Colloquium Brief

U.S. Army War College and

The Heritage Foundation

The PLA Shapes the Future Security Environment

Compiled by

Mr. Andy Gudgel

The Heritage Foundation

Key Points:

•	 The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has problems attracting technically savvy

recruits, owing to competition from China’s booming economy.

•	 The PLA feels the United States will intervene in a conflict over Taiwan, and is training

to defend against or defeat the U.S. military.

•	 Japan and the Korean Peninsula could become issues as troublesome for the PLA as Taiwan.

•	 China and the PLA are becoming more active in South and Southeast Asia to increase

China’s influence in the region. India’s rise, in particular, concerns China.

	 Over 50 experts on China and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) gathered at Carlisle

Barracks, Pennsylvania, from September 23-25, to attend the 2005 PLA Conference, “The PLA Shapes

the Future Security Environment,” cosponsored by the Heritage Foundation and the U.S. Army War

College. The colloquium considered how the PLA shapes the global security environment.

	 Discussion began with the changing relationship between the PLA and the Chinese people, and its

effect on PLA recruiting efforts. While officially the PLA is “the Army of the People,” the Army may

not be as close to the people as it believes.

	 Because of China’s strong, growing economy, the PLA is concerned with its ability to attract the

high-tech recruits it increasingly needs. The PLA’s General Staff Department and the General Political

Department have developed competing approaches to attracting such recruits. The General Political

Department hopes to recruit those already best qualified to serve in the ever-modernizing PLA. The

General Staff Department, however, is working on a comprehensive military education system to

transform any recruits into high-quality personnel.

	 China’s changing population base has affected the PLA. As China becomes more modern, fewer

Han Chinese from affluent coastal areas are willing to join the Army, and it will have to look increasingly

to “upriver” (i.e., inland provinces) Chinese and ethnic minorities, such as Uighurs and Mongolians,

to meet recruiting goals. The PLA is also hiring civilians to fill certain roles. Interviews with Chinese

students show that those who intend to join the PLA do so because it is the “family business” (i.e., their
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family has a history of military service). They

also say that PLA recruiters raise three themes:

Chinese nationalism, the PLA will give them a

place to develop marketable skills, and service

provides a stable lifestyle.

	 The PLA knows it needs to change to keep

up with a modernizing China. However, the

differences in approach between the General Staff

Department and the General Political Department

highlight that the PLA is still trying to decide how

best to do so.

	 The conference next considered how the PLA

assesses the Taiwan situation. The PLA considers

itself an army of the Chinese Communist Party

(CCP) and the people. Since the CCP purportedly

represents the interests of all the people, a threat

against the CCP is technically also a threat against

the nation. 

	 A dichotomy of opinion exists between

the PLA and the CCP over Taiwan. The prior

concept of “peaceful reunification with Taiwan”

was a placeholder for the PLA, as it could not

defeat the Taiwanese militarily. This kept PLA

budgets low. But that changed in 1996 with the

Taiwan missile crisis, when the CCP leadership

believed party-characterized “separatist trends”

in Taiwan threatened China’s core interests, and

that provided impetus to the party hawks. 

	 The PLA has most often fought defensively,

and so has a “bunker mentality,” causing the

army to view its actions as defending itself against

exterior threats. It over-prepares militarily, while

not understanding how these actions could

appear belligerent to outsiders.

	 The PLA and the CCP agree that the PLA’s

job is to maintain Chinese sovereignty; that the

Taiwan issue is key to China’s future success as a

world power; and that the island should be taken

without violence, if possible. Within the PLA,

there are two factions—those who feel that the

Army would eventually win; and those younger

officers who are more cautious and advocate a

Chinese “Revolution in Military Affairs” and

asymmetric warfare. The PLA believes the United

States will react to an invasion of Taiwan, and it

is not ready to face an American intervention.

President Hu Jintao stated the CCP’s position on

Taiwan—“Striving for negotiations, preparing

for war, not fearing delays.”

	 The next panel considered PLA assessments

of the U.S. military. The PLA views the United

States as its biggest potentialthreat, and is training

to defeat the U.S. military. The PLA believes the

Chinese mainland will receive long-range strikes

from U.S. precision-guided munitions. Chinese

militia training focuses on urban air defense

and infrastructure repair. On paper, the PLA

understands the complexity of modern warfare.

“Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese

Characteristics” is the PLA’s version of the U.S.

term; it is concerned with upgrading logistics and

equipment. The PLA slogan, “three attacks and

three defenses,” is geared towards stealth aircraft,

cruise missiles, and helicopter gunships—all U.S.

capabilities.

	 The PLA has increased the size, number,

communications and firepower of its air defense

units. It also has increased the use of obscurants,

UAVs, and combined arms training, and has a

growing professional NCO corps. However, the

training is rudimentary and, in fact, may not be

effective. Overall, continued emphasis on armor

and mechanized forces and the dearth of close

air support, helicopters, and air cushion vehicles

calls the PLA’s capabilities into question.

	 The PLA’s assessment of the U.S. military at

war was discussed. At the beginning of the War

in Iraq, the campaign of “shock and awe” and

the use of targeted “decapitation strikes” against

Iraqi leaders and communications amazed PLA

officials. They used the opportunity to analyze

the U.S. forces’ strengths and weaknesses, as well

as mistakes made by the Iraqi military. Many

articles on these issues appeared in Chinese

military journals, but surprisingly few linked

“People’s War” and insurgency. China and the

PLA have used the U.S. involvement in Iraq

to strengthen their ties with the Third World,

particularly Central Asia. 

	 The conferees then discussed the PLA and its

activities in Northeast Asia. The Sino-Japanese

relationship is deteriorating at the same time

that U.S.-Japanese relations are improving.

The presenter posited that the PLA is a drag on
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Sino-Japanese relations, adding friction—the

sources of which include events in World War II,

competition for oil resources, nationalism on both

sides, and recent anti-Japanese riots in China.

	 Both China and Japan have experienced

numerous political and economic changes since

normalization of relations in 1970. However,

interdependent economic interests, the focus in

both countries ondomestic issues, andthe factthat

few governments would benefit from increased

Sino-Japanese rivalry argue against serious

problems, although friction will continue.

	 The attendees questioned the PLA’s role in

Sino-Japanese relations. The PLA seems more

concerned with sovereignty and oil supply. Oil

claims in disputed territories are expected to

become a source of trouble, but won’t happen

until one country tries to develop those resources.

Ultimately, the Sino-Japanese relationship may be

a bigger problem than the Taiwan issue.

	 On the colloquium’s final morning, conferees

discussed the PLA’s activities in South Asia. The

PLA sees India as a potential rival power in the

region, and, therefore it is trying to become more

active there. Border issues, the nuclearization of

South Asia, the rise of India in the region, and

closer U.S./Indian military ties are also concerns. 

The PLA has been increasing its ties with Pakistan

and Bangladesh through military exchanges and

exercises, while not doing so with India.

	 Next the focus was on China and Southeast

Asia. The PLA has not been a major actor there,

but functions as a “big stick” behind China’s

political statements. The current major issue of

Southeast Asian countries is security, and China

has been very active diplomatically in the region.

The PLA has only mattered during involvement

concerning the Spratleys and Paracel Islands,

but it has been active in arms sales and joint

production of weapons with various Southeast

Asiancountries. Coupledwithsecurityassistance,

this has been the PLA’s major role in the region in

recent times.

	 Chinese political scientists have advanced the

theory of China’s “Peaceful Rise”—that it can

become a superpower in a way that will not lead

to war. The Chinese see theirrise as a world power

as inevitable, and place the onus on the United

States not to create tensions by interfering. There

is an implied sting in the theory that seems to say

“we won’t threaten you, but stay out of our way.”

As an extension of this concept, Chinese political

scientists have created a literal “calculus” (with

mathematicalformulas)thatdetermines anation’s

comprehensive national power. The danger is

that this plays to China’s victim mentality. Slow

progress in modernization or economic growth

could be considered evidence of “meddling” by

other countries.

	 The closing discussion raised the possibility

that China’s military buildup has a broader

purpose than potential conflict with Taiwan—the

militaryunderpinning toChina’s rise to a regional,

and super, power. The turning point came in the

early 1990s as China’s economy began to surge,

the Gulf War showed U.S. military strengths,

and advanced weaponry from the crumbling

Soviet Union became available. Since 1996, China

has been preparing the PLA to prevent Taiwan

secession. The “holy grail” for China would be

to take Taiwan before the United States could

intervene. The lesser preferred outcome would

be to prevent the United States from entering the

Taiwan theater. This is the PLA’s ultimate aim,

but not its only goal.

	 What would happen if both China and

Taiwan reached a status quo? The PLA buildup

would continue, since, as a rising regional and

world power, China feels it has a right to a strong

military. Chinese economic slowdown orthe prodevelopment policies of Hu Jintao might reduce

military budgets but would only change the pace

of modernization, not stop it.

	 Participants suggested that perhaps it is in the

PLA’s interest to keep the Taiwan situation in a

state of status quo, as it justifies a large military

budget without the risk of combat. Also, regional

preeminence is perhaps a lesser concern to the

Chinese than internal stability, improving the

economy, and nationalist issues.

	 China may feel threatened by U.S. military

contacts with Russia, India, and Japan, but the

United States would have to disengage from

major powers in the region just to soothe China’s

feelings.
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	 At the close of the colloquium, the

participants discussed several issues for further

consideration. What is China’s perception of

the United States and its military? What is the

U.S. perception of China’s intent in Asia and

the world? And while U.S. foreign and military

policies are openly and transparently debated;

in China, these policies are not.

*****

The views expressed in this brief are those of the author and 

do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the 

Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the 

U.S. Government. This conference brief is cleared for public 

release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

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