PLANNING FOR A PEACEFUL KOREA

Edited by

Henry D. Sokolski

February 2001
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ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface

 Nicholas Eberstadt ....................

Acknowledgements .....................

Introduction

 Henry D. Sokolski .....................

Chapter 1. Planning for a Peaceful Korea: A Report

 of the Korea Competitive Strategies Working Group

 Henry D. Sokolski .....................

Chapter 2. North Korea’s Strategy

 Stephen Bradner .....................

Chapter 3. The North Korean View of the Development

and Production of Strategic Weapons Systems

 Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr.,

 and Sharon A. Richardson ...............

Chapter 4. The Last Worst Place on Earth:

 Human Rights in North Korea

 Jack Rendler .......................

Chapter 5. China’s Goals and Strategies for the

 Korean Peninsula

 Eric A. McVadon .....................

Chapter 6. China’s Goals and Strategies for the

Korean Peninsula: A Critical Assessment

 Larry M. Wortzel .....................

Chapter 7. Japan’s Grand Strategy on the

Korean Peninsula: Optimistic Realism

 Victor D. Cha .......................

Chapter 8. Economic Alternatives for Unification

 Marcus Noland ......................

Chapter 9. Conventional Arms Control in Korea:

A Lever for Peace?

 Bruce William Bennett ..................

Working Group Participant List ..............

About the Contributors ...................

iii
PREFACE

Nicholas Eberstadt

As a new millennium dawns over the Korean peni

millenary hopes and expectations are very much in ev

among students of Korean affairs. Half a century aft

surprise attack that launched the Korean War, alm

decades into the continuing high-tension military st

that has followed the 1953 Korean War ceasefire, th

suddenly a pervasive and growing anticipation tha

tormented and divided nation may now be on the thr

of a new and momentous era: an era of genuine pea

which the “Cold War structure on the Korean penins

at last dismantled, and a reconciliation betwee

antagonist governments based in Pyongyang 

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) and 

(the Republic of Korea, or ROK) commences in earne

According to some influential voices in both Kore

the West, in fact, the advent of this remarkable new ti

Korea is already at hand—heralded by, and prefigu

the drama of recent events. In this exegesis, the yea

was Korea’s anno mirabilis. By this telling, the yea

marked by occasion after occasion that would once 

been judged impossible by observers of contemp

Korea. After all, the June 2000 Pyongyang summi

courteous, first-ever meeting between the chiefs of th

Koreas—was extraordinary, and entirely unpreced

North Korea’s subsequent proposal (first report

Russia’s president) to shelve its program of ballistic 

tests if other countries would launch the DPRK’s sat

was, for the DPRK, also unparalleled. The specta

North and South Korean soldiers working conjoint

their respective sides of Korea’s “demilitarized zon

reestablish the long-severed rail link between Seou

Pyongyang—as they were indeed doing later i

year—would have been unthinkable even months b

v
And with the Norwegian Nobel Committee’s award 

year 2000 Peace Prize to ROK President Kim Dae Ju

his work for “peace and reconciliation with North Ko

particular,” respected and far-removed elements 

international community registered their own jud

that something tremendously important and promisin

gathering on the Korean peninsula.

To one important contingent of students and state

the notion that contemporary Korea should be he

toward an epoch of peace is entirely unsurprising. Qu

contrary; to them, a peace breakthrough on the K

peninsula is the natural and perhaps even inev

consequence of the security policies they have advo

These are the proponents of what has variously been 

the “sunshine” or “engagement” approach to relation

the DPRK—an approach that maintains that it is po

to alter the DPRK’s menacing patterns of interna

behavior, and even the regime’s inner character, th

positive external inducements and rewards.

Since early 1998, when the Kim Dae Jung gover

was inaugurated, ROK policy toward the DPR

incarnated this theory; by 1999, with the coalesce

what came to be known as the “Perry Process

governments of both Japan and the United States b

de facto subscribers to the same theory, and joined 

experiment. Engagement theorists, both in the aca

and in government, hold that a fundamental chan

North Korea’s international behavior is in evidence 

that the change is attributable to the approach 

champion; and that further salutary changes c

expected the longer and more vigorously their pre

policies are pursued.

What fuels these theorists is easily grasped—

hazard is close by, one should always hope for the b

generation hence, historians may be better placed to 

the fruits of their theories—and the exertions these th

have occasioned—than are we today. From our prese

vi
vantage point, however, it may be well to emphasiz

the engagement theorists’ interpretation of current 

in the Korean peninsula is by no means the only one th

be drawn from those events—nor even necessarily th

compelling among competing explanations.

For all the understandable excitement that the 

turn in inter-Korean atmospherics has engendered

fact remains: that the North Korean government, up 

writing, has taken no concrete steps to lesse

conventional, nuclear, and ballistic capabilities to th

compatriots in the South, or South Korea’s allies a

And despite the high hopes invested in it by serious 

in many countries, the fact remains that the engag

theory is at heart curiously, indeed strikingly, ahist

Indeed, one would be hard pressed to offer a single his

example of a situation in which a lasting peace fram

has been constructed with a closed, repressive state 

manner that the engagement theory currently propo

build with the DPRK.

There is, of course, a first time for everything. Mill

thinkers steeped in the Judeo-Christian tradition 

always professed that the day will come when the wol

dwell with the lamb (Isaiah 11:6); but that day, accord

their same teachings, will be the final day of h

history—when life on earth shall end, and reign 

eternal afterworld shall begin.

Modern-day Korea, to be sure, is hardly the first s

the globe where messianic notions have been embrace

incorporated into foreign policy. Throughout the 

statesmen and men of affairs have often been temp

romantic and even utopian visions in their cond

international relations. But in the international aren

pursuit of such temptations has consequences

unfortunately, the historical record suggests those pu

have seldom contributed to the security and well-be

the populations in whose name they were undertake

vii
Moreover, despite the acclaim (and self-congratu

that the engagement theory has been accorded in 

quarters, there are already signs that the North K

policies informed by it have begun to sag under the we

their own internal contradictions. The engage

approach has reached an impasse, for it is now Pyong

turn to take steps in the envisioned Korean peace proc

For engagement policy merely to mai

credibility—much less to advance—it will be incu

upon the DPRK to make a major gesture, and so

recognize the right of the ROK to exist, for example

demobilize part of its enormous and offensively-

conventional military force; or to offer verifiable assu

that it is eliminating its multifaceted program f

development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

Any of these confidence-building initiatives, how

would require of the DPRK a total departure 

long-entrenched state practices—and a relinquishm

central regime priorities. Pyongyang has a

maintained that its claim to authority over the 

Korean people is absolute and non-negotiable; furt

has repeatedly emphasized that it regards military 

as its very key to survival.

Ordinarily, governments are not expected to ba

over their self-identified vital interests, much less 

them away. Yet this is precisely what the next phase 

engagement approach would seem to expect of the D

Little wonder that the engagement process, d

seemingly spectacular early headway, now looks to 

very stalled.

Like the millennium itself, the millennial mom

Korean security policy appears to be passing. Certa

should, at least for the sake of South Korea and her W

allies. Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington will all assure

better served by a less age-defying, and less other-w

approach to dealing with the North Korean threat.

viii
To be sustainable and effective, a strategy for 

threat reduction must begin by striving to grasp the 

motivations, external objectives, and military capabil

the North Korean regime—and must contin

unflinchingly facing the implications of those inquir

should carefully and deliberately move to lower W

vulnerability to North Korea’s diverse instrume

menace, while simultaneously denying Pyongyan

means by which to further perfect its techniqu

international military extortion. It should aim to anti

the manners and means by which Pyongyang might 

advantageous to create tension or promote conflict

prepare to press the regime in its own arenas of compa

disadvantage (such as economic performance and h

rights). 

No less important, a strategy for reducing the ex

threats posed by the North Korean regime must att

the complex particulars of constructing a sturdy re

security architecture for post-DPRK Korea. In the 

analysis, every one of the great powers of the Pacifi

United States, Japan, China, and Russia—could he

ROK in the great task of building peace and prosper

the Korean peninsula. By contrast, the DPRK—th

existing DPRK that we know today—has absolutely n

positive to contribute to such a project.

With the change of administrations in Washi

current U.S. policy toward North Korea will nat

undergo review and scrutiny. The essays in this v

offer a distinct alternative to the current engag

approach. These authors collectively suggest the outl

a strategy for promoting peace and security in the K

peninsula manifestly sounder than the ones contem

or implemented by Washington in recent years.

Peace and freedom in Korea, as this volume unders

can be treated as a practical strategic objective, on

policymakers need not rely on miracles to attain.

ix
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Edited volumes, as a rule, involve a relatively larg

of characters, and this volume is no exception. In addi

the volume’s various authors, this book benefited fro

guidance and support of Nicholas Eberstadt of Ha

University; Andrew Marshall, director of the Office 

Assessment in the Pentagon; Dr. James Smith of th

Air Force’s Institute for National Security Studies; C

Joseph Cerami of the U.S. Army War College; an

Marianne Cowling of the Strategic Studies Institu

addition, the group leadership and participation 

David Blair of the Industrial College of the Armed F

Dr. Robert Dorff of the U.S. Army War College, and D

Carus of the Center for Counterproliferation Researc

critical to the conduct and success of the comp

strategies meetings held in June and July 2000.

Special thanks also are due to Marin Strmecki a

Smith Richardson Foundation, without whose suppo

project and the many activities of the Nonprolife

Policy Education Center (NPEC) would not be po

Finally, perhaps most important of all was the resear

editorial assistance this book and entire project re

from NPEC’s research coordinator, Ms. Marianne 

Without her help, nothing would have been accomp

With it, the efforts of everyone else were made whole

xi
INTRODUCTION

Henry D. Sokolski

The monographs in this book were all commissio

part of a year-long project sponsored by 

Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC), th

Air Force’s Institute for National Security Studies, a

U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute

were written to help three working groups de

strategies to curb the threat posed by North K

strategic weapons programs.

Central to these groups’ efforts was compe

strategies analysis. As detailed in an earlier Str

Studies Institute volume, Prevailing in a Well-A

World, this approach requires analysts to examine fou

of questions. Stephen Bradner in his monograph, “

Korea’s Strategy” (Chapter 2 of this volume), examin

first three sets of questions. These concern what 

strategic assumptions and goals are, who the like

third actors are, and what strategies would make th

sense for each party to pursue. The last set of que

concerns what the relative costs and risks might be 

alternative strategies devised. These questions 

discussed in consultations with experts and gover

officials after the working groups made their fin

regarding the first three sets of questions.

The groups’ final report, which is this volume’

chapter, has received a good deal of attentio

recommendations concerning U.S. nuclear and 

cooperation with North Korea were detailed in The 

Wall Street Journal and The Washington Post and we

highlighted in The New York Times, USA Today

Aviation Week. More important, the report caugh

attention of senior-level officials within the 

Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, an

xiii
Defense Department, all of whom asked for and re

private briefings on the report.

This volume, of course, consists of more than ju

working groups’ final report. In addition, it includes 

the research that NPEC and the Institute for Na

Security Studies commissioned to prepare the w

groups. Some of this analysis, such as Stephen Bra

monograph on North Korea’s strategy (Chapter 2), J

Bermudez’s and Sharon Richardson’s projection of 

Korea’s future strategic weapons efforts (Chapter 3

Jack Rendler’s monograph on human rights (Chapte

easily identifiable in the final report. However, the dif

analyses of China’s strategy toward Korea by Admira

McVadon and U.S. Army retired Colonel Larry W

(Chapters 5 and 6), Victor Cha’s study of Japan’s vi

Korea (Chapter 7), Marcus Noland’s analysis 

economic determinates of Korean unification (Chap

and the conventional arms control analysis of 

Bennett (Chapter 9) were just as critical to the work g

deliberations. Indeed, without them, the group would 

been unable to answer the competitive strategies que

necessary to produce the final report’s recomm

alternative strategies.

The hope in publishing these essays in a single vol

that they will provoke at least as much debate and refl

among their readers as they did for the working g

Indeed, any lay reader interested in the future of Eas

or analyst wanting to review current U.S. policies t

Korea will get more than a fair start with Planning 

Peaceful Korea.

xiv
CHAPTER 1

PLANNING FOR A PEACEFUL KOREA

A REPORT OF THE

KOREA COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES

WORKING GROUP

Henry D. Sokolski

With the major changes that Korea has seen in the 

months, a natural question is whether or not there re

any need to develop a new long-term Korea strategy. 

things going well enough?

Certainly, the contrast of events before and afte

2000 is striking. Despite years of rhetorical acr

against South Korea and the United States, the two 

met in June, and Kim Jong Il agreed that the U.S. pr

in South Korea was useful. In January, Kim J

threatened to launch another new long-range missil

could hit the United States, the Taepo Dong II. Y

October, he offered to end all further development o

missiles in exchange for U.S. assistance in laun

peaceful North Korean satellites. Earlier this year, 

Korean military training activities reached record 

yet this fall saw the first series of high

military-to-military talks on threat reductions be

North and South Korea. North Korea, meanwhil

sought admission to the World Bank, has norm

relations with Italy and Australia, and is seeking to 

same with key members of the European Union.

One cannot ignore these events. Yet, recognizin

improved atmosphere they have wrought begs the qu

of why they have taken place and continue to occu

because the North Korean leadership believes their co

can tolerate more political and cultural infiltration 

1
they thought it could before? Or is North Korea s

engaging, as it has before, in strategic deception aim

placing the United States, South Korea, and Japan in 

new form of diplomatic disadvantage? North Korea’s 

have changed, but has it changed its strategic goals? 

North abandoning its aim of perpetuating its peculiar 

of cult communism? Has it begun to pursue more mo

military goals?

Unfortunately, with the possible exception of the 

Korean leadership, nobody knows for sure. Even 

Koreans are debating the merits of their new Sun

policy. Opposition party figures argue that South 

should return to the diplomacy of reciprocity. Kim 

Jung’s supporters, meanwhile, do not claim that their 

has succeeded in turning the North away from its h

tyrannical ways. They argue only that over time

concessionary diplomacy toward the North will help 

such change.

This, then, suggests that the United States and it

Asian allies will have to hedge their bets. There m

cause for optimism. But progress on North Korean str

weapons proliferation, military intimidation, human 

abuses, and the implementation of prior agreements 

still be pursued, much as they were before—with pla

and a good deal of vigilance.

Overview.

This report is the result of 2 years of planning, 

year’s worth of commissioned research, an

participation of over 40 East Asian and we

proliferation experts and policymakers from Capito

and the Executive Branch.

What makes it different is its use of compe

strategies analysis. Instead of focusing on current e

the working group used competitive strategies anal

anticipate the challenges and opportunities the U

2
States and its East Asian allies would face regardi

Korean Peninsula over the next 10 to 20 years. Rathe

focus first on how the United States and its allies 

cooperate with North Korea, the group reviewe

competing aims and strategies North Korea and 

might have regarding the Peninsula’s future.

Finally, the group tried to develop alternative long

strategies that would do more than address cu

weaknesses in U.S. and allied efforts to secure peace 

region. In specific, the group tried to propose how the U

States and its allies might leverage their compa

strengths in new ways against the enduring weakne

North Korea and other competing actors in East Asi

idea here was to first discover what peaceful compe

the United States and its allies might engage in and t

win those competitions in a manner that would unde

Pyongyang’s most offensive behavior.

The group offered three specific long

recommendations: 

First, the United States and its allies should do m

clarify how they might develop their advantag

advanced conventional arms against North K

Pyongyang’s interest in acquiring strategic we

capabilities, after all, is rooted in its belief that 

weapons capabilities are all it needs to checkm

U.S.-allied conventional response to North Korean m

threats. By not clarifying how much more the United 

and allies can do to execute their declared conven

counterstrike strategy against North Korean provoca

the United States and its allies are encouraging 

Korea to believe it is correct.

Second, to ensure their long-term nonprolife

policies are effective, the United States and its allies 

do more to oppose Pyongyang’s illiberal, militant ru

violation of its own citizens’ human rights. Almo

nonproliferation victories to date (e.g., in South A

Ukraine, Argentina, and Brazil) were occasioned 

3
transition to liberal self-rule. The most worr

proliferators, meanwhile, include nations hostile to 

liberalism (e.g., Iran, Iraq, Libya, China, Syria, 

Korea). Thus, besides being morally dubious, U.S

allied reluctance to work with others to get Pyongy

improve its human rights record is likely to unde

genuine nonproliferation.

Finally, the l994 Agreed Framework nuclear r

deal and the recent space launch cooperation offer nee

modified lest they complicate the long-term prospe

nonproliferation. First, tying nuclear inspection

dismantlement to the promised reactors’ construct

only likely to produce delay. Yet, having these large re

operate in North Korea is also dangerous from a n

proliferation standpoint. As such, it would make far 

sense to replace at least one of the reactors w

nonnuclear power plant. There are similar concern

the proposed space launch cooperation deal. Here, ag

would make sense to offer the civilian benefits of sa

technology (e.g., space imagery, space navigationa

communications services) rather than space l

services, which necessarily involve access to the know

to launch intercontinental-range payloads.

Each of these findings along with the analysis the

based upon is presented below.

Key Assumptions.

In assessing what ought to guide U.S. and 

strategies regarding Korea, the group reached the fol

conclusions: Any U.S. or allied strategy toward North 

for deterrence or cooperation is most likely to be effec

it assumes that North Korea and, at times, Chin

Russia are engaged in a competition with the United S

Japan, and South Korea over the fate of Korea.

The United States and its allies should assume th

outcome of this competition is vital to the peac

4
prosperity of the entire region. In fact, miscalculations 

serve as a catalyst for a strategic military rivalry be

Japan and China that could conceivably go nucl

ballistic and revitalize major military power compe

beyond the Peninsula. On the other hand, if pr

managed, this competition could result in the pe

unification of Korea on terms acceptable to both the K

people and the nations in the region. The fate of h

rights, democracy, and peace for the entire region is 

how this competition is conducted. Any strategy t

unacceptable to South Korea or Japan under

America’s ability to work with its close allies to levera

behavior and thinking of China, Russia, and North K

Agreement on these points and reliance on comp

strategies analysis influenced how the group went ab

development of alternative strategies. For one thin

group saw the most urgent U.S.-Korean concerns

North Korean development of nuclear and m

capabilities—as symptoms of much more basic fa

These factors included:

• the Kim regime’s (or clan’s) uncompromising de

stay in power,

• the political threat that true political and eco

reform presents to the Kim regime’s maintena

its control,

• the imperative of sustaining the myth that th

regime is superior to all others and the conse

requirement for high levels of isolation from the 

and other cultures,

• the North’s fear that eventual unification wi

South will come at the expense of the continued 

the Kim regime,

• the importance of the military to keeping th

regime in power and preventing the forces of pe

5
coexistence with Seoul from undermining the r

and

• the Kim regime’s recent efforts to use its off

military capabilities (including its missil

nuclear capabilities) to help persuade the o

world to provide the food, fuel, and foreign c

necessary for its short-term survival, witho

necessity of making fundamental politic

economic reforms.

Thus, North Korea’s recent seemingly schizoid beh

North Korea prepares to launch a new interconti

ballistic missile, the Taepo Dong-2, but after U.S

Russian pledges to open trade and possibly pa

launching North Korean satellites, Pyongyang pu

launching the missile. North Korea continu

concentrate nearly 70 percent of its combat forces w

100 kilometers of the Demilitarized Zone (DM

increases its artillery and rocket launcher deployme

this zone. It augments its production of subma

missiles, aircraft, and artillery at record levels with

last year, increases the pace of military exercises, an

offers to meet with South Korea’s president 

history-making summit.

Korean Conventional and Strategic Weapons

Threats.

In fact, the group understood Pyongyang’s inter

developing strategic weaponry to be a logical extensio

conventional arms capabilities. Currently, Pyongyan

threaten the prompt destruction of Seoul, Korea’s l

concentration of population and wealth, with conven

arms alone. In addition, its military could attac

establish a modest foothold on or near the DMZ. Its ab

sustain such operations for a long period of time or to 

its conventional forces further to the south, howev

negligible. In fact, South Korean and U.S. air forces co

counted upon to establish air superiority fairly qu

6
allowing their planes to demolish any visible North K

land convoys headed south. In the longer term, the b

of U.S. forces in Korea could be used to push ba

outflank any North Korean incursion.

The North Koreans clearly understand this. 

certainly do not need long-range missiles with nu

chemical, or biological (NBC) warheads to destroy Se

to make a military-diplomatic land grab along the 

They do, however, need such weaponry to de

complicate any allied counteroffensive. South Korea

Japanese airfields and ports critical to reinforce U.

South Korean forces are all vulnerable to missile at

Certainly, the pace of reinforcements could be slowe

crawl if any of these logistical nodes were hit with 

warheads. More important, both U.S. and Japanese of

would have to think long and hard about backin

military reinforcement of South Korea if it risked h

U.S. or Japanese territories struck by long-range 

Korean missiles.

These concerns have gotten the bulk of attention a

U.S. and allied military analysts. Yet, the op

point—that without its massive offensively dep

conventional forces, North Korea’s deployment of str

weaponry makes far less military sense—has received 

attention. For this reason, research was commission

what kinds of conventional arms reductions efforts 

make sense to propose to the North Koreans. Certain

issue of conventional force reductions would have 

tackled as a part of any Korean unification effort. The

is doubt whether North Korea would have to make th

reductions. 

That said, most members of the working group 

uneasy about proposing anything specific at this time

key concern was the fear that any proposal would re

undesirable reductions of U.S. forces currently deplo

Korea. As the Perry Report emphasized, any withdra

U.S. forces now would undermine the ability of the U

7
States and its allies to deter a North Korean attack. 

the group did find to be curious, however, was the lack 

serious ongoing study of the complicated i

surrounding force reductions even in the govern

contractor community. Many of these issues were ide

in the commissioned research.

In lieu of proposing conventional arms control a

time, the group agreed that the United States was not 

enough to neutralize North Korea’s military strate

essence, this strategy consists of two elements. The 

the offensive deployment of North Korea’s conven

forces for a short-range surprise attack. The second 

acquisition of long-range strategic weapons capab

that could threaten rearward U.S. and allied staging 

to disrupt and deter any effective allied counterstri

date, the United States and its allies have fo

diplomatically on efforts to get North Korea to prom

to deploy further strategic weapons capabilities. 

efforts have produced mixed results.

The working group concluded that the United Stat

its allies need to do much more to dissuade North 

from concentrating its conventional forces so close 

DMZ. In the case of a North Korean attack across this 

the United States currently has a declared strat

counterstriking deep behind the line of battle a

Pyongyang. Clearly, North Korean military planners 

believe the United States is serious about implem

this plan. Why else would the North deploy nea

percent of its offensive ground forces within 65 miles 

DMZ? This not only makes any outflanking maneuv

allied forces much easier, it leaves strategic rearward 

such as Pyongyang much more vulnerable to attack.

If we are serious about reducing South K

vulnerability and reducing North Korea’s incenti

acquire and brandish strategic weaponry, then Wash

and Seoul, in the group’s view, need to make their c

military strategy much more credible.

8
Recommendation: Clarify What Our Military

Strategy Against Pyongyang Requires.

In specific, the group agreed that the United Stat

its allies must clarify precisely what military capab

are needed to implement the current strategy to add

North Korean attack against South Korea. The grou

concurred that the United States and its allies n

identify better what North Korean actions might pu

strategy (and its variants) into play. Towards this en

working group created a military task force to identify 

basic military capabilities, if acquired, would he

United States and its allies persuade North Ko

redeploy its existing forces in a more defensive m

Among the capabilities the military task force ide

were:

• Dispersed and offshore logistics capabilities, 

with stealth technology and deception operatio

reduce U.S. and allied reliance on large lo

facilities, air bases, and ports that are nat

vulnerable to missile attack.

• Deception operations and stealth technolo

conceal rapidly deployable allied maneuver for

• Long-range, precision-strike systems, incl

long-range bombers and fighters; long-du

unmanned air vehicles and missiles; ste

mine-resistant amphibious and arsenal 

integrated C3I systems, and the enhanced-let

precision-guided munitions necessary to laun

effective deep strike against North Korea at re

levels of vulnerability to North Korean air d

and anti-shipping systems.

• Information warfare and tailored munitions di

at North Korea’s targeting systems and off

command structure.

9
• Public information campaigns focused in the U

States, ROK, and Japan to highlight the m

technological dominance noted above.

Clearly, if the United States and its Asian allie

these military capabilities today, it would make 

Korea’s continued forward deployment of so much 

conventional forces near the DMZ untenable. Indeed

with such allied military capabilities, North Korea 

have to redeploy much of its forward forces further 

simply to protect Pyongyang against a possible 

counter strike. Beyond this, Pyongyang would have to 

even more on new air and sea defense capabilities—m

that it otherwise might have spent on more off

weaponry. Finally, all of this might be accomplished 

reducing the footprint of U.S. forces based in Japa

South Korea—something that would make them 

vulnerable to both military and domestic political at

The potential value of these military fixes, how

comes at a cost. The first is financial: all of these capab

are largely beyond the immediate procurement plans 

United States, Japan, or South Korea and would 

cheap. The second is political and military: unless pr

orchestrated, allied efforts to procure these capab

might be misread as an offensive effort aimed prim

against Beijing. This, in turn, might produce an 

rivalry that the United States and its allies would no

to pursue.

The working group’s military task force was consc

these dangers. At the same time, they believed th

military dangers attendant upon a failure to bolste

and allied military strategy against a possible 

Korean attack were quite real. Their recommend

therefore, was to play to America’s comparative adva

in military innovation but to do so with the 

participation of the Chinese military.

10
Specifically, the group recommended that the U

States invite Chinese military officials to a series of m

war games focused on scenarios involving possible U.

allied responses to different types of North Korean a

against South Korea. These games could usefully

• be conducted at U.S. military service schools,

• highlight the range of damage that U.S. and 

Korean forces could inflict in a varie

counterstrikes against a North Korean a

against, or strikes into, South Korea,

• be conducted on the basis of what might happe

15 years out factoring in the use of advanced m

technologies,

• nclude exercises to demonstrate to China and 

key regional players the challenges they woul

with refugee control and humanitarian assi

operations, 

• llow the Chinese representatives to express 

concerns, and

• involve allied representatives as appropriate.

These games would have several objectives. Firs

would help identify what new programs and oper

were required to implement U.S. and allied strategy, 

would in turn help bring them into being. Second, they 

serve to impress upon the Chinese the seriousness 

U.S. and allied commitment to South Korea’s secu

perspective which the Chinese could then convey to of

in North Korea.

With any luck, the North Koreans might reconside

current course. One would hope that the United 

could at least force a debate within North Korea abo

risks of simply building up offensive forces along the 

backed by the further development of nuclear, che

11
biological, and long-range missile capabilities. F

these games would give the United States and its 

direct access to and influence on Chinese thinking on 

and related Korean matters.

Strategic Weapons Proliferation and the North

Korean Regime.

In the midterm, getting more serious about the m

competition on the Korean Peninsula should help b

deterrence. In fact, the Perry Report’s “Fifth Key 

Recommendation” was for the United States and its a

“approve a plan of action prepared for dealing wi

contingency of DPRK provocations.” The Perry Repor

on to note that “these responses should make it clear 

DPRK that provocative actions carry a heavy penalty

Perry Report placed special emphasis on the need to d

responses to possible “provocations in the near term

the clarification exercises the working group recomm

clearly could be made a part of this effort.

This should help in the near and midterm. In th

run, however, the cause of nonproliferation can be sus

only with a significant moderation in the North K

regime itself. In dealing with current events, the 

Report may be right: We must deal with North Korea 

is, not as we might wish it to be.” But for the period th

working group was considering—the ne

decades—regime questions are important. This is n

because we “wish” things to be different in Pyongyan

because we know that most of the worst proliferators

Libya, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and China—have, like 

Korea, been hostile to human rights. More importa

know that the clearest nonproliferation victories

South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, and Ukraine—all 

with these nations’ movement away from illiberal r

one is serious about promoting lasting nonprolifer

then indifference to these matters is a mistake.

12
It was for this reason that research was commissio

examine the issue of North Korean human rights and 

the United States and its allies might do too improve 

Several points emerged from this research and w

group discussions. First, the ability of the United Stat

its allies to work within North Korea to change the re

behavior is limited. On the one hand, overt, unhin

access to North Korea is not now possible. Covertly try

overthrow the Kim regime, on the other hand, 

unrealistic. 

With this in mind, the working group focused on 

could be done to influence North Korean behavior 

outside its borders. Speaking out at the appropriate U

Nations (UN) forums on human rights was considere

the minimum. Currently, the United States is quite 

about abuses in China at these forums; yet it is vir

silent at these same venues regarding North K

transgressions. Beyond this, the group agreed th

United States and its allies should conditio

humanitarian aid upon the proper monitoring 

distribution and that it should be given in-kind rathe

in currency. As for international loans, these too sho

made contingent upon measurable improvement in 

Korea’s protection of its citizens’ human rights. Final

group concurred that the liberal democracies o

region—South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philip

Australia, New Zealand, etc.—should promote the f

spread of liberal democracy and spotlight the shortco

of states such as North Korea.

That said, the group understood that these mea

were unlikely to have an immediate impact. There al

disagreement about the value of increasing trad

commerce with North Korea. Most thought trade co

used to open up North Korea, yet nearly as many feare

trade would be conducted in a concessionary manne

would only bolster the existing regime.

13
However, one idea highlighted in the commis

research did seem actionable. It concerned the incr

number of North Korean refugees fleeing to Chin

Russia. Currently, there are between 100,000 and 20

North Korean refugees living in China and a much s

number who have fled to Russia. The upper 

represents nearly one percent of North Korea’s 

population. 

These North Koreans flee their country at great pe

risk. First, they must elude or bribe North Korean 

guards. Then, they must do the same with the C

authorities or risk arrest. It is estimated that of 

arrested in China in l999, approximately 7,000 (i.e., 

ten percent of the new arrivals) were forcibly repatria

North Korea. In March 2000 alone, Chinese authorit

believed to have forced 5,000 refugees back to North 

All of these repatriations violate international h

rights agreements China has signed or ratified.

If the United States and its allies are serious 

promoting genuine, lasting nonproliferation in Kore

essential that they promote greater North Korean res

human rights and of enlightened government. I

regard, the working group agreed that one of the 

promising opportunities was to persuade China and R

to uphold their international obligations prohibiting 

repatriations.

Recommendation: Encourage China and Russi

to Repatriate Korean Refugees.

One sure way to encourage North Korea to treat i

citizens better is to reduce the risks for its citizen

choose to leave North Korea. In fact, China has sig

ratified a number of international agreements that pr

forced repatriations. It has violated all of them. 

agreements include:

14
• The United Nations Convention on the Sta

Refugees, Article 33 of which prohibits forced 

of refugees when there is a serious risk that this 

result in a further violation of their human rig

• The Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 

requires close cooperation with the Office of th

High Commissioner for Refugees,

• The Convention Against Torture, Article 3 of 

prohibits the forcible repatriation when the

grounds to believe repatriated parties wou

subject to torture, and

• The Convention on Civil and Political Rights, 

makes the freedom to leave one’s country a legal 

China, for its part, is not eager to adhere to 

agreements. Its biggest concern is that stopping fo

repatriation of North Korean refugees might enco

more North Koreans to flee to China. As it is, Chin

difficulty sustaining employment in Manchuria for i

citizens and can hardly afford an influx of addi

mouths and labor.

The United States and its allies should work pri

with China to see if they can help to address these con

Western aid and investments in Manchuria mig

offered to help China cope with the problems North K

refugees present. Arrangements to relocate North K

refugees to locations outside of China might also be 

quietly. A similar effort might be made to addre

smaller numbers of refugees fleeing to Russia.

Nuclear and Space Cooperation and Proliferat

Although the working group avoided debating the 

of current policy, one program, the Agreed Framew

l994, kept intruding into the group’s deliberations

reason why was simple. Although the original arrang

15
was supposed to be completely implemented by 2003, 

is clear that the promised reactors may not come o

anytime before 2010 or later. This is well into the peri

working group was assigned to consider.

More important, it is the Agreed Framework, mor

any other U.S. and allied effort, that the future of 

Korea’s known nuclear production facilities is tied 

long as North Korea believes it is in its interest to upho

deal, the operation of these facilities—a small reactor 

large reprocessing plant—will remain frozen. On the 

hand, it is only when a significant portion of th

promised reactor is completed that North Korea mus

into full compliance with its International Atomic E

Agency (IAEA) obligations. Nor is North Korea obliga

begin to dismantle its other declared nuclear fac

under the deal until construction of this reactor is finis

In fact, North Korea is free to pull out of the A

Framework at any time. The same is true of the U

States and those nations contributing financia

implement the deal. Supporters of the origina

emphasized that North Korea would have much more 

from withdrawal than the United States and its allies 

it would forfeit either completion of the reactors (wort

$5 billion) or their continued fueling. Yet, 7 years late

eventuality is no longer so clear.

Indeed, in the nuclear area, the two things Pyong

military nuclear planners need most are what the A

Framework supplies. First it affords a vast increase 

number of nuclear technicians (under the deal South 

must train approximately 1,000 North Koreans in n

operations). Second, it supplies a massive expans

North Korea’s nuclear materials production base. 

what Pyongyang could produce in l994—one to two b

worth of plutonium a year—the two proposed m

U.S.-designed reactors, when completed, would exce

nearly two orders of magnitude (i.e., an annual prod

of between 75 to 150 bombs’ worth of material).

16
Compounding these concerns is an additional d

the l994 deal allows North Korea to delay dismantl

declared nuclear facilities until after the first of th

reactors (capable of making up to 75 bombs’ wo

material annually) is completed. Clearly, this puts 

Korea in a much more advantageous position with reg

possible withdrawal than the United States or its 

Pyongyang can withdraw at any time, resume n

weapons materials production with its declared fac

enjoy the advantage of more trained nuclear techn

and conceivably increase its plutonium production wi

of the two promised reactors by a factor of 30 or mor

All of this suggests that tying nuclear inspection

dismantlement to the completion of two modern reac

a risky proposition. At a minimum, the l994 deal is 

leveraged to secure dismantlement. Supporters of th

who are anxious to keep the United States and South 

engaged in talks with the North tend to downplay 

concerns. Yet, because of technical and legal challenge

those building the reactors would face, in the long ru

unclear if this project will serve or undermine the ca

North-South cooperation. A partial listing of 

difficulties include:

• The reactors cannot be built without the export 

nuclear items, the shipment of which to North 

(a known violator of international nu

safeguards) would require a controversial wa

U.S. nuclear control laws.

• The only legal way the U.S. president could 

these laws is to secure a complex bilateral n

cooperative agreement with North Korea

negotiation of which he has not yet begun.

• The required IAEA inspections of the North (

will require 2-3 years of unhindered access to 

Korea) have not yet been agreed to by North 

and cannot be performed in time to allow the re

17
to be built anytime near the revised 2007 constr

target date.

• North Korea lacks the nuclear regulatory backg

sufficient to license and properly oversee th

construction and operation of the plants and h

way to insure against nuclear accidents (which 

participating nuclear contractors danger

exposed).

• North Korea’s electrical distribution system (

consists in part of buried iron wires) will have 

rebuilt (at a cost of as much as $1 billion) to be a

effectively move the massive amounts of elec

the reactors would generate and to assur

reactors’ safe operation. To date, no one has st

up to this task.

• To prevent a breakdown of North Korea’s ele

grid (which consists of both North Korea’s ele

distribution system and the power plants conne

it) that would jeopardize the safe operation of t

planned reactors. Pyongyang would have to bri

10 times more electricity on line than it curre

producing. Otherwise, the one or two gigawa

electricity the two reactors would generate 

overwhelm (i.e., disrupt the smooth operation o

a fully upgraded electrical distribution sy

Assuming a price of $1 billion per gigawatt of 

installed electrical capacity, this would 

somewhere between $10 and $20 billion add

dollars and take many years to accomplish. A

part of this grid upgrading, North Korea would 

to develop an unprecedented, massive increase 

consumption and demand for electricity.

• Finally, there is the economic friction that con

pursuit of the reactor project is likely to produce

worry was driven home recently in an analysi

18
for the organization responsible for building th

reactors, the Korean Energy Develop

Organization (KEDO) by Bradley Babson, the 

Bank’s senior advisor on North Korea. As Mr. B

pointed out, “If the nuclear plant project suppor

KEDO was subjected to a normal World Bank p

evaluation and appraisal, it would get an F

reason why, he explained, was that North K

capacity to generate and distribute electricity w

too meager to absorb the output of even one 

proposed one-gigawatt power reactors. Thus, on

plants were completed, North Korea would not b

to sell sufficient electricity to repay the intere

loan it assumed to fund the reactors’ construct

All of these factors, then, raise the question of wh

would ever build the nuclear reactors in the first pla

fact, in l997, the South Korean press reported 

Pyongyang was well aware of these points back in l99

actually requested of its South Korean counterpart

one of the generating stations be nonnuclear. Whe

story ran in Seoul, and junior officials confirmed it, 

U.S. officials quickly denied it. But the point lingers

can’t complete the reactors and Pyongyang needs ele

power, would it not be more sensible to make at lea

first of the power stations nonnuclear and to tie the n

inspections and dismantlement called for in the A

Framework to this first nonnuclear power sta

completion? Alternatively, KEDO could offer to re

North Korea’s existing electrical grid so it could ta

more power as its economy grew.

As for its interest in space satellites, North Korea 

more of a civilian requirement for these or space l

services than it does for nuclear electricity. A case mi

made for its gaining access to the services satellites 

provide—e.g., imagery and communications. Yet, se

such services from the United States would be far ch

and vastly superior to whatever peaceful civilian be

Pyongyang might secure from launching its own 

19
satellites (even if the United States and its allies pa

such launches). Offering satellite services in lieu of fu

space launch also would avoid the risk of helping 

Korean military planners secure the one thing they l

perfect an intercontinental ballistic missile—a wo

upper stage.

In fact, this is precisely the kind of technolog

reported U.S. deal would be primed to provide

impossible to launch a North Korean satellite proper

orbit without developing an upper stage that c

appropriately mated to it. Under the deal currently 

discussed, however, it is a North Korean satellite th

be launched. Because Pyongyang will be dictating the 

volume, weight, and fragility of the satellite being lau

it will dictate the precise kind of upper stage nee

launch it. Is there any way to prevent North Korea 

specifying a satellite that would require a reliable ver

the upper stage used in its frightening (and n

successful) August l998 launch attempt that flew 

Japan? What of preventing Pyongyang from spec

some other satellite that would require an upper stag

it could then use on its more advanced Taepo D

launcher? Sadly, once one helps North Korea laun

satellites, discussions between its technicians an

satellite launch service provider over the specifics 

satellite to be launched and the design characteristics 

launcher and upper stage are unavoidable.

On this point, recent history is all too instructive. 

United States could not prevent China from gainin

information from U.S. space contractors and Russia 

not live up to its pledges to block such technology from 

to India, the prospects of keeping North Korea 

securing such knowledge are slight. Nor does the op

using U.S. contractors to launch North Korean sat

(and trying again to keep these contractors from tre

into the gray areas of intangible technology sharing) a

all that attractive.

20
Finally, it should be noted that in their current form 

the nuclear and space deals risk straining the tril

alliance relationship among South Korea, Japan, a

United States. Specifically, the Japanese are worrie

both the nuclear and space deals are less in Tokyo’s in

than they are in Seoul’s or Washington’s. The n

project, after all, sustains the South Koreans’ Sun

policy and keeps its nuclear utilities from flound

financially. It also has helped keep the United State

having to take a riskier, tougher stance tow

Pyongyang’s nuclear program. As for the space launc

this too helps sustain South Korea’s Sunshine polic

costs Seoul little since it is not targeted by the Taepo 

missiles. And it certainly relieves Washington of pre

to deploy missile defenses.

The benefits of these deals, however, are not so c

Japan’s case. First, Tokyo must pay $1 billion towa

promised reactors’ completion with only part of this 

being spent on Japanese nuclear goods. Second, th

inspection and dismantling of North Korea’s de

nuclear facilities are tied to the completion of th

reactors, which may take 10 or more years. As such, J

key worry—a nuclear Korea—is a threat it must liv

for some time. Finally, a space cooperation dea

includes the Taepo Dong missiles, which might rea

United States, would address American concerns. Giv

conventional artillery threat South Korea already fa

may be possible to buy South Korean support for such 

by allowing Seoul to deploy SCUD-range missiles of i

design. Yet, if it excludes No Dong missiles tha

currently hit Japan, such a deal is only likely to stra

United States-Japan-South Korea relationship.

This, then, brings us to this report’s 

recommendation.

21
Recommendation: Demilitarize Proposed U.S.

Space and Nuclear Aid to Pyongyang.

Recently, Nulceonics Week reported that senior 

Japanese, and South Korean officials discussed the i

substituting a nonnuclear power plant for the first 

two promised reactors. South Korean officials objecte

making such a proposal at this late date might th

support for the Agreed Framework. It is worth notin

the objection was one of timing rather than subs

Eventually, for all the reasons noted above, the lo

returning to this idea will be compelling.

As for the space cooperation proposal, there ar

advantages to offering Pyongyang satellite services in

Perhaps the most important advantage is that the U

States could make sure that such shared ima

navigational, and communications services would 

used for military purposes. North Korea might r

detailed photos of South Korean bases, but lackin

peaceful civilian purpose, the United States and its 

could rightly deny the request. With satellite-

communications services, the United States or its 

might provide free access to existing transponders so l

communications were not encrypted. The United 

should also at least try to secure Japanese backing f

offer by making sure that missiles that can hit Japan

No Dongs—are somehow included in the deal as wel

Making these adjustments would not only elimina

potentially self-defeating aspects of the current deals

should help bolster the trilateral alliance relatio

among the United States, South Korea, 

Japan—something that the Perry Report itself speci

recommends. 

22
CHAPTER 2

NORTH KOREA’S STRATEGY

Stephen Bradner

The Setting.

Internationally unpopular, with a broken

infrastructure, a nutritionally deprived populat

stunted younger generation, and no evident mea

economic regeneration, North Korea, a half century af

foundation, exhibits an unprecedented condition 

modern, industrialized society with expanding weap

mass destruction (WMD) and long-range m

capabilities. Why did this happen? What, if anything, 

done about it? These are basic questions because th

the North got into this predicament tends to define an

their long-term strategic options as well as what they 

in the near to mid term to extricate themselves. All 

can be seen in context only if we give serious attention 

peculiar nature of the Kim family regime (KFR) an

political culture, which shapes Pyongyang’s

1

 str

conceptions.

2

 We will discuss the enduring characteris

the regime, the regime’s strategic options, the signif

of North Korea’s WMD and long-range missiles, w

many find it difficult to grasp the essence of the “K

system, and the serious policy dilemmas facing Wash

and Pyongyang.

Regime Characteristics and Limitations.

The centrality of the military mindset can har

overemphasized. Shaped by his early experience 

guerrilla fighter against the Japanese, Kim Il S

outlook was something like a cross between L

23
“fight-talk, fight-talk” dictum and the view expres

Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf that an organism which do

fight dies.

3

 For Kim, the economy was to produ

implements of war, the education to produce ca

soldiers, and the ideology to convince the population 

inevitability of war and the necessity for absolute obe

to a military leader who would ultimately be extolled 

point of infallibility.

Guerilla Dynasty by Adrian Buzo

4

 is an extremely 

work in which Buzo emphasizes the significance 

guerrilla mindset and revalidates and updates the in

set forth in the two-volume work, Communism in K

The following quotations from Volume II are pertine

Unquestioning loyalty and allegiance were the determinant

survival, and the “Party” took on an entirely military charac

discipline and hierarchy being interwoven with 

camaraderie of the small, determined—often desperate—ba

From guerrilla to governing party thus involved more a cha

of scope than a change of operational pattern or mind.

7

Kim’s regime was born and bred in absolute host

any political authority in the South. Simply, the So

held to be a U.S. colony, and Southern officials are view

nothing more than lackeys of their colonial masters. In 

than a half century, Pyongyang has never had any

good to say about Southern officialdom, and the gover

in the South has been seen as only one of many Sou

organizations, lacking any particular legitimacy 

government and treated for the most part as someth

be avoided, undermined, and, if possible, overthrown

The regime operates like a kind of combination re

cult-crime family gang. Resort to violence is common, 

summary executions, often for political incorrectness 

than substantive violation of law. The regime’s le

utilize gangland practices—counterfeiting, 

smuggling, extortion, kidnapping, and assassinatio

tools of state policy. And, as one might expect, they 

indifference to the welfare of ordinary citizens liv

24
their piece of turf, being concerned rather with h

maintain control and how to extract anything tha

contribute to their own security and comfort.

Undergirding the regime is a vast tissue of myt

fabrication.

8

 Kim Il Sung’s first great myth was that 

Kim and his guerrilla forces who expelled the Jap

from North Korea in 1945. Two other foundation myt

the contemporary North Korean society as “parad

earth” and the future unification of the peninsula 

Kim or his son Kim Jong Il. There is also, of course, the 

of Kim Jong Il’s birth on Paektu-san,

9

 and both Kim I

and his son are held to have thaumaturgical 

miracle-performing) power and links with 

supernatural.

10

Not surprisingly, therefore, the entire society m

kept in virtual isolation, because if isolation cann

maintained all these myths are likely to be challenge

undermined, with consequent severe damage to the 

system supporting the regime. Again not surprising

economy is failing because in a world with so much pr

for interconnectivity, it is difficult to manage an econ

any significant size in the relatively isolated mann

regime attempts.

Finally, as the regime does not brook the possib

compromise, it is locked into a zero-sum regime su

contest with its rival to the South. Why do we expe

competition to be zero-sum? First, because when we l

the major divided country scenarios of the past 2 cen

we see that they seem to turn out that way. With so 

water in between, the China-Taiwan scenario may tu

differently, but the cases of Yemen, Vietnam, Ge

twice, and America in the 19th century all seem to s

that while division may persist for what seems li

interminably long period, the forces for unity ultim

prove too strong.

When unity occurs, however, it does not come 

through a fair and balanced compromise respectin

25
preserving the interests and estates of the leaders

both sides. It’s not a case of “I’m all right—you’re all 

Rather, one side dominates, and it’s a case of “We’ll 

ordering, and you’ll do the obeying.” We witness a repe

of the ancient Athenian formula, “The strong do wha

can, and the weak suffer what they must,”

11

 with the 

of the suffering having a lot to do with the po

traditions of the piece of turf in question. When that p

Korea, it is reasonable to expect that the leaders o

losing side will not get the kind of generous treatmen

in the main, East Germany’s leaders received a decade 

Second, the two societies on opposite sides of K

demilitarized zone (DMZ) are profoundly different, i

close to antithetical. The approaches to politics, econ

education, jurisprudence, religion, and even the mean

life in North and South are very different. Northerne

taught to find the meaning of life in their devotion to 

“great leader.” The South has experienced periods of 

authoritarian rule to be sure, but at repeated c

junctures Southerners have clearly opted for what w

call the imperfect decency of democracy an

accountability of leadership rather than for the auto

model. As one Southerner was anonymously quoted 

press a few years back, “North Korea deifies its leade

throw ours in jail.” This is hardly an insignificant diff

and one which, we may be sure, is not lost on the lead

in the North. Moreover, it is very difficult to identi

significant feature of the Northern system w

Southerners could be expected to endorse—not the 

system, not their humanitarian accomplishments, n

success of the economic model, and certainly not the 

of political thought.

In sum, the trench dividing Korea is much deepe

wider than in the German case. The big boss o

Communist side is in Pyongyang, not in Moscow, a

Kim family ideology appears to be much closer to the 

Korean soul than communism was to the East Germa

Republic of Korea (ROK) news media cannot access 

26
Korea’s people outside the Kim family regime aud

there is nothing like the cross-border passage of a m

West Germans into the east prior to unification, and t

no common Korean experience comparable to the ef

build a modern, industrial, democratic society 

engaged the whole of Germany in the late 19th and 

20th centuries. Finally, and most important, Korea h

war that Germany was able to avoid.

The point of all this is that in spite of the co

cultural heritage prior to 1945, the differences be

North and South are profound, and it is difficult to im

how any policy crafted through the combined wisd

Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo can make them go aw

What the Regime Cannot Do.

Currently, there seems to be no particular rea

believe that Pyongyang’s leaders can either fix the 

Korean economy on their own or “join the world” f

rational choice—“soft landing options” of reconcil

reform, and opening that might bring about a fix. If b

landing” one means that the peninsular confrontatio

ultimately be resolved without war, that thought d

great violence to a realistic outlook. If, on the other 

one means that the confrontation can be resolved wh

Kim family regime remains viable in the North, that 

would seem to belong on the shelf alongside the fa

novels of H. Rider Haggard.

12

Why are the soft landing options so difficult? Wh

U.S. Secretary of State visited Korea in early 1997, sh

asked whether she thought the North and South wo

able to negotiate the end of the Korean War. She answ

It’s very hard to predict. It basically depends on how much t

North Koreans are hurting and whether they are willing 

realize that a peaceful solution to this division is the best w

to go.

13

27
That would appear to be a rational and hu

formulation. But the question is, who are the “

Koreans” who are supposed to see that a peaceful reso

is the best way to go? Are we talking about some 22 m

people walking around in the country and trying to 

from week to week? Do we mean North Korea as a co

Or do we mean the privileged group at the top of the 

structure who run North Korea and make all the dec

about what North Korea as a country will and will not 

few years back a Korean political scientist explaine

while anyone can posit the objective need of North 

viewed as a country, for the soft landing options, no o

show the connection between that objective need an

willingness of the Kim regime to pursue these optio

even their ability to do them without fatal coll

damage. 

What is the problem with reconciliation? North K

leaders have programmed themselves and their peo

believe that true Korean sovereignty and patriotism 

be found only in the inheritors of the anti-Jap

guerrilla struggles of the 1930s and 1940s. These inhe

are Kim Il Sung and his fellow combatants, 

descendants, and their allies. This is what defines 

identity. This is who they think they are. When the

about “one Korea,” they mean their Korea with them

in charge. The notion that somewhere on the pen

there is another group of Koreans with “equal sta

with whom they must negotiate on equal terms abo

future of the peninsula is doctrinally, strateg

ideologically, emotionally—virtually any way you l

it—repugnant and unacceptable. In spite of the Jun

summit meeting, unless history, defectors’ reports

intelligence are all suddenly without utility, w

confidently predict that they will not do it.

14

What about reform? A few years ago North Korean 

media announced that Kim Jong Il had fired a round 

holes of golf in 34 strokes, some 25 shots belo

recognized PGA record.

15

 Here’s a fellow who simply d

28
make mistakes. What’s to reform? We may laugh abou

but someone living in North Korea who starts to talk 

the need for reform will not find it so funny. The who

of reform carries with it the notion that something 

fixing, that there is a better way of doing things

implication is that something is wrong, impossibl

country with infallible leadership. Moreover, to en

reform Kim Jong Il would have to renounce socialis

East European mistake he has vowed he will not 

renounce the chuch’e ideology,

16

 and, in the end

renounce his own father, thereby undercutting hi

legitimacy as the filial son who follows his father’s c

policies. If all of this were not problem enough, the 

idea of reform entails a series of trouble

decisionmaking intersections very disruptive for a 

monocratic regime. For example, when to begin refo

what sector to begin, how fast to go, when to extend to 

sectors, and whom to put in charge? Experience in 

authoritarian systems suggests that sooner or late

process is apt to produce debate about whether ref

being done in the right manner and whether the 

people are doing it, a contradiction in a society wher

one person is allowed to philosophize about what is 

and wrong.

Opening entails many of the same prob

Northerners have been told for decades that the peo

the South live in spiritual and material misery from 

they must be liberated. This is dogma basic to the 

system and cannot be set aside. Should Northerners c

learn not only that this notion is false, but that the 

mass of their Southern brethren live in a kind of aff

hardly imaginable in the Kim family regime “paradis

can imagine the consequences for the regime’s po

support structure and the security of the leade

Moreover, it must be questioned whether the North h

infrastructure necessary for opening in terms of 

guarantees, financial institutions, and profes

expertise. The vast majority of the North’s so-

29
“technocrats” have not been educated at places like M

Ivy League, Stanford, or the London School of Econ

but rather at Kim Il Sung University and M

University, where one can only guess at how much 

have learned that may be helpful in guiding North K

entry into the flux and turbulence of the 21st-century 

economy. 

In sum, while these options sound reasonable for 

Korea as a country, they all amount to things the r

either doesn’t know how to do or would find unaccepta

which would punch holes below the political water l

all three. It is as if by their policies the North’s leader

tied ropes around their necks and these changes wo

like pulling the trap door from beneath their feet.

Three consequences would seem to follow. First, 

the Kim regime may cautiously hazard some li

experiments, in general they will opt to impose on 

population the continuing pain of economic failure 

than to embark on a path of revitalization that will l

growing dependence on perceived hostile forces 

South. Second, absent war, the superiority of the So

every aspect of life except the military will continue t

and Northerners will, as time passes, become increa

aware of the South’s superiority. Third, if unification 

accomplished by war, economics will tend to domin

will be the economically superior South that lead

process of reintegration which precedes, encompasse

continues on past political unification. While all of th

take considerable time, the entire period is arguably o

interim condition. Ironically, the longer the period, th

apparent Southern superiority and the more inevitab

final result. As this process unfolds, it will b

increasingly difficult for the Northern regime’s lead

maintain any relevance, as they will not hav

knowledge or the resources to do much that is usefu

From all of this follows yet another impo

consequence: the Kim family regime would seem to h

30
long-term survival option that is not military in n

This notion is not popular with policymakers, or with 

other observers either, for that matter. No one li

contemplate the horrendous cost that would attend a

peninsular war. But it is difficult to see how ext

peaceful coexistence can lead anywhere but t

increasing appeal of the South and the gradual eros

popular support in the North. The only way Pyongya

escape such an eventuality is by gaining control of the 

peninsula, and it is virtually inconceivable for that obj

to be accomplished by negotiation. However repugna

idea may be, it provides a rationale for KFR conduc

time. In rejecting the options outsiders urge upon the

KFR acts as if they believe it.

Finally, I would contend that to use any other tem

as a means of analyzing and predicting over time 

Pyongyang will and will not do is to set oneself up 

virtually endless series of false expectations.

Strategic Options.

Currently, North Korea would seem to have four 

strategic options. Two offer the prospect of long

survival, but they are difficult and dangerous. Two 

would seem to offer the means of temporary survival o

The first obviously is to attack and win. The upside 

possibility of absolute victory. If the KFR gains contro

entire peninsula, economic failure becomes poli

irrelevant, or at least much less relevant. Penin

polarity would end, as would the economic and po

challenge from Seoul. The downside is, of course, that 

the most dangerous option, as it risks total defeat a

prospect of death, delivery into the hands of the ene

ignominious flight.

The second is the campaign of subversion 

revolution, the strategy envisioned in their “pe

unification” slogan adopted in 1954. The upside is 

31
offers the possibility of total victory with minimal ris

problem, of course, is that since it is extremely hard 

the possibility of success is extremely small. The wo

guerrilla operations of the mid to late 1960s failed

there have been no attempts to revive them. A

subversion, the record seems to show that while indiv

can be recruited and anti-state groups formed, the 

society as a whole is too big and various to take down

to the likely failure of this option, of course, are four f

which decrease the appeal of the KFR message: (

evident failure of North Korea’s economic model, (2) th

and continuing track record of violence against the 

(3) the dynastic succession, which is viewed in the So

ludicrous and anachronistic, and (4) pol

democratization in the South, which over time has de

radical students of their political cover as fighte

democracy. 

The third option is the so-called “soft landin

“rational choice,” option of reconciliation and eco

cooperation, reform, and opening. The upside is tha

time all of these might help to bring about econom

social recovery in the North. The downside is th

already discussed, they would inevitably undermine r

foundations and lead inexorably to the collapse and 

the Kim family system. Moreover, in the interim, this 

does nothing to fend off the threat from the South, 

ROK is still there and still obviously superior econom

Finally, of course, sustained pursuit of this option 

tend to foreclose the first two options above.

The fourth option is what we may call an aid

survival approach with minimal or no reform. This ap

in the main to be the strategic option the KFR has cur

adopted. The advantages of this option are signific

avoids the pitfalls of internal change. It avoids the dan

broad engagement with the ROK but allows for se

ROK business activity in the North. And it preserv

possibility of continued priority to the military a

options one and two above. The disadvantages ar

32
considerable. There is a potential sustainability pro

Will the outside world give enough for long enough

ROK is still there and still superior. Collapse i

possible, and there is rampant corruption, just as wh

ROK pursued a similar strategy in the early to mid–19

Let us now take another look at option one. It has 

become fashionable to describe North Korea’s object

survival. In the context of North Korea’s economic f

and the growing gap between the South and the 

survival has come to be equated with a defensive s

The assumption has been that the North’s mi

establishment must be declining along with the rest 

economy, and that the best the Pyongyang regime c

now is to try to keep information control intact and ha

somehow, even as the leadership agonizes ove

inevitable decision to change course, to abandon host

the South, to reform, open, and accept the assistan

South can provide. Against the background of 

assumptions there has been a tendency to believe th

North no longer poses a military threat, and 

Pyongyang must surely have abandoned its goal of g

control over the entire peninsula. In this context it i

that any decision to attack the South would be suicid

irrational decision. But these assumptions require c

evaluation.

First, here is how the North may think they ca

They may believe they can attack with little warnin

that their artillery will smash forward defenses and d

the morale of the defenders. They may expect roads 

South will be choked with refugees to the poin

Combined Forces Command (CFC)

18

 forces will be un

maneuver. They will expect that their large and well t

special operations forces (SOF) will create havoc in th

and that this along with the use of chemical and bio

weapons will demoralize and panic soldiers and civ

alike. Finally, in spite of the good showing by the ROK 

off the west coast last year, they may believe that wh

33
war starts a substantial portion of the defending forc

either flee, or fight with little enthusiasm.

Second, Pyongyang’s leaders may expect that at 

point in the future the United States will be distrac

developments elsewhere, perhaps in the Middle East 

Taiwan Straits, and be unable to respond quickl

effectively with off-shore reinforcements.

Third, there is little doubt they have noticed the c

U.S. aversion to any kind of involvement which seems 

to entail heavy casualties. They may well calculate 

they can strike early and hard in a way that produce

casualties at the outset, Washington will come 

political pressure to extricate rather than to reinforc

Fourth, what we know about North Korean 

dispositions simply does not support the idea 

Pyongyang has abandoned the military option or tha

overall stance is defensive rather than offensive. 

1980, along with an increase in the size of their g

forces from 700,000 to more than a million, the Nor

steadily deployed combat forces forward. Key ch

include significant numbers of mechanized and ar

units relocating Southward. Today 70 percent of all c

forces, to include 700,000 troops, 2,000 tanks, and 

artillery systems,

19

 are located South of a line be

Pyongyang and Wonsan, or 100 kilometers from the 

as compared with 40 percent so deployed in 1980.

Their artillery includes 500 long-range sy

deployed over the past decade. The proximity of 

long-range systems to the DMZ threatens all of Seou

devastating attack. Without moving any of its artille

North could sustain up to 500,000 rounds per hour a

CFC defenses for several hours. Other North K

threats at the outset are the use of missiles and SOF a

against key targets in the Seoul area. Much of the N

military force is protected in underground faci

including 4,000 facilities in the forward area alone. 

34
their current locations these forces can attack with m

preparations. 

North Korea’s tactical doctrine emphasizes domi

of the battlefield by surprise, firepower, and mo

Critical to North Korean success are secrecy, deliv

massive amounts of firepower against extremely n

frontages, widespread use of WMD, and the abi

methodically feed reinforcing and exploitation for

sustain the momentum of attack. Pyongyang’s cam

plan envisions defeat of the CFC forward defens

isolation of Seoul within seven days and exploi

operations throughout the remainder of the penins

defeat ROK forces and close air and seaports for ar

U.S. off-shore forces.

There are, to be sure, aspects of North K

dispositions that are defensive in nature. During th

year, coastal defenses have been improved in the fo

area, combat positions have been established along 

routes between Pyongyang and the DMZ, and an

barriers have been emplaced in the forward area. But 

dispositions should be seen in context. In any pro

attack against an enemy whose strong suits are flex

speed, and the ability to strike deep, the North 

anticipate the need for defensive operations even 

overall offensive context. Moreover, in three critical as

Northern dispositions do not appear defensive. First

of their artillery is deployed so far forward as 

vulnerable to surprise attack and useless in de

Second, on the Northern side of the DMZ there a

defensive fortifications equivalent to Forward Ed

Battle Area (FEBA) A, B, and C in the South.

20

 Third, t

construction under the DMZ would seem to have 

utility except for offense.

During the past year, North Korea has 

implementing an ambitious program to improve its g

force posture. The highlight of this initiative 

deployment of large numbers of 240mm multiple 

35
launcher systems and 170mm self-propelled gu

hardened sites near the DMZ. Other improvements i

construction of missile support facilities, preparatio

long-range missile testing, and enhancement of an a

impressive camouflage, concealment, and deception 

Production of military equipment, to include mi

aircraft, submarines, and artillery systems, has cont

and since last summer training levels have surged t

heights.

21

 All of this reflects continuing priority 

military and a remarkable allocation of resources in s

severe overall economic deprivation.

Those who believe North Korea will not attack co

the end be right. One can imagine a whole host of reaso

Kim Jong Il to hesitate. Kim may hope his aid

survival strategy will work indefinitely. He may 

about military sustainability and think that with ti

can fix that problem. He may think his efforts to sp

alliance will be successful. He may prefer to wait un

U.S. commitment weakens, or until the United Sta

occupied elsewhere, or until he can attain withdra

U.S. Forces, Korea (USFK). He may believe that he ca

on indefinitely with the assistance of his world

counterintelligence system. He may even remain inde

unable to make a decision until it becomes virtually t

to make a decision.

However, those who say North Korea is too w

attempt an offensive solution to the survival problem 

do well to remember that in the 20th century 

opponents handed the United States four big m

surprises: the Pearl Harbor attack, the Korean surpri

only the June 25, 1950, invasion but the skill and fi

ardor of North Korean forces), the Chinese intervent

late 1950, and the 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam. So

predicted each of these, but the establishment dismiss

predictions. In all four cases there seems to have b

measure of contempt on our part for Asian opponents 

tendency to overrate our own capabilities.

22

 In all four 

we paid a heavy price when the enemy did attack in s

36
all our reasons why they could not or would not. Hin

teaches we are better served by believing that the e

has the strength, will, and ingenuity to force us to fi

his doctrine rather than ours.

With regard to all four broad strategic options, it 

tolerably certain the KFR will attach primary importa

insuring the security and comfort of the leade

especially Kim Jong Il himself, and on maintaining in

control. At a level of secondary importance, the regim

strive to insure that Chinese support continues f

options. 

For all options except the soft-landing app

primary importance will also be placed on weakenin

ultimately eliminating the ROK as a state. In purs

this, the North will attack conservative forces in the 

through propaganda smear campaigns as well 

assassination, kidnapping, and intimidation.

23

 The 

will also continue conducting espionage and surve

operations against the ROK, support and direct radic

subversive organizations in the South, and try to dis

and weaken the ROK military establishment. As a me

marginalizing the ROK, Pyongyang will also con

trying in any way it can imagine to split the ROK

alliance and bring about the withdrawal of USF

converting the armistice into a “peace agreement” a

discrediting USFK through propaganda and agitatio

the sovereignty issue, Status of Forces Agreement (S

criminal jurisdiction, and territorial issues.

24

As a part of this effort, Pyongyang will push for re

of the “Cold War structure on the peninsula” and seize 

opportunity to thrust to the forefront the princip

independent and peaceful unification in accordance 

“grand national unity.”

25

 As a means of exerting lev

against the United States and Japan, the North’s WM

long-range missile capabilities will be pushed at a

rather than abandoned.

26

 Already the world’s 

hardened potential belligerent with hundreds of m

37
underground tunnels and facilities, North Kore

continue sub-surface construction.

For all options except attack, the North will emp

enhancement of its international image through diplo

propaganda, and normalization of relations with its 

enemies, the United States and Japan, in order to ma

a flow of assistance from the former and max

reparations from the latter.

With regard to the soft-landing option, it would 

that priority to the military and denigration of the R

lacking legitimacy would not reconcile very well, but 

are fundamental KFR tenets and consideration 

regime’s track record to date suggests they could 

abandoned, all of which underscores the point that, 

end, a soft landing will likely prove to be an illusion.

In pursuing its aid-based survival strategy, Pyon

has an assortment of carrots and sticks at its dis

Carrots could be such measures as greater transpare

WMD and missile development, greater site acces

destruction, suspension of testing and deploy

initiation of confidence-building measures, ameliora

propaganda attacks, formal negotiations with the RO

a suspension of kidnappings, assassinations

infiltrations. Sticks could include abrogation of or thr

abrogate the 1994 U.S.-North Korean Agreed Frame

provocations along the DMZ, coastal infiltrations, m

sales, further missile testing, and suspension of or t

to suspend various channels of dialogue with the U

States, Japan, and the ROK. It seems reasonable to b

however, that so long as the Pyongyang regime a

encouraging donations from the outside world, prim

the United States and the ROK, its field of maneuver 

confined between, on the lower end, a level of threat n

to motivate donations and, on the higher end, a le

provocation that would cause a suspension of donati

38
The Significance of WMD and Missiles.

The Pyongyang regime appears to consider its WM

long-range missiles as fundamental to survival an

important to give up. Four points would seem to be c

First, these capabilities enable the regime to ba

and blackmail for what it needs rather than having 

Second, while WMD and missile programs are import

this regard, it would be a mistake to imagine that is a

are, and to underestimate the importance attached 

programs per se and the regime’s determination to p

them. Such programs do not spring into exis

overnight. Recruitment of nuclear specialists began 

1950s. North Korea began assigning speciali

Yongbyon in the 1960s.

27

 All of this occurred long 

North Korea had cause to anticipate economic failure 

need for a negotiating card to cope with the consequen

such failure.

Third, WMD and long-range missiles appear inte

Kim Jong Il’s notion of making North Korea a “grea

powerful state.” Simply, he thinks great powers hav

capabilities while weak states do not. In this respect, 

almost certainly consider these capabilities central 

own historic mission and therefore to his notion of h

identity. He and his regime have always been be

achieving these capabilities. It will hardly be easy to 

them to assume a posture that entails stripping th

these capabilities, a posture they have always stead

refused to assume.

Fourth, these capabilities should be seen again

background of what has been happening all a

Asia—from Syria and Israel on the west, t

subcontinent, to China, and to North Korea on the ea

second- and third-tier states develop asymmetric co

to western conventional military superiority. All of 

cogently captured in Paul Bracken’s bookFire in the E

which he argues that as we transition not into the pos

39
War era but into the post-Vasco da Gama era, Asian 

are for the first time in 500 years developing capab

that will enable them to strike back at western states 

try to impose their will by state-of-the-art mi

technology.

28

 These new capabilities will enable 

Korea, among others, to hit our bases in the Pacifi

ultimately to strike at our homeland, thus raising th

and hazards of our attempts to dictate outcomes 

choosing far from home. As Bracken points out, Asian 

are pursuing these new weapons, especially enh

missile range and accuracy, not just to create random 

destruction, but rather to exert leverage, by forc

threats of force, toward specific political objectives. 

asks what Pyongyang’s specific political object

vis-à-vis the United States, the answer is not lo

coming. They have been telling us week in and week 

decades about the need to get USFK off the K

peninsula. 

Finally, it may be instructive to remember that, wh

the policy was called “equal emphasis,” “military firs

“importance of guns,” or “great and powerful state,” 

Korea under the Kims has from the beginning placed 

priority on maximizing its military power. Therefo

trying to force them to abandon their WMD and missi

are very likely trying to make them revert to somethin

never were.

Currently, it appears evident that the regi

pursuing its aid-based survival strategy along with 

to subvert the ROK while maintaining and improv

ability to attack. Reconciliation, reform, and op

appear to have been rejected, although Pyongya

prepared to simulate these options from time to time 

doing so will facilitate donations from outside. 

sometimes argued that this rejection is irrational. It 

however, be more realistic to see this rejection not as 

of irrationality but rather as a case of a rational 

operating in a highly abnormal environment, one in 

the divided country scenario, an extreme ideology ill 

40
to economic success, and a track record of hostility 

South have caught Pyongyang’s leaders in a tra

nonetheless confining even if of their own ma

depriving them of the normal options of a normal stat

leaders motivated by a normal goal orientation. Here

the tragic dilemma of North Korea’s existence. W

medicine for the populace is poison to the regime, a

interests of rulers and ruled are as opposed as in any a

despotism.

Why We Do Not Get It.

All the foregoing is not profound. It should n

difficult to grasp the abnormality and incapacity 

KFR. Why, then, do so many smart people miss it? W

conjure up at least six reasons.

First, most of our experience is with normal states, 

is natural to think that the normal tools of diplomac

international intercourse will be effective. Second, w

to miss the code words even when Pyongyang provid

code, dismissing the KFR’s statements of its go

propaganda. One example: The 1948 Korean Wo

Party (KWP) Rules state that

the KWP struggles for the liberation of the Southern half 

our country from American imperialist aggressive forces a

internal reactionary rule and for the attainment of t

complete unification of the country on a democratic basis 

firmly uniting the broad masses of North and South arou

itself.

29

This is straightforward enough, but some seem in

to think it no longer applies simply because i

enunciated a half century ago. Another example: In th

4, 1972, joint North-South declaration, the two 

pledged efforts for independent and peaceful unifica

accord with great national unity, yet by July 15, 1972, 

Korean news media were again proclaiming that all 

would be united under Kim Il Sung. More important, 

41
Sung himself, in interviews later that summer with J

daily Mainichi Shimbun and monthly magazine Sek

in North Korean publications, explained the mean

these terms. “Independent” meant “to force the U

States imperialists out of South Korea”; “peaceful” 

the reduction of armed forces and halt of mi

modernization in the South; and “great national 

meant freedom for pro-North Korean subversiv

revolutionary groups to operate in the ROK.

30

 We shou

think it inconsequential that North Korean negot

insisted on the inclusion of this terminology in the a

for the June 2000 summit, as each term represents a p

node in the struggle for dominance between two 

regimes of truth.

Third, although Korean issues seldom ex

convoluted, Byzantine patterns, there is freque

measure of garbage strewn over the surface that ma

hard to look down and see the basic simplicity. In thi

we have strewn some of the garbage ourselves by unre

predictions and by formulations which do not distin

between country interests and regime interests. F

there is a kind of policymaking trap in that while it 

natural for policymakers to conceptualize the obj

policy in a manner that affords some hope of policy su

this can pull us off target analytically.

Fifth, we have tended to accept the popular notio

“globalization”—i.e., increased trade, the spre

technology, and the movement of ideas and people 

national frontiers—would create prosperity and a se

common interest that would ameliorate interna

tensions and hostile confrontation. This principle d

work in 1914 despite active trade between Britai

Germany and the German fondness for Shakespea

seems particularly unsound to expect it to work 

Korean case. Sixth, a serious appreciation of the 

Korean political culture and regime intentions woul

to throw cold water on some of the hopeful expect

prevailing in Seoul and Washington.

42
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center’s

(NPEC’s) Questions Considered.

1. What is the abiding context of U.S. strategy th

current strategy must comport with, and what 

assumptions underlie and thus condition our str

thinking about the future?

• North Korea expects the United States will rema

global superpower in the near to mid term.

• North Korea’s force dispositions indicate i

leadership does not expect the United States to lau

preemptive attack on the North.

• North Korea’s leadership does expect the U

States to defend the ROK if North Korea attack

entertains the possibility that the United States w

nuclear weapons if needed.

• U.S. aversion to high casualties appears 

considered a vulnerability to be exploited.

• North Korea probably believes the United State

protect Taiwan but will try to influence the China-T

rivalry so as to avoid war with China.

2. What is the evolving nature of the global str

environment? What alternative futures are possibl

the next 15-20 years? North Korea will see the foll

trends:

• Pressure for the reduction and, eventu

withdrawal of USFK will increase in both the United 

and the ROK.

• U.S. and western influence in Asia will weaken 

a lack of resolve and an increase in the military stren

China and other Asian states.

• Development of WMD and long-range missiles i

is the critical factor for change in the strategic balan

will continue.

43
• Hi-tech terrorism will increase, as will 

vulnerability.

• Development of information warfare will contin

• Chinese support for North Korea could remain 

present or weaken.

• Russia could push for a higher-profile role 

Northwest Pacific in concert with China or independ

• Japan could stay in partnership with the U

States or could take a more independent path.

• Japan could become a nuclear power.

• War between China and the United States 

Taiwan is possible and could be exploited by North K

• Significant improvement in U.S.-Chinese relat

possible.

• Improvement in ROK-Chinese relations is poss

• ROK economic superiority over North Ko

increasing.

• North Korea is becoming increasingly depend

outside (U.S. and ROK) assistance.

• Korea could be united under either North Ko

ROK control.

• Attack could become the only viable option for 

Korea under the Kim regime.

• The KFR could collapse.

3. Which alternatives do we prefer? Which do we w

avoid?

• North Korea’s leaders believe the United State

try to maintain and increase its influence in Northeas

44
• They believe the United States prefers the stat

on the peninsula, but will opt for ROK control of all of 

if this can be realized at an acceptable cost.

• North Korea prefers a U.S. withdrawal fro

region.

• North Korea prefers to gain control of all of 

through a ROK collapse or war.

• North Korea prefers hostile relations between 

and the United States

• North Korea prefers hostile U.S.-Russian relat

• North Korea prefers a breakup of the h

combination of the United States, the ROK, and Jap

• North Korea prefers hostile relations between 

and China.

• North Korea prefers worsening ROK relation

the three major regional powers and breakup 

ROK-U.S. alliance.

• North Korea (specifically, the KFR) must avo

circumstance, or combination of circumstances, which 

lead to loss of internal control and eventual 

domination of the peninsula.

4. Who are our current and likely future compe

Who are key third parties?

• North Korea sees the United States, the ROK

Japan as its competitors.

• China remains the key third party.

... China shares the American interest in prev

proliferation of WMD and long-range missiles 

peninsula, fearing that if unchecked it could l

nuclear weapons development in Japan and T

Missile Defense (TMD).

45
... China no longer endorses North Korea’s ideo

claim to the entire peninsula.

... China sees the ROK as an important trading p

and investor.

... China sees hostilities on the peninsula as damag

its economy.

... But China prefers to keep a friendly buffer state 

border and sees a unified Korea allied with the U

States as a potential threat.

... China is uncomfortable with U.S. “hegemony” 

world and the Pacific region, but China is by no 

unmindful of the advantages of stable relation

the United States.

... China probably expects the KFR to collapse at 

point due to the mistakes of North Korea’s le

but prefers that this occur later rather than so

• With regard to North Korea-China relation

question that has preoccupied many is whether Beiji

induce Pyongyang to follow the Chinese model of op

up. There has been increased speculation on this ques

view of Kim Jong Il’s favorable comments on the C

model during his recent trip to Beijing. While C

support for North Korea appears unconditiona

Chinese officials have been saying for some tim

outside observers tend to overestimate Chinese know

of, and ability to influence, actual conditions in the No

any case, the following considerations appear releva

... North Korea is not a huge country with centu

experience in managing conflict and disparity.

... Unlike China, North Korea does not have a 

agrarian base which can be exploited to pow

recovery of its industrial sector.

... We have seen no sign in Pyongyang of the k

policy debate that preceded policy change in C

46
... Kim Jong Il has long known that the North K

economy doesn’t work. If he has not tried to cha

we can reasonably presume it’s because he is aw

the concomitant political dangers.31

... Unlike the Communist regimes in power in Chin

Vietnam, Kim Jong Il and his comrades have 

win their war of national unification and do no

the same margin for experiment. Pyongyang f

much greater threat from Seoul than Beijing 

from Taipei.

• Russia is also a key third party and could bec

significant supporter of North Korea, but this seem

likely than for China. The following generalizations a

safe.

... Russia values its economic relationship wit

ROK.

... Russia is unhappy with the United States a

superpower and would like to find a way to 

itself in the Pacific region.

... But Russia faces westward and, unlike China

the Korean peninsula as thousands of miles fr

vital centers of power.

• North Korea sees Russia, and even China, larg

lost allies. China, however, is an important sou

economic help, and both are occasional suppli

weapons. Pyongyang would not expect military su

from either except in the case of hostilities between 

and the United States over Taiwan.

• Russian President Putin’s recent visit to Pyongy

mid-July 2000 after talks with Chinese President 

Zemin in Beijing appears to be part of an effort to r

Russian influence and counter U.S. dominance 

region. Russia was seen as a marginal player in the 

when the peninsula reemerged as a major iss

Northeast Asia. Moscow was completely exclud

47
negotiations on Pyongyang’s nuclear development a

four-way talks on the peninsula. The 11-point commu

issued by Putin and Kim Jong Il at the end of their ta

July 20 appealed to the international community to o

the U.S. plan to build an anti-missile system.

If this appeal is to succeed, however, Putin needs 

a way to resolve the problem of North Korea’s m

development program. According to Russian news m

Kim Jong Il told Putin that North Korea will stop its m

development program if other nations provide the 

with rocket boosters for space exploration.

32

 Howeve

Defense Secretary William Cohen has expressed doub

North Korea would abandon its ballistic missile proj

return for access to a third country’s rocket progra

“space research” purposes. Cohen and Pentagon of

point out that during U.S.-North Korea talks in 

Lumpur in July 2000, Pyongyang’s negotiators reit

the North’s intention to develop long-range ba

missiles. “Our missile policy is to develop, to produce, 

deploy powerful missiles continuously,” Pyongyang

negotiator said, according to Cohen.

33

5. What are our competitors’ and key third parties

and their strategies for achieving them?

• The primary goal of North Korea (specificall

KFR) is survival, i.e., to avoid loss of control over the p

territory that has been theirs for more than a half ce

For the time being, this can be interpreted as mainte

of the status quo, but for reasons already explained

unlikely this can be a long-term solution if it is de-co

from total peninsular dominance. Without control 

whole peninsula, North Korea will become increa

dependent on the ROK with increased risk of falling 

Southern control. To stay alive in the near term, 

Korea will selectively engage with the outside 

reaching out to the European Union and keeping the 

connection healthy, as well as selectively engagin

United States and the ROK. This has little to do 

48
opening up North Korea itself but a lot to do with obt

assistance, allowing selective activity in the North by 

business groups, and demonstrating to all that Pyon

has multiple options. For a long-term solution, howev

explained earlier, North Korea must find a way to 

USFK withdrawal and bring the South under its con

• The Pyongyang regime has identified the 

Sunshine policy, or engagement, as a means of ind

change in the North. In this respect the policy is see

threat, but the economic inducements that come wi

policy are an important part of the regime’s aid

survival strategy. Pyongyang will continue to explo

policy for its economic benefits while resisting the k

change which could undermine the regime.

6. What is the current state of the competition? 

future states are possible, and which do we prefer?

• At present, there is no apparent internal threat 

survival of the KFR. No immediate threat appears lik

long as the regime remains willing to triage the popu

as long as substantial donations from the outside con

and as long as Kim Jong Il remains in control of m

counterintelligence agencies, whose combined capab

amount to a world-class internal security posture.34

• Currently, the North appears to be succeeding 

efforts to improve its conventional and unconven

military capabilities. In the last 12 months, North 

has done more to arrest a decline in readiness and im

its conventional military capability than in the last 5 

combined.35 Ground and air exercises last winter we

largest in over a decade, and forward deploymen

reached an unprecedented level. The North’s s

operations forces, largest in the world, number over 10

and are significant force multipliers, providin

capability to simultaneously attack both forward an

CFC forces. Despite the Agreed Framework and eff

engage the North in missile talks, North K

asymmetric threat is formidable and growing. 

49
continue to produce and deploy long-range Nodong m

capable of striking bases in Japan. They are also deve

multi-stage missiles with the goal of fielding sy

capable of striking the continental United States. The

tested the 2,000-kilometer-range Taepodong-

continue working on the 5,000-kilometer-plus Taepod

North Korea possesses a large number of chemical we

that pose a threat to both our military forces and c

population centers.

The USFK J2 estimates that the North is self-suf

in the production of chemical components for 

generation chemical agents. They have produced stoc

estimated at up to 5,000 metric tons of several ty

agents, including nerve, choking, blister, and blood. 

Korea has the capability to develop, produce, and wea

biological agents, to include bacterial spores ca

anthrax and smallpox and bacteria-causing plagu

cholera.

36

 While North Korea has frozen its n

weapons program at the Yongbyon plant, and activi

suspicious facility at Kumchang-ni has been fores

nuclear weapons development could well be cont

without our knowledge at underground facilities elsew

• Pyongyang continues an unrelenting propa

campaign against USFK’s presence conducted o

through official North Korea news media and som

covertly through unofficial spokesmen, who pus

North’s agenda.

• While it is the official policy of the alliance that 

will remain in status quo, the North can be said to 

made headway in a several respects.

... Frictions between USFK and the host society 

increased dramatically due to allegations 

massacre of civilians by U.S. troops at Nogun

1950, an accident at the bombing range 

Maehyang-ni this year, and continuing argu

over the fairness of the Status of Forces Agree

While it can hardly be said that USFK is blame

50
all things, it is nevertheless true that these issu

made to order for North Korean exploitati

Pyongyang’s objectives blend with the nation

emotions of young journalists (who have no re

the Korean War) and the natural inclination 

news media to compete for consumer attention

... The idea of removing the “Cold War structure” 

peninsula has become a popular cliché in the 

North Korean spokesmen are very clear about 

this means. Removing the “Cold War stru

means getting USFK off the peninsula.37 Other

talk about ending the Cold War structure are 

vague about what they mean, but the formu

seems to carry the connotation that hostility be

North and South was caused by the Cold War an

if foreign influence could be removed, reconci

would somehow follow. From the historical view

this is an odd argument to make since the 

actually owes its existence to the Cold War.38

... The notion is gaining ground in some circles th

“buyout” of North Korea’s WMD must extend b

the economic dimension into the security dime

i.e., that if we expect the North to reduce its th

the South, we must take action to reduce the thr

pose to North Korea.39

• How China and Japan will react should it becom

that North Korea has both nuclear weapons and the 

of delivering them is problematic. Of the current pri

players in the Korean scenario only China can be con

that North Korean missiles will not target them

obvious reasons, China would prefer that the Nor

have these capabilities, but there are as yet no indic

that China would exert the kind of pressure suffici

actually prevent their development. Japan, on the 

hand, can expect to be targeted. Pyongyang clearly wa

find a way to neutralize United Nations Command 

bases and staging areas in Japan. Defector Hwang C

51
Yop has said the North is planning to “scorch Japan

means of doing this. How Japan will react to the th

being scorched or to actually being scorched remain

seen. It may be argued that Japan will be cowed initia

then respond by building its own Theater Missile D

(TMD) or deterrent capabilities. Either way, to be sub

to blackmail by Pyongyang will be a new and trau

experience for the Japanese, and it is difficult to believ

will be content to remain helpless in the face of s

threat. 

• The foregoing trends would seem to indicate th

the moment, North Korea is gaining ground i

competition, as they have been able to extract inc

amounts of assistance from outside while improvin

their conventional and asymmetric military capab

and carrying on their public relations campaign a

USFK. While these trends seem to indicate that, a

KFR collapse, North Korea will be an even more men

opponent a few years hence, they do not point the w

escape from the KFR’s long-term strategic dilemma. 

Pyongyang’s point of view, there are still questions t

not have easy answers. How long can effective popu

control be maintained in the absence of economic rec

Will economic recovery actually ease the probl

population control or will it only create new difficultie

Pyongyang continue to extract donations should it b

clear that donations have not been an effective me

curbing weapons development or ameliorating Pyong

hostility to Seoul?

7. What major problems, enduring weaknesses

other constraints face our competitor(s)? What are 

strengths?

• It will be difficult for North Korea to maintain m

opacity in the face of combined U.S.-ROK-Jap

intelligence capabilities. These combined capab

cannot ferret out everything, but they can divine eno

enable conclusions on three key questions: wh

52
Pyongyang’s hostility to Seoul has really eased, w

North Korea deployments are basically offens

defensive, and whether North Korea is abandonin

WMD option or pursuing it.40

• Similarly, the KFR will find it difficult to 

maintain and hide its hostile political posture to

Seoul. The government in Seoul may, of course, e

ignore this and allow the general public to remain f

most part undisturbed in their current threat denial m

• The KFR aid-based survival strategy m

continuing and very likely increasing dependen

archenemies, the United States, the ROK, and Japa

• Breakdown of the economy and official distri

system engenders weakening of population cont

regard to movement, economic activity, lifestyle, m

and crime and corruption.

• The regime increasingly fears ideolo

contamination through an influx of Christia

capitalism, and ROK and Chinese popular culture.

• The most enduring, fundamental, and pe

incurable weakness is that, as discussed earlier i

chapter, North Korea cannot undertake the mea

necessary to revitalize its economy and reinvigora

society without instituting changes that would den

fundamental tenets of the Kim Il Sung-Kim Jong Il sy

with consequences ultimately fatal to the regime. Thi

contradiction applies not only to the economy, but a

modernizing the entire social mindset, and in conseq

North Korea under the KFR seems fated to r

multi-dimensionally out of sync with the world at lar

the extent this defect can be remedied for North 

objectively as a country, the regime will be increa

threatened. This weakness may not matter very m

Kim Jong Il should decide on a military roll of the 

Otherwise it is hard to see how he can get rid o

haunting specter.

53
• KFR strengths are the opposite face of 

weaknesses. Information control and ideolo

indoctrination have up to now enabled the KFR to ke

population marching in the desired direction and, f

most part, resigned to the deprivations imposed upon 

The control systems in place negate political or fac

opposition and give the regime virtually total ta

flexibility even as strategic and philosophical flexibil

denied.41

Priority to the military option, almost to the poin

there is no other option, has enabled the regime to ma

and improve its impressive military posture. Ironicall

very contradiction works to the advantage of the KFR 

respects. First, it is the worrisome imbalance betwe

North’s economic failure and menacing military p

which motivates donations from the outside world 

fear of the “cornered rat” scenario. Second, in spite of 

is difficult for many to believe that a country with a r

economy can still field a threatening military force. 

the contradiction that the North’s military capabiliti

at once feared and underestimated.

8. In any and all cases, what are our time-phased 

for the competition—both overall and supporting?

• Pyongyang describes our goals as establishin

maintaining world and regional hegemony and stifli

socialist way of life in the North. The overall KFR goal 

to dominate the entire peninsula, as that is the only w

secure the future of the regime. KFR supporting goa

be, first, to negate U.S. goals, primarily by keeping 

economy afloat by using their WMD/missile thr

extract assistance from the outside world. Second, th

try to force USFK off the peninsula by threatening 

bases in Japan and by turning ROK public opinion a

USFK and effectively splitting the alliance.

9. What are our areas of advantage or lev

including our enduring strengths relative t

54
challenge(s) that competition poses? What ar

limitations or weaknesses?

• Pyongyang sees the United States as havin

following advantages:

... Rapid force projection capabilities

... Air and sea dominance

... Superior intelligence and battlefield surveillan

... Nuclear weapons

• Pyongyang will also see weaknesses, which in 

cases are the opposite face of our strengths. As th

superpower, the United States has unrivaled capab

but also unrivaled obligations. Pyongyang will wat

signs the United States is stretched too thin, too h

engaged elsewhere, or politically fatigued and gr

weary of its burdens. Knowing our aversion to casu

the North will launch operations designed to maximiz

losses at the outset of hostilities. Pyongyang believes 

and U.S. personnel will not be able to match the fi

spirit of their own Korean People’s Army (KPA) sold

• Pyongyang sees the ROK as having the foll

advantages:

... Vastly superior economic strength

... A larger and healthier population

... A superpower ally

• Pyongyang will also see weaknesses

... A fragile, above-ground infrastructure vulnera

artillery and missile attack

... A weak and fractious body politic lacking cons

on national security issues

... Ideological confusion

... Vulnerability to chemical and biological warfa

55
The KFR will see their own advantag

spiritual—absolute loyalty to the leader, unity, disc

and ideological firmness—and material, with a 

military, both conventional and unconventional, fea

mass, shock, and relatively unsophisticated but re

weapon systems.

10. What basic capacities or core competencies 

need to develop, sustain, adapt, protect, and plan to ex

• North Korea needs to sustain, protect, and conti

leverage:

... Conventional and unconventional military stre

... WMD and long-range missiles

... Information control, including contro

permissiveness and liberalism, and maintain

firewall against contamination in the fo

Christianity, capitalist ideas, and ROK po

culture

• For any serious effort to undertake economic r

and engagement with the international economy, 

Korea will need to develop:

... Understanding of how the capitalist market s

works

... Entrepreneurial skills

... A credible legal infrastructure

... A stable foreign exchange

... Financial and banking expertise

... An internal information system and access 

Internet

Achieving these capacities will be both difficu

politically hazardous, as they will open the syst

contamination and entail a measure of autonomy 

conflicts with the KFR political culture.

56
• The ROK needs to develop:

... More ground power

... Better protection against chemical and bio

agents

... A better grasp of the nature of the KFR a

intentions toward the ROK

... A more realistic educational approach to K

history in the 20th century

... More attention to alliance management and th

to defend both the alliance and the ROK demo

system against internal enemies

... More basic science and research and developm

... Corporate and banking reform

11. What strategies can we employ that will permi

influence—or even dominate—key competitions and 

trends and events? How will the KFR react to stra

designed to move it in a direction which would seem 

counter to the core values of the regime?

• The answer to this question is far from s

perceptions of the right answer will vary dependi

whether one advocates an aggressive policy 

concessionary or engagement policy toward North K

WMD and the KFR itself. If one believes that concess

the form of economic assistance and diplomatic recog

will induce the KFR to mitigate its hostility to the 

undertake reform and opening, and abandon its relia

WMD and conventional military strength, it would 

reasonable strategy to sustain the regime in such a m

as to render it increasingly dependent on assistanc

the United States and key third parties, ultimately 

the United States sufficient leverage to domina

relationship. 

57
If, on the other hand, one believes that such a poli

not induce the regime to abandon either its hostility 

menacing array of conventional and asymmetric we

the case for economic engagement is much weaker. In 

case, one could still argue for engagement, bu

argument would focus more on the aim of preventin

than on any expectation of dominating the relations

one believes that no amount of economic assista

engagement will cause the KFR to abandon its zer

view of the North-South confrontation or to aband

priority to the military, to include WMD, the re

argument for engagement would be that it will in 

contaminate, subvert, and destroy the KFR.

While the current ROK administration describ

policy toward the North as the “separation of economi

politics,” it is interesting that, as Nicholas Ebersta

pointed out, South Korean and Western propone

increased commercial ties between the South and the 

argue that the process will have an ameliorating eff

Pyongyang’s internal decisionmaking, bringing ab

kind of rapprochement through trade along the li

West Germany’s policy of change during rapprochem

Eberstadt goes on to provide experiential evidence 

contrary to common belief, commercial ties with, and 

subsidies from, capitalist countries have done lit

moderate the national security policies of Comm

regimes. The point in any case is that ROK policy is n

separation of economics and politics, but the pursu

political goal through economic means. This is all the 

apparent when one considers President Kim Dae J

repeated statements about the need for a USFK pr

even after unification.

43

The argument for a more aggressive policy towa

KFR and its WMD is based on the expectation 

engagement will neither induce the regime to alter 

nor cause it to collapse, but will rather sustain the r

even as it continues to prioritize its military and impr

WMD while continuing to inflict the pain of economic f

58
on its population. It is argued that the regime would 

the following sources of sustenance could be interdic

• Aid from the United States

• Aid from ROK conglomerates

• Cash inflow from Chosen Soren (an associat

pro-North Korean residents in Japan)

• Remittances from Koreans in the United State

Canada with relatives in North Korea

• Aid from China

• Proceeds from foreign arms sales

Proponents of such a policy also urge the desirabil

more robust military posture in and around Korea to 

that Pyongyang will not see a military option as attr

even as all its other options are running out. With reg

all of the above, policymakers and advisors will have 

themselves whether their policy recommendations 

from their analysis of the KFR and its likely reactions 

versa.

For further discussion of Pyongyang’s likely cou

action and intention to dominate by missiles and WM

question 12 and the following section.

12. What is the likely range of competitor and third 

countermoves? How might Pyongyang respond?

• Consideration of the track record of the KFR a

political culture strongly suggests that no amou

economic cooperation or outright assistance will indu

regime to abandon the core of its belief system. To en

the rational options and mitigate its hostility to auth

in the South would require North Korea’s lead

abandon what amounts to a national mission and to 

all they have been saying for more than half a cent

justify their own authority, justify the damage they 

inflicted on the South, and justify the sacrifices they 

imposed upon their own population. As all of this 

59
have fatal consequences for the internal viability o

system, it appears likely they will shun this course of a

• We lack the kind of data necessary to predict ho

KFR would react should the United States and its 

attempt a full-court press to interdict the flow of suste

from outside. Some predict this would prompt a 

Korean attack. Some predict Pyongyang would res

naked blackmail. Some predict increasing loss of popu

control leading to cracks in the power structure and a

of the regime. No one can be sure.

• An aggressive policy by the United States wou

appear feasible without the cooperation of key third p

It would require an end to the ROK engagement or sun

policy and cooperation from Japan and perhaps from 

as well. Based on what is now known, China would lik

to make up for North Korean shortfalls due to loss of o

help, but if the KFR should begin to lose its grip

uncertain whether Beijing could accurately a

Pyongyang’s needs and respond quickly enough to 

loss of control.

The USFK Role and Pyongyang’s Asymmetric

Counter.

From time to time Pyongyang accuses the United 

of trying to stifle the North. While this may not accu

reflect U.S. intentions, it does reflect the criticality 

USFK role. If, as we have earlier argued, the only w

KFR can avoid being on the losing side of a zer

survival struggle is to gain control of the entire peni

and if the only conceivable way they can do that is by fo

the threat of force, then USFK sits squarely astride 

road to survival. One way or another, virtually 

apologist for Pyongyang must sooner or later confron

obstacle. This is what Kim Il Sung meant by “indepen

unification in 1972. In his November 9, 1999, NAP

piece for the Nautilus Policy Forum, Hwal-Woong 

ROK Foreign Service officer from 1956 to 1971 and 

60
recently a fellow at Korea-2000, a Los Angeles-

research council on Korean unification, argues th

Perry Report fails to recognize the long confron

between the United States and North Korea, going b

1953, when the United States fought a war with 

Korea with the intent to obliterate it, and that the N

WMD programs are the inevitable result of North K

need to defend itself against USFK. Lee says Pyon

cannot renounce its WMD programs with USFK 

South pointing guns at them. He argues that if the U

States is serious about peace, it should recognize USF

threat to North Korea and eliminate the thre

consenting to a phased withdrawal in return for a 

renunciation of WMD programs by Pyongyang. He pr

“a political arrangement for arms reduction

non-aggression pledges by the parties concerned.” H

not spell out the implications of his recommendatio

ROK national security.

44

In his November 1999 interview with Mal,

45

 Pak 

Su, Vice Director of the Secretariat of the N

Committee for the Unification of the Fatherland, re

that in February 1999 Pyongyang suggested high

North-South talks based on three conditions: e

cooperation with foreign powers for anti-North K

activities, abolishing the National Security Law

guaranteeing the unification movement. These a

course, very close to the July 4, 1972, principles, and i

cases, the first point implies the end of USFK. Pak goe

say, “We have no choice but to settle with the United 

the matter of signing a peace treaty and the matter of 

withdrawal.” Pak comments only indirectly abou

future of the ROK, observing that a “peace that do

result in unification is impossible.”

In contrast, the North’s leader, Kim Jong Il, s

bluntly and clearly about the South. An article 

October 8, 1999, Nodong Sinmun

46

 quotes the “great l

as saying,

61
If the United States had not occupied South Korea by force, 

nation would never have been divided into two. And if 

United States had not disturbed Korea’s unification, we wo

have achieved national unification a long time ago.

The article goes on to explain that the South 

complete U.S. colony and that the incumbent puppet 

group, which put on the veil of the “people,” is nothing 

group of servants for the imperialists. Therefore, the 

argues, 

As long as the enemy of unification, such as the puppet ru

bunch, remains in power, the independent unification of 

country cannot be expected. This is one of the reasons 

United States troops that occupied South Korea by force and 

colonial fascist “regime,” which follows them, are cancers t

block our people’s independent unification.

Some find it comforting to regard all this as nothin

propaganda rhetoric. We would suggest that the fa

refrain, as above, about the colonial status of the RO

the need for USFK withdrawal has been Pyong

consistent position for a half century. It is unalt

doctrine, well grounded in reality in that the only end

peninsular condition which would be safe for the 

regime is unification under the regime itself. 

unification is indeed blocked by USFK’s presence

defies the imagination how such an end-state cou

achieved except by force or intimidation.

Perhaps the most straightforward presentat

Pyongyang’s perception of North Korean-U.S. relatio

of the regime’s vision of the relationship of missile

WMD to the future of the peninsula can be found i

Myong Chol’s October 22, 1999, Nautilus Policy F

piece titled “U.S. Will End Up in Shotgun Marriag

North Korea.”

47

 Kim argues that to improve relation

North Korea, the United States must abando

long-standing support for the ROK, maintaining th

only alternatives are a nuclear arms race or a nuclea

He notes that with 12 operating nuclear reactors 

62
ROK, 51 in Japan, and 102 in the United States singl

as prime targets, it would take the North’s hypoth

nuclear missile force only a few minutes to wipe the w

South Korea and the entire Japanese archipelago o

world map.

Kim argues that the U.S. demand for renunciat

missile programs lacks justification and comes too la

North Korea has already become a virtual interconti

ballistic missile (ICBM) power with a small fleet of m

locked on American targets. He observes that Am

authorities will have to realize there is no way of evac

tens of millions of people from Washington, New 

Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego 

incoming North Korean ICBMs strike.

Having outlined the dire consequences of war

argues that American military intervention in the in

affairs of Korea caused the “Cold War structure” in tha

of East Asia. He says the United States must see to it t

“Cold War syndromes” are ended, and that m

dismantling the puppet regime in the South and abro

all its “anti-Korean laws,” including the National Se

Law. Lest any should miss his meaning, Kim Myong C

absolutely explicit about the fate of the ROK.

It is now time that the ROK prepared itself to leave the stage 

history, as its architect and parent, the United States, 

taking a series of steps to move toward eventual normalizat

with the DPRK to end the Cold War. The ROK totally lac

any Korean national credentials and legitimacy, which t

DPRK alone enjoys as it was founded by anti-Japanese arm

partisans. 

He closes with a statement in consonance with that o

Jong Il above and indicative of the North Korean re

core doctrine:

Whichever started the Korean War, had the American for

not been fully involved, the Korean People’s Army might ha

63
emancipated the whole of South Korea and achieved territo

unification with minimum bloodshed.

Kim Myong Chol undoubtedly exaggerates the 

Korea’s current capabilities, but, like defector H

Chang Yop, he has long served the regime and dou

knows its mindset. He probably reflects accurately th

regime’s perception of ends and means and th

Pyongyang’s WMD and missile programs relate to 

desired end-state for the peninsula. He clarifies 

Pyongyang means by the end of the “Cold War structu

the peninsula, and this may be no small service in v

the prevailing tendency to use this term carelessly. F

he reminds us that the North Korea’s notion of legitim

grounded in the anti-Japanese guerrilla struggle 

1930s and 1940s. This idea not only justifies the 

invasion, it also defines the identity of the leaders 

“guerrilla dynasty.” To them, “One Korea” has a

meant their Korea, with the KFR themselves in char

Kim Myong Chol’s threatening argument is couc

the context of nuclear weapons. It might be comfor

this were all there were to worry about, since fear 

overwhelming U.S. response might be expected to det

of such weapons. But as Richard Betts, Director of Na

Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Rela

explains, the new and most troublesome threat of 

destruction would appear to be biological weapons

nuclear weapons second, and chemicals a distant 

Betts makes three points about the new world of 

destruction. First, such weapons will not represe

technological frontier of warfare but will increasingly 

weapons of the weak, of states that cannot compet

U.S. conventional superiority. Second, the ki

deterrence and arms control that marked the Cold W

not likely to be effective. Third, responses that migh

effectively cope with the new threats are not likely to 

warm welcome. In particular, the response that shoul

highest priority, a serious civil defense program, is on

is apt to be ignored, opposed, or ridiculed, especiall

64
tends to reduce popular confidence in govern

reassurances about national security and could ha

undesirable economic impact as well.

The most troubling conclusion for American f

policy as a whole, however, is that to reduce the dan

attacks against the United States it might be necess

pull back from involvement in some foreign conflic

American activism to maintain stability provides the 

motive for such attacks.

48 Jane’s Intelligence Review 

that experience in World War II and the Iran-Ira

demonstrates that the political and psychological im

surface-to-surface missile attacks far outweigh the ph

destruction caused, observing that,

The subtlety behind a missile’s ability to exert terror 

twofold: firstly, the suddenness or short warning time of 

attack presents a sense of helplessness among civilians . . . a

secondly, the anxiety from the ambiguity surrounding t

type of missile warhead being delivered.

49

The threat that biological weapons pose is, of cou

no way mitigated by widespread reluctance to 

contemplate their effect or by ignorance. As one 

observes:

One of the side effects of the closing of the Americ

bio-weapons program was that the United States lost 

technical understanding of biological weapons. There has lo

been a general feeling among American scientists—it’s hard 

say how widespread it is—that biological weapons don’t wo

They are said to be uncontrollable, liable to infect their us

or unworkable in any practical sense. . . . The curre

generation of American molecular biologists has been spar

the agony of having created weapons of mass destruction, b

since these biologists haven’t built them, or tested them, th

don’t know much about their real performan

characteristics.

50

65
The June 2000 North-South Summit.

The big question about the mid-June summit 

question we have always had about North Korea a

critical juncture: Is North Korea really changing, or w

get the same old wine in a new bottle? Only time will te

in view of Pyongyang’s record and in the abse

compelling evidence, prudence would dictate tha

expectations should be kept low. What seems e

already, however, is that the summit contributes t

diminished threat perception and devaluation of U

and encourages a set of trends that are develop

Pyongyang’s advantage.

While we do not know for sure why Kim Jong Il agr

a summit meeting with President Kim Dae C

available evidence suggests three principal factors: 

increased confidence that his aid-based survival st

will work, at least in the near term, (2) his perceptio

he needed assistance badly and that he could get mor

get it faster, from the ROK than from any other sourc

(3) his perception that in the Kim Dae C

administration he would have a compliant partner i

President Kim had already talked about revisin

National Security Law, a possible change in the sta

USFK, and reunification based on a confederal system

had referred to Kim Jong Il himself as a person w

considerable degree of judgment, ability, and knowle

a leader.”

51

In short, Kim Jong Il may have concluded that 

sympathetic to Communism and to collaboration 

North Korea were gaining ground in the South an

Kim Jong Il was in a position to give them pow

assistance. In any case, the June summit meet

Pyongyang has added a new dimension to the compe

and reinforced some of the trends already identified. 

formal sense, the summit represents a forward step in 

unlike earlier North-South accords in 1972 and 199

66
leaders of the ROK and North Korea in their o

capacities signed the June agreement.

What is striking about the earlier agreements, how

is that a reading of each might cause one to wonder wh

subsequent agreement covering essentially the 

ground should be necessary. This illuminate

worrisome aspect of the recent summit. It is, after a

past accords, only an agreement in principle, comm

each side to little in the way of specifics. One suspects 

may ultimately fit the pattern of earlier agreements, 

the first stage was agreement on a set of principles w

specific commitments, the second was disagreemen

correct interpretation of the principles, and the thir

the breakup of the dialogue amid mutual recrimin

and Pyongyang’s accusations that the ROK had be

the spirit of the agreement.

Whether the present case will be an exception due 

North’s economic plight remains to be seen. The N

need for assistance would appear to be an importan

factor, but it is as yet uncertain whether Kim Jong Il 

after a quick kill prior to anticipated political changes 

United States and the ROK or whether he is prepa

manage over an extended period the balance betwe

need to obtain outside assistance and the need to ma

regime integrity.

52

In any case, ROK reaction to the summit has bee

more euphoric and unrealistic than the reaction 

widely hailed “breakthroughs” in 1972 and 1991. In s

repeated cautionary statements by President Kim 

Chung,

53

 many have simply taken the summit as por

in the news media at face value, and assume that the 

and the South are finally on the path to better relation

ultimately, peaceful unification. This serves to soli

kind of threat denial mindset already increasingly app

in the ROK over the past decade.

Uninformed about North Korea’s impressive m

exercises this year, many Southerners wrongly assum

67
economic failure has enfeebled the North’s military 

point that it can no longer pose a threat to the South. 

see the “threat” as little more than a concoction of pr

authoritarian regimes. Few are ready to ser

contemplate the horrendous possibility of another w

the peninsula. Most Koreans have no memory of, and 

education about, the U.S. role in the Pacific War 

Korean War and tend to see U.S. forces more in te

criminal jurisdiction and land issues. Finally

pro-Pyongyang element in the ROK is much 

organized and more effective than most South Ko

realize. This relates especially to ongoing agitation a

USFK and to attacks on “conservatives” who take a ca

view of North-South reconciliation and advocate ret

of USFK.

54

 At this point few Koreans appear to gras

the anti-USFK campaign is but the early stage of a b

campaign that will ultimately be anti-ROK.

Even if there were some uncertainty about Kim Jo

intentions, his gains from the summit are readily appa

(1) Increased economic assistance. How much Pre

Kim Dae Chung may have led Kim Jong Il to exp

unknown, but according to the Ministry of Unificat

July 6, 2000, ROK economic aid in the first half of th

was valued at $67.2 million, up 48 percent from the 

period last year; 85 percent of this total was governme

including 200,000 tons of fertilizer in the April-June p

with another 100,000-ton shipment announced on Jul

(2) Rehabilitation of Kim Jong Il’s personal image

became an overnight news media star in the ROK.

(3) Increasing calls for reduction or withdrawal of U

The campaign against USFK relates to deman

revision of the United States-ROK Status of F

Agreement and to mounting sensitivity to various fr

between the command and the host society, to include 

and environmental issues. It is also an issue that te

fuse motives and interest groups, i.e., the desire 

68
newspapers and TV footage, the nationalistic passi

younger journalists, the prejudices of a xenophobic s

with historical reasons for fear and suspicion of f

influence, and the anti-USFK, anti-ROK objecti

leftists and pro-Pyongyang activists.

Kim Jong Il seems for the moment to have alter

tactical approach to the problem of USFK. In an inte

on June 30, 2000, with a U.S. based journalist, Kim J

observed that,

We have been telling the USFK to get out all this time, but 

the United States must first change its own thinking. . . . T

United States must itself figure out the USFK problem a

make a bold decision that should substantially assist t

unification of the Korean people.

As Seoul’s Sogang University Professor Yi Sang 

pointed out, this remark should be seen in the contex

anti-USFK movement in the ROK that has already ac

significant momentum. By restraining his rhetoric

Jong Il, in effect, defends this movement against the c

that it serves Pyongyang’s cause. Rather than try

pressure USFK out, he seeks to let the playing field 

that USFK may simply fall off.

55

(4) Increasing ideological ferment and partisan st

the ROK. While North Korean news media have st

their attacks on the ROK government, they have con

harsh attacks against what they call “anti-unific

elements in the South, especially former Presiden

Yong Sam, opposition Grand National Party head Y

Chang, and the Choson Ilbo, which appear aimed at t

conservative forces in the South. These attacks 

sparked tense political disputes in the ROK, wit

opposition accusing the Kim Dae Chung administra

being overly meek in response to Pyongyang’s attack

Conservatives also complain that in the rush t

engagement with the North, the accomplishments 

anti-Communist ROK over the past half century ar

69
being cavalierly dismissed even as progressives argu

preoccupation with what they call “Cold War” divisio

impede North-South reconciliation. While the charge 

opposition legislator that there are pro-North K

figures in the Blue House may not represent a cons

even among conservatives at this point, conservativ

increasingly voicing suspicion that important inform

about North Korea and North-South relations is 

withheld and that protecting the security of the ROK 

not be getting its rightful priority. As all sides see 

issues closely bound up with the critical question o

controls the country after the 2002 ROK presid

election, the ferment and strife are not likely to subs

The Policy Dilemmas.

For a realistic hope of fundamental policy chan

Pyongyang it would seem that one must have either 

to induce change in the KFR, which seems rather clo

political mission impossible, or a plan to force the K

stage, which doesn’t look very easy either. Failing eit

these, it would seem that we must take dow

expectation of change as the central case for policym

Whatever inducements we may provide, the reality 

when we talk about fundamental change in North 

i.e., reform and opening on a significant scale, we are t

about undermining the regime. We don’t always se

understand this, but Kim Jong Il does.

57

Since the nuclear issue emerged, we have tried 

number of means, such as the Agreed Framework, KE

food aid, the four-party talks, missile talks, and the o

normalized relations, to induce positive changes in 

Korea. Despite the freezing of activity at Yongbyon an

limited North-South economic cooperation, it seems 

clear that the KFR remains all too aware that openin

reform will deal it a fatal blow. The reality seems to b

(1) despite external aid, the KFR cannot fix the eco

without reform and cannot reform without undermini

70
system; (2) the KFR will not bargain away its asym

advantages because they are fundamental to r

survival; (3) as the problem is one of substance, it w

likely be fixable by any new and imaginative stru

devices; and (4) the so-called rational choice or soft la

idea is more of an evaporating hope than a viable po

The characteristics of what we may call the “po

landing delusion” phase would seem to reveal Pyong

dilemma: (1) the more time passes, the more limited a

KFR’s strategic options; (2) with reform and opening 

out, the regime has no choice but to seek aid from the 

the United States, Japan, and Europe, but even if 

tolerate dependence on its arch enemies in this mann

more aid it takes, the less it will be able to cope on i

with its internal contradictions, so that preservin

status quo in this manner does nothing to dispel the s

of failure; and (3) in the meantime, the North’s asym

weapons programs will continue.

The dilemma this poses for us is that while de

action to force the North to give up its WMD and m

could lead to increased risk of war, or at least the perc

of increased risk, inaction could mean that in a few ye

could face an equally hostile enemy with even 

menacing capabilities.

While it is arguable whether engagement provid

right environment for ROK economic recovery and 

time, the question is, time for whom and for what? 

policy is to offer rewards to North Korea in the h

encouraging reform, abandonment of WMD

North-South reconciliation, it would seem to ha

prospect of success. There is nothing else wrong with 

certainly morally well grounded, but there seems 

reason to believe that we can turn this tiger into a kit

stroking it.

If, on the other hand, the objective is to preser

status quo, the problem is that the status quo 

inherently unstable, as it means (1) continuing 

71
hostility to the ROK even if the North accepts Sou

assistance, (2) bigger and better missiles and more 

(3) increasing North Korean dependence on outside ai

(4) the danger that aid could be suspended at any poi

to provocation by the North or due to a shift in the po

power balance in one or more of the donor countries. T

may be argued, is not movement toward resolutio

rather a process of raising the stakes all around the ta

Both Seoul’s and Washington’s policies have 

attacked as grounded on unrealistic assumptions a

superficial demonstrations of problem management 

than actual problem solving. But one gets the impr

that even those who criticize do not really gras

difficulty of the problem—the depth, intensity

necessity of KFR hostility to the ROK. The problem 

the inadequacy of the Agreed Framework or the fai

the four-party talks and engagement. Whatever one 

of these devices, they are not the problem, bu

symptoms of the problem.

The conclusion is not necessarily that those wh

diplomacy and engagement are wrong, and that thos

urge strangulation are right. The conclusion is more 

(1) that the regime in Pyongyang is locked on a cours

which it cannot deviate without serious risk of fractu

that the North’s enormous internal contradictions a

anomic forces they may unleash mean that any pol

matter how well thought out and how carefully crafte

have only a very limited ability to influence Pyongyan

provide us with a measure of control over events; a

that for better or worse, at some point in the not too d

future we could again transition from a patte

incremental historical change to a moment of conv

transformation.

A final word about USFK is in order. As noted 

Pyongyang frequently accuses us of trying to stif

North. We don’t think that way, and North Korea’s 

deployments (and defectors’ reports) do not indicat

72
Kim Jong Il expects attack. Nevertheless the combina

an increasingly wealthy ROK backed up by U.S. m

power is a threat to the whole Kim family system, bec

tends to confine North-South competition to the eco

dimension in which the ROK is unquestionably supe

Euphoria in the ROK over the June 2000 su

(there’s been little media coverage in the North 

aftermath of the summit) has generated an atmosph

which both Korean and American publicists could wel

to view reduction or withdrawal of USFK as necess

sustain an unfolding process of reconciliation. Some 

even come to argue that USFK is a barrier to the s

such a process. If this argument dictates events and s

USFK be withdrawn, we can imagine two sets of judg

by future historians. If the North-South confron

should ultimately be resolved by peaceful mean

decision to withdraw will, at worst, be seen as an u

risk that we nevertheless got away with. If, as seems 

likely in view of North Korea’s continuing mi

preparations, a decision to withdraw leads to an

disastrous and heartrending Korean conflict, that de

will stand out as a piece of spectacular folly in hind

pitiless gaze.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. The names of Korean places and names (except for some 

ROK President Kim Dae Jung, North Korea’s Kim Il Sung, and 

Kim Jong Il) are Romanized in accordance with the McCune-Reis

system, less diacritical marks.

2. The term “Kim family regime” is applied for three reason

many of the regime’s elite are related by blood or by marriage. 

because, as explained in section II, the regime operates much 

crime family. Third, because we have witnessed one “d

succession,” and there are reports that another is contemplated

3. For a recent reaffirmation of this view, see “If we fight aga

imperialists, we will live. If we succumb to them we will die,” 

Sinmun, May 12, 2000. The article attributes this insight to “th

leader comrade Kim Jong Il.”

73
4. Adrian Buso, Guerrilla Dynasty, Westview Press, 1999, p

5. Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, Univer

California Press, 1972.

6. Ibid., p.783.

7. See also Suck Ho Lee, Party-Military Relations in North 

Research Center for Peace and Unification of Korea, 1989, espec

231-251.

8. This point need not draw us deep into the study of myth

Theorizing Myth, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 199

Bruce Lincoln makes the point that,

In Homer, mythos often denotes what it normally does in H

blunt and aggressive act of candor, uttered by powerful male

heat of battle or agonistic assembly.

Lincoln cites statistics provided by Richard P. Martin in The La

of Heroic Speech and Performance in the Iliad, Ithaca, NY: 

University Press, 1989, indicating that 93 percent of the tim

“mythos” or the verb “mytheomai” appears in the Iliad, the situ

one in which a powerful male either gives orders or makes boasts

context, “mythos” is always a speech of power, performed at le

public, by one in a position of authority. Normally it forces asse

those addressed, and only those equal in status to the speaker ar

contest a proclamation that represents itself as something to be b

and obeyed. Lincoln goes on to make the point that in the epic “m

did not mean “symbolic story” or “false story” or anything of t

Nevertheless, the comparison with 20th century totalitarian 

which have exploited falsehood on a mass scale, is intriguin

Swedish philosopher Ernst Cassirer, who died the year Kim Il Su

installed by the Soviets in Pyongyang, pointed out in his Myt

State, 1946, that in our own great technical age myt

manufactured just like any other weapon, e.g., machine-g

artillery pieces. This is more like the style of the Pyongyang re

9. Paektu-san, on the North Korean-Chinese border, is the 

mountain in Korea (2,744 meters), and the site where a deity is 

have descended to earth and begotten Korea’s mythical f

Tan’gun. It is thus sacred to Koreans in both North and South.

10. A recent example was an April 19, 2000, Korean Centra

Agency (KCNA) broadcast in English, which cited double rain

74
the sky on April 14-15 as proof that Kim Il Sung was a “peerless

man born of heaven.”

11. Enunciated by the Athenians when they occupied the is

Mytilene 428-427 B.C. during the Peloponnesian War. A li

Japanese popular song of the 1880s may be even more to th

“There is a Law of Nations, it is true, /but when the moment 

remember, /the strong eat up the weak.” John W. Dower, Em

Defeat, Norton, p. 21.

12. Haggard, a practicing barrister in 19th century L

authored sensational books such as She, Dawn, and King So

Mines.

13. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, address to tr

Korea’s DMZ, February 22, 1997, as released by the Office of th

Department spokesman in Seoul.

14. This does not mean that they will not meet formally wi

official counterparts, as they did in 1972, 1991-92, and the Jun

summit, when they calculate that it is to their advantage to do 

does not mean a readiness to accept the ideological and moral leg

of the ROK. For Pyongyang’s view of negotiations as a form of c

see Chuck Downs, Over the Line: North Korea’s Negotiating S

Washington, DC: The AEI Press, 1999.

15. Time, May 22, 1995, p.32.

16. Promulgated by Kim ll Sung, chuch’e is a political ideolo

applies Marxism-Leninism to the North Korean culture. “Ba

autonomy and self-reliance, chuch’e has been popularized since 

an official guideline for independence in politics, enonomics, n

defense, and foreign policy.” Mattes Savada, ed., North Ko

Country Study, 4th edition, Washington, DC: Federal R

Division, Library of Congress, 1994 (Headquarters, Departmen

Army, DA Pam 550-81), p. 324.

17. This is why we cannot expect Pyongyang to pay much at

to Seoul’s assurances that the South has no intent to absorb the 

The threat of absorption does not stem from ROK gove

intentions any more than absorption in Germany came about be

West German intentions.

18. The CFC is the ROK-U.S. warfighting component establ

1978 and headed by a U.S. four-star general who is directed 

National Command and Military Authorities of the United Sta

75
ROK. He concurrently commands the United Nations Command 

and United States Forces Korea (USFK).

19. North Korea’s total artillery pieces are estimated at 12

20. FEBAs are concentric defense lines clearly observable s

the DMZ but not in the North.

21. The foregoing data derive from an unclassified, Assistan

of Staff for Intelligence J2, USFK, North Korea Threat Briefin

2000.

22. See Gordon W. Prange, While We Slept, McGraw-Hill, 1

34-36, 124-126. In his incredibly detailed account of the Pearl 

operation, Prange explains that U.S. leaders went astray t

overconfidence in Pearl’s defenses and underestimation of A

Yamamoto’s imagination and will.

23. Assassination and kidnapping within the ROK are ex

rare, but there are occasional suspicious cases. On the night of Fe

15, 1997, an unidentified gunman shot Yi Han Yong at the doorw

apartment where he was staying in Pundang, southern Seoul. Yi 

days later. Yi, who defected in 1982, was the nephew of Song H

mother of Kim Jong Il’s oldest son. Yi, whose real name was Yi 

allowed his defection to be made public only after Song Hye Im 

sister, Yi’s mother, reportedly disappeared from their M

apartment in early 1996. Yi’s killer has not been found, b

theorized that he was killed by North Korean agents in retalia

the Song sisters’ case and a critical book Yi had written about K

Il. While there is no proof, the case has reportedly had an intim

effect on conservative writers in the ROK who might otherwise p

criticize Kim Jong Il.

24. This does not mean that all complaints by Southern grou

these issues are directed by Pyongyang, but, justified or not, agit

this kind contributes to Pyongyang’s objectives.

25. The North will also propagandize for “conf

unification”—one country, two systems—but it does not appear t

idea will have credibility or practical application in the pred

future.

26. This does not mean that North Korea will not make 

concessions from time to time by slowing or suspending som

weapons programs, but there is a difference between suspen

program and abandoning it. Moreover, the ability to m

76
underground nuclear weapons development and other under

WMD activities from outside North Korea is limited, to say the 

27. This is what defectors have told us. See, for example, stat

by defector Kim Yong Song near the end of Kim Tong Hyon’s 

“North Korea Must Go To War,” Monthly Choson, April 1994.

28. Paul Bracken, Fire in the East, the Rise of Asian Militar

and the Second Nuclear Age, HarperCollins, 1999.

29. Cited in Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, 

University of California Press, 1972, p. 1332.

30. See Dae-Sook Suh, Kim Il Sung, the North Korean Lead

York: Columbia University Press, 1988, pp. 256-257.

31. See the section, ‘Kim Jong Il, a Hamlet with Doubts,’ in C

Che’s chapter, “The Information War with North Korea,” M

Choson, September 1990, for information on a tape of a conve

with Kim Jong Il brought out by ROK film director Sin Sang Ok w

escaped from North Korean control in 1986. On the tape Kim Jon

be heard admitting that, in spite of 30 years of socialism, “We’re 

down in our own contradictions” and “cannot even feed our peo

provide them a living unless we rely on the western world.”

32. See “Putin’s Visit to North Korean Brings New Power Pa

to Peninsula,” Seoul Yonhap in English, July 21, 2000.

33. See “Cohen Doubts North Korean Missile Offer,” July 2

online at http://www.usdefense.com.

34. We are, of course, cognizant of expectations on the part 

observers that Kim Jong Il will fall victim to a military coup. S

Lee explains at some length why this does not appear likely. H

that one can hardly point to a military coup in a Communist coun

attributes this to the fact that in Communist countries, the P

sovereign and the military learn the Party’s ideology. 

comparative study of the military in the USSR, China, and North 

he finds that in North Korea the military were never abused by 

leader as in the USSR, and never played an independent politica

in China, but rather have always stood squarely and monolithi

support of Kim Il Sung and his son. See Lee, pp. 231-251.

35. Testimony, March 7, 2000, before Senate Armed S

Committee by General Thomas A. Schwartz, Commander in 

UNC/CFC/USFK.

77
36. Assistant Chief of Staff J2, USFK, Unclassified North 

Threat Briefing, May 2000.

37. See, for example, Kim Myong Chol, “U.S. Will End U

Shotgun Marriage with DPRK,” Nautilus Policy Forum, Octo

1999, www.nautilus.org. Kim, former editor of People’s Korea in 

argues that to remove the Cold War structure means to 

neutralize the American involvement in Korea, including its m

presence.

38. It is interesting that, while many call for removal of th

War structure” in Korea, the term is seldom defined. Most seem 

without explanation. To some, the term conjures up recollectio

somehow on the flight home from World War II, Korea got cau

badminton game between the United States and the USSR, an

up devastated and divided as a result of a proxy war between 

superpowers. Historical evidence, however, would suggest tha

factors made Korea a part of the Cold War. The first was Kim I

belief that unification by war under his command was essentia

own goal of becoming the leader of a united peninsula. The seco

that Stalin came to believe that war in Korea would p

rapprochement between China and the United States. The th

Truman’s perception that the North Korean invasion in 1950 wa

Stalin’s strategy for global domination, and that by interve

Korea he could prevent a third world war. There is no compelling 

to believe that Truman would have intervened had he not so bel

we accept recent scholarship indicating that the Korean War w

and foremost the product of Kim Il Sung’s appetite for the ROK 

than the proxy war we imagined for so long, then the “Co

structure” can be seen as the result of a Munich-oriented W

response, i.e., intervention to stop aggression in the embryo s

defending the ROK. Thus it was none other than Kim Il Sung 

who became the great architect of the U.S. military presence in 

but this, of course, meant the frustration of his plan to become 

“One Korea.” Viewed in this way, “Cold War” meant defense of th

There is no reason to believe the ROK would exist today if Korea 

become a part of the “Cold War.” If one believes that this should n

happened, that unification under Kim Il Sung would hav

preferable to continued division, and that unification under the 

Kim family group is still the preferred option, then ending the “C

structure” naturally becomes a code word for removing USF

dismantling the ROK-U.S. alliance so as to realize this objective 

last. When Kim Jong Il and his apologists talk about the “Co

structure,” they understand all this. They mean, “get rid of 

What others mean is not always so clear.

78
39. See, for example, Joel Wit, “Clinton and North Kore

Present, and Future,” Nautilus Policy Forum Online, March 1, 

which the author suggests that

the changes the U.S. seeks in North Korea’s secur

posture—its foregoing weapons of mass destruction, ballis

missiles and ultimately reductions in its convention

forces—are only possible if accompanied by changes in t

U.S. posture on the peninsula.

40. It is conceivable, of course, that governments in Wash

Seoul, and Tokyo might prefer not to face up to the implications 

intelligence. So-called intelligence failures are sometimes 

failures of will and judgment at the level of government 

command. Two notable instances of this occurred in 1940 wh

Belgian government could not make a decision to allow French f

enter Belgium even though they believed reports of an imp

German attack, and when the French Commander in Chief, G

Maurice Gamelin, ignored reports that the Germans had opted t

their main thrust through the Ardennes rather than further No

William L. Shirer, The Collapse of the Third Republic, Sim

Schuster, 1969, chapter 28.

41. This applies to top level leadership, as exemplified by the 

decision to reverse course and join the United Nations when it 

apparent China would not use its veto to block ROK admission

not, of course, apply to the North’s negotiators, who normally mu

instructions from Pyongyang regarding even small details.

42. Nicholas Eberstadt, The End of North Korea, Washingt

AEI Press, 1999, p. 71.

43. President-elect Kim Dae Jung visited the ROK Nav

Command, the ROK Air Force Fighter Command, and CFC on J

5, 1998, to review defense readiness and ROK-U.S. m

cooperation. At CFC, according to Yonhap News Agency, Kim sai

soldiers stationed here not only prevent a war on the Korean pe

from breaking out but also contribute to the peace and sec

Northeast Asia.” In addition, next day editions of the Joongang 

2, the Donga Ilbo, p. 4, and the Hankyoreh Sinmun on line all qu

as saying during his CFC visit that “U.S. forces must remain in t

even after unification.” Two points would seem in order abou

comments. First, President Kim would not appear to agree tha

Korea is no longer an enemy, as some who advocate scrapp

National Security Law insist, as his statement implies that th

might attack if USFK were not present. Second, Kim seems to p

79
unification under the ROK, as it is hard to imagine the North’s 

opting for a USFK presence. This implied presumption, of cour

likely come across to Pyongyang as inconsistent with Kim’s ass

that no absorption is intended.

44. Lee, of course, does not point out that the U.S. war agains

Korea stemmed from the North’s attack on the ROK. Neither 

subject the two opposite threat perceptions he outlines to the 

history. USFK did not attack the North during the several 

when the North had no WMD capability, but North Korea did a

1950 after U.S. forces were withdrawn. Lee glosses over the diffi

negotiating with North Korea about a reliable arrangement for 

arms reduction and verification of WMD dismantling. He also 

over the practical reality that the North’s WMD and conve

capabilities could be quickly and easily reconstituted, wh

reintroduction of USFK would be problematic, to say the least.

45. Mal is a monthly magazine founded by dissident journal

published in Seoul.

46. The daily official organ of the Korean Workers’ Party.

47. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is, of cou

North’s official name. Except where in a quotation, we hav

throughout this paper “North Korea” as synonymous with DPR

48. Richard K. Betts, “The New Threat of Mass Destr

Foreign Affairs, January-February, 1998. Betts notes that bi

weapons are apt to be the weapon of choice because they are eas

like chemicals, but have mass killing power, like nuclear weap

cites a 1993 study by the U.S. Congressional Office of Tec

Assessment indicating that a single airplane delivering 100 kil

of anthrax spores by aerosol on a clear night over the Washingt

area could kill between one million and three million people.

49. See “Ballistic Missile Proliferation and the Geopol

Terror,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, December 1, 1998. The artic

that the launch of Pakistan’s Ghauri Hatf-V 1,500-km-range 

April 1998, Iran’s Shahab-3 1,300-km-SSM in July 1998, and 

Korea’s three-stage Taepodong rocket in August 1998 all poi

enhanced ability to use force and threats to achieve politica

Jane’s also observed that the devastating psychological effect 

weapons is enhanced if the victim is also suffering military reve

in the case of Iran.

80
50. Richard Preston, “The Bioweaponeers,” The New Yorker

9, 1998, p. 58. Should Kim Jong Il make the big use-or-lose decisi

regard to his burdensomely expensive but still powerful m

establishment, we might learn a lot more about these perfo

characteristics than we would like to know. For an alarm

realistic treatment of “asymmetric warfare” and “catas

terrorism,” see Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, The Plague W

Martin’s Press, 1999. The hugely disruptive impact of biological w

in the event of renewed hostilities in Korea and the difficu

intelligence community faces in assessing North Korea’s bi

weapons capabilities are covered in Chapter 31, pp. 322-334.

51. See February 28, 2000, interview with Der Spiegel cite

article by Professor Yang Hung Mo, formerly of Songgyun

University, in Seoul, Pukhan Magazine, July 1, 2000, pp. 18-23

analysis of Kim Jong Il’s reasons for agreeing to a summit.

52. The announcement on July 25, 2000, that Kim Jong 

approved Hyundai Asan’s plan to build an industrial complex in 

would suggest that the latter is more likely.

53. See The Korea Times, July 20, 2000, p. 2, for an article re

that President Kim Dae Chung told the Los Angeles Time

interview published the same date that

I don’t think there are too many people who are naïve enou

to believe that things will progress relatively easily with t

North.

54. In his Monthly Choson, July 1, 2000, article, ROK 

Lieutenant General Kim Hui Sang, Superintendent of th

National Defense College, notes that,

On a television talk show a while ago in connection with t

recent summit meeting, several participants, including 

clergyman and a professor, obstinately called for t

withdrawal of USFK, an issue that had nothing to do with t

theme of the talk show. A professor who objected to th

argument was reportedly harassed in his car for about 

minutes, surrounded by some student demonstrators w

were at the talk show as observers.

See “Leading Figures Should Step Forward Against Pro

Instigators,” Monthly Choson, July 1, 2000, pp. 167-171.

81
55. See “Kim Jong Il’s Remark on USFK Examined,” M

Choson, August 1, 2000, pp. 62-66.

56. See “More Subdued North Korean Media Still Cap

Stinging Attacks,” The Korea Herald, July 17, 2000, p. 2.

57. We do not, of course, rule out practical changes s

incentives for farmers and a shift in emphasis from corn to 

farming, or a carefully controlled connection to the Internet. 

talking aboutfundamental changes, such as abandonment of the 

“liberating” the South, which would impact on the core of th

system.

58. The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organ

established as the management structure to oversee constructio

nuclear power stations in North Korea in accordance with the 

Framework.

59. We are not unmindful of the June 2000 North-South s

but Pyongyang’s need for immediate help in the form of 

fertilizer, and fuel, and Seoul’s need for vindication of its policies

at least at this stage of the game, add up to a convincing c

reconciliation.

82
CHAPTER 3

THE NORTH KOREAN VIEW OF THE

DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION O

STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS

Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr.

Sharon A. Richardson

Authors’ Note: All too frequently students and analysts of t

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) view 

actions and intentions from their own individual 

nationalistic perspectives rather than that of the DPR

leadership itself. This chapter is an imaginary rep

delivered by an intimate of the Kim family regime, express

in the tone, texture, and rhetorical stance one cou

realistically expect of such a perspective. While some of wh

is written cannot be proven by hard data, it all lies within t

realm of reasonable possibility. It is our sincerest hope th

this chapter will stimulate discussion and provide the read

with a modest understanding of our view of the way the DP

leadership thinks.

Report to the National Defense Commissi

Development of Strategic Weapon System

at the Dawn of a New Century

Introduction.

As the new millennium dawns, we are on the thres

a great new era in our 5,000-year history. The death 

Great Leader, Comrade Kim Il Sung, was a treme

blow not only to the DPRK, but also to all peace-

citizens of the world. Comrade Kim Jong Il has mos

83
carried on, and, indeed, built upon the works of his a

nation’s father. We are moving from a restrained posi

a more prominent and rightful place in the world

leader in the South, Kim Dae Jung, has asked to vi

DPRK to discuss matters of a wide-ranging interest a

have complied with his request. Many issues r

between us and those in the South, but we will procee

the meeting. We shall be cautious in our discu

considering reconciliation and the unification o

glorious Fatherland and we shall accomplish this w

outside interference.

Chuch’e has given our people the strength to b

powerful state by our own efforts

1

. Our diplo

initiatives are bearing fruit and will provide us 

increasing connections with other nations. New tie

bring new opportunities, yet we must be aware 

dangers of falling into economic servitude and depen

on economic trade with others. We must ensure th

trade using the principle of equality. We will trade o

what we need in order to maintain a self-supp

economy and not become economically subservi

another country. According to the teachings of our 

Leader, Comrade Kim Jong Il:

In order to thwart the dominationist machinations of 

imperialists and reactionaries and give a strong impetus to 

people’s cause of independence, the cause of socialism, we m

maintain the chuch’e character of the revolutionary strug

and construction and sustain their national charac

Preserving these qualities is imperative for the independ

development of the country and nation and for success 

realizing independence for the popular masses. Past experie

and lessons have proved that adherence to the chuch’e chara

and national character is the key to success in the revolu

and construction and vital to national prosperity.

Under the wise leadership of the great leader Comrade Kim 

Sung, our Party and our people have resolutely maintained 

chuch’e character and national character in opposition 

imperialism and dominationism throughout the entire perio

84
the revolutionary struggle. As a result, they have achieved 

independent development of the country and nation witho

any deviation and have won brilliant victory in the revolut

and construction.

National Security Policy, Strategy and Doctrin

Long ago our Great Leader Kim Il Sung establish

two eminent underlying principles of our na

security—the survival of the Fatherland, and the libe

of the entire Fatherland (One Choson). We are resolu

determined to fight to the death to achieve thes

principles. We openly declare that we will mercilessl

against the United States imperialists and all the 

enemies to the last drop of our blood. We will to fight 

end, and even if we lose and half our people die, they w

win the hearts and minds of our people.

Our Great Leader Kim Il Sung has likewise given f

these principles in the national military policies of the 

Military Lines” and “Three Revolutionary Fo

Reflecting these principles and policies, and wit

guidance of our Dear Leader, Comrade Kim Jong 

Korean People’s Army (KPA) has developed a st

based upon two principles—the defense of the Fath

through total resistance by the KPA and the people 

enemy, and the complete reunification of the Fath

within 30 days of the onset of hostilities.

Our KPA will achieve its goal of reunification 

Fatherland by combining “two front war” and “com

operations” utilizing overwhelming firepower and vi

under the banner of “One Blow Non-stop Attac

directed by our Dear Leader, Comrade Kim Jong Il, 

“Occupy South Korea, All the Way to Pusan, in Three D

The KPA will achieve these noble missions throu

revolutionary strength of its troops fighting with the 

of the people. Each KPA soldier is a match for 100 e

soldiers as they are filled with the spirit of human b

warriors of guns and bombs, and heroes of self-destr

85
dedicated to the defense of our respected and b

Comrade Kim Jong Il and filled with a do-or-die spir

It is with the highest sense of duty and honor th

Second Economic Committee provides the Korean Pe

Army with the tools it requires to fulfill its gloriou

victorious destiny.

2

To defend our Fatherland, as well as reunite wi

oppressed kindred in the South, we have been enga

the development and production of strategic we

systems in four broad areas—missiles, chemical, biol

and nuclear. We have been successful in our efforts 

upon the brilliant directions and revolutionary spirit 

Great Leader Kim Il Sung who has taught us that,

We must strongly fortify the KPA with modern weapons 

combat material. We must employ all means to modernize 

weapons and make them more powerful based on the succes

of ultra-modern science and technology. . . . In modernizing 

KPA and developing military science and technology, we m

fully consider the reality of our country with its numer

mountains and lengthy coastline. . . . We must develop 

introduce military science and technology in accordance w

the reality of our country and correctly incorporate old s

weapons along with modern weapons.

During the past 10 years, our progress has 

meritorious. It has not only provided the KPA with th

it needs to deter the imperialist aggressors, bu

furnished the Fatherland with significant diplo

leverage. Under the direction of our Dear Leader Kim 

Il, we have utilized this leverage to force the interna

community to recognize our rightful place. We are n

the point where the United States, Russia, China

Japan dare not formulate any policies for East Asia w

considering our demands. We have also utilized this 

achieved leverage to manipulate our enemies, especia

United States, into loosening trade sanctions, pro

economic assistance, and contributing emergency fu

food assistance.

86
In achieving these objectives we have made s

minor concessions regarding our weapons developme

production programs. Included among these have be

freezing of the nuclear program at Yongbyon, suspen

ballistic missile testing, and providing the United 

access to the strategic complex at Kumch’ang-ni. Und

brilliant direction of our Dear Leader Kim Jong Il we 

however, utilized these concessions to our great adva

while at the same time encouraging the ignoranc

arrogance of our enemies.

As the members of the National Defense Commissi

aware, this last aspect of “encouraging the ignoranc

arrogance of our enemies” was first outlined by our 

Leader Kim Il Sung in his great treatise on the 

Military Lines” 40 years ago. Since that time, 

remained an underlying principle in our product

strategic weapons. We allow our enemies to know only 

we want them to know—a very small amount—abo

capabilities, practicing deception, misdirection

misinformation in all phases. At the same time we co

to develop and expand our true capabilities in secr

doing so, we foster within their political, military

intelligence circles an erroneous picture of our spiritu

physical strength. This ignorance and presumptuousn

our enemies can be ranked as one of the greatest suc

of the Second Economic Committee.

As our great nation stands on the threshold of 

millennium, we are poised to make prodigious leaps fo

in the development and production of strategic we

systems. These developments will ensure the security 

Fatherland and propel our Dear Leader and Ch

thought to the forefront of the international commun

Ballistic Missiles.

In accordance with our primary objectives to reun

Fatherland while defending it from outside interf

and aggression, our ballistic missile program has bec

87
cornerstone. It provides us with the capability to det

enemies, deter others who might support our enem

attacking us, inflict punishing damage upon anyon

would dare attack, and dramatically increases the 

ability to reunite the Fatherland in a “One Blow No

Attack” when directed to do so by our Supreme Comm

Kim Jong Il. The ballistic missile program ha

increased our international prestige and provided va

foreign currency as other nations have sought ou

assistance and missiles as they develop their 

deterrence against imperialist aggression. Most n

have been our like-minded associates in Egypt, 

Pakistan, and Syria.

During the past 15 years, ballistic missile develo

has progressed steadily. Utilizing the spirit of Chu’c

have continually increased the range and enlarge

payload capabilities of our systems. First, we prog

from the production of simple copies of the Scud to 

capable short-range ballistic missiles such as the Hw

5 and Hwasong 6. Next, we developed a medium 

ballistic missile known to the world as the No-d

Guided by the spirit of chuch’e, we then combine

existing systems to create an even longer-ranged m

range ballistic missile known to the world a

Taep’o-dong 1. This was achieved in record time a

exceeded the expectations of the world.

At the brilliant direction of our Dear Leader Co

Kim Jong Il, we then utilized this system to create the 

launch vehicle to launch our first satellite 

Kwangmyongsong 1. This same launch vehicle, 

configured as a weapon system, becomes an interm

range ballistic missile possessing a range in excess of 

km, thereby providing us, for the first time in the gl

history of the Korean people, the capability to directly 

at Alaska, the territory of the U.S. imperialists. Ou

advanced system, known to the world as the Taep’o-d

has even greater capabilities. Depending upon the 

the payload this system becomes an intercontin

88
ballistic missile capable of striking at the very heartl

the United States. This is a glorious testimony 

strength of chuch’e and the glorious and penet

leadership of our Great Leader Kim Il Sung and 

Leader Comrade Kim Jong Il.

In pursuing our ballistic missile program, we 

developed a production infrastructure that is second o

that of the United States, China, and Russia. In lin

our Great Leader’s teachings on the “Four Great M

Lines,” we have dispersed the research, production

basing facilities throughout the Fatherland to minim

impact of any imperialist U.S. attack. This ha

enhanced our abilities with regard to strategic dece

misdirection, and misinformation. It is clear that, be

of this most excellent strategy, our enemies do not h

clear understanding of our capabilities. In fact, 

obsession with the Musudan-ri Launch and Sanum

Research Facilities has blinded them. We will conti

encourage this.

If pressed, and if critical components are availab

are capable of producing 5 to 15 ballistic missiles per m

depending upon the version selected. If required, an

the financial support of our foreign friends, this ca

could be doubled within a year’s time to fulfill 

legitimate defensive needs and increase our foreign 

During the past 10 years, we have been utiliz

significant portion of our production capabil

remanufacture and upgrade our older systems to 

modern standards. As a result, our ballistic m

89

 Short range (old and remanufactured) 500

 Medium range 80

 Intermediate range and space launch 15

 vehicles

 Intercontinental range 5

 Type Numb
inventory has remained at a relatively constant level 

systems. These can be broken down as shown in above 

This inventory meets or exceeds the KPA’s require

for operations against the Southern lackeys. It doe

however, meet the projected requirements for oper

against the mainland of either Japan or the United S

Within 2 years, the current program of remanufac

and upgrading older systems will be able to addre

requirement for Japan. The U.S. requirement 

however, require an estimated 10 years. If, howeve

Libyan or Iranian friends continue to purchas

longer-range missile systems, they may be induced to 

test them. This would provide us with data to refine th

an accelerated pace.

We have faced numerous technical obstacles 

production of our ballistic missile systems. These 

centered around six critical areas:

(1) general and specialized ballistic missile d

expertise,

(2) guidance systems,

(3) engine development,

(4) warhead and nosecone design,

(5) acquisition of specialized materials and compo

and

(6) financial support.

To date, we have been able to meet our basic ne

these areas; however, the continued growth of the ba

missile program is dependent upon more compreh

and long-term solutions. Fortunately, thanks t

strength of chuch’e thought and the guidance of our 

Leader Comrade Kim Jong Il, we have been m

significant progress. Under the guidance of Ch

Russian, and Ukrainian missile experts, our designe

technicians continue to develop their own skills

90
Chinese neighbors continue their covert assistance 

missile program, providing education for our peop

critical components and materials. This is especiall

within the areas of guidance systems, satellites

advanced warhead design, including decoys 

countermeasures. Our friends in the Middle East and 

Asia also have proven to be invaluable to our ba

missile program. They continue to provide us with va

foreign currency as they purchase our missile tech

and components, access to western technologie

components denied us by trade sanctions, and a me

test our missile systems with low political risks and 

interference from the United States and the interna

community. Our cooperation with Iran also extends t

interests in satellites. Our covert acquisition pro

within Russia and Eastern Europe have pro

important results within the areas of propulsion sy

and acquisition of specialized components.

Looking forward over the next 10 to 15 years, w

focus upon improving the range to weight capabilities 

existing systems, improving guidance systems, deve

new warheads with advanced decoy and counterme

systems, launching both research (the Kwangmyongs

and reconnaissance satellites, increasing the surviv

of our missile force by the expansion of hardened s

facilities, continuing the development of unique l

platforms (especially those mounted upon rail car

cargo ships), and the accelerated developmen

short-range solid-fuel ballistic missile.

Our successes and future plans within the m

program are tempered by the huge financial burde

have placed upon us. They have forced us, at times, to 

critical decisions on which paths to pursue. Th

continued foreign sales of missile systems and techno

we plan to address this situation and enhance our ac

missile related technologies and components.

91
At the political level, under the guidance of our 

Leader Comrade Kim Jong Il, we will continue to util

ballistic missile program to confound our ene

encourage their arrogance, influence the on

international negotiations, and increase the glory of c

thought and our Fatherland.

An excellent example of how the missile progra

achieved many of these goals in the past was the laun

of our first satellite—the Kwangmyongsong 1—in 

This launch caused great panic and confusion for th

imperialists, their Southern puppets, their Jap

toadies, and others in the international community

United States had previously believed we would not b

to achieve such a capability until sometime around 

The possibility that we might follow this with a test l

of our intermediate range ballistic missile spurre

United States to diplomatic and political action. 

quickly agreed to lift some trade sanctions if we agre

suspension of further missile testing. This was accomp

by complete consternation in that country which has c

it to resolutely consider a national missile defense syst

Our missiles have caused the “mighty superpow

consider deployment of a national missile defense th

be enormously expensive, and, in the end, will fail

failure will come on both technical and political 

Within the technical realm, there are num

rudimentary methods with which to counte

imperialists’ missile defense system. With assistanc

our Chinese friends, we are at the stage where we ca

introduce these countermeasures into our cu

inventory with little or no effect on performan

degradation of our capabilities. With the implementa

any of these countermeasures, the imperialists 

expend tremendous financial and political resour

counter them. If we are careful, we can reveal thes

countermeasures in a phased manner, thereby keepi

imperialists’ missile defense effort in a state of “catch 

many years. More significantly, the U.S. imperialists

92
again, fail to understand the political nature of our str

While there is little doubt that for the next 15-20 yea

United States has the capability to eventually depl

technical means to counter most of our missiles, we w

victorious if only one out of a hundred of our missiles 

within their homeland!

Furthermore, the U.S. imperialists’ efforts to de

national missile defense system have angered our R

and Chinese friends and their own allies. For Russia, 

national missile defense system means that it must a

or abrogate their mutual antiballistic missile (ABM) t

For the Chinese, it means that they would have to g

expand their strategic missile forces. In both instan

has resulted in the increased willingness of both Russ

China to share ballistic missile, satellite, and space-r

technologies with us, and has decreased their willingn

bring political pressure upon us to curtail or suspen

ballistic missile program. We must expend great 

politically to both utilize this situation to our advanta

to increase the friction between the U.S. imperialis

our Russian and Chinese friends. With regard to its 

the United States has stated it will share its new m

defense technology with them. Those same allies, me

of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a

United Nations (UN) are, however, looking at the U

States with suspicion and distrust regarding the issu

rightfully so. As with the friction between the 

imperialists and our Russian and Chinese friend

should do everything within our power on the politica

to encourage dissension between the United States a

allies. If we are successful, this entire issue is likely to 

in the decoupling of the imperialists and their allies w

end result of a much weaker foe.

All of this consternation comes in response t

launching a single satellite! Surely, by any mea

measurement, it was a tremendous succe

demonstrated by the great commotion experienced 

adversaries. It wondrously demonstrates the greatn

93
our national power and the brilliance of our Dear L

Comrade Kim Jong Il. As Sun Tzu has taught,

What is of supreme importance is to attack the enem

strategy;

Next best is to disrupt his alliances . . .

Thus, those skilled in battle subdue the enemy’s army with

battle.

Chemical and Biological Weapons.

Immediately following the Fatherland Liberation 

at the direction of our Great Leader Kim Il Sun

embarked upon the development of biological and che

weapons. Although we are a peace-loving people, we 

forced into this unfortunate situation by the barbaric 

these weapons against us during the war by the impe

United States. Since that time, the wisdom of this de

has been repeatedly reinforced as the United States a

Southern lackeys have continued to threaten us wi

use of these cruel and inhumane weapons.

Progress within the chemical weapons field adv

slowly due to the need to rebuild the nation and care f

people. Through the selfless sacrifice of our people a

strength of chuch’e thought, we produced our 

experimental chemical weapons during the late 1950

early 1960s. By the late 1960s, pilot production of s

chemical agents had commenced. Since that tim

chemical weapons program has unceasingly improve

our chemical weapons production capability ha

matured. We currently possess the capability to pro

wide range of chemical weapons, including the 

binary weapons. Chemical weapons are a vital wea

the KPA’s great inventory for both victoriously trium

over any interfering aggressors and ensurin

reunification of the Fatherland under the banner o

Blow Non-stop Attack.”

In his treatise on the “Three Revolutionary Force

Great Leader Kim Il Sung declared,

94
The Korean Workers’ Party and the Korean people will ma

every effort to strengthen their solidarity with the peoples 

Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the future as in the past a

will positively support their struggle against colonialism a

imperialism.

In line with this direction, during the 1980s we 

exchanging chemical weapons technology and weapon

with Iran and then Syria and Libya. Most recently w

expanded these exchanges to include Pakistan. 

activities have provided us with valuable foreign cu

and access to technologies denied us by the on

sanctions unfairly imposed upon us by the impe

United States and their flunkies in the interna

community. Our efforts to covertly obtain chemical w

research and technologies within the former Soviet 

have proven to be unorganized but moderately succ

but they have also proven to be very expensive. F

efforts will have to weigh the value of what we can co

obtain against the limited financial resources we are 

dedicate to this mission.

In pursuing our chemical weapons program, we ha

directions of our Great Leader’s treatise on the “Four 

Military Lines.” We have dispersed the rese

production, and basing facilities throughout the Fath

to minimize the impact of any imperialist U.S. attack

are thus hardened and redundant. As with the missi

nuclear programs, dispersion has also enhance

abilities with regard to strategic deception, misdire

and misinformation. An unfortunate aspect of this 

we must continue to work on our chemical weapons pr

in secret and publicly deny any such capabilities

wisdom and validity of this strategy of deception is app

by the wide range of estimates of our chemical capab

by the United States. We will continue to encourage 

We are currently capable of producing a wide var

chemical agents including: adamsite 

chloroacetophenone (CN), chlorobenzylidene malono

95
(CS), hydrogen cyanide (AC), mustard-family (H or 

phosgene (CG and CX), sarin (GB), soman (GD), tabun 

and V-agents (VM and VX). For a variety of operation

technical reasons, we have concentrated upon mu

phosgene, sarin, and the V-agents. Since the produc

soman (GD) requires the use of pinacolyl alcohol, wh

currently produced by only a few companies aroun

world in extremely small amounts and has no comm

uses, we would find it inconvenient to import this che

without arousing suspicion. During the past 10 yea

have begun production of binary agents and, wit

assistance of technologies gathered in Russia and C

have begun working on third generation chemical a

These agents, due to their greater safety of handl

transit and longer period of stability in storage, g

enhance the KPA’s capability to distribute them ut

highly-trained and dedicated reconnaissance and 

troops and intelligence operatives.

Our annual production level for chemical weapo

varied considerably during the past 10 years due 

natural disasters and economic hardships we have su

These hardships have likewise affected our product

other chemicals and especially fertilizers for agricultu

average, we have produced 8,000 tons per 

Unfortunately, due to a high level of impurities with

agent stock produced (itself due to the crippling san

imposed upon us by the international community), w

dedicated approximately 50 percent of this to replac

of deteriorating stockpiles. Of the remaining 50 perce

percent goes towards building the KPA’s stockpil

percent for training, 5 percent for research, and 5 per

wastage. Under emergency conditions, and if non-S

Economic Committee resources were made availab

are capable of producing up to 20,000 tons of ch

agents a year. If required, and with the financial sup

our foreign allies, this capacity could, in a year’s tim

raised to 30,000 tons.

3

96
The KPA’s present inventory is approximately 1

tons of chemical munitions, the vast majority of 

consists of 122 mm and 240 mm artillery rockets. The

also significant numbers of 152 mm artillery shel

air-dropped munitions for the Korean People’s Air Fo

addition we maintain an inventory of ballistic m

warheads to arm 20-25 percent of the total m

inventory. The KPA currently has approximatel

chemical warheads for ballistic missiles. This inv

meets, or exceeds, the KPA’s current requiremen

operations against the Southern lackeys and pro

requirements for operations against the mainlands o

Japan and the United States.

The vast majority of the chemical weapons stockpi

stored within our forward deployed corps and are und

control of the General Rear Services Bureau 

Nuclear-Chemical Defense Bureau. Ballistic m

warheads are under the control of the Security Com

and the State Security Department.

In addition to chemical agents, we produce a wide 

of chemical defense and decontamination equipmen

have organized defensive measures to safeguard th

and civilian populations by training in the use of prot

masks, clothing, detectors, and decontamination sy

We have positioned Nuclear-Chemical Defense B

units throughout the KPA force structure. Approxima

percent of our military forces is composed of che

warfare personnel. We also require periodic che

warfare drills in addition to training for our populat

contrast, the U.S. imperialists show little concern f

Korean people, North or South. They have demonstr

lack of concern by distributing approximately 14,00

masks to Americans in the South. This distribution c

is an insufficient countermeasure to our skill and 

aimed toward carrying forward the revolutionary id

our leader. This careless response is a testament 

effectiveness of our strategy of strategic dece

97
misdirection, and misinformation. We will contin

encourage this attitude amongst our enemies.

Of all our strategic weapons programs, the res

development, and production of biological agent

progressed the slowest and is the smallest in size

reasons for this are both varied and simple. Foremost 

we do not possess the biomedical research facilit

capabilities available to the superpowers or many nat

the industrialized world. Given the limited capabili

our medical system, the use of biological weapons, at 

precarious endeavor, has the potential to be 

dangerous to us than to the Americans and their Sou

lackeys unless used on their soil. Finally, there is no n

vast biological agent production facilities. The nat

biological agent production is such that th

fermentation/brewery facilities that we have earmark

conversion to biological agent production, if neede

easily exceed all possible KPA requirements. Our c

laboratory level production facilities are sufficient f

current research and weapons inventory requirement

inventory includes: anthrax (Bacillus anthracis); bo

(Clostridium botulinum); cholera (Vibrio choler

hemorrhagic fever plague (Yersinia pestis); sm

(Variola); typhoid (Salmonella typhi); and yellow fev

this point, our research with genetic engineering and 

other bacterial and viral strains is less well develope

ideal.

At present, our most potent and effective biological 

is the smallpox virus. We can, to some degree, control 

effects by vaccinating our population, while the bala

the world basks in the false security that this disea

been eliminated worldwide and remains unvaccinate

disease kills one-third to one-half those infecte

debilitates others during the infectious phase. W

person is contagious, he may infect 10 to 50 peopl

effectiveness of smallpox, as well as our other bio

weapons, lies within our ability to employ them outsi

Korean Peninsula utilizing the KPA’s highly traine

98
dedicated reconnaissance and sniper troops, as w

intelligence operatives, to covertly distribute them in

enemies’ homeland. This method of delivery is by f

most effective since the agents will be removed fro

Korean Peninsula.

Although the majority of our biological wa

program’s research and development is located with

universities and medical research facilities, key t

facilities and production components are located on i

within the West Sea and in hardened underground fac

throughout the Fatherland, respectively. This has 

done deliberately and in line with the directions of our 

Leader’s treatise on the “Four Great Military Lines

wisdom of this strategy is apparent in the almost com

lack of knowledge concerning our biological w

capabilities by the United States. On occasion, impe

propaganda has alleged that we use those accu

transgressions against the state as subjects in our bio

warfare research. These are lies; all test subjects hav

volunteers, willingly giving of themselves for the g

our Dear Leader Kim Jong Il, chuch’e thought, an

Fatherland.

Since the 1980s, in line with our Great Leader’s tr

on the “Three Revolutionary Forces,” we have 

exchanging biological weapons research and tech

with Iran, Libya, and Syria. These activities have pr

us with access to technologies denied us by impe

United States and the international community

attempts to covertly obtain useful biological w

research and technology within the former Soviet 

have so far proven unsuccessful.

Looking forward over the next 10 to 15 year

chemical weapons program will focus upon improvi

quality of chemical agents produced, convers

stockpiles into binary agents, and increasing the q

and quantity of chemical defensive equipment availa

the KPA and civilian population. We will expan

99
research into third and fourth generation che

weapons, building upon our own research, and combi

with technology gathered in Russia and China. With

biological weapons field, our focus will be on the g

upgrading of KPA and civilian biomedical res

capabilities, research into the development of more eff

agents and vaccines, and research into weaponizat

biological agents (included within this plan 

development of an effective ballistic missile warhea

will continue to expand both our overt and covert eff

acquire advanced biological warfare technology from R

and China. With regard to both programs, we will co

our efforts to recruit a small number of critical f

nationals to assist our scientists and researchers. 

plans, however, will have to be tempered by the reali

our ongoing financial situation.

It is the sincerest desire of our Dear Leader Kim J

and the Korean people that the Korean Peninsula bec

chemical and biological weapons-free zone. Unfortun

this is dependent upon the actions of the imperialist U

States and its Southern lackeys. Despite public state

and the signing of international agreements to the con

they have continued to develop and stockpile chemic

biological weapons for use against us. Until our en

cease and desist from threatening the peaceloving K

people, the Second Economic Committee is dedica

providing the KPA with the most modern and ef

chemical and biological weapons.

Nuclear.

No other nation in the world has lived under the th

a nuclear war longer then has the Democratic Pe

Republic of Korea. This threat has presented itsel

directly against us from the imperialist warmon

United States, and indirectly through its threats a

the peaceloving people of China and the Soviet 

during the Cold War. Although the nature of these t

100
has changed with the end of the so-called Cold War, 

remains and may worsen in the future as both the 

and China assume their just and long-denied pos

within the world community. For these reasons, we 

followed the wise and brilliant direction of our leader

Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, who, in the most pure sp

chuch’e thought, have directed that the rese

development, and possession of our own nuclear we

are of paramount importance to the Korean people.

During the late 1950s, and under the greatest se

we began to take the preliminary steps towards our 

producing nuclear weapons. While our friends with

Soviet Union and China helped us with basic n

research capabilities, they would not provide us wi

knowledge we required to produce nuclear wea

Therefore we were totally dependent upon the guida

our Great Leader Kim Il Sung and chuch’e tho

Gradually, as the years passed we developed a basic n

research capability during the 1960s. We expande

slowly during the early 1970s. During the late 1970s

though we did not possess fissile material or sophist

weapons designs, we established a nuclear we

program and initiated the design for a nuclear w

During the early 1980s, we concurrently initiated a 

range of nuclear programs designed to provide us wi

technical expertise and fissile material we required to 

an arsenal of weapons.

Our scientists had narrowed the production of 

material to two methods—uranium enrichment th

electro-magnetic isotope separation (EMIS) and plut

extraction through chemical reprocessing. We in

pursued both; however, this proved to beyond our l

financial and technical capabilities, so we concentra

the production of plutonium. The EMIS effort proc

but at a much reduced level and as a fallback positi

the end of the 1980s, in a demonstration of iron wi

chuch’e strength, we had achieved a working n

weapons design. The production of fissile mat

101
however, had lagged behind due to technical limita

financial considerations, and natural disasters. Duri

early 1990s, overcoming all obstacles and in a gl

testimony to the insightful wisdom of our Great Leade

Il Sung and Dear Leader Kim Jong Il, our scie

collected sufficient plutonium from our pilot reproc

facility and assembled the Korean people’s first n

weapon. It was a glorious moment in the history of the 

and a testimony to the majesty of chuch’e strength.

Regrettably, as a result of the traitorous acts of 

weak-spirited, impure individuals, we were unable t

all our efforts from the snooping American imperialis

their stable boys in the United Nations. During the 

1990s, tensions between our nations rose dangerousl

we headed toward war. Through the completely penet

perspicacity of our Great Leader Kim Il Sung and 

Leader Kim Jong Il, and the preeminence of our negot

we avoided a cruel and costly war for the Korean peop

forced the most powerful nation in the world to sig

Agreed Framework with us on October 21, 1994.

The sheer brilliance of this negotiating effort is app

only to those faithful to chuch’e thought. On the surfa

agreement is humiliating to the Korean peopl

decimates our ability to produce nuclear weapon

imperialist Americans’ greatest fear. In exchange f

construction of two light-water reactors (LWRs), we a

within the framework to suspend operations of 

megawatt (MWe) reactors and the Radiochem

Laboratory at Yongbyon; halt construction of the 50 

and 200 MWe reactors at Yongbyon and T’ae

dismantle these and several other facilities by the tim

LWR project is completed; come into full complianc

the safeguards agreement with the International A

Energy Agency (IAEA); and permit the safe disposal 

fuel rods from the 5 MWe reactor. The United 

oversaw the creation of a new organization—the K

Energy Development Organization (KEDO)—to con

the two 1,000 MWe light-water nuclear reactors by 20

102
compensation for the loss of electrical production fro

50 MWe and 200 MWe reactors, it agreed to provide u

heavy oil (at a rate of 500,000 tons annually) until th

LWR was completed. Additionally, the United S

agreed to upgrade its relations with us. The half-

insipid Americans were euphoric and boasting to the 

of their victory over us. This ignorance 

presumptuousness can be ranked as one of the super

achievements of chuch’e thought.

The reality of the situation is, however, quite diff

attesting to the illustriousness and genius of our 

Leader Kim Il Sung’s treatise on the “Four Military 

40 years ago. Therein he directed that we pr

deception, misdirection, and misinformation in all ph

our production of strategic weapons. Yes, we agr

abandon—at great financial cost—our reactors at Yon

and T’aech’on and the Radio Chemistry Laborat

Yongbyon. This, however, has by no means halte

production of fissile material and nuclear weapons.

When we realized during our negotiations wh

would have to “surrender” to the ignorant America

took appropriate steps to continue the production of 

material and nuclear weapons. The EMIS program, 

had been proceeding in complete secrecy at a slow

successful—pace, was assigned the highest priorit

resources were quickly transferred to it. The pilot che

reprocessing plant—which had been placed in car

status with the opening of the Radio Chemistry Labo

at Yongbyon—was reactivated, and we initiated a pr

to expand the capacities of the few small research re

located throughout the Fatherland—which the sno

American imperialists and their washwomen know n

about.

We also tripled security and secrecy at all our n

weapons related facilities; redoubled our efforts to co

acquire nuclear materials and technologies from our f

within the former Soviet Union and China; and exp

103
our nuclear weapons design team so they could acce

their design of an enriched uranium weapon w

sacrificing their ongoing work on refining plut

weapons.

In pursuing our nuclear weapons program, we 

covertly developed a research and production infrastr

that is second only to that of the superpowers. In accor

with the “Four Great Military Lines,” we have dispers

nuclear research and production facilities througho

Fatherland. As indicated above, concerning the Am

perceptions of the 1994 Agreed Framework, this disp

program has enabled the Korean people to achieve a 

level of strategic deception, misdirection

misinformation with regard to our nuclear we

capabilities. In fact, their obsession with the facili

Yongbyon, Kumch’ang-ni, and the LWR continues to 

them. We will undertake every effort to encourag

reinforce this.

During the past 10 years, we have produce

acquired enough fissile material to make some 5 

nuclear weapons. The actual number of weapon

constantly fluctuated as we add to our stockpile of 

material and as bomb designers continue to refin

efficiency of their designs. In addition to these fa

changing KPA and National Defense Comm

directives have, at times, called for the developm

larger yield weapons, which naturally require g

amounts of fissile material and result in an overall 

number of weapons. At present, our nuclear we

inventory consists of the following.

104

 Plutonium implosion 3

 Enriched uranium 4

 Experimental devices 2

 Type Numb
This inventory does not meet the KPA’s requireme

operations against the Southern lackeys, which c

10-20 nuclear weapons in the 30–60 kiloton range. N

does it meet the projected requirements for an add

10-20 nuclear weapons in the 30–60 kiloton ran

operations against the mainland of both Japan an

United States. If pressed, and if critical componen

made available, we are capable of re-engineerin

inventory into approximately 20 smaller nuclear we

This, however, still does not meet our overall requirem

With our growing ballistic missile capabilities we p

the ability to employ this limited arsenal of nuclear we

throughout the Korean Peninsula and most of Japa

our crude nuclear warhead. We do not currently pos

workable nuclear warhead for our systems that can 

Alaska, Hawaii, and the United States mainland.

4

We have faced numerous operational and tec

obstacles in the development and production of our n

weapons. The most significant has been the productio

acquisition of fissile material. This obstacle almost at

critical nature with the signing of the 1994 A

Framework. Through the ingeniousness of our 

Leader Kim Il Sung and Dear Leader Kim Jong 

however, avoided the crisis and developed new 

sources for fissile material production. These source

slowly expanded during the past 6 years. If our c

nuclear relationships with Pakistan and others conti

develop favorably, we could possibly double our inven

fissile material in the next 10 years.

Additional operational and technical obstacles 

centered around seven critical areas:

(1) general and specialized nuclear weapons d

expertise;

(2) nuclear warhead design for our long-range ba

missiles;

(3) acquisition of specialized materials and compon

105
(4) financial support;

(5) the need for an extremely high level of secrecy

(6) safety; and

(7) the political inability to field test our core we

designs.

To date, we have been able to address most of our 

requirements; however, the continued development 

nuclear weapons program is dependent on 

comprehensive and long-term solutions. The safety 

within the nuclear program has proven to be diffic

stabilize as is evident by the significant number of w

who have experienced serious radiation illnesses an

small number who have died due to quality control 

and human error. While this is regrettable, our w

continue to be highly motivated and willing to make 

sacrifices to persevere with this important work an

development of the decisive weapon. In the end, w

continue to prevail. We must, however, improve safet

most critical requirement—the testing of our core we

designs—remains unfulfilled. Our developing rel

with Pakistan have, however, provided us with extr

valuable technical information with which to evalua

designs. It is conceivable—and we are working towar

goal—that in the future, with favorable political cond

the Pakistanis will test a weapon designed t

specifications. 

To address other critical areas, we have attemp

hire Chinese, Russian, and Ukrainian experts. T

however, present a serious threat to the secrecy 

nuclear weapons program. To date, the few that we 

hired have shown no desire to return to their home na

Our Chinese neighbors continue their low-level, 

assistance to our nuclear program by providing edu

for our people and some critical components and mat

This assistance must be closely monitored, because 

may compromise our secrecy. Our friends in the Middl

106
and South Asia also have proven to be invaluable 

nuclear weapons program as they provide us with ac

Western technologies and components denied us by 

sanctions. Beside Pakistan, our cooperation with Ira

extends to their interests in nuclear weapons. 

however, remains at a low level.

Our covert acquisition programs within Russi

Eastern Europe have proven to be moderately succ

although extremely expensive due to the inexperience 

personnel we dispatched, the sophistication of the crim

in Russia, and joint United States, Russian, and Eur

Community efforts to prevent the sale of nuclear r

technologies or specialized equipment and fissile ma

Despite the extreme expense, we will carry on these e

Probably the single greatest obstacle to the con

growth of our nuclear weapons program is the im

financial burden it has placed upon the Fatherland a

Korean people during these past 10 years of n

disasters and economic hardships. With the resolu

fatherly guidance of our Dear Leader Kim Jong Il and 

in chuch’e thought we have, and will continue to, ove

this onerous obstacle as well.

During the next 10 to 15 years we will focus on imp

the sophistication, reliability, and yield of our n

inventory and increasing our stockpiles of fissile ma

and nuclear weapons. Our goal is to have 30 n

weapons in the 30-60 kiloton range by 2015. We int

develop more reliable nuclear warheads for our ba

missiles, develop a nuclear warhead with advanced 

and countermeasure systems for our long-range ba

missiles, increase the security and survivability 

nuclear weapons production infrastructure, and co

development of active and passive nuclear defenses f

KPA and Korean people.

With regard to increasing our stockpiles of 

materials, we are reevaluating our previous e

particularly within the area of gaseous diffusion. Usi

107
own naturally occurring resources and a gas centrifug

possible to produce highly enriched uranium suita

weapons. The U.S. imperialists waste far too much e

to produce 90 percent highly-enriched uranium for we

when a satisfactory device can be made with a s

percentage of enriched material. From 5,000 kilogram

of natural uranium, we could produce about 250 

enriched material if we were to use the standard 

imperialists, but this would require 1.5 m

kilowatt-hours of energy. Using the concentr

technique and our own resources, in accordance wi

principles of chuch’e, we have the capability to prod

suitable quantity of nuclear weapons.

For the future, the AVLIS method that requires 

technology shows great promise since its advantag

much lower energy requirement. However, obtainin

equipment is the more difficult aspect. We may be a

secure what is necessary through technology exch

The production facilities can be secreted undergrou

prevent spying from the heavens.

Under the dazzling guidance of our Dear L

Comrade Kim Jong Il and a resolute belief in c

thought, we have achieved what the Americans, 

Southern lackeys and stooges in the United Nation

even the world, had thought impossible—the produc

sophisticated nuclear weapons. We now, for the first t

the history of the Korean people, possess the ability to 

torturous and untold damage upon the homelands 

enemies. Absolutely the most glorious aspect o

crowning achievement is the fact that our intra

enemies have no idea of our magnificent victory.

While this current state is fraught with treme

danger, it also presents immense opportunities. Seei

difficulties, the United States and its lackeys believ

we are in an inferior position. They see what they w

see rather then what is really there. Guided by our 

Leader Comrade Kim Jong Il and armed with chuch’e 

108
we have achieved a level of strategic decep

misdirection, and misinformation with regard t

nuclear weapons capabilities that is unparalleled sin

days of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor. We must, 

levels, encourage this ignorance and arrogance 

United States.

Recommendations.

Recommendations to secure our future and con

sovereignty, as well as to strengthen our position 

world and ensure the continued development o

strategic weapons systems, consist of initiatives 

number of diverse, yet related areas.

• We must above all remain true to chuch’e thoug

the guidance of our Great Leader Kim Il Sung and 

Leader Kim Jong Il.

• We must continue “encouraging the ignoranc

arrogance of our enemies” as outlined by our Great L

Kim Il Sung in his treatise on the “Four Military Lin

years ago. We must allow our enemies to know only w

want them to know by practicing deception, misdire

and misinformation at all levels and in all phases 

dealings with them. In doing so, we maximize bo

spiritual and physical strength and foster their igno

presumptuousness, and arrogance.

• We should vigorously continue rese

development, and production of ballistic missiles. The

provide us with the capability to strike deep in

heartlands of our enemies with impunity, shattering 

will to retaliate. The mere existence of our ballistic m

program serves to cause division amongst our enemi

forces them to spend billions of dollars over the n

years on research and development of missile d

systems that possess only the poorest of chances in pa

neutralizing an attack.

109
• We must continue research, development

production of chemical and biological weapons at 

present levels. This will enable us either to respond i

to a U.S. attack or to achieve a devastating surpris

“One Blow Non-stop Attack” to reunify the Fatherla

• Our nuclear weapons program must continue 

utmost secrecy. These decisive weapons provide the K

people with ultimate means of ensuring the survival 

Fatherland and the dissemination of chuch’e though

• We must expand our foreign military sa

equipment and arms—especially strategic weapons, 

provide the greatest profit. If we must temporarily r

from the sale of entire systems because of some ta

diplomatic maneuvering we should aggressively purs

sale of technologies underlying our strategic we

systems.

• We must continue to expand and diversif

diplomatic initiatives by pursuing our own pol

“engagement.” This will reduce the focus on the U

States and its influence, and demonstrate that we w

be controlled by outside imperialists—including the U

Nations.

• We have proceeded with the meeting wit

Southern puppet leader, Kim Dae Jung. This pe

dialogue and allows us to gain understanding of thos

may seek to control our actions. It will likely conti

provide significant financial rewards.

• We must continue to seek our nation’s remova

the U.S. list of “states that sponsor terrorism.” Th

provide us with a superior diplomatic position with

world community which we can exploit to increas

economic stability.

• We must press for the complete removal of a

onerous and unjustifiable sanctions imposed upon us 

imperialist United States and its lackeys within the U

Nations. This will enable us to engage in trade relation

110
that are advantageous to us without sacrificin

commitment to the revolution.

Pursuit of these recommendations will lead us t

reunification of the Fatherland under the framew

chuch’e thought without sacrificing our precious inte

I sincerely hope these recommendations meet wi

approval of the National Defense Commission 

especially Comrade Kim Jong Il, under whose resple

guidance and benevolent teachings it may be accepte

implemented.

All hail Kim Il Sung, all hail Kim Jong Il, ma

brilliance of chuch’e thought shine throughout the w

Your humble servant,

Chon Pyong-ho

National Defense Commission

Defense Industry Policy and Inspection Department

ENDNOTES-CHAPTER 3

1. For an explanation of “chuch’e,” see chap. 2, endnote 16.

2. The Second Economic Committee is the organization with 

responsibility for weapons procurement, development, and sales 

the DPRK.

3. The United States and ROK currently estimate that the D

capable of producing 4,500 tons of chemical agents in peaceti

12,000 tons in wartime.

4. The United States estimates the DPRK possesses 11–1

weapons grade plutonium attained from the discharge and repro

campaign during 1989–90. ROK, Japanese, and Russian es

differ—being 7–12kg, 16–24kg, and 22 kg, respectively. The diff

reflect different assessments of the multiple reprocessing cam

during 1989-91. Estimates of the DPRK nuclear weapons inven

based upon the level of weapons design technology and qua

111
weapons-grade plutonium it possesses. The U.S. Department of 

in January 1994, reported that, depending upon technology u

little as 4 kg of plutonium would be sufficient to produce a 

weapon. With the 11–13 kg of weapons-grade plutonium that the 

is estimated to have extracted prior to signing the 1994 

Framework, it could have 1–3 nuclear weapons. If the fuel fr

May-June 1994 refueling of the 5 MWe reactor were to be reproce

would provide enough plutonium to manufacture 4–5 add

nuclear weapons. If the Japanese and Russian estimates of plu

inventory are more accurate—being 16–24kg, and 

respectively—the DPRK could possess an additional 1–3 

weapons. If the DPRK’s level of technology is higher than cu

estimated, it could produce nuclear weapons with quant

plutonium as little as 1.5–3 kg. If it achieves this level of techno

nuclear weapons could be double current estimates. The p

acquisition of fissile material from Russia, Pakistan, or elsewher

significantly increase the DPRK’s nuclear weapons inventory.

112
CHAPTER 4

THE LAST WORST PLACE ON EARTH

HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA

Jack Rendler

In most of the world over the past 40 yea

government’s legitimacy, even survival, has b

dependent upon respect for the fundamental rights 

people. Just 20 years ago, the stability and integri

government were measured by how well it could cont

citizens; today, the very need to exert such contro

hallmark of instability and desperation.

But since 1961, the people of the Democratic Pe

Republic of Korea (North Korea) have been denied c

with the rest of the world. And they have been denie

the most basic of their human rights. Since 1990, d

harsh conditions and consequences, as many as 50

North Koreans have escaped their homeland.

1

 Be

1995 and 1998, North Korea lost three million of 

million people to famine, food shortages, and r

disease.

2

 The DPRK may have the only government 

world that is willing and capable of simultane

repressing its citizens and starving them.

An understanding of the human rights cond

prevailing in North Korea is essential to graspin

worldview of the governing elite and to appreciatin

conditions endured by the people of North Korea. An

an understanding is crucial to developing a long

strategy for dealing with North Korea.

113
Overview.

Gathering data on North Korea is notoriously dif

Anyone with the intention of researching anything w

denied entry or will not see much. The government 

DPRK does not allow international inspection; it do

respond to inquiries from independent human 

organizations; it does not report to United Nations 

commissions, as it is obliged to do. There is no one 

where an independent, comprehensive review of h

rights in North Korea can be found. This a

summarizes what can be said from the sources avail

North Korea has ratified the International Coven

Civil and Political Rights, the International Covena

Economic, Social, Cultural Rights, and the four G

Conventions. The DPRK therefore owes its own ci

and the world community a commitment to the provis

those documents. 

But the government of the DPRK regards interna

human rights, particularly individual rights, as alie

illegitimate. With the exception of the ruling elite, all 

people of North Korea have been deprived of their 

human rights. It is said that the paramount leade

Jong Il, is the only free North Korean.

3 The gover

keeps the world from North Korea and the citizens of 

Korea from each other. 

Those who are assumed to be disloyal to the regim

arrested, imprisoned, tortured, starved, and exec

North Korean citizens do not have the right to prop

influence a change of government. The government fo

resettles politically suspect families. Religious prac

confined to state-sponsored Christian and Bud

services. Travel within the country is severely rest

and attempting to leave it is likely to result in bea

imprisonment, and, in some cases, executio

government human rights commission does not resp

requests for information or investigation.

4

114
The governments of the People’s Republic of 

(PRC) and the Russian Federation are delivering 

Korean refugees to DPRK authorities against their w

clear violation of the Convention Relating to the Sta

Refugees (1951).

Dissidents who have successfully fled report wides

crime and a constant struggle for survival. Members 

armed forces are reportedly stealing food, livestock

household utensils. Hundreds of thousands are mov

search of food, despite official restrictions.

5

Human Rights Inside North Korea.

The DPRK currently holds at least 200,000 peo

political reasons.

6

 It is estimated that about 40

prisoners have died in the camps since they 

established by Kim Il Sung in 1972.

7

Such prisoners may be held in any one of a var

facilities: detention centers, “No. 69” labor rehabili

centers, juvenile centers, maximum security pr

relocation areas, and sanitoriums.

8

 “Reeducation th

labor” means forced labor, usually logging or mining, 

brutal conditions. Entire families are detained beca

supposed political deviation by one relative. Fam

including children, may be imprisoned together. Und

concept of “collective retribution,” children are punish

the political sins of their parents, denied education

socially ostracized.

9

In a 1988 report by the Minnesota Interna

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, and Asia W

No. 69 labor rehabilitation centers were found to e

nearly every city and county, each center conta

between 100 and 200 people. The same report cit

existence of 12 to 16 labor camps with a population of 

2500 in each camp.

10

Amnesty International has said of these people:

115
Many of those named in this report are “forgotten prisone

whose fate remains unknown after decades of official silen

Some of those named may have died in prison. Others may 

be detained, after 30 years or more. Some of the prisoners w

last seen alive in 1990, others have not been heard of 

decades. Amnesty International is concerned that they may 

prisoners of conscience, arbitrarily imprisoned in violatio

international human rights standards.

11

DPRK laws do not prohibit torture, and most po

prisoners are tortured. Methods of torture in

whipping; humiliations such as public nakedness; 

beatings; electric shock; force-feeding water, then ju

on the prisoner’s abdomen to make the water com

again; and prolonged periods standing on ice outs

winter. A common method is called “the airplane,” 

prisoners are hung upside down, spun, and be

“Punishment cells,” constructed so that a prisoner c

stand up or lay down, are used as a consequen

breaking prison rules. Many prisoners have died 

starvation and illness.

12

There are more than 47 provisions in the Pena

which call for the death penalty, including “crimes a

state sovereignty” and “crimes against the 

administration.” Prisoners are executed in p

sometimes for offenses as trivial as petty theft, occasi

in front of large crowds which include young children

The government detains and imprisons people a

There have been “disappearances”—people taken 

their homes and sent directly to prison camps.

14

 Ju

review does not exist, and the criminal justice s

operates at the behest of the government. The 

Security Ministry decides who will be punishe

Ministry of State Security decides on the penalty

accused is entitled to representation, but the la

primary role is to persuade the accused to confess.

15

All forms of information are controlled b

government. Indoctrination is supported by neighbo

116
associations and schools at all levels.

16

 The opinions 

North Koreans are monitored by government se

organizations, and electronic surveillance is used in 

private homes.

17

 Radios available to most North Ko

receive only government broadcasts; loudspeak

gathering places broadcast government programs. 

demonstrations have been staged involving as ma

500,000 people. All organizations in North Korea hav

created by the government; independent public gath

are not allowed. The General Federation of Trade Un

used to monitor the political opinions of workers. 

government monitors telephones calls and mail; telep

are not equipped to receive calls from abroad. Listen

broadcasts from abroad is forbidden.

18

Apart from a few Buddhist and Christian se

sponsored and monitored by the government, all re

activity is discouraged. There is no artistic freedom; 

must gild the myth of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.

The government of the DPRK divides the entire s

into three classes: core, wavering, and hostile; the

further subdivisions based on an assessment of loya

the regime. The regime classifies 27 percent o

population as hostile, and an additional 45 perce

wavering” As a result, approximately 15 million peop

denied access to decent education, employment, ho

and medical care, and they get less to eat. Childr

denied adequate education and are punished because 

loyalty classification of members of their family.

20

The government has forcibly relocated hundr

thousands from Pyongyang to the rural areas, inc

people with disabilities or deformities.

21

 Th

Committee on the Rights of the Child has found th

DPRK denies its children basic rights, and pursues “d

discrimination against children with disabilities.”

22

The government of the DPRK does not allow freed

movement. Leaving the country is considered tr

punishable by long prison terms or execution. Gover

117
regulations and practical difficulties make travel w

the country all but impossible. As a result, most 

Koreans live, work, and shop in self-contained ho

units.

23

Perhaps the most damaging human rights violat

the DPRK is its deliberate withholding of food and m

care from millions of people. Since 1995, floods, dro

mismanagement, and the end of food aid from the 

Union resulted in severe food shortages and famine. 

1995 to 1998, several thousand children died each m

Researchers from the World Food Program, the U

Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the Eur

Union found that 62 percent of children under 7 year

stunted growth; international assistance is feeding a

every North Korean child under that age. UNICE

estimated that about 80,000 children are likely to di

hunger and disease, and 800,000 more are sufferin

serious malnutrition.

24

The DPRK has refused to allow human right

humanitarian aid organizations to assess the full ex

the crisis. In September 1998, Medecins Sans Fron

the largest aid group in North Korea, pulled out beca

government interference in the distribution of food a

suspicion that food aid was being diverted to the mi

Other independent nongovernmental organiza

(NGOs) have reported that food was being distribu

the basis of loyalty to the state, effectively leaving ou

most in need.

25

With a negative economic growth rate over the l

years, famine, and the disintegration of the Soviet U

North Korea has been forced into a position of subm

to negotiation in exchange for food. American dema

inspect suspected underground nuclear we

construction sites were met by North Korean insiste

$300 million in cash and food aid for the privilege

recovery of the bodies of Korean War MIAs was 

when North Korea demanded new humanit

118
assistance, including construction of factories. In mid

2000, North Korea announced plans to ask donor cou

for $250 million to relieve hunger and to a

self-sufficiency in food production.

26

Refugees.

Article 47 of the Criminal Code of North Korea st

A citizen of the Republic who defects to a foreign country or 

the enemy in betrayal of the country and the people . . . shall 

committed to a reform institution for not less than 7 years. 

cases where the person commits an extremely grave offen

he or she shall be given the death penalty.

The vast majority of North Korean refugees are l

in the Northeast provinces of the PRC; several thousa

in the Russian Federation. Estimates of the total r

population in the PRC vary wildly, from the 10,000 re

by the Chinese government to the 300,000 estima

local NGOs. The most rigorous field surveys sug

number of 140,000 to 150,000 North Korean refug

China.

27

The border between North Korea and China str

850 miles and offers many opportunities for a safe cro

Most crossings happen on winter nights over frozen r

Most refugees cross the Tumen River; some cross th

River or through the forests around the Cha

mountains. People usually travel in small groups of 

five; some cross by paying commercial carriers or by b

North Korean border guards.

28

Most refugees seek protection and housing fro

Korean-Chinese communities in the Yan

Korean-Chinese autonomous district. Others (slight

than half of the total refugee population) live in the 

Northeast states of Liaoning-sheng, Jilin-sheng

Heilongjang-sheng.

29

119
Some may find shelter and assistance with relat

acquaintances, and ethnic Koreans unknown to them 

provide food, medicine, and small sums of money in 

for performing household chores. Many of these peo

on to perform work arranged by these hosts.

30

The vast majority of refugees in China (perha

percent) left North Korea in search of food and are unw

to return until the food supply and distribution impr

While North Koreans may be driven to China by hung

government of the DPRK regards them as traito

leaving; their return means political persecution. 

Most refugees are single adults between the ages 

and 30, with no dependents. They are likely to be 

shattered families that have lost at least one member 

shortage or famine. Most are from urban areas, alt

refugees from rural areas and areas far from the bord

increasing. Few refugees have been in China for mor

2 years; some return to North Korea with food; other

been forcibly repatriated.

32

The men are usually laborers with a high 

education; they perform the kind of work no one els

do—cutting rock, mining, moving human waste. W

work in restaurants, do housekeeping, attend to pa

they also work in “entertainment,” from which th

often forced into prostitution. Many are able to s

China by virtue of marriage to a Chinese national. 

women are married by introduction, others are s

human traffickers; some escape, but most stay on in o

be fed.

33

Perhaps as many as 50,000 North Korean re

women have been sold by Chinese criminals to C

purchasers, many for the purpose of sexual slavery. 

women frequently become the victims of confinemen

sexual abuse. Unwanted pregnancies often result in 

performed abortions; proper follow-up care is 

possible.

34

120
Most refugee children are male, over 10 years old

have lost at least one parent. Most roam around and b

food or money, sleeping in streets and public squares

young children cross the border in groups and stay to

as they move from village to village. Such groups are 

detected and returned; about half the North K

children in China have arrived and been returned 

three times. All of these children exhibit profound ph

and psychological damage.

35

Chinese police have markedly increased expulsi

North Koreans; the number has more than double

year to about 2,000 per month. In January, the U

Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Re

(UNHCR) granted refugee status to seven North Ko

but China sent them back anyway. The PRC does not p

the UN or other international groups to inves

conditions on the border, although China is party to tr

that should permit such investigation.

North Korean refugees arrested in China are sent 

a Chinese detention camp or prison where they remai

week to a month. In April 2000 about 100 North Kore

a detention center in Tumen rioted and held guards h

to protest China’s program of forced repatriation.

36

Refugees are returned to North Korea where th

interrogated at an intelligence agency office at the b

They are then sent to a detention camp near the borde

from there to another detention center in or near 

hometown. An intelligence agency office in the reg

their hometown determines punishment.

37

They are then sent to one of four places: home, 

camps, prisons, or camps for political offenders. W

children, and the elderly are usually “re-educated” in 

home areas through 3 to 7 days of violent languag

beatings. Young people over 16 are most often sent to 

education camps. Those accused of smuggling or traff

receive prison terms ranging from 1 to 15 years. 

accused of meeting South Koreans are sent to cam

121
political offenders. All detention and imprisonme

accompanied by wretched conditions, beat

ill-treatment, and torture.

38

There are approximately 6,000 North Korean re

in camps in the Russia. They come largely from lo

sites run by the DPRK in the Khabarovsk and Amur r

of the Russian Far East. Most were sent to work legal

left the sites with the intention of not returning to 

Korea. Some made their way illegally into Russia dire

from China. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, loo

controls resulted in higher numbers of North K

workers leaving their sites for other parts of Russia.

At the larger sites there appear to be two prisons, o

criminals and one for political offenders. Po

infractions include criticizing North Korea and challe

camp authorities. Food is inadequate; discipline is 

and includes ill-treatment such as shackles an

weights.

40

Russia is pursuing a policy of tolerating North K

refugees without granting them refugee status or 

permits. Refugees must still fear being arrested as 

aliens by Russian law enforcement, as well as appreh

by the North Korean Public Security Service. North K

agents also pursue people who have helped the refu

North Korean security forces, sometimes on the terri

the Russian Federation, have executed appreh

refugees. The prospect of being returned to North Kor

led some refugees to desperate acts: perpetrating cri

order to be sentenced to Russian prisons and comm

suicide.

41

South Korea has a policy of accepting and ass

refugees from the North. Despite this, there are fewe

1,000 refugees in the South, fewer than 120 in S

There are several reasons for this: the stigma attac

South Korea in the minds of North Koreans; the 

danger to family members remaining in the Nort

increased time and procedures for acceptance; an

122
long-term record of difficulty for refugees in adjusting 

in the South. The vast majority of refugees (perha

percent) would rather stay in China than live in 

Korea.

43

Strategy and Action Recommendations.

In the past year, North Korea has taken a num

steps toward ending its isolation. Diplomatic relation

resumed with Italy in January, and with Australia a

lapse of 25 years. Similar overtures have been m

Britain and Canada. On May 29-31, Kim Jong Il m

secret visit to Beijing (his first since 1983) to mee

Chinese President Jiang Zemin. Jiang is likely t

North Korea before the end of the year 2000. U.S. and 

Korean officials have been engaged for 6 years in a se

talks on tracing U.S. soldiers missing in action duri

Korean War, and on North Korea’s civilian atomic 

plants and intentions regarding nuclear arms manufa

Similar meetings are taking place with Japan. The 

has agreed to allow Hyundai of South Korea to dev

tourist facility in the Diamond Mountains, for $906 m

over 6 years. North Korea showed a likeliho

participating in ASEAN meetings on defense and str

issues in Bangkok in July 2000, and the DPR

expressed interest in joining the Asian Develop

Bank.

44 Reuters reported that Kim Yong-nam, presid

the presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, 

represent North Korea at the UN Millennium Sum

September.

45

• The open countries of the world, especially Japa

United States, and South Korea, should seize this op

to extend their ties with the DPRK. Such contact, ov

long term, offers the best chance of bringing change 

government and to the people of North Korea. At the 

time, there must be a greater sense of urgency for imp

the human rights of the people of North Korea.

123
• The United States should pursue a strate

securing constant improvement in the human 

performance of the DPRK. Development 

implementation of such a strategy should be accomp

in conjunction with other open countries important 

leadership of the North Korea: Japan, France, Ita

United Kingdom, and Australia.

• The basic message of negotiations should be: W

do business with you, but it will be a good deal easier 

would undertake the reforms necessary to assure resp

human rights. In negotiating with the DPRK on h

rights issues, the United States should maintai

forward position: economic favor should follow po

reform; the rights of the North Korean people should 

held hostage to an endless series of economic deman

• Relevant North Korean officials, especiall

Ambassador to the UN, should have the opportun

frequent contact with the Assistant Secretary of Sta

Democracy, Human Rights and Labor.

• Offers of international humanitarian aid sho

made, but should be contingent upon indepe

monitoring of its distribution. Such aid should be 

in-kind rather than in currency.

• The UN should take primary responsibili

long-term monitoring of the human rights situat

North Korea, and in areas of China and Russia adjac

the North Korean border. Priority should be giv

arranging a meaningful fact-finding mission 

independent, international human rights organizati

• The Secretary General of the UN should make i

that, since the DPRK has ratified the Interna

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adherence 

principles is not a casual consideration.

• The World Trade Organization and 

international trade and labor groups should make i

that forced labor of any kind is unacceptable. The 

124
Bank and the International Monetary Fund should 

future loans contingent upon measurable improvem

the protection of human rights.

• At a minimum, the government of North 

should:

... make a meaningful commitment to implementi

rights and procedures guaranteed in the 

Korean Penal Code;

... amend Article 47 of the Criminal Code to bring 

conformity with international standards;

... ensure that no form of torture occurs anywher

... provide the information about individuals, g

and prisons requested by human rights groups

... discontinue the harassment, imprisonment

ostracism of North Korean refugees abroad

returned refugees at home.

• The PRC is the key on the status of refugee

UNHCR should press the DPRK to fulfill its oblig

under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Sta

Refugees, accord displaced North Koreans in China r

status, and press the PRC to protect and provide for 

Korean refugees in China. The government of the 

should alter its policy of forced repatriation of North K

refugees, and adopt guidelines consistent with the 

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The C

government should provide special protection and su

to North Korean refugee women and children, and 

prevent the sexual slave trade on the border.

• Russian authorities should bring an immediate 

North Korean Public Security Service (PSS) operati

Russian territory. No North Korean workers who are 

in the DPRK should be forcibly returned by Russia. R

authorities should take responsibility for preve

ill-treatment of North Koreans at all work sites.

125
Conclusion.

For peace and freedom in East Asia; for con

rapprochement among the United States, the PRC

Russia; and for further reduction of nuclear weapo

stable and secure North Korea is essential. A reg

stable and secure only when its assumption of legitim

matched by its protection and promotion of fundam

human rights. Kim Jong Il’s regime must be regar

fundamentally unstable. The economy is so ruine

North Koreans flee to China to seek a better life. The 

suffer famine and a chronic shortage of food. M

spending and priority cannot be sustained. The 

citizenry is repressed, and political prisoners are h

vast numbers. 

The Economist recently remarked:

To contemplate North Korea is to stare into the abyss. There 

those who argue that if North Korea fails to reform, its reg

will collapse. Others retort that, on the contrary, collapse 

follow directly from reform. Probably both are right.

46

One of the greatest ideas of the philosopher, Conf

regards the nature of power. He said that there wa

one legitimate purpose of power, whether you use 

leader, a parent, or simply a human being—to work f

well-being of the powerless. Confucius believed tha

other use of power constituted an abuse that would re

the loss of power.

47 Work to secure human rights f

people of North Korea is good policy: politi

strategically, and morally.

ENDNOTES-CHAPTER 4

1. U.S. Department of State, “Democratic People’s Rep

Korea,” 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Wash

DC: U.S. Department of State, February 25, 2000.

2. Elizabeth Rosenthal, “In North Korean Hunger, Le

Stunted Children,” New York Times, December 10, 1998.

126
3. Cho Hyuk, “Addressing North Korean Issues,” Life and 

Rights in North Korea, Seoul: Citizens Alliance for Political Priso

North Korea, Autumn 1999, pp. 8-18.

4. U.S. Department of State.

5. The Economist, July 10, 1999.

6. U.S. Department of State.

7. Sung-Chol Choi, ed., The International Community and 

Rights in North Korea, Seoul: Center for the Advancement o

Korean Human Rights, 1996, p. 11.

8. David Weissbrodt et al., Human Rights in the Democratic 

Republic of Korea, Minneapolis: Minnesota Lawyers Intern

Human Rights Committee, 1988, pp. 101-108.

9. U.S. Department of State.

10. Weissbrodt, pp. 100-101.

11. Amnesty International, New Information About P

Prisoners, London: Amnesty International, June 1994.

12. Testimony of Sun Ok Lee and other former detainee

especially Larry Diamond, Voices from the North Korean Gulag

Life and Human Rights Press, 1998.

13. Amnesty International, Democratic People’s Republic o

Public Executions: Converging Testimonies, London: A

International, January 22, 1997.

14. U.S. Department of State.

5. Weissbrodt, pp. 88-95.

16. U.S. Department of State.

17. Weissbrodt, pp. 117-118.

18. U.S. Department of State.

19. Ibid.

20. The Economist, July 10, 1999.

127
21. U.S. Department of State.

22. United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, 

dated February 1996.

23. Weissbrodt, pp. 121-123.

24. U.S. Department of State.

25. Amnesty International, “Democratic People’s Repu

Korea,” in Annual Report, 1999, London: Amnesty Internationa

2000.

26. Reuters, June 2, 2000.

27. Haruhisa Ogawa et al., North Korean Refugees/Defectors

Life and Human Rights Press, 1999. Ven. Pomnyun et al., Re

Daily Life and Human Rights of North Korean Food Refugees in 

Seoul: Center for Peace, Human Rights and Refugees, June 19

28. Ogawa, pp. 9-11.

29. Ven. Pomnyun, p. 7.

30. Ogawa, pp. 22-23.

31. Ibid., p. 13.

32. Ogawa, p. 12.

33. Ven Pomnyun, p. 25.

34. Ibid., p. 23.

35. Ibid., p. 28.

36. Chosun Ilbo (daily newspaper), Seoul, April 22, 2000.

37. Ven. Pomnyuun, p. 32.

38. Ibid.

39. Amnesty International, Democratic People’s Republic o

Human Rights Violations Behind Closed Doors, London: A

Internat8ional, December 1995.

40. Ibid.

128
41. Ibid.

42. Ogawa, p. 64.

43. Ibid., p. 18.

44. Bill Tarrant, “North Korea in Another Step to End Co

Isolation,” Reuters, May 8, 2000.

45. Reuters, June 2, 2000.

46. The Economist, July 10, 1999.

47. William Theodore De Barry, Asian Values and Human R

Confucian Communitarian Perspective, Cambridge: H

University Press, 1999. Quoted from Confucius, The Analects.

129
CHAPTER 5

CHINA’S GOALS AND STRATEGIES

FOR THE KOREAN PENINSULA

Eric A. McVadon

Author’s Note: Before the notable spring 2000 summ

Beijing and Pyongyang,

1

 China’s policies and practi

the Korean Peninsula had slipped into the backgr

American attention and media reporting China’s re

goals and strategies had been justifiably dominated 

tensions across the Taiwan Strait and their implicatio

the United States. The “Taiwan problem” is, as Chine

American leaders have repeatedly stated, the likely ca

hostile military actions between China and the U

States. The divided Korean Peninsula, jutting sout

from China’s northeast coast and blocking (with the R

Far East) China’s access to the Sea of Japan, has fortu

lost the status of a prime problem likely to kindle host

Encouraging initial views of the summit meeting be

the North and South Korean leaders has, for many K

and others, replaced fears of war with euphoria—w

warranted or not. This development, at least with res

the Korean Peninsula, should not, however, dim

interest in China’s intentions and actions concerning 

important Korean neighbors and the implications of C

policies and strategies for the United States. Indeed, 

seems all the more likely that changes on the K

Peninsula will be the catalyst for revision of the archit

of Northeast Asian security.

This chapter will examine the People’s Repub

China’s (PRC) aspirations and actions with respect 

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) an

Republic of Korea (ROK). Primary sources for this s

are Chinese officials, military officers, specialists 

131
strategic studies institutes, scholars, and practitioner

have diverse knowledge and experience in China’s se

concerns in Korea. These sources are not secret

guarded; they readily discuss China and Korea. C

positions, goals, and strategies will be analyze

implications for Beijing, Washington, Seoul, and othe

be explored. Chinese motives, as they apply to a ch

Korea and to the United States, will be examined. Pro

for reconciling divergent American and Chinese re

security philosophies, focused through the lenses 

existing regional security situation and likely change 

Korean Peninsula, will be explored. Taiwan a

reunification or other outcome deserve the attention th

currently receiving, but Taiwan will probably be o

sideshow in the bigger arena of Northeast Asian secu

the coming years. Korea is likely to be the center ring 

main performance that will help shape security rel

among the major regional players.

HOW CHINA VIEWS ITS RELATIONS WITH TH

KOREAS

China justifiably prides itself on its nicely ba

relations with both North Korea and South Korea, arg

(and convincingly so) a better balance by f

comprehensive relations with the two Koreas than t

any other nation.

2

 For much of the last decade, Beijin

perhaps the only capital to have normal working rel

with both Koreas,

3

 a situation that only now appear

changing as other important nations move to improv

relations. Russia, for example, has very recently be

mend its frayed ties with the North; Australia and 

have established formal diplomatic relations; and C

has recognized Pyongyang. Talks to that end with 

continue. Yet China recently demonstrated its preem

position with North Korea when the latter’s Presiden

Jong Il chose Beijing as his first foreign destin

conducting the stunning, secretive visit just 2 weeks 

he was to hold the historic June 2000 initial meetin

132
his South Korean counterpart.

4

 China’s uniquely ba

links with the two Koreas are especially noteworthy i

of the vast differences between the North and Sout

between the two relationships.

5

 Additionally, C

positions and policies for the Korean Peninsula are n

understood or may be widely misperceived, offerin

prospect of discovering a number of surprises, larg

small.

China and the DPRK.

“We wish that the North Korean people . . . will continue 

achieve victories in the process of building socialism w

Korean characteristics and in seeking peaceful reunificatio

Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao said at a pr

briefing in September 1998. In referring to the then rece

confirmation of Kim Jong Il as the North Korean leader, 

was quite reserved, even taciturn, saying only: “Chinese a

North Korean leaders in the past had a tradition of exchang

visits and we hope this tradition will continue.”

6

This somewhat cool official statement was mad

than 2 years ago after North Korea’s parlia

unexpectedly meeting for the first time in 4 years, n

Kim Jong Il as head of state. At that time, Kim wa

reelected (first elected in 1993) chairman of the po

National Defense Commission, with parliament te

that position the “highest post of the state.” These 

were transpiring in the wake of North Korea’s surp

launch several days before of the solid-fuel, three

rocket that flew over Japan on August 31, 1998. 

illustrate the difficulties and uncertainties that plag

PRC government as it determines how best to tre

DPRK. Now, as we have seen, Kim Jong Il has visited 

for the first time in 17 years, his first visit there as 

Korea’s leader, and his first visit in that capacity 

foreign country.

7 There was in Beijing a hosp

reception, but there were still indications of Ch

uncertainty about Kim and his policies and about 

Korea and where it is headed. Those issues a

133
appropriate place to start an examination of China’s v

the Korean Peninsula—and the PRC’s outloo

attitudes, as suggested, are not lacking in surprises.

The Concept of North Korea as a Buffer State. Amo

unexpected discoveries is the diversity of Chinese vie

the matter of North Korea as a buffer state. The ide

North Korea is a valued socialist and authoritarian 

between China to the north, and the military forces 

United States and the ROK and the capitalis

pluralistic influences of South Korean society to the 

is much more readily and widely accepted in W

academic and military circles than among Ch

academics and strategists. Some Chinese thinkers c

concept of a strategic buffer anachronistic, yet anothe

debris left over from the Cold War. Others deny 

attention is given to the buffer concept in Chinese th

about the Korean Peninsula. Still others describe the 

idea as a concept that has little validity at present, ev

was a more vital factor in earlier years.

There are stronger views: The buffer conc

abhorrent to some Chinese because it implies bot

South Korea is at least a potentially hostile p

something Beijing does not wish to dwell upon (or 

contemplate), and that Beijing might somehow be obl

to Pyongyang for mendicant North Korea’s service 

strategic buffer against hostile intrusions of various 

Further, the buffer idea runs counter to the prec

nonalignment, a notion Beijing wishes to foster conc

its relations with the two Koreas. One activ

well-informed Chinese official said that in several ye

talks between China and South Korea, in which h

participated, the buffer concept was never disc

including in private and preparatory discussions amo

Chinese delegations.

8

Another view is that emphasis on the buffer concep

for good reason, waned during the last decade

establishment first of strong trade relations and 

134
diplomatic relations between China and the Repu

Korea was a strong factor in diminished emphasis 

concept; this was reinforced recently by other fav

actions by Seoul—as perceived by Beijing. Notable a

these were President Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine 

toward Pyongyang and the South Korean Minis

Defense decision not to participate with the United St

the development and ultimate deployment of th

missile defense (TMD) systems, both occurring in 

1999. Now there is the apparent easing of North-

animosity during the summit meeting of the Kims. C

thinkers, who give weight to these particular developm

see the ROK in a new light: as simply a bilateral a

partner with the United States and not so much as pa

de facto collective security network comprising Japa

United States, and the ROK—a concept deeply troub

Beijing. For some, this brings a measure of conten

that makes it seem ludicrous that a buffer state woul

value in this changed political geography.

Capping all this is a sense of assuredness amon

Chinese that nothing is about to happen to take aw

buffer—whether they acknowledge its value (or 

necessary) or not. Any form of reconciliation or reunifi

on the Korean Peninsula is viewed by most Ch

specialists as many years away, maybe a decade or m

imminent demise of the buffer (acknowledged or not) i

fear. In this vein, there is a conviction on the part o

moderate Chinese thinkers that the United States wo

highly unlikely to move its military forces north of th

parallel even after the demilitarized zone (DM

dissolved, and that, as we shall see, it is not necessa

great Chinese concern if U.S. forces were to remain 

peninsula.

Laying out these various Chinese views is not me

imply a sweeping consensus that the concept of North 

as a valuable friendly buffer state is a dead idea. I

imply that the concept is at least no longer central to g

Chinese thinking about the future of the Korean Peni

135
At a minimum, Beijing has, as revealed in the various 

described, conditioned itself at least to the eventual d

of this buffer between its highly industrialized Nor

and objectionable influences or forces emanating fro

southern half of the peninsula. And even now the 

among important Chinese thinkers has moved very fa

general acceptance of the need for such a buffer or its c

applicability to Chinese strategic thought concerni

two Koreas, as was clearly the case in earlier year

concept of a Korean buffer does, however, survive in an

form: The Korean Peninsula, taken as a whole, is view

Beijing as a buffer between China and an increa

dangerous and active Japan.

9

 It is significant th

current buffer of import to Beijing is not one between 

the combination of South Korea and the U.S.-ROK al

but rather between China and the combination of Japa

the U.S.-Japan alliance.

DPRK Receptivity to Economic Reform: A Parable 

State of the Relationship. Pyongyang has a reputat

refusing to accept advice on how it might reform its d

economy, even disregarding advice given in a gentle, 

way by Beijing. The Chinese have tried to demonstr

example, rather than finger-waving and lecturing

North Korea has much to learn from China. Put an

way, Beijing has created opportunities for Pyongya

become familiar with Chinese economic reforms and 

domestic changes.

10

 It has often seemed that this effo

largely futile.

This popular conception, that Pyongyang 

stubbornly ignores good Chinese advice and examp

not, however, the whole story. China, indeed, con

delicately promoting economic reform for North Kore

North Korea truly is often quite unreceptive, if not w

intransigent. Among the reasons is that North Ko

believe that China has become largely capitalis

pro-American. The Chinese model, as a consequence

not seem to Pyongyang generally applicable to stau

communist North Korea.

136
Two years ago, nonetheless, noteworthy, if not swe

change began. There is now decreasing resistan

Pyongyang to China’s gentle hints about the advanta

be gained by reform in North Korea. Pyongyan

recognized that all successful countries have opened 

outside. More specifically, in 1999, North Korea obl

acknowledged the success of China’s economic reform

important step away from stubborn resistance. Pyon

now permits farmers to have the combination of smal

of land and small farmers’ markets where the produ

these plots may be sold. This is tacit acceptance of the 

China has sensitively proffered, advice offered in the f

recounting Chinese experiences, not in the form of dem

or threats to cease support. During President Kim Jo

recent visit to Beijing, he reportedly stated that Chin

scored great achievements in its reform and opening 

outside world and that its comprehensive national po

being improved and its international status is rising a

All that, Kim said, demonstrated that the policy of r

and opening to the outside world, which was initia

Deng Xiaoping, is correct, and that the Korean par

government support the policy.

11

 These were striking 

that received little outside attention; however, these 

statements, implying at least that Chinese reforms 

be employed in North Korea, were not repeated in the 

Korean press reports of Kim Jong Il’s visit to Beijing

To be specific, it should be noted that China ha

previously been altogether ignored by North Korea 

source of advice and example in confronting eco

issues. Pyongyang had, for example, accepted in e

decades essentially the verbatim version of China’s s

governing the operation of special economic zones a

use of foreign direct investment. More broadly, Pyon

has learned to some degree how to do economic reform

of it learned from China, and yet maintain internal po

stability. North Korea, nonetheless, has, at least unt

considered it essential in its careful, gradual reform p

137
not to follow the path of ideological doom down which 

has strode—as Pyongyang sees it.

That is the greater lesson reflected herein. The f

closeness between the PRC and the DPRK, “as close 

as teeth,” has been replaced by a pragmatic, even c

and quite selective, approach toward each other. B

seems purposefully to have sought the visit by Kim J

both to make it clear to all that its influence in Kore

second to none and to influence the outcome of the imm

North-South summit. Although some closure seems 

occurring now, there remains the earlier tangible ev

of a gap between Beijing and Pyongyang: Beijing ch

1996 in the United Nations Security Council to 

condemnation of the North Korean submarine int

incident in South Korea. Pyongyang initially objec

Chinese participation in the Four Party Talks. Rumor

rampant that Chinese officials simply did not like Kim 

Il personally, despite their close relations with his fa

As the president of a prestigious Chinese think tan

in March 2000, China no longer treats North Kore

disadvantaged comrade but rather as a brother. This 

that the “costs of the evening” are shared, that China 

up the tab less and expects a relationship with Pyon

more on the basis of relations between normal s

However, China provides help when needed 

understanding way.

12

 (In another vein, a Chinese spe

on North Korea noted that Beijing has little choice no

to accept and work with Kim Jong Il; it is apparent t

has consolidated power and is running North Korea

dancing together—but not too closely—has derived n

from the obvious national differences in size, popu

wealth, and geopolitical circumstances, but also fro

most salient difference, namely, that China’s leader

elected to make fundamental changes in the pr

underlying communism for China and the Ch

Communist Party. Those changes remained anathe

North Korea’s leaders. It is not yet clear wheth

138
May-June 2000 Kim visit to Beijing has remove

barrier. 

Pyongyang: Both an Irritant Rubbing Against C

Northeastern Underbelly and a Thorn under Tokyo

Washington’s Saddles. There is no doubt that one 

most prominent characteristics of North Korean lead

and its approach to international relations is what mi

termed “the three o’s”—obstinacy, obduratness

obstreperousness. It is occasionally overlooked in the 

that Beijing must also put up with its share of 

obnoxious North Korean qualities, to add yet an

o-word.

Although Beijing did not share during the early ye

the last decade the deep pessimism about the DPRK’s 

prevalent in many Western capitals, North Kore

increasingly acknowledged by Beijing as a pot

economic, political, and social disaster. And this profo

troubled country borders on an important, al

economically troubled, region of China. What is 

needed by China there, across the Yalu and Tumen R

is a stable and prosperous neighbor. Further

Pyongyang, as has been described, has not been recep

Chinese advice on reform or, for that matter, to C

advice, example, or urgings in most other areas. As ha

revealed by many Chinese who have dealt with 

Koreans, Beijing finds it very difficult to communicat

Pyongyang, and when it does try to communicat

outcome is often misunderstanding or either intentio

inadvertent misinterpretation. So Pyongyang and 

North Korea are more than an irritant to China; 

Korea is one of China’s most difficult and unple

problems to manage. Putting it in the nicest way he co

Chinese official said, “The Chinese goal is to keep 

Korea reasonable and to keep it from be

troublemaker.”

13

One of the most troublesome specific problems 

matter of North Koreans fleeing the poverty and fam

139
near-famine, pervasive in many areas near C

Estimates of the numbers of those who have a fled acro

border into China and settled there, those who mak

forays for food or to earn a bit of money, and those w

turned back, vary greatly with the source. The numbe

likely much higher than the estimates of tens of thou

offered by Chinese authorities. In any case, Ch

managing these aspects of the immigrant and r

problems and may even have increased the fo

repatriation of refugees in preparation for Kim’s arr

Beijing.

14

Most Chinese who study or deal with these pro

have not believed and do not now believe that North 

is on the brink of collapse or even that there is an impe

lesser calamity that will send hordes fleeing north

They, instead, tend to see North Koreans as even 

resilient than were the Chinese during their very 

periods of the Great Leap Forward in the 1950s an

Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and 1970s. In other w

Chinese observers believe the North Korean

accustomed to making do with very little and tolera

very abusive and ineffectual central government—th

North Koreans are and will continue to be survivors. 

over half a decade of very great North Korean misery

have been right.

Nevertheless, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA

its adjunct, the People’s Armed Police (PAP), are s

responsible sources to have made contingency plans to 

a refugee flood into China and to manage the problem 

extent feasible. The need to plan for this continge

troublesome to Beijing for two reasons that might 

obvious. First, it is a factor in considering how to disp

armed forces and, specifically, a constraint on the fr

to redeploy forces, something that could become a pr

concern if China wants to move forces southward to 

heightened pressure to bear on Taiwan or to cope 

internal or external threats posed in China’s far nort

or southwest. Even under present circumstances, C

140
top military authority, the Central Military Comm

(CMC), may well be keeping group armies and other u

Northeast China, in proximity to the border with 

Korea, that it would prefer to have moved to the eas

facing Taiwan. Second, if there arises a crisis of sign

proportions in North Korea, a CMC decision to 

blocking forces into position to stop refugee flows m

avoid the appearance of a precursor to an invasion, h

be distinguished for an international audience from a 

into North Korea, as discussed more fully later in this 

Beyond these problems, there is, of course

fundamental issue of whether and how China coul

should cope with the practical and humanitarian pro

likely in a North Korean calamity—problems tha

dwarf the experiences the world witnessed in the e

from Kosovo, for example. The PLA and PAP are 

regularly in China to aid in dealing with natural disa

especially the devastating floods and earthquake

plague China. However, neither of these forces is trai

managing thousands or hundreds of thousan

non-Chinese with whom they, for the most part, do no

a common language and whose needs will be very diffi

meet.

If China is busy enhancing PLA capability along 

lines, it has been silent, even secretive, about the end

The odds are very high that the methods employed 

PLA and PAP to handle very large numbers of ref

should such a situation develop, will be rudimentar

even cruel if measured against the norms of wor

agencies and non-governmental organizations (N

dedicated to such efforts. Beijing is highly unlikely eit

admit to the world the scope of the problem and its in

to cope or to permit prompt intervention by o

experienced in handling refugee migrations. It is al

likely that many Chinese officials are deeply conc

about that potential problem, not because they are hea

but rather because China is constrained by li

resources, is short-sightedly sympathetic with Pyong

141
current demands simply to return those who flee (so 

deter further flight), and is focused on Taiwan and per

internal dissidence. Beijing is content to relega

collapse of North Korea to the category of problems 

low probability of occurrence. Few, if any, in China se

a grotesque mishandling and mismanagement of r

hordes from North Korea could be, for China’s interna

repute, the Tiananmen debacle redux.

Pyongyang: Useful Device to Keep Washington and 

Off Balance? There is, however, another aspect of 

Korea’s penchant for being obnoxious. Some W

observers wonder if Beijing, although having, its

contend with North Korea’s bad conduct and unrelia

does not to some extent relish the fact that Pyongyang 

Washington and Tokyo reeling as well—and that Am

and Japanese leaders are far more preoccupied ove

“rogue state” than Chinese leaders. This, howev

another of those views more widely held in the Wes

among Chinese specialists. As one astute Chinese o

associated with a body under China’s State Council 

“One hears talk of using Pyongyang’s obstreperous be

to keep Washington off balance, but in fact the conce

no utility and has not been used in practice. Put

different slant on the issue, he said that there is 

validity instead to the concept that Washington 

Beijing to deal better with Pyongyang and 

(unspecified) troublemakers.

15

Other Chinese who have to deal with North Kor

too concerned with the essential effort to keep Pyon

from acting up to think that encouraging mischief or 

by Pyongyang could be useful in this overly clever w

best Washington. They also are concerned that such 

might backfire with resultant undue hazard to C

direct interests or regional stability. One Chinese o

said first that it does not seem necessary for China 

North Korea as a burr; North Korea surely does no

encouragement in this regard from any country. In his 

North Korea already creates too many troubles. Mor

142
he concluded, there are, as things stand, enough pro

between the United States and China; why produce 

through uncontrolled methods involving a som

erratic North Korea?

16

With respect to Sino-American relations, Pyong

current utility to Beijing lies, for the most part th

playing on the American conviction that Washington 

aided in dealing with Pyongyang if China is pulling 

same direction or at least not tugging the other way. B

United States and Japan are opening up to North 

and Pyongyang is at least sporadically receptive

reaching out in recent months. As Tokyo and Washin

connections to Pyongyang become more frequen

numerous and grow stronger, Beijing will be left l

with just the negative side of bad North K

behavior—worrying about how to keep Pyongyang 

control. This aspect to PRC-DPRK relations was certa

central component of Beijing’s calculus in having Kim 

prior to the North-South summit.

To put a finer point on all this, Beijing sees s

aspects of Pyongyang’s behavior as counterprod

rather than as useful in keeping Tokyo and Washing

balance. For example, in the eyes of most Ch

specialists, North Korea is seen as an excuse (and a 

excuse by Chinese reasoning) for the United State

Japan to cooperate on the development of TMD sy

that are primarily intended to contain China. Sim

North Korea is among the countries that give great im

to the American effort to persuade or coerce Mosc

modify the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. 

Washington can, because of North Korea’s ballistic m

program, make a rational case for national missile d

(NMD) efforts that Beijing sees as curbing China’s c

nuclear deterrent.

Pyongyang is often trying to Beijing even when try

be helpful. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s surp

announcement, after his unprecedented visit to Pyon

143
in July 2000, that North Korea would abandon its ba

missile program if it received assistance from 

countries in “peaceful space research”

17

 might have s

helpful to China’s crusade against NMD. Howe

Chinese official spokesman was forced to say s

thereafter that China knew nothing of the remarkab

enigmatic, proposal Putin had apparently extracted 

the Kim on this, the first visit to Pyongyang ever by a 

or Russian leader! Chinese leaders, apparently nonp

by both the announcement and its circumstances, hav

silent on its likely validity or utility in China’s campa

concert with Moscow) against U.S. NMD. President 

called President Jiang Zemin only after he had com

his trips to Pyongyang and then to the G-8 meet

Okinawa to belatedly tell him of the assurance h

received from Kim Jong Il that North Korea would ce

missile program if it received outside help in 

exploration.

18

 To make matters more trying, the Ru

announced on the day of the Putin-to-Jiang call tha

Jong Il would soon make another trip abroad, an ext

visit to Russia by train, thus seeming to upstage th

trip by Kim to Beijing a few weeks earlier.

19

PRC-DPRK Military Relations and Arms Sales. 

Korea’s armed forces, the Korean People’s Army (KP

the beginning of the last decade of the 20th century l

longstanding primary source of support, the Soviet U

China was a significant source of military equip

especially ballistic missiles and related technolo

earlier decades, when it was trying to woo Pyongyang 

from Moscow.

20

 There was also a later interlude of int

between Pyongyang and Beijing right after the eve

Tiananmen in 1989. North Korea, almost alone in the 

was supportive of Chinese actions to suppress the noto

televised uprising in the heart of China. Then in the 

North Korea’s isolation became greater than ever, 

rationally it would seem North Korea was more ne

Chinese aid and support. Instead, other factors came 

fore. The development by Beijing of close ties to 

144
starting with economic ties and culminating in diplo

relations in August of 1992, and China’s tenden

substitute its practical interests for ideolo

considerations were among the factors that came int

Related to these, Beijing wanted to have its cake and 

too: to maintain appropriate relations with the KPA 

cautiously establishing ties with the ROK armed force

another way, the PLA has felt that it must ma

relations with the KPA to balance or offset the C

military’s improving relations with the South K

military—specifically to preclude paranoid Pyong

overreacting to these improving PRC-ROK links. Th

not been an easy thing to carry off.

Nevertheless, this development was less disturb

Pyongyang (or at least they made less of it) than migh

been the case. This is, in significant measure, because 

unavoidable need for North Korean leaders to focus on 

country’s severe economic plight, the desp

requirements for other-than-military aid, and, inde

the very survival of North Korea as a nation and s

Beijing was pleased to operate in this way; it enh

China’s ability to claim the moral high ground, to poi

that it provided very little in the form of military 

Pyongyang while Washington supplied Seoul with 

amounts of weapons and military equipment and sta

tens of thousands of troops on South Korean soil. S

capitals, Pyongyang and Beijing, were sufficiently sa

(or at least distracted or content) not to press undul

more robust PLA-KPA military relationship.

This is not to suggest that there were no arm

technology transfers, and that North Korea has not 

significant requests from time to time during th

decade. According to a senior PLA Navy officer, dec

(1995) Marshal O Chin-u, then North Korea’s le

military figure,

21

 at one time requested more of wha

then China’s top warships (termed Luda-class destroy

the West) and submarines than the PLA Navy had 

three fleets combined. Other exaggerated reques

145
Chinese military officials to conclude (and some

weakly joke) that North Korea was asking for a great d

the hope of getting even a little—possibly an indica

the distance between the two militaries rather 

evidence of close cooperation.

A noted South Korean expert on China’s m

relations with the Koreas suggested a general conv

among informed observers that China

refrained from providing weapons to North Korea in 

1990s—even if the possibility that a small amount of weap

parts and military technology made its way to North Ko

cannot be ruled out.

22

Reflecting at least ambivalence among the D

leaders toward China’s potential to supply military ai

South Korean specialist quotes the very high-rankin

defector from Pyongyang, Hwang Jang Yop:

Since Kim Jong Il [the current DPRK leader] does not r

China’s military capability highly, North Korea has 

introduced weapons or the technologies for developing weap

from China.

23

It is impossible at present to say if such statement

made (or convictions held, if that was the case) becaus

were altogether true or, instead, as a conseque

Pyongyang’s pique at Beijing for the snub of recog

Seoul, even if relations with Pyongyang wer

interrupted.

It can be said that visits at the very highest 

ceased.

24

 Nevertheless, other senior government of

from the DPRK and PRC, including the foreign minis

each country, exchanged visits after formal recogni

the DPRK’s declared foe, the ROK, in August of 199

before the death of Kim Il Sung, North Korea’s long-

“Great Leader” in July 1994. These visits also in

delegations of very senior military and naval of

Indeed, it is striking (and seemingly significant) 

146
much higher degree of military aid from the PLA to th

did not stem from this series of visits, ranging from 

officials and officers down to working-level mi

exchanges. The personal relationship with Kim Il Sun

have been an important factor, for after his death 6 

ago, the pattern of visits changed markedly, with a n

decrease in frequency and the rank and stature 

officers and officials, plus the presence of a to

symbolism and ceremony rather than one of s

working exchanges.

25

PLA officers privately reported in the late 1990s th

KPA has grown more reclusive, secretive, and seem

independent. For example, PLA Navy officers have no

welcome to go on board North Korean navy ships prov

Pyongyang by Beijing in earlier years. This sugges

only a distance between the services of the two countr

also a desire by the KPA forces not to be embarrassed 

poor materiel condition and degraded operational sta

the transferred ships and equipment. PLA officers sa

the exchanges between the two militaries have b

largely mundane or perfunctory. Because of the D

limited financial resources (despite the apparent ou

purchase in 1999 of formerly Russian MiG-21 f

aircraft from Kazakhstan in 1999), Chinese officials 

said, Beijing has resorted to a policy of making only 

transfers of equipment and provision of training f

charge. This has included, for example, spare 

ammunition, and the training of naval engineers.

26

Interestingly, PLA officers go to some lengths to p

these transfers as innocuous, emphasizing, for exa

that training is provided to “technical branch” office

not combat units. A 1996 PLAN ship visit to North 

was carefully described as nothing more than a m

celebration of the 35th anniversary of the nearly d

PRC-DPRK friendship agreement.

27

 Chinese officer

officials portray the military relationship as stagnant 

little consequence, noting that communications by 

and other routine means are not conducted. When pr

147
one senior PLA officer did say that the full details 

relationship were known only by the most senior C

military officers, that neither side wished to publici

relationship or draw attention to it.

28

All this interesting and revealing, if incom

evidence suggests that China is likely supplying mini

moderate (at most) military aid and doing it in way

forms tailored to serve Beijing’s national interests

apparent limited concern about DPRK needs.

29

 Beij

pleased to keep the nature of the relationship an

specifics of transfers opaque, at least in part because 

not want to put up with the “supervision” o

international community, especially Washing

predictable views, concerning what China does for 

Korea’s armed forces. Concealment of the inter

details is also of value in preserving a good tone in rel

with the ROK; the fewer specifics Seoul has to dige

better.

However, before waxing ecstatic about the lowly s

PLA support for the KPA, it should be recognized 

West that this level of cooperation and supply is pro

sustainable essentially indefinitely and conceivably 

facilitate concealment from international notice the sc

types of equipment. China is not, in this mi

relationship, prone to suffer from “donor fatigu

constantly in danger of incurring international san

China does not see support of the KPA as a shor

endeavor, reflecting Beijing’s longstanding view 

probable long-term persistence of the current North K

regime and its armed forces.

China and the ROK.

Over the last 2 decades, Beijing’s policy towa

Koreas has evolved from one of viewing the K

Peninsula as a single country suffering under illegit

division, through a period of accepting as a practical m

the existence of the two countries, and now to the c

148
recognition that, both in practice and with resp

international law, there are two Koreas. The Cold Wa

sharp focus by China on ideological considerations h

but dissolved, and in its place there are the clear outl

rational economic policy: acceptance by the Chinese le

of South Korea’s amazing success and North K

abysmal failure—and trying to make the most out 

former and cope with the latter.

Furthermore, there is substantial evidence that 

influential figures in Beijing have realized the over

value of China’s economic progress and prowes

concluded that China’s regional security 

comprehensive national power are served much 

thereby than with the erratic modernization of the 

This evolution in Beijing’s policy toward the two Korea

of course, favored China’s relationship with the mor

and prosperous Seoul rather than strengthening its li

a needy and perverse Pyongyang.

30

 It is interesting 

precisely pertinent) to note, in this regard, that Be

economic and diplomatic ties to Seoul are far more 

numerous, and important than Washington’s re

improved but still tenuous links to Pyongya

development in these international relationships th

many experts would have forecast 20 years ago.

In the eyes of most observers, Beijing, wit

establishment of diplomatic relations with the ROK in 

made clear its choice between Pyongyang and 

Doubtlessly, the concept of nicely balanced rel

between the two Koreas is important to China bot

practical level and as a source of pride in Be

diplomatic prowess. Nevertheless, Seoul has won out 

Beijing’s preferred Korean associate. Beijing, of cours

not make public proclamations stating this in so 

words, but the combination of pragmatic eco

considerations and the prevailing Chinese forecast 

long-term outcome on the Korean Peninsula have ma

choice of Seoul over Pyongyang a practical imperativ

149
China is striving (successfully) to position itself 

gain the maximum economic benefit for the time bei

ensure the best possible relations with the particular 

that is virtually certain to come out on top in the long 

and (3) sustain brotherly relations and a meas

influence with the other Korea virtually certain to r

on the bottom. Put another way, Seoul, from Be

perspective, fully deserves careful cultivation 

economic partner. Beijing enthusiastically courts 

because of a very strong desire, even need, to purs

great advantages, economic and diplomatic, to be g

from that burgeoning relationship. Pyongya

undeserving but must not be ignored. The North K

government’s proclivity toward the role of trouble

and the potential of the country, intentiona

inadvertently, to be a source of serious problems for 

means that Beijing ignores or shuns the antics of the 

Korean leadership at its peril. All these factors 

reflected in China’s role in getting Kim Jong Il t

Beijing before the North-South summit and then bask

the euphoric post-summit glow and in its implicit ro

facilitator of radical improvement in inter-Korean rela

Beijing insightfully envisioned good economic rel

with South Korea very early; significant indirect 

existed between China and South Korea by 1979. Be

early hope or vision for the relationship has, indeed, c

pass and, significantly, has weathered the Asian fin

crisis of the late 1990s. Annual two-way trade betwe

ROK and PRC approaches $25 billion,

31

 and total 

Korean direct investment in China is also very subst

already having exceeded $2.6 billion by 1996.

32

 In 

years, the ROK became China’s fourth most imp

trading partner; China was the ROK’s third most imp

trading partner. Comparable ranks are forecast f

current year.

33

Beyond these impressive statistics there i

additional factor that South Korea has tended to 

heavily in China’s Northeast, a rust-belt region 

150
investment is particularly needed. South Korea ha

made well-directed and welcome investments in the 

Gulf region including Shandong Province and the T

area. In addition to the value to China of ROK trad

investment, South Korea has, from the outset, needed 

investment opportunities in China, thus leading 

countries to ensure that economic factors take prio

their relationship. Moreover, this almost single-m

emphasis by Beijing on China’s economic developme

reinforced a desire for the sort of stability on the K

Peninsula that is essential to China’s national eco

progress.

However, economics and who comes out the w

between the two Koreas are not the whole pictu

Beijing’s view of South Korea. The other important C

foreign policy consideration is that of precludin

development of close relations between South Kore

Japan. Beijing is concerned, for example, about 

moves by Seoul toward closer ties with Tokyo, most n

recently warming military relations between ROK 

and the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF), inc

prospects for basic military exercises. In Septembe

the Director General of the Japanese Defense Agenc

the ROK Minister of Defense agreed to regular me

between senior officers of their naval forces and the co

of annual joint exercises. Although the exercise cond

lasting less than a week in August 1999, involved 

operations at sea and not combat operations, this firs

exercise between Japanese and South Korean naval 

aroused concern in Beijing.

Interestingly, advance arrangements were made f

same month, August 1999, to have the ROK minis

defense make a first-ever visit to Beijing, and the 

minister of defense agreed during the visit to a firs

visit to Seoul to take place in 2000. It has not been po

to discern if this flurry of “first-ever” events involvi

defense ministers of the ROK and PRC was an ef

ameliorate concerns in Beijing about ROK military co

151
with Japan (as seemed to be the case) or whether the

a measure of coincidence. In any case, the ministers 

two 1950-53 Korean War adversaries, China and 

Korea, established regular military relations inc

high-level visits on a 2-year cycle.

34

 Moreover

reportedly talked in January 2000 about the prospe

periodic meetings at their level and exchanges of vis

senior military officers as well as reciprocal port vis

the two navies and unspecified joint military exe

Unquestionably, something has kindled an enh

PRC-ROK military relationship.

The broader area of South Korean public att

toward China is also pertinent. While acknowledgi

anecdotal nature of his observation, a leading scho

China-Korea issues at a prestigious Chinese official 

tank remarked that in his experience retired South K

generals do not hate China—as they well might, giv

adversarial period of the 1950s and the aftermath th

South Koreans in general do not have hard feelings t

the Chinese, he asserted. Indeed, in South Korean 

China comes out often as the favorite foreign count

proudly reported, noting pointedly that this is certain

so for Japan, a country not liked by the Koreans.

35

These anecdotal remarks are substantiated by su

of South Korean citizens taken in the mid-to-late 1990

illustrate Beijing’s success in obtaining popular supp

the ROK for China’s position as an Asian good neigh

two popular surveys, two and three times as many 

Koreans, respectively, considered Japan the country 

threatening to ROK security as considered China to 

greatest threat. In three surveys, China, by a mar

about 10 percentage points over Japan in each pol

consistently seen by South Koreans to be more import

promoting ROK interests. (The United States was j

more important than China, but by surprisingly m

margins of less than 10 percent. For example, in the 

survey, 41.1 percent judged the United States the 

important for promoting ROK interests, 33.8 percent 

152
China, 21.0 percent chose Japan, and 14.6 percent 

Russia.) In 1997, twice as many South Koreans wan

strengthen relations with China as wanted to do s

Japan (55.6 percent to 25.3 percent).

36

 So, in respon

variety of questions over a period of several years, 

Koreans say they view China more favorably 

Japan—just as the Chinese rather proudly assert to 

case. Moreover, South Korean affection for the U

States is waning while China’s status in these 

improves. This is all the more significant both be

younger South Koreans tend to have a more favorabl

of China than their elders, and, as years pass, the o

trend toward favoring China over Japan and the U.

increased.

37

China and the DPRK’s Missiles, Proliferation, a

Nuclear Weapons.

Beijing strives to be on the side of the angels with r

to Pyongyang’s development of ballistic missiles, n

warheads, and transfers of missile technology to 

countries. There is a tendency for Chinese interlocut

these subjects to describe quite fully what China

assert, is not doing and to say very few words about 

China is doing. As one mid-level think tank res

professor phrased it, “There is not support, but th

understanding.”

38

 This researcher and other Ch

specialists unhesitatingly point out that, in their 

North Korea feels understandably imperiled an

chosen this way to improve its security. Pyongyang 

threatened by powerful Asian neighbors and especia

Americans, present by the tens of thousands just ac

southern border and exceedingly well equipped wi

most modern arms, at a time when North Korea 

undeniably dire economic straits. North Korea is prou

tries to make its people feel the government is effec

protecting them, the researcher went to great pa

explain. Simply put, as he explained with disarming c

missiles are cheaper than airplanes; also, missile pro

153
have the proven effect of giving Pyongyang negot

leverage in a dramatic way that nothing else could 

done.

A more senior think tanker expressed a simila

from a different slant: “North Korea does have a dif

diplomatic style. It needs the air of crisis and occurre

incidents to draw American attention.”

39

 This same 

specialist went on to say that North Korea’s developm

missiles is understandable to the Chinese; it resemb

said, Mao’s development of nuclear weapons for Chin

isolated and weak country naturally seeks quick an

solutions for its security. Missiles, he argued, are i

easier to come by than complex combat aircraft and r

less technology to maintain, support, and operate. 

Korea and the United States are powerful ene

Pyongyang has had to do something, he concluded.

The Chinese specialists, whose views are described 

and others who claim knowledge of the matter, d

Western claims of recent Chinese support for North K

missile programs. In short, their assertions are that 

is at least no longer providing support for North K

missiles programs and has not done so since the end 

Cold War. One Chinese specialist insisted that Chin

helps North Korea’s missile program with ne

components nor technology; he did, however, confess 

had been exchanges of views.

40

 He claimed ignora

previous instances of the transfer of missile technol

components to North Korea.

41

 The associate res

professor was somewhat more candid, saying tha

relationship has a long history and that in the early da

situation was very different from now.

Contrary to the views of several Western observer

assert that Beijing still supports Pyongyang’s ba

missile program), these interlocutors all agree that Ch

particularly unhappy now with North Korea’s develo

of missiles because it gives Japan and the United Sta

excuse to develop TMD. A senior member of a think t

154
Beijing went beyond that, saying that the Indian, Pak

and North Korean missile programs are all bad for C

interests. However, he and a well-connected foreign s

officer who has specialized in these matters argued th

hard for Chinese to talk to sovereign North Korea 

missile development proliferation issues. Beijing, the

cannot publicly criticize Pyongyang on this count giv

overall nature of the relationship.

42

When pressed on why Beijing “allowed” Pyongy

transfer, over a period of years beginning in the late 

technology and missiles for Pakistan’s Ghauri and Gh

missile programs, Chinese specialists deny or disse

They do go so far as to argue that subtle means in p

meetings are the way Beijing feels it must h

proliferation issues, as the senior think tanker exp

previously. The Chinese Foreign Service officer men

above elaborated, saying that Beijing avoids “instru

North Korea in order to be more effective in its inf

across the board. He went on to say that China 

confident in its knowledge of what Pyongyang has d

far as the transfer of missiles and missile-re

technologies. Consequently, Pyongyang can simply 

the allegations because China does not have proof.

Although China’s interests indeed lie in a perm

cessation of North Korean missile tests, specifically be

Japan will want TMD more strongly in the face of f

tests, China, these specialists argue, finds it diffic

oppose a sovereign government’s testing of missiles 

defense (regardless of how provocative to Toky

Beijing). Similarly, Beijing feels it cannot object 

transfer by North Korea of missiles or missile techno

these transfers are within the limits of the M

Technology Control Regime (MTCR)—which the Ch

somewhat smugly, suggest is the appropriate stand

which Beijing and others should evaluate such condu

Chinese specialists on this matter make two add

points. First, The Russian connection is important in 

155
Korean ballistic missile development. Taepo

technology they assert is basically Russian techno

China was not informed in advance of the notorious A

31, 1998, missile launch.

45

 Second, North Korea, 

Chinese see it, is not a threat, and clearly not a threat 

territory of the United States. To label North Ko

threat, they argue, is to ignore its desperate econom

social plight and its meager resources that preclu

building a significant missile arsenal. And contrary to 

Western convictions, the Chinese argue, North K

leaders are rational and know it would be suici

conduct a “pre-emptive strike” with its missiles a

Japan or the United States.

Chinese positions on these issues are different b

diametrically opposed to those of the United S

Nevertheless, these arguments by knowledgeable C

specialists make it clear that Beijing is, as a general m

considerably more sanguine than Washington and 

about the current situation and prospects for North 

with respect to the development of ballistic missiles a

proliferation of missiles and missile technology to em

countries Washington considers rogue states (as of 

2000, termed “states of concern” by the U.S Secret

State). Chinese arguments take into account Washin

positions and attempt somewhat subtly in most ca

undermine or weaken the American argument, all the 

avoiding direct confrontation or the danger of h

Beijing labeled by the international community as 

unconcerned with the dangers or blatantly abetting 

Korea’s objectionable conduct. This is another nice C

balancing act, facilitated by the ability of an authori

government to orchestrate its publicly stated position

not have them attacked by knowledgeable domestic cr

Although one cannot be sure of the motives of Chin

leaders, those who address the issues in publi

privately with Western interlocutors seem convinced 

merits of China’s “principled positions” and the failu

refusal) of Washington to view these matters in the 

156
light. There is a glimmer of hope that Chinese con

about the prospective development and deployment o

in East Asia might prompt Beijing to pressure Pyongy

curb its Taepo-dong tests and overall ballistic m

program. As was seen in the July 2000 suggestio

North Korea may give up its missile program, R

President Putin seems to have exercised some of the 

many think Beijing should apply with Pyongyang—a

the same reason that applies to Beijing: trying to elim

North Korean missiles as an incentive to Washington 

proceed with development of missile defenses. At leas

is now the reasonable hope that measures to bring 

this result may somehow be applied by Moscow, B

Washington, Seoul, and/or Tokyo.

46

 In trying to mak

an argument effective with Beijing, it must be take

account that Beijing is already poised to respond that 

Korea is not by any reasonable measure a real thre

that TMD must be seen in its real light: ultimat

attempt to neutralize the most effective compon

China’s armed forces, its arsenal of short-rang

medium-range ballistic missiles; in other words, a me

contain China.

Moreover, Beijing does not wish to find itself (eve

remotely) a part of Washington’s efforts to infl

Pyongyang—and especially not to be associated 

agreement verification activities. China sees great p

such a path. When Beijing sees Pyongyang subjecting 

to intrusive inspections, such as that of the sus

underground nuclear facility at Kumchangni, an

inspections related to its compliance with the A

Framework (explained further below), it grows war

inspection regimes of that sort might be urged or even 

on China. The secretive Chinese government and C

Communist Party consider such inspections anathem

a blatant violation of China’s sovereignty intended to e

Chinese secrets and weaknesses and take unfair adva

of backward and developing China.

157
The Nuclear Weapons Issue. Always ready w

“principled position” as a retort (or diversion), C

specialists, when asked about how seriously they op

nuclear DPRK, somewhat surprisingly assert that B

is more concerned about the nuclear tests by Indi

Pakistan than is Washington. As one interlocutor put 

United States is unduly concerned in East Asia about 

Korean missile tests and a “low-level nuclear w

development effort” and not appropriately concerned 

the big threats in South Asia of India and Pakistan, 

nuclear testing is not just an American fear but som

that has actually occurred—many times.

47

Chinese analysts of recent Asian nuclear develop

argue that the United States is far harsher in its at

toward, and treatment of, North Korea than it is 

respect to India, a real nuclear threat, as the

it—failing, understandably, to include their nuclea

Pakistan, in the indictment. The Chinese senior thin

member interviewed in Beijing put it in somewhat 

clinical terms. He pointed out that, contrary to the 

Asian example, North Korea has not tested a n

weapon, although it might well have done so as ea

1994, the year the United States became so concerned 

this prospect and consequently negotiated with Pyon

the Agreed Framework. (This document, controver

the eyes of many, was designed to halt North K

nuclear program and was completed in Geneva in O

1994. Its detractors, primarily in the United States, r

adamant that it is unworkable and doomed to failu

failure they forecast is destined inevitably to pr

disastrous results, including a nuclear-armed DPRK

China and KEDO. China does not make contribut

the funding for Korean Peninsula Energy Develo

Organization (KEDO).

48

 China’s arguments for fail

refusing to contribute come in layers. The superficial r

is that China is both poor and does not want to inter

North Korean affairs, with more emphasis on the poin

China allegedly has no money to contribute t

158
program—an argument hard to swallow given the gro

the Chinese economy over the last 2 decades and the 

China’s foreign currency reserves. The next level 

expressed Chinese rationale for nonparticipation i

China wants to help North Korea in its own wa

through KEDO. China and the United States, it is arg

the Chinese, have some common interests in North 

but also some differences. Beijing does not want 

lumped together with Tokyo, Seoul, and Washington 

way aid and support are provided to Pyongyang. 

wants to be different. The Chinese say they unde

North Korean psychology well (implying that others 

less well). Beijing knows how, in Asian style, to dea

Pyongyang and show respect as needed to bring 

results.

49

What appears to be the last layer of the Ch

rationale for not contributing to KEDO puts a finer po

the argument: As one very authoritative source p

China provides very significant food aid to North 

sometimes on concessionary terms. More important, 

meets important energy needs of North Korea throu

provision of coal and oil; oil is by far the most impo

China prefers to provide for these energy 

independent of KEDO not just because it does not wan

lumped in with other countries but importantly be

North Korea does not want China to switch to the 

conduit. North Korea does not want Chinese aid lin

KEDO, apparently implying a fear by Pyongya

complications, uncertainty, political machinations

and, moreover, North Korean leaders often ask fo

obtain) concessions and other special treatment.

50

So Beijing’s position with respect to nuclear we

development in North Korea, is, as has been seen in 

areas, superficially similar but hardly identical to t

Washington. As with missiles and proliferation, Chin

not support nuclear weapon development by Pyong

However, Beijing does not find its interest in p

coincidence with the international effort under K

159
designed to prevent North Korean nuclear w

development—and it makes its case for nonparticipat

the basis of “principled” reasoning. Many in Washingt

Beijing’s positions in a sinister light; Beijing 

Washington’s positions as simply unenlightened.

The Potential for North Korean Chaos and

Collapse.

Professor Chu Shulong, recognized as a preem

scholar on Sino-Korean relations and policies at the 

Institute of Contemporary International Relations (C

a think tank closely linked to components of the 

government), prepared two lengthy papers in Englis

in mid-1999 and the other late in that year. Both exten

described and analyzed Chinese policy and att

concerning the Korean Peninsula. Significantly, n

paper alludes to the prospects for North Korean co

and chaos.

51

 As another Chinese specialist explain

early 2000, Chinese who concentrate on North K

issues have never thought that North Korea would co

and now think it highly unlikely, if not impossible, 

collapse would occur under its current leader, Kim Jon

Collapse Called an Unlikely Scenario. Chines

specialist said, are firmly convinced that North Kore

not collapse, and he provided his list of reasons.

1. Chinese who study the issue believe the 

assertion of the South Korean Ministry for Reunifi

that North Koreans were absolutely loyal to Kim Il 

and believe now that North Koreans accept Kim Jon

the “idealistic” successor leader (meaning that the son 

philosophical and conceptual successor to his father)

2. Kim Jong Il has strong control over the secret 

and the military. There is no strong force to organi

people to subvert the current regime.

3. South Korea does not want, and therefore do

promote, rapid collapse of the North. Among the 

160
reasons for this is that South Korea is not as weal

West Germany, and North Korea is poorer than wa

Germany. Consequently, the German model is cons

inapplicable to Korea.

4. North Koreans have a very simple life. The

withstand hardships that might bring about the down

other regimes elsewhere around the world.

5. Americans do not want the rapid collapse of 

Korea and, just as with South Korea, do not attem

facilitate collapse. Both countries even take steps to 

that outcome. According to the analysis of this C

specialist, were North Korea to collapse, the U.S. Co

would then ask why U.S. forces should stay in Korea

the Japanese, and especially the Okinawans, would 

the issue of why they alone in Asia had to endure U.S. 

on their soil.

53

In the mid-1990s, a representative of a prom

Chinese think tank contended those in Seou

Washington who forecast doom for North Kore

engaged in wishful thinking. He asserted that Beijin

counseled Seoul that a collapse scenario is somethin

should not be seriously contemplated and, further, le

known that Beijing would be highly displeased with 

by Seoul to promote a collapse—urging instead that 

direct its efforts to reducing tensions and impr

relations. The Chinese who offered this advice to Seo

no doubt, elated with the conciliatory policies toward 

Korea under the current South Korean president, wh

elected in December 1997, and with the appa

successful June 2000 North-South summit.

When Professor Chu of CICIR, the author of th

papers cited above, was subsequently pressed in a 

2000 interview with the author in Beijing, he said h

not believe any communist country will collapse as a 

result of economic troubles. China endured great ha

and did not collapse. East European countries d

collapse because of a failed economy, he asserted, alt

161
economic difficulties did push to the fore political pro

that led to collapse. The survivability of comm

countries is very high under economic stress, Chu a

Nonetheless, if North Korea’s economic problems in

greatly, China will go all out to prevent chaos.

North Koreans Seen as Resilient and Tough. 

Chinese have been more “personal” in their reasoning

say simply that the North Korean people, as men

earlier, have proven themselves to be at least as toug

resilient as the Chinese who suffered the Great 

Forward and the Cultural Revolution, both result

large numbers of needless deaths and other ex

stresses on Chinese society; yet the government did n

and the country did not collapse. Starvation and 

deprivation in North Korea, unlike in other countries 

world whose people have much higher expectations fro

government and for their own lives, are not likely cat

for North Korean collapse or even chaos.

Chinese analysts of Korea have been making this 

for many years and feel the passage of time has val

their analysis; they simply do not think the s

currently warrants significant continuing discussion

largely consider, a bit smugly, that two points have 

made: North Korea is not on the brink of collaps

Americans and others who made the dire forecasts 

mid-to-late 1990s have been proven wrong. Ch

scholars and diplomats who discuss North Korea 

Americans recognize that among American speciali

East Asia the talk of collapse long ago faded away, an

Americans are looking to other outcomes for which th

seeking appropriate descriptions and rationale, su

reconciliation.

North Korean Economic Collapse. But what of a 

economic collapse or meltdown, somehow lack

“political” component? Although China is many 

larger, more prosperous, and more populous than 

Korea, the Chinese argue that they could not a

162
juncture in their economic development reasonably 

the full North Korean requirements for assistance we

country completely to collapse economically. Thi

significant departure from the quite confident C

attitude in 1996, despite China’s rather paltry le

support at the time, that Beijing simply had to ma

decision to go all out and salvage the North Korean eco

if collapse appeared imminent.

As discussed in the section on Chinese views of 

Korea, China is promoting economic reform for 

Korea, but North Korea is stubborn. A Chinese spe

who had dealt with these issues in the 1990s a

recently that North Korea should change its polic

should not continue indefinitely to depend on foreig

Instead it should provide an environment conduc

foreign investment; it should reduce restrictions on f

investment. He pointed out that North Korea said in

it would accept investment only from large South K

firms, but these are few. Indicating that some p

movement may be occurring, he said that, since 1999, 

Korea has allowed investment by a few small compani

Chinese exasperation with Pyongyang’s reluctan

even refusal, to reform earlier may have waned a bit, b

signs that might indicate real, fundamental reform 

North are not compelling. Another Chinese spec

working temporarily in Washington, affirmed that C

concerned about its own economic prospects, no

diminished capability and greatly reduced will to s

North Korea with all it needs or wants. China now doe

what it can; not what North Korea wants.

Given Japanese and American reluctance 

constraints, South Korea is the only big supporter of 

Korea and seems to have largely recovered from the 

financial crisis that struck in late 1997. In any 

Chinese leaders do not want to see Pyongyang left w

recourse and tempted to try anything with nothing t

They almost certainly view the visit to Beijing by Kim 

163
Il, the June 2000 North-South summit, and the prom

possibly rapidly improving ties between North Kore

South Korea as highly desirable steps down a path th

both prevent North Korean economic collapse an

preserve South Korea as a valued, strong economic p

for China.

55

Reunification? Reconciliation? Integration?

Perpetual Partition?

China objects to being lumped together with 

nations said to favor the indefinite division of Kore

views of Chinese specialists are nuanced, an

identically so. For example, among those with opti

outlooks the argument is that Beijing simply do

oppose Korean reunification. China, in this formu

wants peaceful reunification, with South Korea help

bring about North Korean reform. The role of China a

United States should be circumscribed; neither s

interfere but both should provide aid.

56

The view generally attributed to the Ch

government is a bit less optimistic, particularly abo

time frame for possible reunification. The official posi

that maintaining stability and achieving a pe

resolution are a higher priority than any early reunific

or, put a slightly different way, Beijing support

“peaceful” and “reasonable” means of K

reunification.

57

 That said, Beijing does not igno

(ultimately good) example of Vietnam: Reunification 

caused some problems for China but was gen

advantageous for the Chinese economy—and that wa

counted. There are two goals: (1) for the short 

permanent peace in place of a temporary arm

arrangement, and (2) reunification (or pos

“integration,” as a well-informed official termed C

reunification hopes for the two Koreas) for the longer 

China’s perceived role is to push and encourage these

reunification or “complete integration,” China’s role 

164
be to maintain a balance of power in the region, a b

that should include China, Japan, the United State

possibly Russia.

58

A Beijing think-tanker offered what might be the 

candid appraisal of China’s position on reunifica

Beijing’s first priority with respect to the Korean Pen

is stability so as to foster China’s continued eco

progress. He pointed out that his home is in Nor

China, so he also thinks of this in personal terms. Amo

concerns is that instability would equal refuge

examined earlier in this paper), likely a very disr

factor both economically and socially. China, he argue

a carefully balanced policy for the two Koreas t

specifically designed to promote stability; it is not 

policy of diplomatic nicety. The second prior

reunification. Indeed, a reunified Korea may be go

China, and, indeed, it is appropriate to suppor

encourage reunification as an example for a proper ou

of the China-Taiwan situation. Furthermore, a u

Korea would be a good friend of China as well 

important economic partner. In further candor, this 

researcher injected that he does not know what p

might lead to reunification.

There are additional perspectives that warrant me

Other Chinese specialists have been equally candid, i

pessimistic, for the short term, suggesting 

reunification may take decades, maybe 20, 30, or 50 

Unlike Taiwan, they feel, there is no hurry. From C

perspective, nothing is going so badly awry for C

interests in either Korea that reunification is an 

imperative. Those Chinese who are familiar with the 

the term reconciliation by some senior Americans 

respect to resolution of the division of the Koreas) 

recoil at its use. They seem to equate it roughly wi

Chinese preference for the term integration—possi

early stage of a process leading to “complete integra

For whatever reason, these Chinese do not acknowled

proposition, suggested by many outside of China, tha

165
government favors prolonged division of Kor

something that is in China’s interest.

60

 They object to 

they term a Western notion that a weak and divided 

is preferred by Beijing because a strong and unified 

will be a military threat. They look to a stron

prosperous unified Korea as the best outcom

China—especially for China’s economy. Althoug

analogy is flawed, the reasoning smacks of logic sim

the American assertion that a prosperous, stable, s

and unified China is preferred by Washington o

country weak, fragmented, unstable, and needy. J

many Chinese doubt the sincerity of the Ame

argument about the characteristics of a preferred C

many Americans will, naturally, doubt the Ch

expressed preference for a unified, strong, and 

Korean Peninsula—eventually.

The Future for American Military Forces on th

Korean Peninsula.

A Historical Glance. Before peering into the pr

future Chinese attitude toward U.S. forces in Ko

glance at the past provides valuable perspectiv

context. The decades of the 1950s and 1960s and in

beginning of the 1970s were a period of staunch C

opposition to U.S. forces in Korea. This oppo

originated as far back as the U.S. support of the C

National Party (the Kuomintang [KMT] that fled to T

in defeat) against the Chinese Communist Party 

1945-49 civil war. It was mightily reinforced when C

and American forces fought against each other 

Korean War of the early 1950s and again when the U

States, with its South Korean ally, pursued a policy t

the PRC of isolation and containment. The remainder 

1970s and 1980s saw a change of the Chinese position 

United States and the PRC together faced the Soviet t

Chinese leaders were content during this latter perio

the presence of U.S. forces in Korea, despite official su

of North Korean demands for their removal. After th

166
War ended, Beijing became ambivalent, no longer p

by the American presence but recognizing that 

advantages accrued to China from that presence, n

least of which was the singular contribution of these 

to stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the region

stability facilitated unprecedented Chinese eco

growth, although many Chinese observers are reluct

acknowledge that benefit of the American mi

presence.

61

A Note of Realism in China’s Chorus of “Prin

Positions.” It is also useful to understand C

fundamental position now, at the beginning of th

decade of this century, on U.S. forces in Asia. (This me

course, in South Korea and Japan, the only rem

locations for U.S. forces that were in earlier decades s

much more widely and, in some cases, densely in the re

As a Chinese specialist described the position, 

opposes in principle the presence of foreign forces 

region, but Chinese leaders are realistic. They see th

countries of Southeast Asia want the U.S. forces 

region. The Japanese and South Korean government

U.S. military forces and bases in Japan and Korea

Japanese and South Korean people are uncertain

anti-American protests swelling in South Korea

political right wing in Japan does not want the U.S. m

on Japanese soil. This right wing movement, how

advocates making Japan an “ordinary”

62

 state, wi

final goal of having the United States out of Japan s

achieve “full Japanese independence.” Jap

right-wingers and nationalists together make a form

faction.

In light of this, several Chinese analysts, wh

objective and willing to be candid, describe the U.S. m

presence in Japan as having dual tracks: (1) prev

China from causing a problem; and (2) keeping Japan 

control, preventing a new kind of militarism in Japa

keeping Japan developing on a peaceful road. Beijing

argue, wants the United States to recognize C

167
interests in the region and recognize Chinese sover

and territory—including Taiwan. American forces s

not, of course, be employed in ways that contravene 

precepts. Contrary to allegations by others, they asse

adamantly, China does not want to compete with the U

States for a dominant role in the region.

63

Other Chinese interlocutors over the past 4 year

helped flesh out the details of the Chinese position. Be

of China’s “principled opposition” to the presence of m

forces on foreign soil, government spokesmen when p

will consistently and persistently state the oblig

opposition to troops on foreign soil. However, C

specialists frequently assert that China does not ob

the presence of U.S. forces if their presence is cons

with the wishes of the people and governments of Kor

Japan. Some elaborate to the extent of pointing out th

would mean all the peoples of Korea were the Nort

South reunified, but they do not try to explain how 

wishes would be determined or confirmed.

64

 The p

sometimes made that Beijing’s more relaxed at

toward American military power in Asia is evidenced 

fact that the issue of U.S. forces in Korea is at the bot

China’s agenda of regional concerns, but, in contra

matter is always at the top of Pyongyang’s list. Ci

further indirect evidence is that, although the Soviet 

is no longer a threat, Beijing has nevertheless not p

for ejecting the United States from the ROK and J

(The likely futility of making such a request, in b

disregard for the concerns of Seoul and Tokyo, is igno

those who gratuitously make this point.)

What Purpose would U.S. Forces Serve? China Wo

There is, nevertheless, an interesting nuance that ha

into some discussions by Chinese officials actually w

these matters—practitioners, not scholars or think ta

These officials press the point that the purpose of U.S. 

in Korea would weigh heavily in Beijing’s calculus 

how to react to their continued presence after reunific

If there is no alternative but to conclude that U.S. for

168
the nature and composition of the force or the chara

American pronouncements about that forward-de

force, are there to contain or act against China (especi

a Taiwan matter), then it will be difficult for Beijing 

anything but strongly oppose the U.S. presence

somewhat contorted position might be rephrased as fo

Beijing would need to be able to conclude that U.S. fo

Korea were not there to contain China or aid Ta

Washington might take the view that Beijing unders

the United States has no intention of using force a

China—with the unspoken implication that such 

would not be taken unless egregious Chinese be

demanded it.

65

 In other words, both sides might n

apply their own interpretations and agree tacitly not 

for contradictions or complications that both sides 

recognize could be found by digging too vigorously

imprudently. 

One of these Chinese officials recently elaborate

position in a way that may appeal to Americans, sayin

the Korean Peninsula is “sandwiched” between Chin

Japan and also between China and the United S

Beijing, he said, expects U.S. forces to remain on the K

Peninsula to maintain this balance of power, even if 

factors have caused the United States to remove its 

from Japan.

66

 It is not so much that these pos

expressed by Chinese interlocutors can or should be 

at face value. The important thing is that Chinese of

are openly and candidly discussing with Ame

interlocutors the circumstances under which U.S. 

might remain in a unified Korea and not draw the wr

Beijing. Certainly, Beijing has no veto on U.S. 

deployment decisions, but there is much to say for av

contentious issues in Sino-U.S. relations, especially a

apply to American military forces in the region.

China Institute of Contemporary Interna

Relations division director Chu Shulong wrote last ye

the relationship between American alliances, Am

military forces in Asia, and Taiwan, the Chinese po

169
has been clear and consistent and will remain unchan

the future, no matter the state of the relationship be

China and the United States.”

67

 Chu also wrote in the 

paper, “Certainly it will be the Koreans’ decision whe

let American troops continue to stay in a united Kore

whether to keep the U.S.-Korea alliance. Since there 

indications that China-Korea relations will be troub

the future, U.S. troops in a united Korea are unlikely t

any function against China.”

68

 In March 2000, a 

Chinese specialist on security issues concerning Kore

that Beijing’s attitude toward U.S. forces in Korea de

on the status of U.S.-China relations. Only Taiwa

produce a really hostile relationship; there is no 

reason for hostility. China generally does not critici

U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula

offering occasional criticism of some specific exercis

concluded.

69

Evidence of a Dramatic, Ongoing Change in C

Attitudes toward U.S. Forces in Asia. The attitudes 

least some influential figures in China concerning 

forces in Korea have changed significantly in the recen

as a consequence of the view that the United States 

new proclivity for abusing its status as the world

superpower, displaying hegemonism, and acting 

irresponsible interventionist (all Chinese descripti

recent American military undertakings, of course, wi

Kosovo-Yugoslavia air campaign most prominent).

7

Chinese security scholar

71

 who has observe

phenomenon and was willing to discuss it said,

The Kosovo War [his term] caused a shift in Chinese thinking 

the matter of tolerance for U.S. forces in Asia. China now f

surrounded by the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK alliances.

He went on to explain that this is not a conseque

Marxist logic (apparently as some Americans conclud

rather is “based on Chinese observation of U.S. word

actions.”

170
He explained further that, as others had told the a

Chinese see U.S. characterization of North Korea 

enemy as nothing more than an excuse for such acti

the development of the Revised Defense Guidelines (

U.S.-Japan Security Treaty) and the developmen

eventual regional deployment of TMD. This Ch

security scholar said North Korea is very weak and 

cannot project power. In China, the U.S. portrayal 

North Korean threat is considered a joke. Other C

analysts see improving relations between Washingto

Pyongyang and the plight of the DPRK economy as f

lessening the potential threat from North Korean ba

missiles. The fact that several years will pass before 

could become an effective deployed force causes oth

speculate that North Korea may no longer exist b

time.

72

 These Chinese specialists are determined b

their conviction that there is no real North Korean 

and in persuading Americans of that assertion.

Additionally, the reintroduction of U.S. forces in

Philippines and the introduction of a U.S. military pr

in Singapore are considered by the Chinese as rev

indicators of sinister, or at least hegemonic, Am

intentions in Asia. All this, together with such things 

proposed TSEA, the extremely controversial T

Security Enhancement Act, originated by the 

pro-Taiwan Senator Jesse Helms, under considerat

the U.S. Congress,

73

 concern China. The Chinese see 

ominous combination the makings of future contain

despite American protests to the contrary. 

Washington talks of a “strategic pause” for the U

States between now and 2010 or 2015, the conc

preventive diplomacy takes on the appearance of prev

defense—preventing China from achieving its ri

place and full potential, as the Chinese see it.

The Chinese security scholar, interview

Washington in late April 2000, went on to explain th

viewpoint is very popular among the military in C

Chinese are especially troubled by the U.S. inclinat

171
place human rights concerns over the honoring of na

sovereignty and fear that the United States will u

“tools” as means to intervene in Asia. The too

explained, are its forces and arrangements in Japa

Philippines, South Korea, Singapore, etc. He regrette

this attitude had developed, pointing out that, alt

China publicly opposes foreign forces in any co

privately China had accepted the status quo o

alliances in Asia. Among the reasons for the accepta

the practical one that there has been no way for Ch

change that situation. China wants, of course, to e

that Taiwan is not encompassed in these arrangemen

emphasized. But China, even as a rising power, h

previously sought to change the status quo. It was app

that this rather young scholar was representing a 

among his peers that the allegedly rising opposition t

forces in Asia he described, particularly among PLA of

would not serve to reverse the longstanding tolera

even acceptance in China of the U.S. forces in Kore

Japan)—even after there is significant change o

Korean Peninsula.

So far, this chapter has reviewed and attemp

provide insights into the Chinese views of its end

multifaceted relations with troublesome North Kor

newer yet firm and still growing affection for riche

more stable South Korea; its support of better North-

relations; its involvement in, and reactions to, 

Korea’s nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles

proliferation activities; its disagreement with collap

chaos scenarios; its conservative and patient approa

but not rejection of, reunification and reconcil

concepts; and its possibly surprising tolerance of, or a

ambivalence about, the issue of U.S forces in Korea no

in the future.

172
SCRUTINY AND ANALYSIS OF CHINESE

POSITIONS, GOALS, AND STRATEGIES;

IMPLICATIONS FOR WASHINGTON AND OTH

CAPITALS

The remainder of this chapter is devoted to taking 

of matters reviewed earlier and the related issues tha

an examination raises, as well as attempting to asc

the implications for U.S. policy and that of 

governments involved.

China’s Ultimate Goals Concerning the Korean

Peninsula.

One experienced Chinese specialist

74

 distilled C

goals with respect to the Korean Peninsula to a few 

sentences: Beijing does not want to see a Korea hos

China or a Korea allied with another country so th

alliance is hostile to China. China does not want to 

chaotic Korea. Beijing does not want to see nuclear we

on the Korean Peninsula, but it does not give nearly a

a priority to this issue as does Washington. In this syn

he did not specifically mention reunification. O

response to a specific query did he describ

often-repeated position that stability on the peninsula 

clear top priority, stability that is essential to eco

growth for China, Korea, and the region. Reunificat

we have seen, is a second priority, but, as is argu

virtually all Chinese specialists, China does “sin

support” a reunified, reconciled, or integrated K

eventually—with the preferred time frame for endi

division of the peninsula dependent on the interlocut

rarely less than two or three decades.

The Complexities of the Chinese View of Reunific

Despite the expressed views, Chinese support for K

reunification is doubted or denied by many obs

outside China. Some Chinese argue that Westerne

Japanese are improperly applying their own logic pro

and preferences to Beijing’s thinking—engagi

173
inappropriate “mirroring” and therefore arriving 

inaccurate result. Possibly it does not matter a grea

whether Beijing means what its says about reunificat

Beijing publicly supports reunification, maybe that 

much as one can hope to know with any certainty. Ma

helps even when Chinese suggest that Korean unifi

would set a good example for the “Taiwan problem.”

The Chinese Communist Party does not seem to fe

spin-offs of reunification on which others speculat

Chinese are not concerned about the probable ev

presence of a highly successful, unified, and demo

neighbor, reasoning, it appears, that if a successfu

has had no substantive effect on the PRC, then an expa

of the example to all of Korea is also not to be f

Chinese observers see no importance to the relative t

of possible resolutions of the problems of Taiwan, Xin

and Tibet with respect to Korean reunification be

China simply views its own problems in these three ar

wholly internal affairs, while the Korean issue i

accepted by China as a matter between two sov

states.

One Country, Two Systems—for Korea? Ch

specialists occasionally discuss the concept of one co

two systems (as applied to Hong Kong and Maca

offered by the PRC as the formula for Taiwan) as it 

apply to the Koreas, but they do not d

seriously—generally seeing it as a concept or appli

generated by Westerners unfamiliar with the diffe

between the Korean situation of two states and t

China and its sovereignty issues. It seems more likel

Chinese interlocutors are chary about applyin

concept, so dear to Chinese mainlanders, to the K

situation. Maybe there is a measure of unspoken di

among the Chinese for the prospect of Koreans usin

“sacred” mantra, somehow tainting this concept tha

central to China’s determination to achieve reunifi

with Taiwan. Nevertheless, “one country, two syste

an apt description of the direction in which the two K

174
seemed headed, at least at the conclusion of the meet

the Kims (North and South) in Pyongyang in June 2

Testing the Truth of Chinese Assertions of Supp

Reunification. The Chinese want the West and the Ko

to accept that China favors eventual Korean unific

accomplished peacefully and while preserving sta

Nevertheless, Beijing persistently, if inadvertently, 

the doubts of outsiders. For example, if the reunifi

issue is not attacked head-on, addressed very direc

exchanges with Chinese specialists, the talk often t

turn that seems incompatible with suppor

reunification, even as a secondary priority. In other w

when a related issue is raised, the assumpt

reunification does not necessarily underlie the unw

answer.

75

 Three cases illustrate the point: (1) The 

increasing talk of China’s treating North Korea as a 

normal state,” and (2) Chinese specialists’ complaint

Americans and South Koreans (often American-educa

is said pointedly) have at best a superficial understand

China’s relations with North Korea, both suggest a m

more supportive of preservation of the status quo 

movement toward reunification. These two cases are 

followed up by a third—by the Chinese complaint th

South Koreans and Americans have no experience 

socialist societies like China and North Korea. Once 

this seems to display a latent or underlying view towa

two Koreas that prefers continued division to the pros

integration. At least, China is not urgently prepar

cope with a unified Korea.

Of course, one cannot be sure how Chinese policym

and those we assume represent their policies feel “in 

hearts” about this issue. Furthermore, on an iss

complex and as important to China as Korean reunific

there are doubtless unresolved internal debates 

desire to retain flexibility, given the variety of str

circumstances that might surround a reunific

scenario.

76

 Nevertheless, after several years of hearin

sifting through Chinese views on reunification, I find i

175
to accept that there is a solid line of misrepresentat

all, including many who are unexpectedly candid on 

issues and who seem truly to value intellectual int

Consequently, it seems increasingly credible that B

means what its various spokesmen say: Stability o

Korean Peninsula, with its economic spin-off, far outw

Chinese interest in reunification, but China su

eventual “complete integration” and does not in th

term either fear the specter of a unified Korea or so v

socialist brother state or buffer that it would work ac

against reunification. Also, it is understandable that 

is no hurry in China for reunification. One is reminded 

now largely defunct alarms predicting imminent 

Korean collapse so commonly raised in the West just 

years ago and roundly jeered (then and now) by C

specialists. That recollection may well bolster the C

feeling that they, once more, have it right on North 

They may be quite confident, even cocky, in concludin

the reunification process could be destabilizing

reunification will be exceedingly difficult and com

prone to fail (even if there is much initial good will o

sides), and is a matter of little, if any, real urgency.

There are also good reasons to believe that B

indeed, favors eventual reunification and that such 

not just a smokescreen to hide a real preferen

continued separation. It is easy to be cynical about C

leaders’ actions and apparent intransigence on th

other issues. (Many, but hardly all, of them are e

dislike, disbelieve, and even despise.) But, trying t

past the cynicism, Beijing indeed seems to look 

prospect that Korea, unified a the right time in the 

way, will serve China’s interests in a number of way

solve some enduring problems for Beijing, such a

following: 

• It seems reasonable to speculate that Beijing do

wish to continue indefinitely to supply North Korea 

very large amounts of oil, often at bargain pric

176
commodity that, since 1993, China itself has to imp

large and steadily increasing quantities.

• Beijing does not want to worry endlessly th

invaluable South Korean investment in China’s Manc

Shandong Province, and the area around Tianjin will 

as a result of South Korea’s resources being redirec

rebuild and rejuvenate a North Korea whose econom

infrastructure are left indefinitely to worsen and ultim

collapse, when joining with South Korea would se

preclude such a disaster.

• China’s leaders do not want to tolerate forev

inescapable concern that North Korean leader Kim J

or his successor, will bring to a sudden halt the re

stability that China has striven so long to preserve, w

that implies for China’s economic and security situa

• Beijing entertains the hope that a revitalized no

half of the Korean Peninsula will some day becom

economic asset to the bordering areas of China, a pr

that many think laughable now, but a prospect 

patient and persevering China has elected not to forgo

if it takes to mid century or beyond to come to pass. Th

form of very long-term relief for China’s Northeast rus

What of the Chinese Military? Put bluntly, the C

Military Commission and General Staff Department 

like to concentrate on the challenge of coping with T

and avoiding confrontation with the United States—

Korean concerns and contingencies. To put a finer po

these concerns:

• The PLA, for the next 50 years, would like not t

to fret over (or maybe even actually plan for) every K

contingency from blocking huge refugee flows north

out of the DPRK to pouring PLA troops southward 

the Yalu River once again.

• PLA leaders, even those who may not rem

clearly the horrific casualty statistics of the 1950s w

Korea, must find daunting the prospects (even if unlik

177
being forced to march south and face the world’s 

advanced military—and having to find out just how 

support hated Japan will provide to ensure embarr

defeat for the Chinese they disdain, the Chines

constantly tell the world that Japan is the real next th

Asian peace and a country ready to produce n

weapons.

Possibly the list of reasons compiled here by the a

has been skewed by listening too long to too many C

specialists, but it does seem that the reasons for Ch

favor ultimate reunification, as it says it does, out

those for preserving the awkward and troublesome 

quo indefinitely.

These somewhat optimistic tentative conclusions, 

on attempts somehow to fathom the fundamental C

convictions on reunification, do not mean that Be

hopes for the future of the Koreas will make Wash

happy and Americans content. It should be remem

that, although the Chinese expect Seoul to gov

reunified Korea, they also expect that this unified 

will lean much more toward Beijing than is current

case. Certainly an integrated Korea, as the Ch

envision it, would have better relations by far with 

than with Japan. Possibly (eventually) the Sino-K

ties, Beijing hopes, could evolve in such a way that S

more comfortable with Beijing than with Washi

Asian issues to be managed by Asians, not by Ameri

Chinese Views of U.S. Forces in Korea and the U.S

Alliance. A somewhat similar perplexity applies to C

attitudes toward the future of the U.S.-ROK allianc

residual American forces when Korea is no longer divi

is, indeed, difficult to accept at face value that Beijin

grown tolerant of the presence of American forces 

Korean Peninsula, as many Chinese specialists a

Could it be true now, and might it remain the case

Chinese leaders have broadly accepted the stabilizing 

of American military forces in both Korea and Japa

178
especially in Korea in recent years? If so, will the c

Chinese concerns about what they see as a 

interventionist and hegemonic Washington ero

permanently reverse the trend toward tolerance for th

military posture in Asia? Put another way, are we 

process of losing something valuable, or was it ever th

that Beijing was, until recently, at least content wi

presence of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula (a

Japan as well)? Given the doubts that exist a

Westerners about the existence of some measu

tolerance in China for the U.S. alliances and Am

military presence in Asia, or even doubt that a debate 

issue is underway within China, it may be helpful t

closely at the fresh outlook and forthright but inf

words on the subject of a young, yet widely respecte

prestigious, Chinese specialist, Wu Xinbo:

China’s perceptions of the targets, internal structures, a

functions of the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korean alliances ha

changed remarkably over time, from extreme hostility to h

tolerance. These changes resulted from the interactions 

such factors as China’s assessment of the world balance 

power, the well-being of its relationship with both indigeno

and outside powers, and the priority of its national policy. T

evolution of Chinese perceptions also illustrates that Ch

need not view the two security alliances as inherently host

to its interests. Under some circumstances they can 

considered useful or at least harmless. Beijing’s attitudes a

often determined not by the two alliances per se but rather 

its perception of the sources of threat to its security a

whether these security alliances can alleviate or aggravate t

threat. On the other hand, given the nature of China’s fore

policy, Beijing does not have intrinsic love for these allianc

Since the 1980s, China has not particularly endorsed a

bilateral or multilateral military alliance in the regi

Normatively China is also uneasy with the reality of t

American military presence in the region and tends to see it 

a short-term arrangement rather than a long-te

phenomenon. During the Cold War, the Chinese perceived t

two security alliances as either against China or with Chi

In the post–Cold War period, they have yet to be convinc

that the function of the two alliances could be neither.

77

179
The Chinese Hard-liner’s Dream and the Am

Nightmare. It would appear then that, as wit

reunification issue, an internal debate is in progres

the issue of American forces in Asia; the question 

then be what is the nature and urgency of the debate 

what level is it being conducted. Beijing fully appre

that there is certainly no reasonable prospect 

Washington would withdraw its military forces 

present circumstances. Most countries of the r

continue to urge Washington to maintain its force lev

at least capabilities, for the time being. Asian cou

other than China are, indeed, often more supporti

demanding) of Washington’s sustaining its current 

numbers than some American military officers and of

would like. Beijing has largely come to accept that fac

no other reason than that it cannot see how to cha

However, major change on the Korean Peninsula (som

eliminating the North Korean threat) is often seen 

catalyst for change in American forces in Asia, and cer

many in Beijing recognize that prospect. It is appro

then, in this context, to try to comprehend the outlin

various sides of the Chinese internal debate.

The Simple Solution: Americans Out! Hard-lin

China, especially if the Taiwan problem rem

unresolved, could optimistically (from their perspe

envision an “easy” solution. Absent a North Korea

least a North Korean threat, there would rema

rationale for American forces to remain in Korea

Korean people, especially young Koreans al

unfavorably disposed toward American forces there, 

expect the Americans to leave or even agitate f

expeditious U.S. departure. The American people a

U.S. Congress would no longer desire to support and 

tens of thousands of troops and the large American m

infrastructure in South Korea, especially if they 

clearly unwanted by unappreciative Koreans. Beijing 

in this new situation, (without significant peril 

important bilateral relationship) effectively influenc

180
a Seoul that it has worked hard at winning over si

least the beginning of the 1990s and North Korean le

(whatever role they may be playing) it has support

decades, urging both to eject the United States

American arguments offered for a new form of Am

force structure in Korea tailored for respondi

unpredictable (and admittedly hard to define) se

contingencies likely to arise in the region would, i

negative environment, sound rather hollow.

As the Americans would then, of necessity, prep

leave Korea, China quietly could aid in the mov

almost certain to arise in Japan against U.S. force

bases. This movement would be built on objection

domestic political fears) concerning Japan’s r

embarrassing role as the last country in Asia to p

bases and other support for U.S. military forces. Soo

later, according to this hard-line Chinese scenario, 

would cease being the sole host in Asia for American t

aircraft, ships, bases, training areas, and huge quant

military equipment and supplies. The JSDF, it wo

noted especially in China, would cease to benefit d

from the complementary effects of American presen

cooperation; resurgent Japanese militarism wou

curbed by severing it from American military su

Beijing’s concerns would be eased about the arm

technology transfers that China objects to now and 

will lead to the continued inexorable buildup of a Jap

military to be feared in Asia.

China would, in the eyes of some, work to “Finla

this Japan, a Japan they hope would look around a

that accommodating a benevolent and prospe

increasingly modern, and non-expansionist China 

serve its purposes best. There is the hope or expectatio

the unified Korea would be leaning even more t

China. For the Chinese who think in this way, or som

that approximates this scenario of an essentially 

American withdrawal from Asia, there is icing on the 

If the Taiwan situation remains unresolved to this 

181
that would certainly not continue to be the case for 

Beijing would feel free to solve the Taiwan problem 

way it considers best with little fear of Ame

interference in this Chinese internal affair; or at leas

might be the view of Chinese hard-liners.

A More Sober Chinese View of the Future of U.S. F

The obverse of the internal Chinese argument, that w

not privy to hear directly, starts right off with s

questions about the outcome of an attempt at K

unification. Might the enormous political and eco

gaps between the two Koreas prove too great, with res

widespread unrest or worse in a newly unified countr

strident and deeply divisive domestic regionalism th

been such a prominent feature of South Korean politi

elections would pale in comparison to the North-

differences that would divide a novel peninsula-wide 

striving to have democratic elections. For example

voting by those in the former North Korea would a

certainly disrupt the pluralism so vital to South K

democracy now. In this regard, then, might the next 

to regional security be a very unconventional one th

have not envisioned (possibly one reminiscent 

Balkans in the 1990s). Serious strife may arise 

consequence of a premature or misguided attempt to 

the two Koreas together. It is, after all, the Chinese, a

others, who remind those from afar how difficult it mi

to integrate North and South Korea.

Factions could arise in the former North Kore

would cause difficulties for Seoul on their own 

summoning help from abroad, both development

would seem far less likely or troublesome with U.S. 

present. There is also the matter that is mentioned lit

thought about a lot: the fear that Seoul may tend 

rashly or imprudently—something that an Am

presence may, even in today’s world, have al

controlled. Would not it be preferable for a larg

calming U.S. presence to continue to moderat

hot-headed Korean tendencies to be rash or impatient 

182
tense period as reunification tries to take root and 

U.S. forces, and especially their senior leaders, even 

wholly desirable in Chinese eyes, are at least a k

factor, and their steadfast presence might be an imp

element in giving Koreans confidence and add

stability in a time of great uncertainty and extreme te

Beijing may be happier to have Americans stuck wit

rather sensitive and onerous task than a PLA w

untrained in providing either peacemaking or peaceke

assistance and not known or trusted by the econom

and socially dominant majority of the populatio

Chinese specialists might envision these dema

circumstances under which China’s interests are 

served by the enduring presence in significant numb

U.S. military forces.

Of course, the crisis scenario might not be in

Korean unrest. Chinese security scholars who are fav

disposed to an American military presence, or at least 

about it objectively, recognize that the contingency mi

brought on by new problems in new places: in th

troubled Russian Far East, or involving a Phili

Malaysian, or renewed Indonesian insurgency run 

and spilling into the sea lanes of the Philippine and 

China Seas, or, simply put, the East Asian se

contingency that we cannot now imagine but will won

years from now how we could have missed. And mis

may (in a favorable sense), if U.S. forces in East Asia s

preventive, stabilizing role based on their presence, w

having to fire a shot or launch a missile. Yes, there are 

Chinese strategic thinkers who do understand that 

of American presence in the region—as well as man

understand that argument but do not agree wit

premises or conclusions.

An Even More Moderate View: No Reason to Ob

U.S. Forces. Looking at the internal Chinese debate o

less dramatic plane, Beijing’s highest priority fo

Korean Peninsula and the region, as we have se

stability—save for the Chinese obsession over Ta

183
China has, according to many responsible sources, b

quite pragmatic about the U.S. situation in Korea

forces in Korea are not directly threatening China. 

has achieved a highly favorable position on the K

Peninsula, including notably close and improving rel

with the South, despite the large presence of Am

forces there; and the U.S.-ROK treaty is the centerp

security and stability in a place where China most 

stability. To put it simply, American forces have been 

of the woodwork,” and some in Beijing have come to 

their presence as normal, nonthreatening, and, 

important, stabilizing. Those who are pragmatic in B

as opposed to anti-American hard-liners, are much 

inclined to work with the existing security arrange

and be a responsible part of change—change accomp

in parallel with the new government of a unified Kore

with Washington, rather than acting obstreperou

trying to force prompt withdrawal of American force

In this argument, as in that of the hard-liners who 

for American withdrawal as well as for those who expe

United States to continue to play a strong role, there 

Japan factor. Put simply, there is a dark side 

all-too-plausible sequence whereby the departure o

forces from Korea leads to ejection or unavoidable Am

withdrawal from Japan. Most of those who favor this 

line of argument are also likely to believe that it is far 

to keep U.S. forces in Japan. These American forces ar

as a proven restraint; it is far better, from a C

perspective, to rely on that than to hope self-restrai

an unamended constitution (referring, of course, to A

9, which precludes possession of war potential) will r

adequate bulwarks against resurgent Japanese milit

This argument concludes that American forces shoul

in Korea so that the matter of Japan’s politicians no 

finding the presence of U.S. forces tolerable has far 

probability of arising in the near future.

78

So how might the more favorable views in Ch

support of continued U.S. presence on the Korean Pen

184
be bolstered by American actions? Presently, in th

2000, it is the PLA that most strongly argues th

United States should now be viewed differently, th

United States and its military forces are no longer 

trusted and are increasingly tending to tip the scales t

regional instability. There is an optimistic possibility

time passes, the United States is seen as no longer pr

frequent intervention and, for example, Kosovo may 

made the Americans more wary rather than more wil

use force in such instances,

79

 the more moderate s

Beijing will be able to make a more compelling argum

is the newly formed conviction by hard-liners about 

face of American interventionist power that has erod

Chinese tolerance and acceptance of U.S. forces in Ko

tolerance that had grown out of years of the demons

nonthreatening nature of American military presen

the Asian mainland less than 300 kilometers fro

Chinese border. It may not be quite as hard to return 

situation of Chinese tolerance as present circums

make it seem, but that is hardly a sure bet.

The kicker in this for the longer term, howev

Taiwan (assuming an unresolved cross-strait situat

the time of reunification) and how U.S. forces in As

seen then with respect to Taiwan. It will simply no lon

possible to make a substantive case in Beijing 

tolerance for the American presence in a unified K

residual U.S. forces there are seen unequivocally as 

to intervene in a Taiwan crisis. Any disposition t

moderation and pragmatism by Chinese elements ins

loses its weight when Taiwan gets placed on the other 

the scale.

The PRC’s Treaty Obligations to the DPRK. A C

specialist on China’s security relations with North 

said bluntly, “The treaty with North Korea is not a s

alliance in any sense of requiring the use of military 

it is not a mutual defense treaty.”

80

 The mutual coope

treaty, once seen by many as a commitment by Ch

come to North Korea’s aid with military force, is esse

185
a moribund instrument. Publicly, Beijing began clar

the absence of obligations under the treaty at least 5 

ago. In 1995 and repeatedly thereafter, Beijing 

making it increasingly clear it would not use the P

support of hostile action against South Korea by the K

People’s Army (KPA). Initially, the formulation rul

support if Pyongyang initiated the action. Then it b

clear that Beijing reserved the right to interpr

obligation (if it could still be called that) in any way C

leaders chose.

Pyongyang, for reasons that yet remain unclear, d

react noticeably to this snub. North Korea’s leaders d

vociferously object when Beijing went so far as to de

possibility of PLA support even if the South initiat

attack—as long as Seoul was acting alone, meani

course, absent American complicity.

81

 Although this f

of the PRC-DPRK relationship has grown rather sta

apparently unworthy of notice by the public and 

media, the official public statements made at the 

should not be forgotten. The Chinese Ministry of F

Affairs spokesman announced in the latter part of 

“China does not believe the friendship treaty be

Beijing and Pyongyang is a treaty requiring the dispa

military forces.”

In early 1997, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister 

Jiaxuan (now the foreign minister), in South Korea 

official visit, said for public consumption that China w

willing automatically to intervene if North Korea w

start a war. Tang, continuing, said the PRC-DPRK 

was a “dead document.” In May 1997, Premier Li Pen

public statement described North Korea as only a nei

not an ally. These stunning statements and the 

stunning silence from Pyongyang in their wake migh

to signal a rupture in the relationship, especially 

Beijing had previously set the relationship 

significantly by establishing diplomatic relations 

Seoul, still formally declared an enemy by Pyongya

1992.

186
It is possible, of course, that Beijing would say one 

about its intent to use the PLA in Korea and 

another—or do another when the chips are down. How

as time has passed, it seems that Beijing may well hav

meant what it said and also used those blunt state

specifically to deter bad behavior by Pyongyang. 

statements made it unequivocally clear that the chron

unpredictable and intransigent regime in Pyongyang 

be committing suicide were it to undertake a m

adventure. Of course, Beijing could be deterring Pyong

pleasing Seoul (and Washington, for those ther

bothered to notice), and still ready to do what it wish

real crisis.

The Search for Status. These developments ha

effect of bolstering the international reputation of a C

government that coveted status as a constructive mem

the community of nations but had to overcome a well-e

international reputation for taking actions that hav

very harmful to the country, its economy, and the C

people. Although the Chinese government is now once 

in 1999 and 2000, resorting to actions that most obs

think imprudent (domestic crackdowns and very 

saber-rattling against Taiwan), Beijing has, neverth

continued to act soberly and maturely in its dealing

Pyongyang and Seoul. Beijing, not surprisingly, see

have fully understood that North Korea’s leaders wou

regime survival above their flashes of anger and disp

frustration toward the South. Indeed, it is not hyper

suggest that Beijing has certainly made Pyon

consider the unvarnished consequences of thinkin

some desperate act might end up turning out well, w

PLA jumping in and helping greatly to produce the d

result. The Chinese decision openly to deny m

support for Pyongyang may already have pla

significant role in deterring a military adventure or 

similar exploit by Pyongyang. In that regard, it m

remembered, North Korea’s leaders have been more 

testy on many occasions since China’s stunning 

187
declarations (and subsequent repetitions) to the effec

reckless military actions would not bring the PLA’s h

put tersely, that Pyongyang had the ability to start 

but not to survive one.

82

There is the possibility that Beijing has one 

comparatively moderate, motivation for the seeming a

to Pyongyang. Beijing not only wants to avoid war 

doorstep, but also Chinese leaders want to claim the 

high ground. This could go so far that, after an outbr

hostilities, one might find China touting its solid eff

avoid war and pointing the finger at Washington for h

provided Pyongyang with a much bigger dose of pr

and provocation than of understanding 

accommodation. Beijing wants to be perceived as rest

and measured in dealing with Pyongyang 

Washington is made to appear unforgiving, hegemon

disinclined to appreciate the correctness of China’s de

to understand the DPRK and its legitimate concerns 

than to condemn it at every turn.

Pyongyang’s diplomatic outreach (beginning wi

new century and Washington’s double-barreled supp

ROK President Kim Dae Jung’s policy of opening 

North and adoption of the Perry Report) has dimm

some extent the credibility of portraying Beijing as th

national capital that has in recent years cared abou

Pyongyang. Seoul and Washington are now jostling B

in the contest to see which can get close

Pyongyang—and send the most money in the direc

the DPRK. Despite these latest efforts, Beijing is pro

still poised, if something goes seriously wrong (big or 

sooner or later) on the Korean Peninsula, to con

Washington for its belligerent attitudes toward Chin

Russia, and for provoking Pyongyang. In short, Beiji

positioned itself to do some name-calling and 

Washington as the culprit for whatever bad may 

happened concerning North Korea. It is one thi

Beijing to be right about North Korea, but it is quite a

to combine that with a convincing pronouncemen

188
Washington was wrong. That is what Beijing has posi

itself to do in the eventual battle for the hearts and m

a unified Korean people looking for friends—one of 

days.

Chinese Intentions for Use of the PLA in a K

Political or Economic Crisis. Most Chinese are 

convinced that Beijing would not order mi

intervention even if North Korea collapsed either poli

or economically. Chinese specialists, however, do no

the scenario much thought, since most do not, as we 

seen, believe the collapse of North Korea is a re

concern. When pressed, Chinese interlocutors reci

reasons why China would avoid using the PLA or 

forces in an intervention role in North Korea. China a

it is not inclined to send forces into North Korea bec

• South Korea would react badly. Beijing value

much its economic and diplomatic relations with Seo

exchanges views with the South Koreans even now o

a situation to help prevent some future crisis.

• There would be a similarly unfavorable Am

reaction, and Beijing’s relations with Washington ar

if not good, including important economic relations.83 

simply could not prudently act unilaterally in 

something like this, even if it were tempted or felt com

to do so; the international repercussions wou

significant. China increasingly cares about its reputa

a responsible member of the community of nations a

vital trade and investment ties.

• China does not want to be bogged down in 

Korea; it would be very difficult to find a way to pu

“China got out once; the United States is still in 

Korea,” as one Chinese specialist put it.84

Recalling that China did send the PLA into Korea 

early 1950s, a very knowledgeable and well-conn

researcher explained that the situation today is 

different from the way it was 50 years ago. If trouble 

189
between North and South, China would let the two K

sides handle it, probably providing only food and med

he asserted. If the United States were to move acro

DMZ (which he considers highly unlikely unde

circumstances he can imagine), the reaction by Beijin

the PLA would be highly dependent on the sta

U.S.-China relations. If the relationship were hostile 

threat to China appeared to be present, Beijing woul

to act. If the relationship were as good as today (

2000) or better, China would think hard before 

serious action, he asserted. He anticipates that Wash

and Beijing would, under this circumstance, consul

senior researcher added that he thinks it highly un

any faction or rump government in North Korea wou

the United States for help—adding to his conviction t

American crossing of the DMZ was not a plausible sc

for concern.

85

Use of the PLA or PAP (People’s Armed Police, now 

larger than in 1989 and under PLA command bu

responsible directly for internal security matters

Korea as part of a United Nations UN intervention for

been suggested by some Chinese specialists as at l

plausible consideration. Chinese willing to discus

issue (but not be identified) are of several minds. 

remind that China has not participated in any large

UN peacekeeping operations and would initiate su

action in Korea with great trepidation. Others point ou

this method, through the device of the UN, would avo

serious implications of unilateral intervention and 

make it easier for Beijing to believe that Chinese 

could be extracted—that an indefinite commitment co

avoided. Interestingly, among those interviewed, the 

cautious Chinese official was a PLA general office

described the possibility of PLA participation in a UN 

as “very sensitive” and re-emphasized the unpreced

nature of this for the PLA and how likely it was tha

action would be interpreted as essentially a unil

190
Chinese intervention in Korea—regardless of what th

might be.

87

Coping with Refugees. There is the additional pro

under increasingly dire conditions, of a persistent r

flow in very large numbers northward into China. The 

PLA general officer, who expressed such reticence abo

PLA crossing the border and claimed to have been w

on the issue, said unequivocally that the PLA and PAP 

prepared to stop a refugee flow at or near the borde

North Korea and to manage the refugees. He d

elaborate on how the refugees might be handled or se

appreciate how large the numbers might be. It is per

that the PLA legitimately prides itself on being a p

army in the sense that it very frequently (many ti

year) provides troops, often in very large numbers, t

cope with natural disasters in China such as wides

flooding, as mentioned earlier. PLA accomplishme

this area are undoubtedly presented in the best li

domestic (controlled) press reports, news photograph

dramatic television coverage (sometimes a bit overdo

cynical Western eyes).

However, given the frequency and scope of 

assistance of this sort, it is noteworthy that no instan

PLA inadequacy, bumbling, or mishandling o

humanitarian operations have come to light.

88

 It c

said, at least, that the PLA is preparing to handle re

and has both the experience and the resources to at

moderate-scale problem successfully. The pert

question is whether the problem would be so massiv

collapse of North Korea that any conceivable force wo

overwhelmed.

The Economy, Stupid! Chinese scholars 

practitioners who have analyzed the issue of Ch

reaction to chaos or political collapse emphasize wha

see as China’s real interests. They contend China w

foolishly deviate from the priority track of na

economic progress; to accomplish that, a stable peri

191
environment is needed that surely does not include h

the PLA in North Korea and having the South Ko

Japanese, Americans, and others trying to find w

punish China for the actions it took and applying all fo

pressure to force withdrawal of the PLA. Simultane

Beijing would likely be more worried about how to e

the PLA gracefully (or otherwise) rather than 

advantages might be gained incident to an impr

intervention. The head of a prestigious policy instit

Beijing added the somewhat emotional note that duri

recent commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the 

Korea, it was evident by the nature of the event an

remarks made how reluctant Beijing would be to u

PLA in a Korean intervention yet again.

89

These are the Chinese arguments, repeatedly spo

apparent sincerity—at least sincerity on the part of 

speaking the words. Whether Beijing is believed or 

this count, it is significant that the great prepondera

Chinese discussion of this issue, privately and publ

about what China will not do with respect to intervent

the Korean Peninsula, rather than what it might do

stands in remarkable contrast to Beijing’s bluster 

what it will do with respect to the use of force a

Taiwan, illustrating that Chinese leaders are not retic

using the threat of force as an instrume

policy—something it definitely is not doing in its pol

the Korean Peninsula. At a minimum, Beijing c

reasonably be seen as poised to undertake bold interv

on the Korean Peninsula.

Another important message, generally unspoke

clearly implied in all these words by Chinese special

that Beijing does not wish to see (or be a party 

instance of foreign intervention in a sovereign co

especially a country neighboring China, because 

example it might give the world about what could co

pass in Taiwan, Tibet, or some other place China hold

The fear of renewed foreign intervention in China, a

that Beijing considers to be China, is deep and ab

192
Taiwan, especially of course, is rarely out of mind f

Chinese. As one Chinese interlocutor, praising prospe

the June 2000 Korean North-South summit, could no

but say, the success of this summit would imply th

Korean Peninsula is a less dangerous place fro

American viewpoint. Consequently, Washington wo

able to give more attention to the matter of the T

Strait. That, he said ominously, increases the thr

China’s security and well-being.

90

Policy Implications for Washington, Beijing an

Other Capitals.

China’s Role in a Stable Future for the Korean Pen

and the Region. Major change of some sort is expec

come to the Korean Peninsula, although the timin

nature of the change remain quite uncertain. Few 

would want to join the large club composed of thos

have confidently made predictions about North Kore

been proven wrong. Nevertheless, it seems safe to s

that the diminution or elimination of the threat po

North Korea may be a major element of this impendin

long-awaited change. The North Korean threat, by g

and missile forces especially, has at least since the end 

Cold War been proclaimed as the raison d’être of th

alliances with the ROK and Japan and the reason f

intense interest in development and deployment of t

and national missile defenses (TMD and N

Consequently, this change on the Korean Peninsula i

by many, including thoughtful Chinese strategists

catalyst for change in the security architecture of Nor

Asia, or possibly for all of East Asia.

Some might object to calling the existing loose coll

of arrangements in the region a security architecture

is, in fact, a diverse structure of bilateral alliances, str

partnerships (or prospects therefor), joint commun

national statutes, unique constitutional provisions, a

like. Nothing dictates that either the existing 

193
envisioned security architecture have a rigorous or f

structure. Indeed, it has been argued often that, fo

region, a formal structure resembling NATO is simp

suitable. Possibly the more interesting and more imp

questions are: (1) What can we say about the se

environment in which this framework will function? 

What do China and the United States expect or dema

new or evolving security architecture?

In answer to the first question, it is simply too ea

forecast what the security environment will be 

aftermath of some sort of change in Korea. New thre

peace and stability may take many forms, some th

understand now and some that we may have t

imagining at present. It may be that curbing pir

stopping drugs proves to be the major preoccupation

may be, as suggested earlier in this paper, that in

strife in a country like a unified Korea may re

peacekeeping or peacemaking actions similar to those 

Balkans that gained such notoriety in recent years

likely, the nature of the actual future threat or pr

presently escapes our notice or exceeds our imaginat

In light of this high degree of uncertainty, it would 

to most strategists foolhardy to take precipitous actio

as terminating the U.S. bilateral alliances and withdr

or sharply reducing the capability of U.S. force levels 

region—although changes in the missions, num

composition, and disposition seem likely. Furtherm

would seem imprudent unnecessarily to take sign

actions that may become essentially irrevocable

example, because of various American domestic fact

well as regional ones, the withdrawal of U.S. force

Asia may be an action that would be almost imposs

reverse once taken. No responsible government wants 

a dangerous power vacuum in the region or a rush 

such a void, should it occur. Even for the most ad

America bashers, the United States is the “devil they 

in the Northeast Asia security lash-up, and the

adequate constraints on American action to satisfy 

194
(but hardly all) of the concerns of those who do not 

Washington to act with restraint.

In answer to the question about what China wants 

framework, it is evident, of course, that Beijing’s conce

future security architecture would not include as prom

features U.S. security alliances, and may well favor 

dissolution. Although Beijing has not been in a hurry 

American alliances to end, there is the long-term view 

by many in China that Asian security problems s

eventually be the exclusive domain of Asian countries

the oft-stated Chinese preference for no troops on f

soil is more than a self-serving slogan. The central 

however, is that China wants its role as an emerging 

regional nation fully recognized.

Beijing rails against what it calls American attem

hegemony, and Washington does not want China to a

a dominant posture. Nonetheless, fear of hegemony, 

party, must not obscure the fact that China is the l

and most populous country of the region and that 

legitimate aspirations for a constructive role in the se

affairs of the region. This conviction on the part of Bei

an underlying element of the strategic partnership c

that China has announced with Russia and advoca

the way of the future. China does not want to see itself 

apparent, if unnamed, adversary of alliances in the 

and understandably wants instead to be a part 

architecture.

As to American requirements for a security frame

Washington firmly holds that its traditional bil

alliances should be central features of any new se

architecture. New importance, however, has been att

by some American strategic thinkers to what has 

called a “growing pattern of security pluralism.” T

course, includes multilateral security dialogues, the 

prominent of which is the ARF (the Association of Sou

Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum). Many co

the ARF a talkfest at best and arguably a failure. Wh

195
that opinion is shared or not, it is useful, neverthel

mention the ARF in a Northeast Asian context, not be

that body is attempting to tackle problems outside its 

(Southeast Asia) but rather because the ARF is, i

already providing a venue where nations of Northeas

somewhat surprisingly meet and discuss sec

matters—such issues as confidence building 

transparency, which might seldom if ever arise nat

and without direct confrontation in other meetings

may demonstrate the applicability of such meth

Northeast Asia and is most recently illustrated by 

Korea’s joining the ARF session at its July 2000 sess

Bangkok, where the North Korean foreign ministe

with his counterparts including U.S. Secretary of 

Madeleine Albright.

There are other multilateral examples: The ROK, J

and the United States have established an official for

discussion and cooperation. One of the most significa

now somnolent—multilateral forums is the Four 

Talks involving the DPRK, ROK, PRC, and United S

something hard to imagine a few years ago. As th

Department of Defense’s 1998 East Asia Strategy R

states: “Multilateralism in all its forms will becom

important element of U.S. engagement in the reg

coming years.” Only a short time back, neither Wash

nor Beijing thought well of the concept of multilater

Americans thought multilateralism threatene

important bilateral arrangements. The Chinese cons

multilateralism as a way for others to gang up on C

Now, anew, multilateralism is being referred to by 

with disdain, as a concept that was a flash in the pa

now shows no promise. That may turn out to be the ca

for now there is no conclusive evidence of that

moreover, there has not arisen a replacement concep

holds promise. Until that occurs, sticking with multil

efforts may be the only promising recourse.

At the end of the last decade, the American vis

security in Northeast Asia was a network of overla

196
and interlocking institutions and relationships 

“establish a diverse and flexible framework for prom

common security in the Asia-Pacific region into th

century,” to quote the U.S. Department of Defense’

Asia Security Report (EASR) once more. Beijing 

ascribe to much of this as well. This is an excee

encouraging vision. For that reason, if no other, it 

premature to give up hope on multilateralism in one f

another or a conglomerate of forms as a pla

component of an evolving security architectu

Northeast Asia.

Whatever the ultimate solution (or absence ther

central problem is that there are two largely contrad

(possibly even diametrically opposed) views of the 

bilateral alliances in the regional security architectur

broad concept of security pluralism, whether defin

multilateralism or not, seems to hold at least some pr

of finding a middle ground, even if only tempo

Consequently, the real issue at hand is not to choo

view over the other but rather to find a way to accomm

both views of the role of alliances and to make the m

the emergence of the idea of pluralism.

Among the first steps along such a path mig

fostering the realization that alliances need not 

identified adversaries as their raison d’être and th

country need be a target of these alliances unless its co

makes it so. Put a bit more bluntly, it may be that 

could find the concept of bilateral alliances fa

distasteful if it did not inevitably have to conclude th

alliances target China. Some in the United States se

want to identify China more clearly as an adversary 

than attempting to avoid such an appellation. There i

by far to the issue than semantics. It serves no 

purpose to state how unhappy we are with many C

policies and actions, and vice versa with Ch

unhappiness toward the United States, if we a

working positively to avoid an exacerbation of h

attitudes.

197
It may be useful to present this concept another w

turn it on its head: No country which desires to 

integral part of the security architecture can be see

looming threat to regional security and stability. Th

require a good measure of introspection by all the cou

that aspire to be solid components of a new framewo

this regard, there are several important questions th

should ask of ourselves. How does Washington explain 

it sees as its role in a new or modified framework in 

way that even the detractors, the America bashers in 

and elsewhere, know that the United States does not 

to be a regional hegemon and a force bent on containm

legitimate national aspirations? Does Washington n

make it even clearer that it sees U.S. interests best s

by stable, open, and prosperous nations in East 

unquestionably including China? How does Japan 

effectively convince its neighbors, including both 

(invaded and brutally occupied by Japan) and a u

Korea (brutally colonized by Japan for decades), th

goal is not a militaristic future and domination 

region?

What does China have to do to earn a place 

architecture? How might China cut the Gordian knot 

Taiwan issue? How does it deal with the firm convicti

others that Taiwan is not wholly an internal issue and 

peaceful resolution of the problem is the only wa

makes sense? Can the developing confrontation be

Chinese short-range ballistic missiles threatening T

and theater missile defense be avoided? What a

ingredients that will make a unified Korea a welcome 

the framework? What are the appropriate plac

Mongolia and Russia in the new architecture? To the 

that all are unwilling to address these questions 

candor and a desire to understand the views of 

capitals, the future security framework after K

unification will be less strong and less stable.

The future, after Korean unification or some othe

of change on the Korean Peninsula, will bring a ne

198
different security architecture for the region. Concei

this may occur quite abruptly; we may have the luxu

gradual, evolutionary change; more likely we may ha

frustrations and uncertainty of a sporadic process of 

forward, sideways, and backwards. This prosp

development of a new security architecture, at wh

pace it may take, has great promise and shou

approached with optimism and enthusiasm. Howeve

also a sobering, daunting task, fraught with peril; s

appropriate to conclude with a list of reminders 

various formulas that would likely result in fail

construct a stable and effective new security framewo

Northeast Asia.

We must avoid these formulas for failure of a n

evolving security architecture:

• Seeking formality and rigidity in compositio

organizational structure—the fallacy of attempting t

something like NATO in Northeast Asia.

• Failing to appreciate China’s appropriate place 

architecture and ignoring Beijing’s views in shapin

concept.

• Prejudging the outcome on the Korean peninsu

assuming we can forecast the precise form of the reso

of the Korean problem.

• Waiting until after change on the Korean Penins

lay the groundwork—to consider seriously what will fo

stable and enduring framework.

• Acting hastily in reconsidering and readju

American alliances and forward presence in Asia.

• Failing to find a way to blend the bilatera

multilateral, and the “minilateral” mechanisms th

have roles to play.

• Assuming we can understand and foresee the n

of future security contingencies that will threate

region.

199
This is admittedly a daunting task, especially wh

recognizes that no one is in charge and that no one ca

charge. This has to be an international collegial effort

heightens the challenge, but it also, one can hope, heig

the prospects that the new framework will sufficient

appropriately reflect the composition and character 

region so that it will not be subjected to assaults f

country that feels it has been shunned or ignored. Hid

the Chinese goals and strategies for the Korean Peni

there is great promise for major change, but that pr

must be better understood before it can be realized. T

good reason to fear that a new framework will be doom

instability if it is constantly being shaken by outside

are either trying to break into the structure or try

dismantle it. China would be doing just that if we cann

our understanding and analysis of China’s attitudes t

the Korean Peninsula as a good and sufficient les

understand the larger matter of the structur

participants that can become the diverse, yet ess

components of a stable new regional security archite

None of this is to suggest that making the new se

framework inclusive of all who should be part 

architecture will be an easy task. However, despi

extent of the difficulty, it will be easier to resolve 

problems now (and to be ready to apply them as ch

occur on the Korean Peninsula) than to try later to cop

the inevitable assaults on the framework by those wh

been left out in the cold. The most challenging asp

developing a new architecture, one largely and unavo

derived from traditional security perspectives, may 

apply this architecture to a new world of nontrad

security concerns. But that challenge surely goes far b

this examination of China’s goals and strategies f

Korean Peninsula and what they imply for U.S. polic

200
CONCLUSION

China and the United States have entered th

century with a divided Korea composed of a crippled 

and a newly economically recovered South. C

anticipates, even relies on, the prospect that the C

economy will benefit significantly from trad

investment from South Korea. Washington expect

both China and South Korea will be its important eco

partners. Neither Beijing nor Washington expects 

Korea to move militarily against the South becaus

think North Korea’s leaders have too much to los

realize that such an action, absent the direct support 

PLA, would likely mean the devastation of North Kor

the fall of the Pyongyang regime. Beijing hopes th

magic of Korean unification or reconciliation may b

new view, even in Washington, of a security framewo

the region so that China will be able to become an in

component in the Northeast Asian security archite

and that it will no longer, tacitly or expressly, be see

target of alliances.

Washington might hope that China, reflecti

positive role as a constructive member of the commu

nations rather than its dark side as a bully rea

bludgeon Taiwan, would earn its position as a solid p

the regional security framework. If Washington and B

can reach such an accommodation, the now nettl

issue of the continued presence of U.S. forces 

countries of Asia near China will not be a mat

consequence to China, or the forces will have been rad

reconfigured or withdrawn because of other fa

domestic and international.

But no examination, in the year 2000, of C

interests in Korea should ignore the crazy Taiwan fac

we have seen repeatedly. Taiwan is simply an integra

of China’s regional security perspectives because B

has refused to rid itself of the obsession with Taiw

Taiwan has refused to accede to Beijing’s generou

201
unrelenting demands—whichever way one chooses to 

the matter. With the Taiwan issue unresolved, and, 

yet, volatile, China will not view U.S. forces and allian

Asia as innocuous. Moreover, the threat the PLA po

Taiwan will inevitably (and correctly) be consider

other countries as good and sufficient reason for the U

States to maintain a strong, ready military capability 

region and for China to be the unspoken ultimate reas

the potent American presence.

If and when the cross-strait issue is res

satisfactorily there will undoubtedly be other pro

involving China and the United States. However, f

time being, the “Taiwan problem,” as Beijing calls 

recognized clearly by all except the Chinese as th

obstacle to China’s aspiration to be viewed as a p

force in the region. Moreover, China, by its own a

ensures that, in the current situation, the Taiwan 

remains a major complicating factor in devising 

security architecture for the region, even when the 

seemed to be China’s goals and strategies for the K

Peninsula.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. North Korean leader Kim Jong Il made a surprise (kep

until his return home) first foreign visit as his country’s leader to 

for 3 days in late May and early June 2000. South Korean Preside

Dae Jung made an announced, but unprecedented, visit to Pyo

during the period of the conference for which this chapter was pr

The North-South summit meeting, delayed a day for “te

reasons,” was actually held June 13-15, 2000, in the North 

capital. It has left both sides with high expectations.

2. Eric A. McVadon, “Chinese Military Strategy for the 

Peninsula,” chapter 9, in James R. Lilley and David Shambaug

China’s Military Faces the Future, Washington, DC: M.E. Sha

American Enterprise Institute, 1999, p. 273. In this earlier pie

related subject, the author elaborated the balanced relati

between the PRC and the DPRK and ROK, including conc

Beijing that Washington would disrupt the delicate balance the C

had worked so long and hard to attain.

202
3. Yu Bin, “Containment by Stealth: Chinese Views of and 

toward America’s Alliances with Japan and Korea after the Col

Asia/Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, Instit

Strategic Studies, http://aparc.stanford.edu/, September 1999

4. Kim Jong Il’s last known trip abroad was to China in 19

before his father’s July 1994 death. South Korean press repor

that Chinese President Jiang Zemin would make a reciprocal 

Pyongyang in 2000, possibly in October.

5. China, in the months before Kim’s trip to Beijing, signi

increased efforts to discover North Koreans illegally in Chi

return them, an action that would please Pyongyang but not S

6. Reuters news service report from Beijing on September 8

7. Beijing Xinhua, June 1, 2000, report, “More on Kim Jong I

in English.

8. February 11, 2000, interview by the author with an expe

PRC practitioner who until recently participated for 4 years in ac

that support China’s foreign policy development and impleme

for the Koreas.

9. Yu Bin, p. 11.

10. Ibid. 

11. Xinhua, June 1, 2000.

12. Dinner conversation on March 24, 2000, by the author in 

in mid-March with the president of one of China’s most autho

policy analysis organizations. Although citation by name is imp

in situations like this, Chinese specialists on relations with the 

are quite receptive to discussing China’s strategy and actio

respect to the Korean Peninsula, even enthusiastic at the opport

try to ensure that Beijing’s positions and the facts, as they see th

presented.

13. Ibid.

14. Jonathan D. Pollack and Chung Ming Lee, Preparing for 

Unification: Scenarios & Implications, Santa Monica, CA: RAND

p. 15, including footnote 20. Pollack and Lee mention the crackd

Chinese security forces, criminal activities by refugees, an

estimates of North Koreans living in northeastern China are as 

100,000, with larger numbers during surges in search of food. El

203
Rosenthal, in a May 31, 2000, article in the New York Times, “

Steps Up Effort To Expel Illegal North Korean Immigrants,” de

the pre-visit crackdown and also writes that the estimated num

illegal residents are 100,000 to 200,000.

15. Yang Xiyu, acting director of the Institute of World Devel

Research Center of the PRC State Council, interview by author, 

March 19, 2000. The subject of PLA preparations for coping 

refugee flow is covered more extensively in Section 2 of this cha

noted there, the specific course of the information concerning PL

to block a refugee flow was an August 1997 interview by the auth

a PLA general officer who had recently been involved with 

concerning planning for Korean contingencies in senior headqua

Beijing.

16. February 11, 2000, interview cited above.

17. David Hoffman, “Russia Says N. Korea Offers to End 

Program,” Washington Post, July 20, 2000, p. A16.

18. “Russian and Chinese leaders talk by phone,” Reuters, M

July 26, 2000.

19. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov announced the 

July 26, 2000, as reported by Elizabeth Piper in an article enti

Korea’s Kim to make mammoth Russian trip-Ivanov,” Reuters, M

July 26, 2000.

20. Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., A History of Ballistic 

Development in the DPRK, Occasional Paper No. 2, Cen

Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International S

Monterey, California, pp. 3, 8.

21. Marshal O was Minister of the People’s Armed Forces a

Chairman of the National Defense Commission as described in D

Intelligence Agency publication PC-1510-101-96, North Kor

Foundations for Military Strength—Update 1995, Washingto

1996, p. 3.

22. Kim Taeho, “Strategic Relations Between Beiji

Pyongyang: Growing Strains amid Lingering Ties,” in James R

and David Shambaugh, eds., China’s Military Faces the 

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1999, p. 305.

23. Ibid. Kim cites Dong-A Ilbo (Seoul), July 11, 1997, p. 6

original source for these quoted words.

204
24. Making Kim Jong Il’s unannounced May-June 2000 

Beijing all the more noteworthy.

25. Kenneth W. Allen and Eric A. McVadon, China’s 

Military Relations, Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 

1999, p. 67. The patterns of visits and names and titles of visitor

and after Kim Il Sung’s death are provided in this section on PL

relations in the Stimson Center report.

26. Conversation on August 4, 1997, by the author with a 

PLAN officer with knowledge of his navy’s exchanges with othe

as well as general knowledge of those of the other services of th

27. PRC foreign service officer responsible for DPRK 

conversation by author, July 1996.

28. Conversation cited above by the author with a senior 

officer, August 4, 1997.

29. Many of the PLA’s weapon systems and related items w

well suited to both the KPA’s budget and operational requireme

they are not transferred. The KPA has to scrounge elsewhere.

30. Eric A. McVadon, “The Chinese Military and the Per

States in the 21st Century: A Security Tour d’Horizon,” chapt

Larry M. Wortzel, ed., The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st C

Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War C

December 1999, pp. 49-50. The Chinese-asserted view of the Ko

economic rather than military terms is described in full.

31. Chung Jae Ho, in his February 1999 pape

Korean-American Alliance and the ‘Rise of China’: A Preli

Assessment of Perceptual Changes and Strategic Choices,” Asia

Research Center, Stanford University, Institute for Intern

Studies, http://aparc.stanford.edu/, p. 8, states:

Since Korean-Chinese economic changes began in the l

1970s, the size of the bilateral trade has increased 1,249 tim

in eighteen years from $US19 million in 1979 to $US2

billion in 1997. The pace at which the Korean-Chinese tra

has expanded is extraordinary since it took 32 years (1955-

for the Korean-United States trade to reach a compara

level. That much of the expansion had already occurred pr

to the 1992 diplomatic normalization further highlights t

special nature of the bilateral relationship. By 1997, Kor

and China became the third largest partner for each oth

205
after the United States and Japan. Additionally, Koreans se

to regard Korea’s trade with China as much more fair t

Korea’s trade with the United States.

32. For comparison, according to The Heritage Foundation

and Asia Statistical Handbook, 1999-2000 Edition

foreign direct investment in China reached $2.6 bil

1994 and in 1996 totaled $3.8 billion, suggesting that 

Korean and U.S. FDI in China are of the same or

magnitude. 

33. Chu Shulong, “How the Korean-U.S. Security Alliance Is 

by the Chinese,” conference paper, 14th annual Joint Intern

Conference of the Council on U.S. Korean Security Studies a

Korean Association of International Studies held in Arlington, V

October 1999, p. 8; and an interview by the author with Professor 

Beijing in March 2000.

34. Kenneth W. Allen and Eric A. McVadon, p.66.

35. Professor Chu Shulong, director of the North American D

of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relat

Beijing, interview by the author, March 2000.

36. These survey results are extracted from Chung Jae H

Korean-American Alliance and the ‘Rise of China’: A Preli

Assessment of Perceptual Changes and Strategic Choices,” Fe

1999, Tables 6, 7, and 8 on p. 13. See earlier citation for 

information on accessing the paper.

37. Ibid., p. 12.

38. An associate research professor who deals with China’s s

relations with North Korea at a prestigious think tank closely li

the PRC government, conversation by the author, Beijing, Ma

2000.

39. Senior member of a prestigious think tank who has 

extensively on Chinese security interests on the Korean Pen

interview by author, Beijing, March 2000.

40. Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., p. 29. Bermudez supports the C

specialist’s point: “DPRK missile designers and engineer

continued to travel to the PRC for professional training and p

technology exchanges throughout the 1990s.”

206
41. Visiting Chinese scholar-official who has excellent know

and extensive experience with Beijing’s relationship with Pyon

interview by author, Washington, DC, February 11, 2000.

42. If one takes seriously the statements about reluctance to 

the missile issue with Pyongyang, it is intriguing that Chinese 

feel quite free to criticize Washington and others; e.g., telling T

cannot acquire TMD and rebuking an insufficiently repentant 

World War II) Tokyo to the effect that duplicitous Japan will p

use TMD to gain ballistic missile technology with which to t

China or that it will use TMD as a shield behind which it will 

nuclear weapons and once again be the scourge of Asia. Noneth

appears that these “insider” interlocutors firmly believe that B

constrained in this way in its conversations with North Korean le

43. As with Beijing’s alleged constrained and ca

conversations with Pyongyang, it is intriguing to hear 

well-connected interlocutors argue that huge China would in

having proof or concrete evidence before it would feel com

confronting its troubled, comparatively tiny neighbor of North 

when it can so readily confront or insult others on what often ap

be dubious grounds or contrived conclusions. The intr

compounded by the careful crafting of the Chinese posit

incorporate American sacred cows such as the MTCR and 

assertion that the disorderly U.S. arrays of positions are inconsi

illogical as contrasted with Beijing’s unified and unass

“principled positions.” There is more than intrigue to this, of 

Beijing’s points on these matters are the result of developing a 

official view and honing it by repeated rehearsals. Free-lancin

part of the process, even in Track II forums, and, consequently, 

through the formally forged Chinese boilerplate is often 

formidable task for Western interlocutors.

44. Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., pp. 10 and 29, supports the C

assertion. Bermudez establishes a link between early DPRK b

missiles and Soviet R-17E [Scud B] missiles obtained about 1

North Korea from Egypt and reverse-engineered, but with respe

Taepo-dong 1 and 2 he writes:

There have been frequent reports suggesting a linka

between both systems—especially the Taep’o-dong 2—a

PRC missiles (i.e., DF-3). These claims, however, remain to 

confirmed.

45. The lack of advance notice by Pyongyang to Beijing of the 

1998 Taepo-dong launch was corroborated by reference to a sta

207
by Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao as repo

Reuters in Beijing on September 8, 1998. As mentioned pre

Beijing was also surprised recently by Pyongyang’s alleged 

Russian President Putin to abandon rocketry in return for foreig

its space exploration program, interpreted by some as North Kor

of international space launch services.

46. DPRK Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun at the July 2000 A

Regional Forum session in Ban would not elaborate on Putin’s r

a North Korean willingness to give up its ballistic missile pr

leaving the issue quite unclear.

47. Chinese security specialist working in Washington, inter

author, April 21, 2000.

48. KEDO is responsible for procuring and delivering heavy 

to North Korea to fuel electrical power plants that otherwise w

powered by the objectionable nuclear reactors prohibited 

provisions of the Agreed Framework. The agreed arrangement 

light water reactors, which are not ready sources of weapon

fissionable material, will eventually supply the electrical power t

now shutdown “dirty” reactors would have provided alon

plutonium that could readily be used in weapons.

49. This is the carefully constructed, and representative, ar

of a specialist on Sino-Korean relations at a prominent 

institution for the study of international relations. It will be of 

to see how Beijing reacts to the July 2000 mention by Presiden

that Russia may become a contributor to KEDO funding.

50. A very senior and self-confident official of the intern

relations institution above offered this candid elaboration 

reasoning behind Beijing’s decision not to contribute to KEDO f

The remarkable Chinese theme of grave concern about Pyon

sensibilities appears again in this argument.

51. Chu Shulong, “China and the U.S.-Japan and U.S

Alliances in a Changing Northeast Asia,” Asia/Pacific Research 

Stanford University, Institute for Strategic St

http://aparc.stanford.edu/, June 1999; and “China a

U.S.-Korean Alliance,” conference paper, 14th Annual Conferenc

Council on U.S. Korean Security Studies and The Korean Associ

International Studies, Arlington, VA, October 28-29, 1999. B

Professor Chu could not attend the conference in Arlington, the 

coincidentally, presented and discussed the latter paper a

208
retained a copy, as did The Council, whose address is P.O. Bo

Arlington, VA 22203; fax, (703) 979-0909.

52. February 11, 2000, interview previously cited.

53. It was intriguing to hear this thoughtful official and sch

through his chain of logic, which allowed him to argue th

American desire to retain troops in Asia (for reasons he did not d

is so strong that it leads Washington to strive to have North 

remain intact indefinitely.

54. Chinese security specialist working in Washington, inter

author, April 21, 2000. It might be more accurate to say tha

would be unwilling and would find it domestically imprudent 

money down the economic black hole that North Korea has bec

55. The spring 2000 visit by Kim Jong Il to Beijing was see

affirmation of relations between China and North Korea after th

of Kim Il Sung and is expected to make both sides more confident 

Pyongyang will not be so inclined to act in desperation, feeling 

no alternative. During Kim Il Sung’s time, these exchange

frequent. Professor Chu Shulong said that, despite rumors 

contrary, there are good solid relations with North Korea and K

Il’s leadership is accepted by the Chinese. China must deal with K

must be strong to have come out of that system and survived 

Moreover, Kim Jong Il has been reasonable to deal with, Chu as

speaking with authority.

56. February 11, 2000, interview cited above.

57. Yu Bin, p. 10.

58. Dinner conversation by the author on March 19, 2000, in 

with an official who was very familiar with the government polic

respect to the Korean Peninsula and works under the State Coun

Chinese equivalent of the cabinet of the U.S. president.

59. March 20, 2000, interview cited previously.

60. It is somewhat annoying to Chinese specialists to be cont

confronted by disbelief on the part of Americans, many of whom 

an air of confidentiality in saying that they understand t

positions of all the major countries on the matter of reunificatio

go on to suggest quietly that Japan, the United States, and 

although it cannot be said publicly, know that continued divisio

Korean Peninsula is the preference for those insiders wh

carefully about a possible realistic solution.

209
61. Although this history is well known to those who lived t

these years and played a role in the events described, fo

interested, this summary was derived from a much longer descri

the history of Chinese attitudes toward U.S. forces in Kor

appears at the beginning of Chu Shulong’s paper “How the Kore

Security Alliance Is Viewed by the Chinese,” conference pape

annual Joint International Conference of the Council on U.S. 

Security Studies and The Korean Association of International S

Arlington, VA, October 1999, pp. 1-2. In an earlier citation o

paper, methods to obtain a copy are suggested.

62. The term normal, spoken in English with something of 

is used commonly by many Chinese specialists to reflect C

distaste for the possibility that Japan could be allowed to reacq

status of a normal state.

63. February 11, 2000, interview cited above. There ar

thoughtful Chinese who simply do not imagine the China the

they know involved in competition with the very advanced U.S. e

and similarly advanced U.S. military for the dominant role 

region. When reminded that some of their more militarist

possibly influential) countrymen do make such noises, they po

that among so many people there are bound to be outlying view

as in the United States. They call to mind that prestigious Ame

some who are quite influential, essentially declare China an 

even now, over matters that virtually all Chinese consider 

Taiwan self-determination, the status of Tibet, China’s sove

claims in the South China Sea, human rights they wish to d

Western terms, sales of weapons allowed by international pract

hardly comparable in size and technology to American sales), 

spotty, halting modernization of one of the world’s most backwa

military organizations, the PLA. [It is interesting to hear m

Chinese interlocutors essentially equate the immoderate v

vociferous advocates in the two countries.]

64. Chung Jae Ho, p. 14. Chung writes:

Despite the relatively declining popularity of the United Sta

among Koreans, the public attitudes toward the necessity of 

stationing of the U.S. forces have gradually become m

positive. . . . While 74.5 percent of the respondents in the 1988 

survey preferred the withdrawal of the United States fo

sooner or later, the comparable figure gradually but seemin

irreversibly dropped to 60.2 percent in 1990, 51.5 percen

1995, and 37.4 percent in 1997. Whether the decline reflects 

heightened security concerns generated by the North Kor

210
nuclear crisis in the first half of the 1990s remains uncerta

It may be speculated that the Korean attitudes toward t

United States may have become more “pragmatic” in that t

Koreans might have begun to differentiate perceptu

dispositions from their practical needs.

Table 9 of Chung’s paper, immediately following the quote

provides a breakout of data from surveys taken in 1988, 1989

1995, 1996, 1997 from which the figures cited above are derive

65. For a more complete treatment of this subject, see 

McVadon, “Chinese Military Strategy for the Korean Pen

chapter 9, in James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh, eds., 

Military Faces the Future, Washington, DC: M.E. Sharpe and Am

Enterprise Institute, 1999, pp. 289-291, and endnote 5 on p. 29

66. March 19, 2000, interview with Yang Xiyu.

67. Chu Shulong, “China and the U.S.-Japan and U.S

Alliances in a Changing Northeast Asia,” p.16.

68. Ibid., p. 19.

69. March 19, 2000, interview cited previously.

70. The author and others were “lectured” along these line

summer of 1999 by a distinguished PLA general officer at the N

Defense University in Beijing. His theme was that the United S

wrongheaded to proceed down the road of even greater capab

conduct interventions into sovereign countries as was the case w

“U.S.-led attacks on Yugoslavia.”

71. April 21, 2000, interview cited previously.

72. James Clay Moltz, “Viewpoint: Missile Proliferation 

Asia: Arms Control vs. TMD Responses,” The Nonproliferation 

Vol. 4, No. 3, Spring-Summer 1997.

73. Chinese strategists see the TSEA (the passage of w

currently in considerable doubt) as the means to reestablish ess

a U.S.-Taiwan defense treaty, as existed before the United 

recognized the PRC, and certainly as a way to develop coordinat

cooperation between the armed forces of Taiwan and those of the 

States on critical matters like early warning of missile attacks

PRC defense specialists do not blink an eye in very righteously d

211
a system, the purpose of which would be to defend Taiwan 

ballistic missiles launched from across the Taiwan Strait.

74. Senior member of a prestigious think tank who has 

extensively on Chinese security interests on the Korean Pen

interview by author, Beijing, March 20, 2000.

75. The author has repeatedly over several years 

knowledgeable Chinese interlocutors into such “traps” and ha

been confronted by an answer that foresees North Korea’s no 

existing as a separate state. In other words, for whatever reaso

seems to be no vision of, and certainly no preparation for, dealin

unified Korea among those to whom the author has spoken.

76. Jonathan D. Pollack and Chung Ming Lee, pp. 14-15. As 

and Lee state it,

Given that China’s links to both Koreas (despite an increas

policy “tilt” in favor of the ROK) afford it substantial leverag

relation to future outcomes on the peninsula, there is still am

uncertainty and evident internal debate over its prefer

strategy under more stressful circumstances.

77. Wang Jiangwei and Wu Xinbo, “Against Us or with U

Chinese Perspective of America’s Alliances with Japan and 

Stanford University, Asia/Pacific Research Center, Instit

Strategic Studies, http://aparc.stanford.edu/, p. 5. Dr. Wu Xi

prominent professor at the Center for American Studies at 

University in Shanghai; he is currently (summer of 2000) a 

fellow at the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Br

Institution in Washington.

78. Many Chinese, probably by far most of those who conte

strategic issues, seem truly concerned about the Japanese threa

are often torn between belief in the vociferous Chinese compla

the one hand about the Revised Defense Guidelines and Am

helping to make the JSDF imprudently stronger and on the oth

the proven value of the 47,000 American military personnel b

Japan.

79. Alternatively, Beijing may come to realize that Washing

not rush to intervene in Kosovo but rather did so when all else fa

something had to be done. However, even the most modera

thoughtful Chinese security scholars are not currently prone to 

that interpretation, and those who might would likely get shoute

with reminders of the attack on the Chinese embassy in Be

212
Chinese diplomats, for example, guffaw at the suggestion by Eu

that the United States, if anything, was too slow in deciding t

Kosovo and against Yugoslavia. They call the Europeans who 

American lackeys and seem to mean it.

80. Associate research professor who deals with China’s s

relations with North Korea at a prestigious think tank closely li

the PRC government, conversation by author, March 20, 2000.

81. Admittedly, it is difficult to conceive of a reasonable s

wherein South Korea would act alone (without American forc

attack North Korea, so this statement, it can be argued, had r

practical application. Not to be overlooked, however, is that 

rather gratuitously, added this stipulation to the statement th

support would not be forthcoming if the North initiated an at

other words, Beijing went out of its way to make another d

public pronouncement denying PLA support to Pyongyang and 

making it all the more clear to all that the PLA does not stand beh

KPA. 

82. A Chinese diplomat in Washington used this expres

something very similar, during a July 1997 private conversati

the author on China’s attitude toward North Korea.

83. These Chinese expressions of concern about Washi

sensibilities on the matter were a bit unexpected!

84. Chinese security specialist working in Washington, inter

author, April 21, 2000.

85. March 20, 2000, interview by the author.

86. The PAP, after their dismal performance around Tianan

1989 (as viewed from the perspective of China’s leaders), were 

part of the PLA; the PAP units are responsible for diverse i

security matters throughout the country.

87. PLA general officer who had recently been involved in 

concerning Korean contingencies in a senior headquarters in 

interview by author, August 1997.

88. It is possible that the government and the Communis

press have protected the PLA from criticism of this sort, b

protection has certainly no longer in recent years been exte

many, including even senior PLA officers, accused (and generall

guilty) of somewhat similar misdeeds or malfeasance (graft, 

213
scandal, misuse of funds, use of below-standard construction ma

etc.) that have harmed Chinese citizens.

89. March 24, 2000, dinner conversation.

90. April 21, 2000, interview.

214
CHAPTER 6

CHINA’S GOALS AND STRATEGIES

FOR THE KOREAN PENINSULA:

A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

Larry M. Wortzel

Like the communist regime in the People’s Repu

China (PRC), the communist regime in the Demo

People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has one fixed, pri

goal in mind—the survival of a one-party state led 

communist party. Thus, in both countries, even r

legitimacy is sacrificed at the altar of its survival.

Given this primary goal, it is no surprise that be

the beginning of the People’s Republic of China in 194

the collectivization of its agriculture and industry in 

Rudy Rummel estimates that over eight million C

citizens were starved, beaten, or murdered at the ha

the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in CCP-orga

tribunals or other entities.

1

 Then, according to Ru

between 1955 and 1967, during the period of collectivi

and the “Great Leap Forward,” another seven millio

Chinese were killed in the CCP’s pursuit of its so

goals.

2

 After that Great Leap Forward, agriculture an

production was in such shambles in China that anoth

million people starved to death.

3

 Through this, suppor

a huge military that produced its own food supplies 

strong state security apparatus, the Communist Pa

China survived. Therefore, I am extremely skeptical 

senior Chinese army or government officials tell m

“things are a little difficult in the DPRK, but the peop

tough and can endure hardship.”

4

When an official of China’s Ministry of State Se

opines that “he does not believe [that] any comm

215
country will collapse as a direct result of economic trou

he or she is referring to the phenomena desc

above—where citizens are tools of the government, 

than the reverse.

5

 It is for these reasons that the stra

of the PRC must be critically analyzed. The stateme

Chinese officials must be taken as reflections of the b

communist party “line” and compared to the demons

actions of China. Moreover, if past actions ar

indication of future behavior, without a regime cha

North Korea

6

 short-term changes in policy must be as

with skepticism and not accepted as represe

fundamental changes in the goals of the Kim regime

Less than a year ago, in discussing the developm

long-range ballistic missiles capable of hitting the U

States, North Korea’s Central News Agency claimed 

the U.S. should see . . . [North Korea’s] war capacity and 

changed situation. There is no guarantee of safety of the U

mainland.

7

Meanwhile, even when North Korea seemed on the 

of economic collapse, Chinese officials routinely told v

American academic and military groups that “Chin

not let North Korea collapse.”

8

 The unqualified su

given to the DPRK by China, therefore, flies in the 

statements that the proliferation of missiles and n

weapons on the Korean Peninsula is not in C

interest.

9

It is important not to ignore facts in the purs

specific political objectives, even when those fact

indicate that American strategies are failing. Rem

that in the fall of 1997, Secretary of State Mad

Albright said in an address at the University of Lou

that “North Korea’s dangerous nuclear program ha

frozen and will be dismantled.” At the end of August 

however, North Korea fired a Taepo-dong missile in

sea between Japan and Russia.

10

 Not long after 

suspicions arose that the North Koreans were work

216
caves near Kumchang-ri to develop nuclear, chemi

biological warheads to be mounted on the Taepo-dong

Kumchang-ri caves were believed to have served 

underground work complex for up to 15,000 workers.

1

regard to a propensity to back away from real conce

advance a specific policy agenda, a U.S. negotiato

North Korea, Charles Kartman, told the press that th

“compelling evidence” that the Kumchang-ri s

nuclear-related. Two days later, however, Mr. Ka

backed away from that statement, saying that “

information made the United States suspicious” abo

site. In April 1999, NHK Television in Seoul reporte

North Korea was conducting propulsion tests 

Taepo-dong 2 missile with a range of 3,750 miles.

1

China continues to tell the Americans sent out to pr

around Beijing for opinions that China does not su

proliferation, or a hostile Korean Peninsula.

14

The preponderance of evidence shows that China r

good contacts with North Korea; despite what m

Beijing’s frustrations over a failure by Kim Jong Il to 

incentive systems in North Korean agriculture,

15

 

Korea has:

• added military capability;

• improved its missile systems;

• obtained over $645 million in aid from the U

States while it provided no verifiable access to its nuc

biological warfare sites;

• made no changes in its military posture alon

demilitarized zone; and

• cemented its relations with Russia.

All of the foregoing occurred despite the fact that 

does have influence with North Korea:

• In 1996 and 1997 China donated a total of 

200,000 tons of food to the DPRK.

217
• The Chinese donated more rice in August 1997

• At the 70th anniversary of the People’s Libe

Army (PLA) on August 1, 1997, the Chinese D

Attaché to Pyongyang told the Director of the G

Political Department (GPD) of the Korean People’s 

(KPA) that the armies, the people, and the comm

parties of China and the DPRK had close links sea

blood.

• North Korean Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok (Nok)

of the GPD, responded by saying,

The people and armies of the two countries will remain intim

brothers and comrades in arms who help and support each ot

in the common struggle against imperialism and socialism

• An official of the PRC’s GPD, Zhou Kunren, v

Pyongyang again in November 1997.

• In 1998, China sent another 100,000 tons of ri

20,000 tons of fertilizer.

• The PRC Xiantong Group modernized 

Rajin-Namyang railway line and is making improve

that will increase rail volume “14 times.”

• Scientific and technologial and hydrop

cooperation protocols were signed between th

countries in 1998.

• Xiong Guangkai, Deputy Chief of the Genera

Department of the PLA, visited Pyongyang in August 

just before the Taepo-dong launch over Japan.

• China provided 80,000 tons of crude oil to the 

after the Taepo-dong launch, while Japan cut its assis

• On June 3-4, 1999, Jiang Zemin and Li Peng ac

delegations from North Korea. (Note dates.) China 

150,000 tons of food and 400,000 tons of coke to DP

could have done nothing, like Japan) which were del

in February 2000.

218
• Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian and 

Vice Marshal Kim Il Chol met on June 21, 1999.

• Korean Vice Defense Minister Ryo Chun Sok m

Haotian at a reception on August 1, 1999, and exp

linked the inviolate territorial integrity of Korea and 

China with Taiwan.

• Beijing continues to provide hydropower coope

to North Korea.

• Kim Jong Il visited the Chinese Embas

Pyongyang in March 2000 as part of the Spring Fe

visit, a sign of a certain amount of tributary homage 

benefactor.

The Kim Dae Jung Visit and the Albright Visit 

Pyongyang.

Beijing’s influence over the North is perhap

illustrated by the way that Kim Jong Il visited China 

eve of his summit with South Korean President Kim 

Jung. In my view, China pushed Kim Jong Il to moder

positions on family reunification slightly and to soft

rhetoric, for two reasons. First, Beijing still depen

investment from South Korea that would stop in the ev

a war between North and South. Second, Beijing can u

appearance of a more moderate North, with at lea

orientation towards peace, as an argument to unde

the effort of the United States to move forward 

national missile defense programs and to advocate t

missile defense programs for its allies and friends in 

Beijing intensely dislikes such programs because 

undermine the PLA’s ability to coerce China’s neig

Taiwan, U.S. forces, and the United States with nucle

missile blackmail.

Despite Pyongyang’s failure to change its po

harboring fugitive terrorists inside its borders (e.g

Japanese Red Army bombers who took refuge in 

Korea), a visit to New York by Vice Foreign Ministe

219
Kye-gwan to negotiate with the U.S. Governmen

followed by a rushed trip to Washington by Jo Myong 

meeting with President William Clinton at which Jo 

his military uniform was the culmination of the 

although Secretary Albright hosted a some

anticlimactic dinner at the State Department. Pre

Clinton came close to agreeing to visit Pyongyang aft

meeting in October 2000.

Secretary Albright was dispatched to Pyongya

short notice after she announced that she was explo

Clinton visit in November 2000, as the President le

Socialist Republic of Vietnam. In Pyongyang, durin

week of October 22-25, Albright was maneuvered into 

with Jo in the same location as the shrine and statue 

Il Sung, and found herself at a celebration of the K

Workers Party. In what proved to be a more embarr

moment for the Secretary and the United States, C

Defense Minister Chi Haotian arrived in Pyongyang 

Albright was still in town to celebrate the 50th anniv

of the entry of the Chinese People’s Volunteers (the 

into North Korea during the Korean War. Albrigh

maneuvered by Beijing and Pyongyang to be in the c

the anniversary of the battles in which Chinese soldie

their North Korean allies were mauling the U.S. 1st M

Division, the 7th Infantry Division, and allied U

Nations forces in the area around the Chosin (Cha

Reservoir. Chi Haotian noted this while Secretary Al

was still in Seoul conferring with the South Korea

Japanese foreign ministers. It would be difficult t

more concrete evidence of the way that Pyongyan

Beijing are coordinating on Korean Peninsul

U.S.-related matters.

PRC Goals.

China has a clear set of goals in its actions on the K

Peninsula: maintaining a peaceful periphery to fac

foreign investment and the modernization of its arm

220
combat forces; reducing the likelihood that missile de

will be deployed in the region; creating a buffer 

financial crises that might retard science and tech

modernization; replacing American alliances with re

security dialogues; and creating a web of str

partnerships as a means to place itself at the h

inter-state diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.

To demonstrate China’s influence and power o

Korean Peninsula, one needs only to remember that 

mere suggestion that “relations with China wou

difficult” the Clinton Administration refused to ap

badly needed air and cruise missile defenses for Taiw

1999. When China suggested that “it would not be go

relations” in 1999, the Republic of Korea opted 

participate in research even on theater missile defen

Asia with the United States. Looking beyond Kore

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) re

forum (ARF) was formed as a means to respond to C

Vietnam is seeking a new form of security relationsh

balance against China. And the Chinese military in

managed to supply Pakistan with a nuclear and ba

missile capability.

North Korea’s Short- and Long-Term Strategie

the U.S. Role.

There could be changes on the Korean Peninsula le

to reduced military tensions and some reform in the 

Although such changes are more symbolic than subst

to date, symbolic changes are important as a beginnin

dilemma for the people of Korea and the United Sta

well as Japan, is to ensure security and stability 

region while encouraging substantive progress on a l

peace and the end of the Cold War. If the Cold Wa

about fighting and containing communism then it re

nearly over. While communist systems are repressiv

economically unsound, regime change in the North 

the primary goal of the United States and the 

221
Instead, the goal is to bring North Korea out of its iso

from international institutions and the interna

system of commerce and diplomacy.

From the time of the Korean Energy Develo

Organization (KEDO) Agreement and the A

Framework, North Korea seemed to be operating 

short-term strategy aimed at regime survival. North 

operated in the international and regional arena 

combination of threats involving missiles, weapons o

destruction, and arms sales. It blackmailed the 

particularly the South, the United States, and Japa

supporting its fuel and food needs. Yet, it ma

substantive changes in its economic system.

A Long-Term Strategy for Beijing and Pyongya

After Kim Il Sung’s death in the summer of 1995

did not seem to be a distinct change in the long

strategy of regime survival and control, an

maintenance of a closed, communist system. The p

long-term strategy in Pyongyang and Beijing appe

involve coming to some kind of accommodation with 

Korea, Japan, and the United States that preserves 

Korea as a separate entity and keeps the Korean Wo

Party in power.

In the economic realm, however, the North appe

realize that some kind of economic change is nece

North Korea will opt for gradual and controlled refor

it must resolve or at least seriously consider several c

issues to make progress. Pyongyang must address:

• The harboring of terrorists from the Japanes

Army. They are still given sanctuary in the North.

• The missing people from South Korea and 

believed to have been kidnapped by the North.

• The threatening military deployments by the No

the DMZ.

222
• Transparency of the North Korean missile, che

biological, and nuclear weapons programs.

• The continuing arms sales by North Korea to 

countries that seek to destabilize the international sys

Notwithstanding these problems, there are 

positive results from the courageous initiative by Pre

Kim Dae Jung: the Nobel peace prize, which is 

deserved; and the talks between Kim Dae Jung an

Jong Il, which are critical to ensuring high-level po

direction to future contacts. Meanwhile, the strategy 

North appears to be gradually shifting. The Nort

seeks to maintain a robust military. The North still se

maintain control of the nation by the Korean Wo

Party. However, North Korea’s economic strategy ap

to be changing as it comes to realize that any eco

development will require some opening to the outside 

There are some 138 small and medium-size 

Korean businesses operating in the North. P

volunteer organizations are active in the North, 

involved in establishing “micro-economies” in agricu

production and marketing. South Korean conglom

are participating in economic projects. Noneth

without substantive moves by North Korea to addre

fundamental security issues, we cannot be sure that s

its recent moves are not tactical in nature designed to 

in money, food, and economic aid.

North Korea’s attitude appears to be undergoing 

change, which might be due in part to pressure from B

Like China, the United States has a role in fosterin

change. The United States cannot dismiss China’s inf

over Pyongyang, or be blind to areas where America

Chinese foreign policies may be at cross-purposes

United States must work closely with the allies 

Trilateral Coordination Oversight Group (TCOG)

continued U.S. presence in and security commitm

Korea is the security architecture and umbrel

Northeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. The 

223
commitment has a stabilizing effect. Although reluct

admit it, even security planners in Beijing acknow

that the U.S. presence keeps historical tension

animosities from resurfacing.

Conclusion.

The United States has responsibilities to the regio

interests of its own that make its presence impo

Toward such ends, the United States will encoura

North to join international financial organization

become a full, responsible member of the interna

community.

The bottom line for good U.S. policy: continue to 

with China; maintain a strong, forward-deployed Am

military in Korea; keep an active foreign policy in 

provide strong security backing for Kim Dae Jung; an

its powder dry.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6

1. R. J. Rummel, China’s Bloody Century: Genocide an

Murder since 1900, London: Transaction Publishers, 1991, pp. 21

2. Ibid., pp. 241-145; see also Richard L. Walker, The Human 

Communism, a Study of the Committee on the Judiciary, United 

Senate, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971

3. Rummel, p. 251.

4. Comments by Chinese officials, July 1997, Beijing, Chi

Washington, DC.

5. Quoted in Eric A. McVadon, “China’s Goals and Strategies 

Korean Peninsula,” a paper prepared for the workshop 

“Competitive Strategies: Planning for a Peaceful Korea,” co-sp

by the Non-Proliferation Education Center, The Hyatt Ar

Arlington, VA, June 12-14, 2000, p. 20.

6. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK, and 

Korea will be used interchangeably in this chapter to refer to the 

224
the Republic of Korea, ROK, and South Korea will be used to refe

South.

7. “What will war on the Korean Peninsula bring?” Korean 

News Agency, August 2, 1999, , quoted in Jack Spencer, The B

Missile Threat Handbook, Washington, DC: The Heritage Foun

2000, p. 49.

8. This author served in the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, China

tours of duty, the latest of which was as Army Attaché betwe

1988 and June 1990, and between July 1995 and December 19

phrase asserting that China would not allow North Korea to c

was like a mantra, repeated to all visiting American delegation

9. McVadon, p. 28.

10. “Korea’s Provocation,” The Courier-Journal, Louisvil

September 1, 1998, p. A6.

11. Arnold Kramish, letter to the editor, “Great Expectat

North Korea,” The Washington Post, December 6, 1998.

12. F.J. Khergamvala, “Pressure Mounts on North Kore

Hindu, December 8, 1998, p. 1.

13. World In Brief, “U.S. Craft Head to Troubled Korean W

The Washington Post, June 17, 1999, p. A31.

14. McVadon, pp. 13-14.

15. Discussion with the Chinese Academy of Sciences, 

March 2000, .

225
CHAPTER 7

JAPAN’S GRAND STRATEGY ON THE

KOREAN PENINSULA:

OPTIMISTIC REALISM

Victor D. Cha

The Japanese have always considered the Koreans to be 

inferior race. [Wajima] said that a very elaborate study on t

racial characteristics of Koreans had been prepared during t

war, and that it had concluded that the mental and soc

capacities of the Koreans were of a very primitive nature. 

said that this feeling on the part of the Japanese that Korea

are inferior to a great extent motivates Japanese uncertain

and hostility in regard to the Koreans.

Conversation with Japanese Official,

1949

1

An all-out invasion of Japan by Korea is inevitable if Korea 

unified . . . [when it comes] it will be a blitz attack like the Ir

invasion of Kuwait . . . therefore it is in Japan’s best intere

to help North Korea economically so the Korean penins

remains divided as now.

Kenichi Takemura, 1991

2

Korea is one of the most complex, critical, an

understudied of Japan’s foreign policy relationships. 

much attention in U.S. policy and academic circle

focused on Japan’s future relations with China as th

variable for regional stability in the 21st centu

integral part of the security dynamic in East Asia ha

driven by the Japan-Korea axis

3

 In the late 19th and 

20th centuries, this relationship was a proximate ca

two major power wars in Asia (i.e., Sino-Japanes

Russo-Japanese). During the Cold War, the Japan-Re

227
of Korea (ROK) axis facilitated the American presence 

Asia-Pacific power and security guarantor. And 

post-Cold War era, outcomes in the Japan-Korea (un

still divided) relationship are critical to the shape of 

balance of power dynamics in the region and, with 

future American security presence. How, then, should 

thinking about future Japanese relations with the K

peninsula? What are Tokyo’s hopes and concerns 

regard to Korea? How do they view the prospect of a 

Korea? Is there a Japanese “grand strategy” regardi

peninsula? 

The conventional wisdom offers a pessimistic res

to these questions. As encapsulated in the epigraphs 

head of this chapter, this view posits a combinat

historical contempt and geopolitics as auguring poo

Japan’s relations with a united Korea, hence compelli

Japanese in the direction of policies aimed at propp

the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK

keeping the peninsula divided.

The conventional wisdom is wrong. While s

pessimistic-realist view is often accepted at face va

both scholars and practitioners of Asian security, w

upon closer analysis that outcomes on the Japan-Kore

are not nearly as negative as popularly conceived. Jap

grand strategy thinking, although cognizant o

variables for competition with the Korean peninsula

actively to cultivate the potential for cooperatio

preempt possible security dilemmas. This 

optimistic-realist assessment derives from a num

larger geostrategic and domestic-political trends as w

from specific policies enacted by Tokyo and Seoul in t

decade that have improved relations considerably. I 

with a discussion of the conventional wisdom, follow

criticisms of this view. I then offer the argume

optimistic realism vis-à-vis Japanese grand strategy 

peninsula and conclude with propositions regardin

policy implications of this strategy.

4

228
Peer Competition.

The conventional wisdom argues that Japanese 

strategy is premised on avoiding peer competition w

united Korea. This anticipated competition derives 

several factors.

Geopolitics. Proponents of this view cite Jap

concerns about geography and potentially threa

Korean capabilities. Geographic propinquity has a

made Japan—as an island nation—somewhat uneas

its continental Korean neighbor. Should a regime hos

Japan ever control the peninsula, it would be strateg

well-situated to threaten Japan. Indeed, historically 

Japan faced external threats to its security, more ofte

not these emanated from the direction of the contine

the Korean peninsula. For the Japanese, then, Kore

always been the “dagger pointed at the heart” of Japan

geostrategic fact will never change.

5

Growing Korean military capabilities also conce

Japanese. The South Korean military through 

assistance and indigenous modernization efforts 

back to the Yulgok plans of the 1970s has transformed 

into a highly competent military.

6

 What was once a 

trained and deficient force wholly dependent on the U

States at the end of the Korean war has now becom

capable of defending against most ground conting

vis-à-vis the North.

7

 Unification would brin

enhancement of these capabilities. A united K

military, the pessimistic realists argue, would pos

military of nearly 1.8 million with commens

capabilities and aspirations to be a regional m

player.

8

Hate. Realism dictates that a significant incre

relative capabilities between proximate states can gi

to insecurity spirals.

9

 In Japan’s case these con

regarding Korea are exacerbated by two additional fa

The first is the deep historical antagonism between t

229
countries stemming from the occupation period (191

Arguments on the Korean side for this anger (in K

han or unredeemed resentment) are well-known. O

Japanese side, this history manifests itself in a supe

complex toward Korea inherent in the collective mind

former colonizers. It is also manifested in an “avo

phenomenon”—a combination of discomfort and frust

at Korean attempts to hold Japan eternally responsi

its history.

10

Moreover, this negative historical memory has b

deeply-ingrained in the two peoples’ mindsets thro

variety of formal and informal institutions. Antago

images are passed down generationally through 

folklore, chauvinist histories taught in secondary s

(on both Korean and Japanese parts), and popular and 

media-perpetuated stereotypes such that the nega

becomes a part of one’s identity. This is especially pre

on the Korean side, where parts of the Korean self-id

become constructed in linear opposition to Japan

example, the two national holidays in Korea (Marc

samilchol and August 15 or kwangbokchol) cele

Korean patriotism by specifically resurre

anti-Japanese images. The 50th anniversary celebrat

Korean independence in 1995 were marked by the ra

the National Museum (the former colonial headquar

Japan).

11

 When the two Korean leaders agreed at the 

2000 North-South summit to hold family reunions, th

chosen for this symbolic affirmation of a united K

identity was August 15th—the date of liberation fro

Japanese occupation.

Because Korean nationalism is anti-Japa

difficulties in the relationship remain prevalent d

seemingly compelling material forces for less friction

example, despite the string of Japanese colonial state

of contrition, Koreans remain unsatisfied with J

“haughty” attitude. Despite the benefit to South K

security of the revised U.S.-Japan defense guide

Koreans expressed trepidation at the marginally 

230
active role Japan could play in a contingency in the r

While Japanese peacekeeping contributions took 

under severe self-imposed restrictions and far outsid

Asia, Koreans still expressed concerns about re

Japanese militarism. Although the DPRK August 

Taepo-dong launch was provocative and threatening, 

Koreans took perverse hidden pleasure in Jap

convulsions over the event. Seen through the le

identity, this otherwise puzzling behavior makes 

Remaining even mildly neutral about Japan is in esse

deny a critical part of one’s identity as Korean. Advo

security cooperation with Japan becomes synonymou

treason because it would be seen to subjugate Ko

Japanese domination. This ideational barr

cooperation is manifested on the Korean side as a g

state-of-mind as well as domestic-political avers

discussions about Japan in a positive light. It is se

many as a more formidable obstacle than any ot

promoting cooperation.

13

Coupled with the history issue is Japanese concer

potential balancing dynamics in Northeast Asia

post-unification scenario, the pessimists argu

likelihood of a Korea-China coalition that alienates Ja

high. The end of the North Korean threat will most 

mean decreased support for U.S. forces in Korea as w

the end of the overarching security imperativ

cooperation that characterized the U.S.-Japan

security triangle during the Cold War. As the new 

Korean entity seeks to define its place in the region, it 

drawn into a closer alignment with China.

14

 This is (

Chinese are fond of saying) the “natural order of thin

Asia given the pre-20th-century history of 

international relations when the Chinese tributary s

dominated (in this sense, the post-1945 order wa

historical aberration rather than the norm). It is 

function of geography (i.e., what some post-Cold 

analyses of the region have termed continental 

accommodation),

1 5

 and a civilizationally-inh

231
bandwagoning dynamic among smaller Asian powers 

region vis-à-vis China.

16

 Reinforcing this alignment 

will be a revanchist nationalism in a united Korea tha

a natural ally in China against Japan as the two 

similar victimization experiences at the hands of Jap

colonizers. 

Pessimists would argue that examples of this dy

are already evident. When China and South 

normalized relations in 1992, this rapprochemen

celebrated in the language of restoring wha

historically a “natural relationship.”

17

 Even before th

reconciliation, Seoul and Beijing were natural 

whenever an ill-conceived Japanese statement 

history raises problems. The ROK’s decision n

participate in American-led research on theater m

defense (TMD) architectures in East Asia (while Japa

is in good part a function of Korean desires not to al

China.

18

 Indeed, virtually all of the post-Cold War an

of the region assume a consolidation of the China-Kore

against Japan.

19

Japan’s Purported Grand Strategy: Predatory.

The upshot of these commonly-held assumptio

Japanese grand strategy is that a united Korea 

possess the capabilities and motivations (reva

nationalism) while lacking the impediments (coope

based on the U.S.-Japan-Korea triangular alliance) fo

competition with Japan. For this reason, pessimists 

Japan’s long-term strategy regarding the peninsul

predatory one—to keep Korea divided and/or not enco

or facilitate a process of unification. This strat

manifest in practices like Japan’s “comprehensive sec

policy. Devised by Masayoshi Ohira, this do

maintained that Japan could provide for its se

through nonmilitary means, which primarily m

economic assistance for prosperity and stability 

region.

20

 Applied to the Korean peninsula, this strateg

232
seen by South Koreans as thinly veiled attempts to 

Korea divided by Japan’s providing assistance to the N

Even more directly a reflection of Japan’s pur

grand strategy was the “equi-distance policy” fo

peninsula. Conceived in the early 1970s by then Pr

Tanaka Kakuei and Foreign Minister Kimura Toshi

policy’s rationale was that Japanese security wa

served not by siding solely with the South b

maintaining equal contacts with both regimes, th

fostering a balance of power on the peninsula. Sim

high-level dialogue during the Nakasone years in the 

was seen as part of the grand plan to keep Korea d

Normalization dialogue at the end of the Cold Wa

Kanemaru mission) and current dialogue are se

similarly negative light. Though couched in the langu

economic assistance, humanitarian aid, and compreh

security, this is all part of an overall predatory 

strategy that seeks to aid the North to keep the pen

divided and thereby avoid peer competition.

Reassessing the Conventional Wisdom.

Faulty Assumptions. The conventional wisdom is 

(or at least questionable) because many of the 

assumptions informing the view do not stand up w

more discriminating analysis. For example, while his

and geographical arguments for a united Korean se

threat to Japan abound, historical precedents for 

arguments are absent.

22

 While Korea is often referre

the “dagger” pointed at the heart of Japan, aggressio

historically come through Korea (by China) and no

Korea itself. In all likelihood a united Korea would be 

preoccupied with securing its new northern b

(discussed below) and gaining domestic stability tha

entertaining any designs on Japan.

23

 In add

arguments that Japan would be threatened by a 

North-South Korean military are unfounded. Th

Korean militaries together might total 1.8 million 

233
indeed would be intimidating for Japan. However

unification scenario a more reasonable merger figure 

two militaries is likely. The appropriate military 

would probably number around 650,000, wh

comparable to current ROK levels.

24

Second, while some Japanese hold negative ima

Korea, these do not necessarily derive from 

competition. The modern-day origins of these images 

in good part from critical mass news media cover

authoritarian ROK politics in the 1970s. Japanese 

with disdain on the martial-law brutality, po

repression, and human rights abuses, particu

beginning with the Kim Dae Jung kidnapping in 1973

an opposition political leader, he was abducted from a 

hotel room by KCIA operatives in what was a clear vio

of Japanese sovereignty by the authoritarian Park re

The repressive regime under Park (Yusin system

undertook a number of actions against Japanese nat

and press agencies in the 1970s that nearly rup

diplomatic relations.

25

Yesterday’s negative media coverage contrasts s

with today’s reports praising Korean political liberaliz

economic development, the Seoul Olympics (1988

Taejon World Expo, and the 2002 World Cup. Couple

this was an almost naive infatuation with North 

growing out of the 1970s that was rooted in 

developments: the regional detente spurre

Sino-American rapprochement; the DPRK’s succes

member of the nonaligned movement (and the ROK’s f

to win membership); and the poor state of Japanese

relations at the time. Among the Japanese lef

intellectuals, there were also views of North Korea 

true representation of Korean nationalism since the 

remained under the military “occupation” of the U

States.

26

 The point here is not to deny that ne

history-based images exist, but that there are pla

alternative explanations deriving from politics to e

the contemporary incarnations of these biases. Moreo

234
the origins of these emotions are traced to variable

authoritarianism versus democracy; underdevelo

versus development) rather than constants (history)

the argument that these images are unmalleabl

unchanging (assumed by the pessimistic realists) be

less credible.

The final point regarding the conventional w

relates to agency. Proponents of these viewpoin

Japanese grand strategy, ironically, tend not to be Jap

but Koreans. Hence, these agents are not so much pro

a window on Japanese strategic thinking as they a

nationalist thinking in Korea. They assign intention

preferences to Japan deriving from their own fear

preoccupations regarding Japan. The results are arb

(and often logically inconsistent) assertions about Jap

predatory grand strategy that have little empirical va

In spite of this, because these arguments are dyn

controversial, and “sexy” (i.e., presaging conflict), they 

tend to get published over the more sober, cautionar

less sensationalist views. From the Korean side, cog

biases are apparent in that any optimistic or conci

views that may emanate from Japan regardin

peninsula are usually not taken at face value but in

are seen at best as aberrant behavior and at wo

duplicitous.

27

One illustration of the Korea-bias in the scholars

the conspicuous absence of discussion regarding th

variables most likely to cause peer competition be

Japan and Korea: ROK military modernization and n

weapons. Some observers argue that the ROK’s pos

War military modernization and buildup esc

conventional ground war capabilities necessary for a 

Korean contingency and instead emphasizes 

projection capabilities such as a blue water navy, ba

missile technology, in-flight refueling, and sa

technology. For example, the ROK Navy recently com

the first stage of the KDX Destroyer Program which e

development of 3,200-ton destroyers (KDX1) to repla

235
Gearing-class ships acquired from the U.S. Navy 

1960s and 1970s. There are also plans for construct

2006 of nine 4,300-ton destroyers (KDX2) with an ope

range of 4,000 miles, and eventually acquisit

state-of-the-art Aegis-class destroyers (KDX3) start

2010. An active submarine program is also underwa

ROK’s first submarine program started in 1987 an

produce 12 new 1,200-ton 209-class diesel submari

joint venture of Daewoo and Germany HDW) by 2001 

completed). The new SSU program plans in

acquisition of six 1,500 to 2,000-ton submarines by 

This would be followed by indigenous product

3,000-ton submarines in the future.

28

This buildup has continued in spite of the acute ma

constraints imposed by the 1998 financial crisis, and 

argue that the ROK military in looking past the 

Korean contingency is building to prepare for 

regional conflicts, potentially with Japan.

29

 Moreo

united Korean entity based on current capabilities 

two countries would undoubtedly have available to 

options of nuclear weaponization as well as long

ballistic missiles.

30

 These are the variables most lik

cause security dilemmas and peer competition betwe

two countries, but they are never ones cited by the Ko

(i.e., conventional wisdom).

I do not advocate wholly discarding the conven

wisdom as there is no denying some elements of trut

Instead, this short exercise raises legitimate que

about accepting outright this view, becaus

assumptions which inform it, if not simply incorre

certainly susceptible to debate. Some of the 

problematic variables that should be talked about 

Korean side are not being talked about. And ther

plethora of plausible alternative explanations for ev

cited by the conventional wisdom as validatin

predatory arguments regarding Japanese grand stra

now turn to developing an alternate interpretation 

strategy. 

236
The Fear of Entrapment and Determinants of J

Korea Policy. Since the normalization of relations in 

the factors that have driven policy toward Korea are 

subtle and complex than simply an overarching de

keep the peninsula divided. A key factor I have argue

is crucial to understanding Japanese strategic think

Korea has been the fear of “entrapment.”

31

 Deriving 

the literature on alliance theory, entrapment gen

refers to the expectations and anxieties regarding m

support that underpin interaction between allie

aligned states.

32

 Entrapment occurs when a commitm

an alliance turns detrimental to one’s interests. It 

being dragged into a conflict over an ally’s interests th

does not share or shares only partially.

33

Perhaps more than any other factor, the fe

entrapment has been the most consistent single dr

Japan’s Korea policy. Japan and the ROK are not par

mutual defense treaty, but this does not preclud

existence of alignment patterns between the two stat

a result of their geographic proximity, prominence 

region, common security interests, and triangular a

arrangements with the United States, the two n

exhibit alignment patterns and de facto security tie

play an important part in their overall relationship.

34

informal defense links were first publicly enunciated 

joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of the Nov

1969 Nixon-Sato summit. Known as the “Korea clau

stated that the security of the ROK was essential to Ja

Concurrent with the enunciation of the Korea claus

the Okinawan base agreement, which stipulated that 

event of a second North Korea invasion, Japan would p

the United States unconditional access to bases in Ok

for the defense of South Korea.

36

 These two agree

constituted the closest approximation to a defense 

between Japan and the ROK.

In the context of this triangular security relatio

Japan’s strategy vis-à-vis the peninsula is inform

anxieties about becoming entrapped in contingencie

237
were unwanted or would put Japan in awkward pos

For example, an overcommitment to Japan-ROK d

ties, in the form of strong support for the 1969 Korea c

could lead to formal acknowledgment of the R

indispensable security contribution to Japan’s defen

addition, although the region is relatively stab

overcommitment to Japan-ROK defense ties could ac

have destabilizing second-order effects. Strong back

the South could create a more volatile situation o

peninsula by increasing North Korean fea

encirclement. It could also embolden the South to b

more provocative and intransigent toward the Nort

result in either scenario could be a preemptive lashi

by the North, the consequence of which could be 

retaliation against Japan.

Minimizing these entrapment fears serves s

Japanese needs. First, by promoting a stable status q

the peninsula, Japan avoids having to contend with a 

politically difficult domestic issues. North K

belligerency as a result of strong Japan-ROK ties 

force Tokyo to contend with issues of rearmamen

reevaluation of Article IX of the constitution. Japan 

also have to deal with problematic issues such as in

monitoring of a substantial North Korean (Chosen S

resident population, and absorbing the potential outf

Korean refugees in the event of a second Korean 

Entrapment into relations with the ROK that alie

communist neighbors would close off potential e

markets, thus adversely affecting Japanese eco

interests, and run contrary to its seikei bunri (separa

economics from politics) policies. It also would run co

to the sengo shori post-war vision of reestablishing rel

with all nations Japan had warred with or victimized 

past.

Second, by refraining from acknowledgment of a 

Japan-ROK security link, Tokyo avoids beco

vulnerable to the “bulwark of defense” argument and 

demands for “security rent.”

38

 An additional Jap

238
concern regarding such funds is to avoid Seoul’s con

use of colonial contrition arguments as leverage to e

monetary forms of “moral repentance.” Tokyo mus

avoid succumbing to accusations that it withholds eco

funds to stifle South Korea’s rise as a competi

Japanese market sectors.

39

 Finally, Japan must st

entrapment anxieties vis-à-vis the ROK 

burden-sharing pressures from the United States

pressure often takes the form of calls for Jap

assistance of South Korean economic developme

promote prosperity and stability on the peninsula.

40

 I

Tokyo’s entrapment fears center on striking a b

between providing strong political and economic supp

the ROK, and at the same time abstaining from 

security ties that would leave it vulnerable to South K

demands for security rent or moral repentance.

41

Understanding the entrapment dynamic is nec

because it sheds light on evidence that pessimists 

point to as indicative of predatory Japanese long

strategies on the peninsula. For example, pessimists 

to Japan’s reneging on the Korea clause in the 1970s 

in January 1972 and Foreign Minister Ohira in Augus

made statements backing away from commitments 

Korea clause and Okinawa base agreement

42

), as well 

Tanaka government’s attempts at improving relation

North Korea, as validation of the strategy to kee

peninsula divided. However, the alternative explana

that these actions were motivated by entrapment fea

particular, detente both offered Tokyo opportunit

capitalize on its seikei bunri policies of expanding eco

contacts with new countries and heightened its desir

to get entrapped into tight alignments with the ROK

latter could (1) undercut the former objecti

unnecessarily antagonizing potential parties, or (2) 

greater hostility in the region contrary to the new 

toward conciliation at the time.

The equi-distance policy practiced by Japan in the 

and part of the 1980s was not so much about keeping t

239
Koreas down (as the pessimists argue) as about the 

complex considerations the Japanese had abou

peninsula. The equi-distance policy showed how J

security concerns on the peninsula were of a 

multidimensional nature than those of the ROK. Wh

paramount concern for both was an unprovoked 

Korean attack, Japan was also concerned about 

Korean intransigence that might provoke the North a

as by a general war arising out of the super

confrontation in the region. These disparities in wha

seen as threatening on the peninsula reinforced Jap

entrapment fears regarding strong ties with the RO

informed the equi-distance policy.

During the 1980s, Japan adamantly stated that it 

not negotiate loan agreements with the ROK if the 

were classified as security-related. Pessimists see t

evidence of Japanese attempts to avoid enhancing 

military capabilities.

43

 But again, this behavior ste

less from predatory peer competition and more from d

not to become entrapped in “security rent” rationale

when Tokyo refused to link historical repentance 

with economic negotiations, rather than being evide

Japan’s aversion to resolving lingering hist

grievances, this more nearly represented the desire to 

becoming entrapped into untenable bargaining pos

There are many more examples that could be cited, b

upshot is that entrapment fears offer an alter

explanation of Japanese behavior on the peni

Moreover, if one tracks the consistency of th

explanations across time, the entrapment variab

better account for changes in behavior than the pre

pessimist argument (i.e., there are Japanese policies 

are not explainable by the latter argument bu

explainable with the entrapment variable).

44

240
Components of Japan’s Long-Range Strategy i

Post-Cold War Era: Optimistic Realism.

If the pessimists’ argument about predatory Jap

strategies does not hold water, then what ar

components of a long-range grand strategy? I argue t

optimistic-realist approach better characterizes Jap

thinking. This has four basic tenets:

(1) Japan does not oppose unification of the penin

(2) Japan proactively seeks alignment with this en

a hedge (balance) against China.

(3) Japan does not fear and therefore seeks to pr

Korean revanchist inclinations.

(4) Japan seeks to reconstruct the ideational base 

relationship (i.e. history).

No Opposition to Unification.

Contrary to the view of the pessimists, Japan do

seek to keep the Korean peninsula divided. Su

assertion raises the prior question of what exactly 

seeks in terms of its own national security from the K

peninsula. Japan has two key objectives in this rega

stability; and (2) ensuring that alterations to the stat

work in Japan’s favor. Regarding the former obj

although the DMZ remains one of the most heavily 

borders in the world, where peace is sustained only 

1953 armistice, an odd form of stability has emerge

that on the whole does not disadvantage Japan greatly 

least no more so than any of the other major powers 

region). In this sense, Japan’s needs are met by the k

status quo on the peninsula rather than the unk

non-status quo option. Tokyo is therefore not oppo

unification per se; it is in favor of stability—wh

present is provided by the status quo.

But if the two Koreas chose to reunify tomorrow, 

would not oppose or impede this unification process 

241
way, and most likely would proactively support it.

45

 T

because any other option would defeat the long

objective of assuring nonadversarial relations with a 

Korea (2 above). Impeding the process of unification 

started (as the predatory argument might predict) 

ensure an outcome contrary to Japanese interests (i

adversarial united Korea). This sort of argument 

evident in discussions of Japanese aid to North Kore

premise of such assistance is not for the explicit purp

propping up the DPRK and keeping the two Koreas di

but to prevent a collapse of the North or facilitate a r

transition that would cushion unification’s politica

economic effects on both Seoul and Tokyo.

46

 Whi

impetus for changing the status quo is not likely to 

from Japan, Koreans can be assured that, once they s

the process themselves, Tokyo will be obligated to su

it. This would not be out of affinity, goodwill, or l

(although these factors may be present), but because 

Japan’s national interests to do so. Thus, to say that 

opposes dubious changes to the status quo on the pen

but still would support unification are not neces

logically inconsistent statements.

Balancing against China.

Japan actively seeks close relations with a united 

as a hedge against China. Again, one of the 

assumptions in the predatory argument for Jap

strategy is that Japan fears Korea bandwagoning 

China against it; however, this view runs counter to 

realist logic. South Koreans certainly welc

normalization with Beijing in 1992. This mar

triumphant crossing of the Cold War divide, and an op

of tremendous economic opportunity. Perhaps 

significantly, however, Seoul welcomed normali

because in the South’s zero-sum mentality, it amoun

the ultimate diplomatic coup vis-à-vis the North.

47

 

with Soviet normalization in 1990, Seoul succeed

effectively isolating Pyongyang from its two primar

242
War patrons. In this sense, the existence of the 

Korean state has acted as a sort of buffer facili

unbridled ROK enthusiasm for relations with Beijin

In a unification scenario, however, this b

disappears, and a united Korea faces the prospect 

800-mile contiguous border with a militarily 

economically burgeoning communist China w

intentions are not transparent. Moreover, it face

situation most likely without the same U.S. se

guarantees enjoyed during the Cold War. In add

renewed Korean nationalism as a result of unificatio

translate into animosities and suspicions regarding C

The political mood of a post-unified Korea wou

distrustful of a Chinese government as it stands tod

particular, once North Koreans realize the extent o

relative deprivation under Kim Il Sungism, any re

affinity for socialism that might be harbored in a 

Korea would fall by the wayside. The possibility the

arises that the new Korean state might view China 

concern, and might heavily fortify its northern borde

Similar threat perceptions are not unthinkable 

Chinese side as well. Of all the powers in the region, B

has the most direct stake in the status quo on the peni

As a recent PLA editorial stated,

The Korean Peninsula is at the heart of northeast Asia and 

strategic importance is obvious, to control the peninsula is 

tightly grasp hold of northeast Asia.

48

More specifically, as two Chinese analysts noted, 

the North would leave China “deprived of an indispe

security buffer proximate to both the nation’s capital 

one of its most important industrial regions.”

49

 A 

Korea presents Beijing with the unwanted prosp

another noncompliant power (like Vietnam) on its flan

with a competing ideological and social system. Mor

China would not pass lightly over the security implic

of such a situation. It has already expressed concerns 

243
the buildup of South Korean (and Japanese) naval 

and such concerns are likely to be heightened in the ca

united Korea.

50

 Moreover, if relations between Beijin

the United States are tense, then the Chinese perc

that the West might utilize Korean unification as a me

containing China is far from remote.

For these reasons, a lengthy 1992 report on 

peninsular strategies by the Communist Party C

Committee (CPC) stated that despite Seoul-B

normalization, North Korea was still “China’s Nor

Asian strategic bulwark.” It stated that the N

absorption by the South would have a “devas

psychological impact” on China, and therefore Be

priorities center on preventing Korea from becomin

route for the overthrow of socialism by peaceful mean

the West.”

51

 As one specialist noted, for these and 

reasons, the Chinese perception of a united Ko

therefore far from one of unadulterated optimism:

From a longer-term perspective, China is apprehensive ab

potential threats to its interests from a reunified Korea. In 

economic sphere, Beijing is wary of competition from a un

Korean economic powerhouse. Politically, the Chinese 

uncertain about the role that a united Korea might play in 

region and worried that Japan could eventually dominate 

peninsula and undermine China’s growing influence in Ko

Militarily, the prospect of a reunified Korea with at leas

potential if not an actual nuclear capability is also cause 

Chinese concern. In addition, some Chinese foresee 

possibility that a reunified Korea would seek to reclaim Chin

territory bordering Korea that both North and South view as 

birthplace of the Korean nation.

52

History has shown that states with contiguous bo

whether intentionally or not, often lapse into compe

driven by security fears.

53

 In this regard, Japan is 

aware that the most proximate threat to a united Kore

emanate from China, not Japan.

54

 A united Korea do

have the autonomous capabilities to balance against C

in addition, in the post-Cold War era, it does not ha

244
luxury of certain U.S. security guarantees. Further

while a united Korea will certainly harbor its sh

animosities toward Japan, this relationship (presu

between Tokyo and a united government under 

would still be grounded in the decades of Japanese-

Korean normalized relations that preceded unificatio

would also be grounded in a familiarity bred th

common security ties with the United States for the 

post-war and Cold War eras.

56

 By contrast, the cumu

experiences undergirding a united Seoul-B

relationship would not extend further back than 

Compelled to balance against the more proximat

unfamiliar threat, Korea could look to Japan with g

fondness.

In addition, the pessimist’s argument for Japanes

competition with Korea fails to acknowledge that Jap

grand strategy is not made in the vacuum of Tokyo

bilateral relations but must be consistent and conv

with the larger foreign policy picture.

57

 For exa

Japanese geostrategic thinking in the 21st century f

number of cross-pressures and imperatives.

58

 Japan 

uncertain relationships with Russia and China (the la

where peer competition is likely); imperatives for a 

independent foreign policy and a larger leadership 

the region commensurate with its economic capab

and the need to move beyond its one-dimensional se

dependence on the United States.

59

 At the same 

pursuit of more proactive defense policies mus

contradict constitutional principles; must not disr

domestic aversion to rearmament; and must not 

regional concerns about renewed Japanese militari

thriving relationship—not peer competition—with 

seems to fit well with these needs. It provides for Jap

security and regional stability, and at the same time s

a balance between a policy not too strong to raise re

suspicions and incite anti-Japan balancing coalition

not too weak to embolden influence-seeking by Chin

245
Not Concerned with Korean “Revenge.”

As noted earlier, the arguments regarding K

revanchist nationalism are overstated and misfound

three points. The first is with regard to intentions—

Korea has often been referred to as a dagger pointed 

heart of Japan, aggression has historically come from 

(via the peninsula), not by aggressive Koreans thems

The second is with regard to geography—as allud

above, a united Korea would be more preoccupied 

threats on its contiguous northern land border than 

any far-flung designs on Japan across the sea. The t

with regard to capabilities—i.e., arguments that 

would be threatened by a joint North-South Korean m

are misfounded since a combined military force wo

greatly rationalized.

One area in which potential security dilemmas do 

for Japan is future Korean force procurement. This b

down along three lines—the extent to which Korea 

naval capabilities; the extent to which it deploys ba

missiles; and whether it becomes a nuclear powe

likelihood of any of these is far from remote. As noted 

naval modernization programs in submarine

destroyers has proceeded in spite of the 1998 fin

crisis, with Korean intentions clearly to develop com

regional capabilities. On the Korean peninsula 

between the two regimes, there exists the capabili

field a wide array of short and medium-range ba

missiles. Seoul has expressed a clear desire to upgra

own missile ranges beyond those specified in the 

bilateral agreement with the United States. Finally, 

interests in nuclear weaponization have been c

documented. And on the South Korean side, if unifi

means a retrenchment of the United States, the two 

historically that the ROK was interested in n

weapons were the two times the U.S. commitm

Korean security was perceived to be deficient.

246
From the Japanese perspective, the key to av

security dilemmas with Korea over these issues 

future is to create and maintain as much dialogu

transparency as possible in the present.

60

 Rather 

complain about the ROK’s naval modernization pla

China has done or as the ROK has done vis-à-vis Jap

peacekeeping participation and revision of the U.S.-

defense guidelines), Japan has taken the high 

ignoring third party speculation that the ROK buil

directed against Japan, and actively seeking wa

enhance maritime coordination and dialogue.

61

 Th

been manifest in an unprecedented increase in bil

security activity in the past 5 years including exc

visits between working level officers up through 

Chiefs of Staff chairs and defense ministers, 

exchanges, the first-ever reciprocal port calls, and s

and rescue exercises (SAR).

62

 It is also evident in act

at the Track II level aimed at creating familiarit

seeking new avenues of military coordination.

63

regard to potential Korean nuclear and m

proliferation, Japan would seek to facilitate to the 

possible a united Korea’s continued compliance 

nonproliferation regimes (as the ROK does now). Aga

key point here is that the Japanese response has not b

complain, accuse, or rally regional support to preven

scenarios from occurring (as a predatory strategy 

suggest, or as South Koreans have done regarding c

Japanese behavior), but a more patient approach seek

develop a cooperative foundation upon which to mana

potential problems along these lines.

Reconstructing History.

The fourth tenet of Japan’s long-term strategy 

construct a new ideational base for the Japan-

relationship, one that moves away from the current fi

on the colonial period and historical animosity and giv

relationship a more positive identity.

64

 Ther

interesting parallels here with China. As pessimists 

247
the construction of the Korea-China relationship ha

wholly positive, drawing on a common Confucian he

and the history of the tributary system. But who is 

that such constructions will remain constant over tim

one observer noted, often-cited Korean resentments t

Japan seem equally relevant in the Chinese case:

When Koreans get around to nursing grudges, they m

consider which neighbor (Japan or China) saddled them w

Kim Il Sung, which gave the go-ahead for the Korean War, 

which prevented non-Communist unification in late 1950 

massive, undeclared intervention.

65

Traces of this sort of problem were already appar

the negotiations leading up to the 1992 normali

treaty. As a ROK foreign ministry official recalled, C

outright rejection of statements expressing remo

repentance for the Korean war in the treaty left a so

subtext to the fanfare of the moment.

66

 In add

nationalist fervor from a united Korea might also 

Beijing’s concern about the two million-strong 

Korean community in Manchuria (Jilin province

largest contingent of overseas Koreans in the w

Unification raises a plethora of unpleasant scenar

Beijing regarding mass migration or ethnic identifica

this group with the new Korean state. As early evide

this, China has already expressed disapproval of f

President Roh’s advocacy of an international commu

Koreans (1989). Sensitivities were also manifest in Be

harsh charge in 1995 that seemingly innocuous Korea

groups to Manchuria might incite secessionist move

among the ethnic minority.

6 7

 In addition, d

normalization talks in 1992, Beijing rejected ROK pro

for establishment of consulate offices in Jilin, and re

reluctant to permit ROK heads of state to tour thi

during summit visits.

68

A trend that weighs strongly in favor of a po

reconstruction of the Japan-Korea relations is democ

In particular, the ROK’s democratic consolidatio

248
economic prosperity transform Japanese images 

neighbor. As noted earlier, a good part of the nega

surrounding Korea in Japan derived from the repr

practices of the authoritarian regimes in Korea in the 

and 1980s. As Korea developed and liberalized, the c

gradually influenced the Japanese government and g

public to hold more positive images of Korea and Ko

One manifestation of this was the Kankoku boomu (

boom) in which Korean language, food, and 

experienced an upsurge in popularity in Japan 

late-1980s.

70

 Plans to start Korean language broadc

in Japan by the end of the century have also 

implemented.

71

 A study on the Korean minority in 

noted additional ways in which perceptions are chan

A new image is emerging for Koreans in Japan. This n

image is vibrant, dynamic, and self-confident, backed not o

by growing economic power but by changing cultu

attitudes.

72

On the Korean side, as the country embraces dem

and progresses toward economic prosperity, its enh

international prestige (reflected in such events as th

Seoul Olympics, United Nations membership in 

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develo

(OECD) membership in 1996, and 2002 World Cup 

Japan) fosters a growing self-confidence among Ko

that reduces national insecurities and xenoph

nurturing a less petty, less emotional attitude in de

with Japan.

This process of identity change was evident a

October 1998 summit between Kim Dae Jung and O

Keizo. It was not evident in the colonial apology, the f

zones agreement, the commitment to joint naval exe

or the joint action plan, all of which the popular 

focused on.

73

 These were undoubtedly all unpreced

material accomplishments, but what were of signif

from an ideational perspective were instead the little 

that went largely unnoticed. In speeches before the 

249
Kim Dae Jung spoke of how Koreans were as respons

Japanese for putting the history issue to rest and m

forward. The two leaders called “infantile” the fixation 

years of negative Japan-ROK interaction at the expe

1,500 years of positive exchanges and cooperation. 

trumpeted Korea’s successful road to democracy 

Korea lauded Japan’s peace constitution and commi

to overseas assistance.

74

 These attempts to recon

history, to emphasize the positive interaction over neg

to express admiration for the other’s accomplishm

were not present in past interactions. They repres

subtle but important manifestations of Japanese des

change templates and transform the identity o

relationship.

Policy Implications of Japan’s Grand Strategy 

Korea.

Two questions confront this final section. First, giv

chapter’s interpretation of Japanese grand strategy

are the implications for current policy? Second

plausible are certain suggested scenarios for se

outcomes in the region involving Japan given what we 

about the strategy?

Engagement with the DPRK. The pessimists wou

Tokyo’s current policy of restarting normaliz

negotiations in early 2000 with Pyongyang as well 

overall engagement strategy with North Kor

consistent with the predatory grand strategy. In this 

Japan continues to prop up the North indefinitely 

assistance, couching this in the benevolent langu

engagement and humanitarian aid, but really fo

purpose of averting a reunited Korea.

75

 I do not believ

is an accurate interpretation. Tokyo’s engagement 

with Pyongyang is not informed or motivated 

overarching desire to delay unification but by a var

other less menacing motives. A degree of entra

anxieties informs the policy in the sense that Japa

250
seeks to avoid situations in which the DPRK fe

encircled and isolated that it might lash out.

76

 Eco

assistance to the DPRK is provided by Tokyo not so m

prop up the North as to avoid hard landing scenario

would have destabilizing repercussions for Seoul, T

and the region as a whole.

77

 Engagement is also a func

short-term expediency. Kim Dae Jung’s sunshine poli

the Perry review’s emphasis on trilateral coordi

compelled Tokyo to step in line on the policy in sp

substantial inclinations to the contrary after the 

dong test flight over the home island in August 19

addition, Tokyo had few other alternatives. A ha

position after the launch (encompassing the levy

sanctions and reneging on financial commitme

KEDO) would have had little effect on North Kore

would have alienated Japan in relations with Seou

Washington. 

The likelihood of a positive result in these negotiat

not good. The DPRK’s refusal to acknowledge (let 

investigate) the alleged abductions of Japanese ci

from Japan dating back to the 1970s remains a 

impediment. In addition, a normalization settlemen

entailed large sums of money in the range of $5-10 

that essentially served as a bribe to moderate the 

missile threat to Japan would be domest

unacceptable.

78

 Perhaps the most useful insight th

grand strategy discussion offers here is with regard 

flexibility of Japan’s position on engagement. Whi

predatory argument would see Tokyo as wedd

engagement (i.e., as long as the DPRK is in relative

straits, it would prop up the regime to prevent collap

unification), Japan’s grand strategy actually allow

much greater flexibility. Because this strategy does 

fact “fear” unification (and would seek to accommoda

support such a process were it to occur), Tokyo would 

constrained from shifting away from engagement t

more coercive or isolation policies if the consensus a

the allies in the region moved in that direction.

79

251
China-South Korea Relations. Another p

implication that can be deduced from the grand stra

with regard to how Tokyo views Beijing’s actions o

peninsula. China has certainly had a more prominen

than Japan in the post-Cold War on peninsular i

Beijing participates in the Four Party Talks o

armistice; it has provided the venue for much 

North-South contacts, including the ones that led 

agreement on the June 2000 Pyongyang summit; it p

subtle but important roles in defusing the nuclear cr

1994 and in the DPRK missile testing moratorium. T

on the other hand, has been largely relegated to a seco

role, as a financial contributor to KEDO. Japan 

therefore be concerned about the degree to which 

exercises an inordinate amount of influence o

peninsula. 

There is no denying Beijing’s enhanced role in sh

events on the peninsula, while China-South Korea rel

since 1992 remain on an uptick (as do China-

relations given the recent visit by Kim Jong Il to Beij

However, while cognizant of this, Japan is not 

worried. As noted above, this is because of a realizatio

in the longer term, regime type, geography, economic

familiarity work in favor of Japan-Korea alignments 

the disadvantage of China-Korea ones, especially 

North Korean buffer is gone. The one exception to this 

be economic complementarities on the China-Korea 

however, even here the outlook is not nearly as sangu

the popular wisdom predicts.

81

Other Security Outcomes. Finally, what doe

strategy tell us about Japanese reactions to other se

scenarios in the region? Given the DPRK’s unex

resiliency and the June 2000 Korea summit, increa

there is discussion of nonzero-sum peace solutions 

peninsula where the two regimes co-exist rather 

reunite. Indeed the 2000 joint declaration between t

Koreas expressed explicit agreement between Seou

Pyongyang that the common denominator of 

252
respective unification formulas was a long interim pe

coexistence under a “one nation, two systems” vision. 

is nothing a priori in Japanese strategic thinking that 

be averse to such an outcome, but then again it 

depend greatly on the circumstances of this end-state 

peninsula. If for example, the “one nation, two sys

solution left two Korean regimes in peace and com

with arms control and nonproliferation agreements

Japan might favor such stability. On the other hand, 

end-state came about without substantial moderat

DPRK military capabilities, then Japan would be no 

off. In other words, if the inter-Korean peace solution 

only with those things relevant to peninsular securi

DMZ troop reductions and artillery, but does not a

long-range missiles, then Japan would most likely o

such an outcome. Tokyo would not oppose the inter-K

peace per se, but would be very concerned about an

form of entrapment—in this case, the ROK incentive t

its newfound peace with the DPRK (i.e., moderation 

threat of invasion and artillery) and decouple its se

from Japan with regard to missiles or nuclear weapo

What about the possibility of Japan sheddi

nonproliferation identity as a response to continued 

threats? Or, conversely, what about Japan bandwag

with China and the DPRK to mitigate its external th

Either proposition is certainly plausible. In the forme

Japan clearly possesses the capabilities, technolog

infrastructure to proliferate. In the latter, if one is a 

cultural arguments for security, there exist precedent

bandwagoning with China in the region.

82

 The answ

such questions lie less in Japanese grand strategy 

peninsula and more in Japanese confidence in th

alliance. As long as U.S. commitments remain firm

likelihood of Japan seeking alternative internal or ex

balancing options is low. In other words, the causal ar

more likely to run in the direction from a weakene

alliance to alternative balancing options, rather tha

253
alternative balancing options to a weakened U.S. al

As one longtime Japan expert observed,

So long as the United States sustains its existing presence in 

region, Tokyo will undoubtedly maintain its cooperation w

Washington as a core element of its foreign policy. Un

current circumstances, it is highly unlikely that Japan will 

to establish a cooperative system with its regional neighbor

an effort to free itself from the sphere of U.S. influence.

83

Conclusion.

Since the division of the Korean peninsula in 194

common assumption has been that Japan’s predatory 

strategy has been premised on a fear of unification 

desire to prevent it. At times this has been explicit th

the equi-distance policy of the 1970s or more subtle th

post-Cold War humanitarian aid and economic assi

policies to prop up the DPRK regime. But a 

understanding of the relevant grand strategy must lo

the continuities in Japanese attitudes towar

peninsula, not just since 1945 but over the past cen

What emerges from this longer-term view ar

constants. First, Japan has always sought a relatio

with Korea that works to Japan’s security advantage 

region; and second, Japan has always seen Korea 

embedded in the larger context of the region’s bala

power. What has changed in the latter half of the 

century and the beginning of the 21st century is the m

which Japan has sought these objectives. In the pas

was based on unilateral military domination o

peninsula; today, it is based on alignment and coope

within the context of U.S.-Japan-Korea relations. The 

to be made here is that neither of these objectives lo

dictates Japanese opposition to a unified peninsula 

21st century.

As this chapter has shown, arguments suggestin

predatory motives have done so based less on a read

the continuities in strategy and more on historical 

254
and enmity. What emerges in the former case is a 

strategy for Japan not prejudiced against unificatio

actively in pursuit of unification outcomes that w

Japan’s advantage in the regional distribution of p

This translates to support for the DPRK not because 

wants to keep the peninsula divided, but because it wa

cushion and shape unification in stable direction

benefit Japan. Moreover, Japan seeks more politica

military cooperation with South Korea not becaus

carefully planning its opportunity to repeat history. R

it is because in the longer term there is a realizatio

confidence, trust, and transparency on this axis ca

benefit Japan’s security under virtually all balance of 

configurations one could imagine in the region’s futur

indeed is a very realist perspective but also an opti

one. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7

1. “Memorandum of Conversation on February 3, 1949, B

Richard B. Finn and Wajima Eiji, Director of the Control Burea

Foreign Office,” from POLAD to the Secretary of 

894.4016/2-1849, RG 59, Internal Affairs of Japan, in Sun

Cheong, The Politics of Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Korea, New 

Greenwood Press, 1991, p. 72.

2. Kenichi Takemura, quoted in Far Eastern Economic 

January 31, 1991, p. 31, in Young-Sun Lee and Masao O

“Introduction,” in Japan and Korean Unification, Seoul: 

University, 1999, p. 10, note 2.

3. Until the 1990s, there were only a handful of sc

monographs on Japan’s Korea policy (Chae-Jin Lee and Hide

U.S. Policy Toward Japan and Korea, New York: Praeger

Chong-Sik Lee, Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension, St

Hoover Press, 1985; Chin-Wee Chung, ed., Korea and Japan in 

Politics, Seoul: Korean Association of International Relations

and Brian Bridges, Japan and Korea in the 1990s, Cam

Cambridge Univ. Press, 1993). Since the end of the Cold War, int

the topic has grown, largely due to DPRK agitation and concer

contingency planning (Ralph Cossa ed., U.S.-Korea-Japan Re

Building Toward a Virtual Alliance, Washington, DC: CSIS

Young-Sun Lee and Masao Okonogi, eds., Japan and 

255
Unification, Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1999; Sang-Woo R

Tae-Hyo Kim, eds., Korea-Japan Security Relations: Pres

Studies, Seoul: Oreum Publishing, 2000; Trilateral Naval Coop

Japan-U.S.-Korea—Workshop II Report by the Center for 

Analyses, Korea Institute of Defense Analyses, and the O

Institute, May 1998; Japan National Institute for Defense 

(NIDS)/U.S. Center for Naval Analyses and KIDA, Trilatera

Cooperation: Japan, U.S., Korea, February 1997; Trilateral 

Cooperation: Korea-US-Japan Workshop III, October 1999). Th

generation of literature focuses on specific issues regarding tr

coordination and DPRK contingencies; it does not directly addr

question of Japanese grand strategy. Many of these works make 

assumptions about such a strategy, but relatively few works rea

out or try to rigorously infer what such a strategy might ent

Michael Green, “State of the Field Report: Research on Ja

Security Policy,” National Bureau of Asian Research Acce

Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, September 1998, pp. 37-39).

4. In this chapter, I do not employ the term “realism” i

international relations theory terms (i.e., structural or c

realism). Instead, I utilize the term loosely in that both the pes

and optimistic assessments of Japan-Korea relations discussed 

chapter employ capabilities-based variables to explain outcom

does not deny that other factors of a nonrealist nature (domestic 

historical enmity, etc.) are employed to embellish the analysis. F

different realist interpretations of Japanese foreign policy, s

Heginbotham and Richard Samuels, “Mercantile Realism and Ja

Foreign Policy,” International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 , Spring 1

171-203; Reinhard Drifte, Japan’s Foreign Policy in the 1990

York: St. Martins, 1996; Kenneth Pyle, The Japanese Question

and Purpose in a New Era, Washington, DC: AEI, 1996; and M

Green and Benjamin Self, “Japan’s Changing China Policy

Commercial Liberalism to Reluctant Realism,” Survival, Vol. 3

Summer 1996, pp. 35-58.

5. For the classic statement, see James W. Morley, “The Dyna

the Korean Connection,” in Gerald Curtis and Sung-joo Han, e

U.S.-South Korean Alliance, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books

Also see Hisahiko Okazaki, “Japan-South Korea Security Coop

A View Towards the Future,” in Rhee and Kim, eds., Korea

Security Cooperation, pp. 89-90.

6. For the most recent modernization plans for the ROK m

see Defense White Paper 1999, Seoul: Ministry of National D

2000.

256
7. Michael O’Hanlon, “Stopping a North Korean Invasio

Defending South Korea is Easier than the Pentagon T

International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4, Spring 1998, pp. 135-170

8. This is based on a simple aggregation of current DPRK an

capabilities. The militaries are respectively 1.1 million and 670,0

further details, see Defense White Paper 1999, Parts I and II; a

Bruce Bennett, “Conventional Arms Control in Korea: A Le

Peace?” conference paper, NPEC/INSS/AWC Competitive Str

Workshop Series: Planning for a Peaceful Korea, Arlington, VA

12-14, 2000. As will be discussed below, estimates based on a 

aggregation like this are flawed.

9. Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,

Politics, Vol. 30, No.2, January 1978, pp. 167-214.

10. Akira Tanaka, “Japan and Korea—Relations Betwe

Peripheral Cultures,” Japan Quarterly, Vol. 28, No.1, March 19

30-38.

11. Although Kim Dae Jung has gone to great lengths to i

relations with Japan, the degree to which even he lapsed into in

images of “imperialist Japan” and blaming Tokyo in conjuncti

the other major powers for Korea’s division at the 80th anni

celebrations of samilchol is a reminder of how deeply negat

anti-Japan are Korean conceptions of nationalism (see Kim’s sp

“A Nation Recalls a Bold Bid for Freedom,” Newsreview, March 6

Negatively-constructed nationalisms and nationalist myths 

unique to Korea; however, the degree to which this identit

viscerally framed against a past aggressor may marginally dist

the Korean case.

12. For identity-based arguments in this vein, see Tom 

“Tangled Visions: Culture, Historical Memory and Japan’s E

Relations,” conference paper, American Political Science Ass

Annual Conference, Boston, MA, September 8, 1998; and Gerri

ed., Remembering and Forgetting: The Legacy of War and Peace 

Asia, Washington, DC: CSIS, 1996.

13. In social science terms, systematic biases of a cogn

affective nature stemming from this history on the part 

government and general public give rise to an atmosphere of d

and contempt which makes compromise or concession in nego

extremely difficult. This in turn prevents the possibility of am

rationally-based negotiation.

257
14. Jae-Ho Chung, “The Korean-American Alliance and the 

China,’” Discussion Paper on America’s Alliances with Jap

Korea, Stanford: A/PARC, 1999.

15. Robert Ross, “The Geography of Peace: East Asia 

Twenty-First Century,” International Security, Vol. 23, No.4, 

1999, pp. 81-118.

16. Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, New 

Simon and Schuster, 1996, pp. 229-238.

17. For a thorough and insightful analysis, see Chae-Jin Lee

and Korea: Dynamic Relations, Stanford: Hoover Press, 1997.

18. Victor Cha, “Engaging North Korea Credibly,” Survival, 

No. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 151-152.

19. Examples include Richard Betts, “Wealth, Pow

Instability,” International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3, Winter 1993

34-77; Aaron Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry,” International Secur

18, No. 3, Winter 1993/94, pp. 5-33; Ross, “The Geography of Pea

Paul Bracken, Fire in the East, NY: HarperCollins, 1999.

20. Seizaburo Sato, Kenichi Koyama, and Shunpei Kumon, P

Politician, New York: Kodansha, 1990, pp. 450-456.

21. Gerald Curtis, ed., Japan’s Foreign Relations After the Co

New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993, pp. 263-272.

22. Morley, “Dynamics of the Korean Connection,” p. 8.

23. For one of the early and eloquent expositions of this con

argument, see Mark Fitzpatrick, “Why Japan and the United 

Will Welcome Korean Unification,” Korea and World Affairs, 

No. 3, Fall 1991. Arguments against the Chinese bandwagon d

are addressed below.

24. This figure is based on the traditional benchmark of m

forces as approximately 1 percent of total population.

25. See Hideshi Takesada, “Korea-Japan Defense Coop

Prospects and Issues,” in Rhee and Kim, Korea-Japan S

Relations, p. 125; Lee, Japan and Korea, chap. 4; and Don Obe

The Two Koreas, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997, pp. 41-5

258
26. Hideya Kurata, “Historical Perspectives on Japan

Relations,” conference paper, SSRC/CGP Workshop on Japan’

Korea Policy, Washington, DC, March 1, 2000.

27. For examples, see Choon-Kun Lee, “War and Peace 

Korean Peninsula,” Korea Military Review (in Korean), Vol. 10, J

2000; Hong-nak Kim, “Japanese-Korean Relations in the 1980s

Survey, Vol. 27, No. 2, May 1987, pp. 497-514; Dal-joong 

“Integration and Conflict in Japan’s Corporate Expansion int

Korea,” Korea and World Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1, Spring 1983, pp. 

and Byong-man Ahn, “The Internal Political Change in Japan 

Foreign Policy Toward Korea,” Korea and World Affairs, Vol. 2

Summer 1978, pp. 179-97. For an exception to this view, see Ro

Gong, “Japan’s Northeast Asia Policy in the 21st Century,” Korea 

Vol. 7, No. 6, November-December 1999, pp. 18-24.

28. On these points, see MND, Defense White Paper 1

“Defense Ministry pushes Destroyer Plan,” Korea Herald, June 

Myung-ho Moon, “Debate on a Blue Water Navy,” Munhwa Ilbo, 

1997; “Military Concerned about Defense Budget Cuts,” Korea 

February 7, 1998; Charles Morrison, ed., Asia-Pacific Security O

Honolulu: East-West Center, 1997; “Major Military Procu

Projects to be Delayed or Canceled,” Korea Times, January 8

“South Korea to Buy Eight CN-235 Indonesian Military Aircraft

Herald, November 20, 1997; Korea’s Seapower and N

Development in the Era of Globalization, Seoul: Sejong Institut

Yong-sup Han, “Korea’s Security Strategy for 21st Ce

Cooperation and Conflict,” Korea Focus, Vol. 5, No.4, July-Augu

Joon-ho Do, “Security Strategy for 21st Century,” Wolgan C

November 25 1993; Seo-Hang Lee, “Naval Power as an Instru

Foreign Policy,” Korea Focus, Vol. 5, No. 2, March-April 1997.

29. See “ROK Navy Pursues Blue Water Ambition,” Korea 

November 12, 1995; Seo-Hang Lee, “Naval Power as an Instru

Foreign Policy,” Korea Focus, Vol. 5, No. 2, March-April 1997, pp

Wall Street Journal, January 17, 1995; Joongang Ilbo, Janu

1995; Kent Calder, Pacific Defense, New York: William Morrow

Aidan Foster-Carter, Korea’s Coming Reunification: Anoth

Asian Superpower? Economist Intelligence Unit, Special Rep

M212, London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1992.

30. Given current trends in both Koreas, it is difficult to im

future Korea without some form of substantial ballistic 

capability. The DPRK ballistic missile program since the earl

has produced a range of missile systems, either deployed or 

demonstrating progress beyond most expectations. Despite 

259
material constraints, the North accomplished this largely t

reverse-engineering of SCUD-B missile technology acquired fr

Soviet Union. The August 1998 test flight of the Taepodong

Japan demonstrated an unexpected leap in IRBM technology (

failed 3-stage payload launch). The ROK has sought to move aw

a 1979 agreement with the United States that restricts South 

missile ranges to 180 km. Seoul wants greater independence f

United States in terms of an indigenous missile program capabi

membership in the MTCR which would enable the ROK to 

missiles to 300 km. To the surprise and unease of the U.S. gover

the ROK test fired a surface-to-surface missile some eight mont

the Taepodong test, demonstrating both the capabiliti

determination to develop a more advanced and independent 

deterrent (analysts maintain that the South Korean missile 

violates the 1979 limits but was deliberately under-fueled to 

accusations by the United States). U.S. intelligence repo

evidence of clandestine ROK activities in rocket motors indicati

effort to develop longer-range missiles (New York Times, Novem

1999). In addition, the ROK has renewed strong interest from th

in a civilian space launch vehicle program (see Calvin Sims, 

Korea Plans to Begin Rocket Program,” New York Times, Janu

2000).

31. Victor Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The 

States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle, Stanford: Stanford Un

Press, 1999.

32. Glenn Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance P

World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4, July 1984, pp. 461-496; and A

Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997.

33. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” p. 

34. For example, throughout post-war and Cold War eras, 

states essentially comprised an integrated unit in U.S. defense p

in the region. The presence of American ground troops in South 

was as much an extending frontline of defense for Tokyo as it 

Seoul. Similarly, the U.S. Seventh fleet and Marine units in 

provided rearguard support for the ROK. Joint U.S.-Korea m

exercises regularly employed bases in Japan for logistic suppo

tactical air wing deployments rotated frequently between Jap

Korea; and air and naval surveillance of North Korea was opera

of bases in Japan. In addition, Seoul and Tokyo conducted p

exchanges of defense officials, developed bilateral forums for dis

of security policies, and engaged in some sharing of military inte

and technology.

260
35. “Joint Communique Between President Richard Nix

Prime Minister Eisaku Sato,” November 21, 1969, sec. 4.

36. This commitment was originally made in Sato’s Nationa

Club address in Washington after release of the Nixon-Sa

communiqué. Also see Eisaku Sato, “New Pacific Age,” 

Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 2, January 1970, pp. 333-340.

37. Monitoring of the Chosen Soren was a constant source of 

between Tokyo and Seoul during the 1960s and 1970s as North 

infiltration of the South was largely conducted through Japa

refugee issue, though less openly stated by Japanese, is neverth

very salient concern. These numbered between 200,000-500,000 

the Korean War.

38. This essentially states that Japan should provide econo

as a form of “security rent” to the ROK as the latter bears the bu

undergirding stability in the Japanese defense perimeter.

39. This is termed the “boomerang effect.” For example

Korean authorities accused Tokyo of denying funding of the Kwa

Steel works complex because Japan’s earlier support of the P

steel complex in 1969 made the ROK a rival supplier of stee

recently, the ROK has used this argument in connection with Ja

reluctance to provide technology. Japan does not want to giv

South Korean complaints and become locked into investment pro

the ROK when cheaper sources of labor exist elsewhere (e.g., So

Asia). In addition, Tokyo sees technology transfer issues as a 

sector decision beyond the realm of direct government influen

Akira Kubota, “Transferring Technology in Asia,” Japan Quarte

33, No. 1, January 1986; Hy-sang Lee, “Japanese-South 

Economic Relations on Troubled Economic Waters,” Korea O

Vol. 16, No. 2, Summer 1985; and Soon Cho, “A Korean V

Korean-Japan Economic Relations,” in Chin-wee Chung et a

Korea and Japan in World Politics, Seoul: KAIR, 1985).

40. One manner of contending with these forces was, a

earlier, the “comprehensive security strategy” (CSS)

conceptualized by Ohira in 1973 and later formalized by Suzuki 

this states that Japan will promote regional peace and stability t

nonmilitary means.

41. For elaboration of the argument, see Cha, Alignment 

Antagonism, chap. 2.

42. Korea Herald, January 9-11, 1972, and August 4, 1973.

261
43. Lee, Japan and Korea, p. 118.

44. An in-depth discussion of the empirical tests is beyond th

of this chapter. See Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism, chap. 

45. For arguments in a similar vein, see Young-sun Lee and 

Okonogi, “Introduction,” in Lee and Okonogi, eds., Japan and 

Unification, pp. 9-10.

46. See Masao Okonogi, “The North Korean Crisis and 

Political and Diplomatic Responses”; Tetsuo Murooka, “North 

Economic Policy and Implications for Japan’s Economic Assis

and Yukiko Fukagawa, “Japan’s Economic Assistance to North 

all in Lee and Okonogi, eds., Japan and Korean Unification.

47. On the ROK’s zero-sum mentality and classically 

conceptions of security, see Patrick Morgan, “The U.S.-ROK S

Relationship,” in Donald Clark et al., eds., U.S.-Korean Re

Claremont, CA: Keck Center, 1995, pp. 81-106.

48. PLA Daily, July 10, 2000 (editorial).

49. Jia Hao and Shuang Qubing, “China’s Policy Toward the 

Peninsula,” Asian Survey, Vol. 32, No. 2, December 1992, p. 11

50. “Chinese Military Wary of Naval Buildup of Japan, 

Korea Herald, November 10, 1992.

51. See Korean coverage of the CPC report in Mal ([Free] S

October 1994 in Foreign Broadcast Information Servi

(henceforth FBIS-EAS)-94-245, December 21, 1994, pp. 38-46.

52. Bonnie Glaser, “China’s Security Perceptions: Intere

Ambitions,” Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 3, March 1993, pp. 261-

53. John Mearsheimer, “The Case for a Ukrainian N

Deterrent,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, p. 54

54. It is interesting to note that in a 1993 trip to Beijin

Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo explicitly stated that while Jap

administered Korea as a colony, it was no longer seen as thre

(see Frank Ching, “Securing Northeast Asia,” FEER, Novem

1993, p. 42).

55. For arguments regarding Japan-South Korea coop

implicitly as a hedge against China, see Takesada, “Korea

Defence Cooperation: Prospects and Issues,” in Rhee and Kim

262
Korea-Japan Security Relations, pp. 131-133; Hiroyasu A

“Strengthening the U.S.-Centered Hub-and-Spokes Sys

Northeast Asia,” in Rhee and Kim, eds., Korea-Japan S

Relations, pp. 146-151; Narushige Michishita, “Alliances After P

Korea,” Survival, Vol. 41, No. 3, Autumn 1999, pp. 68-83; and O

“Japan-South Korea Security Cooperation.”

56. While these relations do not constitute “institutions” 

formal sense of a European NATO or EC, they do breed a fam

between Japanese and Korean leaders. For a related point on ho

institutions engendered a familiarity among European leade

mollified anxieties about German reunification, see Friedberg, “

Rivalry,” p. 13. On the need for building on this baseline of fam

see Gong, “Japan’s Northeast Asia Policy in the 21st Century

and Kang Choi, “Korea-Japan Security Cooperation 

Post-Unification Era,” in Rhee and Kim, eds., Korea-Japan S

Relations, p. 293.

57. Shinobu Miyachi, “Korea-Japan Cooperation Can Stabi

Balance Their Alliances with the U.S.,” in Rhee and Kim

Korea-Japan Security Relations, pp. 262-265; Francis Fukuya

Kongdan Oh, The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship After the Co

Santa Monica: RAND, 1993, pp. 7-48.

58. For background, see “The Modality of the Security and D

Capability of Japan: A Report of the Prime Minister’s Advisory G

Defense Issues,” August 12, 1994; Mike Mochizuki and M

O’Hanlon, “A Liberal Vision for the U.S.-Japanese Alliance,” S

Vol. 40, No. 2, Summer 1998, pp. 127-134; and Reshap

U.S.-Japan Alliance: From Containment to Regional Securit

York: Ralph Bunche Institute on the UN and the Research Insti

Peace and Security (Japan), May 1998.

59. Nakashima, “Searching for a Korea-Japan St

Partnership,” pp. 174-75; Green and Self, “Japan’s Changing 

Policy,” pp. 35-58; and Gong, “Japan’s Northeast Asia Policy in t

Century,” pp. 21-22.

60. Nagashima, “Searching for a Korea-Japan St

Partnership,” in Rhee and Kim, eds., Korea-Japan Security Re

p.171; and Umio Otsuka, “Prospects of Japan-Korea D

Cooperation: Partners or Rivals,” conference paper, Hudson In

Conference on Japan and Korea’s Future, Tokyo, December 5-6

263
61. Interviews with Maritime Self-Defense Forces officers. A

Akutsu, “Strengthening the U.S.-Centered Hub-and-Spokes Sy

Northeast Asia,” pp. 155-158.

62. Akihisa Nagashima, “Searching for a Korea-Japan S

Partnership,” pp. 165-166; Sumihiko Kawamura, “SLOC Protect

Korea-Japan Cooperation,” in Korea-Japan Security Relation

and Kim, eds.; and Hahnkyu Park, “Between Caution and Coop

The ROK-Japan Security Relationship in the Post Cold War 

Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Summer 1998.

63. See Akira Ogawa, “K-J Shuttle 1997-1999,” in Rhee an

eds., Korea-Japan Security Relations, pp. 325-356; and Ralph 

ed., U.S.-Korea-Japan Security Relations: Toward a Virtual A

Washington, DC: CSIS, 1999. With regard to the exchanges an

joint exercises documented in these works, these might obj

appear like small accomplishments; however, it was only wit

generation’s lifetime that the notion of Japanese military pe

setting foot again on Korean soil provoked wrenching reactio

stigma was so acute that Syngman Rhee during the Kore

threatened to surrender the entire country to the communists 

than enlist Japanese support in 1950; Korea threatened 

Japanese boats in violation of territorial fishing waters; and cere

defense exchanges in the 1960s were downplayed publicly. In th

security cooperation represents a major transformation of relat

64. For example, see Shinobu Miyachi, “Korea-Japan Coop

can Stabilize and Balance Their Alliance with the U.S.,” in Rh

Kim, eds., Korea-Japan Security Relations, pp. 270-271.

65. Fitzpatrick, “Why Japan and the United States Will W

Korean Unification,” p. 430.

66. Kim Won-soo (then director, Treaties Division, M

interview by author, Stanford, CA, October 26, 1994. The only re

agreeable to China was to the “abnormal” state of past re

(bijôngsang kwan’gye) (see the Roh-Yang Shangkun commun

MOFA, Woegyo yônp’yo: 1992, Diplomatic Documents Annu

560-561).

67. See “After 1300 Years, White Collar Armies Target Manc

Wall Street Journal, October 9, 1995; and “Beijing Asks Seoul 

Activities of Korean Civilian Body in Manchuria,” Korea 

October 11, 1995.

264
68. By contrast, meetings with expatriate communities 

standard itinerary item in ROK summits to Japan, the United 

South America, and Europe (Kim Won-soo [former Director, T

Division, MOFA], personal interview by author, Stanford, CA, 

26, 1994).

69. See Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism, chap. 7; and 

“Japan’s Northeast Asia Policy in the 21st Century,” p. 25

contrasting argument that questions the degree to which t

perceive each other as democracies, see John Owen, Libera

Liberal War, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997.

70. See Kil Soong-hoom et al., “Han-Il kwan’gye chiha s

chindan,” (Examining the Hidden Pulse), Chongyong M

September 1984, pp. 149-150; and “Japan’s Korea Boom,” Korea 

September 8, 1988.

71. Jong-suk Lee, “Measures on the Import of Japane

Culture,” Korea Focus, Vol. 5, No. 1, January-February 1997, p

72.Dianne Hoffman, “Changing Faces, Changing Places,” 

Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 4, October-December 1992, p. 489.

73. See Nakashima, “Searching for a Korea-Japan St

Partnership,” pp. 167-168; Choson Ilbo, October 11, 1998; Was

Post, October 8, 1998; New York Times, October 8, 1998.

74. See transcripts of Kim Dae Jung’s address to the Nation

October 8, 1998, and the Joint Declaration, October 9, 1998 (un

translations), at http://www.kocis.go.kr.

75. For a statement of this view (although the author disagre

it), see Dong-man Suh, “Outlook for North Korea-Japan Ties,

Focus, Vol. 8, No. 2, March-April 2000, pp. 27-43.

76. This became less of a factor for Japan after the transiti

the YS to DJ governments in Korea and the concomitant shi

open-ended engagement policy by Seoul that did not seek to 

Pyongyang.

77. See Murooka, “North Korean Economic Policy and Impl

for Japan’s Economic Assistance”; and Fukugawa, “Japan’s Ec

Assistance to North Korea.”

78. For discussion of the sums of money involved a

relationship of such an agreement with the 1965 Japan-ROK tre

265
Mark Manyin, “North Korea-Japan Relations: The Normalizatio

and the Compensation/Reparations Issue,” CRS Report, April 21

79. An interesting contrast here is with China. Unlike 

Beijing’s grand strategy for the peninsula is explicitly prem

maintaining the division and hence the DPRK buffer on its so

flank. This strategy thus compels China to engage and prop 

North. Moreover, the more the regional consensus shifts in f

containment, the more wedded Beijing becomes to engagement w

DPRK. Japan faces no such constraints.

80. On the former, see Victor Cha, “Engaging China: Seoul

Detente,” Survival, Spring 1999.

81. In particular, China’s growth may change its trade n

ways that increase competition with Korea. Already, a combin

high growth and fixed resource endowments have made Chin

importer of food products and raw materials, and a net exp

labor-intensive manufactured goods. Given China’s comp

advantage in labor costs, this leads to fierce competition with 

industries for international markets. Competition also grows a

faces pressures from the Organization for Economic Cooperat

Development (OECD) to liberalize, making the country more vul

to a flood of Chinese imports (see David Dollar, “South Korea

Trade Relations,” Asian Survey, Vol. 29, No. 12, December 19

1167-1168; and Cha, “Engaging China,” pp. 91-93.

82. Huntington, Clash of Civilizations; Ross, “Geography of 

and Zbigniew Brzezinski, “A Geostrategy for Eurasia,” Foreign 

September/October 1997, pp. 50-64.

83. Gong, “Japan’s Northeast Asia Policy in the 21st Century

also see Thomas Berger, “From Sword to Chrysanthemum: 

Culture of Anti-Militarism,” International Security, Vol. 17, 

Spring 1993; and Pyle, The Japanese Question. 

266
CHAPTER 8

ECONOMIC ALTERNATIVES FOR

UNIFICATION1

Marcus Noland

Introduction.

On the Korean peninsula, the world confronts a f

between what is surely one of the greatest success sto

the post-war era and one of the last of a dying br

totalitarian dinosaurs. This situation creates fundam

policy dilemmas of enormous practical and ethical i

for the rest of the world. Judged in terms of the sh

population under arms or the share of military expend

in national income, North Korea continues to mainta

most militarized society on Earth. It produces and e

ballistic missiles and is thought to possess large sto

chemical and biological weapons, and possibly n

weapons as well. It invaded the South once a

subsequent years engaged in state-sponsored ter

against the South. Internally, it maintains a perso

cult around the deceased Kim Il Sung and his son, Kim 

Il, of religious proportions and has one of the worst h

rights records of any state existent today. A famin

claimed the lives of perhaps 10 percent of the pre

population. This is fundamentally a systemic crisis

period of aberrant performance due to bad weat

unfavorable external shocks, though both have contr

to North Korea’s current predicament. Yet to parap

Mark Twain, reports of the regime’s collapse have be

exaggeration, and its durability has confounded num

observers.

267
The Kim Jong Il regime presents the United State

strategic and humanitarian challenges, and its pe

elimination would surely be the first-best solution f

U.S. perspective. Two aspects of that statement 

elaboration. First, note the use of the term “re

Ultimately, it is the Kim Jong Il regime that presen

United States with such challenges—not the existenc

independent North Korean state. Presumably the U

States could easily live with a divided though su

demilitarized peninsula. Whether a non-Kim regime 

be viable in the North for any extended period of t

another matter, and there are reasons for skepticism

from the standpoint of logical consistency, we sho

clear that it is the regime, not the state, to whi

fundamentally object.

Second, note the modifier “peaceful.” Obviously

could obtain our first-best solution in a relatively co

manner, that would be our preferred option. Presuma

costs increase, less ambitious outcomes would be

appear more attractive. At the extreme, few, if any

policymakers would regard total war as an acceptab

for the elimination of the Kim Jong Il regime.

These two considerations quickly lead us into th

world of choosing among second-bests. I have been ch

with writing a chapter on the economics of K

unification. However, as implied in the discussion 

unification itself could take different modalities a

achieved through different paths. For the sa

concreteness, I will focus on two possibilities. In the 

unification is a protracted, negotiated process yielding 

kind of confederation or “one nation, two systems” ou

This is the official position of both the North and 

Korean governments today as reaffirmed in the Jun

summit.

The other option, of course, is the collapse of North 

and its absorption into South Korea along the lines 

German experience. These two options are n

268
exhaustive, nor mutually exclusive: the two states 

enter into a consensual process of unification and the 

could collapse before this was completed, or one side 

other could attempt a forcible unification. Neverthele

dichotomy is useful for illustrating some altern

conceptions of the economic precursors to unification a

as to its effects.

Consensual Unification.

Both North and South Korea have expressed a des

a consensual unification of the peninsula. Kim Dae 

has repeatedly indicated his lack of interest in underm

the DPRK and has instead called for peaceful coexis

In his “Berlin Declaration” of March 2000, Presiden

indicated that the South Korean government was wil

directly support the economic rehabilitation of the 

and “economic cooperation” was identified as one 

priorities for action in the June 2000 summit declar

The South Korean unification plan is gradual i

extreme, envisioning a process of unification lastin

generations. It put forward a plan for federation 

summit. 

For its part, North Korea has proposed a Conf

Republic of Koryo to be governed by a national ass

consisting of an equal number of representatives 

North and South Korea.

2

 The statement in a 1999 m

at the Council of Foreign Relations by North K

Foreign Minister Paek Nam-sun that North Korea 

consider a “one country, two systems” model along th

of Hong Kong and China could be interpreted as a 

that North Korea was open to this kind of engageme

The announcement in April 2000 that leaders 

North and South would meet in the first ever North-

summit stunned the world. While this could be no mor

a tactical move on the part of the North Koreans tim

extract maximum concessions out of an electorally 

Kim Dae Jung and pliant Clinton administratio

269
possibility that this represents a significant strategi

on the part of a newly confident Kim Jong Il can

entirely discounted.

3

 Only time will tell. It is hard to 

though, that recent diplomatic developments redu

likelihood of consensual integration.

In a formal sense, one can imagine a ser

progressively deeper steps of integration that the 

could undertake. Perhaps the first, and simplest, wo

the formation of a free trade area, freeing trade betwe

two Koreas but permitting each to restrict trade with 

parties according to their own interests. This wou

equivalent to the North American Free Trade Agre

(NAFTA) in which trade is unencumbered amon

United States, Canada, and Mexico, but each co

maintains its own trade policies with respe

nonmembers. Even this first step would appear to 

beyond anything that can be seriously expected in th

term. The next step would be the formation of a cu

union which would involve applying a common po

trade with third parties. This would be akin to the Eur

Economic Community (EEC).

Economic union would be a deeper form of integr

permitting the free movement of labor, capital, and 

across borders, as exists in the European Union (EU) 

A monetary union would involve the adoption of a 

currency, as is in process in some EU member states 

A social union would involve the adoption of common 

and social welfare policies in the two states. The fina

would be political union and the surrender of indepe

claims on sovereignty. The EU has managed to cre

economic union and is in the process of forging soci

political union. Within this schema there are dif

degrees of surrender of local authority to ce

governments. Presumably, given the radically dif

social and political systems of North and South Kore

form of consensual political integration would invol

maintenance of extensive local autonomy. Indeed, giv

highly centralized nature of the governing systems o

270
North and South Korea, issues of local autonom

control would presumably be highly contentious und

unification scheme.

Coping with the Present. Thus the prerequisites 

consensual unification would be maintenance o

independent states and a sufficient degree of converge

economic and political practices to make the ou

plausible. In the case at hand, this means aver

collapse in the North and generating sufficient reform 

North’s economic and political system to make some d

of integration with the South sustainable. The is

political change is well beyond my competence, and 

focus on the economic issue.

In the simplest terms, the North Korean econo

longer works. It does not generate enough output to s

its population biologically, nor, absent fundam

economic reforms, will it do so in the future. Faced wi

situation, Pyongyang has pursued essentially two 

strategies. The first strategy has been the purs

“one-off” projects to generate foreign exchange w

affecting the systemic organization of the economy. 

projects would include the Rajin-Sonbong special eco

zone (SEZ) and the Mt. Kumgang tourism projec

October 1998 agreement between Hyundai and Pyon

is important in this regard. First, payments committe

Hyundai dwarf anything that North Korea could pla

earn in Rajin-Sonbong, and, second, the Hy

agreement extends the possibility of the constructio

new SEZ.

With respect to the former, Hyundai has guara

North Korea $942 over 75 months, with the pa

schedule front-loaded for the first 6 months. (Indee

North Koreans used brinkmanship to extract up

payments before the first tour visited Mt. Kumga

November 1998.) At $300 per passenger, North 

stands to make $450 million per year off the to

agreement alone in the admittedly unlikely case 

271
Hyundai is able to reach its target of 1.5 million visito

year in 2005.

4

 To put this in perspective, this mo

properly deployed, would be enough to close the 

Korean food gap and end the famine. Unfortunately

believed that the funds are going into the Macau 

account of “Bureau 39,” a party organization control

Kim Jong Il, to be used to reward his cronies and prop 

rule. If this is how the Mt. Kumgang tourism project 

out, it will amount to a successful version of 

Rajin-Sonbong is not—a regime-preserving hard cu

earner with no real systemic implications fo

organization of the North Korean economy or society

In this respect, the rest of the Hyundai deal mi

more significant. The agreement also calls fo

development of a second SEZ in Haeju, north of Inchon

appears to have far greater prospects than Rajin-Son

First, the geographical location is far more ausp

Second, it has the backing of Hyundai (and presumab

South Korean government). This is critical both fro

standpoint that it provides the necessary infrastr

(which Rajin-Sonbong sorely lacks) and carrie

imprimatur of Hyundai (and by extension the South K

government). Thus, South Korean small- and medium

enterprises are far more likely to move light manufac

operations to Haeju than Rajin-Sonbong.

5

The second has been the use of implicit or explicit t

in developing nuclear weapon and missile capabili

order to extract resources from the rest of the world. 

view, the aversion of a military confrontation wi

United States in 1994 has given North Kor

opportunity to develop more effective means of ext

resources from the rest of the world and pushi

unification on their terms. North Korea’s August 

public announcement of its missile exports and its te

multistage rocket, and its apparently ren

nuclear-related activities, perhaps give some indica

the country’s future course. The marriage of the rock

nuclear programs would give the North Koreans impr

272
tools with which to intimidate their immediate neig

and create proliferation nightmares for the rest of the 

The truly frightening aspect of such reasoning is tha

scenario would be a continuation of the status 

Ironically, given obstacles to successful reform, su

externally high-risk strategy might be the path of 

resistance internally to a weak and risk-averse r

North Korea could continue to play a strategy of attem

to extort resources out of the rest of the world, offer

abandon weapons development and export while cont

to make clandestine sales. In this regard, recent diplo

interchanges potentially represent a major step forw

stopping the North’s nuclear weapons and long

missile programs and in normalizing its relations wi

rest of the world.

In the absence of significant economic rehabilit

North Korea will require external support fo

foreseeable future. Yet the world community is unlik

continue this support unless North Korea continues t

a security threat to its neighbors. Collapse would pose 

risks to international political stability, especially if i

accompanied by civil war and military interventi

external powers. Surrounding countries—South K

China, and Japan—and the United States 

demonstrated a willingness to provide this suppor

more, for fear of North Korea’s collapse, or, what wo

worse, an internal conflict or lashing out which cou

millions of people in Northeast Asia in harm’s 

including thousands of U.S. troops stationed in South 

and Japan.

The provision of such aid is tied to the existence 

security threat. If North Korea was simply a country 

broken economy and 22 million impoverished citizen

extremely unlikely that a multinational consortium 

be pouring in billions of dollars of aid in the form of foo

infrastructural investments. There are plenty of 

countries in Central Asia and Africa, but the rest 

world does not build them light water nuclear react

273
refurbish their electrical grids. Indeed, one could argu

not even the famine distinguishes North Korea

contemporaneous situations in Africa are as bad 

worse.

6

 Rather, North Korea’s ability to extract 

resources from the world community is intimately rela

the threat it poses, so that, in this sense, the status qu

closely resembles extortion than charity. The threat 

Korea poses is its sole asset. It is unlikely to negotiate 

this asset very easily.

Getting from Here to There. All this is to say 

successful consensual unification would requ

significant reorientation of North Korean p

Cooperation could be expected to yield economic bene

North Korea in the form of enhanced trade and invest

assistance from multilateral development banks

settlement of post-colonial claims against Japan. A

same time, to obtain these benefits North K

presumably would have to forego its current revenue

exportation of medium-range missiles and weapons o

destruction, drug trafficking, and counterfe

Furthermore, North Korea would have to settle p

claims arising from past international loan defaults w

to reenter international capital markets. Such a dea

well involve the alteration or renegotiation of the A

Framework upon which much of North Korea’s eco

interaction with the rest of the world is conditioned.

Fundamental reform of the North Korean eco

would have two profound effects: first, there would 

significant increase in exposure to international trad

investment (much of this with South Korea and Japa

countries with which North Korea maintains proble

relations), and second, changes in the composition of o

could be tremendous, involving literally millions of w

changing employment.

7

 Both developments cou

expected to have enormous political implication

alternatively, these implications could be thoug

present significant, perhaps insurmountable, obsta

reform under the current regime. Moreover, prosp

274
reformers in the North would have to deal with their d

country situation—something with which the authori

China and Vietnam did not have to contend.

8

Nevertheless, it is possible that North Korea 

attempt a less ambitious reorientation of its eco

policies and practices supported by help from abroad

North Korean economy desperately needs two thi

meet the minimum survival requirements of its popu

food and energy. It may well be that the country o

enough income through production or aid to atta

minimum survival basket, but chooses not to do so (i.

regime has a strong preference for guns over butter). T

these preferences as given, how much additional i

would the country need to hit the minimum survival b

Under current conditions North Korea runs a stru

annual food deficit of around two million tons. The 

closing this gap through commercial imports would 

the order of several hundred million dollars, depend

prevailing global prices. For the last 5 years, this ga

mainly been closed through the provision of interna

assistance.

10

 This reflects both North Korean po

interests—why pay for something that can be obtain

free?—and the political interests of Western governm

most prominently that of the United States, which fa

domestic resistance to providing in-kind “humani

relief” to North Korea than straight aid to the Kim J

regime. 

In addition to food, North Korea needs energy

reliant on imported oil to generate fuels and fertilizer f

in transportation and agriculture. Electricity is m

generated using coal and hydropower. Generation ha

hampered by difficulties in extracting increas

inaccessible and low-quality domestic coal reserves. B

this problem, the power grid (largely undergrou

security purposes) is said to suffer from extraordi

large transmission losses. The 1994 Agreed Fram

between North Korea and the United States provides 

construction of two light water reactors and the provi

275
oil in the interim. The problem is that this is essent

diplomatic agreement concerning North Korea’s n

program, and does not really address the true needs 

North Korean economy. From an economics standpo

would be better to renegotiate the Agreed Frame

scrapping the costly light water reactors and in

building more cost-effective electrical generating sy

refurbishing the existing electrical grid, and buildi

necessary infrastructure that would allow North Ko

export electricity to South Korea and China, th

earning foreign exchange.

11

Nevertheless, if these estimates are correct an

Framework Agreement as negotiated is fully implem

the actual cost of purchasing the estimated shortf

grain and energy inputs, as well as desperately n

supplies of fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, etc., might 

very large, less than $1 billion dollars.

12

 Assuming no 

interruptions in service, the Hyundai-Mt. Kum

tourism deal guarantees North Korea nearly $150 m

annually over the relevant period. This is a min

North Korea receives a payment per visitor. If Hy

were to fill all the berths on its ships, North Korea 

stand to net approximately $450 million per ye

enough to cover its grain deficit on commercial 

Moreover, other South Korean firms have expr

interest in similar tourist ventures. If the North Ko

went through with the other projects in the Hy

agreement, including the establishment of a new S

Haeju, this could generate additional revenues.

For $2 billion annually, one could fix the North K

economy sufficiently that it would generate rising 

standards and possibly reduce discontent and contrib

political stability.

13

 Around half of this would 

recurrent flow consumption expenditures, and aroun

would be for industrial and infrastructural invest

that could be self-financed through export revenues. M

this trade would be with South Korea and Japan

China and the United States playing smaller roles—

276
with the United States partially lifting its embargo a

North Korea in June 2000.

14

 Thus the necessary rec

external financing needs would be around $1 b

annually.

Where could this money come from? There are 

possibilities, but the single biggest potential sou

additional financing would be the resolution of 

Korea’s post-colonial claims against Japan. This issu

raised by former U.S. Secretary of Defense William 

during his visit to Pyongyang last year. The Jap

government paid the South Korean government 

million in compensation for colonial and wartime act

at the time of normalization of diplomatic relations in 

with $300 million in the form of grants, $200 mill

development assistance loans, and $300 milli

commercial credits. The North Korean government e

similar compensation. Adjusting the South K

payment for differences in population, accrued in

inflation, and appreciation of the yen since 196

obtains a figure in excess of $20 billion.

An additional issue raised by the North Korean

was not included in the South Korean packa

compensation for “comfort women” who were presse

sexual slavery during the Second World War. Repu

settlement figures on the order of $5-8 billion have 

discussed within the Japanese government. In compa

Yi Chong-hyok, Vice Chairman of the Korea Asia-P

Peace Committee, a Korean Workers’ Part (

organization, in remarks before a Washington audie

1996 indicated that $10 billion would be the min

compensation. Japan will certainly argue that its fo

and its billion dollar contribution to the Korean Pen

Energy Development Organization (KEDO) shou

counted against this charge. Some have speculate

Japan will even try to claim credit for the co

recapitalizing bankrupt Chochongryun-controlled fin

institutions in Japan. In any event, such sums, pr

277
deployed, could go a long way in restoring North 

creditworthiness and financing economic moderniza

If North Korea were to accept the Perry review’s te

engagement, another carrot that the United States, J

and South Korea could hold out would be membership 

international financial organizations and the prosp

multilateral economic assistance. Pyongyan

periodically expressed interest in joining the Interna

Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and A

Development Bank (ADB). Membership talks have 

made much progress, however, for they have snagg

North Korea’s unwillingness to permit the kind of ac

economic data and information required for members

these organizations and Japanese opposition relat

unresolved political issues, most notably the a

kidnapping of Japanese citizens. Under no

circumstances, if North Korea were to join 

organizations in the absence of considerable reorien

in domestic economic policies, it would be unlikely th

multilateral development banks would make sign

loans. 

However, given the political importance of North 

to the United States and Japan (influential sharehold

the World Bank, and the dominant shareholders 

ADB), one would expect that North Korea might r

favorable treatment.

15

 Technical advice and assi

would really be more important than direct le

activities, which would ultimately only compleme

activities of private investors. Working from the c

Vietnam (another Asian transitional economy whe

government undertook rapid economic reforms) and s

down the multilateral development banks’ lending pr

for the smaller size of the North Korean populatio

projects lending on a scale of $150-250 billion annual

trivial, but not enough to finance even a bare-bones re

program. More money might be available if the U

States, Japan, South Korea, and others set up a specia

for North Korea at the World Bank or ADB. Such a 

278
might be a particularly useful way of politically laun

Japanese reparations.

It is possible that under some circumstances 

Korea could obtain international financial institution 

even if it were not a member.

16

 For example, the World 

maintains a special program for peace and susta

development in the Middle East through which it 

loans in the areas controlled by the Palestinian Autho

also has adopted a policy that allows it to assist cou

which are emerging from crises even though they a

members in good standing of the Bank. This polic

adopted after the Bank was precluded from lend

Cambodia because of a debt arrearage problem. Th

attributes in these cases appear to be a cooperative rec

government and strong support from major 

shareholders. Bank staff have also expressed the 

privately that an independent, poor North Korea 

probably be able to access more lending than a u

middle-income Korea. Either way, the settleme

post-colonial claims with Japan would dwarf any

North Korea could expect from the multila

development banks.

These developments might be thought of a

necessary, though not sufficient, conditions for conse

unification. Even if they were to occur, they would g

two Koreas only part way down the road. Moreover, 

developments do not necessarily imply progress t

consensual unification. North Korea could adop

minimalist reform program and reject unification ove

from the South. Indeed, while implementing s

program, the North might feel compelled to limit disc

of unification precisely to prevent system overload 

loss of control.

Collapse.

Of course, although this minimalist reform sc

appears relatively attainable, there is no guarante

279
such an outcome will eventuate. It is possible, t

unlikely, that North Korea will not undertake the 

changes necessary to ensure its own survival, and in

could collapse and be absorbed by South Korea as w

case in Germany.

17

 Such a development could g

change the economic calculus on the Korean peninsu

The relatively cheap minimalist reform sce

depends on the stability of the North Korean state a

consequent ability to maintain enormously different 

of income across the two parts of the Korean penins

collapse would set in motion economic and political 

that would make the maintenance of such eno

disparities difficult, if not impossible, to sustain fo

protracted period of time.

Differences between the German and Korean situ

may be revealing in this regard. For one thing, North 

is relatively larger. Its population is roughly half that 

South, whereas East Germany’s was roughly a qua

West Germany’s. Second, income disparities are far g

across the two Koreas than across the two Germ

Although the whole notion of income is problema

centrally planned economies, pre-unification per 

income was probably three to four times higher in 

Germany than in East Germany. In the Korean cas

ratio is more likely to be on the order of 12 or 15 to 1. F

demographically today the population of North Ko

younger than the population of East Germany was 

time of unification. The relatively larger, poorer

younger population of North Korea all points to mig

as being a potentially more important issue in the K

case than in the German case.

18

Indeed, were Korean unification to occur

government would face rising expectations amon

populace of the North and a desire to migrate so

search of better lives. It is possible, though unlikely

the government could use the Demilitarized Zone 

method of population influx control for an extended 

280
of time while conditions in the North slowly imp

However, the political imperative would be to im

conditions in the North rapidly.

The conventional wisdom is that the Germans m

fundamental mistake in setting the unification exc

rate, and considerable economic distress in East Ge

was due to this avoidable error. A more careful an

suggests that it was wage policies, a product of G

institutions and political incentives, not the exchang

that priced East German labor out of the market. Mor

misguided labor market policies were compound

mistakes regarding privatization and restitution po

as well as competition (antitrust) policies, all of 

combined to greatly reduce the demand for goods pro

in East Germany.

19

 However, even under a rela

optimistic scenario of moderate, controlled, cross-

migration, and rapid convergence in North Korea t

South Korean levels of productivity, bringing the le

income in North Korea to half that of the South 

require a decade and hundreds of billions of doll

investment—transfers larger in relative terms than 

German case.

20

This would not be pure “cost,” however. Some in 

Korea could arguably benefit in this scenario. Investm

the North would earn remitted profits to owners of cap

the South, and the process could be expected to sh

distribution of income away from labor and toward c

At the same time, there would be shifts in the i

distribution among different classes of labor, wit

distribution of income shifting toward higher skilled c

of labor. Another cleavage would be between s

producing internationally traded goods su

manufactures, and nontraded goods such as constru

with the nontraded goods sector doing relatively bette

bottom line is that if you are a South Korean constr

magnate with savings to invest in unification bonds, K

unification could be very good for you. If you 

281
low-skilled manufacturing worker, it could be a 

different story.

The question then arises as to what, if anythin

South Korea, the United States, and others do to prep

such a contingency? South Korea’s need to prepare f

contingencies of unification with North Korea and it

to strengthen its financial system in the wake of it

financial crisis coincide. In the event of unification, th

absolutely no reason to finance the construct

infrastructure out of current tax receipts. Instea

government will want to use both taxes and bonds to f

unification expenditures. Hence the developmen

robust government bond market prior to unification s

be a priority. A second priority would be the rejuvena

South Korea’s flagging privatization program: there 

reason why the privatization agenda in the North sho

more aggressive than the one that currently exists 

South.

21

 Finally, once the current crisis in South Ko

surmounted, South Korea will want to return to a po

fiscal rectitude, and salt away some reserves fo

potential rainy day. A strong government financial po

would both allow it scope for immediate expenditures 

event, and facilitate the issuance of “unification bond

At the moment of collapse in this scenario, there w

critical need for close coordination among the milita

the United States, South Korea, and China, 

presumably they will be central to maintaining 

handling refugee flows, etc. This cannot be overempha

though further discussion is really beyond the scope 

paper. Once the situation on the ground has stab

longer-run political and economic policies come to th

As indicated earlier, there is an extensive literature 

lessons for Korea from German unification, and the 

Korean government has devoted considerable resou

studying this topic.

At the time of unification, the South Korean gover

will have multiple (and potentially conflicting) 

282
objectives. On the one hand, maintenance of eco

activity in the North on market-consistent terms will 

top priority. At the same time, the government shoul

to effect a one-time-only wealth transfer to the c

North Korean population since they will have to adj

market institutions with virtually no household w

One can imagine a multi-pronged approach:

• Adopt dual rate monetary conversion. Aim for 

undervaluation of the North Korean won to ma

competitiveness, thereby making North Korea an attr

location for investment. Convert personal savings 

overvalued rate (effecting a wealth transfer).

• Deed land to the tiller and the housing stock 

occupants, contingent on maintained use for some sp

period of time.

• Maintain some kind of temporary, emerg

non-market social safety net in the North.

Having given the land to the tiller, one must confro

issue of property rights claims by past owners or 

descendants and the more general issue of assignm

property rights to commercial or industrial assets. L

learned from the experience of Germany and other f

centrally planned economies (CPEs) are instructive 

regard:

• Avoid the policy of restitution for seized a

Monetary compensation for seized assets mig

considered, though even some South Korean analyst

argued that this would be a mistake.

• Privatize quickly and avoid the cash-on-the-b

head model.

• Abolish inter-enterprise debts.

• Emphasize investment, not consumption, trans

• Accept assistance from foreigners, includin

Japanese. 

283
With respect to privatization, the experience o

Germany and other CPEs suggests that it would be b

move quickly and avoid the cash-in-advance model, s

would severely restrict potential buyers. Attem

restructure these enterprises before privatization s

also be avoided. That is better left to the market. Inte

debts, which are a legacy of irrational policies und

centrally planned regime, should be written off. Debt-

swaps could be used to pay off external debt and at the 

time create a stake in the viability of North K

enterprises for South Korean or foreign firms.

Given these considerations, there appears to b

institution in South Korea ideally suited for the t

making North Korea competitive: the ch

(conglomerates). Unfortunately, one policy goal (to g

North Korean economy functioning as rapidly as po

and another policy goal (to clean up business-gover

relations in South Korea) would conflict. It goes w

saying which one will receive the greater weigh

chaebol are probably ideally suited for refurbishin

North Korean economy. However, saddling them 

unproductive North Korean enterprises would ha

economic price (in terms of reducing ch

competitiveness internationally and possibly encou

anti-competitive behavior domestically) as well 

political one (in the form of the quid pro quo that the c

could be expected to extract).

With respect to the other actors, many of the policie

one would want to see in place in the case of collapse (

Korean involvement with the international fin

institutions, for example) are really not continge

collapse. Since in the case of collapse one would want 

the multilateral development banks involved as quic

possible, it would make sense to get them involve

developing some country-specific knowledge and exp

prior to the event.

284
The big money issue would be how to re

post-colonial claims against Japan if this had not a

been done prior to collapse. If it were the case that thi

had not been resolved, it would be essential that Japa

the government of Korea quickly reach an accord s

resources could begin flowing into Korea. In the case 

United States, its role would probably be one of pro

political leadership (a la KEDO) than direct fin

assistance. One could imagine, for example, the U

States leading a multilateral effort, possibly thro

special window at one of the multilateral develo

banks, to provide additional financial assistance.

Conclusions.

How this all plays out, indeed whether unification 

either of the modalities examined in this paper is lik

the near future, depends, at least in part, on the inte

of the North Korean elite. A necessary conditio

consensual unification would be a willingness of this e

countenance considerable reform of current pra

Today the North Korean elite appears to be split i

regard. Pyongyang’s hesitant steps toward eco

reform, for example, have a two-steps-forw

one-step-back character. At the same time, there is ev

that North Korea is increasing military expenditures

while continuing to receive a considerable volu

international food assistance and enhanced revenue

the Hyundai deal.

22

 But the question remains whet

system-preserving reforms in the form of tourism pr

mining enclaves, and special economic zones w

sufficient to maintain social stability and avert colla

North Korea could count on a fairly supp

international environment were it to undertake the k

reform necessary to make the consensual reform 

plausible. The June 2000 North-South summit, Kim 

Il’s visit to China, the 1999 visit of former U.S. Secre

Defense William Perry, the resumption of discu

285
between Japan and North Korea, and the expected vi

high-ranking North Korean official to Washington d

the spring of 2000 would appear to suppor

interpretation of events. Yet there is no guarante

Pyongyang’s current modest opening is anything mor

opportunistic. History is replete with examples of cou

that did not go the way their foreign patrons desired. 

case of North Korea, whether the regime is willing an

to make the necessary changes to ensure its own surv

still uncertain.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8

1. Paper prepared for the Nonproliferation Policy Education 

Copyright 2000 Institute for International Economics, all 

reserved.

2. For details of this proposal, see Song-ryol Han and Tong 

“Perspectives of Issues by the DPRK,” New York: DPRK Missio

United Nations, mimeo, 1995; and Suk-ryul Yu, “Problems for 

Reunification,” conference paper, Joint Conference of the Cou

U.S.-Korean Security Studies and the International Council On 

Studies, Arlington, VA, October 23-24, 1997. For highly info

interpretations of North Korea’s unification policy, see Han-shi

“North Korea’s Ideology and Unification Policy,” in Jay Speakm

Chae-Jin Lee, eds., The Prospects for Korean Unification, Cla

CA: Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, 19

Nicholas Eberstadt, “North Korea’s Unification Policy: 1948-1

Samuel S. Kim, ed., North Korean Foreign Relations, Oxford: 

University Press, 1998.

3. North Korea has a history of extorting resources from for

to secure its participation in diplomatic activities. Conversely

Korea has engaged in “checkbook diplomacy,” most notably 

process of normalizing relations with the USSR. Given the 

Declaration and Kim Dae Jung’s willingness to directly underw

economic rehabilitation, it is tempting to speculate on what Pr

Kim may have promised the North.

4. North Korea and Hyundai have been in conflict over Hy

desire to significantly increase the number of tourists that it b

Mt. Kumgang by including large numbers of non-Koreans. At p

non-Japanese foreigners are permitted to join the Hyundai tou

286
5. Kim Jong Il reportedly has expressed a preference for S

over Haeju, despite the latter’s greater attractiveness as an ec

hub. Some (e.g., Chung-in Moon, “Korea and Asian Security in t

century,” Asian Voices: Promoting Dialogue Between the 

Statesand Asia, Washington, DC: Sasakawa Peace Foundation 

2000) have argued that the choice between Haeju and Shinu

signal whether economics or politics are driving policy. The possi

a second Hyundai-developed SEZ, located at Tongchon on the ea

near Mt. Kumgang, has also been reported.

6. Indeed, bad weather does not even distinguish North Kore

peak, most observers believe that the North produced about 6 

metric tons of grain. This fell by roughly half by 1996 (Marcus 

Avoiding the Apocalypse: the Future of the Two Koreas, Washingt

Institute for International Economics, 2000, Table 5.1). In comp

Morocco also typically produces around 6 million metric tons, 

weather in 1999 knocked domestic production down to arou

million metric tons, a decline of roughly three-quarters—more t

drop experienced in the North Korean case. While times have bee

there is no famine in Morocco, however. The food shortfall h

closed by importing food on commercial terms.

7. On the first point, see Marcus Noland, “The North 

Economy,” Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies, Vol. 6, 19

127-178; and Noland, Avoiding the Apocalypse. For detailed a

pertaining to the second point, see Marcus Noland, Sherman Ro

and Monica Scatasta, “Modeling North Korean Economic R

Journal of Asian Economics, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1997, pp. 15-38; and 

Noland, Sherman Robinson, and Tao Wang, “Rigorous Speculati

Collapse and Revival of the North Korean Economy,” 

Development, September 2000.

8. See Noland, Avoiding the Apocalypse, for a discussion 

political economy of reform in the North Korean context.

9. Kim Jong Il’s statements in China, praising Chinese ec

reforms, may signal a new North Korean willingness to c

economic reform and accept Chinese tutelage.

10. See Noland, Avoiding the Apocalypse; or Marcus N

Sherman Robinson, and Tao Wang, “Famine In North Korea: 

and Cures,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, forth

2000.

11. See David Von Hippel and Peter Hayes, “DPRK Energy 

Current Status and Scenarios for 2000 and 2005,” in Marcus 

287
ed., Economic Integration of the Korean Peninsula, Special Re

Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1998.

12.This would amount to a fairly bare-bones reconst

program. For example, James H. Williams, Peter Hayes, and Da

Hippel, “Fuel and Famine: North Korea’s Rural Energy Crisis

presented to the Pentagon Study Group on Japan and Northea

Washington, DC, October 22, 1999, estimate that a rural 

rehabilitation program would cost about $2-3 billion over 5 year

estimated price tag for a more comprehensive economy-wide pro

$20-50 billion over 20 years.

13. One should be careful about drawing too simple a cau

between material conditions and political change. There is no 

that reliably maps deprivation to political change. Indeed, in his 

study of political change, Samuel P. Huntington, Political O

Changing Societies, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press

argues that political change more often occurs in the context of m

gains and rising expectations than stagnation. In particular

extent that political change has accompanied famine, it has 

occurred after famine episodes when conditions have suff

stabilized for responsibility to be assigned and blame to be as

During famines, populations are typically too focused on sur

engage in political activities. However, in the case of North Kor

Gertz, Betrayal, Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing

reproduces a secret State Department cable that refers to “ex

evidence of a major coup attempt by elements of the VI Corps i

which appears to have been crushed only with some difficulty” (

The State Department has not denied the authenticity of thi

According to Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, Readin

Addison-Wesley, 1997, after the uprising, the corps, based 

famine-stricken northeastern city of Hamhung, “was disban

leadership purged, and its units submerged into others 

circumstances suggesting disarray in the ranks” (p.375).

14. This assumes that liberalization in the North wa

non-preferential basis. As shown in Marcus Noland, Sh

Robinson, and LiGang Liu, “The Economics of Korean Unifi

Journal of Policy Reform, Vol. 3, 1999, pp. 255-299; and Marcus 

Sherman Robinson, and Tao Wang, “Modeling Korean Unifi

Journal of Comparative Economics, June 2000, the formati

customs union between North Korea and South Korea would ha

impact on the North, while it would have a trivial impact on the 

The customs union would represent a major trade liberalization 

part of the North, while the North’s economy would be too small 

much of an impact on the South’s economy. (Think of the im

288
NAFTA on the United States or the accession of a small 

European economy on the EU.) This story—big impact on the 

small impact on the South—would change considerably if inte

were to come through collapse.

15. Under U.S. law, the U.S. executive directors at the devel

banks could not vote in favor of extending loans to North Korea 

was removed from the list of countries engaging in state-sp

terrorism.

16. An April 2000 statement to this effect by the IMF r

representative in Seoul, David T. Coe, was immediately denou

Representative James Saxton (R-New Jersey).

17. It is theoretically possible that a collapse of the Kim 

regime would not necessarily result in the disappearance o

Korea as a state. Yet, in reality, it is hard to see how a non

Sungist government could be much more than a transitional re

unification on essentially South Korean terms, much as was the 

the short-lived East German government of Lothar de Maizière

18. See Noland, Robinson and Liu; and Noland, Robins

Wang, “Modeling Korean Unification,” for modeling of cross

factor flows in the Korean case. The latter paper finds that Nort

would be virtually depopulated before wage rates converged suff

to choke off the incentives for mass migration. They conclude tha

cross-border migration would have to be limited, or the openin

border would have to be combined with hundreds of billions of do

investment in the North.

19. See Gerlinde Sinn and Hans-Werner Sinn, “What Can 

Learn from German Unification?” in Byong-Moo Hwang and 

Kwan Yoon, eds., Middle Powers in the Age of Globalization

International Conference Series No. 5, Seoul, Korea: 

Association of International Studies, 1996; Marcus Noland, “G

Lessons for Korea: The Economics of Unification,” in C. Fred B

and Il Sa Kong, eds., The Korea-United States Economic Relati

Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics

Christian Watrin, “Monetary Integration and Stabilization Pol

German Case,” in Il Sa Kong and Kwang Suk Kim, eds., Policy P

for the Unified Korean Economy, Seoul, Korea: Institute for 

Economics, 1998; Holger Wolf, “Korean Unification: Lesson

Germany,” in Marcus Noland, ed., Economic Integration of the 

Peninsula, Washington, DC: Institute for International Eco

1998; Noland, Avoiding the Apocalypse, including references the

more extensive discussions of the German “lessons” for Korea.

289
20. See Noland, Robinson, and Wang, “Modeling K

Unification,” for a detailed assessment.

21. Jin-young Bae, “The Fiscal Burden of Korean Reunificat

Its Impact on South Korea’s Macroeconomic Stability,” Joint U.S

Academic Studies, Vol. 6, 1996, pp. 185-202, makes recommenda

improve tax collection. He raises the possibility of privatizing 

Korean government assets as a means to finance unification as 

22. According to the Ministry of Defense, White Paper, Seoul

Ministry of Defense, 1998, North Korea has increased its rese

chemical weapons, boosted KPA manpower by 10,000 troops, cr

missile division, and added 10 submarines to its fleet. In August 

was revealed that North Korea had purchased roughly 40 aging 

fighters and 8 military helicopters from Kazakhstan. 

subsequently reported that North Korea was trying to obtai

advanced MiG-29 and SU-30 fighters as well. In September 

classified U.S. Air Force report describing alleged continued 

Korean work on its Taepodong missile was leaked to the p

October, in testimony before the Senate Armed Forces Com

General Thomas Schwartz, the newly appointed commander-de

of U.S. Forces Korea stated that North Korea had accelerated i

buildup and was forward-deploying artillery and rocket-launc

underground facilities. In March 2000, Admiral Dennis 

Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Forces, indicated that North 

military exercises during the winter of 1999-2000 had been th

extensive in recent years. Russian observers claim that North K

emphasizing “high impact” arms over conventional weapons.

290
CHAPTER 9

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN KO

A LEVER FOR PEACE?

1

Bruce William Bennett

Many experts on Korea scoff at the conce

conventional arms control between North Korea an

Republic of Korea (ROK). From the beginning, it sho

recognized that arms control in Korea is a difficult pr

in part because neither side has much trust in the 

North Korea worries that the ROK and U.S. war plan 

peninsula includes a counteroffensive that would d

the North Korean regime,

2

 and might actually be lau

as a ROK/U.S.-initiated attack on North Korea. The 

side observes the pattern of North Korean bellig

toward the ROK, North Korea’s stated objective of con

of the ROK, and North Korea’s military preparation

worries about a North Korean invasion.

Nevertheless, conventional arms control is a critic

of the Korean unification process. Arguably, the com

forces of North Korea and the ROK are so large tha

would be a major impediment to unification, making 

form of conflict more likely, exercising significant inf

potentially counter to unification, and consuming too 

of the Korean Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

If the Koreas are to unify peacefully, conventiona

control must become feasible somewhere along 

peaceful path. If unification is not peaceful, conven

arms control performed before the conflict would redu

damage suffered by both sides. Nevertheless, arms c

has its risks, such as providing the other side c

information on defense capabilities and plans. In the 

unification by either war or peace could occur with

291
next decade or two, conventional arms control is n

now; but if unification must wait for the distant futur

50 or more years), then conventional arms control ca

for a part of that time.

This chapter discusses objectives for conventiona

control and the means for achieving these objectiv

assesses the military forces on both sides and propose

the dangerous aspects of these forces could be address

the end, arms control of the form proposed herein mig

be possible in Korea; if it is possible, it will undoubtedl

many years. Thus, arms control should not be viewe

quick fix to the conventional military problems in 

but rather as a part of the long-term reconciliation pr

Indeed, given the power of the North Korean mi

conventional arms control in Korea will be an indica

the progress toward peaceful unification. Still, any pr

may occur in very small steps that frustrate those se

rapid resolution of the Korean separation.

OBJECTIVES FOR AND CONSTRAINTS ON

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

Before examining Korean military forces and s

options for arms control, it is important to id

objectives for and constraints on arms control. This s

describes both the general objectives for arms contr

some specific objectives that are important for Kore

now and in the future. It also looks at some 

constraints that might limit arms control efforts in 

and suggests some principles for addressing 

constraints.

General Objectives.

Arms control has traditionally been associated 

three general objectives: (1) to reduce the costs of m

forces in peacetime, (2) to reduce the chances of futur

and (3) to decrease the damage that war would cause

of these has potentially important roles in Korea.

292
With regard to the first goal, both North Korea a

ROK spend a considerable amount of money on 

military forces. In 1997, North Korea had a defense b

of nearly $5 billion, or about 27 percent of its GNP.

3

 In 

the ROK had a defense budget of nearly 14 trillion w

about 2.9 percent of its GDP.

4

 Arms control reducti

force structure by both sides would decrease these 

particularly assisting North Korea in fulfilling the ne

its population and its economy. Even a reduction in th

military budget could be usefully moved to other serv

the ROK.

The threat of large, capable forces launchi

offensive across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) has b

consistent concern by both sides in Korea. Reducti

these forces should lower concerns about offen

decreasing the chances of war. Arms control can also i

confidence-building activities and increase con

between the two sides that foster understanding and 

all of which would reduce the chances of war.

The large military forces on each side in Korea 

cause substantial damage to the other side in any co

including large amounts of damage to the ci

populations and society. Decreasing the force struct

both sides should reduce the damage that each side 

suffer. 

Specific Short-term Problems to Address.

As noted above, the large North Korean and 

military forces facing each other across the DMZ 

increase both the chance of war and the potential da

that war would cause. In addition, the military in 

Korea has become a major power base. North Korean 

duty military forces represent about 5 percent of th

population (compared to 1.5 percent in the ROK and 

0.5 percent in the United States). Given the failures 

North Korean economy and political system, it is 

argued that the military holds a preeminent position

293
The power of the North Korean military complicat

political decisionmaking in North Korea today, and 

likely complicate any North Korean political collaps

North Korean military poses a unique threat to the su

of the Kim regime, as it is one of the few organization

sufficient power to overthrow the regime. Consistent

North Korean military is given priority on food and 

resources, which otherwise could be used to rejuvena

North Korean economy and sustain the North K

civilian population. A North Korean military of 

modest size would pose less of a threat, consume 

resources, and exert less influence on pol

decisionmaking. 

If the North Korean regime were to collapse 

overthrown, there would be serious problems caus

large, very powerful factions within the military/part

could seek different outcomes in the resulting strug

control. Moreover, there would not likely be suf

resources to meet the needs of all of these fac

increasing the likelihood of a violent, multi-sided civ

While a smaller North Korean military woul

necessarily prevent such difficulties from developin

potential number of conflicts would be reduced, as wou

likely level of violence.

For years, North Korea has supported a large m

hoping that its size would deter ROK and U.S. atta

the North, and give North Korea some chance of conq

the ROK in an actual conflict. For a decade or mor

North Korean leadership has apparently recognize

ROK and U.S. qualitative military superiority jeopa

both of these objectives, despite the size of the North K

military. North Korea has therefore chosen to dev

number of asymmetric threats (such as chemica

biological weapons) to make up for its quali

deficiencies. Like the ROK and U.S. militaries, the 

Korean military would likely be stronger for such wa

uses if it reduced manpower and outdated equipment

the monies saved to modernize selective elements 

294
forces. The resulting smaller forces would then be le

threat internally.

North Korea would be best served by reducing unit

outdated equipment and its large infantry force

example, tank units with T-55 tanks would be appro

for elimination: These units would be highly vuln

targets for ROK and U.S. forces and would give the 

Korean military little strength in dealing with ex

forces. The ROK Ministry of National Defen

contemplating similar force changes, trading 

structure for force modernization.

5

 Both sides sho

encouraged to make these changes, which would redu

overall size of the military forces though not signifi

reduce defense budgets (the money saved on force str

being used for modernization).

North Korea also deploys massive amounts of ar

very close to the DMZ. While the ROK places much 

artillery back 7 to 10 kilometers or more for def

purposes, most of the North Korean artillery is l

within a few kilometers of the DMZ, apparently po

primarily for offensive purposes. Artillery deployme

far forward are destabilizing: North Korea would fear 

sites being overrun by a ROK/U.S. offensive, and 

therefore seek to launch a preemptive attack in respo

any ROK/U.S. mobilization (even a defensive mobiliz

because of their artillery’s vulnerability. Thousan

North Korean artillery pieces near the DMZ could 

massive damage to the northern 20 or so kilometers 

ROK if war began, and longer-range artillery could 

and seriously damage the heart of Seoul. This threat 

force the ROK and the United States to rapidly targ

North Korean artillery, and could precipitate preem

action if North Korea mobilizes. In addition, some 

artillery has been moved to relatively forward locati

fire against North Korean artillery under 

circumstances. From an arms control perspective, bo

North Korean and ROK artillery need to be redu

295
numbers and moved back to more defensive loc

(especially the North Korean artillery).

The ROK and the United States are also concerned 

the quantity of North Korean special forces. The ro

100,000 North Korean special forces personnel (ab

percent of total North Korean ground forces) provide 

which is well beyond the relative numbers of special 

in most armies, and which could cause serious dam

the ROK. Reducing their numbers would reduce the da

that would be done to ROK society and ROK and 

military forces.

Paving the Way to Unification.

Except in very bizarre circumstances (e.g., a succ

North Korean conquest of the ROK), Korean unifi

would certainly be performed with the ROK in the lea

ROK military is unlikely to trust the North Korean mi

and therefore cannot be expected to accept a true unifi

of the militaries. Instead, much as in the case of Ger

the eventual, unified Korean military will involve l

ROK military personnel, though potentially with 

significant retention of North Korean military equipm

In any scenario, the lack of trust between th

personnel of North Korea and the ROK is a serious co

In contrast to the German unification case, the seni

mid-level leaders of the two Koreas, both civilia

military, have had almost no contact with each other. 

this lack of contact and the North Korean dogma abo

illegitimacy of the ROK leadership, these leaders can

expected to believe or trust each other, making unifi

extremely difficult. Therefore, far more than in the c

Germany, the Koreas need confidence-building mea

for the military forces to help establish communicatio

engender basic conditions for unification. This proces

be a very slow and evolutionary one, requiring consid

time and effort; it should not be expected to yield broad 

or to develop rapidly.

296
The power of the North Korean military would 

complicate a ROK-led unification. North Korean m

personnel would have little to gain and a great deal 

from such a unification. Naturally, this kind of result 

be imposed on North Korea in the aftermath 

unsuccessful North Korean attack on the ROK. But 

case of a North Korean collapse or a negotiated unific

the opposition of the North Korean military could imp

fatally doom the unification effort.

While reducing the size of the North Korean m

would lessen these difficulties, other actions are requ

address them in a fundamental way. Specifically, the 

needs a plan for jobs and economic security for 

Korean military personnel. At very least, this m

leaving many of the North Korean military organi

their current units for some time into a unifi

transition period. Some of these units could help the 

forces maintain stability among the North Korean c

population, while others could work on developin

critical North Korean infrastructure (roads, rail lines, 

utilities, and communications). Disarming these 

would be an essential, yet very sensitive activity.

Provision would also have to be made for the retir

and care (income, protection, and life style) of most 

senior North Korean military leaders (probably co

and above in rank), since they would be too powerf

insufficiently reliable to depend upon if left with their 

The ROK needs a plan for these actions that i

established and funded, thereby providing a guaran

physical and financial security for the North K

military that will greatly reduce the likelihood of reb

against ROK control.

6

 Clearly, the smaller the 

Korean military is at the beginning of this transitio

easier such a plan will be to fund and execute, and the 

the potential for a major rebellion in the North K

military that would impede unification.

297
Interestingly, North Korean willingness to ser

consider conventional arms control may be an imp

indicator of their real interest in unification efforts. 

experts worry that North Korea may make offer

appear to be moving toward unification, while in r

they are simply seeking to gain more aid so as to help 

Korea survive as a separate country. If North Korea is 

serious about unification, the North Korean po

leadership must convince the North Korean milit

accept actions that move toward unification. That 

North Korean political leadership ought to be prepa

reduce their military forces toward the goal of unifica

the North Korean political leadership is unwill

consider conventional arms control, their commitm

unification would have to be considered questionable

Dealing with the Costs of Unification.

The unification of Korea will be extraordi

expensive. Goldman-Sachs estimates that if unifi

were to occur today, the cost could be $0.77 to $1.2 t

dollars over 10 years; if unification occurs in 2010, th

projections rise to $3.4 to $3.6 trillion dollars over 10 y

Expenditures in these ranges would amount to 16 

percent of the ROK GDP each year over 10 years (com

to German expenditures of 10 percent of GDP per 

While the ROK would seek funds to help pay these 

from other countries and international organization

reality is that the people of the ROK will have to 

substantial fraction of this financial burden. Give

total ROK government expenditures are in the range 

billion annually or about 18 percent of GDP, this su

that ROK government expenditures and therefore 

would have to nearly double to meet these needs. Of c

these estimates assume that the ROK economy 

damaged in the unification process (as would hap

North Korea attacks the ROK), and also that the RO

North Korean economies grow smoothly after unifi

298
starts, without disruption, recession, or other ser

disabling difficulties.

The bottom line is that after Korean unification b

the military expenses (and therefore forces) of the com

Korea will have to decline below those of the existing 

forces. Recent news reports in the ROK have indicate

the Ministry of National Defense has set a manpower 

of 400,000 to 500,000 total military personnel by 

down from 690,000 today (see Table 1); this appears to 

appropriate goal for a unified Korea. Arms control 

thus be useful if it can help reduce the force sizes to

this objective. Reductions in the combined ROK and 

Korean forces toward reasonable post-unification 

levels would reduce the financial burdens of these fo

peacetime both pre- and post-unification.

Transformation of Korean Military Forces.

Current military forces in Korea are prim

“continental” in character, with ground forces 

outnumbering air and naval forces in both North Kor

the ROK. Since both countries fear invasion from the 

and North Korea plans conquest of the ROK, this cha

of the forces is to be expected. However, while Kore

face some concern about its land borders after unifica

will be more concerned about securing its air and sea l

communication. This implies that the Korean m

forces must transform in the direction of greater a

naval force capabilities. Since air and naval forces t

involve very expensive equipment, maintain

modernized Korean military will require a ge

reduction in manpower levels to help pay for moderniz

Increasingly, the modernization argument can be 

with regard to current North Korean and ROK forc

argued above, both sides have large numbers of ou

weapon systems. To pay for their modernization w

reasonable budget constraints, manpower and thus 

levels need to be reduced. These reductions need to 

299
primarily in the ground forces of both Koreas. Fortun

because the ROK Air Force modernization allows 

increasingly provide superb support for ROK ground 

reducing ground force manpower to pay for f

modernization can actually strengthen the ROK mil

Reducing the military manpower in the ROK 

another important opportunity. With lower man

requirements, the ROK military draft would becom

necessary. And with modernized military equipmen

ROK military would need a more professional force in 

its services (personnel serving longer and being 

experienced). This change would imply that far more 

ROK military would be career soldiers, with more st

and higher levels of training. This would be a consid

change for the ROK military forces, and most likely 

welcome one.

9

Addressing Some Constraints on Conventional

Arms Control.

Opponents of arms control on either side could 

any effort to achieve conventional arms control in 

Particular problems exist in terms of (1) the lack o

between the two Koreas, (2) the likely opposition to 

control from the North Korean military, (3) concerns 

the adequacy of defenses when forces are reduced, a

concerns about nuclear, biological, and chemical 

weapons that would not be covered by conventiona

control. Successful arms control must address each of 

issues.

Lack of Trust. One of the major concerns in pu

arms control in Korea is the lack of trust between 

Korea and the ROK, with both sides likely expectin

the other side would use arms control to establish 

military advantage. Each side would also likely fear th

other would lie to conceal aspects of its military stre

and weaknesses. In a security environment like t

Korea, trust is difficult to foster; confidence-bu

300
measures (as described below) need to be pursued ea

the arms control process to help generate trust.

In addition, the basis for negotiations needs to be 

both sides. As a basic principle, both Koreas should 

their forces reduced to equal numbers of personne

equipment, much as was done with the Conventional 

Europe agreement.

10

 North Korea would insist upo

removal of all U.S. forces as part of the negotiations, 

as it has for decades. As a bargaining counter, the U

States should be prepared to make modest reductions 

size of its forces in the ROK, and then have its rem

forces counted with ROK forces as a coalition total 

limited by the agreement. To this, North Korea would 

object that over time in a crisis or conflict, other U.S. 

could be deployed to Korea, with these forces upsetti

North Korean and ROK balance. The United States 

therefore need to agree to some limits on the deploym

U.S. forces to Korea, as discussed below.

North Korean Military Opposition. It can be antic

that the North Korean military will be the gr

impediment to arms control. The North Korean milita

grown in size consistently since the early 1960s, inc

substantial growth from the mid-1970s throug

1980s.

11

 Militaries that experience such growth p

great upward mobility for their officers, and a g

culture of expansion. The more limited North K

military personnel growth of the 1990s was likely res

by the North Korean military. If this limited growth 

replaced by significant reductions, many personnel 

be retired or otherwise cut from active duty, and like

with few job prospects in a North Korea where manpo

already underemployed. For those who remain 

military, opportunities for promotion would be signifi

reduced, and a fear of job loss might propel personn

risk-averse behaviors.

While it is not possible to fully eliminate these fe

the North Korean military, at least some of them nee

301
addressed to reduce the North Korean military oppo

There are a number of options for reducing the imp

military force reductions in North Korea. For exa

many ROK firms plan to develop industrial enterpr

North Korea in the coming years. A significant num

the jobs in these enterprises could be reserved for 

Korean military personnel required to leave the milit

arms control provisions. Considerable thinking need

into planning actions like these to reduce the impact o

control and thereby make it more agreeable to the 

Korean military.

The Adequacies of the Defenses. Some military e

argue that while the relative numbers of military for

North Korea and the ROK are important, the den

ground forces at the DMZ is critical to preve

breakthroughs by the opposition. Therefore, they 

argue that force reductions would leave the defending 

too thin to prevent breakthroughs. The counter t

argument is that, with adequate reductions, neithe

would have sufficient force to both achieve breakthrou

the forward area and then rapidly exploit 

breakthroughs in depth. With regards to the defense 

ROK, modernized equipment in both the ground a

forces would also tend to overcome the thre

breakthroughs by providing forces with sufficient m

and firepower to cover sectors where the defense be

weak. From the North Korean perspective, the ch

and biological weapons not covered by conventiona

control actually have far more utility for defens

opposed to offensive operations, and could sta

attempted ROK/U.S. breakthrough. However, North 

must recognize that the use of such weapons could lea

serious ROK/U.S. escalation.

Concerns About NBC Weapons. NBC weapon

already the subjects of other arms control agreem

including the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), a

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). North Kore

302
joined the first two of these agreements, but not the 

Nevertheless, there is still great concern that North 

is not fully abiding by the NPT and BWC, and pos

significant quantities of NBC weapons that could ove

any balance in conventional weapons.

North Korea must be encouraged to abide 

responsibilities in the NPT and in the BWC. It shou

be encouraged to join the CWC. Until the ROK an

United States are certain that North Kore

significantly reduced NBC threats, they must prep

defend their forces and civilians from the use of 

weapons. Such defenses include both protection fro

effects of NBC weapons and offensive capabilities to d

NBC weapons and to retaliate for their use. The 

Defense Department is more thoroughly analyzing 

force requirements.

12

ARMS CONTROL POTENTIALS: ASSESSING T

EXISTING FORCES

Arms control of any form in Korea must begin wi

existing forces. There is, however, no source of inform

on existing military forces that is accepted by both th

and North Korea. To the contrary, for logical m

reasons, North Korea carries out an active deceptio

denial program to prevent the ROK and the United 

from gaining information on its forces. Therefore

section first examines available information on RO

North Korean military forces from a ROK perspect

both quantitative and qualitative terms. While the fo

this chapter is on conventional arms control, the ra

military forces is examined, recognizing that forces b

the conventional forces affect the overall mi

capabilities, and that conventional arms control 

therefore be undertaken in the context of these o

military capabilities.

303
Quantitative Comparisons.

Table 1 provides a quantitative comparison of m

the kinds of North Korean and ROK conventional for

contained in the ROK Defense White Paper, 19

highlights the major differences, including the much 

North Korean Army and Air Force manpower;

13

 more 

Korean tanks, artillery, surface combatants, subma

and fighter aircraft; and more numerous North K

reserve troops (despite the North Korean total popu

being half that of the ROK). This table does not captu

qualitative differences between North Korean and 

forces, to be addressed below.

Table 1 does not include U.S. forces deployed in the 

ROK and U.S. forces plan to defend the ROK together 

their Combined Forces Command (CFC). Table 2 prov

rough summary of the U.S. forces. Two of the 

maneuver brigades of the 2nd Infantry Division are 

ROK, along with a large number of supporting pers

and the ground force equipment associated with 

division. The U.S. Air Force deploys several squadr

fighters in Korea. These U.S. forces would need 

combined with ROK forces in developing a conven

arms control agreement with North Korea.

Table 1 also does not include WMD or ballistic and 

missiles. Missiles and other delivery systems for WM

to be dual-capable (i.e., they carry both convention

WMD munitions), and thus potentially fit within the 

of conventional arms control. These capabilitie

summarized in Table 3. Note that North Korea has 

numbers of missiles that pose a considerable threat a

the ROK, whereas the ROK generally lacks comp

forces. Moreover, North Korea has been and is work

weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biologica

nuclear weapons), and will continue to do so, where

ROK has tempered its efforts on WMD in part at the u

of the United States. Arguably, North Korea feels that 

offset its conventional qualitative disadvantages w

304
305

Classification ROK North K

Army 560,000 1,0

Navy

1

67,000 6

AirForce63,000 11

Troops

Total690,000 1,17

Corps 11 

Divisions 50

3 

U nit

Brigades

5 18 

Tanks 2,250 3,

Armored

Vehicles

2,300 2,

Field

Artillery

6 5,200 12,

Army

Equipment

12

Heli-copters 580 

Surface combatants 170 

Support vessels 20 

Submarines/

Submersibles

10 

Navy 

12

Aircraft 60 

Fighters 520

Special aircraft 40

Principal

forces

Air

Force

12

Support aircraft 220 

Reserve troops

12 3,040,00010 7,450,

1) Marine Corps included

2) Navy sniper brigades now under the Navy Command and Air Force C

3) Marine Corps divisions included

4) One missile division included

5) Mobile and combat brigades such as infantry, mechanized infantry, tan

warfare, patrol, marine, and assault brigades included; combat support brigades 

6) Field artillery includes rockets, guided weapons, and MRLs

7) Approximately 170 surface patrol boats of the Surface Patrol Boat Forces 

8) Some 40 Sang-0-class submersibles included

9) North Korean aircraft (helicopters) operated by the air force

10) Eighth-year reservists included

11) The Reserve Military Training Unit, Worker/Peasant Red Guards, R

Guards, and social security agents included

12) Figures approximate

Table 1. Comparison of North Korean and 

Military Forces.

14
WMD deployments. Therefore, if WMD reductions w

be negotiated, the ROK and the United States shoul

quantitative conventional force comparability.

15

Sources: The Ministry of National Defense, The Republic of Korea, Defense Wh

1999, p. 33; Defense Department Directorate for Information Operations and 

website: http://web1.whs.osd. mil/mmid/m05/hst1299.pdf.

Table 2. U.S. Military Forces in the ROK

Qualitative Comparisons.

Qualitative military factors include the ag

technical performance of the military equipmen

training and capabilities of the military personnel, a

strength of the command/control system and its m

planning. These factors can temper or totally chan

quantitative comparisons presented above. For exa

one current generation fighter like the ROK KF-16 m

able to engage and defeat several older fighters li

North Korean MIG-21s, though quantity can still pre

some cases, especially early in a conflict.

Most North Korean military equipment was de

and manufactured decades ago (many items were de

in the 1950s). This equipment undoubtedl

maintenance and support problems. Indeed, give

decline of the North Korean economy, many wonde

well North Korea is able to support its military equipm

306

Type of Forces U.S. Today

Manpower 36,130

Army, Marines 27,084

Navy 327

Air Force 8,719

Equipment

Tanks 116

Other Armor 237

Artillery & MRLs 72

Fighter Aircraft 90
Most (but not all) ROK military equipment is newe

more advanced, giving it clear qualitative advantag

shown in the Yellow Sea battle in June 1999).

16 

exceptions to these comparisons include North K

long-range artillery, which has at least been manufa

in recent years, as have some smaller North 

submarines (like the Sang-O), the North Korean ver

the SA-16, and North Korean ballistic missiles.

a

Sources: For ROK, International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military 

1999-2000, London, 1999, pp. 194-196, 311. For North Korea, Bruce Wm. Benn

Emerging Ballistic Missile Threat: Global and Regional Ramifications.” Note 

table does not include multiple rocket launchers, which are included in artillery i

The range of the ROK ballistic missiles (NHK-1/2s) is actually 250 kilometers.

bSources: For ROK, “Seoul Admits to Chemical Weapons Stockpile,” Sou

Morning Post, May 10, 2000. For North Korea, The Ministry of National Def

Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper, 1999, pp. 55-57, 84.

Table 3. Comparison of Other Korean Mili

Forces.

North Korea has had a checkered past with reg

military training. For larger units, most North K

training is traditionally done during the winter tr

cycle, but little training went on in the winter of 199

winter of 1998 was a more robust training period (t

less than historical patterns in some ways), and the tr

307

Type of Forces

ROK

Today

DPRK Threat

Today

DPRK Thre

2010

Ballistic Missiles

a

0-199 km 12 200 - 600 100s?

200-999 km 0 400 - 1,200 700 - 1,650

1,000-2,999 km 0 100+ 300 - 600

3,000+ km 0 0 75 - 125

Special weapons

b

Nuclear 0 A few? 2-20?

Biological — ? Tons?

Chemical 100s tons 2,500-5,000 tons 2,500-5,000 t
in the winter of 2000 was also more robust. Befo

winter 2000 training, it was often argued that the 

Korean economic situation had caused North K

training to decline considerably. Such a decli

combination with maintenance and support diffic

would have minimized the conventional threat pos

North Korean forces. However, the North K

performance in the winter 2000 training was rela

impressive, suggesting that previous judgments hav

premature.

17 ROK and U.S. forces carry out many r

training exercises each year, and have a training pr

superior to that of North Korea (having better eco

resources).

Only modest information is available on the 

Korean command/control system and military pla

While North Korean forces are expected to be dedicate

committed to a preplanned offensive operation, they 

likely be far less prepared than ROK and U.S. for

respond to combat uncertainties that invariably cau

conflict to diverge from the original plan. When th

diverges, the ROK and U.S. cultural strengths in ini

and lower-level decisionmaking ought to give ROK an

forces a considerable advantage over their North K

counterparts. 

Overall Force Comparison.

The combination of force quantity and quality a

likely circumstances of a future Korean conflict sugge

some forces are more capable than others of aff

conflict outcomes. From the perspective of both sides

forces are thus a logical focus for conventional arms co

Table 4 combines the quantitative and qualitative f

discussed above with the standard ROK and 

perception of a future conflict, which proceeds th

several phases.

308
Code: “+” indicates that this force could make a major difference for the side i

Table 4. Conventional Forces Capable of Mak

Difference in a Korean Campaign.

• North Korean Offensive, Early-Phase. Duri

first several days of a North Korean offensive, North K

forces at the front will be seeking to create holes 

ROK/U.S. defenses, and then to exploit these ho

operational breakthroughs. North Korean sta

artillery will have the primary role of creating holes 

employing chemical weapons), North Korean infant

seek to establish these holes in tactical breakthrough

North Korean heavy forces will seek to convert thes

operational breakthroughs. North Korean forward 

SOF will support these efforts. Meanwhile, North K

long-range artillery will seek to damage ROK and 

heavy forces (the theater reserves that could plug h

the defense), disrupt forward area C4I, and damage 

command and control targets in the Seoul area. 

Korean rear area SOF and ballistic missiles will s

disrupt or impair ROK and U.S. air forces on their 

port operations, transportation, and other activities 

rear area.

309

Force

For

DPRK

For

CFC Timing; Type of Impact on Campaign

DPRK

standard

artillery

+ Early; create holes in the defense, cause damage

DPRK longrange

artillery

+ Early; threaten heavy forces, C

4

I, Seoul

DPRK

infantry

+ During offensive; overwhelm defenders

DPRK heavy

forces

+ During offensive; penetrate the defenses

DPRK SOF + Early; disrupt/impair CFC operations

DPRK

ballistic

missiles

+ During offensive; disrupt airfields, ports, C

4

I

ROK/U.S.

(CFC) aircraft

+ Throughout; stop ground forces, destroy artillery, disrupt

rear operations

ROK/U.S.

(CFC) heavy

forces

+ Throughout; stop DPRK offensive, support a

counteroffensive

ROK/U.S.

(CFC)

artillery

+ Throughout; destroy artillery, stop ground forces

ROK/U.S.

(CFC) navy

+ Throughout; stop SOF insertions, control SLOCs
Most ROK and U.S. experts believe that North 

will fail to adequately suppress CFC air bases, al

ROK and U.S. air forces to devastate the North K

ground forces (especially artillery and heavy forces)

and U.S. artillery will significantly add to the damage 

North Korean ground forces, and ROK and U.S. 

forces will counterattack and destroy large elements 

North Korean ground forces within the first few w

Thus, North Korea will ultimately fail in its efforts, 

the process its artillery, heavy forces, and ballistic m

systems will be significantly damaged, as will be its 

for inserting North Korean SOF (at the hands of th

ground, naval, and air forces). Nevertheless, consid

damage will be done to CFC forces in the process of su

offensive.

• North Korean Offensive, Mid- to Late-P

North Korean infantry and heavy forces will contin

North Korean offensive. North Korean ballistic missil

continue to disrupt operations in the CFC rear areas

and U.S. air forces, artillery, and heavy forces will co

to seriously damage the North Korean ground forces

the North Korean progress is stopped. ROK and U

forces will also attack other targets throughout the de

North Korea.

• CFC Buildup Phase. About the time that the 

Korean offensive ends, U.S. forces will be freely flowin

the ROK, protected by CFC naval and air forces. Duri

buildup, the CFC air forces will attack ground force

other resources in the North, preparing 

counteroffensive. 

• CFC Counteroffensive Phase. Once the U.S

ROK build-up is complete, CFC heavy forces and ar

will press the counteroffensive, with CFC air 

providing support and removing other threats.

310
Focuses for Arms Control Reductions.

Each of the forces identified in Table 4 is an appro

focus for conventional arms control. Even if the RO

U.S. expectation is that North Korean forces will be so

defeated, there is some risk in any war, and consid

damage would be done to the ROK in the process, esp

in the area of Seoul and further to the north. Thus red

North Korean forces may help lower the chances of 

reduce some risks, and decrease the damage the war 

do.

SOME SPECIFIC ARMS CONTROL OPTIONS

Conventional arms control pertains to the kinds of 

listed in Tables 1 and 2 and the missile systems lis

Table 3. As we have seen, arms control in Korea s

begin by implementing confidence-building measure

then move on to force reductions. This section recom

specific arms control options in each of these areas, an

presents an approach to implementing the force reduc

Confidence-building.

As argued above, the two Koreas need to beg

developing communication with and trust in each ot

both a national and personal level. For military 

confidence-building measures provide the opportun

help generate such trust. Confidence-building can 

variety of forms. With regard to Korea, some specific o

worth considering include the following.

Communication. The almost complete la

communication between the two Korean militaries ne

end. While arms control discussions will allow 

communication, these discussions will be inhe

confrontational in nature. Therefore, a par

nonconfrontational set of activities needs to occur, e

sponsored only on a unilateral basis by the ROK (wit

support). For example, North Korean officers shou

311
invited to visit ROK military units as well as ROK an

military exercises. ROK military officers (especially 

officers) should be encouraged to establish communi

with one or more counterparts in the North. The 

should make available its literature on unclassified m

issues to the North on a systematic basis (i.e., r

distribution). North Korean/ROK military confer

should be held to discuss military strategy and other i

While these efforts could proceed unilaterally, there 

need to be some North Korean/ROK agreements on 

early in the process; otherwise, participating offic

North Korea might be accused of treason and remove

their positions.

Hot Line. A key form of communication needed be

the North Korean and ROK militaries is a hot line. Th

would connect the senior North Korean and ROK m

leadership, and allow conversations in particular 

crises develop. Hopefully, such conversations would d

such crises. North Korea has previously pro

establishing such a hot line,

18 suggesting that this m

relatively easy to implement. Indeed, in the June 

North Korean/ROK Summit, the two sides agreed to 

on a hot line.

19

Exercise Monitoring. The monitoring of exercises w

up between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the 1980

proved to be a helpful confidence-building measure. 

provided for communication between the two sides, in 

desirable. Monitoring of any exercise above ground 

regiment level seems appropriate, which would mea

exercise involving more than about 2,500 pers

(alternatively, a division-level threshold cou

considered of 10,000 or so personnel).

20This would c

include the North Korean winter training cycle, 

number of annual ROK and U.S. exercises. Ex

monitors would be responsible for observing and rep

on exercises, and would seek to assure that any tran

from an exercise to combat preparation was ra

312
reported. Several aspects of this proposal are 

discussed in the aftermath of the June 2000 Summit

Artillery Pull-Back. As noted above, most of the 

Korean artillery around the DMZ is located in off

positions within a few kilometers of the DMZ. Some 

ROK artillery is also located closer than 10 kilometer

the DMZ. It would be best to pull these artillery units 

range from the opposing artillery into truly def

positions, making it more difficult for either side to 

offensive operations. A 10-kilometer artillery-free 

should be established on each side of the DMZ, placi

opposing artillery no closer than 24 kilometers from 

other (the four kilometers of the DMZ plus ten kilom

without artillery on either side of the DMZ).

DMZ “Cold Zone.” As an extension of the ar

pull-back, it would be ideal to create a DMZ “Cold Zon

area of 10 to 20 kilometers on each side of the DMZ 

forces are generally not allowed out of barracks, excep

few, disconnected small-unit exercises each year.

2

units in this area would be paired at the division 

North and South, and a council setup for each divisio

Both sides would be expected to do what they can to im

life on the other side and provide mutual suppor

example, each side could end its propaganda broadc

and, where needed, provide the other side (the R

North Korea) with power, food, medicines, and other n

commodities. The division commanders of each 

division would meet in a council at least monthly to r

the needs and determine how to fill them. Such an app

recognizes that even the North Korean military is suf

from humanitarian limitations; by providing North K

forces with humanitarian needs, ROK forces will ha

opportunity to establish communication and begin cr

an environment of reconciliation between the North K

and ROK militaries.

Accepting the Risks. During the conference at whic

chapter was first presented as a conference paper, s

313
discussants commented that there are risks associate

some of these confidence-building measures. For exa

allowing North Korean observers at ROK and U.S. exe

might help the North Korean military better unde

ROK and U.S. vulnerabilities, and learn how to copy 

and U.S. strengths. Alternatively, there will a

opportunities to display ROK and U.S. strengths whi

North Korean leadership likely does not appre

hopefully enhancing deterrence.

24 Decisions about h

to proceed with confidence-building measures

eventually on force reductions, must be a function 

ROK and U.S. assumptions on when major changes 

occur in the North. If a North Korean collapse or nego

unification is quite possible within the next decade 

ROK and North Korean forces need to prepare for 

changes by pursuing conventional arms control. But i

form of unification is unlikely for many decades to 

ROK and U.S. forces should be conservative and max

defensive capabilities over the coming years.

Force Reductions.

It may take many years of confidence-building 

before the North Korean and ROK militaries are pre

to discuss military force reductions on a reasonable 

Whenever that time comes, each side will need 

prepared to discuss alternative means for ach

reductions. Given the principles discussed abov

military requirements for combined Korean 

post-unification become a useful target toward which 

control efforts ought to be directed. As wit

Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) agreement, th

sides should seek to reduce their forces to equal ce

Both sides would have to determine the precise force

they require and the ceilings they are willing to emplo

section suggests some sample numbers that mig

considered. Adjustments around these number

certainly possible, and need to be evaluated.

314
On the ROK side, most of the force reductions 

have to come in the ROK ground forces (Army and Ma

Looking at these forces in somewhat more detail, T

summarizes this author’s approximation of a po

Korean ground force structure after unification, very 

reduced from existing forces to facilitate modernizatio

to reduce overall defense expenditures. This force str

would create five corps of relatively heavy forces

another corps of cadre divisions to cover the Chinese b

Many of the divisions would be heavy divisions wit

mobility to cover the much expanded territory of 

giving Korea more tanks and other armor vehicles th

ROK currently has.

Table 5. Sample Korean Ground Force Struct

Post-Unification.

Table 6 uses this possible future Korean force str

as the basis for recommending force reductions

unification goal for ROK forces has been added to a mo

reduced U.S. force size to reach proposed force ce

under arms control. For example, we add 25,000 

ground forces (a modest reduction in current U.S. for

the 400,000 Korean ground forces (Army and Ma

proposed for unification to arrive at a proposed arms c

ceiling of 425,000. This approach is based on the prev

noted anticipation that only a modest number of 

Korean military forces would be retained in the long 

after unification.

25 Total U.S. manpower might be lim

34,000 or so within these ceilings. In contras

post-unification Korean military might retain a sign

315

Type of Ground Force Number

Active Duty

Personnel Tanks Other

Armor

Art

& M

Active divisions 17 185,000 1,600 3,500 2

Reserve divisions 13 45,000 500 — 1

Regular corps 6 90,000 400 300 

Other — 80,000 — — 

Total 400,000 2,500 3,800 4
number of North Korean weapon systems, especially 

and other armor. Therefore, the proposed arms c

ceiling for tanks is a little more than half of the unifi

force requirements (a ceiling of 1,600 allowing for 

total ROK and North Korean systems to be retained b

the 100 U.S. tanks). Artillery, MRLs, and fighter a

are handled more like personnel because many of the 

Korean weapon systems appear to be qualitatively in

and thus unlikely for retention after unification.

Table 6. A Basis for Negotiated Force Reducti

In addition to the ceilings shown in Table 6, some 

force limitations may need to be part of the force redu

Because special forces are of particular concern, they s

be limited in numbers to no more than 8 to 10 percent 

ground force structure on each side. Thus, North K

special forces are reported to constitute 100,000 of 

current 1,000,000 ground force personnel (10 perc

with a ceiling of 425,000 North Korean ground 

personnel, the special forces would need to be reduced 

more than 42,500 (34,000 if 8 percent is used).

North Korea will be concerned about U.S. 

deployments to Korea or the area around it. North 

would be particularly opposed to U.S. deployme

support an offensive against the North. Since the U

States is not interested in carrying out such an offen

316

Type of Ground

Force

Unification

Goal

U.S.

Today

ROK

Today

DPRK (NK)

Today

Pro

C

Manpower

Ground 400,000 27,084 585,000 1,000,000 42

Air Force 60,000 8,719 63,000 110,000 6

Navy 40,000 327 42,000 60,000 4

Tanks 2,500 116 2,250 3,800 

Other Armor 3,800 237 2,300 2,300 

Artillery & MRLs 4,000 72 5,200 12,000 

Fighter Aircraft 500 90 560 850 

Ballistic missiles 200 — 12 700-

1,900
peacetime, the United States would likely accept peac

deployment limitations, but then would want these 

removed if North Korea commits an act of war again

ROK. For North Korea to accept such limitations, a 

threshold would have to exist between peacetim

wartime deployment rules. Two alternative

possibilities. First, U.S. deployments to Korea cou

limited until the United States Congress declares a s

war against North Korea. Congress is very unlik

declare war against North Korea for offensive pur

thus meeting the North Korean objective. In respon

true North Korean attack on the ROK, such a reso

hopefully could be obtained promptly although the p

would slow deployments somewhat. Second, the alter

threshold could depend upon some internat

organization determining when U.S. deployments wo

authorized, though such an approach would further 

U.S. deployments in defense of the ROK, and th

unacceptable to the ROK and United States.

North Korea would likely want constraints on two 

of U.S. military deployments into or around Korea. Th

would be deployments of U.S. ground, air, and su

forces onto the peninsula. Within reason, 

deployments could be limited to the levels that typ

occur in major CFC exercises; for example, the U

States could not have more than 44,000 military per

in the ROK (the 34,000 day-to-day ceiling mentioned 

plus a 10,000 training augmentation). The expansio

the 34,000 to 44,000 would be allowed for only 8 week

each year. The second deployment limitation would i

U.S. naval forces around Korea. The United States 

commit to keeping no more than one carrier battle 

and one amphibious ready group within 1,000 kilome

the North Korean coastline, which would extend to cov

Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea, and the northern part 

East China Sea. This exclusion zone would not reach 

south as Okinawa. These deployment limitations 

reassure North Korea that the force reductions it ma

317
reach the ceilings proposed above will not lea

vulnerable to U.S. coercion in peacetime.

Note that all of the numbers in this section are exa

of the reductions that could be used. To formulate 

arms control proposals, North Korea, the ROK, an

United States would need to decide whether 

illustrative numbers are reasonable and if not, 

alternatives would be appropriate.

The Mechanisms for Force Reductions.

For force reductions even to be considered by th

Koreas, a considerable degree of trust and communi

needs to be generated on both sides. Confidence-bu

measures will help achieve this objective. Neverthele

procedures actually used to achieve force reductions w

critical. The following sequence of procedur

recommended.

 First, both sides must agree to a list of existing 

from which reductions would be negotiated. This list 

to be specific, with a designation of the units at 

location, with their manpower and combat equipme

example, the 6th tank battalion at location X ha

personnel and 31 tanks). An organizational hierarch

also be needed so that divisions and corps can be c

identified. Because of North Korean reluctance to d

such issues, the ROK/U.S. will need to develop a pro

listing for both sides, with some DPRK units perhaps 

at unidentified locations, or the relationships between 

units shown as “not known.”

27 This process may need 

undertaken by area, with the first effort devoted to th

around the DMZ to facilitate discussion of the DMZ 

Zone” notion and the artillery pull-back. This effort s

begin as soon as possible, and should be a part 

confidence-building measures early in the arms c

agreements.

318
As part of this process, some counting rules need 

developed. These include what personnel and equi

categories should be used for reductions (the ones sho

Table 6 being an initial proposal), and what personn

equipment should be aggregated into each categor

example, does a T-34 count as a “tank” or an “other 

vehicle”? In addition, what equipment should be cou

For example, in many units, especially air force f

squadrons, it is typical to talk of total aircraft inv

versus primary aircraft inventory (the difference u

being spare aircraft for maintenance purposes). To 

confusion, the arms control discussions should dea

total aircraft inventory and total equipment in 

categories, including the maintenance spares (even 

spare aircraft are not functional and are used entire

source of spare parts).

28 If this were not agreeabl

alternative counting rule would use primary ai

inventory and allow a maximum addition of 10 or 15 p

for maintenance spares.

Second, both sides must agree to an inspection ef

verify the force lists that are developed. These verifi

inspections should begin immediately (not waiting fo

reductions), and should involve at least 2 percent 

forces each month (thus taking no more than about 4 

to achieve full verification). In addition to verifying th

information, these inspections should invo

determination of humanitarian needs (as discuss

connection with the DMZ “Cold Zone”), with the RO

making follow-up visits (not verification inspectio

deliver needed aid. For ground forces, this process s

start in the DMZ “Cold Zone” and then spread back to 

beyond. Note that this process would also be an imp

confidence-building measure, with both sides encoura

act in ways that generate trust (e.g., no movem

personnel or equipment before inspections).

Third, both sides need to agree to the princip

reduction. As argued above, the preferred alternative 

used in the CFE negotiations, i.e., reduction to 

319
ceilings. The next best alternative would be a perce

reduction in the existing force. Either of these altern

requires an accurate accounting of the North Korean 

in the first two steps. At the same time, the ROK/U

States must determine how far they can reduce. F

ROK perspective, this means that the ceilings on 

cannot reduce forces to the point where the defense lo

coherence (serious analysis must be done o

requirements of a coherent defense, given the likely 

Korean threat). Since one objective of arms contro

reduce in the direction of forces required after unific

forces should not be reduced below appropriate ceili

suggested in Table 6 and confirmed by ROK and 

analysis. From a U.S. perspective, reductions should 

beyond the threshold that will continue to su

deterrence in Korea, nor below the level and types o

forces desired post-unification.

Fourth, both sides should consider limiting mun

For example, artillery rounds could be limited to 1,00

per tube, adequate for a defensive operation but not 

offensive operation. This would reduce the fear of both 

relative to offensives. For munitions limitations to w

comprehensive inventory of munitions and their loc

would need to be created, although this would be diffi

verify if all locations have not been reported. Since 

locations are unlikely to be fully known in the North, r

thumb would need to be developed to assist in lo

supplies. For example, how many rounds per tube nee

forward at the start of a campaign, and within 

distance (or distances) from the batteries? If appro

storage sites cannot be found for each battery, t

challenge would need to be lodged to determine the s

site location. Examination of storage sites would co

quantities of the munitions stored there, but would a

useful in determining the status of the munitions 

there. If some munitions show qualitative deterior

this would be useful information, and would also lea

good basis for recommending future reductions.

320
Fifth, the reduction process should begin. Because 

of the reductions recommended in Table 6 are massiv

should be done in phases as shown in Table 7 (the 

phase is the proposed ceiling). For example, to go fro

million to 425,000 ground forces, North Korea would r

about 200,000 in each phase. Because it would t

substantial time to find jobs for the personnel re

these phases should occur at something like 1

intervals. The ROK side will undoubtedly need to wor

North Korea to help develop civilian jobs for those 

Korean military personnel released from military s

Phases like these allow each side to verify the op

side’s reductions before going too far in the red

process.

Table 7. Proposed Phasing of Force Reduct

As force reductions are made, excess (and in part

outdated) equipment needs to be destroyed. The pro

destruction needs to be clearly defined for different c

321

Type of Ground Force Side Number

Today

First

Phase

Second

Phase

Prop

Ceil

Ground force U.S. 27,084 26,500 25,500 25

personnel ROK 585,000 523,000 461,000 400

DPRK 1,000,000 808,000 617,000 425

Air Force U.S. 8,719 8,500 8,200 8

personnel ROK 63,000 62,000 61,000 60

DPRK 110,000 96,000 82,000 68

Navy U.S. 327 320 310 

personnel ROK 42,000 41,200 40,400 39

DPRK 60,000 53,000 47,000 40

Tanks U.S. 116 110 105 

ROK 2,250 2,000 1,750 1

DPRK 3,800 3,100 2,300 1

Other Armor U.S. 237 225 210 

ROK 2,300 2,170 2,040 1

DPRK 2,300 2,230 2,170 2

Artillery & U.S. 72 72 72 

MRLs ROK 5,200 4,800 4,400 4

DPRK 12,000 9,300 6,700 4

Fighter U.S. 90 90 90 

Aircraft ROK 560 510 450 

DPRK 850 730 620 

Ballistic U.S. 0 0 0 

missiles ROK 12 200 200 

DPRK 1,000? 730 460 
of equipment along with the means for ver

destruction. Some equipment that will be reduced wi

to be replaced with alternative equipment of the sam

Thus, rather than reducing two battalions from 31 

T-55 tanks each, it may be better to completely elim

the T-55s of one battalion and replace them with 15 

more modern (e.g., T-62) tanks. Thus, reductions nee

planned at the unit level, using basic principles accep

both sides. Realignments also need to be planne

agreed to in advance by all.

For verification, observers should be placed in un

the opposing side both to facilitate communication 

confirm the reductions. Force and supply levels sho

closely monitored and equipment destruction confirm

make sure functionality is lost. The equipment sho

followed from storage locations to destruction loca

Inspectors should examine the storage location 

destruction to make sure the force has been appropr

reduced, or that any realignments (e.g., 15 T-62s rep

31 T-55s) are done within the agreed parameter

personnel reductions, reductions will be difficult to 

(many military forces could be moved to comparable 

forces or quasi-military forces). To reduce the feasib

such cheating, where possible the manpower in eac

should be reduced by some amount rather than whole 

being cut.

29This procedure might work best even if 

units are made cadre forces into which reserves co

moved to bring them back to full strength. The re

would be less ready than active forces, and they woul

to be removed from existing reserve units to become 

the cadre units.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED

REDUCTIONS

The DPRK and the ROK must yet negotiat

conventional arms control process proposed herein

322
numbers used here are approximations for illust

purposes; the Koreas may choose their own ceilings.

The Korean Summit created considerable eup

concerning the movement toward unification in K

Many would now argue that unification of some form 

occur within the next decade or so. If that is the 

conventional arms control is needed in Korea now. Th

to unification of not reducing the military forces of 

Korea and the ROK are far greater than the risks to c

defenses implied by pursuing conventional arms co

The confidence-building part of the process should h

develop understanding and trust on the two sides, red

the chances for war and helping prepare the cond

needed for unification. The force reductions pro

should also lower the likelihood of war, facilitate 

modernization by both Koreas, reduce military costs, r

the damage that could occur as a result of a war or c

associated with North Korean collapse, and tran

military personnel to economically productive roles 

they would be less likely to threaten the unification pr

All of these are important goals for a Korea seeking pe

unification; indeed, peaceful unification may not be po

without such efforts.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 9

1. This chapter was presented to a conference on “Com

Strategies: Planning for a Peaceful Korea,” held June 12-14, 20

conference was sponsored by The Nonproliferation Policy Ed

Center, the U.S. Army War College’s Department of National S

and Strategy, and the U.S. Air Force Institute for National S

Studies. It was modified after the conference to clarify some poi

add some additional issues. It reflects the views of the author, a

not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of RAND or its r

sponsors.

2. “South Korean state television said yesterday that Se

Washington have a plan to topple the North Korean governmen

Stalinist state attacks the South. The Korean Broadcasting Syst

that rather than simply driving back the North’s troops, th

provides for a counteroffensive to seize Pyongyang and try to top

323
government of Kim Il Sung.” “KBS reports plan to topple Kim I

Washington Times, March 25, 1994, p. 16. In 1994, the South 

president, Kim Young-sam, said: “Once a major military confro

occurs, North Korea will definitely be annihilated.” Ranan R. Lu

a Confrontation, ‘North Korea Will Definitely Be Annihilate

Angeles Times (Washington Edition), March 24, 1994, p. 11.

3. Defense White Paper, The Ministry of National Defen

Republic of Korea, p. 244. This table lacks information on the 

Korean GNP in more recent years, and thus 1997 data is used 

text.

4. Hee-Mook Chae, “Budget for 2000 set at W92.6 Trillion,

Times, September 21, 1999; “2000 Defense Budget Shows 

Increase,” Korea Times, September 21, 1999.

5. “Defense Ministry to Reduce Military Force,” Korea 

August 20, 1999; “Armed Forces to Be Trimmed to 400,000-500

2015,” Korea Times, August 19, 1999.

6. These actions will likely fail if they are not preplanned. 

efforts to demilitarize the North Korean military could well r

rebellion in the initial areas selected, and lead to more extens

prepared rebellion in the rest of the North Korean forces. At lea

North Korean military leaders will feel that maintaining their w

and control of forces will give them the best chance of survival.

7. “Korean Unification Will Cost Up to $3.6 trillion, Repor

Korea Herald, April 22, 2000; available at http://www.korea

co.kr/news/2000/04/_05/20000422_0539.htm.

8. “Defense Ministry to Reduce Military Force,” Korea 

August 20, 1999; “Armed Forces to Be Trimmed to 400,000-500

2015,” Korea Times, August 19, 1999.

9. Some experts argue that a draft is essential to keep militar

“democratized,” and that the transition to an all-volunteer forc

narrow the parts of society represented in the military. Howeve

of the dire predictions have not come true within the U.S. militar

an all-volunteer force. Nevertheless, the German discuss

reducing their military manpower to the level where a draft w

largely unneeded typify the kinds of concerns that might also o

Korea. See, for example, Roger Boyes, “Germans Shocked By 

Replace Conscription With Professional Army,” London Times, 

2000.

324
10. North Korea will likely prefer proportional force red

where both sides reduce forces, for example, by 25 percent, a

North Korea to maintain quantitative force size advantage

reductions would not achieve many of the objectives outlined abo

variant of both options, the proposals below recommend force red

to equal numbers, but doing so in phases, where a fraction of t

reduction is implemented in each phase. In this way, the North 

retain at least some of its numerical advantages during the first 

of reduction.

11. The growth of North Korean military manpower is plo

Figure 1 in Bruce W. Bennett, “Implications of Proliferation 

Weapons on Regional Security,” The Search for Peace and Sec

Northeast Asia Toward the 21st Century, conference paper, me

The Council on Korea-U.S. Security Studies on October 24-25, 

12. Recent work on defense against CBW within the United 

Defense Department has led to the concept of “joint, stand

templates.” These templates define the requirements for CBW 

at each kind of military facility and for each kind of military forc

are also intended to provide overall guidance for both of

requirements and concepts of operation in any given region

templates are being developed.

13. A key difference not shown in this chart is the size of th

Korean special forces command, generally reported at around 

personnel.

14. This table, including the footnotes, is copied from Defens

Paper, 1999, The Ministry of National Defense, The Republic of 

p. 245.

15. This is especially true since the ROK is destroying its c

weapon inventory in accord with its obligations under the C

Weapons Convention. See “Seoul Admits to Chemical W

Stockpile,” South China Morning Post, May 10, 2000.

16. See, for example, Won-Sop Yi, “After West Sea Conflict

Hangyore (translated into English by FBIS), June 22, 1999.

17. Jim Mann, “N. Korea’s Ability to Sustain Military Surpr

U.S.,” Los Angeles Times, March 17, 2000.

18. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, “On Easing the T

on the Korean Peninsula and Creating a Peaceful Climate for N

325
Reunification,” Press Release of the Permanent Observer Missio

United Nations, June 2, 1990.

19. “Military Hot Line May Link to NK,” Chosun Ilbo (Ele

English Version), June 22, 2000.

20. Historical exercises should be examined to determine t

personnel thresholds. In general, a lower threshold would a

more monitoring, resulting in more communication and inter

something that is needed.

21. Yong-Won Yoo, “Defense Ministry to Redefine North 

Military,” Chosun Ilbo (Electronic, English Version), June 19, 2

MND is considering other post-summit meeting measures s

as giving North Korea advanced notice of military exerci

including Ulchi Focus Lense. Also, the ministry is looking 

conducting mutual exchange of military officials. . . . 

ministry is to consider . . . inviting North Korean milit

observers to various annual military exercises held in So

Korea. 

22. Such provisions would reduce the potential for misinter

the training efforts of the other side, thus reducing the chances of 

23. After writing this proposal, the author learned that bo

stopped their “provocative” broadcasts along the DMZ in prepara

the inter-Korean summit of June 12-14, 2000. They have don

create a more conciliatory environment. See Soo-Jeong Lee, “N

Anti-Seoul Broadcasts Ahead of Summit,” Korea Times, May 3

p. 2. It is unclear whether this cessation is to be tempo

permanent; if only temporary, the issue needs to be raised again 

of arms control, and the precedent cited for creating a conc

environment.

24. For example, North Korea likely does not appreci

lethality of air-delivered anti-armor weapons like sensor-fuzed w

(SFW). A flight of 2 to 4 aircraft carrying these weapons could fl

simulated armor battalion in an exercise and potentially devast

battalion. Such a demonstration would likely chill any North 

hope for a successful offensive against CFC.

25. As noted above, during a transition period for unifica

perhaps a year or more, much of a reduced North Korean militar

likely need to be retained in uniform to help stabilize the 

population in the North, establish and sustain law and ord

326
control the flow of refugees. To perform these functions, North 

personnel would not require heavy weapons.

26. Defense White Paper, 1999, The Ministry of National D

The Republic of Korea, p. 51.

27. The completed force lists need to address total personn

thus need to include personnel on oversees assignments, headq

personnel, personnel in training, and so forth.

28. Aircraft, including outdated aircraft in storage, wo

excluded from total aircraft inventory only if the aircraft are 

disabled, or if both sides agree that some aircraft should not co

29. If the number of divisions, wings, and so forth remains th

many of the flag officer positions would not have to be elim

potentially reducing the objections of the North Korean militar

327
WORKING GROUP PARTICIPANT LIS

Commissioned Research Presentations

Stephen Bradner, “North Korea’s Strategy.”

Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., and Sharon A. Richa

“The North Korean View of the Developmen

Production of Strategic Weapons Systems.”

Jack Rendler, “The Last Worst Place on Earth: H

Rights in North Korea.”

Eric A. McVadon, “China’s Goals and Strategies f

Korean Peninsula.”

Larry M. Wortzel, “China’s Goals and Strategies f

Korean Peninsula: A Critical Assessment.”

Victor D. Cha, “Japan’s Grand Strategy on the K

Peninsula: Optimistic Realism.”

Marcus Noland, “Economic Alternative

Unification.”

Bruce William Bennett, “Conventional Arms Con

Korea: A Lever for Peace?”

Group Leaders

Dr. David Blair, National Defense University

 Dr. Seth Carus, National Defense University

 Dr. Robin H. Dorff, Army War College

Military Task Force

COL Joseph R. Cerami, USA, Department of Nation

 Security and Strategy, Army War College

CAPT James FitzSimonds, USN, Naval War College

COL Glenn Trimmer, USAF, Army War College

329
Participants

COL Joseph R. Cerami, USA, Department of Nation

 Security and Strategy, Army War College

COL John F. Troxell, USA, Department of National

 Security and Strategy, U.S. Army War College

Dr. Andrew Scobell, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. A

 War College

Dr. Bruce Bechtol, Defense Intelligence Agency

Dr. Charles Downs, Author, Over the Line: North Ko

 Negotiating Strategy

CAPT James FitzSimonds, USN, Naval War College

Ms. Balbina Hwang, Georgetown University

Mr. Yunsik Hong, the Hudson Institute

Dr. Thomas Mahnken, Naval War College

ADM Eric McVadon, USN, Ret., consultant

Mr. Jack Rendler, the Aurora Foundation (Minneapo

Representative, State Department, Bureau of

 Nonproliferation

Representative, CIA, Office of Asian Pacific & Latin

 American

 Analyses

Mr. Mel Sakazaki, Systems Planning Corp.

Dr. Abram Shulsky, RAND

Dr. James Smith, Director, USAFA Institute for Nat

 Strategic Studies

MAJ Mark Stokes, USA, Department of Defense, Pent

Ambassador Paul Taylor, Naval War College

COL Glenn Trimmer, USAF, Army War College

Dr. William Williamson, Joint Military Intelligence C

Dr. Larry Wortzel, the Heritage Foundation

330
ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

BRUCE WILLIAM BENNETT is a Senior Anal

RAND, Santa Monica. He is the research lead

strategy, force planning, and counterproliferation w

RAND’s International Security and Defense Policy C

His work focuses on the future of warfare and m

analysis, especially in light of new technologies, opera

concepts, and threats. Dr. Bennett is examinin

operational and strategic implications of possible che

and biological weapon (CBW) threats that could be po

Korea and the Persian Gulf and the character of th

strategy required in response, with a focus on deter

These efforts updated earlier work he had done o

balance of military power in Korea, in which he contr

to an assessment done for the Secretary of Defense 

Director of Net Assessment. Dr. Bennett has w

directly for CINC CFC and with senior ROK m

leaders in proposing strategies to counter CBW, inc

moderating the CINC CFC war game on CBW (Coral B

6) in July 1997. He is the author of numerous publica

including Two Alternative Views of War in Korea: The 

and South Korean Revolutions in Military Affairs (R

1995). Dr. Bennett’s published articles include “Dire

for the Construction of Korean Airpower in the Earl

Century,” presented to the ROK Air Force Univ

Conference on International Security and Strate

September 1999, and “The Emerging Ballistic M

Threat: Global and Regional Ramifications,” present

conference on “Korean Air Power: Emerging Threats, 

Structure, and the Role of Air Power,” sponsored by Y

University on June 11-12, 1999. Dr. Bennett holds a 

in Policy Analysis from the RAND Graduate Institu

Public Policy Analysis and a B.S. in Economics fro

California Institute of Technology.

JOSEPH BERMUDEZ, JR., is an internatio

recognized analyst, author, and lecturer on North K

defense and intelligence affairs and ballistic m

development in the Third World. He is currently a 

analyst for Jane’s Intelligence Review and IntelC

331
During the past 10 years Mr. Burmudez has authored 

books and more than 100 articles, reports, and monog

on North Korea. His two most recent books, North K

Special Forces (2nd Edition) and Terrorism: The 

Korean Connection, are considered by many to b

definitive “open source” works on their subjects and 

been translated into Korean and Japanese. His forthc

book, Shield of the Great Leader: The Armed Forces of 

Korea, promises to follow this tradition. Mr. Bermud

lectured extensively in the academic and govern

environments, both in the United States (e.g., Col

University, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. 

Intelligence, U.S. Naval Intelligence, etc.) and the Re

of Korea (e.g., National Defense College and Na

Intelligence Service). He has also testified before Co

on several occasions as a subject matter expert conc

North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear, chemica

biological warfare programs.

STEPHEN BRADNER is the special advisor t

Commander in Chief of the United Nations Com

(CINCUNC) in Korea. He has served in an advisory ca

to the CINCUNC since 1973. Mr. Bradner also served 

U.S. Army from 1953 to 1955, including 1 year in Kore

the Counterintelligence Corps. He holds a B.A. in h

from Yale University and an M.A. in East Asian S

from Harvard University.

VICTOR D. CHA is Assistant Professor in the Depar

of Government and School of Foreign Service, Georg

University, Washington, DC. He has authored num

articles on international relations and East Asia app

in edited volumes and scholarly journals, incl

Survival, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of 

Research, Security Dialogue, Australian Journ

International Affairs, Asian Survey, Asian Persp

Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, and Korean St

Professor Cha is the recipient of numerous aca

awards including the Fulbright (Korea) and MacA

Foundation Fellowships. He spent 2 years as a John M

National Security Fellow at Harvard University’s C

for International Affairs and as a postdoctoral fellow 

332
Center for International Security and Cooper

(CISAC), Stanford University. Professor Cha has ser

an independent consultant and lectured to various bra

of the U.S. Department of Defense (Office of the Secre

Defense), Department of State, and SAIC. In 1999, h

the Edward Teller National Fellow for Security 

Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Pea

Stanford University and a recipient of the Fulbright 

Scholar Award. He is also the author of Alignment D

Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Tr

(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999, and East 

Institute, Columbia University), which was a winner 

1999-2000 Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation 

Book Prize for best book on the Pacific Basin/East Asi

a nominee for the 2000 Hoover Institution Uncommon 

Award.

NICHOLAS N. EBERSTADT holds the Henry Wendt 

in Political Economy at the American Enterprise Ins

and is a member of Harvard University’s Cent

Population and Development Studies. He is also o

board of advisors of the National Bureau of Asian Res

(NBR) and the Statistical Assessment Service (STATS

is a member of the Environmental Literacy Council 

Dr. Eberstadt frequently serves as a consultant for th

Census Bureau and other government organizatio

such topics as demography, international developmen

East Asian security. He has published over 200 studi

articles in scholarly and popular journals, including F

Affairs, The New York Review of Books, Commentar

New Republic, The New York Times, and The Wall 

Journal. He is also the author or editor of ten 

including Prosperous Paupers and Other Popu

Problems (forthcoming),The End of North Korea (1999

Tyranny of Numbers (1995), and Korea Appro

Re-Unification (1995). Dr. Eberstadt earned his 

M.P.A., and Ph.D. at Harvard University and his M.Sc

the London School of Economics.

ERIC A. MCVADON, a retired U.S. Navy Rear Adm

senior consultant on East Asian security affairs f

Center for Naval Analyses, Areté Associates, and s

333
other organizations, and Director of Asia-Pacific S

with National Security Planning Associates, a subsid

the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. He was d

and naval attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, 19

Admiral McVadon’s Navy career included exte

experience in air antisubmarine warfare 

politico-military affairs, including service as the NAT

U.S. Sub-Unified Commander in Iceland, 1986-198

recent investigations include work on the Pe

Liberation Army with emphasis on the naval servic

China-Taiwan problem, Chinese attitudes toward re

security, and diverse issues involving the K

Peninsula. Admiral McVadon writes extensivel

speaks widely in North America and East Asia on se

and defense matters.

MARCUS NOLAND’s work encompasses a wide ra

topics including political economy of U.S. trade polic

the Asian financial crisis. His areas of geogra

knowledge and interest include Asia and Africa wh

has lived and worked. In the past Mr. Noland has w

extensively on the economies of Japan, Korea, and C

and is unique among American economists in h

devoted serious scholarly effort to the problems of 

Korea and the prospects for Korean unification. He ha

the Senior Economist for International Economics 

Council of Economic Advisers, as well as a visiting pro

at Johns Hopkins University, the University of Sou

California, Tokyo University, Saitama Universit

University of Ghana, and a visiting scholar at the 

Development Institute. Mr. Noland has written 

articles on international economics and is the coaut

Economic Effects of the Asian Currency Devalu

(1998), Reconcilable Differences? United States-J

Economic Conflict with C. Fred Bergsten (1993), and P

Basin Developing Countries: Prospects for the Future (

Also, with Bela Balassa, he is coeditor of Pacific Dyna

and the International Economic System (1993). He 

the editor of Economic Integration of the Korean Pen

(1998).

334
JOHN M. RENDLER is Executive Director of the A

Foundation, which has worked to protect and pr

human rights worldwide for 25 years. He has 

Executive Director of Minnesota Advocates for H

Rights which, with Asia Watch, produced in 1988 w

still the most significant report on human rights in 

Korea. Mr. Rendler worked for Amnesty Internation

12 years, most recently as Director of Camp

responsible for delivering pressure from the United 

in Amnesty’s worldwide actions. His work on human 

has taken him to South Korea, Nepal, Tunisia, as w

Rwanda and Congo (Zaire). Mr. Rendler is a gradu

Boston University’s Comparative Politics program 

received an M.A. in International Relations from 

Francisco State University.

SHARON A. RICHARDSON is the Director of Confe

and Publications in the Institute of Information Tech

Applications (IITA) at the United States Air 

Academy. Ms. Richardson’s paper on the unificat

Korea, accomplished as an INSS-sponsored res

project, was selected for presentation at the annual 

conference in November 1996. In December 1999, she 

a trip to North Korea to visit the construction site of th

water reactors being built by the Korean Peninsula E

Development Organization (KEDO) under the 

Framework Agreement. She holds a B.S. from 

University of Colorado at Boulder and an M

management from the University of Southern Califo

HENRY D. SOKOLSKI is executive director o

Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, a non

organization based in Washington, DC, and te

graduate courses on strategic weapons proliferat

Boston University’s Institute of World Politics. From 

to 1993, he worked as Deputy for Nonproliferation Po

the Pentagon and as a full-time consultant in the Sec

of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment. In 1999 Mr. So

was appointed to serve on the Deutch Prolife

Commission. He is author of a critical history o

nonproliferation policy entitled Best of Intentions: Am

Campaign Against Strategic Weapons Prolifer

335
(Praeger Publishers, Spring 2001) and has writte

edited numerous works on strategic weapons-r

issues.

LARRY M. WORTZEL is an analyst of Asian affairs 

policymaker for the government, having focus

security, defense, political, and economic issues since 

He served in the U.S. Army in Korea, China, Thailan

Singapore, including more than 4 years at the Am

Embassy in Beijing. Dr. Wortzel was the Assistant 

Attaché in China during the Tiananmen Massacre 

1995 returned to China as the Army Attaché. He ha

been a strategist for Asia for the Department of the 

served on the international security policy staff of the 

of the Secretary of Defense, and, most recently, as an 

colonel, has been Director of the Strategic Studies Ins

of the U.S. Army War College. Dr. Wortzel’s books in

Class in China: Stratification in a Classless S

(Greenwood Press, 1987), China’s Military Moderniz

International Implications (Greenwood, 1988)

Dictionary of Contemporary Chinese Military H

(Greenwood, 1999). In addition to these books, h

regularly published articles and monographs on 

security matters. Dr. Wortzel is a graduate of the A

Forces Staff College and the U.S. Army War Colleg

attended the National University of Singapore. He e

his B.A. from Columbus College, Georgia, and his M.

Ph.D. from the University of Hawaii.

336
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

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