THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY:

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

William T. Johnsen

Douglas V. Johnson II

James O. Kievit

Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Steven Metz

August 1, 1995
ii

*******

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This report is approved for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

*******

The authors wish to thank the following individuals for

their critiques of earlier drafts: Lieutenant General (Retired)

Dave R. Palmer; Brigadier General Harold W. Nelson; Dr. John I.

Alger; Colonel William W. Allen; Colonel Marland J. Burckhart;

Colonel Adolf Carlson; Colonel Joseph Cerami; Colonel William

Doyne; Dr. David Jablonsky, Colonel, USA (Retired); Arthur F.

Lykke, Jr., Colonel, USA (Retired); and Phillip W. Mock, Colonel,

USA (Retired). Much of the credit for any insights contained in

this study goes to these individuals. The authors, however,

remain responsible for the opinions expressed in this report.

*******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments may also

be conveyed directly to the authors at the same address, or by

telephone: commercial (717) 245-4140, or DSN 242-4140.
iii

FOREWORD

For nearly two centuries, the principles of war have guided

practitioners of the military art. During the last 55 years the

principles of war have been a key element of U.S. Army doctrine,

and recently they have been incorporated into other Service and

Joint doctrines. The turn of the 21st century and the dawn of

what some herald as the "Information Age," however, may call into

question whether principles originally derived in the 19th

century and based on the experience of "Industrial Age" armed

forces still hold. Moreover, despite their long existence, the

applicability of the principles of war at the strategic level of

warfare has not been the subject of detailed analysis or

assessment.

The purpose of this study, therefore, is to stimulate a

debate on the importance of the principles of war at the

strategic level of warfare and on their continued relevancy in

the Information Age. To this end, the study proposes a revised

set of the nine principles of war that may be applied at the

strategic level of warfare and are believed to conform to the

conditions and demands of the 21st century.

This study represents a first examination of a complex and

relatively unexplored field of study. Many may differ with the

ideas presented or quarrel with a particular phrase or choice of

words. Additionally, each of the principles undoubtedly merits a

more detailed investigation than present length constraints

allow. We encourage readers, therefore, to take up the debate and

contribute to an exchange of views on this important subject.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies

 Institute
iv

PRINCIPLES OF WAR AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL

Objective: Identify and pursue clearly defined and

attainable goals whose achievement best furthers the national

interest(s).

Initiative: Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

Unity of Effort: For every objective coordinate all

activities to achieve unity of effort.

Focus: Concentrate the elements of national power at the

place and time which best furthers pursuit of the primary

national objective.

Economy of Effort: Allocate minimum essential resources to

subordinate priorities.

Orchestration: Orchestrate the application of resources at

the times, places, and in ways which best further the

accomplishment of the objective.

Clarity: Prepare clear strategies that do not exceed the

abilities of the organizations that will implement them.

Surprise: Accrue disproportionate advantage through action

for which an adversary is not prepared.

Security: Minimize the vulnerability of strategic plans,

activities, relationships, and systems to manipulation and

interference by opponents.
v

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS

WILLIAM T. JOHNSEN joined the Strategic Studies Institute in 1991

and currently serves as an Associate Research Professor of

National Security Affairs. He has also held the Elihu Root Chair

of Military Studies of the U.S. Army War College since 1994. An

infantry officer before retiring from the U.S. Army, Dr. Johnsen

served in a variety of troop leading, command and staff

assignments in the 25th Infantry Division and 7th Infantry

Division (Light). He also served as Assistant Professor of

History at the U.S. Military Academy, and as an Arms Control

Analyst in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).

Dr. Johnsen holds a B.S. degree from the U.S. Military Academy,

an M.A. and Ph.D. in history from Duke University, and is a

graduate of the U.S. Army War College. He has authored or

coauthored numerous Strategic Studies Institute studies, as well

as articles in a variety of policy journals, that focus on U.S.-

European security issues.

DOUGLAS V. JOHNSON II is an Associate Research Professor,

Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), U.S. Army War College. He

served in SSI as a Strategic Research Analyst for seven years

before retiring from the U.S. Army with 30 years service and has

continued since then in his present capacity. He is a 1963

graduate of the U.S. Military Academy (USMA), received his

master's degree in history at the University of Michigan. He took

his Ph.D. in history from Temple University in 1992. While on

active duty he served in a variety of field artillery and staff

positions, taught at USMA and is a co-founder of the School of

Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), U.S. Army Command and General

Staff College. Dr. Johnson has coauthored SSI studies on a wide

range of subjects, the last three focusing on Iraq and the Gulf.

JAMES O. KIEVIT is a Strategic Research Analyst at the Strategic

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. Commissioned in the

Corps of Engineers, LTC Kievit has served in the 1st Cavalry

Division, the 7th Engineer Brigade, and the 8th Infantry Division

(Mechanized). He has also served as Assistant Professor of

History at the U.S. Military Academy, and as a force structure

analyst and study director at the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis

Agency. LTC Kievit holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy, a

M.M.A.S. from the School of Advanced Military Studies of the U.S.

Army Command and General Staff College, and a M.A. in history and
vi

M.S.E. in construction management from the University of

Michigan.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR. joined SSI in September 1994 on his

retirement from active duty with the U.S. Army. His Army career

included a combat tour in Vietnam and a number of command and

staff assignments. While serving in the Plans, Concepts and

Assessments Division and the War Plans Division of the Joint

Staff, he collaborated in the development of documents such as

the National Military Strategy, the Joint Strategic Capabilities

Plan, the Joint Military Net Assessment, NSD 74, PDD 25, and

others. He was also Director of Military Requirements and

Capabilities Management at the U.S. Army War College. He is a

contributor to The Conduct of the Persian Gulf War. He holds a

B.S. in aerospace management and an M.A. in business from Embry

Riddle Aeronautical University. He is also a graduate of the U.S.

Army Command and General Staff College and the National War

College.

STEVEN K. METZ is Associate Research Professor of National

Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College. He has taught at the Air War College, U.S. Army

Command and General Staff College, and several universities. Dr.

Metz holds a B.A. and M.A. in international studies from the

University of South Carolina, and a Ph.D. in political science

from the Johns Hopkins University.
1

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY:

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

Throughout history, military practitioners, philosophers,

and historians have struggled to comprehend the complexities of

warfare.1 Most of these efforts produced long, complicated

treatises that did not lend themselves to rapid or easy

understanding.2 This, in turn, spurred efforts to condense the

"lessons" of war into a short list of aphorisms that

practitioners of the military art could use to guide the conduct

of warfare.3

The culmination of these labors, from the perspective of the

U.S. Armed Forces, may be found in what are called the principles

of war.4 (See Appendix A.) Currently contained in Joint and

Service doctrines, "the principles of war guide warfighting at

the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. They are the

enduring bedrock of US military doctrine."5

But, how solid is that foundation? While the principles have

been thoroughly scrutinized at the tactical and operational

levels of warfare, the study of their applicability at the

strategic level has been less exhaustive.6

 Moreover, the

principles of war were derived predominantly from the study of

Napoleonic and Industrial Age warfare.7

 Whether or how these

principles apply at the strategic level of war under the

conditions of rapid technological change that many are calling

the "Information Age" and its military offspring, the Revolution

in Military Affairs (RMA), is an open-ended question.8

Because war at the strategic level is an intellectual

process9 and the development and implementation of strategy is a

creative activity, some form of intellectual framework is

required to shape the strategist's thought processes. The

principles of war provide such a structure. At the same time,

because theory and creativity have limits, they offer a guide to

understanding those restrictions. A good strategist–possessed of

a comprehensive understanding of the principles–will be able,

therefore, to expand creatively upon them, and will also be able

to determine if one or more of them can or must be disregarded.10

Finally, a thorough grasp of the intent behind each principle
2

allows the crafting of strategies that reflect the best possible

balance among the principles for a particular strategic

challenge.11

Once thoroughly understood, the principles of war also may be

used as a decisionmaking aid during formulation, planning, and

execution of strategy. They can be used to assess current

strategic plans, or as an analytic tool to shape new strategies

and plans as they are developed. Further, they can be used to

examine past strategic activities to derive insights from success

or failure, and to extract the pertinent "lessons" that can be

applied to future endeavors.

It is, of course, always easier to use the principles in

retrospect to critique plans and activities than to incorporate

them when creating strategies--but those who can do the latter

will be hailed as geniuses by future historians. In fact, the

principles of war are important exactly because, short of war, it

is difficult to identify potential "Napoleons" in our midst. A

proper focus on the linkages and tensions among the principles

can avoid the stultifying, dogmatic, pro forma use of

"checklists" which inevitably creates vulnerabilities to be

exploited by a more imaginative opponent. At the same time,

innovative application of the principles in simulations and war

games can provide a useful education for future generals and

strategists, who may be called upon to practice their craft with

little or no notice. They are aids, too, in the life-long

development of patterns of thought found in the true strategist.

Finally, given the growing complexities of the 21st century,

there may be a greater, not lesser, need for a unifying set of

principles that can assist strategists in the pursuit of their

craft.

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Before examining the principles of war, a few preliminary

points are in order. This study focuses on the strategic level of

war, specifically national security strategy and national

military strategy.12 Because strategy formulation and execution is

a continuous process, the report addresses the principles of

"war" as they apply in peace, crisis, and war. The term

"Information Age" is used because of its popularity, and as
3

short-hand for the anticipated conditions of the 21st century.

This is done with the full understanding that it insufficiently

describes the technological and geo-political changes that will

characterize that environment. The term "strategist" applies to

civil and military authorities charged with determining policy

and developing the strategic plans to achieve national

objectives. Finally, while the focus of the study is at the

national level, international and multinational conditions

obviously intrude on national level decisionmaking; thereby

complicating significantly the strategist's task.

With the exception of the principle of war objective, which

is clearly paramount, there is no attempt to establish a priority

among the principles. They–especially at the strategic level–

should not be viewed individually, but as a collective whole,

each inextricably linked with the others. Without an

understanding of the connections that bind the principles

together, as well as the tensions and contradictions that stress

them, much of the utility inherent in the principles would be

lost. Worse, strategic failure could result from an undue focus

on one or a few of the principles, when full appreciation of the

whole would yield success.

The discussion that follows concentrates on the eventual

effects of each principle, and not on the methods by which the

principle might be implemented. This is an important distinction

because, all too frequently, strategists fixate on methods of

application at the expense of the desired effect. But even though

accelerating technological change will introduce new methods of

application at a rapid rate, the principles of war–remaining

focused on the desired effects–should not vary in a significant

degree. They can, thereby, continue to act as guideposts for

strategists. Remaining focused on the intended result, therefore,

will assume greater importance in the Information Age.

As the study examines each principle of war, it will first

address the applicability of the principle at the national

security and national military strategy level. It will then offer

insights into the relevancy of the principle in the Information

Age.

Lastly, our recommendations for revising the principles of

war are not radical. They represent more incremental change,
4

updating, and focusing than wholesale change. This is probably

because the principles, as they exist, have been so carefully

honed over time that they reflect "truth" as accurately as

possible.

In order to revalidate continually the principles of war,

though, it is necessary occasionally to consider truly radical

alternatives, even if only to reject them after thoughtful

consideration. Two radical alternatives immediately come to mind.

One might be called the "maximalist" approach, which posits that

war has become so complex that no single set of principles can

apply to all of war's variations. The time tested principles work

for conventional combined arms warfare, but a totally different

set of principles would be required for guerrilla warfare,

information warfare, or other forms. At the other extreme, the

"minimalist" approach suggests that the existing principles of

war can be further distilled. Appendix B contains a discussion of

these approaches.

Objective.

Identify and pursue a clearly defined and attainable goals whose

achievement best furthers the national interest(s).

The principle of objective is primus inter pares of the

principles of war, and particularly so at the strategic level.

Strategy tends to be long term in its development, its execution,

and its effects. Early and accurate selection of an appropriate

overarching goal is the critical keystone for creating and

executing successful strategy. Thus, with adequate focus on the

appropriate goal, much can be accomplished with little; but

absent a specific, clear, attainable, and unifying goal, little

may be accomplished despite great exertion.

Unfortunately, at the strategic level, more worthwhile ends

will exist than means are available to achieve them. Hence, the

phrase "whose achievement best furthers the national interest(s)"

reminds strategists that objectives will vary in difficulty of

achievement and contribution to national interests. Thus, the

principle of objective emphasizes an absolutely essential action:

selection of the most appropriate overall goal from among the

many alternatives.
5

This selection is not as simple as one might think.

Strategic activities always involve every element (political,

economic, diplomatic, psychological, and military) of national

power.13 Each element has different strengths and weaknesses that

come to bear depending upon the objective being pursued.

Furthermore, practitioners within a particular element of power

tend to advocate objectives more suitable for action within their

realm.14 Because of the long-term nature of strategy, full

information is rarely available at the outset to help identify

possible objectives or to assist in their selection. And, because

strategic level issues usually involve allies or coalition

partners, identifying objectives that satisfy all parties is a

difficult and complicated task.

Information Age conditions, particularly accelerating

advances in command and control systems, seemingly offer the

ability to accomplish multiple actions simultaneously. This may

cause some strategists to conclude that clear focus on a single

goal is no longer appropriate, or even desirable. But, in

reality, the ability to control numerous concurrent operations

does not detract from the requirement to ensure that each

individual action contributes to an overarching objective;

instead it reinforces the importance of a clear objective.

Finally, strategists must subject each potential objective,

and the ways to achieve it, to rigorous analyses that assess the

costs, risks, and likelihood of success. Only after completing

such analyses can the strategist recommend objective(s) to

policymakers "which best further the national interest" from the

numerous contenders.16 But strategists must keep in mind that this

is only a first step in a continuous, dynamic process that must

accommodate changes in the conditions under which the objective

was initially formulated. Indeed, the final objective frequently

will not be any single one of the initially proposed objectives,

but rather a new goal that has evolved over the course of time to

accommodate changing conditions.

Advances in information technology will likely complicate,

rather than simplify, identifying and selecting objectives. On

the one hand, more individuals and groups (at national,

multinational, and transnational levels) will have greater access

to relevant information, thereby involving more actors in the

strategy formulation and decisionmaking processes. This could
6

lead to more constituent groups competing to define the national

interests more in line with their political outlook. On the other

hand, the deluge of data and the ability to establish direct

communications links with key actors may result in a

proliferation of "stovepipes" that limits access to the

decisionmaking process. In either case, selecting a suitable and

effective objective may become increasingly difficult, perhaps

exponentially so. But it will be no less important, and strategic

processes and new, "flatter" organizations will have to be

devised to accommodate these requirements.

The potential for increased difficulty in selecting

objectives in the Information Age in no way reduces the

importance of defining suitable objectives. Having more actors

with more information, each more capable of influencing the

decisionmaking process, runs the risk of diffusing efforts,

weakening consensus, or providing an opponent with an opportunity

to exploit the situation. Additionally, the Information Age may

make it more difficult to keep objectives hidden from potential

adversaries. Selecting an appropriate objective at the outset,

while applying proper safeguards, can reduce these dangers.

Initiative (vice Offensive).

Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

The change in the name of the principle and omission of the

word "offensive" from the brief definition is intentional. As

indicated earlier, strategy is a long-term process that

frequently requires considerable time between the initiation of

cause and the culmination of effect. Policymakers and

strategists, therefore, may have to resort to offensive or

defensive phases of a strategy, or a combination of offensive and

defensive actions, to attain the desired national objective.

Therefore, the intense focus on offensive actions at the tactical

and operational levels of warfare may not be always appropriate

at the strategic level.16

Because of the time gap between strategic cause and effect,

the successful strategist must mold the strategic environment

from the outset and seize the initiative, thereby forcing others

to react. Simply put, policymakers or strategists who passively

wait for an opponent to act can make no strategic decisions of
7

their own, and eventually will be at the mercy of their

adversary. Thus, seizing, retaining, and exploiting the

initiative allows one to set the strategic agenda, to shape the

strategic environment in directions of one's choosing, and to

force an opponent constantly to react to changing conditions that

concomitantly inhibit his ability to regain the initiative.

Moreover, maintaining initiative provides a number of

advantages beyond the ability to force an opponent to conform to

one's purpose and tempo. Controlling the pace of events permits a

closer connection of ends, ways, and means. This, in turn,

promotes more effective and more efficient implementation of

policy. It provides increased freedom of action in formulating

and adapting strategy to the evolving context.

A brief example demonstrates the benefits of seizing and

retaining the initiative, as well as the potential consequences

of failing to do so. In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, upset the

fragile strategic balance in the region, and threatened not only

world oil supplies, but also the long-held U.S. aim of peace and

stability in the Middle East. After the Iraqi occupation of

Kuwait, however, the United States seized the strategic

initiative by building an unexpected coalition that included Arab

countries to support Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm

(defensive and offensive missions, respectively).

When Saddam attempted to recapture the strategic initiative

by attacking Israel with SCUD missiles (thereby hoping an Israeli

reaction would destroy the U.S.-led coalition), the United States

used extensive diplomatic efforts and the shipment of Patriot

missile batteries to Israel to restrain Tel Aviv from any action

that might serve Iraq's purpose. In doing so, the United States

retained the initiative, and then by continuing Operation Desert

Storm and executing Desert Saber, achieved the objective of

ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Perhaps more importantly for

the long term, the United States used the success of the

coalition and Israel's demonstrated restraint in the face of

Iraqi provocation to further the entire Middle East peace

process.

Some may argue that in the foreseeable future, relative

advantages in information acquisition and transfer capabilities

will determine who is able to seize and retain the initiative.
8

These capabilities, however, represent only an important first

step. More important is the ability to assess that information

and then make the decisions necessary to turn information into

appropriate action. Even if those same advances in information

technology permit faster and more comprehensive intelligence

operations, an advantage will still accrue to the party who can

originate action which sets the parameters for future action(s)

by all concerned parties.17

To accomplish these tasks will require strategists to

distinguish between the internal and external components of

initiative. The internal is based on ensuring that one's own

decisionmaking processes are the most efficient and effective

possible. The external is based on understanding the expectations

and decisionmaking capacities of an opponent, as well as allies

and coalition partners who also will greatly influence the

ability to seize and maintain the initiative. These two elements

must be pursued concurrently to produce the maximum strategic

benefit.

Unity of Effort (vice Unity of Command).

For every objective coordinate all activities to achieve unity of

effort.

Because strategic endeavors involve applying all elements of

national power (political, economic, diplomatic, psychological,

and military), they must be blended to achieve success. Selection

of a unifying objective, however, is not enough. Precluding

interference or cross-purposes in pursuit of an objective is

vital, especially if one desires to gain maximum benefit from

efforts expended. Failure to accomplish such integration will

likely result in failure to achieve the objective–at least at a

reasonable cost.

Historically, militaries–as hierarchial organizations–have

sought unity of effort via unity of "command." While this is

achievable at the tactical and operational levels of warfare, it

may not be possible at the strategic level, where efforts much

broader than those associated with "command" apply.

The number and variety of actors at the strategic level

mitigate against unity of command. Within the U.S. Government,
9

for example, the ability to "command" is tenuous, at best.

Constitutional checks and balances are designed to preclude

domination by either the Legislative or Executive branches. Few

would argue that the Executive Branch is capable of imposing

"command" on the disparate and fiercely independent elements of

the Federal bureaucracy. Even the interagency process, the

Executive Branch's tool for unifying government efforts depends

upon coordination, not command.18 At the international level,

sovereign states are frequently loath to relinquish their forces

to the command of "foreigners," although the NATO experience

somewhat belies this trend.19 Increasing cooperation with

nongovernmental and private organizations, who are also unwilling

to fall under military control may frequently moot the point of

"command." Thus, at the strategic level, policymakers and

strategists must instead rely on unity of effort.

The importance of unity of effort will not diminish in the

anticipated environment of the 21st century. To the contrary, it

will require more attention at the strategic level because of the

increased likelihood of multilateral actions, Information Age

technologies that will facilitate increased interaction between

governments and organizations, and increased global

interdependence that will make it more difficult for a coalition

to act in unison without straining important relations with

nations outside the coalition. As distinctions among peace,

crisis, and war continue to blur, the ability to build and

sustain allied or coalition unity may become increasingly

difficult, requiring greater levels of sophistication at the

strategic level than may have been practiced in the past.

Reliance on a power projection strategy without a

substantial forward deployment of forces also will complicate the

ability to create and sustain unity of effort. In the past, a

significant presence stationed overseas facilitated multilateral

operations abroad. The opportunities for combined training and

exercises in the future, however, will diminish. If, as the

National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy

posit,20 coalitions become the rule rather than the exception, and

U.S. forward presence declines overall, compensating measures

must be taken if the United States expects to be able to build

and sustain unity within multilateral efforts in fast-breaking

crises.21 Conversely, a dramatically reduced overseas U.S.

presence may drive the United States to increasing reliance on
10

unilateral operations where unity of command is easier to

achieve.

The fact that countries and societies will adapt unevenly to

the Information Age will further confound establishing and

maintaining unity of effort. The United States and some others

will rapidly assimilate Information Age technologies and become

what Alvin and Heidi Toffler have described as "third wave"

societies.22 Other countries will become or remain industrialized

at the "second wave" level, acquiring some Information Age

technologies, but remaining unable to enter the Information Age

in wholesale fashion. Still others will stay "first wave"

agrarian societies. The United States might be involved in

coalitions that include information, industrialized, and agrarian

based nations.

Building and sustaining coalition unity of effort under such

conditions will be challenging. Information Age states may be

best suited for providing information, intelligence, and command

and control support to the strategic effort. Industrial and

agrarian states may be relegated to the role of providing the

bulk of the actual fighting forces; thus likely bearing a

disproportionate share of the casualties. Such a division of

labor could lead to cracks or fissures within a coalition should

Industrial and Agrarian Age states be unwilling to abide by what

they perceive to be an inequitable division of risk.23

Alternatively, Information Age states may be compelled to provide

Industrial Age forces to ensure unity of effort within a

coalition.

A number of additional factors will mitigate against the

ability to establish unity of effort. The long temporal focus of

strategy usually will make it difficult to build consensus on

objectives and the ways to achieve them, and to sustain them over

time. The openness of the American political system and increased

congressional and public influence on the strategic process may

compound this problem. The decentralized and fluid nature of the

post-Cold War security system, particularly the absence of a

large and clearly defined enemy, will further complicate

consensus-building. Finally, strategic action always requires

interagency, and usually international, cooperation among

perceived equals, so "coordination" rather than hierarchial

direction is the operative word. Nonetheless, whether by
11

direction or persuasion, policymakers and strategists must

continually strive for unity of effort.

Focus (vice Mass).

Concentrate the elements of national power at the place and time

which best furthers pursuit of the primary national objective.

Commanders at the tactical and operational levels of war,

usually intent on destroying an opponent's armed forces or their

will to fight, strive to "mass the effects of overwhelming combat

power at the decisive place and time."24 At the strategic level,

with an intent to produce an end state consistent with national

interests, the requirement is to focus effectively the total

power of the state in all its dimensions. Even if a single

unifying goal has been identified (i.e., Objective), the number

and diversity of actors at the strategic level may tend to beget

dispersion of effort. The principle of focus, therefore,

emphasizes that strategists must synchronize actions that may be

separated in time, space, and function to achieve concentrated

effects, avoiding piecemeal, or–worse–conflicting, political,

diplomatic, economic, psychological, or military efforts.

Equally important, focus emphasizes that it matters where

and when to act; strategists must identify the place and time at

which the focused commitment of national power will provide the

greatest benefit for the primary national objective vis-a-vis

potential or actual competitors. Such identification is a

particularly challenging task at the strategic level, not only

because of the span of time to be considered, but also because

the proper site and occasion are functions of a dynamic

international and national situation. The applicable national

power of identifiable competitors, and the condition and

predilection of other regional or global actors also factor into

the calculus.

In the Information Age, the challenge of focusing national

power may become both more difficult and easier. The ability

effectively to utilize diplomatic and political power will be

both facilitated and disrupted by public display of events.

Immediate on-the-scene news reporting will always "be present,"

describing and interpreting events as they happen, and hus

government representatives may feel immediate pressure to "do
12

something."25 Hence, the speed of traditional diplomatic

activities will likely need to increase. At the same time,

government controlled information systems–or the news media–may

now be employed irrespective of national boundaries to send

signals to national leaders or directly to their citizens. Of

course, these same information capabilities affect national

political processes; thus, the interaction between diplomatic and

political actions will have to be carefully orchestrated.

The economic element of power will be more broadly

distributed as information technologies contribute to an ever

more integrated global economy. Consequently, strategists will

have to be even more aware of potential "collateral damage" or

"domino" effects of economic actions, and of their potential

diplomatic or political repercussions. At the same time, greater

economic situational awareness and increased vulnerability to

electronic disruption may make economic attack a more precise and

effective instrument than traditional tariff wars, trade

embargoes or military blockades have been in the past.

Military activities in the Information Age may be executed

more rapidly, with fewer resources accomplishing greater tasks,

separated in both space and time. This apparent dexterity of

military activities, however, may lead to over-reliance upon

military power, or at least to inadequate consideration of its

limitations and insufficient integration with other elements.

Finally, the likely socio-cultural changes that are

inevitable as a result of transformation to the Information Age,

and their implications for the psychological element of power, as

well as for its interrelationship with the other elements, have

yet to be adequately examined.

Just as today, the crux of the issue will be the continuing

need to ensure that the effect of the whole of national power is

greater than the sum of its parts. To do this will require

visualization of the consequences within, and between, each

element of power; judgment in choosing among simultaneous and

sequential activities by each element, as well as how to combine

elements; and development of appropriate coordinating mechanisms.

As a consequence, focus may be the most difficult of all the

principles to satisfy.
13

At the same time, information technology will assume greater

importance in focusing national power. Publics will have greater

access to growing amounts of information. Governments will have

to ensure that publics are exposed to accurate details, and that

they are able to counter an opponent's disinformation or

propaganda campaign, if they are to create and sustain an

internal political consensus that focuses all efforts on

achieving national objectives.

Economy of Effort (vice Economy of Force).

Allocate minimum essential resources to subordinate priorities.

At the tactical and operational levels, the relative

imbalance between required missions and scarce resources has

required military practitioners to "allocate minimum essential

combat power to secondary efforts." But, as argued earlier, the

application of national power implies much more than simply the

employment of force, and, particularly at the national and

military strategic levels, employing the national elements of

power must be viewed within the context of the total power of the

state. Therefore, economy of effort may be a more appropriate

principle of war at the strategic level.

Economy of effort has at least three major elements. First,

the number of national objectives will always exceed the

resources available to achieve them. Thus, if strategists are to

focus on the truly important objectives, they will have to

establish priorities and apply available resources accordingly.

To focus on primary efforts, therefore, economies must be taken

between and within other elements of national power or between

regions to permit resources to be marshalled to achieve the

overriding national objectives. This will continue to require

strategists to delineate a priority of objectives, ensuring that

lower order undertakings receive only what is necessary to

contain them. The strategist then must conduct a risk assessment

that establishes a logical basis for resource allocation in

accordance with the established priority and the risks inherent

in pursuing a particular strategic option.

Second, economy is concerned with effectiveness, and should

not be confused with providing the least amount of resources.

Given the oftentimes considerable time lapses between strategic
14

cause and effect, the continually changing international security

environment, and the number of independent actors involved, it is

impossible for the strategist to calculate resource requirements

with a high degree of certainty. Moreover, despite the emergence

of increasingly sophisticated technologies, Clausewitz's

admonitions about the fog and friction of war will still apply.26

Indeed, the frugal husbanding of resources may produce false

economies that contribute to defeat rather than attainment of

national objectives. True economy of effort, therefore, may

consist of applying overwhelming weight against central

objectives to assure swift and sure success.

Third, economy is not necessarily synonymous with

efficiency. While strategists and practitioners strive to make

most efficient use of resources, policy formulation and execution

do not conform to the "bottom line" approach of business and

industry. Extended time lines and changing circumstances at the

strategic level once again preclude the accuracy needed to

maximize efficiency. Moreover, the consequences of miscalculating

the razor's edge of resource allocation are significantly higher

when national interests and objectives are involved; thus a

degree of inefficiency may be necessary to ensure the effective

execution of strategy.

At the strategic level, economy of effort involves

establishing a balance among all elements of national or

coalition power, as well as allocating resources in accordance

with established priorities. In assessing competing demands,

national interests and objectives must determine the priorities

for allocating resources. Unfortunately, interests and risks are

rarely clear cut, and establishing such priorities is a

formidable task.

Orchestration (vice Maneuver).

Orchestrate the application of resources at the times, places,

and in ways which best further the accomplishment of the

objective.

The principle of orchestration emphasizes the dynamic nature

of the strategic art (the skillful formulation, coordination, and

application of ends, ways, and means to promote and defend the

national interests);27 hence the deliberate use of the term
15

"orchestrate." "Resources" is used, rather than forces or

efforts, to encompass the broadest scope for strategic means

(which may include, for example, all elements of national power,

forces, materials, processes, communications, ideas, information,

and beliefs). "Times, places, and ways" reminds strategists that

there will be more than one option available to employ the

resources at hand, and that the choice and sequencing of

activities may make a significant difference in strategic

outcomes.

Because strategy applies in peace, crisis, and war, planning

is the strategist's principal domain. Planning for orchestration

begins with the straightforward–but extremely difficult–

requirement to balance implementing concepts and available

resources to achieve national goals. In doing so, strategists

must identify and assess the most appropriate concept options–to

include the best places, times, and sequencing of application;

and judge how best to apportion the vast (but not unlimited)

resources available. And, it is important to remember,

strategists do not have the luxury of concentrating on one or two

issues at a time. They may face literally dozens of distinct, but

interrelated, issues that affect national interests and demand

simultaneous attention.

In orchestrating planning efforts, strategists must develop

concepts that permit not only dynamic, but also flexible

execution. Thus, plans must include branches and sequels that

permit agile responses to changes in the strategic environment or

the actions of an opponent. In short, just as a conductor does

not merely place sheet music in front of each musician and,

having told the orchestra to play, docilely await the finale, the

strategist must devise plans that can adjust to changes in

location, tempo, scale, or type of activities during execution.

While orchestration is dynamic in nature, it does not always

require motion. Indeed, with proper forethought it may not be

necessary–or even desirable–to shift resources during execution,

just as the symphony conductor sets the stage for the performance

through his choice of music, the proper selection of musicians,

and the appropriate positioning of the available talent before

the audience arrives. Indeed, developing a scheme of strategic

orchestration before the onset of a crisis may obviate the need

for execution.
16

Finally, some caveats on orchestration. The key to

successful orchestration is ensuring that the application of

resources contributes to focus that furthers progress toward the

desired strategic end. Granted, orchestrating planning and

execution must take into account the actual and potential actions

of other competitors, but this consideration should not be the

strategist's overriding concern. Strategists who over-focus on

their adversaries run the risk of surrendering the initiative and

becoming simply reactive. Instead, while remaining fully

cognizant of an opponent's capabilities, strategists must

orchestrate events, concepts, and resources to retain the

strategic initiative and to shape conditions to help achieve

their desired strategic objectives.

In a similar vein, strategists must understand that placing

an opponent at a disadvantage is not sufficient in and of itself.

In some instances it may, in fact, be undesirable to place

another actor at a disadvantage–his immediate response may be

extremely hostile.28 Instead, it may be preferable to orchestrate

events in a manner that allows an opponent a supposed advantage,

either to guide him in a more desirable direction or to deter

less desirable options by encouraging his application of

resources in the area of one's known advantage. Or, it may be

necessary to offer an opponent a short-term advantage to gain a

long-term benefit.

Strategic orchestration has the potential to be

significantly different in the 21st century. The many changes

associated with the revolution in information technologies will

make additional types of resources available, will offer new

places (cyberspace) to orchestrate, and provide additional ways

to employ resources.29 This will increase the difficulties for the

strategist by providing many more individual pieces and possible

combinations to orchestrate. Concomitantly, the time required to

apply certain types of resources, to alter their mode of

employment, to switch resources, or to apply them at different

places may be significantly reduced. This will increase the

ability to orchestrate events at the strategic level, but it will

also complicate the orchestration of such efforts.

Advanced command and control systems built around

increasingly powerful information systems technologies will be
17

more capable of managing complex plans. Possession of such

systems, combined with the requisite education and training to

employ them to their full potential, may make it possible to

maintain a "complexity differential" vis-a-vis strategic actors

not possessing similar systems.30

Finally, as previously noted in the discussion of

"objective," strategists and policymakers must expect that

information technologies will increase the transparency of

strategic actions. Thus, a key component of any strategic

orchestration plan will be those actions taken to gain and

maintain the support of other government agencies, the public,

other nations, supranational organizations, and multinational

partners. Their support, in turn, becomes another strategic

resource for which the times, places, and manners of application

must be orchestrated to further the accomplishment of the desired

strategic objective.

Clarity (vice Simplicity).

Prepare clear strategies that do not exceed the abilities of the

organizations that will implement them.

Strategy is a complex endeavor requiring synchronized

activity of multiple and diverse organizations. Such

synchronization is possible only if all organizations involved

fully understand the objectives and basic procedures for

attaining them. Clarity is thus a principle where more is always

better.

The principle of clarity addresses the relationship between

leaders, planners, subordinates, and associated organizations. It

is achieved through the ability of subordinates and associated

organizations effectively to ensure unity of effort. Strategic

leaders must understand the capabilities and the limitations of

their subordinates and partners, and structure their guidance and

plans accordingly. Strategic leaders must also clearly articulate

to subordinates their strategic vision or intent. Finally,

clarity is focused internally: it helps strategists augment their

effectiveness and efficiency rather than directly eroding the

effectiveness and efficiency of opponents.

Clarity does not mean that plans should be short or even
18

that they should always contain the fewest possible components,

but only that they can be communicated with maximum

understanding. Nor does clarity necessarily mean simple. The

abilities of the organizations that will implement strategies

largely determine how complex a strategy can be without losing

clarity. Well-trained, experienced subordinate staffs, units, and

partners operating within the same institutional culture as

strategic planners and leaders can tolerate higher levels of

complexity and greater degrees of friction without losing

synchronization than can less-trained, less-experienced, or more

diverse subordinate units and partners.

This conclusion suggests a corollary to the principle of

clarity: the more diverse a strategic coalition (whether

multinational or multiagency), the more important clarity becomes

and the harder it is to attain. In the realm of military

strategy, for instance, a large degree of ingrained understanding

may exist between strategic leaders and their subordinate and

associated units. In grand strategy or multinational strategy,

where diversity of institutions and national cultures will be the

norm and where obfuscation may be a key element in building

consensus within a complex coalition, understanding may be less

deep. The pursuit of clarity, therefore, will demand greater

attention.

In the 21st century, the rapid pace of decision and action

will further increase the importance of clarity. Since there will

be less time to correct misunderstandings and misperceptions in

the midst of execution, strategic plans must be clear from the

outset. To some extent, improved communications technology, such

as realistic simulations, teleconferencing, and the use of

"virtual staffs," will increase the tolerance for complexity. But

considerable effort still will be required.

While classified or controlled strategic plans should be as

clear as possible, the public versions of strategies, which will

be seen by supporting publics, as well as potential opponents,

require a different type of clarity. In fact, analysts have long

argued that deliberate ambiguity in the public version of a

strategy augments deterrence by not allowing an opponent to know

precisely what sort of actions will provoke a response. As a

negative example, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, by excluding

South Korea from the U.S. "defense perimeter" in the Far East
19

during a January 12, 1950 speech, is often accused of

inadvertently providing a go-ahead for North Korean aggression.31

This suggests that clarity within a strategic coalition may be a

linear good where more is always better; but clarity in public

strategies must be balanced with deliberate ambiguity according

to the situation.32

Surprise.

Accrue disproportionate advantage through action for which an

adversary is not prepared.

The proposed definition makes the principle more

encompassing and more applicable at the strategic level. It

recognizes that, at the strategic level, the principle of

surprise bears on actions that may not involve striking the

enemy. This expanded definition also accommodates all the

elements of national power, not simply the military element.

A word of caution is appropriate at this juncture. Surprise,

in and of itself, is devoid of quality–it is neither good nor

bad. Surprise can only be useful if the actor gains tangible

benefit from its application. While this point may seem obvious,

it may help practitioners at the strategic level focus on the

potential costs, as well as benefits of pursuing surprise.

For the United States, surprise at the strategic level is

perhaps the most dichotomous principle of war. The openness of

the U.S. system of government that features unclassified national

security and military strategies, as well as intensively reported

public debates on virtually all aspects of national defense,

leaves it poorly postured for acts of strategic surprise.

Additionally, the United States cannot embrace strategic surprise

without infusing a certain amount of unpredictability in its

foreign policy which may provide short-term advantages that are

outweighed by long-term adverse consequences.33

Several additional aspects of the principle of surprise may

warrant particular attention. In the future, more, and more

complete, information will be available (and faster) to assist

strategists and policymakers in their planning and

decisionmaking. The time required to distill the mounds of data

into usable intelligence may also be compressed. Conversely, the
20

political processes involved in decisionmaking at the strategic

level will likely remain cumbersome for democratic governments.

And, because of the increased accessibility of information–to

decisionmakers and the public–the process may be more complex,

and slower than many anticipate. This may limit improvements in

strategic agility that currently appears possible in the

Information Age. Strategists and decisionmakers may be little

able to affect this situation, but they must take the phenomenon

into account and devise procedures and processes that will

expedite human decisionmaking and keep it on par with the

capabilities of electronic decisionmaking aids.

The ability to gather, sort, process, and understand

information will be unevenly distributed among nations in the

early 21st century. Initially, at least, the United States should

enjoy a distinct advantage, especially at the tactical and

operational level. But, at the strategic level, the ability to

accurately gauge the intentions of potential adversaries will

remain a challenge. In sum, advances in technology may offer a

better "picture" of the physical attributes and activities of an

opponent, but it will not necessarily grant access into an

opponent's mind, thought processes, and intent.34

An increased number and variety of employment options can

contribute to strategic surprise. During the Cold War, potential

U.S. adversaries could predict fairly reliably the manner in

which the United States would mount a military response. It was

apparent within our doctrine, force structure, and training. If,

however, U.S. armed forces organize around information (vice

weapon) systems and military organizations become less

hierarchical and more decentralized, greater variations of

methods are possible, hence enhancing uncertainty about potential

U.S. responses. When coupled with Information Age organizations,

such as adaptive joint force packages, fitted with substantially

enhanced information and intelligence capabilities, and armed

with weapon systems designed to leverage available technology,

strategic surprise (i.e., the differential between action and

effective reaction) may be possible.

Information Age technologies also hold considerable

potential to improve the capacity for strategic deception. Not

only will technologically advanced militaries be able to

identify, define, and exploit an adversary's indications and
21

warnings networks, they may be able to influence an adversary's

perceptions. They must be careful, however, not to deceive other

elements of government or friends and allies, thereby hindering

achievement of national objectives. Indeed, a country may find

that any significant deception on the "information superhighway"

may have consequences impossible to predict beforehand and,

therefore, may find such deception unpalatable.

Moreover, nations must remember that the "information

highway" is a network–not a road–that runs in many directions,

making all states susceptible to electronic penetration and

deception measures. The demonstrated permeability of even the

most "secure" information systems,35 and the ever increasing

number of countries with access to multi-spectral imagery may

constrain our ability to "hide" our intent; thus making strategic

surprise more difficult.

Security.

Minimize the vulnerability of strategic plans, activities,

relationships, and systems to manipulation and interference by

opponents.

Strategy pits two (or more) parties, each attempting to use

power to gain advantage over the other. The more opponents know

of your intentions and capabilities, the easier they can counter

or thwart them. Therefore, denying an opponent insight into your

intentions, plans, and capabilities remains a key principle of

war for strategists. Paradoxically, however, a deterrence

strategy requires that an opponent have clear insights into

intentions and capabilities.

At the strategic level, security has an internal dimension

that deals with relationships among strategists, their

subordinates, and their partners, and an external dimension that

deals with opponents or enemies. The internal dimension of

security includes the protection of plans and intentions–what is

usually known as operational security or OPSEC–but also entails

counterintelligence, counterdeception, C3

I redundancy, and

defensive information warfare.36 The external dimension includes

intelligence gathering and analysis, deception, and offensive

information warfare. The precise value of each dimension will

vary according to the nature of the opponent.
22

Several factors complicate security at the strategic level.

For instance, security has joint and interagency and often

multinational dimensions. This necessarily requires that more

organizations have access to vital information; but the more

information is dispersed, the more difficult it is to protect.

Moreover, because many individuals and organizations need access

to key information, compartmentalization and control of vital

information have to be balanced against clear and complete

communications.

A further obstacle arises because strategic plans and

intentions must be part public and part private or secret.

Security entails protection of the classified portion and

limiting any vulnerability that may arise from the public

dimension. Such protection may be defensive, using classification

or deliberate vagueness, or offensive, through deception.

Security at the strategic level also is complicated by the

fact that it is not always clear against whom to secure. Strategy

entails a spectrum of actors ranging from a full and committed

ally to an outright enemy. The difficulty lies not at the poles

of the spectrum–appropriate behavior is obvious when dealing with

allies or enemies. Problems occur in the ambiguous middle region,

with actors whose ultimate intentions are not clear.

In the 21st century, intelligence collection and analysis

capabilities of strategic actors will increase, as will their

ability to protect their own intentions and capabilities. This

means that the precise techniques for assuring security will

change, but the centrality of the concept will not. One of the

biggest challenges for strategic leaders in the 21st century will

be cyber security–protecting computers and the links between

them. Technology has the potential to facilitate security, but

commanders must be careful to avoid over-reliance on it, for, as

numerous examples clearly indicate, no security system is

completely effective.37

CONCLUSIONS

As yet, nothing known or predicted about the Information Age

provides conclusive evidence that the development of strategy in

the 21st century will be remarkably different than in the past.
23

Clearly, however, strategy will remain a creative activity.

Future strategists, like their predecessors, therefore must avoid

a "cookie cutter" mentality as they create, develop, and execute

strategic plans. But that fact does not diminish the utility of

having principles to assist in the creative process. Creativity,

without bounds, can be a risky enterprise.38 Free-wheeling

creativity may be acceptable for the fine arts, but even

painters, sculptors, and choreographers employ basic theories and

disciplined thought regarding their art forms to guide their

creative processes. So, too, must strategists, for the costs of

strategic failure can be catastrophic. The fundamental theory

behind the principles of war is valid at the strategic level, and

will remain so in the 21st century. No better guide for the

development of national security or military strategy exists.

Thus, the principles of war retain considerable utility for

modern strategists as they delve into the questions of the 21st

century. As adapted here for use at the strategic level of

warfare and for future conditions, the principles of war can

continue to act as a guide–not a prescription–for strategists,

helping them navigate through the complex labyrinth of strategy

formulation and execution in the 21st century.

ENDNOTES

1. For example, Sun Tzu, The Art of War (ca. 500 B.C.);

Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War (ca. 400 B.C.);

Vegetius, The Military Institutions of the Romans (390); Niccolai

Machiavelli, The Art of War (ca. 1510); Marshall de Saxe, My

Reveries on the Upon the Art of War (1757); Frederick the Great,

The Instruction of Frederick the Great for His Generals (1747);

Napoleon, Napoleon's Maxims, (1827); Carl von Clausewitz, On War

(1832); A.T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History,

1660-1783; Guilio Douhet, Command of the Air (1921); Bernard

Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (1959); Martin Van Creveld,

The Transformation of War (1991).

2. Clausewitz's On War immediately leaps to mind.

3. See, e.g., The Military Maxims of Napoleon in T.R.

Phillips, ed., Roots of Strategy, Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole

Books, 1985, or any of the lists from Marshall Foch, Major

General J.F.C. Fuller, G.F.R. Henderson, B.H. Liddell Hart,
24

Marshall Lyautey, et al., found in John I. Alger, The Quest for

Victory: The History of the Principles of War, Westport, CN:

Greenwood Press, 1982, passim.

4. The first American use of the principles of war can be

traced to the U.S. Army's 1921 version of Army Training

Regulations. These principles have their distant roots in Baron

Antoine-Henri de Jomini's The Art of War (Westport, CN: Greenwood

Press, n.d., reprint of 1862 edition), and their immediate roots

in the work of Major General J.F.C. Fuller as he attempted to

distill lessons from the failed British campaigns of 1914-1915.

(See Alger, The Quest for Victory, pp. 113-145). Although the

principles of war disappeared from later versions, they were

reintroduced in the 1939 draft version of Field Service

Regulations (FSRs). Since that time, the principles of war have

been incorporated into subsequent FSRs, as well as their

successor, Field Manual 100-5, Operations (save the 1976

version). The principles of war also have been addressed–in

varying levels of detail–in Field Manual 100-1, The Army, since

that keystone document first appeared in 1978. See also Colonels

Walter P. Franz and Harry G. Summers, "Principles of War: An

American Genesis, An Occasional Paper from the Strategic Studies

Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 20, 1981, p. 3; and

Alger, The Quest for Victory, Appendices 43, 45, 53, and 54.

5. Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Washington,

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1993, p. A-1.

6. See, for example, the cursory treatment in B.H. Liddell

Hart, Strategy, 2d rev. ed., New York: Frederick Praeger

Publishers, 1968, pp. 347-350. Jomini's The Art of War addresses

the application of the principles of war at what he described as

the strategic level, but which modern practitioners would

characterize at the operational level of war. Alger, The Quest

for Victory, offers the most complete discussion at the strategic

level, but his contribution is largely unique.

7. Edward Luttwak, "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare," Foreign

Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 3, May/June 1995, p. 114.

8. For a discussion of these issues, see James O. Kievit and

Steven Metz, Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs:

From Theory to Practice, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies
25

Institute, June 27, 1995.

9. Clausewitz, On War, Book One, Chapter 3, p. 101.

10. At this point it must be noted that disregard of the

principle "objective" is always exceedingly risky. Yet one can

argue that, historically, it has been among the most disregarded,

not least by the United States, with oftentimes adverse results.

11. Thus, the authors adhere to Clausewitz's view that the

principles of war (theory) are a means of study, rather than ". .

. a sort of manual for action," (Clausewitz, On War, Book Two,

Chapter Two, p. 141. Emphasis in the original) rather than the

more prescriptive approach of Jomini. See Jomini, The Art of War.

12. "Strategic level of war–The level of war at which a

nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines

national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security

objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources

to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level

establish national and multinational military objectives;

sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for use of

military or other instruments of power; develop global plans or

theater war plans to achieve these objectives; and provide

military forces and other capabilities in accordance with

strategic plans."

"National military strategy–The art and science of distributing

and applying military power to attain national objectives in

peace and war."

Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and

Associated Terms, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing

Office, March 23, 1994, pp. 363 and 254, respectively.

13. The elements of national power listed here are an

amalgam consolidated from a variety of sources. Traditionally,

political, economic, and military elements of national power have

long been recognized. (See, e.g., Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, New

York: Simon and Schuster, 1995, p. 22.) B.H Liddell Hart, the

noted strategist included diplomacy and morale as key elements

(B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, New York: Signet, 1974, pp. 321-

322). The National Military Strategy lists economic, diplomatic,
26

informational, and military elements of power. National Military

Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1995, p. 1. For a discussion of the

elements of national power and their interaction, see David

Jablonsky, "National Power," in Readings, Course 2, "War,

National Policy, and Strategy," Academic year 1995, Carlisle

Barracks, PA: Department of National Security and Strategy,

September 11, 1994, Vol I, pp. 163-195.

14. Even within the military element of power, different

services are likely to identify certain goals as more easily

attainable with their particular capabilities. A navy, for

example, will find interruption of an adversary's sea lines of

communication a more congenial mission than defense or seizure of

vast expanses of land; an army will probably have exactly the

opposite conception.

15. This is essential because "ways" at the strategic level

will become "ends" for subordinate elements at the operational

level. In the same way, operational "ways" become the tactical

subordinates "ends."

16. For example, preparing to repel a predicted strategic

offensive whether in the form of diplomatic, economic,

informational, or military actions, may allow the strategist to

retain the initiative.

17. Using the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as an example, the

information that the United States possessed became important

only when the United States took concrete action (e.g., briefing

the Saudi royal family, the rapid transit movement of Desert

Shield forces, and the decision to execute Operations Desert

Storm and Saber) that actually seized, retained, or exploited the

initiative. Conversely, the United States possessed technological

dominance over Somali war lords with little apparent strategic

effect.

18. For descriptions of the interagency process, see, e.g.,

Carnes Lord, ""Strategy and Organization at the National Level,"

Grand Strategy and the Decisionmaking Process, ed. James C.

Gaston, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1992,

and ADM (ret.) Paul David Miller, The Interagency Process,

Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1993. This
27

does not infer that strategists and commanders should not

proactively seek unity of command within U.S. operations when

conditions warrant. In some cases, it will remain the shortest

route to unity of effort. However, unified direction at the

national level and unified action at the multinational level are

more realistic methods of achieving strategic unity of effort.

Colonel Adolf Carlson, a U.S. Army War College colleague,

points out that the essential problem at the interagency level

may be that, unlike the military, the other instruments of

national power are not yet disciplined by a rigorous estimates

process that can forecast with any confidence whether an

envisaged action will result in the desired effect. Until that

problem is overcome, he posits, unity of effort will be difficult

to ensure, regardless of who is nominally in charge.

19. See, for example, the command and control relationships

for coalition forces that participated in the Gulf War. Douglas

W. Craft, An Operational Analysis of the Persian Gulf War,

Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, August 31,

1992, pp. 21-29 and H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, It

Doesn't Take a Hero, New York: Bantam, 1992, pp. 302-472, passim.

 Or, more pointedly, see the U.S. reluctance to place its forces

under other than national command. See, e.g., Ronald A. Taylor,

"Foreign Command of U.S. Peacekeepers Debated," The Washington

Times, August 19, 1993, p. 3; Trudy Rubin, "It's Too Soon to Put

U.S. Troops Under Foreign U.N. Commanders," The Philadelphia

Inquirer, August 20, 1993, p. 23; and The Clinton

Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace

Operations (also known as PDD-25), May 4, 1994, pp. 9-11.

20. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and

Enlargement, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,

February 1995, pp. ii, and 8-9, and the National Military

Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1995, pp. 10-11 and 13-14.

21. These issues could be ameliorated though increased

reliance on Information Age capabilities, e.g., electronic staff

exercises, shared data bases, "virtual" staffs, etc. For further

information on such possibilities, see James O. Kievit and Steven

K. Metz, The Revolution in Military Affairs and Coalition

Operations, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,
28

forthcoming.

22. Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave, New York: Morrow, 1980.

For "third wave" warfare, see Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and

Anti-War, Boston: Little, Brown, 1993.

23. Thus, one can better understand the current frictions

within NATO over the role of air power in Bosnia, as well as the

diminished U.S. influence in the Balkan crisis.

24. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-

5, Operations, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,

June 1993, p. 2-4.

25. See, for example, the anxiety over the "CNN effect"

described in Michael Dobbs, "The Amanpour Factor," The Washington

Post, July 23, 1995, p. C3.

26. Clausewitz, On War, Book 1, Chapter 7, pp. 119-121.

27. Major General Richard A. Chilcoat, "Strategic Art: A

Discipline for 21st Century Leaders," forthcoming, p. 4.

28. The Japanese response to the U.S. inspired oil embargo

and freezing of financial assets in 1940-41 is an obvious

example.

29. For example, the front page of The Wall Street Journal

carried an article describing how in Iran

. . . an Islamic revolution is stirring–again.

This time, the nerve center isn't the spartan lair of

an angry ayatollah but the top floor of a modern

theological seminary, where dozens of turbaned men with

beards and bare feet peck at personal computers. Byte

by byte, the young clerics–wired to the world via

Sprintnet and other networks–are computerizing the full

text and commentaries of all seven branches of Islamic

law . . .

. . . For years, many Iranian clerics opposed

automating the scriptures; the mullahs feared that
29

easier access would erode their preeminence in Iranian

society. But younger, 'New Wave' mullahs, as the

turbaned hackers are called, have persevered.

"The spread of information will inevitably lead to a

more moderate climate," says . . . the cleric who heads

the Qom project . . . .

Peter Waldman, "Islamic Upheaval: Iranian Revolution Takes

Another Turn, But Where Is It Going?," The Wall Street Journal,

May 11, 1995, p. 1.

30. In a nonadversarial environment, the simplest strategic

plan is best, since it eases the burden on subordinates and

minimizes the opportunities for "Murphy's Law" to operate. In an

adversarial environment, however, a simple plan may be easily

understood by an opponent and accordingly foiled by his

counteractions. Thus, the "strategic paradox" that Edward Luttwak

describes in Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, Cambridge, MA:

The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987. The ideal is

to be able to maintain a "complexity differential" where plans

and actions are simple enough that subordinates can understand

and execute, but sufficiently complex that understanding and

counteraction by the adversary is insufficient or too late.

31. Dean G. Acheson, "Crisis in Asia–An Examination of U.S.

Policy," reprinted in Department of State Bulletin, January 23,

1950, p. 116. For analysis, see Alexander L. George and Richard

Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and

Practice, New York: Columbia University Press, 1974, pp. 141-157.

32. The distinction between linear and dyadic elements of

strategy is developed in Steven Metz, Eisenhower as Strategist:

The Coherent Use of Military Power in War and Peace, Carlisle

Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute,

1993.

33. For example, strategic surprise can undermine strategic

deterrence, an indispensable component of our national security

and military strategies. On the one hand, deterrence requires

visible capability and intent to act. On the other hand, a

potential adversary's perception that the United States is

capable of, and perhaps predisposed to achieving strategic
30

surprise, could lead an opponent to a preemptive "surprise"

attack of his own.

34. Two key examples of being able to read the mail, but not

the mind immediately leap out: the Japanese attack on Pearl

Harbor and the Battle of the Bulge. In the first instance, U.S.

code breakers had forecast that the Japanese would execute a

strategic level attack, but had concluded that the attack would

occur in the then Netherlands East Indies. In the second case,

the ULTRA system routinely intercepted and deciphered German

radio traffic. But all communications concerning the German

offensive in the Ardennes occurred over telephone and telegraph

lines, to which the Allies did not have access. Thus, faulty

assessment or too much reliance on a single source led to an

opponent achieving surprise.

35. See, for example, Peter Lewis, "Security is Lost in

Cyberspace," The New York Times, February 22, 1995, p. D1, 19.

36. On information warfare, see John Arquilla and David

Ronfeldt, "Cyberwar is Coming!" Comparative Strategy, Vol. 12,

No. 2, April-June 1993, pp. 141-165; Winn Schwartau, Information

Warfare: Chaos on the Electronic Superhighway, New York:

Thunder's Mouth Press, 1994; and George J. Stein, "Information

Warfare," Airpower Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, Spring 1995, pp. 30-

55.

37. For example, during World War II, the Japanese relied

heavily on their Purple diplomatic ciphers, and the Germans

retained a high degree of confidence in the impenetrability of

their Enigma coding machines, despite the fact that the Allies

routinely intercepted and decrypted thousands of messages. More

recent and pertinent, perhaps, are the Walker family spy network

that provided the Soviets with information that allowed them to

decrypt high level U.S. communications and computer hackers who

periodically penetrate highly sophisticated electronic protection

systems.

38. Acceptable risk is a fluid concept that shifts according

to conditions and leaders. See Steven Metz, "Analyzing

Operational and Strategic Risk," Military Review, Vol. 71, No.

11, November 1991, pp. 78-80.
31
32

APPENDIX A

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR1

OBJECTIVE:

The purpose of the objective is to direct every military

operation toward a clearly defines, decisive, and attainable

objective.

The objective of combat operations is the destruction of the

enemy's armed forces' capabilities and will to fight. The

objective of an operation other than war might be more difficult

to define; nonetheless, it too must be clear from the beginning.

Objectives must directly, quickly, and economically contribute to

strategic objectives. Avoid actions that do not contribute

directly to achieving the objective.

OFFENSIVE:

The purpose of the offensive is to seize retain, and exploit

the initiative.

Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to

attain a clearly defined objective. Offensive operations are the

means by which a military forces seizes and holds the initiative

while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive

results. The importance of offensive action os fundamentally rue

across all levels of war.

Commanders adopt the defensive only as a temporary expedient

and must seek every opportunity to seize or re-seize the

initiative. An offensive spirit must therefore be inherent in the

conduct of all defensive operations.

MASS:

The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat

power at the place and time to achieve decisive results.

To achieve mass is to synchronize appropriate joint force

capabilities where they will have decisive effect in a short

period of time. Mass must often be sustained to have the desired
33

effect. Massing effects, rather than forces, can enable even

numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results and

minimize human losses and waste of resources.

ECONOMY OF FORCE:

The purpose of economy of force is to allocate minimum

essential combat power to secondary efforts.

Economy of force is the judicious employment and

distribution of forces. It is measured application of available

combat power to such tasks as limited attacks, defense, delays,

deception, or even retrograde operations in order to achieve mass

elsewhere at the decisive point and time.

MANEUVER:

The purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy in a position

of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.

Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy

to secure or retain positional advantage, usually in order to

deliver–or threaten delivery of–the direct and indirect fires of

the maneuvering force. Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off

balance and thus protects the friendly force. It contributes

materially in exploiting successes, preserving freedom of action,

and reducing vulnerability by continually posing new problems for

the enemy.

UNITY OF COMMAND:

The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort

under one responsible commander for every objective.

Unity of command means that all forces operate under a

single commander with the requisite authority to direct all

forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. Unity of effort,

however, requires coordination and cooperations among all forces

toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not

necessarily part of the same command structure. In multinational

and interagency operations, unity of command may not be possible,

but the requirement of unity of effort becomes paramount. Unity

of effort–coordination through cooperations and common interests–
34

is an essential element of unity of command.

SECURITY:

The purpose of security is to never permit the enemy to

acquire unexpected advantage.

Security enhances freedom of action by reducing friendly

vulnerability to hostile acts, influences, or surprise. Security

results from measure taken by commanders to protect their forces.

Staff planning and understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, and

doctrine will enhance security. Risk is inherent in military

operations. Application of this principle includes prudent risk

management, not undue caution. Protecting the force increases

friendly combat power and preserves freedom of action.

SURPRISE:

The purpose of surprise is to strike the enemy at a time or

place or in a manner for which it is unprepared.

Surprise can help the commander shift the balance of power

and thus achieve success well out of proportion to the effort

expended. Factors contributing to surprise include speed in

decisionmaking, information sharing, and force movement;

effective intelligence; deception; application of unexpected

combat power; operations security; and variations in tactics and

methods of operation.

SIMPLICITY:

The purpose of simplicity is to prepare clear, uncomplicated

plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.

Simplicity contributes to success operations. Simple plans

and clear, concise orders minimize misunderstanding and

confusion. When other factors are equal, the simplest plan is

preferable. Simplicity in plans allows better understanding and

execution planning at all echelons. Simplicity and clarity of

expression greatly facilitate mission execution in the stress,

fatigues, and other complexities of modern combat and are

especially critical to success in combined operations.
35

ENDNOTE

1. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0: Doctrine

for Joint Operations, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing

Office, 1993. Because individual Service doctrine derives from

joint doctrine, the principles of war contained in Service

manuals conform to Joint Pub 3-0. However, because of the unique

characteristics of each Service, elaborations and discussions

contained in the various Service manuals differ somewhat from

Joint Pub 3-0.
36

APPENDIX B

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

Our recommendations for revising the principles of war are

not radical. They represent more incremental change, updating,

and focusing than wholesale change. This is probably because the

principles, as they exist, have been so carefully honed over time

that they reflect the "truth" as accurately as possible.

In order to revalidate continually the principles of war,

though, it is necessary to occasionally consider truly radical

alternatives, even if only to reject them after thoughtful

consideration. Two radical alternatives immediately come to mind.

One might be called the "maximalist" approach, which posits that

war has become so complex that no single set of principles can

apply to all of war's variations. The time-tested principles work

for conventional combined arms warfare, but a totally different

set of principles would be required for guerrilla warfare,

information warfare, or other forms.

At the other extreme, the "minimalist" approach suggests

that the existing principles of war can be further distilled. For

example, if "principles" offer guidance that always holds and

which is universally applicable, many of the traditional

"principles of war" do not fit at the strategic level. Some, such

as "surprise," do not hold under all conditions. Others, like

"unity of effort" may not apply to complex multinational forces.

Having "principles" that only apply under some conditions or at

certain times is, to say the least, confusing. For the sake of

clarity and simplicity, then, it makes sense to distill the

"principles of war" at the strategic level to two:

• Take all possible actions to increase your effectiveness

and efficiency.

• Take all possible actions to erode an opponent's

effectiveness and efficiency.

Most, if not all, of the traditional principles of war are

actually useful (but not necessarily universal) ways of attaining

these two overarching principles. Many ideas that are specific to

the strategic level or the contemporary arena are also valuable
37

methods of attaining those principles. Thus, the "minimalist"

approach rigidly separates "principles" from the techniques for

implementing them. For instance, to "take all possible actions to

increase your effectiveness and efficiency," strategists:

• Must define, communicate, prioritize, and periodically

adjust clear and attainable objectives;

• Must seek unity of effort;

• Should focus resources on the most important objective(s);

• Should maximize strategic resources (economic, military,

psychological, and military) to the point that costs begin to

outweigh benefits;

• Should synchronize the elements of national power;

• Should think and plan as far into the future as possible;

• Should seek clear responsibility and communications

arrangements;

• Should protect friendly resources;

• Should make sure that objectives and plans are understood

and implementable by all involved organizations and individuals;

• Should develop the ability to act, react, and adapt

rapidly;

• Should mobilize the broadest and deepest possible support

base for objectives and methods of attaining them.

Some of these are imperatives; others are desirable, but often

not debilitating if not attained.

Similarly, to "take all possible actions to erode an

opponent's effectiveness and efficiency," strategists:

• Must place the opponent in a position of disadvantage;

• Must understand the opponent;
38

• Should seize, retain, and exploit the initiative;

• Should apply the appropriate element and amount of

national power at the decisive time and place;

• Should develop the ability to anticipate correctly an

opponent's actions;

• Should create and manipulate a "complexity differential"

between friendly and opposing organizations.

Distilling the principles to two will help strategists

distinguish true, immutable principles from things that are

usually a good idea, but not always so. It also will help

distinguish the purely strategic from the strategic/operational.

In terms of the two principles, one additional fact becomes

clear: the first is purely strategic in that it entails force

development and the augmentation of capabilities. The second is

strategic/operational. This has implications for who will make

the most use of the principle and how he will do it. From a

military perspective, for instance, the services are more

concerned with the first principle as they raise, train, and

equip forces. The commanders of the regional unified commands

(CINCs) should be guided by both the first and the second as they

augment their own capability and erode the capability of

opponents. Moreover, contending that there are multiple ways to

attain each of the two immutable principles would also stress

that strategy is essentially a creative activity not reducible to

axioms or checklists.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel Richard H. Witherspoon

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Authors

Dr. William T. Johnsen

Dr. Douglas V. Johnsen II

Lieutenant Colonel James O. Kievit

Dr. Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Editor

Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretary

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mr. Daniel B. Barnett

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler