An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-805

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 18 February 2014

IN THE MATTER OF:

E.E.L.

Forsyth County

No. 12 JA 03

Appeal by respondent-mother from order entered 15 April 

2013 by Judge Denise S. Hartsfield in Forsyth County District

Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 January 2014.

No brief filed for petitioner-appellee Forsyth County 

Department of Social Services.

Levine & Stewart, by James E. Tanner III, for respondentappellant mother.

Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, by Murray C. Greason, III, 

for guardian ad litem.

HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.

Respondent appeals from an order that granted custody of 

her minor child, E.E.L. (“Eugene”), to the child’s father and 

stepmother, terminated the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, and 

transferred the matter to a Chapter 50 civil custody case. 
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Because the trial court failed to find that there is not a need 

for continued intervention by the State on behalf of the 

juvenile, we vacate the order and remand this matter for further 

proceedings.

Background

The Forsyth County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) 

filed a juvenile petition alleging Eugene was an abused, 

neglected, and dependent juvenile. DSS assumed non-secure 

custody of Eugene, and eventually placed him in a therapeutic 

foster home. At the time of the filing of the petition, Eugene 

had been living with respondent and his maternal grandmother. 

Eugene’s father was married to another woman and was not able to 

provide a home for Eugene. 

After a hearing on 30 May 2012, the trial court entered an 

order adjudicating Eugene to be a neglected juvenile. The court 

continued custody of Eugene with DSS and ordered respondent to 

comply with the recommendations of her psychological evaluation 

and parenting capacity assessment, successfully complete 

parenting classes, and otherwise comply with the terms of her 

service agreement with DSS. The court also ordered Eugene’s 

father to complete a parenting capacity assessment and 

psychological evaluation and comply with all recommendations, 
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attend and successfully complete the “Strong Fathers Program,” 

and otherwise comply with the terms of his service agreement. 

By order entered 3 January 2013, the trial court set the 

permanent plan for Eugene as reunification with his father with 

a concurrent plan of custody with his father. The court 

continued custody of Eugene with DSS, but sanctioned a trial 

home placement of Eugene with his father. The trial placement 

went well, and by order entered 15 April 2013, the court granted 

custody of Eugene to his father. The court released DSS and 

Eugene’s guardian ad litem from further responsibility in the 

case, set forth a visitation schedule for respondent, entered a 

Chapter 50 civil custody order, and terminated its jurisdiction 

over the juvenile case. From this order, respondent appeals. 

Argument

Respondent now argues the trial court erred in awarding 

custody of Eugene to his father and terminating its jurisdiction 

over the juvenile case. Respondent contends that the trial 

court failed to make the necessary finding that there is not a 

need for continued State intervention on behalf of the juvenile 

through a court proceeding. The guardian ad litem for Eugene on 

appeal concedes that we must reverse the trial court’s order on 

this basis.
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A trial court must find that “[t]here is not a need for 

continued State intervention on behalf of the juvenile through a 

juvenile court proceeding” before it may enter a civil custody 

order and terminate its jurisdiction over a juvenile case. N.C. 

Gen. Stat. § 7B-911(c)(2)(a) (2011). Here, the trial court’s 

order is devoid of the required ultimate finding that there is 

not a need for continued State intervention on Eugene’s behalf. 

Nor are there sufficient findings from which this Court could 

infer that continued State intervention on Eugene’s behalf is 

unnecessary. See In re A.S., 182 N.C. App. 139, 144, 641 S.E.2d 

400, 404 (2007) (affirming a trial court’s order entered under 

section 7B-911 where the court failed to explicitly find that 

further State intervention was unneeded, but found: (1) the 

respondent parents were able to coordinate visitations between 

themselves; (2) the parents both had “suitable homes for 

visitation and/or custody of [the] . . . children[;]” and (3) 

the mother was “capable of properly supervising and disciplining 

the . . . children and keeping them safe while in her care and 

custody.”). Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order and 

remand this matter for entry of an order with findings of fact 

in compliance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-911(c)(2)(a). Sherrick 

v. Sherrick, 209 N.C. App. 166, 172, 704 S.E.2d 314, 319 (2011)
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(“Although it is permissible for the court to enter one order 

which both terminates juvenile court jurisdiction and serves as 

the ‘civil custody order’ . . . such an order still must include 

the proper findings of fact and conclusions of law required for 

each component of the order.”); In re J.B., 197 N.C. App. 497, 

502, 677 S.E.2d 532, 535 (2009) (holding the trial court 

improperly terminated its jurisdiction over a juvenile case due 

in part to the court’s failure to “find that there was no longer 

a need for continued State intervention on behalf of [the 

juvenile] in accordance with [N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 7B911(c)(2)(a)”).

Respondent further argues that given her cognitive 

limitations the evidence could not support such a finding. 

Additionally, respondent contends that State intervention is 

necessary to monitor the implementation of the visitation plan 

set forth by the trial court, because Eugene’s stepmother would 

have the discretion to terminate respondent’s visitation with 

Eugene and because the stepmother had previously been 

antagonistic toward visitation between respondent and Eugene. 

However, because we are remanding this matter for the trial 

court to comply with the mandate of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B911(c)(2)(a), we need not address respondent’s arguments that 
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continued State intervention on behalf of Eugene is necessary. 

We leave it to the discretion of the trial court as to whether 

or not it receives additional evidence in this matter.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing reasons, we vacate the trial court’s 

order and remand for the trial court to comply with the mandate 

of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-911(c)(2)(a).

Vacated and remanded.

Judges BRYANT and STEELMAN concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).