F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

J U L I O C E S A R V I L L

A V I C E N C I O , P etitioner ,

v

. J E F F E R S O N B

. S E S S I O N S I I I , Attorney General, Respondent. N o. 13-74324
Ag ency No. A090-179-539

ORDER AND AMENDED OPI NI ON

O n Petition for Review of an Order of the B oard of I

mmig ration Appeals
Arg ued and Submitted April 20, 2017 San F rancisco, California

F iled J a nuary 5, 2018 Amended September 11, 2018

B efore: Mary

M. Schroeder and J ohnnie B . Rawlinson, Circuit J udg es, and W illiam H. Stafford, J r., *

District J udg e. Order; Opinion by

J udg e Rawlinson

* T h e Ho n o rab le W illiam H. Staf f o rd , J r., Un ited States District J u dg e f o r th e No rth ern District o f Flo rid a, sittin g b y

d esig n atio n

.V I L L A V I C E N C I O V

. S E S S I O N S 2

SUMMARY * *

Im m igration

The panel filed: 1) an order g r anting in part Respondent’s motion to amend the opinion filed on F ebruary 20, 2018, a nd amending the opinion in this case, published at 879 F .3d 941 (9th Cir. 2018); and 2) an amended o p i n ion g ranting J ulio Cesar Villavicencio’s petition f or r e v iew of the B oard o f I mmig r a ti on Appeals’ decision that affirmed finding s o f removability

and inelig ibility

for cancellation of removal.

I n the amended o pinion, the pan e l concluded that Villavicencio was n ot r emovable f or a c ontrolled s u bstance offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B )(i) because the statutes under which he w as convicted o f conspiracy t o possess certain drug s, Nevada Revised Statutes §§ 199.480 a nd 454.351, are overbroad and indivisible.

The panel held that the Nevada conspiracy statute, N .R.S. § 1 99.480, is overbroad when compared to the g eneri c definition of conspiracy because the Nevada statute lacks the requisite “overt act” e lement. Therefore, the p anel concluded that the c ateg orical approach may not be u s e d to determine removability

. The panel also concluded that application o f the modified categ orical approach is foreclosed because this court has a lready determined that N .R.S. § 199.480 is indivisible.

** T h is su m m ary co n stitu

t es n o p art o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.V I L L A V I C E N C I O V

. S E S S I O N S 3

The panel further held that N .R.S. § 4 54.351 , w h ich
covers any drug which m a y n o t be lawfully introduced into interstate commerce under the F e deral F ood, Drug a nd Cosmetic Act, is categ orically overbroad relative to the substances controlled under 21 U.S.C. § 802.

The panel a lso concluded that, althoug h N.R.S. § 454.351 lists multiple means of violation, i.e. , possessing , procuring , or manufacturing certain drug s, because jurors need not ag r ee on the means o f the violation, the statute must still be reg arded as indivisible. I n so c oncluding , the panel noted that: 1 ) there is n o authoritative state court decision addressing whether the alternatives listed in the statute c reate elements or alter n a tive means o f violating the statute; 2) nothing in the lang uag e of the sta tute itself sug g ests that the alternative phrasing represents alternat i v e e l e m e n t s versus means; 3 ) the listed alternatives carry n o different punishments; 4) the mere f act that a statute is phrased in the disjunctive does not alone translate into a listing of elements rather than means; and 5 ) while there is no model jury instruction addressing N.R.S. § 454.351, a Nevada jury may g enerally convict without b eing unanimous as to the underlying means of committing the offense. According ly , the panel held that, because N

. R.S. § 454.351 is overbroad and indivisible, the statute cannot be used a s a predicate o ffense to support r emoval. The panel further noted that its reversal o f the r e movability determination terminates the removal p r oceeding s, and that the panel need n ot a

nd would not address cancellation o f removal.V I L L A V I C E N C I O V

. S E S S I O N S 4

COUNSEL

Kari E. Hong ( arg ued), Supervising Attorney ; K atherine Horig an (arg

u ed) and Yara Kass-Gerg i (arg ued), Cer t i f

ied L aw Students; Ninth Circuit Appell a te Project, B oston Colleg e L aw School, Newton, Massachusetts; for Petitioner.

Dawn S. Conrad ( arg ued) and Edward E. W ig g ers, Senior L itig ation Co u n s e l, Office of I mmig ration L itig ation, Civil Division, United States D epartment of J ustice, W a s hing ton, D.C., for Respondent.

Robert M. L oeb a

nd T homas M. B ondy , Orrick Herring ton & Sutcliffe L L P, W ashing ton, D .C.; Aaron W

. Scherz er, Orrick Herring ton & Sutcliffe L L P, New York, New York; B rian P. Goldman, Orrick Herring ton & Sutcliffe L L P, San F rancisco, California; J a

y ashri Srikantiah and L isa W eissman-W ard, I mmig r a nts’ Rig hts Clinic, Mills L ega l Clinic, Stanford, Cali fornia; Manuel Varg as and Andrew W achtenheim, I mmig r a nt Defense Project, New York, N ew York; for Amici Curiae I mmig rant Defense Project, American I mmig r ation La w y e r s A s s o c i a t i o n , A s i a n A m e r i c a n s A d v a n c i n g J ustice–Asian L aw Caucus, Community L eg al Services in East Palo Alto, Detention Watch Network, F lorence I mmig r a nt a nd Refug ee Rig hts Project, Heartland Alliance’s National I mmig rant J ustice Center, I mmig rant L eg al Resource Center, National I mmig r a tion L aw Center, National I mmig r a tion Project o f the National L awy ers Guild, Northwest I mmig rant Rig hts Project, Public Counsel, U.C. Davis I mmig ration L aw Clinic, and Centro L eg al de la Raz a

.V I L L A V I C E N C I O V

. S E S S I O N S 5

ORDER Respond e n t ’ s Motion To Amend Opinion filed on F ebruary 20, 2018 is GRANTED I N PART. The opinion in this c ase, published at 8 7 9 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2 018), is hereby amended as follows:

1. 879 F .3d at 944, first sentence - insert <violations of> between <removal,> a

nd <Nevada Revised Statutes>.

2. 879 F .3d at 944, B ackg round Sectio n , second sentence - delete the period following <205.220> a nd replace with <, respectively .>.

3. 879 F .3d at 945, Discussion Section, second p arag raph - insert <, as amended > following th e Ragasa citation.

4. 8 79 F .3d at 9 46, Subsection A , first parag raph, last line

- r eplace < See G arcia-Santana , 774 F .3d a t 534> with < See id .>

5. 879 F .3d at 947, Subsection B , line 2 - delete space preceding second bracket.

6. 879 F .3d a t 9 4 7 , Subsection B , first parag raph, last line - insert the following lang u ag e: <, abrogated on other grounds as recog n i z e d by Ragasa , 752 F

. 3d at 1175.

7. 879 F

. 3d at 947, Subsection B , second parag r aph, line 11

- delete the lang uag e following <N.R.S. § 454.351>.V I L L A V I C E N C I O V

. S E S S I O N S 6

8. 879 F .3d at 947, Subsection B - insert the followi ng lang uag e following the third parag raph:

There is no a

uthoritative sta t e court decision addressing w hether the alternatives listed in the statute create elements or alternati v e means of violating the statute, a

nd nothing in the l a ng uag e of the statute itself sug ge s ts that the alternative phrasing
r e p r e s e n t s a l t e r n a t i v e e l e m e n t s versus al t ernative means. The listed
a l t e r n a t i v e s c a r r y n o d i f f e r e n t p u n i s h m e n t s ; t h e y a r e a l l misdemeanors. See N .R

. S. § 454.31;
see also Mathis , 136 S. Ct. at 2256 ( “ I f s t at u t o r y a l t e r n a t i v e s c a r r y different punishments, th e n under Apprendi they must b e elements.

. . . ) (citations omitted).

The m ere fact that a statute is phrased in the disjunctive does not alone translate into a l isting of elements ra t h e r than means. See Rendon , 764 F .3d at 1086. “On l y when state law requires that in order to c onvict the defendant the jury must unanimously ag ree that he committed
a p a r t i c u l a r s u b s t a n t i v e o f f e n s e contained within the disjunctively worded statute are we able to c onclude that the statute co ntains alternativeV I L L A V I C E N C I O V

. S E S S I O N S 7

elements an d not alternative means .” Id . (emphases in the orig inal).

There is no model jury instruction
a d d r e s s i n g N

. R

. S

. § 4 5 4

. 3 5 1

. Ge n erally , in Nevada, a jury may convict without being unanimous as to the underly ing means of c ommitting the offense. S

ee , e.g. , Triana v. State , No. 54818, 2010 W L 3504809, a t *1 (Nev. J un. 9, 2010); G arcia-Gaona v. State , No. 63255, 2014 WL 989732, at *2 (Nev. Mar. 12, 2014) ( “A
u nanimous g eneral verdict of g uilt
w ill support a c o nviction so long as there is substantial e vidence in support of one o f the alternate theories of culpability .”) (quoting Anderson v. State , 118 P.3d 1 84, 186 (Nev. 2005)).

9. 879 F .3d at 948, line 3 - delete <the> b etween <because> and <jurors>.

F uture petitions for rehearing will not be entertained.V I L L A V I C E N C I O V

. S E S S I O N S 8

OP INION

RAW L I NSON, Circuit J udg e:

Pet i t i o n er J ulio Cesar Villavicencio seeks review of a decision from the B oard o f I mmig r ation Appeals (B I A) affirming finding s o f r emovability and of inelig ibility for cancellation of removal made by an I mmig ration J ud g e ( I J ). Villavicencio was removed pursuant to the provi s i o n s o f 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B )(i). 1 Villavicencio maintains that the state crimes underlying his re m o v a l, violations of Nevada

1 8 U.S.C. § 1 2 2 7 (a)(2 )(B )(i) p ro v id es in p ertin en t p art: (a ) Cla sses o f depo rta ble a l iens

A n y alien

. . . in an d ad m itted t o th e Un ited States sh all,
u p o n t h e o rd er o f

th e A tto rn ey

Gen eral, b e rem o v ed if th e alien is w ith i n o n e o r m o re o f th e f o llo w in g classes
o f d ep o rtab le alien s:

. . . (2 ) Crim ina l o ffenses

. . . (B ) Co ntro lled substa nces (i) Co n v ictio n

An y alien w

h o at an y tim e af

ter ad m i ssio n h as been
co n v icted o f a v io latio n o f (o r a co n s p iracy o r attem p t to v io late) an y law o r reg u l atio n o f a state

. . . relatin g to a co n tro l led su

b stan ce (as def

in ed i n sectio n 8 0 2 of T itle 2 1 ), . . . is d ep o rtab l e.V I L L A V I C E N C I O V

. S E S S I O N S 9

Revised Statutes (N.R.S.) §§ 199.480 2 a n d 454.351 3 are not
a categ orical match to the federal ge n e ric statutes because t h e y a re overbroad and indivisible. W e ag ree w i t h Villavicencio and G R

ANT his petition for review.

I. BACK G ROUND

Villavicencio is a native and citiz en of Mex ico, w ho entered the United States illeg ally i n 1 9 7 9 and adjusted his status to lawful permanent resid e n t in the following decade. On J anuary 20, 2010, an information w as filed in Nevada charg ing Villavicencio with b urg lary and g rand larceny under N.R.S. §§ 20 5 .060 and 205.220, respectively

. The state

2 N.R.S. § 1 9 9 .4 8 0 p ro v id es in p ertin en t p art:

3

. W h en ev er tw o o r m ore p erso n s co n sp ire:
(a ) T o co m

m i t an y crim e o th er th an th o s e s et f orth in su b sectio n s 1 an d 2 , an d n o p u n i sh m en t is o th erw ise p rescrib ed b y

law ;

. . . each p erso n

is g u ilty o f a g ro ss m isd em ean o r.

3 N.R.S. § 4 5 4 .3 5 1 p ro v id es in p ertin en t p art:

1

. A n y perso n w i th in t

h is S tate w

h o p o sse sses, p ro cu res, o btain s, p ro cesses, pro du ces, d eriv es, m an u f actu res, s e l l s, o f

f ers f o r s ale, g iv es aw ay or o t herw ise f

u rn ish es an

y d ru g w

h ich m ay n o t b e law f u lly in tro d u ced i n to in terstate co m m erce u n d er th e F ed eral Fo o d , Dru g an d Co sm etic A ct is g u ilty o f a m isd em ean o r. (Fo o tn ote ref

eren ce o m itted ).V I L L A V I C E N C I O V

. S E S S I O N S 10 subsequently filed two amended informations containing the
same charg es, and a third amended in f o rmation charg ing Villavicencio sol e l y w i th g rand larceny

. A judg ment o f conviction was entered on the g rand larceny

charg e

. Three months b efore entry of the judg ment of conviction
on t h e g rand larceny charg e, an information was filed in Nevada charg ing V illav i c e ncio with possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell (N.R.S. 453.337), a nd sale of a controlled substance ( N.R.S. 453.321), identify ing methamphetamine as the controlled substance. An amended information charg ed Villavicencio with conspiracy to possess drug s that may not be introduced into interstate commerce (N.R.S. 1 99.480 and N.R.S. 454.351), also identify ing methamphetamine as the controlled substance. Villavicencio ag reed to plead g uilty to thre e c onspiracy counts in two separate cases. J udg ments of conviction were entered in both cases pursuant to the terms of the plea ag reement.

T h e D epartment of H omeland Security (DHS ) subsequently served Villavicencio with a Notice to Appear
c h a r g i n g h i m w i t h r e m o v a b i l i t y u n d e r 8 U

. S

. C

. § 1 2 2 7 ( a )(2)(A)(iii) for having been convicted o f an a ggr a vated felony relating to a theft offense, and und e r 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B )(i) for having been convicted of a viola t i o n relating to a controlled substance. At his removal proceeding s, Villavicencio admitted that he was not a citiz en or national of the United Stat e s , that he was a native a nd citiz en of Mex ico, and that h is status was adjusted to that of
a lawful permanent r esident. Villavicencio denied that he
was convicted of g rand larceny and that he was convicted o f
a conspiracy to possess dr u gs

. Nevertheless, the I J f ound Vi l l a v icencio removable, noting that the g overnment h adV I L L A V I C E N C I O V

. S E S S I O N S 11

withdrawn the charg e relating to the theft conviction, leaving only the drug conspiracy charg e as the basis of removal.

Villavicencio appealed the I J ’s decision to the B o a r d o f I mmig r a tion A ppeals (B I A). T he B I A affirmed the I J ’s removability

determination, and Villavicencio filed a timely petition for review.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“W here, as here, the B I A conducts its own review of the evidence a

nd law, our review is limited to the B I A ’ s decision,
ex c e pt to the ex tent that the I J ’s opinion is ex pressly adopted. W e review de novo a ll questions of law, including whether a particular conviction qualifies as an ag g ravated felony

. ” Y o ung v. H older , 697 F .3d 976, 9 81 ( 9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (citations a

nd internal q

uotation marks omitted)

. “W hether
a particular c onviction constitutes a removable offe n s e i s a question of law.

. .” A lvarado v. Holder , 759 F .3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2 014). “W e review f a c tual finding s for substantial evidence. The B I A ’s factual findings a r e conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compe l l e d to conclude to the contrary .” Y

oung , 697 F .3d at 981 (citation s a nd internal quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Villavicencio’s removal under 8 USC § 1227(a)(2)(B )(i)
was predicated on his state convictions for viol a t i o n s o f N.R.S. § 1 9 9. 4 9 0 a nd N.R.S. § 454.351. “W e analy z e whether a conviction qualifies a s a predicate offense for removal purposes b y employ ing the f ramework the Supreme Court constructed in Tayl o r v

. United States , 495 U .S. 575 (1990).

. . .” Alvarado , 759 F

. 3d at 1126 (citation o m i t t e d).V I L L A V I C E N C I O V

. S E S S I O N S 12

This framework is conducted u sing a three-step process. See Descamps v. United States , 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013).

At the first step, we employ “the c ateg orical a pproach, [ in which] we ex amine only the statutory definition of the crime to determine whether the state statute of c onviction renders an alien removable under the statute of removal, without looking to the actual co n d u c t u nderly ing the petitioner’s offense.” Ragasa v. Holder , 752 F .3d 1 1 7 3 , 1 176 (9th Cir. 2014), as amended (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “I f this categ orical approach reveals that the elements of the state crime are the same as or n arrower than the ele m e n t s of the federal offense, t h e n the state crime is a categ orical match

. . .” Lope

z
- V a l e n c i a v. Lynch , 798 F .3d 863, 8 67 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). On the other hand, if the categ o rical ap p r o ach reveals that the elements of the state are c r ime are broader than the elements of the federal offense, then the state crime is not a categ orical match. See Mathis v. United States , 13 6 S

. Ct. 2243, 2251 (2016).

I n a narrow rang e of c ases, when a state statute is broader than the elements of the federal offense, we may employ the modified categ orical approach to determine if the state crime is a match for the f

ederal offense. See Lopez-Valencia , 798 F .3d at 867–68. Use of the modi f i ed categ orical approac h is a vailable only if the state statute contains alternative elements, and the alternative element w hich f orms the basis of t h e c o nviction conforms to the federal offense that is t h e comparator offense. See Descamps , 133 S.Ct. at 2283–84. I n that circumstance, the statute is considered to be “divisible,” and amenab l e t o a pplication o f the modified categ orical approach. I

d . at 2284.V I L L A V I C E N C I O V

. S E S S I O N S 13

The statute of removal, 8 USC 1227(a)(2)(B )(i), provides in r elevant part: “Any alien who at a n y time after admission has been convicted of a violation of ( or a cons p i racy o r attempt to v iolate) any law o r reg ulation of a State, the United States, or a foreig n country relating to a controlled substance (as define d in section 802 of Title 21[ 4 ] )

. . . is deportable.” I n other words, (1) a n y alien ( 2) convicted of a conspiracy under state law (3) relatin g t o a controlled substance a s defined u n d e r 2 1 U.S.C. § 802, is deportable. See 8 U SC 1227(a)(2)(B )(i).

A. N.R.S. § 199.480

Villavicencio was convicted of a conspiracy in violation of N.R.S. § 199.480. Villaivicencio arg ues that the N e v ada drug conspiracy statute is overbroad when compared to the g eneric definition o f conspiracy

. T h e Nevada conspiracy statute prohibits “two or more p ersons” from “conspir[ ing ] [ t] o accomplish any criminal or unlawful p urpose, o r to accomplish a p urpose, not in itself criminal or unlawful, b y criminal o r u nlawful means.” N.R.S. § 1 9 9

. 4 8 0 ; see also United S tates v

. Garcia-Santana , 774 F .3d 528, 534 (9th Cir. 2014) ( “ Nevada law defines a conspiracy as an ag reement between two or more persons for an unlawful purpose. . . .”) (citations omitted). No proof of a n overt act in furtherance o f the conspiracy

is required. See id.

4 2 1 U.S.C. § 8 0 2 , also k n ow n as t h e “ Co n tro lled S u

bstan ces A ct,” (CSA ) en u m erates “ f

i v e sch ed u les o f co n t

ro lled su b s t a n c e s .” Ra ich v. Go n za les , 50 0 F

. 3 d 8 5 0 , 8 5 4 (9 th Cir. 2 0 07 ) (citatio n an d in tern al q u o tatio n m ark s o m itted ). “ Co n tro lled su b stan ces a re p laced o n a p articu lar sch ed u le b ased o n th eir p o ten tial f o r ab u se, th eir accep ted
m ed i cal u se in t

reatm en t, an d th e ph y sical an d p sy ch o lo g i cal
co n seq u en ces o f

ab u se o f th e su b stan ce. . . .” Id . (citatio n o m itted ).V I L L A V I C E N C I O V

. S E S S I O N S 14

The g eneric definition of conspiracy is referenced i n 8 U.S.C. § 1 1 0 1 (a)(43)(U). See id

. The statute provides in relevant part that “an a t tempt or conspiracy to commit an offense described [ in t h e p arag raph defining ag g ravated felonies] constitutes an ag g ravated felony

. 8 U.S.C. § 1 1 0 1 ( a ) ( 4 3 )(U). I n Garcia-Santana , we held that the g eneric definition of c onspiracy requires the performance of an overt act. See 774 F .3d a t 534. B ecause Nevada ’ s c o n s piracy statute lacks the requisite “overt act” element, it “criminaliz e s a broader rang e of conduct than the p roperly determi n e d g eneric definition of conspiracy , ” and the ca t egorical approach may not be u sed to determine removability

. Id .;
see also Marinelarena v

. S essions , 869 F .3d 780, 786 n.2 (9th Cir. 2017) (“ G arcia-Santana held t h a t Nevada’s conspiracy
s t a tute, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 199.480, is o verbroad becau s e i t does not contain, as an element, an overt act”). Ordinarily , once we have d etermined that a st at u t e is overbroad, we then determine whether or not a statute is divisible. S

ee Lopez-Valencia , 798 F.3d at 867–68. However, we h ave already d etermined th a t Nevada’s conspiracy statute is not divisible. See G arcia-Santana , 774 F. 3 d a t 534 n.3 (“The Nevada conspiracy statute is n o t a divisible statute t h a t lists potential offense elements in the alternative.

. . . ” ) ( c itations and internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently , application o f the modified categ orical approach to this statute is foreclosed. See id

.
B

. N.R.S. § 454.351

“ The removal provision [ of 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B )(i)] is . . . satisfied when the elements that make up the state crime of conviction relate to a federally controlled substance.” Mellouli v. Lynch , 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1990 (2015). U nder theV I L L A V I C E N C I O V

. S E S S I O N S 15
categ orical approach, the proper analy sis turns on whether the state drug conviction “limits the meaning of ‘ c ontrolled substance,’ for remov a l p u r poses, to the substances controlled
u n d er [21 U.S.C. § 802.] ” Id

. a t 1990–91; see also R u i z
Vidal v. G onzalez , 473 F .3d 1 072, 1076 ( 9th Cir. 2007), abrogat e d o n other grounds a s recognized by Ragasa , 752 F .3d at 1175.

The N ev a d a statute c overs “any drug which may not be lawfully introduced into interstate c o m m e rce under the F ederal F ood, Drug and Cosmetic Act [ 21 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq.] .” N.R.S. § 454.351. The statute may be v i o l at ed b y

“ p o s s e s s [ i n g ] , p r o c u r [ i n g] , o b t a i n [ i n g] , p r o c e s s [ i n g] , pro d u c[ ing ] , deriv[ ing ] , manufactur[ ing ], sell[ ing ] , offer[ ing ] for sale, g iv[ ing ] away or otherwise furnish[ ing ] ” any d rug prohibited under the F e d e r al F ood, Drug , and Cosmetic A ct (F DCA). N.R.S. § 454.351.

W e have recog niz ed that a California d r ug law that “reg u lates the possession and sale of n u m e r o us substances that are not similarly reg ulated by the CSA” was categ orically overbroad. Ruiz-Vidal , 473 F .3d a t 1 078. I n a similar vein,
our sister circuit has recog niz ed t h a t “ the F DCA prohibits countless ac tivities that are completely u nconnected to controlled substances.” R ojas v. Att’y Gen. of U .S. , 728 F .3d 203, 218 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation a nd internal quotation marks omitted). B ecause the Nevada drug statute likewise prohibits any drug listed under the F DCA, it is categ orically overbroad relative to 21 U.S.C. § 802. See Mellouli , 135 S. Ct. at 1986. Having determined that the statute is overbroad, w e n ow turn to an ex a mination of whether the statute is divisible, a nd thereby amenable to analy sis under the modified categ orical approach. See Lopez-Valencia , 798 F .3d at 8 6 7 -6 8

. I nV I L L A V I C E N C I O V

. S E S S I O N S 16 analy z ing w hether a statute is divisible or indivisible, we keep in mind “[ t] he critical distinction

. . . that while indivisible statutes may contai n multiple, alternative means o f
c ommitting the crime, only divisible statutes cont a i n m u l t i p l e , alt e r n a tive elements of f

unctionally separate c rimes.” Rendon

v. Holder , 764 F .3d 1077, 1084–85 ( 9th Cir. 2014) (citations omi t t ed) (emphases in the orig inal). Application of the modified categ orical app r o a ch “is appropriate only for divisible statutes—because the modifi e d c a t e g o r i c a l a p p r o ach as applied to a divisible statute may reveal which alternative element the state charg ed and the jury or judg e f o und when only some alternative elements m a t c h the f ederal, g eneric crime.” Id

. a t 1 085 (emphasis in the orig inal). “I f the statute is indivisible, o ur inquiry ends, because a conviction under an indivisible, o verbroa d statute can n ever serve as a predicate offense. . . .” Lopez-Valencia , 798 F .3d at 868 (citation a nd internal quotation marks omitted) ( emphasis in the orig inal).

There is no authoritative state court d e cision addressing whether the alternatives listed in the statute create e l ements
or alternative means of violating the st a t u t e , and nothing in the lang uag e of the statute itself sug g e sts that the alternative phrasing represents alternativ e elements versus a lternative
means. The listed alternatives carry no different p u n ishments; they are all misdemeanors. See N .R.S

. § 454.31; se e a l

s o M athis , 1 36 S. Ct. at 2256 (“I f statutory alternatives carry different punishments, then under Apprendi they must be elements. . . .) (citations omitted).

The mere fact that a statute i s p hrased in the disjunctive does not alone translate into a listing of elements rather than
means. S ee Rendon , 7 64 F .3d at 1086. “Only w hen state law requires that in o r d e r t o convict the defendant the jury must unanimously ag ree that he committed a particular substantiveV I L L A V I C E N C I O V

. S E S S I O N S 17

offense contained within the disjunctively worded statute a re we able to conclude t hat the statute contains a lternative

e l e m e nts and n ot alternative means .” I d

. (emphases in t h e orig inal).

There is no model jury i n s t ruction addressing N .R.S. § 454.351. Generally , in Nevada, a jury may convict without being u n a n imous a s to the underly ing means of committing the offense. S

ee , e.g. , Triana v. State , No. 54818, 2010 W L 3504809, at *1 (Nev. J un. 9, 2010); Garcia-Gaona v. State , No. 63255, 2014 W L 989732, at * 2 ( Nev. Mar. 12, 2014) (“A unanimous g eneral verdict of g uilt will support a conviction
so long as there is substantial evi d e n c e in support of one o f the alternate theories of cu l pability .”) (quoting Anderson v

. State , 118 P.3d 184, 186 (Nev. 2005)).
“Any statutory p hrase that—ex plicitly or i m p licitly

— refers to multiple, alternative means of commission must still be reg arded as indivisible if the juror s n e ed not ag r ee on which method of committing the offense the defendant used.” Rendon , 764 F .3d at 1085. Althoug h the Nevada statute lists multiple means of violation, i.e

. , possessing , procuring , o r manufacturing , because jurors need not a g ree on the means o f violation, the stat u t e “ must still be reg arded as indivisible,” and our inquiry is ag ain at an en d

. I d

. ; see also LopezValencia , 7 9 8 F .3d at 868. B ecause N.R.S. § 454.351 is overbroad and indi v i s i b l e, it cannot be used as a predicate offense to support removal. See Alvarado, 759 F .3d at 1126.

IV. CONCLUSION

Villavice n cio was not r emovable under 8 U SC § 1227(a)(2)(B )(i). N.R.S. §§ 199.480 and 454.351 are both overbroad. N .R.S. § 199.480 criminaliz es a broader rang e o fV I L L A V I C E N C I O V

. S E S S I O N S 18

conduct than is described in t h e g eneric definition o f conspiracy , and N .R.S. § 454.351 e ncompasses a wider r ang e of subs tances than those set forth in the federal Controlled S u b stances Act. B e cause neither statute is divisible, t h e modified categ orical approach was unavailable to determine if Villavicencio w as convicted of a removable offense. As a result, Villavicencio is e n t i t l e d to his requested relief reversing the determination of removability

. 5

P ETITION G RANTED.

5 O u r rev ersal o f th e rem o v ab ility d eterm in atio n term i n ates th e rem o v al pro ceed i n g s. W e n eed n o t an d d o n o t ad d ress can cellatio n of
rem o v al.