THE FUTURE OF TRANSCASPIAN SECURITY

Stephen J. Blank

August 2002
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ISBN 1-58487-095-8

ii
FOREWORD

The new agreements between NATO and Russia and

between the United States and Russia create opportunities

for strengthening bilateral and multilateral military

activities throughout the former Soviet Union. These could

embrace all the militaries of the former Soviet Union and

not only enhance military security in the Commonwealth of

Independent States (CIS), but also foster military-political

integration with the West and possibly defense reform in all

or at least some of the CIS regimes. Most importantly,

Russia is pledged to cooperate in these activities.

This monograph explores the unprecedented

opportunities that are now before the United States and

recommends actions that the Government and armed

forces, especially, but not only the U.S. Army, should

undertake to consolidate and extend the newly emerging

military partnership and cooperative security regime that

are now developing. Because the opportunities being

presented to the United States and NATO were never

possible before to this degree, the proper way to exploit them

will become a subject of debate.

The analysis and recommendations offered here by Dr.

Stephen Blank are intended not only to trigger this policy

debate but to contribute to it and provide perspectives for all

interested parties. In this regard, this monograph

continues SSI’s mission of enhancing the formulation and

analysis of the U.S. Army and the U.S. Government’s

national security policies in a new strategic environment.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

STEPHEN J. BLANK has served as the Strategic Studies

Institute’s expert on the Soviet bloc and the post-Soviet

world since 1989. Prior to that he was Associate Professor of

Soviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace Doctrine,

Research, and Education, Maxwell Air Force Base, and

taught at the University of Texas, San Antonio, and at the

University of California, Riverside. Dr. Blank is the editor of

Imperial Decline: Russia’s Changing Position in Asia,

coeditor of Soviet Military and the Future, and author of The

Sorcerer as Apprentice: Stalin’s Commissariat of

Nationalities, 1917-1924. He has also written many articles

and conference papers on Russian, the Commonwealth of

Independent States, and Eastern European security issues.

Dr. Blank’s current research deals with weapons

proliferation and the revolution in military affairs, and

energy and security in Eurasia. His most recent SSI

publications include “The Foundations of Russian Strategic

Power and Capabilities,” in Beyond Nunn-Lugar: Curbing

the Next Wave of Weapons Proliferation Threats from

Russia, edited by Henry D. Sokolski and Thomas Riisager,

April 2002, and The Transatlantic Security Agenda: A

Conference Report and Analysis, December 2001. Dr. Blank

holds a B.A. in History from the University of Pennsylvania,

and a M.A. and Ph.D. in History from the University of

Chicago.

iv
SUMMARY

The new U.S. and NATO partnerships with Russia offer

an enormous opportunity to shape and transform the

security environment throughout the former Soviet Union.

The Russian government now supports partnership and

integration with NATO and the United States, and Russian

military effectiveness is in our vital interest. So the time for

an expanded program of engagement with the CIS

governments, including Russia, and enhanced shaping of

the regional security environment is at hand.

These programs can and should take place under both

U.S. and NATO auspices. Their overall objective should be

the general enhancement of security and stability in

troubled zones like the Transcaucasus and Central Asia.

They should contribute to the integration of Russia’s armed

forces with those of the West, as well as the forces’

transformation to a new and reformed model of an army

that is more attuned to current strategic realities and more

accountable, professional, and subject to democratic

control. Similar goals can be postulated for the armies in

other CIS countries. Both the United States individually

and NATO collectively possess the resources and

organizational structures to accomplish this

transformation, and many of the governments in the CIS

support the overall improvement in military capability and

security that such programs would bring about.

Not only would these programs create a lasting basis for

strategic engagement with critical states in the war on

terrorism, they would also enhance those governments’

stability against the threat of insurgency backed by foreign

or domestic terrorism, restrain Russia’s neo-imperial

tendencies, expand democratization of CIS defense

establishments, and provide an opportunity for restoring

consensus within NATO concerning roles and missions

abroad as well as defining NATO’s future territorial reach.

v
To this end, this monograph makes the following

recommendations. Based on the existing Russian cell at

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) headquarters in

Tampa, Florida, CENTCOM and the Russian General Staff

(GS) should establish a permanent liaison and cell that

covers not just Afghanistan, but also Central Asia.

Once the new Collective Security Treaty

Organization (CSTO) for the CIS begins, Russia

should invite the Pentagon to send its representatives

to be a permanent liaison to the new regional

command structure and to the existing antiterrorism

center. These links should be integrated within an

overall coordination cell.

U.S. and Russian forces should take advantage of the

experience of the CSTO and the Central Asian

Battalion (CENTRASBAT) to conduct further

combined exercises with Transcaspian militaries.

These can and should also be conducted under the

auspices of the Partnership for Peace (PfP), and

Russia should be encouraged to join and take part as

an equal member of PfP. These exercises can and

should be supplemented by regular seminars and

discussions on threat assessment, doctrine, and

coordination.

A special joint training center could be established at

Bishkek or Dushanbe (Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan).

Finally, both Washington and NATO should

encourage assigning liaison officers with Russia and

Transcaspian militaries at various levels, not just at

the CENTCOM/GS level, but down to regional units

like Russia’s 201st division in Tajikistan and Russian

border guards there and Russian liaison units with

U.S. forces in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and

Tajikistan.

vi
Finally, Washington and Moscow should maintain

permanent cells and/or liaison with the new Common

European Security and Defense Program (CESDP)

organization coming into being in Brussels to ensure

tripartite coordination among it, Russia, and the

United States (as well as NATO).

These U.S. and allied activities will surely contribute to

the long-term stabilization of the region which is in our own

and our allies’ interests whether or not Russia contributes

to those programs. They certainly are also in the interests of

local governments. Therefore, the new partnerships we

have forged in the CIS, including Russia, offer dramatic

opportunities for expanded “defence diplomacy” (to use the

British term) and security sector reform that can only have

a mutually beneficial impact for all concerned parties.

vii
THE FUTURE OF TRANSCASPIAN SECURITY

Introduction.

Recent American and NATO agreements with Russia

and deployments to Central Asia and the Transcaucasus

create significant opportunities for building a truly

cooperative security regime across the former Soviet Union.

The idea that individual governments, NATO, and other

Western security organizations effectively could play this

role with or without Russia is not new. Four years ago I

wrote that the many internal and international challenges

to Transcaspian security ultimately pointed to NATO’s

assumption of a critical regulatory role there. Russian

analysts also entertained ideas on new cooperation with the

European Union’s (EU) emerging defense organs in 2000.1

The proposal for NATO’s preeminence in the

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) came under

immediate fire from those who felt that Russia should enjoy

undisturbed and exclusive hegemony in the CIS and/or from

analysts who believed that NATO had either outlived its

mission or was, as Russian analysts charged, merely an

instrument of U.S. military-political power organized to

suppress Russian influence and strength. In other words,

they argued that NATO was too effective a check on Russian

influence for Moscow to tolerate enlargement. Since then

the number of premature mourners at NATO’s funeral has

also multiplied exponentially. Many of these same

observers now argue either that expanding NATO’s

presence in the Transcaspian might not benefit it because

expansion unduly provokes Russia or that NATO after

September 11, 2001, is essentially finished as an effective

security provider. Still others claim that America cannot

foster democracy in the CIS or elsewhere because it has not

done so in Egypt or Saudi Arabia. Therefore, these critics

argue that Russia should receive a sphere of influence and

1
leadership, if not exclusivity in modernizing those areas and

states.2 Many analysts would also likely have argued that

even after September 11, U.S.-Russian or Russo-NATO

cooperation in Central Asia was only feasible in the long

term. While the joint effort in Afghanistan was a necessary

first step, Moscow’s fears of the West’s presence in the CIS

would surely impede genuine cooperation with the West on

vital security issues there.

This monograph aims to refute those criticisms. The

new East-West partnership offers both the United States

and NATO manifold opportunities to exercise a positive

influence upon and along with Russia and governments in

the CIS to enhance security. This is because the criticisms

of NATO as an outdated anti-Russian or suddenly toothless

institution wholly overlook or underestimate the positive

changes that NATO has undergone since the end of the Cold

War, and its great utility for transforming the security

situation across Eurasia. Those changes offer the U.S.

Government and its armed forces and NATO and its

component forces an opportunity to extend the positive

transformation they have undergone further afield to

reduce the chances of another September 11 or an explosion

of insurgency and terrorism in Eurasia or other areas

adjacent to or vital to European and American security.

By acting in this fashion, the United States, its armed

forces, its allies, and their armed forces can all contribute to

the lasting integration of Russia into the West, an outcome

that prevents it from trying to upset or revise the status quo

in Eurasia and that acts as a moderating and democratizing

force for reform within Russia’s national defense structure.

Additionally, the United States and our allies can foster real

progress in deepening the kinds of relationships and

engagement with CIS militaries that will make them and

their governments reliable partners with the United States

and/or NATO in the war on terrorism and in potential

future contingencies. Also, these transformative

military-political activities and the achievement of the

desired outcome of stability and integration of Eurasia with

2
the West reduce the likelihood of future outbreaks of

terrorism, insurgency, and violence in an area whose

importance to the West as a whole, and not only because of

energy, has risen steadily in the recent past. Given the

opportunities at hand and the strategic benefits to be gained

from exploiting them, it is utterly misguided to assert

NATO’s uselessness and to refrain from employing

available policy instruments to achieve these highly

desirable objectives.

Why NATO and Washington Should Act in the CIS

and Transcaspian.

The aforementioned criticisms of NATO and of U.S.

policy overlook or neglect many facts; first, the fact that

there is a real basis for cooperation with Russia that is

accepted by Moscow as serving its interests, too. In this

respect, they are more mindful of traditional or

quasi-imperial Russian interests than is the Russian

government. After all, in February 2001 (well before the

attacks of September 21) Sergei Ivanov, then Secretary of

the Security Council, told Lord George Robertson,

Secretary-General of NATO, that joint efforts against

terrorism might become the basis of NATO-Russia trust

and cooperation.3 Similarly, some Russian analysts

advocate programs similar to those outlined below.4

Neither do these critics consider the visible disaster of

Russian-led modernization in Central Asia and the wider

CIS. Nor do they ponder the possibility that partnership

with the West can give Russia a more legitimate

prominence in the region, albeit one tempered by the

demands of partnership. As Richard Haass, Director of the

State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, recently

observed,

Another area for cooperation is Central Asia, where the

United States and Russia have a shared interest in the

economic reconstruction in Afghanistan, in halting drug and

weapon trafficking, and more broadly in promoting stability,

moderation, trade, and development. It seems to me that

3
assuring Russia a prominent role in the economic

reconstruction of this region could go a long way towards

alleviating Moscow’s concerns about the growing U.S. military

presence there.5

Moreover, these critics also ignore the evolution of

NATO and other European security organizations towards

cooperative security, the acknowledgment of that evolution

by both nonmember states and statesmen, the existence of

U.S. programs to engage and transform CIS militaries, and

the genuine contribution those programs make to security,

stability, and eventual democratization.6 In fact, these new

accords with Moscow permit NATO, the EU, and the

Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to

realize the potential inherent in their organizational

evolution since 1990 and to do so for and with those

endangered states who clearly welcome this enhanced

attention to conflict prevention and have repeatedly

advocated it.7 At the same time all these organizations now

enjoy Russian cooperation and support.

NATO’s critics also overlook that many security

challenges and threats to the new Transcaspian states

originated in Russian policy; e.g., support for separatists,

undeviating support of anti-democratic rulers, and

Moscow’s incessant search for economic, political, and

military hegemony over these states that would radically

circumscribe their real independence.8 Critics of a Western

security presence in the Transcaspian also overlook that

subordinating CIS governments to Russia’s exclusive

sphere of influence ensures their endless backwardness,

proneness to violent conflicts, and the overall continuation

of pathological political-economic-military phenomena

afflicting them and their neighbors.9 Therefore Western

security organizations should not use the opportunity

arising from these agreements to underwrite failed Russian

“peace operations” and neo-imperial policies, but rather

help Russia and CIS governments move beyond the failed

policies and outlooks of the past and towards stabilizing,

developmental, and democratizing policies. Under present

4
circumstances, the way to do this is to change the

“correlation of forces” in the area.10 Instead, as leading

Russian defense correspondent Alexander Golts writes,

The only way a couple of dozen countries can plan and carry

out long-term military programs is if they all have transparent

and public defense budgets. Only democratic institutions can

guarantee that a country’s armed forces won’t try to influence

political decisions and draw the whole alliance into some risky

undertaking or other. In other words, the NATO conditions

are essential for maintaining confidence among the member

states.11

In fact, given continuing terrorist threats in and around

Afghanistan and to the states of Central Asia, as well as the

threats connected with Russian or Chinese interests in

hegemony there and proliferation concerns since those

states’ borders are notoriously porous, a professional

military presence there greatly enhances everyone’s

interests by strengthening the ability of those states to

defend themselves against these threats. Given the visible

weakness of both the state-building process in the CIS and

the real military threats to many of those states,

multilateral combined activities would have a strongly

positive effect. As observers have noted,

Shoring up the feeble statehood of several Central Asian

states is an important anti-terrorist task for the United

States, and nothing we can do to this end is as important as

training combat-capable armed forces. We began doing this

quietly after the IMU incursion [in 1999-author] but the pace

and scope of this aid has greatly increased since September 11.

We need to see this process through to success. This will take

time and it will be facilitated immensely by a local U.S.

military presence.12

The New Strategic Environment.

Fortunately, today the pressure of admittedly

unforeseeable events has validated the original contention.

A radical change in Transcaspian security is taking shape.

5
At the recent Moscow and Rome summits, the United

States, NATO, and Russia formally agreed to work towards

a cooperative security regime throughout the CIS. They

even agreed to discuss joint peace operations and

apparently consider a generic concept for them.13 This

includes joint and cooperative endeavors to bring peace to

Chechnya, Moldova, and Nagorno-Karabakh, and wage war

on terrorism.14

Ukraine also seized this opportunity to announce its

intention to apply to NATO, signifying diminished Russian

resistance to that membership which otherwise would have

profoundly transformed Eurasian security against Russian

interests.15 That decision preserves Ukraine’s Western

option which is ultimately an option for reforming Ukraine’s

politics and economic policies and strengthens prospects for

authentic geopolitical pluralism in the CIS. Thus Kyiv’s

decision represents an open defeat for Russian neo-imperial

pressure. After all, Russia’s Ambassador Viktor

Chernomyrdin had publicly criticized Ukraine for its

neutrality and not so hidden sympathy for the West, openly

stating that Russian preferences should limit Ukraine’s

sovereignty. 1 6 Kyiv’s decision also strengthens

organizations like the Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan,

Azerbaijan and Moldova (GUUAM) security organization

which has faced constant Russian pressure, and directly

rebuffs Moscow’s public demand that there be no military or

defense organization in the former Soviet Union other than

the CIS dominated by Russia.17

Although Uzbekistan’s sudden decision to leave

GUUAM in June 2002 because it feels bilateral relations

with Washington and other CIS states offer more

guarantees of security weakens GUUAM, that does not

reduce the overall significance of Ukraine’s decision.18

Today U.S. and European forces are stationed

throughout Central Asia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. Other

CIS governments seek a comparable presence.19 Yet all this

occurs with Moscow’s official blessing as it executes its own

6
rapprochement with NATO, largely on NATO’s terms. This

does not mean that peace has decisively broken out. There

are still very strong forces in Moscow, particularly among

the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, who oppose

the Western presence, openly announce their intention to

limit that presence, and would subject the CIS to Russian

hegemony.20 Some of their plans undoubtedly enjoy

President Vladimir Putin’s support since he told the Duma

that the CIS is the priority region of Russian foreign

policy.21

Nevertheless, hitherto inconceivable developments are

actually materializing. In May 2002, Putin told the

signatories of the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty on

the occasion of the conversion of that group into a Collective

Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) that he approved of

joint collaboration of the CSTO, and explicitly of its

members, with NATO. He said that,

We said at our private discussions today that issues of a

military-political nature are also more and more frequently on

the agenda within the framework of our organization. The

same goes for political issues. It means that we are ready for

and open to cooperation with our partners in other similar

organizations. It means that the Collective Security Treaty

[signed at this meeting-author] could be an element in the

forming of new security systems in the world, including in

contact with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.22

If this vision can be realized, and there are many

obstacles to it, not only in Russia, then it would open the way

to a truly multilateral cooperative approach to dealing with

the daunting problems of Central Asian and Caucasian

security. Genuine multinational cooperation and the

advent of a cooperative security regime there also generates

new chances for multilateral governance, i.e., multilateral

participation in shaping commonly accepted rules of

military, political, and economic activity, among

governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and

popular grass-roots organizations.23 Given the enormous

and comprehensive range of threats to security in the CIS,

7
especially in and around the Caspian, this would be a major

step forward.

The U.S. military presence in Central Asia and the new

vision of East-West cooperation have already begun to

transform the situation. Pipeline projects that were

previously derided as infeasible, unprofitable, and

impossible dreams due to Russian opposition, are now

viable propositions. Kazakstan shows signs of economic

growth, the EU, the European Bank for Reconstruction and

Development (EBRD), and the International Monetary

Fund (IMF) are all active throughout the former Soviet

“space,” and numerous plans for reviving trade and

constructing major infrastructural projects tying Central

Asia and the Transcaucasus and Central Europe to Europe,

Iran, and India, as well as East Asia, are all afoot.

These trends are transforming the Transcaspian

security situation and carry within them beneficial

possibilities for local governments, if only because

globalizing their contacts with multiple external

governments and institutions reduces chances for any one

actor to monopolize or control their policies, thereby ruling

out new imperial dreams for the foreseeable future. These

trends also reflect the beginning of a hopefully irreversible

process of integration and globalization that alone can

galvanize their backward economies to progress and escape

the well-known and formidable domestic challenges to their

security.

Global integration, particularly with real organizations

that can provide tangible improvement of local conditions

and of physical security, is essential but has eluded the

region’s grasp since 1991. As Western writers have

observed, perhaps the most important factor threatening

Transcaspian states’ long-term security is the absence of

institutionalized mechanisms for resolving inevitable

conflicts: ecological, economic, political, ethnic, military,

internal, or international.24 Actions to further integrate

these states with Europe are essential for building lasting

8
peace because they strike at that defect, perhaps the most

intractable aspect of local states’ inability to make a

regional peace. Given an external mover and impetus

progress might well be forthcoming.25

Today’s global interaction increasingly connects all the

disparate parts of the CIS, former Warsaw Pact members,

and the Baltic states with Asia, Europe, and America. It

generated their increasing involvement with the European,

Asian, and Middle Eastern security agendas even before

September 11.26 Apart from the new opportunity to benefit

from the EU’s, OSCE’s, and NATO’S experience,

Transcaspian states can gain in other ways from this

globalizing trend. Despite their entanglement in foreign

rivalries, these foreign connections and the possibility of

their expansion through the construction of new transport,

communication, and other infrastructures give hope of

overcoming one of the most deep-rooted causes of

backwardness, namely being landlocked states located far

from major trade routes and the inability to compensate for

that factor.27

Finally, this new trend towards seeking multilateral and

cooperative security solutions in the CIS offers great scope

for NATO, the EU, and the OSCE. These organizations,

especially NATO, are the most effective recent providers of

regional security. NATO, contrary to its critics, is a

functioning organization whose integrated military

command and political leadership have adapted well to the

challenges of the post-Cold War world. Thus it remains the

case today that,

NATO’s political procedures and practices were unmatched

among security institutions in their design for intensive

consultation, commitment to consensus, aversion to the

appearance of disarray, and concrete capacity for

implementation.28

NATO’s flexibility and adaptiveness permits it to

mobilize, organize, and implement operations to enhance or

provide security to threatened states. This capability very

9
much includes the PfP that comprises CIS regimes and

which has continued to undergo a comprehensive and

rigorous updating to meet contemporary needs and

challenges.29 Thus NATO is an eminently attractive and

reliable institution from their standpoint. Unlike the CIS or

Shanghai Cooperative Organization (SCO), NATO protects

its members from the spillover of military hostilities,

prevents other countries from either intervening or being

drawn into such conflicts, stabilizes the former Soviet bloc

through expansion of membership and organizational tasks

like PfP, and reduces the former Soviet bloc states’ fear of

being left alone face-to-face with Russia.30

At the same time, and this is necessary in the CIS though

rarely welcome, it provides valuable instruction in

tempering the domestic politicization of PfP and members’

armies, reduces the nationalization of security policy, and

opens a path to the democratization of military forces and

overall military reform. In this respect, nothing could be

further from the Russian military’s relationship to its

government, society, and other states. The lack of this

control and its dangerous consequences were repeatedly

borne out by Russia’s involvement in numerous internal

wars and coups in the 1990s, its continuing threats against

Georgia, and its equivocal record in fighting against Central

Asian terrorism.31

The Need for Western Intervention.

Precisely because of the dearth of effective mechanisms

for resolving and terminating conflicts, organizations like

the EU and NATO have a golden opportunity to extend their

burgeoning capabilities in conflict prevention and crisis

management to new areas and to learn from and overcome

previous errors.32 More importantly, these organizations

are eagerly developing those capabilities for conflict

prevention, crisis management, conflict resolution, and for

peace and stability operations. NATO has been as much

about creating, consolidating, and now extending a political

10
or military-political order in Europe, with particular

reference to civil-military relations as it has been about a

common defense against Soviet or subsequent threats to

peace and security.33 Perhaps more than any other security

organization NATO fundamentally has transformed its

structure, capabilities, and outlook to assume a much more

active, and even potentially proactive role in conflict

resolution, crisis management, and peace and stability

operations beyond its borders.34

The benefits provided by NATO naturally pertain first to

defense and security. To the extent that states enter

NATO’s gravitational orbit, it becomes progressively much

more difficult for their armed forces and government to

launch or stumble into internal ethnic wars, civil wars,

foreign wars, and coups d’etat. The negative examples of

the Russian and Yugoslav/Serbian armed forces in the

1990s confirm this. NATO not only helps create a

democratic political and military order among its members

that precludes war among them, its gravitational pull

attracts other states while it restrains their militaries,

forcing them to build more democratic, transparent, and

accountable military and police structures that are more

attuned to international standards and accords concerning

the use of force.

Paradoxically, the connection to NATO also makes the

new states’ armed forces more adaptable to the rigors of

modern combat and much more proficient in their task. The

almost total inflexibility of their inherited Soviet model

cannot be adapted to contemporary warfare and must be

overcome before real military progress and integration are

achievable.35 Perhaps this is why Putin asked NATO to

help reform Russia’s armed forces.36 Certainly cooperation

with NATO and integration with it and the EU might allow

those organizations to initiate or assist a transformation

among Russia’s armed forces in relation to Russian politics

and the CIS. Similarly, military reform in Russia and the

CIS may fairly be seen as a major move with regard to

conventional arms control and security, not to mention

11
Russia’s own democratization.37 Furthermore, it is obvious

to all observers that military reform in Russia will not take

place from within or of its own accord. As if to confirm this

lack of an internal impetus for reform and transparency,

Russia’s Minister of Defense, Sergei Ivanov, ruled out

genuine military collaboration with NATO, a decision that

means the Russian military seeks to insulate itself from the

“infection” of foreign ideas and standards.38 Although the

idea of creating a dedicated group of Russian specialists for

efficient bilateral cooperation with NATO, including

military and intelligence personnel, won Ivanov’s favorable

attention, the decision rests with the Foreign Ministry,

another notoriously unreformed institution.39 And to

further limit the scope of Russia’s cooperation with NATO,

Ivanov also said that not only will there be no operational

collaboration, but that Russia, by associating itself with

NATO, “effectively proposes a format of security

cooperation” that is an alternative to military blocs and

alliances, a view seconded by Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov

(no relation), who wrote that the new relationship between

Russia and NATO “facilitates the transformation of NATO

itself in a direction which is in the interests of common

European security” and constitutes an alternative to

enlargement.40

Therefore, if there is to be real and internally generated

military reform in Russia—and such reform is absolutely

essential for Russia to be secure, prosperous, at peace,

democratic, and integrated with the West—external

pressure from foreign military-political organizations like

(but not only) NATO must constantly be applied.

Cooperation cannot become an excuse for Russia to

cooperate merely when it chooses to do so or to weaken

NATO’s capacity for action, while it remains unintegrated

with Europe and its military forces unreformed and not

subject to international controls and standards to which

Russia has agreed.

12
Examples from the CIS.

Georgia also provides an excellent example of what can

and must be done. Georgia’s present crises owe much to its

failure adequately to control its myriad paramilitary

formations, support viable regular military forces, or to deal

responsibly with separatist movements, often aided by

Russia.41 Thus there is a constant temptation to exploit the

willingness of Chechen forces within Georgia to strike at

these forces. This temptation, in turn, gives Moscow an

excellent pretext for striking at Georgia by bombing it and

sending in uninvited “peacekeepers.” The U.S. decision to

send forces to train and advise Georgian forces on how to

deal with terrorists, not separatists as many in Tbilisi

would prefer, both defends Georgia from Russian attacks

and reduces its temptation to use irregular forces for ethnic

or other internal wars. But it also begins the task of

imparting some desperately needed professionalism to

Georgia’s armed forces and of encouraging Georgia to

maintain an army that it can afford.42 Similarly, the U.S.

mission to Azerbaijan helps defend it against Iran’s threats

against energy exploration in the Caspian and Azerbaijan’s

coastline, while providing security to energy operations,

training, and aid to Baku.43

Nor is America the only provider of such assistance.

Sweden and Finland have equipped and are continuing to

equip almost 19 battalions of Baltic forces, and Finland and

Sweden are not only equipping these forces but, along with

the U.S. Army, are training them at institutions like the

Baltic Defense College in Tartu, Estonia.44 Turkey and U.S.

military officer schools are also providing aid, assistance,

and training to CIS officers and armies. Other NATO and

American institutions like the Marshall Center and U.S.

military colleges are deepening their contacts with CIS

militaries. Thus other NATO members and institutions too

are taking a leading role in strengthening security and

deepening their military engagement throughout the CIS,

even to the extent of organizing new security arrangements

13
there. This applies in particular to Turkey and the

Transcaucasus.45 These valuable training and advisory

missions not only help inculcate Western notions of military

order and professionalism, they provide much needed

resources and examples for CIS forces, unlike the Russian

forces in Chechnya or Tajikistan, and could provide a basis

for helping states like Armenia and Azerbaijan to make

peace. More professionalization should also foster a trend

towards more rational military expenditures and force

structures and help restrain them despite the presence of

real threats so that nonmilitary sectors of these states’

budgets are not wholly starved of resources. This dimension

has been overlooked abroad, but there is no doubt that the

terrorist insurgencies in Central Asia since 1999 have

stimulated much higher military spending by governments

who can ill afford to do so but see no other choice.

Similarly, training and advisory missions or the

development of multinational forces like the Central Asian

Battalion (CENTRASBAT) teach new skills and missions to

forces who need to know how to perform them and create a

habit of interaction and mutual trust among them. This

relationship then facilitates the projection of power when

needed, as in the current crisis. This kind of sustained

bilateral or multilateral engagement has become a regular

attribute of U.S. military strategy and policy and was

institutionalized as a priority program during the 1990s in

Central Asia and throughout the U.S. Central Command

(USCENTCOM).46 U.S. military officials attribute

Uzbekistan’s rapid decision to welcome U.S. and then allied

forces into its territory to conduct the war on terrorism to

the relationships and learning forged during 3 years of

U.S.-Uzbek military interaction.47

Nor is this an isolated example. Australian analysts

attribute that country’s successful operation in East Timor

that combined deterrence with cooperation to long-term

collaboration with U.S. and Indonesian armed forces. The

long-term engagement and joint activities with Indonesia’s

armed forces gave them the means to assess accurately

14
Australian capabilities, resolve, operations, and policy.48

Long-term bilateral and multilateral cooperation among

militaries increasingly appears to be a prerequisite for

successful prosecution of a wide range of missions in both

peace and wartime operations.

Therefore a greater NATO presence in the CIS will offer

even more opportunities for support in the war against

terrorism and possible future campaigns as well as for the

professionalization and democratization of military forces

and institutions. This also applies to the EU which is not

just building a Common European Security and Defense

Program (CESDP) but also creating a multilateral police

force that can enter conflict zones and provide a basis for the

impartial and disinterested administration of justice and

provision of law and order.49 To the extent that it can

provide police power and training along lines comparable to

NATO, it too can help restore or strengthen order in

endangered societies and help depoliticize and yet

professionalize the indigenous police forces. Thus the EU

and NATO, working on the military and police dimensions

of security in the CIS, can provide actual models for

potentially threatened societies.

Thus the kinds of programs suggested here truly accord

with vital current needs in international security and not

only in the CIS. Dylan Hendrickson and Andrzej Karkoszka

of SIPRI observe that,

The international community is seeking to respond in a more

integrated manner to the violent conflicts and security

problems facing states. Security sector reform is part of an

attempt to develop a more coherent framework for reducing

the risk that state weakness or failure will lead to disorder and

violence. Where states are unable to manage developments

within their borders successfully, the conditions are created

for disorder and violence that may spill over onto the territory

of other states and perhaps ultimately require an

international intervention. Restoration of a viable national

capacity in the security domain, based on mechanisms that

ensure transparency and accountability, is a vital element of

15
the overall effort to strengthen governance. Security sector

reform aims to help states enhance the security of their

citizens.50

Finally, to the extent that Russia welcomes and

cooperates with NATO and EU military-police missions in

the CIS, its own forces will hopefully become more

professional, sensitized to examples of military-police “best

practice” in internal conflicts, and less politicized. At any

rate, they will be more constrained politically by the

possibility of risking harmony with NATO and the West and

thus constitute less of a threat to neighboring states or

become less willing to support separatists and rivals to

existing governments in the CIS than is now the case. Today

the absence of democratic control and professionalism

among regional militaries threatens many states in the CIS

“shatterbelt,” not least Russia itself. In Chechnya,

unprofessional, brutal, and corrupt behavior remains the

norm. Russian forces there not only resist changing their

behavior despite explicit rules to the contrary, but they have

also habitually threatened to precipitate a crisis inside

Russia if “victory” (which can only mean the destruction of

locally organized social life) is denied to them.51

Russian generals also assert openly that they feel not

enough pressure has been placed upon Georgia.52 Thus they

want to widen the Chechen war, a decision that would have

unimaginably bad repercussions across Russia and the

Caucasus, if not beyond. Moreover, their operations and

threats against Georgia since 1999 are inconceivable

without support from Moscow. Thus the strong temptation

to strike at Georgia, combined with an inbuilt tendency

towards military adventurism in Moscow could easily lead

to further provocations and actions along the lines of those

in 2001-through April 2002 that could trigger another

military conflict involving Georgian, Russian, and now U.S.

forces.53 Russia’s armed forces also resist implementing

agreements with the OSCE to vacate bases in Georgia and

Moldova, participate in the drug trafficking through

Tajikistan, and provide much of the flood of stolen or

16
corruptly obtained small arms that are a scourge to the

entire CIS. In Central Asia they have played a rather

dubious role in the war on terrorism.54 Moreover, Chief of

Staff General Anatoly Kvashnin recently conceded that

their condition was “worse than critical,” and that they can

neither defend Russia nor fight terrorism elsewhere.55

Subjecting these forces to international norms and

standards of military conduct would greatly benefit Russia

and its neighbors. Thus the military-political integration of

Central Asian and Transcaucasian states into NATO

strengthens chances for peace within and among them,

without which further progress in any dimension would

become exceedingly difficult, if not impossible.

The Need for a Multilateral Approach.

The new post-September 11 reality allows us to envision

genuine short- and long-term progress in confronting

regional threats to individual and state security. One vision

for the future offers hope of concerted international action to

pacify the region and then to help it build a better future for

all of its citizens. Those concerted actions, it should be

noted, build, not just on hope, but also upon existing

realities.

Western economic interest in the region beyond energy

or energy-related projects has long been established. The

rising appreciation of the Transcaspian’s relevance for

international security predates September 11 and grows

out of the preexisting U.S. and NATO military cooperation

and engagement with Central Asian and Transcaucasian

militaries. But that new strategic importance of Central

Asia and the CIS in particular is now a decisive shaping

factor of international security.56 That engagement with

NATO and individual Western governments itself reflected

the earlier formal entry of Central Asia and the

Transcaucasus into the broader European security agenda.

As John Roper and Peter Van Ham wrote in 1997, “The

main reason why the West cannot remain complacent about

17
Russia’s actions is the fact that Russia’s ‘near abroad’ is, in

many cases, also democratic Europe’s near abroad.”57

These processes facilitate the intensifying interaction

and mutual engagement with Western governments and

Russia. They are and will be an essential instrument of

further multilateral progress if the Transcaspian is to move

from being a zone of war, as much of it now is, to being a zone

of peace. Otherwise, the citizens of all the local

governments and, indeed, in more distant lands will suffer

the consequences of a breakdown in security and the

creation of more black holes in the international order that

resist any efforts at reconstruction. Analysts now warn

that, if a new center for Islamic terrorism and extremism

were to emerge, it would happen in a place resembling

Afghanistan where a weak or failed government and an

indigenous movement ideologically tied to religious

extremism coexisted. In the CIS, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and

Uzbekistan have recently been singled out as places where

this scenario could come to pass.58 Others see Pakistan’s

decline into authoritarian rule since 1999 as a harbinger of

what could be in the Third World and point directly to the

breakdown of controls over police, military, intelligence,

and terrorist forces, exactly what the program being

suggested here aims to counteract.59

In fact, many CIS and other Third World regimes could

easily become failing or failed states that materialize a truly

Hobbesian nightmare vision where man is a wolf to man and

where organized social life has broken down, seemingly

with no hope of recovery. And while ideological fanaticism is

essential for international terrorism to flourish, it is hardly

necessary for any one failing or failed state to become a

threat to its neighbors and more distant interlocutors.

Nonetheless, the urgency of the situation in the southern

CIS is compelling and could easily spread.

Every state in the former Soviet Union is subject, albeit

in varying degrees, to the pathologies that make for failing

states and then spread abroad. Thus the spiraling

18
criminality of Central Asia that also involves large-scale

trafficking in narcotics and conventional weapons (mainly

small arms), and several attempted cases of nuclear or other

proliferations has now spread to take over crime in Russia’s

Far East.60 To the degree that these criminal elements and

linked groups can gain control there, they will likely spread

further into Russia and East Asia.

Therefore the enormous scale and magnitude of the

challenges facing Transcaspian governments and societies

precludes any one state or agency from even beginning to

contemplate acting exclusively unilaterally to improve

conditions there. Multilateral activities are the only way to

bring about stability, and an enduring basis for peace,

development, prosperity, health, environmental

reconstruction, and democracy. Even if we adopt the

Clinton administration’s view that “job number one” is

conflict resolution, our responsibilities in this part of the

world only begin but do not end there.61 Multilateral

cooperation on a scale comparable to that occurring in the

antiterror campaign is probably the only way in which the

international community can begin to act to ensure a better

future for this region. And there are vast opportunities for

this cooperation.

The present cooperative security regime that has grown

around European security, arms control, and the war on

terror offers both a model for future collaboration and for

extending that regime into the CIS. Extending that regime

into the Transcaspian zone also offers Europe, the United

States, NATO, the EU, and the OSCE important missions

for their future operation and cooperation. Certainly the

challenge of establishing new, more relevant, and adaptable

military missions and force structures adapted to them

provides a way to reinvigorate NATO forces and Transatlantic military collaboration in the war on terrorism and

to act “out of area” through these renovated force

structures.62 Europe’s recent example and evolution is

relevant and instructive for the CIS, both because it

confronts so many factors of actual and potential conflict

19
and because it is now part of the intricate and often

competitive security relationships of Europe, the greater

Middle East, and South, if not East Asia.63

The numerous efforts to involve local governments in

these competitive security relationships since 1991

demonstrate the CIS’ participation, albeit sometimes

unwilling, in these complex relationships that have taken

place in the last decade. Not only are Central Asia and the

Transcaucasus integral parts of the global war on terror,

they are fast becoming pivotal actors in the global energy

economy. In other cases, like the Shanghi Cooperation

Organization (SCO), Russia and China sought to sweep

them into an organization whose purpose and perspective

far transcended regional security issues and reflected their

global resistance to American policies.64

Central Asia and the Transcaucasus cannot remain

aloof from those other regions’ challengesas signs multiply

of the region’s vulnerability to trafficking in narcotics,

conventional weapons (either small arms or more lethal

platforms), weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and even

to involvement in potential nuclear rivalries.65Local

governments’ support for a nuclear weapons free zone and

for export control regimes signals their leaders’

understanding that a multilateral approach that originates

with their own decisive involvement with other states is the

only way to go in this regard.66

But these challenges to regional security, like the

porosity of borders and police corruption, as well as large

scale availability of WMD stocks, are also traceable to the

Soviet period, the manner of the Soviet state’s dissolution,

and subsequent trends in politics and economics in all the

successor states. No vision of future international

cooperation among all the relevant actors here is realizable

or sustainable without an honest cataloguing and analysis

of the multiple crisis factors that challenge security both

now and for the foreseeable future. Regular access to and

dialogue with EU, NATO, and OSCE mechanisms by both

20
Russia and other CIS states would facilitate a more open

and candid discussion of these challenges and of ways to

respond to them. These security challenges comprise both

man-made misguided policies and economic-politicalmilitary decisions, and structural elements of the economy

like factor endowments or geography. The combined force of

their interaction in the region’s politics, economics,

sociological trends, and ecology threatens to become a

negative “force multiplier” for the intensification of

simultaneous, multiple, and interactive crises throughout

the Transcaspian if we cannot arrest and reverse the

negative trends that they represent.

That negative, even Hobbesian, vision of an

international or at least regional order composed of several

failing or failed states and violent pseudo-states like the

Palestinian Authority is the alternative for the

Transcaspian region’s security future. It is one where

cooperation is exceedingly difficult, if at all possible. Here

war, poverty, and ecological and social destruction prevail

over peace, security, and development, and interstate and

internal conflicts are the order of the day.

The Transformation of European Security

Organizations and the Transcaspian Mission.

The new entente with Russia and its formal embodiment

in the new NATO-Russian Council and Russo-American

mechanisms for cooperation against terrorism and for

peaceful resolution of conflicts in the CIS open up a vast

field of activity for both Russia and all of the West’s security

organizations. While the CIS may not be at the center of

these agencies’ work anytime soon, its importance to those

organizations will grow steadily. Similarly, the

opportunities for developing a cooperative security regime

in the region with Russia may also grow commensurately

with Russia’s integration into Europe. Therefore European

security organizations’ growing concern with the CIS and

with the Transcaspian security agenda will affect these

21
organizations’ internal workings, interrelationships, and

ties to Russia. Certainly such cooperation could go far in

overcoming the present situation where experts like

Benjamin Lambeth of the Rand Corporation observe that,

given the dysfunctionality of the Russian Air Force and

implicitly the entire armed forces, cooperation with NATO

would be an “operational nightmare.”67 Indeed, as Dana

Allin of the International Institute for Strategic Studies

observes, this new partnership once again shows Moscow

that NATO is not excluding or severing it from Europe.68

Specifically, consolidation and extension of the new

working relationship among all these organizations and

governments should begin to affect not only the Russian and

CIS’ governments, but also the internal relationships

between EU and NATO. This is especially the case as the

former strives to encompass more and more military

missions and the latter becomes more and more a primarily

political and collective security organization. Therefore, the

relations between the EU and NATO, as well as Russia’s

ties to these organizations, will also change. Indeed, the

CIS offers many opportunities for the EU to realize its

conflict prevention and peace mission vocation, as well as

scope for the exercise of the CESDP’s operational mandate

over a vast field of activity, and to do so without coming into

conflict with America and NATO.

Even more importantly, the opening of this enormous

new field for coordinated activity by Transatlantic security

organizations can help resolve some of the many tensions

now plaguing Transatlantic relationships over international security. These tensions encompass widening

disparities in both sides’ view of the threats to international

and regional security and how to deal with them, the role

and missions of armed force, and the most expeditious ways

of modernizing and using existing military forces. NATO

apparently has concluded that “out of area” missions are

now on its agenda, but there is no consensus as to how it

should conduct those missions and who should do so.69

Accordingly, the new opportunities for Transatlantic

22
security organizations and new missions for their agents

create an opportunity for bridging the gap or at least for

devising an agenda by which that gap might be reduced

through multilateral and mutual discussion.

The way forward emerges if we rethink contemporary

military operations as constituting a revolution in military

affairs (RMA) not only in the technological-operational side,

but also relate new operations and weaponry to the

concurrent fundamental alterations in the international

state system and political order. As Australian analyst

Alan Ryan noted, mainly with regard to Canberra’s

operation in East Timor, the RMA can and perhaps should

be reconceptualized in political terms. When we do that, the

following points become clear. As Ryan observes,

technological transformations in warfare are equaled, if not

surpassed, by comparable or larger transformations in

attitudes concerning the legitimate use of military power

and who may employ military power for what ends.

Military forces are expected to provide a wider range of

capabilities, at less cost, than ever before. For advanced

Western countries, this, as well as the expectation that conflict

be waged with minimal casualties, has meant that combat

capability is no longer perceived as a blunt weapon but rather

as a rapier. Accordingly, countries that wish to shape the

international security environment need to retain

broad-spectrum, leading-edge military forces capable of

cooperating with other forces at short notice. The security of

the emergent multilateral, international states’ system is

reliant on general concepts of legitimacy that are increasingly

preserved by coalition operations. In the absence of a

mandatory international government—a utopian notion at

present—the international system is defined by the extent to

which states are prepared to cooperate.70

Ryan’s observations are especially relevant to the

possibility for the EU, NATO, and their members to devise

systematic bilateral and multilateral plans, including

Russia, for preventive deployment, crisis prevention,

conflict prevention, and conflict resolution, including actual

23
deployments of forces where necessary. They confirm the

necessity for coalitional warfare or stability operations

which, in turn, presupposes unity of threat assessments and

objectives among the coalition partners. East Timor also

confirms the necessity for such capabilities. Australian

assessments stress that success was not only due to a long

and well-established relationship with Indonesia, but also

because of the long and even more established relationship

with the United States, and the individual capability of the

leading power in the coalition, i.e., Australia, to project

power and make independent strategic decisions,

capabilities only available to solidly established states.71

Similarly, the leading partner must possess robust

command, control, computers, communications,

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR)

capabilities, deployable utility forces, robust logistics and

lift capabilities, and thus the ability to protect other states’

forces.72 Kvashnin’s admission concedes that only the West

can play this role in the CIS, and thus it is essential that

legitimacy for future operations be established by the

forging of a durable and politically sustainable military

relationship among CIS regimes, including Russia, NATO,

the EU, and all their members.

The dialogues and activities that would occur within this

framework, both strategic and political, also enable NATO

to convert many current challenges into opportunities for

extending and developing its newly acquired capabilities to

meet actual threats and to conduct conflict prevention,

crisis management, and both combat and stability

operations. Since NATO’s militaries must adapt to the new

strategic environment defined by Ryan and many other

analysts, and also adapt to the requirements of

enlargement, a reconceptualization of roles and missions is

especially timely.73

Military adaptation by the new members and

prospective ones is proceeding, but with serious difficulties.

It is clear that West European states will not meet the fiscal

24
challenges inherent in developing forces that compare with

the U.S. military regarding technological sophistication, or

capability for force projection abroad. Indeed, NATO

Secretary-General Lord Robertson is already trying to

tighten and modify NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative

(DCI) to make it more effective and a more achievable

program that can also facilitate NATO’s adaptation to the

needs of the war on terrorism and enhance cooperation with

the CESDP.74

Rather than endlessly revisiting the same arguments

that now divide NATO, we can exploit the changed

conception of the use of force suggested by Ryan and the new

opportunities in the CIS to provide a way out of this dead

end. It is not only a question of Westernizing new members’

militaries and of changing the structures and composition of

NATO forces, but also of rethinking mission and

procurement strategies among members and/or associated

states in the CIS. As Ryan suggests, and he is not alone, the

RMA applies universally to political questions more than it

does to technological responses to changing strategic

circumstances.75 Envisioning the RMA in this way also

allows us to overcome differences between America and

Europe regarding the future direction of European defense

policies. European governments do not see the need for

building extra-European power projection capabilities or

forces for foreign combat operations to the extent that

Washington does. They also advertise an allegedly strongly

differentiated view of the threat from endangered, if not

failing states. Therefore, perhaps they should take the lead

in designing what U.S. analysts are now calling a Stability

Operations RMA that would emphasize the integration of

military and nonmilitary activities.76 Among these

activities would be the kind of “defence diplomacy” now

conducted by European governments and the United

States.77

While this RMA would entail investment in new

technologies, it would not become the capital intensive

process that the U.S. version has become. Certainly, there

25
would be development of new and advanced data bases,

artificial intelligence, robotics, nonlethal weapons, and an

enhanced military-political analytical capability that

embraces both civilian and military institutions. All this

would aim to create a culture of creativity regarding

preventive, if not post-conflict solutions, missions, and

operations in the CIS and elsewhere.78 And it might

actually galvanize mutual activity among all the concerned

parties dealing with Transcaspian security involving the

roles and missions of democratic or democratizing police

and military forces in real or potential combat zones.

Admittedly, this might come to resemble NATO’s dreaded

division of labor where the U.S. forces perform combat

operations and Europe gets the unglamorous stability

operations. But this proposal (and that is all that it is) could

trigger a debate that could lead to mutually acceptable

solutions among NATO members and with the EU which

has, in any case, announced its readiness to conduct these

smaller-scale Petersberg missions. A serious debate, rather

than the kind of undisciplined polemics that have now

become all too common in the transatlantic debate, would

benefit everyone and could stimulate fresh thinking about

the strategic integration of Russia and the CIS as part of a

reshaped Eurasian strategic system and security agenda.

Conclusions.

Karl Deutsch, one of the pioneers of the theory of

regional integration and the originator of the concept of a

security community, observed that there are four aspects to

regional integration: “maintaining peace, attaining greater

multipurpose capabilities, accomplishing some specific

task, and gaining a new self-image and role identity.”79 To

the degree that NATO and other security organizations

effectively systematize and expand their “defence

diplomacy” and mutual cooperation with Russia and the

CIS, they will certainly facilitate accomplishment of all

these goals for Russia and its neighbors and establish new

capabilities and a new identity for Europe and its security

26
agencies. These activities could also greatly revitalize

Transatlantic cooperation while helping to stabilize and

integrate the new states to the West. We should not pretend

that this is a short-term process for merely a few years.

Russia’s integration is already in its second decade and a

very troubled affair, not least in its military aspects, and the

other CIS regimes are clearly some distance behind Russia.

But if we view today’s crisis as both challenge and

opportunity, it becomes clear that the war precipitated on

September 11 presents vibrant new possibilities for

governments and their armed forces to forge new and

enduring structures of cooperation. This is only achievable

on a multilateral scale, given the size of the challenge in the

CIS. But multilateralism, using tested and proven

institutions like NATO and the OSCE, as well as the EU’s

nascent defensive capabilities, provides confidence as well

as competence, while not excessively alarming the

recipients of this pressure for integration.

Multilateral security engagement on military and other

issues not only enhances mutual confidence, but hopefully

stabilizes the former Soviet Union and galvanizes the

Western security organizations to adopt new missions and

forge a new strategic consensus. Few initiatives in world

affairs offer so much scope for major positive

transformation. Yet not many other situations also hold out

the high risk that if we squander the present opportunity

the result will be unending conflict across an enormous

number of states and territories that may be beyond

anybody’s ability to extinguish anytime soon. The challenge

is therefore great, but so is the opportunity. Moreover, as

the means of realizing Eurasia’s integration are now at

hand, thanks to the new partnerships with Russia and CIS

members, the time for action is also now.

Recommendations.

NATO and its leading members’ governments should

undertake serious organizational moves to consolidate and

27
expand possibilities for effective military integration with

the Russian military to give it a stake in integration and in

the kinds of reform it must undergo to survive and flourish.

It appears that a convergence of approaches is taking place

among analysts, if not governments, about the general

direction that such integrative activities should take. A

Russo-American-European task force composed of the U.S.

Atlantic Council, the Centre for European Reform in

London, and the Russian Institute for U.S. and Canadian

Studies (ISKRAN) reported about the new East-West

partnership that,

In all of this, participation of Russia will be essential. If Russia

is not to view out-of-area missions or NATO’s new strategic

concept with suspicion, it must be involved and informed

(although not necessarily with a decision-making role). Russia

could be encouraged to take a more active role in the

Partnership for Peace, especially as the emphasis on Central

Asia increases. Russian officers could also be brought into the

more technical process of force reviews, exercises, and even joint

force planning. One of the most valuable steps the West could

take is to integrate Russia into its own efforts at military reform

and perhaps provide at least some of the significant assistance

that will be required if the Russian forces are to be transformed

into effective coalition partners without placing an

unsustainable burden on the Russian society and economy.80

Similarly, based on the proposals of the Russian analyst

Dmitry Trenin of the Carnegie Endowment in Moscow,

NATO’s resolutions to its members, and our own thoughts,

we can propose the following ideas for consideration by

NATO and member governments and militaries. At their

first meeting, the Defense Ministers of the NATO-Russian

Council in Brussels on June 6, 2002, tasked their

ambassadors with several missions, among them:

To consider the operational implications arising out of

the terrorist threat to SFOR and KFOR peacekeepers

in Bosnia and Kosovo.

28
To determine an appropriate timetable for and

proceed with a broader assessment of the terrorist

threat to the Euro-Atlantic Area, initially

concentrating on specific threats to NATO and

Russian forces, civilian aircraft, or by civilian aircraft

to civilian infrastructural targets, e.g., nuclear power

plants. A working group would subsequently draw

the necessary operational implications.

To consider a follow-on organizing conference in

Moscow on the military role in combatting terrorism

that should focus on concrete possibilities for

enhanced cooperation in this field.

To consider ways to strengthen cooperation in crisis

management.

To create an ad hoc working group on nonproliferation

and develop a joint assessment of trends in the

proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical

agents, leading to a structured exchange of views, and

then ongoing missile proliferation discussions, and

the exploration of intensified practical cooperation

from NBC agents.

To continue developing the relevant sections of the

Permanent Joint Council’s earlier work program in

arms control and confidence-building measures and

develop the NATO-Russia Nuclear Experts

Consultation Work Plan.

To exchange views on defense reform including

ongoing NATO-Russian Staff talks on defense reform.

These exchanges will consist of dialogue and mutual

assistance, including possible initiatives on reform

techniques and personnel training and economic

issues including conversion.

29
To consider creating an ad hoc working group on

defense reform and arrange a seminar on defense

reform at the NATO Defense College in Rome.

To cooperate in logistics, air transport, and air-to-air

refueling, and “as a first step, to agree [to] specific

action plans including possible timetables for taking

forward cooperation in these areas”; demonstration

tests should be discussed with a view to organizing

them as soon as possible.

To monitor the finalization and implementation for a

framework document on search and rescue at sea,

including submarine crews and to raise mutual

confidence in this area.

To develop specific plans and agree on timetables for

implementing the Council’s Work Programme

regarding training, exercises, and cooperative air

space initiative and to pursue implementation as

quickly as possible.81

These decisions illustrate how the new Council could

serve as a forum for reform of the Russian Army, but if they

go beyond these first steps to encompass some of the

recommendations made above, they will also

internationalize that process and diffuse it to the CIS.

Following Trenin’s and our own ideas, the steps below

may be recommended to Washington, NATO and perhaps to

other leading members of the Alliance and the headquarters

of the nascent CESDP in Brussels.

Based on the existing Russian cell at USCENTCOM

headquarters in Tampa, CENTCOM and the Russian

General Staff (GS) should establish a permanent

liaison and cell that covers not just Afghanistan but

also Central Asia.

30
Once the new CSTO for the CIS gets started, Russia

should invite the Pentagon to send its representatives

to be a permanent liaison to the new regional

command structure and to the existing antiterrorism

center. These links should be integrated within an

overall coordination cell.

U.S. and Russian forces should take advantage of the

experience of the CSTO and CENTRASBAT to

conduct further combined exercises together and with

Transcaspian militaries. These can and should also

be conducted under the auspices of the PfP, and

Russia should be encouraged to join and take part as

an equal member of the PFP. These exercises can and

should be supplemented by regular seminars and

discussion on threat assessment, doctrine, and

coordination.

A special joint training center could be established at

Bishkek or Dushanbe (Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan).

Finally, both Washington and NATO should

encourage liaison officers with Russia and

Transcaspian militaries at various levels, not just at

the CENTCOM/GS level but down to regional units

like Russia’s 201st division in Tajikistan and Russian

border guards there and Russian liaison units with

U.S. forces in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and

Tajikistan.

Finally, Washington and Moscow should maintain

permanent cells and/or liaison with the new CESDP

organization coming into being in Brussels to ensure

tripartite coordination among it, Russia and the

United States (as well as NATO).82

These recommendations and decisions illustrate how

the new Council could serve as a forum for reform of the

Russian Army, but if they go beyond these first steps to

encompass some of the recommendations made above, they

31
will also internationalize that process and diffuse it to the

CIS. The new partnership with Russia, as revealed in the

statement above and in other statements by Putin, Sergei

Ivanov, and others, underscores how the questions of

Russian defense reform and CIS stability are linked, and

that the former is necessary if Russia is to be a lasting and

meaningful partner in the war on terrorism and if the

Transcaspian is to be securely pacified. In short, the

democratization of Russian national security agencies and

policies and the stabilization of the CIS are linked policies,

and we now have the instrument at hand and the means to

use it to bring about genuine progress on those goals.

ENDNOTES

1. Stephen Blank, “Every Shark East of Suez: Great Power

Interests, Policies, and Tactics in the Transcaspian Energy Wars,”

Central Asian Survey, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, 1999, pp. 149-184; Moscow,

Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, in Russian, November 17, 2000,

Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Eurasia, (henceforth

FBIS SOV), November 22, 2000.

2. Anatol Lieven, “The Not So Great Game,” The National Interest,

No. 49, Winter, 1999-2000, pp. 69-80; Anatol Lieven, “Bobbing for

Rotten Apples: Geopolitical Agendas in Ukraine and the Western CIS,”

paper presented to the Project on Systemic Change and International

Security in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, Nitze School of

Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University,

Washington, DC, 2000; Anatol Lieven, “The End of NATO,” Prospect,

December 2001; Richard Sokolsky and Tanya Charlick-Paley, NATO

and Caspian Security: A Mission Too Far?, Santa Monica, CA: Rand

Corporation, 1999; Eugene Rumer, “Fear and Loathing in the ‘Stans’,”

Christian Science Monitor, August 2, 2001; Ira Straus, “Wisdom or

Temptation in Central Asia?” The Russia Journal, February 22-28,

2002.

3. Moscow, Interfax, in English, February 20, 2001, FBIS SOV,

February 20, 2001.

4. The Atlantic Council of the United States, Centre for European

Reform, and Institute for the U.S. and Candian Studies of the Russian

Academy of Sciences, The Twain Shall Meet: The Prospects for

Russia-West Relations, Washington, DC, 2002; Nabi Abdullaev,

“Experts Say Moscow To Assume Key Role,” St. Petersburg Times, June

32
18, 2002; Dmitri Trenin, “A Farewell to the Great Game?” paper

presented to the Conference on Russian National Security Policy and

the War on Terrorism, Monterey, CA, June 4-5, 2002, cited with

permission of the author (a revised version will be published in a

forthcoming issue of European Security); for an American view, see

Clifford A. Kupchan and Charles A. Kupchan, “Central Asia: A Budding

Partnership,” Los Angeles Times, May 19, 2002.

5. Richard N. Haass, “U.S.-Russian Relations in the Post-Post-Cold

War World,” remarks to RAND Business Leaders Forum, Tenth

Plenary Meeting, New York, June 1, 2002, www.state.gov.

6. The best account of NATO’s evolution in the 1990s is David Yost,

The Transformation of NATO, Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace,

1998; for recognition of this by foreign statesmen, see the comments of

Finnish Defense Minister Jan-Erik Enestam, “NATO, Europe, and

Finland,” in Tomas Ries, ed., NATO Tomorrow, Helsinki: Department of

Strategic and Defence Studies, National Defence College, 2000, from

the Seminar on “NATO Tomorrow,” arranged by the Atlantic Council of

Finland and the Department of Strategic and Defence Studies, National

Defense College of Finland, Helsinki, March 30-31, 2000, pp. 1-3; see

also Francois Heisbourg and Rob De Wijk, “Debate: Is the Fundamental

Nature of the Transatlantic Security Relationship Changing”? NATO

Review, Spring, 2001, pp. 15-19; Lieutenant Colonel (USA) Timothy C.

Shea, “Shaping on NATO’s Doorstep—U.S.-Ukraine Relations,” Joint

Forces Quarterly, Autumn 2001-Winter 2002, pp. 58-64; Lieutenant

Colonel (USAF) James E. DeTemple, “Military Engagement in the

South Caucasus,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn 2001-Winter 2002,

pp. 65-71; and for the underestimation of the value of U.S. and Western

military programs, see Andrew Bacevich, “Steppes to Empire,” The

National Interest, No. 68, Summer 2002, pp. 39-54.

7. “Statement by His Excellency Giorgi Burduli, First Deputy

Foreign Minister of Georgia,” EAPC Foreign Minister Meeting,

Florence, May 25, 2000, www.nato.int/docu./speech/2000/

s000525p.htm; De Temple, pp. 65-71.

8. For examples of the consequences of Russian policy, see Dov

Lynch, Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS: The Cases of

Moldova, Georgia, and Tajikistan, Royal Institute of International

Affairs, Russia and Eurasia Programme, London and New York:

Macmillan and St. Martin’s Press for the Royal Institute of

International Affairs, 2000; Dov Lynch, “Euro-Asian Conflicts and

Peacekeeping Dilemmas,” Dov Lynch and Yelena Kalyuzhnova, eds.,

The Euro-Asian World: A Period of Transition, New York: St. Martin’s

Press, 2000, pp. 17-22; Charles King, “The Benefits of Ethnic War:

33
Understanding Eurasia’s Unrecognized States,” World Politics, Vol.

LIII, No. 4, July 2001, pp. 538-543.

9. S. Frederick Starr, “Russia and the Neighboring Countries,”

Presentation to the Kennan Roundtable at The Council on Foreign

Relations, Washington, DC, January 24, 2001.

10. The Monitor, May 29, 2002; Charles Fairbanks, “Being There,”

The National Interest, No. 68, Summer 2002, pp. 39-55.

11. Alexander Golts, “Tough Challenge Ahead as Putin Looks

West,” The Russia Journal, October 5-11, 2001.

12. Fairbanks, p. 47. It should be noted first that once the mission

has been achieved, these forces can then be withdrawn, and second, that

they need not be a large number of forces to disrupt local societies,

merely enough to fulfill their stabilizing mission, one long-enshrined in

U.S. military practice.

13. Text of Joint Declaration, The United States of America and the

Russian Federation, St. Petersburg, May 24, 2002, www.whitehouse.

gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020524-2.html; “NATO-Russia

Relations A New Quality: Declaration by Heads of State and

Government NATO Member States and the Russian Federation,”

Rome, May 28, 2002, www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b020528.htm.

14. Ibid.

15. Askold Krushelnycky, “Kyiv, in Policy Shift, Seeks NATO

Membership,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty Magazine, May 30,

2002.

16. Charles Clover, “Kiev Warned on Neutral Policy,” Financial

Times, July 12, 2001, p. 2.

17. The Monitor, November 30, 2001.

18. Vilor Niyazov, “Uzbekistan Leaves Regional Organization,”

TASS, June 14, 2002.

19. Tom Canahuate, “Uzbekistan, U.S. Plan To Expand Military

Ties,” DefenseNews.com, January 25, 2002; “Armenian Officers Will Get

Military Training in US,” Dow Jones International News, June 20, 2002.

20. See Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov’s article in Moscow,

Kommersant-Vlast, in Russian, June 11, 2002, FBIS SOV, June 11,

2002; and Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty Newsline, May 21, 2002.

34
21. This emerges openly in Putin’s annual report to the Duma,

April, 18, 2002, www.kremlin.ru.

22. Moscow, NTV Mir, in Russian, May 14, 2002, FBIS SOV, May

14, 2002. For an early example of Russian views on how this might be

arranged, advanced in order to forestall NATO’s first round of

enlargement, see Moscow, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, June

21-27, 1997, FBIS SOV, June 27, 1997.

23. P. J. Simmons and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, “Introduction,” P.

J. Simmons and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, eds., Managing Global

Issues: Lessons Learned, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, 2001, pp. 8-9.

24. Sokolsky and Chadwick-Paley, p. 10

25. S. Neil MacFarlane, “Arms Control and Peace Settlements: the

Caucasus,” Working Paper, Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP),

1999-2000.

26. Sokolsky and Chadwick-Paley; David Menashri, ed., Central

Asia Meets the Middle East, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998;

Stephen Blank, “A Sacred Place Is Never Empty: The External

Geopolitics of the TransCaspian,” in Jim Colbert, ed., Natural Resources

and National Security: Sources of Conflict & the U.S. Interest,

Washington, DC: Jewish Institute of National Security Affairs, 2001,

pp. 123-142; FBIS SOV, November 22, 2000.

27. Ricardo Haussmann, “Prisoners of Geography,” Foreign Policy,

January-February, 2000, pp. 44-53.

28. Celeste A. Wallander, “Institutional Assets and Adaptability:

NATO After the Cold War,” International Organization, Vol. LIV, No. 4,

Autumn 2000, p. 724.

29. Pauli Jarvenpaa, “NATO and the Partners: A Dynamic

Relationship,” in Ries, ed., pp. 48-54.

30. Wallander, pp. 705-735; John S. Duffield, “NATO’s Functions

After the Cold War,” Political Science Quarterly, Winter, 1994-1995, pp.

763-787; Rebecca R. Moore, “NATO’s Mission for the New Millennium:

A Value-Based Approach to Building Security,” Contemporary Security

Policy, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, April 2002, pp. 1-34.

31. On the equivocal position of the Russian forces and government

towards terrorism, see Ahmed Rashid, Jihad, New Haven, CT: Yale

University Press, 2001, pp. 172-174, 189-193; Ahmed Rashid, Taliban:

35
Militant Islam, Oil & Fundamentalism in Central Asia, New Haven,

CT: Yale University Press, 2000, p. 179; “Putin’s Unscrambled Eggs,”

The Economist, March 9, 2002, p. 53.

32. For an assessment of what European security organizations are

doing toward this end, see Paul Eavis and Stuart Kefford, “Conflict

Prevention and the European Union: A Potential Yet to Be Fully

Realized,” in Paul Van Tongeren, Hans van de Veen, and Juliette

Verhoeven, eds., Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia: An

Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities, Boulder,

CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, pp. 3-14; Richard Caplan, “A New

Trusteeship? The International Administration of War-Torn

Territories,” Adelphi Papers No. 341, 2002; “EU Civilian Crisis

Management,” in Graeme Herd and Jouko Huru, eds., Conflict Studies

Research Centre, Royal Military Academy, Camberley, Surrey, 2001;

Wolfgang Zellner, “The OSCE: Uniquely Qualified for a Conflict

Prevention Role,” Van Tongeren, et al., pp. 15-26; Cees Homan,

“Interview with Max Van Der Stoel, Former High Commissioner on

National Minorities,” Helsinki Monitor, Vol. XIII, No. 1, 2002, pp. 3-10;

Taras Kuzio, “The OSCE and the CIS: Strange Election Bedfellows?”

Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty Newsline, April 9, 2002.

33. Moore, pp. 1-34; Wallander, pp. 705-735; Duffield, pp. 763-787;

Sergio Balanzino, “NATO Since the Cold War,” in Ries, ed., pp. 4-10;

Glen Segell, “Civil-Military Relations From Westphalia to the European

Union,” paper presented to the Annual Convention of the International

Studies Association, Minneapolis, MN, March 18-21, 1998; Stephen

Blank, “Map Reading: NATO’s and Russia’s Pathways to European

Military Integration,” Occasional Papers of the Woodrow Wilson Center,

No. 61, February 2001, also published in Review of International

Affairs, I, No. 1, pp. 31-52, 2001.

34. Ibid., Yost.

35. Peter Foot, “European Military Education Today,” Baltic

Defense Review, No. 5, 2001, pp. 23-25; Brigadier General Michael H.

Clemmesen (Denmark), “Integration of New Alliance Members: The

Intellectual-Cultural Dimension,” Defense Analysis, Vol. XV, No. 3,

1999, pp. 261-272.

36. Judy Dempsey, “Moscow Asks NATO for Help in

Restructuring,” Financial Times, October 26, 2001, p. 2.

37. Jenonne Walker, Security and Arms Control in

Post-Confrontation Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp.

36
6-7; Daniel Nelson, Definition, Diagnosis, Therapy—A Civil/Military

Critique,” unpublished paper, 2001; Golts, “Tough Challenge Ahead.”

38. “Moscow Will Not Cooperate with NATO on Military Issues:

DEFMIN,” Interfax, May 3, 2002.

39. Conversations with Russian, European, and Canadian analysts,

Wilton Park England, March 11-14, 2002; “Press Opportunity and Joint

Press Briefing by Chairman of NATO Military Committee Admiral

Guido Venturoni and First Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces General

Staff General Yuri Baluyevsky,” Official Kremlin International News

Broadcast, May 28, 2002, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; Olga Semyonova,

“A Group of Experts Will Be Formed for Russia’s Cooperation With

NATO,” RIA Novosti, June 6, 2002.

40. FBIS SOV, June 11, 2002; “Moscow Will Not Cooperate with

NATO.”

41. Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty Newsline, May 29, 2002; John

Diedrich, “U.S. Faces Tough Training Mission in the Caucasus,”

Christian Science Monitor, May 30, 2002; Tbilisi, Iprinda, in Georgian,

November 18, 2000, FBIS SOV, November 18, 2000; Moscow, Izvestiya,

in Russian, November 23, 2000, FBIS SOV, November 23, 2000; “The

Ruins of an Empire: Will Georgia Ever Emerge From Russia’s Shadow?”

Newsweek International, June 3, 2002.

42. Ibid.; Nikolai Sokov, “Instability in the South Caucasus and the

War Against Terorrism,” Program on New Approaches to Russian

Security, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington,

DC, No. 247, 2002; Thomas De Waal, “Into the Georgian Quagmire,”The

Moscow Times, May 24, 2002, p. 8.

43. For details, see Stephen Blank, “U.S. Military in Azerbaijan To

Counter Iran,” Central Asia Caucasus Analyst, April 10, 2002.

44. Remarks by His Excellency Bjorn Von Sydow, Defense Minister

of Sweden, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington,

DC, May 25, 2002.

45. Canahuate; Igor Torbakov, “A New Security Arrangement

Takes Shape in the South Caucasus,” Eurasia Insight, January 29,

2002, www.eurasianet.org.

46. Sami G. Hajjar, U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges

and Prospects, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.

Army War College, 2002, pp. 19-29.

37
47. Thomas E. Ricks, “An Unprecedented Coalition,” Washington

Post Weekly, October 1-7, 2001, p. 19; Thomas E. Ricks, “Former Soviet

Republics Play a Key Role,” Washington Post, September 23, 2001, p.

A24; Thomas E. Ricks and Susan B. Glasser,” U.S. Operated Covert

Alliance With Uzbekistan,” Washington Post, October 24, 2001, pp. A1,

24.

48. David Dickens, “Can East Timor Be a Blueprint for Burden

Sharing?” Washington Quarterly, Vol. XXV, No. 3, Summer 2002, pp.

29-41; David Dickens, “The United Nations in East Timor: Intervention

at the Military-Operational Level,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.

XXIII, No. 2, August 2001, pp. 228-229.

49. Caplan; Herd and Huru; Eavis and Kefford, pp. 3-14.

50. Dylan Hendrickson and Andrezj Karkoszka, “The Challenges of

Security Sector Reform,” Relief Web: Highlights from the SIPRIYearbook

2002, www.reliefweb.int/w/Rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/

3adop25f99be, June 14, 2002.

51. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 27, 1999, pp. 1-2.

52. Discussions with Russian generals at the Harvard University

Executive Program for U.S. and Russian Generals, Cambridge, MA,

February 20, 2002.

53. Sokov; De Waal.

54. Rashid.

55. Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty Newsline, May 31, 2002;

“Russia Plans Military Overhaul,” BBC News, May 31, 2002.

56. Adam Daniel Rotfeld, “Introduction: Global Security After 11

September 2001, Relief Web: Highlights from the SIPRI Yearbook 2002,

www.reliefweb.int/w/Rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/

3adop25f99be, June 14, 2002.

57. John Roper and Peter Van Ham, “Redefining Russia’s Role in

Europe,” in Vladimir Baranovsky, ed., Russia and Europe: The

Emerging Security Agenda, Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI,

1997, p. 517.

58. Douglas Frantz, “Around the World, Hints of Afghanistans to

Come,” New York Times, May 26, 2002, Section 4, p. 5.

38
59. Larry Diamond, “Is Pakistan the (Reverse) Wave of the Future?”

Journal of Democracy, Vol. XI, No. 3, July 2000, pp. 91-106.

60. “Crime Central,” Far Eastern Economic Review, May 30, 2002,

www.feer.com.

61. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, “A Farewell to

Flashman: American Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia,” address

at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies,

Washington, DC, July 21, 1997.

62. Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Millen, Tweaking NATO: The

Case for Integrated Multinational Divisions, Carlisle Barracks, PA:

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 2002.

63. Menashri; FBIS SOV, November, 22, 2000; Blank, “A Sacred

Place is Never Empty,” pp. 23-42.

64. Stephen Blank, “From Shanghai to Brussels: The Future of

Transcaspian Security,” Forthcoming, Acque & Terre.

65. For a general assessment of the relevance of weapons

proliferation to the Transcaspian, see Gary K. Bertsch, Cassady Craft,

Scott A. Jones and Michael Beck, eds., Crossroads and Conflict: Security

and Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia, New York:

Routledge, 2000.

66. Charles Fairbanks, C. Richard Nelson, S. Frederick Starr,

Kenneth Weisbrode, Strategic Assessment of Central Eurasia,

Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council of the United States and Central

Asia Caucasus Institute of the Nitze School of Advanced International

Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 2001, pp. 78-79.

67. Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Continuing Crisis of Russian Air

Power,” Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2001, pp. 22-26.

68. Jeremy Bransten, “NATO: Russia Signs Accord With the

Alliance—Is Membership Next?” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty,

June 3, 2002.

69. “Special Report: Europe and America: Old Friends and New,”

The Economist, June 1, 2002, pp. 26-27.

70. Alan Ryan, “From Desert Storm to East Timor: Australia, the

Pacific, and the ‘New Age’ Coalition Operations,” Land Warfare Study

Centre, Study Paper 302, 2000, pp. 1-2.

39
71. Dickens, “Can East Timor Be a Blueprint,” pp. 29-40.

72. Ibid.

73. Millen.

74. Judy Dempsey, “NATO Considers Role in Fight Against

Terrorism,” Financial Times, June 6, 2002, p. 2.

75. Ryan, pp. 1-2; Dr. Steven Metz and Lieutenant Colonel

Raymond Millen (USA), “NATO and the Revolution in Military Affairs,”

Allgemeine Schweizerische Militarische Zeitschrift, June 2002, pp.

14-15.

76. Ibid.

77. “New Challenges to Defence Diplomacy,” International Institute

for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1999-2000, Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2000, pp. 38-53.

78. Metz and Millen.

79. Karl Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations,

Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1978, pp. 239-240; Farkhod

Tolipov, “Nationalism as a Geopolitical Phenomenon: the Central Asian

Case,” Central Asian Survey, Vol. XX, No. 2, June 2001, p. 192.

80. The Twain Shall Meet, pp. 14-15.

81. “Statement: NATO-Russia Council at the Level of Defence

Ministers,” Brussels, June 6, 2002, www.nato.int/docu/pr/

2002/po20606e.htm.

82. Trenin.

40
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Author

Dr. Stephen J. Blank

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Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

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Composition

Ms. Kimberly A. Rockwell