WAR DEPARTMENT 

FIELD SERVICE 

OPERATIONS 

MAY 22,1941 

A MILITARY CLASSIC REPRLNT 

U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL 

STAFF COLLEGE PRESS 

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 

1992 
U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL 

STAFF COLLEGE PRESS 

In September 1991, the commandant of 

the U.S. Army Command and General Staff 

College at Fort Leavenworth authorized the 

establishment of the Command and General 

Staff College (CGSC) Press. The CGSC 

Press has the following missions: 

To provide an outlet for the 

professional publication of monographs and 

book-length works on all subjects of interest 

to professional officers. 

To aid in professional military 

education at all levels of the U.S. Army and 

other military services, foreign as well as 

domestic. 

To promote and support the advanced 

study of the theory, history, and practice of 

the military art by professional officers and 

other military experts. 

To promote and support the 

professional development of the CGSC 

faculty and faculties of other institutions of 

higher military education in the United 

States and abroad. 
PREFACE 

On 22 May 1941, the War Department published a new version 

of FM 100-6, Opemtions. This manual superseded a tentative 1939 

version. The most recent official edition had been the Field Service 

Regulations dated 1923. 

The Army of 1941 desperately needed up-to-date doctrinal 

guidance. The world was already engulfed in war, and the United 

States had begun to mobilize, Thus, the Army was eight times 

larger than it had been in 1939. Moreover, it had also embarked on 

a modernization program that affected virtually every facet of 

military activity. 

The 1941 edition of FM 100-5 encapsulates the state of Army 

doctrine on the eve of America's entry into World War 11. This is 

the doctrine the Army took into the great Louisiana maneuvers of 

1941. Later, it also guided the American soldiers through combat 

in places as diverse as New Guinea and Tunisia. Not until June 

1944 did a new manual supersede this one. 

In 1991, the Army chief of staff directed that a new series of 

"Louisiana maneuvers" begin in 1994. Unlike the 1941 exercises, 

these will involve computer simulations rather than real troops. 

They are intended to prevent postwar unpreparedness, whereas the 

1941 maneuver8 were part of a prewar mobilization. Both 

maneuvers, however, share the goal of enhancing the Army's 

readinese through the means of simulated combat. To facilitate an 

understanding of the historical context underlying the 1994 

maneuvers, the CGSC Prese offers this reprint of the field manual 

that served the Army in 1941. 

The 1941 version of FM 100-5 has long been recognized as a 

clamic piece of doctrine writing, remarkable for its clarity of 

concept and prose. It is also a valuable historical artifact, 

preserving as it does the doctrinal thought of the Army at a critical 

juncture in history. 

CHRISTOPHER R. GABEL, Ph.D. 

Historian, Combat Studies Inatitute 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 
FIELD SERVICE 

REGULATIONS 

OPERATIONS 

Prepared under direction of the 

Chief of Staff 

UNITED STATES 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

WASHINGTON : lB4l 

FW rle by tbe Superintendent of Document.. Wwhington, D. C. - Priae I eantm 
WAR DEPARTMENT,' 

WASHINGTON, May 22, 1041. 

FM 100-5. Field Service Regulations, Operations, is published for the information and guidance of all concerned. 

It contains the doctrines of leading troops in combat and 

tactics of the combined arms and constitutes the basis of 

instruction of all arms and services for fleld service. Additional doctrines pertaining to the defense of coast lines and 

landing operations on hostile shores are discussed in other 

manuals. 

Field Service Regulations will be interpreted in the light of 

FM 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare. FM 100-5, Field Service 

Regulations, Operations, should be studied irl connection with 

FM 100-10, Field Service Regulations, Administration, and 

FM 100-15, Field Service Regulations, Larger Units. 

While the fundamental doctrines of combat operations are 

neither numerous nor complex, their application is sometimes 

dif8cult. Knowledge of these doctrines and experience in their 

application provide all commanders a Arm basis for action in 

a particular situation. This knowledge and experience enable 

the commander to utilize the flexible organization with which 

he is provided to group his forces into task units most suitable 

for the accomplishment of his mission. 

Set rules and methods must be avoided, They limit imagination and initiative which are so important in the successful 

prosecution of war. They provide the enemy a Axed pattern 

of operations which he can more easily counter. 

It is a function of command to coordinate the tactics and 

technique of the various arms and services so as to develop 

in the forces employed on a given task the teamwork essential 

to success. 

[A. 0. 062.11 (1-9-41).] 

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR: 

a. C. MARSHALL,, 

Chief of Stan. 

OFFICIAL : 

E. S. ADAMS, 

Major General, 

The Adjutant General. 

DISTRIBUTION : 

R and H (10) ; Bn and L (5). 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

CHAPTER 1. C~~ANIZATION. Paragraph Territorial organization- -- - -- - -- -- - --- - - - --- - 1-6 

Organization of troops ---------------------- 7-24 

CHA~ a. ARMS AND SEXVICEEI. 

Oeneral--------------------,---------- 2&26 

Iniantry---,---------------------------- 27-35 

Cavalry----,----------,------------------ 3646 

Field Artillery------------------------------ 47-58 

Coast Artillery Corps ------------------------ 59-88 

Air Corps--------------------,------------- 60-83 

Corps of Engineers ......................... 84-90 

Signal Corps-------------------------------- 01-94 

Chemical Warfare Service .................... 9646 

CH~ER 3. LEADERSHIP ---------- ----- - ---------- 97-111 

CHAPTER 4. THE EXEBCISE OF COMMAND. 

Doctrines of combat- --- --- -- - --- ----- - --- 11%118 

mmmand-------------------------------- 119-126 

Estimate of the situation ----------------- 127-192 

Terrain------------------__--------------- 133-138 

Conduct in battle ,------------------------ 130-144 

StaB-,----------------------------------- 146-148 

Combat orders---------------------------- 149-169 

Oommand posts --------,-----------------160-168 

Signal communication- - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 169-192' 

CHAPTEI! 6, ~~GENCE AND RQCONNAISSANCE, 

Oenersl---,----------------------------- 193-196 

Information collecting agencies ---------,-, 196-201 

Organization of reconnaissance --------- 203-213 

Execution of reconnaissance -,------------- 214-233 

Transmission of information ,----,------- 323-233 

Cxmm 6. Sxxmm~. 

General,--------------,----------------,- 233-240 

Security against mechanized forces ,--,,---, 260-264 

Security against chemicals- - - - -- - -- - - - - - - - - 26b260 

Antiaircraft security --------------,-_,_--- 261-273 

Oountemeconnaissance -------------------- 274-278 

Counterintelligence --,------------------,, 270-288 

CHAPTER 7. HALTS AND SIEWRITY Dmtmo HALTS. 

Halte---,-,----------------------------- 289-290 

Shelter- ,, - -, - -, - - - - - - - - ,,,,, - - - - - - - - - - -- - -- - - 391-296 

OUtpoSts---,----------------,------------- 297-823 

Cavalry and mechanized outposts -----,,--- 313-335 

Security messures within shelter areas, -- - - 328333 

CIS- 8. TBOOP MOVKM~. 

&nerd------------------------------- 334-343 

Shuttling--,----------------------------- 844449 

Tactical considerations ---------------,---- 380-373 

March technique- ------------ --- ---------- 374-308 

Idovenrents by rsll-----,---------------enreenreenre 399414 

Movements by air =---------- -----= 1 1111111 41H18 

Security during movement- -, - - - -- -- - - - - - - 410440 

5 Page 

1 

a 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

CHWI~ 9. THE OFFENSIVE. 

Section I. General. mSgraphs The objective- --- --- -- --- -- 450-453 

Distribution of forces, -- ,- , 464400 

Forms of offensive action-- 461473 

Frontages and depths- --- -- 474-475 

Reserves-------------------. 47- 

Coordination ,------,------- 483608 

11. Attack in war of movement---- 500-611 

III. Attack of an organ-d poeition. Preliminary operations- - - - - 632-536 

Preparations for attack- -- - 537684 

Conduct of the attack----- 68556a 

Theaseault ,--------------- 665 

Continuation of the attack, 664-680 

Relief8 to continue the 

attack --,,---------------. 661471 

IV. Attack from the defensive. 

Planned def ensive-ofIensive, 673-576 

The counteroffensive -----,- 676677 

V. Pursuit,---,-------------------- 678-690 

VI. Security in the Menaive ------- 591694 

VII. Termination of offensive action, 69-6 

CEiAPTElt 10. TmE DHaJsIvE. 

Section I. Organization for defenee. 

Oeneral------------------- 607-598 

Reconnaissance and aelec- 

%ion d poaition ,,,,,,,,,, &@W%M 

lbctical organixetion ------- 610616 

Organization of !he ------- 637-893 

Organization of the ground, 63-9 

XI. Conduct of the defense --------- 650671 

111. Termination of the defense- -- - - 67-78 

IV. Security in the defense --,---,-- 674478 

V. Antimechanhd defense -,--,-,-, 679-896 

C*Hm 11. RI~OORADE Mo~~. 

General ,-------------------------608-701 

Withdrawal from action ----------,-------- 703-724 

Retirement,,,,,,,----------------------- 726-741 

Security during retirement ,------,-------- 743-751 

Delaying action ,,------------------------ 762-778 

la. SFTXXAL OPEEATIONS. 

Section I. Attack of a fortilled locality. General ,,,,,,,,,,,,,-,,,, 774-778 

Preparation and preliminary operations ---------------. 777-704 

The break-through --,------ 796-608 

11. Operations at river lines. 

General - -, - -- - - - - -- - - - - - - 809811 

Attack to face croesings-, 81- 

Defenee againet crowsinge- - 843-866 

m. Night combat --,--------------- 866876 

IV. Combat in towns ------------,-- 876-884 

V. Combat in woods--- - --- ,---,, ,, 8- 

VI. Mountain operations. General -------------------- 894.808 

Reconnaiwmnce ------------- 909 

~ches,-,,--------,------- 910414 
TABLE OF CONTPQTB 

CHAPTEB lS(Cont1nued.) 

Section VI-Contlnued. maphe Offensive combat ----------- 91M23 

Defensive operations -------- 93-84 

VII. Combat in onow and extreme 

CQ!~!. 

General ,---,--------------- 93H46 

Conduct ab operations- - - -- - 947-875 

VIII. Combat at deffles --------------- 974478 

IX. Jungle operations -------------- 97S-984 

X. Desert opedons --------------- 98-89 

XI. Partisan warfare. 

General ,,,--,-------------- 990-996 

C- 13. Taoops TBnlvemam BY Ant. 

General -,-,-,,----------------------996-1002 

mesions,,,-,,------------------------- 1003-1004 

planning operations =,------- ..------------ 100&1016 

Conduct of operations ------------------- 1016-la3 

Countermeasures ,,,---------------------- 1024r1039 

CKISPTEB 14. Axu T~gg FOB- ----------,------- 103blWa 

CHAPTER 16. THE DlVYSION. 

Section I. Infantry division -------------- 1043-1049 

II. Motorhed division ------------- 106&1054 

III. Cavalry division ------------ ,--- 1066-1088 

IV. Armored division. 

Organization --,------------- 1070-1087 

Reconnaissance -------------- 1088-1089 

8ecurity ,,,,,,,-------------- 10Q+1099 

Marches - -- - -- - - - - - - - - - -- --- 1100-1101 

mensive operations- - - - - - -- - 110%1139 

Defensive operations- - - - --, -ll4Ch1144 

CH~ 16. GHQ TAN^ Urn- ----- -- -- - - - --- 114&1151 

Imn------------------------------------------------- 
FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS 

OPEBATIONS 

(These mgulations mpersede FM 1W. Tentative Fleld Service 

Regulations, Operatlona, October 1, 1930.) 

CHAPTER 1 

TERRITORIAL ORCIMIZATIOII 

HI. The theater ot umr comprises those areas of land, sea, 

and air which are, or may 'become, directly involved in the 

conduct of war. 

I2. A theater oj operations is an area of the theater of war 

necessary for military operations and the administration 

and supply incident to military operations. The War Department designates one or more theaters of operations. 

3. A combat zone comprises that part of a theater of operations required for the active operations of the combatant 

forces. 

It is divided into army, corps, and division areas, each 

comprising the zone of operations of the urlit to which it 

pertains. 

D4. A communtcatfons zone is that part of a theater of 

operations, contiguous to the combat zone, which contains 

the lines of communication, establishments for supply and 

evacuation, and other agencies required for the immediate 

support and maintenance of the fleld forces in the theater 

of operations. 

1 5. The zane of the interim comprises the area of the na- 

~QE=! terj,tmy ~adififve of sreas !nc!r_?&d In theater 

of operations. 

16. The details of organization of the theater of war and 

its territorial subdivisions are given in FM 100-10, lQf 100-15, 

and in instructions relative to mobilization published by the 

War Department. As indicated therein, definite territorial 

responsibilities are assigned to GCHQ, theater commanders, 

and army commanders. 
ORGANIZATION OF TROOPS 

7. Troop organization includes command, combat (tactical), 

and service (administrative) elements. Most tactical units 

contain service elements and have some administrative functions. But a kit is not designated as administrative unless 

it performs all' or nearly all administrative functions for its 

components. 

8. The ReZd forces consist of a general headquarters (OHQ) , 

one or more armies, the GHQ air force, an armored force, 

and a OH& reserve. 

19. The GHQ air force is composed of a headquarters and a 

variable number of squadrons and groups of combat aviation 

and various other types which may be organized into wings 

or larger commands. It also has a base organizations 

comprising troops of various arms and services for security 

and administration. 

4 10. An armored force is a combined force comprising elements transported in wheeled. or track-laying type motor 

vehicles, the bulk of which is provided either with partial or 

complete armor. 

H 11. The GHQ reserve is composed of units of the various 

arms and services not otherwise specifically assigned which 

are held for use as reinforcements or for separate missions 

under OHQ. 

H 12. Several armies may be org&n&ed into a group of armim 

under a designated commander. Such a .group is primariry 

a tactical command. 

1 13. An army is composed of a headquarters, certain organic 

army troops, a variable number of corps, and a variable number of divisions, of which some or all may be assigned from 

time to time to corps. The army is an administrative as well 

as tactical unit. 

14. A corps consisi;~ of a corps headquarters, certain organic 

corps troops, and such infantry (cavalry, armored) divisions 

as may be assigned to it. The corps is primarily a tactical 

unit. 

1 15. The cliuisfon is the basic large unit of the combined 

arms. It comprises a headquarters, infantry (cavalry) 
OPERATIONS 15-23 

(armored) units, fleld artillery units, and certain troops of 

other arms and services. It is an administrative as well as a 

tactical unit. 

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divisions and larger units. A more detailed discussion of the -....-A- .. ...at- 4.. 8....-~ 4- mm~ inn= AW&CA UAUW 11, AUUU 1U SAW& AVITAU. 

1 17. In each arm or service, the company (troop, battery) or 

similar unit is the basic administrative unit. It contains all 

the agencies required for subsistence, interior economy, and 

administration. For purposes of tactical control and training, 

each company is subdivided into smaller units. 

1 18. The battalfon (squadron) or similar unit is the basic 

tactical unit. It is composed of a headauarters, two or more 

companies or similar wlits, and certain special units, organic 

and attached. Unless organized as a separate battalion it has 

few administrative functions. 

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unit. Ordinarily, it consists of a headquarters, a headquarters nnm..\anw anrl anrvrlma nnrnman.. aitkar nannra+a nr nrrrrrki-aA bUAAAyaAy WU UWA VAWG VVAAApUJ , GAUAAGA OGy-A WUG VA WUAAlUAAAGU, 

and two or more battalions or similar units. It may also 

!nc!ude a campmy cr similar lm!t in ~Mch certs!~ smc!a! 

weapons and means are assembled for tactical purposes, 

economy, instruction, and administration. 

m20. A brfgade is ordinarily a tactical organization composed of two or more regiments of the same arm, together 

with a headquarters and headquarters company or similar 

unit. When organized as a separate brigade It may include 

units of other arms and services and may have administrative functions. 

W21. For organization of the Air Corps, see paragraph 76. 

W 22.' Pbr economy and flexibility in the assignment' to tasks, 

Lhe ,--Lng ~ct b~bitla!!y reql&red by g %@$ =e mend p~yd 

organically assigned, to a higher unit. These means may 

then !x dctte8 tc s?dhr&r?ate u=!% in aeecrbanee mth 

their requirements for particular operations. 

H 23. To insure unity of effort or increase readiness for combat, part or all of the subordinate units of a command may 

be formed into one or more temporary tacticai groupings 

(task forces), each under a designated commander. In 
23-24 FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS 

each, the unity of tactical organizations is preserved as far 

as practicable. In an infantry'division, the term mm&t 

team is usually applied to a task force consisting of a regiment of infantry, a battalion of light artillery. and essential 

units of other arms in suitable proportion. 

24. The details of organization of the field forces and the 

amounts and kinds of transportation and major items of 

equipment are published in current War Department Tables 

of Organization and Tables of Basic Allowances. The organization of large units and pertinent technical and la&- 

tical data are given in FM 101-10. 
CHAPTER 2 

ARMS AND SERVICES 

GENERAL 

25. The units comprising the field forces belong to the 

arms and the services. 

The arms consist of the Infantry, the Cavalry, the Field 

Artillery, the Coast Artillery Corps, the Air Corps, the Corps 

of Engineers, and the Signal Corps. The Chemical Warfare 

Service also has combat units of chemical troops. 

The services are charged with serving the line of the Army 

by performing the necessary functions of administration. 

For administrative functions of the arms and services, see 

FM 100-10. 

1 26. No one arm wins battles. The combined action of all 

arms and services is essential to success. The characteristics 

of each arm and service adapt it to the performance of its 

special function. The higher commander coordinates and 

directs the action of all, exploiting their powers to attain 

the ends sought. 

INFANTRY 

27. The Infantry is essentially an arm of close combat. Its 

primary mission in the attack is to close with the enemy and 

destroy or capture him; in defense, to hold its position and 

repel the hostile attack. 

28. Infantry fights by combining fire, movement, and shock 

action. By fire, it inflicts losses on the enemy and neutralizes his combat power; by movement, it closes with the enemy 

and makes its fire more effective; by shock action, it completes the destruction of the enemy in close combat. 

29. Infantry is capable of limited independent action 

through the employment of its own weapons. Its offensive 

power decreases appreciably when its freedom of maneuver 

is Umited or when it is confronted by an organized defensive 

position. Under these conditions or against a force of the 

combined arms, the limited firepower of Infantry must be 

adequately reinforced by the support of artillery, tanks, com- 
29-37 FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS 

bat aviation, and other arms. The defensive power of Infantry reaches 'a maximum when it occupies an organized 

defensive position or when the enemy's freedom of maneuver 

is restricted. 

i3 30. The principai weapons of hiantry are the rfie anci 

bayonet, the automatic rifle, and the machine gun. Other 

weapons include mortars, pistols, grenades, light antitank 

weapons, and antitank guns. 

1 31. Light antitank weapons and antitank guns are allotted 

to infantry regiments; antitank guns are the prlmary armament of antitank companies and battalions. . 

I 92. me intre~zhlng kc! .! =an essent!d i!rt!",!e cf eqA+ 

ment of the infantry soldier. It is important in attack as 

well as in defense in order to hold ground without excessive 

casualties during interruptions of the advance. 

1 33. Infantry can maneuver on difacult ground. Its ability 

to move in small and inconspicuous formations enables it 

to take advantage of covered routes of approach and minor 

accidents of the terrain. It must utilize the terrain intelli- ,,&1, L- ALLII-. -re(-..- .Alan+ &A ..A-..I~~-.~ -..-n~--~.l 

~~IlCly CU LlCLLZILl lll~~llllUll1 All= CUGUlr, W bULWCI VC ~lDULlAlCI~ 

to conceal movement, and to facilitate the maneuver and employment of reserves. 

1 34. The mobility of Infantry has been greatly increased by 

the use of motor transport for the movement of troops, equipment, and supplies. Infantry units completely motorized 

organically or by attachment are specially suited for the 

close support of mechanized units or for prompt dispatch as 

mobile reserves to distant areas accessible by road. 

1 35. Infantry troops, with equipment and supplies, may 

also be trtlnsported by aircraft to seize decisive objectives 

or to operate in the enemy's rear area. 

CAVALRY 

1 36. Catmlry consists of highly mobile ground units, horse, 

motor, and mechanized. Horse units may be transported in 

trucks or semitrailers in order to increase their mobility or 

to conserve animals. 

W 37. Cavalry is characterized by a high degree of battlefield 

mobility. Its special value is derived from the rapidity and 
OPERATIONS 37-43 

ease with which its Are power can be moved from one position 

or locality to another. (See 41~0 ch. 15.) 

1 38. Cavalry is capable of offensive combat ; exploitation and 

pursuit: seizing and holding important terrain until the 

arrival of the main forces; ground reconnaissance; ground c~n~e7~~c~~nai~~~ (=re---), 'wm rnOffitlg and sAutionary; security for the front, flanks, and rear of other forces 

on the march, at the halt, and in battle; delaying action; 

covering the retrograde movements of other forces; combat 

liaison between large unite: acting as a mobile reserve ,for 

other forces; harassing action; and. surprise action against &ignsiee 3"rrjectlves dep in webfie re&r 

1 39. Cavalry obtains its best results by the rapidity and flexibility of its methods in attack and defense rather than by 

the sustained offensive or defensive operations that are required of Infantry. Its missions should be selected accordingly. It should not ordinarily be employed against objectives which require the sustained power of Infantry. When 

no suitable or necessary missions exist for cavalry, it should 

be held in reserve, awaiting the opportunity for its use. 

1 40. Cavalry flghts on a relatively broad front and in slight 

depfh. In offensive combat, relatively weak forces may contain a less mobile enemy on the front while the principal 

forces strike in flank and rear. 

41. Cavalry executes missions of ground reconnaissance 

and security. In cooperation with the Air Corps, Cavlllry 

locates the enemy, mdntains coatact with him, and procures 

essential information for the higher commander. Security aa=i;s 4a&ri& ppwM+don w8inst &~a*;i;= at+ak sod &Teenhg from ground observation. 

I 42. The efficiency of Cavalry depends in great measure 

upon the condition of its mounts and medmahed vehicles. 

Provision must be made for the rest and subsistence of animals 

and for the maintenance and upkeep of vehicles. 

1 43. Horse cauaZty can operate over almost any terrain and 

under all conditions of weather. It is equipped with weapons 

similar to those of Infantry and has considerable flre power; 

it is provided with means for rapid slgnal communication, 

scout cars for reconnaissance, and motor transport for supply. 

Horse cavalry habitually maneuvers mounted, but ordi- 
43-49 FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS 

wily fights on foot. As a rule, mounted maneuver is combined with dismounted action. 

1 44. MechanM reconnaissance units are pushed well forward and to the flanks. They may be reinforced by armored 

or mok-fi -b, in fire wwei; ia orieii Am &eiaJi or 

block hostile armored or motorized threats. 

1 45. The cavalry regiment, Mse and mechanized, contains 

both port4 horse units and mechanized reconnaissance units. 

Its primary mission is continuous ground reconnaissance. 

It may be used for any suitable cavalry mission. It should be 

reinforced when serious combat Is snticipated. 

1 46. Cavalry may be attached to. or mag be an organic 

part of, an infantry division; as such it ii designated diwMm 

mwlrp. Its primary mission is continuous ground reconnaissance. Security and screening are secondary missions. 

It may be used for liaison during movement and combat. 

FIELD ARTILLERY 

1 47. Field ArtiUery contributes to the action of the entire 

force through the flre support which it renders other arms. 

It has two principal missions in combat: 

a. It supports infantry (cavrtlry) (armored) units by fire, 

neutraliztng or destroying those targets which are most 

dangerous to the supported arms. 

b. It gives depth to combat by counterbattery flre, by fire 

on hostile reserves, by restricting movement in rear areas, 

and by disrupting hostile command agencies. 

1 48. Artillery flre possesses great power of destruction and 

neutralization. It compels hostile troops in the open to adopt 

widely deployed formations and has great moral effect. Plre 

from curved trajectory weapons reaches objectives defiladed 

against flat trajectory weapons or lacking adequate overhead 

cover. 

49. Artillery fhe possesses a high degree of flexibflfty. 

Field Artillery is capable of intervening over a zone of great 

width and depth, and of rapidly shifting and concentrating 

its flre without changing its positions. This characteristic 

zsbs t. s~WIe~t~~~ae Lhz fire ~f cf 

Meld Artillery under a common fire direction. Through the 

maneuver of artillery fire, commanders possess a powerful 
means of influencing the course of combat. The efaciencp 

with which artillery Ares are maneuvered is dependent upon 

adequate control, close Iiaison with supported troops, suEBcient observation, and dependable signal communication. 

1 50. In order to carry out its 'principal combat missions, 

division fleld artillery is ordinarily subdivided for combat 

so that certain units are assigned to the dfrect support of 

specified infantry (cavalry) (armored) units and the remained is retained in general support of the division as a 

whole. 

1 51. The assignment of direct support missions to fleld 

artillery units insures close cooperation .with the supported 

units and enables such artillery to act with greater promptness in meeting the requirements of a rapidly moving situation on the front of the supported units. A field artillery 

unit in direct support establishes liaison and signal communication with the supported unit and as far as possible executes the missions requested by the supported unit. Mrect 

support artillery changes position when necessary to deliver tire supwrting fires and maitltain 

with the supported unit. 

1 52. Whenever the situation permits, both direct support 

and general support artillery are retained under centralized 

control. Field Artillery operates most effectively in this 

manner. However, the division commander frequently cannot efaciently control the Are of all of his artillery because 

of the character of the operations, unusual extension of frontage, difaculties of terrain, lack of suitable observation, or insufficiency of signal communication. In such situations he 

should promptly attach artillery to the infantry (cavalry 

(armored) units which it is to assist. 

53. Corps (army) fleld artillery may be retained under 

corps (army) control or part or all of it may be attached to 

divisions (corps). Units held under corps (army) control 

may be to furnish mial ae.dstnnce t.~ &gigfiat&- 

divisions t corps) , 

1 54. Division artflkry is most effective in fire on unprotected 

personnel. Its principal mission is the support of infantry 

(cavalry) (armored) units. It is employed also to neutralize 

enemy observation, to interdict hostile movements, and to 
5440 FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS 

assist corps artillery in counterbattery. It must be prepared 

to engage promptly hostile tanks within its field of flre. 

1 55. The corps mttllay has for its principal mission the 

neutralization or destruction of the hostile artillery. It is 

also employed in the destruction of hostile defenses, in long 

range interdiction flre, and in reinforcing the fires of division 

artillery. Artillery observation units (sound and flash are 

included in the corps artillery. 

1 56. The army artillery includes only a headquarters and 

such units as are allotted from time to time by GCHQ and 

retained under the direct control of the army commander for 

support of the army as a whole. It has for its principal 

missions distant interdiction and destruction Are, and reinforcement of the fire of corps artillery. 

1 57. The GHQ reserve artfUery includes artillery firing units 

of various classes and artillery observation units. These units 

are habitually allotted to armies for employment under the 

army commander or for reallotment to lower units. 

1 58. When occasion requires, particularly when there is a 

great massing of Field Artillery, temporary groupings of Aeld 

artillery units may be formed for convenience in the execution of missions. These groupings are based upon the nature 

of the mission to be executed rather than upon type or caliber. 

Tactical unity is, as far as practicable, respected in the composition of groupings. 

COAST ARTILLERY CORPS 

1 59. The Coast ArtUW Corps is characterized by the great 

amount of flre it can deliver ag Jnst naval and air targets. 

Its armament comprises flxed and mobile seacoast artillery, 

fixed and mobile antiaircraft artillery, and submarine mines. 

1 60. In the defense of coast lines the missions of the Coast 

Artillery Corps area. In co~unction with the Air Corps and the Navy, to 

protect the fleet (or detachments) while at, entering, or 

debouching from its bases; to defeat naval and air attacks 

against harbor defenses, naval bases, cities, or other important 

areas. 

b. To support (with mobile seacoast artillery and antiaircraft artillery) the Infantry and the other arms in beach 

defenses. 

10 
OPERATIONS 61-67 

61. In field operations, mobile seacoast artillery may serve 

as army or GCHQ reserve artillery. 

62. Seamst artiUery has great power and range and is 

especially equipped and trained to fire at moving naval 

targets. 

1 63. Fixed seacoast artillery is protected from naval and air 

attack by fortifications. Its stability permits great accuracy 

of Are. Its elaborate and precise fized equipment permits 

highly effective Are control and Are direction. Seacoast artillery is organized into group6 and groupments in order to 

develop the maximum Are power and provide emcient Are 

direction. 

I R4$ MW sewnnst wtillery cnrnprtss railwayi truckdrawn, and tractor-drawn artillery. Off the battlefield, these 

types axe capable of moving long distances at fairly rapid 

rates. On the battlefield their mobility is low and they require 

a considerable time for emplacement. Mobile seacoast artillery provides additional gunfire for existing harbor defenses 

and is used in conjunction with other forces to protect harbors or cuastal areas for which no permanent defenses have 

been provided. 

1 65. To combat hostile aircraft, anltatrcraft artillery is 

equipped with antiaircraft guns, automatic weapons, searchlights, detectors, sound-locators, and the equipment required 

for observation, fire control, and signal communication. 

1 66. MOW& antiafrcraj't artiRery in conjunction with the 

Air Corps supports and protects the other arms against hostile 

air observation and attack (see par. 81). It reinforces the 

antiaircraft measures of other troops, protects the vital eiements of a command, and in rear area protects airdromes 

and other sensitive points. When distance precludes the 

centralized tactical control of antiaircraft artillery units, 

the commander of the force may attach antiaircraft units to 

subordinate elements of his command, or may detach units to 

protect vital installations. It is so equipped that it can execute 

antitank and other ground missions chen necessary. 

1 67. An essential agency of antiaircraft artillery is its intelligence service. This service gathers and transmits information 

of the enemy's air activities for use in connection with the 

employment of the antiaircraft artillery units. The aircraft 
67-74 FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS 

umming service also provides the antiaircraft artillery with 

information regarding hostile aircraft. Rapid interchange of 

information between these services is essential. 

68. Coordinated antiaircraft defense of areas is facilitated 

by the organization of commands for air defense. 

AIR CORPS 

I 69. The Air Cmps combats hostile aircraft; ogerates in 

conjunction with ground and naval forces in land and sea 

warfare, and conducts independent attacks against enemy 

objectives on land and sea. 

B 70. Air operations may be restricted by hostile air force 

operations, by antiaircraft measures, by the lack of air bases, 

and by adverse weather conditions. 

H 71. The mobility, speed, and range of aircraft make possible their rapid intervention at critical points in a theater 

of operations, rapid movements between widely separated 

theaters (subject to availability of bases and service and maintenance personnel), and deep incursions into enemy territory. 

The operating range and firepower, including bomb load, 

vary inversely one with the other, depending as they do upon 

the distribution of the useful load between fuel and ammunition. 

1 72. Wtical missions of aviation include air attack against 

surface maMrie1 and personnel objectives, air fighting against 

hostile aircrait, reconnaissance and observation, mapping, 

and transport. 

1 73. The term combat aviation refers to bombaxdment and n~rmrri+ avriatinn 'Fkn tnwm L-hnrAmrw+ mad-+;- an mr.rrl4mA pUAUI.IU O VACLUAWAI. AAIG UGA 111 WIIL- ILIILGICG WVLUCCVIC W ~Y~llCU 

to units whose primary function is the attack of surface 

objectives. The term pursuit aviution b applied to units 

whose primary function is air fighting. 

1 74. The term reconnaissance aviation is applied to units 

whose primary function is reconnaissance of distant objectives. The term photographic aviation is applied to units 

whose function is photographic reconnaissance and air mapping photography. The term observution aviation is applied 

to units whose primary functions are reconnaissance and 

observation of near objectives, observation or' artiiiery iire, 

and maintaining contact between elements of our own ground 
forces. Balloon units are included within the term obser- --&A*- - --4-4.I-- VLtblUIl uvlab1ull. 

111 75. Transport aviation is employed to transport Air Corps 

personnel, certain Air Corps supplies, special units of Infantry 

and other troops dispatched on distant missions in friendly 

or hostile territory and emergency supplies to fast-moving 

or isolated ground units. 

1 76. The basic administmtive and tactical unit of the Air 

Cerps is the squadren. The gctp, CCEI~S ci twc cr =ere 

squadrons of a single class (such as bombardment or pur- 

~'dt! 8\'!8t!O1?, !8 the pr!r?~!~ tt%C$i,!c%! la!t %~d c~r?t%i,!ns 

a11 the essential elements necessary for operation, maneuver, 

a~d c~mb8t. me 1?!3Xt hkher !ir CC'Es l;?!t !E +At? w!~g 

which consists of two or more groups of either the same or 

GEere~t C!~EE~E Q? 8~i8t!m. 

77. Military aviation is assigned to the QHQ air force, to 

oversea departments, to corps and -hrger units, to the zone 

of the interior or important areas, or may be held in GHQ 

reserve. (See par. 11.) 

The aviation organically assigned to corps and armies is 

generally limited to observation units. 

H 78. The operations of both surface and air forces are directed to the attainment of a common objective. Missions 

which do not contribute to the attainment of the common 

objective are avoided. 

I nn +- +L, L..-A, ,.# +LA &(-LA- -rUIn-An..I lAI~r~ -..a- I 11. &l4 UAC AIaAlIW UL UllC A11&5LAGL liUllLAAILLAAUCAD, bULIL~l, LIVIWtion constitutes a powerful means for influencing battle. The LrrLIl- -rr- r-rr -..- #....."..~..+l.. I.. +LA -rn& #..t.~"mI.ll I..-- rluaurt: rear area ulrry rrerlucrlbry ue we ruuar, lavuraurr: wue 

of action for combat aviation, since operations in this area ----a& 4.L- --&III--&4-- -a -&-Il-I-- ---re ---;--A per-uub b~lr: ruu uu~l;lauvr~ ur au,rlarrag ~UWWI- ~~IILLJC C~VIIU~IItrated targets with minimum losses and maximum results. A- CLA kn-A -nmnnA nir nCCnnt 4- Ad-nrt n.-rr-l.C -8 &LA WLA U11C WCILAGL AlLLAAU, LlLILOOGU -A &CCCLUP 1LL UAAGCiU JU)IwA U VA LllG 

ground troops will often be required to obtain quicli and decip + 9;. a e~reP~! es+,L~&a+,e cf esch &e&t!on, the 

higher commander must determine where and in what o+ramn+kn +kn nnmka+ avria+inn srrill nmnlnwrd +A noevvva ou~crr~urw WSAG wu~uwu arn+vavu WAAA GAAA~AWJGU w cwou~~ 

the accomplishment of the mission. Q..--A k.r nnmhn t nwrla+inm 4n nlorr ..sn.draA krr mrnknrr4nnd uuyyv~ u UJ uuu~uwu av~avrvrr AD saw AG~ULACU uy rucbaranurcu 

and motmized units, particularly when operating beyond the nn 8 1 1 TI -11 nnnnm CLn nU~nCI-...-rrr -8 11 1 LAG AL rrl cur Cianw, ULAG clrc~iwvcrre~~ ur 
air support of ground troops is dependent upon careful 

coordination, close cooperation, and rapid signal communication. 

1 80. QHQ may direct all or part of its combat aviation to 

support the ground units as a whole or to support particular 

ground - - --- - units. -- - - - In - - - either - - - - - - - case, - -- - - the adation omrates tn fmrrther 

the mission of the supported unit and receives its missions 

and objectives from the commander of the forces which it is 

supporting. When, however, the tactical situation makes it 

impracticable for aviation so controlled to render effective 

support, QHQ should unhesitatingly attach for definite operations part or all of the aviation to units of the ground forces. 

For further discussion of the operations of the ClHQ Air 

Force, see FM 100-15. 

81. Because of the speed and powers of evasion inherent in 

all aircraft, air Aghting is generally of brief duration and the 

results are4 often indecisive. As a redult, unless greatly 

superior, aviation is incapable of controlling the air in the 

same sense that surface forces can control an area and can 

therefore reduce hostile air operations only to a limited extent. 

The desired coordination of all antiaircraft defense measures in anv larun PPPP ic iiciiallv off~otoA hv the nrrranirratinn nf a a- wrrj rurbu urru ru rwuurrj r-rvuru WJ vrrv vrburrruuvrvaa v~ u 

command for air defense. Operations of aircraft in defense 

of ground troops and installations must be coordinated with 

those of the antiaircraft artillery. This applies particularly 

to the employment of pursuit aviation which is designed primarily for defensive missions In the antiaircraft security of 

important areas and ground installations, and the protection 

of ground troops and their observation aviation beyond the 

------ rnnne of antiaircraft -----I----- artillery, -- 

H 82. Aircraft communicate with the ground by various 

means, including radio, drop and pick-up messages, sound and 

visual signals, and, in the case of the balloon, telephone. 

1 83. Air bases, suitably located, are essential for the operations of heavier-than-air aviation. (See F%I 100~10.) 

CORPS OF ENGINEERS 

1 84. The Corps of Engtneers has the primary missions of 

construction and demolition to increase the combat effectiveness of troops, facilitate their movement, and hinder the 

movement of the enemy. 

14 
OPERATIONS 85-90 

H 85. Engineers increase the combat power of other arms 

by performing combat missions, by technical assistance in 

the construction of protective works and camouflage, and by 

the supply of neceasrtry equipment requiring special equipment 

snd training. Cmi> en$_n_e_rg p-rrt.f~.ip& ~QHv~U jn t;hp wnet;~#,.t,i~n 

of hostile obstacles and the capture of fortified localities, and 

in the defense of road blocks or mine Aelds. Ebgineers may 

be assigned the task of coastruc~ rearward ddensive 

positions. 

Adequate and timely engineer support in the movement 

and operations of mechsnieed and motorbed units is of 

special importance. 

Engipeers are attached to units of other arms when such 

units cannot otherwisa be given adequate engineer support. 

1 86. Important engineer missions include the mstmction, 

improvement, and maintenance of routes of communication, 

inciuding ferrying and bridging operatiions; tne pr'eparatdon 

of landing fields; and the elimination of obstwles to moved 

ment, including the demolition of permanent works and the 

destruction of mine flelds and wire entanglements. 

The mobility and maneuverability of the fleld forces and 

the efficiency of their supply depend largely on the successful -----.La-- .a &I.--.. -a"-;--- t5ABtiUblUIl V1 U-t: IIlWlUlIPI. 

87. The mission of hindering enemy movement is often of 

equal importance. The Inherent mobility ai enemy motorized 

and mechanized forces must be countered by coordinated and 

intensive use of obstacles and demolition. Obstacles may consist of hastily erected barriers, such as road blocks and mine 

fields, as well as of deliberately prepared zones of obstacles. 

W 88. The engineers make, reproduce, and supply maps and 

map substitutes, including those produced from air photographs. 

89. Special engineer missions include camouflage, topographic work, water suppiy, raiiway operation; the operaiiion 

of power plants, water and sewage systems and certain other 

utilities, and the supply and repair of engineer materials and 

equipment. 

1 90. Pbr the classification and detailed operations of engineer troops, see FM 100-10. 
91-93 FIELD SERVICE RIQULATIONS 

STQNAL CORPS 

1 91. Signal Corps troops have the primary combat mission 

of providing signal communication for the command to which 

they are assigned. 

92. Signal Corps froope assigned to divisions, corpe, and 

armies compriae constmtfon units for the installation of 

wire circuits; and operating units for the installation of wire 

centrals and radio stations, and the operation of me 

centers, messenger, wire, radio, and visual cummunicaticm. 

In addition, Signal Cow troops Wgned to field armies include units which provide sfgnal fntellfgem?, photograph&, 

pigeon, sfgnal repufr, and suppZy service. 

The Signal Cow provides message center, local mesaengers, and wire communication for headquasters, OHQ Air 

Force; headquarters all air force units down to include air 

wings, headquarters air bases, and for headquarters of sir 

task forces. 

The Signal Corps provides radio used solely for administrative purposes' at neadquarters, OEQ Air Force, air force 

headquarters of defense commands, and air base headquarters. The Blgnal Corps also installs and operates a signal 

supply establishment at each air base. 

Signal Corps troops establish and operate the aircraft 

warning service in accordance with the instructions of the 

commander responsible for air defense measures. 

The sfgnal fntellfuence service is charged with the Interception of enemy wire and radio transmission and the location, by radio position flnding, of enemy radio transmitters 

operating on the ground and in airplanes. It is charged with 

the location of radio transmitters operating in violation of 

proclamations or orders, and with the interception of radio 

transmissions of friendly stations to detect violations of 

regulations governing the use of codes and ciphers and oi 

radio procedure. The signal intelligence prepares and solves 

codes and ciphers. 

93. Wire (telephone, telegraph, and telegraph printer), 

radio, and messenger communication are the means of signal 

communication most frequently used. Other means of signal 

communication supplement and extend the service of these 

agencies. 
OPERATIONS 94-96 

94. The Signal Corps exercises technical supervision over 

the entire signal service of the fleld forces. It supplies other 

arms and services with the technical equipment required for 

the installations of their own systems of signal communica- I* -- uun. 

CHEYICAL WARFARE SIRVICE 

95. Troops of the Chemical Wwfare Servfce engage directly 

in combat to assist other units of the fleld forces by the use 

of gaa, smoke, and incendiaries. 

96. Chemical units are assigned to the QHQ reserve. They 

are attached to armies and lower units as the situation requires. They are profitably employed either in large units 

for large scale gas operations or in relatively small units for 

minor gas and smoke operations under division or lower unit 

control. A commander who attaches chemical units to units 

of the arms must restrict.chernica1 operations so far as may 

be necessary to avoid interference by gas or smoke with the 

operations of other friendly troops. 
CHAPTER 3 

1 98. Man is the fundamental instrument in war; other in- -A- --a- A- --- -La--- L--& L- ----a1- ----4.1-.-.- ---..&--A Pilrrumencs may CIL~IA~C: UUI, I~C: I ~SULULLU L C:IWWV~AY ~WLUS~U~. 

Unless his behavior and elemental attributes are understood, ---- -.-A-l--- -I.. L- --A- 1- -Vr--l-- ----&la-- ---I 1- gluss mlslraaeu wur ut: rnaue 111 yrarmmg uperrswurrrr auu m 

troop leading. 

In the training of the individual 'soldier, the essentictl considerations are to integrate individuals into a group and to 

stab::& for ~6.d~ 8 Egb ~+&fi&rd ~f c+iig~~t 

and performance of duty without destroying the initiative of tka i.rAirriA..al UUG IIIW VIU UCU. 

H 99. War places a severe test on the physical endurance and 

moral stamina of the individual soldier. To perform his duties efEciently, he must not only be well equipped and technically trained but he must also be physically qualified to endure the hardships of field service and be constantly fortifled 

by discipiine based on high ideais of miiitary conduct. 

Strong men, inculcated with a proper sense of duty, a conscious pride in their unii;, and a feeiing of mu- obiigation 

to their comrades in the group, can dominate the demoralizing iniiuerices of battie far 'better 3iti.n tinose imbued oniy witn 

fear of punishment or disgrace. 

1 100. In spite of the advances in technology, the worth of 

the individual man is still decisive. The open order of combat accentuates his importance. Every individual must be 

trained to exploit a situation with energy and boldness and 

must be imbued with the idea that success will depepd upon 

his initiative and action. 

1 101. The dispersion of troops in battle caused by the influence of modern weapons makes control more diil[icult. 

Cohesion within a unit is promoted by gwd leadership, dis- 

~i~be, ridein the a~com~1,lishments and reputation of $he 

unit, and mutual confidence and comradeship among its 

members. 
I 102. Ieading tmps in combat, regardless of the echeldn 

of command, calls for cool and thoughtful leaders with a 

strong feeling of the great mponsibility Imposed upon Uem. 

They must be resolute and self-reliant in their decisions, 

energetic and insistent in execution, and unperturbed by the 

fluctuations of combat. 

1 103. Troops are strongly influenced by the example and 

c~nflr_?~t of thhr 1e~der.s; _A_ rni~nt hg- ge~~j_ir b-~ledge, will power, self-confidence, initiative, and disregard of 

self. Any show of fear or unwillingness to share danger is 

fatal to leadership. On the other hand, a bold and determined IeM-er will rmry his troogs with him no matter how 

difficult the enterprise. Mutual confidence between the leader 

h 1 SL a& rpc gab- thh 

confidence, the leader must And the way to the hearts oi his 

men; This he W-11 dr, by acqliliring ain understand_ing of their 

thoughts and feelings, and by showing a constant concern 

for their comfort and welfare. 

104. A good commander avoids subjecting his troops to ..-rl..a" L....a..L;-m. L- -.....am ....-a-d aaa-4--+a-- &LA*- usereas 11ruua1uya, ut: guuur, wtuus~, ums~~wny ulrsrr UWLbat strength in inconsequential actions or harassing them &L-..cc~ #n..1&- a&-# -.-.-~C.--A-& UA LA--- 4- -1-a- &A..A~ UUVU~LA rarrruy numu wwq~rrrcr~u. nc n=)n LLI brvoc WUQLL 

with all subordinate units by means of personal visits and 4 T& 4r ~nrr-C4.-.1 CLnL LA 1-A- &-- -r-rr-rl 

VWCl VLIWUll. LC W w&lClLSI WILLI, Ale AllUW llU111 &ElJULlLU Gull' 

tact the mental, moral, and physical state of his troops, the 

conditions with which they are confronted, their accomplishments, their desires, and their needs. 

1 105. The commander should promptly extend recognition 

for services well done, lend help where help is needed, and give 

encouragement in adversity. Considerate to those whom he 

commands, he must be faithful and loyal to those who command him. A commander must live with his troops and share 

their dangers and privations as well as their joys and sorrows. By personal observation and experience he will then 

be able to judge their needs and combat value. A commander 

who unnecessarily taxes the endurance of his troops will only 

penalize himself. The proper expenditure of combat strength 

is in proportion to the objective to be attained. w-nen necessary to the execution of the mission, the commander requires and receives from his unit the compiete measure of 

sacriflce. 
1 lg. -b, gp@!$ ~f p~gel&,h, ~~pergtfcn w!L,h, c,h,ek fe!!ta~g & 

to be fostered among ofrlcers and men. The strong and the 

capable must encourage and lead the weak and less experienced. On such a foundation, a feeling of true comradeship. 

wiU become flmly establbhed and the full combat value of 

the troops wlll be made available to the higher commander. 

: ic'i. Tne v-ire of a i&t is de,rrm--i in Bi'mt 

measure by the soldierly qualities of its leaders and members 

anci itis WGi w tight. Guiwarci mr'ks oC this cambat vaiue 

will be found in the set-up and appearance of the men, in 

the condition, care, and maintenance of the weapons and 

equipment, and in the readiness of the unit for action. O..rr..4-.. ..r-LrL -.rl..- 1 -Cl-rC 1 I-.-..l--IL- OUwl IUl VUlllUI+b VWUI: WlLI UllbCC LlUIlI:llC;&l IUGl lUllby,~. 

Superior leadership combined with superior combat value of 

+.M.Y. ~.rn+4C..+- n rurlinhln kn-4- #A- n..nnnnn 4- hn++ln W Wm WAaO WUUUGO Q A GAA0UAG I+CLUAU AWL UUCIClWJ AAA U&bUAG. 

108. A poorly trained unit is likely to fat1 in a critical 

moment due to demoralizing impressions caused by unexpected events in combat. This is particularly true in the 

&st engagements of a unit. Therefore, training and discipline are of great importance. Every leader must take 

energetic action against indiscipline, panic, pillage, and other 

disruptive influences. Discipline is the main cohesive force 

that binds the members of a unit. 

109. A wise and capable commander will see that the men 

assigned to the component groups of his unit are compatible 

and that the composition of the groups is changed as little 

as possible. He will provide each group with a leader in 

whom its members have confidence. He will so regulate the 

interior administration of the unit that all groups perform the 

same amount of work and enjoy the same amount of leisure. 

He will see that demonstrated efEciency is promptly recognized and rewarded. He will set before all a high standard 

of military conduct and apply to all the same rules of 

discipline. 

110. Good morale and a sense of unity in a command can- --- nnt ----- imarnvised: - . ---, thcv ----.. must 

I--- 

be a~rcyt=hJy ~!an_n_ed_ agxJ 

systematicall'y promoted. They are born of just and fair 

treatment, a constant concern for the soldier's welfare, thorough training in basic duties, comradeship among men, and 

pdde h =!f, ~_rg~dmtinn~ and_ ~nmtry: mTkie establinhm~nt 
OPERATIONS 11&111 

and maintenance of good morale are incumbent upon every 

commander and are marks of good leadership. 

111. The flrst demand in war is decisive action. Com- m n.nrlnrc innnirn ~nnfid~ntw !TJ the!= ~i~~di~~lite~ b~ their -."---.,-w ---=-a v v-.-u--r--rw 

decisive conduct and their ability to gain material advantage 

~vp_r enemy. _A, _rp~utatj~z f~y faugye 3~ g !ea[ier destmys 

morale. The morale of a unit Is that of its leader. -- A cnmmrr.nder ------------- rni~st. ----" bebear ---- in m-ind_ th~t phj.PI~.a] ~lnfi-tn~a 

will undermine his efficiency. He owes it to the men under 

his cnmm8nd- to conserve his nwn fitness, Neglect readers 

him unable to bring a normal mind to the solution of His 

prnhle~l?s, ILE~ reacts unfawrably an his whnle command; 
CHAPTER 4 

DOCTRINES OF COMBAT 

I 112. The u2timate objective of all military operations is 

the ~esi;ruci;ion of Cne enemy's armed forces in battie. Yne 

ability to select objectives whose attainment contributes most anti qUickiy ae of i;'de hmtce iorces 

is one attribute of the able commander. 

1 113. Simple and direct plans and methods with prompt and 

thorough execution are often decisive in the attainment of 

success. 

1 114. V~2t;r cf c!C~rn..glld c!$t%!.!,?s *st %%it2 c?t efxt %blicfi 

is essential to the decisive applicaition of full combat power nC tk~ nwm4lnMrr Cnwnnm TTni4rr lul n#nr+ 4- #~rv+knmrl krr f~rll VA CLLG CLVDII~WAC AVALGO. WLLLUJ VA GAAVI u IU aw wa-rru UJ A uu 

cooperation between elements of the command. 

1 115. Through offensive action a commander exercises his 

initiative, preserves his freedom of action, and imposes his 

will on the enemy. A defensive attitude may, however, be 

deliberately adopted as a temporary expedient while awaiting 

an opportunity for counteroffensive action, or for the purpose of economizing forces on a front where a decision is not 

sought. The selection by the commander of the right time 

and place for offensive action is a, decisive factor in the success of the operation. 

Numerical inferiority does not necessarily commit a command to a, defensive attitude. Superior hostile numbers may 

be overcome through greater mobility, better armament and 

equipment, more effective fire, higher morale, and better 

leadership. Superior leadership often enables a numerically 

inferior force to be stronger at the point of decisive action. 

A strategically defensive mission is frequently most effectively executed through offensive action. It is often necessary for an inferior force to strike at an early moment in 

order to secure initial advantages or to prevent itself from 

being overwhelmed by a growing superiority in the hostile 

forces. 
OPERATIONS 116-119 

1 116. Concentration of superior forces, both on the ground 

and in the air, at the decisive place and time and their employment in a decisive direction, creates the conditions 

essentid to victory. Such concentration requires strict econ- A-rr 4- CLa rCwr-rr.&L -8 O~rrrr rnna-.rA &A --ma-rlr-r -4- UUly All UlG DblCAl&bll UA AUlGCJ -1614GU bU JCWllWAJ -- 

sions. Detachments durlng combat are justifiable only when 

the execution of tasks assigned them contributes directly 

to success in the main battle. 

1 117. Surprise must be sought throughout the action by 

every means and by every echelon of command. It may be 

obtained by Are as well as by movement. Surprise is produced through measures which either deny informsfion to 

the enemy, or pofjitiveiy deceive him, as to our ciisrniti~ns, 

movements, and plans. Terrain which appears to imme 

great ~culties on operations may often be utilized to gain 

surprise. Surprhe is furthered by variation in the means 

and methods employed in combat and by rapidity of 

execution. 

Surprise often compensates for numerical inferiority of 

force. 

Surprise flnds the enemy in a state of mental, moral, or 

physical unpreparedness. Every effort should be made to 

deny him time tn take effective countermessura, The effect 

of surprise may be lost through dilatory methods of execution. 

1 118. To guard against surprise requires a correct estimate 

of enemy capabilities, adequate security measures, effective 

reconnaissance, and readiness for action of all units. Every 

unit takes the necessary measures for its own local ground 

and air security. Provision for the security of fhb and 

rear is of especial importance. 

COMMAND 

1 110. Command is the authority which an individual in the 

military service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue 

of rank or assignment. 

Command and leadership are inseparable. Whether the 

force is large or small, whether the functions of command are 

complex or simple, the commander must be the controlling 

head; his must be the master mind, and from him must flow 

the energy and the impulse which are to animate all under 

him. 
120. ,ww%cfi t& g szcLqc c;'se cf gctic~ & Lhh,~ resFfisibility of the commander alone. While he may accept advice and suggestions from any of his subordinates, he alone 

is responsible for what his unit does or fails to do. 

W i2i. A wiiiingness i;o accepi; responsibiiity is i;he foremost 

trait of leadership. Every individual from the highest commander to the iowest private musi; aiways remember that inaction and neglect of opportunities will warrant more severe 

censure tnan an error of judgment in the action taken. //The 

criterion by which a commander judges the soundness of his 

own decision is whether it will further the intentions of the 

higher commander4 Willingness to accept responsibility must 

rlct m&rlEeSt jtsu iE g &~egmd ijf ci+GeE or, tkle L-b cf 8 

mere probability of having a better knowledge of the situation &La- &LA 2.4-La- ra--a-.Aar ....LIA~-..&I ..-a& 41 ~AA~AA WAC AU~AACL FVLIIIII~AAU~~. &LAC DULIVILUII~K -I, w 8 jjGrt 

of a tactical team employed by the higher commander to 

accomplish a certain misslon, and any independence on the 

part of a subordinate commander must conform to the general ..I..- e.... th* ..-a+ ." . ..*l..*l., y-11 AUL WAC LIII1u CW & WUVIC. 

1 122. The commander's mission is contained in the orders 

which he has received. Nevertheless, a commander of a 

subordinate unit cannot plead absence of orders or the nonreceipt of orders as an excuse for inactivity in a situation 

where action on his part is essential, or where a change in 

the situation upon which the issued orders were based renders 

such orders impracticable or impossible of execution. If the 

situation does not permit communication with the superior 

commander and the subordinate commander is familiar with 

the generai pian of operations or the mission of the whoie 

command, he should take appropriate action and report the 

situation as eariy as practicabie. 

1 123. The situations that confront a commander in war are 

of infinite variety. In spite of the most careful planning and 

anticipation, unexpected obstacles, frictions, and mistakes are 

common occurrences in battle. A commander must school 

himself to regard these events as commonplace and not pennit 

them to frustrate him in the accomplishment of his mission. 

124. Personal conferences between the higher commander 

and his subordinates who are to execute his orders may at 

times be advisable; thait the latter may arrl-ye at g CCEPC$ 
OPERATIONS 124-128 

understanciing of the pians and intentions of their superior. 

Commanders do not justify their decisions to subordinates, 

nor do they seek the approval of subordinates for their 

actions. 

125. All the troops assigned to the execution of a distinbt 

mission should be placed under one command, to function as 

a task force for the duration of the operation. So long as a 

commander can exercise effective command, he does not disturb the established chain of command in his force. In some 

situations, conditions dictate that attachments must be made 

to subordinate commands. Such attachments may be necessary in marches, during periods of development, in rapidly 

changing situations, or in the later stages of any action, and, 

in general, when better support or coordination can be 

effected. 

1%. C!Ollr,El&~dW whO !S 8d~'~"~ed b 9 bigher COII-!~ 

should be relieved from the responsibility ai direct commaad 

of his former unit. 

ESTIMATB OF THE SmATION 

127. In any tactical operation the commander must 

quickly evaluate all the available information bearing on his 

task, estimate the situation, and reach a decision. 

128. The commander's estimate of the situation is based on 

the mission of the unit, the means available to him and to the 

enemy, the conditions in his area of operations including 

terrain and weather, and the probable effects of various lines 

of action on future operations. (See FM 101-5.) On the basid 

of these factors he considers the lhes of action open to him 

which, if successful, will accomplish his mission, and the 

lines of action of which the enemy is physically capable and 

w'nicn can interfere wit'n such accompiisiunent. He anaiyzes 

the opposing lines of action, one against another, to arrive at 

conclusions as to the probability of success for each of hi$ 

own lines of action. On the basis of this analysis he then considers the relative advantages and disadvantages of hts own 

lines of action, and selects that line of action which most 

promises success regardless of what the enemy may do. If 

two or more lines of action appear equally promising, he nk~rao that nma nrhink nrill mmt Qawrnr f1itrira antlnrr bAl-GO VAAQU UAAG WAAAbAA WAU AAA\NV &QVVA AUUIIIG CSbUAVAA. 
129. The estimate often requires rapid thinking, with consideration limited to essential factors. In campaign, exact 

conclusions concerning the enemy can seldom be drawn. 

To delay action in an emergency because of insufacient information shows a lack of energetic leadership, and may 

result in lost opportunities. The commander must take 

calculated risks, 

H 130. In considering the enemy's possible lines of action, 

the commander must guard against the unwarranted belief 

that he has discovered the enemy's intentions, and against 

ignoring other lines of action open to the enemy. Even when 

the weight of evidence warrants the belief that the enemy 

is committed to a defbite line of action, the commander 

must bear in mind that a change in the enemy's plans may 

=ccW tit my time. 

131. Because of their great mobility and rapid striking 

power, the capabilities of the opposing air and armored 

forces and the possible effect of their employment must be 

continually evaluated. In estimating the capabilities of air, 

armored, and motorized forces, both friendly and hostile, 

the commander must be provided with full and up-to-date 

information on the existing and probable future weather ....-A8+*--.- .-.A +I...*" A/P.-.'.+ k~+k rC-. -A .....A -4.. n- #.-11-*. C;ULlUILlU113 aLAU bLlCll CLLCCIL, UUbLA L5LUULlU LLllU a11, U11 Clll~Uy' 

ment of such forces. 

1 132. The estimate of the situation culminates in the decision. A decision once made Is not changed without some 

compelling reason. In combat the will and energy of the 

commander must persist until the mission is accomplished. 

Estimation of the situation is, however, a continuous process, 

and changed conditions 'may, at any time, call for a new 

decision. Too stubborn an adherence to a previous decision 

may result in costly delay, loss of opportunity for decisive 

action, or outright failure. 

TERRAIN 

133. That part of the commander's estimate dealing with 

terrain often exercises a decisive influence upon his decision 

and plan. Proper evaluation and utilization of the terrain 

reduce the disadvantage of incomplete information of the 

enem.y. The more important features to be considered in 

evaluating terrain include not only natural ground forms 

such as mountains, ridges, streams, bodies of water, woods, 
OPERATIONS 133-136 

and open spaces, but aJso artificial features such as roads, 

railroads, and towns. The commander seeks always to 

utilize the terrain to his own advantage and to the enemy's 

disadvantage. 

1 134. While the mission of a force is the basic factor in the 

commander's estimate, this may frequently be resolved into 

terms of terrain. Thus, in the defense, it may be vital to 

hold certain dominating ground, or to protect a certain defile. 

Similarly, in the offense, success may hinge on the capture 

of such features which then become the immediate objective 

of the attack. Where possible, it is an aid to proper evaluation of the terrain to reduce the mission to terms of terrain. 

1 135. Maps are the basis for terrain studies, but should be 

checked by air reconnaissance, air photographs, and ground 

reconnaissance. Map errors must be expected. Moreover, 

changes in the terrain, especially in the road-net and drainage system, occur continually. 

1 136. Terrain can always be evaluated in terms of the following flve factors: observation, fields of flre, concealment 

and cover, obstacles, and routes of communication. 

a. Obsmth of the battlefield is essential in order to 

bring effective fire to bear upon the enemy, to control the 

maneuver of one's own troops, and to prevent surprise by the 

enemy. It is obtained from commanding elevations. 

b. Fields of fire are essential to the defense. On the offensive, the commander seeks to make his main attack in areas 

lacking in good fields of fire to the defender. Best fields of 

fire are found in level or uniformly sloping streches of open 

ground. 

c. CmcecJment and cover may occur together. Concealment is protection against obse~ation from the ground and 

air. Cover is protection against fire. The ideal defensive 

position is one having concealment and cover within but none 

in front of it. The attack is best favored by terrain alf'ording 

good concealment throughout the depth of the advance. 

Concealment and cover, from ground weapons, are to be 

found in broken wooded terrain. 

d. ObstacZes are terrain features which impede the movement of military forces. They are of increasing importance 

in modern warfare where masses of mechanized units are employed. Although chiefly of advantage to the defense, they 
136-137 FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS 

may be of great importance in protecting the flanks of attacking units. Some of the common terrain obstacles are 

mountains, rivers, bodies of water, marshes, gullies, steep inclines, and extensive woods. 

e. Routes of communication include roads, railroads, waterways and airways and their facilities. They are important 

in both offensive and defensive operations for the movement 

of troops and supplies. Troops in small bodies move across 

country readily, but in the operations of large bodies of troops, 

routes of communication are of vital importance. 

1 137. Features such as bridges, streams, woods, and towns 

divide practically all terrain into more or less separate areas. 

mCh Bii 8r"ea frequeiit'rj coiiafsts of a pyiiig L$tween 

two ridges, or an open space between two woods. When the 

terrain features enclosing the area prevent direct Are and 

observation into it from positions outside, the area is called a 

compartment. 

A compartment of which the longer axis extends in the direction of movement of a force, or leads toward or into a 

defensive position, is called a corridor. In general, a corridor favors the attack because it limits observation and direct 

Are from the flanks by the defender. From the standpoint of 

terrain, it is desirable that boundaries between tactical units 

in the attack should coincide generally with the boundaries 

of corridors in order that a single unit may control the terrain features from which direct Are can be brought to bear on 

troops within the corridor. 

In the defense, boundaries are usually located within corridors. To assure unity of defensive dispositions, the boundary 

within the corridor should be so located as to include within 

the sector of a tactical unit of appropriate size avenues of 

approach to the position. To locate boundaries within an 

avenue of approach divides responsibility at critical areas. 

A compartment which extends across the direction of 

movemmt of a force, or which extends parallel with a defensive front, is called a cross-corrfdor. Cross-corridors favor 

the defense. However, ridge lines perpendicular to the direction of advance permit an attacker to deal successively with 

elements of the hostile position. During the advance, these 

crests offer the attacker facilities for observation and Are, as 

well as shelter behind which he may reorganize his units. 
OPERATIONS 138-144 

138. See FM 101-5 for a detailed discussion of terrain. 

CONDUCT IN BATTLE 

1 139. The commander's decision for his unit as a whole, and 

the missions to subordinate units in support of the decision, 

be communicated to subordinates by clear and concise orders, which gives them freedom of action appropriate to their 

professional knowledge, to the situation, to their dependability, 

and to the teamplay desired. 

1 140. After providing for the issuance of orders, the commander places himself where he can best control the course 

of action and exert his leadership. His command post affords --. tne advantage of estabiished signai communication. wnen 

opportunity offers and when his presence at the command post 

is not urgently required, he visits his subordinate commanders 

and his troops in order to inspire confidence and to assure 

himself that his orders are understood and properly executed. 

1 141. Whenever the commander leaves his command post, 

he should orient his staff as to further plans to be made or 

measures to be taken in anticipation of future contingencies, 

and should inform his staff where he can be reached. 

1 142. During the decisive phase of battle, the place of the 

commander is near the critical point of action. 

1 143. A commander influences the course of subsequent 

action by his leadership, by the use of his reserves, by the 

concentration of artillery and other supporting fires, and by 

the employment of combat aviation and armored units. 

1 144. The duration of a tactical operation can seldom be 

predicted. Successful engagements sometimes progress so 

slowly that the gains made are not immediately apparent. 

At other times, they progress so fast that the gains made can 

be capitalized only by the most aggressive and farsighted 

leadership. 

Troops are used up rapidly in the decisive phases of combat. This attrition must be anticipated by the commander 

and his staff who take timely measures for replacement of 

men, units, transport, and weapons, and for replenishment 

of ammunition and other supplies. When the situation permits, troops which have been heavily engaged are rested and 

reorganized before being assigned a new and important 

mission. 

29 
146150 FIXLD SERVICE REGULATIONS 

148. The &8E BEE!E~ *.f! commafider, tc th8 exk-,t t%t 

he may require, by providing information, data, and advice; 

by preparing detailed plans and orders in accordance with 

his directions; and by exercising such supervision over the, 

execuuon 02' his nrders he ~gy preg.r!k. A st%!? etlcer, 

as such, does not exercise command. 

i46. Tne staff may be divided into two groups-the general 

staff and the specfaI stad. In large units these two staff 

groups are separate ana distinct; in smaiier units they merge 

into each other, and one staff ofacer frequently is charged 

with duties pertaining to both staff groups. 

1 147. In every headquarters there is a constant tendency to 

multiply personnel, expand the functions of staff administration, and accumulate records and oface equipment. The 

commander must avoid this expunsion. He must organize 

his headquarters so as to maintain its readiness for prompt 

movement. 

1 148. The organization, functions, and duties of the various 

sections of the staff and the employment and duties of liaison 

omcers me prescribed in FM 101-5, 

COMBAT ORDERS 

1 149. The authority to issue orders is an inherent function A n..~~..,. ....... ,....r..li-r 1.. ,.....a 4.. -..-A ....L..~A~ UA GUIIIllI~LlU. VL UeLJ =LC UUL IllLUly OJUCU CU IICAC OUWICLInate commanders. Bypsssing the normal channels of command is resorted to only in urgent situations; in such cases 

both the commander issuing and the commander receiving A- a- L -2 -..L1C-r 114....IIA4..4~ ...Al-n-.Arr" .a 4L" 

L uruer SIIUUIU nubuy AM C~L IIICLULL cc VUIIILII=IIUCA D UA LW 

purport as soon as possible. 

150. Orders may be either complete or fragmentary. 

The order is compZete when it covers all essential aspects 

and phases of the operation. Complete orders include missions to all subordinate units charged with the execution of 

tactical operations in carrying out the commander's plan. 

Fragmentary orders are used when speed in delivery and 

execution is imperative. Fragmentary orders are issued successively as the situation develops and decisions are made, 

and consist of separate instructions to one or more subordinate 
OPERATIONS 150-154 

units prescribing the part each is to play in the operation or 

in the separate phases thereof. This procedure will be usual 

in divisions and smaller units. Fragmentary orders may be 

either oral or written. They are concise but not at the 

epense of clarity and omission of essential information. 

Thstructions issued in fragmentary orders may be repeated in 

a complete fleld order or in an annex if considered desirable. 

1 1.51; Orders should_ b nri_ninated_ ~ufflcientIy early and 

transmitted in such form as to permit subordinate commanders the maximu- periods tn reconnoiteri to estimate 

their own situations, to issue their orders, and to prepare 

their troops for the contemplated operation. Commanders 

should be alert to forestall delays in the successive dissemfnation of orders in their lower echelons. 

1 152. In many situations it may be necessary or desirable LA I-,..- .- ^.A#.-. 4.1 .-.n-- -8 I----A:...- ^I........&;..-^ I-.--.....:-- bu WDU~ LCLL ULUCL bw W~I LI UI 1111p11u1118 U~CL auuua \ WL~LL~ILL~~ 

orders). A warning order contains information which en- -Ll-r n..k-urli..rnth ~~mmnnAr.rn 4- --1-A ..r-nrrnrnCi~nn Car L~ULCD DUWI UIII~IX CIUIIIIII~IIUCI J w 11la~t; ~IC~LLI ~WUIIJ IUL 8 

contemplated operation. Its principal purpose is to gain 

time for preparatory measures and to conserve the energy 

of the troops. 

133i 153. An order should not trespass upon the province of a 

subordinate. It should contain everything that the subordinate must know to carry out his mission, but notining more. 

1 154. Orders must be clear and explicit and as brief as is 

consistent with clarity; short sentences are easily understood. 

Clarity is more important than technique. The more urgent 

the situation, the greater the need for conciseness in the 

order. Any statement of reasons for measures adopted 

should be limited to what is necessary to obtain intelligent 

cooperation from subordinates. Detailed instructions for a 

variety of contingencies, or prescriptions that are a matter 

of training, do not inspire confidence and have no place in an 

order. Trivial and meaningless expressions divide responsibility and lead to the adoption of half measures by subordinates. Exaggerated and bombastic phrases invite ridicule 

and weaken the force of an order. Expressions such as 

"attack vigorously," if used in orders, are not only verbose 

and meaningless, but tend to weaken the force of subsequent 

orders in which such expressions do not appear, 
155-158 FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS 

1 155. Orders should prescribe only so far as conditions can 

be foreseen. Orders which attempt to regulate matters too 

far in the future result in frequent changes. Frequent 

changes in orders overload the means of signal communication, cause confusion and misunderstanding, imme needless hardships on the troops, and injure their morale. J 

Orders issued by subordinates should not be mere repetition of those from higher authority with additions of their 

own. New orders are clearer and more satisfactory. 

156. As a rule it is desirable to keep contemplated operations secret as long as possible and to confine knowledge 

thereof to a few staff ofacers and senior commanders. However, eEt,ry to gcki~~ 9~ i~~!t shezld d~jbt 

to what the commander wants it to do. Whenever knowledge 

of his intentions is necessary to insure the cooperation of the 

units engaged, a commander does not hesitate to disclose them 

to all concerned. Ignorance of his intentions may often 

lead to inactivity on the part of subordinates. 

157. It is impossible to prescribe detailed forms of orders 

to fit every tactical situation. To attempt to do so would 

result in a rigid form and a routine style of expression which 

would not be in accord with the tactical requirements presented by the diverse situations that arise in war. To the 

extent practicable, however, it has been found efacient and 

convenient to classify combat orders according to their purpose and scope and, for some of these, to adopt a standard 

sequence of composition. This makes for ease of understanding, the avoidance of omissions, and ready reference. 

Moreover, experience has shown that an order which can 

be misunderstood will be misunderstood and that, to obviate 

this danger, it is necessary to follow certain rules relating to 

the designations of boundaries, details of time and place, 

military terminology, abbreviations, designations of units, and 

the like. For details relating to these matters, see FM 101-5. 

1 158. Annexes may be issued to accompany combat orders, 

either for brevity, clarity, or simplicity-for example, maps, 

overlays, photographs, and sketches--or to amplify particular 

aspects of the operation, if the volume of detail is too great 

for inclusion in the order itself. The more mobile the operation, the less opportunity tliere will be for annexes. Where 

an annex has limited distribution, certain instructions 
OPERATIONS 158-162 

contained therein must be repeated in order to insure 

c~r~fintinrr. 

159. In every unit, standing operating procedure is prescribed by the commander whenever practicable. This procedure covers those features of operations which lend themseives i;o a definite or standardized procedure without ioss of 

effectiveness. The adoption of such procedures will save time 

in tne preparation anci issuance of orders, minimize the 

chances for confusion and errors when under stress of combat, and greatiy simpiify anci expdiie the execution ui operations in the fleld. (See FM 101-5.) 

COMMAND POSTS 

160. For convenience of operation in campaign, the headquarters of a large unit is divided into a forward and a rear 

echelon. When desirable, headquarters of smaller units may 

be similarly divided. 

The forward echelon consists of the staff agencies immediately required by the commander for assistance in tactical 

operations. The rear echelon consists of the remaining staff 

agencies which have administrative duties. 

1 161. The command gost is the location of the forward 

echelon of a headquarters. All agencies of signal communication center at the command post. 

L; seiwtion a c6r-al-id wsi, co-miderau"n is 

given to the disposition of troops in the plan of operations, 

routes of communication, requirements of signd communication, space for stafP activities, cover, and concealment. lii the of &ivisLoiis aiid -=its, AULlle preznce C' 

existing wire lines is important. mn-'.ta l~..m+i#.n I~AIAuVG lVb~~luIA ~f 8 ~orifi~id pst ivtth respect to sibordinate units places an unnecessary burden on the means rrC mirrmnl nnmmrrminn+ir.- Anln.~n +kn +-n-nrni-n:-r\ rrQ rrarrrn VA D1LSAACL;I bULLAALAUAAAbCLbLUA1, UCALIJU LAIC bA LLLAPULWDIUAA UL UA UCI D 

and information, and makes tactical control diEicult. 

Through the use of motor transport a command post can 

be moved quickly over a considerable distance. Frequent AL...."~.. 4. &I.- l-..n+<rr... A: +LA #.---..-.a -..A. ..."A --.-2ArA blllYA&GU UA WAC IUbUbIUll Ul IrllC; GUULlllUtllU w31, ale LLVUlUtX,k, 

particularly in large units. In large units, before a change rr: 1r....n+4#... :n rrrn.4- +La ...rr..-n'.n..- --..me-- .-.a -4--..1 -rrrrr-..-* UL LVb&bAUAA AJ UAClUG, bIAC LACbGJDCLly LllC~LAD UL DA6AAlll bUAIAlLILLIUcation for the new command post must be established. 
163-168 FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS 

163. A commander must keep superior and subordinate 

units informed of the location and contemplated movement 

of his command post. 

164. Each large unit announces the location of its command post and, when practicable, the location of the command 

post of each of its major subordinate units. In rapidly movz 

ing situations, it . may be necessary to direct subordinate 

units to select and report the locations of their own command posts. In closely coordinated operations requiring the 

movement of command posts: each large unit may designate 

its own axis of signal communication by naming the probable 

successive locations of its command post, so far as such locations can reasonably be foreseen, and may similarly assign 

an axis of signal communication to each of its major 

subordinate units. 

I i65. On the march, a com=aiid *st say i?i~ve Gji kii& 

along a designated route, or it may move at a designated place 

iii a coliimii. 

1 166. In combat, the location of command posts for small 

units in proximity to a good observation post, and for large 

units in proximity to a suitable landing field is desirable. 

167. The ability of mechanized units and parachute troops 

tc strike qciik!y i~ pgr arc?? j_n_dir.kt.e~ the necpsitr of 10- 

cating command posts well forward, both in the offense and 

defense; A forward location assures A. certain degree of all 

around protection by the combat troops; the command post 

will not so easily be cut off from the units it controls and the 

nerve center of the command is favorably located to meet 

rapidly changing situations. 

1 168. The maintenance of secrecy as to the location of compmts, pal;tic-Gariy of units, is of =reat imwri;ance. 

They are the special objectives of hostile airplanes, mecha- -:---I ---fA- -----.---L- nlzeu UL~ILS, pw-acnuce Lrouy;j, and ca~airy. Tnk 'theat 

makes it necessary not only to provide security against surprise attack from either the air or ground, but also to use 

great care not to disclose their locations to such troops. fir.-anal---.& El.-- CL- ma-. :- AO --a*- 2--r.rC--r- a- ~ULIL~G~IIIICLII, 11 UIIA LAC all- 13 UI rrrryur 1111pu1 WIIUC. 11-auti 111 

and out of command posts is rigidly controlled. Landing 6-lrlc ;Irrrrrr\(nn --A -4-b-..- nr-..-Aa e-A --A(- -C-+lfin- --- rbcluo, wwyprrrg arru yrbn up gr uurruu, alru rauru abawuLra a1 t; 

placed at a distance. Signs to mark their locations and the 
OPERATIONS 168-173 

routes thereto are used sparingly-when the danger is great, 

not at all; in place of signs, guides are posted to point the 

way and messengers are given more precise instructions. 

169, The efficient exercise of command and the prompt 

transmission of information and instructions require the 

establishment of reliable means of signal communication. 

Signal communication is effected by technicaJ means and by 

messengers. Entire dependence cannot be placed upon any 

one means; alternate means must be provided. (See FM 24-5 

and EM 11-5.) 

M 170. Every commander is responsible for the establishment nrrA mnin4nnannn rrQ +h~ n4m.rnl nnmrnssn4nn4in~ n-mbnrn rr* L4n CLUU IIICLllllrCUCUIbC UA lrllC JL6U-I WLIll~UAllbCLClULJ DJD-111 UA LlW 

unit and for its efEcient operation as a part of the system of 

the next higher command. Signal communication systems 

must be simple, flexible, and properly used. 

p-e @gb!kcme~t, pd ma~n~gr?ce cf $uqiu& ~~~~-1~n~~

tion between superior and subordinate units is the responsi- bcjty cf ),he s~er* c~,rn-asd~r; &).wpp~\_ sdigli~n); i&n_!t,.c, a9 

directed by their common superior. A unit supporting anether b~ fire is regmm;siMe fcr L.Je et,ghUfihrn-e~t gni ~-gn,tenance of signal communication with the supported unit. 

171. The various means of signal communication are so 

employed that they supplement each other. Those requiring e-ciitu=e ee"rt ad are itiistaiied 

when the service required can be effectively performed by less -.-.__-_*_ elarmrace means. 

I 172. When headquarters are in movement, signal communication is maintained between and withtn columns by means 

of vehicular radio, airplanes, and motor or mounted messengers. 

I 1%. n-e cornmad ~sts ar?d advar?ce ???=age CCI?+A~E =re 

the control points in the initial installation of the signal 

rdmmunir.at!on system, Early info-tion is $vm f.0 the 

signal or communication ofIicer of a unlt relative to projected 

operations and the location and movement of command posts, 

in order to facilitate the prompt establishment of signal communication. The necessary instructions therefor are prepared by the unit signal or communication ollicer, in accord- 
173-180 FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS 

ance with the directions of the commander. Communication 

ofUcers of higher units maintain close cooperation with the 

signal or communication ofacer of the subordinate unit. 

1 174. Message centers are operated at the command posts 

of all units down to and includmg battalions, and at the rear 

echelons of headquarters of large units, by the signal comf 

munication personnel of the command. Message centers 

assist the commander and staff by coordinating the transmission of outgoing orders, reports, and other messages with 

the available signal agencies, and by expediting the delivery of 

incoming messages. In general, the cryptographing and decryptographing of messages are the responsibility of the 

message center. 

1 175. Advunce message centers are established whenever 

needed for the reception and relay of messages. Information 

as to their location is always transmitted to the troops. 

Advance message centers are frequently employed in the 

reconnaissance operations of large units as collecting points 

for messages of several reconnaissance detachments. 

1 176. The message center is not responsible for those messages which are- a. Transmitted directly by the writer to the addressee by 

telephone or personal agency. 

b. Handled by the military or civil postal service. 

c. Local messages between staff sections of the same headquarters located at the same place. 

U 177. The message center transmits messages in accordance 

with the classiflcation as to urgency indicated by the writer. 

For classiflcation of messages in accordance with the urgency 

of handling, see FM 101-10. 

178. The writer does not ordinarily designate the particular 

means by which a message is to be sent. If he desires a 

message transmitted by a particular means, he so marks it. 

E 179. Means of signal communication include wire, radio, 

visual and sound communication, pigeons, airplanes, and 

messengers. 

U 180. Wire communication (telephone, telegraph, and telegraph printer) constitutes the basic techniml means of 
OPERATIONS 180-182 

signal communication for the infantry division and thre 

larger unit headquarters. It will not, however, .always be 

available for signal commwnication between forces operating 

at a considerable distance from each ather, between troop 

units and the higher command on the march, and between 

the advanced troops and the rear in combat. Rapidl'y 

changing situations, such as a pursuit or retreat, restrict the 

practicability of its employment. The possibility of failure 

to function in critical situations must also be reckoned with. 

A wire system must, therefore, be supplemented by other 

means. 

Although wire communication is a relatively safe means, 

there is always the possibility of hostile interception. When 

such interception is practicable it is inadvisable to employ 

wire communication for the transmission in clear text of 

plans which are not to be executed immediately. 

1 181. Radio communication is especially applicable in spanning distances between widely separated mobile forces, between ground and air, and in the Are-swept zone of the 

forward area. It is less vulnerable than wire communication 

to hostile Are, and is, therefore, a valuable supplement to wire 

systems in combat. It is subject, however, to statia, to 

hostile interference, to interception, and to location by the 

enemy. 

Interception of radio messages must be presumed. Discretion must be used even in the sending of messages in code 

or cipher. When prompt action is called for, the commander 

must decide whether the urgency of sending the message in 

the clear outweighs the value to the enemy of information 

contained therein. Radio transmission in the clear is justified in situations when the time available to the enemy is 

insufacient for exploitation of the information contained in 

the message. 

During certain phases of operations, use of radio must be 

rigidly restricted or it may even be prohibited by higher 

commanders. 

1 182. Visual signal communication (lam@, flags, pyrotechnics, panels) is not suitable for long messages or over long 

distances but finds especial application for communicating 

within and between small units and with airplanes by a few 

short signals in accordance with a prearranged code. (See 

FM 24-5.) 

37 
183-190 FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS 

1 183. Sound communication 1s used chiefly h spread an 

alarm, as a means to attract attention, and to transmit short, 

prearranged messages. 

1 184. Homing pigeons are a means of communicating from 

front to the rear when other means have failed. 

1 185. ,AArg!gne messefigers may he emplo~ed when d_istancei 

intervening obstacles on .the ground, or other factors of the 

situation prevent the use of other means, or when more rapid 

transmission is required than can be otherwise accomplished. 

1 186. Signal communication between airplanes and ground 

is accomplished by means of radio, visual signals, and drop 

and pick-up messages. In cornkd, dropp2hg and pick-up 

grounds are established near unit command posts as required. 

On the march, they are established near the location of higher 

commanders and at points along the route of march. Dropping To-m ds are idei*ifia "uJr 'ae &piay iii 

panels. Moving vehicles designated to receive dropped messages are provided means by which they can be easily identifled from the air. Airplanes in Aight may be used to relay 

radio messages between ground forces. 

187. Sole reliance cannot be placed upon the technical 

means of signal communication. Their absence or failure 

to function does not relieve the commander of his responsibility of keeping higher, lower, and adjacent units informed 

of the situation. Each commander provides for the transmission of orders, information, and reports by means of 

messengers. 

W 188. Messengers are dispatched by the most efficient means 

of transport available. In hostile territory it may be advantageous to use airplanes or armored vehicles, or to provide 

an armed escort. In combat, mounted, bicycle, motorcycle, 

and motor messengers are employed as far forward as hostile 

fire and the terrain will permit. Runners are used in the 

more advanced units. 

189. For covering long distances, relays of messengers may 

become necessary. When relays are established, relay (connecting) posts are generally placed at well-marked points 

on the messenger routes. I d-- 

I isu. important messages are often sent by two or more 

messengers, who travel separately. Ofacers are employed for 
OPERATIONS 190-192 

the transmission of important messages when explanation 

relative to the situation or additional information is required. 

191. The ofacer or noncommissioned ofacer dispatching a 

messenger gives him necessary instructions (destination, route, 

rate of movement, dangerous points to be avoided, place where he & Lm re-mri d'er delli",ery of meswej. 'i"& is 

qf especial importance when secrecy precautions prevent the 

use of directional signs. (See par. 168.) 

1 192. Messengers have the right-of-way and must be given 

all practicable assistance. All commanders will assist messengers in expediting delivery of messages.