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IRAQ’S TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST 

AND CENTRAL ASIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 29, 2005

Serial No. 109–118

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND CENTRAL ASIA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chair 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Vice Chair 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

YLEEM POBLETE, Subcommittee Staff Director 

MATT ZWEIG, Professional Staff Member 

DAVID ADAMS, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

LEE COHEN, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESS 

The Honorable Richard Jones, Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq, U.S. Department of State ........................................................... 6

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Richard Jones: Prepared statement of State ............................... 10

APPENDIX 

Material Submitted for the Hearing Record .......................................................... 47

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IRAQ’S TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 29, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST

AND CENTRAL ASIA,

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:17 p.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(Chair of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The Subcommittee will come to order. Thank 

you so much for being here with us today, and I thank the Ambassador for his willingness to appear before us as well. In his 2005 

State of the Union Address, President Bush underscored that the 

Iraqi people demonstrated their commitment to democracy by holding the first free and fair election in generations. 

Now begins the process of organizing the Transitional National 

Assembly, forming a government, and drafting and ratifying a permanent Constitution that will be the basis for a fully democratic 

Iraq. 

However, as we mark the 1-year anniversary of the transfer of 

power to the people of Iraq, if we are to fully grasp where Iraq is 

now, and where Iraq is heading politically, we must understand 

what this nation endured under a brutal regime that denied the 

Iraqi people their freedom and shackled their hopes and aspirations. 

Saddam Hussein’s terrorist regime wrecked havoc on Iraqi society, and stunted the country’s growth and development. The regime 

destroyed lives as it indiscriminately slaughtered Iraqis, regardless 

of background, with an estimated 300,000 having disappeared from 

the time that Saddam took power in 1979 and until his removal almost 25 years later. 

Thus, the progress achieved so far by the Iraqi people toward establishing a democratic government just a few short years after the 

termination of that regime is nothing short of miraculous. 

In July of last year, a provisional Iraqi Governing Council was 

named, and shortly commenced a process of de-Ba’athistification 

within its rank, authorizing a war crimes tribal for Saddam and 

his associates, and most importantly preparing for direct elections 

to choose a new government. 

These elections were held on January 31, 2005, for a 275-seat 

Transitional National Assembly. The turnout for this election was 

astonishing. Roughly 8.5 million Iraqis risked their lives to participate in the election. 

2

Not only was it a testament to the bravery of the Iraqi people, 

but it clearly illustrated the innate human desire for freedom, for 

prosperity, for security, and it marked a rare occurrence in a region 

punctuated by instability and tyranny. 

Challenges remain, but democracy has taken root. Today, the 

Iraqi people remain engaged in a process that we all hope will result in a unified and democratic Iraq. The deadline for the writing 

of a new Constitution as delineated in the Transitional Administrative Law is this upcoming August 15th, with a referendum on the 

document to be held October 15th. 

If the Constitution is accepted, Iraqis are to hold elections for a 

permanent government by December 15th. According to Iraqi observers, this process is likely to focus on the same contentious 

issues that arose during deliberations over the TAL, and these are 

the role of Islam, whether or not party militias can continue to operate, and the degree of autonomy for the Kurdish-controlled regions, as well as the related issue of the status of the mostly Kurdish city of Kirkuk. 

Some contend that those issues are likely to prompt a delay in 

the drafting, although Iraqi leaders say that they will meet the 

deadline. A deal reached in the past week to incorporate more 

Sunni Arab representatives into writing the new Iraqi Constitution 

is a reason for encouragement. 

Under the plan, the drafting committee will reportedly be expanded to 68 voting seats, with an additional 13 seats in addition 

to the 2 seats already allotted to go to Sunnis. 

Another 10 Sunnis will help draft the Constitution, but they will 

not have voting privileges on the drafting body. We welcome your 

insight, Ambassador Jones, on the potential sources of difficulty, on 

the contentious issues, and the dynamics affecting this specific 

process, and the overall political development. 

Furthermore, we would appreciate it if you would address the 

overall United States strategy to assist Iraq’s transition to democracy. What are United States priorities leading up to the drafting 

of a new Iraqi Constitution and the new round of elections? 

What new efforts and programs aimed at promoting democracy 

are currently being undertaken and considered? How are our efforts to bring security to Iraq complimenting those efforts, and 

what is our strategy to assist the Iraqi people in meeting economic 

challenges that could affect the political process? 

Finally, we ask that you address the impact of the trials of 

former regime officials and specifically the upcoming trial of Saddam Hussein for crimes against humanity. 

America’s role in Iraq is being gradually taken over by the Iraqis. 

They are finally beginning to enjoy the new personal freedoms that 

were forbidden under Saddam’s regime. This is not to say that a 

new Iraqi constitutional government will be a panacea, but it will 

provide the long-term antidote for the disease of autocracy and terror that has ravaged the Middle East for far too long. 

It is a solution that the terrorists and tyrants alike fear, and this 

is why they maim, and kill—to deny the Iraqi people a democratic 

future. These agents of hatred and violence understand that the 

progress achieved in Iraq has had ripple effects throughout the region. 

3

They realized that a democratic Iraq, along with positive developments in Afghanistan, will continue to ignite the forces of freedom 

and create an environment where oppressors and terrorists cannot 

survive. 

I would like to highlight the sacrifice that our men and women 

in uniform continue to make to bring freedom to the Iraqi people. 

We thank you for your service and your courage. I would also like 

to commend the efforts of American civilians serving in Iraq 

through the Department of State and other United States agencies. 

I know firsthand of their dedication and commitment to a right 

and just cause through the service rendered by one of my former 

staffers, Russell—who is embarrassed, and on the row there—

Votushac. I finally learned to pronounce your name, Russell. He 

just returned from an 8-month tour with the Iraq Reconstruction 

Office. So to military and civilian alike, and we have another wonderful intern who has just come back from active military, Iraq, 

and you have my utmost admiration and respect. Your efforts are 

helping to bring about dramatic change, one that will continue to 

contribute to the long-term security of our Nation and of our allies. 

I would like to thank our witnesses for appearing before our Subcommittee today, and I am pleased to turn to the Ranking Member 

of the Subcommittee, my good friend, Mr. Ackerman, for his opening statement. Gary. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much. I want to thank the Chair 

for her kind words, for her powerful statement, for her leadership, 

and for scheduling today’s hearing. And Russell, welcome back. 

The transition in Iraq from dictatorship to democracy would be 

fraught with peril even in the best of circumstances. But we don’t 

have the best of circumstances. We do have pretty close to the 

worst. Tribal differences, ethnic differences, sectarian differences, 

aspirations for Kurdish independence, and a lack of experience 

with democracy and its institutions all conspire against a successful outcome. 

And then there is the insurgency: Sustained, sophisticated, lethal, and anything but defeated. Not the best backdrop against 

which to draft a Constitution. After what can only be described as 

extraordinarily successful elections, as the Chair points out, where 

81⁄2 million Iraqis participated at the risk of life and limb, it has 

taken the new Iraqi Government several months of political wrangling to finally establish the membership of the committee charged 

with drafting the new Constitution. 

While it is a sign of progress that at least some Iraqis are resolving political differences without resorting to violence, and it is a 

positive development that there will be broader Sunni participation 

in the drafting of the Constitution, the fact of the matter is that 

we are only 6 weeks away from the deadline by which the Constitution is supposed to be finished. 

So that is not only 6 weeks for the drafting committee to decide 

on its own internal rules and structure, but only 6 weeks with 

which the same contentious issues that emerged during the drafting of the Transitional Administrative Law, namely the role of 

Islam, the status of political party-related militias, the degree of 

autonomy for the Kurdish-controlled regions, and the status of the 

mostly Kurdish city of Kirkuk. 

4

Some have suggested that the Iraqis exercise the ability to extend the deadline by drafting the Constitution offered by the Transitional Administrative Law. I recognize that the laying of the 

adoption of a new Constitution in Iraq carries with it the possibility that the insurgency will gain some political momentum. 

But I also think that it is worth considering whether or not a 

document can receive majority support in a referendum, and can 

be achieved in the time that is left. If the document produced over 

the next 6 weeks does not have popular participation in its drafting 

and broad public acceptance when finished, then its success and 

ours are called into serious question. 

I would just note that Afghanistan took 15 months to write its 

Constitution, and other nations that recently have been involved in 

writing Constitutions have taken anywhere from 7 months to 4 

years. 

As I suggested earlier, the Iraqi Constitution is not being drafted 

in the best of circumstances. On a daily basis, coalition forces, the 

Iraqi security forces, and innocent Iraqi civilians face a murderous 

enemy bent on destroying Iraq’s opportunity for democracy. 

Unlike Vice President Cheney, who is cheerleading from an undisclosed location, the insurgency that I see is anything but in its 

last throes. The level of attacks has been sustained over time, and 

they are getting deadlier, and they are getting more sophisticated. 

I can only conclude that we are not succeeding against the insurgency, and that our plan for training Iraqi forces and turning the 

fight over to them is not working. On any given day, no one in our 

Government, nor I suspect in the Iraqi Government, can tell me or 

anyone else exactly how many security forces have shown up for 

work that day, let alone whether they are really trained and ready 

to take on the insurgents. 

Fundamentally, we all agree that in the end that Iraqis will have 

to be responsible for their own security. But without a more capable Iraqi force, and stronger Iraqi leadership, we will not be able 

to withdraw United States forces for many, many years to come. 

The President spoke last night about the need for us to be in 

Iraq for as long as it takes to get the job done, and not 1 day 

longer. But his Administration’s inability to put together a coherent plan to produce capable and dedicated Iraqi security forces 

means that more Americans will be in Iraq for a longer period. 

The President is fond of saying that Iraq is the latest battlefield 

in the war on terror. I submit it is only so because we didn’t enter 

the war with a plan for what to do the day after Saddam’s Government fell. 

Our failure to secure Iraq’s borders and generally provide order 

during the transition has allowed the insurgents and terrorists, foreign and Iraqi, to coalesce into an extremely deadly force. 

Because of that failure by the Administration, the task before us 

is much more difficult than the President shared with the Nation 

last night. I want to thank the Chair for holding today’s hearing, 

and I look forward to hearing from our distinguished witness, Ambassador Jones. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Ackerman. Mr. McCotter. 

Mr. MCCOTTER. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Ambassador, first 

let me begin by thanking you for your service to our country. It is 

5

most appreciated in these trying times. I would like to throw some 

food for thought on the table, just quickly. 

One of the concerns that I have had with reconstruction efforts 

in Iraq has been while there have been some strides taken, it has 

been the absence of a transactional benefit to the average Iraqi on 

the street that would be accompanying the transformational 

change to a democracy. 

Now, I see that we have community action programs that we do 

try to engage in, but it seems that the emphasis has been very 

much on the political end, and not so much on the economic end, 

and the empowerment of the individual Iraqi in the towns. 

And my hope would have been that we would have had more concentration on the town councils to emulate what we did so successfully here, would have been to go from town halls to state governments, to a federated system. 

Instead, we seem to have gone from a national system down to 

a provincial system, down to a town council. For example, I think 

in the numbers that we were presented in our packet, we had 

about $860 million for private sector employment development in 

Iraq, which also included $352 million for debt relief for Iraq, 

which would leave about $500 million for private sector employment development. 

It is my concern that if you ask someone to fight for freedom, 

freedom is an abstract concept if they are hungry. If they have no 

hope for the future for their families, for their employment, or sustainability of their quality of life. 

And I just am not certain that we have done enough with that, 

and that it has not received the emphasis on the grassroots economic level, or on the democracy-building level that is necessary. 

I would also throw out as food for thought something that would 

tie in with economic empowerment of the individual Iraqi, would 

be an idea that I have stressed and others have stressed, would be 

the potential to look at the utilization of Iraqi oil revenues into a 

revolving fund, whereby portions of those revenues would go per 

capita to adult Iraqis. 

It would be very similar to what we have in Alaska. If one of the 

problems that we have in rebuilding Iraq is the absence of a per 

capita income level that could help lead to the development of an 

economy and the sustaining of that economy, it would seem that 

the utilization of those revenues would have a very beneficial effect 

on the average Iraqi. 

Those are just two ideas, and I look forward to your remarks, 

and I would reserve any further questions that I have to the appropriate time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, and we appreciate that you actually read those documents, Mr. McCotter. You are setting a dangerous precedent. Congresswoman Berkley. 

Ms. BERKLEY. Madam Chairman, I appreciate your courtesy, but 

I would like to get a feel for the hearing before I make any remarks. Would that be all right with you? Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Congressman 

Fortenberry. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I would like to 

pass at this time as well. 

6

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Ambassador Richard Jones was appointed Senior Advisor to the 

Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq earlier this year. A career member of the U.S. Foreign Service, Ambassador Jones previously 

served as Ambassador to Kuwait from September 2001 to July 

2004; and from November 2003 until June 2004, he served concurrently as the Chief Policy Officer and Deputy Administrator for the 

Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad. 

Ambassador Jones also served as the U.S. Ambassador to 

Kazakhstan, and the U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon. You get all the 

easy cases. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD JONES, SENIOR 

ADVISOR TO THE SECRETARY AND COORDINATOR FOR 

IRAQ, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. And thank you 

for your earlier remarks that you made on our policy, and for those 

of Mr. Ackerman and Mr. McCotter. I have a longer statement for 

the record, but I thought I would make a few brief remarks. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection, we will have it entered. 

Ambassador JONES. I am pleased to meet with you today and I 

look forward to discussing Iraq’s progress toward democracy with 

you. Specifically, I propose to outline our approach to supporting 

Iraq’s democratic transition. In brief, our goal is to help Iraq become a democratic, prosperous, and stable nation. 

To achieve this goal, we have developed a comprehensive strategy to provide the Iraqi’s with the tools necessary to defeat the insurgency, complete the political transition, and create a solid foundation for future economic growth. The key adjective to describe 

our strategy is integrated. 

We are working with the Iraqis to achieve forward progress in 

three areas; the security, the political, and the economic dimensions of Iraq’s transition. These three areas are interdependent. 

Progress in one area reinforces progress in the other areas. 

We are moving actively to train, equip, and field the Iraqi security forces. We are interjectionally promoting an inclusive political 

process, respectful of human rights, and grounded in the rule of 

law. 

We are helping to restore Iraq’s infrastructure in order to meet 

demand for essential services, and providing counsel to facilitate 

Iraq’s re-integration into the international economy. 

The Iraqi people are in the forefront of this effort, putting their 

lives at risk each day to create a new Iraq. As you pointed out, 

early this year, Secretary Rice appointed me to be her Senior Advisor and Coordinator for Iraq Policy. 

In that role, I have focused my efforts on two main tasks. First, 

I have served as a coordinator within the United States Government to ensure American support for Iraq effectively supports the 

political transition and economic reconstruction. 

Second, I have engaged with many foreign governments in an effort to build international support for Iraq’s Transitional Government. As you also pointed out, I was present in Baghdad during 

the Iraqi negotiations that led to the adoption of the Transitional 

Administrative Law in March of last year. 

7

Among its many achievements, the transitional law lays out a 

clear political path for Iraq’s transition to full democracy. As Prime 

Minister Ibrahim Al-Jaafari stated clearly when he was in Washington last week, the Iraqi leaders and the Iraqi people are committed to following that path. 

And as President Bush said last night at Fort Bragg, Americans 

will be steadfast in their support for that transition. This year is 

pivotal in that regard. It began with the January 30 elections of 

the 275-member Transitional National Assembly. 

The assembly, in-turn, elected a presidency council, which then 

appointed a prime minister, who subsequently formed a cabinet of 

more than 30 ministers. The next critical milestone on the political 

path is August 15th, by which time the assembly is scheduled to 

have completed a draft Constitution. 

Over the past 2 months, the Iraqi leadership has been working 

to finalize the membership of the constitutional committee charged 

with preparing the draft. As you pointed out, the original committee of 55 persons only had two members from the Sunni Arab 

community. 

This was clearly insufficiently represented of that important 

Iraqi polity, and recognized to be so by Iraqi political leaders of all 

factions. Following intense discussions, the Iraqis last week 

achieved a formula that expands membership of the committee, 

and satisfactorily addresses the imperative for an inclusive process 

representative of all of Iraq’s various communities. 

Once approved, the draft Constitution will be put to a national 

referendum on October 15, and if approved, elections for a permanent government under that Constitution will be held on December 

15th, with a new government scheduled to assume office no later 

than December 31st. 

Our diplomacy is geared toward helping Iraqis continue to meet 

these deadlines, as in fact they have met all the deadlines up until 

now. Despite these significant accomplishments on the path toward 

political transition, however, real challenges do remain. 

As you pointed out, several controversial areas may prove challenging for the committee charged with drafting a Constitution. 

These include my list, and very similar to yours, the role of Islam, 

vis-a-vis other religions; the nature of Iraqi federalism, the distribution of revenues from national resources; and the future status 

of the city of Kirkuk, which of course is very important to the 

Kurds and other communities. 

While it is up to the Iraqis to write their Constitution, we have 

urged them to rely heavily on the principles of the transitional law, 

particularly those related to human rights, including the rights of 

women and religious minorities, as they do so. 

To support Iraq’s transition to democracy, Congress appropriated 

$21⁄2 billion in April 2003 and another $18.4 billion in the fall of 

2003, for the Iraq relief and reconstruction fund, or the IRRF. 

Our efforts were complimented by other governments who met in 

Madrid in October 2003 and pledged an additional $13.5 billion. 

While this assistance is a very generous contribution, it only forms 

a down-payment on the support that Iraq needs from the international community and from its own resources to repair infraVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:31 Feb 23, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\MECA\062905\22261.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
8

structure in an economy that was devastated by decades of mismanagement, tyranny, and war. 

In the course of the last year, we have adapted IRRF spending 

to the evolving needs of Iraq, and in response to changing external 

requirements and constraints. Initially, we emphasized the reconstruction of basic elements of Iraq’s prewar infrastructure, with the 

immediate goal of restoring essential services, such as electricity, 

water, health, oil production, education, roads, telecommunications, 

and so on. 

Beginning last fall, however, greater emphasis was placed on the 

urgent political priorities, and the standing up of the security 

forces to enable Iraq to assume increasing responsibility for its own 

security. 

We have also begun using IRRF funds to strengthen Iraq’s judicial system. IRRF funds are still being targeted to increase the output of electricity and fuel, of course, though. 

Lately, we have begun adopting our procedures in an effort to reduce the proportion of our assistance going to overhead and security expenditures, and to ensure sustainability of projects by coordinating more closely with Iraqi ministries, and making greater recourse to Iraqi contractors and expertise. 

As part of my role as the Coordinator for Iraq Policy, I have been 

leading an interagency steering group, which has been reviewing 

some of these issues. And we have also made some recommendations for changing some of our emphases. 

One area that we are very proud of, and which we believe will 

help strengthen nascent Iraqi democracy at the grassroots level in 

support of a Federal structure for Iraq, is that we have worked 

with our Embassy and the Iraqi authorities to create something 

which are called provincial reconstruction and development committees. 

These committees, which will be made up of local government officials and local representatives of Baghdad ministries, will be a 

one-stop shop for United States agencies, but also for other donors 

to work with them to get their input into the design of assistance 

projects that will be implemented in their provinces. 

There is a lot of interest in this on the Iraqi side. We are very 

excited about this development, and we are going to be channeling 

an increasing amount of our resources in that direction, including 

some of the funds that will be made available under the 2005 budget for the so-called CERP funds, the Commanders Emergency Response Program, which is administered by our military commanders in the field. 

With the establishment of the Iraqi Interim Government in June 

2004, and the formation of the Iraqi Transitional Government in 

May of this year, Iraqi ministries have gradually become our full 

partners in reconstruction and development planning. 

To sustain the momentum created by the IRRF, the Administration opposes cuts to assistance for Iraq. The $459 million which 

was included in the President’s fiscal year 2006 budget request will 

enable us to continue programs in support of the new Iraqi Government as it undertakes its responsibilities and the difficult transition to democracy. 

9

Now, in addition to supporting the political transition and economic reconstruction taking place inside Iraq, we have also been 

working, as I mentioned, to build a renewed international partnership to include those countries which did not support the war, but 

are now willing to assist the democratically-elected government. 

On June 22, more than 80 governments and institutions, including the United Nations and NATO, met in Brussels to hear the 

Iraqi Transitional Government discuss its vision, strategies, and 

priorities for Iraq’s transition. The transitional government sent a 

large delegation, including key ministers, leaders of the Transitional National Assembly, members of its judiciary, and figures 

from civil society. 

At Brussels, the international community sent Iraq a clear message, and that was that we support your transition to a democracy. 

This political message of unity from the international community 

is a significant development for United States policy in Iraq. 

The participants also committed to follow up on their pledges of 

tangible support for Iraq. Many of them pledged in particular support for the constitutional drafting process. The next international 

meeting will be in Amman, Jordan, on July 18 and 19. 

This meeting will be an opportunity for donor countries and 

international organizations to accelerate the work that was begun 

at Brussels to improve their coordination with the Iraqi Government based on the presentation of Iraq’s priorities at Brussels. 

Another goal for the meeting, or in fact the main goal for the 

meeting will be to inaugurate an Iraqi-led donor coordination 

mechanism. This improved coordination, coupled with a sharper 

focus by the new government on Iraq’s own priorities, will allow for 

more rapid disbursement of international assistance. 

In July, we will also hold the next in our series of bilateral economic policy discussions. Our Joint Commission on Reconstruction 

and Economic Development will take place at that time. The Iraqi 

side will be led by the new minister of finance, Ali Allawi, accompanied by other key ministries and ministers. 

The U.S. delegation will be led by Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zellick, and he will be supported by an interagency team, including senior economic officials. We believe that this policy dialogue is an important compliment to our economic assistance. 

Finally, the Administration remains committed to working with 

our partners in the military coalition. The coalition is currently reviewing how best to support training for the Iraqi security forces, 

and I personally have participated in several briefings and discussions with coalition partners in this regard. 

In closing, I would like to say that none of us who have worked 

in Iraq or on Iraq policy in Washington are under any illusions 

about the magnitude of the task before the Iraqi people and their 

friends. 

It is important that we remain united and coordinated in support 

of Iraq’s transition. We will continue to ensure that our diplomacy 

and our financial resources are devoted to encouraging the political 

process and economic development, and we depend on our heroic 

compatriots in the military to pursue the vital task of developing 

the self-sufficiency of the Iraqi security forces. Iraq is on the right 

10

path, and the American role in supporting this transition remains 

essential. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Jones follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD JONES, SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE

SECRETARY AND COORDINATOR FOR IRAQ, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Introduction 

I am pleased to meet with you today and look forward to discussing Iraq’s 

progress toward democracy. Specifically, I propose to outline for you our approach 

to supporting Iraq’s transition. 

In simple terms, our goal is to help Iraq become a democratic, prosperous and stable nation. We have developed a comprehensive strategy to achieve that goal. This 

strategy calls for us to provide the Iraqis with the tools necessary to defeat the insurgency, complete the political transition, and create an economic foundation for 

future growth. The key adjective to describe our strategy is ‘‘integrated.’’ We are 

working with the Iraqis to achieve forward progress in three areas: the security, political, and economic dimensions of Iraq’s transition. These three areas are interdependent—progress in one area reinforces progress in the other areas. We are moving actively to train, equip and field the Iraqi security forces. We are energetically 

promoting an inclusive political process respectful of human rights and grounded in 

the rule of law. We are helping restore Iraq’s infrastructure in order to meet demand for essential services, and providing counsel to facilitate Iraq’s reintegration 

into the international economy. Thus, the Administration is fully engaged at all levels to promote implementation of our National Strategy for Supporting Iraq. The 

Iraqi people are in the forefront of this effort, putting their lives at risk each day 

to create a new Iraq. 

Role of Special Advisor and Policy Coordinator 

As you may know, early this year Secretary Rice appointed me to be her Senior 

Advisor and Coordinator for Iraq Policy. Following Iraq’s successful elections in January, Secretary Rice sought to capitalize on the positive momentum created by that 

historic event to accelerate the transition within Iraq, and to expand our partnership with the international community in support of the newly elected government. 

Consequently, I have focused my efforts on two tasks. First, I have served as a coordinator within the U.S. government, to ensure American support for Iraq effectively 

supports the political transition and economic reconstruction. Second, I have engaged with many foreign governments in an effort to build international support for 

Iraq’s Transitional Government. 

Political Transition 

With your permission, I would like to elaborate on these efforts. As many of you 

know, I served in Iraq as the Chief Policy Officer and Deputy Administrator of the 

Coalition Provisional Authority. I was present in Baghdad during the Iraqi negotiations that led to the adoption of the Transitional Administrative Law, or TAL, in 

March 2004. Among its many achievements, the TAL lays out a clear political path 

for Iraq’s transition to full democracy. As Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Ja’afari stated 

clearly when he was in Washington last week, the Iraqi leaders and the Iraqi people 

are committed to following that path, and, as President Bush responded, Americans 

will be steadfast in their support for that transition. 

In that regard, this year is pivotal. It began, as I mentioned above, with the January 30 elections, in which 8.5 million Iraqis participated in their country’s first 

democratic elections in living memory, electing a 275-member Transitional National 

Assembly (TNA). The Assembly, in turn, elected a Presidency Council, that is, a 

President and two deputy presidents, with equal legal powers. The Presidency 

Council then appointed a Prime Minister, who subsequently formed a cabinet of 

more than 30 ministers. 

The next critical milestone on the political path is August 15, by which time the 

TNA is scheduled to have completed a draft constitution. Over the past two months, 

the Iraqi leadership has been working to finalize the membership of a constitutional 

committee charged with preparing the draft. The original committee of 55 persons 

only had two members from the Sunni Arab community. This was clearly insufficiently representative of that important Iraqi polity and recognized to be so by Iraq 

political leaders of all factions. Following intense discussions, the Iraqis last week 

achieved a formula that expands the membership of the committee and satisfactorily addresses the imperative for an inclusive process representative of all of Iraq’s 

various communities. Even while the details of creating a more inclusive committee 

were under discussion, preparatory work began to block out portions of the text and 

11

to identify key issues. This augurs for rapid progress once the constitutional committee becomes complete. Of course, in the end, the legitimacy of the constitution 

will depend crucially upon the inclusion of a broad range of credible Iraqi voices. 

These voices must be heard, because, once approved, the draft constitution will 

be put to a national referendum on October 15. If approved, elections for a permanent government under that constitution will be held on December 15, with the new 

government scheduled to assume office no later than December 31. It is in Iraq’s 

best interest to honor the timeline contained in the TAL to maintain forward momentum in the political process. Against all odds, Iraqi leaders have consistently 

met the deadlines first agreed to on November 15, 2003, beginning with the TAL 

itself, the recovery of sovereignty, democratic elections on January 30, and the formation of a transitional government. Our diplomacy is geared toward helping the 

Iraqis continue to meet these deadlines. 

Despite these significant accomplishments on the path toward political transition, 

real challenges remain. Generally speaking, Iraq needs to move from ethnic to issuebased politics. This evolution will require national political dialogue among Shi’a, 

Sunni, and Kurdish groups and the involvement of other minority populations. Although Iraqi officials have repeatedly stated they are committed to the TAL deadlines, several controversial areas may prove challenging for the committee charged 

with drafting the constitution. These include: the role of Islam and other religions; 

the nature of Iraqi federalism; the distribution of revenues from natural resources; 

and the future status of the city of Kirkuk. 

To support the constitutional process, we have been providing assistance to groups 

such as the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, 

IFES, and the U.S. Institute for Peace. These organizations are working with Iraqis 

to provide technical assistance in all aspects of political development. At the recent 

International Conference in Brussels, many countries indicated an interest in helping to support this process. The UN has a key responsibility in this vein and has 

already been providing significant support, as it did for the successful elections in 

January. Nonetheless, as the summer goes on, the UN will need to accelerate its 

activities and make good use of this international good will by coordinating the various proposed efforts. While it is up to the Iraqis to write their constitution, we have 

urged them to rely heavily on the principles of the TAL related to human rights, 

including the rights of women and religious minorities, in doing so. 

Economic Reconstruction 

To support Iraq’s transition to democracy, the Congress generously appropriated 

$2.5 billion in April 2003 and $18.4 billion in November 2004 for the Iraq Relief 

and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). These funds have been used to build a foundation 

for a new Iraq. During the last two years, we have used the IRRF to support the 

training and equipping of security forces; the renovation, construction, and equipping of thousands of health clinics, hospitals, and schools; the reconstruction and 

modernization of the energy, transportation, and other sectors fundamental to the 

economic transformation of the economy; and many other democratic institutionbuilding and assistance programs. These funds represent a generous U.S. contribution to Iraq’s reconstruction and the well-being of the Iraqi people, but they form 

only a down payment on the support Iraq needs from the international community 

and from its own resources to repair infrastructure and an economy devastated by 

decades of mismanagement, tyranny and war. 

We have adapted IRRF spending to the evolving needs of Iraq and in response 

to changing external requirements and constraints. Initially, we emphasized the reconstruction of basic elements of Iraq’s pre-war infrastructure, with the immediate 

goal of restoring essential services such as electricity, water, health, oil production, 

education, roads, and telecommunications. Beginning last fall, however, greater emphasis was placed on the urgent political priorities, such as technical support for 

the January 2005 elections, the formation of the transitional government, the constitutional referendum and subsequent national elections, and the standing up of 

the security forces to enable Iraq to assume increasing responsibility for its own security. The use of IRRF funds in support of the self-sufficiency of Iraq’s security 

forces of course reinforces the successful completion of the political process. Lately, 

we have begun transitioning the way we contract, in an effort to reduce the proportion of our assistance going to overhead and security expenditures, and to ensure 

sustainability of projects by coordinating more closely with Iraqi ministries and 

making greater recourse to Iraqi contractors and expertise. 

We have also begun using IRRF funds to strengthen Iraq’s judicial system, including funding the construction of courts, police stations and prison facilities; the provision of judicial security and training programs to increase prosecutorial capacity, 

rule of law education, anti-corruption; support to the Central Criminal Court of 

12

Iraq; and technical advice to foster the integration of the justice system. The security we are working so hard to achieve on the ground will not be sustainable without these key elements of a society based on the rule of law. 

IRRF funds are still being targeted to increase the output of electricity and fuel, 

a result that will facilitate the further development of the Iraqi economy and respond to the concerns of the Iraqi people. However, a combination of factors has limited a swift achievement of Iraq’s goals on electrical power. These include skyrocketing demand, insurgent attacks on the infrastructure, a weak culture of operations and maintenance, and insufficient coordination among Iraqi ministries. Nonetheless, we believe Iraq now has a sustainable base generating capacity, and that 

future additions will help meet the rising demand. This is a complex problem which 

will require continuous attention. Policy reform and good business and engineering 

practices will also be critical to Iraq’s success. 

With the establishment of the Iraqi Interim Government in June 2004 and the 

formation of the Iraqi Transitional Government in May of this year, Iraqi ministries 

have gradually become full partners in reconstruction and development planning. 

The next step is for the elected government and private sector to employ Iraq’s own 

revenues and assistance from other governments and multilateral institutions in a 

comprehensive strategy for economic development. 

One positive example of such synergistic funding is the telecom sector, where both 

the IRRF and the private sector have played important roles. For example, an IRRF 

investment of more than $370 million has led to the following developments:

IRRF monies supported USAID’s work in replacing 13 telephone switches in 

Baghdad area and elsewhere in the country, leading to an increase in the number of landline telephone subscribers—from pre-war levels of 833,000 to approximately one million subscribers. This work also enabled the restoration of 

international calling service. 

IRRF monies also have been used to establish an Advanced First Responder 

Network for Iraqi police, fire, and emergency medical personnel. The system 

was partially operational in Baghdad for the January elections, and is scheduled to be fully operational in sixteen strategic cities by the December elections. 

Due to investment of more than $400 million by the private sector, Iraq now 

has 2.7 million cellular-phone subscribers. There has been a similar explosion 

in Internet services. Limited to Baathist officials prior to the war, Iraq now has 

more than 2,000 Internet cafes throughout the country. A state-owned internet 

service provider has 17,000 subscribers.

Developments such as these in the telecom sector will foster Iraq’s reintegration 

into the world economy. 

To sustain the momentum created by the IRRF, the Administration opposes cuts 

to assistance for Iraq. Additional assistance to Iraq, together with diplomacy and 

defense, is essential to Iraq’s democratic transition. The $459 million included in the 

President’s request will continue work already begun under programs funded by the 

Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund. The request will assist the new Iraqi government in delivering basic services to its people, developing a free market system, and 

helping Iraqi refugees return to their homes and reintegrate into Iraqi society. 

These funds will also continue programs in support of the new Iraqi government as 

it undertakes its responsibilities and the difficult transition to democracy. 

A Renewed International Partnership 

In addition to supporting the political transition and economic reconstruction taking place inside Iraq, we have also been working to build a renewed international 

partnership to include those countries which did not support the war but are now 

willing to assist the democratically-elected government. During President Bush’s 

February 2005 visit to Brussels, the United States and the European Union offered, 

if Iraq so requested, to co-host an international conference to provide a venue for 

the Iraqi Transitional Government to engage with the international community and 

to present its plans as well as its areas of need. Following its formation, the ITG 

made such a request. On June 22 more than 80 governments and institutions—including the United Nations and NATO—met in Brussels to hear the ITG discuss 

its vision, strategies, and priorities for Iraq’s transition. The ITG send a large delegation, including key ministers, leaders of the Transitional National Assembly, 

members of the judiciary, and figures from civil society. The Steering Group that 

organized the conference is but one concrete example of the renewed international 

partnership that we and Iraq are now building; the group included the United 

States, the EU, the UN, Egypt, Russia, and Japan, as well as Iraq. 

The conference was structured around the three themes outlined in UN Security 

Council Resolution 1546: the political process; economic challenges and reconstrucVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:31 Feb 23, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\MECA\062905\22261.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
13

tion; and public order and rule of law. Secretary Rice led the U.S. delegation and 

co-chaired the session on public order and rule of law. With your permission, I 

would like to quote from her final statement at the conference: 

‘‘We have had an opportunity as an international community to hear from this 

fine team of Iraqis about their aspirations, about their ambitions, and about their 

needs as they move forward. We are witnessing as an international community the 

emergence of an Iraq free of tyranny, a great culture and a great people who are 

finally throwing off years and decades of tyranny and horror for their people to try 

and build a free and democratic future. . . . At some time in the histories of each 

and every country around this table, somebody had to help as other countries 

emerged from tyranny into democracy, as they defeated fascism on the continent of 

Europe with the help of others. At some time, each and every one of us needed the 

help of others. The Iraqi people now need our help. Because they need our help and 

because they have spoken so clearly and so directly, we know what it is that we 

need to do. And I just want to encourage each and every country at this table that 

has spoken about the obligation, that has spoken about our ambitions, and that has 

spoken about what we are willing to do, that we will now go and do it. Because 

the Iraqi people have taken a great risk. They are a courageous people who are 

working toward democracy and freedom. Let us support them fully and wholeheartedly.’’

At Brussels, the international community sent Iraq a clear message that is: ‘‘We 

support your transition to a democracy.’’ This political message of unity from the 

international community is a significant development for U.S. policy in Iraq. The 

participants also committed to follow-up on their pledges of tangible support for 

Iraq. The next international meeting will be a donors’ conference to be held in 

Amman, Jordan, on July 18–19. The meeting in Amman is actually the fourth in 

a series of meetings of the donor community (the previous meetings were in Abu 

Dhabi, Doha, and Tokyo) following the October 2003 Madrid donors’ conference. 

These donors have been overseeing $13.5 billion in assistance—$8 billion in assistance from foreign governments and $5.5 billion in lending from the World Bank and 

the IMF—pledged at the Madrid conference and scheduled to be disbursed between 

2004 and 2007. 

The upcoming meeting in Amman will be an opportunity for donor countries and 

international organizations to accelerate their coordination with the Iraqi government following the ITG’s presentation of its priorities at Brussels. Another goal for 

the meeting is to inaugurate an Iraqi-led donor coordination mechanism. This improved coordination, coupled with a sharper focus by the new government on Iraq’s 

own priorities, will allow for more rapid disbursement of the international assistance. We will be working with Iraq and the donors to help them find innovative 

methods for achieving such an acceleration in disbursements. 

Of course, appropriate Iraqi economic policies will be a key to success. Our intensive dialogue with Iraqi policymakers, including through our bilateral economic commission, is an essential vehicle for building support for such internal coordination 

and reform. In July we will hold the next in our series of high-level economic policy 

discussions when the Joint Commission on Reconstruction and Economic Development takes place. Iraq will be led by Finance Minister Ali Allawi accompanied by 

other key ministers. The U.S. delegation will be led by Deputy Secretary Robert 

Zoellick, who will be supported by an interagency team including senior economic 

officials. 

Finally, the Administration remains committed to working with our partners in 

the military coalition. The coalition is currently reviewing how best to support training for the Iraqi security forces. We appreciate funding provided in the recently enacted FY05 Emergency Supplemental for assistance to our coalition partners in Iraq 

(and Afghanistan). These funds will enable the United States to support the equipment and budgetary challenges of coalition partners engaged in ongoing operations 

in the region. 

Conclusion 

None of us who have worked in Iraq or on Iraq policy in Washington are under 

any illusions about the magnitude of the task before the Iraqi people and their 

friends. It is important that we remain united and coordinated in support of Iraq’s 

transition. We will continue to ensure that our diplomacy and our financial resources are devoted to encouraging the political process and economic development, 

and depend on our heroic compatriots in the military to pursue the vital task of developing the self-sufficiency of the Iraqi security forces. Iraq is on the right path, 

and the American role in supporting this transition remains essential.

14

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Ambassador Jones. I 

would like to start with the last part of your presentation about 

multilateral efforts and pledges at the donor conferences. 

What were the pledges of the Arab states at the Brussels conference? Did Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud comment on that 

country’s readiness to enter into talks with the Iraqi Government 

on debt relief, and have the Saudis followed up or followed through 

on their $1 billion offered by the Kingdom at the 2003 Madrid conference for reconstruction efforts in the form of soft loans, and by 

financing and guaranteeing Saudi exports to Iraq? 

And how much humanitarian assistance has been delivered to 

Iraq from Saudi Arabia? 

Ambassador JONES. First, I want to make it clear that the Brussels conference was not focused on obtaining pledges of new assistance. It was a political conference, and it was a conference for 

countries to hear the priorities of the new government. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. That was generating support for Iraq’s transition phase. 

Ambassador JONES. For the new government, and the meeting in 

Amman will be more focused on accelerating the delivery of assistance in line with those priorities. 

You mentioned Saudi Arabia. In fact, Saudi Arabia was represented by Prince Saud Al-Faisal, the foreign minister, and he did 

make statements on Saudi Arabia’s willingness to enter into direct 

negotiations with the Iraqis in support of debt relief. And in particular said that Saudi Arabia was prepared to be generous in that 

regard, which we took as a very positive signal, that he would 

make that statement in a public forum of that nature. 

At the same time, not only Saudi Arabia, but other countries’ assistance, and much of it that was promised in the Madrid conference in October 2003, still remains to be disbursed. A lot of the 

assistance——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I am sorry, Mr. Ambassador, but disbursed 

means that the countries have not given it to Iraq, or that Iraq has 

not disbursed it to its people? 

Ambassador JONES. That they have not agreed yet with Iraq on 

how it should be used. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. That the countries that offered to donate 

money have not come to terms with the Iraqi Government about 

those pledges? 

Ambassador JONES. Right. Right. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And does that mean that Saudi Arabia is one 

of those that have not come through? 

Ambassador JONES. Saudi Arabia is one of those countries whose 

pledges have not been fully utilized, that is right. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Madam Chairman, if I might, I still don’t have 

it clear in my head what you are trying to tell us. 

Mr. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Ackerman, I am going to give you plenty 

of time. Don’t worry. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I just didn’t want to begin again on the 

whole——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. You can follow through. 

So that would mean that Saudi Arabia, when that government 

made its initial pledge in this Madrid conference in 2003, it was 

15

done in a private manner? You said that you wanted them to make 

it in a public way. 

Ambassador JONES. I was speaking about debt relief. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Debt relief? 

Ambassador JONES. Yes, and I am not aware that they made 

pledges on debt relief as forward-leaning as Saud Al-Faisal was in 

Brussels. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. So it wasn’t for debt relief, but they did say 

that the billion dollars that they offered, what was that supposed 

to be used for? 

Ambassador JONES. Those were in the form of soft loans. In effect what they did was open a line of credit for Iraq. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And they said that publicly, or did they say 

that privately? 

Ambassador JONES. Yes, I believe that is public information. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And since then nothing has happened? 

Ambassador JONES. Iraq has not drawn on that line of credit. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. ‘‘Iraq has not drawn’’ means that Saudi Arabia has not given the money? 

Ambassador JONES. I think that it is—it takes two to tango. 

They have to tell the Saudis what they want to use the money for. 

They have to come up with specific proposals. These are loans. 

Loans have to be made toward specific projects, and they have to 

agree on what the projects are. 

It is like when a bank has money, and people come to the bank, 

if they present a project proposal, the bank will loan money for a 

specific project. Those negotiations, to my knowledge, have not happened. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. So they are not even conversing about it 

then? 

Ambassador JONES. I mean, the United States just does not give 

money to Iraq either. I mean, that is not the way that international 

assistance is normally done. It is normally done through discussions between the lender and the borrower, focused on a specific 

project. So the lender has to come forward. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. But we are in negotiations if that is the process in which these transactions take place. You would say that the 

United States is in the process of making good on whatever pledges 

that we have made? 

Ambassador JONES. Absolutely. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And would you say that other countries have 

made good on those pledges? 

Ambassador JONES. The pledges——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Is Saudi Arabia standing alone from the 

2003 pledge, or is there a list of other countries that have not entered into negotiations? 

Ambassador JONES. The pledges that were made at Madrid were 

basically from 2004 to 2007, a 4-year period. The total pledges were 

about $13.5 billion. Of that, about $5.5 billion was from the international institutions, the IMF and the World Bank. 

So about $8 billion was from bilateral donors, and of that $8 billion, about $2 billion has been used, which is about a quarter. But 

since the pledges were made over 4 years, that is not necessarily 

behind schedule. 

16

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. What is the United States role in helping to 

move those negotiations along? Do we stand back and see if they 

move along, or are we prodding Saudi Arabia and the other Arab 

countries to make good on their pledges? 

Ambassador JONES. Absolutely, and we are working very closely 

with the Iraqi Government——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Can you tell us some of our efforts to try to 

get Saudi Arabia to make good on their pledge? 

Ambassador JONES. Well, we have bilateral contacts at several 

levels. I mean, the fact that we organized this session in Brussels. 

I personally have visited Saudi Arabia and held conversations with 

Saud Al-Faisal and other senior Iraqi officials, and urged them on 

this issue of debt relief. 

We have been working with the Iraqis to be able to articulate 

their priorities better to the international community, which they 

did so at Brussels. And I believe that by participating actively in 

the Amman conference, and the preparations for the Amman conference, we are working with both sides to help bring them together. 

The Saudis are not the only ones that have pledged loans that 

have not been utilized. In fact, very few loans have been utilized, 

from Saudi Arabia or any other source. Most of the assistance has 

been grant assistance. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And would you say it is because the Iraqi 

Government has not put up a list of the projects that are designated to be the recipients of those funds? 

Ambassador JONES. They have been developing their priorities 

and they are still in the process of doing so. They presented some 

initial thoughts at Brussels. They will present greater thoughts at 

Amman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. So we need to prod both Saudi Arabia and 

others to come forth with the money, or do we need to prod 

Iraqi’s——

Ambassador JONES. We need to work with both sides. We definitely do. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Right. And could you tell me whether other 

Arab states had pledged in the Madrid conference or in other opportunities to aid Iraq in their reconstruction efforts and if they 

have not made good? You said that Saudi Arabia is not alone. I 

was wondering how many Arab states are on that list. 

Ambassador JONES. Well, certainly Kuwait and the United Arab 

Emirates are both prominently active in assistance circles. I think 

they both had made pledges at Madrid. They both have sizeable 

debt. Both of those countries have made statements of their willingness to forgive debt. 

Again, even debt forgiveness requires negotiation and so it has 

to be the result of a process that involves Iraq. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. So you are optimistic that because the year 

goes to 2007 that those negotiations will be underway? 

Ambassador JONES. The negotiations on debt, or——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. No, on the donors. 

Ambassador JONES. Well, that is the process that we are trying 

to continue at the Amman meeting, to get them now moving into 

the area where they start utilizing loans. Most of the assistance 

17

that has been utilized up to now is assistance that has been provided in a grant nature by countries that have the kind of aid expertise to deliver projects, to design and deliver projects. 

A lot of these Arab states don’t have that in-house expertise. 

They really do need to rely on the international community to help 

them mobilize their assistance, and that is what we are working 

to do. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Because as you know, we ask our taxpayers 

all the time to fund so many projects, it would be very good for 

those folks who say that they are our allies and are the recipient 

of great relationships with the U.S. to make good on the pledges. 

Ambassador JONES. I agree with you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And we certainly have made good on our 

pledges as well. So we hope that this happens. One more question, 

and I will have the other Members follow up with these and other 

questions. 

With respect to the Shiite majority represented in Iraq’s national 

assembly, is there any concern that a future Iraqi Government 

could pursue a course to align itself with Iran, and thereby alienate 

itself from the United States? 

We know that elements have been close to Iran in the past. What 

strategies are we developing to address this possibility? 

Ambassador JONES. I think that Prime Minister Ibrahim AlJaafari was asked that same question when he was here in Washington, and he acknowledged that he has close ties with Iran. He 

fled to Iran when he was forced out of Iraq by Saddam Hussein 

many years ago, although he didn’t live there for an extended period. 

He went on and took up residence in the United Kingdom. He 

still has, I think, close ties with the Iranians, and he is not alone 

in his government, and he certainly is not alone among members 

of Parliament. 

But what Jaafari said is, ‘‘Yes, I have close ties with Iran. Our 

Government will have close ties with Iran. They are a neighbor. 

However, we will not allow Iran or any other government to interfere in our internal affairs. And it will not affect our close relationship with the United States.’’

And I believe as one who has worked with many of these people, 

both in Baghdad and now in my current capacity, that he was 

speaking from the heart, and that in fact Iraq does want to have 

good relations with Iran as a powerful neighbor, just like they want 

to have good relations with Turkey, with Saudi Arabia, with Jordan, and so on. 

And as with any nation, there will be some members of their society and their government that feel closer to one country than another, but that the key is that we should look at them first and 

foremost as Iraqi nationalists, and deal with them, and try and always get them to focus on what Iraqi national interests are. 

And if they follow Iraqi national interests, I think they will have 

a proper relationship with Iran and with all their other neighbors, 

and they also will continue to have a close relationship with us. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Some neighbors are friendlier to our United 

States national security interests than others, and some can be 

trusted more than others, and I think you would agree that a close 

18

relationship with Iran would be troublesome to our own national 

security interests, unless Iran is doing the right thing with the 

International Atomic Energy Agency, and that remains to be seen. 

Ambassador JONES. I understand. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Ambassador. Mr. Ackerman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Ambassador, I 

just want to get a clear picture of the money. We on the United 

States side approved, here in Congress, about $200 billion worth of 

spending for Iraq, about $21.3 billion of that is to be for reconstruction, and infrastructure efforts, and the rest of it is going to our 

military and the things that go along with that. Of that $21.3 billion, we have identified projects for about $12 billion, and of that 

$12 billion, approximately $4 billion has actually been spent. Is 

that accurate? 

Ambassador JONES. Could you repeat that again? I am not quite 

following your numbers, Congressman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. We have spent $4 billion, if these numbers are 

accurate, and that is what I am asking you, but we have actually 

ponied up $4 billion out of the $12 billion that we have identified 

as spendable in projects. And that $12 billion is out of the $21.3 

billion that we have allocated for reconstruction. 

Ambassador JONES. For all projects, is that what you are asking, 

or——

Mr. ACKERMAN. In Iraq. 

Ambassador JONES. Those numbers don’t square with the numbers that I am familiar with. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. How much have we spent? 

Ambassador JONES. My understanding is that disbursements 

have been over $7 billion. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Over seven? 

Ambassador JONES. Yes, and that all but about maybe $2 billion 

has been obligated or committed, so that we have about—I think 

we have about $800 million that has not been apportioned. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Let us go through it again: $21.3 billion. 

Ambassador JONES. That is the total. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. That is the total? 

Ambassador JONES. Yes. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. How much of that have we identified for spending on projects approved? 

Ambassador JONES. My understanding is that it is all but 

about—probably all but about $5 billion has been obligated, and of 

that $5 billion, about——

Mr. ACKERMAN. So you are saying that we have obligated $17 billion? 

Ambassador JONES. Probably close to that, $16 billion something. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Okay. 

Ambassador JONES. And of the money that has not been obligated, some of it is committed, which means that we know what 

we want to spend it on, but we are just still negotiating with the 

contractors. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. And the $17 billion that we have obligated, how 

much has been actually spent? 

19

Ambassador JONES. Somewhere over $7 billion, I believe, and it 

may be more than that because the $7 billion may apply just to the 

second supplemental and not to the first, which has all been spent. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Now, let me get at the question that the Chair 

was trying to elicit. Within the Arab world, how much have they 

spent? 

Ambassador JONES. There has been significant contributions of 

humanitarian assistance, particularly by the neighbors, Kuwait 

and Saudi Arabia. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. What does significant mean? 

Ambassador JONES. In the hundreds of millions. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. So we have obligated $17 billion, and spent $7 

billion, and they are talking about hundreds of millions, and not 

even $1 billion? 

Ambassador JONES. We could try and sum that up for you, but 

I don’t have that figure. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Of those hundreds of millions, who are the big 

donors in that? 

Ambassador JONES. Kuwait. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Now I am not talking about loans. Our money 

is not loans on these projects. 

Ambassador JONES. No, I understand, sir. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. We are giving this money to them, and I know 

contributions come in many forms. Sometimes it is a loan. A loan 

to me is not a contribution. The bank isn’t making a contribution 

when I am buying a house and looking for a mortgage. They give 

me a loan. 

So I am talking about how much money that they have expended 

that they have no expectation of reclaiming under any terms. Is 

that still hundreds of millions, or is that loans that we are talking 

about? 

Ambassador JONES. In terms of support directly for the Iraqi people, that is what you are asking about, versus support for our military or anything like that? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Yes. I don’t know that Arab countries are making contributions toward our military. I mean, Costa Rica sent us 

four guys and then took them back, but they are not an Arab country. 

Ambassador JONES. There have been contributions, but that is 

probably not the topic of your question. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. No. How much money has the Arab world given 

to their Arab brothers to make their life better, is the question. 

Ambassador JONES. I don’t have a global figure. I know certain 

anecdotal figures, but I am not prepared to give you a total figure. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. It is probably not a lot. 

Ambassador JONES. I think it is in the hundreds of millions, but 

we can check on that and see what we can come up with. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. And these are not loans that I am talking about. 

I am talking about giving them the money. 

Ambassador JONES. I understand. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. And which countries would you suspect are the 

largest among those? 

Ambassador JONES. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia? 

20

Ambassador JONES. Yes. Probably The Emirates have also provided contributions. I know, for example, that The Emirates have 

hosted police training for Iraqi police. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I will take that up in a second. Are we doing 

anything to encourage them to up the ante of what they are contributing if we don’t even know what the ante is? 

Ambassador JONES. Well, they all made pledges at Madrid, and 

what we are focusing on is getting those pledges moving. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. The Madrid pledges, are those loans or contributions? 

Ambassador JONES. It is a mixture. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Do we know what the breakdown is and do we 

know what the total is? 

Ambassador JONES. Yes, I believe that is part of the public 

record. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. And what would that record indicate, what number? 

Ambassador JONES. We can’t provide it to you, especially if you 

want to rack up for Arab states, because the information that I 

have isn’t done by—it is done by individual countries, and I would 

have to sit here and sum it up for you. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. If you could give us all the individual countries, 

we can identify which ones we want to look at, and we would probably want to look at all of them. But it would be a disappointing 

number; would that be fair to say? 

Ambassador JONES. I have got Saudi Arabia, $500 million; 

United Arab Emirates, $215 million; Kuwait, $500 million. For 

countries of the size that they are, some of them, I would say, it 

is pretty significant and others less significant. 

Kuwait is a country of 2 million people, and for them to give 

$500 million is $250 a person. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. But if you figure out the GMP, half the country 

are millionaires, if not more. It does not really work that way. 

Ambassador JONES. No, it doesn’t. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. But you have a lot of oil coming out of there, you 

know. Five hundred million dollars is probably a half-an-hour at 

the spigot. 

Ambassador JONES. I don’t think so. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Well, maybe you can get back to us and let us 

know specific numbers. 

Ambassador JONES. We will be happy to. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. You spoke about the training of police. How 

many police and how many national security forces have been 

trained by us that actually show up to work, and how many by 

other countries? 

Ambassador JONES. In round numbers, 170,000 are trained and 

equipped by the United States. That is police and armed forces, 

Iraqi security forces. We are training them at a very rapid pace 

now. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Do you realize that is 350 percent more than the 

prime minister, Ibrahim Al-Jaafari, who you have cited before, told 

us at a lunch that we had with him? 

Ambassador JONES. Without knowing exactly what he said——

21

Mr. ACKERMAN. He said 30,000 military have been trained, and 

20,000 interior department—is that what they call the police? Interior. Cops. 

Ambassador JONES. I can’t say. There are several different categories of security forces. I am giving you the total numbers. He 

may have omitted some of those. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. He gave us total numbers. 

Ambassador JONES. Well, I wasn’t there, sir, and so I can’t comment on what he said. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. No matter which Administration witness we 

have here either at the Subcommittee or the Full Committee, either we get no answer, or dramatically different numbers, or usually, ‘‘I will get back to you.’’ Nobody has ever gotten back to me, 

and nobody has ever gotten back to anybody that has reported back 

to the Committee that somebody got back to them. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. If Mr. Ackerman could yield. The question 

that you would like to know exactly is, how many of the Iraqi security forces we have finished training? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Yes, and I would like to know what ‘‘finished 

training’’ means, because I think that is part of it. If somebody 

shows up for the day and they say, ‘‘It doesn’t sound like the kind 

of job that my mother would appreciate me having. I think I will 

go back and try to teach school.’’ Does that count for training because the guy came to the seminar that day? 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. We will make sure that we get you those answers. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. And does training mean more than 3 days, a 

week? And what does training mean? 

Ambassador JONES. We have many different training courses. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Does training mean they are ready to take on 

the task? If we are saying that we have 170,000 people total, the 

American people, and we are asking questions—and some of us 

don’t want a timetable, all right? Some of us don’t want a date specific. But we want to know what the truth is, and we are getting 

answers that are more Alice in Wonderland than fact, because they 

are so different. 

When we are told a number, and you said 170,000 altogether. 

Does that mean that there are 170,000 Iraqi men—I presume in 

Iraq that they are all men. I don’t know. 

Ambassador JONES. There are some women, but mostly men, yes. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Okay. One hundred and seventy thousand brave 

courageous men and women in Iraq. Does that mean that that 

number is ready to take over if we weren’t there, as long as there 

was a bigger number? 

Or does that mean that more work has to be done? I have been 

told that the training sometimes consists of a couple of weeks or 

so. 

Ambassador JONES. If you would allow me to explain. There are 

several different types of training. People who had prior experience 

receive less training than people who are new recruits. 

Some of those courses are fairly short, but most of the focus now 

is on training new recruits. It is on training those recruits, and 

equipping those recruits as they come out of training, and most importantly though, it is on forming them into units. 

22

We are working to build very sophisticated levels of organization 

of the Iraqi security forces, and this is something that has only 

been happening over the last year. A year ago, we had one battalion that was formed. Now we have more than 100 battalions. 

Now, I am not going to pretend that all hundred of those battalions are fully functional by any stretch of the imagination. Probably at this stage the number that are functional is in the tens, if 

that. But the point is that we have a plan for organizing them into 

battalions, for training them at ever-increasing levels, for forming 

those battalions into brigades, and brigades into divisions. 

And then the responsibility for security in the country will be 

distributed among 8 or 10 Iraqi divisions, and we will begin working with them to transfer responsibilities. There is a schedule. 

There is a plan. 

Now, can I give you time lines? I can give you time lines for 

training. We are now training people at about the rate of 10,000 

people a month. The plan is to have about 270,000 people by this 

time next year. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Is 270,000 the number of Iraqis that is estimated 

that would be able to sufficiently take over for United States 

forces? 

Ambassador JONES. I don’t think it is a question of numbers. It 

is a question of quality, more important than quantity. And you 

put your finger on that, Congressman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. That is exactly what we are trying to get at. 

Ambassador JONES. I understand that, and that is what we are 

trying to get at, too. And we are training the people not only as 

individuals, but as units, because a unit is much more than the 

sum of its parts if it is well trained, and we are working with them. 

As the President said last night, we are partnering American 

units now with Iraqi units so that Iraqi units have good examples. 

We are also putting in these transition teams to provide liaison 

with our people, but also to provide leadership for the Iraqis. 

The problem in building an armed force from the bottom up, 

from scratch, is developing leaders. To develop leaders takes time, 

and we are working very hard on developing that leadership by 

providing leading by example, and providing training courses, but 

also by providing on-the-job training by having our people work 

side-by-side with them as mentors to help them. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. We appreciate that, and hopefully that is all 

happening at whatever rate. But there is a difference between the 

170,000 figure that you cited, or the 160,000 that the President 

mentioned in his statement last night, or the 30 plus 20 that the 

prime minister mentioned when he was here the other week and 

the tens of thousands that you just said more likely are ready for 

that kind of a mission. 

Ambassador JONES. I said tens of units, of battalions. That is 

what I was referring to when I said tens of units. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Tens of units? 

Ambassador JONES. Yes, of battalions. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. And how many people is that? 

Ambassador JONES. That would be maybe 20,000 or 30,000. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. So this 30,000 may be? 

23

Ambassador JONES. In effective units, but it doesn’t mean that 

they are not out there on the street doing their jobs. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. No, I understand, but the question at hand is, 

where is the goal post? How far do we have to kick this football? 

How far do we have to run? I don’t need the exact yardage, but are 

we talking about that 30,000 that are well trained, well equipped, 

and know what they are doing? Does that have to reach 200,000 

because a million people went to summer camp for a week, and if 

you have 2 million of them, it is not? 

Ambassador JONES. Well, what I can say is that we clearly have 

a plan, and we are exerting a great deal of effort, and a great deal 

of resources. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. And that is exactly what we are asking. If we 

have a plan, it has to involve a number of troops. What is the target for the number of troops? And on top of that, there is no indication here that we are trying to get other countries to come in and 

take the place of U.S. troops. 

Ambassador JONES. We have an active dialogue with all the 

members of the coalition. We continually discuss these issues with 

the members of the coalition, and I mentioned that I am involved 

in that. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. And the coalition is anybody added rather than 

subtracted? 

Ambassador JONES. Well, it is current people and we are always 

looking for new countries to come in. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I know that we are looking, but the question was 

that I know a lot of countries, and I know Poland is in there. They 

are stalworths. But there are a lot of countries that have taken 

people out. Has any of the members of the coalition added one 

troop? 

Ambassador JONES. We have had countries that have come forward to add forces, yes. The Australians recently did, for example. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. How many? 

Ambassador JONES. Several hundred that they added. I think 

they have nearly 1,000 troops. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Mr. McCotter. 

Mr. MCCOTTER. Thank you, Madam Chair. It seems to me that 

the discussion is properly based as you stated, that it is a political, 

economic, and military endeavor at this point, because the effort to 

stand up the Iraqi forces must never be viewed as a panacea for 

what is occurring in that tortured country. 

If the United States military itself cannot curb an insurgency, let 

alone eradicate it, then standing up Iraqis while we are standing 

down American forces will lead to a similar result. It will not lead 

to an improvement of the situation. If anything, it might actually 

embolden the insurgents, because I am sure that they are more 

afraid of the United States military than they are of the Iraqi military, that has just been stood up. 

Secondly, the unconventional nature of the warfare, it is not as 

if we are standing up forces to go face down the Weinbach in World 

War II. We are trying to stand up forces that have to deal with suicide bombers and political assassinations, incidents which are not 

readily curbed by a conventional military in the broadest sense. 

24

So there has to be a political element and an economic element 

because as we have I think rightly identified, the Sunnis are the 

domestic base of the insurgency. Absent the ability militarily to 

eradicate that insurgency fully, it would seem that there must be 

a political and economic way that must be bound to bring them 

into the process. 

Now, given the fact that the Sunnis are understandably very, 

very concerned about their future in a Shiite-run Iraq, it would 

seem to me that given the long history of a total disregard for the 

rule of law, and legal protections of the individual, that simply 

pointing at a written document that takes the Transitional Administrative Law and puts it in a Constitution, if I were a Sunni, 

might not be the adequate protections that I would need to submit 

and participate in a new democracy. 

Now, what I would like to see if I were a Sunni is some tangible 

benefit for me at the end of the road. That there is an economic 

benefit to me. That there is a system in place that allows me not 

only to have my economic benefit, but to make sure that this government, the national government, is weak enough that it cannot 

come in and kill me when it wants to. 

I think that those would be bases upon which the Sunnis might 

be brought into the process. Now, I go back to my original concept 

of Iraq, post-reconstruction, would have been a strong tribal community in many of these areas, and a strong town council, a provincial government housing the Kurds, the Sunnis, and the Shiite, 

and a more weakly, more disparate power of the Federal Government, because that would make it less intrusive into your hometown. 

You see, the building blocks of Iraqi society are the family and 

the tribal relations. It is not the allegiance to the centralized Federal Government. And so I think that the more power that the Federal Government will have under this Constitution, the more endangered the average Sunni, or in other areas, other Iraqis are 

going to feel at the ground level, at the family level, at the tribal 

level. 

Which is why within that federation that I again go back to the 

fact that I would have hoped that at some point that we would 

have had a resolution, or at least a final decision on whether or not 

this new government, under that type of a structure, could have 

had something like an oil fund that would have provided a direct 

tangible, palpable benefit to the adult Iraqis, because that would 

have helped to curb the Sunnis’ fears that there would be no economic future for them in that country. 

It would have helped with a census count to get the per capita 

adult population. It would have protected the oil reserves because 

no one in Iraq would want a foreign fighter coming in and blowing 

up something that was going to put money in their pocket or their 

family’s pocket. 

It would reduce, again, the Sunnis’ fear and incentivize them 

into participating in the government, less they be cut out, and it 

would decentralize the greatest power base for any would-be tyrant 

to arise again in Iraq, which is the control over that oil and the 

revenues therein. 

25

But we have not had a decision on that, and that is frustrating. 

And in terms of the overall reconstruction, another frustration is 

that I represent an area with a large Chaldean-American population. 

Now, these individuals tell me, and from what I have seen when 

I have been over there from average Iraqis on the street, is that 

they are not seeing enough of the reconstruction money at the 

grassroots level. Again, this plays into the perpetuation of Sunni 

fears, and even Shiite fears that the United States is there to exploit them. 

The oil fund would certainly tell them that we are not there to 

steal their oil if they are making money off of it. But, secondly, in 

the larger construction projects that we have had, we have had instances where individual Iraqis on the street have been very upset 

about the fact that outside foreign contractors have come in to perform jobs within their towns, within their communities. 

Now, representing a manufacturing district, I can understand 

this. I think a lot of Americans can relate to the fact that if someone has a job, and all of a sudden, they don’t have a job, and someone is being brought in from outside the United States to perform 

that function, and gain that employment, that would make them 

very, very upset. 

I think that there has to be more of an emphasis on that. Now, 

you did say something that I found interesting. You talked about 

the provincial redevelopment committees, and you talked about 

them in the future tense. I take that as that they will be set up. 

Was that accurate, or are they in place already? 

Ambassador JONES. Most of them are in place already. In fact, 

I believe they are all in place, but I used the future tense because 

I am not 100 percent sure they are all set up. 

Mr. MCCOTTER. Now, these one-stop shots, are these entrepreneurial or are they residual? Are they there to empower individual 

Iraqis with their economy, and with contracts, or are these basically a place where grant money or loan money goes into a community, and then is distributed? 

Does this help generate economic activity among the Iraqis themselves, or is it kind of a pass-through or directional? 

Ambassador JONES. No, it is supposed to involve them in the 

planning process so they can take active ownership of the projects 

that are being—that donors are willing to implement in their local 

area. 

Mr. MCCOTTER. And they would have control over hiring? 

Ambassador JONES. They would be involved in the contracting 

process, yes. 

Mr. MCCOTTER. Would they have control over hiring? I am not 

concerned about the contracting process. What I am concerned 

about is that when the contract is left, that it is Iraqis performing 

the construction and the projects in those areas. 

Ambassador JONES. No, no, the intention clearly is to move in 

the direction that you are recommending, sir. 

Mr. MCCOTTER. But I would like to know, and you don’t have to 

tell me now, but I would like to know, to make sure that the Iraqis 

have control over the hiring of individual Iraqis within those communities. 

26

Ambassador JONES. Subject to legal restrictions on various donors. 

Mr. MCCOTTER. What type of a legal restriction would you place 

on that? 

Ambassador JONES. You would have to have some oversight responsibility. I mean, we are not giving the money to them and saying, ‘‘Okay, you guys do it.’’ I mean, it will be a collegial process, 

where they would have a great deal of input into the contracting 

process, which would include the hiring. 

I mean, we clearly agree with you, sir. It is just a question of 

making sure the money doesn’t disappear into somebody’s pocket 

rather than the work being done. 

Mr. MCCOTTER. And I appreciate that, Ambassador, but it is 

from the small vignettes of life that the rich mosaic appears, and 

what happens when you tell people that they are perfectly capable 

of building their own Constitution and fashioning a new democracy, 

but God forbid that we trust them to hire their own Iraqis, that 

seems a bit counterintuitive. 

And again if I were an Iraqi, I might be a little upset with that. 

So I would look at ways that we can maximize the empowerment 

of these individual Iraqi provincial councils, because this is what 

should be occurring at the local level, too. 

Ambassador JONES. We agree with you, but we have legal requirements that Congress insists on in how we spend the money 

that you provide us. 

Mr. MCCOTTER. And I will be more than happy to engage if you 

can find me ways that I can be helpful to relieve you of that burden, and I will certainly do that. Also, let us not forget that there 

will be slag in this process, whether money is given to a national 

government, or it is given to a provincial council, or it is given to 

a town council, there will be slag in the process. 

And I don’t think that one needs to look any further than the 

current controversy surrounding Congress, or something that many 

municipal governments, such as the Cook County Water Super 

Board, to recognize that we have not quite eradicated total corruption and nepotism from the United States Government either, no 

matter how much we try. So let us not expect more of the Iraqi 

people than we expect of ourselves. We can only try to help them 

along the way. 

And finally a caution that I think the Chair, the distinguished 

gentlelady from Florida, pointed out. I am very concerned about external subversion by Iran within the new and nascent Iraqi democracy. It is often easy to look back on the time of the late 1970s to 

early 1980s and the buildup of the Iran-Iraq water, to think that 

everyone who was chased out of Iraq was a murder to Saddam. 

We do know that in that period of time, in the wake of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the radical Khomeini regime tried to undermine and subvert the secular Ba’athist regime in Iraq, including 

assassinations, car bombings, et cetera. 

Now, some people were rightly refugees from Saddam’s brutal oppression, because they had democratic beliefs. But there were others who were not, and many of them are going to come back across 

that border, and they have been coming back since the end of this 

27

war because they have been waiting 20 years to help lead that revolution within that Nation State of Iraq. 

And I think that Sauders, that many of his followers fit that bill. 

I would hope that in the Constitution process that it would find 

ways to help curb the check of anyone who would care to assume 

some type of power, or infiltrate from within. 

Now, I certainly don’t mean this in the instance of the prime 

minister, but let us not forget that in some of the sects of the Muslim religion, it is not only permissible to lie to the infidel, it is a 

duty to lie to the infidel. 

So I am not always ready to take things at face value under the 

circumstances. For those who think that it would not be possible, 

I would remind them of the Spanish Civil War, where at the height 

of Franco destroying the Republic, you still had the anarchists and 

the libertarians, and the liberals, and the communists, fighting it 

out amongst themselves to see who would be the last person standing on the Titanic. So I don’t rule that out. Also, it is finally a plug in terms of looking at that Constitution. A decentralized government, where the oil 

revenues are predominantly owned by the Iraqi people, it would be 

far harder to subvert from an outside source than would be a highly centralized Iraqi Government, where the oil revenues are controlled by a central government. But that is just me. Thank you. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY [presiding]. Ms. Berkley. 

Ms. BERKLEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador 

Jones, there is no doubt in my mind, although I don’t know you, 

that you are a very hard-working and well-meaning person. And I 

have been in Congress for 7 years, and the last few years since we 

went into Iraq, I have attended almost every confidential briefing, 

every classified briefing, every hearing that I possibly could, to 

glean more about what is going on there on the ground in Iraq. 

And I have to admit to a certain frustration sitting up here. So, 

while the witnesses sitting down there are probably looking up at 

the Congresspeople, and getting very annoyed by our questions, I 

can assure you that our frustration up here matches that, because 

we sit in hearing after hearing, and I can only speak for myself, 

but I have to tell you that I still don’t think I get what I need, the 

information that I need, to make informed decisions and vote in an 

accurate manner by listening to some of this testimony. 

Now, I agree with Mr. McCotter. This is a very complex issue, 

and I don’t want to minimize it at all. It is a combination of politics, economy, and military, and we are in a quagmire in Iraq. And 

some of the issues that have come out in this hearing, I would like 

to explore. 

And I don’t know whether you are going to provide any more 

meaningful answers than we have heard already, but I share the 

concern of my colleagues when we talk about the newly-formed 

Iraqi Government developing closer ties and relations with the Iranians. 

Iran is a very dangerous radical fundamentalist country right 

now. The Iranians just elected perhaps the most conservative radical Islamic fundamentalist that they possibly could to lead their 

nation. That does not bode well for the United States and our leadership ability in the Middle East. 

28

It would seem to me after listening to the President’s remarks 

last night and his position that we are now in Iraq to fight the terrorists, that our so-called Arab allies, although I think there are 

precious few of them, would be more willing to step up to the plate 

and help us in Iraq since that is the region in which they reside. 

When you talk about the pledges that were made at the last conference, and the potential in Jordan of actually making good on 

these pledges, it would be a first, because our Arab friends have 

made pledges before, and they have promised to get involved in the 

Middle East process, and they have promised to help fund it, and 

we are still waiting for the first nickel. 

And that is especially true when it comes to Saudi Arabia. They 

pay suicide bombers families, but they haven’t done much to improve the infrastructure of the Palestinians. So I think if we are 

waiting for the Saudis and the other Arab countries to step up to 

the plate and help us in Iraq, and help the Iraqi people, I think 

we are going to be waiting a good long time, and that worries me, 

too. 

When you talk about 170,000 Iraqi troops, and I realize that 

there are different categories, and the other day we heard that it 

was 162,000, and when we also met with the prime minister, he 

mentioned 30,000. 

I don’t think Members of Congress have an accurate idea of what 

this is. I would like to know. I think it is very—according to the 

Administration, and your figures, there is approximately 170,000 

Iraqi troops and security personnel under the command of the new 

government. 

I don’t think anybody realistically believes, at least people sitting 

here, that there are 170,000 Iraqis who are trained and ready to 

take the place of American soldiers. 

The problem is that we don’t know how many there really are. 

We don’t know the extent of their training. We don’t know to what 

extent they can handle anti-insurgency and anti-terrorist activities 

without our support; and we don’t know if they have the equipment 

and the infrastructure necessary to do the job. 

And when Mr. Ackerman asks how many are fully trained, and 

how many of these Iraqis are ready to take the place of Americans, 

because the President said that when they are ready, American soldiers can come home. My constituents want to know when that is 

going to happen. 

So rather than talking about an American timetable to get out, 

what I think we need to be concentrating on is an Iraqi timetable. 

When will the Iraqis be ready for self-governance, and when will 

they be ready to take control of their military so we can in fact 

stand down? 

And 170,000, if we have 130,000 American troops there, and 

there are 170,000 Iraqis, that seems like a pretty good number. But 

it is obviously not. So do we need 300,000, 400,000, 500,000? 

At what point will we reach critical mass so that American soldiers can start coming home? I don’t know whether you want to answer any of those questions, but those are what keep me up at 

night, and those are the questions that my constituents are asking 

me. I don’t have an answer, and I have yet to get an answer from 

anybody here representing the Administration. 

29

Perhaps you could enlighten us. And one more thing. When I listen to the Secretary of Defense, who has not gotten one thing right 

yet, tell us that it is going to be another 12 years, where did he 

pick up the 12 years? Did it come to him in a dream, in a vision? 

Does he have any evidence about 12 years? 

Because there are other people who have said that we are going 

to be in there forever, and quite frankly, I don’t want to be in there 

forever. I think we are putting our Nation at tremendous risk. 

If there is another problem in the world, we are going to be in 

a world of hurt trying to defend our national interests elsewhere, 

and that is the problem about staying in Iraq forever, or staying 

in Iraq for 12 more years. Would you help me out here? 

Ambassador JONES. I come back to the remarks that I made at 

the beginning of this session. We have a strategy. It is an integrated strategy. It relies not only on the training which you are 

emphasizing, which is important. But it also has other elements. 

The other elements are political and economic. And the political 

and economic are more of the bastion of the State Department than 

the training. I am trying to do my best to answer your questions, 

because I feel that they are serious questions, and I am answering 

them to the best of my ability. 

But I am not going to comment on comments made by Secretaries from other departments. I prefer to stick with my own boss, 

and she has addressed this type of question recently, and she understood that it is difficult for the American people to see how we 

are making progress when they see the images of carnage on television screens every day. 

And so she said that it is easy for some to say that the insurgency is getting stronger, because that is what they see on television every day. But to defeat an insurgency not just militarily, 

but politically, and every day when Shiite, and Kurds, and Sunnis, 

and especially Sunnis, see their future in the political process, not 

in violence, the insurgents are losing the support of the Iraqi people. 

And when an insurgency loses the support of the population, 

then it does get weaker, and that is what we are trying to do. 

Ms. BERKLEY. What evidence do you have that that is happening 

at this point? 

Ambassador JONES. We have a lot of evidence that that is happening. We have many Sunni groups that boycotted the elections, 

that refused to participate in the elections, that are now actively 

engaged in the political process. 

That have lobbied the government to get Sunnis included in the 

government itself, which they did successfully, and have now lobbied the government to expand the role of Sunnis in the constitutional drafting process. 

And we have polling data which shows the same thing; that the 

Sunni rank and file are mad at their self-proclaimed leaders for 

boycotting the elections, because they saw that had they participated in the elections, they might be calling the shots, or they at 

least might be a lot closer to calling the shots than they are by having boycotted the elections. 

And so we have seen a real change in the attitude in the Sunni 

rank and file. We have seen a change in the attitude of the selfVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:31 Feb 23, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\MECA\062905\22261.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
30

proclaimed political leaders of the Sunni community, so that they 

are now participating actively. That is a fact, Congresswoman. 

Ms. BERKLEY. Are they also willing to step up and stand in the 

way of the insurgents, who are largely——

Ambassador JONES. More and more tips are coming in. We are 

getting more cooperation from people in communities helping us 

point out and apprehend elements of the resistance. This is true. 

This Operation Lighting, it captured hundreds of insurgents in the 

Baghdad area. Many of those insurgents were captured because of 

tips from Iraqis. 

The al-Qaeda leader in Mosel who was captured was captured 

because of a tip. So, yes, they are standing up. They are helping 

and progress is being made. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [presiding]. Thank you, Ambassador, and I 

am pleased to recognize Mr. Fortenberry. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you for coming today, Mr. Ambassador. I appreciate the opportunity to speak with you. In a former 

political life, I was a city council member, and we have a project 

called the Antelope Valley Project. It is a $200 million project, 

which for a town of my size is very, very significant. 

But it is directed to achieve multiple policy benefits; of transportation improvements, flood control, and urban revitalization. But it 

looms out there as a $200 million project, and so I suggested recently, because I have close ties to the hometown, that we begin 

to phase this. 

And I think the lesson is that if you can point to when phase one 

is done, and when phase two is done, it takes away or it gives the 

people a sense that we are making endroads, and we are making 

good progress. 

And in that regard, I think it is always important for us as we 

work through a difficult moment, and we may be in a difficult moment right now with a spike of insurgency, clearly, we look back 

at some of the remarkable political achievements that have been 

implemented in a country that has no cultural or historical foundations for implementation of a system based on democratic principles. 

With that said, I think it would be helpful if you could point to 

what that next phase we are looking at, and give a little bit more 

detail, namely the drafting of the Constitution. 

Do you think that is a firm date, August 15th? What do you 

project will be the outcome in the Constitution? How will Islamic 

law be handled within the context of, again, certain democratic 

principles that I assume are going to become an important part of 

the future working mechanism of the Iraqis self-governance? 

So if you could comment on that, I think it would be helpful, 

again, to set that next phase, or give a clear understanding what 

this next phase is. If we are close to implementation, that would 

be helpful. If we have got a ways to go on it, it would also be helpful. But it clearly lays out the next goal. 

Ambassador JONES. Okay. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. If the gentleman would yield for a minute. 

It is a most excellent question that gets us right back to the heart 

of this hearing, which is how far we have come in such a little bit 

of time. We forget to put it in perspective. 

31

And we will give the Ambassador sufficient time to think about 

good answers to those probing questions of Mr. Fortenberry. So the 

Committee will briefly suspend as we go to the markup before we 

lose our Members. 

[Recess.] 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And we will now go back without objection 

to the testimony of Ambassador Jones, who has been mulling over 

the very intelligent and thought-out question of our good friend 

from Nebraska. 

Ms. BERKLEY. Madam Chairman? 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes? I am sorry, Ms. Berkley. 

Ms. BERKLEY. I apologize for interrupting, but I am going to have 

to leave. May I submit my opening statement for the record? 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes, and I apologize. That means that I did 

not recognize you for the opening statement on the markup? 

Ms. BERKLEY. You did and I deferred. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Okay. That was for the hearing itself? Thank 

you, Ms. Berkley. Without objection, it shall be entered. Thank you 

my good friend. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Berkley was not received prior 

to printing.] 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And Mr. Fortenberry, you had just—if you 

wanted to reframe your question, or restate your question. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Well, it was so longwinded, I hope that I don’t 

have to restate it. I may not remember it. But basically, if you 

could give an update, or a bit more detail on the progress; that we 

touched upon the Sunnis. When I was in Iraq, there was clear regret on the part of Sunni leadership that they had not participated 

more actively earlier. 

I touch on that, as you will, as this deadline nears, and it is 

looming for the completion of a Constitution. 

Ambassador JONES. No, I appreciate the question very much, because on the surface of it, it sounds like writing a Constitution between now and August 15th must be nearly impossible. But in fact 

the Iraqis are not starting from ground zero. 

I mentioned of course the Transitional Administrative Law. 

There is an agreement between the two major parties in the governing coalition, the United Iraqi Alliance, and the Kurdish Alliance, that they will use the principles of the transitional law in 

drafting the Constitution. 

And the transitional law in fact is a very comprehensive document. It is a document that I think, I would dare say, would stand 

scrutiny compared to many Constitutions in the world, particularly 

in terms of its protection of individual rights. 

And so it is a very good basis from which to begin. It answers 

some of the questions that you raised Congressman, especially, for 

example, with the role of Islam, and so on and so forth, in a manner that was satisfactory to all the Iraqi communities. 

Those communities were represented in the governing council. 

The governing council adopted the transitional law by consensus. 

It was signed into law by Ambassador Bremer as the Administrator 

of the Coalition Provisional Authority. But he only did that after 

it had received consensus from the Iraqi Governing Council, whereVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:31 Feb 23, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\MECA\062905\22261.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
32

in all of the various communities and the Iraqi politic were represented. 

So I think it was largely acceptable, even to the minorities, in 

terms of the protection of their rights, as well as to the majority, 

in recognizing what they see as the fundamental role of Islam in 

their country. 

So we have a basis. Also, I pointed out that the constitutional 

drafting committee is working to add Sunni representatives, and 

they have a formula for doing that. The actual names are expected 

to be approved shortly, but they have a clear agreement in principle on numbers, and on the role that they would play. 

The drafting committee will operate by consensus. It will contain 

about 70 members. My understanding is that their plan is to add 

15 additional Sunni members, who would be full members of the 

committee; and another 13, who would be kind of an advisory council for the Sunni participants, and they would be basically non-voting observers to the process. 

You mentioned the deadline. August 15th is coming up, but as 

I said, they are not starting from ground zero. In fact, the drafting 

committee has already constituted itself into six subcommittees. 

Those subcommittees have begun work already. 

Some drafting has been accomplished. Great areas of the document should be noncontroversial. They can be taken largely from 

the transitional law, or from other bodies of Iraqi law, or from 

other Constitutions. And so we don’t anticipate that there will be 

a great deal of controversy on many of the articles of the Constitution. 

And drafts are being prepared now. Obviously, no draft is final 

until it goes through the full committee, and that won’t happen 

until the Sunni mergers have been added. So that we do believe 

that by the time that we approach August 15, we will not only have 

a draft, but we may well be into a third, or fourth, or fifth draft 

of the Constitution. 

Because they are working I think quite expeditiously and efficiently, and a lot of the ground that we are talking about has been 

plowed before in the negotiation of the transitional law. 

Now, there are clearly some very controversial and difficult 

areas, where real political deals will need to be made, and that do 

need to be struck. But our sense is that, again, this is not virgin 

territory. These are issues that the parties have discussed with one 

another and debated with one another in the past in the governing 

council, and in the drafting of the transitional law. 

And in fact the relative political weights in the national assembly 

are very close to the same weights that were represented on the 

governing council. So I don’t see that we are going to see fundamental shifts in the point of view that will be represented in the 

drafting committee or in the Transitional National Assembly, compared to that which was represented in the governing council. 

So my suspicion is that in many areas the solutions will be familiar. They won’t be identical, but they will be familiar. And so I do 

believe that it is possible to have a draft accomplished by August 

15th, and to have the ratification of the document take place as 

scheduled on October 15 through the national referendum. It is doable. 

33

And I say that having just come from the meeting in Brussels, 

where a number of Iraqi ministers were represented. I heard nobody express any doubt whatsoever that they would not make that 

time line. 

Now, having said that, there is a provision for extending the 

drafting, as Congressman Ackerman, I think, was alluding to. 

There is a possibility in the transitional law to allow the extension 

of the drafting process if the national assembly decides by August 

1st that they are not going to make the August 15th deadline, and 

they can then extend up to 6 months. 

That would be an Iraqi decision based on their assessment of the 

situation at the time. My reading as one who talks with Iraqis a 

lot, and as one who has observed the process, is that they will not 

avail themselves of that. It is their decision to make, not ours. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Well, that is helpful information. Having been 

there after the election, there was a spirit of triumph. That again 

it was a measured progress that was made, obviously with turnout 

that was higher than most American elections. 

It was not only tremendous for morale of the Iraqi people, but 

also for American military personnel, who have sacrificed so tremendously. But we all know that those windows of momentum are 

short, and so I think encouraging, helping, and your assessment of 

the August 15th deadline is achievable, I think, is good news. 

Thank you. 

Ambassador JONES. Sure. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Congressman 

Fortenberry. And Mr. Chandler, who has been so patiently awaiting. Thank you, Ben. 

Mr. CHANDLER. Madam Chairwoman, thank you very much for 

holding this hearing. I think this is a very important hearing, and 

I am glad that we have the opportunity to explore some of these 

subjects. 

And, Mr. Ambassador, I thank you for your service to our country now in this very difficult circumstance, and your past service 

in many different roles for our country. I appreciate it very much. 

I would like to explore if I could a little bit about the financing 

of the situation in Iraq. I don’t know how much you can tell me 

about it, but what we are spending in Iraq seems to me to be quite 

the moving target. I don’t know whether it is $200 billion, $300 billion. 

I know that this Congress has authorized a great deal of money, and it has authorized at least $300 billion for this effort and the 

effort in Afghanistan. How much of that is attributable to Iraq, I 

am not sure. 

But I think it is safe to say that it is a considerable sum of 

money, and it is quite taxing to the American taxpayer. You know, 

when you throw around figures like that, it gets a little confusing 

to the taxpayer as to the difference between $200 billion, $200 million, and $200 trillion. It is a little bit confusing. 

But to put it in perspective, it has been helpful to me to notice 

that we are getting ready in this Congress, at least I think we are 

getting ready, to pass a bill to pay for roads, for road construction 

in this country for the next 6 years throughout these United 

States, at a total cost of $280 billion. 

34

So for me that puts it in perspective. We are spending about as 

much money, or in the neighborhood of about as much money on 

Iraq as we are spending on the roads of this country for the next 

6 years. 

Now, with that in mind, I would like to know what we are doing 

to see that oil production in Iraq is increasing. I would like to know 

what we are doing to see that Iraq oil production, if anything, what 

oil production is being used to defray some of the costs to the 

American taxpayer. And you threw out the figure $500 million that Kuwait, for instance, is providing to our efforts in Iraq, or to the efforts in Iraq. 

I find that to be a paltry sum of money in the whole scheme of 

things. That is less than $1 billion, particularly considering the fact 

that we went into Kuwait and liberated that country. 

It would seem to me that they could foot some of the bill. All of this in the context of our people paying $60, or roughly $60 a barrel for oil, and the price at the pump going up dramatically every 

single day in this country. 

We are spending hundreds of billions of dollars to deal with this 

situation in Iraq, and at the very same time, sending untold 

amounts of money over to that same area to pay for the oil that 

they are producing and that our consumers are using. 

Given all of that, it would seem to me—particularly since we are 

paying a heavy toll in the loss of life, in the maiming of our brave 

young men and women—these people ought to be doing much 

more, in my view, to defray our costs. What are we doing in that 

regard? 

Ambassador JONES. Iraq is currently exporting around 1.4 million barrels a day of oil. Even at today’s prices that is not enough 

oil to cover fully the expenditures of their own budget. They have 

a budget shortfall in Iraq, part of which is covered by assistance 

from donors like ourselves and the Japanese, and other donors; 

part of which is being covered by the IMF through its lending programs. So the short answer is that all of Iraqi oil revenues are spoken for by expenditures for the Iraqi Government budget. 

Now, what does that government budget go for? The vast majority of the expenditures in the Iraqi budget are for salaries of Iraqi 

Government employees, the majority of whom are members of the 

security forces. 

So in effect the Iraqi oil money, a large proportion of the Iraqi 

oil money is going to fund the security expenses for the country. 

So I don’t know if that fully answers your question, but in fact Iraq 

is paying out of its oil money as much as it can for the defense of 

itself, of its country. 

Mr. CHANDLER. Where are we in terms of getting the oil production up to the levels where it was prior to the invasion? 

Ambassador JONES. Oh, I think we are up to those levels, in 

terms of production. Total production is a little over 2 million barrels a day, and I think that is about what it was before the war. 

We have had difficulty getting beyond that because of sabotage, attacks on infrastructure. 

This is an issue that has been of continuing concern, and we 

have been working very hard to develop a plan for improving infrastructure protection, and that plan is now being implemented. It 

35

involves training and equipping of special Iraqi forces to engage in 

the protection of the infrastructure. 

And also we are looking at the hardening of particular key nodes 

in the infrastructure to protect them from disruption by insurgents. 

So we are looking at this issue, and we are working on it. 

We have also transferred money to do things like workovers of 

wells, and to look at refurbishing or constructing gas oil separating 

plants, which are necessary to be able to increase oil production. 

So we are working with the Iraqi Ministry of Oil to help it in key 

areas to de-bottleneck and to expand their production. 

So this is an area that we agree fully with the comments that 

you made, and we are working to redirect our assistance program 

to, in fact, expand oil production. 

Mr. CHANDLER. Well, the sellers of oil, like Kuwait, are essentially reaping an enormous windfall as a result of the spiking of oil 

prices internationally. Don’t you believe that a country like Kuwait, 

particularly given what we have done to give them their independence essentially, don’t you think that a country like that ought to 

be contributing a little bit more to the cost of an effort like this? 

And particularly since we are sending so much money in revenue 

in that direction just by paying for what we have to pay for at the 

pump. Shouldn’t they be contributing a little bit more than half of 

$1 billion? 

Ambassador JONES. Well, of course, the figure that you cited is 

the figure that they pledged in Madrid. It is not the total amount 

of money that Kuwait has spent. 

Mr. CHANDLER. Do you know what that figure is, the total figure? 

Ambassador JONES. I don’t know the total number, but I do know 

that while I was Ambassador to Kuwait, early on the Kuwaiti Parliament appropriated $500 million Kuwaiti denars in support of our 

presence in Kuwait, and in preparation for Operation Iraqi Freedom, and that is about $1.6 billion. 

It was appropriated within the Kuwaiti Parliament for support 

for Operation Iraqi Freedom, and as the American Ambassador to 

Kuwait, I was instrumental in the discussions which I think encouraged that step to be taken. 

Mr. CHANDLER. Is it your belief that that is sufficient support? 

Ambassador JONES. Well, I am not going to get into what is sufficient, because——

Mr. BOOZMAN [presiding]. In the interest of fairness, let us move 

on and then if we can, we will come back. Mr. Mack. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Ambassador. You know, this is a tough time, I think, for all Americans 

and for a lot of people all over the world. Our men and women are 

fighting in Iraq for a noble cause, the spread of freedom. 

And as I look back and think of from where we have come, and 

where we are now, it has been astonishing, really, if you think of 

the progress that has been made. But I am curious to know if you 

could give me an insight of what you believe the trials of some of 

the former regime officials, what kind of impact that has on the political landscape in Iraq. 

And then specifically the trial of Saddam Hussein, and what impact that might have on democracy in Iraq. 

36

Ambassador JONES. I think that is an excellent question. A lot 

of people have asked why it has taken so long to prepare the trial, 

and one of the things I think explains that is that a lot of careful 

preparation is going into this trial, and not just to the trial of Saddam Hussein, but the entire process. 

A lot of work has been done, for example, to exhume and do forensic investigation of mass graves, to document exactly who the 

victims of these crimes were, because only by documenting the victims can you actually follow the paper trail through to decide on 

responsibility. 

And I think that when the trials take place and the Iraqi people 

see for themselves the work that has been done to prepare the 

trials, they will be very proud. They will be proud of their justice 

system for having done this work, and put together all these pieces 

of information. 

And I think that it will show those people that still cling to the 

support or the fantasy that Saddam was somehow a great leader, 

will begin to realize just how brutal a regime he was leading, and 

it will force them to come to terms with the fact that he did not 

deserve to lead that country. Their country deserves better. 

And I think that it will have an impact on the resistance, the insurgency, whatever you want to call it in Iraq. Those people that 

dream for a return to their former regime, which are in the minority, but are still significant when it comes to creating violence in 

the country, I think it will damage their support. I think it will 

help turn a corner in the fight against the insurgency. 

It is not a magic bullet. I don’t think there is a magic bullet on 

defeating the insurgency. That is why we have an integrated strategy. That is why we are trying to train Iraqis. That is why we are 

trying to make progress on the political front. 

That is why we are trying to do what we can to spend the money 

that Congress has so generously provided in a manner that we 

think will contribute to the overall economic development of the 

country. The trials are a part of that. 

But they are trials that are going to be led by an Iraqi justice 

system, and I think that Iraqis will be proud of their system when 

they see how it has functioned, and when they understand the 

magnitude of the crimes, I think that will weaken support for Saddam within his own community. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I agree with you. I 

think when all of us see exactly what Saddam Hussein had been 

up to for many years, I think it will open a lot of our eyes and recognize how brutal of a dictator he really was. Thank you very 

much. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Mack. Mr. 

Cardoza. 

Mr. CARDOZA. Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to start by 

thanking you for holding this hearing. I have been complimentary 

of your efforts on a number of fronts, and I want to continue that, 

because the work that you are doing here is important. 

I want to start off by prefacing my statement by saying that I 

am not part of the cut and run crew. I believe that we must succeed in Iraq, or else it will have devastating consequences for our 

37

country’s long-term involvement in the region, long-term involvement in the world, and long-term security for the United States. 

Having said that, I will challenge you, Ambassador Jones, that 

having sat through a number of these hearings, largely of which 

the Chairwoman has organized, we continue to get conflicting information from the Administration, some of which we can’t even talk 

about because it is given to us in classified materials. 

But I will tell you that the information that we receive oftentimes does not jive from one administrative agency to another, and 

that is incredibly distressing to me. And I know that the other 

Members of the Committee have talked about it, and shared those 

kinds of concerns. 

There is a significant credibility gap in the Administration testimony, and you talk about a strategy, and that the Administration 

is carrying out a strategy. I would love to have a briefing on what 

that strategy is, because frankly I hear vague references to it, but 

I don’t hear the detailed information that would make me confident 

as a Member of this Congress that in fact the Administration has 

an effective strategy. 

And it is one thing to have a strategy on paper that you can 

point to for political reasons, or for different kinds of reasons, but 

one that is actually working is what the American people care 

about. 

The American people want success. They have invested an awful 

lot. They have sent their young men and women over there, and 

a lot of them have not come back alive, and a lot of them have 

come back maimed. 

They really want you to succeed. There is not a Member of Congress that I know that doesn’t want this Administration to succeed. 

And with that, I don’t want a timetable. I certainly don’t want us 

to pull out. But I have written an editorial that ran in my local papers this weekend, and I am not just going to sit here and criticize 

your strategy. I have offered my own. 

And that is to take as Mr. McCotter suggested earlier, allow the 

Iraqi people to use their own resources. I am told that they have 

111 billion barrels of oil in the ground there. That is one estimate 

anyway. At $60 a barrel, that is a vast sum of money. That puts 

them in one of the richest countries in the world if we just help 

them, empower them to help themselves. 

And I believe, as Mr. McCotter has said, and I was not here during his testimony or his statement, that he is talking about allowing them to section off part of their oil fields. I agree with that, and 

I didn’t hear all of his statement. 

But I believe that the international community should help the 

Iraqi Parliament section off some of their own assets, collateralize 

those assets, and help them pay for some of their own security. The 

American people are providing 90 percent of the resources over 

there that are being expended; and 90 percent of the casualties, 

and we certainly aren’t 90 percent of the world population. 

This is a globalized effort. I think that once we are able to 

collateralize some of their resources or help them collateralize some 

of their resources, then they can go about doing a strategy that 

works. 

38

So I am going to give you five points that I think just generally 

are necessary. Number 1, first and foremost, we have to close the 

borders there. We have to keep the foreign fighters from continuously streaming into that country. 

Second of all, we have to help the Iraqi people police the streets, 

and I believe these resources could do that. Third, obviously we 

have to help them build a strong standing army. 

Fourth, we have to help them secure economic development 

zones, especially in the Kurdish region in the north, and the Shiite 

regions in the south, to help them see what economic prosperity 

could be for their country. We have to show them a path. 

And finally, we have to rebuild the infrastructure, which includes 

utilities, transportation, and education. I believe that the Administration has not truly wanted to internationalize this effort, and 

until they do, we are not going to have success. We need to have 

a second round, another Madrid, another something, where the 

Iraqi Parliament asks the world to come in and help them, and I 

would like to have your observations on these points. 

Obviously, I have thrown out a lot at you in a very short order. 

But I would love to have some observations based on some of my 

comments. 

Ambassador JONES. Actually, your suggestions are not unlike 

what we are doing. We are working very hard, for example, to close 

the borders. We have a clear program, and one of the things that 

we are doing is, we are literally building hundreds of border forts 

while we are training personnel to man those border forts and 

equip them. 

So we are proceeding to do our best to close the borders. We are 

already on track on that front. Police? Absolutely. We have got I 

think 90,000 police that have been trained, and we are continuing 

to work to train them to greater sophistication. 

Mr. CARDOZA. Mr. Ambassador, if I could for just a second, because those kinds of numbers don’t jive with what we have read 

in the New York Times and Washington Post the last couple of 

weeks about the borders and what is happening. I know that you 

say that we are trying to do the effort. My whole point, and I really 

want to be respectful to you on this, but my whole point is that we 

are doing it alone. We are doing it. 

And we need to empower the Iraqi people in a more effective 

way. The numbers that we are seeing in other venues don’t jive 

with the number that you just gave me of 90,000. Effective. And 

the folks are not showing up, and they are not able to do, and what 

I am advocating is not that we quit. I think what we are doing is 

all fine, but that we need to do significantly more, and that is not 

within the capabilities of the current construct. 

And so I am advocating that we take their own resources and 

ask the world to just help us in a more effective way, and actually 

ask the Iraqi Parliament to ask the world to join them in rebuilding their own country. 

Ambassador JONES. No, I was taking them in the order that you 

presented them. 

Mr. CARDOZA. I apologize if I went up one. 

Ambassador JONES. But the point is that closing the border, that 

is going to involve tens of thousands of Iraqis out there on the borVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:31 Feb 23, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\MECA\062905\22261.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
39

der. We are providing them with the places to stand and the equipment to use. But it is Iraqi bodies that are going to be out there 

guarding the border. 

And the same is true of the policing of the streets and building 

the army. We are working with the Iraqis on all of these projects. 

We are working on economic development. One of the things that 

we are very actively doing is pursuing the reduction of debt for 

Iraq. 

I mean, a lot of attention has been focused on the issue of offers 

of assistance, but in fact the debt numbers are huge. Saudi Arabia 

alone probably is owed over $30 billion. If Saudi Arabia provides 

debt relief according to the terms of the Paris Club, it would be relieving more than $20 billion in debt, which would have a very important impact on the Iraqi economy. 

And it is true of the other Arab states as well. We are working 

to rebuild the infrastructure. Your issue on internationalizing the 

efforts, we agree completely. This is exactly what Brussels was all 

about. It is what Madrid was about a year-and-a-half ago. 

And we have seen the efforts after the Madrid lag, and so what 

we are trying to do is re-energize those efforts and expand those 

efforts. You mentioned the presence of the Iraqi Parliament. The 

Iraqi Parliament was represented in Brussels. They did take part. 

The chairman of their constitutional drafting committee was 

there, and their Speaker of Parliament was there. Their Speaker 

of Parliament addressed the group in Brussels, which had 80-something participants, and 60 foreign ministers were in the room when 

the Speaker of Parliament addressed the session. 

And his presentation was one that I think had the most impact 

on the people who were present, because he spoke from the heart 

as a politician, as did the prime minister by the way. So what I 

am trying to say is that the strategy we are following is quite similar to the one that you are recommending, Congressman. 

We do agree that we need to internationalize the effort. We do 

agree that we need to bring the Iraqis in and be partners with 

them. It is their country after all. In fact, they have to lead many 

of these efforts, and all the strategies that I am talking about are 

strategies that have been developed in concert with them, in discussion with them. 

We are not sitting here in Washington writing a strategy and 

sending it out and saying, ‘‘Here, impose it.’’ And this is why, on 

the issue that Congressman McCotter raised, the issue of the Alaska fund, or the issue that you are suggesting, setting aside part of 

the funds to collateralize, those are decisions that would have to be 

made by the Iraqis. 

The United States is no longer the Coalition Provisional Authority. Those days are long gone, over a year now as of yesterday, and 

so these are decisions that the Iraqis are going to have to make. 

We can help push them in certain directions. We can help advise 

them, but we can’t make the decisions. 

In fact, and I am sorry that he is not in the room, but I have 

been looking for an opportunity to mention it, but the Iraqis are 

interested in an Alaska-styled fund. That is an idea that they are 

considering. Now, whether or not it will be approved, I don’t know, 

because as I pointed out, they have serious demands on their oil 

40

revenues at this time. They already have a huge government budget deficit. 

But in the long run, they do agree that something like that does 

make good sense for Iraq. So I find it reassuring, and in fact encouraging, that we have as much commonality in this discussion 

not only between the Administration and the Congress, but also in 

issues that we have discussed with the Iraqis. And I think there 

is a lot of sympathy for the ideas that I have heard today in Iraq, 

as well as in Foggy Bottom. 

Mr. CARDOZA. A very brief follow-up, Madam Chair. I think until 

we secure the borders, Ambassador, and you can please comment 

on this, that this flood of suicide bombers or insurgents, whatever 

you want to call them, is causing us tremendous grief there, and 

it is causing the Iraqi people more importantly, and our soldiers, 

tremendous grief. 

And so while or unless the accounts that I am reading in some 

of the newspapers who have embedded reporters are inaccurate, 

that we have to do much more along that border. There is a 500-

mile border, and I read that there were minimal troops, or not 

enough troops to certainly close it off. 

And wherever we are, they aren’t, and they have a very good intelligence network to move around and to avoid us, much as we 

have in our own southern border in the United States. So that indicates some of the problems that we have. 

And that is why I say that there needs to be a much greater 

magnitude multiple times of what we are doing. The American people, as we have seen in the polling, aren’t willing to send more 

troops. Not even if we have them to send, because we have many 

challenges across the globe. 

So that is my point, that the Administration needs to truly encourage a different strategy, and while we agree on the terms of 

the strategy as you have just said, it has to be much greater in intensity as far as bringing in other folks to help. 

Two hundred and fifty Australians, I think, was your comment 

earlier to Mr. Ackerman’s question, and that isn’t going to get the 

job done. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. If you could give a short answer and then I 

would like to move on to Mr. Boozman, and Mr. Ackerman has a 

follow-up question. 

Ambassador JONES. Okay. These things take time. We are working to build border forts, and we are working to train people, and 

we are working to equip them. There is a schedule, and it is being 

followed. But it does take time. 

Can we intensify efforts? Yes. And in fact, I would say that we 

are intensifying efforts, particularly with the international community. 

Mr. CARDOZA. Thank you, Madam Chair, for the hearing. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Cardoza. Mr. 

Boozman. Thank you. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. First of all, I want 

to thank you for your efforts. This is a very difficult situation and 

I know that you are all working very, very hard. 

I am a member of the NATO Parliament, in the sense of representing Congress, and have been for the last 2 or 3 years, and 

41

have really noticed a tremendous shift in the last 2 years of the 

countries that fought us the hardest understand that though they 

did not agree with us doing it, they understand that now that we 

are in it, it is to no advantage of the Iraqi Government, the Iraqi 

people, and in the whole stability of the area for the Iraqi Government to fail now. 

And so something that I have been pleased with is that it has 

been alluded to on what the rest of the world is doing. I think 

many of those countries that fought us so hard are training Iraqi 

policemen, Iraqi military, not in Iraq, but doing it in Jordan, or 

other countries where they can do that. 

And so I have been very, very pleased with that, and like you 

said, there has been a tremendous shift in sentiment. I am not as 

aware though as far as—and this is really what the hearing is 

about, is about the political process. 

What are some of those countries doing to help us politically as 

far as the election process? We had a situation where you go into 

a country where there is no history. We take for granted having a 

census, just the very basic thing that you need to have in an election, and a county government. 

I was in Fallujah, and had the opportunity to visit with the town 

council of Fallujah, and some of the Sheiks, and the Mullahs, and 

things, and incidentally they were upbeat. This was in the heart 

of the Sunni triangle a few months ago. 

But can you tell us what some of the other countries are doing 

in that respect? 

Ambassador JONES. I thank you for that, because other countries 

are participating actively. You mentioned the police training. The 

European Union at Brussels described a new program they have, 

which is called the Europe Justice Program, which is a program to 

strengthen the rule of law in the country. It involves training for 

police, but it also involves training for judges. 

Of course, we are also doing legal training. At Brussels, a number of countries made offers of support for the constitutional drafting process, but they went beyond the drafting, to the entire constitutional process, and to support public outreach, for example, to 

help with support for the referendum that will be held to ratify the 

Constitution. 

Of course, the United Nations was very deeply involved in the 

successful elections in January, and intends to be involved not only 

in the ratification process for the Constitution, but also in the elections at the end of the year, and many countries support the 

United Nations, and therefore are working indirectly. 

I was amazed, in fact, by the number of countries, some of whom 

who had had no prior involvement or really engagement on this 

issue that came to Brussels, and came at senior levels, and made 

offers of assistance. 

Malaysia was there. Malaysia was a big critic of the entire Iraqi 

Freedom Operation. But their foreign minister came and he talked 

about what Malaysia could contribute by way of its example in the 

constitutional process, because it is a multicultural, multiethnic society. 

India made similar comments, and India had been distant from 

the efforts up until now. So there are countries that are coming to 

42

realize that regardless of how they felt about the initial operation, 

they know that failure is literally not an option. That the world 

cannot have another failed state. 

Afghanistan demonstrated that to all of us, that Iraq must be 

kept from becoming a failed state, and I think that is one of the 

reasons why I am personally optimistic that we will succeed in 

Iraq, because we are not going it alone. We are reaching out and 

we are being supported every day by literally dozens of countries. 

I mean, whether or not they put troops on the ground, there are 

many ways that countries can help. They can help with training, 

and they can help with economic assistance. They can help politically by sending an Ambassador, and putting up their flag, and 

showing to the Iraqi people that the international community is 

supporting their government. 

Even small countries can do that, and they are, and they came 

to Brussels, and they made pledges, and we are going to follow up 

with those pledges to make sure that they become reality. Thank 

you. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. Thank you very much, sir. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, and I know that we are 

almost finished with the meeting, but I wanted to make sure that 

I recognized that Mr. Ackerman wanted some follow-up questions. 

Thank you, Gary. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Yes, thank you very much, Madam Chair. I appreciate that. I just wanted to tidy up some of the answers to get 

a little better understanding of where we are and where we are 

going. 

First, on the oil. The oil production you say is about 1.2 million 

barrels a day. 

Ambassador JONES. No, I said 2.1. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Oh, I am sorry. 

Ambassador JONES. Production, yes. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. So, production is 2.1. 

Ambassador JONES. Yes, and exports are about 1.4. It varies 

from day to day. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. And this is better than pre-invasion? 

Ambassador JONES. I think production is about the same as it 

was pre-invasion, yes. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. It is about the same, and you said that this is 

not enough to sustain the Iraqi economy? 

Ambassador JONES. I said about a financing gap for the budget, 

for the government budget. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. If that is the case, how did the Administration 

so miscalculate the money that is produced by the oil industry 

when it asserted to the American people that the oil production 

would pay for this war if we are back to where we were prior to 

the war, and it is not doing it, not even closing the gap? 

They said that before your tenure, and I am sure that you would 

have had some input into that, but that is a huge miscalculation, 

and people are still puzzled by that, on what is happening to the 

oil money. 

Ambassador JONES. We continue, as I mentioned in response to 

an earlier question, we continue to have attacks on infrastructure. 

43

Because of the attacks on the infrastructure, oil production is 

lower. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. That is ‘‘attacks,’’ one word? 

Ambassador JONES. Yes, ‘‘attacks.’’ Not ‘‘a tax.’’ Not two words. 

That is right, sir. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I just wanted to clarify that for the record. 

Ambassador JONES. For example, the northern export line that 

goes out through Turkey has been disrupted for most of this year. 

That has reduced the production of oil that is possible from the 

northern field significantly. And as a result there has been a significant loss of revenue. 

So in spite of the fact that oil prices are higher, oil revenues are 

only at about the level of what was projected in the budget. But 

of course the budget includes tens of thousands of security personnel, as I mentioned. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. A different issue. The number of foreign fighters 

that are involved, what would your best guess be at that? 

Ambassador JONES. I am not an expert on that, but I have no 

reason to quarrel with the figures that have been in the press recently. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Which are? 

Ambassador JONES. I think 2 to 5 percent. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. So, 2 to 5 percent? 

Ambassador JONES. Was the numbers that I have seen. I have 

no contrary information. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. And the common knowledge is that those are the 

people who are mostly religious zealots who take the cause anywhere anytime? 

Ambassador JONES. I am sorry, but I didn’t quite understand 

what you said? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. The foreign fighters, they are not there as mercenaries for money? They are part of God’s army, so to speak, in 

their mind? They are the religious zealots who would do this as an 

Islamic cause to get rid of the infidels? 

Ambassador JONES. I haven’t spoken to one of these individuals, 

but that is certainly the impression that I have. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. A lot of the Committee Members used the phrase 

similar to the terrorists, or the insurgents, or whatever, and there 

seems to be a confusion, which is what are the people who are offering the resistance besides being the bad guys? 

There is a tremendous difference between insurgents and terrorists. All of the terrorists that are involved in whatever are insurgents. But not all of the insurgents would be terrorists. Some people would consider it guerilla warfare rather than terrorism, although there is a lot of terrorism that is going on. 

We stopped using terrorists as a reference, and I don’t know how 

many weeks or months ago, and the Administration has been referring to them mostly as insurgents of late. Is that a policy decision? 

Because we anticipate what some on the Committee have raised as 

issues that we are going to have to solve this eventually with some 

political savvy, rather than just militarily, because you can’t give 

those people everything that they want. 

And to have a compromise, and in order to have a compromise, 

you have to sit down and negotiate, and you can’t negotiate with 

44

terrorists, because that is our policy. So have we now decided to 

call the whole deal an insurgency? I mean, in some countries, we 

would consider it a resistance, I suppose, or what have you. Yes, 

please? 

Ambassador JONES. I think the people who are fighting us, and 

I will refrain from a label for the overall category. But I think the 

people who are fighting us and fighting Iraqis—because a lot of the 

attacks are on Iraqis, and in fact an increasing number are on 

Iraqis—can fall into several groups. 

I think that first of all, there are Iraqis and there are foreigners. 

The foreigners, I would classify as terrorists, because of the tactics 

that they use, and because they do not have a political agenda for 

Iraq. They have a political agenda that relates to the United 

States, and to their overall idealogy of somehow——

Mr. ACKERMAN. A religious idealogy? 

Ambassador JONES. A political-religious idealogy of restoring the 

kalafit or something like that in their imaginations, and I believe 

those are terrorists. There are Iraqis—and some of the Iraqis probably are terrorists, too, in the sense of the tactics that they are 

using, particularly against other innocent civilians. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. But they have no other religious ideological 

agenda, the Iraqis? 

Ambassador JONES. Some Iraqis may share the ideological agenda of the foreign terrorists. You have to realize that there are a lot 

of——

Mr. ACKERMAN. But the foreign terrorists basically are the people to whom the President refers when he speaks to the notion of 

taking the fight to them before they take it to us? 

Ambassador JONES. The al-Qaeda types, yes. Zargawi is the principal name that is associated with foreign terrorists. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. But that is not the basic insurgency. The basic 

insurgency would be sated if we were gone, and they could just 

have their internal civil war based on whatever. They are not the 

religious zealots. 

Ambassador JONES. There are some people that are opposing us 

or fighting us because of perceived insults that have been received 

or inflicted during the last couple of years. Some of them are fighting us because they want to restore the former regime. 

Some of them are fighting us because they want to——

Mr. ACKERMAN. These are former Ba’athists? 

Ambassador JONES. Yes, former Ba’athists, members of military 

forces. Some of them are fighting us because they want to continue 

the domination of their social group. So it is a mixture of people. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. But these are not people who are likely to attack 

the United States absent our presence in Iraq? These are not the 

al-Qaeda? 

Ambassador JONES. If they restored their regime in Iraq, they 

may well continue the alliances that they have forged on the battlefield with some of the foreign terror groups. We can’t assume that 

they would be benign toward the United States. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Have we reached out to any of the former 

Ba’athists to try to get them back in their uniforms? 

Ambassador JONES. We have talked across the political spectrum, and we are doing our best working with the Iraqi GovernVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:31 Feb 23, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\MECA\062905\22261.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
45

ment to make sure that it is clear that the political process is open 

to all Iraqis’ social, economic, and political factions. I mean, that 

is what including the Sunni Arabs in the constitutional drafting 

process is all about. It is to give them a seat at the table so that 

they have a stake in the outcome so that they join the political 

process, to split off people from the potential supporters of the insurgency. 

But there are some members of the insurgency that you cannot 

negotiate with. They are not interested, even if you were interested, because they are terrorists, and they have a separate agenda, and those people, you have to either kill, capture, or drive out 

of Iraq. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I don’t disagree with that, and finally, Madam 

Chair, finally, a lot of discussion was about the border, and do we 

have to do all of that? Have we made any progress or effort in getting some of our allies in the war against terrorism to help us? 

I mean, it would seem to me if this is now the center, as the 

President has indicated last night, this is the center of the war on 

terrorism right now, that our allies in the war on terrorism, who 

are our goods friends such as Pakistan and others, have we made 

any effort to try and get—not necessarily Pakistan. They have 

enough trouble controlling their own border. But have we reached 

out to these allies that are so close to us on the war against terrorism that the President continuously cites, to say that you have 

a stake being that this is the centerpiece of the war on terrorism, 

to guard that border, instead of us being there all the time, and 

we are trying to get so many Iraqis trained to whatever degree? 

Can we get 20,000 troops from the rest of the totality of the world, 

these 80 members of the coalition of the willing? Are they willing 

to send one person, or two people, or 20,000 people? 

Ambassador JONES. Well, first of all, there are members of the 

coalition that do have border duty, depending on where their area 

of operations are. The British, for example, in the southern sector 

control hundreds of kilometers of the borders with Kuwait and 

Saudi Arabia. 

Also, on the eastern edge, there are multinational forces that 

were responsible for border areas on the Iranian borders. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. But these are small numbers, and we are not 

talking about the border with Syria necessarily? 

Ambassador JONES. Yes. We have had lots of discussions with 

countries all over the world, and we continue to have them, in 

terms of their interests in providing support for the overall military 

operations. Of course, we do. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I wish you good luck in getting some of the people that we have had discussions on here. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Ackerman. 

Ambassador JONES. Thank you. I appreciate that. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I would like to, as we wrap up, recognize 

John Gamino, who is probably embarrassed that I am doing this, 

but a veteran of the United States Army, a veteran of the Iraqi 

war, who in spite of all of these difficulties that we have discussed 

today and all of these obstacles, and how rough it is for us to help 

the Iraqi people get on the road to a stable democracy, he says that 

46

if he had the opportunity, he would do it all over again. So, John, 

thank you, and thank you for your service and for so many other 

brave men and women, and I hope that our whole country follows 

the President’s message from last night, and we fly our flags, and 

support our troops, not just for the Fourth of July, but for each and 

every day. 

And without objection, I would like to put Congressman Dennis 

Cardoza’s op-ed from the Modesto Bee as part of our record, as well 

as today’s excellent Wall Street Journal editorial. 

I don’t know, Ambassador, if you had a chance to read it in support of the President’s policies on Iraq and the reconstruction efforts. 

And with that, without objection, the Subcommittee is adjourned. 

Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(47)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

OP-ED BY THE HONORABLE DENNIS A. CARDOZA, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS

FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

IRAQ: U.S. NEEDS A REAL SUCCESS STRATEGY

This country is in desperate need of a real dialogue on the future of our involvement in Iraq. 

As events in Iraq contribute to a deepening sense of frustration and anxiety 

across the country, some in Congress have begun calling for a fixed timetable for 

the withdrawal of U.S. forces. While I am distressed by the mounting casualties and 

lack of tangible progress on the ground in Iraq, I believe that retreat is neither a 

responsible nor practical course of action. The consequences would be catastrophic. 

If the United States were to cut and run from Iraq, we would send a message of 

weakness that would embolden our terrorist enemies across the globe. A failed Iraq 

would destabilize the entire region and undermine U.S. national security for decades to come. 

We must, however, face the hard truth: our current strategy is not working. Our 

troops continue to pay the price for the failure to plan for the post-invasion phase 

of the Iraq conflict. Equally troubling is the growing gap between the Bush Administration’s rhetoric and the reality on the ground. There have now been over 1720 

Americans killed and more than 12,000 wounded in Iraq. The situation is worsening, and there is no apparent plan for victory. 

In addition, American taxpayers continue to bear 90 percent of the financial burden of this effort—over $300 billion and counting—to the detriment of our domestic 

needs and fiscal health. The deepening quagmire in Iraq has stretched our forces 

to the breaking point as other serious threats emerge across the globe. 

It is urgent, therefore, that we change course and implement a real success strategy for Iraq immediately. At every turn, I have fought along with my colleagues in 

Congress to ensure that our troops have the tools they need to succeed. The current 

mess, however, is not the result of any failure on the part of our brave men and 

women in uniform. It is the product of a willful blindness on the part of an arrogant 

administration that consistently fails to acknowledge the reality on the ground. The 

time has come to conduct a sober reassessment of our strategy. 

Our goal must be to convince the people of Iraq that our objective is to help them 

build the strong, prosperous and independent country they desire. To achieve this, 

the new Iraqi government must have the resources necessary to finance a greater 

share of the effort to secure and rebuild their country. 

Unfortunately, the U.S. has not succeeded in empowering Iraq to utilize its vast 

oil resources to help fund reconstruction and security efforts. A critical step to rectifying this problem is ending the rampant corruption and thievery that currently 

plagues the Iraqi oil industry. Vast sums of Iraq’s awesome natural resources are 

being stolen by corrupt government officials and criminal elements. Coalition forces 

must take aggressive action to expose and stamp out this corruption, and to help 

the Iraqi government return oil revenues to their rightful owners—the people of 

Iraq. This is a matter of the highest priority, and it is unlikely that our broader 

efforts to defeat the insurgency and rebuild Iraq will succeed over the long-term if 

we are unable to accomplish it. 

The Iraqi government should then reserve major oil fields to be designated as collateral for new loans. These loans, to be secured from an international monetary organization, would be repaid by the government of Iraq at a later date. The Iraqi 

government could use these newly acquired funds to finance a broader international 

48

security force to assist the U.S. military and the U.S. treasury in shouldering the 

enormous burden in Iraq. 

Financial incentives alone, however, may not be sufficient to coax the international community to the table. We must also fundamentally re-evaluate our strategy for defeating the insurgency and demonstrate real progress to that end. This 

means ensuring that coalition forces are given the tools and instruction they need 

to effectively combat insurgents. Many of our reserve and regular army forces in 

Iraq have not been adequately prepared for this task. British forces—who are wellschooled in the arena of counter-insurgent tactics—could play a central role in this 

intensified training. 

Coupled with a robust new counter-insurgency effort, tapping the valuable natural 

resources of Iraq will serve as a strong incentive to encourage long-overdue international engagement. These international forces could then help Iraqis accomplish 

the following goals that our current policy has failed to achieve:

• Secure Iraq’s Borders. There will be no significant progress in Iraq unless the 

flow of foreign fighters into the country is stopped.

• Effectively Police the Streets. Iraqis need to feel secure in their homes and 

neighborhoods before they will stand up to insurgents.

• Build a Standing Army. Iraq must make greater progress towards developing 

a force capable of taking over security operations currently being conducted by 

U.S. forces.

• Secure Economic Development Zones. The Iraqi Government should focus economic development efforts in more stable regions of Iraq: the Shia southeast 

and Kurdish north. These projects could then serve as blueprints for expanding security and economic opportunity to other parts of the country.

• Rebuild Infrastructure. The redevelopment of Iraq’s utility, transportation and 

educational systems will be vital for long-term stability and prosperity.

By funding this renewed security effort, the government and people of Iraq will 

be taking responsibility for a significant share of their own defense and reconstruction. This will send a powerful message that they—not the United States—are accountable for the future of Iraq. But the United States must continue to stand with 

them, to provide the capabilities that Iraq does not yet possess. 

While there is no simple answer to the staggering challenges facing us in Iraq, 

the first step must be a constructive public debate. I believe it is time for Democrats 

and Republicans to step forward with new ideas, and to demand that the Bush administration right the ship. The stakes could not be higher—and time is running 

out. 

49

ARTICLE FROM THE WALL STREET JOURNAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE

HONORABLE ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE

STATE OF FLORIDA, AND CHAIR, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND CENTRAL ASIA


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