i

CENTRAL ASIA: A NEW GREAT GAME?

Dianne L. Smith

June 17, 1996
ii

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and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

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monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for electronic

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iii

FOREWORD

In January 1996, the U.S. Army War College's Strategic

Studies Institute (SSI) and the Center for Strategic and

International Studies (CSIS) hosted a conference on "Asian

Security to the Year 2000." One focus of the conferees was the

growing relevance of events in Central Asia.

Perhaps nowhere on the continent was the Cold War

transformation in the security environment more dramatic than in

Central Asia. There the sudden retraction of Soviet power and

decline in superpower competition was rapidly followed by the

creation of new states, whose prospects for legitimacy,

development, and independent survival were, at best, uncertain.

The half-decade that has followed the dissolution of the

Soviet Union has not been sufficient time for any of the vast

challenges facing Central Asia to have been addressed

definitively. Nor can we be confident that a stable regional

"system" has coalesced. Yet, the past 5 years have produced an

emerging pattern of relations amenable to tentative analysis.

That is the task Lieutenant Colonel Dianne Smith of SSI

undertook for the Asian Security conference. In this monograph,

she details the complex problems facing the region and then turns

her attention to Central Asia's evolving security structure. By

involving the "Great Game" analogy, she takes the perspective

that, for this part of the continent, it is the nations

surrounding the region that will play the primary role in shaping

its future (although the new Central Asian nations are

participants, not pawns, in this struggle for influence).

Colonel Smith's analysis focuses on the interests and

actions of five of those surrounding nations: Iran, Pakistan,

India, Russia, and China. Each has significant interests in

Central Asia, and each, thus far, has tempered, to some degree,

its actions to advance those interests in recognition of the

competing objectives of the others. For the United States, a

power vacuum in Central Asia seems a remote concern at first

blush. Colonel Smith's review makes clear, however, that the

paramount American stake lies in helping to ensure that Central

Asia does not become a "game gone bad" that draws the great Asian

powers into conflict. Her survey concludes with policy

recommendations toward that end.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DIANNE L. SMITH joined the Strategic Studies

Institute in August 1995. Prior to that she was Team Chief for

Central Asia, National Military Intelligence Collection Center,

Defense Intelligence Agency. A Military Intelligence officer and

Russian Foreign Area Officer, her previous assignments include

U.S. Army Exchange Officer to the United Kingdom Defense

Intelligence and Security School, Ashford, Kent, United Kingdom;

Chief of Strategic Intelligence Branch, Intelligence Division,

Allied Forces Central Europe, Brunssum, Netherlands;

Counterintelligence Officer, Combined Field Army (ROK-US),

Uijongbu, Korea; and Assistant Professor of Russian History at

the U.S. Military Academy. Her recent works include "Muscovite

Logistics, 1475-1598" and "From Chattanooga to Durham Station,

the Influence of Logistics Upon Sherman's Strategy." She holds a

B.A. in history and international relations from the University

of Nebraska and an M.A. and Ph.D. in Russian history from the

University of California at Davis. She is a graduate of the U.S.

Army Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army War

College.
v

SUMMARY

A new "Great Game" is being played out in Central Asia, one

in which powers on the periphery compete for influence, but also

one in which the Central Asian states themselves are active

players. Their own struggle for power can influence immediate

neighbors Russia, China, and Iran, and even beyond into the

Indian subcontinent.

Serious political, economic, ethnic, religious, and social

challenges confront the five Central Asian states. How each state

is able to resolve these problems will determine its ability to

emerge as a viable force in the regional struggle for influence.

Instability might seem to provide opportunities for states

such as Iran or China, but the risks that such instability would

ricochet back on them are too great. Thus, Iran, Pakistan, India,

Russia, and China each seek, in their own way, to promote

stability within Central Asia while expanding their own regional

influence.

Threats to Central Asia.

The greatest threats to Central Asia are internal. The

painstaking process of nation building, the legitimacy crisis,

rapid social and economic transformation, environmental

degradation, decolonization, ethnic diversity, and border

disputes are among the sources of instability. The core issues

are the ethnic composition of each state and the ability of each

republic to mold a "nation" within the artificial boundaries

inherited from the Soviet empire. Democracy has been sacrificed

at the altar of stability in all five republics. The continuing

civil war in Tajikistan remains the most crucial inter-regional

security threat, while the civil war in Afghanistan remains the

most immediate extra-regional threat.

Iran.

Iran has vital interests in the maintenance of peace and

stability within the region, but its international isolation and

pariah status prevent direct action in support of its genuine

security concerns. As a contiguous state with shared ethnic

minorities, Iran has the most to lose if domestic instability

should cause the implosion of Central Asia, but it also has the

least ability to shape events.

Pakistan.

Pakistan's security policy, long dominated by a fear of

India and the search for a superpower patron to counter that
vi

threat, now must confront threatened spillover from civil wars in

Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Islamabad's hopes that the new states

of Central Asia would provide it with strategic depth, Islamic

allies, and collective security partners in its struggle with

India have been dashed. Geographical constraints and concerted

efforts by non-Islamic neighbors, especially Russia and China,

have stymied her efforts to become a major player in Central

Asia. But, through bilateral ties and agencies such as the

Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), Pakistan can still

provide technical and economic assistance to the Central Asian

states' efforts to resolve the issues threatening their domestic

stability.

India.

The breakup of the Soviet Union and the loss of its

superpower patron have created serious security concerns for

India. India fears that Central Asian border realignment, ethnic

disputes, and resurgent Islam or civil war would directly affect

the territorial integrity of Afghanistan, which, in domino

effect, would influence Pakistan, Iran, and Kashmir. To promote

stability in Central Asia, India has focused its efforts on

bilateral technical assistance and economic programs, building

upon existing links dating back to the Soviet era. The fact that

India does not border Central Asia (Pakistan and Afghanistan lie

between) has hampered development, as has a shortage of

investment capital. India must rely on a non-Islamic proxy,

Russia or China, to provide regional security.

Russia.

 Having earlier dismissed Central Asia as a burden gotten

rid of, Moscow then sought to bring Central Asia, if not back

into the empire, then, at the very least, back into the fold.

Russia seeks to prevent other states from achieving regional

hegemony, protect and expand its own economic interests, protect

ethnic Russians living in the region, and stop the spread of

Islamic fundamentalism. The region remains militarily tied to

Russia through the Commonwealth of Independent States and the

1992 Tashkent Treaty, which created a formal collective security

agreement. Russia supplies around 25,000 peacekeeping forces in

Tajikistan and provides border troops along the CIS' external

borders. More recently Moscow has pushed harder for closer

economic and political integration and a greater share of the

profit from developing energy deals. The Central Asian states are

landlocked; almost all transportation and pipeline routes abroad

must pass through Russia. But, Russia is hampered by a lack of

funds to execute many of the bilateral agreements signed, and

calls by ultra-nationalists for a return to the Soviet Union

cause fear in Central Asia and drive the republics to seek
vii

alternatives to renewed Russian hegemony.

China.

China's security position in Asia has improved with the fall

of its superpower rival, the Soviet Union, but the advent of five

unstable, nominally-Islamic neighbors, the war in Tajikistan, and

growing unrest in the Fergana valley (which leads into China's

ethnically Muslim province, Xinjiang) all support a nightmare

scenario in which unrest in Central Asia spills over into China.

Yet, China also hopes to use Central Asian markets as a catalyst

to fuel a new prosperity zone in Xinjiang, revive the Silk Route

for international trade, and gain access to Central Asian energy

resources.

Implications for U.S. Policy.

America has no vital interests in, nor will it assume

responsibility for, Central Asia's security. The primary focus

will be damage control--to prevent existing problems from

escalating into crises that might engage the other Asian powers.

This is best achieved through development of free market

democracies in Central Asia, for economic dislocation breeds

ethnic, religious, and political extremism. A strong, vibrant

economy is a prerequisite for political stability.
1

CENTRAL ASIA: A NEW GREAT GAME?

This new "great game" in the heart of Asia is unfolding

not so much among the old colonial powers as among

their former minions, many of whom are themselves just

emerging from colonial domination and seeking to define

their roles in their regions and the world.1

--Boris Rumer

Introduction.

Is there a new "Great Game" being played out in Central

Asia? Boris Rumer argues that the successor states to the Russian

and British empires have renewed the struggle for hegemony in the

center of the Asian continent. As the world shifts from a

bipolar to a multipolar focus, the nations of Asia search for new

trans-regional security arrangements. More specifically, the

breakup of the Soviet Union and the creation of five Central

Asian republics2

 (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan,

Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan), have complicated the security

relations of the Asian states. (See Figure 1.) But, this new

struggle is not a repeat of the 19th century "Great Game," by

which the Central Asian states are but pawns of great powers as

they jockey for power and position. Instead, the Central Asian

states themselves are active players in this struggle for power,

in a unique geo-strategic position to influence immediate

neighbors Russia, China, and Iran, and even beyond into the

Indian subcontinent. Once considered a backwater of little

importance during the Soviet era, Central Asia could play a

pivotal role in Asian politics in the next decade.

Enlargement and Engagement set domestic political stability,

regional peace, and the maturation of market economies in the

five Central Asian states as policy goals of the United States.

The key to Asian, especially Central Asian, regional security is

economic. A strong, vibrant market economy is a prerequisite for

political stability and the growth of democracy. Political

stability, however, is itself a key element to economic

development; peace in the region, especially in Tajikistan,

Afghanistan, and Kashmir, must be gained before that economic

takeoff can occur.

Serious political, economic, ethnic, religious, and social

challenges confront the five new Central Asian states in this

quest for regional security. How each state is able to confront

and resolve these problems will determine its ability to emerge
2

as a viable force in this struggle for influence, in this new
3

"Great Game." Instability might seem to provide opportunities for

states such as Iran or China to expand their influence, but the

risks that such instability would ricochet back on them are too

great. Thus, Iran, Pakistan, India, Russia and China each seek,

in their own way, to promote stability within Central Asia while

expanding their own regional influence.

Implications for American security from this struggle derive

from the U.S. desire to prevent existing problems within Central

Asia from escalating into crises that might engage Iran,

Pakistan, India, Russia or China.3

 Therefore, we must first

identify those centrifugal forces threatening Central Asia, then

review each of these states in turn, to analyze their behavior,

identify their regional objectives and state policies in relation

to Central Asia, and evaluate the impact of Central Asia upon

their own security. Doing so offers a better perspective on our

own strategic interests in post-Cold War Asia.

Threats to Central Asia.
4

The greatest threats to Central Asian security are internal.

The painstaking process of nation-building, the legitimacy

crisis, rapid social and economic transformation, decolonization,

ethnic diversity, border disputes, and a catalogue of other

issues are all sources of instability in the post-Soviet

republics.4

The core issue is the ethnic composition of each state.

Since no nation-states existed in the centuries before Russian

conquest, substantial transmigration of ethnic groups

characterized the region. As a result, major concentrations of

ethnic minorities reside within countries other than their

titular5 nation, to include: one million Uzbeks in the Khojent

province of Tajikistan, half a million in the Osh area of the

Fergana valley in Kygyzstan, and 280,000 in the Chimkent region

of Kazakhstan; one to two million Tajiks in Samarkand and

Bukhara, Uzbekistan; nearly a million Kazakhs in Uzbekistan; and

roughly eight million (a number declining daily due to

emigration) Russians, Ukrainians, and Germans in the northern

part of Kazakhstan.6 The percentage of the titular nationality

(and the ruling elite) in each republic may be less than half.7

Ethnic populations are also split by international boundaries;

for example, there are more ethnic Tajiks in Afghanistan than in

Tajikistan itself.8

These titular nationalities are caught outside their home

republic because artificial boundaries, established during the

Stalinist era, purposefully cut across nationalities, to "divide

and conquer."9 Central authorities meant these boundaries as

internal administrative lines of demarcation--no one dreamed the

Soviet Socialist Republics would ever become actual states. This

ethnic mix was further complicated when the area became a wartime

dumping ground for exiled nationalities, such as Volga Germans,

as well as the relocation of war industries during the early

1940s, the Virgin Land program of the 1950s, and Moscow's

systematic immigration of ethnic Slavs (to dilute the titular

nationality) after Stalin's death.

All five republics have suffered sharp economic dislocation

since gaining independence. They were suddenly cut off from the

centralized command economy that directed their resource

allocation, long-range planning, investment funding, and

management. Exploitation of rich natural energy and mineral

resources has been stalled; no longer a part of the Soviet Union,

the five republics are all landlocked, and goods must transit

through a second nation via transportation networks that do not

yet exist (other than through Russia). Economic reform and

movement toward a market economy have been uneven, as states fear

that further economic dislocation will produce massive internal

unrest and political instability. The lack of modern financial
5

systems, transportation networks, banking institutions, and

enforceable legal systems all hamper foreign investment.

Migration of ethnic Slavs to Russia has cost the republics a

large cadre of skilled technicians and managers; migration of

ethnic Germans has cost the republics the group most responsible

for cultivated agriculture. Many local nationalities are a

generation or two from being nomads or herdsmen. At the same

time, overpopulation pressures from large Central Asian families

(often having five to six times the birth rate of urbanized

Slavic states) have produced an underclass of poor un- or underemployed, less-educated workers whose dissatisfaction in the

1980s often provoked the riots leading up to independence. Ethnic

discrimination during the Soviet era produced few senior, local

leaders in the military, industrial, legal, diplomatic, or

managerial fields from the Central Asian republics.

Soviet degradation of the environment created massive

economic distortions and mammoth health problems that have

resulted in rival demands for finite state funds. The question is

whether or not states will use their limited resources to rectify

current problems or invest in the future. Huge tracts of land

were used to test Soviet weapons of mass destruction--with little

regard for the local nationalities living downwind, many of whom

now suffer disproportionate cancer rates.10 Under the Soviet

economic system, cotton monoculture produced 90 percent of the

USSR's cotton requirements and 17 percent of the total world

cotton production. Cotton usurped practically all grain crops and

has taken over land used previously for fruits and vegetables. As

a result, not only does the once agricultural heartland suffer

from an insufficiency of vegetables, wheat, meat, and milk, but

the region is beset with ecological disaster created by

defoliants, airborne salts, industrial pollution, overfertilization, water diversion schemes (the Aral Sea), and an

exhausted water supply.11 Irrigation, the water distribution

system, and control of waterways all threaten to become major

issues in the next decade.12

Efforts to resolve economic ills through inter-republican or

regional associations have not flourished. In 1993, Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan formed a customs union, but a lack of

resources and Russian opposition to any program of which it is

not a part have hampered full implementation. Similarly, Russia

(unsuccessfully) opposed Central Asian membership in the Economic

Cooperation Organization (ECO), founded by Turkey, Iran, and

Pakistan in 1992.13 Turkmenistan's reluctance to enter into any

multilateral regional agreement also has stifled attempts to find

common solutions to common problems.

Democracy has been sacrificed on the altar of stability in

all five republics. None of the Central Asian Communist leaders

wanted independence; indeed, most favored the 1991 coup attempt
6

in Moscow.14 Early constitutional efforts lacked real checks and

balances or public commitment to their survival. When

legislatures attempted to play a genuine role in the decision

making process, the executive branch progressively usurped their

power, and in the case of Kyrgyzstan (September 1994) and

Kazakhstan (March 1995) the presidents dissolved them outright.

Authorities repressed organized opposition political parties,

especially those Islamic in nature.

The continuing civil war in Tajikistan remains the most

crucial threat to inter-regional security. Initially portrayed as

the result of radical Islamic fundamentalism, the civil war is,

in reality, less about religion or ideology and more about

economic, linguistic, ethnic, clan, and regional rivalries for

access to political and economic spoils.15 Russian force of arms

has failed to end the conflict, even with token units contributed

to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Peacekeeping

force by Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. However, the war

justifies the stationing of nearly 25,000 Russian forces in the

area (9,000 peacekeepers and 16,000 border guards) and affords

excessive Russian influence on the Tajik government.

The ongoing civil war in Afghanistan remains the most

immediate extra-regional threat to security. Afghanistan faces

the real prospect of disintegration if the power struggle between

northern ethnic groups and the Pashtun leadership degenerates

into a conflict along ethnic lines. Such a split might eventually

draw in Afghanistan's neighbors, notably Iran, Pakistan, and the

Central Asian republics (relatively unstable themselves), which

have close ethnic-religious ties across the border.16 An Islamic

regime in Kabul could encourage the religious resurgence already

growing across the border in Central Asia.17

Political alignments within Central Asia could be profoundly

affected by events in Afghanistan. Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and

Turkmenistan have large numbers of ethnic kinsmen across the

border. The disintegration of state power occurring in

Afghanistan could result in a new regional realignment; northern

Afghanistan nationalities might forge new links with their ethnic

kinsmen across the Amu Darya, rather than being subordinate to a

Pushtun-dominated government in Kabul.

The current growth of Islam is both a cause and a result of

secular leaders' mistrust. Central Asian leaders have exaggerated

the incursion of radical Islamic fundamentalism and pushed it

forward as the new "threat" to justify their suppression of

internal dissent. They overstate Central Asian adherence to the

religious elements of Islam and the potential of Islamic states

to export their revolution. Such repression can backfire, as

religious martyrdom often generates new converts even as the old

ones are driven underground. True, there has been an explosion of
7

mosque-building and Koran distribution (funded externally,

especially by the Saudis), but at this stage much of the interest

has been in "folk Islam"--the rituals of daily life and death--

and in rediscovering a lost cultural identity, rather than a

purely religious conviction. Attempts to limit or control Islam

and nip "fundamentalism" in the bud without simultaneous dramatic

attempts to reverse the economic and social decline hasten the

growth of more strictly observed Islam.18 Martha Olcott argues

that secular leaders themselves are responsible for Islam's

growth:

What none of Central Asia's leaders seem to understand

is that Islam is not the agent of instability and the

competing power they take it to be, but that its spread

is instead a response to their own inability to control

their economies, their societies and their states.19

Whether Islam itself is an element of instability is debatable,

but central authorities' fears--provoking arrest, imprisonment,

and exile--fuel the flames of intolerance and authoritarianism

that surely do destabilize the region.

These centrifugal forces (and the threatened spillover if

they should explode into ethnic, religious, and social conflict)

alarm the region's Asian neighbors. Each seeks to promote

stability within all the Central Asian states through a variety

of bilateral and multilateral means. Geographic, political,

financial, religious, and ethnic factors affect the ability of

each to achieve its security goals and promote its hegemonic

aspirations.

Iran.

Iran has vital interests in the maintenance of peace and

stability within the region, but its international isolation and

pariah status prevent direct action in support of its genuine

security concerns. Fears of a tide of refugees fleeing southward

from civil war, or of revolutionary slogans hitting a chord with

Iran's own ethnic minorities, can only be met by economic

investment and reliance on proxy allies (e.g., Russia). Iran's

strategy is to use Central Asian markets to reconstruct its own

war-ravaged and constricted economy, project itself as a redeemer

of Islamic values against all non-Shi'ite challengers (especially

Saudi Arabia and Turkey), and act as a key player in the game of

petro politics in the international arena.

The volatile security environment presents direct military

problems for Iran, but Teheran is prohibited from seeking direct

military solutions. Almost overnight Iran went from having one

superpower neighbor, the Soviet Union, to eight fractious
8

neighbors in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The Soviet Army was

replaced by a CIS military organization that exists mostly on

paper. Each state formed small national forces from existing

Soviet units. Several years passed until treaties re-established

a professional border guard system, run by Russia. Civil war in

Georgia and Tajikistan and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the

Caucasus destablized the region. At the same time Iran's

international political isolation prohibits establishing direct

military ties or security agreements with her Central Asian

neighbors. Going it alone, Iran reorganized its armed forces,

modernized its military equipment through foreign arms sales,

developed a chemical warfare capability, and initiated an R&D

program to produce surface-to-surface missiles capable of

reaching throughout Central Asia. Robert Gates, then Director of

Central Intelligence, testified to Congress that Iran could have

a nuclear capability by the end of the century.20 Yet, Iran cannot

use these forces in Central Asia. Any Iranian military move in

the region would provoke an immediate response from both the

Russian Federation and the United States. Thus, Iran must rely

upon others to maintain peace and stability in the region. Russia

is the key to her long-term interests, and nothing must

jeopardize that relationship.

 Iran's cultural and religious influence upon Central Asia

will also be limited. Tajikistan's ongoing civil war hinders

Teheran's ties with that country, to which it is related by

language (Farsi) and ethnicity (Persian), but with which it does

not share a border. Plus, any cultural initiative on the part of

Iran tends to be interpreted politically.21 Its closest ties are

with neighboring Turkmenistan (Turkic and Sunni), but they focus

on transit and energy issues. When Iran first recognized the

newly independent republics, many feared that Iran would try to

export its own revolutionary political philosophy and religious

dogma. Perceived threats of Islamic fundamentalism sweeping

across Central Asia have proven grossly over-exaggerated, as has

talk of Central Asia's adoption of an "Iranian model." After

seven decades of a "Soviet model," the Central Asians are

reluctant to adopt any ideological pattern for their development;

they do not want an Iranian "big brother" any more than they want

a new Russian "big brother." Iran offers specific geographical

and transportation advantages the Central Asian governments hope

to exploit, but they want to rely on their own institutional

heritage or that of more successful economic models in the West

or Far East.

Barred from military, cultural, or religious persuasion,

Iran seeks to increase its regional influence by focusing

attention on its main appeal to the Central Asian republics: a

land corridor to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Teheran

has started construction on several free-trade zones along its

northern border. A railway line from its Persian Gulf port of
9

Bandar Abbas to join the national railway network at Bafq has

been completed, as has an extension from Mashhad to Sarakhs,

completing the link between Iran and Turkmenistan (and the old

Soviet rail system). Additionally, a private-sector Iranian

company is planning a 1,100 mile railway from the new port of

Chah Bahar direct to Sarakhs.22 Funding and a construction

schedule, however, remain unresolved.

Iran also offers Central Asians an alternative means to

avoid Russian efforts to force their way into future Central

Asian energy projects. In September 1995, Iran and Turkmenistan

began discussions on the construction of a $215 million pipeline

to connect the gas field at Korpedzhe to Iranian outlets,

reconstruction of the Turkmen-Bashi gas refinery, and operation

of the Siri refinery. Iran is to provide 80 percent of the

financing, and is prepared to buy annually up to eight billion

cubic meters of Turkmen gas after the pipeline is in operation.23

The greatest stumbling blocks to these endeavors are

political and financial. First, the main players in the oil and

natural gas bonanza sweepstakes are American companies, which

cannot or will not invest in pipeline schemes that cross Iranian

territory. Secondly, Iran will always subordinate its relations

with Central Asia to those with Russia. Iran still views Iraq as

its greatest regional threat. Teheran will do nothing (in Central

Asia or the Caucasus) to alienate Russia as an potential ally in

this struggle.24 Moscow supplies Iran with arms and suppressed

Baku's interest in reuniting with Iran's Azeri population in

return for a nonaggressive policy in Central Asia.25 Finally, the

investment funds needed within Central Asia are too great for any

one state to provide.

Thus, Iran uses multinational organizations to defuse antiIranian antagonism and share the massive burden of investment.

Iran supported the Central Asian states' entry into the

resurrected ECO, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organization of

the Islamic Conference (OIC), and the Organization of Caspian Sea

Littoral States (also known as the Caspian Sea Cooperation Zone).

In the case of the ECO, for example, Iran works with Turkey and

Pakistan, rivals for influence within Central Asia, to provide a

framework for supporting economic change, to solicit aid and

coordinate pooling of investment funds, and to divide up

responsibility for the massive effort needed to modernize Central

Asia. At its 1992 summit, the ECO decided that Turkey would focus

on education, administration and industrial management; Pakistan

on transport, communications, banking and services; and Iran on

oil and mineral resources.26

As a contiguous state with shared ethnic minorities, Iran

has the most to lose if domestic instability should cause the

implosion of Central Asia. But, it also has the least ability to
10

shape those events. An international pariah with a weakened

economy, any reaction on Iran's part would be met with an

immediate American response.

Thus, the current regime has deferred exporting Iran's

revolutionary rhetoric or Shi'ite faith, and focused on economic

and technical assistance, especially in the field of energy

resources. Iran offers Central Asia the most direct route to the

sea, although political constraints hamper its exploitation. But

Turkmenistan, and perhaps other Central Asian states, may refocus

their attention southward to avoid the greater threat of

integration from Russia.

Pakistan.

Two themes have dominated Pakistani policy since

independence: fear of India (harkening back to three wars, the

last in 1971 which cleaved off Bangladesh) and the search for a

superpower patron to counter that threat. Today a third theme

exists: threatened spillover from the civil wars in Tajikistan

and Afghanistan. For the last three decades America served as

that patron,27 but this relationship faltered with the fallout

from Pakistan's nuclear program and the Pressler Amendment28

(which ended all U.S. economic and military aid to Pakistan) and

American attempts to improve relations with India. Moscow's

withdrawal from Afghanistan and the breakup of the Soviet Union

had already weakened Pakistan's importance to the United States.

Thus, Pakistan today must find another patron, form a new

multilateral security arrangement, or foster bilateral ties with

potential regional allies.

Pakistan has failed to find a new patron or establish new

security agreements. China's sale of sensitive nuclear weaponsrelated equipment to Pakistan last year reflects a shift of

traditional power relationships in South Asia, but it does not

make China a patron-replacement.29 Islamabad has had similar

fortune in finding regional allies. Pakistan can recruit on a

basis of pragmatic realpolitik or shared Islamic roots.30 A new

China-Pakistan-Iran axis would match ideological affinity, geopolitical necessity, and complementary interests.31 China has

consistently supported Pakistan militarily, economically, and

politically since the 1960s. Iran, also Muslim and co-founder of

ECO, has supported Pakistan in its disputes with India, played a

crucial role in guaranteeing Islamabad's security after the 1971

Indo-Pakistan war, and sought to exploit Pakistan's recent

alienation from the United States. Nevertheless, serious flaws

hamper this improbable alliance. Even as the United States and

Great Britain are separated by a common tongue, so Pakistan and

Iran are separated by a common faith. Saudi Islam and virulently

anti-Shi'ite Wahhibism greatly influenced the brand of Islam
11

popularized in Pakistan during the last decade. Iran and Pakistan

are on opposite sides of the Afghanistan conflict. Teheran

supports the Shi'ites (mainly Hazaras) and Persian speaking

groups, while Pakistan favors the Pashtun Sunnis. Iran objects

most of all to Pakistan's relationship with Saudi Arabia, seeing

it as the military arm of a long-term Saudi policy of expanding

its influence in Central Asia. Finally, each nation has its own

competing regional ambitions.32 The likelihood for such a

tripartite alliance remains slim, but Pakistan has continued

military exchanges, arms sales, and high-level visits with China

and Iran.33

A second alternative, targeting shared Islamic roots with

the Central Asian republics, has also met with little success.

Islamabad has no historic ties with Central Asia because Pakistan

itself was not formed until 1947. With the sudden appearance of

five nominally Islamic neighbors in 1991, Pakistani policymakers

initially envisioned a Muslim security belt stretching from

Turkey to Pakistan with Central Asia as the "buckle," to provide

both "strategic depth"34 and needed allies in her policy struggles

over Afghanistan and Kashmir.

It immediately became apparent that Islam would not be an

entree to forming a multilateral defense arrangement. The Central

Asian states signed the CIS collective security agreement in May

1992. Islamabad also failed to obtain unilateral support from any

Central Asian state for its position regarding Kashmir, the

litmus test for Pakistan (and India) for potential allies.35

Central Asian rulers are unwilling to involve themselves in the

Kashmir dispute in light of their own nationalities and

territorial problems and its religious (Islamic) overtones.

Rebuffed, Pakistan shifted toward establishing bilateral

(and through the ECO multilateral) economic and cultural ties

with the Central Asian states and offering assistance in

transnational issues such as drugs and terrorism. Economic ties

are a vital asset to boost Pakistan's fragile economy. One

analyst has suggested that the region has a potential annual

market of $80 billion; even if Pakistan secured only five per

cent of that market, it could earn up to four billion dollars per

year--about equal to Pakistan's current total annual exports.36

Moreover, the "Islamic card" was not totally abandoned; Pakistan

decided not to "push" Islam as a religion, but as a shared

cultural identity. Thus, Pakistan has built mosques, sponsored

attendees to the World Islamic Conference, funded scholarships

abroad, and donated printing presses to publish the Koran.

Pakistan aggressively sought to develop bilateral economic

ties. Penetration of Central Asian markets began with high-level

visits in November-December 1991. Pakistan offered a $30 million

credit to Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, and proposed
12

joint ventures in cotton, textiles, garments, pharmaceuticals,

engineering goods, surgical instruments, telecommunications, and

agro-industry.37 Within two months of the Soviet Union's collapse

and Central Asian independence (February 1992), Pakistan signed

its first agreement--with Kazakhstan--on education, tourism,

culture, trade, and science and technology. Pakistan also has

offered to provide training and infrastructure support for

banking, insurance, and joint stock venture capital.38 In July

1992, Islamabad signed an agreement with Uzbekistan to establish

a satellite communications link, construct highways, produce

telecommunications equipment, and manufacture railroad rolling

stock.39 Pakistan agreed to construct four highways in Afghanistan

and one in Uzbekistan to improve its links with Central Asia. A

rail link from Chaman (Pakistan)-Herat (Afghanistan)-Kushka

(Turkmenistan) has been proposed, but not yet constructed.

Pakistan also sought to exploit Central Asian petroleum, natural

gas, and hydro-energy to solve its ongoing energy shortages. For

example, in April 1992, Tajikistan signed an agreement to provide

annually 1000 megawatts of power at a fixed price for 30 years

beginning in 1997 in exchange for $500 million in Pakistani aid

to complete the Ragun dam.

Pakistan has had mixed success in bringing these bilateral

agreements to fruition. They reflect the gap between intent and

capability. The greatest obstacle to Pakistan's Central Asian

ambitions is lack of direct access to the region; Afghanistan and

a small strip of China intervene.40 Air routes between Pakistan

and Central Asia (dating from May 1992) are insufficient for

major transfer of goods and services. The second obstacle is

regional instability. Political disintegration and civil war in

Afghanistan41 make construction and transit prohibitive. The civil

war in Tajikistan has derailed the hydroenergy agreement,

although the concept is sound (albeit expensive) once peace (or

at least quiet) returns to Tajikistan. A third obstacle is

Pakistan's inadequate domestic communications network. Pakistani

(and Central Asian) rail lines currently end at the Afghan

border. Internal Pakistani road, rail, and seaports also need

major upgrading. The fourth obstacle is financial. Pakistan

lacks the resources to fund these investments. Even the credits

offered have been largely symbolic in nature. The Central Asian

states as well are unable to contribute significantly to these

projects.42

Pakistan's hope that Central Asia would provide strategic

depth, new Islamic allies, and collective security partners in

its struggle with India has been dashed. Geographic constraints

and focused efforts by non-Islamic neighbors, especially Russia

and China, have stymied her efforts to become a significant

influence in Central Asia. But, through bilateral ties and

agencies such as the ECO, Pakistan can still provide technical

and financial assistance to the Central Asian states' efforts to
13

confront the economic and social issues which threaten their

domestic stability.

India.

The breakup of the Soviet Union and the loss of its

superpower patron43 created serious security concerns for India.

New Delhi feared that Central Asian instability would mirror the

chaos of the Caucasus. Border realignment, ethnic disputes,

resurgent Islam, and civil war would directly affect the

territorial integrity of Afghanistan, which, in domino fashion,

would influence Pakistan, Iran and Kashmir. In such an

environment drug trafficking,44 illegal arms, and crime syndicates

flourish, threatening not only Central Asia but all its

neighbors. Such a scenario would have inevitable consequences for

India's national security.45 India is also alarmed at Pakistan's

call for Central Asia as a strategic hinterland and its Islamic

initiatives such as the ECO. As a consequence, India is seeking

new security arrangements with the republics of Central Asia.46

The new security environment presents both challenges and

opportunities for India to influence affairs within Central Asia.

Pakistan's failure does not mean India's success. Central Asia's

distrust of Pakistan's Islamic agenda does not make it proIndian. As a non-aligned, non-Islamic state, India rejected

military alliances, security agreements, and cultural ties as

tools for promoting stability in Central Asia. Instead, it

focused its efforts on bilateral economic programs. India's

special relationship with the Soviet Union provided New Delhi

with existing economic links (e.g., a consulate in Tashkent) and

a lively trade with the Central Asian republics. India offered

many advantages to Central Asian authorities converting to a

market economy: a large, urban, educated elite fluent in English;

a functional Anglo-Saxon judicial system; industry and management

based on Western lines; and an established and vibrant stock

market.47

Indian economic programs focused on the two regional

linchpins: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. India offered credits worth

ten million dollars to Tashkent in 1992 and 1993, and in 1992

signed a treaty on "the principles of interstate relations and

bilateral cooperation," promising cooperation in fighting

terrorism, arms and drug trafficking and extremist ideologies.48

Specific investment projects included hotel construction in

Tashkent, Samarkand, and Bukhara. In 1992 India signed a group

of agreements with Almaty to develop its textile and hotel

industries. India also offered Kazakhstan ten million dollars in

credits in 1992 and 1993.49 An April 1992 Indo-Turkmen agreement

promised cooperation in fields such as natural gas extraction,

chemicals, agricultural products processing, hotel construction,
14

and banking. In June 1994 India offered Turkmenistan a 10-year

loan worth five million dollars.50 Little has been done with

Kyrgyzstan and war-torn Tajikistan.

The gap between intent and capability also colors India's

plans for Central Asia. The fact that India is not contiguous has

hampered the development of trade. No overland routes exist

between Central Asia and India. If built, India's access would

depend on Pakistan and Afghanistan. Air transit is cost

prohibitive. Also, India has insufficient capital for the massive

investment needed to make a real impact. Indian investors,

hampered by a lack of reliable banking facilities in Central

Asia, have experienced difficulty in receiving payments and

repatriating money.51

Regardless of its recent military buildup, India itself

cannot provide security to the states of Central Asia; it must

rely upon a (non-Islamic) proxy. Some Indian sources argue that

ultimately only Russia (with whom India has an agreement on

defense planning and cooperation) could act as a balancing force

in Central Asia.52 Another option is China, with whom relations

have improved since last year's surprise proposal to form a

bilateral trade block to counter regional trade groupings and

recent confidence-building measures.53 However, that option will

fade rapidly if the China-Pakistan relationship develops.

Pakistan remains the main focus of India's interest, but

Afghan instability and a threatened domino effect from civil war

in Central Asia make efforts to promote regional peace and

security an Indian national interest. India will politically

support the region's secular regimes, for strategic denial of

fundamentalist Islam in Central Asia will remain a prominent

concern. New Delhi will continue to use economic and technical

assistance as a policy tool and to enhance its own commercial

interests.

Russia.

According to the Primary Chronicle, the first Russian state

was formed in 862 A.D. when inhabitants of the Dnepr' Valley

begged transiting Varangians (Norsemen, or Vikings), led by

Prince Rurik, to establish Kievan Rus'. "Our land is great and

rich, but there is no order in it. Come to rule and reign over

us."54 In its heart of hearts, this is the scenario Moscow

envisions for Central Asia: incapable of ruling on their own, the

penitent republics beg Moscow to reassert its control over the

region. This has not happened, so a more aggressive program

toward economic and political integration has been adopted.

When Russia formed the CIS in 1991, it appeared relieved to
15

jettison the burden of subsidizing the Islamic fringes of the

empire. With Russia's focus on economic collapse at home, loss of

superpower status, and security issues in Europe, and burned by

its involvement in Afghanistan, Central Asia was a backwater.55

Then, within one calendar month, the fall of Kabul, the coup in

Dushanbe, and trips by Islamic leaders to Central Asia occurred.

The threat loomed of significant Iranian and Turkish influence

spreading throughout the region.

Russia took a hard look at the economic and security

implications of its earlier dismissive attitude and formulated a

foreign policy to bring Central Asia, if not back into the empire

with a "gathering of the lands," then, at the very least, back

into the fold. Moscow sought to maintain regional stability,

prevent other regional powers from establishing hegemony, protect

and expand its economic interests, protect ethnic Russians living

in Central Asia (and prevent their migration back to an

economically strapped federation), and stop the spread of Islamic

fundamentalism (especially from Afghanistan via Tajikistan).

By 1995 Russia began to talk of creating an "economically

and politically integrated association of states capable of

claiming its proper place in the world community."56 Edict Number

940, issued on September 14, 1995, stated:

our main vital interests in the spheres of economy,

defense, security and the protection of the rights of

Russians are concentrated on the territory of the CIS,

and the safeguarding of those interests constitutes the

basis of the country's national security.57

The edict identified Russia's main tasks: to ensure political,

military, and economic stability; to promote economically and

politically stable CIS states friendly toward Russia; to

consolidate Russia as the leading force in formulating a new

system of interstate relations; and to boost integration

processes within the CIS. It added, "when collaborating with

third countries and international organizations, it is necessary

to seek their agreement that this region is primarily a zone of

Russian interests."58

Almost immediately after the USSR's break up, Moscow staked

its claim as regional hegemon in Central Asia. Even after the

division of Soviet assets59 and the creation of republican armed

forces, the new states were incapable of ensuring their own

territorial integrity and domestic security. In military affairs

the Central Asian states remained dependent on Moscow. On May 15,

1992, a formal collective security agreement60 replaced Russia's

original passive policy, which regarded Central Asia as a vast

buffer zone, over which Moscow exerted a benign equivalent of the

Monroe Doctrine--"We aren't going to get actively involved
16

ourselves, but everyone else stay out." Moscow then followed up

with bilateral defense treaties with each of the five Central

Asian states. Under the new treaty, Russian Border Guard forces

were responsible for patrolling Central Asia's external

boundaries,61 while a coordinated CIS air defense system guarded

the skies above. In March 1994 Moscow signed an additional 22

bilateral military agreements62 with Kazakhstan, to include

Russian lease of the Baikonur Cosmodrome (for an initial period

of 20 years with an option to extend a further 10 years) for $115

million annually (deducted from Almaty's debts to Moscow) and

resolutions on the strategic nuclear forces temporarily deployed

in Kazakhstan. Moscow also agreed to train 500 Kazakhstani

officers per year at its various military academies.63 A January

1995 agreement gave Russia continued access to several missile

test ranges, proving grounds, and military communications sites

in Kazakhstan.64 Both nations also promised to cooperate on

forming Joint Armed Forces, conducting joint planning for the

training and use of troops, and providing weapons and military

equipment.65

From the beginning the Central Asian states have had mixed

feelings about the CIS alliance. On the one hand, Central Asian

leaders recognize the consequences if Russia does not get

involved. Faced with civil war in neighboring Tajikistan and

Afghanistan, President Karimov of Uzbekistan has stated that he

would "like to see the Russian Federation as a kind of ‘guarantor

of stability' in the region, or more simply put, as a guarantor

of the survival of the administration that exists in Tashkent

today."66 On the other hand, CIS members' suspicions and concerns

about Russia's intentions to inherit the Soviet Union's ambitions

are heightened by the rise of ultra-nationalists such as

Zhirinovskii and the impressive showing of the Communists in

recent elections.67 The example of the Warsaw Pact, which Russia

frequently puts forward as a model for the CIS, makes Central

Asian leaders uncomfortable, remembering as they do that Pact's

"multinational response to attempts at political self-direction

in Hungary and Czechoslovakia."68

On the surface the collective security agreement has

maintained stability in Central Asia. Widescale civil war and

ethnic separatism have not occurred in Central Asia, as they have

in the Caucasus. Russian forces did reestablish a pro-Moscow

government in Dushanbe. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan

did send limited peacekeeping contingents to Tajikistan. Moscow

continues to broker diplomatic efforts to end the crisis. Yet,

deployment of Russian troops to Tajikistan fits Russia's longterm interests. To paraphrase Clausewitz, peacekeeping is the

continuation of politics with other means. The forces preclude

involvement by neighbors who wish to extend their own influence

in the region. Introduction of Russian peacekeepers limits

Western policy options and marginalizes the role of United
17

Nations' peacekeeping overtures.69

Russia also seeks to protect and expand its economic

position in Central Asia as part of a larger effort to revive its

regional economic (and hence political) influence. Moscow's

political leaders realize that a major source of funding for that

revival lies just to its south. Russia lacks the investment

capital or technology to compete for lucrative deals being cut by

foreign consortiums for Central Asia's energy and mineral

wealth. But it does possess access. All five Central Asian states

are landlocked, and although Iran, Pakistan, India, China, and

Turkey all promise transit routes in the future, Russia can offer

access now.

As a consequence, Russia has actively inserted itself into

foreign investment plans. Oil and natural gas can be exported

through Iran, Russia or unstable areas in the Caucasus and

Afghanistan. American investors (such as Chevron in Kazakhstan)

are prohibited, for U.S. domestic political reasons, from using

the southern route through Iran to export oil. Turkish

environmental concerns are threatening supertanker transit

through the Bosphorus. Caucasian pipelines pass through major

areas of armed conflict. Recent proposals to pass thru

Afghanistan to Pakistani terminals are equally precarious. The

only immediate alternative left is Russia. Moscow has stymied

construction of new pipelines across Turkey and is pushing use of

existing pipelines transiting Russia, thereby giving her enormous

leverage over pipeline flow and a greater percentage of revenues.

Russian coercion has been crude, but effective. Russia

pressured Turkmenistan by cutting off gas exports to Europe and

refusing to hand over $185 million in gas revenues earned in

1993.70 Russia also apparently bought Ashgabat's natural gas71

supply at low prices and resold it to Turkey at a 300 percent

markup. In 1994, Russia halted coal payments to Kazakhstan and

partly paralyzed the country by reducing its fuel supplies.72

Moscow reportedly demanded a 20-40 percent interest in

Kazakhstani fields under exploration. That same year Moscow also

blocked almost all of Kazakhstan's oil exports from May to August

and forced its refineries to halt production.73 Russia refused to

raise the 44 million barrel annual ceiling for Kazakhstani oil

pumped through its pipeline network, forcing Chevron to reduce

its daily production at Tengiz in half.74 Russia's "hard ball"

approach won. In August 1994 Moscow doubled the volume of oil

deliveries, in exchange for Kazakhstan handing over to Russia its

export transit volume of one million tonnes of oil, which Russia

then re-exported for hard currency. As a result, Kazakhstan's oil

producers, left with no hard currency income themselves, were

forced to assume high interest bank loans. Industry experts

estimate Almaty will have to export at least 250,000 tonnes

(through Russia) to pay off the loans--for which it will receive
18

only $20 million.75 Until alternate transit routes can be

developed, Kazakhstan and, to a lesser degree, Turkmenistan

remain dependent upon Moscow to generate the energy revenues

needed to break away from that dependency.

The creation of Central Asian currencies exemplifies

Moscow's equally heavy-handed attempts at financial hegemony.76

The "rouble zone" created by Moscow for the CIS little resembled

Central Asian visions of free trade and tariff-free borders.

Moscow refused to surrender control of the rouble, excluded

other CIS leaders from financial policy management, and, in

November 1993, even demanded CIS states keep all their gold and

hard currency reserves on deposit in Moscow. This provoked

Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan that same month to follow

Kyrgyzstan's May 1993 introduction of a national currency.

Uzbekistan followed suit in June 1994. Even Tajikistan, which

exists solely at Moscow's sufferance, has announced plans to

introduce its own currency in 1996.

To stymie Moscow's efforts, the Central Asian states have

exploited economic ties with other regional powers and created

intra-regional institutions. For example, all five republics

joined the ECO in 1992 and work with its Investment Development

Bank. Almaty hosted the December 1995 "Conference on Asian

Cooperation and Confidence-Building Measures," which was devoted

to the questions of providing mutual guarantees for political

independence, territorial integrity, and state security.77 In July

1994, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan agreed to establish

their own Central Asian Bank of Cooperation and Development (in

Almaty) to settle accounts between countries in hard currency or

national currencies.78 They simultaneously formed an Interstate

Council and the Association of Entrepreneurs of Central Asia.79

Presidents of the three states meet periodically to exchange

views on harmonizing their economies to the year 2000.80

Russian security policy exploits the fate of the 8-10

million ethnic Russians who still live in Central Asia.81 Russia

wants to safeguard them, but also keep them where they are. Many

of these Russians feel stranded abroad and threatened by the rise

of Islam, even though all the republics' governments support

secularism. The Russians resent the loss of their privileged

status in Soviet society and fear replacement (justly so) in

positions of authority within business, academia, and government

by titular nationalities. They protest having to learn the local

language. Faced with growing anti-Russian discrimination,

hundreds of thousands of ethnic Russians have returned to Russia

(where no jobs or housing await them) or migrated to more

ethnicly diverse republics such as Kazakhstan.82 Russia cannot

afford their return and does not want to lose the hostages which

might justify intervention. Moscow hoped to ease their fears by

gaining dual citizenship for ethnic Russians in CIS countries,
19

but only Turkmenistan has signed a treaty granting dual

citizenship. Two 1995 documents defined the legal status of

Russian citizens who are permanent residents of Kazakhstan (and

vice versa) and agreed on simplified procedures for such people's

"cross acquisition of citizenship" in the other state, but

stopped short of dual citizenship.83

When Russian analysts today talk of "the Threat," they refer

to the Islamic world. Moscow supports military action in

Tajikistan to avoid a "domino effect" by which Central Asia and

the Caucasus would fall under the influence of an "insidious

faith" and the hegemony of their regional rivals, Turkey and

Iran. Georgii Kunadze, the Russian Deputy Minister for Foreign

Affairs "with special responsibility for Central Asian issues"

expressed a common attitude:

Obviously, not one of the countries of Central Asia is

capable without our help of protecting its own borders.

. . . If we were to leave, we must be prepared for

Islamic extremism, for the forces of instability in

general, to pass through Tajikistan, enter Kyrgyzstan,

and from there it is not far to Kazakhstan, before

those forces are on the threshold of Russia.84

Moscow's policy of "strategic denial" of the area to other

powers, while forcefully integrating Central Asia's economy with

that of the Russian Federation, has had short term success. But,

as Deep Throat counseled during Watergate, "follow the money."

Moscow lacks the huge amounts of capital to put such plans in

action. It is a peer competitor with the Central Asian states for

Western aid and investment funds. The Central Asian states have

the right to bypass the CIS to join outside organizations such as

the ECO and the freedom to seek alternate routes for their oil

and natural gas. American myopia about a "trickle down" of

resources to Central Asia through Moscow is giving way to greater

flexibility toward involvement in the region and support of

Central Asian states vis-a-vis Moscow. Finally, a key rival has

appeared on the scene with a more vibrant economy, contiguous

location, and desire to flex its own hegemonic muscles--the

People's Republic of China.

China.

China finds itself no longer bordered by a superpower with a

rival brand of Marxism, but by a bevy of small unstable states

open to influence by China's rivals and a new competing ideology:

Islam. The disintegration of Tajikistan and growing unrest in the

Fergana Valley--with direct geographical access to China's Muslim

outreaches--have magnified China's concerns. How China manages

its relations with Central Asia will have profound significance
20

for security within China, as well as its future relations with

regional rivals, the Middle East, and South Asia.85

China's worst nightmare is that unrest in Central Asia will

spill over into the Xinjiang-Uigher Autonomous Region86 (XUAR,

formerly known as Eastern or Chinese Turkestan). With 530,000

square kilometers, the XUAR comprises one sixth of the People's

Republic of China, but has only a population of 15 million, of

whom over 60 percent are Muslim.87 Beijing has systematically

resettled more than six million Han Chinese to the XUAR, diluting

the titular population so that Uighurs (ethnic Kazakhs) now

constitute just less than half of the XUAR population,88 but the

area remains a tinderbox.

The Chinese leadership dreads that ethno-nationalism alone

(or in combination with resurgent Islam) could destabilize

China's northwest provinces (Gansu and Qinghai) and autonomous

regions (Ningxia, Xinjiang, and Tibet). These areas are of

considerable strategic importance as they house China's principal

nuclear testing and missile launching sites and much of its

"gulag archipelago."89 The XUAR holds vast natural resources

necessary to fuel China's modernization, to include unexploited

petroleum reserves in the Tarim Basin (sufficient to free Beijing

from future dependence on Middle East petroleum) and large

deposits of natural gas, iron, and coal.90

China has sought to control the area with a combination of

carrots and sticks. As controls over the Muslim majority relaxed

in the 1980s, mosques reopened and a communist government openly

anti-religious, but willing to make concessions to coopt local

minorities, tolerated Muslim religious practices. Nevertheless,

unrest fermented again at the end of the 1980s with a series of

incidents in December 1986, June 1988, May 1989, and April 1990

which resulted in Muslims' deaths at the hands of authorities

quick to suppress "local nationalism."91

Islamic groups in Central Asia fueled Chinese fears. In the

early days of Central Asian independence exiled Uighurs in

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan pressed for the national

liberation of the XUAR. However, Chinese anxiety over Central

Asian collusion diminished as Beijing realized that the leaders

of the new republics did not support the separatist movements.92

"Free Uighuristan" parties (formed in the early 1990s in Bishkek

and Almaty) calling for a "new Turkestan" linking Turkic-speakers

in the XUAR and Central Asia were both suppressed by Central

Asian authorities. Nevertheless, the threat of ethno-nationalism

and Islamic resurgence in Central Asia remains a core element of

Chinese policy in the region.

Chinese policy in Central Asia is designed to maintain

political stability through economic development. China borders
21

Central Asia and has the transportation links in place to provide

the access Central Asians so desperately want. It has also

embarked on an ambitious program of rail and pipeline

construction which would go a long way toward freeing Central

Asia from dependency on Russia. A new rail line completed in June

1992 links Almaty and Urumchi, and from there 3,000 miles on to

the coastal port of Shanghai.93 The October 1990 opening of the

Trans-Eurasian Railroad through Central Asia has resulted in

"dramatic surges" in the movement of people, goods, and hard

currency.94 During an April 1994 visit to Turkmenistan,

Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, China's premier Li Peng

reached an agreement with Turkmenistan's President Niyazov to

conduct feasibility studies for a new railroad across Central

Asia and a $20 billion pipeline that would carry Central Asian

oil to China. Once completed, this transcontinental route would

have consequences conceivably comparable to the impact of the

advent of the Suez and Panama canals.95

China hopes to use Central Asian markets as a catalyst to

fuel a new prosperity zone in Xinjiang for foreign investment

(especially by Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Japan) and revive the Silk

Route, pushing Chinese economic interests beyond Central Asia to

the Persian Gulf and even to European markets. Beijing expects

economic growth in Xinjiang and Central Asia to strengthen the

secular-minded governments of Central Asia against those groups

which favor Islamic rule and prevent the republics from returning

to dependence on Russia.96

By the beginning of the 1990s . . . China could offer

major trade opportunities as well as modest amounts of

capital and technology to the economically weak Central

Asian republics. By doing this, China is strengthening

the republics' economies and responding to what Central

Asian leaders consider their most basic need. It is not

cultural, linguistic, or religious ‘aid' that Central

Asian elites crave, it is economic development. The

Chinese clearly agree that economic development offers

the best chance of limiting future ethnic and religious

conflict.97

To accomplish this, China has enacted a series of reforms to

boost Xinjiang's (and by consequence Central Asia's) economic

takeoff. Western attention on Guangdong and Hong Kong ignored the

fact that Xinjiang placed first nationwide in terms of real

income growth in the period 1985-91. In 1992 Beijing granted

Urumchi (Xinjiang's capital) the same right to conduct

preferential trade policies as the coastal regions. Eight "ports"

(rivers, airports and railheads) are now open, and Yining,

Taching, and Bole have been approved as "border open cities."

This boom coincides with the breakup of Russia's political and

economic ties with South Asia (India) and Southeast Asia
22

(especially Vietnam). As a consequence, China now wields more

influence across its western and southern tier than at any time

since the 18th century.98 China quickly moved to establish ties

with the new republics. Kazakhstan and China signed agreements in

February 1992 in the areas of trade, scientific and technological

cooperation, communications and transport, personnel exchanges,

and the establishment of a joint committee for the development of

further ties. China also extended credits equivalent to $5.7

million to Kyrgyzstan and pushed exports of food, clothing,

electronics, and other consumer goods. Even war-torn Tajikistan

received $5 million in yuan credits to buy Chinese food and

consumer goods, plus $500,000 worth of food and humanitarian aid.

Dushanbe and Beijing also signed ten cooperative agreements for

future economic projects such as joint ventures in the textile

industry.99

The breakup of the Soviet Union and the sharp decline of the

Russian military offer China its best military position in a

century and a breathing space to reevaluate its military

doctrine,100 manning levels, and modernization pro-grams.101 With

the independence of the Central Asian republics, the forward

basing of the Soviet Army and border guard forces antagonistic to

China's interests have been replaced by weak Central Asian

indigenous forces, a strategic buffer zone, and Russian and

Central Asian border guards engaged in operations to suppress

Islamic fundamentalism and prevent ethno-nationalistic border

changes, all of which work to the benefit of Beijing.

 The success of its economic reforms has also provided China

the opportunity to purchase huge quantities of advanced weapons

systems from cash-strapped Russia such as the Su-27 fighter

aircraft and S-300 high altitude air defence missile system.

Jane's Defense Weekly estimates that purchases in 1992-93 alone

may have totaled five billion dollars.102 With Central Asia a

military backwater and with her back "covered," China's military

now looks toward using the fruits of this new economic power to

exert its influence outside its borders, especially in southeast

Asia.103

Stability in Central Asia is essential to Beijing's

continued economic growth because China has shifted from an

exporter to an importer of crude oil. Advent of the "China

Century" depends on stable energy resources, domestic stability,

and positive economic growth. It is estimated that China will

have to import 100 million tons of crude by 2010 unless it finds

new sources.104 China's new, weak Central Asian neighbors are the

potential, new "Kuwaits" of the 21st century. If the Chinese

build a pipeline (over Russian resistance), Central Asia's

importance to China will shift immeasurably in the next century,

as will Chinese military attitudes towards safeguarding their

strategic oil reserves.
23

China's relations with Central Asia are not without sore

spots. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan contain thousands of square

miles stolen by the tsars in the 1880s, which China has refrained

from reclaiming (as opposed to the Spratlys). An April 1995

agreement provided confidence-building measures to lessen

tensions over existing borders between China, Kazakhstan, and

Kyrgyzstan. Water rights and environmental issues also exist. For

example, in January 1993 Kazakhstan and China agreed to build a

water conservancy works over the Horgos River along their border,

to address hydropower, flood control, and navigation interests.105

Alteration of the river flow affects both signatories and

Uzbekistan, located downstream on the river. Additionally, in

August 1992 China broached Kyrgyzstan with the possibility of

exploiting four rivers whose waters are shared by the XUAR and

Kyrgyzstan.106 China's 20 years of nuclear weapons testing in the

Turfan-Kuerla region (the most recent test at Lop Nor in June

1996) have produced serious environmental consequences, to

include contamination of China's third largest lake, Lake

Bositeng.107 Continued above-ground testing exacerbates tensions

with the population within the XUAR. Kazakhstani concern, both

public and private, over the impact of radiation drifting into

Kazakhstan has also been quite vocal.108

Chinese concerns about Central Asian domestic stability are

matched by similar Central Asian concerns about China. As Graham

Fuller has noted,

there is no reason to believe that China will remain

immune to the forces of breakup that have affected

nearly all post-Communist empires and multi-ethnic

groups. . . . Few Muslim minorities ever remain happily

contained within another state and culture, especially

a Communist one. The model of political independence

lies just over the border in former Soviet Central

Asia.109

China is undergoing a rapid economic and social transformation,

heightened by inflation; environmental degradation; depletion of

finite energy resources; a potential succession crisis following

the death of Deng; the increased political influence of the

People's Liberation Army (PLA); a weakened center; and economic

inequality among the provinces.

China's economic and political transformation will have

mixed consequences for Central Asia. At the present they can play

the "China card" to thwart dependence on Moscow. In the short

term Russia and China share a common interest in deterring ethnonationalism and resurgent Islam in the region, but each for

contradictory goals.110 Moscow and Beijing will collaborate to

maintain political stability even as each jockeys to increase its
24

economic hold over the region. But, if Russia's decline continues

unabated, in the long run, the Central Asian states risk simply

changing masters. They must counterbalance Russia and China with

other economic powerhouses from Asia (such as Japan or South

Korea), the United States, the Middle East and Europe.

Implications for U.S. Policy.

America has no vital interests in Central Asia, nor will it

assume responsibility for Central Asia's security. We have little

"leverage" to directly influence events or push our foreign

policy agenda on these sovereign states. Within those parameters,

what are American security interests in Central Asia, and how can

they best be realized?

The primary focus of the United States will be damage

control--to prevent existing problems from escalating into crises

that might engage Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan, or India:

. . . the United States is more concerned that the

region does not become the breeding ground of civil

war, nuclear proliferation, radical Islamic movements,

a battleground for Asian geopolitics, an ecological

wasteland, an economic basket case or the target of a

resurgent Russian imperial vision. The geopolitical

centrality of Central Asia--its spokes radiating out in

all directions across a vital continent--is of

considerable importance.111

The territorial integrity and political security of the

Central Asian states are ostensibly guaranteed under the

collective security agreement of the Commonwealth of Independent

States. But Russia's calls for political and economic

integration, its statements that Central Asia is within its

sphere of influence, and its efforts to deny Western or

international participation in peacekeeping efforts threatens

that security. America does not want to "contain" Russia in

Central Asia, but it opposes coercion and intimidation of

neighboring states. The United States endorses regional

cooperation only so long as it is truly and totally voluntary and

only if it opens doors to the outside world.112

The United States can nurture political stability in Central

 Asia by disavowing through its actions the concept of the "near

abroad," and refusing to condone it as justification for

intervention in Central Asian affairs. As noted by Rajan Menon,

while acknowledging the legal independence of the ex-Soviet

republics, the very term "near abroad" itself is colored with

nuances and presumptions of special Russian rights, interests,

"obligations," and "responsibilities." It depicts Russia's
25

juridical and its geopolitical borders as different categories,

and it asserts the fact and desirability of a Russian

preponderance overshadowing all other powers.113 Washington's

recent reassessment of deferring to Russia on the issue of

pipeline routes presents such a change of focus.

Instead, America's "damage control" is best achieved through

the development of free market democracies in Central Asia. Our

strategic priority must be on the economic development of the

region. American businesses, especially in the energy sector,

have already made substantial investments in the region. But,

America's interests go far beyond their profit or loss. Economic

dislocation breeds ethnic, religious, and political extremism.

Government reaction to stem such movements would further

exacerbate social tensions. A stable economy enhances development

of democracies and rule by law. Washington must also support

inclusive talks, national reconciliation, a negotiated peace, and

free elections in Tajikistan.

Central Asian security is also promoted through efforts by

the Department of Defense to support development of viable armed

forces within the region. Military-to-military contact programs

provide practical expertise to rump militaries formed from the

remnants of Soviet forces in each state. Recent initiatives, such

as the agreement (signed by Defense Secretary William Perry) to

give Kazakhstan four grants totalling $37 million for defense

conversion (in particular re-equipping the Stepnogorsk chemical

products plant), are a step in the right direction. Central Asian

participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace also offers an

alternative to Russian assistance. Defense Attache Offices are

slowly being established throughout the area. Primary focus will

first fall on language training programs, so that offers to

attend U.S. military education institutions can be accepted.114

There are no short-term solutions to Central Asia's

problems. Indeed, with proposed slashes in foreign aid, direct U.

S. government involvement to support the Central Asian states

economically and politically will be limited. American legal and

technical assistance in tackling issues such as environmental

protection, drug enforcement, organized crime, and weapons

proliferation will be valuable. The United States can also

channel its efforts through international organizations that

provide social programs such as refugee relief, health care, and

family planning. Washington can support an enhanced role in the

region for the United Nations and the Organization for Security

and Cooperation in Europe, to which all the Central Asian

republics belong. Finally, the United States can bolster 

moderate Islamic republics (especially our NATO ally, Turkey)

which serve as mentors for economic and political development.

Immediate attention must be focused on both Uzbekistan and
26

Kazakhstan as co-stabilizers of the region. They predominate in

terms of population, resources, skilled and educated elites, and

industrial potential. A strong Kazakhstan deters Uzbeki

irrententism. A strong Uzbekistan deters a Kazakhstani

dissolution. Strong stabilizers would fill the Central Asian

political vacuum, prevent Russian expansionism, and join Russia

and Ukraine as the third tripod of power in the Former Soviet

Union.115 But mistrust of Uzbekistan's long-term objectives among

her Central Asian neighbors (especially those such as Tajikistan

and Kyrgyzstan with large Uzbek minorities) is even stronger.

Nazarbayev's calls for a Euro-asian Union are seen as a ploy to

assert Kazakhstani hegemony. According to Jed Snyder, "the desire

to replace the CIS with a Central Asian forum clearly exists, but

the lack of leadership in the region and the persistent mutual

suspicion among the five Central Asian presidents prevents

concrete initiatives."116 American support of the development of

inclusive market democracies can do much to ease those fears.

The Road Ahead.

The new "Great Game"--jockeying for power and position in

Central Asia--will continue. The outcome of the contest for

regional influence is unsure. The status quo may continue under

CIS collective security but with relative freedom of action for

the Central Asian states. Moscow may succeed in its gradual

reintegration of Central Asia into a Russian sphere of control--

although whether in the form of outright absorption or legal

independence as formerly experienced by the Warsaw Pact states is

unclear. Into "the Chinese Century," Beijing may eventually

become the regional hegemon. Or, a state within Central Asia

itself, such as Uzbekistan, may exert control, with warlordism in

peripheral areas. In a worst case, the region may explode,

causing realignment of boundaries and annexations, with civil war

spilling over into neighboring states. In a best case, an

independent bloc of Central Asian market democracies, based

perhaps around Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, would succeed in

playing off the United States, Russia, China, and other neighbors

to maintain a balance of power on its own terms.

The key to Asian security in the region is economic. A

strong, vibrant economy is a prerequisite for political

stability. Stable democracies will seek peaceful solutions to

common problems. Peace in the region, especially in Tajikistan,

Afghanistan, and Kashmir, must be achieved before economic

takeoff can occur.

What is most important is the fact that domestic stability

of all five states is a policy goal of Central Asia's neighbors

and the United States. Each seeks to increase its own influence

while denying domination by any one state. No one wants to upset
27

the Central Asian applecart--rather they want to sell them the

apples.

ENDNOTES

1. Boris Z. Rumer, "The Gathering Storm in Central Asia,"

Orbis, Vol. 37, No. 1, Winter 1993, p. 89.

2. The parameters of "Central Asia" fluctuate in the popular

press and practical use. Once the old, tsarist province of

Turkestan was subdivided in the 1920s, the Soviets coined the

phrase "Sredniaia Aziia" (Middle Asia) to refer to the territory

covering the present four republics of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,

Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, omitting Kazakhstan (almost half of

which included heavily ethnic-Russian areas that Muscovy absorbed

into the empire in the 16th century). Western sources coined the

phrase "Soviet Central Asia" to include all five republics. When

the ECO expanded to "Central Asia," there were six new states--to

include Azerbaijan. At a 1992 meeting of the five former Soviet

Central Asian states, they adopted the term, "Tsentral'naia

Aziia" (Central Asia), to include Kazakhstan. Some contemporary

popular periodicals, under the subheading "Central Asia," stretch

their coverage from the Bosphorous to Southeast Asia. For the

purposes of this study, however, "Central Asia" refers only to

Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan.

3. The other player, Turkey, is beyond the scope of this

study. See Stephen J. Blank, Stephen C. Pelletiere, and William

T. Johnsen, Turkey's Strategic Position at the Crossroads of

World Affairs, Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute,

December 1993. Chap 4, "Turkey's Strategic Engagement in the

Former USSR and U.S. Interests," is of special interest.

4. Seyed Kazem Sajjadpour, "Iran, the Caucasus and Central

Asia," in Ali Vanauzizi and Myron Weiner, eds., The New

Geopolitics of Central Asia, Bloomington: Indiana University

Press, 1994, p. 197.

5. For example, the titular nationality of Uzbekistan is

Uzbek, of Kazakhstan is Kazakh, etc. Because ethnic Kazakhs

comprise less than half of the population of Kazakhstan, care is

taken to use the adjectival form "Kazakhstani" rather than

"Kazakh," when referring to that state. Ethnic Uzbeks form over

70 percent of Uzbekistan, so there "Uzbek state" is admissible.

6. Anthony Hyman, "Power and Politics in Central Asia's New

Republics," Conflict Studies 273, London: Research Institute for

the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, August 1994, p. 10.

7. Percentages range from around 40 percent Kazakhs to 70

percent Uzbeks. This creates serious social tension, for example,
28

when the national legislature announces a shift from Russian to

the titular language when, for half of the population (and even

many of the Russified titular minority), it is not their native

tongue.

8. Anthony Hyman, "Moving Out of Moscow's Orbit: The Outlook

for Central Asia," International Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 2, 1993,

pp. 302-303.

 @ENDNOTE TXT = 9. According to Martha Brill Olcott, the dispute

between the Uzbeks and Tajiks is potentially the most

contentious. Central Asia's two main Persian-speaking cities,

Samarkand and Bukhara, were included in Uzbekistan, leaving the

Tajiks with the backwater town of Dushanbe for their republic

capital. For their part, the Uzbeks have periodically staked a

claim to all of the Fergana valley, which includes Kyrgyzstan's

Osh oblast, and part of the Khojent oblast in Tajikistan. The

Uzbeks also argue that part of southern Kazakhstan and eastern

Turkmenistan rightly belongs to them as well. The republics of

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan disagree not only about where their

border should be, but even where it is, and briefly came to blows

over this question in the summer of 1989. "Central Asia's Postempire Politics," Orbis, Vol. 36, No. 2, Spring 1992, p. 256.

10. Nuclear test ranges are but the tip of the iceberg.

Local authorities often had little, if any, knowledge of specific

testing of chemical and biological agents in Soviet research

facilities throughout the region. The identification of

facilities, the types of tests once conducted, and disposal of

test materials is of great interest to republican health

authorities--and U.S. Department of Defense officials.

11. Igor Lipovsky, "The Central Asian Cotton Epic," Central

Asian Survey, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1995, p. 534.

12. Olcott, "Central Asia's Post-empire Politics," p. 253.

See also Gregory Gleason, "The Struggle for Control over Water in

Central Asia: Republican Sovereignty and Collective Action,"

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Report on the USSR, June 21,

1991, pp. 11-19.

13. Afghanistan is the ninth member.

14. Only Akayev of Kyrgyzstan immediately condemned the

August 1991 coup in Moscow. Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan waited 36

hours (until the outcome was evident) before protesting. The

leaders of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan openly

supported the coup from the start and used it as an excuse to

crack down on their own dissidents. See Ahmed Rashid, The

Resurgence of Central Asia Islam or Nationalism?, London: Zed

Books, 1994, pp. 39-40.
29

15. "The War in Tajikistan Three Years On," Special Report,

Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, November 1995,

pp. 1-16.

16. The bonds of religious faith and ethnic kinsmanship must

not be over-exaggerated, however. When one state intervenes in

the domestic affairs of another, it all too often is merely a

justification for pursuit of national interests, e.g. to create

weak or dependent neighbors. Such states risk having the tables

turned on them by their victims--who support dissident minorities

within their borders tit-for-tat. In such cases, religious or

ethnic "solidarity" would give way to Realpolitik.

17. J. Mohan Malik, "India Copes with the Kremlin's Fall,"

Orbis, Vol. 37, No. 1, Winter 1993, p. 80.

18. Martha Brill Olcott, "Central Asia's Islamic Awakening,"

Current History, Vol. 93, No. 582, April 1994, p. 150.

19. Ibid., p. 154.

20. Andrew Rathmell, "Iran's Rearmament--How Great a

Threat?" Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 6. No. 7, July 1994,

pp. 317-322.

21. Sajjadpour, p. 210.

22. Colin Barraclough, "Iran Moves to Position Itself as

Central Asia's Trade Path," Christian Science Monitor, December

21, 1995, p. 8.

23. "Niyazov, Iranian Oil Minister Discuss Oil Pipeline,"

Teheran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program

Network, September 5, 1995; and "$215 million oil deal proposed,"

Moscow ITAR-TASS, September 4, 1995, in Foreign Broadcast

Information Service Central Eurasia (henceforth FBIS-SOV)-05-171,

September 5, 1995, pp. 80-81.

24. In return, Iran has played a mediatory role in

Tajikistan, often acting directly in conjunction with Moscow. For

example, Iran's diplomatic efforts led to a second round of talks

held in Teheran in June 1994 which produced a three-month

ceasefire and POW exchange. Both government and insurgent forces

pledged to uphold and respect democratic principles and asked the

United Nations Secretary General to expedite the dispatch of

peace-keeping forces to the area.

25. Stephen J. Blank, Energy, Economics and Security in

Central Asia: Russia and its Rivals, Carlisle Barracks: Strategic

Studies Institute, May 1995, p. 11.
30

26. Dietrich Reetz, "Pakistan and the Central Asia

Hinterland Option: The Race for Regional Security and

Development," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies,

Vol. XVII, No. 1, Fall 1993, p. 47.

27. To counter India's perceived military and economic

superiority, Pakistan has always sought the patronage of external

powers. America extended superpower patronage in the 1950s when

John Foster Dulles allied the "northern tier" of Turkey, Iran,

and Pakistan against the Soviet Union (although Pakistan really

was concerned with Indian military power and intended to use the

aid to bolster its position against New Delhi, not Moscow). The

United States and Pakistan signed a Mutual Defense Agreement in

May 1954 and Pakistan joined the Southeast Asia Treaty

Organization (SEATO). Disillusionment with America set in

following arms sales to India in the wake of the Sino-Indian War

of 1962 and American failure to settle the Kashmir dispute in

Pakistan's favor.

28. The 1990 Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance

Act ended all economic and military aid to Pakistan because

Congress was convinced Islamabad had "crossed the red line" and

assembled a nuclear bomb. The amendment embargoed delivery of

weapons systems like the F-16 and P-3C Orion, shifting the

balance of conventional and nuclear weapons to India (which was

allowed to continue its nuclear program unhindered). It convinced

the Pakistani government that the development of nuclear weapons

was the only option for Pakistan to safeguard its sovereignty and

eliminated any incentive for New Delhi to resolve their nuclear

imbroglio because any solution might have led to the resumption

of U.S. aid to Pakistan. Ali Abbas Rizvi, "The Nuclear Bomb and

Security of South Asia, Asian Defense, No. 108/94, April 1995, p.

26. The Pressler Amendment did not forbid aid to non-governmental

organizations (NGOs), joint military exercises (if no U.S. funds

were used to support Pakistani participation), commercial arms

sales, or any service fully paid for by the Government of

Pakistan with its own national funds. On January 26, 1996,

Congress passed the Brown Amendment to the Fiscal Year 1996

Foreign Operations Appropriation Bill, which modified the

Pressler Amendment. The Brown Amendment permitted the U.S.

government to deliver $368 million of non-embargoed F-16

equipment, exempted transfer of "military equipment, technology,

or defense services other than F-16 aircraft," extended counterterrorism and counter-narcotics assistance, authorized some forms

of peacekeeping assistance, facilitated humanitarian and civic

assistance projects, and allowed military-to-military contact

authorized outside of the International Military Education

Training (IMET) program. The embargoed F-16s were to be sold to a

third party and the proceeds given back to Pakistan.
31

29. "China Sent Nuclear Aid to Pakistan," Washington Post,

February 7, 1996, p. A1.

30. Kail Ellis, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Alternating

Policies," in Hafeez Malik, ed., Dilemmas of National Security

and Cooperation in India and Pakistan, New York: St. Martins

Press, 1993, p. 131.

31. Samina Yasmeen, "Pakistan's Cautious Foreign Policy,"

Survival," Vol. 36, No. 2, Summer 1994, pp. 127-128.

32. See Shireen T. Hunter, "Southwest Asian Security

Compact: Problems and Prospects," in Hafeez Malik, ed., Dilemmas

of National Security and Cooperation in India and Pakistan, New

York: St. Martins Press, 1993, pp. 258-272.

33. Yasmeen, pp. 127-128.

34. Reetz, p. 36. This "strategic depth" would provide

Pakistan access to military supplies over possible Central Asian

land routes that were not controlled by the Indian sea or air

forces. See also P. Stobdan, "Looking Towards Central Asia,"

Strategic Analysis, Vol. XVI, No. 8, November 1993, pp. 1111-

1114, for an Indian perspective.

35. This is a constant refrain during all visits to Central

Asia. For example, during Prime Minister Bhutto's August 1995

visit to Almaty, on the airport tarmac following pro forma

welcoming remarks about peace and stability, she then referred to

the "grave situation in occupied Kashmir where a valiant

struggle for the right of self-determination by Kashmir is

unmatched by brutal use of force, ruthless suppression and

violation of human rights by Indian occupation forces." Islamabad

Radio, "Bhutto makes statement on arrival," Pakistan Overseas

Service in English, August 23, 1995, FBIS-SOV-95-193, August 23,

1995, p. 75.

36. Yasmeen, p. 129.

37. Tahir Amin, "Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Central Asian

States," in Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner, eds., The New

Geopolitics of Central Asia, Bloomington: University of Indiana

Press, 1994, p. 221.

38. Yasmeen, p. 129.

39. Amin, p. 222.

40. The shortest route is the Karakoram Highway from

Rawalpindi through Chinese Xinjiang to Almaty. There are three

railheads on the Pakistan side: one each near Peshwar and Quetta
32

facing Afghanistan and one terminating inside Iranian Baluchistan

at Zahidan. Reetz, p. 40.

41. P. Stobdan argues that finding a solution to

Afghanistan's problems became Pakistan's first priority when it

realized that although "balkanization" of Afghanistan might lead

to annexation of the south-eastern Pushtun region, it also could

affect Pakistan's own territorial integrity. A peaceful, stable

Afghanistan was necessary if Pakistan was to obtain a land route

necessary for economic penetration. P. Stobdan, "International

Aspects of the Conflict Situation in Central Asia (An Indian

Perspective)," Strategic Analysis, Vol. XVI, No. 3, June 1993,

pp. 275-276.

42. Amin, p. 225.

43. Russian civil and military trade continue, but India can

no longer count on a Russian veto in the Security Council on

issues such as Kashmir; its old ally now demands payment in hard

currency, and the 1971 Mutual Defense Treaty has been replaced by

an agreement on defense planning and cooperation. Raju C. C.

Thomas, "Indian Security Policy in the 1990's: New Risks and

Opportunities," in Hafeez Malik, ed., Dilemmas of National

Security and Cooperation in India and Pakistan, New York: St.

Martins Press, 1993, p. 109.

44. According to P. Stobdan, "the phenomena of opium

cultivation, narcotics trafficking and its related crimes and

mafia politics are not only posing a threat to the Central Asian

states themselves, but also to India. Central Asia is emerging as

the world's largest opium producer. . . . Central Asia plus

Afghanistan on one side, and Myanmar on the other, will make

India most vulnerable to the narcotics trade, bringing with it a

host of other social and political problems." P. Stobdan,

"Central Asia: India's Strategic Approach," Strategic Analysis,

Vol. XVIII, No. 6, September 1995, p. 749.

45. Ibid., p. 742.

46. New relations with Central Asia are a part of a larger

realignment following the end of the Cold War, although Pakistan

remains the immediate threat. India has improved relations with

Iran, which in turn helped persuade Pakistan to drop a United

Nations motion to censure India for its human rights record in

Kashmir. Relations with the U.S. have improved since India opened

refueling facilities to American military aircraft during the

Gulf War; the recent U.S.-India Memorandum of Understanding

includes armed forces joint exercises and training, visits

between senior civilian officials for policy planning and joint

research, and development projects. Russia is now more an

economic than a political partner. Cash-strapped Kremlin
33

officials have willingly sold equipment and spare parts; over 70

percent of India's military equipment comes from factories in the

Former Soviet Union. Russia now supports a nuclear free zone in

South Asia. China remains the long-term threat to India's

regional ascendancy. China still occupies 12,000 square miles of

Indian territory, and remains neutral on the Kashmir controversy,

supporting a peaceful resolution under the framework of the Simla

Agreement. China has established new agreements with Pakistan,

Myanmar and Sri Lanka which Indian analysts view as encirclement

to contain India.

47. Shekhar Gupta, India Redefines its Role, Adelphi Papers

293, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies/Oxford

University Press, 1995, p. 58. He was actually talking about

China, but the principle is the same.

48. Anita Singh, "India's Relations with Russia and Central

Asia," International Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 1, 1995, p. 79.

49. Ibid., p. 80.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid., p. 78.

52. Stobdan, "International aspects," p. 281.

53. These resulted from the September 1993 Agreement on the

Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility.

54. Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, 5th ed.,

New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 24.

55. R. Zaripov, in Komsomolskaya Pravda, noted, "Russia,

which had gotten carried away with establishing ties with the

West, clearly missed the moment at which the destruction of the

‘Asian wall,' began. Evidently it did so not by chance but

because it lacks a conception for relations with the Moslem

world. . . . The activity of Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs

Kozyrev is confirmation that Russia wants to correct the mistake

and shift its foreign-policy emphasis to the East." Current

Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. XLIV, No. 19, June 10,

1991, p. 4.

56. Moscow, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, in Russian, September 23,

1995, FBIS-S0V-95-188, September 28, 1995, p. 19. The edict also

introduced new provisions for a customs union, economic

integration, common standards of international economic

legislation, a payments union, integration of the defense

industry, and a common capital market.
34

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid, p. 21.

59. A March 1992 agreement divided up the Caspian Flotilla

among Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan.

60. Under this agreement over 25,000 Russian troops are

stationed in Tajikistan (which exists as a state at their

sufferance). Peacekeeping forces in Tajikistan include the

Russian 201st Motorized Rifle Division and an increasingly

ethnic-Tajik "Russian" border guard force, supplemented by small

numbers of Uzbek, Kazakhstani, and Kyrgyz forces and a small

Tajik Army.

61. Within Central Asia, only Uzbekistan refused to sign the

treaty on joint protection of the Commonwealth's external

borders. Uzbek Foreign Minister Adbulaziz Komilov stated, "We are

able to reliably monitor the 156-km border with Afghanistan with

our own forces without involving foreign troops from other

countries, primarily Russia." Nikolay Musiyenko, "Fearing Even a

Hint about USSR," Moscow, PRAVDA, in Russian, February 22, 1996,

p. 2, in FBIS-SOV-96-037, February 23, 1996, p. 51.

62. These include the Treaty on Military Cooperation, the

Agreement on the Basic Principles and Terms of Use of the

Baikonur Cosmodrome, the Treaty on the Furtherance of Integration

and Economic Cooperation between the Republic of Kazakhstan and

the Russian Federation, and the Agreement on the Strategic

Nuclear Forces Temporarily Deployed on the Territory of

Kazakhstan.

63. Dimitry Vertkin, "Prospects for Stability--The View from

Kazakhstan," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 6, No. 6, June

1994, p. 287.

64. Douglas Clarke, "Russia's Military Presence in the

"‘Near Abroad'," Transition, Vol. 1, No. 19, October 26, 1995, p.

8-9.

65. Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. XLVII, No.

3, February 15, 1995, p. 27.

66. Vitaly Portnikov, Nezavisimaya gazeta, May 20, 1992, in

Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. XLIV, No. 19, June

10, 1992, p. 2.

67. Mikhail Konarovsky, "Russia and the Emerging

Geopolitical Order in Central Asia," in Ali Banuazizi and Myron

Weiner, eds., The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and its

Borderlands, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994, p. 235.
35

68. Martha Brill Olcott, "Sovereignty and the ‘Near

Abroad'," Orbis, Vol. 39, No. 3, Summer 1995, p. 359. She

identifies Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan as the most cautious,

while the dependency of a Warsaw Pact-style arrangement appeals

to leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.

 @ENDNOTE TXT = 69. Jed Snyder, "Russian Security Interests on

the Southern Periphery," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 6, No.

12, December 1994, p. 551.

70. Steve LaVine, "Moscow Pressures its Neighbors to Share

their Oil, Gas Revenues," Washington Post, March 18, 1994, p.

A24.

71. Blank, Energy, Economics and Security in Central Asia:

Russia and its Rivals, pp. 12-14.

72. LaVine, "Moscow Pressures its Neighbors," p. A24.

73. Blank, Energy, Economics and Security in Central Asia:

Russia and its Rivals, pp. 12-13.

74. Snyder, p. 551.

75. INTERFAX, "Government Seeks Higher Oil Transit Quotas,"

in Russian, August 3, 1994, FBIS-SOV-94-151, August 5, 1994, p.

36-37.

76. Stephen Blank argues that the Central Asians did not

flee the rouble zone, but rather Russia ousted them into a

market-dominated system, thus giving Russia substantial control

over their economies. Blank, Energy, Economics and Security in

Central Asia: Russia and its Rivals, p. 9. See, also, Ilya

Prizel, "The United States and a Resurgent Russia: A New Cold War

or a Balance of Power Recast?," in Stephen Blank and Earl

Tilford, eds., Does Russian Democracy Have a Future?" Carlisle

Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994, pp. 142-143.

77. Moscow ITAR-TASS in English, February 7, 1996, FBIS-SOV96-027, February 8, 1996, p. 12. Fifteen states attended to

include Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, China,

Russia, India, Iran, and Pakistan. Observers from ten other Asian

states, the United Nations, and the Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) also attended.

78. When the CIS was created, the republics assumed that the

so-called "rouble zone" would be similar to the European Economic

Community with tariff-free borders, free movement of goods, and a

common currency. But Russian leaders were unwilling to give up

control of the rouble and excluded other CIS leaders from
36

financial policy formation; instead, they responded to their own

rising prices and budget deficit by printing more roubles. The

republics did not help matters by demanding (and receiving)

enormous quantities of roubles to cover their own economic

expenses. The Central Asian states fell victim to currencytransfer and debt clearing mechanisms (that could take up to 6

months to execute), while having to honor contracts to sell

resources to Moscow at old, pre-inflationary prices. The move to

establish national currencies began only after Russia's surprise

decision to remove all pre-1993 roubles from circulation in July

1993. This forced the cash-short republics, not issued the new

roubles and used as dumping grounds for the defunct roubles, to

use the now-worthless older bills. Concomitant termination of

some artificially low price controls and unregulated subsidies

caused inflation to skyrocket--in Kazakhstan by 2500 percent--

even as trade deficits with Moscow mushroomed. Moscow's demand

(November 1993) that states remaining in the rouble zone keep all

their gold and hard currency reserves on deposit in Russia, while

subordinating their monetary policies to Moscow's, provoked their

adoption of national currencies. Martha Brill Olcott, "The Myth

of ‘Tsentral'naia Aziia'," Orbis, Vol. 38, No. 4, Fall 1994, pp.

555-558. Lynda Maillet, "New States Initiate New Currencies,"

Transition, Vol 1. No. 9, June 9, 1993, pp. 44-49, 56.

79. Yuriy Gallimov, "Aspiration to Integration," Delovoy

Mir, in Russian, Moscow, January 17, 1996, in FBIS-SOV-96-018-S,

January 26, 1996, p. 1.

80. "Uzbek, Kazakh, Kyrgyz Heads Discuss Economic

Integration," Narodnoye Slovo, Tashkent, in Russian, January 13,

1996, in FBIS-SOV-96-010, January 16, 1996, p. 4.

81. The new Russian military doctrine pays special attention

to regional threats and the Near Abroad, with special focus on

those elements which endangered the rights, freedom, and lawful

interests of Russian citizens in foreign states. See also,

Elizabeth Teague, "Russians Outside Russia and Russian Security

Policy," in Leon Aron and Kenneth M. Jensen, eds, The Emergence

of Russian Foreign Policy, Washington, DC: United States

Institute of Peace Press, 1994, pp. 81-105. For a short synopsis

of the Russian view, see "Plight of Russians in ‘Near Abroad'

Debated," TRUD, Moscow, in Russian, July 9, 1994, in FBIS-SOV-94-

135, July 14, 1994, pp. 10-12.

82. Most ethnic Germans have emigrated directly to Germany.

83. Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. XLVII, No.

3, February 15, 1995, p. 27.

84. Cited by Peter Frank, Stability and Instability in

Eastern Europe, Adelphi Paper 285, London: International
37

Institute for Strategic Studies/Oxford University Press, February

1994, p. 9.

85. Lilliam Craig Harris, "Xinjiang, Central Asia and the

Implications for China's Policy in the Islamic World," The China

Quarterly, No. 133, March 1993, pp. 112.

86. The history of this province, so distant from Beijing,

mirrors the chaos in Moscow's borderlands during this century.

During the early Soviet period, the Red Army exploited local

revolts to gain control of the region. In 1933, 1944, and 1946,

the Soviets tried to establish an "independent" Kazakh-Uighur

East Turkestan Republic. Thousands of Kazakhs fled to the XUAR

following the suppression the Basmachi Revolt and Stalinist

collectivization. In return, following a mass revolt in 1962 and

the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, the People's Liberation

Army halted cross border transit from the XUAR into Kazakhstan

only after up to 70,000 Uighurs had fled.

87. Muslims make up approximately 60 percent of the

population; they comprise Uighurs (about 47 percent), Hui,

Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Tatars. See Dru Gladney,

"The Muslim Face of China," Current History, Vol. 92, No. 575,

September 1993, pp. 275-280.

88. Approximately 38 percent Han, 48 percent Uighur, 7

percent Kazakh, 1 percent Kyrgyz and 1 percent Mongols.

89. J. Richard Walsh, "China and the New Geopolitics of

Central Asia," Asian Survey, Vol. XXXIII, No. 3, March 1993, p.

274.

90. Harris, p. 116.

91. Gladney, pp. 278-279.

92. Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, Karimov of Uzbekistan, and

Niyazov of Turkmenistan were all former Party Chiefs; even Akayev

of Kyrgyzstan had served as a junior party functionary. Rakhmanov

of Tajikistan was installed by the Russians in 1992.

93. Ross H. Munro, "China's Waxing Spheres of Influence,"

Orbis, Vol. 38, No. 4, Fall 1994, p. 601.

94. Gladney, p. 278.

95. Munro, pp. 603-604.

96. Harris,p. 123.

97. Munro, p. 600.
38

98. Ibid., pp. 586-587.

99. Ibid., pp. 602-603.

100. See Valentin Shishlevskiy, "China's Defense Policy:

Redefining Security Interests and Rewriting Military Doctrine,"

Asian Defense Journal, No. 108/10/94, February 1995, pp. 30-33.

With war unlikely in the next 10-20 years in the minds of Chinese

strategists, the only threats they perceive are those of local

military conflicts prompted by political stability and over

territory disputes. China also claims its right to economically

advantageous "living space" within "strategic borders," which do

not necessarily coincide with state borders. "Strategic borders,"

they contend, should be extended in relation to the state's

economic and military needs.

101. Russian and Chinese leaders have not only engaged in

serious "fence-mending," but have agreed (in principle) to move

the fence itself by creating a 100 meter-wide demilitarized zone

the entire length of the Sino-Russian border. Swaran Singh,

"China's Post-Cold War National Security Doctrine," Strategic

Analysis, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, April 1995, p. 49. The two countries

also declared that they no longer view each other as a "threat,"

and have initiated a series of confidence-building measures such

as military visits and port calls. Shishlevskiy, p. 31.

102. Singh, p. 50.

103. For example, its claim to sovereignty over three

million square kilometers of maritime territory by extending its

320 kilometer Exclusive Economic Zone out 1600 kilometers to

include the entire Spratly chain (and its potential oil wealth).

104. Singh, p. 56.

105. See Gregory Gleason, "The Struggle for Control over

Water in Central Asia: Republican Sovereignty and Collective

Action," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Report on the USSR, Vol. 3, No. 25, June 21, 1991, pp. 11-17. Current Digest of the

Post-Soviet Press, Vol. XLV, No. 1, February 3, 1993, p. 7. He

argues that the "feud" between the presidents of Tajikistan and

Kyrgyzstan dates back to a 1989 dispute over the division of

irrigation water between the Isfara District of Tajikistan and

the Batken district of Kyrgyzstan.

106. Munro, p. 602.

107. Harris, p. 117.

108. FBIS-SOV-95-162, August 22, 1995, p. 67. Kazakhstani
39

demonstrators protested the August test outside the Chinese

embassy in Almaty. Activists of "Attan," the People's Center for

the Elimination of Nuclear Ranges, demanded an end to nuclear

testing and the closure of the Chinese range at Lop Nor. Japan,

Australia, and Kazakhstan have strongly criticized China for its

continuing underground test program which is to continue into

1996. For example, New York Times, "Chinese conduct nuclear bomb

test," May 16, 1995, p. 13, for protests against a 15 May test.

109. Graham Fuller, "Central Asia: The Quest for Identity,"

Current History, Vol. 93, No. 582, April 1994, pp. 148-149.

110. At a 1992 meeting the Russian Foreign Minister noted,

"Central Asia should remain a CIS sphere of influence, and not a

sphere of extremist forces, and in particular, of Islamic

fundamentalism." The Chinese Foreign Minister replied that Russia

and China "have common interests in preserving stability in the

Central Asian region," and that Chinese policy toward Central

Asia would take into account the close ties that had been

established over time between Russia and the region. ITAR-TASS

World Service, in Russian, November 25, 1992, FBIS-SOV-229-95,

November 27, 1992, p. 9.

111. Fuller, p. 149.

112. Strobe Talbott, "Terms of Engagement," New York Times,

February 4, 1996, Section 4, p. 13. During the March 1996 visit

of Department of State and Department of Defense officials to

Kazakhstan, American delegates stressed that the United States

has no intention whatsoever of interfering in Russian-Kazakh

issues relating to the deployent of Russian military bases on the

territory of Kazakhstan. The United States would support the

process of CIS integration, but wanted these processes to be

carried out, taking into account the national interests of all

countries involved, which would allow each country in the area to

feel itself a proper participant in the world community and world

economic system. "Kazakhstan: U.S. Ambassador Discusses Defense

Conversion Program," Almaty, Kazakh Television First Program

Network, in Russian, March 11, 1996, in FBIS-SOV-96-049, March

12, 1996, p. 50.

113. Rajan Menon, "In the Shadow of the Bear: Security in

Post-Soviet Central Asia," International Security, Vol. 20, No.

1, Summer 1995, p. 158.

114. During the March 1996 visit of Ambassador James

Collins, chief coordinator for relations with CIS countries for

the U.S. State Department, Turkmenistan agreed to send officers

to study at U.S. military schools. In his departing remarks

Collins stressed the importance of creating favorable conditions

for foreign investment and Turkmenistan's execution of economic
40

reforms in cooperation with the International Monetary Fund.

INTERFAX, Moscow, in English, February 10, 1996, FBIS-SOV-96-048,

March 11, 1996, p. 60.

115. S. Frederick Starr, "Making Eurasia Stable," Foreign

Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 1, January/February 1996, pp. 80-92. Martha

Brill Olcott argues that if Kazakhstan should split up, the

Uzbeks may claim part or all of Kazakhstan's three southern

oblasts, could also choose to move into southern Kyrgyzstan (Osh

oblast which is nearly half Uzbek) and could also claim the

western part of Turkmenistan which once were the Khivan outlands.

Martha Brill Olcott, "The Myth of Tsentral'naia Aziia," Orbis,

Vol. 38, No. 4, Fall 1994, p. 563.

116. Snyder, p. 549.
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