FI RST DI VI SI ON BA RNES, P. J. , GOBEI L and PI PKI N, JJ.

N O T IC E : M o tions for r e c ons i de r a tion m us t be phy s ic a lly r

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https ://w w w . ga a ppe a ls .us /r ule s Septem ber 19, 2024



# In t he C ourt o f A ppe a ls o f G e o r g ia

A 24A 0 7 37
. M A B V U RUN GE v

. K A TSA N D E.
P IP K I N , J u d ge. I n M a r ch 2 0 2 2 , Felic itas K atsand e, the mat e r n a l g r a n d m o t h e r o f m i n o r ch i l d r e n C. T. M. , C. A

. M ., and I

. H

. M

. , p e titio ned fo r letters o f c o nserv ato rship o f her three grand c hild r en a f

ter the d eath o f their mo t her. 1 Calv in Mabv u ru nge, the mo ther’ s exhu sband a nd the c hild ren’ s bio lo gic al f ather, f iled an obj ec tio n to the petitio n. A fter

a hearing, the p ro bate c o u rt d etermined that it w as in t he best interest o f the c hild ren
to ap p o int a third p arty as the mino rs’ co nserv ato r . M abv u ru nge ap p ealed this d ec isio n to the su p erio r c o u rt, and the c ou rt d etermined th a t M abv u ru nge d id no t

1 I nitially, t he p etitio n w as f iled in Chero kee Co u nty bu t it was later t ransf erred to Barro w Co unty. I t is und isp u ted that the c hild r e n are the so le heirs o f their mo ther’ s estate, w hic h inc lu d es su rv iv o r benef its and real p ro p erty interests in Texas and Z imbabw e.hav e stand ing to ap p eal the p ro bate c o u rt’ s o rd er p u rsu ant to OCGA § 1 5- 9

- 1 23 (a)

bec au se he w a s no t a “p arty” to the pro bate c o u rt pro c eed ing. OCGA § 15- 9

- 1 23 (a) states, in p ertinent part, t hat “[e]ither p a rty to a c iv il c ase in t he p ro b ate c o u rt [ 2 ] shall hav e the right o f ap p eal to the Su p r eme C o u r t o r the Co u r t o f A p p eals f ro m any d ec isio n mad e b y the p ro bate c ou rt. ” I d

. M abv u ru nge a p p eals, a rgu ing he do es hav e stand ing to ap p eal the p ro b a te co u rt’ s o r der. We need no t squ arely ad d ress the issu e

o f s tand ing, ho wev er, bec a u se the su perio r c o u rt’ s relianc e o n OCGA § 1 5- 9

- 1 23 w as misp lac ed

. I nd eed , the p lain langu age o f OCGA § 1 5- 9

- 1 23 ap p lies to a p arty’ s right
to d irec tly ap p eal a pro bate c o u r t’ s o rd e r to this Co u rt or the Geo rgia Su p reme Co u rt. H ere, Mabv u ru nge filed an ap p eal f ro m the p ro bate c o u rt o r d er to the su perio r c o urt and no t a d irec t ap p eal to this Co u rt. A c c o r d ingly OCGA § 1 5- 9

- 1 23 d id no t c o ntro l the issu e o f

stand ing in the su p e rio r c ou rt. Still, K atsand e argu es that w e sho u ld af f irm the d ec isio n o f the su p erio r c o urt based o n o ur d e c i s i o n in Twi tty v . Akers , 21 8 G a. A p p . 46 7 (46 2 SE2d 41 8) (1 9 9 5).

2 The term “ p ro bate c ou rt” ref ers to t he p r o bate c o u rt in c o u nties p o p u lated by mo re than 9 0,000 p eo p le ac co rd ing to the c ensu s. See OCGA § 1 5- 9

- 1 20 (2). I f the B a rro w Co u nty Pro bate Co u rt d id meet this d ef initio n, then the su p erio r c o urt sho u ld hav e tran s f

e r r e d t h e c ase to this Co urt f o r a d irec t ap p e al rather than rend ering a d ec isio n in the c a se. See Pi n eda v . Lewi

s , 36 9 G a. A p p . 346 , 347 (89 3 SE2d 51 2) (2023).
2H o w ev e r, the Twi tty c ase c o nc erned the c onserv a to rship o f an a d u lt , see OCGA § 29

- 5- 1 et s eq. , and w hether so meo ne no t a p arty to t ho se p ro bate c o u r t p ro ceed ings c o u ld f ile an ap p eal u nd er f

o rmer OCGA § 29

- 5- 1 1 (the p red ec esso r statu te to OCGA § 29

- 5- 1 1 0), w hic h p ro vid ed a sp e c i f i c a p p ellate p ro c ed u re sep a rate and ap art f ro m the

mo re general ap p e llate sc heme laid o u t in OCGA § 5- 3- 1 et seq. See Twit ty , 21 8 Ga. A p p . at 46 7 (“ [ The r ]ight to ap p eal f ro m the p ro bate c ou rt t o t he su perio r c o u rt in this

c ase is go v erned by the sp e c i f i c statu te, OCGA § 29

– 5– 1 1 , r ather t han t he mo re general statu te, OCGA § 5

– 3– 2. ” ). B ec au se this c ase d o es no t inv o lv e an ap p eal f ro m the ap p o intment o f

a c o nserv ato r o v er an ad u lt, Twitty d o es no t ap p ly. M o reo v er, u nlik e the statu to ry p r o v isio ns regard ing the ap p o intment o f a

c o nserv a to r o f an ad u lt, the sta t u to ry p ro v isio ns go v e rning the ap p o intment o f a

c o nserv a to r o f

a mino r d o no t inc lu d e a sep arate statu te c o ntro lling a p erso n’ s right
to ap p e al a p ro bate c o u rt’ s o r d er t o the su p erio r c o urt. See OCGA § 29

- 3- 1 e t seq. B a sed o n the f

o rego ing, the mo re general ap p ellate pro c ed u res o f OCGA § 5- 3- 1 e t seq. ap p ly to M abv u ru nge’ s ap peal o f the p ro bate c o urt’ s o rd er to t he su p erio r c o u rt. This is no t to say that M abv u ru nge has stand ing to ap p eal the p ro bate c o u rt’ s o rd er

o r t h a t t h e su p e rio r c o urt has j u risd ic tio n to hear the same; instead , w e simp ly ho ld

3that OCGA § 1 5- 9

- 1 23 d o e s no t c o ntro l the qu estio n as to w hether M agv u ru nge has

stand ing to ap p e al the p ro bate c o u rt’ s d ec isio n to the su p erio r c o u rt. Co nsequ ently,

w e v ac ate the su p erio r c o urt’ s o rd er and reman d f o r t he c ou rt to rev iew M abv u r u nge’ s ap p eal u nd er the relev ant statu t o ry sc heme and c ase law

. Ju dgmen t va ca ted an d case rema n ded wi th di recti o n . Ba rn es , P. J. , a n d Go b ei

l , J. ,
co n cu r .

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