MANAGING A CHANGING RELATIONSHIP:

CHINA'S JAPAN POLICY IN THE 1990s

Robert S. Ross

September 30, 1996
ii

*****

The views expressed in this report are those of the author

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

*****

This monograph was originally presented at the U.S. Army War

College Seventh Annual Strategy Conference held April 23-25,

1996, with the assistance of the Office of Net Assessment. The

Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish the paper as

part of its Conference Series.

*****

All 1995 and later Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)

monographs are available on the Strategic Studies Institute

Homepage for electronic dissemination. SSI's Homepage address

is: http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/

*****

Comments pertaining to this monograph are invited and should

be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.

Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5244. Comments

also may be conveyed directly to the Conference Organizer, Dr.

Earl H. Tilford, Jr., by calling commercial (717) 245-4086 or DSN

242-4086. Copies of this report may be obtained from the

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at rummelr@carlisle-emh2.army.mil
iii

FOREWORD

In April 1996, the Army War College's Strategic Studies

Institute held its Seventh Annual Strategy Conference. This

year's theme was, "China into the 21st Century: Strategic Partner

and . . . or Peer Competitor." The author of the following

monograph, Dr. Robert S. Ross, of Harvard University's Fairbank

Center for East Asian Research, argues that Japan's relationship

with China is a key element in the evolving East Asian security

structure. From Beijing's perspective, China's Japan policy

rivals its relationship with the United States in relative

strategic importance. Japan's economic strength and its potential

military power make it a major factor in Chinese security

calculations.

Many of the same factors that affect Sino-American relations

and Sino-Russian relations are integral to the relationship

between Beijing and Tokyo. Among these are Chinese treatment of

dissidents, the Taiwan issue, economic investment, and Japanese

military policy and strategy. Today Japanese and Chinese

interests compete in many areas, requiring tolerance, patience

and diplomatic sophistication to keep competition from evolving

into conflict. In the future, these challenges are likely to grow

in complexity.

Perhaps as a legacy of the Cold War, those of us in the

strategic analysis community on this side of the Pacific tend to

see the world in terms of bilateral relationships with the

United States. Professor Ross's thoughtful monograph illustrates

the greater complexity of international interactions. In this

century, the United States has faced tremendous challenges in

East Asia, with conflict erupting into warfare with both China

and Japan. For that reason alone, Professor Ross's essay warrants

a close reading by strategists and policymakers alike.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

ROBERT S. ROSS is an Associate Professor of Political Science at

Boston College and a Research Associate of the John King Fairbank

Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University. His most

recent works are Negotiating Cooperation: U.S.-China Relations,

1969-1989 and East Asia in Transition: Toward a New Regional

Order. He is currently writing a book on the rise of China and

East Asian security and a book on Chinese foreign policy with

Andrew J. Nathan. Professor Ross is a member of the National

Committee for U.S.-China Relations, the United States Committee

of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, and

 the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
1

MANAGING A CHANGING RELATIONSHIP:

CHINA'S JAPAN POLICY IN THE 1990s

Introduction.

China's Japan policy is a central component of China's

overall security policy, rivaling the U.S.-China relationship in

importance. As both an economic and potential military great

power, Japan has the ability to make a significant contribution

to Chinese security. It can contribute to Chinese economic

development and become a partner in managing regional security

issues in the interest of stability in East Asia and their

respective national interests. Alternatively, over the longer

term, Japan has the ability to become a major threat to vital

Chinese interests. Should Sino-Japanese security relations

deteriorate, Tokyo could deny China access to its economic

resources, including the Japanese market, and its capital and

technology, and it could influence other countries in East Asia

to do the same. This would have a significant impact on Chinese

economic development and Beijing's long-term military

modernization program. Japan could also participate in a regional

coalition aimed at China and, most alarming, if it realized its

considerable offensive military potential, it could directly

influence the regional balance of power and regional diplomacy to

China's strategic detriment.

China has a lot at stake in Sino-Japanese relations. To

maximize the benefits and minimize the prospects for adverse

trends, Beijing must carefully manage the relationship, seeking

to consolidate cooperative trends, to avoid the development of

unnecessary conflict, and to minimize the impact of basic

conflict of interests. Simultaneously, without undermining its

cooperative efforts toward Japan, Beijing must also develop the

domestic resources necessary to contend with an economically,

technologically, and militarily more capable Japan; it has to

play catch-up to a potential great power threat. Finally, Chinese

policymakers must pay close attention to contemporary trends in

Japanese foreign and defense policy, including policy toward

China, assessing the impact of changing Japanese policy on

Chinese security interests. In response, they must develop a

nuanced policy that discourages detrimental trends in Japanese

policy while not undermining the prospects for bilateral

cooperation.

The challenges of China's Japan policy are considerable.

Even under the best of circumstances, Chinese leaders would be

hard-pressed to develop a Japan policy that could satisfy these

competing demands. Yet, contemporary circumstances make the task

all the more difficult. Recent developments in Chinese relations

with Taiwan and the United States impact Japanese foreign policy,
2

and domestic politics in Beijing and Tokyo complicate the process

of sustaining nuanced foreign policies and cooperative bilateral

relations. It is far from clear that, in these complex

circumstances, Chinese policymakers have either the diplomatic

skill or the political flexibility to meet the challenge of

sustaining Sino-Japanese cooperation.

Japan, Multipolarity, and the 21st Century.

Chinese leaders share the global appreciation for the

reduced tensions of the post-Cold War era. As much as any other

country, China contributed to the positive outcome of the Cold

War, and it welcomes the opportunity to end the high level

military readiness and economic dislocations associated with the

Soviet threat and to focus its scarce domestic resources on

economic development.

Nonetheless, Chinese leaders also share in the widespread

apprehension that the current relief from high levels of

international tension may be short-lived. They do not believe

that power politics has ended or that there is any guarantee that

there will be long-term stability in international politics or

great power relations. As Premier Li Peng explained in his March

1996 Report on the Work of the Government to the National

People's Congress, "The world . . . is still full of

contradictions. Hegemonism and power politics are the roots of

instability in the world."1

 This attitude was repeated by a

senior Chinese journalist, who explained that looking toward the

21st century, "all is not well in the world. Hegemonism and power

politics will remain the principal barriers to . . . peace and

stability."2

A key component of this perspective is the shifting

relations among the great powers in the transition to a

multipolar balance of power in East Asia. While acknowledging

that the United States is the only superpower, Chinese

policymakers understand that uneven rates of change among the

great powers will gradually produce a more equitable regional

distribution of power in the 21st century. Once again, Li Peng

described well the Chinese perspective, arguing that "the world

is developing toward multipolarization at an accelerating pace."3

A retired senior Chinese diplomat observed that since the end of

the Cold War, "the world has been moving with a dizzying pace

toward multipolarity."4 In this evolving situation, international

conflict and cooperation will be determined by great power

relations. "In a multipolar world, the single superpower and the

many powers may cooperate when their interests collide, and clash

when their interests conflict."5 In the 21st century, the great

powers "will engage in mutual competition, mutual restraint, and

mutual cooperation."6
3

Central to China's understanding of East Asian security in

the 21st century is its assessment of Japan's likely future role

in the multipolar balance of power. The Chinese perceive Japan as

a rising power determined to play a major independent role in the

regional balance. Foreign Minister Qian Qichen observed that

Japan "is not reconciled to being only an economic power but

hopes to play a major role as a big power in international

affairs."7 Chen Peiyao, director of the Shanghai Institute of

International Studies, argues that Japan aims to become the

economic and political leader of East Asia and has started to

compete actively with the United States for regional influence.8

Chinese analysts also point to Japan's increasing effort to

become a permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security

Council and its growing military participation in U.S.

peacekeeping activities, including its participation in the UN

intervention in Cambodia, as evidence of its political

ambitions.9

Compounding Chinese concern regarding Japanese intentions is

its appraisal of Japanese capabilities. Japanese great power

economic capabilities are well known. Japanese business has

become the importance source of new direct foreign investment for

the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries,

displacing the American role as the primary source of industrial

growth for such countries as Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia.

Japan also makes an important contribution to economic

development and continued growth in Taiwan. Tokyo's regional

economic influence can readily translate into political

influence, potentially enabling Japan to influence the foreign

policies of many East Asian countries.

More significant, however, than Japanese economic influence

is its potential military capability. Chinese leaders frequently

point out that power in the 21st century will increasingly rest

on comprehensive national strength, and that economic and

technological capabilities are central to the development of such

power. Yet, the implications of this analysis are not only that

economic capabilities will play an increasing role in great power

competition, but also that technological and economic

capabilities will be increasingly important in determining the

strategic balance of power and the outcome of military

competition. Certainly, the display of U.S. capabilities during

the Gulf War revealed the post-Cold War continued importance both

of military power and of technology in producing such power.

Thus, Ding Henggao, head of China's Commission on National

Defense, Science, Technology and Industry, pointed out that: "The

explosive growth of modern technology is having an increasingly

profound impact on military affairs"10 and that defense S&T

(science and technology) "plays an irreplaceable role in boosting

China's defense capability and comprehensive national strength."11
4

Chinese leaders are convinced that military capabilities

will play a decisive role in great power relations and that

Japan, despite its relationship with the United States and

domestic political and societal restraints on military activism,

is well positioned to be a formidable military great power.

Japan's military acquisition program makes clear that Japan

"harbors a strong desire to play a bigger military role in the

world."12 Although Japan has not developed significant offensive

capabilities, the steady increase in its defense budget since the

late 1970s has produced a modern and formidable defense

establishment.13 Apart from the United States, Japan has more

major warships than any other Asian country and any European

member of NATO. It already deploys in Asia more submarines,

escort ships and mine warfare units than the United States;

indeed, after the U.S. Seventh Fleet completes its scheduled

downsizing, Japan will have more major vessels in East Asia than

the United States. Moreover, this is a new and modern navy,

having been built in the last 15 years. Almost all of Japan's

naval vessels are constructed and equipped with highly advanced

technology, such as Aegis technology. Finally, Japan already

possesses the technology to build, support, and manage aircraft

carriers; it deployed aircraft carriers over 50 years ago during

World War II.14

 Japan is also constructing an advanced air force. Based on

the technology of the U.S. F-16C/D, Japan's FSX will be far

superior to any aircraft that China can manufacture, and it will

be at least as capable as any aircraft China can import from

Russia or from anywhere else, but with the important advantage of

domestic production. Japan is also purchasing Airborne Warning

and Control System (AWACS) aircraft from the United States. Thus,

Japan possesses or is developing advanced conventional naval and

air capabilities based on weaponry and technology far superior to

that which China possesses or can look forward to developing

during the next decade.15

Finally, China is concerned by Japan's determination to

develop a sophisticated nuclear weapons program. Japan's interest

in plutonium-based nuclear reactors and its advanced-technology

civilian rocket program indicate Japanese possession of advanced

strategic nuclear capability. One Chinese report noted Japanese

stockpiling of plutonium and its acquisition of uranium

enrichment, commenting that the only use of such minerals and

technology is in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. It also

observed that the capability of Tokyo's nuclear delivery systems

rank Japan third, behind only the United States and Russia.16

Tokyo has also been developing the technology to construct

advanced nonstrategic missile systems with various ranges and

deployments. "Spin-ons" of Japanese civilian technology to

military uses is an important source of potential Japanese
5

strategic power.17

This combination of Japanese economic resources and

strategic potential creates heightened Chinese concern for

Japan's future regional role. In many respects, Japan has the

ability to "turn on a dime." Moreover, unlike policymakers in the

United States and other western countries, Chinese leaders give

reduced weight to Japan's current reluctance to expand its

military role in world affairs. While acknowledging that domestic

opinion in Japan continues to restrain Tokyo's foreign policy

options, Chinese leaders have a longer historical perspective on

the role of domestic politics and culture on Japanese foreign

policy. Japan's occupation of China during the 1930s and 1940s

teaches that Japanese potential for domestic "militarism" can be

as influential as "pacifism" and that such "militarism" can lead

to regional instability with serious implications for Chinese

security.

Thus, as Chinese leaders look toward the 21st century, they

must be concerned about Japanese intentions. Indeed, not too long

ago most of the research analysts in China's Central Military

Commission reportedly concluded that Japan will become a major

military power and, in the context of continued Soviet weakness,

that it will target its strategy and capabilities against China,

"challenging China politically and militarily."18 It is thus

incumbent on Chinese leaders to develop a foreign policy toward

Japan that consolidates the foundation of Sino-Japanese

cooperation and that maximizes Tokyo's incentive to deemphasize

the military instruments of diplomacy.

Consolidating Cooperation.

In many respects, China can draw considerable confidence

from the current status of Sino-Japanese relations. For an

historically troubled relationship and one that has considerable

potential for heightened tension and conflict, the two sides have

developed foreign policies and a bilateral relationship that

suggests a long-term ability to manage and constrain the

inevitable competition that will develop between two great powers

in close proximity that are simultaneously developing expanded

economic, political and military roles in East Asia--their common

strategic backyard.

A crucial component of contemporary Sino-Japanese relations

that helps reassure Chinese leaders of the prospects for longterm stability and contributes to Chinese ability to prepare for

instability is bilateral economic cooperation. Sino-Japanese

economic relations can provide the capital and technology

required to modernize China's economy and defense capabilities.

Equally important, over the long term it can provide powerful
6

economic and social incentives for leaders in both countries to

maintain cooperation and to find peaceful solutions to bilateral

conflicts. To the extent that interest groups develop in Japan

that benefit from Japanese participation in Chinese economic

development, they can encourage politicians to consider

compromise solutions to conflicts of interests. This dynamic is

apparent in U.S.-China relations, in which U.S. business

interests have been instrumental in the annual efforts by the

White House to maintain China's Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading

status. Economic cooperation can create a foundation for

cooperative relations which can exist amid developing political

conflict.

Recent trends in Sino-Japanese economic relations are

encouraging. Japan is China's largest trading partner. In 1995,

total merchandise trade increased to nearly U.S. $58 billion, a

nearly 25 percent increase over 1994; China's imports from Japan

grew by over 17 percent to nearly U.S. $22 billion. Chinese

exports to Japan play an important role in Beijing's efforts to

accumulate hard currency. Exports grew by 30 percent to nearly

U.S. $36 billion, yielding China a U.S.$14 billion trade surplus

with Japan.19 Although this trade surplus may create friction

with Japan, it is a manageable amount, especially insofar as

Japan continues to run an overall trade surplus.

China is also an important export market for Japanese

manufactured goods. In 1994, China was Japan's fifth largest

export market, significantly contributing to Japanese employment

and stable economic growth.20 In the future, the Chinese consumer

market should become increasingly important for Japan, as Chinese

economic development spreads beyond coastal cities and major

industrial centers, stimulating increased Chinese demand for

high-end imported consumer goods.

Especially important for the economic and political

relationship is the trend for Japanese investment in China.

Through the 1980s and early 1990s, Japanese investors showed

little interest in China. Through 1989, Japan had provided only 8

percent of the direct foreign investment in China and only 1

percent of Japan's total direct foreign investment and 6 percent

of its direct foreign investment in Asia.21 The dearth of

investment aroused suspicions in China over Japanese attitudes

toward China, particularly insofar as the minimal investment led

to little technology transfer.

This trend began a fundamental turnaround in 1992. Between

March 1992 and March 1993, new Japanese investment in China

increased by 87 percent over the previous year and three times

that of 1989-1990, while total Japanese overseas investment

dropped by 18 percent. By 1993, Japan had become the fourth

largest investor in China, surpassing Germany.22 Sino-Japanese
7

investment relations took another positive turn in 1995. In the

first 6 months of 1995, actual Japanese capital input into China

increased nearly 48 percent over the same period in 1994. More

importantly, in 1995 large Japanese firms, including Matsushita,

NEC and Toyota, began investing in large-scale Chinese

manufacturing projects involving high-technology industries.23

Japanese capital is now beginning to make a significant

contribution to Chinese economic development. Moreover, this

trend has important implications for the Sino-Japanese political

relationship, creating a significant Japanese economic interest

in stable political relations.

Finally, Japan's important loan program to China also

contributes to Chinese economic development. Between 1979 and

1995, Japan's three yen loan packages for China amounted to

approximately 1.6 trillion yen. The annual interest rate for the

loans has been a mere 2.3 percent and China has 30 years to repay

the loans, with an additional 10 years of "deferment." In

preliminary negotiations for the fourth loan package covering

1996-1998, Tokyo agreed to loan Beijing an additional 580 billion

yen to help in the construction of 40 projects, including such

important infrastructure projects as airports and water supply

systems.24 In the aftermath of the February 1996 earthquake in

Yunnan province, Japan also offered China U.S.$300,000 in

emergency aid.25

Complementing the positive developments in trade relations

have been constructive developments in political relations. In

the aftermath of the June 1989 Tiananmen incident, Japan was the

advanced industrial country least inclined to allow ideological

considerations to interfere with bilateral ties. There was never

any question that Japan would continue to grant yen loans to

China and that trade relations would continue uninterrupted.

Since then, bilateral summitry has been a common development in

relations, including frequent trips back and forth by each

country's prime minister and a historic visit to Beijing by the

Japanese emperor. The dialogue in these meetings has been free of

the friction that so often characterizes meetings between U.S.

and Chinese diplomats, despite the existence of various SinoJapanese conflicts of interest.

The absence of ideological conflict has allowed Japan to

engage Chinese leaders in a regular security dialogue. Since the

two sides agreed to hold the security meetings in 1993, they have

held three such meetings, the most recent in January 1996. Prior

to the 1996 meeting, separate meetings had been held between

foreign ministry and defense department officials. In 1996, Tokyo

and Beijing held a joint session of diplomatic and defense

officials, including Chinese General Xiong Guankai. Annual, lowprofile meetings such as these offer regular opportunities for

each side to express concerns about the other's defense and
8

foreign policies, including trends in their respective defense

budgets.26 Bilateral dialogues can also be conducive to dealing

with specific issues. After tensions developed in January 1996,

in early March the Japanese and Chinese foreign ministers agreed

to open bilateral talks over economic development of the waters

surrounding the disputed Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands.27

New Directions in Sino-Japanese Relations.

The cooperative trends in Sino-Japanese relations have been

developing since the early stages of the post-Mao period, when

extensive economic, societal, and diplomatic contacts became

possible. Recent trends in Japanese security policy and in

Japan's China policy have begun to elicit growing concern in the

Chinese leadership. Chinese leaders must contend with what they

perceive to be the emergence of a potential countervailing trend

in Japanese foreign policy.

One aspect of this trend concerns U.S.-Japan security

cooperation. Chinese leaders clearly understand that U.S.-Japan

security cooperation plays an important role in restraining

Japanese military development. But should they conclude that the

post-Cold War U.S.-Japan relationship is moving from maintaining

the option for Tokyo and Washington of enhanced future

cooperation against an unidentified threat toward contemporary

strategic cooperation against China, Beijing would view U.S.-

Japan security cooperation with considerable alarm.

Beginning in early March 1995, following the release of the

1995 U.S. Defense Department report on the East Asia Strategic

Initiative, China began to express doubts about the direction of

the U.S.-Japan relationship. Among the various aspects of the

Pentagon report that aroused concern in Beijing was U.S. interest

in strengthening U.S.-Japan strategic cooperation and American

interest in bolstering specific Japanese defense capabilities.

Beijing expressed concern that in the post-Cold War era, now that

the Soviet threat had ended, America sought expanded strategic

cooperation with Japan. China wondered whether this new direction

in U.S.-Japan relations was in response to the "China threat" and

if it was aimed at "containing" China.28 Then, in February 1996,

in preparation for President William Clinton's April visit to

Tokyo, White House officials reportedly sought to include, in a

joint U.S.-Japan statement on security, a reference to Chinese

military modernization.30

This trend culminated in April 1996, when President Clinton

traveled to Tokyo for a U.S.-Japan summit, signed the U.S.-Japan

Joint Declaration on Security, and reached agreement on

Principles for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. The agreements

called for greater Japanese military responsibility in the
9

alliance, including (for the first time) responsibility in joint

defense operations throughout Asia, suggesting to Chinese leaders

that the alliance could promote rather than inhibit the Japanese

defense build-up and be used against China. Chinese media argued

that the agreement was a "dangerous signal" that Japan has been

"brought into U.S. global strategy" and that the agreement will

"strengthen coordination with the actions of U.S. troops" in

Asia.30 It "gives the feeling" that the two countries "work handin-hand to dominate the Asia-Pacific region."31 The Chinese media

also argued that the expansion of Japanese military activities

"is bound to evoke the vigilance . . . against Japan's advance

toward becoming a military power," and that in the long run,

there is no doubt that the aim is to keep a close watch on

China.32

Coinciding with the initiative in U.S. policy toward Japan

has been a corresponding Japanese interest in bolstering its

relationship with the United States in response to the

development in Chinese power. Although concern for the Chinese

military is not as great in Japan as in the United States,

Chinese economic and defense modernization has elicited increased

Japanese attention. Chinese military maneuvers during the 1996

Taiwan Straits crisis elicited increased Japanese attention to

Chinese capabilities and led many Japanese to question the wisdom

of reducing the U.S. military presence on Japan.33 Coinciding with

these developments is the prospect for U.S.-Japan strategic

cooperation against Chinese security interests. In February 1996,

Tokyo and Washington agreed to conduct a study on theater missile

defense (TMD). Japanese sources also report that the United

States, to heighten Japanese security concerns and encourage

Japanese interest in cooperation with Washington on TMD, has

shared with Tokyo strategic intelligence on China's nuclear

capability.34 The Chinese have argued that an East Asian TMD would

be "clearly aimed at China." Should it be deployed, its primary

effect will be to "render ineffective" China's limited secondstrike nuclear capability, significantly enhancing Chinese

vulnerability to U.S. military power and to potential Japanese

nuclear capability. Chinese concern for the strategic

consequences of TMD in East Asia have led Beijing to issue a

warning that it would reconsider its commitment to participating

in a comprehensive test-ban treaty should such a system be

deployed.35

China still sees considerable positive elements in U.S.-

Japan cooperation. It is not opposed to the U.S.-Japan alliance

or to the U.S. military presence in Japan. It has not concluded

that the alliance is a net detriment to China's interests. On the

contrary, Beijing still considers U.S. security ties with Japan a

contribution to both Chinese security and regional stability, if

only because the alternative--an independent Japan providing for

its own defense--remains a far more daunting prospect. There is
10

now simply greater Chinese ambivalence toward U.S.-Japan

relations and uncertainty concerning the outcome of the new trend

in security ties.

The second disconcerting element in Japanese foreign policy

is the new trend in Japan's China policy and the politics of

policy making in Japan. Similar to the new dynamic in U.S. policy

making, the demise of the Soviet Union reduced Tokyo's concern

for Sino-Japanese strategic cooperation and opened the domestic

debate in Japan over China policy. But perhaps even more

important was the end of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)

domination of Japanese politics in early 1994. Chinese leaders

were not pleased with the emergence of true two-party politics in

Japan. Needless to say, Chinese communists are simply more

comfortable dealing with one-party governments. But more

important, Beijing was apprehensive over the impact of enhanced

electoral competition on Japanese foreign policy. China expressed

concern that Japanese politicians would have to appeal to mass

sentiment to win votes and that domestic politics would play a

increasingly significant role in Japanese policy making.36

Since that time, Tokyo's China policy has elicited increased

public debate, constraining the flexibility of Japanese

policymakers. Of greatest concern to China is the development in

Japan of a "Taiwan lobby." In mid 1995, after President Lee Tenghui visited Cornell University in the United States, the Japanese

government came under domestic pressure to allow the Taiwanese

leader to visit Japan. Japanese opposition politicians pressed

for the government to grant Lee a visa to visit Kyoto University,

his undergraduate institution, or to invite him or Taiwan Vice

Premier Hsu Lee-teh to attend the November 1995 Asia-Pacific

Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Osaka. China warned that

any such visits would place the relationship "in the greatest

danger" and Chinese President Jiang Zemin promised to boycott the

APEC meeting should either Taiwanese leader attend.37 Ultimately,

Japan succumbed to Chinese pressure and Taiwan was represented

in Osaka by Ku Chen-fu, head of Taiwan's Straits Exchange

Foundation.

Nonetheless, the trend in Japanese politics was clear.

Throughout 1995, politicians from various political parties in

Japan were calling for enhanced Japanese-Taiwanese diplomatic

contacts. In response, Beijing criticized "pro-Taiwan forces" and

warned the Japanese government to oppose any pro-Taiwan

activities in Japan. When it seemed that a Japanese cabinet

member might participate in a pro-Taiwan demonstration, Beijing

made "solemn representations" with the Japanese Foreign

Ministry.38

Then, during the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis, hard-line

members of the Liberal Democratic Party, reacting to China's
11

military maneuvers, demanded that the Japanese government freeze

its yen loans to China. The Japanese Foreign Ministry has been

accused of being "weak-kneed" toward China, but in response to

the political pressure, the government was compelled to postpone

its talks with Beijing over the third round of Japanese yen

loans. Japanese Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda advised Chinese

Foreign Minister Qian Qichen that in reaction to Chinese nuclear

testing and its Taiwan policy, voices in Japan had called for a

review of loan program. 39 When asked about the prospect that

Japan might freeze the loans, China's foreign ministry spokesman

responded that China "would like to send a very clear and

unmistakable message to the Japanese side, which is that the

issue of Taiwan is purely an internal matter of China which

brooks no foreign intervention or interference of any kind."40

Nevertheless, the "Taiwan issue" is now embedded in Japanese

politics, adding an important element of uncertainty to SinoJapanese relations.

Japanese domestic politics have affected other aspects of

Japan's China policy. Japan's response to Beijing's nuclear

testing program has elicited Chinese concern. Faced with domestic

opposition to Japanese acquiescence to Chinese testing, in

September 1995 the Japanese government froze its grant aid to

China. Although the amount of the aid was relatively nominal and

China issued a low-key reaction, Chinese commentary pointed to

domestic forces in Japan that opposed Chinese modernization and

Sino-Japanese cooperation and expressed concern for the prospects

for the relationship.41

The recent tension between Japan and South Korea and Japan

and China over disputed islands may also reflect the influence of

Japanese domestic politics. In conjunction with its ratification

of the Law of the Sea, the Japanese government is under pressure

to formally establish a 200-mile economic zone around all

Japanese territory. The prospect of such legislation has led to

demonstrations throughout South Korea and tension in South

Korean-Japanese relations. Beijing's apparent response to

Japanese intentions was to send vessels to carry out short-term

trial oil drills in the vicinity of the Diaoyutai Islands. In so

doing, Beijing likely meant to reassert its claims to the 

islands while, more quietly than South Korea, warning Japan to

avoid placing the dispute high on the bilateral agenda.42 Japan's

changing domestic environment will continue to contribute to

Chinese apprehension and uncertainty over the Japanese foreign

policy. Although Chinese leaders believe that Japanese

policymakers and leading politicians continue to place importance

on Sino-Japanese relations and wish to maintain cooperation with

China, they also understand that Japanese domestic political

instability is a potential source of policy change, insofar as

Japanese policymakers could allow political considerations to

determine policy. The Taiwan issue, economic relations and other
12

bilateral issues could become hostage to Japanese partisan

politics.43

The combination of Japan's changing strategic relationship

with the United States and the politicization of China policy in

Japanese domestic politics creates an important element of

uncertainty in China concerning the future of Japanese foreign

policy, its implications for Chinese security, and for the course

of Sino-Japanese relations. How Chinese foreign policy responds

to these new challenges to Sino-Japanese relations will be

critical in determining the course of the relationship and the

politics of East Asia.

Managing a Changing Relationship.

China's impact on Japan's China policy falls into three

categories. The first is Beijing's strategic response to Japanese

capabilities and the trend in the bilateral balance of power. The

second is Beijing's response to immediate issues in the bilateral

relationship and to emerging trends in Japan's China policy. The

third category comprises those Chinese policies not necessarily

aimed at Japan but which impact Japan's China policy, including

policy toward third parties. In each case, the implications of

Chinese policy for bilateral relations and Chinese policy

alternatives need to be addressed.

China's most fundamental and long-term policy response to

the Japanese challenge is economic modernization and,

specifically, defense modernization. Beijing cannot but look at

Japan's technological and military superiority over China and the

prospect that the gap might actually widen before it begins to

narrow without considerable apprehension. From this perspective,

Chinese leaders express their true intention when they insist

that China needs a peaceful international environment in which to

modernize its economy and develop the foundation of comprehensive

national strength.44 The longer China can focus its scarce

domestic resources on economic modernization, the more secure it

will be if and when heightened tension returns to East Asian

politics.

But, while laying the economic foundation for national

security, Chinese leaders have also decided that they must begin

the process of military modernization. To wait to acquire modern

weaponry and reduce China's strategic vulnerability until the

security situation requires it would ensure Chinese strategic

inferiority when the weaponry is needed most. This is as true

for nuclear weaponry as it is for conventional weaponry, insofar

as the long-term survival of China's second-strike capability is

in doubt. Ding Henggao made this point when explaining why China

needs to modernize its defense capability:
13

The grim reality is that in a world characterized by

turbulent international politics and fierce competition

in military high-tech, a nation that fails to work hard

to raise its level of defense S&T and upgrade its

defense capability . . . would find itself in a

vulnerable position once war breaks out, with

devastating effects on its national interests, national

dignity, and international prestige.45

What most concerned Ding was the long way that China's defense

capabilities had to go to meet world standards:

China's defense S&T has come a long way but still

trails the best in the world. To master modern

technology, especially to meet the demands of high-tech

war, we must overcome many hurdles, including the

shortage of funds, technology, and qualified personnel

. . . . the situation . . . compels us to work hard for

several years to bring our defense S&T and weaponry to

a level to meet the needs of future high-tech war.46

This strategic imperative drives China's increasing defense

budget, purchases of foreign weaponry (including advanced Russian

aircraft and naval vessels), and nuclear testing. Japan, as much

as any other country, could become China's strategic rival,

posing a daunting defense agenda for China's People's Liberation

Army (PLA). But China's strategic response to vulnerability also

contributes to Sino-Japanese friction, insofar as it elicits

Japanese fears of a "China threat," and the prospect of

transformed Japanese intentions, leading Japan to adopt those

very policies that China is trying to prevent. Embedded in

China's response to the imbalance in the Sino-Japanese

relationship is the potential for a self-fulfilling prophesy.

It is not clear how China's defense policy can ameliorate

this dilemma. China's 1996 budget calls for a modest (when

adjusted for the inflation rate) 10 percent increase in defense

spending.47 Nevertheless, as long as China's absolute defense

budget continues to increase by double-digit figures and the PLA

seeks foreign weaponry to correct its strategic vulnerability,

China's defense modernization efforts will attract attention in

Japan. This puts the burden of maintaining stable Sino-Japanese

relations and Japanese confidence in Chinese intentions on

Chinese diplomacy. It also requires that Chinese leaders manage

Sino-Japanese conflicts of interest with sufficient subtlety both

to protect Chinese interests and not elicit Japanese

apprehension.

China's response to the recent developments in Japanese

foreign policy and China policy has been to place increased
14

pressure on Japan to reconsider its policy priorities. Much of

this pressure is reflected in greater Chinese media attention to

the potential for renewed "militarism" in Japan and to worrisome

developments in Japanese foreign policy. In the aftermath of the

Chinese government crackdown of the Beijing democracy movement on

June 4, 1989, Chinese scholars and journalists were instructed

not to write negative reports about Japan.48 In 1995, that

restriction was lifted and the Chinese media began an active

campaign against a wide range of Japanese behavior. Most

prominent was Chinese media coverage of the 50th anniversary of

the end of World War II, which relentlessly attacked the

atrocities of the Japanese occupation of China and ominously

warned of the potential for revived militarism in contemporary

Japan. But perhaps more important was Chinese coverage of

Japanese military capabilities. Until 1995, with the exception of

commentary on the size of the defense budget, there was a clear

restriction against any coverage of Japanese defense policy. In

1995, for the first time, Chinese analysts discussed Japan's

military capabilities and its advanced weaponry, including its

nuclear program. In so doing, China was not only signaling Japan

its concern for trends in Japanese defense policy, but also the

risk of heightened Sino-Japanese tension resulting from "China

threat" charges and corresponding changes in Japanese defense

policy. One Chinese report observed trends in Japanese defense

policy and warned that the "situation in Japan is somewhat

similar to that in pre-war Japan. What road will Japan take?--

this question definitely cannot be ignored."49

Chinese use of the media is a convenient and low-profile

approach to general trends in Japanese foreign policy. More

difficult for Chinese diplomats to manage are specific Japanese

policy initiatives. One such issue is the territorial dispute in

Sino-Japanese relations. The Diaoyutai/Senkaku dispute has

existed since 1949, yet both countries have preferred to keep the

issue off the bilateral agenda. Ideally, China would ignore form

and focus on substance regarding the dispute, or simply respond

with similar legislation, which it will likely do in 1996. Yet

sensitivity to sovereignty issues seems to combine with

succession politics to compel a more active Chinese response.

Thus, Beijing dispatched a drilling vessel to the disputed

waters. Using its media, it also quietly sided with South Korea

in its conflict with Japan over the disputed island of

Tokto/Take, thus urging caution on Japanese handling of the SinoJapanese dispute.50 Nonetheless, these were low-key responses.

They did not involve either military vessels or public

recriminations requiring a Japanese response. Moreover, because

Japan has minimal interest in developing the waters around the

disputed islands, this should remain a manageable issue.51

Another issue requiring a Chinese response is Japan's

increasing desire to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security
15

Council. It is clear that China is opposed to Japanese permanent

membership on the committee. China clearly prefers the current

situation, in which it has the advantage over Japan regarding

Security Council deliberations over regional issues. Moreover,

Beijing cannot look forward to the prospect of U.S.-Japan

cooperation in the Security Council. Thus, China frequently

asserts that it is not yet appropriate to consider Japanese

permanent membership on the Security Council. One discussion of

Security Council reform went so far as to assert that "it is

absolutely impermissible to grant the veto to newly admitted

permanent members."52

Beijing should be able to manage this issue, as well. China

has not drawn any lines in the sand and there remains a wideranging and inconclusive debate on UN reform, suggesting that the

issue may linger for awhile and that Beijing will not have to

take the lead in resisting far-reaching reform. Equally

important, should an international consensus emerge that Japan

should have permanent member status with the veto, Beijing would

most likely not stand in the way. Similarly, China appears to

have acquiesced to growing Japanese participation in UN

peacekeeping activities, despite the implications for Japanese

receptivity to the use of military instruments in diplomacy.53

Chinese leaders seem intent on preventing bilateral issues

from disrupting Sino-Japanese cooperation. Although China

continues to modernize the PLA, refuses to move off long-held

positions (such as sovereignty over disputed territories and

Japanese membership on the UN Security Council), and warns of the

consequences of revived Japanese "militarism," it has maintained

a low profile on Sino-Japanese disputes. There is evidence that

China understands the risks entailed in an overly contentious

Japan policy. But what is less clear is whether China can manage

the consequences for Sino-Japanese relations of third party

issues and nonforeign policy issues.

The factors affecting Japan's China policy are not limited

to Chinese policy toward Japan and Chinese defense policy.

China's mere size and proximity to Japan ensures that various

aspects of Chinese politics and foreign policy will be

contentious issues in Japanese politics and that Japanese

policymaking will reflect the political considerations of

Japanese leaders contending for power in an uncertain electoral

environment. Moreover, many of these issues are not readily

amenable to Chinese diplomatic management.

China's human rights policies could destabilize SinoJapanese relations. Renewed violent repression of dissent in

China in the post-Deng period or even simply excessive

authoritarian policies in Hong Kong after 1997 would likely

elicit far greater public outcry and political and policy
16

repercussions in Japan than did the June 4th tragedy. The

Japanese public is increasingly disinclined to be tolerant of

Chinese human rights violations, and Japanese politicians are

increasingly disinclined to ignore voter sentiment in

policymaking.

Chinese conflict with third parties will also affect 

Japanese attitudes toward China. Taiwan's foreign policy and U.S.

policy toward Taiwan, themselves susceptible to recurring

domestic instability in all three parties, may well determine the

trend in cross-Straits relations, eliciting additional mainlandTaiwan crises which could undermine support in Japan for

cooperative relations with China and for restraint in Japanese

defense policy. Insofar as Taiwan is the mainland's most

important foreign policy issue, it will be difficult for Chinese

leaders to moderate policy toward Taiwan to maintain cooperative

relations with Japan. Should U.S.-China relations deteriorate due

to heightened conflict over any of the numerous conflicts of

interest in U.S.-China relations, Japan will come under increased

pressure to cooperate with U.S. policy and to contribute to

American efforts to "contain" China. Yet, U.S.-China relations

are equally unpredictable and potentially unmanageable,

influenced as much by American domestic politics, third party

issues, and U.S. policy on a wide range of bilateral conflicts of

interests as by Chinese behavior. Equally troublesome for SinoJapanese relations could be conflict between China and the other

claimants to the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.

Insofar as heightened conflict would suggest Chinese expansionism

along the shipping lanes to Persian Gulf oil, support would

likely grow in Japan for greater strategic cooperation with the

United States.

On the other hand, enhanced cooperation between China and

third parties, which China does have considerable ability to

control, could also influence Sino-Japanese relations. Of

particular importance is Sino-Russian relations. The combination

of potential Sino-Japanese conflict with ongoing Japanese-Russian

rancor over the Northern Territories and lack of economic

cooperation prepares Japan to see "collusion" in Sino-Russian

relations. In this respect, Beijing must be sensitive to the

effect of growing cooperation between China and Russia, including

Russian arms sales to China and close ties between the civilian

and military leaderships, on Japanese policymaking. Although less

strategically prominent and of less immediate importance, SinoSouth Korean cooperation has a similar potential to arouse

anxiety in Japan. China and South Korea share distrust of

Japanese "militarism" and for the trend in Japanese defense

procurement policies. Beijing's decision to side subtlely with

Seoul in its territorial dispute with Tokyo suggests that Beijing

is aware of Japanese concern and that it is willing to insinuate

greater Chinese-South Korean cooperation to pressure Japan to
17

consider Chinese interests. Yet, incautious Chinese cooperation

with South Korea could spur Japan to adopt strategic measures

detrimental to Chinese security and Sino-Japanese cooperation.

China can draw comfort from its cooperative political

relationships with Russia and South Korea, but it must manage

these relationships so as not to harm its equally important

interest in Sino-Japanese cooperation.

The danger in all of these potential developments is that 

Chinese policy on domestic or third party issues could elicit the

very Japanese foreign policy that Beijing's bilateral Japan

policy attempts to forestall. Yet, policymaking on all of these

issues has its own domestic and bilateral dynamic. It requires

policymaking sophistication and domestic political confidence to

consider the multitude of cross-cutting interests involved in

"grand strategy" when making policy on such intrinsically

important and politically sensitive issues as Taiwan, Hong Kong,

human rights, Spratly Islands, U.S.-China relations and SinoRussian relations. Moreover, many of these issues, such as the

Taiwan issue and repressing domestic dissent, entail interests

which Chinese leaders consider more important than stable

bilateral relations with Japan and which entail a mixture of

sovereignty and succession politics, thus reducing Beijing's

incentive to consider the implications for Sino-Japanese

relations of policy toward these interests. But whether Beijing

is simply reacting or taking the initiative, its policy on any of

these issues could derail Sino-Japanese cooperation.

Conclusion.

Chinese management of its Japan policy is not only crucial

to vital Chinese interests but also to regional stability. Japan

has the potential both to contribute to Chinese economic

modernization and security and to develop and use regionwide

military, political and economic instruments to retard Chinese

economic development and to undermine Chinese security.

Heightened Sino-Japanese cooperation can underpin regional

stability and economic cooperation, but heightened conflict has

the potential to polarize all of East Asia into competing blocs,

undermining the region's ability to continue its successful

pursuit of economic growth and the development of regional

stability with multilateral institutions of cooperation. Much is

riding on Chinese policy and the course of Sino-Japanese

relations.

To protect Chinese security and maintain Sino-Japanese

cooperation, Beijing must weave together a wide range of

potentially contradictory policies. Its defense policy is a

necessary hedge against the possibility of deteriorated relations

with a superior economic, technological and even military power.
18

But China's defense budget and its acquisition of advanced

foreign weaponry has the potential to elicit Japanese policy

detrimental to Chinese interests. The burden rests on Beijing's

bilateral Japan policy to have a countervailing impact on

bilateral relations. But, Sino-Japanese relations have become

increasingly complex. The end of the Cold War and the decline of

LDP dominance in Japanese domestic politics have undermined

Tokyo's ability to take the long view of Sino-Japanese relations

and to continue to shelve what had been secondary conflicts of

interest. The resulting new points of friction, as well as

enhanced U.S.-Japan strategic cooperation, have complicated

bilateral relations and added an element of doubt to Chinese

confidence in Sino-Japanese cooperation.

Complications in Sino-Japanese relations have elicited a 

more outspoken Chinese policy toward Japan. The Chinese media are

once again covering trends considered counterproductive to

Beijing, including alleged revival of militarism and Japanese

defense spending. They have been critical of elements of Japanese

policy toward China, including Tokyo's relationship with Taiwan,

its handling of the yen loan program, and its policy on disputed

territories. Nonetheless, Beijing continues to evaluate favorably

the trend in Japanese foreign policy and its Japan policy

reflects this. It has maintained a low-key approach to conflicts

of interest, trying to caution Japan from adopting contentious

policies, while trying to maintain cooperative relations. Its

bilateral Japan policy reflects the cross-cutting pressures that

Japan poses to Chinese interests.

If Sino-Japanese relations existed in a vacuum, relations

would be relatively easy to manage. But there exists a wide range

of external factors (ranging from Chinese treatment of dissidents

and the Taiwan issue to U.S.-China and Sino-Russian relations)

that could affect Japanese policymaking and redirect the

relationship, despite Chinese intentions to maintain stable

relations. China's control over the course of these issues is, at

times, minimal. At other times, leadership incentive and/or

ability to incorporate China's interest in stable Sino-Japanese

relations into policymaking is minimal. And affecting the entire

spectrum of issues is the fact that Japan is a democracy and

Chinese leaders are celebrated for their inability to consider

the implications of their own behavior for the politics of China

policy in democracies.

Sino-Japanese relations do not exist in a vacuum. Chinese

leaders will have to exercise considerable tolerance, patience,

and sophistication to maintain cooperative relations with Japan

in increasingly complex circumstances. Thus far, they have shown

the ability to develop a Japan policy which responds to the

numerous challenges to Chinese interests. Nonetheless, given the

fact that the challenges will likely grow and relations with
19

Japan will likely become more complex, China's Japan policy and

Sino-Japanese relations must be considered one more factor

contributing to the uncertainty of Asia after the Cold War.

ENDNOTES

1. Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service, March 18, 1996, in

Daily Report, China, Foreign Broadcasting Information Service

(henceforth FBIS-CHI)-96-053, March 19, 1996, p. 33.

2. Tang Tianri, "Nations Gear Up for the Next Century,"

Beijing, Banyue Tan, January 10, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-027,

February 8, 1996, p. 4.

3. FBIS-CHI-96-053, p. 33.

4. Xue Mouhong, "The New World Order: Four Powers and One

Superpower," Beijing Review, No. 39, September 25-October 1,

1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-188, September 28, 1995, p. 10.

 5. Chen Xi, "Peace and Development: Sign of the Times,"

Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service, December 28, 1995, in FBIS-CHI96-001, January 2, 1996, p. 1.

6. Yan Xuetong, "Forecasting International Politics at the

Beginning of the Next Century," Beijing, Xiandai Guoji Guanxi

Yanjiu, No. 6, June 20, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-182, September 20,

1995, p. 3.

7. Qian Qichen, "Unswervingly Follow the Independent Foreign

Policy of Peace," Beijing, Qiushi, No. 12, June 16, 1995, in

FBIS-CHI- 95-129, July 6, 1995, p. 2.

8. Chen Peiyao's article, "The New Asia-Pacific Triangle of

Dependence, Constraint, Cooperation, and Competition," is

discussed in: Shanghai, Guoji Zhanwang, October 23, 1995, in

FBIS-CHI-95-241, December 15, 1995, p. 1.

9. Tao Zhipeng, "A Year of Advance Toward Multipolarity,"

Beijing, Banyue Tan, No. 24, December 25, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-96-

027, February 8, 1996, p. 3.

10. Ding Henggao, "New Defense S&T Strategy to Emphasize

Technology Transfer to Civilian Use," Beijing, Zhongguo Junshi

Kexue, No. 3, August 20, 1995 in FBIS-CHI-95-235, December 7,

1995, p. 36. See also Liu Huaqing's comments in Beijing, Jiefang

Ribao, December 23, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-96-008, January 11, 1996,

pp. 35-36.

11. Ding Henggao, FBIS-CHI-95-235, p. 35.
20

12. Da Jun, "Where Will Japan Go?", Beijing, Xinhua Domestic

Service, December 7, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-235, December 7, 1995,

pp. 4-5.

13. For a comprehensive discussion of Japan's military

capability, see Norman D. Levin, Mark Lorel, and Arthur

Alexander, The Wary Warriors: Future Directions in Japanese

Security Policies, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1993; Michael W.

Chinworth, Inside Japan's Defense: Technology, Economics, and

Strategy, Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1992.

14. For a Chinese description of the Japanese naval

capabilities, see Da Jun, "Where Will Japan Go?"

15. For discussion of the development of Japanese defense

policy, see Richard Samuels, Rich Nation/Strong Army: National

Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan, Ithaca,

NY: Cornell University Press, 1994; Michael J. Green, Arming

Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar

Search for Autonomy, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.

16. Liao Xinan and Sang Zhonglin, "A Potential Nuclear

Power: Japan," Beijing, Bingqi Zhishi, No. 6, November 15, 1995,

in FBIS-CHI-96-024, February 5, 1996, pp. 4-6. For a discussion

of ongoing Japanese plans to stockpile plutonium, see Far Eastern

Economic Review (henceforth FEER), Vol. 157, No. 9, March 3,

1994, p. 13.

17. Steven Vogel, "The Power Behind ‘Spin-Ons': The Military

Implications of Japan's Commercial Technology," in Wayne

Sandholtz, et. al., The Highest Stakes: The Economic Foundations

of the Next Security System, New York: Oxford University Press,

1992, pp. 55-80.

18. Hong Kong, Cheng Ming, No. 195, January 1, 1994, in

FBIS-CHI-94-016, January 25, 1994, pp. 4-5.

19. These statistics are based on Japanese figures. Tokyo,

Kyodo, January 26, 1996, in Daily Report, East Asia, Foreign

Broadcast Information Service (henceforth FBIS-EAS)-96-017,

January 25, 1996, pp. 10-11. For Chinese figures, see Beijing,

Xinhua Domestic Service, February 17, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-034,

February 20, 1996, p. 1; FEER, Vol. 159, No. 11, March 14, 1996,

p. 63.

20. Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1995, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1995.

21. Shuichi Ono, Sino-Japanese Economic Relationships:

Trade, Direct Investment, and Future Strategy, World Bank

Discussion Papers, No. 146, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1992,
21

p. 17.

22. FEER, Vol. 156, No. 36, September 9, 1993, pp. 46-47;

Beijing, China Daily (Business Weekly), July 11-17, 1993, in

FBIS-CHI-93-131, July 12, 1993, pp. 19-20.

23. Beijing, Zhongguo Xinwen She, January 18, 1996, in FBISCHI-96-013, January 19, 1996, p. 32.

24. Tokyo, Sankei Shimbun, March 14, 1996, in FBIS-EAS-96-

052, March 15, 1996, p. 7.

25. Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service, February 7, 1996, in

FBIS- CHI-96-028, February 9, 1996, p. 6.

26. Tokyo, Yomiuri Shimbun, December 30, 1995, in FBIS-EAS96-001, January 2, 1996, p. 9; Tokyo, Asahi Shimbun, January 16,

1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-013, January 19, 1996, p. 5; Tokyo, Yomiuri

Shimbun, January 17, 1996, in FBIS-EAS-95-015, January 23, 1996,

p. 7.

27. Tokyo, Kyodo, March 2, 1996, in FBIS-EAS-96-043, March

4, 1996, p. 43.

28. Chinese government analysts, interviews by author,

Beijing, 1995.

29. Tokyo, Mainichi Shimbun, February 14, 1996, in FBIS-EAS96-032, February 15, 1996, pp. 1-2.

30. Chen Zhijiang, "Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on

Security--A Dangerous Signal," Beijing, Guangming Ribao, April

18, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-079, April 23, 1996, p. 2.

31. Zhang Guocheng, "Japan's Constitution Is Facing a Test,"

Beijing, Renmin Ribao, April 23, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-083, April

29, 1996, p. 4.

32. Yu Ming-shan, "Transforming into a World Security

System," Hong Kong, Wen Wei Po, April 18, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-

076, April 18, 1996, p. 5.

33. Tokyo, Yomiuri Shimbun, March 14, 1992, in FBIS-EAS-96-

052, March 15, 1996, pp. 3-4; Tokyo, Asahi Shimbun, January 19,

1996, in FBIS-EAS-96-016, January 24, 1996, p. 13.

34. Tokyo, Kyodo, February 23, 1996, in FBIS-EAS-96-037,

February 23, 1996, p. 5; Naha, Ryukyu Shimpo, March 10, 1996, in

FBIS-EAS-96-048, March 11, 1996, pp. 3-4.

35. Liu Huaqing, "Evaluation and Analysis of China's Nuclear
22

Arms Control Policy," Beijing, Xiandai Junshi, November 11, 1995,

in FBIS-CHI-95-246, December 22, 1995, pp. 6-11.

36. Chinese government foreign policy analysts, interviews

by author, Beijing, 1994.

37. Tokyo, Kyodo, June 23, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-122, June

26, 1995, p. 1; Tokyo, Kyodo, June 24, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-123,

June 27, 1995, p. 13.

38. Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service, September 21, 1995, in

FBIS-CHI-95-183, September 21, 1995, p. 1; Hong Kong, Ta Kung

Pao, September 23, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-199, October 16, 1995, p.

4.

39. Tokyo, Yomiuri Shimbun, April 1, 1996, in FBIS-EAS-96-

065, April 3, 1996, p. 14; Tokyo, Ekonomisuto, April 2, 1996, in

FBIS-EAS-96-064, April 2, 1996, p. 10.

40. Tokyo, Sankei Shimbun, March 14, 1996, in FBIS-EAS-96-

052, March 15, 1996, p. 7; Tokyo, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, March 17,

1996, in FBIS-EAS-96-053, March 18, 1996, p. 20; Tokyo, Kyodo,

March 19, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-054, March 19, 1996, pp. 1-2.

41. Gu Ping, "An Unwise Move," Beijing, Renmin Ribao,

September 9, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-196, October 11, 1995, pp. 2-3;

Hong Kong, Ta Kung Pao, August 30, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-172,

September 6, 1995, pp. 13-14; Hong Kong, AFP, August 21, 1995, in

FBIS-CHI-95-161, August 21, 1995, p. 5.

42. Tokyo, Kyodo, February 11, 1996, in FBIS-EAS-96-029,

February 12, 1996, pp. 5-6; Tokyo, Tokyo Shimbun, February 12,

1996, in FBIS-EAS-96-031, February 14, 1996, pp. 5-6; Tokyo,

Kyodo, February 15, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-032, February 15, 1996,

p. 3; Hong Kong, AFP, February 15, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-032,

February 15, 1996, p. 4; Tokyo, Kyodo, February 14, 1996, in

FBIS-EAS-96-032, February 15, 1996, pp. 3-4.

43. Zhang Guocheng, "Turbulent Political Situation in

Japan," Beijing, Renmin Ribao, January 6, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-

010, January 16, 1996, p. 8; Chen Yali, "Relations with Japan

Will Face a New Test," Beijing, China Daily, January 16, 1996, in

FBIS-CHI-96-014, January 22, 1996, pp. 3-4.

44. For a recent statements making this point, see, for

example, Qiao Shi's statement in Beijing, Xinhua Domestic

Service, January 23, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-015, January 23, 1996,

p. 2; Qian Qichen, "Unswervingly Follow the Independent Foreign

Policy of Peace," p. 3.
23

45. Ding Henggao, "New Defense S&T Strategy to Emphasize

Technology Transfer to Civilian Use," p. 36.

 46. Ibid.

47. See the report on the budget to the March 1996 National

People's Congress by Finance Minister Liu Zhongli in Beijing,

Xinhua Domestic Service, March 19, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-062,

March 29, 1996, pp. 25, 29.

48. PRC government specialists on Japanese politics and

foreign policy, interview by author, Beijing. For an analysis of

this period in China's Japan Policy, see Allen S. Whiting, "China

and Japan: Politics Versus Economics," Annals of the American

Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 519, January 1992,

pp. 39-51.

49. Da Jun, "Where Will Japan Go?", p. 5.

50. Chinese treatment of the South Korean-Japanese dispute

is in Xu Baokang, "ROK-Japan Dispute Over Island," Beijing,

Renmin Ribao, February 12, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-035, February 21,

1996, pp. 2-3.

51. For a discussion of Japanese attitudes toward the

dispute, see FEER, Vol. 159, No. 10, March 7, 1996, p. 16.

52. Zhang Jing, "Reform of the UN Security Council," Beijing

Review, No. 43, October 23-29, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-204, October

23, 1995, p. 6; Chinese government analysts, interviews by

author.

53. After some effort to resist this trend, China was mute

in response to the first time Japanese troops served in a full

peacekeeping role, which occurred in the Golan Heights. Prior

Japanese peacekeeping experience in Cambodia and Rwanda was

limited to medical and relief operations. New York Times,

February 13, 1996.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel Richard H. Witherspoon

Director of Research

and Conference Coordinator

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Robert S. Ross

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretary

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler