U.S. Army Research Institute 

for the Behavioral and Social Sciences 

Research Report 1793 

Command Group Training in the 

Objective Force

J. R. Gossman 

Human Resources Research Organization 

Billy L. Burnside

U.S. Army Research Institute 

for the Behavioral and Social Sciences 

Michael R. Flynn and Bud Dannemiller

Northrop Grumman Information Technology

Rebecca P. Mauzy

L-3 Communications 

July 2002 

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
U.S. Army Research Institute 

for the Behavioral and Social Sciences 

A Directorate of the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command

ZITA M. SIMUTIS 

 Acting Director

Research accomplished under contract 

for the Department of the Army 

Human Resources Research Organization 

Northrop Grumman Information Technology 

L-3 Communications Link Simulation and Training 

Technical review by 

James W. Lussier 

John S. Barnett 

NOTICES 

DISTRIBUTION: Primary distribution of this Research Report has been made by ARI. Please address 

correspondence concerning distribution of reports to: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and 

Social Sciences, Attn: TAPC-ARI-PO, 5001 Eisenhower Ave., Alexandria, VA 22333-5600. 

FINAL DISPOSITION: This Research Report may be destroyed when it is no longer needed. Please do not 

return it to the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. 

NOTE: The findings in this Research Report are not to be construed as an official Department of the Army 

position, unless so designated by other authorized documents. 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. REPORT DATE (dd-mm-yy)

July 2002 

2. REPORT TYPE

Final

3. DATES COVERED (from. . . to)

4 September 01 – 4 March 02

5a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER

DASW01-99-D-0012 DO. 0012

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Command Group Training in the Objective Force

5b. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

0603007A

5c. PROJECT NUMBER

A792

5d. TASK NUMBER

205 

6. AUTHOR(S) 

J. R. Gossman (HumRRO); Billy L. Burnside (U.S. Army

Research Institute); Michael R. Flynn, Bud Dannemiller

(Northrop Grumman Information Technology); and Rebecca P.

Mauzy (L-3 Communications) 5e. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

Human Resources Research U.S. Army Research Institute Northrop Grumman L-3 Communications (L3 Comm)

Organization (HumRRO) for the Behavioral and Information Technology Link Simulation and Training 

66 Canal Center Plaza Social Sciences (ARI) 1500 PRC Drive 13665 Dulles Technology Drive

Alexandria, VA 22314 Attn: TAPC-ARI-IK Suite 350 Herndon, VA 20171 

2423 Morande Street McLean, VA 22101 

Fort Knox, KY 40121 

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

10. MONITOR ACRONYM

ARI

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

ATTN: TAPC-ARI-IK

5001 Eisenhower Avenue

Alexandria, VA 22333-5600

11. MONITOR REPORT NUMBER

Research Report 1793 

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Contracting Officer’s Representative: Dr. Billy L. Burnside

14. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words): 

As part of future force development, the U.S. Army has begun a transformation to an Objective Force

capable of achieving full-spectrum dominance in all future conflicts. This transformation will require

changes in training, particularly the training of teams. Objective Force teams will likely consist of small 

groups of individuals (and probably robots or intelligent agents) and will have new and modified 

performance requirements leading to unique training needs. Teams will conduct training continuously

using portable devices and training support capabilities embedded in their vehicles. Meeting these sorts of 

team training requirements is likely to require new training tools and techniques. This project collected 

and analyzed information related to Objective Force Unit of Action command groups, and, based on the 

analyses, developed training requirements for and identified an approach to training teams that fully

supports training anytime, anywhere using operational equipment. A discussion of future research and 

d l t i i l id d Th lt f thi j t b fit th i l d i f th

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Objective Force Future Combat Systems Training Unit of Action 

Embedded training Training Exercise Support System Team training UA Battalion 

 Command group UA Cell UA Team

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF

16. REPORT

Unclassified

17. ABSTRACT

Unclassified

18. THIS PAGE

Unclassified

19. LIMITATION OF

ABSTRACT

Unlimited 

20. NUMBER

OF PAGES

72 

21. RESPONSIBLE PERSON

(Name and Telephone Number)

Dr. Billy L. Burnside

502-624-3450

i
Research Report 1793 

Command Group Training in the 

Objective Force

J. R. Gossman 

Human Resources Research Organization 

Billy L. Burnside

U.S. Army Research Institute 

for the Behavioral and Social Sciences 

Michael R. Flynn and Bud Dannemiller

Northrop Grumman Information Technology

Rebecca P. Mauzy

L-3 Communications 

Armored Forces Research Unit 

Barbara A. Black, Chief 

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences 

5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22333-5600

June 2002 

Army Project Number Personnel, Performance 

2O363007A792 and Training

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

iii 
FOREWORD

The U.S. Army has initiated transformation to an Objective Force designed to be responsive, 

deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable to meet dynamic future 

requirements. The training of soldiers and leaders is key to the success of this transformation, 

particularly the training of teams. For many years the U.S. Army Research Institute for the

Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) has been a leader in the development of innovative team 

training techniques and tools. For example, ARI’s Armored Forces Research Unit (AFRU) at 

Fort Knox, KY has developed prototype structured programs for training small units and 

command groups (commanders and primary staff personnel). Available training techniques and 

tools need to be adapted and expanded to support the training of Objective Force teams. 

This report provides the underpinnings for a research and development program addressing

innovative training and performance support for Objective Force teams, with a focus on 

command groups. It identifies selected Objective Force training requirements and an initial 

approach for addressing them. This report was prepared as part of Work Package 212, “Unit 

Training Technologies for Future Forces.” The relevant requirements document is a 

Memorandum for Record between the Chief, AFRU and Project Manager, Army Transformation 

Office, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, entitled “Future Combat Systems 

Command and Control Experiments,” dated October 18, 2001. 

The results of this effort were briefed to representatives of the U.S. Army Armor Center 

(USAARMC) on January 17, 2002, and were provided to representatives of the U.S. Army

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) on February 7, 2002. The requirements and 

approach identified should be highly useful to personnel in USAARMC, TRADOC, and other 

agencies responsible for developing a comprehensive training support system for the Objective 

Force. 

MICHAEL G. RUMSEY

Acting Technical Director 

v 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of the U.S. Army Research Institute for the

Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) in the completion of this project. In particular, we

recognize Dr. James Lussier, ARI Armored Forces Research Unit, and Dr. Kathleen Quinkert, 

Chief of the ARI-Scientific Coordination Office at U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 

Headquarters. 

vi 
COMMAND GROUP TRAINING IN THE OBJECTIVE FORCE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Research Requirement:

As part of future force development, the U.S. Army has begun a transformation to an 

Objective Force capable of achieving full-spectrum dominance in all future conflicts. The

transformation to the Objective Force will require changes in doctrine, leader development, 

organization, and soldiers, as well as in materiel. A key area of concern will be training, 

particularly the training of teams. Objective Force teams will likely consist of small groups of

individuals (and probably robots or intelligent agents). One type of team will be the command 

group, which will probably be smaller than legacy force staffs and will include vertical teams 

consisting of leaders across echelons. Command groups will have new and modified 

performance requirements leading to unique training needs; they will likely be distributed during

operations as well as during training with reduced opportunity for face-to-face communication; 

and, because they will rely much more heavily on information networks and common operating

pictures during operations, they will need to be confident and proficient in their use. They will 

need to be proficient at commanding and controlling robotic and sensor elements and at 

integrating information from these various sources rapidly. Command groups will conduct 

training continuously, including just prior to and during deployment using portable devices and 

training and performance support capabilities embedded in their vehicles. Meeting these sorts of 

training requirements is likely to require new training tools and techniques. A general integrated 

approach to future command group training needs to be designed so that needed training methods 

and technologies can be identified for high-priority research and development. These needs 

provide the basis for the present project. 

Procedure: 

Initial project activities consisted of identifying and obtaining materials relevant to the

project objectives. The vast majority of information is still under development, so many of the 

materials examined were draft and preliminary copies. In addition, the project staff had access 

only to unclassified materials. Throughout the project, the staff made its “best guess” as to how 

future forces would be organized based on information at hand and on the collective knowledge 

and experience of the staff members. Each member of the project staff gathered information 

independently by conducting Internet searches, and by reviewing current military and trainingrelated periodicals. 

Information analysis was conducted based on the individual skills and expertise of the 

project staff, which had an equal mix of military subject matter expertise and human

performance development expertise. This analysis consisted of categorizing information, 

identifying consistencies and inconsistencies, and establishing a more and more detailed 

understanding of how future combat forces will be organized and will operate. Once the project 

staff achieved a comfortable level of understanding, it began to develop notional organizational 

and operational models that led to identification of training requirements, particularly for 

vii 
command groups, identification of exercise types for future command group training, and the 

proposed approach to command group training. 

Two in-progress reviews were conducted. These allowed the project staff to fine-tune the 

emerging findings and the comprehensive training approach. Project staff also solicited 

feedback on the lists of command group training requirements from military subject matter 

experts who were more or less familiar with Objective Force and Future Combat Systems plans 

and requirements. Modifications to the lists were made based on this feedback. 

Findings: 

The project produced several outcomes related to the stated needs. An examination of the 

key differences between legacy forces and the Objective Force is provided along with the role of 

training in the Objective Force environment. Team training requirements for command group 

and non-command group collective tasks are also presented. An approach to team training in the 

form of a Training Exercise Support System is described in terms of its operation and 

organization, its fielding, its future benefits, and a list of exercise types that it supports. Finally,

a discussion of future research and development issues is provided. 

Utilization of Findings: 

The results of this project can benefit those involved in further definition and development 

of the training requirements, particularly command group training requirements, for the 

transformation to the Objective Force. One approach or mechanism for supporting projected 

command group training needs is presented in detail and can serve as a starting point for 

development of future training support systems. In addition, the research and development 

issues provide direction for future work that will assist the Army in achieving its stated goals for

the Objective Force. 

viii 
COMMAND GROUP TRAINING IN THE OBJECTIVE FORCE

CONTENTS 

Page

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 1 

BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................................... 2 

PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND TASKS................................................................................... 8 

PURPOSE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT.......................................................... 9 

INFORMATION GATHERING AND ANALYSIS................................................................. 10 

FINDINGS................................................................................................................................. 11 

Key Differences Between Legacy Forces and Future Forces ............................................ 11 

Training in the Future Force Environment......................................................................... 13 

Future Combat Systems Training Requirements................................................................ 18 

A Method for Training Command Group Tasks................................................................ 22 

THE TRAINING EXERCISE SUPPORT SYSTEM................................................................ 23 

The Training Exercise Support System Components......................................................... 25 

The Training Exercise Support System Functions............................................................. 26 

Fielding the Training Exercise Support System................................................................. 28 

Exercises Training Exercise Support System Supports...................................................... 29 

Using the Training Exercise Support System to Train....................................................... 30 

Implications and Benefits of the Training Exercise Support System................................. 34 

FUTURE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT DIRECTIONS ............................................. 36 

Key Research and Development Issues.............................................................................. 36 

Near-Term Research and Development Considerations .................................................... 38 

SUMMARY............................................................................................................................... 39 

REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................... 41 

ix
CONTENTS (continued)

Page

Appendix A. Acronyms............................................................................................................ A-1 

 B. Project Sources.................................................................................................... B-1 

 C. Unit of Action Collective (Non-Command Group) Tasks.................................. C-1 

 D. Selected Research and Development Issues for the Objective Force 

 Organized by DTLOMS.................................................................................. D-1 

LIST OF TABLES 

Table 1. Command Group Collective Tasks by Echelon......................................................... 20 

 2. Exercise Types Developed for the Training Exercise Support System..................... 30 

LIST OF FIGURES 

Figure 1. Prototypical maneuver Unit of Action Platoon configuration.................................. 5 

 2. Objective Force organizational structure .................................................................. 6 

 3. Prototypical disposition of a Unit of Action............................................................. 7 

 4. Possible command groups within Units of Action ................................................... 8 

 5. A notional Future Combat Systems command and control vehicle.......................... 15 

 6. The total performance development system ............................................................. 24 

 7. The Training Exercise Support System (TESS) – Centralized Component ............. 25 

 8. The Training Exercise Support System – Platform Embedded Component............. 26 

 9. Example of a Unit of Action Platoon command group exercise using the 

 Training Exercise Support System (TESS) and executed from the command 

 and control vehicle (C2V)...................................................................................... 32 

 10. Example of a Unit of Action Platoon manned exercise using the Training

 Exercise Support System (TESS), including the centralized component, and 

 executed from the Platoon Future Combat Systems platforms............................ 33 

 11. An example of a Unit of Action Platoon manned exercise using only the 

 platform embedded Training Exercise Support System capability to do 

 mission planning and rehearsal........................................................................... 34 

x 
COMMAND GROUP TRAINING IN THE OBJECTIVE FORCE

Introduction 

In the first two decades of the twenty-first century, the U.S. Army will undertake a 

transformation as significant as any previously undertaken in its two hundred twenty-five plus 

year history. While this transformation is in response to the way future conflicts are likely to be

fought as well as to the changes in the missions the Army will face, it is equally in response to 

the changes in technology that characterized the last quarter of the twentieth century, especially

in the areas of information gathering, processing, and dissemination. Chief of Staff of the Army, 

General Erik Shinseki (2000) has recently characterized the need for transformation as follows: 

Our legacy Army’s warfighting prowess today is assembled around two force characteristics 

– heavy and light: magnificent heavy forces that are well equipped for war but difficult to 

deploy strategically; and magnificent light forces that can respond rapidly and are well 

suited for stability and support operations but lack staying power against heavy mechanized 

forces. Our forces must be capable of building sustained momentum in spite of the gap 

between these two operational forces. What we require is greater lethality, survivability,

and deployability all across the force. The infusion of these capabilities throughout the 

force will also increase our versatility and agility for full-spectrum operations. Our forces

must be able to dominate the full spectrum of military operations – to make the transition 

from military operations other than war to warfighting without a loss in momentum (p. 23). 

This transformation is an integral part of the Joint Vision 2020 (Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS1

],

2000) which concludes that “full spectrum dominance implies that U.S. forces are able to 

conduct prompt, sustained, and synchronized operations with combinations of forces tailored to 

specific situations and with access to and freedom to operate in all domains – space, sea, land, 

air, and information” (p. 6). The Army’s role and success in achieving full-spectrum dominance

will rest largely in its transformation to the Objective Force.

The transformation to the Objective Force will require changes in doctrine, leader

development, organization, and soldiers as well as in materiel. A key area of concern will be 

training, particularly the training of teams. While there will be numerous configurations of

individuals, robots and intelligent agents that will comprise different types of Objective Force 

teams, one specific type is the command group upon which this report focuses. Command 

groups will exist at all echelons, will probably be smaller than legacy force staffs, and will 

include vertical command groups consisting of leaders across echelons. Objective Force 

command groups will have new and modified performance requirements leading to unique 

training needs. Command groups will likely be distributed during operations as well as during

training with reduced opportunity for face-to-face communication, and because they will rely

much more heavily on information networks and common operating pictures2

 (COPs) during

operations, they will need to be confident and proficient in their use. They will need to be

proficient at commanding and controlling robotic and sensor elements and at integrating

information from these various sources rapidly. Command groups will likely conduct training

 

1

 A list of all acronyms used in this report is included in Appendix A. 2

 Also referred to as common relevant operating picture (CROP). 

1 
continuously, including just prior to and during deployment, using portable devices and training

support, and other performance support capabilities embedded in their vehicle platforms and 

equipment. Meeting these sorts of training needs is likely to require new training tools and 

techniques. A general integrated approach to future command group training should be designed 

so that needed training methods and technologies can be identified for high-priority research and 

development. The purpose of this report is to identify future command group training needs as 

well as an approach and associated technologies for addressing those needs. 

Background 

In order to provide a comprehensive picture of the role command groups will play in the 

future forces, it is necessary to understand the transformation that is underway among all forces, 

and to examine how that transformation will occur in the Army. To accomplish this, a fairly

extensive background section is provided. 

The Department of the Army (DA), in a recent White Paper (DA, 2001a), has described the 

conceptual basis for the development of the Objective Force and laid the groundwork for its 

operation and organization. The Objective Force is designed to be organized, manned, equipped, 

and trained to be more strategically responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, 

and sustainable across the full spectrum of operations from Major Theater Wars to Small-Scale 

Contingencies to Homeland Security. Objective Force units will be capable of rapid deployment 

anywhere in the world and of conducting simultaneous, distributed and continuous combined 

arms, air-ground operations throughout the battlespace. The Objective Force will likely be

organized hierarchically, although the use and power of distributed command and control (C2) 

systems to provide a common situational understanding may compress strategic, operational, and 

tactical echelons. Tactical units will cover much larger geographic areas than their counterparts 

in the legacy force, and all units will have instantaneous access to information through 

networked command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. In fact, Shinseki (2001) has characterized the Objective Force 

as “a system of integrated capabilities – space, air, ground, direct and indirect and internetted 

with ...C4ISR” (p. 33). Current plans provide for fielding of the Objective Force initial 

operational capability by 2010 and an additional five Objective Force units by 2012 (Doty,

2002). 

At the strategic level, the Objective Force will continue to fulfill the Army’s primary

mission: to fight and win wars and conflicts in which the U.S. is engaged. The Army will 

continue to serve as the primary integrating agent for other services. At the operational level, the

Army will provide headquarters for joint, interagency, and multi-national forces along with 

operational level information superiority through intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

(ISR), information management (IM), and information operations (IO). At the tactical level, 

Objective Force units will be “optimized to win on the offensive, to initiate combat on their

terms, to gain and retain the initiative, build momentum quickly and win decisively ... Objective

Force units will see first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively. Operations will be

characterized by developing situations out of contact; maneuvering to positions of advantage; 

engaging enemy forces beyond the range of their weapons; destroying them with precision fires; 

and, as required, by tactical assault at times and places of our choosing” (DA, 2001a, p. 6). 

2 
Seven characteristics will guide the development of the Objective Force as described in the

White Paper (DA, 2001a) and as further elucidated in Field Manual (FM) 1 (DA, 2001b) and FM

3-0 (DA, 2001c). The Objective Force will be responsive – it will be organized into smaller, but 

more capable, formations able to exploit military and commercial lift to arrive in theater ready to 

fight. It will be deployable – capable of quickly and rapidly concentrating combat power in an 

operational area. Units will also be capable of enroute mission planning and rehearsal during

deployment. It will be agile – possessing the mental and physical agility to transition rapidly

among various types of operations. Agility will require leaders who are highly adaptive and 

mentally responsive. It will be versatile – inherently capable of domination at any point in the 

spectrum of military operations. Units will be organized for multifunctional operations 

incorporating combined arms capabilities at the lowest tactical levels. It will be lethal – every

element will be capable of generating combat power and contributing decisively to the fight. It

will be survivable – taking advantage of technologies to provide maximum protection. And, it 

will be sustainable – deploying fewer vehicles and utilizing combat service support (CSS) reach 

capabilities that optimize management and tracking of supplies and equipment. 

Key to the success of the Objective Force will be its ability to obtain and employ

information. It will operate in a network-centric environment by means of a global information 

grid (JCS, 2000) that will consist of a globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information 

capabilities, associated processes, and people to manage and provide information on demand to 

warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel. Information systems and equipment will 

allow access to the global information grid by any appropriately cleared participant. In the

Objective Force, this access will be through C4ISR systems which provide leaders at all echelons 

the ability to achieve information superiority and situational understanding, and to establish, 

maintain, and distribute a COP (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command [TRADOC],

2001a). Objective Force C4ISR systems will be able to collect, display and disseminate a COP, 

execute battle command on the move, maintain situational awareness at all times, and identify

schemes of maneuver and decision points. To operate effectively, C4ISR systems will be

intuitive, redundant, reliable, continuous, configurable, automated, self-healing, transparent, and 

will reach to higher and adjacent echelons (TRADOC, 2001a). 

The concept of information superiority is critical to future success of the Objective Force. It

involves the operational advantage obtained from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate 

an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the

same (DA, 2001c). Information superiority will begin before forces ever arrive in theater and 

will continue throughout the conflict. The COP will be attained by the sharing of information 

across commands and will be displayed at a scale and level of detail that meets the information 

needs of the command at a particular echelon. It will be tailored to the user’s requirements. 

Obtaining and employing a COP is a critical feature of the Objective Force C4ISR systems. 

At the strategic level, the Objective Force will be composed of Units of Employment, 

roughly equivalent to legacy force divisions and above. These units will link ground and joint 

forces and orchestrate ground operations and will be the basis of combined arms air-ground task 

forces. At the tactical level, the Objective Force will consist of Units of Action (UAs) – tactical

warfighting echelons roughly corresponding to legacy units at brigade and below. Maneuver 

3 
UAs will be the smallest combined arms units that can be committed independently (TRADOC, 

2001b). 

The backbone of the maneuver UAs will be the Future Combat Systems (FCS), sometimes 

referred to as the Future Combat System of Systems. The FCS will be a networked system of

systems that will serve as the core building block within all maneuver UAs. The FCS will be

comprised of a family of advanced, networked, space-, air- and ground-based maneuver, 

maneuver support, and sustainment systems that will include manned and unmanned platforms. 

The FCS will include suites of information technologies; reconnaissance, surveillance, and target 

acquisition (RSTA) networks; and battle command systems that will enable UAs to operate at

high levels of synchronization. 

The organizational structure of the UAs is currently under development, and there is not yet 

complete agreement on the organization or the specific terminology that will be used. This 

report assumes, for example, that the Platoon will be the lowest combined arms unit; however, 

some sources designate the Company. This paper will use the terminology that is being

employed by the FCS Lead System Integrator (LSI)

 3, although it will acknowledge other 

terminology currently in use particularly by TRADOC and the Defense Advance Research 

Projects Agency (DARPA). At the lowest echelon, there will be the UA Platoon – the smallest 

and most atomic organization within the UA. The notional UA Platoon illustrated in Figure 1 

will consist of a suite of manned and unmanned systems, mounted and dismounted capabilities, 

direct and indirect fires, and ground and air sensors. It will be an organic combined arms unit 

and may be, for example, composed of one command and control vehicle (C2V), two robotic 

reconnaissance vehicles, two line-of-sight (LOS) direct fire systems, two non-line-of-sight 

(NLOS) and beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) vehicles, three Land Warrior carriers, unmanned 

aerial vehicles (UAVs), and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) networked together as a single 

fighting system. The illustrated UA Platoon will operate in a three-dimensional 10- by 25-

kilometer geographical space defined by the range of its organic weapons and sensor systems. 

Although the ultimate goal of the Objective Force is full-spectrum dominance, no Platoon will 

itself be full-spectrum capable. However, with proper augmentation from higher Units of 

Employment (UE) and UA elements, UAs at the highest echelon will become full-spectrum 

dominant. 

 

3

 At the time this project was completed, most of the information available to the researchers was from DA, 

TRADOC, Defense Advance Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and other public sources. The LSI contract was

not awarded until the project was nearly completed. This had two consequences. First, the terminology and

organization considered during the project were different from that used in the report. Second, the vast majority of

information considered addressed UAs only through Battalion level. Consequently, the report generally does not

address Brigades specifically, although, in general, the findings will apply to this echelon also. 

4 
LOS Systems

Network

 Centric 

Force

Land Warriors

NLOS/BLOS

 Systems

Small Unit UAV

Sensor Systems

Other 

Layered

Systems & Sensors

C2V

Figure 1. Prototypical maneuver Unit of Action Platoon configuration. 

The UA Platoons will likely operate in tandem with one or more additional Platoons under 

the control of a UA Company, roughly equivalent to a Company or Troop in the legacy force. 

The UA Company will provide guidance, support and overwatch to Platoons and will be 

responsible for shaping the Platoons’ battlespace and coordinating support beyond the range of 

the Platoon. Four to six UA Companies will comprise a UA Combat Command (Battalion), 

which will be responsible for rotating UA Companies in and out of action to provide continuous, 

uninterrupted operational pressure on opposing forces. The UA Battalion will also be 

responsible for pushing logistics packages, tailored to a unit’s needs based on current status and 

future missions, to mission staging areas (MSAs). At the highest echelon, UA Battalions will be 

organized as a UA Brigade.4

 The UA Companies, Battalions, and Brigades are expected to be

lean compared to their corresponding legacy force echelons; however, they may control 

additional assets not provided at the UA Platoon level. The UA Companies, for example, might 

own and control Distributed Common Ground System – Army (DCGS-A), and Battalions might 

own and control long-range tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Figure 2 illustrates a

likely Objective Force UA organizational structure, and, as shown in Figure 3, UAs will have 

 

4

 The TRADOC and DARPA terminology for UA echelons consists of UA Cells at the lowest level, UA Teams at 

the next level, UA Battalions at the next level, and UA Brigade (or simply Unit of Action) at the next level. 

5 
much larger footprints than their equivalent legacy force units. The UA Battalions, for example, 

may cover an area of operations (AO) as large as 300 kilometers. 

UA

Company

UA

 Platoon

NLOS (x2) Land Wa Sensor (x2) LOS (x2) C2V rrior (x3)

Maneuver 

 Brigade

 Unit of Action

UA

Battalion

Figure 2. Objective Force organizational structure.

Manning requirements for units that will comprise echelons within UAs are currently under 

development. Current research being conducted by the U.S. Army Research Institute for the 

Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) and DARPA, for example, is examining command group 

requirements. Although the exact structure of FCS command groups has not yet been 

determined, it may be close to that shown in Figure 4.5

 The command group for the UA Platoon 

may consist of four members, all of whom could operate from the UA Platoon C2V. For a UA

Platoon such as the one shown previously, the four positions might include the leader, an indirect 

fires person, a direct fires person, and a sensors and intelligence person. These correspond to the 

functions around which the maneuver platoon is built. At the UA Company, the command group 

might consist of six to eight people operating from two C2V platforms. In addition to the 

commander and a supporting fires person or persons, the UA Company command group could 

 

5

 The information on UA structure presented in this report is based on the best available information from

TRADOC, DARPA, ARI and other relevant sources at the time this report was written. To satisfy project 

requirements, assumptions about command group structure and organization were made based on this information

and on the knowledge and experience of the project staff.

6 
also have ISR and IM6

 people. At the UA Battalion echelon, the command group might consist 

of eight to 12 people operating from a command post (CP) that could be fixed or mobile. The 

UA Battalion level is the first echelon at which specific command group responsibility for IO, 

CSS and joint/combined coordination is likely to be introduced.

7

 The UA Brigade will likely

resemble the UA Battalion in its make up, although it will be somewhat larger and will probably

operate from a fixed CP. 

100-300 kms

Unit of Action Battalion

TUAV TUAV

 BN C2V

Figure 3. Prototypical disposition of a Unit of Action. 

As described above, meeting general team training requirements for the Objective Force, 

including training of command groups, will likely require new approaches and methodologies. 

Training management tools will be required to determine when team members are ready to fully

utilize the C4ISR network, the exercise or exercise sets (including gates) the team is ready to 

complete, modifications to exercises required for upcoming missions, and the skills and 

competencies that need to be emphasized. Training support tools will be needed to assess and 

display team performance results and to represent the activities of surrounding hostile and 

 

6

 Information Management is defined as the provision of relevant information to the right person at the right time in

a usable form to facilitate situational understanding and decision making. (DA, 2001c) 7

 As discussed previously, organizational structure continues to emerge. It is quite possible that some of the 

command group functions will shift up or down echelons. 

7 
friendly forces as well as missing team members. These needs provide the basis for the present

project. 

Command Groups 

Unit of Action Platoon (4 people) 

Leader

Organic and Supporting Indirect Fires and Effects 

Direct Fires 

Sensors and Intelligence

Unit of Action Company (6 – 8 people) 

Commander

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

Information Management 

Supporting Fires 

Unit of Action Battalion (8 – 12 people) 

Commander

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

Information Management 

Information Operations

Combat Service Support 

Joint/Combined Coordination 

Figure 4. Possible command groups within Units of Action. 

Project Objectives and Tasks 

Two major objectives from the Statement of Work ([SOW] ARI, 2001) drove the project 

activities: 

To identify expected requirements for training staff, leader, and small unit teams in both 

the 2008 and 2015 timeframes. 

To design at least one comprehensive approach to addressing the future team training

requirements identified for the 2008 and 2015 timeframes. 

These objectives were addressed through completion of the following tasks: 

Task 1. Identify anticipated training requirements for staff, leader, and small unit teams 

within the context of Objective Force UAs in both the 2008 and 2015 timeframes. This will 

include the identification of key technological developments expected to be available in 2008 

and 2015 leading to needed parallel accomplishment of research and development on training

8 
methods, tools, and techniques. It will also identify requirements for training management and 

training support, as well as techniques and tools that appear most relevant for training teams in 

UAs in 2008 and 2015. Task 1 will identify training requirements in terms of key expected skills 

and competencies for staff, leader, and unit teams in the 2008 and 2015 timeframe, and identify

exercise types needed for the training media expected to be available. 

Task 2. Design at least one comprehensive approach for addressing the training

requirements identified in Task 1. The training approach will integrate training media and 

capabilities expected to be available in 2008 and 2015 and will be designed in sufficient detail to 

allow identification of specific training management and support tools and techniques required. 

It will also address training of key skills and competencies within exercise types identified in 

Task 1. The design of the comprehensive training approach will result in identification of highpriority areas and issues for near-term research and development in sufficient detail to allow 

specification of research hypotheses. 

As the project proceeded, these tasks were refined somewhat with concurrence of the 

Contracting Officer’s Representative. Primary emphasis was placed on examining requirements 

for command groups in the UAs, a term that had not been generally in use when the SOW was 

written. 

Purpose and Organization of the Report 

The purpose of this report is to examine future team training requirements for the Objective

Force, particularly as related to UA command groups. It also describes, in somewhat less detail, 

the training requirements for unit (other than command group) collective tasks at the UA 

Platoon, UA Company, and UA Battalion levels. It presents an approach to training for 

command group and other collective tasks based on technological advances anticipated to be 

available and on future training requirements that will need to be satisfied. Finally, it presents 

research issues and questions that will need to be addressed in order to provide maximally

effective training for future forces. 

The report is organized as follows: 

Information gathering and analysis. This section describes the information gathering and 

analysis methods employed for the project. 

Findings. This section presents the results of the information analysis in terms of 

differences between legacy and future forces, the role of training in the future force

environment, future training requirements, anticipated technological advances and their 

impact on training design, development and management, and an identification of 

exercise types that will support future team training. 

The Training Exercise Support System. This section presents a detailed description of a 

proposed Training Exercise Support System (TESS) that represents a training approach 

that could take full advantage of future technology advances and that should be fully

responsive to future training needs. 

9 
Future research and development directions. This section presents a description of 

selected research questions that may be key to developing future forces. 

Summary. This section summarizes the methodology and findings of the project. 

Appendixes A through D contain an acronym list, a list of the information sources

reviewed for the project, UA collective (non-command group) tasks, and selected 

research and development issues, respectively.

Information Gathering and Analysis 

Initial project activities consisted of identifying and obtaining materials relevant to the

project objectives8

. Since Objective Force and FCS concepts are in early stages of development,

much of the material is in flux, and many of the materials examined were draft and preliminary

copies. In addition, project personnel had access only to unclassified materials. And, while it is 

true that there is a wealth of information available electronically on, for example, the Objective 

Force, FCS, and probable technological advances, it is also true that the information is not 

always in agreement, and, in fact, is sometimes contradictory. Throughout the project, members 

of the project staff made their “best guess” as to how future forces would be organized based on 

information at hand and on their collective knowledge and experience. 

Each member of the project staff gathered information independently by conducting Internet 

searches, and by reviewing current military and training related periodicals. This comprised the

primary initial activity of the project, although the staff met frequently to discuss findings and to 

continue to refine the approach to collecting additional information. 

Information analysis was conducted based on the individual skills and expertise of the staff 

members. The group had a mix of military subject matter expertise and human performance 

development expertise. Analysis consisted of categorizing information, identifying consistencies 

and inconsistencies, and establishing a more and more detailed understanding of how future 

combat forces will be organized and will operate. Once the staff achieved a comfortable level of

understanding, they began to develop notional organizational and operational models that led to 

identification of training requirements, particularly for command groups, identification of 

exercise types for future command group training, and the proposed approach to command group 

training. 

Several reviews were conducted during the project providing the project staff with 

additional information. Two in-progress reviews were conducted: one at the completion of 

Task 1 and one at the completion of Task 2. Both reviews provided valuable feedback, which 

allowed the staff to fine-tune the research findings and the comprehensive training approach. 

The staff also received feedback on the lists of command group training requirements from a 

group of military subject matter experts who were more or less familiar with Objective Force and 

FCS plans and requirements. Modifications to the lists were made based on this feedback. 

 

8

 A listing of references and materials examined for the project is included in Appendix B. 

10 
Findings 

Key Differences Between Legacy Forces and Future Forces 

The future force is likely to differ from today’s legacy force in several key areas, and in

large measure, it is the differences that lead to the identification of training requirements and that

suggest the design of a training approach. 

First, the types of conflicts and the nature of warfighting itself are changing. Future

conflicts are likely to require rapid deployment into undeveloped theaters characterized by

asymmetric threats. Conflicts will take place in complex urban environments in which hostile 

forces are intermingled with noncombatants. Recent incidents of this have occurred in 

Afghanistan where Taliban forces and friendly forces were virtually indistinguishable, and, in 

fact, Taliban forces often became friendly forces by overnight changes in allegiance. 

Future forces will need to share information seamlessly and effortlessly. Future conflicts 

will involve joint operations, and very often, multi-national operations as well. This places a 

tremendous emphasis and demand on sharing of information in a highly effective, efficient 

manner. The linking of sensors, delivery systems, and effects, will take place across Services

and will incorporate applicable capabilities of multi-national partners when appropriate. The key

to information sharing will be interoperability. As directed in Joint Vision 2020, (JCS, 2000): 

“Interoperability is a mandate for the joint force of 2020 – especially in terms of 

communications, common logistics items, and information sharing. Information systems and 

equipment that enable a COP must work from shared networks that can be accessed by any

appropriately cleared participant” (p. 15). For FCS units, interoperability and information 

sharing will be achieved by means of C4ISR systems networked through the global information 

grid. 

Related to information sharing will be the need for future forces to achieve information 

superiority. The side with the better ability to obtain and process information will have a definite

advantage in future conflicts. The value of information operations cannot be overstated; it could 

well be the decisive factor in future conflicts. Potential opponents undoubtedly think that 

achieving information superiority will constitute the most productive avenue to take to offset the 

U.S. conventional battlefield capabilities. FM 3-0 (DA, 2001c) defines information superiority

as “the operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an 

uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the

same” (p. 11-2). Achieving information superiority involves three components: the ability to 

obtain information through ISR; the ability to manage information to ensure that commanders

have the information they need when they need it, and the ability to conduct information 

operations to protect friendly information and to disrupt the enemy’s information. It will be 

critically important that U.S. and allied forces achieve information superiority.

Future forces will rely heavily on precision fires to the point that close combat may become

a rare event. More and more of the most dangerous operations will be performed by robotic 

elements, which will be capable of identifying targets and executing fires to achieve greatest 

effect. As FM 1 (DA, 2001b) states, “In the future, the Army will see a battlefield in which 

11 
precision weaponry both demands and allows greater dispersion of forces. Increasing reliance on 

electronic systems for managing the fight will move even more combat into the information 

environment” (p. 35). The emphasis will be on massing fires, not forces, which is specified as a

requirement for the Revolution In Military Affairs described by the Defense Science Board 

(DSB) Task Force (Braddock & Chatham, 2001). This will be accomplished by means of 

“widely spaced units flawlessly connected to each other and to their command structure” (p. 1). 

Because the emphasis will be on massing fires, future force units will be able to cover much

larger geographical areas than their legacy force counterparts. As previously shown in Figure 2, 

for example, a UA Maneuver Platoon may cover approximately a 25 kilometer diameter circular 

area extending 10 kilometers into the air; UA Companies may cover as much as 50 kilometers; 

and UA Battalions as much as 300 kilometers. 

Future forces will rely on collaborative planning9

 even down to the lowest echelons, unlike 

collaborative planning in the legacy force, which generally does not occur below the brigade 

level. This will be made possible by means of shared information networks and the increased 

ability to develop and disseminate a COP. The flow of information will be virtually

instantaneous to all echelons resulting in simultaneous rather than sequential orders production 

cycles. These newly acquired capabilities will place additional requirements on commanders 

and other unit members who will need a broad understanding of the operational systems and 

tools in order to provide flexible cooperation and collaboration. 

Future conflicts will likely be much more “public.” As occurred in the Gulf War, and more 

recently in Kosovo and Afghanistan, engagements are reported almost immediately on public 

news agencies. This can be both a blessing and a curse to commanders. It can offer great

assistance to the decision-making process; however, it also makes operations transparent to the

world. Future commanders will need to be skilled in dealing with the news media in order to 

maximize the benefits and minimize the risks of increased public awareness. 

Future forces will be capable of command and control on the move. “Objective Force

commanders will be free to move about the battlespace by any means while maintaining

uninterrupted access to the common operating picture and subsequent situational awareness” 

(TRADOC, 2001a, p. 15). Commanders will have access to networked RSTA – “manned and 

unmanned air and ground RSTA and remotely delivered sensors – organic at all UA echelons, 

linked to all shooters...Units will be able to go on mission, receive and disseminate terrain and 

weather information immediately throughout the area of responsibility (AOR), even while 

enroute to gain the ‘home court advantage’ at all times” (TRADOC, 2001b, p. 7). Commanders 

will also be able to take advantage of virtual staffs. They will be able to engage in active

planning and decision-making without having to physically assemble at a CP. This will greatly

facilitate the decision-making process and will also provide the capability to rehearse subordinate 

commanders and staff while dispersed and on the move. Staffs at higher echelons will 

undoubtedly be leaner since much of the logistics and CSS will be highly automated, and since 

there will no longer be the intensive human actions required to move information up, down, and 

across echelons. Information will be instantly available via the global information grid to 

everyone with proper clearance. Additionally, more and more decision-making is likely to occur 

 

9 Collaborative planning is the real-time interaction of commanders and staff at two or more echelons developing

plans for a particular operation. (DA, 2001d)

12 
at lower echelons consistent with the vision that “In making well-informed decisions at the 

lowest levels, Objective Force units will operate faster than current units where decisions are

more centralized” (DA, 2001a, p. 8). There will no longer be a necessity for CPs to be located 

close to the conflict since all critical information will be available worldwide virtually

instantaneously. 

These are some of the operational differences that will characterize future forces, and, in 

general, they have one thing in common. They all involve much greater access to, and utilization 

of, information. Information will be the most sought-after commodity of future conflicts. This 

will be as true for the lowest echelons as it is for the highest. However, what this also means is 

that leaders at all echelons must be adept at processing this information. Leaders will need to be

highly skilled at information integration, independent thought, abstraction and the use of broad 

and complex frames of reference (TRADOC, 2001a). Leaders will need to be adaptive and selfaware. 

Training in the Future Force Environment

Although the primary focus of this report is on training of command groups, there are 

considerations that apply to training in general. This section will examine those considerations. 

The same factors that are leading to the need to transform the Army are also pushing a 

transformation in the way the Army will train. This doesn’t mean basic training doctrine will 

change – the principles established in FM 25-100 (DA, 1988) and FM 25-101 (DA, 1990) will 

continue to apply to future training, including command group training. The Army will continue

to train as it fights, that is, it will train tasks under conditions that are as close to those that will 

be involved in actual combat as is practical. This will still apply even though the way the Army

fights might change dramatically. Commanders will continue to be the primary trainers for their

units since they will be responsible for assessing their unit’s proficiency, identifying training

deficits, and providing the required training and resources to ensure that their unit is combatready at all times. Training will continue to be the most important unit activity outside of actual

combat; in fact, the amounts of time units spend training will likely increase significantly. Every

day a unit is not fighting should be spent training. Training will continue to be performanceoriented and task- or proficiency-based. Training development will likely continue to employ a

form of the Instructional Systems Design (ISD) model it has used for years, and that has 

provided the Army with a decided training advantage. Training effectiveness will continue to be

critically assessed through rigorous after action reviews (AARs). What will change is the way

the Army trains. More and more training will be supported and delivered using actual 

operational systems. 

Current Army policy (DA, 1987) specifies that all new systems must consider embedded 

training in their design and development.10 It is entirely conceivable that the capability to 

support most training needs could be embedded in the FCS. However, this capability must be 

considered in conjunction with other system specifications and requirements. For example, it is 

 

10 In this report, a distinction is made between embedded training and an embedded training capability. Embedded

training implies that the actual training content and/or specific exercises are resident in the system or platform. 

Embedded training capability implies that the system or platform supports training, although actual content or 

specific exercises may reside on the system only during a training event. 

13 
possible that “out the window” simulation capabilities could be embedded in an FCS platform; 

however, this could add substantially to the weight and size of the platform, particularly in the 

2008 timeframe if extensive hardware (e.g., monitors) is required. This may be prohibitive. 

Other training capabilities might involve merely adding an additional circuit board or additional 

software to the onboard operational systems which is much more feasible. In addition, 

capabilities are likely to change substantially over time as hardware gets smaller and information 

processing gets more sophisticated. Whatever the case, it will be important for FCS designers to 

consider FCS training needs and embedded training capabilities in the near- and long-term as an

integral part of total system design. 

To provide a better understanding of embedded training capabilities, consider the notional 

layout of the C2V for the UA Platoon command group shown in Figure 5. The layout for a UA 

Company C2V would probably be quite similar. As displayed on the right side of Figure 5, there

are four stations in addition to the driver and self-defense/communications stations. Each of 

these stations will have a support environment consisting of display panels, communications 

devices, and input/output devices (touch screens, keyboards, mice, voice recognition and 

generation, etc.) as shown on the left side of the figure. All stations will be fully networked and 

wirelessly connected to the global information grid via the on-board C4ISR network. In an 

operational environment, the stations will be receiving data through the C4ISR network, and the 

data will be displayed and presented on one or more of the components of the support 

environment. Actions taken by crew members will produce data which will be transmitted either 

internally to other crew members via the vehicle’s internal network, or out to the world over the 

global information grid. Imagine the following scenario. The UA Platoon leader has just 

received an order, transmitted digitally, from the UA Company commander requesting

surveillance of an area of terrain falling within the UA Platoon’s AO. The UA Platoon leader 

sends an order to the sensor and intelligence crewman, either verbally or via his support 

environment, to gather surveillance data on the specified area. The sensor and intelligence

crewman decides how best to conduct the surveillance and transmits a digital order to one of the 

Platoon’s organic sensor vehicles, which happens to be fully robotic. The digital order triggers 

the launch of a UAV carrying a digital video camera. The UAV flies over the specified area, 

under the control of the sensor and intelligence crewman, and provides a continuous stream of 

digital video images. The images are transmitted to and picked up by the global information grid 

from which they are available to everyone with clearance including the sensor and intelligence

crewman, the UA Platoon leader, and the UA Company commander who gave the original order. 

In addition, since it is a fully networked environment, the images are also available 

simultaneously to higher and adjacent elements all the way up through command groups located 

at CPs in the U.S.. 

It is relatively easy to envision an embedded training support capability in the FCS that 

would operate through the onboard C4ISR network and individual support environments. All 

that is required is the capability to stimulate the C4ISR network to produce the displays and 

communications that would occur in an actual operational situation. This could be accomplished 

14 
by means of a partially embedded training support system11 that provides soldiers the 

opportunity to train using their actual equipment – not on a simulator or other device that 

represents or replicates their equipment. This represents a substantial difference between today

and the future. As discussed in the Objective Force C4ISR Concept paper (TRADOC, 2001a), 

“The legacy force commander cannot currently use his own battle command systems to train his 

headquarters to fight. He must either use artificial response cells in a static simulation center or 

he must plan for months and spend a great deal of funds to establish interfaces between his battle 

command systems and outdated simulations. Without an embedded battle command training and 

mission rehearsal capability, the commander cannot realistically prepare for his mission or 

wargame his courses of action” (p. 11). 

37” Plasma Display

 Driver Self-Defense &

Communication

CDR

 Organic &

Supporting Indirect Fires

 & Effects

Direct

Fires

Sensors &

Intelligence

37” Plasma Display

The left side displays the support environment that will be used by command group members; the right side

displays the workstation locations of the command group.

Figure 5. A notional Future Combat Systems command and control vehicle. 

For embedded training to work effectively in future force training, it must be an inherent 

component of FCS design. It must be usable and sustainable and must enable units to deploy

rapidly without the need for system-specific training prior to deployment. In addition it must 

facilitate training using the same operational systems and controls that will be used in the FCS 

environment. 

 

11 In this instance, embedded refers to the FCS, not just to a specific vehicle or platform. Some components of the 

embedded system may be on the vehicle; however, others may be part of the larger FCS. In addition, there may be a 

non-embedded training support component (i.e., external to the FCS) that works in conjunction with the embedded 

component to provide the complete training capability.

15 
Training for FCS units should be designed to involve the capability to train using actual 

operational systems with training support being provided by onboard systems and by external 

systems operating through the global information grid. (A later section of the report will discuss 

the external training support system in greater detail.) The FCS training capabilities underlie a 

number of important implications: 

Entire units, or portions of units, at any echelon will be able to train anywhere, anytime. 

They will not be limited by unit size, and they will not need the complex training and 

simulation sites required for the legacy force of today. Because the vast majority of 

collective training will occur in the unit’s vehicles using actual operational systems, units 

will be able to train at home station; they will also be able to train at combat training

centers (CTCs) or while being deployed, or even after deployment while in theater. 

Training will be brought to units instead of units being brought to training. Units will no 

longer rely on fixed institutions or simulation centers;

12 this will allow training to be

delivered just in time and completely relevant to the units’ current training needs. As the

DSB Task Force put it, “Future training must be delivered to the individual, to units, and 

to joint forces, when it is needed, not in the schoolhouse after which there is time for 

proficiency to decay. Training must be applied over and over again as the composition of 

the units and joint forces changes and as skills erode over time” (Braddock & Chatham, 

2001, p. 1). 

Units will train on the move as well as while stationary. This mirrors the basic command 

and control on the move operational capability of UAs and will be achieved through 

networking via the global information grid and the embedded C4ISR systems. Unlike 

legacy forces, future force units will not be limited to static CPs. Since the C4ISR 

network is also the backbone of FCS training, units will be able to train on the move

including effective enroute mission planning and rehearsal. 

Training will employ a train-alert-deploy paradigm rather than the alert-train-deploy

paradigm characteristic of the legacy force. Objective Force units will be

multidimensional and multifunctional. They will be capable of rapid deployment in 

support of a wide variety of missions requiring them to have been adequately trained on 

those missions. When the need for deployment arises, units will be able to use mission 

planning and rehearsal during deployment to fine-tune their skills and knowledge to 

achieve maximum effectiveness as soon as they are in theater. 

Units will train using multi-echelon and joint/combined exercise scenarios. It does not 

matter whether higher, subordinate, adjacent or multi-national units are actually present; 

the training support systems will have the capability to simulate their actions with realism 

and fidelity such that any participating units will not know whether other units are live or 

simulated. 

 

12 This discussion applies specifically to collective training. It may be more efficient to continue to deliver some

training in simulators, particularly when there are substantial risks involved. Initial driver training or initial gunnery

training are examples where potential risk might dictate training in a simulated environment. 

16 
In a similar vein, individuals will be able to participate in collective training as if their

entire unit was present. Individual soldiers will be able to train or fine-tune the individual 

skills and knowledge they perceive to be weak or deficient in a collective training

exercise even though no other members are present. Again, this stems from the ability of

the training support systems to simulate the actions of any individual member of a team 

just as if that member had been present. 

Individuals or groups will be able to train even when they are not in their vehicles, or 

even when they are not in the same location. Since the training support system will be 

using the same global information grid that will be used in the operational environment, 

all that is required is access to the grid via a device that has the capability to simulate the

C4ISR network and the support environment. This could be a personal computer (PC), or 

by the year 2015, even a handheld personal digital assistant. As Campbell and Holden 

(2001) envisioned it, “Research on modeling is leading to representations of individual 

human performance, which should allow small groups to train without a full complement 

of participants. Wide-area networks and the Internet are being used to overcome the 

challenges of providing collective training for geographically separated team members, 

and linked simulations using long-haul networks are maturing to create a realistic training

environment” (p.16). By 2015, this vision is likely to be realized, although necessary

planning and design to achieve it should be occurring now. 

The use of artificial intelligence capabilities including intelligent agents13 will become

more and more widespread and sophisticated during the timeframe of FCS development. 

Significant advancements are continuously occurring in areas such as on-line tutoring and 

mentoring, as well as advanced help systems in which intelligent agents monitor a user’s

actions and offer suggestions and/or interventions where appropriate. These capabilities 

will be particularly important to the FCS operational environment where units will be

required to process and utilize large amounts of information in relatively short 

timeframes. Intelligent agents can assist users in correctly interpreting information as

well as in avoiding actions that are inappropriate or unnecessary. 

Distance learning methodologies will become increasingly important in the training of

future forces. The Army Distance Learning Program (ADLP) is becoming an integral

part of total Army training and will assume even greater importance in the future. While

ADLP currently applies more to individual training, in the future it will likely apply to 

collective training also using methods such as collaborative Internet-based meetings and 

other distributed technologies. 

While embedded training will be critical to training of FCS units, it must still be recognized

that it is only part of the picture. There will continue to be the need to apply good, sound 

training development and delivery methods and techniques such as those specified by the ISD 

process or its successors. The Army must continue to maintain the training superiority cited by

 

13 Although there are currently many definitions of intelligent agent, a useful one comes from Gilbert, et al., 1995. 

"Intelligent agents are software entities that carry out some set of operations on behalf of a user or another program

with some degree of independence or autonomy, and in so doing, employ some knowledge or representation of the 

user's goals or desires."

17 
the DSB who gave much credit to the use of CTCs

14 which provide an environment as close to 

actual battlefield conditions as is practical. The same task force also found that the CTCs are not 

being supported as well as they were five or ten years ago and recommend that this trend be 

reversed (Braddock & Chatham, 2001). 

The Army should continue to apply an AAR/feedback system to ensure training

effectiveness. And, it must find ways to make the feedback even timelier. Part of the training

support systems for future training will need to examine performance feedback requirements, not 

only after an exercise is completed, but also even during the running of the exercise. It is quite 

probable, for example, that methodologies will be developed for providing intervention feedback 

during an exercise in which an individual’s or group’s active participation will be temporarily

suspended and taken over by the training support system while the group or individual is 

provided with feedback, coaching and mentoring. 

The Army should increase the capability of commanders and other trainers to tailor training

to their specific needs. The efficacy of doing this has been demonstrated by a series of ARIsponsored projects to develop the Commander’s Integrated Training Tool (CITT) for the Close 

Combat Tactical Trainer (see Flynn, et al., 2001). These projects clearly demonstrated that 

commanders are capable of developing quality training exercises, often by modifying existing

ones, given sufficient assistance and tools. 

The Army should reexamine acquisition policies for new programs. The DSB task force 

noted that the Army at one time had a policy that for each development program, a training

subsystem be formally designated and funded with acquisition dollars. The policy was not 

applied fully because, if the training subsystem was not ready, the whole system was declared 

not operationally ready and was not deployed. The task force “saw no plans anywhere, Servicebased or joint, for fundamentally altering the training infrastructure to accommodate Joint Vision 

2010/2020 warfare. As we found in the acquisition process, it appears that training is ignored 

when planning for the future in the tacit hope that it will solve itself. Training programs are, by

and large, reactive, not proactive” (Braddock & Chatham, 2001, p. 12). The FCS program will 

not be successful if this is allowed to occur again. The embedding of the training support 

systems must be considered as part of the system design and development process, or FCS 

training will never live up to the capabilities described in all the specifications and all the design

documents, no matter how well they are stated. 

Future Combat Systems Training Requirements

In addition to examining how training likely will occur in the future force, project personnel

also examined what the future force training requirements for command groups will be. 

Following Army doctrine that training is task-based, this examination was approached by

attempting to identify what tasks the UA command groups will complete. The analysis was 

limited to collective tasks and further distinguished between command group tasks and other unit 

 

14 Although CTCs may be considered part of the institutional training network, their importance to the present

discussion lies in their ability to provide a very realistic training environment coupled with excellent opposing forces

and AARs. These functions need to be available regardless of whether they are provided within an institution or not. 

18 
collective tasks. It should be noted that, although the project’s efforts focused on tasks, there is 

no reason a similar analysis could not be made focusing on group and individual competencies. 

In attempting to identify command group tasks, the project staff focused on the collective 

actions that would be taken by the command group in their C2 capacity. This did not include 

other collective tasks the command group may complete that are not part of commanding and 

controlling the unit. Table 1 presents the results of the analysis for command group tasks broken 

down by echelon. For each echelon, tasks are further categorized by whether they represent a 

planning activity, an activity related to “see first,” an activity related to “understand first,” an

activity related to “act first,” or an activity related to training the unit.15 

While there are tasks that are included at all three echelons (Conduct intelligence 

preparation of battlefield [IPB], Communicate and display information) the number of tasks 

required increases at each higher echelon. This reflects the fact that the UA Platoon and (to a 

lesser degree) the UA Company are expected to be lean organizations whose command groups 

are very focused on conducting combat operations, and that combat support (CS) and CSS 

activities are consolidated at the higher echelons. 

At the UA Platoon level, the focus is on executing tasks that are directly related to the 

placement and movement of its elements, control of its sensors, targeting and engaging threat

forces, and communicating information to higher and adjacent units. Tasks associated with CSS 

activities are planned and conducted by other units and monitored at the Platoon level. 

At the UA Company level, there is still a significant focus on tasks that support conducting

combat operations such as those mentioned above. However, at this level there are additional 

tasks that support planning for stability and support operations, coordinating with external units, 

synchronization of forces and their effects, and conducting battle damage assessment (BDA). As 

at the Platoon level, the Company command group only monitors CSS activities within its AO. 

At the UA Battalion level, the number of command group tasks increases fairly

dramatically. This is the first level of command that has a significant number of tasks associated

with CS (mobility, survivability, and communications) and CSS (plan for and coordinate CSS)

operations. Additionally this level is where the majority of the planning and coordination with 

external (joint and coalition, media, humanitarian, and native) agencies occurs. This makes the 

UA Battalion command group the first level responsible for coordination of all activities related 

to operations in the battlespace. (As discussed previously, the task analysis could easily be

extended to UA Brigade; however, this was not done as part of the current project.)

 

15 It is possible that some of the listed tasks will move to a higher echelon when final UA organizational decisions 

are made (i.e., what the lowest level for a combined arms unit will be.) 

19 
Table 1 

Command Group Collective Tasks by Echelon 

Unit of Action – Platoon

Plan

 Conduct intelligence preparation of the battlefield

(IPB) 

 Conduct collaborative planning and decisionmaking

 Plan intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance 

(ISR) operations

 Develop fire plans

 Develop orders

 Plan force protection operations

See 

 Develop and maintain a common operating picture 

 Develop the situation using ISR assets (out of

direct contact) 

 Control sensors and process information

Understand 

 Communicate and display information (ISR

handover)

 Communicate and display decisions and orders

 Develop and maintain situational awareness

 Conduct mission rehearsals

 Collect and report battle damage assessment

(BDA) 

Act 

 Command and control (C2) the platoon

 Control placement and movement of subordinate

elements

 Control targeting and engagement at extended

ranges 

 Act without or beyond the scope of orders

 Monitor combat service support (CSS) operations

Plan, Execute, and Assess Training

Unit of Action – Company 

Plan

 Conduct IPB

 Conduct collaborative planning and decisionmaking

 Plan ISR operations

 Develop fire plans

 Develop orders

 Plan force protection operations

 Plan combat operations

 Plan support operations

 Plan stability operations

See 

 Develop and maintain a common operating picture 

 Develop the situation using ISR assets (out of

direct contact) 

 Control sensors and process information

Understand 

 Determine likely enemy action

 Communicate and display information (ISR

handover) 

 Communicate and display decisions and orders

 Develop and maintain situational awareness

 Conduct mission rehearsals

 Collect BDA reports 

Act 

 Command the company

 Control placement and movement of subordinate

elements

 Control targeting and engagement at extended

ranges 

 Rapidly assess options 

 Identify when and where the team needs to 

transition (adjust execution)

 Maintain full synchronization throughout the 

battlespace 

 Act without or beyond the scope of orders

 Monitor CSS operations

Plan, Execute, and Assess Training

(table continues)

20 
Table 1 (continued)

Command Group Collective Tasks by Echelon 

Unit of Action – Battalion

Plan

 Conduct IPB

 Conduct collaborative planning and decision-making

 Plan ISR operations

 Develop fire plans

 Develop orders

 Plan the cycling of available forces

 Plan mobility and survivability support operations

 Plan communications support

 Plan information operations

 Plan CSS operations

 Plan force protection operations

 Plan combat operations

 Plan support operations

 Plan stability operations

 Plan humanitarian support

 Develop media plan

See 

 Develop and maintain a common operating picture 

 Develop the situation using ISR assets (out of direct 

contact) 

 Control sensors and process information

Understand 

 Determine likely enemy action

 Communicate and display information (ISR

handover) 

 Communicate and display decisions and orders

 Develop and maintain situational awareness

 Conduct mission rehearsals

 Collect BDA reports 

Act 

 Command the battalion

 Coordinate maneuver to a position of advantage 

 Control targeting and engagement at extended ranges 

 Rapidly assess options 

 Identify when and where battalion needs to transition

(adjust execution)

 Maintain full synchronization throughout the 

battlespace 

 Coordinate the cycling of available forces

 Coordinate CSS operations

 Integrate mobility and survivability support 

operations

 Coordinate communications support

 Integrate joint and coalition forces 

 Conduct information operations 

 Act without or beyond the scope of orders

 React to indirect fire 

 Coordinate movement of dislocated civilians

 Establish liaison

 Transfer control of current operations between

command elements

 Conduct mediation and negotiation 

 Conduct ISR operations 

 Coordinate humanitarian support

Plan, Execute, and Assess Training

Table 1 presents the expected training requirements for the Objective Force UA command 

groups. Using this list, exercises can be designed and developed that focus on training the 

various command groups. Appendix C contains a list, by echelon, of unit collective tasks, which 

will serve a similar function for development of unit exercises. 

Having described the role of training and its characteristics as well as training requirements 

for future force UAs, the report will now examine a possible method for training command group 

tasks. 

21 
A Method for Training Command Group Tasks 

Command group tasks are, by definition, collective tasks, and a plan for training command 

group tasks should recognize that learning to perform collective tasks is best accomplished 

through executing exercises designed to ensure practice of those tasks. Any collective task 

performance is comprised of the actions of the individuals making up the collective group, and 

the individual skills and knowledge required to support those actions can be trained by a variety

of methods. Teams or groups, on the other hand, learn to perform collective tasks by practicing

them together – by learning to apply their individual skills and knowledge at the correct time, in 

the correct sequence, in conjunction with the actions of other members of the group to produce a 

collective action. This is the basis for the command group training method, which consists of 

providing opportunities to practice performing command group tasks in a variety of situations. 

Before describing the method, it will be helpful to examine training that should have already

occurred prior to collective exercises. There will have been a great deal of individual training

delivered in a variety of ways. There will be a need for institutional training at the individual 

level, although this training may or may not be delivered in classrooms. It could also be 

delivered via distance learning methods or other non-traditional methods including individual 

training embedded in systems. The important point is that each individual will have received

training to a measurable level of proficiency on the individual skills and knowledge required for 

performance of their tasks. The command group training method assumes that this individual 

training has occurred (and may still be occurring).

The command group training method consists of participation in training exercises utilizing

a systematic process in which exercises become progressively wider in scope and more and more 

realistic. This is substantially the same as the way collective training occurs in today’s legacy

force. Currently, staff16 training typically occurs in either a constructive or live environment 

using a variety of exercise types such as map exercises, staff training exercises, and live training

exercises. Command group training will also occur using a variety of exercise types that provide

group members an opportunity to practice command group tasks with increasing realism both in 

terms of the number of participants and the overall context of the exercise. 

A continuum of training events that represent increasing realism can be described based on 

three dimensions. The first dimension, Exercise Scope, represents the highest echelon for which 

an exercise is written from Platoon through Battalion. The second dimension represents the 

echelon of the unit members participating in training, again from Platoon through Battalion. The 

third dimension represents the number of members of the unit who are actually participating in 

the training exercise. This dimension recognizes that someone can participate in a group 

exercise as an individual with full realism as long as the training support system is capable of 

simulating the other members of the group.17 Similarly, subsets of the command group can 

participate in an exercise, again with full realism. The continuum is produced by the variation of 

these dimensions in different combinations. Exercises can vary from a single individual 

participating in an exercise written for his echelon only up through an entire Battalion (including

its associated Companies and Platoons) participating in an exercise written at the Battalion level. 

 

16 Staff training is the closest analog to command group training in the current legacy force. 17 A later section of this report will describe such a training support system. 

22 
To clarify the command group training plan, an example will be presented. Lieutenant 

Jones is the leader of a UA Platoon and has completed individual training to a proficiency level 

required to begin command group training. In a typical situation, he would begin with a 

command group exercise at the platoon level as the sole live participant. The actions of all other 

member of the command group would be simulated. As LT Jones gains proficiency, he would 

bring other members of the command group (who may also have been practicing their roles 

individually) into the exercise until, ultimately, the entire command group is participating. As 

the group gains proficiency, they would select an exercise written at the Company level in which 

they would practice their Platoon level command group tasks, initially with the Company

command group simulated, but ultimately with that command group participating live also. 

Following this approach, the Platoon command group would ultimately execute their command 

group tasks in a Battalion level exercise with all other command groups participating live. By

extension, one can apply this same approach to command groups at Company and Battalion 

levels. 

As implied, for this approach to work, there will need to be a sophisticated, intelligent, and 

powerful exercise support system capable of presenting the exercises and simulating the actions 

of the command group members not actually participating. Such a support system is the subject 

of the next section of the report. 

The Training Exercise Support System 

The support system for future command group training will need to include an intelligent 

training system that provides a synthetic exercise environment to support individual through 

multi-echelon unit training, and to support training using remote hand-held devices and PCs 

along with training using the actual operational equipment of the FCS platforms. It will need to 

employ the global information grid, and will need to be an integral component of the FCS “Total

Performance System of Systems.” This section will propose and describe such a system which 

we have termed the Training Exercise Support System (TESS). 

As shown in Figure 6, the TESS is designed to be one part of the FCS Training Support 

System which, in turn, is one part of the Total Performance Development System. The future 

Army should attend just as much to personnel selection and integrated performance support 

systems as it does to training and training support. Training should not be the automatic solution 

of choice to existing or anticipated performance deficiencies since it is frequently the most

expensive and least efficient option. When possible, personnel should be selected who already

possess required skills and knowledge, and systems should be designed to provide maximum 

performance support in the form of embedded help, intelligent agents, and other methods that 

will become increasingly possible in the future. When training is the solution of choice, there

will be a variety of systems that make up the total training system. Institutional training will 

continue to be important as will distance learning, information repositories such as the General 

Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library (RDL), and CTCs including the National 

Training Center. A system like the TESS proposed here will play a major role, particularly in 

training collective tasks. 

23 
Figure 6. The total performance development system. 

The TESS will be designed as an intelligent system that will satisfy the requirements for

future force training described previously. It will: 

Utilize the FCS C4ISR network as its backbone. 

Support training anywhere anytime. 

Support training by all, or a subset, of the members of a unit. It will automatically detect 

and simulate the actions of unit members who are not actually participating.

Support access to training from multiple sources from hand-held devices through actual 

operational systems. 

Support multi-echelon unit training. 

Support individual training as if participating in a collective exercise. 

Support mission rehearsal and training while deploying and during deployment. 

Support task-based and competency-based training. 

Support a gated training strategy. 

Support joint/combined training. 

Provide sophisticated AAR and other feedback systems including the ability to record 

unit and individual performance for future replay.

Provide for user- or unit-based modification and creation of exercises. 

24 
The Training Exercise Support System Components 

The TESS will consist of two components: a centralized component and a platform 

embedded component. As depicted in Figure 7, the centralized component will include the 

complete capability to present and support exercise execution. It will consist of the necessary

hardware and software to provide exercise control, training management, C4ISR stimulation, and 

a multi-level observation and feedback system. It will utilize reconfigurable workstations similar

to those employed in current fixed simulation sites to provide control of computer generated 

forces and AAR functions, and it will be accessible via the global information grid, which will 

also provide the capability to link multiple TESSs. In the near future, up through 2008, the 

TESS centralized component will probably be a relatively small and limited system capable of 

supporting the collective training requirements of a UA Battalion. It will consist of necessary

computers, workstations, communication equipment, and support personnel, and it will probably

be mobile so that it can be moved with the unit when the unit is deployed. As technology

advances, the TESS could become a single system that is part of the global information grid 

capable of serving the collective training needs of the entire force or a major command, although

this is probably not going to occur by 2015. 

Workstations Communication via

C4ISR network

Functions

Exercise

Control

Training

Management

C4ISR

Stimulation

Multi-level

Observation &

Feedback

System

Net Access

- Into TESS from other systems

- From TESS to other system/repositories

Figure 7. The Training Exercise Support System (TESS) – Centralized Component. 

The second component of the TESS consists of the component that is embedded in the FCS 

platform as shown in Figure 8 (where the platform is represented by the support environment.) 

This will be referred to as the platform embedded component and consists of onboard hardware 

and software necessary to replicate the vehicles’ functions and those of their subordinate 

25 
elements including vehicle movement.18 The platform embedded component provides the 

vehicle the capability to replicate its own actions and those of elements it controls through a

semi-automated force (SAF) functionality.

19 It provides communication via the C4ISR network. 

It does not, however, simulate the crew member’s support environment functioning since the 

TESS will utilize the actual support environment just as it would be used in a real operation. 

Exercise participants will not be able to distinguish between real operations and training (other

than having “told” the vehicle that it is in training mode by means of some kind of software or

hardware switch, and possibly some distinctive visual cue.) It is important to remember that the

TESS is both components which are in constant communication with each other, and both are 

essential to its operation. 

Replication of vehicle and

subordinate elem ent functions

including vehicle m ovem ent

Com m unication via

C 4ISR netw ork

SAF Functionality

Figure 8. The Training Exercise Support System – Platform Embedded Component. 

The Training Exercise Support System Functions

As touched on briefly, the TESS will have all of the functionality required to manage and 

deliver training exercises. Primary TESS functions are examined in detail below. 

Exercise control. The TESS will have complete capabilities to initialize and support 

simultaneous exercise execution. Each exercise will have a corresponding initialization file 

 

18 This refers to representations of vehicle movement on tactical displays (without the vehicles actually moving.) It

does not refer to apparent motion of the vehicle by crew members. 19 Depending upon the situation, elements may be simulated by the centralized component or by the platform

embedded component. In addition, elements may sometimes be real; in which case, the element itself would be

sending data to the information grid. 

26 
which will specify friendly and enemy forces, terrain, starting locations, and any other data

required to start the exercise. The TESS will include full SAF functionality to simulate the

operation of the various entities as would occur in a real operational environment. Some of the

SAF operation will be completed by the centralized component; some by the platform embedded 

component. In its early instantiation (2008), the SAF capability will require human intervention; 

however, as advances in modeling and simulation occur, along with advances in the use of 

intelligent agents, it is likely that most, if not all, of this capability will become automated. Since

the TESS will likely have the capability to control multiple exercises running simultaneously, 

initially there will need to be sufficient SAF operators and workstations, as well as Observer/ 

Controller (O/C) workstations, to support them. 

Exercise management and assessment. The TESS will have full support for required 

exercise management and assessment, issues that were extensively examined by Gossman, 

Graves, Mauzy, and Clagg (2001). The TESS will be capable of addressing all management and 

assessment concerns described in that effort. It will support exercise modification and creation 

by unit training personnel by including an exercise-authoring tool similar to the CITT. It will 

support exercise assessment by collecting data on unit performance during execution as well as 

unit subjective reactions to the exercise. It will include a repository for retaining these data for

dissemination via the global information grid. It will provide access to a central repository of

exercises for download and execution (and probably some limited repository for storage of

frequently executed exercises.) It will also provide access to other resource repositories such as

the RDL, the Center for Army Lessons Learned, and other relevant sources. It will support the 

use of core sets of exercises along with the use of gate sets. Core sets are made up of a group of 

exercises that serve the basic training needs of a unit. Gate sets consist of exercises that must be 

completed to a specified performance level in order for a unit to be rated proficient or to proceed 

to the next training level.

C4ISR stimulation. This represents one of the most important functions of the TESS in 

being able to provide training that utilizes actual operational systems. The TESS will have the

capability to replicate all of the data streams required to realistically portray actions and 

operations that are occurring on the battlefield. The TESS will be able to send data to, and 

receive data from, the global information grid, or it will have the capability to fully simulate the 

operation of the grid itself, thereby making the data available to C4ISR networks.20 For 

example, when a UAV (simulated) is deployed during an exercise, the TESS, either in the 

centralized or platform embedded component, will simulate the sensor’s operation and will 

produce precise replications of the data that the sensor would send to the global information grid 

in real operations. All users with access to the grid will be able to receive the data on their

operational support environments. All actions users take using their support environments will 

 

20 Simultaneous support of multiple exercises raises the question of how this will be accomplished given that there 

will be only one C4ISR network with the TESS interacting through it, or perhaps someday becoming part of it. One 

way to accommodate multiple simultaneous exercises would be by providing TESS the capability to establish

training networks that filter sending and receiving of data to those individuals and systems participating in the 

exercise. Thus, for example, if two Platoons were both conducting different exercises, TESS would establish 

separate information networks for each exercise such that the first Platoon only “sees” data related to its exercise, 

and the second Platoon only “sees” data related to its exercise. It should also be possible to establish higher level 

networks such that personnel from the Platoons’ commanding Company could observe both exercises. In theory, 

there should be virtually no limit to how many networks could be established.

27 
be interpreted by the TESS to replicate the data that would be produced in an actual operational 

environment. In effect, the support environment will look, act, and feel exactly the same to the 

user whether he is in training or in combat. 

Multi-level automated observation and feedback system. The TESS will have a number of

capabilities related to observation and feedback. It will have extensive recording capabilities to 

support feedback and AARs. It could, if desired, be designed to record every action taken that 

results in data replication. It’s just a matter of sufficient processing capacity. By 2008, and 

certainly by 2015, storage capacity will not be a concern. Because the TESS will be accessible 

via the global information grid, it will have the capability to allow for observation and feedback

from a variety of devices and by individuals who do not need to be physically collocated at the 

TESS, or even with the training unit. For example, an individual unit commander could ask a 

mentor to observe his unit’s performance, even though the mentor might be located on another 

continent, and the mentor could “log in” to the TESS via the global information grid, observe the 

exercise, and provide feedback. 

One observation and feedback capability that would be highly desirable, and that may be

possible in the future, is the ability to provide real-time intervention to some participants without 

disrupting the execution of the exercise. If an observer (or an intelligent agent) detects that some

members of the training unit have performed actions that are so incorrect and off target that the 

unit will get no value from the rest of the exercise, the exercise could be halted for that group 

only, with the TESS assuming their role via SAF. They could be provided with constructive 

feedback to the point where they are ready to resume, at which time they would again “go live.” 

This capability provides two major advantages over waiting until the exercise is completed. It

provides immediate feedback which is likely to be more effective than feedback given after some

delay. And it avoids the possibility that while the group is “doing all the wrong things,” they

may also be learning actions that might actually be detrimental to desired task performance. On 

the other hand, there are numerous obstacles that will need to be overcome for real-time 

intervention to become a reality. The rest of the training unit, those for whom intervention is not 

being provided, either should not be able to detect the change from live to SAF, or the change

must occur in such a manner as to provide minimum disruption. This will require an 

intervention agent that is able to provide a seamless transition from the incorrect actions the

group was taking to a path that will get them back on track. It will also require some means to 

inform the group for whom the intervention occurred what has transpired during the intervention 

and allow them to seamlessly resume their participation. These are by no means trivial tasks and 

will require significantly more intelligent agents than are currently available. 

Fielding the Training Exercise Support System 

As indicated previously, initially the TESS could be fielded to UA Battalions in a

configuration that allows it to be moved as the battalion moves. It should be capable of 

supporting multiple exercises at Platoon and/or Company levels, or of simultaneously training

the entire battalion. Multiple TESSs could be linked to support multi-echelon training above 

battalion level. And, since the TESS will use common simulation protocols based on High Level 

Architecture (HLA) or its successors, it will also support joint and multi-national training with 

other Services and other nations utilizing their own version of a TESS. 

28 
The TESS should also be fielded to the CTCs. The TESS will have the capability to support 

exercises that combine live and simulated training through the operation of the C4ISR systems. 

That is, units that are participating in a live training exercise could also be receiving C4ISR data

from simulated units via the TESSs data replication function. This function would occur 

seamlessly to the point that the training units should not be able to identify who is live and who 

is simulated. This may, in fact, be one of the TESSs most important functions since it will allow 

execution at the CTCs of exercises that include more units than the CTC can accommodate

geographically. 

There are additional significant reasons for fielding the TESS to the CTCs. One stems from

the fact that while UA forces will be able to train anytime anywhere on operational tasks using

the TESS, this simulation training omits the training of CSS systems, movement to and from the

battlefield over long distances, and having small groups functioning effectively as part of larger 

formations while spread out over great distances. These types of training can only occur in a 

field environment that supports the execution of continuous operations with units operating over 

doctrinal distances against realistic opposing forces. While the TESS provides much of this in 

any setting, it cannot replicate the wear and tear on equipment and personnel that live training

can. The use of CTCs for live training will always be necessary and may well be the most 

effective way to stress units, systems, and personnel, and to introduce realistic friction and fog of 

war. 

Staffing requirements for the TESS will initially be significant. Each TESS may support a 

number of reconfigurable workstations for exercise control and observation/feedback – perhaps 

as many as ten or more. These workstations could be staffed either by unit personnel or by

others. On the other hand, it is anticipated that the TESS will be in-use nearly all the time since

as much as 80% or more of a unit’s time will be spent training. This will justify the cost. It is 

also anticipated that staffing requirements will be reduced significantly over time as more of the

exercise control and observation is assumed by intelligent agents. By 2015, when the TESS 

could become a component of the global information grid, where one TESS might serve the 

training needs of an entire command, total staffing could be even further reduced, although there 

will likely be some centralized staffing. 

Exercises Training Exercise Support System Supports 

The project staff identified the exercise types shown in Table 2 which could be supported by

the TESS. These will be discussed briefly even though the main focus of this report is on 

command group training. One characteristic of each of these exercise types is that it can be 

executed in the actual equipment or platforms versus in a simulated environment. A second 

characteristic is that the exercise can be conducted by the command group only, or by the entire 

unit. The former are termed “command group” exercises; the latter are called “manned”

exercises. Finally, a distinction is made between exercises based on the echelon at which it is 

conducted, UA Platoon, UA Company, UA Battalion, or multi-echelon, producing the exercise 

types illustrated in Table 2. 

29 
Table 2 

Exercise Types Developed for the Training Exercise Support System 

Exercise Type Description 

PCX Unit of Action (UA) Platoon Command Group Exercise

PMX UA Platoon Manned Exercise 

CCX UA Company Command Group Exercise 

CMX UA Company Manned Exercise 

BCX UA Battalion Command Group Exercise 

BMX UA Battalion Manned Exercise 

 MCX Multi-echelon Command Group Exercise 

(Battalion and Company; Battalion, Company, and Platoon; Company

and Platoon) 

 MMX Multi-echelon Manned Exercise 

(Battalion and Company; Battalion, Company, and Platoon; Company

and Platoon) 

So, for example, a UA Platoon command group exercise would be developed to train the 

members of the command group in the collective command group tasks previously discussed. 

Similarly, the UA Company and UA Battalion exercises would be developed for those echelons. 

Multi-echelon command group exercises would train command group tasks from more than one 

echelon in a single integrated exercise. Manned exercises are a slight misnomer in that all of 

these exercises are manned or staffed. However, the term is used here to indicate that all of the 

members of the unit may be participating in the exercise, not just the command group. As with 

the command group exercises, manned exercises can be conducted at a single echelon or can 

combine multiple echelons in the same exercise. 

The exercise types shown in Table 2 provide a basic shell that allows for an entire 

progression of training. Platoon command groups can train by themselves; they can train with 

Company command groups; and they can train with Company and Battalion command groups. 

Similarly, the whole Platoon can train by themselves or with the Company and with the 

Battalion. At the other end of the continuum, individuals or small subgroups can train as if all 

unit members were present. 

Using the Training Exercise Support System to Train 

Having examined the TESS conceptually along with its various components and functions, 

it will be helpful to look at some examples of how the TESS could be used to support training for 

individuals and teams. These examples are based on a conceptualization of the TESS as it could 

function in the early stages of Objective Force development – the 2008 timeframe. Most of its 

functionality is external to the vehicles themselves, and it requires support in the form of SAF

operators and O/Cs. Further in the future, as modeling and simulation technology advances, and 

as the capabilities of intelligent agents and the use of artificial intelligence improves, the need for

human intervention will decrease, and it is likely that more and more of the TESS functionality

will be embedded in the FCS platforms. It may, in fact, be possible to build all of the TESS 

30 
functionality into the C2Vs. Units might carry a complete exercise support and simulation 

capability with them at all times making the concept of training anytime anywhere even more of

a reality. Any number of units could participate in an exercise simply by virtue of having the 

global information grid serve as the backbone network for sharing C4ISR data streams (as it will 

in the operational environment.) Even in this scenario, however, there will continue to be a need

for a centralized TESS, probably as a component of the global information grid. This centralized 

component is necessary to support an individual or group training collective tasks as if they were 

in vehicles. If Captain Jones, for example, wants to “brush up” on some collective tasks by

training from his home, he may not be able to access his C2V to support that training. It may be

powered down and sitting in the motor pool. However, he will always have access to the 

centralized TESS, and by telling it what exercise to run and the role he will play, he can train on 

virtually any task and at any time he wants to train, although probably not with the same fidelity

as training on the actual platform. 

Figure 9 illustrates an example in which a UA Platoon command group is training command 

group tasks while in the C2V. The members of the command group are each seated at their 

workstations using their unique support environments. The C2V platform has been placed in 

training mode and is “connected” to the TESS via the C4ISR network. The exercise has been 

initiated by the centralized component, and the support personnel needed to control SAF entities 

and to provide feedback are in place. As the exercise runs, the members of the command group 

complete their actions using their vehicle’s operational equipment exactly as they would in an 

operational environment. The outcomes of their actions, however, are communicated to the 

TESS which simulates the corresponding results and produces corresponding data streams. 

As the illustration shows, the TESS centralized component, through its SAF functionality,

replicates the actions of all manned and robotic entities involved in the exercise except for the 

UA Platoon command group. If a command is sent to one of the NLOS platforms, for example, 

the TESS replicates its actions as well as the results of those actions. It then creates the data 

streams necessary to stimulate the C2V C4ISR network. From inside the C2V, everything

“looks” real. 

In addition to controlling the exercise and replicating the actions of any non-live entities, the

TESS is also recording the entire exercise for use during the AAR. When the exercise is

complete, the AAR can be provided immediately with the command group still in the C2V since

the C4ISR system should be fully capable of presenting displays (including exercise playback) 

needed to support a complete AAR. 

There are notable aspects to this scenario. First, the C2V could be virtually anywhere and 

this scenario will still work. It could be in the motor pool at the unit’s home station; it could be 

on a transport plane headed toward deployment; or it could even be in the area of deployment 

itself. The only thing necessary is that it be able to establish the communication link with the

TESS centralized component. Second, other individuals could have been invited to observe the 

exercise and provide feedback. They would not need to be collocated with the TESS. They

could log in using the global information grid, observe the exercise, and provide feedback to the 

command group even though they might be on the other side of the world. Third, this could have 

been part of a larger exercise at UA Team, UA Battalion, or even higher. As envisioned, one 

31 
TESS could support the battalion exercise with all command groups participating, and by linking

multiple TESSs, it will be possible to conduct exercises at higher echelons or with other Services 

or other nation’s forces. Fourth, and perhaps most important, the participants need not actually

have been in their vehicles. They could just as readily have participated by accessing the TESS 

from a device such as a PC, or, further in the future perhaps, a personal digital assistant, as long

as the device was capable of simulating the support environment to some degree of realism. The 

participants would have no need to be collocated, and in fact, would not all need to participate. 

A single member of the command group could train with other members being simulated by the 

TESS. Obviously, in this instance, all of the exercise control and simulation would be done by

the centralized component. 

C2V

TESS

Centralized Component

OPFOR

workstation

BLUFOR

workstation

AAR

workstation

LOS (x2) NLOS (x2) Sensors (x2) Land Warrior (x3)

Communication Link

Replicated by

 centralized component

Legend

Figure 9. Example of a Unit of Action Platoon command group exercise using the Training

Exercise Support System (TESS) and executed from the command and control vehicle (C2V). 

A second example of training using the TESS is shown in Figure 10. In this example, not 

only is the command group participating, so also are the other members of the Platoon. As in the 

first example, they could be in their motor pool, in transport, or in deployment. The difference 

between this and the first example is that the actions of the Platoon vehicles are not being

simulated by the centralized component of the TESS, but rather by the platform embedded TESS 

component. Thus, when the commander sends an order to the NLOS vehicle, the vehicle 

commander completes the appropriate task or tasks using his operational equipment, the platform 

embedded TESS component simulates the actions of the vehicle and the elements it controls and 

produces the appropriate results. The results are in the form of data streams that go out to the 

C4ISR network where all other players in the exercise, as well as SAF operators and observers, 

have access to them. 

32 
NLOS (x2) Sensors (x2) Land Warrior (x3)

C2V

LOS (x2)

 Replicated by

 embedded component

Communication Link

Legend

TESS

Centralized Component

OPFOR

workstation

BLUFOR

workstation

AAR

workstation

Figure 10. Example of a Unit of Action Platoon manned exercise using the Training Exercise 

Support System (TESS), including the centralized component, and executed from the Platoon 

Future Combat Systems platforms. 

Figure 10 illustrates the exercise with all participants in their vehicles. However, as in the

previous example, it is possible to complete this exercise with some of the players live and with 

some simulated. The TESS will detect the live players and will simulate the others. It is also 

possible to complete the exercise with some participants in their vehicles and others using PCs or 

other devices, or even with all players participating via remote devices. It could easily be part of 

a multi-echelon, joint, or multi-national exercise. The TESS will support the entire continuum of 

possibilities since it is operating and interacting with exercise participants by means of their

support environment or some replication of it. Much of this should be possible by 2008; it 

should be fully possible by 2015 or 2020. 

Figure 11 illustrates how TESS could support limited training and mission planning and 

rehearsal in the near-term (2008). The embedded platform component of TESS will include 

some limited exercise control, probably housed in the C2V, and each vehicle will have the 

capability to represent, through SAF, its operations and that of its elements. This is sufficient to 

support mission planning and rehearsal in theater. The Platoon will be able to run exercises that 

match the terrain in which it has been deployed and the missions it will perform. Since the 

centralized component is not involved, and since the platform embedded component will have 

33 
limited capabilities in the near-term, there may be some loss in fidelity or other limitations on 

exercise execution. However, there will be a significant improvement over what is currently

available with legacy forces. 

LOS (x2) NLOS (x2) Sensors (x2) Land Warrior (x3)

Adjacent,

Supporting, Higher

Forces

OPFOR

C2V

Communication Link

Replicated by

 centralized component

Legend

Figure 11. An example of a Unit of Action Platoon manned exercise using only the platform 

embedded Training Exercise Support System capability to do mission planning and rehearsal. 

Implications and Benefits of the Training Exercise Support System 

There are a number of implications and benefits related to the exercise support system

requirements being proposed: 

It definitely supports the Army’s training philosophy of train-as-you-fight. Since it 

employs the actual equipment that will be used in the operational environment, all cues

and responses are completely realistic. And, since a major component of future 

operations will be information-based, the capability to faithfully reproduce that 

information will add sufficiently to the realism of the training. Even when exercise

participants are training using PCs or other devices not based in their vehicles, training

will still be as realistic as the ability to simulate the C4ISR environment. In the future, as

display technologies advance, that capability will increase significantly.

34 
A related implication stems from the likelihood that the device that an exercise 

participant would use when not in his vehicle will actually be a component of the 

vehicle’s C4ISR system. That is, there will be a portable component, such as a portable 

PC or a personal digital assistant that will dock with the C4ISR when the user is in the

vehicle, and that the user will remove and take with him when he is not. By using an

actual operational component, exercise realism will be increased. 

While the TESS does not preclude “out-the-window” viewing capability, it is not 

necessary for conducting the kinds of command group exercises discussed above. In

effect, “out-the-window” equates to utilizing the support environment since command 

groups and vehicle commanders will be primarily engaged in tasks that involve 

processing information and issuing commands from their support environment using the 

C4ISR network. And, the information that appears on the support environment will be 

virtually identical to that which will appear in an operational environment. On the other

hand, there may be other reasons for “out-the-window” capabilities such as driver 

training and crew training. These definitely need to be examined; however, they fall 

outside the scope of this report. 

The TESS will support maximum collective training opportunities. Since command 

groups and crews will train in their own vehicles, and since the TESS will be available to 

them virtually all the time, there is no reason they cannot train virtually all the time. 

There will be no need to schedule training at a fixed simulation center months in advance,

or to have access to such centers only once or twice a year. The project staff is convinced 

that a standard of 80% of a unit’s time being spent training is a realistic goal. 

The TESS will significantly enhance any live training the unit conducts. Live training

will continue to be a very important component of the whole training picture; however, it 

will no longer be limited by the size of the CTC. Through the TESS’s capability to 

simulate higher and adjacent elements, or to link to those elements which could be 

located at another CTC, realistic training will be possible in a live environment even

given the increased footprint of the UA echelons. 

The TESS will support enhanced feedback and AAR capabilities. Trainers will be able to 

designate specific tasks to focus on and establish methods for measuring task 

performance. Also, any number of people will be able to observe an exercise as long as

they have been provided access to it via the global information grid. This will allow 

commanders and other unit personnel to request feedback from mentors and other 

experts. Since the TESS will be capable of recording the complete exercise, and since

the embedded component of TESS will allow playback capabilities, feedback can be

provided immediately upon completion of the exercise no matter where the people

providing the feedback are located. Feedback can be given immediately and 

constructively, thereby increasing its effectiveness. In addition, in the future, the TESS 

will support the capability to perform constructive intervention when necessary. Thus, if 

a group or individual is doing something that is so far off as to preclude getting any real 

value from the training, observers (or intelligent agents) could intervene while the TESS 

assumes their role in the exercise so that other players can continue uninterrupted. 

35 
The TESS supports the ability of individuals to train as if they were participating as part 

of a group. They can access the TESS, specify an exercise to run, and participate in 

whatever role they choose. Alternatively, they can access the TESS, determine what 

exercises are already running and which roles are being simulated, and join the exercise 

in progress. This truly allows training anytime anywhere with maximum benefit. 

The TESS will include an exercise creation and modification tool allowing unit 

commanders and others to customize their training to fit their specific needs. The work

that has been completed with the CITT can serve as the prototype for this function. 

The TESS will be part of the larger Objective Force Total Performance Development 

System, and thus, will operate in conjunction or coordination with other training efforts 

such as individual training using distance-learning techniques. It will provide access to 

repositories of exercises thereby increasing those that a unit has to choose from. It will 

also allow inclusion of exercises that a unit produces in the repositories for use by other 

units. 

While this report has emphasized command group training, the TESS should be equally

effective in supporting other collective training exercises. There may, however, be a 

need for some additional simulation capabilities to support operational tasks that are not 

included in the command group training requirements. 

Future Research and Development Directions 

Transformation of the U.S. Army to an Objective Force fielded with FCS is an ambitious 

undertaking involving numerous research and development (R&D) requirements. Appendix D 

lists selected R&D issues for the Objective Force, with an emphasis on command group training

issues that are the topic of this report. The issues in Appendix D are organized by doctrine, 

training, leader development, organization, materiel, and soldier systems (DTLOMS) areas, 

although many of them are inter-related and may fit under several DTLOMS domains. For 

example, issues relating to information displays apply to doctrine, training, materiel, and soldier 

systems; in fact, such issues are so ubiquitous that one could argue for information being an 

additional DTLOMS domain. 

Regardless of how they are organized, the issues listed in Appendix D provide fertile ground 

for future R&D. This R&D needs to be initiated very quickly if an effective Objective Force is 

to be fielded within the present decade. The remainder of this section discusses a few key

training-related R&D issues in further detail, followed by a discussion of near-term 

considerations for addressing them. 

Key Research and Development Issues 

Many of the key R&D issues of interest here center on providing embedded training and 

performance support for the Objective Force. In order to provide the required training for a 

ready Objective Force, the Army will need to implement fully the policy in effect since 1987 

36 
(DA, 1987) identifying embedded training as the preferred approach for incorporating training in 

the development of materiel systems. 

Objective Force units will be expected to deploy rapidly to address a wide range of 

contingencies. As suggested earlier in this paper, their normal mode of operations will be to 

train 80% of the time to maintain a high state of readiness. But they cannot be expected to be

fully trained all the time on every individual and collective skill that may be required for every

mission. They will need to accomplish mission-specific and probably refresher training “just in 

time” immediately before and during deployment. Thus, they will need the capability to train 

anywhere, anytime. 

It is impossible to specify which skills and tasks Objective Force units and individuals will 

need to train on just before and during deployment. Given skill and knowledge retention 

problems that will always exist, all skills will require retraining at some point in time. Also, 

Objective Force teams may be somewhat ad hoc in nature, consisting of individuals from 

different units who may not have had the same training experiences. One cannot assume that 

Objective Force teams will have a common foundation of individual and collective training

experience for the skills they need to perform. Thus, Objective Force units will need the

capability to train on anything anywhere, anytime. 

The requirement for Objective Force units to train on anything anywhere, anytime leads to 

the conclusion that which Objective Force skills and tasks should be trained through embedded 

training is not a key R&D issue. Rather, the key issue is how to train all skills and tasks 

(individual and collective) through embedded training as effectively as possible. It is expected 

that some Objective Force training (e.g., individual skills training requiring high-fidelity

simulations such as platform driving) can be accomplished better, cheaper, or safer in a 

classroom or fixed simulation facility setting, and some training of this nature will always be a

wise alternative to have available. But such training is not the preferred alternative; embedded 

training comes first. An R&D program is needed to ensure that all training for the Objective

Force is developed in an embedded form as fully as possible. 

Given that the primary means of training delivery for the Objective Force will be embedded 

training and that this training must be deliverable during deployment, the primary delivery media

will be ones units deploy with. In addition to operational equipment and networks, this includes 

small devices that can be carried easily, such as wireless electronic notebooks. It does not 

include simulators and large simulation facilities. Such facilities may be preferred for safe

training of certain tasks prior to deployment, but they should not be a high priority for supporting

training of Objective Force units. All training for the Objective Force should be designed and 

developed so that it can be delivered as fully as possible on each of two primary media: 

operational equipment and networks, and small wireless electronic devices. This leads to R&D 

issues relating to how training can be designed to be as effective as possible on these media, as 

well as to how training components (or objects) can be tailored or packaged automatically for 

optimal delivery on the media available. 

The primacy of embedded training for the Objective Force means that the C4ISR network 

will be the backbone of training as well as operations. This network must be designed so that it 

37 
can be used to update and deliver training materials, as well as to manage and monitor training in 

support of providing guidance and feedback. A key consideration in the present report is that 

this network will be used to support collective training of teams as well as training of

individuals. This leads to the need for a support system such as TESS described earlier in this 

report. Simulations for the Objective Force must be built into and executed within operational 

C4ISR networks, as well as within interconnected wireless devices (which may be ports 

unplugged from C4ISR networks). There are a host of R&D issues here, such as location and 

resourcing of TESS (see Appendix D). 

A final general point on training R&D for the Objective Force relates to the need for 

integration or blending of training and performance support (Department of Defense, 2002). 

Training has generally been thought of as formal instruction that is provided in a classroom or 

through dedicated media. Performance support has generally been thought of as job aids and 

other tools that are provided on operational equipment as a task is being performed. The help 

routines available during use of most computer software packages are an example. These 

distinctions will blur as training is developed for the Objective Force. Individuals, teams, and 

units in the Objective Force will need to have immediate access on their operational weapons 

systems and networks to the current version of all training (including entry-level individual 

training) and performance support tools for all tasks and skills. The primary requirement is to 

support Objective Force soldiers and teams in performing a broad range of tasks quickly and 

completely while minimizing sensory, cognitive, and physical demands on them. This requires a

broad integrated view of training and performance support. It also raises a multitude of R&D 

issues. For example, a soldier (or a team) will not want to deal with an annoying icon (like a

paper clip) or a recommendation to complete a training module in the middle of performing a 

combat operation. He will rather want immediate help in performing the task at hand, and if he 

doesn’t get that he will want to be left alone. Integrated training and performance support must 

be sitting transparently in the background and be immediately useful, readily available, and 

tailored specifically to the need at hand. The contents of such support and the methods for 

presenting it efficiently in readily understandable forms are significant R&D challenges. 

Near-Term Research and Development Considerations

The purpose of this report is to describe requirements for future training of Objective Force 

teams, and to lay out a general approach for meeting these requirements. There is no intent to 

lay out a complete supporting R&D program here. However, it is possible to discuss some 

considerations for initiation of R&D in the near term. 

The Objective Force is currently in the conceptual stage, and it is difficult to develop 

training for conceptual entities. But if the training R&D community waits for the Objective

Force and FCS to reach an advanced state of doctrinal and materiel development before training

is addressed, it will be too late to embed integrated training and performance support. It is 

apparent that for embedded training and performance support to be fully successful, it must be 

accounted for in the earliest stages of system design. The future training requirements must be 

identified so that a sufficient infrastructure is designed for meeting them. The collective tasks 

and general training requirements described in this paper are one starting point. An ongoing

effort of the DARPA with support from ARI at Fort Knox is attempting to identify Objective 

38 
Force command group functions based on observation of early warfighter-in-the-loop simulation 

runs. Opportunities such as this should be taken advantage of whenever possible. Objective 

Force functions and tasks, and thus training requirements, need to be identified quickly in as 

much detail as possible and then refined as Objective Force systems are developed. 

It is often difficult for people to think about use of new technology in the abstract. They

need something they can get their hands on. Similarly, it is difficult to conduct training R&D for 

the Objective Force in the abstract. A representation of Objective Force operations and functions 

is needed, even if it is only a best guess. There will be many modeling and simulation efforts 

ongoing to support development of the Objective Force over the next few years. These will 

generally be large-scale exploratory efforts in which variables are not manipulable in a rigorous 

fashion to support R&D on specific training and performance support methods. Small-scale 

controllable representations or demonstrations of Objective Force activities are needed to support 

research on alternative methods for training their performance. 

A near-term approach for conducting research on training and performance support for the 

Objective Force, currently being applied by ARI at Fort Knox, involves the development of 

small-scale representations of selected Objective Force functions. These may include tactical

scenarios or vignettes driven by the OneSAF Testbed Baseline (OTB) or similar software. 

Embedded training and performance support will be integrated within these representations from 

the beginning to address the complex issues in that area. The functions addressed initially will 

fall within the C4ISR arena (e.g., future equivalent of IPB, seeing the battlefield), since that is a

critical set of functions for Objective Force performance and training. 

The R&D opportunities outlined above should support refinement of identification of 

selected Objective Force functions or activities, along with development and refinement of

techniques for embedding integrated training and performance support. In the future, 

opportunities may allow researchers to address follow-on issues such as management and 

tailoring of collective exercises and perhaps performance support through a system such as the 

TESS. A “micro” R&D approach is just a part of the total effort needed to develop an effective

training and performance support system for the Objective Force. Other parts include continued 

observation and documentation of modeling and simulation activities to identify Objective Force

training requirements, and full incorporation of training developers and researchers early in the 

development of FCS. These activities should lead to increasingly specific and useful guidelines 

and methods for providing fully embedded training and performance support for Objective Force 

units. 

Summary

This report examined team training requirements for the Objective Force focusing on the 

2008 and 2015 timeframes. These dates are based on the tentative first unit equipped and fully

operational status dates for the Army’s transformation to the Objective Force. In examining the

team training requirements, the project team focused on the command groups that will function 

at the UA levels–Platoon, Team, and Battalion, and on identifying the training requirements for 

them. 

39 
The report discussed the key differences between the legacy force and the Objective Force 

including the likelihood that future command groups will probably be smaller than legacy force 

staffs, will include vertical teams, will have new or modified performance requirements, and will 

be distributed during both operations and training. The role of training in the future force 

environment was examined, and the FCS and training requirements related to it were analyzed

and described. 

A training approach for developing team skills was proposed consisting of the TESS 

designed to provide training anytime, anywhere using the actual operational systems that future

forces will employ. The TESS will consist of a centralized and an embedded component with 

the centralized component playing the major role in exercise initiation and control in 2008. The 

centralized component will be mobile and will be fielded at the UA Battalion level. By 2015, it 

is expected that most, if not all, of the initiation and control functions will be contained in the

embedded component. There will continue to be a need for a centralized component, perhaps as 

part of the global information grid, in order to support training from locations other than FCS 

platforms. In 2008, there will continue to be a need for significant numbers of humans in the 

training loop acting as O/Cs and SAF operators; by 2015 these functions are likely to be handled 

by intelligent agents built into the TESS. In 2008, performance feedback will resemble what it is 

today with formal AARs delivered at the completion of an exercise; by 2015, the TESS will have

the capability to provide constructive intervention as well as formal AARs. In constructive

intervention, a human or intelligent agent will be able to interrupt an exercise for a subset of the 

players to provide corrective feedback without disrupting the exercise for other players. This 

will allow more effective feedback to be provided when it is most needed. Finally, in 2008, 

individuals will be able to access the TESS using devices such as PCs or hand-held digital 

assistants to conduct individual training; however, fidelity to the C4ISR displays will be limited. 

By 2015, the technology will have advanced sufficiently to allow access via wireless nonembedded devices with fidelity equal to that attained by the embedded equipment. 

The final section of the report presented future research and development directions 

including near-term considerations for addressing the issues identified. Additional research

questions, organized by DTLOMS areas, were included in Appendix D. 

40 
References 

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42 
Appendix A 

Acronyms 

AAR after action review

ADLP Army Distance Learning Program

AFRU Armored Forces Research Unit 

AO area of operations 

AOR area of responsibility

ARI U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences 

BCX Unit of Action Battalion Command Group Exercise 

BDA battle damage assessment 

BLOS beyond line-of-sight 

BLUFOR blue forces 

BMX Unit of Action Battalion Manned Exercise 

BN battalion 

C2 command and control 

C2V command and control vehicle 

C4ISR command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance 

CCX Unit of Action Company Command Group Exercise 

CDR commander

CITT Commander’s Integrated Training Tool for the Close Combat Tactical

Trainer 

CMX Unit of Action Company Manned Exercise 

COP common operating pictures 

CP command post 

CROP common relevant operating picture 

CS combat support 

CSS combat service support 

CTC combat training center 

DA Department of the Army

DARPA Defense Advance Research Projects Agency

DCGS Distributed Common Ground System 

DCGS-A Distributed Common Ground System - Army

DSB Defense Science Board 

DTLOMS doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, 

and soldier systems 

FCS Future Combat Systems

FM Field Manual 

HLA High Level Architecture 

A-1 
IM information management

IO information operations 

IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield 

ISD Instructional Systems Design

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

LOS line-of-sight 

LSI FCS Lead System Integrator 

LT lieutenant 

MCX Unit of Action Multi-echelon Command Group Exercise 

MMX Unit of Action Multi-echelon Manned Exercise

MSA mission staging area

NLOS non line-of-sight 

O/C Observer/Controller 

OPFOR opposing force 

OTB OneSaf Testbed Baseline

PC personal computer 

PCX Unit of Action Platoon Command Group Exercise 

PMX Unit of Action Platoon Manned Exercise 

R&D research and development 

RDL General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library

RSTA reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition 

SAF semi-automated force

SASO stability and support operations 

SOSO stability operations and support operations 

SOW statement of work 

TESS Training Exercise Support System 

TRADOC U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 

TUAV tactical unmanned aerial vehicle 

UA Unit of Action 

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle 

UE Unit of Employment 

UGV unmanned ground vehicle 

USAARMC U.S. Army Armor Center

A-2 
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B-1
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B-2
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B-9
Appendix C 

Unit of Action Collective (Non-Command Group) Tasks 

Unit of Action – Platoon 

Assault 

Attack by fire 

Conduct a relief in place

Conduct assembly area activities 

Conduct breach 

Conduct compliance inspections 

Conduct fire and maneuver 

Conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 

Conduct liaison activities 

Conduct presence patrol 

Conduct screen 

Conduct tactical movement 

Conduct tactical road march 

Consolidate 

Defend 

Establish checkpoints 

Establish observation posts 

Execute actions on contact 

Execute convoy security operations 

Infiltrate/exfiltrate

Perform deployment/redeployment activities 

Reorganize

Unit of Action – Company 

Assault 

Attack by fire 

Conduct a relief in place

Conduct area security

Conduct assembly area activities 

Conduct breach 

Conduct combat service support operations 

Conduct compliance inspection (Search) 

Conduct fire and maneuver 

Conduct ISR operations 

Conduct liaison activities 

Conduct presence operations 

Conduct screen 

Conduct security drill (Withdraw/disengage) 

Conduct tactical movement 

Conduct tactical road march 

Consolidate 

C-1 
Coordinate minefield clearance (stability and support operations [SASO]/stability operations and 

support operations [SOSO]) 

Defend 

Execute actions on contact 

Infiltrate/exfiltrate

Perform deployment/redeployment activities 

Provide humanitarian support 

Reorganize

Secure basecamp 

Unit of Action – Battalion 

Attack 

Attack by fire 

Conduct (coordinate) infiltration/exfiltration 

Conduct a civil military operation 

Conduct area security operations 

Conduct cordon and search operations 

Conduct guard stationary and moving

Conduct non-combatant evacuation 

Conduct rear operations (based upon actual configuration) 

Conduct relief in place as part of cycling process 

Conduct reserve operations 

Consolidate 

Control dislocated civilian traffic

Defend 

Occupy assembly areas 

Patrol a zone of separation (Enforce peace agreements) 

Provide disaster assistance

Reorganize

C-2 
Appendix D 

Selected Research and Development Issues for the Objective Force 

Organized by DTLOMS 

D-1 
Research and Development Issues – Doctrine 

What will be the basic doctrine enabling Objective Force units to accomplish a wide variety

of missions? How will basic doctrine vary across echelons and missions? How will doctrine

be developed that is applicable to a wide variety of situations (i.e., adaptable)? What are the 

fundamental principles, tenets, or values that must be maintained as doctrine is adapted? To 

what extent is doctrine situational? 

Will doctrine development become increasingly distributed as opposed to centralized? If so, 

how will this be managed? Who will control doctrine development (proponents, integrating

centers, Combat Training Centers [CTCs], etc)? 

How will doctrine be kept up-to-date as lessons are learned in a variety of situations? How 

will doctrinal databases be accessed, controlled, and maintained? How will available lessons 

learned and other relevant information be collected and integrated efficiently from humans 

and sensors? 

D-2 
Research and Development Issues – Training 

How can all training (entry-level individual to advanced collective) be embedded in 

operational weapons systems and command, control, communications, computers, 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) networks to the maximum extent 

possible? How can the widespread embedding of training be made failsafe so it does not 

interfere with the operation of systems and networks? 

How can training be designed and developed so that it can be adapted readily for delivery on 

any available medium (including small wireless hand-held devices and displays within 

operational weapons systems and networks)? To what extent can such adaptation be 

automated? 

How can performance support be integrated or blended fully with embedded training so that 

appropriate support is available immediately to address any performance problem the 

operator, commander, or command group member may have (support may vary from a quick 

tip to a recommendation to retrain)? How can this support be made available when a 

performer needs it without interfering with performance or annoying the performer (mix of 

required and optional aids)?

How will network training of teams be accomplished through simulations over operational 

C4ISR networks, allowing for team members to be at dispersed locations? How will such

training be managed and assessed? How will surrounding elements (higher, adjacent, and 

lower) be represented? How will missing team members be represented? Can one system

support training from individual to full team levels using intelligent agents? 

What training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations are needed for training the Objective

Force? How can they be embedded to the maximum extent possible? Which need to be 

available in a standalone version as well as embedded? 

What is the appropriate training strategy for the Objective Force? How often do units and 

teams within units need to train together? What amount of live training with vehicles 

actually moving over terrain is required? What are the training gates that must be completed 

for certification of a unit as ready for deployment? 

How will performance measurement and feedback be supported? To what extent can 

provision of effective training feedback be automated through intelligent agents? What sorts 

of feedback techniques or displays are needed to enhance rapid understanding? How can 

immediate feedback be provided without degrading or interfering with the flow of an 

exercise? When is live feedback from a fellow human being required? 

How will the modification of exercises to meet individuals’, teams’, and units’ needs be

facilitated but controlled? Who (individual/echelon) will be allowed to modify exercises? Is

there a basic certification or gate set that cannot be modified? To what extent can 

modification be automated? If widespread modification is supported, how will the process 

D-3 
and the large number of products be managed? For example, how will a unit rapidly access 

the exercise version most appropriate for its needs? 

At what echelons or locations will Training Exercise Support System (TESS) be located or 

hosted? What resources are required for TESS at various locations (e.g., CTCs)? 

What frequency of training or rehearsal is necessary to maintain proficiency for Objective

Force tasks or functions? 

How can adaptability be trained? Should training be provided on common underlying

principles, followed by extensive practice in a wide variety of situations? Are there other 

ways to train adaptability? (The same questions apply to multifunctional training.) 

What are the most efficient ways to train soldiers to perform complex tasks such as

management and interpretation of large amounts of information from various sensors and 

displays? How do we develop the capability to see the whole, aggregating and fusing the

parts? 

How will individual, team, and unit training performance data be archived and where will the

archive be located? Who will have access to archived performance data? How will the

passing of training gates be used to establish unit readiness levels? How can the

determination of readiness be made more objective by the use of embedded training and 

performance measurement? 

D-4 
Research and Development Issues – Leader Development

How will leaders be selected in the Objective Force? Will this selection be based on training

and education, experience, performance, or a combination? What accession policies need to 

change to provide leaders for the Objective Force? 

How can leaders be developed rapidly, or be provided a large amount of wide-ranging

experience efficiently? Will simulated exercises or vignettes be sufficient? What role will 

mentoring play? 

To what extent can leader development be accomplished using technology at a distance? 

What aspects of leader development require face-to-face human interaction? 

What changes are needed in promotion and retention systems to support future leader 

development? Should the “up or out” policy be out? 

D-5 
Research and Development Issues – Organization 

What is the most effective and efficient command group structure at each echelon? Does this 

structure need to be adapted to different situations? 

At what echelons (if any) is it more efficient to have a fixed command post (CP)? At what 

echelons is it necessary to have an identified (but perhaps highly mobile) CP at which 

personnel can gather face-to-face? At what echelons is the CP not an identified location, but 

always where the commander is? 

What is the lowest echelon of the Objective Force that is fully combined arms and selfsustaining for a major operation? How many standing types or configurations of units are 

needed at lower levels? How are these task-organized into non-standard units for nonstandard missions? 

To what extent can and should operational and administrative functions be separated? How 

will deployable units be supported in administrative functions to allow training 80% of the 

time? How will matters such as the Uniform Code of Military Justice be handled? 

D-6 
Research and Development Issues – Materiel 

What capabilities must be built into operational weapons systems and networks to enable 

complete embedding of training and performance support (including team network training)? 

What resources are required to support these capabilities? 

How can operational weapons systems and networks be designed through performance or

usability engineering to maximize the ease of employment? How can system design

minimize sensory, cognitive, and physical demands on soldiers in order to reduce task 

performance complexity and time, thus reducing training and performance support 

requirements? To what extent should operational systems and networks have common 

interfaces? To what extent should interfaces be readily adaptable to individuals’ preferences 

(e.g., through scanning of a “smart” card)? 

How can decision support and planning aids be integrated with operational weapons systems 

and networks? To what extent can these reduce information and options, thus reducing

cognitive demands on leaders and soldiers? 

How can operational weapons systems and networks be designed to support enroute mission 

planning and rehearsal during deployment? How can enroute mission planning and rehearsal 

be accomplished with available resources (i.e., with or without operational weapons systems 

and networks)? How can digital terrain representations of mission areas be provided readily

to support enroute planning and rehearsal? Can this include complex and urban terrain? 

How can operational networks be designed to provide continuous connectivity on the move, 

thus providing continuous C4ISR? How will relays be handled? How will networks 

accommodate missing relays or nodes? 

How can the platforms put at risk during combat be made robotic to the maximum extent 

possible? To what extent can robots be made autonomous? How will they be controlled? 

What will be the message formats for directing robots? Can they be the same as those for

directing humans? 

How can maximum force protection be provided for soldiers occupying light Future Combat 

Systems? What materiel solutions (e.g., approach warning indicators, countermeasures) to 

force protection are needed to complement tactical solutions (e.g., stand-off engagement)? 

How should a common operating picture be displayed? Does this vary by echelon and 

mission? What are the specific information requirements for each echelon and mission? 

How can intuitive summary graphics be incorporated to convey knowledge readily? 

D-7 
Research and Development Issues – Soldier Systems 

How will soldiers be recruited or selected for the Objective Force? Are unique capabilities 

required? Are these available in the recruiting base? 

What measures are needed to help soldiers and their families cope with the stress and strain 

of frequent rapid deployments and deployment readiness as a way of life? What individual 

and family support structures need to be established? 

What sort of military occupational specialty and rank structure is needed to allow soldiers to 

be as multifunctional and adaptable as possible? Will the personnel system support soldiers 

being highly trained generalists who can be trained very rapidly to be specialists for a range 

of missions? 

Will the individual replacement system degrade performance of Objective Force teams and 

units? Will a regimental or hybrid system (i.e., some sort of team set fielding) be necessary? 

D-8