FUTURE WARFARE

Anthology

Revised Edition

Major General

Robert H. Scales, Jr.

U.S. Army War College

Carlisle barracks, pennsylvania
*****

The views expressed within this publication are those of the 

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position 

Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or t

Government. This report is cleared for public release; distrib

unlimited.

*****

ISBN 1-58487-026-5

ii
CONTENTS

Foreword

General Donn A. Starry

U.S. Army, Retired.........................

Prologue

Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr. ...........

Revised Acknowledgements.....................

Introduction to the First Edition

Dr. Williamson Murray .....................

Preface to the First Edition

Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr. ..........

1. Speed and Power: Primal Forces in the New

 American Style of War ......................

2. Cycles of War .............................

3. Preparing For War in the 21st Century

 with Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper,

 USMC, Retired ............................

4. Adaptive Enemies: Dealing with the Strategic

 Threat after 2010 ..........................

5. A Sword with Two Edges:

 Maneuver in 21st Century Warfare ...........

6. From Korea to Kosovo: How America’s Army

 Has Learned to Fight Limited Wars

 in the Precision Age: ......................

7. Clashes of Visions: Sizing and Shaping Our Force

 in a Fiscally Constrained Environment ........

8. America’s Army: Preparing For Tomorrow’s

 Security Challenges .......................

9. The Dawn of a New Age of Warfare:

 And the Clarion Call for Enhanced

 Maneuver Capabilities......................

iii
10. The Annual Report for The Army After Next

 Project to the Chief of Staff of the Army.......

11. The Army After Next:

 Intertwining Military Art, Science,

 and Technology Out to the Year 2025

 with Dr. John A. Parmentola................

12. The Indirect Approach: How U.S. Military

 Forces Can Avoid the Pitfalls of Future

 Urban Warfare ...........................

13. Russia’s Clash in Chechnya:

 Implications For Future War................

14. Trust, Not Technology, Sustains Coalitions ....

15. Trust, More Than Technology, Ensures

 Interoperability ..........................

16. In War, The U.S. Can’t Go It Alone ..........

17. Europe as a Strategic Staging Base

 for 21st Century Stabilization Operations .....

18. Adaptive Enemies: Achieving Victory

 by Avoiding Defeat........................

Index of Selected Terms .......................

About the Author.............................

iv
FOREWORD

This Revised Anthology is about the future of m

operations in the opening decades of the 21st Centu

purpose is not to predict the future, but to speculate 

conduct of military operations as an instrument of na

policy in a world absent massive thermonuclea

conventional superpower confrontation characteristic 

Cold War. Also absent are indirect constraints impo

that confrontation on virtually all political-mi

relationships, not solely those between super

principals.

It is likely not possible to predict the futur

uncertainties increase the number of assumption

need to be made and taken as fact in order to think a

So, all futures investigations are really speculation.

Further, looking ahead, it is necessary to accomm

the past. For the present is the leading edge of the p

well as the line of departure to the future. With 

legacies of the past; we struggle with them daily in pro

of the present. Dialectically, accommodating the 

inhibits free thinking about the future; but ignori

assuming away the past, foredooms thinking abo

future to the trash bin of non-credibility.

This foreword is not to critique General Bob S

essays. It is rather to illuminate perceptions about pa

present to help evaluate the intellectual strengt

relevance of speculations about the future.

What’s in the baggage? What legacies ne

accommodated? Our military heritage reflects thre

order legacies: Napoleon, the Industrial Revolution

Modern Technology. Our Napoleonic heritage, observ

from Jomini and Clausewitz, amended by our own u

post-Napoleonic experience, provided a set of m

concepts embracing mass conscript military forces in t

emergency. Forces whose primary modus wou

v
destruction of enemy armed forces and infrastruc

largely by overwhelming numbers—of soldiers, of un

weapons systems.

Secondly, the systemic processes of the Indu

Revolution have reinforced and facilitated our conv

about mass armies and the nation in arms, and provid

material means for the ultimate battle—annihilatio

unconditional surrender.

Thirdly, Modern Technology enabled these con

beginning with rifled shoulder weapons in the 

Century, advancing to thermo-nuclear weapons a

intercontinental ballistic missiles in the 20th Centur

Realities of post-World War II Soviet conven

power, overlain with thermo-nuclear weapons, 

apparent that no longer could we plan to win by mass 

and fire power—numbers alone, even with the aid of 

were insufficient. Then thermo-nuclear weapons a

intercontinental ballistic missiles extended the ba

annihilation to a potential Armageddon, from which 

would be few survivors, and no winners. Thus the con

Limited Warsomething short of Armageddonem

during Korea and Vietnam.

Limited War raised inevitable questions: what po

goals are sought by the use of arms; what does it m

win; how is winning to be accomplished; what price a

willing to pay? Political collapse of the Soviet Union, a

to the Cold War, ensuing uncertainties about Ru

political and military futures, and the grow

militarization of conflict (with modern weapons) 

Third World, especially in the Middle East—all ma

suite of Limited War questions more acute. For, absen

War superpower confrontation, there were far 

political constraints bearing on Limited 

confrontations. This was a clear call to revisit pr

national political-military policies in a vastly ch

world.

It was Secretary of War John C. Calhoun who

1818, laid down the basic underpinnings of a military 

whose implementing processes and structures provide 

vi
of the inhibiting legacies confronting us as we spe

about the future from the vantage point of the pr

Secretary Calhoun’s policy saw the Navy as our first 

defense. There would be a very small regular 

expanded by volunteer militia when required. Cons

replaced volunteer militia in the Root reforms of the 

20th Century; and structurally, forces were denom

into regulars, National Guard and Reserves; nonet

the Calhoun “Expansible Army” idea, now the Mobili

System, survives. Present and recent past expe

suggests that most processes of the Calhoun syste

anachronisms—Second Wave systems in a Third 

World. In particular: the individual replacement sy

Service and Joint logistics systems; the Defense D

ment materiel research, development and acqu

system; command and control systems that are now 

whelmed by burgeoning information technology; an

continuing search for relevant strategic and opera

level doctrine.

Meantime the national security policy of the U

States has changed. Required by the National D

Reform Act of 1986, there is now an annual pub

statement of national security policy by the incu

administration. The current statement, circa 1999

forth an interventionist policy. Secretary Calhoun’s 

was one of protection of the United States from f

aggression. The 1999 policy statement sees the U

States as the keeper of world order, peace, health, sta

and a host of other conditions whose relationship t

national security interests, vital or not, is in most 

obscure, and in too many cases nonexistent.

Most of General Bob Scales’ essays are attem

define military operational concepts that mig

employed to execute such an engagement strategy. A

Limited War questions cited above are obviously rel

what are the political goals, what does it mean to win; 

winning to be accomplished; what price are we wil

pay?

These are tough questions; there are others. For 

we are willing to address ourselves to fundamental ch

vii
required in obviously dysfunctional processes of t

mobilization system, is anything like what General 

suggests even possible? Among many examples, just 

we are unwilling to look for effective alternatives 

individual replacement system, alternatives whic

field effective units, then is it even possible to consid

operational concepts suggested within these essays

effectiveness of units is driven largely by budget. Co

ant forces are ever overstructured and understrength

are unwilling to provide enough end-strength (budget

all the structure, then is it even reasonable to specul

full-up units, well-trained, ready to deploy quickly, w

providing fill-up personnel and equipment, and ade

time for training units to effectiveness?

Finally, one ultimate tough question. Is 

appropriate policy for the United States to undert

regulate world affairs? Meddle in other nations’ bus

Keep everyone in every nation quiet, stable, h

prosperous, healthy? If that is considered an appro

role for the United States, then do we have, and a

willing to sacrifice ourselves in order to expend on o

the resources—requisite time, energy, money? But 

importantly, can we find the wisdom to compr

problems we are likely to encounter, the intellectual 

to know for certain what to do, and the leadership cap

to literally save the world from itself?

DONN A. STARRY,

General, USA, Retired

Cavalry Hill, Fairfax Station, Vir

August 2000

viii
PROLOGUE

As I complete my third year as the Commandant 

Army War College, it is a great pleasure to introduc

new version of Future Warfare. The first Future W

Anthology, published in May 1999, received much g

distribution than anyone expected. Now in its s

printing, it continues to be in great demand among re

both at home and abroad. Future Warfare has also pro

be popular among the Internet users who sur

homepage. Because of easy Internet access, it has 

translated into two versions of Chinese and publishe

text in both Taiwan and the People’s Republic of Chi

This revised edition republishes the complete c

that appeared within the 1999 edition. Additional

new chapters have been developed during this pas

and, subsequently, are included within this new edit

am also grateful to General (R) Donn A. Star

graciously consenting to write a new Foreword fo

revised edition.

Each essay was developed and tailored for a s

reading audience. The collection presents a he

argument that has been refined after many warg

simulations, symposia and extensive overseas t

dialogue and study. The consistent thesis that perva

of the articles, however, is simply that ten years aft

end of the Cold War, we are beginning to see the 

outlines of an emerging and entirely new transforma

warfare. It is my hope that this new book will cont

some insights into the ongoing and healthy “battle of 

ix
within our national security community. The concl

from this debate will have a lasting impact upon ho

military forces will be shaped to accommodate th

realities of precision age warfare.

ROBERT H. SCALES, JR.

Major General, U.S.A.

Commandant

U.S. Army War College

July 28, 2000

x
REVISED ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This revised anthology assembles a collection of 

that have been developed and published over a per

almost four years. The chapters are presented in the 

sequence that would be used during a staff briefing. 

essay represents a reflection of my evolving tho

regarding future warfare and the urgent need to explo

development of a new generation of military capabiliti

The thesis within each article was tailored for a s

reading audience, but, in a broader sense, each messag

represents my attempt to make a professional contri

to our national defense debate. During the next five 

without question, the emerging conclusions from 

“battle of ideas” will shape the formulation of U.S. Na

Security Strategy for the next two decades. These ma

concepts, moreover, will define the research 

developmental boundaries that will create the next g

tion of defense capabilities.

To be sure, there is a holistic pattern of thought th

stimulated and refined the overall content within 

essay. We must develop a long-range vision of Am

Army beyond 2010 that will communicate both a re

outline of future warfare and the broad organiza

concepts that will underscore future capabilities. I b

the next decade will find the Army emerging as the 

important member of future Joint Task Forces becau

U.S. will not be able to collapse an opponent’s nation

to fight without orchestrating both lethal firepowe

agile ground maneuver. Without question, there wi

dramatic increase in future landpower responsib

because of the Way we will commit our military Me

achieve our political Ends. 

xi
Before you begin reading this book, please permit 

thank the following publishing sources because they 

willingly granted their permission to reprint the essay

appear within this revised anthology:

• Strategic Review Journal

• The Armed Forces Journal International

• Center For Strategic and International Studie

• Parameters

• The Army RD&A Journal

• Newsday Daily Newspaper

• Defence Systems International

• National Security Studies Quarterly

• Joint Forces Quarterly

• Jane’s Defence Weekly

Furthermore, I am indebted to many colleague

have shared my professional interests and helped me 

the acuity of my intellectual investigations. It is not fe

to list the names of these individuals within this brief 

but my circle of “fellow travelers” literally extends a

the world. I do, however, want to acknowledge the f

and staff from the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 

War College. Their assistance helped me transform th

for this revised anthology into a published reality. 

Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Major General, U.S.A.

July 2000

xii
INTRODUCTION

TO THE FIRST EDITION

We stand at the brink of a new century as well as 

millennium. The pace of technological change is st

accelerating, while the strategic environment re

opaque and uncertain. Once again the United Sta

between major wars. Yet, the current period is not th

time the American military have confronted an inte

period. Between 1919 and 1941 the services develo

wide range of capabilities from carrier aviatio

amphibious warfare to combined arms tactics that sto

country well in the terrible conflict that followe

bombing of Pearl Harbor. Similarly, in the inter-war p

between 1953 and 1965, and 1973 and 1991, the Am

military confronted a wide disparity of challenges. A

the development of airmobile and then air-land 

underlined the importance of peacetime innovat

battlefield performance.

But unlike these earlier inter-war periods, the 

military faces no clear threats at present. Thu

problems of innovation and adaptation that have 

military organizations over the past two centuries p

even greater uncertainties and ambiguities. Unlik

American military of the 1930s which confronted thre

the Pacific as well as in Europe against which the se

could design solid concepts of operation, today’s 

forces do not know against whom they will fight, whe

will fight, and even where they will fight.

Throughout U.S. history the American military se

have had an unfortunate penchant for not being rea

the next war. Part of the problem has had to do with f

beyond their control: the American polity has 

xiii
notoriously slow to respond to the challenges pos

dangerous enemies. On the other hand, American m

institutions have been surprisingly optimistic in we

their preparedness as they embarked on the nation’s 

The first battles involving American military forces 

give reason for optimism. The initial defeats in the W

1812, Bull Run, Belleau Woods, Savo Island, Kas

Pass, Task Force Smith, and Landing Zone Albany 

suggest unalloyed success by America’s milita

preparing for the next war. Admittedly, in each of its 

wars the United States did enjoy the luxury of time to 

the deficiencies that showed up so glaringly in the cou

first battles. Unfortunately, in the twenty-first centu

United States may not have that luxury of time.

The Gulf War does stand out as an anomaly in Am

wars. In that conflict, service leaders were profo

pessimistic about the losses their forces might suffe

war to occur. In the end, the armed forces of the U

States smashed the Iraqis in a blitzkrieg campaig

ground portion of which lasted barely 100 hours. B

very ease of that victory may carry with it dangerous 

The current belief that technology alone and the capab

of distant strike will allow American military forces t

simple, decisive campaigns with few casualties flies 

face of 3,000 years of accumulated military history

idle hopes are the direct result of the “victory disease

broke out in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War

American military are to innovate in an intelligen

effective fashion, they cannot afford to believe thei

press releases from that conflict.

Military institutions have always had consid

problems in adapting and innovating during inte

periods, particularly during periods of technological ch

The catastrophe of the First World War is a partic

good example. It took three long years of interm

slaughter before Europe’s armies began to understan

adapt to the complexities of combined-arms warfare

then, the operational solutions took another twenty y

xiv
peacetime innovation to work out. Unfortunate

everyone, it was the Germans who worked out the eq

of tactics, doctrinal change, and technology to its ful

the operational successes of blitzkrieg war that won 

devastating victories between 1939 and 1941.

The requirements for successful innovation, as w

the ingredients for unsuccessful innovation, have be

emerge from the work of military historians over th

several decades. Successful innovation in times of 

technological change possesses a number of character

the least important of which is technology. The G

Blitzkrieg resulted from a sophisticated historically 

analysis of what had happened on the battlefields of 1

solidly grounded system of professionalism that j

officers on the basis of their intellectual attainment a

as their tactical proficiency, and a careful, ruthlessly h

analysis of what was really happening in exercise

combat. Technology was no more than an enable

allowed the Germans to realize the potential of succ

innovation in combined arms. And it is well to rem

that French artillery and armored fighting vehicles 

superior to those possessed by the Wehrmacht in May 

It was the tactical and doctrinal concepts that the F

got wrong, and the result was military catastrophe. 

was not the Germans alone who successfully innova

the inter-war period. The American military in 

respects equaled the Germans and in some re

outshone their future opponents in their willingn

examine doctrinal concepts in the harsh light of 

capabilities.

Unfortunately, there is an emerging belief in the c

American defense community that capabilitie

platforms represent the essential component in ho

United States needs to design its forces for war in th

century. To put it bluntly, this approach, no matte

much easier it may make defense planning, will n

Capabilities, no matter how impressive to the engin

technologist, may prove irrelevant in the next war. I

xv
they may prove worse than irrelevant, be

technological capabilities that are irrelevant to the w

hand will have involved the expenditure of sums 

spent on other systems and capabilities. As with so m

the art of war, the best may be the enemy of the good. 

end technology is no more than an enabler—help

extending coherent, intelligent concepts of operation

useless in forces without training or intelle

preparation. Vision and serious thinking about the fu

war in the next century are the crucial components to 

vibrant military innovation in the next century.

Whatever approaches the American military ta

innovation, war will occur. And it will provide a harsh 

Almost certainly the next war will take the United Sta

surprise. U.S. military institutions may well have pre

for some other form of warfare, in some other locati

paraphrase Omar Bradley: it may well be the wrong w

the wrong place, at the wrong time. But there it will b

the American military will have to fight that conflict 

terms rather than their own. Unfortunately, m

history is replete with examples of military institution

have refused to adapt to the real conditions of wa

rather have attempted to impose their own paradig

matter how irrelevant or illsuited to the actual cond

If we cannot predict where the next war will oc

what form it will take, there are some things for whi

American military can prepare as they enter the 

millennium. Obviously, the services have to prepa

physical condition and training of soldiers, marines, s

and airmen. But equally important, they must prepa

minds of the next generation of military leaders to h

the challenges of the battlefield. And that m

preparation will be more important than a

technological wizardry U.S. forces can bring to b

combat. Most important in that intellectual prepa

must be a recognition of what will not chang

fundamental nature of war, the fact that fog, fr

xvi
ambiguity, and uncertainty will dominate the battlefi

the future just as they have those of the past.

There are at present many who are arguing 

technology offers America’s military forces an easy ro

solving the intractable tactical and operational pro

that will be raised by war in the next century. They b

that technology, computers, and other information sy

will allow the United States a complete transparenc

not only the enemy’s forces but his intentions as we

problem with such views is that America’s opponents 

next war are already at work studying how the U.S. m

works. As the services discovered in the Vietnam 

military organizations are human and therefore ad

and creative, even though they may not po

sophisticated technology. They may also hav

motivation of religion or ideology to back up their capa

adapt to the battlefield. Nevertheless, those who argu

technological view of future war clearly believe that h

is irrelevant and that the new technologies will 

American forces to exist in a frictionless environmen

in which our opponents cannot adapt. However, 3,000 

of history underline that fog, friction, ambiguity

uncertainty have always formed the underlying typog

of war. Furthermore, modern science has underline

the ambiguities and uncertainties of war only refle

actual state of the universe. Thus, the view that tech

will allow absolute knowledge and predictability is on

requires a dismissal understanding of not only histor

science as well.

When the next war occurs, the United States ma

face opponents who will have prepared themselves t

on their home ground. Wars in the next century will n

like the Gulf War, where an inept and unmot

opponent collapsed almost as soon as the fighting 

Americans should not forget what the North Korean

Chinese, and the North Vietnamese were able to do a

technologically superior American forces in the 1950

1960s. The ambiguous nature, however, of f

xvii
challenges (the who, what, and where of the equ

demands serious intellectual preparation for war. 

Michael Howard has suggested on a number of occa

war is not only the most physically demandi

professions, it is also the most intellectually demand

professions. To make the next century “an Am

Century,” U.S. military organizations must enga

serious debate. They must examine the past with som

more than idle curiosity. They must understand 

technology is only an enabler. And they must tie the w

conceptualization and technology to a solid understa

of the fundamental nature of war and the harsh rea

muddy boots.

Major General Robert Scales has been a w

participant in this debate. He has been one of the 

stand up and question the easy assumptions 

characterize so much of what passes for thinking 

present moment. The articles that this book has br

together represent the work of a scholar-soldier wh

devoted his life to thinking long and hard abou

fundamental business of his profession, the profess

arms. It is a book that army, marines, air force, and 

officers must read. And if they do not agree with ever

that General Scales suggests, at least they will beg

process of debate within their own minds. And that is 

those who wish to think seriously about preparing for 

the next century must begin.

Williamson Murray

Harold K. Johnson Professor

 of Military History

U.S. Army Military History Insti

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

xviii
PREFACE

TO THE FIRST EDITION

Between the Fall of 1995 and the Summer of 1997, 

remarkable organization charged by the Army Chief o

to delve into the distant future in order to postula

course of warfare beyond the year 2010. The Army 

Next (AAN) investigation has stimulated a rich intell

debate within the defense community. What follow

collection of essays and articles either written by 

co-authored with a small band of trusted colleague

sought to meet the intent of the Army leadership.

The AAN project remains controversial today due i

because it differs considerably in scope, period, metho

and focus from similar future gazing efforts by the 

and other services during the past few years. Contr

began with the time period of our observation. We c

far more distant perch, the years 2020-2025, so as to 

comfortably beyond the acrimony usually associated 

debates over existing or near term programs and bu

We did not anticipate that a real revolution in m

affairs could be even a remote possibility in less than 

generation. Also, with few exceptions, we felt that 

least the next decade the nation would be able to achi

security goals with the materiel and structures on 

today. Some time after 2010, however, the huge mou

of Cold War equipment accumulated during the 

quarter century will begin to wear out and 

replacement or refurbishment. Thus a focus comfo

beyond 2010 would give us the perspective necess

forecast what new structures and materiel the Arm

need “next.”

xix
Initially, AAN studies and gaming focused o

strategic level of war. This proved to be an eno

cultural shift for a service which takes great pride in h

brought about a renaissance in the art of war a

operational level with the development of Airland 

doctrine during the waning days of the Cold War. B

secure strategic anchors of the Cold War as manifes

the great global war plans had been wrenched from 

moorings by the time the Berlin Wall fell. To our min

Post Cold War Army needed to reset its strategic mo

and derive a clear understanding of its strategic rele

to America’s future national policy before it 

reasonably be expected to devise a new operational m

for fighting on land.

We created some nervousness when we comm

ourselves to testing our hypotheses about the futur

rigorous synthetic environment of force-on-force, fre

war games. These were enormously elaborate and co

affairs conducted at the Army War College and else

that often involved hundreds of players, gamers

observers as well as some of the most sophisticated g

and simulations models and facilities available in the 

We made sure that our “virtual” enemy was compete

credible. He was free to engage us using any style 

consistent with his own culture, means and na

strategic ends. Often our AAN battle force did not d

against such competent opposition but the expe

convinced us that we were pursuing a meaningful 

whenever we beat him cleanly and fairly. 

Each exercise would be followed by a period of vali

and reassessment by a cadre of scientists and opera

artists charged with refining our hypothese

developing a new set of structural and doctrinal param

for the next yearly gaming cycle. The process was ite

and dialectical. We began the gaming virt

unconstrained. For instance, during the first war ga

assumed that in 2020 we would have the capabi

deploy a close combat battle force directly fro

xx
Continental United States into a distant theater o

ready to fight. While such a capability fit the require

of our national strategy, scientists in our group deter

that such a capability was neither affordable nor techn

practicable by 2020. Therefore, for the next game w

obliged to shorten the operational reach of our fo

inserting an intermediate staging base with a ju

point between the Continental United States and the 

area. 

Technical changes demanded doctrinal changes. A

an intermediate base to our strategic deployment s

slowed our rate of strategic closure and opened the pr

of exposing our intermediate bases to the enemy’s we

of mass destruction delivered by long-range cruis

ballistic missiles. These realities in turn deman

substantial change in our postulated warfighting do

and caused us to search out other imaginative tec

solutions to these new and unforeseen variables 

warfighting equation. Thus, over time and wit

deliberation our AAN study group derived a cr

strategic environment for a war in the next ce

Subsequently, we postulated a concept for fightin

conflict and refined structural and materiel require

to allow this new style of war to be prosecuted succes

on some future battlefield. 

The knowledge gained from four rich years of 

experimentation allows us now to begin to move fro

esoteric to the concrete, from the general to the sp

from strategic to operational and from the distant fut

a period closer to the present. Granted, many of our 

are as yet indistinct. Some will require major techno

advances to become wholly feasible. Others will r

time and additional gaming before they can be cons

mature enough for experimentation in an opera

environment. Yet with time to reflect I have come 

conclusion that many of the concepts derived by the 

effort for the distant future increasingly seem to 

remarkable currency today. Some examples may illu

xxi
this point. In the articles that follow we postulate the 

a “Major Competitor,” a nation or nation-like opponen

could well have the means and the will to present a s

strategic challenge in a region of vital interest to the U

States some time beyond 2010. However, recent eve

the Middle East, the Balkans and elsewhere m

convincing argument that legitimate strategic chal

may not wait until the end of the next decade to matu

a real challenge to our national security interests. 

Another insight: Throughout the AAN study proc

took as an article of faith that a true revolution in man

warfare could not occur until certain leaps ahe

technology were made in military science necess

operationalize most of our warfighting concepts. How

there is much that we can do now to make the A

structures and doctrine more receptive to the opportu

offered by technologies already at hand or just ov

horizon. Any military revolution that we expect to m

beyond the end of the next decade must set its az

firmly in place today or in the near future. It takes 

generation to educate a battalion commander or t

platoon sergeant. At least that long is needed to pro

new weapon, even one derived from today’s techn

Taken together, from today’s headlines or from in

gained from our intensive and introspective look in

future of warfare, I am convinced that the argum

compelling for us to accelerate our research. We 

examine some of the critical areas that demand att

now rather than in the years beyond 2010–especially 

areas related to the shape and purpose of our na

defense structures and our landpower structures.

If the Army is to remain relevant to the security ne

the nation we must begin now to accelerate the spee

which we can project legitimate, powerful and ba

forces to threatened regions overseas. There are tw

term alternatives for achieving this goal. First, w

continue to maintain and exploit overseas bases cur

in our possession. Bases, particularly those within o

xxii
to areas whose stability is vital to our national inte

offer a launch platform as well as an observation pos

close to a potential theater of war. Second, we can redu

time it takes for units stationed in the U.S. and overs

arrive on the scene of conflict prepared to fight. Expe

in recent wars tells us that maximum strategic spee

best be achieved by projecting units organized in

smallest self-contained entities of all arms capa

sustained combat. Today we possess units that can 

quickly but have very little capacity to fight sus

combat against significant opposition. Or, we can p

units capable of sustained combat but which cannot 

quickly enough to prevent an enemy force from ach

his initial wartime operational objectives. 

We must commit ourselves to repackaging our c

forces into the smallest discrete entities of all arms ca

of sustained, autonomous operations. Recent expe

tells us that we habitually organize our ground and ai

into packages of about five thousand. We have learne

anything less becomes unsustainable or leaves o

important combat function and anything much 

becomes too cumbersome and inflexible for rapid proje

We must learn to leverage the information age to per

to leave behind either in the U.S. or in a forward 

overseas much of the impedimenta that slows us dow

prevents us from intervening in a theater of war quick

decisively. During the Gulf War it took us nearly six m

to build up a theater of war mainly because we had to 

all of the manpower and materiel to construct a stru

analog of one of our stateside logistical and su

facilities. For that reason and others an American ar

division weighted over a hundred thousand tons an

materiel to keep it in the field for the length of a cam

weighed almost as much. We transported, mainly b

over six hundred thousand tons of ammunition to th

and brought most of it back unexpended. Likewis

transported tens of thousands of shipping container

xxiii
the theater and had to open most of them on the docks 

out what was in them. 

The image of the air campaign is one of power pro

quickly and efficiently into the Gulf. In fact, howev

power was just as constrained by the realities 

logistical umbilical cord as that of the ground 

Practically every weapon delivered by air began its jo

to Iraq by sea from a U.S. port. Over forty tons of av

fuel were burned to drop one ton of bombs with

theater. 

So a force tailored for strategic projection must be a

as possible consistent with the need also to posse

combat power to dominate an enemy force 

overwhelming lethality and agility. To achieve this 

strategic force must leave behind those structures t

not contribute directly to success on the battlefield. 

information age technologies allow finance, pers

intelligence, communications, and some supply funct

be performed outside the immediate confines of the 

battle area. 

The precision revolution allows much of the mun

train that traditionally accompanies ground units 

shrunk considerably. Air power can provide much 

distant supporting fires a ground force will need to ma

firepower dominance without demanding a ma

munitions to be carried along with the intervening 

But as recent experience has shown, air deli

munitions are heavy, expensive and rare. Plu

experience has demonstrated dramatically that the 

expensive the munitions and the more distant the sou

delivery the less responsive the source of firepower wi

soldiers on the ground. Fortunately technology is ava

today to make precision cheaper, smaller and 

available to ground forces. This capability becomes 

more desirable as our future enemies learn to disper

go to ground in an effort to lessen the destructive eff

precision delivered from the air. 

xxiv
Once in the presence of the enemy these early ar

forces will have to face the reality of close combat on 

As the article “A Sword With Two Edges” contend

introduction of ground forces into combat does not n

imply that the cost of the operation in terms of hum

now becomes prohibitively expensive. First, it mu

obvious after recent experience that the time it ta

bring a campaign to closure is, in itself, a cause of f

and a producer of casualties. An air campaign take

because it is an instrument of attrition and at

demands a protracted period to kill and destroy eno

the enemy force to break his will and force him to capit

A thinking enemy with a will to resist will use the 

time to his own advantage. Also, air attacks are not fr

be sure, today we are ahead in the technological con

protect pilots with radar jamming and stealth. But, 

we must expect that given time, ingenuity, an

necessity driven by a will to survive our enemies w

induced to develop the technical and tactical mea

prevail under air attack while making the cos

prolonged air campaign more and more expensive 

side. 

Yet the image still exists of the helicopter pilots 

dragged through the streets of Mogadishu or, 

contemporaneously, the image of the horrific opening 

in “Saving Private Ryan” where the true hor

face-to-face ground combat is driven into the psyche 

movie goer. I am increasingly convinced, however, th

technologies and structures available today, su

modified, offer the potential for ground forces to int

themselves into the midst of an enemy’s ground 

isolate him and collapse his will very quickly w

absolutely minimal loss of life. 

How would such a force differ from forces today? 

the force would be balanced. It would possess the 

both to strike the enemy with great precision but a

maneuver throughout the enemy’s area of operation

equal competence and precision. Balanced forces are a

xxv
joint, that is, they possess the flexibility and mea

confront the enemy with a variety of capabilities fr

dimensions of combat: air, sea, land, and space. Secon

force must have the ability to apply all dimensions 

simultaneously so as to deny the enemy the opportu

confront us sequentially, one dimension at a time.

A force balanced between firepower and man

prevents an adaptive enemy from optimizing his fo

prevail against American firepower alone. Centur

experience in war tells us that an enemy arrayed to a

firepower is immediately vulnerable to a force optimiz

maneuver. As an enemy scatters and goes to grou

becomes paralyzed, incapable of maneuver and t

vulnerable target for small mobile forces capa

interposing themselves amongst and between an imm

enemy. Simultaneously, continuous and balanced pr

gives the enemy two unacceptable alternatives. H

attack our forces deposed in his midst and suffer def

precision fires or he can remain static only to wither in 

or be systematically found, fixed and overwhelm

decisive and balanced ground and air attack.

The articles that follow make the case for a ba

force in future war. Our thesis is reinforced by Joint 

2010 which echoes the nearer term case for a b

between the two active offensive components of 

warfighting, “precision strike” and “dominant mane

However, if one looks at what we are doing rathe

saying the issue of balance is much in doubt. Today w

strike with precision as evidenced by our performance 

Gulf War and thereafter. But we cannot maneuve

equal precision, or with the speed necessitated b

demands of a greatly expanded and infinitely more 

battlefield. More troubling is the realization that we 

certainly cannot maneuver with the assurance that w

done all that we can to lessen the cost of human life. 

we are continually faced with two conflicting alterna

attack by precision from the air and achieve no decis

introduce ground troops to ensure a decision bu

xxvi
unnecessary casualties. This assertion is all the 

disturbing when one looks out into the programmatic 

and sees that firepower programs, particularly aircra

platforms to support aerial combat, dominate our 

hardware acquisition programs. 

Granted, there is much that we in the Army can 

make our existing landpower forces more suitable 

future conflict environment. We must begin soon to l

our force. We must repackage our combat forces into 

projectable and more tactically mobile entities. We 

increase the proportion of our close combat forc

maneuvers by air. We must better exploit inform

technologies so that we will be able to see the enemy 

us with greater clarity and immediacy. We must im

our system of battle command and our metho

inoculating our leaders to deal with the shock, con

and complexity of modern close combat so they will be 

able to use the instruments within their command. 

But if we are to provide our national leaders in the 

with the instruments necessary to prosecute our na

military strategy we must ultimately refocu

intellectual and fiscal resources in a concerted eff

rebalance our fighting forces. It is important to rem

in this high-tech-era that certain timeless principle

govern the course of conflict. The first among these 

war will be ultimately and foremost a test of will. H

tells us repeatedly that a military that can only att

fire alone is a military capable of achieving only fl

advantage. A balanced force, on the other hand, capa

paralyzing by fire and gaining and holding grou

maneuver, can translate temporary into lasting adva

by collapsing the enemy’s will to resist. A damaged e

with his territory intact will continue to resist. The 

enemy ejected from or dislocated within his territor

fall victim to the paralysis that always must precede d

Only when paralysis occurs can our side gai

overwhelming decision we seek at minimum cost in li

the fourth essay in this anthology contends, our 

xxvii
arsenal must include a 21

st

 Century sword with two 

one side—precision firepower; and the other—e

precise maneuver. Unless we apply both in balanc

harmony future wars might well devolve into massiv

of attrition. 

Current events only serve to reinforce and a

element of urgency to what we have learned from ou

studies. These events now tell us that we may not hav

2020 to implement the strategic and operational 

tenets. In fact, the future is now and we must 

immediately to make today’s weapons and structu

suitable as possible to fit our newly emerging im

future warfare. 

ROBERT H. SCALES, JR.

Major General, U.S.A.

Commandant

U.S. Army War College

xxviii
Chapter One

Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Under the title “Learning From Past Mistakes,

a condensed version of this essay was publishe

JANE’S DEFENCE WEEKLY

Volume 34, Issue Number 2

12 July 2000

1

SPEED AND POWER

PRIMAL FORCES

IN THE NEW

AMERICAN STYLE

OF WAR
SPEED AND POWER: PRIMAL FORCE

IN THE NEW AMERICAN STYLE OF WA

The nature of war is changing and the rate of cha

more rapid than any similar period of modern hi

Evidence of how profoundly contemporary events 

affected America’s style of war is clearly documented w

the historical record of American conflict since the end 

Second World War. For almost forty years we planne

return to a total war with the Soviets—a war that 

came—while we evolved, through bloody pra

experience, a new style of limited liability wars foug

ends not necessarily vital to our national interests 

time. Only recently, thanks to our experience in K

have we just begun to associate our years of experie

limited wars as perhaps the most relevant anal

understanding the nature and character of wars w

continue to fight for generations to come.

Our bloody education began in Korea. We starte

war in the European style with division level oper

supported by concentrations of air and surface del

firepower established by norms developed from ou

against the Germans. By the winter of 1951, the conto

a future stalemate were already discernable. Our opp

had become an adaptive enemy capable of abso

doctrinal doses of killing power while remaining effect

the battlefield. Back in the states, the American po

increasingly became unwilling to tolerate unli

expenditures of life in order to achieve unclear ends

combination of these two realities compelled m

leaders in the field to radically reverse the estab

doctrinal relationships between fire and mane

Subsequently, attacks were lead by infantry pla

supported by hundreds of guns and aircraft whose 

3
effects were orchestrated by an increasingly comple

cumbersome firepower system that was uniquely Ame

The lessons of Korea, unfortunately, did not e

thanks to our preoccupation with fighting the big w

Europe. So we were reeducated, often tragica

Vietnam. In time, the Army shifted away from the wa

large-scale search and destroy operations to the 

smaller platoon sized units to find and fix the e

followed by copious doses of air and artillery to finish 

But, as in Korea, the process took too long. Given the 

time, a dedicated enemy with the will to endure and a

punishment by fire eventually learned to maneuver 

without the benefit of a firepower advantage.

4

In The Future, A Thinking, Adaptive Aggressor W

Occupy Quickly, Gain Control Of The Ground T

Subdue The Population And Disperse To Avoi

Destruction By Fire.
Our successful performance in Just Cause and D

Storm shows that by the end of the Cold War we had 

to learn the lessons for winning limited liability wars

first lesson was to win quickly by the applicat

overwhelming combat power. The object was to collap

enemy’s will to resist before his soldiers became inu

the psychological trauma induced by firepower and 

he could learn of our weaknesses and adapt his met

war on the battlefield to offset our firepower advanta

Kosovo reinforced the need to win quickly by ap

overwhelming power in the shortest time. But this c

also demonstrated that our enemies are beginn

relearn the lessons taught by successful enemies d

past wars of limited liability. As we have become 

proficient in finding, tracking and striking the enem

enemy has also learned how to mitigate the effe

5

First Phase: 

Establish An “Unblinking Eye,” With Continuo

C4ISR Coverage
superior firepower by adapting the tenets taught to th

the Chinese, Vietnamese, Afghans, Iraqis and others

Our potential opponents have learned to gain an

the advantage of time. They will seek to win by av

loss, to hold on until the Americans tire of the conflic

The surest way to accelerate this process, they al

learned, is to kill Americans —- quickly. Time can be g

by shifting from a traditional European style of linear 

a non-linear style based upon the control of territory 

than the command of key terrain and critical nodes

which are prime targets for destruction from abo

precision weaponry. The enemy can stretch out the c

by going to ground, dispersing, hiding, and occu

complex terrain such as mountains and cities a

deceiving the Americans through the use of camoufla

information deception.

If done correctly, an adaptive enemy can turn a one

conflict into a close contest as we saw in Kosovo. So, h

we insure that we will continue to win and win ch

against such an opponent? We must be able to depri

enemy of his time advantage and make the most 

firepower advantage by robbing the enemy of his ab

deceive, disperse and go to ground.

The surest way to gain the advantage of time is to 

within the battle area quickly, armed with overwhe

force. Speed of arrival will allow us to literally cat

enemy in the open before he is able to captu

operational objectives and go to ground in te

advantageous to the defensive. The paralytic eff

precision strikes will serve to freeze his forces in pla

then force him to disperse. 

Our past wars have taught us that as an e

disperses to absorb firepower, he becomes vulnera

quick destruction in detail by ground forces. Once e

forces are sufficiently weakened by fire and find them

unable to mass, friendly maneuver forces must be in

quickly across the entire span of his operational a

6
ensure the immediate disintegration of his force an

ultimate collapse of his will to resist. The inter-dispo

of forces in the enemy’s midst ensures that we contr

clock, not him. 

Enemy units gone to ground can now be found and 

by maneuver forces. Exposed, cut off and unable to m

mass, each enemy pocket can be destroyed in detai

minimum loss to the intervening force. As long as w

the initiative by occupying his territory, time is on ou

We now have the luxury of taking him down us

balanced application of firepower and maneuver

enemy is faced with a deadly paradox. If he re

7

Second Phase:

Strategic Strike Campaign To Paralyze The Ene

And Force Him To Disperse . . .

Check
dispersed our forces will destroy him at leisure. 

attempts to mass he summons the full wrath of Am

precision strike. Check and checkmate. 

Kosovo serves as just another compelling data 

along a remarkably clear continuum of Ame

experience in contemporary wars of limited liability

lessons are strikingly clear. To win cheaply we mu

quickly. Future victories will only come if we are pos

with the speed to arrive quickly and the power to e

conflict decisively by overwhelming the enemy w

balance of precision firepower and maneuver. 

8

Third Phase: 

Strategic Maneuver to Occupy and Culminate 

Checkmate
Chapter Two

Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Reproduced with Permission Granted by:

July 1997 Issue

ARMED FORCES JOURNAL

INTERNATIONAL

Volume 134, Number 12

9

CYCLES

OF WAR
CYCLES OF WAR

Speed Of Maneuver Will Be The Essential Ingredient Of 

Information-Age Army

The nature of warfare, like other forms of coll

complex human behavior, changes slowly. Cycles of c

in warfare are particularly difficult to comprehend an

more difficult to anticipate because, unlike endeav

finance, medicine, or law, active experience in w

thankfully, infrequent. Because warfare cann

practiced often, soldiers are obliged to rely on the labo

of past experiences to gain vicarious experience in w

CYCLES AND PATTERNS

Before the advent of the industrial age, study 

laboratory of past wars served soldiers well. Cyc

change were centuries long, and factors that gen

change, such as demographics, politics, and relative 

among contenders, while not necessarily predictable

at least constant and familiar enough to give so

confidence that data derived from past campaigns 

remain relevant and useful as signposts into the f

Since the beginning of the Industrial age, techno

warfare—the applied science of killing—has eclips

other dynamics of change. For many, this magnitud

newness of science threatens the reliability of precede

useful mechanism for predicting the future course of 

To be sure, the frenetic pace of technological cha

the modern world has served to compress the interv

stretch the amplitude of the cycles of change. Noneth

identifiable cycles remain. If our historical labo

serves us, we should be able to search the recent p

identify new cycles driven principally by technology. S

we find a common pattern in technological cycles, an

11
accept the premise that technology will continue to 

future change, then we should be able to use the recen

to fix the central axis aligning those cycles and project 

the future.

Technology began to dominate patterns of chang

the rise of industrial production and the appeara

precision warmaking machinery like rifled weapons 

mid-19th century. The small bore repeating rifl

machine gun, and quick-firing field artillery extend

deadly zone, or the distance that soldiers had to cross t

a defender out of his position, from 150 meters in Napo

day to a thousand meters or more by the end of the Am

Civil War. As the deadly zone increased by nearly a fa

10, the risks of crossing it were further multiplied 

lethality induced through the precision and volume 

the massive proliferation of repeating arms. 

technology favored the defender. Images of the te

slaughter of World War I remain as testimony to the 

blood exacted by an operational method that 

principally on killing effect to achieve decisive result

12
Before the slaughter ended, military profession

both sides of no-man’s land sought to solve the tactic

operational dilemmas imposed by dominance of fire

on the battlefield. The tactical problem simply was to 

the killing zone alive. The operational problem was to 

a successful crossing militarily decisive. Once across, 

had to reach deep, concentrate, and strike to disloca

eventually disintegrate the order and cohesion 

opposing force.

The conceptual solution came first to the Germ

1918, and it was deceptively simple: short, highly in

doses of firepower to prepare the assault; small un

exploit the shock effect of firepower in order to infiltra

bypass centers of resistance; and operational format

move through exposed points of weakness to push dee

the enemy’s rear. While the Germans had the method

lacked the means to translate theory into effective a

After the war, the development of the internal comb

engine provided the means. The graft of practical scie

an innovation born in war turned the cycle of war a s

time and restored dominance to the offensive. Mot

armored vehicles allowed soldiers to cross the deadl

protected and at enormously greater speed. Large 

could now dash great distances into the enemy’s r

strike at his brain and avoid his powerful extremitie

object of Blitzkrieg became the collapse of an enemy’s 

resist. Victory was gained through psychological par

induced by movement, rather than through but

induced by massive application of firepower.

After World War II, the Western Powers faced a

tactical and operational dilemma. The problem now 

halt a Soviet-style blitzkrieg across the Northern G

Plain. Tactical forces needed defensive killing pow

absorb the initial Soviet armored shock and hold 

defensive positions. The operational problem was to 

deep with long-range firepower in order to slow the 

arrival from follow-on armored forces at the fron

Billions of dollars and the collective genius of a genera

13
brilliant minds succeeded in developing a remarkable 

technologies capable of stopping a mechanized off

with precise, long-range killing power. Micr

technology provided the tools necessary to extend the 

zone and made targets easier to find, track, and kill.

Signs foretelling how the defensive’s retu

dominance might turn the cycles of war a third time 

to appear as early as the closing days in Vietnam. 

laser-guided bombs destroyed targets that had prev

required hundreds of unguided dumb bombs. In Worl

II, an average of 18 rounds was needed to kill a tan

range of 800 yards. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli Wa

average was two rounds at 1,200 yards, and by 

Storm one round at 2,400 yards.

The ability to see and strike deep using groun

aerial platforms served to expand the battlefield by or

magnitude. What was once a theater area for a field 

now became the area of operations for a division or a 

Just as an army moving at two miles per hour cou

cross a killing zone dominated by long-range, rapid-

rifled weapons in 1914, the precision revolution m

prohibitively expensive for an army moving at seven 

that speed to cross an infinitely more lethal space a hu

times as large. Thus, in a conflict involving two ro

equal—or symmetrical—forces, evidence seems to 

convincingly that the advantage goes to the defende

Today, seven years after the prospect of a 

blitzkrieg has crumbled with the same finality as the 

the Berlin Wall, we seem strangely content to remain 

in the third cycle. As the post-industrial age begins t

way to the information age, we still find comfort in a 

of future warfare that continues to emphasize the ca

to kill with greater and greater efficiency.

14
THERE IS NO SILVER BULLET

Arguments against a firepower-centered appro

warfare have been with us since the earliest days 

industrial age. War is a deadly business. Yet the ob

war is not to kill the enemy so much as it is to break h

to resist. No matter how efficient and precise a fire

system might be, victory is rarely defined by k

everyone on the other side. The extension of influe

control by force is much more powerful and palatabl

genocide through firepower. Therefore, our obj

applying firepower must be to exploit its subst

paralytic effects to gain advantage.

Unfortunately, recent experiments in the labora

real war substantiates the view that the paralytic eff

firepower erode quickly over time. Soldiers become i

to hardships and danger. Firepower that might bre

enemy formation early in a conflict eventually be

merely a nuisance once soldiers accustom themsel

firepower’s pyrotechnic drama and devise effective me

deflect, deceive, dissipate, and protect themselves 

firepower’s killing effects.

To win quickly and decisively at low cost in the futu

must have the means to conduct the battle quickly 

end it cleanly, preferably at the moment when the pa

effect of firepower is greatest. To delay beyond that m

only increases the killing and makes the enemy 

effective by stiffening his will to resist and by allowin

to reconstitute. Decision is best guaranteed th

maneuver of forces on the ground. Psycholo

collapse—the breaking of an enemy’s will to resist—

when an opponent finds himself challenged and b

wherever he turns. He admits defeat when further p

of his political objective is not worth the cost or wh

centers of gravity are threatened, controlled, or occ

and he has no remaining options for restoring them.

15
LETHALITY AND MANEUVERABILTY

To avoid the horrors of protracted firepower-at

warfare in the future, we must be sure to main

necessary but delicate symbiosis between the ability 

and the ability to maneuver. Easier said than done 

assumes that we still dwell in the third cycle of war

period that favors the defender.

As we gaze into the distant future and face the pr

of a competent enemy with both the will to fight an

means to develop or purchase his own systems of pre

firepower, the prospects of winning a third-cycle c

become even more sobering. Possessed with the in

power of the defensive and most likely defending on fa

terrain, such a foe would not necessarily have to def

tactically to win the conflict. He would most probably 

our overwhelming superiority in the air and at se

concede both. He would not have to seek victory so m

the avoidance of defeat. He would only need to preser

ground force in the face of superior firepower long eno

create stalemate and cause enough casualties fo

Americans to tire of the contest first. Again, an e

possessed with a will to fight at the beginning of a con

likely only to grow stronger over time without 

intercession and eventual domination on the ground

RESTORING THE OFFENSIVE

The restoration of the offensive as the dominant f

war will come with the appearance of a fourth cy

warfare, a cycle defined more by the new revolut

information rather than the stale remnants of the ma

age. Imagine a maneuver force possessing the ability 

with unprecedented clarity, to anticipate with unpara

sureness, to accelerate the pace of movement 

unequaled velocity, and to maintain an unrele

operational tempo. Such a force would be able to tr

the killing ground, however expansive and lethal, rela

untouched, and decide the campaign with a violen

16
debilitating movement that ends quickly with min

loss of life to all sides.

The fourth cycle of war will seek to explo

information age in order to increase the veloc

maneuver. Speed must be the essential ingredien

future landpower force. Speed will be achieved by crea

force unburdened by the logistical yoke that has lon

the principal impediment to agility and speed.

The secret of the dominance of the offensive in the s

cycle was not to be found in the tanks, personnel ca

and self-propelled artillery of blitzkrieg armies. The 

lay, instead, in the ability of a portion of the man

force—in the case of the Wehrmacht, just 10 o

divisions—to break free of the railhead long enough to 

deep into an enemy’s rear with enough sustaining str

to collapse his psychological center of gravity and h

down long enough for following forces to solidify the vi

Today the railhead has been replaced by an e

cumbersome and constrictive logistical umbilical cord

the Germans in 1940, we must develop the means to b

portion of our force free to achieve the same objectiv

information revolution promises to give us the m

Information technologies will allow us to deposit outsi

close combat zone all but those forces necessary to 

observe, and kill. Detailed knowledge of the en

strength will free us from our traditional fixati

stockpiling and “worst casing” so that we will be a

carry with us into the close combat zone only what w

when we need it. In effect, we will know enough to 

what to leave behind.

The information revolution should allow us to tra

individual elements of a force with exquisite clarit

detail. But knowledge of the enemy, alone, is not en

We must possess the means to act on what we kno

action is dependent, again, on speed. The combinat

knowledge and speed of movement will allow a 

battleforce to anticipate enemy movement and turn 

17
force-on-force engagements of past wars into surer an

costly engagements by choice.

That combination will allow a battleforce to maint

unrelenting tempo. In the chess game of opera

planning, superior battlefield awareness will enable 

stay four or five moves ahead of an opponent. Spee

allow battleforces to shift quickly about the battlef

check, block and, when conditions are optimal, strik

ratio of friendly action to enemy reaction of, again, pe

four or five to one. Thus, the object of a maneuver fo

this type will not be to kill so much as to paralyze, to e

the ability to maintain a constant advantage of posi

order to close an enemy’s options, wear him down

eventually collapse his will. Speed of maneuver offe

essential finishing function that balances our prod

ability to kill.

The imperative for speed in this new form of w

begins at home ports, airfields, and installations. A 

lethal force, shorn of its Cold War impedimenta, will b

to project itself from the homeland or from strategic 

overseas in days rather than weeks or months and ar

the operational theater ready to fight. The ability to g

a theater “firstest with the mostest” reduces risk to 

first to arrive and prevents the enemy from setting h

into an advantageous defensive position.

Early arrival will change the elemental patterns 

at the theater level. Such a campaign will allow 

simultaneous rather than sequential applications o

killing power and maneuver. Strategic speed will a

theater war to take the form of a coup de main. The b

set-piece, sequential campaigns of the industrial ag

give way to sharp, intense acts of strategic preempti

A landpower force optimized to capture the bene

the information age would take on physical characte

distinctly different from industrial age armies. First, 

force would be able to divide itself into two func

groupments: the first, essentially sustaining in char

18
might be removed from the combat zone entirely, rely

sure communications and rapid aerial logistics to d

the goods and services of war to the combat zone in ju

proper quantities just when needed.

The combat force would become the second major 

It must be compact, possessing just the people and 

necessary to sense, track, move, and kill. Many ess

combat functions necessary in contemporary armies 

displace from the ground upward into the exospher

space. This “space-to-surface continuum” between th

combat force and the information structures that sus

from above would, in fact, form the central nexus 

information-age maneuver force. In effect, space be

the new high ground. When all the services o

vertically oriented battlespace, the character of 

service missions changes from the segregated land, se

air operations to a new approach which w

characterized by total interdependence throughou

surface-to-space continuum.

UNPRECEDENTED BATTLESPACE AWAREN

The ability to see the battlefield and to know the e

combined with the speed to exploit these advantage

fundamentally change the dynamics of fire and man

A commander able to observe enemy movement wit

granularity would be able, with confidence, to divi

own forces into comparably fine increments and po

each precisely enough to control and dominate each d

bit of enemy combat power. The ability to employ 

small units at once would allow a commander to c

large operational area with discrete combat eleme

sports analogy is appropriate: a basketball team 

superior speed, agility, and understanding of the oppo

would be more effective playing man-to-man rathe

zone.

A commander with the dual advantage of spee

killing power will dominate the battlefield. Superior 

19
power allows incapacitation of an enemy force, a nec

capability, but by itself intrinsically indecisive. Su

mobility allows exploitation of the temporary adva

gained by the stunning effect of killing power.

If these two essential elements of combat pow

orchestrated with skill so that they are applied in har

an unfettered battleforce would be able to strike m

vital points simultaneously or in a sequence of our cho

In a very short time, perhaps only hours, such a force 

be able to inflict a rapid sequence of local tactical disa

The cumulative effect of these closely spaced events 

serve to dislocate and confuse an enemy to the point th

warfighting structures quickly disintegrate. This conf

dislocation, and disintegration will combine to produ

unequivocal military decision with minimum cost t

sides.

EXPERIMENTATION AND INNOVATION

The image of a landpower force to accomplish such 

is purely conceptual today. But certain realities have 

to appear dimly through the veil of the future. Firs

time when American arms will most likely be called 

win an offensive campaign cheaply, the third cycle se

tell us that the advantage goes to the defender

offensive cannot be restored by firepower alone, be

firepower cannot provide the essential decisive fu

necessary to end a campaign quickly on our ter

minimum cost. Second, even when precede

overwhelming doses of precision firepower, a maneu

force cannot hope to succeed against a determined, th

enemy if its speed of movement cannot excee

20-kilometer-per-hour pace of a third-cycle forc

information-age army must move at 10 times that ve

Finally, as in past cycles, technology promises a way 

this dilemma. The information revolution will give 

forces both the mental agility and matching physical 

20
to restore the essential balance between firepowe

maneuver on a future battlefield.

Henry Ford never met Heinz Guderian, the G

general commonly held most responsible for exp

Ford’s invention to gain victory on the battlefield. Lik

history will eventually produce the warrior wh

capitalize on the opportunities offered by Bill Gates a

revolution most often associated with his name. The 

and nationality of the warrior who someday will pr

himself the Guderian of the information age has ye

recognized. But one fact is certain: the inform

revolution will continue to alter our world 

ever-increasing pace whether we choose to engage our

in it or not.

We cannot remain fixed on the third cycle of warf

much longer. Already, competing nations are striv

chip away at America’s dominance in precision fires. S

or later someone will find a way to match or count

firepower advantage. The result may well be equilibri

the battlefield that might lead to stalemate or ev

defeat.

Imperatives for innovation and change are overdu

need to begin now to forge a new marriage be

battlefield knowledge and unprecedented landpower 

We must do no less than draw the outline for a new 

whose structure is predicated on the premise th

machine age is past and the age of information ha

begun.

21
Chapter Three

Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper, USM

Reproduced with Permission Granted by:

Summer 1997 Issue

STRATEGIC REVIEW

Volume 25, Number 3

23

PREPARING FOR WA

IN THE 21ST CENTUR
PREPARING FOR WAR

IN THE 21st CENTURY

IN BRIEF

Recurring proposals to substitute advanced tech

for conventional military capabilities, epitomized 

New Look of the 1950s, reflect a peculiarly American f

science’s ability to engineer simple solutions to co

human problems. But as Vietnam proved, techno

superiority does not automatically guarantee succ

arms. Unpredictability constitutes the enduring nat

war. Thus, success in war requires the reject

over-reliance on any single capability. America’s nex

like those that have preceded it, almost certainly w

won—or lost—on land.

The U.S. government has now embarked on its 

major reassessment of current and future mi

requirements since the end of the Cold War. Give

leadtime involved in making any significant change 

nation’s defense posture, the results of this review are 

to influence American military capabilities well in

next century. All the more reason to insist that any 

reexamination of America’s military requirements s

reflect a clear understanding of the likely charac

future war. Thus we are troubled by recent claim

technological supremacy will allow the United States 

future to abjure the use of ground combat forces in fa

delivering advanced precision weaponry from pla

remote from conflict areas.

This is not the first time we have been lured by pro

of high-tech, bloodless victory. In the early 1950s, s

promises produced the New Look, a strategy propos

rely on strategic nuclear weapons as an alternat

conventional warfare. Describing the origins of the 

25
Look, one observer noted “the American yearning for 

simple, single solution to all the bothersome and frust

complexities of living in a world of perennial con

Then, as today, optimists insisted that technological c

had rendered conventional warfare obsolete. Eve

Southeast Asia and elsewhere soon disabused them. B

resulting damage to conventional military capab

persisted long after the United States had abandon

New Look.

What overconfidence in nuclear weapons produced 

overconfidence in the microchip threatens to repr

today. Recurring proposals to substitute adv

technology for conventional military capabilities re

peculiarly American faith in science’s ability to en

simple solutions to complex human problems. The

gratify both economic and political interests. That re

true even though the practical military impa

technological supremacy over the past half-centur

been equivocal at best. Such supremacy could not p

the Netherlands’ defeat in Indonesia, France’s defe

Indochina and Algeria, America’s defeat in Vietnam

Soviet Union’s defeat in Afghanistan, or Russia’s 

recent defeat in Chechnya. All these episodes confirm 

technological superiority does not automatically gua

victory on the battlefield, still less at the negotiating ta

Nonetheless, belief in the possibility of a techno

“fix” for the challenges of war has shown aston

persistence. In addition to its impact on force postu

has significantly affected even how Americans 

military success. That influence peaked during Vietn

which reliance on body counts and other quanti

“indicators” virtually replaced strategic reasoning

while defeat in Vietnam temporarily discredited 

mechanistic thinking, some still insist that a techno

solution for war is “out there somewhere,” if only we 

discover it.

26
In an important sense, therefore, U.S. military 

remains imprisoned in an unresolved dialectic be

history and technology, between those for whom the 

prologue and those for whom it is irrelevant. Today’s d

about the preferred structure of American military 

thus in the end is a debate about the future of war itse

debate goes far beyond which weapons to buy or whet

favor this or that capability. At its heart, rarely cons

and even less often articulated, are fundame

incompatible views about the nature of war, about 

conditions produce victory and defeat—indeed, ho

should define these concepts—and ultimately, abo

purpose for which we maintain military forces in th

place.

For those placing unbridled faith in technology, w

predictable, if disorderly, phenomenon, defeat a ma

simple cost/benefit analysis, and the effectiveness 

military capability a finite calculus of targets destroy

casualties inflicted. History paints a very different p

Real war is an inherently uncertain enterprise in 

chance, friction, and the limitations of the human 

under stress profoundly limit our ability to p

outcomes; in which defeat to have any meaning m

inflicted above all in the minds of the defeated; and in 

the ultimate purpose of military power is to assure 

trial at arms, should it occur, delivers an unamb

political verdict.

Such a view of war does not discount the importa

technology. But it recognizes that technology is only 

many influences on the conduct and outcome of m

operations, an influence mediated by the nature, scop

locale of the conflict, the character and objectives 

combatants, the attitudes of local, domestic

international publics, and above all, the political iss

dispute. Acknowledging war’s inherent unpredictabi

rejects over-reliance on any single capability, 

maximum force versatility, and requires that m

27
operations conform to the peculiar conditions and dem

of the conflict itself.

America’s military forces in the 21st century 

exploit every advantage our technological geniu

supply. But as we will argue in this article, the c

ingredients of military victory or defeat will contin

reflect the enduring nature of war at least as much 

transient means used to prosecute it. And in th

America’s next war, like those that have preceded it, a

certainly will be won—or lost—on land.

The Geopolitics of Future War

From a geopolitical perspective, the world in whic

war might erupt may be indefinite, but it i

indecipherable. On the contrary, it promises to look 

like that of the late 19th century. As in that er

principal engines of economic progress will continue 

the wealthy nations of Western Europe, North Americ

the Asian rim. Political relations among these First 

nations are, if anything, more stable than those 

prevailed among the major powers after the Congr

Vienna, which inaugurated modern history’s longest 

of sustained great power peace. Healthy democr

economic interdependence, cultural affinities, an

shared memory of two appalling world wars have cre

community of interest that makes war among the dev

democracies nearly unthinkable.

Unlike the major powers for 130 years after Nap

however, today’s developed nations do not domina

remainder of the world. Instead, they confront 

developing states—some of which, like Russia, b

precariously between aspirations to join the dev

world and the threat of political, economic

demographic collapse—and Third World societies m

economic and demographic misery. Nations in both g

tend to organize on different principles and opera

different premises from those of the developed democ

28
and it is in relations within and among them that 

military challenges are most likely to arise.

While some developing nations are poised econom

to enter the developed world, neither political freedo

respect for law, two of history’s most reliable inhibi

aggression, necessarily have accompanied their eco

growth. Some like China continue to pursue irred

claims against the territory of their neighbors. Othe

Iran assert religious suzerainty over entire regions. A

access to the raw resources that fuel development. An

continue to see war as a legitimate way of achieving 

objectives. For many of these states, acquiring ter

remains a basic impulse, for prestige if for no other r

Armed aggression may not be their only or even 

preferred means. But especially among states 

authoritarian governments, the conquest of land rem

legitimate ambition, and given their own econom

strategic interests, the developed democracies c

remain unaffected.

In the meantime, vast portions of the worl

economically either stagnant or retrogressing. Whi

proximate causes may be violent, venal, or othe

misguided governments, the fundamental problem

structural. Many developing world societies re

economically dependent on subsistence agricultur

simple mineral extraction. In the meantime

introduction of modern medicine has only accelera

demographic explosion straining both their econom

political arrangements.

Among these societies, war tends to revert to its 

primitive character. Driven by ethnic or tribal riva

themselves often a function of differential popu

growth—civil warfare will fester. Populous state

launch calculated invasions of less-crowded neig

Hordes of refugees will spill across borders prov

violence. And while war in the Third World may be 

with relatively unsophisticated forces, it frequentl

29
drag on beyond any apparent strategic purpose, i

because it is aimed deliberately at depopulation. Fina

recent events in Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire illustr

often will manifest war’s worst excesses—inten

starvation, extreme brutality, and mass slaughter.

In these unhappy struggles, the developed democ

typically will seek reasons not to intervene. But as w

seen already, media-generated public revulsion may c

intervention. The visual horrors of genocide m

intolerable. Humanitarian efforts may backfire, as th

in Somalia. Or the collapse of Third World societies wh

through internal dynamics or external invasion 

threaten to destabilize an economically vital region 

point where nonintervention is imprudent.

Finally, we will continue to confront military chal

from nongovernmental groups which fall neatly into n

these categories, but whose military capabilitie

political, ideological, or economic objectives make 

impervious to restraint by the civil police power. 

groups are far from a historical novelty, but their pot

access to sophisticated military technology is un

dented. They will remain among the most difficult m

problems confronting us.

The Siren Call of Technology

While the military challenges outlined in this app

vary in origin, kind, and degree of threat to U.S. inte

all have one thing in common: In each case, strategic s

ultimately will require the direct control of land, peop

resources. In confrontations with developing states, 

likely to be about the control of territory. In Third 

episodes, it is likely to be about the control of popula

And suppressing terrorist and other nongovernm

challengers will require depriving them of pol

psychological, and material support.

30
In none of these cases is technology alone likely 

decisive, and in many cases the very nature of the c

will restrict its use. Notwithstanding, some visio

insist that emerging technologies will utterly transfo

nature of war, permitting the defeat of future adver

from a distance with no need to risk precious lives 

maelstrom of land combat. Such predictions ignor

war’s inherent uncertainty and what we have learned 

military victory and defeat in our own time.

Soldiers and Marines intuitively recognize the lim

prediction, and increasingly, even physical scientists 

that recognition. From quantum physics to meteor

science has become aware that “nonlinear” intera

pervade the natural world. We call such intera

“chaotic,” and where they predominate, confident pred

is impossible. If that is true even of the app

regularities of nature, how much more true must i

war? As Clausewitz noted long ago, “No other h

activity is so continuously or universally bound up 

chance.”

2

 Indeed, Clausewitz remains relevant 

largely because his work is “suffused with the u

standing that every war is inherently a non

phenomenon, the conduct of which changes its chara

ways that cannot be analytically predicted.”

3

The Enduring Character of War

Recognizing that, observers as far back as Thuc

have insisted that war can be perceived accuratel

through the lens of history. To be useful, military 

must be grounded in the known realities of the pa

because the past repeats itself in specific ways, but 

because it reveals aspects of war which are timeless.

One such enduring feature is the invar

subordination of war to politics. “War is not a mere 

policy,” Clausewitz asserted, “but a true po

instrument, a continuation of political activity by 

means. . . . War should never be thought of as som

31
autonomous, but always as an instrument of policy.”

4

 

way or another, political considerations always con

military operations. Allied commanders rediscovere

enduring reality at the very outset of the Gulf W

campaign, when two bombs aimed at a secret 

communications bunker in the heart of Baghdad des

not only the bunker, but also 200-odd civilians shel

inside it. Political reaction to CNN’s telecast the foll

morning resulted in the abrupt curtailment of all atta

the downtown Baghdad area.

5

 In the process, i

removed any possibility of destroying the po

infrastructure of Saddam Hussein’s tyrannical regim

As this incident confirmed, war in practice is host

political concerns that routinely preclude the unconst

employment of military means. Such concerns tend 

highly situational, hence unpredictable. For that r

alone, the mere possession of advanced technology 

guarantee of its practical utility.

The second and most pervasive of war’s end

characteristics is what Clausewitz called “fric

“Everything in war is very simple,” he observed, “b

simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumula

end by producing a kind of friction that is inconce

unless one has experienced war.”

6

 In battle, da

confusion, fear, fatigue, and discomfort combine w

hostile physical environment to curtail the eff

performance of both men and machines. Moreov

battlefields enlarge, formations disperse, and oper

accelerate, these stresses increase, even as familiar s

of physical and psychological support—proximity to 

units, lulls in activity, and the comfort of k

ground—continue to evaporate. Hence the laborat

best is an imperfect predictor of battlefield effectiv

and even where the employment of advanced techno

politically unconstrained, it is far from a military pana

The stresses of battle, finally, merely are compo

for leaders, who must make crucial decisions with littl

32
for reflection and in a welter of typically ambi

information. “In the dreadful presence of sufferin

danger,” Clausewitz reminds us, “emotion can 

overwhelm intellectual conviction, and in this psycho

fog it is . . . hard to form clear and complete insights.”

7

 

the profound danger of claims like those of c

Washington consultants who recently asserted, “Wh

[Military Technical Revolution] promises, more 

precision attacks and laser beams, is . . . to imbu

information loop with near-perfect clarity. . . .”

8

Such arguments verge on the theological, having n

scientific nor historical foundation. On the contrary, 

observer has noted,

Much of the particular information which any individ

possesses can be used only to the extent to which he hims

can use it in his own decisions. Nobody can communicate 

another all he knows, because much of the information he c

make use of, he himself will elicit only in the process of mak

plans of action.

9

Similarly in war, there simply are too many critical pi

information inaccessible to sensors and beyond the po

computers.

In an information-rich environment in which 

matters remains buried in noise, individuals at ever

are limited in both what they can absorb and what th

pass along. And the more oppressed by danger and fa

the more vulnerable they become to both inadv

misunderstanding and deliberate deception.

It is above all the interactive—indeed, antagon

quality of war that makes it unpredictable. “War 

waged against an abstract enemy,” Clausewitz poin

“but against a real one.”

10

 America’s adversaries in th

century will have options no matter what our techno

advantages. Political limitation, friction, and fog a

artifacts of history, but rather conditions imbedded 

very fabric of war. To suppose that technology 

33
eliminate them from the battlefield thus flies in the 

the natural world as it is.

Instead, 2,500 years of history confirm that amb

miscalculation, incompetence, and above all chanc

continue to dominate the conduct of war. In the en

incalculables of determination, morale, fighting ski

leadership far more than technology will determin

wins and who loses.

Distant Punishment vs. Physical Domination

Acknowledging war’s inherent uncertainty by no 

argues for ignoring technology. On the contrary, adv

information and munitions technologies already have 

significant influence on Army and Marine Corps do

Some believe they may radically alter the relatio

between maneuver and firepower, just as the tan

airplane did from 1918 to 1939. And every modern 

force must cope with increasing battlefield transpa

munitions lethality, information overload, and log

vulnerability.

Our objection is not to technology itself, but rat

claims that it will permit the achievement of victo

distant punishment alone, with no need to exert dire

continuing influence over the land, people, and res

which are war’s ultimate stakes. In addition to what h

reveals about the inherent nature of war, our own m

experience in this century argues the contrary.

That experience repeatedly has confirmed that d

punishment unexploited by the physical dominat

ground is a wasting asset. From Verdun to Cassino, th

Triangle to Al Busayyah, firepower alone, even 

delivered on a massive scale, rarely has proved capa

ejecting determined troops from the ground they o

Even massive bombing in the Gulf War, for a

destructive and demoralizing effect on the Iraqi Army

not by itself induce that army’s withdrawal from Ku

34
What is true of firepower delivered against troops 

field may be even truer of firepower delivered d

against an opponent’s civil infrastructure. In fac

evidence suggests that such efforts readily bac

particularly when directed against opponents 

leaders can manipulate their publics’ interpretat

events. We also must be concerned with the reactions 

own citizens as they watch modern weapons imp

among apparently defenseless populations, a problem 

to intensify as the developing states which represe

most probable loci of future high-intensity conflict co

to urbanize.

Some argue that the increased precision of em

munitions will limit collateral damage, making less 

both psychological stiffening on an enemy’s par

psychological revulsion on our own. But precision 

one thing applied to military forces in the field, 

another applied to heavily populated urban areas. I

fear of media reaction to the scenes of carnage even a

military targets along Kuwait’s “Highway of Death” i

explains the Bush Administration’s decision t

hostilities in the Gulf War after 100 hours, though 

objectives of the ground offensive had yet to be achie

There certainly have been a few cases in whic

limited use of distant firepower alone produced str

results. Air attacks against Libya in 1986, for exa

seem effectively to have diminished Muamar Gad

eagerness openly to challenge the United States. In 

cases, in which objectives are limited or m

demonstrative, distant punishment may well curb h

behavior. But it is unlikely in any permanent way to r

the underlying issue, as the history of the 1965-

campaign against North Vietnam underlines. Rather

such application of distant firepower risk

embarrassing possibility that the recipient simpl

ignore the attack, forcing the attacker to choose be

escalation or impotence.

35
In short, over-reliance on distant punishment ig

the psychology of an opponent’s will to resist. There 

enormous difference between enduring distant a

which however unpleasant must eventually end

enduring the physical presence of a conquering arm

all of its political and sociological implications. We s

not lose sight of the difference between a Kuwait lib

by ground forces and an Iraq still truculent and comb

however ravaged by air attack.

The fundamental limitation of distant punishm

that it commits without resolving. Notwithstandin

ease of use and apparent low risk make it decep

attractive in cases where U.S. strategic interests are l

or ambiguous. Some even have urged redesigning Am

military forces specifically for intervention in such c

Such proposals are a gilt-edged invitation to back int

and ignore everything we have learned so painfully ov

past half-century about the incremental use of force.

Ground Forces and Future War

If resolution and durability are among the 

important and irreplaceable contributions of land fo

victory in war and deterrence in peace, they are by no 

the only ones. In the geopolitical environment fo

earlier, strategic success will place a premium on m

versatility. Even the United States cannot affo

maintain capabilities tailored discretely to every pot

military challenge, nor will any single capa

accommodate all such challenges. Instead, Ame

military forces must be capable of rapid adaptatio

broad and constantly varying range of strategic task

conditions.

Ground forces remain the indispensable founda

that strategic versatility. Air and naval capab

complement but can never replace the ability to 

ground forces tailored to the peculiar condition

objectives of a given conflict. To say that in n

36
deprecates their importance. No American comm

today would consider launching ground combat oper

without command of the air and space, nor li

operations without command of the sea. Moreover, 

United States continues to shift from a forward deplo

an expeditionary force posture, dependence on 

aerospace and naval capabilities will increase mer

ensure ground forces reach the theater of operations r

and safely. Hence, to insist that future U.S. m

operations will inherently be joint is not just rhetor

rather frank acknowledgment of strategic and opera

imperatives. But only in unusual conditions will air, 

space operations alone produce decisive strategic resu

almost every circumstance, the effective integration 

components will be required.

Moreover, U.S. military forces exist to deter as w

fight. Even after a half century of practice

understanding of the dynamics of deterrence re

imperfect, but we have learned that a key requirem

making a deterrent threat credible. One of the c

arguments for relying upon the threat of di

punishment is that its presumed low risk enhance

credibility. As we have seen, however, situations in 

distant punishment alone is likely to be effectiv

precisely those in which the issues in dispute are 

fundamental. The greater the stakes, the less likel

distant attack alone will produce a favorable str

result. It follows that the greater the stakes, the less 

that the threat of such attack alone will deter.

Instead, reconciling credibility with effectiv

requires operational seamlessness. Deterrence is 

likely to succeed when complementary capab

reinforce each other, and when all contribute in a cr

way to the assurance of victory should deterrence fai

emerging precision attack systems promise more effec

to kill people and break things is not at issue. The cha

will be to translate those essentially tactical effect

strategic results. And the principal mechanism o

37
translation will remain an unrivaled land co

capability.

There is one additional reason why eme

technologies must be designed to enhance rather 

replace land power. Whether to deter or fight, th

probably will confront future adversaries as a membe

alliance. We have nearly a century of experience 

alliances. And if one lesson can be drawn from 

experience, it is that presence on the ground 

irreducible bonafide of alliance commitment, especia

the nation claiming leadership of that alliance.

Central to alliance commitment is the requirem

share risk. Thus, Sir Basil Liddell Hart’s effort in the 

to restrict the continental role of British ground forc

only diminished deterrence, but also led to doctrin

material stagnation for which the British paid a heavy 

when deterrence failed.

13

 More recently, repeated 

efforts to “rationalize” America’s NATO contributio

substituting air for ground forces in return for g

European ground force contributions invariably foun

over the principle of shared risk.

The reality is that ground combat forces represe

strongest evidence of alliance commitment. That, a

fact that their deployment alone conveys an intent

remain engaged for the duration, makes them 

irreplaceable adhesive of any military coalition.

War: A Contest of Wills, Not Machines

Any sustained period of peace challenges m

institutions. It requires holding on to the immutab

terrifying realities of war in a climate of peacetime pu

and ease, because only by an understanding of what w

been can we hope to glimpse what it will be. To prepa

the future, we must keep our grip on the past.

America’s performance in its first battles rarely ha

impressive.

14

 The Gulf War broke the mold. For 

38
America took the field with a team that was ready to 

And the result was the shortest, most successful, a

American lives least expensive, military campa

modern history.

But the military forces which won that war had 

built to fight another, and in that fact there is a 

warning for today’s planners. In an uncertain wor

dare not base force requirements on preconc

assumptions about whom we might fight in the next ce

or how. Instead, American military forces must be a

fight and win on any battlefield, under any condition

with whatever means the nature of the contest req

And to do that, America will need robust, well-equ

and sustainable land combat capabilities as far ahead 

can foresee.

Innovative application of emerging technolog

enhance those capabilities. But in the end, war is a c

of human wills, not machines, in which means m

subordinated to ends if the results are to justify the co

the world we confront, those ends are likely to be 

complicated, and the circumstances in which they m

pursued less predictable, than ever before in our hist

military posture that evades rather than accomm

that reality is doomed to expensive irrelevance.

NOTES

1. Warner R. Schilling, et al.,Strategy, Politics, and Defense B

(New York: 1962), p. 386.

2. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by M

Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: 1976), p. 83.

3. Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, a

Unpredictability of War,” International Security, Winter 1992/

61.

4. Clausewitz, On War, pp. 87-88.

39
5. Williamson Murray, Air War in the Persian Gulf (Baltimo

1995), pp. 190-192.

6. Clausewitz, On War, p. 119.

7. Clausewitz, On War, p. 108.

8. Michael I. Mazarr, et al., “The Military Technical Revolu

Structural Framework,” Center for Strategic and International S

March 1993, p. 38.

9. Friedrich Von Hayek, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Soc

in W.W. Bartley III, ed., The Collected Works of F.A. Hayek

(Chicago: 1988), p. 7.

10. Clausewitz, On War, p. 161.

11. Col. (Ret.) Richard M. Swain, “Reflections on The Rev

Critique,” Army, August 1996, p. 28.

12. Edward N. Luttwak, “A Post-Heroic Military Policy,” 

Affairs, July/August 1996.

13. Williamson Murray, The Change in the European Ba

Power, 1938-1939 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

pp. 86-91.

14. Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, America’s First 

1776-1965 (Lawrence, KS: 1986).

40
Chapter Four

Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Reproduced with Permission Granted by:

Winter 1999 Issue

STRATEGIC REVIEW

Volume 27, Number 1

41

ADAPTIVE ENEMIES

DEALING WITH THE

STRATEGIC THREAT

AFTER 2010
ADAPTIVE ENEMIES:

DEALING WITH THE STRATEGIC THRE

AFTER 2010

IN BRIEF

The history of warfare reminds us that every dom

military advantage eventually yields to a counterv

response. For more than 50 years, the United Stat

derived its current military superiority from a rema

ability to translate technological innovation and indu

capacity into effective battlefield advantages. This m

dominance has become increasingly manifest by the p

application of explosive killing power. It is only a ma

time, unfortunately, before a creative opponent will dev

method of war that will attempt to defeat our preoccu

with the science of war and the application of pre

firepower.

The history of warfare suggests a martial coroll

Newton’s fundamental law of physics: every succ

technical or tactical innovation that provides a dom

military advantage eventually yields to a counterv

response that shifts the advantage to the opposing 

America’s military dominance has been on display fo

than 50 years. It has become the standard emulated b

Western nations. The United States has derived its c

military superiority from a remarkable ability to tra

industrial capacity and technological know-how 

effective battlefield advantages—advantages that 

become increasingly manifest by the precise applica

explosive killing power. But half a century is a long ti

a method of war to have been practiced withou

43
appearance of countervailing, competitive method

will represent a real challenge—something far 

dangerous and effective than the Pentagon’s cu

buzzwords, “asymmetric warfare.” Inevitably a cr

opponent will develop a method of war that will atte

defeat our preoccupation with precision firepower.

The Established Cycle

The evolving sequence from dominance th

challenge and adaptive response has been a hallmark 

Western way of war. In combat, as well as peac

Western militaries have proven to be “complex ad

systems.” In other words, unlike the static and st

forms of combat that characterized much of the way em

and other cultures have waged war throughout h

Western military organizations have consistently ad

and innovated during both peacetime and war. This p

of successful adaptation reaches back to the very da

Western warfare. The Spartans went to sea to be

Athenians. To counter the genius of Hannibal, the R

developed the guile of Fabius and the determinat

Scipio. The longbowmen of Edward III found their ma

the tenacity and patience of du Gueschin’s band of Me

irregulars. Washington developed a body of Continen

threaten the long service professionals of Great B

Moreover, the American militia fundamentally alter

political context within which war among Euro

occurred. The British utilized the strengths of Wellin

ancient regime army with the cold hard cash produ

the Industrial Revolution to defeat the legions of Nap

In 1918, Allied armies, after heavy defeats in the s

utilized not only enemy tactics, but new technology to 

the German Army in the field. Furthermore, Ame

should not forget that armies forged in the image of M

China successfully held off and at times defeate

firepower armies of the West during the Korea

Vietnam Wars.

44
This process carries an important warning for th

military as the United States embarks on a new ce

Military organizations, particularly skilled and mot

ones, will adapt and learn on the battlefield. In fa

ability to adapt swiftly is an essential component of m

effectiveness—and as one side changes and adapts, 

eventually will the other.

Every Age Has Its Own Kind of War

The great difficulty that confronts the U.S. militar

enters a new century is that, for the most part, the se

still retain a mental and physical attachment to the c

conceptions that had their origins through innov

occurring in the 1920s and 1930s and served so well d

the Cold War. The apparent utility of these methods 

during some of the post-Cold War skirmishes ha

served to reinforce this attachment. The U.S. visio

been further clouded by a characteristic Western arro

that presumes that, to be a challenge, non-We

militaries must mimic the Western way of war. As a 

the movement within the non-Western world to di

methods to counter the Western fixation on firepow

remained shrouded in the shadows of unfamiliar m

cultures. Thus, U.S. military analysts have missed m

the recent discourse and experimentation occurring o

of the West due to the cultural schism that divid

world’s advanced industrial democracies from the 

four-fifths of the planet.

Since 1918 the foundation of the twentieth ce

Western way of war has rested on the perfection of acc

predictive firepower. The assumption has been th

explosive power of modern munitions, if delivered 

great precision at decisive points in a timely fashio

create sufficient physical and psychological dama

collapse an enemy’s will to resist. The collapse 

enemy’s will on the battlefield such as the German Ar

the Western Front in 1918 or the French Army in 1940

45
his homeland as evidenced by the surrender of Jap

1945, offers a warring state the opportunity to tra

dominance on the battlefield into decisive political re

Truth is, challenges, and effective ones at that, 

Western way of war have been germinating over th

half-century. The Japanese in the Pacific displa

skillful capacity to adapt to the challenges posed by so

and Marines in that theater. Over the course of 194

1944, the Americans had won a series of quick and de

victories by using the mobility and firepower of 

amphibious forces. But the Japanese had observed wh

Americans had been doing as well; at the end of 194

entirely revamped their approach to defending the i

still guarding the approaches to the Homeland. In Feb

1945 on the small island of Iwo Jima off the coast of J

Lt. Gen. Kuribayashi Tadamichi quite literally buri

defending forces and their artillery deep in the natur

man-made caves of Mt. Suribachi. Moreover, he order

subordinates not to launch the banzai, suicidal charge

had so characterized Japanese defenses before, an app

that had exchanged Japanese bodies for American b

and shells. When it was over virtually the entire Jap

garrison of 20,000 was dead; but the three attacking M

divisions had suffered 6,821 dead and nearly 2

wounded.

Things were even worse on Okinawa. Ther

defending Japanese army commander had more troo

more territory to defend. In effect, his defensive 

abandoned the best beaches where the Japanese th

the Americans would attack (and where they did atta

well as the entire northern two-thirds of the island. B

Gen. Ushijima Mitsuru buried his defending force u

vast array of pillboxes, switch lines, and deep bunk

carry out an extended defense of the southern port

Okinawa. Ushijima recognized that his 32d Army 

never match American firepower, but he maximized 

firepower he had. His objective was to use mortar

artillery in sufficient numbers and with enough d

46
effect so as not to cede the firepower advantage comp

to the Americans. Fighting their way through 

defensive lines, the Marines and soldiers eventuall

the island and completely destroyed the Japanese 

Army of 70,000 men (killing 70,000 Japanese civili

well). But the casualty bill in the island fighting and a

the ships forced to stand off Okinawa to support the g

forces in the face of massed Kamikaze attacks 

horrendous: 65,631 killed or wounded.

Another effort to redefine and codify an Ea

approach to defeating the Western way of war began 

mountain fastness of Manchuria immediately after t

of the Pacific war. Mao Tse-tung and his ma

developed a body of doctrine adapted from their succ

wartime guerrilla campaigns and modified their conc

fit the demands of a conventional war fought agai

enemy superior in technology and materiel.

1

 Mao per

his new way of war against the nationalists durin

Chinese Civil War fought between 1946 and 194

concepts were simple and centered around three tene

first and most important of which was “area control.” 

successful Mao’s army first needed to survive in the m

a larger, better-equipped enemy.

2

 To ensure survi

divided his army into small units and scattered them 

a broad expanse of territory. Controlling and maint

cohesion among such a disparate and scattered forc

and remained his greatest challenge.

Once his force was supportable and stable

proceeded to apply the second tenet, which was to “

and compartmentalize” Nationalist forces. The challe

this phase was to leverage control of the countryside t

a degree that the enemy gradually retreated into 

areas and along major rail and road lin

communications.

3

 The final act of the campaign dem

an ability to find the enemy’s weakest points in or

collect and mass overwhelming force against each 

sequentially, much as one might take apart a str

pearls, one pearl at a time. Mao’s new style of conven

47
war, while effective, demanded an extraordinary deg

discipline and patience to persevere under ex

hardships. It also demanded the ability to transition q

from an area control force to a force capable of fighting 

of movement.

From China to Korea

Within a year of the end of the Chinese Civil Wa

Americans severely tested Mao’s methods in Korea. D

the early days of the Chinese intervention—beginn

October 1950—the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 

misjudged the killing effect of American artiller

tactical air power. Pushed too quickly into man

warfare, the Chinese massed in the open, often in da

to expand their control over the northern portions 

Korean Peninsula.

4

 They extended their narrow li

communication farther down the mountainous sp

Korea as they advanced.

5

 But they soon found their l

support exposed to the terrible effects of America

power. The Chinese paid a horrific price for their 

Their spring 1951 offensive sputtered to a halt a

artillery and aerial firepower slaughtered Chinese so

in masses, while air interdiction cut their supply lin

forced a retreat back across the Han.

Brutal experiences led quickly to sober lessons rele

from the Chinese Civil War. As a highly skilled co

adaptive system the Chinese Army quickly adjusted 

actual conditions of this new war. Over the next two 

subsequent Chinese attacks remained limited 

controlled. The Chinese high command learned to hol

key logistic facilities north of the Yalu River well 

reach of U.S. air attacks. South of the river the C

dispersed and hid their forces while they massed only 

period immediately before launching an attack. Be

their forces were so difficult to locate and so ea

transport, mortars became the Chinese weapon of c

PLA soldiers moved at night and chiseled their front l

48
resistance deep into hard, granite mountains. Am

casualties soon mounted, while the Chinese stabilized 

casualties at a rate acceptable to their political leade

Far more Americans died in combat during this “st

phase” of the war than during the earlier period o

warfare. A cost acceptable to the Chinese became too 

to the Americans. The result was an operationa

strategic stalemate. To the Chinese, stalemate eq

victory.

6

From Korea to Vietnam

Over the next two decades the Vietnamese bor

extensively from the Chinese experience and found cr

ways to lessen the killing effect of firepower, first a

the French and then against the Americans

Vietnamese also proved highly skilled in adapting 

new challenges posed by their Western opponents

Vietminh won the battle of Dien Bien Phu again

French Army in spring 1954; the battle was a straig

conventional confrontation.

7

 The Vietminh based 

tactical and operational approach on Mao’s unconven

methods. Their conduct of the battle was remar

reminiscent of siege operations conducted by the 

during the Chinese Civil War. In both cases the se

success proved to be dispersion and careful prepara

the battlefield. The Vietminh remained scattered in 

units whenever possible to offer smaller, and thu

detectable and less lucrative targets, and to allow 

troops to live off the land. Fewer supply lines and l

sites offered even fewer opportunities for interdiction 

To win the Chinese and the Vietminh eventually n

to attack. Successful attacks demanded the ability to 

at least temporarily. The Vietminh needed to exercise 

care in massing under the enemy’s umbrella of prot

firepower. Superior intelligence provided suff

information to select the right time and place. Their 

to collect and orchestrate the movement of tens of thou

49
of soldiers at just the right moment allowed attacking 

to collapse the enemy’s defenses before French fire

could regain the advantage. This remarkable abi

“maneuver under fire” perfected against the Natio

Chinese and the French, reached new levels of refin

during the second Indo-China War against the U

States.

During the early days of the conflict, impatience a

as ignorance of the enormously more potent U.S. fire

led the Viet Cong (VC) and the North Vietnamese 

(NVA) to push too quickly for a showdown. Neverth

there is some evidence to suggest that Giap delibe

sacrificed units in the Ia Drang in 1965 to find out e

what the American capabilities were. The result, how

was that over the course of 1965 and much of 1966 t

and NVA suffered terrible casualties. But Giap le

quickly to accommodate his strategic plans to th

realities imposed by American firepower. By 196

North Vietnamese had shifted the bulk of their atten

the Marines in I Corps, a region where the NVA was 

to its logistical support and up against U.S. force

possessed substantially less firepower. Over this perio

North Vietnamese relearned the importance of disp

and patience. They redistributed their forces to keep 

most vulnerable units outside the range of Am

artillery while they moved their logistic system awa

battle areas into sanctuaries relatively safe from 

detection and strikes.

Thus, the VC and NVA dusted off and applied m

the same methods that had proven useful in previous 

wars against Western style armies, including the 

submerged bridges, overhead coverings for major fac

and practically invisible artillery positions. A

Americans developed technologies to find the enem

enemy found innovative ways to evade detection. T

consistently spoofed U.S. aerial and ground based int

stations with deceptive transmissions; they also bui

and phony roads and deployed elaborate decoys t

50
interdicting aircraft.

8

 Whenever close comba

necessary, the VC chose to attack soft support bases 

than formidable front-line forces. The enemy contin

refine its doctrine for breaking contact and withdr

quickly from firefights to lessen the exposure of its tro

American firepower. Increasingly, the VC chose to 

American units before attacking in order to rem

closely engaged that U.S. forces could use supportin

from artillery and aircraft only at considerable r

themselves. The Tet offensive represented a revers

earlier tactics, much against Giap’s wishes, but the te

casualties again forced the VC and NVA to return to a 

prudent approach. The general results of Giap’s in

approach to the Asian art of war were immediat

dramatic. By early 1969, for example, the ratio of ene

friendly casualties dropped by half, or two-thirds in 

areas, compared to the period before the Tet offensiv

Overconfidence again appeared in the N

Vietnamese high command as the South Vietn

assumed responsibility for the war on the ground. By 

the war had lost much of its unconventional n

Beginning in April 1972 main force North Vietnamese 

equipped with effective gun and missile defense

supported by tanks, artillery, and trucks pushed acro

Demilitarized Zone and against several major 

Vietnamese cities. Again, U.S. aerial firepower t

terrible toll of enemy forces until Giap’s comma

learned how to maintain mechanized formations in th

and to maneuver effectively in spite of America

superiority. When dispersion and patience once 

replaced mass and impetuosity, victory was sud

within the grasp of the North Vietnamese.

10

To be sure, victory took time. Over the next three 

American firepower continued to generate pyrotechn

impressive displays. But throughout this difficult p

Giap gained ground in the south, and, as long as the r

of the North Vietnamese leadership remained intact

rightfully recognized that ownership of enemy ter

51
would ultimately guarantee victory. His opera

challenge in the south remained unchanged. He nee

reestablish his army’s ability to survive and man

successfully while under aerial attack; once the do

and training were in place to allow this to happen on a 

scale and throughout the combat zone, battlefield s

and the ultimate outcome were no longer in question

From Vietnam to Afghanistan

Half a decade later and half a continent aw

Afghanistan, the Soviets learned the same harsh, firs

lessons of overconfidence when first-world mi

organizations confront third-world militaries which 

the will, tenacity, and skill to remain effective in th

despite complete firepower inferiority. Year after yea

Soviets arrayed themselves for conventional comba

pushed methodically up the Panjir Valley only 

expelled a few months later by a seemingly endles

psychologically debilitating series of methodica

well-placed ambuscades and minor skirmishes. Borr

a page from the American textbook in Vietnam, the S

tried to exploit the firepower, speed, and intimi

potential of armed helicopters. They employed helic

principally as convoy escorts and to provide fire supp

times, Hind helicopters proved enormously letha

effective, particularly early in the war, whe

Mujahideen were psychologically unprepared. Bu

Mujahideen eventually borrowed a page from 

Vietnamese textbook. They first learned to employ 

antiaircraft machine guns and later Stinger shoulde

missiles to shoot the gunships down in increasing num

The result of military frustration and defeat in Afgha

presaged the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The Middle East

Beginning in 1982, after nearly three decades of f

in open warfare, an alliance of Arab state and non

52
actors pushed Israeli mechanized forces out of Beirut

streets, tall buildings, and other forms of urban c

provided the Arabs just enough respite from the fire

intensive methods of the Israelis to wear away 

morale both in the field and at home. Unable to bring t

force of their superior maneuverability and shock ef

bear, the Israelis paused just short of their opera

objectives. Excessive casualties and the public ima

bloody excesses on both sides eventually resulted 

Israeli withdrawal from Beirut. This success in Beiru

provided Israel’s enemies in the region with a ne

promising method to offset the Israeli superiority in 

mechanized combat. Now a spectrum of low-tech th

that run the gamut from weapons of mass destr

delivered by crude ballistic missiles, to random a

terrorism, to children throwing rocks at soldiers, co

an increasingly frustrated Israeli military and publi

One of the more curious ironies of the recent wars 

Middle East has been the fact that Western style mil

have had great success when fighting against non-W

enemies who mimic Western firepower doctrines. Th

War is the most recent example of failed efforts by 

states stretching back through the conflicts in the M

East to 1948. In 1973 Arab armies enjoyed some meas

success while employing Western methods, but 

success was as much due to Israeli overconfidence as 

limited aims the Arabs sought. Even the People’s Libe

Army, erstwhile creator and most successful practitio

a method of war effective against a convent

firepower-centered system of war, failed when it viola

own recipe by invading Vietnam with conventiona

motorized regiments in 1979. In that war, the 

watched the extraordinary spectacle of the star 

teaching a bloody lesson to its former friend and men

53
Operation Desert Storm

During the Gulf War, despite an extraordinary l

incompetence at the highest level of the Iraqi leade

the Iraqi Army displayed considerable capacity to ad

the battlefield. As the American air campaign began t

on the destruction of the Iraqi ground forces in the K

Theater of Operations (KTO) in early February, the 

almost immediately began to adapt in order to limi

losses.

11

 By constructing berms around their tanks a

scattering them widely across the desert, the Iraqis en

that an aircraft dropping precision guided bombs 

only be able, at best, to destroy a single vehicle with 

pass. By burning tires next to operational vehicle

spoofed their tormentors into missing the real target

finally by using antiaircraft effectively they k

substantial portion of coalition aircraft at an altitude 

they were unable to do substantial damage. Th

trained Iraqi units endured several weeks of alli

bombardment with unbroken will and their co

capability essentially intact. The most impre

indication of the Iraqi ability to adapt came i

operational movement of a substantial portion 

Republican Guard during the first hours of Desert S

Elements of two divisions shifted from a southe

defensive orientation to defensive positions facing 

southwest along the Wadi al-Batin. In those positio

Tawakalna Republican Guards Division and the 50t

37th Armored Brigades would be destroyed by the U

Corps.

12

 Nevertheless, sacrifice by these units pr

time for the remainder of the Republican Guard to e

Significantly, the Republican Guard carried ou

movement in terrain and weather conditions ideally 

to interdiction and despite the overwhelming superio

coalition air power.

54
The Emergence of Future Threats

Nearly a decade beyond the defeat of the Repu

Guard, the United States military has yet to face an e

capable of doing us serious harm. Yet, if the past is pro

this vacation from violence must end eventually. It 

too soon to postulate who our significant competitor 

be. However, it seems reasonable to anticipate with 

degree of certainty that a major military threat to ou

national interest is not likely to arise from the 20 

developed industrialized democracies. Although w

among or between mature democratic states 

impossible, such a prospect is highly improbable. Lik

the huge number of states at the opposite end 

have-and-have-not continuum are not likely to p

serious military threat either. These “failed states,” m

in the developing world, will certainly continue to c

Western humanitarian and peacekeeping assistance

sure, some may seek to do us harm. But the des

economic condition of these states will simply deny the

means to threaten either our vital national interests 

interests of our allies.

In between these two extremes lies a group of 

most likely to become candidates for serious m

competition in the next century. Some of these so

“transitional states,” located primarily in Europ

Middle East and Asia, are already beginning to devel

economic means to generate income to support 

sophisticated militaries. While they may expand mili

a certain number of them will fail to develop a concom

facility with democratic institutions. Thus, we s

anticipate that perhaps by the end of the next decade 

transitional states will be able to procure the m

means and build a collective will to challenge W

interests seriously within their respective regio

influence. And should these threatening states be ast

near a region whose continued stability is vital 

55
interest of a Western nation, we must be prepa

respond by force if necessary.

Increasingly, non-Western militaries are ident

and internalizing the lessons of recent wars. Their 

recent thoughts and writings concerning the opera

and tactical problems confronting them in a fight a

Western style military organizations suggests some 

warnings for the future. First, non-Western mil

understand that the West does possess vulnerabilit

aversion to casualties and excessive collateral dam

sensitivity to domestic and world opinion, and an app

lack of commitment to prepare for and fight long wars

perceive that Americans in particular still re

committed to a style of war focused primarily on the 

dimension of precision strike. They are already th

about how to target Western vulnerabilities 

capitalizing on the three inherent advantages they po

time, will, and the inherent power of the defensive. Ta

page from Mao and Giap, our potential future oppo

have learned the value of time and patience. From 

perspective, swift success is not essential to ult

victory. In particular, the Chinese experience sugges

the maintenance of an army in the field at all costs, e

the face of the most damaging punishment, must be th

rule of war—a lesson not entirely surprising to stude

the American Revolution.

13

The second lesson apparent to our potential oppon

that it is imperative to interfere with an intruding p

intention to end the conflict quickly and at minimum 

Thus, the logic of their strategy will lead to effort

impede rather than prevent the intrusion of a W

opponent. In recent wars, non-Western armies have le

to limit the damage and duration of air campaig

dispersing their forces in the field and by distri

telecommunications, logistics, and transport

infrastructures as widely as possible. Moreover

understand that sophisticated air defense networks, 

effectiveness depends on airfields, surface-to-air m

56
sites, and complicated and vulnerable command and c

nodes, have become more of a liability than an asset. A

time, patience, and a willingness to sacrifice can subs

for technological sophistication. A few guns and m

scattered about the countryside, capable perhaps o

shooting down the occasional intruder, may be eno

raise the level of frustration and impatience of the at

sufficiently to limit an air campaign.

The experience of the Gulf War has also sugges

potential future opponents that they must not allo

United States unfettered use of air bases in surrou

territory. Their first option will be the use of in

diplomatic and political pressure to prevent U.S. force

gaining access to airfields. Our recent experiences 

Gulf suggest how effective this approach may prove 

But even if American air forces gain access to foreign 

U.S. troubles will not be over. We can expect that th

the means of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and s

forces, any future opponent will attack the airfield

which the U.S. will conduct any future air campaign

the North Koreans, the sole remaining vestige of St

militarism, are striving with their missile and weap

mass destruction programs to ensure that they ha

means to interfere with the movement of U.S. force

the Korean peninsula, should war break out.

Once conflict on the ground begins, potential oppo

understand they must capitalize on their superior m

offset the superior firepower and precision technol

Western armies. They will capitalize on the advanta

being on the defensive in or near their own territory. A

gain confidence, they will search for opportunities to 

sufficient force to achieve local successes. As in t

campaign, the enemy will seek to frustrate Western g

forces by employing just enough modern weapon

extend the campaign indefinitely. A few precision 

missiles against major logistic bases will add to the ca

bill that Western militaries must explain to their c

populations back home. The object will not be de

57
victory, but stalemate, stalemate that if continued f

prolonged period of time will inevitably result in the e

of Western political support for the conflict.

Early Signals of Change

As non-Western militaries develop concep

defeating the American firepower-centered method o

the character and composition of their forces will 

change. The impulse that existed during the Cold W

mimic Western force structures is rapidly disappe

Foreign militaries that were once Cold War clon

taking on identities unique to their own cultur

societies. The mountains of metal, consisting of exp

yet often second-rate air, sea, and ground machines 

that today serve as potentially lucrative targets in a c

against modern Western militaries are ra

disappearing. Non-Western armies, in particula

getting lighter. The need to survive and remain ef

against the threat of overwhelming Western killing po

forcing them to develop means to disperse, hide

possible eliminate the vulnerable logistics, transport

and telecommunications facilities that now character

Western way of war.

Evidence of this trend lies in the shopping lists of 

wealthier non-Western militaries. Instead of invest

sophisticated aircraft and blue water fleets, mo

purchasing or developing cheap weapons of 

destruction and methods of delivering those wea

Mines, both sea and land, as well as distributed air d

weapons add credence to the conclusion that the int

these militaries is to use such weapons as a means t

potential enemies at bay. Most money and attention is 

toward land forces because armies provide po

legitimacy in non-democratic states. They are the 

useful instrument for regional wars of aggression, as w

the surest means for suppressing internal dissen

thwarting troublesome outsiders. For that reason the 

58
corps of non-Western states are becoming more m

professional, and better educated. A visit to any of the 

vigorous military educational institutions in the em

world underlines a renewed sense of intellectual cu

and a willingness to study the tenets and theory of w

their own terms. Younger officers, no longer fettered 

ideological constrictions of the Cold War, are seek

discover ways of fighting that conform to their own u

cultures, local threats, and regional circumstances.

The Information Age—A Neutral Ally

At present there are too many in the U.S. and 

Western military organizations who believe that th

best address the appearance of a major competitor 

next century by exploring the technologies o

information age to develop ever more effective me

finding the enemy and killing him from a distance. 

are a number of troubling concerns with this premis

most obvious is that the information revolution w

neutral in this looming competition; in fact it may fav

competition more than it favors Western militaries be

potential enemies will be able to tailor new technolo

their particular style of war without beco

information-dependent. On one hand, the increasing 

information is quite literally drowning commanders, 

and intelligence organizations. This is the crucial pr

of the information age—one that we have yet to solv

evidence is already clear that information technolog

not simplify the decision-making process, but in fact 

it more complex. Our future opponents, however, 

their expectations and aims, will require muc

information to strike effectively—particularly since 

aim is not to win a decisive victory. They will be, mor

less dependent upon the microchip to conduct their m

of warfare. A thinking opponent will quickly realize th

intensive reliance on information age technologies be

a weakness that can become an asymmetric target.

59
A reading of current military writing from a

particularly Asia, reveals that many armies are a

placing extraordinary emphasis on information oper

and information warfare. At present American analys

taking considerable comfort in the observation tha

have made serious investments in information warfa

precision systems similar to those possessed by W

military organizations. What, however, they fail to 

that Asian armies already understand that advan

information technologies will favor their style of w

just as much as it does the Western style. In particul

internet and wireless, non-nodal communications wil

dispersed armies to mass rapidly. As information be

more secure and information centers more disperse

less vulnerable, potential opponents will wield more f

and agile land forces. Moreover, they will be able to 

their forces into smaller and thus less detec

increments. In perhaps one of the strangest pot

ironies of the future, Western information technolog

well provide non-Western armies solutions to two v

problems. First, cellular technology and the interne

allow them to maintain a concert of action for long p

among widely dispersed units. Second, these 

technologies will allow them to orchestrate the 

massing of dispersed units when opportunities ar

transition to the offensive.

The result may well be a technological foot rac

either side could win. As we develop the technologies 

and kill an enemy, our potential opponents will devel

technologies to become even more difficult to find

prospect becomes even more sobering when one con

the fact that the commercial sector is now in the pro

providing future competitors with the tools they ne

our research centers continue to perfect non-

distributed, and netcentric global information techno

for paying customers on a worldwide basis. Mor

potential U.S. opponents do not have to spend a dime 

development of any of these systems. And again we 

60
remember that such opponents have a very dif

strategy in mind for the next war. They have only to cr

stalemate and inflict sufficient casualties on Western 

to raise political difficulties for the political leader

decided to intervene (in the words of Nevile Chamberl

“a quarrel in a far away country between people of wh

know nothing.”

The Warnings Are Real

Clausewitz provides us with a harsh and ac

warning about the fundamental nature of war:

War, however, is not the action of a living force upon a lifel

mass (total nonresistance would be no war at all), but alwa

the collision of two living forces. The ultimate aim of wag

war . . . must be taken as applying to both sides. Once aga

there is interaction. So long as I have not overthrown 

opponent I am bound to fear he may overthrow me. Thus, I 

not in control: he dictates to me as much as I dictate to him.

1

It is this fundamental Clausewitzian point 

Western, and American military organizatio

particular, are in danger of forgetting. Our pot

opponents in the next century will have thought lon

hard about how to attack our weaknesses.

The less than sterling performance of the U.S. m

in two recent wars against thinking, creative, re

Asian militaries possessed with their own will, should 

Americans cautious about an over-reliance on a style 

focused primarily on the advantages of superior firep

There is no compelling evidence in the modern hist

war to suggest that the killing effect of modern weap

sufficient to break the will of a determined opponen

survival of Waffen SS and Wehrmacht defenses, se

attrited though they might have been by the m

bombardment of Allied air forces, is one more indica

how tenacious the human will can be under the wo

circumstances.

61
To be sure, firepower can be paralytic in its effec

paralytic effects by fire are always fleeting. Armies 

shown time and again that they can become inured 

paralytic effects of fire and can even learn creative w

lessen its destructive effects. Add to this factor the ab

non-Western armies to utilize the advantages of time, 

will, and the power of the defensive, and the 

American advantage of superior killing power be

much less persuasive as an instrument of war t

appears on first consideration.

Our experience in wars recently passed should se

both a guide and a caution as we prepare today f

prospect of facing some opponent on a future battlefiel

United States must choose its wars carefully and ref

allow an inflated opinion on the utility and effectiven

precision weapons to push for involvement in a confli

precision strike and distant punishment cannot w

themselves. The experience of Vietnam should pro

sobering caution. To a considerable extent the Am

military embarked on that conflict believing that air 

and technology could deliver far more than they ac

could in the face of a clever and ruthless opponen

consistently adapted and changed to every new inno

the American military brought to the war.

Notes

1. Mao Zedong, “On the International Front Against Fa

Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol III (Beijing: Foreign La

Press, 1967); William H. Whitson, The Chinese High Comm

History of Communist Politics, 1927-1971, (New York: Praege

1973).

2. Mao Zedong, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol I and 

(Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1975 and 1967).

3. Frederick Fu (F.F.) Liu, A Military History of Modern 

1924-1949 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956).

4. Bin Yu, “What China Learned from Its Forgotten War in 

Strategic Review, Summer 1998.

62
5. Russell Spurr, Enter the Dragon: China’s Undeclar

Against the U.S. in Korea, 1950-51 (New York: Newmarket Press

6. T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War (New York: The Ma

Company, 1963).

7. Bernard B. Fall, Dien Bien Phu: Hell is a Very Sma

(Philadelphia; Lippincott, 1967).

8. Earl H. Tilford, Crosswinds: The Air Force Setup in V

(Texas: Texas A & M Press, 1993).

9. Cecil B. Currey, Victory at Any Cost: The Genius of Vie

Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, Inc, 199

274-280.

10. Don Oberdorfer, Tet! (New York: Doubleday, 1971); and 

J. Wirtz, The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War (New 

Cornell University Press, 1991).

11. Robert H. Scales, Certain Victory: The US. Army in the G

(Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff United States Army

12. Ibid.

13. Mao Zedong, On Protracted War, Selected Works 

Tse-tung, Vol III (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1967).

14. Carl Von Clauswitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael H

and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

63
Chapter Five

Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Reproduced with Permission Granted by:

Spring 1999 Issue

STRATEGIC REVIEW

Volume 27, Number 2

65

A SWORD WITH TWO

EDGES:

MANEUVER 

IN 21ST CENTURY

WARFARE
A SWORD WITH TWO EDGES:

MANEUVER IN 21ST CENTURY WARFA

Battles are won by slaughter and maneuver. The greater t

general, the more he contributes in maneuver, the less 

demands in slaughter.

1

 Winston Churc

An observer standing in the midst of the F

positions on the heights of La Marfee can clearly ma

the crossing points across the Meuse River seiz

German infantry on the afternoon of 13 May 1940. T

was bright and cloudless. The French held the comma

heights in strength. Their two hundred guns rang

ground over which German columns inched their w

assembly areas on the east bank. Yet, the cro

succeeded. Within four hours the 1

st

 Rifle Regi

supported by Infantry Regiment Grossdeutschland

crossed the river in strength and ruptured French de

irreparably. Over the course of the evening, French t

who held most of the tactical cards, dissolved in pa

one of those rare moments of cataclysmic impact, a 

afternoon’s combat sufficed to open the door to the co

of the most respected army in the world. The result 

the fate of the Third Republic.

How could it have happened? Any student of 

knows that a river crossing against a defended shore 

most difficult of all tactical maneuvers. In such a man

the assaulting side requires overwhelming superio

firepower and mobility. Yet the Germans had ne

Historians have tended to ascribe the German succ

superiority in mechanized warfare. In fact, the c

67

1. Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, 1915 (New York, 1923), p. 
assault that broke the back of French resistance re

from the efforts of infantry and combat engineers pa

across the Meuse in rubber boats. The battle culmina

the Wehrmacht’s favor 12 hours before German eng

completed the bridges necessary to carry German 

across.

The Germans succeeded because of the excelle

their operational method–one that played out o

battlefield like a superbly orchestrated symphony

instruments of blitzkrieg–tactical aircraft, tanks, inf

sappers, and artillery–each added their own u

harmonic at the right time and in proper balance. 

managed to balance the brute strength and psycho

intimidation offered by firepower with the spee

physical paralysis provided by rapid movement. This 

of fire and maneuver resulted in a seamless, unrel

offensive that made the German assault on Sed

overwhelmingly decisive. The German success 

triumph, not of overwhelming mass or firepower, but o

applied in harmony using intellect, foresight, imagi

and will.

Victory in France had its roots in Germany’s def

World War I. Decades of introspection and disciplined 

during the inter war years taught the Germans a c

lesson about the relationship between technology a

nature of war. Modern rifled weapons had upset the b

between the ability of armies to prepare the attack 

and their ability to use maneuver against the en

vulnerable points. The battlefield had become so va

lethal that soldiers attacking on foot could no longer 

no-man’s-land with sufficient strength intact to a

decisive results.

What the Germans understood in developing 

doctrine was that, given the dispersion of troops, conf

and chaos characterizing modern warfare, top-down c

was no longer in the cards. It worked for Napoleon be

he could see virtually the entire battlefield at Aust

68
But it was no longer a possibility on a battlefield whe

only distance but the very violence and confusion of m

war separated soldiers and units. Troops now h

understand the objective and then, as the ope

unfolded, adapt their responses to the tactical situatio

existed. Above all they must not wait for their comma

to tell them what to do. Rather, dependin

circumstances, they had to act in accordance with 

training, intuition, and understanding of the imm

situation. 

The balance and harmony between maneuver an

remained the essential imperative of maneuver w

through the remainder of the machine age. They form

nexus of American combat doctrine during the last dec

the Cold War. “AirLand Battle,” developed jointly 

Army and the Air Force in the early 1980’s, represent

final maturation of mechanized warfare, combinin

aerial and ground dimensions into the instrumen

proved so effective in the Gulf War. But, in retrospec

doctrine and the Gulf War appear as the final refinem

a machine age fast disappearing. As the machine age 

with the appearance of a new millennium, the respons

of U.S. military leaders is to anticipate and prepare 

new age.

The information age promises to change the con

war as decisively as the machine age altered war in th

and 20th Centuries. The challenge today is not unlik

faced by a previous generation of military thinker

sought to anticipate how changes in technolog

geopolitics would affect future wars. Unfortunatel

recent success of U.S. forces in the Gulf may well 

American military leaders to misjudge the cours

duration of future war in the next century. The p

fixation on firepower and bloodless wars may well cau

U.S. military to develop a 21st Century version 

methodical battle that brought catastrophe to the F

Army and nation. History provides ample warning 

single-dimension approach to war is risky and dang

69
Adaptive military organizations quickly learn h

counter technical and tactical advantages that ofte

provide their possessors fleeting advantage.

2

War in the 21st Century: What Won’t Change?

Thinking about war in the next century, m

innovators need to grapple with a number of ess

questions. The most obvious has to do with wha

change and what will remain the same. On the ans

those two questions rides a host of others: What will 

role of technology? What kind of asymmetric possib

are open to our opponents? What will be the unde

principles of command and control? What ar

vulnerabilities of U.S. military forces, and perhaps 

important, what is it that U.S. military power will n

achieve in terms of operational results? In the end Am

preparations and thinking about force structur

doctrine for the next century should aim at ensuring t

the tactical and operational levels of war, U.S. m

forces will imitate the Germans and not the French 

the Meuse.

As has been the case throughout the past 2,000 

political concerns will undergird the conduct of 

Clausewitz’ trinity of people, government, and militar

the ambiguities that relationships among 

involve–will determine the parameters within whi

United States will employ military force. And con

with the political dimension will be the will of the U

States as well as of its opponents. In the Vietnam W

American military and government fought a limite

while its opponents engaged in a war of “na

liberation”–a total war.

3

 Thus the political context w

which America fights will prove as critical in the 

70

2. Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr., “Adaptive Enemies,” Strategic 

Winter 1999.

3. See in particular Harry Summers, On Strategy (Carlisle, PA, 1981
century as it has in the past centuries. If the politic

does not exist, then all the military power is of litt

Moreover, the United States will fight its wars in th

century for political purposes and that will deman

occupation of territory as opposed to simply smash

the landscape.

4

Equally important to thinking about war in the fu

the fact that there are certain immutable facets to h

conflict that technology cannot change. Contrary 

claims of some current theorists, technology alon

never eliminate the fear, confusion, ambiguity, fo

friction of battle. Such claims represent the rebirth 

technological mechanistic view of the world tha

American military took with it to Vietnam.

5

 Ever

that modern science (not to mention history) indicates 

the world is that mankind lives in a nonlinear unive

immense complexity. The American military can a

superiority of battlefield information, and we must d

order to exploit fully our technological superiority

human beings will never gain anything approa

complete information dominance, because inform

alone does not, and will never equate to knowledg

wisdom about the enemy. As Clausewitz suggested 

War: “War ...is not the action of a living force upon a l

mass...but always the collision of two living [thi

forces.”

6

 Our opponents will have limitless opportun

71

4. Paul Van Riper, USMC and Robert H. Scales, Jr., “Preparing for Wa

21

st

 Century”, Strategic Review, Summer 1997.

5. In his memoirs McNamara ascribes the American difficulties in Vie

the following cause: “Uncertain how to evaluate the results of t

without battle lines, the military tried to gauge its progres

quantitative measurements such as enemy casualties (which 

infamous as body counts), weapons seized, prisoners taken, sortie

and so on”. We later learned that many of these measures were mis

or erroneous. Robert Strange McNamara, In Retrospect, The Trag

Lessons of Vietnam (New York, 1995), p. 48.

6. Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, 1975), p. 77. For a clear dis

of why Clausewitz will remain as relevant in the next century as has 

this century see Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Non-Linearity, a

Unpredictability of War”, International Security (Winter 1992/199
find a way to win regardless of whatever techno

superiority we might possess. And as the Vietnam 

suggests, they will react with intelligence, imaginatio

sophistication. The intellectual source of the Ge

success at Sedan was derived from the 1933 edition 

German keystone manual, Die Truppenführung (“

Leadership”). It suggested all too accurately that:

Situations in war are of unlimited variety. They change of

and suddenly and are only rarely from the first discerni

Incalculable elements are often of great influence. T

independent will of the enemy is pitted against ours. Fric

and mistakes are everyday occurrences.

7

Firepower and maneuver will continue to be the c

determinates of how military operations play out o

21st Century battlefields. The relationship between 

two primal variables will also follow the patterns o

wars. Rarely has superior firepower determine

outcome of a war. Armies and nations have disp

remarkable resiliency in enduring sustained punis

wrought by bombs, artillery and missiles. In World W

four years of strategic bombardment were not suffic

break the will of either the Nazi regime or the G

people. Years of extensive bombing over Vietnam fa

reduce the flow of troops and supplies to support the 

the south. In the Gulf War, despite relentless pound

coalition forces, Saddam Hussein refused to withdra

forces from Kuwait.

8

 While firepower kills, it can

72

7. Chef der Heeresleitung, Die Truppenführung (Berlin, 1993), p. 1.

8. Robert H. Scales, Jr., Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gu

(Washington, DC, 1993), pp. 368-69. See also Williamson Murray, A

in the Persian Gulf (Baltimore, MD, 1995), p. 307. Murray makes th

that if Saddam had been allowed to withdraw from Kuwait wi

ground campaign, he would have been able to make the claim that h

had stood unbeaten and unbroken in the field. In effect the Iraqi

have been able to create another Dolchstoß legend, as the Germa

had done after its defeat after World War I.
itself achieve the political objectives required for vi

Even when delivered on a truly massive scale it has 

succeeded in ejecting determined troops from the g

they occupy.

10

But maneuver by itself also has inherent limita

Depending on the experience of soldiers and their le

the unexpected presence of enemy forces in their rea

their flanks, while disconcerting, rarely leads to 

collapse. Stonewall Jackson’s brilliant maneuver in h

Hooker’s exposed flank at Chancellorsville would pro

have failed against a more resolute opponent.

11

 

MacAuthur’s success at Inchon began with a succ

amphibious landing behind North Korean line

collapse of Communist forces occurred only after the

lost a bitter struggle to hold Seoul. 

Decisive maneuver is extremely difficult to e

because the complexity of maneuvering many thousa

individuals across the landscape demands extraord

skill and no small amount of luck. The risk is alway

that the inherent friction so much a part of land warfa

quickly turn the most brilliant plan of maneuver 

costly slugging match where the victor will be th

willing to endure and suffer the most. Maneuver is m

the more difficult because it is inherently an offensive 

and, as Clausewitz cautioned two centuries ag

defensive is inherently the stronger form of war

maneuvering side must by necessity risk exp

detection and destruction to a much greater degree th

defender. Clausewitz’ caution is made all the more s

by a corollary which suggests that the power of the def

73

9. See William Hawkins, “Back to Vietnam? Iraq and the Limits of Air 

Strategic Review, Spring 1998, pp. 43-50. See also Williamson Murr

War in the Persian Gulf: The limits of air power”, Strategic Review, 

1998.

10. See Paul Van Riper and Robert H. Scales, Jr., “Preparing for War in 

Century”, Strategic Review, Summer 1997, pp.14-20.

11. It is worth noting that the majority of the Union Corps Comman

Chancellorsville voted against a withdrawal.
becomes greater still when the state of weapons tech

allows firepower systems to dominate the battlefield

corollary has not been evident in our most recent co

because we were the only side to possess the most m

precision firepower weapons. But if the past is prologu

favorable condition cannot last for long. Eventually a 

foe will copy or counter our precision advantage, a

may well discover the truth of the corollary painfully 

we find the technology to reverse the firepower advant

It is only when one side exploits the effects of fire

by maneuver that an enemy force begins to fall victim 

psychological dislocation of its fighting elements

resulting psychological collapse spreads throughou

defeated force and eventually leads to paralysis.

12

when paralysis occurs can the attacking side ga

overwhelming decision it seeks at minimum cost to 

Thus it is the combination, the subtle, sym

interrelationship between fire and maneuver that p

the decisive force necessary to end a contest qu

Firepower temporarily paralyzes and impairs the e

and thus creates opportunities to translate a temp

advantage into a lasting one through exploitati

maneuver. 

War in the 21st Century: What Will Change?

Some aspects of future war will be decidedly dif

from today. For one thing, our enemies will be differen

American military is being carefully watched by thos

some day might wish us harm. Potential opponen

opportunity and advantage in the way we have com

ourselves in recent conflicts. They are increasingly c

74

12. As Clausewitz, who had experienced military catastrophe, su

“When one is losing, the first thing that strikes one’s...intellec

melting away of numbers. This is followed by a loss of ground...Nex

the break-up of the original line of battle, the confusion of units, 

dangers inherent in the retreat...The feeling of having been defeated

on the field of battle had struck only the senior officers, now runs t

the ranks down to the very privates.” Clausewitz, On War, p. 254.
to believe that the American fixation on precision 

makes it possible to win simply by avoiding d

Tenacity, patience, and a willingness to sacrific

effective counters to a high tech foe who has technolo

little stomach for protracted conflict. The techno

demands of hostile forces whose only objective is to 

losing are most certainly modest. 

A major war, anywhere in the world, may de

massive deployments of U.S. forces from North Am

into areas where no base structure exists or where, e

the bases exist, there will be direct threats from e

cruise and ballistic missiles.

13

 Moreover, the projec

U.S. military power may demand a forced entry into 

where the enemy has found the opportunity to hunker 

and prepare defenses to meet an expected American t

Just enough precision or counterprecision weaponry w

sufficient to inflict unacceptable casualties on Am

forces. Sea mines, submarines, conventional brown 

vessels and cheap weapons of mass destruction wil

intruders away from a hostile enemy’s shore.

The Gulf War and the lethargic reactions of the 

military to Coalition military operations should not s

how future opponents will fight in the next century

must be prudent enough to give them credit for 

substantial advantages. First we must assume t

prospective opponent will possess a high degree of po

and military competence. If they are competent an

led, then we must also concede to them an advantage 

and tenacity to resist. Our future enemies under

clearly that in any conflict time will be our enemy a

enemy’s friend. He may lose all of his battles and still 

75

13. See among others on the changed strategic framework for war in t

century, Williamson Murray, “Preparing to Lose the Next War,” S

Review, Spring 1998.

14. To understand the weaknesses of the Iraqi military before the Gulf W

must possess and understanding of the nature of the Iraqi regi

Saddam Hussein’s tyranny. The best book on this subject remain

al-Khalil, Republic of Fear, The Politics of Modern Iraq (Berkley, 1
long as he preserves legitimacy by maintaining con

his army in the field. 

In all likelihood he will field greater numbers. As w

in the Gulf a mass of undisciplined, unmotivated, 

trained soldiers can be as much an impediment 

advantage. But just enough training with equipmen

modern enough to be marginally effective aga

technologically superior opponent may well provide 

sophisticated but determined opponent with a force di

to defeat quickly. Armed in all probability with advan

of massive numbers, determination and willingn

endure, a future enemy will not need to match us syst

system to remain viable on the battlefield long enough 

to tire of the conflict and withdraw.

Regardless of advantages in mass and will, no th

enemy will follow a doctrine that exposes his for

destruction from American aerial delivered pre

firepower. Over time he must transition from a Sovie

linear offensive doctrine centered around massive ar

maneuvers to a more cautious doctrine that emphasiz

defense and control of broad areas of territory. Ta

units will disperse to the greatest extent possible 

retaining the ability to mass on demand. The enem

divide his combat forces into increasingly sm

increments with more and more empty spaces app

between them.

The Size, Shape and Pattern of the 20th Centu

Battlefield

So what then might the battlefield of the next ce

look like, and how can the U.S. military leverage 

capabilities to take advantage of a potential oppo

weaknesses? To begin with, we must understand 

maneuver warfare aims to do and what its fundam

philosophy will remain. First, maneuver aims to d

and then to destroy the enemy’s equilibrium. Consequ

it is not maneuver for its own sake that is the primary 

76
of maneuver war, but rather combining firepowe

maneuver in such fashion that the enemy’s entire com

and control structure can no longer function. In other 

he can no longer respond in a coordinated fashion 

moves of his opponent. This then will have imp

implications for how the American military should p

forces to operate in the next century.

The first characteristic of future battle that will 

the nature of American war in the next century is th

battlefields will be very distant and, in all likel

located in regions of the world both remote 

inhospitable. Getting to these places will in itself requ

act of maneuver, in this case strategic maneuver, j

critical a task to success as maneuver on the battlefi

we, as a nation, are to win quickly at minimum cost we 

arrive early in a conflict, hopefully early enough to int

with the deployment scheme of the enemy, perhaps 

enough to place forces on the ground between the enem

his operational objectives. Imagine how much more q

and painlessly the Gulf War might have concluded 

August 1990 we had anticipated Saddam’s inten

possessed a maneuver force with strategic ve

sufficient to have arrived in time to block the movem

the Republican Guard into Kuwait. To be sure, th

today, we can project both firepower in the form of t

aircraft and presence in the form of light ground force

we did not have then nor do we yet have maneuver 

able to arrive quickly and fight enemy main force 

decisively. 

Well into the next century, once precision weapon

reached the arsenals of the world’s most prom

militaries, the shape and character of the battlefie

change fundamentally. Armies will adapt, as they a

have, to revolutionary improvements in weaponr

develop effective ways to either copy or counter them

process of adaptation is both natural and inevitabl

battlefield will continue to empty as armies seek to 

the destructive effects of precision firepower. Again, 

77
continuing and spontaneous process that has been w

since the first precision revolution started thinnin

battlefield with the introduction of rifled ordnance 

mid nineteenth century. Union and Confederate for

Gettysburg were packed to a density of approxim

26,000 soldiers per square mile. On a World W

European battlefield a firefight on terrain simi

Gettysburg might involve several battalions of about 

men. In Desert Storm the battlefield of Gettysburg 

easily have been covered by a mechanized company 

attack. 

On a future battlefield with precision weapons 

hands of both sides we can anticipate the batt

spreading out even further. Gettysburg might well bec

platoon position of perhaps three dozen soldiers and 

weapon systems. With densities that thin, traditional 

of machine age maneuver will no longer be nece

Armies spread over vast distances and divided int

smaller tactical increments will no longer be assa

through the use of linear constructs of the direct a

penetration or envelopment. Clausewitz’ centers of g

and Jomini’s decisive points will no longer be 

identified, nor will they be geographically centere

concentrated. Highly rigid air defense grids, intercon

communications nodes and logistic networks of the pa

give way to porous, distributed, and autonomous form

able to absorb repeated precision strikes with little 

people or effectiveness. No amount of precision wea

will be able to destroy robust formations divided into 

increments spread over vast distances. The challeng

enemy so arrayed will be to retain control and co

among so many dispersed and isolated elements o

battlefield. Curiously, information age technologies 

form of satellites and cellular telecommunications ma

provide him with just the right tools to spread hims

and still retain the ability to mass on demand. 

testimony to the curious nature of our times

78
technologies spawned by information based societie

well be turned against them on some future battlefie

So how then must we operate in the future to achie

moral and psychological collapse necessary for de

maneuver warfare? Let’s begin with a restatement of 

the immutable principle of warfare. War in pr

requires the application in the proper balance betwe

ability to maneuver and the ability to destroy. As 

optimizes his operational method to accommodate o

makes himself increasingly vulnerable to the 

Misjudgments concerning the true state of balance be

fire and maneuver greatly increased the risk of catast

failure. The balance could get substantially out of 

because of political or doctrinal misjudgments or by on

being too slow to adjust to opportunities offered by adv

in technology. As the French demonstrated at Seda

natural response to the threat of an attack by fire w

hunker down, spread out and concentrate on domi

the battlefield by firepower. But this so called meth

style of war made them particularly vulnerable to assa

maneuver. The Germans saw opportunities for counte

method of war that had become unbalanced in fa

firepower and therefore vulnerable to maneuver. As o

become more fixated on surviving precision strike, s

opportunities must inevitably arise. 

To defeat a dispersed enemy we must disperse ours

Close combat will become a contest for control of territ

vast battlefield thinly held will provide unoccupied 

that can be assaulted and occupied at minimal cost

the enemy can be collapsed by interposing forces be

and among his widely scattered formations. We will p

the ability to see, sense, and track with great clari

ability secured by our control of the vertical dime

Unblinking eyes in the exosphere and space will chang

soldiers define key terrain. In past wars the de

advantage went to the side occupying the high g

Command of observation insured command of ter

Thus, from Little Round Top to Monte Casino to Pork 

79
Hill the infantryman’s bloody obligation has been t

the hill. But our exploitation of the potential promi

satellites and high altitude remotely piloted vehicle

create a new high ground gained and dominat

information age technology rather than blood. Ground 

will now be able to nest on almost any piece of groun

still command their surroundings. The enemy will no 

be able to predict when and where American forces wi

in their midst. Frontal attack, ambushes and m

engagements, long the most costly events in ground co

will be less likely. Fewer soldiers in contact with the e

and occupying uncontested ground events will surely r

the cost of ground combat tremendously.

The ability to maneuver and occupy territory takes 

from the enemy his first tenet of success: area con

highly mobile and sophisticated ground maneuver 

capable of operating in small units scattered acro

countryside will deny the enemy refuge and sou

sustenance. Our superior ability to see the battlefiel

unparalleled clarity coupled with our ability to occ

control key points will take away his ability to assem

scattered forces without risking piecemeal destruct

fire. A soldier’s eyes on every target will ensure th

right and most vital targets are hit. Our inform

advantage will help us to reduce the threat of surpri

ambush and will allow us to select and strike or capt

enemy’s own centers of gravity and decisive poin

matter how well hidden or scattered.

Regardless of how compelling the argument might 

maneuver as an essential component for achiev

decision on a future battlefield, the reluctance to put 

on the ground for fear of suffering excessive casu

continues to persist. Images of the first 20 minutes 

film “Saving Private Ryan” are compelling and ch

But the information age promises to make ground c

considerably less destructive that the screen images o

beachhead in “Private Ryan.” The film serves as a 

metaphor to explain the difference. Conjure the op

80
scene in your mind for a moment, but imagine that C

John Miller knows exactly where the German defens

located. Not only can he see them, but he has the ab

watch them move about and to anticipate where they 

move next. He has at his command the ability to d

some of the more critical static positions with pre

munitions as his Higgins boat approaches the shore. H

can see well inland and knows with equal clarity whe

enemy isn’t located. Now imagine that Miller can l

boat over the beach and land it precisely in a spot that 

from enemy fire but positioned so that his platoon

dismounted, can effectively block enemy egress fro

beach. The enemy is now left with two unacce

alternatives: either move out of his protected positio

the open and face the certainty of destruction by fire, o

in place and cede the initiative and the adva

permanently to the intruder. 

Consider for a moment a more contemporary sce

Recall our recent effort to intimidate and punish the 

for not allowing full inspection of their nuclear, che

and biological storage sites. Imagine how much 

compelling the impact of military action might have 

had we had the ability to follow tactical aircraft and 

missile strikes with a sudden aerial assault by hundr

individual ground units each capable of landing safel

a known or suspected site and commanding it by 

observation and covering it by fire. 

Suppose further that each maneuver unit were 

enough to maneuver about for days if not w

Information age technologies will allow the tooth por

a land power force to become extremely lean, self-con

and completely mobile. This capability will be achi

because most of the traditional impedimenta for a 

combat force—-such as logistic and administ

facilities, higher command and communications c

and long range fire support units—-can be removed fro

immediate battle area and held in a support base hun

of miles distant from the battlefield. Only those few 

81
necessary to prosecute the close in fight would be pla

immediate proximity of the enemy’s main force units

The objective of blitzkrieg in the information age w

the same as its machine age predecessor, namely the 

paralysis and eventual psychological collapse 

opponents will to resist through overwhelming appli

of a balance of firepower and maneuver. But technolo

the nature of our future enemies will cause th

blitzkrieg to look considerably different. The aim w

different. As long as the enemy possesses pre

weapons, no matter how primitive, the operational-t

offensive that proved so successful for the German

prove to be too costly in future war. The dynamics 

future battlefield call for a return to the str

offensive-tactical defensive approach where an off

force uses its strategic mobility to place its combat uni

positions so threatening to the enemy that he must 

attack them or capitulate. Thus the most costly phase 

battle, the tactical offensive, becomes necessary for e

not friendly, forces to execute.

The requirement to overwhelm an enemy sca

across a vast area will require a maneuvering fo

blanket or saturate a broad area with many 

autonomous and extremely mobile combat elements. 

an operation would play out more like a take down 

than a traditional linear movement through an en

defensive formations. Duration, timing and tempo wo

different. Information age blitzkrieg would dem

continuous, relentless operation opened first with pre

firepower followed immediately by a pattern of man

layered over the complete expanse of an the en

defenses in a single smothering act of aggression. 

In order to overwhelm so much territory so quickl

so many discrete bits of combat power both fire

maneuver will increasingly have to be delivered fro

air. An aerial maneuver force capable of opera

maneuver of this sort will be costly to build. But reme

82
the armored formations that broke the back of the F

Army made up less than eight percent of the total G

army in 1940. Speed and agility count far more than 

weight of metal if the objective is to collapse the enemy

rather than slaughter him. Speed and agility also gua

safety and lower casualties. A force mobile through t

will be practically immune from the threat of atta

missiles tipped with weapons of mass destruction. 

agility lessens the risk of defeat in detail. If surpris

any reason, the force possesses the mobility to shift q

out of harm’s way and approach the enemy from an

direction. Aerial mobility permits a maneuver fo

command more territory with fewer soldiers, thus lim

the number of soldiers exposed to enemy fires with

close combat area.

By the end of the next decade the maturation 

information age will provide the United States m

with and even more remarkable ability to see the enem

to strike him quickly with greater and greater pre

However, information age advances alone wi

guarantee our ability to lift the Higgins boat over the 

or to coerce Saddam into doing our will through a cr

threat of force. If we are to remain viable as a military 

well into the next century, we must improve drama

our ability to seize and control ground. We must bui

our system of war the speed and agility to move unim

across large expanses of territory. We must be able to 

combat formations at decisive points with the 

precision and flexibility that we now have to place exp

killing power on distant targets. 

The ability to complement precision fires with pre

maneuver offers two essential advantages for warfare 

future. First, we would be able to beat an enemy at h

game of area control if we possessed the ability to 

forces across a broad area yet retain the ability to mass 

quickly at the point where the enemy is most vulnerab

weak. A balanced method of war that includes both 

timeless dimensions of fire and maneuver will g

83
complicate the plan of an enemy who might seek to 

the recent successes of others who have shown how 

against an approach to war centered principally a

firepower. 

An enemy who optimizes his operational meth

remain viable and intact in the face of an opponent 

superior in firepower, will by necessity make himsel

vulnerable to assault by maneuver. If he disperses ac

wide area to avoid the destructive effects of precision 

he must suffer the loss of cohesion and control and t

less able to mass against a threat from the gr

Dispersion will leave gaps in his ability to comma

territory by observation and fire. These gaps will pro

maneuver force with the local sanctuaries he will n

occupy territory without having to fight for it. An expa

of forces over a wide area will increase the dis

between each of his units in the field, thus making it 

for maneuvering forces to interpose themselves betwe

enemy’s major units to paralyze them in place. 

disperses we disperse to check him at every decisive 

never allowing him to disappear into the shadows

masses we mass faster and bring to bear our overwhe

advantage in killing power. Facing two dimensions of 

rather than one, he will no longer be able afford the lux

choosing the passive option of hunkering down to o

and endure precision strikes. With troops in his mi

must act or lose. But if he attacks, our side then garne

inherent advantage of the defensive. To attack he 

mass. But massing spells destruction by precision 

Check by fires, checkmate by a balance of fir

maneuver. 

A rapid orchestration of fire and maneuver o

battlefield is critical to winning quickly at minimum 

Near simultaneous application of maneuver with 

allows an attacking force to sustain or make permane

stunning yet transitory psychological effects of firep

War is a test of will. The surest way to collapse an en

will is to control his territory. Without physical occu

84
warfare is nothing more than punishment from a dis

something that any nation with a will to resist can e

indefinitely.

Nevertheless, a word of caution is in order. The 

technologies that will allow us to accelerate strateg

operational maneuver may also, if we are not carefu

us down and impede our ability to maneuver wi

precision we will require to achieve decisive results an

quickly. Too much information received through too 

telecommunications instrument will create the temp

to micromanage the battle. This at a time when man

intended to paralyze an enemy spread over vast dis

demands decentralized command and control at the 

possible levels. Without the ability to out think the e

by exercising superior agility and initiative, greater sp

maneuver will only shorten the path to defe

commander who lets some higher authority do his th

for him and who waits for orders before acting will ne

able to use the instruments at his command effective

This is not to say that higher commanders must 

hands-off approach. To the contrary, future wa

demand that commanders manipulate a huge mech

composed of enormously more parts spread over 

greater distances and moving at vastly greater vel

than today. The challenge to a commander of ap

precision firepower and maneuver will be all the g

because, if he is to gain the most from each, he must d

one immediately behind and in close proximity to the 

Therefore, a commander, in order not to become hi

worst source of friction, must learn to think ahead 

opponent and to orchestrate his symphony rather tha

each bar one instrument at a time. Otherwise he will 

be able to react to the inevitable uncertainties and sur

in war. The 1933 edition of Truppenführung still c

with it the essence of maneuver warfare, and its ca

continue to resonate from one age of warfare to the 

“situations will be of unlimited variety...the indepe

85
will of the enemy will always be pitted against ours...f

and mistakes will continue to be everyday occurrenc

A final word of caution. Regardless of how success

are at restoring the balance between fire and maneu

the future, we must accept the truth that all future vic

will not be cheaply won. A thinking enemy will

sacrifice and fortified with enough technology to de

unlimited domination of the battlefield will most cer

cause us damage. If we hope to restore a range of bal

offensive options to American commanders beyond th

2010, the power of the information age must be harnes

develop a new generation of maneuver platforms th

be able to place close combat soldiers into comma

positions on the battlefields at the least possible 

Tomorrow’s battlefield success will be achieved by 

Task Force Commanders who have the abil

orchestrate precision strike with precision maneuver

leap ahead in situational awareness guarante

improvements in information age technologies prom

provide us with the instruments necessary to add ph

agility to our future force as well as superior killing p

The dawn of a new age of warfare and the antic

emergence of clever, adaptive enemies will require an 

of magnitude increase in strategic and operational sp

maneuver if we hope to strike the enemy quickl

preemptively and collapse his will to resist.

The corollary to Newton’s fundamental law of p

echoes with a sense of urgency: every successful techn

tactical innovation that provides a dominant m

advantage eventually yields to a countervailing res

that shifts the advantage to the opposing force. Am

military dominance in firepower and attrition warfa

been on display for almost five decades. We must anti

a future military challenge that will attempt to defe

preoccupation with precision strike. We must use th

we have in the decade ahead to restore balance in our 

method of war. Our future arsenal of military capab

must include a 21st Century sword with two e

86
compelling edges: precision maneuver as well as pre

firepower. Without these two applied in balanc

harmony, future conflicts might well devolve into m

wars of attrition. Churchill’s understanding o

relationship between slaughter and maneuver is 

propitious and sublime. Great generals win with man

Let’s begin now to take on the challenge of a 

competitor and begin now to build a balanced force to 

him.

87
Chapter Six

Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Reproduced with Permission Granted by:

December 1999 Issue

ARMED FORCES JOURNAL

INTERNATIONAL

Volume 137, Number 5

89

FROM KOREA TO KOSO

HOW AMERICA’S ARM

HAS LEARNED TO FIG

LIMITED WARS IN TH

PRECISION AGE
FROM KOREA TO KOSOVO: HOW AMERI

ARMY HAS LEARNED TO FIGHT LIMIT

WARS IN THE PRECISION AGE

Author’s Introductory Note

This article was written after a visit to Albania i

1999. During that trip, I developed the central the

this essay: In wars of limited liability, success m

gained with a limited expenditure of means. A brief r

of recent history clearly tells us that we have 

practically learning this lesson in real wars for 

century, beginning with Korea. The imperative to p

for a full-scale war against the Soviets, howeve

effectively impeded our ability to embed this lesson in

warfighting doctrine. Kosovo is a wake-up call. 

The Cold War is over. Thankfully, we expect it w

some time before we have to face the prospect of fi

another major military competitor who can threate

vital national interests. But recent events such as K

seem to be telling us that lesser conflicts fought for les

vital interests will continue to challenge us. We 

improve our understanding of these conflicts. We mu

develop a realistic doctrine for winning them based 

our own practical experience. This article addresses 

issues and concludes with a proposed maneuver w

concept for this new era of limited liability wars 

Precision Age. 

91
FROM KOREA TO KOSOVO: HOW AMERI

ARMY HAS LEARNED TO FIGHT LIMIT

WARS IN THE PRECISION AGE

Every age has its own kind of war, its own limiting conditio

and its own preconceptions. Each period, therefore, wo

have held to its own theory of war.

1

Carl Von Clausew

Many in the professional ranks of the American m

see the reluctance to put soldiers on the ground in Kos

a disturbing precedent that calls for future wars 

fought and won by air power alone. A close examina

American battlefield performance, however, suggest

the Kosovo experience marks nothing more than a

data point, albeit a dramatic one, along a clearly d

continuum of transformation by the United States. 

the end of the Second World War, America’s military 

have adjusted their unique capabilities to produce 

style of warfare. This is the result of a fundamental s

the relationship between the dynamics of firepowe

maneuver. When the dynamics of combat un

substantial transformations, radical shifts in doctrine 

be made to accompany and capitalize upon them. D

this last half-century, the principal factors affectin

conduct of wargeostrategic, political and techno

conditionshave been altered by the events of our t

Geostrategy:

 The end of the Cold War stand off between the two 

global powers removed the protective blanket tha

92

1. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael H

and Peter Paret, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 5
dampened all of the old ethnic, tribal and religious e

left smoldering since the end of the Second World 

Lifting great power control gave the green lig

aggressive regimes to set about righting perceived re

wrongs. Frustrated autocrats felt free to satisfy 

hegemonic ambitions usually at the expense of som

powerful neighbor. At home, national paranoia ov

threat of a great cataclysmic war gave way to social o

directed at powers who tramp on the territory, righ

well-being of lesser states.

No longer are our wars desperate struggles to pr

our right to exist as a nation. Instead, our most 

conflicts have been fought as wars of conscience to f

peripheral interests in many diverse corners of the 

Our potential enemies are increasingly being percei

local tyrants who are intent upon gaining hegemon

some part of the world only tangentially important 

domestic welfare.

Technology:

The course of war would be difficult enough to anti

if the shifting relationships between international 

were the only significant factor to influence change 

future. But we must also account in our calculation f

fact that we live in a transitional era set within a 

between the machine age and the information age

microchip is altering the way armies fight ju

thoroughly as did the gasoline engine and radio by 

armies off their feet and mounting them inside lan

aerial vehicles.

 We know enough now from field experiment

practical experience with information age warfa

anticipate with some clarity how the microchi

continue to alter the course of war. The battlefie

continue to expand, perhaps geometrically, now 

communications no longer effectively limit the amo

territory a military force can occupy and control. The 

93
to see with great clarity and strike with even g

precision will force ground units to take full advant

the opportunity to spread out and disperse in or

survive. Fear of destruction in detail by precision s

principally from above, has already made linear, eche

massed armored formations an anachronism of a ma

age that is now just passing.

Domestic Politics:

Both the geopolitical and technological trends 

recent past have raised expectations by the Am

people that our wars will be fought in a manner suc

the political ends are worth the costs and the cos

increasingly measured in terms of expenditures of h

life. Casualties soon may represent a dominant, perha

dominant measurement of success or failure in w

limited ends and means such as Kosovo. Dead Ame

are becoming our most vulnerable center of gravity

our enemies know it. As we have seen from recent e

serious doubts on the part of our national leaders 

casualties may not only delay, but may well pr

commitment of ground forces.

The tolerance bar that we use to measure our casu

has been driven ever downward by America’s cha

attitudes toward conflict. Since our most recent war

been fought increasingly to further peripheral int

abroad rather than for national survival, we are less w

as a nation to send our sons and daughters into harm

Likewise, modern weapons technology has also rais

expectation that precision weapons can now subs

explosive killing power for manpower on the ground

Limited War Precedents: Korea to Vietnam:

To its credit the American military began, intuitiv

least, to sense these shifts in battlefield dynamics as 

as the Korean War, the first of our modern wars in 

limited strategic interests did not justify unli

94
commitment. Combat commanders in the field, qu

recognize the importance of preserving the lives of 

soldiers, routinely modified their way of fighting to a

success at minimum cost. The most pervasive doc

adjustment made during our first two experiences 

limited war was to increase the firepower availa

support maneuver forces in close combat and to less

exposure of close combat soldiers to direct attack 

enemy.

Early battles in Korea began with the applicat

doctrinally correct proportions of firepower to man

inherited from the Second World War.Very qu

however, field commanders increased their dema

artillery and air power to support ever more compa

self-contained assault forces. What began as trad

dismounted infantry assaults in 1950 soon be

elaborate tank, infantry, and firepower inte

demonstrations intended to gain the objective 

minimum cost in lives.

During the Battle of Soryang in the spring of 

twenty-one battalions of artillery fired over three hu

thousand rounds in five days in support of a single pus

Corps. Two years later, at Pork Chop Hill, nine batt

fired over thirty-seven thousand rounds in less 

twenty-four hours in support of a single regimental as

As the weight of firepower increased, the densit

infantry formations decreased in proportion. By the w

of 1950-51, General Ridgway conducted most of the E

Army counter attacks at regimental level. That s

Ridgway consistently used nothing larger than com

teams to spearhead his advance to the Han River.

2

95

2. Billy C. Mossman, Ebb and Flow: November 1950-July 1951, Wash

DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1990, pp. 238-239, 35

442; S.L.A. Marshall, Pork Chop Hill: The American Fighting M

Action, Korea, New York: Morrow, 1956, p. 196.
Similarly in Vietnam commanders learned quick

adapted a European style, maneuver- centric method 

to match the realities of limited war in constricted 

terrain. Close combat units gradually increase

proportion of supporting fires and lessened the expos

lead elements moving into contested areas.

General William DePuy, commanding the First In

Division in 1966-67, realized quickly that artiller

tactical aircraft were responsible for most enemy casu

His casualties, on the other hand, came principally 

three sources: enemy mortars, concentrations of e

small arms fire delivered against infantry units in set

ambushes, and mines. His common sense solutio

simply to use much smaller infantry units to locate a

the enemy, usually squads or platoons, and then orche

a varied medley of supporting firepower systems to d

of the killing.

3

Once the enemy was located, the infantry’s task 

stay out of the killing zone, avoid decisive engageme

pull back just far enough to allow effective deliv

ordnance, but not so far as to allow the enemy bre

space to disengage and escape the firepower trap. T

infantry adage “close with and destroy the enemy” b

simply get close enough with as few forces as poss

“find, fix, flush and set up the enemy for destruction by 

DePuy was among the first to grasp the fact that m

firepower technology and the imperative to win at low

together were sufficient to cause a shift in the relatio

between firepower and maneuver. In later years h

fond of saying “On a battlefield increasingly domina

lethality, if you can be seen you can be hit, if you can 

you will be killed.” Whether traditionalists liked it o

96

3. Paul H. Herbert, Deciding What Has To Be Done: General Will

Depuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations, Leaven

Papers, No.16, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1

19-23.
DePuy believed that the balance had in fact shifted 

point that firepower systems, not infantrymen, ha

become the central instrument for achieving decisive 

on the battlefield. To DePuy, the doctrinal maxim 

firepower supported maneuver may well have 

reversed.

4

While seeming to offer the promise of less 

victories, DePuy’s concept of maneuver supporting 

failed to last as a viable doctrine much beyond Vie

There were cultural objections. Commanders righ

feared that training combat soldiers not to close wi

enemy might diminish fighting spirit and create hesi

and a loss of decisiveness and élan.

Experience in real combat also demonst

shortcomings of a firepower-centered doctrine. The 

persistent complication was offered by the enem

learned over time how to lessen the killing effects 

fires. After suffering horribly from American fire

during the Tet offensive in 1968, the North Vietn

quickly changed their fighting doctrine. They lear

“hug” close to units in contact and to keep larger form

dispersed and positioned just out of artillery range

enemy soon became very adept at hiding in built-up 

and the jungle. They also learned imaginative w

deceive reconnaissance and spoof even the 

sophisticated detection technologies.

Second, pressure late in the war to reduce casu

served to pervert DePuy’s intent. As the war dragg

firepower became too much of a good thing. Man

commanders began to complain that a firepower int

doctrine had become a millstone around their ne

single example serves to make the point. The “

feed-fire support system” used by the 25

th Infantry Di

97

4. John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to Airland Battle: The Developm

Army Doctrine, 1973-1982, Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Trainin

Doctrine Command, 1984, pp. 8-9.
toward the end of the war relegated the control of 

contact, however minor, to the duty officer at di

headquarters. He was instructed automatically to dis

a stream of firepower systems into the fight to inclu

Force gunships, tactical airpower, attack helicopter

even “flame bath” helicopters equipped with napalm

firepower would come even if the battalion command

that such a rich dose was either wasteful or counter 

scheme of maneuver.

5

Another extreme example of the debilitating influe

firepower late in the war comes from a corps ar

commander in the Central Highlands region of Vi

who reported that his command fired almost two m

rounds in seven months of relatively inactive c

equating, by his best estimate, to a ratio of 1,000 rou

roughly $100,000 per kill. Lives were saved to be su

the resulting loss of flexibility and control was righ

lamented by infantrymen on the ground.

6

Yet in spite of these shortcomings, man

commanders returning from Vietnam supported D

hypothesis. The new limited war imperative to w

minimum cost demanded that the traditional ba

between fire and maneuver be altered significantly j

DePuy suggested. A remarkable study done by a gr

returning infantry commanders at the Army War Col

1969 concluded that firepower was now the dominant 

on the American battlefield. They wrote that maneu

performed primarily to pinpoint the location of the e

and to increase the effectiveness of the massive applica

fire on the enemy. Ideally the enemy should be killed 

maximum effective range of organic weapons.The n

advance infantry to “zero” range will proportio

98

5. Robert H. Scales, Firepower in Limited War, Washington DC: Na

Defense University, U.S. Government P:rinting Office, 1990, pp. 287

6. Scales, p. 143.
increase friendly casualties and decrease the ability 

infantry to maneuver or use fire support.

7

Post Cold War Precedents:

Practical experience in subsequent wars contin

reinforce the lesson that the cost of a conflict must rem

proportion to the perceived value of the endeavor. Th

War in particular taught the value of a protr

preliminary aerial bombardment to wear dow

demoralize the Iraqis sufficiently to make the 

campaign as casualty free as possible. The batt

continued to thin in the Gulf as the firepower quotien

The range and lethality of modern tanks and the ab

maneuver forces to see vast distances in the desert a

armored formations to open up to an unprecedented d

thereby exposing forward maneuver elements as li

possible. What might have constituted a battalion fr

World War II was now occupied by a force as sma

platoon. Instinctively when faced with the realities 

war against a thinking enemy the Army return

DePuy’s maxim of minimum exposure for maximum 

effect.

The loss of eighteen rangers in close, back alley fi

in Somalia dramatically underscored a corollary to D

maxim: a tactical engagement fought for too high a pr

too little return might very well by itself determin

strategic outcome of a national endeavor.

Recent experience in Kosovo now seems to sugges

the bar continues to lower as the country begins to 

the burden of limited liability wars fought to prevent 

to one ethnic or cultural group by another. Some 

suggest that the bar has been lowered so much for wa

99

7. Richard E. Cavazos, et al., “Analysis of Fire and Maneuver in Vi

June 1966 - June 1968,” unpublished Student Research Paper, U.S

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1 March 1969, pp. II-v and 

II-212.
Kosovo that a ground campaign with its attending 

casualties is a thing of the past at least for American t

Perhaps, the argument goes, the precision revolutio

given us the ultimate tool, the silver bullet, to win 

wars by firepower alone.

However, a closer look at Kosovo suggests that, 

improvements in precision munitions may continue 

the firepower-maneuver equation in favor of the form

nature of the enemy and the immutable character 

continue to argue for the preservation of balance be

the two classic components of war. The Serb react

firepower dominant assault was remarkably similar 

North Vietnamese over a quarter century before

Vietnamese realized that overwhelming firepower 

could never compensate for the presence of an aggr

force on the ground to find, fix and fight them in 

combat. Without a ground threat, they merely had to 

their forces in order to endure punishment by fire al

Serb tactics followed the Vietnamese example 

remarkable fidelity. Units went to ground and disp

over wide areas. Soldiers hid their equipment with 

skill and constructed dummies that proved effect

spoofing aerial observers and image interpreters. T

for the Serbs arrived with the ground threat fro

Kosovo Liberation Army. However amateur and ineff

the presence of the KLA in their midst forced the Serb 

to come out of hiding and begin to mass. Once in the 

the Serbs were obliged to trade the security of their 

places for battle in the open.

If Kosovo suggests that maneuver still remains ess

to a balanced approach to war, how then do we resol

problem of maneuvering without suffering exc

casualties? Back to DePuy and his maxim. DePuy’s m

correctly grasped the trend of the expanding battle a

the range and lethality of weapons continues to inc

Soon the battlefield will become so expansive and p

that the conventional schemes for ground maneuve

100
well play more to the advantage of the enemy rather t

ourselves. On an expanded battlefield an adaptive e

armed first and foremost with patience and guile, 

well be able to offset our advantage of superior fire

with a countervailing strategy centered aroun

occupation and control of large thinly occupied ar

territory. His tactic will be defensive and center

controlling ground. He cedes the other dimensions 

because he knows he cannot compete agai

technologically superior enemy on the sea and in the a

the defensive, he may appear to lose the initiative an

it, in the conventional wisdom, the ability to win, bu

George Washington during our Revolutionary Wa

losing either forces or ground becomes the eff

equivalent of a new kind of winning. So his object is 

win but to avoid losing by holding on and preservi

forces in the field just long enough for the enemy to 

the conflict and go home.

DePuy’s maxim, reinforced by experience in K

suggests that as an enemy disperses across a broad ar

goes to ground in order to avoid destruction by fire he 

his force increasingly vulnerable to defeat by maneu

dispersed enemy force cannot mass quickly, nor can i

all of its territory by fire from static positions. An e

gone to ground cannot see beyond the end of its nos

cannot react in time to turn back forces which 

suddenly rush to occupy the uncovered, unprotected t

in its midst.

But DePuy also demonstrated that a ground force 

change its style of maneuver to gain full advantage 

potential provided by modern firepower systems. A 

optimized to fully exploit precision fires must be a

maneuver quickly against a dispersed, static enemy

can only be done if that force has adopted new meth

warfighting at the strategic, operational and tactical 

of war.

101
Strategic:

The surest way to win at minimum cost is to win qu

A decisive, quick victory can best be assured by an 

arriving force of overwhelming power capable of cond

a strategic takedown. A “strategic preemption” force 

first seek to use airpower to frustrate enemy deploy

long enough for early arriving ground forces to po

themselves between the enemy and his initial opera

objectives. Enemy ground forces caught in the 

deploying or moving forward in the attack can be 

targeted and destroyed by precision weaponry.

Time is a particularly critical factor on a batt

dominated by firepower. As we have seen in Kore

Vietnam too long a delay in collapsing an enemy g

heightens the risk that an act of strategic preemption 

stretched into a wasteful war of attritiona war the e

knows we cannot win. As we have seen from our own 

experience with limited wars of attrition, given enoug

an enemy will learn to avoid destruction by dispersin

burrowing into the countryside or by massing insi

urban terrain.

Our difficulties with projecting forces to Korea

Kosovo and elsewhere, tell us that quick victories ar

to achieve when an intervening power like the U

States is an ocean away from an enemy who perha

only to violate a neighbor’s territory to fulfill his aggr

intentions. An enemy acting unilaterally can mo

quickly and achieve almost total surprise. A major 

like the United States, on the other hand, can respon

with great deliberation. Time must be taken to 

political consensus for action both at home and with

international community. Thus the chance exists th

enemy will be able to initiate aggressive actions, o

possibly gain his initial objectives before we can interv

The example of the Serbian dash into K

demonstrates the particular futility of attempt

102
preempt an enemy force using airpower alone. S

experiences with strategic intervention by air in pr

limited wars suggests that such an effort can be 

orders of magnitude more effective if aerial platform

guided to their targets by eyes on the ground. S

operations forces planted deep inside North Korean, 

Vietnamese, and Iraqi territory have proven their 

repeatedly both to survive and to take away the en

ability to hide from or spoof attacking aircraft.

Given the right strategic conditions and reso

however, strategic preemption can succeed and su

decisively. Our strategic takedown in Panama took 

day to cause the collapse of Noriega’s army of thug

secret of success lay in the ability of the American com

to synchronize the delivery of overwhelming 

simultaneously against a multitude of objectives s

throughout the entire Republic. That power was an eff

mix of air operations to paralyze and disorient th

selective destruction and ground operations to seize

and ultimately to confirm the effects.

Before the Panamanian forces could even be

comprehend what was happening, they found them

surrounded, overwhelmed and blocked at every 

Victory, as evidenced by the disintegration of the 

came, not with physical destruction so much as wi

utter inability of the enemy to react effectively i

direction, leading to the ultimate collapse of his w

resist.

Operational:

The apparent shift in the firepower-maneuver b

in favor of firepower works to the disadvantage of a 

which seeks to intervene in a distant theater and o

offensively against a static foe. It has been a long-sta

tenet of warfare in the modern age that a fire

dominant battlefield environment favors the defe

Experience has shown that the surest way for an off

103
force to overcome this disadvantage and succeed 

firepower dominant battlefield is to employ an opera

offensive-tactical defensive method of war. The conc

both simple and timeless. An attacking force maneuv

place himself between the defender and his l

communications. The defender then can either r

static and wither or leave the security of his defen

attack the force to his rear now set firmly in place and 

to receive him. Defenders like the Serbs who must di

and go to ground in order to survive a precision atta

particularly vulnerable to such a stratagem becau

attacker can take advantage of the enemy’s thinly occ

battlespace to locate and then occupy voids left unco

by fire and observation.

The secret of success against an enemy gone to g

would be to paralyze him with precision fires jus

enough to allow an early arriving ground fo

simultaneously occupy multiple points throughou

enemy’s area of operations and saturate the enemy’

vital areas with small, discrete, autonomous and 

lethal, mobile combat elements.

In order to gain and maintain maneuver dom

ground combat units would not need to physically o

key terrain or confront enemy strong points di

Instead, an intervening force would occupy uncon

terrain close enough to control and thus dominate 

vital centers through direct observation and the 

short-range precision weapons. Such a vio

unanticipated and overwhelming act would take the f

a strategic takedown or coup de main rather t

conventional form of linear maneuver.

A once cohesive body of enemy forces would n

divided into isolated pockets, each a sub-critical 

severed from its parent body unable to communic

maintain itself for very long without resupply and un

be reinforced. Once the intervening force gain

advantage of position over the enemy the factor of tim

104
shifts to his favor. The enemy cannot linger very lon

fractured state. His choices are either to fight or withe

fighting will be a problem. Once set within the en

critical area the intervening force is in a position to c

tactical shots now that he can leverage the power 

defensive to his advantage.

Modern precision technology strengthens the in

power of the defensive phase of an offensive-def

stratagem. The range and lethality of our su

firepower weaponry expands the killing zone making 

more expensive for a less sophisticated enemy to 

unprotected against us in the open. The static side h

advantage of watching and engaging with firepowe

positions well out of the enemy’s much shorter lethal 

while remaining relatively secure in fixed, co

positions. The enemy is trapped and can only esca

massing to attack. If he masses he becomes a perfect 

for destruction by precision strike. Check and checkm

Our dominance in situational awareness given to 

our overwhelming advantage in information technolo

help us solve the problems that DePuy and other Am

field commanders found most vexing in this new s

war. DePuy realized that a change in tactics alone 

reduce casualties only to a limited degree. In Vietna

matter how small and protected he made his lead elem

the cost of the initial contact was still too high. Also, D

was frustrated by the ability of the enemy to escape 

his supporting firepower became most effective. The e

could slip away because ground forces could be n

assembled quickly enough or spread thin enough to co

avenues of escape particularly in the rugged wooded t

in Vietnam.

The Army learned from its experiments with digiti

at the National Training Center in 1997 that a pr

internetted maneuver brigade provided wi

immediately available suite of aerial sensors could e

its area of control by a factor of four or more. Su

105
situational awareness allowed units to locate all fr

units and most of the enemy immediately around them

ability to see the battlefield with great clarit

immediacy allowed them to anticipate each e

movement and avoid being surprised. Also, 

participating in these force-on-force experim

discovered that the ability to spread out, yet still r

cohesive and able to maneuver, freely allowed th

outflank and surround much larger units in open com

Tactical:

If we have been successful at gaining posi

advantage and paralyzing the enemy at the opera

level then we must seek to finish the fight in close c

with the smallest possible loss of life. Once secu

operational sanctuaries, tactical units will expand ou

to find the specific location of previously unlocated e

ground units. These tactical scouts will be preced

aerial eyes in the form of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (U

or other downlinked aerial sensors. These sensors m

capable enough to find small discrete pockets befo

scouts stumble within the range of enemy direc

weapons. The scouts’ mission will be to define the out

the enemy formation clearly and then locate and dest

significant points of resistance without the finding 

becoming decisively engaged or suffering casualties.

Seen from a point high above, the battlespace 

culminating campaign against a dispersed enemy 

appear in the mind’s eye like a distant prairie ablaze 

thousand fires. All of the individual fires wou

surrounded simultaneously by groups of firefig

building fire lanes and pouring on flame reta

selectively in order to keep the smaller fires from com

to form larger conflagrations.

Most enemy points of resistance would be left to 

themselves out, particularly those in difficult areas s

close terrain, forests and cities. Those which th

106
people or property would be fought aggressively, but 

distance. Firefighters would move in close enough 

effective but not so close as to be trapped by the flam

Close combat of this sort will be decisive to be su

decisive from a distance. Close combat units will ma

just enough contact to surround, contain and feel o

shape and size of each enemy formation. As pre

strikes begin to wear away the will of the enemy

combat forces converge methodically with deliberatio

this stage of the fight time becomes our ally. The ini

belongs entirely to us. We can only lose now if impa

causes us to be careless and allows a desperate ene

inflict more casualties than we can afford. Even

surrounded, unable to mass, out of touch with ad

units and higher authority, each discrete enemy force 

collapses.

Finding the Balance:

Our Cold War fixation on fighting the big batt

impeded the development of weapons appropria

fighting limited liability wars just as surely as 

impeded our ability to internalize and accept limite

fighting doctrine. This has lead to some curious iron

Recent experiences have taught us that the surest 

win limited wars is to win them quickly. Time is our gr

enemy and our enemy’s greatest friend. Yet a

experience in Kosovo has shown, we still lack the me

transport decisive landpower to even a local theater 

in time to preempt or preclude the offensive action

minor tyrant.

 We seek to win at minimum cost. During wars 

century the overwhelming majority of battlefield d

have been suffered by infantrymen in close comba

greatest killer of American infantry has been the h

and unglamorous mortar, followed closely by the rif

machine gun. Yet while today we possess the techno

107
remotely locate strategic targets in Belgrade or Bagh

platoon leader must still rely on DePuy’s tactic of 

observation and contact in order to locate a machin

position. We can strike strategic targets with precisio

thousands of miles distance but our platoon leader h

way to destroy a mortar over the next hill with any de

precision.

Recent post-Cold War experience in Kosovo an

have shown that even an army of inept petty tyrants 

given time, adapt and learn to counter our unique met

fighting limited wars. Add to this uncomfortable tru

realization that the American people will contin

demand cheap victories and it seems absolutely appa

those who have studied recent history that the U

States will no longer have the luxury to improvise 

battlefield. Fortunately, the recent history of limited 

offers more than just a warning. It offers us a historica

of practical and empirical evidence which provides a p

guide us into an uncertain era. In sum the recent past 

to be telling us that:

• A battlefield dominated by precision fire favo

defensive. Therefore, the surest way to win at acce

cost is to employ an operational offensive-tactical def

strategy whereby the attacker uses superior mobi

place his forces amongst and between the enemy suc

the enemy is forced to wither and concede or to attack 

most disadvantageous circumstances.

• Firepower intensive wars must be won quickly

time, the effects of firepower diminish. Therefore, de

on the battlefield must be achieved before the wei

munitions needed to achieve effects exceeds the pra

limit of the force to deliver them. However, the promi

geometric increase in killing power for a given wei

munitions offered by cheap distributed precision wea

will relieve us at last of the millstone of the ammu

train. Infantrymen will now be able to kill the e

108
effectively in the close fight without suffering subst

loss in mobility.

• The enemy must be located precisely and fixed 

the smallest possible exposure of the maneuver force. 

long term this finding function might well be perf

remotely from air or ground vehicles.

• An adaptive enemy will most likely counte

superior precision strike capability by dispersing, 

and going to ground. While such a posture limi

vulnerability to precision, it also makes his force extr

vulnerable for exploitation by maneuver forces capa

controlling his most vulnerable points from the grou

• The object of close combat in the future will be 

and fix the enemy without closing to within de

distance of the enemy’s weapons. Decisive range is d

as the practical limit of the enemy maneuver unit’s o

weapons.

• Maneuver forces must be provided the to

adequately support an offensive strategy that is dom

by precision firepower. We can kill very deep target

great precision, principally from the air. Likewise, c

units can kill with precision very close using direct fir

guided anti-tank missiles. But the firer is expose

vulnerable during this direct exchange. We lack the 

to kill with precision in the zone between thes

extremesjust where this new style of warfare 

precision mostclose enough to find, fix and track d

without being so close as to become vulnerable 

enemy’s direct fire systems.

A Cautionary Conclusion:

DePuy’s doctrinal method is best suited for w

limited liability which clearly occupy only a narrow se

of our potential future conflict spectrum. Surely, f

near term at least, America’s soldiers will find them

most involved in non-shooting peacetime continge

109
True, but we already have shown that we can do pre

peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions w

demonstrated by the performance of American sold

Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti and elsewhere. We can do bette

sure. But our past performance tells us that our doctr

stability operations today is fundamentally s

Improvement is always needed but the imperati

changing the way we conduct these kinds of operat

not pressing. Our most serious doctrinal challenge 

when bullets begin to fly. Recent history tells u

limited wars are what we do most often with least su

These kinds of wars need the most attention to insur

we will be able to win them at the least possible cost 

future. 

A second caution deals with the perception 

Americans are no longer willing to expend blood in f

adventures. The day may well come soon when a s

competitor threatens an interest vital enough to a

serious sacrifice in blood. However, while the Am

people may someday allow military professionals to 

lives more freely, they will never again allow soldiers

to be wasted. So even in a major war we will conti

shoulder the obligation to fight and win at minimum 

Our experience in recent war tells us that regard

how intense the combat, cheap victories will come onl

change our warfighting doctrine to accommodate th

realities of the precision age. Modern weapons techno

have changed the dynamics of battle. The relatio

between the dynamics of firepower and maneuve

shifted fundamentally. We must begin now to alter th

we fight in order to stay ahead of potential enemies w

we have seen in Kosovo, already have begun to unde

and exploit our tendency to rely on firepower alone to w

the battlefield.

110
Chapter Seven

Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Reproduced with Permission Granted by:

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC

AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Washington, DC

111

CLASHES OF VISION

SIZING AND SHAPING O

FORCES IN A FISCAL

CONSTRAINED

ENVIRONMENT
CLASHES OF VISIONS:

SIZING AND SHAPING OUR FORCES

IN A FISCALLY CONSTRAINED

ENVIRONMENT

Author’s Introductory Note

In the Fall of 1997 the Center of Strategi

International Studies put together a panel to deba

conflicting views that the three services had abo

nature of future war. I was joined by Major General C

Link, U.S. Air Force, Retired, and Lieutenant Genera

Van Riper, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired. We were sche

for about an hour but the exchange became so pass

that it lasted nearly three times as long and could hav

much longer had the schedule permitted.

General Link gave a presentation that argued th

recently completed Deep Attack Weapons Mix 

(DAWMS) conducted by the Joint Staff was seriously f

in that it failed to give air power sufficient credit 

destructive power against a postulated ground 

invading South Korea. He contended that, in fact, air 

would have been sufficient to “halt” the enemy force s

its strategic objectives and thus would have provid

American leadership a viable alternative to the imm

introduction of ground forces into the theater.

Needless to say, General Van Riper and I t

conflicting position. The excerpt that follows was th

presentation of the day and it is a fairly co

encapsulation of my retort to General Link’s depict

what has since become commonly referred to as t

Force Halt Strategy.

***

113
A Soldier’s View

Let me begin by addressing a couple of points. The 

the issue of gaming: the problem we have with DAWM

all the other games over the years is that we are using 

in essence, is an analytical training tool that has e

over 20-25 years, based on old, Lanchestrian mo

force-on-force engagement; in short, the old 

application models that go back to World War II. W

take attrition-based models and apply them to the 

war. Of course, the further we get into warfare, the mo

an intellectual rather than a physical exercise; and th

that information will determine your ability to win 

battlefield, the less viable force-on-force attrition

models become. This is a given.

The second issue is that of the sequence of opera

Again, particularly as we look toward warfare in the f

I agree with General Link 100 percent: the days 

sequential linear joint operations are over the mome

enemy gets the opportunity to buy even a nickel’s wo

precision or counter-precision. We have to get beyo

old Desert Storm models of how to fight wars. M

yesterday perfect is a portent for disaster, and I am go

tell you not necessarily how to rearrange deck chairs, 

is what General Link has talked about for the past hou

how to design a new ship to carry the deck chairs to vic

General Link said something, perhaps inadver

that I haven’t heard him say before. He talked abo

need for operational art, the services’ need to mainta

hands-on experience, the fingerspitzgengefuhl, tha

necessary for an understanding of the operation

within the services. I do not know whether he inten

say this, but our view of operational art is subjective 

than objective. We are not looking for the golde

bearing factory here. We approach warfare as a holis

in which the object is not butchery, but the collapse 

enemy’s will to resist. It is an art rather than a scienc

if Johnny can’t dive bomb, that’s too bad; but if Johnn

114
not understand the fundamental character and nat

war in the future, then all the precision and all th

bombing in the world will lead you up a blind alley.

The object of war is not to kill everyone: is not but

is not genocide. We in the Army maintain that the ob

war is the destruction of the enemy’s will, not his ph

destruction. The purpose of combat is to convince the e

that he has lost. And the enemy, in terms of the Am

art of war in the 21

st

 century, is time. General Link ha

dead right: the longer a campaign is drawn out—the m

campaign becomes a sequential battle of attrition t

determined by the pace of buildup and counteroffen

the more likely we are to suffer unnecessary casu

Why? Look at the Firepower Curve chart. 

Unless your object is to kill everyone, then the pri

impact of killing power, or precision firepower—call i

you want—is psychological and not physical: over ti

every war in which firepower ever has been applied al

include the Gulf war, the psychological effect of fire

decreases over time.

115

FIREPO W ER-CENTERED APPRO ACH: UNNECESSARY

RISK. FIREPOW ER EFFECT DECLINES OVER TIM E

DEC IS ION

HER E . . .

E

F

F

E

C

T

TIM E

– SEDAN 1940

– FALKLA ND S 1982

– YO M KIPPU R 1973

– CO BRA 1944

O ver tim e an enem y:

– Becom es inured, less intim 

– Learns to lessen effects thr

deception, dispersion

– Bonds, coalesces w ith lead

population

– H usbands strength, prepar

assault

– O KINAW A 1945

– VIETNA M 1947-72

– AFG HANISTA N 1981-89

– SO M M E 1916

Friendly

Advantage

Enem y

Advantage

Leadership

Operational

Tactical

Strike

Econom ic

C ollapse W ill of People

Soldiers

C ivilians

Strategic

Strike

Targets

Focus

Am erican

R eaction

Support

U ncertainty

Rejection

.......

P rovides enem y the

advantage of concent

resources to counter 

one dim ension of thre

. . . NO T H ERE

– KOREA 1951-53

Firepow er
What we seek is a Sedan, not a Khe-Sanh. We s

have the ability to compress that cycle of war and 

maneuver and firepower—the components of c

power—not sequentially, but simultaneously. Be

remember, over time the enemy bonds himself 

leaders. Anthropologists call that terror bonding

enemy becomes inured to war. A good example of this 

image of the British soldier brewing tea on the fires

the middle of a German bombardment. More imp

than his apparent comfort, he learned how to deal w

After the terrible disaster of Saipan in 194

Japanese 32nd Army under General Cho—when h

ordered to defend Okinawa—figured this out. He le

how to handle it. In the Battle of Shuri Castle, U.S. 

suffered 9,000 dead and 90,000 casualties in 89 d

combat because the Japanese had figured it out. They 

right. Fast-forward to the time after the terrible slau

of the spring offensive of 1951 in the Huan Ju Bow

Chinese got it right. They figured out how to defle

killing power of U.S. aerial firepower. Once they did 

what did we have? A stalemate for the next year and 

that caused far more casualties from that point for

After the terrible slaughter of North Vietnam

Offensive in spring 1968, General Giap got it righ

figured it out and changed his strategy to be able to a

his political and military aims by ceding U.S. domina

the firepower battlefield.

 We need to be careful. If you take a single-dimen

approach to combat, you give the enemy the opportu

take a single-dimensional counter. If you do that, an e

with a nickel’s worth of technology is going to beat you 

time. History tells us this is true.

I am going to talk to you about the Army After Nex

not simply going to rearrange the deck chairs. W

important is what happens next. What sort of enemy 

face in the years ahead?

116
Here is where I disagree with General Van Riper 

The information revolution will give us mental agili

“information dominance,” but sometime in the f

probably after 2010, our potential foe—someone I wil

major competitor, not a peer competitor—will hav

ability to apply combat power effectively on the battl

So, by 2010, to have information no longer will be en

this will result simply in building an Army that only w

smarter. You have to have the ability to act on wh

know, to balance your ability, to put speed into the eq

so that you can exploit “information dominance.”

I think we agree on everything we have heard so fa

the enemy we will face in the future after 2010 will n

peer competitor. No one else will buy carrier battle g

infantry divisions, and stealth fighters to compete wit

the next 20 to 25 years, but the threat is even more s

because it is a threat based around an asymm

approach. I have seen from my tours around the worl

the past two and a half years that many of our 

competitors have it right; they have figured us out. A 

bit of technology applied in the right direction—for exa

cheap cruise missiles; distributed air defenses that h

nodes; the ability to place both sea and land mines; t

of cellular telephone technology; and so on—will ma

enemy very difficult to take down with a single-dimen

approach, and the enemy then can apply his 

advantages. The number-one advantage that we wil

in the future is defeating the enemy’s will—the abi

collapse the psyche of his people. To try to destroy th

with firepower alone, as the British learned in Londo

Germans in Berlin, and the North Vietnamese in H

will serve only to steel that will rather than break it

The enemy also has the power of the defensive. 

order to win, he doesn’t have to beat the American

more than George Washington had to beat the British 

Long Island. If he can achieve a halt phase in a futur

he wins! Because halt means he’s been able to exte

campaign out, and time is on his side.

117
If all this is true, then how do you take on that st

after 2010?

The answer is speed: speed to balance knowledg

ability to seek protection and to achieve a decision in 

and order of magnitude quicker than our ability to co

campaigns today; the ability to move about the batt

and to exploit what you already know.

Why is speed important? The challenge we face i

similar to the challenge that armies have faced for hun

of years. In order to collapse the enemy’s will to res

have to cross a deadly zone. We have to be able 

through the enemy’s area of effectiveness to strike 

operational center of gravity and collapse it in or

achieve victory.

The muzzle-loading rifle extended the killing zone 

infantryman from 150 meters to 1,000 meters or more

then, armies moved at two and a half miles an 

Americans learned at Gettysburg and at Antietam e

what the price for that was. It is no different today.

Today, we have an Army, or a land power, that mo

20 kilometers an hour, and the killing zone is thousa

miles wide. We can achieve a decisive effect on a 

battlefield with a 20-kilometer-per-hour Army no mor

we could at Le Mans and Le Chateau with a two-and-a

mile-per-hour Army in 1914. We must accelerate the p

movement in order to be able to achieve decisive effec

do you do that? By strategic, operational, and tactical s

What is the long pole? Logistics. Not techn

logistics. We took 640,000 tons of ammunition with 

Desert Storm. It took 40 tons of fuel to drop a single 

bombs. We took 28,000 containers with us to Saudi A

That is why the campaign buildup took six months, be

we had an Army—I would say a military—that was 

too heavy. An Army division weighs 94,000 tons. It 

another 90,000 tons to sustain it for six weeks. No m

118
how much you know, you can’t inject speed into 

equation with a military that is heavy and immobile

Finally, as Lenin said, quantity has a quality all it

The bottom line is this—and here I agree with Gener

Riper—ultimately, close combat is a blue-collar busin

the density of the battlefield becomes too thin, factors 

than technology and physical effect begin to determin

effective you are on the battlefield (such things as bo

cohesion, leadership, the ability to control and deal w

fear of violent death). So even an army that thins out 

battlefield, so to speak, still will have to be able, wh

close fight occurs—and it always does—to be able to co

and bond units together.

Let’s talk about strategic speed—getting there “f

with the mostest,” to quote General Nathan Be

Forrest. The first element of winning wars after 

against a major competitor will be to get to the thea

war very quickly to begin the process of the collapse 

from the moment you leave the continental United S

How will you do it? You can put air power, sea powe

land power into this equation, but this is how we do it 

you have a line in the sand with forward-deployed 

Early-arriving forces give you a political statemen

maybe they will be able to survive, but they certainly a

able to achieve decisive effect. As General Link sa

enemy force has the opportunity to set itself operatio

Whether it is in Kuwait, in Budapest, or along the 

perimeter, the enemy has the ability to set h

operationally. Therefore, subsequent operations—w

calls the counteroffensive—is reactive. You are try

reestablish yourself in a theater of war.

What we need is the ability to preempt the enemy 

battlefield. Here is where General Link and I agree. It 

ability to arrive on the battlefield and, through an 

strategic preemption—a strategic takedown opera

keep the enemy from his operational objectives and d

him in detail, to disintegrate his force—not to butcher 

119
to disintegrate his force in the field. When you do 

campaigns go from months to weeks, in some case

weeks to days. The operational level of war takes hour

in some cases, perhaps days, depending on the nature 

terrain.

How will you do it? You have to break that log

umbilical cord. You have to accelerate the pace of mov

by an order of magnitude. The only way to do that is to 

Here again, General Link and I agree. If you can go 

you can exploit the “surface-to-space continuum,” as w

it—you can gravitate many of your combat su

functions outside the immediate confines of the battl

and you can gravitate many of the combat support fun

upward—including logistics, intelligence, communica

and fire support (to some degree).

So it is conceivable, then, that you could build a 

that is split, much as it appears in the following ch

fact, we saw hints of this in Desert Storm: the ability t

a force. Keep in the battle area only those forces tha

sense, move, and fuse information. That’s it. 

everything else outside the battle area. How far? 

depends on technology. Probably outside the imm

reach of weapons of mass destruction.

120

O PE RA TIO N A L C H AR A CTE RISTICS of A A N (20

. . . A BA LA N C ED A PPR O A C H to W A R FA R E

T he new high ground - -

firepow er and C3I

Support

Efficient, flat organization

• From joint to interdependence

• Autonom ous operations for w eeks

• All operating system s resident w ithin

battle force

• “Reach out” for com bat functions

(Fires, C2, Logistics)

Com bat Effec

Leader I

• Self-protection through m ovem ent

organic w eapons, low -observables

situational awareness

• Engage enem y w ith inform ation,

organic, and inorganic weapons

• Pull-D ow n Data – fro m the Internet

Air-ground approach uses

ground tactically w ithout

relying on it for m obility

• F

rom joint to interdependence

• Autonomous operations for weeks

• All operating systems resident within

 Battle force

• Self-protection through movement,

 organic weapons, low-observables, and

 situational awareness

• Engage enemy with information,

 organic, and inorganic weapons

• Pull-Down Data - from the Internet

Combat Effecti

 Leader In

 The new high ground - -

 firepower and C

3

I

Air-ground approach uses

ground tactically without

relying on it for mobility

 Support

Efficient, flat organization
The left part of the above chart is an industrially ef

organization that provides just what’s needed, just in 

The right side of the chart is a military force t

extremely small, extremely lean, very agile, and a

move operational distances at hundreds of kilomet

hour.

We conducted an operational war game in early 19

a matter of fact, we conducted seven iterations—one M

and six Army. I will not go into the details, but allow 

give you some insights.

The first thing we learned is that the art of war do

change. The second is that, if you do not control spac

lose. You must be able to know more than the enemy 

and that difference needs to be on the magnitude 

seven, or eight to one. When we fought RMA forces tha

roughly equal, we had something like the blitzkrieg. 

we bumped up the information advantage by about a 

of two, we saw a very fluid, dynamic battlefield. Wh

pushed it up to six to seven to one, the whole chara

warfare changed.

If you can apply killing power and maneuver 

simultaneously and lay that over an enemy force acro

entire spread of his operational array, it is like putting 

blanket over a fire. You snuff it out and you collapse 

the double shock of destructive power and a maneuve

that surrounds you and occupies all positions of adva

This is what collapses the enemy’s will to resis

constant butchery. That is what does it. I think th

game showed that.

General Van Riper and I were raised in an era in 

we saw enemy units aggregated in rectangles displaye

piece of acetate on a map. The information was a

wrong, it was always old, and we never trusted i

aggregations we saw of the enemy—and even of ourse

were always in blocks.

121
But what happens if you can see the enemy in exq

detail, in near-real time? What if, instead of seeing, sq

on a map, you can see individual units and individua

as General Link mentioned? If you can do that, then y

take the Blue force and break it down into aggregation

correspond to the Red force. Then you have comman

control again, thanks to the information revoluti

coordinate all that and apply it as a single blan

maneuver. If you can do that in a very short period of t

campaign goes from a month-long, exercise, a b

exercise, to something that lasts hours.

In the six iterations that we ran, we fought in C

Europe, Southwest Asia, and Northeast Asia

operational phases lasted from two hours to two week

enemy did what you would expect it to do: he went st

for the cities and more complex terrain. When he did th

stretched out the length of the campaign considerab

the way, another point to General Link’s idea, if y

going to model future conflicts, it has to be free play, fo

force; fixing the enemy does not give you insights if th

of the realm is information.

Go to the strategic game. If you can pick up a str

force and move it—in this case, to Europe in abo

hours—and have it in combat immediately, it mak

more efficient militarily, but it also makes your dipl

and political problem infinitely more complex. We le

that during our strategic war game at Carlisle Barra

January 1997. So if you are not careful and you don’

coalitions carefully over time, you run the risk of 

going to war alone or going to war without the precond

properly set. The enemy knows this; therefore, he 

that our strategic center of gravity is our ability to b

coalition and to do it quickly.

Jointness becomes interdependence. Listen to m

because this is important. We cannot fight a camp

whether the center of mass is air, land, or sea—

traditional building-block, phased, time-sequenced m

122
that joint doctrine calls for today. If you do this, 

learned in our war game, the biggest source of c

friction is ourselves, not the enemy. It is ourselves, be

of this obsession we have with putting everything 

matrix. We have to learn to get beyond joint doctrin

come to something that my war gamers call 

dependence, or the ability to orchestrate killing power 

positional advantage concurrently.

Our Achilles’ heel was space, and the enemy knew 

The Red commander in this game was James Blac

formerly of the Center for Strategic and Interna

Studies—and you trained that diabolical bastard 

because he attempted immediately to collapse 

surface-to-space continuum. As soon as he started 

that, that became our center of gravity, and we had a

Pearl Harbor in slow motion. The lessons are that we 

protect our space assets, and there is no such thing as 

war, air war, or ground war—it is a single continu

2020.

Operational impressions: speed and mobility. 

can’t combine the two together, all the firepower 

world does not help. There is great synergy when yo

maneuver and firepower. The more killing power yo

bring from outside the battlefield into the battlefie

smaller and more agile your operational force becom

Special operations forces are our global scouts. I co

into a great deal of discussion about this, but the peop

made the coalition possible and allowed us to figh

coalition partners effectively with a high-tech/low-tec

were the special operations forces that we employed 

game.

How about technology? How do you build a forc

this? Just as General Heinz Guderian learned in the 

that the diesel engine and metal roads in Central E

were going to give him the blitzkrieg irrespective of wh

he wanted it, the information revolution is going to al

to build flexibility and “information domin

123
irrespective of whether we choose to do so. Much 

technology I am talking about is derivative as outli

the following chart. How do you project a force overse

day and a half rather than six months? You do 

exploiting the work that is being done as we speak to

General Michael Loh and others to exploit the so

middle market. Aircraft and high-speed sealift will al

to pick up strategic forces and move them very q

directly into an operational area and free up what for

were strategic assets to move forces within the thea

war.

That is a fast and dirty Army After Next. Suffice it 

that what you have just heard is not the idle rambli

some gray-headed, two-star general, but the culmina

a great deal of work done by a team of people who, f

past two years, have worked very hard and approache

from a holistic, eclectic perspective in which we starte

the art of war and geostrategy and worked back t

technology, instead of going into some technologic

store and pulling the things off the shelves that we th

were the neatest. The result, we, at least, believe, 

image of war as it begins to unfold through the murky 

that will look increasingly like the cycles of war to co

124

To Set the Stage for A A N , the A rm y Should A ugm ent Its Exist

R esearch and D evelopm ent Effort by Further Exploring These

System s and Technologies. (updated)

T he new high ground–

firepow er and C3I

Support

• H ybrid Pow er System s

• Logistics Efficiencies (fuel efficience, ultra-reliability,

w eight-reduction)

• Hum an Engineering/Cognitive Engineering

• Signature Control (including counters)

• Protection Schem es for Land System s (including

active protection)

• Advanced M aterials

• Affordable precision and alternate lethality m eans

• Alternative Propellants

• Non-lethal capabilities

• Biological and Chem ical Protection, Antidotes, and

Vaccines

Co

Air-ground approach uses

ground tactically w ithout

relying on it for m obility

• Situational Aw areness

• G lobal M aneuver Platform s

• Advanced Airfram e

– Heavy Lift/T actical Utility Lift

• Future Fighting G round Craft

• Autonom ous and Sem iautonom ous

Unm anned System s (air, ground, s

• Advanced Fire Support System

• “Living Internet” w ith m obile NLO S 

• Assured intel, surveillance and rec

• Soldier as a system

AAN TEC HN OLOG Y SH ORT LIST

A AN SYSTEM S SH OR T LIS
Chapter Eight

Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Strategic Studies Institute

U.S. Army War College

Army Issue Paper Number 2

November 1998

125

AMERICA’S ARMY:

PREPARING FOR

TOMORROW’S SECUR

CHALLENGES
AMERICA’S ARMY:

PREPARING FOR TOMORROW’S SECUR

CHALLENGES

Every age [has] had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, 

its own peculiar preconceptions.

1

Carl Von Clausew

Introduction:

The chronicles of military history teach u

importance of preparing for future security challeng

would be unrealistic to anticipate the next 25 years 

beginning of a peaceful century void of confli

Clausewitz observed, every age has indeed been m

with its own kind of war. While the means change ove

warfare will remain “An act of force to compel our ene

do our will.”

2

America’s elected leaders should expect num

international security challenges as the new mille

witnesses continued racial, economic and religious ten

Some of these conflicts will be so severe that ou

national viability and existence could be in jeopard

United States, moreover, must anticipate the r

regional hegemons

3

 who will undoubtedly challeng

vital national interests. In some instances, these se

threats will require resolution by using the elem

military power.

The Army is preparing to meet tomorrow’s se

challenges by implementing a strategy that will tran

127

1. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael H

and Peter Paret, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, 

2. Ibid., p. 75.

3. For purposes of this discussion, regional hegemons are defi

nation-state actors who attempt to dominate their respective regio

world by either threat or use of military force.
it from a heavy, forward-deployed force to a lighter

versatile, power projection force. The knowledg

attributes of Force XXI will be enhanced with the ph

agility of Army After Next Era Battleforces. Thes

capabilities, in combination with a fully trained 

consisting of high quality people from both activ

reserve components, will enable America’s Army to r

the world’s dominant strategic land power during th

Century.

The World Beyond 2010:

While the first decades of the 21

st

 Century will 

dramatic social and economic change, some thing

remain predictable. There is little evidence that su

the Information Age will alter the perpetual characte

of geopolitics. 

Geopolitical interactions based upon the purs

international order, stability and the balance of pow

continue to influence the national interests of the U

States. The nation-state will remain fundamental

same. These states will be identifiable political e

bounded by geographical parameters. They may ex

sovereignty in new ways as the old Industria

bureaucracy designed to regulate commerce and indu

pushed aside by Information Age innovations.

Global restraint, maintained through the bala

power during the Cold War, will be more difficult to a

as the world is likely to disintegrate into areas of mult

tensions with competing regional hegemons. Re

influence of a bi-polar strategic balance has already a

the world to return to its pre-Cold War natural con

Competing states will seek to gain dominance over 

neighbors. Conflicts will abound as some nations r

historic grievances and others open old wounds tha

been festering for hundreds of years. The prolifera

information, while increasing knowledge 

understanding among nations, also galvanizes 

128
groups and contributes to cultural friction within tro

regions. Some states may disintegrate into sm

ethnically based units. This fragmentation will caus

interstate and intrastate conflict.

What is different today is the fact that, thanks 

growing interdependence of world markets an

expansion of information, even the most local sou

friction may spark sympathetic heat in distant place

thousand year conflict in the Balkans has become mor

a localized squabble between conflicting ethni

religious groups. What goes on there affects rel

among the West, Russia and the Muslim countries 

Middle East. The lingering territorial dispute and n

arms race on the Indian subcontinent, the conf

interests over the Spratly Islands among China and 

Southeast Asian nations, and the continuing issue 

relationship between Taiwan and China point to 

likely areas of regional strife and disharmony.

Future conflicts will most likely occur along the 

geopolitical and cultural fault lines that have sepa

civilizations for millennia. These historic lines e

across northern and southern Europe, converge 

Balkans, and traverse through the Middle East; cont

beyond Eurasia, turning south toward the Pacific 

down the Malay Peninsula and into the Indon

Archipelago. As in the past, these geopolitical faul

will continue to witness ethnic, religious, economi

political confrontation.

4

As the competition for resources and regional dom

intensifies, hegemons will likely develop wher

intersection of sociopolitical zones collide. Since 

regional fault lines contain abundant natural reso

particularly petroleum, these economic attribute

continue to capture the interest of the United State

other advanced countries. Between now and 2025

129

4. For greater detail see Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civiliz

Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, p. 25.
reasonable to assume that if an aspiring regional heg

emerges to threaten either our interests or the inter

our friends and allies, conflict will likely occur.

Future militaries throughout the world will conti

reflect the societies they defend. Just as the Agricultur

and Industrial Age affected how armies fought, inform

technologies will have a dramatic impact upon the cha

of military organizations and force structure. The po

the microchip already makes it possible to know much 

about the location of both enemy and friendly forces

enhanced situational awareness requires us to 

thinking in terms of a surface- to-space continuum th

transform the traditional battlefield of the past into a 

“battle-space” that will be more vertical than linear.

This enhanced knowledge will mean American 

will strategically deploy with greater speed to the the

operations and then act with greater speed througho

operational and tactical battle-space. Digitization no

improves the ability to communicate, it fundame

alters the relationship between fire and maneuver. 

the capacity to attack an enemy’s center of gravity 

great precision, our forces will maneuver with g

dispersion and protection to overwhelm the oppo

ability to resist. 

130

We Can Begin to Identify Geopolitical Trends

• Fracturing and Regionalization.

• Diffusion of Threats.

• Rise of Regional Hegemons.

• Resurrection of Lingering Hostilities dormant during

the Cold War --- return to normal global chaos

• Anti-Access Strategies.

Conflict continues to center around States or

State-Like Actors.
Just as societies and states will reflect various sta

economic development and modernization, global mil

will likely retain elements of older, industrial armed 

while selectively buying state-of-the-art technology. 

likelihood, the proliferation of weapons and techno

will continue, thus contributing to the pote

destabilization within regions of interest to the U

States. For example, warriors from failed states 

equip themselves with outdated weapons yet have ac

weapons of mass destruction and employ the 

technology to exploit our information systems.

America’s Vital National

Interests in the 21st Century:

The United States has little choice but to remain gl

engaged beyond 2010. America is expected to mainta

of the world’s largest economies, and we can assum

some certainty that the United States will contin

actively promote democratic principles, free m

economies and human rights.

For the American military, the Third Millennium 

in August 1990 when GEN(R) Colin L. Powell, Chairm

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shifted the United States 

131
threat-based planning to capabilities-based planning

approach reflected the changing strategic land

resulting from the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end 

Cold War. For the last several years this methodolo

been the basis for determining the required forces nee

secure America’s national interests.

The President’s National Security Strategy define

national interests as those of such importance that w

nation, will do whatever is necessary to defend 

whenever our national survival is at risk. Vital int

include the physical security of our territory an

security of the territory of our formal allies. The

include the safety of American citizens at home and a

Part of insuring our security is maintaining access to 

and resources that are vital to our economic well-bein

defend these vital interests we are, and will remain, 

to use military force “unilaterally and decisively.”

5

Important but not vital national interests are thos

affect our national well-being and the character 

world, but do not threaten our national survival. We m

may not use military force to address these inte

depending on the costs and risks and how these me

against the interests at stake.

6

 Many of the threats 

132

5. See A National Security Strategy for a New Century, Washington, D

Government Printing Office, October 1998, p. 5.

6. Ibid. 
interests through 2010 and beyond will fall into thi

area of “important” but not “vital.”

The third level of interests addresses humani

concerns. These interests stem from our historical ide

and our democratic values and heritage. As a nation w

continue to stand for what is good and right. If peopl

our help, we may act because our values demand that 

so. Often, we will try to avert humanitarian dis

through diplomacy or by cooperating with a wide ra

international and non-governmental organization

many cases, it will make more sense to take action e

alter a situation which, if left unattended, might grow 

disaster requiring a massive intervention, which mi

costly in terms of both treasure and lives.

7

Our national interests will remain focused on E

East and Southwest Asia.

8

 These regions are strate

important to the United States because most of ou

interests extend from the continental United Sta

Europe, Asia and the Pacific Rim. The United States 

be prepared to act wherever vital national int

intersect with regions of potential conflict. Latin Ame

certainly important to the United States, as stated 

Monroe Doctrine, and we are mindful of events in A

But, not every conflict will require U.S. military a

Military intervention, however, may be required 

outbreak of conflict within these regions jeopardiz

national interests. 

Future Threats: Who Might Oppose the United

States?

We can postulate with some degree of certainty 

major military competitor is not likely to arise from m

democratic states. Although warfare among or be

democracies is not impossible, because of mutual eco

133

7. Ibid., p. 6.

8. Ibid., p. 12.
interests and the similarity between political and 

culture, such a prospect is highly improbable.

It seems almost a certainty that current threa

continue from hostile subnational groups, criminal c

and transnational terrorists. While each group may p

the capacity to cause great mischief, they are not expe

pose a threat to our continued existence and viabilit

nation. Various rogue states may possess the will, bu

lack of means to do us harm will not allow them to be 

than a temporary threat to any vital national interes

Likewise, failed states are not likely to pose a sign

threat. Although there may be plenty of people in 

states who have very little regard for our nation 

values, the only way they can threaten us will be th

criminal activity involving various forms of terr

Although this is an area of concern, the states them

will simply lack the means to threaten our vital inte

The proliferation of weapons of mass destructio

particular concern but this activity is not expec

threaten our national survival. It would be threaten

our homeland and overseas interests if any of these e

gain access to either chemical or biological weapons o

134

Probable Long-Term U.S. Strategy (to 2025)

• Security Policy will center on:

– Security of the United States.

– Stability overseas in areas of vital national interest.

• Military Strategy will center on:

– Defense of United States; land, sea, air and space.

– Forward engagement (stationing) in vital regions.

– Projectable Military Power.

• Engagement & Enlargement will continue worldwide

across the full spectrum of operations.
destruction. However, delivery systems with limited 

along with the increasing sophistication of det

capabilities, constrain their viability as a weapons sy

Moreover, there is no basis to assume that the current 

of deterrence will not continue to be effective as the U

States has declared that the use of such weapons a

our forces and homeland will incur a rapid and d

retaliation.

The Rise of a Major Competitor:

A major competitor, however, with both the will a

means to oppose us, could become a significant threat 

vital national interests and possibly to our cont

viability as a global power. While we do not pred

emergence of a peer competitor, one that could mat

United States in all military categories, certain re

states have both the national will and the conv

military means to challenge and threaten the re

interests of the United States and our commitm

favorable world order. These countries would not 

match American air, land, and sea capabilities. Inste

regional powers, their conventional center of gravity 

be protected by a large army and reinforced by se

investments in key systems such as missile defen

cheap but effective air and naval counter measures. 

resources would feature just enough precision and let

to deter outside incursions and achieve regional domin

The famous study of strategy and warfare, writ

Sun Tzu, warned: “In battle one engages with the ort

and gains victory through the unorthodox.”

9

 The 

dangerous future opponent will heed the lessons fro

Gulf War and will subsequently design a strateg

avoids our strength and uses indirect means to ero

national will. This opponent will exploit perc

American weaknesses such as an over-relian

135

9. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Ralph D. Sawyer, Boulder, Co

Westview Press, 1994, p. 187.
technology, an aversion to casualties and collateral da

a lack of commitment for sustained campaign

sensitivity to world opinion. Willing to inv

disproportionate amount of resources into adv

weaponry, this potential adversary will not seek to 

our military forces in the field. Rather, he would a

defensive-offensive strategy that seeks to counter c

American advantages and deter, or, at the worst, att

operational stalemate.

Without question, beyond 2010, America should 

the new century to bring a new kind of war tha

threaten a number of vital national interests. The 

serious threat will likely arise from a transitional stat

on becoming a regional hegemon. This potential enem

feature a partially modernized military, specially tailo

counter American technology and enriched wit

enough Information Age advancements to seiz

initiative. Such an adversary will not try to defeat u

will seek to deter our incursion into a regional cri

make our involvement so costly that we withdraw. 

136

More than 8 YEARS into the 21st CENTURY w

see a RISING PATTERN of ASYMMETRY

• Shedding Cold War Impedimenta

• Streamlining forces: Less weight, more mobility

•Less corrupt, more ideologically tuned

•From internal security to regional projection

•More mature, professional, educated

• Doctrinal focus on Operational Art. - Deflect air/seapower to preserve “Armies in 

•Off-the-shelf information age technologies

• Just enough conventional weapons technology to keep low tech forces viable

•Offensive strategy: Satisfy long simmering hegemonic ambitions

• Defensive strategy: Primitive strategic forces to prevent interference from abroad

India

North Korea

Pakistan

Iran

Iraq

Russia

China

980,000

1,000,000

520,000

345,000

350,000

670,000

2,200,000

Army Asymmetric Investments
opponents will realize that a stalemate can be define

victory. These nations and actors with revolut

impulses are going to be difficult to deter and defeat 

coming century.

National Security Policy Beyond 2010:

As the world leader of democratic principles, our se

policy serves three objectives. First, it must provide f

physical security of the United States by making su

military capability is strong enough to deter aggressio

protect our national interests. Second, we seek stabi

those areas of the world where American vital interes

at stake. Third, we will promote democracy abroa

bolster economic vitality along the cultural fault lines 

American interests and potential instability converge

a long-term commitment of American power to 

regions will foster the kind of stability that will ensur

U.S. vital interests are not threatened. 

Our national military strategy must further refle

commitment to deter aggression and preserve our w

life. As a global power, the United States mu

unmatched in its ability to defend U.S. interests by air

sea and space. It is no longer useful to think of this na

a “maritime” or “continental” power. Air and sea li

communications are the interior lines of a world whe

far-flung interests may be threatened.

The Army of the 21st Century will use those air a

lines of communications to move where it must to secu

interests. In the Roman Empire, the Mediterranea

both facilitated commerce and allowed for the movem

troops. The Empire was sustained for nearly four cen

largely because Rome was master of both the sea a

land. The Army will never participate in operations th

completely independent of the other services. Duri

next century, the United States must continue to be a 

maritime and aerospace power. Joint, Unifie

137
Coalition action will be necessary to secure our wor

interests and respond to future threats.

Developing the Army’s Long-Range Vision:

America’s Army will continue to be the only elem

military power prepared to exercise direct, continuin

comprehensive control over land, its resources a

people. During the next 25 years, the Army will e

deter aggression and to fight and win the nation’s 

Other requirements will include providing options d

small-scale contingencies and peace operations su

humanitarian and domestic assistance. Despit

infusion of technological systems, the Army of the 

will be a total quality force seamlessly integrated 

active and reserve components. More importantly, 

continue to rely on a strong value system that demons

an organizational commitment to take care of people

As the long-range transition from Force XXI to 

After Next continues, great change will occur in the A

physical, technological and cultural makeup. Beyond 

the Army must complete the metamorphosis fro

rudimentary efforts initiated with Force XXI to th

integrated force envisioned within the Army After 

These changes will physically alter the institu

war-making sinews and will ensure the Army’s vi

138

America’s Strategic Challenge Might Play Out Like This...

Threat

Response

Constrained Competitors

• Industrial-Age Forces

• Very Limited Precision

• Asymmetric Strategies

• Quasi-Professional

• Sparse WMD

Regional Competitors

• Industrial-Age Forces

• Selective Precision

• Asymmetric Strategies

and Investments

• Quasi-Professional

• Limited WMD

Major Competitors

• Information-Age Forces

• Precision and Mass

• Hegemonic Ambitions,

“Anti-Access Strategies”

• Professionalized

• Proliferated WMD

• Tension Management

• Engagement and

Enlargement

• Peacekeeping/Peace

Enforcement

• OOTW

• 2-MRC Strategy

• Improved Forces

• Improved Strategic and

Operational Mobility

• Improved Situational

Awareness

• Forward Presence

• Major War-Winning

Capabilities

• Precision, Mass, Speed

• Strategic Maneuver

• Information Dominance

• Jointness to

Interdependence

2000 2010 2020

MILITARY

PREEMPTION

CAPABILITY

BECOMES

ESSENTIAL
well into the next century. While a future enemy ma

competencies that would counter American tec

advantages, we must retain a dominent ability t

quickly and decisively at low cost. Moreover, the Army 

have the means to conduct battle rapidly and to end it 

the paralytic effect of firepower is greatest.

To fulfill its role as the land component member 

joint team, the 21st Century Army must acquire a n

of mental and physical capabilities that will e

full-spectrum dominance. The Army must be suffic

versatile to operate effectively across a wide ran

missions as part of a joint force or multinational co

that can win quickly and decisively. Combat elemen

incorporate the effects of knowledge and speed to 

positional advantage while protecting the force with

environment of near total strategic, operational and ta

battle-space awareness. This force will be capable of m

rapidly to any point where conflict threatens our 

interests. The 21st Century Army will combine the eff

battle-space awareness and precision fires to derive t

potential of strategic speed and dominant maneuv

these changes become fully integrated, the syne

effects derived from these various capabilities will e

139

But we must Anticipate the Rise of a Major

Competitor by 2025

A Major Competitor:

Will Not

• Try to recreate a Cold War bipolar world

• Attempt to match US system-for-system

Will

• Focus on landpower

• Apply limited resources asymetrically

• Frustrate US with just enough precision to kill and buy time

• Capitalize on intrinsic potential of mass, popular will, and

inherent strength of the defensive

Not a Peer

(US Look-Alike)

Competitor

Stalemate Works to the Advantage

of the Competition
the Army to be the nation’s force of decision on th

Century battlefield.

The objective must be to use all the capabilitie

balanced military force so that the final outcome of an

will be decided before the first engagement. The way 

that is to collapse the enemy’s will to resist. Str

preclusion is a process that involves marshalling 

rapidly and moving them to points of conflict quickly

In Operation Desert Storm we saw a glimpse of th

soon as the decision was made to deploy American 

into the Persian Gulf in great numbers, the television 

programs showed troops getting on airplanes, tan

flatcars moving toward ports, aircraft taking off for ba

Saudi Arabia, and ships leaving port. Iraqi leadership 

formidable force building and moving inexorably t

them. The psychological destabilization of the enemy 

with mobilization and deployment, and culminates w

total collapse of the enemy brought about throu

integrated attack that combines the destructive eff

maneuver and precision engagement.

The Army’s Contribution To Our National

Military Strategy:

In the 21st Century, the twin pillars of our na

military strategy will continue to be forward presen

power projection. Both active and passive deterrence 

essential throughout the regions where we maintain 

national interests. After more than three years of 

investigation, we are convinced that four major catego

military forces will be required in order to effec

execute a comprehensive National Security Strategy

Global scouts are a key resource and part of the A

effort to bridge active and passive deterrence mea

Consisting of attaches, foreign area officers, conven

and special operating forces, global scouts build and n

a reservoir of trust and goodwill with potential co

140
partners. These soldiers seek to favorably shap

strategic environment. While these teams teac

fundamentals of combat, they also seek to educate 

cultures on democratic values and governm

procedures. 

Forward presence forces demonstrate our na

resolve and commitment to maintain peace and st

within a region. These resources serve to deter aggr

and they help prevent major crises through aggr

engagement programs and coalition building. E

through the foresight of our predecessors or fat

currently have forces throughout the world station

regions where our vital national interests endure. 

forces are deployed on foreign soil and their prese

usually enough to deter hostile actions. If necessary

can provide an immediate response to acts of aggressio

stabilize the situation until reinforcements a

American forces stationed in South Korea are an exc

example of strategically positioned forward-dep

forces. 

Because of its current forward positioning along h

lines of conflict that are of great interest to the U

141

Beyond 2010 Knowledge Dominance will no

longer be enough. We must have....

Speed -- to Exploit Knowledge:

•Forces must move to survive and succeed

– Linear Speed -- Strategic preemption

– Angular Speed -- Anticipate, out think, gain

positional advantage

•Pulsed, continuous operations

•Agile, high operational transition capability

•Adaptive, full-spectrum force
States, the 21st Century Army will play the largest 

all the services in favorably shaping the geo-str

environment through peacetime engagement acti

Most countries throughout the world depend on larg

forces to define and defend their way of life. Ver

nations, in contrast, have significant navies or air for

part of their military structure. In the eyes of our f

and allies, and even our potential enemies, troops sta

overseas represent the ultimate American commitm

peace and stability. 

Global scouts and forward deployed forces will o

effective if they are backed with a credible reserv

over-the-horizon forces that can mobilize and deploy 

the United States to wherever acts of aggression occu

essence of our military credibility will be continental

forces that can rapidly deploy to either preclude aggr

actions or defeat an opponent before his forces have t

achieve complete victory.

Charting the Road Ahead−

The Army as an Integral Member of the Joint T

During the next 25 years, the world’s sec

environment will be shaped by the interaction of n

undergoing various stages of national economic and 

142

• Power projection from all

points on the globe converge

and paralyze enemy

• Simultaneous convergence of

overwhelming land, air,

space, and sea forces

• Overseas presence quickens

global maneuver

• Being “First with the Most”

reduces risk and begins

process of psychological

domination

Strategic Speed

The Goal: A globally self-deployable force capable of striking directly at

strategic and operational centers of gravity

Seize initiative,

build momentum . . . an image of uncontestable

competence and unstoppable force
development. While the information revolution 

undoubtedly affect most societies, only a few nation

have transitioned into the Information Age by 2010

those nations that make this leap, information techno

will also permeate their older industrial produ

facilities as well as their agricultural sectors. In 

nations, these effects will be positive, fostering g

socio-economic progress. In other societies, people 

suffer while their government pours resources into bu

a military machine that could transform these nation

regional hegemons. 

With few exceptions, major conflict between stat

occur in the vicinity of long-standing geopolitica

cultural fault lines that separate civilizations. Natio

groups will continue to seek ways to impose their will

each other and when they do, war will result. Am

involvement will occur whenever its vital national int

intersect with conflict along these tectonic fault lines

Certain nations will choose to invest in conven

military forces, information technologies and se

weapons of mass destruction. Their purpose will 

dominate selected regions while deterring Ame

incursions. If confronted, they will employ an asym

strategy that seeks to avoid America’s military stre

143
and exploits perceived weaknesses. Nations that follo

pattern represent our most significant future threat

While the world beyond 2010 will present a num

strategic security challenges, America will remain 

single global military power. Although the fundam

nature of war in the 21st Century will not change

weapons will alter the traditional relationship betwe

and maneuver.

During the early decades of the 21st Century, the 

of 2025 will differ from today’s Army in two d

ways. First, it will achieve unprecedented strateg

operational speed by exploiting information technolo

create a knowledge- based organization. Second, 

exhibit tremendous flexibility and physical agility th

streamlined, seamlessly integrated organizations th

new tactics and procedures. The collective result wi

versatile, full spectrum, capabilities-based force th

decisively respond to any future global contingency. 

world begins a new age and a new century, the Ar

preparing for the next kind of war that will emerge.

144
Chapter Nine

Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Reproduced with Permission Granted by:

Spring 1999 Issue

DEFENCE SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL

Sterling Publications Ltd.

London, England

145

THE DAWN OF A NEW A

OF WARFARE:

AND THE

CLARION CALL FOR

ENHANCED MANEUV

CAPABILITIES
Submitted for Publication

THE DAWN OF A NEW AGE OF WARFAR

AND THE

CLARION CALL FOR ENHANCED

MANEUVER CAPABILITIES

The Information Age will alter modern warfare 

21

st

 Century just as the Industrial Age altered 20

th Ce

battlefields with new forms of integrated mechaniz

Armies reflect the cultural fabric of their spon

societies. There is a historical and symbiotic relatio

between advancing technology and the evolving me

warfare. As Clausewitz observed, every age has indee

marked with its own kind of war. The inform

revolution promises to deliver a watershed of chang

will again significantly alter the context of future wa

During the past 50 years, much of the talent, energ

national resources of the free world were invested w

the Defense Community to ensure that the batt

advantage resided with the armed forces who 

compelled to fight from defensive positions. The m

threats of the Cold War Era required this type of opera

capability. For more than two generations, demo

nations invested their military research and develo

funds to improve precision strike capabilities

dividends from this investment strategy yielded a s

weapons with unprecedented lethal range and acc

The Cold War, consequently, ended with defensive 

enjoying the battlefield advantage.

The Battle Trumpet Sounds Anew

If we hope to restore a range of balanced, off

options on the battlefield of tomorrow, the power 

microchip must be harnessed to develop a new genera

147
maneuver platforms that will be able to counter pre

fires while making contact with the enemy. Precision 

only brings a single dimension of offensive heft to the 

To be sure, firepower can be paralytic in its effect, but 

effects are always fleeting. Firepower alone will not co

an opponent’s will to resist nor will it bring the co

commander certain victory. The clarion call for 

generation of maneuver platforms sounds a

Tomorrow’s battlefield success will be achiev

commanders who have the ability to orchestrate pre

strike with precision maneuver. As computer tech

enhances both situational awareness and pre

munitions, soldiers of tomorrow will simply die sma

we fail to develop this leap-ahead physical agility. The 

of a new age of warfare and the anticipated emerge

clever, adaptive opponents will require an ord

magnitude increase in strategic and operational man

speed.

Almost 10 Years into a Strategic Pause

We are now experiencing a period of strategic calm 

similar to the interwar years of 1918 to 1939. The end 

Cold War and the defeat of Iraq’s Republican Guard m

a major geopolitical transition that has introduced an 

global harmony. The world beyond 2010, however, pro

to become a complex web of international security con

Global restraint, maintained through the balance of 

that existed during the Cold War, will be more diffi

achieve as long-standing multipolar tensions feste

competing regional hegemons attempt to dominate 

respective corners of the world. Conflicts will abou

some nations redress historic grievances and others 

old wounds that have been simmering for hundreds of 

Future conflicts will most likely occur along the 

geopolitical and cultural fault lines that have sepa

civilizations for millennia. These historic lines e

across northern and southern Europe, converge 

148
Balkans, traverse through the Middle East, con

beyond Eurasia, turning south toward the Pacific 

down the Malay Peninsula and into the Indon

Archipelago. As in the past, these geopolitical faul

will continue to witness ethnic, religious, econom

political confrontation.

The Rise of Major Military Competition

If the past is an indication of the future, this 

vacation from military violence will end eventually. I

soon to postulate whom the significant challengers 

be, however, we have started to develop some em

insights regarding the origin and context of future re

conflict.

During the next two decades, states will contin

cluster in one of three major groups based upon 

political, economic and social differences. It 

reasonable to anticipate with some degree of certaint

major military threats will not likely arise fro

approximately two dozen developed, industria

democracies. Although warfare among or between m

democratic states is not impossible, such an outcome i

improbable. Likewise, at the opposite end o

have-and-have-not continuum, there is a large num

states who struggle for survival and they will not 

either the economic or military means to challenge ou

national interests. Without question, these “hav

nations will certainly continue to need humanitaria

peacekeeping assistance.

In between these two extremes there is a gro

“transitional” states most likely to become candida

serious military competition in the next century. 

evolving states, located primarily in Europe, the M

East and Asia, are already beginning to develo

economic means that will generate the expandable i

to support more sophisticated militaries. We s

anticipate, by the end of the next decade, a few of 

149
transitional states to become adaptive enemies wit

the national will and military means to challenge us. 

competitors will enjoy both the positional advantage 

defense and the technical advantage of newly em

precision munitions to challenge our interests within 

respective regions of influence.

Without question, the United States Army expec

new century to bring a new kind of war that will thre

number of vital national interests. The potential ene

the early 21

st

 Century may feature a partially mode

military, specially tailored to counter American tech

and enriched with just enough Information 

advancements to seize the initiative. Such an adversa

not try to defeat us, but will seek to deter our incursion 

regional crisis, or make our involvement so costly th

withdraw. These opponents will realize that a stal

can be defined in their terms as a victory.

The Microchip is a Neutral Ally

Presently, many military organizations believ

they can best address future competition with techno

that improve our ability to find and kill the enemy f

distance. This superior knowledge, unfortunately, w

be sufficient to ensure future success. Even the 

chess-masters, who have 100 percent clarity and rea

vision over their battlefield, must cope with the unex

moves from a thinking opponent.

The information revolution, at best, will be neut

military competitors challenge each other. It will alt

nature of warfare and potentially do more for our oppo

than it will do for us. A thinking opponent will q

realize that our intensive reliance on informatio

technologies becomes a weakness that can becom

asymmetric target.

One of the potential ironies of the future may 

because western information technologies could p

150
non-western armies with solutions for two of their 

vexing problems. First, cellular technology and the In

may allow them to maintain a concert of action fo

periods of time with widely dispersed units. Second, 

same technologies will allow them to orchestrate the 

massing of dispersed units when opportunities ar

transition into offensive operations.

The prospect of this scenario becomes even 

sobering when one considers the fact that many comm

ventures already provide future competitors with th

they need while commercial research centers conti

perfect non-nodal, distributed and net-centric 

information technologies. All of these resources w

available to paying customers without one developm

dollar spent by our potential opponents. The techno

foot race is underway and either side could win. 

develop the technologies to find and kill the enem

potential opponents will develop the technologies to b

even more dispersed and difficult to find.

Charting Tomorrow’s Capabilities Today

The Information Age beckons the Defense Comm

with a clarion call for innovative thought 

experimentation. Increasingly, the dominant mea

warfare will become less anchored within ex

industrial age impedimenta and more reflective o

systems, innovations and adaptations launched b

unfolding march of the information revolution. As th

and lethality of the deadly zone increases, our industr

experience becomes less relevant as a means of determ

the future course of modern war. During the pe

interlude that we currently enjoy, it is important to ex

new ideas and evaluate the merit of new con

Fortunately, we have a rich historical roadm

experiences that give us a sense of direction. The chro

of military history teach us the importance of develo

vision for the future of landpower that will 

151
technological developments and assist wit

development of new fighting doctrine. The bluepri

successful Armies beyond 2010 will be discovered th

both analyses of military history and an orga

experimentation effort that must be sustained over a 

of many years.

The imperatives for charting tomorrow’s capab

today are imposing. The secret of future victories w

discovered if we are willing to foster innovation and su

experimentation during the next decade. A re

blueprint for tomorrow’s Army is possible to imagine 

concepts, doctrine and structure are investigated. C

victory in 2025 can only be assured if we accept the pr

that the era for industrial age warfare is passing q

while we are just witnessing the dawn of informatio

warfare.

152
Chapter Ten

Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

The Army After Next Project

Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine

Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Comman

Fort Monroe, Virginia

153

THE ANNUAL REPOR

FOR THE ARMY AFTE

NEXT PROJECT TO TH

CHIEF OF STAFF OF T

ARMY
The Annual Report for

The Army After Next Project

to the Chief of Staff of the Army

July 1997

Contents

IN TRO DUC TION ................... 

THE PRO CESS OF CHANGE ............ 

THE RATIONALE FOR CHANGE .............

THE PACE OF CHANGE ..................

THE PROCESS OF CHANGE: MID- AND LONG-RANGE 

A GEOSTRATEGIC VIEW OF 2025 ......... 

 AMERICAN NATIONAL INTERESTS THROUGH 2025. 

 RISE OF A MAJOR MILITARY COMPETITOR .....

 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY IN 2025.......

MIL I TARY ART AND SCI ENCE IN 2025 ...... 

 THE FY 1997 WAR GAME SERIES ............

 THE LEAVENWORTH GAMES ..............

 THE WINTER WAR GAME ................

 EMERGING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FORCE ..

 MODELING, SIMULATION, AND FUTURE GAMES...

SOL DIERS AND UNITS IN 2025 .......... 

 EXPERIENCED LEADERS ................

 COHESIVE UNITS .....................

 SOLDIER TRAINING AND EDUCATION ........

TECH NOL OGY: THE PATH TO KNOWL EDGE AN

SPEED ........................ 

 THE TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGE .........

 THE AAN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LINKAGES. 

THE ROAD AHEAD ................. 

155
INTRODUCTION

The Chief of Staff of the Army and the Comm

Training and Doctrine Command established the 

After Next project in February 1996 to help the 

leadership craft a vision of future Army requirement

project connects the process of change represented by 

XXI and guides future Army research and develo

programs. This is the TRADOC commander’s second a

overview of the AAN program.

Visualizing the future requires a process 

anticipates the nature of warfare in the next centur

the evolution of U.S. national security requirement

that purpose, AAN conducts broad studies of future w

to frame issues vital to the development of the U.S. 

and to provide those issues to the senior Army leaders

a format suitable for integration into TRADOC c

developments programs. These studies focus on, but a

constrained to, the period 2010 and beyond. The choi

30-year point of focus is intended to place a d

intellectual beacon far enough in front of the pace of c

so that ideas and a vision of the future will not be const

by near-term budgetary and institutional influences

an approach is needed to break free of the action-re

cycle of incremental change, which can only hold the 

hostage to the past. To ensure a comprehensive and h

perspective focused on 2025, the program is orga

around four broad research areas: the geostrategic s

the evolution of military art, human and organiza

issues, and technology trends.

By 2010, the Army will exploit the Force XXI ef

achieve nothing less than a technological and cu

metamorphosis. By then, over a decade of experimen

and field exercises will create a knowledge-based 

Army XXI, balanced across our traditional imperativ

156
possessed with a clarity of observation, degr

decentralization, and pace of decision making unpara

in the history of warfare. AAN simply seeks to provi

Army of 2020 with the physical speed and agil

complement the mental agility inherited from Force 

Following the conceptual direction set by Force 

advanced warfighting experiments, AAN’s pr

research mechanism is a series of free-play ta

operational, and strategic war games and war

excursions designed to explore the character of 

warfare and to provide an in-depth joint and 

disciplinary examination of political, social, demogr

and technological trends likely to affect the future o

Insights derived from games conducted to date compr

heart of this report. Because they reflect only the firs

of AAN studies, these insights should be cons

suggestive rather than conclusive. Future AAN war 

can be expected to refine them significantly.

THE PROCESS OF CHANGE

The history of warfare reveals a cyclical patt

military change in which evolving technology alter

favors attack or defense. Before the Industrial Age

cycles alternated slowly because innovation develope

spread slowly. After the Industrial Revolution, the 

began to accelerate, though they were still som

retarded by political and institutional conservatism a

uneven development of military technologies. B

American Civil War, rifled muskets—the precision we

of the day—had greatly extended the deadly zone troo

to cross to close with an enemy, a condition favori

defense. Subsequent advances in artillery led Eur

armies to believe that superior firepower would resto

power of the offensive and with it the possibility of 

decisive victory. Events proved them wrong. While let

skyrocketed, the pace of movement across the wid

deadly zone remained that of a marching so

Technology thus served only to increase the slaught

157
to mire armies on both sides in a conflict of attrition to 

there seemed no alternative.

By 1918, the Germans had found a partial solut

method of opportunistic infiltration allowing infan

transit the deadly zone intact—but they lacke

technology to accelerate the advance enough to 

decisive objectives before the defender could recover. 

onset of World War II, the internal combustion e

armor plating, and the wireless provided the mea

accelerate maneuver. Mechanization allowed troo

cross the deadly zone protected and at high speed. 

units could dash great distances into the enemy’s 

Victory thus came from disintegrating the coherence 

defense and collapsing the psychological will o

defender. Through rapid maneuver supported by m

firepower, the offensive once again came to dom

warfare.

In the postwar years, the United States and its 

allies applied microchip technology to develop p

long-range killing power in an effort to successfully d

against a Soviet-style blitzkrieg. The cycle of warfa

turned yet again in favor of the defense. By the mid-

technology had extended the tactical deadly zone to 

were once operational and possibly strategic distanc

this trend continues, long-range, precision fire

systems will maintain the defensive as the dominant f

warfare.

To restore the advantage to the offensive, we believ

the Army must devise the means to accelerate the sp

movement across the deadly zone by an order of mag

or greater. The union of knowledge and speed will do 

than increase linear velocity; it will also quic

commander’s ability to divine and exploit an en

weaknesses and to offset the influence of chanc

uncertainty. The American method of war-making 

future must rely on the offensive if this nation intend

matter of policy, to retain the ability to strike rapidly, 

158
quickly, and finish wars cleanly with minimal loss of 

all sides. Current AAN research is directed at this mos

and pressing challenge.

THE RATIONALE FOR CHANGE

The historical record of military change is mixed. 

changes, like the Navy’s development of carrier avia

the mid-1930s, Germany’s blitzkrieg, and the A

development of airmobile operations in the 1960s

succeeded. Others, like France’s Maginot Line and th

Army’s Pentomic reorganization of the 1950s, hav

Generally speaking, those that have failed reflected 

too narrow a view of warfare or else a faddish preoccu

with untested theories. The AAN Project conseq

embraces a broad view of warfare, particularly sin

Army must win wars as well as battles. Accordingly

studies consider warfare in all its dimensions, beg

with its most likely strategic conditions. Fundamen

this perspective is the belief that even the smallest el

of the Army must reflect a common unifying th

beginning with the vital interests of the United Stat

proceeding through national security policy, m

strategy, long-term operational objectives, and, ultim

the design and employment of every tactical unit.

Based on its broad study of future warfare, 

research to date indicates that the Army should 

dramatic changes in the dynamics of battle in the 

beyond 2010. The remainder of this report discusses 

changes as we currently understand them. While 

aspects of the future remain indistinct, others have a

become discernible. The Army can and should begin 

prepare for the future, even if our desired end state re

only dimly perceived. We can adjust our glide path 

vision of the future gains clarity. Inaction is a decis

cannot afford. The Army must change soon for 

reasons:

159
First, every revolution, whether political, econom

military unfolds in evolutionary steps. Generally, a

half a generation, about 15 years, is required for visio

ideas to mature into secure and irreversible change. It 

about that long to grow a battalion commander or p

sergeant or to develop, test, and field major systems. 

take even longer to truly alter the institutional c

sufficiently to internalize revolutionary change. In ad

the Army today finds itself very much a fellow travel

grander societal revolution. Global institution

cultures are busily shifting from the Industrial 

Information Age. The Army today has a foot firmly p

in both ages. Materiel and structures developed in the 

the recent past must now either be modified or repla

prepare for conflict in the Information Age. Central 

decision is whether current and programmed system

satisfy the requirements of a 2025 battlefield. Since c

AAN research suggests that tomorrow’s battlefiel

differ from today’s in revolutionary ways, the Army’s l

ship must soon determine how to apportion researc

development resources among a host of comp

technological alternatives. Also, it must determin

much of the Army to modernize along current lines 

leapfrogging Army XXI systems with entirely 

technologies and significantly different operationa

organizational concepts.

Second, the United States currently enjoys unr

military supremacy, but this condition may well erod

the turn of the century, Many analysts see both China 

recovered Russia as having the economic potent

become major military competitors. Yet, any num

military challengers might arise. Such challengers ne

seek to match the U.S. in every military category. In

they merely need to acquire capabilities intended to co

critical American advantages—in sensor technolog

example—depriving U.S. forces of the assurance of 

battlefield dominance and raising the political co

military intervention. That approach would espe

160
appeal to armies building or rebuilding from a rela

small technology base, as the Germans did after Worl

I. Such armies would have few sunk costs. Indeed, c

AAN research strongly suggests that any serious m

threat between now and the 2025 period will very 

involve asymmetric forces designed specifically to th

U.S. superiority in areas requiring long developmen

deployment lead times.

Third, if not corrected soon, the current emphasi

method of warfighting that emphasizes firepower 

expense of maneuver may well result in a protracte

characterized by stalemate, attrition, and unacceptab

of life to both sides. Recent experience in war and in

from the AAN series of war games demonstrate that, e

the age of precision warfare, the principal benefit 

derived from firepower is the psychological paralysis 

enemy, not his physical destruction. Unfortunately

benefit decreases over time as an enemy inures him

the shock of firepower and learns to “maneuver 

161

In war, the psychological dominates the phys

Since the psychological effects of firepower e

over time, decision should be sought quickly. T

otherwise invites unnecessary risk.
precision” through the use of deception, dispersion

maneuver by infiltration. Quite likely by 2025, a com

enemy may also be able to counter American advanta

precision firepower with a variety of precisio

counterprecision technologies of his own. If Am

military forces are to win quickly and decisively at low 

they must have the means to conduct battle rapidly 

end it clearly at the moment when the paralytic ef

firepower is greatest. As the figure above demonstra

delay beyond the high point of effect only prolon

killing and stiffens the enemy’s will to resist. De

victory ultimately must be achieved by forces on the g

Psychological collapse—the breaking of an enemy’s 

resist—results when an opponent finds himself chal

and blocked wherever he turns. Restoration of the b

between fire and maneuver will take time, at least a d

or more, and the process must begin soon.

THE PACE OF CHANGE

Adapting to change is difficult for any army. A

changing a military organization too quickly may re

acquisition of immature or inappropriate capabiliti

worst, it can threaten the doctrinal and organiza

cohesion on which any fighting force depends. But as a

throughout history have learned to their dismay, fai

adapt is equally deadly. Sunk costs or budgetary p

may preclude adoption of new technologies, 

institutional conservatism may prevent their eff

exploitation. In either case, failure to adapt ultim

results in squandered lives and military defeat

challenge today is to get the balance right. And with s

wear-out only about 12 years away, we have just e

time to do it. The diagram below makes this point.

The steep axis of change is undesirable because too 

an angle encourages too rapid a lock on systems that 

be quickly outdated. Another risk on this axis—pe

even greater than premature materiel lock-in—is t

162
disrupting the organization without achieving a 

increase in fighting capability; simply to be seen to o

audiences as “doing something.” The Pentomic reo

zation of the 1950s was perhaps the clearest recent ex

of such a misplaced impulse.

The shallow axis is equally undesirable because to

a rate of change may miss the revolution altogethe

years after World War I the tank was widely seen 

infantry support weapon, though hindsight proved its 

as a primary instrument of maneuver. When the dyn

of the battlefield change rapidly—and we believe 

change is occurring now—so also must the ra

adaptation. Rapid military change is not unpreced

But too often in the past, its driving impulse has been 

defeat. We believe effective adaptation is possible w

that unpleasant incentive.

As a general observation, near-term change te

focus on force structure and equipment. Planning for 

distant futures tends to concern capabilitie

163

The challenge is to change the force withou

putting it at risk.
possibilities—the how rather than the who or what. 

pragmatic near-term planners try to improve ex

systems, longer-term visionaries can deal in theor

emerging capabilities in a more abstract fashion

challenge is linking the two without allowing the pres

consume the future, or the vision to become intellec

sterile. While focusing on capabilities, AAN seeks 

same time to think through the organizational and h

changes that will be required to exploit those capabi

THE PROCESS OF CHANGE: MID- AND

LONG-RANGE

TRADOC’s commander once commented that the 

was about “ideas, not concepts.” That is a su

description of AAN’s orientation. The AAN Proje

become a laboratory—part technology-oriented

military science—in which the Army works with 

services and agencies of government, academic institu

and civilian industry to build ideas about the future

differs perhaps from the efforts of other futures gro

that its participants take extra care to subject ideas t

the considered experience of military history an

analytical rigor of state-of-the-art gaming.

AAN is the flagship program among several s

whose purpose is to assist the Army’s leaders to est

priorities and earmark resources to maintain 

readiness today and in the future. The finding

analyses developed by the AAN Project and provided 

planners of the DCSOPS Office of Strategy, Plan

Policy help set the more distant parameters that will 

Army long-range planning.

As a result of this year’s study, a more com

understanding of the Army’s long-range process of cha

beginning to emerge. In general, the process divide

three armies: the current force, the programmed forc

the potential force.

164
The current force is today’s Army in the field, re

fight. TRADOC’s obligation to this army is trainin

doctrine. Pursuant to that obligation, TRADOC soo

publish the newest edition of FM 100-5, Operation

Army’s keystone doctrinal manual, last revised in 19

The second force falls under TRADOC’s co

developments responsibility. Roughly equivalent 

programmed force, it is the army in near-term develop

which is undergoing upgrades to existing systems in 

to take advantage of new technologies and opportu

immediately available for organizational improve

This force falls within the influence of the Pro

Objective Memorandum, which tends to lock 

programs within a 5-to-7-year period to compete with

budget process. The programmed force is aimed 

midterm future. In 1940, this would have bee

Louisiana Maneuver force. Today, it is Army 

TRADOC’s battle labs were established specifica

extend as far as possible the period of experimen

within the POM’s influence. Programmed 

development is guided by TRADOC Pamphlet 525

addresses the familiar TRADOC requirements: do

training, leaders, organizations, materiel, and soldie

The third or potential force is the one with which A

primarily concerned. Here the focus shifts 

improvement of fielded capabilities to long-term res

and development programs; and from curren

programmed force structures to as-yet-unspe

capabilities associated with our emerging vision of 

warfare. Implied is a similar shift from the sorts of Col

challenges that shaped the creation of today’s Army, 

more ambiguous and variegated global military chal

likely to confront America and her allies in the next ce

Hence, while some of the associated technologies m

revolutionary, the potential force itself should be v

essentially as the next logical step in a conti

adaptation of military capabilities to the cha

dynamics of war and requirements of national se

165
Next summer TRADOC will publish a new pamphlet, 

that will capture the emerging ideas of AAN in order t

the senior leadership craft its vision of future warfig

The pamphlet will serve as the Army’s distant bea

guide the combat developments process for the m

long-term future.

Because of this anticipatory function, AAN furnish

primary link to other DOD agencies engaged in long

development—for example, Defense Advanced Res

Projects Agency projects and various Defense Science 

studies. As with AAN, such efforts typically aim well b

DTLOMS and frequently push the outer boun

practicality. Moreover, because the potential force 

hostage to the POM, it represents the most prom

opportunity for true integration with sister s

concepts, such as the Air Force’s ultra-high-altitude 

and the Marine Corps’ small-unit operations study.

The wellspring of AAN is the Army leadership’s vi

the role and function of land power in the 30-year futu

beyond. AAN’s four broad areas of study all seek to 

developments in geopolitics, military art, huma

organizational issues, and technology that are toda

dimly perceived, and then integrate those insights 

those of other services into a cohesive joint view of 

warfare. At the same time, AAN is closely connecte

futures programs in DOD and other government age

including partnerships with AAN franchise programs 

U.S. Army Space and Strategic Defense Command (S

U.S. Army Special Operations Command, and TRA

Combined Arms Support Command.

In sum, AAN’s objective is to provide the A

leadership the raw materiel for a vision of war, and t

land-power’s role, in the 30-year future. To accomplis

objective, the AAN process must be continuous, yea

year, so that the Army’s vision is always extende

linked to developments in other services. Provi

remains solidly connected to technologica

166
organizational development, such a process is the A

best assurance of a smooth and effective glide path 

future.

A GEOSTRATEGIC VIEW OF 2025

The most difficult yet essential aspect of de

land-power capabilities 30 years in the future is forec

the security requirements those capabilities must s

Clearly, we cannot predict with precision the f

geostrategic condition of a world that even today is cha

at an unprecedented pace. We can however recognize 

enduring national interests that any future land 

force must be able to support.

AMERICAN NATIONAL INTERESTS THROUG

2025

For the purpose of AAN studies, interests subdivid

vital and important. The boundary between 

categories is neither rigid nor immutable, particularly 

statesmen have a habit of transmuting important int

interests when the former are challenged. Bu

categories at least help distinguish objectives for whi

nation is willing to risk unlimited liability from 

whose importance tends to be more circumstantial. A

vital interests, AAN recognizes—

• Deterrence and prevention of nuclear, biologica

chemical attack on the United States and its a

and continuing reduction of the threat of such

attack. Implied is the maintenance of effective

control over formerly Soviet nuclear weapons a

weapons-usable materiel.

• Prevention of the rise of a powerful, hostile

hegemony in Asia or Europe. Implied are the

continued safety, freedom, and prosperity of fr

nations in both regions, maintenance and

improvement of effective alliances like NATO, 

167
deterrence of hostile ambitions on the part of a

potential aggressor.

• Continued unhindered access by the United St

and our allies to global resources—especially e

resources—essential to our economic health.

In addition to these overriding interests, the U

States will continue to pursue objectives that are less 

but still important enough to justify the selective 

force. Examples might include preventing the emerge

a hostile regional hegemony in the Persian Gulf and 

taining the peace and security of the Korean peninsu

Taiwan Straits, and the South China Sea. The U.S. w

continue current efforts to suppress and co

international terrorism, drug trafficking, and transna

crime.

Given these interests, the United States can be ex

to remain heavily involved in the world of 2025—a lea

both multinational and bilateral defense arrangemen

an active promoter, as we are today, of demo

principles, free market economies, and human rights

the United States to renounce global leadership an

inward as we did in the 1930s, the effect would b

profoundly throughout the world, creating a power va

almost certain to produce uncertainty and un

historical precursors of global conflict.

There is, however, no reason today to suppose th

United States will turn inward even if we could. O

contrary, every indication is that we will contin

maintain sufficient power to play a decisive interna

role. Thus AAN assumes a world in which the United 

remains engaged, retaining the military power to su

regional alliances and to deter or defeat major m

competitors. In this year’s studies and war game

analytical focus was on hypothetical challenges to 

interests in 2021. This summer, the study effort will e

to include examination of potential conflicts inv

168
less-than-vital interests. The following chart summ

the expected features of the threat spectrum asso

with pursuit of both vital and important national int

during the next 30 years.

RISE OF A MAJOR MILITARY COMPETITOR

From the beginning, the AAN Project has 

problems with the term peer competitor. While a m

image peer may serve DOD and service program

objectives, AAN believes that the term major m

competitor better characterizes the military challenge 

United States for the next 30 years.

Peer competitor implies the mirror-image, a

reaction stasis inherited from the Cold War. In fact, 

disparities in disposable wealth and the competence 

American technological base, current U.S. mi

superiority will continue to discourage would-be aggr

from engaging in head-to-head competition. Today, a

169

America’s strategic challenge is to prepare fo

rise of a major military competitor.
seven years into the new millennium, evidence ind

that many states concede U.S. technical dominanc

have sought alternative strategies to neutralize 

strengths. These states do not seem particularly conc

with the acquisition of sophisticated, state-of-th

weaponry. They are inclined to purchase weapon

provide relatively cheap counters against our air an

systems such as land and sea mines, distributed air de

coastal seacraft, submarines, inexpensive cruis

ballistic missiles, and unsophisticated weapons of 

destruction. Such strategies offer a less sophist

enemy the ability to dampen, delay, and disrup

high-tech offensive power of an advanced military 

without the inherent expense of purchasing batt

symmetry. These states will likely offset techno

inferiority with asymmetric approaches, which migh

include the ability to field mass armies, to incite p

will, and to exploit the inherent strength of the str

defensive.

Control or deterrence of military hostilitie

undoubtedly remain an objective of future Am

national defense policy. Furthermore, AAN believe

there is a high probability that one or more major m

competitors will arise by 2025. For purposes of this 

AAN defines major military competition as “first-tie

with a modernized military establishment and cultur

strategic predilections counter to the vital interests 

United States or its allies.”

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY IN 2025

Ideally, the pursuit of national interests is tran

into action through a coherent national security st

that balances requirements against capabilities. 

assumes that U.S. national security strategy through 

will continue to exhibit a fundamental continuity. 

incorporating new capabilities and operational techn

U.S. military forces will continue to support allies, 

potential adversaries, and respond as requir

170
unforeseen military and humanitarian continge

Forward-based forces will continue to play a vital r

supporting these objectives, not only in terms of 

operational effectiveness, but even more importantly 

clearest demonstration possible of U.S. national wi

commitment to the defense of its allies and interests. Y

events in the recent past have shown, even the 

positioned and most potent military force can fail to 

particularly if an opponent misjudges American r

because of his own ignorance or cultural bias. The

actual or threatened military aggression will u

require the deployment of major fighting forces fro

United States directly into threatened regions to reso

issue.

MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE IN 2025

The proliferation of precision weaponry by 202

expand the battlespace enormously in terms of siz

lethality—conditions that will favor the def

Additionally, the ability to see the battlefield more c

through information technology will heighte

defender’s advantage by making attacking forces ea

detect and by allowing the defender to mass battlefiel

and other effects more accurately. This year’s AA

games indicate that, unless the speed of move

increases substantially, those improvements in det

and the precision-fire delivery will make offensive 

infinitely more difficult.

Fortunately, knowledge—battlefield information

two-edged sword. Mating superior knowledge with sp

movement can provide the means to frustrate the defe

ability to acquire and mass fires and thus allow an at

to cross the deadly zone intact to accomplis

operationally decisive maneuver. Since operational a

definition, entails employing tactical successes to a

strategic ends, increasing the speed of movement acr

171
three levels of warfare must become the driving impe

of future military development.

THE FY 1997 WAR GAME SERIES

During FY 97, AAN conducted a series of futurist

games to frame strategic and operational issues lik

influence war against a major competitor in 2020. The 

TRADOC-organized war games consisted of opera

level, force-on-force games at the TRADOC Analysis C

at Fort Leavenworth (the Leavenworth Games), the W

War Game at Carlisle Barracks (WWG 97), and a se

excursions derived from the WWG to provide a sens

check of the WWG major events. All games were 

ended, free-play exercises with an active and unfe

Red force. All services participated. The WWG in

world-class representatives from the executive b

industry, academia, the military, and other gover

agencies.

The games played a 2020 Blue force capable of 

of-magnitude increases in speed, which we propose ca

be achieved by rotating the traditional two-dimen

orientation of land forces upward into the atmosphe

space. A more refined understanding of the character 

force emerged during the course of the war-game seri

independent contractor associated with the 

Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) study 

constructed a hypothetical Red force designed to pres

asymmetric threat to U.S. 2020 force structure.

THE LEAVENWORTH GAMES

The Leavenworth games explored force-on-force c

between notional forces at the tactical and opera

levels. The principal objective was to develop a ba

determining conflict resolution in the WWG. 

subgames took place. The first pitted an Army XXI di

against a Red 2020 force. The second and third placed 

2020 force in opposition to the Red force in two dif

172
combinations of terrain. The last evaluated enh

Marine Corps capabilities against the Red force. The 

involved four variables: terrain, including urbanized 

size and posture of the enemy force; support availab

located outside the engagement area; and the leve

quality of information dominance on both sides.

The principal finding of the Leavenworth game

that mobility, characterized predominantly by sp

maneuver, proved to be the most important 

contributing to battlefield success. Further, batt

knowledge actually enabled speed, though the p

relationship to date remains difficult to determine. T

isolate the contribution of knowledge to combat outc

the AAN staff defined three tiers of relative batt

knowledge. A tier-one force possessed limited knowle

the enemy plan and intent, but could achieve inform

dominance for specific periods of time; this force 

exploit certain limited windows of opportunity. 

tier-two capabilities, a force could understand sign

aspects of the enemy’s plan, could recognize his inte

at key decision points, and could react to take advant

those decisions. With tier-three capabilities, the force 

see the enemy as an organizational whole, includi

pattern of operations, task organization, phasin

tempo; in short, Blue could understand Red’s inten

could develop and execute a plan to counter that inten

introduction of a force capable of tier-three know

superiority changed the time cycles and patte

maneuver between opposing forces fundamentall

dramatically; Blue could enter the engagement 

quickly, achieve decisions more rapidly, finish the 

faster, and reengage the enemy elsewhere

Leavenworth games offered the following insights.

Maneuver

A significant finding of the AAN war games wa

superior knowledge permits a commander to apply 

173
discrete part of his force in a single simultaneous 

overwhelming fire and maneuver. Knowledge domina

the battlefield will allow a dramatic increase in the sp

maneuver. A relationship exists between knowledg

precision that permits maneuver forces to empl

ambush dynamic against opponents on an almost r

basis. Precision in maneuver might take any num

forms. One example is highly refined targetin

maneuver directed against individual enemy eleme

small units moving at great speed under leaders foll

mission orders. After several game turns, th

commander knew that a Blue force with know

advantage and speed was unstoppable, and that hi

options were to hold in place and concede or execute a 

of disjointed, uncoordinated attacks and suffer def

detail. In either case, the practical result on the batt

was always the same: immediate and dramatic d

gration.

Blue forces employed an air-ground tactical met

maneuver that combined lighter surface fighting ve

with advanced airframes capable of transporting th

speeds as great as 200 kilometers per hour over distan

excess of 1500 kilometers. This method allowed, a

other things, a more extensive use of the vertical dim

of the battlespace which, coupled with superior lev

information dominance, permitted greater spee

precision in maneuver. Terrain came to serve a prot

and concealing function without restricting mobilit

the resultant ability to accelerate movement throug

battle zone enhanced force survivability by frustrati

enemy’s capability to detect, track, and engage Blue fo

Asymmetric Responses

Red’s learning curve rose sharply as the g

progressed. Confronted by overwhelming combat pow

resorted to asymmetric responses in an effort to offset 

advantages. He recognized early on that Blue’s super

174
particularly in firepower and information domin

eroded over time. Any action that heightened ambigu

complexity, and thus increased the time Blue needed t

control of the situation, benefited Red. Therefore

moved rapidly to complex terrain—urban, suburban

in some cases, forests and mountains. He used his l

information warfare capabilities to slow Blue man

through electronic warfare and deception. Althoug

lost, his asymmetric responses partially succeede

managed to degrade Blue’s precision, to slow his opera

tempo, and to significantly increase the damage to th

force. The lesson is obvious. For the 2020 Blue forces, t

the worst of enemies.

THE WINTER WAR GAME

The strategic, or winter, war game forms the ca

event in the annual AAN cycle. This year’s WWG focu

the whole realm of political, strategic, and opera

levels of a most vital war in 2020 to identify issues rela

the changing character of warfare in about 2025.

The Blue force employed in the WWG represen

multifunctional total army concept. It consisted of S

Operations Forces providing an essential global 

function, forward-deployed Army XXI forces perfo

deterrence and condition-setting roles, a global strik

composed of AAN battle forces, and a force of de

consisting of CONUS-based Army XXI units operatin

consolidating force that insured the ability to 

sustained combat should the campaign last longer 

expected or take an unexpected turn. In effect, the 

Blue force represented an army in transition, from the 

XXI legacy force to the notional 2020 AAN battle force 

Leavenworth games.

A portion of the legacy force was deployed in Europ

scattered in partnership-for-peace packets—so disper

to offer the capacity for only limited resistance whe

began threatening aggression. Modernized 2020 force

175
concentrated in CONUS, with the exception of a 2020 

deployed in Korea as part of the Army’s 2020 moderni

plan. Special Operations Forces were present in E

prior to hostilities. They established close and tr

relationships with nontreaty states in the region an

provided the glue that held together a quickly asse

coalition of warfighting partners. They also provid

first reliable theater-level eyes-on-target and h

prepare for the arrival of Blue forces. In deploymen

battle, the Blue 2020 forces reached conflict termi

before the legacy systems could close on the theate

WWG offered significant insights on the influenc

speed and knowledge will have on a future battlefiel

Speed

Speed emerged once again as a dominant factor 

strategic-political, strategic-military, and opera

levels of war. Technology’s impact on the speed of po

decision making during crisis complicates the Na

Command Authorities’ problems of deterrence and res

and the always-difficult problems of forming coaliti

willing allies and reluctant friends. Paradoxically, th

capabilities that allow future forces to increase spee

tempo may contribute to hesitation on the part of po

leaders.

Strategic speed—very rapid deployment directly 

theater of operations—as played in the WWG a

political leaders and military commanders to acce

movement to a theater of war before the enemy can 

make a preemptive move. In a subsequent war 

excursion, an earlier Blue deployment effectively de

Red’s aggression. Concerns emerged during the gam

an obvious disparity between the strategic speed of an 

force—arriving from CONUS ready to fight with

hours—and the follow-on CONUS-based Army XXI 

To allow the ability both to preempt an enemy from s

his force in a theater and to continue unrelenting sus

176
pressure over time, the projection schemes of both 

should be seamless and firmly joined. It became 

during the game that by 2020 a mature Army XX

must be much more projectable than heavy forces are 

inferring perhaps the requirement to move globally 

staging point to a distant battlefield in no less tha

weeks. Also the war game reinforced the observatio

most of the information technologies inherent in 

should be present in an Army XXI force to ensure tha

can act in harmony on the battlefield and collectively e

the advantages of a knowledge-based force.

The challenge of connecting the deployment of 

with dramatically different strategic speeds 

exacerbated by the requirement that arose during the 

to approach the theater by infiltration rather th

staging. During the Leavenworth games, it be

apparent that even when opposed by an enemy poss

primitive weapons of mass destruction, the risk of 

casualties prohibited the use of major ports and air

The enemy quickly realized that his greatest oppor

for success when facing a force of such enormous cap

was to defeat him before arrival in theater. The

early-arriving AAN forces were obliged to set do

scattered locations deep inside the theater of wa

beyond the reach of the enemy’s operational forces.

Operationally, the WWG suggests that sequ

operations, as understood today, should occur in a 

seamless and simultaneous manner at theater 

melding the application of firepower and maneuver 

single culminating act and thereby reducing the dura

campaigns from months to days or hours.

The geostrategic position of the United State

committed the Army in this century to rely on str

maneuver to win wars on the ground. The major diff

between General Marshall’s concepts of power projec

1942 and the Army’s of 2025 is the speed with which 

can be deployed and employed in a single, unrele

177
sustained act of global maneuver. Early discussi

global force projection indicate that the worldwide str

that will enable Army forces of 2025 to conduct high-

strategic maneuver must be in place prior to deploy

The early placement of logistics, communications

intelligence may play a more significant role in the pa

effectiveness of strategic maneuver than the deploym

the fighting force itself.

Logistics in the WWG, the Leavenworth games, a

war-game excursions were played primarily as a func

deployment. AAN’s hypotheses, which require fu

testing in FY 98, posit that to achieve the speed necess

cross the deadly zone intact, operational-level forces r

a radically streamlined logistical tail. Se

strategic-level deployment requires new technologie

methods of projection that get a fighting force fro

CONUS base into combat in a few days. Cu

deployment systems, based on an outmoded Cold Wa

of strategic maneuver, will only present the enemy 

targets in a precision-rich theater of war.

Knowledge Sensitivity

In the WWG, Red reacted to Blue’s deployme

immediately attacking the systems that Blue relied 

knowledge dominance, especially space-based sys

Reds all-out attack in space caused policy and warfi

dilemmas for Blue. The erosion of Blue’s ability 

space-based assets would have, over time, signifi

reduced Blue’s knowledge advantage. As it happ

Blue’s war with Red ended before attrition of space 

could influence events on the battlefield. Forces alre

contact mitigated the loss of satellites to some ext

using organic means, such as high-altitude UA

maintain tactical knowledge dominance. Strategical

at the theater level, however, the loss of specific sy

would have had a cumulatively harmful, thoug

disastrous, effect. Blue’s Pacific campaign against 

178
just getting underway when the game ended, was pa

blinded by Red’s actions. The effect on global logistics 

have been felt immediately. A subsequent war

excursion that varied the nature of Red’s atta

space-based assets did not materially affect the outc

the game. Nonetheless, in both war games Red comma

understood how vital information dominance was t

force effectiveness. Both aggressively sought to co

Blue’s protective shield of knowledge. The insights fro

games suggest a serious need to protect informatio

through robust, resilient, and redundant infrastru

that can be reinforced with a bodyguard of deceptio

disinformation and easily regenerated if damaged.

EMERGING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FOR

Thus far, AAN study results indicate that success 

2025 battlefield will require force characteristics 

emphasize a robust surface-to-space continuum, split

operations, interdependence, hybrid forces, and m

leaders leading cohesive units.

Surface-to-Space Continuum: The New High

Ground

In order to achieve the degree of knowledge dom

and operational speed postulated in this paper, by 20

Army must have shifted upward from its tradi

two-dimensional spatial orientation of land forces in

vertical or third dimension. In particular, the deep

operational maneuver function must be able to occu

third dimension from just above the surface throug

exosphere into space. Future land combat units will e

terrain by maneuvering for tactical advantage with

folds and undulations of the earth’s surface w

suffering the restrictions imposed on mobility by c

with the ground.

The vertical component should also include ta

UAVs, exospheric long endurance UAVs, and space ve

179
in various orbital configurations extendi

geosynchronous orbits. This constellation of aerial ve

should allow traditionally land-bound functi

intelligence, all forms of communications, and fire su

delivered from unmanned platforms orbiting contin

above close combat forces—to move upward. Many 

elements in the continuum will come from other se

and from the civilian telecommunications industry.

Split-Based Operations

A robust surface-to-space continuum—consistin

constellation of UAVs and space-based telecommunic

satellites—will also permit an order-of-magn

reduction in the size of the tactical force arrayed in 

contact with the enemy. Reach-out communica

intelligence, and fire support, combined with just-i

and just-what’s needed logistics, will eliminate all ba

not directly related to closing with or gaining pos

advantage over the enemy. To achieve a relative deg

protection and security, support units will operate 

separate locations, possibly hundreds of kilometers 

the theater, beyond the effective range of weapons o

destruction.

Interdependence

Time is the enemy of a force that depends on know

and speed for effectiveness. The effect of time on the co

of battle is corrosive and gradual rather than drama

we learned in the Leavenworth games and subse

analyses, the shock effect upon which much o

effectiveness of U.S. combat power depends dissipa

the enemy becomes inured to the psychological imp

precision fire and learns to lessen its destructive 

through counteraction. Also, as the Red comm

demonstrated, even a tier-three knowledge adva

inevitably erodes as the enemy learns our patte

operations and begins to predict our actions.

180
Finally, the strategic game suggested that in a futu

of informal and ad hoc military relationships, coa

may become more difficult to create and harder to ma

once combat begins. Lingering too long on the batt

opens the opportunity for an enemy to split an op

coalition. Saddam Hussein taught this lesson very w

Therefore, in 2025 even more than today, U.S. forc

not be able to afford linear, sequential campaign

require discrete staging and phasing. To defea

corrosive enemy of time, the operational level of war m

pushed toward the execution of near-simulta

campaigns that, at the theater-operational level, wi

on the characteristic of a coup de main. Opera

acceleration of this magnitude can only be achiev

moving beyond joint toward interdependent opera

Interdependence suggests the need for a lev

interoperability between land, sea, and aerospace me

that will allow a near-simultaneous application of pre

fires and maneuver applied in a broad pattern of effec

strike and check the enemy everywhere he can be see

engaged. Sequenced campaigns, depicted today by de

schedules and broad arrows on a map, will be replaced 

expansive takedown operation where the enemy’s w

resist collapses when he finds himself smothered by fi

surrounded everywhere by maneuver forces occu

positions of advantage.

Interdependence also has programmatic implica

AAN believes force structures of the 2025 time perio

also need to be interdependent, that is, whole function

migrate from one service structure to another in fa

speed, agility, and economy. For example, space

systems may well provide communications and 

functions now associated with land systems. If this 

holds up, quite possibly future land forces may requi

expense to field and operate than previous Army for

181
Hybrid Forces

The U.S. Army has always gone to war as a hybrid 

Traditionally, dissimilar forces—heavy and light, r

and reserve, legacy and modern—have fought side b

The problem in the past has been to get the most out o

a disparate force. In the Winter War Game, the tota

force that Blue employed consisted of a mix of Arm

units and AAN battle forces. In the environment post

for 2025, the capabilities of these forces complemente

other very well. AAN battle forces executed rapid, str

maneuver, while Army XXI units functioned as a fo

decision, providing the total force with heft, flexibility

hedge against uncertainty. The challenge in this s

will be to ensure a proper fit between the early-dep

AAN force and the slower-deploying Army XXI forces. 

the former must arrive quickly to collapse the enem

latter must possess enough strategic agility to 

immediately behind to guarantee unrelenting long

pressure on the enemy and to limit risk to the early ar

force.

The Human Dimension

Although discussed in greater detail further i

report, the human dimension bears mentioning h

well. AAN research indicates that battle leaders will h

function in very compressed planning and operating 

and at very high tempos. Indications are that battlefi

2020 will require cohesive units and leaders with 

levels of maturity. This research does not necessarily 

that the Army will require a higher leader-to-led rati

that it needs a more mature, better-experienced lead

soldier than is the norm today.

MODELING, SIMULATION, AND FUTURE GAM

After a year of intense study, wargaming, and wor

the other services and agencies of government

182
becoming apparent that present-day tools and perce

only lead to more questions about the effects of techno

change, the human and organizational dimension of 

warfare, and the character of warfare itself.

Two-sided, open-ended war games continue to 

their worth as research tools for framing issues 

25-year future. Free play is essential to understa

future warfare—even if Blue loses—because future s

at the strategic and theater levels will increasingly d

on knowledge and other nonquantifiable advantages 

than on the more familiar attrition models that tend to 

bigger, more powerful forces. The key to gaming at str

and theater levels is to make interaction between m

and human experts as realistic as possible. WWG 

utilized an interactive global model with more advan

than drawbacks, but as games increase in complexi

focus, they will require more realistic models 

effectively stretch a combat environment from surf

space. AAN will take this issue on as a major portion 

1997 effort.

The Winter War Game this year postulated a w

vital interests. Consequently, game play centered 

most violent and intense end of the conventional sc

warfare. The AAN study group recognizes that to me

needs of American defense policy in 2020, the Army m

extraordinarily capable, to be sure, but it must a

adaptable enough to be useful at the lower end of the c

spectrum. Intuitively, an AAN force built around know

and speed would seem to possess characteristics essen

prevail in a conflict for “less-than-vital inter

Exceptional mobility across inhospitable terrain, sp

deployment, and the ability to observe with excep

clarity and to maneuver and strike with great precis

give promise that the AAN battle force postulated 

would be decisive in stability and security oper

against a less sophisticated enemy. The Summer War 

(SWG 1997) has been designed to test this hypothesis 

conditions differing markedly from AAN games to dat

183
Army Special Operations Command will play as 

partners in this important exercise, and AAN will p

an analysis of the game separately and in the June 

report.

SOLDIERS AND UNITS IN 2025

The war games demonstrated that Blue’s ta

success depended to a great extent on his ability to e

decentralized operations. His strategic and tactical 

would have required an exceptional degree of mental 

and psychological resilience. We believe tha

development of these qualities by 2025 will require n

less than a cultural change within the Army that em

a philosophy of decentralized action based upon a 

degree of professional trust and confidence between le

and led.

Situations changed quickly and sometimes drama

in the war games, which suggests that commande

have to make decisions at consistently faster 

Real-time battlefield knowledge may require AAN le

to rapidly digest and act upon an indeterminat

ever-changing amount of information. In additio

heightened speed of AAN operations may generate 

levels of physical and emotional stress, thereby crea

greater risk of cognitive and psychological impair

AAN battle units employed a larger number of moving 

functioning at higher rates of speed, which in the 

may force leaders at all levels to cope with increasing 

of complexity. Even armed with the advantag

sophisticated information aids, AAN leaders may find 

decision-making capacities quickly overwhelme

execute the precise and dispersed maneuver 

characterized Blue operations in the tactical war g

crews and teams will very likely be obliged to figh

degree of isolation far more psychologically demandin

in past wars. The war games suggested that Blue 

would also need a high level of mental agilit

184
psychological resilience to operate effectively in di

self-reliant, well-informed, autonomous small units.

EXPERIENCED LEADERS

One way the Army can achieve and maintain the m

agility necessary for success on tomorrow’s battlefiel

cultivating mature, highly experienced leaders. 

leaders provide at least four benefits: 1) mast

increased skill sets; 2) greater experience in both com

positions and staffs; 3) a firm foundation from wh

exercise battlefield intuition; and 4) the abil

successfully withstand higher levels of stress d

psycholoical maturity and experience.

COHESIVE UNITS

Stable, cohesive units can provide the req

foundation for developing mental agility and psycho

resilience. Soldiers who train together for long period

to adopt a shared view of the battlefield, to include 

environment and their unit’s ability to respond to s

combat challenges. This shared view allows leaders, 

and subordinates to act effectively, with little 

communication, even in rapidly changing situa

Likewise, cohesive units offer the Army a greater res

of psychological resilience—a safety net—that offset

great degree, battlefield fear, fatigue, stress, and iso

Such units remain mentally agile even under s

circumstances. They require less supervision, h

complex tasks effectively, and exhibit mutual 

confidence, and loyalty.

SOLDIER TRAINING AND EDUCATION

Synthetic training environments, in the form of v

constructive, and live simulators, may allow highly eff

training under conditions both safe and, in some 

nearly indistinguishable from actual combat. In the f

185
newly formed units or staffs may build trust, confi

and a state of constant readiness by working thro

series of increasingly demanding exercises in a syn

environment. Live training will remain necessary 

future to be sure. But, realistic simulators will allo

training to be reserved for finishing exercises. The 

should develop synthetic training to assist it in meeti

demands of the 2025 battlefield.

AAN soldiers and their units will require higher le

mental agility and psychological resilience to succes

meet tomorrow’s battlefield challenges. Experi

leaders and cohesive units should serve as the foun

for the Army’s effort to develop and maintain 

qualities. The goal of the AAN human and organiza

effort should be to build units capable of operating w

their optimal range while forcing the enemy to o

beyond his own.

TECHNOLOGY: THE PATH TO KNOWLEDG

AND SPEED

The Army of 2025 will probably differ from today’s 

in two fundamental ways. It will achieve unpreced

strategic and operational agility by exploiting inform

technologies to create a knowledge-based Army. B

know and see with greater clarity is not enough. The 

must possess a complementary capacity to act 

superior knowledge by building into its structur

physical agility to move rapidly and adroitly across a 

and more lethal battlefield. An essential bo

technologies is emerging that offers the potential to cr

knowledge-based army capable of strategic and opera

maneuver by 2025.

THE TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGE

The AAN study expresses tomorrow’s technol

challenges in terms of the need to achieve gr

knowledge and speed.

186
Knowledge

Knowledge will proceed from a robust, redundan

flexible network of communications and intelli

systems interwoven into a seamless surface-to

continuum. This continuum will feature nets of s

sensors connected electronically to a series of inter

UAV fields, ranging from low to very high altitudes, co

by an umbrella of space-based systems. This constella

systems will provide an unblinking eye capable of co

surveillance over the battlespace and will conne

combat force with its distant support and sustainmen

It should serve as a living internet of connec

immediately responsive to soldiers on the ground.

However, as the WWG demonstrated, an adversar

attack space systems immediately, and perhaps repea

to deny knowledge dominance. Work should the

continue in TRADOC and SSDC to identify sp

land-power requirements in terms of space systems 

develop relationships that carry those needs into 

technology initiatives in other services and agencies. 

experience and follow-up research also indicate tha

mid-, and high-altitude UAVs will become essen

maintaining knowledge dominance. Internetted 

serve to thicken the communications infrastructure 

event of a loss of space systems.

Mechanisms also must be established for both 

replacement of degraded systems and sea

substitution of one information source for another. F

doctrine and training must accommodate the possibil

degraded information environment; and soldiers, unit

leaders must be deliberately conditioned to su

operational tempo notwithstanding system interrup

Speed

The AAN views speed in strategic, operationa

tactical dimensions. The Army must pursue wa

187
accelerate pace of movement so that, in the ta

dimensions, close combat forces can frustrate e

acquisition, targeting, and precision weaponry and, 

operational and strategic dimensions, can rapidly co

check, and ultimately collapse enemy maneuver forc

Technologies related to self-deploying tactical 

fast sealift, and airborne large-capacity lifting 

currently support the acceleration of strategic proje

Although the Army does not develop new conce

vehicles for air and sealift, these capabilities will b

essential to the effective use of land power in 2025.

At the tactical and operational levels, three techno

offer possibilities for shrinking the logistical tail of fi

organizations. First, alternative power source

fuel-efficient ultrareliable fighting vehicles will 

combat forces to operate longer and over greater dis

than today. Second, cheap precision warheads, long

fire support located outside the combat area

alternative propellants will allow reductions in the w

and bulk of ammunition trains. Third, energy s

systems and hybrid power systems can reduce fue

electrical power requirements and eliminate most 

weight and bulk of today’s power generation and s

systems.

In addition, future ground craft, composed of adv

lightweight materials, will enjoy greater firep

mobility, and speed. Advanced airframes will p

increased capacities for heavy lift and tactical utili

These greater lift capacities will allow a marriage of g

and air systems that permits commanders to use the g

tactically for cover and concealment without suffe

degradation in mobility. Protection schemes for land 

will include a host of new active protection and sign

control systems. While the 2025 battle force will p

itself primarily through knowledge and speed, s

emerging technologies promise to further enhance 

protection. Advances in antidotes and vaccines will r

188
vulnerability to chemical and biological weapons. 

also includes rapid strategic deployment. All o

lightening technologies already mentioned hav

potential to enhance deployability as well as batt

mobility. In addition, future technology must conce

on enhanced means of self-deployment, ultrafast s

and improved high-capacity airlift. Although the A

not directly responsible for the last two, no service 

greater interest in them.

THE AAN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

LINKAGES

Throughout the past year, AAN has established 

relationships with the science and technology comm

academia, and several DOD and non-DOD gover

scientific agencies, most importantly, the Ass

Secretary of the Army (RD&A), Army Materiel Com

DARPA, HQDA DCSOPS, and members of the TRA

combat developments community. AAN opera

requirements influence the research efforts of the s

and technology community through these relation

Just as importantly, this collegial cooperation ensure

AAN remains apprised of further emerging techno

that might enhance its operational concept

requirements.

As the process matures, the AAN will become pa

growing number of science and technology decision-m

teams. Through AAN, TRADOC has participated in t

basic research triennial review and has influence

direction of defense strategic resource objectives an

creation of Army SROs. AAN has also provi

perspective on 6.2 science and technology objective

advanced concepts technology demonstrations.

The Army must continue to develop partnerships w

the science and technology community to create a fo

set of technologies for future warfighting. Key among 

is DARPA, which is already working with the Ar

189
explore innovative concepts and technologies that ap

small-unit operations. As the pace of technological ad

continues to accelerate, perspicacity in acquisitio

become a strategic imperative for the Army.

THE ROAD AHEAD

Although the Army in the field is operating at a ver

tempo, the next few years will find the Army in a posi

unchallenged military superiority and with breathing 

to consider the next challenge. This window of oppor

will not last long; perhaps by the end of the century th

major military competitor will begin to show itself. 

meantime, the Army can begin to reorder its house f

challenges ahead.

Since the opportunity is fleeting, changes o

magnitude tentatively envisioned in this report must 

soon. Issues of force structuring and budget manag

must be addressed within the tenure of this CSA if 

force is to begin fielding around 2010. The AAN proce

its estimation of the future will continue to develop, b

AAN staff is satisfied that the major issues outlined 

will remain valid. The challenge now is to begin to 

from ideas and vision into action.

190
Chapter Eleven

Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Dr. John A. Parmentola

Reproduced with Permission Granted by:

May-June 1998 Issue

ARMY RD&A JOURNAL

191

THE ARMY AFTER NE

INTERTWINING MILITA

ART, SCIENCE, AND

TECHNOLOGY OUT T

THE YEAR 2025
THE ARMY AFTER NEXT:

INTERTWINING MILITARY ART, SCIEN

AND TECHNOLOGY OUT TO THE YEAR 2

Introduction

The Army After Next (AAN) Project Offi

Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Com

(TRADOC) is conducting broad studies of future warf

the year 2025 timeframe. The purpose is to isolate the 

vital to the development of the Army. The vision gen

from these studies will be integrated into future TRA

combat developments programs.

Several important dimensions motivate the focus 

2025 timeframe for AAN. First, given our availabl

time and the rapid pace of economic developmen

number of evolving countries, it is likely that the U

States will encounter a major military competitor or, 

very least, confront significant asymmetric threats 

period.

Second, the year 2025 enables military ar

technology experts to divert their thinking from co

and capabilities associated with the programmed fo

Army 2010 to more novel approaches to achieve the 

vision. It also provides ample lead time to incor

innovative technologies and unanticipated revolut

discoveries into this vision.

Finally, it provides an opportunity to refocus Army 

and applied research on efforts that have signi

potential for advancing critical AAN enabling techno

Thus, TRADOC’s AAN efforts will enable the Army to 

its choices as a function of time and optimize its inves

decisions to achieve critical AAN warfighter capabili

193
This article describes the assumptions, argument

challenges that form the basis for conceptualizin

Army’s warfighting capabilities out to the year 2025 a

science and technology support and activities tha

enable the Army to eventually realize these capabili

Speed, Knowledge And The Lessons Of History

Cycles of change in warfare are particularly diffi

comprehend and even more difficult to anticipate be

unlike endeavors in finance, medicine, or law, 

experience in war is, thankfully, infrequent. Be

warfare is not frequently practiced, soldiers must r

the laboratory of past experiences to gain vica

experience in war. To be sure, the frenetic pa

technological change in the modern world has comp

the interval and stretched the amplitude of the cy

change. Nonetheless, undeniable cycles remain, a

should be able to search the recent past to identify thes

cycles.

With the rise of industrial production an

appearance of precision warmaking machinery su

rifled weapons in the mid-19th century, technology be

dominate patterns of change. Such weapons extend

deadly zone, or the distance that soldiers had to cr

engage a defender, from 150 meters in Napoleon’s 

1,000 meters or more by the end of the American Civi

As the deadly zone increased by nearly a factor of 1

risks of crossing it were further multiplied by the let

induced through the precision and volume from the m

proliferation of repeating arms. Thus, technology fa

the defender. Images of the terrible slaughter of Worl

I remain as testimony to the cost in blood exacted 

operational method that relied on a killing effect to a

decisive results.

The Germans first conceptualized the solution in 

and it was deceptively simple: short, highly intense d

firepower to prepare the assault, small units to expl

194
shock effect of firepower to infiltrate and bypass cen

resistance, and operational formations to move th

exposed points of weakness and push deep into enemy 

After the war, the further development of the in

combustion engine provided the means to transla

theory into effective action and restore the dominance 

offensive. Motorized armored vehicles allowed sold

cross the deadly zone protected by enormously g

speed while employing blitzkrieg to gain victory. Th

achieved through psychological paralysis induc

movement, rather than through butchery induc

massive application of firepower.

After World War II, the challenge was to h

Soviet-style blitzkrieg across the Northern German 

Tactical forces needed defensive killing power to abso

initial Soviet-armored shock and hold their def

positions. This led to the defensive forces’ retu

dominance. The operational problem, however, w

strike deep offensively below the rate of arrival of fol

armored forces at the front line. The resulting Ai

Battle Doctrine of the 1980s suggested a swing 

pendulum back toward offensive forces. Operation D

Storm added momentum to the pendulum swing 

ground and air forces overwhelming static defense

unprecedented speed and intensity. Nonetheless

Desert Storm produced troubling hints that ev

defensive systems threaten to reimpose strategi

operational paralysis. Iraq’s SCUD missile attacks on 

Arabia and Israel, had they been more accurate or inc

chemical or biological warheads, might have strengt

Iraq’s defense considerably. The proliferation of 

systems will substantially raise the stakes of f

interventions.

Two key attributes of future U.S. Armed For

harmoniously developed, would firmly re-establis

dominance of the offensive forces. The inform

revolution will likely allow us to define and trac

elements of a force with exquisite clarity and deta

195
knowledge of the enemy, alone, is not enough. We 

possess the means to act on what we know, and 

depends on speed. The combination of knowledge and 

of movement will allow a future battle force to anti

enemy movement and turn costly force-on

engagements of past wars into surer and less 

engagements by choice.

Much like the evolution of military and private 

capabilities in the 20th century, an important ph

parameter influencing the Army After Next 

compression of time. For the Army, this means 

advantage of future advancements in inform

technologies while concurrently increasing spe

equivalently reducing the time required to strate

deploy, tactically maneuver, traverse the killing 

deliver metal on target, and provide timely logistic su

to the battleforce. To that end, information technologi

allow us to position outside the combat zone all but 

forces necessary to move, observe, and kill.

The imperative for speed in this new form of w

begins at home ports, airfields, and installations. A 

lethal force, shorn of its Cold War impedimenta, will b

to project itself from the homeland or from strategic 

overseas in days rather than weeks or months and ar

the operational theater ready to fight. Strategic spee

allow theater war to take the form of a coup de main

Our goal in applying firepower must be to expl

substantial paralytic effects to gain advantage. T

quickly and decisively at low cost in the future, we 

have the means to conduct the battle quickly and 

cleanly, preferably at the moment when the paralytic 

of firepower is greatest. Victory is best guaranteed th

maneuver of forces on the ground. Psychological co

the breaking of an enemy’s will to resist, comes wh

opponent is challenged and blocked at all poin

commander with the dual advantage of speed of man

and killing power will dominate the battlefield. If the

196
essential elements of combat power are orches

skillfully, an unfettered battle force will be able to 

multiple vital points simultaneously or in a seque

their choosing. In a very short time, perhaps only 

such a force would be able to quickly disintegra

enemy’s warfighting structures, producing an unequ

military decision with minimum cost.

The fourth cycle of war, therefore, should seek to e

the information age to increase the velocity of man

Speed must be the essential ingredient of a f

landpower force. Speed will be achieved by creating a 

mobile force unimpeded by terrain and unburdened 

agility sapping logistical yoke. To achieve the sp

maneuver necessary to wage 21st Century know

based warfare will require a new concept of mecha

warfare that will free forces of maneuver inhi

restrictions. The exploitation of knowledge via increas

and ground mobility will result in unprecedented t

and operational maneuverability.

Such “air mechanized” battle units would be mecha

combined arms echelons of maneuver capable of air a

to operational depths to attack regimental size uni

defend against division sized attacks. These units a

personnel and systems they contain will combine ex

speed with superior knowledge to provide p

maneuverability that takes optimum advantage of d

accurate firepower. The employment of more maneuv

air mechanized battle forces in advance of potent Arm

forces would create the capacity for 21st Century str

blitzkrieg. Once again, offensive forces would dom

warfare.

Intertwining To The Year 2025 And Beyond.

The process for intertwining military art and tech

for the AAN is depicted in Figure 1. This proc

comprehensive, highly coordinated, and reli

significant levels of cooperation among its participa

197
starts with the annual AAN strategic and tactica

games that explore and assess novel concepts of oper

and capabilities and then pass through a num

coordinated technology activities and eventually fee

into the AAN war games. This nonlinear process con

until the AAN military art innovations and pro

supporting technologies and systems converge to a fe

affordable, and militarily significant set of 

capabilities.

One important output of each yearly cycle of this p

is a TRADOC-approved short list of critical AAN en

technologies that is used to establish new AAN Scien

Technology Objectives (STOs) that directly involve p

sector participation. This is designed to cultivate a gr

198

Figure 1.

Science and technology support to the Army A

Next development process.
private sector involvement in advancing technolog

support of challenging AAN capabilities.

Very early in the AAN study process, the 

recognized that team building among the military a

technology experts was crucial to the overall success 

AAN effort. This observation led to the concept of Inte

Idea Teams (IITs). The objective of these teams is to a

from a technological perspective, the concepts, capab

and notional systems, including tradeoffs, that su

AAN operational characteristics and ideas deve

through AAN war games. IITs are managed by the 

Materiel Command (AMC) through the Army Res

Laboratory (ARL) and are composed of technical e

from Army laboratories, National Laboratories, the p

sector, the Defense Advanced Research Projects A

(DARPA) and the other Services, and academia, as w

those more involved in the military art side of the AA

Once the IIT has developed such concepts, these no

system concept designs are then playe

force-on-force/system-of-systems high resolution mo

and simulation exercises conducted in collaboration 

Rand Corporation, the TRADOC Analysis Center (T

TRADOC, the IIT, and Office of the Assistant Secret

the Army for Research, Development and Acqu

(OASARDA). The purpose of this is to assess the m

significance of these systems within a larger 

warfighting systems and to determine system perfor

parameters that make a difference on the battlefield

effort recognizes that maximizing individual s

performance does not necessarily result in a more ca

and affordable system.

The final step in this process is to assess the feas

and affordability of selected concepts through a te

experts from the military laboratories, nat

laboratories, the private sector, and academia

objective of this effort is to evaluate the IIT notional s

designs, in concert with the above force-on-force r

199
with respect to feasibility (laws of physics, matu

concept, and schedule) and affordability (developmen

production cost, operations and support costs

leveraging with the private sector and the other Se

and agencies). This effort also provides positive feedb

the IIT on their notional system concept designs. 

assessments are then forwarded to TRADOC for revie

assessment, and the results are used to decide on the 

these notional system concept designs in the next ro

the AAN war games.

An example of an emerging insight from the AA

gaming that was fleshed out through the IIT process 

concept of air mechanization, which was mentioned e

To achieve the requisite speed and agility, 21st Centu

mechanization will have to derive from new combinat

air and ground vehicles. A plausible option to provi

tactical and operational maneuverability required f

21st Century is to include an advanced airframe desig

be both a lifting and fighting vehicle. It would be able 

conformably, members of a family of light advanced g

vehicles with long-range, lightweight, highly acc

armaments. The advanced airframe would connect q

to an advanced ground vehicle while its crew re

inside. The advanced airframe would transport the v

anywhere on the battlefield out to a combat radius w

hours and deploy it combat ready. In addition to 

advanced ground vehicles, the advanced airframe wo

or employ a variety of other mission modules.

All advanced ground vehicles would rarely be requ

face main battle tanks head-on, which makes it poss

limit their weight by reducing the need for heavy a

They will survive through a combination of speed, a

active protection, signature management and co

comprehensive situational understanding, te

masking, deception, and indirect fire. Greater ground 

on and off roads will be possible because of adv

suspension systems, power trains, and engines. G

200
fuel economies will result from significant weight red

and advanced propulsion system designs.

Thus far, the AAN study has focused on the challe

air mechanization concept involving a high-speed ti

and several versions of a lightweight, highly lethal, m

companion ground craft. This concept addresse

following: the need to overcome the limitations of g

vehicle speed by transporting the ground craft at high 

via the tiltrotor within theater; the need for a lightw

ground craft to limit the size of the tiltrotor; and the n

overcome the possible absence of an airfield in t

through the self-deployment of the tiltrotor and g

craft combination from CONUS. This system appro

the AAN air mechanization concept has not comple

first cycle through the AAN process depicted in Fig

However, the results so far are very encouraging. Th

complete assessment will occur sometime in the sum

1998.

In addition to this process, a complementary 

activities involving the Army Science Board (ASB) a

National Research Council’s Board on Army Scienc

Technology (BAST) are currently under way. The A

investigating opportunities to advance stra

deployment capabilities out to the year 2025, whi

BAST is constructing an investment roadmap for the 

Basic and Applied Research Programs for the develo

of technologies that will significantly reduce log

demand. Finally, OASARDA, in partnership 

TRADOC, is planning to initiate a series of techn

based war games that will assist in determining the 

productive investment options to support AAN capabi

Conclusions

We believe the Army has seized upon a h

compelling vision of its future role in land warfare. 

also carefully thought through a comprehensive p

that will determine the key science and techn

201
investments enabling it to achieve this vision. The p

the Army has created to navigate into the future is w

very well. The future Army and the United States will 

beneficiaries of this cooperative but challenging effor

ENDNOTE

1. The authors would like to acknowledge the contribution

Douglas C. Lovelace of the U.S. Army War College and Dr. Tom 

of the Army Research Laboratory in the preparation of this art

202
Chapter Twelve

Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Reproduced with Permission Granted by:

October 1998 Issue

ARMED FORCES JOURNAL

INTERNATIONAL

Volume 136, Number 3

203

THE INDIRECT

APPROACH:

HOW U.S. MILITARY

FORCES CAN AVOID

THE PITFALLS OF

FUTURE URBAN WARF
THE INDIRECT APPROACH: HOW U.S

MILITARY FORCES CAN AVOID

THE PITFALLS

OF FUTURE URBAN WARFARE

Author’s Introductory Note

The following article was published within the O

1998 issue of Armed Forces Journal International. S

months later, while the Russian Army was aggres

destroying the city of Grozny, the editorial staff of 

awarded the following accolade within their Jou

Darts and Laurels Section.

1

A laurel to the Russian general staff—for ada

While the 1999-2000 battle for Grozny is a dete

military action, its initial execution was a far cry fro

1996 debacle in the same location. Until mid-Dece

when Russian forces were mauled during a probe in

city under light armor cover, military analysts 

generally impressed by Russian field comman

absorption of lessons learned from the 1996 camp

Avoiding the close-in engagements which had prov

disastrous during the earlier, failed attempt to 

Grozny, Russian commanders waged a long-

campaign against the city in tandem with an up

courtship of the media. As one observer noted, the i

successful campaign plan paralleled the thrust of an 

warfare article by Major General Robert H. Scale

Commandant of the U.S. Army War College, publis

the October 1998 issue of AFJI. 

205

1. February 2000 Issue, Armed Forces Journal International, Volum

Number 7, page 64.
THE INDIRECT APPROACH:

HOW U.S. MILITARY FORCES CAN AVO

THE PITFALLS OF

FUTURE URBAN WARFARE

Urban warfare, fighting in cities, war in “co

terrain.” To the casual observer, the words seem det

almost pristine. However, the words are starkingly 

military professionals who have seen the images of 

destruction and excessive casualties in cities such as B

Stalingrad, Hue, and Beirut. Urban warfare, a subje

many military professionals would prefer to avoid, 

with us. Moreover, it may be the preferred appro

future opponents.

Consider one of the key lessons that emerged fro

Spring 1998 Army 2025 wargame conducted at th

Army War College. The enemy (Red Force) condu

lightning assault to seize and control a web of co

terrain (a large urban area). This enabled it to deca

the political leadership and control critical lodgment 

Designed to dismember coalition efforts and co

American resolve, the Red Force dispersed its army w

the cities and prepared to wage an attrition-

campaign. Since the National Command Authorit

initially reluctant to turn to the military element of p

the friendly Blue Force was unable to prevent Red 

occupying the urban areas. However, once Red move

the urban areas, the political fallout to regain control 

lodgment area and reestablish a legitimate governme

Blue with little choice but to wage an urban w

campaign.

Although successful, the cost was excessive in te

battle casualties and time. In retrospect, the Blue app

was exactly the opposite from what should have been 

206
Why? Because by playing into the hands of the enemy

illustrated one of the key issues for 21st Century wa

How can the force of the future achieve success in co

terrain?

A recent revival of interest in urban warfare has y

a rich outpouring of intellectual energy and 

investment in an effort to exploit interest into a rela

unfamiliar form of warfare. As is often the case 

American inquiry style, there has been too quick 

beyond the more conceptual aspects of war in urban t

and into the weapons and tactics necessary to 

street-to-street and door-to-door. I suggest a mea

approach to the study of urban warfare. Its premise 

the time-tested tenets of warfare must be appl

rigorously and with the same fidelity in urban warf

they are applied to other forms of warfare.

NEGATING AMERICAN MILITARY STRENGT

In the next century, a future enemy might look 

urban masses as a possible refuge from overwhe

American military power. Technological precision 

more importantly, the will to carry out a strategic plan

enable him to pursue at least two possible option

might lead to a favorable strategic outcome. Each 

seek to nullify American technological advantages of 

and knowledge, while simultaneously pursuing a str

end state that focuses on the attainment of li

objectives while avoiding defeat.

The first option combines the diplomatic, politica

military elements of power into an operational concep

seeks to delay and disrupt our arrival into a str

theater. Initially, an aggressor moves swiftly to 

military objectives in a neighboring country. Then, th

skillful diplomatic efforts and political maneuverin

enemy disrupts coalition-forming efforts 

simultaneously offering a peace settlement. Central 

enemy’s concept is the occupation of complex urban t

207
that enables him to control key lodgment areas and na

centers of gravity.

If the first option fails, the enemy can burrow his f

the urban terrain and prepare for combat operations

places the U.S. leadership on the horns of a dilemm

urban assault largely neutralizes American high-tech 

and mobility advantages. With the added risk of exc

casualties and prolonged campaign timelines, many 

question a decision to undertake such an operation.

Urban fighting has always been one of the 

destructive forms of warfare. During World War 

Russian army sustained over 300,000 casualties in 

epic struggle for Berlin. American casualties were e

excessive: over 1,000 killed in action to regain Mani

more than 3,000 in the battle for Aachen, Germany. 

Vietnam War, the casualty rates for U.S. Marine

fought in Hue exceeded those from Okinawa’s b

amphibious assault. More recently, the ill-fated R

attempt to seize Chechnya resulted in the dea

thousands of soldiers and non-combatants (August A

But urban warfare doesn’t happen all that often

sides realize the destructive effects that street fightin

cause. Only a desperate enemy, defending at 

disadvantage, willing to sacrifice initiatives, his citie

a large portion of his military force, has taken to defe

cities. A casual glance at the last 500 years of majo

history shows that as more of the world blankets it

urban sprawl, the incidents of actual street fighting 

declined.

THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT

A large urban center is multi-dimensional. So

must contend with subterranean and high-rise th

Every building could be a nest of fortified enemy pos

that would have to be dug out, one by one. Moreov

208
experienced enemy could easily create connecting pos

between buildings.

With limited maneuver space, the urban enviro

precludes mobility operations and largely negate

effects of weapons, while minimizing engagement r

The proximity of buildings plays havoc with com

cations, further adding to command and control diffic

Finally, the psychological effects of combat on soldie

magnified. While the array of threats from mu

dimensions has a debilitating effect on soldiers, it f

hastens the disintegration process that haunts all m

units locked in close-combat operations.

The proliferating sprawl of urban center

populations make the challenge of future city fightin

more pronounced. Some estimates indicate that betw

to 70 percent of the world’s population will reside in 

areas by the year 2025. If current global demog

trends continue into the next millenium, we will s

growth of huge urban masses, many exceeding ten m

inhabitants. The enormous problems of infrastructu

the demand for social services that threaten to s

governing authorities in the urban centers of em

states will most likely worsen. Moreover, the proxim

the disenfranchised to the ruling elite provides the spa

further unrest and sporadic violence.

The future urban center will contain a mixed popu

ranging from the rich elite to the poor and disenfranc

Day-to-day existence for most of the urban poor w

balanced tenuously on the edge of collapse. With 

conditions ripe for exploitation, the smallest 

unfavorable circumstance might be enough to ins

starvation, disease, social foment, cultural unrest, or 

forms of urban violence.

Military leaders who believe that future warfare w

encompass this unpleasant environment are del

themselves. A little more than one-third of all deploy

by U.S. forces over the past 20 years have occur

209
complex terrain. As urban areas continue to expand

will increasingly encompass regions of vital interest 

United States. Representing geo-strategic cent

gravity, these urban areas will contain all the 

functions of government, commerce, communication

transportation activity.

While some future urban operations may be lim

scope and capable of being controlled by special oper

forces and other operatives, others may take pla

strategic key terrain of vital interest. Such an ope

would require a major American investment of c

forces.

A GREAT EQUALIZER

The dynamics of knowledge and speed that are id

open warfare take on an additional dimension wh

enemy chooses to occupy key urban areas. An e

occupies cities to slow us down and avoid our stre

Rather than suffer the brunt of American military p

where speed and precision technology can be brou

bear, he understands that his intent must be not to 

clear victory but to avoid losing. The enemy’s only 

these circumstances is time. If he can delay, disrup

diffuse our effort to achieve a quick decision, he mi

able to force a campaign of attrition in w

disproportionate casualties could induce us to grow we

the conflict. While he surrenders the tactical initiativ

close terrain offers protection from firepowe

surveillance and allows further time to prepare a de

In open warfare, time is a disadvantage as the n

achieve a rapid victory pushes commanders to 

decisive results. In urban warfare, just the opposite i

A premature rush into the city works to our disadva

and plays to the strength of the defender.

History is full of examples of armies that tried and 

to seize a city by coup de main. The Israeli army perf

210
brilliantly in executing a lightning counterstroke acro

Suez Canal during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. How

once Israel’s armored columns entered the streets of 

the Egyptians were able to inflict a high num

casualties while stopping the Israelis’ progress. The 

Russian experience in Chechnya is equally illust

There, a semi-trained and poorly-equipped 

successfully waged a war of attrition that eventually 

down the larger, technologically superior Russian ar

While the different technology and tactical sk

armies are a factor, defensive urban warfare is a 

equalizer for an under-modernized force. A vast b

historical evidence reminds us that urban warfare is a 

casualty producer. Thus, in urban warfare, we must 

the enemy enticement that lures our forces into su

environment and use time to our advantage.

COUNTERING THE URBAN OPTION

If we are patient, time will place our opponen

disadvantage. The time advantage reversal occurs 

the enemy’s inability to continue to provide for the pop

This will eventually lead to the displacement 

government leadership or hostile action on the part 

populace.

Picture for a moment a conflict against a future e

state similar to some of our more recent post-Col

adversaries. After a lightning campaign lasting only 

the mobile formations of our future foe are decisively b

in open warfare. To avoid total defeat, the enemy rush

remaining forces into his capital city, a city of spra

dimensions with millions of people that house his po

cultural, and financial centers of gravity.

As soon as the enemy loses on the open ground and 

to occupy complex terrain, a fundamental shift of batt

dynamics occurs. He loses the initiative. Time is now 

on the side of the intervening coalition.

211
Without the capacity to maneuver, the enemy c

escape. Attacking would only result in his destru

Thus, he arrays his forces throughout the capital to 

creating lucrative targets for American precision we

He impresses the local citizenry into national servic

appeals to the world to watch the impending slaugh

non-combatants.

Assuming that Americans are leading a coalition 

how should the coalition respond? The best option 

preempt the enemy from using complex terrain in th

place. Recognizably, a preemptive approach requir

political entity to build strong domestic and interna

support, along with developing solid public underpin

Moreover, preemptive measures could come in a var

forms. In the pre-hostilities phase, political and diplo

means could be used to discourage future aggr

activity. The coalition could also selectively implemen

deployment options, such as increasing the prese

naval or air forces and staging pre-positioned equip

Once hostilities begin, we could force the enemy to fig

way into the urban areas by isolating his army, blocki

key avenues of approach, and augmenting host-

forces that occupy friendly cities.

If, despite our best efforts, the enemy is able to fa

on a major city, we must be mindful of the limiting fac

using military power. Americans do not expect 

military to wage war in an unconstrained manner

difficult to imagine fighting another World War II cam

like Berlin or Dresden. In Berlin, between Februar

May 1945, a third of the total tonnage of bombs was dr

on the beleaguered city, resulting in the deaths of mor

100,000 people. In our struggle to seize Aachen, the ci

virtually destroyed.

With many of the major global cities experiencing 

of infrastructure and overcrowding shortcomings, the 

damage from unconstrained urban warfare would req

total rebuilding effort. Such warfare could cause th

212
dismemberment of basic services and the dea

thousands of innocent people, along with great coll

damage to homes, hospitals, and other structures, cr

a new mass of refugees. Rampant disease and star

would quickly overcome those lucky enough to s

bombs and missiles.

As the moral beacon for international law, 

democracy, and respect for human rights, the United 

can ill-afford to undertake such costly operations. 

likelihood, the American people would not tolera

casualties that an urban assault would produce, nor 

they tolerate the civilian casualties or extensive dam

the captive city. The trend to exercise constraint is 

American-led coalitions and military operations must 

better solution than physically destroying a city in or

rescue it from a hostile force.

Another limiting factor is the desire for a short co

One of the enduring legacies of the Gulf War wa

expectation for quick victory with few casualties. Wh

American people have reluctantly tolerated high nu

of casualties and prolonged military campaigns in th

events in Somalia and Bosnia indicate that the Am

public has little stomach for excessive casualties in 

wars.

In our example, another viable option exis

preemptive measures fail, rather than initiat

time-consuming, costly attack in complex terrain, I s

that an indirect approach would accomplish the str

end at a much lower cost in terms of human life and ph

destruction. Implementing an indirect approach lev

the intrinsic instability of the urban mass to ou

advantage. By avoiding a direct assault on an entre

force, we do not engage the enemy on his terms. The in

approach enables us to maintain the initiative and e

our technologically superior forces to their fullest pot

leaving the enemy with little option.

213
This option encompasses three fundamental con

using an indirect approach, using time to our adva

and letting the city collapse on itself.

THE INDIRECT APPROACH

In his landmark book on strategy, Liddell 

contended that in most successful campaigns

dislocation of the enemy’s psychological and ph

balance was brought about through use of the in

approach. This also applies to urban warfare.

Instead of conducting a direct assault and m

strike, coalition forces could establish a loose cordon a

the city and control of the surrounding countrysid

cordon would eventually result in complete isolation 

city from the outside world. All avenues, including ai

and land arteries, would be blocked. Moreover, the co

would seek to control sources of food, power, wate

sanitation services. Any vital natural resources wo

controlled. Finally, using technological means, all in

information sources and commercial, financial

governmental nodes would be suppressed, and 

information emanating from the coalition would rea

city’s population.

Throughout the cordon operation, coalition forces 

demonstrate their absolute mastery of the situation, 

knowledge and speed to seize, control, and strike se

decisive points within the city. High-altitude unm

aerial vehicles orbiting miles above the city could ma

unlimited surveillance with a minimum of manp

Ground-mounted cameras could observe areas susce

to infiltration. Unless the enemy attacked, coalition 

would not engage in close combat, instead using g

standoff advantages and technology to strike selected 

targets, key leadership, and weapons of mass destru

As history reminds us, a continued massive use 

power often has the opposite effect from what is inte

214
Thus, the coalition would not attempt to achieve com

destruction of the enemy force, but only to destroy 

targets that have the greatest impact on the govern

the army, and the population. The purpose is two-f

demonstrate the futility of further resistance, and to 

conditions that will lead to collapsing the enemy’s 

continue the struggle.

USING TIME TO OUR ADVANTAGE

Through the use of psychological operations and c

of the media, the coalition could create an environm

which the enemy army becomes an unwelcome forc

underlying purpose is to shape the perception th

enemy is a hostile occupying force. This perce

eventually turns the population against the enemy. 

regard, the coalition could establish mechanisms to 

the prevailing moods of the population.

LET THE CITY COLLAPSE ON ITSELF

As the coalition achieves control of the surrou

countryside, it could collect resources to suppo

establishment of sanctuaries or safe havens around th

Humanitarian organizations, both governmenta

non-governmental, would be encouraged to con

protected camps. The city’s population would be encou

to leave, and coalition forces would freely allow re

passage through the cordon to the relative securit

safety of the camps.

For those who stay, the isolation of the city, in 

would create a refugee problem for the enemy. Wi

steady depletion of resources, the remaining popu

would eventually see the government as an impotent 

that can’t provide basic services or security for the p

Inevitably, the military forces and their leaders wo

seen as the real enemy, particularly among the dispos

within the city.

215
Although this approach has its advantages, this is 

suggest that it would always work. The following a

considerations before this approach is undertaken

much popular support does the enemy have? How wil

the enemy’s population to accept suffering? To what 

is the city self-sustaining and for how long? Is there 

sanctuary nearby that allows forces to rest and recu

in safety? To what extent are we relying on a coalitio

how strong is the coalition? How coherent were the en

military forces when they occupied the city? How clo

the city to collapse before the initiation of mi

operations?

Future conditions will force us to fight in co

terrain. We can no longer fight the destructive campa

World War II. The indirect approach enables us 

knowledge and speed to their fullest potential to achie

strategic ends with the least cost in human lif

destruction of physical property.

216
Chapter Thirteen

Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Reproduced with Permission Granted by:

NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES QUARTERLY

Volume 6, Issue 2

Spring 2000

217

RUSSIA’S CLASH IN

CHECHNYA:

IMPLICATIONS FOR

FUTURE WAR
RUSSIA’S CLASH IN CHECHNYA:

IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE WAR

War does not belong in the realm of arts and sciences;

rather it is part of man’s social existence. War is a clash between m

interests, which is resolved by bloodshed.

1

Clausew

Historians recorded the dawn of the twentieth ce

as a time when the Russian military found itself mak

end to a messy siege against a determined enemy 

periphery of its crumbling empire. This military tas

made all the more challenging by the socia

technological upheavals of the times. As the co

escalated, Russian military leaders found them

powerless to overcome their country’s traditional po

conservatism and economic penury. Fighting during 

of revolutionary change in military science, Ru

military was not able to take full advantage 

opportunities new technologies promised to bring 

battlefield. World opinion generally condemned 

military efforts without seeking to understand how 

Russian victory was to the short-term political health 

Russian ruling elite and the long-term future stability 

region.

Another century has passed, the geographic loc

have changed, but the above description of Russia’s 

Port Arthur siege could also be used to outline the 

Russian siege of Grozny. Exactly nine decades 

between the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War a

December 1994 attack against the Chechen ca

However, many political-military condition

observations remain just as relevant today as they w

century ago.

219
Few western military analysts in 1904 realize

outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War and the batt

tactics used in Manchuria would become a fri

metaphor for the horror of trench warfare to follow 

than a decade. It has always been difficult to anticipa

comprehend the cycles and pace of change in w

because, unlike endeavors in finance, medicine, o

active experience in war is, fortunately, episodic. D

periods of relative quiescence, however, it is imperat

soldiers and statesmen to gain vicarious insights th

laboratory analysis of past experience, and, whe

discontinuity or brief incidents of war erupt, avo

temptation to view them as historical anomalies.

THE AFTERMATH: A PRISM THAT REFRACT

VALUABLE INSIGHTS

Even though shots are still being fired in Chec

rugged southern mountains, it is not too soon to 

reflecting upon the long-range implications of this 

war. Across the western world, questions now a

regarding the military implications of this deadly and 

conflict. The aftermath of the war may well provide u

a revealing window of opportunity to glimpse 

guideposts that portend the direction, pace of chang

perhaps even the nature of future warfare.

Russia’s first Chechen war was a disaster that a

led to the full secession of Chechnya. The 1994-1996 c

was degrading for a Russian military already broug

by the Afghan War and the humiliating loss of 

prestige and ensuing discomfort that followe

withdrawal from the Soviet Army’s East Eur

garrisons. The failure of the first Chechen war revea

Russia’s military leadership profound stra

operational, and tactical defects. The Russian m

rightfully concluded that their civilian leaders 

understood the nature of this new style of cultura

Likewise, they realized that they had badly underesti

the fighting resolve of the Chechen rebels. They 

220
particularly frustrated by a civilian administratio

seemed totally incapable of establishing a coh

consistent policy towards the war.

The Russians also recognized their own unique m

shortcomings. Unity of command was never estab

between the disparate assortment of deployed t

Senior commanders continued to employ tactics 

appropriate for open, mechanized warfare than 

fighting against tenacious guerilla-like bands of Che

who were operating within restrictive terrain. Comma

in the field never had enough troops for the task, no

the few units at their disposal sufficiently well trai

fight on difficult urban and mountain battlef

Undisciplined solders and ineffective leaders eventua

to episodes of corruption, brutality, and Dedovsh

(hazing). In the end, Russia’s ill-prepared force was u

to take Grozny by storm, nor could their poorly disci

armed forces win the hearts of the Chechen populati

The first Chechen war never gained popular supp

Russia. To most Russians, it appeared the Chechen

winning both the propaganda war at home an

information war abroad. To those outside the battle a

seemed as if Russian soldiers had become nothing 

than expendable commodities thrown mindlessly 

senseless war of attrition. After two expensive ye

combat, Russia was forced to negotiate a settlemen

Chechen leaders in August 1996.

For the next few years, Chechnya remained a hot

unrest with cross-border raids, kidnappings, destruc

neighboring provinces, and efforts to organize a k

Pan-Islamic movement that promoted the secess

neighboring provinces from Russia. Eventually, Mo

military leaders resolved to take action. By 1998

devised and started to rehearse operational plans 

second Chechen war—one they intended to win.

221
SETTING THE CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS

Since the time of the Czars, Russia’s Army has pra

a method of change and adaptation that reflec

structured, autocratic, and hierarchical nature 

Russian society. In contrast to western militaries, r

within Russia’s military occurs more slowly, usually 

and starts and always under the direction and c

authority of the General Staff.

2

 In wars of this ce

Russian field commanders have learned to adhere to 

regulations and tactical “norms” that dictate behav

combat to a level of specificity unheard of in the Wes

result is a rigid method of warfare that leaves li

chance, uncertainty, inspiration, or serendipity.

4

The path of change after the first Chechen war fo

this Russian pattern with remarkable fidelity. Fro

beginning, the General Staff recognized the conflict 

not be resumed without first securing political and p

support within the homeland. Fortunately for the R

side, the Chechens assisted by conducting an ill-con

domestic terror campaign of bombings and border raid

served only to turn popular opinion in Russia sq

against them.

Senior Russian leaders quickly seized the inform

warfare initiative and aggressively organi

comprehensive effort to gain popular support. 

television footage was aired showing Chechen execu

prisoners. The September 1999 unsolved bombin

Moscow presented Russian leaders with an unex

opportunity to blame the Chechen rebels without any 

of complicity. Additionally, Russia was able to con

relatively successful information blockade around th

of Grozny. This “cyberspace curtain” worked t

advantage of Russia’s information war

Simultaneously, they encouraged helpless civilians to 

the city, and they attempted to win the hearts of th

Chechen population by creating refugee relief c

outside Grozny and in neighboring provinces. Wh

222
possible, Russian commanders attempted to coop

area’s local elite and tribal elders with the goal of leve

local support for Russia against the rebel’s defensive e

DEVELOPING A CAMPAIGN PLAN AND

TAILORING IT FOR THE SITUATION

Urban warfare historically has been both tim

people intensive, and therefore terribly lethal. Duri

Second World War, for example, the Russian 

sustained over 300,000 casualties taking Berlin. Stal

cost the Russians even more. However, the Ru

learned from watching the West that the arri

democracy takes away from the military the trad

authority to write blank checks on the lives of their so

particularly if they intend to prosecute the w

maintaining popular support at home. To accommoda

realities of this new “democratic” way of war, the R

Army customized their fighting tactics for mountai

urban fighting by increasing the expenditures of fire

as a means of decreasing expenditures of manpower

resolved to avoid door-to-door street fighting if 

possible. Initially, the substitution seemed to work.

The Russians reorganized combat forces to ove

their previous unity of command problems. The G

Staff clearly demonstrated their ability to learn and 

several key principles of urban warfare based upon 

terrible 1994-1996 experience. They created new com

and control structures to streamline cooperation be

the regular army and the Vnutrennye Voiska (VVMVD

Ministry of Interior’s Internal troops. Since the VVMV

less capable force, the General Staff ultimately im

unity of command under its consolidated leadership.

From experience, Russian commanders realized 

even in a firepower-intensive style of urban wa

numbers of soldiers guaranteed overwhelming force

time the General Staff sent a total of 93,000 troops—

times the number used during the first Chechen war. 

223
assorted police formations were committed to co

“mopping-up” operations once the back of Ch

resistance was broken in the cities. The army grew 

patchwork of military units consisting of a number of 

elite “temporary operational groups” consisting princ

of airborne, air assault and special operations units, a

Naval Infantry.

From the beginning the General Staff determine

Grozny could only be taken by first securing, 

dominating the Chechen countryside. Instead 

medieval-style siege, the plan was to establish a sort o

cordon around the city and then begin a series of ca

probes preceded by ample doses of bombs, rocket

shells. Once control of this sort was establishe

Chechens would lose the initiative, and battl

advantage would shift to the Russians. If senior m

leaders could convince their political bosses of the ne

patience, time would eventually guarantee victory.

ANALYSIS OF THE RUSSIAN ART OF WAR

As so often happens, politics and the enemy int

with careful planning. In the beginning, the Ru

leadership failed to accurately assess the political res

the Chechen rebels. Eventually, political impatie

home caused them to lose the advantage of tim

patience. Russia’s senior civilian and military leaders 

to maintain the city of Grozny merely as a military obj

When it became apparent to Russia’s political leader

their future survival depended upon a rapid victory, G

quickly evolved into a critical political center of gr

Suddenly the advantage of time shifted back t

defenders.

The western press made much of Russian shortco

during the second Chechen war. To be sure, in t

Russian fashion, it was a messy and tragically brutal 

But the Russians did achieve their military objectiv

least for the near term. The Russian General Sta

224
appears to retain its ability to analyze failure, dete

what needs to be done and subsequently dictate corr

actions to the field. While the brain of the army shows 

of life, the Chechen war also seems to tell us that the b

the Russian Army remains on the sick list. 

Commanders simply lacked the resources, both huma

materiel, to effectively execute the intent of the G

Staff. Poorly trained and led solders will inevitably m

mess of the best-laid plans.

Throughout both Chechen conflicts, the Russian

seemed to be continually surprised by the steadfas

guile, stoicism, and tenacity of the Chechen fig

Without question, the Chechens taught the Russ

lesson the United States painfully learned from the 

Vietnamese. Given time and a will to win, a deter

enemy learns to survive the onslaught from a fire

intensive force. Soldiers become inured to the pyrote

and blast of firepower weapons. They learn to disper

go-to-ground in order to present the smallest and 

lucrative targets. Eventually, after the shock wears of

learn to not only survive, but to remain effective in 

combat, even under the most severe bombardmen

Russians in Chechnya relived our own experience in 

The field army’s difficulty realizing the intent 

General Staff was most evident by its inability to ma

control of the countryside while attempting to isola

contain the Chechens inside Grozny. On several occ

the Russians had to return to open warfare in order t

the Chechens back inside their urban lair. The 

defenders were not cut off from their free access to s

bases in the southern mountains until the very end 

conflict.

The Russian plan to replace manpower with fire

was proper for the circumstances. However, as the 

progressed, the Russians found themselves obliged t

an ever-increasing tonnage of shells and bombs into t

in order to kill Chechens while preserving the lives o

225
own soldiers. This firepower challenge was exacerba

the poor quality of materiel and training within the R

fire support system. Coordination between soldi

contact with supporting artillery was poorly exe

Often close-in fires seemed to be delivered indiscrimin

Hundreds of rockets, mortars, and artillery rounds 

dumped into portions of the city seemingly without pu

or effect. Frustration, revenge, and the desire to cause 

took over as the principal motives for delivering firepo

The crude Russian firepower system remained wo

imprecise, and their approach continued to displa

old-fashioned Soviet preference for mass over qualit

lack of both technical and tactical discretion was c

evident. Had they been available, a few laser or 

Positioning System (GPS) guided munitions would 

been much more effective as a method of striking 

targets within the city. While operationally well-grou

the plan nevertheless failed in large measure becau

lack of precision weapons, precision surveillance

proper battlefield coordination increasingly le

Russians with no other option but to escalate the tonn

firepower in order to meet the intent of the General 

Eventually this deadly escalation left them with no 

but to destroy Grozny and many of its innocents in or

save it.

Russian small unit tactics improved considerably 

the first Chechen war. Mounted troops no longer sou

rush the center of the city only to be ambushe

destroyed within smoking, bloody columns stretching 

Grozny’s inner thoroughfares. Instead comma

followed bombardments by cautiously infiltrating th

block by block, leading with their best soldiers, 

smaller formations with usually either airborne or s

forces units. Green conscripts were kept out of the 

movements to contact as much as possible in order to r

battlefield losses.

226
But the Chechens learned quickly. After end

Russia’s firepower onslaught, they cautiously sou

snipe the lead formations in order to slow their ad

Simultaneously, they reserved their limited resourc

major engagements, usually ambushes at night, again

less well-trained and ill-prepared conscripts in rear 

Eventually the Russian tactics of leading with fewe

better quality infantry paid off, but the Chechens in

that the cost of victory was very high indeed.

THINKING-IN-TIME: A FEW NUGGETS WITH

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

Grozny has been turned into an urban wast

Russia’s leadership now pretends that the ba

desert-like landscape of Chechnya signals a victor

90,000-plus Russian troops will not be able to p

cross-border retaliation raids, and they most certain

experience continued guerrilla warfare in the area. 

Russia will not be able to effect either political or eco

resolution to the fundamental problems in the 

Caucasus region, it should not expect peace anytime 

More importantly, the potential of a protra

post-imperial war on its periphery still remains Ru

worst nightmare, just as it did almost one hundred 

ago when Japanese forces marched into central Manch

The aftermath of Chechnya seems to reinforce 

insights on the changing nature of war garnered from 

post-Cold War battlefields. The Russians re-lear

lesson NATO first taught them in Kosovo: a fire

intensive style of war can reduce casualties. But the 

destruction and duration of the conflict will be too 

unless the firepower is delivered with precisio

followed with rapid occupation of the enemy’s ter

Ground forces, using great caution, must exploit the 

of firepower, particularly when fighting in difficult t

such as cities or against an enemy with the will to resi

adapt. Increasingly, as the Russians learned, fewer so

must be exposed to contact in order to avoid exc

227
casualties, and these soldiers should be of excep

quality, well led, and well equipped. The precise appli

of firepower, maneuver, and cautious close combat o

the Russians the only tactical scheme by which they 

win relatively quickly and with acceptable costs. This 

key lesson of limited warfare: a commitment to limite

demands the judicious use of limited means. The Rus

unfortunately, lacked the technical precision and t

means to effectively implement this new precisio

paradigm of air and land warfare.

After more than a decade of experience, w

witnessing a geo-strategic shift in the motives for co

The Chechen war conforms to a developing patter

started to emerge several years ago as evidenc

Afghanistan, Lebanon, Bosnia, Somalia, Kosovo, and 

conflicts along the periphery of Eurasia. We s

anticipate the world beyond 2010 to be an era of rek

conflict where breakaway regimes will frequently 

themselves by their cultural-ethnic identities. Ma

these regimes will be radically fundamental in natu

religiously motivated. And many will find warfare 

surest means for defending their culture from o

influences or for imposing their culture on less cu

neighbors.

Explosions of long-simmering conflict, once held in 

during the Cold War, will be free to start again. So

these recently ignited conflicts have been smolderi

generations and in some cases, such as Chechny

centuries. As this trend continues, developed democ

and their allies should anticipate future wars that w

conducted within what the Russians habitually refe

“under-cultured theaters of operation.” Most of 

clashes between forces will be intractable or unrul

shooting portion of the conflict may very well end w

decisive advantage to either opponent. Since this t

war will be difficult to manage, the best an interv

power can hope for may well be a truce, stalemate, or 

minimum level of sustained violence acceptable 

228
sensitivities of the world’s advanced democracies. Th

predictable aspects of this type of conflict, if it is allow

expand into open warfare, will be its bloody n

protracted duration, and inconclusive ending.

The recent Chechen saga helps us derive a num

insights regarding Russia’s application of military p

To be sure, the war in Chechnya will have a num

implications for Russia and its military forces. As Ru

military leaders begin their inevitable proce

assessment and change, we must observe carefu

determine how their Chechnya experience will alte

approach and prosecution of warfare in the future.

The legacies from Chechnya could directly inf

Russia’s potential evolution into a future regional m

competitor. Currently, the average Russian citizen 

street has a heightened regard for Russia’s military 

and Russian military leaders will most likely enjoy a g

voice within their government’s policy making pr

There seems to be an established realization among t

political elite that the future use of military force m

necessary to maintain stability within the cou

borders, and likewise, to guarantee the political longe

the political regime now in power. It would not be surp

to see additional conflicts conducted in order to secu

periphery of Russia’s remaining empire.

Senior Russian military leaders, moreover, mus

realize the need for additional reform. The timing m

right for them to win both political support and fin

resources from the country’s political leadership. M

leaders, most certainly, have a greater appreciati

well-trained and more effectively led troops. The Che

experience, in retrospect, may be the impetus to b

smaller, more professional, long-serving army. C

within Russia’s military will be two fold: heal the bod

sharpen the mind. The General Staff will orchestrate 

traditional path for reform after they have completed 

dialectical assessment of the conflict. And perhaps 

229
importantly, it will not be surprising to see a 

commitment from the Russian military to join the unf

precision revolution.

5

Finally, from a western perspective, Chechnya t

the Russians have now convincingly learned a te

democratic warfare that will increasingly influence h

in the West prosecute real, shooting wars. In every c

since the end of the Second World War, we have re-le

the maxim that a political commitment to limited en

demand strict limits on the means that we are allow

commit to achieve those ends. For more than five de

developed militaries have been in search of a method 

that will reduce friendly casualties by increasin

expenditure of precision firepower delivered ag

opponents. Unless its very existence is at stake, a m

state no longer publicly tolerates the massive slaugh

its soldiers. The Russians are the latest modern st

have learned this lesson. The cost of learning has be

high.

ENDNOTES

1. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael 

and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 149.

2. There is an excellent discussion regarding the Russian G

Staff’s “Top-Down” planning process published by J. Erickson 

the article, “Soviet C

3

: Trends, Techniques, and Technology,” Defense 

7, No.2/ 3 (1991): 263-276. Erickson also references the 1987 benchmark 

by James T Westwood, “Evolution and Change in c

3

s Requirements and 

Soviet Perestroika, U.S. Responsiveness,” 10-12. 58th Military Op

Research Society Symposium, U.S. Naval Academy (1990).

3. Hemsley has published a detailed analysis and explanatio

Soviet approach to intensive study of past wars and the process t

to develop tactical norms within their troop control procedur

John Hemsley, Soviet Troop Control: The Role of Command Technolo

Soviet Military System (Oxford: Brassey’s Publishers Limited, 1982), 8

4. Robert H. Scales, Jr., Firepower in Limited War (Novato: 

Press, 1995), 166-167.

230
5. For an outstanding analysis of Russian military refor

Christopher Donnelley, “Crisis and Reform in the Russian Milit

Williamson Murray, ed., The Emerging Strategic Environment: Chal

theTwenty-first Century (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1999), 60-85.

231
Chapter Fourteen

Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Reproduced with Permission Granted by:

Winter 1998-1999 Issue

PARAMETERS

Volume 28, Number 4

233

TRUST, NOT

TECHNOLOGY,

SUSTAINS COALITION
TRUST, NOT TECHNOLOGY,

SUSTAINS COALITIONS

History testifies to the ineptitude of coalitions in waging w

Allied failures have been so numerous and their inexcusa

blunders so common that professional soldiers had lo

discounted the possibility of effective allied action unl

available resources were so great as to assure victory 

inundation. Even Napoleon’s reputation as a brilliant milita

leader suffered when students . . . came to realize that 

always fought against coalitions—and therefore again

divided counsels and diverse political, economic, and milita

interests.

Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Euro

As Supreme Commander of the Allied Expedit

Force in Europe during World War II, General D

Eisenhower led one of the most successful coaliti

history. By insisting on an integrated staff and dema

an atmosphere of fairness and mutual respect, Eisen

transcended personalities and many political challen

his decisions. His success was in large measure attrib

to the cohesive—if sometimes contentious—environm

Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces Europe.

Strategists predict that instability and conflic

characterize the 21st century, due to cultural unre

regional wars engulfing bordering states or cons

states from within.

2

 Over the past decade We

democracies and others, mindful of the need to conta

spread of violence, have demonstrated incr

willingness to use military force to defuse inter

regional political conflicts or to respond to humani

crises.

But smaller and more expensive militaries as w

pressing social needs confront decisionmakers wit

235
need to find ways to contain the cost of such m

undertakings. For the foreseeable future the United 

will remain reluctant to intervene unilaterally in 

crises; as a consequence, the need for coalition partne

shape American strategy.

In all its modern wars the United States has foug

member of a coalition.

3

 Thus, it is likely that U.S. m

leaders throughout their careers will confront the cha

of organizing and leading coalitions. Any officer 

intuitively, if not from experience, that interoperab

equipment and compatibility of doctrine and opera

procedures pose significant challenges in any coa

Many also are aware of the costs of rationa

procurement, doctrine, and training within the 

alliance; few, however, could even speculate on how to 

NATO’s levels of interoperability within a coalition.

Eisenhower’s success is instructive here

compatibility of leaders and staffs in a coalition is 

important than compatibility in doctrine or materie

article considers technological capabilities, require

for coalition interoperability, and the need to rev

concept with a long history—the liaison officer as “di

telescope”—to form and manage coalitions.

Communicating In Coalitions

Coalition operations need two simultaneous meth

communication. The first presumes the tech

connectivity required within coalitions to perform as

missions. The U.S. military needs to develope suf

compatibility in data and information to prov

reasonable level of technical interoperability 

prospective coalition partners.

The second method relies on personal and profes

relationships with counterparts in other natio

recognizes the potential impediments of language, cu

differences, and national perspectives when operatin

236
coalition. Compensating for such impediments re

long-term investments in training select officers to fu

autonomously under great stress within a multina

environment. Sensitive to national or subnational 

and skilled in building trust based on per

relationships, such officers would help reg

commanders-in-chief “see” the complexities of strateg

operational environments.

Alliances and Coalitions

While there are similarities between alliance

coalitions, politically and structurally they are ma

different. Created for collective defense or to cope w

long-term threat, alliances usually rest on f

agreements among nations with mutual interest

(often) cultural ties. Sometimes referred to as “laten

communities, alliances require a formal stru

agreed-upon rules, and protocols to manage the routin

structure the rest.

For many years Washington’s Farewell Address s

U.S. perspectives on alliances: “Tis our true policy to 

clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the f

world.”

4

 By the end of World War II, however, the th

Soviet aggression proved more compelling than 150 y

tradition. The role of the United States in developing 

as a barrier to Soviet aggression,

5

 and the Organiza

American States to improve relations in the W

Hemisphere, needs no review. But alliances remain 

only so long as the reason for their founding endure

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) dis

long before the Soviet Union did, and in 1986 the U

States suspended security obligations incurred with 

Zealand under the ANZUS Treaty (Australia, New Ze

and the United States).

In contrast, coalitions are transitory, emerg

response to specific threats and dissolving once co

goals have been met. Politically fragile in nature

237
develop out of necessity, sometimes uniting nations w

a history of harmonious relations. Since the end of th

War, “coalitions of the willing” have been an incr

factor within NATO in dealing with crises affecting th

interests of only a part of the Alliance. Italy’s leading 

the 1997 intervention in Albania may be a harbin

NATO’s future in this respect.

6

National military capabilities either increase or r

the coalition’s fighting power by their value relative to 

coalition members and the capabilities of the adversar

coalitions facing major operations, member nation

large armies are important. Coalitions formed from ro

equal militaries sharing qualitative characteristics 

versatility. And some coalitions will include me

whose participation is symbolic. These states cont

little in military capability; they serve primarily to in

the number of flags at the command post an

international legitimacy.

Technology in Coalitions

Technology is a two-edged sword in coalition opera

Global communications systems enhance connec

among coalition members; emerging military tech

allows unprecedented surveillance. Moreover, inform

technologies have the potential to accelerate deploy

and permit decisive operations.

The downside is that rapid and costly chang

technology also create barriers to effective integrat

coalition forces. Thoughtful observers have already 

that in a replay of the 1990-91 Gulf War, there co

three and possibly four distinct levels of technology w

the coalition. The United States could be well in adva

the second-tier militaries, such as the United Kin

Germany, and France, with the rest of pre-enlarg

NATO forces at a third level. The fourth level could in

recent NATO accessions and the armed forces of 

states. Moreover, while the U.S. military might even

238
be able to preempt adversary planning, those 

adversaries could limit or negate our ability to a

surprise by accessing similar technology. Finally, 

logistic capabilities improve ways and means for ope

in bare-base environments, Army theater requiremen

Title 10 responsibilities will pose substantial strateg

operational challenges in either multilateral or unil

environments.

Attaining technological interoperability will be d

for coalitions in any case. Each Gulf War participant a

with its own level of technical sophistication. In some 

participants had advanced systems that wer

compatible within the coalition. In others, military 

needed substantial assistance to communicate 

coalition partners. For example, it required approxim

70 soldiers, 27 tons of equipment, and 80 days of tr

and coordination to create communication interoper

for an average brigade from the Middle Eastern na

The sheer number of potential coalition partners an

cost of acquiring common or interoperable equipmen

make it impossible to guarantee interoperabil

similarly constituted coalitions over the next 5 to 10 ye

To further complicate matters, the rate of chan

communications, automation, and other technolog

such that equipment is often obsolete before m

organizations can establish and maintain interoper

for coalition operations. In the meantime, availabi

off-the-shelf technology may allow potential adversa

procure the latest equipment even as potential co

members struggle with obsolete equipment. Tech

offers no panacea for conducting coalition opera

regardless of who the members are.

Liaison Officers Can Help

The practice of using liaison officers as “di

telescopes” to facilitate command and control is alm

old as war itself. Beginning in antiquity and continuin

239
the modern era, ground commanders have reli

carefully selected subordinates to serve as their eye

ears. These trusted agents, often with direct access 

deliberations that produced the “commander’s intent,

provided invaluable information to the comma

immediate staff and others. And during the heat of 

they assisted commanders by communicating order

controlling units.

9

A number of great captains developed communic

and information gathering systems that resemb

directed telescope concept of the 19th and 20th cen

Alexander the Great detailed junior officers as cour

help control widely separated columns. Caesar’s 

included aides who served as observers and courie

high-priority missions. Napoleon relied on liaison offi

provide vital battlefield information and to clarify his 

to subordinates, while Grant used liaison officers t

form impressions of the morale and spirit of his Arm

Field Marshal Montgomery was perhaps the 

creative user of such liaison officers in World War 

selected and integrated into his personal staff a small 

of young combat veterans. With the Field Mar

authority to go anywhere and see anything, these l

officers traveled extensively, gathering and rep

information via radio. Many returned at nig

Montgomery’s command post to provide firsthand ac

of their insights. The responsibilities of Montgom

officers extended beyond gathering information. They 

interrupt normal signal traffic with their reports, an

routinely interacted with senior generals and polit

Moreover, Montgomery authorized them to ask p

questions of senior officers who appeared incapa

executing their prescribed tasks.

11

 This system allowe

to keep the pulse of British, American, Canadian

Polish formations under his command.

12

 Chu

delighted in hearing the nightly reports from Montgo

“directed telescopes”; he considered the system inva

in the command of Montgomery’s forces.

13

 The quest

240
us today is whether the average Army captain or 

could perform such tasks in a coalition environment. A

preparing such officers in our schools and tra

institutions?

A Geostrategic Scout

One can expect that skilled junior officers will co

to serve as liaison officers to allied tactical formations 

as they have in the past. But what of the strategic 

where geopolitical issues and conflicting national int

truly complicate coalitions and alliances? Until 1990 

U.S. Army officers had experience in NATO, as well as 

culture, economy, politics, and forces of other cou

around the world. This familiarity came about l

through the Army’s Foreign Area Officer (FAO) pro

Prepared by study and assignment, such officers ser

high-level liaison officers in good times and 

Unfortunately, the Army has had to curtail that pr

during the drawdown.

Recent experience indicates a clear requirement 

cadre of officers whose skills and capabilities 

transcend the norms of the FAO program. In an 

short-notice deployments, the Army and the other se

need to examine the requirement for sophisticated l

personnel—officers, noncommissioned officers

civilians—in the active and reserve components. 

individuals would perform the tasks of the foreign 

specialist and more. As in the FAO program, their 

would include language as well as cultural and his

understanding of one or more countries in a region. Bu

would set their sights much higher to include re

geostrategic and geopolitical matters; knowledge 

regional alliances; awareness of new and eme

technologies affecting the ability of the United States 

or sustain a coalition; U.S. capabilities in str

communications, logistics, transportation, 

sustainment; the interagency process that determine

241
involvement in peace support activities; and the 

national humanitarian support system, includin

principal private volunteer and nongovernm

organizations through which most humanitaria

developmental work occurs. This list of capabilit

representative, not inclusive; it defines only part 

challenge facing each regional commander-in-chief 

day.

Personnel with the desired attributes would be ava

to regional commanders-in-chief and command

combined and national joint task forces. They would a

the role of advisor to the task force commander in mat

important as those addressed by political advis

regional or theater commanders. The reported prolife

of political advisors in the Balkans underscores the ne

such officers. Traditionally “reserved” for work a

highest headquarters, individuals charged with keepi

task force and other commanders apprised of local po

social, and economic conditions have appeared at 

levels in Bosnia. This is a pragmatic solution 

unprecedented requirement. With the FAO concept 

foundation, the Army needs to draw on the B

experience and identify new skills and attributes re

at the headquarters of coalition partners in 2025. We 

better than ad hoc solutions during crises.

What’s the Precedent?

In multinational operations, trust binds the co

together. “Patience, tolerance, frankness, absolute h

in all dealings, particularly with all persons of the op

nationality, and firmness are absolutely essen

Eisenhower wrote to Lord Louis Mountbatten as the 

was preparing to assume command in Southeast A

Eisenhower’s perspective on coalitions, in large me

shared later by General Norman Schwarzkopf, was th

center of gravity in a coalition is often the coalition 

242
There are a number of historical examples that und

this point.

• Hitler aspired to duplicate Frederick the Grea

ability to wear down the great alliance formed

against Prussia in the Seven Years War. So hi

concept for the December 1944 offensive throu

the Ardennes rested on the assumption that by

capturing Antwerp and encircling and destroy

British and American forces, the Allied coalitio

would splinter and result in a peace offer.

• During the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein applied

similar reasoning when he attempted to draw 

into the conflict. Israeli retaliation to the Scud

attacks might have unraveled the fragile ties

binding the coalition together.

Hitler’s offensive met a bitter end in the snows 

Ardennes. Israel’s close relationship with the United 

enabled Israeli political leaders to exercise restrain

the anti-Iraq coalition held together, to a consid

degree due to the part played by liaison teams. Trust 

key ingredient in sustaining the 1990-91 coalition.

But trust requires time and a measured appraisal 

another to emerge from personal relationships, partic

those that cross cultures.

• In 1981-83, as the Program Manager, Saudi A

National Guard, General John Yeosock earned 

trust of the Saudi leadership. Years later, as th

United States began deploying forces to the re

during Desert Shield, Yeosock was granted acc

and host nation support by Saudi officials.

• The U.S. Army rediscovered the value of liaiso

officers in the Gulf War. A group of carefully

selected liaison teams established communicat

between Schwarzkopf and major coalition part

243
The teams in turn reported to the Coalition

Coordination and Communications Integration

Center, which provided information and clarifi

orders to coalition members. Later, the center

served as a directed telescope for Schwarzkopf

we intend to achieve a similar degree of succes

future coalition efforts, including peace operat

the United States needs to establish programs 

educate and train a cadre capable of communic

effectively with coalition partners. The time to 

is now.

Conclusion

Although emerging technology offers promi

applying precision firepower and swift maneuver th

enhanced information, it will not eliminate the fo

friction of war. New and improved technologies 

enhance the 21st Century commander’s abil

communicate with coalition partners, but coalition 

may still founder on the shoals of technical incom

bilities, language difficulties, cultural asymmetrie

ignorance of key historical and geopolitical issues

antidote to the fog and friction of coalition warfare 

technology; it lies in trusted subordinates who ca

effectively with coalition counterparts.

NOTES

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Jordon, Strategic Studies In

U.S. Army War College, contributed to this article.

1. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New 

Doubleday, 1948), p. 4.

2. Earl H. Tilford, Jr., ed., World View: The 1998 S

Assessment from the Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle Barrac

U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 26 February 

3. Wayne A. Silkett, “Alliance and Coalition Warfare,” Para

23 (Summer 1993), 74-85.

244
4. George Washington, Farewell Address, 17 Septembe

Microsoft Bookshelf 1994.

5. See Alan Ned Sabrosky, ed., Alliances in U.S. Foreign 

(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 6-9.

6. See Thomas Cooke, “NATO CJTF Doctrine: The Naked Em

Parameters, 28 (Winter 1998-99).

7. Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr., Chairman’s 

Operations Seminar, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 11 June 1998.

8. For an assessment of NATO’s ongoing effort to apply the 

of a combined joint task force to 16 (soon 19) separate nations, see 

“NATO CJTF Doctrine: The Naked Emperor.”

9. Gary B. Griffin, The Directed Telescope: A Traditional Ele

Effective Command (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Co

and General Staff College, July 1991), pp. 1-2.

10. Ibid., pp. 10-12.

11. Ibid., p. 30.

12. Nigel Hamilton, Monty (New York: Random House, 1

148.

13. Griffin, pp. 28-33. See also, Alan Moorhead, Mont

(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1947), pp. 147-49; and Berna

Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal The Viscount Mont

of Alamein (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1958), 

14. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., ed., The Papers of Dwight 

Eisenhower: The War Years III (Baltimore: The John Hopkins 

1970), pp. 1420-24.

15. Robert H. Scales, Jr., Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in t

War (Washington: U.S. Army, Office of the Chief of Staff, 1993), 

381.

245
Chapter Fifteen

Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Reproduced with Permission Granted by:

Autumn 1999 Issue

DEFENCE SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL

Sterling Publications Ltd.

London, England

247

TRUST, MORE THAN

TECHNOLOGY, ENSUR

INTEROPERABILITY
TRUST, MORE THAN TECHNOLOGY,

ENSURES INTEROPERABILITY

The intangible, human dimensions of trust, not technolo

will ensure NATO’s future position as the pre-emine

security alliance during the 21st century.

As the 20th century draws to a close and NATO le

pause to celebrate the alliance’s past 50 years of succes

timely and appropriate to discuss NATO’s organisa

strategy for the next five decades. Without question, 

faces a midlife challenge as the alliance crosse

threshold of a new millennium. If NATO hopes t

boldly into the 21st century, it must strengthen its 

building mechanisms while pursuing the que

technological interoperability. To be sure, this tec

interoperability is an important factor and must conti

he a key organisational focus. Fostering the inta

sense of trust, however, is more important tha

coordination of tangible technical connections. It is 

human relationships, ultimately, that will ensure N

continued political and military interoperability.

The primary focus

The organisational blueprint for a viable multina

partnership must be primarily based upon trus

subsequently facilitated by technological interoper

as NATO prepares to resolutely enter the new millen

The impediments of technological connectivity p

secondary issues when attempting to communicat

coordinate within a multinational relationship. Tru

technology or doctrine nor materiel binds and sust

successful alliance especially during times of crisis. 

more than technology, makes its possible to de

organisational consensus while designing a coll

249
solution that may not require the application of stan

from the ‘lowest common denominator test.’

Building a sense of trust and shared interest

labour-intensive venture that requires a long

commitment of human resources. Professional ra

between officers of various nations cannot be purc

garnered overnight or mandated. Rather, trust m

nurtured and fostered over a period of time a

individuals who are sensitive to each other’s natio

sub-national concerns. Trust, fostered by re

consultation, becomes the adhesive that bi

multinational partnership despite individual na

differences. The foundation of trusting relationships 

be established earlier rather than later to ensure that 

be available when it may he needed for the complexi

future strategic and operational battlefield environm

Allied solidarity

While there are similarities between alliance

coalitions, politically and structurally they are ma

different. However, both must achieve unity of eff

order to he successful. This solidarity require

simultaneous methods of communication. The 

presumes a reasonable level of technical interopera

whereas the second relies on personal and profes

relationships with counterparts from other nations.

Overcoming the fog and friction of complex m

operations is not a new security challenge and profes

relationships were used long before the invention 

microchip. Many great leaders from the past 

confronted with complex command and co

requirements and they relied extensively on a netw

trained liaison officers. In fact, the practice of using l

officers as ‘directed telescopes’ to facilitate comman

control is almost as old as war itself. Beginning d

antiquity and continuing into the modern era, comma

have relied upon carefully selected subordinates to se

250
their eyes, ears and military ambassadors. These t

agents, often with direct access to the deliberation

produced the ‘commander’s intent,’ have pro

invaluable information to subordinate comm

throughout the theatre of many past military operat

The chronicles of history document examples w

number of great captains have used trusted liaison o

to establish and maintain effective command, contr

communication functions. Alexander the Great de

junior officers as ambassadors to help control w

separated columns. Caesar’s staff included aide

served as observers and couriers for high-priority mis

Napoleon relied on liaison officers to provide 

battlefield information and to clarify his intent. 

Marshal Montgomery was perhaps the most creative u

such liaison officers during World War II. He selecte

integrated into his personal staff a small group of o

who routinely interacted with other senior genera

civilian political leaders

1

. I These historical example

a central question for us today: are we preparing 

officers in our schools and training institutions to effec

function within a composite multinational environm

contemporary directed telescopes?

New and improved technologies will most cer

improve the 21st century commander’s abil

communicate with alliance partners, but operation

still founder on the shoals of technical incompatib

language difficulties, cultural asymmetries and igno

of key historical and geopolitical issues. The antid

this type of fog and fiction is not more technology; it 

trusted subordinates and liaison officers who can 

effectively with military and civilian counterparts. 

era of short-notice deployments with complex m

requirements, we need to examine the anticipated dem

for sophisticated liaison personnel who would perfor

tasks of foreign area specialist with ambassado

responsibilities. Their skills should include no

language proficiency but also an understanding of cu

251
and historical differences between one or more a

partners.

The technology solution

The quest for technological interoperability 

number of inherent limitations. But, we can not igno

need to address this challenge; it must be a part 

overall plan for the future. Increased attention m

given to the accelerating pace of technological chang

the different rates of acquisition that will permit 

members to introduce these advanced capabilities int

inventories. In reality, there is not enough money w

any of the defence budgets to attain and su

technological interoperability among the entire 

alliance and the states within its developing Partners

Peace effort. The growing number of nations and the 

cost of acquiring common or interoperable equipmen

certainly makes it impossible to always guarantee s

interoperibility.

Further complicating this matter is the rapid r

change within command, control, communicatio

information links. In many instances, the techno

half-life of these systems is such that military equipm

often obsolete before units can field and train with 

systems. In the meantime, availability of off-the

technology may allow potential adversaries the oppor

to procure the most current equipment while al

members struggle to use obsolete equipment. There 

‘technological silver bullet’ and even though technolo

always be a supporting dimension of multina

operations, it will never become the panacea cha

overcome the fog and friction of complex mi

operations.

Enduring strategic solutions

The new century will most certainly bring a new f

future warfare. We should expect the information 

252
alter the means of future warfare just as decisively 

machine age altered the conduct of war during the 19

20th century. There is a historic and symbiotic relatio

between advancing technology and the evolving me

warfare.

2

 The sense of relative stability, main

through the balance of power that existed during th

War, will be more difficult to achieve during the n

years as long-standing, multi-polar tensions erup

competing hegemons attempt to dominate their resp

regions. Conflict will abound as some nations r

historic grievances and others open old wounds tha

been festering for centuries.

During the past decade, Western democracie

others, mindful of the social need to contain the spr

violence, have demonstrated increased willingness 

military force to defuse internal or regional po

conflicts or to respond to humanitarian crises. In 

instances, the need for synchronised NATO military 

may be greater than in the past. There are numerou

political and military outcomes that can only be ac

through the actions of an alliance or coalition. The 

d’être frequently involves more than the need to ass

equal or compatible military partners. Alliance

coalitions have historically provided military comma

with the opportunity to achieve an overwhelming m

force on the battlefield They also provide the organisa

framework for demonstrating political consensus.

3

In many cases, the political heft of multina

partnerships may be the single most important comm

as the ‘war of national resolve’ is waged. Moreove

solidarity may be the only way to achieve end

strategic solutions within a complex web of interna

security concerns.

The next frontier

NATO has five decades of remarkable achieveme

we anticipate this outstanding track record to continu

253
into the next century. As this multinational partn

seeks to sustain regional peace and security throu

Europe, we should expect complex future sec

challenges that will require the commitment of m

capabilities. Planning these future NATO-spon

operations will require particular attention t

challenges of technical interoperability. In fact, N

current membership action plan encourages as

members to pursue interoperability upon accessio

NATO. The next two decades, most certainly, will pla

demands upon NATO’s command and control capab

and highlight the need for increased sy

interoperability. This technical connectivity, howeve

secondary issue when examined against the requir

for human factors that promote multinat

‘interoperability.’ The organisation and efficiency 

alliance or coalition operation will ultimately depend 

single, intangible characteristic-trust. The foundat

this collaboration must be built upon a sense of m

respect, tolerance and a commitment to the shared va

democracy. Our senior leaders must foster the m

education and staff exchange programmes that will d

a generation of sophisticated liaison officers capa

facilitating the challenging, multinational oper

alliance members will face in the next century. 

References

1. This idea was developed by MG Scales within an essay r

published in Parameters, Winter 1999, Volume 28, Number 4.

2. For additional information regarding this thesis, read “Th

of a New Age of Warfare” by MG Scales. Defence Systems Intern

Spring 1999.

3. This concept was first articulated by MG Scales in a

published in the January 28, 1999 issue of Newsday.

254
Chapter Sixteen

Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Reproduced with Permission Granted by:

January 28, 1999 Issue

NEWSDAY NEWSPAPER

235 Pinelawn Road

Melville, New York

255

IN WAR,

THE U.S. CAN’T GO I

ALONE
IN WAR, THE U.S. CAN’T GO IT ALONE

Are military coalitions political relics of the p

viable instruments of modern political power? 

analysts argue that coalition warfare, like the dinos

traveling a path toward extinction.

These commentators use the growing technologic

between militaries as the primary rationale to sugges

the United States will no longer be able to fight along

less technically developed military. Moreover, fig

doctrine, language, and other cultural differences se

impede rather than bond nations into a coalition that 

able to fight for a common cause.

On the other hand, to envision the United States 

to fight any future war without partners is inconcei

The United States has fought all its modern war

member of a coalition, and we will find coalitions 

militarily viable well into the 21st Century. Further

future coalitions will continue to provide America’s le

with the most reliable means of achieving succe

enduring strategic results.

To be sure, America’s political leaders will a

reserve the option to apply military force unilaterally 

a nation-state or hostile state-like actor has violate

interests or those of our allies. These tactical m

actions can be used either to destroy a capability sur

or to administer punishment for an aggressor’s offe

actions.

The results of precision strikes are immed

perceived, but rarely enduring. They provide us, w

question, a temporary national gratification or perh

sense of moral victory. At best, they signal to rogue 

our watchful commitment to international securit

regional stability.

257
However, long-lasting

strategic effects will only be

realized when the convergence of

mutual national interests

unleashes the international will

of a coalition.

There are various vital

political and military outcomes

that can only be achieved

through the actions of a

coalition. Its raison d’etre

frequently involves more than

the need to assemble equal or

compatible military partners.

Coalitions have historically

provided military commanders with the opportun

achieve an overwhelming mass of force on the battl

Coalitions also provide the organizational framewo

developing and demonstrating political consensus.

War has always been a test of national wills. The co

of war involves more than the destruction of ph

resources. Beyond the boundaries of the battlefield

must ultimately influence public perception and 

opinion. Victory is only achieved when you brea

national determination of your opponent and persuad

to accept your final terms and conditions for peac

political heft of a coalition becomes an inval

commodity as the “war of national resolve” is waged

Ultimately, the formation of any coalition hinges u

single, intangible characteristic—trust. The impedi

of national and cultural differences pale as secondary 

when attempting to communicate within a coalition. 

not technology nor doctrine or materiel, binds and su

a successful coalition.

Building this sense of trust and shared interes

labor-intensive venture that requires a long-term co

ment of resources. Professional rapport between offi

258

Reproduced with perm

from Martin Kozlow
various nations cannot be purchased, garnered over

or mandated. Rather, trust must be nurtured and fo

over a period of time among individuals who are sensi

each other’s national or subnational concerns.

Trust becomes the adhesive that binds a coa

despite individual national differences. The founda

trust must be established earlier rather than later to e

that it will be available when it may be needed f

complexities of strategic and operational battl

environments.

The information age promises to change the nat

21st Century warfare just as decisively as the machi

altered the course of war in the 19th Century. But th

to fight within a coalition will prevail as an urgent po

and military necessity. We should anticipate not 

seismic shift in the character of technology, but a

increasingly complex web of international se

concerns.

Global restraint, maintained through the bala

power that existed during the Cold War, will be 

difficult to achieve as long-standing, multi-polar te

erupt, and competing hegemonies attempt to dom

their regions. Conflicts will abound as some nations r

historic grievances and others open old wounds tha

been festering for centuries.

In many instances, the need for military coalition

be greater than in the past because coalition warfare 

the only way to achieve enduring, strategic solutions

259
Chapter Seventeen

Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Strategic Studies Institute

U.S. Army War College

The Future of the American Military Presence

in Europe Conference Proceedings

May 2000

261

EUROPE AS A STRATE

STAGING BASE

 FOR 21ST CENTURY

STABILIZATION

OPERATIONS
EUROPE AS A STRATEGIC STAGING BA

 FOR 21st CENTURY STABILIZATION

OPERATIONS

Toward the end of 1995, I was privileged to launc

then participate in, for some 2 and 1/2 years, the A

so-called Army After Next (AAN) Project, which sou

define the shape and character of landpower beyon

year 2010 and to investigate two of the principal facto

cause styles of war to change—technology and geostr

We had some powerful tools to help us hypothesize 

conflict might look like out beyond 2010, including 

tactical and strategic war games and num

conferences. AAN war games were conducted a

Leavenworth and Carlisle Barracks, and because 

complexity were extremely difficult to do. The Army’s 

doctrinal revolution had occurred in the late 1970

early 1980s at the operational level, and that was d

enough. But now we were attempting to reestablis

tenets of landpower during warfare at the next higher 

We conducted a series of exercises using force on fo

free-play scenarios. It is really challenging to rep

National Training Center exercises in the computer

simulations of Collins Hall at the Army War College, 

did it four times.

Collaterally, in conducting a historical inquiry in

changing cycles and patterns of war, we observed th

has mutated from wars of religion to wars of kings to w

nations to wars of ideology, and so forth. Increasin

became apparent that the fall of the Soviet empire 

foster a new era of wars characterized by ethnic and cu

conflict. Accordingly, we postulated a clash in the yea

involving a newly emergent hegemonic power in c

Asia seeking to reestablish ethnic and cultural dom

263
over a small country in southeastern Europe

hegemonic power aimed to achieve its strategi

operational objectives quickly—that is, to put forces 

victim’s ground, disperse them, and then begin a pro

cultural transformation in that country before the U

States could project forces into the region and initi

effective response.

We also made a series of visits, an intellectual ody

you will, to representatives of all the major armies a

the world island. For my part, I spent almost 2 years 

this, enjoying an opportunity to conduct searching dis

with the leaders of most of the armies in eastern and c

Asia. Based upon impressions gleaned from my vis

similar visits by other AAN Project team membe

formulated a general outline of what the nature of c

might be out to the year 2025 and beyond. It ten

confirm our earlier suspicions, based upon hist

investigation, that the most likely causes for conflict d

that period would be ethnic and cultural in nature.

It seemed to us that such conflicts would arise 

those historical borders separating traditio

antagonistic economic, religious, ethnic, nation

cultural groupings. The territories of such disputan

analogous to geological tectonic plates, colliding again

ultimately riding over or sinking under adjacent pla

an eternal friction of heat, strife, and violence. 

collisions have been the occasion of major wars for th

5,000 years. To borrow Samuel Huntington’s famou

line analogy (“The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign A

Summer 1993), it seemed to us that the greatest pot

for serious combat during our time frame would occur 

these traditional fault lines.

History clearly shows that when the artificial cap

suppress or sublimate ethnic and cultural confli

removed, the actors revert to this approach and c

resumes. Thus it seemed to us that the maintena

security and stability along these fault lines would d

264
on the ability of political structures to manag

inevitable tensions by means short of war. In any eve

were certain we knew where tensions were most lik

flare into outright hostilities. That is why we 

southeastern Europe as the setting for our first war ga

happens that this particular region marks the inters

of not two but three fault lines—Eastern Ort

Christianity, Islam, and Western Christianity.

In talking to the potential major actors, it seemed 

that we were seeing an almost spontaneous proc

change well under way among many of the armies a

the world island. We observed, first of all, a shedding o

War baggage and attitudes. I was struck particula

how quickly armies of the world are relinquishing 

weapon systems and readjusting their style of war to 

force milieu. Even in large mass armies, such as 

around the Asian rim, we saw a process of streamlinin

lightening of the forces. Perhaps surprisingly, an

interesting phenomenon we observed was an attempt 

officer corps in many of these armies to forego corr

and doctrinaire ideological stances—thus producing a 

mature, professional, and better-educated officer cla

It was also somewhat of a shock to discove

knowledgeable of American operational methods m

these officers are. They also are intensely curious abou

Americans fight. More specifically, they are interes

our doctrinal focus on the operational art. These arm

many ways have moved into the era that we faced b

the early 1970s. Much as we did, they moved from a t

focus to one more directed at operational ar

operational maneuver. Strategically, they seem be

deflecting the ability of major world powers to interfer

their own hegemonic ambitions, principally by def

incursions from air and sea.

They are also turning their attention to inform

technologies, but they come at it from a different va

point than we do. The last trip I made was to China. I 

265
chance to talk to my counterpart in that country. M

his questions and comments dealt with inform

technology, information warfare, and so forth. His tak

quite interesting. He said,

General, the information age is neutral; you have your styl

war that is facilitated by information technology. It gives 

the ability to see with great clarity and to strike with gr

speed and precision. But in our style of war, informa

technology is also helpful because the Internet and cellu

communications allow us to do what we do best, which is to f

wars of area control; to capitalize on the endurance of 

people; to exploit time and the inherent power of forces on 

defensive to disperse, to go to ground, to control wide area

territory, and still to maintain the ability to mass on demand

The only English term he used during our conversatio

“non-nodal Army,” as contained in the following sen

delivered in Chinese:“ What we seek to build is a non

army.” He was saying that modern distrib

communications would permit control of massed a

without the necessity of large, cumbersome, hierar

control headquarters.

Thus as the tectonic plates begin to collide 

post-2010 time frame, they are going to bring with the

possibility of collisions between different styles of w

along these critical lines of contact. It seems to us th

war in Kosovo may very well have provided a foreta

how such warfare might play out in the future.

Beyond the year 2010, though we might not see th

of a true peer competitor, we may very well se

emergence of what was referred to in our AAN stud

“major competitor,” one that uses its inherent streng

counter our inherent weaknesses. In practically 

country I visited, when I asked the question, “Wh

America’s military weaknesses?” the answer that 

back was “aversion to casualties and the political n

end the war quickly.” Therefore, as one officer to

“Time is our friend and time is your enemy.” An

266
recalled to me the famous response of Ho Chi Minh in 

when a French journalist asked him how he could po

expect to beat the world’s most technologically adv

country: “They will kill many of us, we will kill a few of 

and they will tire first.”

Major competitors out beyond the year 2010 will n

to re-create a bipolar world. They won’t try to mat

United States weapon system for weapon system. Th

focus on landpower and the ability to maintain an ar

being. Their object will not be to defeat the United S

but rather to avoid losing. Meanwhile time will take i

or so the thinking goes, on the American popular wi

victory will accrue to our competitor by default. Rem

Vietnam? 

Now what does all this have to do with America’s 

relation with Europe? To go back to the AAN war 

played in 1997 and 1998, in every one of those war 

the critical element in achieving success was the ab

American forces to arrive early and position themsel

as to prevent the enemy from settling in and establ

control over the areas comprising his operationa

strategic objectives. And regardless of the site of 

hostilities—in southeastern Europe, in Northeast A

in the Middle East—Europe remained the critical l

platform.

Though we assumed initially that we would be a

project forces from the continental United States 

enough to block the enemy on the ground and thwa

operational design, we later found that expectation 

totally unrealistic. Some form of forward stati

whether of materiel or forces in being, had to be availa

strategic intermediate staging bases in Europe. The 

already in Europe were usually the ones that arrived 

theater of hostilities first and applied the initial preem

counterstroke. This action was critical because if the e

succeeded in accomplishing his initial objectives

friction became a problem, time turned again

267
casualties began to mount, resolve began to erode, 

successful outcome became extremely problematic.

It thus seemed to us in the AAN business that E

would continue to have a vital role to play i

maintenance of global security and stability. It sits a

or near the intersection of three of the most activ

dangerous strategic tectonic plates. Thus, whether as 

of conflict or solution for conflict, Europe remains crit

proximity grounds alone. Moreover, it represents a 

intermediate staging base that proved decisive in a

war scenarios.

Does that mean that the nature of our forces in E

should remain immutable? While our games did not a

that question specifically, they seemed to suggest that 

like humanitarian support, force projection support, C

forward intelligence support, and forward logistics 

are becoming increasingly important.

2

 The possessio

forward logistics base will become particularly essen

may therefore be that over the next 15 to 20 years the n

and character of forces in the region will change to 

these growing support priorities. Whatever the p

nature of the forces in Europe, however, the AAN st

exercises, and war games led me to conclude that E

will continue to be a critical arena for the maintena

global security, and that the United States can 

efficiently and effectively contribute to such secur

retaining appropriate forces in Europe.

ENDNOTES

1.Conversation with PLA senior leaders at the Nanjing 

Command College, Nanjing, China, August 21, 1998.

2.The acronym C4ISR encompasses command, c

communications, computers, intelligence, surveillanc

reconnaissance.

268
Chapter Eighteen

Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Reproduced with Permission Granted by:

JOINT FORCES QUARTERLY

Autumn/Winter 1999-2000

Issue Number 23

269

ADAPTIVE ENEMIES

ACHIEVING VICTORY 

AVOIDING DEFEAT
Adaptive Enemies: Achieving Victory B

Avoiding Defeat

Authors Introductory Note

This article was developed immediately after the 

Kosovo. It is an adaptation of Chapter Four, whic

written after a trip to Asia in1998. In the original 

that was published by STRATEGIC REVIEW, I sugg

that foreign militaries were beginning to perceiv

fixation on a firepower-centered way of war 

exploitable weakness. In fact, some states, armed 

experience gained against us in real war, had already 

to evolve a doctrine to counter our superiority in pre

These potential adversaries have concluded that dispe

deception, patience and a willingness to absorb punis

offers the means to endure precision strike long eno

outlast a technologically superior foe. Subsequent pr

experience in Kosovo caused me to modify this arg

somewhat, but not much. This essay also introduc

Newton Corollary thesis that suggests the chronic

military history clearly indicate each dominant m

advantage eventually yields to a countervailing resp

This battlefield trend is very discernable. Ad

opponents, moreover, have been learning faster a

must aniticpate a future military challenge tha

attempt to defeat our preoccupation with precision s

271
ADAPTIVE ENEMIES: ACHIEVING VICTO

BY AVOIDING DEFEAT

Once the dogs of war are unleashed, and the sh

begins in earnest, conflicts tend to follow unpredi

courses. As Clausewitz warned many times in his m

classic,

1

 wars are contests between two active, w

opponents both of whom expect to win. Thus an act

one side to gain advantage precipitates a response 

opponent to counter it. Once begun, war with its 

crafted plans and comforting expectations quickly de

into a series of stratagems and counter stratagems b

sides as each seeks to retain advantage on the batt

long enough to gain a decisive end by collapsing the en

will to resist.

2

In spite of its video game image, NATO’s war again

Serbs proved to be no exception to the classic Clausew

construct. The Serbs sought to overcome a treme

materiel and techno- logical disadvantage by capitaliz

their own strengths: the ability to gain opera

objectives quickly and then disperse in order to avo

inevitable aerial assault they knew would follow. The 

trusted that patience, tenacity, guile and the abi

sequester ground forces throughout the countryside 

give them the interval they needed to out wait the res

the NATO coalition. This plan, however, did not work

political will of the NATO coalition proved to be stron

the end than that of the Serbs. But the skil

272

1. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael H

and Peter Paret, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.

2. This Adaptive Enemy thesis was originally published within the W

1999 issue of Strategic Review. Major portions of this JFQ ess

reproduced with permission granted by Strategic Review.
perseverance of the Serbian army, in the face 

overwhelming onslaught by a thousand or more 

aircraft armed with precision weapons, present us w

compelling demonstration of a thinking, creative

adaptive opponent who can foil the best prepared pla

superior opponent simply by capitalizing on hi

inherent strengths while minimizing those o

opposition. 

For the last fifty years the militaries of the W

powers, and particularly the United States, have 

remarkably consistent in how they have chosen to go t

We have inherited the remarkable ability to tra

technological innovation, industrial capacity and na

wealth into effective battlefield advantages because 

enormous defense expenditures during the Cold 

However, in this new era of limited wars, our commi

to limited ends now demands the use of limited m

Therefore, the lives of our soldiers have become ou

precious resource and we increasingly seek to dev

method of war that will replace manpower expend

with an ever multiplying expenditure of firepower. 

But as we have seen in Kosovo, our future enemi

watching. They understand our preoccupation 

firepower. Therefore, we should not be surprised wh

encounter a future opponent who has learned how to 

our firepower advantage. We have consistently been s

perceive the growing effectiveness of the opposition i

because of a characteristic Western arrogance 

presumes that, to be a challenge, non-Western mil

must either symmetrically challenge us or mimic W

ways of war. As a result, the growing skill a

non-Western militaries at countering our fire

centered method of war has remained shrouded 

shadows of unfamiliar military cultures. Thus

military analysts have missed much of the discours

experimentation occurring among thinking mi

institutions outside the West due in part to the cu

273
schism that divides the world’s advanced indu

democracies from the other four-fifths of the planet.

The Serbs were certainly not the first oppon

demonstrate adaptive strategies against our Wester

of war. More than five decades ago, the Jap

demonstrated their analytical ability to survive Am

firepower intensive attacks during the closing months 

Pacific campaign in World War II. During the bat

1943 and 1944, the Americans won a series of quic

decisive victories by using the mobility and firepow

their amphibious forces. But the Japanese car

observed this method of attack and by the end of 194

had entirely revamped their defensive plans for the i

that guarded the approaches to their Homeland. 

In Okinawa, the Japanese abandoned their 

doctrine of beach defense and buried their force under 

array of pillboxes, switch lines, and deep bunkers to 

out an extended defensive scheme centered in the sou

portion of Okinawa. The Japanese recognized tha

could never match American firepower, but they maxi

what little firepower they had by using mortar

artillery in sufficient numbers and with enough d

effect so as not to completely cede the firepower adva

to the Americans. Fighting their way through 

defensive lines, the Marines and Soldiers eventuall

the island and destroyed the Japanese Tenth Army—

approximately 70,000 Japanese soldiers and 7

Japanese civilians killed. But the U.S. casualty bill f

island fighting was horrendous: 65,631 killed or wou

The Chinese Civil War:

Soon thereafter, another effort to redefine and cod

Eastern approach to defeating the Western way o

began in the mountain fastness of Manchuria immed

after the end of the Pacific war. Mao Tse-tung an

marshals developed a body of doctrine adapted from 

successful wartime guerrilla campaigns and modified 

274
concepts to fit the demands of a conventional war 

against an enemy superior in technology and materiel

perfected his new way of war against the nation

during the Chinese Civil War fought between 194

1949. His concepts were simple and centered around 

tenets, the first and most important of which was 

control.” To be successful Mao’s army first needed to s

in the midst of a larger, better-equipped enemy.

4

 To e

survival he divided his army into small units and sca

them across a broad expanse of territory. Controllin

maintaining cohesion among such a disparate and sca

force was and remained his greatest challenge.

Once his force was supportable and stable

proceeded to apply the second tenet, which was to “

and compartmentalize” Nationalist forces. The challe

this phase was to leverage control of the countryside t

a degree that the enemy gradually retreated into 

areas and along major rail and road lin

communications.

5

 The final act of the campaign dem

an ability to find the enemy’s weakest points in or

collect and mass overwhelming force against each 

sequentially, much as one might take apart a str

pearls, one pearl at a time. Mao’s new style of conven

war, while effective, demanded an extraordinary deg

discipline and patience to persevere under ex

hardships. It also demanded the ability to transition q

from an area control force to a force capable of fighting 

of movement.

275

3. Mao Zedong, “On the International Front Against Fascism,” S

Works of Mao Tse-Tung, Vol. III, Beijing: Foreign Language Press

William H. Whitson, The Chinese High Command: A Hist

Communist Politics, 1927-1971, New York: Praeger Press, 1973.

4. Mao Zedong, Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, Vol. I and Vol. III, B

Foreign Language Press, 1967.

5. Frederick Fu (F.F.) Liu, A Military History of Modern China: 1924

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956.
From China to Korea:

Within a year of the end of the Chinese Civil Wa

Americans severely tested Mao’s methods in Korea. D

the early days of the Chinese intervention—beginn

October 1950—the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 

misjudged the killing effect of American artiller

tactical air power. Pushed too quickly into man

warfare, the Chinese massed in the open, often in da

to expand their control over the northern portions 

Korean Peninsula.

6

 They extended their narrow li

communications farther down the mountainous sp

Korea as they advanced.

7

 But they soon found their l

support exposed to the terrible effects of America

power. The Chinese paid a horrific price for their 

Their spring 1951 offensive sputtered to a halt a

artillery and aerial firepower slaughtered Chinese so

in masses, while air interdiction cut their supply lin

forced a retreat back across the Han.

Brutal experiences led quickly to sober lessons rele

from the Chinese Civil War. As a highly skilled co

adaptive system, the Chinese Army quickly adjusted 

actual conditions of this new war. Over the next two 

subsequent Chinese attacks remained limited 

controlled. The Chinese high command learned t

most key logistic facilities north of the Yalu River wel

reach of U.S. air attacks. South of the river the C

dispersed and hid their forces while they massed only 

period immediately before launching an attack. 

soldiers moved at night and chiseled their front li

resistance deep into hard, granite mountains. Am

casualties soon mounted, while the Chinese stabilized 

276

6. Bin Yu, “What China Learned from Its Forgotten War in Korea,” St

Review, Summer 1998.

7. Russell Spurr, Enter the Dragon: China’s Undeclared War Agai

U.S. in Korea, 1950-51, New York: Newmarket Press, 1987.
casualties at a rate acceptable to their pol

leadership. Far more Americans died in combat durin

“stability phase” of the war than during the earlier pe

fluid warfare. A cost acceptable to the Chinese becam

costly to the Americans. The result was an operation

strategic stalemate. To the Chinese, stalemate eq

victory.

8

From Korea To Vietnam:

Over the next two decades the Vietnamese bor

extensively from the Chinese experience and found cr

ways to lessen the killing effect of firepower, first a

the French and then against the Americans

Vietnamese also proved highly skilled in adapting 

new challenges posed by their Western opponents. Th

Minh based their tactical and operational approa

Mao’s unconventional methods. Their conduct of the 

was remarkably reminiscent of siege operations cond

by the PLA during the Chinese Civil War. In both cas

secret of success proved to be dispersion and c

preparation of the battlefield. The Viet Minh rem

scattered in small units whenever possible to offer sm

and thus less detectable and less lucrative targets, 

allow their troops to live off the land. Fewer supply lin

logistic sites offered even fewer opportunitie

interdiction fires.

To win, the Chinese, and eventually the Viet 

needed to attack. Successful attacks demanded the 

to mass, at least temporarily. The Viet Minh nee

exercise great care in massing under the enemy’s um

of protective firepower. Superior intelligence pro

sufficient information to select the right time and 

Their ability to collect and orchestrate the movement 

277

8. T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, New York: The Macmillan Com

1963.
of thousands of soldiers at just the right moment a

attacking forces to collapse the enemy’s defenses 

French firepower could regain the advantage. 

remarkable ability to “maneuver under fire” per

against the Nationalist Chinese and the French, re

new levels of refinement during the second Indo-Chin

against the United States.

General Giap learned quickly to accommoda

strategic plans to the new realities imposed by Am

firepower. The North Vietnamese relearned the impo

of dispersion and patience. They redistributed their 

to keep their most vulnerable units outside the ra

American artillery while they moved their logistic s

away from battle areas into sanctuaries relatively saf

aerial detection and strikes. Thus, the VC and NVA d

off and applied many of the same methods that had p

useful in previous Asian wars against Western style a

From Vietnam to Afghanistan:

Half a decade later, and half a continent aw

Afghanistan, the Soviets learned the same harsh, firs

lessons of overconfidence when first-world mi

organizations confront third-world militaries which 

the will, tenacity, and skill to remain effective in th

despite complete firepower inferiority. Year after yea

Soviets arrayed themselves for conventional comba

pushed methodically up the Panjir Valley only 

expelled a few months later by a seemingly endles

psychologically debilitating series of methodica

well-placed ambuscades and minor skirmishes. Borr

a page from the American textbook in Vietnam, the S

tried to exploit the firepower, speed, and intimi

potential of armed helicopters. They employed helic

principally as convoy escorts and to provide fire supp

times, Hind helicopters proved enormously letha

effective, particularly early in the war, whe

Mujahideen were psychologically unprepared. Bu

278
Mujahideen eventually borrowed a page from 

Vietnamese textbook. They first learned to employ 

antiaircraft machine guns and later Stinger shoulde

missiles to shoot the gunships down in increasing num

The result of military frustration and defeat in Afgha

presaged the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Israel and the Middle East:

Beginning in 1982, after nearly three decades of f

in open warfare, an alliance of Arab state and non

actors pushed Israeli mechanized forces out of Beirut

streets, tall buildings, and other forms of urban c

provided the Arabs just enough respite from the fire

intensive methods of the Israelis to wear away 

morale both in the field and at home. Unable to bring t

force of their superior maneuverability and shock ef

bear, the Israelis paused just short of their opera

objectives. Excessive casualties and the public ima

bloody excesses on both sides eventually resulted 

Israeli withdrawal from Beirut. This success in Beiru

provided Israel’s enemies in the region with a ne

promising method to offset the Israeli superiority in 

mechanized combat. Now a spectrum of low-tech th

that run the gamut from weapons of mass destr

delivered by crude ballistic missiles, to random a

terrorism, to children throwing rocks at soldiers, co

an increasingly frustrated Israeli military and publi

One of the more curious ironies of the recent wars 

Middle East has been the fact that Western style mil

have had great success when fighting against non-W

enemies who mimic Western firepower doctrines. Th

War is the most recent example of failed efforts by 

states stretching back through the conflicts in the M

East to 1948. In 1973, Arab armies enjoyed some meas

success while employing Western methods, but 

success was as much due to Israeli overconfidence as 

limited aims the Arabs sought. 

279
Operation Desert Storm:

During the Gulf War, despite an extraordinary l

incompetence at the highest level of the Iraqi leade

the Iraqi Army displayed considerable capacity to ad

the battlefield. As the American air campaign beg

focus on the destruction of the Iraqi ground forces 

Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO) in early Februa

Iraqis almost immediately began to adapt in order t

their losses.

9

 By constructing berms around their tan

by scattering them widely across the desert, the 

insured that an aircraft dropping precision-guided 

would only be able, at best, to destroy a single vehicl

each pass. By burning tires next to operational vehicle

spoofed their tormentors into missing the real target

finally by using antiaircraft effectively they k

substantial portion of coalition aircraft at an altitude 

they were unable to do substantial damage. 

The best trained Iraqi units endured several we

allied air bombardment with unbroken will and 

combat capability essentially intact. The most impr

indication of the Iraqi ability to adapt came i

operational movement of a substantial portion 

Republican Guard during the first hours of Desert S

Elements of two divisions shifted from a southe

defensive orientation to defensive positions facing 

southwest along the Wadi al-Batin. In those positio

Tawakalna Republican Guard Division and the 50

37

th Armored Brigades would be destroyed by the U

Corps.

10

 Nevertheless, sacrifice by these units pr

time for the remainder of the Republican Guard to e

Significantly, the Republican Guard carried ou

movement in terrain and weather conditions ideally 

280

9. Robert H. Scales, Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gul

Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff United States Army, 1

10. Scales, op. cit.
to interdiction and despite the overwhelming superio

coalition air power.

NATO and Kosovo:

Placed in suitable historical context, the Se

response to the NATO onslaught is nothing more 

another data point along a continuum of progre

predictable adaptation by technologically disposs

militaries who are willing to challenge Western mil

armed with superior precision firepower. Like their 

Asian travelers, the Serbs sought victory by avoiding d

In a similar fashion, the Serbs conceded the ve

dimension of the battlespace to NATO. They were c

with an approach that only hoped to shoot down a few 

aircraft using ground mounted guns and missiles. Thi

was underscored with the expectation that a few d

captured allied airmen would contribute to the gr

degradation of NATO’s resolve. Even if a shoot dow

not possible, the Serbian force sought to keep 

antiaircraft assets sufficiently viable because they 

ground targets would be difficult to spot from high alti

The surest way for the Serbians to avoid defeat w

keep their army in the field viable — both to act as a d

symbol of national resolve and to be the legitimate S

guarantor of sovereignty over the occupied territo

maintain an effective “army in being,” the Serbs lik

borrowed from successful past precedents. Units q

went to ground, and dispersed across a broad expa

territory. They quickly computed the pace at whi

allies could find, target, and strike uncovered targe

then devised the means to relocate mobile targets insi

allied sensor-to-shooter envelope. Camouflage, decoy

spoofing techniques proven so effective by Asian a

were repeated with varying degrees of success by the 

As the allies became more proficient at spotting troop

Serbs sought even greater dispersal and went dee

ground. 

281
Toward the end of the conflict, significant succes

the air came with the appearance of an infant g

presence in Kosovo in the form of the Kosovo Libe

Army. The KLA was not terribly effective in open c

against the better armed Serbs but the presence of 

scale KLA units amongst them forced the Serbs to com

of protective cover and mass. The results were predi

and remarkably consistent with past experiences in c

against the Chinese and NVA. Troops moving, masse

in the open present the most lucrative targe

destruction by fire from the air. Yet the Serbian arm

never severely damaged because it was simply too lar

well protected to be completely destroyed from th

Since total destruction was not feasible, as in all bat

attrition, the contest in Kosovo soon devolved into a 

time and will. Ultimate victory would be achieved 

side that could endure the longest without collapsing 

national resolve. Once it became evident to Milosev

NATO’s political resolve would not be broken be

threatened ground assault could materialize, he cho

always, the most expedient path. Seeking to ensure h

political survival, the Serbian leader ceded Kosovo 

Allies.

Implications for the Future:

The example of Kosovo again reinforces the conc

that non-Western militaries are increasingly interna

the lessons of recent wars against technologically su

foes. Recent thoughts and writings concernin

operational and tactical problems confronting them 

fight against Western style military organizations s

some clear warnings for the future.

First, non-Western militaries understand that the 

does possess vulnerabilities: an aversion to casualtie

excessive collateral damage, a sensitivity to domest

world opinion, and an apparent lack of commitm

prepare for and fight wars that are measured in 

282
rather than months. They also perceive that America

particular, still remain committed to a style of war fo

primarily on the single offensive dimension of pre

strike. Moreover, they are already thinking about h

target Western vulnerabilities while capitalizing on 

three intrinsic advantages: time, will, and the in

power of the defensive. Taking a page from Mao and 

strategy, our potential future opponents have learn

value of time and patience. From their perspective

success is not essential to achieve ultimate victory.

Future adversaries have also discovered the app

advantages that can be gained when they interfere w

intruding power’s intention to end the conflict quick

at minimum cost. Thus, the logic of their strategy wi

to efforts that impede rather than prevent the intrusi

Western opponent. In recent wars, non-Western a

have learned to limit the damage and duration 

campaigns by dispersing their forces in the field a

distributing telecommunications, logistics

transportation infrastructures as widely as pos

Moreover, they understand that sophisticated air d

networks, whose effectiveness depends on airfields, s

to air missile sites, and complicated and vuln

command and control nodes, have become more of a li

than an asset.

Once conflict on the ground begins, potential oppo

understand they must capitalize on their superior m

offset the lethal firepower and precision technol

Western armies. They will capitalize on the pos

advantages of being on the defensive in or near the

territory. As they gain confidence, they will sear

opportunities to mass sufficient force to achieve 

successes. As in the air campaign, the enemy will s

frustrate Western ground forces by employing just e

modern weaponry to extend the campaign indefinit

few precision cruise missiles against major logistic 

will add to the casualty bill that Western militaries 

explain to their civilian populations back home. The 

283
will not be decisive victory, but rather stalemate. 

importantly, a stalemate arrangement will inev

result in the erosion of Western political support f

conflict, especially if it is sustained for any prolonged 

of time.

Early Signals of Change:

As non-Western militaries develop concep

defeating the American firepower-centered method o

the character and composition of their forces will 

change. The impulse that existed during the Cold W

mimic Western force structures is rapidly disappe

Foreign militaries that were once Cold War clon

taking on identities unique to their own cultur

societies. The mountains of metal, consisting of exp

yet often second-rate air, sea, and ground machines 

that today serve as potentially lucrative targets in a c

against modern Western militaries are rapidly 

pearing. Non-Western armies, in particular, are g

lighter. The need to survive and remain effective again

threat of overwhelming Western killing power is f

them to develop means to disperse, hide, or if po

eliminate the vulnerable logistics, transportation

telecommunications facilities that now characteriz

Western way of war.

Evidence of this trend lies in the shopping lists of 

wealthier non-Western militaries. Instead of invest

sophisticated aircraft and blue water fleets, mo

purchasing or developing cheap weapons of 

destruction and methods of delivering those wea

Mines, both sea and land, as well as distributed air d

weapons add credence to the conclusion that the int

these militaries is to use such weapons as a means t

potential enemies at bay. Most defense expenditure

attention are going toward land forces because a

provide political legitimacy in non-democratic states

are also the most useful instrument for regional w

284
aggression, as well as the surest means for suppr

internal dissent and thwarting troublesome outsider

The Information Age Is Neutral:

At present there are too many in the U.S. and 

Western military organizations who believe that th

best address the appearance of a major competitor 

next century by exploring the technologies o

information age to develop ever more effective me

finding the enemy and killing him from a distance. 

are, unfortunately, a number of troubling concerns wi

premise. The most obvious is that the inform

revolution will be neutral in this looming competit

fact it may favor the competition more than it 

Western militaries because potential enemies will be 

tailor new technologies to their particular style o

without becoming information-dependent. On one han

increasing flow of information is quite literally dro

commanders, staffs, and intelligence organizations

information overload challenge is one of the c

by-products of the information age—one that we have 

285
solve. The evidence is already clear that inform

technology will not simplify the decision-making pr

but in fact makes it more complex. Our future oppo

however, given their expectations and aims, will r

much less information to strike effectively—partic

since their aim is not to win a decisive victory. They w

moreover, less dependent upon the microchip to co

their method of warfare. A thinking opponent will q

realize that our intensive reliance on informatio

technologies becomes a weakness that can becom

asymmetric target.

A reading of current military writing from a

particularly Asia, reveals that many armies are a

placing extraordinary emphasis on information oper

and information warfare. At present, American an

are taking considerable comfort in the observation th

have made serious investment toward either inform

warfare or precision systems similar to those posses

Western military organizations. What, however, they 

see is that Asian armies already understand that adv

in information technologies will favor their style of w

just as much as it does the western style. In particul

Internet and wireless, non-nodal communications wil

dispersed armies to mass rapidly. As information be

more secure and information centers more disperse

less vulnerable, potential opponents will wield more f

and agile land forces. Moreover, they will be able to 

their forces into smaller and thus less detec

increments. In perhaps one of the strangest pot

ironies of the future, Western information technolog

well provide non-Western armies solutions to two v

problems. First, cellular technology and the Interne

allow them to maintain a concert of action for long p

among widely dispersed units. Second, these 

technologies will allow them to orchestrate the 

massing of dispersed units when opportunities ar

transition onto the offensive.

286
The result may well be a technological foot rac

either side could win. As we develop the technologies 

and kill an enemy, our potential opponents will devel

technologies to become even more difficult to find

prospect becomes even more sobering when one con

the fact that the commercial sector is now in the pro

providing future competitors with the tools they ne

our research centers continue to perfect non-

distributed, and netcentric global information techno

for paying customers on a world-wide basis. Mor

potential U.S. opponents do not have to spend a dime 

development of any of these systems. And again we 

remember that such opponents have a very dif

strategy in mind for the next war. They have only to cr

stalemate and inflict sufficient casualties on Western 

to raise political difficulties for the political leader

decided to intervene —in the words of Neville Chamb

— in “a quarrel in a far away country between peo

whom we know nothing.”

Defeating the Adaptive Enemy:

Clausewitz provides us with a harsh and ac

warning about the fundamental nature of war:

War, however, is not the action of a living force upon a life

mass (total nonresistance would be no war at all), but alw

the collision of two living forces. The ultimate aim of waging 

... must be taken as applying to both sides. Once again, ther

interaction. So long as I have not overthrown my opponent I 

bound to fear he may overthrow me. Thus, I am not in control

dictates to me as much as I dictate to him.

11

It is this fundamental Clausewitzian point that We

and American military organizations in particular, 

287

11. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael H

and Peter Paret, p. 77.
danger of forgetting. Our potential opponents in th

century will have thought long and hard about how to 

our weaknesses. 

To be sure, firepower can be paralytic in its effec

paralytic effects by fire are always fleeting. Armies 

shown time and again that they can become inured 

paralytic effects of firepower and can even learn cr

ways to lessen its destructive effects. Add to this fact

ability of non-Western armies to utilize the advanta

time, mass, will and the power of the defensive, an

single American advantage of superior killing 

becomes much less persuasive as an instrument of wa

it appears on first consideration.

The corollary to Newton’s fundamental law of p

echoes with a sense of urgency: every successful techn

tactical innovation that provides a dominant m

advantage eventually yields to a countervailing res

that shifts the advantage to the opposing force. Am

military dominance in firepower and attrition warfa

288
been on display for almost five decades. We must anti

a future military challenge that will attempt to defe

preoccupation with precision strike. We must use th

we have in the decade ahead to restore balance in our 

method of war. Our future arsenal of military capab

must include a 21st Century sword with two e

compelling edges: precision maneuver as well as pre

firepower. Without these two applied in balanc

harmony, future conflicts might well devolve into m

wars of attrition. Let’s begin now to take on the challe

a future adaptive enemy and begin now to build a ba

force to defeat him.

289
Aachen, Germany, 208, 212

Adaptive enemies/opponents, 6

Afghanistan, 52, 278–279

challenges to Western way of

war, 45–48

China, 47–49, 274–275

defeating, 287–289

early signals of change,

58–59, 284–287

emergence of future threats,

55–58

established cycle, 44–45

future implications, 282–284

future wars and role of, 75–76

Gulf War, 54, 280–281

information age, role of,

59–61, 117

Israel and the Middle East,

279

Korea, 48–49, 276–277

Kosovo, 281–282

as major competitors, 117,

133–137, 149–150, 169–

170

Middle East, 52–53

overview, 43–44

Vietnam, 49–52, 277–278

warnings about nature of war,

61–62

Adaptive weapons, 44

Aerial mobility, 83

Afghanistan, 26, 52, 228,

278–279

Air Force Halt Strategy, 113–124

AirLand Battle, 69, 195

Albania, 238

Alexander the Great, 240

Algeria, 26

Alliances

coalitions and, 237–23

commitment and, 38

American style of war, sp

power in, 1–8

Antietam, 118

ANZUS Treaty, 237

Armed Forces Journal

 International, 205

Army After Next (AAN),

116–124, 128, 138–

annual report, 153–19

competitors, rise of ma

117, 133–137, 149–

169–170

current force, 165

force characteristics n

for the future, 179–

franchise programs, 1

future games, 182–18

hybrid forces, 182

leadership, 182, 185

Leavenworth games,

172–175

military art and scien

2025, 171–172

pace of change, 162–1

potential force, 165–16

programmed force, 16

rationale for change, 1

291

INDEX OF SELECTED TERMS
science and technology, 191–

202

security issues, 170–171

soldiers, training and

education of, 184, 185–186

Summer War Game (SWG

97), 183–184

technology issues, 186–190

vital versus important national interests, 167–169

Winter War Game (WWG 97),

172, 175–179

Army of the 21st Century.

See Security; War in the

21st century

Army Science Board (ASB), 201

Army War College, 98–99, 206

Asia, national interests in, 133

Asymmetry, rising pattern of,

 136

Athenians, 44

Balkans, 242

Battlefields

future size, shape, and

patterns of, 76–87

limited wars and changes in,

103–106

role of technology in gaining

position, 30–31, 71–72, 78–

80

Battle-space, 19–20, 130

Beirut, 52–53, 206, 279

Berlin, 206, 208, 212

Berlin Wall, 14, 132

Blackwell, James, 123

Blitzkrieg, 13, 68, 82, 121

 195

Board on Army Science a

 Technology (BAST), 2

Bosnia, 110, 213, 228, 24

Bradley, Omar, xvi

Burundi, 30

Bush administration, 35

Caesar, 240, 251

Calhoun, John C., vi–vii

Casualties, 208

limited wars and, 9

108, 110

Center for Strategic and 

national Studies, 113, 

Centers of gravity, 15, 78

C4ISR, 268

Chamberlain, Neville, 61

Chancellorsville, 73

Chechnya, 26, 208, 211, 21

Check and checkmate, 8, 8

China, 29, 116

civil war in, 47–48, 27

as a major competitor

Churchill, Winston S., 67, 

Civil War (U.S.), 12, 73, 

157, 194

292
Civil warfare, 29–30

Clausewitz, Carl von, 31–32, 33,

 61, 70, 71, 73, 74, 78, 92, 127,

 147, 219, 272, 287

Coalitions, 235

alliances and, 237–238

communicating in, 236–237

Foreign Area Officer (FAO)

program, 241–242

liaison officers, role of, 239–

241

need for, 257–259

precedents, 242–244

technology in, 238–239

trust and, 243–244

Cold War, 69, 91, 92–93, 132, 147

affects of, on future developments, 107–109

limited wars post, 99–110

Combined Arms Support

Command, 166

Communication, in coalitions,

236–237

Competitors

major, 117, 133–137, 149–

150, 169–170

peer, 169

Conflicts, areas of future, 129,

148–149

Congress of Vienna, 28

Coup de main, 18, 104, 181, 196,

210–211

Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study

(DAWMS), 113, 114

Defense Advanced Re

Projects Agency (DA

166, 199

Defense Science Board

189–190

Department of Defense 

166, 189

DePuy, William, 96–99, 1

105, 109

Desert Storm, operatio

Gulf War

Dien Bien Phu, 49

Die Truppenführung 

Leadership), 72, 85–86

Digitization, 105–106, 13

Distant punishment 

physical domination, 3

du Gueschin, 44

Edward III, 44

Egypt, Yom Kippur War, 1

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 2

242

Europe

national interests in, 1

as a strategic staging 

263–268

Fabius, 44

Firepower

balance between mane

ability and, 20–21

changes in responses t

77–78

293
curve chart, 115

distant punishment versus

physical domination, 34–36

limited wars and changes in,

103–106

role of battlefield size, shape,

and patterns, 76–87

what will change in the 21st

century, 74–76

what won’t change in the 21st

century and, 70–74

FM 100-5, Operations, 165

Ford, Henry, 21

Foreign Area Officer (FAO)

program, 241–242

Forrest, Nathan Bedford, 119

Fort Leavenworth games,

172–175

France

Indochina and, 26, 49, 50

World War II and, 67–69, 79

Gaddafi, Muamar, 35

Gates, Bill, 21

Geopolitics, of future war, 28–30,

128–129

Geostrategy

limited war and, 92–93

security and, 142, 167

Germany, 158

World War I and, 194–195

World War II and, 67–69, 72,

79

Gettysburg, 78, 118

Giap, Vo Nguyen, 50, 51–

278

Global scouts, 123, 140–1

Grant, U., 240

Ground forces

See also Battlefields

of adaptive opponents

future war and use of, 

Grozny, 205, 219, 226–22

Guderian, Heinz, 21, 123

Gulf War, 5, 14, 32, 34, 35

54, 280–281

battlefield, 78

as a limited war, 99

logistics, 118–119

maneuverability, 72, 7

psychological destabil

140

SCUD missiles, 195, 2

Haiti, 110

Hannibal, 44

Hart, Basil Liddell, 38, 2

Hitler, Adolf, 243

Ho Chi Minh, 267

Howard, Michael, xviii

Huan Ju Bowl, 116

Humanitarian issues, 13

Huntington, Samuel, 264

Hussein, Saddam, 32, 7

243

294
Hybrid forces, 182

Indochina, 26

Indo-China War, second, 50

Indonesia, 26

Industrial age, 11

Industrial Revolution, impact of,

11–12

Information age/technologies,

14, 16–19, 21

adaptive opponents and,

59–61, 117, 149–150

future role of, 69, 83, 147–152

limitations of, 85

Integrated Idea Teams (IITs),

199–200

Interdependence, 123, 180–181

Internet, 60

Interoperability, trust and,

249–254

Iran, 29

Iraq, 34, 54, 75

See also Gulf War

Israel, 52–53, 243, 279

Yom Kippur War, 14, 211

Italy, 238

Iwo Jima, 46

Jackson, Stonewall, 73

Japan/Japanese, 46–47, 116, 274

Russo-Japanese War, 219–

220

Joint Task Force Comma

 role of, 86

Jomini, Antoine Henri, 7

Just Cause, 5

Killing zones, changes in

118, 157–158, 194–19

Knowledge, techno

development and

194–197

Korean War, 3–4, 48–

276–277

as a limited war, 9

102–103

Kosovo, 3, 5, 6, 8, 228

as a limited war, 91, 9

110

NATO and, 281–282

Kosovo Liberation Army 

100, 282

Kuwait Theater of Oper

(KTO), 54, 280

See also Gulf War

Latin America, na

interests in, 133

Leadership, 182, 185

Leavenworth games, 172

Lebanon, 228

Beirut, 52–53, 206, 27

Lenin, 119

Lethality and maneuver

balance between, 16

Liaison officers, role of, 2

295
Libya, 35

Limited wars

casualties and, 94, 107–108,110

conclusions, 109–110

domestic politics, role of, 94

geostrategy, 92–93

Korean War, 94–95

lessons learned, 107–109

operations, 103–106

post Cold War, 99–101

strategy, 102–103

tactical units, 106–107

technology, role of, 93–94

Vietnam war, 96–99

Link, Charles, 113, 114, 119

Logistics, future wars and,

118–119

Loh, Michael, 124

Louisiana Maneuver force, 165

Machine/industrial age, 11, 82

Major competitors, 117, 133–137,

149–150, 169–170

Manchuria, 47

Maneuverability

balance between lethality

and, 16

balance between precision

firepower and, 20–21

historical background, 67–70

limited wars and changes

in, 103–106

need for enhanced, 147–152

role of battlefield size, shape,

and patterns, 76–87

speed of, 18

strategic, 8, 77

what will change in the 21st

century, 74–76

what won’t change in t

century, 70–74

Manila, 208

Mao Tse-tung, 47–48, 274

Marshall, George C., 177

McArthur, D., 73

McNamara, Robert S., 71

Microchip technology, 

93–94, 150–151

Middle East

adaptive opponents, 5

Israel and, 279

Yom Kippur War, 14, 

Mitsuru, Ushijima, 46–47

Monroe Doctrine, 133

Montgomery, B. L., 240, 2

Mountbatten, Louis, 242

Mujahideen, 52, 278–279

Murray, Williamson, xvii

Napoleon, 12, 28, 44, 6

240, 251

National interests

security and, 131–133

vital versus important

167–169

National military strate

of Army, 140–142

National Training Center

296
NATO, 38, 236, 237, 238, 249,

252–254, 272–273

Kosovo and, 281–282

Netherlands, 26

New Look, 25–26

Newton, Isaac, 86, 288

New Zealand, 237

Noriega, 103

North Korea, 57

North Vietnam, air campaign

against, 35

North Vietnamese Army (NVA),

50–51, 278

Office of the Assistant Secretary

of the Army for Research,

Development and Acquisition

(OASARDA), 199, 201

Okinawa, 46–47, 116, 208, 274

Operational art, 114

Operation Desert Storm. See

Gulf War

Operations

future wars and, 119–124

limited wars and changes in,

103–106

split-based, 180

Organization of American

States, 237

Pacific Rim, national interests in,

133

Panama, 103

Partnership for Peace eff

Peer competitors, 169

Pentomic reorganization, 

People’s Liberation Army 

48–49, 53, 276

Persian Gulf War. See Gu

Planning, shift from 

based to capabilities

131–132

Political purposes, futur

and, 70–71

Politics, limited war

domestic, 94

Pork Chop Hill, 79–80, 95

Potential force, 165–166

Powell, Colin L., 131–132

Precision Age. See Limite

Precision firepower

Firepower

President’s National S

Strategy, 132

Programmed force, 165

Program Objective Me

dum (POM), 165

Psychological collapse, 15

in future wars, 117

in Gulf War, 140

Rand Corp., 199

Regional hegemons, 127–

297
Republican Guard, 54, 280–281

Revolution in Military Affairs

(RMA) forces, 121, 172

Ridgway, General, 95

Risk, sharing, 38

Roman Empire/Romans, 44, 137

Russia

Chechnya, 26, 208, 211,

217–231

Grozny, 205, 219, 226–227

as a major competitor, 160

Russo-Japanese War, 219–220

Rwanda, 30

Saipan, 116

Saving Private Ryan, 80–81

Schwarzkopf, Norman, 242,

243–244

Science and technology, 191–202

Scipio, 44

Security

beyond the year 2010,

128–131, 137–138, 170–

171

determining future threats,

133–135

developing long-range,

138–140

global scouts, role of, 140–142

major competitors, 135–137

national interests, 131–133

Serbs, 100, 102–103, 104,

272–273, 274, 281–282

Shuri Castle, battle of, 11

Soldiers

training and education

186

in 2025, 184

Somalia, 30, 99, 213, 228

Soryang, battle of (1951), 

Southeast Asia 

Organization (SEATO

South Korea, 141

Soviet Union

See also Russia

Afghanistan and, 26, 5

279

after World War II, 19

Space and Strategic D

Command (SSDC), 16

Spartans, 44

Special Operations Com

166, 184

Speed

of arrival, importance o

15, 17–18, 102, 194

battlespace and, 19–2

future wars and role o

strategic, 18, 83, 119–

technological developm

and, 187

Starry, Donn A., viii, ix

Strategic maneuvering, 8

Strategic offensive-t

defensive approach, 82

104–105, 108

298
Strategic speed, 18, 83, 119–120

Strategic stalemate, 49, 116

Strategic strike campaign, 7

Strategy, limited wars and,

102–103

Summer War Game (SWG 97),

183–184

Surface-to-space continuum,

120, 130, 179–180

Tactical units, limited wars and,

106–107

Tadamichi, Kuribayashi, 46

Technology/technological warfare

adaptive, 44

adaptive opponents and,

59–61, 117, 149–150

balance between lethality and

maneuverability, 16

battlespace, 19–20

changes in, 11–14

coalitions and, 238–239

digitization, 105–106, 130

distant punishment versus

physical domination and,

34–36

experimentation and

innovation, 20–21

firepower, changes in

responses to, 15

future wars and role of, 30–31,

71–72, 78–80, 123–124,

147–152, 186–190

limitations of, 85, 117

limited wards and, 93–94

microchip, 14, 26, 93–94,

150–151

over-reliance on, 25–26

restoration of the offensive,

16–19

science and, 191–202

Telescope, directed, 240

Terror bonding, 116

Tet Offensive, 51, 97, 116

Thucydides, 31

Time

advantage of opponen

how to gain the advan

6–8

Training and Doctrine Co

(TRADOC)

AAN and annual repo

153–190, 193, 198–

Analysis Center (TRA

Transitional states, as 

threats, 55–58

Trust

coalitions and, 243–24

interoperability and, 2

need for, 257–259

Tzu, Sun, 135

Unmanned Aerial Ve

(UAVs), 106, 166, 179

Urban warfare, 206

countering, 211–214

environment of, 208–2

as an equalizer, 210–2

indirect approach, 214

as a means of negatin

American military st

207–208

using time to our adva

215

Van Riper, Paul, 113, 121

299
Viet Cong (VC), 50–51, 278

Viet Minh, 49–50, 277–278

Vietnam/Vietnam War, 4, 14, 26,

35, 49–52, 277–278

casualties, 208

lessons learned from, 70, 71,

72

as a limited war, 96–99,

105

Waffen SS, 61

War

changes in, 157–167, 194–197

cycles of, 9–21, 194–197

enduring character of, 31–34

object of, 115

a soldier’s view of the nature

of future, 114–124

warnings about the

fundamental nature of,

61–62

War games, 121–123

Europe as a stage for,

263–268

future, 182–184

Leavenworth games, 172–175

Summer War Game (SWG

97), 183–184

urban, 206–207

Winter War Game (WWG 97),

172, 175–179

War in the 21st century

distant punishment versus

physical domination, 34–36

geopolitics of, 28–30

ground forces, role of, 36–38

overview, 25–28

past experiences, role of,

31–34, 38–39

technology, role of, 30–31,

71–72, 78–80, 123–

147–152

Washington, George, 44, 1

Wehrmacht, 17, 61, 68

Wellington, duke, 44

Winter War Game (WW

172, 175–179

World War I, 12–13, 45, 1

194–195

World War II, 13, 14, 45–4

208, 274

battlefield, 78

maneuverability of Ge

and France, 67–69, 

Yeosock, John, 243

Yom Kippur War, 14, 211

Zaire, 30

300
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major General Robert H. Scale

became the 44th Commandant 

U.S. Army War College in Augus

Before moving to Carlisle Bar

Pennsylvania, he was the Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Operations and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine 

Training and Doctrine Command Headquarters, Fort M

Virginia. He is a 1966 graduate from the United 

Military Academy and he later received a Masters and P

history from Duke University.

Commissioned as a field artillery officer, General 

served in numerous command and staff positions throu

the Army. His commands include four artillery batterie

in Germany and two in Vietnam; an artillery batta

Korea and the U.S. Army Field Artillery Training Cente

Sill, Oklahoma. He also served as the Assistant D

Commander, 2d Infantry Division, Eighth U.S. Army.

His decorations include the Distinguished Service 

Silver Star, Legion of Merit with four Oak Leaf Cluste

Bronze Star Medal, Meritorious Service Medal with fou

Leaf Clusters and the Air Medal. He wears the 

Parachutist Badge, the Army Staff Badge and the Range

General Scales is the principal author of Certain V

the 1993 official Army account of the Gulf War. His lates

Firepower in Limited War, is a 1994 publication that ou

the history of fire support in post-World War II co

During the past four years, General Scales has pub

numerous articles within several European and Am

defense journals. In November 2000 he retired from 

duty.

301
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Director of Strategic

Outreach Program

Colonel Richard J. McCallum

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams

Cover Artist

Ms. Roberta M. Hill

First Printing: May 2001