CHINA AND NORTH KOREA:

FROM COMRADES-IN-ARMS TO ALLIES AT ARM’S LENGTH

Andrew Scobell

March 2004
ii

*****

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not 

necessarily refl ect the offi cial policy or position of the Department of the Army, the 

Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public 

release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

Portions of this monograph were published in the September 2002 and 

September 2003 issues of Current History. It benefi ted from feedback received 

from audiences at the following venues: the Association for Asian Studies Annual 

Meeting in March 2002 in Washington, DC; the IX Defense Analysis Seminar 

in May 2002 in Seoul, Korea; a faculty seminar at the Asia Pacifi c Center for 

Security Studies in March 2003 in Honolulu, Hawaii; the East Asian Colloquium 

at the Jackson School of International Studies at the University of Washington 

in April 2003 in Seattle, Washington; and at a noontime lecture during National 

Security Seminar Week at the U.S. Army War College in June 2003 in Carlisle, 

Pennsylvania.

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ISBN 1-58487-155-5
iii

FOREWORD

The relationship between China and North Korea surely ranks 

as one of world’s strangest. While on the surface, it might not seem 

surprising to have a formal military alliance between two communist 

neighbors that has endured more than 4 decades. After all, their armed 

forces fought shoulder-to-shoulder in the Korean War 50 years ago. 

However, Beijing’s ties to Pyongyang have weakened considerably 

over time, and China now has much better and stronger relations 

with the free market democracy of South Korea than it does with 

the totalitarian, centrally planned economy of North Korea. In many 

ways Pyongyang has become a Cold War relic, strategic liability, and 

monumental headache for Beijing. Nevertheless, the China-North 

Korea alliance remains formally in effect, and Beijing continues to 

provide vital supplies of food and fuel to the brutal and repressive 

Pyongyang regime.

Since the ongoing nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, which 

emerged in October 2002, the United States and other countries have 

pinned high hopes on Chinese efforts to moderate and reason with 

North Korea. Beijing’s initiative to bring Pyongyang to the table in 

the so-called Six-Party Talks and host them seems to substantiate 

these hopes. Yet, as Dr. Andrew Scobell points out in this monograph, 

it would be unrealistic to raise one’s expectations over what China 

might accomplish vis-à-vis North Korea. Beijing plays a useful and 

important role on the Korean Peninsula, but in the fi nal analysis, 

Scobell argues that there are signifi cant limitations on China’s 

infl uence both in terms of what actions Beijing would be prepared to 

take and what impact this pressure can have. If this analysis is correct, 

then North Korea is unlikely to mend its ways anytime soon.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer a current analysis 

of this long-term relationship and its effect on the United States and 

the region.

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

ANDREW SCOBELL is Associate Research Professor at the Strategic 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, and Adjunct Professor 

of Political Science at Dickinson College. Born and raised in Hong 

Kong, he joined the Strategic Studies Institute in 1999 and is the 

Institute’s specialist on Asia-Pacifi c security. Prior to his current 

position, he taught at the University of Louisville, Kentucky, and 

Rutgers University, New Jersey. Dr. Scobell is the author of China’s 

Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March

(Cambridge University Press, 2003), ten monographs and reports, 

and some twenty articles in such journals as Armed Forces and Society, 

Asian Survey, China Quarterly, Comparative Politics, Current History, 

and Political Science Quarterly. Dr. Scobell holds a Ph.D. in Political 

Science from Columbia University.
v

SUMMARY

The China-North Korea relationship remains the most enduring, 

uninterrupted bilateral friendship for both the People’s Republic of 

China (PRC) and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). 

This brother-in-arms relationship was solidifi ed early during the 

Korean War. Sharing a common border and ideology, both China 

and North Korea confront the frustration of divided nations. And 

while, on the one hand, each views the United States as hostile, 

Beijing and Pyongyang, on the other hand, appear to crave better 

relations with Washington.

Arguably, each clings to the other because they have nowhere 

else to turn―each believes that close cooperation with the other is 

vital to its own national security. No doubt each country would 

prefer to depend less on the other. China has a major stake in 

ensuring the continued survival of the North Korean regime and 

may be willing to go to considerable lengths to guarantee this. North 

Korea, meanwhile, seems destined to remain heavily dependent on 

China for morale support and material assistance.

Despite this type of relationship between Pyongyang and Beijing, 

there are signifi cant limits to China’s infl uence on North Korea―in 

part due to China’s unwillingness to apply hard pressure and in part 

because, even if China did apply such pressure, North Korea might 

not respond in the desired manner.

China was spurred into action in early 2003 by heightened fears 

that North Korea might be the next target of U.S. military action after 

Iraq. China undertook an unprecedented diplomatic initiative to 

bring Washington and Pyongyang to the same table in Beijing thrice 

in the space of 10 months: three-party talks in April 2003, and then 

six-party talks in August 2003 and February 2004. China deserves 

considerable credit for these signifi cant accomplishments.

Nevertheless, China may have reached the limits of its infl uence 

on North Korea in terms of what actions the United States can expect 

from Beijing and what impact Chinese infl uence is likely to have on 

Pyongyang. The most the United States probably can expect is for 

China to push on to continue the six-party talks.
vi

Recommendations include:

• Don’t expect too much from Beijing.

• Don’t underestimate China’s commitment to protect its own 

national interests.

• Don’t force China to choose sides.

• Don’t expect much movement from Pyongyang.

• North Korean distrust of outsiders may be almost 

insurmountable.

• Don’t count on China to dissuade North Korea from going 

nuclear.
CHINA AND NORTH KOREA:

FROM COMRADES-IN-ARMS TO ALLIES AT ARM’S LENGTH

Introduction.

The relationship between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 

and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) remains the 

most enduring, uninterrupted bilateral friendship for both countries. 

This monograph examines the signifi cance of the relationship from 

Beijing’s perspective. First the author considers the logic of China’s 

ties with North Korea, and then surveys the various dimensions of 

this multifaceted relationship. Next, he analyzes China’s evolving 

views of North Korea and assesses its activist initiative in 2003 

seeking to resolve the nuclear issue. Then he discusses Beijing’s 

preferences for the future of the Korean peninsula, summarizes 

conclusions, and offers the implications for U.S. national security.

The Logic of the Relationship.

From Beijing’s perspective, the logic of the relationship between 

the PRC and DPRK is tied intimately to the two states’ more than halfcentury of history of battlefi eld cooperation and military alliance, 

shared socialist divided nation ideology, the geopolitical balance 

of power both in Northeast Asia and on the Korean Peninsula, and 

ambivalent overlapping views of the United States.

The brother-in-arms relationship between China and North 

Korea was solidifi ed early during the Korean War. Beijing’s decision 

to enter the war in late 1950 was not taken lightly. While China’s 

paramount leader Mao Zedong clearly was predisposed to intervene 

on the Korean Peninsula, many leaders had serious reservations, 

and others strongly opposed intervention. The consensus of several 

careful scholarly accounts is that “a high-level policy” debate took 

place in Beijing.1 Mao’s forceful personality won out, and the fi rst 

units of the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) crossed the Yalu 

River on the night of October 19, 1950. China paid a tremendous cost 

as the result of this decision in terms of casualties and war-related 

expenses. By one offi cial Chinese estimate, the CPV’s “combat 

1
2

losses were more than 360,000 (including 130,000 wounded) and 

noncombat losses were more than 380,000.”2 Moreover, while the hot 

phase of the Korean War lasted 3 years, Chinese forces remained on 

the peninsula for an additional 5 years (until 1958), many assisting in 

national reconstruction projects. 

This de facto alliance was formalized in July 1961 when Beijing 

and Pyongyang signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and 

Mutual Assistance. This agreement committed one country to come 

to the aid of the other if attacked.3

Legitimating Ideology.

As fraternal socialist party-states, Beijing and Pyongyang share 

an ideological affi nity. Moreover, both have weathered the collapse 

of communism of 1989-91 in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 

As two of the handful of the world’s “Last Leninists,” the continued 

existence and health of the other is considerably important. This 

is not simply a matter of China having a friendly (or at least 

nonthreatening) neighbor, but it is also linked to the regime’s 

political legitimacy. If Leninist regimes continue to be toppled, it 

will be much more diffi cult for the shrinking remainder to shore up 

their own legitimacy. Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought 

are crucial to the formal justifi cation of the Chinese Communist 

Party’s continued right to rule, and Party leaders cannot renounce 

this mantle. 

The frustration of divided nations is another ideological 

dimension that both Beijing and Pyongyang confront. In each case, 

national unifi cation constitutes a core regime goal. Indeed, national 

unifi cation should be considered a central tenet of each regime’s 

ideology, and for both China and North Korea, it is appropriate to 

speak of “divided nation ideologies.” Neither Beijing nor Pyongyang 

can afford formally to renounce or even downgrade this priority 

without fear of undermining its legitimacy. Signifi cantly, neither 

Hu Jintao nor Kim Jong Il has seen fi t to renounce the use of force to 

achieve unifi cation with Taiwan or South Korea, respectively.
3

Geopolitics.

Basic geography and modern history combine to make the Korean 

Peninsula and Northeast Asia of major importance to Beijing. China 

and North Korea share a common 850 mile-long border. China 

recalls that Korea was the route by which imperial Japan launched 

its invasion of the Chinese mainland in the early 20th century. 

China’s sense of vulnerability vis-à-vis the Korean Peninsula was 

reinforced by swift U.S. intervention in the Korean War, especially 

in late 1950 when General Douglas MacArthur’s forces crossed the 

38th Parallel and approached the Chinese border. Chinese leaders 

seemed to view the Korean Peninsula as a key bulwark. For the past 

5 decades, the PRC has viewed the DPRK as a crucial buffer state.4

Jiang Zemin reportedly told his North Korean hosts in September 

2001, during his 3-day visit to Pyongyang, that because China is 

“close to the Korean Peninsula, [it] is always concerned about the 

development of the situation on the peninsula and has consistently 

worked to maintain peace and stability on the peninsula.”5

For China, in balance-of-power terms, Korea fi gures prominently 

in two sets of confi gurations: a larger Northeast Asian one, and 

a smaller Korean Peninsula one. On the peninsula the power 

confi guration is between two bilateral military alliances: the PRC 

and DPRK balanced against the United States and ROK. In the region 

the power confi guration is a more grand strategic one whereby 

Beijing seeks to balance with Pyongyang and as much as possible 

with Moscow against the U.S. alliances with Tokyo and Seoul. Both 

confi gurations present enormous challenges to and headaches for 

China.

The United States in particular poses dilemmas for both the 

PRC and the DPRK. While, on the one hand, each views the United 

States as hostile, on the other, Beijing and Pyongyang appear to 

crave better relations with Washington. In 2004 both perceive the 

United States as threatening them: China sees this more in terms of 

a subversive plot to gradually undermine communist rule through 

a strategy of “peaceful evolution” and contain China by gradual 

encirclement, while North Korea sees this in terms of more direct 

military menace by U.S. forces positioned in Northeast Asia.6
4

Nevertheless, Beijing and Pyongyang, somewhat paradoxically at 

the same time, desire closer ties with Washington. China wants 

this to reap the full benefi ts of greater integration into the world 

economic system. North Korea wants it to lessen the military threat 

and, relatedly, weaken and eventually break the U.S.-South Korean 

alliance. Pyongyang also wants to extract monetary aid from the 

United States and international fi nancial institutions.7

DIMENSIONS OF THE RELATIONSHIP

The bilateral relationship between Beijing and Pyongyang is 

multidimensional and one-sided. China makes all the sacrifi ces―

providing crucial political and diplomatic backing, essential 

economic assistance, and limited military cooperation.

Politics/Diplomacy.

Politically, relations are cordial on the surface, but ties 

between Beijing and Pyongyang have been strained since China’s 

rapprochement with Seoul in the late 1980s and early 1990s. China 

sent a large delegation of athletes to South Korea for the 1986 Asian 

Games and followed, 2 years later, by attending the Seoul Olympics, 

increasing trade investment links with South Korea, and then formally 

establishing full diplomatic ties in 1992. All of this angered North 

Korea and resulted in cooler relations. However, with the collapse 

of the Soviet Union and the end of Soviet economic and military aid, 

Pyongyang was forced to adopt a pragmatic and moderate approach 

to Beijing and exhibit a more conciliatory approach to Seoul.

China encouraged North Korea to moderate its militarist stance 

and reform its economy. Chinese efforts, for example, seemed critical 

to persuading North Korea to join the United Nations simultaneously 

with South Korea in 1991.8 Beijing appears to be having some success, 

and bilateral relations warmed with two visits within 8 months by 

Pyongyang’s leader Kim Jong Il to China. These visits appeared to 

signal a softening of North Korea’s hardline and increased interest 

in the Chinese experience with economic reform. The fi rst visit, in 

May 2000, was made on the eve of the historic summit between 
5

the leaders of the two Koreas held in the North Korean capital. 

The second visit, in January 2001, seemed to presage more steps to 

implement economic reform in the DPRK. However, viewed from 

the vantage point of early 2004, the results have been disappointing. 

The great promise of the June 2000 inter-Korean summit has not 

materialized, and a reciprocal visit by the North Korean leader to 

Seoul has yet to occur. Economic reform in the North appears, at 

best, to be sputtering and, at worst, virtually nonexistent. 

Tensions reportedly emerged in the late 1990s over either unmet 

North Korean demands for Chinese aid or Chinese pressure on North 

Korea to reform. According to one account, in early 1996 Pyongyang 

asked for a substantial amount of grain and Beijing responded by 

offering only a tenth of this. Kim Jong Il was reportedly incensed 

and threatened to “play the Taiwan card” unless China was 

forthcoming on an even broader set of demands. Beijing regretted 

that it was unable to meet all these requests but did offer a more 

comprehensive package.9 Pyongyang apparently was mollifi ed. 

According to another account, a team of Chinese agricultural experts, 

who visited North Korea in the spring of 1997 under the auspices of 

the UN Development Program, recommended that their hosts adopt 

Chinese style reforms without delay. Pyongyang responded by 

calling Deng Xiaoping a traitor to socialism. Beijing took umbrage 

and threatened to halt its food aid. Pyongyang responded by 

initiating talks with Taiwan on the subject of opening direct air 

links between Taipei and Pyongyang. After the Chinese dropped its 

threat, the North Koreans broke off talks.10 Signifi cantly, but perhaps 

unrelatedly, Beijing also permitted Pyongyang to open a consulate 

in the newly acquired Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong. 

Although it is impossible to verify these reports, they indicate the 

existence of strains in the relationship. So far, these tensions have 

proved manageable.11

Nevertheless, relations between the PRC and DPRK appear to 

have warmed since 1999.12 Efforts on both sides to be more cordial 

are evident in President Jiang Zemin’s September 2001 visit to 

Pyongyang―China’s fi rst head of state visit to North Korea in a 

decade (the last was by PRC President Yang Shangkun in 1992) 

and the fi rst since Beijing normalized relations with Seoul. The 
6

term “friendly” now regularly is employed by top offi cials from 

both sides to characterize their relationship. Both Jiang Zemin and 

President Kim Yong Nam of the Supreme People’s Assembly used 

the adjective in their discussions during Jiang’s September 2001 

Pyongyang visit.13

But the PRC-DPRK relationship continues to blow hot and cold. 

While Kim Jong Il reportedly is keen to have Chinese President 

Hu Jintao visit Pyongyang in the near future and has issued an 

invitation, no high-level Chinese leader was invited to attend the 

DPRK’s 55th annual national celebration in early September 2003. 

The PRC was represented by the President of the Chinese People’s 

Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, Chen Haosu. 

While media reports have suggested this was an intentional snub by 

China, it actually appears to be a snub by North Korea who did not 

invite any senior Chinese leader.14 In any event, it probably suited 

Beijing not to have any senior leader photographed next to Kim Jong 

Il on such a nominally festive occasion.

Economics.

North Korea is essentially an economic basket case―the result 

of wrong-headed Stalinist policies, bad weather, and the cut off 

of Soviet aid in 1991.15 Estimates are that since 1990 the DPRK has 

registered negative economic growth. Since 1988 Pyongyang’s 

foreign trade has shrunk and has suffered an overall trade defi cit 

every year since 1985. It has yet to recover from the sudden drop in 

two-way trade with the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

(USSR), which stood at an estimated U.S.$2.56 billion in 1990 and 

then a year later plunged to about U.S.$365 million. Indeed, since 

1995 two-way trade with Russia has remained well under U.S.$100 

million annually.16

China has failed to take the place of the Soviet Union for North 

Korea, although Beijing has become Pyongyang’s most important 

trading partner and economic patron. The PRC currently provides 

considerable aid. Two-way trade with China constitutes about 

one-third of North Korea’s entire trade, although this amount 

constitutes only about 3 percent of China’s trade with South Korea 

and approximately 1 percent of China’s total trade volume. Prior 
7

to the Agreed Framework of 1994, shipments of oil and of Western 

aid and since the suspension of oil deliveries by the United States 

in December 2002, Beijing was thought to be providing about 

three-quarters of Pyongyang’s petroleum and food imports.17

Pyongyang’s imports from China since 1985 have hovered between 

approximately U.S.$329 million and U.S.$600 million annually. 

Meanwhile, the DPRK’s exports to the PRC have fl uctuated wildly―a 

refl ection of Pyongyang’s erratic economic performance―from a low 

in 1999 of U.S.$41.7 million to a high of U.S.$297 million in 1993.18

North Korea’s trade defi cits with China are sizeable and growing: 

estimated at U.S.$4.5 billion between 1990 and 2002 (Pyongyang has 

imported U.S.$6.1 billion from Beijing but only exported U.S.$1.7 

billion), with an average annual bilateral defi cit since 1995 of more 

than U.S.$350 million.19 Smuggling and unoffi cial trade across the 

PRC-DPRK border seem commonplace, and this commerce may be 

equal to the value of at least half of the “offi cial” fi gure.20

Illegal population fl ows are also common occurrences along 

the China-North Korea border. As many as 300,000 North Korean 

refugees currently live a perilous existence in China.21 Some are 

temporary visitors―one member of a family earning desperately 

needed cash or food to take back to other family members remaining 

in North Korea; others are seeking more permanent sanctuary in 

China. A signifi cant number of the refugees are children―either 

orphaned or abandoned by parents at their wits’ end. Of those 

children who do remain north of the Yalu River, some are adopted by 

childless Chinese couples. A sizeable number of the refugees appear 

to be women, and many are either forced (or sold by their families) 

into prostitution or marriage to poor Manchurian peasants unable to 

fi nd Chinese wives.22 Other North Koreans provide a cheap source of 

factory labor for Chinese businesses in Northeast China. They tend 

to be exploited by factory managers who pay them extremely low 

wages and provide terrible living and working conditions because 

they know these unfortunates are powerless illegal aliens subject to 

immediate deportation from China.23

Many Chinese analysts stress the signifi cance of multiple steps 

North Korea has taken in an apparent effort to make economic 

reforms.24 In mid-2002, for example, Pyongyang lifted domestic price 
8

controls and promised wage increases, but the result was a bout of 

severe infl ation without any improvement in people’s lives or an 

amelioration of the country’s disastrous economic predicament. 

Conditions may not be as dire as they were in the mid-1990s, but 

malnutrition is still widespread and aid from foreign donors has 

declined.25

Then, in late September 2002, North Korea announced the 

appointment of Yang Bin, a fl amboyant China-based entrepreneur 

and naturalized Dutch citizen, to run the Sinuijiu foreign trade and 

investment zone on the border, overriding prior consultation with 

China. Beijing had made its opposition clear―reportedly telling 

Pyongyang that Yang was a criminal. When North Korea ignored 

its neighbor’s wishes, China made its displeasure known―fi rst 

detaining Yang in October 2002, and charging him with bribery, 

fraud, and illegally appropriating land the following month―

effectively freezing the project.26 Yang was sentenced to 18 years in 

prison for bribery, tax evasion, and illegal use of land in July 2003. 

His judicial appeal in September 2003 (shown on Chinese television) 

was rejected. While Yang’s case should also be viewed as part of a 

larger crackdown on corruption, it was also undoubtedly aimed at 

registering China’s displeasure with North Korea.27

Military.

Relations between the Korean People’s Army (KPA) and the 

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have declined precipitously in 

terms of the frequency, level, and substance since the days of the 

Korean War and, in particular, since the death of Kim Il Sung in 

1994. While regular military-to-military visits continue, the close 

cooperation seems to have given way to symbolism and ceremony. 

Many of the PLA fi gures visiting North Korea in recent years 

are described as being on “goodwill delegations.”28 Beijing has 

simultaneously, over the past decade, in line with its “two Koreas” 

policy, developed noteworthy defense ties with Seoul: high level 

visits, functional exchanges, and research cooperation.29 A key 

indication of this was the visit by the South Korean defense minister 

to China in August 1999, and his Chinese counterpart reciprocated 

the following January. Efforts to repair military-to-military ties with 
9

North Korea are evident by PRC Defense Minister Chi Haotian’s 

visit to Pyongyang in September 2000 to commemorate the 50th 

anniversary of China’s intervention in the Korean War. More 

recently, in mid-August 2003, General Xu Caihou, Director of the 

General Political Department and vice chair of the CMC, journeyed 

to Pyongyang. While some Chinese analysts insisted this was a 

“routine visit,” others have labeled it as far from an ordinary series 

of offi ce calls. Xu reportedly met not only with Marshal Jo Myong 

Rok, vice chairman of the DRPK National Defense Council (and 

director of the KPA’s GPD), but also with none other than Kim Jong 

Il. The Chinese used Xu’s visit (along with other civilian visits) to 

gauge the climate in Pyongyang, while the North Koreans requested 

closer cooperation and exchanges between the KPA and PLA.30

Reportedly, China has provided some degree of technical 

assistance for North Korean satellite and missile programs.31

Moreover, according to media reports U.S. intelligence believes that 

Beijing may have been providing indirect assistance to Pyongyang’s 

nuclear program until very recently.32 In response to these reports, 

since mid-2002 China has issued two sets of stricter export control 

regulations on the export of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-

related technologies and, on the heels of North Korea’s October 

nuclear confession to the United States, tightened restrictions on an 

existing third set of regulations.33

THE CREEPING NUCLEAR CRISIS

The current creeping nuclear crisis is the second such event on 

the Korean Peninsula in the space of a decade. The latest nuclear 

crisis emerged in October 2002 when DPRK Vice Foreign Minister 

Kang Sok Ju confessed to visiting U.S. Assistant Secretary of State 

for East Asia James Kelly that his country did have an ongoing 

nuclear weapons program. The fi rst nuclear crisis ignited in March 

1993 when North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from 

the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Negotiations between 

Pyongyang and Washington reached an impasse, and hostilities 

in 1994 were only averted by an 11th-hour deal. The outcome was 

the Agreed Framework of October 1994 whereby the United States 

agreed to help North Korea build two light water nuclear reactors 
10

in exchange for Pyongyang scrapping its own effort to build 

graphite nuclear reactors which were thought to be more easily 

used to produce a weaponized nuclear capability. This accord led 

to the establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development 

Organization (KEDO) with the participation of South Korea, Japan, 

and the European Union to oversee the project. 

The current crisis continues as of early 2004. The United States has 

adopted a low-keyed approach to the current situation. Responding 

to the revelation, President George W. Bush insisted on December 

31, 2002, that the North Korean situation constituted a “diplomatic 

showdown” rather than a “military showdown” and hoped it would 

be resolved “peacefully.”34 In the administration’s view, in contrast 

to the confrontation with Baghdad, handling Pyongyang required 

a political and multilateral approach. While there has been no 

escalation of confl ict, at the same time there has been no resolution 

resulting in a “creeping” crisis.

The Limits of Chinese Infl uence.

In the face of North Korean posturing and insistence on direct 

bilateral talks with the United States, Washington continued to insist 

that multilateral talks with Pyongyang involving other concerned 

capitals such as Seoul, Beijing, Tokyo and Moscow were the only 

way forward. The Bush administration pressed countries, notably 

China, to exert infl uence on North Korea. The assumptions were 

fi rst that Beijing had signifi cant infl uence on Pyongyang and was 

prepared to use it; and, second, that Beijing’s goals regarding North 

Korea were the same or at least similar to those of Washington. 

These assumptions are questionable. Indeed, while China probably 

has more infl uence on North Korea than any other country, this 

infl uence actually seems rather limited, and China’s priorities 

regarding North Korea have tended to be quite different to those of 

the United States.

The world may have witnessed the furthest extent of Beijing’s 

infl uence on Pyongyang in 2003 and early 2004. China facilitated, 

hosted, and participated in the April 23-25, 2003, talks between 

Washington and Pyongyang, and six-party talks on August 27-29, 
11

2003, and February 25-28, 2004. The six parties are China, Japan, 

North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States. China 

deserves considerable credit not only for persuading North Korea 

to be more fl exible on the format of the talks, but also for getting 

the North Koreans actually to show up. Pyongyang had insisted 

for months that it would only talk to Washington one-on-one, 

and Washington had been just as adamant that any talks must be 

multilateral. In mid-January 2003 China offered to host talks between 

North Korea and the United States. Beijing persisted in prodding 

and coaxing Pyongyang to be more open on its approach to dialogue 

with Washington. The result was that North Korea announced in 

mid-April 2003 that it was willing to consider various formats for the 

talks and shortly thereafter participated in three-party talks held in 

Beijing.

A Unique Confl uence of Conditions.

The outcome of Chinese pressure in this instance is due to what is 

very likely a unique set of conditions. It is important to put China’s 

diplomatic efforts in 2003 in full perspective―Beijing’s sustained 

efforts to bring Washington and Pyongyang to the same table are 

unprecedented. China has never before undertaken such an activist 

diplomatic initiative solely on its own initiative. Beijing literally 

stuck its neck out: by Chinese standards of excessive caution, it took 

an enormously bold and risky step well outside of its normal comfort 

zone. It could be argued that China had little to lose because even if 

this attempt to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis had failed 

miserably, Beijing only would have been widely applauded for its 

efforts. Nevertheless, China’s efforts are nothing short of highly 

unusual. The closest Beijing has come to this kind of self-initiated 

diplomatic activism is in its leading role in the formation of the 

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in June 2001. But in this 

earlier case, Chinese efforts entailed bringing together neighboring 

countries that enjoyed good relations without a legacy of hostility 

and with a recent track record of confi dence and trust-building 

measures including landmark steps at demilitarization. By contrast, 

in the case of North Korea, the primary actors had a long history of 
12

hostilities and antagonisms, and substantial mutual mistrust and 

suspicion. Certainly, some analysts stress that in recent years China 

has become a more confi dent international actor, more willing to 

participate in both multilateral and bilateral settings.35

Nevertheless, prior to January 2003, China had displayed no 

interest in taking an activist and leading role on the Korean crisis. 

What brought on this sudden burst of high energy activity? The 

answer seems to lie in the unique confl uence of three conditions. 

The fi rst was the impending and then actual Iraq war. This had a 

signifi cant and sobering impact on both China and North Korea. 

Both regimes were extremely concerned about what the United 

States would do next. The result was a sudden sense of urgency 

on the part of Beijing and Pyongyang to remove any excuse for 

the United States to use military power on the Korean Peninsula. 

China’s perceived sense of crisis can be gauged by Beijing’s reported 

decision in early 2003 to establish a leading small group on North 

Korea.36

Second, China had thought more seriously about the strategic 

consequences of a nuclearized North Korea and began to recognize 

the disturbing ramifi cations of this.37 Some Chinese security analysts 

grasped that Bejing’s hierarchy of priorities vis-à-vis Pyongyang 

might be illusory. That is, China’s number one priority of keeping 

the regime afl oat might be in doubt if North Korea went nuclear. A 

nuclearized Pyongyang could mean the end of the regime because 

this development could cause the United States to respond militarily 

and oust the regime. Moreover, if not, Pyongyang might even at 

some point engage in nuclear blackmail against China. Indeed, one 

Chinese analyst has raised this as a possibility.38 At the very least 

North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons might trigger a “chain 

reaction” or “domino effect”[duominnuo gupai xiaogai] in Northeast 

Asia: Japan and perhaps South Korea might also go nuclear (rarely 

mentioned but certainly a concern to China is the possibility that 

Taiwan might reconsider its non-nuclear stance).39 Moreover, 

unmentioned by Chinese analysts but a logical second order effect 

would be heightened U.S. enthusiasm for ballistic missile defense.40

Third, China was also beginning to realize the extent of the 

economic cost of continued tensions on the peninsula. This is not 
13

only measured in terms of China’s signifi cant largesse to prop up 

North Korea’s collapsed economy, but also in terms of the potential 

damage to China’s economy of prolonged instability on the 

peninsula and the fallout on South Korea’s economic performance.41

The impact of the protracted Pyongyang nuclear crisis was being 

felt in Seoul, and Beijing feared this might impinge on South Korea’s 

burgeoning economic relationship with China. 

The Iraq war was almost certainly the most important condition, 

and the one that motivated both China and North Korea to act. But 

the further away from the end of major combat operations we get, 

declared by President Bush on May 1, 2003, the more the “shock and 

awe” value of the highly successful military victory in Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM recedes. By the autumn of 2003, the sense of 

urgency in addressing the North Korean nuclear crisis that China 

exhibited in the spring and summer seemed to have evaporated. 

Chinese analysts in civilian and military research institutes in 

Beijing with whom the author held discussions in September 2003 

seemed―with one notable exception―generally comfortable with a 

very gradual approach to resolving the crises. The consensus was 

that there was no reason to rush matters: the North Korean nuclear 

problem would take a long time to resolve, and patience was 

essential.42 Negative economic impact and nuclear fallout from the 

creeping crisis, by themselves, are probably not suffi cient to prompt 

a degree of alarm necessary for Beijing to rouse itself to exert direct 

infl uence on Pyongyang.

DIFFERENT PRIORITIES REGARDING NORTH KOREA

President Bush has noted that the U.S. goal of a nuclear free 

peninsula is a “position shared by the Chinese.” Speaking in 

April 2003, he emphasized that the United States and China have 

“common interests” on North Korea.43 However, China’s priorities 

have been considerably different from those of the United States: 

Beijing’s has been to stabilize and strengthen the Pyongyang regime 

(i.e., prevent its collapse), while many in Washington desire the end 

of the regime.44 However, since at least January 10, 2003, when North 

Korea declared that it was withdrawing from the NPT, China appears 

to have viewed the nuclear issue with increasing concern. Several 
14

months earlier, on October 25, 2002, then PRC President Jiang Zemin, 

speaking at a joint press conference with President Bush, confessed 

that China was “completely in the dark” about North Korea’s nuclear 

program. China’s leaders and spokesmen repeatedly stress their 

country’s desire for a non-nuclear, peaceful, and stable peninsula 

and a negotiated solution to the crisis.45 More recently China has also 

stressed that the “reasonable security concerns of the DPRK should 

be addressed.”46 It seems very clear that China’s number one priority 

remains stability. According to a researcher at China’s National 

Defense Univesity, “Preserving peace and stability on the peninsula 

is China’s number one and most important strategic interest there.”47

For Beijing, this means the survival of the Pyongyang regime, and 

while preventing a nuclearized North Korea remains important, it is 

less vital for China.48 Many analysts and journalists have concluded 

or simply assumed that Beijing’s primary concern (or at least a 

very high priority) is to prevent North Korea from going nuclear.49

This is understandable given that putatively the crisis is nuclear 

(certainly in the view of the United States), and that Pyongyang’s 

words and deeds about going nuclear have spurred China to action. 

This mistaken perception of China’s nuclear concerns is reinforced 

by the readiness of Chinese academics to discuss in media outlets 

their fears about North Korea and proliferation.50 But this should 

not be confused with China’s bottom line―stability and peace on the 

peninsula.51 It was not the specter of North Korea’s entry into the 

nuclear club per se that mobilized China to action in early 2003, but 

rather the prospect of imminent U.S. military action prompted by 

Pyongyang’s course of action.52 However, judging from writings by 

and interviews with Chinese analysts, most of whom are affi liated 

with Chinese government think tanks, Beijing appears able to live 

with a nuclear North Korea (although it would certainly prefer not 

to).53

North Korea.

Many in Beijing would like to see the Pyongyang regime survive 

indefi nitely, and China is doing what it can to prop up North 

Korea.54 China would prefer to see this fraternal socialist state 
15

endure rather than witness another loss in the handful of surviving 

Leninist regimes. Musings by Chinese academics about desirability 

of “regime change” in Pyongyang should not be equated with 

such transformed thinking by China’s top leaders.55 The remarks 

of an unnamed Chinese analyst, speaking after the conclusion of 

the Three-Party Talks in April 2003, are very important: “A lot 

of us [academics] are telling the government that we . . . need to 

support regime change [in North Korea]. . . . But the government 

is afraid to change.”56 Beijing fears that the process of Pyongyang’s 

collapse would be certainly unmanageable, probably destabilizing, 

and possibly cataclysmic, and the outcome would be a Northeast 

Asian power confi guration not in China’s favor. Nevertheless, 

China desires a more stable “domesticated” North Korea, preferably 

without nukes.57

Thus Beijing viewed the defusing of the 1993-94 nuclear crisis 

with considerable relief and satisfaction.58 The signing of the Agreed 

Framework heralded the establishment of the Korean Peninsula 

Energy Development Organization (KEDO), through which Western 

countries agreed to bankroll and build two light water nuclear 

reactors for North Korea and provide the north with oil until the fi rst 

reactor was completed. While Pyongyang can continue to stave off 

collapse without instituting thoroughgoing reform, Beijing believes 

that the current status quo is simply not sustainable indefi nitely. 

At the same time, however, China desires gradual (not “dramatic”) 

change.59 Therefore China seeks to nurture the emergence of a 

reform-minded North Korea that would resuscitate its economy, 

draw down its massive military, and initiate threat reduction and 

confi dence-building measures on the peninsula.60 How realistic this 

goal is and how far Beijing is willing to pursue it remains unclear.61

In short, North Korea presents China with a major dilemma: 

the status quo on the Korean Peninsula is problematic and fragile, 

not to mention unsustainable. But at the same time Chinese elites 

see change (resulting from direct external pressure) as worrisome 

because it is quite likely to unfold very rapidly, be highly 

destabilizing, probably tumultuous, and perhaps even cataclysmic. 

Although Chinese analysts and leaders seem largely convinced that 

the outcome of a unifi ed Korea would be in China’s favor, it is how

this end state might be achieved that alarms China. This is manifest 
16

in the analyses of widely quoted academics such as Shi Yinhong 

of People’s University. Some of these scholars suggest that China 

could benefi t in the long term from the collapse of North Korea.62

Indeed this line of thinking is nothing new. However, it is the short 

and medium term phases of a collapse scenario that China’s elites 

are most worried about: they fear that this will play out to China’s 

detriment.

Status Quo Plus.

Beijing appears to believe the best way to ensure Pyongyang’s 

survival is to shape a kinder, gentler, more reform-minded North 

Korea, and for years China has actively encouraged North Korea to 

adopt Chinese-style market reforms. This, China’s most preferred 

outcome, might be dubbed “status quo plus.” In other words, no 

sudden major changes in North Korea are desired.

Beijing is not willing to push too hard for reforms or more 

moderate international behavior for fear of loosing all infl uence 

in Pyongyang and/or being shown to have little or no infl uence.63

First, if China pushes very hard, negative consequences could 

result for China: North Korea might simply sever ties with China or 

even become hostile to China. On the other hand Beijing is secretly 

worried that China’s pressure may have no impact―that Pyongyang 

will simply ignore Beijing’s efforts, and China will look peripheral, 

if not inconsequential, to the North Korea situation. Chinese analysts 

frequently admit that Beijing’s infl uence is limited and lament the 

challenges of dealing with Pyongyang―a proud and diffi cult regime 

that does not readily listen to, let alone heed, advice.64

In fact, Pyongyang still views Beijing with a signifi cant amount of 

suspicion although China probably has more infl uence with North 

Korea than any other country because of its history of steadfast 

morale support and material assistance.65 For both China and North 

Korea, their relationship in the past decade has been close but 

uncomfortable (as noted earlier in this monograph). The Kim Jong 

Il regime does not want to depend heavily on any one country and 

would almost certainly prefer not to rely on China. As one Chinese 

academic observed: the North Koreans “. . . believe we [Chinese] 
17

betrayed them. We embraced the U.S. and the enemy in the South.”66

To put it mildly, China’s motives are suspect in the eyes of many 

North Koreans.

Finally, in early 2003, Beijing appeared to realize that some kind 

of action was needed. But after the latest round of U.S.-North Korean 

talks in August, what follow-up steps might China be prepared 

to take vis-à-vis North Korea? At most, Beijing will continue to 

encourage Pyongyang and Washington to keep talking. This is 

because China’s thinking on North Korea continues to be shaped by 

three major factors: a “lingering buffer mentality,” a conservative 

and risk averse Chinese mindset, and a tendency to scapegoat the 

United States. All three predispose Beijing to shy away from bold 

new initiatives. Moreover, now that the major combat phase of 

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM is over, and both U.S. forces and the 

Bush administration’s attention seem to be focused on rebuilding 

Iraq, China perceives the likelihood of U.S. military action against 

North Korea in the near future as unlikely. In short, as of late 2003, 

Beijing no longer felt a sense of urgency, and China remains focused 

once again at efforts to prop up Pyongyang.67

LINGERING BUFFER MENTALITY

China has long tended to view North Korea as a “buffer” between 

China and the military forces of the United States and its ally, South 

Korea. Since July 1953 Pyongyang has served as a cordon sanitaire. 

This made sense in the 1950s and 1960s and even in the 1970s, but 

by the 1980s and 1990s, the “buffer” was becoming an anachronism. 

China now has good relations with South Korea and cordial ties 

with the United States, and no longer sees either country as a direct 

military threat.

Yet, the buffer mentality lingers in Beijing. One Chinese analyst 

observed the persistence of a “very powerful . . . [and] enduring” 

mentality “forged by war” and noted that it was very diffi cult for 

people accustomed to this to envision proactive change of the status 

quo.68 Korea is still seen as a sensitive border region: the route of 

Japan’s military invasion of China in the early 20th century and 

possible invasion by the United States in late 1950. Chinese leaders 
18

and analysts continue to refer to the relationship between China and 

North Korea as being one of “lips and teeth”: if the Korean “lips” 

are gone, then China’s “teeth” will get cold. Some still cling to this 

conception.

From Lips to Lipstick.

Today, however, many in Beijing appear to view Pyongyang as 

“lipstick” (rather than “lips”) to China’s teeth and lips. This lipstick 

is red, increasingly expensive, of questionable quality, but looks 

good to a cursory glance.

The red color of the lipstick signifi es that the relationship has 

an important ideological component. Both China and North Korea 

are fraternal socialist party-states―two of only a handful of Leninist 

regimes in the world today. The continued existence and health 

of the other is important to each and not simply because they 

are neighbors. The issue of domestic political legitimacy for both 

communist regimes is exacerbated if this group of countries shrinks 

further. 

The lipstick is expensive, that is, it exerts a signifi cant economic 

drag on Beijing. China is North Korea’s most important trading 

partner, and as much as half of all Pyongyang’s imports come from 

Beijing. China provides vital stocks of food and fuel to its needy 

neighbor. The economic relationship is very one-sided as North 

Korea exports very little to China. In contrast to this aid donor 

relationship with the north, China has a thriving and prosperous 

economic relationship with South Korea. While China’s annual oneway trade with North Korea is estimated at hundreds of millions in 

U.S. dollars, China does tens of billions of dollars in two-way trade 

with South Korea. Moreover, China is the benefi ciary of billions of 

dollars in foreign direct investment from South Korea.

The lipstick is now of dubious quality: that is, for at least a decade, 

it has not been working as effectively as advertised and has created 

signifi cant headaches for Beijing. North Korea historically has 

offered China a kind of security blanket. North Korean leader Kim Il 

Sung had good personal relationships with successive generations of 

China’s top leaders: Mao Zedong, until the latter’s death in 1976, and 
19

then with Deng Xiaoping, until Kim’s own death in 1994. However, 

relations have not been as good between senior Chinese leaders and 

Kim’s son, Kim Jong Il, who succeeded his father as Pyongyang’s 

top leader. Nevertheless, Beijing appears to have rationalized that 

while the younger Kim might be a diffi cult son of a gun to deal with, 

he can at least be considered China’s son of a gun. In short, China 

has infl uence over a truculent but known quantity. Pyongyang’s 

actions in early 2003 have only provided Beijing cause for greater 

frustration and distress. On January 10, North Korea announced its 

withdrawal from the NPT; on February 18, North Korea threatened 

to void the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement if economic sanctions 

were imposed; and then on March 2, 2003, North Korean fi ghters 

intercepted a U.S. surveillance aircraft fl ying in international 

airspace over the Sea of Japan.

Although China and North Korea are technically allies, bound 

by a 1961 treaty to come to each other’s aid in the event of war, the 

defense relationship might be dubbed a “virtual alliance” because 

since the mid-1990s Beijing has made clear to Pyongyang that China 

will not come to North Korea’s aid if Kim Jong Il gets himself in 

hot water. Privately and sometimes publicly, Chinese offi cials and 

analysts make this point.69

Nevertheless, this is the only formal bilateral military alliance 

China has―one sealed in blood by fi ghting shoulder-to-shoulder in 

the Korean War―and Beijing has not seen fi t to abrogate it offi cially. 

The war ended with an armistice that celebrated its 50th anniversary 

on July 27, 2003. Many Chinese are proud of their country’s role 

in the Korean War and resist to any suggestion that the sacrifi ces 

of almost three million Chinese soldiers who served, including 

hundreds of thousands killed and a comparable number wounded, 

might have been in vain.70 Moreover, Chinese are angered by how 

North Korea downplays or outright ignores China’s essential 

contribution to the war. A Chinese visitor to North Korea was 

devastated to fi nd no acknowledgement or reference to China’s 

massive wartime contribution in a DPRK museum at Panmunjom.71

It is no exaggeration to say that many Chinese view the North 

Koreans as ingrates. 

Speaking in 1997, Premier Li Peng reportedly told a group of 

Americans “North Korea is neither an ally of the PRC nor an enemy, 
20

but merely a neighboring country.”72 His words can be taken as 

refl ecting Chinese frustration with Pyongyang, but they cannot be 

taken as an accurate indication of Beijing’s views. Clearly North 

Korea is not “merely” another neighbor; arguably China sees North 

Korea as its most important neighbor, simply because it is so fragile 

and has the real and imminent potential to cause Beijing problems 

of such severe scope and intensity. In short, Pyongyang may not be 

easily classifi ed as a friend or foe of Beijing, but its fate is crucially 

important to China’s leaders.

The lipstick looks good at a cursory glance; that is, it appears 

to have geopolitical benefi ts for China, but upon more careful 

examination, it actually might be construed as more of a liability. On 

the positive side, the Korean issue puts China in demand: Beijing is 

viewed as having a key role to play on the peninsula. It is an issue 

upon which China can cooperate with the United States and makes 

China look like a responsible and infl uential major power.73 But 

North Korea now also looms as a serious liability. For one thing, the 

negative side is that “the emperor may have little or no clothes.” In 

short, the world might discover that China has virtually no infl uence 

in North Korea after all. In such a situation where China is unable 

(or unwilling) to deliver results vis-à-vis North Korea, relations with 

the United States might be adversely affected, and at the very least 

China might lose face internationally.74 Indeed, Beijing has infl uence 

on Pyongyang, but this is almost certainly “soft” infl uence that is 

limited and largely “potential” rather than “hard” and “actual” 

because only two outcomes are likely. If China chooses to apply 

direct pressure to North Korea, it is quite possible that Pyongyang 

will not be infl uenced (at least in the desired manner). In fact, 

Chinese analysts regularly state that while China has infl uence this 

is limited, the kind that can only be exerted softly and subtly via 

suggestions or encouragement behind the scenes instead of blunt 

and direct admonishments in public view.75

RISK AVERSE MINDSET

China likely will never exert substantial hard infl uence because 

it fears the result―only a negative outcome is likely: either no 
21

result or a bad result. No result would mean North Korea does 

nothing except to pull away from China. China would then lose 

any possibility of infl uence. If this happens, China might also gain 

a dangerous and unpredictable foe on its doorstep. A bad result of 

China’s pressure would be the possible collapse of North Korea, the 

emergence of a more paranoid and militant regime, or result in war 

on the peninsula―Beijing’s worst nightmare.

China is risk averse under the best of circumstances, but this is 

especially true in 2003. In its actions over the past year or so, China 

has stepped about as far outside of its comfort zone on Korea as it is 

likely to go. The predominant tendency has been for Beijing to keep 

a low profi le and adhere to what Samuel Kim has dubbed the “maximini principle,” whereby China seeks to maximize the benefi ts of 

a policy initiative, while at the same time minimizing the costs it 

expends. Beijing’s current foreign policy priority is to maintain 

peace and stability in the Asia-Pacifi c, and its domestic priority is to 

ensure continued economic growth and prosperity in China.76 This 

risk averse tendency was most pronounced in 2003 because of the 

leadership succession underway in China.77

A transition is currently in progress from the so-called third 

generation with Jiang Zemin (aged 78) at the “core” to the fourth 

generation spearheaded by Hu Jintao (aged 62). This change 

began with the 16th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party 

in November 2002 and continued with the 10th National People’s 

Congress (NPC) held in March 2003, but the succession is incomplete 

because the new slate of leaders remains as yet largely untested, 

and Jiang remains paramount leader retaining the crucial post of 

chair on the powerful Central Military Commission. But by the 10th 

NPC, Hu had apparently assumed responsibility for China’s foreign 

affairs, and it was reportedly Hu who launched the major Chinese 

diplomatic initiative to bring the United States and North Korea 

together for talks. The Chinese leader reportedly was alarmed that 

U.S. military action against North Korea might be imminent in the 

aftermath of Iraq and believed Beijing had to act promptly to avert 

war on the Korean Peninsula.78

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) proved enough of 

a challenge for China’s leaders in 2003, and this experience does 

not dispose them to tackle another tricky issue if they can avoid it. 
22

China strongly desires peace on its periphery and good relations 

with neighboring states and the major powers, especially the United 

States. Beijing is averse to any new policy initiative that would put 

these desirables at risk. China’s six-party talks efforts (as mentioned 

earlier), while bold by Chinese standards, carried few risks for 

China: it actually has little, if any, down side. But additional steps 

likely will be seen as extremely risky by Beijing and not justifi ed 

unless the creeping crisis dramatically worsens.

What pressure can China exert on North Korea? China could 

publicly criticize North Korea in the United Nations, but this would 

only make North Korea more militant and paranoid, and destroy 

any infl uence Beijing has over Pyongyang. The same would be true 

if China were formally to revoke the 1961 treaty of alliance. Beijing 

also appears unwilling to cooperate vigorously in the Proliferation 

Security Initiative launched by the United States, fearing that 

measures such as blockading and interdicting North Korean exports 

to check proliferation of WMD would only exacerbate the problem. 

The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Department of 

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in mid-August that these steps 

“could make a bad situation worse.”79 China could also impose 

sanctions: withhold food and fuel, for example. However, China 

adamantly opposes the implementation of sanctions. In Beijing’s 

view, this would make Pyongyang more desperate and probably 

lead to regime collapse.80

China could throw open its border to North Korean refugees, but 

this act might very well hasten the collapse of regime. Beijing is highly 

unlikely to do this, fearing the consequences both in terms of the 

scale of humanitarian crisis China would face, not to mention being 

at odds with Beijing’s consuming priority: Pyongyang’s survival. 

Since the early 1990s, Beijing has faced an unwanted humanitarian 

problem, with hundreds of thousands of North Korean refugees 

seeking safe haven in China. And China was embarrassed by a high 

profi le wave of at least 130 North Korean asylum seekers, during 

spring and summer 2002, trying to break into diplomatic missions 

in Beijing and Shenyang.81 A larger infl ow of refugees from North 

Korea would not only threaten to swamp Northeast China but also 

increase international pressure on Beijing to permit access to the UN 
23

High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) and Non-Governmental 

Organizations (NGOs) eager to provide humanitarian assistance. 

China has resisted efforts by the UNHCR or NGOs to gain access 

to the individuals, insisting they are economic, rather than political, 

refugees. Beijing is extremely reluctant and/or averse to taking any 

of these steps because it perceives only negative consequences for 

China.82

Pipeline Shutoffs and PLA Deployments.

Journalists and analysts have pointed to two episodes in 2003 

as proof that China is willing and capable of applying pressure on 

North Korea. Perhaps the most frequently cited incident as evidence 

is an oil pipeline shutoff for 3 days in late February 2003 allegedly 

for “technical reasons.” There is considerable speculation that this 

was a deliberate act by China intended to apply pressure to North 

Korea. The author’s assessment is that the shutdown really was due 

to technical problems, but it was defi nitely to Beijing’s advantage to 

let both Pyongyang and Washington believe this was done expressly 

to apply substantive pressure to North Korea. When Chinese Vice 

Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with North Korea Foreign Minister 

Paek Nam Sun in Beijing in mid-February, he warned Pyongyang 

to moderate its behavior. Coming on the heels of this meeting, the 

North Koreans concluded the pipeline shutoff was the application 

of Chinese pressure, but China claimed this was not the case. The 

effect was to help convince Pyongyang to sit down with Washington 

2 months later. Meanwhile, Beijing can encourage Washington to 

believe that China is heeding U.S. calls to apply pressure to North 

Korea and win credit for merely doing what it had to do anyway. 

It is impossible to verify the real reason behind the temporary 

shutdown of the pipeline, but the belief that China’s action was 

carried out to exert pressure on North Korea is enormously 

appealing to many observers. This is because, fi rst, the shutdown 

appeared to get results. Second, this interpretation offers a glimmer 

of hope to many observers desperate to believe there is a peaceful 

way to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. Third, the pipeline 

shutoff seems to be consistent with an assumed Chinese preference 
24

for subtle tactics. Whatever observers would like to believe, given 

the environment in Beijing on the eve of the 10th NPC with the 

diffi culty of getting a high-level consensus decision to go forward 

with such a move, it is improbable that the shut off was a conscious 

pressure tactic.

The second episode concerns the deployment of PLA units close 

to the border with North Korea. Several Hong Kong newspapers 

reported in mid-2003 that Beijing had moved as many as 150,000 

soldiers to signal its displeasure with Pyongyang over its efforts to 

develop nuclear weapons and to pressure North Korea to continue 

to participate in the six-party talks.83 Also noted but receiving less 

attention was that the move may have been aimed at dealing with a 

deteriorating law and order situation in the border region. Increased 

crime and unrest have been blamed on North Korean refugees and 

rogue soldiers of the Korean People’s Army.84 Foreign Ministry 

spokesman Kong Quan denied the troop moves were an effort to 

pressure North Korea. He stressed this was a “normal adjustment 

carried out after years of preparation.” He declined to confi rm 

numbers and insisted that the border was “relatively stable.” 

Indeed, the move seems to be part of a larger ongoing reorganization 

of police and military forces in the area rather than designed 

specifi cally to send a particular signal to Pyongyang―indeed similar 

troop adjustments were made along China’s border with Burma 

(Myanmar) at about the same time.85 As with the pipeline report, 

there is no way to state with certainty what Beijing intended. Once 

again, it is in China’s interests to let the United States, North Korea, 

and other countries perceive this as pressure.

THE BLAME GAME

In addition to a lingering buffer mentality and a risk averse 

mindset, a third element makes Beijing hold back from pressing 

Pyongyang to the extent it otherwise might: a tendency to blame 

Washington for either creating, or at least exacerbating, the crisis. 

Although Chinese leaders and analysts appear to recognize that 

North Korea lies at the root of the problem, they cast blame on the 

United States partly out of a sense of frustration and partly because 

they believe that the Bush administration has the potential to defuse 
25

the crisis.86 Moreover, they seem to believe that the U.S. potential has 

a greater probability of being realized than does North Korea’s.

That is, Washington is more likely to change/moderate its stance 

than Pyongyang is.87 In other words, Chinese analysts do not appear 

to anticipate much fl exibility from North Korea and have pinned 

their hopes for progress on moderation on the United States.88

At its most extreme, this scapegoating amounts to heaping 

the blame on Washington. According to one PLA analyst, “the 

United States concocted [or manufactured] the Korean nuclear 

issue [Meiguo baozhi chaoxian he wenti].”89 A more moderate and 

more pervasive view seems to be that the United States, by its 

hostile attitude manifest in harsh rhetoric and a refusal to make 

concessions/compromises with North Korea, is inhibiting progress 

and a resolution of the crisis. Speaking a week after the six-party 

talks, PRC Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi announced to the media: 

“America’s policy towards the DPRK: this is a main problem we are 

facing.”90 The Chinese military analyst quoted above phrased this 

sentiment more strongly: “The greatest obstacle is the hostile policy 

and military pressure of the United States as well as U.S. restrictions 

on the foreign policies of South Korea and Japan.”91 Certainly some 

of this U.S. scapegoating rhetoric is aimed at reassuring North Korea 

that China is still on its side. Nevertheless, these words also seem to 

be manifestations of an underlying assumption that for progress to 

be made in resolving the crisis, the United States must take the fi rst 

step.92

To sum up: a U.S. expectation that China will apply strong 

pressure on North Korea to move Pyongyang towards complying 

with Washington’s demands is problematic. This expectation is 

grounded in the assumption that China actually has signifi cant 

infl uence with North Korea, is willing to use it, and Beijing shares 

the same policy priorities on Pyongyang as Washington. The reality 

seems to be that China’s infl uence to push for major change in North 

Korea is quite limited and in a sense merely potential (i.e., never to 

be used) because China will not apply direct pressure. Because of a 

lingering buffer mentality, an entrenched risk averse mindset, and 

a tendency to make Washington the scapegoat, Beijing believes any 

direct Chinese pressure is extremely unlikely to have signifi cant 

positive impact on Pyongyang and likely to produce unfavorable 
26

results for China. Even if China applies additional pressure, North 

Korea is likely to either not respond or react negatively―in any case, 

not to alter its behavior in the desired direction.

In any event, China and the United States continue to have 

different priorities. Beijing’s top priority is Pyongyang’s survival, 

while Washington’s aim is preventing Pyongyang from possessing 

and proliferating WMD. In the author’s view, getting North Korea 

to the negotiating table probably represents the outer limits of 

China’s infl uence. While this is not an insignifi cant outcome, 

it appears to be the result of a unique set of conditions and the 

unintended consequence of an oil pipeline temporarily shutoff due 

to mechanical problems. Progress from this point in the creeping 

Korean nuclear crisis will depend on Pyongyang and Washington, 

with only qualifi ed support forthcoming from Beijing.

BEIJING’S PREFERRED OUTCOMES FOR THE KOREAN 

PENINSULA

Discerning China’s preferences for the future of Korea is complex. 

This section examines Beijing’s thinking regarding unifi cation, and 

then its position on the continued U.S. military presence on the 

peninsula.

Korean Unifi cation.

China has offi cially tended to maintain its support for peaceful 

Korean reunifi cation. Interestingly, this position dates back at least 

4 decades. Article VI of the bilateral treaty Zhou Enlai and Kim Il 

Sung signed in July 1961 states: “The Contracting Parties hold that 

the unifi cation of Korea must be realized along peaceful and 

democratic lines and that such a solution accords exactly with the 

national interests of the Korean people and the aim of preserving 

peace in the Far East.” Behind this formal position, there is no strong 

desire to see this happen in the near future because Beijing assumes 

this would mean the South absorbing the North.93 Unifi cation on 

these terms would mean the emergence of a stronger, larger, and 

democratic Korea with a modern military at China’s borders. A 
27

unifi ed Korea, according to one analyst, might have designs on 

Chinese territory populated by approximately two million ethnic 

Koreans or at the very least exert a strong pull on the heart strings 

of the Korean minority to unite with their ethnic kinsmen across the 

border.94 Other analysts see no evidence of interest or enthusiasm on 

the part of ethnic Korean Chinese citizens to join with their brethren 

in either Korea.95 In the short and medium terms, Beijing ideally 

would prefer a reconciled rather than a unifi ed Korea in which the 

south could bankroll and otherwise facilitate the rejuvenation of the 

north without controlling the entire peninsula. This scenario would 

tend to lead to Korea shifting into a Chinese sphere of infl uence.96

U.S. Military Presence. 

And what of China’s attitude toward a continued U.S. troop 

presence after reconciliation or unifi cation? The conventional 

wisdom is that China desires eventually to have American forces 

withdrawn.97 Chinese strategic thinking about the peninsula and 

presence of U.S. troops varies according to analyst, research center, 

and bureaucratic affi liation and fl uctuates according to changing 

regional and international conditions.98 Some Chinese analysts―

mostly military ones―express the view that no reason exists for 

American forces to remain after the dissipation of tensions on the 

peninsula.99 However, other analysts appear to assume that U.S. 

forces will stay for the foreseeable future and accept this as a positive 

constant.100 One Chinese Koreanist explained that a continued U.S. 

military presence on the peninsula prevents North Korea (or South 

Korea) from taking rash military action. North Korea offi cials 

reportedly confi de to Chinese counterparts that with American forces 

off the peninsula, North Korea will have clear military superiority 

over South Korea.101 A concern also exists that a likely consequence 

of a U.S. pullout from the Korean Peninsula would be a resurgence 

of Japanese military power.102 But what will ultimately determine 

China’s position at any given point regarding the presence of U.S 

forces on the peninsula―and elsewhere in the Asia-Pacifi c―“is U.S. 

policy toward Taiwan and Beijing’s confi dence in that policy.” Or 

to put it another way: “. . . the more that the PRC suspects that the 
28

U.S. presence in Asia is directed toward intervening in the Taiwan 

problem, the more China will favor the removal of U.S. forwarddeployed forces.”103

The recently announced plans to reconfi gure U.S. forces in the 

Republic of Korea have received attention in China. Some analysts 

have assumed that the purpose of the pull back from the demilitarized 

zone (DMZ) of the U.S. Second Infantry Division is to make it easier 

for the United States to launch a strike against North Korea.104

At least one observer has expressed concern that the pullback of 

the division from the DMZ and towards the western coast of the 

peninsula would place U.S. forces much closer to China.105

CONCLUSION

Arguably China and North Korea cling to each other because 

they have nowhere else to turn―each believes that close cooperation 

with the other is vital to its own national security. According to the 

closing paragraph in a recent article from the offi cial Beijing Review: 

A strengthened China-DPRK friendship is . . . vital to the economic 

and social development of both countries in the 21st century. China 

needs peace and stability along its border, in order to ensure its rapid 

modernization. Likewise, the DPRK needs China’s cooperation, in order 

to press ahead with its socialist construction. Since both countries need 

each other for these economic and social purposes, stronger bilateral 

relations are inevitable.106

If anything, this quote understates the signifi cance Beijing places on 

the relationship.

Almost certainly, each country would prefer to depend less on 

the other. Indeed, Beijing seems to view Pyongyang as a troubled 

teenager lacking adult supervision who lives right next door in 

a decrepit old house with a large arsenal of lethal weapons and 

exhibiting strong self-destructive tendencies. A confrontation, 

or―heaven forbid―battle between the teen and the police threatens 

to damage China’s newly remodeled mansion, and worse case 

scenario could lead to the complete destruction of other homes in 

the Northeast Asian neighborhood, including China’s. The DPRK 

looks to balance against total reliance on the PRC in the aftermath of 
29

the collapse of the Soviet Union. In any case, the DPRK leadership 

has probably realized that there is a limit to what the PRC is willing 

or able to provide for it. Since the late 1990s the DPRK has engaged 

in an unprecedented fl urry of diplomatic activity and established 

offi cial ties with more than two dozen states. Pyongyang has made 

efforts to seek a rapprochement with the United States, including 

hosting then U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in late 2000 

and sending Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok to Washington. More 

recently, Kim Jong Il paid a visit to Russia in mid-2001. 

In the fi nal analysis, China has a major stake in ensuring the 

continued survival of the North Korean regime and may be willing 

to go to considerable lengths to guarantee this. North Korea, 

meanwhile, seems destined to remain heavily dependent on China 

for moral support and material assistance. This is unlikely to change 

unless Pyongyang more actively re-engages with Seoul and/or 

pursues a thoroughgoing rapprochement with the United States, 

and undertakes a major reorientation of its economy toward market 

reforms and external trade and investment. Thus, for the foreseeable 

future, China and North Korea seem destined to remain close to, but 

uncomfortable with, each other.

Three possible paths may lie ahead for China-North Korea 

relations: (1) no change in the relationship, (2) a warmer and closer 

relationship, or (3) a cooler and more distant relationship. What is the 

likelihood of any of these coming to pass, and what would each of 

these mean for the United States? To start with the third possibility, 

frostier ties between Beijing and Pyongyang are a distinct possibility. 

The most likely way for the relationship to sour further would be for 

North Korea to pursue brinkmanship with the United States and 

continue its nuclear weapons program, and discard any pretense 

of making reforms. This would likely create more opportunities for 

cooperation and consultation between the United States and China. 

The result would also likely be a more isolated and desperate North 

Korea which would make it more unpredictable and dangerous.

An improved relationship between Beijing and Pyongyang 

would be the best turn of events for the United States because it 

would signal real, positive change. This would likely come about if 

North Korea became more moderate and reasonable in its relations 
30

with the United States, took tangible steps to discontinue its nuclear 

program, and permitted foreign inspectors wide access to its facilities. 

Pyongyang would also likely embark on signifi cant thoroughgoing 

economic reforms.

However, the most likely path ahead in China-North Korea 

relations is no signifi cant change. This might prove the most 

disappointing outcome for the United States. Nevertheless, there 

should be some consolation that this is probably a better outcome 

than a worsening or severing of the Beijing-Pyongyang link. 

However, at least persistence of the status quo in its relationship with 

China provides North Korea with some level of reassurance and a 

dissuasion against irresponsible and erratic behavior. And the status 

quo also holds out the possibility of positive future change. From the 

U.S. perspective, more of the same in Beijing-Pyongyang relations 

at least permits China to play a role in encouraging North Korea to 

moderate its stance, contemplate ending its nuclear program, and 

continuing a multilateral dialogue.

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

The foregoing analysis leads to some important implications for 

U.S. national security. The overall theme of the following six points 

is to keep expectations realistic. The United States must operate 

under the basic assumption that a dramatic change for the better 

in the North Korean nuclear crisis in the near future is unlikely. 

Maintaining low expectations is not only prudent but will also 

ensure that Washington does not set itself up for disappointment.

Don’t Expect Too Much from Beijing. 

While China should continue to be very helpful in handling the 

North Korean nuclear crisis, it is unlikely to move much beyond 

sustained support for talks among North Korea, the United States, 

and other concerned parties. Beijing has played a key role and, as 

the U.S. National Security Strategy published in 2002 states, China 

does “cooperate well” with the United States “in promoting stability 

on the Korean Peninsula.” But as the National Security Strategy also 
31

notes (and this monograph has stressed), while U.S. and Chinese 

interests “overlap” on Korea, they are NOT identical.107 For this 

reason, Beijing is not likely to participate in the Proliferation Security 

Initiative. While Beijing serves as a stabilizer and balancer on the 

Korean Peninsula and, as such, provides crucial reassurance to 

Pyongyang, it continues to proffer key morale and material support 

to a regime that has virtually no other trusted friends (Moscow may 

be the one exception). China is also useful conduit and source of 

information about North Korea. Nevertheless, China is extremely 

risk averse and unlikely to apply strong pressure to North Korea, 

unless it perceives a sudden, dramatic, and alarming change to the 

fragile status quo—imminent U.S. military action.

Don’t Underestimate China’s Commitment to Protect Its Own 

National Interests. 

While Washington should not expect too much from Beijing, the 

United States must not underestimate China’s readiness to leap into 

action to protect what it perceives as its vital national interests in 

a critical situation. As Beijing’s December 2002 Defense White Paper

noted: “China takes all measures necessary to safeguard its national 

interests. . . .”108 It is quite likely that Chinese military forces would 

intervene in North Korea in the event of an implosion or military 

confl ict north of the DMZ. China would cross the Yalu River to 

protect its vital interests―not to prop up a crumbling regime or 

fi ght shoulder-to-shoulder with Pyongyang. The goal of Chinese 

military intervention most probably would be to establish a buffer 

zone along its border. In a Korean contingency where U.S. forces 

might fi nd themselves operating in North Korea―say, for example, 

assisting ROK forces in restoring order and providing humanitarian 

assistance―the overriding assumption ought to be that China 

will conduct a limited intervention.109 It would be advisable for 

Washington to engage in a confi dential dialogue with Beijing about 

the roles and missions of their respective militaries in various 

hypothetical North Korea scenarios.
32

Don’t Force China to Choose Sides. 

China continually seeks to position itself as an impartial balancer 

in the crisis. It has criticized not only North Korea but also the 

United States. In fact, as noted earlier, Beijing continues to lay a 

major, if not the lion’s, share of the blame for the current crises 

at Washington’s door. In part, this likely refl ects actual Chinese 

thinking, but it is also important for Beijing to demonstrate to 

Pyongyang that it is indeed impartial. Efforts to pressure China 

openly to support the U.S. position are likely to be unsuccessful and 

probably counterproductive.

Don’t Expect Much Movement from Pyongyang.

China is the most infl uential country where North Korea is 

concerned, but this has had limited impact. Beijing’s efforts to 

encourage economic reform in North Korea have seen very limited 

results, and the pace has been glacial. Signifi cant changes have 

occurred in North Korea in recent years, such as a 2000 summit 

between the leaders of the two Koreas in Pyongyang and the 

establishment of full diplomatic relations with a host of Western 

states. However, these steps have come in fi ts and starts, and it is 

unclear if these represent tactical measures or strategic changes.

North Korean Distrust of Outsiders May Be Almost 

Insurmountable.

Pyongyang possesses a deep-seated distrust of outsiders. 

Even China is viewed with deep suspicions. If North Korea’s 

sole remaining military ally is treated with such suspicion, then 

one can only imagine the level of paranoid alarm reserved for a 

country such as the United States, which is viewed as hostile to the 

regime. Establishing a basic level of trust is likely to be an extremely 

challenging but important prerequisite for getting beyond the 

current crisis. (Of course this works both ways since deep distrust 

and suspicion are held on the part of the United States regarding 

North Korea.) To this end, President Bush’s offer at the Asian-Pacifi c 
33

Economic Coooperation Summit in Bangkok in October 2003 to sign 

off on a multilateral document guaranteeing North Korea’s security 

is an important step. Pyongyang may warm to this proposal since it 

would include fairly trustworthy North Korean friends, Beijing and 

Moscow, who could be relied upon to help balance North Korean 

deep distrust of the United States.110

Don’t Count on China to Dissuade North Korea from Going 

Nuclear.

Following from the above points, it is extremely diffi cult for 

this author to envision a scenario in which Pyongyang voluntarily 

would abandon completely its nuclear program. There seems to be 

little incentive for North Korea to divest itself of the program. The 

degree of paranoia and distrust Pyongyang holds for even its closest 

friend (i.e., China) suggest it will not give up what is seen as a crucial 

defensive weapon. Moreover, as noted earlier, Beijing’s top priority is 

propping up Pyongyang, not preventing the regime from acquiring 

nuclear weapons. Therefore, pressure from China of the sort to make 

North Korea give up its program is unlikely to be forthcoming. 

While China’s latest White Paper on Nonproliferation (issued in 

December 2003) states: “China has always . . . resolutely opposed the 

proliferation of [WMD] and their means of delivery,” the document 

also states: “China stands for the attainment of the non-proliferation 

goal through peaceful means . . . through dialogue and international 

cooperation.”111 In other words, Beijing is unwilling to apply heavyhanded pressure, not to mention participate in blockades and 

embargoes, against Pyongyang. North Korea appears to fear military 

action from the United States and considers its nuclear program as 

an essential deterrent. The idea of North Korea possessing a nuclear 

device is extremely unsettling, if not downright disturbing. This is 

not to mention the serious proliferation challenges this outcome 

would pose. And this outcome would be likely only to exacerbate 

Pyongyang’s status as the “world’s principal purveyor of ballistic 

missiles” and include WMD technology.112 In such circumstances, 

China’s willingness to cooperate in counterproliferation and 

nonproliferation efforts would become even more critical.
34

However, one positive outcome of a nuclear North Korea might 

be to make Pyongyang a little less paranoid. In this limited sense, 

going nuclear might help stabilize the situation on the Korean 

Peninsula by making Pyongyang feel more secure. This could make 

North Korea more open to the possibility of extensive reform, as well 

as conventional and WMD arms control. Under these circumstances, 

Beijing, at the very least, would continue to play a key, albeit 

circumscribed, role in steering Pyongyang in the right direction.

ENDNOTES

1. Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the 

Long March, New York and London: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 83.

2. Zhang Aiping, Chief Compiler, Zhongguo Renmin Jiefang Jun [China’s 

People’s Liberation Army] Vol. 1, Contemporary China Series, Beijing: Dangdai 

Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1994, p. 137.

3. “Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation and Mutual Assistance Between 

the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” 

Peking Review, Vol. 4, No. 28, 1961, p. 5.

4. Samuel S. Kim, “The Making of China’s Korea Policy in the Era of Reform,” 

in David M. Lampton, ed., Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Reform Era, 

Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001, p. 401; Chae-Jin Lee, China and 

Korea: Dynamic Relations, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1996, p. 71.

5. Lee Dequan and Huang Hanmin, “Jiang Zemin Meets with President Kim 

Yong Nam and Hang Song Nam of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” 

Xinhua Domestic Service (in Chinese), September 4, 2001, in Foreign Broadcast 

Information Service (FBIS)-CHI, September 4, 2001.

6. The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has produced improved U.S.-China 

relations and a period of cooperation between Washington and Beijing. But China’s 

leaders still believe that the United States is working to bring about the collapse of 

Chinese communism, keep the country weak, and use the GWOT to encircle China 

strategically. Today, while the rhetoric about peaceful evolution and strategic 

encirclement is muted, Beijing continues to stress internal stability and unity. This 

refl ects not just unease in Beijing over domestic discontent and current concern 

over perceived movement toward Taiwan independence, but also the strong belief 

that U.S. support, or at least encouragement, is behind these problems. Two of 

China’s main national defense goals―articulated in the December 2002 Defense 

White Paper White Paper―are “safeguarding social stability,” and “stopping separatism and ―are “safeguarding social stability,” and “stopping separatism and 
35

realizing unifi cation.” See China’s National Defense in 2002, Beijing: Information 

Offi ce of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, December, 2002, pp. 

11-12. North Korea’s leaders appear to be alarmed about the military threat from 

the United States and these fears were heightened during 2003. According to two 

analysts: “the [North Korean] regime perceives itself facing a highly threatening 

and deteriorating security environment” and fears “U.S. military preemptive 

strikes.” See Daniel A. Pinkston and Phillip C. Saunders, “Seeing North Korea 

Clearly,” Survival, Vol. 45, No. 3, Autumn 2003, pp. 79-102 (the quotes are from pp. 

90 and 92, respectively). See also, for example, “U.S. Intention to Launch Nuclear 

War in Korea Under Fire,” Korean Central News Agency, April 3, 2003.

7. See Stephen Bradner, “North Korea’s Strategy,” in Henry D. Sokolski, ed., 

Planning for a Peaceful Korea, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, February 2001. On the aim of weakening the alliance, see p. 37; on 

seeking aid, see pp. 32-33, 38.

8. Lee, China and Korea: Dynamic Relations, Stanford, CA: Stanford, pp. 121-

122; Ilpyong Kim, “China in North Korean Foreign Policy,” in Samuel S. Kim, 

ed., North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, Hong Kong: Oxford 

University Press, 1998, p. 100.

9. Kim, “The Making of China’s Korea Policy,” pp. 386-387.

10. Andrew S. Natsios, The Great North Korean Famine: Famine, Politics, and 

Foreign Policy, Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2002, p. 139.

11. The course of PRC-DPRK relations has been fi lled with constant tensions 

and frequent strains. Disagreements have been frequent, yet the relationship has 

survived. For a good overview that highlights these diffi culties, see Chen Jian, 

“Limits of the ‘Lips and Teeth’ Alliance: An Historical Review of Chinese North 

Korean Relations,” in Uneasy Allies: Fifty Years of China-North Korean Relations, 

Asian Program Special Report no. 115, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson 

International Center for Scholars, September 2003, pp. 4-10.

12. Tom Hart, “The PRC-DPRK Rapprochement and China’s Dilemma in 

Korea,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 25, No. 3, 2001, pp. 247-259; Jonathan D. Pollack, 

“China and a Changing North Korea: Issues, Uncertainties, and Implications,” 

paper presented to Conference on North Korea’s Engagement-Perspectives, 

Outlook, and Implications,” held in Washington, DC, February 23, 2001, accessed 

at http://www.nwc.navy.mil/apsg/papers/Pollack%20NORTH%20KOREA%20PAPER.

htm.

13. Lee Dequan and Huang Hanmin, “Jiang Zemin Meets with President Kim 

Yong Nam.”
36

14. Interviews, September 2003; and “China cools its ties with neighbour: only 

a minor dignitary attended the state’s 55th birthday party,” South China Morning 

Post (Hong Kong), September 2003.

15. There are several excellent and comprehensive overviews of North 

Korea’s economic morass. For a relatively optimistic assessment, see Marcus 

Noland, Avoiding the Apocalypse: The Future of the Two Koreas, Washington, DC: 

International Institute for Economics, 2000; and Marcus Noland, “Why North 

Korea Will Muddle Through,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 26. No. 4, July/August 1997, 

pp. 105-118. For a more pessimistic assessment, see Nicholas Eberstadt, The End of 

North Korea, Washington, DC: AEI, 1999.

16. Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, North Korea Through the Looking Glass, 

Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2000, pp. 42-45.

17. Kim, “The Making of China’s Korea Policy,” p. 385; Samuel S. Kim, “China 

and North Korea in a Changing World,” in Uneasy Allies: Fifty Years of China-North 

Korean Relations, p. 13.

18. Oh and Hassig, North Korea Through the Looking Glass, pp. 44-45; KOTRA, 

“Trade Between DPRK, China Reached Over $370 Million in 1999 . . .,” Seoul 

Yonhap (in English), March 7, 2000, in FBIS-CHI, March 7, 2000.

19. Kim, “China and North Korea in a Changing World,” in Uneasy Allies: Fifty 

Years of China-North Korean Relations, p. 13.

20. Oh and Hassig, North Korea Through the Looking Glass, p. 178.

21. Estimates vary widely, and reliable estimates are diffi cult to come by. 

See The Invisible Exodus: North Koreans in the People’s Republic of China, New York: 

Human Rights Watch, November 2002; Andrew Scobell, “North Korea on the 

Brink: Breakdown or Breakthrough?” in Carolyn Pumphrey, ed., The Rise of China 

in Asia: Security Implications, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 

Army War College, 2002, pp. 197-227, at p. 205.

22. Hazel Smith, “Asymmetric Nuisance Threat: The Border in China-DPRK 

Relations,” in Uneasy Allies: Fifty Years of China-North Korean Relations, pp. 23-24. 

Panel discussion at 2001 March Association for Asian Studies in Chicago; Natsios, 

The Great North Korean Famine, chap 4. According to one South Korean NGO, as 

many as three-quarters of the North Korean refugees in China are female―and 

many of these are forced into prostitution, marriage, or slavery. Ibid., pp. 67-68.

23. See, for example, Benjamin Neaderland, “Quandry on the Yalu: 

International Law, Politics, and China’s North Korean Refugee Crisis,” Stanford 

Journal of International Law, forthcoming 2004. See also David Shambaugh, “China 
37

and the Korean Peninsula: Playing for the Long Term,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 

26, No. 2, Spring 2003, p. 47.

24. See, for example, Lu Guangye, “Chaoxian he wenti: zongneng zhaodao 

jiejue banfa” [Korean nuclear issue: a solution can be worked out eventually] 

Guoji zhanlue yanjiu, No. 3, 2003, pp. 35-36; Xu Xianzhong, “Jiedu suowei ‘xin 

de Chaoxian he wenti’” [an interpretation of the so-called ‘new Korean nuclear 

issue’] Guoji zhanlue yanjiu, No. 3, 2003, pp. 42-43; author’s interviews with civilian 

and military researchers in Beijing, September 2003.

25. “North Korea’s economy: Desperate Straits,” Economist, May 3, 2003, p. 

26; John Larkin, “North Korea: Why Refugees Flee,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 

March 6, 2003, pp. 14-17. For a good overview and analysis of economic reform 

efforts in North Korea, see Bradley O. Babson, “Economic Cooperation on the 

Korean Peninsula,” paper presented for the Task Force on U.S. Korea Policy, 

presented on January 9, 2003, and available at http://www.nautilus.org/pub/ftp/

napsnet/special_reports/Babson-EconomicCooperation.txt.

26. Joseph Kahn, “China Seizes Entrepreneur Named to Run North Korean 

Enclave,” New York Times, October 4, 2002; Peter S. Goodman, “China Arrests 

Head of N. Korea Project,” Washington Post, November 28, 2002; “China Says 

North Korea Was Warned,” Far Eastern Economic Review, October 31, 2002, p. 

30; Interviews, Beijing, September 2003. According to one published report, the 

Sinnujiu zone was “at a standstill.” However, Beijing and Pyongyang appear to 

be near an agreement on a more suitable executive for the zone. See Chiang Hsun, 

“Chinese American Favored to be New Head of Sinnujiu,” Yazhou Zhoukan, Hong 

Kong, September 7, 2003, translated in FBIS-CHI.

27. Smith, “Asymmetic Nuisance Value,” pp. 21-22; Peter S. Goodman, 

“Chinese Energy Executive Vanishes: Disappearance Pegs Gao Yan as Possible 

Target of Corruption Probe,” Washington Post, October 16, 2002.

28. See, for example, Zhang Jinfang, “Vice Chairman of DPRK National 

Defense Committee Meets China’s Military Goodwill Delegation,” Xinhua 

Domestic Service (Beijing) September 25, 2001,translated in FBIS-CHI; and Zhang 

Jinfang, “The DPRK National Defense Vice Chairman Meets a Chinese PLA 

Goodwill Delegation,” Xinhua Domestic Service (Beijing), November 3, 2002, 

translated in FBIS-CHI.

29. Kenneth W. Allen, and Eric A. McVadon, China’s Foreign Military Relations, 

Report No. 32, Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1999, pp. 66-67.

30. Interviews, Beijing September 2003; Zong Hairen (pseud.), “Hu Jintao 

Writes to Kim Jong Il To Open Door to 6-Party Talks,” Hsin Pao (Hong Kong), 

August 28, 2003, in FBIS-CHI.
38

31. Hart, “The PRC-DPRK Rapprochement and China’s Dilemma in Korea,” p. 

249.

32. At the very least China appears to have served as a conduit or transshipment 

point for nuclear technology and hardware provided to North Korea by Pakistan 

nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan.

33. “North Korea’s nuclear programme: Getting the genie back into the 

bottle,” Economist, October 26, 2002, p. 38; Murray Hiebert, John Larkin, and Susan 

Lawrence, “North Korea: Consequences of Confession,” Far Eastern Economic 

Review, October 31, 2002, p. 19.

34. “President Discusses Iraq and North Korea with Reporters,” accessed at 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021231-1.html.

35. See, for example, Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s New 

Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, November/December 2003. The authors 

argue that China has “embraced regional and global institutions” and has 

willingly taken on the “responsibilities that come with great power status.”

36. On the establishment of the leading small group on Korea, see Kim, “China 

and North Korea in a Changing World,” pp. 11; and Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “Secret 

Petition Submitted to Hu Jintao for ‘Military Support’ for North Korea,” Sapio

(Tokyo), May 28, 2003, translated from Japanese by FBIS-CHI. On China’s fears, 

see ibid., p. 14. On North Korea’s fears, see Howard W. French, “North Korea 

Says Its Arms Will Deter U.S. Attack,” New York Times, April 7, 2003; Willy WoLap Lam, “Time to act, China tells N. Korea,” August 25, 2003, cnn.asia.com; and 

Oh Young-jin, “Fear of U.S. Attack Forced North Korea to Come to Negotiating 

Table,” Korea Times, August 27, 2003.

37. Beijing’s thinking about proliferation has undergone signifi cant 

transformation since Mao’s day when arms control and nonproliferation regimes 

were viewed as plots by the Soviet Union and United States to prevent China’s 

emergence as a world power. As of December 2003, Beijing’s offi cial policy is that 

“The proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery benefi ts neither world 

peace and stability nor China’s own security.” This position is articulated in the 

latest PRC White Paper in Nonproliferation issued in December 2003. For the text, 

see China’s Nonproliferation Policy and Means, accessed at http://english.peopledaily.

com.cn.

38. Shi Yinhong mentioned the potential of North Korean nuclear blackmail 

against China. He is quoted in John Pomfret, “Powell: U.S.-China Relations 

Entering ‘New Dimension’,” Washington Post, February 24, 2003. See also Shi 

Yinhong, “DPRK Nuclear Crisis and China’s Supreme Strategic Interests,” 

Zhongguo Pinglun (Hong Kong), February 1, 2003.
39

39. The term “domino effect” is used by Lu Guangye, “Chaoxian he wenti,” 

p. 39. The term “chain reactions” is used by Zhang Tuasheng of the Chinese 

Academy of Social Sciences. Jin is quoted in Jin Xide, Zhang Tuosheng, and Piao 

Jianyi, “Will China Aid the DPRK in Resisting the United States a Second Time?” 

Shijie Zhishi (Beijing), March 16, 2003 ,translated in FBIS-CHI. On North Korea 

triggering a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia, see Zhang Liankui of the Central 

Party School, cited in Gady A. Epstein, “China Debates Greater Role in N. Korean 

Crisis,” Baltimore Sun, February 13, 2003; and Shi Yinhong, “DPRK Nuclear Crisis 

and China’s Supreme Strategic Interests.”

40. Phillip C. Saunders and Jing-dong Yuan, “Korea Crisis Will Test Chinese 

Diplomacy,” Asia Times Online, January 8, 2003, at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/

Korea/EAO8Dg03.html.

41. See the Chinese analysts quoted in Michael A. Lev, “Korea Talks Elevate 

China as a Diplomatic Force in Asia, Chicago Tribune, August 27, 2003; and Murray 

Hiebert, “Decision Time Looms Over North Korea,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 

May 15, 2003, p. 13.

42. See also Ruan Zongze, “Six Party Talks in Beijing and Regional Security,” 

Liaowang (Beijing), September 1, 2003, in FBIS-CHI.

43. Cited in Mike Allen, “Bush: Iraq War Drove N. Korea to Concede,” 

Washington Post, April 14, 2003.

44. Key fi gures in Washington―both inside and outside the administration―

have expressed a preference for regime change in Pyongyang. For a recent 

articulation of this view, see David Frum and Richard Perle, An End to Evil: 

How to Win the War on Terror How to Win the War on Terror, New York: Random House, 2003. See also, Robert , New York: Random House, 2003. See also, Robert 

Marquand, “US Strategy: Isolate Kim Jong Il,” Christian Science Monitor, August , August 

1, 2003. Moreover, many Washington policymakers, including President Bush, 

reportedly harbor a strong dislike for North Korean leader Kim Jong Il. See, for 

example, Bob Woodward, Bush at War Bush at War, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002, p. , New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002, p. 

340.

45. See, for example, “Foreign Ministry Spokesman Kong Quan Answers 

Journalists Questions at New Conference on 26 June 2003,” Beijing PRC MFA text 

on World Wide Web in Chinese, posted June 26, 2003.

46. See, for example, Barbara Demick and Sam Howe Verhovek, “At North 

Korea Talks, Discord Is In the Details,” Los Angeles Times, August 27, 2003. This 

theme of addressing North Korea’s security concerns appears to have originated 

in the spring of 2003. See Lam, “Secret Petition Submitted to Hu Jintao.”
40

47. Xu Weidi, “Resolving the Korean Peninsula Nuclear Crisis and Moving 

the Korean Peninsula out of the Cold War,” Shijie Jingjiyu Zhengzhi (Beijing), 

September 16, 2003, in FBIS-CHI.

48. Interviews, Beijing, September 2003. See also the hierarchy of interests 

outlined in Shambaugh, “China and the Korean Peninsula,” pp. 44-46.

49. This includes leading newspapers and news magazines. See, for example, 

“North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: China Starts to Worry,” Economist, July 26, 

2003, pp. 38-39.

50. A prime example would be the publications and interviews given by Shi 

Yinhong of People’s University.

51. This is an important theme running through a recent article by a perceptive 

and well-informed Shanghai-based academic. See Ming Liu, “China and the North 

Korean Crisis: Facing Test and Transition,” Pacifi c Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 3, Fall 

2003.

52. Interviews in Beijing, September 2003.

53. Beijing, September 2003 interviews; and “North Korea’s Nuclear 

Programme: Getting the genie back into the bottle,” Economist, October 26, 2002, p. 

38.

54. Larry M. Wortzel, “China’s Goals and Strategies for the Korean Peninsula: 

A Critical Assessment,” in Henry Sokolski, ed., Planning for a Peaceful Korea, 2001, 

pp. 215-226.

55. On the musings of Beijing academics, see John Pomfret, “As Talks Begin 

China Views North Korea as Risk,” Washington Post, August 27, 2003; and David 

M. Lampton, “China: Fed Up with North Korea?” Washington Post, June 4, 2003.

56. Glenn Kessler and John Pomfret, “North Korea’s Threats a Dilemma for 

China: Ally’s Nuclear Gamesmanship Rankles Beijing,” Washington Post, April 26, 

2003.

57. Lorien Holland and Shim Jae Hoon, “China’s Korea Game,” Far Eastern 

Economic Review, June 15, 2000, p. 17; “Interview with Wu Dawei, Chinese 

Ambassador to the ROK,” Hanguk Ilbo (Seoul), Internet version, January 17, 2000, 

in FBIS-CHI, January 21, 2000. See also Shambaugh, “China and the Korean 

Peninsula.”

58. Kim, “The Making of China’s Korea Policy,” pp. 392-394. 
41

59. Xu Weidi, “Resolving the Korean Peninsula Nuclear Crisis.” This is also 

noted by Kim, “The Making of China’s Korea Policy,” p. 400; and Shambaugh, 

“China and the Korean Peninsula,” p. 52.

60. Kim, “The Making of China’s Korea Policy,” pp. 402-403.

61. Pollack, “China and a Changing North Korea: Issues, Uncertainties, and 

Implications.”

62. See, for example, Pomfret, “As Talks Begin China Views North Korea as 

Risk.”

63. Philip P. Pan, “China Treads Carefully Around North Korea,” Washington 

Post, January 10, 2003.

64. Interviews in Beijing, May 2002 and September 2003; Pan, “China Treads 

Carefully Around North Korea.”

65. Interviews in Beijing and Seoul, May 2002; discussions in faculty seminar 

at APCSS, Honolulu, March 2003.

66. See the quote in Charles Hutzler and Gordon Fairclough, “The Koreas: 

China Breaks With Its Wartime Past,” Far Eastern Economic Review, August 7, 2003, 

p. 27.

67. Interviews, Beijing, September 2003.

68. Epstein, “China Debates Greater Role in N. Korean Crisis.”

69. Interviews, Beijing, May 2003. See also Oh and Hassig, North Korea Through 

the Looking Glass, p. 156.

70. See the source cited in endnote 2 for casualties. On the total number of 

Chinese troops who served in Korea, see Zhang Wannian and Chi Haotian, “Great 

Victory, Valuable Asset―Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Chinese 

People’s Volunteers’ Participation in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid 

Korea,” Qiushi (internet version), November 1, 2001, translated in FBIS, November 

13, 2001.

71. Hutzler and Fairclough, “The Koreas: China Breaks with Its Wartime 

Past,” p. 27; David J. Lynch, “Some Chinese Feel Resentment Toward N. Korea,” 

USA Today, August 28, 2003.

72. Cited in Oh and Hassig, North Korea Through the Looking Glass, p. 158.
42

73. Interviews, Beijing, September 2003. See also Medeiros and Fravel, 

“China’s New Diplomacy.”

74. Indeed, prior to China’s efforts in early 2003, U.S. offi cials were considerably 

frustrated at China’s “failure to assertively pursue a solution to the crisis.” John 

Pomfret and Glenn Kessler, “China’s Reluctance Irks U.S.: Beijing Shows No 

Inclination to Intervene in N. Korea Crisis,” Washington Post, February 4, 2003.

75. Interviews, Beijing, May 2002.

76. China’s National Defense in 2002, Beijing: Information Offi ce of the State 

Council of the People’s Republic of China, December 2002, p 1.

77. Pan, “China Treads Carefully Around North Korea.”

78. “Hu Jintao Already Heads CPCCC Group for Security, Foreign Affairs,” 

Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), internet version, March 14, 2003, translated in FBIS; and 

Mashiro Ishikawa, “The Start of President Hu’s ‘New Generation Diplomacy’: The 

Materialization of the US-DPRK Talks,” Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Tokyo), internet 

version, April 25, 2003, translated in FBIS.

79. John Pomfret, “China Wary of Weapons Searches,” Washington Post, 

August 23, 2003.

80. Interviews, Beijing, May 2002; Pomfret, “Powell: U.S.-China Relations 

Entering ‘New Dimension’.”

81. On the numbers of asylum seekers, see John Pomfret, “China Cracks Down 

on North Korean Refugees,” Washington Post, January 22, 2003. For details of the 

asylum incidents, see “China and North Korea: The Close But Uncomfortable 

Relationship,” Current History, Vol. 101, No. 656, September 2002, pp. 280-81.

82. Still there would be some positive outcomes for China if Beijing was more 

open to addressing the humanitarian crisis and more willing to cooperate with 

NGOs and international organizations. See Neaderland, “Quandry on the Yalu.”

83. Sing Tao Jih Pao and Sunday Morning Post Sunday Morning Post reported in “China ‘sends 150,000 reported in “China ‘sends 150,000 

troops to North Korea border’,” The Straits Times (Singapore), September 15, 2003, 

accessed at http://straitstimes.com.sg.

84. “China ‘sends 150,000 troops to North Korea border’”; Philip P. Pan, 

“China Deploys Troops on N. Korean Border,” Washington Post, September 16, 

2003; Joseph Kahn, “China Moves Troops to Area Bordering North Korea,” New 

York Times, September 16, 2003. On the security problems, see Cortlan Bennett and 

Melinda Liu, “North Korea: Nukes and Crimes―China’s Borderline Troubles,” 

Newsweek, September 1, 2003.
43

85. “China Denies Effort to Pressure North Korea,” Baltimore Sun, September 

19, 2003; Joseph Kahn, “China Moves Troops to Area Bordering North Korea, New 

York Times, September 16, 2003.

86. Hence a researcher at China’s National Defense University claims that 

the “United States is . . . the main obstacle preventing the Korean Peninsula from 

moving out of the Cold War . . . ” but admits “There is no denying the crux of 

Korean Peninsula crisis in the DPRK.” Xu Weidi, “Resolving the Korean Peninsula 

Nuclear Crisis.”

87. This is a questionable assumption. While the Kim Jong Il regime may be 

capable of greater pragmatism and fl exibility than many observers give it credit for, 

the Bush administration may be less pragmatic and more dogmatic than Chinese 

elites realize. See, for example, Andrew Scobell, “Crouching Korea, Hidden China: 

Bush Administration Policy Toward Pyongyang and Beijing,” Asian Survey, Vol. 

XXXXII, No. 2, March/April 2002, pp. 344-345.

88. The Chinese expectation that North Korea will not show fl exibility fi rst 

appears to be based on the belief that Pyongyang is extremely stubborn AND 

fearful of the United States. Interviews, Beijing, September 2003.

89. Lu Guangye, “Chaoxian he wenti,” p. 36. See also Xu Xianzhong, “Jiedu 

suowei ‘chaoxian he wenti’,” p. 44.

90. “China faults U.S. on nuclear negotiations: Washington is called a 

hindrance in talks with North Korea,” International Herald Tribune, September 6, 

2003.

91. Lu Guangye, “Chaoxian he wenti,” p. 36. 

92. Interviews, Beijing, September 2003.

93. Kim, “The Making of China’s Korea Policy,” p. 400.

94. Ibid., pp. 403-404.

95. Oh and. Hassig, North Korea Through the Looking Glass, p. 177-178.

96. Kim, “The Making of China’s Korea Policy,” p. 404.

97. Kevin Platt, “Beijing Reunifi cation Priority: Get US Troops Out of South 

Korea, “Christian Science Monitor Christian Science Monitor, June 21, 2000; Holland and Hoon, “China’s , June 21, 2000; Holland and Hoon, “China’s 

Korea Game”; Lorien Holland and Chester Dawson, “What If?” Far Eastern 

Economic Review, June 29, 2000, p. 18.
44

98. Kim, “The Making of China’s Korea Policy,” p. 400.

99. Zhang Jinbao, “Changes in the Situation on the Korean Peninsula and 

Their Impact on the Strategic Pattern in Northeast Asia,” Guoji Zhanlue Yanjiu

[International Strategic Studies], No. 59, January 2001, pp. 28; Shambaugh, “China 

and the Korean Peninsula,” p. 51.

100. Eric McVadon, “China’s Goals and Strategies for the Korean Peninsula,” 

in Henry D. Sokolski, ed., Planning for a Peaceful Korea, Carlisle, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2001, pp. 131-214.

101. Interviews, Beijing, May 2002; and summer 2002 interviews with a wellplaced Chinese Korean specialist.

102. On North and South Korea, summer 2002 interviews with a well-placed 

Chinese Korean specialist; on Japan, see Richard Halloran, “The Three No’s of East 

Asia,” Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. XIV, No. 2, Fall/Winter 2000, pp. 197-215.

103. David M. Lampton, Same Bed Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China 

Relations 1989-2000, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 

2001, pp. 106-110 (quotes on pp. 109 and 107).

104. Xu Weidi, “Resolving the Korean Peninsula Nuclear Crisis”; Interviews, 

Beijing, September 2003.

105. Ibid.

106. Xiao Zan, “Beijing and Pyongyang Get Closer,” Beijing Review, September 

27, 2001, pp. 9-10.

107. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, 

DC: U.S. Government Printing Offi ce, September 2002, p. 27.

108. China’s National Defense in 2002, p 11.

109. While it is impossible to say what China would do with complete 

certainty, I believe that the key question is not “if” China would intervene, but 

rather “when” and “how.” My thinking is strongly colored by the infl uence of the 

“lingering buffer mentality” identifi ed in this monograph. For an “if” statement 

on the subject, see Roger Cliff and Jeremy Shapiro, “The Shift to Asia and U.S. 

Landpower,” in Lynn E. Davis and Jeremy Shapiro, eds., The U.S. Army and the 

New National Security Strategy, Santa Monica, CA: RAND/Arroyo Center, 2003, p. 

93.
45

110. Mike Allen and Glenn Kessler, “Bush Says Pact with North Korea 

Possible,” Washington Post, October 20, 2003. Of course Pyongyang would prefer 

other formats: it demands a peace treaty directly with the United States and has 

recently insisted that Tokyo be dropped from the Six-Party Talks. Still, North 

Korea appears to desire improved ties with the United States and so may be 

receptive to this proposal.

111. China’s Non-Proliferation Policy and Means.

112. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p. 14.