FUTURE LEADERSHIP, OLD ISSUES,

NEW METHODS

Douglas V. Johnson II

Editor

June 2000
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ISBN 1-58487-024-9

ii
Foreword ................................

1. Introduction

Douglas V. Johnson II.................

2. Information, Knowledge and Wisdom:

 Leader Development Implications

 for The Army After Next

Kevin J. Bergner......................

3. Proliferating Decisionmakers: 

 Root Cause of the Next Revolution

 in Military Affairs

Arthur J. Corbett .....................

4. The New Math for Leaders:

 Useful Ideas from Chaos Theory

Glenn W. Mitchell ....................

5. Educating Junior Military Officers

 for the Information Age

Andre H. Sayles......................

 6. A Proposal for Designing Cognitive Aids

 for Commanders in the 21st Century

Lawrence G. Shattuck.................

iii
Chapter 2

Figure 1. Information-Knowledge-Wisdom

 Definitions .........................

Figure 2. Chess. ..........................

Figure 3. Tactical-Operational-Strategic

 Relationships .......................

Figure 4. Organizational Strata and Functional

 Domains ...........................

Chapter 5

Figure 1. Information Operations Relationships

 across Time ........................

Figure 2. Information Warfare Systems

 Engineering at NPS .................

Table 1. Education Requirements for Military

 Officers ............................

Table 2. Education Opportunities for New

 Officers ............................

Chapter 6

Figure 1. Major Components of the Army

 Tactical Command and Control

 System (ATCCS) Architecture..........

Figure 2. Decision Tree Depicting the Rational

 Decisionmaking Model for a Commander

 prior to the Onset of Hostilities ........

iv
Each year, the Army After Next Seminar studen

asked to orient their Strategy Research Papers on topi

are potentially relevant to future defense programs. 

years is a challenging time horizon for planning. Thirty 

ago, the United States Army was deeply involved in Vi

and in the Cold War. Officers could reasonably expect t

repetitive tours in Southeast Asia interspersed with 

along either the Korean Demilitarized Zone o

Inter-German Border. The tension between some

guerrilla, sometimes major warfare in the Pacific a

prospects of nuclear war in Europe made any projectio

future like that which we currently enjoy highly unlike

we are now asking officers to make such prognosticat

that they might be less surprised by whatever futur

eventuate.

The authors of the following papers have accepted, fo

of argument, that the future leadership environmen

conform to a paradigm in which time and distance w

compressed while operational scope and information 

enormously expanded. Although there is consensus o

paradigm, the particulars are not well-deve

Nevertheless, these authors put forward recommend

that, although focused on a distant future condition, h

much application to today as they do for that future. Car

maintain the essential differences between leaders

business and industry and military operations, they hig

some of the most important and promising developme

leadership education and training. Their papers d

serious consideration.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

v
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Douglas V. Johnson II

The monographs here assembled are the wo

students in both the AY98 and AY99 Army After 

Seminar at the U.S. Army War College. Their focus is 

leadership development component of the human 

organizational dimension of the Army After Next Prog

While the ultimate shape of the Army After N

unclear, a consensus has emerged from the broader st

conducted through the Training and Doctrine Com

(TRADOC) and elsewhere that the future comman

leadership challenge will be significant. If a com

transformation of warfare occurs, as some pos

accompanying transformation of command and leade

may likewise be required. This is not to say that the ba

leading soldiers is likely to change, but it suggests th

art of command, in which leadership is a compone

likely to be significantly transformed. The oper

premise is that the tempo of operations will increas

scope of action at each level will expand; the 

constraints for mission accomplishment will diminish

the tools for gaining and obtaining information 

proliferate and provide near-perfect friendly 

significantly improved knowledge of the enemy.

Lieutenant Colonel Kevin J. Bergner’s chapter rec

this premise and examines in detail perceived misma

between sets of cognitive requirements. If tomor

leaders need to know more about more in less time 

today, something has to change; and those change

answer to the “How To?” questions, are the ba

Bergner’s argument. Among his most intrig

propositions is our ability to develop “tacit knowl

action-oriented knowledge, acquired without the h

others, that substitutes for the “On the Job Training

1
the concept of “consilience,” the ability to maneuver ra

among cognitive domains—"a jumping together" a

author describes it—to produce a useable explanat

events. In this chapter, his work connects to Ber

through the need for cognitive development. Cor

monograph has a different focus, however, as he sug

that the root cause of the next Revolution in Military A

(RMA) will only come about with the proliferati

decisionmakers. In one sense this is a manifestation 

emerging consensus that the only way to manag

fast-paced, widely-dispersed, simultaneously exe

future operations is to accept a much flatter, 

hierarchical command structure. The very thought of s

change is unsettling, partly because some of its roots 

the business world. In that world profits are the goal a

soldier should be willing, rightly, to eq

profit-generating mechanisms with the life and 

decisions involved in combat mission accomplish

Corbett takes the reader through a rapid historical rev

dispersed military decisionmaking, then review

business literature as well. He also touches on the 

sciences of chaos and nonlinearity, noting the gr

proliferation of complex adaptive systems. At this poi

reinforces Bergner’s depiction of the future wa

environment, some aspects of which are already evid

contemporary operations.

Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence G. Shattuck 

Permanent Professor in the Department of Beha

Science and Leadership at the U.S. Military Academ

“Proposal for Designing Cognitive Decision Aid

Commanders in the 21st Century” is based upo

research and personal observations of a series of exe

conducted in June 1997. His research concluded 

digitization and decisionmaking have a long way to 

achieve maturity. Employing historical example

illustrates several decisionmaking models prominent 

literature. Shattuck argues that human cognitive acti

2
g

g qgp

operations, and that the Army ought to take the time n

fully investigate which systems are best—even at the c

delayed fielding of some systems.

Math for Leaders is probably enough to scare 

readers off, and Colonel Glenn Mitchell’s subtitle, 

From Chaos Theory, could be further motivation to ski

chapter altogether. The reader who succumbs to those 

fears will be the poorer for doing so. Yes, chaos the

complex and is often described with mathematical form

that make even the best engineer or artilleryman w

despair. But Mitchell’s self-appointed task is not o

explain the essentials of chaos theory in readable En

but to present that theory as something useful to mi

commanders. For those who are still skeptical, we str

recommend Alan D. Beyerchin’s monograph, “Claus

Non-linearity and the Unpredictability of War,” 

accessible in Coping With the Bounds, edited by 

Czerwinski (Washington: Institute for National Str

Studies, National Defense University, 1998). Mi

describes the Newtonian world, with its characte

linearity, in which we all came to maturity. He then m

into the emergence of chaos theory and the Non-

Military Organization. Among his recommendation

startling proposition that jointness, when carried to

may stultify by reducing inherent chaos below an ess

level of creativity.

Colonel Andre H. Sayles is a Permanent Professor 

Department of Electrical Engineering at the U.S. Mi

Academy. As one might expect, his concerns are for the 

educational proficiencies required to fully understan

effectively practice his discipline. His chapter, “Edu

Junior Officers for the Information Age,” addresses wh

perceives to be a required fundamental competen

future military leaders. He lays out a descripti

information operations and relates their centrality to f

operations to the requirement for technical proficienc

3
p

pgg

career that will ensure essential competence in the f

officer corps.

In sum, these monographs offer a collection of id

response to a perceived future leadership environ

Some offer solutions that are available right now, som

later, but all of them suggest that it is time to focus o

issues, analyze them, and set to work on overco

barriers to progress. One may argue that adoption 

these suggestions would set leadership education 

training on its ear. With the exception of Sayles’ propo

revamp and reorient basic and continuing educatio

more electronic disciplines, all the proposals cou

implemented today with a solid promise of signi

improvement in officer education across the board

worth considering.

4
CHAPTER 2

INFORMATION, KNOWLEDGE AND WISD

LEADER DEVELOPMENT IMPLICATIO

FOR THE ARMY AFTER NEXT

Kevin J. Bergner

There is an evolving mismatch in the U.S. Army be

the strategic environment and institutional l

development. To prepare soldiers to lead in the Army 

Next, the developmental process must be accelerate

enriched through utilization of emerging technolog

performance enhancement techniques.

THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF THE ARMY AFT

NEXT

As the Army rapidly progresses into the informatio

the professional dialogue concerning how to harnes

enormous potential of information becomes more inte

is too frequently centered on equipment/techn

solutions as opposed to human performance solution

Army After Next initiative is a rare example wh

healthy balance between equipment-technology and h

performance is emerging. Maintaining this foc

becoming ever more challenging as the allure of high-p

high-technology equipment and digitization oversh

the more “touchy-feely” explorations of human beha

science and leadership.

Recent operational experience reinforce

fundamental importance of the human dimen

particularly to leadership. There is little disagreemen

leader development played a central role in the A

decisive combat victories in Panama and the Gulf W

well as in the military operations other than war in 

and Bosnia. Indeed, most senior military leaders po

the Army’s institutional commitment to leader de

5
p

overwhelming successes.

1

Another consideration which compels an enduring 

on leader development is that the human dynamics 

Army of Excellence culture (1986-present) wil

necessarily remain constant as we move further in

information age. In that regard, there already are glim

of the potential effect that at least one institution

media—may have on the learning patterns and v

formulation of future soldiers and leaders.

For example, the average number of shifts in atte

required of a viewer during a typical hour of tele

programming exceeds 800. That is more than 13 shif

minute. One result among students is “diffi

concentrating in classrooms and impatience with an

of issues and ideas beyond a few minutes.”

2

 Clearly

raises concern for future Army leader development tra

and education. Alternately, it may suggest po

implications for leader capacity to rapidly pr

increasing amounts of information.

By age 18, young people now entering the Army 

spent 11,000 hours in the classroom and 22,000 

watching television. They have seen more than 75

commercials, “each crafted to short-circuit judgmen

stimulate irrationality and gullibility to buy someth

These are troubling implications for developing the s

intuitional judgment, character and values that f

Army soldiers must have if they are to be member

values-based organization.

These facts represent just the tip of the informatio

iceberg. They also illustrate that human performa

vulnerable to a variety of influences. By inference, l

development for the Army After Next is no less susce

to changes in the strategic environment.

6
MISMATCHES WITH LEADER DEVELOPMEN

Throughout this century and particularly durin

Army of Excellence era, the Army made a concerted ef

match leader knowledge and experience to the appro

level of operational responsibility. A junior lieutenan

responsible for directing and executing tasks in a rela

well-bounded tactical environment, consistent wit

level of training and experience. A colonel, on the 

hand, was generally performing in a more abstrac

complex environment, consistent with 20(+) yea

experience and education. A robust leader and tra

development program emerged in the late 1970s 

provided leaders a progressive and sequential educa

system to prepare them first for the tactical, 

operational, and ultimately the strategic lev

responsibility. The result was a fairly strong match be

level of thought, level of war, and level of institu

training and leader development. Today, ther

glimmers of change in two areas which, if left unatte

may dramatically alter the relevance and henc

effectiveness of the Army’s leader development system 

and even more profoundly, by 2025 for the Army After 

The first change is a shift in leader focus 

information gathering to rapid learning. It is driven b

broad application of information technology and resu

information overload. The most direct implication for l

development is an increasing need to focus on “ho

think, as opposed to “what” to think, and to accelera

development of rapid learning skills.

The second area of change is as a shift from a linea

compartmented relationship between tactical, operat

and strategic levels of war to a more over-lappin

inter-connected relationship. Leader decisions a

tactical level now may have direct consequences a

strategic level. This change is driven by the incre

complexity of operations such as peace implementat

7
y 

implication for leader development is the ne

purposefully nurture strategic savvy earlier in profes

development, as opposed to waiting until the 20th y

service.

These indications of mismatch between l

development and the emerging operational environ

are defined principally by a universally broader acc

information and a more complex operating environ

For the purposes of further discussion and examinatio

terms cognitive mismatch and operational mismatch w

used to describe these two challenges for Army After 

leader development.

COGNITIVE MISMATCH:

INFORMATION-KNOWLEDGE-WISDOM

Army After Next Leaders will have access to m

decision-relevant information than ever before, but there wil

too little time to consider it sufficiently.

Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege

(U.S. Army Retired

The evolution of the Encyclopedia Britannica prov

useful start point in examining the differences be

information, knowledge, and wisdom in the inform

age. In 1768, the 3-volume encyclopedia was limited, 

the information available, but by the printing and bi

technology. Today the 32-volume Encyclopedia conta

million words and 23,000 illustrations. In computer t

it equals a gigabit of data that can now be transmitte

fiber-optic lines in about a second.

4

 No matter how fast 

be transmitted though, it is still more information tha

one person could ever know, because the human abi

test, learn, or memorize it is inadequate.

The enormous amount of information in 

Encyclopedia Britannica and the capability to acc

quickly is symbolic of the information environment evo

8
y g 

an overload of information available to the leader w

an accompanying improvement in human thinkin

learning skills. Fully understanding this challenge req

a more detailed examination of the cognitive process an

relationship between information, knowledge, and wis

As leaders mature, they progress thr

developmental stages that reflect the increasing comp

of thinking processes.

5

 These stages are not deter

solely by the increased sophistication of a leader’s cog

processes, but are deeply affected by the depth, breadt

complexity of the information the leader is processin

the simplest terms, Figure 1 shows a cognitive hier

consisting of information, knowledge, and wisdom.

The relevance of this hierarchy to leader develop

can be illustrated simply by relating it to the game of 

9

Information

• Data collected from the environment and processed into a us

form. (FM 100-6)

• Unprocessed data of every description which may be used in 

production of intelligence. The meaning a human assigns to dat

(Joint Pub 1-02)

Knowledge

• Information that has been tested and accepted as factual.

 (FM 100-6)

• Facts, including procedures, that have been learned and ca

reproduced from memory. (Jacques, Requisite Organization)

Wisdom

• Use of judgment to give knowledge relevance within a sp

situational context. (FM 100-6)

• Soundness of judgment about the nature of people and the w

(Jacques, Requisite Organization)

Figure 1. Information-Knowledge-Wisdom Definitio
g 

is only useful if your intent is to play the game competi

or develop a mastery of the game. That requires pra

memorization, and experiential learning to develo

requisite knowledge and wisdom described in Figure 

The point is that enormous amounts of inform

about chess will not, in and of themselves, create a 

master. However, unfettered access to information, co

with rapid learning and experiential growth, off

opportunity to develop a tremendous knowledge 

wisdom advantage.

7

 The same is true for the Army 

Next. Leaders can have broad access to vast amou

information, but without rapid learning and experi

growth, they will not have the knowledge and wisd

exploit the information advantage.

The information age clearly demands redefining l

thinking requirements. The challenge for leaders is to 

from information deficit to information overload; to 

how to use that abundance of information and hav

wisdom to relate it to an increasingly complex ope

environment. The Army must shift focus from tea

what to think, to how to think, and adopt rapid lea

10

From an Information perspective, chess is . . .

• A game of strategy in which various pieces are moved in combin

to attempt to capture the opponent’s pieces.

From a Knowledge perspective, chess is . . .

• Memorizing which pieces can be moved according to the rules o

game and some understanding of how an opponent will approac

game. 

From a Wisdom perspective, chess is . . .

Figure 2. Chess.
qpgg

shift toward more rapid experiential growth in ord

exploit a wisdom advantage.

8

 Institutional relucta

make this transition will almost certainly broade

mismatch between cognitive challenges in the f

information environment and current leader develop

preparation. 

OPERATIONAL MISMATCH:

TACTICAL-OPERATIONAL-STRATEGIC 

Army After Next subordinate leaders will need experience a

expertise currently enjoyed by their superiors.

Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege

U.S. Army (Retire

The relationship between tactical, operational

strategic levels of military operations is the second are

shows an evolving mismatch between leader develop

and the future environment.

The challenge today, and arguably more so in the f

is that the sequential, progressive approach to l

development does not fully prepare junior leaders f

types of complex, strategic circumstances in which th

increasingly finding themselves. In the Cold Wa

example, tactical, operational, and strategic levels o

were separated by echelon of experience. A lieute

actions had an impact at the tactical level which wa

where the training and leader development system fo

his preparation.

Today, that lieutenant’s or captain’s actions increa

may have strategic implications, as seen recently in B

and Haiti. For the most part, however, their institu

and leader development training remains consistent 

their conventional war fighting responsibilities and ra

the tactical level. General William W. Hartzog des

this emerging mismatch as a shift from a linear relatio

11
 between tactical, operational and strategic environme

a non-linear relationship as shown in Figure 3.

9

 Behavioral scientist Colonel George B. Forsythe 

frame this phenomenon in terms of organizational 

and functional domains (Figure 4). He confirms the n

that cognitive requirements increase in complexity a

moves from the “production domain (tactical level) 

systems domain (strategic level).” Cognitive require

increase because the tasks at higher levels involve a g

number of elements, and generally longer time spans

12

Figure 3. Tactical-Operational-Strategic Relationsh

ORGANIZATIONAL STRATA AND FUNCTIONAL DOMAI

Stratum Time span Functional Domain

(vii) 4-star level 20 years Systems (Strategic level)

- unbounded environment, outward focus

- create complex systems, envision

 future

- build consensus, create culture

(vi) 3-star level 10 years - oversee complex systems

(v) 2-star level 5 years Organizational (Operational level)

- exist within bounded open system

- manage one complex system

(iv) Brigade CDR 2 years - oversee operating sub-systems

(iii) Battalion CDR 1 year Production (Tactical Level)

- direct one operating sub-system

- bounded within larger sub-system

- face-to-face

(ii) Company CDR 3 months - direct tasks

(i) Troops <3 months - perform tasks

Figure 4. Organizational Strata and Functional Doma
ygg

levels of complexity leaders face as a result of adva

through higher strata, generally associated with rank

of responsibility within the organization, 

approximation to a level of war or military operation 

than war (tactical, operational, and strategic).

The trend we observe in operations today, howev

increasing complexity and higher levels of responsibi

lower rank and duty positions. For example, an Inf

Battalion Commander implementing peace operatio

Brcko, Bosnia, was arguably operating in an organiza

domain, but with complexity commensurate with Str

or VI, and with profound strategic implications fo

actions. His training and leader development, howeve

only consistent with the Strata III level.

11

 Likewise, th

platoon leader patrolling the streets of Port-au-P

Haiti, before deciding whether to open fire on hostile p

must consider the broad strategic implications fo

tactical decision.

12

Behavioral science experts suggest that recent su

by tactical leaders confronted with strategic implica

happens, despite the mismatch, because the quality 

individual allows rapid adaptation. The question, 

becomes “Can the quality of individual leaders be sust

to assure success in the increasingly complex circumst

of the Army After Next?” Another way to phras

question is to ask how much more effective Army After 

leaders might be if strategic savvy was more purpos

nurtured earlier in their leader development.

13

 This is 

suggest that we can expect captains to develop 

strategic skills. Rather, it acknowledges that junior le

today and more so in the future, must have more str

comprehension than the existing leader develop

paradigm offers. The challenge is to explore the mea

accelerate and enrich that component of leader de

ment.

13
DEVELOPMENT

Part of the [leader development] solution will require us 

individuals and the Army as an institution to discern and ena

new methods. They may require us to alter or give-up some l

held and cherished cultural sentiments.

Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege

U.S. Army (Retire

Behavioral scientists also suggest we are entering 

era of previously unthinkable possibilities. There is a

universal agreement that, while enduring principle

basic qualities of leadership still appear relevant, ther

significant impetus in the area of learning new techn

to stimulate, condition, and develop leadership.

14

 We a

to be complacent with current rates and techniqu

development, and worse, resistant to examining eme

possibilities that offer profound, if not revoluti

opportunities to enhance leader development.

Among other techniques and technologies, there a

emerging capabilities to accelerate and enrich l

development for the Army After Next. In the near

(1998-2010) performance enhancement techniques, v

reality technology, and high-fidelity personal perform

assessments offer broad applicability. In the longer 

(2010-2025), expanded understanding of tacit know

coupled with bio-technology memory enhancement

provide the means to finely tune the learning proces

increase the efficiency of leader development.

Performance Enhancement (U.S. Military

Academy). 

For the past 9 years the U.S. Military Acad

Performance Enhancement Center has driven a fo

effort to explore methods of enhancing leader perform

through effective thinking, goal setting, s

management, attention, imagery, and relaxation. In 

14
p, pgg 

think” as opposed to the more traditional focus on “w

think.” The program’s charter is to build the key m

skills for the cognitive and conceptual complexity of th

century.

15

One specific approach is built around state-of-t

bio-feedback training. This tool for enhancing perform

utilizes sophisticated environmental-control to he

individual relax, focus on a specific thought, and 

mentally practice desired performance. For example, 

case of a football player, the challenge might be to im

quickness in identifying a complex defensive arrange

requiring an immediate decision whether to hand off o

with the ball. In this case, the player must learn h

visualize the situation to be encountered and then me

practice the appropriate responses. While tradi

football practice may accomplish that learning object

can be greatly enhanced when players mentally reh

their parts and can begin practice having already visu

the desired performance.

16

The same requirements apply to war fig

leadership. One specific example is the aide-de-camp f

Commanding General, Joint Readiness Training C

who I interviewed during a visit in 1994. When aske

he selected this lieutenant to be his aide, the general r

that he was unquestionably the best small unit lead

had ever seen.

When asked how he achieved such a level of excel

the lieutenant replied simply, “I can visualize the batt

better than my opponents.” He went on to say that it w

a result of more experience, but because of his exper

with the Performance Enhancement Center at the Mi

Academy.

As a football player at West Point, I routinely practic

visualizing the offenses that I would face and menta

practiced my responses. Though this isn’t football, I find tha

I use the same techniques, my decisions are quicker a

15
equate to engaging the enemy before he can engage me.

The Performance Enhancement Center is quick to 

out that there are no high-tech bio-feedback systems o

battlefield, but leaders who can learn the art of visua

the kinds of situations they will encounter and me

practice desired performance, can take that advantag

them where ever they may go.

17

For the Army After Next leader, the environmen

the decisions will be infinitely more complex than footb

small unit leadership. Nevertheless, improvement of l

confidence under pressure, concentration am

distraction, and composure during times of stres

clearly be accelerated and enriched through perform

enhancement techniques.

18

 The acquisition of state 

art electronic training devices, or similar technology, s

also be considered for improving peripheral awar

visual concentration, and reaction times. The pot

pay-offs for improving “how” a leader thinks are beco

increasingly evident through the data and experience 

Performance Enhancement Center at West Point.

Virtual Reality Simulations (Research Triangle

Institute).

The development and fielding of a prototype m

planning, rehearsal, and training simulation (MPRT

Fort Leavenworth’s Battle Command Battle Laborat

providing early insights into the war fighting pay

being able to visualize plans and alternative cour

action before having to conduct combat operations. 

simplest form, the MPRTS is an “interactive, t

dimensional computer representation of the terrai

force circumstances to be encountered during a m

operation.” The capability for leaders to examine “mu

options and visually experience the outcomes g

enhances the fidelity of the commander’s cogn

analysis.” In many respects, it also allows him to 

16
y y pp

actual operation.

19

Aside from it’s primary purpose of providing an a

battle command, the MPRTS has another useful appli

directly related to leader development. By providing le

the means to “virtually” experience actual circumstan

past operations or interpersonal encounters, 

interactive environment, the potential exists to crea

kinds of critical experiential learning from which impo

tacit knowledge emerges. The result is the institu

capacity to “teach” tacit knowledge through v

experiences. For the Army After Next this equates 

opportunity to accelerate individual leader learnin

develop knowledge and wisdom-based leader compete

vital for success in the complex environments of 2025

efficiencies of Virtual Reality learning also offer dra

improvements in time management. What would nor

take up to 10 classroom days of instruction ca

accomplished in as little as 1.5 days with Virtual R

media.

20

Personal Performance Assessment: Strategic

Management Simulations (Penn State Univers

The level of complexity involved in strategic thin

interpersonal relationships, and decisions arg

demands specific capabilities not necessarily cons

with individual competencies at lower levels of leade

The challenge is to first accurately gauge an indivi

propensity to perform at the strategic level, and 

condition desired responses that transcend any one 

any one task. Dr. Siegfried Streufert’s Stra

Management Simulations are “scenario based simula

which place leaders in realistic settings that 

observation and analysis of how they perform.”

21

 Not 

the Army War College’s Strategic Crisis Exe

individuals perform strategic planning and con

emergencies requiring more extemporaneous 

17
pg 

computer-based measurement of various aspec

performance, the simulation generates “profil

effectiveness” which are predictive of success.

22

The capacity not only to predict individual succes

to condition desirable performance distingu

Streufert’s work from other simulations. In additio

breadth of performance indicators for “complex, inter

situations, and fluid environments” is remark

particularly given reliability of the validity coeffi

exceeding .60.

23

As the Army After Next Wargame series contin

explore the collective dimensions of time and knowle

the strategic level, the development of a stra

simulation model to examine the quality of l

competence offers a parallel means to enhance str

leader skills in complex environments. Additionall

insights into individual planning and decisionmaking 

an opportunity to enhance the fidelity of future Army 

Next wargames.

Tacit Knowledge: (U.S. Military Academy and Y

University). 

Every Army leader learns personal lessons 

experiences in what we typically refer to as the “sch

hard knocks.” It is the school of the motor-pool, the 

road-march, the rifle range, and countless other exper

on the job. Collectively, these lessons amount 

individual’s “tacit knowledge” or the practical know

necessary to succeed.

24

Tacit Knowledge refers to action-oriented know

acquired without help from others, that allows indiv

to achieve goals they value.

25

 It differs from aca

knowledge in that it is goal-oriented and acquired w

direct teaching. Extensive research proves that 

knowledge is extremely relevant in predicting perform

18
, g

classroom academic performance.

26

 The study of 

knowledge, therefore, offers compelling insights as w

opportunities for developing leaders for the Army 

Next. 

A 7-year joint study recently completed by the 

Military Academy, Yale University, and the Army Res

Institute demonstrates that tacit knowledge ca

extracted from individual leaders. It offers some 

insights into the ways leaders use tacit knowledge. 

personal lessons are “best related as stories, thoug

actual leadership lessons are frequently difficu

articulate and must be coached out by skilled intervi

and then converted using a complex set of analytical to

It should be noted that this study specifically focus

“leader” tacit knowledge as opposed to “technical” 

knowledge about specific battlefield operating syste

other subjects. That type of tacit knowledge exists as 

though is not the focus here.

Researchers found that the content of military l

tacit knowledge varies by organizational level and, pe

not surprisingly, the tacit knowledge for a particular 

reflects the leadership issues and challenges at that 

For example, at platoon level, establishing credibilit

authority over others with generally greater experien

common theme in their military leadership tacit 

ledge.

28

At company level, the emerging need to tak

institutional perspective is added to the challenge of 

leadership. A company commander’s increased disc

(as compared to the platoon level) is reflected in his 

knowledge about directing and supervising others

other company level tacit knowledge theme cente

requirements to balance subordinates needs 

supporting the higher headquarters. In that regard

knowledge about cooperating with others and bala

mission accomplishment is dominant.

29

19
, yg 

developmental change. Tacit knowledge for protectin

organization and managing organizational chan

characteristic at this echelon. Tacit knowledg

communicating is uniquely centered on indirect me

and systems. Knowledge about dealing with 

performers is the other distinguishing aspect of leade

for the battalion commander.

30

Aside from the leadership insights, the real power 

body of research lies in the potential to structur

organize experiential learning in such a way as to acce

and enrich those high-payoff opportunities. The 

specifically focused on leadership knowledge as oppo

technical knowledge, but there appears to be a sim

profound opportunity to enhance experiential learn

that area as well. Finally, the research also prove

capability to export or share tacit knowledge. Interest

the researchers consider this to be the least prom

implication because the real power of tacit knowle

largely derived from its contextual source, which a

point is enormously difficult to replicate.

31

Corporate and commercial perspectives on exp

and sharing tacit knowledge differ from the mi

research conclusions. This is illustrated in at leas

software application specifically designed for the purp

sharing tacit knowledge. The “6DOS Interpersonal Li

Technology” is a system based on the theory of interper

linkages known as the Six Degrees of Separation or 6

It facilitates sharing or exporting tacit knowled

electronically connecting people who need answers to 

who have them. The stated purpose of the software 

“discover, track, and promote the conversion of uns

expertise into a form that is useful to customers, ve

and employees.” It’s marketing strategy centers o

notion that tacit knowledge is a tremendously va

corporate asset.

32

20
, p

tacit knowledge for any of the three purposes disc

above has the potential to broadly enhance and acce

the learning of leadership competencies relevant t

Army After Next. Future studies should couple 

knowledge with emerging simulations techno

bio-technology memory enhancers, and perform

enhancement strategies, to gain broader understand

the potential impact.

Bio-technology Memory Enhancement (Militar

Health Services System).

The 1997 Military Health Services Study predict

over the next 20 years, biotechnology will take h

health beyond our traditional treatment focus on cur

preventing illness and into the realm of enhanceme

improving human performance. “Enhancemen

memory, cognitive processing and physical capacit

gradually be accepted as normal.”

33

Biochemical enhancement of memory is one area w

research is in full swing. Scientists at Cold Spring H

Laboratory on Long Island are examining proteins 

underlie memory and learning, pinpointing genes 

produce and control those functions. Helicon Therap

has since grown out of that research to pursue a fo

effort to develop drugs to both treat memory los

enhance normal memory functioning. Their res

suggests that by the time the Army After Next com

fruition, the ability to stimulate specific cognitive activ

the brain will be mature enough to dramatically im

certain human intellectual performance.

34

When used in conjunction with advanced strate

virtual simulations, and performance enhance

techniques centered on how to learn, the potenti

cognitive enhancement through biotechnology is prof

They also suggest almost limitless implication

21
g g p

Army After Next.

CONCLUSIONS

Research demonstrates that doing business as 

threatens to erode the relevance and effectiveness 

existing leader development system. It also suggest

there are viable means to accelerate and enrich l

development to compensate for those evolving misma

caused by changes in the strategic environment.

Sophocles said, “Wisdom outweighs any wealth.” 

as today, knowledge requires time and experien

evolve.

35

 Our Army’s 25-year institutional commitm

leader development yielded extraordinary results a

small amount of wisdom at every level. The challenge f

future is three-fold. First, and foremost, the Army 

fight to preserve the integrity of the existing, p

system. Second, to sustain the leader develop

advantage in the future, the Army must be willi

examine new technologies and emerging capabilities

finally, the institution must exercise the courage to be

more aggressive in stimulating leader development.

The mismatch between the human capacity to ha

more complex operating environment and the inform

requirements generated by it are troubling. It 

represents a useful catalyst to push the quality and p

leader development ahead, particularly as it relates to 

senior leader competencies for the Army After Nex

must seize the opportunity to develop the possibilit

improving leader development and our institut

capacity to groom the leaders of the Army After Next

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. Walter F. Ulmer, Jr., “Military Leadership into the 21st C

Another ”Bridge Too Far?,"Parameters, Vol. XXVIII, Spring 199

22
2. Vincent R. Ruggiero, “Thinking Instruction in the 21st Ce

Speech delivered at the 6th International Conference on Th

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, July 18

3. Ibid.

4. Joseph Esposito, “Future of Knowledge,” Speech delivere

Smithsonian Institute, Washington DC, May 10, 1993.

5. Elliott M. Jaques, Requisite Organization: The CEO’s 

Creative Structure and Leadership, Arlington, VA: Cason Hall, 

16.

6. Ibid., pp. 33-40.

7. Elliott M. Jaques, Executive Leadership: A Practical g

Managing Complexity, Arlington, VA: Cason Hall, 1994, p. 53.

8. Huba Wass De Czege and Jacob Biever, Battle Comma

Teamwork: Realizing the Potential of 2020 Technologies, Fort M

VA, 1998, p. 3.

9. General William W. Hartzog, “Laying Foundations from 

XXI to the Army After Next,” Speech delivered to the Associatio

United States Army, Orlando, FL, February 16, 1998.

10. Ibid.

11. Colonel George B. Forsythe, “Cognitive Frames of Re

and Strategic Thinking,” Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 

1989, p. 14.

12. Lieutenant Colonel Steven R. Layfield, U.S. Army, Tas

1-18 Commander, Brcko, Bosnia-Hercegovina. Interview by 

February 24, 1998.

13. General William W. Hartzog, U.S. Army, Commande

Army Training and Doctrine Command, Post-Haiti After Action 

conducted November 1994.

14. Lieutenant Colonel Scott Snook, U.S. Army, Departm

Behavioral Science and Leadership, United States Military Ac

West Point, NY, telephone interview by author, February 23, 1

23
15. Walter F. Ulmer, Jr., “Military Learning: A Practi

Perspective,” in Tacit Knowledge in Professional Practice, Ro

Sternberg and Joseph A. Horvath, eds., Hillsdale, NJ: La

Erlbaum Associates, 1998, p. 22.

16. Lieutenant Colonel H. Michael Hughes and Ste

Cornelio, Peak Performance Program Fact Sheet, West Poi

Center for Enhanced Performance, U.S. Military Academy, 1998

17. Ibid.

18. Hughes and Cornelio, p. 2.

19. Ibid.

20. Professor Robert F. Helms, “Mission Planning and Re

Trainer,” Research Triangle Institute, http://www.rti.org

mprts.html, Internet.

21. Professor Robert F. Helms, “Virtual Reality,” R

Triangle Institute, http://www.rti.org/vr.html.

22. Dr. Siegfried Streufert, Strategic Management Simu

Harrisburg, PA, p. 2.

23. Ibid., p. 12.

24. Ibid., p. 15.

25. Professor Robert J. Sternberg, “Testing Common 

American Psychologist, November 1995, pp. 912-927.

26. Ibid.

27. Professor Robert J. Sternberg, “For Whom the Bell Curv

A Review of the Bell Curve,” Psychological Science, Vol. 6, 

September 1995, pp. 257-261.

28. Colonel George B. Forsythe, “Experience, Knowled

Military Leadership,” in Tacit Knowledge in Professional P

Robert J. Sternberg and Joseph A. Horvath, eds., Hillsda

Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1998, pp. 9-11.

29. Ibid, p. 13.

30. Ibid, p. 14.

24
31. Ibid, p. 15.

32. Ibid, pp. 24-25.

33. Professor Merrick Furst, “Connecting to Tacit Knowl

6DOS,” Carnegie-Melon University, http://www.6dos.com. 

34. Science Applications International Corporation, White 

Biotechnology—Military Applications, Washington DC: The S

Assessment Center, December 1995, p. 11.

35. Robert Olson, Military Health Services System (MHS

Focused Study on Biotechnology and Nanotechnology, Washing

U.S. Department of Defense, July 29, 1997, pp. 2-41.

36. Jill and Stuart Briscoe, Family Book of Christian Value

IL: Chariot Publishing/Cook Communications, 1995, p. 131.

25
CHAPTER 3

PROLIFERATING DECISIONMAKERS

ROOT CAUSE OF THE NEXT

REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Arthur J. Corbett

INTRODUCTION

In his recent book, Consilience, Edward O. W

asserts, “The greatest enterprise of the mind has bee

will always be the attempted linkage of the sciences an

humanities.”

1

 Explaining the origin of the apt title f

book, Wilson defines consilience as “a jumping togeth

knowledge by the linking of facts and fact-based t

across disciplines to create a common ground wo

explanation. This chapter addresses the possibility 

“revolution in military affairs” (RMA) from the 

perspective of interdisciplinary consilience. It is an at

to expand the RMA debate beyond its current empha

new technologies and innovative concepts, and to foc

the human dimension of warfare. Following the admo

of Sun Tsu to first “know yourself,” we must expan

range of disciplines from which military institutions d

insight into human potential if we are to achiev

consilience of thought required to produce a ge

revolution in military affairs.

Discerning the character of future war is more a p

of intuitive appreciation than logical proof. Consequ

this chapter will embrace a methodology of consilience 

a variety of disciplines to demonstrate the relative dir

and potential velocity of the next RMA. It will examin

emerging lessons of chaos and complexity theory in li

the theory and nature of war, compare economic syste

discern the effect of proliferating decisionmakers, inte

the historical lessons of previous RMAs, and adapt le

27
py y y p

insight on the next revolution in military affairs.

THESIS

A “proliferation of battlefield decisionmakers” will 

proximate cause of the next RMA. The disconti

advance in military capability will be harnessed b

nation that first reforms the institutional value

organizational structures of its military forces to un

the full potential of human nature. The next RMA 

initially be dominated by the first nation to captur

essence of the free market dynamic, i.e., the proliferat

trusted and empowered decisionmakers, and to incorp

that dynamic into its military institutions. That na

forces will develop an entrepreneurial battlefield etho

values initiative and trust over order and inspection; w

success is determined not by a smarter centra

coordinator or adherence to a rigid plan, but th

decentralized initiative and timely decisions to e

fleeting opportunity.

HISTORICAL PRECEDENT

Current efforts to precipitate an RMA se

incorporate emerging technologies into innov

operational concepts to produce synergistic mi

capability. Numerous historical examples, from blit

and amphibious assault, to the development of c

aviation and nuclear weapons, validate the effectiven

the conceptual and technological method to evolve de

force on the battlefield. Nevertheless, this approa

evolutionary, not revolutionary. While the result o

evolutionary method may be operationally or strateg

decisive in the short term, the effects will not c

adversaries to radically modify their social structure

political institutions in order to field competitive capa

Human ingenuity being what it is, the duration of tech

or operational dominance over an adversary is limited

28
gy qqy , 

improved, once it is shared on the common laboratory 

battlefield. Yet genuine, and somewhat enduring, RM

occur. The French “nation in arms,” created followin

French Revolution, is a particular example wort

attention.

The French Revolution changed the status of the F

people from royal subjects to national citizens. Alth

this did not alter the education, intelligence, health, o

of the individual citizen, it dramatically increased the 

of responsibility, loyalty, and initiative that he was w

to exercise in defense of the state. Consequently

intangible factors of initiative and motivation 

calamitous for the kingdoms of Europe. Unable to co

with a nation that could mobilize its entire populat

support of national wars, the monarchies, with 

traditionally recruited, trained and fielded armies, su

repeated defeats. The levee en masse was a genuine 

achieved without any significant disparity between na

in the technical means of war. The French Army leve

its intangible advantages, derived from the enh

empowerment of its populace, to achieve extraord

success in battle.

The operational dominance generated by the F

RMA was long lived when compared to conce

innovations such as blitzkrieg, or technical advance

as gas warfare and the atomic bomb. The defeated 

armies, entrenched in military systems support

benevolent despotism, were slow to comprehend or 

acknowledge the changes. The difficulty of cha

emotionally charged social and political attitudes o

duration, what contemporary thinkers might c

paradigm shift, is far more challenging and complex 

adjusting to technical innovations. Conseque

nontechnical and nonmethodological RMAs ha

precedent for being rare, but more enduring. The Prus

for example, were not about to subject the mi

29
g

the Great, to rigorous analysis. Victory in their last 

war justified their contemporary methodology; their r

defeats were attributed to individual mistakes or 

disputes.

2

Denial, however, was not a method tolerated b

German military reformers. Under the rigorous intelle

leadership of General Gerhard von Scharnhors

German general staff was compelled to contemplate 

effect the French Revolution had on military capa

Enhancements in battlefield morale, initiative, leade

operational mobility, and flexible tactical doctrine 

among the many by-products of the revolution discern

Prussian military thinkers. Since the origins of 

enhanced military capabilities were found in 

institutions, they were overlooked in the first glan

traditional military theorists. Indeed, most Pru

officers accepted the existing social, political, economi

military structures of Prussian society and refus

consider nonmilitary factors in their operational ana

Scharnhorst saw this ignorance of French nat

character as the major reason for the Allied defeat.

4

Scharnhorst knew that war could not be studied in isolation

had to be analyzed in context. This meant that the scop

military history encompassed much more than just “milita

factors. Officers had to be taught to appreciate the soc

political, economic, technological, and moral forces t

influence military institutions and operations. The so-ca

“art of war” embraced all of these factors. Convincing 

members not to base their studies on exclusively military 

tactical considerations proved to be Scharnhorst’s m

formidable task.

5

Scharnhorst demonstrated that effective study 

French success on the battlefield required a m

disciplinary approach. Similarly, our ability to preci

or predict a future RMA necessitates a consilien

multidisciplinary insights. Of course, Scharnhorst’s 

interest lay in the operational effects the French Revo

30
p

p

contemporaries to observe the beneficial operational e

exhibited by the French and then study their c

Conversely, the architect of the next RMA must be a

cause or recognize social, political, and economic ch

that may be leveraged to produce enhanced opera

effects on the battlefield.

One enhancement the Prussians recognized was th

of tirailleur, or skirmisher tactics, by light infantry f

Among the members of Scharnhorst’s Milita

Gesellschaft was a Major Knesebeck, who had observ

French in six engagements. He noted that they 

employ “their entire infantry” as light forces “and 

decided superiority.” Knesebeck perceived:

It is here that the education of the individual is of such gr

benefit to the Republicans, because situations too often occ

during the combat of light troops in which the officer’s cont

ceases completely . . . in which each man acts on his own.

6

Scharnhorst was convinced that French mi

superiority was the direct result of a new French socia

political order and the most significant sign of these ch

was the greatly enhanced capability of the common F

soldier and junior officer to exploit his natural intelli

and independent judgment.

7

 In contrast to the Pru

fusilier, the French tirailleur was free to think and re

as part of a team. Scharnhorst’s biographer, Charles 

makes this point emphatically clear in The Enligh

Soldier:

The real problem here was the social, political, and mo

implications of training the third rank of the line battalion 

think and fight as individuals. The advent of the skirmish

marked the beginning of a new epoch in warfare, and his sp

embodied “the civil rights of the art of war.” No longer cou

the soldier be treated like “a mere machine.” Now he wou

have to be acknowledged as “an important participant” in a

tactical scheme. This is why the French Revolution had suc

tremendous impact on the art of war. It destroyed the shack

that had enslaved the will of the common soldier, and h

released a force unprecedented in the history of warfare. 

31
for a cause he believed in was unimaginable to most officers 

civilians . . .for most Prussian officers, skirmishing w

politically suspect and militarily unnecessary.

8

Scharnhorst’s reforms did not end with advoc

skirmisher tactics. He was a vociferous propone

combined arms divisions capable of indepen

operations. By providing subordinate commanders w

arms, he structured divisions and corps that could 

apart. In creating combined arms divisions, he emu

Napoleon; but he did Napoleon one better by creatin

Prussian general staff system. Scharnhorst not 

advocated the proliferation of decisionmakers at the ta

level; he recommended expanding the numb

decisionmakers at the operational level as well. In co

to Napoleon, who relied on his individual inst

Scharnhorst’s staff system enabled multiple combined 

forces to disperse and reconcentrate under the direct

separate commanders, in accordance with a comm

understood vision. The reforms Scharnhorst initiated

the staff system he helped to create, eventually br

about Napoleon’s defeat at Leipzig.

Although most of Scharnhorst’s reforms have 

universally adopted and are commonplace in mi

institutions today, they generated considerable contro

in his own age.

The idea of a soldier or officer who could think or 

independently, even without orders, was simply too horrify

and altogether unprofessional to those reared in the traditi

of Frederick the Great. Such notions would destroy the v

fabric of the Prussian Army.

9

But, Scharnhorst persisted. Although it took yea

his ideas to permeate the Prussian Army, his ac

eventually brought about the end of French imperi

Remarkably, and in contrast to the French exper

where a revolution in political affairs brought abo

upheaval in the military, it was the revolution i

Prussian military that prompted a liberalization of Ge

32
y ppp

the Prussians were forced to emulate them.

From this quick glance at the levee en masse and l

learned by the German reformers, we can glean insi

the characteristics of a genuine revolution in m

affairs. First, the national character of a people an

nature of their social and political institutions 

determine the capability and limitations of their mi

forces. The French RMA was not based upon technol

innovation or advantage. Instead, the advantage w

the force that was best able to expand the numb

competent decisionmakers and broaden the qualit

complexity of the decisions for which they were respon

Last, there is a strong tendency in highly developed mi

institutions to undervalue the competence and initiat

the individual soldier.

Significant to our study, this period of military h

begins a parabola of progress based on the decentraliz

of forces and the expansion of combat decisionma

Although rudimentary by contemporary standard

increased reliance upon the will, fortitude, and initia

the individual soldier was truly revolutio

Comprehending the changed social geometry, Scharn

positioned Prussia to be on the arc of the lofting parab

human potential. Later German military theorist

practitioners would build on this initial success 

advance higher on the path, with infiltration tactic

blitzkrieg.

10

 The RMA we seek today will be found still 

to the ever expanding apex of this same progre

parabola of individual initiative, decentralizati

authority and proliferation of decisionmakers.

 Napoleon inherited the changed social and po

conditions necessary to revolutionize warfare and exp

them comparatively soon after they occurred

Prussians slowly recognized that their deficien

operational capability resulted from asymmetries in 

and political factors, and sought to better compete o

33
y g y 

Had the French not been so quick to capitalize on 

social asymmetries for military ends, their mi

potential may have remained dormant and undiscover

years. This begs the obvious question; are there dor

and unexploited social or political changes that 

occurred since this last true RMA that can pr

unrealized asymmetries for development by 

contemporary military innovator?

ECONOMICS

The greatest asymmetry among modern nation sta

in the realm of economics. Comparative econ

demonstrates the great difference between free m

societies that leverage the will, creativity, initiative

ability to calculate risk by placing the authori

decisionmaking in the hands of their people, and 

centralized planned economies that do not

incontestable disparity of wealth produced by the 

market system compared to any centralized pla

competitor is ample evidence of what occurs when p

are empowered with the authority to make dec

pertaining to their fields of responsibility.

The typical socialist, centralized, planned econo

logical, linear, hierarchical, and scientific. If human n

and activity conformed to Newtonian principles of 

and effect, socialism might merit great accolade

bringing the complexity of economics under rat

organized and predictive control. Assuming near p

knowledge of resources, means of production, work

and population, via statistics the state itself collecte

equitable distribution of the fruits of national labor 

seem assured.

11

 The mystery for the logical, linear th

who often views reality through the narrow lens 

Newtonian paradigm, is that such a rational and “scie

process can fail so badly. Attempts by centra

government to impose order on an essentially c

34
will of the many, utterly failed in contrast to the compe

oriented free market system. Although centralized, pla

economies were obvious failures from the start, 

creators and their successors persisted in maintainin

system because it promised control of individuals, e

they could not control the economy. In the socialist 

hierarchical order and control was valued over 

efficiency and effectiveness.

In contrast, the free market system cr

opportunities for vast wealth, as individuals freely ch

create, interact, and decide across a wide variety of h

activities. Since there is no central coordinating autho

synchronize the activity, this decentralization of c

should, by any linear cause and effect theory, pr

massive social incoherence and chaos. Yet the very op

occurs. Bottom-up interactions between indivi

generate self-organizing, cooperative relationships 

optimize or mutually suffice to promote self-interest 

maximum efficiency. By accepting distributed res

bility, and ensuring commensurate decisionm

authority, the free market economy engages a nat

chaotic environment and responds with a flexible, ada

economic order that generates opportunity, wealth

social coherence.

The primary difference between the free market an

central planned economy is in whom the system trust

empowers to make decisions. The central planned eco

trusts the intellectual or experiential elite—a few 

smart or experienced individuals who “know” what 

The decisions are so vital, and the results so critical, th

leadership cannot allow the uninitiated to dabble 

complex details.

The market economy, on the other hand, finds the 

system far too difficult for even the most intel

individual or group of individuals to comprehend in d

Knowing the decisions are complex and the consequ

35
, p

possible. By empowering a larger number of intereste

not necessarily professional, decisionmakers, the m

economy engages chaos and develops a broad p

individuals experienced in performing withi

complexity. These individuals learn from and adapt 

market environment; capture fleeting opportunities a

occur; act on their own initiative; cooperate with 

neighbors to overcome common problems; take calcu

risks; and produce synergistic efficiencies in 

self-interest and quest for wealth. The colle

intelligence and energy of the many has proven to 

greater than the refined knowledge of the few. 

individuals will risk and fail, but because the hierar

pyramid has been flattened, fewer will be effe

Examples of both the failed and the successful contrib

the learning curve and adaptive response of all. Sin

many are engaged, the overall “system” learns and a

with remarkable speed. Multiple entrepreneurs, aler

initiative, are quick to discern and exploit fle

opportunity. 

Despite America’s almost 200 years experience w

nonlinear, free market economy, its military se

persist in seeking battlefield advantage by refining 

institutions modeled on centralized, linear, hierarc

Newtonian principles. As in the army of Frederic

Great, these principles have served our forces well ov

years; but like Frederick’s Prussian descendants, we 

soon find ourselves studying how we lost our advan

Similarities between our conventional mil

organization for war and a centralized planned econom

direct and obvious. Both are top down hierarchies r

upon the centralized planning of a few to direct the ene

the many. Execution is decentralized, to some exten

initiative outside the established plan is largely su

Focus is disproportionately directed on generating in

order and establishing control, rather than on engagin

enemy, generating a faster and more contin

36
ppg g pp

Organizational communications are constructed to 

information up and send direction down.

Conventional economics provides insight o

importance of proliferating decisionmakers to lev

human nature; the so-called “new economics” pr

examples of a decentralized decision process leveragin

new communications technologies. Kevin Kelly, exe

editor of Wired magazine and author of New Rules F

New Economy, combines the experience of cutting 

businesses with wisdom emerging from the biol

sciences and chaos and complexity theory. He pre

numerous examples of decentralized decisionm

profoundly improving productivity. A particularl

example is from Mexico:

Any process, even the bulkiest, most physical process, can 

tackled by bottom-up swarm thinking. Take, for example, t

delivery of wet cement in the less-than-digital economy 

rural northern Mexico. Here Cemex (Cementos Mexican

runs a ready-mix cement business that is overwhelming 

competitors and attracting worldwide interest. It used to 

that getting a load of cement delivered on time to 

construction site in the Guadalajara region was close to 

miracle. Traffic delays, poor roads, contractors who were

ready when they said they would be, all added up to an on-ti

delivery rate of less than 35%. In response, cement compan

tried to enforce rigid advance reservations, which, wh

things went wrong (as they always did), only made matt

worse (‘Sorry, we can’t reschedule you until next week

Cemex transformed the cement business by promising 

deliver concrete faster than pizza. Using extensive network

technology—GPS real-time location signals from every tru

massive telecommunications throughout the company, a

full information available to drivers and dispatchers, with 

authority to act onit—the company was able to promise tha

your load was more than 10 minutes late, you got a 2

discount.

Instead of rigidly trying to schedule everything ahead of ti

in an environment of chaos, Cemex let the drivers themselv

schedule deliveries ad hoc and in real time. The drivers form

a flock of trucks crisscrossing the town. If 3 contractors cal

37
site at that time would make the delivery. Dispatchers wo

ensure customer creditworthiness and guard against omissio

but the agents in the field had permission and the informa

they needed to schedule orders on the fly. Result: On-t

delivery rates reached about 98%, with less wastage 

hardened cement, and much happier customers.

12

How a Mexican company decentralized decisionm

and solved its problems of “just in time delivery” con

sharply with how Joint doctrine centralizes the deliv

air ordnance, and speaks volumes about institutional h

and proclivities. The Cemex example provides impo

insights on the growing inverse relationship bet

control and effectiveness. Kelly does not denigrat

important role of leadership in institutions, but he ma

clear that:

At present, there is far more to be gained by pushing 

boundaries of what can be done at the bottom than by focus

on what can be done at the top . . . The great benefits reaped 

the new economies in the coming decades will be due in la

part to exploring the power of decentralized and autonom

networks.

13

Despite the vast differences between economi

martial enterprises, war and economics share the 

driving common denominator—human nature. Theo

war and economics are both designed to explain 

maximize human dynamics in a complex endeavor. 

we learn about allocating decision authority from bu

models may not be directly applicable to a battl

environment, but the consiliance approach compels 

examine how extraordinary success in one fiel

influence another.

THEORY AND NATURE OF WAR

Our current military organization for battle fa

exploit the most obvious advantages of our na

character at the operational and tactical levels of 

Military organizations expend considerable effo

38
p

y 

suppresses initiative by narrowly allocating de

authority along functional lines, and then establishe

enforces procedures to keep everyone in their desig

lane. Holistic solutions and perspectives are preclud

administrative compartmentalization. Coordinat

rarely done between adjacent or supporting units w

the intervention—and associated friction—of a desig

coordinating authority. This can lead to econom

centralized management, but often at the expense of t

support. Bottom-up associations and solutions are stif

top-down administration.

The current system, however, is not without its m

and ultimately some form of linear process does 

organizational functioning. Some aspects of our w

particularly the physical dimension, are fairly 

represented by the linear Newtonian paradigm. How

as our glimpse of comparative economics suggests, 

human interactions, such as commerce and war, a

well replicated in the Newtonian model. The gen

Clausewitz was that he comprehended the nonlinear n

of war in an age that was energetically learning 

gratuitously applying the emerging theories of Newt

physics across a wide variety of disciplines. A student 

physical sciences in his own right, Clausewitz discern

critical incongruities between the interactions of wa

and the cause and effect relationships of the ph

sciences. He strongly resisted the proclivity of his a

submit the study of war to reductionist theories. Hi

study and experience suggested that scientific determ

was incompatible with the unpredictable nature of 

Linearity could not account for his observation that co

power accrued synergistically from both physica

intangible forces, and morale factors were dispr

tionately significant when compared to the physical m

Most significantly, Clausewitz understood that war 

dynamic process between two competing wills 

interacted in real time within an environment of 

39
, y

precluded predictability and certainty for Claus

causing him to eschew any attempts to reduce war 

action-reaction concept, such as a chess match

understood that in warfare, moves are not neces

sequential, but can become simultaneous.

Nevertheless, Clausewitz was a captive of his age

much of his writing is laced with metaphors heavily 

with terminology taken from the physical sciences. 

age enamored with science and Newton’s princ

Clausewitz lacked an overarching set of scientific prin

or explanations that would provide the terminolog

perspective needed to describe those aspects of wa

remained outside of Newtonian bounds. The complime

and emerging sciences of chaos and complexity t

provide us with the tools and terminology that, to 

degree, quantify Clausewitz’s qualitative insights.

CHAOS AND COMPLEXITY

Incorporating chaos and complexity theory i

consilience of RMA disciplines provides both an altern

conceptual paradigm and a more robust lexicon to de

the nature of war. The essential difference betwee

linear and the nonlinear approach to warfare i

contrasting ways they deal with war’s chaos 

uncertainty. 

The linear approach seeks to impose order on a c

environment by simplifying complexity through bre

problems into component parts. A great deal of attent

focused internally on organizational doctrine, co

measures, coordination techniques, and proced

Nonlinearity accepts chaos as inherent to warfare and 

to better adapt to that environment than the adversar

enemy is understood not only to be “reactive” as Claus

noted, but potentially interactive. The relative dec

action speed of adversaries engaged in conflict deter

the ability to generate operational tempo and gai

40
, , y y

mode. To achieve this decision cycle dominance, chao

complexity theorists advocate a proliferation of “co

adaptive systems” generating multiple decisions, tha

be deliberately “out of phase” with each other, to pr

constant stimulus to fatigue the centralized enemy de

process. Speed of adaptation will form another cycle s

to the traditional observation, orientation, decision, 

loop (OODA loop). Focus is on the adversary; discerni

intentions and interacting advantageously.

Nonlinear approaches seek to enhance chaos 

uncertainty if advantage can be gained, relative t

adversary, by faster decision and adaptation c

Complex organizational attempts to control chao

eschewed in favor of developing resilient organiza

structures that can accommodate changing co

circumstances and enemy innovation. Similarly, the e

is considered as a dynamic, adaptive, and resou

opponent, who himself is capable of generating su

and chaos.

Both linear and nonlinear models can be use

describing, interpreting, and conceptualizing the nat

war and its contemporary character. Arguably, in the 

massed, on-line formations, the linear model was no

suitable, but optimized. However, the growing comple

war, and knowledge of the inherent truths of the 

sciences will shift the paradigm by which we under

how the world works. More to the point, we will co

better understand how complex adaptive systems

mankind, work in a world that still responds to the 

principles of Newtonian physics. Today, the non

principles of chaos and complexity have begun to be v

as a competing paradigm with linearity. This percept

competition will transition to an understanding of how 

linear and nonlinear models are compatible, an

mutually exclusive ideas. Eventually both perspective

become complementary concepts that will enable thos

41
py py py

wisdom, wealth, and national power.

The chaos and complexity model will surpas

Newtonian model as the dominant template for f

military organization and innovation. Warfare will n

the first discipline to incorporate the principles of 

emerging theories; war will follow science, economic

business; where the natural truths of chaos and comp

theory are already having dramatic effect. Several f

will drive this paradigm of innovation.

First, warfare will grow in complexity. While 

always been a complicated undertaking, in past wars 

models were adequate to approximate the compara

limited number of battlefield variables. During ou

Civil War, for example, the adversaries were technolog

mirrored, and attempts to gain technological adva

were often immediately thwarted, as occurred wit

simultaneous fielding of the evenly matched Monito

Virginia ironclads. With the opposing forces using ide

weapons and tactics, the terrain became the pr

battlefield inconsistency. Extensive effort went 

understanding the nature of the terrain, with adva

often going to the commander who used it best. Toda

variables include a wide range of technological innova

that are employed not only on land and sea, but in t

and space as well. These many tangible uncertainties, 

from those introduced by human fog and friction, are s

produce myriad asymmetries on the future battlefiel

Second, adaptive preparation for future war wil

marginalize the utility of the centralized linear mo

organizing armies and procuring equipment

abundance of new technological innovations and “sy

of systems” will open countless technological variabl

the force developer to choose from. Process in

procedures for discerning requirements relative to ra

mutating enemy system capabilities will be far too s

adapt to dynamic battlefield conditions. The tim

42
g p

compounded by the need to select from a wider ar

technological options. Even advocates of linear m

attempting to surmount this problem acknowledge th

nonlinear introduction of emerging technologies 

challenge formal tools like Assumption Based Pla

(ABP) and that “Genuine intuition and exper

judgment may prove just as valuable as fo

decisionmaking tools, perhaps even more so.”

14

 Conn

the decisionmaking process for equipment selectio

development down to the unit level will field a wider v

of systems for experimentation in the crucible of b

With experience gained from battlefield intera

adequate systems can be introduced until more opti

systems evolve. The innovation, experimentation, fee

process will be continuous throughout the war. 

proliferation of innovators would be the biolo

equivalent of expanding the gene pool. Current proce

are “inbred” with commensurate results.

Third, the character of warfare will continue to gro

predictable, and the requirements to meet its ra

mutating challenges will emerge directly from 

battlefield. The relative advantages and disadvanta

new weapons and technologies will be largely undeterm

until they interact on the field of battle with new 

innovative enemy systems and concepts opposing them

uncertain number of quantitative and qualit

beginning variables that precedes interaction wit

enemy further complicates the existing challen

battlefield predictability that linear planning formul

designed to produce. Linear techniques are design

identify tangible and quantifiable requirements that c

used to assure predictable success. Statistical inform

on our own organization is rigorously pursued to 

planning and development schedules. Eventua

centralized process provides standardized equip

common to all. While some degree of centra

standardization is necessary for communications 

43
py, p

adaptation. Save for what soldiers have on hand 

foraging, captured enemy supplies and their 

expedients, neither the materials nor time are u

present on the battlefield to allow adaptation to take 

forward. Nor, traditionally, are the contractors 

habitually produce the weapons employed. The batt

innovation of the “Rhino Tank” to bust the hedgero

Normandy was a significant bottom-up technol

innovation led by enlisted soldiers. Similarly, 

Petersburg crater” produced by the Union miners 

Pennsylvania capitalized on unit unique “nitch know

to potential advantage. These events are atypical exa

of bottom-up initiative that sporadically punctuat

history of linear warfare. The limited availabil

examples of such initiatives demonstrates how succes

linear military organizations can suppress the innov

capability of otherwise “highly complex adaptive syst

If we choose to build on the nonlinear model, w

capitalize on the innovative potential that is latent 

soldiers and make it commonplace on the future battle

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Chaos and complexity theories are relevant t

inquiry into a potential revolution in military affai

only because these theories provide us with an enh

model to understand the dynamic nature of war

because they also suggest more optimized mod

command, based on realistic appraisals of human cog

and decisionmaking potential.

In his anthology of “Speculations on Nonlinear

Military Affairs,” entitled Coping with the Bounds, T

J. Czerwinski credits Martin Van Creveld for disce

three dominant methods of command 

control—direction, plan, and influence. He notes 

command systems are designed to address the “perv

underlying commander’s quandary—uncertainty 

44
,

of the three methods of command can be found as dom

in a contemporary U.S. service’s future force initiativ

The system supporting command by direction is the Arm

“Force XXI” and its digitized battlefield. The “System 

Systems” advocated by the immediate past Vice Chairman 

the Joint Staff is a command-by-plan approach. Fina

command by-influence is associated with maneuver warfare 

which the Marine Corps is doctrinally committed.

15

Command by direction is the oldest method of com

and control and extends from the beginning of prim

formation battles until the mid-1800s. It was the pre

method of kings and generals who could have line of 

observation and control over most of their force o

battlefield. The problem of uncertainty was resolved f

king by keeping the forces tight and within visual sign

distance. The digitized force seeks to replicate this le

visual simplicity for the commander with thick band 

and display screen icons.

The advent of modern weapons required dispersio

beyond visual range, so Command by Plan was develo

Frederick the Great. This methodology opt

“comprehensiveness over dynamism” and “inherently 

the disorderly nature of war as much as the adversary. 

futile quest to will order upon chaos.” Czerw

characterizes the command by plan method as “tr

flexibility for focus,” and notes that it has become the h

centralized command method of choice for most m

forces. Today’s variant of command by plan envisi

“system of systems” that provide “dominant battle

awareness” to conduct “precision warfare.” It drast

reduces information requirements by avoiding intera

with the adversary and simplistically focuses on com

and prioritizing target lists to destroy a limited set 

targets related to centers of gravity. To the extent pos

the contemporary version of this system reduces the e

to an inanimate set of targets. A finite number of e

reactions are “planned for” as branches and sequel

45
p, p, y 

is to be avoided via centrally controlled sta

technologies.

Command by Influence is designed to distr

uncertainty in a manner highly analogous to the 

market economy. What the commander wishes to infl

is articulated via mission type orders that effectively c

a general concept of operations and commanders i

Influence replicates the function of Adam Smith’s “inv

hand” as the uniting force behind a proliferati

decisionmakers. Command by influence interacts 

rather than avoids or simplistically reduces com

situations. 

. . . only the outline and minimum goals of an effort 

established in advance, effectively influencing all of the fo

all of the time. Unlike other command forms, this method ta

disorder in stride as “inevitable and even insofar as it affec

the enemy as well, desirable.” Great reliance is placed on 

initiative of subordinates based on local situational awaren

which translates to lowered decision thresholds. It relies 

self-contained, joint, or combined arms units capable 

semi-autonomous action. All of this activity occurs within 

bounds established by the concept of operations derived f

the commander’s intent.

16

Command by influence is the appropriate adaptat

the nonlinear, post-Newtonian realities of modern wa

It is optimized for an environment of uncerta

complexity, and unpredictability; where experi

intuition and pattern recognition are prized over tran

knowledge; and self-organization at the “edge of cha

favored over slower, static, hierarchical, centra

systems. The ability of decentralized and “dec

empowered” units to rapidly and advantageously in

with more intimate situational awareness is a treme

advantage over centralized systems which, howeve

connected by electrons, respond slower. Mo

communications technologies are useful to leverag

capabilities of command by influence, but not integra

Other technologies, such as “missiles in a box,” which 

46
p

pg g

against armored, air, and personnel targets, will en

self-reliance, reduce logistics, and enable greater auto

on the battlefield (as did Stinger missiles in the ha

Afghan and Contra rebels). Since we American

accustomed to decentralized decisionmaking by vir

our economic system, we have a strong cultural adva

over many potential centralized adversaries; a situ

analogous to the advantage enjoyed by post-revoluti

France over the monarchies of Europe.

Properly, and of necessity, a nation’s mil

institutions are a sub-culture of the dominant cultur

are sworn to protect. Unless the nation is a militarist 

this sub-culture status is designed to provide opport

for the military to promote those unique personal v

and institutional qualities that are required during wa

otherwise divergent from more liberal social va

However, to the degree that the two cultures can sh

common set of basic assumptions on how to max

human potential, we can more readily leverage our na

character to military advantage. Currently, the mi

sub-culture, intent on conformity and order, drills out 

of the very qualities our wider culture intrinsically v

and inculcates into its citizenry to achieve wealth. Yet 

are strong indicators, from diverse sources, that the

the very qualities we will want to proliferate in the “

After Next.”

The essence of command by influence is the inter

of a clearly articulated commander’s intent with h

autonomous, self-directing, decisionmakers. Focus is 

internal control, but on external result. Uncertainty is 

with by intuitive comprehension based on pa

recognition and localized situational awareness, not b

expanding and time consuming quests for inform

Timely “sufficient” interactions are preferred over 

optimized, but delayed “solutions.” The organiza

values of such a force are trust, initiative, intuition

47
py

protected, as a necessary trade-off for enhanced veloc

the OODA loop and adaptation cycles. Higher opera

tempo to gain and maintain the initiative is valued 

slower more comprehensive efforts. Multiple OODA 

acting in concert, but not in phase, compound the conf

of the enemy and render his ability to discern opera

patterns more difficult.

CONCILIANCE

The intersection of chaos and complexity th

military history, contemporary conflict, theory and n

of war, and economics all point to a future wher

dominant force on the battlefield will be the one tha

proliferates competent, more autonomous decisionma

who freely interact among themselves and the ene

exploit opportunity, within the bounds establish

commanders’ intent. These units will be led by tr

intuitive thinkers and risk takers, who adapt quickl

innovatively to the rapidly mutating conditions of m

war. Of course, this consilience-derived hypothesis is 

an intuitive leap, based on broad pattern recogniti

grasp the character of future war. Our contemporary 

models and Newtonian thought patterns 

self-perpetuating, and will not transition logically t

same recognition. Consequently, we may not constru

“Army After Next” until we have first encountere

enemy after next.

The popular Prayer of St. Francis asks for “the str

to change what may be changed, the perseverance t

with what cannot change, and the wisdom to kno

difference.” Clausewitz and Sun Tsu articulate the ess

and unchangeable nature of war. Specious argument

new technologies and systems will redefine war, or 

high-minded promises of a more humane form of wa

are beyond the pale of credibility. The character of w

mutable, but its fundamental nature is as fixed a

48
gy, 

represents a continuum of activity from the static 

dynamic and beyond to the chaotic. Chaos and comp

theory leads us to understand that as we move closer to

the edge of the chaotic abyss—without falling in

maximize the dynamic properties of human nature. 

many linear processes will remain part of the process o

The successful force of the future will be that whic

move seamlessly between both linear and nonl

concepts, utilizing each in the most effective ma

Wisdom lies with the force that can make these distinc

Ever more important in future war will be 

intangible factors that elevate the soldier to the sta

warrior. The proliferation of authority and respons

downward to small unit leaders will make strong dem

on character and leadership. The lack of “elbow touc

that has traditionally provided solidarity on the batt

must be accounted for by greater effort in traini

develop cohesion. The moral and organizational val

the force will remain of primary importance, but they w

different, at least in emphasis. Responsibility will be 

important than accountability, initiative more impo

than conformity, expectation more important 

inspection, and innovation more important than proce

Above all, trust will be the paramount institutional 

Trust will be complimented by the command qual

nerve. The battlefield challenge for the future large 

commander will be to exercise self-restraint. Once h

clearly articulated his intent and concept of operatio

will need nerve to allow independent subordina

maximize opportunity. The commander will b

custodian of the vision, verbalized as intent, and cons

promulgated and updated by every communications m

available. 

Recent history demonstrates how our adversaries 

leveraged our propensity for centralized, risk ad

hierarchical command organization to defea

49
pg

counterproductive bombing efforts in Yugoslavia, cu

history is rife with examples of how the linear parad

warfare is crumbling. Still, rigidly linear concepts ling

and serve to mark how impervious our thought p

really is. The Afghan rebels, armed with Stinger mi

prototyped how autonomous small units can vex a 

centralized force. Regretfully, America’s adversarie

adapting to counter traditional methods of national 

projection faster than we are innovating them. Y

persist in seeking greater technological, rather 

organizational, innovation, and develop ever 

expensive and centralized systems of systems. Mecha

decision aides are sought to better empower the 

slender number of decisionmakers, rather th

distribute the decision process among those most di

involved. 

In many ways, we find our plight similar to the F

army between World War I and World War II. Euge

Kiesling, in her book, Arming Against Hitler: France a

Limits of Military Planning, provides a historic paralle

helps explain our situation. The French generals

concludes, did their best within the social values, mi

traditions, and resources allotted. They were confin

the bounds of the social system they supported and 

own institutional values. The French army did wha

feasible and produced a valid plan. However, i

designed to meet internal constraints and fail

adequately consider external enemy capabilities

domestic feasibility of the plan did not ensure its re

effectiveness. The French had won the last war, s

previous formula was considered validated. Sim

IBM’s dominance and competence in the mainf

computer industry caused them to scoff at the introdu

of the personal computer until the competition nearly 

them out of the market. By the same token, our ev

complex, hierarchical military structure will cause 

neglect empowering the small unit decisionmaker un

50
y 

and the German military reformers, we will be respo

to the initiatives taken by innovative adversarie

attempting to educate ourselves to their methods. In 

we will fail to learn one of the most important lessons 

“new economics”—readiness to abandon success, 

current methods are surpassed by more innov

competitors. 

The consilience approach leads us to a b

understanding of future war and its character. The 

approach, however, focused on established, succe

hierarchical institutions reveals that it is unlikely the

have the foresight, incentive, or perspective to innov

the extent required to capitalize early on the next 

This is an objective appraisal, not an excuse for fail

meet the responsibilities of leadership. Once 

Scharnhorst can be invoked as a role model fo

contemporary military reformer. His ability to influen

self-education process of the German officer corp

critical to the ultimate success of the Prussian army an

victory of the Allies over Napolean. We must fin

Scharnhorsts and place them in positions from which 

can prepare the minds of future leaders to first accep

then cultivate the values that will enable a proliferat

combat decisionmakers.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. Edward O. Wilson, Consilience: The Unity of Knowled

York: Alfred A Knopf, 1998, p. 8.

2. Charles Edward White, The Enlightened Soldier: Scha

and the Militarische Gesellschaft in Berlin, 1801-1805, W

Connecticut: Praeger, 1989, p. 57.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p. 61.

5. Ibid., p. 57.

51
6. Ibid., p. 59.

7. Ibid., p. 62.

8. Ibid., pp. 77-78.

9. Ibid., p. 60.

10. Timothy T. Lupfer, “The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Cha

German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War,” Leave

Papers, July 1981, p. 28.

11. Ludwig Von Mises, Human Action: A Treatise on Eco

Chicago, Henry Regnery, 1963, pp. 676-682.

12. Kevin Kelly, New Rules For the New Economy: 10 

Strategies for a Connected World, New York, Viking Penguin, 1998, pp

13. Ibid., pp. 18-19.

14. Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Tomorrow’s Army: The Chal

Nonlinear Change,” Parameters, Autumn 1998, p. 95.

15. Thomas J. Czerwinski, Coping With the Bounds: Spec

on Nonlinerity in Military Affairs, Washington, DC: National D

University, 1998, p. 234.

16. Ibid., p. 240.

52
CHAPTER 4

THE NEW MATH FOR LEADERS:

USEFUL IDEAS FROM CHAOS THEOR

Glenn W. Mitchell

INTRODUCTION

The workings of this universe, as seen through th

of most intelligent and educated leaders in the West 

are fairly straightforward. Sir Isaac Newton describe

basic concept of cause and effect almost 300 years ag

common sense observations of everyday life reinforc

paradigm.

1

 To be sure, programs on educational tele

suggest unusual problems occur if you travel at the sp

light or near massive stars, but those events are unlik

most of us. So why delve into seemingly esoteric su

such as this one?

In this chapter we outline some basic implicatio

chaos theory to illustrate its usefulness to military le

Understanding predictable effects of this theo

fundamental to shaping and leading the Army After 

(and its sister services). First, we will take a brief

hopefully painless—look at Newton’s cause and 

universe and then step into somewhat deeper water

done, we will have the basis for widening our understa

of science at the end of the 20th century and for its effe

the military of the next century.

Our discussion of the chaos theory is at exceptional

resolution. We do not need knowledge of mathem

intricacies to comprehend its important effects

phenomena it predicts are the relevant outcomes f

Given this framework, we will then discuss eme

concepts for management of the military of the futur

53
Two comforting ideas in the everyday world are 

cause precedes effect and that results are proportiona

forces applied. These ideas are the essence of New

science. He developed the mathematical calculus to p

the future motions of all material bodies, given the 

applied and the initial states of their motion. If you 

enough detail about everything—all the position

velocities, etc.—then you can calculate the future. Ph

systems are either in equilibrium—the forces a

balance—or they are near-equilibrium and become sta

soon as possible.

This worldview is called determinism since all of h

can theoretically be known given perfect knowledge a

point in time. Accuracy of predictions depends on the le

detail known. This is similar to the notion of reducin

fog of war by increasing the amount of data display

soldiers on the battlefield.

Another important Newtonian concept is line

Forces cause change in direct proportion to 

magnitude. If anything appears to contradict this ide

usually say the system in question is either too compl

to model exactly or the processes are poorly understo

present. Fundamentally, we want to believe in increm

change without sudden surprises.

These ideas brought us the Industrial Age. Impl

the equations is the working of machines: this is New

clockwork universe. A working knowledge of mathem

leads to familiar modeling theories and war gaming. 

things that do not fit the models’ variables—from 

brilliant insight and inspiration of a great comman

panic among poorly led troops—are viewed as “wildc

These uncontrolled factors can radically and unpredi

alter the anticipated result of the exercise. Additio

they are very difficult to model mathematically. The w

54
, ; 

situations have nonlinear models.

2

CRACKS IN NEWTON’S WORLD

What does nonlinear mean in the context of 

theory? There is danger in assuming you know what a 

means because you use it frequently in another conte

the military, the terms linear and nonlinear commonl

to the geometry of the battlefield. The linear battlef

evocative of Napoleonic times with lines of troops sta

shoulder-to-shoulder, delivering fires within presc

zones on the field. Elements of power were us

predictable times and places to maximize their e

Today’s supposedly nonlinear battlefield uses disp

friendly forces, massing at the last minute, exerting 

combat power simultaneously at several depths to d

the enemy’s momentum and plans for maneuver.

In the context of mathematics, however, nonlinear 

different definition. It means having equations with 

or parameters raised to powers other than one

variables whose future values depend on their past v

A nonlinear model for a given situation often con

feedback loops. Operationally, it violates the notion of 

changes in the value of various factors yielding 

changes in the answer. Small changes in input may 

huge differences in the output.

3

Therefore, when the operations analyst tal

nonlinear situations, the modeler is thinking of equa

with terms that are squared, cubed, or even w

Variables are multiplied together rather than appe

separately in the equations. The output is not just line

slopes and intercepts. There are no simple tables re

inputs and outputs, like gunnery tables, or even ne

smooth curves like those describing the maximum 

distance for each altitude and airspeed after engine f

in an aircraft.

55
pgy

A nonmilitary example may help clarify the concep

modern Arab-Israeli conflict has been a Gordian kn

over 50 years. The current peace process owes its ori

great part to the strategic insight by Dr. Henry Kiss

He separated the conflict into individual two-party con

so each could be addressed in turn. This philoso

approach is called reductionism. Thus, the conflict wa

to be the sum of the Syrian-Israeli border conflict plu

Egyptian-Israeli border conflict in addition to mu

other conflicts. Kissinger’s approach provided the part

opportunity to talk in a focused way about their tw

relationship. Consequently, the Egyptian-Israeli d

was settled with the Camp David Accords in 1978

contribution to peace in the region has been dramatic

it is difficult for the adjoining states to wage war ag

Israel without Egypt.

Reductionism also facilitated solution of several ar

the Jordanian-Israeli conflict. Yet, overall, peace be

Israel and its neighbors has not materialized. Why n

The answer lies in the original assumption tha

conflict was, in fact, the sum of the various two

conflicts. This was too much of a simplification 

effective overall. The real interactions had effects tha

dependent upon relationships among several partie

example, the Syrian-Israeli situation depended not o

the two parties, but also on groups in Lebanon

Jordanians and their resident Palestinians

relationship between Jordan and Iraq, the current p

in Israel, and other factors.

These interactions make a linear model for the 

process too simplistic. The easy, mostly linear terms—

as the Israeli-Egyptian border dispute over the Sin

the true model have been solved. However, the real wo

too complex for Newton’s theory to apply to the m

mensional situations.

56
g, 

Linear approximations work well enough in 

circumstances, and that reinforces our confidence i

approach; allowing us to think we understand a situ

when we really do not. Approximation works 

predicting the general positions of planets in our 

system next year. Problems arise when you need to p

future positions of distant galaxies or even the 

position of the planets. Remember, there is a mid-c

correction for astronauts traveling in space because 

must compensate for modeling errors, or they will miss 

mark.

4

 A military example is the adage that a tactica

no longer applies after the battle starts; the linear m

we use do not apply to complex interactions a

combatants.

With this overview in mind, we have arrived at the 

where we can appreciate how chaos theory was disco

and why it is being developed.

THE DISCOVERY OF CHAOS THEORY

Predicting the weather has long been a goal of man

Meteorologists developed theories of air mass intera

and seasonal patterns that gave us hope a working 

would be available as more sophisticated comp

emerged. A scientist named Lorenz at the U.S. We

Bureau built an incredibly detailed program to sim

weather patterns. Using Newton’s Laws and o

developed from them, he wrote the equations for h

weather system develops while interacting with terre

and atmospheric forces. He ran his program on a com

that analyzed the equations and printed out predictio

future weather. The output appeared promising, b

repeated his calculations as a precaution against erro

entered the same starting data, only rounding off 

decimal places to save time. The second answe

completely different from the first!

57
p

complex, nonlinear equations: the results are very se

to the exact initial conditions. Seemingly minor chan

initial data lead to tremendous effects downst

Discussions of this phenomenon

5

 gave rise to the fa

Butterfly Effect; which postulates that a butterfly fla

its wings in the Brazilian rainforest today may ca

typhoon in the Pacific a few weeks from now.

But what does this aspect of chaos theory mea

useful terms—to those of us in the military?

CHAOS AND THE MILITARY

The occurrence of unexpected results is bewilder

most of us. The surprise may be the loss of an outsta

unit in combat against a less professional and prepare

Or it may be the brilliant success of units or individual

were mediocre in training. After action reports 

explain the outcomes, but causes often are ascrib

phenomena such as bad luck or miracles. This is actua

effect of chaos

6

. The complex mathematical equation

truly model combat success are most certainly nonl

Complex interactions among factors such as motivatio

leadership, commitment and endurance are not s

terms. The situation is just right for chaos to ente

matter how many times a scenario is run during tra

the results will always be different; sometimes only in 

ways, sometimes strikingly so. Under the 

circumstances, slight changes in the starting cond

result in vastly different results. Anyone who has tr

repeat a maneuver against the opposing force a

National Training Center knows it is impossib

reproduce conditions exactly. The difference bet

success and failure in some circumstances may be as 

as the flap of butterfly wings.

The military importance is in the need to abando

simple determinism that makes us comfortable. We l

think we can reliably predict the performance of a uni

58
g g, 

almost imperceptible changes can occur under str

conditions that result in dramatic differences in indiv

and group performance. A lackluster company makes 

attack that carries the battalion to victory; a slow and 

soldier earns the Medal of Honor. We can only ass

probability to the success or failure of a given unit 

specific mission. We use our own accumu

assessments—a strategy of repeated trials to see the 

and distribution of possible results during training—

judge a unit by seeing it perform once or twice. Of cours

second choice is potentially dangerous and prejudiced

practical lesson is to always try injecting positive f

into any unit’s starting conditions—a mother

and-apple-pie talk, a hot meal, resupply of per

necessities, a pre-combat visit from the commander—a

exercise repeatedly under stressful conditions to explo

entire range of outcomes. Yes, there is actua

mathematical theory behind what good leaders have 

doing empirically all these years.

There is one other important aspect to chaos theory 

explored. We need to understand the circumstanc

which the chaos phenomenon is likely to happen.

In some cases, the linear approach alone is suff

Operation DESERT STORM was an example. Coa

forces were so superior that the enemy was una

generate large-scale chaotic conditions during 

engagement. Therefore, the nonlinear terms in the 

never became strategically or operationally significa

essence, the Gulf War’s complex equations 

functionally simplified to linear terms by the imbala

combat power and leadership. The area in which Ira

most able to threaten chaos was in information w

where random SCUD missile attacks and efforts to po

innocent civilian casualties could have destabilized 

opinion. Terms in the equation for use of weapons of 

destruction never had to be determined, but could ha

59
q

kinds of effects in a chaos model?

THE BORDERS OF CHAOS

Many daily situations are effectively model

familiar, predictable, linear equations. These model

only one answer for each combination of varia

Equations exhibiting chaotic behavior, however, ma

two very different answers at one time. On a graph 

chaotic equations, there is a discontinuity in the grap

instead of the familiar continuous line. The possibi

two very different answers for one combination of var

is the hallmark of chaos. We do not know reliably 

result the system will have at the end.

7

 In complex sys

such as units in combat, there may be a cascade of 

discontinuities; the result is lack of predictability fo

whole system.

This lack of predictability should not be confused 

random outcomes. A characteristic of chaos, arising 

complex interactions modeling real world behavior, i

potential outcomes have predictable limits. Which 

state the system will end up in is uncertain, but the 

and the probabilities of possible outcomes are constra

This is called deterministic chaos, and it applies to 

situations of interest to us.

Military operations research should attempt to fin

critical values leading to discontinuities in equa

modeling phenomena of interest. What were the c

factors leading to political collapse of the former S

Union? What are the critical values leading to possib

of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups or 

states? The full equations are incredibly complex, an

knowledge of all variables is incomplete. Howeve

payoff for successfully modeling these issues 

tremendous potential for future applications.

60
g

our military success under chaotic conditions. Wha

does the organization need to do? What does a non

organization look like? How should its leaders manag

chaotic environment?

THE NONLINEAR MILITARY ORGANIZATION

To best understand the impact of chaos theory o

military, we can look at the emerging paradigm of non

organizations. We will borrow heavily from recent con

of the Santa Fe Institute and of Dr. Uri Merry conce

nonlinear organizational dynamics.

8

 From this view

there are five types of organizations categorized into 

general types of behavior patterns. They will be discus

terms of practical implications for military managem

THE FIVE BEHAVIOR TYPES

OF ORGANIZATIONS

A series of five behavioral types characterize most 

of organizations. While each has a specific patte

behavior, the forms differ, mostly in terms of the m

linearity and nonlinearity. The names they are give

not important to our discussion, but indicate unde

mathematical behavior to those who study chaos t

more rigorously. In systems of many diff

kinds—physical, physiological, etc.—it is possib

calculate when the transition from one type to anothe

take place. Unfortunately, no one has yet proposed a w

do this in organizations.

The first two types, Point and Limit Cycle, 

behaviors that repeat themselves exactly. In the 

behavior repeats itself like a free-swinging pendulum 

always comes to rest at the same point. In the Limit 

behavior repeats itself like a thermostat which main

the temperature between two points, or a street lam

goes on and off according to the amount of daylight. Sy

61
py y gy 

linear, close-to-equilibrium systems fully described 

Newton’s theories. They allow very exact calculation

their behavior can easily be predicted.

Point and Limit Cycle are typical physica

mechanical systems and are seldom found in individ

organizational behavior. If found in an organization, 

probably be one in which people are treated as if the

machines. In an effort to create an exact scien

management based on the ssumption that human beh

follows orderly patterns, attempts have been ma

perfectly describe behavior and make accurate predi

on what will happen in any given circumstance. R

mimic this behavior.

In the third state, the Torus, each behavior more o

repeats itself, but in a slightly different way each 

Instead of identical repetition as in the Point and 

Cycle, there is only similar behavior. In organization

behavior follows norms, customs, regulations, 

prescriptions, or laws. This type is common in the beh

of individuals, groups, teams and other entities. Just a

tie your shoelaces in a similar way each morning

behave in a similar way, but not exactly, each time.

Most people will behave as the norm prescribes, 

few deviants will digress and go beyond the norm

example, we can be relatively sure of an average num

employees who will be absent from work at different tim

the year. Likewise, we can use statistical methods to p

what will happen and prepare for what may take pl

the future.

In a Torus organization rules, regulations and co

behavior will maintain order and discipline. In this s

linear order is preserved, and continuity is ens

Uniform regulations apply to everyone without favor

Management is kept busy issuing new rules and regula

and ensuring they are observed. Most regulations a

62
, gp

ensure enforcement.

This type of organization functions best in a 

environment where little change takes place, such as d

the Cold War. Weaknesses become apparent in a turb

environment: lack of ability to change; lack of resilienc

uniform procedures unsuitable to people who are 

different from each other. The challenge a Torus l

faces in turbulent times is not how to maintain orde

enforce the regulations, but how to create condition

nourish the growth of change, innovation, enterprise

creativity. Encouraging renewal and positive change s

be the organizational goal.

The fourth behavioral type, the Butterf

characterized by even less regularity and dimini

control. The change is from similar behavior to a ra

behaviors. Instead of one norm, there is division 

dissimilar patterns. This means that under the same 

conditions people in the organization will divide 

populations that may react in completely different w

This system often behaves like multiple Torus sy

joined together. People acting within one grou

behaving similarly to one another, but differently 

those in other groups. For example, employees may c

(albeit from a limited range of possibilities) what c

they wear at work, during what hours they work, wh

they carry umbrellas, etc. Instead of the constrai

unchanging rules and regulations, freedom opens cho

roles and the way the roles are performed. This vari

choice of behavior holds not only for individuals, but a

departments and teams.

Problems arise when the chosen behaviors ar

functional or supported by the organization. Ther

unacceptable divisions among groups, for example, be

those who are committed to, and identify with

organization, and those who are alienated from it

63
g

output and those who shirk their responsibility, or be

those who are honest and those that steal time or pro

from the organization.

Behavior in different groups may be radically ch

by a small shift in a critical organizational parameter

as differences in wage increases or in the way employe

treated. When such a parameter reaches a critical po

can lead to chaotic change. In other words, not every c

in organizational parameters leads to division; change

take place without a ripple in the pond. It is only w

change reaches a critical point—like the last straw an

camel—that dramatic divisions occur. A chan

retirement eligibility policy may have no effect at a

under certain conditions, it may be seen as a crucial fac

decreasing job security and lead to organizat

instability.

Allowing choices for a range of behaviors may app

be the opposite of desirable military behavior

organizations functioning in a turbulent environmen

variety, creativity, and change. Survival is not possib

climate of turbulence if an organization clings rigi

irrationally to its old and trusted ways of functio

Flexibility and adaptability become more and 

essential as the environment changes at an increasing 

This will be the environment of the next century

challenge for leaders is to consistently demons

appropriate behaviors while guiding workers to 

choices that are consistent with the organization’s v

Versatility enhances our survival: A butterfly o

unchanging flight path soon falls prey to predators.

The fifth and last behavioral type is called Deep C

In this state, constraints on behavior disappear, and 

are no limitations imposed by order and regul

Randomness reigns and allows no place for order. It is 

a desirable state for a military organization.

64
p p

down, and a new order has not yet emerged to repla

old. Complex systems reach this state after int

divisions turn into deep cleavages and external factors 

beyond a critical point. Disturbances move the system 

point where its only alternative is total chan

disintegration. The former Soviet Union illustrate

condition well.

Deep chaos in organizations may follow 

organizational crises involving major factors su

budget, mission, or human resources. The organiz

faces either transforming itself into a new ord

disintegrating. From deep chaos a complex sy

transforms itself into a different state which cann

accurately predicted.

Organizational Behavioral Patterns.

The Santa Fe Institute’s research on complex ada

systems indicates the existence of three basic patte

behavior: ordered, chaotic and complex.

9

 The or

pattern coincides with the two linear states: Point and 

Cycle. The chaotic pattern coincides with the Deep C

where randomness reigns. The complex pattern com

features of Torus and Butterfly. Systems that adapt b

changing environmental conditions function mainly 

complex pattern.

Management in the Orderly Patterns.

What managerial style fits organizations that fun

within the orderly pattern of Point and Limit C

Applying this pattern to human beings is problem

Attempts to do so can be found in prisons, in a con

army, and on the assembly line in industry. It is poss

use this pattern in industries employing workers with 

education and no alternative employment possibiliti

65
py

regimented to work like machines and robots.

The managerial style of this pattern is one of top

control. The pattern is maintained by the thre

punishment or being fired, combined with financial rew

for performing regularly in a repetitive manner accord

managerial instructions. Close follow up and regulat

all actions and interactions maintain tight control

world of mass communication and the global highway

pattern cannot survive.

Management in the Complex Pattern.

How should a leader behave in an organization t

functioning in the complex pattern, which combines 

and disorder, certainty and uncertainty, continuit

variety? It is a difficult path to follow. On one side li

danger of too much order, continuity, similarity, loya

the past, etc. This stifles organizational energy 

creativity. Conversely, there is the danger of falling in

much disorder and ineffectiveness, resulting 

irregularity, uncertainty, and instability. An organiz

may reach this state when it forfeits its vision, a

identity and members are lost in uncertainty concerni

future. This is a transition state of Deep Chaos, where 

worked in the past is no longer relevant and there is 

new way of escaping from the maze.

Avoiding Deep Chaos.

How may Deep Chaos be avoided? Insights from th

Math suggest that leaders should try to identify and 

critical forces whose continued growth might pu

organization to a critical division. These parameters 

between organizations, but basically they are of two ki

The first is internal division, such as widening th

between the needs and wants of people and the possib

of satisfying them. This may cause major beha

66
g

their organization, their devotion to work, and 

readiness to do anything beyond regular work dem

There will always be differences and gaps, the proble

in how wide and extreme they are. If the breaches d

beyond a critical threshold, the population tends to bre

into sections. For example, there will be those wh

continue to behave honestly even when there is a neg

change in their work conditions. Others may attem

solve their problems through deviations such as ab

destruction or neglect of organizational property

outputs, theft, embezzlement, etc. Criminal acts by s

leaders, for example, may be seen as a warni

impending Deep Chaos.

The second kind is external division, which is lin

the organization’s ability to adapt to its environmen

example, an unanticipated change in government pol

base housing or commissary availability can lead to c

divisions. Leaders must strive to minimize these neg

outside forces and mitigate the effects of those tha

necessary.

Management of Deep Chaos.

All accepted methods of control loose their valu

state of Deep Chaos. Means such as education, trainin

rewards do not work. New directions are necessary. St

reveal that only chaos can cope with chaos. Resea

being conducted in areas such as controlling chaos in l

in electrical circuits, in heart tissues, and in brainwav

yet, these directions have not been translated 

controlling chaos in human systems.

We do know that a state of deep chaos is a tran

period that may lead to either transformati

disintegration of the system. The leader’s role is to pr

disintegration and to assist the organization 

transformation and renewal.

67
pg 

approach. Attempts to motivate people by preac

pressure, rewards, and punishments generally le

failure. The problem is not one of applying pressu

change the existing state, but how to free the organiz

from the binds it itself has created. These are often m

models of personnel in the organization. The models a

filters through which organizations perceive realit

give meaning to incoming information. The leader’s 

to create conditions through feedback, support o

initiatives, and other means, that undermine 

maladaptive models, so employees can concentra

positive change. Of course, the best strategy is to avoi

state.

Managing at the Edge of Chaos.

An adaptive system attempts to steer itself to the e

chaos by regulating the level of mutual dependence a

its components and between itself and other systems 

environment. In other words, it can be guided by incre

or decreasing the level of autonomy of its compo

teams, and individuals, while simultaneously increas

decreasing the level of integration with outside sy

such as suppliers, sub-contractors, and sister ser

Strategic planning applies, but only for limited time p

into the future.

10

Since many organizations want to move from the e

chaos into the orderly pattern, the problem generally 

of too much continuity and order maintained by hiera

centralized control.

11

 This necessitates increasing the 

of autonomy of organizational components; decreasing 

central control of units; and increasing their authorit

control of resources, creating semi-autonomous work t

building teams on the basis of competencies of mem

etc.

Regulating internal interdependence alone i

sufficient to reliably guide the organization near the e

68
pg

increase or decrease the level of integration with ou

bodies. Increasing interdependence may take many 

such as partnership, joint venture, sub-contra

information sharing, joint development, stra

partnerships, etc. Decreasing these relationships ma

take different forms, such as spreading the sour

materiel, maintaining parallel forces, building in

capabilities, etc.

Why does regulating interdependence influenc

ability of organizations to function at the edge of c

Organizations with no outside ties do not influence 

other. If the ties are very close, every act may adv

influence the relationship because of repercussions. J

in a good marriage, there needs to be the right ba

between interdependence and autonomy. The relatio

needs to be tuned to allow both close relations and long

stability.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

This basic examination of chaos theory provi

minimum amount of knowledge for comprehension 

application of its principles. We examined the manage

of organizations using chaos principles and disco

potential changes in philosophy that may cope with 

turbulent times.

Recommendations.

Several positive steps to ensure the military su

and to prepare it for future success in the field emerge 

chaos theory:

1. Diversity can allow us to adapt more efficien

changing times.

12

 Only with a full array of culturally d

viewpoints and mindsets can we get to the opt

solutions. This principle applies to individuals, to unit

to the services themselves. A purple-suited fighting 

69
y y y y y 

with operational effectiveness. When the tension a

various groups is channeled into creative tension, it i

for generating ideas and new approaches. The divers

have today among services, combat formations

individuals should not be diminished. Celebrati

diversity is not homogenization of the underlying cul

2. War games, battle labs, and training maneuve

vital to defining a range of outcomes for new approac

battle. An individual exercise, however, is not predict

future success or failure. It is simply the outcome 

particular event, given its unique starting poin

resources. We need to document each exercise and an

multiple iterations to gain insight into the desirabi

outcomes and the probabilities of obtaining success 

new configurations. Only with repetitive similar out

can we gain confidence in a specific doctrinal approac

3. Current planning cycles and systems are mostly 

in concept and execution. In the operations area, eve

set sequence of briefers suggests compartmentalizatio

insufficient creativity and cross talk. The mi

statement and commander’s intent, however, indicat

some principles consistent with chaos theory have m

into our thought process, but we should go farther. We 

to revise the process to optimize staff interaction

feedback loops. This will get us closer to the edge of ch

optimal solutions may emerge more easily. In the plan

budgeting, and execution cycle, we need to redes

cumbersome and poorly responsive Cold War proc

allow innovation and adaptability to our pr

environment. Otherwise we consign ourselves to medi

and perhaps failure against a more unconstrained and 

future adversary.

4. Quality of life issues are extremely important 

functioning of the entire military organization. Ineq

among individuals, groups, or even services pro

divisiveness and push the system towards the possibi

70
p gy 

use in the Army sets males against females and the 

against the other services. Perceived inequiti

deployment taskings or promotion opportunities ar

destabilizing. Leaders must continually exert signi

effort to maintain the highest quality of life possib

service members. We must balance individualism wi

need for discipline and consistently demonstrate the c

and respect that will maintain and maximize cohesive

5. Values and vision have a profound effe

organizations. Our values drive behaviors on the batt

during chaotic situations. If soldiers believe in the sy

they will sacrifice all to accomplish the mission. Howe

the conduct of leaders does not seem to follow the v

publicly espoused

13

 or if the organization’s vision f

future is not clear and resonant, soldiers may not 

motivated to perform beyond their limits. Then chao

not steer units to the creative edge. Soldiers will, at 

follow traditional linear patterns at less than the

potential or, at worst, they will lose their cohesion an

Whether or not leaders live up to the personal commi

and responsibility demanded by the organization’s v

and vision truly effects the outcome of battles.

14

6. With emerging technology allowing near-p

knowledge of the battlefield, there will be a temptat

give senior commanders too much detailed inform

about their subordinate units. The ability to know 

things as the physical (or even mental) conditi

individual soldiers is not necessarily a good thin

battalion commanders and higher.

15

 The chaos inher

combat is best dealt with at the lowest level w

individual factors can be more clearly recognized 

compensated for.

16

 Filters will be required to give sum

information to higher echelons without superfluous d

encourage micro-management. Historical situations 

as President Johnson’s personal selection of bom

targets in North Vietnam support this approach.

71
That too much chaos is a problem is intuitive. B

may not understand why an ordered pattern a

problematic. Managing is often seen as creating or

insure the sequential flow of planned events. Problems 

when an organization attempts to be so orderly t

excludes the necessary elements of variety, disconti

change, innovation, experimentation, development

creativity.

17

 Too much order is counterproductive whe

organization needs to adapt quickly and effectively 

chaos-producing conditions.

18

Should a leader manage so that the organiz

functions in the complex pattern? Generally yes, bu

may not be optimal. The organization should funct

closely as possible to the edge of chaos. This is where li

enough stability to maintain itself and enough creativ

be called life; it is where the system’s components d

degenerate into stability and do not disintegrate into 

chaos. The challenge for today’s military leader is to fin

closest approach to this edge, consistent with m

requirements during training and everyday operation

to maintain a balance there during actual combat.

We need to become comfortable with these new con

and exploit their combat multiplier effects to the fulles

success of the Army After Next depends as much on l

development as on technological advances.

19

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. Newton’s impact on our innate sense of order is tho

discussed in L. Douglas Kiel, Managing Chaos and Compl

Government: A New Paradigm for Managing Change, Innovat

Organizational Renewal, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publisher

pp. 4-6. He goes on to develop the need for dynamic change and 

out why the usual government bureaucracies will not adapt w

complex and socio-economically turbulent world.

72
2. There is a clear physical example in James Gleick, 

Making a New Science, New York: Penguin, 1988, p. 24:

Nonlinearity means that the act of playing the game has a 

changing the rules. You cannot assign a constant importance to 

because it depends on speed. Speed, in turn, depends on frictio

twisted changeability makes nonlinearity hard to calculate, bu

creates rich kinds of behavior that never occur in linear system

3. Margaret J. Wheatley, Leadership and the New 

Learning About Organization from an Orderly Universe, San Fra

CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 1992, pp. 125-127.

4. Edgar E. Peters, Chaos and Order in the Capital Marke

York: Wiley & Sons, 1991, p. 135.

5. This discovery and its military implications are discusse

succinctly in Robert R. Logan, A Complex Dragon in a Chaotic S

Science for USMC Information Age Decisionmakers, CARLISL

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, 1996, PP. 5-8.

6. An enlightening and creative discussion of chaos theory i

of Clausewitzian theory and the overlap of both with the Vietnam 

contained in Scott E. Womack, Chaos, Clausewitz, and Com

Critical Analysis of Operational Planning in the Vietna

1966-1971, Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information 

Document Number ADA306112, 1995, p. 151.

7. This branching of pathways is framed in terms of sy

breaking by Kiel, p. 37. The process of branching is discusse

rigorously in Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, Order Out of 

Man’s New Dialogue with Nature, New York: Bantam Books, 1

177.

8. Uri Merry, Coping with Uncertainty: Insights from t

Sciences of Chaos, Self-Organization, and Complexity, Westpo

Praeger, 1995, is a treasure trove of reasonably clear discussion

effects of chaos on organizations. His more recent work, along w

of the current staff at the Santa Fe Institute is available on the S

website at http://santafe.edu/sfi/publications and on Dr. 

website at http://pw2.netcom.com/~nmerry/art2.htm.

9. Ibid.

73
10. Steven E. Phelan, “From Chaos to Complexity in S

Planning;” available from http://comsp.com.latrobe.edu.au/ 

chaos.html; accessed November 21, 1997, details the relatively 

applicability of long range strategic planning

11. This point is made clearly by Kiel, p. 140.

12. A strong argument is made for the positive effects of dive

ibid., p. 162.

13. That leaders should be risk takers, strongly reinforce 

that have positive outcomes for the organization, and have a lon

outlook, not simply a response to everyday crises is discussed b

pp. 175-194.

14. Peter M. Senge,The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practi

Learning Organization, New York: Doubleday, 1994, p. 214, g

excellent discussion of the requirements for executing an organiz

vision. He points out that everyone, not just the leaders them

must believe the vision, and everyone should contribute 

development to facilitate buy-in.

15. This is even consistent with current writings from the T

and Doctrine Command itself. See John L. Romjue, America

Doctrine for the Post-Cold War, Fort Monroe, VA: United State

Training and Doctrine Command, 1997, pp. 28-29.

16. The fact that the fog of war will persist in the face of tec

is presented clearly in Douglas A. Macgregor, Breaking The Pha

New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century, Westport, CT: P

1997, pp. 50, 161. He also makes the point that local initiative b

level leaders make critical differences in outcome in Ibid., p. 16

17. The necessity of seeing reality for any adaptive organiz

seething with change and not simply a mechanical sys

emphasized in Prigogine and Stengers, p. xv.

18. “The linear approximation is usually worst when thi

about to fail.” Nina Hall, Exploring Chaos: A Guide to the New S

Disorder, New York: Norton, 1991, p. 151.

19. John G. Sifonis and Beverly Goldberg, Corporatio

Tightrope: Balancing Leadership, Governance, and Technolog

Age of Complexity, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996

points out that:

74
of an organization; on another it enables process

Technology enables and facilitates leadership a

governance, but how much technology an organization uses 

driven by leadership and governance.

This feedback is a basic phenomenon of nonlinear interaction.

75
CHAPTER 5

EDUCATING JUNIOR MILITARY OFFICE

FOR THE INFORMATION AGE

Andre H. Sayles

INTRODUCTION

Future military leaders need to learn about cutting-ed

technology that may change how wars are fought, but th

also need a historical underpinning to their profession

education.

 Rep. Ike Skelto

As the Armed Forces transition to the 21st ce

senior leaders will face the challenges of the inform

age. At an unprecedented pace, new technologie

changing the way the services plan for future m

operations. During the first two decades of the 21st cen

nearly every service member will feel the impact 

Information Revolution. A paradigm shift in 

professional military education (PME) of junior officer

the horizon. Simultaneously, this new approa

education must continue to provide for the hist

underpinnings in the current education system.

In May 1996, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

published Joint Vision 2010 as “the conceptual templ

how America’s Armed Forces will channel the vitalit

innovation of our people and leverage technolo

opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in 

warfighting.”

2

 This framework for joint operations in 

lays the foundation for visionary programs in the indiv

services. 

The Army outlook for the first 25 years of the 

century is captured by the continuum of Force XXI, 

Vision 2010, and Army After Next.

3

 Transitions for the 

and Marine Corps will be guided by the strategic con

77
g

captured by Global Engagement: A Vision for th

Century and Air Force 2025.

5

Joint operations are common threads tha

throughout the collective vision of the Chairman of the 

Chiefs of Staff and the service chiefs. As a driving 

behind future joint, combined, and ultimately integ

operations, the Information Revolution will lead to 

education requirements for junior leaders. Soldiers , sa

airmen, and marines will continue to win wars as they 

done in the past; new technologies will not displac

human dimension. However, leaders will ha

understand new tools of the trade in the future as they 

in past wars. These new information age tools have al

begun a historic revolution in military affairs (RMA)

This chapter will address issues related to j

military officer education in the information age. A

discussion of information operations (IO), a future sce

provides a basis for proposed junior officer education

report suggests that education of military leade

factored into the force planning process. The services s

not assume that education requirements fo

information age will be a natural product of the 

Unless direct action becomes a priority, the human 

may slow progress towards the 2010 force.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

All planning, particularly strategic planning, must 

attention to the character of contemporary warfare.

 Carl von Clausewit

In 1996, Winn Schwartau defined information w

(IW) as “those actions intended to protect, exploit, co

deny, or destroy information or information resour

order to achieve a significant advantage, objectiv

victory over an adversary.”

8

 He developed this definit

78
g g 

with the Department of Defense (DoD), national sec

and economic infrastructure. Although the DoD focu

on actual conflict, the broader definition offer

Schwartau extended to peacetime activities that r

from recreational hacking to computer terrorism.

In Field Manual (FM) 100-6, published in August 

the Army used information operations to describe th

range of information issues from peace through global 

Information operations became the Army’s implemen

of the DoD version of information warfare, but in a 

broader sense.

Although information warfare was becoming a univ

term by the mid-1990s, a resistance to the use of “wa

in the private sector ultimately led to a preferen

information assurance (IA). This term described the 

of nonmilitary activities related to what previousl

been described as information warfare. The Presi

Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection desc

information assurance as:

Preparatory and reactive risk management actions intend

to increase confidence that a critical infrastructur

performance level will continue to meet customer expectatio

despite incurring threat inflicted damage. For instan

incident mitigation, incident response, and serv

restoration.

10

Assurance includes protection of information sys

detection of intrusions, and restoration of operations 

an attack. In 1998, the new Joint Publication (Join

3-13 brought closure to the concept of military inform

operations from a Joint Staff perspective.

11

 As sho

Figure 1, Joint Pub 3-13 describes relationships be

information operations, information warfare

information assurance in peace and war.

Information operations are supported by comm

control, communications, computers, and intelligence 

across the full spectrum of military activities. 

79
operations include “actions taken to affect adve

information and information systems, while defending 

own information and information systems.”

12

 Inform

warfare is a subset of information operations during t

crisis or war. Like information operations, inform

assurance is a full-time activity. In Joint Pub 

information assurance is defined as “IO that protec

defend information systems by ensuring their availa

integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonre

ation.”

13

 In DoD, as well as the private sector, inform

assurance implies protection of systems, detecti

infringement, and recovery or reaction.

Defensive and offensive IO are relevant across the 

and war spectrum. Defensive IO is particularly impo

in protecting information systems on a daily 

80

Figure 1. Information Operations Relationships Acros
y 

available. As attacks on information systems inc

offensive information operations may also be us

defensive measures. Currently, the number of attac

military information systems may be as high as 50

annually.

14

 Many of these attacks are not detect

current defensive measures.

INFORMATION AGE TECHNOLOGIES

The world has changed and there is great risk in standing st

General Gordon R. Sullivan

Information operations are a conduit for integrat

information age technologies into future battlespace

projections in Joint Vision 2010 include g

communications and intelligence networks, pre

weapons, digitized platforms, direct links between se

and shooters, advanced soldier systems, full enem

friendly force identification, and situational awarene

Many rapidly advancing technologies are driven b

innovations in semiconductors, electronics, and opti

1965, Gordon Moore predicted that the numb

transistors on an integrated circuit would double 

year. In 1975, he revised his prediction to what is now 

Moore’s Law; the number of transistors will double ev

months. Remarkably, this prediction has rem

accurate for the past 20 years, except for recent adv

that are about 1 year early.

16

Success in the semiconductor industry has underp

advancement for many other technologies. Specif

miniaturization of high speed processors has opened 

for computers, communication systems, sensors, dis

and numerous other capabilities that have both comm

and military applications. Coupled with adva

materials, signal processing, and developments in sof

engineering, microelectronics has led to dra

81
p, , 

computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais

(C4ISR). Technology is affecting force structure, mi

operations, and the way the services manage informat

a daily basis.

FUTURE MILITARY SCENARIO

Generally, operations of war require one thousand f

four-horse chariots, one thousand four-horse wagons covere

leather, and one hundred thousand mailed troops.

Sun Tzu

A significant number of futurists have offered scen

describing the evolution of economic, political, socia

military conditions over the next 30 years. Likewise, e

the services has published a vision from the present to 

Due to the conjectural nature of scenarios, an exha

review of military futures would offer no more cer

than a single brief scenario. Thus, a concise fu

statement is adequate to stimulate thoughts about j

officer education requirements in the information age

following paragraphs offer a brief future scenario bas

the notion that the advanced land warrior will b

primary focus.

Currents of Change.

Steven Metz describes the most important overar

currents of change as interconnectedness, compress

time, and demassification.

18

At the strategic level, 

three broad categories are applicable to many pub

military futures. Interconnectedness is already und

at all levels within the Armed Forces, including indiv

organizational, service, and interservice systems

increased focus on information operations support

C4ISR is but one indication that interconnectednes

way of the future.

82
p, p

becoming reality through a variety of communication

information systems. Data can be sent or retrieved in 

real time from virtually any location on earth. F

transportation systems will likely compress both tim

space as travel times are reduced or the need to trave

distances to accomplish the mission will no long

necessary. 

The application of demassification to mil

organizations will lead to smaller units across the ser

The smaller units will be able to conduct an ope

anywhere in the world while moving quickly 

maintaining global communications. A full ran

information operations resources will be at their disp

Land Warrior Futures.

Over the next 30 years, the land warrior will develo

an individual fighting machine. Outfitte

climate-controlled individual armor, the land warrio

be protected by an integrated defense against che

agents, small arms fires, and adverse environm

conditions. Global communications via satellite 

complement regional communications via wirele

cellular systems enhanced by unmanned aerial veh

Along with these communications assets, advanced 

positioning concepts will be integrated into a spe

designed helmet.

At the touch of a button or perhaps in response 

inconspicuous mental or physical gesture, the head

display will provide the positions of enemy and fr

forces, targeting information, mission status

environmental conditions. The individual weapon w

able to identify and target the enemy while offering a 

of responses from stun to kill. The land warrior will ha

concerns about temporary environmental conditions 

as day and night. Likewise, the ability to be extrac

resupplied at just the right time is taken for granted

83
ppg 

The remainder of the military force structure w

designed to support the individual land warrior as w

operate independently. A wide range of small units w

combined at practically any level or size in order to pr

the necessary firepower and logistical support. He

weapons will be made available in case of a rare co

which may be thought of as conventional. Suppo

aviation platforms will range from close suppo

strategic. Space and naval assets will be available 

land warrior upon request. When the mission dicta

larger force, land, air, and sea elements will be integ

into a single unit that communicates and operates 

like the smaller land warrior component.

Land Warrior Technology.

The land warrior is a creation of the Inform

Revolution. From a technology point of view, only the 

warrior assets matter in the transition to the fu

Capabilities that will have been miniaturized and pow

for the land warrior in 2030 or the robot replacement in 

will easily be duplicated on larger platforms. G

communications, situational awareness, prec

weapons, and climate-control are easily accomplish

vehicles, ships, and aviation assets where power, siz

weight restrictions are of less importance.

In some cases, existing larger platform technolog

be miniaturized for land warrior use. In other 

technology developed for the land warrior will be mag

for space, air, naval, and vehicular applications

greatest challenge will be developing resources for th

warrior. Integrating those capabilities into the other 

will be a secondary task.

Cyber tools will underpin nearly every land w

asset. Addition of the land warrior support force

generate an integrated battlespace that provides rea

84
, g, ppp

be supported by a national cyber infrastructure, linked 

international infrastructure and a space infrastru

Within this framework, wars will be fought—some

from space, sometimes silently through the global 

infrastructure, sometimes by the warrior support f

and sometimes by the warrior on the ground.

SCENARIO INTERPRETATION

Technology, one of the principal driving forces of the future

transforming our lives and shaping our future at ra

unprecedented in history, with profound implications that 

can’t even begin to understand.

John L. Petersen

The scenario in the previous section is just one of 

ways of looking at the future. Complete credibility of s

projection into the future is not essential to an argume

or against a paradigm shift in junior officer educati

fact, when funding constraints are considered

probability of a full set of advanced land warrio

support forces appearing in 2025 is relatively low. The 

likely scenario is one that projects a mixture of for

various stages of modernization.

By 2025, the Armed Forces may have a percent

advanced forces with a corresponding advanced su

structure. The remainder of the force may be groupe

two or three categories according to the level moderniz

Extension of modernization to reserve forces is yet an

consideration. Some of the more expensive platform

continue to exist essentially as they do today, exce

selected sub-system improvements.

Argument for a new look at junior officer educatio

be supported by any segment of the scenario, incl

projections for the next few years. The Inform

Revolution has already created a need for change, w

key step being acknowledgment by DoD that inform

85
pg

education needs of the land warrior are already clear

As outlined in Joint Vision 2010, “we must 

information superiority: the ability to collect, proces

disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information 

exploiting or denying and adversary’s ability to d

same.”

20

 In time of conflict, offensive information w

will reduce or eliminate enemy capabilities, while defe

information warfare will protect military operations a

as the supporting infrastructures.

Challenges associated with information assurance 

be addressed on a full-time basis. Protection of nationa

space infrastructures is vital to the safety and eco

prosperity of America. Today most attacks are recrea

in nature. In time of conflict, however, it is likel

infrastructures will receive more serious attacks a

adversary attempts to use space and cyberspace to fu

his war aims.

For the land warrior, information superiority is th

to success, whether in the year 2000 or 2025. In an ad

environment, the land warrior must understan

technology that provides his tactical and opera

advantage. This understanding must include how to u

technology effectively, how to make it work under ad

conditions, how to recognize when it is not functi

properly, and how to operate when the technology fa

FUTURE LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES

In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrai

personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the military.

General Douglas MacArthu

The impact of the Information Revolution on the A

Forces has often been compared to the developme

motorized armored vehicles and the effective u

technology in the Blitzkrieg of World War II. A parall

86
gg

internal combustion engine. Similarly, Blitzkrieg c

likened to information operations and other metho

employing information age capabilities.

Perhaps a better analogy for pending revoluti

trends in military affairs is the impact of rifled 

repeating weapons in the 19th century. The killing 

increased from approximately 150 meters to a tho

meters or more by the end of the American Civil W

Many military leaders did not accept the larger killing 

brought on by technology and continued to charge a

open spaces while facing a rainstorm of bullets. Thos

failed to respond to new weapons caused the loss of 

lives; from Pickett’s Charge at Gettysburg to the slaug

of World War I.

Like rifled and repeating weapons, inform

technologies will directly affect every person in unifor

some point, C4ISR tools will be at the finger tips 

service members, including the land warrior. Those w

to respond to the Information Revolution will join Ge

Pickett at Gettysburg or the Allied Forces at the begi

of World War II. The services must face the need to 

warfighters into the information age. The most imm

challenge is the necessary paradigm shift in education 

officer corps. This change will be an even greater task f

services that have not emphasized technical degrees 

past. 

A 1997 Army After Next Wargame demonstrated 

tactical success greatly depends on the ability to ex

decentralized operations.

23

 Junior leaders must be pre

to accomplish their mission without the luxury of c

upon support elements or contractors when equipmen

to operate properly. They also must understan

underlying principles in order to use informatio

technologies to maximum effectiveness under a vari

conditions.

87
y, p

use the same communications and intelligence reso

that digital technology will make available to h

commands. Education requirements will go well beyon

understanding of information technologies. Integrat

systems or “systems of systems” will require a ge

understanding of science and engineering, along w

certain level of comfort with technical equipment. Tra

will not be able to accommodate the pace of change an

breadth of technological advances. The only solution w

through technical education for the officer corps.

2

process must start with the undergraduate educat

junior officers and continue through their military ca

While education must focus on science, engineerin

the requisite historical perspective, both training 

education must also address the need for leaders to 

correct decisions in a timespan decreased by the fast p

future operations. Leaders will have to be decisive 

conditions of too much information, just en

information, and too little information. Quick and po

development of innovative solutions to a wide-ran

multidimensional problems will be a standard for 

leadership. The information age will brin

overwhelming amount of information, but when sy

have temporary failures the flood of information 

become a drought.

OFFICER EDUCATION

Wars may be fought with weapons, but they are won by me

General George S. Patton, J

The Armed Forces need “leaders who have a 

understanding of warfare in the context of the inform

age.”

25

 Such knowledgeable leaders must have ha

opportunity to internalize the significant capabilitie

vulnerabilities associated with the current and futur

88
(g

perspectives).

26

Although a variety of technologies will have an i

on future warfare, we will focus on the information ag

Information Revolution is clearly driving the revolut

military affairs (RMA) and the need for a paradigm s

junior officer education. When the services hav

adequate number of information knowledgeable lead

likely by-product will be that the overall shortfall in s

and engineering education will become manageable

result will be an environment in which technology is r

accepted.

The new approach to junior officer education 

specifically address the 4-year undergraduate program 

the first 6 months of service after commissioning. The 

listed in Table 1 are suggested for three categories of o

education by the end of the first year of service. Many 

topics can be covered in undergraduate progra

appropriate requirements are placed on commissi

sources. Remaining topics can be provided through jo

service distance learning programs and military bran

specialty schools upon entry on active or reserve duty

The Depth of Knowledge categories are represent

three tiers. Tier 1 represents the minimum require

for all junior officers. At this level of knowledge, all of

will have the tools to operate effectively and 

subordinates in information age or land warrior scen

Tier 2 represents the knowledge requirements for offic

branches or specialties that include operational 

responsibilities in communications, intelligen

information. Tier 3 is the depth of knowledge requi

officers who have strategic level responsibilities or w

scientists, engineers, or system administrators. T

officers should have an undergraduate or graduate d

in science or engineering.

89
The topics in Table 1 do not imply separate aca

courses. Single undergraduate courses that cover seve

the topics already exist. An explanation of each 

follows:

• Computers and Information Technology: Thi

typical introductory or CS1 level computer course 

provides the basics of computer operation, typ

computers, and computer hardware. Completion o

course should enable the officer to be comfortable wo

with computers and displays at the required level.

• Software Applications: Often included in introdu

courses, software applications provide addit

experience with computers and the opportunity to 

fundamentals applicable to commercial and mi

software.

• Programming Languages: This course provid

understanding of how software interfaces with hardw

90

 Depth of Knowled

TOPIC TIER 1 TIER 2 T

Computers and Information Technology B I 

Software Applications B I 

Programming Languages F B 

Software Development N F 

Networks and Telecommunications F I 

Information System Intruder Tactics F B 

Information Security F I 

Computer System and Network Security F B 

Information Assurance N F 

Human-Computer Interaction F B 

Satellite Communications Systems F I 

Global Positioning Systems (GPS) F B 

Wireless Communications F B 

Communications Fundamentals B I 

Electrical Engineering Fundamentals F B 

Electronic Vulnerabilities F B 

Strategic and Operational Intelligence B A 

Information Operations Principles B I 

Levels: N-None F-Familiarization B-Basic I-Intermediate A-Advanced

Table 1. Education Requirements for Military Offic
py, py

military applications.

• Software Development: Provides knowledge 

experience to Tiers 2 and 3 officers, enabling th

develop software, troubleshoot systems, or supe

contractors or military subordinates performing 

functions. Software is critical to system integration.

• Networks and Telecommunications: Connectivit

communications between systems will be a pri

component of future information warfare. Officers s

have a basic understanding of strengths and weaknes

this area.

• Information System Intruder Tactics: A first s

defense against attacks on information systems 

recognition of adversary techniques and capabilitie

understanding of the hacker will also lead to h

sensitivity to, and better identification of, intrusions

• Information Security: Junior leaders will be exp

to ensure proper security measures are in plac

electronic information. Decentralization will place 

responsibility at the lowest levels.

• Computer System and Network Security

information warrior needs to understand sec

mechanisms and the associated vulnerabilities 

reliability.

• Information Assurance: Information assuranc

more advanced topic that focuses on maintaining r

systems that will resist attack, detect intrusions

continue to operate while under attack. The technolo

assured performance will evolve as infrastru

protection becomes a higher priority.

• Human-Computer Interaction: Although not 

defined, this topic will take on more importan

warfighters learn how to sort information from the 

communications and intelligence network. Subje

91
gpygy 

decisionmaking.

• Satellite Communications, Global Positi

Systems, and Wireless Communications: Leaders m

familiar with these three subjects since they will und

future information operations. System level familiariz

should be combined with a clear understandi

vulnerabilities to the environment as well as the adver

• Communications Fundamentals: Every leader 

information age will be a communications of

Computers will become so common that the user will a

a system administrator. The organizational sy

administrators will have to concentrate on architectur

security and will no longer be able to make desk call

individual land warrior will have to know 

communications business in this same manner.

• Electrical Engineering Fundamentals: 

information age would not exist without electronics. F

hardware will be based on advanced applicatio

electrical engineering principles. A basic understand

electronics will raise the confidence of users of num

systems.

• Electronic Vulnerabilities: Electronic vulnerabili

sub-topic of several of the other subjects, but is 

separately because this will be the adversary’s pr

counter measure in a theater of operations. Satellites

and many other information age technologies w

susceptible to degradation by electronic countermeas

• Strategic and Operational Intelligence: Situa

awareness will be critical to warfighting in the next cen

Intelligence information will be important at all levels 

the individual land warrior to the carrier battle group

information knowledgeable leader will need to kno

sources of intelligence, the integration schemes, and h

interpret information in real time.

92
pp

operations are not confined to DoD. Many of the issue

concerns are common to the private sector. The impor

of IO dictates that the principles be taught in an aca

as well as in a training environment.

The arguments presented here are by no m

exhaustive. Implementation of such an education pro

for military leaders demands further study. Topics in 

1 are repeated in Table 2, along with suggestions as t

the required education can be provided. The service

have to place more requirements on commissioning so

and restrict the number of new officers who do not h

degree in mathematics, science, or engineering. 

distance learning programs may be more efficient 

programs generated by individual services. It is impo

to note again that competency objectives can no long

accomplished through training alone. Education mus

a much greater role in providing a background that 

93

Undergraduate Distance Mi

TOPIC Course Learning Co

 

Computers and Information

 Technology X

Software Applications X

Programming Languages X

Software Development X

Networks and Telecommunications X 

Information System Intruder

Tactics X X 

Information Security X 

Computer System and Network

Security X 

Information assurance 

Human-Computer Interaction X 

Satellite Communications Systems X 

Global Positioning Systems X 

Wireless Communications X 

Communications Fundamentals X X 

Electrical Engineering Fundamentals X X

Electronic Vulnerabilities X 

Strategic and Operational

 Intelligence X 

Information Operations Principles X 

Table 2. Education Opportunities for New Officer
y p

range of technologies.

The “military course” category in the right colu

Table 2 would likely be the basic course or specialty tra

that a new officer receives upon entrance on act

reserve duty. Because of the importance of informatio

technologies, it is conceivable that most basic officer co

will have an information operations component in th

century.

The table may appear to suggest a large num

sub-courses under military education; however

suggested Tier 1 familiarization will often be a by-prod

an undergraduate program. For example, sat

communications, GPS, and wireless technology may 

out to be survey topics in a communications course. O

other hand, the requisite depth at Tier 3 may dic

special sub-course if an officer’s undergraduate progra

not meet requirements.

Information operations need not challenge warfig

in the 21st century as Blitzkrieg did in World War I

American Army responded to German armored divisio

carefully identifying officers to lead the newly fo

armored units. Since these units had not existed befor

Army could not look to training alone for the sol

Instead, versatile officers were identified from 

education background. Education offers the 

versatility necessary in the information age. As sugg

by Alvin and Heidi Toffler, the new military must 

massive emphasis on training and education at 

level.

27

WORK IN PROGRESS

New technologies and processes can frighten those who 

comfortable with the routines established to accommodate 

old technologies. Furthermore, vested interests within 

organization and within its bureaucracy—usually for wha

94
threaten status quo.

 General Gordon R. Sullivan, and

Lieutenant Colonel Anthony M. Coroalles

DoD is leading the way in bringing inform

operations into focus. The establishment of a D

Assistant Secretary for Information Operations an

pending publication of Joint Pub 3-13 will lead to incr

emphasis on policy and doctrine. New technologie

eventually stimulate new ideas on force structure and 

organizations. As history has proven, the human dime

is of critical importance and must not be left out.

In August 1996, the Army published FM 

(Information Operations). Although the release of 

Pub 3-13 (Doctrine for Information Operations) will re

significant revisions, FM 100-6 was a good start. In 

the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) introduce

Information Warfare degree within the Sys

Engineering Program. With the help of the Deputy Di

of Operations, J39 (Information Operations), on the 

Staff, the Navy has made a strong statement that o

education requirements have changed. An outline 

curriculum is available on the NPS web site 

summarized in Figure 2. In addition to programs a

Naval Postgraduate School, the Navy established the 

Information Warfare Activity in 1994 and the 

Information Warfare Center in 1995. Navy doc

publications will be published shortly after release of 

Pub 3-13.

The Air Force established the Air Force Inform

Warfare Center in 1993 and created the 609th Inform

Warfare Squadron in 1996. In March 1997, the Air 

activated the Information Warfare Battlelab at th

Intelligence Agency, Kelly Air Force Base, Texas

Army’s Land Information Warfare Activity has take

95
leadership role in establishing security measures fo

information infrastructure and responding to attacks

These are but a few examples of current 

investments in the information age. The new De

Information Assurance Program will add to ongoing e

to secure the defense and national inform

infrastructure. Other initiatives will continue to ad

the full spectrum of offensive and defensive operation

CONCLUSION

We face no imminent threat, but we do have an enemy—

enemy of our time is inaction.

President William J. Clinton

96

Figure 2. Information Warfare Systems Engineering 

NPS.

29
y

Armed Forces. Each of the services has charted a p

2010 and beyond with technology being a primary d

force. The manner in which leaders will be educat

Joint Vision 2010 has not been adequately spelled out. 

the services will not reap the benefits of any new educ

policy until approximately 5 years after the effective 

immediate action is necessary.

Over the next 9 years the New York Times esti

that one million new computer science jobs will be crea

the United States. Up to 400,000 jobs may be vaca

1998.

31With colleges and universities graduating less 

40,000 candidates for those jobs on an annual basi

salaries offered to experienced programmers are some

exceeding six figures.

After the Cold War, the services lost a large num

officers with technical degrees. Promotion policies hav

been costly as officers who took time to get adv

technical degrees were no longer competitive for prom

Although some of those officers have reserve commitm

many will not have a role in the next military force.

The demands of the Information Revolution are le

the services—some more than others—to the id

contracting technical jobs to private companies. Thi

has at least three major drawbacks. Due to competit

the private sector, the cost of private contracting 

consulting to the military will be much more than the c

requiring officers to come into the service with a tec

degree. The services simply will not be able to affor

contracts. Today, a contract for a single civ

programmer costs up to $150,000 per year.

32

The second shortcoming is that contractors may 

willing to follow the warfighters into battle when so 

jobs are available across the private sector. The 

consideration is the evidence presented in this repor

the need for technical competency will extend down 

97
py 

contractor to be the land warrior or land warrior lead

In conclusion, the Armed Forces must actively con

initiating programs that will develop inform

knowledgeable leaders. These programs must provide 

more technically qualified officers than actually n

because of the expected losses to the private sector 

service obligations are fulfilled. Junior officers will h

be educated through a combination of undergra

course requirements, distance learning, and mi

schooling.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. Rick Maze, “Officer Schooling Concerns Buyer, Skelton

Times, February 16, 1998, p. 6.

2. John M. Shalikashvilli, Joint Vision 2010, Washingto

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. 1.

3. Dennis J. Reimer, Army Vision 2010, Washingto

Department of the Army, 1996, p. 2.

4. Department of Defense, Defense 97, Alexandria, VA: Am

Forces Information Service, No. 6, 1997, p. 19.

5. Ibid., p. 19.

6. Steven Metz and James Kievit, Strategy and the Revol

Military Affairs: From Theory to Policy, Carlisle Barracks, P

Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, June 27, 1995), 

7. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Pete

trans., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 220

8. Winn Schwartau, Information Warfare, New York: Th

Mouth Press, 2nd ed., 1996, p. 12.

9. Department of the Army, FM 100-6, Information Ope

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, August 27, 1996

10. President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Pro

Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s Infrastructure, Wash

98
October 13, 1997, p. B-2.

 11. Department of Defense Joint Staff, Joint Publicatio

Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, Draft, Washington, D

Department of Defense, January 28, 1998, p. I-4.

12. Ibid., p. I-19.

13. Ibid., p. I-18.

14. John T. Correll, “War in Cyberspace,” Air Force Ma

January 1998, p. 34.

15. Gordon R. Sullivan and Anthony Coroalles, The Arm

Information Age, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War C

Strategic Studies Institute, March 31, 1995, p. 21.

16. Linda Geppert and William Sweet, “Technology 

Spectrum, January 1998, 20.

17. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Samuel B. Griffith, trans., 

England: Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 72.

18. Steven Metz, Strategic Horizons: The Military Implica

Alternative Futures, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War C

Strategic Studies Institute, March 7, 1997, pp. 2-3.

19. John L. Petersen, The Road to 2015, Corte Madera, CA

Group Press, 1994, p. 27.

20. Shalikashvili, p. 16.

21. Department of Defense Joint Staff, Joint Publicatio

Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, Draft, Washington, D

Department of Defense, July 2, 1997, p. VI-9.

22. Department of the Army, The Annual Report on The Arm

Next Project, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, Ju

p. A-1.

23. Ibid., p. 21.

24. U.S. Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, New World Vis

and Space Power for the 21st Century, Washington, DC

Department of the Air Force, January 30, 1996, p. 50.

99
25. Philip A. La Perla, Creating Information Knowle

Leaders Through Information Operations Education, Carlisle Ba

PA: U.S. Army War College, July 1997, p. 1.

26. Ibid.

27. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Surviva

Dawn of the 21st Century, New York: Little, Brown and Compan

p. 146.

28. Sullivan and Coroalles, p. 18.

29. Naval Postgraduate School, “Information Warf

Information Operations,” available from http:/

nps.navy.mil/~iwag; accessed 13 March 1998.

30. President William J. Clinton, “State of the Union Ad

January 1997.

31. Amy Harmon, “Software Jobs Go Begging, Thre

Technology Boom,” New York Times, January 13, 1998, sec. A, 

32. Ibid.

100
CHAPTER 6

A PROPOSAL

FOR DESIGNING COGNITIVE AIDS

FOR COMMANDERS

IN THE 21st CENTURY

Lawrence G. Shattuck

Army commanders at all levels will face new 

unprecedented challenges on 21st century battlefield

challenges will result, in part, from the infusi

technology into the command and control (C2) proces

doctrine states that commanders have two primary 

leading and deciding. FM 100-5 describes decisionm

as “knowing if to decide, then when and what to de

Commanders at all levels—tactical through strategic

decisionmakers. As we digitize the military

decisionmaking process is quickly becoming more com

more difficult, and more taxing on cognitive reso

Digitization provides decisionmakers with unlimited a

to data. However, decisionmakers do not make dec

based on data. Data must be amplified, interpret

integrated, within the situational context. This 

analysis is performed by humans who are, in most 

unaided by technology. With more data available tha

before, decisionmakers easily can become overwhe

They need an aid that will assist them with contex

based data analysis. This aid will free them to reas

higher cognitive levels and, as a result, make them 

decisionmakers. This chapter investigates 

decisionmaking challenges induced by digitizing the 

discusses the cognitive processes that contribu

decisionmaking; proposes methods to study the pro

that precede decisionmaking; and offers a soldier-cen

solution.

101
pgg

An Illustration of the Problem.

During the period June through November 199

Army prepared for and conducted the Division Adv

Warfighting Experiment (DAWE) with the 4th Inf

Division. The division was possibly the most technolog

sophisticated ground maneuver force in the world. Y

many ways, it was a model of inefficiency. Observ

from that experiment reveal three problems that m

attributed to the digitized technology. All observations 

made at a brigade tactical operations center (TOC).

Observation #1 (Data Flow and Analysis).

Research conducted by Shattuck, et al., investigate

data flowed within a brigade TOC and the types of ana

staff personnel performed on the data.

2

 They found th

of the most sophisticated brigade TOCs in the worl

transmitted approximately 89 percent of its data 

traditional means (radio, telephone, paper, and face-t

conversations). Additionally, the type of processing 

occurred on data flowing within the TOC was 

categorized. Types of processing ranged from transdu

(i.e., changing the data from an incoming radio mess

an entry in a paper log) to interpretation (i.e., app

higher order knowledge and cognitive skills to reason 

the data). The results revealed that less than 30 perc

the data was processed beyond the level of transduct

Researchers attributed the results to two pheno

First, as more data flowed into and around the TOC

staff had less time to devote to any one item. Therefor

cognitive processing performed on the data was rela

shallow. Second, clumsy automation impeded data flo

analysis. It was easier to write an incoming messag

piece of paper and take it to the other side of the TOC t

was to move it electronically.

102
()

Military organizations are hierarchical. At the ta

level, a senior decisionmaker—the commander—re

data, reviews what he knows about the battlefield

makes a decision. He has assistance in gathering 

analyzing the data, but the final decision rests with 

During Simulation Exercise (SIMEX) 1, a training ex

prior to the DAWE, staff officers frequently hande

brigade commander slips of paper or briefed him face t

On other occasions, the commander roamed aroun

TOC, looking at various Army Tactical Command 

Control System (ATCCS) computer screens (see Figu

In most instances, what was brought to him (or wh

observed as he walked around) was low-level, unfi

data.

Just prior to the actual DAWE, the commander di

that a wooden cabinet be built that could house s

monitors.

4

 On the screens, he wanted to view the A

data. During the DAWE, the commander spent much 

time studying the monitors, as well, as a large paper 

103

Figure 1. Major Components of the Army Tactical Com

and Control System (ATCCS) Architecture.
g

there was still a problem. The TV monitors displayed 

not information. Additionally, by bypassing the staf

was supposed to filter and analyze the data for him

commander now had to perform that task himself

array of TV monitors actually increased the cog

workload, even though he no longer had to physically 

around the TOC.

Observation #3 (Creating Situational Awarene

During SIMEX 1, not everyone in the TOC appea

understand what was happening or what the comm

was trying to accomplish in the tactical scenario. The 

did not have situational awareness. To correct the situ

before the DAWE, the commander procured and insta

high quality sound system that could drown out all 

noise in the TOC.

5

 During the DAWE, a few times a d

explained to everyone in the TOC what was happenin

what he was planning to do next. Although innovativ

solution bypassed not only his senior staff officers, bu

all the technology in the TOC.

One might draw the conclusion from these 

observations that the commander lacked the skill nece

to command a brigade equipped with the latest techn

On the other hand, the actions of the commander c

interpreted as providing creative solutions to problem

arose when the brigade was given technology that wa

than optimal in its design. We presume the 

explanation, but do not view the adaptations implem

by the commander as suitable.

The large amount of data, coupled with insuff

technological tools to process it, resulted in staff o

delivering raw data to the commander. The comma

response was to attempt streamlining the proce

centralizing the data. By doing so, the commander ma

decisionmaking process more difficult because he was 

required to perform both analytical and reasoning 

104
(

y, py

commander to the TOC and made its displace

problematic.) The technology was poorly designed be

it was not compatible with our doctrine, our organiza

procedures, or the way that humans process data and 

decisions. The following section provides results of a r

of the literature on decisionmaking and the processe

lead up to it.

DECISIONMAKING AND CONTRIBUTING

PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES

Decisionmaking. There are three general theor

approaches to decisionmaking that relate well t

methods found in Army doctrine. The first approa

based on rational models of decisionmaking. These m

describe how we ought to make decisions. Resear

eventually learned that most people didn’t follow ra

models in decisionmaking tasks. Instead, it became 

that subjects were systematically influenced to 

decisions that were less than optimal. As a r

researchers developed descriptive mode

decisionmaking. These models describe how subjects 

influenced by heuristics and biases to make decisions

Decisionmaking research that led to the normativ

descriptive models often was conducted in labor

settings. Laboratory subjects were not confronted wi

dynamics of the real world, nor would they ha

implement and live with the decisions they made. 

researchers began to investigate how decisions were 

outside the laboratory by practitioners engag

meaningful activities. These studies led to the natur

models of decisionmaking. We will now discuss the 

models in greater detail and then relate them to cu

doctrinal descriptions of decisionmaking.

Rational Models of Decisionmaking. Two role

attributed to rational models: normative and prescri

Normative models describe the choices of a hypoth

105
omniscient and omnipotent. Prescriptive means that 

is only one true rational choice. By systematically app

the rational model, a decisionmaker will be able to id

the correct choice.

Howard Raiffa discusses decisionmaking tasks by 

the language of decision analysis. According to him, 

are several steps in identifying the best outcome.

7

 Fi

depicts a simple decision tree illustrating the de

analysis method. Assume a commander must select a c

of action for an upcoming mission. The staff has deve

three options. The commander realizes that the best c

of action is dependent upon what the enemy decides 

According to decision analysis, there are four steps 

should be followed.

First, list the events that you expect to occur.

8

 Even

of two types: choices and chances. A choice event, depic

a square, represents a decision that must be made be

two or more alternatives. A chance event, depicted 

106

Figure 2. Decision Tree Depicting the Rational

Decisionmaking Model for a Commander prior to the O

Hostilities.
, p

environment. A chance event differs from a choice ev

that the decisionmaker has no control over the outcom

Figure 2, enemy activity illustrates a chance event

enemy may decide to press the attack to the north or 

south. 

Second, list the value of the possible outcomes

criteria for assigning values are at the discretion 

decisionmaker. The commander might use criteria su

speed, accuracy, number of lives lost, or amou

equipment damaged. Outcomes can be actual figure

35 soldiers killed in action (KIA)) or based on a relative 

(i.e., 10 = most desirable outcome; 1 = least des

outcome).

Third, list the probabilities of chance events.

10

 

probability for all the branches originating from a 

must total to 1.0. Determining the probabilities of ho

enemy will attack into the sector can be a difficult task

difficulty stems from the inherent uncertainty o

battlefield. Commanders may be able to reduce uncer

but they will not be able to eliminate it.

Fourth, analyze the tree and determine the op

choice.

11

 Beginning at the right side of the tree, the ou

value of each branch is multiplied by the probability o

outcome. These figures are summed for each Chance 

In Figure 2, the Chance Nodes have values of 3.8, 6.9

4.6. At the Decision Node, the decisionmaker should 

the COA that has yielded the highest value—in this 

COA #2.

As previously stated, the prescriptive nature o

Rational Decisionmaking Model suggests that there i

one possible correct solution to the problem. Techn

such as decision analysis are designed to lea

decisionmaker to the “right” answer. However, even 

simple example depicted, it should be obvious that the

several sources of error that could lead to an erro

107
functioning in operational settings and, faced 

non-trivial problems, often did not make the “

decision. In operational environments, one may be una

list all possible outcomes or to make definitive assessm

of values or probabilities of outcomes. Consequ

researchers began to look at how decisions are ac

made rather than how they ought to be made. This 

descriptive models of decisionmaking.

Descriptive Models of Decisionmaking. At approxim

9:12 PM (local time) on May 17, 1987, an Iraqi Mirag

fired two Exocet missiles at the USS Stark while 

operating in the Persian Gulf.

12

 Prior to the attac

Stark’s commander initiated action to track and est

contact with the aircraft. However, he never gave the 

to bring the ship’s weapon systems to bear on the air

As a result, 37 sailors were lost, and the ship was sev

damaged.

Fourteen months later, on July 3, 1988, an Ir

A-300 Airbus carrying 298 people climbed into the sk

turned to enter a commercial air corridor. The 

Vincennes, operating in the Persian Gulf, detecte

aircraft and mistook it for a hostile warplane

Vincennes fired on the Airbus, killing everyone on bo

During the ensuing investigation, the commander 

Vincennes indicated that the attack on the Stark had p

a part in his decisionmaking process. His state

supports the idea that, in operational settings, decisio

not discrete events, and decisionmakers do not rely sol

rational models. The outcome of one decision will infl

or bias subsequent decisions.

A. Tversky and D. Kahneman conducted exte

research into influences that lead decisionmakers to d

from “optimal” outcomes.

14

 These consistent deviatio

actually patterns of error known as biases. The resear

demonstrated that biases arise when decisionm

attempt to employ rules of thumb known as heur

108
y p 

limited cognitive resources. While these cognitive sho

require fewer resources, they may rely on assumption

ultimately prove to be invalid. The research of Tversk

Kahneman identified several heuristics and biases. Th

them are described below.

Availability Heuristic.

15

 Decisionmakers m

influenced by their ability to recall or imagine event

are similar to the situation in which they now 

themselves. The availability heuristic predicts tha

recency or salience of their experiences will influence 

assessment. The trend is to over-estimate the freque

events and, therefore, ascribe inordinately 

probabilities to these events.

Representativeness Heuristic.

16

 Decisionmakers 

rely on the extent to which the characteristics of a 

situation S are prototypical of a parent population 

there is a close match, the decisionmaker is likely to d

situation S is an instance of population P1. This p

seems reasonable until the base rates are consider

base rate tells us how often an event is likely to occur

although the characteristics of situation S closely m

population P1, this population is rarely present i

environment. Populations P2 and P3 contain only a 

the characteristics of S but they occur much more frequ

than P1. The representativeness heuristic predicts th

decisionmaker would ignore the base rates and conside

be an instance of P1 because the characteristics are a 

match.

Confirmation Bias.

18

 Decisionmakers who have se

a course of action will interpret subsequent informat

light of their decision. Therefore, new evidence that ou

disprove their decision is interpreted as supporting 

decision.

Descriptive models explain how and why we d

systematically from rational decisionmaking strat

109
y, pp

consistent irrationality of decisionmakers. Lik

descriptive models, naturalistic models also stri

accurately describe the decisionmaking process. How

naturalistic models stress that decisionmakers are rat

According to naturalistic models, decisions are ground

and influenced by, the operational setting in which 

occur.

Naturalistic Models of Decisionmaking. Natur

models are recent additions to the decisionmaking do

More accurately, perhaps, they represent a paradigm 

that led researchers out of the laboratory and 

operational settings. In the laboratory, decisions tend 

studied as singular events. In operational set

decisions are embedded in a complex process an

influenced by the events that precede the decision

organizational structure, and the environm

Researchers have identified eight characterist

naturalistic decision settings.

19

• Ill-Structured Problems.

• Uncertain, Dynamic Environments.

• Shifting, Ill-Defined, Competing Goals.

• Action/Feedback Loops.

• Time Stress.

• High Stakes.

• Multiple Players.

• Organizational Goals and Norms.

Several naturalistic decisionmaking models have 

proposed in recent years. While all of them are based o

eight characteristics listed above, they vary in 

approach to explaining how decisions are ma

operational settings. One model that has been popula

military researchers is Gary Klein’s Recognition P

110
() 

decisionmaking in a number of diverse domains. H

studied, among others, fireground commanders, army 

commanders, critical care nurses, and tournament 

players.

21

RPD emphasizes situation assessment and v

expertise. Rather than searching for the optimal sol

RPD asserts that decisionmakers in naturalistic s

engage in “satisficing.” That is, they look for the first o

that works rather than the best option. Decisionm

consider alternatives serially. They engage in m

simulation to determine whether the alternative has 

If the alternative does not fit the situation and cann

tailored to fit, it is discarded and a new alternat

considered. There are four major steps in the RPD M

• Experience the Situation.

22

 Is the situation fa

based on previous experiences? If not, the decisionm

may need to gather more information or reasses

situation. (A platoon leader in Desert Storm observ

Iraqi armor formation.)

• Recognition.

23

 The decisionmaker recognize

situation as similar to one previously experienced

match between the current and recalled situation

range from exact to only vaguely similar. In addit

recalling the situation, the decisionmaker also recal

solution that was implemented. (The platoon l

recognizes the Iraqi armor formation as similar to an e

formation he encountered at the National Training C

He recalls that he used an arrowhead formati

penetrate the defensive position.)

• Mental Simulation.

24

 The decisionmaker me

simulates implementing the recalled solution in the cu

situation. If the decisionmaker cannot visualize 

problems, the solution is implemented. However, 

decisionmaker visualizes problems in implementin

solution, the solution is modified. If, after modificatio

111
p

decisionmaker must recall the next closest match (s

above) and again mentally simulate implementin

solution. (The platoon leader mentally simulates his 

attacking in an arrowhead formation. However, unlik

National Training Center (NTC), these positions are 

dispersed and better fortified. He will have to re

indirect fire to soften the enemy’s defenses and dire

tank commanders to spread out the formation. He me

walks through the attack with these modifications a

satisfied with the plan.)

• Implementation.

25

 The feedback the decisionm

receives from implementing the plan serves as input 

next decision that must be made.

Decisionmaking in Doctrine. FM 101-5 describe

seven-step military decisionmaking process (MDM

These steps include developing and comparing mu

courses of action. The commander then reviews 

evaluating their strengths and weaknesses, then selec

best one. This is the same process described in the Ra

Decisionmaking section. The commander’s decisions m

affected by heuristics and biases, depending o

experiences and expertise. The process applies most 

decisionmaking that occurs prior to implementing the 

After the plan is implemented, the commander 

continue to make decisions because inevitably, unexp

events occur. In these instances, commanders are 

likely to use naturalistic decisionmaking methods, su

Klein’s RPD. Army doctrine (FM 101-5), however, do

acknowledge the fundamental differences bet

decisionmaking that occurs during the deliberate pla

process and that which occurs after the pl

implemented. Instead, it suggests that time is the 

factor that impacts on the process. It further states 

under time constraints, the same steps should be foll

but they should be modified. Command and General 

College Student Text 100-9, while not doctrine, des

112
p

combat decisionmaking; quick decisionmaking

immediate action drills.

27

 The latter two are perf

exclusively by the commander and employ natur

methods.

Research literature indicates that decisionmake

operational environments, described by the 

characteristics listed above (i.e., ill-structured prob

uncertain, dynamic environments; etc.), utilize natur

decision methods. In developing aids to assist comma

in their decision process, methods embedded in thes

should parallel methods used by actual decisionmake

this case, aids developed to assist commanders, in 

decisions that must be made after the plan is impleme

should be based on naturalistic decisionmaking. Ess

to naturalistic decisionmaking is having situat

awareness.

Situational Awareness.

Anyone who has been exposed to the Ar

modernization program is familiar with the 

“situational awareness.” Junior enlisted soldie

digitized TOCs refer to it as “SA.” Soldiers describe 

knowing where they are in relation to other friendl

enemy forces. Most researchers agree that better dec

are made if the decisionmaker has situational awar

Stated differently, situational awareness is a precur

good decisionmaking. Perhaps more important 

determining if one has situational awareness 

determine how to get it.

Understanding how situational awareness is achie

essential to building automated decision aids. Pr

building the aids, however, we must identify 

understand the cognitive process that underlies or pre

the attainment of situational awareness. A well-des

aid should work in parallel with the cognitive proces

113
, 

will discuss some of that process.

Cognitive Processes Requisite for Situational

Awareness.

Our memory systems are generally thought to con

three components: sensory memory, short term 

working) memory, and long term memory.

28

 Only a p

of the data sensed by our eyes and ears (as well as our 

senses) is transferred to our working memory. We 

focus on a data element for it to be transferred. All 

data fades from our memory system within a few sec

Data are transformed and reasoned about in our wo

memory. Relevant elements of long term memory (

procedures, schema, etc.) are transferred to wo

memory to help process the data. Unfortunately

capacity of working memory is very limited (7 

elements).

29

 This capacity is even more restricted d

periods of stress. These three memory component

integral to the processes that lead to decisionmaking

Before commanders or staff officers can 

appropriate decisions about events unfolding o

battlefield, they should have accurate situat

awareness. They achieve this accurate view by ana

information they have received and structuring 

meaningful ways. Before they can reason, the data m

transformed into information. Before it can be transfo

data must be detected. This process—reaso

transformation, and detection—is affected by indiv

and environmental factors. Each are esse

considerations in designing a system to a

decisionmakers on the battlefield.

Detection. Military decisionmakers work in a com

dynamic, and data-rich environment. A data elemen

only be transferred from sensory memory to wo

memory if we focus on it.

30

 What we focus on is a func

the characteristics of the stimulus (or data element

114
, 

element? Is it an auditory or visual stimulus? 

sufficiently different (i.e., louder, brighter, etc.) fro

surrounding environment to warrant our attention? 

we been primed by our long term memory to look 

particular data element? Are we tired, sick, or a

Well-designed decision aid displays must discrim

between important and unimportant data. Data de

important must be presented in a manner that will fac

detection.

Transformation. After data is detected and trans

to working memory, it must be transformed into mean

information. Micah Endsley, a situational awar

researcher, refers to this process, where disjointed 

elements are combined, as comprehension.

31

 Perh

better term is cognitive integration. This latter 

suggests that combining the data is not an amor

process but a function of both situational context an

experience level of the decisionmaker. An experi

commander, whose subordinate units are about to e

the enemy in a frontal assault, will more than 

integrate different data elements (or integrate the 

elements in different ways) compared to a n

commander whose subordinates are in a terrain-ori

defense. As described at the beginning of this ch

battlefield automation systems display overwhe

amounts of data and provide little, if any, assistan

commanders in integrating the data. Decision aids s

assist commanders in context-based integration so 

they can free up limited information processing capac

reason about the newly created information.

Reasoning. Fundamental to decisionmaking 

ability to reason about that which we perceive and 

which we know. Much of this reasoning involves pa

matching. In his RPD model, Klein indicates 

decisionmakers match patterns that have been constr

in working memory from what they have perceived 

115
py, , pp

expert’s memory consists of an array of ‘patterns,

information items grouped and indexed by their rele

for problem solving in the domain of expertise.”

33

The literature reviewed indicates that we use rat

descriptive or naturalistic models when making deci

Military decisionmakers, during battlefield operation

more likely to use naturalistic models (i.e., Klein’s 

Model). Many of these models stress tha

decisionmakers should have situational awareness p

making decisions. Situational awareness is construc

our memory system by employing processes that in

perception, integration, and pattern matching. Of 

there is little research on how military decisionm

integrate low-level data in meaningful ways to 

information that may be used in pattern matching.

Investigating Cognitive Integration.

The most reliable research methods are those 

employ converging methods. A single type of research 

lead to an answer, but not necessarily the truth. S

research should be both valid and reliable. Findings w

even more robust if a variety of methods are us

surround—or converge on—the truth.

34

 At least 

methods may be used to converge on the role of cog

integration in decisionmaking.

Single Scenario Simulations.

Many researchers make a distinction between e

and novice decisionmakers. Identifying those differen

useful in training novices and for developing aids to 

commanders in decisionmaking. Using a single sce

simulation is one method to discern these differences

expert group might consist of former brigade comma

who have excelled in combat or at the NTC. The n

group might consist of combat arms officers of s

116
g

p

given an operations order, maps, overlays, and 

products to embed themselves in the tactical scenari

movement to contact). The officers would then be pres

with a series of situation reports. Each report would 

the situation in such a way as to require a dec

Presented with an array of low level data, they wou

forced to select a subset of the data, integrate it, and u

newly constructed information to match patterns and 

decisions. Measurements might include identifying 

data were selected and why; how they were integrated

what patterns the integrated data formed. We would e

the integration patterns of experts and novices wou

significantly different.

Multiple Scenario Simulations.

Commanders are faced with a multitude of ta

scenarios—attack, defend, envelop, delay, etc. The set 

level data that is integrated in a movement to contac

differ from that in another tactical situation. It is impo

therefore, to explore multiple scenarios to determine if 

is a data set that is particularly relevant for a 

scenario. In these simulations, expert commanders 

be run through protocols similar to the one described a

However, each commander would be asked to particip

a variety of mission types. The data sets they use an

integration they performed would be compared a

mission types.

Cross Domain Observations.

Researchers often make the mistake of concentrat

a single domain. Much can be learned from studying 

domains. While other domains may appear to have li

common with military C2 on the surface, at theoreti

abstract levels they may be remarkably similar

observations made and the lessons learned from other 

may be used to develop solutions to problems identif

117
y 

characteristics of the cognitive integration task that d

the domain and those that are merely present. For exa

when defining characteristics in the tactical military a

commanders might include data overload and vir

exclusive use of visual and auditory modalities. A 

important characteristic might include the environ

(tent or track versus office building). Once the de

characteristics are determined, other relevant domain

be identified and studied.

Results from these three studies will yield conve

evidence that will surround the truth about cog

integration and the role it plays in building situa

awareness prior to decisionmaking. The next step is to 

the empirical results to the design of a soldier-cen

decision aid. The final section of this paper describes 

characteristics essential to such a system.

Considerations in Designing an Aid to Assist

Commanders with Cognitive Integration.

Engineers or computer programmers who ha

military experience develop most of the milit

technological systems. The result is systems tha

technology- or machine-centered. Donald Norman sta

Today much of science and engineering takes 

machine-centered view of the design of machines and, for t

matter, the understanding of people. As a result, the technol

that is intended to aid human cognition and enjoyment m

often interferes and confuses than aids and clarifies.

35

Technology-centered solutions often result in c

systems. These systems aid humans during perio

routine activity when the cognitive demand is min

However, when the system is stressed, due to incr

demands or failure, the cognitive demands on the h

escalate and the technology provides little relief.

alternative to a technology-centered system is one t

soldier-centered. The focus is the soldier (includin

118
p

ygp

system in which he/she operates, the task to be perfo

and the environment in which it is performed. The sys

then built around the soldier (rather than buildin

system and then selecting and training soldiers to op

it).

This chapter described the methods and proc

involved in decisionmaking. It also described the r

situational awareness and the cognitive processes 

contribute to situational awareness, including cog

integration. Finally, converging methods to study cog

integration were described. These theories and the r

of the proposed research should form the foundation 

system developed to aid commanders in cogn

integration. The system should be based on a natur

decisionmaking model; it should integrate low leve

into patterns consistent with the context; and, it s

facilitate the commander’s ability to match the patt

integrated information with patterns they have sto

memory. There are two approaches in the field of art

intelligence (AI)that would be useful in developing this 

Intelligent Agents.

Most TOCs operate on a data-push sys

Commanders, sitting at the top of the organiza

hierarchy, are fed a continuous stream of data by 

officers. Most of the data is sent to the commande

because it is wanted or needed, but because staff office

obliged to keep their boss informed. The result 

commander overwhelmed with low-level data that 

unable to process or reason about. An alternative woul

pull system. System designers should develop intel

agents or knowbots to search computer systems for low 

data elements needed to build informational pattern

commander might use within the context of his mis

When located, the data would be pulled up and integ

for the commander.

119
g

A veteran observer-controller (OC) at the NTC may 

seen as many as 40 brigades rotate through the man

box. His experience affords him the opportunity to b

robust schema with respect to movement to co

operations. He has the ability to look at patterns of dat

immediately discern what is happening because h

relate the current situation to a previous rotation in w

similar pattern emerged. When this type of cog

processing is built into an AI system, it is know

case-based reasoning.

38

 Such a tool may be us

comparing the patterns identified and confirmed b

commander, with previous patterns for similar scen

stored in memory. The key to developing a successful 

to build it to complement and support the cog

activities of the decisionmaker.

Conclusion.

The Department of the Army continues to invest h

in technologically-laden systems for the battlefields 

21st century. The systems will increase the ran

weapons, increase the speed at which soldiers and log

move around the battlefield, and improve the abil

communicate with one another. Concomitant with 

changes is a dramatic increase in the amount of raw 

available to the commander. Current C2 system

impressive in their ability to move data, but the ta

analysis, synthesis, and integration are still left to hu

Commanders will not be able to intrude upon the en

decision cycle unless they have assistance. It is time f

Army to begin developing soldier-centered systems 

complement human cognitive activity.

39

 Such systems 

be intuitive to operate.

4 0

 The goal of devel

soldier-centered systems begins with the delibe

empirical investigation of human cognitive activity 

occurs in operational settings.

41

 This may slow develo

and fielding of these systems, but ultimately it will res

120
gy 

more timely manner.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6

1. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, Ope

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, June 14, 1993, p

2. Lawrence Shattuck, Douglas Mulbury, Justin Rue

Sehchang Hah, “The Impact of Technology on Tactical Decisionm

A Cognitive Evaluation,” in Proceedings of the Fifth Annual U.

Research Laboratory/United States Military Academy T

Symposium, West Point, NY, 1997, p. 188.

3. Ibid., p. 189.

4. Lawrence Shattuck, Field observations made duri

Division Advanced Warfighting Experiment, Fort Hood, TX, No

1997.

5. Ibid.

6. Lee Roy Beach and Raanan Lipshitz, “Why Classical D

Theory is an Inappropriate Standard for Evaluating and Aidin

Human Decisionmaking,” in Gary A. Klein, Judith Orasanu, 

Calderwood, and Caroline Zsambok, eds., Decisionmaking in 

Models and Methods, Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corp

1993, p. 21.

7. Howard Raiffa, Decision Analysis, Random House: New 

1968, p. x.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Gene I. Rochlin, Trapped in the Net, Princeton, NJ: Pr

University Press, 1997, p. 154.

13. Judith Orasanu and Eduardo Salas, “Team Decisionma

Compex Environments,” in Gary A. Klein, Judith Orasanu, 

Calderwood, and Caroline Zsambok, eds., Decisionmaking in 

121
1993, p. 327.

14. A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, “Judgement Under Unce

Heuristics and Biases,” Science 185, 1974, p. 1124.

15. Marvin S. Cohen, “Three Paradigms for Viewing D

Biases,” in Gary A. Klein, Judith Orasanu, Roberta Calderwo

Caroline Zsambok, eds., Decisionmaking in Action: Mode

Methods, Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1993, p. 

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Judith Orasanu and Terry Connolly, “The Reinven

Decisionmaking,” in Gary A. Klein, Judith Orasanu, R

Calderwood, and Caroline Zsambok, eds., Decisionmaking in 

Models and Methods, Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corp

1993, p. 7.

20. Gary Klein, “The Recognition Primed Decision, RPD) 

Looking Back, Looking Forward," in Caroline E. Zsambok an

Klein, eds., Naturalistic Decisionmaking, Mahwah, NJ: La

Erlbaum Associates, 1997, p. 285.

21. Gary A. Klein, “A Recognition Primed Decision, RPD) M

Rapid Decisionmaking,” in Gary A. Klein, Judith Orasanu, 

Calderwood, and Caroline Zsambok, eds., Decisionmaking in 

Models and Methods, Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corp

1993, p. 144.

22. Ibid., 141.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Department of the Army, Field Manual 101-5

Organization and Operations, Washington, DC: U.S. Departmen

Army, May 31, 1997, p. 5-3.

122
27. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, The T

Decisionmaking Process, Student Text 100-9, Fort Leavenwor

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, July 1993, pp

28. Rochlin, p. 109.

29. Mica R. Endsley, “Toward a Theory of Situation Aware

Dynamic Systems,” Human Factors, Vol. 37, No. 1, March 1995

30. Gary Klein, “Re: Another question,” electronic mail mes

Lawrence Shattuck, February 19, 1999.

31. Christopher D. Wickens, Sallie E. Gordon, and Yili 

Introduction to Human Factors Engineering, New York: A

Wesley Longman, Inc., 1998, p. 147.

32. G. A. Miller, “The Magic Number Seven Plus or Minu

Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Inform

Psychological Review, Vol. 63, 1956, p. 81.

33. Endsley, p. 40.

34. Ibid., p. 37.

35. Gary A. Klein, “A Recognition Primed Decision (RPD) M

Rapid Decisionmaking,” in Gary A. Klein, Judith Orasanu, 

Calderwood, and Caroline Zsambok, eds., Decisionmaking in 

Models and Methods, Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corp

1993, p. 141.

36. Daniel Serfaty, Jean MacMillan, Elliot E. Entin, and E

Entin, “The Decisionmaking Expertise of Battle Command

Caroline E. Zsambok and Gary Klein, eds., Natu

Decisionmaking, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 

235.

37. Elizabeth B.-N. Sanders and Susan Stuart, “The Role 

Research in Consumer Product Development,” in Thomas G. 

and Samuel G. Charlton, eds., Handbook of Human Factors Test

Evaluation, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1996, p

38. Donald A. Norman, Things That Make Us Smart, Readi

Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1993, p. 9.

123
39. David D. Woods, Leila J. Johannesen, Richard I. Co

Nadine B. Sarter, Behind Human Error: Cognitive Systems, Com

and Hindsight, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH: Crew S

Ergonomics Information Analysis Center, 1994, p. 114.

40. “Intelligent Software Agents,” http://www.cs.umbc.edu/ 

Internet;accessed March 31, 1999.

41. “Case-Based Reasoning,” http://www.ai-cbr.org/theinde

Internet.

124
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Editor

Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II

Director of Publications and Productio

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler
ERRATA

Corrected Figure and Tables.

Page 12, Figure 4, Organizational Strata and Func

Domains.

Page 90, Table 1, Education Requirements for M

Officers.

Page 93, Table 2, Education Opportunities for 

Officers.

1

ORGANIZATIONAL STRATA AND FUNCTIONAL DOMAI

Stratum Time span Functional Domain

(vii) 4-star level 20 years Systems (Strategic level)

- unbounded environment, outward focus

- create complex systems, envision

 future

- build consensus, create culture

(vi) 3-star level 10 years - oversee complex systems

(v) 2-star level 5 years Organizational (Operational level)

- exist within bounded open system

- manage one complex system

(iv) Brigade CDR 2 years - oversee operating sub-systems

(iii) Battalion CDR 1 year Production (Tactical Level)

- direct one operating sub-system

- bounded within larger sub-system

- face-to-face

(ii) Company CDR 3 months - direct tasks

(i) Troops <3 months - perform tasks

Figure 4. Organizational Strata and Functional Doma
2

 Depth of Knowle

 TOPIC TIER 1 TIER 2 T

Computers and Information Technology B I 

Software Applications B I 

Programming Languages F B 

Software Development N F 

Networks and Telecommunications F I 

Information System Intruder Tactics F B 

Information Security F I 

Computer System and Network Security F B 

Information Assurance N F 

Human-Computer Interaction F B 

Satellite Communications Systems F I 

Global Positioning Systems (GPS) F B 

Wireless Communications F B 

Communications Fundamentals B I 

Electrical Engineering Fundamentals F B 

Electronic Vulnerabilities F B 

Strategic and Operational Intelligence B A 

Information Operations Principles B I 

Levels: N-None F-Familiarization B-Basic I-Intermediate A-Advanced

Table 1. Education Requirements for Military Office

Undergraduate Distance Mi

TOPIC Course Learning Co

 

Computers and Information

 Technology X

Software Applications X

Programming Languages X

Software Development X

Networks and Telecommunications X 

Information System Intruder

Tactics X X 

Information Security X 

Computer System and Network

Security X 

Information assurance 

Human-Computer Interaction X 

Satellite Communications Systems X 

Global Positioning Systems X 

Wireless Communications X 

Communications Fundamentals X X 

Electrical Engineering Fundamentals X X

Electronic Vulnerabilities X 

Strategic and Operational

 Intelligence X 

Information Operations Principles X 

Table 2. Education Opportunities for New Officer