STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS 

OF INTERCOMMUNAL WARFARE IN IRAQ

W. Andrew Terrill

February 2005

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 The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not 

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the 

Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public 

release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

 The author would like to thank Ms. Sarah E. Womer; Colonel Thomas N. 

Baker, U.S. Army Reserve; Dr. Sherifa Zuhur; Dr. Jeffery Record; Dr. Steven Metz; 

Dr. Conrad Crane; and Captain David M. Burke, U.S. Air Force (USAF), for useful 

comments on the draft of this monograph. My talks with Dr. Sami Hajjar and Mr. 

Joseph (Barry) Hughes have also been important learning experiences that have 

helped me with this and other works. For valuable insights and support while I 

was overseas, I would also like to thank Colonel Brian Kern, USAF, of the U.S. 

embassy in the United Arab Emirates; Major James Overstreet, USAF, the former 

Assistant Air Attaché in Amman Jordan; Colonel Patrick Michelson, U.S. Army 

(USA), former U.S. Defense Attaché in Cairo; Colonel John Chere, USA, of the 

U.S. Embassy in Morocco; and Commander Daniel Lafferty, U.S. Navy, of the U.S. 

Embassy, Tunisia. Any mistakes of fact or interpretation associated with this work 

are, of course, my own.

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to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes 

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iii

FOREWORD

The future of Iraq is uncertain. The country is in a dangerous phase. 

The removal of a brutal dictatorship by coalition forces in April 2003 

has given the Iraqi people hope for a new and better political system, 

where individuals do not have to live in continuing fear and uncertainty. 

Nevertheless, the Iraqi people must also address the difficult challenges of 

self-government for a diverse population, with major ethnic and sectarian 

groups that often maintain widely divergent agendas. If they fail to do 

this and an ethnic/sectarian war ensues, the consequences will be dire, not 

only for Iraq, but for the entire Middle Eastern region.

 This monograph, by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, does not predict an Iraqi 

civil war, which is the worst-case outcome for the current struggle in 

Iraq. Neither can this monograph fully rule out this possibility since the 

responsibility for preventing such an eventuality is ultimately Iraqi and not 

American, and U.S. analysts cannot predict with certainty what Iraqis will 

do once they take full control of their own country. Rather, this monograph 

underscores what is at stake in the Middle East by a comprehensive 

discussion of potential region-wide consequences should an ethnic and 

sectarian war actually occur. This work therefore serves as an important 

warning of how an Iraq civil war could offer new strategic opportunities, 

but especially dangers, to many of the states within the Middle East. Dr. 

Terrill’s work performs this important task by examining how an Iraqi civil 

war may develop and how this could influence the internal stability and 

foreign policies of regional countries. 

 The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as a 

contribution to the national security debate on this important subject as 

our nation grapples with a variety of problems associated with the U.S. 

presence in Iraq and the new strategic reality following Saddam’s removal 

from power. This analysis should be especially useful to U.S. military 

strategic leaders as they seek to understand the complicated interplay 

between Iraq and its neighbors at this critical point. It reflects analysis 

conducted with an information cutoff date of December 2004.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

W. ANDREW TERRILL joined the Strategic Studies Institute 

in October 2001, and is SSI’s Middle East specialist. Prior to his 

appointment, he served as a Middle East Nonproliferation analyst for 

the International Assessments Division of the Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory (LLNL). In 1998-99, Dr. Terrill also served as a 

Visiting Professor at the U.S. Air War College on assignment from 

LLNL. He is a former faculty member at Old Dominion University in 

Norfolk, Virginia, and has taught adjunct at a variety of other colleges 

and universities. He is a U.S. Army Reserve lieutenant colonel and 

a Foreign Area Officer (Middle East). Dr. Terrill has published in 

numerous academic journals on topics including nuclear proliferation, 

the Iran-Iraq War, Operation DESERT STORM, Middle Eastern 

chemical weapons, and ballistic missile proliferation, terrorism, 

and commando operations. Since 1994, at U.S. State Department 

invitation, Dr. Terrill has participated in the Middle Eastern Regional 

Security Track 2 talks, which are part of the Middle East Peace Process. 

He holds a B.A. from California State Polytechnic University and an 

M.A. from the University of California, Riverside, both in Political 

Science. Dr Terrill also holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from 

Claremont Graduate University, Claremont, California.
v

SUMMARY

 Contemporary Iraqi society is comprised of Shi’ite Arabs, Sunni 

Arabs, ethnic Kurds, and a variety of smaller ethnic or religious 

minorities. In the post-Saddam era, differences among these groups 

will either emerge as a barrier to political cooperation and national 

unity, or they will instead be mitigated as part of the struggle to define 

a new and more inclusive system of government. Should Iraqi ethnic 

and sectarian differences become unmanageable, a violent struggle 

for political power may ensue. Democracy, if it can be established, 

can regulate and then alleviate the hostility leading to such events, 

but this function usually occurs only after the development of strong, 

largely unbiased political institutions and political parties, which 

transcend ethnic and religious differences. Ethnic and sectarian-based 

political parties, even if internally democratic, often feel pressure to 

tolerate or even embrace extremism in order to retain their base of 

power and undercut rivals who might claim more expansive rights 

for the community. Except for the fear of intercommunal conflicts, 

such political parties often have few political reasons to consider the 

rights of rival communities since they are outside of their base of 

power.

 This monograph does not predict an ethnic or sectarian civil 

war in Iraq, nor does it assume that a civil war will necessarily be 

based on ethnic and sectarian differences if it occurs. Rather, the 

author assumes that the post-Saddam political situation in Iraq 

can have a variety of possible outcomes, only the worst of which is 

intercommunal warfare, either in the near or medium term future. 

This work holds out the strong hope that the current Iraqi awareness 

of the danger of civil war will be an important factor in reducing the 

possibility of this conclusion. Nevertheless, this report also assumes 

that the prospect of this sort of civil conflict is sufficiently serious as 

to warrant detailed consideration despite the fact that it is only one 

of many possibilities and hopefully not the most likely outcome for 

the future of Iraq. 

 The scope of this monograph is confined to the Middle East, 

which is where Iraqi ethnic and sectarian strife will almost certainly 

have the greatest implications for regional stability and U.S. foreign 

and military policy. If Iraqi violence erupts along religious/sectarian 
vi

and ethnic lines, this conflict will have thunderous echoes 

throughout the area. Group identity, which is critical throughout 

much of the Middle East, will provide a compelling context for 

regional bystanders watching ethnic and sectarian bloodshed. Such 

a conflagration will undoubtedly influence regional co-religionists 

and ethnic kin of the embattled communities within Iraq. Many 

individuals and nations would feel compelled to take sides. Some, 

perhaps many, young men will consider traveling to Iraq to join 

the fight. Moreover, various nations would involve themselves in 

the fighting in ways up to and including the possibility of military 

intervention. Additionally, intercommunal harmony and tolerance 

in other regional states may suffer as the result of Iraqi fighting and 

the responses of neighboring governments to that fighting.
1

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF INTERCOMMUNAL 

WARFARE IN IRAQ

Introduction: The Challenge of Avoiding Catastrophic EthnoReligious Conflict.

 Iraqi is a heterogeneous society divided along ethnic, tribal, and 

religious lines as well as those of political orientation and ideology. 

Around 60-65 percent of Iraqis are Shi’ite Arabs, 15-20 percent are 

Sunni Muslim Arabs, and 15-20 percent are Kurds. Turkomans, 

Assyrians, and other minorities constitute about 5 percent of the Iraqi 

population, according to unclassified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 

figures.1

 Divisions among these groups are, to some extent, mitigated 

by urbanization and intermarriage among Sunni and Shi’ite Arabs. 

Such intermarriage is both accepted and widespread among Sunni and 

Shi’ite Arabs in Iraq, but has not eliminated intercommunal differences 

or the danger of intercommunal violence in the post-Saddam era. 

 The toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime in April 2003 ended 

an era in which Iraqi sectarian, religious, tribal, regional, and other 

differences were contained and manipulated (but not always suppressed) 

against a background of unyielding tyranny. Saddam’s strategy for rule 

included numerous circumstances of manipulating ethnic and tribal 

loyalties, although repression was always his ultimate fallback position 

to control the population.2

 The future of Iraq is now uncertain, as the 

country must address its internal difficulties in ways that are entirely 

different from those of the Saddam regime. 

 This report is an attempt to address some of the issues associated 

with these concerns. It assumes that the strategic implications of an Iraqi 

civil war are sufficiently serious as to warrant detailed consideration 

despite the fact that this is only one of many possibilities and not 

necessarily the most likely possibility for the future of Iraq. Serious 

ethno-religious conflict and especially a full-scale civil war in postSaddam Iraq would present the United States, the West, and the region 

with a variety of severe strategic problems. Such an outcome is only one 

of Iraq’s potential futures, but a number of key observers have noted 

that such an Iraqi civil war is at least possible. United Nations (UN) 

Ambassador Brahimi has warned of this danger, while various academic 

and research organizations have expressed similar fears.3

 Some U.S. 

journalistic sources, citing what they describe as leaked documents, 
2

also suggest that the U.S. CIA is concerned about the danger of an Iraqi 

civil war.4 Indeed, public opinion data also indicates that many Iraqis 

are concerned over the possibility of a civil war in the post-Saddam era, 

while some foreign Arab leaders have expressed similar concerns.5

 Obviously, the danger of civil war is particularly pressing for the 

United States, if this eventuality occurs while significant numbers of 

U.S. military forces remain in Iraq. Civil war under these circumstances 

is nevertheless unlikely since U.S. and allied troops in Iraq are currently 

serving as a deterrent to serious intercommunal fighting. Another more 

realistic scenario is that widespread ethnic and sectarian fighting breaks 

out during or shortly after a major U.S. troop withdrawal, when these 

forces are no longer able to prevent Iraqi communities from challenging 

each other over conflicting demands for political representation, power 

and resources. It is also possible that civil war will be staved off for 

years, but then finally break out in response to changing internal 

political events or efforts by one group to consolidate disproportionate 

levels of power. The most desirable alternative is, of course, for Iraqi 

sectarian groups to resolve their differences without resorting to 

violence of any kind. A key requirement for achieving this outcome will 

be the development of a broad based and legitimate Iraqi government 

supported by respected and professional Iraqi security forces willing to 

protect that government. 

 If the new Iraqi leadership fails in its efforts to prevent catastrophic 

levels of sectarian violence, leaders throughout the region will feel the 

need to respond to the unfolding crisis. Most of Iraq’s neighbors fear a 

deeply-fragmented Iraq as a potentially destabilizing threat to their own 

domestic politics and tranquility. Many are especially concerned about 

the possibility of an Iraqi civil war. Yet, many of these governments will 

also face domestic political pressures to involve themselves ever more 

deeply in Iraq’s troubles, should an intercommunal war break out. 

Some governments will also see opportunities to expand their influence 

in Iraq in ways that either contradict or support U.S. goals in the region. 

Seasoned terrorists and inexperienced, but angry, young men may also 

enter the strategic equation as they involve themselves with Iraqi ethnic 

or sectarian warfare. 

How an Ethnic-Sectarian War Might Ignite and Develop in Iraq.

 Many Western observers reflexively view Western-style democracy 

as the way to address the divisions within Iraq society that may 
3

lead to severe civil conflict. Nevertheless, the birth of democracy 

and development of ethnic and sectarian harmony are not always 

closely related, and a number of important challenges will have to be 

addressed for Iraq to evolve into a viable democracy that protects the 

rights of all religious and ethnic groups.6

 Should Iraqis be unable to 

meet the challenges of accommodating and regulating key differences 

while forming a functioning government, civil war becomes a serious 

possibility.

 Currently, Iraqis of differing ethnic and sectarian background are 

discussing and agitating for alternative futures for their country in ways 

that were forbidden during Saddam’s era. Disagreements over Iraq’s 

future are, in some cases, undergoing a natural sharpening as issues and 

competing visions of the future are discussed more fully and as various 

groups demand what they perceive to be their rights. The danger is that 

current disputes may become more angry and intractable over time. In 

countries with well-established democratic institutions, patterns have 

developed whereby parties, factions, and groups relinquish political 

power with the certainty that they will be able to compete to regain 

such power at a later point, such as a new election. Strong institutions 

do not yet exist in Iraq, and many Iraqi citizens will be unwilling to 

accept the actions of any government that they perceive as slighting 

their ethnic or sectarian interests. These slighted groups may perceive 

violence as a preferable option to waiting for future redistributing of 

power through nonviolent means.7

 A breakdown in civil order in Iraq, should it occur, would therefore 

most likely be on ethnic and sectarian grounds, although ideological 

and tribal differences might also be reflected in the fighting. Ethnic 

and sectarian fighting in any country is often particularly bloody and 

is usually viewed by many of the participants as zero-sum. Moreover, 

Iraq’s brutal history may lead some among all three of Iraq’s major 

groups (Kurds, Sunni Arabs, and Shi’ite Arabs) to assume any such 

struggle is not subject to compromise. Saddam’s murder of vast 

numbers of Kurds and Shi’ite Arabs looms large in the consciousness of 

both communities, which would correspondingly be reluctant to scale 

back claims for power or autonomy. Additionally, smaller groups such 

as the Turkomans have less capacity for self-defense, while maintaining 

extremely serious differences with the Arabs and Kurds over such issues 

as the future of the northern Iraqi city of Kirkuk. Their most effective 

strategy in a civil war would be to seek Turkish diplomatic and perhaps 

military intervention. 
4

 As noted, this work does not predict an inevitable civil war, but 

there are aspects of such a crisis that will start to emerge before any 

large-scale fighting, and observers need to be attentive to these factors. 

An important indicator of problems associated with intercommunal 

civil war is the development of uncompromising political leaders 

within Iraq’s ethnic and sectarian communities. Ironically, these people 

can be particularly dangerous in a democratic setting, where power 

is redistributed periodically through elections because leaders must 

outbid each other for a following within the community. Sociologist 

Andreas Wimmer and ethnonationalism scholar Donald Horowitz 

have examined this process in depth, and each has warned that it can 

lead to a radicalization of ethnic politics whereby ethnic and sectarian 

divisions are sharpened and rendered increasingly difficult to resolve.8

 Major national leaders seldom plan to ignite civil wars within 

their own countries. Rather, such conflicts usually result from 

escalating societal confrontations that cannot be resolved peacefully 

by compromise or the use of domestic institutions. Violence, in turn, 

sometimes spirals to exceptionally high levels. At such a point, it is 

likely that even individuals who have given little thought to their ethnic 

or sectarian identities would have to reemphasize them in response to 

any escalating intercommunal crisis. Few people will have the luxury of 

neutrality under such conditions, and most would be forced to choose 

sides. Long-standing friendships across ethnic and sectarian divides 

usually end under these circumstances, and mixed ethnic or sectarian 

families are forced to choose one side or another or split.9

 One particularly serious indicator of a developing crisis would be an 

unwillingness of Iraq’s major communities to compromise on issues of 

power sharing. There may also be considerable difficulties in dividing 

resources, such as oil wealth, among communities in a way that satisfies 

all of those involved. Moreover, an easy or amicable division of Iraq 

into separate political entities is virtually impossible. In many areas, 

populations are highly mixed. Baghdad itself is almost evenly divided 

between Shi’ite and Sunni Arabs by some estimates, and it also has a 

sizable Kurdish population.10 Additionally, many of Iraq’s economic 

resources, including a large portion of the oil industry, are in disputed 

territory. This situation suggests that the stakes associated with any kind 

of a territorial division will be staggering. It is inconceivable that any 

of Iraq’s major groups will give them up without at least considering 

violence.
5

 The danger of civil war is much closer if political differences appear 

to become irreconcilable and negotiations between groups break down. 

The factor that allows these types of disputes among communities 

to devolve into civil war is the capacity of various sides to employ 

violence effectively. In Iraq, this capacity now exists among all major 

groups due to the rise of regional and sectarian militias, a process that 

began occurring immediately after Saddam’s removal. Some of these 

groups returned to Iraq after political exile following the elimination 

of the former regime. Others existed in Iraqi Kurdish areas outside 

of Saddam’s control since 1991, while still others were established 

within Iraq following Saddam’s ouster. The growth in militia activity 

is a natural by-product of an insecure political environment in which 

security is not effectively guaranteed by national level political and 

security organizations. Since the individual cannot depend on the state to 

provide security, self-defense becomes imperative. A variety of militias 

are thereby able to assume the tasks of self-defense and security for 

various portions of their sectarian or ethnic community. These militias 

may also be used as instruments of domestic political aggression and 

are usually only accountable to a small leadership core. Militias may 

therefore protect some members of an ethnic or sectarian group from 

outsiders, while simultaneously exploiting and intimidating the same 

people to ensure their own dominance over them.

 Immediately following Saddam’s ouster, the U.S. leadership hoped 

that militias would not take root in the Iraqi political system, and strong 

efforts were made to pressure them into dissolving.11 This hope has 

now proven illusory, and senior U.S. officials acknowledge the need 

to tolerate some militia activity.12 Kurdish leaders even took offense at 

having their forces referred to as militias.13 Senior U.S. policymakers 

currently suggest that militias will become unnecessary as legitimate 

governmental security institutions are strengthened, and militias are 

replaced or absorbed by national and regional governmental security 

forces.

 Most major Iraqi militias are associated with religious and ethnic 

political parties, although some are also tribal. As such, these militias 

would be expected to fight in the interests of their sectarian or ethnic 

communities, should relations among Iraqi communities decline or 

collapse. A massive Shi’ite electoral victory will unquestionably serve 

as a spur to the further development of Sunni and Kurdish militias since 

the Shi’ites would then appear closer to the control of national military 
6

institutions including security forces. Sunni Arabs and Kurds could at 

that point wonder if the national military could eventually evolve into 

a force devoted primarily to the welfare of the Shi’ite community.

 If fighting among the radical fringes of Iraq’s major communities 

develops, various sectarian and ethnic militias could be drawn into 

the fighting. Once mainstream militias begin fighting each other, full 

scale intercommunal war may well follow, unless Iraqi security forces 

can contain and then suppress (although not necessarily eliminate) the 

fighting. Moreover, under these circumstances, individual Iraqi soldiers, 

national guardsmen, and other security forces would be subjected to 

strongly conflicting loyalties. They would have to either remain in the 

Iraqi military or desert, depending upon the circumstances of the civil 

conflict, particularly regarding their home community. It is especially 

likely that numerous soldiers would desert if they felt that that army 

was being used to crush the aspirations of their own ethnic or sectarian 

group. Such individuals would probably desert with their weapons and 

join the militias associated with their home communities in a similar 

process as that of the disintegration of the Lebanese Army during 

Lebanon’s 1975-91 civil war.14 Such a collapse can be quite rapid and 

difficult to reverse once it has started.15

 Other problems exist as well. Border security is a major problem in 

contemporary Iraq and will become an even more serious predicament 

should Iraq be engulfed by civil war.16 Currently, U.S. and other 

coalition forces are providing at least some limited border security. 

Most of the projected Iraqi border security force is still undergoing 

extensive recruiting, training, and organizational development. The 

effort is, however, moving forward, and border security will improve 

as these new units are equipped and put into place. Unfortunately, the 

Iraqi border force will almost certainly crumble without a functioning 

central government to provide logistical support and pay should 

civil war conditions begin to develop. Iraq’s borders would thus 

become much more porous and subject to infiltration by terrorists 

and criminals. Moreover, a civil war in Iraq could also be expected to 

produce significant and perhaps severe levels of cross border refugees, 

creating the possibility of a humanitarian crisis. Large refugee camps 

associated with humanitarian relief programs would become centers 

of discontent and could correspondingly serve as recruitment pools for 

terrorists fighting inside Iraq. 

 An Iraqi civil war would also undoubtedly attract and generate 

extremely high levels of terrorist activity just as the Lebanese civil war 
7

did in that country. Without a strong central government, international 

terrorists would have considerable leeway to establish enclaves 

and power bases, while local combatants could be expected to allow 

terrorists to operate in exchange for money, weapons, and other 

support. Additionally, established terrorist groups, such as that of the 

Abu Musab al Zarqawi group, will seek to expand their power and 

influence in the aftermath of a breakdown of internal security. Under 

civil war conditions, some terrorists would support their co-religionists 

in sectarian fighting, while others may simply seek to remove any 

last vestiges of U.S. influence from Iraq. Indeed, based on a variety of 

evidence, Zarqawi is widely believed to be seeking to foment an Iraqi 

civil war as the price of a radical new government that he hopes will 

emerge from the ashes of such a conflict.17

 Moreover, the prestige of Islamic terrorists in the Muslim World 

could be expected to rise dramatically if they managed to wrest 

control of substantial portions of Iraq’s territory from a pro-American 

government in Baghdad or appear close to victory in a civil war. The 

spectacle of victorious Islamists in Iraq would be a powerful source of 

attraction for unemployed, directionless young men across the Muslim 

World seeking to find some meaning for their lives. Young men without 

serious economic prospects and harboring strong but muddled antiAmerican feelings may see an anti-American jihad as an adventure 

that would give meaning to their lives. Thus, an Iraq in civil war could 

become an incubator for anti-American terrorists because of the desire 

to bring forth an anti-American vanguard state out of the civil war, the 

need for what radical Palestinian leader George Habbash once called an 

“Arab Hanoi.”18

 If civil war breaks out in Iraq, the United States will also be widely 

blamed in the Arab World, despite strong U.S. efforts to prevent such 

an eventuality through the thankless job of refereeing Iraqi factions. 

The U.S. decision to invade Iraq and restructure the Iraqi political 

order will be seen as the essential cause of any failure. Moreover, in 

Iraq and the rest of the Arab World, the United States will probably be 

widely assumed to have incited a civil war deliberately. Many Arab 

commentators have clearly stated their belief that the United States 

invaded Iraq to exploit its oil resources and to protect Israel and not 

because the United States had any particular concern about liberating 

the Iraqi people from Saddam Hussein.19 Arab conspiracy theorists 

would undoubtedly latch on to the outbreak of civil war as a deliberate 
8

U.S. plan to safeguard both of these goals, however unlikely this may 

seem to more dispassionate observers.

The Shi ́ite-Sunni Arab Divide in Iraq.

 Sunni Muslim Arabs have dominated all Iraqi governments from 

the formation of the state until the ouster of Saddam Hussein. Sunni 

preeminence in Mesopotamia dates back to Ottoman times, although 

mass conversions from Sunni to Shi’ite Islam also occurred during the 

1800s throughout what is now southern Iraq.20 Following World War 

I, the British installed a monarchy under King Feisal of the Hashemite 

family to function as Iraq’s leader. King Feisal, himself a Sunni, enjoyed 

some genuine popularity in Iraq, but nevertheless depended heavily 

upon Sunni officers (especially Mesopotamian officers) who served 

with him during the Great Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Turks 

(1916-18).21 The Hashemites also formed political alliances with Iraq’s 

Sunni urban elite, and displayed favoritism to Sunnis for administrative 

and military positions.22 Some British officials may also have favored 

bringing Sunnis into the government because they considered Sunnis 

as less complicit in the nationalist Revolt of 1920 (although the British 

were also quite confused about the revolt’s origin and causes).23 Iraqi 

military officers during the initial years of the monarchy were almost all 

Sunnis.24 Sunni ascendancy survived the 1958 revolution, and reached 

its height during the era of Saddam Hussein.

 During their years of political hegemony, many Sunni Arabs worried 

that they would be forced to pay for their history of discrimination against 

the Shi’ites if the roles were ever reversed and the Shi’ites were able 

somehow to dominate Iraq. This concern became especially pronounced 

during Saddam Hussein’s years in power, which included an 8-year 

war against Shi’ite Iran. Additionally, Iraq’s Sunni Arab community 

did not join in the post-DESERT STORM 1991 Shi’ite rebellion to oust 

the Ba’ath, and many Sunnis instead rallied to Saddam. Republican 

Guard tanks crushing the rebellion were often painted with the slogan, 

“No more Shi’ites after today.”25 These forces razed villages, massacred 

civilians, and established a horrendous death toll while crushing the 

rebellion. The Sunni community’s quiescence during this period may 

have further widened the gap between the two communities.

 Currently, many Iraqi Sunni Arabs feel politically besieged, and 

some appear to believe that the United States seeks to punish them for 
9

Saddam Hussein’s crimes and that the United States favors a Shi’ite 

dominated government.26 In the aftermath of Saddam’s removal, Sunnis 

lost a brutal dictator who was nevertheless a member of their community 

and a leader who favored Sunni Arabs over Iraq’s other ethnic and 

sectarian groups. Promises of democracy are not always attractive to the 

Sunnis since they can never constitute a electoral majority by themselves. 

Should sectarian divisions become entrenched political divides, their 

limited numbers will marginalize them indefinitely. Many Sunni Arabs 

were also alienated by the de-Ba’athification process, which they felt 

was directed primarily at them throughout the beginning of the postSaddam era. A variety of critics, including Prime Minister Ayad Allawi 

(a secular Shi’ite), now feel that the sweeping initial de-Ba’athification 

policy was one of the most serious U.S. mistakes in the post-Saddam 

era.27 Additionally, the abolition of the Saddam era army was of special 

concern since the officer corps of that force was heavily Sunni Arab.

 Iraq’s Sunni Arabs are also faring poorly in the effort to reorganize 

themselves to compete politically in post-Saddam Iraq. No Sunnioriented political parties currently appear equipped to accomplish 

this task, and some Sunni leaders call for a boycott of the January 

30, 2005, elections. Well-organized, mass political parties, which 

can vastly increase voter turnout, operate in the Kurdish and Shi’ite 

communities, but not in the Sunni community.28 The resistance to the 

U.S. presence and the new Iraqi government is also currently strongest 

in the Sunni community, and support for the insurgency may distract 

from any potential Sunni effort to take hold of a share of power within 

the framework of the new government. Many non-Iraqi Sunni Arabs, 

especially in the Gulf, fear a possible U.S. decision to align with 

Shi’ites Muslims as a strategy for influencing the Muslim World due to 

exasperation with the Sunni insurgents.

 Some Sunni Arab leaders are also worried about the Kurds and 

may fear Kurdish-Shi’ite cooperation directed against them. At least 

some Sunnis also believe that Kurdish military units played a major 

role in coalition attacks against Fallujah in April 2004. While many 

individual members of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corp (later renamed the 

Iraqi National Guard) units operating in Fallujah were Kurdish, it is 

not clear that these forces were operating as primarily Kurdish units.29

It is possible that disproportionately Kurdish units moved against the 

Fallujah radicals since the Kurdish members of the National Guard are 

often the most reliable troops in that organization, and since the fighting 
10

in Fallujah was particularly intense. True or not, this interpretation of 

events gathered force, and many Kurds living in Fallujah chose to leave 

afterwards.

 Yet, if the Sunnis carry the psychological baggage of lost dominance, 

Shi’ites must address a heritage of horrific sectarian repression that 

has thoroughly traumatized their community. Saddam, who was an 

untrusting leader at best, always kept an especially wary eye on the 

majority Shi’ites. This concern reached new heights in 1979 with the rise 

of a militant Shi’ite Islamic regime in Iran. Iranian calls for regionwide 

Islamic revolution and the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War caused the Ba’ath 

leaders to view Iraqi Shi’ites as a potential fifth column that was all too 

willing to side with Iran under the right circumstances. Iraq’s Shi’ite 

Arabs nevertheless remained loyal to their country during this conflict, 

probably because they were fighting a foreign enemy. In 1991, however, 

a different set of circumstances applied in the aftermath of Saddam’s 

defeat during Operation DESERT STORM. Shi’ites rose against Saddam 

and the Ba’ath party to overturn his government in an action that may 

have been viewed as equally patriotic as resisting the Iranians.

 Virtually all Iraqi Shi’ites view any return to a system of Sunni 

domination of Iraq as unacceptable due to the horror of the recent past. 

The Shi’ite political leadership, including Iraq’s most senior cleric, Grand 

Ayatollah Sistani, have repeatedly emphasized that they favor an Iraqi 

democracy as promised by the United States when it ousted Saddam. 

To these leaders, democracy is a majority rule political system, which 

they may also view as a winner-take-all system. Moreover, most major 

Shi’ite leaders have resisted all formulas to increase Sunni representation beyond that of their numbers to encourage their integration into 

the political process. Grand Ayatollah Sistani, for example, took an 

exceptionally dim view of an early post-Saddam American plan to use 

“regional caucuses” as a voting device, since this program would have 

diminished the importance of Shi’ite numbers. He and other Shi’ite 

leaders have also told their followers that voting is a moral duty.30

 Violence between Iraq’s Sunni and Shi’ite communities exists but 

appears limited and confined to the fringes of each community. One 

particularly appalling incident of possible anti-Shi’ite violence occurred 

with the assassination of Shi’ite political leader, Mohammad Bakr al 

Hakim, and at least 80 other people by a bomb set in front of a Najaf 

mosque in August 2003. This attack is suspected of being either antiShi’ite or a product of an inter-Shi’ite power struggle. Other attacks have 
11

been made against Shi’ite Mosques or pilgrims to Shi’ite shrines and 

are sometimes suspected to be the actions of Sunni Muslim extremists. 

The period immediately prior to the January 30 elections seems to have 

been particularly tense. Some Sunni clerics accused “poisonous” Shi’ite 

religious leaders of ignoring the U.S.-coalition November 2004 attack on 

Fallujah, which was widely unpopular among many Sunni leaders.31

 Incidents of suspected anti-Sunni violence by Shi’ite Muslims are less 

common at the time of this writing. Many Shi’ites are widely believed 

to be seeking to dominate the new Iraqi polity by force of numbers, 

and therefore do not see violence as a first resort. Nevertheless, antiSunni violence widely attributed to Shi’ite extremists has occurred. 

In September 2004, for example, two prominent Sunni clerics were 

assassinated in separate incidents in Sadr city, the Shi’ite area in Eastern 

Baghdad.32 The rise of populist Shi’ite radicals, such as Muqtada al-Sadr, 

increase the danger of sectarian violence should the radical fringes begin 

to engage each other further and then threaten to expand their conflict 

to the larger communities.

 Strikes against Iraq’s tiny Christian community, apparently by 

Sunni radicals, have also occurred on a recurring basis throughout the 

post-Saddam era. Such persecution, while reprehensible, is not itself 

an indicator of civil war since the Christians are too small as a group to 

emerge as significant combatants. The attacks do, however, indicate an 

ongoing problem with religious intolerance, which can expand to other 

groups.33

Iraqi Kurdish and Turkoman Ethnic Challenges.

 The Kurdish question looms large in Iraq’s future and is closely 

entwined with the danger of civil war. Currently, there are between 28-

35 million Kurds throughout the Middle East, making them one of the 

largest nationalities in the world without their own state.34 In addition 

to Iraq, other large Kurdish communities are located in Turkey, Syria, 

and Iran. All of these states are concerned about the future directions 

of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq, which they view as an important factor 

influencing their own Kurds. Moreover, the closer a Kurdish state comes 

to reality in northern Iraq, the more likely that these other regional 

powers will find ways to unify their efforts against it.35

 In an important study of ethnic identity, Donald Horowitz suggests 

that Iraqi Kurds went through a process of partial Arabization under a 

succession of Arab regimes, but that they later experienced a cultural 
12

revival reflecting awareness that they could lose their group identity.36

A succession of Iraqi governments has nevertheless sought to suppress 

the Kurdish identity, while the mainstream Kurdish leadership has 

strongly resisted this effort. Moreover, the Kurds engaged in a series of 

rebellions against Baghdad that, at times, threatened to unravel the Iraqi 

state. Iraqi Kurds also collaborated with the Iranians during the IranIraq war in the hopes that they would make political gains following an 

Iraqi defeat. Iraq was not defeated, however, and Saddam’s post-war 

efforts to crush separatist Kurdish aspirations reached a new intensity 

as he waged a genocidal campaign against Iraq’s Kurds to punish them 

for their support to Tehran.37

 Since 1991, Iraqi Kurds have enjoyed a semi-independent status 

because of the creation of a UN-sponsored “safe haven” in northern 

Iraq in the aftermath of Operation DESERT STORM. The safe haven 

was protected by a U.S./UK-enforced “no fly” zone (1991-2003) where 

Iraqi aircraft were prohibited from operating. Theoretically, Iraqi troops 

were not allowed to enter the area either, although this prohibition was 

violated when Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani sought and obtained 

Saddam’s military support against Kurdish rival Jalal Talabani in 1996.38

The Kurdish areas have mostly flourished since 1991, and the Kurds have 

reveled in their separate non-Arab/non-Iraqi identity. The Iraqi Kurds 

substituted their own red, yellow, green, and white flag in place of the 

Iraqi national flag throughout areas under their control.39 Many young 

Kurds have stopped learning Arabic and have no apparent interest in a 

joint Arab-Kurdish future.40 Now, in the aftermath of Saddam’s capture, 

almost 2 million Kurds have signed a petition demanding a referendum 

on Kurdish independence, although it is widely understood that such 

independence would produce an angry backlash within Iraq and 

throughout the region.41 In the Kurdish media, universities, and public 

opinion, pro-independence sentiment is clear and overwhelming.

 Faced with the danger of a regional backlash, the major Kurdish 

leaders have asserted that “federalism” is the most acceptable solution 

for governing Iraq, although when asked to describe the nature of 

such an arrangement, their ideas appear more like a very loose 

confederation.42 Moreover, most non-Kurds seem to view Kurdish-style 

federalism as an intermediate step toward Kurdish independence. The 

Kurdish leaders call for a federation of “nations,” with a partnership 

between the Arab and Kurdish regions.43 Such “federalism” implies the 

Kurdish control of northern oil, a particularly inflammatory issue. A 

significant portion of Iraq’s total oil infrastructure is in northern Iraq, 
13

especially around Kirkuk. The June 2004 assassination of Ghazi Talabani, 

the head of oil field security in northern Iraq, for example, is widely 

believed to have been a warning against Kurdish ethnic and economic 

separatism. Ghazi Talabani was from the same Kurdish clan as Jalal 

Talabani, the head of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), one of the 

two major Kurdish political parties, advocating a more decentralized 

form of Iraqi federalism.44

 Iraqi Kurds seek to retain the militias associated with their major 

political parties and ban non-Kurdish military units from their region. 

Additionally, disarming Kurdish militias is not a realistic prospect. The 

Kurds are aware that ethnic conflict is a realistic possibility, and they 

are much more inclined to improve their military capabilities rather 

than disarm. Moreover, the U.S. leadership has good reasons not to 

press too tenaciously on this issue. The disarmament of the Kurdish 

militias could lead to a power vacuum that will allow the expansion of 

the al-Qa’ida affiliated terrorist group, Ansar al-Islam, which is based 

in Kurdistan. Mainstream Kurdish militia forces include about 50,000 

fighters.45 Kurdish members of the New Iraqi Army openly state that 

they will desert and return to Pesmerga (Kurdish irregular fighters) 

units if their Kurdish homeland is threatened.

 Many Iranian, Syrian, and Turkish leaders doubt that the Iraqi Kurds 

would be satisfied with their own independence, even if they were able 

to achieve it. Rather, they assume that an independent Kurdish state in 

territory carved out of Iraq would serve not only as an inspiration to 

their own Kurdish populations, but also as a base for subversion against 

the national unity of their respective countries. The Kurds are also faced 

with solid opposition to “federalism” by most of the major leaders 

within Iraq’s other communities. Indeed, Shi’ite religious leader Grand 

Ayatollah Sistani denounced elements of the Interim Iraqi Constitution 

that were designed to reassure the Kurds. To face these rivals, Iraqi 

Kurds have attempted to bring the United States into their disputes, 

apparently in the hope that the United States will lose patience with 

the prospect of working with Shi’ite and Sunni Arabs. Many Kurdish 

leaders have, for example, indicated that they favor an indefinite U.S. 

presence in northern Iraq.

 Additionally, the Kurds have engaged in at least a limited forced 

expulsion of non-Kurdish Iraqis from disputed areas of northern Iraq 

including the oil-rich city of Kirkuk, and this type of activity could 

expand dramatically in a period of increased sectarian strife.46 These 
14

population shifts involve ethnic Kurds returning to Kirkuk, Mosul, and 

other areas of northern Iraq, while seeking to expel the Arabs that were 

transplanted there during the “Arabization” effort.47 This effort began 

in 1963 and was designed to replace the Kurds of northern Iraq with 

Arabs. By April 2003, around 250,000 Arabs had been transplanted to the 

Kirkuk area, and an equal number of Kurds were displaced. The Kurds 

claim that Kirkuk is their “Jerusalem” and should serve as the capital 

for the Kurdish region. This has been presented as a non-negotiable 

issue for them, and Kurdish leaders suggest that Arabs brought to 

Kirkuk under the Arabization program must leave, along with their 

descendents.48

 Another important ethnic group with a key role in the future of 

northern Iraq and very different views from the Kurds and Arabs on 

Kirkuk is the Turkomans. Turkomans are of ethnic Turkish heritage 

and speak an archaic version of Turkish. They also write their language 

according to the pre-Ataturk, non-Latinized version of the Turkish 

language, using Arabic-style script. The Turkomans view Kirkuk as 

their ancestral home and are deeply opposed to the idea that it may 

become a Kurdish city. U.S. statistics suggest that the Turkomans are 

only about 3 percent of the population, but they strongly object to this 

characterization, maintaining instead that they constitute 10-15 percent 

of the total population of Iraq.49 They have also contested the Kurdish 

domination of the instruments of local government in Kirkuk, and 

tensions between the two groups appear to be serious and perhaps 

rising.50

Iran: Dangers and Opportunities Resulting from an Iraqi Civil War.

 Turning from the internal situation in Iraq to that country’s neighbors, 

Iran has an especially strong stake in Iraq’s future. It is likely that Tehran 

might find significant opportunities to advance its regional agenda as 

the result of an Iraqi civil war, but Iran may also be faced with severe, 

perhaps regime-threatening, dangers because of such an eventuality. 

Tehran fought an exceptionally bloody 8-year war against Saddam 

Hussein’s Iraq from 1980-88, and the Iranian leadership knows the price 

of a powerful and unfriendly regime in Baghdad. Correspondingly, the 

Iranian regime will almost certainly feel compelled to intervene in any 

Iraqi civil conflict, although it may do so in ways short of military force. 

Tehran can also be expected to claim that it strongly supports Iraqi 
15

national unity, while the Iranian leadership nevertheless realizes that 

a dismembered Iraq fragmented into multiple “de facto” states offers 

Tehran a less threatening and more easily dominated western neighbor. 

Additionally, Iranian policy directed at Iraq may not always appear 

coherent due to internal Iranian divisions which can cause various 

intelligence and foreign policy bureaucracies to act independently of 

each other and sometimes even at cross-purposes.

 It is unclear if the Iranian leadership, behind closed doors, favors 

a unified Iraq or a weak chaotic Iraq. There are advantages and 

drawbacks to each option. The possibility of a strong and stable Iraq 

is undoubtedly of serious concern to the Iranians since such an entity 

could develop into a committed and dangerous enemy. Currently, a 

number of outstanding differences remain between Iraq and Iran over 

territory, Iran-Iraq War reparations, and other issues. A strong and 

assertive Iraq would be in a good position to challenge the Iranians 

over these differences. Additionally, tensions have already developed 

with the Iraqi interim government. The Iranians have described Prime 

Minister Iyad Allawi’s government as U.S. “lackeys,” and Allawi 

has returned the charge by stating that Iran is engaged in a vigorous 

espionage campaign within Iraq. Defense Minister Hazem al Sha’alan, 

for example, has stated that Iran seeks to “kill democracy” in his 

country.51 Sha’alan is also reported by al Jazirah television as having 

referred to Iran as “Iraq’s arch-enemy,” suggesting that current Iranian 

meddling in Iraq is simply the latest manifestation of continuing Iranian 

efforts to dominate the Iraqis.52 Although other Iraqi leaders have 

backed away from Sha’alan’s statements, such remarks undoubtedly 

reflect the sentiment of many Iraqi citizens who deeply distrust Iran. 

Iraqi officials have also charged that Iranian intelligence organizations 

are deeply involved in Iraqi politics, and some Iraqi leaders privately 

state that Iranian spies and saboteurs have been executed.53 While 

execution claims are unconfirmed, they do reflect a vehemence that may 

be instructive on the level of hostility between at least some members of 

the two governments.

 The Tehran leadership also fears that a unified and pro-Western 

Iraq could help facilitate an attack against the Iranian homeland at 

some future point. At least some of the Iranian leadership felt their 

own government was slated for near-term regime change after the fall 

of Baghdad. The U.S. identification of the Iranian regime as part of an 

“axis of evil” was of serious concern to the ruling clerics, many of whom 

seemed to fear that the United States would attack them after Iraq had 
16

been stabilized through military means. Shortly after the fall of Baghdad, 

former Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani suggested that the United 

States and Iran restore diplomatic ties in a symptom of nervousness 

about future U.S. action against Iran.54 Calls for U.S.-Iranian dialogue by 

Iranian leaders have continued periodically up to the present date, but 

new problems have also emerged.55 Current differences over the Iranian 

nuclear program are particularly serious. Tehran claims to be interested 

in a full fuel cycle nuclear program for exclusively peaceful purposes, 

the most important of which is power generation. The U.S. Government 

fears that Iran is also seeking a nuclear weapon. The possibility of a 

U.S.-Iranian military confrontation over this issue cannot be ruled out, 

although there would be enormous difficulties for the United States in 

conducting such military operations at this time.56

 Tehran also fears an Iraqi government that is willing to accept 

permanent U.S. military bases that may be used to threaten and intimidate 

the Iranian regime, even if a U.S. attack is not immediately forthcoming.57

Since the 9/11 attacks against the United States, Iranian leaders have 

watched their strategic situation erode as the United States has expanded 

its influence and military presence in states near Iran to a degree that 

some view as “encirclement.”58 The United States reinvigorated its ties 

with Pakistan and expanded military links with Islamabad in order to 

confront the Taliban regime. Additionally, Washington has established 

strong military relationships with a variety of former Soviet Central 

Asian republics to Iran’s north. These relationships remain important 

with ongoing U.S. military operations in Afghanistan against a resurgent 

Taliban.59 Moreover, Washington also installed a new government in 

Afghanistan, although that government appears willing to co-exist with 

pro-Iranian figures in Western Afghanistan.60 While the Iranians were 

never close to the Taliban regime and in 1998 almost went to war with 

Taliban Afghanistan, a U.S.-dominated Afghanistan may not be seen as 

much of an improvement.61

 Iran has other serious concerns about a united Iraq even in the 

absence of a strong U.S.-Iraqi relationship. The Iranians, at some level, 

would favor an Iraqi religious theocracy, but there are dangers here 

as well. Tehran could feel threatened by an Iraqi government heavily 

influenced by clerics who outshine the Iranian theological leadership 

or are in a position to challenge the Iranian leadership’s interpretation 

of correct principles of Islamic government and policy. Some Iranian 

media sources have even expressed fear that the United States seeks 

to work against the Iranian government through domination of Iraq’s 
17

Najaf clergy.62 The current Iranian Supreme Religious Guide (rahbar), 

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is probably particularly concerned about 

highly respected religious figures advising the new leaders of Iraq, since 

he maintains only modest credentials as an Islamic scholar. Moreover, 

in a possible harbinger of serious problems, Iranian dissidents have 

approached Grand Ayatollah Sistani in an effort to persuade him to 

issue fatwas (religious opinions) on issues involving the Iranian political 

process.63 Should Sistani reverse himself at some point and intervene, 

this would present unpleasant complications for the Iranian regime’s 

already flagging domestic political legitimacy. While Sistani’s fatwas

are only authoritative for individual Shi’ites who have accepted him 

as their marja al taqlid, or “source of emulation,” they may also carry 

at least some weight for a wider body of people throughout the Shi’ite 

community.

 Yet, if Tehran does not want an Iraqi government guided by 

independent-minded religious scholars, neither does it desire a 

government led by reckless, radical Islamists. Such individuals might 

help to drag Tehran into confrontation with the United States by 

committing irresponsible acts that are then perhaps incorrectly linked 

to the Iranians by U.S. policymakers. The Iranians must therefore be 

careful not to support radicals they cannot control, while nevertheless 

avoiding the alienation of clerical and other leaders who are willing to 

cooperate with them. The case of Muqtada al-Sadr and other members 

of his movement may be particularly problematic, although the 

Iranians are almost certainly providing him with support and clearly 

seek to influence him. It is, nevertheless, unclear if Tehran can restrain 

and control him during a time of crisis, and this is probably the most 

pressing question for Iran in its dealings with Sadr. Tehran also has 

concerns that he may be an extreme Arab nationalist with an ethnic 

bias against the Iranians.64 The Iranian leadership may not have come 

to grips with these conflicting views of Sadr. 

 Some Iranian leaders appear to view Sadr as a useful potential ally 

with whom they might cooperate in the same way they have worked 

with the leadership of the Lebanese group, Hizballah. Hizballah, under 

the leadership of the radical and relatively young Secretary-General 

Hassan Nasrallah, is an important political party in Lebanon with an 

extensive following among the poor and considerable influence over the 

future of the country.65 In its early stages of existence, the group received 

Iranian money and was especially receptive to Iranian influence without 

being dominated by Tehran.66 Iranian influence over Hizballah has 
18

continued to decline as the party has become more institutionalized and 

entrenched in Lebanese politics, but the relationship remains friendly 

and cooperative. Sadr’s movement has parallels with Hizballah, and 

Tehran may view the Hizballah model as instructive to Iraq under current 

circumstances. Nevertheless, Sadr is not as intelligent or sophisticated 

as Nasrallah, and Sadr’s actions can attract unwelcome U.S. activity to 

Iran’s doorstep in a way that Hizballah activity in Lebanon cannot. 

 While the Iranians may envision potential difficulties with an 

independent minded, Shi’ite-dominated government, they are even 

more deeply concerned about the possibility of an Iraqi government 

that is once again led or heavily influenced by Sunni Muslims, even 

if these people are hostile to the United States. Currently, the proinsurgent portion of the Sunni community appears dominated by Sunni 

Islamic extremists known for their view of Shi’ites as apostates and 

former regime loyalists who once supported Saddam’s Arab nationalist 

aversion to the Iranians and their regime. Obviously, a strong Iraqi 

government influenced by either of these factions would provide 

difficulties for Tehran.

 Yet, while Iran may face severe problems with a unified or powerful 

Iraq, it could face even more severe problems with an Iraq in civil war. 

The Tehran leadership would find the formulation of an Iraq policy to 

be an exhausting and divisive exercise for their already badly divided 

government. Different factions within the Iranian government would 

favor different levels of risk associated with different levels of intervention and may also seek dissimilar results. Hardline Iranian Islamists 

would probably seek a like-minded Iraqi leadership in Baghdad to 

pressure moderates within Iran. Iranian reformers would be more likely 

to seek a liberal Islamic government in Baghdad. Additionally, Iran also 

has a Kurdish population that may be inspired if a strongly autonomous 

or independent Kurdish entity arose in northern Iraq. Iranian efforts 

to address these domestic problems, while simultaneously seeking to 

expand its influence in Iraq will be a major challenge. Finally, the West 

may blame Iran for aggravating civil war-related problems, thereby 

threatening Tehran’s dialogue with Europe and potentially further 

antagonizing the United States.

 On balance, the Iranians therefore probably do not favor an Iraqi 

civil war, but it is certainly likely that Tehran will take advantage of 

any such eventuality should it occur. Tehran’s perceptions of its own 

vital interests would probably propel the Iranians to become heavily 
19

involved with Iraq, although they would probably intervene in ways 

that do not involve large-scale conventional military operations. They 

would also attempt to conceal their involvement to the greatest extent 

possible.67 Neutrality in such a conflict is unthinkable because Iran has 

vital interests related to the future Iraqi government. Rather, the Iranians 

would seek to support the Shi’ite community, while simultaneously 

bolstering pro-Iranian elements within that community. Moreover, the 

emergence of a strong, Arab nationalist government in Baghdad may 

increase the Iranian interest in supporting centrifugal forces, since such 

a government can reasonably be expected to emerge as an important 

rival to Tehran.

 An Iraq in the midst of sectarian war would allow Iran some latitude 

to support pro-Iranian Shi’ites at the expense of their secular or antiIranian co-religionists, and thus help enable pro-Iranian groups to 

dominate the Shi’ite community and perhaps prevail in a sectarian war. 

Tehran will seek to formulate policies that maximize its own interests 

within Iraq, while minimizing the influence of the United States and 

potential regional rivals such as Saudi Arabia. Such an approach would 

involve supporting some factions at the expense of others, in a policy 

that would create enemies as well as friends. Tehran will also seek to 

expand its influence in ways that do not produce a significant backlash 

with either the United States or the Iraqis themselves. The vigilance of 

U.S-led coalition forces in the region, and the long history of IranianIraqi conflict makes such a task difficult. 

 Iran can also be expected to be able to make use of a wide spectrum 

of individuals, institutions, and organizations to influence the outcome 

of a civil war. Some of these organizations are arms of Iranian foreign 

policy, such as the Iranian intelligence services. Others are Iraqi exile 

groups which have had close working relations with the Iranians 

for years or even decades. Two of Iraq’s largest political parties, 

Da’wa Islamiyya and especially the Supreme Council for the Islamic 

Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), have long histories of political cooperation 

with Iran. SCIRI is now emerging from a dependent relationship with 

Iran and currently has at least the option for increased independence. 

Da’wa was once one of Iraq’s most important political parties but was 

badly decimated in its confrontations with Saddam, and subsequently 

became radical and pro-Iranian. Its ties to Tehran were never as strong 

as those of SCIRI, and Da’wa is probably somewhat more willing to 

act independently of Tehran. Nevertheless, Iranian backing still has 
20

advantages for all parties involved, and Da’wa and SCIRI are currently 

maintaining friendly relations with Tehran.68 Additionally, the Iranians 

have also sought influence with a variety of secular Iraqi leaders, 

including Ahmad Chalabi.69 Some observers have also suggested that 

Iran may even compete for influence with the Iraqi Kurds under some 

circumstances. Iran may also seek a mediation and power-breaking 

role among factions, although such activities make enemies as well as 

allies.

Turkey, Syria, and Lebanon.

 Turkish goals for Iraq have considerable overlap with those of the 

United States. Ankara is not threatened by the possibility of a democratic 

Iraq, and the Turks also strongly favor Iraqi national unity under most 

future circumstances. Additionally, most Turkish leaders strongly 

approve of a secular Iraq, rather than an Islamic, republic. The Turkish 

leadership operates within the framework of a secular Westernized state 

as envisioned by the Turkish Republic’s revered founding President 

Kamal Ataturk. Over the last decade, Ataturk’s ideals have been 

challenged by a growing Islamic movement in that country, but there 

has also been a strong backlash against the Islamists. In this regard, it 

is important to look beyond the current self-described “conservative” 

Turkish government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his 

Justice and Development Party, which includes many Turkish leaders 

who have previously tilted towards Islamist principles. The Prime 

Minister is among this group, although he now claims that religion is 

a private matter and that he is loyal to the secular vision of Ataturk.70

Additionally, the Turkish military leadership is deeply concerned about 

radical Islamist activity, and military leaders are in a strong position to 

insist that it be opposed forcefully. Turkey’s 1982 Constitution and the 

1961 Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law charge the military 

with the duty of protecting and promoting the Ataturk system. The 

military views this responsibility as quasi-sacred.71

 Turkey traditionally has also been concerned about any autonomous 

Kurdish region in Iraq that exhibits the characteristics of an independent 

state and perhaps sets the stage for a formal declaration of independence. 

Turkish suspicions of Iraqi Kurdish separatist intentions run high due 

to a history of difficulties with the restive portion of Turkey’s own 

Kurdish population. The modern Kurdish insurgency in Turkey began 

in 1984 and was led by Kurdish Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkari Kurdistan
21

[PKK]). It reached its height in the early and mid-1990s. By spring 1999, 

it appears to have been defeated, and Kurdish rebel leader Abdullah 

Ocalan was captured in Nairobi Airport.72 Nevertheless, the Turks are 

extraordinarily sensitive about any threat to their national unity, and 

they view any sign of Kurdish unrest as a serious concern. 

 A revitalized Kurdish insurgency in Turkey remains a potential threat 

of ongoing concern to the Turkish government. Around 5,000 Kurdish 

guerrillas of the former PKK, now known as Kongra-Gel (Kurdish 

Peoples’ Congress) have retreated into the mountains of northern Iraq. 

These fighters maintained a cease-fire with the Turkish government from 

1999 until May 2004. In May 2004 Kongra-Gel made an announcement 

that it would resume guerrilla warfare against Turkish military forces, 

and has followed this announcement with some minor attacks.73 Should 

Kongra-Gel escalate this effort, they would be faced with the strong 

possibility of forceful Turkish military intervention in northern Iraq. 

Turkey has requested that Iraq take action against Kongra-Gel units 

in Iraq, but the Iraqi leadership responded that it is unable to do so 

at this time due to shortcomings within its still developing military.74

Moreover, even if Iraq did have the military capability to confront 

Kongra-Gel, it is doubtful that it would do so, as such actions would 

inflame already fragile Arab-Kurdish relations within Iraq. 

 Additionally, the Turks traditionally have been reluctant to grant 

the Kurdish minority wide-ranging cultural and language rights 

or allow outspoken Kurdish nationalist politicians to serve in the 

Turkish parliament.75 Rather, Ankara has consistently viewed serious 

concessions to the Kurds as intermediate steps leading to demands 

for new concessions. This outlook is now being challenged, and a “go 

slow” approach to Kurdish political and cultural rights is replacing the 

more rigid policies of the past. This new approach allows such things 

as a limited number of radio programs in the Kurdish language and 

the teaching of Kurdish in private schools.76 The Turks therefore are 

working actively against the possibility of a Kurdish state, while at the 

same time giving their own Kurds small doses of cultural liberalization.77

There is also some tension over issues of liberalization. The Turks seem 

determined to go forward with these reforms, but they also recognize 

that risks are involved and that concessions on Kurdish culture and 

language could lead to increasing political demands.78 This sensitive 

situation could be severely aggravated by events in Iraq.79

 The Turkish government leaders will also become extremely 

apprehensive about the situation in Kirkuk during any future Iraqi 
22

civil war. Kirkuk is viewed by the Kurds as a natural capital for any 

emerging Kurdish state. This view is sharply contested by the Arab 

and Turkoman populations of the city. The well-being of the Turkoman 

population is an ongoing concern for the Turkish public, and it would 

be difficult for the Turkish government to ignore this issue, even if they 

wished to do so.80 The Turkish leadership’s fiercely protective outlook 

concerning the Turkomans was underscored in September 2004 during 

U.S. operations in the northern Iraqi town of Tel Afar. U.S. military 

operations against insurgent forces in the area became a subject of 

deep Turkish unhappiness when Turkoman officials claimed a number 

of civilians had been killed as part of the struggle for control of the 

area. Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul threatened to end Turkish 

cooperation with the United States over Iraq if the action continued. 

The crisis ended a day after Gul issued these threats, when U.S. military 

actions in this area were completed.81

 Under these pressures, the Turkish leadership is searching for 

creative ways in which to address unfavorable developments in Iraq. 

One scenario that is increasingly popular among Turkish academics is 

for Ankara to offer cooperation and protection to the Iraqi Kurds should 

a radical Islamic regime arise in southern Iraq.82 This scenario assumes 

that, if Islamic radicals seize control of the Iraq government, Iraqi Kurds 

will then be willing to overlook potential differences with Turkey in 

order to avoid subservience to an Islamic regime in Baghdad. The Turks 

by intervening establish a powerful check on future Iraqi Kurdish moves 

towards independence and also insure that a relatively secularized 

population of Kurdish Muslims serve as a barrier to Islamic agitation 

and militancy against the Turkish homeland. Turkish leaders had to 

cope with Iranian subversion and agitation in the years immediately 

following the declaration of the Islamic Republic there, and the Turks 

have no desire to repeat the experience with a militant Islamic Iraq. 

 In addition to Turkey, another secular regime, that of Syria, would 

face a number of challenges resulting from an Iraqi civil war. The 

circumstances of the Syrian dictatorship are, however, immeasurably 

different from those of democratic Turkey. Syria is a Ba’athist police 

state where unrest is quickly and brutally suppressed. Paradoxically, the 

authoritarianism of the Syrian regime masks certain regime fragilities, 

and it is uncertain that Syria would be immune to unrest and civil 

disorder in Iraq.83 Additionally, a successful pro-American Iraq would 

present serious problems for Damascus on a number of levels. Syria, in 

this instance, would be almost totally encircled by pro-American nations 
23

and regimes. It would also face an unwelcome example of post-Ba’athist 

political development in a neighboring country. Moreover, some Syrian 

leaders seem to view U.S. hostility as based upon the very existence of a 

Ba’athist Syria. In their minds, this means that Syrian cooperation with 

the United States on issues such as terrorism will not ultimately prevent 

the United States from seeking regime change in Damascus.84

 Despite numerous problems associated with Iraqi unrest, Damascus 

may see some benefits in such an eventuality. In particular, the Syrian 

leadership seems to feel that it has had every reason to believe that it 

will be a future target of U.S. pressure, and perhaps even military 

action, if democracy and stability were brought to Iraq.85 Moreover, the 

proximity of a large U.S. military force to the Syrian border is of serious 

concern to the leadership of the Assad regime.86 If the U.S. enterprise 

in Iraq ends in failure or if U.S. troops are bogged down in an effort 

to contain an Iraqi civil war, the perceived U.S. appetite for further 

intervention may well disappear. Indeed, some U.S. accusations that 

Syria is “facilitating” or at least allowing the flow of foreign fighters 

into Iraq appear to be based on the premise that Syria views the current 

insurgency in Iraq as its first line of defense.87 Such statements may 

underestimate the serious concerns that Damascus maintains about 

provoking a U.S. attack, and are probably designed to prod Syria into 

additional border security measures.

 Nevertheless, Damascus also has good reasons to fear an Iraqi civil 

war. It is uncertain how an Iraqi civil war might influence or inflame 

ethnic and sectarian divisions within Syria. The key leadership in Syria 

is composed of the Alawite sect of Islam, which comprises about 10-12 

percent of the population. About 74 percent of the population is Sunni 

Muslim (including both Arabs and ethnic Kurds), with the remainder of 

the population being Druzes, Kurds, and other smaller groups.88 Sunni 

Arabs probably constitute about 63 percent of the population.89 Many 

traditionally-minded Sunnis view Alawites as heretics and deviationists 

from the true path of Islam, as well as their social inferiors.90 The Alawites, 

however, maintain that their religion is a branch of Shi’ite Islam. This 

claim has been supported by two towering figures of Shi’ite history, 

Lebanon’s Imam Musa Sadr and Iran’s Imam Ruhollah Khomeini, 

although their declarations are somewhat tainted as they were made at 

times when each leader was seeking Syrian support.91 Syria’s Alawite 

leaders hoped such declarations might reduce tensions with the Sunnis, 

although the ultimate guarantor of the regime was always the Army 

and security forces. 
24

 Syria is probably concerned about the rise of Islamic extremism in 

an Iraqi civil war and will be especially concerned about Sunni Islamic 

extremism, which became a serious and perhaps regime-threatening 

problem for the Syrians in the early and mid-1980s.92 The potential 

for Iraqi unrest to spread to Syria is uncertain, but Syrian citizens will 

think carefully before provoking their government, which is willing to 

employ a great deal of force to ensure its survival. Nevertheless, Syria 

is already reported to be experiencing an upturn in religious devotion 

in conservative neighborhoods within the cities and small Sunni Arab 

towns for a variety of reasons, including the disappointment associated 

with President Bashar Assad’s stillborn reform and liberalization 

movement.93 Increased religious devotion and anti-regime Islamic 

activism are two distinct phenomenons, but this trend is still unlikely 

to reassure the government. Syria’s long border with Iraq provides 

many opportunities for Islamic rebels in both countries to coordinate, 

even if they see only temporary or tactical value in doing so, and Syria 

has a continuing concern over the potential rise of a regime-threatening 

Islamic opposition in Syria. U.S. insistence that Syria improve its border 

security appears to have led to some improvements, but complete 

control of the border is beyond the reach of the regime.

 There are also between one and two million Kurds in Syria, although 

exact estimates vary widely.94 Kurds in urban areas seem to have 

assimilated much more fully into Syrian society, and some of the lower 

estimates may not count all of them as Kurds. Other Kurds, particularly 

from the rural areas, maintain a highly-distinct Kurdish identity and 

are not fully integrated into Syrian society. Some Kurds from northeast 

Syria refused to register in the 1962 census to avoid military conscription 

and were thus denied citizenship. Others were denied citizenship on 

various other pretexts, including an inability to prove that they or 

their parents had lived in Syria since 1945.95 These policies prevented 

these Kurds and their descendents from obtaining Syrian nationality, 

furthering their status as outsiders. Between 200,000 and 360,000 Syrian 

Kurds currently do not have Syrian citizenship.96 Not surprisingly, one 

of the first post-Saddam challenges to Damascus came from Syrian 

Kurds. During a March 12 soccer match, a brawl erupted between fans 

of teams supported by Arabs and Kurds.97 In the aftermath of the riots, 

more clashes took place, and statues of the late President Hafez Assad 

(the current President’s father) were defaced in Syria’s Kurdish areas.98

The Syrians reacted to these actions with characteristic harshness. 
25

Additionally, the leaders of various “unofficial” Kurdish political 

parties were told by senior intelligence officials that the state would no 

longer tolerate their activities, and they must disband.99 Kurdish parties 

unanimously rejected this demand.100 The potential for Syrian Kurdish 

unrest is therefore serious and may increase, should Kurdish-Arab 

military strife break out in Iraq.

 A civil war in Iraq will also have important implications for Lebanon. 

In the event of an Iraqi civil war, Lebanese Muslims, and especially the 

numerically dominant Shi’ites, can be expected to be concerned with 

the fate of Iraq’s Shi’ite community, and a few young Shi’ite men may 

further choose to go to Iraq.101 Leaders of the Lebanese Shi’ite militant 

group, Hizballah, have made numerous statements about Iraq, and will 

probably seek to support like-minded Shi’ite radicals in Iraq, should 

civil war break out. Some Israeli sources have even gone so far as to 

suggest that Hizballah seeks foreign adventures as a way of keeping 

their militant identity and avoiding being turned into just another 

Lebanese political party.102 While this viewpoint is probably excessive, 

Hizballah will be reluctant to simply ignore a civil war in Iraq in which 

its co-religionists are threatened and Shi’ite shrines are bombed.103 A 

circulation of fighters could occur between Iraq and Lebanon under 

conditions of protracted sectarian fighting. 

Egypt, Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinians.

 The Egyptian government of President Husni Mubarak strongly 

opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and issued a number of warnings 

about negative consequences for U.S. interests in the Arab World if 

the invasion proceeded. In the aftermath of the invasion, the Egyptian 

government periodically has distanced itself from the United States to 

avoid becoming the subject of domestic popular anger. Mubarak has 

also attempted to present himself as a seasoned leader who warned 

the U.S. administration against the invasion of Iraq but was ignored by 

the U.S. leadership.104 Yet, beyond polishing his own image with the 

Egyptian masses, it is not certain that Mubarak or the remainder of the 

Egyptian leadership believes that they have large stake in the future of 

Iraq. Currently, Egyptian government leaders are more likely to express 

anger toward U.S. policy on Israeli/Palestinian issues rather than Iraq.

 Most Egyptians have never felt a special relationship with Iraq. Iraqi 

claims to Arab leadership have surfaced periodically since the 1950s 
26

and are especially poorly received by the majority of Egyptians who 

see their country as the natural leader of the Arab World. Competition 

between Iraq and Egypt for Arab leadership was particularly bitter at 

various points during the Presidency of Gamal Abdul Nasser in Egypt 

(1952-70). Nasser had an intense rivalry with the Iraqi monarchy, which 

developed into an even more sour and angry “cold war” with the 

successor Iraqi government of Brigadier Abdul Karim Qassim (1958-

63).105 Later, under the Ba’ath party, Iraq led the effort to isolate Egypt’s 

Sadat government after the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979.106

Iraqi-Egyptian relations nevertheless improved dramatically within a 

year because of Baghdad’s scramble for support during the Iran-Iraq 

War. 

 Saddam’s claims of Arab leadership were sometimes off-putting 

to Egyptians throughout his years in power, although there was also 

sympathy for his Arab nationalism and struggle against the Iranians. 

Additionally, the barbarity of Saddam’s regime disgusted a number of 

Egyptians, but Ba’athist cruelty was not always viewed as atypical for 

Iraq. Compounding problems, Egyptian workers who traveled to Iraq 

in the 1980s to perform labor while Iraqi men were at the front with Iran 

were often treated quite poorly. Egyptian public opinion during this 

period was infuriated by stories of the abuse and murder of Egyptians 

at Iraqi hands. Later, in 1990, Egypt supported Kuwait and joined the 

multinational coalition against Iraq during the first Gulf War. The 

Cairo leadership did this after Saddam lied to President Mubarak in 

July 1990, privately promising not to invade Kuwait.107 Saddam asked 

Mubarak to reassure U.S. President George H. W. Bush that the crisis 

over Kuwait could be expected to end soon. Saddam’s manipulation of 

the Egyptian president publicly embarrassed Mubarak when it became 

clear that Saddam was using him as a pawn in the overall strategy for 

seizing Kuwait.108 Egypt also reaped considerable economic gains by 

joining the coalition since the United States and Gulf Arabs forgave a 

vast amount of Egyptian debt. 

 Current problems in Iraq probably do not have the same emotional 

impact for Cairo as other key issues, since Egypt is not faced with 

sectarian differences that might be aggravated by an Iraqi civil war. 

The Egyptians, however, do have to cope with periodic problems from 

violent Islamic dissidents, the most recent of which appear to have 

been mostly defeated in the late 1990s. It remains unclear if this defeat 

of the radical Islamists will remain a lasting victory for the Egyptian 
27

government. Critics point out that Egyptian security forces destroyed 

radical terrorist organizations primarily by using repression, whereas 

the root causes and misery leading to extremist appeal remain in 

place.109 This situation suggests that extremist solutions may again find 

a popular following. 

 Egyptian radicals (including those associated with al-Qa’ida) 

previously have made good use of international ties to other terrorists, 

and they may be able to coordinate with Iraqi-based terrorists should 

civil war conditions develop in that country. Such coordination would 

be a problem for Egypt, but it should probably be manageable. While 

the Egyptian government could face new radical challenges, such 

developments will probably have only a limited relationship to what 

happens in Iraq. The more dangerous problem will be if there is a 

general upsurge in radical Egyptian terrorist activity at some point 

where the government is particularly vulnerable. President Mubarak’s 

refusal to appoint a Vice President, and his general unwillingness to 

prepare the country for his death or departure from power, suggests 

that such a period of vulnerability may occur in the foreseeable future 

as the result of a succession crisis. Mubarak is 76 years old and seems 

to favor his unpopular 41-year-old son, Gamal, to be the next president. 

Gamal Mubarak would nevertheless find it excruciatingly painful to 

consolidate power after taking office due to a lack of clear support from 

any other source than his father.110

 Jordan has an even stronger stake than Egypt in a stable, united, 

and prosperous Iraq, and to the extent it can, is supporting U.S. efforts 

to achieve that goal. Both before and after Saddam’s ouster from power, 

Iraq was Jordan’s most important export market.111 Should Iraq 

devolve into civil war, such economic relations would be difficult, if 

not impossible, and the Jordanian economy will suffer accordingly. 

Additionally, Jordan, as a small country of limited resources, is 

particularly vulnerable to any refugee crisis, which would almost 

certainly follow an Iraqi civil war. 

 The Jordanian government traditionally has governed by balancing 

alternative interests and perspectives, including those of conservative 

tribal members, Palestinian nationalists, and those Islamists who are 

willing to work within the political system. Mainstream Islamists who 

oppose terrorism are an important force in Jordan, and organizations 

such as the Muslim Brotherhood and its political arm, the Islamic Action 

Front (IAF), have serious followings. In the event of an Iraqi civil war, 

these groups undoubtedly will sympathize with Sunni Iraqi Islamists 
28

and will pressure the Jordanian government to be at least passively 

supportive of the actions of these types of individuals. The prestige 

of the Islamic organizations would also rise due to their vociferous 

opposition to U.S. policy, which they would blame for any civil war. 

Mainstream Islamists could become a much more serious domestic 

center of political power and could perhaps constrain the ability of the 

monarchy to conduct the pro-Western foreign policy with which it is 

most comfortable. 

 There is also the issue of terrorism. Al-Qa’ida and its radical allies 

have engaged in operations against Jordan just as they have against 

Saudi Arabia, and a shadow war is believed to be occurring between the 

radicals and the Jordanian intelligence services.112 This problem is likely 

to intensify if Iraq enters into a civil war. A key leader of the current 

Islamist insurgency in Iraq is Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi, a Jordanian 

whose early forays into terrorism occurred in his own country in 1993, 

where he sought to help overthrow the government. Zarqawi was 

imprisoned in Jordan because of such actions but was later pardoned 

as part of a far-ranging amnesty for Jordanian prisoners. His time 

in prison did not make him any more sympathetic to the Jordanian 

government, and, despite diversions to Afghanistan and elsewhere, 

Zarqawi’s organization is suspected of the assassination of a U.S. 

diplomat in Amman, Jordan, in October 2002.113 Moreover, Jordanian 

authorities allege that Zarqawi was responsible for a 2004 plot to attack 

Jordan’s General Intelligence Department, the Prime Minister’s Office, 

and the U.S. Embassy in Amman with three trucks laden with 20 tons of 

explosives and toxic chemicals. Jordanian sources maintain that such an 

attack could have killed 80,000 people, although other sources consider 

this claim to be highly exaggerated.114

 According to Jordan’s King Abdullah, the situation in Iraq and 

the Palestinian territories “feed off of one another.”115 This statement 

reflects Amman’s concerns that the Jordanian government must 

simultaneously deal with two of the most significant regional concerns in 

the contemporary Middle East in ways that could harm the monarchy’s 

long-term political legitimacy, if progress is not made on these issues. 

A highly destabilized Iraq thus could be a truly difficult challenge for 

the monarchy. Iraqi Islamists who may rise to prominence in a civil 

war would probably view Jordan as a key target beyond Iraq for both 

its strategic location and its cooperative relationship with the United 

States. 
29

 The Jordanian government, in addition to addressing its legitimate 

concerns about Iraqi instability, is also seeking to appear active and 

concerned over Iraq as a way of maintaining domestic support for the 

government.116 To these ends, Amman has attempted to mediate with 

the United States to reduce tensions with Iraq’s Sunni Arabs. These 

measures include urging the United States to reach out to Sunni leaders 

and to ease the de-Ba’athification process.117 King Abdullah has also 

stated that the United States may be insufficiently concerned about 

Iranian domination of Iraqi Shi’ites’ leading to an Islamic government 

in Iraq.118 Nevertheless, the Jordanians may have much less to fear from 

a Shi’ite-dominated government than do other Sunni Arab leaders. 

King Abdullah is a Sunni Muslim, but he is also as a member of the 

Hashemite family, and, as such, claims direct family descent from the 

Prophet Mohammed. This lineage has salience to a variety of Muslims, 

and it is well-received by many Shi’ites worldwide. The original break 

between Shi’ites and Sunnis occurred because of the Shi’ite belief that 

members of the Prophet’s family are the most legitimate leaders of the 

Muslim community. While contemporary Shi’ites do not seek their 

leadership from the family of the Prophet, many do have considerable 

respect for the Hashemites. King Hussein’s widow, Queen Noor, for 

example, has commented on what she perceives as Shi’ite esteem for 

the Hashemite family.119

 Israel is, of course, a special case in the Middle East, and Israelis, 

not surprisingly, had radically different views from the rest of Middle 

Easterners about the opportunities presented by the U.S. invasion of 

Iraq. Most Israeli leaders, as well as the Israeli public, strongly favored 

a U.S. invasion of Iraq because of Saddam Hussein’s suspected strategic 

weapons programs and his perceived willingness to use such systems 

against Israel.120 Additionally, Saddam provided extensive financial 

support to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers killed in operations 

against Israeli civilians. While the Iraqis attempted to present such 

actions as a humanitarian effort to support the dependents of martyred 

fighters, the Israelis considered Iraqi actions as an incitement to the 

Palestinians to commit murders that they might not otherwise carry 

out.121 On the eve of war, close to 80 percent of the Israel public favored 

a U.S. invasion, despite the perceived possibility that it could trigger 

a missile strike―perhaps even with chemical or biological weapons―

against Israelis cities.122

 Those Israelis who held high hopes for improved relations with Iraq 

have been overwhelmingly disappointed by the aftermath of Saddam’s 
30

removal from power. Prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, some Israeli 

commentators viewed various Iraqi exiles, including Ahmad Chalabi 

of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), as potentially friendly to Israel. 

They made this assessment due to Chalabi’s ties with pro-Israeli figures 

in Washington.123 Former American-based exiles, however, did not 

emerge as serious contenders for power in Iraq despite initial U.S. 

financial support for some of their groups and agendas.124 Additionally, 

these people were not in a position to push for improved ties with 

Israel, even if they wished to expend their political capital to do so 

(which is doubtful). The new Iraqi government even briefly indicted 

one Chalabi supporter under a 1969 Ba’ath party law for contacts with 

Israel, although the charges were quickly dropped.125 Additionally, the 

INC even chose to expel the individual involved in this action, perhaps 

underscoring the unrealistic nature of hopes for strongly improved 

Iraqi-Israeli relations. 

 Whatever future path Iraq takes, it now seems doubtful that any 

major leader will seek strong political or economic ties with the Israelis. 

Iraqi interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi already has strongly defended 

his government against charges of undue Israeli influence, and he and 

other government leaders have promised not to normalize relations 

with Israel before other Arab nations do so as a part of an overall 

Middle Eastern settlement.126 Any discussions of serious economic ties 

between Israel and Iraq also seem increasingly farfetched.127 Moreover, 

even in the absence of Iraqi-Israeli ties, Muqtada al Sadr and other Iraqi 

radicals have voiced their suspicions about potential future government 

dealings with the “Israeli terrorist enemy.”128 Islamic leaders and radical 

Arab nationalists within Iraq are clearly positioned to cry betrayal at 

the slightest movement in Israel’s direction.

 An Iraqi civil war would present Israel with a mixed but mostly 

worrisome strategic result. One of Israel’s greatest fears has been a 

strong, united, anti-Israeli Iraq, with a vibriant economy and strong 

military power, including weapons of mass destruction. Such an entity 

may eventually emerge from a united and nationalistic post-sanctions 

Iraq, but is unlikely to emerge from an Iraqi entity at war with itself. 

Thus, one aspect of the strategic threat to Israel would be diminished 

under these conditions. Nevertheless, other key problems remain.129 A 

weak and divided Iraq would allow the development and strengthening 

of Islamist and other anti-Israeli terrorist organizations that support 

the training and financing of radical anti-Israeli groups within Iraqi 
31

borders.130 Should a highly energized Islamist regime emerge from the 

chaos of civil war, Israel would face a new enemy that may become 

much more threatening than Saddam ever was in his last years in 

power. Moreover, if Iraqi-based terrorists were able to help overthrow 

the Jordanian government (which is moderate and maintains diplomatic 

relations with Israel) this could mean a militant Islamist regime on 

Israel’s longest border. This scenario is horrifying for the Israelis.

 Currently, Israel is widely reported to maintain strong political and 

military links with Iraqi Kurds. These links are not new and date back 

to at least 1973.131 Israeli leaders at that time sought to destabilize the 

Ba’athist regime, which they viewed as part of an “Eastern Front” that 

could bolster the military threat against them. The Israelis have also 

been accused of providing military training and aid to the Iraq Kurds in 

the post-Saddam era, but they strenuously deny these claims.132 Should 

intercommunal civil war break out in Iraq, the natural inclination of 

the Israeli leadership will be to find ways to support moderate Kurds, 

with whom they have a long-standing relationship. Israeli political 

leaders may view the development of a powerful Kurdish state as an 

improvement in their geopolitical standing, although clear and decisive 

support for such a goal would seriously endanger the alliance with 

Turkey. The Turks tolerated Israeli efforts to support Iraq’s Kurds 

when they sought to destabilize Saddam Hussein’s regime, but see 

little justification for Israeli support for the Iraqi Kurds under current 

circumstances.133

 The Palestinian reaction to an Iraqi civil war will vary according to 

the circumstances of such a war. Should Islamists continue to rise to 

leadership in the Iraqi insurgent movement, it is likely they will seek 

to expand and consolidate their ties to Palestinian Islamic radicals. 

Nevertheless, many Palestinians, including Islamists such as the 

members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, are deeply troubled about the 

danger of having the Palestinian cause lost inside a larger anti-Western 

struggle and delegitimized with the West should it become identified 

with al-Qa’ida and its supporters.134 The Hamas leadership, for example, 

is known to be concerned about the possibility that it will be identified 

with al-Qa’ida and correspondingly considered as terrorists who must 

be eradicated as part of the U.S. Global War on Terrorism. Two leading 

experts on Palestinian Islamist movements note that, on at least one 

occasion, Hamas and Islamic Jihad agreed to a unilateral ceasefire 

against Israel to reduce the chances that they would be viewed as allies 
32

of al-Qa’ida and that the Palestinian cause would be “subsumed as 

simply another front in the wider conflict.” 135

 Thus, a civil war in Iraq in which Islamists become important 

will probably lead to increased ties between Iraqi and Palestinian 

radicals, although these ties may not be as extensive as might initially 

be suspected. Additionally, such ties will be controversial among 

Palestinian Islamists and Palestinians in general. Palestinian “localists” 

concerned primarily with their own problems with Israel will come 

into conflict with Palestinian “regionalists” in attempting to determine 

a response to the issues raised in an Iraqi civil war. While the localists 

may be dominant now, it is uncertain they will remain so indefinitely. 

Al-Qa’ida leaders are interested in recruiting Palestinians to their cause, 

and do have at least a limited following in Lebanese refugee camps, 

such as Ayn al Hilwah near Sidon.136 Al-Qa’ida supporters from within 

the Palestinian community could therefore find themselves involved 

with Iraqi Islamists. Nevertheless, the pressures to become involved 

in an Iraq civil war will probably not be greater than those to become 

involved in the current struggle between Iraqi insurgents and the United 

States. Palestinian involvement in the current Iraqi fighting appears to 

be marginal.137

Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf States.

 The conservative monarchal leadership of Saudi Arabia has a deep 

stake in the future of Iraq. An Iraqi civil war could be cataclysmic for 

the Saudis, although a strong, independent, and democratic Iraq is not a 

preferred option either. The underlying goals of the Saudi government 

have been to support conservative states in the region, limit the spread 

and appeal of anti-Saudi Islamic radicalism, and maintain ties with 

the United States in ways that do not provoke excessive domestic 

and international criticism. These policies are seen as a key to regime 

survival. If the Saudi leadership were to have its choice of governments 

in Iraq, they would probably prefer to see Iraq led by a conservative 

Sunni Arab strongman, or at least a respected Sunni Iraqi elder statesman such as Adnan Pachachi. Either of these developments seems 

virtually impossible under current conditions.

 A democratic and pro-Western Iraq poses a number of problems 

for the Saudis. Democracy in the Gulf has been a long-standing worry 

for Saudi Arabia, and an Iraqi example could lead to pressure on the 
33

House of Saud to democratize. The Saudis also suspect that the United 

States might be seeking a client state in Iraq as a counterweight to the 

U.S.-Saudi relationship. The Saudis are not likely to favor an Iraqi 

democracy because of such problems, but an Iraqi civil war probably 

remains the worst possible scenario for the future of Saudi Arabia, as 

it would complicate an already severe security crisis that exists within 

that country.

 The potential weakness of the Saudi regime and its tough and 

continuing struggle with al-Qa’ida terrorists, both in exile and within 

its own borders, suggest that a civil war in Iraq would be catastrophic 

for the current government. Since May 2003, “Al-Qa’ida on the Arabian 

Peninsula” (QAP) has shown itself to be a resourceful adversary 

within the Kingdom capable of challenging the Saudi regime’s ability 

to provide security for its citizens and for foreign residents, although 

at this time unable to threaten the existence of the regime itself. QAP 

has made extensive use of bombings and kidnappings to wage war 

against the House of Saud and its allies. The spring 2004 U.S. and 

Western decisions to urge the evacuation of their citizens from Saudi 

Arabia indicated that some governments believed the Saudis, at least 

temporarily, had lost control of important elements of their internal 

security situation.138 Moreover, the Saudis cannot easily afford to have 

Western expatriates driven from the kingdom by terrorism threats, since 

they are still needed to keep the oil industry operating. This situation is 

already a problem for the Saudis, since terrorist attacks such as a May 

1, 2004, shooting spree in Yanbu and various kidnappings/executions 

are targeted specifically at Westerners.139

 The possible decline in the Iraq situation is, therefore, a complicated 

and dangerous challenge for the Saudis linked to their current security 

problems. If a Shi’ite-dominated Iraqi government unleashed a 

campaign of military conquest against Iraqi Sunnis, or if Shi’ite militias 

gain the upper hand in a civil war, the Saudi Arabian government may 

face some particularly painful choices in formulating its foreign policy 

towards Iraq. Sunni-Shi’ite violence in Iraq under these circumstances 

would have an intense influence on Saudi domestic opinion, and 

public opinion would probably seek governmental action to reign 

in Iraqi Shi’ites. A passive Saudi Arabian policy towards Iraq would 

anger a variety of Sunni Wahhabi Saudi citizens who view Iraq’s Sunni 

Muslims as their co-religionists, while considering Shi’ites as little better 

than apostates. 
34

 Yet, a Saudi policy of supporting, or even simply tolerating, 

increasingly radicalized Sunni fighters traveling to Iraq from Saudi 

Arabia could bolster enemies who might later turn on the House of 

Saud, should they achieve their goals in Iraq. In particular, Saudi men 

choosing to fight in Iraq or going there to disperse funds could then 

return to Saudi Arabia with radical ideologies, military skills, and 

terrorist contacts, paralleling the experience of Saudis in Afghanistan 

but possibly on a much larger scale.140 The Saudi government is not 

currently tolerating such activity and would become even more stern 

about such activities, should civil war conditions occur in Iraq.141

Nevertheless, some radical Islamists within the Kingdom are deeply 

concerned about remaining on the sidelines, even under current 

conditions. Hinting at potential future problems, a group of 26 Saudi 

Islamic scholars unaffiliated with the Saudi government issued a 

fatwa in November 2004, calling for jihad against U.S. forces in Iraq.142

Radical clerics, bypassing the government, may issue other such fatwas 

in response to an Iraqi civil war, although such opinions may also be 

widely ignored as going against the conscience of the individual. One 

individual in Saudi Arabia has even sued the “group of 26” clerics, 

claiming they corrupted the mind of his son and caused his death in 

Iraq.143

 The Saudis also fear an empowered Shi’ite majority in Iraq, which 

could align with Iran against them and perhaps direct subversive 

messages at Saudi Shi’ites in the oil rich eastern province of Saudi Arabia. 

This province has been calm recently, although there were pro-Iranian 

and anti-government demonstrations in December 1979. Additionally, 

Shi’ites in Saudi Arabia continue to have important grievances against 

the Riyadh government.144 This distrust is sometimes aggravated by 

Saudi Arabian differences with the Shi’ite theocracy in Iran. At the 

height of these differences in the 1980s, Saudi political attacks against 

Iran and Shi’ite Muslims in general often seemed to blend into one set of 

charges.145 Rival Saudi-Iranian efforts to shape the future of Iraq could 

severely damage relations between the two countries. Additionally, a 

post-civil war Shi’ite-dominated government in Iraq may believe that 

it has a score to settle with the Saudis should the civil war itself be 

characterized by clearcut Saudi support for Sunni elements.

 Another aspect of the potential problem is that many of the foreign 

radicals currently in Iraq have placed the destruction of the Saudi 

regime as a high priority. Should these individuals flourish in a civil 
35

war setting, the Saudis would face an even more serious subversion 

threat. Should these elements prevail in an Iraqi civil war, they would 

be flushed with victory and fully prepared to press forward with an 

anti-Saudi agenda. Should al-Qa’ida-oriented radical groups gain an 

increased foothold in Iraq, they would be able to threaten Saudi Arabia 

to an even greater extent.

 Ironically, for the Saudis, the most favorable side effect of an Iraq 

civil war would be to push the United States much closer towards 

Riyadh than it has been for at least a decade. Should Iraq devolve into 

chaos, the value of Saudi Arabian oil to both the United States and the 

West in general would skyrocket. The prospect of both Iraq and Saudi 

Arabia dissolving into a nightmare of civil war and radicalism would 

galvanize the West to support the Saudi regime to the greatest extent 

possible. Yet, a huge infusion of last-minute help may or may not be 

enough save a Saudi regime engulfed by radicalism. The return of a 

highly-visible U.S. presence could further complicate the relations of 

the Saudi government with its citizens. Saudi views of the United States 

have consistently declined in the last few years as the result of U.S. 

policies toward Iraq, Israel and the Palestinians, and U.S. homeland 

defense measures that directly impact Saudi travelers. A heavy-handed 

U.S. presence in the middle of a crisis may help the Saudi government, 

but it would certainly have negative consequences as well, including 

the furthering of Saudi Arabia’s image as a U.S. client state.

 Of the other Arab Gulf states, only the tiny island nation of Bahrain 

has a Shi’ite majority (along with a Sunni monarchy), although 

some Gulf Arab states have substantial Shi’ite minorities. Kuwait, in 

particular, has concerns about the danger of a divisive civil war taking 

place in Iraq due to Sunni-Shi’ite national unity issues. Shi’ites constitute 

about 30 percent of the total Muslim population of Kuwait. In the years 

immediately following the 1979 Iranian revolution, an energetic and 

sometimes effective Shi’ite terrorist network arose and perpetrated 

serious acts of violence.146 These strong Iranian-supported terrorist 

networks no longer exist in Kuwait, although extremist Shi’ite groups 

still distribute literature and audiotapes deemed subversive by the 

government.147 Sunni Kuwaitis may therefore worry that an Iraqi civil 

war will inflame Shi’ites in Kuwait, and that any pro-Sunni actions by 

the Kuwaiti government will create pressures for some Shi’ite radicals 

to return to terrorism. 

 Wahhabism also has a following in the smaller Gulf Arab states, 

although its most puritanical aspects are not always recognizable 
36

to Western visitors in the same way they are in Saudi Arabia. The 

Kuwaiti government is already worried about its young men fighting 

in Iraq, and fears a radicalization problem if this process expands, as it 

probably would in a civil war.148 In this regard, Islamic Affairs Minister 

Abdullah al Maatuk has announced the creation of teams of experts 

and clerics who are to direct educational efforts to combat extremism.149

Kuwaiti police have also been reported to close down rings of religious 

extremists recruiting fighters to go to Iraq from Kuwait. The number of 

Kuwaitis who have gone to Iraq to fight is uncertain, but young Kuwaiti 

men have clearly engaged in this type of activity in Afghanistan in the 

past. Many of the other Gulf Arab states may also have concerns about 

how a civil war in Iraq may influence their youth, although Kuwait’s 

problem may be especially disconcerting due to its proximity to the 

Iraqi border.

 Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are more 

insulated from Iraqi events than Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, or Bahrain. 

Qatar has not suffered any recent terrorist incidents, and has introduced 

an ongoing program of reform.150 It also does not have a border with 

Iraq, but it could feel any ripple effect of events in Saudi Arabia. Thus 

Doha is somewhat inoculated from the immediate problems of an Iraqi 

civil war, although it may face internal and external criticism for its 

high levels of cooperation with the United States, should the United 

States be widely blamed for Iraqi civil unrest (as is likely).151 Qatar is 

likely to simply accept such criticism since the protection of the United 

States may become particularly important following any development 

of large-scale civil unrest in Iraq. 

 The UAE has been only marginally influenced by the events in Iraq 

thus far, although, like Qatar, it could feel substantial impact from the 

collapse of the Saudi system. The UAE’s long history of political and 

economic stability will almost certainly continue even following the 

November 2004 death of its founding statesman, the much-respected 

Sheikh Zayid Bin Sultan.152 Due to its staggering wealth, the UAE has 

found it useful to seek a strong relationship with the United States. The 

UAE, and especially its constituent emirate of Dubai, has sought to 

consolidate ties with the United States through strong and noticeable 

ties with American business, and these associations would help that 

country deal with stability problems following the outbreak of an Iraqi 

civil war.153 Additionally, the UAE will undoubtedly help Iraq to the 

extent possible with humanitarian aid, and will pay particularly close 
37

attention to the plight of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs, perhaps using diplomatic 

and other efforts to aid them in a civil conflict. 

 Yemen and Oman have also been quite insulated from many events 

in Iraq. The initial impact of an Iraqi civil war on these countries would 

probably be minimal, although Yemen has had a problem with alQa’ida-supported terrorist activity on its soil, and a noticeable number 

of its young men have joined radical movements both in Yemen and 

overseas. A few Yemeni fighters have already been captured in Iraq 

fighting the U.S.-led coalition, and it is possible that some, including 

Yemeni Shi’ites (who are almost entirely a Shi’ite sub-branch, the 

Zaidis), would also participate in an Iraqi civil war. Nevertheless, the 

overall political and security situation in Yemen will probably not 

change dramatically as the result of an Iraqi civil war. Yemen will have 

a terrorist problem in the indefinite future and will deal with it through 

force, and bargaining with tribes that may protect the terrorists. The 

impact on Oman will probably also be extremely limited.

The Issue of the International Oil Market.

 Apart from the effect on specific regional countries, a civil war in Iraq 

will also have important implications for the international oil market. 

Prior to the war, the Iraqi oil industry was burdened by a large number 

of problems including a deteriorating infrastructure, bad management, 

international sanctions, and exceedingly corrupt business practices that 

were designed to enrich Saddam and his family rather than improve 

the country’s export capacity. Exports conducted under the UN Oil for 

Food Program (OFF) or smuggled out of Iraq, often in collaboration 

with the Iranians, usually occurred only after the payment of extensive 

bribes to the Iraqi leadership.154 In the aftermath of Saddam’s ouster, 

hope existed for a new, more efficient Iraqi oil industry unburdened by 

extensive corruption. Yet, under widespread civil war conditions, the 

oil export situation would deteriorate from the Saddam era rather than 

improve.155

 The disorder resulting from a civil war will make it difficult, if not 

impossible, for the Iraqis to continue to export oil, should civil war 

conditions prevail throughout the entire country (which they may not). 

Moreover, even if some Iraqi factions retain control over portions of 

the Iraqi oil infrastructure and can export oil, it will not be a simple 

economic decision for nations interested in buying it from them. Rather, 
38

purchasing oil from any Iraqi faction will infuse that faction with funds, 

which they would almost certainly use to improve their position within 

the ongoing struggle against other Iraqi groups. A decision to buy oil 

from one group may also endow that group with an increased amount 

of international legitimacy and may be seen as bolstering their claims to 

rightful authority. International deals with the Kurdish leadership, for 

example, may be viewed as tacit endorsement of any future Kurdish 

claims to independence. 

 Additionally, oil infrastructure in the hands of any one faction may 

face constant sabotage efforts from other factions. Since sabotaging oil 

infrastructure can be quite simple, it is likely that such sabotage would 

emerge as a major problem should civil war conditions develop.156

Targets vulnerable to such strikes would include pumping stations, 

refineries, and especially pipelines. Some 250 guerrilla attacks against 

pipelines have already occurred in Iraq since the removal of Saddam 

Hussein.157 Such attacks may be easier and more frequent should a civil 

war develop. Additionally, skilled Iraqi workers needed to keep the 

industry performing may be threatened or killed. Foreign oil specialists 

would find Iraq an uninviting place to work under such conditions 

and would not be able to keep the system functioning. Thus, Iraq, 

with 10-11 percent of the world’s oil reserves, may be removed from 

the international oil market, except for a small trickle resulting from 

smuggling.158

 The problem with Iraq may be intensified if further political 

problems develop in Saudi Arabia or among the Arab Gulf states. The 

Saudis, as noted, are currently under siege from a terrorist group that 

seeks to both destabilize the country and to drive foreign workers from 

Saudi Arabia. The strikes against foreign workers directly threaten the 

productivity of the oil industry. Simultaneous disruption of Iraqi and 

Saudi oil activity would therefore become a serious economic crisis, since 

the two countries combined control around 35 percent of the world’s 

known oil reserves. The economic welfare of the West consequently 

depends on maintaining some level of political stability in at least one, 

and preferably both, of these countries.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations.

 As noted throughout this monograph, the author does not intend 

to convey the impression that a civil war in Iraq is inevitable. The 

Iraqis are deeply concerned about this danger, and this awareness 
39

may encourage them to find ways to compromise and avoid this grim 

scenario. Moreover, if the beginnings of civil war do occur in one part 

of the country (for example, the city of Kirkuk), it may still be possible, 

although difficult, to contain and reverse the conflict before it spreads 

throughout the entire country. 

 The avoidance of a civil war is primarily an Iraqi responsibility, 

despite the problem that the United States will be blamed widely for such 

a development if it does occur. The United States cannot prevent such 

a conflict if Iraqis are determined to create the preconditions for such a 

struggle, and then to follow through with a violent effort to define the 

future political system of Iraq. It is therefore reasonable for the United 

States both to take preventive actions to the extent possible and to 

consider possible options in case the worst happens and this eventuality 

becomes a reality. In this spirit, the following recommendations are 

offered.

1. The United States needs to make helping Iraqis prevent an Iraqi 

civil war its first priority in dealing with that country despite 

the limits on U.S. power noted above. Civil war is probably the 

only consequence of the U.S. invasion of Iraq that could lead 

the population into a situation that is worse than the one they 

lived with under Saddam, while simultaneously threatening 

U.S. interests to a greater extent than Saddam ever did. If a civil 

war can be avoided for the time being by deemphasizing rapid 

democratic development, then this sacrifice will need to be made. 

Some of Iraq’s sectarian differences may not be solvable through 

democratic means unless a yet uncertain spirit of compromise 

becomes more apparent in intercommunal relations in Iraq. 

 2. The United States must make it clear to Iraqi community 

leaders that it is their responsibility to reach compromise with 

responsible leaders of other ethnic or sectarian communities 

because the United States cannot remain in Iraq indefinitely, 

nor can it adjudicate Iraqi factional disputes indefinitely. In 

this regard, U.S. troop presence cannot be allowed to become 

a crutch for intransigent Iraqi leaders to refuse to explore the 

possibility of compromise, knowing that civil war probably 

will be prevented by the U.S. presence. Additionally, if the 

Iraqi government reaches out to some of the insurgents through 

amnesties and concessions, this may be part of the price to bring 

important factions back into the political system. 
40

3. The United States must begin serious multilateral planning 

and regional discussions for coping with a civil war. A civil 

war in Iraq will not simply be a U.S. problem. The United States 

should maintain and expand its relations with moderate Arab 

states that fear an Iraqi civil war just as U.S. policymakers do. 

If radicalism takes a foothold in Iraq, the United States will 

need allies to contain and reverse the consequences of radical 

empowerment. This means working with moderate Arab states, 

including Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf Cooperation Council 

States. The United States will need all the help it is able to obtain 

to contain and to reverse a civil war should this occur. 

4. Should Iraq explode into civil war after U.S. withdrawal, 

the United States must seek to avoid large-scale military 

reintervention with ground forces and must instead, if possible, 

support a regional or international force that would help to 

stabilize Iraq. A renewed U.S. presence in many circumstances 

will probably only inflame differences among the warring 

factions, while further alienating elite and public opinion in at 

least some allied and especially Arab countries. 

5. The United States must make strong efforts to work with Saudi 

Arabia and the other Gulf Arab states in waging the war on 

terror. Saudi Arabia has been the subject of public U.S. hostility 

and anger since the 9/11 attacks, although the U.S. Government 

has not allowed such anger to be translated into seriously 

counterproductive policies. While reform in Saudi Arabia will 

remain the ultimate bulwark against radicalism, the violent 

overthrow of the regime by Islamic radicals will become an even 

more serious short-term threat should its northern neighbor 

devolve into civil war. Should Iraq and Saudi Arabia be plunged 

into turmoil simultaneously, the economic consequences for the 

West would be catastrophic. 

6. The United States needs to discourage Iraqi Kurds from 

declaring an independent state, and it must dissuade Iraqi 

Kurds from supporting activities in neighboring states that 

could provoke foreign military intervention. This will not 

be easy as the Kurds do have a strong moral case for selfdetermination. Nevertheless, the Kurds will only be able to 

achieve self-determination by engulfing the region in blood, 

probably including a great deal of Kurdish blood. Rather, the 
41

United States must support respect for Kurdish human rights 

and community rights within their respective nations.

7. The United States may need to consider opening a dialogue 

with Iran on Iraq-related matters. Iran and the United States 

have widely divergent interests in Iraq, but they may at times 

be able to find common ground on important issues. Temporary 

and tactical cooperation with Iran may be permissible so long as 

the fundamental differences between the United States and Iran 

on long-term goals are always kept firmly in mind. 

ENDNOTES

 1. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), World Factbook, 2004, Iraq, internet. Please 

note that the actual figures for the Iraqi population are subjects of heated debate among 

of the various Iraqi groups.

 2. Amatzia Baram, “Neo-tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein’s Tribal Policies 1991-

96, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 29, February 1997, pp. 1-31.

 3. Iraq in Transition: Vortex or Catalyst? London: Chatham House, September 

2004, p. 9; John Daniszewski, “Report Warns of Regional Tumult, Los Angeles Times, 

September 2, 2004, internet. Also see Anthony H. Cordesman, “Act Now or a Civil 

War May Hit Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, May 7, 2004, internet.

 4. Douglas Jehl, “U.S. Intelligence Shows Pessimism on Iraq’s Future, New York 

Times, September 16, 2004, p. 1; Warren P. Stobel and Jonathan S. Landay, “CIA: 

Iraq at Risk of Civil War,” Philadelphia Inquirer, January 22, 2004, p. 1.

 5. Michael Georgy, “Poll Suggests Civil War Tops Iraqi Fears,” Boston Globe, 

January 25, 2004, internet. Also see Reuters, “Mubarak Fears Outbreak of Civil War in 

Restive Iraq,” Chicago Tribune, April 13, 2003, internet; and Neil MacFarquhar, “Arabs 

Worry Over Extremism While Evoking Vindication,” New York Times, April 9, 2004, 

internet.

 6. On some of the problems associated with democratizing but ethnically divided 

states, see Andreas Wimmer, Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict, Shadows of 

Modernity, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004, especially 

chapter 6. Also see Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence, Democratization and Nationalist 

Violence, New York: Norton, 2000; Demet Yalcin Mousseau, “Democratizing with 

Ethnic Divisions: A Source of Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 38, No. 2, 2001, 

pp. 547-567; and Ted R. Gurr, “Peoples against the State: Ethnopolitical conflict in the 

changing world system,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38. No. 3, September 1994, 

pp. 347-377.

 7. For a useful and detailed exploration of this problem, see Andreas Wimmer, 

“Democracy and Ethno-religious Conflict in Iraq,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, Winter 

2003-04, pp. 111-134. Note Wimmer’s conclusion that “Iraq fulfils all conditions for a 

pervasive conflictual politicization of ethnicity,” p. 113.

 8. Ibid., pp. 120-123; and Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley 

and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2000, chapters 7, 8. 
42

 9. Iraq in Transition, p. 3. 

 10. Yitzak Nakash, “The Shiites and the Future of Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 

4, July/August 2003, p. 18.

 11. “Iraqi PM Says Factional Militias Agree to Disband,” New York Times on the 

Web, June 7, 2004, internet.

 12. See remarks by Dan Senor, Senior Advisor CPA in U.S. Department of Defense, 

“News Transcript, Coalition Provisional Authority Briefing,” May 28, 2004. Also see 

Dexter Filkins, “Failing to Disband Militias, U.S. moves to accept them,” New York 

Times, May 25, 2004, p. 1.

 13. Mark McDonald, “Kurdish Chiefs want Rights Guaranteed,” Miami Herald, 

June 8, 2004, internet.

 14. Dilip Hiro, Lebanon: Fire and Embers: A History of the Lebanese Civil War, New 

York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992, p. 37.

 15. This proved to be the case in Lebanon. See David Gilmour, Lebanon, The 

Fractured Country, New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc, 1983, pp. 132-133.

 16. On current problems, see, “Coalition, Iraq reinforcing porous borders,” Jordan 

Times, August 16, 2004, internet.

 17. Walter Pincus, “Iraq Called ‘Springboard’ for Insurgency Figure,” Washington 

Post, October 21, 2004, p. 23.

 18. “Platform of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine,” as cited in 

Walter Laqueur, The Terrorism Reader: A Historical Anthology, Philadelphia: Temple 

University Press, 1978, p. 149.

 19. Sami Aboudi, “Arabs See Israel’s hand behind U.S. war on Iraq,” Jordan Times, 

April 4, 2003, internet; and Christine Hauser, “Arabs Sneer at ‘Iraqi Freedom’ label for 

war,” Jordan Times, April, 1, 2003, internet.

 20. According to Yitzhak Nakash, one of the many reasons for these mass 

conversions was for southern Iraqis to draw distinctions that would insulate them 

from the Sunni government in Ottoman Baghdad. See Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi’is of 

Iraq, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 1995, p. 29.

 21. The most important individual representing this trend was Nuri al-Said, who 

was born in Baghdad in 1899 and later became the most prominent politician of the Iraqi 

monarchical era. For a friendly account of Nuri’s role in Iraqi history, see Waldermar J. 

Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri, My Recollections of Nuri al-Said, 1954-1958, Baltimore: 

Johns Hopkins Press, 1964.

 22. Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 

p. 83.

 23. Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 

2004, p. 32; David Fromkin, A Peace to End all Peace, New York: Henry Hold and 

Company, 1989, p. 453. 

 24. Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to 

Dictatorship, London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987, p. 20.
43

 25. Kanan Makiya, Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising and the Arab World, 

New York and London: WW Norton & Company, 1993, p. 97.

 26. Iraq’s Transition on Knife Edge, Baghdad/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 

April 27, 2004, p. 19. 

 27. Edward Wong and Erik Eckholm, “Allawi Presses Effort to Bring Back 

Baathists,” New York Times, October 13, 2004; and Mathhew Campbell and Ali Rifat, 

“Iraq’s Secret Police Rebuild their Network,” London Sunday Times, July 25, 2004, 

internet.

 28. “Sistani Spearheading effort to ensure Shiite Electoral Victory,” Jordan Times, 

November 18, 2004, internet.

 29. Jeffrey Gettleman, “U.S. Training a new Iraqi Military Force to Battle Guerrillas 

at their own game,” New York Times, June 4, 2004, internet.

 30. Alissa J. Rubin, “Iraq Vote a Priority for Shiite Leader,” Los Angeles Times, 

November 22, 2004, p. 1.

 31. Steve Negus, “The Widening Divide,” Middle East International, December 3, 

2004, p. 7.

 32. Howard LaFanchi, “Iraq’s Sunni-Shiite Tension Rising,” Christian Science 

Monitor, September 22, 2004, internet.

 33. Peter Ford, “Iraqi Christians Wary of Islamists,” Christian Science Monitor, April 

21, 2003, internet.

 34. Michael M. Gunter, “The Kurdish Question in Perspective,” World Affairs, 

Spring 2004, p. 197.

 35. Some coordination on these types of issues has already occurred among 

regional states. See “Erdogan Wraps up Tehran Visit,” Jordan Times, July 30-31, 2004, 

internet.

 36. Horowitz, p. 72.

 37. Makiya, chapter 5; Peter W. Galbraith, Kurdistan in the Time of Saddam Hussein: 

A Staff Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, Washington 

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1991.

 38. Marr, pp. 285-288.

 39. Julia Duin, “Kurds Build Own Identity,” Washington Times, August 18, 2004, p. 

15.

 40. Thanassis Cambanis, “Kurds’ Separatist Ambitions Pose Challenge to Iraq 

Unity,” Boston Globe, November 14, 2004, internet; and George Packer, “The Next Iraqi 

War,” The New Yorker, October 4, 2004, p. 75.

 41. Hugh Pope and Bill Spindle, “Kurds’ Success Makes It Harder to Unify All 

Iraq,” Wall Street Journal, May 19, 2004, p. 1. 

 42. For Kurdish statements of support for federalism, see Iraq’s Kurds: Toward 

an Historic Compromise? Amman and Brussels: International Crisis Group, April 8, 

2004. For a useful discussion of the types of problems associated with federalism in 

multinational states, see Ramon Maiz, “Democracy, Federalism, and Nationalism in 
44

Multinational States,” in Identity and Territorial Autonomy in Plural Societies, William 

Safran and Ramon Maiz, eds., London: Frank Cass, 2000, pp. 34-60. 

 43. Chris Kutschera, “An Island of Prosperity and Calm,” The Middle East, January 

2004, p. 44.

 44. Mark Matthews, “Kurdish Official’s Killing Intensifies Population’s Fears,” 

Baltimore Sun, June 17, 2004, internet.

 45. Bruce Fein, “A Partitioned Iraq,” Washington Times, May 18, 2004, p. 13.

 46. “More than 10 Die in Arab-Kurd Clashes in North Iraq,” Jordan Times, May 20, 

2004, internet.

 47. Dexter Filkins, “Kurds Advancing to Reclaim Land in Northern Iraq,” New 

York Times, June 20, 2004, p. 1.

 48. Packer, pp. 64-79.

 49. H. Tarik Oguzlu, “The ‘Turkomans’ as a Factor in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 

Turkish Studies, Vol 3, No. 2, Autumn 2002, p. 143,

 50. Packer, p. 71.

 51. Agency France Press, “Iran-Iraq Relations take a series of hits,” The Daily Star, 

August 9, 2004, internet.

 52. Doha Al Jazirah Satellite Television, “Iranian Defense Minister Responds to 

Iraqi Counterpart, Denies Interference,” August 9, 2004, as cited in Foreign Broadcast 

Information Service (FBIS), August 9, 2004, internet.

 53. Doug Struck, “Official Warns of Iranian Infiltration,” Washington Post, July 26, 

2004, p. 14; Matthew Cambell and Ali Rifat, “Iraqi Secret Police Rebuild their Network,” 

London Sunday Times, July 25, 2004, internet.

 54. Azadeh Moaveni, “U.S. Actions in Iraq Resonating in Iran,” Los Angeles Times, 

April 19, 2003, p. 1.

 55. “Iran open to talks with U.S. based on respect―Kharrzi,” Jordan Times, January 

9, 2004, internet; “US eyes Limited talks with Iran,” BBC News Online, October 29, 

2003, internet.

 56. These are explored in James Fallows, “Will Iran be Next?” The Atlantic Monthly, 

December 2004, pp. 97-110.

 57. U.S. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld has denied an interest in such bases, but 

the Iranians are nevertheless concerned. Some neo-conservative commentators have 

forcefully disagreed with Rumsfeld’s statement renouncing Iraqi bases, perhaps 

further alarming Tehran. For two thoughtful discussions of this disagreement, see 

Jeffrey Record, Dark Victory: America’s Second War Against Iraq, Annapolis, MD: Naval 

Institute Press, 2004, pp. 131-132; and Christopher Preble, et. al., Exiting Iraq, Report 

of a Special Task Force on Exiting Iraq Sponsored by the CATO Institute, Washington DC: 

CATO Institute, 2004, p. 12. 

 58. Paul-Marie De La Gorce, “Encircled and Under Pressure,” World Press Review, 

October 2003, pp. 14-16.

 59. Elizabeth Wishnick, Strategic Consequences of the Iraq War: U.S. Security Interests in 

Central Asia Reassessed, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies 
45

Institute, May 2004, pp. 12-13; Department of Defense, “Secretary Rumsfeld Joint Press 

Conference in Bishkek,” Defense Link: News Transcript, April 27, 2002, internet. 

 60. On Iran’s ties with various Afghan warlords and especially former Herat 

Governor Ismail Khan, see Larry Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War, Seattle and 

London: University of Washington Press, 2001, p. 75. Also see “New Afghan Governor 

Pledges Order,” BBC News Online, September 14, 2004, internet.

 61. Goodson, p. 80; Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, New Haven, Yale University Press, 

2001, p. 77.

 62. “The United States’ 40 tactical and strategic aims following the occupation of 

Iraq,” Tehran Mardom-Salari, May 30, 2004, as quoted by FBIS, June 1, 2004, internet.

 63. Anoushiravan Ehteshami, “Iran’s International Posture After the Fall of 

Baghdad,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 58, No. 2, Spring 2004, p. 190.

 64. “Iranian Influence in Iraq: Tetchy neighbors,” The Economist, April 24, 2004, pp. 

44-45.

 65. Nasrallah is in his mid-40s and has been elected to the position of Hizballah 

secretary-general five times. He is the political leader of Hizballah, while the spiritual 

leader is Sheikh Mohammad Fadlallah. See Sam F. Ghattas, “Hizbullah Reelects 

Nasrallah as chief,” Jerusalem Post, August 17, 2004, internet.

 66. Sami G. Hajjar, Hizballah: Terrorism, National Liberation or Menace? Carlisle 

Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, August 2002, 

pp. 8-9.

 67. “Iran says it is determined not to interfere in Iraq,” Jordan Times, May 30-31, 

2004, internet.

 68. Tehran IRNA, “SCIRI Leader Hakim Praises Iran’s Stance Towards Iraq as 

‘Constructive’ Positive,” July 13, 2004, as cited in FBIS, July 13, 2004, internet. 

 69. “Tehran admits close contacts with Chalabi, rejects spying accusations,” Jordan 

Times, May 24, 2004, internet; Sean Boyne, “Iran Signals backing for Iraqi Opposition,” 

Jane’s Intelligence Review, September 1, 2001, internet; John Burns and Dexter Filkins, 

“Iraqis Ordering Chalabi Arrest; He Vows to Fight,” New York Times, August 9, 2004, 

internet.

 70. See David L. Phillips, “Turkey’s Dreams of Accession,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, 

No. 5, September/October 2004, p. 90.

 71. Edward J. Erickson, “Turkey as Regional Hegemon―2014: Strategic Implications 

for the United States,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3, Autumn 2004, p. 27.

 72. David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, London: I.B. Tauris Publisher, 

2000, p. 443.

 73. Milan Vesely, “Kurdish Unrest: Egypt’s pre-Invasion warning comes true,” The 

Middle East, July 2004, p. 18.

 74. Agence France Presse, “Iraq in Talks with Turkey on Water Sharing,” The Daily 

Star, Beirut, August 18, 2004, internet.

 75. Jon Gorvett, “Nobel Nominee to Remain Behind Bars . . . For Now,” The Middle 

East, June 2004, pp. 26-27. 
46

 76. Ilene R. Prusher, “Turks grow wary in easing up on Kurds,” The Christian 

Science Monitor, January 14, 2003, p. 1.

 77. “Erdogan Wraps up Tehran Visit,” Jordan Times, July 30-31, 2004, internet; 

“Turkish TV allows Kurds Airtime,” BBC News, June 2004, internet.

 78. In addition to domestic reasons, the Turkish leadership also recognizes that 

increased recognition of Kurdish rights may improve Turkey’s chances of gaining full 

membership in the European Union. 

 79. Prusher, p. 1.

 80. Jon Gorvett, “Turkmen Trouble causes anxiety in Ankara,” The Middle East, 

November 2004, pp. 22-23.

 81. Associated Press, “Iraqis Return to Northern City After U.S.-led Assault,” Los 

Angeles Times, September 15, 2004, internet; “Dispute with U.S. on Turkmen Eased,” 

Washington Times, September 15, 2004, p. 13. 

 82. The author learned of this theory during a series of meetings in Istanbul with 

Turkish academics in September 2004.

 83. Middle East Report No. 24: Syria Under Bashar (II) Domestic Political Challenges, 

Amman/Brussels: International Crisis Group, February 11, 2004, internet. 

 84. On U.S.-Syrian intelligence cooperation, see Alfred B. Prados, Syria: U.S. 

Relations and Bilateral Issues, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Issue Brief for 

Congress, Washington DC: CRS, August 8, 2003, pp. 9-10; Jonathan Randal, Osama: 

The Making of a Terrorist, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004, pp. 260-261.

 85. Cawston Miles, “Syria’s Split Personality,” Jerusalem Report, June 2, 2003, p. 

27.

 86. Kim Ghattas, “Syria Benefits from Iraq Unrest,” BBC News Online, April 10, 

2004, internet.

 87. Rowen Scarborough, “Syria Not Keeping Promise: Terrorists still crossing Iraq 

Border, Rumsfeld says,” Washington Times, October 5, 2004, internet.

 88. CIA, The World Factbook, January 1, 2004, internet.

 89. Alan George, Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom, London and New York: Zed 

Books, 2003, p. 4.

 90. Ibid., p. 15.

 91. Vali Nasr, “Regional Implications of the Shi’a Revival in Iraq,” The Washington 

Quarterly, Summer 2004, p. 10; Fouad Ajami, The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the 

Shia of Lebanon, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986, p. 174.

 92. Patrick Seale, Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East, Berkeley and Los Angeles: 

University of California Press, 1988, chapter 19.

 93. Nicholas Blanford, “In secular Syria, an Islamic Revival,” Christian Science 

Monitor, October 3, 2003, internet.

 94. For example see George, p. 9; David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, 

London: I.B. Tauris & Company, 2000, p. 4.

 95. George, p. 4.
47

 96. Ibid.; Agence France Presse, “Kurds in Syria Vow to Continue Political 

Activities.”

 97. Cilina Nasser and Rhonda Roumani, “Weekend Violence leaves Syrians 

Seeking Answers,” The Daily Star, March 15, 2004; “Syria urges to free riot Kurds,” 

BBC News Online, April 7, 2004, internet.

 98. Kim Ghattas, “Syria Benefits from Iraqi Unrest,” BBC News Online, April 10, 

2004, internet.

 99. “Syria Clamps Down on Kurd Parties,” BBC News Online, June 3, 2004, internet. 

Also see “Has the Epidemic of Hooligans Spread to Our Stadiums? Al Ba’th, Damascus, 

internet version, March 14, 2004, as quoted in FBIS, March 14, 2004, internet.

 100. Agence France Presse, “Kurds in Syria Vow to Continue Political Activities.”

 101. “Thousands March in Lebanon ready to defend Iraqi Holy Shrines,” Daily 

Star, May 21, 2004, internet.

 102. “Israel: Hizbullah Sponsors Palestinian Militancy,” Daily Star, Beirut, May 18, 

2004, internet.

 103. Haytham Mouzaahem, “Hizbullah and Al-Qaeda: Friends or Foes?” Daily 

Star, August 20, 2004, internet.

 104. Barry Schweild, “Arab Allies Tell U.S. of Rising Anger,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 

April 21, 2004, internet.

 105. See Said K. Aburish, Nasser: The Last Arab: A Biography, New York: Saint 

Martin’s Press, 2004, p. 184.

 106. See Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography, New 

York: The Free Press, 1991, p. 102; “Baghdad Summit Sets Up Multi-Billion Dollar 

Fund to Buttress Eastern Front,” Jordan Times, November 7, 1978, p. 1; “Communiqué 

of the Arab Summit Conference in Baghdad of 5 November 1978,” reprinted in Colon 

Legum, et al., Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1978-1979, New York and London: 

Holms and Meier Publications, 1980, p. 262.

 107. “Interview with President Hosni Mubarak,” Public Broadcast Service (PBS) 

“Frontline: The Gulf War,” 1996.

 108. Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991: Diplomacy 

and War in the New World Order, Trenton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993, 

pp. 97-99; Gregory L. Aftandilian, Egypt’s Bid for Arab Leadership: Implications for U.S. 

Policy, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993, p. 28.

 109. Raymond William Baker, Islam Without Fear: Egypt and the New Islamists, 

Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2003, p. 22.

 110. Mary Ann Weaver, “Pharaohs-in-Waiting,” Atlantic Monthly, October 2003, 

pp. 79-92.

 111. Rami Abdelrahman, “Iraq remains largest Arab importer of Jordanian 

products,” Jordan Times, April 26, 2004, internet.

 112. Ed Blanche, “Terrorists gun for Arab Intelligence Services,” Daily Star, May 8, 

2004, internet.
48

 113. Neil MacFarquhar, “Jordan Sentences 8 Militants, Linked to Qaeda, to Death,” 

New York Times, April 7, 2004, internet.

 114. Ed Blanche, “Terrorists Gun for Arab Intelligence Services.” For a more skeptical 

account of these events, see “Foiled or Fabricated?” Middle East International, May 14, 

2004, p. 17. 

 115. “Interview with King Abdullah: Time to ‘Wake up,’” Newsweek, May 24, 2004, 

p. 36.

 116. On the types of problems the government is coping with, see Majid Tawbah, 

“Islamic Movement Asks Al-Fayiz to Stop Contact with Interim Iraqi Government,” 

Al-Ghadd (internet version), November 21, 2004, as cited in FBIS, November 21, 2004, 

internet.

 117. David Ignatius, “A King’s Advice,” Washington Post, December 16, 2003, 

p. 37.

 118. Ibid.

 119. Queen Noor of Jordan, Leap of Faith: Memoirs of an Unexpected Life, New York, 

Miramax Books, 2003, p. 142. 

 120. Molly Moore, “Israel Shares Blame on Iraq Intelligence, Report Says,” 

Washington Post, December 5, 2003, p. 18; “Israel Welcomes Post War ‘New Middle 

East,’” Daily Star, April 29, 2003, internet.

 121. See Baghdad Republic of Iraq Television, “Saddam Husayn on U.S.-Israeli 

‘Allience,’Martyrdom Operations,” April 15, 2002, as cited by FBIS, April 15, 2002, 

internet; “Oust Him Please,” The Jerusalem Report, October 21, 2002, pp. 22-23.

 122. Ephraim Yaar and Tamar Hermann, “Peace Index/Most Israelis Support the 

Attack on Iraq,” Ha’aretz, August 10, 2004, internet.

 123. On ties between Chalabi and neoconservatives, see Record, pp. 123-124. For 

a strong Israeli endorsement of Chalabi, see Max Singer, “Who is Ahmad Chalabi?” 

Jerusalem Post, April 13, 2003, internet. For a much more skeptical (and prescient) 

Israeli view, see Ze’ev Schiff, “Beware of Iraqis Bearing Gifts,” Ha’aretz, March 5, 

2003, internet.

 124. See “The Rise and Fall of Chalabi,” Newsweek, May 31, 2004, p. 26; Smadar 

Peri, “Saddam’s Heir Visited Israel in Secret,” Yedi’ot Aharonot (Hebrew), May 2, 2003, 

as quoted by FBIS, May 2, 2003, internet.

 125. Erik Eckholm, “Iraqi Indicted for Proposal to Open Talks with Israel,” New 

York Times, October 6, 2004, internet; Edward Wong, “Chalabi in Comeback, Siding 

with Shiites,” New York Times, December 3, 2004, internet.

 126. Associated Press, “Allawi in no Rush to Forge Ties with Israel,” Los Angeles 

Times, July 27, 2004, internet.

 127. Beirut AFP, “Iraq Eyes Renewed oil exports via Lebanon,” Jordan Times, July 

27, 2004, internet; Muhannad Fa’iz, “Industry Minister to Al-Ra’y: Iraq Will not Allow 

Israeli Companies to Invest in Iraq,” Al Ra’y (Internet Version), August 23, 2004, as 

quoted in FBIS, August 23, 2004, internet.
49

 128. “Text of Muqtada al-Sadr’s Friday Sermon of 30 July in Al Kufa Dealing with 

Religious Observances, Domestic and International Politics,” Baghdad Ansar al Mahdi, 

August 6, 2004, as translated by FBIS, August 6, 2004, internet.

 129. Juan Cole, “The Situation in Iraq acutely threatens Israeli security,” Daily Star, 

(Beirut), June 4, 2004, internet.

 130. For an exploration of this possibility, see Ina Friedman, “Not so good for 

Israel after all?” The Jerusalem Report, July 12, 2004, pp. 20-21.

 131. John Bullock and Harvey Morris, No Friends but the Mountains, Oxford: Oxford 

University Press, 1992, p. 135; General Raful Eitan, A Soldier’s Story, The Life and Times 

of an Israeli War Hero, New York: Shapolsky Books, 1991, chapter 18.

 132. Seymour M. Hersh, “Plan B: As June 30th Approaches Israel Looks to the 

Kurds, New Yorker, June 28, 2004, internet; “Kurdish leader denies Israeli agents 

operating in Iraqi Kurdistan,” Jordan Times, June 23, 2004, internet; Matthew Gutman, 

“Israeli Intelligence Agents Infiltrating Iraq, Iran,” The Jerusalem Post, June 21, 2004, 

pp. 3, 16. 

 133. Ilter Turkmen, “Turkey and Israel,” Istanbul Hurriyet, July 13, 2004, as quoted 

by FBIS, July 13, 2004, internet; also see “Turkey and Israel: A Strategic Friendship 

Cools,” The Economist, June 26, 2004, p. 52.

 134. Some U.S. analysts, especially neo-conservatives, already treat al-Qa’ida and 

the Palestinian Islamist radicals as virtually interchangeable. See David Frum and 

Richard Perle, An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terrorism, New York: Random 

House, 2003, p. 125.

 135. Beverley Milton-Edwards and Alastair Crooke, “Waving, Not Drowning: 

Strategic Dimensions of Ceasefires and Islamic Movements,” Security Dialogue, 

September 2004, p. 304.

 136. “Keuka Hatoum, “Al-Qaeda’s Lebanese Chief Arrested,” Daily Star, September 

23, 2004; Beirut Lebanese National News Agency, “Interior Minister and Prosecutor 

General at News Conference Discuss Details of Thwarting Operations to Bomb Italian 

Embassy and Other Targets,” September 22, 2004, as cited by FBIS, September 22, 2004, 

internet; Radwan Aqil, “Fugitives in Ayn al Hilwah Surrender, Followers of ibn alShahid are under the Influence of Bin Laden,” Al Nahar, Beirut, November 18, 2003, as 

quoted in FBIS, November 18, 2003, internet. 

 137. Other nationalities clearly outnumber the Palestinians among Iraq’s Foreign 

Fighters, and there seem to be only limited numbers of foreign fighters. For one 

exception, see Associated Press, “Iraq TV Reports Confessions from Foreign Fighters,” 

USA Today, November 8, 2004, p. 8.

 138. “Bin Laden Hates Saudis, too,” The Economist, April 24, 2004, p. 44; “Embassy 

Urges Americans to leave Saudi Arabia,” Jordan Times, May 3, 2004, internet.

 139. “Saudi Arabia: Security Trumps Reform,” Middle East International, May 14, 

2004, p. 18.

 140. Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, New York: Penguin Press, 2004, pp. 229-230.

 141. Prince Bandar ibn Sultan, “We will Lose the War on Terrorism Unless . . .” 

Abha al-Watan, June 1, 2004, as quoted by FBIS, June 1, 2004, internet.
50

 142. Amr al-Faisal, “The Fatwa of the 26 and Resistance by Iraqis,” Arab News, 

December 6, 2004, internet.

 143. “Saudi to sue jihadist scholars,” BBC News, November 21, 2004, internet.

 144. James Dorsey, “Saudi Minority Sect is Restive, Christian Science Monitor, 

February 20, 1980, p. 12; John K. Cooley, “Armed Khomeini cells Found in Arab States, 

Christian Science Monitor, January 22, 1979, p. 3.

 145. Vali Nasr, “Regional Implications of Shi’a Revival in Iraq,” Washington 

Quarterly, summer 2004, p. 11.

 146. Anthony H. Cordesman, Kuwait: Recovery and Security After the Gulf War,

Boulder: Westview Press, 1997, pp. 8-9.

 147. AFP, “Kuwait to investigate Shiite magazine for insulting Prophet’s wife,” 

The Jordan Times, November 23, 2004, internet.

 148. AFP, “Kuwait to ‘Guide, Reform’ Fighters Returning from Iraq,” Jordan Times, 

August 18, 2004, internet.

 149. “Kuwait forms teams to combat extremist—minister,” Jordan Times, August 

19, 2004, internet.

 150. Neil Ford, “Qatar: A Trailblazer for Democracy?” The Middle East, January 

2004, pp. 20-22.

 151. Alan Sipress, “Tiny Qatar Discovers the Pitfalls of its Alliance with U.S.,” 

Washington Post, March 19, 2003, p. 21.

 152. “Sheikh Zayed Dies,” Daily Star, November 3, 2004, internet.

 153. The presence of Western and especially U.S. companies in the UAE is 

staggeringly clear to any visitor to that country. My thanks to Colonel Brian Kerns, 

USAF, U.S Defense Attaché, for hosting me in the UAE in the Summer 2003. 

 154. Mark Hosenball, “Iraq’s Black Gold,” Newsweek, November 11, 2002, 

pp. 27-30.

 155. Severe problems may also exist under non-civil war conditions. See Nancy 

Birdsall and Arvind Subramanian, “Saving Iraq From its Oil,” Foreign Affairs, 

July-August 2004, pp. 77-89.

 156. “Oil, Oil, Everywhere,” The Economist, December 18, 2004, p. 64; Milan 

Vesely, “Iraq’s Oil Wealth Fuels Fires of Discontent,” The Middle East, December 2004, 

pp. 26-27.

 157. Vesely, p. 25.

 158. For more on Iraqi and Middle Eastern oil reserves, see Anthony H. Cordesman, 

“Middle Eastern Energy After the Iraq War: Current and Projected Trends,” Washington, 

DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 30, 2004, internet.