GLOBALIZATION AND THE NATURE OF WAR

LTC Antulio J. Echevarria II

March 2003
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ISBN 1-58487-118-0

ii
FOREWORD

Perhaps the single most important phenomenon of the

21st century is globalization. It is clearly redefining the

international security environment, as well as many other

aspects of human affairs. Yet, while analysts and scholars

continue to study (and debate) its economic, social, and

political effects, they have done comparatively little work

concerning its impact on war, in particular the nature of

war. In an effort to fill this gap, Lieutenant Colonel Antulio

J. Echevarria II has written a monograph exploring the

nature of war, and how it has changed as a result of

globalization. He uses the Clausewitzian model of war’s

trinity (political guidance, chance, and enmity) as a

framework for understanding the nature of war, a concept

that has been only vaguely represented in defense

literature. He then analyses the global war on terrorism via

that framework. Lieutenant Colonel Echevarria concludes

that the Clausewitzian trinity is alive and well.

Globalization is strengthening the role that political

guidance is playing in war, it may well increase the

elements of chance and uncertainty, and it is clearly

exacerbating basic feelings of enmity among different

cultures. It is this last area that Lieutenant Colonel

Echevarria sees as the most critical in the war on terrorism.

If there is a center of gravity in this conflict, it is in the ideas

that have fueled radical Islam.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this

contribution to the debate on globalization’s effect on war.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

ANTULIO J. ECHEVARRIA II, a lieutenant colonel in the

U.S. Army, is currently assigned as the Director of Strategic

Research at the Strategic Studies Institute. He graduated

from the U.S. Military Academy in 1981, was commissioned

as an armor officer, and has held a variety of command and

staff assignments in Germany and Continental United

States; he has also served as an assistant professor of

European history at the U.S. Military Academy; Squadron

S3 of 3/16 Cavalry; Chief of BN/TF and Bde Doctrine at the

U.S. Army Armor Center at Fort Knox; as an action officer

at the Army After Next project at HQ TRADOC, Ft. Monroe,

VA; and as a speechwriter for the U.S. Army Chief of Staff.

He is a graduate of the U.S. Army’s Command and General

Staff College, the U.S. Army War College, and holds M.A.

and Ph.D. degrees in History from Princeton University. He

has published articles in a number of scholarly and

professional journals to include the Journal of Strategic

Studies, Journal of Military History, War in History, War &

Society, Parameters, Joint Force Quarterly, Military

Review, and Airpower Journal. His book, After Clausewitz:

German Military Thinkers before the Great War, was

published by the University Press of Kansas in the spring of

2001.

iv
SUMMARY

Just a few years into the new millennium, and it is

already a truism to say that globalization—the spread of

information and information technologies, along with

greater public participation in economic and political

processes—is transforming every aspect of human affairs.

What is not yet clear, however, are the impacts of these

trends, especially how they might affect the nature of war.

Understanding the nature of war is important for more than

academic reasons; the nature of a thing tends to define how

it can and cannot be used, which, in the case of war, makes it

extremely important to both political and military leaders.

To answer the question of war’s nature, one must turn to the

famous Prussian philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz

(1780-1831), who devoted more time than perhaps any other

military theorist (contemporary or otherwise) to this topic.

The Clausewitzian Nature of War.

The most important aspect of Clausewitz’s concept of

war is that war has a dual nature, not in the bi-polar sense

where wars can be limited or unlimited, but in the sense

that derives from German philosophical traditions in which

phenomena are considered to have objective and subjective

natures. The objective nature of war includes those

elements—such as violence, friction, chance, and

uncertainty—that all wars have in common. Conflicts can

range in kind from an all-out attack to a war of observation

(peacekeeping), for instance, but each will have all of these

elements present to one degree or another. By contrast, the

subjective nature of war encompasses those elements—

such as military forces, their doctrines, weapons, as well as

the environments (land, sea, air, and danger) in which they

fight—that make each war unique. Under Clausewitz’s

concept, the objective and subjective natures of war interact

continuously. As a result, the nature of war cannot be

v
separated from the means and the actors involved in its

conduct.

In addition, war is shaped by three major forces (war’s

trinity) that also contribute to its nature: a subordinating or

guiding influence (policy), the play of chance and probability, and enmity or basic hostility. Each is present in the

current global war on terrorism.

The Element of Subordination—War as a Political

Instrument.

Globalization has actually increased the role of politics,

both in determining the purpose for and influencing the

actual conduct of war. Both President George W. Bush and

terrorist leader Osama bin Laden have released statements

that link their actions to very explicit political agendas.

Hence, the conflict remains thoroughly political at every

level and, thus far at least, throughout every operational

phase. Furthermore, this trend does not appear likely to

reverse itself.

The Element of Hostility—Blind Natural Force.

The element of blind natural force is playing a decisive

role in the global war on terrorism. Globalization has,

among other things, contributed to the creation of fertile

breeding grounds for terrorism as some groups try to resist

its encroachment. Despite successful operations in

Afghanistan and elsewhere, Al Qaeda’s ideology remains

intact and attractive to young Muslims. By comparison, the

U.S. populace, which lacked any deep-seated feelings of

hostility prior to September 11, 2001, is now being

psychologically prepared (one can argue how well) by its

political leadership for a long fight. The war against global

terrorism is thus foremost a battle of ideas—ideas powerful

enough to provoke violent emotions. Consequently, it is

within this arena that the war will be won or lost.

vi
The Elements of Chance and Uncertainty—Military

Forces.

For the United States and its Western allies, the

elements of chance and uncertainty manifest themselves

through traditional, if transforming, military and law

enforcement organizations. For non-state actors such as Al

Qaeda, on the other hand, chance and uncertainty are

personified in irregular forces buoyed by a broad, religionbased ideology, an extensive organizational and operational

infrastructure, and a multinational membership. While

information technologies provide more data to

decisionmakers and their constituencies, without analysis

and synthesis such data are inadequate. The total amount

of information—which includes irrelevant and incorrect

information—might increase by a certain percent, but

knowledge grows by the same percent.

Conclusions.

Globalization is strengthening the role that politics will

play in war by affording it the capability to exert greater

real-time control over military operations. Globalization is

also making the element of hostility more critical. Political

leaders can now mobilize hostile passions more quickly and

over a larger area than hitherto, particularly in areas

“suffering” from the spread of globalization. Finally,

contrary to expectation, the increase in information that

globalization brings may well intensify the play of chance

and probability in war.

Even with globalization, war remains essentially

Clausewitzian in nature. It is still a dynamic expression of

political wills in conflict. The challenge is to defeat volatile,

extremist ideas. Hence, the center of gravity in the global

war on terrorism is ideological in nature. The United States

and its strategic partners must take the fight to the enemy

on that front and win there decisively.

vii
GLOBALIZATION AND THE NATURE OF WAR

Just a few years into the new millennium and it is

already a truism to say that globalization—the spread of

information and information technologies, along with

greater public participation in economic and political

processes—is transforming every aspect of human affairs.1

Indeed, globalization is enhancing the real and virtual

mobility of people, things, and ideas and is increasing social,

political, and economic interconnectedness worldwide.

From 1980 to 1996, for example, the percentage of the

world’s population that travels internationally on a regular

basis rose from 6.5 percent to 10 percent.2 Similarly, the

number of personal computers connected to the internet has

been growing at a rate of nearly 70 percent per year for more

than 30 years.3 The associated spread of democratic ideas

and free market values helped increase the total number of

democracies in the world by 14 percent within the last

decade alone.4 Furthermore, considerable evidence

suggests that globalization is making national and regional

economies more interdependent, thereby giving rise to an

integrated world market economy.5 Clearly, then,

globalization is changing how we interact with our world.

What is not yet clear, however, are the impacts of these

trends. While the world may indeed have more democracies

than ever before, how many of them have stable regimes

with established civil societies where strong traditions exist

conforming to the rule of law? As the example of Weimar

Germany shows, newly formed democracies can rapidly

reverse course and transform into dangerous autocratic

regimes. While there is some validity to the view that

“established democracies do not go to war with other

democracies,” the number of established democracies is

relatively small.6 Also, while globalization has improved

general wealth, raised living standards, and increased life

expectancy across the world, 60 percent of the world’s

1
wealth continues to travel back and forth among the

developed countries, giving them the greater share of

benefits. The poor may be richer, but the rich are richer still;

and the gap between them is growing.7 What is more, as the

First and Second World Wars demonstrate, economic

interconnectedness and continuous growth do not necessarily preclude conflict.

Despite its apparent positive impact on the spread of

democracy and free-market economies, globalization might

produce a more dangerous and unpredictable world,

especially if the cultural backlash it has generated thus far

gathers more momentum. This world might be

characterized by shifting power relationships, ad hoc

security arrangements, and an ever-widening gap between

the richest and poorest nations.8 A number of new

democracies—lacking strong traditions for maintaining

checks and balances—might, for example, collapse after

only transitory successes. Transnational threats, such as

international crime syndicates, terrorist networks, and

drug cartels, could continue to grow in strength and

influence, thriving among autocratic, weak, or so-called

failed states. And, ethnic rivalries, nationalism, religiousbased antagonisms, and competition for scarce resources,

including water, could go unresolved. Thus, serious crises

would undoubtedly arise, especially as the world’s

population continues to grow.

On the other hand, globalization could give rise to a more

stable world in which national interests merge into the

general aim of promoting peace, stability, and economic

prosperity.9 In this world, the rule of law and the existence

of pluralistic political systems would continue to spread;

and the number of free-market economies would expand,

distributing economic prosperity still further. Even if this

“Utopia” should materialize, a number of crises—some of

which will undoubtedly require military intervention—will

most likely have had to occur beforehand, since most

autocratic regimes will probably not surrender power

without a fight. Moreover, as the 1999 Kosovo crisis

2
demonstrated, even relatively small states armed primarily

with conventional weapons can pose significant security

challenges to a superpower and its strategic partners.10 The

world need not devolve into a “clash of civilizations” or a

“coming anarchy,” therefore, in order for military power to

continue to play a significant role in the future.11

In any case, globalization will surely continue and may

even accelerate if data concerning the rate of technological

change are any indication.12 As numerous studies and

strategic papers have pointed out, globalization is already

changing how wars are being fought in the 21st century,

making them more dangerous than in any previous era.13 At

a minimum, the greater mobility of people, things, and ideas

will mean increased mobility for nonstate actors, weapons

of mass destruction, and radical fundamentalism of all

types.

In fact, the U.S. Department of State currently reports

that more than 60 active terrorist groups exist (with some

100,000 members); and over one-third of them have the

capacity for global reach.14 Furthermore, today’s terrorists

have proven very adaptive, learning from previous

generations, and changing their tactics in response to new

anti-terrorist measures.15 Globalization clearly offers them

some extraordinary capabilities to communicate and

coordinate their efforts.

Globalization also facilitates the proliferation of

destabilizing capabilities, such as weapons of mass

destruction or mass effect. Eleven countries currently have

nuclear weapons programs; thirteen more are actively

seeking them.16 More than 25 countries now possess

ballistic missiles, and over 75,000 cruise missiles are in

existence, with the number expected to rise to between

80,000 and 90,000 by 2010.17 Also, at least 17 countries—

including the so-called “Axis of Evil”—currently have active

chemical and biological weapons programs, and the number

is rising.18 As the Assistant Secretary of State for

Non-proliferation recently explained, despite the provisions

3
of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and the Chemical

and Biological Weapons conventions, proliferation of

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high

explosive/high yield weapons continues worldwide: “There

is an intense sort of cooperation that goes on among

countries that are trying to acquire such weapons.”19 For

example, China and North Korea have long contributed to

the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, both

for strategic leverage against the United States and for

economic advantages.20 Thus, globalization assists some

powerful motives that run counter to nonproliferation

efforts.

Biological weapons, especially, pose a serious threat not

only to human populations, but also to agriculture and

livestock. Unfortunately, U.S. crops lack genetic diversity,

rendering them vulnerable to disease. Furthermore, the

nation’s centralized feeding and marketing practices make

livestock extremely vulnerable to a biological attack. If such

an attack were to occur, a devastating ripple effect would

surely spread throughout the global economy since the

United States produces 30-50 percent of the world’s

foodstuffs.21

Globalization has also introduced a new form of warfare:

cyber-war. More than 30 countries—including Russia,

China, and several so-called rogue states—have developed

or are developing the capability to launch strategic-level

cyber attacks.22 The interconnectedness of many nations’

infrastructures means that a successful cyber attack

against a single sector in one country could result in adverse

effects in other sectors within the same country, or those of

its neighbors. Indeed, intended (and unintended) adverse

effects could well travel globally.23

If globalization is making war more dangerous and

adding new dimensions to it (such as cyber space), is it in

some way changing the nature of war? What exactly is the

nature of war? These questions are of more than a purely

4
academic interest, since the nature of a thing tends to define

how it can and cannot be used.

To answer the question of war’s nature, we must turn to

the famous Prussian philosopher of war, Carl von

Clausewitz (1780-1831), who devoted more time than

perhaps any other military theorist (contemporary or

otherwise) to understanding the nature of war. Western

theories of the nature of war seem to derive—in one way or

another—from Clausewitz’s own work on the subject.

Despite its length and its sometimes ponderous prose, his

masterwork, Vom Kriege (On War), has been cited by the

majority of contemporary scholars and defense analysts. In

fact, his most popular observation that “war is the mere

continuation of policy by other means” now forms the core of

the western, and in particular the American, view of war.24

This belief is reflected in the bulk of the modern literature

on war, including the memoirs of prominent military

commanders.25 The dominant—and in many ways tacit—

understanding of this passage is that war is foremost a

political act and that policy alone determines (or ought to

determine) the object for which a war is to be fought, the

scale of effort to be exerted, and the means to be employed.

Since policy gives war purpose and direction, so the

reasoning goes, it forms the central element in war’s nature.

This belief is largely a post-Vietnam phenomenon,

however. Prior to that, most military writers considered

war’s nature as something akin to Clausewitz’s concept of

absolute war, an idealized extreme, but one that some claim

was nearly realized in the total wars of the 20th century.26 A

popular view emerged within the U.S. military that the

nature of war—nasty and brutal—was essentially

unchanging.27 Only its character—the way it is waged—

transformed over time. A corollary of this view was that

low-intensity and guerrilla conflicts were not “valid” types

of wars and so professional militaries should avoid them;

true war demanded full mobilization of the popular will and

a strategy of going “all-out” against one’s opponent, even in

conflicts involving so-called limited aims.28 The post5
Vietnam renaissance of Clausewitz in military and

scholarly literature surely contributed to the general

awareness of the centrality of politics in his theory of war.29

Yet, some critics of Clausewitz—such as historian John

Keegan—have maintained that, for many societies, war

serves more of a religious or cultural function than a

political one.30 Keegan rejects Clausewitz’s idea that war is

an extension of politics, claiming that it is “incomplete,

parochial and ultimately misleading.”31 According to

Keegan, politics in many cases serves culture, which he

defines very broadly as the “shared beliefs, values,

associations, myths, taboos, imperatives, customs,

traditions, manners and ways of thought, speech and

artistic expression which ballast every society.”32 Defined

this broadly, culture would be responsible for much, indeed.

He maintains that some societies make war simply because

it is an integral part of their culture to do so; thus wars take

the character and shape that cultures cause them to take.

Accordingly, war itself has no specific nature.33

Other critics, such as historians Martin van Creveld and

Russell Weigley, have taken direct issue with the concept of

politics. Van Creveld attempts to paint Clausewitz into a

corner. He argues that Clausewitz’s dictum about war

serving politics can mean only that war is the rational

extension of the will of the state; otherwise, the dictum is

nothing more than a meaningless cliché. Accordingly, if

Clausewitz’s dictum only pertains to the rational will of the

state, it fails to account for the wealth of irrational motives

that drive war. In short, according to van Creveld,

Clausewitz is only describing what the nature of war should

be, not what it actually is. Therefore, his theory has no

practical value.34 Unfortunately, as we shall see, van

Creveld, like so many others, has misinterpreted On War.

For his part, Weigley maintains that politics tends to

become an instrument of war rather than the other way

around. In an essay assessing military effectiveness in the

First and Second World Wars—genuine global conflicts

6
within the 20th-century context—Weigley concluded that

“War once begun has always tended to generate a politics of

its own: to create its own momentum, to render obsolete the

political purposes for which it was undertaken, and to erect

its own political purposes.”35 According to this view, then,

military necessity and the dynamics of conflict, particularly

conflict on a global scale or for unlimited aims, tend to

constrain and subordinate policy. Yet, Weigley’s assessment ultimately amounts to less a valid criticism of

Clausewitz’s idea than an unconscious affirmation of it, for,

as the Prussian theorist explained, in the course of a war,

political aims are apt to change, at times even radically.

This alteration would be more apparent than real, however,

since it would merely reflect the fact that political and

military aims had coincided. In other words, policy itself is

not subordinated as much as, locked in a life-or-death

struggle, it assumes a “war-like” character. Hence, under

Clausewitz’s concept, policy, which is also of two characters—

one aggressive and one placatory—is just as present in wars

of unlimited aims as it is in wars of limited ones.36

The Clausewitzian Nature of War.

A re-examination of Clausewitz’s ideas about the nature

of war helps dispel these misunderstandings; it also

uncovers a surprisingly durable and versatile concept, one

that remains valid for the 21st century. Inexplicably, the

most important aspect of Clausewitz’s nature of war has

gone unnoticed—that war has a dual nature, not in the

bi-polar sense where wars can be limited or unlimited, but

in the sense that derives from German philosophical

traditions in which phenomena are considered to have

objective and subjective natures.37 The former pertains to

those aspects of a phenomenon that are universally valid;

the latter concerns those that are true only for a specific

time and space. The objective nature of war thus includes

those elements—such as violence, friction, chance, and

uncertainty—that all wars have in common, no matter

where or when they are fought. Conflicts can range in kind

7
from an all-out attack to a war of observation (peacekeeping), for instance, but each will have all of these

elements present to one degree or another.

By contrast, the subjective nature of war encompasses

those elements—such as military forces, their doctrines,

weapons, as well as the environments (land, sea, air, and

danger) in which they fight—that make each war unique.

One way to grasp this construct is to think of objective

elements as internal and subjective ones as external.

Maritime conflicts, for instance, appear different externally

from wars on land, but are nonetheless similar with respect

to their internal characteristics. Even the same conflict can

change its appearance over time as different combatants

enter or leave the fight, or introduce new weapons, tactics,

and techniques into the fray, as in the Thirty Years’ War.

Interestingly, under Clausewitz’s concept, the objective

and subjective natures of war are closely connected to one

another and interact continuously. New weapons or

methods, for example, can increase or diminish the degree of

violence or uncertainty, though probably never eliminate

them entirely. Similarly, a war’s political motives can cause

the combatants to use, or refrain from using, certain types of

weapons or tactics, as in the Cold War where both the

United States and the Soviet Union essentially established

a number of treaties designed to prevent escalation to

nuclear war. Thus, the interaction between the objective

and subjective natures of war is a dynamic one. In

Clausewitz’s words, war’s subjective and objective natures

make it “more than a simple chameleon” that only changes

its nature partially.38 A chameleon might change its color,

for instance, but its internal organs would remain the same.

War’s internal tendencies, on the other hand, can change in

intensity, proportion, and relative role as the external

features themselves transform. Therefore, under Clausewitz’s system, the nature of war cannot be separated from

the means and the actors involved in its conduct.

8
The Clausewitzian Trinity.

Since wars do not occur in a vacuum but in the

complexities of the physical world, Clausewitz devoted

comparatively little time to examining war—along with its

nature—as an isolated activity. Instead, he discussed the

nature of war via another well-known concept—the

“wondrous” or “remarkable” trinity (wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit)—which he also considered as a foundation for a theory

of war. The trinity is built on the same objective-subjective

construct discussed above, which may make it difficult to

understand at first blush.39 In the objective sense, the

trinity consists of three dynamic forces: a subordinating or

guiding influence; the play of chance and probability; and

the force of basic hostility. As Clausewitz explained:

War is thus not only a genuine chameleon, since it alters its

nature somewhat in each particular case, it is also, in its

overall manifestations, a wondrous trinity with regard to its

predominant tendencies, which consist of the original violence

of war’s nature, namely, hatred and hostility, which can be

viewed as a blind natural force; of the play of probabilities and

of chance, which make it into an unpredictable activity; and of

the subordinating nature of a political instrument whenever it

submits to pure reason.40

These forces come into play in every war, though the role

of one is sometimes more pronounced or influential than the

others. By introducing the trinity, Clausewitz moves from

discussing war as a thing-in-itself (in isolation), an

approach that was well within the German philosophical

tradition, to concluding that war cannot be properly

understood as a thing-in-itself. The trinity thus tells us that

war’s nature is inseparable from the historical and sociopolitical contexts in which it arises, and that no tendency is

a priori more influential than any other. Thus, to single out

policy or politics as the central element of war’s nature is

simply not Clausewitzian.

Viewed from a subjective standpoint, these tendencies

manifest themselves in three ways: through the govern9
ment (die Regierung), which attempts to direct war toward

some objective; through military actors, such as the

commander (der Feldherr) and his army (sein Heer), who

must deal with the unpredictability of combat; and through

the populace (das Volk), who act as a reservoir of the

emotional power necessary to sustain a serious struggle.

However, these elements assume variable forms over time

and among different cultures.41 Also, the term “government,” as Clausewitz used it, stands for any ruling body,

any “agglomeration of loosely associated forces,” or any

“personified intelligence.”42 Similarly, the military

represents not only the trained, semi-professional armies of

the Napoleonic era, but any warring body in any era.

Likewise, Clausewitz’s references to the “populace” pertain

to the populations of any society or culture in any period of

history.

The phrase “war is the mere continuation of policy by

other means” requires further elucidation because it, more

than any other, has come to represent the essence of

Clausewitz’s thought. In the German language, the word

Politik can mean both policy and politics. While we might

instantly recognize the difference between the two—the

first is a product, the other a process—that distinction does

not always appear in English translations. In Clausewitz’s

usage, the term Politik also has objective and subjective

aspects.43 In the objective sense, Politik means the

extension of the will of the ruler through a process—both

formal and informal—of arriving at a decision to pursue a

goal. In the subjective sense, Politik clearly means a specific

policy, an actual manifestation of politics that can vary from

era to era and from people to people based on the influence of

culture, ideology, geography, tradition, personality, and

skill, among others. Thus, for Clausewitz, Politik encompasses more than mere policy, or a rational calculation of

ends, ways, and means. In fact, he considered it “an art” in

which human “judgment”— influenced by internal

“qualities of mind and character”—comes into play.44 It was

also influenced by external factors such as the “charac10
teristics” of a governing body’s geo-political position as well

as the general mind-set of the “spirit of the age.”45

Clausewitz went on to explain that Politik was at work in

Napoleon Bonaparte’s imperialistic wars of expansion, just

as well as in the raids of tribal plunder and conquest waged

by the semi-nomadic Tartars.46 While the policy aims of the

Tartar tribes might have been less sophisticated than those

of Bonaparte, they nonetheless derived from similar factors.

Tartar warfare, for instance, reflected available resources

(means), the tribes’ geopolitical position as a composite of

Turkish and Mongol peoples in Central Asia, their nomadic

culture and traditions, and the religious influence of

Islam.47 Clausewitz’s use of Politik thus represents the

collective strengths and weaknesses of a body of people, to

include its resources, alliances and treaties, and its own

decisionmaking processes, as well as the skill and

personalities of its policymakers. In a sense, Politik was for

Clausewitz what culture (defined above) is for Keegan.

The Clausewitzian Nature of War

and Globalization.

Clausewitz thus arrived at his concept of war’s nature by

first assuming that it did indeed have one. His analyses of

historical conflicts validated that assumption by revealing

that each war had characteristics in common with all

others, though those characteristics might vary in terms of

their relative dominance and intensity. Because the

Clausewitzian nature of war has internal and external

elements that are at once variable and able to influence one

another, it captures the dynamism of real war as much as

any theoretical concept can. Accordingly, it is more suitable

for understanding the nature of war in today’s global

environment than any of the alternatives mentioned

earlier.

11
The Element of Subordination—War as a Political

Instrument.

The war against Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups of

global reach represents the first conflict of the 21st century

in which the characteristics of globalization—the enhanced

mobility of people, things, and ideas—have come into play.

It is certainly a war that neither side can afford to lose. The

political objectives of the combatants reflect that

realization, even if neither side has fully mobilized all of its

forces to date. Sources indicate that, even though it is not

necessarily bent on the immediate total destruction of the

United States, Al Qaeda will never compromise and will

continue to fight until all religious apostasy is eliminated,

all illegitimate or corrupt Islamic regimes are replaced by a

unified Muslim polity and Caliphate, and all infidels are

driven from Muslim holy lands. 48 The United States is seen

as a major source of support for apostatic regimes and,

hence, weakening it politically and economically is essential

for success. In order to ensure ultimate success, however, it

might be necessary to have a final showdown with the “great

Satan.” For its part, the United States will not accept

anything less than the complete neutralization, if not

destruction, of Al Qaeda. Contrary to what historians such

as Martin van Creveld have argued, therefore, the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the

emergence of powerful nonstate actors, such as Al Qaeda, do

not mean the end of decisive warfare or of major wars among

states.49 Instead, we find a general shift toward less overt

and more protracted forms of conflict, while, at the same

time, major powers such as the United States emphasize a

greater willingness to take unilateral preemptive action or

to respond to attacks involving weapons of mass destruction

in any manner deemed appropriate, to include massive

retaliation against major states.50

Moreover, instead of culture displacing politics as the

primary force behind conflict, globalization has actually

increased the latter’s role, both in determining the purpose

12
for and influencing the actual conduct of war. Both

President George W. Bush and terrorist leader Osama bin

Laden have released statements that link their actions to

very explicit political agendas. Both are clearly using war to

achieve political ends, rather than to satisfy a cultural

impulse to wage war, as Keegan argues. To be sure, culture

and politics are inextricably linked in this conflict. Al

Qaeda’s leadership might have sought to provoke a massive

U.S. military response to the attacks of September 11,

which it could then portray as an assault on Islam. This

general assault, it was hoped, would inspire the entire

Islamic world to rise up against the West.51 Indeed, the

West, conscious of this possibility, has taken great pains to

portray the conflict as a war against terror tactics rather

than a war against Islam. And, it must continue to do so.

Otherwise, the conflict between Al Qaeda and the West may

indeed escalate into a more dangerous “clash of civilizations.” Nonetheless, the fact remains that both sides are

using war as a political instrument, that is, they are

subordinating its conduct to the achievement of political

ends.

Political leaders on both sides can also have real-time

access to military actions as they unfold, though one would

hope that in the case of Al Qaeda the access would be less

secure.52 Still, both sides can more or less communicate

their intentions to their operatives in the field and thus

influence the course of events throughout every phase of a

military operation, no matter where it occurs. This

capability means that political direction of a campaign can

span time and distance to influence the smallest of details,

not that it should. Moreover, the public statements by

President Bush and bin Laden’s periodic releases of video

messages through Al Jazeera demonstrate that each can

address his support base to give it guidance or motivation,

or to garner further support, while at the same time

challenging or vexing his opponents. Hence, the conflict

remains thoroughly political at every level and, thus far at

13
least, throughout every operational phase. Furthermore,

this trend does not appear likely to reverse itself.

The Element of Hostility—Blind Natural Force.

In the global war on terrorism, the element of blind

natural force is playing the decisive role. Globalization has,

among other things, contributed to the creation of fertile

breeding grounds for terrorism as some groups try to resist

its encroachment. Al Qaeda has associated the United

States with the spread of globalization, which it sees as a

form of decadence. Building on the perception that Islamic

society’s current political and economic problems are the

result of the West’s decadent values and duplicitous

policies, Al Qaeda has penetrated Islamic nongovernmental

organizations and woven itself into the social, political, and

religious fabric of Muslim societies. Consequently, it has

managed to create a substantial support base that may

enable it to regenerate itself indefinitely.53 Despite the

arrest of hundreds of operatives in North America and

abroad since the attacks of September 11, 2001, for

example, Al Qaeda has created new cells and reconstituted

older ones.54 While operations in Afghanistan and

elsewhere have led to the killing or capture of some 16 of its

25 key leaders, Al Qaeda’s ideology remains intact and will

probably continue to draw young Muslims.55

Evidence also suggests that Muslim extremism, or

Islamism as some authorities identify it, has been moving

from the margins of the Islamic political spectrum toward

the center, so that bin Laden and other key terrorist leaders

may enjoy considerable empathy, if not sympathy, regarding their words and actions.56 The Islamist’s mindset is that

the current war is one in which God’s warriors—the

mujahidin—are heroically fighting the forces of Satan: U.S.

troops.57 In this war, civilian populations of both sides are

more than a manifestation or a reservoir of “blind natural

force.” They have become the primary target in both a

physical and a psychological sense for Al Qaeda and a

14
psychological sense for the United States. With what has

been described as a “virus-like ability to infect indigenous

groups,” Al Qaeda has turned itself into an ideological

weapon that evidently excels in the generation of

propaganda to support its cause.58 By comparison, the U.S.

populace, which lacked any deep-seated feelings of hostility

prior to September 11, 2001, is now being psychologically

prepared (one can argue how well) by its political leadership

for a long fight in which conditions might get worse—

particularly if an attack on Iraq or other “rogue” states

occurs—before they get better. Indeed, some of the current

political rhetoric of the administration and its supporters

likens the war against terrorism to “World War IV.”59 In

other words, the war against global terrorism is foremost a

battle of ideas—ideas powerful enough to provoke violent

emotions. Consequently, it is within this arena that the war

will be won or lost.

The Elements of Chance and Uncertainty—Military

Forces.

For the United States and its Western allies, the

elements of chance and uncertainty now manifest

themselves through traditional, if transforming, military

and law enforcement organizations. For nonstate actors

such as Al Qaeda, on the other hand, chance and

uncertainty are personified in irregular forces buoyed by a

broad, religion-based ideology, an extensive organizational

and operational infrastructure, and a multinational

membership. Paradoxically, globalization and the spread of

information technology have made it likely that both sides

will generate more—rather than less—chance and

uncertainty. Despite the existence of a vast technologybased intelligence and surveillance network, for example, a

great deal of uncertainty still surrounds a single bit of

tactical information of strategic importance, namely, the

location of Osama bin Laden. Of course, the key to fighting a

successful war on terrorism is intelligence, especially

human intelligence. Unfortunately, for budgetary and

15
cultural reasons, the United States scaled back its human

intelligence efforts considerably some years ago.60

To be sure, information technologies now deliver more

information than ever before to decisionmakers and their

constituencies. Still, without analysis and synthesis, the

information they provide is always inadequate. As Al

Qaeda’s attacks to date have shown, small terrorist cells can

execute well-coordinated—and genuinely devastating—

surprise assaults despite a vast intelligence network and

the proliferation of information technologies.61 Thus, we

simply cannot make a direct, linear correlation between

information and knowledge. The total amount of

information—which includes irrelevant and incorrect

information—may well increase by a certain percent, but

that does not mean that knowledge grows by the same

percent. It is often impossible to discern the quality or

correctness of information until after the fact—when it can

be compared to the way events actually unfolded.

We would do better to develop experienced judgment and

learn to become comfortable with uncertainty—with things

that we cannot know beyond a reasonable doubt—than to

delude ourselves that our technology will deliver all the

knowledge we need to achieve victory. Yet, experienced

judgment takes time to develop; and we may not have that

luxury in an era in which change seems to be occurring at an

accelerating rate.62 In other words, knowledge is not solely a

function of available information. Merely throwing more

information at the problem will not solve it. Contrary to

what pundits have predicted, therefore, globalization and

the spread of information technologies still have not

eliminated the elements of chance and uncertainty in war.

In some cases, in fact, these elements may increase,

especially if opponents use misinformation more frequently

as a counter to knowledge-based warfare.

Defense officials have repeatedly asserted that, on

matters of combat, new thinking has yet to replace old.

However, one should not act too hastily here. While many of

16
today’s weapons differ significantly from those of a century

ago, several of the tactical and operational principles that

underpin military doctrine still remain valid. Studies of the

recent fighting in Afghanistan, for example, show that the

principles of fire and movement that enabled soldiers to

cross the deadly zone during the First World War have

proven just as essential against entrenched Taliban and Al

Qaeda forces.63

Nonetheless, at least one fundamental concept of

Western military doctrine—Clausewitz’s center of

gravity—has some serious limitations and may have

outlived its usefulness. For decades, the U.S. military in

particular has wrongly defined the center of gravity as “a

source of strength.” Yet, Clausewitz’s original notion of the

center of gravity was more akin to that of a focal point, a

place where energies come together to be redirected and

refocused elsewhere.64 It was neither a strength nor a

weakness, per se, but it could be strong—well-protected—or

not. Even with a redefinition, however, the concept may

have only limited applicability in a globalized operational

environment where opponents can fight in vast, distributed

networks without necessarily being linked to one central

authority, or to one another. Clausewitz’s center of gravity

concept depends on the condition that the enemy is

connected enough to act as a single entity. By implication,

when this was not the case, the concept did not apply.

Unfortunately, a globalized operational environment

presents fewer cases in which enemies function as a single

entity. Al Qaeda’s global terrorist network adheres to the

cellular, or cluster, model in which many cells exist, but the

members of any particular cell do not necessarily know one

another, or those in other cells. If one member is caught, the

other members and other cells are not in danger.65

Destroying Al Qaeda cells in Europe, therefore, will not

necessarily cause those in Indonesia to collapse. In fact,

destroying such distributed enemies in one location could

lead to some extremely undesirable consequences, if those

at other locations retaliate by discharging a weapon of mass

17
destruction in a major city. Hence, the United States must

think more globally—finding ways to hit as many enemy

cells as simultaneously as possible. Furthermore, Al

Qaeda’s center of gravity might lie at its ideological core—

its hatred of apostasy and its vision of a pan-Islamic

empire—since that is what enables it to draw recruits and to

support them. Yet, ideology is a difficult target to hit

militarily. Still, if employed in combination with other

elements of national power, military might can prove

invaluable, even in this type of conflict. Military thinking

has changed a great deal over the last decade. However, it

has yet to relinquish certain linear concepts that no longer

apply and to internalize the idea of fighting in a

discontinuous, highly volatile environment. And, it must

find better ways to combine the effects of military

operations with those of economic, political, and

informational actions as well.

Military thinking is not alone in this regard. The

strategy of “ring vaccination” that officials in the Centers for

Disease Control want to employ as a way to counter

bio-attacks of smallpox and similar contagious diseases is

an example of a similarly inappropriate linear concept.66 In

brief, the strategy calls for vaccinating only those

individuals (such as emergency and medical personnel) who

are or would likely come in contact with an infected person,

thereby creating, in theory at least, a ring that will isolate

the disease even before it is discovered. However, while this

strategy proved effective in containing and eliminating

natural outbreaks of smallpox in Asia and elsewhere, it will

hardly work against an attack delivered simultaneously at

multiple locations—at three or four major airports, sports

arenas, or major shopping malls, for example. In a

globalized world, as infected individuals travel about the

country, the disease would spread too quickly for such

containment measures to work.67

Accordingly, officials responsible for developing

strategies for combating diseases, just as much as those for

defeating highly decentralized enemies, must approach the

18
problem from a global and nonlinear perspective.68 One

approach, of course, is a strategy of mass vaccination. At

present, however, the smallpox vaccine is not without risk

to certain populations, thereby making mass vaccination an

unpopular solution. Clearly, a safer vaccine is needed, and

quickly, not only for smallpox but for other contagious

diseases. And, different strategies for defending against

bio-attacks must be developed concurrently and wargamed. When (if ever), for example, should the United

States close its borders and cease all traffic in the event of a

serious bio-attack? And for how long? What if a neighboring

country is hit? How will the global economy be affected?

These and similar questions must be considered in advance

and factored into the development of any viable strategy.

All of this raises some questions about another key

concept of Clausewitz, his views about the relative

strengths of attack and defense. Clausewitz maintained

that the defense was the stronger form of war because its

advantages—cover and concealment, shorter lines of

supply, time, preparation of the terrain—compensate for

the defender’s psychological and physical weaknesses, at

least partially. Moreover, the defender’s aim is selfpreservation, an objective that he can achieve by merely

persuading the attacker to abandon the fight. Selfpreservation is a condition that exists before hostilities

commence and, in some cases, remains intact even if the

defender’s military is defeated. The attacker, on the other

hand, enjoys the advantages of initiative and surprise, but

these are weighed down by the burden of attempting to

subdue his opponent, a task more difficult than merely

surviving, once hostilities commence.69 Hence, while

Clausewitz considered the defense stronger, he did not

maintain that it was better. Defense is not necessarily

decisive, for example, since an attacker, once persuaded to

give up the fight, could renew his assaults at a later time.

Do Clausewitz’s arguments still hold when the attacker

is willing to pay more in blood than the defender and when

he can operate in a highly mobile, global environment? As

19
the preceding discussion has shown, globalization has

rendered societies more vulnerable to attack. It is

exceedingly expensive—perhaps impossibly so—to defend

against every conceivable form of attack. Accordingly, a

determined opponent now has more opportunities to seize

the initiative and to achieve surprise, particularly if he is a

relatively invisible nonstate actor. Moreover, if his aims fall

short of all-out conquest and subjugation, as seems to be the

case with Al Qaeda, he is free of the burdens traditionally

associated with the attacker.

Nonetheless, Clausewitz was not wrong in his day, nor is

he altogether wrong in the present. As he pointed out,

attack and defense are not exclusive concepts: an offensive

has aspects of defense; and a defensive involves elements of

attack. A well-conducted defense, he wrote, usually consists

of many offensive blows, such as counterattacks and spoiling attacks.70 Similarly, the U.S. military, in conjunction

with the Department of Homeland Security and other

agencies, should develop an “active global defense-indepth” concept, based on the principle that the best defense

includes major elements of an aggressive offense. To

succeed in the emerging global environment, a defensive

strategy must tag and relentlessly track terrorists and their

accomplices, keeping them on the run and denying them

opportunities to plan, organize, and execute a major attack.

Such a strategy must also include provisions for actively

targeting the sources from which the terrorists’ financing

and other resources—such as personnel—come. And it must

involve building cooperative security arrangements, both at

home and abroad, that provide interlocking, even

redundant, security measures over all critical areas. In

other words, while globalization clearly favors the attack,

one can find ways to make it assist the defense. Anything

less may only offer the terrorists another opportunity to

increase their learning curve.

20
Conclusions.

If the war on terrorism is any guide, globalization is

changing the nature of war in several ways. First, it is

strengthening the role that politics will play in war by

affording it the capability to exert greater real-time control

over military operations. Of course, this control will vary

depending on the personalities involved as well as a

combatant’s ability to interdict its opponent’s communications. Second, globalization is increasing the criticality of

the element of hostility. Political leaders can now mobilize

hostile passions more quickly and over a larger area than

hitherto, particularly in areas “suffering” from the spread of

globalization. Images and the ideas they convey may now be

more decisive than the sword. Yet, it may prove more

difficult to cool such passions than it did to ignite them.

Finally, globalization means that opponents (even if they

are neighbors) can now fight each other across global

distances, in new dimensions, and with a broader array of

weapons. These changes may amount to a net increase in

the dual element of chance and uncertainty at all levels of

war. It remains to be seen whether information technology

will reduce or exacerbate this expansion. Certainly, skillful

commanders and well-trained militaries still matter.

Yet, as has been shown, even with the rapidly spreading

and intensifying effects of globalization, war remains

essentially Clausewitzian in nature. It is still a dynamic

expression of political wills in conflict, colliding via the

means of organized violence with multinational populations

serving both as resources and as targets. The forces of

Islamic terrorism are fueled by volatile extremist ideas and,

hence, the global war on terrorism remains at heart a

conflict of opposing ideas. The United States and its

strategic partners must take the fight to the enemy on that

front and win there decisively.

21
ENDNOTES

1. Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, New York:

Anchor, 2000, p. 9, offers a similar definition of globalization—as the

dispersion and democratization of technology, information, and finance.

See also Stephen J. Flanagan, Ellen L. Frost, and Richard L. Kugler,

Challenges of the Global Century: Report of the Project on Globalization

and National Security, Washington, DC: Institute for National

Strategic Studies, 2001.

2. From 287 million in 1980 to 595 million in 1996; the world’s

population increased from 4.4 to 5.7 billion, or 30 percent, during the

same period. James H. Mittelman, The Globalization Syndrome:

Transformation and Resistance, Princeton: Princeton University Press,

2000, p. 21.

3. Robert Hobbes, “Hobbes’ Internet Timeline,” August 23, 2001,

http://www.zakon.org, accessed February 21, 2003.

4. A National Security Strategy for a Global Age, The White House,

December 2000, p. 2, claims that more than half of the world’s

population now lives under democratic rule. How much of the increase is

due to globalization is open to debate.

5. Bruce R. Scott, “Measuring Globalization,” Foreign Policy,

Jan/Feb 2001, p. 56-65, points out the difficulty of measuring

globalization. See also “Toward a Better Understanding of

Globalization and the Third World,” in Global Transformation and the

Third World, Robert O. Slater, Barry M. Schutz, and Steven R. Dorr,

eds., Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1993, pp. 5-7.

6. The view that democracies do not go to war with each other is

defended in Donald M. Snow, World Politics in a New Century: The

Shape of the Future, 3rd Ed., New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999, p. 34. Bruce

R. Scott, “The Great Divide in the Global Village,” Foreign Affairs, Vol.

80, No. 1, Jan/Feb 2001, pp. 160-77; and C. Fred Bergsten, “America’s

Two-Front Economic Conflict,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 2,

March/April 2001, pp. 16-27.

7. Evidence of the positive effects of globalization is still in dispute.

Lael Brainard, “Smoothing the Rough Edges of Globalization,” lecture

delivered to the University of Baltimore School of Law, November 18,

2002, suggests that the poverty gap between nations has grown, but

that the living standards, life spans, and incomes have risen across the

board. See also Anne O. Krueger, First Deputy Managing Director of the

International Monetary Fund, who maintained that the poor are

22
actually getting wealthier at a rate faster than the rich; presentation

delivered at the Eisenhower Conference, September 26, 2002,

Washington, DC. Stephen J. Flanagan, Director of the Institute for

National Strategic Studies, disputed Krueger’s claims; presentation

delivered at the same conference.

8. Consider, for example, that while globalization has brought

greater prosperity to some parts of the world, it has also contributed to

the rapid spread of the Asian economic flu. Even if this crisis has passed,

a full recovery might still take considerable time. Sheldon W. Simon,

The Economic Crisis and ASEAN States’ Security, Carlisle, PA:

Strategic Studies Institute, 1998. One should also remember that,

despite a decade’s worth of effort, a free market economy has still not

taken hold in Russia, owing to an ineffective government, a

well-entrenched organized crime syndicate, and growing regional

fragmentation, among other problems. Tensions in the Middle East,

where democracy has precious few footholds, have recently risen quite

dramatically, threatening to erupt in a broader military and political

crisis. While democracy has made rapid strides in Central and South

America, economic change has actually exacerbated social inequalities.

And corruption and narco-trafficking remain stubborn problems. In

Africa, economic growth has been uneven and intrastate violence has

been extremely bloody. Strategic Assessment 1999: Priorities for a

Turbulent World, Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic

Studies, National Defense University, 1999, pp. xi-xiv, pp. 69-188; New

World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century: Supporting

Research & Analysis, Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on National

Security/21st Century, September 15, 1999, pp. 59-116; and Jacquelyn

K. Davis and Michael J. Sweeney, Strategic Paradigms 2025: U.S.

Security Planning for a New Era, Washington, DC: Institute for Foreign

Policy Analysis, 1999, pp. 33-174.

9. Richard Faulk and Andrew Strauss, “Toward Global

Parliament,”Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 1, Jan/Feb 2001, pp. 212-220.

10. The Kosovo campaign required the marshalling of considerable

political and military resources from the entire NATO Alliance. If

supported by a larger state or a network of transnational forces or if

armed with weapons of mass destruction, a small state like Serbia could

have presented much greater challenges, even for an alliance as large as

NATO. Of course, such adversaries could also employ so-called

asymmetric weapons or strategies, which might make the challenge

even greater. See Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., The Revenge of the Melians:

Asymmetric Threats and the Next QDR, Washington, DC: Institute for

National Strategic Studies, 2000; and Steven Metz and Douglas

Johnson, Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition,

23
Background, and Strategic Concepts, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies

Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2001.

11. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the

Remaking of World Order, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996; and

Robert Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the

Post-Cold War World, New York: Random House, 2000. Huntington is

balanced by Richard E. Rubenstein, “Challenging Huntington,” Foreign

Policy, Vol. 96, 1994, pp. 113-128; Strategic Assessment 1999, p. xi; New

World Coming, 1999; Davis and Sweeney, Strategic Paradigms 2025,

1999; Sam J. Tangredi, All Possible Wars? Toward a Consensus View of

the Future Security Environment, 2001-2025, Washington, DC:

National Defense University, 2000; and Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue

about the Future, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/

globaltrends2015.

12. Dr. Ray Kurzweil maintains that the decade from 2000-2010 will

see as much change as the entire 20th century. Presentation entitled,

“The Law of Accelerating Returns and its Impact on War & Peace,”

delivered at the 23rd Army Science Conference, December 4, 2002.

13. See, for example, The U.S. National Military Strategy, Predecisional Draft, October 16, 2002, pp. 3-5.

14. Collectively, international terrorists were responsible for 348

attacks during 2001, with the casualty total reaching an all-time high of

4,655, due to the attacks of September 11, 2001. U.S. Department of

State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, May 2002, p. xx, http://

www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt. According to the FBI’s Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence Directorate, the United States also

faces “significant challenges” from domestic terrorists. From 1980 to

2000, a total of 335 terrorist (or suspected terrorist) incidents occurred

in the United States, 247 of which were attributed to domestic

terrorists. Dale L. Watson, Executive Assistant Director,

Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence, FBI, “The Terrorist Threat

Confronting the United States,” Testimony before the Senate Select

Committee on Intelligence, February 6, 2002, pp. 2-5.

15. Today’s terrorists also appear less constrained and more

informed than those of the 1960s-1970s, having learned from their

methods, and mistakes. While the number of deaths per terrorist

incident has risen over time, one should not conclude from this trend

that future terrorists will only attack in ways that result in mass

casualties. Rod Probst, “New Terrorists, New Attack Means:

Categorizing Terrorist Challenges for the Early 21st Century,” Journal

of Homeland Security, March 22, 2002.

24
16. http://www.cdi.org/issues/nukef&f/database/nukearsenals.

html. See also Global Trends 2015.

17. Donald H. Rumsfeld, et al., The Report of the Commission to

Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, Washington, DC,

July 15, 1998, pp. 8-9; and Michael O’Hanlon, “Cruise Control: A Case

for Missile Defense,” The National Interest, No. 67, April 2002,

http://www.nationalinterest.org/issues/67/Ohanlon.html.

18. As the congressional testimony of Carl W. Ford, Jr., Assistant

Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, indicated, biological

weapons appeal to many states and will grow in importance because

they “are relatively cheap, easy to disguise within commercial ventures,

and potentially as devastating as nuclear weapons.” Statement before

the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the topic of “Reducing

the Threat of Chemical and Biological Weapons,” March 19, 2002, p. 3.

19. Press briefing by John S. Wolf, Assistant Secretary of State For

Nonproliferation Issues, at the Foreign Press Center, Washington, DC,

April 16, 2002. Despite the chemical and biological weapons

conventions, concerns remain over clandestine programs and the

absence of Middle Eastern and North-east Asian states as signatories.

Jonathan B. Tucker and Kathleen M. Vogel, “Preventing the

Proliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapon Materials and

Know-How,” The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, Spring 2000,

pp. 88-96, esp. p. 95; Marie I. Chevier, “Strengthening the International

Arms Control Regime,” in Biological Warfare: Modern Offense and

Defense, Raymond A. Zilinskas, ed., Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 2000, pp.

149-176.

20. Mohan Malik, Dragon on Terrorism: Assessing China’s Tactical

Gains and Strategic Losses Post-September 11, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army

War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002, p. 50. Amy Smithson and

Leslie-Anne Levy, Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism

Threat and the US Response, Stimson Center Report No. 35, October

2000; and Hype or Reality? The ‘New Terrorism’ and Mass Casualty

Attacks, ed., Brad Roberts, Alexandria, VA: 2000, caution that

weaponizing chemical and biological materials is difficult. Yet,

acquiring them is far from impossible. Felgenhauer, “Do the Terrorists

Have Nukes?” Wall Street Journal, November 8, 2001, p. A-24. This is

particularly true of radiological or “dirty” bombs. Paul Richter,

“Studying ‘Dirty’ Bomb Scenario,” Los Angeles Times, April 24, 2002. We

should not forget that a number of Western arms suppliers are also

responsible for current nonproliferation challenges. Hugh Williamson,

“German Newspaper Lists Iraqi Arms Suppliers,” Financial Times,

December 17, 2002.

25
21. United States General Accounting Office, MAD COW DISEASE:

Improvements in the Animal Feed Ban and Other Regulatory Areas

Would Strengthen U.S. Prevention Efforts, Washington, DC: GAO,

January 2002, pp. 3-4. In total, U.S. agriculture netted $215 billion in

1999. The U.S. Census Bureau 2001, p. 537.

22. Eric Lichtbau, “CIA Warns of Chinese Plans for Cyber-Attacks

on U.S.” Los Angeles Times, April 25, 2002.

23. The Government Accounting Office and the National Security

Agency currently assess U.S. federal cyber defenses as inadequate.

“GAO Reports on Information Security Audits,” Homeland Security

Monitor, April 19, 2002.

24. Author’s translation. The German text is: “Der Krieg ist eine

bloße Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln.” Vom Kriege

Hinterlassenes Werk des Generals Carl von Clausewitz, 19th Ed., ed.

and intro. by Werner Hahlweg, Bonn: Ferd. Dümmlers Verlag, 1980, p.

210. Hereafter, Vom Kriege. For examples of the central place of politics

in the nature of war, see Bernard Brodie, “A Guide to the Reading of On

War,” in Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael

Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976,

pp. 641-656; Eliot A. Cohen, Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemmas of

Military Service, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985, pp. 22-24,

which maintains that “politics pervades war and the preparation for it”

and “Strategy: Causes, Conduct, and Termination of War,” in Security

Studies for the 21st Century, ed. by Richard H. Shultz, Jr., Roy Godson,

George H. Quester, Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1997, pp. 364-366,

which uses “politics” as the defining element in war; and Colin S. Gray,

Modern Strategy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, who places it

at the center of his definition and concept of strategy.

25. See Colin Powell, My American Journey: An Autobiography,

New York: Random House, 1995; Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War:

Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat, New York: Public Affairs,

2001. Clausewitz’s concepts concerning the nature of war and the

primacy of politics are also stressed as part of the curricula at most of the

U.S. military’s command and staff colleges and war colleges.

26. See, for example, Colonel Joseph I. Greene, “Foreword” to Karl

von Clausewitz, On War, trans., O. J. Matthijs Jolles, New York:

Modern Library, 1943, p. xiii.

27. That view is still prevalent today; see Colonel James K. Greer,

“Operational Art for the Objective Force,” Military Review, SeptemberOctober 2002, pp. 22-29, esp. p. 24.

26
28. See, for example, G.F. Freudenberg, “A Conversation with

General Clausewitz,” Military Review, Vol. 57, No. 10, October 1977, pp.

68-71.

29. Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in English: The Reception of

Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815-1945, Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1994. Stuart Kinross, Clausewitz and the American

Military Tradition, Ph.D. Dissertation, Kings College, 2002, Chapters 1

and 3. The classic example is Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A

Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, Novato, CA: Presidio, 1995.

30. John Keegan, A History of Warfare, New York: Alfred A. Knopf,

1994. See also Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War, New

York: Free Press, 1991, esp. pp. 33-62.

31. Keegan, Warfare, p. 24.

32. Ibid., p. 46.

33. Much of the literature dealing with the nature of war actually

fails to differentiate between war and the weapons used to wage it.

William E. Odom, America’s Military Revolution: Strategy and

Structure after the Cold War, Washington, DC: American University,

1993, purports to discuss the changing nature of war, but really only

addresses changes in weaponry; Martin van Creveld, “Through a Glass

Darkly: Some Reflections on the Future of War,” Naval War College

Review, Vol. LIII, No. 4, Autumn 2000, pp. 25-44, in effect, only includes

changing forms of war when discussing changes in the nature of war;

and the Cantigny Conference Series, The Changing Nature of Conflict,

Chicago: Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation, 1995, p. 32,

actually only discusses changes in war’s root causes.

34. Van Creveld, Transformation of War, pp. 124-126; and “The

Transformation of War Revisited,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol.

13, No. 2, Summer 2002, pp. 3-15, esp. pp. 12-13.

35. Russell Weigley, “The Political and Strategic Dimensions of

Military Effectiveness,” in Military Effectiveness, ed., Williamson

Murray and Allan R. Millett, Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1988, Vol. 3, The

Second World War, p. 341.

36. Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, Book I, Chap. 1, pp. 211-12.

37. Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories,

and His Times, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985, p. 154,

noted that Clausewitz used the same objective-subjective construct in

an earlier (1804) essay entitled “Strategie und Taktik,” Strategy and

27
Tactics. This construct was not uncommon in Clausewitz’s day,

particularly in philosophical discourse. It was used in the works of

Immanuel Kant, for example, from whom Clausewitz borrowed several

analytical tools; for example, compare Vom Kriege, Book I, Chapter 3,

“Military Genius,” to Kant’s description of genius in the Critique of

Judgment, Sections 46-50. Under Kant’s system, objective laws were

those recognized as valid for the will of every rational being. Subjective

laws were those regarded as valid only for an individual; see Book I,

Chapter I, Section 1 and the Table of Categories in the Critique of Pure

Practical Reason.

38. Vom Kriege, Book I, Chap. 1, p. 213.

39. For a correct interpretation of the trinity, see Christopher

Bassford and Edward J. Villacres, “Reclaiming the Clausewitzian

Trinity,” http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/Keegan/KEEGWHOL.htm.

40. Author’s translation: Vom Kriege, Book I, Chap. 1, p. 213.

Readers may also find the term “wunderlich” translated as

“remarkable” as it is in the first edition of Howard and Paret’s

translation of On War (1976) or as “paradoxical” as it is in the second

edition (1989).

41. Ibid., pp. 212-213.

42. Ibid., Book VIII, Chap. 3B, pp. 962, 964-965.

43. On Clausewitz’s division of Politik into objective and subjective

factors, see E. Kessel, “Zur Genesis der modernen Kriegslehren” [On the

Genesis of Modern Military Theories], Wehrwissenschaftliche

Rundschau, Vol. 3, No. 9, July 1953, p. 405-423, esp. pp. 410-417.

44. Vom Kriege, Book VIII, Chap. 3B, pp. 961-962.

45. Ibid., p. 974. The last three books of On War (Defense, Attack,

and War Plans) reflect Clausewitz’s increasingly historicist perspective,

that is, that historical eras must be understood on their own terms.

There is, therefore, no single, correct type of war. Instead, the kind of

war that occurs in a particular era—such as a limited war in the 18th

century—is valid for that era.

46. Ibid.

47. Douglas S. Benson, The Tartar War, Chicago: Maverick

Publishing, 1981.

28
48. “Al-Qaeda (the Base),” http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/orgdet.

cfm. George J. Tenet, Director, CIA, “Worldwide Threat—Converging

Dangers in a Post 9/11 World,” Testimony before the Senate Armed

Services Committee, March 19, 2002, pp. 2-3.

49. Van Creveld, Transformation of War, pp. 192-233.

50. “Anticipatory Defense in the War on Terror: Interview with

Condolezza Rice,” New Perspectives Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 3, Fall 2002,

pp. 5-8; Tom Barnet, “Where—Not When—Preemption Makes Sense,”

Transformation Trends, November 18, 2002; The White House,

National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,

Washington, DC: December 2002, p. 3.

51. Brian Michael Jenkins, Countering al Qaeda: An Appreciation of

the Situation and Suggestions for Strategy, Santa Monica, CA: RAND,

2002, p. 7.

52. Although, by their nature, cells tend to operate independently,

the capability does exist for a political leader such as Osama bin Laden

to communicate with those cells.

53. Ed Blanche, “Al-Qaeda Recruitment,” Jane’s Intelligence

Review, Vol. 14, January 2002, pp. 27-28; Paul J. Smith, “Transnational

Terrorism and the al Qaeda Model: Confronting New Realities,”

Parameters, Vol. XXXII, No. 2, Summer 2002, pp. 33-46.

54. Also, new activities suggest at least indirect Al Qaeda

involvement: threats against U.S. embassies in Southeast Asia; the

October 2 bombing in an open-air market in Zamboanga, Philippines;

the October 6 explosion aboard the French supertanker Limburg in a

Yemeni port; two shooting incidents involving U.S. Marines off the coast

of Kuwait and the October 12 car bombing outside a nightclub in Bali

which killed nearly 200 people, many of them Westerners. “String of

Violence Highlights Core Problems in Battle Against Al Qaeda,”

http://www.stratfor.com/corp.

55. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror,

New York: Columbia, 2002, pp. 55, 227.

56. Reportedly, Osama became a popular name for new babies.

Jenkins, Countering Al Qaeda, p. 7. Yet, the spontaneous uprisings that

bin Laden apparently hoped for have not materialized.

57. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, p. 230.

58. Smith, “Transnational Terrorism,” p. 45.

29
59. “World War IV,” an address delivered at the National War

College by James Woolsey, November 16, 2002. Woolsey considers the

Cold War to have been World War III.

60. “Searching for Answers, US Intelligence After September 11: A

Conversation with [Senator] Bob Graham,” Harvard International

Review, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, Fall 2002, pp. 40-43.

61. The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency emphasized

that the “strategic attack” of September 11, 2001, was carried out “not

by the military forces of a rival state, but by a shadowy, global network

of extremists, who struck unprotected targets, using methods we did not

anticipate.” Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson, “Global Threats and

Challenges,” Statement for the Record, U.S. Senate Armed Services

Committee, March 19, 2002, p. 2.

62. Kip P. Nygren, “Emerging Technologies and Exponential

Change: Implications for Army Transformation,” Parameters, Vol.

XXXII, No. 2, Summer 2002, pp. 86-99.

63. Steven Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare:

Implications for the Army and Defense Policy, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army

War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002.

64. Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity: It’s

Not What We Thought!” Naval War College Review, Vol. LVI, No. 1,

Winter 2003, pp. 71-79.

65. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, pp. 76-77.

66. The Department of Health and Human Services is now

considering using Dr. Donald Ainslie Henderson’s “ring” strategy to

combat any future outbreaks of contagious diseases. His strategy is

credited with having eradicated smallpox. J. D. Reed, “Virus

Vanquisher,” Smithsonian Magazine, February 2002. See also Charles

V. Lanza, William P. Johnson, and Niel H. Batista, “Smallpox: A Global

Problem with Local Solutions, Parts I-III,” Homeland Defense Journal,

April 9, 2002.

67. ANSER Institute for Homeland Security, “Dark Winter”

briefing, which describes an exercise that took place at Andrews Air

Force Base, June 22-23, 2001; its casualty estimates were validated by

an outside source: Tara O’Toole, Michael Mair, and Thomas V. Ingelsby,

“Shining Light on ‘Dark Winter’,” Confronting Biological Weapons,

electronically published by Clinical Infectious Diseases, February 19,

2002.

30
68. This is not to say that linear methods are never appropriate. On

the contrary, they will prove useful much of the time and may often

complement nonlinear strategies.

69. Discussions concerning defense and attack appear numerous

places throughout Vom Kriege, but receive special attention in Book VI,

Chapters 1-5; Book I, Chapter 1; Book VII, Chaps. 1-2; and Book VIII,

Chap. 8.

70. Ibid., Book VII, Chap. 2; and Book VI, Chap. 1.

31
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Author

Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria II

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Ms. Kimberly A. Rockwell-Jacoby