LOGISTICS TRANSFORMATION― RESTARTING A STALLED PROCESS

Lieutenant Colonel Victor Maccagnan, Jr.

January 2005

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PREFACE

 The U.S. Army War College provides an excellent environment for selected military officers and 

government civilians to reflect and use their career experience to explore a wide range of strategic 

issues. To assure that the research developed by Army War College students is available to Army and 

Department of Defense leaders, the Strategic Studies Institute publishes selected papers in its Carlisle 

Papers in Security Strategy Series.

 Lieutenant Colonel Victor Maccagnan, of the AWC class of 2004 and the author of this paper, 

contends that Army logistics transformation has not happened to the extent needed in strategic, 

operational, and tactical environments. He discusses what must be changed and how to reenergize 

logistics transformation to get results now.

 The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this Carlisle Paper as a contribution to the debate 

on Army Transformation.

 ANTULIO J. ECHEVARRIA II

 Director of Research

 Strategic Studies Institute 

v

ABSTRACT

 The Army has been pursuing a process of transformational change for over a decade. It is readily 

apparent that the amount of actual transformation in the Army as a whole has been extremely limited 

in size and scope. The promise of radical and revolutionary change has yet to take effect across the 

force. This reality is nowhere more evident than it is in logistics. Logistics transformation has simply 

not happened to the degree necessitated by today’s strategic, operational, and tactical environment. It 

follows that, if logistics transformation has not occurred or is stalled, the rest of the force will not be 

able to transform successfully. This paper will address the following: 

 • Why there must be a logistics transformation. 

 • Why transformation has not yet been realized for logistics concepts, doctrine, processes, systems, 

organizational structures, and architecture; what has gone wrong, and how to prevent it from 

occurring again.

 • What must be changed to achieve a successful transformation of logistics, the priority of change, 

and who must change it. 

 • What to do logistically to become a campaign quality Army with a joint and expeditionary 

mindset.

 • How to reenergize logistics transformation to get results and benefits now.

1

LOGISTICS TRANSFORMATION―

RESTARTING A STALLED PROCESS

THE CURRENT STATE OF 

TRANSFORMATIONAL CHANGE

Transformation in the First Decade.

 The U.S. Army has been actively pursuing 

a process of change since the conclusion of 

Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM 

and the end of the Cold War. This change process, 

initially described by the phrase “Revolution 

in Military Affairs” (RMA) is known today by 

the term “transformation.” In the past decade, 

numerous papers, countless articles, and even 

entire books have been dedicated to the analysis 

of the Army’s efforts to transform itself into a new 

type of force. The quantity of briefings, slides, and 

presentational products on transformation is even 

greater and goes beyond any calculable number. 

The range of topics addressed in these writings 

and briefings has spanned almost every military 

subject area and is truly staggering.

 It is readily apparent, however, that the 

amount of actual transformational change that 

has occurred in the Army as a whole is much 

more limited in size and scope than the number 

of words that have been penned and slides that 

have been briefed. While indeed there have been 

some significant transformational breakthroughs 

as a result of experimentation and study of how 

the U.S. Army will wage war in the future, by and 

large the pervasive sweeping promise of radical 

and revolutionary change has yet to take effect 

across the force. Furthermore, the pace of the 

limited transformational change that has occurred 

has been slow and ponderous; a fact that has at 

times placed the Department of Defense (DoD) 

and the U.S. Army at odds in both public and 

private forums.1

 The issue of transformation is further complicated by the fact that the United States is currently 

a nation at war; prosecuting a fight against 

terrorism on a global basis. The Army has fully 

transitioned to a wartime footing. It is more 

committed on all levels and at all echelons than it 

has been since Vietnam. Accordingly, the Army’s 

charter has changed. Army Chief of Staff General 

Peter J. Schoomaker clearly outlined the Army’s 

focus in a January 2004 document entitled, The 

Way Ahead.

. . . the most salient aspect of the current security 

environment is that we are a Nation and an Army 

at war―a war unlike any we have experienced in 

our history . . . This war is being conducted across 

the globe and across the full range of military 

operations against rogue states and terrorists 

who cannot be deterred, but nevertheless must 

be prevented from striking against the United 

States, our allies, and our interests . . . Our Army 

will retain the best of its current capabilities and 

attributes while developing others that increase 

relevance and readiness to respond to the current 

and projected strategic operational environments.2

 This situation affects the process of 

transformation in dramatic ways. The question 

of transformation now becomes one of priority, 

balance, necessity, and speed. The priority is 

clear; winning the war obviously comes first.3 The 

balance may seem less clear but is defined when 

the necessity of transformation is examined. To 

win this war and future wars, it is necessary to 

continue to transform the Army. Balancing the 

fight with continued transformation is simply 

required. The last factor then becomes speed. 

Because we need transformed forces to win today 

and tomorrow, we must generate speed and step 

up the pace to transform the Army now.

A Report Card on Logistics Transformation.

 The dual realities of the limited amount of 

transformational change that has taken place, 

coupled with the relatively slow speed of the 

change that has occurred, are problematic. These 

realities are nowhere more evident than in the 

world of logistics and combat service support. 

The transformation of logistics, or the Revolution 

in Military Logistics as it was initially called, has 

simply not happened to the degree necessitated 

by today’s strategic, operational, and tactical 

environment. Every Chief of Staff of the Army 

(CSA), every Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

(CJCS), and both Secretaries of Defense in the last 
2

15 years have stated unequivocally that a true 

transformation of the U.S. Army cannot occur 

without significantly changing the way we conduct 

logistics. The premise is that logistics is clearly the 

one area that absolutely must be transformed if the 

Army’s vision of the future force is to be realized.4

It follows that if logistics transformation has not 

occurred or is stalled, the rest of the force will not 

be able to transform successfully.

 Some observers may be tempted to argue that 

the Army executes logistics today in exactly the 

same manner as it has since World War II when 

warfare first became fully mechanized. This 

assertion is somewhat oversimplified and not 

entirely accurate in terms of the sophistication 

and development of current day combat service 

support operations. At the same time, however, it 

is true that the basic principles and a good bit of 

the doctrinal underpinnings of logistics support 

are much the same as they were 60 years ago. 

What is clearly indisputable is that since 1991, the 

official beginning of the Army’s transformational 

journey, very little has changed in the way that the 

U.S. Army executes combat service support.

 Evidence to support this conclusion is seen 

daily in motor pools at Army posts worldwide, 

witnessed in training exercises and Combined 

Training Center rotations, and confirmed in the 

official and unofficial discussions of combat arms, 

combat support, and combat service support 

leaders in units at all levels across the force. Most 

recently, the Army’s lack of transformational 

change in logistics has been on active display in 

the field; in the mountains of Afghanistan and the 

deserts of Iraq. Verification in the form of initial 

observations from Operations NOBLE EAGLE, 

ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), and IRAQI 

FREEDOM (OIF) all draw similar conclusions 

concerning the shortcomings of logistics and the 

inability to deliver what has been planned and 

promised.5 The Army is supporting the execution 

of combat and stability operations today with 

untransformed, or at best semitransformed, 

logistics forces, systems, and processes. 

 More troubling is the realization that the 

depth of involvement in current operations and 

preparations for follow-on and future operations 

in the Global War on Terror may very likely 

perpetuate the status quo; a nontransformed 

logistics force that is locked to the current methods 

of legacy logistics operations and unable to generate 

the energy or actions required to transform. The 

risk that this poses to the continued success of 

the war on terror in the near term is significant. 

The risk that this poses to the continued relevance 

and readiness of the Army in the next 20 years is 

immeasurable.6

Recovering the Stall.

 The failure to realize transformational effects 

in Army logistics does not mean that logistics 

operations are not happening or that soldiers are 

not receiving support. This is far from the case. 

Many talented, courageous, and dedicated combat 

service support soldiers and civilians in countless 

logistics units work tirelessly to ensure that the 

entire Army is successfully sustained on a constant 

basis. What it does mean is that full transformation 

of the Army will not occur until we find a way 

to jump-start a stalled logistics transformation 

process, achieve the proper balance with current 

operational requirements, and generate speed 

of execution to get measurable results in the 

very near-term that contribute to our priority of 

winning the war on terror and any future wars 

that the nation must prosecute. The failure to 

realize transformational effects in Army logistics 

also does not mean that the Army’s logisticians 

and leadership should be faulted en masse for 

the lack of change. Blame is not the point, nor is 

it the goal of this paper; answering the following 

questions is:

 • Why must there be a transformation in 

logistics at all? 

 • Why has the promise of transformation not 

yet been realized for combat service support 

concepts, doctrine, processes, systems, 

organizational structures, and architecture; 

what has gone wrong and how do we 

prevent it from occurring again?

 • What must be changed to achieve a 

successful transformation of logistics, what 
3

is our priority of change, and who must 

change it? 

 • What must we do logistically to meet the 

goal of becoming a campaign quality Army 

with a joint and expeditionary mindset?

 • How do we reenergize logistics transformation, and most importantly, how do 

we do it to get results and benefits now?

WHY THE NECESSITY TO TRANSFORM 

ARMY LOGISTICS

Arguments Against Change.

 Most people, both in the general public and 

among military professionals, would agree that the 

Army clearly is not failing to win the nation’s battles 

and wars. Reflecting on the arguably impressive 

successes of the Army in the recent past, this issue 

of a lack of transformational change in logistics may 

seem trivial. It is easy to infer from these successes 

that the Army must have it about right, so why all 

the fuss. Proponents of this thinking may tend to 

believe that if transformational change is slow or 

has not occurred at all, it may be because it does 

not need to happen.

 Other arguments against transformational 

change are more complex and indeed more subtle. 

They have to do with a degree of institutional 

reluctance to change that is based on several 

factors. Among these are a comfort level with 

what soldiers have now in terms of organization, 

doctrine, and equipment, and the fact that they 

understand how to make it work with a relative 

degree of success in most circumstances. In place 

of wholesale change to what works, many will 

substitute improvements at the margins. There is 

also a very large degree of skepticism and mistrust 

that goes along with things new and unproven. 

Our military history as an Army is littered with 

both anecdotal and actual examples of “great” 

ideas, rapidly force-fed to the field, that did not 

work as well as advertised or did not work at all. 

Finally, there is a very real and sincere concern 

about the risk that we take as an Army if we get it 

wrong because ultimately we pay for our mistakes 

and missteps with soldiers’ lives during wartime 

operations.7

 Debunking the first argument is relatively 

easy when a close examination of the Army’s 

past and present campaigns is made with an eye 

towards objectively measuring logistics success 

against stated principles, fundamentals, and 

tenets of combat service support. Analyzing 

overall logistics performance in this manner may 

result in the conclusion that we were either more 

lucky than good in our planning, preparation, and 

execution of support or that we substituted brute 

force and improvised on-the-fly solutions to our 

support challenges that masked inefficiencies and 

ineffectiveness. The key place to look is in initial 

observations, after action reviews, and lessons 

learned that are generated routinely concurrent 

with and subsequent to missions and operations. 

The truth of our performance and the quality of 

our force is usually easily discernable from this 

type of analysis.

 The second series of arguments are more 

difficult to counter. Former Chief of Staff of the 

Army retired General Gordon R. Sullivan, the senior 

leader who launched the Army’s transformation 

efforts, likens these arguments to traps that are 

hard to see and even harder to extricate oneself 

from. Sullivan warns against not recognizing the 

need for change because you are doing things 

too well, playing conservatively so as not to lose 

rather than playing to win, and mitigating risk by 

simply improving an old paradigm.8 All of these 

excuses or justifications against change can and 

must be overcome by dispassionately focusing on 

the environment and the circumstances that frame 

current and future reality. 

To Better Serve Our Nation.

 The Army’s leadership has correctly recognized 

that the strategic environment and current operational requirements mean that the Army must 

be ready now to address a whole different set of 

variables than previously anticipated. General 

Schoomaker writes, 

. . . the Army must be prepared for operations of 

a type, tempo, pace, and duration different from 

those we have structured our forces and systems 

to achieve. Some assumptions made and processes 

developed for a Cold War Army or an Army with 
4

a “window of opportunity” to transform itself, 

while valid at the time, are no longer relevant to 

the current security environment.9

 Care is required so as not to misconstrue the 

meaning or the mandate of these words. The Chief 

of Staff of the Army is absolutely decreeing that 

transformation continue. The invalid assumptions 

apply to the relevance of the previous and current 

force to today’s security environment and the time 

thought to be available to transform it. General 

Schoomaker is very direct in his guidance when he 

says, “We [the Army] must immediately begin the 

process of reexamining and challenging our most 

basic institutional assumptions, organizational 

structures, paradigms, policies, and procedures to 

better serve our Nation.”10

 Transformational change of the U.S. Army is 

inevitable; moreover, it is required. It is inevitable 

because the nature of the world today demands a 

different force to meet and defeat the new types, 

kinds, and quantities of enemies that threaten 

our strategic national interests and endanger our 

national survival. It is required, not only because 

DoD and the senior leadership of the Army have 

ordered it so, but because without this change, 

the Army runs the very real risk of becoming 

irrelevant and unready to fulfill its constitutional 

requirements to fight and win the nation’s wars.

WHY HAS LOGISTICS TRANSFORMATION 

STALLED?

The Developmental Path of Logistics 

Transformation―1991 to 2004.

 To understand fully why and how logistics 

transformation has stalled, it is necessary to take a 

closer look at its developmental path to date. The 

transformation of logistics had a difficult birthing 

process. When General Sullivan set the course for 

transformation in the early 1990s, it actually took 

the Army’s logisticians until the summer of 1998 

to generate significant Army-wide discussion and 

a specific focus on a pending revolution in military 

logistics; a full 7 years from transformation’s initial 

inception.11

 The Army had not codified the overall 

transformation effort of the force until March 

1994 when it released a message labeling the 

Army of the future as Force XXI and announcing 

the establishment of an experimental force 

(EXFOR) to further develop and experiment 

with transformational concepts.12 The Army’s 

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 

was designated as the overall lead for managing 

transformation with the Combined Arms Service 

Support Command (CASCOM) as its executive 

agent for logistics transformation.

Army Vision 2010 was published 3 years later in 

1997. This was directly linked to the CJCS vision 

statement, Joint Vision 2010, published in July 1996 

that outlined the Chairman’s thoughts on how the 

U.S. military needed to prepare to meet, what were 

at that point, unspecified and unclear challenges 

and adversaries in 2010. Joint Vision 2010 and Army 

Vision 2010 introduced a new operational concept, 

“Focused Logistics.” Focused Logistics was named 

as one of the key tenets required for the military 

to achieve a level of full spectrum dominance over 

any and all adversaries. Army Vision 2010 defined 

Focused Logistics as “the fusion of information, 

logistics, and transportation technologies to 

provide rapid crisis response, to track and shift 

assets even while en route, and to deliver tailored 

logistics packages and sustainment directly at 

the strategic, operational, and tactical level of 

operations.” At that time the Army listed eight 

concepts, five enablers, and four technologies that 

it would pursue in the development of Focused 

Logistics.13

 In March 1997, the Army’s logistics community, 

through CASCOM, participated in the Force XXI 

Advanced Warfighting Experiment at the National 

Training Center. This exercise, preparations for 

which had been ongoing for almost 2 years, was the 

first major integrated experimentation involving 

new doctrine, concepts, and technologies designed 

to leverage information age technologies. Logistics 

concepts, however, were not rigorously tested, 

and the entire event was given very little publicity 

in the Army’s logistic community. It is evident 

from reading the insight reports of the experiment 

that most of the focus was on maneuver-oriented 

information superiority.14 It is also likely that none 

of the designated logistics concepts in Army Vision 

2010 were matured to the point that they could 
5

actually be tested in the field, much less fielded to 

the force as a mechanism to achieve the promise of 

Focused Logistics.

 Later that same year the Joint Staff Logistics 

Directorate (J4) published a logistics volume as 

an adjunct to Joint Vision 2010 entitled Focused 

Logistics, the Joint Logistics Roadmap to Joint Vision 

2010. This document was described as an action 

plan for the identification and integration of joint 

logistics issues and initiatives.15 A key part of this 

plan was the identification of six tenets or areas of 

focus designated as the framework for the logistics 

template required to support joint warfighting. 

These tenets included: Joint Theater Logistics 

Command and Control, Joint Deployment 

and Rapid Distribution, Information Fusion, 

Multinational Logistics, Joint Health Services 

Support, and Agile Infrastructure. The stated goal 

was to ensure a systematic, relational approach to 

developing new capabilities that enhanced these 

areas.16 The roadmap qualities of this document, 

however, arguably were limited in terms of 

actually being useful for navigating the route to 

Focused Logistics. Concepts such as technological 

innovation and leveraging key enablers to achieve 

information superiority were referred to loosely 

as something desired, but clearly this document 

served as more of a general direction of effort 

than a series of steps to be followed to achieve the 

endstate described.

 In 1998, the Army’s EXFOR, the 4th Infantry 

Division, was reorganized to the structure that 

it retains today; commonly known as the Force 

XXI Division model. Much work was done in 

redesigning the logistics elements of the Division’s 

Infantry, Armor, and Engineer Battalions, and the 

organizational structure of the Forward Support 

Battalions, the Main Support Battalion, and 

the Division Support Command headquarters. 

Concurrent with the final redesign of the Division 

was CASCOM’s development and introduction 

of new logistics doctrine and the expansion of the 

initial Focused Logistics combat service support 

concepts from the original 8 to 22. In conjunction 

with this, CASCOM identified a total of 18 materiel 

enabling and experimental systems comprising 

both new vehicles and equipment and new 

technologies. Finally, CASCOM developed a series 

of tactics, techniques, and procedures designed 

specifically to support the digitally enabled 

transformed force over a dispersed battlefield.

 In March 1999, these concepts, procedures, and 

enabling systems were tested and evaluated in the 

field during a logistics focused National Training 

Center rotation. Significant observations, insights, 

and conclusions from this training rotation and 

corresponding data collection effort included a 

general validation of the divisional logistics force 

structure with some relatively minor force redesign 

requirements and extensive soldier level feedback 

on the utility of the enabling and experimental 

logistics systems. The rotation also showed that 

the future logistics doctrine and procedures being 

developed needed some refinement in the areas of 

direct support relationships, movement control, 

and security.17

 The Army’s vision on Focused Logistics 

was refined as a product of the doctrine and 

concept development, the training, and the 

experimentation conducted in 1998 and 1999. This 

period produced the most significant progress in 

terms of theoretical work and practical application 

of logistics transformation up to that point. 

The Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics 

(Army G4), the CASCOM Commander, and the 

Commander of Army Materiel Command (AMC) 

collaborated on an article for Army Logistician

magazine in 1999 that clearly laid out the way 

ahead for logistics transformational change. For 

the first time, the Army’s three senior logisticians 

addressed the logistics community in a unified 

voice in a force-wide manner. Companion articles 

in the same issue of the magazine were written 

by the CSA and the Commander of the Defense 

Logistics Agency (DLA).

 These articles identified the Army’s focus areas 

for the next 10 years of transformation; designated 

as the first wave of the stated revolution in military 

logistics. The Army’s logistics transformation 

plan would focus on exploiting improvements 

in automation, communications and business 

practices, reshaping command and control 

relationships to provide better unity of command, 

and purchasing distribution technologies 
6

that facilitated rapid throughput and followon sustainment. The second wave of logistics 

transformation, from 2010 and beyond, would 

focus on maximizing emerging technologies that 

could be utilized to lighten support requirements, 

to enable them to be projected faster, and to reduce 

the overall demand for logistics as a whole.18 The 

Army also named its tenets needed to frame the 

efforts in the achievement of Focused Logistics: 

a seamless logistics system, distribution based 

logistics, total asset visibility, agile infrastructure, 

rapid force projection, and maintaining an 

adequate logistics footprint.19

 It is important to note that the Army did not 

completely mirror the Joint concept of Focused 

Logistics as defined by the six Joint tenets of 

transformational framework; neglecting to 

include Joint Theater Logistics Command and 

Control, Multinational Logistics, and Joint Health 

Services Support. This dichotomy is significant 

because it reveals that the alignment of priorities 

at the Army level and the Joint level were not in 

synch. The result was that the unity of effort, as 

well as perhaps the priority of resources and level 

of visibility, in making Focused Logistics a reality 

was not shared across service and joint staffs. 

 Then the CSA (retired General Eric K. Shinseki) 

dramatically changed the direction and the 

context of transformation in the first quarter of 

fiscal year 2000. The new direction steered away 

from a transformational redesign of the heavy 

force embodied in the EXFOR and Force XXI. The 

Army’s new focus would be on the development 

of an interim force that had the qualities of both 

heavy and light formations and on a force to 

follow the interim one that had a yet to be defined 

organizational construct. The Interim Brigade 

Combat Team, renamed as the Stryker Brigade, 

was this first force. The follow-on force was 

termed the Objective Force.20 The new context was 

measured in speed and weight; the force had to 

deploy more rapidly and it had to have a much 

decreased logistics footprint. Almost concurrent 

with this shift in Army transformation, the CJCS 

published an update to Joint Vision 2010 entitled 

Joint Vision 2020. Initially, the basic concepts of 

the Army’s vision of Focused Logistics, the focus 

areas in the first and second waves and the six 

tenets of logistics transformation, did not officially 

change with this new guidance. However, their 

application to this new direction and construct did 

differ from how they were previously applied.

 A significant adjustment was made by the Army 

to the basic premise of logistics transformation 

with regard to these interim and objective forces. 

Logistics transformed was now seen as logistics 

marked by a sharply reduced footprint forward; 

the intent of which was to make deployment more 

rapid by requiring fewer units to be projected 

into an area of operation. This smaller logistics 

footprint was to be enabled by a concept called 

“reach back” logistics or “Combat Service Support 

or CSS reach.”21 It has been posited that this term, 

while new to the logistics transformation lexicon, 

was actually not a new concept; but rather a 

synthesis of several existing and emerging logistics 

transformation initiatives such as split-based 

operations, velocity management, information 

superiority, and distribution management.22

Nonetheless, it took the Army logistics community 

nearly 3 years to develop a published definition of 

the term “CSS reach” and to redefine Army logistics 

transformation for the field.23 Additionally, as 

time passed, the terms of reference for Focused 

Logistics as described in 1999 faded and were 

subsumed by the a more joint oriented vision as 

described in Joint Vision 2020.

 From 2000 to 2002, work at CASCOM shifted 

away from the EXFOR and FORCE XXI, now in 

its final stages of fielding and preparation for its 

capstone exercise, and towards development of 

combat service support strategies and concepts 

for the Stryker Brigades. This change of direction 

caused CASCOM to go back to drawing board; as 

maneuver doctrine and organizational structure 

were reworked from the ground up. Transformation 

of combat service support focused on a redesign of 

the existing Forward Support Battalion as a Brigade 

Support Battalion to include companies organized 

along the lines of the Force XXI model Forward 

Support Company. In addition, figuring out how 

to actually leverage “CSS reach” was another 

key focus area. These logistics organizations and 

these new concepts were tested in the field at 
7

the National Training Center in 2002 and were, 

for the most part, found wanting. Significant 

challenges were noted in providing sustainment 

for the brigade. Comments, not unlike those made 

previously in 1999 when the first generation of 

transformed logistics was tested in the Force XXI 

experiments, centered on shortcomings in timely 

delivery of supplies, logistics connectivity, asset 

visibility, and information fusion.24

 In August 2002, the Joint Staff J4 published a 

revised Focused Logistics Campaign Plan; an update 

of the previous Joint campaign plan designed 

to correspond with Joint Vision 2020. The plan 

redefines Focused Logistics as, “. . . doing logistics 

right . . . getting the right personnel, equipment, 

supplies, and support in the right place, at the 

right time and in the right quantities across the full 

spectrum of military operations.”25 This document 

also introduced two new initiatives, entitled 

“Logistics Transformation” and “Future Logistics 

Enterprise,” designed to establish a more robust 

foundation for achieving Focused Logistics. The 

first initiative was aimed at improving real-time 

logistics situational awareness by optimizing 

business practices, developing a data system that 

provides interoperable and actionable logistics 

information, and enhancing responsiveness of 

support operations to the warfighter.26 The second 

initiative was described as a “. . . mid-term vision 

(2005-10) to accelerate logistics improvement, 

enhance support to the warfighter, and align 

logistics processes with the operational demands 

of the 21st century.” 27 This initiative specified the 

direction that Joint logistics would explore in the 

future; focusing on improvements in maintenance, 

life cycle management of new systems, distribution 

management, and synchronization of deployment 

and sustainment.28

 The Army did not publish a corresponding 

document. However, some of the concepts 

contained in the updated Joint campaign plan 

were concepts previously described in CASCOM 

work. These included: Customer Wait Time 

(CWT), a metric first described by the Army in 

1999 to assess the effectiveness of the supply chain 

by measuring the time between ordering and 

receipt in the hands of the customer unit; Time 

Definite Delivery (TDD), a concept dating from 

1998 whose goal is to assure that requests filled 

within a specific time frame for a specified region 

are actually delivered within that stated period; 

Total Asset Visibility (TAV), a systemic approach 

to give users visibility of materiel requisitions and 

the corresponding commodities enroute back to 

them at any point; and the development of a WebBased Shared-Data Environment to enable real 

time logistics situational awareness.29

 The Army’s latest vision of logistics 

transformation is contained in the U.S. Army 

Transformation Roadmap, published in January 

2004. This document is useful in the sense that 

it does describe how the Army sees Focused 

Logistics contributing in the context of current 

Joint Operating Concepts. Nevertheless, this 

newest round of logistics transformation writings 

still displays some of the previous characteristics 

of concept and doctrine development we have 

seen over the years. It is still broad in scope and 

again describes what we want but not necessarily 

how we get there. The most recent published 

Joint view remains the Focused Logistics Campaign 

Plan from 2002. It is difficult to trace any linkages 

between these two documents. Again, it is safe to 

assume that the authors of the Army Transformation 

Roadmap read the joint work, but the nesting 

expected between documents entitled “roadmap” 

and “campaign plan” is just not there. They 

are stand alone documents that are not clearly 

synchronized.

 The latest DoD vision of logistics 

transformation, dated April 2003, is described 

in the Transformation Planning Guidance. It too is 

broad in scope, but it has recently been further 

refined by the DoD Office of Force Transformation 

in a new initiative entitled “Sense and Respond 

Logistics.” This initiative describes a new view 

and direction for logistics transformation efforts. 

Described as, “. . . a system interwoven with 

network-centric operations and based upon 

highly adaptive, self-synchronizing, dynamically 

reconfigurable demand and support networks 

that anticipate and stimulate actions to enhance 

capability or mitigate support shortfalls . . .”, 

it borrows heavily from the latest in successful 
8

commercial business thinking and logistics 

management models. 30

 This is where logistics transformation has 

been and where it stands now; in terms of efforts, 

experimentation, development of doctrine, concepts, and organizations, and the Army, Joint, and 

DoD visions of what transformation means. This 

chronology, while impressive in its length, is, in 

fact, an indictment of itself. It clearly illustrates 

the level of ineffectiveness the Army has had in 

achieving any lasting or all-encompassing success 

in changing the way combat service support is 

conducted. There has been much effort put forth 

by many well-respected and visionary leaders. 

However, that vision of change, the means to 

empower it, and, most importantly, the collective 

buy in, ownership, and commitment from 

logisticians and operators across the force to make 

it a reality that has not taken root. After more than a 

decade of transforming, it is necessary to ask what 

the product is so far, where has the value added 

been, how much is left to do, and when will that 

be. The job is well-started, but not completed.

The Reality Today―Recent Observations that 

Matter.

 The true status of Army logistics transformation 

can only be determined by performance in the 

field. No other backdrop is as relevant, important, 

or appropriate. Other venues are simply academic; 

no matter what attempts are made to replicate 

the real thing, warfare and combat cannot be 

simulated. Both OEF and OIF serve as excellent 

yardsticks against which logistics transformation 

can be measured. These operations are helpful 

especially in assessing the state of logistics 

transformation because they represent a level and 

scale of warfare that is likely to mark U.S. military 

operations in both the present and future strategic 

environment.

 OEF is an illuminating case study on 

transformational logistics for several reasons. In the 

first place, it was conducted in an extremely harsh 

and austere environment that was exceedingly 

difficult to reach. This factor, more than any other, 

stretched logistics planning and execution to 

its limits and provided a significant test of how 

much transformation of logistics had occurred. 

Specifically, OEF provided a venue to examine 

the transformational goal of reducing the logistics 

footprint and executing the concept of “CSS 

reach.” In an operation such as this where access 

was difficult, existing infrastructure was relatively 

nonexistent, and geographic and environmental 

conditions were as daunting as they could possibly 

be, this concept was one of necessity rather than 

just choice. In addition, OEF highlighted some 

issues with regard to combat service support force 

structure, modularity, deployability, capability, 

and force balance that must not be overlooked.

 A key observation in The U.S. Army’s Initial 

Impressions of Operations Enduring Freedom and 

Noble Eagle, published in August 2003, was that 

projecting and sustaining a force in a region such as 

Afghanistan placed a great burden on logisticians 

to conduct successful sustainment operations. 

This is no great surprise to anyone. However, the 

report concludes that, “a better system needs to 

be devised to direct and coordinate the resources 

and forces necessary for this new kind of war.”31

This comment does not speak very favorably of 

our progress in transforming our logistics force or 

concepts.

 The report identifies several problematic 

issues. Key among them was the demonstrated 

paucity of reliable long distance communications 

equipment to enable the force.32 This observation, 

relevant to all Army forces participating in OEF 

and especially within the area of operations 

in Afghanistan, meant that the Army logistics 

systems at the unit level could not communicate 

in a timely or efficient manner to execute the most 

basic of logistics tasks; that of requesting repair 

parts and resupply by an electronic means. This is a 

glaring problem made more troublesome because 

it is not a new or surprising one. Transformation 

of logistics clearly has not solved this issue.

 Other observations from OEF noted a lack 

of modularity in logistics force structure which 

restricted the ability to flow a right-sized force 

tailored to the support mission. Logistics units had 

to be deployed in their entirety or massive internal 

reorganizations had to be conducted during the 
9

deployment phase of operations to get the right 

capabilities at the right place at the right time.33

Modularity is a key quality of the transformed 

force. It is critical to enable “CSS reach” operations, 

limit the logistics footprint forward, and to reduce 

unnecessary requirements for limited strategic lift. 

Modularity in logistics force structure, a key tenet 

of Focused Logistics, has not yet occurred.

 A related issue was the challenge of resourcing 

several particular types of logistics units that were 

both high in demand and low in density. 34 This 

problem speaks directly to a necessary reshaping 

of the logistics force structure from its Cold War 

legacy where host nation and allied assets could 

be relied on to provide certain service and support 

functions. Complicating this challenge further is 

that the majority of the Army’s echelon above 

Division and echelon above Corps logistics force 

structure, and many of these are high demand, low 

density units, are in the reserve component. The 

reserve mobilization and call-up question, which 

is bounded by both political and time constraints, 

effectively prevents a rapid deployment of a right 

sized and mission tailored logistics force. 

 The deployment process itself was reinvented 

for OEF; specifically the method and mechanisms 

used to determine, source, prioritize, and flow 

forces into theater. This precipitated a large degree 

of stress on both logistics units and planners as 

combat service support forces were piecemealed 

into theater as a result of new requirements being 

generated by ongoing and upcoming operations 

as opposed to an overall plan. A CENTCOM 

C-5 plans officer indicated in an Army War 

College study on the subject that the plan did not 

necessarily mandate a preordained and ordered 

flow of decided upon forces. He stated that, 

“New tasks from CENTCOM . . . would create 

unplanned requirements. Requests for forces by 

capability were then generated by the staff for 

submission through joint channels to the Army.”35

This concept of adaptive planning and requesting 

forces as requirements unfold is likely to become 

the new paradigm for how the United States 

deploys military forces to execute a strategy of 

preemption in the current strategic environment.

 While deployment is not by definition 

logistics, it is logistically intensive and enabled 

by logistics processes and components such 

as transportation. Thus, it is commonplace for 

the mechanics of deployment planning and 

execution to ride on the backs of logisticians; 

especially at the corps, division, and brigade 

levels. Similarly, the reception, staging, onward 

movement, and integration (RSOI) process upon 

debarkation frequently falls to logisticians to 

plan, resource, and execute. A new model for 

deployment that still requires a time-phased flow 

of forces without the utilization of the traditional 

deployment processes, the deliberate preparation 

and execution of time phased force deployment 

data and list (TPFDD and TPFDL), is an entirely 

new challenge for logisticians. The requirement 

to employ while deploying, another operational 

transformation concept, requires a relook at how 

logisticians support RSOI as well. It is clear from the 

arguably chaotic turmoil that marked deployment 

operations and the initial RSOI and sustainment 

operations during OEF that Army logistics forces 

have yet to transform to the degree that they can 

handle either of these new changes comfortably 

and efficiently. 

 The Army’s official initial report on OEF 

concludes that, while Army logistics forces 

demonstrated a level of proficiency in sustainment 

operations, central to that success was a 

considerable level of innovation and agility.36

This is commendatory, of course, but it does not 

equate to transformed forces, capability, concepts, 

or thinking. Quite frankly, it is evidence of what 

has frequently been the norm; brute force logistics 

applied to make the operational situation work. 

There is a certain amount of ease and finesse that 

should come about with the transformed force. 

Routine things should be executed routinely. 

The scope and nature of warfare and where 

and how it is conducted in a changed strategic 

environment is the reality that we must adapt and 

transform to. Being able to meet the sustainment 

challenges in a routine and effective manner 

in this new environment for this new type of 

warfare is imperative in gauging our success. 

Brute force logistics, while always required to a 

certain degree, should be the exception, not the 

rule. Transformation of logistics had little to do 

with the success of OEF, and transformed logistics 
10

forces or processes did not play a significant role 

in these operations.

 OIF is perhaps even more telling on the state 

of Army logistics transformation than OEF. There 

is a distinct comparison that can be made between 

logistics operations in OIF and those of Operations 

DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM nearly 13 

years prior. Secondly, the scope and scale of the 

Army logistics effort during OIF vastly exceeded 

that of OEF; at one point supporting nearly five full 

Army divisions and an armored cavalry regiment, 

one Marine division, associated corps and Marine 

Expeditionary Force level headquarters and 

several brigades worth of corps troop units, and 

a large number of echelon above corps or theater 

level units. Third, the U.S. military, and the Army 

in particular, had a preexisting forward presence 

in the region, with nearly unlimited access to 

world class seaport and airport facilities and an 

extremely favorable relationship with a willing 

host nation government that possessed outstanding 

infrastructure, services, and resources. Finally, 

there was a very long period of time available, 

on the order of 12 or more months, to conduct 

operational and logistics campaign planning and 

preparation of the theater.37

 Observations regarding logistics during 

OIF have been mixed. Amid the heady rush of 

success regarding the rapid advance to Baghdad, 

the disintegration of the Republication Guard 

and the Iraqi Army, and the avoidance of a long 

protracted urban fight to topple the Hussein 

regime, initially almost nothing but laudatory 

comments were made concerning logistics. On 

March 31, 2003, Lieutenant General John Abizaid, 

then Deputy Commanding General of Central 

Command (CENTCOM), stated, “I’m certain 

that when the history of this campaign is written 

people will look at this move that land forces have 

made in this amount of time as being not only a 

great military accomplishment, but an incredible 

logistics accomplishment.”38 Noted military 

historians such as Victor Hansen also echoed the 

triumph of the logistics effort in support of OIF 

saying that, as a campaign, it was “historically 

unprecedented” and that its “logistics will be 

studied for decades.”39 In addition, an initial series 

of positive articles over the summer and fall of 

2003 in both service and joint publications told of 

only success in logistics.40

 It is dangerous to assume that this praise 

equates to high marks for logistics transformation. 

Success in logistics is indeed measured in battles 

won or at least in battles not lost due to resupply or 

sustainment failures. Success in the transformation 

of logistics, however, must be measured in how 

effectively resupply and sustainment are planned 

and executed. While there were herculean efforts 

exerted to provide the necessary sustainment to 

make OIF successful, the definition and tenets of 

transformation and Focused Logistics again were 

not realized in any significant fashion.

 There is another story to OIF logistics that 

has slowly crept to the surface and is not quite 

so flattering; a story that tells of problems related 

to sustainment planning and execution on a 

serious scale. It is described in several key “initial 

observation” studies conducted by the Army and 

the units involved. It is also addressed by the U.S. 

Government Accounting Office (USGAO) and 

in several recently published books on OIF. It is 

alluded to in, and is the likely genesis of, a White 

Paper newly published by the Army G4 staff; the 

bottom line being that we were not as logistically 

successful as some may have initially thought or 

publicly stated.

 A telling portend of the logistics challenges 

faced during OIF was seen when severe food and 

water shortages in forward combat units were 

reported on national television within 10 days after 

decisive ground operations commenced. These 

reports were quickly dismissed as an insignificant 

aberration; the Commander of CENTCOM himself, 

General Tommy Franks, stating that, 

We have sufficient―and have had sufficient―

stocks all across the battlefield of food, water, fuel, 

ammunition. But that doesn’t necessarily mean 

that . . . Sergeant Franks or Private Franks out there 

in the west-most squad, because he was involved 

in some serious combat, may not have gotten his 

fair share on a given day.41

In Operation Iraqi Freedom, What Went Right, What 

Went Wrong, And Why, author Walter Boyne 

writes, “Despite all the statements to the contrary, 

the V Corps and the MEF outran their supply 
11

lines, and this not only hampered their forward 

movement but also exposed them to the possibility 

of dangerous counterattack.”42

 Armies have been outdistancing their supply 

lines since there have been armies. That is not new. 

What is troubling is that this situation occurred to 

a force that has been working for so many years at 

transforming its logistics structures, procedures, 

and policies to support the kind of rapid, decisive 

operations that were planned and executed in Iraq; 

transforming to prevent just such an occurrence 

in the continuity of support. More troubling is the 

fact that this situation was repeated several more 

times, although absent the media scrutiny, as lines 

of communication stretched north of Baghdad. 

During a 14-day period between April 30 and 

May 14, 2003, the 4th Infantry Division failed to 

receive, on seven separate occasions, either its 

allotted shipment of food or bottled water until the 

day it was to be consumed. This effectively caused 

the division to consume all of its stocks and go 

without its planned resupply for a 24-hour period 

in each case.43 Boyne indicates that food and water 

were not the only commodity in short supply, 

referencing “myriad stories of units pleading for 

more ammunition―always ammunition first―and 

for other supplies . . .”44

 Most experienced logisticians will agree that 

planning for food and water resupply is not 

terribly difficult; it is simply a math problem 

based on the size of the force and number of 

trucks needed to move these supplies, coupled 

with a time-distance calculation involving the 

length of the line of communication that must 

be traveled. Computing this requirement and 

resourcing the assets to ensure its delivery is the 

basis for the transformational concept of Time 

Definite Delivery (TDD). This concept proved 

untenable and unreliable during OIF with what is 

the simplest of all supply commodities; one based 

on a known population and consumption rate.

 The Army OIF Study Group, a composite 

team led by the Center for Army Lessons Learned 

(CALL), conducted a “Quick Look” examination 

of all aspects of OIF throughout the campaign. 

In their initial report, actually released in the fall 

of 2003 as only briefing slides, the CALL Study 

Group listed logistics as one of only four areas that 

fell short of expectations or needs and indicated 

that it is an area that should be redressed through 

new initiatives.45 The report is damning in both its 

findings and its stated context. The base finding 

was that, “Logistics distribution and management 

systems, weakened by late deployment of 

support units, failed to adequately support the 

requirements of OIF forces.” It continues that the, 

“Decade-long effort to digitize logistics, adapt 

‘business practices’ and promote efficiency over 

effectiveness [is] insufficient for [the] contemporary 

operating environment.”46 A follow-on expansion 

of this initial study is currently in draft format and 

has not yet been released officially. Preliminary 

reports indicate that it contains further criticism 

of what occurred logistically during OIF.

 In a recent lessons learned conference 

sponsored by the Army Infantry School, the two 

mechanized Divisions that conducted operations 

in Iraq through May 2003, the 3rd and 4th Infantry 

Divisions, and the 101st Airborne Division all 

echoed the same challenges with logistics. All 

noted that the corps and theater systems designed 

to deliver sustainment to their own divisional 

logistics hubs were hopelessly inadequate.47 The 

problem is described by other sources as well. 

Anthony Cordesman, a military analyst and Senior 

Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, writes in The Iraq War―Strategy, Tactics, 

and Military Lessons that the Army simply did not 

have enough trucks to support and sustain the long 

distance supply chain.48 Cordesman’s analysis is 

accurate but only in part. The problem was much 

more complex, and the failures ran much deeper. 

The entire distribution system for OIF was never 

adequately established or validated in the theater 

of operations. The basic components comprising 

a theater distribution system were not there; 

trucks being just one obvious part. Other integral 

components were also absent. 

 No viable plan existed in the theater for logistics 

data connectivity and the ordering of repair parts 

once units moved out of staging areas in Kuwait. 

For example, the 4th Infantry Division was forced to 

leave the bulk of their materiel management center 

and ordering capability in Kuwait for weeks after 

the rest of the division deployed north into Iraq as 

it was the only way to order parts. Even in Kuwait, 
12

however, no robust electronic network existed for 

the Army’s Standard Army Retail Supply System 

(SARSS) to interface with. All of the subordinate 

echelons at Brigade level had to verbally call parts 

requisitions in over a fragile phone network, text 

messages over a satellite based system designed 

to track movement, or courier hand-written 

requisitions back on helicopters or trucks.49 Other 

units simply did not even attempt to order repair 

parts; resorting to wholesale cannibalization and 

abandonment of vehicles after they were stripped 

of all useful parts. Units were forced to survive on 

the limited repair parts they brought with them in 

their organic maintenance units or sections. The 

CALL team report states, “. . . no one had anything 

good to say about parts delivery, from the privates 

at the front to the generals.”50

 The concept of TAV also did not work as 

designed. There was initially a great deal of 

positive publicity concerning the use of Radio 

Frequency (RF) Tags and the achievement of 

TAV by agencies such as the U.S. Transportation 

Command (USTRANSCOM) and DLA.51 Every 

container and every vehicle was to have an RF Tag 

affixed so that it could be tracked and, in the case 

of a container, its contents annotated; a marked 

improvement over DESERT SHIELD and DESERT 

STORM where stories of items lost forever in a sea of 

stacked containers took on legendary proportions. 

Unfortunately, the system only worked at the 

strategic level with items only able to be tracked 

on ships or planes enroute to the theater from the 

United States or Europe. Once items arrived in 

Kuwait, there was nearly zero visibility on these 

same items. The USGAO reported extensively 

on this; citing inadequate access to TAV systems 

within the theater and absence of RF Tag 

interrogators projected forward as supply lines 

extended into Iraq, interoperability challenges 

at different echelons, as well as communications 

shortfalls and training deficiencies.52

 The management of the theater distribution 

system during OIF was also called into question. 

The USGAO in particular noted severe problems 

at the Theater Distribution Center established 

near Arifjan, Kuwait; identifying “. . . a backlog 

of hundreds of pallets and containers of materiel 

at various distribution points . . .” The report 

describes the scene as follows: “. . . a wide array of 

materiel, spread over many acres, that included a 

mix of broken and useable parts that had not been 

sorted into appropriate supply class, unidentified 

items in containers that had not been opened 

and inventoried, and items that appeared to be 

deteriorating due to harsh desert conditions.” Lack 

of transportation resources was certainly partially 

to blame for this situation, but a key observation 

concerning command and control at this level 

was that the absence of an effective prioritization 

process for supplies and cargo that were awaiting 

delivery meant that the scarce transportation assets 

that were available were not used effectively.53

 Other issues noted concerning logistics during 

OIF included: the inability of industry and the 

wholesale supply system to have the requisite high 

demand spares, items such as batteries, vehicle 

tires, and track for armored vehicles, readily 

available to support combat operations; inadequate 

parts on hand to support prepositioned stocks of 

equipment; and failure of contracted commercial 

logistics systems to adequately deliver supplies 

and repair parts to the theater.54 One final failure 

of logistics transformation exhibited during OIF 

was the Combat Service Support Command and 

Control System (CSSCS); the system designed and 

fielded over the last 10 years to provide situational 

awareness and a common operating picture of 

units’ overall logistics posture and status. CSSCS 

was simply not used because it could not perform 

its functions in a reliable, efficient, and useable 

manner in a wartime environment. A basic 

spreadsheet-based system utilizing secure email 

was developed and used in its place with more 

effective results. 55

 OIF logistics, like OEF logistics, was all about 

improvisation and adaptation by many talented 

logisticians. Again, the overall success of the 

mission speaks volumes about their determination 

and skill. At the same time, it reflects extremely 

poorly on the state of logistics transformation. The 

message from both OEF and OIF is clear; logistics 

transformation has stalled. This stall has placed 

the very future of transformation of the Army at 

risk.
13

The Promise Not Yet Realized―Factors that 

Caused the Stall. 

 A close examination of the last 10-12 years will 

show that there have been numerous restarts and 

goal changes in the description of what logistics 

transformation is. Part of this may be attributed 

to leadership changes and differing viewpoints. 

Most of it, however, has been caused by an ability 

to describe what we want but an inability to define 

the concrete steps we need to take to get us there. 

It is far easier to talk about change and the desired 

endstate than it is to develop and assemble all the 

pieces required to achieve it. Many of the enabling 

ideas about logistics transformation have stayed 

in just that state; as concepts described by bullets 

on a slide or paragraphs in a glossy pamphlet.

 The fact is that across the U.S. Army, very little 

has occurred aside from experimentation; and 

even that has truly only been limited to two distinct 

periods of time with only two different units. While 

this may at first seem to be a necessary and logical 

part of the process, it has not served logistics 

transformation well. A period of experimentation 

critical to enabling change is acceptable, but it is 

rendered relatively ineffectual if the findings and 

resulting value of these experiments are not put 

expediently in place to transform the remainder 

of the force. None of the so-called roadmaps to 

logistics change have been followed to conclusion. 

Any milestones and timelines that have been 

established as part of these roadmaps have not 

been aggressively adhered to. 

 All of this is complicated because for a long 

time, the DoD view, the Joint view, and the 

Army view of logistics transformation were 

not synchronized. Between 1996 and 2003, the 

DoD’s view on logistics transformation was only 

communicated through small passages buried 

deep in Annual Defense Reports; not until the 

publication of Transformation Planning Guidance

in 2003 did the Department issue a complete 

document dedicated to the definition, scope, and 

strategy for transformational change of the armed 

forces.56 The Army’s vision and the Joint vision 

of Focused Logistics have only recently begun 

to mirror one another, and it is still debatable 

whether they are fully complementary or work at 

cross purposes with some joint concepts.

 The distance between the staffs in the past has 

not helped move transformation along in terms 

of the cooperation and service interdependence 

necessary to make Focused Logistics a reality. 

The Army has a reputation for talking jointly but 

not executing jointly. The Joint community, in 

particular the Joint logistics community, habitually 

has leaned very heavily on the Army for much 

of its doctrinal thought; a scan of Joint logistics 

publications and the Army ones that predate them 

will verify this fact. Similarly, the Army has been in 

front of both the DoD and the Joint community in 

terms of actual experimentation and development 

of change. The problem with this is that a major 

part of Army logistics transformation singularly 

dependson change that must occur in both the 

Joint and DoD communities. 

 Finally, a mindset has been established in the 

Army and the Joint world that this entire process 

will take a great deal of time; perhaps another 

decade or more if the mid-term vision stretches 

to 2010 as the latest published word on logistics 

transformation states. The reasons for this are 

varied; they include funding and resourcing 

constraints, competing priorities, inability to get key 

and critical enabling mechanisms such as assured 

communications into logistics units, competition 

for electronic bandwidth to move logistics data, 

selected technologies and systems that have not 

yet been developed, and the realization that some 

of the systems, concepts, and doctrine that were 

developed did not provide the anticipated result.

 Most significant, however, is that Army 

logisticians as a body have not embraced 

transformation in such a way as to make it 

happen in the here and now. An old adage among 

logisticians is that they perform their wartime 

mission every day. Consumed with the challenges 

of supporting training and operations on a daily 

basis, most logisticians outside of CASCOM, the 

4th Infantry Division, and the Stryker Brigades 

have not been included in transformation at all. 

When you consider that only 6 of the Army’s 

50 divisional logistics battalions and only 4 of 

the Army’s echelon above division support 
14

battalions have had any sort of an active role in 

transformation, it is not difficult to understand 

why the process, the products, the concepts, and 

the doctrine are not well-distributed across the 

force.57

Preventing a Reoccurrence and Preserving 

Change Momentum.

 Recovery of this stall in logistics transformation 

must start with an acknowledgement that there is 

a problem; that collectively the military has not 

achieved much, if any, transformational change 

in logistics. This is likely to be an unpopular 

statement with some as both individual and 

organizational pride and reputation are at stake in 

many cases. There will be people and agencies who 

will not readily admit to this truth. They must be 

persuaded to this reality; the experiences in OEF 

and OIF serving as a lever to convince them.

 Next, there has to be a pervasive understanding 

of the process of logistics transformation and what 

exactly must be changed. This must be something 

understood by the entire Army logistics community 

from top to bottom. This does not mean only the 

Army Staff, the various logistics school houses in 

TRADOC, and CASCOM. The entire community 

includes the senior and mid-level commanders 

and leaders at every echelon of every logistics 

organization in both the Active and Reserve 

components; in the divisions and the Stryker 

Brigade Combat Teams, in echelon above division 

formations, in echelon above corps formations, 

and in the AMC. In addition, understanding of 

this process must go beyond the Joint Staff J4 

section, selected individuals in the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense and DoD, and DLA. It must 

be understood by logisticians in the Air Force, 

Navy, Marine Corps, and by the staffs of both 

regional and functional combatant commands; 

with a special focus on USTRANSCOM. This is no 

small list and no small task.

 Finally, there has to be an overarching 

synchronized logistics transformation plan with a 

strategy and a common intent that all participants 

can agree to. There cannot be an Army plan, a 

Joint Staff Plan, a DLA or AMC plan, sister service 

plans, and a DoD Office of Force Transformation 

plan that are not nested. It is acceptable for there to 

be differences in the scope, focus, and approach at 

each level, but there must be a common purpose, 

shared terminology, well-matched concepts, and 

a common vision of endstate. There should also be 

established milestones and checkpoints to measure 

progress towards a series of stratified goals at the 

tactical, operational, and strategic levels of the 

logistics spectrum. The plan needs to be in tune to 

the realities of a changing environment, aggressive 

in distinguishing between success and failure of 

experimentation, dispassionate towards cutting 

off the funnel of time, energy, and resources to 

follow failed strategies, and adaptive towards 

taking what works and disseminating it widely 

and rapidly. Lastly, the plan must be a roadmap 

in more than just name only. It must actually get 

us somewhere. It cannot be just theory without 

practice and substance, framed by enablers not yet 

conceived, bounded only by the fantastic and not 

the realistic, and not simply a self-perpetuating 

end in and of itself but a means to an end. This 

plan has not been written yet.

 Preventing a reoccurrence of the stall should 

be relatively easy if we accomplish the three 

prerequisites of acknowledgement of where 

we are now, pervasive understanding of what 

we are doing and have yet to do, and a viable 

transformational plan that has a strategy to 

move us ahead. Preserving the momentum of 

logistics transformation is ensured by frequent 

azimuth checks to sustain progress and consistent 

movement towards established milestones and 

goals.

ACHIEVING A SUCCESSFUL 

TRANSFORMATION

Understanding the Process 

of Logistics Transformation.

 The baseline for achieving a successful 

transformation in Army logistics begins by 

understanding that the change process is both 

evolutionary and revolutionary in nature. 

Evolutionary change is characterized by constancy, 
15

gradualism, and an ordered approach. It tends to 

be more subtle and smaller. It does not, however, 

need to operate only at the margins; it can still 

be sweeping. It may be that a greater measure of 

command and control exists over the shape and 

direction of the change effort. Planning for it and 

managing it should be easier. Revolutionary change 

sounds more dramatic because it generally is. It is 

by nature and definition, broad and extensive. It 

redefines systems and processes in a much shorter 

period of time. It also tends to be more chaotic.58

 The real question here is not what kind of 

change we want or desire but what kind of change 

we are faced with and forced to work with. Most of 

the change that has presented itself in the logistics 

world in the last 10 years has been evolutionary. It 

is likely that much of the change in the future will 

be evolutionary as well. This is not an inherently 

bad thing. It may not sound as spectacular in a 

briefing, the “Evolution in Military Logistics” vice 

the “Revolution in Military Logistics,” but that 

is not the point. The point is change. Debating 

or worrying about the nature or character of it 

frequently distracts us from harnessing it. Looking 

for the revolutionary, or waiting for it, tends to 

make us miss the evolutionary.

 Revolutionary change for logistics will come 

when and if we develop a replacement for fossil 

fuels that provides perpetual power with reduced 

need for resupply, armaments that use energy with 

an indefinite and onboard recharge capability, 

super-reliable and self-repairing machinery and 

electronics, a replacement for foodstuffs in a pill 

or tablet format that satisfies both nutrition and 

soldier hunger for traditional food, and a way 

to recycle and reuse bodily waste water and 

perspiration to decrease the requirement for water. 

In short, we will see a revolutionary change in 

logistics when we can either dramatically reduce 

or eliminate the demand or shrink the size of what 

must be distributed.

 Communicating this understanding to the 

field is the first challenge we face. The subject 

of logistics transformation must be forced out 

to all levels, acknowledged, and then discussed. 

The discussion is crucial as it will engender 

consideration, understanding, and ultimately 

acceptance of the realities of the process. The Army 

must reach a very broad but also a very select 

audience; present and future logistics battalion 

and brigade level commanders, mid-level and 

senior logistics noncommissioned officers (NCOs), 

present and future logistics platoon leaders and 

company commanders, and present and future 

support operations officers and executive officers. 

A three-fold strategy to do this will work best.

 The strategy must include contact and 

briefings, followed by discussion, at all logistics 

pre-command courses, at logistics officer basic 

courses, at the Combined Logistics Captains 

Career Course, at logistics basic and advanced 

NCO courses, and at the Support Operations 

Officer Course. Logistics officers and NCOs 

attending the Command and General Staff 

College and the Sergeants Major Academy should 

also get the same briefings. These briefings and 

discussion on logistics transformation must be 

treated as the centerpiece around which the rest of 

the curriculum is based. Other material presented 

at these schools must reinforce and support the 

idea of logistics transformation. The goal here is to 

change the mindset and establish it as the basis for 

all doctrinal thought and application. CASCOM 

and the Army Logistics Management College 

(ALMC) should take the lead on developing the 

products to be used for this. ALMC should go on 

the road to instruct the seminars for students at 

the Command and General Staff College and the 

Sergeants Major Academy. ALMC or CASCOM 

should also make similar presentations to 

logisticians attending the senior service colleges, 

sister service schools at the combined staff college 

level, and at the Joint Forces Staff College.

 Most soldiers in the Army have experienced 

the chain-teaching method of disseminating 

information or guidance. Units receive canned 

briefings, with accompanying notes or script, 

from higher level headquarters and are required 

to deliver the product to members of the unit and 

then report back on completion and compliance. 

While chain-teaching is not always greeted 

enthusiastically, it has indeed proven effective 

in getting the word out. This is the approach that 

must be taken to reach key logistics leaders who are 
16

not currently in school. A chain-teaching briefing 

on logistics transformation should be sent to all 

battalion and brigade level logistics headquarters, 

as well as to AMC, with the requirement that it 

be delivered to the same group of leaders noted 

above in all subordinate elements. Simply emailing 

the information across the force or posting it to a 

website is not sufficient and will not be effective. 

There is very little impetus or emphasis that 

can be put on reading and dissemination and 

no opportunity for discussion, dialogue, and 

interaction. 

 Finally, the Army logistics leadership 

community currently sitting in command billets at 

the battalion level and higher in the operational and 

institutional Army, in both the active and reserve 

components, should meet at least annually as a 

corporate body to discuss logistics transformation. 

This meeting should be a forum for exchange of 

ideas and, most importantly, a status report on 

where the Army is with logistics transformation 

and where it is going in the next 12 months. A 

plethora of reasons will always be offered as to 

why this cannot occur; it will be perceived as too 

hard or too expensive or too distracting. These are 

irresponsible protests. The issue is too important 

and the failures to date have been too severe not to 

do this. Meetings that are held now are too narrow 

in their audience focus; senior Army staff, the school 

houses, CASCOM and TRADOC, and the swarm 

of contractors and Program Managers are the only 

ones who ever meet. Logistics transformation is 

logistics commanders’ business. It has not been 

executed in that fashion up to this point. There is 

little wonder why logistics transformation is not 

happening across the Army. The key leaders who 

are responsible for change are not involved.

 Beyond communicating an understanding of 

the process, the Army must come to grips with 

what must be changed to achieve a successful 

transformation of logistics. The following outline 

of where we ought to focus, what must actually 

be changed, what the priority of change ought to 

be, and who should be the lead in effecting it is 

offered for consideration.

WHAT MUST CHANGE

Doctrine and Concepts―Speak With One Voice.

 The first area on which that the Army logistics 

community must focus is the written word as it 

relates to doctrine and concepts. We must ensure 

that what has been most recently published by the 

Army, the Joint Staff, and DoD is synchronized, 

valid, and commonly accepted as the way 

ahead. Two specific issues must be immediately 

addressed: first, an update to the doctrinal 

publications that logisticians in the field Army 

read and use; and second, an assessment of another 

looming disconnect in the published azimuth and 

synchronization of where we are going with the 

concept of the transformed logistics. 

 A notable issue with both Army and Joint 

doctrine is that the two manuals that are actually 

supposed to articulate the application of logistics 

doctrine significantly lag behind transformational 

concepts. Army Field Manual (FM) 4-0, “Combat 

Service Support,” dated August 2003 and Joint 

Publication (JP) 4-0, “Doctrine for Logistics Support 

of Joint Operations,” dated April 2000, are not 

very useful to a transforming force. FM 4-0 fails 

to address the concept of Focused Logistics at all; 

giving it no mention anywhere in the manual. 

Its only acknowledgement that the Army is 

undergoing a logistics transformation is in a dozen 

paragraphs under the heading of “Directions 

in CSS Development” in the last portion of the 

introductory chapter of the manual; some 60 

sections into the text. The reader is apprised 

only that the Army’s logistics transformation 

charter has a three-fold goal: to enhance strategic 

responsiveness to meet deployment timelines; 

to reduce the logistics footprint in the area of 

operations; and to reduce logistics costs without 

reducing warfighting capability and readiness.59

The rest of the manual is devoted to legacy concepts 

and doctrinal thought. JP 4-0 is even more dated. 

It contains no reference and no direct relevance to 

transformation whatsoever.

 Both of these documents are the product of the 

traditional doctrine publication model. Both likely 

were started 3-5 years prior to their publication 
17

date. It may be that they were written by a section 

in CASCOM or J4 that was not involved directly 

with transformation and therefore did not use 

transformation as a central theme in organizing the 

manual. This needs to be fixed; even if it is just a 

restructuring of the current FM and JP to align the 

existing content to a more updated context. Again, 

we are not able to communicate broadly with the 

field Army on doctrinal matters in a manner that is 

relevant to our focus on changing it. If the manuals 

only survive for 2 years, as opposed to 10, then 

so be it. Electronic publications can easily have a 

shorter shelf-life and not incur the sunk costs of 

bound and printed hard copy paper. The point is 

that these manuals and their like are the reference 

that is found in motorpools, headquarters, offices, 

and schoolhouses across the Army. They are being 

used to educate and train the force. They must be 

current and relevant to be of any significant value 

in achieving transformation. 

 The second issue is with a DoD initiative 

regarding a new concept called “Sense and 

Respond Logistics.” This idea, not currently 

captured in any published Joint or Army work, 

yet again may redefine logistics transformation 

focus. The sense and respond concept is focused 

on achieving a network-centric environment 

where information technology provides superior 

and relatively seamless connectivity of data, 

information, and awareness. The concept seeks to 

develop an adaptive logistics system that enables 

units to draw support from a number of supply 

nodes that are distributed dynamically across the 

battlefield as operations dictate. Robust and flexible 

transportation networks, enabled by situational 

awareness of requirements, demand, and location 

of forces, mitigate risk and uncertainty. This 

concept mirrors and borrows liberally from 

recently successful civilian industrial logistics 

models.60

 It might be argued that this is already a foregone 

conclusion since all indicators from DoD are that 

this is the direction they are leading the force. It 

is also evident from the material available on the 

DoD Office of Force Transformation website that 

this initiative has “legs” within the Pentagon. 

Articles have been written, briefings have been 

given, and studies have been released. What is not 

certain is the collective logistics community vote 

and acceptance on the feasibility of this particular 

concept as it applies to support of current and future 

warfare. Conclusions have already been drawn 

by some with regard to this concept and OIF. The 

DoD-contracted authors of a report entitled, The 

Sense and Respond Logistics Capability and Operation 

Iraqi Freedom, state that, “We do not believe . . . 

that the more detailed and in-depth analyses that 

emerge over the next several months will alter 

significantly the observations, assessments, and 

conclusions of this study.”61 The study, of course, 

prescribes the “sense and respond” concept as the 

way of the future for a more agile and adaptive 

logistics system and offers it as the solution to the 

failure of transformational logistics in OIF. 

 The danger here is clear. There has been a 

history of the Army, the Joint Staff, and DoD going 

off in separate directions with regard to doctrine 

and concepts. This is evidence that this may be 

occurring again. This would be another restart 

and refocus without the benefit of debate and 

discussion as to value, the particulars of execution 

and the way ahead, and, most importantly, how 

well a commercial solution fits with military 

realities. The result may be more of what we have 

experienced in the past where there has been no 

concrete plan, no nesting of concepts, no unity of 

effort, and, most importantly, no buy-in from the 

force. It may very well be that sense and respond 

logistics is where we need to go with logistics 

transformation, but the Army and the Joint force 

cannot afford to embrace it without examining it 

in detail. To do so may generate nothing more than 

another theoretical restart of the transformational 

process with no substantive change that is 

illuminated in the harsh glare of current combat 

operations or the next conflict.

Doctrine and Concepts―Embrace an Evolutionary 

Approach. 

 The Army must fight the urge to link doctrine 

and concepts to only revolutionary change. We 

cannot afford to wait for a revolutionary event 

to enable a revolutionary change. This will 
18

cause us to miss the opportunity provided by an 

evolutionary approach that yields transformational 

benefits now. We must temper our concepts and 

doctrine with a healthy dose of what is feasible, 

acceptable, and suitable both today and in the 

future. There are indications that the Army is 

embracing this idea. Just prior to the release of 

the Army Transformation Roadmap, the Army G4 

produced a White Paper entitled “Delivering 

Materiel Readiness to the Army.” This paper 

addresses the need to remedy “known shortfalls 

in our current structure that require immediate 

action, and directly support our Army’s transition

[italics added] to an expeditionary force. . . .”62

The word transition vice transformation is a key 

one. Transition implies changes now with the 

resources at hand. The paper identifies focus 

areas that are to be held preeminent over the 

next 2 years. This time span is also important, not 

only because it sets a mark for measuring results, 

but also because it effectively precludes waiting 

for a revolutionary action or process to occur to 

stimulate change. The paper is written with the 

observations and insights of OIF and OEF in the 

forefront of the Army’s frame of reference. While 

not openly declaring the logistics effort supporting 

these operations a debacle, it does identify four of 

the key areas that fell far short of expectations; 

namely logistics communications and data 

connectivity; an effective theater distribution 

system; an effective force reception process, plan, 

and capability; and an integrated supply chain 

with visibility and information sharing.

Doctrine and Concepts―Look Back to Find 

the Way Ahead.

 The Army logistics community must take a 

measured and focused look back across the history 

of logistics transformation in the last 10 years to 

examine closely the work that has already been 

completed. There is a great deal of value in some 

of the basic insights gained with Force XXI and 

with the Interim Force experiments. At the same 

time, the observations and insights from OIF and 

OEF must be considered as the current benchmark 

for a reality check. If a concept or doctrine does 

not or cannot be made to work in the present 

context of logistics operations, it must be weighed 

carefully to determine if it can be of relevant value 

in the short term or in the long term. This is crucial 

to developing a viable roadmap for change and a 

vision that is executable.

Doctrine and Concepts―VALIDATE 

the Distribution-Based Logistics Method.

 The underpinning theory of logistics 

transformation and Focused Logistics is based on 

ensuring that the right commodity is delivered 

to the right place, in the right quantity and 

configuration, and at the right time with the 

minimal logistics footprint forward in the area of 

operations. Whether termed inventory in motion, 

just-in-time logistics, distribution-based logistics, 

precision logistics, or sense and respond logistics, 

the concept seeks to leverage select technologies, 

primarily digital communications and network 

systems, to reduce the necessity to stockpile 

resources to meet demands. The goal is to keep 

large quantities of supplies and the forces needed 

to manage them away from the area of operations 

and still be able to get it rapidly to the requesting 

unit when required. There is no question that this 

concept will work in theory and that it offers great 

advantages. It has worked in practice as well; 

although primarily in civilian sector commercial 

industry or in extremely small-scale military 

contingencies. The real debate should be about 

why it has failed to work in operations like OEF 

and OIF, what risk do we incur when it fails to 

work and how do we mitigate it, and is it valid in 

its ability to meet the needs of the military in its 

current form or must we develop a new or hybrid 

concept.

 One of the key reasons for the failure of 

distribution-based logistics to work in operations 

as massive as OIF is the incredible complexity of 

the system. Distribution-based logistics requires a 

system or a process that enables a unit to order 

supplies, materiel and movement managers to 

achieve a required level of TAV to direct and 

redirect supplies, supply units to receive and 

configure supplies, and the proper type and 
19

quantity of transportation assets to project them 

to the intended recipient. Failure in any one of the 

component areas of distribution-based logistics 

will cause problems. Failure in multiple areas, 

or in the case of OIF in nearly all areas, can be 

disastrous. This complexity is manageable, but 

only if the system is established and is viable.

 What was revealed in both OEF and OIF was 

that we failed to establish the system. In one case 

we had only weeks to do it, but in the other we had 

months. A real concern is that we may be headed 

towards future conflict in a strategic environment 

where having time is more the exception than the 

rule. If that is the case, then a serious look must 

be taken at how we establish a distribution-based 

logistics system to respond immediately to even 

more fluid, disorderly, and uncertain situations 

than we have been presented with so far. Within 

this constraint, we must also assess risk and 

develop mitigation if the system fails to work. The 

near-term risk, of course, is that we temporarily 

run short of food, water, ammunition, or fuel. A 

longer-term risk is that we are unable to reorder 

repair parts for our vehicles, and our combat 

power bleeds away. Mitigation may mean that 

we take more sustainment with us initially in our 

fielded forces or we push anticipated supply based 

on planned requirements; the former course of 

action making the force heavier and deployment 

more difficult, and the latter course often further 

disrupting and congesting an already broken 

process.

 Given this reality, then, an adjustment must 

be made to the concept. The first parameter 

must be effectiveness. The system has to work 

effectively or it will be of no value; efficiency is 

of lesser importance. An undisguised effort for 

many years now has been underway to make the 

Army’s logistics system more efficient. Wal-Mart 

is frequently the model touted by many for what 

efficiency in distribution-based logistics ought to 

look like. No military logistician believes that the 

Army’s logistics system and process will ever be, 

or even should be, exactly like Wal-Mart’s. The 

context and conditions in which military logistics 

is conducted are radically different and much 

more complex. However, the desire to parallel 

“Wal-Mart like” efficiencies runs quietly under the 

surface. Maximizing efficiency, or even optimizing 

it, may not provide the necessary effectiveness. 

The heretofore traditional method of logistics, 

where the footprint was large and stocks equating 

to many days of supply were established, was an 

effective method, but it clearly lacked efficiencies. 

Distribution-based logistics offers efficiencies, 

but it cannot seek these at the expense of the 

ultimate bottom line, which is effective support. 

Achieving efficiencies, especially at the strategic 

level where dollars are big and the perspective is 

broad, that do not contribute to effectiveness at 

the operational and tactical level ultimately risk 

the lives of soldiers, failure of missions, and the 

loss of a war. 

 Another key parameter must be flexibility. 

The system has to be able to be adapted to fit the 

situation. Flexibility in distribution may mean 

that the system looks different for different 

scenarios. We cannot be too wedded to a single 

theoretical design if it will not work in a specific 

campaign plan. Having this flexibility built into 

the logistics design of the plan precludes the type 

of crisis response that will inevitably occur if 

there is a system failure. Some have argued that 

flexibility and adaptation are different qualities, 

and that the best way to adjust to radical changes 

in environment or context is by being less rooted 

in preplanning.63 This is absolutely not true and 

is extremely dangerous. Executing logistics by 

discovery or serendipity is irresponsible and will 

lead to failure. Flexibility does not mean that we 

conduct logistics planning on the fly or that we 

make it up as the situation develops. Flexibility 

and the ability to adapt comes from being able to 

deviate or adjust from a plan.

 A flexible approach to distribution-based 

logistics may call for a system where selected 

sustainment commodities that are forecasted 

easily are indeed stockpiled or where the logistical 

footprint is indeed larger. This is not a throw back 

to the old ways of doing business but rather an 

acknowledgement of the necessity to do what 

works and to develop appropriate mitigation 

against anticipated and perceived risk. The reality 

of war is that, when a process is not working, 
20

every effort is made to solve the problem. 

Flexible tailoring of how we develop and execute 

distribution-based logistics at the front end will 

enable us to adapt the system more readily when 

operationally necessary.

 A third parameter must be practicality. 

Distribution-based logistics need not be perfect. 

Perfect has always been the enemy of good 

enough. A great deal of uncertainty is inherent in 

a complex system such as this one. Managing this 

uncertainty can be overcome in many ways. Some 

may argue that robust information technology 

is the best way to do this so that having close 

to perfect situational awareness and data will 

limit uncertainty. Experience repeatedly has 

shown that perfect situational awareness is an 

impossibility. The chaos and ambiguity of the 

battlefield precludes it from happening. Secondly, 

any strategy that rests upon technological reliance 

as opposed to technological leveraging will fail. 

These are the most vivid lessons of the Force XXI 

experience, and they must not be discounted.

 Uncertainty is best managed by distributing 

it to the levels where risk is real and can be 

addressed. To use an example from OIF, this may 

mean that the theater leader, who has ultimate 

responsibility for the theater-wide planning and 

resourcing, works with the corps or even the 

division or brigade leaders early in the planning 

process to come up with feasible answers to how 

to get mail or meals or water or fresh fruit or ice 

to soldiers along extended lines of communication 

during every phase of operations. Many of the 

answers to solve these challenges during OIF came 

about when logistics leaders and planners from all 

these levels worked together to develop practical 

solutions that were outside of the conventional 

distribution system model that existed up until 

that time. That these answers were developed deep 

into the operation in April, May, and June 2004 

is unfortunate. Sharing the uncertainty across all 

levels 6 months earlier in November, December, 

and January would likely have led to the same 

conclusions and solutions about how to provide 

support and possibly would have precluded some 

of the problems that did arise. 

 Another key parameter of distribution-based 

logistics is that it must be validated deliberately. 

There must be a plan and process for establishing 

it and verifying that the system is set and will 

work. A “rockdrill” or a rehearsal in a warehouse 

in the desert is not good enough. There were 

“rockdrills” aplenty for OIF, and the impression 

was that the system was sound. Nothing could 

have been further from the truth. Several critical 

elements of the distribution system must be 

addressed and validated. The distribution system 

must have a reliable means to execute over the 

horizon communications that can pass logistics 

requisition data as well as logistics status and 

reporting data. It must include an in-transit and 

TAV plan for more than just the strategic lift aspect 

of transportation and supply that is capable of 

being projected inland. There must be a validation 

that a right-sized logistics footprint exists. It 

must have adequate forces and resources phased 

and flowed in a timely manner, arrayed in the 

proper locations, and equipped with the proper 

tools so that the forces can receive, configure, and 

transport sustainment to the limits of advance or 

the Phase Line that is operationally acceptable. 

An exhaustive identification and analysis of the 

possible failure points in the system must take 

place so that risk can be anticipated and mitigated, 

and uncertainty can be managed. Finally, there 

must be a validated metric for measuring success 

based on the effectiveness of logistics support 

to synchronize with the operational scheme of 

maneuver.

 The final parameter of distribution-based 

logistics involves process ownership. Someone 

must be in charge of the process and the system. 

The general consensus since OEF and OIF has been 

that no one agency or organization exercises overall 

control of the distribution process; the follow-on 

implication is that this lack of ownership lies at 

the root of the distribution problems experienced 

during these operations. This conclusion recently 

prompted the Secretary of Defense to designate 

USTRANSCOM as the overall distribution 

process owner and the organization responsible 

to ensure that distribution-based logistics is 

realized. Assigning responsibility is fine, but the 

reality is that USTRANSCOM cannot solve theater 

distribution problems as they are not present in 

the theater in a capacity to do so. USTRANSCOM 
21

operates at the strategic level and does a great job 

of coordinating the movement of personnel and 

equipment to the theater but not within it.

 Distribution must be fed by a wholesale supply 

and requisitioning system that provides and injects 

the necessary materiel into the transportation 

pipeline. This has always been, and will continue 

to be, DLA’s job. Merging the two agencies, one a 

combatant command and one a DoD command, 

may be possible, but indications are that it will be 

resisted and may not be in the best interest of all 

concerned. Frankly, the distribution system at this 

level works very well. The only valid complaint 

about distribution-based logistics at the highest 

strategic level is that commercial and defense 

industries do not produce or stockpile all of the 

combat critical demand items in peacetime that 

are required during wartime; an age-old problem 

experienced by every nation that is not a strictly 

militaristic state with all industry focused on the 

continual production of military materiel. The 

United States has always had to, and will likely 

continue to always have to, ramp up peacetime 

industry to a wartime footing.

 Ownership of the distribution system must be 

shared, not just placed in the lap of USTRANSCOM. 

The real test of distribution-based logistics is in 

the last 100 miles; or, in the case of OIF, the last 

800 miles. This portion of the theater cannot be 

affected by USTRANSCOM, nor should it be. 

Ownership of distribution-based logistics within 

the theater must be carefully divided between the 

different organizations that operate at different 

levels therein. The Theater Support Command gets 

a large piece and should be the key headquarters 

that manages the end-to-end distribution from 

the high water mark to the front lines. In the 

current logistics organizational model, they 

must be assisted by the corps support command, 

division support commands, and by the logistics 

formations of the brigades themselves. As the 

force transforms, these organizational structures 

may change in name and form, but the shared 

responsibilities will still exist. Ownership of the 

process, more specifically ownership of certain 

parts of it, must still be assigned to the proper 

level. 

Doctrine and Concepts―Reexamine Key 

Concepts Associated with Distribution.

 The concept of TDD needs to be reexamined 

for the simple fact that no guarantees exist on a 

battlefield. The term is misleading and causes 

operational commanders to count on something 

that may not occur. This can have an extremely 

adverse effect on many different levels. Not only 

might failure be associated with execution of the 

mission because the promised support was not 

delivered, but also the erosion of trust previously 

established between operator and logistician can 

have much farther reaching negative consequences. 

Serious damage has been done during OEF and 

OIF in this regard; our failure to successfully 

demonstrate this concept being the cause.

 The concept of TDD should not be abandoned. 

It does have utility. Establishing a TDD, repeatedly 

demonstrating the ability to achieve it, and 

then providing the supported unit with relative 

assurance about when to expect something once 

it has been requested is useful in predicting 

sustainability of a particular course of action or 

plan. TDD is a goal to strive for, and it must be 

explained in that way. It may be achievable at 

some levels and in some circumstances, but it is 

ultimately an assumption until it can be proven 

as a fact. We must remember that when we make 

assumptions that are not valid, we modify or 

discard the assumption. TDD must be approached 

in this manner. It is possible, even probable, that 

TDD will change as events change. We must 

be alert to that and cognizant of what caused it 

to get better or worse so that we can sustain or 

improve the process. The utility of TDD is in its 

use as a metric against which the distributionbased system is measured. Most importantly, if 

we are not meeting the stated TDD for a particular 

commodity, we must use this as a prompter to 

initiate immediate examination and evaluation of 

the system to discover and aggressively rectify the 

fault.

 TAV must be broadened in its scope and reach 

on the battlefield and refined in its use in garrison 

and training. The concept of TAV is valid, but its 

value to date in a wartime theater of operations 

has been negligible. The reality is that in the 
22

last 10 years we have been unsuccessful in our 

ability to extend TAV beyond the strategic level; 

arguably all that we were able to do in OIF and 

OEF. The Army and the wholesale supply system 

did a relatively good job of affixing RF tags to 

equipment, containers, and vehicles but a dismal 

job of leveraging any of the TAV information 

beyond the aerial or sea port of debarkation. The 

true utility of TAV is that it enables the redirection 

of incoming supplies to support a new priority or 

to respond to a developing situation; either within 

the Army force component or to a joint service 

component. None of this will ever be possible 

unless TAV can be made to work at the materiel 

management centers of the theater and corps 

support commands. The TAV goal is to have endto-end visibility. At a minimum, TAV must exist 

through to the operational level where sustainment 

stocks come under divisional or separate brigade 

control.

 The fix involves equipping, training, and 

discipline. TAV must be pushed forward on the 

battlefield. This takes several things; most notably 

hardware and software at forward nodes that can 

be used to access the system. Secondly, it takes 

training at levels much lower than TRANSCOM 

and DLA and the discipline to make it happen. 

Once the force is adequately equipped, the problem 

is reduced to a classic “train as you fight” issue. 

Utilization of TAV technology and procedures as 

a matter of routine in a peacetime environment 

in daily operations, exercises, and training is a 

key part of the strategy needed to make it work 

in wartime. This utilization must occur in the 

two active duty theater support commands in 

Germany and Korea and at the corps and division 

level. Necessary fielding and extensive training on 

TAV also must occur in reserve component theater 

support commands; a reserve component theater 

support command was most recently the critical 

materiel management and distribution logistics 

node in OIF. 

 The concept of in-transit visibility (ITV), a 

component of TAV that is based on tracking the 

transportation platform as opposed to the cargo, 

is working now. The Movement Tracking System 

(MTS) is a satellite based system that effectively 

provides this capability and is currently being 

fielded to logistics units at all levels and to selected 

echelon above division combat and combat 

support units. MTS worked very well in certain 

locations during OIF. However, other aspects 

of OIF may call into question its future utility. 

The Army’s likely dilemma with MTS will be to 

continue the fielding as is, or to migrate all Army 

platforms to one common system. The common 

system would likely be Blue Force Tracker (BFT); 

a satellite based version of the existing Force XXI 

situational awareness system known as Future 

Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2). The 

reason that there are two situational awareness 

systems, MTS and FBCB2, goes back to the Force 

XXI experiments. FBCB2 was designed to only 

be fielded to divisional units at brigade level and 

below, to include the forward support battalion, 

and to some selected units in the division base. 

MTS was developed for the echelon above division 

units; primarily logistics units and combat and 

combat support units such as Corps Field Artillery 

and Military Police. The systems never interfaced 

and still do not.

 The reason there might be pressure to dump 

MTS is because BFT received a great deal of 

praise during OEF and OIF. Much of this can be 

attributed to a “gee-whiz” effect in units that had 

no such situational awareness tool and then were 

given this system at the last minute; basically they 

went from nothing to something overnight as 

rapid fielding was executed in the final days before 

crossing the line of departure into Iraq. MTS works 

for logisticians, giving them everything they need 

to conduct ITV, but the desire to have one common 

system may be too great. Plus, there are advantages 

to pure fleeting the force in terms of maintenance, 

training, and interchangeability. A closer look at 

comments on BFT by key OIF leaders, to include 

the V Corps Commander, and an examination of 

the experiences of the 4th Infantry Division with 

FBCB2, specifically with regard to maintenance 

and system failure rates, should occur before a 

final decision on MTS is made.64

 If the decision is made to keep both MTS and 

BFT, the fielding of MTS must be relooked and 

expanded to include a much broader basis of 
23

issue in all logistics units in both the active and 

reserve components. It must also be expedited 

rapidly so that fielding is accomplished now and 

not in accordance with the current Department of 

the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL) order. 

Further research must be done to create an interface 

between the two systems. MTS can coexist with 

BFT, but its survival depends on proving that it 

can stand alone and still be part of the overall 

network by having the capability to pass data back 

and forth.

 If the decision is made to cancel MTS, then two 

things must occur. Existing MTS systems across 

the Army immediately should be redistributed 

exclusively to active and reserve component 

logistics units. Specifically, MTS should be given 

to all logistics battalion headquarters and select 

transportation units; focusing on petroleum, 

palletized loading, semi-trailer, and heavy equipment transport units. This will ensure that an 

ITV capability is resident and pervasive across 

the logistics force in the short term. The Army’s 

logistics leadership must then aggressively fight 

to ensure that MTS is rapidly replaced one for one 

by BFT in accordance with the expanded basis of 

issue described above.

Doctrine and Concepts―Supporting 

Simultaneous Deployment and Employment.

 It is clear that a new paradigm is developing in 

how Army forces are likely to be employed in the 

future. Reading the current Army Transformation 

Roadmap, any number of the CSA’s recent 

statements regarding the “expeditionary” nature 

he wants the Army to adopt, or simply observing 

how operations were conducted during OEF and 

OIF, it becomes apparent that the U.S. military will 

focus on being able to conduct decisive combat 

operations simultaneously with conducting 

deployment operations. Not part of the original 

logistics transformational charter, supporting 

simultaneous deployment and employment 

represents a huge transformational challenge for 

Army logisticians. This concept has implications 

on logistics transformation that may be overlooked 

if they are not carefully addressed.

 Part of the challenge of supporting combat 

operations while the force is still deep into the 

deployment process, or conducting “a rolling 

start” as it was termed for OIF, lies in basic logistics 

planning and the development and execution of 

the initial support concept. In every operation in 

the future, unless otherwise dictated, we must 

plan to force package and integrate combat 

service support capability that enables support 

from the rear deck of the tank back to a plug into 

the wholesale supply and maintenance system; an 

end-to-end capability that allows for immediate 

and indefinite sustainment of whatever size unit 

is committed. This inevitably will require a break 

from traditional methods employed today that 

layer support echelons from brigade back through 

the theater support command in a build-up of 

forces. A likely approach may be the creation 

of an adequately sized logistics task force (LTF) 

that is flowed in as part of the combat force, with 

required resources from all echelons, and tailored 

to provide full-spectrum combat service support. 

Depending on the force projected, this LTF may or 

may not be comprised of the organic support units 

associated with the force. In general, efficiencies 

must be sacrificed to ensure effective support; this 

may mean that duplicate LTFs are established 

when forces are dispersed. 

 A second transformational requirement for 

simultaneous deployment and employment 

involves bending a rather rigid deployment 

process to the supported commander’s intent. This 

topic generates lots of discussion between parties 

which believe that this already happens and those 

who think that it occurs in name only. Joint and 

service doctrinal reference terms such as Latest 

Arrival Date and Required Delivery Date have 

different practical definitions depending upon 

what metric is being assessed and who is assessing 

it, specifically related to a pure transportation 

action or a target for when a unit can actually fight. 

What is clear is that large-scale transportation 

movements tend to initiate arguments for largescale efficiencies. The focus must always be that 

the concept of employment drives the concept of 

transportation, and not the reverse.

 A final requirement is the transformation of the 

traditional model of how we execute reception, 
24

staging, onward movement, and integration or 

RSOI tasks upon arrival in the area of operations. 

It is anticipated that the requirement to do RSOI 

will still exist in the future, but current debate 

centers on where and how it should be done. 

The transformational change required here 

is a mindset change more than anything else. 

Deployments in the future must be marked by the 

movement of combat ready formations that are 

capable of executing their missions when the ramp 

comes down, the door is opened, or the hatch is 

unbattened. This is beyond the scope of anything 

involving routine strategic deployment to date, 

with the exception perhaps of an airborne assault, 

but it must become the norm. Where commercial, 

governmental, domestic, or foreign laws and 

regulations preclude it from occurring, efforts 

coordinated at the highest strategic level necessary 

must be made to gain permissions, mitigate risk, 

and, most of all, to manage expectations.

 New concepts such as “sea basing” proposed 

by the Marine Corps and the Navy hold some 

promise. Some could argue that the floating an 

Army division and all necessary echelon above 

division support forces off the coast of Turkey and 

then projecting it through the Suez Canal and into 

operations was the biggest and most successful 

sea basing operation ever. The challenge for the 

Army will be to determine if the scope and size of 

projecting a large land component force equivalent 

to an Army division or corps calls for other 

solutions that may be more suited to projection 

from homestation to the area of operations without 

having to go through the sea base.

 Perhaps the most feasible answer is to limit 

the requirement for as much of the RSOI process 

as possible by deploying units in as close to 

a combat ready mode as possible. Again, this 

requires certain permissions for issues involving 

deployment of combat vehicles that are uploaded 

with ammunition and fuel. In addition, it requires 

a plan to rapidly reinstall weapons and radio 

equipment that may have to be dismounted for 

security reasons as well as a plan to ensure that 

basic loads of food, water, and repair parts are 

integrated and accessible on organic transport 

vehicles. It also must include an accounting of 

noncombat related life support items such as 

tentage, cots, and personnel baggage required for 

a long-term presence. Finally, it must be planned 

to occur in the most severe level of austerity using 

only the organic resources of the deploying unit.

 OIF provided an excellent, albeit relatively 

unpublicized, example of how to successfully 

employ a large and lethal Army force while in 

the midst of deploying it. Operations conducted 

between January 19, 2003, and April 14, 2003, 

by a mission tailored 30,000-soldier task force 

built around the 4th Infantry Division serve as 

an exceptional model of just how effectively we 

can execute this concept. All of the characteristics 

described above, force packaging and integrating 

required logistics capability into the flow of 

forces, adjusting the deployment mechanisms to 

meet the commander’s intent, and streamlining 

the JRSOI process, were exhibited in the planning 

and execution of the deployment of Task Force 

Ironhorse.

 The teaming, cooperation, partnership, and 

flexibility demonstrated by III Corps, FORSCOM, 

and USTRANSCOM resulted in the most rapid, 

precise, and efficient deployment of ground 

maneuver forces that the Army has ever executed. 

The upload, embarkation, debarkation, and 

configuration for combat of Task Force Ironhorse 

demonstrated the art of the possible. The first ship 

was being loaded within 120 hours of deployment 

notification and was underway a mere 48 hours 

later. Within the next 7 days, seven more ships 

were loaded and were enroute; and by February 

2, 2003, the entire division and all active duty 

component echelon above division units were 

staged in combat configured task organization at 

the port of embarkation awaiting transportation.65

When the decision was made to commit Task Force 

Ironhorse through Kuwait, it took the division 

only 10 days to get the first combat force package, 

a four battalion reinforced brigade combat team 

and the divisional cavalry squadron, through 

RSOI and committed into combat in Iraq north of 

Baghdad. Estimates are that this time would have 

been reduced to 72 hours if permission had been 

granted to deploy with ammunition uploaded on 

combat vehicles.66
25

 Discounting sailing time, the Army was able to 

project 115 Abrams Tanks, 128 Bradley Fighting 

Vehicles, 18 Self-propelled Howitzers, 18 Multiple 

Launch Rocket Systems, 16 reconnaissance and 

attack helicopters, associated logistics and other 

support vehicles from motor pools into combat in 15 

days. With ammunition uploaded, this time could 

have been reduced to 7 days. This demonstrates 

how a heavy force with overwhelming combat 

power can be uploaded for a contingency, placed 

in a standby status off of the coast of a hostile shore, 

be downloaded, and made ready for combat in 

an extremely rapid manner. This is reality today. 

If and when sailing times are reduced by the 

development of extremely high speed ocean going 

transport vessels, the argument about the inability 

to rapidly project heavy forces will become moot.

Organizational Design―Modular, 

Multifunctional, Multicapable. 

 It has been recognized for some time that a key 

component of logistics transformation, specifically 

with regard to the ability to sustain forces projected 

in an expeditionary manner, is the modular 

redesign of echelon above division combat service 

support organizations. Modularity enables the 

development of tailored logistics task forces of the 

kind previously described. The Army already does 

this tailoring today with current force structure 

that is far from modular. The resulting problem is 

that this is only accomplished with a great deal of 

effort, coordination, and with directive authority 

that cuts across several command echelons. The 

theory and practice are there, but the process is 

far from routine or as effective as it should be. 

Another product of the Force XXI experimentation 

era, echelon above division modular logistics 

units that perform supply, maintenance, and 

transportation functions, were all previously 

designed by CASCOM. Few of these designs have 

found their way into being, but the templates are 

all still there. The Army, specifically TRADOC 

and CASCOM, needs to step up the transition to 

modular units right now. They are relevant to the 

force today as well as to the future force.

 Multifunctionality is another goal for 

logistics unit redesign, although so far it has 

been confined mostly to redesign efforts within 

brigade or divisional structure. An example is 

the forward support company that was designed 

to support maneuver battalions in the Force XXI 

Division and the Stryker Brigades. The concept 

of multifunctionality applies to echelon above 

division logistics unit redesign as well. It is 

especially effective in reducing the command 

and control and administrative overhead that 

pure modularity usually requires; a modular 

unit requires some redundancies in these areas to 

enable it to be split and operated effectively. The 

Army needs to develop a number of echelon above 

division multifunctional logistics companies; 

a recommendation would be one per brigade 

element. These companies, in addition to purely 

functional ones that are modular, will enable the 

Army to have a ready pool of units that have 

the expertise and experience to provide the full 

spectrum of support functions. Multifunctional 

companies will be able to receive augmentation 

in the form of attachment from modular units, 

will deploy with the brigade, and will serve as the 

initial link between the brigade’s organic logistics 

element and the corps or theater. 

 Another requirement to achieve the 

transformation of logistics is a continued push 

towards producing multi-capable soldiers 

and units. In the late 1990s, CASCOM was 

very successful in combining several military 

occupational specialties in certain career fields 

and enhancing logistics support by developing 

soldiers who could perform tasks that spanned 

several echelons of support levels. The most 

notable success was the multi-capable maintenance 

soldier who could perform both organizational 

level and direct support level tasks. This resulted 

in manpower and manhour efficiencies and a 

reduction in personnel required. More importantly, 

however, it introduced effectiveness in the system 

as a greater degree of maintenance was able to be 

performed forward on the battlefield and combat 

systems were returned to the fight faster since 

some level of evacuation and the corresponding 

time associated with it was eliminated. Similar 

results may be possible in other logistics career 

fields and should be pursued.
26

 A final area of logistics force structure 

that requires a relook is the logistics battalion 

headquarters. Today, there are 21 different 

varieties of headquarters designed to support 

deployable Army ground forces. Also, nine 

different kinds of battalion headquarters are 

designed to support aviation units, medical units, 

and to work at ports.67 Some of these headquarters 

are multifunctional, and some are purely 

functional. A consolidation and simplification 

of these headquarters is required at both the 

divisional and echelon above division level. As 

the Army redesigns itself around the brigade as 

the central maneuver force, an opportunity exists 

to change concurrently the number of different 

types of ground support logistics battalions from 

15 to 4. The Army should develop three versions 

of the Forward Support Battalion (FSB); one to 

support a heavy brigade, one to support a light 

brigade, and one to support the Stryker Brigade. 

All the remaining logistics battalions, to include 

the Divisional Main Support Battalion (MSB) and 

all functional supply, maintenance, transportation, 

and movement control battalions, should be 

converted to the Corps Support Battalion (CSB) 

design. Note that if the Airborne Brigade, Air 

Assault Brigade, and Armored Calvary Regiment 

are not changed in the Army redesign, a slightly 

different FSB type headquarters for each of these 

would also be required. 

 The arguments for doing this are strong. The CSB 

is currently the only logistics battalion in the Army 

that is designed to be task organized or tailored to 

meet mission requirements. The only one with the 

appropriate staffing to command and control any 

type of logistics unit, less aviation and medical, a 

CSB historically commands up to seven different 

units in wartime. With a small staff augmentation 

of less than 10 personnel, or a redesign to make 

them a permanent part of the organization, the 

CSB could easily command aviation maintenance 

or medical supply or treatment units as well. The 

MSB is no longer needed; a CSB can fill this role. 

Functional battalions have limited capabilities; 

they do not have the staff expertise, experience, 

or knowledge to command and control any type 

of unit outside of their basic branch affiliation. 

Counter arguments will likely be presented by 

branch “purists” who claim that only transportation 

officers, or quartermaster officers, or ordnance 

officers can command certain types of units. This 

is archaic and shortsighted thinking. The success 

of the multifunctional logistician program is proof 

to the contrary. Branch specificity is only useful 

for lieutenants. The transition to multifunctional 

units and assignments needs to start with a select 

number of companies and apply to all captains. 

At the field grade level, there only needs to be 

one logistics career field; currently Functional 

Area 90 or Multifunctional Logistician. Branch 

parochialisms need to be set aside, and the “branch 

protected” functional logistics commands need to 

be disbanded, redesigned, and redesignated as 

CSBs.

Logistics Transformational Enablers―Kill the 

Nonfunctional and Fill the Gaps. 

 Transformation has spawned a number of 

“enablers” over the years. Industry responded 

enthusiastically to the Army’s call for new materiel 

and equipment solutions, new technologies, and 

new systems to develop an approach to warfare 

in the information age. As part of this process, 

the manner of developing and fielding logistics 

transformational enablers in the past decade has 

worked well. There have been many opportunities 

to get logistics transformation enabling items into 

the hands of soldiers to see how they perform 

in actual usage. This method, which includes 

a feedback loop from the soldier to the combat 

developer for modifications and improvements, 

is loosely referred to as “spiral development.” It 

works well and should be continued.

 At the same time, however, this process has 

perpetuated a situation where some enablers take 

on a life of their own, and it becomes difficult, if 

not impossible, to terminate a program that is not 

meeting requirements. A great example of this 

was the Combat Service Support Command and 

Control System. As noted previously, CSSCS was a 

system designed to provide situational awareness 

and a common operating picture of units’ overall 

logistics posture and status. In more basic terms, 
27

CSSCS was an automated version of the logistics 

status report (LOGSTAT). It also contained a suite 

of planning tools incorporated from other stand 

alone logistics planning models. In development 

for more than a decade in one form or another, 

CSSCS has never been able to provide logisticians 

with the responsive, reliable, and relevant results 

it promised to deliver. Although fielded for 

many years, with periodic software upgrades 

along the way, it never took hold as a useful and 

used tool which indicates its status as a failed 

system and program. The utter disregard for the 

system during OEF and OIF sounded its deathknell. A new system called the Battle Command 

Sustainment Support System (BCS3) is now under 

development to take its place.68

 There are several lessons here and at least one 

significant caution. The major lessons include a call 

to the combat developers and system and program 

managers in CASCOM, TRADOC, AMC, and on 

the Army Staff to listen to the field. For years, 

scores of logistics units and logistics leaders from 

individual CSSCS operators up through Division 

Support Commands, Corps Support Groups, 

and Corps Support Commands reported the 

significant shortcomings, problems, and failures 

of CSSCS. Their comments and concerns were 

listened to, noted, adopted as best as possible into 

subsequent versions of the system, but were never 

truly heeded and certainly never resolved. The 

result was years of effort and energy, mountains 

of money spent, and nothing of practical utility to 

show for it. Another lesson is that a line has to be 

drawn where we cut our losses, regroup, and go 

back and start over in a new direction. We waited 

for a war to tell us what we already knew years 

before but would not admit to. In one sense this 

was fortuitous, because without OIF to expose the 

glaring deficiencies and inadequacies of something 

like CSSCS, it would very likely still be chugging 

along and providing nothing of value.

 The caution here involves the next generation 

of systems that come as a replacement for existing 

ones; again CSSCS and its replacement, BCS3, 

being a great example. If the replacement system 

is nothing more than the previous one with a new 

name, perhaps a new look, but with the same 

theory, same technology, and same architecture 

and structure, it will suffer the same fate. Clearly 

some of the science will migrate, but if we rely 

too much on what was a failure before, we will 

have problems. If we develop BCS3, or any other 

system, without identifying, understanding, and 

addressing the root causes of what went wrong 

with its predecessor, we are wasting our time, 

money, energy, and effort again. The message is 

that if BCS3 is just CSSCS in different clothing, it 

will be recognized immediately. Efforts from the 

very top must preclude this from happening.

 With specific regard to logistics transformation 

and the requirement to develop an information 

technology system that facilitates logistics 

situational awareness, the recommendation is to 

keep it simple. What is needed is a LOGSTAT that 

is timely and accurate, easy to use, and able to be 

sent over assured communications that do not 

depend on line of sight. Do not call it a command 

and control system because that is not what it is; 

command and control is what commanders do, 

not machines. It does need the planning suite as 

one already exists in Operations Logistics Planner 

(OPLOGPLN) for the operational level and the 

Logistics Estimator Worksheet (LEW) for the 

tactical level. The Common Operating Picture 

(COP) that is fed in from other Army Battle 

Command Systems is nice to have but not at the 

expense of the LOGSTAT functionality. What is 

required is a means to access in-transit visibility 

so that the data from the Movement Tracking 

System can be displayed and monitored. CSSCS 

was never able to provide any sort of automated 

predictive logistics analysis. It is unlikely that 

BCS3 will be able to do so either. This function is 

still a human one, with the machines serving as a 

decision support tool.

 A number of gaps are yet to be filled by logistics 

enablers. Areas that require enablers to further 

logistics transformation include the supply and 

requisitioning system, communications, force 

protection for logistics units, repair parts storage 

and transport, and water distribution. Plans are in 

place for the eventual upgrade of legacy supply 

systems; the Standard Army Supply System 

(SARSS) and the Unit Level Logistics System 
28

(ULLS). The Global Combat Service Support System 

(GCSS) will replace SARSS and ULLS, as well as 

legacy maintenance management systems, but 

this will not occur in total for several more years.69

The truth is that SARSS and ULLS work fine for 

the Army, but lack of an assured communications 

system and data pipeline over long distances 

precludes its reliability in settings other than 

the motorpool in a garrison environment. This 

is no great secret or revelation; the problem has 

existed and been acknowledged for years. The 

solution simply had been out of reach for lack 

of technology until the development of satellite 

communications, and then not acted upon from 

that point due to lack of priority and funding. The 

opportunity to fix this problem in the near term 

with SARSS and ULLS, and subsequently in the 

future for GCSS, exists now. Procure the satellite 

based communications gear based on insights and 

justifications from the OEF and OIF experiences, 

and many problems will be solved. Letting GCSS 

suffer the same communications constraints 

that the current systems have, a line of sight 

radio system with limited range and bandwidth, 

provides no advantage and no transformational 

benefit.

 A transformation in force protection for 

logistics units requires enablers of a different 

sort. Unlike having to wait for new technologies 

or new systems to be developed and built, 

a transformation in force protection can be 

achieved by simply rewriting tables of equipment 

authorizations and procurement of more fielded 

systems. Ring mounts, 50 caliber machine guns, 

and 20 millimeter grenade launchers would go a 

long way to enhancing the survivability of logistics 

units. Increasing the numbers of radios, global 

positioning systems, and night vision devices to 

common sense levels in logistics units may have 

more immediate transformational effect than 

any other action ever taken, causing a dramatic 

improvement in the ability of logisticians to not 

only protect themselves but to perform their 

sustainment jobs more effectively. Making the “soft 

targets” of the Army less soft is another measure 

that is taken easily. A new tactical truck for the 

Army is not currently needed, and the Army’s 

logistics leadership wisely cancelled that program 

in recent months. What is needed are modifications 

and retrofit to existing trucks to improve 

hardening. An adjustment to production lines to 

incorporate better survivability characteristics in 

the existing models yet to be produced completes 

this strategy. These are all pen strokes and budget 

adjustments with little requirement for research 

and development, testing, and program review. 

They can and should be executed now.

 We have again proven that we need to have 

immediate access to an adequate and robust 

selection of repair parts. Distribution-based 

logistics will diminish some of this challenge, but 

there must still be parts carried down range by 

units and under their direct control to meet the 

current need until the larger system can provide 

the necessary resupply. The answer has always 

been to authorize units to carry a certain number 

of spare parts; termed a Prescribed Load List (PLL) 

at the organizational level and as an Authorized 

Stockage List (ASL) at the direct support echelon. 

There are two transformational aspects to this 

issue. The first involves a method of thinking about 

PLL and ASL in a more transformational way to 

ensure that any limits we place on these stockages 

of parts do not significantly reduce our ability to 

operate in a combat environment. PLL and ASL are 

determined by peacetime demands not wartime 

ones. OIF offers an outstanding opportunity to 

do the wartime analysis required to “right-size” 

our stockages of repair parts at all levels of supply 

so that we do not face the crises we faced in Iraq 

with certain items; track shoes, track pads, and 

suspension items being examples. PLL and ASL 

are also limited by a willingness to sink costs into 

on the shelf inventory. Again, transformational 

thinking needs to be applied here. It must be about 

effectiveness over efficiency. Inventories must be 

determined by need, not by aversion to cost of 

items on hand but not used in peacetime. Finally, 

PLLs and ASLs traditionally are limited by a unit’s 

ability, or inability, to transport. There are several 

materiel solutions of a transformational nature. 

One is better systems for carrying parts of some 

of the commercially available containers that exist 

today; containers that have designed shelving 
29

and drawer spaces for maximizing available 

space. They are expensive but readily available. 

The other solution is more of the right kind of 

trucks, specifically those having a palletized 

loading capability, that can be made available to 

move, quickly download, and move repair parts 

again. The exact number of trucks required and 

a decision on where to assign them, either to the 

brigade’s logistics organization or to an echelon 

above brigade logistics organization such as a 

CSB, need to be determined once requirements for 

PLL and ASL are set.

 A final transformational enabler that, like 

radios, global positioning devices, and night 

vision devices, long has been recognized as a 

valid requirement but remains unresourced is 

bulk water transportation. The Army today has 

primarily the same bulk water distribution system 

it had in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. We 

rely on 400-gallon trailer mounted water tanks and 

canteens. The 3,000- and 5,000-gallon Semi-Trailer 

Fabric Tank (SMFT) and the 500-gallon collapsible 

gallon water drum, developed in the 1970s and 

1980s, lack flexibility in movement or are too small 

and labor intensive to be effective. The answer, of 

course, is a water tank truck, which does exist in 

small numbers. Never fielded in great numbers due 

to dollar constraints, its absence plagues us every 

time we deploy the force in any size configuration. 

The Army has been pursuing the development of 

a modular water system based on a water tank 

that can be lifted and moved by a palletized load 

system (PLS) truck. The weight of water and the 

lift limitations of the truck actually require more 

transportation assets to be committed to complete 

water distribution than if a 5,000-gallon tanker 

similar to an Army fuel tanker were to be used. 

This is one instance where a new transformational 

solution is actually resident in an older established 

platform. Additional capability in the form of the 

PLS water tank is fine, but it should follow the 

procurement of water tanker trucks.

Transforming Logistics Leaders. 

 The final and most important logistical 

transformational change that must occur involves 

leader development. Developing transformational 

logistics leaders is different than simply explaining 

what transformation is or that it has stalled. As 

described previously, that is a relatively easy 

thing to accomplish, but it will only help to restart 

the logistics transformation process. To ensure 

that transformation is successfully continued 

and concluded, the Army needs to transform its 

leaders as well. Transformation is as much about 

soldiers, and the way they think and act in a new 

operational framework, as is it is about materiel, 

systems, and processes. This is a well-recognized 

and well-publicized idea that has routinely made 

its way into DoD, Joint, and Army transformation 

publications; usually in the foreword or the 

very first paragraphs.70 It, like many other 

transformational concepts, has been written about 

more than it has been implemented.

 This process of leader development must occur 

at all levels both in the logistics schoolhouse and 

in logistics units in the field. Several overriding 

themes must be stressed in leader development 

programs. The leader development models that 

currently reside in the traditional “leadership 

development schools” such as the Primary Leader 

Development Course (PLDC) or in the officer 

basic courses should be retained. The leader 

development portions of logistics branch specific 

courses for noncommissioned officers at both at 

the basic and advanced levels and the Combined 

Logistics Captains Career Course should maximize 

their focus on small unit leader actions and tactical 

proficiencies. Leader development programs in 

units must focus on the practical application of 

staff functions, military occupational skill training, 

troop leading procedures, and combat survival 

skills. The idea that to be able to support, you must 

be able to survive must be stressed constantly; 

there is no rear area.

 The frame of reference, strategic environment, 

and context in which both current and future 

operations will be conducted is marked by a 

much greater degree of complexity, uncertainty, 

chaos, and ambiguity than just a few years ago. 

In addition, threat patterns have begun to emerge, 

seen most vividly in Iraq, indicating that logistics 

forces are the primary targets of our adversaries. 

The tendencies towards asynchronous threats 

redefine the battlefield in such a manner as to 
30

require the same level of combat preparedness 

from every soldier in every unit regardless of 

location or position. Finally, operational strategies 

being discussed for employment of Army forces in 

the future point towards a logistics footprint that 

relies more on junior leaders in an autonomous 

role with a much greater responsibility and fewer 

layers of logistical hierarchy above them in the 

area of operations to offer guidance or to provide 

redundancy of support. 

 A final thought on leader development 

as it applies to logisticians in general and 

to transformation in particular. Innovation, 

adaptability, and a mature sense of when and 

how to identify, mitigate, and take risks are 

required leadership traits in logistics leaders 

at all ranks. Innovation is important because it 

encourages leaders to generate new ideas and 

see them to completion. Adaptability fosters an 

attitude towards accepting change. Both of these 

leader qualities also contribute to the ability to 

improvise, adjust, and reinvent flexible solutions 

and support concepts once the force is engaged. 

Understanding risk management will enable 

leaders to stay grounded in the reality of “what 

is” when it comes to transformational concepts 

and not get lost in the nebulous area of “what if” 

that may cause operations to fail when concepts 

are not mature enough or not viable enough to be 

effective. 

WHAT IS UNLIKELY TO EVER CHANGE

 The laws of physics still apply to transformation. 

Focused Logistics cannot overcome certain truths 

and realities that may characterize operations. 

Truths such as extended lines of communications 

that create a minimum time-distance equation to 

transit, adverse weather, and bad or untrafficable 

terrain will always affect effectiveness. Requirements for the force, such as food, water, fuel, 

and ammunition, will never be driven by the 

relative capability to provide support, but by 

need. Predictive rates of failure or predictive rates 

of consumption will always remain predictive. 

Demand supported items associated with 

maintenance repair parts will always require a 

system that can be reactive, yet timely. The design 

of the transformed Army may be self-sustaining 

for a period, but operational commanders at all 

levels will always reserve the right to change 

requirements or priorities. Disorder, uncertainty, 

fluidity, and friction will continue to characterize 

current and future battlefields. Violence and 

danger, moral and physical forces, and the human 

dimension will remain as part of the enduring 

nature of war. Finally, we must never forget that 

the enemy will always get a vote.

WHAT SHOULD NEVER CHANGE

 Certain elements of logistics theory and 

practice should never change no matter what 

transformational systems exist to facilitate 

sustainment, what support concept is put in 

place, or what mission is being supported. The 

basic skills of soldiering and principles of troop 

leading are everlasting. Technical and tactical 

skills associated with mission performance such 

as contact drills, convoy procedures, fire control, 

site occupation, and priority of work must not be 

ignored. These are all basic blocking and tackling 

tasks that must be mastered, and that no amount 

or type of transformation can change or displace. 

The logistics tenets or characteristics found in 

FM 4-0, Combat Service Support, are also constants 

that should be applied to planning and execution 

of all logistics operations. Referred to as “guides 

to analytical thinking and prudent planning,” 

they reflect the fundamentals of effective combat 

service support.71 Similarly, logistics planning 

and support concepts must always be integrated 

and synchronized with maneuver planning and 

with the plans of the higher logistics headquarters 

or higher echelon. Perhaps the most valuable 

contribution to warfare that the logistician brings 

to the combat commander is the assessment of 

logistics feasibility of the planned operation. In 

addition to informing the commander when he has 

achieved a sufficient level of logistics attainability 

to commence operations in accordance with the 

plan, the logistician must also identify the logistics 

risk that may lead to culmination or failure. Finally, 

the logistician must always be prepared to support 
31

operations that are only marginally logistically 

feasible; striving to ensure sustainability through 

all the collective talent and ability of the logistics 

soldiers and leaders, support systems, and architecture available. 

WHAT WE CHANGE FIRST AND WHO 

MUST CHANGE IT

 The priority for logistics transformational 

change will always be a debatable point. The reality 

is that the Army can probably change several 

things simultaneously and should strive to do so. 

The most important thing to change, however, is 

more easily identified. Logistics transformation 

efforts must start with the people and the mindset; 

the logistics leaders and soldiers of the force must 

adopt ownership of transformation. Education of 

the current status; identification of past, present, 

and future challenges; and the roadmap for the 

way ahead are the starting points. Everything else 

will flow from this beginning. By doing this, we 

will identify the believers and the blasphemers, 

the change agents and the naysayers, and we 

will combine the folks with the muddy boots and 

the folks whose buildings and offices have no 

windows into one team. What must change first 

also describes who must change it. It will take all of 

the individuals identified above working together 

to get logistics transformation back on track and 

to keep it there.

CAMPAIGN QUALITY LOGISTICS WITH 

A JOINT AND EXPEDITIONARY MINDSET

Meeting the Goal―Campaign Quality Combat 

Service Support.

 The current CSA charter to the Army is 

very clear. We must become a relevant and 

ready campaign quality Army with a joint and 

expeditionary mindset. This does not contradict 

logistics transformation. In fact, it helps to focus 

it. The phrase campaign quality has several 

connotations. As it applies to logistics, it means 

developing and validating the sustainment 

linkages among the tactical, operational, and 

strategic level of combat service support. These 

linkages include all interrelated functions of 

logistics and combat service support: supply 

and services, transportation, ordnance support, 

health service support, human resource support, 

financial management operations, legal support, 

and religious support. Campaign quality also 

means that all phases of a campaign described 

by Army and Joint publications must be planned, 

nested, synchronized, and rehearsed at all levels. 

Joint is Not a Four-Letter Word.

 Joint logistics likewise does not oppose or 

challenge logistics transformation. Joint operations 

are a reality, a necessity, and the desired way of 

conducting operations. Joint logistics enables each 

service to take advantage of other component 

capabilities and strengths, promotes economies of 

scale, avoids duplication of effort, and precludes 

counterproductive competition when resources 

are scare. The Army needs to do a great deal more 

in its logistics transformation efforts to promote 

jointness. The first step is to communicate what 

we are doing to our sister services. The priority 

of that communication should be with the Marine 

Corps, followed by the Air Force, and then the 

Navy.

 Army logistics transformation initiatives 

that impact most on other services involve 

support provided under Inter-Service Support 

Agreements and in instances where the Army has 

been designated as the lead service. The changes 

that the Army is seeking to make in achieving a 

distribution-based logistics system are the most 

critical ones that need to be shared. If DoD directs 

a change in focus for the Army towards a sense 

and respond logistics system, the requirement to 

share how the Army plans to implement these 

processes becomes even more important because 

it will involve some changes from the current 

approach. The Army also needs to clarify its role as 

an expeditionary force and synchronize its efforts 

with both the Navy and the Marine Corps with 

regard to “sea-basing” initiatives being worked 

by those services. Finally, the Army needs to share 

technologies and information on certain logistics 
32

enablers; specifically the ones dealing with intransit visibility. Sister services and higher Joint 

headquarters being able to access information on 

inbound Army convoys promotes joint situational 

awareness of the logistics effort.

 A significant transformational logistics 

initiative proposed from the Joint Staff is the 

creation of a Joint Theater Logistics Command 

(JTLC). Still in the discussion phase and lacking 

any concrete approval or guidance to establish this 

headquarters, the idea requires serious analysis by 

the Army. This command would replace or perhaps 

subsume the Army’s Theater Support Command. 

It would definitely have an impact on roles and 

missions, responsibilities and requirements, and 

command and control of theater level combat 

service support. The JTLC would be responsible to 

the combatant commander or the land component 

commander as a Joint headquarters and not a 

service one. The Joint Staff has developed many 

arguments that point to advantages in doing this, 

including unity of effort, common standards, 

enhanced interdependence, single arbitrator of 

priorities, economies of scale, information fusion, 

and better integration of staffs. The Joint Staff 

presents almost no disadvantages. The Army has 

yet to express a strong opinion on the matter in 

anything currently published. The danger is that 

this concept, which may indeed be the best way 

to go, may be adopted and directed without being 

vetted with the Army; a problem because the Army 

will almost certainly be charged with making it a 

reality and may not be prepared to do so if not 

aware of the full scope of the issue.

To Be More Expeditionary―What it Really 

Means to Logistics Transformation.

 Expeditionary warfare and logistics transformation are a good fit for one another. The 

expeditionary method of operations will serve 

to drive logistics transformation where it needs 

to go. Logistics transformation, in turn, will help 

to scope the reality of what expeditionary is and 

what it can be. The term expeditionary has been 

in the Army lexicon for many years, and many 

Army operations in the past can be classified as 

expeditionary in nature. In recent times though, the 

term expeditionary has become more associated 

with the Marine Corps than the Army. The Army’s 

doctrinal writing on the subject is currently rather 

thin, but we can expect that to change as soon as 

this new vision takes hold.

 Expeditionary operations are described by 

rapid and immediate projection of forces into an 

area that is frequently controlled by the enemy. 

Forces conducting these types of operations 

are usually tailored so that they are no heavier 

than necessary. Logistics characteristics of 

expeditionary operations often include the 

requirement to support from a distance, to deal 

with severe austerity, to adapt to the environment, 

and to ensure advantage by seeking innovation. 

Supporting expeditionary operations may mean 

that there is a temporary creation of a support 

structure in a task force format to sustain operations 

to their conclusion.72 It may also be, for the Army 

anyway, that expeditionary operations are not 

temporary in nature and that follow-on logistics 

forces must be accommodated and incorporated 

into the sustainment plan.

 Logistics transformation supports the conduct 

of expeditionary operations in several ways. 

Modularity and multifunctionality are key 

elements in the transformed logistics force and 

requirements for providing a tailored support 

package that has both the needed tactical and 

operational capabilities and the strategic linkages. 

The ability to conduct “reach-back” sustainment 

operations enabled by transformed information 

technology systems and a robust and dependable 

distribution-based logistics system is a prerequisite 

for successful expeditionary operations. The 

ability to operate in an austere environment and 

to do things such as RSOI without significant 

overhead or additional force commitment is 

where the Army is headed and what is frequently 

required in an expeditionary setting. The ability 

to expand the lodgment and sustain operations 

for an indefinite period over extended lines of 

communications addresses the realities of today’s 

strategic environment and likely future conflicts. 

Finally, the innovative and adaptive nature of 

Army logisticians ensures that the uncertainty, 
33

disorder, and friction inherent in expeditionary 

operations will be managed successfully.

REENERGIZING LOGISTICS 

TRANSFORMATION

How We Do It . . . Now. 

 Reenergizing logistics transformation now is 

all about leverage and opportunity. More than a 

few good reasons have been identified for why 

the Army must continue to transform. Similarly, 

even more examples exist of where we have yet 

to do so. The best and worst thing that could have 

happened to logistics transformation was the 

Global War on Terror and the experiences of OIF 

and OEF. It was the best thing because it gave the 

Army perspective on where we really are with the 

transformational change process to date; exposing 

strengths, weaknesses, and future possibilities 

through the crucible of combat. It also gives us 

incentive, initiative, and arguments to resource 

the fixes needed. On the other hand, the tempo of 

current operations and the necessary attention and 

energy that must be given to wartime operations 

could detract from the simultaneous requirement 

to transform. 

 A great opportunity exists now to harness 

the current mood and recognition that change 

is needed. The lessons of OIF and OEF are not 

difficult to see despite the 6-8 months it took to 

publicly acknowledge them. The Army does not 

appear to be confusing victory with success in 

terms of how effectively we have transformed our 

logistics forces, systems, and processes. There is 

support for change at all levels; from the units in 

the field, through Joint and service headquarters 

and staff, through DoD, and in Congress.

 The Army is also fortunate on two other 

accounts. The template for change is already out 

there, and the great work done in the last decade 

holds many of the answers. Some effort may 

need to be modified or updated to meet current 

requirements or to address present realities, but 

the fact is that logistics transformation does not 

have to begin again from a cold start. The second 

advantage is that the Army currently enjoys a 

wealth of recent and relevant combat experience 

from the logisticians who will be tomorrow’s 

senior leaders. This is a rare opportunity that must 

not be overlooked. These soldiers, commanders, 

command sergeants majors and first sergeants, 

staff officers and noncommissioned officers, 

platoon leaders and platoon sergeants at all levels 

of divisional and nondivisional logistics units from 

the theater support command, COSCOM, and 

DISCOMs are key in jump-starting transformation. 

They have a great expectation for change because 

they just witnessed what is and what might be. 

The Army must track these leaders and extract 

their valuable insights.

The Way Ahead. 

 Restarting a stalled process is not easy. In 

the case of the stall of logistics transformation, 

it is made more complicated because the stall 

may not be self-evident to all the individuals 

involved or concerned or upon whom it impacts. 

Transformation is about people; it always has 

been, and it always will be. The people of the 

Army, soldiers and civilians, must be involved to 

transform it. No technology or piece of equipment 

or new and revolutionary process will make it 

happen without people involvement. This is not 

an incredible insight; rather it is a blindingly 

obvious one. This may explain why it has been 

so easily overlooked or taken for granted. Getting 

the whole Army, especially Army logisticians, 

involved in transformation is how to get it going 

again and how to keep it going.

 Logistics transformation is a contact sport. It 

cannot be accomplished from the sidelines, or the 

stands, or the press box. It must happen on the 

field, and the players must be willing to get dirty 

and work hard to win. The field today is even 

more difficult to traverse than it might normally 

be. There are more obstacles, the stakes are 

higher, and the other team is playing for keeps. 

At the same time, though, our team has more 

talent, more experience, and is more engaged and 

focused than it has ever been. There is also the 

question of resources and support, both of which 

run significantly deep at the moment. The time 
34

to get logistics transformation going is now. We 

must tone down the rhetoric, the promises of the 

briefing slides and point papers, the concept sales 

pitches and get after the hard work at hand. We 

must do it with an integrated strategy, a roadmap, 

a timeline, and milestones. This is our logistics 

corps and our doctrine. It is ours to form and 

design and ours to train and fight. We must not 

fail.

ENDNOTES

 1. Gerry J. Gilmore, “Rumsfeld, Keane Discuss Army 

Transformation, Troop Rotations,” July 23, 2003; available 

from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2003/n07232003_ 

200307231. html; Internet, accessed November 10, 2003.

 2. Peter J. Schoomaker, The Way Ahead: Our Army at War 

. . . Relevant and Ready, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 

the Army, January 2004, p. 1; available from http://www.army.

mil/ thewayahead/foreword.html. Internet, accessed January 20, 

2004.

 3. Ibid., p. 14.

 4. Dennis J. Reimer, “A Note from the Chief of Staff 

of the Army on The Revolution in Military Logistics,” 

Army Logistician, January-February 1999 [journal on-line]; 

available from http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/backissues.htm; 

Internet, accessed November 7, 2003.

 5. For observations and insights on Operations NOBLE 

EAGLE and ENDURING FREEDOM, see Conrad C. Crane, 

Final Report: The U.S. Army’s Initial Impressions of Operations 

Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. 

Army War College, August 2003. See also Perry L. Knight, 

Observations on Operation Enduring Freedom: Recommendations 

for Development of the Transformation Objective Force Logistics 

Structure, Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 

U.S. Army War College, April 7, 2003. For observations and 

insights on OIF, see U.S. Army Operation Iraqi Freedom Study 

Group, “U.S. Army Operation Iraqi Freedom Observations 

Quick Look,” briefing slides, Fort Leavenworth, KS: 

Center for Army Lessons Learned, August 2003. Available 

from https://call2.army.mil/oif/brief.asp; Internet, accessed 

November 6, 2003.

 6. Schoomaker, p. 14.

 7. Murray Davies, Commanding Change: War Winning 

Strategies for Organizational Change, Westport, CT: Praeger 

Publishers, 2001, p. 26.

 8. Gordon R. Sullivan and Michael V. Harper, Hope is 

Not a Method: What Business Leaders Can Learn from America’s 

Army, New York: Random House, 1996, pp. 26-32.

 9. Schoomaker, p. 1.

 10. Ibid.

 11. The first series of significant articles focusing on the 

aspects of logistics change, or the Revolution in Military 

Logistics as it was originally termed, began to appear in 

1998 and 1999 when Major General Dan Brown was the 

Commanding General of the Combined Arms Support 

Command (CASCOM). These articles, mostly written by 

personnel assigned to CASCOM, detailed the major work 

conducted during this period as the 4th Infantry Division 

at Fort Hood, Texas, was being redesigned to what became 

known as the Force XXI model. CASCOM’s two-fold 

requirement to write new logistics doctrine, and to develop 

new support concepts to utilize the “logistics enablers” in 

the redesigned divisional logistics battalions of the Force 

XXI Division, were the impetus for these articles. Quite 

frankly, up to this point CASCOM had very little product 

to share with the field. The product now matured, and the 

opportunity to test Force XXI logistics concepts and force 

structure at National Training Center rotation 99-05 in March 

1999, with the same brigade of the 4th Infantry Division that 

had conducted the Advanced Warfighting Experiment some 

2 years earlier, generated a series of articles. Most of these 

articles were published in Army Logistician. 

 12. Sullivan and Harper, p. 19.

 13. Dennis J. Reimer, Army Vision 2010, Washington, 

DC: U.S. Department of the Army, November 1996; available 

from http://www.army.mil/2010/introduction.htm; Internet, 

accessed on November 7, 2003. 

 14. The focus of the Force XXI Advanced Warfighting 

Experiment (AWE) in 1997 was on situational awareness as 

provided by the first generation Future Battle Command 

Brigade and Below (FBCB2). While logistics in support 

of the rotation were conducted, it was not a major part of 

the data collection effort designed and executed by the 

Army. In fact, significant artificialities in the form of extra 

military personnel and contractors termed “Red Hats” were 

deployed to ensure that logistics support, or lack thereof, 

would not in any way hamper the data collection effort on 

the situational awareness aspects of the experiment. Far 

from being a normal “freeplay” exercise in terms of logistics 

support, the AWE saw a much greater level of logistics 

support than would normally be present to support this size 

force. Furthermore, the systems and concepts later exercised 

in 1999 were not fielded to the 4th Infantry Division or 

developed to the degree that they could be presented as 

new doctrine or tactics, techniques, and procedures. The 

logistics community published only a handful of articles 

referencing the AWE and very little discussion or analysis 

among logisticians at large across the Army took place as 

a result. See “Digital Warfighting Ability Tested,” Army 

Logistician, March-April 1997 [journal on-line]; available 

from http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/backissues.htm; Internet, 

accessed November 7, 2003. See also “Army EXFOR Tested 

in AWE,” Army Logistician, July-August 1997 [journal online]; available from http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/backissues.

htm; Internet, accessed November 7, 2003.
35

 15. John J. Cusick and Donald C. Pipp, “In Search of 

Focused Logistics,” Army Logistician, May-June 1997 [journal 

on-line]; available from http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/

backissues.htm; Internet, accessed November 7, 2003.

 16. John J. Cusick and John M. Shalikashvili, Joint Vision 

2010, Focused Logistics, A Joint Logistics Roadmap, Washington, 

DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 1, 1997, Foreword; 

available from http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/history/focuslog.

pdf, Internet, accessed November 7, 2003.

 17. Eric E. Smith, “A Logistics-Focused NTC Rotation,”

Army Logistician, September-October 1999 [journal on-line]; 

available from http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/backissues.htm; 

Internet, accessed November 7, 2003.

 18. Johnnie E. Wilson, John G. Coburn, and Daniel G. 

Brown, “Our Revolution in Military Logistics-Supporting the 

21st Century Soldier,” Army Logistician, January-February 

1999 [journal on-line]; available from http://www.almc.army.

mil/alog/backissues.htm; Internet, accessed November 7, 2003.

 19. Mark J. O’Konski, “Revolution in Military LogisticsAn Overview,” Army Logistician, January-February 1999 

[journal on-line]; available from http://www.almc.army.mil/

alog/backissues.htm; Internet, accessed November 7, 2003.

 20. Eric K. Shinseki, Statement on the Army Transformation, 

Posture Statement presented to the Airland Subcommittee 

on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 106th Cong., 2d sess, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, March 8, 

2000; available from http://www.senate.gov/~armed_services/

statement/2000/000308es.pdf, Internet, accessed November 7, 

2003. 

 21. Eric K. Shinseki and Louis Caldera, “Army 

Vision,” Military Review, September-October 2000 [journal 

on-line]; available from http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/

english/SepOct00/caldera.asp; Internet, accessed January 25, 

2004. 

 22. Ronald V. Robinson, Combat Service Support Reach: 

A Risky Support Strategy for the Interim Brigade Combat Team, 

IBCT, Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. 

Army War College, April 9, 2002, p. 6.

 23. The concept of CSS Reach was first used in June 2001 

in U.S. Department of the Army, Operations, Field Manual 

3-0, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, June 

2001. The first use and definition of this term in a logistics 

doctrinal publication was in the draft and later the approved 

version of U.S. Department of the Army Field Manual 4-0, 

Combat Service Support, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 

the Army, August 29, 2003. 

 24. GAO-04-188: Military Transformation, The Army and 

OSD Met Legislative Requirements for First Stryker Brigade 

Design Evaluation, but Issues Remain for Future Brigades, 

Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, December 

10, 2003, pp. 25-27.

 25. Gordon S. Holder, Focused Logistics Campaign Plan, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 10, 2003, 

p. 4; available from http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/j4/projects/foclog/

focusedlogistics.pdf, Internet, accessed November 7, 2003.

 26. Ibid., p. 11. 

 27. Ibid., p. 13.

 28. Robert D. Paulus, “Delivering Logistics Readiness 

to the Warfighter,” Army Logistician, January-February 2004 

[journal on-line], p. 6; available from http://www.almc.army.

mil/alog/backissues.htm; Internet, accessed February 22, 2004.

 29. Holder, pp. 11-13.

 30. U.S. Department of Defense, Sense and Respond Logistics: 

Co-evolution of an Adaptive Capability, Concept of Operations, 

Version 3.0, Washington, DC: Office of Force Transformation, 

September 12, 2003, para 1-2; available from http://www.oft.osd.

mil/library/library_files/document_229_SRL%20CONOPS%

20v3.0.doc; accessed on January 22, 2004.

 31. Crane, p. 2.

 32. Ibid., p. 3.

 33. Knight, p. 16.

 34. Ibid., p. 15.

 35. U.S. Department of the Army, The First Year: U.S. 

Army Forces Central Command During Operation Enduring 

Freedom, Draft Case Study, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army 

War College, November 1, 2002, p. 9. 

 36. Crane, p. 7. 

 37. John A. Bonin, U.S. Army Force Central Command in 

Afghanistan and the Arabian Gulf During Operation Enduring 

Freedom: 11 September 2001-11 March 2003, Carlisle, PA: 

Army Heritage Center, March 2003, p. 29.

 38. John Abizaid, quoted in Bob Edwards, “Military 

Finding it Hard to Keep Up with Troops Logistical Needs,” 

National Public Radio Morning Edition, 31 March 2003 (746 

words) [database on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis; 

accessed November 17, 2003.

 39. Victor D. Hanson, quoted by Richard B. Cheney, 

Remarks by the Vice President to the American Society of News 

Editors, Remarks presented at The Fairmont Hotel, New 

Orleans, LA: The White House, Office of the Vice President, 

April 9, 2003; available from http://cndyorks.gn.apc.org/caab/

articles/cheneyonroguestates.htm; Internet, accessed January 

22, 2004.

 40. Numerous articles regarding the apparent success 

of logistics operations during OIF appeared in both Army 

and Joint professional military journals between March and 

October 2003. All of these articles were extremely laudatory 

in tone and claimed only great successes. See George Cahlink, 

“Logistics Lessons,” Government Executive, Vol. 35, No. 14, 

September 2003, pp. 61-65; Susan Declercq Brown and Phyllis 

Rhodes, “DLA: Logistics Backbone of Iraqi Freedom,” Army 

Logistician, July-August 2003 [journal on-line], available 

from http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/backissues.htm, Internet, 

accessed November 6, 2003. See also Walter Kross, “Iraqi 
36

Freedom: Triumph of Precision-Guided Logistics,” Army 

Logistician, September-October 2003 [journal on-line], 

available from http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/backissues.htm, 

Internet, accessed December 6, 2003. See also J. R. Wilson, 

“Logistics Fixes That Took Root,” Armed Forces Journal, Vol.

141, No. 3, October 2003, pp. 44-50. 

 41. Tommy Franks, quoted in Andrea Stone, “U.S. 

Supply Lines Need an Army of Their Own,” USA Today,

March 31, 2003, sec. A, p. 1 [database on-line], available from 

Lexis-Nexis, accessed November 17, 2003.

 42. Walter J. Boyne, Operation Iraqi Freedom: What Went 

Right, What Went Wrong, and Why, New York: Forge Books, 

2003, p. 124.

 43. This data was kept as a matter of record by the author 

in my own personal notes while serving as the Assistant 

Chief of Staff, G4, for the 4th Infantry Division in Tikrit, Iraq, 

on the dates indicated. 

 44. Boyne, p. 124. 

 45. U.S. Army Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group, 

“U.S. Army Operation Iraqi Freedom Observations Quick 

Look,” briefing slide 5 of 88, Leavenworth, KS: Center for 

Army Lessons Learned, August 2003; available from https://

call2.army.mil/oif/brief.asp, Internet, accessed November 6, 

2003.

 46. Ibid., slide 16 of 88.

 47. See 3rd Infantry Division, Mechanized, “Third 

Infantry Division: Operation Iraqi Freedom,” briefing slides 

with scripted commentary, Fort Benning, GA: U.S. Army 

Infantry School Infantry Conference 2003, September 8, 2003, 

slide 16, available from https://call2.army.mil/oif/brief.asp, 

Internet, accessed November 6, 2003. See also 4th Infantry 

Division, Mechanized, “Task Force Ironhorse: Operation 

Iraqi Freedom,” briefing slides, Fort Benning, GA: U.S. Army 

Infantry School Infantry Conference 2003, September 8, 2003, 

slides 23-24, available from https://call2.army.mil/oif/brief.asp, 

Internet, accessed November 6, 2003. See also 101st Airborne 

Division, Air Assault, “101st Airborne Division (AASLT) in 

Operation Iraqi Freedom,” briefing slides, Fort Benning, 

GA: U.S. Army Infantry School Infantry Conference 2003, 

September 8, 2003, slide 37, available from http://call2.army.

mil/oif/brief.asp, Internet, accessed November 6, 2003.

 48. Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iraq War: Strategy, 

Tactics, and Military Lessons, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 

2003, p. 206.

 49. This data was kept as a matter of record by the author 

in my own personal notes while serving as the Assistant 

Chief of Staff, G4 for the 4th Infantry Division in Camp New 

Jersey, Kuwait, and Tikrit, Iraq, between April 12, 2003, and 

June 16, 2003. 

 50. Eric Schmitt, “Army Study of Iraq War Details a 

‘Morass’ of Supply Shortages, New York Times, February 3, 

2004, sec. A, p. 1, [database on-line], available from ProQuest, 

accessed February 15, 2004.

 51. See Susan Declercq Brown and Phyllis Rhodes, 

“DLA: Logistics Backbone of Iraqi Freedom,” Army 

Logistician, July-August 2003 [journal on-line], available 

from http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/backissues.htm, Internet, 

accessed November 6, 2003. See also Walter Kross, “Iraqi 

Freedom: Triumph of Precision-Guided Logistics,” Army 

Logistician, September-October 2003 [journal on-line], 

available from http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/backissues.htm, 

Internet, accessed December 6, 2003. 

 52. GAO-04-305R: Defense Logistics: Preliminary 

Observations on the Effectiveness of Logistics Activities During 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, Washington, DC: U.S. General 

Accounting Office, December 18, 2003, p. 3, available from 

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04305r.pdf, Internet, accessed 

January 22, 2004.

 53. Ibid., pp. 2-3.

 54. Ibid., p. 5.

 55. This data was kept as a matter of record by the author 

in my own personal notes while serving as the Assistant 

Chief of Staff, G4 for the 4th Infantry Division in Camp New 

Jersey, Kuwait, and Tikrit, Iraq, between April 12, 2003, and 

June 16, 2003. 

 56. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Transformation Planning 

Guidance, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, April 

2003.

 57. The only logistics battalions to actively work 

transformation in the sense of redesigning force structure and 

organizations are the four of the five logistics battalions of 

the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Hood; the Forward Support 

Battalion of the 4th Infantry Division Brigade stationed at 

Fort Carson retains the former nontransformed structure, 

and the two logistics Battalions of the 25th Infantry Division 

and 2d Infantry Division at Fort Lewis. There are three 

echelon above division logistics battalions at Fort Hood 

and one at Fort Lewis that have had some interface with 

transformation in terms of supporting these transformed 

divisional battalions, but these units themselves have not 

transformed to any great degree. Logistics battalions in the 

1st Calvary Division at Fort Hood and another battalion 

from the Separate Infantry Brigade at Fort Richardson are in 

the process of transforming as of this writing.

 58. Davies, p. 15.

 59. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field 

Manual 4-0, Combat Service Support, Washington, DC: U.S. 

Department of the Army, August, 2003, para. 1-60.

 60. Department of Defense, Sense and Respond 

Logistics: Co-evolution of an Adaptive Capability, Concept of 

Operations, Version 3.0, Washington, DC: Office of Force 

Transformation, September 12, 2003, available from 

http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_229_

SRL%20CONOPS%20v3.0.doc; accessed on January 22, 

2004.

 61. The Sense and Respond Logistics Capability and 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, McLean, VA: Science Applications 
37

International Corporation, August 11, 2003, p. 5, available 

from http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library.cfm?libcol=6, Internet, 

accessed January 12, 2004.

 62. Delivering Materiel Readiness to the Army, Army 

Logistics White Paper, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 

the Army, December 2003, available from http://www.army.

mil/features/LogWhitePaper2004/LogWhitePaper.pdf, Internet, 

accessed January 10, 2004.

 63. Sense and Respond Logistics: Co-evolution of an Adaptive 

Capability, Concept of Operations, Version 3.0, p. 2. 

 64. V Corps Commander Lieutenant General William 

Wallace, in a position better than most to know FBCB2 as 

he fielded it in 4th Infantry Division 7 years ago, has issued 

some cautions, stating: 

what’s important to understand is what 

you get and what you don’t get . . . the fact 

that you are looking at one screen that has 

blue and red icons on it does not necessarily 

mean that the picture that you’re looking at 

is a coherent, real-time, no-fooling picture of 

what’s going on the battlefield.

See Jefferson Morris, “Wallace: ‘Digital Divide’ Separates 

Soldiers From Net Warfare,” Aerospace Daily, October 9, 2003, 

available from http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/s20031009223408.

html; Internet, accessed October 9, 2003.

 65. Commander, Headquarters, U.S. Army Garrison, 

Fort Hood, TX, William H. Perry, III, “Chief of Staff Army, 

Deployment Excellence Award (DEA) Nomination 2003,” 

memorandum for Department of the Army, Headquarters, 

Installation Management Agency, Washington, DC, June 24, 

2003, part 2, tab a, p. 2. 

 66. 4th Infantry Division, Mechanized, slide 6.

 67. The 21 different types of logistics battalion 

headquarters designed to support ground forces include 

five types of Forward Support Battalions (Heavy, Light, 

Air Assault, Airborne, and Force XXI); a Brigade Support 

Battalion (Stryker); four types of Main Support Battalions 

(Heavy, Light, Air Assault, and Airborne); a Division 

Support Battalion (Force XXI); two types of Support 

Battalions to support Separate Brigades (Infantry and 

Armor); two types of Regimental Support Squadrons to 

support Armored Cavalry Regiments (Heavy and Light); a 

Corps Support Battalion; a Transportation Battalion (Motor 

Transport); a Transportation Battalion (Movement Control); 

a Petroleum Supply Battalion; a Maintenance Battalion; 

and a Water Supply Battalion. The nine different types of 

logistics battalion headquarters to support aviation and 

medical forces and to conduct or coordinate port operations 

include five types of Division Aviation Support Battalions 

(Heavy, Light, Air Assault, Airborne, and Force XXI); an 

Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Battalion; a Medical 

Logistics Battalion (an Area Support Medical Battalion); and 

a Transportation Battalion (Terminal). 

 68. Department of the Army, Battle Command 

Sustainment Support System (BCS3): Functional 

Requirements Document, Phase I, Fort Lee, VA: Combined 

Arms Support Command, November 2003, available 

from https://www.cascom.lee.army.mil/private/TSM_BCS3/

BCS3%20FRD%20FINAL.doc, Internet, accessed February 2, 

2004.

 69. Department of the Army, Global Combat Support 

System-Army, GCSS-Army, High Level Functional Description, 

Fort Lee, VA: Combined Arms Support Command, January 31, 

1998, available from https://www.cascom.lee.army.mil/private/

ISD/GCSS-A/Documentation/GCSS-Army_High_Level_

Funtional_Description_31_Jan_98.doc; Internet, accessed 

February 2, 2004. 

 70. Rumsfeld, Foreword.

 71. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field 

Manual 4-0, Combat Service Support, para. 1-9.

 72. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 3, Expeditionary 

Operations, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Navy, 

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, April 16, 1998, pp. 32-35.