DEVELOPING ADAPTIVE LEADERS:

THE CRUCIBLE EXPERIENCE OF OPERATION IRAQI 

FREEDOM

Leonard Wong

July 2004

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iii

FOREWORD

The euphoria over the exceptionally successful combat operations 

of the Iraqi War has subsided as Operation IRAQI FREEDOM shifted 

to the long, hard tasks of nation-building and counterinsurgency. By 

all accounts, the process of assisting Iraq in becoming a secure, stable 

democracy has become much more complicated than originally 

believed. Yet within the complex environment of postwar Iraq, Dr. 

Leonard Wong argues that junior officers are being developed into 

creative, innovative, and independent leaders. He attributes this 

unique leader development opportunity to the ambiguous, complex, 

and unpredictable environment of postwar Iraq. 

The implication of so many of the Army’s junior officers being 

developed into adaptive leaders is significant. For several years, 

the leadership literature in both the military and civilian arenas 

has been replete with calls for adaptable and innovative leaders. 

The U.S. Army is transforming as its lowest officer ranks are filled 

with leaders who have learned to deal with ambiguity, change, and 

complexity. It is now the Army’s responsibility to leverage this 

newly developed cohort and continue to develop the confidence and 

creativity of tomorrow’s senior leaders.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

LEONARD WONG served in the Army for over 20 years, including 

teaching leadership at West Point, serving as an analyst in the Office 

of the Chief of Staff of the Army, and in the Office of the Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Personnel, and serving as the Director of the Office 

of Economic and Manpower Analysis. His current research includes 

leadership, professionalism and innovation in the military. He is 

a Professional Engineer and holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military 

Academy, and an M.S. and Ph.D. in Business Administration from 

Texas Tech University.
v

SUMMARY

 This monograph examines the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

environment and concludes that the complexity, unpredictability, 

and ambiguity of postwar Iraq is producing a cohort of innovative, 

confident, and adaptable junior officers. Lieutenants and captains 

are learning to make decisions in chaotic conditions and to be 

mentally agile in executing counterinsurgency and nation-building 

operations simultaneously. As a result, the Army will soon have a 

cohort of company grade officers who are accustomed to operating 

independently, taking the initiative, and adapting to changes. The 

author warns that the Army must now acknowledge and encourage 

this newly developed adaptability in our junior officers or risk stifling 

the innovation critically needed in the Army’s future leaders.

1

DEVELOPING ADAPTIVE LEADERS:

THE CRUCIBLE EXPERIENCE OF OPERATION IRAQI 

FREEDOM

Can you find the opportunity within the chaos? Because you can’t 

organize the chaos of the battlefield.1

General Peter J. Schoomaker

Chief of Staff of the Army

 Leadership has and always will be associated with the U.S. Army. 

Cadets continue to memorize that “the commander is responsible 

for everything the unit does or fails to do”2 and names such as Lee, 

Patton, MacArthur, and Marshall still evoke images of larger than 

life leaders in service to the Nation. The preeminence of leadership is 

reinforced in Army guiding documents with statements such as “We 

are about leadership; it is our stock in trade, and it is what makes us 

different,”3 and “Leadership is the lifeblood of The Army.”4

 A few years ago, a new emphasis began to emerge concerning 

the leadership and leaders required in the future Army. It began 

in 2001 with the Army Training and Leader Development Panel 

(Officer) report, concluding after a sweeping study of the officer 

corps that future leaders needed to be self-aware and adaptable.

5

Similarly, the 2001 Objective Force White Paper looked into the future 

and contended that tomorrow’s security environment will require 

leaders “changing from plan-centric to intent-centric operations; 

changing from physical rehearsals to virtual ones; and changing 

from static command posts to situational awareness on the move. 

They will be adaptive and self-aware―able to master transitions in 

the diversity of 21st century military operations.”6 More recently, the 

current senior Army leadership’s vision of the future Army calls for 

“agile and adaptive leaders able to conduct simultaneous, distributed, 

and continuous operations.”7

 While the U.S. Army historically has 

valued the ingenuity and creativity of its leaders, the ambiguous 

and decentralized combat environment of the 21st century has made 

adaptive leaders an especially valuable resource. 

 The criticality of adaptability has also emerged as a theme in 

the civilian leadership literature. Warren Bennis, a prominent 
2

leadership researcher, argued that effective leaders tend to have 

experienced at least one intense, transformational experience―

what he calls a crucible experience. A crucible experience is “both 

an opportunity and a test. It is a defining moment that unleashes 

abilities, forces crucial choices, and sharpens focus. It teaches a 

person who he or she is.” 8 According to Bennis, the critical quality 

of a leader that determines how that leader will fare in a crucible 

experience is adaptive capacity. Adaptive capacity allows leaders to 

respond quickly and intelligently to constant change. It is the ability 

to identify and seize opportunities. It allows leaders to act and then 

evaluate results instead of attempting to collect and analyze all the 

data before acting.9 Bennis describes the role of adaptive capacity in 

a crucible experience,

People with ample adaptive capacity may struggle in the crucibles they 

encounter, but they don’t become stuck in or defined by them. They 

learn important lessons, including new skills that allow them to move on 

to new levels of achievement and new levels of learning. This ongoing 

process of challenge, adaptation, and learning prepares the individual 

for the next crucible, where the process is repeated. Whenever significant 

new problems are encountered and dealt with adaptively, new levels of 

competence are achieved, better preparing the individual for the next 

challenge10

 Despite the Army’s tendency to lean towards the gravitational 

pull of its bureaucratic nature, many of today’s junior officers―indeed 

a large majority―are being given opportunities to be innovative, 

adaptive, and mentally agile. The foundation of this unique leader 

development transformation rests on the serendipitous crucible 

experience of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)―more specifically, 

postwar Iraq. Although there are many criticisms of postwar Iraq as 

being avoidable,11 undesirable,12 and unwinnable,13 it nevertheless 

is producing a cohort of junior leaders who are acquiring adaptive 

capacity critical to the future Army. 

 The following monograph describes how the environment 

of OIF is allowing―and compelling―junior officers to develop 

adaptive capacity. In the crucible of OIF, captains and lieutenants 

are becoming more creative, innovative, and confident as they learn 

to deal with the complexities, unpredictability, and uncertainties 
3

of counterinsurgency and nation-building in postwar Iraq. This 

study examines the leadership development of junior officers in OIF 

through their words and perspectives. The study relies heavily on 

observations collected from junior Army leaders deployed to Iraq in 

March of 2004―specifically over 50 structured interviews conducted 

with junior combat arms officers in the 1st Armored Division, 1st 

Cavalry Division, 2nd Infantry Division, and the 82nd Airborne 

Division in locations throughout Iraq. The interview sessions were 

conducted in the field environment, followed an interview protocol, 

were taped, and subsequently were transcribed.14

 The study reveals that our junior officers are developing 

adaptability―a competency that the Army has recognized as vital to 

future warfare, yet difficult to develop in a nondeployed Army. By 

being confronted with complexity, unpredictability, and ambiguity, 

junior officers are learning to adapt, to innovate, and to operate with 

minimal guidance. 

DEALING WITH COMPLEXITY

Two things seemed pretty apparent to me. One was, that in order to be a 

[Mississippi River] pilot, a man has got to learn more than any one man 

ought to be allowed to know; and the other was, that he must learn it all 

over again in a different way every 24 hours.15

Mark Twain

Life on the Mississippi

Complex Roles.

 Complexity for a junior leader in the garrison Army environment 

may consist of dealing with complicated personnel issues, logistics 

or maintenance, or preparing and participating in a culminating field 

exercise such as a CTC rotation. (CTC and many other acronyms 

used in this manuscript are explained in the Appendix.) In OIF, 

complexity for junior leaders comes from a much wider variety of 

sources. One significant source of complexity is the number and 

nature of roles that junior officers must fill in counterinsurgency 

and nation-building operations. When examining the roles required 

of our junior officers in OIF, the question is not which role, but how 
4

many? One officer commented, “You are not just trying to learn one 

job, you are trying to learn several dozen jobs. Everything from being 

a politician to being a war commander. That is just an incredible 

amount of information for someone to carry around in their head.” 

 Because of the large-scale nation-building effort taking place in 

OIF, junior officers are being thrust into additional roles that would 

ordinarily be the realm of specialists or be resident in a higher 

echelon unit. Junior officers are finding themselves much more 

involved in activities other than leading their platoon or company 

in combat operations. A captain noted, “Junior officers are handling 

the embassy, PAO, and IO―missions that were mainly designated 

functional areas for others . . . People are wearing a lot of different 

hats that they thought they would never wear.” Another officer 

stated,

The complexity comes from some of the things that we did not have 

to deal with [in the past], like POO, FOO, claims officer, dealing with 

the IGOs, having CA teams attached, PSYOPS attached, dealing with 

interpreters, all of the new things―the new variables―that make it 

different, but different in a good way. 

 Unlike recent previous deployments where debates centered on 

whether combat arms soldiers could shift from being aggressive 

warriors to functioning as calming peacekeepers, OIF requires 

junior leaders to be warriors, peacekeepers, and nation-builders―

simultaneously. A captain reflected on the concurrent roles that he 

performed as a junior officer in postwar Iraq, 

It is complex because of the difference from full spectrum war―because 

at one moment I am planning three missions to do raids over here, and 

the next moment I am planning projects for my three areas here, and the 

next thing with the three NAC members―they have certain things they 

need help with. I am doing three different things on top of the regular 

company commander stuff.

Another company commander described his changing roles,

You go out and you talk to the people at the school or the clinic. 

You ask them, ‘What do you guys need? How can we improve your 

neighborhood―your living conditions?’ You get all that information and 
5

the next thing you have is, ‘Hey tonight you have a raid.’ You push all 

that information to the side . . . I got to go and do this raid tonight and 

then I got two more days of patrols and QRF―so a week later you get 

back to this civil affairs thing.

 In addition to the complexity caused by the multiple roles of 

junior officers in OIF, the previous comments also illustrate what 

several officers called “the faucet” or the necessity of adjusting 

to situations that could change from cold to hot and back to cold 

instantaneously. A lieutenant described it by saying,

You have to be flexible to what comes down. You could be doing a 

presence patrol . . . saying “Hi” to a kid and your vehicle is there a few 

hundred yards away getting mortared. Now you are talking to this little 

kid, and you hear on the radio that the rest of your platoon is over there 

getting mortared, and they want you to maneuver to try to catch the guy 

who just mortared. So you have to switch from one thing to another.

Another officer gave an example, “You got to deal with a little girl 

who wants a chem light and the very next minute might have to 

shoot somebody for trying to place an IED . . . It is such a switch.” 

 Many leaders spoke of the intricacies of leading troops in the 

sharply different worlds of fighting insurgents and maintaining good 

relationships with the local people. One platoon leader described the 

situation,

It is very difficult to keep 18-year-old guys, to take them and one second 

we are dodging bullets and trying to hide on the street corner and react 

because you got somebody in a window or a roof, and the next second 

you are knocking on the door, asking to search the house and you have to 

be polite. I think that is a very large leadership challenge here―keeping 

guys focused on that; making sure that they can calm back down after 

brief periods of excitement.

 Because U.S. forces are largely consolidated on forward operating 

bases, junior officers commented on the “surreal” nature of shifting 

from the extreme danger in the streets to the relative comfort of the 

FOB. One lieutenant put it this way,

Leaving out the gates of the fire base, you can get in a fire fight one 

minute, or you can be on the scene of a VBIED―just horrid scenes, body 
6

pieces everywhere. Ten minutes later, you travel back inside the FOB and 

you can be inside your room with a TV on, go take a shower, sit in your 

PT, sit on the couch. You know what I mean―it is odd. 

 In addition to the mental agility needed to take on additional 

duties or to shift roles constantly, many junior leaders in OIF 

described the need to adapt by functioning outside their combat 

specialty. Field artillerymen, engineers, and tankers spoke of 

operating as infantrymen as they conducted raids or cordon and 

searches. One engineer noted, “I don’t think that I am much of 

an engineer at all. I think I am an infantry guy with a lot more 

equipment.” A field artillery officer stated, “I definitely didn’t think 

that I would be clearing buildings as an artillery officer, or working 

with the CIA or Special Forces or anything like that. Never, never 

ever.” On the other hand, infantrymen spoke of functioning as 

engineers or civil affairs officers as they assumed responsibility for 

the infrastructure of a sector. An infantry lieutenant commented on 

his added responsibilities,

I am a combat infantryman. You want me to fire and maneuver; I can 

fire and maneuver―anywhere, in any terrain, anywhere you want to do 

it. Here, I have had to learn how sewage works. In my AO, I can brief 

you where all my pumps are, all my manholes, and where my sewage 

is broke.

 Similar comments were heard from mechanized junior leaders 

learning to operate as light infantry. An armor officer spoke of his 

transition to light infantry tactics, “My mental tool guide is just 

not filled with how to employ dismounted soldiers. I know how to 

employ vehicles. I know how to maneuver vehicles. I am a mounted 

maneuver warfare guy. [But] I am trying to pick it up; I am adapting 

the best that I can.” Another tanker spoke of the hard adjustment 

from mechanized warfare,

It is way out of my lane, dealing with dismounted. Every time I screw up 

or do something that is bad, someone is like, “No. Stop that. Bad idea.” 

Hey, roger, okay, just tell me when I am messing up because I am “Death 

before dismount.” It is a totally new way of thinking.
7

 With so many leaders operating out of their usual specialties, 

junior officers were asked if their OIF experience made them more 

proficient in their particular branch. Armor officers were asked if 

they were becoming better tankers, artillerymen were asked if they 

were becoming better artillerymen. Except for infantrymen, most 

officers responded that they were not gaining proficiency in their 

branch. Interestingly, most officers also added that, while they were 

not becoming better officers in their branch specialty, they were 

becoming better officers in general. As one armor officer stated,

Am I a better tanker? Probably not. My tank is not here. I have not been 

in a tank for 6 months . . . My specialization in armor is probably getting 

worse, but my general knowledge as an army officer is exponentially 

increasing every day because I am exposed to so much now . . . I feel I 

am much more well-rounded―not specialized as much―but much more 

well-rounded. 

Another officer bluntly stated, “Better artilleryman? For coming 

here? Hell no. Absolutely not. I am a better leader.”

 Junior leaders in postwar Iraq are learning to be adaptable and 

agile. They are taking on roles they never envisioned; they are 

learning to shift mental models rapidly. They are developing the 

leadership ability that the Army has been seeking for many years, 

yet has struggled to capture. While many deployed officers do not 

see the transformation they are undergoing in the crucible of OIF, 

some do. One field artillery lieutenant reflected,

It wasn’t exactly what I thought it would be because I pictured myself 

fighting―laying steel down, destroying stuff. But this is fine; this is what 

it is about. It is about being flexible. It is about being able to conduct any 

mission as a soldier first and a leader first―not worried about being an 

artilleryman first. 

Cultural Complexity.

 While junior officers stationed in Korea or Germany often learn 

to deal with a different culture, many OIF leaders expressed surprise 

at how different the Iraqi culture that confronted them could be. 

One lieutenant stated, “ We are absolutely the newcomers to this 
8

environment . . . It is so foreign to us. You couldn’t pick a place in the 

world that would be more foreign to most Americans than Iraq.”16

Another officer added, “The complexity of their culture―just dealing 

with their culture―has been overwhelming. That is where I run into 

the biggest problems right now.” One lieutenant spoke of learning 

about the Iraqi culture in school, but not truly understanding it, 

The biggest thing that makes it complex here for me personally is the 

religious aspect of it and the Muslim world. I grew up learning about 

Shia and Sunnis in social studies class in junior high school, but I had no 

idea what these people were all about. To be here and learn about how 

they interact with each other and then in turn how they interact with the 

rest of the world―it was nothing I was prepared for. 

 Because junior officers are heavily involved in nation-building 

activities, they are interacting much more with the local populace 

than in other deployments such as Bosnia, Kosovo, or the MFO. As 

a result, the nuances of culture become more noticeable. Officers 

reported having to learn how not to offend Iraqis with mannerisms 

inadvertently. Others noted that there were Iraqi idiosyncrasies that 

had to be learned. One officer commented, “People here like to get 

really close to you when they talk. That bothers the hell out of me. 

It is a good thing to learn that they are not trying to sneak up on 

you or grab you or anything. They just want to talk; they are being 

friendly.” 

 Of course, junior officers in past deployments and even tourists 

on vacations have had to deal with the complexities of foreign 

cultures. OIF is unique, however, in that a large number of junior 

officers are dealing with cultural intricacies that have potential 

strategic implications. As one captain recounted,

I was never given classes on how to sit down with a sheik that 2 days 

before I had seen his face on CNN, and now all of a sudden I am talking 

to this guy face-to-face. He is providing food for myself and soldiers out 

in the trucks that are providing security for us while we are having our 

meeting in this guy’s house . . . He is giving me the traditional dishdasha 

and the entire outfit of a sheik because he claims that I am a new sheik 

in town so I must be dressed as one. I don’t know if he is trying to gain 

favor with me because he wants something . . . or is it something good or 

something bad. It is just something you are going to have to learn on the 

job and how to deal with.
9

 Another lieutenant gave an example of how a seemingly simple 

misunderstanding of cultural hand gestures could have led to 

strategic consequences. “Well, I did this [ ] to the Minister of [a 

governmental branch] to say, “Wait,” and he flipped out because 

you are suppose to cup your hand like this [ ] and say “Hold on.” 

You do this [ ] to dogs, I think . . . I didn’t really understand.”

 The result of the immersion of such a large cohort of junior 

officers into a foreign culture is an emerging confidence that they can 

operate effectively in unfamiliar conditions. Day-to-day interaction 

with Iraqis produces competence in understanding a Middle Eastern 

culture, but more importantly, company grade leaders are realizing 

that their horizons are being broadened. One officer reflected upon 

the leadership development value of the OIF cultural environment, 

The things that I have experienced here, beyond the soldier environment, 

just going around and really experiencing the Middle East, you know, 

another part of the world and just being in a new environment, interacting 

with the interpreters, I think that is where the real experience comes in. 

Complex Warfare.

 While war is never simple, many junior officers believed that 

counterinsurgency operations were proving to be more complicated 

than the high-intensity battles they had trained for in the past. Many 

officers yearned for the simplicity of coordinating with units on their 

right and left, and destroying everything in the sector ahead. One 

lieutenant spoke of the experiences of high-intensity training at a 

CTC and then arriving in Iraq,

[At NTC] we went through traditional force-on-force fighting―tank 

battles. That is easy. You are here. The bad is north. Drive north and kill. 

Secure this piece of terrain; clear this piece of terrain . . . You get here [in 

Iraq], and it is just different. 

Another lieutenant observed,

The waves of BMPs and T72’s and stuff that you train for―that would 

have been great! My guys wanted to blow something up so badly. As 

soon as we got [live] ammunition, we were like, “I hope I get to pump it 

into a Volkswagen.” That is the easy stuff.
10

 Counterinsurgency warfare presents junior officers with 

missions and tasks that appear to be less complex than highintensity warfare, e.g., cordon and search, traffic control points, or 

escort duty. Indeed, many officers noted that their actual missions 

were amazingly simple. But many junior leaders also noted that the 

counterinsurgency environment demanded more mental energy. 

For example, one lieutenant commented on the asymmetrical moral 

nature of insurgency,

It is frustrating at times because you are expected to play by certain 

regulations and certain rules when your opposition is not held to the 

same standard. There are all these Geneva Convention rules: you can’t 

go undercover in certain situations; you got to be in very plain view. 

You have all these ROE rules that we are restricted to, yet we are fighting 

against an enemy who is not constrained by the same things. 

Another lieutenant described how fighting an insurgency adds a 

level of complexity to leadership,

Most of the people here are actually our friends. It is very, very difficult 

to determine who in a crowd is friendly and who is not, and what to do. 

We go over ROE and then you have to constantly before every mission 

sit down with the guys and read through and make up off the wall 

situations because they actually happen. 

 Another officer reflected upon CTC training and stated,

I think―as far as mentally―this [OIF] is tougher. There [at a CTC], it is 

physically tougher, but here it is mentally more difficult. There you knew 

that if you see a guy on the hill with a weapon, you kill him because he 

is the bad guy at JRTC, and they wear the uniforms and all that. Here, 

you see a guy with a weapon and he is not in a uniform. You have to call 

and be like, “Hey do you see that guy?” “Is he wearing an Iraqi police 

uniform?” “No, he is not.” “Does he have that weapon slung across his 

back?” “Yeah, he does.” “Okay, well, let’s go and dismount and talk to 

him and see if he should be having that weapon.” You can’t just shoot the 

guy like you do at NTC. You got to think about it.

The environment in OIF is forcing our junior leaders to confront 

the hard realities of a complex situation, a relatively restrictive 

ROE, the presence of innocents on the battlefield, and the need to 
11

still accomplish the mission. The OIF experience is developing in 

our junior officers the ability to recognize the strategic implications 

of their actions in a complex moral environment. As one astute 

lieutenant noted, “The fact is that we don’t lower our standards and 

we abide by an ROE; that we are not out there just to kill innocent 

civilians; and that the mission is important, but the means to that 

end is sometimes more important.” Such words speak volumes 

about how adept our junior officers are becoming in dealing with 

the moral complexities in the OIF crucible. 

Complexity through Change.

 Adaptive leaders learn to live with unpredictability. They spend 

less time fretting about the inability to establish a routine or control 

the future and focus more on exploiting opportunities. In OIF, junior 

leaders reported operating in an environment of planning ahead 

and attempting to establish a battle rhythm against a backdrop of 

imminent change. Junior officers quickly learned that the battle 

rhythm they emplace lasts only until the next interruption. As one 

lieutenant paradoxically described the environment, “Right now, it 

is fairly predictable, but that can always change.”

 Army officers have always been accustomed to sudden change, 

but the OIF environment is a sharp contrast to recent deployments. 

Many factors appear to be accelerating the impact of unpredictability. 

First, the insurgents are an adaptive enemy. As one officer noted, 

“It’s a constant struggle of one-upmanship. We adapt, they adapt. 

It’s a constant competition to gain the upper hand.”17

 Second, because the OIF environment is rich in intelligence, 

missions emerge on very short notice based on new information. 

One platoon leader noted, 

I can’t tell you what I am doing tomorrow. I can tell you what I am 

supposed to be doing tomorrow. Things change so frequently and you 

just expect that. You know that every day you live a day at a time. Things 

you plan change based on intel reports, based on different changes in the 

mission.

 Third, the attitudes of the Iraqi people towards U.S. forces are by 

no means homogenous or stable. Junior leaders cannot assume the 
12

reception their troops receive during missions will be constant. A 

lieutenant observed,

We don’t know whether we are going to get rocks thrown at us, or 

mortars, or a handshake, or a cup of tea. It really doesn’t depend on what 

neighborhood we are going to. It doesn’t matter what we are going to do. 

The level of hostility is something that we cannot predict.

 Finally, the overall strategic environment in postwar Iraq is 

still unstable which creates havoc for those at the tactical level. 

An assassination, a prison abuse scandal, or a localized uprising 

can change conditions for leaders on the ground. One officer 

elaborated,

Things are going to go wrong and some crazy things are going to happen. 

Like the UN is going to blow up or Sadr is going to ambush a patrol 

in Sadr City, and they are going to call our tanks in to be prepared to 

basically assault the city . . . My guys realize that it is a very unpredictable 

environment that we live in.

 As a result of the possibility of change at any moment, junior 

officers have learned to plan and establish routine, but anticipate 

change at any moment. One lieutenant stated,

You never know what to expect. Tasks seem to come in spurts. It is quiet 

for a while―you think that maybe we have gotten a hold of the sector . . . 

then we will have three IEDs in a day within the battalion AO. 

One officer gave this advice for leading in the OIF environment, 

“The first priority is to accept the fact that it is going to be completely 

unpredictable. You just have to make the best of it.” A lieutenant 

added, 

I guess you get used to the unpredictable nature of things . . . I guess 

you build little lessons learned off of each one. So next time when a new 

experience comes up, you draw from that last one. Okay, how could I 

quickly adapt to this and make this happen? I guess the only danger is 

it really could make you complacent. You want to be comfortable with 

unpredictability. But, you don’t want to become complacent. I guess 

that’s the balance.
13

 Junior officers in the OIF environment are working towards 

establishing predictability for their troops. They are planning and 

scheduling, but they are also learning to adapt to the situation when 

it changes or emerges differently from what they expected. 

TASK AND PURPOSE

There is a type of staff officer who seems to think that it is more important 

to draft immaculate orders than to get out a reasonably well-worded 

order in time for action to be taken before the situation changes or the 

opportunity passes.

General B. H. Liddell Hart

Thoughts on War

 A key factor in developing adaptive capacity in junior officers is 

the ability to actually lead and make decisions rather than merely 

to execute the orders of higher commands. Two years ago, a study 

chartered by the Chief of Staff of the Army entitled Stifling Innovation 

reported that the centralized and overly structured Army system 

had created an oppressive culture that encouraged in our junior 

officers “reactive instead of proactive thought, compliance instead of 

creativity, and adherence instead of audacity.”18 Although creativity 

and innovation tend to be highly esteemed by the Army in its 

rhetoric, the report found that “the reality is that junior officers are 

seldom given opportunities to be innovative in planning training; 

to make decisions; or to fail, learn, and try again.”19 In essence, the 

Army had replaced leadership with what leadership researchers call 

leadership substitutes. 20 The leadership substitutes model suggests 

that a variety of situational variables can substitute for or neutralize 

the effects of a leader’s behavior. These situational variables can 

“paralyze, destroy, or counteract” the ability of leadership to make 

a difference and make leadership “not only impossible but also 

unnecessary.”21 For example, lack of authority may neutralize a 

leader’s effectiveness, while detailed planning may substitute for 

leadership and make the leader redundant. 

 In OIF, many of the situational variables that normally substitute 

for leadership in the nondeployed Army are removed. For example, 

many officers reported that their missions were not covered by 
14

Army doctrine or established TTP. Officers spoke of improvising 

and experimenting in operations such as the employment of heavy 

units in a MOUT environment, patrolling in a nonhostile MOUT 

terrain, and conducting Phase IV (nation-building) operations in a 

situation void of many of the agencies and organizations normally 

expected in reconstruction. As a result, junior officers are having 

to rely on the their own judgment and ingenuity in getting the 

mission accomplished. One lieutenant perceptively noted, “Every 

environment that we as a military go in, we are going to learn 

something. For those of us who are learning it now, we’ll be the ones 

to write the doctrine later to help out the next set.”

 For many of the officers interviewed, there was a surprising 

lack of detailed guidance from higher headquarters. Geographical 

dispersion, changing tactical and strategic situations, and volatile 

environments prevented higher echelon commanders from 

developing plans with specific guidance for junior officers carrying 

out missions. Junior officers became the experts on the situation, 

not higher headquarters. One officer commented on why he did 

not receive more explicit directions, “The big thing that you have 

to understand is that this is bottom-up fed. I am the guy on the 

ground. I know everything about my AO.” As a result, junior 

officers reported moving away from the traditional detailed military 

decision making process and relying on FRAGOs, task and purpose, 

and commander’s intent for guidance instead. 

 One platoon leader recounted how general his guidance was 

upon arriving in his sector, “When we first got here, the colonel told 

us to go out and find bad guys and kill them. That was our orders. 

That was our task and purpose. We were, like, ‘Roger, all right!’” A 

company commander related the broad guidance he received,

I had a very simple commander’s intent. It was two lines. It said prevent 

anti-coalition militants and former regime militants from getting weapons 

or explosives into this facility. Second line―always use active force 

protection measures to deter an attack, i.e., be a hard target. In a situation 

like this, you can make your commander’s intent as complicated as you 

want. You can address every issue, or you can just give them a broad 

stroke of a philosophy you want them to work under. 
15

 A significant implication of OIF is the growing confidence 

possessed by junior officers that they can lead without being 

propped up by either close supervision or detailed guidance. They 

are learning to be comfortable, as one officer noted, with only, 

“Here is your task, here is your purpose, we don’t have as much 

information that may be necessary to complete the whole mission, 

but the information is out there for you to get.” Another officer 

described the command climate as, “Here, a lot of times it is, ‘Here 

it is, figure it out, go, you have one hour.’” An aviation lieutenant 

commented on his confidence in operating in an intent-centric rather 

than plan-centric environment, 

Honestly, if I was flying around out there . . . you give me a call sign on 

a ground unit, a grid to go to, and a task and purpose―e.g., there is a 

cordon and search, this grid, this is the call sign of the ground unit, this 

is their frequency―in the time that it takes me to get there, I can have a 

pretty good warm fuzzy about how to handle the operation. 

TOMORROW’S LEADERS

The preceding paragraphs have attempted to make the case 

that today’s junior officers are learning to lead in the crucible of the 

extremely complex and dynamic OIF environment. Lieutenants and 

captains have conducted missions for which they never trained, 

executed operations that have outpaced Army doctrine, shifted 

constantly from adrenaline-pumping counterinsurgency to patiencedemanding nation-building, and received very little detailed 

guidance or supervision in the process. The result of this experience 

is a cohort of junior officers that is learning to be adaptable, creative, 

innovative, and confident in their abilities to handle just about any 

task thrown at them. 

 One lieutenant reflected upon the leader development aspects of 

OIF, “I have learned that I can adapt to circumstances and situations 

that surround me much better than I expected . . . Three hours after 

I got on the ground in Baghdad, I went on my first raid with these 

guys. Just my ability to learn and absorb information has impressed 

me.” Another officer offered insights on what he learned in theater, 
16

You learn not to over-analyze . . . A place like this really drives home, 

I would say, that the most important thing that a leader can do at the 

lowest level is make a decision―right or wrong . . . Making the decision 

in a timely manner, on the spot, at the lowest level, has implications that 

are huge all the way to the top.

 Being able to adapt, make decisions, and lead in the complex, 

ambiguous, and uncertain conditions of OIF produces a confidence 

in junior leaders. The boldness developed in OIF is the seed for 

the audacity required in the future Army. It is something that can 

be best developed by allowing junior officers to lead in a crucible 

experience. One lieutenant noted, 

I feel that myself, and all the other officers that I serve with, are doing 

things that they never expected they would have to do and finding out 

that they’re doing them very, very well. I think that it comes to a shock to 

some guys, many of us, how well things are going for us individually. 

 For the officers deployed to Iraq, the OIF environment has become 

the way the Army operates. For many of the more junior officers, 

OIF is their only reference point in the leadership development 

process of the Army. As a second lieutenant pointed out, “I don’t 

really know what infantry platoon leaders normally do. I went to 

two training centers and I came here. I have no idea what they do in 

garrison.” Another lieutenant said, “I have never been on a CMTC 

or a JRTC. You could say this is my first field problem coming out 

here and coming to Baghdad. I am just kind of learning as I go.” For 

other officers with experience in the nondeployed Army, the OIF 

experience stands in contrast to much of what they learned in other 

leader development experiences. For example, one officer compared 

leader development in the OIF environment with a CTC rotation,

I know the Army hates this word, but [the OIF environment] keeps me 

flexible . . . The Army hates the word because if you have ever been to 

a training rotation, you always have an AAR, and the thing that they 

always tell you . . . is “Don’t ever say under one of your ‘Sustains’―

flexible.” Don’t even bother. They hate to hear it. The Army hates to hear 

the word flexible.

 Such observations raise a key question: What happens when these 

junior officers―who have experienced the exhilaration of leading 
17

troops in a complex environment with little close supervision―

return to the nondeployed Army? Will the Army leverage this 

newly developed adaptability? Or will bureaucratic forces gradually 

whittle away and wear down these young warriors with SOPs, 

TTPs, MREs, and strict adherence to the MDMP? While there have 

already been some adjustments at the CTCs to instill ambiguity 

and uncertainty instead of following closely scripted scenarios, 

changes are also needed throughout the schoolhouses, and more 

importantly, in the daily operational training of units. The leader 

development gains of OIF will be lost if instructors at the Captain’s 

Career Course, battalion and brigade commanders in tactical units, 

and division chiefs on headquarters staffs fail to recognize that 

these junior officers are quite capable of operating within the broad 

boundaries of commander’s intent, instead of being told what to do 

and how to do it. 

 Three factors are important to consider when exploring the 

implications of a large cohort of adaptive, independent leaders 

returning to the garrison Army. First, while the current situation 

has many similarities with deployments of the past such as Bosnia 

and Kosovo, Vietnam, or post-World War II Germany or Japan, the 

leader development experience is unique due to differences in scope 

and scale. The Vietnam experience included counterinsurgency 

operations, but the nation-building in that conflict was mostly at the 

local level (e.g., civil action teams) and did not attempt to rebuild the 

national government. Operations in Bosnia and Kosovo included 

some nation-building, but leaders were not confronted with an 

active insurgency. Likewise, while post-World War II reconstruction 

efforts were at the national level, junior officers did not have to 

contend with fighting an insurgency at the same time. Probably a 

more significant difference in the leader development experience 

from past deployments is the increased quality of the all-volunteer 

force―especially when comparing Iraq with the Vietnam conflict. 

With higher quality troops, especially the noncommissioned officer 

corps, junior officers can devote more of their mental energy to 

issues other than discipline and individual training. Additionally, 

current force stabilization policies allow units to push their band 

of excellence upwards due to cohesion and reduced turbulence. 
18

In other words, the current situation of so many adaptive junior 

officers returning to the nondeployed Army presents an extremely 

rare opportunity to the Army. 

 Second, this monograph focused on the development of 

adaptability in company grade officers. While many field grade 

officers are also in postwar Iraq, mostly lieutenants and captains are 

in the line units interacting with the local populace, conducting the 

raids, and working with soldiers. The development of agile, adaptive 

leaders in OIF is, by and large, a junior officer phenomenon. Thus, 

any impact of adaptability and flexibility on the Army will come 

mainly through the influence of a large cohort of junior officers with 

OIF combat experience. 

 Finally, the influence of the Army’s senior leadership on the 

leadership development of the Army is also a salient factor to 

consider. Former Chief of Staff of the Army General Eric Shinseki 

set the stage for change. He chartered the Army Training and 

Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) in anticipation of developing 

adaptive leaders for the Objective Force. Under his direction, the 

Army explored ways to eliminate 50 percent of nonmission related 

training in order to allow company commanders to be innovative 

in developing their own training. Additionally, he directed that all 

company commanders be given a week of “white space” on their 

training calendars to encourage junior officer creativity. While 

the institutional Army may not have responded with significant 

policy changes to promote adaptability during his tenure, General 

Shinseki’s vision of adaptive leaders established the foundation for 

change. 

 Current Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker continued the 

momentum of change and is pushing the Army towards reform 

with radical restructuring, discontinuation of programs once 

thought sacred, and the dismantling of processes no longer viewed 

as flexible enough for a transforming Army. As far as developing 

leaders, General Schoomaker has shown that he is comfortable 

with exposing leaders to complex, ambiguous environments. 

Statements such as, “What makes a great team is what happens after 

the ball is snapped,” “You’re not learning unless you’re operating 

in the zone of discomfort,” and “You can’t organize the chaos of 
19

the battlefield”22 reflect a perspective consistent with notions of 

flexibility, adaptability, and innovation. 

 With a cohort of junior officers experiencing and expecting to be 

treated as adaptive, innovative, and independent leaders putting 

pressure on the Army from the bottom, and a Chief of Staff of the 

Army familiar with the virtues of special operating forces (not to 

mention a transformation-oriented Secretary of Defense) pushing 

adaptability from the top, the Army finds itself sandwiched between 

forces of change. The Army can continue the momentum by 

leveraging and encouraging adaptability and innovation, or it can 

allow traditional Army inertia to gradually grind down the out-ofthe-box perspectives of its returning junior officers. 

 An Army at war is stressed and stretched. Wars also have the 

ability, however, to mature an Army. Today’s Army is receiving a 

large number of junior officers who have learned to be comfortable 

with complexity, change, and ambiguity. While these junior officers 

do not appear much different than fresh-faced cadets, they carry 

with them a savvy and wisdom that can only be gained in a crucible 

experience. Such a perspective is evident in the following quotation 

from a very eloquent second lieutenant. Note the maturity in his 

words as he reflects upon the OIF environment and his development 

as a leader. 

Our equation is filled with variables that constantly change―the weather, 

people, different dynamics that we have no control over. If we tried to 

control them, we would be breaking the rules. It is important that we 

understand our constraints, understand our limitations, understand the 

variables that are out there, and then learn how to deal with it. There are 

certain things that you are not going to be able to control―the emotions 

your soldiers run into, the problems your soldiers have at home, the 

complex situation between the Shiites and Sunnis, the cultural barrier, 

the stand off between Western culture, Christian culture, and Muslim 

culture. There are certain things that we won’t understand because it 

is a totally different environment . . . To prepare an officer for this, to 

prepare anyone for this, you need to just constantly test him, put him 

in very challenging situations, and allow them to sort of think and act 

under pressure and stress. That is essentially what you do here. You 

are given a task and expected to perform . . . You see the true colors of 

people because you see a lot of these guys get bent out of shape. You get 

tired, you get frustrated, you get mad, you start screaming. You are, like, 
20

“This is all [messed] up.” You understand their frustration. You got to 

pull yourself back. You got to remain calm. You got to come with, “Okay 

these are the changes, and this is how we are going to change our plan.” 

You got to be able to think on your feet. You got to be flexible. I can’t 

stress that enough. That has been our success here. 

Of course, not all the junior officers encountered during 

interviews for this monograph were as comfortable as this lieutenant 

in leading in a complex environment. Some of the junior officers in 

OIF are frustrated with the constant change, while others report 

unease in dealing with ambiguity. Over all, however, most of the 

junior officers showed an astute understanding of leadership in the 

future environment. 

 Today’s junior officers are not afraid to lead in ambiguous 

conditions. They can execute a mission with minimal guidance. They 

are an incredibly valuable resource to a transforming Army that has 

desired and sought adaptive capacity in its leaders. The crucible of 

OIF has delivered to the Army a cohort of adaptive leaders. The 

challenge for the Army is to encourage and leverage this priceless 

potential.

ENDNOTES

1. Quoted in Thom Shanker, “New Chief Sets Out to Redesign a StretchedThin Army,” The New York Times, January 28, 2004, p. A19. 

2. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 22-100, Army 

Leadership, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990, p. 7.

3. Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Vision Statement, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999, p. 7.

4. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 1, The Army, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001.

5. Headquarters, Department of the Army, The Army Training and Leader 

Development Panel Officer Study Report to the Army, http://www.army.mil/atld, 2001 

(emphasis added). See also Lieutenant General William M. Steele and Lieutenant 

Colonel Robert P. Walters, Jr., “21st Century Leadership Competencies,” Army 

Magazine, August 2001, p. 29.

6. Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army White Paper, Concepts 
21

for the Objective Force. http://www.army.mil/features/WhitePaper/ObjectiveForceWhiteP

aper.pdf, 2001, p. 5 (emphasis added). 

7. Headquarters, Department of the Army, The Way Ahead, Washington, DC: 

U.S. Government Printing Office. 2004, p. 8 (emphasis added). 

8. Warren G. Bennis and Robert J. Thomas, Geeks & Geezers: How Era, Values, 

and Defining Moments Shape Leaders, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 

2002, p. 16. 

9. Warren G. Bennis, On Becoming a Leader, New York: Basic Books, 2003, pp. 

xxii–xxiii.

10. Bennis and Thomas, p. 93.

11. James Fallows, “Blind Into Baghdad,” The Atlantic Monthly, Jan/Feb 2004, 

Vol. 293, p. 74.

12. Bob Herbert, “No End In Sight,” The New York Times, April 2, 2004, p. 

A19.

13. General William E. Odom in John Harwood, “Former General Sees 

‘Staying the Course’ in Iraq as Untenable,” The Wall Street Journal, April 28, 2004, 

p. 4. 

14. In addition to assisting in officer interviews, Colonel John R. Martin 

handled logistics, scheduling, and transportation. He is a first class soldier who 

made this monograph a reality. 

15. Mark Twain, Life on the Mississippi, Cambridge, MA: University Press, 

1883, p. 105. 

16. Unless otherwise noted, quotations are from transcribed interviews with 

OIF company grade officers. 

17. Major John Nagl, quoted in Nicholas Blanford, “Insurgent And Soldier: 

Two Views On Iraq Fight,” Christian Science Monitor, February 25, 2004, p. 1.

18. Leonard Wong, Stifling Innovation: Developing Tomorrow’s Leaders Today, 

Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002, p. v. 

19. Ibid, p. 3. 

20. Steven Kerr and John M. Jermier, “Substitutes for Leadership: Their 

Meaning and Measurement,” Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, Vol. 
22

22, 1978, pp. 375–403. 

21. Ibid, p. 395. 

22. Shanker, p. A19. 
23

APPENDIX

ACRONYMS

AAR After Action Review

AO Area of Operations

BMP Soviet military personnel carrier

CA Civil Affairs

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CMTC Combat Maneuver Training Center

CSA Chief of Staff of the Army

CTC Combat Training Center

FOB Forward Operating Base

FOO Field Ordering Officer

FRAGO Fragmentary Order

IED Improvised Explosive Device

IGO Intergovernmental Organization

IO Information Operations

JRTC Joint Readiness Training Center

MDMP Military Decision Making Process

MFO Multinational Force and Observers

MOUT Military Operations in Urban Terrain

MRE Mission Rehearsal Exercise

NAC Neighborhood Advisory Council

NTC National Training Center

OIF Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

PAO Public Affairs Officer

POO Purchase Ordering Officer 

PSYOPS Psychological Operations

PT Physical Training

QRF Quick Reaction Force

ROE Rules of Engagement

SOP Standard Operating Procedure

TTP Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

VBIED Vehicle-borne Improvised Explosive Device