GENERATIONS APART:

XERS AND BOOMERS

IN THE OFFICER CORPS

Leonard Wong

October 2000
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ISBN 1-58487-038-9

ii
FOREWORD

The junior officer attrition problem has grown in

importance and urgency to reach the levels of the Secretary

and Chief of Staff of the Army. They have instituted pay

raises, pay table reform, and improved retirement benefits

to stem the flow of captains and others from the Army. At

the same time, the Army’s senior leadership has sensitized

battalion commanders throughout the force to the issue and

is trying to convince captains to continue in the Army. Yet

attitudinal surveys predict and exit numbers verify that the

exodus of junior officers has not abated.

In the following monograph, Leonard Wong mines the

generational differences literature for insights. Organizations in the civilian sector have been forced to deal with

conflict between the Baby Boomer generation and

Generation X and the Army is now discovering that it is no

different. 

The analysis in this monograph goes beyond anecdotes,

e-mails, and editorials to describe the situation the Army

finds itself in today. It is at times an uncomfortable and

difficult process to objectively examine our perspectives in

relation to others. The key point is that today’s junior

officers think differently than junior officers in the past and

hence solutions to the attrition problem cannot come from

the traditional menu of conventional fixes.

Retaining our junior officers will require policy changes

and critical leadership actions. This monograph convincingly makes the case for both.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

LEONARD WONG joined the Strategic Studies Institute in

July 2000 after serving 20 years in the U.S. Army. His time

in the Army included teaching leadership at the U.S.

Military Academy, serving as an analyst in the Program

Analysis and Evaluation Directorate and later in the Office

of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, and serving as the

Director of the Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis.

He has authored several articles, chapters, and papers on

organizational issues in the Army such as downsizing,

leadership, and junior officer retention. He is a registered

Professional Engineer and holds a B.S. from the U.S.

Military Academy, and an M.S.B.A. and Ph.D. from Texas

Tech University.

iv
SUMMARY

This monograph addresses the junior officer attrition

problem by identifying and discussing the disparity

between senior and junior officers in terms of generational

differences. Officers from the Baby Boom Generation think

and perceive things differently than officers from

Generation X. Using empirical evidence to support the

generational differences literature, the author points out

that Generation X officers are more confident in their

abilities, perceive loyalty differently, want more balance

between work and family, and are not intimidated by rank.

Additionally, while pay is important to Generation X

officers, it alone will not keep junior officers from leaving.

The solutions presented in the monograph range from

strategic policies changing the Army as an organization to

operational leadership actions affecting the face-to-face

interaction between senior and junior officers.

v
GENERATIONS APART:

XERS AND BOOMERS

IN THE OFFICER CORPS

Introduction.

In July of 1998, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for

Personnel (ODCSPER) released a message addressing the

growing concern of junior officers departing the Army. The

message stated that,

ODCSPER analysts confirm that officer retention is down

slightly for all grades except lieutenant and major. However,

the downturn in retention is not significant, and rates remain

within bounds of pre-drawdown rates.

1

Less than 2 years later, the Vice Chief of Staff of the

Army (VCSA) sent another message on the same topic. This

time, however, the message stated that,

. . .in the last 10 years, the voluntary attrition rate for captains

has risen from 6.7% to an all-time high of 10.6%. If we, as

senior leaders, don’t take action now to turn this around, we

may not be able to meet our future requirements.

2

Shortly after the VCSA’s message was sent to commanders,

the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army

set up a Blue Ribbon panel tasked with developing specific

recommendations on how the Army could stop the exodus of

junior officers in the near, mid, and long-term future.

3

In less than 2 years, the Army shifted from denial of a

junior officer retention problem to a situation where the

most senior Army leadership became involved in seeking

help to staunch the flow of captains out of the Army. How

could Army senior leaders miss the signals of an attrition

problem? How could the Army’s senior leadership not see

junior officer resignation numbers increasing or hear the

growing discontent at the junior officer level?

1
One answer is that the Army’s downsizing masked the

increasing departure of junior officers. In the process of

drawing down a force of 780,000 to an Army of 480,000, so

many junior officers were enticed, encouraged, or induced to

leave that the resignation of junior officers became routine

and viewed as generally good for the organization.

Downsizing was painful, but the huge number of junior

officers that left the Army was viewed as an expected and

accepted consequence. The continued attrition that

occurred after the conclusion of the downsizing was thought

to be a temporary state while the organization recovered

from the drawdown.

In addition to desensitizing the force to junior officers

leaving, the downsizing had a far more subtle effect. Eight

years of downsizing affected the attitudes of the

survivors—those officers left behind. Research in

organizational behavior had well documented the

detrimental effects on survivors as a consequence of

drawing down an organization.

4

 The Army as an

organization was no exception. The psychological bond

between officer survivors and the Army was weakened and

redefined.

5

 As competition in the now trimmer Army

became keener, a stifling atmosphere of perfection known

as the “zero defects mentality” along with notions of

careerism emerged.

6

 This is the environment encountered

by today’s junior officers soon after commissioning.

The attitudinal effects of the downsizing were

overshadowed, however, by reduced budgets and increased

operating tempo (OPTEMPO). With the Army’s attention

focused on adjusting to a post-Cold War period, the

attitudinal changes in the junior officer population largely

escaped the notice of the senior Army leadership. Instead,

debate arose over the role of peacekeeping, humanitarian

assistance, a shrinking labor market from which to recruit,

a rush to digitization, and the need for a larger budget slice.

Thus, in addition to the numbing effects of forced attrition

due to downsizing, the changing roles and missions of the

Army after the fall of the Berlin Wall shifted the Army

2
leadership’s attention away from monitoring its people to

reevaluating the Army’s relevance in a post-Cold War

world.

7

The Generational Divide.

Now that the junior officer attrition crisis has the

attention of the Army leadership, it seems plausible that the

problem may now be analyzed and remedied, assuming

adequate resources are available. One factor, however, that

contributed to the senior Army leadership overlooking the

attrition problem in the first place will continue to hamper

efforts to overcome it. Simply put, today’s senior officers do

not understand today’s junior officers or their perspectives.

Senior officers think they understand the world of

lieutenants and captains, but many junior officers and

others are convinced that they do not. Junior officers have

become persuaded in increasing numbers that the Army’s

senior leadership is not connected to the reality of the

trenches. 

This monograph identifies and discusses the disparity

between senior and junior officers in terms of generational

differences. The objective of this monograph is to inform

senior officers about captains and their perspectives during

a time when many junior officers believe that senior officers

“just don’t get it.” The analysis is at times stereotypical and

over-generalizing, but it addresses a disturbing message

that is growing in intensity in the junior officer ranks of the

Army. 

For example, in the spring of 1999 in the Sample Survey

of Military Personnel administered by the Army Research

Institute, sample comments concerning senior officers

included a major commenting that the problem is, “Trust in

senior leadership. My personal opinion is that they are out

of touch with what is happening, where the rubber meets

the road.” A colonel remarked,

3
I talk to a lot of young officers. They have lost faith with the

senior leadership of the Army. They believe they [senior leaders]

are either out of touch with reality or liars. We’re losing a

generation of good leaders.

A lieutenant added,

The largest problem affecting retention of junior officers is the

perception that the senior leadership (LTC+) is completely out

of touch with soldiers and their needs.

8

A study on military culture conducted by the Center for

Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) reiterated the

theme of mistrust and differing perceptions across ranks. In

that study, focus group participants believed, “that senior

leaders were out of touch with conditions in the field and

fleet.”

9

 The researchers found differing perceptions across

the junior and senior ranks, noting that issues ranged from,

. . . agreement by senior leaders to take on missions that have

stressed their forces beyond what some think are prudent limits

to assessments of readiness that did not match perceptions at

lower levels.

10

The CSIS findings were echoed in a widely distributed

e-mail containing Command and General Staff College

focus group responses. In that study, one officer noted that,

Young officers are getting out because they feel out of touch with

leadership; the Army [that young officers] are experiencing is

not the same Army [that] general officers experienced as

lieutenants and captains.

11

Junior officers wince when senior officers assume they

are familiar with the plight of today’s junior officers. Yet,

well-meaning policies are created and admirable mentoring

sessions are conducted by senior officers who inadvertently

exacerbate the gap between the ranks by assuming today’s

junior officers think the same as junior officers of yore. For

example, in the VCSA’s message to field commanders

concerning the exodus of captains, the VCSA stated:

4
I need your help in convincing these young warriors that there

is a bright light at the end of the tunnel. Listen to their

concerns, and let them know what we are doing to address

them. We know that many of their concerns are similar to those

we had as junior officers; so share with them what it was like

when you were a captain—when you stood in their shoes and

faced similar hard career decisions.

12

 (emphasis added)

Rather than telling captains of the similarities of then

and now, it may be prudent to first examine the differences

between junior officers of then and now. Senior officers need

to understand who today’s junior officers are and how they

may differ from junior officers in previous decades.

Of course, some will be quick to point out that there has

always been a rift between older, senior officers at higher

echelons and younger, junior officers on the front line. Two

key aspects make today’s situation much different,

however. First, in the past, communication between ranks

was much less frequent due to the hierarchical nature of the

Army structure. A captain used to be merely a small cog of a

much larger wheel and contact with a senior officer was

rare. Today, a captain can be the pseudo-mayor of a town in

Bosnia or the only U.S. representative in a potential flash

point in Latin America. E-mail and the Internet keep these

junior officers well informed of issues and well connected

with peers and senior officers. As a result, junior officers

now interact much more with senior officers because the

unstable world situation demands it and advances in

technology allow it. This increased interaction serves to

highlight any generational differences between the ranks

and oftentimes results in debilitating conflict within the

Army.

13

A less subtle difference of today’s situation is the simple

fact that today’s junior officers are leaving, and many are

blaming their departure on senior officer lack of

understanding. Commanders have always reassured

themselves with the adage, “A happy soldier is a

complaining soldier,” but now the complaining soldiers are

acting on their grievances. Simply stated, the Army’s

5
current readiness and the future leadership of the Army are

in jeopardy. Ignoring or misinterpreting the increasingly

louder voices of disgruntled junior officers only serves to

kick the can down the road.

Boomers and Xers.

To understand the gap between senior and junior

officers, it is helpful to examine the research done on

generational differences. The following paragraphs briefly

summarize the two generations dominating the officer

corps—the Baby Boomers and Generation Xers.

14

 Extensive

research in demographics has yielded a wealth of

knowledge concerning generational characteristics of

Boomers and Xers. The emphasis in this monograph is on

Generation X, however, since the junior officer population is

predominantly Generation X.

The Baby Boom Generation was born between 1943 and

1960 and Generation X was born between 1960 and 1980.

Different researchers have adjusted these dates 5 or 6 years

in either direction, but the important point is to realize that

there are two distinct generations in the officer ranks.

Generational differences emerge as cohorts experience

defining moments in history which shape their attitudes

and perspectives.

Baby Boomers grew up during a time of economic

prosperity against a backdrop of rebellion and indulgence.

15

Their views were shaped by events such as Vietnam,

Woodstock, the Kennedy assassination, and Kent State. A

Boomer childhood consisted of a nuclear family where Dad

worked and Mom stayed at home. These parents doted on

the young Boomers and viewed them as the generation that

was going to change the world. At school, they learned to

“work well with others” since the sheer numbers of their

generation overwhelmed school systems and necessitated

teamwork and collaboration. They entered adulthood

optimistic and driven.

6
In the workforce, Boomers worked relentlessly in

pursuit of goals, often at the expense of marriages, family,

and personal lives. Boomer women began to enter the

workforce as the influence of the feminist movement grew

and reinforced the independence characterized by Boomers.

Day care and nannies allowed both Boomer parents to work

tiring, yet supposedly fulfilling, 60-hour workweeks. Work

became more than just putting food on the table; it became

their raison d’être.

In contrast to all the attention heaped on the Baby

Boomers as they grew up, Generation X arrived on the scene

unnoticed. Sometimes called the Slackers, Baby Busters,

Twenty-somethings, or the MTV generation, Generation X

developed a cynical, pragmatic, survivor mentality as they

experienced a world much less idyllic than their Boomer

predecessors.

16

 Watergate, Three Mile Island, Operation

DESERT STORM, and Rodney King shaped their thinking

in their early years. With Boomer parents overworked and

focused on accomplishing personal goals, Generation X

children were often neglected and overlooked.

17

Two factors heavily impacted the childhood years of

Xers. First, soaring Boomer divorce rates meant Xers did

not have the nurturing environment enjoyed by the

Boomers. Instead, visitation rights and joint custody

became the norm as over 40 percent of the Xers spent time in

a single-parent home by age 16.

18

 Second, as women entered

the workforce in increasing numbers, Xers became the

ultimate latchkey children. Being alone and fending on

their own, the young Xers learned to rely on themselves and

developed a confidence often misinterpreted as arrogance.

Yearning for the bonds normally found in a family, Xers

learned to seek out a circle of friends for relationships.

Xers developed a skeptical nature about authority as

people and institutions around them let them down

repeatedly.

19

 They watched one president resign in disgrace

and another defend himself by examining the definition of

“is.” Whereas the Boomers’ hopes soared eternal with the

7
first lunar landing, Xers hopes were shattered as they

watched the Challenger explode on their schoolroom TV

screens. They waited for the “quality time” with their

parents that seldom came and learned to trust only

themselves. To the Xer, authority was to be earned, not

declared by position or fiat.

Education became more and more important to

Generation X with record numbers of its members entering

college. In college, they were not given the approved

solutions, but instead were encouraged to think critically

and challenge whoever thought they had the right answer.

This pragmatism borne from memories of an austere

childhood led many Xers to choose business majors such as

economics instead of the traditional liberal arts degree.

As Xers entered the workforce, they remembered the

workaholic tendencies of their Boomer parents and

responded with an intense pursuit of balance in their lives.

Work became just a means to earn a living. Life included

work, but also family, spouse, friends, and personal time.

The psychological bond with the organization where they

worked weakened even more as Xers watched downsizing

reward hardworking Boomers with pink slips and early

retirements. The “Work is Life” motto of the Boomers was

replaced by “Get a Life” as Xers brought a sense of

informality and balance to the workplace.

Boomers and Xers in the Army.

In the Army, the distinctions between Baby Boomers

and Generation Xers are not as glaring because

self-selection into the Army serves to homogenize the

population. Nevertheless, generational differences still

emerge. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of the two

generations in the officer corps. Note that lieutenants and

captains are almost exclusively Generation Xers, while

lieutenant colonel and above are almost all Baby Boomers.

While self-selection and the socialization process of the

Army soften many potential aspects of generational conflict,

8
the hierarchical nature of the Army puts Boomers clearly in

the “senior” ranks and Xers in the “junior” ranks. This is in

contrast to many civilian corporations where Xers are

increasingly entering the workforce in more senior positions

due to entrepreneurial and technological skills. With all the

Boomers in the key decision and policymaking positions in

the Army, it is easier for Xers to place the blame for Army

problems on generational differences rather than the classic

line versus staff tension.

As the first of the Baby Boomer generation of officers

entered the Army, they encountered the disillusionment of

the Vietnam War. Vietnam shaped the minds of the early

Boomers who used their zeal and enthusiasm for hard work

to later produce the AirLand Battle doctrine and the

National Training Center.

21

 Boomer officers squirmed

under the Carter administration and the frustration of the

Hollow Army, but came into their own under the Reagan

build-up. Boomer officers were the commanders who helped

9

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

2LT 1LT CPT MAJ LTC COL - GEN

Rank

Generation X Baby Boomer

Figure 1. Distribution of Generations in the Officer

Corps.

20
transform the Army from failures in Vietnam and mistakes

in Grenada to victories in the streets of Panama and the

dunes of Operation DESERT STORM. It was the

hardworking Boomers who won the Cold War and saved our

way of life from the Evil Empire, but it was also the

overworking Boomers who brought zero defects, careerism,

and new accusations of micromanagement to the Army. As

Boomers moved into the senior ranks of the officer corps,

their driven nature flourished in the post-Cold war

environment. “24/7" became the norm and bigger and better

QTBs

22

 became commonplace. Today, Baby Boomers

dominate nearly all the leadership positions in the Army

ranging from battalion commander to Chief of Staff. When

junior officers complain about the Army’s senior leaders,

they are talking about the Boomers.

Generation Xers entered the Army as the reform of the

Army was nearing its completion. Xers were the platoon

leaders in Operation DESERT STORM and company

commanders in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. They can

remember the Cold War in a historical sense, but their time

in uniform has been dominated by peacekeeping,

humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. Events such

as the Army’s downsizing, Somalia, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,”

and Aberdeen shape the attitudes and views of Generation

X officers. Their skeptical attitudes toward authority,

already influenced by events prior to entering the Army,

were further affected by the court martial of the Sergeant

Major of the Army, the reprimand of Major General Hale,

and general-on-general sexual harassment.

Xers were deployed more often than their Boomer

counterparts,

23 but their absence did not lessen their

interconnectedness with others. Instead, Xers grew up in a

deployed Army where phones, e-mail, and the Internet kept

them linked with their family, peers, and the outside

world.

24 Consequently, Generation X officers tend to be

more current in issues and also more aware of the situation

outside the military than junior officers had in the past.

They know about the outside job market, housing trends,

10
technological advances, and the nuances of the New

Economy, often more than their Boomer bosses.

Captain Boomer and Captain Xer.

In order to gain a better understanding of today’s

captains, it is useful to contrast Baby Boomers and

Generation Xers in the Army. Instead of comparing how

attitudes of older Boomers contrast with younger Xers,

however, the following analysis compares Baby Boomer

captains with Generation X captains. Specifically, the focus

is on captains with about 7 years’ time in service. For the

Boomers, data collected in 1988 concerning year group 1981

officers is used. Year group 1981 officers were born in the

late 1950’s. They are the later Baby Boomers who remember

the Vietnam War growing up, but really entered the Army

during the height of the Cold War. For Generation Xers,

data gathered in 1998 concerning year group 1991 officers is

used. Year group 1991 officers were born in the late 1960’s

and entered the Army at the early stages of the downsizing.

Longitudinal databases allow the contrast of two cohorts

at similar points of time in their careers. The comparison of

historical Boomer captain attitudes with those of current

Xer captains helps determine if senior officers really did

have the same experiences and thoughts as today’s junior

officers. 

Although much smaller in numbers, Generation X

captains are demographically almost identical to Baby

Boomers when they were captains—about 89 percent male,

about 80 percent white, and about 92 percent married.

25

 As

we examine their attitudes, however, we see many trends

already identified in the Baby Boomer/Generation X

literature on differing attitudes.

Xer Captains are more confident in their abilities.

Because of the lack of attention showered on them as

children, Xers learned to rely mainly on themselves. The

hardiness developed by austere conditions manifested itself

11
in a belief held by Xers that they will succeed, regardless of

the circumstances. Xer captains believe that they will

flourish in the Army or wherever they are planted. Figure 2

shows the attitudes of captains in 1988 and in 1998.

26 Notice 

how Generation X captains are more confident in their

abilities and their capacity to succeed both in the Army and

in the civilian world.

Of course, fueling this belief is the sustained growth of

the New Economy. Xer captains have not experienced a

recession. In their minds, the current economic boom is

normal and expected to continue. In January 2000, the U.S.

economy entered into the longest official peacetime

expansion with 92 straight months of expanding Gross

Domestic Product—and this while unemployment rates

remained at record lows.

27

 As the economy continues to

grow, the Xer captains’ perceived risk in leaving the Army

continues to shrink.

12

Percentage of officers

agreeing

Boomer

CPTs

Xer

CPTs

(1988) (1998)

I am confident I will be promoted as high as

my ability and interest warrant if I stay in

the Army.

59.8 % 67.8 %

Percentage of officers

answering "Easy" or "Very

Easy"

Boomer

CPTs

Xer

CPTs

How difficult do you think it would be for you

to find a good civilian job right now,

considering both your own qualifications and

current labor market conditions?

52.4 % 75.1 %

How difficult would it be for you to leave the

Army in the next year or so given your

current personal or family situation?

45.2 % 51.1 %

Figure 2. Confidence of Generation X Captains

Compared to Boomer Captains.
What does this mean to senior officers? It means that

Xers are not in the Army for job security. They know they

can make it on the outside, and they see few obstacles if they

choose to leave. It means that policymakers should not

assume that the junior officers are a free good. They are a

valuable commodity and very hard to replace. For an Xer,

seriously exploring career options other than the Army is

not a momentous decision.

Generation X officers see loyalty differently. But even if

Xer officers can do well on the outside, what about their

selfless service? Where is the loyalty in our junior officers?

Keep in mind that Generation X officers grew up in a society

replete with downsizing and restructuring. As a Fortune

magazine pointed out:

Loyalty. Gratitude. Fortitude. They’re dead, man. And who’s

the culprit? Maybe corporate America. After all, it was big

companies that in the late 1980s and early 1990s ended the

traditional employment contract. That whole loyaltyin-exchange-for-lifetime-employment-and-a-gold-watch 

thing no longer made sense. So they got rid of it.

28

Generation X junior officers are loyal, but their loyalty is

based on a bond of trust between the Army and the

officer—not on the promise of lifelong employment. While

the impact of the civilian downsizing is significant on the

attitudes of the Generation X cohort in general, Generation

X Army officers are intimately familiar with the strain on

organizational commitment from downsizing. Figure 3

shows the magnitude of policies and programs designed to

coax or force officers to leave the Army as seen by

Generation X officers. With junior officers witnessing such

an array of policies designed to entice or force over 23,000 of

their peers and role models to leave, it is not surprising that

their loyalty to the military has been redefined with a

healthy dose of skepticism.

Xer Captains want more balance between life and work.

Ask a Baby Boomer captain to define who they are and they

will usually answer that they are an Army officer. Ask a

13
Generation X captain who they are, and they will also

answer that they are an Army officer, but in addition will

mention their family and occasionally their hobbies. Baby

Boomer captains admired and respected families, but

families were usually placed in the background and existed

mainly to support the role of the Army officer. Likewise,

hobbies and personal time were luxuries not afforded to a

Boomer Army officer who devoted every ounce of energy and

attention to the job.

To a Generation Xer, being an Army officer is a noble

profession. Nevertheless, to an Xer, it is not an

all-consuming source of self-identity. Of course, job

satisfaction is still important as evidenced by 26 percent of

Xer captains putting “Opportunities for Job Satisfaction” as

one of their top three factors in their career decision. But

contrast this with over 42 percent of Boomer captains who

placed Job Satisfaction in the top three considerations back

in 1988. Xers want more than just satisfaction at work for

their career in the Army.

Xer captains, like their civilian counterparts, are

yearning for balance in their lives. The job is still central,

but they want family time and personal time too. They have

watched their Boomer predecessors throw themselves into

14

Policy Years Total

Number of

Officers

Downsized

Selective Early Retirement (Involuntary) FY92--FY95 3,393

Early Retirement (Voluntary) FY93--FY97 3,387

Reduction in Force (Involuntary) FY92 244

Voluntary Separation Initiatives FY92--FY97 11,439

Captain/Lieutenant Retention Board

(Involuntary)

FY92--FY94 1,681

Voluntary Early Release and Retirement

Program

FY92--FY95,

FY97

3,480

TOTAL OFFICERS 23,624

Source: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Army

Figure 3. Officer Drawdown Witnessed by Year Group

1991 from FY92 to FY97.
the profession, and they are now resetting the boundaries of

what exactly it means to be in the Army. Figure 4 shows the

drastic attitudinal changes that have occurred in the officer

ranks in just 10 years. Notice how less than a quarter of Gen

X officers (compared with nearly half of Baby Boomer

officers) believe work/life balance is compatible with an

Army career. This is a significant attitudinal shift to take

place in only 10 years.

The shifting emphasis on work/life balance is a

troublesome trend for many Boomers since it implies a

lesser sense of duty. Yet today even many Boomers are

questioning the insatiable appetite that an Army career has

for family or personal time. It is no longer uncommon to hear

of Boomer colonels turning down coveted Brigade-level

command positions because of “family reasons.” Indeed, the

same Boomer sample that as captains had over 38 percent

agreeing that a rewarding career can compensate for

limited personal and family time had only 24.2 percent

agree when asked the identical question as lieutenant

colonels.

Pay is important to Xer captains, but more money won’t

hold them in. Boomer policymakers often mischaracterize

Generation Xers as materialistic and consumed by higher

15

Percentage of officers

answering "Agree" or

"Strongly Agree"

Boomer

CPTs

Xer

CPTs

(1988) (1998)

The demands of an Army career would/does

make it difficult to have the kind of family life

I would like.

48.7 % 65.3 %

For me, a rewarding career can compensate

for limited personal /family time.

38.4 % 22.4 %

An Army career would allow/allows me to

maintain the kind of balance I want between

my work and personal life.

47.4 % 21.3 %

Figure 4. Work/Life Balance of Generation X Captains

versus Boomer Captains.
paychecks. Pay, indeed, is more important to captains today

than in the past. Nearly 37 percent of Xer captains listed

pay as one of the top three factors in the career decision,

while only 25.7 percent of Boomer captains placed pay in the

top three issues. But while compensation is important to

Xers and retention, it is not the primary reason why

captains are leaving. When asked about their current

compensation package of pay, allowances, and benefits, 57

percent of Boomer captains in 1988 and 56.3 percent of Xer

captains in 1998 said they were satisfied. The exodus of Xer

captains despite nearly identical levels of satisfied Boomer

and Xer captains indicates that the Xer captains are not

leaving in pursuit of better salaries. Pay is a critical issue

and must be adequate, but more money alone will not keep

the Xer captains from resigning.

Xer captains are not impressed by rank. Any senior

officer who has recently faced an auditorium full of junior

officers knows that Xer officers have a different attitude

towards authority. In those situations, someone will

inevitably ask a piercing, pointed question that, in years

past, would have evoked gasps from the audience. It’s not

that Generation X officers are disrespectful; it is just that

they are not impressed by rank or hierarchical position.

They have been let down by too many authority figures

ranging from their overworked parents to their

Commander-in-Chief. As a result, they are extremely

skeptical towards authority. This attitude is reflected in the

questions in Figure 5.

Note that despite the possibility of a baseline level of

dissatisfaction towards superiors that may exist in all

organizations, Generation X captains are clearly more

critical of senior officers than captains in the past. This was

a major finding in the CSIS study that continues to be

echoed in every study of junior officers.

16
So Now What?

Before moving onto the implications of the generation

divide, it is important to note that just as senior officers

should not assume that Boomer captains and Xer captains

think alike, they should also not assume that they are

totally different either. Indeed, there are some enduring

attitudes spanning both generations in the officer corps that

point to the overarching culture found in the Army. Figure 6

illustrates with similar responses by both Boomer and Xer

captains that pride in the Army, camaraderie, and

professionalism are still alive and well in the Army. (Notice

how in the second and third survey questions Xer officers,

true to their generation, are drawn more toward peer

relationships than Boomers to fill the vacuum of familial

bonds.) 

With an understanding of the nuances of Generation X

officers, senior leaders can address the junior officer

retention problem by altering the organization or effecting a

change in the attitudes and perspectives of Xer officers.

Changing the organization may include policies at the

strategic level to reflect the reality of Generation X attitudes

17

Percentage of officers

expressing dissatisfaction

Boomer

CPTs

Xer

CPTs

(1988) (1998)

How satisfied are you with relationships with

superior/senior officers?

5.7 % 17.8 %

Percentage of officers

responding with "Poor" or

"Very Poor"

Boomer

CPTs

Xer

CPTs

Overall leadership effectiveness of

supervisor/rater

9.3 % 16.6 %

Figure 5. Attitudes Towards Senior Officers and

Superiors.
and also senior officer leadership and actions at the

operational level directly affecting Generation X officers.

Likewise, influencing the viewpoints of Xer captains may

require emphasis at both the strategic and operational

levels. The following section examines some possible policy

and leadership implications of the generational gap in the

officer corps.

Instill work/family/personal time balance. This is easy

to say, yet hard to do given the Army’s lack of control in

determining its own workload. Cutting back on deployment

tempo (DEPTEMPO) and personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO)

may appear out of the realm of the possible, but the first step

is to establish a metric and then work towards reducing it to

acceptable levels. The goal is not to move to an 8-to-5 Army,

but rather to bring the life of a junior officer back into

balance. It is not just about getting more “time off” for Xers,

but also creating family and personal time activities that

work toward creating more commitment to the Army. Once

18

Percentage of officers

answering "Agree" or

"Strongly Agree"

Boomer

CPTs

Xer

CPTs

(1988) (1998)

I am quite proud to tell people that I am in

the Army.

92.2 % 90.8 %

One of the things that I value most about the

Army is the sense of community or

camaraderie I feel.

72.5 % 76.4 %

I can count on Army people to help out when

needed.

72.7 % 75.9 %

Percentage of officers who

agreed

Boomer

CPTs

Xer

CPTs

When I think of myself as a professional, I

compare myself most often with Army leaders

whom I know and respect.

77.8 % 75.0 %

Figure 6. Enduring Attitudes Across Generations.
some breathing room has been established, then policies

and actions emphasizing balance can be put into place.

Examples include:

• Make the Army community a fun place to work and

live. Revamp the Morale, Welfare, and Recreation

(MWR) program to include more activities amenable

to Xers. Remember that Xers gravitate to “extreme”

sports, so the frame shop may have to give way to the

mountain biking club. Army posts should rival every

nearby community in the quantity and quality of

activities and special events. If family and personal

time can be freed up, then make the Army an

attractive place to spend it.

• Do not measure quality of life in square footage. To

Boomer officers, taking care of families was

constructing state-of-the-art day care facilities for the

kids and building big PXs

29 for the spouses. To Xers,

taking care of families is giving officers time to

nurture relationships with children and spouses.

• Commanders must avoid the temptation to fill every

minute of the training schedule. Cut back on

mandatory training, especially the classes viewed as

“politically correct.”

30 There will certainly be peak

times when long hours are necessary for mission

accomplishment, but there should also be some valley

times when it is acceptable to give everyone time off.

• Senior leaders must model work/family balance

themselves. Many junior officers are leaving because

they do not want the life of their superiors. It is not

good enough to make a policy sending everyone home

at 1700 if the commander is seen carrying several

hours’ worth of work home every night. Show junior

officers that senior officers don’t have to sacrifice

family and personal time to be successful in the Army

(e.g., what message is sent when junior officers find

19
out that the incoming commander will be a

geographical bachelor?).

• Give officers a chance to reflect. Allow harried junior

officers to step off the fast moving train by

encouraging advanced civil schooling, training with

industry, or sabbaticals. Make the officer advance

course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School

(CAS3), and Command and General Staff College

(CGSC) times where officers can restore mental,

physical, and spiritual balance.

Appeal to the Xer desire for relationships. Generation X

officers crave close relationships to make up for the family

life they never had. As a result, a circle of close friends is a

valuable commodity to a Generation X officer. If the Army

can become the source of social relationships in addition to a

place of employment, it will be possible to improve

Generation X commitment to the Army. The goal would be

to emphasize the institutional aspects of the Army instead

of the occupational.

3 1

 A focus on reinforcing the

institutional aspects encourages junior officers to find their

reference group internal to the Army. The Army becomes

not so much the work involved, but the people and shared

experiences it includes. If the Army can offer the

camaraderie and cohesion desired by Generation X officers

(and often lacking in the civilian world), then Xers will stay

regardless of the economic situation.

The objective here is to preserve aspects of one of the

Army’s intangible, yet extremely powerful, retention

tools—the Army’s culture. Of course, some critics are

already questioning the “gap” between the military and

society

32

 and will point out that making the boundary

between society and officers less permeable only serves to

widen the gap. The intent of these policies and actions is not

to distance Army officers from society, but rather to provide

more opportunities for Generation X officers to find

satisfying bonds of friendship within the Army.

20
Policies and actions to improve junior officer retention

that address the Generation X search for meaningful

relationships include:

• Resurrect officer calls. When the Army got rid of

Happy Hour in order to de-glamorize alcohol, an

unintended side effect was the removal of an

organizational ritual that served to strengthen the

bonds between officers in a unit. Bring back

“mandatory” social gatherings such as prop blasts,

spur ceremonies, and dinings-in, but keep alcohol

consumption in check. Events do not have to be

restricted to the club, but can also include staff rides,

outdoor extreme sports, trips, or anything that allows

friendships to flourish. These events do not have to be

after work hours (when they would conflict with

family and personal time), but could be scheduled

during the workday. Rituals and traditions are often

viewed suspiciously by outsiders as frivolous, but they

serve the important purpose of strengthening the

bonds within a unit.

• Proceed cautiously with privatization. While

economic rationale points us down the path to

privatization, it must be done carefully. Activities

such as officer clubs, housing, bowling alleys,

commissaries, and post exchanges provide services

that may be acquired more economically through

privatization, but recognize that these agencies also

serve to define the Army’s culture. They provide a

platform for building relationships other than the

workplace. Economic efficiency is important, but

maintaining our culture of camaraderie is priceless.

• Maximize opportunities during key career

milestones. The officer basic and advance courses,

CAS3, and CGSC all provide opportunities for officers

to establish lasting friendships with other officers.

Place exercises, activities, and events into the

21
curriculum that foster close interaction and

teamwork. Use the time wisely since these are rare

moments in an officer’s career when large groups of

officers are gathered in an environment generally

void of the pressures of leading troops.

• Really mentor junior officers. Senior officers need to

pull in junior officers and talk with (not to) them. This

is not performance counseling; this is not quarterly

counseling. This is a senior officer (not necessarily the

rater or senior rater) taking an interest in the life of a

junior officer. Spend 95 percent of the time listening

and 5 percent of the time giving advice. Of course,

junior officers will be guarded at first, but once they

see that the senior officer is not doing this out of

concern for the mission or even the unit, they will

begin searching out mentors.

Rely less on traditional hierarchical leadership. The

Army is the epitome of hierarchical leadership.

Unfortunately, Generation X officers, who are unimpressed

by position and leery of authority, reside at the lower rungs

of the Army structure. While it would be ludicrous to

suggest that we abandon all notions of hierarchical

leadership in the Army profession just to accommodate

Generation Xers, it may be feasible to alter the process

through which leadership is applied via the hierarchy. Note

however, that few policies can address this issue. Similarly,

speeches, posters, and articles will not change the way the

Army does business. Instead, direct leadership by senior

leaders is the main means to mitigate the Xer aversion to

hierarchical leadership. Xer officers are not naïve. They

understand the need for some hierarchy. Yet they will

greatly appreciate genuine attempts to reduce the

dependence on rank or position whenever possible.

Some possible actions to reduce the undesirable aspects

of hierarchy for Generation X officers include:

22
• Make the Officer Professional Management System

(OPMS XXI) work. Generation X officers love

development and the option of switching to a career

field other than Operations may open the door to

sought-after training and development. More

importantly, the role of hierarchy is downplayed in

the technical career fields as the role of knowledge

becomes more salient. Of course, if the training for

career fields is “dumbed down,” Xer officers will see

through the façade quickly.

• Stop micromanagement and the “zero-defects”

mentality. This is something that everyone knows,

but nobody does simply because senior leaders are too

concerned about the performance of their unit during

their watch.

33 Senior leaders must learn to give Xers a

task and then avoid the temptation to tell them how to

do it or require them to check in constantly with a

status report. Unfortunately, it will take much more

than this paragraph to change this well-engrained

aspect of the Army. Interestingly, as promotion rates

rise due to dwindling numbers of promotable officers,

the intense inter-officer competition caused by the

downsizing may subside. This in turn may lead to

more freedom to make mistakes and a decrease in

levels of micromanagement. By then, however, it

might be too late.

• Include Xers in the decisionmaking process. When

possible and appropriate, increase junior officer input

into key decisions. This is not to undermine the chain

of command, but rather to broaden the base of

knowledge and expertise supporting the decision.

Highlight technology. In the 1998 survey, less than 3

percent of Generation X officers believed that it would be

difficult to adapt personally to the high-tech demands of the

future Army. Not surprisingly, Xer officers are quite

comfortable with technology. Interestingly, however, close

23
to 40 percent of Generation X officers responded that they

did not believe that their particular job in the future Army

would be high-tech. In order to retain junior officers, the

Army must be technologically relevant. This does not imply

that somehow technology will replace boots on the ground; it

does suggest that the Army should not lag behind society in

the everyday use of technology.

Boomer officers can remember the days when the Army

was at the forefront of high-tech equipment, e.g., global

positioning systems, laser rangefinders, and night vision

devices. The rapidity of development in the commercial

world has left the Army behind.

34

 Today, it is not uncommon

for Xer officers to have more up-to-date technology at home

than they do at work.

Some possible actions to leverage the use of technology

include:

• Keep Army technology current. Upgrade computers

in units every 2 years. Install the latest software

versions as they come out. Being able to brag that they

are fluent in using the latest hardware and software

will pay big dividends in retaining Xers.

• Issue PDAs (personal data assistants). PDAs (e.g,

Palm Pilot, Visor, Pocket PC) are not only effective in

improving productivity, but also provide tangible

evidence that the Army is forward thinking in

technology. Offer them to officers who want them and

watch how quickly free application programs written

by Xer officers appear on websites such as

CompanyCommand.com. Within a year, key field and

training manuals will be available for download as

well as programs helping junior officers with

maintenance, supply, and administrative tasks. It is a

small investment (about $150 for each PDA) for a very

valuable benefit. Note how this differs from issuing

every officer a laptop computer. Laptops are clunky

24
and geared more for business travelers on airplanes

than Army captains in TOCs.

35

• Continue to exploit the Internet. The Army is making

great strides in providing junior officers choices via

the Web (e.g., the career field designation process),

and it is time for other parts of the Army to catch up.

Junior officers should be able to schedule

appointments online instead of waiting endlessly on

the phone. Interactive training courses need to be

widely available on the Net—and these courses

should not be just documents posted on a server, but

also video and audio clips. Everything from receiving

an RFO

36

 to submitting a household goods claim

should be made available via the Internet. One

caution, though. Junior officers are already decrying

the substitution of e-mail for face-to-face interaction.

Care must be taken to automate administration, not

leadership. 

Conclusion.

The trends in junior officer attrition continue to point to

a worsening situation. Early indications from year group

1995 retention statistics show no let up in the exodus. Two

additional factors complicate the situation. First, attrition

for Baby Boomer officers is on the rise, too. As retention

rates for lieutenant colonels and colonels drop and continue

to decline, the officer corps inventory is starting to look more

like a trapezoid than the traditional pyramid. Second, the

newly-minted second lieutenants that will enter the Army

this year are not Generation X. Instead, they are

Generation Y—the Nintendo Generation, Generation 2001,

or Generation Next. Nexters bring a totally different

perspective than Xers or Boomers. While it is too early to tell

how they will approach the workplace, our experience with

Generation X tells us that we had better be ready.

Understanding generational differences will become even

25
more critical with three unique generations in the officer

corps.

Generation X officers are different. They are not

slackers, but are extremely competent and willing to work

hard. They are, however, voicing their opinions and leaving

the Army. This monograph will fall short of its objectives if

battalion commanders nod their heads in agreement with

the previous paragraphs, yet convince themselves that the

situation can only be remedied through policies at the

Department of the Army level. Likewise, if policymakers

defer to direct leadership as the sole solution to the junior

officer attrition problem, the intent of this monograph will

not be fulfilled either. It will take both policy and leadership

working in concert to keep our captains.

One common reaction to the junior officer exodus is to

call for calm and assume that this crisis, like all previous

ones, will also eventually pass. Somehow we convince

ourselves that, because the Army is a big enough

organization with a history of weathering all sorts of crises,

it can absorb this one too. Realistically, the Army will

survive through this crisis—the Army always goes rolling

along. But like a family who loses a child at an early age,

there will always be a sense of loss over the potential that is

never realized. Our captains are leaving and that says

something about who they are and what the Army has

become. It is time we took notice and did something about it.

ENDNOTES

1. Message from Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel,

Headquarters, Department of the Army, July 28, 1998. The message

was in response to concerns over the increasing attrition rates of junior

officers. Notice that the message focuses on the static attrition rates in

1998 rather than the dynamic trend of junior officer attrition rates

overall.

2. Message from the Vice Chief of Staff, Army, Headquarters,

Department of the Army, February 15, 2000.

26
3. “Blue Ribbon Panels To Study Leadership And Training,” Army

Public Affairs Press Release #00—024, April 17, 2000.

4. For example, see David Noer, Healing the Wounds: Overcoming

the Trauma of Layoffs and Revitalizing Downsized Organizations, San

Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1993.

5. For an analysis of the effects of the Army downsizing on those left

behind, see Leonard Wong and Jeffrey McNally, “Downsizing the Army:

Some Policy Implications Affecting the Survivors,” Armed Forces and

Society, Vol. 20, Winter 1994, pp. 199-216.

6. A reduction in command positions and the departure of many

officers with low promotion potential left the relatively “high-quality”

survivors competing for advancement. See General Dennis Reimer,

“Leadership for the 21st Century: Empowerment, Environment and the

Golden Rule,” Military Review, Vol. 76, January-February 1996, pp. 5-9.

7. For example, the Army’s main research engine for leadership, the

Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, was

downsized of nearly all of its leadership research capability in 1996.

8. Spring 1999 Sample Survey of Military Personnel Written

Comments, Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social

Sciences, November 1999. The term “senior leader” is not well defined.

In this monograph, it refers to those officers in the older generation, or

generally in the rank of lieutenant colonel and higher.

9. American Military Culture in the Twenty-first Century, Center for

Strategic and International Studies, 2000.

10. Ibid.

11. CGSC Student Perceptions on Army Retention & Leadership,

E-mail, April 2000.

12. VCSA message, February 2000.

13. There have been efforts to explore the impact of generational

differences in the Army such as the research done by Peter J. Legree,

Generation X: Motivation, Morals, and Values, Army Research Institute

Special Report, June 1997. Additionally, Generation X expert Bruce

Tulgan spoke at the Spring 1998 TRADOC Commanders/Division

Commanders Conference (TCDC) about Generation X characteristics.

14. For a good description of all generations, see Ron Zemke, Claire

Raines, and Bob Filipczak, Generations at Work: Managing the Clash of

27
Veterans, Boomers, Xers, and Nexters in Your Workplace, New York:

American Management Association, 2000; Neil Howe and William

Strauss, 13th Gen, New York: Vintage Press, 1993, or Bruce Tulgan,The 

Manager’s Pocket Guide to Generation X, Minneapolis: Lakewood

Publications, 1997.

15. For an interesting look at Baby Boomers, see The Boomer

Institute on the Internet at http://www.boomerpower.net/.

16. See discussion on the independence of Generation Xers by Jay A.

Conger, Winning ‘Em Over: A New Model for Managing in the Age of

Persuasion, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998.

17. See Legree, p. 3, or Geoffrey T. Holtz, Welcome to the Jungle,

New York: St. Martin Press, 1995.

18. N. Zill and J. Robinson, “The Generation X,” American

Demographics, April 1995, pp. 24-33.

19. See Zemke, Raines, and Filipczak for a good account of the

Generation X skeptical nature towards authority.

20. Data includes Army Competitive Category officers only. Source:

Officer Master File, September 1999.

21. For a thorough discussion of how many of the successes

demonstrated in Operation DESERT STORM were shaped by

experiences in Vietnam, see Edward C. Meyer and R. Manning Ancell

with Jane Mahaffey, Who Will Lead?: Senior Leadership in the United

States Army, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995; or James Kitfield, Prodigal

Soldiers: How the Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized

the American Style of War, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995.

22. The Quarterly Training Brief (QTB) is a planning session that

has increasingly become a major production with exacting detail and

complicated PowerPoint slides.

23. While Boomer deployments were longer (e.g., a 1-year Vietnam

tour), today’s deployments are more unpredictable and often occur

nearly back-to-back.

24. See Morten. G. Ender, “E-Mail to Somalia: New Communication

Media Between Home and War Fronts,” in J. E. Behar, ed., Mapping

Cyberspace: Social Research on the Electronic Frontier, Oakdale, NY:

Dowling College Press, 1997, pp. 27-52.

28
25. Baby Boom and Generation X officer data are taken from the

1988 Officer Master File using Year Group 1981 and the 1998 Officer

Master File using Year Group 1991. The Generation X cohort did have

more U.S. Military Academy graduates (22 percent versus 17 percent)

and slightly more Asians (3 percent versus 1 percent) and Hispanics (3

percent versus 2 percent) than the Baby Boomers when they were

captains. 

26. Attitudes of Baby Boomer captains are taken from year group

1981 responses to the 1988 Longitudinal Research on Officer Careers

(LROC) survey administered by the Army Research Institute (ARI).

Attitudes of Generation X captains are taken from year group 1991

responses to the 1998 Survey of Officer Careers (SOC) survey also

administered by ARI. Sample size of the LROC survey is 513 out of a

population of 3,478 year group 1981, Army Competitive Category

captains. Sample size of the SOC survey is 176 out of a population of

1,864 year group 1991, Army Competitive Category captains. Because

both the LROC and SOC surveys oversampled U.S. Military Academy

graduates, the samples used in this analysis were adjusted to reflect the

population’s proportion of Military Academy graduates. Thus the

samples used in this analysis mirror the demographics of the

population. 

27. See Christopher Chambers, “The New Economy Shifts Soldiers’

Expectations,” Army, April 2000, Vol. 50, No. 4, p. 9.

28. Nina Munk, “The New Organization Man,” Fortune 137, No. 5,

March 16, 1998, pp. 62-74.

29. Post Exchanges.

30. Junior officers may perceive that training, while worthwhile, is

“politically correct” if it is not directly related to warfighting tasks.

31. See Charles C. Moskos, “Institutional and Occupational Trends

in Armed Forces,” in Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood, eds., The

Military: More Than Just a Job?, New York: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1988,

pp. 15-26.

32. For example, see Thomas Ricks, Making the Corps, New York:

Scribner, 1997.

33. Micromanagement or a zero-defects mentality is usually

considered to be the result of a self-interested commander. It may,

however, also stem from a well-intentioned senior leader.

29
34. Compare Moore’s law that states that silicon chips double in

complexity every 2 years, with Army acquisition cycles that are typically

much longer.

35. Tactical Operation Centers.

36. Request for Orders.

30
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Dr. Leonard Wong

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler