THREATS TO RUSSIAN SECURITY:

THE VIEW FROM MOSCOW

Stephen J. Blank

July 2000
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ii
The years 1999-2000 mark a watershed in Ru

military policy. During this time President Boris Y

resigned and was succeeded by Vladimir Putin, wh

elected in his own right in March 2000. The Russian 

carried out an operation to descend on Pristina 

challenge the NATO campaign in Kosovo, and launch

second Chechen war in August 1999. In addition

Russian armed forces conducted the biggest and 

openly anti-Western exercise of their post-1991 hi

known as Zapad (West)-99. The defense establish

published a draft military doctrine in October 1999, an

government published its own draft national se

concept and revised official national security conce

January 2000.

These developments led the Strategic Studies Inst

along with the Center for Strategic Leadership of th

Army War College, to sponsor a conference on the Ru

Army in February 2000, at which this paper was prese

A subsequent Institute publication will address the o

Russian defense doctrine, which was published in 

2000.

The documented threat assessments addressed h

Dr. Stephen Blank are clearly the culmination to dat

long-standing process by which the Russian militar

government have forsaken the optimistic Western

postures and visions of the initial post-Soviet year

returned in many respects to assessments and deman

specific policies that evoke the Soviet mentality and p

The armed forces and the government have adop

viewpoint that magnifies both the internal and ex

threats to Russia that they perceive and regard 

threats as growing in number and saliency. This view

is fundamentally at odds with both the post-1985 Sovie

iii
international security.

In adopting this heightened sense of threat, the a

forces may well have been guided as much by int

urging higher defense spending and greater visibility f

General Staff and armed forces in the framing of Ru

security policy. To the extent that official policy statem

accept that assessment, they reflect trends in both in

and external policy that are inimical to notio

democratic reform and stability at home and partne

with the West abroad. Needless to say, such perspe

also make it harder for the overstressed economy, so

and polity to provide genuine security for Russia 

dynamic international context.

The future course of Russian security policy is one 

most important and difficult questions in contemp

international affairs. This monograph addresses 

issues pertaining to Russia’s future options for p

makers’ consideration and reflection as the global d

over Russia’s future direction under Vladimir Putin 

shape. We hope that its publication contributes 

informed debate that enhances the quality of U.S. resp

to Russia’s national security policy.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iv
STEPHEN J. BLANK has served as the Strategic St

Institute’s expert on the Soviet bloc and the post-S

world since 1989. Prior to that he was Associate Profes

Soviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace Doc

Research, and Education, Maxwell Air Force Base

taught at the University of Texas, San Antonio, and 

University of California, Riverside. Dr. Blank is the ed

Imperial Decline: Russia’s Changing Position in 

coeditor of Soviet Military and the Future, and author 

Sorcerer as Apprentice: Stalin’s Commissar

Nationalities, 1917-1924. He has also written many a

and conference papers on Russian, Commonwea

Independent States, and Eastern European security i

Dr. Blank’s current research deals with proliferatio

the revolution in military affairs, and energy and secu

Eurasia. He holds a B.A. in History from the Univers

Pennsylvania, and an M.A. and Ph.D. in History fro

University of Chicago.

v
THREATS TO RUSSIAN SECURITY:

THE VIEW FROM MOSCOW

Generals have told me that we must build a monument 

Clinton because the campaign over Kosovo drastica

changed political attitudes here. Now there is no mo

opposition to the idea that Russia should restore its milita

potential.

 Alexander Zhylin

 Russian Military Correspondent

The Security Concept, the Draft Defense Doctr

and Their Context.

In October 1999 Moscow published a draft de

doctrine and the next month published a draft o

national security concept. That concept was then re

and given official imprimatur in January 2000. The 

official version of the military threat will be pub

during the spring of 2000. Because those publications 

an official and normative, if not juridical, character, 

content and unusual sequence of publication possess c

significance. They aroused considerable interest d

their provisions on nuclear use and both documents’ 

postulation of the United States and NATO as the sou

rising military and political threats. Therefore

monograph focuses on those threat assessments 

underlie whatever justification may exist for the u

nuclear weapons or for any other defense policy.

Because of these documents’ importance, their co

threat assessments, and the context of those assess

merit careful scrutiny. The draft doctrine stat

purposes in its very opening:

Russian Federation military doctrine (henceforth milita

doctrine) represents a systemized aggregate of fundamen

official views (guidelines), concentrated in a single docume

on preventing wars and armed conflicts, on their nature a

1
state, society, and citizens to ensure the military security of 

Russian Federation and its allies. . . . Military doctr

elaborates on the 1993 “Basic Provisions of RF Milit

Doctrine” and, as applied to the military sphere, concret

guidelines of the RF National Security Concept. It is based o

comprehensive assessment of the status of the military-polit

situation; on a strategic forecast of its development; o

scientifically substantiated determination of current and fut

missions, objective requirements, and real capabilities 

ensuring RF military security; and on conclusions from 

systems analysis of the content and nature of modern wars 

armed conflicts and of the domestic and foreign experienc

military organizational development and military art.

1

The draft doctrine’s and security concept’s cha

importance, and the centrality of the threat assessm

them, ensure that both documents, and particularly 

threat assessment, emerge out of continuing in

political struggles over the definition of the threat(s). 

struggles are so highly charged because the winner 

decisive leverage over doctrine, strategy, and policy.

Assessments are developed through an ongoing “or

ferment” that constantly assesses the nature 

characteristics of war, along with potential threa

Russian security and options for countering those th

Since this debate remains, largely though not exclus

confined to officers within the General Staff, the Minis

Defense, and the key national security officials i

leadership stratum, the issues under debate are matt

high politics and political struggle within the mi

leadership and atop the government. Indeed, today’s d

over a national security and a defense doctrine to revis

of 1993 had begun by 1996. Therefore, once the govern

announces an official doctrine based on the t

assessment and ensuing policy requirements, that do

should then determine the policies and strategy appro

for defending Russia. But discussion and contro

clearly continue since the draft doctrine was sent ba

revisions in February 2000.

2
conditions. Russian military apprehensions have g

with the collapse of Russian power, the augmentat

power of the United States and NATO, Kosovo

Anglo-American bombing campaign against Iraq

Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), and the on

information warfare and operations (IW an

respectively). Kosovo was the last straw since it u

many of the most feared military and political eleme

threat.

2

 Authoritative spokesmen like Defense Mi

General Igor Sergeyev and Deputy Chief of the Ge

Staff Colonel-General Valery L. Manilov, who chaire

doctrine’s editorial “collective," admitted that Kosovo 

revisions of the draft doctrine. Manilov also admitte

there were enormous differences of opinion among 

charged with preparing the draft doctrine. Thus

published draft doctrine represented the fifth attempt 

1997 to promulgate such a document. Not surprising

claimed the draft doctrine’s “supertask” was to e

unanimity concerning the threats, nature of contemp

war, and policy recommendations presented there.

3

It is important, therefore, to understand exactly 

threats Kosovo presented to or ratified in the minds 

Russian military-political elite and what the 

unanimity concerning threats signified. Accordi

Harvard University Professor Celeste Wallander, K

presented or confirmed the following negative assessm

of NATO enlargement.

For Russia, all the hypothetical security concerns of the p

decade are the threats of today. NATO is now closer to Russi

borders, and is bombing a non-NATO state. Even bef

NATO’s new strategic concept, the alliance’s development 

Combined Joint Task Forces offered ways for the alliance 

employ forces outside the constraints of Article 

(self-defense). NATO’s changes, combined with 

determination to use force against nonmembers threate

Russia because political turmoil in the former Soviet Un

increases the likelihood of NATO involvement near a

perhaps even in Russia. Moscow has long feared th

3
neighboring countries, sparking internal splits or civil w

that could drag in Russia—a role it neither wants nor can affo

Unfortunately, NATO-Russia cooperation failed to addr

these concerns even before Kosovo. After Kosovo, it is difficu

see what kind of cooperative relationship NATO and Russia 

have. For one thing, the air strikes [as viewed fr

Russia—author] violated several principles of 

NATO-Russia Founding Act—primarily NATO’s commitme

limiting its right to use force and promising the settlemen

disputes by peaceful means. Russians interpret the ongo

military campaign absent U.N. [United Nations] Secu

Council approval as NATO’s drive for unilateral security 

Europe. NATO’s new Strategic Concept adopted at the 5

anniversary expanded the alliance’s mission to incl

non-NATO Europe as a potential area for further NATO us

force. While the Concept recognizes the role of the U.N. Secu

Council, it does not require that NATO obtain [a] U.N. mand

for actions beyond the alliance’s border.

4

Clearly these are largely political threats that 

reduce and even potentially marginalize Russia’s r

European and even Eurasian security processes. Bu

are not, for the most part, military threats against Rus

its vital strategic interests. However, this assess

while correct as far as it goes concerning Ru

perceptions of Kosovo’s importance, does not go far en

Conversations with Russian military leaders 

military-political analysts told the author that, as the

Kosovo, it presented serious military threats to Ru

military-political interests.

For example, by 1999 Russia had come to see its

being under threatened or actual information attack, 

to the same extent as its friend, Serbia. Western reacti

the “anti-terrorist” operation in Chechnya is a ca

point.

5

 But this perception preceded that oper

Military leaders and analysts also argued that NA

Kosovo operation represented the template of future N

operations against Russia or its vital interests in the 

abroad” as outlined in NATO’s April 1999 strategy con

4
cemented and seemed to validate it.

A central element of that Russian perception is 

NATO harbors designs of enlargement and unil

out-of-area operations on both the Balkans an

Caucasus, areas that are regarded as more or less eq

vital to Russian national security interests. When N

Secretary-General Javier Solana told a NATO confere

September 1998 that both those regions were tro

areas from which NATO “cannot remain aloof," he w

merely reiterating ideas he had already voiced public

was confirming the expansive threat assessment held 

increasing conviction in Moscow.

7

 His subse

statement that “We are not condemned to be the vic

events that lie beyond our control—we can shape the fu

seemed to prove NATO’s and especially Washin

hegemonic aspirations.

8

The following examples show that, while official 

as embodied in the documents under examination her

not yet fully crystallized, the trend by 1998 was movi

least in leading military circles) toward public accepta

the expansive threat assessment found in the docume

1999-2000. The following statement of November 19

Colonel General Yury N. Baluyevskii, Chief of the Ge

Staff’s Main Operations Directorate, indicates the des

say the military-political threat is growing and must b

by military means. But the concomitant pressure is no

beyond the more optimistic line enforced by the 

security concept. Baluyevskii observed that,

A deepening of international integration, formation of a glo

economic and information space, and increased acuteness 

the competitive struggle by world centers of strength 

consolidating and expanding spheres of influence are amo

the main trends of the military-political situation. Views 

[the] use of military force have also changed. Despite th

however its role as an important factor in the process 

achieving economic and political objectives has be

preserved.

5
nature. They can and must be neutralized by political me

with reliance on the state’s military might, and first 

foremost on combat-ready strategic nuclear forces a

general-purpose forces with precisely functioning command 

control, communications, intelligence, and early-warn

systems. At the same time, with a diminished probability 

major war being initiated and with the main emphasis 

interstate contradictions [being] transferred from the are

ideology into the sphere of politics and economics, there 

been a significant growth in the danger of outbreak of arm

conflicts where escalation can lead to their expanded geograp

scale, an increased number of participants and developm

into a local and then a regional war. Therefore the Russ

Armed Forces must be ready both to localize and neutra

them as well as to carry on wide-scale military operations.

9

These remarks clearly outline the armed force

General Staff’s desire to have it both ways and confo

policy while registering the sense of expanding threat

need for a large army, and the importance of the mi

factor as an instrument for resolving nonmilitary pro

as well as actual conflicts and wars. They just barel

within the confines of the 1997 security concept tha

military resented because it stated that the main threa

now and the foreseeable future are not military bu

concentrated in the domestic, political, economic, s

environmental, information, and spiritual spheres.

1997 concept also cited the particularly critical state 

economy.

10

 There is no doubt this approach “unse

military commanders. General Leontii Kuzne

Commander in Chief (CINC) of the Moscow Mi

District, publicly stated that the Main Provisions 

1997 Security Concept wrongly cited the low probabi

large-scale war within the next few years. Kuzn

complained that civilians had reinserted the state

there that Russia’s army should be prepared on

conducting regional and local wars that he had rem

from the original draft. Instead, Russian troops s

prepare for large-scale aggression. The Kremli

lamented, accepted the draft, “without his amendment

6
invoked the availability of numerous political mecha

and avenues for resolving disputed issues. Thus,

There has been an expansion in the community of Russi

interests with many states on problems of internation

security, such as countering the proliferation of weapons 

mass destruction, settling and preventing regional conflic

countering international terrorism and the drug business, a

solving acute ecological problems including nuclear a

radiation security. This significantly increases t

opportunity to ensure Russia’s security by nonmilita

means—through legal treaties, political, economic, and oth

measures.

12

This posture presented Russian armed forces as m

a burden than an asset, and one whose priority has s

from preparing for the previous total war template 

more extreme areas of the spectrum of conflict: nu

deterrence, IW, and space war at one end; and prepare

for small scale, “local,” and even internal conflicts a

other end.

13

 While that posture met the desidera

President Yeltsin, his national security teams of 19

and Defense Minister General Igor Sergeyev, former 

of the Strategic Nuclear Forces, it assuredly did not co

to the General Staff’s views on the threats facing Russ

the military forces needed to counter them. Their 

emerges from the second example of pre-Kosovo t

assessments, one that also appeared in November 

under the authorship of lower-ranking but knowledg

members of the General Staff.

This article, written as the crisis in Kosovo was ne

its zenith, lambasted NATO for desiring to act unilat

out of area and impose a new world order by bypassin

U.N. and the Organization for Security Cooperati

Europe (OSCE). It accused NATO, and specificall

United States, of trying to go beyond the Washington T

and convert the Alliance into an offensive military blo

was expanding its “zone of responsibility” by pun

military means.

14

 The authors charged that,

7
organize crises similar to that in Kosovo in other areas of 

world to create an excuse for military intervention since 

“policy of double standards” where the bloc’s interests dict

the thrust of policy (the possibility of the use of milit

force in Kosovo against the Yugoslav Army a

simultaneous disregard for the problem of the genoc

faced by the Kurds in Turkey, the manifestation 

“concern” at the use of military force in the Dnies

Region, Chechnya, and Nagorno-Karabakh) is typica

the alliance’s actions.

15

 (Emphasis by author)

The authors went beyond this hint that today’s w

Chechnya was already on the agenda to forewarn N

openly about Russia’s likely reaction to an operation ag

Serbia. Rather than accept a NATO-dictated isolation 

European security agendas and the negati

organizations like the U.N. and OSCE, Russia wou

because this crisis provided NATO with an opportun

project military force not just against Serbia but ag

Russia itself. This was because the main objective of N

enlargement was to weaken Russia’s influence in E

and around the world. Therefore, the following scenar

possible. “Once our country has coped with its difficu

there will be a firm NATO ring around it, which will e

the West to apply effective economic, political, and po

even military pressure on Moscow.”

16

 Specifically,

When analyzing the development of events in the Balka

parallels with the development of events in the Cauca

involuntarily suggest themselves: Bosnia-Herzegovina 

Nagorno-Karabakh; Kosovo is Chechnya. As soon as the W

and, in particular, NATO, has rehearsed the “divide and r

principle in the Balkans under cover of peacekeeping, t

should be expected to interfere in the internal affairs of the 

[Commonwealth of Independent States] countries and Rus

It is possible to extrapolate the implementation of “pea

keeping operations” in the region involving military fo

without a U.N. Security Council mandate, which could resu

the Caucasus being wrested from Russia (it bears mention

that this applies as well to the independent states of 

Transcaucasus—an involuntary hint of the continu

8
lasting consolidation of NATO’s military presence in t

region, which is far removed from the alliance’s zone 

responsibility. Is Russia prepared for the development 

this scenario? It is obvious that, in order to ensure th

the Caucasus does not become an arena for NAT

Allied Armed Forces’ military intervention, t

Russian Government must implement a well defin

tough policy in the Balkans, guided by the U.N. char

and at the same time defending its national interests 

the region by identifying and providing t

appropriate support for this policy’s allies.

17

 (Empha

by author)

Clearly we were warned here first that Moscow 

intervene in Kosovo along with Serbia in the event 

attack, and second, that it was ready to use for

Chechnya not just against secession and terroris

whatever threat Chechnya presented, but to forcefull

NATO from the Caucasus, an area that remains, inso

these authors and those for whom they spoke are conce

exclusively part of Russia. The fact that NATO went 

and intervened in Kosovo, probably not even understa

such warnings which probably were lost in the backg

“noise” of the Kosovo crisis, only confirmed the Ge

Staff’s views of the threats to Russia and the unil

measures it had to take, e.g., landing in Pristina 

attacking Chechnya to reorient defense policy and 

structure. It was essential for the General Staff that it 

to reorient threat assessments and thus subsequent de

policy in the direction that these documents then took. 

then adds the threat posed by our pending decision 

theater and national missile defense (TMD and 

which Russia regards as a threat to the very ba

strategic stability worldwide, then the reason and co

for subsequent Russian statements and policies b

much clearer.

9
Concept.

The security concept’s nuclear provisions stated 

vital task of the armed forces is to exercise deterre

prevent nuclear or other aggression on any scale ag

Russia and its allies. Thus Russia extended deterre

those allies, presumably CIS members. Likewise, “Nu

weapons should be capable of inflicting the desired ext

damage against any aggressor state or coalition of sta

any conditions and circumstances.”

18

 The concep

stated that nuclear weapons use would become possib

the event or need to repulse armed aggression, if all 

measures of resolving the crisis situation have 

exhausted and proven ineffective.”

19

 The security co

tailors nuclear use to the particular threat at ha

implied by its phrases “aggression on any scale, nucl

otherwise” and “to the desired extent of damage.”

20

 

key officials, e.g., Deputy Defense Minister Vla

Mikhailov, confirm this interpretation of the conditio

nuclear use, thereby proclaiming limited nuclear w

Russia’s officially acknowledged strategy in respon

many different kinds of contingencies.

21

Therefore, Russian nuclear weapons serve two cr

but not necessarily complementary, functions. They d

wide range of phenomena along the spectrum of conflic

could conceivably threaten Russia. Second, they ar

warfighting instruments that can be used in a wide ra

conflicts, including limited war.

22

The nuclear provisions of these documents clear

related to NATO’s Kosovo operation. Officers and an

told the author in June 1999 that Kosovo led do

writers to include contingencies for deploying ta

nuclear weapons (TNW) in conventional threat scena

In December 1999, General Vladimir Yakovlev, CINC 

Strategic Nuclear Forces, admitted this, attributin

new strategy to Russia’s economic crisis—where nu

10
regional proliferation threats.

Russia, for objective reasons, is forced to lower the thresh

for using nuclear weapons, extend the nuclear deterrent 

smaller-scale conflicts and openly warn potential oppone

about this.

24

Russia would also continue modernizing its str

rocket force with the new Topol-M intercontinental ba

missiles. The foregoing statements illustrate as well 

belief that nuclear weapons can deescalate co

situations and wars.

25 These remarks also illustrate so

the “threat context” animating the formulations in 

documents, amplify the security concept’s intent

suggest that TNW will be the weapon and/or deterr

choice for many of the smaller-scale contingencies 

Russia fears. Russian doctrinal statements also repr

the culmination to date of a debate going back at le

1993 over nuclear first-strike use against certain ki

conventional attacks on Russian interests and target

Conforming to the security concept, Yakovlev tie

new posture to the multiple threats facing Russia. He s

that nuclear weapons serve the political funct

deterring “possible aggression of any intensit

convincing everyone to desist from aggression ag

Russia.

27

 Like virtually every other senior commande

military-political analyst, he invoked Kosovo 

justification. He said that NATO’s campaign conv

Russia that Washington and other NATO allies 

rehearsing methods of warfare that will be the bas

future wars to which Russia must adjust. The Genera

shares the notion that Kosovo is a template for future N

strategy.

28

 Yakovlev cited,

The massive use of aviation and long-range precisi

weapons; electronic countermeasures; and integrated use 

space information assets—all these approaches have becom

firm part of U.S. military threats beginning with Operat

Desert Storm against Iraq in 1991. Moreover, the prima

11
installations of the economic infrastructure, elements of 

state and military command and control system, and line

transportation. NATO’s eastward enlargement not o

radically altered the force ratio in theaters of milit

operations, but also permitted a number of kinds of tactical 

operational-tactical weapons to perform strategic missi

previously set aside for Pershing II missile complexes and cru

missiles.

29 

Therefore, the draft doctrine’s and security con

statements on nuclear issues are a fundamental asp

Russia’s adaptation to future war. Yakovlev an

Russian leadership are equally adamant about blo

U.S. efforts to build ballistic missile defense (BMD), 

they regard as a threat to the foundations of str

stability between Moscow and Washington, and a vio

of the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

30

The defense doctrine and the security concept, as w

published statements by authoritative officials 

spokesmen, also invoke a broad range of political-mi

threats, many of which also directly emerge out of N

enlargement, Kosovo, and the Anglo-American 

operation of 1998-99. NATO enlargement and its 

strategic repercussions constitute a large number 

military-political threats. Apart from politic

military-political threats, we also can identify three sp

military threats displayed in Kosovo and Iraq 

particularly trouble Russian leaders: information wa

(IW) and information operations (IO), the use of high

precision weapons in a primarily aerospace and long-

offensive (what they call contactless war), and ba

missile defense (BMD).

These documents’ threat assessments also portra

United States and NATO as threats in and of thems

Those formulations serve two purposes. They justif

shape the increasingly anti-NATO and anti-Ame

political orientation of the military and government. A

home they are the essential pillars of the General S

12
national security policy and gain higher status and 

resources for defense. Indeed, Sergeyev stated tha

forthcoming officially revised defense doctrine examin

new external threats and 6 new internal ones that 

appeared recently.

31

 Inasmuch as only 2 years have el

since the old security concept and its official t

assessment, this remark tells us how much of the t

assessment we are now receiving has been fabricated 

a sense of paranoia and in order to justify obtaining 

resources from the government. Or in other words, t

assessment is a major aspect of the military’s rent-se

proclivities as well as a justification of its status in Ru

politics, and in the quest to retain Russia’s global stand

Consequently, the new security concept repudiat

1997 predecessor’s optimistic and supposedly scienti

substantiated, high-level, official prognosis of no 

threat by stipulating the rising possibility of 

aggression against Russia.

32 The security concept and 

doctrine invoke NATO and the United States as the au

of growing threats, define international affairs mai

terms of the threat U.S. unipolarity poses to Ru

espousal of a multi-polar world, expand paramete

nuclear first-strikes, urge vastly increased de

spending, and calculate that spending on a Soviet basi

upon the military’s proclaimed needs not Russia’s a

capabilities.

33

 Thus these documents give a kind of o

imprimatur to the view that increasingly saturate

Russian media concerning the American and We

inspired threats to Russia’s very existence.

Western alleged misdeeds include: attempting to fo

inappropriate reform medicine down Russia’s throat wh

failing to give real help to the ailing economy, stealing Russi

markets, including blocking the sale of arms and nucle

technology, endeavoring to turn Russia into an econom

colony, a provider of cheap raw materials and a market 

dumping, inciting Ukraine and other CIS states agai

Russia; trying to limit Russian influence in the Transcaucas

13
transit routes; encouraging Balts and others to repress Russ

minorities; establishing military and political hegem

through the expansion of NATO and the crushing of s

Russian friends as Iraq and Serbia; perhaps even encourag

the disintegration of the Russian state [and civilizatio

author] (hence the increasingly vociferous condemnation 

anti-terrorist actions in Chechnya).

34

Signifying the greater militarization of assessmen

thinking about national security, the official se

concept also replaces the word “defense” ( oborona a

derivative adjectives) in the 1997 concept with the 

“military” (Voennyi and its derivations).

35

 Thus th

documents not only conflate political and military th

together, strongly suggesting the need to respond 

former by military means, they also reflect an incr

militarization of the “discursive practice” of thinking 

Russian security.

36

This mode of thinking about military-political

specifically military, threats appears prominently in 

documents and in public statements by leading militar

political spokesmen and analysts. Sergeyev, Manilov

Chief of Staff General Anatoly Kvashnin argue that

and unless NATO recants over Kosovo and gives Ru

veto over its operations, the threat of more Kosov

crises and operations will remain, freezing Europe 

Russia) into permanent insecurity.

37

 This essen

political threat will endure and govern defense policy

Russian military leaders charge that Kosov

aggression against sovereign Serbia, breached the 

charter and by-passed the U.N. NATO’s claim to use 

unilaterally could trigger an international and g

catastrophe. NATO also overturned European politic

security by negating concepts of territorial integrity an

right to self-determination. This allowed Washingt

intervene abroad under the pretext of human right

place a “bomb” under the structures of world poli

Kosovo also damaged nonproliferation efforts beca

14
Washington by obtaining nuclear weapons or 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

39

Kvashnin openly stated that any enlargement of N

is at Russia’s expense and that European security 

zero-sum game. Thus “We will view NATO’s fu

practical actions for eastward enlargement an

annexing Central and East European states to it 

challenge to national security.”

40 Sergeyev went 

further, saying that,

The approaching of NATO’s infrastructure to Russian bord

is a direct increase of NATO’s combat possibilities, which 

unfavorable for our country in a strategic sense. We w

regard the approaching of NATO’s tactical aviation to Russ

borders as an attempted nuclear threat.

41

Sergeyev here reiterated and even expanded Yako

threat assessment. He also showed how far he would 

expand deterrence against NATO in discussin

parameters of what the armed forces now call exp

deterrence.

42

His remarks evoke expanded deterrence w

vengeance. But they are not far removed from Kvas

harsh rhetoric that reads like a late 19th century treat

Realpolitik where alliances “annex” states to them

than to our times. Like Manilov and Yeltsin, Kva

demands an all-European security system based only 

OSCE’s framework. That supposedly would assure M

of an exclusive zone of influence in the CIS and equal s

with Washington and NATO.

43

 Kvashnin’s justifica

simple, NATO’s enlargement extended its zo

responsibility 650-750 kilometers eastward, substan

reducing Russia’s warning time of an offensive. Ru

nuclear weapons, not to mention its conventional one

therefore insufficient as a deterrent.

44

Despite this implicit belief in the inutility of Ru

nuclear deterrent, Kvashnin also takes for granted the 

15
few states might want such an alliance since Mosc

ready to risk nuclear war even in small contingenc

their behalf. Neither does anyone anywhere spell ou

criteria for becoming a Russian ally and enjoying 

extended deterrence. That omission in itself is a sign o

dangerous and slipshod is the new approach to se

issues. Simultaneously, the contradiction bet

affirming both the inutility and potency of Russia’s nu

systems’ apparently eluded Kvashnin and other eli

well. But this ambivalence reflects key strategic dilem

Indeed, if any of Russia’s neighbors or enemies 

nuclear, that would intensify the burden on an al

overstressed nuclear force and the threat to vital Ru

interests.

45

In December 1999 Sergeyev, too, called N

enlargement, in and of itself, a threat to globa

European collective security and world politic

particularly stressed the deployment and use of N

forces out of area without U.N. or OSCE sanction as a t

that devalues confidence-building measures, arms c

treaties, and security (probably having in min

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE] Treat

the strategic weapons agreements).

46

 Kosovo duly bec

moment of truth for Russia that rendered efforts to 

with NATO towards equal security “totally worthle

also follows that the nightmare scenario of N

supporting secessionist or anti-Russian movements 

CIS is now a staple of threat assessments, includin

doctrine and security concept.

47

 After all, such th

manifested in NATO’s support for the Kosovo Libe

Army (KLA) and supposedly backed up by NATO’s ta

aviation, tactical, or operational-tactical missiles, 

appear as attacks against either Russia’s nuclear m

or their command, control, and communications

intelligence (C3I).

Consequently, military leaders express the fear 

NATO’s continued existence in its present form 

16
precluding any hope of a solid European security syste

Manilov, like Kvashnin, insists,

There has to be a search for a “European identity," and t

“European factor” should be strengthened in dealing with t

USA. This means establishing a pan-European secur

system serving the interests not only of two, five, or sev

states but absolutely all European countries.

48

These remarks in favor of a European Security and De

Identity (ESDI) neatly illustrate this conflation of po

and military threats and the armed forces’ efforts to 

foreign policy on European security issues.

Sergeyev’s strictures against NATO also stress Ko

impact regarding IW and IO. These two phenomena c

many-sided threat and are cited for doing so in th

security concept as well as in official briefings giv

foreigners.

49

 Implicit in these publications, briefings

many Russian writings is the understanding of an on

RMA where the nature of war has changed or is under

a revolutionary transformation. Contemporary 

typically displays new components that must be take

account in constructing armed forces. And 

components include all aspects of the art of war on disp

Kosovo, prominently including IW and IO.

Threat Assessments in the Draft Doctrine

and the Security Concept.

The draft doctrine, security concept, and asso

military-political commentary paint a very alar

picture. Because military elites view Kosovo as a tem

of NATO’s future operations, they charge that NA

Strategic Concept challenges the strategic mi

situation and the entire structure upon which the defe

Russian interests, and, supposedly, world peace rest.

draft doctrine, security concept, and its authors’ t

assessments also demonstrate the General S

17
political leaders suggested to NATO enlargement.

The melange of political and military threat

recommendations for policy in the draft defense doctri

us that it is, first of all, a blueprint for a total na

security policy, not just defense policy. As su

represents the General Staff’s effort to seize the rud

the ship of state with regard to national security

discernible resemblance of both documents’ mil

political threats illustrates the primacy of the Ge

Staff’s vision of the threat. The draft doctrine postulat

following external military-political threats: terri

claims upon Russia; intervention in its internal a

attempts to infringe upon or ignore Russian intere

resolving international security issues and oppose Ru

strengthening as a center of a multipolar world; a

conflicts, especially near Russia’s and/or its allies’ bo

creation and buildup of forces and troop groupings 

disturb the balance of forces near Russia’s or its 

waters; expansion of military blocs and alliances ag

the interest of Russia and/or its allies’ military sec

introduction of troops without United Nations Se

Council (UNSC) sanction to states contiguous wit

friendly to Russia; creating, equipping, supporting

training armed groups abroad to redeploy them for a

upon Russia and/or its allies or against installation

structures on Russia’s or its allies’ borders; oper

aiming to undermine global and regional secur

stability, including hindering the operation of Russian 

and military C2 systems, systems supportin

functioning and combat stability of nuclear force

missile attack warning, ABM defense, and 

surveillance systems; hindering the operation of nu

munitions storage facilities, power plants, che

installations, and other potentially dangerous installa

information operations of a technical, psychologic

other nature against Russia and/or its allies; discrimin

against Russians abroad; and international terrorism

18
threats portrays NATO, and not only in its enlarged fo

a threat in and of itself and shows tremendous conce

the use of IO and IW in all their guises against R

Russian views of IO and IW form a consensus that the

be used to unhinge the basis of military control 

weapons, political control and governance over the 

and overall social stability.

52

 Given the centrality of n

weapons to Russian strategy and policy and the critica

proper C3I for their deployment and use, obviousl

weapons that strike at that C3I network are seen 

worst possible light.

Hence the draft doctrine’s and the security con

threat assessments in many ways evoke Soviet prece

By publishing the draft doctrine before the security co

that it is supposed to concretize the General Staff sou

preempt and dominate debate on national security p

No other approach to potential threat assessment

policy recommendations would command a p

platform.

53

 Second, for the first time Russian do

articulates Soviet-like perceptions of growing We

threats. The causal links between the military’s domi

of threat assessment, its recommendations for defens

foreign policy, and unilateral efforts to define the v

and direction of defense spending recall Soviet practic

concurrent military operations in Pristina and Chec

as predicted above, further sharpen the doctrine’s 

Western animus and serve three related goals.

The first goal is to forestall NATO’s further enlarge

in scope or mission. Russia still rejects NATO enlarge

on principle and regards further NATO expansi

territory or mission as intolerable. Pristina and Che

forcefully illustrate how Russia plans to resist either k

enlargement, especially in the Caucasus. Second, Pri

Chechnya, and the threat assessment forcefully 

directly reply to U.S. policies in Kosovo, NATO’s attem

exclude Russia from the Balkans, and their implicatio

future warfare. Moscow’s premeditated war with Che

19
secession from Russia that may become aligned 

foreign, and probably NATO support, as in Kosovo

deterring NATO participation in those wars, once 

particularly in the Caucasus.

High-ranking military commentary explicitly 

together internal secessionist threats with U.S. pre

and NATO enlargement and implies that they are al

joined together as a single composite threat. Therefor

strongest possible military action is urged to resist 

converging threats. The doctrine’s third goal was to re

the domestic and defense agenda and preserve Yeltsi

now his successor, Vladimir Putin, in power. Accord

Manilov charged that,

Actually, today the internal threat, that is associated w

terrorism that is covered by Islamic phraseology, has beco

extremely exacerbated. That threat does not have anythin

common either with Islam or with national-ethnic problems

roots and primary sources are outside Russia. . . . The pragm

conclusion is as follows: we cannot weaken external secur

while placing the emphasis on internal security. Or vice vers

He also listed new threats present in the new docu

that are not listed in the 1993 doctrine:

Attempts to ignore and all the more so infringe upon Russ

interests in the resolution of international security proble

and to oppose its consolidation as one of the influential cen

of the modern world. As you know, that’s what happened w

the United States and NATO made the decision to bomb 

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Or [another threat is] 

creation, equipping, support, and training of formations 

groups on the territory of other states with the goal of th

transfer for operations on the territory of Russia and its all

Specifically, that is what happened with the manni

equipping, training, and financing of the Chechen terro

formations that committed aggression against Russia in 

North Caucasus.

55

20
contained in the draft defense doctrine.

56 These prim

political and psychological threats now justify the m

response of a major buildup of conventional weapons. P

too, linked foreign and domestic threats, even invokin

domino theory, and charging that the Chechen threa

part of an overall attempt to detach whole territories 

Russia and CIS governments on behalf of an interna

Islamic project. He stated that,

What happened this summer in Dagestan should not be se

as some particular, local occurrence. Combine in a sin

whole Dagestan, the incursions of the gang elements fr

Afghanistan and Tajikistan, and the events in Kyrgyzst

What was happening—-we will call a spade a spade—was 

attempt at the military and political assimilation of part of t

territory of the former Soviet Union. . . . A rebellio

self-proclaimed state supported by extremist circles o

number of Islamic countries had in these four years (since t

Khasvayurt agreement of 1996 ending the first war w

Chechnya—author) fortified its position on the territory 

Russia. A self-proclaimed state which, in the intentions 

these extremist circles, was to have become Greater Ichke

from the Caspian to the Black Sea, that is to have seized al

the Caucasus, cut Russia off from the Transcaucasus, a

closed the route into Central Asia. Dagestan was, after all

have been merely the first step. . . . So the danger for o

country was extremely high. We really could have l

Dagestan and quit the Caucasus. And subsequently in t

very near future, we would have had, in accordance with t

domino principle, attempts by the international terrorists 

detonate the situation in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, the Vo

region. We must not close our eyes; these attempts could w

have been successful. Centrifugal trends in the relations of t

federal authorities and particular regions of the country a

still strong on the territory of Russia. And it would not then 

a question of today’s anti-terrorist operation, which so

overseas and Russian politicians consider incommensurate

would be a question of truly broad-based combat operations

callup of reservists, and the transfer of the entire coun

absolute to a war footing.

57

21
security concept that direct military aggression is pres

unlikely. However, potential external and internal th

have been preserved, “and in a number of region

intensifying.”

58

 This parallels the revised and now o

security concept’s line that “the level and scope o

military threat are growing,” an unprecedented state

in Russian Federation official documents.

59

 Kvashni

took a strong line towards these perceived threats

principal threats facing Russia are for him:

• Territorial problems connected to the absen

precise juridical borders;

• Intervention in Russian Federation affairs, incl

encroachment on state unity and territorial integrity

• Attempts to ignore or infringe upon Ru

Federation interests in resolving international se

problems;

• The appearance and escalation of armed con

particularly near the borders of the Russian Federatio

its allies;

• Creation and buildup of troop groupings that d

the balance of forces near those same borders;

• Expansion of military blocs and alliances t

detriment of Russian security; and,

• Actions aimed at undermining global reg

security.

60

While this list parallels Manilov’s, the draft doc

and the security concept’s assessment, Kvashnin, as s

above, assessed any enlargement of NATO as bei

Russia’s expense and that European security is a zer

game.

61 Kvashnin’s response to the enlargement t

extended deterrence to the CIS, is also not a new depa

and reflects a continuing policy trend. Prelim

discussions on doctrine in 1997 took extended deterre

22
Baturin’s January 1997 reform plan stated that R

when confronting local wars that expand due to o

assistance into large-scale conventional wars, reserv

right to use nuclear weapons as first strike and preem

weapons. This allegedly limited first strike will eq

allegedly regain escalation dominance and force a ret

the status quo.

62

 Obviously this formulation c

anticipated the language of the security concept a

optimistic belief that Moscow could launch and con

supposedly limited nuclear war.

Kvashnin also strongly argued that Russia’s exc

from NATO means that NATO ignores Russian se

interests. NATO’s benevolent intentions are irrel

because its capabilities are what matters and the

awesome and growing. Kvashnin similarly invokes NA

defiance of the OSCE and U.N. in Kosovo as an exam

the growing trend towards using force unilaterally 

area and of NATO’s attempt to dictate European secur

force. Hence he, too, saw Kosovo as a moment of tru

Russia. He also invoked the threat of proliferation 

Middle East, blaming Israel, not Iran or Iraq, for it. Y

answer to this problem is purely dialogue with pot

proliferators, this being the official Russian posit

Though Russia shares Washington’s unease 

proliferation, Kvashnin dismisses the likelihood of 

World states having the requisite technology to consti

threat in the near future and rejects ballistic missile de

(BMD) because that will undermine arms control an

reduction of strategic weapons.

64

 This statement follow

official line in regard to BMD. But it also suggests inde

either concerning the desirability of fighting proliferat

about the best method of doing so.

65

Kvashnin’s reasoning also suggests that Russia re

to believe in the reality of the new proliferation threats 

though the U.S. Rumsfeld Commission’s findings in 

demonstrated that such threats are already a fact o

multiplying in previously unforeseen ways, and rema

23
argument may be an attempt to conceal the fact that R

is assiduously proliferating dual-use technologie

systems to China, Iran, India, and perhaps other sta

Given Russia’s past record as nuclear proliferator

might be pardoned for suspecting that Russia, like Ch

not totally unhappy to see certain states gain nu

weapons, thus reducing the reach of U.S. military powe

Statements by Sergeyev and Minister of Foreign A

Igor Ivanov now follow the same line as Kvashnin, Ma

the Security Concept, and the draft doctrine concernin

linked foreign and internal threats sponsored 

emanating from the United States. On November 12, 

Sergeyev, for the first time, linked internal and ex

threats, claiming that U.S. interests are best served 

continuing smoldering war in the North Cauc

Allegedly that would force Russia into major exertio

localize the conflict and thus weaken it.

69

 Further

Kosovo showed that NATO’s new strategy relies on th

of force. That strategy “is an attempt to defy Ru

positions, to oust it from the Caspian region

Transcaucasian area, and Central Asia.”

70

 Four day

Ivanov wrote that,

The question often raised in Moscow is whether Kosovo 

Chechnya are links in a chain of steps toward the creation 

one-dimensional, NATO-centered world. Is Chechnya be

used as a smokescreen for preparing NATO to assume the ro

a world policeman, for undermining the fundamen

components of strategic stability and reversing 

disarmament processes? Has the anti-Russian campaign o

Chechnya been launched to force Russia out of the Caucas

and then out of Central Asia? And these are by no means 

only concerns that have arisen in Russian public opinion w

respect to the actions—or sometimes, the lack of actions—of 

Western partners.

71

Accordingly, the draft defense doctrine and the se

concept emit a pervasive sense of linked interna

external threats. Sergeyev’s article on the foundati

24
reinforced that outlook. He listed as internal threa

just Russia’s horrible socio-economic crisis an

constraints that this crisis put upon modernizing 

restructuring of the armed forces, but also the “aggrav

of international relations, regional separatism and reg

extremism which create favorable conditions fo

outbreak of internal armed conflicts.”

72

 Consequent

main foreign threats to Russia that derive from its 

global military position and that represent a threat 

sovereignty and integrity include,

• Negatively developing trends in the entire syst

international relations expressed in the United State

NATO striving for military resolution of political pro

and bypassing the U.N. and OSCE.

• The strengthening of unfriendly military-po

blocs and unions (i.e., the U.S. alliance system) “an

broadening of their ‘sphere of influence’ and ‘zo

responsibility’ with the simultaneous intensific

of centrifugal forces within the CIS” (Empha

author).

73

• The outbreak and escalation of armed confli

proximity to the borders of Russia and the CIS.

• “The sharp escalation of the scale of interna

terrorism against Russia and its allies, to includ

possible use of OMP (weapons of mass destruction).”

• The increasing gap between those leading m

powers who are breaking away from other states an

growth of their capabilities for creating a new generat

military and military-technical weapons. This 

triggers a qualitatively new phase in the arms rac

significantly changes the character, forms, and compo

of military operations.

• Territorial claims on Russia from neighboring s

This is most powerfully expressed in NATO’s “expans

25
the events in the Northern Caucasus.”

75

 Here Sergeye

linked domestic and foreign threats, recklessly conf

them to formulate his assessment and justif

political-military agenda.

The draft doctrine and security concept echo this in

threat perception. They both begin by polarizin

opposed tendencies, U.S.-led unipolarity and Russia

multipolarity, as determining “the status and prospe

development of the present day military-pol

situation.”

76 Accordingly, the basic features o

military-political situation are as follows. While ther

diminished threat of world war, including nuclear wa

the development of mechanisms for safegua

international peace regionally and globally; doc

writers nevertheless discern the formation 

strengthening of regional power centers, national-e

and religious extremism, and separatist tende

associated with those phenomena.

Although there are economic, political, technolo

ecological, and informational trends favoring a mult

world and Russia’s equal position in it, the United S

and its allies’ policies, and policies of other cou

associated with proliferation, are working to circum

international law and threaten Russia. Hence military 

and the resort to violence remain substantial aspe

international relations, a favorite justification o

military for their policy aims.

77

According to the draft doctrine, those negative t

foster the escalation of local wars and armed con

strengthened regional arms races, proliferation of 

and delivery systems, aggravated information contes

(protivoborstovo in Russian), and expanding transna

threats: crime, drug running, terrorism, and the 

arms trade.

78 These actual and potential threats 

basic destabilizing factors of the military-po

situation. 

26
ethnic, religious, separatist, and terrorist movement

organizations (Chechens or the KLA in Kosovo); the 

informational and other nontraditional means 

technologies to attain destructive military-political 

diminished effectiveness of international sec

organizations, particularly the U.N. and the O

operations involving military force in circumvent

“generally recognized principles and rules of interna

law (and) without UNSC sanction"; violati

international arms control treaties—the U.S. intent

amend or withdraw from the ABM treaty.

79

 Russia’s active foreign policy and the maintenanc

sufficient military potential, including nuclear deter

presently avert direct and traditional forms of aggre

against Russia and its allies. Nonetheless “a num

potential (including large-scale) external and int

threats to Russia and its allies’ military security re

and are strengthening in a number of d

tions.”(emphasis in the original)

80

 The original 

security concept went further, reflecting the General S

preeminence, charging that the combination or sum t

specific internal and external threats which encompa

the threats arising out of Russia’s socio-econ

catastrophe “can present a threat to Russia’s sovere

and territorial integrity, including the possibility of 

military aggression against Russia.”

81

 Likewise, 

spectrum of threats connected with international terro

including the possible use of weapons of mass destruct

widening.”

82 Much of this language obviously para

Kvashnin’s and Sergeyev’s views.

83

 Although the 

version of internal and external threats listed in the o

security concept is broader and more specific in d

interestingly, this language was left out except to ci

growing level and scope of the military threat.

84

 I

context, the armed forces’ nightmare scenario of N

support for an ethno-secessionist (and, in Russian 

27
surprising.

85

Fusing Internal and External Threats.

The scope of internal military threats that 

documents outline also deserves attention becaus

manner of its presentation permits the fusion of in

and external threats described by Sergeyev, Ma

Kvashnin, Putin, and others. As the other military 

have proven unable to cope with these threats in Chec

the draft doctrine and security concept now also str

imply the use of the regular armed forces for those 

forces’ domestic missions.

86

 This new set of missions 

extremely dangerous risk for the army and govern

because of the incompatibility of police function

missions with those of the regular army. But in so stre

state as Russia where both the MVD and the armed 

are already thoroughly criminalized, placing the ar

the domestic line of fire is apparently the only altern

Here Russia is flirting with the risk of state failure.

progression from linking internal and external thre

fusing foreign and domestic missions in a s

organization automatically entails many great risk

was probably taken without the requisite foreth

concerning them. Although it makes a nice lo

progression, in practice such policy decisions al

represent a confession of failure or of despair at the ab

of usable effective police or military power inside Rus

point all too tragically on view in Chechnya in 1994-9

again today.

We should also note that this fusion of interna

external threats also continues previous Leninist and 

recent military-political arguments invoking IW to 

together external and internal threats of aggressio

subversion.

88 

The draft doctrine’s internal threats comprise:

28
• Separatist ethno-national, terrorist movem

seeking to disrupt state unity and Russia’s integrity 

destabilize the internal situation there;

• Planning, preparation, and accomplishment of a

to disrupt and disorganize the activity of 

governmental organization;

• Attacks on governmental, military, economic

information infrastructures;

• Establishment, equipment, training, and functi

of illegal armed units; unlawful proliferation of we

usable for terrorist or criminal actions; and,

• Organized crime, terrorism, smuggling and 

unlawful acts on a scale threatening Russian mi

security.

89

While Putin altered the draft of the security conc

put more emphasis on internal threats and crim

document as a whole exudes the Soviet sense of perv

and all-encompassing threats.

90

After laying out a comprehensive description of 

internal threats, the revised security concept 

addresses the foreign threats. It is noteworthy that 

order of presentation represents a full-blown attack o

United States. These threats are:

• States’ desire to bypass organizations of securit

the U.N. and OSCE;

• Weakening Russian influence in the world;

• The strengthening of military blocs and alli

particularly NATO’s eastward expansion;

• The possible emergence of military bases 

presences “in the immediate proximity of Russia’s bor

(not specifically in neighboring states one s

note—probably to include the Balkans);

29
vehicles, weakening of integrative processes within th

• The outbreak and escalation of conflicts nea

borders of Russia and/or the CIS states; and,

• Territorial claims on Russia.

91

The revised concept also lists as threats attemp

other states to prevent a strengthening of Russian pos

in world affairs and hinder the exercise of its na

interests in Europe, Transcaucasia, Central Asia, an

Middle East. The latter region was added now due to P

intervention and to signify renewed Russian inter

playing a key role there.

92

 A new note crept int

document in the wake of Kosovo and perhaps belatedl

result of the Indo-Pakistani nuclear tests of 1998. M

seems to show more concern, if not fear, of nu

proliferation. Perhaps because of Pakistan’s sup

support for the Chechens and Taliban forc

Afghanistan, its nuclear status now gives Moscow p

Thus the new security concept warns expressly again

aspiration of a number of states to strengthen 

influence in world politics, including the u

proliferation.

93

Not surprisingly then, the security concept 

terrorism as a serious threat. Information threats ar

rising. They grow out of states’ (i.e., the United S

desire to monopolize the global information space 

expel Russia from the external and internal inform

market." The development of concepts of inform

warfare fit in here as well.

94

 Finally, the rising m

threats are attributable, as in the draft defense doctr

NATO’s high-handed unilateralism in expanding its 

and missions in Kosovo without international age

sanction.

95

All these threats, including upgraded intelli

subversion of Russia, are growing as the Russian mi

remains at a “critically low level” of training and 

30
sees cultural threats from abroad, not to mentio

standard litany of transnational threats, narcotics

crime.

96

 Furthermore, these precepts are shared b

military and will be solidified in the official doctrin

was published on April 21, 2000, and represent a re

version of the draft doctrine which we have discussed h

Signs of Continuing Debate.

Because they are supposed to be authorit

documents, both the defense doctrine and the na

security concept are obviously the source of enor

political maneuvering, much of it hidden from 

However, the struggles leading up to publication o

these documents evidently continue. For the first tim

Navy has been allowed to publish its draft of a 

strategy, and Putin went out of his way to focus on c

challenges confronting this service.

98 Evidently the 

has won its constantly reiterated point that there is s

thing as a separate naval strategy (if not doctrine), th

upgrading to some degree its status in Russian m

policy.

99

 Clearly there was a struggle over these issu

October 1999, Eduard Shevelev, a leading naval th

and Vice-President of the Academy of Military Sci

wrote to the MOD, fearing that the navy was being ig

in the new doctrine.

100

 This upgrading evidently occur

some degree at the expense of the Army, i.e., ground 

who have yet to reclaim their special status in the MOD 

Sergeyev and Yeltsin abolished in 1997-98. As a res

this struggle, Admiral Viktor Kravchenko, Head o

Navy’s main headquarters, announced plans to cre

Russian naval presence in all the world’s major water

including the Mediterranean Sea. Heavy cruiser

regularly be posted there. Design and construction o

generation ships are underway, and work on the 

strategic nuclear forces is “being conducted as a prio

This means that by 2005 the Russian navy will car

percent of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. Mor

31
responses to the U.S. expected withdrawal from the 

ABM Treaty and subsequent construction of an Ame

national missile defense system.

101

Kravchenko’s observations correspond to the re

program or budget for military spending in the year 

According to that program, there will be a 50 pe

increase in defense spending, 80 percent rise in spend

Research and Development, and a 70 percent increase 

state order. Future defense spending will display 

increases in aerospace systems, microelectro

electro-optical systems, new strategic, tactical

miniature nuclear weapons, the first Borey class n

submarines armed with the new SS-NX-28 SLBM

Navy, C3I technologies for IW and nuclear wea

Spending on naval force development will double to 

new ships on stream by 2008. Current plans also in

increasing strategic naval forces to 55 percent of the to

2005.

102

 Other large-scale programs are also now 

announced.

103 

Putin also apparently contributed to this strugg

decreeing changes in the draft security concep

publishing them in the revised version in January 

They are designed to strengthen the Security Con

emphasis on fighting terrorism and crime, provisions

if taken to their logical end, mean following Yeltsin’s 

strengthening the Ministry of Interior Troops (VV

and FSB at the expense of the Army, or, alterna

engaging the Army even more in domestic “coun

surgency” operations, which it has never liked.

104

 Y

suggested above, there is no alternative. The replacem

MVD CINC General Vladimir Ovchinnikov with 

General Vyacheslav Tikhomirov suggests an attemp

again to bring the MVD’s army up to snuff, but on

probably cannot succeed for all the usual reasons su

lack of funding, corruption, and inter-service rivalry.

32
These threat assessments are notable for 

pessimism, pervasiveness, and expanded scope. The

play a significant role in the internal political strug

direct military reform and obtain increased appropria

Yet at bottom, many reflect essentially psychol

projections of threats to Russia’s vision of itself a

political and diplomatic threats more normally the pro

of the government and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 

expose the exaggerated but prevalent ideas held in 

quarters concerning Russia’s place and future in 

affairs. While clearly derived from the sense of outra

being disregarded over Kosovo, they also reflect Ru

inability to come to terms with its ability to contrib

international and European security. In addition, 

provide a refuge from the reality that Russian polic

nothing to contribute to a peaceful outcome in Kosovo b

March 1999 and was, in fact, obstructive of Western e

to do so. While the United States and its allies had the

share of follies and misdeeds throughout this crisis

Moscow, not Washington, that has attempted to hav

standard for Europe and another for its projected exc

zone of influence in the CIS, an outcome that is c

unacceptable to those states, Europe, and Washin

Thus many of the fears and threats that Moscow pr

due to Kosovo owe at least as much if not more to Ru

policies and policy failures than they do to so called We

“aggression.”

For example, another widely feared threat is 

NATO’s enlargement will isolate and marginalize Rus

a serious player, let alone a great power, in areas of hi

influence and dominance. The idea that Russia will ce

be counted a great European and global player on a pa

Washington terrifies many elites, even if the yo

generation is allegedly—though this is unproven—

reconciled with contemporary reality. The determinat

play this global role or the belief that Russia “is entitl

33
hard, indeed too hard.

105

This great power mystique of Derzhavnost’—a k

objectively fated quality that Russia must be a great 

and be seen as such by all—pervades even the most ro

diplomatic and political statements.

106

 It also has be

most consistent justification of the anti-reform grou

stopping reform ever since the Decembrist Moveme

1825. This mystique has played this role because 

profound conviction, going back to the Tsars, that 

multinational empire and state like Russia, any r

could put the whole system and state at risk. Functi

speaking, Derzhavnost’ is essentially the most r

contemporary manifestation of the deeply rooted T

idea that the state and the empire are identica

inextricable concepts.

107

For instance, at a recent meeting of the Acade

Military Science on future war that Sergeyev attend

director, Retired General Makhmut A. Gareyev, o

Russia’s leading thinkers and a former Deputy Ch

Staff, stated openly that,

One of these unifying factors is the idea of Russia’s rebirth 

great power, not a regional power (it is situated in several la

regions of Eurasia) but a truly great power on a global sc

This is determined not by someone’s desire, not just 

possession of nuclear weapons or by size of territory, but by 

historical traditions and objective needs in the developmen

the Russian society and state. Either Russia will be a stro

independent, and unified power, uniting all peoples, repub

krays, and oblasts in the Eurasian territory, which is in 

interests of all humanity, or it will fall apart, generat

numerous conflicts, and then the entire internatio

community will be unable to manage the situation o

continent with such an abundance of weapons of m

destruction. In the opinion of the president of the AVN (

Gareyev himself—author), there is no other alternative.

108

Gareyev’s perspective, widely shared across the 

Russian military-political elite, also logically entai

34
must expand territorially and politically as a central p

the multipolar world if it is to survive at home.

1

national security concept went so far as to insist 

Russia’s need for foreign bases in CIS countri

Prominent statesmen like Yevgeny Primakov and A

Kokoshin also share a revisionist agenda concernin

territorial settlement of 1989. And they are hardly al

their thinking.

111 The distinguished Finnish diploma

historian, Max Jakobson, observes that virtually eve

he meets in Russia expects the reintegration of the CI

Russia. 

The public flaunting of such delusions, revisionism

anger at the post-1989 European status quo has 

saturated the Russian media. But it only inten

Russia’s inability to devise realistic national se

policies or threat assessments while fueling neighb

states’ constant fear and negative perceptions of R

Derzhavnost’s prevalence also reflects the failu

consummate democratic reforms. It profoundly distor

perceptual lenses through which Russian elite

themselves and other states, as well as broader tren

world politics, creating a self-centeredness that cann

refuses to, understand why a politically blighted state 

a devastated economy does not count as much as the U

States does.

Nevertheless, it is clear that adherents of these 

remain blind to the way in which provocative Ru

actions have brought about Russia’s worst nightm

Russia wants status not responsibility and indeed c

comprehend its own substantial responsibility f

currently unfavorable international situation.

112 Natu

so archaic an outlook will cause an over-ambitious 

and expansive threat assessment.

For example, even though economic conditions ru

the need for power projection forces, the new Se

Concept openly states that,

35
predetermine the need, under appropriate circumstances, 

Russia to have a military presence in certain strategic

important regions of the world. The stationing of lim

military contingents [the same term used to describe force

Afghanistan—author] (military bases, naval units) there o

treaty basis must ensure Russia’s readiness to fulfill 

obligations and to assist in forming a stable military-strat

balance of forces in regions, and must enable the Russ

Federation to react to a crisis situation in its initial stage 

achieve its foreign policy goals.

113

This is an open call for stationing forces in CIS cou

for Russia’s benefit and thereby restoring the f

military unity of the Soviet Union. Such stationing 

resemble a permanent military occupation, albeit und

organizational scheme often described as being the 

the Warsaw Pact, hardly a coalition of equal allies. 

from all the other unanswered questions in that parag

the fact that Moscow could take for granted the neces

publicly state its need for a higher degree of security th

supposed allies enjoy epitomizes the strategic insens

that still characterizes too much Russian policy.

Thus NATO’s enlargement in both scope and m

threatens some of Russia’s most basic foundational m

It undercuts the reformers of 1991 and their aco

cherished belief that the Russian people and Boris Ye

and not NATO’s steadfast resistance to Soviet p

destroyed the Soviet Union. Second, enlargement eq

the Soviet system with Russian imperialism. It stri

the very tenacious Russian myth that Russia suffered 

than anyone else, or at least as much as other peoples

the Soviet system. This Russian version of Dostoye

“egotism of suffering," or what Freud called the “narci

of small differences,” is very deeply ingrained now a

many members of the elite alongside older notions of 

and empire being equivalent concepts. Thus an enor

propaganda effort making Russia the victim in the Ch

campaign is now underway. Competitive victimiz

almost by definition, cannot serve as a realistic bas

36
international arena. By conflating Soviet power 

Russian imperialism, NATO and partisans of enlarge

also reveal their skepticism as to the extent of demo

rule in Russia.

NATO enlargement, seen from Moscow, is hostile e

what Russians believe are voluntary, foreord

integrationist tendencies in the CIS that would pre

what Russians perceive as the positive ties of th

empires. It allegedly denigrates the extent to which R

has refrained from inciting its co-nationals in the CI

Baltic states and following Serbia’s example u

Slobodan Milosevic.

114

 The fact that Russia has f

basic democratic agreements with Europe on the use 

military at home and civilian democratic control of 

forces, has tried to restrict the OSCE from the CIS at 

opportunity, and wages “economic wars” and makes 

threats against its neighbors, all actions which show 

does not behave as European states think a state shou

continues to elude Russian thinkers as does the fac

they cannot play a role equal to that of the United Stat

the Finnish Institute of International Affairs’ Russia 

report recently stated,

In the realm of foreign and security policy, Russia is n

committed to the principles of democratic peace and comm

values. Its chosen line of multipolarity implies that Russia 

entitled to its own sphere of influence and the unilateral use 

military force within it. Russia refuses to countenance a

unipolar hegemonic aspirations, in particular it will not acce

security arrangements in which the United States seems 

have a leading role. As a solution, Russia proposes a Euro

without dividing boundaries which will, however, requir

buffer zone of militarily non-aligned countries between Rus

and NATO. Russia’s idea of Europe’s new secur

architecture is therefore based on an equal partnership 

great powers and supportive geopolitical solutions—not 

common values accepted by all, nor on the right of every sm

state to define their own security policy. The abo

summary of recent Russian developments is, in eve

37
EU’s fairly optimistic goals. (emphasis by author)

115

Implications for the U.S. Army.

These threat assessments present the U.S. armed 

and particularly the Army with difficult problems. 

while undoubtedly Russian military elites crave discus

with us, they inhabit a different conceptual universe 

we do and will not readily learn from others or change 

mind as their cognitive predispositions happen to 

their sectoral interests quite nicely. This does not pre

bilateral programs between U.S. and Russian armed f

but it does render the chances of successful dialogue 

low. For this reason we can expect a relatively frozen d

or only a minimally warming one between Russia 

NATO on all issues affecting the European security ag

A second problem that goes beyond the difficult

formal dialogue is that there will remain a high le

military-political elite suspicion of American policies t

deliberately cultivated and diffused throughou

Russian media and political-military systems. 

mistrust and suspicion will place immense diffic

ahead of any agreement on security issues.

Third, our bilateral military programs in R

especially those that seek to alter the nature o

relationship between state and armed forces, will 

under attack. This Russian elite appears uninteres

democratization; quite the opposite. The area of 

military relations is likely to be a particular neuralgic 

for them.

Fourth, we can expect that the Russian army, and 

is evidence in support of this trend from 1999, will s

much warmer attitude towards China. Threat perce

of a resurgent China have diminished even as Ch

Russian positions on major issues of international se

have come together. Military exchanges have pick

considerably since late 1998 and there are visible si

38
the United States on issues like national missile de

(NMD) and theater missile defense (TMD).

116

 Theref

can anticipate, if all things remain equal, gr

Sino-Russian military cooperation and Russian we

and technology transfers to China that are openly tar

deliveries against U.S. policies and interests. T

together, all these likely trends in the bilateral mi

relationship will probably reduce, if not nullify

effectiveness of the bilateral military dialogue 

considerable degree outside of shared concerns in B

and Kosovo. Even in those cases, the dialogue may co

nothing or be frozen for political reasons originati

Moscow or in the larger U.S.-Russian relationship.

Conclusions.

The strategy of limited nuclear war and first-strik

of nuclear weapons, as a backup to a deterrence polic

the singling out of the United States and NATO are the 

prominently reported negative aspects of these docum

But the deeper trends that undergird those strategie

policies are equally, if not more disturbing. The 

doctrine, security concept, and Russian military pol

shown in Pristina, Chechnya, highlight forces and f

that are much more troubling and structurally threat

than the temporary absence of usable conventional fo

First of all, these documents and policies reinfor

bitter truth that there has been no military reform and 

or no democratization of the entire edifice of defense 

including its cognitive structures. A government that 

start internal wars three times in 6 years and do so, as 

most recent case, mainly to win elections and giv

General Staff a larger share of control over defense po

a permanent threat to its own people, even more than 

neighbors and interlocutors.

117

The absence of democratization and reform is evid

the following aspects of the documents analyzed a

39
this, they support use of the army for purposes of dom

repression. They postpone true military reform 

professionalization to some unknown date w

maintaining, if not increasing, the already high eco

burden of militarization. They continue to concea

burden’s dimensions from elected officials, while ins

that the army must be ready for deterrence and defen

all azimuths and against all-encompassing threats a

the entire spectrum of conflict.

118

These documents also demonstrate the ascenda

the trend that sees threats everywhere and post

military approaches over all other aspects of na

security policy. It offers primarily military solutio

political challenges. These documents also demonst

military-political elite that cannot deal with the reali

Russia’s shrunken estate, and who therefore constant

in ways that unsettle their neighbors and interlocutor

self-centered mystique of Derzhavnost’ and the d

entrenched Leninist axiom that international securit

question of who does what to whom (kto-kogo) rather 

mutual opportunity for gain for all players remain a

the greatest impediments to Russia’s internal and ex

security and to its ultimate democratization and prosp

The greater danger here is not necessarily that a nu

provocation will occur, it is rather that the mi

institutions and government have yet to devise a str

and policy based on reality. Instead they continue to 

after fantasies of recovering a lost status and of be

military-political global superpower. The deeply emb

notions of international security as a zero-sum game, 

militarization of politics, and the pervasiveness of th

from all sides, are axioms that are deployed, first of a

domestic advantage and to obstruct reform. W

juxtaposed to the absence of coherent controls 

institutions to formulate and direct defense policy, 

axioms are an invitation to disaster.

40
behind them represent only the latest manifestat

Russia’s continuing failure to become a true democr

peace with itself and the world. As long as this unre

and pre-modern structure of politics govern the disc

and practice of Russian security policy, continuous in

unrest is the best scenario we can predict for Russia

experience shows that this unrest does not remain b

up in Russia. The war in Chechnya is now accompan

threats against Tbilisi and Baku as well as attem

military-political union in the CIS.

Thus Russia’s refusal or inability to adapt to r

presages a continuing struggle in the CIS and 

unsettled areas like the Balkans. Every preceding 

when state power in Russia fragmented, the whole r

within which it acted was engulfed in instability, 

conflict, and foreign armies were either tempted to inv

dragged into the quagmire. Thus these document

ultimately a confession of political, economic, socia

moral bankruptcy and an admission of despair. If R

perceives everything around it as a threat whose origi

beyond its borders, then the temptation to avert dom

reform will continue to strengthen and breed still 

internal unrest and instability. Nor will any ou

attempts to help be appreciated or accepted. Abs

reliable defense policy and defense forces and followi

elite that seems determined on racing to the brink 

precipice, Russia’s elites remain fixated on military th

that exist mainly in their fantasies. Thus they 

themselves utterly unable to come to grips with the ne

very real threats to Russia’s security and stability.

119

situation continues, then the Russian people, if not 

neighbors and partners, will be thrown over the ed

Russia falls into an economic, ecological, demographi

possibly even nuclear abyss.

41
1. “Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Proekt,” Kr

Zvezda, October 9, 1999, p. 3.

2. Celeste A. Wallander, “Russian Views on Kosovo: Synopsis 

6 Panel Discussion,” Program on New Approaches to Russian S

Harvard University, Davis Center for Russian Studies, Cambrid

April 1999, Policy Memo No. 62; Moscow, Nezavisimoye Vo

Obozreniye, in Russian, November 19-25, 1999, Foreign Br

Information Service, Central Eurasia, (Henceforth FBIS

December 6, 1999; Oksanna Antonenko, “Russia, NATO, and Eu

Security After Kosovo,” Survival, Vol. XLI, No. 4, Winter 1999-2

124-144; Roland Dannreuther, “Escaping the Enlargement T

NATO-Russian Relations,” Survival, Vol. XLI, No. 4, W

1999-2000, pp. 145-164; Viktor Gobarev, “Russia-NATO Relatio

the Kosovo Crisis: Strategic Implications,” Journal of Slavic M

Studies, Vol. XII, No. 3, September 1999, pp. 1-17; Colonel A.B. K

(Ret.), “Aviatsiya v Iugoslavskom Konflikte,” Voyennaya Mysl

September-October 1999, pp. 71-74; and as told to the au

conversations with Russian officers and analysts in Helsin

Moscow, June 1999 (henceforth Conversations).

3. “Novaya Voyennaya DoktrinaRossii – Adekvatnyi Otvet n

Vremenyi,” Krasnaya Zvezda, October 8, 1999, p. 1, “Shestaya V

Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, October 29, 1999, pp

FBIS-SOV, December 6, 1999.

4. Wallander, pp. 3-4.

5. Charles J. Dick, “Russia’s 1999 Draft Military Do

Occasional Brief, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal M

Academy, Sandhurst, Camberley, Surrey, UK, No. 72, Novem

1999, p. 4.

6. Conversations.

7. Dick, pp. 4-5.

8. Ibid.

9. “Interview with Colonel General Yuriy Nikola

Baluyevskiy,“ FBIS-SOV, November 9, 1998.

10. Moscow, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, in Russian, December 26

FBIS-SOV-97-364, December 30, 1997.

42
is Down but Not Out,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, June 1999, p

12. FBIS-SOV, December 30, 1997.

13. Ibid.; Christopher Bellamy, “Spiral Through Time: 

‘Conflict Intensity’,” Occasional Papers, Strategic & Combat 

Institute, No. 35, London, 1998, pp. 14-15.

14. Moscow, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, in Russi

42, November 6-12, 1998, FBIS-SOV, November 9, 1998.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Moscow, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, in R

January 14, 2000, FBIS-SOV, January 14, 2000.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, in Russian, October 12, 1999, FBI

October 12, 1999.

22. Ibid., FBIS-SOV, January 14, 2000.

23. Conversations.

24. Martin Nesirsky, “Russia Says Threshold Lower for N

Weapons,” Reuters, December 17, 1999.

25. Ibid.; FBIS-SOV, October 12, 1999; FBIS-SOV, Janu

2000.

26. “Osnovnye Polozheniia Voennoi Doktriny Rossiiskoi Fe

(Izlozhenie),” Krasnaia Zvezda, November 19, 1993, pp. 3-8.

27. Nesirsky; see also, Moscow, Interfax, in English, Novem

1999, FBIS-SOV, November 26, 1999.

28. Moscow, Yaderny Kontrol, No. 6, November-December, 

Russian, FBIS-SOV, December 24, 1999.

43
30. “Russia Rejects Changes in ABM Treaty,” Reuters, M

2000.

31. Stephen Blank, ”Russia Rises to Perceived Threats,” 

Intelligence Review, February 2000, pp. 24-27; Moscow, RIA, in E

February 4, 2000, FBIS-SOV, February 4, 2000.

32. FBIS-SOV, January 14, 2000.

33. Ibid.; Voyennaya Doktrina, pp. 3-4.

34. Dick, p. 5.

35. FBIS-SOV, January 14, 2000;FBIS-SOV, December 30, 

36. This term is taken from the French philosopher Michel Fo

1927-84, and denoted the manner in which discussions about c

are structured by the initial definition of those concepts. Thus, 

word “security” is always defined in narrow military terms and i

of military threats.

37. Moscow, Nezavisimoye Voynnoye Obozreniye, in Russian

November 19-25, 1999, FBIS-SOV, November 19, 1999; Be

Politika, in Serbo-Croatian, December 23, 1999, FBIS-SOV, De

24, 1999; Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in Russian, October 18

FBIS-SOV, October 18, 1999.

38. Conversations.

39. Ibid.

40. FBIS-SOV, November 19, 1999.

41. FBIS-SOV, December 24, 1999, from Belgrade, P

December 23, 1999.

42. Ibid.

43. FBIS-SOV, October 18, 1999; FBIS-SOV, November 19

44. Ibid.

45. Stephen Blank, “Proliferation and Counterprolifera

Russian Strategy,” and “Remarks on Russia,” Proceedings f

Conference on Countering the Missile Threat: International 

44
National Security Affairs, 1999, pp. 127-149, and 41-45 respect

46. FBIS-SOV, December 24, 1999, from Belgrade P

December 23, 1999.

47. Conversations; “Kontseptsiya Natsional’noi Bezop

Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, (I

Version) November 26, 1999, (henceforth cited as Kontse

Nesirsky. It should be pointed out too that Yakovlev’s warning

nuclear use pertain to exactly this kind of scenario.

48. Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in Russian, October 18, 1999, FBI

October 18, 1999.

49. Conversations; FBIS-SOV, January 14, 2000.

50. Conversations.

51. Voyennaya Doktrina, pp. 3-4.

52. Timothy L. Thomas, Information Technology: US/R

Perspectives and Potential for Military-Political Cooperation, 

Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1999, http

army.mil/call/fmso/fmsopubs/issues/infotech.htm.

53. Conversations, Novaya Voyennaya Doktrina, p. 1, Mosc

(Electronic Version), in Russian, November 26, 1999, FBI

November 29, 1999.

54. Novaya Voyennaya Doktrina, p. 1.

55. Ibid.

56. FBIS-SOV, November 19, 1999.

57. Moscow, Vek (Electronic Version), in Russian, Novem

1999, FBIS-SOV, November 29, 1999.

58. FBIS-SOV, November 19, 1999.

59. FBIS-SOV, January 14, 2000.

60. FBIS-SOV, November 19, 1999.

61. Ibid.

45
FBIS-SOV-97-015, January 24, 1997.

63. FBIS-SOV November 19, 1999.

64. Ibid.

65. For an examination of the ambivalence of Russian 

concerning proliferation, see Michael Beck, “Russia’s Ration

Developing Export Controls,” in Gary K. Bertsch and Suzette R. 

eds., Arms on the Market: Reducing the Risk of Proliferatio

Former Soviet Union, Foreword by Sam Nunn, New York: Rou

1998, pp. 37-38, 49; Moscow, Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdun

Otnosheniya, in Russian, No. 7, July 1998, pp. 50-60, FBI

August 28, 1998.

66. “Executive Summary of the Report to the Commission to 

the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States,” July 15

Pursuant to Public Law 201, 104th Congress, Report of the Com

To Assess The Ballistic Missile Threat To The United States, Ap

III, Unclassified Working Papers, Pursuant to Public Law 20

(henceforth Executive Summary).

67. Stephen Blank, ”Russia as Rogue Proliferator,” Orb

XLVI, No. 1, Winter 2000, pp. 91-107.

68. Colonel Larry M. Wortzel, “Ballistic Missiles and Wea

Mass Destruction: The View From Beijing,” Proceedings fr

Conference on Countering the Missile Threat, International 

Strategies, Washington, DC: Jewish Institute for National S

Affairs, 1999, p. 193 (henceforth Proceedings); Ken Alibek and S

Handelsman, “Is Russia Still Preparing for Bio-Warfare?,” Wa

Journal, February 16, 2000, from the Pentagon’s Early Bir

selection for that day, internet http://ca.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/ebir

69. Moscow, Interfax, November 12, 1999.

70. Ibid.

71. Igor Ivanov, “West’s Hypocrisy Over Chechnya,” Fi

Times, November 16, 1999, p. 19.

72. Moscow, Krasnaya Zvezda, in Russian, December 9

FBIS-SOV, December 8, 1999.

73. Ibid.

46
75. Voyennaya Doktrina, pp. 3-4, FBIS-SOV, January 14, 2

76. Ibid.

77. Voyennaya Doktrina, pp. 3-4.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid.

81. Kontseptsiya.

82. Ibid.

83. FBIS-SOV, November, 19, 1999; FBIS-SOV, December 

FBIS-SOV, December 23, 1999.

84. FBIS-SOV, January 14, 2000.

85. Conversations.

86. Voyennaya Doktrina, pp. 3-4; FBIS-SOV, January 14

FBIS-SOV, February 4, 2000.

87. Stephen Blank, ”State and Armed Forces in Russia: Tow

African Scenario,” in Anthony James Joes, ed., Saving Demo

U.S. Intervention in Threatened Democratic States, Westpo

Praeger Publishers, 1999, pp. 167-196.

88. One finds this similar conflation in China’s perceptio

threat environment, and it certainly carries over from the Lenin

Stalinist belief in capitalist encirclement at the same time as th

internal enemies of the socialist project. Denny Roy, “China’s 

Environment,” Security Dialogue, Vol. XXVII, No. 4, 1996, pp. 43

89. Voyennaya Doktrina, pp. 3-4.

90. Ibid.

91. FBIS-SOV, January 14, 2000.

92. Ibid.

47
94. Ibid.

95. Ibid.

96. Ibid.

97. Moscow Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Electronic Version) in R

February 5, 2000; FBIS-SOV, February 7, 2000.

98. Moscow, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, in R

November 19, 1999; FBIS-SOV, November 19, 1999; The Jam

Monitor, November 24, 1999.

99. “Presidential Bulletin,“ FBIS-SOV, December 27, 1999

100. Moscow, Krasnaya Zvezda, in Russian, October 19

FBIS-SOV, October 19, 1999.

101. Moscow, RIA, in English, December 17, 1999, FBI

December 17, 1999; Moscow, RIA, in English, November 23

FBIS-SOV, November 23, 1999.

102. Moscow, RIA, In English, November 23, 1999, FBI

November 23, 1999; Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, Novem

1999, FBIS-SOV, November 23, 1999; Moscow, Interfax, in R

November 23, 1999, FBIS-SOV, November 23, 1999; Moscow, R

Public Television First Channel Network, in Russian, Novem

1999, FBIS-SOV, November 17, 1999; Moscow, Kommers

Russian, November 24, 1999, FBIS-SOV, November 24, 1999

Saradzhyan, “Russia to Emphasize Replenishing Spy Satellite 

Defense News, October 25, 1999, p. 6; Simon Saradzhyan, “Ru

Emphasize Electro-Optics in Future Projects,” Defense News, No

22, 1999, p. 22; Christopher Foss, “Russia Develops MEADS Loo

Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 21, 1998, p. 18; Moscow, Inte

English, April 25, 1999, FBIS-SOV, April 25, 1999; Moscow, Inte

English, August 31, 1999, FBIS-SOV, September 1, 1999; 

Saradzhyan, “Russia Set to Invest More to Modernize We

Defense News, December 13, 1999, p. 22; Simon Saradzhyan, 

Seeks to Catch Up With West in Microelectronics,” Defense 

December 13, 1999, p. 8; Vladimir Isachenkov, Douglas Bar

Simon Saradzhyan, “Russian Air Force to Improve Tactical 

Capability,” Defense News, December 6, 1999, p. 5; M

Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy, in Russian, November 2

FBIS-SOV, November 3, 1999; Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in R

October 28, 1999, FBIS-SOV, October 28, 1999; Moscow, Inte

48
Rossiyskaya Gazeta, in Russian, July 8, 1999, FBIS-SOV, July 

Richard Staar, “A Russian Rearmament Wish List,” Orbis, Vol

No. 4, Fall, 1999, pp. 605-612; Richard Staar, “Funding R

Rearmament,” Perspective, Vol. X, No. 1, September-October, 1

1-2, 8-10.

103. Ibid.

104. FBIS-SOV, January 14, 2000.

105. Dmitry Trenin, “Transformation of Russian Foreign 

NATO Expansion Can Have Negative Consequences for the 

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 5, 1997, Foreign BroadcastInfo

Service, Observations and Analysis (henceforth FBIS-FMN), Fe

12, 1997; Sergey M. Rogov, “Russia and NATO’s Enlargeme

Search for a Compromise at the Helsinki Summit,” Center fo

Analyses, Alexandria, VA, CIM 513/ May 1997, p. 10. This was 

dominant theme of Russian presentations at the Biennial Confe

European Security Institutions, January 22-24, 1996, in Mosc

also Sergei Rogov, et al., Security Concerns of the New Russia, 

Alexandria VA: Center for Naval Analysis, 1995, p. 34, whe

demand is made explicitly; and Lena Jonson, “In Search of a D

Russian Interventionism in Conflicts in Its ‘Near Abroad

Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, Vol. V, No. 3, Winter, 1

447.

106. Thus Russia’s ambassador to Seoul, Evgeny Afa

speaking apropo of Moscow’s new treaty with North Korea, ob

“Being a global and regional power, Russia will continue to po

involve itself in a peaceful resolution of the turbulent situation 

Korean peninsula, etc.” Seoul, The Korea Herald, (Internet Vers

English, January 7, 2000, FBIS-SOV, January 6, 2000.

107. Theodore Taranovski, “Institutions, Political Cultu

Foreign Policy in Late Imperial Russia,” in Catherine Evtuho

Gasparov, Alexander Ospovat, Mark Von Hagen, eds., Kazan, M

St. Petersburg: Multiple Faces of the Russian Empire, Moscow

1997, pp. 53-69, Richard Wortman, “Ceremony and Empire 

Evolution of the Russian Monarchy,” Ibid., pp. 32-37.

108. “Geopolitika i Russkaya Bezopasnost’,” Krasnaya Zvezd

31, 1999, p. 2.

109. Moscow, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, in Russian, September 2

FBIS-SOV-95-188, September 28, 1995, pp. 19-22. Andrei Ko

49
School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridg

Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, 1998, p. 31

excellent example of this pervasive mentality. At the time 

Deputy Defense Minister and soon after became Secretary 

Defense Council. Vassily Krivokhiza, Russia’s National Security 

Conceptions and Realities, Richard Weitz, trans., John F. K

School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridg

Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, 1998, p. 3

Iaz’kova, “The Emergence of Post-Cold War Russian Foreign 

Priorities,” in Robert Craig Nation and Stefano Bianchini, ed

Yugoslav Conflict and its Implications for International Re

Ravenna: Longo Editore, 1998, p. 112.

110. FBIS-SOV, January 14, 2000.

111. Kokoshin, Institutions Project, 1998, p. 31, is an e

example of this pervasive mentality; Moscow, Rossiyskaya Ga

Russian, November 6, 1996, FBIS-SOV, 96-217, November 8

Address by Y.M. Primakov to the OSCE Permanent Council, 

September 20, 1996, p. 2. Transcript made available by the Emb

the Russian Federation to the United States.

112. Robert Legvold, “The ‘Russian Question’,” in V

Baranovsky, ed., Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security 

Oxford; Oxford University Press for the Stockholm Internationa

Research Institute (SIPRI), 1997, p. 67; Sergei Medvedev, “Eu

Security After the Cold War: A Rejoinder,” Security Dialog

XXIV, No. 2, pp. 319-320, writes,

In the years to come Russia will stay a suspended, yet const

security threat on the edge of Europe; a nuclear power and st

major military force with unclear intentions, complica

domestic policies, with multiple interest groups influenc

foreign and security policy, producing scores of refugees 

migrants, raising security concerns of the CIS states 

Eastern Europe, and finally unable to cooperate with the W

on security issues.

113. FBIS-SOV, January 14, 2000.

114. Dannreuther, pp. 153-156.

115. Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Russia Beyon

The Prospects for Russian Developments and Their Implicat

Finland, Helsinki, 1999, pp. 1-2.

50
Relations,” Forthcoming, Issues & Studies.

117. Stephen Blank, “Vladimir Putin and Russia’s Armed F

Faustian Bargain?,” Forthcoming, Brown Journal of World Aff

118. Interestingly enough, a great deal of the threat envir

depicted in these documents corresponds to some analyses of 

“threat environment.” Roy, pp. 437-448; and, for example

General A.F. Klimenko, ”International Security and the Char

Future Military Conflicts," Voyennaya Mysl’, No. 1, January-Fe

1997, p. 6.

119. Sergei Medvedev, “Former Soviet Union,” in Paul B. 

ed., The New Security Agenda: A Global Survey, Tokyo: Japan Ce

International Exchange, 1998, pp. 75-116.

51
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Commandant

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Director of Research

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Author

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