NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v. CHRISTOPHER SANTILLANES CEJA,

Defendant

- Appellant. No. 21

- 30178
D.C. Nos. 1:19

- cr - 00141

- SPW

- 1 1:19

- cr - 00141

- SPW

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana Susan P. Watters, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted July 5, 2022 Seattle, Washington
Before: CLIFTON and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and CHEN, * * District Judge. Christopher Ceja appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss
the indictment and motion to suppress

. Because there is no Speedy Trial Act or Fourth Amendment violation, we affirm.
We r eview de novo a district court’s application of the Speedy Trial Act.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The Honorable Edward M. Chen, United States District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation. 

# FILED

JUL 18 2022 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

United States v. Medina , 524 F.3d 974, 982 (9 th Cir. 2008). In reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review the legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. United States v. Basher , 629 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 2011).
1. The district court properly denied Ceja’s motion to dismiss for a Speedy Trial Act violation. The Speedy Trial Act requires that a defendant’s trial generally

start within 70 days of the filing of the indictment or information. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). Pretrial motions requiring hearings automa tically pause the clock “through the conclusion of the hearing on . . . such motion. ” Id. § 3161(h)(1)(D) ; U nited States v. Tinklenberg , 563 U.S. 647, 655 (20 11 ). Ceja argues that more than 70 days elapsed because the district court improperly excluded 2 6 additional days between August 14, 2020 , and October 15,
2020

. Ceja contends that this time period should be included in the Speedy Trial
calculation because the delays were attributable to the government or the court. But Ceja filed a motion to suppress on June 15, 2020

. The filing of the motion had the effect of pausing the clock while the motion wa s u nder the advisement of the court.
18 U.S.C. § 3161 (h)(1)(D) , (H)

. See Medina , 524 F.3d at 979 ( explaining that pretrial motions which require a hearing automatically pause the clock even when the delay is not “reasonably necessary”)

. The clock was thus paused between June 15, 2020 and December 2, 20 20 (30 days after the hearing on the suppression3

motion)

. So the district court correctly calculated that only 69 days elapsed after Ceja’s arraignment and did not err in denying his motion to dismiss based on a Speedy Trial Act violation

. 2. The district court did not err in denying Ceja’s motion to suppress evidence

. P olice office rs had reasonable suspicion to stop Ceja ’s car based on two independent ground s: (1) violation of drug trafficking law s , and (2) violation of a traffic regulation. P olice officers had “specific, articulable facts” that Ceja’s car carried drugs based on information from a confidential informant

. United States v. Monte r o Camargo , 208 F.3d 1122, 1129 ( 9 th Cir. 2000) (en banc)

. Other evidence
corroborated the informant’s information

. The corroborated evidence provided “objective and reasonable inferences” for a “particularized suspicion” to stop the

car. Id. ( emphasis omitted ) ; see also Alabama v. White , 496 U.S. 326, 331

– 32 (1990) (holding that an investigatory stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment when an anonymous tip was significantly corroborated ). A p olice officer also witnessed Ceja committing a traffic violation and so Ceja could be stopped based on th at violation alone. See Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) ( holding that “the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred”). Ceja argues that the traffic stop was unlawfully prolonged because the traffic4

citation and the drug investigation were not conducted simultaneously. But h e cites no authority requiring the drug investigation to be conducted at the same time as the traffic stop . Indeed, “[w]e [have] recognize [d] that an officer may prolong a traffic stop if the prolongation itself is supported by independent reasonable susp icion. ”
United States v. Evans , 786 F.3d 779, 788 (9th Cir. 2015) . Here, since we conclude that independent reasonable suspicion support ed both the traffic stop and the drug investigation, there was no unlawful prolongation of the stop.
Because none of Ceja’s other arguments supports suppressing the drug
evidence , the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED.