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan is Needed to Address Army Reserve Personnel and 

Equipment Shortages, GAO-05-660, Washington DC: GAO, July 2005.

 138. Tom Bowman, “Army Worries About Quality,” Baltimore Sun, March 7, 

2005, p. 1; “Army National Guard Lowers Its Standards to Get Recruits,” Arizona 

Daily Star, April 24, 2005, internet. 

 139. According to Tom Bearden of the Public Broadcasting Service’s (PBS) 

“News Hour,” “Polls indicate that African Americans overwhelmingly oppose 
58

the war. Among African American youth, only 36 percent thought the war was 

justified, compared to 61 percent of white youths.” Transcript of “News Hour 

With Jim Lehrer,” PBS Television, May 12, 2005. Also see Richard Whittle, “Army 

Battling Steep Decline in Black Recruits,” Dallas Morning News, August 2, 2005, p. 

1. 

 140. As cited in Ann Scott Tyson, “Two Years Later, Iraq War Drains Military,” 

Washington Post, March 19, 2005, p. 1.

 141. Jon R. Anderson, “Army Experiments with Raising the Maximum Age for 

Reserve Recruits,” European Stars and Stripes,” March 20, 2005, internet; “Needed: 

More Soldiers, More Billions,” Newsweek, July 12, 2004.

 142. James W. Crawley, “Commandos Leaving in Record Numbers,” WinstonSalem Journal, July 30, 2005, p. 1; Dave Moniz, “Soldiers Re-Enlist Beyond U.S. 

Goal,” USA Today, July 18, 2005, p. 1.

 143. For arguments that the overwhelming majority of the U.S. population is 

sheltered from the war and does not really honor military service beyond very 

shallow gestures, see Uwe E. Reinhardt, “Who’s Paying for Our Patriotism?” 

Washington Post, August 1, 2005, p. 17; Mark Shields, “Whose Shared Sacrifice?” 

CNN.COM, July 11, 2005, internet.

 144. Ann Scott Tyson, “Two Years Later, Iraq War Drains Military,” Washington 

Post, March 19, 2005, internet. Also see Andrea Stone and Dave Moniz, “Worn-Out 

Army Equipment to Cost U.S.,” USA Today, January 26, 2005, p. 7. 

 145. Peter Spiegel, “US Sees Coalition Allies Step Up Pace of Pull-Out,” London 

Financial Times, January 27, 2005, internet; Associated Press, “Ukrainian Parliament 

Wants Force Out of Iraq,” Washington Post, January 12, 2005, internet; Associated 

Press, “Poland to Cut its Troops in Iraq in Mid-February,” December 15, 2004, 

internet.

 146. Nick Childs, “Iraq’s Strained Coalition,” BBC News, March 15, 2005, 

internet.

 147. “Iraq Pullout within Two Years,” BBC News: World Edition, April 17, 2005, 

internet.

 148. Alan Cowell, “Iraq Backlash May Affect Future Military Moves,” New 

York Times, May 4, 2005, internet.

 149. “Last Spanish Troops Leave Iraq,” BBC News: World Edition, May 21, 2004, 

internet.

 150. “Who’s Leaving Iraq?” The Christian Science Monitor, April 13, 2005, 

internet.

 151. Judy Dempsey, “Poland Sets Date for Iraq Pullout,” International Herald 

Tribune, April 13, 2005, internet; Warsaw Polish Radio, Text of Interview with 

National Defense Minister Jerzy Szmajdzinski, April 12, 2005, as cited by FBIS, 

April 12, 2005, internet. 
59

 152. “Australia Boosts Iraqi Deployment,” BBC News World Edition, February 

22, 2005, internet.

 153. On various political leaders who support such a timetable, see Marty 

Meehan, “Fix Schedule for U.S. Exit,” USA Today, February 4, 2005; “Gilchrest 

Joins Call for Announcing Iraq Withdrawal Plan,” Baltimore Sun, July 22, 2005, 

internet; “Facing Lagging Support, Bush Defends War in Iraq,” CNN.com, June 18, 

2005, internet; Liz Sidoti, “Some in Congress Talk of Iraqi Withdrawal,” Associated 

Press, January 28, 2005, internet; Kevin Whitelaw, “Hit by Friendly Fire,” U.S. 

News and World Report, June 27, 2005, internet.

 154. Bradley Graham, “No Stated Timetable, but Plenty of Goals,” Washington 

Post, February 17, 2005, p. 12.

 155. Edward N. Luttwak, “Iraq: The Logic of Disengagement,” Foreign Affairs, 

January/February 2005, p. 31.

 156. Tom Lasseter, “To U.S. Chagrin, Sadr Winning Hearts,” Philadelphia 

Inquirer, June 10, 2004, internet.

 157. See, for example, Lutwak, pp. 31-32.

 158. “Diverging Sunni Positions as Europe Protests Iraq War,” Jordan Times, 

March 20, 2005.

 159. “Call for Timetable a Religious Duty, National Right,” Al Basa’ir (Baghdad) 

April 6, 2005, as translated in FBIS, April 8, 2005 internet; “Diverging Sunni 

Positions as Europe Protests Iraq War.”

 160. Gwynne Dyer, “Iraq: Deadlock by Design,” Arab News, March 18, 2005, 

internet.

 161. “Sadr Says Iraq’s Political Process Legitimizes Occupation,” Jordan Times, 

June 8, 2005, p. 5.

 162. Trudy Rubin, “General Tries to Build New Iraqi Army,” Philadelphia 

Inquirer, January 23, 2005, internet.

 163. Walter Pincus, “Iraqi Forces are Better Trained, Study Says,” Washington 

Post, December 22, 2004, internet.

 164. Rich Scavetta, “In Iraq, 1st AD is ‘Improving the Foxhole’,” European Stars 

and Stripes, January 22, 2004, internet.

 165. James Glanz and William J. Broad, “Looting at Iraqi Weapons Plants Was 

Systematic, Officials Say,” New York Times, March 13, 2005, p. 1.

 166. Tim Ropley, “US and UK Reveal Plans to Set Up Bases in Iraq,” Jane’s 

Defense Weekly, April 30, 2003, p. 2.

 167. David R. Francis, “US Bases in Iraq: Sticky Politics, Hard Math,” The 

Christian Science Monitor, September 30, 2004, internet.

 168. “Full Text: Bush’s Iraq speech,” BBC News: World Edition, June 29, 2005, 

internet. For comments on the base issue as reflected in the speech, see Anthony 
60

H. Cordesman, “In his Speech, George W. Bush Sacrificed the Truth for Spin,” 

Daily Star, July 1, 2005, p. 1.

 169. Pat McDonnell Twair, “Syria: Bogeyman or Whipping Boy?” The Middle 

East, July 2005, p. 21. Also, for an exceptionally useful overview of regional 

attitudes toward the West, see Center for Strategic Studies, Revisiting the Arab 

Street: Research from Within, Amman, Jordan: CSS, University of Jordan, February 

2005.

 170. For a valuable critique of the neo-conservative views on obtaining bases 

in Iraq, see Record, Dark Victory, pp. 131-132.

 171. David R. Francis, “US Bases in Iraq: Sticky Politics, Hard Math,” Christian 

Science Monitor, September 30, 2004, p. 17. 

 172. See Adeed Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From 

Triumph to Despair, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003, 

chapters 8 and 9.

 173. See, for example, remarks by former Agriculture Minister Ahmad Dujaily 

(under the Iraqi monarchy) in John F. Burns, “For a Battered Populace, A Day of 

Civic Passion,” New York Times, January 31, 2005, p. 1. 

 174. In 2004 and 2005 trips to Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, Andrew Terrill 

consistently noted that the U.S. presence there was not a major political issue. 

Also see “U.S. to Expand Abu Dhabi Air Base,” BBC News: World Edition, May 14, 

2003, internet; “Qatar to host U.S. Command Centre,” BBC News: World Edition, 

September 16, 2002, internet.

 175. The Saudis, for example, publicly maintained that they did not allow 

their bases to be used for strikes against Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001-03, although 

the Afghanistan component of this argument is disputed by numerous journalist 

sources. See “Saudi Air Base Blow for U.S.,” BBC News: World Edition, September 

30, 2001, internet; “Saudis deny letting U.S. use Bases,” BBC News: World Edition, 

December 30, 2002, internet.