RECONFIGURING THE AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE 

IN EUROPE

LTC Raymond A. Millen

February 2004
ii

*****

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not 

necessarily refl ect the offi cial policy or position of the Department of the Army, the 

Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public 

release; distribution is unlimited.

 

The author would like to thank Dr. Thomas-Durell Young and Colonel Alan 

Stolberg for insightful comments on earlier drafts of the manuscript. Any errors or 

misinterpretations which remain do so despite their best efforts.

** ***

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded 

to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes 

Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of this report may be obtained from the 

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Rita.Rummel@carlisle.army.mil

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ISBN 1-58487-151-2
iii

FOREWORD

What does NATO bring to U.S. national security in practical terms? 

This rhetorical question seeks not so much to provoke debate than to 

invoke NATO’s potential. In the post-Cold War era, especially during 

the war on terrorism, NATO’s raison d’être must expand beyond 

securing the immediate borders of member states.

In this monograph, Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Millen examines 

America’s choices regarding the basing of ground troops in Europe. He 

considers three major options available to the United States—complete 

withdrawal, annual rotations, and restructuring the Alliance to 

accommodate a smaller U.S. presence. While weighing the advantages 

and disadvantages of each option, he does not lose sight of the ultimate 

objective of NATO—to provide credible land power for the full 

spectrum of operations.

Lieutenant Colonel Millen has expanded his concept of the integrated 

multinational division by introducing a NATO 3-3 Force Structure 

concept that rests on a smaller NATO ground force adaptive to the 

capabilities and wealth of member states; increases interoperability 

(technologically and procedurally); and supports the expeditionary 

force structure already in progress by the formal establishment of 

three standing combined joint task forces (CJTF). Additionally, he 

recommends the adoption of nine division-sized bases in Europe 

located at key geostrategic points for greater access to the Middle East 

and Africa. Indeed, the idea is daunting, but he lays out a pragmatic 

approach for implementation.

One of the monograph’s strengths is not simply introducing 

innovative concepts for the Alliance; the author also ensures they are 

practical and within current capabilities. The reader will fi nd Lieutenant 

Colonel Millen’s ideas provocative but compelling. The Strategic 

Studies Institute is pleased to offer this insightful and controversial 

monograph as a topic of debate among European security specialists 

and Department of Defense.

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

RAYMOND A. MILLEN, an Army lieutenant colonel, is currently 

assigned as the Director of European Security Studies at the Strategic 

Studies Institute. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 

1982, was commissioned as an infantry offi cer, and has held a variety 

of command and staff assignments in Germany and Continental 

United States; he has also served as the U.S. Army Infantry School 

Liaison Offi cer to the German Infantry School at Hammelburg, 

Germany; Battalion Executive Offi cer, 3-502d Infantry, Fort 

Campbell, Kentucky; and Chief of Intelligence Section and Balkans 

Team Chief, Survey Section, SHAPE, Belgium. He is a graduate of 

the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College, and holds 

an M.A. degree in National Security Studies from Georgetown 

University. He is a Foreign Area Offi cer for Western Europe. He has 

published articles in a number of scholarly and professional journals 

to include Infantry Magazine and the Swiss Military Journal. His book, 

Command Legacy, was published by Brasseys in April 2002.
v

SUMMARY

As the United States prosecutes the war on terrorism, it is also in 

the process of adjusting its global security posture. Not surprisingly, 

the American presence in Europe will be profoundly affected by the 

U.S. calculations, and hence by extension, so will NATO. It is no 

exaggeration that the whispered conversations within the Pentagon 

reverberate within the halls of NATO headquarters, so the ultimate 

decision has the potential to rock the Alliance, no matter how benign 

it may appear to the United States.

The United States has three basic options regarding its future 

ground presence in Europe—withdraw completely, rotate divisions, 

or restructure the Alliance to permit a smaller U.S. presence. 

Maintaining the status quo in Europe is not a viable option, since it 

does not rectify the U.S. over-extension of forces or accommodate 

the dynamics associated with the war on terrorism.

A withdrawal from Europe permits the consolidation of ground 

forces in the United States for power projection missions globally. 

Because the United States maintains relatively modern divisionsized posts with contiguous maneuver training areas, unit readiness 

would be much higher than in Europe and certainly more cost 

effi cient. Power projection from the United States provides greater 

fl exibility in that the United States can rely on staging bases in 

Europe and elsewhere (“Lily Pads”) en route to trouble spots. 

Unfortunately, a withdrawal will likely result in a European loss of 

confi dence in the United States and a de facto marginalizing of U.S. 

leadership and infl uence. More disturbing, the European Union (EU) 

will fi ll the void with its Rapid Reaction Force, which will compete 

with NATO for resources but fail to live up to expectations. In the 

end, the Alliance will not likely survive the trauma.

The rotation of divisions has the advantage of maintaining 

power projection fl exibility without endangering U.S. commitment 

to the Alliance. However, given the enormous effort and associated 

costs for preparation, staging, moving, and reception, this 

option is incredibly expensive and time consuming. Given that 

rotations traditionally involve three units (those preparing, those 
deployed, and those recovering), require extensive organizational 

reconfi guration for the mission, and present a host of logistical and 

administrative challenges, this option is impractical. It might look 

good on paper, but would needlessly distract the Army from more 

important matters.

Restructuring the Alliance to accommodate fewer and smaller 

units presents signifi cant opportunities despite the initial challenges 

and visceral resistance. As opposed to the dozens of ill-equipped 

and undermanned divisions and brigades currently comprising 

NATO, a restructuring to nine integrated multinational divisions 

is in order. (See Table 2, page 17.) Organized into three permanent 

combined joint task forces with three divisions each, along with an 

allotment of specialized units at the CJTF level (NATO 3-3 Force 

Structure), Alliance members would contribute fully modern and 

manned forces in accordance with their capabilities and wealth. 

Because of the relatively small size of the new force structure, each 

member would contribute only four to fi ve battalions or brigades to 

the Alliance.

In connection with restructuring, NATO should modernize its 

concept of unit stationing. Rather than relying on the 19th century 

concept of small casernes scattered throughout Europe, the Alliance 

should establish nine division-sized posts at geostrategic locations. 

Because each post would also require a contiguous maneuver training 

area as well as modern facilities, NATO should solicit members to 

compete for the contracts giving relative value to location, available 

land, and potential for modernization. Suffi cient time is required for 

member states to hold referendums and select sites for the bases. The 

construction and other associated costs for new bases will be offset 

by the closures and sales of hundreds of obsolete casernes as well as 

the energy and maintenance savings with modern facilities.

The NATO 3-3 Force Structure and division-sized bases fi ts 

perfectly with the new NATO Military Command Structure and 

NATO Response Force. Most importantly, the NATO 3-3 Force 

Structure provides a standing force for force generation, currently 

a long and tedious process within the Alliance. Integrated 

multinational divisions permit all NATO members to make a 

meaningful contribution and increase the interoperability (both 

vi
vii

technologically and procedurally) between the United States and its 

allies.

Recommendations:

• Adopt the NATO 3-3 Force Structure.

• Establish a NATO working group to explore nine division-sized 

bases.

• Adopt a public awareness campaign to inform member states 

of the need for a NATO 3-3 Force Structure and division-sized 

bases.

• Withdraw U.S. political support of, and a priori support of, the 

use of NATO assets for the EU Rapid Reaction Force.

The United States can have its cake and eat it too without appearing 

unilateralist. The United States needs a power security partner, and 

any decision which endangers that need will be to U.S. detriment. The 

implementation of these long-term recommendations will provide 

the Alliance with a powerful, sustainable expeditionary force and 

signifi cantly ease the security burden on the United States.

1

RECONFIGURING THE AMERICAN 

MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE

Introduction.

The United States and Europe are approaching a crossroads 

regarding common security interests. After the world wars of 

the 20th century, culminating in a cold war, few national security 

specialists in the United States would argue that the stability of 

Europe is not an enduring U.S. national security objective. In the 

same vain, while the European elite may wrinkle its collective nose 

at U.S. approaches to foreign policy, particularly with regard to the 

U.S. preference for the Big Stick approach, few in Europe would 

dispute the stabilizing benefi ts of American power. 

As America defi nes its new security posture vis-à-vis Europe, 

the issue of continued U.S. military presence in Europe will have 

enormous strategic implications within the Alliance. The United 

States has three basic options regarding its future presence in 

Europe--withdraw completely, rotate divisions for annual tours, or 

restructure the Alliance to accommodate a smaller U.S. presence.

The United States could exercise the option of status quo, 

meaning it maintains its presence more or less intact, even if this 

includes shifting ground forces farther east and southeast for closer 

proximity to the Middle East. This option does nothing to address 

U.S. global security concerns or the war on terror. As the number 

of these concerns, operations, and missions expand without a 

concomitant increase in the size of the military, existing regional 

commitments in Europe and Korea need to be revisited. Sooner or 

later something has to give, and if the United States missteps in its 

approach, the whole security apparatus, to include NATO, could 

collapse. Pragmatically, the status quo approach resolves nothing.

The three options provide the United States with the opportunity 

to harness existing resources more effi ciently. As this monograph 

addresses these choices, it explores their effect on U.S.-NATO 

relations, on NATO readiness, and on long-term cost benefi ts. 

Naturally, a failure to strike a balance among these issues may result 
2

in unintended consequences, causing irreparable damage to the 

Alliance. The intent of this monograph is to explore the pros and 

cons of the fi rst two options as a lead in to the third and preferred 

option. This option intentionally ignores existing U.S.-European 

Union (EU) initiatives, agendas, and frictions to get to the heart of 

the argument. Most of the obstacles go beyond the scope of this 

monograph and tend to obfuscate the basic need for change.

In discussing the reconfi guration of U.S. ground forces in Europe, 

the reconfi guration of NATO must also occur. Both go hand-inhand and represent the most profound way to redress U.S. strategic 

concerns as well as enduring problems within the Alliance.

Withdrawal from Europe.

A complete withdrawal of ground forces from Europe constitutes 

the most traumatic option for the health of the Alliance. Relying on 

its robust power projection capabilities, the United States would 

conceptually use select bases in Europe for the staging of ground 

and air forces to a crisis region. These bases would serve for interim 

reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of combined 

joint task forces (CJTF). Ground forces would also use available time 

at these bases to train on specifi c mission essential tasks. The use 

of way stations, sometimes called “lily pads,” presents the United 

States with substantial advantages.

Consolidation of ground forces in the United States permits 

greater strategic fl exibility for power projection. Given the limited 

available ground forces and growing global responsibilities, 

maintaining as many forces as possible in the homeland allows 

the United States to concentrate strategic air- and sea-lift for rapid 

projection of forces to any point in the world. 

The U.S. basing of units also obviates the reliance on European 

states for support of a diplomatically contentious operation. For 

instance, ground units stationed in Germany could be immobilized 

if the German government demonstrated its opposition to a military 

operation by denying or delaying the use of airspace, rail, airbases, 

and seaports, despite treaty obligations. Additionally, other 

European neighbors to Germany, such as Austria, Switzerland, 
3

and France, could complicate deployments by denying the use 

of airspace either as an invocation of neutrality or as a sign of 

displeasure regarding U.S. policy. As the EU gains prominence 

and given that it is often at loggerheads with the United States over 

virtually every issue, the problem of cooperation in Europe likely 

will grow. Even though obstructionist governments could derail 

the “lily pad” option as well, the United States would retain the 

fl exibility to bypass Europe.

Division readiness would benefi t from home stationing as well. 

Although Germany offers extraordinary personal and professional 

rewards, military service in Germany can be a trial. Decaying 

living and work facilities in pre-World War II casernes require 

vast expenditures for maintenance and renovation. Even though it 

would be cheaper in the long run to raze existing casernes and build 

anew, this option has never been exercised adequately. Living and 

working conditions remain spartan and demoralizing, especially 

when soldiers happen to see the modern German casernes. 

The scattering of brigade and smaller units throughout Germany 

in small casernes hampers coordination, training, and logistics, 

as well as creating to a redundancy in supply and administrative 

services. Training and readiness issues suffer the most though. Few 

casernes possess a maneuver training area. The vast majority of units 

must conduct annual training (sometimes less often) at Grafenwöhr, 

Hohenfels, or Baumholder for range qualifi cation and some 

maneuver exercise training. Far from routine, unit rotations to these 

training areas require extensive preparation. Weeks of coordination 

and preparation are required for rail movement, wheeled convoys, 

inprocessing (establishing ammunition and supply accounts, 

signing for billets and maintenance facilities, drawing ammunition, 

and range control certifi cation), and outprocessing (clearing the 

above accounts, cleaning and turning in issued property and items, 

initiating property accountability procedures, and billets and 

maintenance facility inspections), and rail and convoy deployment 

back to home station. Under this morass of bureaucracy, less time 

and effort is spent on training than getting to the training areas and 

back.

With the end of the Cold War, exercises in the German 

countryside are practically nonexistent. German environmental 
4

concerns, payments for maneuver damage, maneuver restrictions, 

and the danger to civilians are too great to make them worthwhile. 

In contrast to Germany, American posts accommodate whole 

divisions with contiguous, large maneuver training areas. None of 

the obstacles that hamstring units in Germany applies. Hence, unit 

readiness in the United States is considerably higher.

Withdrawal from Europe carries signifi cant strategic drawbacks 

though. Despite the advantages of basing ground forces in the 

United States, the effect on NATO would ultimately prove more 

deleterious to U.S. national security because it would directly affect 

the U.S. relationship with all NATO nations. Critics, who continue 

to harp on the lack of threat brought about by the fall of the Soviet 

empire, are intellectually mired in the Cold War. That the NATO 

Alliance no longer serves its original purpose is self-evident: from 

collective self-defense to the defense of collective interests. NATO 

has and continues to realign its vision, missions, and structure to 

address the new strategic realities. Simply put, NATO is no longer 

just a security umbrella for the protection of Europe; its shade has 

extended beyond. Just as the wheel has evolved exponentially 

beyond the original intent of its inventor, NATO has evolved beyond 

the wildest dreams of its creators.

The presence of U.S. ground troops in Europe represents a tangible 

U.S. commitment to NATO. The manner of this commitment differs 

greatly than the original design. Initially, the United States provided 

the air power (and by implication the nuclear umbrella), the United 

Kingdom—the sea power—and continental Europe—the land 

power. The complacency of the continental land powers (including 

the problems associated with rearming Germany) and the Soviet 

acquisition of the atomic bomb confounded this security arrangement 

should the Soviets invade. So the United States stationed permanent 

ground troops (initially four divisions) in Germany as a trip wire to 

deter Soviet fait accompli invasion stratagems.1 

American ground presence not only assured Europeans of the 

U.S. commitment; it also enhanced the infl uence of the United States 

in European security matters and engendered a binding trust in 

America among the allies. Admittedly, in terms of military power, 

U.S. air and naval power in Europe was substantial; nevertheless 
5

these forces were not as visible to the Europeans as ground forces, 

and because these forces could withdraw quickly out of harm’s way, 

their assurance to the Europeans could never match the presence of 

ground troops. Hence psychologically, U.S. ground forces provided 

greater security to the European psyche.

Had NATO and the United States not weathered a slew of crises 

together—Suez, 1956; Hungary, 1956; Berlin, 1961; France, 1967; 

Czechoslovakia, 1968; and Soviet saber rattling throughout the 1970s 

and 1980s—perhaps the issue of ground forces would be minor. But 

the fact remains, U.S. ground forces’ presence during these events 

reassured Europeans that American commitment through NATO 

remained stalwart. At this stage in the relationship, a withdrawal in 

any form (e.g., further reductions) represents a defi nitive break from 

the Alliance, a separation presaging the fi nal divorce. To a continent 

steeped in diplomatic cynicism, American assurances to the contrary 

are meaningless.

U.S. ground forces and headquarters stationed in the United 

States will certainly remain declared to NATO, but as other crises, 

national security concerns, and shifting priorities surface, the United 

States will become inattentive to Europe. U.S. participation in future 

NATO military operations would likely devolve to the Air Force or 

at best, an ad hoc arrangement with a U.S. Joint Task Force operating 

independently. Once U.S. ground forces are separated from their 

European counterparts, interoperability will decay. In a crisis, 

little time will be available for reacquaintance; hence the degree of 

cooperation will be limited. 

Inevitably, Europe will distance itself from the United States as 

well. European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) proponents 

will pounce on any opportunity to marginalize U.S. leadership in 

Europe, and a withdrawal would serve as a pretext to advance the 

EU agenda.

Because space abhors a vacuum, pan European politicos will use 

the withdrawal to advance their EU Rapid Reaction Force (EU RRF) 

initiative. For those unfamiliar with EU foreign policy, the EU RRF 

appears as a pragmatic and necessary force to revitalize European 

militaries. Professed as a fully modern, interoperable, expeditionary 

force of 60,000 troops, the EU RRF would play a larger role in coalition 
6

warfare and shoulder an equitable burden of military expenditures 

with the United States. As with prior European military ventures, 

the devil has always been in the details. Two enduring security 

matters plague the EU—inattentiveness to military readiness and 

embryonic federal institutions. 

As the headline goal for the establishment of the EU RRF was 

2003, European rhetoric has overreached badly. To date, the idea 

of a European expeditionary force is more fi gment than reality.2 In 

addition to insuffi cient troop strength, the EU RRF lacks adequate 

numbers of precision weapons, refueling aircraft, surveillance 

equipment, secure communications, and intra-theater airlift; and 

acquisition of these are at least a decade away. U.S. Ambassador to 

NATO R. Nicholson Burns has repeatedly warned that the European 

contribution to modern military operations will remain meager for 

years.3 European assurances regarding progress in the fi eld of 

modernization are cold gruel for the United States, which must 

shoulder the security burden while Europe ambles along. 

Of all the military defi ciencies, airlift capabilities are the most 

pertinent. Power projection defi nes the added value a nation 

brings to modern security alliances, and the issue of credible airlift 

capabilities directly affects Europe’s caliber of deterrence. As long as 

EU power projection capabilities remain mediocre, the use of a force 

mechanism, which is integral to deterrence, is missing. Adversarial 

parties may be willing to conduct talks with the EU, but they will not 

take them seriously. Moreover, without the ability to conduct initial 

entry operations, the EU RRF brings no added value to the United 

States in times of crisis. What practical reason is there for the United 

States to engage in coalition building with the EU?4

EU political institutions grant no mechanism for the rapid 

deployment of forces. European states show neither the desire 

nor the inclination to surrender their foreign policy to a central 

European polity. European ministries require months of debate 

before even agreeing to deploy forces.5 Without a central federal 

authority, unencumbered by consensus mechanisms, the potential 

rapid capabilities of the EU RRF will remain irrelevant. European 

federalists seek salvation in the common foreign and security policy, 

but this pursuit ignores Europe’s fundamental problems—trust 
7

and confi dence. It would truly be a wonder if Europe progressed 

politically beyond a loose confederation of states, given its historical 

baggage of inveterate mutual suspicions honed by centuries of 

intrigue and betrayal. On the other hand, the United States, through 

NATO, has a remarkable record of instilling common cause that no 

other European state has duplicated.6 The absence of U.S. ground 

forces in Europe risks marginalizing the U.S. leadership, and left to 

its own devices, the EU is unlikely to become a trustworthy security 

partner.

The belief that the EU RRF will ultimately benefi t NATO is 

illusory and detrimental to the Alliance. The hope that the EU 

RRF will become the European security pillar under NATO is 

fraught with risks. If ESDP advocates are less than candid about 

their intentions, the EU RRF will act as a Trojan horse, infecting the 

Alliance and destroying it from within. The EU diversion of scarce 

military spending from domestic military forces to fund ESDP and 

the frequent attempts to establish separate headquarters speak 

volumes regarding intent.7 Since the vast majority of NATO EU 

countries’ military expenditures fall far below the 2.0 percent of GDP 

requirement, the diversion of resources has a marked impact on 

the military readiness of NATO units.8 The fundamental question 

remains whether the EU RRF will be available for NATO missions—

unlikely.

The EU is committed to the Petersberg Tasks charter, which 

deals exclusively with humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping 

tasks, and crisis management, including peacekeeping.9 Once the 

EU RRF begins deploying on these missions, its availability as an 

expeditionary force for NATO is diminished. The EU RRF will 

depend largely on NATO support (command and control, airlift, 

combat support, and combat service support) for some time.10

Given that most deployments in support of the Petersberg Tasks 

will require an enduring presence, a substantial number of units will 

be involved in preparation, deployment, and recovery. Hence, not 

only will the EU RRF compete with NATO for scarce resources, but 

it will also consume NATO resources in the process.

The temptation for the EU to use the RRF as a counterbalance to 

U.S. power is alarming and not unfounded. The EU, more enamored 
8

with diplomacy and incentives, placing its “faith in international 

institutions, regimes and norms to tackle problems of common 

concern,”11 could use the EU RRF as a political weapon to stymie 

U.S. foreign policy. By denying NATO the use of the EU RRF during 

a crisis, the EU would have a political sledgehammer to humiliate 

and undermine the United States. Traditionally, the United States 

prefers to build coalitions bilaterally with NATO members during 

crises, so the impact of RRF denial would purely political. To 

counter this approach, France has introduced provisions in the EU 

draft constitution that prohibit bilateral agreements between the 

United States and individual EU states. In essence, EU member 

states would be compelled to adhere to the EU common foreign 

and security policy, preventing direct negotiations with the United 

States.12 Naturally, the EU seeks to form a solid political bloc, and 

EU enthusiasts would like nothing better than to dismantle the 

one organization from which the United States wields tremendous 

infl uence—NATO. As U.S. Ambassador Burns opines, “Their vision 

of Europe as a countervailing power to the United States is one that 

would destroy the cooperative spirit that has held us together in 

NATO.”13 

The danger posed by a complete withdrawal of ground troops 

from Europe is such that many Europeans may view it as a harbinger 

of complete U.S. detachment from the Alliance. The temptation 

will be great for EU advocates to fi ll the void with the EU RRF. 

Disturbingly, given the dearth of forces, funding, and resources, 

the EU RRF will not be able to fi ll the U.S. boots. It follows that the 

EU will clamor for a European Supreme Allied Commander Europe 

(SACEUR); after all, with no U.S. presence, what need is there for 

an American SACEUR? Europe’s demonstrated inattentiveness to 

military expenditures and modernization combined with the sole 

pursuit of Petersberg Tasks and the insidious policy of fettering 

the United States will result in an enervation of the Alliance and 

eventually its dissolution. Consolidating U.S. forces in the United 

States appears to make good military sense on paper, but in the end, 

the United States will fi nd itself shouldering more of the security 

burden than ever before.
9

The Annual Rotation of Divisions.

While not as drastic as a complete withdrawal, the adoption of 

a rotation policy represents a compromise of sorts. Although still 

highly speculative, the 1st Infantry and 1st Armored Divisions could 

rotate to the United States once their deployment in Iraq ends in 2004 

and 2006, respectively. It follows that the families and a number of 

civilian contractors would also move to the new home stations for 

both divisions. 

This option is not without substantial benefi ts for the Army. At 

some point, the United States will begin the rotation of divisions to 

Europe for 1-year tours. Without family members, the logistical 

footprint (i.e., travel, moving, family housing, shopping facilities, 

schools, etc.) will no longer be a factor and result in increased 

savings for the military. 

 Benefi ting from the insights gained from the stationing of troops 

in Germany, the United States should negotiate with potential 

host countries for division-sized posts with contiguous and large 

maneuver training areas. Additionally, the posts should have 

modern living and work facilities as well as land set aside for 

further expansion projects (simulation centers, additional ranges, 

urban combat centers, etc.). Granted, the expenses associated with 

building a new post are worth debating, and some points bear 

noting. Without family members and the attendant infrastructure 

requirements, the number of facilities would be drastically smaller 

than the norm. NATO pays for 75 percent of construction costs, 

with the United States footing 25 percent of the bill.14 Assuming 

an enduring commitment to NATO, the initial expense of new 

facilities would become offset over time as a result of energy savings 

and lowered upkeep requirements. Moreover, the cost savings of 

training in the maneuver training area as opposed to deploying to a 

training area will pay for itself. More importantly, U.S. units would 

enjoy the same training opportunities as their sister units in the 

United States. 

European NATO members are unlikely to split hairs over annual 

rotations or permanent basing. As long as the United States maintains 

a ground presence in Europe, the Alliance will have tangible proof of 
10

U.S. commitment, securing U.S. infl uence and leadership.

Despite its merits, annual rotations leave some problems 

unresolved and indeed raise new ones that question their 

practicability. The insights gleaned from rotations to the Sinai, 

Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq, suggest that, for every division 

deployed, two are tied up either in preparation for or recovery 

from the deployment. The noun “bureaucracy” may have French 

origins, but the U.S. Army made it profound. At a minimum, a 

division designated to rotate to Europe will begin the planning and 

preparation 6 months prior to deployment. Multiple command and 

staff recons (battalion to division) to the host station are a necessity. 

Preparation for oversees movement (POM) entails a myriad of details 

that consume a division’s time and resources to include activation of 

family support groups, designation of the rear detachment chain of 

command, identifi cation of nondeployable soldiers and requests 

for fi llers (the inevitable replacements for nondeployable soldiers), 

family care plans, palletizing personal and unit equipment, and 

processing through the Program Objective Management (POM) site, 

to name just a few key activities.

As an aside, any thought of reducing the rotations below a 

year doubles the number of divisions preparing or recovering 

from rotations. With an Army of ten divisions, this option is not 

sustainable.

The disparity in the types of U.S. divisions makes annual rotations 

particularly problematic.15 The Modifi ed Table of Organization and 

Equipment (MTOE) for each division is unique; hence a deploying 

division cannot simply assume control of its predecessor’s 

equipment. It really is like mixing apples and oranges, and leaves 

the Army with options that cause more problems than solutions. 

Divisions could deploy with all their equipment to Europe, 

which is cost prohibitive and time consuming. Once one 

calculates the round-trip movement costs—rail transportation to 

a seaport of debarkation, loading onto ships, sea transportation, 

air transportation, off-loading at the seaport of embarkation, and 

rail movement to their station—the Army annual budget rises 

exponentially. Factoring in a conservative movement time of 6 

weeks and approximately 1 month for maintenance recovery, a 
11

division consumes about 9 months in preparation and movement. 

No doubt, divisional units will continue a modicum level of training 

throughout, but the combat effectiveness of a division would remain 

an area of concern during and after a rotation.

The Army could adopt a standardized “European” division 

MTOE, which would require a reorganization of the division for 

the European MTOE. For each division earmarked for rotation, 

reorganization would add at least 2 more months of preparation 

time in order to request personnel from other units to fi ll the MTOE 

positions and to identify the personnel who cannot deploy because 

they are either excess or nonapplicable to the MTOE. Describing this 

process is not nearly as confusing as executing it. To make matters 

more complicated, if that is possible, a period of extensive train up 

for the entire division would be required. Assuming the European 

MTOE would be an armored or mechanized division, light infantry 

divisions (82nd, 101st, 25th, and 10th Mountain) would need to 

learn how to command and control armored and mechanized units 

as well as master maintenance and supply procedures. Add another 

4 months to the preparation time. Since light infantry has neither 

the inclination nor the desire to operate as a mechanized force, the 

equipment status ratings of the division would plummet under its 

tutelage.16 The most pragmatic course would be to use the heavy 

divisions (3rd Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry Division, 4th Infantry 

Division (Mechanized), 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), and 

1st Armored Division) for rotations. Despite variations in MTOE, 

they are more aligned to execute rotations with the least internal 

turbulence.

Using a light or eventual medium division MTOE in Europe 

would carry strategic disadvantages for the United States. Given 

that the light forces are the fi rst responders for global crises, in terms 

of strategic lift, they are far easier to deploy from the United States 

than elsewhere, particularly for the Pacifi c Rim region.

The option of just rotating brigades into Europe does not resolve 

the inherent problems. Preparation and realignment requirements 

will not diminish, and cobbling together brigades and support units 

for the rotation will require a fair amount of time before they become 

cohesive. Assuming that the division headquarters at home station 
12

and the host nation remain stationary, both will need to expend 

inordinate amounts of time in the logistical and administrative 

movements of rotating their brigades and supporting units. If 

the idea is simply to rotate independent brigades to Europe, then 

each will require its own support package--hardly an effi cient use 

of limited resources. This option only makes sense if the Army 

converts to an independent brigade-based organization, hence 

eliminating division headquarters. Until that happens however, the 

brigade rotation option will lead to redundancies and infrastructure 

requirements that currently plague the Army in Europe. 

Of course, rotations cannot be implemented in a vacuum. 

Existing security obligations (Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq, to 

date), limit the availability of divisions and, more importantly, the 

command headquarters. The result would be an army in perpetual 

deployment, with soldiers spending an exorbitant amount of time 

away from their families. In time, this problem would self-correct—

just as soon as all the divorces are fi nalized—but then again, the 

retention issue might raise its ugly head. 

The rotation system carries implications for the Alliance as well. 

One of the strengths of the Army system lies in the family community. 

Military families bring a sense of cohesiveness that transcends 

other professions. The family community also draws U.S. forces 

indefi nably closer to the host communities. Daily contacts through 

mutual sports events, schools, business, employment, shopping, 

and sightseeing create bonds. Absent the family community, host 

countries are unlikely to form a special relationship with their U.S. 

partners. To be sure, they will not enjoy the economic benefi ts or the 

cultural exchange opportunities. In short, U.S. forces would remain 

one step removed from an occupation force, no matter how benign. 

Rotating divisions is not just a challenge—the euphemistic 

“opportunity to succeed” that Army commanders enjoy saying 

when given a particularly diffi cult task—it is a bad idea. As with 

total withdrawal, it sends a message that the United States is trying 

to fi nd a way, step-by-step, to disengage itself from the Alliance. 

More importantly, it does not solve the fundamental problems that 

have plagued the Alliance since the end of the Cold War—burden 

sharing.
13

The Challenge for the United States in Europe.

The question of whether to withdraw or rotate ground troops 

does not address the basic problem confronting the United States visà-vis Europe. Namely, the United States must ensure its leadership 

and infl uence in Europe remain solid; it must reduce its presence in 

Europe as part of its global realignment, but do so without risking its 

commitment to Europe; and it must fi nd a way to make the Alliance 

more effective militarily so it can actively participate in ground 

operations.

For some time now, the United States has shouldered the 

lion’s share of the military burden because of an imbalance in 

interoperability. This is partly technical, but a large part of it is also 

procedural. The key to working more closely does not lie solely with 

compatible equipment, munitions, and repair parts; to operate as a 

team, partner units need to train with one another regularly. The 

geographic separation of Alliance military units remains a major 

obstacle to greater cooperation.

Adoption of a New NATO Force Structure.

The United States must fundamentally change the way it 

operates within NATO. The U.S. Army cannot charge ahead with 

Transformation and then carp about its NATO partner militaries 

not carrying their own weight. NATO European nations are not 

inclined to spend more money on the military, at least not in a way 

which will benefi t the Alliance. To achieve greater integration and 

interoperability and a greater degree of allied cooperation in NATO 

operations, the Alliance must organize into permanent integrated 

divisions.

Permanent multinational integrated divisions provide numerous 

benefi ts to the Alliance as an expeditionary force and to the United 

States for burdensharing. Under this concept, NATO can downsize 

to nine divisions, resulting in an overall savings of millions of dollars 

per year. The Alliance can direct this money towards modernization 

and the establishment of nine division-sized posts. This size force 

is more than adequate to address most security threats immediately, 
14

and would permit the Alliance to mobilize. Integrated divisions 

permit all members to contribute to NATO operations automatically, 

eliminating the need to build coalitions of the willing and resort to 

the tedious and time intensive force generation process. At the 

national level, integrated divisions negate the practice of passive 

nonparticipation in NATO missions. Participation is automatic 

unless individual partners actively opt not to participate. Exercising 

nonparticipation places a heavy political burden on a member state 

to declare publicly the reasons for withdrawing from the mission. 

The onus for taking such a stance weighs particularly heavy on a 

state since it carries with it diplomatic consequences. Breaking faith 

with the Alliance and risking political isolation would cause even the 

most obstreperous members to pause before crossing the Rubicon. 

At the national level, the member state contribution would 

represent only a small part of the national army. Because NATO 

would only be concerned with the quality of the contributed force, 

the readiness of a partner state’s remaining armed forces is of no 

import to the Alliance, nor is the overall level of gross domestic 

product (GDP) committed to military expenditures. A member 

state’s military contribution to NATO would be a factor of its wealth, 

population size, and military capabilities (Table 1). Member states 

must ensure their military contribution is compatible with the rest of 

NATO, as well as fully manned, equipped, and modernized.

For collective defense to be truly equitable and effective, the 

larger and wealthier partners must bear the greater burden, but as 

the table shows, the burden is not onerous. The United States proves 

the exception because of its global responsibilities and stationing. 

Still, the U.S. contribution is measured in brigades, not to mention 

Special Operating Forces and headquarters not included in the 

table. 

The new NATO force structure requires an expeditionary 

capability with the fl exibility to task-organize according to the 

mission before deploying. A CJTF confi guration with permanent 

CJTF headquarters is appropriate. The expeditionary qualities of 

a permanent CJTF forces NATO to train, think, and operate as a 

cohesive entity. If NATO can train as a CJTF, it will fi ght as a CJTF. 
15

Country Population 

(in 000’s) 2002

GDP (PPP 

in Billions of 

U.S. $) 2002

GDP per 

Capita 

(PPP). a

Active 

Force b MilitaryContribution Contribution Military

Belgium 10,275 297.6 29,000 39,260 5 units

Bulgaria 7,621 50.6 6,600 68,450 4 units

Canada 31,902 923.0 29,400 52,300 6 units

Czech Rep 10,257 155.9 15,300 49,450 5 units

Denmark 5,369 155.5 29,000 22,700 4 units

Estonia 1,416 15.2 10,900 5,510 4 units

France 59,766 1,540.0 25,700 260,400 6 units

Germany 83,252 2,184.0 26,600 296,000 7 units

Greece 10,645 201.1 19,000 177,600 5 units

Hungary 10,075 134.7 13,300 33,400 4 units

Iceland 279 7.7 27,100 120 c ---

Italy 57,716 1,438.0 25,000 216,800 6 units

Latvia 2,366 20.0 8,300 5,500 2 units

Lithuania 3,601 29.2 8,400 13,510 4 units

Luxembourg 448 20.0 44,000 900 1 unit

Netherlands 16,068 434.0 26,900 49,580 6 units

Norway 4,525 143.0 31,800 26,600 5 units

Poland 38,625 368.1 9,500 163,000 5 units

Portugal 10,084 182.0 18,000 43,600 4 units

Romania 22,317 152.7 6,800 99,200 3 units

Slovakia 5,422 66.0 12,200 26,200 3 units

Slovenia 1,933 36.0 18,000 9,000 3 units

Spain 40,077 828.0 20,700 177,950 4 units

Turkey 67,309 468.0 7,000 514,850 4 units

UK 59,778 1,520.0 25,300 210,450 4 units

USA 280,562 10,082.0 36,300 1,414,000 4 units

a Derive by dividing GDP (PPP) by population.

b

 IISS, The Military Balance 2002-2003. c

 Paramilitary forces.

Source: CIA, The World Fact Book, 2002, Internet, http:/www.odci.gov.cia/ publications/

fact book/ index.html.

Table 1. Military Contributions of NATO States.
16

The nine divisions are organized into three permanent CJTFs 

with three divisions assigned—light, medium, and light—coined the 

NATO 3-3 Force Structure. With the new NATO Readiness Force, 

SOF, and other government, nongovernment, and international 

organizations assigned to the CJTF headquarters, the NATO 3-3 

Force Structure refl ects an alignment for the strategic environment 

(Table 2). 

The formal assignment of a multinational Special Forces battalion 

provides unique capabilities to the CJTF. Special Forces are critical 

for shaping success in an unstable or crisis region. Often deployed 

into troubled regions well in advance, these forces gain an intimate 

understanding of unique issues and impart their insights to the CJTF 

command and staff, which in turn can conduct mission planning 

and preparation as a contingency. Because virtually every country 

has Special Operating Forces, each of which bring niche capabilities 

and skills, it is worth exploring forming SF multinational battalions, 

permitting a greater sharing of skills, ideas, and experiences.

Reconfi guring into integrated multinational divisions is not 

without obstacles though. The issue of sovereignty will need to be 

vetted by the Alliance. Under this organization, countries would 

surrender a degree of command authority of the contributed units 

to the Alliance.17 Because any multilateral agreement regarding 

the assignment and employment of the contributed units for 

training and deployment precludes the Transfer of Authority (TOA) 

requirement, member states may fear the domestic repercussions 

of a deployment in support of a contentious security issue. Rather 

than face the diplomatic repercussions of withdrawing their forces 

during a crisis, it would be more astute not to support the initiative. 

The member state offi cer corps would quickly realize that this 

fundamental reorganization would negatively affect the size of their 

armed forces, career paths, and national prestige. This issue would 

also require serious discussion to ensure member states maintain a 

military hedge to their nation’s security strategy even if it leads to 

some redundancy. 

Some states, like the United States, may not relish the idea of 

being under foreign commanders, even though its troops have 

served under foreign commanders before (since 1776). Furthermore, 
17

Table 2. Proposed NATO 3-3 Force Structure.

Country

CJTF 1 (USA) CJTF 2 (UK) CJTF 3 (GER)NRF, SOF, CA, PSYOPS, IO, NGO, PVO NRF, SOF, CA, PSYOPS, IO, NGO, PVO NRF, SOF, CA, PSYOPS, IO, NGO, PVODivision (Light)

Division (Medium)

Division(Heavy)

Division(Light)

Division(Medium)

Division(Heavy)

Division(Light)

Division(Medium)

Division(Heavy)

Belgium Artillery Engineer MI Mil Police Div HHC MotorizedBulgaria Mil Police Signal Artillery Lt InfantryCanada Motorized ADA Support Div HHC Airborne Signal ArtilleryCzech Rep ADA Artillery Engineer NBC RSTADenmark Motorized Aviation Artillery ArmorEstonia Support Mil Police ADA SignalFrance Airborne Div HHC

Motorized

Aviation Gendarme MI Mechanized

Germany MI Signal Engineer Aviation Motorized Mountain Div HHC ArmorGreece Signal Artillery Div HHC Motorized MI ADAHungary ADA Lt Infantry Signal Mil PoliceItaly Artillery Div HHC Mountain Mil Police Mechanized Motorized AviationLatvia Gendarme SupportLithuania RSTA ADA Mil Police MILuxembourg SupportNetherlands Support Mechanized MI Aviation Artillery EngineerNorway Div HHC Mountain Support Engineer Aviation NBCPoland Motorized Signal Armor Artillery SupportPortugal Engineer RSTA MI SupportRomania Engineer MI MotorizedSlovakia ADA NBC EngineerSlovenia Gendarme ADA SignalSpain Armor Aviation Signal EngineerTurkey Mountain Support Motorized ADAUK Aviation MI Div HHC

Armor Engineer

USA Aviation Motorized Div HHC

Armor

Airborne
18

reorganizing into multinational divisions is just plain diffi cult. 

The divisional readiness levels would be low for a time while the 

division reconciles the language barriers, differing procedures, and 

equipment compatibility. 

Nonetheless, coalition warfare and by extension the use of 

multinational divisions have become a reality in modern warfare 

(e.g., the on-going operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan). 

Resolving the problems in peacetime is less costly than in the midst 

of a confl ict. Finally, the long-term implications of reorganization 

are such that the United States will enjoy an increasing level of active 

participation from all member states rather than a select few. 

Basing Considerations.

The adoption of nine integrated multinational divisions permits 

European countries to replace hundreds of small casernes with nine 

large bases. Three criteria shape the establishment of these bases—

location, land, and costs.

The security challenges for Europe no longer lie to the east but 

to the south and southeast. The orientation of NATO towards the 

Middle East and Africa requires forces that can deploy quickly using 

a combination of intertheater aircraft, sealift, and rail movement. 

Given the volatility of these outlying regions, deployment times 

must be measured in days, not weeks. Turkey, Greece, Romania, 

and Bulgaria appear best sited for power projection posture to the 

Middle East, whereas Italy, France, and Spain provide superb access 

to the Mediterranean Basin and Africa. Of the nine divisions, only 

the three heavy divisions require quick access to seaports. The 

rest can be located anywhere in Europe that has suffi cient airbase 

infrastructures. So, the impression that central Europe has no 

geostrategic relevance understates the fl exibility of airlift.

Availability of suffi cient land for a division-sized base with a 

contiguous maneuver training area requires the greatest scrutiny 

because such bases are essential for readiness. NATO must solicit 

competitive land contracts formally among its members. The Alliance 

must view this initiative as a long-term project to give member states 

time to acquire suffi cient space for these bases. This period will 
19

permit member states to study possible sites which match NATO’s 

land requirements, vote on the proposition, and relocate affected 

citizens once NATO approves the contract. This monograph does 

not advocate the uprooting of entire villages such as practiced by 

autocratic regimes. Instead, these governments must recognize the 

familial ties to the land and the village. Given the tremendous cost 

savings from closing obsolete casernes and the attendant land sales, 

governments can compensate the affected citizens above the value 

of their property and the cost of relocating (including family burial 

plots). This issue is so delicate and fraught with potential excesses, 

that NATO (or EU) must establish an oversight commission during 

its execution. For member states, two incentives infl uence their 

desire to win the basing contract: prestige regarding the contribution 

to the Alliance, and tremendous positive economic impact of having 

NATO bases in their country. 

The Anatomy of a Base.

The size, infrastructure, and design of the new NATO bases must 

refl ect the transformational requirements to meet future strategic 

challenges. Modern living and working facilities represent only a 

portion of the land needed. To preclude the problems associated with 

training in Germany, the maneuver training area must be contiguous 

to the base and possess suffi cient land to permit the unhindered 

exercise maneuver of at least two brigade combat teams, plus the 

construction of ranges, simulation centers, specialty facilities/areas 

(e.g., urban combat, peacekeeping base camp, strong point, and 

forest combat), and an airfi eld. Ultimately, land requirements are 

predicated on the type of division. Heavy divisions will need greater 

space and more open terrain than light and medium divisions, so 

member states can bid on the type division that is most adaptive to 

their landscape. Hence, an armored division would be well-suited 

in the open expanses of Spain, and a light division quite comfortable 

in the mountainous regions of Greece and Italy.

Due to the size of a heavy division base, the CJTF headquarters 

is ideally suited for co-location or in the vicinity. The location of 

the airfi eld permits the DCFTF to deploy quickly, and the large 
20

maneuver training area permits combined joint training exercises 

with its echelons above division units, and elements of its light, 

medium, and heavy divisions. 

Large maneuver training areas accommodate multiple units 

training in noncontiguous operations, which characterize Rapid 

Decisive Operations. Modern ranges—from small arms to combined 

arms to joint arms—permit the full array of ground and air units to 

exercise capabilities in a permissive environment. As recent confl icts 

have demonstrated, conducting joint operations only during combat 

operations is rife with hazards and unintended consequences. Stateof-the-art simulation centers for weapons training, driver training, 

command and control training, and war gaming provide tremendous 

benefi ts at low cost.

As confl ict grows in complexity, honing combat skills in 

specialty facilities pays high dividends. Confl ict trends reveal that 

urban terrain will fi gure more prominently in future operations. 

Combat training and security and stability operations in urban 

terrain are absolutely critical. Ideally, any abandoned villages as a 

result of citizen relocation should be incorporated into the maneuver 

training area. A prime example of a premier urban combat center 

is Bonnland, Germany, which was an actual village prior to World 

War II. Bonnland’s town grid, construction and layout of buildings, 

underground system, and surrounding areas give unequaled 

training benefi ts and realism to urban combat training. Attempting 

to build such villages from scratch would likely be too expensive to 

be worthwhile. For realism, cost savings, and training benefi ts, the 

conversion of an existing village is the best solution.

A peacekeeping base camp permits units to train in a crisis 

environment with concurrent training in immediate action drills, 

deploying a quick reaction force, operating check points, clearing 

hasty minefi elds, and conducting control of civilians on the 

battlefi eld.

Reserving an area for strong points permits soldiers to experience 

the tremendous value of defending and the excruciating diffi culty in 

reducing entrenchments. To preclude units from gaining too great 

a familiarity of the layout, strong points should be dismantled and 

the area leveled after each training exercise. This approach permits 
21

units to vary the design of strong points as well as training leaders 

and soldiers on the planning and preparation of a strong point. 

The forest combat area familiarizes units with the diffi culties of 

operating in wooded terrain. This highly perishable skill is usually 

tested upon the fi rst enemy contact in combat with devastating 

results. U.S. units at least have the opportunity to train in such 

terrain at their home station maneuver training areas and at the 

Joint Readiness Training Center. European units rarely have the 

opportunity to train in such areas because they are only available 

in civilian sectors and are subject to environmental restrictions. 

On military reservations, the military can be good stewards of the 

environment and still receive valuable training. The byword should 

be “No more Huertgen Forests.”

A C-17 capable airfi eld would serve several purposes. Naturally, 

it would serve for airlifting the NRF, DJFT, and HRF to a crisis 

region, and it would serve as a staging area for training involving 

army aviation and air squadrons. Ground units would also use the 

airfi eld for forced entry and hostage rescue training.

Integrated multinational divisions offer numerous intangibles 

that enhance cohesion and a sense of community. Living and 

training in one location permit allies interpersonal contact as a 

matter of routine. This proximity fosters immersion in English 

(NATO’s offi cial language), training procedures, and cooperation 

among partner units. The current practice of major training 

exercises conducted infrequently may have value at the higher 

echelons of command, but has limited value at lower levels because 

skills acquired from collective and combined training are perishable. 

If not conducted routinely within the division training management 

cycle, they disappear quickly.

The construction of family housing and supporting infrastructure 

is not a frivolous or profl igate expense. Military communities 

form unique bonds, which enhance division cohesion. The daily 

interaction of allied and U.S. families will lead to a quickening of 

integration through the friendships formed. Frequent contacts 

among families, as well as exposure to Armed Forces Network (TV) 

and radio improve language skills, ease the cultural adjustment 

period and create informal lines of communication among soldiers. 
22

Because the United States would have a reduced force of four 

brigades and headquarters staffs, its family footprint would be 

relatively small, and an assignment to NATO would not become 

a hardship tour for married soldiers with the family problems that 

occur when a military spouse is deployed over an extended period.

Partnership extends beyond the gates of the base. The reputation 

of NATO begins or is enhanced in the local community. Mutual 

participation in base open houses, local festivals, and other special 

events create deeper relations between host nation citizens and the 

military. Employing the local populace for citizens in the battlefi eld 

training provides a readily available resource at minimum cost. 

Investment in these training complexes seems cost prohibitive. 

To reiterate, modern living and maintenance facilities and a nearby 

maneuver training area provide tremendous fi nancial savings 

and more time available for training. The maintenance and 

operating costs of these facilities would be a fraction of the current 

maintenance and renovation costs associated with antiquated, preWorld War II casernes in Germany. The proximity of the facilities 

to the contiguous training area obviates the costs associated with 

rail and convoy movement. Signifi cantly, units need not spend 

the hundreds of man-hours coordinating in-processing and 

outprocessing currently associated with the major training centers in 

Germany. NATO members share associated costs (the United States 

pays for 25 percent of common costs).18 Moreover, the tremendous 

cost savings associated with smaller and fewer units make these 

centers fungible. Since the U.S. presence in Europe is enduring, the 

investment in modern facilities makes economic sense.

Rather than accepting the visceral arguments that new NATO 

bases are too intrusive and cost prohibitive, one should acknowledge 

that the consolidation of modern facilities and training areas at 

only nine bases saves time, resources, and money in the long term. 

Instead of the cluster of casernes with distant scattered maneuver 

training areas in Germany, units can enjoy superb, immediate, 

recurrent combined-joint training with responsible impact on the 

environment and little intrusion on the citizens of the host country. 

Stationing integrated multinational divisions at nine European bases 

permits the United States to reduce its force contribution without 
23

marring the sensibilities of U.S. commitment to the Alliance.

The operative question is whether this restructuring of NATO is 

adaptable to the NATO command and force structure. If it is not, 

the concept becomes impractical. The recent reforms, following the 

November 21-22, 2002, Prague Summit, have set the conditions for 

this operational restructuring.

The Streamlined Military Command Structure.

Considering that NATO’s military command structure during 

the height of the Cold War stood at 78 major headquarters, the recent 

reorganization to just eleven major headquarters is remarkable (see 

Figure 1).19 

The redesignation of the strategic commands as Atlantic 

Command Transformation (ACT) and Allied Command Operations 

(ACO) reveals a greater commitment to transformation and 

expeditionary capabilities.20

Formerly the Allied Command Europe (ACE), ACO has 

streamlined into three major joint forces commands, each with an 

expeditionary posture. Joint Headquarters Command is located in 

Lisbon and has assumed the operational command function of the 

former SACLANT with the capability to form a maritime CJTF.21

Joint Forces Command North and South integrate their land, air, and 

naval component commands into functional joint forces. Between 

them, they can form a land-based CJTF.22 For the fi rst time in its 

history, NATO is structured and beginning to think as a combinedjoint expeditionary force.

NATO’s International Military Staff conceives a new force 

structure that permits units “to rapidly deploy to crisis areas and 

remain sustainable, be it within or outside NATO’s territory, in 

support of both Article 5 and Non-Article 5 operations.”23 Since 

the majority of NATO’s current ground forces are unwieldy and 

lack the crucial strategic mobility, the military staff’s criteria for 

highly deployable tactical forces with requisite tactical and strategic 

mobility are essential to expeditionary operations.24 Multinationality 

characterizes another key feature of the new force structure, 

permitting partner countries and international organizations a 
24

Figure 1. NATO Military Command Structure.
25

defi nitive role in NATO operations while exhibiting to potential 

threats “solidarity and its political cohesiveness.”25

Because the NATO force structure is the force provider for the 

land-based CJTF, it should provide the CJTF with its expeditionary 

character. In this capacity, it falls short. NATO basically has 

repackaged the tactical units into high and low readiness forces 

without really improving their tactical and strategic mobility. The 

High Readiness Forces-Land (HRF-L) fl uctuates in size from the 

Spanish division-equivalent corps to the 10-division Allied Rapid 

Reaction Corps (ARRC) with deployment criteria of 90 days or less 

upon alert. Since the two Deployable Combined Air Operations 

Centers (DCAOC) and the High Readiness Forces-Maritime have the 

capability to deploy within hours and days, the HRF-L becomes the 

bottleneck. The Forces of Lower Readiness are intended to reinforce 

and sustain an operation if needed.26 But, if the various divisions of 

the HRF-L are insuffi cient, how would two to four more divisions 

of the Forces of Lower Readiness-Land (FLR-L) be enough? They 

would not, and hence only give the impression that other member 

states are active participants. In a serious crisis, the HRF-L would 

provide the time for member states to mobilize their armed forces. 

The multinational character of the HRF-L is suspect as well. 

A multinational corps is a mere pretense to true multinational 

participation. Its subordinate units remain national by organization 

and are geographically separated. Since integrated multinational 

divisions provide all the necessary elements for participation and 

burden sharing, and since the organization of CJTFs into light, 

medium, and heavy divisions enhance rapid deployment, it is logical 

that the NATO force structure should comprise nine integrated 

multinational divisions.

The NATO Response Force.

Critics could point out that the NATO Response Force (NRF) 

provides the NATO force structure with its expeditionary component 

with a deployment readiness of 5-30 days (see Figure 2).27 With an 

initial strength of 5,000 by October 2003 and a target of 20,000 by 

2006, the NRF is a remarkable organization and would fi t perfectly 
26

with the recommended NATO 3-3 Force Structure.28 NATO’s criteria 

for the NRF were precise: 

a technologically advanced, fl exible, deployable, inter-operable and 

sustainable force, including land, sea and air elements ready to move 

quickly to wherever needed. It will serve two distinct but mutually 

reinforcing purposes. First, it will provide high-readiness force able to 

move quickly to wherever it may be required to carry out the full range 

of Alliance missions. Second, the NRF will be a catalyst for focusing and 

promoting improvements in the Alliance’s military capabilities and, 

more generally, for their continuing transformation to meet evolving 

security challenges.29 

The NRF will be able to act independently or as the initial entry force 

for the HRF and will be self-sustaining for 30 days.30

Figure 2. NATO’s Graduated Response Forces.

In consonance with NATO’s new missions, the NRF missions 

include crisis response (including peacekeeping), support of counterterrorism operations, consequence management (including chemical, 

biological, radiological, and nuclear events and humanitarian 
27

crises), peace enforcement, embargo operations (maritime, initial 

land, and no-fl y zone), initial entry force, demonstrative force pack 

(quick response operations), and noncombatant evacuation.31 As 

is apparent, NATO’s missions not only overlap the EU Petersberg 

Tasks but also have the robust capability to execute them.

The tip of NATO’s spear is the Very High Readiness Force, 

a battalion-sized joint task force (see Figure 3).32 It forms the 

vanguard of the NRF’s initial entry brigade with a potent forced 

entry capability. NATO discovered that the CJTF was too unwieldy 

a headquarters to deploy and thus developed the Deployable Joint 

Task Force (DJTF) concept. So even though the original NATO plan 

is to form CJTFs from subordinate JFCCs, DJTFs will become the 

command and control for the NRF and by extension the HRF (see 

Figure 4).33 

Figure 3. Very High Readiness Force.
28

NRF/VHRF NRF/VHRF NRF/VHRF

JFC

CJTF

DJTF

HRF (L) HQ HRF (M) HQ

Corps Task Forces Air Forces

HRF (A) HQ

Initial Entry Bde NRF (M) Module NRF (A) Module

Generated 

Forces

Generated 

Forces

Generated 

Forces

Figure 4. Command and Control.

The signifi cant and unnecessary problem with the current force 

structure arises from the issue of force generation. The generated 

forces for the NRF originate from the HRF ground, naval, and air 

forces. NRF force generation is a two-phased process initiated a 

year prior to units assuming the duty. The initial force generation 

conference creates the generic force in accordance with the Combined 

Joint Statement of Requirement. The fi nal conference determines 

the specifi c make up of the force upon activation and once the JFC 

mission analysis tailors the force.34 

Even though NATO is well-versed in force generation, the 

process is involved, and may require artful negotiations with 

Alliance members to pledge specifi c forces for the NRF. Force 

generation conferences resemble negotiations because Alliance 

members may be reluctant to contribute forces or opt to contribute 

forces that are unsuited or not needed for a task force (e.g., infantry 

versus engineer units).35 Such a process requires months to garner 

the necessary forces and is ill-suited for tailoring high readiness 

forces for crisis response. Force generation is likely to remain a 

contentious issue as long as the Alliance maintains its current form 

of segregated divisions.
29

The NATO 3-3 Force Structure greatly reduces the tedious force 

generation process. If a member state declines to participate in an 

operation, the redundancies provided by the 3-3 Force Structure 

permit the replacement of the unit. With a ready-made force 

postured already for expeditionary operations, the CJTF command 

and staff generates the forces for the NRF quickly, effi ciently, and 

most important, equitably.

NATO has made great strides with reforms as it postures to 

meet the challenges of the 21st century. Certainly, no other security 

organization exists in Europe to compete with the Alliance. Given 

the tremendous almost revolutionary drive of NATO towards 

reform since the end of the Cold War, continued reform is expected. 

The fi nal step lies in the adoption of the 3-3 Force Structure. With 

such a force, NATO will achieve assured expeditionary capabilities. 

Conclusions.

As it reconfi gures its ground forces in Europe, the United States 

must consider the ramifi cations of its decisions. If reconfi guration 

results in a military divorce between the United States and Europe, 

the Alliance will be doomed. Prominent fi gures on both sides of 

the Atlantic would like nothing better than to see the demise of the 

Alliance in pursuit of their own agendas. A rash decision regarding 

the basing of U.S. ground forces would only serve the purposes of 

NATO’s opponents.

A withdrawal of U.S. ground forces would create the impression that the United States is no longer serious about the Alliance. 

Alleged pan-Europeanists would use this action as a pretext to 

replace the United States with the EU RRF. It would only be a matter 

of time before the SACEUR is replaced by a European commander. 

The rotation of U.S. divisions on a yearly basis would likewise create 

the impression of a diminished U.S. commitment to the Alliance. 

Worse, the execution of this scheme would be too disruptive to 

the U.S. Army to be practical. The United States experimented 

with a similar rotational system during the Cold War, and it was 

discontinued due to the diffi culties in implementation. The proposed 

NATO 3-3 Force Structure permits the United States to downsize its 
30

presence in Europe without undermining the Alliance.

The proposed NATO 3-3 Force Structure permits the 

development of a long-term plan for dealing with the lingering 

problems of collective contributions, force generation, and basing. 

Downsizing the Alliance to nine integrated multinational divisions 

not only makes budgeting and burden-sharing sense, it also permits 

all Alliance members to make meaningful contributions and take 

shared risks in security matters. This initiative also permits the 

United States to downsize its ground presence to about four brigades, 

a Special Forces component, and two major headquarters—a size of 

about 10,000-12,000 personnel. 

If the Alliance does not adopt the integrated multinational 

division concept, the European side of the Alliance will continue as 

a junior partner with diminishing contributions. Moreover, without 

these divisions, Europeans will view the downsizing of U.S. ground 

units as another example of U.S. disengagement from Europe. The 

NATO 3-3 Force Structure provides an immediate source for force 

generation, particularly combat support and combat service support 

units, which the Alliance lacks in suffi cient numbers. Moreover, 

NATO can conduct long-term deployments without over-extending 

itself or over-using key units and personnel.

As a long-term initiative, NATO needs to realign its basing 

concept to permit swifter access to out-of-area regions and the 

consolidation of land and resources. Division-sized bases with 

living, working, and training facilities, as opposed to hundreds of 

small casernes scattered throughout Europe, enhance unit readiness, 

interoperability, and cohesion within the Alliance.

Recommendations:

• Adoption of the NATO 3-3 Force Structure.

• Establishment of a NATO working group to explore nine 

division-sized bases.

• Adoption of a public awareness campaign to inform member 

states of the need for a NATO 3-3 Force Structure and divisionsized bases.

• U.S. withdrawal of political support of, and a priori support of, 

the use of NATO assets for the EU Rapid Reaction Force.
31

The United States can have its cake and eat it, too, without 

appearing unilateralist. The United States needs a power security 

partner, and any decision which endangers that need will be 

to the U.S. detriment. The implementation of these long-term 

recommendations will provide the Alliance with a powerful, 

sustainable expeditionary force and signifi cantly ease the U.S. 

security burden.

ENDNOTES

1. Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States, Boston: Twayne 

Publishers, 1988, pp. 39-48, 61-62. Although atomic weapons were the backbone 

of the security umbrella, the presence of U.S. ground troops clearly implied that 

the United States would go to war if the Soviets invaded Western Europe, hence 

bolstering deterrence.

2. “Ready, or Not: Europe’s not-so-rapid-reaction force,” Economist, May 24-

30, 2003, Internet http://ebird.dtic.mil/May2003/ s20030523187678.html, p.1

3. The Economist, p. 1; R. Nicholas Burns, “NATO Has Adapted: An Alliance 

With A New Mission,” International Herald Tribune, May 24-25, 2003, Internet http:

//ebird.dtic.mil/May2003/s20030527187885.html, p.1.

4. Lorenzo Cortes, “Wald: Europeans Not Addressing Strategic Lift Defi cit 

With A400M,” Defense Daily, September 3, 2003, Internet http://ebird.dtic.mil/

Sep2003/s20030903213389.html.

5. Illustrating this gridlock is the EU intervention into Albania in 1997 in which 

the EU states became so mired in debate that an Italian-led coalition was forced 

to resolve the crisis nearly 5 months after it emerged. Even the EU intervention 

in Congo (Operation ARTEMIS) from June to September 2003 can hardly qualify 

as successful crisis action planning since France provided the lion’s share of the 

contribution, and hence few members shared any risks for debate.

6. Even without conjuring up the Cold War solidarity, the military and postconfl ict operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and even Iraq illustrate the 

dynamics of U.S. leadership regarding coalition building.

7. John O’Sullivan, “Ill-Conceived European Defense Alliance Gains Steam,” 

Chicago Sun Times, October 21, 2003, Internet, http://ebird.afi s.osd.mil/ebfi les/

s20031022226578.html.

8. Raymond A. Millen, PAX NATO: The Opportunities of Enlargement, U.S. 

Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2002, pp. 14-15.
32

9. Dr. Andrew Dorman, European Adaptation to Expeditionary Warfare: 

Implications for the United States Army, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 

Strategic Studies Institute, August 2002, p. 6. 

10. By the Berlin Plus agreement between NATO and the EU, the EU is 

permitted access to “NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led Crisis Management 

Operations.” “Berlin Plus Agreement,” SHAPE Information, Internet, http://www.

anto.int/shape/news/2003/shape_eu/se030822a.htm. See also Philip Shishkin, “U.S. 

Decries EU Plan To Set Up Military Center Outside NATO,” Wall Street Journal, 

October 3, 2003, Internet, http://ebird.afi s.osd.mil/ebfi les/s20031003221877.html.

11. Ivo H. Daalder, “Are the United States and Europe heading for divorce?” 

International Affairs, Vol. 77, Issue 3, 2001, pp. 553, 561.

12. Bernard Jenkin, “Europe Must Stop Trying To Compete With NATO,” 

London Financial Times, October 8, 2003, Internet, http://ebird.afi s.osd.mil/ebfi les/

s20031008222970.html.

13. Burns, p. 2.

14. John J. Lis and Zachary Selden, NATO Burdensharing After Enlargement, 

Congressional Budget Offi ce, August 2001, Internet, http://www.cbo.gov/

showdoc.cfm?index-2976&sequence=0&from=0, pp.4-5. See also Report to the Congress 

on the Military Requirements and Costs of NATO Enlargement, February 1998, 

Internet, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/nato/, p. 2.

15. The MTOE for each division varies widely: 82d Airborne Division, 

101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), 1st Armored Division, 1st Infantry 

Division (Mechanized), 2d Infantry Division (with one Stryker Brigade), 10th 

Mountain Division (Light), 25th Infantry Division (with one Stryker Brigade), 3d 

Infantry Division (Mechanized), 1st Cavalry Division, and 4th Infantry Division 

(Digitized). 

16. This observation is not meant to denigrate light divisions but to highlight 

the fundamental differences between heavy and light divisions. No doubt 

quite a few offi cers, NCOs, and enlisted in light divisions will have mechanized 

experience, but establishing the maintenance infrastructure and procedures will 

take months before operations begin to run smoothly. By that time, the rotation 

will be over.

17. Command authority is a particularly contentious issue for the United 

States. It should not be so because the precedent was set long ago. U.S. forces 

have served under foreign commanders in the Revolutionary War (von Steuben, 

Lafayette), the Civil War (many commanders fresh from Europe could barely 

speak English), World War I (Foch), and World War II (Alexander, Montgomery, 
33

and Slim). U.S. military and political leaders need to get in front of this issue and 

explain that such thinking is resurgent isolationism.

18. Lis and Selden, p.2.

19. The NATO Military Command Structure is adapted from Lieutenant 

Colonel Brick T. Miller, Transforming the NATO Military Command Structure: A New 

Framework for Managing the Alliance’s Future, ACUS Occasional Paper, Washington, 

DC: The Atlantic Council of the United States, April 2003, p. 11.

20. “New NATO Command Structure,” NATO Issues, June 18, 2003, Internet 

http://www.nato.int//issues/military_structure/command/index-e.htm, pp. 1-2. The 

most substantial change was the re-designation of Strategic Allied Command 

Atlantic (SACLANT) as Atlantic Command Transformation (ACT), which no 

longer has an operational command function. ACT’s primary function is to 

“oversee the transformation of NATO’s military capabilities.” Since the Supreme 

Allied Commander Transformation is dual-hatted as the Commander U.S. Joint 

Forces Command, transformation initiatives between the United States and the 

Alliance will be more closely aligned. Moreover, ACT will establish a number of 

joint-related training and research centers in Europe.

21. Luke Hill, “NATO Base Cuts in New Command Revealed,” Jane’s Defence 

Weekly, June 11, 2003, p. 1. Internet, http://www2.janes.com/search97/vs.vts?action=V

iew&VdkVgwKey=/content1/janesdatat/.

22. Ibid.

23. The New NATO Force Structure, International Military Staff, January 24, 

2003, Internet, http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/force-structure.htm.

24. Ibid. 

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid. Operational Testing of NATO High Readiness HQ Finalised, NATO 

Update, January 10, 2003, Internet, http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/update/2003/01-

january/e0109a.htm. See also Colonel Bradley Mason, NATO Response Force: 

Graduated-readiness forces and the NRF, briefi ng for the SMI conference on NATO 

Land Systems, June 11-12, 2003. Referred to as Mason, SMI Conference.

27. Mason, SMI Conference.

28. Kevin Dougherty, “NATO Commanders Say Rapid-Response Force 

Should Be Ready by October,” European Stars and Stripes, June 19, 2003, Internet, 

http://ebird.dtic.mil/Jun2003/s20030620194260.html. See also Luke Hill, “NATO 
34

ministers approve Response Force,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 18, 2003, p. 

1. Internet, http://www2.janes.com/search97/vs.vts?action=View&VdkVgwKey=/

content1/janesdatat/. Referred to as Hill, NATO ministers.

29. NATO After Prague, NATO Offi ce of Information and Press, December 

2002, p. 4, Internet http://www.nato.int.

30. Hill, NATO ministers. 

31. Mason, SMI Conference. 

32. Ibid. This conceptual model was developed by NATO’s former Regional 

Command North. 

33. Ibid. 

34. Ibid.

35. Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Toler, Force Generation For NATO: Acquiring 

forces for NATO and ensuring their operational effectiveness in the fi eld, briefi ng for 

the SMI conference on NATO Land Systems, June 11-12, 2003.