fhe second complete outer belt of 28 forts and fortified groups, located
on the rim ef a wheel of hills approximately six miles out from the Imb of the
city of Meta, was composed of permanent fortifications, The forts of thie
group were essentially fortified artillery positions, on distinguished from
tho inner belt, whose forts were primarily used as infantry stronzpoints.
There were no planned fielde of fire from the forts proper for direct fire of
automatic weapons, Instead, an interdefensive system of fire was devised
whereby the deep moate that surrounded each fort or fortified group were
covered by interlocking fields of automatic fire which effectively barred any
dafantry croseing. The German infantry positions protecting these highly
fortified artillery positions were set up quite a distance out from the forts
themselves in an all-around security design.

fo prevent high velocity direct fire weapons from destroying the gun em
Placements, the Metz forte were generally underground with their large caliber
guns firing from rouml, revolving, steel turrets that protruded above ground
level, Underground passages linked the various forts so that counter~battery
artillery fire was ineffective and only a direct hit on a turret by an aerial
bomb of 1,000 pounds, or more, would silence the position, Attacking in
fantry on one fort proved ineffective, The German defender merely went
underground while the attacking infantry received heavy artillery bombardaent
from the supporting German forte and artillery positions.”

Bach fortress accommodated 2,000 to 3,000 men along with a crew of 150
to 200 men for each battery, The communications system was excellent and was
designed to provide the defenders of one fort with direct comminications with
other forte as well as indirect communications with each fort via a central
telephone exchange in Mets.

The terrain ef the Moselle River region forme one of the finest naturel)
1s


MORALR

Tho morale of Patton's 31 Aray Was high defore the initial stopping Veat
of the Moselle, ‘They had devastated the Germans sand bragged that they wore
with Patton, Their loss in momentum for 30 days or ao cwaed a slight decrease
in morale due to inactivity. They were overjoyed when given the order to
attack onward “toward the Rhine”, During this loss in momentus the Germans
had set strong defenses ani were nearly prepared for the full scale Angrican
attack. They inflicted heavy casualties on the U.5. forces and oxpertenced
a Lift in their morale by stopping Patton,5°

During the first phase, the U.S. roraes wers tired, hungry and took 50
percent casualties, The morale of wen in the companies had gone down as thoy
saw their leaders die, Some unite even retreated uncontrolled from the
patt1e.57

fhe weather served to further demoral‘ze thes as the rain, cold and mut
slowed thom, thereby oxposing them longer to the eneay's fire, The terrain
and weather «id not favor use of tanks which caused the goldiers to fight a
different type of battle than they had been previously fighting. Gone was
the flank security achievei by speed. Gono was the maneuver they enjoyed
with their tanks. In ite place was an aseault upon fortified positions
without the aseistanee, initially, of six cover.

The leaders did all they could to increase morale. Patton gave many of
hig fauous “pep talke", Many subordinate leaders showed their concorn for
thety soldiers by insuring thoy had proper clothing and adequate food. ‘he
solliers believed in their lesders and in their causes, They knew Hitler must

be defeated,
SEADEASHIE
The German Leaderehip was convinced the war was ever in the Western Front
38



Gersans were hastily organizing to defend Metx and the Meselle River Line,
The fortress syaten around Mets was to be used as the basis for thie defense,
and the loss of Mets to the advanciag American Ferce was to be prevented. To
the north ef Mets German Forees were observed setting up s defensive acreen
went of the Moselle in the Thionville area,

Wunereue diserganixed German units, after falling back in confusion from
the XX Corps offencive, were observed withdrawing towards Mets as a rallying
point.

‘There was a permanent German garrison, the 462d Mobilisation Division,
It consisted of an officer candidate school, Regiment VI, # number of battale
tons of the Stellung type incorporated into a regimental organisation, and
the 1010th Security Regiment, remnants of which had fallen back on the city
after their previous stand on the Seins River, This unit was menning static
defenees in Metz. The 17th 3S Panzer Grenadier Division, whieh had fallen
back frem positions in the vicinity ef RTAIN, was assigned the defense of the
sone southwest of Mets. In the Thionville sector, on the north, the 559th
Infantry Division was mobilized to defend the Moselle line ani to delay west
of Thionville as long as possible, The object of the delay in feree ot Metx
was to establish a hinge on which to organixe the center of tho western front.

The XX Corps had little information regarding the military strength of
Mets, ‘Their rapidity of advancement hed allewed no time to gather and die=
cenminate information en the fortress system or the availability of troops to
defend it, Maps available to U.S. forces showed neither the fortifications
nor the details of the terrain.

Prom the German perspective, the defense of Metx could beet be accom
plished by concentrating forces east of the Moselle River line, and the forte

west of the river were used chiefly for delaying purposes only, Metz itself
31



In conjunction with the crossing, the 2nd and 3rd battalions initiated
their night attack against Maizieres=les-Mets, The operation was almost
immediately halted by the extensive minefields in the area, Onoe tripped, the
Germans were alerted to the attack ani caught the American troops in the open
with artillery fire, Despite heavy casualties, the attack continued through
out the night and on into the next day. On the afternoon of 9 November, the
battalions were reinforced with tanks and by nightfall had secured the entire
ares except for a emall eneny enclave in the town of Hauconcourt. On the
following day, the Noselle River began to flood ami the rising water isolated
this village, Thereafter, no further attempt was made to clear it.

On daybroak of 9 November the lst Battalion had succoeded in crossing
ite A company and a heavy weapona platoon seross the river, Ry this time,
howover, German artillery had seroed in on the crossing site and prevented
the bridge building operations of the engineers, Additionally, the rising
flood of the Moselle, combined with the increasing accuracy of German fire
made contimed boat crossings impossible, ‘The two companies of the battalion
were cut off.

Phe 19th Volke Grenadier division, which opposed the crogsing, made no
major attempt to eliminate the bridgehead. Its actions were confined to
patrolling ani indirect fire, It is apparent that the division recognized
the action as a fient. ‘The companies on the east tank were supported for
three days by air drops from light spotter aircraft. Finally, on the night
of the 11/12 Wovember the flood waters began to recode and the remainder of

the battalion was able to cross,

the 90th Division Croseine®t
fo execute its northern envolopment of Metx the 90th division selected

two crossing sites on the Moselle River: Cattenom and Malling. It was the
4o



ordered to reconnoiter to the Rhine without delay ami the 7th Armored Division
was to advance east in multiple columns; seize crossings ever the Rhine, The
5th Infantry Division was to capture Mets and then continne to advance to the
Rhine, while Thionville vas assigned to the 90th Infentry.?+

At this state of the caspaign, the XX Corps and the American Army had run
out of detailed maps and were using mostly 1:100,000 Michelin read maps. The
fortifications around Nets and Thionville were marked on some of the maps used
vy XX Corps, but nobody had any idea of the type, design, or actual sites of
the forts, Some apprehension was felt, wut the general tendency was to hope
for the best and to dismiss the forts as probably obsolete and incapable of
offering determined resistance, The events of the next ten days virtually

altered this view.!?

The German Situation at the beeinnine of the Nets Ganpeien

Direetly opposing General Patton's forces was the German First Army. On
6 September the commander, General von der Chevallerie was retired on grounds
of “41lhealth" and replaced by General Otto von Knobelederf. Ths latter had
hed considerable experience ss a corps commanier in Russia and was known to
be beth w tough fivhter and an optimist, Wis Army, together with the Nineteenth
Army immediately to the south, was placed under the somand of Army Group ¢
and General Plaskowite.!?
During the last days of angust, tho German Pirest Army had pulled back
behind the Meuse with its forces totally shattered and on the run. From the
retroat, only nine battalions of infantry, two batteries ef field artillery,
ten tanks, and a mumber of antiaircraft and antitank guns had been retrieved.
Reinfercements in the slope of elements of the 3rd and Sth Panzer Grenadier

Divisions had arrived from Italy in time to see action in the Verdun~Commercy

Ares, and the remaining troups of these units were in position along the
8



momentum maintained by large concentrations of artillery fire. Until such
time when the air assets available to support corps operations are truly
“all-weather”, it would seom that the employment of artillery should be mora
carnfully considered in wargaming offensive courses of action, In light of
the Army's experience at Mets, wargaming under conditions of unfavorable
weather should bo the rule rather than the exception in staff operations,

Commander's intent: ‘The “Buttle of Netz" renffirmed the importance
of a subordinate's understanding of his commanier's intent in an operation.
Corps, division and regimental commanders were able to effectively recom
figure their forces, change their main effort, and redirect their combat
support to meet changing situations without diverting their attention fron
what Was to be accomplished. ‘The early crossing of the 95th Infantry Divi-
sion, the redireetion of the 10th Armored Division, and the formation of Task
Force Bacon were all diversions from the original plan that commanders were
able to improvise because they knew what end result was expected.

fraining during dombst: One important aspect that is often neglected
in the study of tactics is the conduct of unit training during a war, A key
element in the success of the U.S. Army in the "Battle of Metz" was the
special training in fortification fighting coniucted before the November
aseault, The 90th and 95th division units hai practiced the techniques neces
sary to storm and defeat the Metz fortifications. Without this training, they
would have beon subjected to high casunitier, The Army needs to insure that
its corps are organized and oriented to conluct such training in future
conflicts, Without this capability, U.8. units may find it difficult to deal
with new threat battlefield tactics or to employ new weapons and tactics

introduced during the conflict.

68



ae

theless, there was minimal damage done to the ferte er their occupants, the
979th attack advanced to their first objective which wae 500 yarde to the
rear of Fort Jeanne dfarc, Although the objective was reached, the fort wae
not secured, ‘This permitted # large number of German troops to hide in the
trenches and bunkera. After the 2d Battalion of the 379th moved through the
fort, the enemy forses regrouped and word able to cut off the 2d Battalion
from the Regiment, The let Battalion wae similarly cut off after they captured
Fort Jusey, and Fort Bois la Dame which they lost again shortly afterward.
“the encirelud unite were supplied during the early part of the evening by
artillery spotter aireraft runaing the gauntlet of eneay tire 66

The defending enemy foreos weren't strong enough to prevent a penctra~
tion but they were quick to regroup where possible and contime to place
harasning fire oa the U.S, ferces. “The 4624 Pusilior was committed in the
Jeanne dtare sector, Mlements of the 1010th Seeurity Regiment cut off the
American 24 Battalion. It is probably that the 1217th Regiment opposed the
let Battalion".©” General Kittel had successfully engaged the 95th Division
threat by moving his small reserve throughoat the battlefield and concentrat~
ing them agsinat the 379th attack.

The night of the 14th was spent drafting contingency plans to effect
link up with the two 0.5. elements that were eneireled, The next Jay, the
3d Battalion was committed along the road between Ford da Guise and Jeanne
de Arc. Presaure was delng spplied by the 378th to enhance the effectiveness
of the operations of the 3d Battalion,

Eneny resistance was lowered significantly, and “the German officer in
chargo of the strongpoint then surrendered with 46 men and it later trane~

pirel that he had (wrongly) assunei that he was surrounded by & considerable

fores of jmorteans" 58

50



the 90th division's southern flank.

At firet light of November 15th, the combat group struck the town of
Distroff. ‘This area was held by the 2nd Battalion 358th Infantry. The
battalion had recently been reinforced with one platoon of tanks snd one
platoon ef tank destroyers, Initially, direct fire from the village was able
to ferce the Geraan tanks back and separate them from their supporting im-
fantry, After two attempts the Gersan troops forced their way into the
willage, At the same time another German unit encireled the village and eut
the Americans @ff. In four hours of hard fighting, the German attack was
trsken and the combat group withdrew,

The 357th attacked on 15 November, but was stopped by German held fortie
fications at Hackenberg, After a full day and night artillery duel with the
fort's field guns, the area was neutralised on 16 Nevember and the attack
continued. By the 17th of Kovember the division had advanced beyond the
village ef Klong and had destroyed or captured several German units.

Upon restoring ite situation at Distroff, the 358th Regiment meved to
the attack on 16 November, The 3rd Battalion cleared Inglange. ‘The lst and
2nd Battalions attacked and seisod Netservisse. The 2nd Battalion continued
the attack to seeure Metseresehe on 17 November,

At thie point the 90th division stopped assigned intermediate ebjectives
and launehed the division into a pursuit to clese the gap around Mets, The
359th relieved the 358th. Rapidly moving on trucks, the reginent overran
German demolition tesms and caught road blecks before they were emplaced. By
19 November the regiment had cut escape routes out of Mets at Conde-Northen
and Les Bfange. Later that day the 90th Reconnsissance troop linked up with
elenente of the 735th tank battalion eupporting the Sth Division. The em

cirelenent was complete, At that time, the 90th division was ordered to
48



preparing to enter,

TY Bacon, consisting of the 2nd Battalion, 378th Infantry, the 1st Battal~
ion, 377th Infantry, and the 95th Reconnaissance Troop were located approxi~
mately 24 miles north of Mots in the vicinity of the German-held Fort St.
Julian, The bulk of the 377th(-) and 378th Infantry Regiments had drawn up
to the Hofen Canal, parallel to the Moselle River, just northwest of the city.
West of the city the proviously encircled 379th Infantry Rogiment had fought
ite way to within about # mile from the Moselle, South of Mets, elements of
the Sth Division's 10th and 1lth Infantry regiments were occupying the city's
southern suburbs, 76 All U.S. forces were reduced in strength because of
eagualties ani because of forces which had to be left behind to hold several
German occupied strongpoint ferte which surrounded the city.

In addition to the previously mentioned U.S. forces surrounding the
city, there were sone 400 combatant FFI people still in the city iteelf,

fhe main German etrongpoint forts surrounding the city which were still
offering strong resistance during the night of 17 November were Forts St.
Julian, about 3 miles north of the eity in TF Bacon's sector; Forts Plappe=
ville and St. Quentin approxinately 3 miles west of Metx in the 379th Infantry
Regiment's area; Forts Jeanne d'Arc, Driant, and a couple of the Seven Dwarfe
further south and west of the city; Fort Verdun about 4% miles south and Fort
St. Privat on the city's southernmoat edge, doth in the 11th Infantry Regi~
ment's ares; and Fort Queuleu abcut # mile southeast of Mets in the 10th
Infantry Regiment sector.

German forces contained within these forts by U.S. troops reduced the
number of forces available to the German commander rewponsible for holding
the city of Mets.

Hecsuse of the large number of French civilians still in the city the
shh



avail, The TF Bacon commander then ordered a 155um salf propelled gun to be
brought up to fire on the door, after firing ten rounds at point blank range
the door to Fort St. Julian stil) stood. When the target was finally changed
to the stonework surrounding the door, twenty more rounds finally caused the
giant door to fall into the fort. It was indeed fortunate for TF Bacon that
the Germans defending Fort St. Julian had no antitank guns. Sinco it was
dark by the time the door was destroyed, 2/378 elected to wait until the
following day to enter and clear the fortress.

Meanwhile 1/377 was experiencing heavy mortar fire while attempting to
enter the suburb of St. Julian. That fire was likely to have been fire from
an antiaircraft battery put into position north of Fert Bellecroix by General
Kittel, General Kittel claimed to have known of the plan for the 1/377 to
bypass Fort St. Julian and had consequently positioned the entiaircraft
battery to fire on tanks approaching the city from the direction of Forts St.
Julian end Belleeroix, The resistance offered by the antiaircraft battery
and the few German soldiers in the suburb did not stop the 1/377th, end led
by tank destroyers, they entered St. Julian by early afternoon, They preased
on to Fort Rellecrotx, # huge storage facility constructed in the 18th
century.

While Company A 1/377th moved to the rear of the fort and took a large
number of German prisoners, Company C lost 8 killed and 48 wounded ss the
result of a hugo explovion from within the fort's northern edge near where
they were located. The oxact cause of the explosion has never been established
but speculation has it that an ammunition storage magarine exploded, As a
result of the explosion, however, the 2/377th had to withdraw for the night
to care for their wounded soldiere.

The 95th Reconnaissance Troop under TF Bacon wae moving to the west
58



On 13 November, the lst Hattalion 377th Infantry which held the initial
crossing at Uckange was ordered to attack north to make contact with the 2nd
Bn, 378th Infantry. The battalion immediately secured the villages of Bertange
and Imeldange, However, before its defenuns could be fully emplaced, the unit
was Gounter=attacked by a taek forca from the 73rd Regiment of the 19th Volks
Grenadier Division, This strong force was reinforced by a unit from the 485th
Antietank Battalion, In two days of hard fighting the battalion took heavy
canvalties tt continued to hold the village. Finally, the 2nd Bn, 378th
Infantry with a platoon of tank destroyers attacked south from Illange and
relieved the battalion,

fo coordinate the advance towards Mets, the 95th reorganized te con-
colidste its unite on the east bank, On 15 Nevember, COL Rebart L. Racon
was given command of all unite east ef the Moselle, Task Fore# Bacon was
then reinforced with some cavalry, artillery, tank and tank destroyer units,
Upon the reliof of the 1st Bn 377th Infantry, the taek force wae assigned the
miseion of attacking south towards Mets to clear the enemy from the east bank
of the Mose}le,

Commitment of the 10th Armered Diviesen®?

The 10th Armored wae moved into secure aseenbdly areas juct weet of the
Meaclle on 9 Novepber, As e00n as ao suitable crossing site Was established,
4t was to cross the river and conduct a two pronged operation to seize a
bridgeheai across the Sarre and to attack alongside the 90th division, On
12 November, following the attack of the 95th division across Thionville,
work wae begun in that area on a Bailey Bridge. Despite intensive eneny
fire, the bridge was completed on 14+ November, Combat Command B (CCR) of

the 10th Armored crosued the bridge in the afternoon and closed on an assembly

ares near Kerling before ¢aylight on 15 November, Yarlier that evening, CCA
46



US Forces:
Order of Buttle, Composition:

RHIRD U.S. ARMY

XX Corps

Sth taf Div
24 Inf Regt
10th Inf Regt
llth Inf Regt

g0th Inf Div
387 Inf Regt
358 Inf Regt
359 Inf Regt

95th Inf Div
377 Inf Regt
378 Inf Regt
379 Int Regt
TY Racon

XIT Corps

26th Inf Div
10ist Inf Regt
1o4th inf Regt
328th Inf Regt

35th Inf Div
134th Inf Regt
137th Inf Regt
320th Inf Regt

80th Inf Div
317th Inf Regt
318th Inf Regt
319th Inf Regt

+ *

» a *
7th Armor Div
@CA
ocB
ocR
10th Armor Div
oa
eos
ock
3a Cav Sp
6th Gav Gp

11034 Cbt Engr Gp
1139th Got Engr Gp
5th Ranger Bn

4th Armor Div

6th armor Div
CCA
ccB
CCR

2a Cav (tp

106th Cav Gp
1117th Gbt Engr Op
1135th Cbt Engr Gp



but wore nearly fanatical about protestion of tho homeland, In this battle
the most fierce oppowition was from the OCS regiment and the WOO academy,
Although some of the leaders were tachnically competont the aajority of the
smaller level leaders were inexperienced,

Patton's personnlity permeated the battle, He wae everywhere! He
foread, pushod and, at times, directed forward operations. He proved, how-
avor, not to be very flexible about this plan. The smaller unit leaders
ended up using initiative to overcome the obstacles anil eventually took Nets.
fhe american Army had the leadership advantage throughout the pdattle, al-
though the Germans fought bravely.

Co Immediate Military Objectives
XX Corval aission was simple: “to encirele and destroy the enexy in the

Mets garrivon ami capture a bridgehead ever the Saar (River). The order
specifically called fer the “destruction or capture of the Mets garrison
without the investiture or seizure of the Mets Ports,#°8 ‘The Corps vas
anxious not to repeat the fiases at Fert Driant which had cost so many lives
and LIc Patten wae anxious to requue his rapid advance to the Rhine River.

feneral Kittelts orders were clear: His outh was "to defend the city to
the last man and cartridge.” Hitler hed now taken a speeial interest in the
Motz garrison and in the seconi week of Nevember ordered the garrison to
“hola® and to de reinforced, provisioned for a long siege, and equipped with
additional rockot launchers, He saw the opportunity to put 4 large salient
in the advancing Allied lines and to nlow or atop Patton, His orders came
too late for the Metz garrison,
De Feasible Courses of Action

U.S. Porces hal the following courses of action:

1. Enctrele and roduce the garrison.
36



ae

were partly compensated for by the Nets fortifications. This allowed the
Gormans to release good formations for the winter offansive in the Ariennes,
allowed then to gain time for the offensive, and strengthen western defenses
boyond the Saar at the cost of only their nowt expeniable formations,

In addition, the Germana could use the arca to force the Americans inte
difficult and longthy urban battles, This type of combat is extremely
destructive to the villages and farus, Hewever, since it vas unlikely that
this territory would ever be returned to derman control, they could use it
to achieve the maxinus delay of U.S. feroon.”>

Army Group (i, although it inourred grcat losses, was able to delay the
Third Army, position ite more effective units to defend the Saar, and gain
time and forces for the Ardennes Offensive, It was able to maintain the
cohesion of ite First Arny throughout the battle and establish a continuous

2nd defensive Line 86

Battlefield Lessons
The "Battle of Mete” offers several important leesons that are highly

relevant to the aArmy’e present day application of ite Airlani Battle doctrine,
Some of the most significant are as follows:

Bad Weather Operations: An extremely notable characteristic of
Advland Battle tactics is the eaployment of attack helicopters and other air
support to destroy counter attack forces, and to generally isolate the battle=
field 20 that the offensive power of ground mansuver forces ean de concentrated.
These operations sre successful, however, only if the veathor permite the
employment of aircraft. XX Corps found themselves in 6 situation where their
available alrpower could not be used, This waa coupengatod for by the
effnctive employment of both division ani corps artillery assets. On more

than one occasion, enemy counterattacks wero disrupted and the offensive

67



THE RATTLE OF META

A Battlebook presented to the Staff and
Faculty of the United States Aray
Commani snd General Staff
Sellere in fullfillment
of the requirewents for
P,651

by

Staff Group 13A
R. Stephenson, MAT(P), IN
J, McNulty, Mae. QM

ee Kuhn, MAS, IN
K. Kremenak, MAT, MSC
T. Bowdon, MA), FA
Je Watson, MAT, AR

wo, Potrick, MAT, MP
W. Marshall, MA‘, AR
J. Brennan, MAC, AD

M, Maguey MAT, AY
Ke Jarnon, MAT, MT
Ke Knight, MAS, AY
Jd, Tomlin, MAT, SC

Fort Leuvenwo: th, Kansas
1984

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEAL SE.
DISTHEUTION UNLDOTED.

addy eee teniee



2

*6rysa., De 7
7 yeia., BP. BD.
Bria, Po 7
bide, Pe 9

30go1e, He Mes Fog peoeragye Campaden (Washington, D.9.: Government Printing
értico, 1950), Pe 225

Blgemp, ods Gites De 42,

gore, OP, Chie, De 126,

2xemp, QBs Gite, De 27.

HM eor0, We Shte, Pe 123.

3Spuppenthal, Holand 6. ligetatical support of the Aradat. Joh Lam
(Washington, DeOet Tice of the Chief of Military History, 1959),
Pe 259.

36core, ope Gites pp. 249, 250, 308,

IKeup, gps Sikes Pe 215s

8rpga., Po 230

39cole, Ors Chtes De 305.

“Oxemp, QPe Chie, Pe 211.

‘Anuppenthal, 9ps Gites, Pe 15~

423) wuenson, Wertin, (Boston: Houghton Miff~
lin Go., 1974), pe 531.

Score, QPs Ght.. pp. 435, 439.
Meeupponthal, 9a Gites Pp. 13-139.
Sy pta., Pe 339

'6eo10, QPe Git, pe 388.

“Tr pta., pe 2116

"Br ndae, pps Us, 146,

89 wppenthal, We Cit.» Bp. R146,

5°pome, Forrest Os» (Washington, 1.0.2: Office of the
Chie? of Military History, 1954), p. 216.

Slkamp, Ope Cites Pe 147.

70



END NOTES
lanthony Xemp, The Unknown Battle (New York: Stein and Day Publishers,
1981), Pe 3.
Tblde. Pe 4.
Jyosa., pp. Yms,
totdes PPe dnb,
Frbta., Pe Be
Ibdid., Pe %
7idid.s Ps 10.
8iia., mre 1Sel?.
Sghira Army After Action Report (AAR, 5 Septomber 194+),

1nthony Kemp, The_fosnown Battle (New York: Stein and Day Publishere,
1981), pp. 341.

Vipia., pe 42.
yasa., ve 42.
Win, re Je

Wybides Pe 32.
16inig., pe 35.

VW ipig., pp. 35-36.
20s uaa, Pe 36.

Lhid.,» Pe 38.

"the dejugtion of Fortress Nets (XX Gorps Operational Report & 1 Sep = 6 Dee
19h), Po Be
69



"ole, ore Shker De 438,
erptaes pe Md,

73xomp, gps Gite, Pe 163.
Teta, pe 185s
75 Tbid., pe 201.
7 etdes pe 203s

ia. pe 214.

rota. Pe 218.
7oradley, Omar, A Soldier's Story (Hyre ani Spottiswodis, 1951), p. 438.
B0cole, om cit.

Slyetienthin, F. We, Panzer Battles (University of Oklahoma Press, 1956),
PP. 383-3850

B2aradley, Os Gite, Pe MW
core, Oe Shter Pe 607.
Hyerienthin, QDs Ght., PP. 393%,

Saradley, ORs eit., Pp. Hl,
86,

Mellenthin, ops Gites: Pe 395«



as

fought on without communications.

Command of the German Forces was fair, but was hampered by a lack of
planning and uncertainty of the fortress! mission, Additionally, many ex
perienced officers and NCO's from the units within Kets hed been reassigned
during the October lull, Mot until one day before the U.S. offensive was it
decided by the German high command to hold the city, Nevertheless, General
Baleh, commanding the Gorman Corps, had foreseon the sacrifice of Metz, He
had therefore not committed his precious tanke or assault guns to the city.
When the decision to held the city was finally made, there was not time te
reinforce with men and equipment and the commanders were left to fight with
what they had on hand, To add to the confusion, General Imebbe, commanding
the Mets Fortress, suffered @ stroke. He was replaced on 14 November by
Genoral Kittel, who had formerly commanded the 49th VG Division,
ROCTRINE AND TRALWING

fhe losses suffered by Third Army unite during the September battles had
caused a rethinking in tactics and training during the Octeter lull in the
Dattle, ‘This break in the fighting allewed U.S. unite to efficiently train
units which had to undergo major replacement and reconstitution operations.

Superior U.S. personnel strength allowed unite to be rotated to the rear
for rest and training. XX Corps conducted courses on Floating Bailey bridges,
river crossing, explosives, fortress reduction, end housetorhouse fighting
immediately preceding the November effensive. Rotating unite to the front
again allowed green troops to experience combat before the actual Jumpoff.

ferman Forces were not ag lucky. Although they outnumbered U.S. Forces
in number of unite, their strength and training were well down, Opposing U.S.
Forces kept up patrolling and artillery, thus preventing major rest or reta»

tion operations, Good training was hampered by a lack of skilled leaders and
29



barriers, ‘The river's swift waters cut @ natural breastwork of abruyt slopes
or western banks, ‘To the east of the Moselle the banke are dominated by
hi. . that have been cut out of the land by tributary streams, chiefly the
Seille and Nied Rivors. Throughout the entire area, the hille and ridges
formed by these rivers are steep and heavily wooded, These facts proved tat
Mets wae the perfect site fer fortifications on dominating terrain formed by
the convergence of these rivers,

The 4mposing double belt of forts and fortified croups that ringed the
naturally fortified city of Mets were carefully and cleverly emplaced so that
full defensive advantage of the dominating terrain could be utilised. In all,
there were 43 fortified areas or forts, with 128 artiliery pieces of large
caliber explaced around Metz. These were exclusive of the Maginot Line forti=
fications, the forte around Thionville and the Siegfried Line.”6

Fort Guentrange wae northwest of Thionville and was eccupied by the 90th
Yafantry Division in ite September sweep east to the Moselle Kiver, After the
attack, 1¢ wae vacated and left in good condition by the Germans retiring east
of the Moselle, Its eight 100mm French guns, pow manned by the cannoneers
from XX Corps artillery, later played an important part in the assault against
the Mets fortified region.”?

The terrain along with the German held ferte on high ridge lines and hill
tops forced the infantry and armor of the XX Corps to eanalixe their attacks
between ridge lines of hilly and heavily wooded terrain,

R OPPO:
Btrength and Composition
U.S. Forces consisted of elemente of the Third U.S. Army, eommanded by

LIC deorge 8. Patton, Jr., and supported by elements of the XIX Tactical Air

Sommand, The battle on the ground was fourht by men of two of the Third
15



more gradual and evenly paced advance scross Franco,*2°

Locintical Requiremonts

U.S. = the U.S. forces needed fuel and artillery; 2,000 tone of smn-
nition per day; 20,000 shells per day; rifles; antitenk guns; rifles; tires;
maintenance parts; bridge croasing equipment; explosives; fortification
mounting equipment; river crossing equipment; ond as winter set in, dlankete,
warn clothing ani shoes. Vital spare parts were missing and maps were sorely
neoded, 22

Gernans — Tho Germans mainly needed antitank weapons, artillery, gasoline,
tanks, ammunition, rations and potable water, and concrete and steel to rein~
force their fortifications, >“

ab. se

U.S. — At the outset go supplies were readily available, The demand for
fuel had grouni the Third Arsay to @ complete halt. The Fifth Infantry Divi-~
sion had only 2,900 gallons of fuel of which half wae needed just for
cooking. 23

Maps vere not available since the planners had not anticipated the need
80 quickly, Therefore, there was no idea of the type, design or actual sites
of the forte, let alone the inside fortifications.”

By 20 September there was a chronic shortage of artillery ammunition: 7
rounds per gun for 155ts and about the same for 105's. Water was getting
short and ammunition began to run oat, Mo vehicles hai been able to cross
the river even up to 12 November; therefore, no bangalore torpedoes and engi-
neer squipment normally needed for tackling forts were available, fhe desired
artillery expenditure of 60 rounds per weapon par day had been reduced to .&

rounde per day == = grani totel of 553 rounds for the ontire Third aray.?>

It was mainly due to the lack of aumunition that the initial aseault on Mots
21


THIRD ARMY

THE NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE
© November - 2 December 1944

TUTTE FRONT LINE, EVENING 7 NOVEMBER
SUE ENCIRCLEMENT OF METZ! AXIS OF ATTACK
neces Front Lint, evening 19 NoveMeER
A Fronr Line, evENING 2 DEcENBER

: 10 o 39 as

Mies.

SE
SO i) Vn. /
es 2 ? es

MAP NO. 45 MAP A



supplies, While U.&. Forces had introduced two new divieions into the Netz
area during Octeber, the Jernans had actually allowed their defensive com
dition to gravely deteriorate,

like U.S. Forces, the Gersane had suffered tremendous easualtics during
the September fighting. They, however, vere hampered in reconstitution by a
severe lack of manpower, Overall in Nets, German Forces were down to 14,000,
while the 462a YO Division was dewn to lese than 7,000, Recent replacements
were overage and poorly trained, and the lack of good leaders further hindered
additional training. The 416 VG Division and the 19th VO Division were both
unier strength and undertrained with many new replagemente, Only the 17th 33
Panzer Division and the 25th Panser Grenadier Division were good fighting
unite, and both were pushed east as Metz was squeezed off,

Deception played a major role immediately prier to the offensive, XX
Corpa' relocation of the 90th Division to an assembly area in the nerthern
sector prior to the battle was a successful large-ccale deception operation,
Dummy guns and robber dummies were left on the line along with limited real
Woapons ond men, Sound<teeeption unite provided realiss, and false radio
traffic was provided. From their assembly areas, 90th Division unite conducted
recons of their river crossing sites with false vehicle bumper sarkinge axd
perrewed shoulder insignis, This complicated sehens, which relocated an
entire division just s few miles from the Cersans, was effective and achieved

surprise during the subsequent attacke??

ALBTELLIGENGE
bat
Tho U.S. Army's 3d Cavalry Squedron conducted the initial ground recom

naissance to the cast and northeast in the direction of Mets and Thionville,

Observation posts were established overlooking the Moselle Hiver eight niles

from Mete, Theee reconnaissance elewontes obtained information that the
30



@:

Li Ls _RIVLEW OF TAR ZAOTICAL SITUATION

A. Zhe Ares of Operations

(1) Climate and Weather

The plan to reduce the fortresses of Mets was destined to be creatliy
altored, Even before it was initiated the weather bad changed the plan mate~
rislly, Steady autunn rains blanked out the medium and heavy air bombardment
that was scheduled to soften up the Metz defenses. Serving to exacerbate the
already unfavorable situation, the Moselle River began to rise over its bi..s
and f111 adjacent flood plains. A feint had to be established at # secondary
crossing site at Ackange because of the risk of crossing the swollen Moselle
at Koenigsmacher as originally planned, Due to the extreme flooding along
the Moselle, it wae feared that th. elewent of surprise associated with the
deeaption plan was lost because of the necessity to conduct a safo river
crossing operation.

(2) ferrain (OCOKA)

Complete surprise was impossible to achieve due to the excellently
positioned observation posts and fields of fire from the outer ring of forts.
Additionally, German infantry soldiers were deployed as far out as possitle
fron the forts themselves,”>

As regarde cover and concealment: Across from the 90th Infantry Divi~
eion's crossing area, Fort Koenigsmacher and the ridge line of Maginot forts
commanded the entire crossing area and provided the enemy with excellent
observation. ‘The tactical effect of the area of operations clearly favored
the enemy. The terrain virtually dictated the effective placement of obser~
vation pouts ani influenced the ability of the Germans to exercise surveillence

of critical areas of the battlefield. Typically, the Forest of Cattenon

provided an assembly area for the inisiel river crossing operation to be



S3patton, Gs Se» Mar Ae I Know Jt (Roaton: Houghton Mifflin Go., 1947), p. 125.
Sa eddey De 1370
Sxomp, Be Gites De 38.
SS ratton, obs Cte, Pe 16
5? rag.
S8emp, QPe Sites pe 16.
52cole, Oba Gites Bp. I7I7h
Komp, Oe Cites Be 153.
Reduction of Netz, op. cite, Appendix 3.
60610, Re Siter Pre 376~380.
Kemp, Qn Cite, PP. 15/157.
Sleote, aba thies PP. 381-103,
Kemp, Ope Cites PP. 157170.
Cole, Ope Cites pe 403.
Kemp, oPe Cite, PP. 170-178,
co10, Qe cite, pe 406.
Kemp, 2a Gites PP. 178-179.
Reduction of Mety, ops Gites Pe M2.
Hore, OPe Slt. Pp. 410-416,
Reduction of Mets, ods Gite, PP. 27628.

Skemp, 2Pp ite, Pe 189.
$6 yyaa., Pe 190.

[7 cote, QPe Cities Pe 434,
S8xenp, Qa Gites Po 191.
Mole, ome Gites Pe 457

comp, Qe Git. Pe 192..

62

71



Regiment wae ordered to keep Forts Jeanne dtArc and Driant contained and to
mop up any remaining German resistance in the area.

The 378th(=) Infantry Regiment in the Division's sector was in dire
etraite. Its lat Battalion wae fully occupied keeping Fert Plappeville con-
tained, ‘The situation there was aggravated by the German forces in Forte St.
Quentin and Plappeville being able to exchange supplies with one another. The
German forces in the two forte numbered about 650, Ammunition and food within
the forte wae being expended rapidly. The Germans were willing to pay high
covts to hold the forte since they overlooked the Moselle and the Hofen Janal
where the Americans would have to cross and the city could be fired upon from
forte, Had the Germans prestocked these positions better with food and
ammanition they could have greatly delayed the Americans® eventual capture
of the city.

The Regiment's other dattalion, the 3d, attempted to seize one ef the
few bridges left intact by General Kittel, the bridge from Longville across
the Tle St. Symphorian just to the weat of Mets. Unfortunately, however, the
Germans who had been securing the bridge blew it just as lead American elements
began to crosa, With the bridge out it was decided that an attempt to cross
the river would be carried out on the next day, 19 Nevember.

Mout of the 377th(=) Infantry Regiment's two battalions were located in
the northern Mets suburbs of Sansonnet and Mets Nord, While the 2d Battalion
was attempting to seixe a bridge over the Hofen OGanal to the north of the
auburbs, they were slowed considerably by 189" machine guns ant 20-nm anti=
aircraft gunfire from an island in the river, The resistance was neutralized
by American tanks, When the battmlion reached the bridge, however, they
found that it too had been demolished but that foot soldiers could still

@ Company of the 2d Battalion crossed and mopped
56

cross over the remains.



mena William, Battalion Surgeon. Privately printed, Rochester, Minne,
1966, :

MacDonald, G, and 8, Mathews, hree Battlee-arnavilie, ALturzo, ant Schaidt.
Washington,D.0,: devernnent Printing Office, 1952,

Nellonthin, T. W. Bangor Battles, University ef Oklahoma Pross, 1956.
Patton, G, 5S. Nar ag i Know it. Beston: Houghton Mifflin, 1947,

Pogun, Vorrest. She Supreme Gommand., Washington,D.C.: Governuent Printing
Offices, 195%,

Ruppenthsl, Rolani ¢, Logistical Support of the Aruios, Vole. J and Ui.
Washington,2.¢.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1954.

Spiwoks, W. and H. Stober, Bndkampf swischen Nogol uml Lan. Munin Verlag,

Osnabruck, ned.
Stober, Hane. Die Sturmflut uni das Bade. Munin Verlag, Osnabruck, nde
Werlimont, Walther, Zrinnerungen. Frankfurt/Main, 1962.
Weaver, William, Yankee Doodle Went to Town, Privately printed, 1959.
Westphal, Stevfriei. The Terman Army in the West. Cassell, 1953.
Wilmot, Cheater, The Struzele for Burope. Collins, 1952.

Arkicles
Andorsen, 9 "Kempene om Fort Driant." Danok Artilleri Tideekrift, Feoruary
1978,

Anonynous, A Little Bit of Metx (Uckange Bridgehesd).“ 95th Division Joure
nal, Yol 27, Wo. 2, June 1977.

Anonyrous, “Le 20 C.A.U.S. Libero Met.” Revue Historique de) tarmee,
March 1953.

Golin, General J, “Les Combate du Fort Driant." Memorires de )*Acadonio
Hationsle de Mets, Vol. VII, 1962,

Cottingham, L. “Smoke over the Moselle." he Infantry Journa], August, 1948,
Kemp, Anthony, "“Metx 19," Warfare Monthly, No. 46, October, 1977,
Kemp, Anthony, “The Maginot Line.” Maerfers Monthly, No. 52, March, 1978,

Turner=Jones, G. la T. “Verdun and NetseA Comparative Study of the Forti-
fications.” The Royul Iycinear Journal, Vol. UXXIV, 1921,

4



desperately in need of hospitalination were able to be evacuated until late
dn Novenber during the final reduction of Mets, Until then thore were a

number of reporte of the dead and wounded being piled up, t8

MAINTENANCE

With the poor state of even the mest basic logistical support, maintenance
support was virtually nonexistent, Any vehicle that broke down waa rathleasly
bulldosed off the road, Yehicles were in urgent need of ropair, casualties
had to de replaced, and equipment overhauled long before such services were
avatlavie,?

IMPACT OF SHORTAGES
By 1 Septomber, the main force of the Third U.8. Army's XX Corps had run

out of gasoline at Verdun, If they had had fuel, the XX Corps would have
pushed on to Metz, and, probably would have sealed it off with a regimental
aize force and continued to push on to the Rhine, As it waa the delay in
receiving fuel allowed the Gernane to reinforce Mets and thereby repulse the
firet attempt to attack in early September, Inexperience in attacking forti=
fied positions and lack of adequate air support were probably the primary
reanons for the initiul lack of success of the American forces. However,

the caliber and training of the youny officere-tr-training at Nets were a
formidable obstacle,

With the supply priorities geared to a broad front and first priority
going to Montgomery and the First army, slong with instructions that no mere
agrreusive action be permitted beyond what the maintenance situation would
support after the full requirements of the main effort had been met, the Third
Army drive forward had little chance for success.” °

fhe shortage of fuel stopped the advance, fhe shortage of artillery and

air support blunted the success of the attack as did the absence of maps and
27



Although the commander of Fort St, Privat repeniedly refused to surrender, a
large number ef his men allegedly desurted during the night of 22 November
ereatly reducing this threat, On 22 November tho 11th Infantry Regiment was
able to set up its forward command post inside the city,

As 20 November dawned on the 377th(=) Infantry Regiment, they were still
cccupying their narrow foothold on the Isle Ohambiere confronted by dJenoral
Kittel ani the last of his defenders inside the Mundra @;,serne. ‘The Regi~
ment's 2d Battalion cleared the northern part of lsle Chambiere by nightfall
of the 20th only after very bitter fighting. Their fight for the southern
and on 21 Novembor, however, wae much harder but efter block to block fighting,
they elosed in on Mundra Canserne by evening. Rarly iu the morning one company
ef the Battalion managed to get into the ground floor of the barracks housing
General Kittel's command post. Since tho two floors above them still contained
enemy, it was not until later that a tank was able to cross the Moselle vis
& bridge constructed by the engineers and shoot the top floors to pieces
thereby forcing the surrender of the remaining defenders.

During the morning of 21 Noverber General Kittel besan participating in
the battle es an infantryman and vas subsequently wounded about 1100 hours. 72
Colonel Von Stosse] still holding out in Fort St. Quentin assuned command at
thie point. Shortly aftervard General Kittel wes taken privoner while being
‘rented for his wound. Since General Kittel had relinquished command amd
since some of the outlying forts stil] had not surrendered, Kittel refused to
surrender the garrison, Thies refusal denied the XX Corps the surrenier
coremony they deserved.

Fighting continued on the Tele Chambiere on 22 November while American

troops flushed Oerman soldiere from the tunnel). complex of the fortress, By

63



Vs AWALYSIS 0} SAE BATTLE

Senora)
The "Battle for Mets" developed in an outstanding example of a deliber~

ate attack to reduce a fortified position, ‘The operation wae marked by
detailed and skillful planning on the part of tbe Third Army and ite ssesoci=
atec corps staffs, This planning was clearly the result of lessons learned
from the poorly coordinated and costly operations concucted in September and
October. The operation was conducted without air cover in the worst of
weother conditions.79 Its successful execution, therefore, depended in most
part on the effective leadership of regimental and battalion commanders who
kept their men moving and managed limited combat support resources efficiently.
Most important, however, to final victory was the determination, endurance,
and ageresaivencee of the individual soldier who daily continued the attack
despite supply shortages, bad weather, persona] misery, and fierce enexy
resistance. Their performance at Metz put away forever the myth of the
“amorican ice cream soldier” that relied more on material than courage to
win battles,

Jo the Third Army, the battle was an eesentisl let step to continue its
offensive, sztablish « bridgehead across the Ssar River, and to finally
breech the famed German "Western Wall”, Metx wae not simply a pocket of
renistance that could be simply by passed, Tho rosd net in the areas ad~
jncert to the city was poorly developed and probably could not support the
traffie associated with an army or corps line of communication, Additionally
the bridges setup by the divisions involved in thy bsttle could net sustain
long term heavy logictice traffic. ‘he bridge and road network that ran
through Mets had to be secured if the Third was to ¢ontinue ite drive weet .60

The perspective of the Gorman's any Group G ves similer, Metc was an
5


important center from which to support its forward positions az ong the
Mosolle, The retention of Metz and its associated riverline defense bouzht
time for the Army Group to improve its “Western Wall" fortifications and to
farther delay the U.8. Third Army's entry in Germany atecit,&
Siunificanse of the Battle

Tho Americans

General Patton's success in breaking through to the Saar which was made
poseible by the reduction of Metz, gave eredibility to the U.S. position of a
broad front strategy. In the north, General Hodge's First Amay had met only
Limited progress in its attack and was held east of the Rubr River, If Third
Arnyts attack had also failed, the British could have easily held 21st Army
Group's operations as poor diversions to the theater's main effert. This
could have eliminated for General Eisenhower any support for his broad front
strategy. 2”

The enemy forees caught by Third Army's attack were decisively defeated.
The envelopment and follow on pursuit destroyed large enemy units beyond the
poiut of reconstitution, As a result, when Third Army established its new
line along the Saar, 1t opposed an extremely weakened enemy with almost no
offensive capability. This situation greatly facilitated Third Aruy's later

disengagoment to launeh its December counter attack in the Ardennes. "?

The Germans

Despite the decisive defeat of their forces in the area, Army Group @
was able ta achieve some strategic gains. The September and October engage
ments which precsded the final battle of Mets showed the value of the area's
fortification network, The Germano were then able to withdrew their more

experienced combat troops for omployment elsewhere while utilizing lower

quality units around Mets. The poorer fighting capabilities of these troops
66



shunted to the north for the great counteroffensive, Ae a matter of fact,
Balek conmented, “I have never commanded such jumbled up and badly equipped
troope."29 Of course this commont came just prior to the U.S. najor thrust
in November after Mets had been forced to relinquish the “elite* troops and
~ . was being refilled with troops having as little as one week's training and
receiving a low fill priority for arma and ammunition. fundreds of train
loads were diverted to support the tildup for the Ardennes offensive. Dure
ing the October lull, proper steps had not deen taken to ensure an adequate
supply for Mets, Sonsequently, as the November attack began, they only had
enough food available for 2 days. Ground resupply had met the interdicting
power of our air ferce, ani by 17 November the trains were cut off, The
attempts to resupply by air failed to conneet when the wery item needed for

identification (flares) was part of the critical shortage,“

The American plan had been to build small reserves by the first of Never
ver, Market Garden denied logistical support for the Third Aray and the basis
method of delivery for all supplies and equipment was using the Red Ball ex
press in which it took three trucks for every single trip to the front.“
Patton's main means of obtaining supplies and equipment was by using tho “Rock
Soup" method; asking fer bite and pivees ani using it up se he would ferce the
hand of his euperiore in providing hia more, They were able to confiscate a
large etore of Argentine beef and fucl. Though lew gerade, it was enouzh to

push abead for a few days 2

With no rail available, ports hundrede of miles eway, no forward logisti~
cal support points, confiscation, austerity and use of the resupply trucks
were the primary weans for U.S. procurement. In November, air resupply de~

ivered 1800 Kevations, 46,000 rounis of .50 calibre anmmnition and medical

supplies, Air resupply contimed to i a major resource throughout the



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I. INTROXICTION

. fhe Rattle of Mets is but one episode in what is commonly referred to as
the Horthwest Europe Campaign during the final year ef Werld War Ti. The
campaign really began on 25 July 1944 when the Allicd armies broke out from
the confines of the Nernandy Peninsula and ended in May of the following year
when the German Army surrondered unconditionally, To reduce the scale eome-
vhat further, the operations that nade up the Battle of Mets and which lasted
from Soptember through December 19, vere part of the Lorraine cempaign, waged
during the same period by the Third U.S. Army.

fhe Battle of Mets took place at the city of Mets, between the Ardennes
hilla and the Vosges in France, ‘The principel allied ferees involved in the
battle were the XX (US) Corps of the Third U.S, Army consiuting of the 5th
Infantry Division, 90th Infantry Division and the 7th Armered Division.
German forces consisted of Gerwan Army Group G with the primary unite coming
from the German First Army.

fhe types ef sources required fer a thorough, balanced account of thie
battle include first hand accounts of the battle from the German and the
American armies, newepaper and magazine articles, and operaticnal histeries.

The comprehenoivo bibliographies are contained im the principal book on
the eubject: Ihe Unknow Battle, by Anthony Kemp.

The Unknown Bottle provides an excellent account of the battle. The
vook goes inte great detail about the packground leeding up to the fight,

d particularily emphasising the part Mets played in the war both atratezicully

4 and politically, ‘The book also details the background on the principal com

manders, perhaps keying on Patton and his attitudes towards this type of

warfare, Additionally, the book outlines the logistic problems facing the

1



TASLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
UTNTROICTION 6c ee ee ee et te ee tet we we OD
BIBLIOGRAPHY 6 oe ee eee ew eee ee eee een 7
REVIEW OF THE STRATWITC SETTING. . 2. we ee ee eee SF
REVIEW OF THE TACTICAL SITUATION . 0 6 ee ee eee we 12
THE BATTLE £6 we ee ee ee ew ew ew BG
ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE 2 6 0 ee eee ee te ee ew 65
END WOTHS. © eee ee ee ee eee eee ee ee tee 69

MAPS gw wee ee ee eee rere rarer eve ve BF



seed

executed by the 90th Infantry Division, The area was located on the forward
slopes of the valley hills, Between the forest and Moselle River, the ground
was devoid of cover and completely under direct observation from the eneny
held high ground east of the river, This observation vulnerability prompted
the planning of the movement into the forest and the subsequent aseault fron
the woods to occur under the cover of darknese, ‘The natural defences of the
city were formidable, ‘The city is located in a looping bent of the Moselle
that provides a water barrier to the orth and west, and @ tributary, the
fnille, flows in from the South, Steep hills on three sides of the city form
@ shallew bow] further enhancing the defense of the fortress. Narrow and
twisting valleys disect this bowl into four dietinet defensive areas,
The Fort System

The first complete circle of forts and fortified groups that afforded
the outer defense of Mets consisted of 15 positions, On occupation of the
forts in 1940 by the Germane, the outer ring fortifications were improved. A
military eignal center was installed at Fort St. Quentin connecting the forti~
fied groups. Actual repair lagged as a result of German victories. fhe forts
of Girordin and Sion were linked by tunnels and supported by bunkers, pill-
doxos, armored observation posts, heavily reinforced casonates, minefields
and « trench system that extended completely around the crest of sone of the
majer hille of the city, ‘wo 210mm guns were installed on the west bank of
the Moselle at Fort St. Quentin along with » protective, modern, revolving,
armored observation post. Several 105mm self-propelled guns and anti-tank
guns were also installed in the area, Concrete~reinforeed caves dug into the
side of tho hill were to protect the roving self-propelled guns when the guns

were not in use. Extensive, deliberate field fortification work was also
26

done on the remainder ef the 12 forts.
13



SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Rocks

Abrans, Joe. Aiistory of the 90th Division in World War IJ. Baton Rouge,
1946,
Allen, Robert. lucky Forward. Nacfadden, 1965,

Anonymous, The Attack on Fort Keonicepaker. xagle Lake, Ninn, : Mayot Enter=

prises, 1977.

Anonymous, Tho XX Corps: Its History ani Service in Worda War JI. Osaka,
Japan, 1951.

Anouymous. The Fifth lateatry Divinion in the Buropean Theatre of Overe-
rations. Atlanta: Albert Love Enterprises, 1945,

xX Corps 0

os BS us Oxp! peri on R
lo date or place of publication,
Anonynouse 1th Infantry Recisent Histery, Baton Rouge, 1967,

Blumensen, Martin, She Patton Papers, 194002945. Boston: Houghton Mifflin

Coo, 197%,
Bradley, Owar, A Soldterty story, Eyre and Spottiswoddie, 1952.

Colo, He Me The Lorraine Campaun. Washington, ?.G.: Gevernaent Printing

Office, 1950.

Eisenhower, Dwight, Gzusade jn Burope. Heinemann, 1948,

Essame, He Patton: A Study in Command. Seribner, 197%,

Farago, Ladiolas, Pattont Onies) ani Trivwoh., Arthur Barker, 1956.

Foermann, G. ani F. Cranx, BthIafantzy Diviaion Ristory, 191006, Atlanta:
1947.

Albert Love Enterprises,

doward, Michael, - Hart~Davis, 1960, few York:
Mecmillaz; Collier Books (Macmillan Paperback,

Hubatech, Walther, 5 ° Franke
furt/Maing Bernhard and Oraefe, 1962,

Keap, Anthony, The Unknown Rattle, Metz, 194), stein and Day Publishers,

1981,

Koch, 0, W. Get Intellizence for Patton, Army Timea /Whitmore, 1971,

3



AO Cried ath

Mavtonoeria
“Farm

1 oy th Wittoncourt . “

ain et Ram y
Aw

BATTLE FOR METZ

ENVELOPMENT FROM THE SOUTH
8-19 November 1944

"7: FHONY LINE. MORNING 8 NOVEMBLA
CID StH Division obsective

PHIL POS:VWUNS REAGLO 12 Novemaen
— => Anis oF apvance,
mmm AX:S OF GERMAN COUNTERATTAGK, 13 NOVEMBER
FTTTTT FORWAKD HOSITIUNS, NUK 19 NOVEMOER
CS) GERMAN POCKET, NOON 19 NovEMBeR

LL EVATIONS IN WET EMS
* . .

‘
c

CCB, 6TH Aamo Division



QXRWAY ORDER OF AATTLR
COMPOST TION

LXXXII OORPS

19TH VOLKS GHENADIER DIV.

416TH DIV.

462 VOLKS GRENADIER Dive

25TH PANZER GRENADIIR DIV.

1069H PANZER BDB

17TH S38 PANZER GRENADIER DIV.

19



aa eee ee eee +
a eee OPS, Penne See ei er Re act Rhos oR
a

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CSI BATTLEBOOK

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Yt Koonigemacker while the 3rd battalion bypassed the attack and advanced
toward the village of In¢glange. The lst battalion quickly penetrated the
wire and mine fields surrounding the fort. The battalion had detailed maps
of the fertification and had trained previously in the special techniques
required to clear ite bunkers, ‘The operation proceeded systematically but
waa hindered by the shortage of explosives. Supplies had to be hand carried
from the river and the flow was insufficient to support tho attack. Spotter
aircraft were then employed to airdrop explosives. By 10 November, A ani B
eonpanies of the lst battalion had captured roughly half the fert,

On the afternoon of 9 November, two battalions of the 357th crossed the
river and secured the town of Koenigemacker, Hewever, the flooding river had
prevented the croneing of any tanke or other heavy wespons and the eight
battalions were virtually cut-off, Despite this situation the regiment
launched # battalion attack on 10 November to secure the Metrieb fertifice-
tions. The fort was surrounded and the ridgeline secured by nightfall.

In the 358th and 359th sectors, the enemy war slewly beginning to react
to the bridgehead, On 10 November, the 359th wae hit by a German ecunter-
attack which caused the regiment to lose control of the town of Kerling. This
villsge controlled the road network needed by the 10th Armored to conduct its
attack. In the 358th area, » counter=ettack was repulsed st Rasse-Ham,
Company C of the lst battalion was breught up to reinforce A and B companies
in Ft Koonigsmacker, The fatlure to secure this fortification allowed ite
Gersan accupants to interdict the advance of the 2nd battalion and forced it
to stop short of ite objective,

On the llth of November, the three regiments wero stiil cutecff. Only a
few anti-tank guns hed made it across the river. The soldiers had been fight=

ing hard for two days with little sleep and wore soaked from the continuiog
42



bases in the Pas de Calais, Patton was to continue his eautward move, at
least as far ay Rheims, and to link up with the Anvil /Dragoon forces advancing
up the Rhono valley toward the Vosges. The bulk of Bradley*s fuel tonnage was
allocated to the Firat Arzy, so that Patton wae civen enough fuel to join the
dattle but not to win at.

The advance agreed on by General Bisonhover finally got underway on 29
August «= by which date Patton's spearhoads were already approaching Rheims,
having managed to etorn serous the Marne, Three days later his mobile colunns
would be across the Meuae, but stalled for lack of fuel, Only thirty miles
ahead of then lay the Moselle, junt one more river on the way to the Rhine.?
the Jerman Situation

After the defeat in Normandy, and as a result of thn terrible losees
suffered during the Russian sumer offensive, under « norma) political syutem,
Goruany shoald have sued for peace, Nothing, however, was further from the
mind of the Fochrer, who in midmAuzust was alreaiy considering a counteroffen.
waive that was to emerge as the Ardennes attack in December, ®

At the beginning of September, shortly bvefere he was relieved ef command,
Model received w set of instructions that were indicative of German strategy,
These enphasixed Hitlerts “stand or hola" dootrine, which had led to the loss
7 so many troops in isolated pockets and had not succeeied in halting Allied
advances, The enemy was to be held in s general defensive battle in front of
the Weetwall to ain time eo that it Could be wade ready, According te
Hitlor, success here would mean that the Nethorlands could be retained ant
Gerean territory would net be Occupied, Allied aircraft Vould be left as far
away @8 possible, and even if Antwerp wore to be lost, German Poenession of
the north bank of the Scholdt would render the Spproachee useless, Finally,
the vital Ruhr and Saar industrial and atning arose would be retained,”

6



TL._RaVI_OF THE STRATEGIC SWRTERG

The operations which male up the Battle of Mets lasted from September
through December 19+ and wero part of the Lorraine campaign, waged during

the same period by the Third U.S. Arey.

The Allied Situation

Actual detailed planning for the invasion of Burope went only as far as
the Lideration of France up to the line of the river Seine, which, it was
calculated, would be reached by D190, In fact thie line was Feached on 15
August (Dt74), and, on the following day, units of the Third Army had a
bridgehead at Mantes.”

fhe city of Mets was first mentioned in Allied planning during the con
niderations for how to reach the Ruhr area, the heart of German industrial
production, It was determined by SHARP (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expoii-
tionary Ferees) plannera that the main emphasis would be placed on the
northern thrust alony the traditional invasion route into northern Germany
vin Manbenge and Liege, Once acrowe the Rhine and with the Ruhr poutral ized,
the way to Berlin would be open across the North German Plain. This maneuver

vould be supported by a subsidiary thrust on the VerdumHets line,”

Tho success of the breakout was so overwhelming that the Allied leader~
ship found itaelf on the horns of a dilemma, By mideAugust the whole command
system was being called into question, and lack of firm diraction was to lead
to fatal delays. feneral Eisenhower, as Supreme Allied Commander, delegated
the responsibility ef ground commander to General Montgomery with Bradley in
charge of an Aray Oroup equal to Montyomery's, but subject to overall tactical
supervision by the latter, General Montyonery was directed to advance into

Belgium with the immediate aim of taking Antwerp and neutralixing the Veweapon

5



ar

Americana! use of bombing and artillery was greatly restricted.

Genoral Kittel had the following forces, aside from those previously
montioned, svailable to hold Netz. The 1215th VG Regiment was in the general
vicinity of Fort St. Quentin to the west of the city and was ordered to hold
out in the fort itself if necessary, Regiment Anton (1010th Security Regi~
ment) was in the vicinity of Fort Plappeville, also to tho west, The 1217th
VG Regiment staff was located inside Fort Driant and the regiment was in the
fort's general area west of the Moselle and south of the city. The 462 Fusil=
jer Battalion was located to the south and west of Netz around the Seven
Dwarfs, Gombat Group won Matzdorf allowed itself to be surrounded in Fort
St. Privat just south of the city.

The German forces under General Kittel wero prepared to pose the Anericans
as many problems as possible ani, although they were aware their situation
waa grave, they were only to give it up block by block.
Fighting on 18 November

Anerican efforts to enter the city of Mets keyed upon securing any
remaining bridges over the Mosolle River and upon the assistance of FFI forcoa
atill within Nets, ‘Thoir situation was severely hampsred by Genoral Kittel's
aluost wholesale demolition of the bridges in the area prior to their arrival,

The attack on 18 November began with the 95th Division's 379th Infantry
Regiment from the west. Leaving two companies to contain German resistance
at the Sevon Dwarfs, the lst Battalion managed to cut off Fort Jeanne d!arc
from ite rear end, By evening it was at the Moselle at Moulins-les=Metz only
to find the bridge there had been demolished, The isolation of Fort Jeanne
dtarc wag supported by the 3d Battalion's clearence of the suburbs to the

west of the fort, Since the bridge had been blown and s boat crossing of the

river at that point waa not considered feasible, the 379th(=) Infantry
55



10. THB BASLE

the. XK Corps Phan®?

On 3 November XX Corna issued Field Order No, 12 which outlined its con
cept for the reduction of the Mets fortified area and the resumption of
offensive operations to secure the Rhine. ‘thie plan called for an encirele=
mont of Mets, a follow on reconmisaance to the Sarre River, the seixure of a
bridgehead in the vicinity of Saarburz, and on order, the contiiuation of the
attack to the northsast. In specific regard to Mets, the order stated that
the intent of the commander was to destroy or capture the Nets garrison,
without the investiture or siege of the Netz Forts.

fo implenent the plan, the 90th Infantry Division was tasked with the
initial envelopaent of the city from the north. ‘The Sth Infantry Division
attack wae to onctrele Metz from the south. The 95th Infantry Division was
initially to contain the German salient west of the Moselle, When the con
eentrie attacks of the 90th and the 5th divisions closed, the 95th was to
drive into the salient, cross the Moselle, ani secure the city, The 10th
Armored Division was to follew the 90th division, After erossing the Moselle,
it was to attack to the left and parallel to the 90th to closa the encircle~
ment east of Metr. Simultaneously, the 10th was to push ermorod reconnaissance
unite eaet towards the Sarre River with the intention of setsing # preliminary
bridgehead near Merxig, Finally, the 3rd Cavalry Group was to follow the 10th
Arnored scrous the Moselle River, Upon erossing, it would swing northeast to
probe enemy resistance in the vicinity of Saarburg and to sereen the flanks
and rear of the corps units encireling Mets.

The plan was basically to be executed in two phases: 1) The elimination
of German forces in the Met area, 2) The resumption of tho attack to the

northeast. Its success depended upon the rapid culmination of the encirclement
38



potatoes, salt ani coffee were acarce,46
SUPPLY LNBTALLATLONS AD) SHRMIMALS

fhe theater was virtually deveid of airfields. Cleve pert facilities
were not available and supplies had to be shipped over land from the initial
demches at porte at Normandy, Allied strategy called for a halt on the Seine
to build up atecka, followed by a systematic advance, The spectacular
succese of the Third Army could not be kept up with, and success of allied
tactical bombers had smashed the reilway network,

The rapid advance ef armored columns meant that the barden thrown on air
field construction agencies was auch greater than the capacities of the
organizations which had been eet up, Opening a port at Antwerp vas the main
order ef the day ani considered to be the only way to support the drive to~
ward the Rhine, Only the port at Cherbourg was functioning. Rrest, Calais
and Tunkirk were atill in German hands. Despite the opening of Antwerp, it
could not help tho eastward nove of the Third Army through the Lorraine,?

By 5 November suppliss of gasoline and rations were in sound condition
due primarily to the opening of new railheads directly behind the front line,
wut tires and diesel fuel were still in short supply. The petroleum pipeline
opened to Alomon was some help, but it could handle only relatively snall
anountts
HVAGUATION AND SALVAGE SYSTEN

Oneo again due to the combination of low priority for combat service
support, rapid movement ef the combat forces, jinability to provide fuel,
direction of effort toward the north, and finally the destruction of rail
lines and the worrisome weather complete with ite knee-deep mud and flooding
rivare, there was no way the battlefield evacuation and salvage system could

work, Virtually no vehicles were returned for salvage and only patients
2



rein and flood, Nono the less, all three regiments moved on the offensive.
The 357th secured the high ground weat of Breiatroff-lmPetite. The 359th
remileed soverel strong counter=attacks, retook Kerling, and secured the
dominant terrain from the vaillage of Rettel along the river to the village
of Oudrenne. The 358th completed the reduction of Ft Koenigamacker, captured
or killed several German units attempting to reinforce the fort and secured
hill 254,

The most important event of the day, however, did not occur on the
battlefield, The flood waters were receding, Thue far, the German had not
put together a strong ecunter-attack ferce, Time was running out for the
division beceune ite activities of the past three days had clearly marked it
as the major attack in the area. If the 90th did not cross its tanks, tank
destreyers and other heavy weapons soon, the infantry regimenta could be
pushed into the river by strong armored forces,

The German Army Group had been initially forced to deal the bridgehead
with pieconeal attacks seraped together from its two divisions in the area:
The 416th division and the 19th Volks Grenadier division, These attacks,
although executed with great spirit, lacked the firepower, depth and mobility
needad to achinve decisive results. However, on the night of 11 November a
combat group of the 25th Panzer Grenadier Division was committed to attack
the bridgehead, Meanwhile, the 90th Divieion was working to push supplies
and heavy weapons by ferry across the river. By early morning of 12 November,
a bridges finally spanned the Moselle and two tank destroyers crossed the
river, At thig point in the battle, both sides were locked tn 2 deadly race
to build up enough combat power to decide the battle,

At 0300 12 Novewber, the combat group of the 25th Panser Grenadicr

reinforeed by ten tanks and asseult guns struck the 359th. This initial
43



conflict. It was not until 18 November that the first supplies were brought
in vy road ent landing stripe were cleared ani able to evacuate the more
seriously wounded, Large stocke of engineer equipment and special supplies

for dealing with fortifications were built up during the October aw,

TRANSPORTATION

Since both the Third U.S. Army and the First German Army were given «
rather low priority, transportation was inadequate to support either. The
Red Ball express transported fuel and supplies from supply dumps near the in
vasion beaches end ports, Howaver, their increasingly longer trips decreased
the amount of fuel that could be brought to the combat units. Ratl lines
wore not epened to Mets until Decenber,

Weather had a significant impact on both forces, slowing the transport
for the U.S. and causing efckuess for the horses which were used to draw mueh
of the forward field artillery to be used by the Germans,

At close range during the final reduction of Mets in Novomber, U.S.
efforts to construct rafts to crous the river were frustrated and overturned,
dumping contante into the river, The first briige was not completed until
12 November, thus enatling the headquarters ami medical facilities to move
inte Fert Yuts, Two platoons of tank destroyers and a number of anti-tank
guns crossed to the east bank, and carrying parties brought over the much
needed explosives and desolition equipment. Up until this time, however,

transportation wae totally inadequate. ">

Trainloads of assorted guns, mainly Italian "booty," were brought in te
the Germans on 15 November, Ammunition, however, wae scares. Metor tractors
were virtually nonexistent and thore was @ grave shortegs of horses. Due to
the lack of transportation the Germans lacked artiliery, antitank veapons,

water ani were down to only 18 days ef rations by wid November, Bread,
25



Eighting on 20 ani 2) Neventer

The main combat within the city during this period consisted mainly of
confused street fighting.

West of the Moselle, however, matters were more complicatec for the
379th Tnfantry. They hai been ordered responsible for the take over for all
the forts still holding out on the weet bank of the Moselle, By 0730 hours
on 21 November they were to attack to contain or capture the Ferte Plappe~
ville and St, Quentin complex, Jeanne dtarc, the Seven Dwarfs, and Fort
Brisnt. They were promised ag much supporting fire as possible but were not
to eonduet any attacks which may result in casualties! In essence, the Regi~
ment was al] that the Americans were willing to expend and any remaining forces
in the forte would be contained until ready to surrender,

In addition to artillery eupport being utilized in support of the 379th's
efforts, an air strike which never materialized was plannec against Fort
Plarreville on 21 November, Psychological warfare unites were also employed in
trying to convinee the Germans in the forts to surrender. Their efforts were
perhaps countoracted by the German radio broadcasts, praising the Jersan
soldiers stil] defending the forts, On 23 November the 379th Infantry Regi=
ment was relieved by the 2d Infantry Hegiment of the 5th [ivision as the 95th
Division prepared to move out to participate in the Saar campaign.

Ineide the city on the morning of 26 November the 378th(=) Infantry
Regiment seized their objective, the msin railway atation, while TF Bacon
reported that resistance had eeased in their sector of the city. On 21
November TF Bacon was dissolved,

By 1200 hours on 21 November the Sth Division reported that it had

Cleared its southern section of the city and that Fort Queuleu had at last

surrendered, That left the Verdun croup and Fort St. Privat as a concern,
62



Americans and the peraonne] and material shortages facing the German forees.
fhe book is also very valuable in providing the reader with illustrations ef

the Metz Fortress and a detailed account ef the notes and sourcea used in

writing the book,



e:

Aray's corps. (Map A, Third U.S, Army Situation).

The XX Corps, in the north, commanded by MG Walker, contributed the
unite whe did the bulk ef the fighting for the final reduction of Mets, In
the far north, TF Polk and the 83d Infantry Division held defensive posi~
tions, The 90th Infantry Division, commanded by MG James A. VarFleet, was
ascenbled weat of the Moselle River for an intended encirclement from the
north, Tho 10th armor Division was positioned te breakout to the rear of
Metz, fhe 95th Division, commanded by NG H. L, Twaddle, directly epposed the
city ef Mets, The Sth Infantry Division, commanded by MG W. H. He Morris wae
positioned south of Mets to encircle from that flank. Additionally, 77 Bacon,
commanded by GOL R. L. Bacon and comprised of 95th Division units, was formed
after the initial river crossings in the north, The 34 Cavalry Regiment elso
played « major role in cembat ani in the Corpst deception schemes prior to
the battle,

fhe XII Corps, in the south, was commanded by NG Nanten 5, Eddy. Kddy's
forces had fought well to gain their initial positions along the Moselle
River, vat their participation in the aetual reduction of Mets was limited.
They were poised to breakout to objectives along the Saar River and further
east on the Masinot Line and the WestWall. Mejor cerps units were the 4th and
6th armor Divisions and the 26th, 35th and 80th Infantry Divisions.

Opposing forges for the Metz battle consisted of elements of the LXXXI]
Oorpe of the First (German) army, The 462d Volleagrensdier (VG) Division oo=
cupied the city itself, while the 416 Vd Division, 19th V0 Divieion, and the
1010th Security Regiment held the lines to the north, In the south 22d For-
trees Regiment and the 462d fusilier Battalion held the lines with the 17th
SS Hanger Grenadier Division to the rear in the south. While the Allies
possessed air superiority during the battle, limited Luftwaffe support in the

way of reconnaiesance was received. 16



Enemy forces made numerous unsuccessful attempts to destroy the bridge=
head that had been established,

The 10th and 11th Infantry fought their way north and "by the evening of
14 November, six daya after the commencement of the offensive, the pincers
were gradually closing around Mote". The 10th Infantry had moved as far
North as Marly and the Sth Division, although overeztended, atarted to get
ready for the attack on the city of Netz. Prior to moving out the Sth Divi~
sion completed plans for establishing contact with the 90th Division and mate
final preparations on the 15th of November, The following day elements of
the 11th Infantry were pinned down in fighting near the airfield at Frescaty,
Two ndditional Battalions had to be committed to extricate the llth from the
enomy which was held up in the hangars and bomt shelters at the airfield.

fhe enemy forcee contimed to fight # determined battle in spite of high
casualties, Forces pitted against the Sth Division contimed to be elenonts
of the 17th SS PG Division which had lost communications with the Mets
garrison, The Verdun forts were not finally encireled by the Americans until
the night of 16 November, The German forcee at the Frescaty airfield were
finally driven off by two Infantry Battalions and the 735th Tank Battalion by
dusk on the 17th.

fhe city of Mets was finally encircled by the U.8. forces on 18 November
when elements of the 5th Division linked up with elements of the 90th Division
at Point Marais. Some elements of the 5th Division entered into the city of
Nety and started to “mop up the southern suburbs block by block, fighting
their way throagh the mane of railway yards at Sabien",75 The American forces
were now in position to enter Mets and ever~run the enemy.

Battle For the City of Mets

By nightfall on 17 Novomber, the Americans surrounded the city ani were
53



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force defending the bridge, it wae essily captured, At about noon a firet
rifle company supported by a tank platoon crossed the bridge into Mets tut
was greatly hampored by extensive sniper fire. The Gerwan force of nearly
700 men wag not well organized hewever, end their commander received per-
mission from Generel Kittel to attempt a breakout, The unit's conmander, a
Colonel Meter, vas subsequently captured und by that afternoon TF Bacon had
control of w large part of the city. That evening FFI men led units to a
building housing a Gestapo headquarters where a few infantry supported by
two tank destroyers neutralized the headquarters.

The 95th Reconnaiasance Troop finally managed to establish contact with
the 10th Infantry Regiment of the 5th Division east of the city near
Vallieres, Shortly before this the enemy's other escape route was closed
by the 2d Infantry Regiment of the 5th Division and the 90th Division's Re-
connaissance Troop south of the city.

The 377th(=) Infantry Regiment, which had tuken up positione on the
deland between the Hofen Conal and the Moselle, were ordered to take the Isle
Chambiere, General Kittel’s headquarters ani the last strong defensive
position in the city. Due to confusion as to where the actual crossing was
to take place support bombardment for the croseing fell in the wrong place,
Boats were made available and although initial American losses were heavy,
by noon a 200 yard foothold was gained on the Isle Ghambiere and 300 Geraen
prisoners had been taken. By evening the entire 2d battalion ami one company
of the 3d battalion had crossed and had entered two of the large barracks
complexes on the island,

fhe 34 Battalion, 378th Infantry formed the center of the attack and
were to cross the Isle St. Symphorian. Under the support of very effective

artillery and tank fire thoy easily overcame enemy positions, To their din

way they soon learned that the bridges @onnecting the island to the city were



base to recum the attack to the northeast. It was reasoned that after the
Metz operation had commenced and the enemy strength had been siphoned inte
the threatened area, an infantry division, crossing north ef Phionville, eould
proceed rapidly over the base of the Sear-Koselle triangle and seixe s bridge
head on the Saar River at Suarbure.
PERSO. REPL AGONTS

The personne] replacement system for both sides was similar in one
aspect, they were inadequate to sustein prolonged operations. We sec that
Patton's drive across France produced 24,620 casualties with 19,506 replace-
sents through 28 Avuguet 1944, while German losses totaled 154,000. While the
Americans were depending almost totally upom individual replacements, the
Gornans used aluost extensivoly the unit replagenent system. Their concept
was to form unite and insert them into the defense as such. If # unit had
deon disabled, they were collected, consolidated and reformed inte another
unit.? 3
By Septemter 17, the beginning of the short lull or stalemate, 34 Aray
Casualties totaled 26,402, an increase of 2,000, while enemy casualties
numbered an estimated 186,000, an increase of 30,000 since 28 August 1944,
There was w delay in reporting the casualties up the ranks as the initial
attacks to seize Dridgeheads produeed more than 2,000 ensualties, This is
further juatified by the casualty figures ef 3d Army ae reported on 2 Sep-
tember, Total casualties wers reported at 45,130, sn increase of 7,272 during
& period of lessening activity, while the enemy casualties were estimated at
216,109, un increase of 30,100 in one weok, The cumolative replacenents for
3a Arny nustered 43,566, less than 2,000 short of casualtios sustained >"

The individus) replaeement concept Was employed after all unite were de-~

ployed in the theater, and provided the new green tuops a sense of identity
33



REPROUULEY AT OUVEN Set FN eon

>

Volmestratt = \



and afferded them some measare of security. They knew if they survived initial
battles they had a chance of surviving the war, On the other hand the German
unit replacexent system employed by the Germans seemed to suit their purposes
and was their best course of action, Although there were cohesion probloms,
the Germans at that time were continually involved in reconstituting units
from whatever assete they could manage.

Both aidest replacement stream was inadequate to keep up with casualties.
In the 34 army, non battle casualties were 2,5 for each KIA, The German re-
Placement stroam was inadequate because Hitler felt the war with Russia hed
greater significance, This major influx of people into the West would eccur
during the ferming of units for the battle of the Bulge.

The 0.8. replacements were green, Although Patton tried to give them
training prior to throwing them into wattle, it was not always pos#ivle to do
20, The Geraan replacements were no better, The 462 Div, defending Mets,
endod up using an OCS Regiment, a Security Regiment, the NCO Sehool Regiment
and a composite regiment vith 2 replasgement battalions asi « signal battalion,

Tho 06S regiuent vas composed of young men ae well as veterans of the
Bastern Front who had distinguished themselves, The NCO Schocl regiuent was
ratel high in technical ability, but had never worked together, Tho other
reginonts Were not line soldiers and illetrained for the pission. >>

Although Patton was short ef replacements, this was not the cauns ef hiv
delays, The Jo:tetical problems caused the initial stopping of his momentum,
allowing the “ermans more tise to prepare Metz fortifications. On the Gersxn
aide, their shortages wero directly responsible for this inability to hold
the terrain, But one must look at Hitler's position to understand why he did
not seni replacenents to the West, He knew the Allies linss were short ant

until Antwerp wae open, he could devote all hia attention to the Eastera Front,
wy



regroup tn contime the drive to the Sarre.
CLOSING JAWS" suo

The fricndly forces participating in the “Closing Jews" segnent of the
pattle include the 95th Infantry Division, 5th Division and Task Ferce Bacon
which although technically a part of the 95th Division was deployed as an
Andependent force, The 95th Diviaion, for the mest part, had been responsible
for guarding the western fortifications and was finally given an active role
in the battle on 14 November, ‘They had deployed the 379th Intartry Regiment
in the vieinity of Driant; the 378th in the vicinity of the Ganrebert fortia=
fication; and the 377th near Maizieres-les-Metx, Mearwhile, the 5th Division
which was leeated to the south had expanded the bridgehead and was waiting to
aid the 95th in the encirelement and. the capture of Met.

The eneny forces deployed in position to oppose the 95th consisted of
the 1217th VG Regiment, 1010th Security Reginent, 1215th VC Regiment and the
1216th VO Regiment which faced TF Bacon, Further to the South the 17th 3S
Panzer Grenadiers faced the Sth Division.

The 95th Division

“The misaiun assigned to the 379th Infantry was to penetrate en both
aides of the Jenne dtarc group, On the left, the 378th Reginent was to
attempt to wheel around to the Korth of the Feves «idge and roll up the de
fenees from the rear, ‘The 377th Infantry and TF Bacon were te advance into
the eity astride the Moselle".©5 ‘The overall U.5, plan included avoiding
frontal asseults cn the forts, isolating them and to move forces into the
city itself.

The main attack was scheduled for 15 Nevember while the supporting at~
tack, to be conducted by the 379th, was slated for 14 Nevomber, A heavy

artillery preparation preceded the 0600 14 November supporting attack. Never=
kg



had to be called off,

asoline was 368,900 gallons short on 30 August 1944 and had there not
been a lull in fighting during the month of October to build up supplies, the
Wovenber offensive could not havo begun.

By November the critical neede were explosives and fuele. ‘The veather
made it impossible to bridge the river and any supplies brought up to the
fort had to be hand carrier acrowa by engineers ani infantry already heavy
laden with their normal battle equipment, personal weapons and ammunition.

After the second full day of fighting in November, still no tanks or
tank destroyers had made it to the east bank, so the only support was fron
artillery verking in mud up to their kees and firing around the clock.

Germans — Newt of tho ferts lacked usable guns, ammunition and fire
control apparatus, Only fort Driant had its fixed batteries functioning by
6 September. They also found problens with # lack of barbed wire and mines,
Apart from personal wespons and a few mortars, firepower at Fert St. Quentin
consisted only of two heavy infantry howitzers, The two 60mm mortars were

out ef ammaition,2¢

Due to the need of building up for the later Ardennes'’s offensive, the
forces at Metz had a low fill priority and were very low in assault guns and
tank destroyers, During the October lull, only one and one half rounds per
gun per day were asde available.

Artillery regiments wers in fairly good shape, although the mumber of
field pleees was generally well below the complement of the American division
artillery. The 17th $5 Division was lacking most of ite tanks and asesult
guns,

By 21 Hovenbor, food was in short supply as was water. Finally, a combie

nation of the lack ef both items foreed them to give in, As Colonel Vogel had
22



tank destroyers ani tanks — later reinforced by two self-propelled 155M
guns —~ at the head of each column, and with infantry following in trucks
and on foot".’2 This tactic allowed them to uso one column as a base of fire
and manocuver the other column into @ position to hit the flanks and rear of
enemy unite located in strongpoints along the axis of advence. The Task
Force moved approximately 4h miles before it stopred for the night and
attempted to make contuct with elements of the 90th Division on its right
flank. ‘he advance south continued the following day and by nightfall the 7
was at Yort St. Julien, which wae within 3000 meters of the center of Nets.
The Sth Bivielon

The Sth Division, with the 2d Infantry, 10th Infantry and llth Infantry
had been out of action since early November and had now received badly needed
resupply and replacements, The 9th of November was the start of the 5th
Division advance toward the city of Nets, The Seille River, which was normal~
ly less than 20 meters wide, was now almost 200 meters wide as a result of the
tremendous rainfall. Crossing the river presented a significant obstacle but
“throughout the night of 8/9 November, the engineers labored to complete
bridges acrose the river and to mark the approaches for the Infantry" 3
There was little enemy resistance oneountered and seeure bridgeheads were
established throughout the Division sector by the end of the first day, On
the second day elements of the 2d Infantry captured over 400 prisoners as the
towns of Pagny-lew Goin and Silly~en Saulnois were sver~run. On 12 Noveuber
the attack was deliberately slowed down to allow the lines of communications
bDetweon the 2d Infantry and the Division main body to be restored. Later that
day, the Nied river was reached by the let ani 2a Battalions, 2d Infantry.
During the night, tho lst Battalion crossed the river and occupied the town

of Ancervilie,
52



destroyed and that they would have to make another crossing by eagewult boats.
This crogeing, which was eventually successful, could not be accouplished
until nearly 1700 hours, however, vecause a boundary change with the Sth
Division had to be coordinated firat.

The 379th Infantry Regiment wae left without a suitable crossing site,
Having been ordered to keep Forts Jeanne d‘arc and Driant contained and to
mop up any remaining German resistance in the ares on the previous day, they
were given responsibility for the Yorts St. Quentin-Plappeville complex on
19 November, This wae as a result of the 378th(~) Infantry Regiment's request
tor a boundary change to facilitate its crogsing of the Moselle.

Sth Division unite were busily engaged south of the city. The llth
Infantry Regiment had all of its forces committed to containing Forts St.
Privat and Verdun and in isolated combat at Trescoty Airfield south of the
city. This left only the 34 Battalion to take on the German forces in the
area of the railway yards south of the city.

The 10th Infantry Regiment had units still committed around Ft, Queuleu
but the majority of the unit wes into the cast and southeastern suburbs of
the city.

Since all major enemy escape routes had been cut off and the divisions
surrounding Mets were now in contact, finsl eapture of the city was only a
matter of time,

German accounts of the battle indicate that attempts were made to air
drop supplies vo the encircled Forts St. Quentin and Plappeville (whieh be=
cause of their strateric locations could have stil] greatly complicated the
American occupation of the city) during the night ef 19 November, Fecause

the German soldiers were out of flerce to mark their location, the airplanes
7?

were unsble to drop the supplies to them,
61



REPRODUCED AT GOVERMENT EXPENSE

ns
= COMMON REFERENCE: Reduction of Metz.
= TYPE OPERATION: Offensive, Deliberate Attack, MOUT.
OPPOSING FORCES: US: 3d Army 377th Inf
XX Corps 378th Inf
5th Inf Div 379th Inf
90th Inf Div 320th Eng Cbt Bn
95th Inf Div 10th Inf
10th Armored Div lith Inf
XIX TAC 2d Inf
German: LXXXII Corps
19th Volks Grenadier 17th SS Pz Gren Div
Div
416th Div
462d Volks Grenadier
Div
25th Panzer Grenadier
Div

106th Panzer Bde

SYNOPSIS: US XX Corps encircled and reduced Metz as a preliminary
for continued attack east by 3d US Army.

Excellent example of a Corps sized deliberate attack
against a well fortified and defended strongpoint.
Good deception operation, detailed planning, surprise,
a river crossing, and urban combat.

Foptpine) o%

DTIC TAB [a piste i.
Unannounced im] fond Whaa be dn bla
Justification._____4 wiitel
uennIaISSennDnanO
a SB

Dist oven FOR PUBLIC RAMEN
| Distribution Dist ISUTION UNLDOT Ye

vailability Codes eke ene t

Avail and/or
Dist Special

|
All bed



commaniers intent to put a strone force across the river before daylight on

9 November in orier to quickly overrun the forte of Koenigemacker ani Metrich
while securing the dominant terrain to the southeast. ‘Tho remaining rogiments
Would cross in follow-on attacks on 9 November,

The 356th Infantry Regiment was to be on the division's right and was to
crous at Oattenon, Tt was to seixe Ft. Koenigemacker and the village of
Basse=Ham with one battalion, The remaining two battalions were to by pase
the fort and secure the ridgeline southeast of Koonicemacker, The 359th
Infantry Regiment on the left was to cross at the Malling site and seeure the
high ground between Mount Altenbderg and the village of Oudremne. The 357th
Infantry Regiment wae to cross at either site and attack between the ether
two regiments to secure the town of Koenigemacker, From theese positions, the
Division was to continue its attack to dominate the high ground northwest of
Boulay-Moselle which controls the roads leading out of Mets and would clene
the northern portion of the XX Corps encirclement,

Two days before the attack the division moved its regiments and support
troops into the cover of the Forest of Gattenom which was directly to the
rear of the crossing area, The 3rd Cavalry patrolled extensively to conceal
this movement ani keep German patrols away, Before midnight on 9 November,
the assault battalions of the 358th and 359th bogan to carry their boate
towards the river, ‘The Moselle was beginuing to flood and hampered the ap-
proaches to the river, The flood, however, also covered the German mine
fields on the east bank and forced their outposts away from the river. By
0500, the 358th had one battalion ashore without incident and was shortly
followed by the arrival of the two other battalions, The 359th was also able
to cross 41 three battalions with no casualties,

In the 358th sector the 1st battalion launched ite attack at 0715 against
4



and the point at which the German Army commander decided to withiraw from the
encirclod ares,
Tho 26th Divisions Brideeneed at UckanceTM?

On 7 November, only houre before the attack was to jump off, the th
division was given @ change of miasion, In addition to containing the salient
around Nets, the division was to force a crossing of the Moselle at Uckange
and to reduce a pocket of Uerman resivtance in the vicinity of Maixierce=les=
Metn. The purpose of this effort was to create « disturbance which would
draw the German's attention away from the 90th division attack further north.
The Sth division was to employ only the minimum of forces in the crossing
but would aleo coordinate its attacks on both sides of the river to give the
iapression that it wae the corps main effort. The attack was to be executed
on 8 November which wax one day before the other XX Cerps unite were to begin
operations,

fhe new miesion wae assigned to the 377th Infantry Regiment. ‘The renain
ang units, the 378th and 379th Infantry regiments were to contain the Nets
salient. in the 377th, the lst Battalion was designated to make the river
crossing, ‘Their mission was to force a crossing, occupy the town of Immeldange
and block the north-south road betwoun Mets and Thionville, Once these objec
tives were secured, the battalion was to dig in and wait relief by troops
moving down from tho main erossing in the north, The 2nd and 3rd Battalions
of the 377th were to reduce the German pocket at Maixieres=lore=Hots.

At dusk, on the night of 8 November, a detachment of the 320th engineers
crossed the river in assault boets and blew a gap in the German wire ani
minefield, at 2100, C company let Bn 377th Infantry crossed the river with
no opposition, ‘The cowpany advanced approximately 400 meters from the river

ani thon dug in to await the arrival of the rest of the battalion,
39



1435 hours, 22 November the 377th Infantry Regiment Commander reported that
all resistance in the city had ceased, Although the battle for Mets was

officially over, the fight for the rowaining outlying fortes would continue

for three nore weeks before the area was turned over to the French.



Moaelle by 2 September. In addition there was the exhausted 17th SS Panxer
Grenadior Division, which was in the First Army area for refitting. Parts of
this unit were thrown in to form an outpost line to the west of Met, astride
the main read from Verdun. }+

Directly facing General Walker's xXx Corps, on the Monelle betwean Nets
and Thionville, was the Geraan LUXXXIT Corps, commanded by the artillery gener=
al, Johann Sinnmber, American intelligence had estimated that the enemy
Would not ake a stand on the Moselle, but would retire to the prepared posi~
tions ef the Westwall along the German frontier, ‘This proved to be a false
estimate, for as early as 2h August, Hitler had issued orders for the prepara-
tion of defenses in advanee of the Weatwall, In the Movelle sector, dauleiter
Burekel was empowered to call up the civilian Population fer the construction
of defense worke, and orders were also given for the Tegonditioning of the
old fortifications of Netw and Thienville,25

Sometime tovard the end ef July 1944, Lieutenant deneral Walther Krause
wae appointed to command Division No, 462 im Metz, At the time, thie unit
Was nothing moro than a headquarters with @ nominal staff, responsible for
the various military schools and training and replecement unite in the Nets
area, They were engaged in such matters us the reorien‘ation of convalescents
and the care of wounded prior to discharge. The officers ani WC0ts of the
division were oither unfit or overage, and nene of the units were in any Way
realy for coabat, 26

On 2 September, Krause was appointed fertress commander by General Sinn~
huber (LXXXII Corps), However, on 7 September the higher command echelon
changed to the XIII 83 Panser Corps and assumed responsibility fer the sector
from Thionville to south of Mets, This was 38 Corps only in name as the bulk

of the troops were normal arny unita,-?
9



The 377th ani 378th began their coordinated attack on tho 15th of Noven
ver. The Bois de Fevoe ridge was attacked in the northern sector by the ist
Battalion of the 378th. "Company A, leading the assault, secured the main
ridge line south of Fremecourt Farm and around to the rear of Fort le Feves.
By 1100 this key work, commanding the approaches to Metz from the North and
Northwest, Was in American nande".59 Qhis fort hat provided the eneny with
excellent observation, fire direction and commmications resources. Nost of
their war effort in this sector had been directed from Fort de Fevoe, “The
capture of the relatively weak position may not sound like all that much, but
in many ways, 1¢ was deeisive, It means that = small force was in behind the
fortifications and that they had hit the boundary betwoen the 1010th Security
Reginent and the 1215 VG Regiment", ”°

The 377th wae able to clear the 1215th Regiment from the vicinity of
Naizieres=les-Nets and proceed as far as the town of Woippy which was about
three miles from the center ef Metz. “The American success of 15 November
not only turned the Nerth flank of the German bridgehead West of the Movelle
but also threatened to cleave @ corridor straight to the Mets vridges", 72
German equipment, which included artillery and trucks that were still half
loeded, was found abandoned along many of the roads used by the 377th to
chase the retreuting enemy.
nak Force Bagon

Tank Force Bacon, which consisted primarily of the let Battalion from
the 379th Regiment and the 24 Battalion from the 378th Regiment, started its
assault on tho city of Mets from positions on the east side of the Mouelle
river. After spending most of the 15th putting together a formidable fight-
ing force, TF Bacon was ready to get into the battle, The commander of TF

Bacon decided to use very simole tactice in making tho attack. “The advance

was made in two columns, moving along parallel] roads on a narrow front, with
51



ae

up the remaining enony on the island while engineers made the bridge suitable
for Jeaps to cross, Tho 3d Battalion arrived shortly thereafter on tho

deland ani aneisted in securing 200 captured German prisoners. The 377th(~}
was thon ordered to force their way across the Movelle, even though no boate
were available, if they could do so without taking too many casualties, As
they were preparing to crows they began taking increasing fire from the Ielo
Chambiere which stood between the island the 377th(=) had taken and the
opposite shore they were ordered to reach, Unbeknown to them General Kittel's
coumand post was located on the Isle Chambiere and he was organizing hie
troopa there for a last etand,

?¥ Bacon was bury north of Metx in the vicinity of Fort St, Julian, Ite
plan for 18 November hud its 2d Battalion of the 378th Infantry Regiment
attacking the fort from the rear at 0700, At the same time ite other battal=
jon, the let Battalion of the 377th Infantry Regiment was to bypass tha fort
and clear the suburb of St. Julian of any resistanco. From the suburd thy
were to go on toward Fort Bellecroix and attempt to cross the Seille River
where it forma the northeast border of the city, just south of where it joins
the Moselle, While the 2/378 approached the rear of the fort they were
erently slowed by German troops from the garrison who had been deployod omong
the fortifientions, Fy early afternoon, however, they managed to reach the
dry ditch which ran around the fort. The fort's only ontrance was through a
very heavy metal donr at the end of & ceugeway which spanned the ditch,

After consirming that thera ware no other entrances a tank deatroyer was

placed on the causeway about filty yards from vne door, While infantry and
two <anke fired at the mltitude of gun porta in the wolle of the fort from
which German soldier's of the 1215 and ¥5 Regiments were dofeniing, the tank

destroyer fired ammo plerctng eavi hich exrlooive rounds at the doom=to no

57



Ge

a

10.sie guna,”
General Krause deployed the bulk of his ferees around the western fortin

fied salient. On the right, the 1010th Security Reginent held the line facing
north detween the Feves Ridge and the Meselle. In the center, the NCO Sehool
was spread between St. Privat and Verweville, The erea from Verneville to
the river at Auo-aur-Moselle was held by the Officer Candidate Regiment to
whom the bulk of the artillery was ausigned.?2

On 5 Septemter, OB weet eatinated that there was the equivalent of four
ani = half divisions available for the Mete-Thionville sector. They were
positioned cn the eastern bank, except for the fortified salient to the west
of Metz, The divisions were a mixture of odd battalions and “vurnt-cut"
regiments, largely without vehicles, heavy Weapons, and armor. Their state
of training and efficiency varied considerably, from excellent to terrible,

However, there was a front of unite, es General Walker's men were to discover

when they resumed their advance,”

11



REPRODUCED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE

a See — niacin acateRiaitl neces
UNCLASSIFIED . oO
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF TIS PAGE (When Date Enter. Se
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE“ BEFORN COMPLETING FORM |
[TREFORY NUMBER a, GOVT Acc WSSION NO) 5. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER |

a 4 TITLE (and Subtitte) 8. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED

METZ: Offensive, Deliberate Attack, MOUT Student Paper

Wy 6. PERFORMING ORG, REPORT NUMBER
1 3 CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(S)

7 AUTHOR) MAJ (P)R. Stephenson, MAd J.McNulty,MAJ G.
Kuhn, MAJ K.Kremenak,MAJ T.Bowden,MAJ—J Watson,
MAJ J.Petrick,MAJ W.Marshall,MAJ J.Brennan,MAJ

1 M.Mague, MAJ K, Ja: _|
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS io. QROGR AY EL MENT MUSeeRS TASK

Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC

ATZL“SWI, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

[IC contRoLLina OFFICE NAME ‘AND AGORESS ") 12. REPORT DATE
Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC : 23 May 1984
ATZL-SWI, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas 66027 3 hed PAGES y
rTT. WONTTORING AGENCY NAME @ ADORESS(I! different trom Controlling Office) | 18. SECURITY CLASS, (of thle report)
UNCLASSIFIED
[ 15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING |
ja. PES Oot CATION DOWNGRADING

TTSDISTRIGUTION STATEMENT (of thia Report)

Approved for Public Release:
Distribution Unlimited

\'7. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered In Block 20, if dilferent from Report)

18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES:
A Battlebook prepared by students of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College under the supervision of the Combat Studies Institute as part of the
{ Battle Analysis progran.

19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reveree aide If necessary and Identity by block number)
: History, case studies, military operations, tactical analysis, battles, military!

tactics, tactical warfare, antitank warfare, armor, artillery, infantry, tactical
— air support. Free Terms: Battle Analysis, World War II, Metz, offensive-
} deliberate attack, France, Lorraine, urban warfare,

26. ABSTRACT (Comtinue am reverse cide N nevesoaty mad identity by block number)
During the period September-December 1944 the US XX Corps encircled and reduced
Metz as a preliminary move to enhance the continued attack eastward of the US

} Third Army. Recognizing the strategic and political importance of the city,

' seizure by US forces was strongly contested by elements of the German First

; Army. The Battle is an excellent example of a Corps sized operation against

} a well fortified and defended strongpoint, as well as combat in urban terrain.

n

je.

DD [ann 1473 EoInOW OF 1 wov 68 13 oBsoL ETE UNCLASSIFIED

- SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Dale Entered)



would be used av an adwinistrative center to direct and repulee the advancing
Amoricans, later, Mets would be used as a concentration point for amonition
and veapons to arm the counteroffensive which was to be organized behind tho
Moselle River line, Hewever, Hitler directed that all forts, including those
west of the Moselle, te manned, improved where possible and held at all corts.
Work was begun on these positions and as many artillery pieers as possible
were enplaced,

The sstack on Fort Driant

XX Gorpa and Third U.S. Army endorsed s plan developed by the commaniers
of the llth Infantry Regiment and the Sth Infantry Division for the attack on
Fort Lrisnt. The plan wae designed to indeetrinate newly arrived replacenents
and retnforcenents and to bolster the morale of the llth Infantry Regiment.
However the Corps and Third Army commanders saw Fort Driant as vitel to the
sesenlt on Metx since the Fort was considered s keyatone in the reduction of
the approaches to Metx, The reduction of Fort Driant would open the way for
# tank assault north through the Moselle Valley to Metz. The planning ef the
initial sttack on 27 Septomber was based on ground reconnaissance su wel] as
extencive asris) reconnaissance photo information regarding the actual die
position of the enemy in Fort Driant, This attack did not take place however
until  Qctober to allow for additional engineer preparations. The assmilt
after cleven daya of effort wae repulsed,

Rased on the ordeal at Fort Uriant, the Commanding General, XX Corps,
initiated intensive planning for the subsequent reinforced sttack on the ene
tire fortified region ef Metx. This plan consisted of two distinct operations
to be accomplished concurrently: The firet would be an attack to encircle

and destroy the fortress and garrison of Metz, the seecnd would be the

seizure of w bridgehead over the Saar River in the vicinity of Saarburg as a
32



a)

SSN)

Bred

wt ee



ZechnolLeey
fechnology of the opposing forces was fairly evenly matched, Large

weapons systexs did not play a major role, for the battle was fought mostly
by infantry unite or on # small unit basis.

U.S. Forces had been unpleasantly surprised by the Netx area fortress
defenses during the Septenber battles, ‘They had strived for an improvenent
in thetr river croasing metheds and fortress reduction techniques in the
interim period, Plane and blueprints of the forts were finally supplied to
U.S. foreos ani aseieted in an uniorstuniing of the construction ani connec~
tivity of the strongpoints.

During the October lull, Geraan Forces had made sone improvenents to the
fortifications. ‘They had stopped well short of real improvement and many
forta were unmanned or undermanned and several important gan positions vere
inoperative, The eastern sector wae especially deficient in repair.

Nevertheless, .S. Forces in the Third Army wero faced with a formidable
odstacls which would have to be sleared fort by fort, tlding by building.

A large civilian population in Metz precluded on voth a political and morale
Dbasia the use of heavy bombing, although this type of bombing had proved un
succossful against the Mets fortifications, Tho large civilian population
also provided FFI forces to the Allies and syupathizers and fifth colunnists
to the Germans.

honisticnl ani Administrative Syeten

"All through Auguat General Patton's determination to override every
edstacie and continue to advance had so inspired hie army that it had violated
with impunity many an accepted tactical or logistical dictum and had gurpassed

the most sanguine «xpsetations of success. The totul impact of theas suc

cosees could not tt disrupt a system of supply based on tho expectation of a
20



THE BATTLE OF METZ

Combat Studies Institute
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

DTIC

ELECTE
JUL 26 1985 |

B uw,



attack drove the 3rd battalion out of Kerling. The German main effort was
centered along the Kerling-Petite-Hettange axis and was obviously focused on
the deatruction of tho Malling crossing site, In their advance, the Germans
broke through two company size unite attempting to block them. 4 composite
force of cooke, staff and support personne] formed by the 2nd battalion com
mander checked the Germans at Petite-Hettanze. At that time, twenty artillery
battalions opened up on the German combat group. Additionally, the two tank
deutroyers that had crossed earlier that morning moved up ani took the combat
eroup under fire, The counterwattack complotely broke under such intense
preseure and the German force retreated back throveh Kerling. Ry the after~
nocn of 12 Kovember, the 359th had regrouped and then moved ovor to the
attack to retake lost ground.

The 357th had managed to cross its reserve battalion. After heavy fight
ing, the regiment pushed the bridgehead line to the end of the Koenigsemacker
ridge and overlooked the villages of Inglange. The 358th also continued the
attack seizing the villages of Valmestroff and Eluange. This effort was
stopped outside the villages by plustic mines which current U.S. mine de~
tectors covld not locate, At the crossing eiten, strong efforts were again
underyway to repair the bridges damaged during the counter=attack. Supplies
were atill net croseing the river in sufficient quantities, The bridgehead
had been expanded but the troops were cold, wet and tired,

On 13 Noventer al) three regiments again attacked, The 357th cleared
out pocketa of enony resistance in ite rear, The 359th attacked with great
losses through « minefield to link up With the 357th at Cudrenne, It also
completed its reoccupation of Kerling, The 358th also had to deal with mine=

fields, tat managed to seize the high ground overlooking Inglange and tied

in with the 357th, A bridge vas completed at Cattenom end the 90th Division
dds,



special materials needed to overcome fortifications, Leck of heavy bridging
equipment and ability to cress the swollen river nadie it virtually impossitle
to accomplish the initial assault on Mets, fhe Octeder Jull provided an op=
portunity to make up for these and other shortcomings, thereby making it
possible to successfully defeat the Germans at Mote in November,

On the other hand, had the Germans had the proper prierity in personnel
and logistical support ae well as improved tho fortification asuets, they
could very likely have ropulsed the Third Army advance, As it wae, they did
not have the priority or the logistical support and finally, due to a lack
of artillery and antiqormer capability, coupled with the sealing off of their

lines of communication, they were forced to surrender.

GOMMAMD. CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS SYS2EM

U.S. Ferces were well organized for the Metr battle. The commanders and
staffs bai been preparing for the final reduction since the September battles,
A realignment of forces had positioned the Infantry divisions against Mets
while the Armor units vere poised to exploit te both the north and the sooth,
Additional engineer support had been positioned for the river crossings and
engineers and infantry were trained and organized to reduce the fortifications
with explosives,

Communications were generally satisfactory, although deficiencies existed
on both sides, U.S. wire commnications were frequently interrupted by enexy
shelling and the destruction of one bridge severed conmorcial circuits scross
the Meselle. A lack of communications fer command prompted the formation of
TF Bacon on the east side of the Moselle early in the battle.

The Germans relied primarily on wire within the protection of the fortress

system, Destruction of this system was accomplished only by eliminating the

coumunications centers scattered through the fortresens. Many enomy units
28



2. Encirele, then bypase the city,

3. €Bncirole the garrison, then coniuct singe warfare,

Goraan forces had the following coursus of action:

1. Hold the garrison.

2, Gonduct delay operations with the city as 3 pivot.
3. Withdraw the garrison with delaying general foress.

@ne Third Army had learned its leseon in siege operations during the
September fighting. While XX Corps encircled the city, XII Corps and other
XX Corp elomente wero to push ahead to the Saar River. XX Corps vas to ren
duce the city without engaging in a costly, long tera siege.

®ho German deeision to hold the city was a waste ef precicus wen ani
equipment, Although a more adequately equipped force could have been a thorn
to the U.S. Forces for an extended period, the days of siege warfare had
literally been bypassed by arsor and air power, This German course of action

could not be supported tactically or logistically.

3”



suid, ve refused to surrender until ferced to do #0 or by having hia food or

ammnition run out.?”

PROCUREMENT AMD DISTRUBTION
At the initial phase in September the greatest difficulties were with

the Third Army, Having outrun the lines of conmunication which extended all
the way back to Normandy. Since no closer porta hadi been opened, ani receive
ing third priority, since the main effort was going to Montgomery din the north
and etockpiling to support NarketeGarden, the Third Army was in dire straite.
With no knowledge of the fortifications and inadequate artillery avatiable,
coupled with the adverse weather which pravented adequate air support and rade
the river impassable as well ae causing any legistical support to be awallowed
in a quagmire, the likelihood of succese in September was pour to nome. On
the other hand, the Germans in the fortifications faced a wuch better position.
Despite their shortages the presonce of elite troops, moral and physical
strength derived from steel and concrete, even in outdated fortifications and
the possession of ground that favored the defender were factors which greatly
swung to the side of tho German forces st the outset of conflicte in September.
sAditionally, trains stil] ran in to Metx until 17 November, Despite
the slow resupply to them due to the priority fill going to the anticipated
Ardennes offenaive,the lines of communication favored the Germans,

Bridging equipment and heavy engineer stores for the Third Army were
scattered in trucks that had run dry along the lise of advance. Bridging
trains were not moved up until 6 September, 2° Due to the lack of fuel,
ammunition could not be moved up and the appalling weather only compounded
the problem while the opponents were generally warm ant snug in their perma-

nent emplacements.

fhe Gernans were given little aid since men and usterial were being
23



:
]

Dhind Army and XX Gerps

fhe Battle of Mets was fought by thu «X Corps which was part of the Third
Army commanded by General George 8. Patton, At the ond of Augnet, the Third
Aruy consisted of 314,514 officers and men divided into nine divisions, two of
which were armored, By this time, the Third Army was a close=knit fighting
organization flushed with vietory and eager for the kill. The XX Corps was
companied by General Walton H. Walker and consintad of three divisions, the
5th and 90th Infantry, and the 7th Armored, None of the three divisions had
suffered excessive casualties during the pureuit of Germany across France.®

On 1 September 194, the Third Army suffered the humiliation of running
out of fuel. Wowever, by 5 September, the situation had improved somewhat
and Qeneral Bradley again assigned the Rhine at Frankfurt as the Third Aray
adjective as soon as the Westwall could be breached. Inmediate.y as the com
forence was over, Patton issued his orders, General Waiker with XX Corps was
to attack eastward in two phasemfirst, to establish a bridgehead over the
Nouelle, anid secemi, to cross the Rhine? At no tine was any mention made of
expected. Oerman opposition. it was assumed thet the Germans would make some
sort of stand at the Westwall, which General Patton thought would be breached

e@asily by arzor,)°

Armed with his orders, Gennral Walker rushed back to his headquarters and
ieaued verbal messages that were followed tho next morning by Field Order No,
10, upon which the first stage of the Mety battle was based. It stated, "Third
Ue 3. Army attacks to seize eros#ings over the Rhine River between Mannhei» and
Codleny." The mission of XX Corpse wag first to weixe # crossing over the
Movelle and then to capture Metz and Thionville, Second, they were to cross

the Rhine in the vicinity of Mains ani prepare to aivance to Frankfurt. The

individual units were as@igned missions as follows: The 3rd Cavalry Group wae
7



during tho battles for Forte St. Julian ani Belleeroix in an attenpt to
eatublish contact with the 5th Division's 10th Infantry Regiment. The 10th
wae operating in the ecuthern auburbs of Metz east of the Seille River,

The 10th and the 11th Infantry Regiments had been contending with ree
eistance in their sectore from Forte Quevleu and St, Privat respectively.
Fort Queuleu had approximately 500 German troops and the 10th's efforts to
storm the fort were unsuccessful because of tho limited number of forces
available to the Americana.

Forts St. Privat and Verdun provided the 1lth Infantry Reginent problems
in their area of operation south of Metz between the Moselle and Seille
Rivere. The Americans continually fired on the forts with tanks, and each
time the fermans refused opportunities to surrender, attempts were made to
burn then out with white phosphorous rounds, The 11th'y strength was
diminished by having to leave elements behind to contain these strongpoints,

Ry nightfall on 18 November (lenoral Kittel concentrated his efforts on
the immediate defense of the area around hia command post on the Jele Chan
viera.

Eighting on 19 November

At dawn 8 company sized element of the 2d Battalion, 378th infantry
Regiment of TY Bacon prepared to enter Fort St. Julien. As they entered the
blown doer to the fort they overpowered @ German NCO who was posting # sqund
to defend the entrance and led him at bayonet point to the fort comanier
who was persusded to surrerder Fort St. Julian,

At about the same time the other battalion of TF Racon, the lst Pattal=
ion, 377th Infantry Regiment, was moving, back intc the area of Fort

Bellecroix, Ag they moved srouni the rear of the fort they were vory aurrrised

to find o bridge over the Setlle still intact, After defeating « small German
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poured the rest of its units into the bridgehcad, ‘Transport, ertillery,
anti=tank, and supply unite crossed in a contirmous stream at Cattonom. The
90th Reconnaissance troop pushed south along the river to link up with the
95th division elements at Uckange, Ry the 14th of November, tho troops in
the regiments had overcosts, blankets and dry socks and the 90th division
was now in position to support the advance south.

25th Brideshead Expanded®?

On or about 10 November, YX Corps headquarters became very concerned
about the progresa that was being made in securing a suitable crossing to
comnit the 10th Armored Division, Operations in the 90th bridgehead did not,
at that time, look hopeful. Therefore, the 95th division was ordered to
expand ite foothold on the east bank of the moselle by conducting a recon
naiseance in force to test the possibility of securing a crossing in the town
of Thionville,.

The 2nd Battalion 378th Infantry wae tasked with the mission, By mideday
on 11 Novonber the battalion had crossed the Moselle ani secured a small
section of the east side of Thionville, The most sericus resistance en-
countered was from an old fortification in the town called Ft Yuts. This
was overrun by the battalion on 13 November. Operations were immediately
initiated to expand the bridgehead, By the lth of November, the villages
of Rasse-Yuts and Heaute~Yuts were seized expanding its area to the north and
east, In the southern sector a German company size element of the 74th
Regiment held a emall cluster of more nodern fortifications near the town of
Tllange, It took the battalion two days of hard fighting to eliminate this
threat. Turing the fight, the reconnaiesance troop from the 90th division
linked up with the battalion and established « secure lane on the east bank

of the Moselle for the commitment of the 10th Armored Division,
45



Crossed the repaired bridge at Nelling and aseenbdled south ef CCB, The 3rd
Cavalry Group also crossed at Nalling. It relieved the northern flank of the
359th and prepared for ite future ecreening and reconnaissance missions,

In the early morning of 15 November, GCB began its drive east along the
Kerling-Waldwisse read. OCA began ite attack south later that afternoon, In
order to effectively utilixe the few available roadie, each Combat Command
broke down into omaller task forces, The German forces opposing the division
lacked coheeion but were able to mount several strong bDlocking actions along
the narrow roads. The clearing of the weather allowed beth units to employ
the full support of the XIX Tactical Air Command.

CCA advanced steadily fer three days and by 19 November had fercec
croveings of the Nied river in the vicinity of Freiatreff and Bouxonville.
This effectively completed 10th Armored's mission in the Metz encirelement.
“he infantry divisione to ite left had at this time closed the inner circle
on the city. Meanwhile CCB was meeting stiff opposition in its advance to
the Sarre, CCA, therefore, was @rdered to destroy its Nied cressings and

attack north to join the rest of the division in the drive east.

Cloning Attack of the 90th Division”

On 15 November, at the time of the 10th Armored attack, the 90th division
had expanded the bridgehead to a width of eleven miles and a depth of seven
miles, ‘The division was now preparing to continue ite attack to close the en=
cirelement of Mets, ‘The reeistance of the Jerman 416th and 19th Volks
Qrenedier divisions wae crumbling. Indications were that the German commanders

at Army and Army Group level were trying to cut their lo

s and prevent a fap
from being ripped out of their line by the eneirelement. None the less, the

German First Arpy commander reinferced the 25th Panser Greradier combat group

with m battalion of the 74th Regiment and launched a counter attack against
4?



General Krause took control of the roudblocks and set to work to sesenble
as fighting ferce capable of defending the city, Hise division had twe infantry
training battalions immediately available plus nmiseellaneous specialists, but
by the beginning of September he managed to form a three-reginent divieton,
which consisted of the Officer Candidate Regiment, the 1010th Security Regi~
ment, and the NOO School of Military District x11,28

The Officer Caniidate Regiment was commanded by Colonel von Siegreth, and
the unit was mainly composed of the cadets of an officer training sehool,

They munbered some 1,800, moet of whom had been commissioned as lieutenants
on passing their examinations at the beginning of September, The regiment

was filled out with some 1,500 sundry troops who had been gathered in from

the retreating colusns to give a total combat strength of 3,300 experienced
won}?

Phe 1010th Security Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Richter,
had retroated from France and consisted ef twe under~strength battalions.

The personnel ware mostly overage and their combat efficiency wae 1ow,”°

The NCO Sehool of Military District X11, commanded by Colonel Wagner,
was formed into « regiment of some 1,500 men who had been attending various
courses. Krauee rated their efficiency as high, although they had never
before fought together as # combat unit.22

In addition to the above three rezinents, the two replacenent battalions
belonging to the division were stationed on the east bank of the Moselle to
the south of the city. ‘There they were joined by # battalion formed from the
personnel of the SS Signal Sehool — known as “Battalion Bery," after ite
commender, Initially, artillery was almost nonexistent, consisting of two
battalions of a replacenent unit armed with Buseian 7.5em cannon, and with no

transport of ite own. ‘The only reinforeement received waa « battery of four
10