THE ARMY AND HOMELAND SECURITY

A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE

Antulio J. Echevarria II

March 2001
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ISBN 1-58487-046-X

ii
FOREWORD

The topic of homeland security includes a broad a

missions and mission areas ranging from national m

defense to military assistance to civil authorities. Re

the topic has attracted a great deal of attention due 

public’s heightened awareness of the variety and nat

emerging threats and of the United States’ vulnerab

to them.

This monograph, written by Lieutenant Colonel A

J. Echevarria II, grew out of a tasking by the Army S

investigate the Army’s role in homeland security f

strategic, rather than a legal or procedural perspectiv

author achieves this perspective by placing hom

security missions within the larger spectrum of opera

In so doing, he exposes potential problem areas—mi

requiring more or different force structure than 

already available—for further action by the Army. H

recommends that the Army consider alternative 

sizing metrics that include, as a minimum, the “hig

homeland security identified in the study.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTH

ANTULIO J. ECHEVARRIA II is a lieutenant colonel 

U.S. Army currently assigned as the Director of Str

Research at the Strategic Studies Institute at C

Barracks, PA. He graduated from the U.S. Mi

Academy in 1981, was commissioned as an armor o

and has held a variety of command and staff assignme

Germany and Continental United States; he has also s

as an assistant professor of European history at th

Military Academy; Squadron S3 of 3/16 Cavalry; C

BN/TF and Bde Doctrine at the U.S. Army Armor Cen

Fort Knox; as an action officer at the Army After 

project at HQ TRADOC, Ft. Monroe, VA; and 

speechwriter for two U.S. Army Chiefs of Staff. H

graduate of the U.S. Army’s Command and Genera

College, and holds M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in Histor

Princeton University. He has published articles 

number of scholarly and professional journals to inclu

Journal of Military History, War in History, War & S

the Journal of Strategic Studies, Parameters, Joint 

Quarterly, Military Review, and Airpower Journa

book, After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers bef

Great War, was published by the University Press of K

in March 2001.

iv
THE ARMY AND HOMELAND SECURIT

A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE

Throughout our nation’s history, the U.S. Army a

sister Services have readily responded to the Constitu

requirement “to insure domestic Tranquility and prov

the common defence.”

1

 That requirement has oblige

forces to conduct a broad range of missions fro

suppression of sedition, as in the Whiskey Rebellion of 

to the reconquest of U.S. territories, as in the Second 

War. However, global economic changes, the rapid ad

of information technologies, and the incre

proliferation of long-range missiles and weapons of 

destruction (WMD) recently have added new dimens

the requirement to protect the homeland.

2

 Accord

political and military leaders have begun to voice con

about America’s growing vulnerability and what sho

done about it.

3

 It is both timely and appropriate, the

for the U.S. Army to reexamine the issue of hom

defense and to assess whether it possesses the nec

resources to perform its homeland security (HLS) mi

while carrying out its other responsibilities unde

national security and national military strategies.

This monograph approaches homeland security 

strategic issue, examining the Army’s capac

accomplish its HLS missions under the current force

metric and war planning requirement to figh

simultaneous (or nearly simultaneous) major theate

(MTWs).

4

 Little agreement exists over whether the Se

have sufficient forces to execute two MTWs even w

the additional—and still difficult to quan

requirements associated with HLS.

5

 Furthermore, d

much debate about the future of U.S. national se

strategy and much rhetoric about the vulnerabilities 

homeland, little of the work done to date on alter

strategies actually addresses the requirement to prote

1
homeland.

6

 To assist the Department of Defense (D

identifying requirements and assigning priorities for 

the Army should establish a force-sizing metric for it

missions, particularly its high-end missions (defined l

Assumptions.

This monograph makes two fundamental assump

First, the United States will remain engaged in the 

for the foreseeable future. As a result, its national se

strategy of “Engagement” and its national military st

of “Shape, Respond, Prepare Now” will remain unch

in principle, even if the terms and priorities are alte

Second, if U.S. national culture and historical trad

are any indication, Americans will demand a do

environment in which their homeland is secure, bu

authority and liberties remain intact and security mea

are transparent.

8

 Accordingly, the U.S. militar

perform the bulk of its HLS missions as the supp

rather than the lead federal agency and may have to c

with fairly restrictive rules of engagement.

9

A New Threat Environment.

With the ending of the Cold War and the emergen

new technological revolution, the threat environme

changed. A number of regional powers, states of co

and transnational groups already possess limit

asymmetric, means capable of challenging the inter

the United States abroad and those of its al

Intelligence estimates indicate, for instance, that ba

missiles will continue to proliferate over the nex

decades. More than 25 countries currently possess ba

missiles, though only two, Russia and China, 

intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capa

reaching the United States. However, China’s m

arsenal will probably increase significantly in the 

decade. Furthermore, as the report of the Commiss

Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United Stat

2
Rumsfeld report) concluded, within 5 years North 

and Iran (and Iraq in 10 years) will have the capabi

target the United States with ICBMs armed 

conventional and unconventional warheads.

11

 Concei

by 2010, any one of these states and a score of others 

issue a “stay at home or else” ultimatum to the 

National Command Authority (NCA), thereby effec

threatening the nation’s ability to protect its int

overseas.

12

In addition, cruise missiles—which vary in type 

relatively inexpensive unmanned aerial vehicles (UA

million-dollar-per-copy Tomahawks—have prolife

enormously in recent years. Approximately 19 n

currently produce cruise missiles of some type, while 

than 75 countries possess them. Often referred to 

“poor-man’s air force,” cruise missiles are much chea

develop and easier to conceal than ballistic missiles

can also carry payloads similar to those of ballistic mi

but can deliver them with greater effectiveness beca

their ability to make multiple passes. Intelligence esti

project a market of some 7,000 cruise missiles 

land-attack type by 2010, not counting Chinese or Am

purchases.

13

 These missiles can be concealed i

launched from standard shipping containers. U.S. 

typically handle 13,000,000 shipping containers ann

but only a fraction of these are inspected. On any give

about 1,000 ships travel the Atlantic Ocean, mak

difficult to determine which vessel (or vessels) 

launch, or had launched, a cruise missile against 

target.

14

 To date, the major sea and air ports of the U

States lie virtually unprotected from an attack by l

sea-launched cruise missiles.

Furthermore, assessments conducted by the U

States Commission on National Security/21st Ce

(Hart-Rudman Commission) and the National Comm

on Terrorism (Bremer Commission) point out that Am

remains vulnerable to a large-scale terrorist attack.

15

the total number of terrorist incidents in the United 

3
has declined from a high of 51 in 1982 to a low of 3 in 

the overall lethality of terrorism worldwide has risen 

an average of 1,200 casualties during 1987-94 to mor

3,500 during 1995-97.

16

 Intelligence projections, su

Global Trends 2015, suggest that this trend will conti

What’s more, some political leaders have expressed co

that large-scale domestic terrorism has already begu

evidenced by the Oklahoma City bombing—and 

extremist organizations like the Order and the 

Resistance are planning more attacks.

18

 Domestic ter

thus poses at least as serious a threat to U.S. citizens 

international brand, perhaps more.

Moreover, international and domestic terrorists a

to have grown more radical in their aims and me

During the Cold War, international terrorists typ

executed limited attacks so as not to undermine ex

political and financial support for their causes. T

however, a number of international and domestic te

organizations seem motivated by revenge or apoca

fears, and seem bent on inflicting as many casualt

possible. Some international terrorists, such as Osam

Laden and his al-Quaida organization, have achie

considerable degree of fiscal and political independen

are thus less concerned that mass-casualty attacks 

alienate their supporters. Hence, terrorist attac

general have expanded in scale, as evidenced by the 

bombing of the World Trade Center, which was expec

yield some 60,000 casualties. Consequently, while th

number of terrorist incidents worldwide has decline

the years, intelligence estimates indicate that the o

likelihood of a terrorist attack in the United S

involving a WMD has actually increased.

19

Additionally, nuclear, biological, and chemical we

have proliferated despite Congress’ Cooperative T

Reduction program with Russia, and the presence o

arms control regimes as the Chemical Weapons Conv

(CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BW

Russia’s inability to maintain accurate accountability 

4
of its WMD remains a source of concern; and Iran

Libya, and North Korea, among others, continue to in

their chemical and biological stockpiles despite, in 

cases, being signatories to one or both of these conven

A WMD attack, whether delivered overtly by miss

covertly by other means, could result not only in m

casualties, disruption or degradation of inform

infrastructures, contamination of public health sy

and foodstuffs, and degraded response capabilities, b

in economic damage, loss of strategic world po

social-psychological damage, and undesirable po

change.

21

Finally, one must consider the potential menace t

information systems posed by cyber attacks. The num

documented computer intrusion events has increase

1,334 in all of 1993 to 8,800 in the first 6 months of 2

The Computer Security Institute estimates that com

crime in the United States doubled in 1999, causing 

$10B in financial losses.

23

 Because the sectors of the c

infrastructure of the United States—informatio

communications, vital human services, energy, ph

distribution networks (e.g., waterways, bridges)

banking and finance—are becoming increasingl

together electronically, cyber attacks can h

devastating effect on them as well. The Presid

Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection as

the vital human services and information 

communications sectors as highly vulnerable to com

attack. The energy, physical distribution, and bankin

finance sectors were classified as either well-protec

relatively resilient to an attack.

24

 Nonetheless, a

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency testified 

Congress in February 2000, the foreign cyber 

continues to grow. More than one dozen countries, inc

Russia and the People’s Republic of China, have dev

or are developing the means to launch strategic-leve

attacks.

25

5
Today’s threat environment reflects the influenc

faster-paced and more interconnected world. In 

environment, the traditional notion that “a thr

capabilities x intentions” remains valid, but requires 

emphasis on potential threats than previously. Few o

states or nonstate actors that might wish to do the U

States harm currently possess the capability to do s

even a slight increase in the rate of proliferat

long-range missile technologies and WMD means th

adversaries can acquire that capability sooner th

expect, perhaps sooner than we can implement co

measures. In addition, computer “glitches” such as th

bug possess no intent at all, but can nonetheless unde

national security when they become active. Accord

policymakers must now focus as much on possibilities 

probabilities, as much on vulnerabilities as on threat

differently, an effective homeland defense might r

treating vulnerabilities as seriously as confirmed t

under the traditional reckoning.

26

Definition of HLS and Mission Areas.

The U.S. Government needs to develop a compreh

definition of HLS to provide a uniform basis for coordi

the efforts of all federal agencies and for deriving m

areas, tasks, and responsibilities for each. Remar

however, HLS has not yet been authoritatively de

either at the interagency level or by the de

community.

27

 Part of the reason for this is the disagre

over whether the definition should address on

requirement to “deter and defend against foreig

domestic threats” or whether it should encompas

hazards,” including natural and man-made disasters

views, such as those offered by RAND Arroyo, fav

former—a more circumscribed definition—beca

provides a clear distinction between “military acti

and the “activities of civilian organizations.”

28

 They 

that such distinctions will reduce damage to the mil

image, which could suffer harm if it is perceived as 

6
either too little or too much. Unfortunately, defin

clarity will not necessarily preclude mispercepti

whether the military has actually done too little or too 

in any particular HLS situation. Furthermo

circumscribed definition tends to make the problem 

tools available; and would thus not help expose pot

organizational or procedural weaknesses in the wa

U.S. Government and the Joint community prop

protect the homeland.

In the absence of an authoritative definition, the 

has rightly developed and tentatively approve

following “all-hazards” definition in its HLS: Str

Planning Guidance (Draft dated Jan. 8, 2001):

Protecting our territory, population, and infrastructure 

home by deterring, defending against, and mitigating t

effects of all threats to US sovereignty; supporting ci

authorities in crisis and consequence management; a

helping to ensure the availability, integrity, survivability, a

adequacy of critical national assets.

Such a definition avoids dividing national securit

“domestic” and “overseas” concerns and thereby 

preserve unity of effort in the execution of the na

security and national military strategies. Second, it a

in reducing the potentially disruptive impact of an in

in which it is not clear whether hostile intent is invol

enabling the creation of a single chain of com

appropriate for either situation. Finally, it facilitat

establishment of priorities and the allocation of resour

This definition supports the following missio

mission areas described in the draft HLS Str

Planning Guidance:

• Land Defense. The Army objective under Land D

is to be prepared to participate as part of the join

executing plans for the defense of the United States a

territories.

7
• Responding to Chemical, Biological, Radiolo

Nuclear, and High-yield Explosive (CBRNE) Incid

The Army objective in responding to CBRNE inciden

organize, equip, and train units to timely, effective

efficiently support the Lead Federal Agency in its effo

(1) reduce the vulnerabilities to CBRNE incidents; a

manage the consequences of CBRNE incidents.

• National Missile Defense (NMD). In the near-

term the Army’s objective is to perform those a

necessary to ensure the successful testing, deployme

operation of a land-based NMD system. The purpose 

NMD system as currently envisioned is to pr

protection against limited ballistic missile attacks ta

at the United States. This protection will be ach

through integration of the NMD system elements 

Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Asses

(ITW/AA). The Army’s Operational Concept for NMD 

found in TRADOC PAM 525-82.

• Combatting Terrorism. The Army objective 

Combatting Terrorism is to provide training, staffin

equipment resources and services to support do

emergencies consistent with national security prio

Federal Response Plan criteria, and U.S. Code dealin

employment of military forces within the United Sta

• Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP). Prot

and defending critical infrastructure, including inform

and information systems. Army support will likely con

equipment and forces to prevent the loss of, or to as

restoring, telecommunications, electric power, gas a

banking and finance, transportation, water, emer

services, and government continuity. The Army obj

under CIP is to develop a capability to ensur

availability, integrity, survivability, and adequacy of 

assets deemed critical to the United States.

• Information Operations (IO). The Army obj

under IO is to provide information operations in sup

HLS efforts. Information operations are defin

8
defensive and offensive operations taken to affect adv

information and information systems while defending 

own information and information systems. While the

situations where a retaliatory IO offensive strike direc

an external entity might be undertaken to stop an on

attack, the general expectation is that HLS IO missio

be defensive in nature.

• Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA)

Army objective under MACA is to provide essential su

services, assets, or specialized resources to help 

authorities deal with situations beyond their capab

MACA includes all of the actions that can be taken 

the disaster-related Military Support to Civil Auth

(MSCA).

As this list reveals, the Army’s HLS missions s

broad spectrum. In addition, they take place in paralle

other activities reflected in the Army’s Spectr

Operations. As Figure 1 illustrates, the Army’s 

missions correspond to low- and high-end operations 

on their frequency and magnitude. For exa

Environmental Operations, which are often hi

frequency but low in magnitude, correspond with the 

low-end of the spectrum. Last year’s fire-fighting act

in the northwestern United States were significant 

for the soldiers involved, but those activities did not t

Army’s (or DoD’s) resources to the degree that a 

attack would have.

By contrast, operations at the right end of the spe

tend to occur less frequently, if at all, but demand 

resources, and often of a specific kind. The exception 

rule is Domestic Relief, which can occur anywhere alo

spectrum depending upon the size of the incident

general rule, then, those incidents with the l

probability of occurrence could result in the most 

consequences and, accordingly, would require the gr

amount of resources.

9
It is doubtful that most low-end HLS missions 

prevent the Army from executing a two-MTW sce

However, it is almost certain that some high-end 

missions would. A WMD incident, for example, 

require sufficient resources to halt or interrupt the f

forces from the continental United States (CONUS

thereby seriously affect the commander-in-chiefs’ (C

war plans. Since defense officials currently assess th

to U.S. forces as “moderate” for the first MTW and “hi

the second, any disruptions in the flow of forces 

compound an already acute strategic dilemma.

As a minimum, therefore, the Army should dev

HLS force-sizing metric for its high-end mis

specifically its WMD and NMD missions (and po

Domestic Relief, though it is not clear under 

circumstances it would cause the NCA to halt the f

forces overseas). Moreover, the process of developing 

metric would help the Army (and the defense establis

at large) to refine the full range of potential HLS mis

develop planning factors, assess requirements, id

10

Figure 1.
areas of possible conflict between HLS and warfi

missions, and determine how to develop a force to 

metric.

29

A Force-sizing Metric for HLS.

WMD. It is difficult to forecast with precision the n

and type of resources a WMD incident would requir

variables involved are too numerous and diver

hard-and-fast rules. Planners at Joint Forces Com

Task Force for Civil Support (JTF-CS) have nonet

used the best information available from the D

Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) to develop 

“playbooks” that offer an estimate of the resources re

to respond to three possible high-end events: the deto

of a 10KT nuclear device; a persistent chemical strike; 

discharge of a high-yield explosive device.

30

By these estimates, the resources required to resp

the detonation of a 10KT nuclear device include: four 

infantry battalions; five medical companies; three che

battalions; three engineer construction battalions; 

military police companies; four ground transpor

battalions; an aviation group; three direct su

maintenance battalions; and two general su

maintenance battalions. Resources required to respon

persistent chemical strike or to an incident involvi

detonation of high-yield explosives would amount to 

30 percent of those required for a 10KT nuclear event. 

these numbers might appear small, it is import

remember that the loss of even a single medical, che

or signal element can render larger units non-m

capable for the prosecution of an MTW.

Naturally, a combination of incidents would r

more resources. However, that amount might not equ

simple sum of resources required for each incide

combination of incidents could well produce a ne

synergy that would require more resources. Yet, it 

11
also result in a reduced resource demand overall depe

upon the timing and proximity of the events.

Since an infinite number of scenarios are possib

Army requires a force-sizing metric that balances res

and requirements within acceptable risk parameter

Probability-Severity Matrix included as Figure 2 repr

one possible framework for such a force-sizing m

Cross-indexing the probability of an event wi

anticipated severity produces a Probability-Severity 

(SI) that can also serve as a resource baseline. For ins

an SI equal to one 10KT incident (the detonation 

nuclear device the size of a 55 gallon drum) re

probability of occurrence that is greater than that of a 

incident, but lower in severity.

The Army might, for example, consider establis

force-sizing metric capable of addressing an SI of 2x

events, which would accommodate any number of sce

in which one or two nuclear devices are brought in

United States covertly. A scenario involving three or 

devices suggests that the perpetrators have acc

considerable resources—not only weapons but also me

transportation and concealment—and that they 

planned a well-coordinated assault. In such a cas

United States would probably be engaged in a w

national survival in which “all bets are off” and the Na

Command Authority would likely direct all reso

against the perpetrators, assuming they could be iden

In addition, a resource baseline capable of addr

2x10KT events would enable the Army to respond to s

incidents, such as a 1x15KT or 1x22KT incide

approximately 3x1KT nuclear incidents, or three bio

or chemical attacks.

31

NMD. Ideally, NMD would include a ro

multi-layered defensive system consisting of space, a

and land weapons capable of long-range—strat

defense as well as shorter-range—theater—de

Although it seems clear that the United States wil

12
some form of NMD, support for it is far from unanimo

technical and political reasons.

The technical argument, presented by such outs

critics as Dr. Theodore Postol, is that the technolog

not exist (and probably never will) to enable an inter

to distinguish a real missile from the chaff or decoy

inevitably accompany it. However, experts at the U.S. 

and Missile Defense Command have successfully r

this argument by showing that Postol’s claims pertai

an obsolete version of interceptor technology.

32

The political argument for not building an 

proffered most conspicuously by Russia and China, 

implementation will cause an expensive and dang

arms race, or have an otherwise destabilizing inf

worldwide.

33

 However, this is a specious argument. An 

race is essentially already underway as evidenced 

proliferation of missile technology. An NMD, whic

13

Figure 2.
defensive system, not an offensive one, and presumab

be extended to our friends and allies, serves as a nec

counterweight to the dangers inherent in proliferatio

manner of speaking, it represents a “threat” prima

those states inclined to use their offensive m

capabilities to threaten others. Rather than exer

destabilizing influence, in fact, NMD could contrib

maintaining or restoring peace and stability by preclu

“state of concern” from using its ballistic missiles to 

the United States or its allies from intervening in a re

crisis. 

Another component of NMD is a shorter-

antimissile system capable of defeating cruise mi

Such a system would also meet some requirements fo

protection as well as the defense of critical infrastru

The type and number of systems required would nat

depend upon a careful analysis of such factors as m

enemy, troops, terrain, and time (METT-T). Excludi

understandable desire to provide an anti-missile shie

every major U.S. port or city, the defense of only c

ports and airfields along the east, west, and Gulf coast

the Great Lakes would still require a large num

systems. For example, some 147 Nike-Ajax and 

Hercules air-defense sites were constructed in the U

States during the Cold War.

34

To be sure, the Army’s force-sizing metric will als

to include the other HLS mission areas. However, 

most likely to have an impact on the force stru

necessary for the U.S. military to execute 2MTWs are 

and NMD.

Developing a HLS Force.

Once the Army has developed a force-sizing met

HLS, it will need to examine the options available for 

that metric. Two of the more popular options are des

below:

14
1. Add HLS as a “third MTW” to the current two

force-sizing metric and assign high-end missions 

appropriate number of Army National Guard (A

divisions (along with full-time soldiers as necessary)

2. Convert the current two-MTW force-sizing metr

one overseas MTW (or multiple smaller-scale continge

and one within CONUS for HLS missions.

Option 1 has the advantage of maintaining a large

for deterring aggression or, if necessary, for defeat

adversary quickly and decisively. It also retains more 

for executing smaller-scale contingencies abroad—

many strategists claim will characterize the str

environment for the foreseeable future—and reduci

excessively high operational tempo for the Army over

addition, it reduces the risk that unforeseen crises 

draw units away from transformation. Furthermor

stability that most ARNG units enjoy would enable 

personnel to become well-established in their commu

and develop critical working relationships with loc

enforcement, fire departments, paramedics, and 

emergency response organizations. (In many cases, A

and Reserve personnel are also local “first-responder

that could pose a challenge unless planned for before

Such relationships can aid communications efforts a

responding authorities and help reduce the inevitab

and friction that would attend a major incident.

35

However, reequipping an appropriate numb

full-time ARNG divisions for WMD response and m

defense of the homeland will require substantial add

funds. The Army would also have to de-conflic

warfighting missions that might already have 

assigned to some of those units.

Option 2 comes in a variety of forms. Fundament

has much in common with any option—such as focus

smaller-scale contingencies—that calls for scaling ba

number of MTWs the U.S. armed forces must addr

eliminating them altogether. Overall, this option h

15
advantage of directing more resources toward HLS w

increasing the total amount of defense spending

possible that this option would even allow for f

reductions in force structure, thereby freeing fun

redirection to other federal agencies so as to increase 

security, drug interdiction activities, and cr

infrastructure protection.

However, it has significant disadvantages in t

reduces U.S. influence overseas, as well as U.S. abi

deter war or to fight more than one major conflict at a 

This option would require changing U.S. strate

“win-hold-win” and thus would mean placing 

emphasis on (and ultimately more funding in) Halt

operations to stop an aggressor’s advance in one t

while a friendly counteroffensive takes place in an

Yet, as the results of the Kosovo campaign ind

one-dimensional operations—which currently charac

the Halt-phase concept—entail a high degree of ris

tend to produce ambiguous results. In short, option 2 

flexibility in crisis response for better protection at ho

In sum, each option would cause defense planne

strategists to address HLS and national security as a s

integrated activity. Each would also place the d

emphasis on HLS missions. However, only option 1 p

the United States to address high-end HLS missions 

retaining its present capability to deter war and to fig

win two conflicts simultaneously.

At the same time, this comparison illustrates th

two-MTW force-sizing metric has outlived its useful

The two-MTW metric fails to capture, for exampl

requirements for HLS, not to mention those associate

other missions, such as peacetime engagement. The 

should consider whether another metric would enab

quantify and communicate its force structure require

more accurately.

Clearly, HLS requirements must be imbedd

whatever overall force-sizing metric is chosen. In any 

16
the major conclusion of this monograph—that the 

needs to develop a HLS force-sizing metric—remains 

even if the overall two-MTW force-sizing metric is cha

Recommendations.

In summary, this monograph recommends tha

Army do the following:

• Consider alternative force-sizing metrics that in

high-end HLS missions as a minimum;

• Advocate development of an NMD system to in

defense against cruise missiles;

• Continue to emphasize the importance of HLS 

development of national security and national m

strategies.

Whether and to what extent the United Sta

attacked in the future will depend a great deal upon h

potential adversaries perceive the measures tak

defend it. If prudent steps have been taken, 

opportunities will exist for harm, and the United Stat

find itself in a better position to mitigate the effects of 

should it occur.

ENDNOTES

1. For a summary of the Army’s contribution to the “c

defence,” see Gregory J. W. Urwin, “The Army of the Constituti

Historical Context,” in Max G. Manwaring (ed.), “. . . to insure d

Tranquility, provide for the common defence . . .” Carlisle, PA: S

Studies Institute, 2000, pp. 27-62.

2. For the purposes of this monograph, WMD refers to ch

biological, nuclear, radiological, and high-yield explosives as 

those generally referred to as weapons of mass effect (WME), 

electro-magnetic pulse or computer viruses. The term “weapons 

destruction” is controversial. Mike Osterholm and John Sc

Living Terrors: What America Needs to Know to Survive the 

Bio-terrorist Catastrophe (New York: Delacorte Press, 2000) po

that the term conveys the sense that defense against such wea

17
primarily a military or police concern rather than one affec

citizens.

3. Phillip A. Odeen, et al., Transforming Defense: National S

in the 21st Century (Arlington, VA: National Defense Panel, De

1997), was one of the first documents to raise homeland defen

strategic concern.

4. While recent indications are that the 2MTW force-sizing 

will soon change, this monograph resulted from a tasking to inve

homeland security within the context of 2MTWs. For indicatio

the Joint community is considering abandoning the 2MTW me

Elaine M. Grossman, “Military Makeover: Fight two wars a

That’s old thinking,” Boston Globe, January 7, 2001, p. D1.

5. Many analysts, in fact, maintain that not only does t

military lack the forces for a 2MTW scenario, but the force-sizing 

itself is antiquated and does not reflect the full range of today’s s

requirements. See Steven Metz, ed., Revising the Two MTW 

Shaping Paradigm, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Ins

Forthcoming, 2001.

6. An example of such a discussion is Michael O’H

“Rethinking Two War Strategies,” Joint Force Quarterly, Sprin

pp. 11-17, which proposes an additional 10 percent cut in U.S

forces, but fails to mention homeland defense. Such omissions ar

part to DoD’s position that it will play a supporting role in ho

defense and its failure to define better the full range of HLS m

and their potential overlap with warfighting missions—a de

addressed in the recommendations of Michèle A. Flo

Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Working Group, Washingt

National Defense University, November 2000, p. 60. Nonetheles

amount of material on HLS issues does exist. See, for exam

recent publications on homeland defense by the Center for Strate

International Studies and the Journal of Homeland D

(www.homelanddefense.org).

7. Public pronouncements by key members of th

administration suggest that the United States will remain eng

the world. See, for example, the speech of Dr. Condoleeza Rice, th

administration’s National Security Advisor, at the Fletcher Conf

November 15, 2000; and Condoleeza Rice, “Promoting the N

Interest,” and Robert B. Zoellick, “A Republican Foreign 

Foreign Affairs, January/February 2000, pp. 45-62, 63-78, here 

70, respectively.

18
8. In a speech to the National Academy of Sciences on Janu

1998, President Clinton assured the public that those demand

be met, declaring that even in the face of a growing bioterrorist 

the government would remain committed to upholding “privac

and other constitutional protections, as well as the proprietary r

American businesses.”

9. Thomas R. Lujan, “Legal Aspects of Domestic Employmen

Army,” Parameters, Vol. 27, No. 3, Autumn 1997, pp. 82-97, o

excellent summary of legal lessons learned from selected d

employments of the Army during the 1990s.

10. A useful summary of key aspects of the U.S. homeland a

vulnerabilities to asymmetric attack is provided in Kenn

McKenzie, Jr., The Revenge of the Melians: Asymmetric Threats 

Next QDR, McNair Paper No. 62, Institute for National S

Studies, November 2000, pp. 60-64, Table 7. Global Trends 

Dialogue about the Future (http://www.cia.gov/cia/public

globaltrends2015) states that asymmetric approaches will beco

“dominant characteristic” of most threats to the U.S. homeland

11. Donald H. Rumsfeld, et al., The Report of the Commi

Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, Washingt

July 15, 1998, pp. 8-9.

12. Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Exploring U.S. 

Defense Requirements in 2010, Washington, DC: IFPA, April 1

6-9.

13. Cruise Missile Threats; and Emerging Cruise 

Capabilities, Center for Defense and International Security S

http://www.cdiss.org/cmthreat.htm; Ballistic and Cruise 

Threats, National Air Intelligence Center, NAIC-1031-0

http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/tabled.htm. The Insti

Foreign Policy Analysis, Assessing the Cruise Missile Puzzle: Ho

a Defense Challenge? (Washington, DC: IFPA, November 200

reports that 80,000 cruise missiles comprised of 75 different ty

deployed in 81 different countries.

14. http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/cruise4.htm.

15. The United States Commission on National Secur

Century, Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving S

and Promoting Freedom, April 15, 2000; and the Report of the N

Commission on Terrorism, Countering the Changing Th

International Terrorism, The Terrorism Research Center, June 

19
Some critics maintain, however, that as dramatic as terrorist 

are, “to call them a serious threat to national security is s

plausible.” John and Karl Mueller, “Sanctions of Mass Destr

Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 3, May/June 1999, pp. 43-53. This 

successfully rebutted by Patrick L. Moore, “Is Catastrophic Te

Just Strategic ‘Peanuts?’” National Security Law Report, Vol. 22

July-August 2000, pp. 1, 5-6.

16. Terrorism in the United States 1996, Washington, D

http://www.ncvc.org/stats/dt.htm; and Anti-US Attacks, 1

Director of Central Intelligence, Counterterrorist C

http://www.cia/di/products/terrorism/attacks.gif; and 

Casualties Worldwide, 1987-1997 (graph), http://www.c

products/terrorism/worldwide.gif.

17. Global Trends 2015, http://www.cia.gov/cia/public

globaltrends2015.

18. Hon. John Train, “Who Will Attack America?” Strategic 

Fall 2000, pp. 11-15.

19. Global Trends 2015. Amy E. Smithson and Leslie Ann

Ataxia, Stimson Center Report No. 35, contend that terrorist us

and CW will remain difficult. See also Bruce Hoffman, “Terro

Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Reassessment of the Thr

Transnational Threats: Blending Law Enforcement and M

Strategies, Carolyn W. Pumphrey, ed., Carlisle, PA: Strategic 

Institute, November 2000, pp. 85-104. Hoffman essentially argu

terrorists cannot overcome the difficulties of employing WMD

will not use them. His argument is successfully defeated by 

Utgoff, “Bruce Hoffman’s View of Terrorism by Weapons o

Destruction: Another Perspective,” pp. 133-136, in the same v

See also Walter Laquer, The New Terrorism, New York: Oxford

20. Richard Latter, “Chemical and Biological Weapons: Fo

Response to a Twenty-first Century Threat,” Wilton Park 

October 2000, points out that, while 139 states have signed th

and 27 of 61 declared CW production facilities have been destroy

far, concerns remain over clandestine programs and the abs

Middle Eastern and North-east Asian states as signatories. Sim

the BWC is hampered by the absence of any arrangements t

compliance. On the need to bolster CW and BW arms control r

see: Jonathan B. Tucker and Kathleen M. Vogel, “Prevent

Proliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapon Materia

Know-How,” The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, Sprin

pp. 88-96, esp. 95; Marie I. Chevier, “Strengthening the Intern

20
Arms Control Regime,” in Biological Warfare: Modern Offen

Defense, Raymond A. Zilinskas, ed., Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 20

149-176; and Laurie Garrett, “The Nightmare of Bioterrorism,” 

Affairs, January/February 2001, pp. 76-89.

21. Much depends upon the social and historical context 

attack. The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide 

Peloponnesian War, Robert B. Strassler, ed., (New York: S

Schuster, 1998); and Giovanni Boccaccio, The Decameron, Jo

Usher, trans., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 

examples of how an epidemic can cause political and social 

However, the great flu epidemic of 1918, devastating as it was, 

no such disruption. Gina Kolata, Flu: The Story of the Great In

Pandemic of 1918 and the Search for the Virus that Caused it (Ne

Touchstone, 2001). Henry W. Fischer III, Response to Disast

Versus Fiction & Its Perpetuation, 2d ed., (New York: University 

America, 1998), indicates that chaos will be a typical organiz

response, but not for individuals, provided they are kept well-info

22. Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) Coord

Center, www.cert.org/stats/cert_stats.html.

23. Charles Piller, “Cyber-Crime Loss at Firms Doubles 

Billion,” Los Angeles Times, March 22, 2000; cited from F. G. H

Homeland Defense: A Net Assessment, Washington, DC: Cen

Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Forthcoming 2001.

24. Robert T. Marsh, Critical Foundations: Protecting Am

Infrastructure, Washington, DC: President’s Commission on 

Infrastructure Protection, October 1997, pp. 11-20, Appendix A

25. Hoffman, Homeland Defense.

26. For supporting views on the need to change the tra

definition of a threat, see Colonel Randall J. Larsen, U.S. Ai

(Retired) and Ruth A. David, “Homeland Defense: Assumption

Strategy Second,” Strategic Review, Fall 2000, pp. 4-10; and Ph

Lacombe, “Daniel T. Kuehl’s View of DOD’s Role in Defend

National Information Infrastructure: Another Perspecti

Transnational Threats, pp. 163-172.

27. Ashton B. Carter, “Keeping America’s Military Edge,” 

Affairs (January/February 2001), pp. 90-105, esp. 94, in fa

homeland defense as one of the “homeless missions” th

accomplished in an “ad-hoc fashion by unwieldy combinat

21
departments and agencies designed a half-century ago for a d

world.”

28. Eric V. Larson and John E. Peters, DRAFT, The Army 

Homeland Defense: Concepts, Issues and Options, RAND Arroyo 

October 1999, pp. vi-xvii.

29. See Quadrennial Defense Review 2001, p. 60, for simila

cast as recommendations.

30. Playbooks for other scenarios are under development, b

not yet progressed to the draft stage.

31. The baseline of 2x10KT also accords roughly with a RAN

study, October 1999, that proposed planning guides of one 22KT 

incident of 100,000 casualties, three chemical attacks o

casualties each, and three biological attacks of 10,000 casualtie

32. Lieutenant General John Costello, Commander USA

briefing presented at the Annual U.S. Army Space and Missile D

Command Conference, August 22, 2000. Dr. Postol was invit

declined to participate in the conference. See also The Insti

Foreign Policy Analysis, National Missile Defense: Policy Issu

Technical Capabilities, July 2000, Final Edition. Nonetheless, c

of developing an NMD continues; see “Missile Shield Illusion

York Times, on the web, January 10, 2001.

33. There are also issues with the 1972 ABM Treaty that re

be resolved. R. James Woolsey, “The Way to Missile Defense: 

with Russia and Ourselves,” National Security Law Report, Vol. 

3, May-June 2000, pp. 1-2, 5-6, provides a brief discussion 

provisions of the ABM Treaty and suggests how it might be chan

also discusses a cheaper alternative that would employ satellit

34. http://www.zianet.com/dpiland/ordnance/wspg.htm.

35. The advantages and disadvantages of using Army Reser

by extension some ARNG forces) in a HLS role are discussed in 

L. Mercier Jr., “Terroists, WMD, and the US Army Re

Parameters, Vol. 27, No. 3, Autumn, 1997, pp. 98-118.

36. On the limited efficacy of air operations in the Kosovo cam

see Admiral Bill Owens, Lifting the Fog of War, New York: 

Straus, & Giroux, 2000, pp. 181-183. For a critique of the Hal

concept, see Earl H. Tilford, Jr., Halt Phase Strategy: New Win

Skins . . . with Powerpoint, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies In

1998.

22
37. For a discussion of force-sizing alternatives, see Metz, R

the Two MTW Force Shaping Paradigm.

23
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

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Director of Publications and Production

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