INDIA'S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT:

TOWARDS THE YEAR 2000

Raju G. C. Thomas

July 29, 1996
ii

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iii

FOREWORD

In January 1996, the U.S. War College's Strategic Studies

Institute and the Center for Strategic and International Studies

hosted a conference on "Asian Security to the Year 2000."

In his presentation to the conference, Dr. Raju Thomas

examined India's defense perspectives and prospects. From the

standpoint of national security, India's post-independence

history divides neatly into a turbulent first half, which

included conflicts with China and Pakistan, and a relatively more

stable period since 1971. That stability has been rattled by

significant challenges (Kashmir, Sri Lanka, etc.), as Dr. Thomas

points out. Five years ago, the collapse of the Soviet Union

seemed to presage a more troubled era. Certainly, it caused as

broad a reassessment of strategic policy in South Asia as

elsewhere in the world.

Dr. Thomas analyzes India's security environment and the

three levels of challenges that India confronts in this post-Cold

War period--internal, conventional military, and nuclear. While

the challenges in each arena are profound and interrelated, he

finds considerable room for optimism that the early years of the

next century will see continued stability in South Asia.

While the risks may be low, the consequences of conflict

among states in the region with existing or near nuclear

capabilities would be serious indeed. Also, the longer term

offers the requirements for accommodating the rise of Chinese

power, watching the uncertain political evolution in Pakistan

and deciding India's own choices about expanding its role in the

region and the world.

Dr. Thomas' survey of Indian security provides valuable

insights to issues which will become increasingly germane to U.S.

strategic interests.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

RAJU G. C. THOMAS is Professor of Political Science at Marquette

University in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. He is the Co-Director of the

Joint Center for International Studies of the University of

Wisconsin-Milwaukee and Marquette University, one of 16 National

Resource Centers set up by the U.S. Department of Education.

Professor Thomas was a Visiting Scholar/Research Fellow at

Harvard University, the University of California-Los Angeles, the

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the International

Institute for Strategic Studies-London, and the University of

Wisconsin-Madison. He has lectured at or consulted with various

agencies of the U.S. Department of Defense, the Foreign Service

Institute of the U.S. State Department, the Royal College of

Defense Studies and the Royal Naval College of the British

Ministry of Defense, and at several universities in the United

States, Great Britain, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Australia,

Canada, South Korea, and Singapore. Between 1965 and 1969, he

worked for British multinational corporations in India. His most

recent book is Democracy, Security and Development in India (St.

Martins Press/Macmillan, 1996), and he is currently editing a

volume entitled The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: The Next

Phase. He was educated at Bombay University, the London School of

Economics, the University of Southern California, and the

University of California-Los Angeles, where he obtained his Ph.D.

in political science.
1

INDIA'S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT:

TOWARDS THE YEAR 2000

Introduction.

The end of the Cold War, marked by the collapse of the

Soviet Union, transformed the global security environment. This

sudden change generated a catharsis in India's security

perspectives and policies. During much of the Cold War, the

Soviet Union was a pivotal actor that influenced India's

formulation and conduct of its security policies.1

India had established security and military ties with the

Soviet Union in the mid-1960s following wars with China in 1962

and Pakistan in 1965. The growing collaboration was highlighted

in September 1971 by the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace and

Friendship which was signed at the height of the East Pakistan

secessionist movement.2

 With Sino-American "rapprochement" also

in progress at the same time, the treaty with the Soviet Union

enabled India to resolve the "Bangladesh" issue by force in

December 1971. India waged war with Pakistan without much fear of

military intervention by Pakistan's then allies, China and the

United States. However, even before 1991, India's security

problems were not directly related to Cold War politics. The

primary sources of Indian security fears were regional, not

global, although these fears were compounded by great power

intrusions into the region emanating from the politics of the

Cold War. Rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union,

and China and the Soviet Union, enabled Pakistan to obtain

American and Chinese military assistance to counter Indian

military capabilities. Meanwhile, India had turned increasingly

to the Soviet Union for weapons to counter or preempt Pakistani

arms procurement.

During this period there were constant pressures on the part

of both India and Pakistan to become nuclear weapons states. Two

underlying characteristics may be noted about the covert or

latent nuclear arms race in South Asia, one perpetual and the

other a relatively new situation. First, Pakistan's propulsion

towards nuclear weapons arose mainly from strategic imperatives,

namely, the threat from India. The nuclear energy rationalization

put forward by Pakistan later was an afterthought. The Pakistani

program may be viewed, therefore, as a "Security-to-Energy"

driven phenomenon. India, on the other hand, perceived nuclear

energy programs as critical for meeting anticipated shortfalls in

the country's overall energy needs. Thereafter, various security

rationalizations for nuclear weapons, such as the Chinese nuclear

threat, tended to be spinoffs from the technological capability

generated by the energy program. The Indian program, therefore,

may be seen as an "Energy-to-Security" driven phenomenon. This
2

analytical distinction is important when attempting to prevent

proliferation in South Asia. In the case of Pakistan, it is more

critical to address its security concerns, real or imagined. In

the case of India, it may be more meaningful to watch its nuclear

energy and space programs. These may be for genuine civilian

development purposes, but they could be diverted to the making of

nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems.

The second characteristic of the South Asian nuclear

situation was the change in the direction of India's primary

nuclear threat perceptions. As before, India still insists on

maintaining its "nuclear option," i.e., it will neither acquire

the bomb nor sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) for

the present. But, India also proclaims the right to acquire

nuclear weapons in the future if its security warranted such a

move. However, the same "option" policy now exists in a radically

different setting. Before the 1974 Indian atomic test, India's

nuclear option policy was directed solely at China's perceived

nuclear threat, but conditioned by Pakistan's expected reaction.

But, as Pakistan proceeded headlong towards acquiring the bomb

after the 1974 Indian test, there followed a decade of ambiguity

and uncertainty in India about the direction from which it faced

a nuclear threat. Was it China or was it Pakistan? By the early

to mid 1980s, Indian analysts were convinced that Pakistan had

put together an effective nuclear weapons program. Thereafter,

India's nuclear option policy was directed primarily at the

Pakistani nuclear threat.

This change in the orientation and direction of India's

perceived nuclear threats continues into the 1990s. It also marks

a significant change in India's ability to control the nuclear

situation in South Asia. At one time, India had the "luxury," as

it were, of deciding whether or not South Asia would become

nuclearized. Now Pakistan determines whether South Asia will

become nuclearized--while India can only respond.

Meanwhile, India's internal security problems, to include

violent secessionist movements and communal (mainly Hindu-Muslim)

rioting, have become perennial since independence. Only the

extent and intensity of these problems have varied. Until the

early 1980s, the separatist movements were largely confined to

the tribes of the northeast: Nagas, Mizos, Gharos, Khasis and

others. Following long bouts of insurgency and counterinsurgency, carving out three mini-states from the state of Assam

(Nagaland, Mizoram, and Meghalaya) mainly resolved these

pressures. Violent separatist movements in the major states of

Punjab, Assam and Kashmir commenced only after 1984. Hindu-Muslim

rioting remained sporadic, occurring mainly in Uttar Pradesh,

Bihar, Gujerat, and Maharashtra.

By rank order, Indian policymakers during the period 1960-90
3

judged threats in Southern Asia from China and Pakistan to be of

paramount concern, followed by the policies of the United States

and the Soviet Union. The "nuclear option" continued to be an

important part of the security debate among policymakers,

analysts, and the attentive Indian public. While separatist

movements in the northeast and Hindu-Muslim tensions were of

concern, by Indian standards, at least, political life went on

"as usual."

The Shifting Dymanics of India's Security Environment.

Whether gradual or sudden, substantial alterations have

taken place in the India's security environment. The strategic

relationships among India, Pakistan, and China at the regional

level, and China, Russia (formerly USSR), and the United States

at the global level, continue to define the security framework of

India, although the nature of these relationships has shifted,

and the intensity has declined.3

 Certain specific post-Cold War

global political, economic, and social trends--democratization,

marketization, increasing concerns about human rights violations,

regional integration--further define the evolving Indian

strategic environment. These constant or changing regional and

global interstate relationships directly or indirectly affect the

three basic levels of India's security concerns: internal

security, conventional military security, and nuclear security.

Each of these three basic levels demands new priorities in

policymaking. Considerable interaction takes place among them.

Internal security problems at the first level include

domestic violence and proxy wars conducted by India's neighbors

across national boundaries in support of Indian secessionist

movements. India alleges that Kashmiri and Sikh insurgents

operate out of Pakistan with Pakistani support. Before the Indian

Peacekeeping Forces went into Sri Lanka, many Tamil insurgents in

Sri Lanka allegedly operated from India.4 Before the creation of

Bangladesh in 1971, both China and Pakistan supported the Naga

and Mizo separatist movements in Northeast India. Secessionist

violence continues to rise and fall in Sindh in Pakistan, and

Assam in India. India could fuel the neighboring Sindhi

separatist movement, and Bangladesh could do the same with the

Assamese and Mizo separatist movements. Burma could support

separatist violence in Nagaland and Mizoram if it chose to do so.

During the height of these tribal insurgencies in the 1960s and

1970s, Naga and Mizo guerillas moved freely across the

uncontrolled Indo-Burmese frontiers and received small arms from

across the Burmese-Chinese border. Insurgency in Tibet in the

1950s led to war between India and China in 1962. Despite

improved relations between India and China today, repression or

instability in Tibet generates domestic debate in India regarding

its relations with China. India is directly or indirectly
4

involved or concerned about all such "internal" security issues

both within its own borders and those of its neighbors.

Security pressures at the second level concern the

continuing conventional arms race and the prospects for a

conventional war between India and Pakistan. The conventional

arms race needs to be examined in the context of internal

security problems and nuclear weapons capabilities in the region.

How effective are conventional forces in dealing with

insurgencies and terrorist strategies? Would nuclear weapons

capabilities in South Asia make conventional forces and military

strategies less relevant? Would this capability prevent

conventional wars between India and Pakistan for fear of

escalation to nuclear war, not unlike the situation among the

nuclear superpowers? Again, would such military paralysis at the

conventional and nuclear levels increase wars of proxy through

clandestine arms supplies to insurgents across national

boundaries?

The interaction of domestic and unconventional security

problems (insurgency, terrorism, and large-scale civilian

violence) with conventional external security problems

(traditional inter-state wars) complicates and muddles the role

of the armed forces. Should the regular armed forces be used to

address both problems of security since they impinge upon each

other? The Indian armed forces have resisted this idea, claiming

that they are not trained to deal with internal security and that

such a role would also undermine their effectiveness in dealing

with external security threats.

Security concerns at the third level may be found in the

potential nuclearization of South Asia and its likely impact on

regional and global stability. Is South Asia already nuclearized?

Should we attempt to create a nuclear weapons-free zone in South

Asia, or a nuclear weapons-safe zone? Is it possible for India

and Pakistan to develop and deploy nuclear weapons without test

detonations? Would a "nuclearized" South Asia be stable or

unstable? Needless to say, nuclear developments in South Asia

affect proliferation elsewhere, and conversely, proliferation

elsewhere (in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Northeast Asia)

affects nuclear strategies in South Asia.

All three security levels are interrelated, perhaps as a

possible scenario of conflict escalation. Conflict may begin with

secessionist violence within a state, which may then spill across

international frontiers by a proxy war, sparking a regional

conventional war. This may further escalate into a regional

nuclear war, then a strategic nuclear conflict as allies are

drawn in. This scenario of three-stage escalation applies to

Indo-Pakistani confrontations only. However, the first stage of

war in South Asia--namely, spillover wars through proxies--could
5

apply to all the major countries of South Asia.

The three levels of security and conflict reflect the

origin, sequence, and probability of occurrence. Thus,

secessionist or separatist violence, as in the case of Indian

Kashmir and Punjab, in Pakistan's Sindh province, and in Sri

Lanka's Tamil areas, is most frequent and perpetual. From such

internal insurgencies, conventional inter-state war may occur,

especially between India and Pakistan. This could escalate to

nuclear levels since both India and Pakistan possess the ability

to convert their nuclear resources and technology to weapons

capabilities at short notice. Indeed, they may already possess

covert nuclear weapons stockpiles. Contrary to some speculation,

there is little evidence that a covert or mutant "Cuban Missile

Crisis"-type situation occurred between India and Pakistan during

the intensity of the 1993 Kashmir crisis.5 Indeed, this

scenario's worst-case last stage of escalation--nuclear war--is

mentioned here to prompt methods to prevent it from happening.

Security pressures and violent conflict, or the prospect for

such conflict, at each of the three levels are modified or

magnified by several emerging conditions and trends, to include

greater privatization and democratization; the decline of the

non-aligned movement; improvements in Sino-Indian relations;

shifting patterns in security relationships; and the general

erosion of state sovereignty.

Greater privatization and democratization. The trends

towards greater privatization (e.g., a market economy) and

democratization in South Asia may alleviate these security

problems. All the countries of South Asia are now democratic

except Bhutan, which represents less than one percent of the

population of South Asia. If the recent observation made by Bruce

Russett and other political scientists carries merit, namely that

democracies have not gone to war against each other over the last

50 years, then it could be argued that the avoidance of war

between India and Pakistan throughout the Kashmir crisis was due

to prevailing democracies in both countries.6

The growth of market economies and democracy may minimize or

soften security problems among neighboring countries which

possess the same economic and political values. This growth may

lead to greater regional economic integration, a trend that may

imitate and parallel the one-time warring member states of the

European Union and of Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or

ASEAN7 (which now includes Vietnam against whom ASEAN was once

directed). But this potential in South Asia remains doubtful. The

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has not

been doing so well.8 Even cricket matches between India and

Pakistan, which were expected to serve as confidence-building

measures, usually turn out to be a sort of non-shooting war by
6

proxy.9 Kashmiri Muslims, and indeed probably many Indian Muslims

elsewhere, usually cheer Pakistani cricket teams against India.

This is not a laughing matter because many Hindu nationalists

point to this phenomenon as proof that most Indian Muslims are

really "Pakistanis" at heart.

Decline of the Nonalignment Movement. Nonalignment, the onetime fulcrum of India's foreign and security policy, has become

irrelevant, whether it still exists in some other reincarnation

or not.10 With no competing global power blocs, it may be

important for India to take into account that the West is

militarily and economically dominant. Russia can be of no

assistance (as in the past) in countering any pro-Pakistani

stance that the United States may take up. At present both India

and Pakistan are wooing the United States and the West as

possible quasi-allies. Indeed, at the end of the Cold War there

was a sudden Indian rush towards embracing the United States. New

Delhi sought greater military cooperation with the United States,

but soon ran into several roadblocks. India's refusal to protect

American pharmaceutical patents, its decision to buy from Russia

cryogenic engines for its rocket program, and the testing of the

Prithvi missile in defiance of American warnings, have cooled

U.S. interest to establish closer military ties, and provoked

growing suspicions in India about American friendship.11 However,

it is important to note that while Indo-American military ties

have not progressed as well as India would desire, economic ties

have been booming as never before. The United States was always

India's main trading partner, but now leading American

corporations have rushed into India with investment capital

following New Delhi's economic liberalization.12

Correspondingly, while it has become clear that Russia has

few economic benefits to offer India, the sudden break in IndoSoviet military collaboration following the end of the Cold War

is now being mended. Much of this change stems from India's

desire to purchase or manufacture under license Russian weapons,

especially the MiG-29 and the Sukhoi-30 combat aircraft.13 Indeed,

proponents in both India and Russia push the creation of a new

triangular defence relationship between India, Russia, and

China.14

Improvement in Sino-Indian Relations. Sino-Indian relations

have recently shown considerable improvement, possibly to

Pakistan's security detriment.15 A de facto solution to the SinoIndian border dispute has taken effect.16 Relations at the

official level have displayed increasing cooperation, although

various Indian analysts have pointed out the potential for future

disputes and military rivalry.17 A basic and underlying rivalry

still remains, especially since the Chinese conventional and

nuclear arms buildup continues unabated. India's development of

the Agni Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) and the
7

conversion of Polar Satellite Launch Vehicles to match the

capability of an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) appear

"targeted" against China, not Pakistan. A growing Sino-Indian

naval rivalry is possible in the future. The Chinese Navy has

been active around the Spratly and Paracell Islands, and there

have been reports that China is aiding Burma to build a naval

base at Rangoon. Since India's maritime territorial jurisdiction

extends from the Lakshwadeep Islands in the Arabian Sea, to the

Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal, stretching up

to the Straits of Malacca, the possibility increases of SinoIndian naval confrontation.

Shifting Patterns in Security Relationships. India and

Pakistan are looking now in different directions to define the

central aspects of their foreign and security policies.18 Pakistan

is looking west towards the Islamic world (Central Asia, Iran,

and Turkey) to foster closer political, economic, and perhaps

military ties. Pakistan has been at the forefront of promoting

the enlarged Economic Cooperative Organization (ECO), a kind of

successor to the Pakistan-Iran-Turkey Regional Cooperation for

Development (RCD) which emerged from the old Central Treaty

Organization (CENTO) defense pact.19 The ECO consists of these

three states, joined by all six of the Muslim republics of the

former Soviet Union,20 plus Afghanistan. But the ECO is not

working all that well.21 Afghanistan as a functioning country

barely exists anymore. An on-and-off civil war continues in

Tajikistan. Iran and Turkey are pursuing their own political

agendas in the Central Asian republics. At the same time, India

is looking eastward towards Southeast Asia and East Asia for

economic ties, and inwards to deal with its numerous internal

security problems.

General Erosion of State Sovereignty. Finally, state

sovereignty is generally eroding, especially where human rights

violations are taking place. This erosion affects India,

Pakistan, and Sri Lanka's handling of its internal security

problems, especially in the Kashmir, Punjab, Assam, Sindh, and

Tamil regions. Serious human rights violations now often result

in international intervention, as in the cases of Cambodia, Iraq,

Bosnia, and Rwanda. Undoubtedly, it is much more difficult to

threaten to intervene in the case of states as big and powerful

as China (in Tibet), Russia (in Chechnya), or India (in Kashmir),

but they could face international economic sanctions.

Internal Security Issues.

The most serious threats to the states of South Asia are

internal conflict and the potential for state disintegration.22

Two successful secessionist movements have already taken place on

the subcontinent: the creation of Pakistan out of British India
8

in 1947 and the creation of Bangladesh out of Pakistan in 1971.

The creation of these two states was preceded by bloody communal

conflict, followed by Indo-Pakistani wars. Similarly, within

Europe the breakups of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the

early 1990s were extremely violent, as was, after a bloody 10-

year African war, Eritrea's 1993 break from Ethiopia.

The basic dilemma underlying secessionist conflict is

whether to recognize the right to national self-determination of

various ethnic groups who feel that their future is best served

by carving out their own independent states or to support the

right of the state to maintain its sovereignty and territorial

integrity as it sees fit because it is sovereign and independent.

Except for the creations of Pakistan and Bangladesh, all

nationalist-secessionist movements in South Asia have been

crushed or simply dissipated through a combination of military

pressure and political negotiations. The Baluchi and Pashtun

separatist movements have melted away, while the Sindh separatist

movement may also hopefully go the same way. In India, the

Dravidastan separatist movement among the Tamils simply

dissipated after the DMK gained power in Tamil Nadu in the mid

1960s. The Naga, Mizo, and Khasi/Gharo secessionist movements

were resolved through a combination of military force and

political concessions, mainly by allowing new mini-states to be

formed within the Indian Union. A combination of military force

and political concessions short of conceding independence

resolved the Sikh and Assamese separatist movements. Thus, the

three main problem areas remaining are Kashmir (in India), the

Tamil Ealam movement (in Sri Lanka), and the Sindhi-Mohajir

question (in Pakistan).

The Kashmir situation somewhat differs from the other

separatist movements because it involves a dispute between India

and Pakistan that dates back to partition in 1947, when the

Muslim province remained a part of India. For Pakistan, the

Kashmir question is the unfinished business of partition. As far

as India is concerned, the Kashmir problem is an internal

problem; it considers the accession by the Maharaja of Kashmir

legal and final.23 After the separation of East Pakistan in 1971,

the Kashmir issue seemed finally settled. Pakistan no longer

appeared to represent the Muslims of the subcontinent, especially

given the Mohajir situation in Sindh and Islamabad's internal war

with Sindhi Muslims. Pakistan rarely made serious claims to

Kashmir after 1971 until the revolt erupted in Indian Kashmir

following the rigged elections of 1987.

Unlike past crises over Kashmir that provoked conventional

wars between India and Pakistan, this crisis involves terrorism,

insurgency, a proxy war, and a fundamental and qualitative shift

in the nature of the crisis itself. Past differences between
9

India and Pakistan concerned the acceptance and validity of the

"two-nation theory" of Hindu and Muslim nations in an undivided

India. The current Kashmir crisis is far more "international" and

"Islamic" in character. Various Kashmiri insurgent groups have

accepted the Islamic fundamentalist beliefs of Iran, adopted the

insurgency tactics of the mujaheddin struggle in Afghanistan

during the Soviet occupation, and assumed the style and approach

of the Palestinian Intifada.

Under the present conditions of Muslim alienation from India

in Kashmir, if a two-way plebiscite (a choice between India or

Pakistan) were to be held in Kashmir today, in all likelihood

India would lose the plebiscite, and the majority of Muslim

Kashmiris would vote to join Pakistan. However, if a third

option, of independence, were offered, the majority of Kashmiris

would probably choose independence. Ultimately, India's power

will prevail, affirming its international legal right to rule in

Kashmir whether or not it earns the political legitimacy bestowed

by the consent of the governed.

Nevertheless, it would appear more advisable to maintain the

territorial status quo in South Asia whatever India's legal and

moral rights in Kashmir. There are more Muslims in India than in

Pakistan or Bangladesh, and sending Kashmir to Pakistan could set

Indian Muslims back to the bloody strife of 1947. Some extreme

Hindu nationalists have declared that if Kashmir is ceded to

Pakistan, Pakistan should be prepared to save the remaining 120

million Indian Muslims as well. Perhaps there may be a growing

feeling among moderate Hindus that hanging on to Kashmir has

become counterproductive, not unlike the feeling of some in Great

Britain about hanging on to Northern Ireland. Let Kashmir go to

Pakistan and let Northern Ireland go to Ireland as they probably

should have when Pakistan was created in 1947 and Ireland in

1921. But, the difference is the probable consequences for 120

million Indian Muslims if Kashmir is transferred to Pakistan.

Besides, whether Northern Ireland is part of Great Britain or

Ireland may make little difference now, since Great Britain and

Ireland are now both members of the European Union which

maintains open borders among the member states. South Asia has

not yet reached that stage.

As regards Tamil demands for an independent Tamil Ealam

carved out of Sri Lanka, and Sindhi demands for a free Sindhudesh

independent of Pakistan, it appears doubtful if either of these

demands will be conceded. Prospects for Tamil Ealam are now even

more distant, with India supporting Sri Lanka to maintain its

territorial integrity against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil

Ealam (LTTE). India has thrown a naval cordon around Sri Lanka to

prevent the smuggling of arms to the Tamil Tigers. Much of the

official Indian anger towards the Tamil Tigers began with the

bloody involvement of the Indian Peace-Keeping Forces (IPKF) with
10

the Tamil insurgents whom the IPKF had gone to protect. India's

withdrawal of support for the Tamil cause (although this was 

always short of Tamil independence) followed the assassination of

then Indian prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi, by a Tamil Tiger

suicide killer. Indeed, this event alienated much of ethnic Tamil

support within India's Tamil Nadu for the Tamil Ealam movement in

Sri Lanka.

Within Pakistan's Sindh province, Mohajir demands for their

own state within Pakistan pits them against the Sindhis, the sons

of the soil, who believe they have already been dispossessed by

the Indian emigre Muslim population. Sindhis want an independent

Sindhudesh. Mohajirs talk about creating their own province

within Pakistan out of its Sindh province linking the main cities

of Karachi, Hyderabad, and Sukkur through corridors, or just

creating a state south of the 26th parallel. This would leave an

impoverished and rump Sindh province with virtually no resources.

India's position on this issue has remained ambiguous, wavering

between sympathy for both the Sindhi separatists and the Indian

Muslim emigres. The Sindh separatist movement and the opposing

Mohajir's violent struggle against the Sindhis undermines

Pakistan's moral claims to Kashmir. Although India appears to be

less involved, if at all, in the violent struggle taking place in

Pakistan's Sindh province, instability in Sindh counterbalances

instability in Kashmir. Pakistan's ability to undermine India by

playing the "Kashmir" card, can be countered by India's ability

to undermine Pakistan by playing the "Sindh" card.

Meanwhile, through Indian application of armed force and

political concessions, the Assamese and Sikh separatist movements

were fizzling out in the early 1990s, although there is some

revival of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) which

spearheaded the Assamese independence movement.24 There is a

similar revival of the Naga independence movement. There are

other demands in India for new mini-states within India such as

Gurkhaland and Bodoland in the northeast, and the carving out of

a large new state for the Adivasis out of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh

and Orissa to be called Jharkand.

The fact is, with the exception of Bangladesh which has a

minor tribal separatist movement in the Chittagong Hill Tracts,

India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka are all vulnerable. The threat to

the territorial integrity of these states comes mainly from

within. Successful internal security management will determine

the survival of these states in their present form.

Conventional Forces and External Security.

In the past, the conventional arms race and the balance of

conventional forces in South Asia were usually considered crucial
11

in understanding the probabilities of war occurrence and war

outcome in South Asia. The conventional military balance now

appears relatively less deterministic about such probabilities

compared to the earlier decades. Any war between India and

Pakistan in the future must take into account each side's ability

to conduct wars of proxy concurrently, and the threat to escalate

the war to nuclear levels. They constitute complicating or

supplementary factors in devising strategies of conventional

wars in South Asia.

In South Asia, land forces remain crucial to the conduct of

wars, and while some global technological advances will have been

absorbed by the armed forces, technological levels do not equal

those found in the United States and the West. Efforts by South

Asian countries to upgrade their weapons systems with advancing

military technology (such as precision guided missiles) for all

the Services will not radically change their military strategy;

doctrine continues to give the primary combat role to ground

forces, with air and naval forces providing mainly supporting

roles.

Following the 1962 Sino-Indian War, India's defense against

China has rested on the 10 to 11 lightly-armed mountain/infantry

divisions raised in the 1960s, which supposedly act as a "tripwire." But, there is really no fall-back conventional defense

measure short of demonstrating an Indian nuclear deterrent based

on IRBMs tipped with nuclear warheads. This is precisely what the

Indian Agni missile and covert nuclear weapons programs are

intended to serve.

Against Pakistan, India's battle scenarios do not look

fundamentally different from the those fought in 1965 and 1971.

In the 1965 war, the armies and air forces of India and Pakistan

fought independent and separate battles with limited close air

support. For the greater part, the Indian Air Force and the

Pakistan Air Force conducted their own separate interdiction

campaigns, targeting ammunition dumps and air bases. The navies

of the two countries were not involved. During the 1971 war, all

three services were engaged, but there was not much

synchronization except for the Indian naval attack on Karachi

harbor, which was coordinated with an Indian air attack on the

city to draw away the Pakistan Air Force. For the rest, the air

forces and navies on either side conducted their own wars with

limited ground support provided in certain battles.

Military legacies and traditions change slowly in South

Asia. Not even the major shock of 1971 losses provoked a change

to Pakistani military strategy which continues to emphasize land

forces. There is an effort to obtain advanced aircraft from the

West (including unsuccessful efforts to obtain F-16s from the

United States), and there has been a modest build up of the
12

Pakistan Navy with the acquisition of short-range Augusto and

Daphne- class submarines and a few frigates. The Pakistan Army

remains the backbone of the Pakistani military. India has

adjusted better, with the army now drawing only 60 percent of the

defense budget (down from a high of almost 80 percent in the

1950s). India paid greater attention to its air force and navy.

But even here the lessons of the Gulf War and Bosnia highlighting

high-tech, precision-guided weapons have not been incorporated in

Indian strategic thinking, force structure, and equipment.25 The

failure to copy Western military strategy based on the supremacy

of high-tech air power may result from India's inability to

procure or pay for such technology. Also, direct Western

military intervention in another war in South Asia, which would

upset the regional military balance, is not expected.

Recall that India conducted a proxy war in East Pakistan

throughout 1971 before a two-front conventional war broke out

between India and East and West Pakistan.26 The insurgency in East

Pakistan speeded up the Indian military victory in the east. In

the west there was a stalemate. The conduct of another IndiaPakistan war must take into account Pakistan's ability to

simultaneously feed the Kashmiri insurgents, and India's

potential to fuel unrest in Sindh. In that respect, Kashmir is

India's "Bangladesh."27 In a similar vein, Sindhi nationalists in

Hyderabad and London told me that they had made a mistake when

they failed to seize the opportunity to carve out a "Sindhudesh"

in 1971 with the help of the Indian armed forces while they were

"liberating" Bangladesh.28 Thus, if India loses Kashmir in another

Indo-Pakistani war (although quite unlikely), Pakistan could also

lose Sindh. The loss of Kashmir or the loss of Sindh could

completely unravel both India and Pakistan into several

independent states, as happened in the former Soviet Union and

Yugoslavia. A future Indo-Pakistani war could be messy, with

aspects of the Vietnam/Afghanistan syndrome coming into play.

Along the Himalayan frontiers, in the less likely event of

another conventional Sino-Indian war, India could stir up

insurgents in Tibet, while China could do the same in Kashmir,

Assam, and the other mini-states of Northeast India. India still

deploys its ten mountain divisions ready to fight the last war of

1962 again. Sino-Indian tensions would only occur in the event of

another Tibetan uprising which seems unlikely at present. This is

in part because--through migrations and settlements--Han Chinese

have become the majority in Greater Tibet. Hindu Nationalists

advocate a similar resettlement policy and solution for Kashmir

as well. Indeed, three million Kashmiri Muslims could easily have

been overwhelmed decades ago through Hindu and Sikh settlements

in Kashmir. This India has not done.

Despite the renewed, but mellowed, wave of "Hindi-Chini

Bhai-Bhai" (Indians and Chinese are Brothers), voices within
13

India are cautious regarding the growth of Chinese military

capabilities.29 China's aggressive policies toward Hong Kong, the

Paracell and Spratly Islands, and Taiwan, have produced periodic

criticism in the Indian parliament and press regarding the

current Congress government's rush towards embracing China

without serious qualifications.30 In early 1996, former chiefs of

the Indian armed forces urged the Congress government to bolster

its military capability and focus on China's long-term plans in

South Asia. According to the assessment of Lieutenant General

K.K. Hazari, "Pakistan is not a military threat, but we have to

work out a long-term perspective on capability vis-a-vis China,

say after 15 or 20 years."31 According to retired Vice Admiral

R.B. Suri, "China is making inroads into the Indian Ocean by

building up a navy that in the next 10-15 years could interfere

with our interests in the region."32 However, Indian concerns

about the growth of Chinese conventional and nuclear military

power and its aggressive territorial claims to the Spratly

Islands and Taiwan are countered by those who argue that Indian

political--if not military--cooperation with China and Russia is

essential to counter the military, economic, and political

dominance of a U.S.-led West.33 Indeed, it may not be too farfetched to say that while the Defense Ministry is warning about

Chinese threats, the External Affairs Ministry is seeking to

promote Sino-Indian and Indo-Russian cooperation.

Chinese military modernization has targeted air and naval

forces. In early 1996, China contracted with Russia to purchase

72 Su-27 multi-role fighters to replace some of its aging 4,000

indigenously built aircraft based on 1950s Soviet technology.34

The Chinese have claimed that these purchases were to counter

Taiwanese purchases of American F-16s and French Mirage-2000s.

 The size of China's land and air forces is numerically

overwhelming, although the qualitative standards of some of its

equipment may be inferior to that of India. As in the growth of

the Indian Navy in 1980s, it is the growth of the Chinese Navy in

the 1990s that may be of greater concern to the Southeast Asian

countries. The following comparison of the basic sizes of the

militaries of China, India, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Pakistan

illustrate the wide divergence in the regional military balance:35

 China India Pakistan Vietnam Indonesia

Land Forces 2.2m 1.0m 0.5m 0.5m 0.2m

Tanks 8,000 2,400 2,050 1,300 330

Towed Arty 14,500 4,075 1,566 2,300 170

Combat Aircraft 4,970 844 430 190 73

Combat Ships 50 25 11 7 13

Submarines 50 15 9 0 2

Patrol/Combat 870 41 13 57 44

 Boats
14

Neither India nor China have "blue water" navies;36 they can

be better described as "brown water" navies. Whereas India has

two ex-British aging aircraft carriers, China has none. On the

other hand, whereas India's naval expansion has slowed down or

even halted, the Chinese Navy has begun to expand. In 1995, China

arranged for the purchase of four submarines from Moscow at a

cost of $4 billion.37 The purchase of another six submarines is

being negotiated, with the purchase of yet another 12 by the end

of the decade. The purchase of 22 submarines in 5 years suggests

that China is moving well beyond a coastal defense role and

towards an offensive naval capability. Both India and China

sought to buy from Ukraine a former Soviet aircraft carrier, now

rusting in a Ukrainian harbor, but the quality and price proved

unacceptable. Both India and China are attempting to promote and

establish indigenous naval technologies. Although India's recent

efforts to produce its own submarines in collaboration with a

German firm has been abandoned (only two were produced), India's

indigenous Godavari-class frigate development program, an

extension of the construction of the Leander-class frigates in

Bombay in collaboration with a British firm, has been a major

success.

Any major expansion of the Indian Navy into a blue water

capability has always raised the possibility, albeit remote, of a

naval response from Indonesia, Pakistan, and Iran, the three

major Muslim countries of Asia. However remote this may now

appear, it could potentially create a virtual Islamic naval

triangle around India. In the 1960s, the Indonesian Navy under

Sukarno attempted to expand, and likewise, the Shah of Iran

sought to build up a significant Iranian naval force during the

1970s. Meanwhile, Pakistan, in response to India's naval buildup,

has acquired nine submarines (including two Augusto-class

submarines from Italy and four Daphne-class submarines from

France) and 11 combat ships (including three ex-U.S. destroyers

and six ex-U.K. frigates). Similarly, any major expansion of the

Chinese Navy may invite an Indian naval response and also trigger

naval purchases in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.38 The

Asian security dilemma at sea may interlock naval rivalries among

the littoral states of the Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, and the

South China Sea.

In any future Indo-Pakistani or Sino-Indian conventional

war, the nuclear factor must be taken into account, quite unlike

the past, when all wars in South Asia were strictly among

conventional powers. China tested its first bomb in 1964, two

years after the 1962 Sino-Indian War. India tested its first bomb

(or peaceful nuclear device) in 1974, about two years after the

December 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. No wars between India and its

traditional antagonists have occurred since these wars in the
15

decade between 1962 and 1971. The present conditions for another

conventional war are now under the shadow of nuclear capabilities

in China, India, and Pakistan. A "nuclear India" could deploy

IRBMs capable of reaching the industrial cities of south China.

India now possesses a second-strike capability against China.

Both India and Pakistan possess aircraft capable of dropping

nuclear weapons. Mutual retaliatory strike capability exists

between India and Pakistan. All of this affects conventional war

strategy in South Asia. The threatened use of nuclear weapons in

South Asia may be seen as a strategy of conventional war

deterrence, or, if war did break out, of conventional war

termination.

Since the end of the Cold War, the conventional arms race in

South Asia has slowed down considerably.39 No major new weapons

acquisitions have taken place. Pakistan is trying to obtain the

F-16 fighters whose purchase from the United States was halted by

the Pressler Amendment, or get its money back; India is trying to

obtain from Russia a few more MiG-29 fighters and some T-72

tanks. Indigenous design, development, and production of weapons

systems continue as before in India, but successes have been

limited to certain parts and sections of weapons systems.

Development of the Light Combat aircraft has floundered, while

several prototypes of the Main Battle Tank have not met the

expectations of the Indian Army and have proven very costly.

However, a variety of aircraft, tanks, frigates and submarines

have been produced in India through technology transfers from

overseas manufacturers. Although India's naval capabilities are

quite modest, its navy still appears overwhelming compared to

that of Pakistan. However, much of India's Soviet-vintage

submarine fleet (old and dangerous because of malfunctions) is

being taken out of commission. Efforts failed to obtain a third

carrier, but two old British carriers remain in service.

Conventional weapons purchases in South Asia have been relatively

quiet despite the availability of weapons from the ex-Soviet

republics at bargain basement prices. The size of the Indian Army

has actually declined from about 1.2 million uniformed personnel

at its peak in the 1970s to just under 1 million in the mid1990s.

Size alone is an inaccurate tool to evaluate ground forces.

Indian force capabilities dwarf those of Pakistan, but the force

deployment throughout the various regions, especially in the

north and east, produces local parity. India argues that raw

numbers of men and equipment, without an assessment of their

comparative technological sophistication, are insufficient to

determine military advantage. Terrain and duration also play a

role. India claims to have the disadvantage in fighting wars

against Pakistan and China in Kashmir and along the Himalayan

frontiers, respectively, and in wars that last barely a month,

quantitative superiority in weapons is less decisive than the
16

effectiveness of frontline equipment that can be deployed

immediately.

India justifies this naval expansion since it was never

really tied to Pakistani naval capabilities but to India's large

coastline, its island territories, the increasing seaborne trade,

and so on. The power of the Chinese Navy and claims to the

Spratly Islands and Paracell Islands suggest a future possible

Sino-Indian naval arms race as China extends its naval reach to

the Straits of Malacca. However, as with the other two services,

Indian naval policy has been largely that of force maintenance

and sustenance rather than expansion.

Economic reforms in India and Pakistan, especially the

process of marketization and privatization, affect weapons

procurement. In India, "privatization" unleashed the private (not

public) sector and opened up the Indian market to foreign

investments. Public sector undertakings, to include defense, have

not benefitted; rather, they are just being allowed to wither

away slowly. It is unclear what the government intends to do

about public sector defense production; the government may

neglect industries such as Hindustan Aeronautics, Mazagon Docks,

Bharat Electronics, and so forth, or replace them with private

sector contracting for defense goods. Indeed, it is unknown

whether these defense public sector undertakings will be

sustained. In other words, India's privatization may not apply to

defense production, at least in the short run.

Conventional Forces and Internal Security.

The fact that future conventional wars in South Asia will

possibly involve concurrent domestic low-intensity conflicts

raises the question of the use of conventional forces to deal

with internal conflict and security. The militaries of India,

Pakistan, and Sri Lanka have been used to crush secessionist

movements at various times: in the northeast tribal belt, in

Assam, Punjab, and Kashmir by the Indian Army; in East Pakistan

(unsuccessfully), in Baluchistan, the Northwest Frontier Province

and Sindh by the Pakistan Army; and in the Tamil areas of the

Northern and Eastern provinces by the Sri Lankan Army.

Until the Indian Army's assault on the Sikh's Golden Temple

in Punjab in 1984, the military was viewed by much of the Indian

population as a symbol of national unity. To most Indians, the

military was, and still is, the trusted friend of the people.

Indeed, the Indian military sees itself as the defender of the

nation and as an important symbol of national unity, and it would

like to keep things that way. The military acts as an integrating

force in its national recruitment efforts; its role as the

defender of the nation against external aggression; and, its role
17

in providing disaster relief and other assistance to the civilian

authorities during natural calamities. The recruitment policy and

composition of the Indian military are largely responsible for

the stability of India's democracy; the absence of such pressure

may provide clues, on the other hand, to why democracy in

Pakistan failed, even though Pakistan inherited one-third of the

British Indian military services.

Perceptions of the regular armed forces as symbols of

national unity and integrity began to decline following the 1984

assault on the Sikh's Golden Temple in Amritsar. Its prestige

fell further as a result of its reluctant role in the maintenance

of internal security. Controversy over the use of force to quell

domestic insurgencies, of course, surrounds both the paramilitary

forces and the armed forces. In the case of the paramilitary

forces, the issue is not whether they have a role to play in the

maintenance of internal security; they were, after all, raised

for that purpose. The issue is whether such special internal

security forces could be misused by the government in power.

Arguably, the greater the size of paramilitary forces, the

greater the probability that democratic processes and the freedom

of the citizens are likely to be undermined. On the other hand,

in the case of the regular armed forces, the question is whether

such forces should be used at all in the maintenance of internal

order.

The Indian military, unhappy about this role, has protested

that the use of the military to deal with internal conflicts 

could lead to military demoralization, increasing politicization

of the military, and to the breakdown of civilian controlled

democracies. The use of the Indian Army to attack the Sikh's

Golden Temple nearly led to a mutiny by some Sikh soldiers of the

Indian Army, and it destroyed civilian-military confidence in

Punjab.40

The military argues that to use the armed services "against

their own people" would not only produce a breakdown in the

military-civilian trust that has been built up over several

decades, but also--if the army were deployed on domestic security

missions in the border provinces such as Punjab, Kashmir, and

Assam--would undermine its own ability to fight a conventional

war because of the alienation of the people living in those

regions.41 The military would eventually be seen as the enemy of

the people, a situation already found in Pakistan and several

other developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

However, these military misgivings have not stopped the civilian

authorities from ordering the armed forces to deal with internal

security; the military is resigned to the situation given the

growing threats to the security and sovereignty of the Indian

state from within. As a former Army chief, General V.N. Sharma,

noted:
18

What is the alternative? The police, despite its vast

rising strength of armed battalions under the Central

Home Ministry or under the various states, with

thousands of crores of expenditure, is unable to easily

control the violent masses when the police itself is

subservient to criminal political masters and their

fawning bureaucrats.42

India would like to avoid the type of political involvement

experienced by the Pakistani military, which has a record of

violent suppression in Baluchistan and in East Pakistan (before

it broke away to form the independent state of Bangladesh). The

military regime of Zia-ul Haq engaged in political battles

against various opposition groups in Pakistan, especially the

"Movement for the Restoration of Democracy" led by Benazir

Bhutto. After Bhutto came to power through the electoral process,

the military continued to be a threat to her government.

Eventually, she was deposed by the civilian president of

Pakistan, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, but there were suspicions that the

military was behind the dismissal of her government.

The Indian armed forces are not equipped or trained to deal

with problems of internal law and order. As Lieutenant General M.

L. Thapan noted, "A fundamental principle of war is concentration

of men and materiel at the right place and at the right time."43

Internal security duties, on the other hand, "require dispersion

and the use of minimum force since our own countrymen are

involved."44 Similarly, Lieutenant General A. M. Vohra observed

that because the army does not mingle with the crowds (as the

police are required to do), the army's ability to sense and deal

with internal riots is severely limited.45

The use of the armed services for internal security may 

produce a breakdown in military training and their readiness to

deal with external threats. Frequent use of the military for

internal purposes would invariably create friction and arouse the

emotions of both civilians and soldiers. Politicization and

corruption could eventually result in struggles for power,

leading to military coups and takeovers.

The Indian civilian authorities' response has been to build

up the paramilitary forces under the Home Ministry. But this has

had its own problems. The Indian paramilitary forces, especially

the Central Reserve Police Force and the Provincial Armed

Constabulary, are not very disciplined. The growth of such forces

to nearly half a million potentially threatens civilian

authorities. They often get caught up in the emotions of HinduMuslim or Hindu-Sikh conflict and take sides. The Provincial

Armed Constabulary and the Central Reserve Police Force have been

notorious in getting involved in communal conflict against
19

Muslims in Uttar Pradesh and Gujerat. Allegations of human rights

violations in Kashmir have been mainly directed at paramilitary

forces such as the Border Security Force.

India has one advantage over Pakistan and Sri Lanka in the

deployment of armed forces to deal with internal conflicts; it is

capable of introducing a "neutral" force in the old imperial

military tradition of British India. For example, the Indian

government could send Gurkhas to Kashmir, Madras regiments to

Punjab, the Maratha Light Infantry or Sikh regiments to Assam,

Dogra regiments to Nagaland or Mizoram, and so on. On the other

hand, because of Punjabi-Pashtun domination of the military in

Pakistan and the exclusive Sinhalese composition of the Sri Lanka

armed forces, the use of "neutral" forces becomes less possible

in these countries. Arguably, Punjabi-Pashtun intervention

between Sindhis and Mohajirs constitutes intervention by a

neutral force, but it may deteriorate into a three-way ethnic

conflict. It does little for Pakistan's national integration and

may only reinforce the image of Punjabi military domination.

Similarly, when the Sri Lankan army is sent to crush Tamil

separatism, it aggravates the Sinhalese-Tamil divide.

Nuclear Weapons and Missile Capabilities.

The recent NPT renewal conference in April 1995 went better

than expected.46 Virtually everybody signed except India,

Pakistan, and Israel. Israel says it will sign when all the

problems revolving around the Israeli-PLO Peace Accords are

settled. That would leave only India and Pakistan as the

significant "hold-out" states. Shortly after the Cold War, Thomas

Graham of the Rockefeller Foundation declared that the United

States must not think just about "coping" with proliferation, but

with "winning" the struggle against proliferation.47 The renewal

of the NPT in 1995 would indicate trends in that direction. With

the 1974 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the 1993

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) also in effect, it would appear

that the world is now becoming safer from dangerous

unconventional weapons. However, whereas the BWC and CWC are

non-discriminatory universal treaties,48 the problem with the NPT

is that it remains a discriminatory non-universal treaty. So long

as China has nuclear weapons, India is reluctant to sign the NPT;

if India does not sign, Pakistan will not sign as well.

Fortunately, the chain appears to end here.

There are still two other general problems. First, nuclear

proliferation in the future, especially among NPT signatories, is

likely to be either latent or covert where nuclear weapons

technology (short of putting the bomb together) will be

maintained. Little difference exists between India's peaceful

nuclear energy program and that of Japan. Indeed, Japan
20

stockpiles or has access to greater levels of plutonium and

enriched uranium than India. The American determination of who is

a potential proliferator or not is based on motivations rather

than technological capabilities. Thus, for instance, Pakistan is

considered a more likely proliferator than India, and India a

more likely proliferator than Japan.

Secondly, verification will remain difficult. Iraqi and

North Korean nuclear weapons development were discovered quite

late.49 Because India, Pakistan, and Israel (with suspected

development programs) have not signed the renewed NPT, attention

is constantly focused on them; therefore, they are more readily

monitored and illicit activity detected. Verification is even

more difficult when attempting to detect clandestine production

of chemical weapons. The CWC is a very large document of over 200

pages, much of it dealing with verification; the NPT is only

about two or three pages long--with little said about

verification and compliance enforcement. So long as there is no

technological "fix" to trace the shift from a peaceful nuclear

energy program to a nuclear weapons program, reliable

verification will prove elusive.

India and Pakistan are probably de facto nuclear weapons

states if conversion to nuclear capability at short notice is

considered the criterion. Some Indian and Pakistani strategists

have argued that since India, Pakistan, and Israel are virtually

nuclear weapons powers anyway, the nuclear club should be opened

to them--then closed again with eight members. Iran, Egypt, North

Korea, South Korea, or even Japan, are not likely to accept this

arrangement. Many states would invoke Article 10 and withdraw

from the NPT if the nuclear club was going to be opened to new

membership.

Does an increase in the number of nuclear states actually

increase the likelihood of nuclear war? The standard

interpretation argues that nuclear proliferation is dangerous and

could lead to nuclear war.50 The more the number of nuclear

weapons states, the greater the chances of nuclear war.

Opponents contend that a few more nuclear powers such as

India, Pakistan, Israel, and Japan may actually generate greater

nuclear stability through conditions of regional and multiple

nuclear deterrence.51 Non-proliferation prevents nuclear war

among potential new nuclear weapons states through denial.

Deployment of nuclear weapons and the threat of counter-attack

would deter war among new nuclear weapons states. For example,

nuclear deterrence may have prevented a conventional war between

India and Pakistan during the 1991 Kashmir crisis because both

either possessed clandestine nuclear weapons or were on the brink

of such capability.
21

The argument that nuclear weapons in South Asia (implying a

legal increase in the number of members) could actually support

stability has been put forward in India by K. Subrahmanyam and

General K. Sundarji.52 Indian and Pakistani strategists have

argued that instead of attempting to create a Nuclear Weapons

Free Zone in South Asia, the international community should focus

on establishing a Nuclear Weapons Safe Zone in South Asia.

There is some limited merit to the nuclear deterrence

argument, provided nuclear weapons do not spread beyond the eight

powers. If it is possible to have a stable nuclear relationship

among the United States, the Soviet Union, and China during the

Cold War, then why not a stable relationship among China, India,

and Pakistan?

On the other hand, there are four composite and standard

arguments supporting the thesis that proliferation in South Asia

would be dangerous: Emotional Intensity, Geographical Proximity,

Sudden Change, and Frequent Wars.53 Each argument has its own

strengths and weaknesses.

The "Emotional Intensity" argument suggests that religiousbased antagonism between India and Pakistan is more dangerous

than more secular-based antagonism among the five nuclear powers.

Rationality under stress would be difficult for either power to

maintain. However, this is not borne out in reality. Indian and

Pakistani decisionmakers have always been quite rational when on

the brink of war or during the conduct of war. Indeed, IndoPakistani wars have been essentially gentlemanly wars. As former

Army Chief, General K. Sundarji noted: "India and China are Not

Crazy States. They share a civilization going back 5,000 years.

During the three wars fought against each other, they have

displayed enormous restraint in targeting civilian industry or

infrastructure."54

The "Geographical Proximity" argument suggests that weapons

of mass destruction across common frontiers in each other's

backyards could lead to greater paranoia and nuclear preemption.

After all, there would be no warning time. The counter to this

argument is that nuclear attacks on each other could produce

fall-out in the territory of the attacking country, since India

and Pakistan are contiguous states. Therefore, there exists a

mutual built-in deterrent system between India and Pakistan.

The "Sudden Change" argument suggests that nuclearization in

South Asia would occur overnight with little or no learning time.

Therefore, this could prove destabilizing. However, this is not

necessarily so, because India and Pakistan already understand the

logic of nuclear strategy as played out by the nuclear powers

during the Cold War. They understand the conditions of nuclear

stability and instability.
22

The "Frequent Wars" in South Asia argument suggests that

nuclearization of South Asia would imply greater chances of

nuclear war. However, the situation has actually proved to be the

opposite. A nuclear India or Pakistan would not even dare engage

in conventional wars for fear of escalation to nuclear levels. We

should keep in mind that the existing nuclear powers never

engaged in direct conventional wars with each other although

there were two major wars conducted against each other, by the

Soviet Union and the United States through their proxies in

Vietnam and Afghanistan. Similarly, Pakistan is conducting a war

against India through its Muslim proxies in Kashmir. But there

appears to be no imminent danger of a conventional war between

India and Pakistan over Kashmir, let alone a nuclear war. This

situation may exist because latent nuclear weapons capabilities

in India and Pakistan have now paralyzed military action at the

conventional and nuclear levels.

However, the avoidance of wars under the logic of nuclear

deterrence implies a restricted number of nuclear weapons states

locked especially in a two-way or three-way relationship. Nuclear

relationships that were four-way or more, or several two-way and

three-way nuclear relationships sugggest instability. Nuclear

deterrence might create nuclear stability between India and

Pakistan, but it might not be relevant if nuclear weapons were to

spread to Iran, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, the Koreas, Japan, and

Taiwan.55

There were fears in early 1996 that India, following the

examples of France and China, was about to conduct a series of

nuclear tests before the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was

finalized.56 A similar Indian pro-bomb lobby had advocated that

India test atomic weapons before the finalization of the NPT in

1968 in order to classify itself as one of the "haves" in the

treaty and thereby become exempt from the nuclear weapons ban on

the "have-nots." The fear at present is that once the CTBT, which

India has always advocated and supported, is "opened for

signature,"57 India would be forever prevented from testing

nuclear weapons. Creation of a nuclear device without test

detonations is considered technologically difficult for India; to

accede to the CTBT before such extensive tests would, in effect,

take away India's nuclear option. These considerations have led

to Indian demands in early 1996 that the CTBT be accompanied by a

firm timetable for the elimination of all nuclear weapons by the

existing nuclear "haves" as a quid pro quo for Indian abstinence

from weapons testing.

India and Pakistan have been developing their ballistic

missile capabilities as well. India, which performed a nuclear

test in 1974 and has material for 20 to 50 bombs, has developed

surface-to-surface missile (SSM) and IRBM missile systems. The
23

SSM Prithvi-150 has a range of 90 miles, while the improved

Prithvi-250 can travel 150 miles. The IRBM Agni has a range of

1,500 miles. Pakistan has never tested a nuclear device, but

analysts suggest that it has material for 6 to 15 bombs. Its two

missile systems, both SSMs, include the indigenous Haft-1 (range

48 miles) and Haft-2 (range 180 miles), and the M-11 (range 180

miles) purchased from China.58

Clearly, India does not have unrestricted access to foreign

nuclear weapons and missile technology given the restraints

imposed by the NPT and the Missile Technology Control Regime

(MTCR). However, the expected technological sophistication of

indigenous nuclear weapons and missiles need not match the

quality of those found in the United States, Great Britain or

France. The minimum expected requirement at present of such

weapons is that bombs must detonate when launched, and missiles

must reach their designated targets. Technological parity with

existing nuclear weapons states, including China, is not

considered important, although this attitude may change if India

decides to embark on an overt nuclear and missile arms buildup to

rival that of the "medium" nuclear powers. However, India must be

reasonably assured that its missiles meet predefined and

projected range, payload, accuracy, and other operational

requirements. In the case of the Army's short-range tactical

missiles, Indian military expectations are that such missiles

must match the technological level available to India's

adversaries. Medium and intermediate range missiles intended for

strategic deterrence need meet less stringent requirements since

they serve a somewhat more flexible and ambiguous purpose.

Whether or not the civilian nuclear energy program is

economically viable, and whether or not the program is intended

primarily to maintain India's nuclear weapons option, the program

has acquired considerable resources and "technological selfsufficiency." India has about 50,000 tonnes of uranium deposits

(found mainly in Bihar and substantial resources of thorium in

Kerala); it is also almost self-sufficient in the basic raw

materials needed to conduct the nuclear program. India also has:

developed and constructed a self-sufficient nuclear

fuel cycle, with uranium mines and mills, a uranium

purification UO2 plant, fuel fabrication plants,

plutonium reprocessing plants, nuclear power reactors

and research reactors. In addition, it has a small

uranium conversion UF6 plant, a pilot uraniumenrichment plant, and heavy-water production plants . .

. India is experimenting with gas centrifuges for the

enrichment of uranium.59

The civilian nuclear program has run into severe

technological snags and breakdowns. India's projected goal of
24

attaining 10,000 megawatts of electricity by the year 2000 is

likely to produce in reality only 5,770. However, India's ability

to siphon off a nuclear weapons program from its energy program

is not in doubt. The gestation period of converting civilian

programs to weapons programs at one time almost reached 2 years--

the period needed to test the first atomic device at Pokharan in

Rajasthan in May 1974. Today, however, the period may be as short

as 4-6 weeks. By the end of 1995, India's stock of weapons-grade

plutonium was estimated at nearly 420 kilograms, enough for about

85 nuclear weapons.60 Much of this plutonium came from the Dhruva

Research Reactor, which is not under international safeguards.

Further progress on India's Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) program61

will provide India with more plutonium for bombs.

Meanwhile, India's civilian space rocket and satellite

development programs indirectly support the military Agni and

Prithvi missile programs.62 The MTCR does not carry the same legal

constraints as the NPT, which is a multilateral and nearuniversal treaty. The MTCR is an American-initiated, informal

agreement among the G-7 industrialized countries (the United

States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, and Japan)

not to transfer missile and rocket technology to those countries

aspiring to develop missiles. The MTCR does not prohibit an overt

program to acquire missile technology; signatories agree merely

to take all measures to prevent the transfer of such technology.

Similarly, New Delhi has also embarked on the indigenous

development of nuclear powered submarines, which India agrees

falls within a grey area not covered by the NPT. The development

of the submarine program at Mazagon Docks in Bombay (in

collaboration with HDW of Germany) ran into political problems

involving alleged kickbacks and had to be cancelled. However, the

development of the reactor and its containment vessel has been

progressing at a satisfactory pace. Indeed, the former Chairman

of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, M.R. Srinivasan, pointed

out that the "work on the reactor was in fact proceeding faster

than the work on the boat itself."63

Concluding Remarks.

These security issues discussed impinge upon each other.

Internal security problems complicate the conduct of external

conventional wars and raise the question of whether conventional

armed forces should be used to crush domestic insurgencies.

Concepts of nuclear deterrence, conventional war escalation

control, and threatened nuclear utilization to terminate

conventional war overshadow conventional military strategies. On

the other hand, democratization and marketization tend to mellow

these security concerns. Wars appear increasingly less

worthwhile. Another conventional war would likely be a stalemate,

while a nuclear war would be catastrophic and unacceptable.
25

In conclusion, we may ask whether political pressures

arising from security problems affect democratic processes in

South Asia, and whether marketization and privatization trends

reduce security pressures.64 The experience in South Asia (and

elsewhere in the developing and developed world) has been that

internal security pressures tend to corrupt democratic practices

through the introduction of draconian laws restricting

individuals' rights. Such pressures increase the levels of human

rights violations, and they politicize the armed forces when they

are used to deal with domestic violence. However, the emphasis on

 economic reforms and development issues in South Asia tend to

counter these trends to produce a greater level of strategic

stability in the region. India's security environment towards the

year 2000 looks relatively stable and manageable compared to the

turbulence and uncertainty that existed in the decade between the

1962 Sino-Indian War and the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war.

ENDNOTES

1. The urge to restore Indo-Russian ties is still strong in

India. See Dina Vakil, "From Sentiment to Realism: New Chapter in

Indo-Russian Ties," Times of India, June 27, 1994.

2. For articles assessing the changing strategic situation

at the time, see Ashok Kapur, "Indo-Soviet Treaty and the

Emerging Asian Balance," Asian Survey, Vol. 12, No. 6, June 1972,

pp. 463-474; J. D. Sethi, "Indo-Soviet Treaty and Nonalignment,"

India Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 4, October-December 1971, pp. 327-

336; and Sisir Gupta, "Sino-U.S. Detente and India," India

Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 3, July-September, 1971, pp. 179-184. For

the full text of the Indo-Soviet Treaty, see Current Digest of

the Soviet Press, Vol. 23, No. 32, September 7, 1971, p. 5.

3. For two studies of the South Asian strategic environment

at the end of the Cold War, see Peter Lyon, "South Asia and the

Geostrategics of the 1990s," Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 1, No.

1, January 1992, pp. 25-39; and Sandy Gordon, "South Asia After

the Cold War: Winners and Losers," Asian Survey, Vol. 35, No. 10,

October 1995, pp. 879-895.

4. The Sri Lankan situation has radically changed since the

Indian government threw its weight behind the Sri Lankan

government's efforts to crush the Tamil rebellion; at the end of

1995, Sri Lankan forces seized the Jaffna peninsula, the Tamil

stronghold.

5. Seymour Hersh made this claim in his "On the Nuclear

Edge," The New Yorker, March 29, 1993, pp. 56-73.

6. Bruce Russett of Yale University pointed out the
26

following:

Over the past 50 years, pairs of democratic states have

been only one-eighth as likely as other kinds of states

to threaten to use force against one another, and only

one-tenth as likely to carry out these threats.

Democracies have also been less likely to escalate

disputes with one another, and more likely to avail

themselves of third-party mediation. Moreover, the fact

of peaceful relations between democracies cannot be

attributed solely to other influences, such as their

distance from each other, wealth or common alliances.

These influences do matter; but in quantitative

analyses that compensate for their effect, democracy

still exerts a powerful, independent pacifying

influence. There are many cases of distant

authoritarian states fighting each other. The two World

Wars pitted several wealthy industrialized states

against one another; the Soviet Union invaded its ally

Hungary in 1956. [And we may add Communist China

attacked Communist Vietnam in 1978.] There are no such

examples of war between democracies however.

From "Letters," The Economist, April 29-May 5, 1995, p. 8.

7. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations was formed in

1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and

Thailand. Newly-independent Brunei joined in 1984. Vietnam and

Cambodia were granted observer status in 1992; Vietnam became a

full member in 1995.

8. While pointing out the failures of SAARC, S.D. Muni takes

an optimistic view about its future. See S. D. Muni, "Dynamics of

Future Cooperation Takes Shape," India Abroad, January 28, 1996.

9. However, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lankan Cricket Boards

showed considerable cooperation during the joint staging of the

World Cup cricket matches in February and March 1996. See Mayank

Chhaya, "Cricketing Show of South Asian Solidarity," India

Abroad, February 23, 1996.

10. For an extended discussion of the status of India's

nonalignment policy, see Raju G. C. Thomas, South Asian Security

in the 1990s, Adelphi Paper No. 278, London: International

Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993, pp. 5-14.

11. See N.C. Menon, "U.S. Proposes to Improve Defence Ties

with India," Hindustan Times, November 12, 1994; Manoj Joshi,

"Reviewing Indo-U.S. Technology Transfer Ties," Times of India, November 18, 1994; C. Raja Mohan, "Progress Likely in Indo-U.S.

Defence Ties," The Hindu, November 26, 1994; and, M.D. Nalapat,
27

"Indo-U.S. Relations: Giving Away Too Much for Nothing," Times of

India, June 6, 1995.

12. See Badar Alam Iqbal, "Indo-U.S. Trade in the 90s,"

Patriot (New Delhi), July 18, 1994.

13. Jasjit Singh, "Future of Indo-Russian Cooperation,"

Economic Times (Bombay), January 11, 1995; Pushpindar Singh,

"Fighters in the Sky: IAF Returns to Russia," Times of India,

July 27, 1994; John Cherian, "Back on Track, Almost: On IndoRussian Relations," Frontline (Madras), December 16, 1994; Dina

Vakil, "From Sentiment to Realism: New Chapter in Indo-Russian

Ties," Times of India, June 27, 1994.

14. See Pravin Sawhney, "India, Russia and China Should Form

a Bloc," Asian Age (New Delhi) November 11, 1994; and the report

in The Telegraph (Calcutta) dated November 6, 1994, that the

chairman of the Russian Federal Assembly would like to see

defense ties between Russia, India, and China.

15. For some studies of the origins and nature of SinoIndian disputes leading to war, see Alastair Lamb, The ChinaIndia Border: The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries, London:

Oxford University Press, 1964; B.N. Mullik, The Chinese Betrayal,

New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1971; Neville Maxwell, India's

China War, New York: Doubleday Press, 1972; Nancy Jetly, IndiaChina Relations, 1947-1977, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities

Press, 1979; and Steven A. Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis,

Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.

16. See Reuter‘s news report entitled, "China, India Sign

Landmark Border Agreement," September 7, 1993. The agreement was

signed in Beijing by Chinese and Indian prime ministers, Li Peng

and P.V. Narasimha Rao. The Indian Embassy in Beijing issued the

following statement: "Pending a boundary settlement, India and

China have agreed to respect and observe the line of actual

control" (which separated their troops since the 1962 border

war.) "The two countries have agreed to undertake a series of

confidence-building measures, including the reduction of military

forces deployed along the India-China border. India and China

have agreed to keep their military forces in areas along the

border in conformity with the principle of mutual and equal

security."

17. See Rita Manchanda, "Beyond the Rhetoric of Hindi-Chini

Bhai-Bhai," The Pioneer (New Delhi), July 8, 1994; Ram

Jethmalani, "India's China Policy: Dismal Spectacle of Ineptitude

and Lack of Respect," Indian Express, August 5, 1994; Kamlendra

Kanwar, "Perils of Appeasement: India Cannot Ignore China's

Hegemonism," Indian Express, June 20, 1994; Brahma Chellaney,

"The Dragon's Rise," Hindustan Times, June 16, 1994; Lt. General
28

J.F.R. Jacob, "China is a Long-Term Threat to India," Asian Age

(New Delhi), January 12, 1995; Dipankar Banerjee, "China Sees

India as a Potential Threat," Asian Age (New Delhi), January 12,

1995; and, Tarun Basu, "Harm Seen in India-China Axis," India

Abroad, December 20, 1991.

18. For two early comprehensive studies of relations between

the two countries, see Sisir Gupta, Kashmir: A Study in IndiaPakistan Relations, Bombay: Asia Publishing, 1966; Robert W.

Jackson, South Asia Crisis: India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, A

Political and Historical Analysis of the 1971 War, New York:

Praeger Press, 1975; and, Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in

South Asia, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993.

19. See special article entitled, "The Expanded ECO: A New

Phenomenon in the Islamic World," Pakistan Times Overseas Weekly,

June 12, 1992.

20. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and

Uzbekistan from Central Asia, plus Azerbaijan from the Caucasus.

21. A much more optimistic assessment is provided by Dr.

Maqbool Ahmad Bhatty, "Prospects for Cooperation with Central

Asia," Nation, October 8, 1991. Bhatty points out some of same

obstacles--the instability of Afghanistan and uneven levels of

per capita incomes--but feels that these problems can be overcome

eventually.

22. For three comprehensive studies of ethnic conflict in

South Asia, see Urmilla Phadnis, Ethnicity and Nation-Building in

South Asia, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1990; Paul Brass,

Ethnicity and Nationalism, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991;

and Ralph R. Premdas, S.W.R. de A. Samarasinghe, and Alan B.

Anderson, eds., Secessionist Movements in Comparative

Perspective, London: Pinter Publishers, 1990.

23. Alastair Lamb refutes the India case at length. See

Alastair Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846-1990,

Hertsfordshire, England: Roxbury Press, 1991. For opposing views,

see Rajesh Kadian, The Kashmir Tangle, Boulder, CO: Westview

Press, 1993; and M. J. Akbar, Kashmir: Beyond the Vale, New

Delhi: Viking Penguin Press, 1991. For a variety of viewpoints

from Indians, Pakistanis and Kashmiris, see Raju G. C. Thomas,

Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992.

24. For a study of the Sikh problem, see Rajiv Kapur, Sikh

Separatism: The Politics of Faith, London: Allen & Unwin, 1986.

For the Assam situation, see Subir Bhaumik, "Is Assam Going the

Kashmir War?" India Abroad, October 11, 1991; and Farzand Ahmed,

"Assam: A Critical Crackdown," India Today, October 15, 1991.
29

25. For some studies of the Revolution in Military Affairs,

see James R. Fitzsimonds, "The Coming Military Revolution:

Opportunities and Risks," Parameters: US Army War College

Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2, Summer 1995, pp. 30-36; and Brigadier

Peter J. Dunn, "Time x Technology x Tactics = RMA: Why We Need a

Revolution in Military Affairs and How to Begin It!," unpublished

manuscript submitted to the Director General, Force Development

(Land), Headquarters Australian Defence Force, Canberra,

Australia.

26. For a excellent study of factors leading to war, see

Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, War and Secession: India,

Pakistan and the Creation of Bangladesh, Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1990.

27. See Mushahid Hussain, "The Kashmir Issue: Its New

International Dimensions," in Raju G. C. Thomas, ed.,

Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia,

Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992, pp. 341-349.

28. This occurred during my lecture at the University of

Hyderabad, Jamshoro, Pakistan, February 1992.

29. See Rita Manchanda, "Beyond the Rhetoric of Hindi-Chini

Bhai Bhai," The Pioneer (New Delhi), July 8, 1994.

30. For a detailed assessment, see Mark J. Valencia, China

and the South China Sea Disputes, Adelphi Paper No. 298, London:

International Institute for Strategic Studies/Oxford University

Press, 1995. For claims and activities, see pages 8 to 11.

31. See Sonali Verma, "Indian Defence Should Focus on China,

not Pakistan," Reuters, January 29, 1996.

32. Ibid. See also articles by Major General Dipankar

Banerji, "China Sees India as a Potential Threat," Asian Age (New

Delhi), January 12, 1995; Lieutenant General J. F. R. Jacob,

"China is a Long Term Threat to India," Asian Age (New Delhi),

January 12, 1995.

33. See Jasjit Singh, "Future of Indo-Russian Cooperation,"

Economic Times (New Delhi), January 11, 1995; "Russian Plan for

Peace in Asia: Defense Ties with India and China Proposed," The

Telegraph (Calcutta), November 6, 1994.

34. Patrick E. Tyler, "China to Buy 72 Advanced Fighter

Planes from Russia," New York Times, February 7, 1996.

35. The Military Balance, 1995/96, London: International

Institute for Strategic Studies/Oxford University Press, 1995.
30

36. For a collection of views on the Indian Navy, see Robert

H. Bruce, ed., The Modern Indian Navy, Perth, Australia: Curtin

University of Technology, 1989.

37. See Benjamin C. Ostrov, "The PLA, Chinese Foreign

Policy, and Asian Regionalism," unpublished paper presented at

the Conference on the Politics and Economics of Regional

Cooperation in East and Southeast Asia, April 28-29, 1995,

University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, p. 22.

38. See K. Subrahmanyam, "China and the Indian Ocean,"

Economic Times, January 4, 1995; Major General Ashok K. Mehta,

"All At Sea," Sunday (Calcutta), January 8, 1995; Rahul RoyChaudhury, "Showing the Flag Can Earn India Much Goodwill,"

Economic Times, April 3, 1994.

39. For studies of India's weapons procurement efforts, see

Paul S. Killingworth and Jonathan D. Pollack, "The Indian Defense

Program in the 1980's: Ambitions and Realities," unpublished

manuscript, Rand Corporation Working Draft-5897, prepared for the

Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, October 1992; David A.

Fulghum, "Indian Air Force Faces Tough Choices," Aviation Week &

Space Technology, July 25, 1994; Eric Arnett, "Military

Technology: The Case of India," SIPRI [Stockholm International

Peace Research Institute] Yearbook, 1994; Raja Menon,

"Modernising Navy: Submarine's Key Role," Hindustan Times (New

Delhi), June 22, 1994; Rita Manchanda, "India's Nuclear Submarine

Project: Extravagance at Sea," The Pioneer (New Delhi), December

22, 1994; Rita Manchanda, Tribune (Chandigarh), September 9,

1994; Manoj Joshi, "Desperately Copying Charlie: India Designs

Nuclear Submarine," Times of India, December 14, 1994; and M.R.

Srinivasan, "The Nuclear Submarine Project," The Hindu, December

8, 1994.

40. Despite efforts to recruit the military from broad

segments of Indian society, Sikhs still constitute about 12

percent of the combat forces. Overall, the Indian Army is still

about 20 percent Punjabi, Sikh, and Hindu. In comparison, the

Pakistan Army is about 70-80 percent Punjabi, with much of the

rest being Pashtun. Suppressing violence among Sindhis, Mohajirs,

and Baluchis has meant Punjabi-Pashtun military suppression.

 41. See Lieutenant General M. L. Thapan, "The Army: How Far

to Aid the Civil Authority," Statesman (Calcutta), August 3,

1980; Lieutenant General A. M. Vohra, "Other Tasks of Armed

Forces," Tribune (Ambala), April 14, 1980; and, Lieutenant

General A. M. Vohra, "Coups and Military Takeovers," Tribune

(Ambala), March 28, 1980.

42. General V. N. Sharma, "National Security: More Threats
31

from Within," Hindustan Times, December 18, 1994.

43. Thapan, "The Army."

44. Ibid.

45. Vohra, "Other Tasks of Armed Forces."

46. For a study of the Indo-Pakistani nuclear relationship,

see Mario E. Carranza, "Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Relations After

the Cold War," in Marvin G. Weinbaum, and Chetan Kumar, eds.,

South Asia Approaches the Millennium: Reexamining National

Security, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995, pp. 103-126.

47. See Thomas W. Graham, "Winning the Nonproliferation

Battle," Arms Control Today, Vol. 21, No. 7, September 1991, pp.

8-13.

48. In a "non-discriminatory universal treaty," the terms

apply equally to all states and all have signed the treaty; in a

"discriminatory non-universal treaty," the terms do not apply

equally to all states and not all have signed the treaty.

49. For various reports of developments in North Korea, see

Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, No. 24, 4th

Quarter 1993; The International Herald Tribune, October 28, 1991;

Far Eastern Economic Review, November 7, 1991; Financial Times

(London), November 14, 1991; and, The Independent (London),

November 20, 1991. For an argument against military strikes to

take out the Yongbyon nuclear research reactor, see the editorial

by William J. Taylor and Michael Mazarr, "Defusing North Korea's

Nuclear Notions," New York Times, April 13, 1992. For the Iraqi

situation, see David A. V. Fischer, "The Future of the IAEA

[International Atomic Energy Agency-ed.]," Programme for

Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Issue Review, No. 2,

Southampton, Great Britain: University of Southampton Press,

December 1993. Fischer argues that the failure in Iraq was

chiefly a failure by leading governments to acquire and share the

findings of intelligence. It was not the failure of the NPT

safeguards system as it was drawn up by 45 countries in 1970-71

and is set forth in the IAEA document INFCIRC [Information

Circular-ed.] 153. The 1971 system was not designed to detect the

existence of a wholly independent, clandestine nuclear fuel

cycle--such as Saddam Hussein's.

50. Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of

Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, New York: W.W. Norton Press, 1995.

51. Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More may

be Better, Adelphi Paper No. 171, London: International

Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981. The arguments made by
32

Sagan and Waltz will be discussed by Devan Haggerty in an

upcoming issue of International Security under the title "The

Logic of Nuclear Non-Proliferation" and the "Logic of Nuclear

Deterrence."

52. See K. Subrahmanyam's introductory chapter in his edited

book, Nuclear Myths and Realities, New Delhi: Lancer

International Press, 1987; and General (Retired) K. Sundarji,

"Nuclear Realpolitik," India Today, August 31, 1991.

53. In a book put out by Los Alamos National Laboratory, I

summarized four composite and standard arguments that supported

the Sagan thesis that proliferation in South Asia would be

dangerous. Then I argued against those arguments in support of

the Waltz thesis. See Raju G. C. Thomas, "India and the NPT After

the Cold War," in Joseph F. Pilat and Robert E. Pendley, eds.,

1995: A New Beginning for the NPT, New York: Plenum Press, 1995,

pp. 91-120.

54. K. Sundarji, "Indian Nuclear Doctrine: Notions of

Deterrence," Indian Express, November 25, 1994.

55. The implications of a nuclear arms and missile race is

discussed by T.T. Poulose, "Thinking Beyond the Pakistan Bomb,"

Hindustan Times, October 4, 1994.

56. See Sunil Adam, "The Politics of a Noncomprehensive Test

Ban," India Abroad, February 23, 1996; Brahma Chellany, "The

Military Nuclear Option Poses a Grave Dilemma for India,"

International Herald Tribune, January 26, 1996.

57. "Opened for signature" means that the treaty is

finalized and ready for signature. It takes effect after a

certain minimum number of states sign and ratify the treaty.

58. U.S. News and World Report, February 12, 1996.

59. Frank Barnaby, How Nuclear Weapons Spread: NuclearWeapon Proliferation in the 1990s, London: Routledge Press, 1993,

p. 68.

60. Ibid, p. 73.

61. A research FBR has already been established at Kalpakkam

in Madras.

62. A study of the missile program in India may be found in

Atul Aneja, "Security By Deterrence," The Hindu, June 19, 1994.

63. M.R. Srinivasan, "The Nuclear Submarine Project," The

Hindu, December 8, 1994.
33

64. For an extended discussion of these issues, see Raju G.

C. Thomas, Democracy, Security, and Development in India, New

York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

*****

 STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel Richard H. Witherspoon

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Dr. Raju G. C. Thomas

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretaries

Mrs. Devona A. Peck

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler