THE MEXICAN ARMED FORCES IN TRANSITION

Jordi Díez

Ian Nicholls

January 2006

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ISBN 1-58487-227-6
iii

FOREWORD

 After the 9/11 attacks on the United States, homeland defense 

became the primary issue in U.S. defense policy. At the same 

time, it was clear that homeland defense would have to become a 

trilateral continental issue, and, thus, would have to include Canada 

and Mexico. Because the United States and Canada already had 

developed a relatively close relationship during and after World 

War II as a result of their common interests and efforts in NATO 

(North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and NORAD (North American 

Air Defense), increased knowledge of and contact with the Mexican 

armed forces became important.

 Understanding the most recent component of the new continental 

defense arrangement involves more than accessing the military 

capabilities of the Mexican armed forces. Rather, the demands of 

continental defense outside the usual NATO or NORAD contexts 

require that U.S. and Canadian civilian and military decisionmakers, policymakers, and opinionmakers embark on a comprehensive investigation of the cultural, political, economic, and military 

history of our Mexican neighbor—who also happens to be one of 

our largest trading partners. This is the basis of policy that is at the 

heart of international defense relations. This understanding and 

appreciation define what might be possible when nations attempt to 

change policy intentions into viable policy and strategy to achieve 

mutual security interests.

 This monograph is a significant step in that direction. The first of 

the Strategic Studies Institute’s expanded series, “Security Issues in 

the Western Hemisphere,” it comes from a series of Claxton Papers

produced by the Defense Management Studies Program at Queen’s 

University in Kingston, Ontario, Canada. The authors are wellacquainted with the Mexican armed forces, and have developed 

a keen awareness of the Mexican defense establishment. Dr. Jordi 

Diaz wrote on Mexican security and defense policy for his doctoral 

dissertation at the University of Toronto, and continues to broaden 

his understanding of Western Hemisphere defense issues. Colonel 

(Retired) Ian Nicholls served as the Canadian Forces attaché in 

Mexico from 1998 through 2001, and his continuing relationship 
iv

with key military and civilian leaders in that country significantly 

informs this research.

 The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to join with the Defense 

Management Studies Program at Queen’s University in offering this 

monograph as part of our attempt to clarify the issues regarding 

Western Hemisphere security, focus the relevant debate, and learn 

from it. This security debate is critically important to the vital interests 

of the United States, Canada, Mexico, the hemisphere, and the global 

community.

DOUGLAS BLAND DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Chair Director

Defense Management Studies Program Strategic Studies Institute 

Queen’s University
v

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHORS

JORDI DÍEZ is Research Associate with the Defence Management 

Studies Program at Queen’s University, and Assistant Professor 

of Political Science at the University of Guelph. He has also been 

a Visiting Fellow at the Colegio de México and the Centro de 

Investigación y Docencia Económicas in Mexico City. The holder 

of numerous research grants and awards, among which are the 

Social Science and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) and 

the International Development Research Council (IDRC), Dr. Díez 

has focused his research on processes of democratization in Latin 

America, environmental policymaking, and civil-military relations 

in Mexico. He has taught courses in political science, international 

development, and violent conflict at the University of Toronto, 

Queen’s University, and the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris. 

Dr. Díez received his B.A. and Ph.D. in Political Science from the 

University of Toronto, and his M.A. (with distinction) from the 

University of Essex, England.

IAN NICHOLLS is a Research Associate with the Defence 

Management Studies Program at Queen’s University. He recently 

retired from the Canadian Forces after a distinguished military 

career. From 1969 until 1989, Colonel Nicholls served in military 

logistics and training establishments in Europe, the Middle East, the 

United States, and Canada. He was Base Commander at Canadian 

Forces Base, Borden, Ontario; and Military Attaché to Mexico and 

to Central America. From 2001 until his recent retirement, he was 

Executive Secretary at the Conference of American Armies (CAA), a 

position in which he responded to military chiefs of 25 countries in 

Latin America. Colonel Nicholls received his B.A. in Political Science 

and Economics from Sir George Williams University in Montreal.
vi

Gulf of Mexico

Pacific

Ocean

Tijuana

La Paz

Guaymas

Ciudad Juarez

Chihuahua

Monterrey

Tampico

Mazatlan

Guadalajara

Mexico City

Acapulco Santa Cruz

Veracruz

Merida

UNITED STATES

New Orleans

San Diego

Houston

Dallas

Mexico

Figure 1.
vii

SUMMARY

 After the September 11, 2001 (9/11), attacks on the United States, 

homeland defense became the primary issue in U.S. defense policy. 

At the same time, it was clear that homeland defense would have 

to become a trilateral continental issue, and, thus, would have to 

include Canada and Mexico. Because the United States and Canada 

already had developed a relatively close relationship during and 

after World War II as a result of their common interests and efforts 

in NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and NORAD (North 

American Air Defense), it became important to begin to understand 

the Mexican armed forces and their capabilities. This monograph, 

written from a Canadian prospective, is a significant step in that 

direction.

 Because interaction among the U.S., Mexican, Canadian, and 

other hemispheric armed forces is likely to increase, within or 

outside a continental economic and/or security architecture, better 

mutual understanding of the structure and inner workings of the notwell-understood Mexican armed forces is indispensable. Thus, the 

purpose of this monograph is to provide a long-overdue appraisal of 

the Mexican armed forces, with the intention of acquainting those in 

Canada and the United States—and other countries in the Western 

Hemisphere—with the Mexican armed forces. This monograph 

will demonstrate that the armed forces are professional and wellrespected in Mexico, and that many Mexicans depend on these forces 

for medical services, physical and human development, and disaster 

relief. Additionally, the authors expect that this monograph will 

contribute to a more universal understanding of the history, structure, 

and doctrine of the Mexican forces, and of the changing nature of 

civil-military relations in Mexico. This is not only desirable, but likely 

necessary, as we move further into 21st century interdependence.

1

THE MEXICAN ARMED FORCES IN TRANSITION

INTRODUCTION: NORTH AMERICAN SECURITY 

AND THE MEXICAN MILITARY

 Since coming to power in December 2000, Mexican President 

Vicente Fox continually has expressed a willingness to pursue 

further North American integration beyond the North American 

Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). At the Quebec City Summit of 

the Americas in 2001, for example, he declared his hope of moving 

toward a “North American Union”—an arrangement similar to 

the European Union (EU) that would involve a common currency, 

a customs union, new political institutions, the harmonization of a 

wide range of policies, and the establishment of a North American 

Regional Development Bank. The then Canadian Prime Minister 

Jean Chrétien received the proposal somewhat coolly, stating his 

view that North American integration should be strictly economic. 

U.S. President George W. Bush did not appear any more receptive 

to the idea. Fox has continued, nonetheless, to express his interest in 

further North American integration, but, despite having developed a 

close personal relationship with Bush, his proposals have not gotten 

far: Bush has indicated that cooperation may be limited only to an 

immigration agreement.

 The terrorist attacks in the United States in September 2001 

significantly changed the foreign policy priorities of the Bush 

administration, to the extent that even an immigration agreement 

between the United States and Mexico may not now be achievable. 

Since September 2001, the United States has focused on issues 

concerning security and terrorism, and other parts of the world such 

as the Middle East have taken precedence over North American 

issues. Fox’s desire for closer North American integration does not 

appear to have abated, however, and he has, in fact, added a defense 

component to his vision of a more integrated continental system. 

Soon after the attacks of September 11, he declared:

[W]e consider that the struggle against terrorism forms part of a 

commitment of Mexico to Canada and the United States, as a result of 

the need to construct the framework of the North American Free Trade 
2

Agreement within which we build a shared space for development, wellbeing, and integral security. At the hemispheric level, Mexico considers 

that the current struggle against terrorism is a basic component of our 

regional security that demands a redefinition of a doctrine of continental 

security and a redesign of the legal and diplomatic instruments for our 

legitimate defense.1

 More recently, at a meeting between Presidents Bush and Fox 

in Crawford, Texas, in March 2004, Fox spoke about a “North 

American Initiative”—a proposal to increase trade flow further and 

coordinate policies more closely, especially in the energy sector, as 

well as establishing a regional security framework that could protect 

the three countries from terrorism.

 It remains to be seen whether a security system such as envisioned 

by Fox will ever be created. Formidable barriers—sensitivities in 

both Mexico and Canada about sovereignty—would first have to 

be overcome, and there has been little interest within the current 

political leadership in Canada or in the United States. However, 

even if a continental security structure is not created, it is possible 

that cooperation among the three countries will increase. Indeed, at 

the Monterrey Summit of the Americas, Prime Minister Paul Martin 

declared that stronger relations with Mexico were a priority for his 

government. In terms of security, there has already been increased 

cooperation in areas such as the sharing of intelligence and the 

establishment of “smart borders.” An example of such cooperation 

has been the decision by the Fox administration in December 2004 to 

allow FBI agents to operate freely at Mexico City’s airport inspecting 

“suspicious” travellers—a development that would have been 

unthinkable just a few years ago.

 It also remains to be seen what role the armed forces of the 

three countries might play in an eventual North American security 

structure, should it become a reality. Cooperation among armed 

forces of the three has indeed increased, especially between the 

United States and Mexico. The training of Mexican troops by the 

United States and the sharing of intelligence, especially in regard to 

operations relating to the fight against drug trafficking, have grown 

in recent years, and there are signs that Mexican and Canadian 

military officials have increased interaction at last.
3

 Whether the armed forces of Canada, Mexico, and the United 

States take an active role in any continental security structure, or 

cooperate in foreign peacekeeping missions, one aspect of the 

relationship between Canada and Mexico that stands out is the 

scant knowledge that exists about the Mexican armed forces within 

the Canadian armed forces in particular, and the Canadian public 

more generally. This, in part, has been because the Canadian Forces 

for decades have worked mainly with the armed forces of NATO 

members, as well as because of the “inward” orientation of the 

Mexican forces. (Unlike other Latin American countries that have 

taken part in foreign missions, such as Chile and Brazil, the Mexican 

military has focused almost entirely on internal matters such as drug 

trafficking and crime.) This has resulted in very little understanding 

outside Mexico of the structure, doctrine, equipment, or professional 

development of the Mexican armed forces. 

 Because of the possibility that the interaction between the Mexican 

and Canadian armed forces might increase—within or outside a 

continental security structure—or as a result of geographic proximity 

and the growing economic interdependence of both countries, better 

mutual understanding of the structure and inner workings of the 

other country’s armed forces is not only desirable, but is also likely 

to be necessary in the future.

 The aim of this monograph is to provide a general overview of 

the Mexican armed forces, with the intention of acquainting those in 

Canada, both military and civilian, with the Mexican armed forces 

and the changing nature of civil-military relations in Mexico. The 

authors hope that this will contribute to a better understanding 

in Canada of the history, structure, and doctrine of the Mexican 

forces. We believe that this is long overdue, especially because of 

widespread misperceptions about the Mexican military that have 

been fuelled by allegations of human rights abuses and corruption 

within the officer corps. Although in some instances abuses certainly 

occurred, it should also be known that in Mexico the military is one 

of the most respected of national institutions among the population, 

and one on which many Mexicans depend, especially in rural areas, 

for help such as the delivery of medical services and natural disaster 

relief. The Mexican armed forces, we believe, are professional and 
4

well-respected institutions that are little understood outside Mexico, 

and the Canadian military ought to learn more about them.

 This monograph is divided into five sections. The first places 

the formation of the Mexican military in historical perspective. This 

is important in that the distinctive characteristics of the Mexican 

armed forces are the result of very specific historical circumstances. 

Mexico is, after all, the only Latin American country not to have 

experienced a military coup during the 20th century. The second 

section provides an overview of the structure and organization of 

the Mexican armed forces, whose most notable feature is that there 

are only two distinct components: the Army, which includes the Air 

Force as a subordinate entity, and the Navy, which is smaller and 

generally more poorly funded. Unlike what has been the practice in 

most other Latin American countries, there has never been a single, 

unified national headquarters that exercised command over both 

components.

 The third section deals primarily with four aspects of the 

Mexican military: doctrine, missions, equipment, and professional 

development. The fourth looks at the process of political change 

in Mexico over the last few years, and the effects this has had on 

civil-military relations. As will be seen, it appears that the process of 

democratization the country is experiencing has altered some of the 

fundamental conditions that characterized civil-military relations 

since its revolution—the so-called “pact” between the Institutional 

Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the military. Also there are some 

areas in which progress needs to be made as the military still enjoys 

a significant degree of autonomy and lack of oversight by the 

civilian authority. The final section examines areas where military 

cooperation between Canada and Mexico might be possible.

I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT: THE MEXICAN MILITARY 

UNDER THE “PERFECT DICTATORSHIP”

 The political system that guaranteed more than 7 decades of 

political stability in Mexico has been called the “Perfect Dictatorship” 

by Peruvian novelist Mario Vargas Llosa.2

The system that emerged 

from the turmoil of the Mexican Revolution—which spanned the 

period from 1910 to 1919—was a well-developed mechanism of 
5

control and redistribution which depended on a delicate balance 

among cooption, selective repression, and limited political freedom. 

It became an authoritarian-corporatist structure in which adherents 

were rewarded with material benefits, and opponents were either 

co-opted or ultimately eliminated. It took the form of a hierarchical 

structure in which the various branches of government and social 

and political organizations (e.g., unions) were integrated vertically 

into the system, the whole controlled by the President at the top.3

 One of the salient characteristics of the “perfect dictatorship” was 

the absolute subservience of the Mexican armed forces to civilian 

authority. Unlike their Latin American counterparts, the Mexican 

forces never attempted to overthrow the government, nor did they 

intervene in domestic politics; they dutifully obeyed orders given 

by the President, to whom they gave unquestioned loyalty. The 

relationship between the PRI and the military has been described as 

a “pact,”4

 under which the PRI allowed full autonomy to the military 

in exchange for absolute respect for the civil authority. Because civilmilitary relations in today’s Mexico, as well as the structure and 

functioning of the armed forces, can only be understood within the 

historical context from which they emerged, this section presents an 

historical overview of the armed forces in Mexico and its relationship 

with the PRI.

The Pre-Revolutionary Mexican Armed Forces.

 When Mexico gained independence from Spain in 1821, the 16,000 

troops of the revolutionary army, called “The Army of the Three 

Guarantees,” became Mexico’s standing army; it was subsequently 

renamed the Mexican Imperial Army. The structure of Mexico’s first 

army replicated the Spanish colonial militia in which officers were of 

Spanish descent and the rank-and-file were generally poorly-trained 

indigenous people who deserted frequently. As in most other Latin 

American countries, the half-century following independence from 

Spain was characterized by social and political instability as the 

various factions and political forces vied for control and fended 

off foreign intrusions. The new nation dealt with a civil war 

between conservative and liberal factions, a war with the 

United States (1846-48), and the French intervention of 1860. 
6

During this time, 50 governments rose and fell, and 30 men 

served as president.

 The Army played an important role in the building of the country. 

Again, similar to what occurred in the rest of the region—and to 

what would later occur in other newly-independent developing 

nations—the Mexican Army was instrumental in building the state 

apparatus and providing social cohesion to the new political entity, 

all while centralizing power in Mexico City. The importance of the 

Army in the building of the country was such that for the first quarter 

century, in 2 out of every 3 years, its budget exceeded government 

revenues. After losing half of its territory to the United States in 1853 

and after 50 years of instability, at the end of the 1860s, Mexico began 

a process of state reconstruction, mostly carried out by the military.

 In 1876, during this process of reconstruction, General Porfirio 

Díaz ascended to the presidency. Having experienced the political 

turmoil and violence of 19th century Mexico, once in office Díaz 

decided to curb the influence of the armed forces. He believed that 

the only way he could ensure that the military would not intervene 

in political affairs was to take power away from the officer corps. 

He thus embarked upon a process of providing significant material 

benefits and very generous salaries to the senior leaders who were 

loyal, and discharging and forcing into exile those who opposed him. 

Díaz also co-opted potential opponents by promoting them to highranking positions, he established a personal constabulary (rurales) 

to crush opposition, and, to prevent enlisted soldiers developing 

strong personal loyalty to local commanders, he regularly shifted the 

commanders from place to place in the country’s 11 military districts. 

At the same time, Díaz embarked on a process of professionalizing 

the armed forces, and he dramatically reduced the size of the Army. 

By the end of his term, there were only 20,000 enlisted soldiers and 

4,000 officers in a country of 14 million people. 

 While Díaz was successful in consolidating control over the 

military, he failed to appease civilian opponents. The centralization of 

power and flagrant contempt for democracy and political freedom—

which involved a highly exclusionary style of policymaking in the 

hands of a coterie of technocrats and the suppression of opposition 

among peasants, urban workers, and the middle class—antagonized 

many elements within the country to such an extent that they took 
7

up arms. Díaz was finally overthrown in 1911, and in what was 

the bloodiest revolution in the hemisphere, more than one million 

people died, a tenth of the Mexican population. The 10-year period 

of the Mexican revolution was a time of extreme violence and 

chaos, during which all sorts of armed groups and factions (peasant 

movements, foreign troops and private militias) fought against one 

another. During the revolution, the size of the Army grew to over 

80,000 troops, but they were poorly trained and badly led.

The Military after the Revolution.

 The leaders that emerged victorious from the revolution all came 

from the Army, and they were to lead the state for several decades. 

This group, also known as the “revolutionary family,” established 

a political pact with other sectoral interests and began the arduous 

process of rebuilding the state. They drafted a new constitution in 1917 

and set about fulfilling the three ideological goals of the revolution: 

“constitutionalism”—adherence to the liberal ideals guaranteeing 

individual rights enshrined in the constitution; social justice through 

improving living standards; and economic development. This 

revolutionary family, composed mostly of generals, responded to 

the population’s desire for the restoration of political order through 

the establishment of a highly centralized political system that vested 

considerable powers in the president.

 While the size of the military increased during the revolution, 

two general officers belonging to the revolutionary family became 

president in succession, Alvaro Obregón (1920-24) and Plutarco 

Elias Calles (1924-28). Both initiated a series of reforms intended to 

reduce the size and budget of the forces as well as to make them 

more professional. This was done in an attempt to depoliticize the 

forces and bring them firmly under civilian control. First, as had been 

done prior to the revolution, both purged the armed forces of rivals, 

or perceived rivals, by retiring hundreds of generals, arranging 

the mysterious disappearance of others, and bribing the rest. They 

filled the vacancies thus created with promising young officers who 

had graduated from the Colegio Militar at Chapultepec (created in 

1917), dispatching some to areas where loyalty to the new regime 

was tenuous; sending others for training to military schools in Spain, 
8

Germany, France, and the United States; and enlisting young men 

who had exhibited some loyalty to caudillos (regional strongmen). 

Second, with the assistance of the French, the Commission of Military 

Studies and the Superior War College were created in 1926 and 1932 

respectively, with the intention of increasing both efficiency and 

professionalization. Third, the budget of the armed forces was cut 

almost in half.

 While these reforms were successful in pacifying opposition, they 

were not enough to eliminate it completely. General Calles therefore 

decided to create a political party—the National Revolutionary 

Party (PNR)5—with the aim of assuaging the political rivalries that 

remained among the various military caudillos. Controlled by the 

President, the PNR became a centralized political institution that 

forced military rivals to resolve their differences within the party 

in exchange for personal security, material goods, and control over 

their regional areas. The establishment of the PNR coincided with 

the beginning of the Great Depression of the 1930s. As this global 

economic downturn severely affected the commodity-dependent 

Latin American countries, Mexico and the rest of Latin America 

adopted measures such as high tariff barriers in an attempt to 

protect their markets from foreign competition and spur internal 

production and consumption. What ensued was a process of stateled urbanization and an increase of the size of labor and popular 

organizations.

 During this time of economic crisis (a third of the workforce 

was unemployed by 1933) and enormous social change, a wellrespected general, Lázaro Cárdenas, was elected president. Cárdenas 

introduced far-ranging changes to the political system that resulted 

in the consolidation of the national party and the establishment of a 

corporatist system with a populist veneer. These changes realigned 

forces and created political institutions that would last for several 

decades. Indeed, some of them, such as corporatist mechanisms of 

mediation, are still present. In 1938, Cárdenas renamed the party and 

integrated the labor movement, as well as the peasant and popular 

organizations, into the party’s leadership. By this means, sectoral 

leaders representing the various corporate groups (e.g., labor unions 

and the peasantry) exchanged party loyalty for material benefits. 

With remarkable political skill, Cárdenas managed to consolidate 
9

power in the office of the presidency and garner popular support for 

the new corporatist system through populist reforms that included 

land redistribution, the protection of labor, and nationalization of 

the petroleum industry. The new political pact guaranteed that 

the official party could rely on the many corporate groups to win 

elections in exchange for the provision of economic and political 

benefits.

 Cárdenas also introduced a number of fundamental changes to the 

armed forces, some intended to reduce their power. For example, he 

divided the Ministry of War and Navy into two autonomous defense 

ministries, the Ministry of Defense, which included the Army and 

the Air Force, and the Ministry of the Navy.6 He enacted legislation 

barring serving officers from participating in any political activity. 

And, continuing earlier efforts aimed at the professionalization of 

the forces, he required all infantry officers below the rank of colonel 

to take examinations in military science, and made these competitive 

examinations a prerequisite for promotion. He passed the Law of 

National Military Service which established compulsory basic military 

training for 18-year-old males. He also very heavily emphasized the 

military’s role in education and public works, rather than as the 

guardian of national order. Thus, since the Cárdenas administration, 

the Mexican military has had responsibility for implementing the 

revolutionary ideals as part of its institutional culture. This, as we 

will later see, has been one of the reasons why the Mexican citizenry 

thinks very highly of the armed forces.

 By the end of the Cárdenas administration, the Mexican armed 

forces had been weakened and brought under the control of the 

national party. During the 1940s, the military withdrew almost 

completely from the political process and agreed to support the 

civilian authority through the creation of what has been termed a 

“civil-military pact.” That is, when the first civilian president, Miguel 

Alemán, came into power in 1946, he accepted the authority that the 

generals of the revolution had given him in return for his absolute 

respect for the integrity of the military institution. For their part, the 

armed forces would give unconditional backing of the revolutionary 

elite and the revolutionary goals: unconditional loyalty, and 

obedience to the civilian power. A fundamental component of 

this “pact” was the significant level of internal autonomy that the 
10

military retained in both legal and real terms with regard to internal 

functioning, training, and promotions, along with a high level of 

discretion in making expenditures.7 The pact was facilitated by a 

generalized rejection of violence by the population in the wake of 

the excessively violent period of the revolution, as well as by the 

successful professionalization of the forces in which the values of 

loyalty, discipline, and subordination were emphasized.

 This relationship between the PRI and the military became a 

strong and harmonious one that lasted for several decades. Just as 

in the case of the other corporate groups—labor, the peasantry, and 

business—the armed forces were one of the pillars that sustained the 

regime. Unlike the practice in most other Latin American countries, 

the Mexican armed forces did not get involved in political matters, 

accepting subordination to the President in accordance with his 

constitutional mandate. This, some analysts believe, was one of the 

sources of political stability of the Mexican political system under 

the PRI.8

The armed forces, then, were the guardians not only of the 

Revolution, but also of the revolutionary elite.

 While retaining its internal autonomy, the military was indeed 

called on by the PRI to assist in maintaining internal security. This 

was the case in 1958 when they were tasked to suppress a railroad 

workers’ strike, in 1968 when they were asked to intervene against 

a student movement, and throughout the 1960s when they were 

ordered to put down guerrilla uprisings, especially in the southern 

state of Guerrero. But these interventions were all temporary affairs, 

and the forces returned to their barracks once the situations were 

stabilized. What is important to note in all these cases is that the 

Army acted only at the behest of the civil authority. An observer has 

referred to this as a “residual political role” of the armed forces, a 

form of duty carried out only in exceptional circumstances.9

 As we will see in the fifth section, several developments within 

the region, such as the Central American crises of the 1980s and the 

emergence of drug trafficking as a threat to national security, changed 

the role of the Mexican military as they acquired responsibilities well 

beyond acting as guardians of the revolutionary family. In some 

cases, these increased responsibilities put a severe strain on the 

civil-military pact. But throughout the PRI’s “perfect dictatorship,” 

and until the PRI lost the presidency in 2000, the Mexican military 
11

acted as an armed branch of the state and adhered to the conditions 

implicit in the civil-military pact.

II. STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION 

OF THE MEXICAN ARMED FORCES

 Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of the structure of the 

Mexican forces is that there are two distinct components, instead of 

the usual three found in most countries. The largest, best funded, 

and most important is the Army, which includes the Air Force as 

a subordinate entity. The second is the Navy. The two components 

do not come under a single unified commander at any level below 

the President. That is to say, there is no Minister of Defense as the 

term is usually understood. Instead, a Minister who is a serving 

officer—a four-star general in the case of the Army and an Admiral 

in the case of the Navy—heads each of the component parts. Each 

minister serves in a dual capacity: as a full cabinet member reporting 

to the President, and as the operational commander of his force. (The 

Presidential Guard is a separate entity.) The ministers are handpicked 

by the President, and may or may not serve in that position for the 

entire sexenio (period of office) of the incumbent president.10 In the 

halcyon days of the PRI as ruling party, the selection of ministers was 

generally a pro-forma exercise, with strict attention being paid to 

seniority. In the past two sexenios, however, both Presidents Ernesto 

Zedillo (1994–2000) and Vicente Fox (2000 to the present) strayed 

from the norm and reached down into more junior levels to select 

what some have described as “more progressive” officers to lead the 

forces during times of change and, of course, support the President’s 

agenda. It is certainly true that since 1995 the military as a whole has 

come under much more intense public scrutiny, both domestically 

and internationally, and the challenges to the leadership to permit 

greater openness, better fiscal accountability to the public, and more 

productivity in pursuing new missions will no doubt persist.

 The current ministers, General Vega García and Admiral Peyrot, 

are considered by most observers to be progressive and academic 

in nature and background, although they have not strayed far from 

the monolithic image usually associated with the Mexican military. 

The public does not get much insight into whatever internal debates 
12

and dialogue may be occurring within the institution, and both 

services continue to be responsive instead of proactive in terms of 

public relations. The armed forces indeed have developed public 

access websites, but the content of these essentially is limited to basic 

information. 

 Returning briefly to the matter of the subordination of the Air 

Force to the Army, it must be pointed out that although there is a 

defacto Air Force commander, he and his staff are embedded in the 

Army headquarters, and an Air Force officer never has risen to the 

most trusted senior positions within the hierarchy. This subordination 

has allowed the Army to use the term “National Defense” (SEDENA) 

for its organizational structure, and General Vega García and his 

predecessors have held the title of Minister of Defense (much to the 

annoyance of the Navy).

Organization.

 Both the Army and Navy are organized on a regional dispersion 

basis. There are centralized national headquarters in Mexico City 

and many subordinate regional headquarters. Historically, this 

has proven to be effective, as the military’s main employment has 

been on domestic missions. Troops are stationed throughout the 

country to serve as an ongoing presence of authority and to allow 

for immediate response to crises. This regional dispersion also has 

facilitated programs of local recruitment for noncommissioned 

members, allowing them to stay near their families during their 

service, an important cultural consideration. Officers, on the other 

hand, are expected to be more mobile, moving between remote posts 

and to the center in Mexico City with great frequency. This provides 

experience and, from an historical context, prevents any senior officer 

from staying too long in one location, developing local allegiances 

and potentially becoming too powerful. The current strength of the 

forces is about 241,000.

 Enrollment is voluntary, although nominally a draft system 

exists whereby a proportion of young men on their 18th birthday are 

selected by lottery. Those so selected attend weekend training that 

emphasizes education, history, physical fitness, and discipline. These 

recruits also act as a labor pool for a variety of public works social 
13

programs, such as tree trimming, clean-up of urban areas, painting 

schools, etc. Officer candidates from all three services are trained 

in a military college, in Mexico City for the Army, in Guadalajara 

for the Air Force, and in Veracruz for the Navy. Officer candidates 

generally are selected from the lower and middle classes, and this 

therefore is seen as a mechanism for upward social mobility for 

the less privileged and less educated sectors of the population. The 

military colleges are not universities, but rather provide significant 

technical training related to employment after graduation in the 

various branches of the services. Great emphasis is also placed on 

military ethos (patriotism, honor, and loyalty), history, discipline, 

physical fitness, and perpetuating the institution. The Armed Forces, 

among the most respected institutions in the country, enjoy a very 

positive domestic image in the pueblo.

The Army and the Air Force.

 There are three main components of the Army: a national 

headquarters, territorial commands, and independent units. The 

Minister of Defense commands the Army by means of a very 

centralized system and a large number of general officers. The Army 

uses a modified continental staff system in its headquarters (see 

Figure 2).

 At present there are 12 Military Regions (see Figure 3), which 

are further broken down into 44 subordinate Military Zones. In both 

cases, a numbering system is used for designation. There is no set 

number of zones within a region, and these can therefore be tailored 

to meet operational needs, with a corresponding increase or decrease 

in troop strength. 

 Chief among the independent troops is an Army Corps consisting 

of two mechanized infantry brigades located in Mexico City, with a 

full complement of combat and support troops. In addition, there 

are two brigades of the Corps of Military Police, Special Forces units, 

Presidential Guards (another motorized brigade) and a parachute 

brigade—all located in Mexico City where they act as a ready reserve 

and as centers of excellence.
14

Minister

Inspector General General Staff

Sub- headquarters

Co-ordination and Security

Legal Council

Bureau

Social

Communication

Special

Priviliges

Office

Comptroller's

Office

Direction General of

Administration

Air Force Chief

of Staff

Informalities Chief

of Staff

(Oficialia

Mayor)

Military

Industries

Veterinarian

Services

Education Firearms

and

Explosives

Control

Justice

Personnel

Mapping

Social

Security

Archives

National

Service

Food

Services

Assistant Secretary

Infantry

Cavalry

Artillery Health

Communications

Armour

Engineering Supply

Territorial

Troops Transportation

Army and Air Force

Territorial Commands

Military

Regions 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

Air Force Regions

1

2

3

4

Special Forces and Units

1st Army

Corps

Military

Police

Special

Forces

Presidential

Guard

Paratroop

Brigade

Figure 2. Army Headquarters Structure.
15

Region Location

I Distrito Federal.

II Mexicali, Baja California

III Mazatlán, Sinaloa

IV Monterrey, Nuevo León

V Guadalajara, Jalisco

VI LaBoticaria, Veracruz

VII Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chiapas

VIII Ixcotel, Oaxaca

IX Cumbres de Llano Largo, Guerrero

X Mérida, Yucatán

XI Torreón, Coahuila

XII Irapuato, Guanajuato

Figure 3. Military Regions.

The Air Force.

 As mentioned earlier, the Air Force national headquarters is 

embedded in the Army headquarters in Mexico City. It also follows the 

continental staff system, with the usual A1, A2, A3, and A4 sections. 

The tactical forces form what is loosely called an Air Division, but 

it is dispersed in four regions—Northeast, Northwest, Central, and 

Southern. The Air Force maintains a total of 18 air bases, and has the 

additional capability of opening temporary forward operating bases 

in austere conditions for some of the rotary wing and light fixedwing assets.

The Navy.

 The Ministry of the Navy, the Navy’s national headquarters, is 

located in the southern part of the capital, Mexico City. It is a smaller 

organization than the Army’s. Its main components are shown 

in Figure 4. The “Junta (or Council) of Admirals” plays a unique 

consultative and advisory role within the headquarters, an indication 

of the institutional importance placed on seniority and “year groups” 

that go back to the admirals’ days as cadets in the naval college. 

They are a very tightly knit group, and great importance is placed 

on consultation among the factions within year groups: the Navy 

speaks with one voice.
16

Minister

Office of the

Comptroller

General

General

Staff

Headquarters

Council of

Admirals

Directorate

of

Strategic

Planning

Legal

Office

Naval

Council

Chief of

Staff

Assistant

Minister

Director

General of

Naval

Construction

Director

General of

Services

Director

General of

Research and

Development

Naval

Regions and Zones

Director

General of

Human Resources

Director

General of

Administration and Finance

Figure 4. Ministry of the Navy Headquarters.

 The Navy’s operational forces are organized as two independent 

groups: the Gulf (East) Force and the Pacific (West) Force. Each 

group has its own headquarters, a destroyer group, an auxiliary 

vessel group, a Marine Infantry Group, and a Special Forces group. 

The Gulf and Pacific Forces are not mirror images of each other, as 

independence of organization is permitted. Both are subdivided into 

regions, with Regions 1, 3, and 5 on the Gulf, and 2, 4, and 6 on 

the Pacific. Each region is further divided into sectors and zones, 

so a proliferation of headquarters and senior officers exists. The 

Navy also has an air arm with troop transport, reconnaissance, and 

surveillance aircraft.

 Recently the Navy has ceded most of its riverine responsibilities 

(formally handled by the Marines) to the Army, and has reduced 
17

the size of the Marine force, putting them back aboard ships where 

they play a vital role in drug interdiction and boarding of suspect 

vessels in territorial waters. The Navy maintains some impressive 

infrastructure, including naval dockyards that have the capability 

of building ships, such as the Holzinger class gunboats. These 

dockyards have a significant employment and economic impact in 

country.

The Legal Framework.

 The constitutional framework under which the Mexican armed 

forces operate is established by the following articles of the Mexican 

constitution.

Article 29. In the event of invasion, serious disturbance of the 

public peace, or any other event which may place society in 

great danger or conflict, only the President of the Mexican 

Republic, with the consent of the head officials of the State 

Departments, the Administrative Departments, and the 

Office of the Attorney General of the Republic and with 

the approval of the Congress of the Union, and during the 

adjournments of the latter, of the Permanent Committee, may 

suspend throughout the country, or in a determined place, 

the guarantees which present an obstacle to a rapid and ready 

combating of the situation; but he must do so for a limited 

time by means of general preventive measures, without such 

suspension being limited to a specified individual. If the 

suspension should occur while the Congress is in session, the 

latter shall grant such authorization as it deems necessary to 

enable the Executive to meet the situation. If the suspension 

occurs during a period of adjournment, the Congress shall be 

convoked without delay in order to grant them.

Article 34, Sec. IV. [Among] the rights of the citizens of the 

Republic are to bear arms in the Army of National Guard 

in the defense of the Republic and its institutions, under the 

provisions prescribed by the law.
18

Article 36, Sec. II. [Among] the obligations of citizens of the 

Republic are to enlist in the National Guard.

Article 55, Sec. IV. [Among] the following are the requirements 

to be a deputy [or senator]: Not to be in active service in the 

federal Army nor to hold command in the police or rural 

gendarmería in the district where the election is held, within 

the last 90 days prior to the election. 

Articles 73, Sec. XII,XIII, XIV, XV. [Among] the duties of Congress are:

• To declare war, in the light of the information submitted 

by the Executive;

• To enact laws pursuant to which the capture of enemy 

forces on sea and land must be declared; and to enact 

maritime laws applicable in peace and war;

• To raise and maintain the armed forces of the Union, 

to wit; army, navy and air force, and to regulate their 

organization and service; and,

• To prescribe regulations or the purpose of organizing, 

arming, and disciplining the national guard, reserving 

to the citizens who compose it the appointment of their 

respective commanders and officers, and to the States 

the power of training it in accordance with the discipline 

prescribed by such regulations.

Article 76, Sec. II, III, IV, and VII. [Among] the executive 

powers of the Senate are: 

• To ratify the appointments made by the President of the 

Republic as ministers, diplomatic agents, consuls general, 

high-level employees of the Treasury, colonels, and other 

high-ranking chiefs of the national army, navy, and air 

force, in accordance with the provisions of the law;

• To authorize him [the President] also to permit the 

deployment of national troops beyond the borders of the 

country, the passage of foreign troops through the national 
19

territory, and the visits of squadrons of other powers for 

more than a month in Mexican waters; and,

• To give its consent for the President of the Republic to 

order the national guard outside its respective States, 

fixing the necessary force.

Article 82, Sec. V. In order to be President, it is required 

[among other things] not to be in active service, in case of 

belonging to the Army, within 6 months prior to the day of 

the election.

Article 83, Sec. IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII. [Among] the exclusive 

powers of the President are:

• To appoint, with the approval of the Senate, the colonels 

and other high-ranking officers of the army, navy, and air 

force, and high-level employees of the Treasury;

• To appoint the other officers of the army, navy, and air 

force, as provided by law;

• To dispose of the national guard for the same purposes, 

under the terms indicated in Section IV of Article 76; 

and,

• To declare war in the name of the United Mexican States, 

pursuant to a previous law of the Congress of the Union.

Article 118, Sec. II and III. Nor shall the States, without the 

consent of the Congress of the Union:

• Have at any time permanent troops or ships of war; and,

• Make war themselves on any foreign power, except in 

cases of invasions and of danger so imminent that it does 

not admit of delay. In such cases, a report shall be made 

immediately to the President of the Republic.

Article 129. No military authority may, in time of peace, 

perform any functions other than those that are directly 

connected with military affairs. There shall be fixed and 

permanent military commands only in the castles, forts, and 
20

warehouses immediately subordinate to the Government 

of the Union; or in encampments, barracks, or arsenals 

established for the quartering of troops outside towns.

Article 132. The forts, barracks, storage warehouses, and other 

buildings used by the Government of the Union for pubic 

service or for common use shall be subject to the jurisdiction 

of the Federal Powers in accordance with provisions to be 

established in a law enacted by the Congress of the Union; 

but in order that property acquired in the future within 

the territory of any State shall likewise be under federal 

jurisdiction, the consent of the respective legislature shall be 

necessary.

 More specific laws include the Código de Justicia Militar (Code 

of Military Justice), the Ley Orgánica del Ejercito y de la Fuerza Aérea 

Mexicanos (General Law for the Army and Air Force), and the Ley 

Orgánica de la Armada (General Law for the Navy).

III. DOCTRINE, MISSIONS, EQUIPMENT, 

AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Doctrine.

 Mexican defense policy has developed over time as a response 

to the historical reality of events since independence. It has always 

been extremely inward looking, although indications are that this 

may be slowly changing so as to allow at least discussion, if not 

adoption, of a more worldly view of defense and security consistent 

with the country’s self-image as an emerging hemispheric leader. 

Despite energetic public discussion about many aspects of society 

and government under the current president, the military has 

avoided engaging in the debate, at least in public. The development 

of defense policy and doctrine has not been the result of a white 

paper-type process that starts with a traditional threat analysis, out of 

which missions and tasks for the military are identified, elaborated, 

and prioritized, which sets the stage for decisions to be made about 

equipment and organization needed to meet these government-
21

assigned priorities. That should not, however, be understood to 

say that the military has not reacted appropriately to changing 

circumstances. Since the Chiapas uprising of 1994, and in light of the 

continual increase in drug trafficking, the armed forces have done 

their best to contend with new requirements and missions, but they 

have had to do so without any major adjustments in structure and 

especially in equipment. 

Missions.

 It is fair to say that Mexico does not face any external military 

threat. The Mexican military certainly could not defend the country 

against an attack by a force of equal size armed with modern 

weapons. However, given the de facto umbrella of U.S. protection 

similar to that enjoyed by Canada, this is not a major consideration. 

The Mexicans correctly are focused on internal defense. Should 

Mexico decide to play a role on the wider world stage, there would 

have to be significant changes. Currently, the Army/Air Force have 

five general missions assigned.

1. Defense of the Integrity, Independence, and Sovereignty of the Nation. 

In effect, this is defense against external threats, the classic mission 

all national armed forces have as a result of the prime obligation 

of governments to protect and defend their population. But, as 

mentioned, this is not an important factor even though it plays well 

in public debates, in that the definition of what constitutes an external 

threat in today’s climate of asymmetric threats is a matter of debate.

2. Internal Security. This is the most important and highest 

profile mission. It includes military actions against narcotrafficking, 

assistance and support to public security agencies, and maintenance 

of internal order. Certain of these tasks may be very controversial, 

as questions often arise about the proper, perhaps intersecting, roles 

of the military, the civil police, and security agencies in the essential 

matter of preserving civil order.

3. Civic Action and Social Projects that Assist in the Development of 

the Nation. This is an extremely important mission as it allows the 

government to provide help to the populace, even if the civil bodies 

one would normally associate with this type of work (and they all 

exist in Mexico) are incapable of delivering the service. Examples 
22

are reforestation, education through the National Military Service 

mentioned earlier, and support to sporting activities. The Army does 

not receive much external credit for undertaking this mission.

 4. Assisting the Population in Case of Public Necessity. Similar to 

the above, this encompasses a range of assistance to poorer areas—

feeding hot meals to entire villages; medical and dental consultations, 

including treatments and dispensary services; haircuts; painting 

residences; repair of domestic electrical appliances; and veterinary 

services—all at no cost to the recipient. This work is a major reason 

for the overall high approval rating the military has among the 

population at large. Another vital service is the provision of on-site 

potable water to rural locations.

 5. Assistance to the Population in Natural Disasters. This form of 

assistance, provided under terms of Plan DN-III-E, is also a vital 

service to the nation. The geographical reality of Mexico, and most of 

Central America, is that natural disasters occur frequently, with the 

resulting negative effects on the population and the economy. The 

regional territorial commands of the Mexican forces are the prime 

responders in time of disasters, and they are leaders in subsequent 

reconstruction. The forces train hard for this role, and are regularly 

tested by devastating hurricanes, floods, mudslides, forest fires, 

volcanic eruptions, droughts and outbreaks of disease. In recent 

years, the Mexican forces have deployed some of this capability 

and expertise to assist their neighbors in Guatemala, Honduras, El 

Salvador, and even Venezuela.

 The Mexican Navy has two main stated missions, both derived 

from the Constitution—the use of naval power to ensure external 

defense and to assist in internal security. The Navy further breaks this 

down into 15 sub-missions, but, with the exception of such things as 

oceanographic scientific investigation and maritime contamination, 

their focus and use by the government is the same as the Army.

Naval Equipment.

 Although rich in both natural and human resources, Mexico is 

not a wealthy nation, and the equipment of its armed forces reflects 

this reality. In general, they have a plethora of too many different 
23

types of vehicles, weapons, and equipment, and many of those 

are obsolete. This has resulted in units that are generally poorly 

equipped to meet the threats and challenges the country faces, such 

as small rural insurgencies and well-equipped drug traffickers. These 

latter two problems are, however, being actively addressed. Most 

notably, forming, training, equipping and deploying airmobile and 

amphibious Special Forces units/groups (GAFES/GANFES) in the 

war on drugs have been emphasized. These are serious soldiers who 

do well in their internal mission, and compare favorably to foreign 

counterparts. Strategically, increasing importance has been placed 

within the Army/Air Force on acquiring airborne surveillance 

platforms, light aircraft, rotary wing aircraft, and rapid troop 

transport. The Navy has obtained fast patrol boats and launches to 

interdict drug runners, it has built a fleet of fast gun boats, it has 

acquired shipborne helicopters, and it is replacing engines in its 

aging destroyers to make them more effective in fishery protection 

and drug interdiction.

Army Equipment.

 The Mexican Army, with a strength of some 144,000, has a wide 

variety of weapons and equipment in its inventory, much of it is 

procured off-shore but some manufactured by the military owned 

and operated Fabrica Nacional organization. Among the Army’s 

many and diverse types of equipment are 136 French-built AMX-13 

light tanks acquired from Belgium; some 105 armored cars of various 

makes; roughly 575 armored personnel carriers, mostly French-made, 

but including a number manufactured locally; about 195 artillery 

pieces and howitzers; over 1500 medium and heavy mortars, along 

with limited numbers of anti-tank guns and anti-aircraft missiles; 

and a wide variety of unarmored troop transporters and logistics 

vehicles.12 Much of this equipment is obsolescent or obsolete. The 

basic infantry weapon is the G3 rifle, made in Mexico.

Air Force Equipment.

 The Mexican Air Force, with just under 12,000 members, has 

a fleet of 107 combat aircraft (including 10 F-5s, 70 Pilatus PC-7s, 
24

and 17 T-33s); 71 armed helicopters, mainly Bell Jet Ranger and Huey

variants, but including some Soviet Mi 8s; and another 90 transport 

helicopters. It has a transport fleet of 35 aircraft, including one Boeing 

757, 3 Boeing 727, and 7 C-130 Hercules.13 In all, the Mexican Air 

Force maintains some 32 different types of aircraft.

 In addition, the Air Force is obtaining Embraer surveillance and 

command and control platforms. At first glance, this is an impressive 

array. The reality, however, is that much of the equipment is 

outdated and often unserviceable. The wide variety has caused a 

tremendous logistics, maintenance, and training problem for the Air 

Force. Spare parts are increasingly difficult to obtain, maintenance 

personnel are lured away by the better paying private sector, and 

flying hours are low for pilots. Procurement of Russian rotary wing 

equipment at bargain basement prices recently has provided a boost 

to troop transport and rapid reaction capability, but it has not solved 

the longer-term requirement. The Air Force is overdue for a major 

rationalization of its fleets, but senior Air Force officers do not have 

much voice in the hierarchy.

Naval Equipment.

 The Mexican Navy values its self-image as a blue-water navy, 

but suffers from the same problem as the Air Force—a hodgepodge 

of too many different types of vessels. Many of its larger ships are 

obsolete ex-U.S. Navy vessels of World War II vintage. Among its 

newer acquisitions are eight Holzinger class gunboats, the first two 

coming into service in 1999. These were designed and constructed at 

the Navy’s own shipyards, which are an important national strategic 

infrastructure. In addition, Swedish fast launches have been procured 

for interdictions close to the coastlines.

 The Navy, with a strength of 37,000, has 11 principal surface 

combatants (3 destroyers and 8 frigates), 109 patrol and coastal 

combatants (44 offshore patrol, 41 coastal patrol, 6 inshore patrol, 

and 18 riverine patrol), 3 amphibious tank landing ships (LSTs), 19 

support vessels, and a host of auxiliary and training vessels. Naval 

aviation consists of eight combat aircraft, several transport aircraft of 

different sizes, and helicopters of at least seven different types and 

ages.

14
25

 The Marines are organized in 3 brigades, each of 3 battalions, 

2 airborne battalions, 1 Presidential Guard battalion, 11 regional 

battalions, and miscellaneous coastal defense units.

 The Navy suffers from the same logistics and maintenance 

challenges as the Air Force, but its network of naval shipyards 

provides a significant in-house maintenance and construction 

capability. 

 Notwithstanding the age and utility of some of this equipment, the 

Mexican armed forces are the most significant in the region between 

the Rio Grande border with the United States and the Panama 

Canal. None of the three forces has come under the sort of rigorous 

external fiscal scrutiny that might force a thorough rationalization 

of organization and equipment leading to a major new procurement 

program.

Professional Development.

 The 1994 Zapatista uprising had two effects on the Mexican 

military, principally the Army, that persist to this day. First, it served 

as a wakeup call for a proud institution that found itself held at bay 

by a group of lightly armed peasants, which brought international 

scrutiny upon the country and its security policies and forces. 

Second, it provided sound justification for additional funding for 

modernization. This was quickly recognized and taken advantage 

of by the military hierarchy. In addition to significant equipment 

purchases, the institution embarked upon a thorough review of 

its professional development of the officer corps, as well as of its 

training and organization.

The senior leadership of the armed forces recognized that 

perpetuation of the status quo was not enough to ensure the forces’ 

utility in the future, and that a far more focused approach was needed. 

Over the period of 10 years, massive improvements to barracks and 

training facilities have been made throughout the country, and new 

courses for Special Forces and the Army in low intensity warfare 

developed. The most significant changes have, however, been in the 

field of professional development for officers. Schools and courses 

were developed for all rank levels, with successful completion being 

a prerequisite for advancement. There is a course for captains, a 
26

course for majors and lieutenant colonels, and a senior course for 

colonels and brigadiers, all based at least in part on the American 

equivalents. These closely resemble the Canadian Army’s junior staff 

course, the Canadian Forces Command and Staff Course, and the 

defense colleges of most Western countries. The Mexicans enjoy an 

active and productive exchange student program at the officer cadet 

and field officer level with several Latin American countries (e.g., 

Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela), with Spain and France, 

and with the United States. Recently an officer attended the National 

Security Studies Course at the Canadian Forces College. The Mexican 

forces have also introduced computer-based simulation equipment 

and exercises. They have built a superb National Training Center 

in Chihuahua where brigade-size all arms exercises are conducted 

regularly. These exercises usually include practicing the road, rail, 

and air deployment of the formations from their home location to the 

training center. Language training has received increased emphasis, 

especially in the Navy; and in the Army, selected officers are being 

taught indigenous dialects to assist in communicating with the local 

residents when the Army is deployed to provide social services in 

remote locations. Of course, because of their long-standing but rarely 

discussed relationship with the United States, hundreds of Mexican 

officers and noncommissioned officers train in American military 

schools every year.

 However, perhaps the most noteworthy advancements have 

come in human rights training and Rules of Engagement (ROEs) 

formulation. Virtually every course, whether for privates or generals, 

includes a human rights component. For example, many training 

areas include mock-ups of villages where situational exercises assist 

young soldiers in learning what is acceptable conduct and what is not. 

Discussions with human rights organizations show that the number of 

accusations of violations by the military has plummeted, and very few 

of those are found to have substance. ROEs for a variety of situations 

have been established, and it is believed that they have resulted in 

remarkable restraint being shown by young officers and soldiers in 

some very provocative situations, often with media cameras rolling, 

hoping the military will overreact. These developments show a high 

degree of maturation and professionalization.
27

IV. POLITICAL CHANGE AND THE CHANGING 

NATURE OF THE MEXICAN ARMED FORCES

 The coming to power of President Vicente Fox in December 2000 

was a momentous event in Mexican politics. After 71 years in power, 

the PRI was defeated at the polls, receiving only 36.1 percent of the 

popular vote. The election of Fox to the presidency can be regarded 

as the culmination of a protracted and complex process of political 

change that Mexico has undergone since the mid 1980s. This process, 

as well as changing international circumstances, has affected the 

relationship between the civil authority and the Mexican military, 

as well as the roles the armed forces are asked to perform. In this 

section, first is a brief overview of the process of political change in 

Mexico, highlighting the most important developments. Second is 

the changing role of the Mexican armed forces. The several Central 

American crises of the 1980s, the emergence of drug trafficking as 

a threat to national security, and the Chiapas rebellion of 1994 all 

have contributed to growth in the size of Mexico’s standing army, as 

well as expansion of its responsibilities, in what has been referred to 

as a “remilitarization of Mexico.” The most important changes that 

have occurred in the way the military interacts with government 

are discussed. Both the process of democratization in Mexico and 

the increased responsibilities of the armed forces have altered this 

relationship. 

Political Change in Mexico.

 As was discussed earlier, by 1940 the structures had been put in 

place to sustain the “perfect dictatorship” in Mexico; and between 

1940 and the early 1980s the PRI dominated all aspects of national 

life. Its authoritarian-corporatist structure allowed for the resolution 

of conflict within the party, thus maintaining political stability. 

Thirty years (1940-70) of high and sustained economic growth15—the 

so-called Mexican miracle—provided the regime with the financial 

resources to distribute in the form of patronage and other forms of 

pay off. One observer has described the PRI regime as a “gigantic, 

pork-barrelling political machine, soaking the bulk of the population 

and selectively rewarding its leaders and adherents.”16
28

 By the early 1970s, the system had begun to crack. On the 

economic front, the corporatist-populist economic model, which 

had been very successful in sustaining economic growth, began 

to show signs of exhaustion. State-owned enterprises and tariffprotected private firms became highly uncompetitive, subsidies did 

not follow any economic rationale, the balance of payments deficit 

grew as agricultural production declined, and macro-economic 

policy became highly politicized. On the political front, the regime’s 

authoritarian structure came under strain as the PRI lost a great 

deal of its legitimacy. President Luis Echeverría Álvarez (1970–76) 

attempted to rebuild support for the regime by allowing for greater 

political expression through electoral reform that made it easier for 

small opposition parties to gain seats in the lower house of Congress. 

He also loosened government censorship over some media outlets, 

and co-opted some leaders of groups opposed to the regime.

 Echeverría began to introduce austerity measures soon after 

coming to power, but shortly they were abandoned in favor 

of an expansionist economic policy through which the state 

acquired several hundred business enterprises and increased total 

government expenditures. The discovery of oil in the southern states 

of Chiapas and Tabasco in the mid-1970s allowed the government 

to increase spending. Echeverría significantly expanded the size of 

the government bureaucracy, attempting to use public employment 

to foster economic growth, and thereby fuelling the gigantic 

political-corporatist machine with state resources. He contributed 

to improvements in higher education by building new facilities and 

giving financial support, increasing subsidies to organized labor, 

and expanding social programs such as housing, social security, 

nutrition, and rural development.

 With the help of high petroleum prices and heavy borrowing 

from international financial markets awash in “petrodollars,” Mexico 

enjoyed a brief period of economic boom from 1976 until 1981, when 

the economy grew at an average of 8.5 percent each year. However, 

when international petroleum prices fell in 1981-82 and the price of 

borrowing from international lenders increased, Mexico was unable 

to service its foreign debt or secure the foreign exchange necessary 

to pay for essential imports, thus forcing a steep devaluation of the 

peso. The Mexican economy consequently crashed, and the old 
29

economic model crumbled. In 1982, the Gross Domestic Product 

(GDP) dropped by 1.5 percent, inflation reached 100 percent, 

unemployment doubled to 8 percent, and the public deficit soared 

to 18 percent of GDP. This economic meltdown—the worst since 

the Great Depression—marked the onset of a new era of economic 

reform and the beginning of the demise of the PRI’s hegemony.

 Mexico experienced profound change in the 1980s, adopting a 

new economic model based on neo-liberal tenets and beginning a 

process of political transition. The administrations of presidents 

Miguel de la Madrid (1982–88) and Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–

94) implemented structural adjustment policies and a fairly radical 

series of market reforms that culminated in the country joining the 

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in January 1994. 

The first years of the de la Madrid administration saw the adoption of 

radical stabilization programs. In 1985 this became a comprehensive 

program of structural adjustment reforms, which were accelerated 

during the Salinas administration. These included an extensive 

program of privatization of state-owned enterprises, as well as the 

liberalization of trade, exchange rates, and industrial policy. By 

1987, tariffs had been reduced to 20 percent from levels of 50 to 100 

percent, and, with the accession of Mexico to the General Agreement 

on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986, virtually all import licenses had 

been eliminated by 1987.17 The government also lifted restrictions 

on foreign direct investment, deregulated both commercial and 

industrial activities, and eliminated numerous subsidies to targeted 

groups of consumers and producers.

 The crash of 1982 and the ensuing economic deterioration, along 

with the series of economic reforms introduced during the 1980s, 

had a severe impact on social conditions, resulting in increased 

unemployment, lowered real wages, and generally declined standards 

of living. This economic downturn had serious repercussions for the 

regime. Within the PRI, the economic meltdown strained the party’s 

heterogeneous coalition, as it could no longer afford to provide 

resources to its various allies—the peasants, organized labor, the 

federal bureaucracy, and the employees of state-owned enterprises. 

This provoked party infighting over national economic policy. The 

internal struggles culminated in 1987, when Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas 

Solórzano (son of former president Lázaro Cárdenas) defected from 
30

the PRI and launched an independent presidential bid in 1988—the 

first real challenge to the PRI since its coming to power. The elections 

of 1988 were marred by widespread allegations of fraud, further 

eroding the PRI’s legitimacy. For the business community, the 

economic downturn fractured its relationship with the regime and 

exposed the necessity for fundamental economic structural change. 

Perhaps more important, the economic crisis gave rise to largescale social mobilization, as citizens began to withdraw from the 

corporatist structure of the party and place their demands directly 

on the state. By the end of the 1980s, the PRI effectively had lost 

legitimacy with the Mexican population, and the old regime was in 

crisis. 

 Faced with the collapse of the party’s legitimacy, President 

Salinas attempted a difficult balancing act—restructuring the 

system through deepening economic reform and establishing new 

institutions without ceding power to the opposition.18 Part of his 

strategy was to achieve economic reform while still retaining power. 

He took several measures to weaken the influence of organized labor 

on policy, such as creating new interlocutors in the labor movement 

under the banner of “new unionism,” reconstructing the popular 

bases of the PRI at its expense, and reducing its influence on social 

policy. Although he appeared to have been partially successful in 

regaining support for the PRI in the mid-term legislative elections 

of 1991—the PRI received 61 percent of the vote—his attempts to 

revive the party through economic reform and neo-authoritarianism 

proved unsuccessful. A sluggish recovery exacerbated socioeconomic inequalities, popular mobilization accelerated throughout 

the country, the media became increasingly critical, and opposition 

parties became viable governments-in-waiting. Moreover, in 1994 a 

guerrilla movement emerged in Chiapas, and the political infighting 

that had began to brew in the party in the 1980s culminated with 

the assassination of two prominent party officials. Political chaos 

deepened in late 1994 when Mexico’s economy again was thrust 

into crisis, prompting another precipitous devaluation of the peso. 

By the end of 1995, the country was experiencing armed conflict, 

an unprecedented increase in incidents of violence, and the worst 

economic crisis in decades. 
31

 President Ernesto Zedillo (1994–2000) began his administration 

against this backdrop of severe political and economic crises. While 

Zedillo continued Salinas’ economic policies, he agreed to bring 

about significant political reforms. In 1996, by negotiating with the 

country’s main opposition parties, he secured agreement to a major 

electoral reform (COFIPE) that granted the Federal Electoral Institute 

(IFE) complete autonomy, and enhanced its power to oversee, 

supervise, and administer elections. It also expanded the power 

of the Federal Electoral Tribunal (TRIFE), levelled the finance and 

media playing fields for all parties, and introduced restrictions on 

individual contributions to party financing and to media coverage. 

These reforms enabled opposition parties to make significant electoral 

inroads at the subnational level as they elected increasing numbers 

of municipal governments and state governorships—including the 

mayor of Mexico City in 1997—as well as gaining control over the 

Lower House of Congress in 1997, and, ultimately, the presidency in 

2000.

 Beyond the significant electoral reforms that Zedillo introduced, 

under his administration other major changes took place, including 

a weakening of the centralization of power as it began to “disperse” 

through the system. In terms of intergovernmental relations, for 

example, he introduced an important decentralization program 

under the banner of “New Federalism” that devolved power to state 

and municipal levels in areas involving education, health, poverty 

alleviation, and development projects. It appears that Zedillo was 

either unwilling or unable to exercise the same degree of power as 

his predecessors. A good case in point was his refusal to intervene 

in a contentious election in the state of Tabasco, during which the 

PRI’s candidate was accused of having exceeded the spending limits 

significantly (by almost 50 fold!).19 He also curbed the power of the 

presidency in the selection of PRI candidates. Under the declared 

need to establish a “healthy distance” between the state and the 

party, he essentially annulled the president’s “right” to appoint his 

successor (dedazo), and brought in a U.S.-primary style candidate 

election process within the PRI in 1999. Zedillo in effect permitted a 

significant reduction in the power of the president. It has been argued 

that the reforms he undertook were the result of his reformist zeal. 

Although there is no doubt that he did demonstrate a commitment 
32

to some of the changes (i.e., decentralizing power), in other cases it 

seems he had little choice. Given the severity of the economic and 

political situation he inherited, the strong pressures from below, and 

international pressure to democratize, it is difficult to see how the 

president could have refused to bring about substantive electoral 

reform without risking serious social unrest.

The “Remilitarization” of Mexico.

 During the PRI’s hegemonic rule, Mexico’s foreign policy was 

firmly grounded on the principle of nonintervention, and PRI leaders 

consistently disavowed the use of military force to solve international 

problems. In effect, the country did not have an international military 

policy. This resulted, as has been shown, in a policy/doctrine in which 

the armed forces focused on the preservation of internal order. From 

the 1950s until the 1970s, they concentrated on maintaining order 

by policing both urban and rural areas and by actively suppressing 

dissident guerrilla activities. During the 1980s, Mexico started to 

experience a process of remilitarization as international conditions 

changed, and new internal threats emerged.

 On the international front, Mexico’s isolationist position began 

to change in the late 1970s as it attempted to prevent a spill-over 

of numerous Central American insurgencies. In 1979, after having 

withdrawn its support for the government of Nicaraguan dictator 

Anastasio Somoza and soon after endorsing the Sandinista 

revolution, Mexico established foreign policy goals of maintaining 

stability and minimizing external influence in the region. In effect, 

it became an active player by becoming an ally of France (through 

the endorsement of Salvadorian insurgents as a political force) by 

openly opposing American support for the political elites of El 

Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, and by applying pressure on 

the Sandinista government not to change its economic policy. Most 

notably, Mexico was in the forefront of forming a regional alliance 

called Grupo Contadora that aimed at forming a common block with 

other countries that supported Mexico’s position, such as Venezuela, 

Panama, and Colombia. These actions affected the Mexican armed 

forces in a number of ways, but, most important, they resulted in the 

inclusion of generals in discussions about national security, about 
33

the deployment of troops to southern states, especially Chiapas, and 

about an increase in defense spending. The designation of a serving 

general, Abaslón Castellanos Domínguez, as governor of Chiapas 

from 1982 until 1988, was of special interest.

 Domestically, the role of the armed forces began to change in 

the late 1970s. As the flow of illegal drugs through national territory 

increased, mostly from Central and South America to the United States, 

the Mexican government began to rely on the military to fight this 

new threat because of the notorious weakness and corruption-prone 

nature of its police forces. To put this significant effort into context, 

it is important to understand that the increase in the drug trade was 

largely the result of a continued increase in American consumption 

of drugs during this time. In 1977, the Mexican government instituted 

Plan Condor, an operation that assigned significant military resources 

to the anti-drug fight through direct action: it involved a force of close 

to 16,500 troops. By 1985, the number of military personnel involved 

had increased to 25,000, representing 18 percent of the active duty 

Army, a number that increased to 25 percent by 2000. By 1985, 7 

years after this struggle began, 315 military personnel had died in 

the “war on drugs.”

 The military’s role in the antinarcotics campaign accelerated in 

the late 1980s under the Salinas administration, after he declared 

drug trafficking to be an issue of national security.20 The armed forces 

increased their interdiction efforts by establishing checkpoints along 

all major roads and highways, seizing maritime vessels suspected of 

carrying drugs, patrolling beaches, and increasing surveillance of the 

maritime approaches.21 Under the Zedillo administration (1994-2000), 

the role of the armed forces in counternarcotics activities continued 

to grow. The Defense Ministry (SEDENA) issued what is known as 

the “Azteca Directive” as a result of modification of the Constitution 

and the Criminal Code. This established the military’s permanent 

campaign against drug trafficking, with programs to eradicate drug 

crops, confiscate illegal drugs, and combat organized crime.22 During 

this time the “Plan to Combat Drug Trafficking” was established and 

the Drug Control Planning Center (CENDRO) created. Zedillo sent 

the first of several thousand young men to the United States to study 

antinarcotic tactics and apply them at home.23
34

 The armed forces increased their role in the fight against drug 

trafficking as successive presidents placed military officers in charge 

of civil institutions with responsibilities for law enforcement, public 

security, and intelligence gathering. Since the Zedillo administration, 

for example, the Drug Control Planning Center (CENDRO), the 

Federal Preventative Police (PFP) and the National Institute to 

Combat Drugs have been headed by military officers, and the 

Center for National Security and Intelligence—Mexico’s intelligence 

agency—increasingly has been run by the military. Moreover, when 

Zedillo established the PFP in 1999, he “borrowed” military personnel 

while new civilian officials were selected and trained. The number 

of soldiers within this institution has steadily increased, some of 

whom have been drawn from the Federal Support Forces (FFA)—

which is made up of military police and members of the Navy. Eight 

Army units were transferred to the FFA, and 1,600 members of naval 

battalions were also added to the PFP.

 Although President Vicente Fox pledged during his election 

campaign that he would reduce the military involvement in the 

fight against drug trafficking, it appears that quite the opposite has 

occurred. The armed forces, in fact, have been given responsibility 

for activities previously under the purview of civil institutions. 

Since he came to power, Fox has used special battalions and military 

intelligence in pursuing and arresting drug traffickers, and the Army 

has been directly involved in dismantling and tracking cartels and 

staging commando operations. Perhaps the clearest example of the 

increased penetration of the armed forces into the civil branches 

of government was the appointment in 2000 of Brigadier General 

Rafael Macedo de la Concha to be Attorney General, the first time in 

Mexico’s history that a military officer has ever served in that office. 

Since that time, several other senior military officers have been 

named to counternarcotics and intelligence positions within the 

Attorney General’s Office (PGR). By late 2002 at least 227 military 

officers were in the institution, 20 of whom headed up important 

bureaus overseeing intelligence, eradication, interdiction, and seized 

assets. Overall, 107 members of the military were assigned to the 

Special Prosecutor for Drug Crimes (FEADS), 42 to the federal police, 

8 to the CENDRO, and 70 others to various divisions and units.24 In 

addition, both the PFP and the FFA are headed by general officers.
35

 The Chiapas rebellion of 1994 also had a significant effect on the 

armed forces. The administrations of both Salinas and Zedillo relied 

on the Army to contain the uprising of Subcomandante Marcos and 

his Zapatista rebels while peace negotiations took place. During the 

Zedillo administration, troops were deployed to Chiapas province, 

and numerous checkpoints were established on the highways that 

surrounded the so-called “conflict zone.” It is important to note that 

large numbers of the troops deployed to the region were used to 

provide hot meals and medical services, and for transportation and 

general base duties. During the 1990s, the armed forces also increased 

their activities through implementation of Plan DN-III (referred to 

earlier), which is intended to assist the population in times of natural 

disasters by providing medicine, potable water, and other basic 

necessities. For example, from 1997 until 1999, the military helped 

to more than 115,000 victims of natural disasters. Also, from 1995 

until 1999, Army and Air Force elements fought forest fires in a vast 

area.

25

 These changes in the role of the armed forces have resulted in an 

increase in government spending on the forces, allowing the size of 

the military to double from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s. In 1990, 

total government expenditure on the military (through the Ministries 

of Defense and the Navy) was .48 percent of GDP (See Figure 5). This 

increased to 0.57 percent in 1994, the year the Zapatista rebellion 

broke out. Despite a small decrease in 1995 and 1996 (the years 

following the Peso Crisis), the amount increased again, reaching 

.60 percent in 1999. This is roughly in line with the Latin American 

spending average, which is .542 percent, but it should be noted 

that Mexico, unlike the other large countries in the region, does not 

participate in expensive international operations. As a percentage of 

total government spending, an exponential increase in the military 

budgets occurred during the 1990s.

 The size of the Mexican armed forces also increased as a result 

of the expansion of their responsibilities and increased funding 

(Figure 6). While in 1985 the total number of active personnel stood 

at approximately 130,000, the number increased to close to 150,000 

by 1990 and to some 240,000 by 2003.
36

 As a Percentage of Total

Year As a Percentage of GDP Government Expenditure (Budget)

1990 0.48 1.96

1992 0.52 –

1994 0.57 3.93

1995 0.56 3.60

1996 0.56 3.68

1997 0.58 3.50

1998 0.58 3.60

1999 0.60 3.34

Based on figures from The Military Balance, London: International Institute 

for Strategic Studies, for the years cited.

Figure 5. Expenditure on the Armed Forces.

Year Total Number of Active Personnel

1985 129,100

1990 151,500

1991 198,900

1992 203,800

1993 210,200

1994 217,800

1995 225,200

1996 235,000

1997 235,000

1998 235,000

1999 232,000

2000 237,000

2001 241,100

Sources: Compiled from Statesman’s Yearbook, New York: St. Martin’s Press; The 

Military Balance, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies; The Europa World 

Year Book, Vol. II, London: Europa Publications, 1995; Benítez Manaut, “Security and 

Governance,” Op. Cit.; and Grayson, Mexico’s Armed Forces: A Factbook, p. 38.

Figure 6. Mexico’s Armed Forces.
37

Year Change or Event

1977 Creation of the Airborne Special Forces Groups (GAFEs). There are 

approximately 64 GAFE units across the country, 2 per military region 

and one per military zone.

Plan Condor is established.

1988 President Salinas declares drug trafficking a threat to national security.

1994 Deployment of troops to the state of Chiapas.

 President Zedillo declares drug trafficking “the most severe” threat to 

national security.

 Promulgation of the Azteca Directive.

1996 Creation of the Drug Control Planning Center (CENDRO).

 Establishment of the Plan to Combat Drug Trafficking.

1997 The Special Antinarcotics Prosecutor (INCD) is disbanded and replaced by the Special Prosecutor for Drug Crimes (FEADS).

1999 Creation of the Federal Preventive Police (PFP).

2000 General Rafael Macedo de la Concha is appointed Attorney General.

2001 Reinforcement of Navy surveillance of oil installations in the Gulf of 

Mexico against terrorist threats. 

 Federal Judicial Police (PFP) replaced by the Federal Investigation 

Agency (AFI).

 Creation of two schools for Special Forces training.

2002 Reorganization of GAFEs through the integration of three brigades 

and nine special forces units.

 Leader of the Tijuana Cartel, Benjamin Arellano Felix, is arrested.

2003 Establishment of “smart border” with the United States and increased 

cooperation in intelligence gathering.

 FBI and CIA agents are allowed to operate at Mexico City airport. 

Figure 7. Important Institutional Changes and Events.

 As can be seen in Figure 7, the changes that have taken place 

within Mexico and internationally have altered and expanded the 

traditional role of the Mexican armed forces, which, in turn, has 

resulted in an increase in their size. The most salient aspects of their 

changing roles are perhaps the increased responsibility they have 

acquired in the fight against drug trafficking and in maintaining 
38

public security, and the increased influence they have had in the 

running of civilian institutions. This, in turn, also has affected the 

civil-military relationship that has characterized the country for 

several decades. 

 Since Vicente Fox came into power, he has instituted several 

important changes to the structure and organization of the armed 

forces.26 He created the Public Security and Justice Services Agency, 

with cabinet-level status to oversee and coordinate the formulation 

and implementation of security policies, and he increased the size of 

the PFP by 25 percent by bringing in 826 recruits from the Navy and 

the Army. 

Changing Civil-Military Relations in Mexico.

 As discussed earlier, civil-military relations under the “perfect 

dictatorship” were characterized by a “pact” under which the armed 

forces afforded complete loyalty to the president and withdrew from 

the political and policymaking processes in return for autonomy in 

the internal running of the forces. An important consequence of the 

pact was that the civilian authority did not exercise much oversight 

over the forces, especially in regard to equipment acquisition and the 

promotions process. The pact remained stable until the mid-1980s.

 The Central American crises of the 1980s and the increased 

responsibilities assigned to the military, especially in the fight 

against drug trafficking, affected the civil-military pact. Because 

the new tasks demanded military planning, the senior leaders of 

the armed forces began to be consulted about the formulation of 

security and defense policy. This was accomplished primarily by 

means of better communications between officials the Ministry 

of the Interior (SEGOB) and the Navy and Defense Ministries, 

as well as through the National Security Council. Although there 

were serious differences of opinion between civilians and highranking officers—which became more pronounced after the Chiapas 

uprising, which the military had warned of in advance—there was 

also increased cooperation. Since President Fox came to power, he 

actively has encouraged officials from all services to participate in 

inter-institutional efforts to establish federal policies, similar to the 

way interagency groups operate in the United States.27 Staff Sections 2 
39

and 7 of SEDENA (Army Intelligence and Military Operations) have 

taken over responsibility for investigating drug cartels’ leadership 

structures, and President Fox has involved special forces battalions 

in supporting regional commanders’ “high impact” operations.28

The appointment of a general officer as Attorney General has meant 

increased contact between that office and the armed forces (202 

members of the armed forces were assigned to the PGR in 2003). 

The Minister of Defense and the Minister of the Navy also have 

encouraged a close relation with the civilian authorities as they have 

attempted to establish continuous communication with the President. 

This may have occurred partly as a result of their more “academic” 

background and open-minded outlook. 

 Increased opposition to the PRI during the 1980s also affected 

the civil-military pact. As the PRI began to lose its dominant place 

and opposition parties acquired greater prominence, the traditional 

neutrality of the armed forces was questioned as some generals were 

openly critical of the regime, and in some instances even went so far 

as to express sympathy for opposition parties. In 1990, for example, 

General Alberto Quintanar declared that he would advise the leftleaning Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) on security 

matters, and during the 1990s some others, most notably General 

Luis Garfias, were elected to Congress on the PRD ticket. Further, 

in an effort to ensure that the political elite of the PRI would not 

be able to use the military to their advantage during the process of 

political change, members of the opposition demanded publicly that 

the armed forces declare their neutrality.29 Since Fox’s election in 

2000, the Minister of National Defense repeatedly has declared that 

armed forces will obey the orders of the President, regardless of his 

political affiliation.

 The growth of opposition parties also has led to some questioning 

of the constitutional role of the armed forces. For example, in 1996 

the opposition IRD argued that the increased role of the military in 

policing and in the fight against organized crime violated Article 

129 of the Constitution, and took its case to the Supreme Court. The 

Court ruled, however, that “while the authorities require the support 

of the army, and considering that the armed forces are at the order 

of the President, its participation in assignments dealing with public 

security are not in violation of constitutional provisions.”
40

 The PRI’s loss of its majority in the lower house in 1997 meant 

that members of Congress belonging to opposition parties have 

become more interested in military affairs, and have demanded 

more accountability from the military, especially regarding the 

officer promotion process. This is perhaps one of the most significant 

changes in civil-military relations that have accompanied the process 

of democratization, and it has certainly altered the traditional civilmilitary pact. By law, Congress, through its standing committees (in 

both houses) is responsible for oversight of all government agencies 

and the procurement process. Members of Congress have become 

more active in exercising this responsibility, and are more critical. In 

1999, for example, the PRD openly questioned some practices of the 

armed forces, such as the secrecy in which the promotion process 

takes place, and demanded a reform of the legal framework. In 2000 

the newly elected Congress demanded that both the Ministers of 

Defense and Navy appear before congressional standing committees, 

which they had never before been required to do.30 The Senate also 

has become more active in reviewing the promotion process, as it 

has the right to veto any recommendation for promotion, and it also 

has become more active in oversight of the procurement process. The 

increased interest in military affairs shown by opposition members of 

Congress and their efforts to carry out their oversight responsibilities 

have resulted in far better communication between the legislative 

branch of government and top military officials.31 This, indeed, is a 

positive, if rather novel, development in civil-military relations in 

Mexico.

 Improved oversight by members of Congress and the appointment 

of reform-minded Ministers of Defense and of the Navy have resulted 

in increased transparency and important structural changes, especially within the Navy. For example, a new generation of admirals has 

reduced the size of its administrative structure and created a Council 

of Admirals which advises the Minister of the Navy on policy and 

strategy. It also designates assignments for officers above the rank of 

Commander. As noted earlier, promotion of officers to senior rank, 

a purely internal matter under the so-called “pact,” was always a 

contentious issue; thus the creation of a promotions committee 

made up of captains and admirals to decide on officer promotions 

has been an important development.32 The Army has followed suit 
41

and in October 2003 created its own pomotions committee. But the 

decisions of both committees must now be ratified by the Senate. 

As recently as the late 1990s, as part of the civil-military pact under 

the PRI, the promotions process was conducted mostly within the 

armed forces by the top brass without significant input from the 

civilian authority. These changes point to a reduction in autonomy 

in the internal running of the military, and a positive step toward a 

better civil-military relationship.

 The other salient aspect that characterized the civil-military pact 

was the secrecy within which the forces tended to operate. In this 

regard, there also appear to be important changes brought about by 

the process of democratization: transparency is now demanded of 

the armed forces. In 2003, President Fox enacted the Law of Access to 

Information (similar to the Canadian Access to Information Act) which 

requires that all federal government agencies disclose information to 

the public upon request. This has forced the armed forces to release 

information on, among other things, equipment procurement, the 

selection of private contractors, and all expenditures, a practice 

never before even considered. Both Ministers have been willing to 

comply.

 The changes described may not amount to a complete reformulation of the civil-military pact—a demand made by some social and 

political circles soon after Fox’s election to the presidency—but they 

constitute a significant alteration. There are, of course, other areas 

where further changes would be beneficial. For example, although 

members of Congress have become more interested in military 

affairs, the fact that they are barred by the Constitution from running 

for a second term has a negative effect on their ability to develop 

expertise and thus be more effective in their oversight role. This is 

particularly the case with regard to the promotion process, as the 

lack of knowledge about military structures, the rank system, and 

military life in general limits their ability to oversee the process.33

Then, too, there is still little control by civilian authorities over the 

internal allocation of resources. Finally, contrary to what some 

observers have suggested,34 an informed and engaged “defense 

community”—made up of civilians inside and outside government, 

academics, and military officials—has yet to emerge. Such a 

community would facilitate the interaction and communication 
42

between civilian authority and the military. Regrettably, in Mexico 

only a handful of academics and journalists are interested in military 

affairs, and rarely do they interact actively and openly with military 

officials.

 Several points need to be made about the changing nature of the 

civil-military pact.35 First, some observers are critical of the increased 

responsibilities the armed forces have been given, especially those 

relating to public security which in other countries fall under the 

jurisdiction of civil institutions.36 This may be regarded as especially 

risky in a part of the world where the military has been active 

politically. What is important to note in the Mexican case, however, 

is that the civilian authority has asked the armed forces to take on 

these new roles; this has not been a military initiative. Because of 

the weakness of civil institutions such as the police forces, the 

military was directed by the government to broaden its political 

responsibilities. Clearly the Mexican armed forces are firmly under 

civilian control, despite some shortcomings in oversight mentioned 

earlier, and there is absolutely no evidence of any diminished loyalty 

to the President. It is true that the Minister of Defense has become 

more outspoken and has begun to comment in public on matters of 

national political concern (such as the inability of Fox to cooperate 

with other political parties, and the failure to reduce poverty), but 

this can be seen as a part of changing and dynamic political relations 

between civilian and military forces described by Douglas Bland in 

his theory of “shared responsibilities.”37 The more active role can be 

considered a positive step toward healthier civil-military relations, 

as there has been an increased flow of ideas between the two.

 Second, we must remember that the military is trusted by the 

Mexican people more than any other national institution. Polling 

consistently shows that Mexicans have more confidence in the armed 

forces than in the police or the justice system,38 despite negative 

media coverage during the Chiapas uprising and allegations of 

corruption. Because of the high levels of trust Mexicans have for the 

military, it is likely that the armed forces will continue to be tasked 

to carry out jobs that in other countries would be police or judicial 

responsibilities, simply to get things done. The real challenge for 

Mexico as it consolidates its democratization is the strengthening of 

its civil institutions so this is no longer necessary. Finally, a commonly 
43

held perception among foreign observers is that widespread 

corruption in the Mexican armed forces exists. While it is true that 

the military’s involvement in the fight against drug trafficking has 

given its members opportunities to engage in corrupt practices, 

successive administrations have been diligent in addressing the 

problem. Between 1995 and 2000, several military officers have 

been tried on corruption charges,39 and, to limit the temptations that 

might arise if an individual were to develop intimate links in any one 

location, officers are rotated from one garrison to another regularly. 

Very likely the problem has been exaggerated, given the high levels 

of trust the citizenry continue to express for the armed forces. 

V. TOWARD CLOSER COOPERATION BETWEEN 

THE CANADIAN AND THE MEXICAN ARMED FORCES

 This monograph has been written to dispel many of the common 

misconceptions about the Mexican armed forces that have resulted 

from its long-standing inward-oriented focus, from negative 

international press coverage, and because of the lack of knowledge 

outside Mexico about its structure and roles. In Canada, this is, in 

part, because, for the past half-century, the Canadian Forces’ external 

focus was on interoperability with the armed forces of other NATO 

member countries in Europe, or, to some extent, on foreign forces 

with which it worked in UN peacekeeping missions.

 Despite problems and challenges of the past, the Mexican armed 

forces of today have made significant strides toward becoming vital 

and professional institutions within a country that is now taking its 

place alongside other democracies. The Army, Navy, and Air Force 

are well-trained and dynamic organizations that are well-respected 

by a significant number of Mexicans, and they are adapting well to 

changing political circumstances. No doubt there are areas in which 

the Mexican forces could show further evidence of liberalization, 

perhaps especially in regard to the excessive secretiveness that 

continues to prevail. But, even here change is happening because 

of a new generation of senior officers who have a more open and 

outward-looking view of the world.

 Having examined the Mexican military and the changing nature 

of civil-military relations in the Canadian context, two questions 
44

immediately come to mind: What has been the relationship between 

the Mexican and Canadian armed forces in the past? and, Is greater 

cooperation possible? It is a fact, regrettable perhaps, that direct 

military-to-military relations between the Canadian and Mexican 

forces have been of a relatively minor nature. Perhaps the most 

important recent step in that relationship was the exchange of 

military attachés in the early 1990s, so the groundwork to facilitate 

future initiatives does exist. Unlike the Mexican military attaché 

in Ottawa, the Canadian attaché in Mexico is also cross-accredited 

to seven other Central American and Caribbean countries, but his 

priority clearly is focused on the bilateral dynamic with Mexico.

 To date, the few successful contact initiatives have been limited 

to a small number of Mexican officers participating in exercises at 

the Peace Support Training Center in Kingston and at the Pearson 

Peacekeeping Center in Nova Scotia, and the attendance of a Mexican 

officer at the year-long staff college course in Toronto. Also, port visits 

by Canadian vessels on the West Coast of Mexico have occurred, 

and a member of the Canadian Forces participated in a cruise on 

the Mexican Navy’s sail-training vessel. Of course, opportunities for 

greater Canadian Forces’ involvement are hampered by the lack of 

Spanish-speaking personnel, and that is likely to remain a serious 

limitation for reciprocal exchanges. The Mexicans, of course, have 

many English-speaking personnel.

 If we look at what type of cooperative ventures would benefit 

both armed forces in the future, the area that immediately comes to 

mind is Mexican interest in peacekeeping, and the Canadian Forces’ 

interest and experience in employing its troops in austere locations 

with geographical conditions very different from Canada. Increased 

contact and cooperation between the two armed forces might be 

possible in the following areas:

 • Include more Mexican officers in courses at the Pearson 

Peacekeeping Center and the Peace Support Training Center, 

especially the UN Observer course;

 • Invite Mexican officers to observe predeployment training of 

Canadian units preparing to go on UN missions;

 • Invite Mexican officers to visit Canadian units deployed on 

UN missions;
45

 • Invite Mexico to provide junior staff officers to serve in a 

deployed Canadian headquarters;

 • Invite the Pearson Peacekeeping Center to deliver courses, 

in Spanish, on site in Mexico and propose that Mexico, in 

turn, invite officers from other Central American countries to 

participate;

 • Host reciprocal seminars on disaster relief operations;

 • Organize small unit exchanges where, for example, Canadian 

troops participate in training in Mexico in mountain, riverine, 

anti-drug, desert, and jungle warfare;

 • Invite the Mexican Navy to conduct port visits in Canada;

 • Organize reciprocal language training in both countries;

 • Consider the exchange of intelligence on mutually agreed 

threats;

 • Consider ways in which the Canadian “defense community,” 

especially the academic centers and NGOs that focus on 

security and defense issues, might help foster the development 

of a similar community in Mexico. This might be done through 

the organization of seminars, workshops, and symposia at 

which information can be exchanged between civilians and 

military personnel;

 • Encourage the exchange of officer cadets and academic 

faculty between the two countries’ military educational 

establishments so as to encourage an exchange of ideas and 

the growth of personal friendships; and,

 • Consider cooperation in natural disaster relief in areas (i.e., 

Central America and the Caribbean) where the Mexican 

military has experience and expertise.

 This list certainly is not exhaustive and may be slightly cavalier, 

as it does not consider the administrative, diplomatic, and funding 

implications inherent in the possible initiatives. However, these and 

similar types of activities demonstrate that room for mutual benefit 

exists within our own continent for enhanced military cooperation. 

Canada and Mexico share much in common in the areas of defense 
46

and security. Both are huge countries with diverse and challenging 

geography, immense wealth in natural resources, long and vulnerable 

coastlines, and shared borders with the United States, to list just a few 

common characteristics. We should look to our neighbors. Indeed, 

in recent months President Fox has declared his desire to integrate 

the Mexican armed forces within U.S. Northern Command, despite 

original reservations. As the Martin administration implements the 

terms of its defense policy review, perhaps a closer look to the south 

might be in order.

ENDNOTES

 1. Declaration made by President Fox at the Meeting for the Evaluation of 

Coordinated Action for Border and National Security, Tijuana, Mexico, October 3, 

2001.

 2. Mario Vargas Llosa, “Mexico: The Perfect Dictatorship,” New Perspectives 

Quarterly, Winter 1991, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 23-25.

 3. For one of the best descriptions of the Mexican political system during the 

20th century, see Roderic Camp, Politics in Mexico; The Democratic Transformation, 

London: Oxford University Press, 2003.

 4. See Raúl Benítez Manaut, “Security and Governance: The Urgent Need for 

State Reform,” in Joseph S. Tulchin and Andrew D. Selle, eds., Mexico’s Politics and 

Society in Transition, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003.

 5. The PNR was renamed the Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM) in 1938 

and the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in 1946.

 6. The terms Minister and Secretary and Ministry and Secretariat are used 

interchangeably.

 7. Manaut.

 8. Roderic Camp, Generals in the Palacio, London: Oxford University Press, 

1992.

 9. David Rondfelt, “The Mexican Military and Political Order since 1940,” 

in David Rondfelt, ed., The Modern Mexican Military, La Jolla, CA: University of 

California at San Diego, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1984.

 10. Presidential terms last 6 years, and presidents are constitutionally barred 

from seeking reelection.

 11. George Grayson, Mexico’s Armed Forces: A Fact Book, Washington, DC: 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, Americas Program, 1999, pp. 6-8.

 12. Numbers and types are from The Military Balance 2001, London: International 

Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 2001.
47

 13. Ibid.

 14. Ibid.

15. The Mexican economy grew at an average rate of 6.5 percent a year from 

1940 to 1960.

16. Chappel Lawson, Building the Forth Estate: Democratization and the Rise of the 

Free Press in Mexico, Berkley: University of California Press, 2002, p. 16.

 17. Kevin J. Middlebrook and Eduardo Zepeda, “On the Political Economy 

of Mexican Development Policy,” in Kevin J. Middlebrook and Eduardo Zepeda, 

eds., Confronting Development: Assessing Mexico’s Economic and Political Challenges, 

Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003, p. 8.

 18. Salinas repeatedly stated that his administration favored economic over 

political reform.

 19. Governor of Tabasco and President of the PRI since 2002, Roberto Madrazo 

refused to resign despite having publicly admitted that he had broken electoral 

rules and spent $U.S.70 million, far beyond the $1.5 million limit.

 20. Camp, Generals in the Palacio, p. 91.

 21. José Luis Sierra Guzmán, “Mexico’s Military in the War on Drugs,” 

Washington Office for Latin America Briefing Series, Washington, DC: Washington 

Office for Latin America, April 2003, p. 2.

 22. Ibid., p. 9.

 23. Ibid.

 24. Ibid., p. 5.

 25. Guillermo Garduño Valero, “The Organizational Transition of the Mexican 

Armed Forces in the New Millenium,” in Always Near, Always Far: The Armed Forces 

in Mexico, San Francisco: Global Exchange, 2000.

 26. Upon assuming office, there were plans to create a new institutional 

structure for the Air Force outside SEDENA, and have all three forces under one 

command (Estado Mayor Conjunto). The plan, however, was never executed. 

Fox’s former security advisor, Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, also proposed the creation 

of a security council at which the Estado Mayor Conjunto would be given a seat. 

His proposal also was rejected (interview with Mr. Zinser, Mexico City, July 30, 

2004). In terms of institutional organization, Fox restructured the 2nd, 3rd, and 

7th military regions, as well as the 30th, 31st, 36th, and 38th military zones. Fox 

also has withdrawn troops from the state of Chiapas and reduced the number of 

checkpoints. Here it is important to note that the reorganization of military zones 

is a common practice to meet changing threat levels and population/recruiting 

demographics. Both Salinas and Zedillo undertook reorganizations themselves.

 27. Roderic Camp, Challenges to Civil-Military Relations in the 21st Century, 

forthcoming.

 28. Guzman, p. 3.
48

 29. Monica Serrano, “The Armed Branch of the State: Civil-Military Relations 

in Mexico,” Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 27, May 1987, pp. 423-426.

 30. Roderic Camp, Politics in Mexico: The Democratic Transformation, London: 

Oxford University Press, 2004.

 31. As stated by the Minister of National Defense in an interview with Camp 

in February 2004 (Camp, forthcoming) and by several members of Congress in 

interviews in July 2004.

 32. Camp, Challenges to Civil-Military Relations.

 33. Interview with Senator Castañeda, PAN, Mexico City, July 20, 2004.

 34. Manaut.

 35. The best work on civil-military relations in Mexico, especially after Fox 

became president, is Camp’s forthcoming book, Challenges to Civil-Military Relations 

in the 21st Century.

 36. See Guzmán.

 37. Douglas Bland, “A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations,” Armed 

Forces and Society, Vol. 26, No. 1, Fall 1999, pp. 7-19.

 38. Several polls show this to be true. See, for example, the poll cited by 

Grayson in Mexico’s Armed Forces, p. 72, which shows that 71 percent of the 

population expressed a great deal or a fair amount of confidence in the armed 

forces, compared with 44 percent for the federal police, 40 percent for the justice 

system, and 36 percent for the local police.

 39. Most notably, in 2001 General Jesús Gutierrez Rebollo, the officer in 

charge of the government’s antinarcotics campaign, was tried on a charge of illicit 

enrichment and sentenced to 15 years in jail.