Defeating Terrorism:

Strategic Issue Analyses

Edited by

Colonel John R. Martin

January 2002
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ISBN 1-58487-080-X

ii
CONTENTS

Foreword ··········································v

Introduction· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · vii

1. Terrorism Viewed Historically

Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II and Colonel John R. Martin ··············· 1

2. War Aims and War Termination

Dr. Stephen Biddle ·································· 7

3. Beware of Unintended Consequences

Dr. Conrad C. Crane································· 13

4. Avoiding Holy War: Ensuring That the War on Terrorism

Is Not Perceived as a War on Islam

Dr. Sami G. Hajjar·································· 17

5. State Support for Terrorism

Dr. Steven Metz ··································· 21

6. Maintaining Strategic Balance while Fighting Terrorism

Dr. Conrad C. Crane ································· 27

7. Homeland Security Issues: A Strategic Perspective

Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria II ···················· 31

8. The Military’s Role in the New Domestic Security Environment:

Will Army Missions Change?

Colonel Dallas D. Owens······························· 37

9. Defining Preparedness: Army Force Structure in the War on Terrorism

Colonel John R. Martin ······························· 43

10. The Campaign against Terrorism: Finding the Right Mix

of Foreign Policy Instruments

Ambassador Marshall F. McCallie ························· 47

11. The Carrot and Stick Challenge

Dr. Gordon Rudd and Colonel John R. Martin ··················· 53

12. Potential Changes in U.S. Civil-Military Relations

Dr. Marybeth Peterson Ulrich and Dr. Conrad C. Crane ·············· 59

iii
13. Maintaining Public Support for Military Operations

Dr. Leonard Wong ·································· 65

14. Ethical Issues in Counterterrorism Warfare

Dr. Martin L. Cook ·································· 71

15. Coalition Partners: Pakistan

Dr. Steven Metz ··································· 75

16. Coalition Partners: India

Dr. Andrew Scobell ································· 79

17. Central Asia and the War on Terrorism: Towards a New Alignment

Dr. Stephen J. Blank································· 83

18. Russia and the U.S. War on Terrorism

Dr. Stephen J. Blank································· 87

19. Coalition Partners: China

Dr. Andrew Scobell ································· 93

20. Reaction of Key Asian States to the War on Terrorism

Dr. Andrew Scobell ································· 97

21. Terrorism: Sounding Roland’s Horn across the Atlantic

Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Millen························ 101

About the Authors · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 107

iv
FOREWORD

After the horrendous attacks of September 11, 2001, the Strategic Studies Institute

marshalled its analytical resources to provide insights on how best to defeat the terrorist

threat and wage the war on terrorism. This collection of essays represents the initial

contributions made by the Institute. They were designed to provide senior Army leadership

with context, information, and policy options as they made strategic decisions in the earliest

days of the war. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to share this collection with the

broader national security community.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

v
INTRODUCTION

Within only a few days after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Army

War College initiated a series of short studies addressing strategic issues in the war on

terrorism. This collection of essays analyzes a broad array of subjects of great strategic

importance. Because national leaders were pressed to issue orders on the prosecution of the

war on terrorism, it was necessary to produce these papers on a very short time-line. This got

the ideas included in the articles into the hands of decisionmakers as quickly as possible,

giving them better understanding of factors affecting their various decisions. Issue analysis

was never short-changed in this process, but authors were asked to provide “think pieces”

quickly and to worry less about references and footnotes and more about capturing strategic

insights. The shortened time-line in some cases also meant that it was possible to provide

only an understanding of the context of the decision; specific policy recommendations were

considered something that could be developed later if not included in these papers.

Even given these caveats, these papers represent an extraordinary amount of intellectual

energy expended in only a few weeks. They have already been distributed to many senior

leaders, but it still seemed appropriate to publish them formally. This volume provides

historical documentation of some of the advice given the military leadership in the early days

of the war, but it also continues to be a source of solid strategic analysis as the war lengthens

and perhaps broadens.

The first paper provides historical perspective, but as you read many of the other essays,

you will note several common and recurring themes. The first point is that this war can be

won. Even now, some analysts question the stated war aims and doubt the possibility of

victory. Nobody suggests it will be anything less than a complex undertaking, but victory is

possible—although that probably only means a “new normalcy,” not the comparatively

halcyon days of the prewar situation. Conversely, the war on terrorism can be lost if missteps

produce unintended strategic consequences. One way to do that would be to ignore the other

parts of the world where America’s interests lie. President Bush and the administration

appear to have dodged this pitfall thus far, but they still must work to avoid expanding the

war unnecessarily. As the struggle against terrorism proceeds, it is perhaps best to allow

other elements of national power—not the military—to take the lead. The military will still

be an essential component, but should be a buttress to the diplomatic, economic, and

information elements as they attempt to end the scourge of terrorism with a minimum

amount of further warfare.

The war on terrorism will require a restructuring of the military; it is less apparent that

the military will have to grow significantly. In particular, the homeland defense mission will

require a heretofore missing emphasis that will necessitate quantitative and qualitative

changes in the active and reserve components. The defense establishment needs to place a

high priority on defining the requirements; apportioning them appropriately; and developing

the forces necessary to fight the war on terrorism, defend the homeland, maintain strategic

balance and adapt and accelerate transformation.

Any expansion of the war requires a clear-cut rationale—both international and

domestic. The regional essays, separately edited by Dr. Steve Metz, give global perspectives

on the war on terrorism. They focus initially on the regions where the war is being actively

vii
fought, but look through the wider lens as well. Both regions that were previously lower on

the U.S. priority and possible future peer competitors must be considered before other

terrorist targets are attacked with any of the elements of national power.

It is still impossible to tell, of course, exactly how this war will end. It is possible even now,

though, to give some advice and insights that will lead to the best possible conclusions to the

war. If American leaders continue to concentrate on winning the war, not just winning the

early battles, the result will be a world free from mass-casualty terror, a world where

American values of liberty and open markets can continue to flourish.

viii
Terrorism has come in many guises

through the centuries, reflecting changes in

terrorists’ conceptions of the best targets

and methods to use to achieve their political

ends. Until the 20th century, most

terrorism was directed against “tyrants” or

their agents. This style of terrorism traces

its roots at least as far back as Biblical times

and was sanctioned by no less than Aristotle

and Plutarch. There have been periodic

waves of this type of terror, the most

historically remarkable being the reign in

northern Iran of the hashishim—the

Assassins—for almost 200 years, from 1047

to 1296. Another upsurge of assassination

attempts afflicted Europe between 1860

and 1911. Although just outside of that

period, the assassination of the Austrian

Archduke Ferdinand in 1914 is one of the

best-known examples of terrorism by

assassination. Assassins have scored some

remarkable successes; however, most

terrorist groups of this nature have been

suppressed fairly quickly.

The 20th century saw a transformation

of terrorism through at least two stages.

The first was through the use of terror to

support larger revolutionary insurgencies.

The earliest success was the overthrow of

the Russian government and, following a

brutal civil war, establishment of Soviet

Communism. The breadth of Russian

popular dissatisfaction—and the weakening effects of World War I, coupled with

Lenin’s German sponsorship— provided

nearly ideal conditions. Subsequent

communist insurgencies employed terror

tactics with varying degrees of success,

most frequently against decaying colonial

regimes or states only recently decolonized.

Although certainly not inspired by

communism, Israeli terrorism against the

1

ONE

Terrorism Viewed Historically

Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II

Colonel John R. Martin

Conclusions:

• As a tool of the weak, terrorism rarely succeeds in achieving its political goals.

Terrorists rarely have the resources to succeed in a fight against an aroused

state, but their reprehensible methods frequently inspire resolve within the

target state. Those same methods also separate terrorists from crucial popular

support.

• The continuing evolution of terror means that a study of history will be an

imperfect predictor, but historical insights suggest:

– Laws governing domestic and international actions against terrorism must be

adapted for comprehensive intelligence collection and for prompt action on

that intelligence. Appropriate safeguards of civil liberties must be provided.

– Terrorists must be separated from their popular support base. Separating

them from state support is an important element of this effort, but not

necessarily critical.

– Every effort must be taken to maintain American and coalition will in the war

on terrorism. The stronger side can win if will remains strong.
British and Palestinians was used

effectively to support their insurgency and

was sufficiently successful to hasten the

creation of the state of Israel. Israeli success

resonated deeply in the better organized

and utterly committed minority Jewish

population. In both the Russian revolution

and the Israeli insurgency, the objects of

terror were normally the civil

administrators and the security apparatus,

not “the people,” whose support was

considered crucial.

The second stage in the 20th century

transformation of terrorism was the growth

of state sponsorship. States which are

unable to confront their enemies

conventionally have provided every

imaginable assistance to terrorist groups in

order to weaken their enemies physically or

morally. State sponsorship does not

necessarily ensure success, but does allow

the fight to be prolonged. State-supported

terrorism comes in several forms, including

unwitting or inconsequential “support,” as

is the case in many liberal democratic states

where laws protecting civil rights also allow

a form of refuge for some terrorists;

unwilling support, but an inability to take

counteraction, as with Colombian drug

operatives; toleration arising from common

goals vis-à-vis the “enemy,” as with Libya or

Sudan; and full-blown support, either as a

direct instrument of the supporting

government or as a happy coincidence of

objectives and willingness to pursue them

actively together, as is the case of Syria and

Iran in support of Hamas and Hezbollah.

Syria, for example, has failed miserably in

every conventional attempt to destroy

Israel, but Syrian—and Iranian—support

of Palestinian terrorism has brought some

“positive” results, at least from Syria’s view.

Israel’s recent tactic of very selectively

“eliminating” Palestinian terrorist

leadership has been sufficiently successful

that it may have provided at least some

motivation for the September 11 attacks.

Although the original acts of Palestinian

terror have brought some international

condemnation upon the perpetrators,

Israeli responses have resulted in even

worse condemnation for Israel. Formal U.N.

reprimands weaken Israel’s moral position,

which affects its relations with the U.S.

Government. Ironically, the attacks have

not weakened the Israelis physically; if

anything, the attacks have moved the

Israelis to new levels of proficiency in

eradicating the threat.

Although the Middle East may present

some exceptions, terrorism—in whatever

guise—rarely achieves its political ends and

even then generally only under specific

strategic conditions. Terrorism is a tool of

the weak; were terrorists strong enough,

they would fight conventionally, which

holds the promise of quicker results.

Because terrorism is pursued by the weak,

its infrequent success should be expected.

Terrorism’s regular failure also stems from

the reprehensible methods employed. Those

methods can alienate terrorists from

popular support and possibly from state

support. Terrorism also can arouse the ire of

the opposing state, which usually has the

resources to crush terrorist movements if it

can muster the will.

Terrorists do succeed on occasion, but

the record suggests strongly that very

specific conditions need to obtain first. Since

the target of terrorism—almost by

definition— has the greater resources, only

weakness of will can normally keep the

state from prevailing.

Even with the will and resources, the

target state can lose to terrorists if it lacks

the ability to collect comprehensive

intelligence and to act rapidly and forcefully

on that intelligence. The historical record

demonstrates that counterterrorist

campaigns are most successful when laws

are adapted to address terrorist threats.

2
Intelligence capabilities must be expanded

first, followed quickly by elimination of any

excessive concerns for due process that

might impede direct action—capture and

prosecution, if possible; killing, if not—

against terrorists. In America and in other

democratic countries, any such expansion of

police powers—and any expansion of

military involvement in police matters—

must be accompanied by adequate

safeguards on civil rights. Terrorists are

neither legitimate soldiers nor common

criminals, so special provisions are

required. The dilemma for liberal

democratic states is the need to act against

terrorists as a national security risk

without destroying the essential rule of law.

This dilemma makes democracies

simultaneously vulnerable and resilient.

The so-called “Battle of Algiers” is worth

particular review. In the early 1950s,

Algerians started an insurgency in an effort

to remove French colonial rule from that

country. Repeated insurgent failures led to

adoption of terrorist methods. These

enraged the French and resulted in the

deployment of the French parachute

division to Algeria. In a coordinated civilmilitary campaign of incredible ferocity, the

terrorists were destroyed. Closely

coordinated intelligence gathering and

rapid response to actionable information

were chief among the tools employed.

Although the French were successful in

stopping terrorism in the short term, the

paratroopers relied on brutal excesses of

torture and bribery, which eventually

caught the attention of the French Republic.

This ruined the colonists’ political

foundation and ultimately cost them the

colony.

At some point, the terrorists require a

supportive population. That support can be

broad-based or can be provided by a

committed minority. Increasingly in the

late 20th century and beyond, media

coverage has been a major factor in either

sustaining popular support for terrorists or

in separating them from it. As stated

previously, state support may not be

essential to success of terrorists’ efforts, but

can help provide a “popular” base through

control of state media organs.

These “lessons of history” may not apply

directly to Usama bin Laden and his al

Qaeda organization. Their form of terrorism

may be an evolved form that is

fundamentally different from that used in

the past. Although completely innocent

civilian populations have been targeted

previously by Palestinians and by the Irish

Republican Army, the scale of the

September 11 attacks is unique. Americans

have been targeted before, but rarely in

America. Further, the goal of the attacks

may not be simply to inflict enough pain on

Americans that the government is forced, as

it was in Beirut and Somalia, to acquiesce to

another’s aims; it may be an attempt to

destroy America.

The attacks stem from a pervasive

fear—in the minds of bin Laden and many

other Muslims—that American culture is

crushing theirs. In today’s geostrategic

environment, bin Laden’s stated goal of a

separate Islamic world leaves him no real

choice but to attack the United States with

the goal of destroying American influence.

The repressive, extremist regime that he

seeks to establish is diametrically opposed

to the values Americans hold dear and want

to see flourish in the world: freedom,

democracy, free markets, human rights. If

these opposing views of civilization could

coexist peacefully, there would perhaps be

concern only at the intersections between

them. However, globalization means that

no nation can completely exclude itself from

the influence of another. For some

Americans, that idea carries with it a fear of

loss of national identity, but for most it

represents only a continuation of the

3
assimilative process that defines America.

For those of bin Laden’s ilk, globalization

means that the “evil” influences of the

“opulent and arrogant” Western world—

particularly from America—can never be

kept from “corrupting” the citizens of his

Islamic world. Thus, he and his followers

must fight the United States, not just to

force it to solve the Palestinian question and

get it out of the Arabian Peninsula, but to

destroy it before U.S. influences irrevocably

change Muslim culture. The overwhelming

strength of the United States makes it

impossible to confront conventionally. As a

result, bin Laden turns to terrorism to

achieve his political goal—but terrorism is

just his current tactic. If he is allowed to

continue, he will use any capability he can

acquire to press his attack: conventional,

unconventional or criminal. It thus

behooves the United States to destroy him

and his organization and to neutralize any

state sponsors before he gains added

capabilities.

If bin Laden’s terrorism is similar

enough to past terrorism, history suggests

that he can be defeated by a strong and

resolute government that can separate the

terrorists from popular support. Because

bin Laden’s support is international and

appears broadly-based, concerted coalition

action is crucial.

In order to defeat al Qaeda or other

similar terrorist organizations, the

following actions are essential:

• Laws governing the collection of

information on suspected terrorist

organizations must be adapted to the

nature and degree of the threat. Such

adaptations will infringe upon existing civil

rights, but not nearly as heavily as do the

death and destruction wrought by the

terrorists. In order to maintain a balance

between civil rights and necessary law

enforcement powers, reasonable judicial

oversight must be maintained. Within the

United States, some expansions of police

powers must be pursued, and effective

coordination of counterterrorist intelligence

gathering and sharing must become the

norm. Legislative and executive actions

since September 11 attempt to lay the

foundation for all of the above requirements, but the definition of the details

remains a challenge. Also, a more realistic

approach to foreign counterterrorist

requirements must be developed if the

United States hopes for greater international cooperation. This must include a

relaxation of restrictions on the use of

weapons supplied through foreign military

sales so that they can be employed against

terrorists irrespective of the terrorists’

nationality.

• State support must be eliminated,

although each type will require specialized

approaches. Countries that willingly

provide direct support to those who attack

the United States should expect to see their

regimes replaced, the stated goal in

Afghanistan. For other countries providing

unwitting or indirect support, concentrated

application of international pressure may

be enough. The Afghanistan example

should make them more receptive to this

approach.

• Terrorists must be separated from

popular support, a much more difficult

matter, especially since the al Qaeda

terrorists manifest religious motives widely

shared by their fellow Muslims. There must

be serious efforts to address the underlying

motivations for terrorism without outright

capitulation to their demands. Issues must

be addressed without making compromises

that neglect Israel’s security or fail to

protect U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf.

These efforts must be accompanied by an

information campaign highlighting the

repugnance of terrorist methods and their

ineffectual or counterproductive effect. The

heroic image of the perpetrators must be

4
discredited, preferably by their own

religious leaders.

• Finally, American will to fight

terrorism must be maintained. This will

hinge on several issues. Americans are

willing to accept losses if vital interests are

involved, tactical success is periodically

demonstrated and operational and strategic

success is expected eventually. Casualties

and tactical failures can be accepted if

regular successes by law enforcement and

the military are honestly portrayed and

widely broadcast. Continuing information

operations should be conducted to affirm

the justice of U.S. intentions and the

reasonableness of military and other

actions. The public should not be

manipulated, but must believe in the war on

terrorism.

American will must be maintained;

intrusions on civil liberties must be

balanced against the need to gather

intelligence and take action against the

terrorists; terrorists’ popular support base

must be reduced, and state support choked

off. These are not easy tasks, but a

multidimensional, sophisticated approach

focusing on the inherent weaknesses of

terrorist organizations will lead to their

eventual destruction, both domestically and

internationally.

5
What is our desired end state in this

war? Is it achievable? If it is, how will we

know when we’ve achieved it? Is this to be

an open-ended campaign like the war on

drugs, with no real end point likely, or is

there hope for a meaningful victory that

could someday terminate the conflict? Is

there a center of gravity against which

decisive effort can be directed and the war

won thereby, or is the enemy so amorphous

and ubiquitous that we face instead a future

of chronic low-level hostilities susceptible

only to management or containment and

with no real hope of resolution?

In fact, this war can be won, not merely

contained. But this will require war aims

focused on our enemies’ ideology, not their

tactics. And this in turn will demand an

especially close interconnection between a

war of military violence and an inseparable

war of ideas. In fact, the best lens for

understanding this new war and its

termination requirements may be our last

great military-ideological struggle: the Cold

War. Just as that conflict used military

means to preserve an opportunity to

triumph on the battlefield of ideas, so in this

conflict we must look to a synergistic

interaction between violence to root out

terrorists and persuasion to prevent their

replacement from among the great mass of

politically uncommitted Muslims.

The case for this interconnected framing

of war aims, termination conditions, and

strategies rests on the answers to four

questions: what’s at stake; what’s the real

threat to those stakes; what would suffice to

end the threat; and how would we know

when we’ve achieved this?

7

TWO

War Aims and War Termination

Dr. Stephen Biddle

Conclusions:

• This war can be won, not merely contained, but only if we choose our aims and

strategies correctly.

• Our enemy is not terrorism, it is al Qaeda’s radical ideology.

• Our war aim must be the defeat of this ideology. If we achieve this, mass

casualty terrorism against Americans will subside; if we do not, counterterrorist efforts will inevitably fail.

• To defeat this ideology requires both a war of military violence to destroy al

Qaeda’s current operatives and a war of ideas to prevent their replacement

from among the millions of politically uncommitted Muslims.

• We cannot allow our military means to undermine our ideological ends: the

hearts and minds of politically uncommitted Muslims are the center of gravity;

military exigencies, while important, take second place.

• This war of ideas must focus on a “third way”: neither al Qaeda’s radical

separatism nor an imposed Westernism, but an indigenous alternative that

allows the legitimate religious yearnings of everyday Muslims to see political

expression.
What is at Stake?

In objective terms, terrorism was

traditionally thought to threaten only small

stakes; for many, the real challenge was

thus to avoid over-reacting to vivid but

minor acts of violence. This war is different.

In just 2 hours, the September 11 attacks

killed fully a tenth as many Americans as

died in the entire Vietnam War. This would

be horrible enough as an isolated incident,

but we can expect many more such

attempts. Unchecked, our enemies could

inflict mass casualties on a scale unseen by

Americans since the World Wars—yet this

time, our dead would be mostly civilians in

their very homes and workplaces.

Nor is this all. As we have already seen,

global economic health is at risk. The

September 11 attacks have already plunged

America into near-certain recession. With

the world economy’s current weakness,

more such strikes could induce far deeper

crises both here and abroad. Some describe

this as a war for cheap oil, but far more is at

stake economically than just the price of

gasoline at American service stations. A

major, sustained, worldwide economic

contraction is entirely possible if we fail to

thwart a long-term continuation of

mass-casualty attacks. These stakes are

thus far closer to those of a major war than

to traditional terrorism, and warrant

responses appropriate to war in their scope

and energy.

What is the Threat?

What—and more important, who—

threatens these stakes? Who are our

enemies, what do they want, and how much

of what they want must be thwarted to

secure our vital interests? These questions

have yet to be answered clearly. Attempts to

date have included evil itself, terrorism,

“terrorism of global reach,” al Qaeda, and

Osama bin Laden. None is satisfactory, and

the resulting ambiguity has important

strategic consequences.

Calls for a war against “evil,” for

example, are rhetorical license without

meaningful strategic content. “Terrorism,”

by contrast, is a tactic, not an opponent.

Declaring a “War on Terrorism” is like

declaring a “War on Strategic Bombing” or a

“War on Alliances.” As such, it is at once too

broad, too narrow, and beside the point. We

surely do not seek war with the IRA or the

Tamil Tigers, though both are terrorists.

Adding “of global reach” doesn’t help:

globalization has so eroded the effects of

distance that any established terrorist

group can reach targets over intercontinental distances—if the IRA isn’t a

threat to America, it’s not because they

can’t get here or couldn’t build a network

here if they so chose. “Reach” isn’t the

problem. Intent is: our enemies are those

whose intentions embody mass killing of

Americans.

Bin Laden and al Qaeda are thus closer,

as both clearly harbor such intent. Neither,

however, is sufficient. Al Qaeda could now

survive without bin Laden; killing him

alone would not destroy his organization.

More important, al Qaeda itself could be

destroyed without eliminating the threat if

the ideology it represents survives it. It is al

Qaeda’s ideology—and the malign intent

this creates and embodies—that pose the

real threat. No campaign which leaves this

ideology vital and intact can succeed in

eliminating the real threat to our vital

interests that September 11 unveiled.

What is this ideology, and what makes it

so threatening? Two points are most

important. First, it is radically separatist.

Al Qaeda seeks to preserve a puritanical,

strictly fundamentalist Islam by isolating it

from the destructive influences of modern,

and especially Western, culture. Western

ideas are seen as a profound threat to the

proper practice of the faith; they see in them

8
a licentious decadence that both affronts

God and corrupts humanity. Only by

eliminating the temptation of Western

ideas and culture can the community of the

faithful properly serve Allah.

In the near term, this mandates

expulsion of all Western presence from

Arabia; eventually, it implies the need to

cleanse all Islam of Western influence. This,

in turn, poses major economic risks for a

world economy dependent on Arabian and

Indonesian oil, and presents insurmountable difficulties for long-standing U.S.

commitments to Israel.

Yet even if we left Arabia and abandoned

Israel, this would still fall short of satisfying

the demands implied by the logic of al

Qaeda’s doctrine. In a world of global

communication, international broadcasting, and growing cultural interpenetration, it is impossible to imagine a society

successfully insulating itself from outside

influences for very long. A strictly observant

Islamic world of al Qaeda’s design would

inevitably find itself in conflict with

Western ideas it could not possibly wall off

beyond its shores. If the proper practice of

Islam and the influence of Western culture

are incompatible, and if the former is a

central obligation of the faithful, then

conflict between the West and al Qaeda’s

radically separatist version of Islam is

literally existential, and al Qaeda is

unlikely ever to accept long-term

coexistence even if its other aims were

somehow realized. If so, then we cannot

satisfy them with any feasible proffer;

ultimately, Western concessions are likelier

to stimulate further demands than to

satisfy such an opponent. Only a global

imposition of their interpretation of the

faith could be stable and sufficient for them

in the long term. Al Qaeda’s separatist

ideology thus puts it on an inevitable

collision course with our basic way of life.

The second crucial feature of al Qaeda’s

ideology is its commitment to violence in

pursuit of political empowerment.

Separatist religious communities are not

problematic in themselves; on the contrary,

they have a long tradition in American

history. The combination of radical

separatism and mass violence, however, is

poisonous. Al Qaeda sees violence as both

acceptable and necessary, and draws no

distinction between military and civilian

targets for this violence. Nor does al Qaeda’s

doctrine condone passive acceptance of their

ideas without active participation in the

fighting: bin Laden’s declaration of jihad

against the West obligates all followers to

armed struggle. In bin Laden’s view,

Muslims cannot properly stand on the

sideline in this war. Even if only a fraction

of bin Laden’s potential followers act on his

injunction, the spread of these ideas thus

has profound military consequences; we

need to be concerned not just with the

extent of al Qaeda’s formal membership,

but also with the extent of its ideological

penetration in the Muslim world.

This combination of radical separatism

and jihad is thus dangerous; it is also

unusual, and distinguishes al Qaeda from

other terrorist groups that have not to date

inflicted mass casualties on Americans.

Organizations like Hamas or Hezbollah, for

example, while violent, have far more

limited political aims centered on installing

fundamentalist Islamic governments in

specific states. Among Middle Eastern

terrorist groups, only al Qaeda has yet

formulated an ideological program oriented

around a radical separatism focusing less

on Israel or on the overthrow of individual

Arab regimes per se than on the exclusion of

Western influence from the entire region.

While more traditional terrorist groups

could well merge their aims into al Qaeda’s

in the future—and especially if the latter

sees initial success—they need not, and

9
have not to date. It is strongly in our

interest to dissuade them from doing so.

While terrorists of many stripes may

threaten Americans, the vital national

interests sketched above are threatened

only by a much narrower subset

represented by al Qaeda alone. Most

terrorism does not approach the dangers

raised by September 11; the real threat to

America is thus much narrower than

terrorism as such.

But while al Qaeda is a small minority

even among terrorist groups, much less

among Islam as a whole, it aspires to

majority status in the Muslim world. The

export of this ideology beyond the ranks of

al Qaeda’s current operatives is thus a

profound threat to our vital national

interests. This export could take the form of

increased membership for al Qaeda or the

adoption of al Qaeda’s ideological program

by terrorists who now share only some of its

aims; either outcome is equally dangerous

to us. It will do little good to kill current

operatives if, in the meantime, they recruit

more new adherents than we have removed.

Restricting the ideology’s spread is at least

as important as rooting out its current

members if we are ever to get on top of the

problem.

Our real opponent is thus the ideology

that underpins al Qaeda’s terrorist

program—it is not terrorism per se, nor

even al Qaeda itself. And this implies that

our war aims must include not only

eliminating al Qaeda’s current operatives,

but preventing their ideology from spreading beyond their current membership. To do

this will demand the use of force and

coercive leverage to root out bin Laden’s

terrorists and their state sponsors—but it

will also require us to win a war of ideas to

persuade the great mass of politically

uncommitted Muslims that al Qaeda’s

separatist ideology is a dead end. This war

of ideas will matter as centrally as the war

of bullets for ultimate victory or defeat: if we

lose the former, we will surely lose the

latter, as the flow of new recruits will

inevitably swamp our ability to find and

eliminate veteran fighters.

What Would Suffice to End

the Threat?

This conception of war aims implies a

center of gravity against which a successful

campaign could be directed. If we can deny

al Qaeda a flow of new recruits, we can

eventually destroy it. Al Qaeda’s shadowy,

covert nature will make the process of

running down its members slow and

laborious, but sustained effort can

eventually grind down any organization of

fixed size. The challenge is to keep al

Qaeda’s size fixed in the meantime. If they

succeed in exporting their ideas to any

significant portion of broader Islam, then

we will never be able to cope militarily with

the resulting flood of people and resources

into Bin Laden’s camp. But if al Qaeda fails

to spread its ideas, then even a slow-moving

military campaign will eventually snuff it

out. The center of gravity in this war thus

lies in the hearts and minds of politically

uncommitted Muslims: if bin Laden

succeeds in converting them to his ideology

of separatist jihad, then no plausible U.S.

military effort will be sufficient to prevail;

but if we succeed in winning the war of

ideas, then al Qaeda will eventually be

destroyed by our accompanying military

operations.

To do this it will not be necessary to

uncover every last al Qaeda operative—

much less to kill every last terrorist

worldwide. If we can combine steady

progress on the military front with political

containment of al Qaeda’s ideology, we will

make it ever harder for bin Laden to mount

mass casualty suicide attacks (especially in

conjunction with energetic efforts in

homeland defense). In this, the Weather

10
Underground offers an instructive

metaphor. The Weathermen’s bombing

campaign did not end because the FBI

arrested its entire membership; some

remain at large to this day. Instead, it was

the loss of a sympathetic body of supporters

and the ensuing recruits and resources that

killed the Weathermen as an organization.

Many fewer people are willing to risk their

lives for an apparently losing cause than

will do so in the vanguard of a movement

with a future. If we can deny al Qaeda a

future by winning the war of ideas, we thus

make the military task attainable and

victory achievable even if we cannot ever

hope to extinguish terrorism as such or

annihilate al Qaeda in its entirety.

This war of ideas, moreover, is one in

which we enjoy important long-term

advantages. Al Qaeda promulgates a

repressive, sexist, authoritarian distortion

of Islam that is unattractive not only to us,

but to the great majority of Muslims as well.

Most Muslims—like most Americans—do

not want their daughters excluded from

education. They do not want women

relegated to veils and denied a meaningful

life outside the home. They do not believe

the state should punish people for the

clothes they wear or the music they enjoy.

And they do not see anyone who disagrees

with them as an enemy of God whose ideas

must be snuffed out and whose life can be

taken in the name of Allah. Most Muslims

see a God of peace and forgiveness, not a

God of hate and violence. The mainstream

practice of Islam is today so distant from al

Qaeda’s twisted extremism that we need

only prevent it from being hijacked by a

splinter group whose views are now rejected

by the majority of Muslims in Arabia and

beyond.

We must be careful, however, to avoid

waging this war of ideas in ways that give al

Qaeda crucial ammunition. Many now

worry about this, but see the problem in

chiefly military terms: they oppose attacks

on Muslim states like Iraq or Syria as

alienating potential allies. Valid or not,

however, a different danger of at least equal

magnitude lies in the conduct of our

ideological campaign: we must not abet bin

Laden’s effort to portray us as cultural

imperialists bent on destroying Islam and

imposing Western licentiousness. To avoid

this implies at least two requirements.

First, we cannot approach this campaign

as a war to convert Muslims to our way of

life. Our aim must be to promote a third

way: neither separatist extremism nor

imposed Westernism. Al Qaeda and the

Islamic mainstream are now so far apart

that many such opportunities should exist

for enabling the legitimate religious

yearnings of everyday Muslims to see

political expression without creating a

dualistic struggle with Western ideals. A

central strategic challenge will be to

identify such alternatives and promote

them—especially where these alternatives

threaten repressive political regimes whose

corruption is seen by mainstream Muslims

as inconsistent with their ideals.

Second, we must counter common

perceptions of the West now being

promulgated in much of the Arab world. We

are routinely caricatured as rapacious

libertines with no greater moral compass

than vulgar materialism. These widely-held

misperceptions make stable coexistence

and effective opposition to extremist

fundamentalism much harder. To overturn

them will require a positive effort to provide

a more accurate picture of America, our

ideals, and our culture. This effort must

walk a fine line between informing others

and imposing our way of life—but our

ability to promote a stable Islamic “third

way” that does not define itself in violent

opposition to us depends in part on escaping

the demonized portrayal of ourselves now so

common in the Arab world.

11
These challenges are not trivial, but they

can be surmounted. And the ideological

battlefield on which they are to be met is one

where we enjoy important advantages if we

conduct the campaign properly.

How Would We Know When the War

Has Been Won?

Unlike World War II or Operation

DESERT STORM, this war will not end at

an appointed hour by the signing of a peace

agreement or the declaration of a cease fire.

But it can have a discernable ending. Our

desired end state is the isolation of a

remnant of al Qaeda into a small band of

harried individuals living in deep cover as

fugitives from the law, cut off from any base

of popular support, despairing of any real

hope of establishing their views through

political power, and with no successor

organization waiting in the wings to take up

their struggle on behalf of a sympathetic

people. Like the Weathermen, al Qaeda’s

ability to threaten vital American interests

would then be broken even if survivors

remain, and even if these prove able to

mount occasional terrorist incidents of

conventional scale. Orthodox terrorism is

not an existential threat to America; mass

casualty terrorism on the scale of

September 11 and the ability to sustain

this, by contrast, is not achievable by bands

of isolated individuals. The record to date

suggests that this requires a degree of

organization and profound commitment

characteristic only of an institution like al

Qaeda, and it is within our power to defeat

al Qaeda as an institution even if we cannot

kill every individual terrorist in the world.

The arrival of this day will not be

apparent at the time, but will become ever

clearer as the absence of mass fatality

attacks on Americans grows prolonged. Just

as the Cold War’s end was clear mainly in

retrospect, so we can expect that the end of

this war will be proclaimed by historians

rather than by soldiers. Looking backwards

today, we can say that the fall of

Communist Poland, the destruction of the

Berlin Wall, and the breakup of the Soviet

Union signaled a period within which the

Cold War ended, though no single event can

be said to have provided more than a

symbolic finale. Likewise looking forward

from today, there will come a time when we

can be confident that we have seen the end

of al Qaeda, but we cannot expect to be able

to proclaim it at any single moment. End,

however, it shall—if we formulate our aims

and our strategies properly.

12
The noted British military theorist Basil

Liddell Hart wrote in one of his many books

that “War is the realm of the unexpected.”

Military actions often produce unintended

results that can negate positive gains and

may even worsen the long-term situation.

American planners must keep this hard

truth in mind as they develop the

continuing war against terrorism.

Reverberations from Choices

in the Application of Force.

Strategic choices about the use of force

often produce unexpected effects at all

levels of war: tactical, operational and

strategic. As an example, look at the norm

for the initial American employment of

military power. In an effort to achieve

objectives quickly, limited air strikes often

constitute the dominant part of early

phases of an operation. This selection is

driven in part by the rapid response

capability of aerial assets and the desire to

avoid friendly casualties and collateral

damage, but is further motivated by hopes

that goals can be achieved by committing a

minimum of resources. Adherents of this

strategy also assert that it is advantageous

because it still allows levels of force to be

gradually escalated to send signals of

American resolve and to increase pressure

on enemy decisionmakers. Coalition

partners tend to prefer this approach.

However, lessons from Vietnam, the

Balkans, and even early operations in

Afghanistan show that this course of action

can actually stiffen enemy resistance rather

than break it, providing opponents with

time to develop countermeasures and

become inured to military pressure, and

increasing enemy confidence in their ability

to hold out. In the long run, the gradual

escalation of force tends to cost more

resources and prolongs conflict. There is

much to be said for delaying action until an

13

THREE

Beware of Unintended Consequences

Dr. Conrad C. Crane

Conclusions:

• Prolonged destructive military action, especially with airpower, strains

coalitions and fosters resentment. The best approach is to apply overwhelming

force in short decisive campaigns, even if that requires time to build up

resources in theater.

• Relying on local ground forces for combat reduces American leverage to shape

the postwar environment, encouraging conditions that undermine political

stability and increasing requirements for military peace operations.

• No matter how widespread American operations against terrorism are, attacks

on numerous targets in Muslim countries will foster the perspective that the

United States is engaged in a war against Islam.

• The United States must avoid appearing to be engaged solely in an attempt to

maintain its hegemony or the status quo. Accordingly it should be wary of

becoming tied too closely to repressive regimes, and should encourage reform in

so-called “moderate” Arab governments.
overwhelming application of military power

is possible. One can knock out an opponent

quickly with a single, well-placed blow to

the head, but the foe will repeatedly recover

and require further fighting. It is quicker

and more efficient in the long run to apply

overwhelming force continuously until that

opponent is permanently eliminated as a

threat.

Once the air effort over Afghanistan was

substantially increased and coordinated

with major offensive efforts by local allies, it

achieved great military success—so great,

in fact, that many now hope to apply the

same formula elsewhere. However, the

application of American airpower in combat

operations can often cause unintended

consequences at the strategic level of war.

The precise nature of the strikes in

Afghanistan was supposed to help sustain

international support for the operation by

showing U.S. concern for minimizing

collateral damage. However, the

international reaction to the bombing

campaign revealed the difficulties inherent

in projecting an image of clean, surgical war

to garner public support and reassure allies.

Americans who emphasize the surgical

nature of airpower must realize that the

rest of the world does not view aerial

bombardment the same way. When

bombing commences, U.S. leaders tout the

accuracy shown in strike videos, but the

world press immediately invokes images of

the carpet bombing of Tokyo and Dresden. A

tactical effect was felt almost immediately

as Pakistani volunteers—inspired to defend

Afghanistan by the perceived brutality of

the bombing and emboldened by its initial

apparent ineffectiveness—compensated for

some of the Taliban casualties from the

initial American attacks. The strategic

impact took just a bit longer, having to wait

until inflated expectations for precision—

both in intelligence and bombing—

increased the impact of inevitable collateral

damage. It should have come as no surprise

when pictures of dead Afghan women and

children started to be paraded across

international television screens. These

images evoke much more sympathy in the

Third World than pictures of the ruins of the

World Trade Center.

This effect is heightened by the

impression that bombing is another

example of American bullying of weaker

nations, and reinforces the perception that

the United States is not really committed to

serious action. As one European

commentator noted after Operation Allied

Force in Kosovo, “Now we know what

Americans are willing to kill for; but what

are Americans willing to die for?” No course

of action produces more coalition challenges

than a prolonged campaign that makes it

look as though America is “beating up” a

weaker country. In such a situation,

increasing numbers of civilian casualties

inevitably erode international support for

military action. And the backlash from the

significant destruction wreaked by air

attacks can threaten the very peace such

tactics aim to achieve. Many Serbs still

resent NATO’s bombing of their country,

and billions of dollars will be necessary to

repair the resulting damage and revive

Balkan economies. Journalists have noted

much hatred of Americans in Afghan towns

where inhabitants feel they were

improperly targeted by U.S. bombs. Even

air attacks on military targets in mountain

redoubts and cave complexes have produced

enough civilian casualties to bring

accusations of disproportionate and

unacceptable force from international aid

organizations.

Because of its reluctance to commit its

own landpower in Afghanistan, America

has had to rely on the forces of the Northern

Alliance. This reliance also has produced

unintended strategic consequences. The

operational success of their forces has

14
emboldened the Northern Alliance to

demand a major—if not leading—role in the

new government, a situation unacceptable

to majority Pashtun tribes. Press reports

about their execution of prisoners have

caused international alarm. Aid convoys are

being looted or stopped, and local warlords

are reasserting control of many areas

liberated from the Taliban. Though the role

of the Northern Alliance was instrumental

in achieving tactical and operational

success in Afghanistan, without moderation

and control their actions might still

endanger the strategic goal of a stable

country that will not foster future

terrorism. Similar problems appear to be

arising with tribes in other parts of the

country, as various warlords jockey for

territory and bargaining leverage. A recent

analysis of 52 wars since 1960 reveals that

50 percent of peace deals break down within

5 years, and the situation in Afghanistan is

worse than most. Another study on

peace-building in the 1990s warns “using

local factions and warlords to provide the

ground component of a military campaign

can only undermine the political goals of

diplomatic relations for a post-war state.”

The consequence of limiting American

ground involvement in the initial stages of

combat operations in the country might be

to increase its necessity in the long run,

both in persistent fighting to root out al

Qaeda and in keeping the peace after such

combat is ended.

Broadening the War.

Those conducting the war on terror must

remain focused on reducing the unintended

consequences of near-term activities that

could endanger the accomplishment of longterm objectives. Without such foresight, the

backlash from the campaign in Afghanistan

could make future operations in the war on

terrorism more difficult. Many pundits have

commented on the dangers of destabilizing

Pakistan, and losing support from moderate

Islamic states. Without a clear blueprint for

the course of the war, the United States

could find current actions antagonizing key

allies for the next phase.

But there is an even greater danger in

the future. As the United States pursues its

war against terrorism, planners must keep

in mind the ultimate goal of eliminating, or

at least significantly reducing, the terrorist

threat against the nation and its interests.

It will do no good to wipe out al Qaeda while

sowing the seeds that ensure the rise of

similar organizations. This will require a

hard look at how American actions are

perceived.

The phrase is often quoted that “one

man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom

fighter,” and reflects the fact that terrorism

is an approach sometimes taken by the

weak against the strong to induce change. A

broad war against all terrorist groups will

reinforce Third World perceptions that the

United States wants to retain its hegemony

by enforcing the status quo at all costs. This

argument was first made in the 1960s and

1970s by a school of revisionist diplomatic

historians who argued that American

economic prosperity depended on a world of

order, stability, and open markets;

according to this view national policies have

aimed to maintain those characteristics in

the international system. This viewpoint

encouraged much cynicism about American

ideals at home and abroad, and will do the

same again if revived by a war that appears

to value stability over human rights.

U.S. leaders should reevaluate relations

with so-called “moderate” Arab regimes in

countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia,

where most popular political aspirations

are repressed and where many terrorists

have been produced—including Osama bin

Laden and most of the hijackers of

September 11. The United States would

probably benefit significantly if it could

15
influence those regimes to reform.

Continually propping them up and

maintaining the status quo risks a

revolutionary explosion in the long term,

and will insure a new crop of terrorists in

the short term.

Some who argue for a broader conflict

suggest expanding the war to include

non-Islamic groups outside the Middle

East, believing such action will obviate the

argument that the United States is engaged

in a war against Islam. A possible

unintended consequence from that

approach is that it might drive these other

groups to adopt mass-casualty methods—

and perhaps a common cause with al

Qaeda—thus increasing the overall threat

level for Americans. Whether or not

operations in non-Arab countries are

attempted, attacks against multiple targets

in Arab countries will still reinforce the

perception of a crusade against Islam. The

end result of broad attacks will just be to

stretch American resources while still

antagonizing an Islamic public easily

convinced of its victimization.

Avoiding future terrorism will also

require that planners thoroughly analyze

concessions required to obtain support from

some states. Becoming identified with

repressive regimes such as that in

Uzbekistan might ultimately do us more

harm than good. American dealings with

Pakistan, essential as they have been, have

endangered a growing relationship with

democratic India. Short-term requests for

support can also backfire in other ways.

Though the U.S. request for a small number

of Turkish soldiers provides visible evidence

of Muslim support on the ground for the war

against terrorism, the long-term impact of

that action on an important NATO ally

where the vast majority of the public is

against American policy in Afghanistan

should be carefully considered.

Conclusions.

To avoid sending the wrong message to

future foes, military actions must be

decisive in achieving operational and

strategic goals. Rapidity is always

preferred, but decisiveness is the most

essential requirement. Failure to achieve

such results—as is too often risked when

quick action is overvalued or commitments

are too limited—would diminish America’s

image as a power to be respected. This

would further embolden other groups and

nations to challenge the United States and

its interests, and make others less likely to

trust our promises of support. National

Command Authorities and the Joint Staff’s

military planners must ensure that

immediate regional actions—and their

unintended consequences—don’t compromise the long-term strategic goals of the

war on terrorism. Winning battles is not as

important as winning the war.

16
The war on terrorism will undoubtedly

fail if it is perceived as a war on Islam and

generates a call for Muslim solidarity in a

holy war against the United States and the

other powers combating terrorism. Understanding how to avoid that perception first

requires some familiarity with the concept

of jihad. Strictly speaking, translating jihad

as “holy war” is incorrect. Harb

mukaddasah is the Arabic phrase for holy

war. The Arabic word jihad means striving

or exertion. In an Islamic context, it would

mean striving in the way of God:

perpetually struggling for the triumph of

the word of God among men, doing good

deeds and performing the prescribed duties

of the faith. A Muslim strives in the way of

God with his sword, tongue, and wealth,

thus giving the concept of jihad a

multifaceted nature that applies to the

individual believer and the community.

One meaning of jihad is the duty of

preaching the faith, since Islam is a

proselytizing religion: “And let there be

from you a nation who invite to goodness,

and enjoin right conduct and forbid

indecency” (Qur’an 3:104). This meaning of

jihad could be accomplished through such

activities as teaching, preaching, publishing, and establishing Islamic centers and

schools.

Another meaning of jihad is in the sense

of fighting: “Sanction is given unto those

who fight because they have been wronged:

and Allah is indeed able to give them

victory” (Qur’an 22:39). The word qital

(Arabic for fighting in the narrow sense—

fight as it appears in this Qur’anic verse) as

used here is not synonymous with the

broader concept of jihad, which includes

fighting where the context so requires.

Jihad in the sense of fighting has always

been a defensive principle. Muslims were

allowed to fight only in self-defense and

were forbidden to be aggressive.

Furthermore, Muslim scholars are

generally in agreement that jihad in the

sense of fighting must meet several

conditions to be religiously sanctioned.

There must be a just cause for the conflict, it

must be declared by the right authority, and

the fighting must be waged in accordance

with Islamic ethical principles, including

17

FOUR

Avoiding Holy War: Ensuring That the War

on Terrorism is Not Perceived as a War on Islam

Dr. Sami G. Hajjar

Conclusions:

• U.S. cannot prevent extremists from declaring jihad in response to military

attacks.

• Imperative for the U.S. to limit appeal of such calls with diplomacy and

restrained rhetoric.

• U.S. should try to discredit those calling for jihad.

• At least initially, U.S. should limit targeted groups to al Qaida and its direct

supporters while avoiding widespread attacks that would look like war against

Islam.
sparing the lives of women, children, and

the elderly.

The United States can do little, if

anything, to prevent Muslim extremists—

including al Qaida’s Osama bin Laden and

the Taliban’s Mullah Mohammad Umar—

from declaring jihad in response to U.S.

military action against them. Questions

about the “right authority” to call jihad will

constrain the number of Muslims who

would answer that call. However, an

abundance of anti-American sentiments in

the Arab and Islamic worlds—sentiments

generated over the past several decades by

U.S. pro-Israeli and perceived anti-Islam

policies and compounded by deteriorating

socioeconomic conditions—guarantee that a

call to jihad by the Taliban and bin Laden

will fall on many receptive ears across the

Islamic world. “Striving with sword, tongue,

or wealth”; those who do respond might be

enough to cause the stability of friendly

Arab and other Muslim nations to be of

concern. The United States could make that

response even greater by expanding

military action beyond bin Laden and the

Taliban regime that harbors him. If that

happens—at least without some conclusive

evidence proving a connection to the attacks

of September 11—there is a high risk that

other “religious authorities” would be

enticed to join in the call for jihad against

the “aggressor.” Emotional broadcasts of

war conditions showing Muslim

mujahideen being defeated by American

and other Western forces would do more

than call into question the stability of

friendly Muslim states; it would put at

significant risk the U.S. ability to prosecute

the war on terrorism to a successful end.

How then should we extract justice for

the attack on our country on September 11?

How can we wage a war on terrorism and

not elicit a holy war in response? Refraining

from military action against Afghanistan,

the Taliban, and al Qaida—or any other

country or organization suspected of

involvement in terrorism—would be a

simple answer. Use of the other instruments

of U.S. national power—diplomatic,

economic, and informational—would not

engender holy war. Neither would it appease

the American public, which expects some

form of military revenge for the deaths of

thousands of citizens from America and

around the world. The suggestion of not

responding militarily also has the serious

flaw of being an incentive for extremists in

Afghanistan and elsewhere in the Muslim

world to engage in further acts of terrorism.

It would promote the belief that the United

States would refrain from military response

because of American leaders’ fear that the

threat to declare jihad would be heeded by

Muslims across the Islamic world.

Rather than being concerned with

avoiding even illegitimate calls for “holy

war”—a situation over which the United

States has no control save for the absurd

option of not responding militarily—the

focus should be on how to contain the

validity of a bin Laden or Taliban

declaration of jihad to their immediate

adherents and like-minded extremists.

Perhaps only rewriting the history of U.S.

policies and strategies toward the Arab and

Islamic worlds since World War II would

ensure success in this endeavor. However,

the Bush administration has thus far made

many proper moves in responding to the

crisis. Declaring war on terrorism, not on

Islam, was one of the most critical. It leaves

no doubt, at least in national rhetoric, that

America’s enemies are those who pervert

Islam with unacceptable violence. Building

an international coalition with partners

from the Arab and Islamic worlds is also

key. This gives great credibility to the

U.S.-led efforts, just as was the case in the

Gulf War, when Arab allies demonstrated

that aggression by an Arab and Muslim

country would not be tolerated. Use of all

18
the elements of national power—not just

the military one—is also important in

containing the response to the call for jihad.

It is hard to justify fighting the

antiterrorism coalition when it is providing

humanitarian assistance and other

economic incentives to assist Muslims.

The military action—with the immediate task of defeating bin Laden and his

training bases in Afghanistan—is only the

first part of a complex campaign. The

United States must take several additional

actions to contain any call for jihad. First, it

should work to discredit the legitimacy of a

jihad declaration by an entity that

sanctions terrorism. The desired outcome

would be an Islamic world convinced that

American military response is in

self-defense against criminals who will

repeat their deeds unless stopped. To

contain any fallout from the inevitable calls

to jihad, the United States should work with

its closest Muslim allies to nudge Egypt—

the seat of Al-Azhar Mosque and the center

of orthodox Sunni theology—to question bin

Laden’s qualifications and authority to

issue fatwas (religious edicts) and to declare

jihad. It is strongly in the U.S. interest to

increase across the Islamic world the

numbers of mufti (clerics) articulating this

point of view. The brief exposition of the

meaning of jihad outlined above suggests

important errors in bin Laden’s call, such as

his declaration of offensive war against

innocents, and raises serious doubts about

the qualifications of bin Laden and the

Taliban to declare a jihad of any kind. Bin

Laden’s doctrine—claiming legitimacy for

the use of terror in a jihad against a strong

enemy—could and should be refuted by

Muslim clerics. A well-prepared psyops

team will be able to play a major positive

role in this effort.

The temptation exists to go after several

“affiliates” of al Qaida. Many of these—like

Hamas and Hizbollah—are scattered across

the Arab world and are viewed by most

Arabs and Muslims as organizations

engaged in legitimate self-defense and

national liberation efforts. Overt military

action against such groups would be a grave

strategic error if the United States wishes

to contain the spread of the call to jihad.

More grave would be a military campaign

against so-called “rogue” states that for

some time have graced the State

Department’s list of nations that support

terrorism. In such an eventuality,

containing the appearance that the United

States was waging a war against Islam

might be impossible.

The United States has much to lose if it

is unsuccessful in its efforts to avoid its war

on terrorism being characterized as a war

against Islam. Military action is unavoidable—although it must be accompanied

throughout the war by use of the nonmilitary elements of power—but it must be

carefully applied to avoid the specter of a

Muslim world united behind bin Laden.

19
In today’s world, a terrorist movement

can be built and operate without state

support. Terrorists can fund themselves via

crime or even legitimate business ventures

and charities. They can obtain information

and intelligence via open sources. They can

communicate and coordinate their activities

using the global information infrastructure,

protected by various forms of encryption.

And they can train almost anywhere by

simply renting an isolated house or farm.

Still, state support certainly makes

terrorism easier and more effective.

Eliminating it is an important but complex

part of the war on terrorism.

Modes of State Support to Terrorism.

In the contemporary security environment, there are three modes of state

support to terrorism. Each requires a

different U.S. response. What can be called

Category I states provide protection,

logistics, training, intelligence, or

equipment to terrorists as a part of national

policy or strategy. While this sort of activity

has a long history, it became particularly

common during the Cold War. Support for

terrorism and for other forms of low

intensity conflict was seen as a way that

some Soviet clients, particularly East

21

FIVE

State Support for Terrorism

Dr. Steven Metz

Conclusions:

• Analyze state support to terrorism in terms of three categories: Category I

support entails protection, logistics, training, intelligence, or equipment

provided terrorists as a part of national policy or strategy; Category II support

is not backing terrorism as an element of national policy but is toleration of it;

Category III support provides some terrorists a hospitable environment,

growing from the presence of legal protections on privacy and freedom of

movement, limits on internal surveillance and security organizations,

well-developed infrastructure, and émigré communities.

• Further develop Army doctrine, concepts, and forces to be able to punish

Category I supporters of terrorism and to contribute to multinational

reconstruction of those that are punished. Make this a focus mission for IBCTs.

• Develop Army doctrine, concepts, and forces to provide engagement and other

types of support activities to Category II states attempting to eradicate

terrorism within their territories to include concepts and organizations

designed specifically to support regional partners and allies rather than having

support to partners as a secondary mission.

• Use Army wargaming and strategic planning capabilities to create a program

designed specifically to improve the counterterrorism concepts, doctrine, and

organizations of the U.S. military, other U.S. Government agencies, and

partner nations, with a focus on deterring Category I supporters, augmenting

the capabilities of Category II supporters, and increasing cooperation and

communication among Category III supporters.
Germany, North Korea, Bulgaria, Cuba,

Libya, Syria, and Iraq, could attack the

West and Israel while minimizing the

chances of escalation. Many of these

Category I supporters developed terrorist

support industries, providing large scale

training facilities as well as intelligence and

other forms of direct operational support.

The end of the Cold War did great

damage to the global terrorist support

network. With the Soviet Union no longer

offering protection, state sponsors were

vulnerable to direct punishment. The end of

Soviet economic support led states like

Cuba and Syria to seek integration into the

global economy and global community.

Support for terrorism is, of course, a major

obstacle to this. Today the remaining

Category I supporters go to great lengths to

cover their involvement with terrorism or

provide only limited forms of support. There

are no “full spectrum” supporters today.

Most Category I support now takes the form

of either sanctuary without direct

operational support (e.g., Afghanistan) or

intelligence assistance from a segment of a

state’s security forces sometimes acting

without the explicit approval of national

leaders.

Category II supporters do not back

terrorism as an element of national policy,

but tolerate it to some degree. This often

grows from an assessment that the risks

and costs of eradicating terrorist networks

outweigh the expected benefits—letting

sleeping dogs lie. In effect, Category II

states have a tacit modus vivendi with

terrorists. In exchange for turning a blind

eye, the regime is not targeted. In some

Category II states, terrorists have the

sympathy of segments of the military or

other security services, so the regime may

feel that pressuring them may cause

dangerous schisms within the government.

Egypt and Pakistan seem to fit this model.

Some Category II states may tolerate

terrorist activity to deflect attention from

their own shortcomings or repression. In

the Islamic world, for instance, allowing

radicals to blame Israel or the United States

for poverty, misery, and so forth removes

attention from the flaws of the region’s

leaders and systems. The toleration of

virulent anti-Americanism in Saudi Arabia

and elsewhere is an example. Finally, some

Category II states may provide sanctuary

for terrorists simply out of an inability to

police and control parts of their national

territory.

Category III support is what might be

called “structural.” It comes from the

presence of legal protections of privacy and

freedoms of movement and association,

limits on internal surveillance and security

organizations, well-developed communication and transportation infrastructures,

and émigré communities, all providing a

hospitable environment for some kinds of

terrorists. The governments of Category III

states do not support or approve of

terrorism; most actively seek to

exterminate it, but find their efforts

constrained by the legal system and values

of their states. The United States, Canada,

and Germany are examples.

Addressing State Support

to Terrorism.

Stopping and deterring state support to

terrorism should, when possible, be pursued

through diplomatic, legal, and multilateral

channels. One element of this should be

strengthening the international legal

proscriptions on support for terrorism.

Attempts to do this have been underway for

years, but have been hindered by ideological

and political considerations. Even defining

the problem is difficult since one man’s

“terrorist” can be another man’s “freedom

fighter.” In recent years, though, a basic

legal framework has begun to take shape.

For instance, the 1994 and 1996

22
Declarations on Measures to Eliminate

International Terrorism of the United

Nations General Assembly condemned all

terrorist acts and methods regardless of

political, philosophical, ideological, ethnic,

or religious considerations. This was

further strengthened in Resolution 1269

(October 19, 1999) in which the U.N.

Security Council: “Unequivocally condemns

all acts, methods, and practices of terrorism

as criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of

their motivation, in all their forms and

manifestations, wherever and by whomever

committed, in particular those which could

threaten international peace and security.”

Documents like the International

Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist

Bombings (1997), International Convention

for the Suppression of the Financing of

Terrorism (1999), and the Draft

International Convention for the

Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism (1998)

focused on specific elements of the problem.

This legal structure, though, has some

serious flaws. The first is the continuing

problem of defining terrorism. While there

is little debate that the September 11

attacks on the United States constituted

terrorism, many other uses of force are

harder to categorize. Second, the existing

international legal structure largely treats

terrorism as a crime rather than an act of

war. This creates friction and ambiguities

in any attempts to deal with it. Third, like

much of international law, no formal

enforcement mechanism exists to deal with

terrorism.

The United States could address these

shortcomings first by leading an effort to

codify an internationally accepted

definition of terrorism. The United States

should insist that terrorism or support to

terrorism be treated as a threat to

international peace and security and thus

an act of war. Then the international

community should develop the same sort of

enforcement mechanisms that address

other threats to international peace and

security, specifically a procedure by which

the United Nations authorizes collective

security to address the threat under

Chapter VII of the Charter. At the same

time, the United States should refine the

National Security Strategy to deal with

each of the three types of terrorist

supporters. Eradicating Category I support

will often require coercion, to include armed

force. U.S. policy should specify that overt

support to terrorists who target U.S.

citizens or the United States is an act of

war, and will be treated as such. After all,

Article 51 of the U.N. Charter states,

“Nothing in the present Charter shall

impair the inherent right of individual or

collective self-defense if an armed attack

occurs against a Member of the United

Nations, until the Security Council has

taken measures necessary to maintain

international peace and security.”

To deter Category I supporters requires

that the United States be able to project

decisive force around the world. The Army’s

contribution to this is vital. While the

United States would always prefer not to

project landpower to a distant state, having

the ability to do so and, if appropriate,

replace a regime, is a deterrent. If decisive

action is taken against a Category I

supporter of terrorism, the Army may also

play a vital role in post-conflict

reconstitution of the state by providing

security and other forms of support to a

multinational force or international

organization. In instances where a Category

I supporter is willing to change its behavior,

the United States should be willing to

provide political, economic, and perhaps

even military inducements. Army

engagement programs including IMET,

MTTs, and combined exercises could be part

of this.

23
To stop and deter Category II support,

the United States must provide inducements to eradicate terrorist networks,

support for doing so, and, in some cases,

punishment for failing to do so. The

inducements could include economic steps

like preferential market access and debt

relief, or political ones like increased

attention to a diplomatic problem of concern

to the Category II supporters. Punishments

for Category II supporters that fail to take

serious steps could also include a range of

political and economic actions. For instance,

the United States could expand the system

for listing state sponsors. The current list,

which is prepared by the State Department,

focuses on Category I type support. It might

also include Category II support from

nations not making strenuous efforts to deal

with terrorist support networks within

their territory. Various types of economic

and political inducements could be tied to

this list. As with policies to promote

democracy and counter narcotrafficking,

the United States should oppose World

Bank or IMF funding to Category II states

on the State Department’s list. In addition,

the United States should instigate an effort

to create a multinational legal forum to try

to punish terrorists. This would limit the

vulnerability of Category II states to

retribution as they brought terrorists to

justice.

Each Category III state, including the

United States, must assess its legal system

and security organization to become more

effective at countering terrorism while

protecting national values. Among

Category III states, the United States

should take the lead in improving

intelligence sharing and cooperation in

eradicating terrorist support infrastructure, particularly financial flows.

Conclusions.

Addressing state support for terrorism

will require a broad effort on the part of the

United States, integrating economic,

diplomatic, law enforcement, and

intelligence steps. The Army can contribute

to this by:

• Analyzing state support to terrorism

in terms of three categories: Category I

support entails protection, logistics,

training, intelligence, or equipment

provided terrorists as a part of national

policy or strategy; Category II support is

when a regime does not back terrorism as

an element of national policy but tolerates

it; Category III support provides some

terrorists a hospitable environment,

growing from the presence of legal

protections on privacy and freedom of

movement, limits on internal surveillance

and security organizations, well-developed

infrastructure, and émigré communities.

• Further develop Army doctrine,

concepts, and forces to be able to punish

Category I supporters of terrorism and to

contribute to multinational reconstruction

of those that are punished. Make this a

focus mission for the Interim Brigade

Combat Teams.

• Develop Army doctrine, concepts, and

forces to provide engagement and other

types of support activities to Category II

states attempting to eradicate terrorism

within their territories, to include concepts

and organizations designed specifically to

support regional partners and allies rather

than having support to partners as a

secondary mission.

Use Army wargaming and strategic

planning capabilities to create a program

designed specifically to improve the

counterterrorism concepts, doctrine, and

organizations of the U.S. military, other

U.S. Government agencies, and partner

nations, with a focus on deterring Category

24
I supporters, augmenting the capabilities of

Category II supporters, and increasing

cooperation and communication among

Category III supporters.

25
The recent terrorist attacks on New

York and Washington have focused the

attention of the nation and its military on

immediately combating this serious threat.

The dominant National Military Strategy

paradigm of the 1990s—“shape, respond,

and prepare”—was in the process of being

redone by the Bush administration prior to

the attacks, but still provides a concise way

of broadly describing the tasks the military

must perform. Along with its sister

Services, the Army is currently concentrating almost exclusively on responding

and even more narrowly on actions to

punish and prevent terrorism. President

Bush and his cabinet have been clear that

this will be a long struggle, however, and

the Army must not neglect its many other

important shaping and preparing missions

during that time. A victory over terrorism

will be meaningless if it is not accompanied

by the continuing spread of peace, security,

democracy, and free market ideas that

those other military missions support.

U.S. needs and interests require a broad

and balanced security focus. While the

Army will understandably place high

priority on contributing to winning the war

against terrorism, the service must

simultaneously conduct operations along

four other axes. It must continue its

involvement in day-to-day engagement

activities around the world, sustain its

capability to conduct peace operations,

remain ready to fight and deter major wars,

and maintain momentum for transformation. The Army was already stretched by its

operational tempo before September 11; the

new demands will only exacerbate that

situation. However, they must not divert

the Service from accomplishing its other

essential missions.

First, the Army must not allow an

increased emphasis on force protection and

other operations against terrorism to

deflect it from supporting regional CINCs in

their efforts to remain engaged overseas.

Through its 150,000 forward-stationed and

deployed forces, the Army provides over 60

percent of America’s forces committed to

engagement. Often such involvement can

shape the regional environment to prevent

conflicts or facilitate responses when they

occur. The U.S. ability to conduct current

27

SIX

Maintaining Strategic Balance while Fighting Terrorism

Dr. Conrad C. Crane

Conclusions:

• While fighting terrorism, the Army must maintain its ability to remain engaged

in the world, perform peace operations, fight and deter wars, and execute

transformation.

• The service will quickly need an expanded and restructured active force with

increased intelligence/CS/CSS/SOF assets.

• Reserve Component mobilization plans need to be reexamined with their forces

reorganized for new missions and reapportioned with the Active Component.

• Reconfiguring the force to better combat terrorism should reinforce and

accelerate transformation efforts.
operations against Afghanistan was aided

considerably by 82d Airborne Division

exercises with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan

in 1997. Remaining engaged around the

world now will similarly facilitate

operations when the next unexpected crisis

occurs and will also help prevent crises from

occurring in the first place. The coalitions

forming to combat different aspects of

terrorism include a number of new partners

and should provide even more opportunities

for military-to-military contacts and other

engagement activities.

Even while initiating new operations

against terrorism, the Army will still have

forces involved in numerous peacekeeping

missions and must resist calls to withdraw

from these missions to provide resources for

the war on terrorism. The current Army

missions in Bosnia and Kosovo remain

important, though future similar

assignments should not be lightly accepted

because of the strain these seemingly

unending deployments impose on existing

forces. However, there will be times—even

while fighting the war on terrorism—when

national interests will require humanitarian assistance and secure peace

operations that only American military

forces can provide. Effective and efficient

“peace-building” efforts must remain an

important element of any national security

strategy. The current situation in Afghanistan highlights again that post-conflict

societies can become breeding grounds for

crime and terrorism if some sort of order is

not imposed.

To prevent peacekeeping assignments

from dragging on and tying up scarce

assets, the Army and supporting agencies

must become better at nation-building.

Though President Bush has again

reiterated his resistance to that mission,

long-term solutions to create a more stable

world will require the United States to

engage in it, and only the Army can really

do it in an environment of questionable

security. Success in stabilization operations

and success in the war against terrorism

will be closely linked because of the

cause-effect relationship that exists

between them and because of the similarity

of unit requirements. The service should be

daunted by—and prepare for—the responsibilities it might assume to help stabilize

and rebuild Afghanistan after bin Laden

and his supporters are rooted out.

The Army must also retain its ability to

deter and fight wars. Cross-border wars of

aggression are not the most likely type of

conflict predicted for the future, but they

are certainly not impossible and clearly

require forces ready to fight them. In fact, it

is precisely because forces are ready to fight

them that they are so unlikely. Even in the

war on terrorism, where major combat

forces will likely have only limited utility,

they will still be essential if operations

expand to take on states that support

terrorism. The most powerful military force

on the planet remains a joint force based

around a heavy corps, and those units must

not be allowed to atrophy. Cross border

incursions remain a threat in Asia and the

Middle East. The Bush administration’s

stern warning to Iraq not to attempt to take

advantage of America’s concentration on

terrorism would not be an effective

deterrent without the joint force—including

landpower—to back it up.

While the Army must continue to

emphasize the importance of a balanced

joint force to fight and deter wars, it must

also simultaneously maintain its focus on

long-term transformation. The evolving

requirements of the war against terrorism

will highlight even more the necessity for

lighter, smarter, more lethal, and more

agile forces. As originally conceived,

transformation was to prepare the Army for

future wars. That concept needs to be

shaped by the new geostrategic focus on

28
terrorism and then probably should be

accelerated to allow the new capabilities to

bring increased levels of effectiveness to the

war on terrorism.

Force Structure Considerations.

When combined with ongoing missions

and responsibilities, the demands of the

new focus on fighting terrorism will strain

the Army considerably and highlight many

shortfalls in its structure. The force that

fought and won Operation DESERT

STORM is long gone. The current Army is

really too small to fight a major land war

against a state like Iraq without even more

coalition landpower augmentation than it

received in the Gulf War, but it is also

deficient in many elements necessary to

fight terrorism, provide for homeland

defense, and conduct peace operations. The

number of active component intelligence,

psychological operations, civil affairs,

military police, and engineer units must be

increased, not only to perform contemporary peacekeeping and stabilization

functions, but also to meet the new

demands of the war against terrorism,

including significantly increased force

protection requirements around the world.

Performing all these missions will also

be very stressful on the National Guard and

Army Reserve. They will be pulled between

future significant and immediate requirements for homeland security, the recent

demands of peace operations, and the need

to support or participate in the overseas

fight against terrorism. If more of the

Reserve Components are committed to

duties at home, deployment schedules for

the Balkans could be affected, increasing

the burden on active forces for peacekeeping

in Bosnia and Kosovo. The 50,000 reservists

being called up and National Guard troops

providing airport security are only the

beginning of a long-term commitment to

homeland security and consequence

management which, if the mission remains

with the Reserve Components, might

seriously compromise their ability to

support a major theater war. Current

mobilization plans clearly need review and

probably need significant revision.

The war against terrorism is only one of

many essential missions the Army must

perform. The service must be very

forthright with Congress and the Bush

administration about the additional forces

needed to conduct its myriad of important

duties. The HQDA staff should immediately

develop plans and gather support to begin

the process of expanding and restructuring

the force. Recruiting, training, and

equipping new soldiers and units will take

time. While Reserve Component mobilization and some economy of force efforts might

suffice in the short term to meet Army

requirements, these arrangements cannot

be maintained for a long period without

debilitating the force and raising the level of

risk for long-term missions.

In summary, maintaining strategic

balance will require more than just better

guidance, planning, and training. Increased

force structure—accompanied by revisions

in the makeup of that structure and by

reallocation between the Active and

Reserve Components—will be necessary to

enhance the Army’s ability to fight the war

against terrorism while simultaneously

keeping the peace in other areas. The

simultaneous and ongoing demands for

homeland security, anti-terrorist strikes,

peace operations, and deterring war will

require more land forces, especially in the

Active Component, and mostly in the areas

of CS, CSS, and SOF. Increasing

intelligence assets will be especially crucial.

Forces will need to be reapportioned

between the Active and Reserve

Components and reserve units reconfigured

to handle new and existing long-term

requirements. At the same time, the Service

29
cannot become so focused on current

operations that the momentum and

direction of transformation is lost. The

world changed on September 11, 2001, and

the Army must adjust accordingly. But its

long-term vision remains viable, and the

course to reach it must be maintained.

30
This paper provides a brief analysis of

the U.S. homeland’s current threats and

vulnerabilities, outlines a general strategy

for homeland defense and the war against

terrorism, and discusses some salient issues

related to command and control.

Assumptions.

The U.S. will continue to wage a multilateral and sustained war against all

terrorist organizations with “global reach”

and their state (and nonstate) sponsors.

Hence, homeland security requires a

long-term perspective.

Unless significant legislative changes

occur, the U.S. military will perform most

homeland security missions in support of

other federal agencies.

The U.S. will remain politically and

economically engaged in the world. It will

maintain sufficient military presence

overseas to deter aggression and honor its

alliance and treaty commitments.

Threats and Vulnerabilities.

Terrorism. Despite heightened awareness and increased security efforts since the

tragic events of September 11, 2001, the

U.S. remains vulnerable to a wide variety of

terrorist attacks. On October 5, 2001, for

instance, the Project on Government Oversight reported that America’s ten nuclear

weapons research and production facilities

are still inadequately protected. A report

recently published by the Henry L. Stimson

Center revealed that the 850,000 sites that

produce, consume, and store hazardous

chemical materials in the U.S. remain

virtually unprotected.

Furthermore, while much attention

remains focused on the war overseas,

domestic terrorist organizations—e.g., the

“Michigan Militia,” the “Order,” and the

“Aryan Nations”—remain at large and

dangerous. Until September 11, 2001,

international and domestic terrorists had

claimed 670 lives on U.S. soil in over 2,700

31

SEVEN

Homeland Security Issues:

A Strategic Perspective

Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria II

Conclusions:

• The new war being waged against America is a form of asymmetric warfare

using terror tactics, not a standard terrorism campaign.

• DoD’s role is evolving but will likely remain largely a supporting one in

homeland defense.

• The new threat environment and the numerous “vulnerabilities” within the

homeland require a new way of thinking about “threats” and how to address

them.

• Assessments of critical infrastructure and key assets require updating.

• NMD will remain a critical component of homeland defense.

• The nation needs a Federal Defense Plan to complement the Federal Response

Plan (FRP) that exists for consequence management.
incidents, with white racist groups causing

the majority (51 percent) of deaths.

Domestic terrorist groups could well

retaliate in response to the federal

government’s introduction of increased

security measures in the aftermath of

September 11.

Although the number of international

and domestic terrorist attacks has declined

in the 1990s, the lethality of those attacks

has risen dramatically. This rising lethality

can be looked at in one of two ways: 1) as the

emergence of a “new” or “apocalyptic” brand

of terrorism bent on producing mass

casualties, or 2) as a new or “asymmetric”

form of warfare that employs terror tactics.

The first view tends to regard “terrorism” as

an aggregate, placing disparate terrorist

groups—such as the Aryan Nations, the

IRA, and al- Qaeda—into a single category.

In so doing, it obscures their ideological,

political, and cultural differences. An

understanding of such differences is critical

to the development of effective strategies for

defeating such groups. The IRA has shown a

proclivity to employ small-scale attacks

that do not involve large numbers of

casualties and which damage infrastructure such as power grids. These are

clearly not the tactics of the al-Qaeda group.

The motives of al-Qaeda, unlike those of the

IRA or the Aryan Nations, have unique

religious and cultural underpinnings which,

if not understood, could result in an

escalation of the current conflict or lead to

other negative strategic consequences for

the U.S., its allies, and coalition partners.

Thus, a “one-size-fits-all” approach to

terrorism could lead to an inappropriate

strategy for defending the homeland and for

conducting military operations overseas.

The U.S. Army and DoD would do better,

therefore, to take the view that America is

engaged in a new or asymmetric style of

warfare perpetrated by certain states and

nonstate actors who prefer terror tactics.

This view permits the disaggregation of

“terrorism” based on useful criteria such as

political and cultural motives, enabling a

better understanding of a particular group’s

strengths and weaknesses. It also

facilitates development of a more integrated

national security strategy, one that

provides for a comprehensive defense of the

homeland while also dealing with nonstate

actors and their state sponsors. Third, it

allows the U.S. Army to demonstrate the

strategic relevance of its core competencies

and its transformation programs. The Army

should also stress how the campaign in

Afghanistan has highlighted the limitations

of an airpower-centric approach to warfare.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological,

Nuclear, and High-Explosive/High-Yield

(CBRNE) Weapons. CBRNE weapons

continue t o proliferate. Seventeen

countries—including Iran, Iraq, Libya, and

North Korea—have active chemical and

biological weapons programs. While it

remains difficult to manufacture, deliver,

and activate certain types of CBRNE

weapons, the apparent availability of

“free-lance” expertise from the former Soviet

Union combined with today’s rapid pace of

technological innovation suggests that

potential adversaries will succeed in

overcoming these difficulties sooner rather

than later. The recent decision to increase

the reserve of smallpox and anthrax vaccines

is, therefore, encouraging.

Critical (and Other) Infrastructure. In

1997, the Presidential Commission on

Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP)

assessed the vulnerability of the nation’s

critical infrastructure. At that time, U.S.

critical infrastructure included: 400

airports; 1,900 seaports; 6,000 bus and rail

transit terminals; 1,700 inland river

terminals; 1.4 million miles of oil and

natural gas pipelines; and other banking,

financial, and energy-related networks. The

Commission assessed the Energy, Physical

32
Distribution, and Banking and Finance

sectors as either well-protected or relatively

resilient to an attack, while it regarded the

Vital Human Services and Information and

Communications sectors as highly vulnerable to cyber and physical forms of attack.

The PCCIP admitted that it did not

know enough about water-borne pathogens

and the threat they could pose if released

into the nation’s water supply. The

American Waterworks Association

(AWWA) maintains that the sheer volume,

chlorine content, and multiple filtration

systems built into major water supplies

make them resistant to contamination by

all but a few pathogens. At risk, however,

are smaller water supplies.

Unfortunately, the PCCIP also completely overlooked the nation’s agricultural

infrastructure. While the U.S. Department

of Agriculture (USDA) is confident that it

can respond to “natural, accidental, and

inadvertent introductions” of exotic

diseases and pests into the food supply and

agricultural system, it admits that it is

incapable of addressing the “widespread

intentional introduction” of such threats.

The number of pathogens and other agents

that could devastate U.S. livestock and

crops are numerous and inexpensive to

develop. Since the U.S. produces some

30-50 percent of many of the world’s

foodstuffs, an agricultural crisis could have

global implications.

The PCCIP also failed to consider the

entertainment and recreational industries—

amusement parks, sports arenas, shopping

malls, and other locations where large

numbers of people gather. While not

necessarily critical to the nation’s ability to

function, these are the types of targets that

al-Qaeda and other such organizations

seem inclined to strike. A successful

CBRNE attack against Disney World or a

major sports arena, for example, could

result not only in thousands of casualties,

but in adverse economic consequences as

well.

The PCCIP’s oversights combined with

the rapid pace of urbanization and economic

development, even since 1997, suggest that

the Commission’s assessment requires

immediate updating. By way of illustration,

in 1999 the National Infrastructure

Protection Center (NIPC), an interagency

office housed at the FBI, identified a list of

just over 200 key national assets requiring

protection. However, its FY01 report is

expected to include a total of 4,385 key

assets.

The Cyber Threat. In February 2000, the

Director of the CIA testified before Congress

that the foreign cyber threat was growing

rapidly. More than one dozen countries—

including Russia, the PRC, and several

states of concern—have developed, or are

develop- ing, the means to launch

strategic-level cyber attacks. The interconnectedness of much of the nation’s

infrastructure means that a successful

cyber attack against one sector will likely

result in adverse effects in others.

Ballistic Missiles. Today, more than 25

countries possess ballistic missile

programs, though only two, Russia and

China, currently have missiles capable of

reaching the U.S. The Rumsfeld Commission reported that North Korea and Iran

could build ballistic missiles capable of

striking the U.S. within 5 years of deciding

to do so. Iraq could have the same capability

within 10 years of such a decision. It is

difficult, if not impossible, to know precisely

when one of these states might take such a

decision. North Korea, Iran, and Iraq have

also been known sponsors of terrorism for

some time. In other words, America’s war

against terrorism could lead in time to a

confrontation with one or more states

capable of targeting the U.S. with ballistic

missiles.

33
Cruise Missiles. Cruise missiles include

a wide variety of types, ranging from

relatively inexpensive unmanned aerial

vehicles (UAVs) to the more expensive

U.S.-made Tomahawks. Intelligence

estimates indicate that some 80,000 cruise

missiles of numerous types will exist by

2010. More than 75 countries already

possess some kind of cruise missiles, and

the technology for developing them is

proliferating rapidly. Many types in

existence today can be concealed in and

launched from standard shipping containers. On average, 1500 ships carrying

standard containers navigate the Pacific

and Atlantic oceans within cruise-missile

range of the United States every day.

“Threats” versus Vulnerabilities.

Today’s threat environment reflects the

influences of a faster-paced and more interconnected world. In this environment, the

traditional notion that “a threat =

capabilities x intentions” remains valid for

conventional warfare, but has serious

deficiencies when applied to America’s

“New War.” In the attacks of September 11,

2001, for example, terrorists demonstrated

an ability to use common materials—box

knives and airliners filled with fuel—rather

than uniquely military “capabilities.” The

so-called capabilities of al-Qaeda and

similar terrorist groups are, therefore,

limited only by their imagination and their

ability to gain access to the specific items

they want to use.

Moreover, the general intention of such

groups is self-evident, namely, to hurt the

U.S. in whatever way possible. Yet, the

specific intentions of individual tactical

cells—such as which targets will be

attacked, when, and how—are much more

difficult to divine and are clearly much more

important. The traditional definition of

“threat” essentially provided a useful

calculus for the strategy of deterrence that

characterized the Cold War. However, it is

inadequate for the new security environment in which an enormous number of

vulnerabilities exist, and where many of the

players do not readily conform with the

“rational-actor” model.

National Missile Defense (NMD).

America’s war on terrorism will make NMD

more important to U.S. security despite the

fact that attacks so far have been largely

“asymmetric.” Since a long war against

terrorism and its state-sponsors runs the

risk of escalating into a war against one or

more states of concern, the U.S. is

effectively in a race against time to develop

some type of comprehensive missile defense

system. Reports that development of an

NMD system will proceed are, therefore,

encouraging. The U.S. should maintain a

global perspective when it comes to missile

defense, since an attack against an ally or

strategic partner could adversely affect

America’s ability to protect its interests.

A Strategy for Defense. Most

government- sponsored studies of homeland

security have focused primarily on issues

related to consequence management.

Indeed, defense seems a nearly impossible

task, given the large number of potential

targets, the vast number of scenarios, and

the overall financial expenditures that an

effective defense would likely require.

While consequence management is clearly

important, the events of September 11,

2001, demonstrate that the absence of a

comprehensive, preventive strategy for

homeland defense can result in an

enormous loss of lives and even greater

financial costs than prudent defensive

measures would have entailed.

One of the first actions that the Office of

Homeland Security (OHS) should

undertake, therefore, is to develop a

comprehensive strategy for homeland

defense. A Federal Defense Plan would

provide a critical element in that strategy.

34
DoD’s strategists and war planners could

provide valuable assistance in the

development of both. One possible outline

for a homeland defense strategy follows:

1. Prevention: Hardening potential

targets—whether nuclear reactors or shopping malls—against attack. This measure

will require thorough vulnerability

analyses involving all forms of attack.

2. Active Countermeasures: Systematic

surveillance and preemptive confrontation

with known terrorist sympathizers and

supporters, increased law enforcement

and/or military presence, and an active

publicity campaign designed to let

terrorists know that the U.S. is prepared to

respond.

3. Aggressive Intelligence: Proactive

intelligence gathering, analysis, dissemination, and sharing among appropriate

national (and international) agencies, allies

and coalition partners, and state and local

law enforcement authorities. This is the

most essential and yet most complicated

component due to legal constraints

regarding the collection of intelligence on

U.S. citizens.

4. Development of Indicators: A set of

triggering events that could be used to focus

intelligence efforts and/or initiate countermeasures.

5. Anticipatory Crisis Response:

Multilateral, global response mechanisms

designed in anticipation of terrorist attacks.

This component would include coordination

(particularly with Canada and Mexico),

training, readiness evaluation, and

rehearsals of what to do and how to do it in

the event of an attack.

This model served the U.S. well in the

Gulf War (1990-91) by helping military and

civilian officials deter or defeat Iraqi

terrorist attacks. It offers a clear reminder

that effective homeland defense requires a

global perspective, particularly with regard

to intelligence.

Successful execution of any strategy will

require effective management by an overarching organization, such as the OHS.

While personal influence, individual

leadership skills and direct access to the

President will help, ultimately the OHS’s

effectiveness will depend upon the degree of

budgetary and legal authority it has over

the more than 40 federal and other

organizations that play a role in homeland

security.

Command and Control. Military

command and control in homeland defense

could take a variety of forms, from enlarging

Joint Task Force-Civil Support to standing

up a unified combatant command.

Recent studies that recommend against

standing up a U.S. combatant command

might have arrived at the right answer for

the wrong reasons. One study split the overarching mission of homeland security into

two parts: defense of the U.S. and support to

civil authorities. The author saw little

advantage in combining the two parts of the

overall mission under one command, a

command that, if current plans remain in

effect, would not have assigned forces.

Instead, he recommended that UCP’01

reflect a short-term fix by (1) consolidating

civil support functions at JFCOM through

the realignment of DOMS from the Army to

OSD and the Joint System, and (2)

assigning NMD to SPACECOM.

However, such objections do not stand

up to closer scrutiny. First, whether a

synergy exists between the two homeland

security missions—and whether this is a

valid criterion for not putting them under a

single command—are matters of judgment.

One could combine both missions under one

command to facilitate coordination and

reduce possible conflicts over resources.

Second, the fact that forces are not

currently assigned does not necessarily

preclude their assignment at a later date.

The problem of defending the homeland is

35
larger than the solution a revised UCP

could provide. The nation needs a Federal

Defense Plan to complement the Federal

Response Plan that exists for consequence

management.

A more compelling reason for not

creating a “CINC America” is that current

laws prohibit the military from collecting

and storing intelligence on U.S. citizens.

Until those laws are changed, a military

combatant commander cannot gather the

intelligence necessary to take proactive

steps in defense of the homeland.

Accordingly, a combatant commander

would do little more than respond to

“taskings” for military forces by the FBI or

other lead federal agencies. It is far from

certain that the courts would grant

exceptions to the law, even under a wartime

footing. At issue are privacy rights and civil

liberties, the preservation of which remains

an enduring vital interest of the U.S. and its

citizens.

If legislative changes do not occur, then

the establishment of a para-military civil

defense force might offer a better long-term

solution for defending the homeland. A civil

defense force would not fall under the

constraints of the Posse Comitatus Act and

could perform a variety of functions, such as

protecting key national assets and

augmenting local law enforcement, border

guards, customs officials, and the Coast

Guard. It could come under the control of an

organization similar to the OHS.

36
The Issue.

Events on September 11, 2001, changed

many aspects of the domestic security

environment. Those changes will ultimately

redefine the military role in domestic

security, which will subsequently affect

Army missions. After a solid analysis of the

new or revised missions, the Army will be

required to adjust its force structure

significantly and adapt to major DoD

structural changes, particularly those

necessitated by development of the Homeland Security Agency.

The military’s role in domestic security

has evolved over many years and is

constrained by the Constitution of the

United States and subsequent laws. That

evolution has been engendered by periodic

changes in the domestic security

environment, either when new requirements were identified or when old methods

of dealing with previously-identified

requirements were found to be inadequate.

The military’s current role in domestic

security is officially defined by a collection of

DoD and other agency documents.1

This

paper will examine the major changes for

the military role and will determine which

of those are likely to result in significant

changes for the Army’s mission. The

domestic security environment is divided

into two dimensions for purposes of

examining the issues pertinent to military

roles and missions. The first, crisis

management, is the prevention of events

that threaten national security. The second,

consequence management, deals with those

times when prevention fails, and the

military and others respond to those events

to minimize damage and effect recovery.

Consequence management also covers the

actions taken to provide consequences for

the perpetrator of the event. Any

examination of changes in requirements—or

assignment of responsibility for those

requirements—in domestic security must

consider both prevention actions and response

actions.

37

EIGHT

The Military’s Role in the New Domestic

Security Environment: Will Army Missions Change?

Colonel Dallas D. Owens

Conclusions:

• Events on September 11, 2001, changed aspects of the domestic security

environment that will ultimately redefine military roles and affect Army

missions for domestic security.

• New or enhanced Army missions are in the areas of internal air defense,

international response, intelligence sharing, immigration support, national

level coordination, law enforcement support, and infrastructure protection.

• The Army’s Active Component is likely to require additional air defense,

intelligence, and information operations forces.

• The Army’s Reserve Components are likely to require significant additional

increases in military police forces and minor increases in air defense,

intelligence, and information operations forces.
Prevention and Response

Requirements.

With perhaps one exception, no new

preventive requirements were discovered in

the aftermath of the attacks on September

11. Before the attack, there were valid

requirements to identify potential enemies,

deny them entry into the United States, and

to apprehend those who nonetheless were

able to enter and would commit criminal

acts. These roles were primarily performed,

respectively, by the intelligence community,

immigration services, and the Department

of Justice. The military provide some minor

amount of support to the intelligence

collection effort and some likewise small

amount of assistance to immigration

agencies (primarily border patrol support).

Military support to law enforcement is

generally proscribed by law. The one

potentially new or—more accurately—

renewed requirement is for internal air

defense, i.e., prevention of a similar attack

in which terrorists use the airplane as a

bomb. Air marshals and airport security

offices will play a major role in this effort,

but the air defense role is uniquely suited to

the military since no other agency has the

necessary equipment, training, and

response time to perform the role

adequately.

In the response category, there has been

no change in the requirement to respond,

either domestically or internationally.

However, there has been a subtle shift in

the meaning of the international response.

After a criminal incident of this nature,

American citizens expect immediate

response in the form of domestic disaster

assistance, normally coordinated by the

Federal Emergency Management Agency,

with military support provided as

necessary. They also expect the

perpetrators to be caught and brought to

justice as quickly as possible. Domestically,

this role is normally performed by the

Department of Justice, working with local,

state, and federal law enforcement

agencies. This requirement remains valid,

but the magnitude of the attack has caused

it to be characterized as an act of war,

making the military the expected main

means of dealing with the perpetrators.

This role is the norm for international

response, but the domestic division of

responsibility between civilian law

enforcement agencies and the military is yet

to be defined completely.

Internationally, the military is currently

at center stage in responding to the attack.

The stage is shared by the Department of

State, but for the purpose of finding and

rooting out Usama bin Laden and al Qaida,

at least in Afghanistan, the military is

clearly in the lead, with the State

Department supporting with diplomatic

efforts to obtain basing rights, maintain

coalitions, etc. Subsequent stages of the war

may find the lead role taken by the

Department of State as the push for

military action dissipates.

The military is comfortable with its

traditional role as international responder,

but there are new strategic implications to

success or failure. The traditional battlewar linkage has become a more direct

battle- national perception linkage. In other

words, a successful battle or operation

would lead not only to the longer-term goal

of “winning a war,” but also to the

establishment and sustainment of the

perception of security by the populace of the

homeland. Failed operations no longer

represent a short-term setback with

tangential effects on popular opinion; they

may have immediate consequences for

feelings of security. The requirement for

public success for every operation will be an

enormous burden on the military.

38
Prevention and Response Failures.

In the prevention category, intelligence

is most often noted publicly as a failure.

Most cite inadequate coordination and

insufficient resources as the major causes

for that failure. The resource issue

surrounds both personnel (type and

number) and funds, with a major focus on

human intelligence. Correcting this failure,

particularly the human intelligence aspect,

will take long-term investment that

recognizes the difficulty and risk in

identifying and infiltrating terrorist cells.

The coordination issue involves intelligence

sharing, both national and international,

and is linked to the coordination of the

collection and dissemination effort. The

military has little stake in the collection

issue, but has significant stake in

intelligence sharing.

Response failures continue to be

identified. Domestically, the creation of a

cabinet-level post for homeland defense

indicates some recognition that improvements in response coordination are needed.

The actual events did not create this

recognition,2

but they drove home its

importance and immediacy. Infrastructure

security measures have been condemned on

many fronts; again, few of the inadequacies

came as a surprise. Recognition of domestic

inadequacies has two consequences for the

military. As a supporting agency, the

oversight and coordination role at the

cabinet level will have some effect on how

support is provided, but that effect will only

gradually be felt as the post evolves.

Infrastructure protection will affect the

military in the short term with assignments

of missions to complement capabilities of

law enforcement to protect selected key

assets. Concurrently, force protection

requirements have increased at military

facilities, its own internal key infrastructure.

Army Missions.

The impact on military roles will affect

Army missions when the Army is the

appropriate service for performing the

military role. New missions include:

Internal Air Defense: Though much of

this mission will fall to the Air Force, the

Army may be expected to provide air

defense for fixed key infrastructure. This

mission is similar to or an extension of that

proposed as part of the missile defense

program, which has significant force

structure implications.3

Recommendation: Determine the

Army’s mission and analyze the adequacy of

existing structure. If the requirement is

large, constant, and long term, the Army’s

Active Component (AC) will require

additional air defense forces. The Reserve

Component could provide near-term

support while the AC restructures.

International Response: The Army

will not necessarily see changes at the

tactical level, depending on how battles are

conducted. It will be a challenge to Army

leadership to ensure that the perceived

requirement to succeed in every battle does

not affect the performance of its units.

Recommendation: The Army can

attempt to shield its units from undue

pressures, but the CINCs and DoD have

more ability than the services to meet this

challenge. The military should also

anticipate an occasional tactical failure and

assume such failures will become public. A

plan should be prepared to minimize the

impact of such failures on the public

perception of increased threat to its security

and to strategic goals.

Intelligence Sharing: Though not a

new mission for the Army, the new

emphasis will have some impact on the

Army as a collector and user of intelligence.

The greatest burden is likely to be in the

requirement to receive greater amounts of

39
intelligence at the higher echelons of the

Army. Receiving more may require

additional assets to interpret and

disseminate what is received. The great

danger is that more would be received, but

not disseminated to the units that need it

most.

Recommendation: The Army should

reassess its ability to receive, interpret, and

disseminate intelligence. If that ability

proves insufficient, intelligence assets

should be increased.

Immigration Support: The Army’s

mission for immigration support has

traditionally been in the areas of command

and control and communications. The law

enforcement nature of border patrolling is

beyond what the Army sees as its domestic

role and is not legally appropriate under

most routine circumstances. However, the

Army National Guard—in state status, not

federal—may perform law enforcement

functions. The Army’s position will probably

remain one of only providing short-term

support, preferably not of a law enforcement

nature, until immigration can expand

capacity to the needed level.

Recommendation: Anticipating a

long-term demand for intermittent support,

the Army needs to analyze the skills needed

for such support and make the minor

changes in RC force structure necessary to

meet that requirement. The RC is the most

appropriate force to meet the requirement

because of its intermittent and short-term

nature.

National Level Coordination:

Clearly a perception exists that

coordination of homeland security has

“failed,” but it is not yet certain what the

new office will do to correct that failure or

how successful those corrections will be. At

this point, it is equally clear that the

military will need to respond to new

coordination demands, but specifics are

lacking. Likewise, the Army’s mission in

this coordination scheme is not yet

apparent. The DoD will continue to make

internal adjustments and the Army’s

mission will become more clear over the

next few months. The Army’s mission for

support to civilian authorities will receive

new emphasis and reorganization

recommendations like those provided by the

Hart-Rudman Commission4

will receive

new consideration.

Recommendation: The overall military reorganization will largely determine

the Army’s reaction. However, the Army

should resist pressures to restructure

radically—at the expense of important

long-term issues—to address immediate

concerns. Restructuring responsibilities

and staffs to coordinate DoD response

better is certainly necessary. Some force

restructuring is also needed, but many

recommendations being proposed, both

internal to DoD and in Congress, may not be

beneficial to either the Army or the Nation.

Law Enforcement Support: Under

the general rubric of “security,” a

labor-intensive Army mission resulted from

the 11 September attacks. The guards at

airports and Army facilities were the

highest profile Army missions. These

missions were not new, but the “off-site”

security requirements are a unique and

potentially large twist to expected

consequence management. If this mission is

seen as a long-term or frequently-spiking

requirement, there are definite force

structure implications. The Army’s military

police are already in high demand with

peacekeeping and routine installation

requirements. Significant additional

requirements certainly exceed capabilities.

If the current novel funding status of Army

National Guard airport security portends

things to come, the Active and Reserve

Components both need more military police

structure. Indeed, it is possible to have

soldiers other than military police perform

40
security missions and many security

missions are only marginally law

enforcement in nature, but it is wise to have

appropriately trained soldiers perform

missions that even loosely fall into the

category of law enforcement duties.

Recommendation: See Infrastructure

Protection.

Infrastructure Protection: The

mission of infrastructure protection clearly

crosses the boundaries of two, and possibly

three, missions already discussed: domestic

air defense, law enforcement, and (possibly)

immigration support. The preferred mission

for the Army is to have long-term

responsibility for its own facilities, but only

short-term enhancement missions for

nonmilitary infrastructure. If the latter

become long term or the short-term spikes

become frequent, the Army’s force structure

would certainly be affected. The nature of

those effects would depend on the

magnitude of the mission and types of

infrastructure selected for protection. For

instance, information network protection

missions are far different than port security

protection, both in manpower levels and

skills.

Recommendation: Each of the three

related missions (domestic air defense, law

enforcement, and immigration support) and

infrastructure protection have minor force

structure impacts. Cumulative impacts,

though, are potentially significant. For the

AC, those impacts may be for additional air

defense, intelligence, and information

operations forces. For the RC, implications

are for significantly more military police

forces and minor increases in the three

types having impacts on the AC. Most of

these requirements likely will be met with

existing structure. The AC will need to

make difficult choices to shift forces, but the

RC should have less difficulty. The Army

National Guard has previously committed

to providing increased combat support and

combat service support forces through their

Division Redesign program. Traditionally,

the Army Reserve also readily changes its

force structure to remain complementary to

active forces.

Endnotes.

1. For consequence management, the defining

documents are the Federal Response Plan, U.S.

Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism

Concept of Operations Plan, DoD Directive 5100.1

(Functions of the Department of Defense and Its

Major Components), and the 3025 series of DoD

Directives on Military Assistance to Civil

Authorities (MACA). Domestically, the DoD role is

clearly one of support to a Lead Federal Agency

(LFA) in either crisis management (LFA:

Department of Justice) or consequence management

(LFA: Federal Emergency Management Agency).

For consequence management, missions would be

the outcome of taskings by the LFA, subsequent to

Requests For Assistance (RFAs) from local and State

first responders. For crisis management, the LFA

would request assistance as appropriate to the

nature of the threat.

2. The Hart-Rudmann Commission and others

identified this need prior to the event.

3. Antulio J. Echevarria II, The Army and

Homeland Security: A Strategic Perspective, Carlisle

Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, March

2001.

4. For discussion about the assumptions behind

and implications of the Hart-Rudman Commission

recommendations, see Ian Roxborough, The HartRudman Commission and the Homeland Defense,

Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,

September 2001. Also see Michael P. Fleming,

National Security Roles for the National Guard,

Journal of Homeland Defense, August 2001,

http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/

article.cfm?article=20

41
The deployment of Army forces, both to

Afghanistan to fight terrorists and throughout the United States for homeland defense,

places additional strain on an Army force

structure that is already overcommitted. It

should already be obvious to military

planners, but as war efforts continue at

home and abroad, it will become

increasingly clear that the Army needs a

significant increase in its force structure.

There will be no corresponding reduction in

the requirements for the Army’s numerous

other missions: worldwide engagement,

transformation, strategic reserve. The

increased requirements for homeland

defense and the overseas war on terrorism

are permanent—or at least long term—and

will require major force structure growth,

restructuring of the force and reapportionment among the Active and Reserve

Components.

To assess the adequacy of its force

structure, the Army develops a simultaneity

stack of mission task-organized forces

(MTOFs). This list of MTOFs represents the

forces needed by the Army when the United

States is confronted with a demanding

domestic and global environment, presenting the Army with several simultaneous

major missions. To be judged adequate, the

evaluated force structure must be capable to

some degree of simultaneously accomplishing all the missions in that stack. Since a

realistic scenario is used instead of the

“worst case,” some acceptable level of risk is

assumed. Because the Nation has

maintained much of the strategic focus that

pertained prior to the terrorist attacks of

September 11, the simultaneity stack after

that date retains several MTOFs with only

marginal changes. The increases in the other

MTOFs, though, will produce significant

change in the total force structure—both its

size and composition—and in the allocation

of that structure between the Active and

Reserve Components.

43

NINE

Defining Preparedness:

Army Force Structure in the War on Terrorism

Colonel John R. Martin

Conclusions:

• Significant growth of Army force structure will be required to prosecute the war

on terrorism successfully. Virtually all mission task-organized forces will have

increases, but the predominant growth will be in homeland defense and the

forces needed to fight the antiterrorism battle overseas.

• Reduction in forces assigned to other missions is not prudent. The Army still

needs the forces to transform, to constitute a strategic reserve and to maintain

a strategic balance around the world.

• The Reserve Components should constitute the majority of the forces for

consequence management, but forces for homeland defense should come

predominantly from the Active Component.

• The strategic reserve should retain its combat structure, giving it the flexibility

to perform a variety of missions across the spectrum of conflict.
Even before the terrorist attacks of

September 11, the simultaneity stack was

evolving, reflecting the focus of the new

administration and its review of the

national security strategy. Perhaps the

most significant change involved the forces

to conduct major combat operations.

Previous administrations felt that it was

essential to maintain the forces to fight two

major theater wars (MTWs) simultaneously. The new administration believed

that the probability of simultaneous MTWs

was low enough to justify a new measure.

Forces would have to be able to fight a

“large” MTW and a “small” one at roughly

the same time. It was understood, at least

implicitly, that these forces would also have

to be able to defeat enemies who might

choose to fight asymmetrically. After

September 11, the defeat of terrorism

became an explicit part of this element of

the simultaneity stack; requirements grew

and the mission element assumed a

much-higher priority.

The other simultaneity stack element to

get a major priority boost after September

11 was the homeland security MTOF.

Although many indicators before that date

suggested homeland security needed

attention, it continued to be given low

priority, primarily because of constraints in

the budget. With inadequate funds to

accomplish all of its missions, the Army

placed homeland security on a lower

priority so it could maintain its appropriate

focus on fighting major wars and marshal

its resources for current readiness and

transformation. With the exception of

national missile defense, most of the

homeland security effort was focused on

consequence management, not homeland

defense, either passive or active. As a direct

result of the attacks, both elements of

homeland security are receiving increased

attention, which should quickly validate the

need for added capabilities to defend the

United States and its interests and to react

when attack inevitably occurs. Whether

those capabilities are produced or not

depends upon budget sufficiency and proper

prioritization. Neither is yet assured.

Some voices have called for reduction of

the amount of forces allocated to the

deterrence MTOF. These are the forces used

by each regional Commander-in-Chief to

execute his day-to-day requirements to

shape a particular part of the world. This

MTOF also includes the forces needed to

conduct critical smaller-scale contingencies

(SSCs) in areas such as the Balkans and the

Sinai. Fortunately, the voices calling for

deterrence reductions are not prevailing. To

maintain strategic balance while fighting

the war on terrorism, the United States

must continue to focus a large amount of its

forces in locations where the risk of conflict

is low. That risk will remain low—a

prerequisite for fighting the war on

terrorism—only if U.S. forces maintain

adequate levels of engagement worldwide.

Although some limited economies might be

possible, any cuts would be quickly

subsumed by the need to increase force

protection for units exposed to terrorist

action.

The transformation MTOF is also

getting increased attention since

September 11. While some call for reduction

of transformation to allow concentration on

the current war, most call instead for

transformation to be adapted to the postSeptember 11 geostrategic environment

and to be accelerated. In any event, the

forces required to execute transformation

properly will increase, although probably

not by an order of magnitude.

Other MTOFs in the simultaneity

stack—the generating force, forces to

conduct noncritical SSCs, the strategic

reserve—are not significantly different

after September 11. Those forces needed to

generate and project power overseas have

44
increased force protection concerns, but

they should be captured under the

homeland security MTOF. The same force

protection requirements apply to the

noncritical SSC units, although those

requirements must be documented inside

that MTOF. The size of the strategic

reserve, a hedge against uncertainty, is also

probably not noticeably different.

It is clear that the force structure

requirements for the Army have increased.

The size of that increase will be a function of

the breadth of the war aims. If the military

continues to take the lead in carrying the

war to Iraq, Libya, Colombia, the

Philippines or wherever, a major expansion

of the force will be required, probably at

some point requiring resumption of the

draft. If the target list is not expanded

unnecessarily and the other elements of

national power—diplomatic, economic and

information—are given the lead, significant

military increases will still be required, but

they can perhaps be produced without

resort to extraordinary methods.

One of the major changes must occur in

the homeland security forces. Governor

Ridge and others are calling for the Army

National Guard (ARNG) to take the bulk of

this mission. In the short term, Reserve

Component forces are critical in

accomplishing this mission, particularly the

homeland defense portion. They are the

only sources of available manpower to

provide critical infrastructure protection.

This mission, though, ultimately will not be

a part-time mission. In the long term, forces

assigned to it must be full-time soldiers.

Civil defense forces—perhaps part of a

national gendarmerie—should be constructed to provide the personnel to man critical

defensive positions, but an Active

Component element should provide

leadership and possibly a rapid reaction

force. Equipping and training the civil

defense force should also be an Active

Component responsibility.

Because consequence management

requirements present themselves only

infrequently, the predominance of the force

structure allocated to this mission should

continue to reside with the Reserve

Components. With the majority of its

structure consisting of combat support (CS)

and combat service support (CSS) forces,

the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) is already

tailored for this mission. However, those

forces will generally be required for MTWs

or SSCs. Additional forces must be grown,

either in the USAR or the ARNG. The

ARNG Division Redesign, although started

years before the terrorist attacks, continues

to be an important initiative as it converts

low-priority combat structure to CS and

CSS. Alternatively, the Army could add the

warfighting CS/CSS requirements to the

active structure and allow the Reserve

Component to focus on consequence

management. This would move away from

the paradigm that requires reserve force

mobilization any time the Army deploys,

but has the advantage of replacing the

reserve forces that are regularly being used

in an active role supporting ongoing

contingency operations.

The strategic reserve probably changes

less than any of the other MTOFs.

Preparation for the unexpected requires a

flexible force, but one that is focused on

contributing units at the higher end of the

spectrum of conflict. The combat structure

of the strategic reserve must therefore be

retained, but those flexible forces may also

be of intermittent value in homeland

defense and consequence management.

As defeating terrorism remains a high

priority, the composition of some forces may

need to change. The Army should begin now

to build more special operations forces

(SOF), but must not do so to the detriment

of larger combat formations. Although only

45
SOF and air power have been used in

significant strength thus far, the war on

terrorism can still require a “D-Day," where

major land, sea and air forces combine to

defeat a strong state sponsor of terrorism.

Army transformation must be assessed

in light of the war on terrorism and some

adaptation is undoubtedly needed. Before

September 11, though, it seemed safe to

take some risk with the transformation

process, allowing some units to “stand

down” while transforming. It is still

important that they be stood down, but it is

imprudent to assume away the risk

inherent in standing down forces. There

must be enough force structure to allow

units—perhaps two to three brigade combat

teams at once—to undergo transformation

without adversely affecting the accomplishment of other missions in the

simultaneity stack.

The forces needed to accomplish other

missions in the stack—deterrence, force

generation, strategic reserve—need to be

only incrementally larger than before

September 11. However, because accomplishment of those missions is critical if the

war on terrorism is to be successful, the

forces for those “other” missions must be

considered as essential as those in the front

line in Afghanistan or guarding critical

infrastructure in the homeland. The Army

must immediately acknowledge the need for

increased force structure; take prompt

action to organize, equip, man and train the

units required; and apportion them

appropriately between the Active and

Reserve Components. Broad war aims

expected to be implemented quickly will

make successful completion of this task

critical.

46
Foreign Policy Implications

of September 11.

Until September 11, American foreign

policy elites debated the utility of various

approaches to grand strategy. Should the

United States adhere to a policy of

cooperative security or, mindful of our

unique power, should we pursue a policy of

primacy? The latter would be tempting.

With apparently no other nation in position

to challenge American authority and with

the strongest economy and military forces

in the world, we could consider a unilateral

approach to international affairs. Some

pundits have argued that we had already

chosen the unilateral approach and that our

choice had been reflected in the rejection of

a series of international treaties and

protocols during the first nine months of

2001.

Whatever arguments may have obtained

before September 11, the reality of U.S.

interdependence with the rest of the world

readily became apparent as we sought to

respond to the most significant attack upon

continental American soil since British

forces burned Washington in 1814.

Immediately after the attack on the World

Trade Center and the Pentagon, the U.S.

Government chose a policy of coalition

building to seek and destroy terrorists and

their organizations throughout the world.

This policy will have far reaching

implications for U.S. foreign policy in the

47

TEN

The Campaign against Terrorism:

Finding the Right Mix of Foreign Policy Instruments

Ambassador Marshall F. McCallie

Conclusions:

• If the U.N. is to play a strong and helpful role in the fight against terrorism, as

well as in the stabilization of failing or failed states, the United States will have

to give that organization full moral and financial support.

• Several specific flashpoints in the world call for U.S. diplomatic and military-tomilitary engagement, and possibly greater policy flexibility. The Israeli/

Palestinian conflict and the Indian/Pakistani confrontation over Kashmir are

only two such cases.

• “Nation building” or “peace building” does not necessarily call for the long-term

presence of U.S. military forces, but does require the attention and resources of

the world’s leading power, along with the parallel civil-military assets of its

allies.

• The United States must strengthen the range of its human assets and internal

capabilities to influence global affairs. No amount of technology can replace the

human element required to gather and assess intelligence, conduct diplomacy,

and promote military cooperation.

• Our best insurance for the future will be set upon three supports: a strong and

united democratic country, a more capable homeland defense, and a more

effective capacity to project national power—including landpower—overseas.
years ahead and will strongly influence the

structures of our regional and bilateral

relations worldwide.

Four implications of this policy are

immediately apparent:

• The United States will have to breathe

new life into its relationship with the

United Nations. If that organization is to

play a strong and helpful role in the fight

against terrorism, as well as in the

reconstruction and stabilization of failed

states, we will have to give it full moral and

financial support.

• Several specific flashpoints in the

world call for U.S. diplomatic engagement

and possibly greater policy flexibility. The

Israeli/Palestinian conflict and the Indian/

Pakistani confrontation over Kashmir need

the attention of the United States, perhaps

in concert with other significant powers.

• The United States must commit itself

to long-term development efforts in states

where instability can threaten the security

of the entire region. “Nation building” or

“peace building” does not necessarily call for

the long-term presence of U.S. military

forces, but it does require the attention and

resources of the world’s leading power along

with the parallel assets of its allies.

• The United States must strengthen

the range of its human assets and internal

capabilities to influence global affairs. No

amount of technology can replace the

human element required to assess

intelligence, conduct diplomacy, influence

public opinion, and promote military

cooperation.

Strengthening the Role of the United

Nations.

For many years, an article of faith

among foreign diplomats was that the

United States gained politically far more

from the existence of the U.N. than any

other country. While many nations may

have worked against U.S. interests in the

General Assembly, most concluded that the

United States used its seat in the Security

Council to achieve its ends with remarkable

success. Only in recent years, as the United

States began to fall behind in its dues and

as U.S. politicians disparaged the organization, did observers begin to question

whether we lacked the will to use the

organization we had worked so hard to

establish after World War II.

With the strong support of the Secretary

General and the Security Council for a new

effort against terrorism and with an

understanding that all member states are

obliged to help fight terrorism, the U.S.

Government has been handed an

opportunity to reengage with the

organization in meaningful ways. The

recent payment of dues, as well as the

acknowledgement of President Bush that

the U.N. can help with nation building and

stabilization, holds promise for a revitalized

relationship. For the United States to retain

credibility, however, we must pay our dues

on time and cooperate in as many joint

ventures with the U.N. as is feasible.

Strengthening the U.N.’s Department of

Peacekeeping Operations, as well as its

important humanitarian assistance

organizations, should be high on the list of

American priorities at the U.N.

Dealing with Flashpoints.

While there can be no justification for

the horrific acts of terror the world

witnessed on September 11, we need to

understand some of the frustrations which

fuel disaffection and alienation from the

norms of international behavior. Undoubtedly, no amount of diplomatic or other

positive activity by the United States will

turn the hatred of a relatively small group of

hardened ideologues, but we should

examine the causes of so much resentment

of the United States among the broader

Middle East population. The unresolved

48
conflict between the Palestinians and the

Israelis remains a festering sore which will

continue to breed atrocities if we and other

international partners do not take action.

The cycle of violence must be stopped. Yet it

is hard to see how this can be done without

recognizing Israel’s right to exist on the one

hand and a state of Palestine and the

limitation of Israeli settlements on the

other. The issue of governance and

protection of holy sites in Jerusalem is

perhaps even more inflammatory. It is hard

to overestimate the degree of feeling in

Israel and the Arab states on this issue.

Unless a plan is devised allowing for

unbiased international administration of

these sites, long-term peace is unlikely, and

the United States will continue to be pulled

into the maelstrom.

Likewise, the international community

can ill afford to stand by as India and

Pakistan, both possessing nuclear weapons,

continue to struggle over Kashmir. Volatile

and subject to pressure from internal

radical fundamentalist groups, Pakistan

needs help to find its way out of a

self-defeating confrontation which drains

resources and fuels political intemperance.

Should Pakistan implode, the consequences

for the region and, indeed, the world could

be costly. As Pakistan and India sit at a

strategically important point in the world, it

seems unlikely that one nation serving as a

mediator would be sufficient to overcome

the various balance of power interests

which could militate against a solution.

This conflict best lends itself to mediation

by a carefully selected contact group of

three to five nations.

The continued rogue status of Iraq is

equally worrisome. Saddam Hussein shows

no signs of retreating from his desire to

develop weapons of mass destruction, but

he appears to be winning the propaganda

war. Broad sanctions against Iraq are

unenforceable, and continued allied efforts

to contain his activities are losing

international support. Forceful ejection of

Saddam militarily would be costly and

politically disastrous under current

circumstances, as we work to build an

international coalition against terrorism. A

policy of containment and development of a

finer regional understanding of the threat

that he poses to his neighbors would be our

best strategy at this time. Such a strategy

should be supplemented, nonetheless, with

renewed and quiet warnings to Saddam

that any use of WMD by his government

will be met with his own certain

destruction.

Laying the Groundwork for Stability.

Where there is hunger and dire poverty,

nothing will advance in the absence of

humanitarian assistance. It is the sine qua

non of existence where all else has failed,

but it is not sufficient to ensure a stable

future. In states threatened by poverty,

weakened by corrupt governments, and

devoid of representative structures,

instability and violence are liable to emerge,

particularly in a world in which

increasingly accessible views of material

prosperity elsewhere inflame the appetites

of those who have been denied. Demagogues

with ethnic or ideological agendas easily

manipulate such passions.

If the United States wishes to remove

the breeding ground of radicalism and

political violence, there is no substitute for

nation building. There is no cheap ticket to

success. A mixture of development

assistance, strengthening of education and

health care systems, and, above all, an

emphasis on good governance will be

required. The good news is that, in addition

to the U.S. military, the United States is

richly endowed with governmental and

nongovernmental organizations which can

address these issues, provided sufficient

resources exist. It is time we regard this

49
challenge not solely as a development issue,

but as a national security one.

Happily, we don’t have to tackle these

challenges alone in developing countries.

We have partners in Europe and Japan who

have demonstrated interest and commitment through generous assistance which,

on a per capita basis, far exceeds our own. In

any event, in order to avoid charges of

seeking hegemony either in individual

states or regions of the world, we will find it

advantageous to strengthen our development partnerships in the OECD and the

U.N.

In our efforts to confront global

terrorism, we undoubtedly will deal more

closely with states from which we have kept

at some distance in the past. Uzbekistan is a

prime example. With a government which is

corrupt and undemocratic and a record

further blemished by the existence of

thousands of political prisoners, Uzbekistan

hardly lends itself to traditional American

assistance. Yet if the United States is to

embrace Uzbekistan for practical security

reasons, then we must extend our

development assistance to it as well,

including emphasis on education, good

governance, and the development of

democratic structures.

While the United States cannot naively

seek to make the world in its own image, we

must surely recognize, after years of

experience with failed states, that good

governance and legitimate forms of popular

representation are essential to development. Flexibility will be required in states

fragmented by ethnic or religious division.

Federal structures, governments of

national unity, and proportional representation systems, all of which avoid the

chimera of “winner take all” solutions, may

be particularly applicable. Further, systems

which acknowledge the importance of

traditional leaders and fold them into

modern governance may be helpful. We

should not delude ourselves, however.

Nation building and the development of

democratic processes are hard work.

Failure to address these issues, on the other

hand, is even more costly.

Americans regard our technical prowess,

economic strength, and proficient military

as the primary building blocks of our

security. Ironically, while these factors are

enormously important, they are most

significant as support for America’s

greatest strength: our democratic tradition.

In a world where ideology may eschew

wealth and guerrilla bands and terrorists

may avoid confrontation with overwhelming military force, our genius for good

governance and public education may be

our most effective long-term weapon. In

northwestern Pakistan, where children

may be fed, housed, and schooled in narrow,

mind-bending madrasahs, the most

effective program we could support would

be the provision of excellent and accessible

government schools which meet the needs of

young minds and bodies. In countries

struggling to make governments and

economies perform, the provision of

financial expertise and governance training

is essential. And, in utterly failed states, the

international community, under the leadership of the U.N., may wish to consider

return to international trusteeship, much

as is being done in East Timor. There is no

question that economic assistance and debt

relief must be matched by the development

of good governance capacity and educational opportunity.

Likewise, it would be a mistake to

underestimate the importance of militaryto-military contacts and assistance. For

years, U.S. Special Forces have demonstrated the efficacy of “mil-to-mil” programs

in de-mining, peacekeeping, military

justice, and civilian/military operations.

Equally, the United States has benefited

from contacts developed as foreign officers

50
have attended U.S. military institutions.

There may be increased pressure for

weapons sales abroad and a growing desire

to reduce military personnel tied up in

“engagement” activities overseas, but we

would do well to remember that our greatest

return on investment is precisely in the

areas where U.S. forces demonstrate

personal interest and competence. There is

no substitute for focused, professional

military contact.

Strengthening Our Human Resource

Base.

Our capacity, ultimately, to influence

events throughout the world will depend

upon the quality of our people on the front

lines. If we are to spot the development of

political trends, if we are to intercept and

cut off dangerous currents, if we are to

promote positive programs, we will need to

reinforce our cadre of language qualified

Foreign Area Officers, Foreign Service

Officers, and intelligence officers. We

reaped the peace dividend at the end of the

Cold War by neglecting our Foreign Area

Officers’ careers, failing to hire sufficient

numbers of Foreign Service Officers and

cutting resources for human intelligence

operations for too long. We are currently

paying a price. There is no substitute for top

notch, professional personnel at diplomatic

missions and listening posts throughout the

world. This is the backbone of intelligent

policy and effective engagement, and if we

wish to win the campaign against terrorism,

we must effectively fund it.

Conclusion.

As realists, we must recognize that the

campaign against violence and instability

will never end. We may eradicate one form

of terrorism, only to see another raise its

head. Our best insurance for the future will

be set upon three supports: a strong and

united democratic country, a more capable

homeland defense, and an extremely

effective capacity to project our diplomatic,

democratic, and military strength overseas.

This calls for long-term commitment and

the expenditure of significant resources. We

must be attuned to local conditions in every

region of the world, and we must remain

engaged with partners across the full

spectrum of social, economic, and political

development. If we eschew this responsibility, the forces of instability and violence

will find us where we live.

51
In an effort to marshal resources against

Usama bin Laden’s al Qaeda terrorist

organization, the United States has implemented a carrot and stick approach to help

build a coalition. Carrots—or rewards—are

provided for “voluntary” compliance with

implied preferences or explicit direction,

while sticks—or punishment—are imposed

to coerce compliance. Democracies

generally prefer the carrot option, believing

that reward will have a more positive or

long-lasting effect, and that the reward

provided will be viewed either as a due

reward for desired performance or as just

payment for services rendered. Unfortunately, the perception from the other side

may be of a bribe—tainting both the donor

and recipient—or of equally distasteful

payment from a master to a servant.

Machiavelli did not use the same terms,

but essentially argued for the stick over the

carrot, noting that it is better for the strong

to be feared than loved. He contended that

“love” or “gratitude”—in exchange for

reward—is inherently fickle, all the more so

if it appears to be a bribe. Machiavelli

defined two forms of fear: one based on

hatred, the other based on respect. Respect

is obviously preferred, as hatred will have

regressive effects in the long term.

Effectively applying these two tools—using

carrots and sticks, either together or as

options to achieve synergy through their

integration—is no small challenge. If

carrots and sticks are applied arrogantly by

a strong state—without proper regard for

those who see them as bribes or armtwisting—the results may be limited, both

immediately and in the longer term.

Improperly implemented, carrots and sticks

can make the stronger state appear a bully,

cost it resources to no advantage, or lead to

imposition of punitive action with negative

consequences.

To make the carrot and stick more

effective, a state must be just and propor53

ELEVEN

The Carrot and Stick Challenge

Dr. Gordon Rudd

Colonel John R. Martin

Conclusions:

• As the United States builds and maintains the coalition fighting the war on

terrorism, it may obtain some good short-term results from the use of carrots

and sticks— rewards and punishments to induce compliance with U.S.

desires—but must be wary of potential negative effects in the long term.

• A just cause makes the use of carrots and sticks more effective. The justice of

the U.S. cause is easily defined with al Qaeda and the Taliban, but much

harder if the war is against all terrorism. The list of targets in the Muslim

world must not be unnecessarily expanded.

• Even if countries see the justice of the cause, they may not make it their cause.

• Appeasement cannot be part of the solution, but issues that provide al Qaeda

great resonance in the Muslim population—the Palestinian issue, sanctions on

Iraq, and U.S. presence on the Arabian peninsula—must be fairly addressed by

the U.S.
tional in its application of rewards and

punishments, which in turn should be

aligned with a just cause. Such a cause must

be just in the eyes of other states, not simply

in the eyes of the stronger state. In such a

situation, the reward for compliance is not

seen as a bribe or a payment, but simply as

an expected consequence of working for a

just cause. If punishment is imposed, it

must be seen as a proportional requirement

of justice, not the act of a “bully” which

cannot buy what it wants. To make

America’s just cause compelling to others,

their different values and perceptions must

be taken into account.

Even if others acknowledge America’s

cause and actions as just, there can be no

assumption that America’s cause then

becomes their cause. The United States does

not actively support all just causes with its

resources, nor do other states. This is the

inherent challenge in structuring a

coalition of states with different interests

and characteristics. Caution must be

applied in any demand that another state

align itself with the United States or risk

being considered an enemy. In Thucydides’

history of the Peloponnesian War, Athens

demanded that the state of Melos join an

Athenian-led coalition against Sparta.

When Melos resisted, stating that it wished

to join neither Athens nor Sparta, Athens

forced the issue, and stated “. . . the strong

will do what it will, while the weak will do

what it must.” When Melos refused to join

the coalition, Athens had no recourse but to

destroy it or lose credibility. When Athens

chose the former and destroyed Melos, it

had less trouble getting other states to join

the coalition, but the fear that caused them

to join was not from respect based on justice.

When the coalition came under duress later

in the war, it came apart because it lacked

genuine cohesion, and Athens lost the war.

A demand by the United States that other

states are either “with it or against it” may

make good domestic rhetoric, but will be

counterproductive if enforcement is

attempted internationally.

The other NATO countries did not need

to be bribed or coerced to support America,

nor should there be any need to resort to the

carrot or stick to sustain their support. The

invocation of Article 5 of the NATO treaty—

declaring that the World Trade Center and

Pentagon attacks constituted an attack on

all—was a treaty requirement. However,

even without that requirement, those

states’ comparable values would have led

them to recognize the cause as just; they

identify with it and have made it their

cause.

NATO countries are democracies; as

such, their governments represent the will

of their people. With nondemocratic states,

it is often difficult to determine the will of

the people, which may not be the same as

the will of their government. When dealing

with non-democratic states, their governments may be convinced to comply with

American objectives through a carrot and

stick approach, but if the people of that

state do not see America’s cause as just,

then they will believe that their government

has been either corrupted or unfairly

coerced. In either case, this weakens

whatever bond that government has with

its people, destabilizing the state, and

perhaps instigating insurrection or civil

war, neither of which is in a coalition’s

interest.

The most obvious carrot or reward used

recently is economic assistance. Sanctions

have been lifted; direct payments have been

made; food and other refugee assistance

have been delivered. All of these can be

useful, but they may also be more limited

and temporary in value than anticipated. If

the government or people felt sanctions

were improper, then lifting them will be

perceived as a correction of a wrong, rather

than a gracious act, and may not motivate

54
the desired action. If the government that

receives the economic assistance is either

corrupt or perceived by its people as

corrupt, the money may be useful to

persuade the government, but will have a

different effect on the people. If economic

assistance is diverted to military forces that

the government can use to suppress its own

people, the effect may be counterproductive,

even if the intent was to enhance the

government’s role in the military aspects of

the coalition.

Use of food to influence directly the

people of a country may allow governments

to be by-passed to some degree. The

altruistic motives of the givers may be

genuine, but if the hungry recipients

perceive that the food aid is given simply to

bring a coalition together, it will appear a

simple bribe rather than a just reward. If

the hungry identify with al Qaeda or the

Taliban, the appearance of such a bribe may

not alter their views towards America at all.

In fact, they may eat the food with an

increased contempt for the United States.

Food aid given to the hungry in Pakistan—

in bags of grain marked USA—should

satisfy hunger for a short period, but it will

not correct the long-term causes of hunger

and may make the Pakistani people see

their government as incapable of feeding

them.

President Bush recently started a

campaign to have American children donate

a dollar each to be used for aid to the Afghan

children. This plays well in the United

States, but there may be little gained in

Afghanistan and the broader Muslim world,

where the effort may be seen as a simple

and inexpensive propaganda ploy. The real

value in such a campaign may be to

condition the American people to see the

people of Afghanistan as worthy of

American assistance. The provider again

may be genuinely altruistic, but the

perception may be very different, and

effects overseas may be very different from

those domestically.

The ultimate challenge is to make

America’s cause just in the eyes of the

governments and people of the Middle East

countries, whose physical and moral assistance is needed in the war on terrorism.

There may be some utility in a simple bribe

or use of force, but the returns could only be

temporary and potentially counterproductive. If the American cause does not

become the cause of others, the

intermediate position is to at least make a

compelling case that the American cause is

just, and to use the carrot and stick

approach as just rewards or just

punishments to support that cause. How

that cause is defined thus becomes crucial.

The al Qaeda terrorist organization

must be defined as an aggressor adversary

because it has attacked and hurt the United

States. The Taliban should be described as

America’s adversary because they willingly

harbor those aggressors. There is great

clarity in such a position, and there is no

difficulty in defining the terrorist

organization or the Taliban. But if the

adversary is terrorism, that term must be

defined. That is not difficult with NATO

allies.

However, many states in the Middle

East may not share the same definition of

terrorism or may not find terrorism as

objectionable if the target of terrorism is an

oppressive government. They may see an

assault on other terrorist organizations as a

more general attack on Islam or as a means

to neutralize the aspirations of several

groups in the Middle East who have not

targeted the United States. Such a view

could have two negative results: first, if all

terrorist groups are declared targets, such

groups that have not targeted the United

States may soon do so or provide

previously-denied support to al Qaeda.

Second, by enlarging the target set beyond

55
al Qaeda, America makes its position

adversarial to those people that identify

with the goals of those newly-targeted

groups, even though they may not have

supported al Qaeda, either its goals or its

methods. To have as many Muslim states as

possible in the coalition on the war against

terrorism is essential. It is thus important

that there be no unnecessary enlargement

of the states in the Muslim world that are

considered targets.

To complement the application of

rewards and punishments—or to avoid the

challenges of their use—some of the root

causes of Muslim disgruntlement must be

addressed. The al Qaeda organization has

several ways to rationalize their attack on

the United States. The primary

rationalization is that the values of the

West and the United States in

particular—are profane. To them, the

ultimate profanity is U.S. presence in Saudi

Arabia: a perceived major affront to the

Muslim faithful. Secondary objections

include American actions towards Iraq and

support for Israel with respect to the

Palestinian issue. A potential weakness for

al Qaeda is that it receives far greater

popular support in the Muslim world from

its secondary objections to the United

States than for its primary objections.

There is little question that, if the situations

in Iraq and with the Palestinians were

resolved, al Qaeda would try to attack the

United States. But if either conflict were

resolved or American efforts to resolve them

appeared more balanced, al Qaeda would

gain far less popular support in the process.

Middle East governments, particularly

Egypt, have stated that their primary

difficulty in supporting the war on

terrorism more aggressively is America’s

support for Israel, which they perceive to be

at the expense of the Palestinians. That

perception cannot be denied, but it is fair to

say that America’s real intent is not so one

sided. The central concern for Israel is

security, and that will not change, but U.S.

support for Israeli security should not mean

support for settlements in Gaza and the

West Bank or oppression of the

Palestinians. The central concern for the

Palestinians is sovereignty. American

support for that goal appears lukewarm,

but it can be reinforced without reducing

support for Israeli security. American policy

is sympathetic to Israeli domestic politics; it

could be more overtly sympathetic to

Palestinian domestic politics. Beyond

domestic politics in either case, a more

balanced American approach is in the

interest of both Israel and the Palestinians

if there is progress towards a resolution.

Such a resolution is in the interest of

everyone, except terrorist organizations

that need popular support to sustain their

efforts against the United States.

Some pundits suggest that it would be

appeasement to attempt to resolve the

Palestinian issue, review and revise

sanctions on Iraq, or look for ways to protect

U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf region

without a major military presence there.

Since these were bin Laden’s goals—

according to this line of reasoning—

America should be even more resolute in

denying them for fear of showing other

terrorists that they can achieve their goals

if they can mount a similar attack. It is not

appeasement, though, if the United States

can isolate al Qaeda from popular support,

which may be essential to destroy it. Usama

bin Laden and al Qaeda will not see

America as less adversarial if the United

States makes greater attempts to solve the

Palestinian issue, they will instead see that

as a threat to their popular support.

A carrot and stick approach may have

utility in the effort to fight al Qaeda and the

Taliban, although the results may only

accrue in the near term. In the longer term,

such an approach can be counterproductive.

56
The carrot and stick approach will have

greater utility if perceived to be fairly

applied in a just cause. Ultimately, any use

of carrots or sticks must be part of a more

comprehensive effort to deny al Qaeda the

popular support it needs to survive. That

effort must demonstrate—with all available

means—that America’s cause is just and

must create the conditions that lead others

to believe that this cause is their cause. That

is unnecessary with America’s allies and

fellow believers in NATO; the immediate

challenge is in the Middle East, both with

their governments and their people.

57
State of U.S. Civil-Military Relations

Prior to September 11.

While the state of U.S. civil-military

relations prior to September 11, 2001, was

generally strong, certain tensions

warranted monitoring and attention both

within the military profession and across

the governmental agencies that interact

regularly with the military.

Imbalance of Power. Perhaps the most

important issue was the improper

relationship between the political

leadership and the military in the policymaking process. Political leaders should

make policy decisions with advice from the

military. During the Clinton years, though,

the administration’s reluctance to confront

the military and the military’s

disagreement with many policy initiatives

of its elected and appointed masters

combined to allow the military to exert

undue influence in the policy-making

process. Critics contended that the U.S.

military did not consistently follow the

norm of supporting political objectives—

especially those requiring the limited use of

force in various peace operations—in good

faith, but instead engaged in behaviors

that, in effect, had a determinative effect on

policy outcomes. Some observers believed

that the interjection of conditions, such as

the “Powell Doctrine,” into the policymaking process was an overplaying of the

military’s designated role as expert

advisers.

During the first months of the Bush

administration, there were signs of

attempts to redress this apparent

imbalance—and some military resistance to

the change. There were many reports of

friction between Secretary of Defense

Rumsfeld and the Joint Chiefs of Staff over

his strategic review, especially concerning

the impression that Rumsfeld was ignoring

or bypassing them in shaping his policies.

Many in Congress also became involved in

this dispute over future national security

strategy and the structure and transformation of military forces.

Civil-Military Gap. Another concern

that may have relevance for civil-military

59

TWELVE

Potential Changes in U.S. Civil-Military Relations

Dr. Marybeth Peterson Ulrich

Dr. Conrad C. Crane

Conclusions:

• A nation at war gives its military strong support and power, but military

leaders must still provide expert and professional counsel. They must also

resist the temptation to force policy, to make inappropriate demands on the

budget, or to avoid “out-of-the- box” thinking.

• The current crisis provides the military a chance to strengthen its connections

with the rest of American society.

• With public confidence in the military soaring, it is even more essential that

military leaders maintain professional standards for nonpartisanship.

• The Army must accept and focus on its essential homeland security mission,

including rethinking of AC/RC roles and analyzing potential legal issues.
relations in this newly emergent era is the

much touted civil-military gap. Years of an

all-volunteer force, major down-sizing of

that force, and recent rounds of base

closings have contributed to a growing

isolation of the military from the society it

serves. Scholars have warned that the

implications of this gap may have negative

consequences for manning the all-volunteer

force and for sustaining the ideal image

among the American people of the U.S.

military as being comprised of America’s

Army, America’s Navy, America’s Air Force,

and America’s Marines—that is, forces of

America and not forces separate from U.S.

society. Concerns also exist about a lack of

military experience in civilian leaders, and

that generals and admirals will not properly

respect congressional oversight from those

who are perceived as unqualified.

Partisanship. Another source of tension,

and closely related to the policymaking

imbalance, is the perception of many that

political partisanship gradually has been

increasing within the U.S. military. The

concern is that the U.S. military is losing its

adherence to an apolitical ethic. Some

critics contend that assumed and perceived

preferences of the military—sometimes

openly expressed by retirees—were leading

to attempts by military institutions to

influence unduly the American political

process.

Homeland Security. Homeland defense

issues in civil-military relations were also

evident prior to the September 11 attacks.

Various strategic reviews were attempting

to focus the U.S. military—and the U.S.

Army, in particular—on homeland security

issues. Perhaps the foremost issue

regarding home- land security was the

military’s reluctance to accept it as a

high-priority mission, relegating it instead

to police forces or, at best, the National

Guard. The low priority assigned to this

mission—similar to that assigned to

peacekeeping operations—allows the

Service to continue focusing on its

warfighting mission. There were several

other key emergent challenges in this area.

Among these was fulfilling the homeland

security mission within a domestic environment where civil liberties remained intact.

Another issue was articulating the

homeland security mission in such a way

that effectively differentiated responsibilities across the U.S. Government, while

distinguishing between civilian and

military roles.

Anticipated Changes in U.S. CivilMilitary Relations.

The full impact of the September 11

terrorist attacks on civil-military relations

is still evolving, but some projections can be

made. While a united civil-military front is

apparent now, many sources of potential

friction and concern remain.

Imbalance of Power. The role of the

military in the post-September 11 policymaking process may pose particular

challenges for both civilian and military

participants. Many of the parameters that

regulated civil-military relations in the

policymaking realm have changed since the

attacks. Budget constraints that limited the

demands of the Services have been lifted to

some extent, Congress and the Executive

are united to an unprecedented degree, and

the nation as a whole is focused on national

security in general and the war on terrorism

specifically. Such an environment calls for

strict adherence to traditional standards of

military professionalism in policy councils.

The present process relies heavily on

military expertise relevant to the

application of force in the attainment of

stated political objectives. Military

professionals must be careful in their

presentation of options to include all

potential applications of the military

instrument of power without limiting

60
choices to those options consistent with a

particular preferred doctrine, e.g., the

Powell Doctrine. The current strategic

challenge does not appear to have a

short-term exit strategy and may not be

conducive to the application of overwhelming military force, as required by that

doctrine. The civilian leadership should not

deny military leaders the right to argue in

favor of particular options, but they must

demand presentation of comprehensive

military options on ways and means to

achieve political ends. Media reports

suggest that Secretary Rumsfeld has been

disappointed by the lack of innovative

military advice he has received. In general,

the military leadership should stay within

their roles as expert advisors to the

President and the Secretary of Defense,

even when greater influence may be

solicited by other forces—particularly

congressional—in the policymaking

process. The leadership must still think

“out-of-the box” to meet the needs of this

new war.

Restraint on the part of military

professionals also will be needed especially

on the budget front. More monies are

available to fight the war on terrorism, but

military leaders must subordinate

institutional interests to national interests.

Some might be tempted to take advantage

of the environment to fund other service

desires that might not be consistent with

the national interest of limiting deficit

spending, or which might not be sustainable

when public, congressional, and administration support for increased defense

spending inevitably declines. Service chiefs

must also not become so focused on current

needs that they forget about transforming

for the future, and must not allow their

civilian masters to develop similar myopic

views.

While the pre-attack clashes between

the Services and Secretary of Defense over

his vision of transformation have been

muted, the issues still remain. Secretary

Rumsfeld’s position in Washington, though,

has been strengthened by both his own

strong leadership and the unified national

support for the military that has

accompanied the war on terrorism. The

media reports that he wants to revise the

Unified Command Plan because of the

global nature of the current conflict to

create a central command structure more

responsive to direction from Washington.

This might create new friction with the

CINCs as well as the Services.

Civil-Military Gap. Additionally, there

may be challenges related to congressional

oversight of covert operations. One of the

primary objectives of the war on terrorism is

to conduct it in such a way that democratic

institutions remain intact and that

American democratic values are not

undermined. The military and the administration must fulfill their responsibilities

to be accountable to the American people

via complete cooperation with the requisite

oversight committees in Congress.

On the positive side, American society is

unusually focused on national security

issues. The heightened visibility of the

military and an appreciation that the

armed forces will play an ongoing and

crucial role in a protracted war presents

opportunities for recruitment, reenlistment, and—more importantly—the

general reconnection of American society

with the military. Military experts can also

play an important part in exercising the

information element of U.S. national power

through an educational role that explains

the national security challenges at hand

and publicizes its myriad successes and

challenges in an effort to sustain public

support.

Partisanship. Challenges related to

political partisanship include maintaining

professional standards for nonpartisanship

61
in the upcoming 2002 mid-term elections

and presidential campaign in 2004.

Assuming that the war on terrorism will be

a long-term effort, it will be incumbent upon

the military profession to disconnect

consistently their professional support for

the war effort with political support for

candidates of a particular party that may be

conducting the effort.

Homeland Security. The defense

establishment has not been quick to adopt

homeland defense as its primary mission in

the wake of the September 11 attacks,

preferring to focus on a warfighting

campaign in Afghanistan. Critical infrastructure protection and control of borders

are still seen as police missions, although

National Guardsmen and some Active

Component soldiers are involved. The Army

must immediately apply the necessary

focus and resources to this vital mission,

ensuring the homeland is secure enough to

allow operations overseas.

Consensus on the ongoing threat of

terrorism has heightened awareness that

the Pentagon must be ready to provide its

capabilities and support to other federal

agencies, both in counterterrorism efforts

and in a response role. As emerging details

of the new Homeland Security Council and

Governor Ridge’s powers become clearer,

the Army should be actively studying its

long-term roles and missions and the

implications of participating within such a

broad-based homeland security effort.

Though the exact scope, powers, and

budgetary authority of the new homeland

security entity are still unknown, its final

form will inevitably include a mix of law

enforcement and national security tasks

that will call for ongoing collaboration

between civilian and military authorities.

The Army and the other services should

be thinking about the potential effect these

various new relationships will have on the

overall state of civil-military relations and

on the ability of the services to perform their

functional obligations across a comprehensive array of national security threats.

As new civil-military relationships are

formed—such as that between the

Secretary of the Army as DoD’s executive

agent for all homeland security matters and

Governor Ridge as the head of the Office of

Homeland Security— civilian and military

participants should strive to ensure that

their efforts remain collaborative rather

than competitive.

Challenges also exist with regard to the

long-term implications of using the Reserve

Components (RC) to participate in small

scale contingencies and major wars abroad

and in the homeland defense role

domestically. Active Component (AC) and

military leaders must think through such

issues as the viability of prolonged employer

support for RC utilization, functional

specialization of the AC or RC for homeland

security and finding funds for equipment

and proper training.

A new focus on homeland security will

also highlight a number of legal issues.

Posse comitatus considerations need to be

examined to insure optimum military

involvement in domestic operations to

combat terrorism. Other legal issues that

need to be resolved include permissible

methods to obtain critical intelligence

domestically and whether to treat captured

terrorists as criminals or POWs.

Conclusion.

Clearly the events of September 11,

2001, have resulted in new challenges and

opportunities in U.S. civil-military relations. Some of the tensions that existed

prior to September 11 seem trivial in light of

recent events. Others have taken on a new

significance as the current environment

could possibly exacerbate pre-existing

tensions. U.S. military leaders must provide

expert and comprehensive advice in a

62
complex and uncertain war that does not

fall neatly into traditional conceptions of

military campaigns. U.S. military leaders

also face significant challenges in

monitoring their own professionalism in

ways that best serve the nation and the

profession itself. Finally, a unique

opportunity exists to reconnect with

American society as America’s Army, an

Army that fully accepts its responsibility to

protect the homeland and that needs the

ongoing support and participation of all

Americans to accomplish its many missions.

63
The American public continues to show

an unprecedented level of support for the

country’s leaders and institutions since the

September 11 attacks. The President’s

overall job approval rating of 90 percent

exceeded that of President George H. W.

Bush after the Gulf War, President Truman

after VE day in World War II, and President

Roosevelt after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Similarly, approval ratings of Congress

achieved a record high, and even the media

received high marks in the coverage of the

attacks.

Amid this surge in public support for

government institutions, public opinion

polls are also reflecting extraordinarily

widespread support of military action. As

late as the end of September, the vast

majority of Americans support the general

idea of military action against groups or

nations responsible for the attacks. Polls

show support for retaliatory action at about

the 90 percent level, with 89 percent

favoring direct military action in

Afghanistan, and 73 percent in Iraq.

One of the most remarkable findings in

assessing public opinion is the strong

support of the American people despite

awareness of the possible consequences of

military action. In past uses of military

power, public opinion may have been

affected by the perceived rapidity of the

prosecution of the war, the amount of

casualties involved, the possible personally

detrimental consequences of the war, and

the degree of agreement among the

country’s leaders.

Duration.

Americans appear to be ready for a

protracted use of military power. When

asked if they would support military action

against terrorism even if it lasted a period of

several months, 86 percent of Americans

responded that they would, and a still-high

69 percent said they would support military

action even if it lasted several years.

Interestingly, 92 percent of Americans

polled said that they expected the war

against terrorism to be long, and 94 percent

said it would be difficult. Contrast these

percentages with the reaction of Americans

after the attack on Pearl Harbor, when 51

65

THIRTEEN

Maintaining Public Support for Military Operations

Dr. Leonard Wong

Conclusions:

• Public support for military action is at levels that parallel public reaction after

Pearl Harbor.

• Americans believe military action is appropriate, support a protracted war, and

are willing to endure negative consequences from that war.

• Despite favorable polls, public support is bound to be fickle, since most

Americans are not really involved with the conflict and are being asked to

return to their normal lives where they largely ignored the military.

• Support for military action will diminish unless the military continually shows

progress in the war against terrorism, keeps the nation connected to its armed

forces, and provides effective domestic security that is mostly unseen.
percent thought the war against the

Japanese would be long, and 65 percent

thought the war would be difficult.

Despite the realization that this war will

likely last several years, Americans are

exhibiting an apparent willingness to wait

for the right moment to strike at the

terrorists. One poll asked those who favored

military action if they felt the United States

should act immediately against all known

terrorist organizations even if it was

unclear who orchestrated the attacks, or if

the United States should take a more

restrained approach of waiting for those

responsible to be identified—even if it takes

months—before conducting military strikes

against them. Only 23 percent favored

immediate strikes, while 62 percent favored

waiting until those responsible are

identified.

Similarly, just 3 weeks ago, some 59

percent of Americans agreed that the

United States should take as long as

necessary to plan something that will work.

That number actually increased to 65

percent 1 week later. In this unique period

of history, Americans appear to be willing to

accept a long war and long preparation

period before military action begins.

Casualties.

Previous debates about the supposed

aversion of U.S. casualties by the military,

government leaders, or the public appear to

be moot. One poll reported that 69 percent

of Americans support going to war even if it

means “getting into a long war with large

numbers of U.S. troops killed or injured.”

Another poll specifically asked respondents

if they would support a war that might cost

the lives of 5,000 U.S. troops and 5,000 U.S.

civilians. In each instance, about 80 percent

of the respondents continued to indicate

that they would support the use of military

action.

When a Newsweek poll posed the

condition that military action would include

a “high likelihood of [non-U.S.] civilian

casualties,” 7 out of 10 Americans still

supported military action. A subsequent

CBS/New York Times poll added the more

specific condition of “thousands of innocent

civilians” who would be killed, and 60

percent of the respondents still continued to

support military action. These findings are

remarkable since casualty aversion (at

much smaller numbers) and civilian

collateral casualties have been dominant

facets of any recent debate on public

support for military action.

Past possible explanations for casualty

aversion in military operations included the

perceived lack of vital interests or the

nonparticipation of American elites in the

operation. With issues such as the economy

struggling to avoid recession, half of the

country reporting that they are worried

about a terrorist attack affecting their own

family, and polls indicating that 20 percent

of the public personally knew someone who

was missing, hurt, or killed in the attacks,

casualty aversion is currently not a major

factor in public support of the war on

terrorism.

Consequences.

One possible consequence of military

action is an increase in terrorist attacks.

One poll asked public opinion about two

courses of action—what would happen if the

United States did conduct military

operations, and what would happen if it did

not. While 43 percent of the public believed

that terrorist attacks would increase as a

result of U.S. military action, 89 percent

believed that the chances of terrorist

attacks would increase if the United States

did not take military action.

Polls show that Americans support

military action against those responsible for

terrorism, even when explicitly advised of a

66
series of possible consequences of such

action. Consequences tested in polling

include (in addition to casualties and a long

war) the reinstitution of the draft, shortages

of oil and gas, and the possibility of having

less money to spend on such social programs

as education and Social Security. The table

below shows the details. Americans seem

determined to support military action

despite personally detrimental consequences.

Political Leadership.

Some studies argue that the degree of

consensus exhibited by political leaders is a

major determinant of public support for

military operations. While no polls

specifically attempted to measure political

consensus, there has been an unusually

high degree of trust placed in the

government since the attacks. The public

was asked, “How much of the time do you

trust the government in Washington to do

what is right?” Responses showed in the

graph that the trust in government to do the

right thing has risen to levels not seen since

the 1960s.

Implications.

There are two possible scenarios taking

place in America today. The first suggests

that our nation has returned to an era

similar to the early days of the Cold War.

People who earnestly desire our demise

have threatened our national existence, our

shores no longer protect us, and, unless we

take action, our way of life is in danger. Civil

defense is back, the National Guard has

returned to doing more than disaster relief,

and intelligence is moving back into a

prominent role in national security. As a

result, public support of military action is

high, and America will indefinitely continue

to approve of the use of the military to

safeguard the nation.

The other scenario suggests that this

current situation is merely a temporary

disruption. The public is willing to support

military action for months and even longer

in order to return to life as it was before

September 11. The public, in this scenario,

is looking forward to the day when the

military finally gets its hands on terrorism

and is successful in attempts to “stop it,

eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows.”

67

Question: Would you support the U.S. taking military action if you knew

each of the following would happen?

The U.S. military action would continue for a

period of months

Taxes would be increased

U.S. ground troops would be used in an

invasion

Shortages of gas and oil would occur

There would be less money to spend on

domestic programs such as education and

Social Security

A prolonged economic recession would occur

Further terrorist attacks would occur in the U.S.

Support Oppose No

opinion

Sample: 1,032 adults

Methodology: Telephone interview conducted September 14-15, 2001

Margin of error: +/-4%

86%

Support

84%

80%

79%

78%

78%

78%

11%

15%

18%

18%

18%

18%

19%

3%

1%

2%

3%

4%

4%

3%

The military action would continue for a

period of several years

1,000 American troops would be killed

66%

65%

30%

30%

4%

5%

The military draft would be reinstituted 77% 18% 5%

Percent responding “Always” or “Most of the Time.”

How much of the time do you trust the

government in Washington to do what is right?

*****
Military force is necessary and supported,

but only long enough to permit the

American public to get back to enjoying

“normal” lives again.

Of course, our future probably lies

somewhere between these two scenarios.

Americans are uniting in this fight because

we understand that this is a total war like

the Cold War, yet we are also being told to

“Do your business around the country. Fly

and enjoy America’s great destination spots.

Get down to Disney World in Florida. Take

your families and enjoy life.” Americans

want the single-minded resolve that

characterized the fight against communism

found early in the Cold War, but our society

is also struggling not to “let the terrorists

win” by minimizing the changes to everyday

life. This unique combination of public

expectations has three implications in

maintaining public support for military

actions.

First, the public desires and expects

victory. A surprising 87 percent of

Americans said they believe the United

States “absolutely must” capture or kill bin

Laden and break up al Qaeda, and 8 out of

10 were confident that this would happen.

Similarly, 91 percent said the United States

must reduce the number of terrorist attacks

in the United States, and an equal

percentage was confident that this would be

done. The military must show the public

that their expectations are being met.

Tactical successes must be periodically

publicized. A decrease in the threat of

terrorist attacks will be evident, but the

public must be occasionally made aware

that its armed forces are why the terrorists

are on the run. Part of the strategic

planning for this war on terrorism needs to

include combining operational security

requirements with the realization that

public support is part of America’s center of

gravity in this war. The focus should not be

on “spin” or public relations, but on showing

a correlation between military action and a

decrease in terrorist activity.

Second, as images of the collapsing

towers and burning Pentagon wear off, and

Americans realize that their contribution to

this war effort is to live as if there were no

war, public support will drop as individual

involvement in the war decreases. It is hard

to mobilize the public when their role is not

to ration or to step up security, but to act

normal. Part of the message the military

sends to the public must emphasize that

America’s military is part of America. The

public cannot be permitted to disconnect

psychologically from the war effort. This

may be difficult as much of the war will be

conducted by less visible special operations

troops instead of entire divisions. It may be

time to resurrect notions of national service

(not the draft) as military manpower gets

stretched beyond current available end

strengths. This will be especially crucial for

the reserve component in a protracted war.

National service will require the sacrifice

that pulled the public together in other

major wars.

A good interim solution is to

immediately offer short-term enlistments

(18 months) to college graduates in

exchange for college loan repayment. These

enlistees could serve a year in Bosnia,

Kosovo, or Afghanistan and then revert to

several years in the reserve component. The

short-term benefit would be valuable, high

quality manpower in the active and reserve

components, but the longer lasting and

more important result would be an America

that is more connected to its armed forces.

Third, there will be an expectation of

continuing effectiveness without the visible

signs of domestic military action. While

armed National Guardsmen patrolling the

nation’s airports is a reassuring sight today,

the time will come when Americans will

question the necessity of such shows of

force. After the attacks, it was common to

68
hear that the United States had finally

become just like Israel—an armed country

constantly wary of attack. Americans do not

want to live like Israelis. Americans want

the security, but an overt military presence

goes against the American way of life.

Planning should take place now on shifting

to a domestic security posture that produces

a minimal signature. For example, the

current combat air patrol protection

provided by the augmentation of 26

airbases throughout the United States gives

the assurance that the skies are safe, yet

the fighters are largely invisible to the

traveling public. The military will still have

to be actively engaged in the war on

terrorism, but it must have a low domestic

profile. Despite today’s tolerance of the

militarization of America, the public will

begin to expect that the arm of the military

be strong, yet invisible when used within

the shores of the United States.

Public support for military action is at

levels that parallel the public reaction after

the attack at Pearl Harbor. Americans

claim today that they believe military

action is appropriate, that they support a

protracted war, and that they are willing to

endure the negative consequences that may

accompany the war. Despite the favorable

polls, Americans are bound to be fickle in

their support. This war will not be like

World War II where every citizen is directly

or indirectly involved with the conflict.

Americans are being told to return to their

normal lives—lives that largely ignored the

military before the attacks. As they return

to those lives, their support of military

action will diminish unless the military

continually shows progress in the war

against terrorism, keeps the nation

connected to its armed forces, and provides

domestic security that is effective, but for

the most part unseen.

69
Introduction.

Much has been said and written in

recent weeks about the changed nature of

“warfare” as it pertains to responding to the

attacks on the Pentagon and the World

Trade Center. That attacks of such vast

scale are made directly on U.S. soil by

nonstate actors poses important new

questions for military leaders and planners

charged with conceiving an appropriate and

effective response.

The established moral and legal

traditions of just war are similarly

challenged. Forged almost entirely in the

context of interstate war, those traditions

are also pressed to adapt to the new and

unforeseen character of a “war against

terrorism.” This paper is a preliminary

effort to extrapolate and apply existing

fundamental moral principles of just war

theory to this novel military and political

terrain.

Fundamental Moral Principles.

The theoretical framework of the just

war tradition provides two separate moral

assessments of uses of military force. The

first, jus ad bellum (right or justice toward

war) attempts to determine which sets of

political and military circumstances are

sufficiently grave to warrant a military

response. It focuses on the “just cause”

element of war, and attempts to determine

whether use of force to redress a given

wrong has a reasonable hope of success and

whether nonviolent alternatives have been

attempted (the “last resort” criterion) to

redress the grievance. Given the

horrendous loss of innocent American (and

other) life in these recent attacks, it is

without serious question that a just cause

exists to use military force in response.

However, legitimate questions remain

regarding reasonable hope of success given

the difficult and diffuse nature of the

perpetrators of these events. Indeed, the

very definition of success in conflict of this

sort is to some degree ambiguous.

The second body of assessments

concerns jus in bello, right conduct of

military operations. The central ideas here

concern discrimination (using force against

those who are morally and legally responsible for the attack and not deliberately

against others) and proportionality (a

reasonable balance between the damage

71

FOURTEEN

Ethical Issues in Counterterrorism Warfare

Dr. Martin L. Cook

Conclusions:

• Even in the war against terrorists, attacks must be discriminate and

proportionate.

• Attacks can legally and morally be directed against all those reasonably

believed to be involved in a wide circle of conspiracy.

• Tenets of military necessity and double effect may permit some collateral

damage.

• Terrorists are not entitled to protection of the Geneva Convention, but are they

truly outside the protection of any law?
done in the responding attack and the

military value of the targets destroyed).

These fundamental moral principles

continue to have force, even in the quite

different “war” in which we are now

engaged.

Jus ad bellum Considerations.

The scale and nature of the terrorist

attacks on the United States without

question warrant a military response. The

important questions about jus ad bellum

are confined to the other questions the just

war tradition requires us to ask regarding

the ability to respond to those attacks with

military force that will, in fact, respond to

the attackers themselves and be effective in

responding to the wrong received.

Just cause requires that we identify with

accuracy those responsible and hold them to

be the sole objects of legitimate attack. Who

are those agents? In the first instance, those

directly responsible for funding and

directing the activities of the now-deceased

hijackers. There is a tremendous intelligence demand to identify those agents

correctly. But, having identified them to a

moral certainty (a standard far short of

what would be required by legal criteria of

proof, it should be noted) there is no moral

objection to targeting them. Indeed, one of

the benefits of framing these operations as

“war” rather than “law enforcement” is that

it does not require the ideal outcome to be

the apprehension and trial of the

perpetrators. Instead, it countenances their

direct elimination by military means if

possible.

What of the claim that we may

legitimately attack those who harbor

terrorists, even if they are not directly

involved in authorizing their activities? The

justification for attacking them has two

aspects: first, it holds them accountable for

activities which they knew, or should have

known, were being conducted in their

territories and did nothing to stop; second, it

serves as a deterrent to motivate other

states and sponsors to be more vigilant and

aware of the activities of such groups on

their soil.

How far ought the moral permission to

attack parties not directly involved extend?

I would propose application of a standard

from American civil law: the “reasonable

person” (or “reasonable man”) standard of

proof. This standard asks not what an

individual knew, as a matter of fact, about a

given situation or set of facts. Instead, it

asks what a reasonable and prudent person

in a similar situation should know. Thus,

even if a person or government truthfully

asserts that they were unaware of the

activities of a terrorist cell in their territory,

this does not provide moral immunity from

attack. This standard asks not what they

did know, but what they ought to have

known had they exercised the diligence and

degree of inquiry a reasonable person in

their circumstance would have exercised.

Also, legitimate targets include more

than those who have carried out or are

actively engaged in preparing to carry out

attacks against U.S. citizens and forces.

There will presumably be numerous

individuals who, in various ways, assisted

or harbored attackers, or who possessed

knowledge of planned attacks. From a

moral perspective, the circle of legitimate

targets surely includes at least these

individuals. A rough analog for the principle

here is the civil law standard for criminal

conspiracy: all those within the circle of the

conspiracy are legitimate targets. The

analogy is not perfect, but in general it

justifies attacks on those who possessed

information about the contemplated

terrorist activity or who supplied weapons,

training, funding, or safe harbor to the

actors, even if they did not possess full

knowledge of their intent.

72
Jus in bello Considerations.

How do ethical considerations constrain

the manner of attack against legitimate

adversaries? The traditional requirements

of just war continue to have application in

this kind of war. Attacks must be

discriminate and they must be proportionate. Discrimination requires that

attacks be made on persons and military

objects in ways that permit successful

attack on them with a minimum of damage

to innocent persons and objects. In practical

terms, this requires as much precision as

possible in determination of the location

and nature of targets. Further, it requires

choice of weapons and tactics that are most

likely accurately to hit the object of the

attack with a minimum of damage to

surrounding areas and personnel.

Proportionality imposes an essentially

common-sense requirement that the

damage done in the attack is in some

reasonable relation to the value and nature

of the target. To use a simple example: if the

target is a small cell of individuals in a

single building, the obliteration of the entire

town in which the structure sits would be

disproportionate.

Two important real world considerations

bear on this discussion. The first is military

necessity. Military necessity permits

actions that might otherwise be ethically

questionable. For example, if there simply

are no practical alternative means of

attacking a legitimate target, weapons and

tactics that are less than ideal in terms of

their discrimination and proportionality

may be acceptable. It is important not to

confuse military necessity with military

convenience. The obligation of military

personnel is to assume some risk in the

effort to protect innocents. However,

situations can certainly arise in which there

simply is not time or any alternative means

of attacking in a given situation. There,

military necessity generates the permission

to proceed with the attack.

The other consideration is the tendency

of adversaries of this type to co-locate themselves and their military resources with

civilians and civilian structures in order to

gain some sense of protection from such

human shields. Obviously, when possible,

every effort should be made to separate

legitimate targets from such shields. But

when that is not possible, it is acceptable to

proceed with the attack, foreseeing that

innocent persons and property will be

destroyed. The moral principle underlying

this judgment is known as “double effect,”

and permits such actions insofar as the

agent sincerely can claim (as would be the

case here) that the destruction of the

innocents was not part of the plan or

intention, but merely an unavoidable

by-product of legitimate military action.

It is important to note, however, that

there can be no just war justification for a

response to these attacks with attacks of a

similar character on other societies. Not

only would this constitute an unethical and

illegal attack on innocent parties, it would

almost certainly erode the moral “high

ground” and wide-spread political support

the United States currently enjoys.

The Moral Status of the Adversary.

The individuals who initiated the terror

attacks are clearly not “soldiers” in any

moral or legal sense. They, and others who

operate as they did from the cover of civilian

identities, are not entitled to any of the

protections of the war convention. This

means that, if captured, they are not

entitled to the benevolent quarantine of the

POW convention or of domestic criminal

law. For the purposes of effective response

to these individuals, as well as future

deterrence, it may be highly undesirable

even if they are captured to carry out the

extensive due process of criminal

73
proceedings. If we can identify culpable

individuals to a moral certainty, their swift

and direct elimination by military means is

morally acceptable and probably preferable

in terms of the goals of the policy.

However, as this conflict proceeds,

especially if ground operations commence

against fixed targets, one may foresee that

individuals and groups may come to operate

against U.S. forces as organized military

units. It is important to keep in mind that,

no matter how horrific the origins of this

conflict, if and when this occurs and such

groups begin to behave as organized units,

to carry weapons openly, and to wear some

kind of distinctive dress or badge, they

become assimilated to the war convention.

At that point, close moral and legal analysis

will be required to determine the degree to

which they become entitled to the status of

“combatant” and are given the Geneva

Convention protection that status provides.

The previous permission for swift

elimination applies to the period in which

they operate with civilian “cover.” Should

elements of the adversary force eventually

choose to operate as an organized military

force, the long-term importance of universal

respect for the Geneva Convention’s

provision would make our treating them at

that point as soldiers under the law the

preferred course of action.

74
Pakistan may be the most pivotal

coalition partner during the initial phase of

the war on terrorism since it has the longest

border with and provides the best access to

Afghanistan. In a broader sense, Pakistan

is crucial because it is the world’s second

most populous Islamic state. Its cooperation

helps prevent the war on terrorism from

becoming a conflict between Islam and

Christianity. Pakistan is also a Category II

sanctuary for global terrorist movements.*

And Pakistan has an effective military and

intelligence service and thus could serve as

an important ally for anti-terrorist

operations.

The United States would like to see

Pakistan emerge from the war on terrorism

as a stable, developing state where

religious-based extremists do not find

support or recruits. As such, it could provide

a model for other Islamic states and play a

75

FIFTEEN

Coalition Partners: Pakistan

Dr. Steven Metz

Conclusions:

• Resuscitate and broaden contacts with the Pakistani military through a

coordinated NATO engagement plan (with a major role for Turkey); renewed

and expanded IMET for Pakistani officers and NCOs; establishment of

Pakistani faculty liaison positions at the CGSC, USAWC, TRADOC, and

branch schools; provide U.S. instructors at Pakistani PME schools; and explore

a new form of engagement that leads to the rotational stationing of a Pakistani

company or battalion at a U.S. Army base for training and professional

development.

• Support Musharraf while quietly pressuring him to undertake the political and

economic reforms necessary for long-term stability.

• In collaboration with the European Union and the United Nations, lead a major

effort to find a solution to the Kashmir problem that satisfies that region’s

Muslim majority but does not do so at the expense of India’s security.

• Continue debt forgiveness and increased access to the American market,

particularly for textiles.

• Provide reconstruction assistance focused on the rebuilding of the educational

system.

• Resist any urge to use Pakistani territory for military operations against

Afghanistan.

• Broaden and deepen military engagement with India to assure that New Delhi

does not see improved ties with Pakistan as a strategic “tilt.”

* Category I states support terrorist movements as official policy (e.g. Afghanistan and Iraq). Category II states turn a blind eye

or allow terrorist movements to exist because of fear, weakness, or sympathy (e.g. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE).

Category III states host terrorist activities because their systems of legal and civil rights and their large immigrant

communities provide a form of protection (e.g. Germany and the United States).
leading role in building regional stability

and prosperity.

This positive outcome is certainly not

preordained. Pakistan could disintegrate

into a nightmare internal war of ethnic

conflict, sectarian violence, and humanitarian disaster. Under such conditions,

religious extremists could ally with

sympathetic military officers, seize political

power, and thus control nuclear weapons.

The ultimate outcome for Pakistan

depends on the sagacity of that nation’s

leaders and on the wisdom of American

strategy.

Context.

Pakistan faces severe constraints and

problems that American strategists must

consider. From its creation in 1947,

Pakistan has had a weak sense of national

identity. Composed of a multitude of ethnic

groups with different cultures and

languages, its only unifying feature was

Islam. Pakistan has never decided whether

it seeks to be an Iran-style nation ruled by

religious leaders or a secular state along the

lines of Turkey.

Punjabis, who constitute about 48

percent of Pakistanis, dominate the

economy, government, and military. This

has created deep resentment among the

other ethnic groups. Ethnically Pashtun

Pakistanis, who represent about 8 percent

of the population, feel as much connection

with their fellow Pashtuns in Afghanistan

as with Islamabad. Thus the Taliban has

deep reservoirs of support in western

Pakistan and in the slums of other cities

like Karachi.

Pakistan suffers from rigid class

distinctions intermingled with religious

considerations. Members of the upper class

tend to identify with modernization and the

West. Many have been educated in Europe

or North America, and all speak English.

While some are devoutly religious, most

consider the religious extremism popular

among the largely illiterate lower classes as

a threat.

To avoid inflaming class war, the

Pakistani elite has tolerated this

extremism. The tendency of the extremists

to blame external forces, particularly the

United States and Israel, for Pakistan’s

problems was a convenient way to deflect

attention from the shortcomings of the

nation’s leaders and political structures.

Bad governance has been the norm in

Pakistan. The first decade of independence

established a pattern of political instability

and corruption. In combination with rapid

population growth, crushing poverty, and

ethnic and sectarian conflict, this is

incendiary.

Pakistan has experienced cycles of

military dictatorship and weak, corrupt

civilian governments. In October 1999 the

Army deposed Prime Minister Muhammed

Nawaz Sharif when he attempted to replace

Chief of Army Staff Pervez Musharraf with

a family crony. General Musharraf, while

promising a return to civilian rule, has

ruled since then, attempting with only

modest success to root out corruption,

forestall ethnic and regional conflict, control

religious extremism, and resuscitate the

nation’s stagnant economy.

Pakistan’s external debt burden is

crushing with $21 billion coming due in

2002-03. Defense spending consumes a

significant portion of government expenditures. These economic problems contributed

to a collapse of public education, the public

health system, and the criminal justice and

law enforcement systems. Foreign

investment has nearly dried up. GDP

growth during most of the 1990s was less

than population growth, leading to a decline

in living standards and widespread

discontent.

Pakistan’s primary foreign and security

problem has been its conflict with India. In

76
recent decades, this has centered on the

status of Kashmir. While this state is

overwhelmingly Muslim, its ruler at the

time of independence was Hindu and thus

sought to join India. Armed conflict ensued

which led to India’s occupation of the

eastern part. In 1990 Kashmiri militants

began an armed insurgency against Indian

control. While Islamabad officially denies

involvement, it is widely known that

Pakistan supports the insurgents. This has

led India to label Pakistan a supporter of

terrorism. The fact that both India and

Pakistan are nuclear states makes their

conflict one of the most dangerous on earth.

While grappling with these problems,

Pakistan developed close ties with the

Taliban government in neighboring

Afghanistan. The military and intelligence

services trained and equipped the

mujahedin who fought against the Soviets.

Out of the concern that the civil war and

disorder in Afghanistan that followed the

Soviet withdrawal would spill over, the

Pakistani military and security services

helped form and support the Taliban, most

of whom emerged from the refugee camps

and radical religious schools (madrasahs) in

Pakistan. (These schools, which are the only

source of education for many poor

Pakistanis, remain a breeding ground for

violent extremism).

Support for the Taliban remains high,

particularly in the heavily Pashtun areas

like Quetta and Peshawar, among the

urban poor in large cities like Karachi, and

among the more radically religious

segments of the professional classes,

including the military and intelligence

services.

Pakistan’s Strategy.

The United States’ declaration of war on

terrorism forced General Musharraf to

abandon his attempts to tolerate or mollify

extremism. In effect, he had to choose

between alternative futures for his country,

one based on an improved relationship with

the West and integration into the global

economy, the other leading toward the

“Talibanization” of Pakistan.

Musharraf has several interlinked

objectives:

• Improving ties with the West in order

to gain the removal of sanctions imposed

after the 1998 nuclear tests and the 1999

military coup, deflecting pressure caused by

the slowness of the return to civilian rule,

attracting economic assistance and investment, and providing a diplomatic counterweight to India, particularly on the

Kashmir issue;

• Diminishing the threat from the

extremist movements inside Pakistan;

• Avoiding the disintegration of

Afghanistan which would create serious

refugee problems for Pakistan and

potentially engulf the western section of the

country; and,

• Preventing the emergence in Kabul of

a successor government hostile to Pakistan

(on this point, Musharraf supports a

coalition government dominated by

Pashtuns, who form a majority in

Afghanistan).

In September Musharraf pledged

“unstinted cooperation in the fight against

terrorism,” but out of concern with the

backlash among Pakistan’s lower classes

and other Taliban sympathizers, stipulated

that there be no U.S. forces in Pakistan and

that the Pakistani military not be used

outside the nation’s borders. He made

several attempts to broker a deal with the

Taliban leading to the turnover of Osama

bin Laden, but all failed.

Musharraf’s government has controlled

the anti-American demonstrations that

exploded once military operations began

and shown a willingness to use force if

necessary. He has consolidated his grip on

power. The most important step in this was

77
an October 7 purge of senior military

officers and intelligence officials thought to

be sympathetic to the Taliban and other

extremists. In general, then, he has

attempted to go as far as he can in support

of the United States and the Afghanistan

operation without sparking outright

rebellion within Pakistan.

Prognosis.

In the short term, Musharraf appears

firmly in control of Pakistan and likely to

continue cooperation with the United

States. The level of professionalism among

the officer corps is high; its senior leaders

appear solidly behind Musharraf’s

approach. He has expressed his confidence

that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are fully

under control and cannot be seized by

radicals. This is all very important for the

United States: if Musharraf should be

removed from power, any successor would

be less likely to cooperate in the war on

terrorism and might be overtly hostile.

Three things could help solidify

Musharraf’s position and support. One is if

the Afghanistan phase of the war on

terrorism is short, leads to minimum

civilian casualties and refugee flows, and

paves the way for a coalition government

and the reconstruction of that battered

country. Second is some immediate

economic payoff. It is not yet clear whether

this will happen. On one hand, the United

States, the European Union, and Japan

have all taken steps to provide debt relief

and other means of economic support. In

late September the IMF, with U.S.

approval, authorized the final tranche of

Pakistan’s $596 million standby loan. On

the other hand, the turmoil in South and

Central Asia have further deterred

investment and increased shipping

insurance for goods to and from Pakistan.

Third is international involvement leading

toward a solution of the Kashmir problem in

a way satisfactory to the Muslim majority

there.

Musharraf’s position and support could

be weakened by several things:

• A protracted military operation in

Afghanistan leading to refugee flows and

widespread civilian casualties;

• An outright takeover of Afghanistan

by the Northern Alliance;

• Anti-terrorist attacks by the United

States on other Muslim countries such as

Iraq or Libya;

• A significant crackdown on the

Muslim insurgents in Kashmir by India;

• Failure on the part of the United

States and Europe to produce tangible

economic benefits in exchange for

Pakistan’s cooperation; or

• The coalescence of opposition from

within the Pakistani military.

Conclusion.

Without cooperation from Pakistan, the

United States would have a very difficult

time completing the first phase of the war

on terrorism. But the United States has

been burned many times by placing its trust

in friendly dictators unwilling or unable to

undertake serious political reform. This is

the dilemma with Pakistan: the United

States may not be able to succeed without

Musharraf, but to be associated with him

could be risky over the long term if he

becomes just another corrupt, repressive

military dictator.

78
While Pakistan may be the most pivotal

coalition partner in the initial phase in the

war on terrorism, a top U.S. priority in

South Asia must be to keep India-Pakistan

tensions at the lowest level possible. A

successful outcome in this phase of the war

not only requires ongoing cooperation with

Islamabad but also parallel U.S.

engagement with New Delhi. Because of the

decades-old animosity between India and

Pakistan, especially concerning the

territorial dispute over the region of

Kashmir, a misstep by the United States,

Pakistan, or India could easily lead to a

dangerous heightening of tensions between

the two nuclear armed South Asian

neighbors and possibly escalate into war.

Rightly or wrongly, India continues to

see Pakistan as “part of the problem” rather

than “part of the solution” in the war. From

New Delhi’s perspective, Islamabad is a

major exporter of terrorism—first to

Afghanistan and then, since the late 1980s,

to Kashmir. Indeed, Afghanistan is seen by

many Indians as a virtual colony of

Pakistan, with the Taliban serving as a

proxy of Pakistan’s military.

Context.

At independence from Great Britain in

1947, the subcontinent was partitioned into

the predominantly Hindu state of India and

predominantly Muslim state of Pakistan

because Hindu and Muslim leaders could

not agree on a political formula to keep their

communities in one country. Although India

remains officially a secular state, more than

80 percent of its one billion people are

Hindu, and the dominant political party in

New Delhi’s current governing coalition is

the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata

Party (or BJP). Nevertheless, approximately 12 percent of the country’s

population is Muslim. Numbering some 120

79

SIXTEEN

Coalition Partners: India

Dr. Andrew Scobell

Conclusions:

The United States must work very hard to prevent people from viewing the war on

terrorism as a religious struggle between Islam and Hinduism by:

• Continuing to develop and expand its relationship with India while being

careful at the same time not to be viewed as leaning toward India at the

expense of Pakistan;

• Expanding mil-mil relations on a trajectory comparable with that planned for

Pakistan;

• Assisting India to improve command and control systems for its nuclear

weapons;

• Urging India to moderate its response to communal unrest and insurgency in

Kashmir at least in the short term;

• Encouraging India to seek over the longer term a negotiated solution in

Kashmir with the help of an honest broker such as U.N. Secretary General Kofi

Anan.
million, this gives India a Muslim

community even larger than that of

Pakistan and second only to that of

Indonesia.

India today shares approximately a two

thousand mile-long border with Pakistan,

and it has fought three major wars and one

mini-war with Pakistan. All but one of these

was fought over Kashmir. The first was

fought at Independence in 1947 when the

Muslim majority in Kashmir sought to join

Pakistan, and the Hindu hereditary ruler

appealed for help from India. The result was

a war that led to the division of Kashmir

into Indian and Pakistani control sectors

separated by the so-called Line of Control. A

second Indo-Pakistan war was fought over

Kashmir in 1965. Six years later the two

countries fought another war, this time over

the status of East Pakistan. India’s victory

meant East Pakistan became the

independent state of Bangladesh.

More recently, in 1999 Indian troops

fought a small war against Pakistan

irregulars in the remote Kargil region of

Kashmir. It remains to be seen whether

India’s strikes against Pakistani-controlled

Kashmir on October 15 of this year will

escalate into another full-blown war or

simply dissipate.

India and Pakistan are both nuclear

powers and therefore the possibility exists

of a nuclear conflict in South Asia.

Moreover, there are serious questions about

command and control mechanisms for

nuclear weapons in both countries.

India’s Strategy.

India views itself as a natural ally of the

United States and an indispensable

coalition member of the war. New Delhi is

very eager to continue the rapprochement

with Washington that began during the

Clinton administration and continued in its

view until the immediate aftermath of

September 11.

India has expressed strong support for

the war on terrorism. New Delhi has offered

bases, airfields, and intelligence for U.S.

forces involved in operations against

targets in Afghanistan. India is extremely

concerned about Pakistani support for

terrorism particularly in the disputed area

of Kashmir, especially in the wake of the

October 1 car bombing outside the state

parliament building in the capital of

Srinagar. Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee

reportedly gave assurances to President

Bush prior to October 1 that India would

show restraint in Kashmir.

New Delhi supports ongoing U.S.

military actions but remains wary about the

closer ties developing between the United

States and Pakistan. Vajpayee and

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf

spoke by telephone on October 8. Vajpayee

insisted that Pakistan must end support for

Islamic terrorists in Indian-controlled

Kashmir, and he declined Musharraf’s

invitation to meet face-to-face with the

Pakistani leader.

India’s main objectives are:

• Further improvement in bilateral

relations with the United States;

• The continued existence of a unified

Pakistan;

• The defeat of “terrorism” in Kashmir;

• No significant impairment of India’s

impressive economic growth.

Prognosis.

India will continue to support strongly

the war and will remain very interested in

expanding security ties and defense

cooperation with the United States. At the

same time, New Delhi will continue to be

extremely concerned about growing U.S.-

Pakistan security cooperation.

India will also be extremely sensitive to

further terrorist activities in Kashmir. It

will be difficult for New Delhi not to

retaliate with force in the event of further

80
terrorist attacks in the disputed territory.

Nevertheless, India’s actions will be

constrained by the sober recognition that

sustained military action against Pakistancontrolled Kashmir would exacerbate the

political challenges confronting Islamabad’s

military government and perhaps lead to its

collapse—the last thing New Delhi wants.

If, for whatever reason, Pakistan’s

armed forces intervened in Afghanistan,

India would vehemently condemn this, and

Indo- Pakistani tensions would heighten.

Recommendations.

The United States must work very hard

to prevent people from viewing the war on

terrorism as a religious struggle between

Islam and Hinduism by:

• Continuing to develop and expand its

relationship with India while being careful

at the same time not to be viewed as leaning

toward India at the expense of Pakistan;

• Expanding mil-mil relations on a

trajectory comparable with that planned for

Pakistan;

• Assisting India to improve command

and control systems for its nuclear weapons;

• Urging India to moderate its response

to communal unrest and insurgency in

Kashmir at least in the short term;

• Encouraging India to seek over the

longer term a negotiated solution in

Kashmir with the help of an honest broker

such as U.N. Secretary General Kofi Anan.

81
Introduction.

Although the five Central Asian states

are similar, there are significant

ethnographical, religious (Sunni versus

Shia), and linguistic cleavages among them.

Therefore, policies and strategic options

that involve them must be tailored to their

specific needs and conditions. But if we

understand their interests, we should be

able to devise successful responses and

inducements of an inclusive strategic

nature, within whose umbrella we can

target specific countries’ needs. Success in

doing so will enhance the U.S. coalition’s

viability and allow us to exploit the present

crisis so that we can bring about a

significant and lasting geostrategic

realignment in America’s interest.

Impact of the Crisis and Support for

U.S. Goals.

The willingness of the Central Asian

states to cooperate with the United States

varies. Because of this, our assistance

should be tailored and go proportionally to

those who help us the most.

The most willing to help is the most

independent-minded of all these states,

Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan seeks maximum

freedom of action and distance from both

Russia and China, but must deal with what

it perceives as a constant threat of Islamic

insurgency and terrorism emanating from

Afghanistan. It also is obviously contending

with not just the threat of internal unrest

and insurgency, but Russian and perhaps

Chinese pressure to limit any military

cooperation with Washington. President

Islam Karimov’s regime has stated its

willingness to provide the use of air space

and one military base for humanitarian

missions. It also has allowed 1,000 U.S.

troops to be stationed in Uzbekistan,

probably at that base. Presumably this

involves intelligence cooperation as well.

Kazakstan, the most distant from the

scene of current Central Asian insurgencies

and the most abundantly endowed with

energy, must always balance Russia and

China. Therefore, it generally seeks to

diversify its external and defense relationships. It, too, has offered the United States

bases and air space.

Turkmenistan has followed a formal

policy of neutrality since becoming independent, and perhaps due to that has the

best relations with the Taliban of any of

83

SEVENTEEN

Central Asia and the War on Terrorism:

Towards a New Alignment

Dr. Stephen J. Blank

Conclusions:

• Upgrade military engagement, security assistance, and PFP relationships.

• Implement intelligence cooperation and training.

• Link assistance to political and economic reforms.

• Support petroleum pipeline routes through Central Asia to India.

• Provide infrastructure, public health, and ecological assistance.

• Assist developmental NGOs and foundations that work in Central Asia.
these states, often serving as an

interlocutor. Thus its support is limited to

opening its air space to humanitarian

flights.

Tajikistan, the victim of civil war and

with a fragile regime sustained mainly by

Russian troops, nevertheless has consented

to use of its bases. But most likely any

further or future cooperation from

Tajikistan will remain covert and

unspoken. Kyrgyzstan, another small state

that depends largely on Russian support,

has offered its air corridors for

humanitarian flights and has not totally

ruled out military cooperation. In this

context, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan offer

excellent bases for missions directed at

Afghanistan and are the real logistical keys

to any success in launching missions from

Central Asia.

Central Asian Demands or Needs.

At the same time, all these states will

expect and also need “compensations” from

the United States. These rewards for their

support are both short and long term in

nature. They are not exclusively military,

but the military “compensations” appear to

be the most urgent ones. As these are states

that face permanent and ongoing threats

from terrorists aligned to the drug trade

from Afghanistan, they will want military

assistance. Uzbek officials, for instance,

talk of “annihilating the Taliban.”

Specifically, they appear to want upgraded

Partnership for Peace (PfP) relationships

and improved bilateral relations and

assistance in weapons and training, as well

as intelligence, from Washington. The

longer-term goal is to obtain, if not a

security guarantee from Washington and/or

NATO, then a permanently functioning

U.S. military presence or relationship in

and with Uzbekistan. Thus it is hardly

surprising that Uzbekistan now wants to

negotiate a Status of Forces Agreement

(SOFA). Uzbekistan, and probably the other

states as well, want independence from the

hegemonic plans of both Russia and China,

now enshrined in the Shanghai-6 communiqué of July 2001. That communiqué not

only licensed the external power projection

of Russian and Chinese forces in Central

Asia (the latter signing off on such an

agreement for the first time), it also defined

terrorism, separatism, and extremism as

security threats. Despite Russian offers of

cooperation, it is clear that Moscow objects

to these states having any meaningful or

lasting defense relationship with the

United States.

The Central Asia states may not fully be

able to escape the Russo-Chinese defense

straitjacket, but they certainly wish to have

real alternatives to it. For Kazakstan,

Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, this is

realistic. Perhaps it would be possible to

provide some or all of these kinds of

assistance. However, the danger for the

United States is that it creates too close an

identification with these extremely repressive regimes whose policies, including

disregard for civil and human rights,

massive corruption, authoritarianism, and

fierce religious repression, are creating the

grounds for insurgency. Not surprisingly,

the increasing impoverishment of masses of

people as a few grow very rich, the

unresolved socio-ecological-economic issues,

and an apparently growing identification

with Islam as a form of political expression

provide fertile grounds for internal and

possibly interstate conflict. Thus military

and security assistance must be finely

calibrated and should not be the only card in

our deck.

Economic-Political Needs

and Assistance.

All these regimes desperately need

large-scale and long-term economic, ecological, and political support. They require

84
help to obtain favorable terms of trade for

their products and access to markets. That

means major infrastructural investments in

transportation and pipelines to free them of

dependence on Russia. Only such investments, coupled at the less glamorous end

with developmental programs of a smaller

scale such as have worked elsewhere in the

Third World, can allow these regimes to

make substantial economic progress and

eventually a breakthrough. This would

include substantive assistance to build the

Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, or pending the

pacification of Afghanistan, UNOCAL’s

proposal for a pipe- line from Turkmenistan

through Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Indeed, for Turkmenistan and

Kazakstan, as well as the states less

endowed with oil and gas, a major

realignment can be realized if we can pacify

Afghanistan and reverse Pakistan’s support

for insurgents in Afghanistan, Central Asia,

and Kashmir. To the degree that

Washington can persuade or, more bluntly,

frighten either Tehran or Islamabad into

renouncing terrorism and negotiating with

their rivals, it can support more

alternatives for Turkmenistan, Kazakstan,

and Uzbekistan, as well as smaller

Kyrgyzstan and even the Russian client,

Tajikistan, to expand and diversify their

international trade. That possibility entails

energy pipelines and construction of major

infrastructural and transportation outlets

that will greatly stimulate all commercial

traffic, not just in energy products, among

all these states. Such large-scale growth of

trade offers Central Asia major security and

economic benefits, provided Afghanistan is

pacified and becomes the recipient of

sustained international efforts at

reconstruction. Certainly it would help

overcome the logjam concerning pipelines

and shatter the material basis for IranianRussian alliance, partly directed against

Central Asian states and Azerbaijan.

This strategic realignment also offers a

possibility for genuine Indo-Pakistani negotiations and reduced tensions between Iran

and its neighbors and/or Israel. Either or

both of those outcomes would clearly be

mutually beneficial for everyone in the

Middle East, Central Asia, and/or South

Asia. While this vision may seem too

audacious, this crisis and the fact that the

war will not likely be a short one offer the

possibilities for major restructuring of

Central Asian alignments to the benefit of

local regimes and the United States.

Recommendations.

U.S. inducements for support should

avoid long-term and binding ties like

SOFAs. Rather, we should make the

following kinds of military-politicaleconomic offers in return for real support.

• Upgraded bilateral military exercises,

training, weapons sales, IMET agreements,

and more frequent participation for all who

want it in PfP exercises.

• A regular program of intelligence

cooperation and training as needed.

• Political assistance to bolster those

countries against China and Russia. This

assistance can also take the form of the

bilateral and multilateral military

programs listed above, since those enhance

these regimes’ capability to defend

themselves or to solicit Western support.

However, we cannot ally ourselves with

repressive domestic tactics. Ideally, a

discussion should begin that requires

political and economic reforms as a

condition for aid.

• Support for pipelines through those

countries to India and beyond, giving

producers a real outlet to the sea that is an

alternative to Russian and Iranian

pressures, pipelines, and ports.

• Large-scale assistance to build roads

for rail, truck, and commerical trade south

85
from Central Asia, tied to the EU Silk Road

project.

• Large-scale assistance with water

purification and cleanup and development

of renewable sources of water.

• Large-scale assistance in public

health and pollution cleanup.

• Major financial assistance to NGOs

and foundations with a proven record of

success that are working to develop areas

from the bottom up to parallel the larger,

macro-economic projects cited here.

86
To grasp the impact upon Russia of our

new war and the requirements for

sustaining Russia’s cooperation, we must

distinguish four sets of players in Russia

and one set of foreign players besides the

United States. President Vladimir Putin

must balance the inputs and pressures

emanating from these sources. Based on

public record, they are the intelligence

community, i.e., the Foreign Intelligence

Service (SVR) and the domestic Federal

Security Service (FSB), the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Ministry of

Defense (MOD), and the armed forces,

represented by the General Staff. The

Central Asian governments also influence

Moscow’s thinking from the outside.

The Players in Russia.

The SVR and perhaps FSB apparently

have previously offered the United States

covert rights to bases in Tajikistan for use

against Osama Bin Laden. The Russian

government regularly professes deep

anxiety about the rapid spread of

insurgency in Central Asia supported by bin

Laden and the Taliban. The assassination

of the latter’s main rival, Ahmad Shah

Massoud, military leader of the Northern

Alliance forces in Afghanistan, might

eventually provoke a Taliban offensive

towards the Afghan border with Central

Asia. That would facilitate the direct spread

into Central Asia and beyond of large-scale

refugee flows, terrorism, insurgency, and

rampant narcotics trading that finances

this violence. Russia also argues that these

Afghan-based forces are materially

implicated in Chechnya.

The SVR and FSB have previously

shared intelligence up to a point with their

U.S. and Western opposite numbers

concerning these terrorists. They clearly

view the attacks on America as a basis for a

deeper and more enduring intelligence and

thus political entente with the West. They

also evidently believe that the U.S.-led

military alliance will facilitate resolution of

the problem of military suppression of

either the Central Asian and Afghan-based

forces or allow Russia greater scope for

action in Chechnya without worldwide

opposition. Preliminary indications concerning the expectation of less Western

opposition to Russia’s activities in

Chechnya seem to be justified. Therefore

the SVR and FSB have now revealed their

past cooperation with Washington (in

general terms) and appear ready to upgrade

it. Thus, after Putin’s offer to share

intelligence with Washington, it is likely

that a deeper and perhaps more regularized

87

EIGHTEEN

Russia and the U.S. War on Terrorism

Dr. Stephen J. Blank

Conclusions:

• Provide Russia expanded trade access to the U.S. market and investment

opportunities.

• Develop programs help Russia with the clean up of nuclear materials, ecological

repair, and reconstruction of its public health system.

• Provide some form of compensation for an end to proliferation of WMD

technology and systems.
mechanism of sharing and cooperation

between our two intelligence systems will

take place.

The MFA evidently also sees

opportunities for gain here, including at

least the expectation of Western silence, if

not active approbation for Russian

activities in Chechnya. Therefore Moscow

has steadily proclaimed the tie between the

Chechens and Bin Laden’s network. U.S.,

German, and Italian reactions to Russian

policy in Chechnya evidently justify that

expectation. The MFA also apparently

entertains the hope of future membership in

a revamped NATO. Defense Minister Sergei

Ivanov, who supports such cooperation, now

also urges the establishment of a

mechanism with NATO for deeper and more

regularized security cooperation with

Moscow. Moscow also wants compensation

for any cessation of weapons and weapons of

mass destruction (WMD) capability

transfers to Iran and other “rogue states”

(Iraq and North Korea, among others); a

veto, presumably in the U.N., over any

action that may be taken against Iraq;

presumably membership in the World

Trade Organization; and debt forgiveness.

Thus it is also urging that the United States

act exclusively through the U.N., a bad idea

for many reasons.

The point of this gambit is not just

approving Russian aims in Chechnya, but

also preventing NATO enlargement in

2002, especially to the Baltic, reversing the

idea of NATO and Western primacy in

providing security to Eastern Europe, and

recognizing a privileged place in the

Commonwealth of Independent States

(CIS) for Moscow—the last one being its

topmost foreign policy and defense priority.

This attempted reconstitution of NATO not

only reverses the thrust of Western policy in

Europe, it also gives Russia its longsought-after veto on NATO’s activities

without having undergone or affirmed

internal reform, defense reform, and

acceptance of the territorial status quo in

Eurasia, not to mention renouncing its

hegemonic aspirations in the CIS. None of

these objectives, except for financial and

economic assistance, comport with vital

U.S. goals that our new war on terrorism

does not supersede.

However, Putin’s offer to assist

Washington also came about because

Moscow cannot control the Central Asian

states to the extent that it wishes. His offer

followed numerous reports that Uzbekistan

and Kazakstan, and possibly Turkmenistan, would offer the United States

overflight rights, access to air bases and

intelligence sharing, and that U.S. forces

were either in Uzbekistan or en route there.

Failing to stop this move by Central Asian

governments, Moscow apparently tried to

jump on the bandwagon and regain control

of it. Moscow wants to retain control over

the duration, modalities, and extent of U.S.

military and other presence in Central Asia

by offering Washington more than would be

otherwise expected. It also hopes to obtain

the political benefits sketched out above.

The military, led by the General Staff

and its Chief, General Anatoly Kvashnin, is

clearly the most suspicious element in

Russian policymaking. Beyond concern

about being dragged into another Afghan or

Chechen-like war which it cannot win, or of

becoming a target for further terrorist

attacks, it also harbors deep suspicions

about any U.S. military presence in the CIS

under any conditions. Consequently, it not

only refused to commit any troops to the

operation, it preempted Putin when Ivanov

practically ruled out even the kind of

cooperation that Putin later supported. We

can reliably expect the MOD and General

Staff to resolutely oppose any extended U.S.

strategic presence in Central Asia and the

CIS, generally to seek to limit America’s

presence and Russian and Central Asian

88
cooperation with U.S. forces, and loudly to

demand compensations even beyond what

we have mentioned.

Russia’s Offer and Its Ambivalent

Role in the War on Terrorism.

Putin offered the United States

intelligence cooperation with the SVR and

possibly FSB, opened Russian airspace to

humanitarian flights and to search and

rescue missions, and offered weapons and

arms to Afghan anti-Taliban forces. Putin

also tried to pretend that he was graciously

offering former Soviet air bases in Central

Asia and had coordinated this with those

governments to maintain the pretense of

Russian hegemony there. But he refrained

from offering Russian military or air bases

as staging posts for U.S. or coalition forces

or from allowing overflight rights to U.S.

aircraft in support of military missions.

Thus actual operational assistance will be

limited strictly to nonmilitary operations.

Russia will not directly support attacks on

the Taliban. Should the war shift to other

theaters known for harboring terrorists,

like Iran, Iraq, Syria, or Libya, it is very

doubtful that even this limited cooperation

will continue.

Indeed, Russia’s actual conduct in the

war on terrorism is highly suspect and

rather different from its loud anti-terrorist

rhetoric. The war in Chechnya largely

stems from Putin’s and Yeltsin’s effort to

launch a quick, victorious war against an

enemy that certainly could be charged with

terrorism in Dagestan and perhaps beyond

that in Russia, and to do so for domestic

electoral purposes. Yet there is no credible

evidence of any Chechen terror in Russia

since 1999 apart from Dagestan, and there

are new charges that the FSB was behind

the terrorism of 1999 in Moscow. Although

international Islamic fighters are present in

Chechnya and ties to Bin Laden do exist,

that war is more about Russian issues than

about terrorism.

Moreover, Polish scholars have noted

that the only power that benefits from

ongoing insurgency and terrorism in

Central Asia is Russia, since that justifies

Russian efforts to project its military power

and to advocate integrating Central Asian

states around Russia’s armed forces. Yet

when those states faced real threats last

year, Russian help was minimal and

derided by local governments. Furthermore,

there are charges within the Russian press

that Russian forces allowed the Islamic

Movement for Uzbekistan (IMU) to cross

into Central Asia by opening the TajikAfghan border to them in 2000. Russian

troops and commanders in Central Asia

have also participated in the drug trade

originating there and in Afghanistan.

Nuclear smuggling has taken place in

Central Asia, and this suggests at least

some officials’ or armed forces’ connivance

with the smugglers and the intended

recipients of this contraband. Finally,

Russian intelligence (as the Washington

Times reported on June 14-15) sold Bin

Laden high-tech communications and

apparently encryption technology stolen by

Robert Hanssen. These facts suggest

Russia’s rather unique approach to

terrorism, one that the United States

should not reward unduly.

Sustaining the Coalition.

Most Russian objectives run counter to

U.S. goals in Europe and Asia and our new

opportunities to gain a lasting influence in

Central Asia. Since many Central Asian

governments clearly seek some lasting U.S.

presence and were disappointed at not

getting it, we now have an opportunity to

gain that presence while making fewer “side

payments” to Russia than might otherwise

have been the case. We can offer the

following “compensations” to Russia, even

89
while expanding our visibility in Central

Asia.

• We should offer Russia expanded

trade access to U.S. market and investment

opportunities (provided the legal bases for

the latter are implemented).

• We should also offer large-scale public

programs to clean up nuclear materials, and

help deal with some of the monumental

ecological and public health issues there

that are beyond Russian control.

• Furthermore, we can and should offer

reasonable compensations to induce a

cessation of proliferation of all forms of

WMD technology and systems (and, if we

are able, conventional weaponry as well) to

Iran and other rogue states: Iraq, Syria,

Libya, etc.

• A very important inducement to

Russia is to move rapidly on reducing

strategic offensive arms in return for

building strategic defenses to levels

outlined by President Bush and the

administration. This neutralizes some of

the Russian military opposition to

cooperation, reaffirms our willingness and

ability to be a reliable partner, eases many

Russian security dilemmas since they

cannot afford parity any longer, and

conforms to our overall desire to rewrite

relations with Russia. Agreement here

demonstrates our desire to forge truly

nonadversarial relations with Russia. But,

at the same time, it does not compromise

any of our other existing and still

continuing broad strategic-political

objectives across Eurasia.

• It would also be helpful to devise, if it

is possible, a mechanism for regular

intelligence exchanges on terrorism and

narcotics trafficking.

• These incentives should not stop or

limit our plans for NATO enlargement and

our intention to forestall spheres of

influence in the CIS.

• Nor is it time to admit Russia into

NATO. Indeed, doing so would be an act of

the greatest strategic folly because it would

utterly compromise NATO’s mission,

purpose, and standards for entry, as well as

regional security, especially in the Baltic,

Balkan, Black Sea, and CIS areas.

• Although there is no doubt of Chechen

ties to Bin Laden and other such groups, that

war has a different profile and etiology than

our current campaign, and they should not be

linked. While we may urge the Chechens to

sever ties with Bin Laden, we should not

refrain from criticizing Russian operations, or

more importantly, urging a political solution

to the war.

• This crisis offers us an opportunity to

achieve other key aims beyond Russia’s

integration into the West through strategic

arms and economic agreements sketched

out above.

• In particular, this crisis provides an

opportunity to undermine the essentially

anti-American thrust of the Shanghai

Cooperation organization that was imposed

on Central Asia by Russia and China. That

organization’s recent communiqué licenses

Chinese and Russia military presences

there in the guise of anti-terrorist or

anti-separatist operations (terms that could

justify Russian assistance over Taiwan).

• Recent events demonstrate not only

that the Central Asian states, particularly

Uzbekistan and Kazakstan, still desire a

meaningful and multifaceted U.S. presence

there, they also show that Russia cannot

stop it from taking place. Therefore, we

need to prevent this area from becoming not

only a site for regular terrorist activities

and insurgency, but also a platform for an

anti-American coalition aiming to restore

Russian hegemony or extend Chinese

influence in Asia. Our invited presence

there can serve all the strategic objectives of

security, energy, and maintaining trade

access and Central Asian states’ indepen90
dence that we have previously proclaimed

for Central Asia. And we might successfully

do so at a smaller cost vis-à-vis Russia than

has been imagined.

91
At a minimum, China’s tacit support or

at least nonopposition is crucial to the

eventual success of the war on terrorism

because Beijing holds one of the permanent

seats on the U.N. Security Council. China’s

active participation in the war is not

essential. In fact, the United States should

probably not expect much in the way of

substantive Chinese support.

Officially, Beijing has offered supportive

rhetoric for America’s war on terrorism and

has shared intelligence with the United

States. Some Chinese analysts see the

events of September 11, while tragic, as

heralding a brighter future for U.S.-China

relations. These analysts see significant

potential for U.S.-China cooperation on

counterterrorism efforts, which can

contribute to an improvement in overall

bilateral relations. Other Chinese analysts,

however, expect that the United States will

single-mindedly and unilaterally pursue its

war on terrorism, which will result in a

deterioration in relations.

Context.

China’s leaders are very concerned

about ethno-religious terrorism in their own

country—especially from Islamic extremists seeking greater autonomy or

independence from China in the western

region of Xinjiang. Xinjiang shares an

extended land border with central Asian

states (including a short stretch with

Afghanistan), Pakistan and Kashmir.

Beijing is also concerned about other

“separatist” movements seeking independence in places such as Tibet and Taiwan.

These are all seen as constituting serious

threats to national security, and China’s

leaders are extremely sensitive to the point

of paranoia about internal security. The

issue of “separatism” tends to be on the

agenda alongside the subject of “terrorism.”

During his visit to Shanghai to attend

the Asia-Pacific Economic Conference

(APEC) meeting on October 20-21,

President Bush got a qualified statement of

support for the war from his Chinese

counterpart. The first ever face-to-face

meeting between the two national leaders

went as well as could be expected. The

Chinese did not want the issue of terrorism

to monopolize the agenda or for President

Bush to upstage the Chinese leader.

China’s Strategy.

President Jiang told President Bush on

October 8 that China supports efforts to

combat terrorism but cautioned him to keep

civilian casualties limited. However, as the

U.S. and coalition forces continue to conduct

93

NINETEEN

Coalition Partners: China

Dr. Andrew Scobell

Conclusions:

• Reactivate mil-mil ties with China across the board with a more comprehensive

pro-active approach to promote our long-term war on terrorism. The existing

“case by case” review of activities should be discarded.

• Place the topic of counterterrorism prominently on the agenda in mil-mil

exchanges.
limited military operations in Afghanistan

against the Taliban and al Qaeda, Beijing

has heavily censored Chinese media reports

of the war. China has sealed its

approximately 50 mile-long border with

Afghanistan and provided a small amount

of humanitarian assistance for the

resettlement of Afghan refugees. For now,

the Chinese government is also denying

visas to passport holders of countries in the

Arab world and Southwest Asia, and

Chinese airlines and travel agents are

declining to sell air tickets to these same

individuals.

China’s main objectives are to:

• Prevent terrorist acts and defeat

secessionist movements in China;

• Maintain good relations with the

United States;

• Ensure stability in Central Asia and

cordial relations with the states of the

region;

• Secure a stable supply of foreign

energy resources;

• Continue economic growth which

entails smooth entry into the World Trade

Organization (China formally joins the

WTO next month).

Prognosis.

As time goes on, Beijing could begin to

express publicly reservations or condemnation, although Chinese leaders may

privately be pleased that terrorist

organizations that also pose a threat to

China are being destroyed or greatly

weakened.

However, if the United States pursues

operations beyond the current limited

U.S./coalition military action in Afghanistan, there will likely be strong official

Chinese condemnation. China fears that

the United States might undertake

extensive military operations against other

states in Southwest Asia or the Middle East

(e.g., Iraq) or establish a long-term military

presence in the region. This would damage

U.S.-China relations and result in closer

ties between China and Russia. Both

countries would redouble their efforts to

oppose U.S. actions via the United Nations

and the recently established Shanghai

Cooperation Organization (composed of

Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,

Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan).

Recommendations.

The United States should not expect

much actual support from China and should

probably be satisfied with no vocal

opposition to the war on terrorism.

Nevertheless, Beijing could make some

useful contributions, although Washington

should not expend valuable political capital

in pursuit of these. If the United States does

seek substantial help from China in the

war, Washington should anticipate Beijing

insisting on a significant quid pro quo (e.g.,

regarding Taiwan). The United States

should avoid going down this road. Instead,

Washington should play up Beijing’s sense

of its status as a great power and Beijing’s

desire to be treated like a distinguished

member of the community of nations.

If efforts in Afghanistan take place

under U.N. auspices (once the Taliban is

toppled), China may be willing to provide

token military units for peacekeeping or

humanitarian relief activities in

Afghanistan. At the very least, China may

be willing to offer some humanitarian aid.

This Chinese involvement might be of

considerable value in stressing the broad

nature of the antiterrorism coalition and be

useful in improving mil-mil relations

between the People’s Liberation Army and

other armed forces (including U.S.

military).

The United States should make every

effort to ensure that bilateral relations with

China improve. To this end we should:

94
• Reactivate mil-mil ties with China

across the board with a more comprehensive pro-active approach to promote our

long-term war on terrorism. The existing

“case by case” review of activities should be

discarded;

• Place the topic of counterterrorism

prominently on the agenda in mil-mil

exchanges;

• Stress the importance of calm and

stability in the Taiwan Strait and Korean

Peninsula.

95
This paper surveys the reaction of seven

key Asian states to the U.S. war on

terrorism following the events of September

11, 2001. Four of these states are allies or

good friends of the United States (Australia,

Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines),

and the three remaining states are coalition

partners or potential coalition partners

(Indonesia, Malaysia, and North Korea).

Each of these states merits close attention

from the United States and its armed forces,

either to ensure that a particular country

remains in the coalition or at least that it

does not actively oppose the coalition.

ALLIES AND FRIENDS

Australia.

Response so far: There has been strong

bipartisan and public support in Canberra

for the war. Both the government of Prime

Minister John Howard and the main

opposition Labour Party have been

extremely outspoken in their support.

Australia has offered SAS (special

operations forces), air-to-air refueling

aircraft, and intelligence.

Responses to military action: Canberra’s

response has been strongly supportive to

date, but broader military action outside

Afghanistan might cause the erosion of

public support and then political support.

What we can expect in the future:

Continued strong support, particularly if

the incumbent administration wins

national parliamentary elections scheduled

for November 10.

Policy recommendations: Express public

thanks and appreciation for Australian

support.

Japan.

Response so far: There has been

surprisingly strong official and public

support for a U.S. military response in the

war. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi

announced a 7-point program, including

efforts to clear legal hurdles to allow

Self-Defense Forces to serve in support

functions for military action against

Afghanistan. Compared to the paralysis

and timidity Japan displayed during the

Gulf War, Tokyo’s response has been

remarkably swift and robust.

97

TWENTY

Reaction of Key Asian States to the War on Terrorism

Dr. Andrew Scobell

Conclusions:

• Encourage higher profile military support and major financial contributions by

Japan to help rebuild Afghanistan.

• Publicly welcome humanitarian assistance efforts by South Korea but

encourage ROK forces to remain in the country to continue to serve as a

deterrent against a North Korean attack. Leave U.S. forces deployed as they

are on the Korean Peninsula.

• Continue to cultivate good ties with the Philippines and share intelligence on

terrorist groups, especially on Abu Sayyaf which has links to Osama bin Laden.

Do not seek the deployment of Filipino troops in Afghanistan.
Responses to military action: Japan has

already sent military air transports with

relief supplies to Pakistan. Official and

public support for limited military action

against Afghanistan has been widespread.

What we can expect in the future: Further

official backing and qualitative improvement in the level of military support offered

to U.S. operations. The continued reactions

of South Korea and China to Japan’s

initiative to play a larger military role

overseas also will be crucial to future

actions. This extreme sensitivity to

Japanese forces operating abroad is linked

to the prolonged and harsh Japanese

military occupations of these two countries

in the last century. To date Prime Minister

Koizumi has actively consulted with his

counterparts in Seoul and Beijing, and they

have been remarkably receptive. If either

Seoul or Beijing voice grave concern at any

phase of the war, this could dramatically

undercut public support within Japan for

such steps. Moreover, there are indications

that public support would likely erode quite

rapidly if the United States widened the

campaign beyond this one country or if

Japanese forces suffered casualties.

Policy recommendations: The United

States should encourage higher profile

military support and major financial

contributions by Japan to help rebuild

Afghanistan. At the same time, the United

States should be realistic about the limits of

what Japan will be able or willing to do and

not push too far.

South Korea.

Response so far: Seoul has given strong

public backing. On September 17, President

Kim Dae Jung offered his full support for

U.S. strikes against terrorists and stated

that South Korea will be part of the

coalition fighting the war on terrorism. The

ROK Defense Ministry offered some 450

noncombat personnel in medical, air

transport, and sea transport units as well as

humanitarian assistance to Afghan

refugees.

Responses to military action: On October

7, the first day of bombing in Afghanistan, a

ROK spokesman said South Korea “actively

supports” the attacks on Afghanistan, and

President Kim ordered increased security

around U.S. military installations in the

country.

What we can expect in the future: Seoul is

likely to remain very supportive of limited

action, but this can change in the event of

more extensive military action, especially if

public opinion turns strongly antiAmerican. If the United States widens the

war beyond Afghanistan, a groundswell of

public opposition might put government

support in question.

Policy recommendations: The United

States should publicly welcome

humanitarian assistance efforts by South

Korea but encourage ROK forces to remain

in the country to continue to serve as a

deterrent against a North Korean attack.

The United States should also be on guard

against doing or saying anything that might

be construed as a weakening of resolve or

readiness of USFK forces. Therefore, no

U.S. forces should be redeployed away from

the Korean Peninsula.

Philippines.

Response so far: The Government of the

Philippines has offered to cooperate fully

with the United States in the war. On

October 2, President Gloria Macapagal

Arroyo very strongly stated that Manila

was “prepared to go every step of the way.”

Arroyo offered the use of airfields and

seaports, logistics support, intelligence, and

even combat forces.

Responses to military action: Manila has

certainly supported limited military action

against targets in Afghanistan and

probably will continue to provide solid

98
support, even if the war on terrorism widens

beyond Afghanistan.

What we can expect in the future: Given

the Philippines has its own serious

homegrown Islamic terrorist/insurgency

problem, the United States can expect

continued public and substantive support in

the war and requests for American

assistance in dealing with terrorist groups

such as the Abu Sayyaf group based in the

Philippines.

Policy recommendations: The United

States should continue to cultivate good ties

with Philippines and share intelligence on

terrorist groups, especially on Abu Sayyaf

which has links to Osama bin Laden.

Filipino troops should not be deployed in

Afghanistan or vicinity because of the

perception they are anti-Islamic, given their

role in the ongoing Muslim separatist war

in the southern Philippines.

COALITION OR POTENTIAL

COALITION PARTNERS

Indonesia.

Response so far: Jakarta has made

positive official statements but significant

and widespread anti-Americanism exists in

the world’s most populous Islamic state. In

the wake of the October 7 bombing, radical

Islamic groups in Indonesia have

threatened to storm the U.S. embassy

and/or attack U.S. citizens and demanded

that the government break diplomatic

relations with Washington. President

Megawati Sukarnoputri was very supportive of the United States during her recent

visit to Washington (pre-October 7).

Responses to military action: However,

Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan

Wirayuda expressed “deep concern” on

October 8 about the danger to innocents in

the ongoing military operations. He said

that Indonesia neither supports nor opposes

the military strikes against Afghanistan.

Both before and after October 7, radical

Islamic groups active in the country

threatened to strike at U.S. targets in

Indonesia. Since October 7, the rhetoric has

become increasingly vociferous, and

protests have multiplied. Large

demonstrations and fears of violence

prompted the U.S. Embassy to take the

precaution of closing for several days and

authorizing the departure of nonessential

personnel and dependents. Although some

protests have been violent, many others

have been peaceful and, to my knowledge,

no U.S. citizens have been injured so far.

What we can expect in the future: There

is likely to be continued and even growing

Muslim radicalism with a strong anti-U.S.

flavor whether military action continues or

not. Given the economic problems that will

continue to plague the country, Indonesia

will remain fertile ground for Islamic

extremist groups who share bin Laden’s

views. Some of these groups have been (and

continue to be?) funded by al Qaeda, or

trained by the Taliban. In recent years,

hundreds of young Indonesian Muslims

have attended Islamic schools in Pakistan.

Policy recommendations: The Indonesian government is in an extremely delicate

situation. Washington should not press

Jakarta for strong public statements of

support or any form of military assistance

since it will place President Megawati in an

even more precarious position. The United

States should be satisfied with moderate

expressions of support or no condemnation

of the war on terrorism. DoD personnel

should keep a very low profile in Indonesia

for the foreseeable future.

Malaysia.

Response so far: The United States has

received solid support for counterterrorist

efforts from this predominantly Muslim

state. The Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed

Hamid Albar on October 6 stated that the

99
United States was “justified in its action to

wipe out this [terrorist] menace.”

Responses to military action: The

government of Prime Minister Mahathir

Mohamad has issued sternly worded statements condemning terrorism and cracked

down on his country’s major opposition

party, the Pan Malaysia Islamic Party

(PAS). PAS leaders have been vehemently

anti-United States.

What we can expect in the future:

Mahathir will continue to exploit the

international situation in order to

strengthen his domestic political position. A

moderate Muslim state, Malaysia is a key

member of the 56-member Organization of

the Islamic Conference (OIC) that met in

Qatar on October 10. Significantly, the OIC

issued a public statement that did NOT

condemn U.S. attacks on Afghanistan.

However, the OIC did express concern over

the “deaths of innocent civilians.”

Policy recommendations: Malaysia can

be a pivotal actor in the coalition against

terrorism because it is a moderate Muslim

state. Malaysian participation or contributions to humanitarian relief efforts in

Afghanistan would send a powerful

message that the war is not a war on Islam.

North Korea.

Response so far: Pyongyang has offered a

relatively muted response and termed the

events of September 11 “regrettable and

tragic.” The United States may ask North

Korea for intelligence on terrorism.

Responses to military action: However,

the Korean Central News Agency issued a

October 9 statement warning the United

States against embarking on a “vicious cycle

of terrorism and retaliation.”

What we can expect in the future:

Criticism is quite likely if military

operations continue, even if they are limited

in scope. There could even be heightened

bellicose language warning that the United

States is pursuing a policy of worldwide

aggression that might herald imminent

action on the Korean Peninsula. However, it

is possible that Pyongyang could see the

war as an opportunity to improve ties with

the United States and continue its

moderate and quite muted response.

Policy recommendations: At a minimum,

Washington should work closely with Seoul

to ensure that the United States and ROK

present a strong united front that continues

to deter North Korea. If Pyongyang

continues to offer a moderate and relatively

conciliatory response to the war,

Washington could outline to North Korea

the steps by which it could get itself off the

list of terrorist states.

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The United States cannot defeat global

terrorism without support from its friends

and allies. Europe plays center stage in the

counterterrorism campaign. A disinterested

Europe can only assist terrorism. As an

active U.S. ally, Europe can provide

resources, expertise, and access to terrorist

citadels, while at the same time

strangulating the terrorist cells thriving on

its soil. Not surprisingly, the United

Kingdom provided immediate, unwavering

support for Operation ENDURING

FREEDOM and requires no further

edification. Continental Europe is a

different matter altogether. Europe’s

political will and military capabilities can

be problematic. The United States must not

only understand and allay Europe’s fears,

but also come to terms with its limited

military capabilities. The United States

needs to awaken Europe’s incredible

potential and shape European security for

the new millennium.

European Perspective.

The September 11 terrorist attack on the

United States outraged Europeans, but not

in the same manner as it did Americans.

Although currently united in principal with

the United States to defeat the al Qaeda

terrorist network, political will and

consensus are likely to wane as Operation

ENDURING FREEDOM protracts. This

paradox is best explained by seeing how

Europeans view terrorism.

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in

Europe. In fact, it is interwoven in the

tapestry of its modern history. The terrorist

activities of the Serbian Black Hand against

the Austro-Hungarian Empire in BosniaHerzegovina, culminating in the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand, were the

catalyst to World War I. In the interwar

period, terrorism was rampant in Germany,

Russia, and France as various groups vied

for power. The terror bombings during

World War II reduced the major cities of

Europe to rubble. The Cold War spawned a

host of terrorist organizations that seemed

to vie with each other for sanguinary

publicity. If Europeans are not inured by

terrorism, they certainly are numbed by

and fearful of it.

Of all the instruments of power to be

employed in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, a prominent military option is likely

to be the most contentious with Europeans.

The arguments against the use of military

force would expound the following themes:

terrorism does not threaten the survival of

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TWENTY ONE

Terrorism: Sounding Roland’s Horn across the Atlantic

Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Millen

Conclusions:

• Continue an active information campaign in Europe to sustain the

anti-terrorism coalition.

• Make the Middle East peace process a transatlantic initiative with a major role

for Europe.

• Contribute an IBCT to the Eurocorps.

• Sell or lease C-17 and RO/RO ships to the EU.

• Contribute to the maturation of the Eurocorps.
the state—the military is the wrong

instrument of power; Operation ENDURING FREEDOM appears to be an

open-ended obligation—fear of military

adventurism; a military conflict will result

in collateral damage—alienation of

indigenous populations and added impetus

to the terrorist movements; the conflict

could easily escalate into a full-fledged war;

a long-term war would have severe

economic consequences; and because of its

geographic proximity to the Middle East

and Magreb, Europe is particularly

vulnerable to terrorist retaliation from the

Muslim community. Although Europeans

are not likely to condemn covert operations

and discrete military strikes, they do see

law enforcement as the primary means of

fighting this conflict.

As a backdrop to these fears, many

European commentators enjoy counseling

against rash action. The common theme is

that terrorism is a symptom of poverty,

imperialism, great power arrogance, disenfranchised citizenry, and so on—each a

possible root to the conflict. Extending their

argument, they offer a reasoned approach to

resolving the conflict—pacifism, appeasement, international laissez-faire, and

modus vivendi. Even though the extent of

their influence is not known, such talk does

reach a sympathetic ear with Europeans. As

the United States learned during the

Kosovo conflict, consensus is not a strong

suit with Europeans. Given the nebulous

nature of a counterterrorism campaign,

European consensus regarding tactics,

strategy, and objectives is equally not

likely.

Fortunately, the U.S. initial approach

has impressed the Europeans. One of the

greatest concerns following the wake of the

terrorist attacks was that the United States

would use a “cowboy” approach—shooting

first and asking questions later. To the

European Union’s relief, the U.S. measured

approach and decision to build a

counterterrorism coalition have allayed

fears and muted criticism. But the United

States must go further.

In order to maintain solidarity and

consensus with Europe, the United States

needs to conduct an active information

campaign in Europe. Ambassadors, defense

attachés, and TRADOC senior liaison

officers must present the U.S. rationale

with public statements and articles

regarding the campaign strategy. The U.S.

State Depart- ment should encourage

American commen- tators to appear on

European talk shows and news programs.

These actions would present the American

perspective without the European editorial

filter. The problems associated with

misstatements and contradictory assertions

are small in comparison to the biases that

permeate the European media. Without

continued dialogue, Europe will lose focus

and assume a disinterested posture as the

conflict extends over the months and years.

Military Capabilities.

Even if the European allies maintain

solidarity, their military capabilities are

currently insufficient to meet the demands

of the imminent conflict. In pursuit of the

post-Cold War peace dividend, every

European state downsized its armed forces

with insufficient, concomitant reforms.

Moreover, they made virtually no

investments in defense modernization. The

armed forces may be smaller, but their

divisions are still heavy. With little air- and

sealift capabilities, European power

projection is still confined to road and rail.

These military discrepancies became

woefully apparent during the Kosovo

Campaign in 1999, particularly in the realm

of avionics, electronic warfare, precision

munitions, and C4SIR. NATO’s resultant

Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), which

provides a roadmap for correcting the

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deficiencies, is a slow, expensive process—

something none of the European states

seems willing to shoulder.

The conflict will not have a negative

impact on NATO enlargement. The

campaign against global terrorism has had

a unifying effect and is likely to accelerate

the desire to increase membership among

NATO members and candidates. In times of

regional instability, states seek greater

security. The danger lies in accelerating the

process beyond NATO’s capability to

assimilate new partners. NATO should

resist this temptation and continue with its

thoughtful, measured approach to

enlargement.

Despite European proclamations of the

Eurocorps being ready by 2003, a more

realistic appraisal is 2010. Lack of funding

is the main but not the only culprit. Actual

troop contributions are below the minimum

requirements, the provisional corps headquarters appears mired in nascency, corps

combat service support is nonexistent, and

the issue of consensus, which has haunted

every European defense initiative in the

past, is not likely to be resolved any time

soon. Furthermore, sufficient strategic airand sealift capabilities are unlikely to be

realized by the end of the decade.

One bright light does shine, however.

European Special Operating Forces (SOF)

appear to be the most appealing and readily

available for employment. Thus far, only

the United Kingdom has deployed its

Special Air Service (SAS) into Afghanistan

along with U.S. forces. Germany is hotly

debating whether to authorize the

deployment of its Division for Special

Operations, composed of a Special Forces

Detachment (KSK) and two airborne

brigades. The KSK currently numbers 400

out of an authorized strength of 1,000, and

the airborne brigades comprise approximately 6,000 paratroopers. The airborne

brigades also have K9 platoons for tracking

humans as well as sniffing out explosives

and mines. France also has a robust SOF

capability and, unlike Germany, has plenty

of experience. Additionally, several other

European countries have SOF, although not

as large. In aggregate, Europe possesses a

significant SOF capability and, because of

its covert nature, the various European

countries are likely to contribute these

forces with alacrity upon a U.S. request.

Not to be overlooked, Germany, France,

Austria, and Italy possess mountain

brigades, which can provide enormous

assistance in mountain warfare. These

brigades are actually the elite forces of their

respective ground forces and would be

indispensable to any mountain operation.

At the very least, their alpine specialists

could be attached to the SOF as technical

and tactical experts.

Given the penurious military budgets,

European militaries are not likely to

improve in the near term. The United

States can expect financial, infrastructure,

combat service support, and discrete

personnel participation without

reservations, but, given the European

propensity to muddy the waters of

consensus, it would be more beneficial to the

coalition initially to request specific

capabilities (SOF, mountain experts, naval,

and airpower) under U.S. operational

control, rather than a blanket commitment

of forces as authorized under NATO’s

Article 5.

Energizing Europe’s Potential.

The United States can recommend a

number of initiatives, which would allow

Europeans to take an active part in the

counterterrorism campaign. European

versions of the television show, America’s

Most Wanted, would greatly assist governments in identifying and capturing wanted

terrorists; HUMINT is still the most

powerful resource for intelligence.

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Government subsidies will ensure that

these shows remain on the air. In this

manner, Europe can flush out the terrorist

nests and organized crime.

A few European countries have lax drug

enforcement laws. Since drugs (especially

heroin) are a major source of revenue for

terrorist organizations, an anti-drug

campaign must address this link. Suggested

themes are: “Drug money lines the pockets

of terrorists,” “For terrorists, needles have

two shots—one in the arm and one in the

back,” and “A moment of pleasure can bring

a lifetime of grief—don’t give terrorists a

chance.” Such efforts have a patriotic

appeal and should curtail drug sales.

As an enduring incentive to deprive

terrorists of funds, European countries

should take the money from frozen terrorist

financial accounts and apply it to their own

counter-terrorist initiatives, funding the

coalition, or compensation for the destruction wrought by terrorists. Terrorists and

their financial supporters can pay by more

than one means for their crimes against

humanity.

The time is ripe for an integrated

European Intelligence Agency, perhaps

under the aegis of Europol. Such an

initiative would greatly enhance intelligence sharing, coordination of assets and

effort, and greater powers to apprehend

terrorists and organized crime. Such an

agency may be harder to establish than an

American would think. Given the recent

history of secret police (KGB, Gestapo,

Stasi), Europeans will be very wary of any

organization with overarching powers. In

any case, it is time to debate the issue.

In a related issue, greater cohesion is

needed among law enforcement agencies. In

order to defeat the terrorist network, close

cooperation and sharing of information

among allies are crucial. Because of the

various legal systems involved, domestic

law enforcement agencies have greater or

lesser access to information. Information or

evidence shared from some allied agencies

can assist domestic agencies gather

probable cause against criminal/terrorist

elements operating in their countries. Few

law enforcement agencies like to share

information; the State Department will

need to initiate the process in order for it to

gain momentum.

European countries have considerable

access to and influence with their former

colonies. In fact, their relations are more

cooperative than adversarial. The United

States should allow these European

countries to supplement its efforts with

regional consensus building, intelligence

gathering, and diplomacy. Every actor in

the Middle East believes that the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict must be resolved

before progress against terrorism can be

made. Given their connections, Europeans

are better placed to take the lead in the

Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The

United States need not abandon the peace

process, but it should make it a transatlantic initiative.

It is never too early to secure agreements

for use of rail, air bases, sea ports, facilities

(medical, fuel storage, warehouses, and so

on), and over-flights from all relevant

NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP)

members. Such arrangements provide

greater flexibility as shifts in priorities and

use of force change during the campaign.

Land access to future theaters of conflict

will allow NATO and PfP nations to

participate by deploying heavy units by rail.

Lastly, access agreements are easier to

secure in the aftermath of the terrorist

attacks than later in the conflict.

Shaping the European Security and

Defense Policy.

The European Security and Defense

Policy may be moribund, at least as a

separate entity from NATO. The current

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conflict exemplifies the reality of the

Alliance—that no conflict or crisis should be

handled unilaterally. Success in modern

conflicts requires consensus building, unity

of effort, and unity of command. A

contingency does not necessarily need the

active participation of every member of the

Alliance, but it should require the

involvement of each member in some

capacity.

The United States needs to take a

greater role in shaping Europe’s defense

capabilities. Conceptually, the Eurocorps

has the greatest potential to contribute to

this type of conflict, but without U.S.

leadership, it is doomed to remain a paper

tiger. America is very good at establishing

consensus and building coalitions. In a

practical sense, the creation of the

Eurocorps is a permanent coalition.

First, NATO must secure national

contributions for the corps headquarters,

the combat service support units, and the

ground forces, as well as the air and naval

squadrons. Due to their unique character,

multinational divisions allow both large

and small countries to contribute forces

within their means, ranging in size of a

specialized company to a brigade. America’s

contribution to the ground forces could be

an Interim Brigade Combat Team. The

Eurocorps should be open to NATO, EU,

and PfP countries, but upon alert, must fall

under NATO’s command authority.

Contributing nations would have the option

of not deploying their Eurocorps-designated

units if it is not in their interest. The depth

of the Eurocorps would not suffer from the

nonparticipation of a few.

Second, in order to fill the air- and sealift

vacuum, the United States could sell or

lease C-17 transports and RO/RO ships to

the European Union until its own

production capabilities bear fruit. This

phase-in/phase-out approach assures that

the Eurocorps establishes a power

projection capability within a short time.

Third, the Eurocorps allows the

contribut- ing countries to focus resources

in order to fulfill the DCI. As the Eurocorps

is to be a modern force, NATO must attain

consensus on standardization of equipment.

Either this initiative can be accomplished

by a consortium and/or by national

contracts. In this manner, newer members

with current, obsolete equipment can buy or

lease equipment without shouldering an

enormous financial burden. This approach

enhances interoperability and keeps

combat service support at manageable

levels.

Fourth, NATO establishes a train-up

and certification timeline in order to

establish milestones for progress. By

instituting a train-to-standard attitude and

a sequential collective training schedule,

the Eurocorps can be operational within 2-3

years of its establishment.

Lastly, the mission of the Eurocorps does

not need to deviate from the Petersberg

Tasks. All the tasks contribute to the

ultimate objectives of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. The basic organization of

the Eurocorps is sound, and the proposed

5,000-man police force is a superb idea and

helps bridge the capabilities gap between

military and law enforcement. The

Eurocorps can be rounded out with a

Special Forces detachment that can deploy

into a crisis region weeks or months in

advance of the Eurocorps. The inclusion of a

Special Forces group with each member

contributing its own forces would greatly

enhance the capabilities of the Eurocorps.

The New Vision.

If the United States is the global

policeman, then Europe surely should be its

deputy. The United States must awaken

Europe to the insidious dangers of terrorism

by changing how it views terrorism and

105
infusing it with the resolve to take action.

Although its military means are currently

limited, Europe does have specific forces

which can make an important, immediate

contribution. Lastly, the Eurocorps has the

potential to allow Europe to assume a

greater security role in the world without

shouldering heavy military expenditures.

The Islamic terrorists thought they would

cow and divide the world, instead they have

revitalized the transatlantic link.

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About the Authors

DR. STEPHEN D. BIDDLE joined the Strategic Studies Institute in June 2001. He has

taught at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and has held research positions at

the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) in Alexandria, Virginia; the Harvard University

Center for Science and International Affairs (CSIA); and the Kennedy School of

Government’s Office of National Security Programs. Dr. Biddle has presented testimony

before congressional committees on matters of conventional net assessment and arms

control, served as U.S. Representative to the NATO Defense Research Group Panel 7 study

on Stable Defense, and is a member of the directing faculty for the Columbia University

Summer Workshop on the Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy (SWAMOS). His

research has won Barchi, Rist, and Impact Prizes from the Military Operations Research

Society; most recently, his paper “Why Skill Matters in Combat Outcomes—and How to

Include It in Combat Modeling,” won the Society’s 2000 Rist Prize. He holds AB (1981), MPP

(1985), and Ph.D. (Public Policy, 1992) degrees, all from Harvard University. Dr. Biddle’s

publications include articles in International Security, Survival, The Journal of Politics,

Security Studies, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Contemporary Security Policy, Defense

Analysis, and Military Operations Research; shorter pieces on military topics in The Wall

Street Journal, Joint Force Quarterly, Orbis, and Defense News; various chapters in edited

volumes; and 24 IDA and NATO reports.

DR. STEPHEN J. BLANK has served as the Strategic Studies Institute’s expert on the

Soviet bloc and the post-Soviet world since 1989. Prior to that he was Associate Professor of

Soviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, Maxwell

AFB, Alabama, and taught at the University of Texas, San Antonio, and the University of

California, Riverside. Dr. Blank is the editor of Imperial Decline: Russia’s Changing Position

in Asia, coeditor of Soviet Military and the Future, and author of The Sorcerer as Apprentice:

Stalin’s Commissariat of Nationalities, 1917-1924. He has also written many articles and

conference papers on Russian, Commonwealth of Independent States, and Eastern

European security issues. Dr. Blank’s current research deals with proliferation and the

revolution in military affairs, and energy and security in Eurasia. He holds a B.A. in History

from the University of Pennsylvania, and an M.A. and Ph.D. in History from the University

of Chicago.

DR. MARTIN L. COOK has been a Professor of Ethics in the Department of Command,

Leadership and Management at the U.S. Army War College since 1998. He previously

taught ethics and religion at the U.S. Air Force Academy, Santa Clara University, and the

College of William and Mary. Dr. Cook received a bachelor’s degree in Philosophy from the

University of Illinois in 1974 and a master’s degree in Religious Studies from the University

of Chicago in 1975. He obtained his doctorate in Philosophical Theology and Ethics from the

University of Chicago in 1981.

DR. CONRAD C. CRANE joined the Strategic Studies Institute in September 2000 after 26

years of military service that concluded with 9 years as Professor of History at the U.S.

107
Military Academy. He has written or edited books on the Civil War, World War I, World War

II, and Korea, and published articles on military issues in such journals as The Journal of

Strategic Studies, The Journal of Military History, The Historian, and Aerospace Historian,

as well as in a number of collections and reference books. He holds a B.S. from the U.S.

Military Academy along with an M.A. and Ph.D. from Stanford University. He is also a

graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army War

College.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ANTULIO J. ECHEVARRIA II currently is assigned as the

Director of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute. He graduated from

the U.S. Military Academy in 1981, was commissioned as an armor officer, and has held a

variety of command and staff assignments in Germany and Continental United States; he

has also served as an Assistant Professor of European History at the U.S. Military Academy;

Squadron S3 of 3/16 Cavalry; Chief of BN/TF and Bde Doctrine at the U.S. Army Armor

Center at Fort Knox; as an action officer at the Army After Next project at HQ TRADOC, Ft.

Monroe, VA; and as a speechwriter for the U.S. Army Chief of Staff. He is a graduate of the

U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College, and holds M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in

History from Princeton University. Lieutenant Colonel Echevarria is the author of After

Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers before the Great War, published by the University

Press of Kansas (2001). He also has published articles in a number of scholarly and

professional journals to include the Journal of Military History, War in History, War &

Society, the Journal of Strategic Studies, Parameters, Joint Force Quarterly, Military

Review, and Airpower Journal.

DR. SAMI G. HAJJAR was born in Beirut, Lebanon. He taught a variety of courses including

American Government, Middle East Politics, and Islamic Political Theory at the University

of Wyoming as Professor of Political Science from 1966-87. While at Wyoming, he was

assigned for 2 years to the Governor’s Office and worked on international trade promotion for

the State of Wyoming. In 1987 Dr. Hajjar joined the U.S. Information Agency and was

assigned first to Riyadh as Cultural Affairs Officer and in 1990 to Abu Dhabi as Public

Affairs Officer, before returning to Washington in 1992 as Gulf Desk Officer. In 1993 he

resigned the Foreign Service to become consultant to the Emirates Center for Strategic

Studies in Abu Dhabi. In September 1994, he joined the U.S. Army War College as Professor

and Director of Middle East Studies. Dr. Hajjar received a B.A. and M.A. in Public

Administration from the American University of Beirut and a Ph.D. in Political Science from

the University of Missouri-Columbia in 1969. He is the author of more than 30 professional

articles in public administration, political science, and Middle East studies.

DR. DOUGLAS V. JOHNSON II has been with the Strategic Studies Institute since 1985,

first as Strategic Research Analyst and then as Research Professor of National Security

Affairs. His 30 years of service in the U.S. Army included two combat tours, a variety of troop

and staff assignments, and instructor duty at the U.S. Military Academy and the School of

Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth. Dr. Johnson’s current research addresses

Army transformation. He is co-author of Soissons, 1918 (Texas A&M University Press). He

holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy, an M.A. in History from the University of

Michigan, and a Ph.D. in History from Temple University. He is also a graduate of the U.S.

108
Army Command and General Staff College and holds a diploma from the U.S. Army War

College.

COLONEL JOHN R. MARTIN became Deputy Director of the Strategic Studies Institute

and Chairman of the Art of War Department in August 2000. He has served extensively in

the Republic of Korea, where he commanded an Aviation Company and Battalion. His

experience there also includes service with the United Nations Command Military Armistice

Commission and as Commander of a liaison team with the Korean Army. Colonel Martin

possesses considerable experience on the Army Staff, having served as a Division Chief with

both ODCSOPS and ODCSPER, where he assisted in development of the Army’s force

structure and programmed manning of that force structure. He served previously with

ODCSOPS as the Systems Integrator for the RAH-66 Comanche and as Director of the

Washington office of the Defense Language Institute. Just prior to coming to the Strategic

Studies Institute, Colonel Martin was deployed operationally to the Balkans for a year,

serving sequentially as Chief of Staff of Task Force Falcon in Kosovo and as Executive

Assistant to the Commander of the Stabilization Force in Bosnia. A previous operational

tour in 1975 took him to Guam to assist Vietnamese refugees. Colonel Martin graduated

with highest distinction from the College of Naval Command and Staff at the Naval War

College, Newport, RI. He is also a 1996 graduate of the National War College and holds

masters’ degrees in National Security Affairs from both institutions. Colonel Martin also

holds a master’s degree in Aeronautical Engineering from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate

School and is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Test Pilot School at Patuxent River, MD. He is a

1974 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy.

AMBASSADOR MARSHALL F. MCCALLIE is Deputy Commandant for International

Affairs at the U.S. Army War College. Previously he served as the Special Coordinator for the

African Crisis Response Initiative. He also served as Diplomat in Residence at the Ralph J.

Bunche International Affairs Center at Howard University in Washington, DC. Ambassador

McCallie has served most of his career in Africa. He completed a 3-year tour as U.S.

Ambassador to Namibia from July 1993 to July 1996. Prior to that time, he served as Deputy

Chief of Mission at the American Embassy in South Africa and at the American Embassy in

Zambia. During his 27-year career with the U.S. Foreign Service, he has also served as

Political Officer in Zaire, Economic Officer in the United Arab Emirates, Political Counselor

in Liberia, and Country Desk Offier for Nigeria in the State Department. Ambassador

McCallie earned a B.A. in History from Vanderbilt University, and received an M.A. and

M.A.L.D. in Development Studies from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

DR. STEVEN METZ is Director of Research at the Strategic Studies Institute and Chairman

of the Regional Strategy and Planning Department. He has been with SSI since 1993,

previously serving as Research Professor of National Security Affairs and the Henry L.

Stimson Professor of Military Studies. Dr. Metz has also been on the faculty of the Air War

College, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and several universities. He

has served as an advisor to U.S. political organizations, campaigns and commissions;

testified in the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives; and spoken on military and

security issues around the world. He is author of more than 80 articles, essays, and book

chapters on such topics as world politics, national security policy, and military strategy. Dr.

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Metz’s research has taken him to 25 countries. He is currently examining the changing

nature of military strategy and the U.S. security relationship with Pakistan. Dr. Metz holds

a B.A. in Philosophy and a M.A. in International Studies from the University of South

Carolina, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Johns Hopkins University.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL RAYMOND A. MILLEN is currently assigned as the Director of

European Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute. He graduated from the U.S.

Military Academy in 1982, was commissioned as an infantry officer, and has held a variety of

command and staff assignments in Germany and Continental United States; he has also

served as the U.S. Army Infantry School Liaison Officer to the German Infantry School at

Hammelburg, Germany; Battalion Executive Officer, 3-502d Infantry, Fort Campbell,

Kentucky; and Chief of Intelligence Section and Balkans Team Chief, Survey Section,

SHAPE, Belgium. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

and holds an M.A. degree in National Security Studies from Georgetown University. He is a

Foreign Area Officer for Western Europe. He has published articles in a number of scholarly

and professional journals to include Infantry Magazine and Military Review. His book,

Command Legacy, will be published by Brasseys in the Fall/Winter of 2001.

COLONEL DALLAS D. OWENS became the U.S. Army Reserve Adviser to the Strategic

Studies Institute in July 2000. His recent assignments include Mobilization Branch Chief,

DCSOPS Army Operations Center; and Transportation Action Officer, Mobility Division,

Logistics Directorate (J4), Joint Staff. He holds Sociology degrees from the University of

North Carolina (B.A.), Utah State University (M.S.), and the University of Tennessee

(Ph.D.), and has served on the faculty of Clemson University, North Carolina State

University, University of Virginia, and University of Colorado. His military education

includes Infantry OCS and Basic Course, Transportation Basic Course, Quartermaster

Advance Course, CAS3, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the National

Security Fellowship at Harvard University. Colonel Owens served as a Port Operator with a

Transportation Terminal Unit during Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and

as an Infantryman in Vietnam.

DR. GORDON RUDD attended Virginia Tech, where he was commissioned through ROTC.

He served in the U.S. Army for 23 years in Infantry and Special Forces units. He also served

as a Joint Staff Officer and as a Middle East Foreign Area Officer, serving a total of 9 years

overseas, including tours with the United Nations and NATO. He attended graduate school

at Duke University—subsequently earning his doctorate in history—and taught military

and Middle East history at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Upon retirement from

the Army, he joined the faculty of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, then moved

to the Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting, where he has served since 1998.

DR. ANDREW SCOBELL joined the Strategic Studies Institute in August 1999 and is SSI’s

expert on Asia. He taught at the University of Louisville, Kentucky, and Rutgers University,

New Jersey. Since 1988 Dr. Scobell has published articles in such journals as Armed Forces

and Society, Asian Survey, China Quarterly, Comparative Politics, Journal of Political and

Military Sociology, and Political Science Quarterly. Recent articles have focused on

China-Taiwan relations and Chinese military modernization. Dr. Scobell holds a B.A. in

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History from Whitman College, an M.A. in International Studies from the University of

Washington, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University.

DR. MARYBETH PETERSON ULRICH is Professor of Government in the Department of

National Security and Strategy at the U.S. Army War College. She has also taught at the

United States Air Force Academy and at the Naval Postgraduate School. Dr. Ulrich received

her Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Illinois and a B.S. from the United

States Air Force Academy. She has written extensively in the field of strategic studies with a

special emphasis on civil-military relations and national security democratization issues in

postcommunist Europe. Among her publications is a book, Democratizing Communist

Militaries: The Cases of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces, (1999) and numerous book

chapters and articles. Dr. Ulrich is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

DR. LEONARD WONG joined the Strategic Studies Institute in June 2000 after serving 20

years in the U.S. Army. His time in the Army included teaching leadership at the U.S.

Military Academy, serving as an analyst in the Program Analysis and Evaluation

Directorate and later in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, and serving as

the Director of the Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis. He has authored several

articles, chapters, and papers on organizational issues in the Army such as downsizing,

leadership, and junior officer retention. He is a registered Professional Engineer and holds a

B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy, and an M.S.B.A. and Ph.D. from Texas Tech

University.

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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Volume Editor

Colonel John R. Martin

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Ms. Kimberly A. Rockwell