U.S. SECURITY POLICY

IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE:

Why Colombia, Why Now,

and What Is To Be Done?

Max G. Manwaring

June 2001
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ii
FOREWORD

This is one in the Special Series of monographs ste

from the February 2001 conference on Plan Col

cosponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S

War College and The Dante B. Fascell North-South Cente

University of Miami. In this monograph, Dr. Max G. Man

provides a comprehensive analysis of the Colombian 

situation and makes viable recommendations to deal with 

effectively. 

In substantive U.S. national security terms, Dr. Man

addresses the questions, “Why Colombia, Why Now, and W

To Be Done?” He explains the importance of that troubled c

to the United States. He points out that the fragile democ

Colombia is at risk, and that the violent spillover effects o

simultaneous wars pose a threat to the rest of the W

Hemisphere and the interdependent global community. Th

Manwaring makes a case against continued tactica

operational approaches to the Colombian crisis and outline

must be done. In that connection, he recommends an acti

political-military strategy to attain security, sta

democratic governance, and a sustainable peace. The pr

strategy would not be costly in monetary or military te

would, however, require deliberate planning, cooperation

and will.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to join w

North-South Center in offering this monograph as part 

attempt to clarify the issues regarding Plan Colombia, fo

debate, and learn from it. That international security de

critically important to the vital interests of the United 

Colombia, the hemisphere, and the global community.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
PREFACE

This monograph by Dr. Max G. Manwaring is anot

a series to emerge from a joint project on Plan Col

begun last February by the U.S. Army War College an

Dante B. Fascell North-South Center. In it, the a

places the dilemma of Colombia’s three-front “war” w

the framework of the national security strategy 

United States. Dr. Manwaring answers the questi

“why” and “how” in clear contextual terms.

The fact that “the fragile democracy of Colombi

risk” poses a threat to the entire Western Hemispher

not, the author points out, a single-country problem 

country that has experienced instability and insurgen

over 50 years. The situation has deteriorated to the 

where Colombia could become a failed state, with m

spillover effects of insurgency, criminality

narco-trafficking in all of its neighboring countries.

In the post-Cold War scenario, security in Latin Am

means for the United States more than ke

Communism out of the Hemisphere, which it once 

now means underpinning democracy and free-m

economics, plus close cooperation on the immense “s

problems” of drugs, crime, immigration, and environm

concerns in the hemisphere. Colombia, in this sens

challenge that is highly complex. It is, as the author 

out, “multidimensional, multilateral and m

organizational.” In these terms, Plan Colombia an

country’s positive turnaround and contributi

hemispheric stability, prosperity, and peace will depe

civil-military solutions implemented at the strategic 

Ultimately, that will depend on U.S. leadership.

Dr. Manwaring presents an eloquent case fo

country to exercise that strategic leadership. To do 

underscores, Washington must advance beyon

v
traditional swings from “benign neglect” of the Hemis

to various forms of operational-level political, econom

military intervention (often misguided). I would ad

Washington must also outgrow its short attention 

That will require a great deal of analysis and educ

contributing to which is the underlying purpose o

project. Our institutions are pleased to make 

contribution.

AMBLER H. MOSS, JR.

Director

The Dante B. Fascell North-So

 Center

University of Miami

vi
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTH

MAX G. MANWARING, a retired U.S. Army colon

Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Dickinson C

joined the Strategic Studies Institute in September 

He has served in various civilian and military positi

the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Southern Com

and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Dr. Manwaring 

a B.S. in Economics, a B.S. in Political Science, an M

Political Science, and a Ph.D. in Political Science fro

University of Illinois. He is also a graduate of the U.S. 

War College. Dr. Manwaring is the author and co-au

several articles, chapters, and reports dealing 

political-military affairs. He is also the editor or co-ed

El Salvador at War; Managing Contemporary Co

Pillars of Success; Beyond Declaring Victory and C

Home: The Challenges of Peace and Stability Opera

and “. . . to insure domestic Tranquility, provide f

common defense . . ., the conference report of the U.S. 

War College Strategic Studies Institute year 2000 st

conference on homeland defense.

vii
U.S. SECURITY POLICY IN THE WESTE

HEMISPHERE:

Why Colombia, Why Now,

and What Is To Be Done?

In the year 2000, the U.S. Congress provided 

billion package of assistance to enable Colombia to g

more effectively with its ongoing security problems

intent of this legislation, which came to be known a

Colombia, was to help address the counterdrug “w

Colombia. The intent was also to encourage s

complementary Colombian and international acti

address the political, economic, and social insta

generated out of Colombia’s other two “wars”—the 

against so-called paramilitary self-defense forces an

“war” against a 50-year-old insurgency.

2

 Even 

President William J. Clinton asked the Congress for a 

2-year assistance program for Colombia, that countr

the third largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid money

Egypt and Israel.

3

 As a consequence, 

Americans—and others—at all levels, have begun t

“Why Colombia, why now, and what is to be done?”

Before answering these questions, strategic leade

thinkers, policymakers, and opinionmakers must be 

on what a situation such as that in Colombia is and w

is not. This, according to Carl von Clausewitz, is “the 

all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.”

4

that determination, senior leaders and their staf

correctly identify and prioritize centers of gravity an

policy, strategy, force structure and equipment

campaign plans to achieve strategic clarity and sol

central strategic problem. This monograph, then, se

explain the Colombian situation with an eye t

strategic clarity and what Sun Tzu would cal

perfection of strategy.”

5

1
An evaluation of U.S. policy toward Latin Americ

Colombia and its implications for the military begin

an understanding of the purposes and patterns of in

over the years. As a corollary, it is important to rem

that an evaluation of contemporary security policy 

Western Hemisphere also hinges on an understand

the broadening view of U.S. national security. In deve

these themes, the author (1) analyzes the major ten

U.S. policy toward Latin America; (2) examine

broadening concept of security; and (3) explain

clarifies “Why Colombia, why now, and what is to be 

With that background, he elaborates “What is to be 

In these terms, the author (4) outlines some strateg

high operational-level imperatives for U.S. civil-m

involvement in Colombia; (5) puts forward some add

recommendations for playing in that security arena; a

addresses the strategic adaptation of U.S. military po

the Colombian threat situation. Such an exercise 

hopefully, stimulate North American, Colombian

Latin American thinking and action regarding a 

complicated security problems that—whether or n

likes it or is prepared to deal with it—are likely to be w

for some time beyond the year 2001.

The Major Tenets of U.S. Policy Toward Latin

America and the Criteria for Intervention.

The keynote of U.S. policy toward Latin Americ

implicit in President George Washington’s farewell a

of 1796.

6

 Opposition to extra-continental control ov

territories of the Western Hemisphere was made exp

four subsequent policy statements: The No-Tra

Resolution of 1811, the Monroe Doctrine of 182

Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine of 1904, a

Wilson Corollary of 1913.

7

 Thus, virtually every 

statement and action regarding Latin America fro

successful U.S. negotiations to purchase Florida from 

in 1821, to the intervention in Haiti in 1994, to the pr

2
traces its conceptual origins back to these fundam

tenets.

The Major Tenets. The No-Transfer Resolution o

reflected concern that Spain might transfer Florida to 

Britain. Foreshadowing the Monroe Doctrine

resolution made it clear that the United States “c

without serious inquietude, see any part of said ter

pass into the hands of any foreign power.”

8

 The M

Doctrine broadened the 1811 prohibition of a Fl

to-Great Britain territorial transfer so as to embra

western hemisphere territory and all other e

continental powers. Its key phrase asserted, “. . . we s

consider any attempt on their part to extend their sys

any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our 

and safety.”

9

 As one relatively recent example 

application of that doctrine in Latin America, Pre

Lyndon Johnson implicitly invoked this doctrine in 1

connection with preventing the establishment 

communist government in the Dominican Republic:

I think it is a well-known and advertised doctrine of t

Hemisphere that the principles of communism a

incompatible with the principles of our inter-Americ

system. President Kennedy enunciated that on seve

occasions. The Organization of American States enuncia

that. I merely repeated it.

10

Yet, justifications of U.S. interventions, especially 

the end of the Cold War, are more reminiscent 

Roosevelt and Wilson Corollaries than the Monroe Do

itself. In 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt was conc

about instability in the Western Hemisphere. He de

that “chronic wrongdoing, or impotence which resul

general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may 

require intervention by some civilized nation, and 

Western Hemisphere the United States cannot igno

duty.”

11

 Under these terms, the United States inte

imperiously and repeatedly in such places as Cub

3
Dominican Republic, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Pana

the 19th and early 20th centuries.

12

Actions of the Wilson administration, its predece

and successors generated additional interventions 

Caribbean Basin in the early 1900s. It is argued th

application of the Wilson Corollary in Latin Am

affairs brought “the gospel of democracy and morality 

concerned whether they wanted it or not.”

13

 The appli

of this policy, in conjunction with the Roosevelt Cor

included the occupation of the port of Vera Cruz, Mex

1914; the occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1934; an

occupation of the Dominican Republic from 1912 to 

The intent, even then, was to establish the ba

democracy and restore financial and political stabilit

At the same time, U.S. policy toward Latin Am

demonstrated that the Panama Canal and the sea 

connecting the east and west coasts of the conti

United States must remain in U.S. or friendly hands

strategic concept was the underpinning of President D

Eisenhower’s support for the 1954 overthrow of the “l

Arbenz government in Guatemala. As already noted, 

also the basis for President Johnson’s political justifi

of the 1965 invasion of The Dominican Repu

Nevertheless, the argument for protecting the U

States and the hemisphere from an extra-continental 

has receded into the background more and more since 

Because of the end of the Cold War and the concom

major power confrontations in the Western Hemis

recent U.S. interventions in the Caribbean Basin hav

discussed more in the Wilsonian and Rooseveltian te

“democracy,” “morality,” “instability,” and “human r

than in the Monrovian expressions of concern rega

territorial threats from a “foreign” power. The 

interventions in Grenada in 1983, Panama in 198

Haiti in 1994 are cases in point.

16

 The concept of respo

to traditional threats from extra-continental powe

given way to countering nonterritorial threats 

4
“hostile” or “disruptive” hemispheric government

political actors.

Additionally, the broad behavioral pattern of 

indirect U.S. involvement in Latin America includes 

democracy a chance in countries such as Grenada, Pa

and Haiti; training military and/or police force

working for economic development in the hope of cr

political stability throughout the entire hemispher

restoring financial order in Brazil and Mex

Nevertheless, and despite the justifying rhetoric, the 

causal linkage between instability anywhere i

hemisphere and a threat to U.S. security has been

continues to be—the cognitive bedrock of U.S. policy t

Latin America in general and toward Colombia now 

the future.

18

Conclusions. In the past, security has been ac

primarily as a result of maintaining what Lars Sc

calls strategic access and denial.

19

 That is, strategic 

to the Western Hemisphere for the United State

strategic denial of the region to extra-contin

adversaries or potential adversaries. More recentl

United States has expanded that concept to in

hostile—and disruptive—hemispheric government

other political actors. The United States has thu

suffered gladly governments or actors that threa

undermine the development of a stable, democrati

prosperous hemispheric community. U.S. support f

1974 overthrow of the “destabilizing” governm

Salvador Allende in Chile is one example. U.S. supp

the 1981 coup against the “narco” government of G

Luis Garcia Meza in Bolivia is another. The 

government of Fidel Castro in Cuba is obviously som

of an exception—but gladly is the operative word i

case.

20

5
Broadening the Concept of Security.

When what mattered most in U.S. policy toward 

America was maintaining military bases and pres

access to sea lanes of communication, choke point

materials, and hydrocarbons and denying these asset

enemy or its surrogates, the United States could gen

ignore internal conditions in specific countries. This w

U.S. stance toward Latin American until the early 

Policymakers, decisionmakers, and opinionmakers co

content with “good partner” regimes in key countries—

if those regimes were undemocratic and corrupt.

21

 A v

example of the Latin American reaction to this polic

seen in anti-American demonstrations and mobbin

spitting on Vice-President Richard Nixon during his v

Latin America in April 1958. Remarkably, an ex-pre

of Costa Rica, normally supportive of the United S

justified the Latin American behavior toward Nixon a

time by arguing that the United States had first s

Latin America by bolstering, decorating, and 

sheltering torture-chamber dictators. He further a

that Latin America could not spit on the United State

that could be done was to take out its frustrations 

vice-president.

22

Additional Factors for the Contemporary Se

Equation. Now, in 2001, the United States is also ser

concerned about the western hemisphere’s developm

democratic and free market institutions and human 

cooperation on shared problems such as illegal drug

environment, and refugees; and the ability of others 

North American and Latin American products. As a 

the United States must concern itself with nontrad

internal national and regional well-being.

23

 In 

connection, the national security strategy of the U

States now and over the past several years states th

principal U.S. security concerns in Latin Americ

internal and transnational in nature and have s

implications for national and regional well-being. 

6
include illegal drug trafficking, organized crime, 

laundering, illegal immigration, firearms and h

trafficking, and terrorism. Additionally, North Ame

are beginning to recognize the dangers to nationa

regional stability produced by corruption, ineffective 

systems, and illegitimate governance.

24

All of these threats—especially drug traffick

produce adverse social effects that undermin

sovereignty, democracy, stability, well-being, and se

of all the countries of the Western Hemisphere, inc

the United States.

25

 The notion that a criminal activit

as illegal drug trafficking could constitute a thr

national security may seem odd at first. It is gen

perceived that narcotics dealers do not present an 

physical threat to the people or territory of a nation

Accordingly, the illegal drug industry has not 

considered an inherent national security threat. Ye

potential for the illegal drug trafficking industry to d

social mores and produce dysfunctional behavior 

society has a direct bearing on the political process

undermines vital institutional pillars of regime sta

the internal and transnational narcotics industry pr

a challenge to the control of any country thus affected

in turn, generates security problems for producer cou

consumer countries, transit countries, and the 

community.

26

Illustrations from the Hemisphere. Two exa

evolving out of the Colombian situation should suf

make the point. First, with billions of dollars in rev

Colombian narco-traffickers have bribed, intimi

kidnapped, and assassinated government leaders, j

law enforcement and military officials, journalists, cit

and even soccer players. They have infiltrated and sub

the institutional pillars of regime stability such as th

bureaucracy, the courts, the police, and the army. The

also provided ingratiating patronage to the poo

directly manipulated and distorted the democratic po

process. As a consequence, they have made a con

7
effort to slow down and/or paralyze the governmen

establish themselves as an untouchable entity abo

state.

27

 Indeed, it has been argued that the illegal na

industry in Colombia and elsewhere is a “state with

state.”

28

 In this sense, illegal drug trafficking is not sim

criminal activity. It is more than that. It has created 

political-psychological-economic-social-moral conflic

presents a clear and present threat to the existence 

state as we know it.

29

Second, the spillover effects of the illegal drug in

have inspired violence, corruption, and insta

throughout Latin America in general and Caribbean t

countries in particular. The 1992 report by the West I

Commission captures the essence of the scope and gra

this “equal opportunity” phenomenon:

Nothing poses greater threats to civil society in [Caribbe

countries than the drug problem, and nothing exemplifies 

powerlessness of regional governments more. That is 

magnitude of the damage that drug abuse and trafficking h

for our Community. It is a many-layered danger. At base is 

human destruction implicit in drug addiction; but implicit a

is the corruption of individuals and systems by the sh

enormity of the inducements of the illegal drug trade 

relatively poor societies. On top of all this lie the implications 

governance itself—at the hands of both external agen

engaged in inter-national interdiction, and the drug bar

themselves—the “dons” of the modern Caribbean—w

threaten governance from within.

30

Thus, Colombia is of particular importance becau

illegal drug trade represents a dual threat to the aut

of that government—and to those of its neighbo

challenges the central governance of countries affecte

it undermines the vital institutional pillars of r

legitimacy and stability.

31

Conclusions. Colombia’s and, by extension, 

America’s contemporary importance to the United 

has major implications for policy in 2001 and beyo

8
suggests that the United States must concern itself w

region’s social, economic, and political conditions. Ye

not enough to consider the need for political reform 

socio-economic development. Because the illegal 

industry, insurgent groups, and paramilitary “self-de

organizations are all firmly established, a tar

government such as that of Colombia has no choice 

institute more direct military-police actions to dest

neutralize these threats to its security. Thus, the se

task appears more and more to consist of two 

interrelated elements. It involves dealing with both th

causes and the violent consequences of instability. 

most fundamental level, however, the real threat 

come from failing to recognize and respond—at the h

levels—to the dangers that instability poses to Col

and the rest of the interdependent global community

As a consequence, internal and transnat

conflict—to include the so-called drug war—can no 

be considered essentially a short-term, low-leve

enforcement effort. Rather, it is a long-term intrana

national, and transnational conflict involving Clause

multiple “forgotten” political-economic-social-psycho

dimensions of strategy.

33

 The challenge in redefini

term “security,” then, is to understand that it opera

three different levels. First, security must be conside

be protection and preservation of a people’s freedom 

external military attack and coercion perpetrat

traditional state actors—and from subversion an

erosion of cherished political, economic, and social 

perpetrated by internal and transnational non

political actors. Second, according to these terms, secu

multidimensional and transnational and mu

understood and dealt with as such. Third and f

security is a problem that may involve multiple int

external, and transnational enemies. As such, secu

complex and ambiguous, requiring rethinking obje

ways, and means of achieving it.

34

9
“Why Colombia? Why Now, and What Is To Be

Done?”

Since the early 19th century, the primary interests 

United States in Latin America have been to enco

maintain, and enhance a stable, peaceful, and s

southern flank. At the same time, U.S. national se

policy remains firmly committed to the interdepe

regional objectives of democracy and free-market eco

progress.

35

 The rationale for the expansion of the con

security from maintaining military defenses ag

external military threats to include internal po

economic, and social concerns is the realization tha

security is inextricably tied to the stability, prosperit

well-being of the interdependent hemispheric and 

communities.

36

 Unfortunately, the tendency has b

take a business-as-usual, ad hoc, and piecemeal 

management” approach rather than a proactive appro

the achievement of these objectives.

“Why Colombia?” Within the hemispheric co

Colombia is important to the United States because 

potential for further development of democrati

free-market institutions and improvement of human 

standards; its potential for increasing (legal) bil

trade; and its potential for cooperation on shared pro

such as illegal drugs, illegal immigration

environmental issues. More specifically, Colombia 

important U.S. trading partner and a key factor in the 

American and global economic equations.

37

To illustrate Colombia’s importance econom

Colombia’s legal two-way trade with the United 

amounts to $10 billion per year; it is South Am

fourth-largest economy; and it provides the fifth-l

U.S. export market in Latin America. Moreove

Western Hemisphere accounts for nearly 40 percent 

United States’ two-way world trade, compared to 33 p

for the Pacific Rim and 21 percent for Europe.

38

 An

crucial fact is that two of the four largest suppliers of e

10
to the United States are Venezuela and Colombia. W

the interdependent global economy and sec

environments, the argument is uncomplicated. That 

these interests are maintained and enhanced in Colo

they enhance the stability, prosperity, and well-being 

Western Hemisphere and the interdependent 

community. However, to the extent that these interes

not maintained and enhanced in Colombia, they de

the potential of the region and the world.

39

 Cl

significant interests are at stake.

“After Nearly 50 Years of Internal Instabilit

Drug-Related Turmoil in Colombia, Why Is the U

States Now Becoming More Seriously Interested in H

That Country?” The problem, at the moment, is 

Colombia (including its potential), is deteriorating be

three simultaneous and interrelated wars—insur

illegal drug trafficking, and growing vigilante param

movements—are directly threatening the demo

economic progress, and social fabric of that co

Internal deterioration may be illustrated by three 

First, violence associated directly with internal turm

claiming over 3,500 lives every year. Second, viole

generating over 1.5 million displaced persons and 80

emigrants who are finding new homes in other count

Latin America, the United States, Europe, and Ca

Third, Colombia’s internal turmoil is also induc

contracting economy that declined by more than 5 p

in 1999 and has produced 20 percent unemployment a

worst recession since the 1930s.

40

Colombia’s three simultaneous wars (think 

“Hobbesian Trinity”) also indirectly threaten the st

and well-being of its neighbors. In this conne

narco-traffickers have for some time operated bac

forth across Colombia’s borders and have taken with 

violence, corruption, and criminality wherever they 

gone. Colombian insurgents and paramilitary group

also made frequent incursions into the neighb

countries of Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Vene

11
The resulting violence and instability are undermini

sovereignty, security, and well-being of these count

Another negative result of turmoil in Colombia an

region—the abundant flow of narcotics into the U

States to satisfy its great demand—is sufficiently o

and well documented not to require much elabor

Suffice it to note that illegal drug use in the United 

kills some 52,000 people every year, and costs are esti

at $100 billion to $500 billion per year in the United 

for illegal drug-related health care and accidents.

42

Most significant, there is now explicit recognitio

Colombia’s current situation has reached crisis propo

though an alarmist prognosis would probab

counterproductive. Yet, it would be irresponsible not t

that the illegal drug trafficking and paramilitar

insurgent organizations are perpetrating a le

corruption, criminality, humanitarian horror, and in

instability that—if left unchecked—can ultim

threaten the collapse of the Colombian state and unde

the political sovereignty of its neighbors.

43

The Corollary Question: “What Is To Be Done?

urgent problem for decisionmakers and policymaker

analyze the seriousness of the crisis in Colombia and 

exactly what to do beyond what is already being done 

Plan Colombia. Significant current activities appea

ad hoc, piecemeal, and disjointed. These activitie

centered on the $1.3 billion of U.S. military support t

one component of the central strategic problem—th

war. At the same time, the European and Jap

contributions to the strategic social and eco

components of Plan Colombia have been meager

Colombian contribution to make up the balance of the 

$7.5 billion package has not been spelled out. In 

connection, operational-level activities addre

problems such as crop substitution, judicial reform

human rights abuses appear to be based on “crisis co

rather than a coherent, coordinated plan of action

dysfunctional approach is failing to reconcil

12
aspirations listed in Plan Colombia with the reality 

strategic situation in the country and the region. 

consequence, the illegal drug trafficking industry con

to be strong, ruthless, adaptable, and wealthy

continues to exploit the weaknesses of the governme

turn, there is considerable confusion, frustration

ambiguity concerning the intent, objectives, and viab

the plan.

44

A lack of cooperative, holistic, and strategic

involvement within Colombia is generating great ris

that country and the world around it. In light 

dynamics of Colombia’s Hobbesian Trinity, there is 

reason for worldwide concern. At this time, the Colo

focus on the operational, micro-level, drug war se

question in the short term, leaving strategic macr

security, political, economic, and social issues to be 

with in the future—by others—leaves much to be de

The Colombian drug issue is only one piece of a larg

more complex strategic puzzle. Solving that puzz

require a long-term and holistic strategic solution. It i

for the United States, Colombia, and the global comm

to go beyond the present uncertainties of Plan Colomb

deal more vigorously and cooperatively with an u

strategic agenda that greatly affects the interdepe

global economic, political, and security arena.

45

Conclusions. The strategic ambiguity and ge

confusion reflected in the questions about “Why Colo

why now, and what is to be done?” are the results 

common denominators: (1) a radically different se

environment than that addressed, and (2) the lac

strategic,cooperative, holistic, and long-term foreign 

and military strategy to deal with that environmen

crisis situation in Colombia is not simply and sing

result of illegal drug production and trafficking. That 

one of the consequences of long-standing political, eco

and social inequities that have spawned that cou

Hobbesian Trinity of three simultaneous wars. Thus

must be attempted in Colombia will require consid

13
effort in several different dimensions—political-diplo

socio-economic, psychological-moral, and stab

security—simultaneously. Unless these macro-level 

are addressed cooperatively, holistically, and strateg

Colombia’s three wars will continue indefinitely. A

Sun Tzu reminds us, the attendant national, regiona

global deterioration will work to the benefit of no on

Implications, Part 1: Strategic and High

Operational-Level Imperatives for Civil-Milita

Involvement in Colombia.

What is required, then, is a combined civil-military 

to apply the full human and physical resour

cooperating nations to generate the real well-be

Colombia and its political, economic, and geogr

neighbors. In these terms, the attempt to resolve the c

in Colombia cannot be a strictly operational-

military-police effort. Clausewitz’s translator, M

Howard, reminds us that an adequate response m

essentially a strategic political-economic-moral-se

effort. The most refined tactical doctrine and operatio

carried out by the optimum military or police struct

pursuit of a policy that ignores the strategic who

include the populace—will be irrelevant.

47

 It must a

remembered that if one wants strategic clarity to op

effectiveness, one must precede tactical and opera

efforts with relevant policy direction—and a strate

organizational structure, and appropriate tools of po

Some Fundamental Requirements for a Grand Str

Success in countering the chaos of the Colombian cris

fulfilling the hope for national, regional, and 

well-being will be constructed on the same pillar

supported favorable results in the past. These pill

success are conceptual, organizational, and opera

They form the foundation for a strategic paradig

engagement, unity of effort, and holistic multidimen

and multinational organizations and programs desig

14
promote and consolidate political, economic, socia

security legitimization efforts.

In the past, the United States worked hard to d

strategic paradigms (i.e., theories of engagement). 

example, a great deal of intellectual energy, na

debate, and writing, to say nothing of war gaming, we

the question of how and under what circumstanc

United States could politically, economi

psychologically, and militarily deter and contain the 

Union. Now, the United States must seek to unders

new central strategic problem and, in the counterdru

be able to deal with more than the strictly law enforc

aspects of hemispheric security. Theories of engageme

as important for success in “unconventional conflict” a

are in conventional war. This is the first conce

requirement.

49

Second, the United States developed an exe

branch management organizational structure to impl

the strategic paradigm that brought both militar

civilian assets to the field of confrontation with the f

enemy. In this connection, government must restr

itself to the extent necessary to establish the appro

political organization to achieve an effective unity of 

and ensure that the application of the various civilia

military instruments of power directly contribute 

achievement of the political end-state dictated b

strategic paradigm. Generating a more complete un

effort requires contributions at the international le

well.

Critical organizational points are: (1) Colombia a

internal and external allies must be in general agre

as to what the central strategic problem is; (2) these p

must be in general agreement on national goals a

associated set of programs designed to contribute dire

the achievement of the mutually agreed-upon end-sta

these requirements reflect the need for an interna

organizational structure for improved coordinatio

15
cooperation between Colombia and its internal and ex

allies; and (4) all of this requires mutual cultural awa

and sensitivity. Otherwise, the various nationa

international civil-military actions will wo

cross-purposes, be counter-productive, and/

irrelevant.

50

 These points are primarily organiza

requirements.

Third, the United States worked very hard to ge

the conceptual, technological, and industrial capabi

produce major direct and indirect political-diplo

socio-economic, psychological-moral, and military

instruments of power that were both offensiv

defensive. The intent was to support the deterrenc

containment strategies that came out of George F. Ken

strategic paradigm for the containment of the 

Union.

51

 Today, the United States must develo

incorporate the appropriate instruments of power by 

the root causes and consequences of Colombia’s inst

might be neutralized. Present-day actions are me

influence significantly the society and political syste

country such as Colombia to help the government 

control of its own territory, society, and po

system—not an attempt by the United States to gain 

sort of political, economic, or territorial concession.

52

 

are primarily operational requirements.

Conclusions. Strategic paradigms, organiza

structure, and appropriate instruments of pow

implement the follow-on strategies and effect the nec

cooperation and coordination of effort should n

considered relics of a bygone era. Indeed, those civilia

military leaders assigned to the difficult but urgent t

developing and implementing U.S. national security 

and strategies now and in the future would do w

rethink and apply these fundamental strategic compo

of success to the requirements of the contemp

international security environment—and th

Colombia.

53

16
Implications, Part 2: Seven Additional Strategi

and High Operational-Level Civil-Military

Imperatives for Playing in the Contemporary

Global Security Arena.

In September 2000, President Clinton opene

summit meeting of world leaders at the United Natio

that occasion, he urged the gathering to prepare na

and international institutions for a new age in 

unilateral and multilateral forces will have to 

regularly and rapidly inside national boundaries to p

threatened people.”

54

 The president was responding 

realities of the so-called “new world disorder.” 

realities center on the idea that although contemp

conflict is political-psychological-moral, it is also viol

Thus, the military has an important role to play 

given conflict situation, especially that of Colombia

role, however, must be based on the correct identifica

a range of actions and in proper proportions—th

subordinated to and in support of the larger po

economic, social, and security components of such a co

Thus, political and military leaders, planners

implementers would do well to recognize that in figh

foe today and in the future, the situation has cha

Fighting the Hobbesian Trinity in Colombia today 

exception to the rule of change.

55

 We can see that 

following seven ways.

Ambiguity. First, the definitions of “enemy” and “v

are elusive, and there is a lack of consensus on the 

“power” to secure, maintain, and enhance vital inte

Underlying these ambiguities is the fact that contemp

conflict is more often than not an intra-state affai

international law and convention are only beginn

address. A part of one society is pitted against anoth

these so-called “teacup” wars,

56

 the following cle

conditions do not apply or are not present; therefore 

are (1) normally no formal declaration or terminat

conflict, (2) no easily identified human foe to attac

17
destroy, (3) no specific territory to take and hold, 

single credible government or political actor with wh

deal, (5) no legal niceties such as mutually reco

national borders and Geneva Conventions to help c

the situation, (6) no guarantee that any agreement be

or among contending authorities will be honored, and 

specific rules to guide leadership in a given “engage

process. These aspects of the global security environm

general and in the Colombian context in particular a

only complex, they are ambiguous.

The Need to Redefine “Enemy,” “Power,” and “Vi

Second, as a consequence, there is a need to re

“enemy,” “power,” and “victory.” The enemy is no lo

recognizable military entity or an industrial capabi

make traditional war. The enemy now becomes “vio

and the causes of violence. Thus, the purposes of powe

changed. Power is not simply “hard” combat fire 

directed at a traditional enemy military format

industrial complex. Power is multi-layered, com

“hard” and “soft” political, psychological, m

informational, economic, societal, military, police, an

bureaucratic activities that can be brought to 

appropriately on the causes as well as the perpetra

violence. And victory is no longer the acknowl

destruction of an enemy’s military capability. Victo

success) is now—more frequently, and perhaps with a 

“spin control”—defined as the achievement of stabili

a “sustainable peace.”

57 Plan Colombia is a case in p

A New Center of Gravity. Third, these ambig

intrude on the comfortable vision of war in whic

assumed center of gravity has been enemy mi

formations and the physical capability to conduc

Clausewitz reminds us, however, that “in countries s

to domestic strife . . . and popular uprisings, the [cen

gravity] is the personalities of the leaders and 

opinion. It is against these that our energies sho

directed.”

58

 Thus, in contemporary intranational co

the primary center of gravity changes from a fa

18
military concept to an ambiguous and uncomfo

multidimensional political-economic-psycholo

security paradigm. Again, the Colombian situation 

exception to the Clausewitzian dictum.

Asymmetry. Fourth, strategic asymmetry is the 

disparity between contending parties to gain an adva

Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson have defined str

asymmetry as:

acting, organizing, and thinking differently than opponents 

order to maximize one’s own advantages, exploit 

opponent’s weaknesses, attain the initiative, or gain grea

freedom of action. It can be political-strateg

military-strategic, operational, or a combination of these

can entail different methods, technologies, valu

organizations, time perspectives, or some combination 

these. It can be short-term or long-term. It can be deliberate 

by default. It can be discrete or pursued in conjunction w

symmetric approaches. It can have both psychological a

physical dimensions.

59

Asymmetry is a concept as old as war itself, but 

military officers and political leaders don’t like it. 

argue that asymmetry is not fighting fair. Th

unfortunate. What many first world military and po

leaders seem not to have learned is that contemporar

traffickers, insurgents, and paramilitaries—such as 

operating in Colombia—can be what Ralph Peters 

“wise competitors.” He argues,

Wise competitors will not even attempt to defeat us on o

terms; rather, they will seek to shift the playing field aw

from conventional military confrontations or turn to terrori

and nontraditional forms of assault on our national integri

Only the foolish will fight fair.

60

Conflict Has Become Multidimensional, Multil

and Multiorganizational. Fifth, the conflictive me

secure, maintain, and enhance interests abroad 

become multidimensional, multilateral, 

multiorganizational. The conflict in Colombia is 

19
military-to-military confrontation. That conflic

involves the entire population as well as a large num

national civilian, military, and police agencies, 

national civilian organizations, internat

organizations, nongovernmental organizations (N

and subnational indigenous actors who must work to

to deal effectively with complex internal and transna

threats to security, peace, and well-being.

As a result, a viable unity of effort is requi

coordinate the multilateral, multidimensional

multiorganizational effort necessary for succ

engagement in the contemporary interdependent 

Because of the difficulty in achieving it, that ideal has 

been achieved in the past. Nevertheless, in this chang

infinitely more complex security arena, governmen

their functional agencies, the various NGOs, an

diverse international organizations involved in the p

of stability, peace, and well-being must make the nec

effort to develop ways and means of working toward a 

effective unity.

61

Deterrence. Sixth, threats associated with the gr

sophistication of biological, chemical, and cyber w

intensifying. At the same time, other “nontradit

threats and menaces emanating from virtually a tho

different political actors with a cause—and the w

conduct asymmetrical warfare—are spreading 

throughout the global community. The deterrence t

straightforward. Culturally effective ways and means 

be found to convince Colombia’s “nontraditi

narco-traffickers, insurgents, and paramilitary playe

it is not in their best interests—whatever those may 

continue their negative behavior. Deterrence 

necessarily military—although that is important. It 

necessarily negative or directly coercive—although 

too, is important. Deterrence is broader than 

Deterrence is the creation of a state of mind that 

encourages one thing or discourages something else. 

20
these terms, motives and culture as well as weapon

tactics become crucial.

62

Contemporary “War” Is Not Limited; It Is Total. Se

contemporary nontraditional “conflict” is not a k

appendage (a lesser or limited thing) to the 

comfortable military paradigm. It is a great deal mo

long as opposition exists in Colombia or anywher

which is willing to risk all to take down a gover

violently and establish one more to its own liking, th

war. This is a zero-sum game in which there is on

winner. It is, thus, total. In his novel, The Centurians

Larteguy vividly captures the difference bet

traditional warfare designed to achieve limited po

economic, or territorial concession and the totality 

type of threats we confront today. He contrasts the F

(traditional) and the Vietminh (total) methods of se

vital interests in the following passage:

It is difficult to explain exactly, but it is rather like [the ca

game] bridge as compared to belote. When we [the Fren

make war, we play belote with 32 cards in the pack. But t

Viet Minh’s game is bridge and they have 52 cards—20 m

than we do. Those 20 cards short will always prevent us fr

getting the better of them. They’ve got nothing to do w

traditional [military] warfare, they’re marked with the sig

of POLITICS, PROPAGANDA, FAITH, AGRARIA

REFORM . . . What’s biting [the French officer]? I think he 

beginning to realize that we’ve got to play with 52 cards and 

doesn’t like it at all. . . . Those extra cards aren’t at all to 

liking.

63

Conclusions. These are the realities for now and in

next century. As the United States and its armed 

transition over the next months and years to deal 

effectively with the requirements of the 21st centu

should contemplate the problems of threat and respo

the terms outlined above. The consequences of failin

so are clear. Unless thinking and actions are reorien

deal with those realities, the problems of global, reg

and sub-regional (Colombian) stability and securit

21
resolve themselves—stability and security will be 

along with the complicated problems they present.

Implications, Part 3: The Strategic Adaptation 

U.S. Military Efficacy to the Colombian Threat

Environment.

The earlier two sections dealing with Implicatio

forth fundamental strategic civil-military direction

additional imperatives that should inform the deb

what is to be done in Colombia. They also provide dir

in terms of the nontraditional and complex threa

requires a change of perspective from unilateral resp

to multilateral and highly coordinated responses

primarily blunt police and military tools of power to 

people-oriented instruments of action; and from ad h

piecemeal crisis management to deliberate and h

commitments of resources and will.

The third set of Implications concerns the str

application of U.S. military power. At the outset, howe

should be noted that the ultimate responsibili

reversing the political-economic-social-sec

deterioration of that country and setting it on a 

positive course lies with Colombians. As Michael S

argues, “They have borne the enormous costs 

country’s decline—and they will enjoy the fruits of wh

progress it makes.”

64

 Yet, the United States, as the c

interested outside actor, has indispensable exper

resources, and political clout. The judicious applica

lessons learned from relevant experiences similar to 

of Colombia could make the difference between succe

failure of the Colombian armed forces in helping to a

the political-economic-social-security regeneration o

country. Key lessons learned center on professional m

education and leader development.

65

 In these te

mentor, and role model terms, U.S. military forces can 

a major positive influence for enhancing and strength

democracy, stability, and peace in Colombia.

66

22
The Central Strategic Problem. Thus, we come b

where we began. We return to Clausewitz’s first and 

comprehensive of all strategic questions which is cru

understanding the central political problem.

67

 Demo

stability, and sustainable peace depend on effectiv

legitimate control of the national territory and the peo

it. The Colombian government must achieve that con

a manner that safeguards the human rights, civil lib

and personal security of all its citizens. At the same 

the government must enhance its political legiti

provide economic progress, and engender social justic

Tzu reminds us, “Those who excel in war first cultivat

own humanity and justice and maintain their law

institutions. By these means, they make their govern

invincible.”

68

For the Colombian government to accomplish 

formidable tasks within the context of illegal insu

narco-trafficker, and paramilitary violence, it must d

things. First, it must professionalize and moderni

country’s police forces and judicial system to the 

where they can enforce and administer the law fair

effectively throughout the entire country. Secon

government must professionalize and moderniz

military to a level where it has the capability to neu

and/or destroy the illegal perpetrators of vio

throughout the national territory. The inten

requirement are to generate the societal acceptanc

support that controlling institutions need to m

contemporary violence adequately—and to guaran

durable peace.

69

Governments not responsive to the importance 

central strategic problem of controlling the na

territory and the population find themselves in a “cr

governance.” They face increasing social violence, cr

anarchy, and eventual overthrow. Solutions to this pr

take us beyond training small units for condu

aggressive operations against narco-traffickers to b

professional military education and leader developm

23
What the Military Must Do: Primary Requirement

United States has had a great deal of experience and s

in training military forces to take the offensive a

enemies on the battlefield and in teaching armed force

to fight according to the humane considerations re

under the just war concept. The United States 

continue to help train and educate Colombian for

those fundamentals. Nevertheless, additional trainin

education are also necessary. At the least, a car

designed and relatively modest assistance program 

vastly increase the speed at which military and police 

professionalize and modernize themselves. A f

Department of State Director of Andean Af

Ambassador David Passage, provides a short list of th

important deficiencies and areas for improvement 

Colombian military and police forces:

Development of strategy. The Colombian arm

not yet have a viable, comprehensive strategy to r

government control over the national territory.

Training and doctrine for joint operations

Colombian military is only now beginning to dev

doctrine for joint operations, which should includ

national police; it must use army, navy, and air force 

to reinforce each others’ skills and strength

compensate for weaknesses.

Far-reaching improvement in the collec

evaluation, and dissemination of usable operat

intelligence. To describe the Colombian mili

collection and evaluation of intelligence as “prim

would be charitable. Dissemination of usable, actio

intelligence is virtually nonexistent due to rivalrie

distrust between military and police units and their le

Development of quick reaction capabil

Colombia needs to create such capabilities to 

immediately to intelligence on high-value targets.

24
Significant improvement in transport capa

and lift. Additional trucks and other vehicles are nee

the ground; fixed and rotary wing aircraft are 

imperative to help restore government control ov

national territory.

70

What the Military Must Do: Some Interme

Recommendations for U.S.-Monitored Professional M

Education and Leader Development in Colombia. Cha

mind-sets to develop leader judgment needed to 

effectively with the complex, politically domin

multidimensional, multiorganizational, multinationa

multicultural internal conflict in Colombia requ

carefully staffed, phased, and long-term valid

planning, and implementation program at all level

recommended basic direction for such an effort is ou

as follows.

• First, the study of the fundamental nature of c

has always been the philosophical cornerston

comprehending the essence of traditional war. It is n

relevant to nontraditional conflict. As exam

nontraditional national interests centering on “well-

must be carefully defined and implemented. At the 

time, the application of all the instruments of nation

international power—including the full integrat

legitimate civilian partners—as part of a syner

process to achieve Colombia’s political ends has 

rethought and refined.

• Second, in that connection, Colombian police, mi

political, and civilian leaders at all levels must acqu

ability to interact collegially and effectively 

representatives of international organizations, U.S. c

agencies, indigenous national civilian agencies, NGOs

and global news media, and civilian populations. The 

is to achieve unity of effort, not just unity of comman

• Third, in turn, military and nonmilitary leaders 

levels must understand the strategic and po

implications of tactical and operational-level actions

25
must also understand the ways that military force 

employed to achieve political and psychological end

understand and accept the ways that pol

considerations affect the use of force.

• Fourth, leaders at all levels must understan

information can be a force multiplier. At the same tim

of timely information and intelligence can be a 

minimizer. Waiting for higher or other headquart

provide timely, accurate, and detailed local intelligen

often proved costly in terms of mission achievemen

force protection. As a consequence, Colombian profes

military education and leader development must fost

idea that commanders have to take responsibility a

initiative for collecting and managing relevant inform

for their own use.

• Fifth, education and training for contemp

Colombian intranational conflict must prepare milita

police personnel at all levels to be effective war-fig

Political actors such as illegal drug traffickers, insur

and paramilitaries have at their disposal an awesome 

of conventional and unconventional weaponry to u

their own purposes. Additionally, because of the 

charged political-psychological environment in whic

must work, soldiers and police officers must also d

political sensitivity, considerable restraint, and 

discipline.

71

A supplementary list of intermediate-level imper

would focus on the following:

• The power of the interagency process when 

correctly and the impotence of unilateral actions, even 

“leading in support”;

• The notion of indirect engagement versus 

involvement;

• Regional, hemispheric, and global implicati

actions;

26
• The concept of multiple centers of gravity, to in

public opinion and leadership;

• The power of information and public diplomacy a

penalties that are paid when these instruments of pow

not used, channeled, or harnessed;

• The importance of learning how to defend one

centers of gravity as well as attacking those of an opp

and the ultimate penalty for not doing so; and again

• The fact that contemporary conflict is not “limited

“total.”

72

What the Military Must Do: Some Adva

Requirements. As early as 1990, as a follow-on 

Cartegena (Colombia) Summit, a U.S. interagency 

headed by Ambassador Edwin G. Corr met with pres

of Andean countries, along with other government of

and representatives of major groups within the p

sector, to make recommendations for counter-na

assistance to interested governments. The team conc

that a successful response to illegal drug traffickin

production must deal with political, social, cultura

security ramifications of narcotics problems—not ju

enforcement and economic aspects. What 

recommended then and is still required is a h

approach that deals with root causes, enhances legi

governance, and provides more than cosmetic se

throughout a given country.

73

These recommendations for success against 

narcotics trafficking are interestingly similar to those 

in the Implications Sections above. Additionally, the

at least five tasks that could be initiated at any time t

not depend on the accomplishment of the primar

intermediate requirements for relevance i

contemporary security arena.

• Help the Colombian government to identify and c

key strategic political, economic, and social shortcom

27
• Renew the U.S. executive-legislative understand

the purpose of security assistance by recomme

carefully constructed conditions as guidelines fo

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 in accordance wit

realities of contemporary conflict;

• Recommend the repeal of the legal prohibition a

most U.S. aid to foreign police;

• Replace U.S. operationally oriented officers 

Foreign Area Officer (FAO) diagnosticians to desig

manage indirect and direct security assistance prog

and,

• Ensure that direct and indirect military aid 

Colombian government makes a direct contribution 

strategic objectives of promoting democracy, human 

economic development, social justice, persona

collective security, and a durable peace for the 

country.

74

To quote Ambassador Passage again, “If the U

States is serious about wanting to see a reduction 

production and trafficking in illegal narcotics, it ne

accept the fact that no reduction is likely unt

Colombian government regains control of its na

territory and is able to deal with narco-traffickers 

basis of law.”

75

 At the same time Passage says, “

United States is serious about wanting to see a reduc

human rights abuses, it should offer training progra

help professionalize both Colombia’s police and m

forces so than neither of them believes it has to res

human rights abuses and deny civil liberties in or

enforce laws and maintain public order.”

76

It must be remembered, however, that the United 

can help Colombia’s government and armed forces ev

shortcomings and overcome them by providing a

training, education, and equipment. Yet, the ch

necessary to take control of the national territory wil

only if the Colombians want U.S. help—and are wil

28
apply the lessons learned from their own and 

experience.

A Cautionary Concluding Note. The above out

fundamental strategic recommendations, addi

strategic and high operational-level imperatives, an

professional military education and leader develo

imperatives for the strategic adaptation of U.S. m

power to the Colombian security situation takes us b

where we began. This list of recommendations for “w

to be done” provides the basis for the understandin

judgment that civilian and military leaders must hav

clear on what the situation in Colombia is and what it 

The hard evidence over time underscores the wisd

Clausewitz’s dictum, “The first, the supreme, the 

far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman an

commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind 

on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it fo

trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its natu

These recommendations for the adaptation of U.S

and military efficacy to the crisis in Colombia ta

beyond doing “something” for something’s sake. The

us beyond developing budgets, force structure

equipment packages for a given crisis situation. The

us beyond asking, “What are we going to do?” “Who is 

to command and control the effort?” “How is it to be 

These imperatives take us to the development of a mu

agreed-upon strategic vision (that is, the po

end-game). In turn, these imperatives take us 

cooperative, holistic, and long-term planning 

implementation of the objectives (strategic ends), 

(strategic courses of action), and means (stra

monetary, personnel, and equipment resources

directly support the achievement of the pol

end-game.

78

There is very little glamour, only a few sound bite

not many career enhancement possibilities inher

much of the work outlined above, but it does have 

29
potential for directing progress toward democracy, sta

and a sustainable peace.

The Challenge, the Task, and Threat.

The primary challenge is for senior civilian and m

leaders to change perspectives and realize that p

money, personnel, and equipment into a situation s

that in Colombia without first doing the fundamenta

result in ad hoc, piecemeal, disjointed, premature

over the long term, ineffective—reactions to problem

The main task includes four sub-tasks. The firs

develop an adequate intellectual framework (str

paradigm) to deal with Colombia’s Hobbesian trinity a

root causes. The second is to promulgate ade

organizational structure to generate international

and U.S.-Colombian unity of effort. The third is to d

appropriate instruments of hard and soft power for po

and psychological as well as military purposes. The 

task is to generate strong international, 

U.S.-Colombian, and regional public understandin

support that will guarantee all parties the ability to st

course.

80

The danger is that unless responses are h

cooperative, carefully coordinated, well-organized

conducted with considerable political skill, str

ambiguity is introduced into the situation. In a sit

such as that in Colombia, strategic ambiguity (1) pr

the opportunity for opponents to “play at the seam

frustrate objectives; (2) allows friends and allies to p

their own narrow agendas; (3) allows political, pers

and monetary costs to rise; and (4) increases the prob

of failure and unnecessary loss of life.

81

Conclusions.

Two fundamental sets of requirements underli

discussion. The first is the need for Colombian lead

30
learn how to optimize capabilities in an ambig

nontraditional, and intranational security environ

The second involves U.S.-Colombian-interna

political partnership requirements to achieve civil-m

and national-international unity of effort. Together

two sets of requirements are essential for strategic 

and success in complex stability operations. It m

remembered that the final outcome of a conflict su

that in Colombia is not determined simply b

manipulation of violence on a traditional battl

Rather, control of the entire situation and its succ

resolution are determined by the qualitative judg

and unity of effort that directly support overriding po

requirements. 

Some Final Reflections.

The primary verities and implications of the se

situation in the Western Hemisphere and Colomb

clear. First, the world has seen and will continue to 

wide range of ambiguous and uncomfortable threats 

gray area between war and peace. Second, these t

and challenges—manifested by transnational illega

trafficking, organized crime, corruption, terro

warlordism, insurgency, civil war, regional wars

humanitarian problems such as large-scale refugee 

and famine—are the consequences of root cause pre

and problems perpetrated and/or exploited by a var

internal and transnational political actors. Thir

spillover effects of Colombian gray area phenomen

the rest of the hemisphere ultimately place demands 

international community, if not to solve the proble

least to harbor the victims.

82

The policy implications for the United States a

Western community—and their military and 

organizations—regarding the illegal transna

narcotics trade in Colombia are far-reaching. Probab

most important, from a U.S. policy perspective, is th

31
fragile democracy in that country is at risk. Of 

importance from the perspectives of both U.S

Colombian policy and practicability, the various in

and transnational threats posed by illegal 

trafficking—and the violence stemming from it—are 

overlooked and evaded at the macro-strategic leve

result is a series of tactical and operational “success

the battlefield over the past 40 years that are irrelev

the strategic whole.

Lessons learned for virtually every conflict over 

years from Algeria, to El Salvador, to Somalia, to the f

Yugoslavia, demonstrate that the situation in Col

requires the greatest international, U.S.-Colom

civil-military, and military-to-military diplo

cooperation, and synergism.

83

 These recomm

multidimensional integrative efforts at the strateg

high-operational levels will lead to the establishm

conditions that will allow Colombia to renew its po

solvency and legitimacy—and that will lead t

achievement of a mutually agreed-upon manda

sustainable peace.

ENDNOTES

1. A National Security Strategy for a New Century, Wash

DC: The White House, December 1999, pp.39-40; hereafter c

White House. Also see Plan Colombia: Plan for Peace, Prosper

the Strengthening of the State, Fact Sheet released by the Bu

Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State, July 1

pp. 1-5.

2. Ibid.

3. World Factbook, Prepared by the Central Intelligence A

Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2000, pp. 106-108, 508-511. Also s

the Facts, 2000-2001, Washington, DC: Latin American Working 

2001, pp. 3, 29-39, 56-57, 79, 84-92.

4. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by M

Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 

1976, p. 88.

32
5. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Samuel B. G

London: Oxford University Press, 1971, pp. 63-71.

6. Graham H. Stuart and James L. Tigner, Latin America 

United States, sixth ed., Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 197

7. For a succinct account of these tenets, see Thomas A. B

Diplomatic History of the American People, ninth ed., Englewoo

NJ: Prentice Hall, 1970, pp. 286, 183-190, 505-507, 553-562.

8. Ibid., pp. 668-689.

9. Messages and Papers of the Presidents, J. D. Richards

Washington, DC, 1896, Vol. II, p. 218.

10. New York Times, June 2, 1965.

11. A.H. Lewis, Messages and Speeches of Theodore Ro

Washington, DC, 1906, Vol. II, p. 807.

12. Bailey, pp. 505-506, 553-556, 559-562, 676. Also see Stu

Tigner, pp. 4, 130-132.

13. Stuart and Tigner, p. 5. Also see Congressional Record, 63 

1 Sess., p. 5846.

14. Ibid.; also see A. Curtis Wilgus and Raul D’Eca, Latin Am

History, New York: Barnes & Noble, 1968, pp. 404-404.

15. Bailey, pp. 901-903, 829-830. Also see Fredrick B

“Guatemala, the United States, and Communism in the Am

Review of Politics, 1955, pp. 232-261; and Abraham Lowenth

Dominican Intervention, Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1972.

16. For examples of the rationale, see “Transcript of Add

President on Lebanon and Grenada,” New York Times, Octo

1983; and “Transcript of President Reagan’s News Conferenc

York Times, October 28, 1983. Also see “A Transcript of Bush’s A

on the Decision to Use Force in Panama,” New York Times, De

21, 1989; and “At the White House, an Emotional Send-Off for Ar

The Washington Post, October 15, 1994. Also see Lars Sc

National Security and United States Policy toward Latin A

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987, pp. 238-248; R

Pastor, “The United States and the Grenada Revolution,” Docum

Trabajo, No. 26. Centro de Investigaciones del Caribe y America 

Universidad Interamericana de Puerto Rico, 1986; Deputy Secr

33
State Kenneth Dam, speech to the Associated Press Managing 

Conference, Louisville, KY, November 4, 1983.

17. “Transcript of Bush’s Address,” and “Send-Off for Aristid

see White House.

18. Schoultz, p. 310.

19. Ibid., pp. 143-149, 225-229.

20. See, as examples, Jose Manuel Vergara and Florencia 

Coup! Allende’s Last Day, New York: Stein and Day, 1975; Na

Davis, The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende, Ithica, NY: 

University Press, 1985; Nathaniel Davis, “U.S. Covert Actions i

1971-1973,” Foreign Service Journal, November 1978, pp. 10-14

and December 1978, pp. 11-13, 43; Waltraud Queiser Morales, 

Land of Struggle, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992, pp. 125-1

author interview with Ambassador Edwin G. Corr, in Washingt

January 5, 2000.

21. Bailey, pp. 849-850. Also see Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, “D

and Double Standards,” Commentary, November 1979, pp. 34-3

22. For this remarkable statement by Jose Figueres, see 

Hanke, Mexico and the Caribbean, Princeton, NJ: Princeton Un

Press, 1959, pp. 105-107.

23. Anthony Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement,” r

by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Hopkins University, Washington, DC, September 21, 1993. For 

elaboration on the contemporary complex global security enviro

also see Max G. Manwaring, “Beyond the Cold War,” Gra

Phenomena: Confronting the New World Disorder, Boulde

Westview Press, 1993, pp. 63-76.

24. White House. See also The National Security Strateg

United States, Washington, DC: The White House, January 19

National Security Strategy of the United States, March 199

National Security Strategy of the United States, August 199

National Security Strategy of the United States, January 1

National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, Ju

A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlarg

February 1996; A National Security Strategy for a New Centu

1997; and A National Security Strategy for a New Century, 

1998; hereafter cited as White House (with date).

34
25. Ibid.; also see The Latin American Narcotics Trade an

National Security, Donald J. Mabry, ed., Westport, CN: Gree

1989. 

26. Ibid.; also see David Passage, The United States and Co

Untying The Gordian Knot, Carlisle Bks, PA: Strategic 

Institute, 2000.

27. Violence in Colombia: The Contemporary Crisis in Hi

Perspective, Charles Bergquist, Ricardo Penaranda and G

Sanchez, eds., Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1992. A

Colonizacion, coca y guerrilla, Jaime Jaramillo, Leonidas Mo

Fernando Cubides, eds., Bogota, 1986; Mario Arango and Jorg

Narcotrafico: Imperio de la cocaine, Medellin, 1984; and 

Garcia-Sayan, Coca, cocaina y narcotrafico: Laberinto en los 

Lima: Comision Andidna de Juristas, 1989.

28. An early assertion of this argument was made by Rensse

Lee III,The White Labyrinth, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 

139. Another, by an eminent Peruvian jurist, is Luis Bust

Belaunde, “Corrupcion y discomposicion del Estado,” in Fede

Leon and Ramiro Castro de la Mata, eds., Pasta Basica de C

Lima, Peru: Centro de Informacion y educacion para la preven

abuso de drogas, 1990, pp. 301-321. For a similar, more rece

thorough discussion of this issue, see Stephen E. Flyn

Transnational Drug Challenge and the New World Order, Wash

DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993; and 

Lloyd Griffith, Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty 

Siege, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press

29. Griffith, p. 1.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid. Also see William O. Walker III, “The Foreign N

Policy of the United States since 1980: An End to the War on 

International Journal of Narco-Diplomacy, Winter 1993-94, p. 

32. White House, January 1992, p. 4.

33. Clausewitz, pp. 92-93, 596. Also see Michael Howar

Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy,” in The Causes of War, L

Temple-Smith, 1981, pp. 109-110.

34. Frank Kitson, War as a Whole, London: Faber and Faber, 

35. The White House, 1988-99.

35
36. Ibid.

37. Author interview with Ambassador Curtis Kamman at C

Bks, PA, on December 7, 2000. Also note statements made by t

Phil Chicola, Director of Andean Affairs, U.S. Department o

General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC (Ret.); the Hon. Juan E

Orduz, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of Colombia in the 

States; General Barry McCaffrey, USA (Ret.); and the Hon. E

Pizano, Special Assistant to the President of Colombia at the con

“Implementing Plan Colombia: Strategic and Operational Impe

for the U.S. Military,” co-sponsored by The Dante B. 

North-South Center of the University of Miami and the S

Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College in Miami, 

February 1-2, 2001. Hereafter cited as NS/SSI Conference.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. “Hobbesian Trinity” is a term coined by Colonel Jos

Nunez, Fighting the Hobbesian Trinity in Colombia: A New Stra

Peace, Carlisle Bks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001. As ex

of the “spillover” problem generated by the Hobbesian Trin

Editorial, “Contain Colombia’s Troubles,” New York Times, Janu

2001; Amy Taxin, “Colombia Rebels, Paramilitary Battle in Ec

Reuters, January 15, 2001; Juan O. Tamayo, “Colombia-Venezu

on Brink of Crisis,” Miami Herald, December 1, 2000; Associate

“Panama Border Teachers Cancel Classes, Cite Death Th

November 24, 2000; and Larry Rohter, “Latest Battleground i

Drug War,” New York Times, October 30, 2000.

42. National Drug Control Strategy: 2000 Annual 

Washington, DC: Office of National Drug Control Policy, 20

133-134; and Statistical Abstract of the United States: The N

Data Book, Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau, 1999, p. 109

43. Michael Shifter, Toward Greater Peace and Secu

Colombia, New York: Council on Foreign Relations a

Inter-American Dialogue, 2000, pp. viii, 1-2, 18, hereafter cited 

Report. Also see Richard Downes, Landpower and Ambiguous W

The Challenge of Colombia in the 21st Century, Carlisle B

Strategic Studies Institute, 1999, p. 1. For an Argentine view 

situation, see Mariano Cesar Bartolome, “Violencia pol

fragmentacion estatal en Colombia,” in Una Mirada Argentin

36
Colombia, Manuel Gonzalez, Mariano Bartolome, and Mario 

eds., Buenos Aires: Instituto de investigacion sobre seguridad y 

organizado, 1999, pp. 59-109. Also note NS/SSI Conference.

44. Ibid., NS/SSI Conference.

45. Ibid.; also see Michael Shifter, “Un primer paso,”Foreign 

en Espanol, Primavera 2001, pp. 11-15.

46. Sun Tzu, p. 73.

47. Howard.

48. Ambassador David C. Miller, Jr., speech to the Americ

Association at the International Club, Washington, DC, Febru

1994. Also see Clausewitz, pp. 88-89.

49. Ibid.

50. NS/SSI Conference.

51. See George F. Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” 

Affairs, July 1947, pp. 566-582.

52. Clausewitz, p. 596.

53. NS/SSI Conference; and Miller.

54. New York Times, September 7, 2000, p. 1.

55. NS/SSI Conference.

56. Leslie H. Gelb, “Quelling the Teacup Wars,” Foreign 

November-December 1994, p. 5. Also, this argument was elabo

Max G. Manwaring and Edwin G. Corr, “Defense and Offense i

and Stability Operations,” in Beyond Declaring Victory and 

Home: The Challenges of Peace and Stability Operations, M

Manwaring and Anthony James Joes, eds., Westport, CN: P

2000, pp. 26-27.

57. This argument was made in Manwaring and Joes, pp. 2

58. Clausewitz.

59. Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II, Asymmetry a

Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Co

Carlisle Bks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001, pp. 5-6.

37
60. Ralph Peters, “Constant Conflict,”Parameters, Summer 

10. 

61. For elaboration of this idea, see David Last, “Winn

Savage Wars of Peace: What the Manwaring Paradigm Tells Us,

Savage Wars of Peace, John T. Fishel, ed., Boulder, CO: Westview

pp. 211-239.

62. For three excellent discussions regarding this topic, see 

Gray, “Deterrence and the Nature of Strategy,” pp. 17-26; Ro

Dorff and Joseph R. Cerami, “Deterrence and Competitive Strat

New Look at an Old Concept,” pp. 109-123; and Daniel S. Gress

“Terrorism in the 21st Century: Reassessing the Emerging Thr

Deterrence in the 21st Century, Max G. Manwaring, ed., London

Cass, 2000, pp. 72-97.

63. Jean Larteguy, The Centurians, New York: E.P. Dutton

pp. 181-182.

64. CFA Report, p. 1.

65. Passage, pp. 21-23.

66. NS/SSI Conference.

67. Clausewitz, p. 88.

68. Sun Tzu, p. 88.

69. B. H. Liddell Hart makes a convincing argument w

reminds us that “the object of war is to attain a better peace—

only from your one point of view. Hence it is essential to cond

with constant regard to the peace you desire.” See Strategy, Ne

Signet, 1967, p. 353.

70. Passage, pp. 14-16.

71. These imperatives are derived from General Sir Frank 

See Kitson; and Low Intensity Operations, Harrisburg, PA: St

Books, 1971.

72. Author interview with General Charles E. Wilhelm, 

(Ret.), Reston, VA, February 9, 2001. Also note NS/SSI Confere

73. “The Corr Report: Recommendations and Findin

Expanding Andean Agricultural Production and Trade,” for C

Hills, U.S. Trade Representative from Ambassador Edwin G

38
leader of the Inter-Agency Team on Andean Trade In

Agricultural Task Force, January 31, 1991.

74. Ibid.

75. Passage, p. 20.

76. Ibid.

77. Clausewitz.

78. Author interviews with General John R. Galvin, USA 

Boston, MA, August 6, 1997; Lieutenant General William G. Car

USA (Ret.), Washington, DC, November 30, 1998 and March 2

General Anthony Zinni, USMC, Commander-in-Chief, United 

Central Command, Washington, DC, June 2, 1999 and October 

and General Charles E. Wilhelm. Also note NS/SSI Conference

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid.

82. For cogent discussions of this issue see Peter Lupsha, “Gr

Phenomenon: New Threats and Policy Dilemmas,” paper prese

the High Intensity Crime/Low Intensity Conflict Conference, C

IL, September 27-30, 1992; William J. Olson, “International Or

Crime: The Silent Threat to Sovereignty,” Fletcher F

Summer/Fall 1997, pp. 65-80; and David C. Jordan, Drug Politic

Money and Democracies, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma 

1999. 

83. This research is based on more than 300 interviews condu

the author and Colonel Alfred W. Baker, USA. The indi

interviewed were civilian and military experts directly involve

post-World War II intranational conflicts. The interview

conducted in the United States, Europe, the Middle East, an

America over the period 1984-92. Since 1992, more than 80 ad

interviews were conducted by the author with government mi

former government ministers, military officers, busine

journalists, and former “guerrillas.” The resultant paradigm, or

called SSI-1 and SSI-2, is called the SWORD Model. The S

Papers, although long out of print, are archived in their entire

private research organization, the National Security Arch

Washington, DC. The first public publication of the paradigm 

specifically with “insurgencies”—in Max G. Manwaring and J

39
Fishel, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Towards a New An

Approach,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, Winter 1992, pp. 2

That work and the original SWORD effort have been subse

validated in various books and articles reviewed by Ernest Evan

Savage Wars of Peace,” World Affairs, Fall 2000, pp. 90-94. Mo

the author was the rapporteur at the first and 

Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Reviews held at Carlisle Barra

on May 19-23, 1996, and April 13-17, 1997, respectively. The 

publication of most of the results of those conferences may be f

Parameters, Winter 1998-99, pp. 28-38.

40
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

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Author

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