United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

JOINT STRIKE 

FIGHTER 

DOD Plans to Enter 

Production before 

Testing Demonstrates 

Acceptable 

Performance 

March 2006 

 

GAO-06-356 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

March 2006

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER 

DOD Plans to Enter Production before 

Testing Demonstrates Acceptable 

Performance 

Highlights of GAO-06-356, a report to 

congressional committees 

The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is 

DOD’s most expensive aircraft

program. The program represents

90 percent of the remaining

planned investment for

recapitalizing DOD’s aging tactical

aircraft fleet. 

GAO is required by law to review 

the program annually for 5 years,

beginning in fiscal year 2005. This

is our second report and GAO 

assessed the program’s acquisition 

approach—in terms of capturing 

knowledge for key investment

decisions—and identified an 

alternative to improve outcomes. 

What GAO Recommends

The Congress should consider

delaying authorizations and 

appropriations for JSF 

procurement until a new business 

case is developed and flight testing

demonstrates the design and 

integrated mission systems work. 

GAO included this matter for 

consideration because DOD did not 

plan to make changes as a result of

recommendations. 

GAO is recommending that DOD 

delay investing in production until 

flight testing shows that the JSF 

performs as expected, and that the 

program develop a plan, consistent 

with DOD’s preferred policy, to 

adopt an evolutionary approach 

that limits new content for each

increment to proven technologies

and design. DOD partially

concurred, but believes that its 

current practices achieve our 

recommendations’ objectives. 

DOD is investing heavily in procuring JSF aircraft before flight testing proves

it will perform as expected. For example, the JSF program plans to produce 

424 low-rate initial production aircraft, at a total estimated cost of more than 

$49 billion, by 2013—the same time at which the program plans to complete 

initial operational testing. Producing aircraft before testing demonstrates the 

design is mature increases the likelihood of design changes that will lead to 

cost growth, schedule delays, and performance problems. Because the 

program will lack key design and testing knowledge, DOD plans to use cost 

reimbursement contracts to procure early production aircraft. This type of 

contract places a substantially greater cost risk on DOD and the taxpayers. 

Confidence that investment decisions will deliver expected capability within 

cost and schedule goals increases as testing proves the JSF will work as 

expected. 

Overlap of Production Investments and Testing

Cumulative production

investment (in billions of dollars)

Increasing confidence in investment outcomes

5 23 70 126 190 291 424

$1.5 $4.9 $11.7 $18.7 $26 $36.9 $49.3

Percentage of

flight test program

completed

1% 3% 13% 35% 56% 77% 98%

Cumulative aircraft

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Limited knowledge

gained from flight tests

More knowledge

gained from flight tests

Source: DOD (2005 data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

At the same time, the JSF program has not adopted an evolutionary 

approach to acquiring the aircraft—despite DOD policy that prefers such an 

approach. Instead, the JSF program has contracted to develop and deliver 

the aircraft’s full capability in a single-step, 12-year development program—a 

daunting task given the need to incorporate the technological advances that, 

according to DOD, represent a quantum leap in capability. DOD’s buying 

power has already been reduced. Since initial estimates, program acquisition 

unit costs have increased by 28 percent, or $23 million. Development costs 

have increased 84 percent, planned purchases have decreased by 535

aircraft, and the completion of development has slipped 5 years, delaying

delivery of capabilities to the warfighter. With more than 90 percent of the 

JSF investment remaining, DOD officials have the opportunity to adopt a 

knowledge-based and evolutionary acquisition strategy that would maximize 

DOD’s return on its investment. The acquisition approach used for the F-16 

fighter, the Air Force’s JSF predecessor, could provide a model for delivering

JSF capabilities to the warfighter sooner and recapitalizing tactical aircraft 

forces more quickly while lowering risk. The F-16 program successfully

evolved capabilities over the span of about 30 years, with an initial capability 

delivered to the warfighter about 4 years after development started. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-356.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Michael J. 

Sullivan at (202) 512-4841 or 

sullivanm@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 4

JSF Acquisition Strategy Will Begin Procurement before Testing 

Demonstrates the Aircraft’s Performance 6 

Evolutionary Acquisition Strategy Provides a Less Risky 

Alternative for the JSF Program 13 

Conclusions 22

Matters for Congressional Consideration 23 

Recommendations for Executive Action 24 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 24 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 29 

Appendix II Changes in JSF Program Purchase Quantities 

and Costs 31 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 32 

Table 

Table 1: Military Services’ Planned Use for the Joint Strike Fighter 5 

Figures 

Figure 1: Overlap of Low-Rate Initial Production Investments and 

Testing Demonstrations of the JSF Variants 9 

Figure 2: JSF Program Acquisition 14 

Figure 3: JSF’s Annual Funding Requirements, as of December 

2004 16

Figure 4: F-16 Incremental Development Approach 18 

Figure 5: Planned JSF Blocks 19 

Figure 6: Potential Application of an Incremental Development 

Approach to the JSF Program 21 

Page i GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
Abbreviations 

DOD Department of Defense 

JSF Joint Strike Fighter 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

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Page ii GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

March 15, 2006 

Congressional Committees 

Since the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program began in 1996, Congress has 

appropriated nearly $25 billion for its development. It is the Department of 

Defense’s (DOD) most expensive aircraft acquisition program. As the 

program is currently planned, DOD estimates it will spend $257 billion to

develop and procure about 2,443 aircraft and related support equipment by

2027 and an additional $347 billion to operate and support these aircraft 

once they have been fielded. 

JSF program goals are to develop and field a family of stealthy, strike 

fighter aircraft for the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and United 

States allies. Design plans call for three variants of the aircraft, but the 

program aims to provide maximum commonality to minimize life cycle 

costs. JSF is a central part of DOD’s overall recapitalization strategy for its 

tactical aircraft fleet, representing 90 percent of the remaining planned 

investment for its major tactical aircraft programs. How DOD manages the 

JSF program in the future will be critical for getting the most out of this 

remaining large investment and for success in replacing the aging fleet of

tactical aircraft. 

The Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2005 (P.L. 108-375) requires GAO to review the JSF program annually for 

5 years.1

 In March 2005, we reported the JSF’s original business case was 

unexecutable and recommended that DOD establish an executable 

program consistent with best practices and DOD policy regarding 

evolutionary acquisitions.

2

 We also recommended that this new business 

 1

Section 213 of the act requires us to assess the extent to which the system development 

and demonstration program is currently meeting key cost, schedule, and performance

goals; the likelihood that the program will be completed within estimated costs; and the 

program’s current acquisition plan leading to production. 

2

GAO, Tactical Aircraft: Opportunity to Reduce Risks in Joint Strike Fighter Program

with Different Acquisition Strategy, GAO-05-271 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2005).

Page 1 GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
case be accompanied by a knowledge-based acquisition approach 3—an 

approach that ensures attainment and use of demonstrated product 

knowledge before making future investments. In commenting on our 

report, DOD stated that JSF’s restructured acquisition plan would 

incorporate a knowledge-based, evolutionary approach consistent with 

DOD policy. This is our second report. Specifically, we (1) determined 

whether the JSF program acquisition strategy captures critical knowledge 

in time to make production investment decisions and (2) identified an 

alternative to the current acquisition strategy to improve JSF program 

outcomes. 

The act also requires us to certify whether we had access to sufficient 

information to make informed judgments on the matters contained in our 

report. We were provided sufficient information to assess the plans to 

capture technology, design, and manufacturing knowledge for the three 

JSF variants, the evolutionary nature of the acquisition strategy, and the

opportunities to improve outcomes. At the time of our review, the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) was still preparing its fiscal year 2007 

budget request as well as conducting its independent assessment of the 

program cost estimate, which is not expected to be completed until 

sometime in 2006. Additionally, the Quadrennial Defense Review was 

ongoing during our review, and we did not have insights into the potential

outcomes or how the results of the study might affect the JSF program. We 

performed our work from June 2005 through March 2006 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards. For more on our 

scope and methodology, see appendix I. 

Despite recent program restructuring, the JSF program continues to base 

its acquisition strategy on a highly concurrent approach that makes 

significant investments in manufacturing capabilities and production 

aircraft before flight testing demonstrates the JSF’s performance. As a 

result, significant development risk remains, and it is likely that current 

cost and schedule goals will not be met. The program plans to proceed 

into low-rate initial production in 2007 with inadequate testing to prove a 

Results in Brief 

 3

A business case provides demonstrated evidence that (1) the warfighter need exists and 

that it can best be met with the chosen concept and (2) the concept can be developed and

produced within existing resources—including proven technologies, design knowledge, 

adequate funding, and adequate time to deliver the product when needed. Establishing a 

business case calls for a realistic assessment of risks and costs; doing otherwise 

undermines the intent of the business case and invites failure. 

Page 2 GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
mature design for any of the three basic JSF variant airframes, without 

developing critical software, or without a fully integrated aircraft with 

advanced mission systems and prognostic maintenance capabilities. All 

three production representative variants4

 will not be in flight testing until 

2009, and a fully configured, integrated development aircraft will not begin 

flight testing until 2011—4 years after production begins. By this time, 

DOD plans to have ordered 190 aircraft at a cost of about $26 billion. By 

2013, when initial operational testing is expected to be complete, the 

program plans to have procured 424 aircraft at an expected cost of $49 

billion. Because it will lack necessary technology, design, and 

performance knowledge, DOD plans to procure early production aircraft 

using cost-reimbursable-type contracts. This type of contract places a

significantly greater cost risk on DOD. 

DOD has revised its acquisition policy to embrace evolutionary 

acquisition, allowing managers to develop and evolve a product through 

small, time-phased development increments—an alternative still available 

to the JSF program. Instead of establishing time-phased requirements for 

aircraft to be delivered in sequence that could first meet DOD’s need to 

recapitalize its aging fleet of aircraft and then evolve the aircraft to 

eventually achieve improved capabilities in future increments, DOD chose 

a single-step approach to develop and deliver the JSF with ultimate 

capabilities in a single 12-year system development program. The large 

amount of uncertainty in this approach has already led to poor cost and 

schedule estimates for the JSF program and a reduction in DOD’s buying 

power. The length and scope of work remaining continue to make it 

difficult to predict the cost and time needed to complete the program. The 

Air Force’s JSF predecessor, the F-16 Fighter program, provides a model 

for a less risky alternative JSF acquisition strategy that delivers weapons 

to the warfighter more quickly and that recapitalizes tactical aircraft 

forces sooner. The F-16 program successfully delivered 2,200 aircraft with 

incremental improvements as technology became available over the span 

of about 30 years. An initial F-16 capability was delivered to the warfighter 

within about 4 years after development began and substantial quantities 

 4

A production representative aircraft is one that is built using production-like tooling and 

methods and using production workers and is of the design expected be built to satisfy the 

requirements of the warfighter. Flight-testing a production representative prototype that 

incorporates all critical software is the primary method to capture key design knowledge 

that indicates the system will work as planned, is reliable, and is ready for production. The 

higher the percentage of testing completed, the lower the risk of investing in production. 

Page 3 GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
were purchased with each increment to meet warfighter needs, including

the replacement of aging legacy tactical fighter aircraft. 

To improve the chances for a successful outcome, we are recommending 

the JSF program delay production and investments in production 

capability until the aircraft design qualities and integrated mission 

capabilities of the fully configured and integrated JSF aircraft variants 

have been proven to work in flight testing. We are also recommending the 

Secretary of Defense report to the Congress by July 2006 on the feasibility 

of an incremental acquisition approach that follows the intent of DOD 

evolutionary acquisition policy and delivers a first increment that limits 

new content to proven technologies and design. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendations stating that the 

current JSF acquisition strategy and management practices will be able to 

achieve the objectives of our recommendations, and therefore, further 

limits on production are unnecessary. DOD also stated that the program’s 

strategy balances technical risk, financial resources, and operational 

needs to reduce program risk and is based on a knowledge-based, 

incremental approach. We continue to believe DOD’s planned strategy to

make significant investments in production concurrent with testing is very 

risky and is similar to strategies of past programs with poor outcomes. We 

believe that DOD has an opportunity to reduce risk by adopting an 

acquisition strategy based on capturing technology, design, and 

manufacturing knowledge. We also believe that smaller, more manageable

commitments in capabilities would make JSF program cost and schedule 

more predictable and deliver needed capabilities to the warfighter sooner. 

Because DOD does not plan to make changes as a result of our 

recommendations, we believe Congress should consider delaying 

authorizations and appropriations for JSF procurement until DOD 

develops a new business case and demonstrates the aircraft design 

qualities and integrated mission capabilities of the fully configured and 

integrated JSF variants work as designed based on actual flight testing. 

JSF is a joint, multinational acquisition program for the Air Force, Navy, 

Marine Corps, and eight cooperative international partners. The program 

began in November 1996 with a 5-year competition between Lockheed 

Martin and Boeing to determine the most capable and affordable 

preliminary aircraft design. Lockheed Martin won the competition, and the 

program entered system development and demonstration in October 2001.

Background 

Page 4 GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
DOD has set major expectations for the program. The program’s objective 

is to develop and deploy a technically superior and affordable fleet of 

aircraft that support the warfighter in performing a wide range of missions 

in a variety of theaters. The single-seat, single-engine aircraft is being 

designed to be self-sufficient or part of a multisystem and multiservice 

operation, and to rapidly transition between air-to-surface and air-to-air 

missions while still airborne. To achieve its mission, JSF will incorporate 

low observable technologies, defensive avionics, advanced onboard and 

offboard sensor fusion,5

 internal and external weapons, and advanced 

prognostic maintenance capability. According to DOD, these technologies 

represent a quantum leap over legacy tactical aircraft capabilities. At the 

same time, the JSF aircraft design includes three variants: a conventional

takeoff and landing variant for the Air Force; an aircraft carrier-suitable 

variant for the Navy; and a short takeoff and vertical landing variant for 

the Marine Corps, the Air Force, and the United Kingdom. JSF is intended 

to replace a substantial number of aging fighter and attack aircraft in 

DOD’s current inventory (see table 1). 

Table 1: Military Services’ Planned Use for the Joint Strike Fighter 

Service Planned use

Air Force Replacement for the F-16 and A-10; complement the F-22A 

Marine Corps Replacement for the AV-8B and F/A-18 A/C/D 

Navy Complement the F/A-18 E/F

Source: DOD data. 

In recent years, DOD has revised its acquisition policy to embrace an

evolutionary, or incremental, approach to improve program outcomes. The 

acquisition policy states evolutionary acquisition is the preferred DOD 

strategy for rapid acquisition of mature technology for the user by 

delivering capability in increments, recognizing up front the need for 

future capability improvements. The objective is to balance needs with 

resources in order to put capability into the hands of the warfighter more 

quickly. The policy states that a product enters system development and 

demonstration when an affordable increment of militarily useful capability 

has been identified, technology has been demonstrated in a relevant

 5

Sensor fusion is the ability to take information from both multiple onboard and offboard

aircraft sensors and display the information in an easy-to-use format for the pilot. It is 

vitally important, because the JSF is a single-seat aircraft, and the pilot needs support to

carry out multiple types of missions. 

Page 5 GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
environment, and a system can be developed for production in a short 

time frame (normally less than 5 years). Each increment of an evolutionary

acquisition will have its own decision milestones and baseline—cost, 

schedule, and performance requirements. In commenting on our March 

2005 JSF report, DOD stated that JSF’s restructured acquisition plan 

would balance technical, cost, and schedule risk and incorporate a 

knowledge-based, evolutionary approach to system acquisition consistent 

with DOD policy. 

DOD’s acquisition strategy for JSF has not substantially changed as a 

result of the program’s restructuring last year. In May 2005, DOD 

leadership approved the program’s plan, which intends to start production

in 2007—more than 2 years before all three JSF variants have completed 

some flight testing of the aircraft’s basic design, 4 years before a fully 

configured and integrated aircraft is expected to be flight tested, and 

6 years before development and initial operational testing are scheduled to 

be completed.6

 Before development has ended, DOD will have potentially

signed procurement contracts for 424 JSF aircraft at an estimated cost of 

$49 billion. Starting production before ensuring the design is mature 

through flight testing significantly increases the risk of costly design 

changes that will push the program over budget and behind schedule. 

Evidence of the risk associated with concurrently developing, testing, and

producing the JSF aircraft can be seen in the program office strategy to 

place initial production orders on a cost reimbursement contract, placing

an unusually high risk burden on the government during the early 

production phase. 

The JSF program plans to begin low-rate initial production of the aircraft 

before many of JSF’s technology advances and basic flying qualities are 

flight-tested and to produce substantial quantities of aircraft before initial 

operational testing is completed. According to JSF program plans, DOD’s 

low-rate initial production quantities will increase from 5 aircraft a year in

2007 to 133 a year, before development and initial operational testing are 

completed in 2013.7

 This production rate will require DOD to invest 

JSF Acquisition 

Strategy Will Begin 

Procurement before 

Testing Demonstrates 

the Aircraft’s

Performance 

Key Testing Events Will 

Not Be Completed before 

Significant Procurement 

Investments Are Made 

 6

Initial operational testing consists of field tests intended to demonstrate a system’s 

effectiveness and suitability for military use.

7

These figures do not include the potential for orders for international partners during lowrate initial production. Preliminary data indicate that these orders could significantly 

increase this rate. 

Page 6 GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
significantly in tooling, facilities, and personnel. Initial contractor cost 

estimates indicate that close to $1 billion of new tooling will be needed to 

support low-rate initial production rates. Early contractor data also show 

that the program will need to double its manufacturing workforce by 2008 

and will need six times the number of manufacturing personnel before 

low-rate initial production ends. Total monthly spending for production 

activities in 2013 is expected to approach $1 billion, a significant increase 

from $100 million a month when production is scheduled to begin in 2007. 

The cost of discovering design problems during production could be 

significant if testing shows that large, structural components of the aircraft 

require modifications. Design changes needed in one variant could also 

ripple through the other two variants, reducing efficiencies necessary to 

lower production and operational costs with common parts and 

manufacturing processes for the three variants. Some industry officials 

have indicated that the cost of design changes such as these could be 10 to

1,000 times greater, depending on how far the product has progressed into 

production.

When the JSF program is expected to begin low-rate initial production in 

2007,

8

 the program will have completed less than 1 percent of the flight 

test program and none of the three JSF variants will have a production 

representative prototype built and in flight testing. Features critical to 

JSF’s operational success, such as the low-observable and highly common 

airframe and the advanced mission systems, will not have been 

demonstrated in a flight test environment. The program plans to proceed

into low-rate initial production without demonstrating that (1) the 

aircraft’s flying qualities function within the parameters of the flight 

envelope—that is, the set limits for altitude, speed, and angles of attack; 

(2) the aircraft design is reliable; or (3) a fully integrated and capable

aircraft system can perform as intended. These are key indicators of a 

program’s readiness for entering production and making significant 

investments in tooling, facilities, and materials. When the first fully 

integrated and capable development JSF is expected to fly, in 2011, DOD 

will have committed to buy 190 aircraft at an estimated cost of $26 billion 

 8

DOD policy contains three critical milestone decision points in its acquisition process. One 

of these, referred to as milestone C, authorizes entry into low-rate initial production.

However, the JSF program is deviating from that milestone framework and has delayed this

critical milestone decision point to the full-rate production decision point in 2013—more

than 6 years after entering low-rate initial production. This delay compromises the controls 

expected in the DOD acquisition policy for the start of production. 

Page 7 GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
under current plans. By the time testing is planned to be completed, in 

2013, DOD will have procured more than double that amount—424 aircraft 

at an estimated cost of about $49 billion. Figure 1 shows the significant 

overlap in development and testing and the major investments in 

production capability and aircraft that inject additional cost and delivery 

risks that could delay delivery of a proven capability to the warfighter. 

Page 8 GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
Figure 1: Overlap of Low-Rate Initial Production Investments and Testing Demonstrations of the JSF Variants 

Cumulative 0 23 70 126 190 291 424 5

aircraft

Cumulative 

production 

investment

(in billions of dollars)

$0.2 $4.9 $11.7 $1 $1.5 8.7 $26 $36.9 $49.3

Percentage of

flight test program

completea

0 3% 13% 35% 56% 77% 9 1% 8%

Airframe

durability and

reliability tests

Block 1

(air interdiction)

Block 3

(deep strike

capabilities)

Block 2

(close air support,

improved

air interdiction)

Ground tests

Lifetime 1 Lifetime 2

Basic flying

qualities and

aircraft first flights

Mission

capabilities

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Source: DOD (2005 data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

Early

prototype

Short takeoff

plane

Conventional

plane

Fatigue tests

Static tests

Developmental testing Operational testing

Developmental testing Operational testing

Developmental testing

Operational

testing

Carrier plane

a

Flight testing data reflect the percentage of the total flight tests completed at the time of the planned 

investment decision, which is currently planned for January of each year. 

Under the current schedule, the JSF program plans to manufacture and

deliver 15 flight test aircraft and 7 ground test (nonflying) articles in 

5 years—an aggressive schedule when compared with schedules of other 

programs with fewer variables. Current JSF schedules are already showing 

delivery of early test aircraft could be later than the planned delivery date. 

Page 9 GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
Unplanned manufacturing and technical problems can delay the 

completion of a flight test program, increase the number of flight test 

hours needed to verify that the system will work as intended, and affect 

when key knowledge will be available for making investment decisions. 

For example, when the B-2 program began flight testing in July 1989, it 

estimated that the flight test program would last approximately 4.5 years 

and require about 3,600 flight test hours. When the test program ended in 

1997, the flight test hours had grown to 5,000 hours, or by 40 percent, over 

an 8-year period. Program officials cited several causes, including 

difficulties in manufacturing test aircraft and correcting deficiencies from 

unanticipated problems discovered during testing. The F-22A encountered 

similar delays, increasing a planned 4-year flight test program to about 8 

years and affecting the program’s ability to conduct operational testing 

and move into production on schedule. 

While each JSF variant is similar—all are being designed to have stealth 

airframes, fly at supersonic speeds, shoot air-to-air missiles, and drop 

bombs on a target—there are subtle airframe design differences to support 

the services’ different operational concepts and environments. Test 

officials acknowledge that each airframe variant will require flight testing 

to demonstrate that each will fly as intended. Yet at the time the JSF 

program expects to begin low-rate initial production, only 1 of 15 flight

test aircraft is expected to have started testing. Further, the aircraft’s test 

flights are not scheduled to begin until August 2006, less than 6 months 

before the planned decision to begin low-rate initial production,

9

 and will 

not assess the aircraft in more demanding operational environments, such 

as high angles of attack. Moreover, the first flight test aircraft will not 

include a large number of design changes that resulted from an effort to 

significantly reduce aircraft weight over the past 2 years and, therefore, 

will not represent the planned production configuration. The first 

demonstration of a production representative airframe that includes the 

latest design changes is scheduled for late 2007—after production has 

been initiated—with first flight of the short takeoff and vertical landing 

variant. 

Initial Procurement Decisions 

Will Be Made before the Basic 

Aircraft Design Is 

Demonstrated 

 9

During this approximately 6-month period of initial tests, which includes about 30 planned 

flights, the program intends to demonstrate the aircraft’s flight qualities in limited flight 

conditions, takeoff and landing, and initial air refueling. However, recent program data 

indicate that the first flight may be delayed until October 2006, reducing the number of

flights that may be completed before the production decision. 

Page 10 GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
All three variants will not be in flight testing until 2009, when the carrier 

variant is expected to have its first flight. Several key test events identified

by the contractor to demonstrate the flight characteristics of these aircraft

in the intended operational environment are not scheduled until 2009 or 

later. These include shipboard operations for the carrier and short takeoff 

and vertical landing variants. According to the contractor, the full-flight 

envelope for all three variants will not be fully demonstrated until 2011 or

2012—4 to 5 years after low-rate initial production is scheduled to begin.

According to DOD, modeling and simulation will be used to evaluate the 

performance of the aircraft’s flying qualities and to support decisions to 

invest in production. However, the Rand Corporation recently reported in 

a study on testing and evaluation that modeling is not a substitute for flight 

testing.10 Rand found that even in performance areas that are well 

understood, it is not unusual for flight testing to uncover problems that 

were not apparent in simulations. Examples include flight effects on the 

wing of the F/A-18 EF and buffeting of stores externally carried on various 

aircraft when flown in certain conditions. Additionally, OSD testing 

officials indicated that flight testing of each variant is necessary to 

demonstrate designed capabilities. Our past work has found that flying 

quality problems were identified during actual flight testing on programs 

like the F-22A, B-2A, and V-22. 

Finally, two major ground tests of the airframe’s structural integrity—

fatigue and static testing—will be in their very early stages or not have 

started when production begins. Fatigue testing, which measures the 

aircraft’s durability over its expected life, is slated to begin in 2008 with 

testing to show structural fatigue over one lifetime of flying to be 

completed in 2009 and a second lifetime completed by 2010. Fatigue 

testing uses actual JSF airframe structures that are subjected to the longterm stresses expected over the aircraft’s life. Standards require this 

testing to be done to represent the stresses expected over two lifetimes. 

Static testing, which measures the aircraft’s ability to withstand the 

stresses expected to be encountered throughout the aircraft’s flight 

regime, is slated to begin in 2007 and last through 2009. These tests are 

important to reduce the risk of structural problems emerging during 

production or after aircraft are fielded. 

 10Rand Corporation, Test and Evaluation Trends and Costs for Aircraft and Guided

Weapons (Santa Monica, California, 2004).

Page 11 GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
In addition to late design testing, many of the mission systems planned for 

JSF will not be available for initial flight testing either. Although 

laboratory tests are under way, DOD does not plan to flight-test several of

the new technologies needed for the JSF to perform its intended missions 

until 2009 at the earliest. Defense Operational Test and Evaluation officials 

have stated that flight-testing capabilities in a production representative 

test aircraft and in the operational environment planned for the new 

system are important to reducing risk. This actual environment differs 

from what can be demonstrated in a laboratory and has historically 

identified unexpected problems. For example, the F-22A software worked

as expected in the laboratory, but when tested in the aircraft, significant 

problems were identified. These problems delayed testing and the delivery 

of a proven capability. The different levels of mission capability will be 

tested in JSF aircraft as follows. 

Mission Capabilities Will Not 

Be Tested until 4 Years after 

Procurement Has Begun 

• Block 1, an initial air interdiction capability, is scheduled to begin 

testing in 2009, with initial operational testing scheduled for 2011—4

years after DOD plans to begin production. 

• Block 2, an improved air interdiction and close air support capability, is 

scheduled to begin testing in 2010, with initial operational testing 

scheduled for 2012. This block will include several critical technologies 

that are not fully mature, such as the advanced missions systems and 

prognostics and health maintenance, but are critical to meeting 

requirements like sortie generation and mission capabilities. 

• Block 3, the fully integrated and capable JSF, is scheduled to begin 

testing in 2011. At this time less than 50 percent of the planned mission 

capability testing will have been completed. This is close to the same 

point that the F-22A and other past programs experienced difficulties 

integrating all the complex software and hardware components into 

the aircraft. Flight testing to evaluate the effectiveness and suitability 

of the fully integrated system is expected to continue until the full-rate 

decision in late 2013. 

JSF’s expected performance is largely dependent on demonstrating 

software that supports vehicle, mission system, and other capabilities. The 

program plans to develop over 19 million lines of code—substantially 

more than the lines of code needed for the F-22A. The software is planned 

to be developed in five blocks. The first block is scheduled for completion 

in 2006, and the last block is scheduled for completion in 2011. At the time 

the program enters low-rate initial production, the program will have 

completed less than 35 percent of the software needed for the system’s 

Aggressive Software 

Development Schedule May 

Cause Delays 

Page 12 GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
functionality. Past programs have encountered difficulties in developing

software, delaying flight test schedules. Data provided by the program 

office indicate that the program is already showing early signs of falling 

behind its software delivery schedule. JSF program officials recognize the 

risk associated with this large software effort. 

According to program officials, the uncertainties inherent in concurrently

developing, testing, and producing the JSF aircraft prevent the pricing of

initial production orders on a fixed price basis. Consequently, the program 

office plans to place initial production orders on a cost reimbursement 

basis. Cost reimbursement contracts provide for payment of allowable 

incurred costs, to the extent prescribed in the contract. Such contracts are 

generally used only when the uncertainties involved in contract 

performance do not permit costs to be estimated with sufficient accuracy 

to use any type of fixed price contract. Cost reimbursement contracts 

place substantial risk on the buyer—in this case DOD—because the 

contractor’s responsibility for performance costs is minimized or reduced. 

In contrast, a fixed price contract provides for a pre-established price, and 

places more risk and responsibility for costs and resulting profit or loss on 

the contractor and provides more incentive for efficient and economical 

performance. 

The program plans to transition to fixed-price-type contracts once the air

vehicle has a mature design, has been demonstrated in flight test, and is 

producible at established cost targets. According to program officials, this 

transition will occur sometime before full-rate production begins in 2013. 

The program office believes the combination of the early concept 

development work, the block development approach, and the relatively 

small numbers of aircraft in the initial production buys allow decisions to

be made earlier than normal with an acceptable level of risk.

The Current Acquisition 

Strategy Requires 

Prolonged Reliance on 

Cost Reimbursement 

Contracts That Place an 

Increased Risk on DOD 

The JSF acquisition strategy currently plans a single-step approach to 

deliver a quantum leap in tactical fighter capability by 2013 and has 

already felt the negative cost and schedule impacts from the executing this

approach. The length and scope of the remaining effort in the JSF program 

make it even more difficult to accurately estimate cost and delivery 

schedules. The JSF funding profile—which requires an average of 

$11 billion annually for the next two decades—is also at risk to increase if

costs continue to grow or schedules are further delayed to develop the

ultimate JSF capabilities. An alternative acquisition strategy, such as used 

by the F-16 program, that sequences capabilities over time based on 

Evolutionary 

Acquisition Strategy 

Provides a Less Risky 

Alternative for the 

JSF Program 

Page 13 GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
proven technologies and design would reduce risk and deliver aircraft 

sooner. This evolutionary approach is actually the preferred approach in 

DOD’s acquisition policy for acquiring new systems for more rapid 

delivery of incremental capabilities to the warfighter. 

JSF Program Is Designed 

to Deliver Full Required 

Capability in a Single-Step 

Development Program 

Instead of establishing time-phased requirements for aircraft to be 

delivered in sequence that could first meet DOD’s need to recapitalize its 

aging fleet of aircraft and then evolve the aircraft to eventually achieve

improved capabilities in future system development increments, DOD 

chose a single-step development approach to deliver the full required 

capability by the end of system development in 2013. That approach is 

now planned to last 17 years (5 years in concept development and 12 years 

in system development)—including the development of immature, 

undemonstrated technologies and will take at least two to three times 

longer than the development time of leading commercial firms or that 

suggested by defense acquisition policy. The JSF acquisition strategy is 

shown in figure 2. 

Figure 2: JSF Program Acquisition

5 years 12 years

Technology development

System development

Productiona

Source: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

System 

development ends

System

development

starts

Concept

development

starts

a

The bar for production is not drawn to scale. JSF production lasts for 20 years. 

While JSF’s acquisition strategy calls for delivering a small number of 

aircraft with limited capabilities, the program has committed to deliver the 

full required capability by the end of system development and 

Page 14 GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
demonstration in 2013. For JSF, this includes a set of objectives that 

exceeds those of aircraft development programs of the past. JSF will use 

cutting-edge technology to fuse data from the aircraft itself and other 

sources, from all aspects of the aircraft, and display the information to the 

pilot. The aircraft must be able to rapidly transition from ground attack to 

air-to-air missions while airborne. JSF also expects advances in 

technologies for mission systems, prognostics, and autonomic logistics 

support requiring hardware development as well as extensive and complex 

software development and integration to have lower cost of ownership 

than the legacy aircraft while being able to deploy rapidly, sustain high 

mission reliability, and maintain a high sortie generation rate. 

Past single-step development programs have been unsuccessful in 

predicting acquisition costs and delivery schedules. For example, 

development costs for the F-22A fighter, B-2 bomber, Crusader artillery 

vehicle, and Comanche helicopter skyrocketed, and production quantities 

were either substantially reduced or the program was canceled. Such 

outcomes are a poor return on investment and a failure to recapitalize 

aging legacy systems. So far the JSF program is experiencing similar 

results. Since the program’s start, development cost has increased 84 

percent, the development schedule has increased by almost 5 years, and 

planned delivery of capabilities to the warfighter has been delayed. DOD 

now plans to buy 535 fewer aircraft than originally planned. As a result, 

DOD’s buying power has been significantly reduced—program acquisition 

unit costs have increased by 28 percent, or $23 million, since first 

estimates. See appendix II for more details on JSF outcomes. 

Funding Needs Could 

Increase Given the Level of 

Risk to Complete the JSF 

Program 

Despite a lengthy restructuring effort that added over $7 billion and 

18 months to the development program, JSF officials have stated that the

restructured program has little or no flexibility for future changes or 

unanticipated risks. Furthermore, the length and scope of the remaining 

effort make it even more difficult to accurately estimate cost and 

completion schedules. While it has been over 9 years since the program 

started, the first flight test aircraft still has not been delivered. The 

program has planned almost 8 years to complete the remaining activities 

of the system development and demonstration phase. These remaining 

activities include 

• fully maturing 7 of the 8 critical technologies; 

• completing the designs and releasing the engineering drawings for all 

three variants; 

Page 15 GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
• manufacturing and delivering 15 flight test aircraft and 7 ground test 

articles; 

• developing 19 million lines of software code; and

• completing a 7-year, over 12,000-hour flight test program. 

The JSF program’s latest planned funding profile for development and 

procurement, produced in December 2004, expects annual funding 

requirements to hover close to $13 billion in between 2012 and 2022, 

peaking at $13.8 billion in 2013. If the program fails to achieve its current 

estimated costs, funding challenges could be even greater than they are 

today. Thus, even a modest cost increase would have dramatic impacts on 

funding. For example, a 10 percent increase in production costs would 

amount to over $21 billion (see fig. 3). 

Figure 3: JSF’s Annual Funding Requirements, as of December 2004

The current cost estimate reflects the position of the JSF program office. 

The Office of Secretary of Defense Cost Analysis Improvement Group was 

to update its formal independent cost estimate in the spring of 2005, and 

the Navy and the Air Force were expected to fully fund the program 

Page 16 GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
consistent with the estimate. The group now does not expect to formally 

complete its estimate until the spring of 2006, but its preliminary estimate 

was substantially higher than the program office’s. According to Cost 

Analysis Improvement Group officials, an assessment of the software and 

mission systems requirements based on more recent information could 

further increase the estimate of JSF costs. 

An Incremental 

Development Approach 

Provides an Alternative 

Model for Reducing JSF 

Risks 

An incremental development approach consistent with DOD’s policy on 

evolutionary acquisition and best practices has potential to deliver 

warfighter capabilities in planned product increments that would increase 

JSF capabilities over time. The F-16 fighter program, the Air Force’s JSF 

predecessor, successfully evolved capabilities over the span of about 30 

years, delivering increases of capabilities quickly and often, as

technologies became available. That program may provide a model for a 

possible alternative acquisition strategy for the JSF program. Structuring 

the program into separate and manageable increments based on what is 

achievable now and in the future would allow more predictable cost and 

delivery estimates. 

Over the past three decades, the Air Force successfully procured more 

than 2,200 F-16s. The F-16 acquisition approach allowed the timely and 

affordable delivery of aircraft and capability to meet the warfighter’s 

needs, including the recapitalization of aging aircraft. By using an 

evolutionary approach to develop the aircraft, the program was able to 

quickly deliver new and improved capabilities to the warfighter and 

increase the aircraft’s capability as new technologies were matured and 

added to the aircraft. The first increment, developed during the 1970s, 

provided a “day fighter” aircraft with basic air-to-air and air-to-ground 

capabilities. This allowed the developer to deliver new and useful military 

capability to the warfighter in less than 4 years. With each subsequent 

increment, new technology was used to improve the engine, radar, 

structure, avionics, and other systems that allow the aircraft today to 

perform close air support, ground attack, air defense, and suppression of 

enemy defense missions (see fig. 4). The evolutionary approach also 

enriched the industrial base capabilities by extending the life of the 

production over the length of this incremental approach. 

Page 17 GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
Figure 4: F-16 Incremental Development Approach

Second

increment

Third

increment

Fourth

increment

Fifth

increment

First

increment

Multirole day fighter

Fly-by-wire flight controls

Highly maneuverable

Multirole day fighter

Structural improvements for 

 future subsystems

Airframe refinements

Multirole, all-weather fighter

Improved radar

Advanced cockpit

Alternate fighter engine

 added

Larger weapons payload

Multirole, all-weather, 

 precision strike fighter

GPS capabilities

Improved ground targeting

Upgraded computer

Multirole, all-weather, 

 suppression of enemy 

 air defense fighter

Advanced targeting system

Precision weapons

Improved engine

F-16

increment

Incremental

capabilities added

Number of

aircraft delivered

Source: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

Development effort Production effort

0

Years after start of full-scale development

5 10 15 20 25 30

329

456

721

462

271

Note: This gives the number of aircraft delivered to the U.S. Air Force only, no foreign military sales or

other allied government sales included. 

In contrast, JSF’s fully configured design represents a quantum leap in 

capability that far exceeds the capability of legacy systems that JSF is 

intended to replace. While the program is using a block structure—where 

each block adds capabilities over the proceeding block—the blocks are 

part of a single development effort, and DOD is on contract with the 

developer to deliver the warfighter the full capability (see fig. 5). The 

program’s block structure provides for an escalating capability, but DOD 

already plans to buy 95 percent of JSF aircraft with the ultimate capability 

(block 3). Unlike the approach used with the F-16, this risky approach will 

Page 18 GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
likely be like past programs that have encountered significant increases in

cost and time, not allowing DOD to quickly recapitalize the aging legacy 

aircraft. 

Figure 5: Planned JSF Blocks

Block 0: Fleet introduction and training

Envelope expansion.

Block and basic capabilities added Number of planned JSF aircraft procurements

23

47

Block 1: Initial warfighting capability

Basic warfighter needs–interdiction and 

initial air-to-air missions. Includes a flightqualified, low-observable airframe with 

basic functionality, initial logistics support, 

and baseline missiles and bombs.

Block 2: Expanded mission capability

Additional functionality for close air support,

moving targets, electronic attack, and air

interdiction. Ability to fuse information from

other JSFs and increased logistics support

with advanced prognostics capabilities. 

Additional bombs and missiles.

Block 3: Enhanced warfighting capability

Warfighters’ desired capability. Concludes

avionics development, including ability to

fuse information from other platforms or

sensors for increased situational awareness.

Suppression and destruction of enemy air

defenses and deep strike capabilities and

qualification of additional weapons.

56

2,317

Source: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

An evolutionary approach would entail delivering a first product 

increment with at least as much capability as currently operating legacy 

aircraft with sufficient quantities to allow DOD to retire older planes 

sooner and reduce operating inefficiencies. DOD has repeatedly raised 

concerns about the age of its fighter aircraft fleet, which was bought 

largely in the 1970s and 1980s and will need to be replaced around 2010. 

Delays in fielding JSF aircraft may increase costs to maintain legacy 

aircraft to meet force structure requirements. Limiting development to 5-

year increments or less, as suggested in the DOD acquisition policy, would 

force smaller, more manageable commitments in capabilities and make 

costs and schedules more predictable. Some of the more challenging JSF 

capabilities, such as the advanced mission systems or prognostics 

technologies, would be deferred, kept in the technology base (off the 

Page 19 GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
critical path of the JSF program), and added to follow-on increments once 

they are demonstrated in the more conducive technology development 

environment.11 In addition to considering available resources—including 

technology and design knowledge, budget, and time—each increment 

should be based on the warfighter’s most immediate needs and the 

number of aircraft needed to maintain a viable fleet. Figure 6 shows what 

an incremental approach might look like for JSF. 

 11These technologies are not expected to be fully mature until 2011. 

Page 20 GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
Figure 6: Potential Application of an Incremental Development Approach to the JSF Program 

Scenario for an incremental approach for JSF program

System development starts

when technologies and 

resources match requirements

Production starts when manufacturing 

and system are fully demonstrated

Technology

development

System

development Production

Next-generation aircraft,

separate business case

New program that focuses on

using same airframe as firstgeneration aircraft but fitted

with advanced capabilities

Technology

development

System

development Production

DOD’s current approach for JSF program

Single-step approach,

one business case

Targeting full capabilities at 

completion of system

development

System development starts

when technologies and 

resources match requirements

Production starts

when manufacturing and system

are fully demonstrated

System development starts

before technology 

development is completed

First-generation

aircraft, first

business case

Initial program

focuses on developing

low-observable airframe 

with basic mission system 

and support systems

Source: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

12 years with concurrency

5 years with

no concurrency

5 years with

no concurrency

Production starts before system development is completed

System development

Productiona

Technology development

a

The bar for production is not drawn to scale. JSF production lasts for 20 years. 

Because an incremental approach would reduce the amount of risk in each 

development phase, it would make the program manager and contractor

accountable for a lower-risk system development phase with precise cost

and schedule targets. A shorter system development phase also makes it 

Page 21 GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
more feasible to align a program manager’s tenure to the completion of the 

phase, holding the program manager accountable for decisions made. It 

also would enable the use of fixed-price-type contracts for production that 

contains a pricing structure that reduces government risk. 

While the JSF program plays a critical role in DOD plans to recapitalize the 

services’ aging tactical aircraft fleet, DOD’s current acquisition approach 

for the JSF program continues to be risky and could further jeopardize 

meeting this important objective. The JSF program has already 

encountered increases to estimated development costs, delays to planned

deliveries, and reductions in the planned number of JSF to be procured 

that have eroded DOD’s buying power. We believe the current acquisition 

strategy to begin production in 2007 is too risky. By committing to procure 

large quantities of the aircraft before completing testing that demonstrates 

that the design is mature and reliable, DOD has significantly increased the 

risk of further compromising its return on investment—as well as adding 

more cost and delaying the delivery of critical capabilities to the 

warfighter. Also, making sizable investments in tooling and other 

manufacturing capability needed to produce JSFs at higher rates before a 

fully integrated aircraft is demonstrated in testing places the program at 

risk for expensive design changes as testing uncovers problems. Deferring 

production decisions until all three variants’ performance has been 

demonstrated throughout their flight envelopes and with the full 

integrated capability would allow additional time to capture knowledge 

and help to significantly minimize these risks. 

Conclusions 

To continue with the current plan to deliver the ultimate JSF capability 

will require (1) execution of a 7-year test program without further 

schedule delays, (2) development of 5 major blocks of software (19 million 

lines of code), and (3) new and yet undemonstrated technologies for 

advanced mission systems that must collect, analyze, and synthesize 

information from other platforms or sensors not all a part of the JSF 

aircraft. These are necessary to ensure the JSF has increased situational 

awareness to destroy enemy air defenses and perform deep strike 

missions with advanced weapons. The JSF program will also need, 

annually, an average of $11 billion of development and procurement 

funding for the next two decades. 

All of these factors add to the challenges faced by DOD in trying to 

manage this highly concurrent program, increasing the risk it will have the 

same poor outcomes experienced by similar major acquisition programs 

with significant cost and schedule growth and delayed modernization and

Page 22 GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
recapitalization of aging systems. DOD has an alternative. With 90 percent

of DOD’s remaining planned investment in JSF, it can adopt a knowledgedriven and evolutionary acquisition approach to reduce JSF program risks, 

recapitalize its aging tactical air force sooner, and deliver needed 

capabilities to the warfighter more quickly. The experiences of the F-16 

program—evolving and improving capabilities over time while providing 

the warfighter combat capability—provide a precedent for this. 

Requirements for the first increment of JSF under this evolutionary 

approach would match a level supported by current knowledge of 

technologies and design. This would allow the testing of those reduced 

requirements to support a knowledge-based low-rate production decision 

sooner and allow delivery of a useful product and in sufficient quantities

to start replacing the aging legacy fighter force. Capabilities that demand 

as yet undemonstrated technologies, for example, advanced mission 

systems and software, would be included as requirements in subsequent 

future JSF aircraft increments—managed as separate development 

programs—as technology is demonstrated in the technology base and 

becomes available. 

DOD does not plan to change its business case or acquisition plan for 

developing and buying the JSF. Without changes, the acquisition plan will 

put at risk $50 billion for procuring JSF aircraft at the same time the 

program develops and tests the aircraft’s expected performance 

capabilities over a 7-year, 12,000 hour flight test program. The JSF 

program has continually missed its cost and schedule targets over the 5

years it has been in development. If DOD were to make smaller, more 

manageable commitments in capabilities, it would make cost and schedule 

more predictable and deliver needed capabilities to the war fighter sooner. 

For these reasons, Congress may want to consider delaying authorizations 

and appropriations for procuring JSF aircraft until 

Matters for 

Congressional 

Consideration 

1. DOD develops a knowledge-based business case that matches 

requirements with proven technologies and design knowledge and 

available funding. Capabilities that demand technological advances not

yet demonstrated should be part of future increments that are funded 

and managed separately once demonstrated. 

2. DOD demonstrates the aircraft design qualities and integrated mission 

capabilities of the fully configured and integrated JSF variants work as 

designed based on actual flight testing. 

Page 23 GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

We are making the following recommendations to reduce program risk 

and increase the likelihood of successful program outcomes by delivering 

capabilities to the warfighter when needed and within available resources. 

Specifically, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense: 

1. Delay the investment in production aircraft until sufficient testing has 

at least demonstrated the basic airframe design of each JSF variant in 

important parts of the flight envelope, including combinations of 

critical altitudes, speeds, and angles of attack. 

2. Once the basic airframe design has been demonstrated, limit 

production quantities to the number of aircraft needed for operational 

testing and that can be produced using the current production

capability (based on existing tooling, materials, and personnel) until a 

fully integrated aircraft (with advanced mission systems and predictive 

maintenance systems) demonstrates through flight testing the required 

capabilities. 

3. Plan an incremental acquisition strategy that follows the intent of DOD 

evolutionary acquisition policy and delivers a first increment that 

limits new content to proven technologies and design. The plan should 

be completed and reported to the Congress by July 2006, and include 

adjustments in associated programs as necessary to maintain needed 

capabilities. 

DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report. The 

comments appear in appendix III. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of 

Defense delay the investment in production aircraft until sufficient testing 

has at least demonstrated the basic airframe design of each JSF variant in

important parts of the flight envelope, including combinations of critical 

altitudes, speeds, and angles of attack. DOD agreed that a knowledgebased approach is critical to making prudent decisions and that this type 

of approach is being used by JSF. However, DOD’s response did not 

provide a plan of action to show how it will ensure flight testing 

demonstrates acceptable performance before significant production 

investments are made. In the past, Congress has raised concerns about the 

costly outcomes of highly concurrent development and production efforts 

that are not “flying before buying.” DOD points out that the JSF program is 

in its fifth year of a 12-year development, but starting production with 

nearly 7 years of development and testing remaining leaves a high 

probability that, because it is not flying before buying, it will incur costly 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 24 GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
design changes and delay getting capability to the warfighter. Until there 

has been testing to demonstrate that all three variants will work as 

intended, we believe entering production in 2007 places financial 

investments at significant risk. The risk increases as spending for 

production goes from about $100 million a month in 2007 to over $500 

million a month just 2 years later. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to the Secretary of 

Defense to limit production quantities to the number of aircraft needed for 

operational testing and that can be produced using the current production

capability until a fully integrated aircraft demonstrates the required 

capabilities through flight testing. DOD stated it is limiting production 

until aircraft capabilities are fully demonstrated and that further limits are 

not necessary. It stated that various program reviews to assess 

performance, including test objectives, are conducted to ensure associated 

program risks are understood and mitigated. We believe DOD’s plan to 

invest almost $50 billion to buy over 400 aircraft concurrent with testing is 

very risky. Significant efforts remain in the JSF program to demonstrate 

the aircraft will perform as expected. A number of major DOD acquisition 

programs have employed highly concurrent acquisition strategies in the 

past and experienced significant cost increases and schedule delays. DOD 

stated its use of modeling and simulation and laboratory testing reduces 

risk. However, DOD operational test officials have stated that

demonstrations need to occur in the actual aircraft in an operational 

environment to verify that the system works as intended. For example, the 

F-22A avionics software performed successfully in the laboratory but 

experienced significant problems that delayed the program and increased

costs once it entered actual flight testing in the F-22A aircraft. JSF 

software and advanced electronics are more complex than the F-22A’s. 

While DOD believes it can manage program risk by holding regular 

program reviews, DOD’s own experience has shown this approach is not 

effective. Accepting and managing risk instead of capturing technology, 

design, and manufacturing knowledge, as suggested in DOD policy, has 

made it difficult for DOD to make informed decisions at key points. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to the Secretary of 

Defense to plan an incremental acquisition strategy that follows the intent 

of DOD evolutionary acquisition policy and delivers a first increment that

limits new content to proven technologies and design and to report this 

plan to Congress by July 2006. It stated the JSF Acquisition Strategy fully 

complies with policy and is a knowledge-based, incremental approach that 

includes three blocks of increasing degrees of warfighter capability. We 

believe DOD’s strategy does not provide the benefits of an evolutionary 

Page 25 GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
approach, as suggested by DOD’s policy and best practices. In commenting 

on our report, DOD did not address the salient points concerning the true 

significance of adopting an incremental acquisition approach—reducing 

program risk, delivering needed capabilities to the warfighter quicker, and 

recapitalizing the aging tactical aircraft fleet sooner. The JSF strategy 

resembles other past major acquisition programs that have attempted to 

achieve the ultimate capability in a single development increment, 

producing nearly all of the fleet with the fully required capability from the 

outset. DOD has allowed technology development to spill over into 

product development, weakening the foundation for program cost or 

schedule estimates. This has led to disastrous outcomes for other major 

acquisition programs in the past. We continue to believe the successful F16 program can serve as a model for the JSF program. The F-16 program 

evolved capabilities over a 30-year period, buying substantial quantities of 

each increment in order to recapitalize aging tactical aircraft and provide 

new capabilities to the warfighter more quickly. If DOD were to make 

smaller, more manageable commitments in capabilities, it would make 

cost and schedule more predictable and deliver needed capabilities to the 

warfighter sooner. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 

Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy; and the Director of the 

Office of Management and Budget. We will also provide copies to others 

on request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the 

GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Page 26 GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-4841. Contact points for our offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. Other staff making key contributions to this report were 

Michael Hazard, Assistant Director; Lily Chin; Matthew Drerup; Matthew 

Lea; Gary Middleton; Karen Sloan; and Adam Vodraska. 

Michael J. Sullivan 

Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Page 27 GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable John Warner 

Chairman 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ted Stevens 

Chairman 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young 

Chairman 

The Honorable John P. Murtha 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Page 28 GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To determine if the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program will capture critical 

product knowledge before making production investments, we compared 

the program’s plans and results to date against best practice standards for 

applying knowledge to support major program investment decisions. The 

best practice standards are based on a GAO body of work that 

encompasses nearly 10 years and visits to over 25 major commercial 

companies. Our work has shown that valuable lessons can be learned from

the commercial sector, as well as successful Department of Defense 

(DOD) cases, and can be applied to the development of weapon systems. 

We reviewed JSF management reports, acquisition plans, test plans, risk 

assessments, cost reports, independent program assessments, and 

program status briefings. We identified gaps in product knowledge at the 

production decision points, reasons for these gaps, and the risks to 

program cost and schedule associated with moving forward. We reviewed

DOD’s acquisition policy to determine whether JSF’s approach met its 

framework and intent. We interviewed officials from the DOD acquisition 

program management office and prime contractor to gain their 

perspectives on program risks and their approaches to managing risks. 

To evaluate whether the current acquisition plan follows an evolutionary 

or incremental approach, a key best practice for meeting business case 

goals, we examined the JSF program’s acquisition framework and the 

actions taken by DOD to address the recommendations made in our 2005 

report. We compared the JSF program’s approach with the approaches 

used by leading companies and successful DOD programs to evolve 

products to their ultimate capabilities. We also reviewed DOD guidance on 

structuring evolutionary acquisition programs. To determine the JSF 

program outcomes to date, we used the program estimates that justified 

the program when it started in 1996. This was the point JSF transitioned 

from a technology development environment to an acquisition program 

environment, with the commitment to deliver a family of strike aircraft 

that meets the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps needs. At that time, total 

production, acquisition, and ownership costs had not been estimated. The 

total production, acquisition, and ownership cost estimates were first 

established to support the decision to enter the system development and 

demonstration phase in 2001. We used these estimates as the baseline for

these costs. We also obtained information on past DOD programs from

Selected Acquisition Reports and prior work conducted by GAO over the 

past 25 years. 

To identify opportunities to improve JSF program outcomes, we assessed 

the potential of applying an incremental development approach to the JSF 

acquisition program based on the commercial model and DOD guidance. 

Page 29 GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

We also examined the program history of the F-16 fighter, the JSF 

predecessor, which applied an incremental approach over its 30-year 

acquisition. The F-16 acquisition has been touted by DOD and others as a 

successful program and a model for others to follow. To examine the 

program history of the F-16, we met with F-16 program officials and 

analyzed acquisition plans, management reports, and program outcomes. 

In performing our work, we obtained information and interviewed officials 

from the JSF Joint Program Office, Arlington, Virginia; Lockheed Martin 

Aeronautical Systems, Fort Worth, Texas; Defense Contract Management 

Agency, Fort Worth, Texas; and offices of the Director, Operational Test 

and Evaluation, and Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Program 

Analysis and Evaluation-Cost Analysis Improvement Group, which are part 

of the Office of Secretary of Defense in Washington, D.C. We also obtained

information from the F-16 program office and Rand Corporation, Santa 

Monica, California. 

Page 30 GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
Appendix II: Changes in JSF Program Appendix II: Changes in JSF Program Purchase Quantities and Costs

Purchase Quantities and Costs 

November 1996 

(program start)

October 2001 

(system

development start)

As of December 

2005

Changes since 

initial estimate

Expected quantities 

Development quantities 10 14 15 50

Procurement quantities (U.S. only) 2,978 2,852 2,443 (18)

Total quantities 2,988 2,866 2,458 (18)

Cost estimates (then year dollars in billions) 

Development $24.8 $34.4 $45.7 84

Procurement Not available $196.6 $210.7 7

Other Not available $2.0 $.2 (90)

Total program acquisition Not available $233.0 $256.6 10

Unit cost estimates (then year dollars in millions) 

Average procurement Not available $69 $86 25

Program acquisition Not available $81 $104 28

Unit recurring flyaway costs (fiscal year 2002 dollars in millions) 

Conventional takeoff and landing $31.5 $37.0 $44.5 41

Short takeoff and vertical landing $33.7-39.3 $45.8 $58.7 49-74

Carrier $34.9-42.7 $47.8 $61.7 44-77

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data 

Page 31 GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
Appendix III: Comments from the Department Appendix III: Comments from the of Defense 

Department of Defense 

Page 32 GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 33 GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 34 GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

(120450) Page 35 GAO-06-356 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition
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