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IN RE ADOPTION OF JAELYN B.

Cite as 293 Neb. 917

In re Adoption of Jaelyn B., a min

Jesse B., appellant, v. Tylee H., appel

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed June 24, 2016. Nos. S-15-096, S-15-228.

1. Judgments: Jurisdiction. A jurisdictional issue that does not involve a 

factual dispute presents a question of law.

2. Statutes. The meaning and interpretation of a statute present questions 

of law.

3. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When reviewing questions of law, 

an appellate court resolves the questions independently of the lower 

court’s conclusions.

4. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Before deciding the merits of an 

appeal, an appellate court must determine if it has jurisdiction.

5. ____: ____. If the court from which a party appeals lacked jurisdiction, 

then the appellate court acquires no jurisdiction.

6. ____: ____. An appellate court has the power to determine whether it 

has jurisdiction over an appeal and to correct jurisdictional issues even 

if it does not have jurisdiction to reach the merits.

7. Constitutional Law: Courts: Jurisdiction: Child Custody: Habeas 

Corpus: Adoption: Declaratory Judgments. District courts have 

inherent equity jurisdiction to resolve custody disputes. And they have 

jurisdiction over habeas proceedings challenging adoption proceedings. 

Accordingly, district courts have jurisdiction over a related declaratory 

judgment action challenging the constitutionality of Nebraska adoption statutes.

8. Foreign Judgments: Jurisdiction: States. A judgment rendered in a 

sister state court which had jurisdiction is to be given full faith and 

credit and has the same validity and effect in Nebraska as in the state 

rendering judgment.

9. Constitutional Law: States: Statutes: Public Policy. Nebraska is not 

constitutionally required to give effect to a sister state’s statutes that are 

contrary to the public policy of this state.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

06/24/2016 09:09 AM CDT
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10. Paternity: Child Custody: Time. In Nebraska, a paternity acknowledgment operates as a legal finding of paternity after the rescission period 

has expired. And a father whose paternity is established by a final, voluntary acknowledgment has the same right to seek custody as the child’s 

biological mother, even if genetic testing shows he is not the biological father.

11. Paternity. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1402 (Reissue 2008), establishment of paternity by acknowledgment is the equivalent of establishment 

of paternity by a judicial proceeding.

12. Constitutional Law: Foreign Judgments: States. The Full Faith and 

Credit Clause requires states to give the same effect to a judgment 

in the forum state that it has in the state where the court rendered 

the judgment.

13. Constitutional Law: Foreign Judgments: States: Paternity. Neb. 

Rev. Stat. § 43-1406(1) (Reissue 2008) extends the full faith and credit 

requirement for judgments to a sister state’s paternity determination 

established through a voluntary acknowledgment.

14. Foreign Judgments: States: Paternity: Adoption. Whether a paternity 

acknowledgment in a sister state gives an acknowledged father the right 

to block an adoption in Nebraska depends upon whether the acknowledgment confers that right in the state where it was made.

15. Interventions. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-328 (Reissue 2008), to be 

entitled to intervene in an action, an intervenor must have a direct and 

legal interest. The intervenor must lose or gain by the direct operation 

and legal effect of the judgment that may be rendered in the action.

16. Foreign Judgments: States: Paternity: Adoption: Parental Rights. 

When the law of a sister state legally determines that an acknowledged 

father has the full rights of a natural father who can withhold consent to 

an adoption, that father is not a “man” within the meaning of Neb. Rev. 

Stat. § 43-104.22(11) (Reissue 2008).

17. Judgments: Collateral Attack: Paternity. The collateral attack rules 

that apply to a judgment also apply to a voluntary acknowledgment of 

paternity that has the same effect as a judgment.

18. Constitutional Law: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will generally not decide a constitutional issue that was not presented to the 

trial court.

Appeals from the County Court for Douglas County: 

Marcena M. Hendrix, Judge. Reversed and remanded

directions to vacate.

George T. Babcock, of Law Offices of Evelyn N. Babcock, 

and Jennifer Gaughan, of Legal Aid of Nebraska, for appellant.
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Shawn D. Renner and Susan K. Sapp, of Cline, Williams, 

Wright, Johnson & Oldfather, L.L.P., for appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Wright, Connolly, Miller

Cassel, JJ., and Pirtle and Riedmann, 

Connolly,

I. SUMMARY

In these consolidated cases, and a companion case,1 the 

appellant, Jesse B., challenged the adoption of his daughter, 

Jaelyn B. These consolidated appeals arise from the adoption 

proceeding in county court. Jesse attempted to intervene to 

challenge the court’s authority to exercise jurisdiction over the 

adoption proceeding. Jesse is Jaelyn’s legal father under Ohio 

statutes. Those statutes provide that he has a right to notice of 

a proceeding to adopt Jaelyn and that his consent is required. 

Jesse claimed that Nebraska must give full faith and credit to 

Ohio’s determination of his paternity. He also claimed that the 

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because he had not 

consented to Jaelyn’s adoption.

Despite Ohio statutes that give Jesse paternity rights, the 

county court concluded that Nebraska’s adoption statutes did 

not require Jesse’s consent to Jaelyn’s adoption because genetic 

testing showed that another man was Jaelyn’s biological father. 

Accordingly, the county court did not allow Jesse to intervene. 

Later, it issued an adoption decree.

We conclude that Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-1406(1) (Reissue 

2008) requires Nebraska to give full faith and credit to Ohio’s 

paternity determination. Giving full faith and credit includes 

giving effect to Ohio’s determination that Jesse must consent to Jaelyn’s adoption. Because he did not consent, we 

conclude that the county court erred in disestablishing his 

paternity through an adoption decree. We reverse the judgment and remand the cause with directions for the county 

court to vacate its decree. We deal with the custody issues 

1 See Jesse B. v. Tylee H., post p. 973, ___ N.W.2d ___ (2016).
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going forward in Jesse’s separate habeas corpus appeal from 

the district court.

II. BACKGROUND

Before setting out the facts and resolving some of the issues 

under Ohio’s statutes, we set out the judicial notice principles 

that apply here. A court may judicially notice adjudicative 

facts, which are not subject to reasonable dispute, at any stage 

of the proceeding.2 In interwoven and interdependent cases, 

we can examine our own records and take judicial notice of 

the proceedings.3

1. Jesse’s Voluntary Acknowle

of Paternity and Jae

Birth Certif

Jaelyn was born in Ohio in April 2013. The next day, 

the mother, Heather K., and Jesse signed before a notary an 

“Acknowledgment of Paternity Affidavit,” affirming that Jesse 

was Jaelyn’s father. The instructions provided that both the 

mother and the father had to sign the acknowledgment and 

have each signature notarized. The form explained that the 

purpose of the paternity affidavit “is to acknowledge the legal 

existence of a father and child relationship through voluntary 

paternity establishment.” The signature certification required 

each parent to affirm that he or she had read both sides of the 

affidavit. On the back, the acknowledgment included a notice 

of the parties’ rights and responsibilities. First, the man signing the form assumed the parental duty of support. Second, the 

notice provided that Ohio statutes limited the signatories’ right 

to rescind it:

Both parents who sign this paternity affidavit waive any 

right to bring a court action to establish paternity pursuant to sections 3111.01 to 3111.18 of the Revised Code 

2 Bauermeister Deaver Ecol. v. Waste Mgmt. Co., 290 Neb. 899, 863 

N.W.2d 131 (2015).

3 Id.
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or make a request for an administrative determination 

of a parent and child relationship pursuant to section 

3111.38 of the Revised Code, other than a court action 

filed for purposes of rescinding the paternity affidavit.

The notice explained that in some circumstances, a signatory 

could seek an administrative rescission of the acknowledgment 

within 60 days. A signatory could also file a court action to 

rescind it for fraud, duress, or mistake of fact. But a signatory had to commence a court action after the 60-day period 

for requesting an administrative rescission expired and within 

1 year after “the paternity affidavit becomes final pursuant to 

sections 2151.232, 3111.25 or 3111.821” of Ohio’s statutes. 

The form also provided that if the law presumed another man 

to be the father, the parties could not sign a paternity acknowledgment. The notice defined a presumed father to include a 

man who had signed an acknowledgment of paternity that was 

on file with the “Ohio Department of Job & Family Services” 

but was not yet final. Finally, the notice provided that either 

parent had the right to request genetic testing at no charge 

instead of signing the acknowledgment.

Heather and Jesse were later named as Jaelyn’s mother and 

father on her birth certificate. It was recorded in Ohio’s office 

of vital statistics on June 3, 2013.

2. Jesse’s Relationship

Heather and Jae

In the Nebraska adoption proceeding, the county court 

received Jesse’s affidavit for deciding whether he could intervene. In the affidavit, Jesse stated some background facts 

regarding his relationship with Heather and Jaelyn. Jesse met 

Heather in Omaha in June 2012, and they began living together 

in July. That month, they learned that Heather was pregnant. 

Jesse stated that he supported her financially and emotionally 

throughout the pregnancy. In March 2013, they moved to Ohio 

to live with Jesse’s parents. Jesse was present at Jaelyn’s birth 

and took an active role in caring for her.
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According to Jesse, Heather left Jaelyn with Jesse and his 

parents about the middle of September 2013 to pursue a relationship with a man she met on the Internet. Before she left, 

she signed the paperwork to give Jesse’s mother custody of 

Jaelyn. But at the end of September, Heather returned and 

asked to take Jaelyn for a weekend visit. She never returned 

Jaelyn. Jesse visited Jaelyn once in Cleveland, Ohio, about 2 

weeks later, but Heather would not allow Jaelyn to return with 

him. Later, Jesse learned that Heather had obtained a dismissal 

of an Ohio case to give custody of Jaelyn to Jesse’s mother. 

Instead, she returned to Nebraska with Jaelyn. She refused 

to allow Jesse to see Jaelyn, and at some point, she blocked 

his telephone calls. The last time Jesse communicated with 

Heather was on Christmas in 2013.

In Jesse’s motion to dismiss the adoption proceeding, he 

attached a copy of a letter from Heather to a judge in the Ohio 

Court of Common Pleas. In the letter, Heather requested a dismissal of the custody petition for Jaelyn. She stated that she 

had decided to retain custody of Jaelyn and return to Nebraska. 

The letter was dated October 7, 2013. Another attachment 

showed that the Ohio court dismissed the custody case on the 

same day.

3. Adoption Notif

and Commencemen

Judicial Procee

In January 2014, Jesse received adoption paperwork from 

Heather’s Nebraska attorney, Kelly Tollefsen. The letter stated 

that Heather had identified Jesse as a possible biological 

father and intended to relinquish Jaelyn for an adoption. It 

informed him that if he intended to claim paternity and seek 

custody, he should obtain his own attorney, or he could sign 

the enclosed forms for relinquishing Jaelyn and consenting to her adoption. In his affidavit, Jesse stated that he had 

contacted Tollefsen but that she would not provide him with 

any information about the adoption. He could not afford an 
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attorney and did not obtain legal assistance in Nebraska until 

later that spring.

In June 2014, Jesse filed a complaint in Lancaster County 

District Court for a writ of habeas corpus and a declaratory 

judgment. In that action, he challenged the constitutionality of 

Nebraska’s adoption statutes that permitted Jaelyn’s adoption 

without his consent. And he claimed that Nebraska must give 

full faith and credit to Ohio’s paternity determination. On July 

22, Jesse sued for custody in the Ohio Court of Common Pleas. 

On July 30, Jesse filed an objection to the adoption of Jaelyn 

and a request for notice of any adoption proceeding for Jaelyn 

in Douglas County Court. In August, Tylee H., the prospective 

adoptive parent, filed a petition to adopt Jaelyn in Douglas 

County Court.

4. Ohio Court Proce

A March 2015 order from the Ohio Court of Common Pleas 

shows that in September 2014, Tylee moved to intervene in 

Jesse’s custody action (after she filed a Nebraska petition for 

adoption in August). Tylee sought a dismissal of Jesse’s custody case, but the Ohio court continued the matter and ordered 

a home study. In October, Tylee moved for a finding that Jesse 

was not Jaelyn’s biological father and asked for a dismissal. 

The Ohio court again continued the matter and ordered the parties to file briefs. In February 2015, Tylee filed a notice of a 

final adoption in Nebraska. The Douglas County Court entered 

the Nebraska adoption decree on January 15, 2015.

The Ohio court stated that Jesse’s rights regarding an adoption were established by the acknowledgment of paternity. 

The court concluded that “[p]aternity is not an issue because 

[Jesse] is the legal father of Jaelyn . . . . This court is curious 

as to why this child was adopted in another jurisdiction when 

this matter has been pending since July 22, 2014.” It continued 

the matter for “pre-trial on the issue of custody.” At oral arguments before this court, Jesse’s attorney stated that the Ohio 

custody proceeding was still pending.
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5. County Court Proce

(a) Parties’ Pleadings

In Jesse’s objection to the adoption, he alleged that under 

Ohio law, his acknowledgment was a determination of his 

paternity as though Jaelyn were born to him during marriage. 

He believed that a person named “Tylee” or someone else 

would seek Jaelyn’s adoption and would claim that he was 

a putative father. He objected to any adoption and requested 

notice of any adoption petition or hearing. He also alleged that 

he had filed a habeas proceeding in district court to challenge 

Jaelyn’s detention. He requested that the county court hold any 

adoption petition in abeyance until the district court resolved 

the claims in his habeas proceeding.

As stated, in August 2014, Tylee filed an adoption petition 

in Douglas County Court. She alleged that Heather had relinquished Jaelyn in February 2014 and that Jaelyn had lived with 

Tylee for more than 6 months. Tylee alleged that Jesse was not 

Jaelyn’s biological father. She claimed that she did not need 

his consent because he had not filed an administrative request 

for notification of an adoption or an administrative objection 

to an adoption. She acknowledged that Jesse had filed a custody action in Ohio but claimed that the Ohio court lacked 

jurisdiction for unstated reasons. She requested that the court 

order Jesse to submit to genetic testing.

In September 2014, Jesse moved to intervene in the adoption proceeding. He attached a copy of his paternity acknowledgment. He alleged that the U.S. Constitution and Nebraska’s 

§ 43-1406 required the county court to give full faith and 

credit to his paternity determination under Ohio law. Citing 

this court’s decision in Cesar C. v. Alicia L.,

4

 he alleged that 

he was also Jaelyn’s legal parent under Nebraska law. Finally, 

he alleged that he had a constitutionally protected relationship 

with Jaelyn that required his consent to her adoption and that 

4 Cesar C. v. Alicia L., 281 Neb. 979, 800 N.W.2d 249 (2011).
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he had not given it. He cited the case number for his pending custody case in Ohio and again informed the court of the 

habeas corpus proceeding in district court.

Tylee objected to Jesse’s motion to intervene. She alleged 

that Heather had named two possible biological fathers and 

that genetic testing had shown that Jaelyn’s biological father 

was Tyler T., who had relinquished his parental rights. And 

Nebraska’s adoption statutes require consent only from a biological father. She alleged that Jesse’s paternity acknowledgment created only a rebuttable presumption of paternity and 

that genetic testing had rebutted the presumption. Because 

Nebraska’s statutes did not require Jesse’s consent, she claimed 

that he did not have sufficient interest to intervene.

Jesse responded with a motion to dismiss the adoption 

proceeding. He alleged that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and could not grant an adoption because he 

had not consented to it. He alleged that he was a necessary 

party because of his constitutionally protected relationship with 

Jaelyn. Additionally, he alleged that under Ohio law, Heather 

had waived her right to a judicial paternity determination 

because she signed the paternity acknowledgment and did not 

seek a rescission. He again alleged that the court must give full 

faith and credit to Ohio’s paternity determination. He claimed 

that Tylee and her attorney had committed a fraud on the court 

by characterizing him as a putative father.

(b) Adoption Hearings

At the hearing on Jesse’s motion to intervene, the court 

received Heather’s February 2014 relinquishment of Jaelyn 

specifically for adoption by Tylee. It also admitted evidence 

that Jesse had filed an action in district court. He argued that 

the district court therefore had jurisdiction over the matter. 

Tylee countered that the county court had exclusive jurisdiction 

over an adoption.

Jesse objected to genetic testing results that showed Tyler 

was Jaelyn’s biological father. He argued that the evidence 
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lacked foundation and was irrelevant because he was Jaelyn’s 

legal father. He argued that Nebraska’s putative father statutes 

do not apply to a child’s legal father and that for such men, 

an adoption proceeding is a collateral attack on a prior paternity determination.

Tylee argued that neither Jesse’s paternity acknowledgment 

nor Jaelyn’s birth certificate gave Jesse standing to block 

Jaelyn’s adoption. She argued that under Nebraska law, he was 

only a putative father whose consent was not required. Tylee 

acknowledged that Nebraska law excuses an adjudicated father 

from the 5-day time limit for filing an administrative objection5

 and that he can still file an objection in county court. 

But she argued that if genetic testing excludes that man as the 

biological father, he still has no right to block an adoption. She 

contended that there was no prior “judgment” to collaterally 

attack. The court admitted the testing results.

(c) County Court’s Orders

In December 2014, the county court denied Jesse’s motion to 

intervene. The court stated that Jesse had never filed an administrative objection, never contested the adoption in county 

court, and never asked a county court to determine whether 

his consent was required. It concluded that the genetic testing 

results were relevant and admissible. It reasoned that Neb. Rev. 

Stat. §§ 43-104.05(3) and 43-104.22(11) (Reissue 2008) render 

a man’s consent to an adoption unnecessary if a court determines that he is not the child’s biological father.

The court reasoned that the putative father statutes, read 

as a whole, affirmed this conclusion. It noted that under Neb. 

Rev. Stat. § 43-104.12 (Reissue 2008), the statutory notice of 

the mother’s intent to relinquish custody for an adoption only 

informs a “biological father or possible biological fathers” of 

his right to deny paternity or relinquish custody and consent to 

5 See In re Adoption of Jaden M., 272 Neb. 789, 725 N.W.2d 410 (2006). 

See, also, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-104.01(7) and 43-104.25 (Reissue 2008).
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an adoption. And the men who must receive this notice include 

a child’s adjudicated father or a man listed on the child’s birth 

certificate as the father.6 Similarly, the notice only informs the 

recipient of the rights of a biological father or “possible biological fathers.”7

The county court correctly recognized that we have held the 

5-day time limit for filing an administrative objection does not 

apply to adjudicated fathers or undisputed biological fathers 

who have an established familial relationship with their child.8

But it concluded that § 43-104.22(11) still governed whether 

a legal father must consent to an adoption. It determined that 

§ 43-104.22(11) made Jesse’s consent unnecessary because he 

was not the biological father. Therefore,

this Court need not determine whether [Jesse] should be 

called a putative (possible) or adjudicated (“legal”) father, 

or whether [he] did or did not establish a familial relationship with [Jaelyn] (a fact which is in dispute), because 

section 43-103.22 applies no matter which word is used 

to describe [Jesse’s] status as to this minor child born out 

of wedlock.

Accordingly, the county court determined that Jesse lacked 

standing to block the adoption because he had no interest that 

entitled him to intervene. In January 2015, the court entered a 

decree of adoption.

III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Jesse assigns that the court erred in: (1) denying Jesse’s 

motion to intervene; (2) failing to give Ohio’s paternity determination full faith and credit; (3) concluding that his consent 

to the adoption was unnecessary; (4) admitting genetic testing 

results and disestablishing his paternity under §§ 43-104.05(3) 

6 See § 43-104.12(1) to (3).

7 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-104.13 (Reissue 2008).

8 See, In re Adoption of Corbin J., 278 Neb. 1057, 775 N.W.2d 404 (2009); 

In re Adoption of Jaden M., supra note 5.
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and 43-104.22(11); (5) excluding evidence of his established 

familial relationship and jurisdiction; (6) determining that it 

had jurisdiction over the adoption; and (7) entering a decree 

of adoption.

Additionally, Jesse assigns (1) that Nebraska’s putative 

and unwed father statutes violate the Due Process and Equal 

Protection Clauses of the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions 

and (2) that these constitutional guarantees require a trial 

court to appoint counsel for indigent parents who object to the 

involuntary termination of their parental rights through adoption proceedings.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1-3] A jurisdictional issue that does not involve a factual 

dispute presents a question of law.9 The meaning and interpretation of a statute present questions of law.10 When reviewing 

questions of law, we resolve the questions independently of the 

lower court’s conclusions.11

V. ANALYSIS

[4-6] Before deciding the merits of an appeal, an appellate 

court must determine if it has jurisdiction.12 If the court from 

which a party appeals lacked jurisdiction, then the appellate 

court acquires no jurisdiction.13 But we have the power to 

determine whether we have jurisdiction over an appeal and to 

correct jurisdictional issues even if we do not have jurisdiction 

to reach the merits.14

9 Pearce v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., ante p. 277, 876 N.W.2d 899 (2016).

10 See Adair Asset Mgmt. v. Terry’s Legacy, ante p. 32, 875 N.W.2d 421 

(2016).

11 Pearce, supra note 9.

12 See In re Interest of Jackson E., ante p. 84, 875 N.W.2d 863 (2016).

13 Shasta Linen Supply v. Applied Underwriters, 290 Neb. 640, 861 N.W.2d 

425 (2015).

14 See id.
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1. County Court Incorrectly Ig

or Failed to Properly Res

Jurisdictional Que

Jesse’s pleadings and attachments in county court should 

have alerted the county court to possible jurisdictional issues 

under state and federal law. First, both parties alleged that 

Jesse had commenced a custody dispute in Ohio that was still 

pending. These allegations raised a jurisdictional issue under 

the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980.15

In particular, under that federal act, the record fails to show 

that the court determined whether the Ohio court was properly exercising jurisdiction over a custody dispute involving 

these parties.

Second, Jesse alleged that he had previously commenced 

a habeas and declaratory judgment action in district court to 

challenge Jaelyn’s detention. This allegation raised an issue 

under the jurisdictional priority doctrine.16

[7] The county court apparently agreed with Tylee that 

it had exclusive jurisdiction to decide all matters related to 

adoption proceedings. It is true that under Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 43-102 (Reissue 2008), a county court or juvenile court 

will ordinarily have jurisdiction over an adoption proceeding. 

But district courts have inherent equity jurisdiction to resolve 

custody disputes.17 And they have jurisdiction over habeas 

proceedings challenging adoption proceedings.18 Accordingly, 

district courts have jurisdiction over a related declaratory 

15 See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(g) (2012).

16 See, Charleen J. v. Blake O., 289 Neb. 454, 855 N.W.2d 587 (2014); 

Molczyk v. Molczyk, 285 Neb. 96, 825 N.W.2d 435 (2013).

17 See Charleen J., supra note 16.

18 See, e.g., Monty S. & Teresa S. v. Jason W. & Rebecca W., 290 Neb. 1048, 

863 N.W.2d 484 (2015); Brett M. v. Vesely, 276 Neb. 765, 757 N.W.2d 360 

(2008); Flora v. Escudero, 247 Neb. 260, 526 N.W.2d 643 (1995); Uhing 

v. Uhing, 241 Neb. 368, 488 N.W.2d 366 (1992); Shoecraft v. Catholic 

Social Servs. Bureau, 222 Neb. 574, 385 N.W.2d 448 (1986).
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judgment action challenging the constitutionality of Nebraska 

adoption statutes.19 In short, the county court’s statutory jurisdiction over the adoption petition did not give it exclusive 

jurisdiction to resolve challenges to Nebraska’s adoption statutes that could have foreclosed the adoption. In both courts, 

Jesse claimed that his relationship with Jaelyn was constitutionally protected and that Nebraska was required to give full 

faith and credit to Ohio’s determination of his paternity. So, 

the separate proceedings raised the same material issues and 

involved the same parties. And Jesse filed the action in district 

court first.

We point out these jurisdictional errors to guide county 

courts in future adoption cases. But our decision rests on the 

jurisdictional question that the county court did not address. It 

failed to determine under § 43-1406 whether it must give full 

faith and credit to Ohio’s determination that Jesse’s consent 

was required. Because § 43-1406 requires Nebraska to recognize Ohio’s paternity determination, the court lacked jurisdiction to decree an adoption without his consent.

2. Recognizing Jesse’s P

Rights Is Not Contrar

Nebraska’s Public Po

Section 43-1406(1) requires this state to give full faith and 

credit to another’s state’s paternity determination: “A determination of paternity made by any other state, whether established through voluntary acknowledgment, genetic testing, or 

administrative or judicial processes, shall be given full faith 

and credit by this state.”

Tylee contends that Nebraska should not recognize Jesse’s 

parental rights under Ohio’s statutes. She argues that doing so 

would conflict with the public policy reflected in Nebraska’s 

adoption statutes. She claims that a distinction exists between 

19 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-21,149 (Reissue 2008) and 25-21,150 (Cum. 

Supp. 2014).
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giving effect to another state court’s judgment and giving effect 

to another state’s statutes that are contrary to Nebraska’s adoption statutes. She contends that the doctrine of comity is inappropriate here because § 43-104.22(11) makes a legal father’s 

consent to an adoption irrelevant if he is not the biological 

father. And she contends that Jesse’s legal status cannot trump 

the desires of Jaelyn’s natural mother and father to permit 

an adoption.

Leaving aside the irony of Tylee’s argument that the rights 

of an uninvolved and unsupportive biological father are more 

significant than those of a legal father who has financially supported his child and participated in rearing her, she misstates 

Nebraska’s public policy.

[8] “The Full Faith and Credit Clause of U.S. Const. art. 

IV, § 1, provides in part that ‘Full Faith and Credit shall be 

given in each State to the Public Acts, Records, and judicial 

Proceedings of every other State.’”20 A “judgment rendered 

in a sister state court which had jurisdiction is to be given 

full faith and credit and has the same validity and effect in 

Nebraska as in the state rendering judgment.”21

[9] It is true that we have recognized Nebraska is not constitutionally required to give effect to a sister state’s statutes that 

are contrary to the public policy of this state:

[T]he Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel a 

state to substitute the statutes of another state for its own 

statutes, with regard to “judgments, however, the full faith 

and credit obligation is exacting.” . . . [A] “forum state 

need not give application to the statute of another state 

where the statute is in conflict with the laws or policy of 

the forum[.]” . . . [W]hile a Nebraska court would not be 

required to grant an adoption pursuant to California statutes when such adoption would not be permitted under 

20 In re Trust Created by Nixon, 277 Neb. 546, 549-50, 763 N.W.2d 404, 408 

(2009).

21 Id. at 550, 763 N.W.2d at 408.
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Nebraska statutes, a Nebraska court may not refuse to 

recognize the judgment consisting of an adoption decree 

validly entered by a California court.22

Revealingly, however, Tylee never discusses § 43-1406(1) 

in her brief. And we cannot conclude that recognizing Jesse’s 

parental rights under Ohio law is contrary to Nebraska’s public 

policy when the Legislature, through § 43-1406(1), specifically 

requires this recognition.

(a) Recognizing a Person’s Relationship 

Status Under a Sister State’s Laws 

Is Not Limited to Judgments

Section 43-1406(1)’s requirement that Nebraska recognize 

a sister state’s paternity determination mirrors Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 42-117 (Reissue 2008). That statute requires courts to recognize legal marriages in other states even if they would be 

invalid in Nebraska: “All marriages contracted without this 

state, which would be valid by the laws of the country in which 

the same were contracted, shall be valid in all courts and places 

in this state.”

And usually, no judgment exists in a sister state finding a 

valid common-law marriage. Instead, Nebraska courts have 

applied the law of the sister state to determine a party’s legal 

marital status.23 So, our common-law marriage cases illustrate that resolving the full faith and credit issue does not 

always turn on whether a judgment conferring a legal status exists. This is consistent with recognizing another state’s 

“[p]ublic [a]cts.”24

Similarly, in a will dispute, we applied the law of a sister 

state to conclude that a parent-child relationship existed under 

22 Id. at 551, 763 N.W.2d at 409 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).

23 See, Spitz v. T.O. Haas Tire Co., 283 Neb. 811, 815 N.W.2d 524 (2012); 

Randall v. Randall, 216 Neb. 541, 345 N.W.2d 319 (1984); In re Estate of 

Schenck, 5 Neb. App. 736, 568 N.W.2d 567 (1997). See, also, Millatmal v. 

Millatmal, 272 Neb. 452, 723 N.W.2d 79 (2006).

24 See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
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a California statute that created that legal status if a man had 

publicly acknowledged a child as his own and received the 

child into his family.25 So, we have previously recognized a 

man’s legal status as a child’s father that rested on a statutory 

paternity determination, not a court’s judgment.

And contrary to Tylee’s arguments, in Cesar C. v. Alicia 

L.,

26 we recognized that a paternity acknowledgment signed in 

Nebraska confers legal parental rights the same as a judgment 

of paternity. We turn to that decision.

(b) An Acknowledged Father 

in Nebraska Is Also a 

Child’s Legal Father

[10] In Nebraska, as in Ohio, a paternity acknowledgment 

operates as a legal finding of paternity after the rescission 

period has expired.27 At that point, the acknowledged father is 

the child’s legal father, not a presumed father. And under Cesar 

C., a father whose paternity is established by a final, voluntary 

acknowledgment has the same right to seek custody as the 

child’s biological mother, even if genetic testing shows he is 

not the biological father.28

There, the mother was arrested on drug charges after she and 

the acknowledged father signed a paternity acknowledgment; 

the father retained custody while she was in prison. After she 

was released, she took the child without his consent. He sought 

a judgment of paternity and child support from the mother. 

The mother countered by filing a separate action in which she 

obtained an order for genetic testing, which excluded him as 

the biological father. She then sought summary judgment in the 

acknowledged father’s paternity action. The trial court determined that the mother had a superior right to custody because 

25 See Riddle v. Peters Trust Co., 147 Neb. 578, 24 N.W.2d 434 (1946).

26 Cesar C., supra note 4.

27 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-1402 and 43-1409 (Reissue 2008).

28 See Cesar C., supra note 4.
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she was not unfit, but awarded the father visitation rights and 

ordered him to pay child support.

[11] We reversed that judgment. We found plain error 

because the trial court failed to give the proper legal effect 

to the paternity acknowledgment. We explained that under 

§ 43-1409, after the rescission period expired, the acknowledgment became a legal finding, and the mother had not challenged that finding for fraud, duress, or material mistake of 

fact. We noted that the Legislature added the “‘legal finding’” 

provision to comply with a federal mandate as a condition for 

financial aid.29 And we explicitly stated that under § 43-1402, 

“establishment of paternity by acknowledgment is the equivalent of establishment of paternity by a judicial proceeding.”30

We concluded that the genetic testing results were irrelevant 

and that the court erred in failing to treat the action as a custody and support dispute between two legal parents.

Tylee incorrectly argues that Cesar C. is distinguishable 

because the father filed a paternity action. He was not trying 

to establish his paternity for the first time in that action. He 

was asking the court to recognize his statutory legal finding 

of paternity, return his child, and impose child support obligations on the mother. The important point is that we held 

the paternity acknowledgment gave him the same right to 

seek custody of his child as the mother, despite genetic testing showing that he was not the biological father. We did not 

limit that holding to a custody dispute between the signatories 

of an acknowledgment. Instead, we relied on § 43-1409’s 

explicit statement that an acknowledgment becomes a legal 

finding after the rescission period. And under that holding, 

it would be a strange result if a legal father nonetheless had 

no right to seek custody if the mother unilaterally decided to 

relinquish her child for adoption. But we need not decide that 

issue here.

29 Id. at 988, 800 N.W.2d at 256.

30 Id. at 986, 800 N.W.2d at 255.
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We agree with Jesse that if he had voluntarily acknowledged 

his paternity in Nebraska, we would recognize his status as 

Jaelyn’s legal father. In Cesar C., the acknowledged father’s 

equal right to seek custody was directly tied to his paternity 

acknowledgment. To hold that recognizing Jesse’s rights under 

Ohio’s statutes is contrary to Nebraska’s public policy would 

directly conflict with our recognition of an acknowledged 

father’s parental rights under Nebraska’s statutes.

[12-14] The Full Faith and Credit Clause requires states to 

give the same effect to a judgment in the forum state that it has 

in the state where the court rendered the judgment.31 Section 

43-1406(1) extends that requirement for judgments to a sister 

state’s paternity determination established through a voluntary 

acknowledgment. We note that most states probably have some 

version of § 43-1406(1) because Congress has mandated that 

states adopt this provision to obtain grants to provide aid to 

needy families.32 The federal statute ensures uniform recognition and enforcement of child support orders based on a 

foreign state’s determination of a man’s paternity.33 Because 

the Legislature complied with this requirement, it could not 

have simultaneously intended to give it a restricted meaning 

that forecloses courts from applying it to adoption proceedings. So whether a paternity acknowledgment in a sister state 

gives an acknowledged father the right to block an adoption in 

Nebraska depends upon whether the acknowledgment confers 

that right in the state where it was made.34 In Ohio, Jesse has 

that right.

31 In re Trust Created by Nixon, supra note 20.

32 See, 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)(iv) (2012); Burden v. Burden, 179 Md. 

App. 348, 945 A.2d 656 (2008); 23 Am. Jur. 2d Desertion and Nonsupport

§§ 73 and 74 (2013).

33 See, e.g., H.M. v. E.T., 14 N.Y.3d 521, 930 N.E.2d 206, 904 N.Y.S.2d 285 

(2010).

34 See Matter of Gendron, 157 N.H. 314, 950 A.2d 151 (2008). See, also, In 

re Mary G., 151 Cal. App. 4th 184, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 703 (2007); Burden, 

supra note 32.
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3. Ohio Parentage Sta

Ohio’s parentage statutes35 create a parent-child relationship 

that does not require a court order. Under § 3111.02(A), the 

“parent and child relationship between a child and the natural 

father of the child may be established by an acknowledgment 

of paternity as provided in sections 3111.20 to 3111.35.” Under 

§ 3111.01(A), the term

“parent and child relationship” means the legal relationship that exists between a child and the child’s natural 

or adoptive parents and upon which [§§ 3111.01 to 

3111.85] and any other provision of the Revised Code 

confer or impose rights, privileges, duties, and obligations. The “parent and child relationship” includes the 

mother and child relationship and the father and child 

relationship.

Under § 3111.03, a man is presumed to be a child’s natural 

father when an acknowledgment of paternity has been properly 

filed but has not yet become final. But under § 3111.25, an

acknowledgment of paternity is final and enforceable 

without ratification by a court when the acknowledgment has been filed with the office of child support, the 

information on the acknowledgment has been entered in 

the birth registry, and the acknowledgment has not been 

rescinded and is not subject to possible rescission pursuant to section 3111.27 . . . .

(Emphasis supplied.)

And under § 3111.27, either signatory can seek an administrative rescission of the acknowledgment if he or she requests 

a paternity determination within 60 days of the last signature. 

Under Ohio’s § 3111.26, “[a]fter an acknowledgment of paternity becomes final and enforceable, the child is the child of the 

man who signed the acknowledgment of paternity, as though 

born to him in lawful wedlock.” Here, neither party asked for 

an administrative paternity determination within 60 days of 

35 See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 3111.01 to 3111.85 (LexisNexis 2008).
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signing the acknowledgment on April 16, 2013. Heather acquiesced in the establishment of Jesse’s paternity despite her later 

acknowledgment that another man could have been Jaelyn’s 

father. So after June 16, 2013, neither Heather nor Jesse could 

seek an administrative rescission under § 3111.27. It was a 

final paternity determination.

Under Ohio’s § 3111.38.1, if neither signatory requested an 

administrative paternity determination within the 60-day time 

limit, Ohio’s paternity statutes preclude bringing a paternity 

action, apart from specified exceptions. But these exceptions 

do not include disestablishing a man’s paternity in an adoption proceeding.

To the contrary, Ohio statutes require a legal father’s consent 

to an adoption. Under § 3107.06,

[u]nless consent is not required under section 3107.07 

of the Revised Code, a petition to adopt a minor may be 

granted only if written consent to the adoption has been 

executed by all of the following:

(A) The mother of the minor;

(B) The father of the minor, if any of the following apply:

. . . .

(4) He acknowledged paternity of the child and that 

acknowledgment has become final . . . .36

Section 3107.07 lists exceptions to the consent requirement.37 It excludes a putative father from the consent requirement if he failed to comply with the putative father registration requirements. But for legal parents, the exceptions to the 

consent requirement are more limited and do not appear to 

apply here.

Finally, Ohio’s § 3111.28 permits a court action to rescind 

a paternity acknowledgment for “fraud, duress, or material 

mistake of fact.” The action can be brought by either of the 

36 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3107.06 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009).

37 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3107.07 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009).
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signatories, a man presumed to be the father, or a person who 

did not sign the acknowledgment, presumably including the 

actual biological father if he was not a signatory. But a signatory must bring the action within 1 year of the acknowledgment’s becoming final. Heather never brought an action to 

rescind the acknowledgment. So, she has lost that right and 

Ohio law precludes her from disestablishing Jesse’s paternity 

in an adoption proceeding.

In sum, under Ohio’s statutes, Jesse is Jaelyn’s father, not 

her presumed or putative father. And he has the right to give 

or refuse his consent to her adoption. Under § 43-1406(1), 

Nebraska courts must extend full faith and credit to Ohio’s 

determination of Jesse’s paternity and his accompanying rights 

to withhold his consent to Jaelyn’s adoption. So, Nebraska is 

not a sanctuary state to avoid the law of the state where the 

child was born. Permitting this adoption would defeat the 

purpose of § 43-1406(1), which requires Nebraska to give full 

faith and credit to Ohio’s act. The county court erred in failing 

to recognize Jesse’s legal status and apply Ohio’s law to determine his parental rights.

4. Nebraska’s Statutes Do Not Pe

County Courts to Disestab

Legal Father’s Paternity T

an Adoption D

[15] Under the general intervention statute,38 to be entitled to intervene in an action, an intervenor must have a 

direct and legal interest. The intervenor must lose or gain 

by the direct operation and legal effect of the judgment that 

may be rendered in the action.39 The county court relied on 

§§ 43-104.05(3) and 43-104.22(11) to conclude that Jesse’s 

consent to Jaelyn’s adoption was not required. But we conclude that these statutes do not authorize a county court to 

38 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-328 (Reissue 2008).

39 See In re Adoption of Amea R., 282 Neb. 751, 807 N.W.2d 736 (2011).
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disestablish an acknowledged father’s parental rights under 

another State’s paternity determination.

Section 43-104.05 sets out the requirements for a putative 

father’s petition to establish paternity of his child born out 

of wedlock. Under this section, a putative father can only 

file such a petition if he previously filed an administrative 

objection to a child’s adoption within 5 days of the child’s 

birth or receiving notice of the mother’s intent to relinquish 

custody. At that proceeding, if the mother challenges the 

putative father’s paternity, the court can order genetic testing 

and determine that his consent to an adoption is not required 

under § 43-104.22(11). Similarly, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-104(4) 

(Reissue 2008) provides that “[c]onsent shall not be required 

of an adjudicated or putative father who is not required to consent to the adoption pursuant to section 43-104.22.” But Jesse 

is neither an adjudicated father nor a putative father. He is an 

acknowledged father.

We have stated that “to terminate a father’s rights through 

an adoption procedure, the consent of the adjudicated father 

of a child born out of wedlock is required for the adoption 

to proceed unless the Nebraska court having jurisdiction over 

the custody of the child determines otherwise, pursuant to 

§ 43-104.22.”40 That section sets out 11 circumstances under 

which consent to an adoption is not required from “an adjudicated biological father or putative biological father of a minor 

child born out of wedlock.” Six subsections in § 43-104.22 refer 

to a “father,” two refer to a “putative father,” and one refers to 

“an adjudicated biological father.” Section 43-104.22(6) eliminates the consent requirement if the child “was conceived as a 

result of a nonconsensual sex act or an incestual act.” Only the 

last one, § 43-104.22(11), refers to a “man”: A man’s consent 

to an adoption is not required if “[t]he man is not, in fact, the 

biological father of the child.”

40 Jeremiah J. v. Dakota D., 287 Neb. 617, 623, 843 N.W.2d 820, 826 

(2014).
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[16] But we conclude that Jesse is not a “man” within the 

meaning of § 43-104.22(11). He is Jaelyn’s legal father under 

Ohio law. To hold otherwise would be inconsistent with the 

requirement under § 43-1406(1) that Nebraska give full faith 

and credit to another state’s paternity determination. As we 

have explained, to do that, we must look to the effect of that 

determination under Ohio law, which gives an acknowledged 

father the full rights of a natural father who can withhold 

consent to an adoption. And in Ohio,41 as in Nebraska,42 the 

statutory determination of Jesse’s paternity has the effect of 

a judgment.

[17] For judgments, collateral attacks on previous proceedings are impermissible unless the attack is grounded upon the 

court’s lack of jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter.43 Only a void judgment is subject to collateral attack.44

The same rules apply to a voluntary acknowledgment of 

paternity that has the same effect as a judgment. Tylee has 

not attacked Jesse’s paternity determination for procedural 

or jurisdictional defects, nor do we see any grounds for such 

a challenge. We conclude that the court erred in determining that §§ 43-104.05 and 43-104.22 authorized it to forgo 

Jesse’s consent.

Although Jesse urges us to address his due process and 

equal protection claims, we decline to do so. Jesse concedes 

that he did not explicitly raise his due process challenges 

to Nebraska’s adoption statutes in the county court, and he 

did not raise an equal protection challenge at all. But he 

claims that he was unfairly deprived of an opportunity to 

raise these issues because the county court did not allow him 

to intervene.

41 See § 3111.13.

42 See Cesar C., supra note 4, citing § 43-1409.

43 Spady v. Spady, 284 Neb. 885, 824 N.W.2d 366 (2012).

44 Id.
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[18] An appellate court will generally not decide a constitutional issue that was not presented to the trial court.45 We 

recognize that in Jesse’s motion to intervene, he claimed his 

familial relationship with Jaelyn was constitutionally protected. 

But because we conclude that § 43-1406 requires Nebraska to 

give full faith and credit to Ohio’s paternity determination, we 

need not reach Jesse’s constitutional claims. And contrary to 

Jesse’s arguments, they will not recur on remand because we 

have determined that the county court must vacate its decree. 

Although they may recur in future cases, the Legislature may 

yet address these issues statutorily, making a constitutional 

analysis unnecessary.

Similarly, Jesse’s claim that he was entitled to appointed 

counsel in an involuntary adoption proceeding to terminate his 

parental rights rests on his constitutional claims and was not 

presented to the trial court. Accordingly, we do not address that 

issue here.

VI. CONCLUSION

We conclude that the county court erred in failing to give 

full faith and credit to Ohio’s determination of Jesse’s paternity. Section 43-1406(1) requires Nebraska to recognize his 

status, the same as if an Ohio court had entered a judgment 

of paternity. And full faith and credit means that Nebraska 

courts must give Jesse’s paternity the same effect that it 

would have in Ohio. Because Jesse’s consent is required 

under Ohio law, the county court could not disestablish his 

paternity without his consent in Nebraska. Because we conclude that § 43-1406 requires Nebraska to give full faith and 

credit to Ohio’s paternity determination, we do not reach 

Jesse’s constitutional challenges to Nebraska’s statutes or his 

claim that he was entitled to appointed counsel to challenge 

the adoption.

45 See Lindner v. Kindig, 285 Neb. 386, 826 N.W.2d 868 (2013).
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We conclude that the adoption decree is invalid, and therefore, we reverse the judgment and remand the cause with 

directions for the county court to vacate its decree. We are, 

of course, sympathetic to the heartache that undoing these 

errors will cause the parties after this much time. But we cannot ignore our duty to uphold Jesse’s parental rights under 

Ohio law.

Because we conclude that the court erred in exercising jurisdiction over this adoption petition, we do not set out instructions here for custody determinations going forward. Instead, 

we instruct the district court to resolve these issues in the 

companion case.

 Reversed and remande

directions to vaca

Stacy, J., not participating