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NOTE: This is an UNCLASSIFIED version of the original document.
Contents

Executive Summary ......................................................................................1

PART I. CONTEXT AND THEORY OF RUSSIAN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE .......5

The Evolution of Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, 1991–2014............8

Intervention in Lithuania, 1991 .................................................................9

Intervention in Transnistria, 1990–1992..................................................10

Intervention in Chechnya, 1994–1996.....................................................11

Dagestan and the Second Chechen War, 1999–2009...............................12

Intervention in Georgia, 2008 .................................................................13

Russian Information Warfare.......................................................................14

Schools of Thought on Geopolitics and Information Warfare in Russia........15

Igor Panarin......................................................................................15

Alexandr Dugin .................................................................................16

The Gerasimov Model............................................................................. 17

PART II. THE RUSSIAN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE CAMPAIGN IN UKRAINE, 

2013–2014...............................................................................................21

Historical and Political Context ....................................................................21

Political Framework Leading up to Euromaidan .............................................24

Russian Intervention in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine .....................................33

The Players............................................................................................33

The Motivations .....................................................................................36

Domestic Political Stability and Incentives ..........................................37

Counter Eastward Progression of Western Economic and 

Security Institutions..........................................................................37

Geostrategic Control of the Black Sea Region .....................................38

Maintain Buffer of Russian Influence in Peripheral States 

against the West ..............................................................................39

Strengthen EEU in the Former Soviet Sphere of Influence ....................39

Incorporate Ethnic Russians ..............................................................40
Russian Order of Battle ..............................................................................40

Military Forces .......................................................................................41

SPETSNAZ.............................................................................................43

Russian-Backed Proxy Organizations in Ukraine ........................................43

Russian-Backed Agents in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.............................45

Russian Information Warfare in Ukraine ...................................................46

International Information Themes.......................................................48

Indoctrination of Ethnic Russians in Ukraine .......................................48

Domestic Messaging ........................................................................49

The Gerasimov Model in Action: Russian Tactics, Techniques, 

and Procedures in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, 2013–2014.........................49

Covert Origins ........................................................................................53

Escalations (February 20–22) .................................................................54

Russian Operations in Crimea .................................................................55

Start of Conflict Activities (February 22–26)........................................55

Crisis (February 27–March 15)...........................................................56

Resolution (March 16–19) .................................................................57

Restoration of Peace (March 19–31)..................................................58

Russian Operations in Eastern Ukraine ....................................................58

Start of Conflict Activities (March 1–August 1).....................................58

Crisis (August 1–31)..........................................................................61

Resolution (September 1–November 30) ............................................61

Restoration of Peace (November 30–Present).....................................62

Conclusion.................................................................................................62

Notes........................................................................................................63

Bibliography ...............................................................................................65
Figures

Russian expansion in the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries ....................8

The role of nonmilitary methods in interstate conflict resolution.....................18

Ukrainian ten-hryvnia note featuring Ivan Mazepa .........................................21

Stepan Bandera.........................................................................................21

Map of Ukraine ..........................................................................................22

The Orange Revolution................................................................................23

Chernobyl reactor 4....................................................................................23

Viktor Yanukovych ......................................................................................25

Languages in Ukraine .................................................................................28

Euromaidan ...............................................................................................29

Population density of Ukraine......................................................................30

Sergei Aksyonov.........................................................................................31

Denis Pushilin............................................................................................32

The oligarchs .............................................................................................34

Russian leadership.....................................................................................35

History of NATO enlargement.......................................................................38

Igor Girkin (also known as Strelkov) .............................................................45

Alexey Mozgovoy ........................................................................................46

The role of nonmilitary methods in interstate conflict resolution.....................50

Main phases (stages) of conflict development in Crimea................................51

Main phases (stages) of conflict development in eastern Ukraine...................52

The black fur hat seemed to be just as much a part of the Serb as the thick, 

black beard that hung below his clavicle. On the shoulder of his woodland 

camouflage uniform was a patch with a skull and crossbones depicted on it.

He stopped in front of the Orthodox Church in Sevastopol to pray for a few 

moments before sharing why he and his compatriots came to Crimea.

“We’ve come simply to support the referendum and to share our experiences 

from the barricades in Kosovo and Metohija and similar situations,” he said. 

“Our main goal is to prevent war and bloodshed and to prevent this area 

from falling victim to the lies of America and the European Union, because it 

would be better to resolve this issue internally.”

As night fell, he directed operations at the Belbek checkpoint with other 

Serbian War veterans. They were not the only outsiders in Crimea. 

Cossacks, motorcycle gangs, and thugs looking for work flooded into the 

region, providing muscle that could be controlled from Moscow. They were 

all irregulars for an irregular war.1

♦♦♦

The RT television camera scanned the crowd on the Maidan and then zoomed 

in on her. Dressed conspicuously in fashionable dress jeans and an expensive 

black silk blouse, she raged at the small, docile group that had gathered 

around. Her words seemed over the top, almost comical in their invective. 

To anyone old enough, she sounded like a Nazi from the 1930s. She spouted 

rhetoric about the need to “obey” the European Union and its “sponsor,” the 

United States. “We must seek out and crush the hated minorities in Crimea 

and the Donbas!”

In Sevastopol an elderly, grieving mother wailed inconsolably over her dead 

son—murdered by the illegitimate Kyiv regime. Olexandr was her only son, a 

proud factory worker and patriot. The fascist monsters who invaded the city 

sought him out because his accent revealed Russian ancestry. “They won’t 

stop until they kill us all!” she cried. “When will Vladimir Putin rescue us?”

Standing atop a wall outside a chemical plant in Kharkiv, a stern, serious 

woman lectured the crowd on the history of Ukraine and its proud heritage 

of loyalty to Russia and heroic resistance against invaders. She rattled off 

figures touting the strength of the Eurasian Economic Union and how it is 

vastly superior to the EU’s faltering, authoritarian economy. Dressed in 

a worker’s simple dress, she appealed to the listeners’ patriotism and selfinterest, insisting that hope lay east and tyranny west.
The three women could not be more disparate: a fiery champion of the Kyiv 

regime trying to inspire ethnic conflict, a simple peasant woman aching from 

the pain of losing a son to a war she does not understand, a hard-nosed 

proletariat woman fed up with encroaching Western liberalism and fascism.

Photographic analysis, however, reveals the truth—it is the same woman in 

all three cities.2

♦♦♦

The contrast between the two men could not be more revealing. The first 

sought exposure, the second anonymity.

“Do you have a pass to be here? Journalists are not allowed here,” his stern 

voice said from behind the balaclava covering all but his eyes. Not only was 

his face hidden, but his green and black digital patterned kit that shouted 

“special forces” rather than “conscript” had no insignia or markings.

“Says who?” challenged the reporter. In jeans and designer jacket, the 

bespectacled on-screen personality’s voice and posture were brazen, as if the 

rolling cameras behind him could trump the soldier’s Kalashnikov.

“You’re not allowed here,” the soldier repeated, trying to obtain authority 

through firm repetition.

“Who says that we’re not allowed here?”

“The Ministry of Defense.”

“Of what country?”

“Ukraine.”

“Ok, show me that you are a Ukrainian soldier.”

Suddenly, the trooper was summoned away. The journalist posed and looked 

directly into the camera.

“So the situation is kinda tricky because the soldiers up there said they were 

part of the [self] defense force of Crimea. But, then when we come down 

here another one comes over and says we have to leave under orders of the 

Ukrainian Defense Ministry.”

It was clear that the invaders who the Ukrainians dubbed “Little Green Men” 

were neither.3
1

“Little Green Men”: A Primer on Modern Russian 

Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013–2014

Executive Summary

This document is intended as a primer—a brief, informative treatment—concerning 

the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. It is an unclassified expansion of an earlier classified version that drew from numerous classified and unclassified sources, including 

key US Department of State diplomatic cables. For this version, the authors drew 

from open source articles, journals, and books. Because the primer examines a 

very recent conflict, it does not reflect a comprehensive historiography, nor does it 

achieve in-depth analysis. Instead, it is intended to acquaint the reader with the 

essential background to and course of the Russian intervention in Ukraine from the 

onset of the crisis in late 2013 through the end of 2014. The document’s key points 

are summarized below.

Part I. Context and Theory of Russian Unconventional Warfare

• Key Principles

§ Strategy to deal with states and regions on the periphery of the Russian 

Federation

§ Primacy of nonmilitary factors: politics, diplomacy, economics, finance, 

information, and intelligence

§ Primacy of the information domain: use of cyberwarfare, propaganda, 

and deception, especially toward the Russian-speaking populace

§ Persistent (rather than plausible) denial of Russian operations

§ Use of unidentified local and Russian agents

§ Use of intimidation, bribery, assassination, and agitation

§ Start of military activity without war declaration; actions appear to be 

spontaneous actions of local troops/militias

§ Use of armed civilian proxies, self-defense militias, and imported paramilitary units (e.g., Cossacks, Vostok Battalion) instead of, or in advance 

of, regular troops

§ Asymmetric, nonlinear actions
• For the purpose of clarity and uniformity within this study, the authors use the 

term unconventional warfare to embrace the wide variety of military, informational, political, diplomatic, economic, financial, cultural, and religious activities 

Russia employed in Ukraine.

• Evolution of Russian unconventional warfare. Russian intervention in Ukraine 

has featured refined and modernized techniques evolved through observation 

and analysis of Western methods (the color revolutions, Arab Spring) and 

Russian experiences since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Specifically, they 

drew lessons from interventions in:

§ Lithuania, 1991

§ Transnistria, 1990–1992

§ Chechnya (and Dagestan), 1994–1996 (1999–2009)

§ Georgia, 2008

• Russian information warfare has emerged as a key component of Russian 

strategy. Igor Panarin and Alexandr Dugin are the primary theorists.

• Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov’s model for interstate conflict reflects 

the growing importance of nonkinetic factors in Russian strategy.

Part II. Russian Unconventional Warfare in Ukraine, 2013–2014

• Historical Context

§ Ukraine’s historical, cultural, religious, and economic ties to Russia 

make it a vital interest to Moscow.

§ Western encroachment into the Russian sphere of influence, primarily 

through North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion and 

European Union (EU) economic ties, stimulated a reactionary movement among Russian conservatives to stop the loss of peripheral states 

to the West.

§ The Crimean peninsula, with a majority of ethnic Russians, 

includes Russia’s Black Sea naval base of Sevastopol and is a vital 

interest to Moscow.

§ The Maidan movement is viewed as a product of Western—especially 

American—conspiracy.

§ Vladimir Putin has boosted his popularity by portraying himself as the 

defender of Russian nationalism and Russian Orthodoxy in Ukraine.
3

• Russian Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures in Ukraine, 2013–2014

§ Political organization within the conflict region to create and sustain 

pro-Russian political parties, unions, and paramilitary groups

§ Recruitment and support of regional SPETSNAZ

§ Importation of “little green men”—unidentified Russian agents (usually 

SPETSNAZ) to organize and lead protests and paramilitary operations

§ Importation of Cossack, Chechen, Serbian, and Russian paramilitary 

“volunteers”

§ Persistent (rather than plausible) denial of Russian operations, even in 

the face of photographic evidence and firsthand testimonials

§ Domination of television, radio, and social media through the use of 

highly trained operatives, including “hacktivists” and seemingly independent bloggers; use of Russia Today television as a highly effective 

propaganda tool; use of professional actors who portray themselves as 

pro-Russian Ukrainians

§ Use of blackmail, bribery, intimidation, assassination, and kidnapping 

against regional political opponents and government officials, including 

police and military officials

§ Use of “relief columns” to import weapons, soldiers, equipment, and 

supplies to pro-Russian forces

§ Small-scale invasion and precision operations by conventional Battalion 

Tactical Groups (BTGs) based along the Russian border

§ Issuing Russian passports to pro-Russian populations and touting 

Moscow’s need to defend the Russian diaspora against alleged abuses

Conclusion

• Driven by a desire to roll back Western encroachment into the Russian sphere 

of influence, the current generation of Russian leaders has crafted a multidisciplinary art and science of unconventional warfare. Capitalizing on deception, 

psychological manipulation, and domination of the information domain, their 

approach represents a notable threat to Western security.

• The new forms of Russian unconventional warfare challenge the structure of 

the NATO Charter, because they obviate the appearance of “armed invasion.”

5

Part I. Context and Theory of Russian 

Unconventional Warfare

“Russia has found a recipe to counteract the color revolutions.”

—Igor Panarin

In his recent work entitled “The Technology of Victory,” Igor Panarin, a leading 

advocate for Russian information warfare, boasted about the nearly flawless 

Russian operation to seize and annex 

Crimea. He celebrated the campaign’s 

success in avoiding armed violence and 

preempting American interference. 

While pointing to neoconservative 

ideals of justice, spirituality, and “true” 

liberty, he praised the use of blackmail, 

intimidation, and deception in the face 

of international dithering in the West. 

He attributed the success to the personal leadership and direct control of 

Vladimir Putin.4

The Russian intervention in Crimea 

and eastern Ukraine in 2013–2014 

demonstrated a radical departure from 

the paradigm of twentieth-century 

conventional warfare and an effective evolution of techniques Moscow 

employed after the dissolution of 

the Soviet Union in the Baltic states 

(1990–1991), Transnistria (1990–1992), 

Chechnya and Dagestan (1994–2009), 

and the Russo–Georgian War of 2008. 

The rapid pace of events culminating 

in Russia’s annexation of Crimea 

and Kyiv’s acquiescence in greater 

autonomy for eastern Ukraine took 

Western leaders by surprise and raised 

fears that Russia’s success in Ukraine 

may lead to further aggression in the 

Key Principles of Russian 

Unconventional Warfare

• Strategy to deal with states and 

regions on the periphery of the Russian Federation

• Primacy of nonmilitary factors: politics, 

diplomacy, economics, finance, information, and intelligence

• Primacy of the information domain: 

use of cyberwarfare, propaganda, 

and deception, especially toward the 

Russian-speaking populace

• Persistent denial of Russian operations

• Use of unidentified local and Russian 

agents

• Use of intimidation, bribery, assassination, and agitation

• Start of military activity without war 

declaration; actions appear to be spontaneous actions of local troops/militias

• Use of armed civilian proxies, selfdefense militias, and imported paramilitary units (e.g., Cossacks, Vostok 

Battalion) instead of, or in advance of, 

regular troops

• Asymmetric, nonlinear actions
6

Baltic states, Moldova, or Poland. Moscow’s goals vary from outright annexation 

to the creation and discipline of weakened states all along its periphery. Russia’s 

unconventional warfare techniques challenge the provisions of Article 5 of the 

NATO Charter because the treaty invokes collective defense in response to “armed 

attack” by another power. Throughout the campaigns in Ukraine, Moscow denied 

involvement and employed proxies and deception to obviate the stigma attached to 

a conventional armed invasion.5

The purpose of this document is to provide a primer on Russia’s unconventional 

warfare operations in Ukraine. These principles will be explored later in a full study 

to draw out more detailed observations and insights on Russian unconventional 

warfare operations and to help further identify phases of Russia’s nonlinear warfare 

approach. The title’s reference to unconventional warfare is intended to include the 

full spectrum of Russian activities in the subject time frame (2013–2014), including 

diplomatic coercion, intimidation, bribery, manipulation of media, terror, subterfuge, sabotage, and a host of other kinetic and nonkinetic activities. There are 

many terms and concepts that contribute to the study of modern conflict, including 

irregular warfare, hybrid warfare, new-generation warfare, and others. Each term has 

competing definitions and nuances, and each adds value to the ongoing discussion 

and analysis. Russian activities in Ukraine featured elements of many of these 

ideas. But for the purpose of clarity and uniformity within this study, the authors 

use the term unconventional warfare to embrace the wide variety of military, informational, political, diplomatic, economic, financial, cultural, and religious activities 

observed and analyzed.

Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations examined the nature and course of conflicts among nations.6 His main thesis was that the wars of princes and ideologies 

were in the past and that new conflict would be between civilizations. Huntington 

named eight such civilizations including Western, Islamic, Confucian, and Japanese 

civilizations. With the book’s publication in 1993, readers could view the Iran-Iraq 

war, Operation Desert Storm, and the ongoing conflict in Israel and easily envision 

Huntington’s description of the conflict between Western and Islamic civilizations. 

What was less obvious was the growing rift between the successor state to the 

Soviet Union—the rump state now called the Russian Federation—and the West. 

Moscow was emerging as the leader, champion, and oftentimes tyrant of the Slavic 

Orthodox civilization. Incisive observers might have remembered that Ukraine was 

the seam between Western and Slavic Orthodox civilizations, and that the Russian 

nation traces its history to the Kievan Rus’ Empire. The division between the Latin 

Church and Orthodoxy was exemplified by the 1472 marriage of the Grand Prince 

of Moscow Rus Ivan III to Sophia Paleologue, claimant to the throne of the Byzantine Empire, at the recommendation of Pope Paul II in an unsuccessful attempt 

to join the two civilizations. Still, through this union, Russian autocrats believed 

themselves to be the true inheritors of civilization, with Moscow the “third Rome,” 
7

following Constantinople. Ivan III began to refer to himself as Tsar, the Russian 

derivation of Caesar. Vladimir Putin’s interest and intervention in Ukraine emanated from these deep roots and, more recently, from the dramatic experiences of 

the Soviet Union as it teetered toward its demise.

US national security benefits from geography. The world’s two largest oceans 

provide a formidable barrier for any would-be invader. Russia does not enjoy such 

an advantage. Having endured multiple invasions from the west, east, and south 

throughout history, Russian and Soviet leaders developed defensive precepts that 

began with a buffer zone of border states. After their rise to superpower in World 

War II, the Soviets invaded Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. They 

invaded Afghanistan on Christmas Eve 1979 and became embroiled in a long war 

against insurgents that became known as the Soviets’ Vietnam. Each of these 

interventions occurred in order to bring to heel governments that were attempting 

to distance themselves from Russian control. Moscow’s post-Cold War incursions 

into the peripheral states and regions surrounding the Russian Federation occurred 

within this historical context that, since tsarist times, has featured concern, obsession, and paranoia about the defensive buffer.7

The rise of the Polish labor union movement in August 1980 led to unconventional 

warfare in a Soviet client state, but the actions did not result in an invasion. As 

the Soviet Army became mired in Afghanistan, a noncommunist labor movement 

emerged in Poland and rapidly subsumed one-third of Poland’s workforce. Solidarnosc, or Solidarity, used nonviolent, civil disobedience to achieve its aims. Still, 

the movement’s rise triggered a response in Moscow that led to serious consideration for yet another eastern European invasion. US intelligence indications and 

warnings led to an assessment that Soviet military intervention was likely. Soviet 

forces conducted a dress rehearsal in anticipation of a potential invasion as early 

as December 1980, and this rehearsal seemed to follow the pattern they employed 

before entering Czechoslovakia in 1968. Soviet leaders Leonid Brezhnev (general 

secretary from 1966 through 1982) and Yuri Andropov (1982–1984) elected not to 

respond with outright invasion. The Polish state instead imposed martial law but 

was forced to reckon with Solidarity eventually. The movement became a de facto 

political party and its leader, Lech Walesa, was elected president in 1990. Some 

historians suggest this was a major factor in the eventual dissolution of the Soviet 

Union. Despite the movement’s contribution to the Soviet dissolution, Russia’s current leadership likely considered and recognized the potential of using similar large 

popular movements to foment nonviolent insurrection. These principles certainly 

emerged within Crimea and eastern Ukraine.8
8

The Evolution of Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, 

1991–2014

From the sixteenth century Russia has expanded its control of territory through military invasion, intimidation, economic suasion, and subterfuge. Over four centuries 

Russian expansion eastward and southward proceeded at the remarkable average of 

fifty-five square miles per day. Cossack bands, agents masquerading as tradesmen 

or explorers, and conventional military units were the primary means of securing 

Russian control over the vast swaths of land incorporated across Asia.9

Russian expansion in the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries

By the twentieth century, tsarist Russia was in its last throes, but the Bolshevik 

Revolution of 1917 replaced the anachronistic regime with a vigorous, ideological 

power. Russia was hungry to reassert its control over what it considered its natural sphere of influence, stretching from eastern Europe to the Pacific and from 

the Arctic Ocean to the Caucasus and central Asia. The trauma of World War II 

gave rise to the superpower conflict of the Cold War, and the Soviet government 

assumed its new mantle of the leader of the Second World by installing authoritarian puppet regimes throughout its periphery. With the precipitous collapse of 

the Soviet Union in 1991, the rump state of Russia struggled to find and reclaim its 

place in the world order. Reactionary elements within the government, intelligence 

services, and armed forces found common cause with the new economic elites and 
9

elements of the Russian Orthodox Church in desiring to recoup the loss of empire. 

Thus, even before the de jure dissolution of the USSR, Moscow began to reassert its 

control over members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Russian 

methods of intervention evolved from one conflict to the next as leaders sought the 

most efficient methods of bringing weaker powers to heel while avoiding the stigma 

of outright imperialism, invasion, and war with the West.10

Intervention in Lithuania, 199111

When the Baltic states (Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia) each declared independence 

from the Soviet Union and deprecated Moscow’s former annexation as illegal, the 

Russian government under Mikhail Gorbachev responded by attempting to crack 

down on Lithuania. The government in Vilnius had declared independence in 

March 1990, but the ensuing months featured economic crises, rampant inflation, 

political upheaval, and ethnic tensions as pro-Russian populations within the 

country (including ethnic Russians and pro-Moscow Poles) protested what they 

saw as discrimination. The “Russian diaspora” problem became a common theme 

in this and future Russian interventions. Protection of ethnic Russians teetered 

between being a genuine objective and a convenient—even artificial—contrivance 

by which Moscow could justify military invasion. During the January Events of 

1991, the Russians exerted political pressure through their control of the Lithuanian 

Communist Party and the Yedinstvo Movement, which agitated against the government’s independence. Russian operatives employed propaganda and organized 

worker protests that on the surface were aimed at overpriced consumer goods but 

fundamentally were vectored more at the government’s independence from the 

Soviet Union. These events were followed by protesters attempting to storm government buildings—a tactic that would be repeated in future conflicts. The Soviets 

deployed military forces into the country, allegedly to ensure law and order. The 

forces included Spetsgruppa A (Alpha Group)—a counterterrorist unit created by 

the KGB in 1974 that operates under the direct supervision of the government in 

Moscow—along with a unit of paratroopers.

The January Events commenced with Soviet military forces seizing key government 

buildings and media infrastructure on January 11. Concurrently the Lithuanian 

Communist Party announced that its National Salvation Committee was the sole 

legitimate government in Lithuania. Soviet forces continued to assault and occupy 

government facilities while unarmed civilians mounted protests and demonstrations against the aggression. On January 13, Soviet forces moved to take over the 

Vilnius TV Tower. Tanks drove through demonstrators, killing fourteen, and Soviet 

forces began to use live ammunition against civilians. When an independent 

television broadcasting station managed to transmit desperate pleas to the world 

decrying the Soviet invasion, international pressure on Moscow mounted.
10

This situation gave rise to another tactic that was to be repeated and refined in 

future interventions: denial. Gorbachev and his defense minister denied that 

Moscow had ordered any military action in Lithuania, claiming that the “bourgeois 

government” there had initiated the conflict by firing on ethnic Russians. Nevertheless, international and domestic reaction to the aggression caused the Soviets to 

cease large-scale military operations and instead use small-scale raids and intimidation. The Soviets signed a treaty with Lithuania on January 31, and subsequent 

elections saw massive popular support for independence. The Russians had been 

given their first post-Cold War lesson about wielding power abroad: large-scale 

conventional operations against sovereign states would invite unwanted scrutiny, 

international pressure, and domestic protest within Russia. To maintain their 

control over states on the periphery, they would have to employ power in a more 

clandestine, deniable fashion.

Intervention in Transnistria, 1990–199212

The dissolution of the Soviet Union led to ethnic tensions in Moldova as well. The 

Popular Front there agitated for closer ties to Romania, the reestablishment of 

Moldovan as the sole official language, and a return to the Latin alphabet. Under 

Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost, anti-Soviet sympathies grew, and ethnic Slavs 

in Transnistria and Gagauzia, who favored ties to the Soviets, formed an ad hoc 

government that sought autonomy from the rest of Moldova. War broke out in 1992 

as Moldovan forces tried to suppress separatist militias in Transnistria. The Soviets 

fell back on an old tactic for handling such problems on the periphery: they sent 

Cossack volunteer units to assist the separatists. For several months Transnistrian 

militias and Cossacks, supported by the Soviet 14th Guards Army, fought Moldovan 

forces, which had support from Romania.

The strategic dynamics of the small war included Moldova’s military weakness and 

the political and military strength of Transnistria. The latter came about because of 

the strong ethnic Russian majority in the disputed territory on the east bank of the 

Dniester River and the remnants of the Soviet 14th Army who remained in the area. 

Some of the unit’s officers who had strong local ties defected to join the separatists, 

and others offered their support, at times turning over weapons and ammunition and training the militias. On July 3, 1992, the commander of the 14th Army 

launched a massive artillery strike against Moldovan forces, effectively destroying 

them and ending the military conflict. Transnistria thus became one of the four 

“frozen republics”—quasi-legal states left over from the Soviet occupation. As in 

past and future conflicts, Russian operatives in Transnistria branded the opposition 

as fascists attempting to install an illegal government over ethnic minorities.
11

Intervention in Chechnya, 1994–199613

In September 1991 a popular coup ousted the communist government of Chechnya, 

the only one of the former federated states that had not come to terms with Russia 

as the Soviet Union dissolved. President Yeltsin attempted to put down the rebellion 

with Internal Troops, but the Russian forces were surrounded and compelled to 

withdraw. In 1993 the government of Chechnya declared full independence from 

Russia. The subsequent exit (both voluntary and forced) of Russian professionals 

caused a severe downturn in the economy. In response to the independence movement, Russian forces fighting in South Ossetia were positioned on the Chechen 

border. Russia began to provide funding, arms, training, and leadership to the 

opposition against the Chechen government, and in 1994 Russian forces joined the 

insurgents in two assaults on the Chechen capital of Grozny that failed catastrophically. During the campaign, Russia repeated its unconventional warfare tactics of 

supplying mercenary and volunteer forces, denying involvement, and using its own 

forces in support of the rebels. In December 1994 Russia launched an all-out invasion aimed at destroying the government of Dzhokhar Dudayev (who was president 

of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, a breakaway state in the North Caucasus), but 

many within the Russian military and government protested the war, insisting that 

it would lead to another stalemate as in Afghanistan.

The dire predictions came true in short order. Dispirited, disorganized Russian 

troops suffered severe reverses. Because of the Russian conscripts’ poor training 

and leadership, Russian forces inflicted horrendous casualties among the civilian 

population, including those who had originally supported the intervention as 

well as ethnic Russians. After months of bloody fighting, the invaders finally took 

Grozny, but the cost in civilian life attracted universal condemnation, including 

from former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. The war grinded on as Russian forces 

advanced to try to take control of the entire country. Public confidence in Boris 

Yeltsin plummeted. The war took on a new and dangerous dimension when the 

senior mufti in Chechnya declared a jihad against the Russian invaders, opening up 

the prospect of a wider Islamist war against Russia. On the last day of August 1996, 

the Russian government signed a cease-fire agreement with Chechen leaders, 

ending the First Chechen War.

As in the Lithuanian conflict, Moscow learned again that the large-scale use of 

conventional force to impose its will on the periphery caused more problems than 

it solved. The challenge of ensuring Russian control of regions and states remained, 

but Russian leadership began to cast about for different, more effective techniques 

for dealing with conflict. Ongoing war in the Caucasus required more conventional force operations, but unconventional warfare tactics rose in prominence for 

Russian planners.
12

Dagestan and the Second Chechen War, 1999–200914

Radical Islamists within Chechnya were not content with the political gains of the 

First Chechen War but instead intended to carve out an Islamic state, joining the 

faithful from Chechnya and Dagestan. To that end they organized a two-thousandman brigade of jihadists and crossed the border into Dagestan to aid Islamic 

separatists there. The response from the local government and its Russian support 

was slow, allowing the rebels to seize several villages. But Russia eventually staged 

an effective counterattack using ground troops and strong air attacks. Key to Russian success was the failure of the Islamists to gain the substantial popular support 

for which they had hoped. Instead, local villagers tended to view the Chechens as 

invaders and religious fanatics. The Russians expelled the invading forces, pushing 

them back into Chechnya, and commenced airstrikes against their strongholds 

there. This success led to the Second Chechen War.

In the aftermath of the war in Dagestan the Russian FSB (Federal Security Service) 

accused the oligarch billionaire Boris Berezovsky of conspiring with the Chechen 

Islamists to instigate the Dagestan war as a way of goading the Russians into 

attacking separatist Chechnya and providing access to the region’s rich mineral 

resources. The case was never proven, but Berezovsky’s involvement and opposition 

to Vladimir Putin (then head of the FSB) highlighted the growing role of Russia’s 

super-rich elites and the need to engender cooperation between them and the 

Russian government. Oligarchs could pose a threat to Putin’s agenda because, as 

Berezovsky put it in an interview, Russian capitalists at times had to interfere with 

political processes as a counterweight to ex-communists “who hate democracy and 

dream of regaining lost positions.”15 If Putin and his reactionary allies hoped to 

succeed in recapturing Russia’s status as a great power and regional hegemon, they 

would have to make common cause with the oligarchs. That they were effective in 

doing so was critical to operations in Ukraine in 2014.

On the heels of their success against the Islamic International Brigade in Dagestan, 

the Russians invaded Chechnya to continue the fight and to reestablish Moscow’s 

control of the region. This was Vladimir Putin’s first war as the new prime minister 

of the Russian Federation. A string of bombings tied to Dagestani separatists and 

their Chechen allies served as a catalyst for invasion. Allying with pro-Russian 

militias against the Islamists, the Russians rapidly maneuvered to the Terek River, 

besieged Grozny, and methodically seized the city, largely destroying it in the process. Planners and leaders had learned hard lessons in the First Chechen War and 

applied them during this invasion. Conventional attacks were more deliberate and 

cautious, and the Russian forces focused on securing their rear area against insurgents and terrorist attacks. Throughout the spring of 2000 the Russian offensive 

moved into the mountains to destroy the remaining insurgent groups, including 

bands of Islamic foreign fighters.
13

After the initial military engagements, the Russian government sought to turn over 

most of the remaining conflict to its local proxies within Chechnya—primarily the 

police forces. Use of properly aligned proxies became another key feature of Russian 

unconventional warfare within the periphery. The FSB and MVD (Ministry of 

Internal Affairs) were the agencies that directed proxy forces—an organizational 

technique that would continue in future wars. From 1999 through 2009 Moscow 

directed a sustained campaign that effectively destroyed the Islamic insurgency in 

Chechnya and reasserted Russian control of the region.

Once again the political and economic situation in Chechnya was a key factor in 

Russian success. The separatist government proved unable to effectively administer 

the economy and rapidly lost popular support. The rift between separatist leader 

Aslan Maskhadov and the Islamists, and the growing strength of independent 

warlords, left the region’s political framework fragmented and ripe for exploitation 

by the Russians. This environment allowed Russian forces to assume the mantle 

of liberators and protectors and furnished Moscow with an acceptable premise for 

invasion. The wars in Chechnya and Dagestan, however, were characterized by allegations of excessive use of force and indiscriminate use of violence against civilians. 

The charges and graphic images of the results of the Russian invasion threatened 

Putin’s domestic political base and attracted unwanted criticism from human rights 

organizations and the international community. Because the wars were technically 

considered internal affairs, Moscow was able to deflect charges of aggression. Still, 

the global outrage in the wake of civilian deaths and the growing refugee problem 

motivated Putin’s planners in the military and intelligence services to transfer control of the ongoing counterinsurgency operation to reliable proxies (i.e., local militias 

or imported paramilitary forces used in place of regular Russian troops).

Intervention in Georgia, 200816

In the early 1990s Georgia had fought to regain control of the two breakaway 

regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but Russian support for the separatists 

foiled the plan and left the two regions with de facto independence. Russian citizens 

with Russian passports made up the majority of the population in South Ossetia, 

and in the face of further attempts by Georgia to reassert control there, Putin 

decided to strengthen Russian control. Georgia’s application for NATO membership 

and the fact that the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline runs through the country underscored Moscow’s intention to bring Georgia to heel.

In early summer 2008 Putin directed a series of intimidating moves, including 

overflights by Russian aircraft, the introduction of more forces (masquerading as 

peacekeepers or railway repair units) into Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and military 

training maneuvers in the region. US President George W. Bush sent his secretary 

of state, Condoleezza Rice, to Tbilisi on a state visit, and American troops trained 
14

with their Georgian counterparts. Putin and his allies in Moscow viewed this as 

American interference on the Russian periphery.

The situation heated up in early August as South Ossetian forces began shelling 

Georgian villages and Georgian forces responded. The Russians moved in more 

forces and began to evacuate civilians from the region. Georgian forces launched an 

attack into South Ossetia, initially seizing the key city of Tskhinvali. The Russians 

deployed units of the 58th Army along with paratroopers into the fight, and by 

August 11 the Georgian forces had been expelled from the region. Russian forces 

then followed up with attacks into Georgia, seized the city of Gori, and threatened 

the capital of Tbilisi. Simultaneously they opened a second front against Georgia 

through operations in Abkhazia and adjacent districts.

Throughout their operations, the Russians alternately denied involvement or 

downplayed the size and activities of their forces. They also introduced the use of 

information warfare on a scale previously unseen. Russian operatives employed 

cyberwarfare and strong propaganda to neutralize Georgia’s warfighting options 

and to vilify them in the press as aggressors, even accusing them of genocide. 

The Russian military brought journalists into the theater of war to strengthen 

the message of Russia protecting the population from Georgian aggression. 

Moscow carefully managed television broadcasts both at home and in the region, 

highlighting atrocities that the Georgians allegedly inflicted on the population of 

South Ossetia.

Russian military forces performed notably better in the Georgian war than they 

had in the Chechen wars, in part due to a renewed reliance on professional soldiers 

instead of conscripts. However, strong Georgian air defenses were able to limit 

the use of Russian airpower, which complicated reconnaissance and the rapid 

deployment of Russian airborne forces. In general, Russian leaders viewed the 

relative success of the Georgian operation as an indicator of the need to continue 

modernization. Likewise, the brief campaign reiterated the key features of Russia’s 

unconventional warfare along the periphery: (1) use of proxies when possible; 

(2) deniability to deflect international criticism and domestic political reaction; 

(3) use of information warfare, including propaganda and cyberwarfare; and 

(4) political preparation of subject populations and manipulation of economic conditions. All these factors would play roles in Russia’s intervention in Ukraine in 2014.

Russian Information Warfare

Russian information warfare techniques are an amalgamation of (1) methods 

evolved within the Soviet Union (with roots as far back as tsarist Russia) and 

(2) deliberate developments in response to scrutiny of Western (especially Amer-
15

ican) operations in the twenty-first century. The revitalized doctrine, called 

spetzpropaganda, is taught in the Military Information and Foreign Languages 

Department of the Military University of the Ministry of Defense. As an academic 

discipline it reaches out to military personnel, intelligence operatives, journalists, 

and diplomats.

The doctrine specifies that an information campaign is multidisciplinary and 

includes politics, economics, social dynamics, military, intelligence, diplomacy, 

psychological operations, communications, education, and cyberwarfare. In general, 

Russian information warfare has in view the 

broad Russian-speaking diaspora that 

fragmented into the various post-Soviet era 

states. It aims at affecting the consciousness 

of the masses, both at home and abroad, and 

conditioning them for the civilizational 

struggle between Russia’s Eurasian culture 

and the West. At its roots, the theory is 

military and nonmilitary, technological and 

social. Information warfare is likewise the 

chief tool with which the state achieves 

diplomatic leverage and attains its foreign 

policy goals. It links directly to geopolitics in 

service to the state and the Russian civilization. Through coordinated manipulation of 

the entire information domain (including 

newspapers, television, Internet websites, blogs, and other outlets), Russian operatives attempt to create a virtual reality in the conflict zone that either influences 

perceptions or (among some Russian-speaking audiences) replaces actual ground 

truth with pro-Russian fiction.17

Schools of Thought on Geopolitics and Information Warfare 

in Russia

Two noted academics dominate the development of information warfare in Russia: 

Igor Panarin and Alexandr Dugin. Both men not only promulgate their doctrines, 

but they also have experience in prosecuting information warfare firsthand.

Igor Panarin

Igor Panarin holds doctoral degrees in political science and psychology. He is a 

member of the Military Academy of Science and currently serves as a professor 

in the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He is a former 

According to Russian 

doctrine, information is 

a dangerous weapon. “It 

is cheap, it is a universal 

weapon, it has unlimited 

range, it is easily 

accessible and permeates 

all state borders without 

restrictions.”

—Jolanta Darczewska
16

KGB member and a close associate of Putin. His writings detail two periods of 

American-led information warfare targeting Russia: the first spanning from perestroika to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the second from 2000 on aimed at 

discrediting Vladimir Putin and keeping the former Soviet states fragmented. He 

attributes the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia (1989), “color” revolutions in 

former Soviet states (early 2000s), and the Arab Spring (2010–2012) to American 

conspiratorial influence.

In response to these threats Panarin advocates for a centrally controlled information warfare campaign that uses propaganda, intelligence, analysis, secret agents, 

media manipulation, and selected special operations to influence the masses and 

politicians. His method includes five cyclical stages: (1) forecasting and planning; 

(2) organization and stimulation; (3) feedback; (4) operation adjustment; and 

(5) performance control.18

Alexandr Dugin

Alexandr Dugin is a professor of political science, geopolitics, philosophy, and religious history at Lomonosov Moscow State University and the director of the Centre 

of Conservative Studies at Moscow State University. He is the leading proponent for 

“netwar,” “net-centric warfare,” and a “Eurasian network” designed to engage the 

so-called Atlantic network (i.e., the US-led Western coalition) in geopolitical battles 

within the former Soviet states and around the world. Dugin, like Panarin, sees the 

color revolutions as engineered by the United States to keep Russia fragmented and 

weak. He states that the Americans accomplished this goal through a broad application of net-centric warfare—a curious interpretation of American warfighting 

doctrine from the 1990s. As originally derived, net-centric warfare was a tactical/

operational idea designed to use computer and communications networks linked 

with sensors to command and control widely dispersed military forces. Dugin 

extrapolated from that application and conceived of the theory as a geopolitical 

idea—linking not just joint military forces in a theater of war but rather the entire 

information apparatus of a state and culture in a contest for political and social 

domination. Having perceived this structure in the West, Dugin calls for a similar 

approach in Russia.

Dugin’s Eurasian network would include political leaders, diplomats, scientists, 

military organizations, intelligence, media, and communications linked together to 

promulgate a geopolitical campaign to counter Western influence and information. 

He also insists that the creation of the network must be attended by a shift toward 

postmodernism, by which he seems to mean an evolution in Russian culture that 

can appeal to twenty-first-century masses. Dugin’s theory and practice seem somewhat bipolar in that he pushes for a postmodern, postliberal approach but integrates 

it into the conservative themes of other Russian elites. He views twentieth-century 

history as the titanic ideological struggle among fascism, communism, and liber-
17

alism, culminating in the victory of Western liberalism. He argues, however, that 

liberalism, focused on individualism, technocracy, and globalism, has run its course 

and must be replaced with a neoconservative super-state (Russia) leading a multipolar world and achieving genuine justice, dignity, and freedom. At the same time, 

this ideological superpower will defend conservative values and tradition.

Dugin’s theory demonstrates the evolving nature of Russian information warfare 

through its incorporation of social media tools. Russian observers noted how the 

color revolutions and the Arab Spring outflanked state-controlled media through 

the use of Facebook, Twitter, and other forms of social media. Dugin insists, 

therefore, that patriotic Russians must be organized and seize the domain of social 

media in service of the state. He prescribes a vigorous campaign of combating 

pro-Western liberalism through a set of polemics designed to vilify Russian liberals 

as lackeys for the Americans. If a blogger advocates for Western-style democracy, 

the patriotic Russian should respond, “How much did the CIA pay you?” Dugin 

insists that Russians must sustain the social media campaign relentlessly over a 

prolonged period to effectively paint the opposition as corrupt. Persistent messaging through social media not only conditions the domestic audience and targeted 

groups in areas of conflict, but it also gives rise to spontaneous support groups 

abroad—people who respond with enthusiasm to the Russian message and help to 

propagate it without direct control from the state. This technique is analogous to 

small boat swarms overwhelming capital ships at sea: the sheer volume and persistence of the messages overtaxes the adversary’s ability to defend.19

The Gerasimov Model20

This study uses an analytical framework derived from the work of General Valery 

Gerasimov, chief of the general staff of the Russian Federation. General Gerasimov’s 

main thesis is that modern conflict differs significantly from the paradigm of World 

War II and even from Cold War conflict. In place of declared wars, strict delineation 

of military and nonmilitary efforts, and large conventional forces fighting climactic battles, modern conflict instead features undeclared wars, hybrid operations 

combining military and nonmilitary activities, and smaller precision-based forces. 

Gerasimov, observing American and European experiences in the Gulf War, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the intervention in Libya, notes that political, economic, 

cultural, and other nonmilitary factors play decisive roles. Indeed, even humanitarian operations should be considered part of an unconventional warfare campaign.

In a January 2013 report entitled “The Main Trends in the Forms and Methods of 

the Armed Forces” Gerasimov explained that the color revolutions and the Arab 

Spring demonstrated that the line between war and peace has blurred. While liberal 

democratic uprisings may not appear to constitute war, they often result in foreign 

intervention (both overt and clandestine), chaos, humanitarian disaster, and civil 
18

war. These activities may become the “typical war” of the modern era, and Russian 

military practices must evolve to accommodate the new methods.

Modern war, Gerasimov argued, focuses on intelligence and domination of the 

information space. Information technologies have reduced the “spatial, temporal, 

and information gap between army and government.” Objectives are achieved in a 

remote contactless war; strategic, operational, and tactical levels, as well as offensive 

and defensive actions, have become less distinguishable. Asymmetric action against 

enemy forces is more commonplace.

Gerasimov developed a model for modern Russian warfare under the title “The Role 

of Nonmilitary Methods in Interstate Conflict Resolution.” His model envisions six 

stages of conflict development, each characterized by the primacy of nonmilitary 

measures but featuring increasing military involvement as the conflict approaches 

resolution.

1. Covert origins

Emergence of differences

of interest

Differences transform into conict.

Military-political leaders become

aware of this change.

Intensifying contradictions

Crisis reactions

Localization of military conict

Neutralization of military conict

2. Escalations 4. Crisis 5. Resolution 6. Restoration of 

 peace (postconict 

 settlement)

Embargo Economy on 

a war footing

Change in military

Nonmilitary measures

political leadership

Military measures

Potential

military threat

Direct

military threat

Immediate

military threat

Military

conict

Formation of coalitions and unions Search for ways to resolve conict

Political and diplomatic pressure

Economic sanctions

Break diplomatic relations

Strategic deployment

Formation of political opposition Action of opposition forces

Conduct military operations

Military strategic deterrence measures

Conduct information warfare (ratio of nonmilitary to military measures = 4:1)

3. Start of 

 conict 

 activities

Main Phases (Stages) of Conict Development

Peacekeeping

operations

Comprehensive

measures to 

reduce tensions

The role of nonmilitary methods in interstate conflict resolution
19

1. Covert origins. During the initial stage, which will likely be protracted, political 

opposition forms against the opposing regime. This resistance takes the form of 

political parties, coalitions, and labor/trade unions. Russia employs strategic deterrence measures and conducts a broad, comprehensive, and sustained information 

warfare campaign to shape the environment toward a successful resolution. At this 

stage, the potential for military activity emerges.

2. Escalations. If the conflict escalates, Russia exerts political and diplomatic 

pressure on the offending regime or non-state actors. These activities can include 

economic sanctions or even the suspension of diplomatic relations to isolate the 

opponent. During this stage military and political leaders in the region and abroad 

become aware of the developing conflict and stake out their public positions.

3. Start of conflict activities. The third stage begins as opposing forces in the 

conflict region commence actions against one another. This can take the form of 

demonstrations, protests, subversion, sabotage, assassinations, and paramilitary 

engagements. Intensification of conflict activities begin to constitute a direct military threat to Russian interests and national security. At the commencement of 

this stage of conflict, Russia begins strategic deployment of its forces toward the 

conflict region.

4. Crisis. As the crisis comes to a head, Russia commences military operations, 

accompanied by strong diplomatic and economic suasion. The information campaign continues with a view to rendering the environment conducive to Russian 

intervention.

5. Resolution. During this stage Russian leadership searches for the best paths to 

resolve the conflict. The domestic economy is on a war footing, as a way to unify 

the nation’s efforts toward successful prosecution of the war effort. A key aspect of 

resolution is effecting a change in the military and political leadership of the conflict 

region or state—what Western militaries refer to as “regime change.” The goal is to 

reset the political, military, economic, and social reality in the region in such a way 

as to facilitate a return to peace, order, and the resumption of routine relations.

6. Restoration of peace. During the final stage, which again may be protracted, 

Russia oversees comprehensive measures to reduce tensions and conducts peacekeeping operations. This stage includes the diplomatic and political measures 

required to establish a postconflict settlement that addresses the original causes 

of conflict.

Gerasimov’s model for modern conflict is a theoretical adaptation of emerging ideas 

about warfare, but elements of these ideas clearly pertain to Russia’s unconventional 

warfare in Ukraine and Crimea in 2013–2014. Part II of this paper uses the model 

and Russia’s information warfare theories to analyze the intervention.

21

Part II. The Russian Unconventional Warfare 

Campaign in Ukraine, 2013–2014

Historical and Political Context

The dominant theme of Ukraine’s history is foreign rule punctuated by movements 

for cultural and political independence. Sharing ethnic and cultural roots with 

Russia in the Kievan Rus’, 

Ukraine has been dominated 

by Poland to the west and 

the Russian Empire to the 

east since the Middle Ages. 

In 1654, Cossack hetman 

Bohdan Khmelnytsky signed 

the Treaty of Pereyaslav 

allying the Cossack people 

of Ukraine and the Russian 

Empire against Poland. But 

in 1704 another Cossack 

hetman, Ivan Mazepa, threw 

in his lot with Charles XII of Sweden against the tsar. Centuries later, these two 

figures elicit both praise and condemnation from Ukrainian nationalists on the 

one hand and the pro-Russian population on the other. Mazepa’s image decorates 

the Ukrainian ten-hryvnia note, but in Kyiv a street 

named in his honor was renamed under Viktor 

Yanukovych’s administration, and Mazepa remains 

anathematized by the Russian Orthodox Church. 

Russian and Soviet narratives point to the Treaty of 

Pereyaslav to illustrate the perpetual union of the 

Ukrainian and Russian peoples.21

Ukraine’s experience under Soviet control was not 

a happy one. Soviet efforts to impose collectivized 

agriculture in the late 1920s generated a famine 

(the Holodomor, 1932–1933) that killed millions in 

Ukraine. During Stalin’s Great Terror (1937–1938), 

Ukraine’s bid for cultural independence led to a 

brutal crackdown. Simmering nationalist aspirations 

and a growing hatred of the Soviets found expresUkrainian ten-hryvnia note featuring Ivan Mazepa

Stepan Bandera
22

sion in the person of Stepan Bandera during World War II. Bandera worked with 

the Nazi regime to separate Ukraine from the Soviet Union and then fought against 

the advancing Red Army late in the war. KGB agents assassinated him in 1959, and 

he became an infamous figure in Russia’s vilification of pro-Western sentiments—a 

caricature of what Moscow labels fascist influence.

Map of Ukraine

Ukraine’s borders stabilized as the territory of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 

Republic (SSR) was expanded at the end of World War II to encompass territories 

taken from Poland and Romania. The makeup of Ukraine’s population also shifted 

dramatically after World War II as millions of Russians moved into Ukraine to 

rebuild and industrialize the region, a process that shaped the region into the economic engine of the USSR. Propaganda stressed the unity of Ukraine and Russia on 

the basis of centuries of claimed historical precedent. In 1954, during a celebration 

of the Treaty of Pereyaslav, Russian premier Nikita Khrushchev transferred the 

Russian-majority Crimean peninsula to the Ukrainian SSR, certain that Kyiv and 

Moscow would be perpetually bound together. Recent Russian propaganda points 

to the artificial nature of Ukraine’s borders and decries the mixture of West-leaning 

populations with pro-Russian eastern Slavs.22

Anti-Soviet and Ukrainian nationalist activism continued despite repeated Russification efforts, escalating when the Chernobyl nuclear plant exploded in 1986. 

The disaster killed thirty-one workers and caused widespread contamination that 

extended the death toll from radiation-related sickness over ensuing years. Outrage 

over government duplicity in the wake of the accident, and the rapid collapse of 

the Soviet system as the Cold War ended, led to a vote for independence from the 

USSR on December 1, 1991. Despite achieving independence, Ukraine fell victim 

to political and economic corruption under president Leonid Kuchma (1994–2004). 
23

Competing factions of wealthy oligarchs, public 

officials, and organized crime led to a decade of 

scandals, political murders, and election irregularities. Ukrainian leadership and business interests 

sought to maintain cordial relations with Russia 

while simultaneously expanding economic ties 

and integration with Western Europe. Russia 

viewed the prospect of integration with the West 

as a threat to its sphere of influence and sought 

to compel Ukraine’s membership in the Eurasian 

Economic Union (EEU) instead. Moscow also 

pressed for continued basing rights in Sevastopol, 

home to the Russian Black Sea Fleet.

Government incompetence, corruption, and 

kowtowing to Russia stirred both Ukrainian 

nationalism and a growing affinity for the 

liberalism and capitalism of Western Europe. The bitterly contested 2004 presidential election between former prime ministers Viktor Yanukovych and Viktor 

Yushchenko led to an unforeseen popular movement that became known as the 

Orange Revolution. During the campaign, Yushchenko became seriously ill, leading 

to suspicion that he had been poisoned with dioxin at the behest of Russia. Mass 

demonstrations, civil disobedience, and strikes led to a court-mandated recount and 

the election of pro-Western candidate Yushchenko. Russia rankled under the threat 

of losing more of its East European buffer states to the EU and NATO.23

The Orange Revolution

Chernobyl reactor 4
24

The new administration, led by prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko, brought hopes 

of political and economic reform, but political corruption and infighting led to the 

dissolution of the Orange coalition and the dissipation of popular idealism. Kyiv’s 

attempts to move toward closer alignment with the EU, World Trade Organization 

(WTO), and potential NATO membership gave rise to a sustained national debate 

over the question of alignment with Western Europe or Russia. Trade and gas 

disputes with Russia soured public opinion of the government. Cultural relations 

likewise deteriorated as President Yushchenko enacted symbolic measures that 

many in Russia and Russian speakers in Ukraine considered “anti-Russian,” including recognition of the Holodomor as genocide and official hero status for Ukrainian 

nationalists who fought the Red Army during World War II.24

Viktor Yanukovych was elected president of Ukraine in February 2010 in a narrow 

victory over Yulia Tymoshenko, and he shaped a majority government of mostly 

ethnic Russian parties with power bases in eastern Ukraine.25

Political Framework Leading up to Euromaidan

In describing the political context of Russia’s intervention in Ukraine it is tempting to reduce the complexities into a bipolarity of pro-Russian and pro-Western 

blocs. The twin histories of Bohdan Khmelnytsky (the famous Cossack signer of 

the Treaty of Pereyaslav with Russia) and Ivan Mazepa (who joined with Sweden 

against the Russian tsar) can, at a superficial level, suggest this basic duality in 

Ukrainian politics. But closer examination of Khmelnytsky’s life and times reveals 

the causes of his famed devotion to Mother Russia—specifically, his antipathy 

toward the Polish regime that had deprived him of his property. (His family’s 

estate had been seized by a Polish magnate, and the king refused to intervene.) His 

motivations and those of his followers in seeking alliance with Russia transcended 

merely personal considerations, but the fact remained that the Cossacks who looked 

to Khmelnytsky for leadership perceived that such a connection would best protect 

their own interests, freedoms, and prerogatives. Indeed, before finally turning to 

Russia for protection, the Cossack hetman flirted with the Ottoman sultan and 

contemplated a union with a Muslim power. But in the end he grudgingly looked to 

the Russian tsar and signed the Treaty of Pereyaslav not because ideology or religion dictated his actions but because he saw it as the best guarantor of Cossack and 

Ukrainian sovereignty. The resulting relationship was troubled from the start.

Likewise, the seemingly ideological opposite pole—Ivan Mazepa—is viewed by Russians and Ukrainians alike as a symbol of Ukraine’s defiance of Moscow and dogged 

determination to be free of Russia’s domination. But again the details reveal nuances 

that spoil the simplistic model. Mazepa was, like Khmelnytsky before him, a pow-
25

erful Cossack hetman. He came to power during his colorful career as an ally of the 

tsar. But Russia’s struggles against the Swedish–Polish alliance left Mazepa worried 

that the tsar’s generals intended to employ the Cossacks as cannon fodder in far-off 

battles and leave his own lands vulnerable to enemy incursions from the West. In 

1708 matters came to a head, and Mazepa made the fateful decision to betray the tsar 

and ally with the Poles and Swedes. The Battle of Poltava the following year doomed 

Mazepa’s new alliance, and he died in exile. His legacy thereafter was booted about 

like a football: pro-Russian and pro-Soviet sources despised him, while Ukrainians 

tired of Russian domination hailed him as a nationalistic freedom fighter.

Khmelnytsky and Mazepa, although posthumously bearing the burden of opposite 

political ideologies, were very much cut from the same cloth of Cossack nationalism 

and self-interest. Likewise, on the surface modern Ukrainian politics can appear to 

be polarized between pro-Western and pro-Russian extremes, but the panoply of 

factions and parties are in reality more complex in their motivations and objectives. 

Like the famous Cossack leaders before them, modern Ukrainian political leaders 

also have in common a fundamental desire to carve out, protect, and sustain a 

Ukrainian identity. The realities of the modern world force each party to look westward or eastward as they search for better ways to guarantee their hoped-for futures.

The Rada featured intense political conflict in the months leading up to Euromaidan.a Viktor Yanukovych attained the presidency in 2010, and soon after his 

associate Mykola Azarov formed a government as the new prime minister. By this 

time, the Party of Regions had gained considerable 

strength throughout the country, including in 

municipalities, except in western Ukraine. The 

Party of Regions, originally created in 1997, represented ethnic Russians as well as others in the 

country who favored ties to Russia. In 2012 the 

Party of Regions gained strength through a merger 

with Strong Ukraine, a political party that 

coalesced around billionaires Serhiy Tihipko and 

Oleksandr Kardakov. Despite Yanukovych’s 

inclination toward Moscow, the Party of Regions’s 

foreign policy reflected both the East–West tug-ofwar and the more nuanced objective of finding a 

balance that would promote Ukrainian interests. 

Thus, the party was open to stronger economic ties 

with the EU and even agreed to commit troops to 

the US-led War on Terror but deprecated full 

a Euromaidan was a spontaneous uprising in late 2013 in reaction to President Viktor Yanukovych’s 

decision to abandon growing ties to the EU in favor of stronger links with Moscow.

Viktor Yanukovych
26

integration into NATO. In his initial foreign policy statements in 2010, the new 

president expressed his vision for Ukraine as a neutral state cooperating in matters 

of defense with both NATO and Russia.

Under Yanukovych’s leadership, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine overturned 

the 2004 amendments, considering them unconstitutional on October 1, 2010. The 

subject amendments had significantly reduced the power of the executive branch in 

favor of the Rada. Yanukovych’s move was widely perceived among the opposition 

as a power grab.

Opposition parties included the Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform 

(UDAR), led by heavyweight boxer Vitali Klitschko; Fatherland, led by former prime 

minister Yulia Tymoshenko; and Svoboda (“Freedom”), led by Oleh Tyahnybok.

The UDAR party was center-right and espoused nationalism and opposition to 

Russian pressure and involvement in Ukraine. Its power base was in Kyiv. It had 

strong links to the Social Democratic Party in Germany, and Angela Merkel lent 

her support for Vitali Klitschko as an effective counterweight to Russian influence. 

Klitschko was elected mayor of Kyiv in 2014 and was thereby required to give up 

official leadership of UDAR. He supported Petro Poroshenko’s bid for the presidency. UDAR tended to avoid polarizing political stances and instead focused on 

achieving social justice, cutting corruption, and reining in perquisites for government (and former government) officials.

The Fatherland party underwent a complex series of mergers and splits after its 

founding in the late 1990s, but in general it inclined toward European integration 

and Ukrainian nationalism. In 2013 Tymoshenko proposed a party ideological 

manifesto that spelled out her thinking on key political issues. The manifesto called 

for eventual full integration into the EU and declared Fatherland as an associate 

member of the European People’s Party (EPP), a multinational center-right political 

party in the European Parliament. Tymoshenko went on to insist that Ukrainian 

should be the sole official language of the country, that the Holodomor was an 

act of genocide, and that any infringement of Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty be 

resisted immediately and with strength.

Svoboda was originally founded as the Social-National Party of Ukraine, a rightist 

party that espoused nationalism and anti-communism. Its original power base 

was Lviv, and early constituents included veterans of the Soviet–Afghan War. Its 

iconography and far-right policy stances led opponents to label the party as fascist. 

The party established a paramilitary called Patriot of Ukraine that sought to support the country’s military forces. By 2007 Svoboda severed official links with the 

paramilitary, but they remain informally connected. Oleh Tyahnybok took over 

leadership of the party in 2004 and became a moderating influence. He pushed 

far-right members out of the party and changed the party’s symbol to a picture of 
27

a hand holding up three fingers, reminiscent of freedom movements in the 1980s. 

But Tyahnybok also made public speeches in which he denigrated various groups, 

including Jews, calling them “scum,” which attracted a lot of criticism. The party 

continued to attract followers among the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and other 

nationalists. In one infamous episode in 2013, Svoboda deputies shouted during a 

Party of Regions speech in the Rada in which Oleksandr Yefremov was speaking 

Russian. The delegates shouted “Speak Ukrainian,” to which the Party of Regions 

members responded with cries of “fascists!” against Svoboda. A fistfight ensued. 

Svoboda vehemently opposed the Russian annexation of Crimea and formed a 

paramilitary called the Sich Battalion to fight in eastern Ukraine.

As Viktor Yanukovych sought to consolidate his power, the government brought 

criminal charges against Yulia Tymoshenko for abuse of power and embezzlement, 

eventually obtaining a conviction. She was sentenced to seven years imprisonment, 

but the proceeding was widely viewed as a political ploy to rid the president of his 

strongest opponent. The United States and the EU condemned the actions, with the 

latter insisting that Tymoshenko’s release would be a condition for Ukraine’s membership in the EU.

Yanukovych sought to balance growing popularity for closer relations with the EU 

on the one hand with the very real pressure he felt from Moscow and his ethnic 

Russian constituency on the other hand. He sought to negotiate a more advantageous natural gas deal with Russia, and to that end he signed an agreement 

extending Russia’s lease of Ukraine’s Black Sea port facilities, including Sevastopol, 

in 2010. The deal split the nation’s political spectrum into two camps—one championing closer ties to Moscow and the other touting nationalism and independence 

from Russian domination. Many in Ukraine viewed the continued presence of the 

Russian fleet in Sevastopol as an affront to Ukrainian sovereignty. But Yanukovych 

tried to sell the deal as an essential part of his strategy to further Ukrainian integration with Europe. He argued that to sustain loans from the International Monetary 

Fund (IMF) and to meet EU standards, the government had to keep expenditures 

under control. Measures in this direction included highly unpopular cuts in pensions and other social spending, but Yanukovych pointed to reduced natural gas 

prices as contributing to government savings.

One of the most poignant symbols of the struggle for a rational and effective foreign policy is the ongoing dispute regarding how to interpret the Holodomor—the 

1930s famine that Stalin’s Russia inflicted on Ukraine, killing nearly ten million. 

Parties and people seeking to distance themselves from Moscow’s control label the 

incident as genocide and place the blame on the country of Russia. Those more 

inclined toward friendly relations with Russia (including Yanukovych) instead seek 

a middle ground of condemning the forced food expropriations but blaming Stalin’s 

totalitarian government rather than Russia itself. They are quick to point out that 

the resulting famine killed many in Russia as well.
28

Yanukovych also sought to promote the Russian language as one of Ukraine’s 

official tongues. He pointed to problems within schools, courts, and other civil 

institutions, and he sponsored a law (passed in 2012) that allowed for any language 

spoken by at least 10 percent of the population to be declared official within that 

local area. The law was later repealed after Yanukovych’s ouster, because it was seen 

as an attempt to further Russify Ukraine.

Languages in Ukraine

In early 2013 opposition parties, including UDAR, Fatherland, and others, blocked 

access to the podium in an attempt to protest the direction of the government’s 

policies and the practice in which party deputies could vote for absent members of 

the parliament. Throughout the year the opposition parties pushed back against 

Yanukovych’s attempted austerity measures, which he sponsored in the name 

of obtaining better integration into the EU. Indeed, the president proclaimed his 

intention to sign the Association Agreement in November and pushed parliament 

to join together to pass the needed legislation to make it a reality.

With rising antipathy threatening his regime, Yanukovych signaled his willingness 

to formalize integration with the EU. But in November 2013, he bowed to economic and diplomatic pressure from Moscow and shocked the West by reversing 

his decision and declaring his intent to instead deepen relations with Russia. The 

move was met with an outcry from the opposition and pro-EU demonstrations in 
29

Kyiv’s Independence Square (the Maidan Nezalezhnosti). Protests were initially 

nonviolent, and in response to government crackdowns the protests surged to 

hundreds of thousands of people in Kyiv and spread throughout the country. The 

new pro-Western movement was called Euromaidan.26

Euromaidan

President Yanukovych and Russian president Vladimir Putin moved quickly in an 

attempt to calm the opposition. They signed the Ukrainian-Russian Action Plan 

treaty, which discounted Ukraine’s natural gas purchases by a third and provided 

that Russia would buy $15 billion in Ukrainian government bonds to alleviate the 

debt crisis. The treaty was met with a blockade of demonstrators hoping to prevent 

its ratification. The number of demonstrators dwindled after New Year’s Eve during 

the Orthodox Christmas season, but protests suddenly reignited on January 12 

after police injured an opposition leader while he was protesting the convictions 

of several Ukrainian nationalists. Court and legislative actions banning protests 

continued to escalate the crisis, giving rise to riots and demonstrations in the 

hundreds of thousands, with protesters demanding that Yanukovych resign. The 

passage of a series of laws on January 16—which the opposition referred to as the 

Laws of Dictatorship—swelled the ranks of the protesters, including the violent 

Pravy Sektor.b The interior minister authorized police forces to use physical force 

b Pravy Sektor was a far-right Ukrainian nationalist group that emerged as a paramilitary during 

the November 2013 protests. It became a political party in March 2014.
30

and firearms to quell rioters, which caused hundreds of injuries and several deaths. 

In response to the effectiveness and energy of the Automaidan movement, the 

government outlawed more than five cars driving together. Amid all these efforts to 

intimidate the demonstrators, cries for the ouster of Yanukovych grew stronger.

Population density of Ukraine

The violence in Kyiv spread across the country in early February. Protesters occupied regional government buildings and the Justice Ministry in defiance of the 

anti-protest laws, spurring more police actions. President Yanukovych tried to 

negotiate with the opposition, offering to repeal the anti-protest laws, remove Prime 

Minister Azarov, grant amnesty for arrested protesters, and return to the limits on 

presidential power codified in the 2004 constitution. Negotiations broke down in 

February, and violence erupted, resulting in at least sixty-seven deaths between 

February 18 and 20. The president and numerous Party of Regions deputies fled 

the capital, and the parliament voted to remove President Yanukovych from office 

(Yanukovych then fled to eastern Ukraine before exile in Russia). The interim 

authorities released Yulia Tymoshenko from prison on February 22. Oleksandr 

Turchynov became interim president and Arseniy Yatsenyuk became prime minister.

The parliament set presidential elections for May 25, 2014, and the pro-Western 

voters chose billionaire oligarch Petro Poroshenko as the new president of Ukraine. 

Reflecting the sentiments of his constituents, he signed the Association Agreement 
31

with the EU on June 27, 2014. The pro-Russian resistance opposed the new government, considered it illegal, and insisted it was a fascist regime.

The locus of conflict shifted to Crimea, where a largely Russian-speaking majority 

allegedly favored deeper ties with Moscow. After the expulsion of Yanukovych, 

Sergei Aksyonov, leader of a large paramilitary force in Crimea, appealed to Putin 

for help. Popular support for ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in Crimea 

emboldened Putin to act. Pro-Russian 

protesters labeled the Kyiv government as 

Western fascists and adopted a position that 

ethnic Russians in Ukraine were in danger. 

Groups of unidentified armed men began 

appearing throughout the region, often in 

coordination with local pro-Russian militias. 

Both the Ukrainian government and most 

Western intelligence sources claimed that the 

“little green men” were Russian operatives. 

The Crimean “self-defense” militias seized 

government buildings, air bases, and military installations, and the Kyiv government, 

desiring to avoid bloodshed and further 

provocation, ordered its military forces not to 

resist. On March 11, 2014, a joint resolution 

between Sevastopol and the Supreme Council of Crimea declared their intention to hold a referendum to join Russia. Refat 

Chubarov, president of the Worldwide Congress of Crimean Tatars, announced 

that the new Crimean government and the proposed referendum were illegitimate 

and supported only by the armed forces from another country. On March 18, 2014, 

a treaty was signed to incorporate all of Crimea, including Sevastopol, into the 

Russian Federation.

The United States and EU responded to the move with economic sanctions and 

small-scale military deployments to the Baltic states and Poland. Diplomatic protests continued, but Russia’s annexation appeared to succeed as the world turned its 

attention to eastern Ukraine.

Demonstrators in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts engaged in sporadic violence 

in the wake of Yanukovych’s ouster, but Russia’s annexation of Crimea stimulated 

a new wave of demonstrations in April. The SBU (Security Service of Ukraine) had 

ejected demonstrators who seized the Donetsk Regional State Administration building in early March. But in April more than a thousand demonstrators again seized 

the building and demanded a regional referendum similar to the one in Crimea. 

When the government refused, the rebels declared the People’s Republic of Donetsk. 

That month, pro-Russian militants stormed government offices in Donetsk, 

Sergei Aksyonov
32

Luhansk, and Kharkiv. Resistance 

groups labeled the Kyiv government as 

fascist and held informal referendums 

on autonomy in the east. Denis Pushilin, 

one of the leaders of the self-styled 

People’s Republic of Donetsk, stated that 

his forces would not consider withdrawal 

until the new leaders in Kyiv left power.

In mid-April the Kyiv government 

launched its counterattack against rebels 

in the east. The offensive quickly stalled, 

with scattered reports of Ukrainian 

soldiers refusing to fire on their fellow 

citizens and in some cases changing 

sides. Other Ukrainian forces simply 

lacked the combat power to overcome the 

Russian-backed resistance. In late April 

government forces launched a second 

round of attacks with some success in Mariupol and to the northeast of Donetsk. To 

deal with firmly entrenched rebel fighters in Slovyansk and Donetsk, government 

forces resorted to blockades aimed at isolating the defenders. But with Russian 

troops, intelligence personnel, and equipment, the rebels continued to seize buildings 

and hold their positions throughout the Donbass region. The combatants became 

increasingly brutal, and allegations of torture inflamed passions on both sides. In late 

April, Vyacheslav Ponomaryov, the pro-Russian mayor of Slovyansk, threatened to 

kill hostages, including an American journalist, if his forces were attacked.

On May 22, rebels from the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts declared the establishment of New Russia, an area including southern and eastern Ukraine. The militants 

mandated that Russian Orthodoxy was the state religion and that private industries 

would be nationalized. Late spring and early summer saw an increase in the pace 

of skirmishing, but actions remained relatively small in scale with few casualties 

on either side. The presence of Russian-made antiaircraft weapons neutralized the 

Ukrainian government’s air advantage and resulted in the downing of an Ilyushin Il-76 transport in mid-June, killing forty-nine troops who were aboard.

Militants continued to expand their footprint in eastern Ukraine until the government counterattack began to gain some momentum. On July 1, after a weeklong 

unilateral cease-fire, the government counteroffensive resumed and rapidly 

recaptured several towns, including Slovyansk on July 5. The renewed government 

attacks inflicted heavy losses on the pro-Russian militants, and some insurgents fled. 

Fighting intensified through mid-July, with government forces capturing more towns 

and gradually pushing the remaining militants into their strongholds of Donetsk and 

Denis Pushilin
33

Luhansk. On July 17, Russian-backed militia in eastern Ukraine fired a surface-to-air 

missile at Malaysian Airlines Flight 17, causing it to crash, killing 283 passengers and 

15 crew members. The downing of the civilian passenger flight brought increased 

world attention on Russian activities, and strengthened economic sanctions may 

have contributed to a lessening of direct Russian support. In any case government 

forces began to threaten the remaining rebel strongholds. By early August, the 

government had recaptured about 75 percent of the territory once held by insurgents.

In September 2014, a tenuous cease-fire was arranged between Ukraine and 

pro-Russian forces, with the support of Russia and the EU. Sporadic fighting continued, but both sides claimed that the cease-fire would continue to be respected. 

However, by early November there were clear indications that the fighting was heating up. Russian tanks crossed the border, and on November 12, media outlets were 

reporting that the cease-fire was over and that major hostilities had resumed. The 

use of conventional invasion can be viewed from two perspectives. On the one hand 

it represents the failure of Russian information warfare in eastern Ukraine, because 

it implies Putin’s desperation in recouping the failures of his agents there. On the 

other hand, it represents the logical, culminating sequel in the Russian information 

campaign, which in part is designed to set the conditions for invasion if necessary.

The government of Ukraine under President Poroshenko sought to secure the 

nation’s sovereignty by calling on both the West and Moscow to respect the 1994 

Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, which guaranteed Ukraine’s security and territorial integrity in exchange for Kyiv relinquishing its nuclear arsenal. 

Poroshenko also flirted with requesting Major Non-NATO Ally status—a move 

sure to inflame Putin.

Russian Intervention in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine

The Players

According to Russian polemics championing the annexation of Crimea and Russian 

involvement in eastern Ukraine, the entire operation was planned, organized, and 

controlled under the leadership of Vladimir Putin. It is significant that pundits in 

favor of Russia’s actions—and not just those opposed to Russia—point to the cult of 

personality that has gathered around Putin. Indeed, it is striking that despite all the 

modern and postmodern features of Russian information warfare, the age-old glorification of a strongman continues to characterize Moscow’s politics. The current 

generation of Russian military and civilian leadership includes a large number of 

siloviki—Russian leaders with backgrounds in the intelligence or military services. 

The siloviki represent themselves as resolute, honest, apolitical patriots—strong 
34

bulwarks against the chaos of liberalism. Most major governmental figures with 

influence in Russia are close associates of Putin’s, and many share earlier experiences in the KGB.27

Minister of Defense Sergey Shoygu was reportedly appointed to his position 

because he was politically neutral, and Putin wanted to avoid strengthening the 

“St. Petersburg Group” of siloviki. Of the military officials involved in the campaigns 

in Ukraine, the most notable is general Valery Gerasimov, who outlined Russia’s new 

methods of warfare, highlighting the nonmilitary factors as the most decisive.28

Key to understanding Russia’s foreign policy is understanding the role of the 

oligarchs—the super-rich Russian businessmen who are close to Putin. Although 

they are not a monolithic group, they generally have deep investments in energy 

and finance, and they champion the EEU. They share neoconservative values. Some 

tout their devotion to Russian Orthodoxy and by so doing attract some favorable 

attention from religious figures in the West. But the oligarchs remain Russian 

1. Igor Sechin, former Soviet agent and arms smuggler and currently Rosneft CEO and 

adviser to Putin; 2. Yuri Kovalchuk, “Putin’s banker” and largest shareholder in Bank 

Rossiya; 3. Arkady and Boris Rotenberg, co-owners of SGM who control InvestCaptital Bank 

and SMP Bank; 4. Gennady Timchenko, oil trader, founder of Gunvor and Volga Group, and 

close associate of Putin; 5. Konstantin Malofeev, lawyer and investment banker who backs 

illegal paramilitary in Ukraine; 6. Sergei Chemezov, engineer and former KGB agent, Rosneft 

director, and director general of Rostec.

The oligarchs

1 2 3

4 5 6
35

nationalists above all else. They see the unification and success of ethnic Russians 

(and eastern Slavs in general) as the key to achieving Putin’s vision of a multipolar 

world to counterbalance America’s overweening domination. Western sanctions 

targeted the oligarchs because they are viewed as both influential with Putin and 

vulnerable to economic and financial pressure.29

The class of the super-rich business elites grew in the wake of the collapse of the 

Soviet Union and the rise of Boris Yeltsin. In the name of privatization, Russian 

business interests (and the political clout that attended them) were sold off to a new 

class of leaders. These leaders in turn sought to solidify their control of Russian 

politics and foreign policy by cultivating a pliant politician. They sponsored the rise 

of Vladimir Putin but soon discovered that the former KGB agent was anything 

but their puppet. Instead, Putin jailed oligarchs that defied him and instructed the 

business elite that he would foster their economic and financial interests if they kept 

clear of political interference and remained loyal to his regime. Within a few short 

1. Vladimir Putin, former KGB agent and current president of Russia; 2. Dmitry Medvedev, 

former law professor and president, now prime minister of Russia; 3. Sergey Lavrov, foreign 

minister of Russia; 4. Sergey Shoygu, minister of defense—seen as apolitical and chosen in 

place of “St. Petersburg Group” candidate; 5. Valery Gerasimov, chief of the general staff of 

the Armed Forces of Russia and proponent of “new-generation warfare”; 6. Alexandr Galkin, 

commander, Southern Military District.

Russian leadership

1 2 3

4 5 6
36

years Putin consolidated his control over the key oligarchs, and they became the 

third pillar, along with the government and security services, of the Russian political infrastructure. In the current environment, elites are given positions at the head 

of corporations or in government, which are viewed as interchangeable.

Putin’s inner circle includes a number of these oligarchs, including Igor Sechin, 

who was given control of the giant oil corporation Rosneft; Vladimir Yakutin, who 

controls the country’s rail network; Dmitry Medvedev, who became, alternately, 

prime minister and president; Arkady and Boris Rotenberg, co-owners of huge 

financial institutions; and Yuri Kovalchuk, known as “Putin’s banker.” Most members of the inner circle are Leningrad men with long associations with Putin. Tikhon 

Shevkunov, a Russian Orthodox priest said to be Putin’s confessor, is another close 

confidant. Shevkunov directed and starred in a popular documentary on the history 

of the fall of the Byzantine Empire—a thinly veiled propagandist piece designed to 

help craft the message that a strong empire can be sapped by foreign intrigue and 

internal weakness. Over the years the Orthodox Church has influenced Putin toward 

nationalism and conservatism with its theme of Christian order. Putin’s chief of staff, 

Sergei Ivanov, is a foreign policy hawk and likewise a close adviser to the president. 

Vladislav Surkov, of part Russian and part Chechen ancestry, is the chief ideologue 

of the Putin regime’s “sovereign democracy” theme and is one of the leaders of the 

national youth movement Nashi (Ours), which targets anyone deemed anti-Russian.

The Motivations

Russia’s intervention into Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea in 2014 stem from 

a combination of motivations, fears, and interests that drew strength from the 

period of pozor (shame) in the early 1990s. The historical and cultural experience 

of imperial Russia, with its control of massive swaths of territory across Asia and 

Europe, combined with the pragmatic concerns over the strategic security of the 

Russian Federation. Tangential to this is the feeling of victimization associated with 

the radical shift in Moscow’s global influence—from feared superpower to minor 

regional power—highlighted by the West’s seemingly unstoppable encroachment 

into Russia’s historical sphere of influence. Finally, there is the pervasive influence 

of domestic politics and Putin’s paranoia over maintaining his regime.

The strategic factors that led to Russian aggression in Ukraine included domestic 

politics, reaction to the expansion of the EU and NATO, the strategic value of 

the Black Sea, Russia’s need to maintain influence in peripheral states as a buffer 

against Western invasion, and President Putin’s desire to strengthen the new EEU 

in the former Soviet sphere of influence. Each of these factors contributed to Moscow’s mandate for intervention under the umbrella imperative to reclaim Russia’s 

status as a superpower. These factors underlie Russia’s foreign policy, but Moscow 

also touts its aim to foster and protect ethnic Russians and Russian speakers who 

are threatened by American-inspired fascist regimes in the former Soviet states.30
37

Domestic Political Stability and Incentives

Russian operations in Crimea and eastern Ukraine helped to remedy domestic 

political threats to the Putin regime. The reversion to autocracy in the Russian political system has affected both domestic and foreign policies. The inherent instability 

associated with strong centralized rule fosters a traditional Russian view of domestic reformers as a perpetual fifth column serving foreign interests. This insecurity 

is exacerbated by President Putin’s struggle to maintain Russia as a superpower. 

Russia views as threats any movements within peripheral states toward integration 

with Europe, and Putin continues to raise the specter of encroachment from the 

West as a pretext to justify a unitary, autocratic state and neoimperialist policies as a 

necessity for national security.

The deterioration of economic and sociopolitical life in Russia between 2009 and 

2012 sparked backlash from the urban middle class. Massive demonstrations in 

Moscow and St. Petersburg emerged in late 2011 and continued through 2012 with 

protesters demanding freedoms and decrying corruption. Opposition leaders (e.g., 

Alexei Navalny) became icons, and Putin’s approval ratings began to decline. This 

political threat led Putin to make a strategic shift to right-wing policies to garner 

support from the “other Russia,” presenting Putin as a bulwark of traditional 

Russian values.

Ukraine is central to the original narrative of the Russian nation and Eastern 

Orthodox civilization, and losing influence in Ukraine and Crimea would threaten 

Putin’s political appeal among the demographics of the other Russia. The tidal shift 

against Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych and the Russian dominance of 

Kyiv’s politics expressed in Euromaidan constituted a serious blow to Putin’s image 

as a defender against the eastward drive of Western influence. The annexation of 

Crimea and continued operations in eastern Ukraine have served to quell a potential domestic crisis of legitimacy for the Putin administration.

Russian actions in Crimea also served to warn those within Russia who may be 

inspired to imitate Euromaidan or start uprisings in the North Caucasus. Russia’s 

recent military buildup and increased security funding have been particularly 

focused on improving domestic security, including new bases in Uzbekistan, 

Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to enable rapid movement of forces to hot spots (a 

strategic imperative frequently rehearsed since 2004).

Counter Eastward Progression of Western Economic and Security Institutions

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the chaos of the Yeltsin era, political 

elites under Vladimir Putin reached a consensus to reestablish Russia as a great 

power. President Putin’s outlook on the West hardened after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (2004–2005) and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan (2005). These 
38

popular movements coincided with eastward expansion by the EU and NATO, and 

together they were perceived as a US-led conspiracy to further the reach of Western economic and security alliances Eastward to undermine Putin’s regime and 

regional influence.

The Westward orientation of former Soviet republics poses economic and geopolitical 

risks to Russia’s drive for renewed status as a great power. Acceptance of Western 

institutions and values may encourage popular movements within Russia and 

embolden insurgents in the North Caucasus. Moscow does not view central European countries as merely adopting Western institutions and mores but (in President 

Putin’s words) as an aggressive and forceful progression eastward of “the infrastructure of a military bloc . . . toward [Russia’s] borders.” Putin’s April 2014 statement 

continued, saying “our decision on Crimea was partly due to . . . considerations that 

if we do nothing, then at some point, guided by the same principles, NATO will drag 

Ukraine in and they will say: ‘It doesn’t have anything to do with you.’”

European Union

Member states joining

the EU in 2004

Member states joining

the EU in 2007

Member states joining

the EU in 2013

History of NATO enlargement

Geostrategic Control of the Black Sea Region

Russia’s long-standing maritime and security interests in the Black Sea highlight 

the importance of Crimea and the port of Sevastopol. The peninsula served as a 

barrier against invasion from Western powers, including Ottoman, French, and 

British forces in the Crimean War (1853–1856), and hosted some of the bloodiest 

engagements on the Eastern Front during the German invasion in World War II. 

Russian expansion into the Black Sea basin in the seventeenth century was driven 

by both imperial ambitions and hopes to open significant maritime trade routes. 

Today, the Black Sea provides Russia with a crucial avenue to advance, demonstrate, 
39

and safeguard its superpower status. Black Sea access allows Russia to address 

maritime security threats to its coastal waters and energy transportation routes, as 

well as to project power into the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and beyond.

As the largest economic player in Crimea, the Black Sea Fleet also offers nonmilitary 

Russian influence. It owns more than eighteen thousand hectares of land, only three 

thousand of which are in Sevastopol. The 

fleet and its affiliates own high-value 

assets, including resorts, real estate, and 

profitable businesses, many of which 

operate outside of Ukrainian tax regimes 

and significantly below market rates. 

These nonmilitary activities integrate the 

Black Sea Fleet and affiliates into regional 

politics, business, and crime.31

Maintain Buffer of Russian Influence in Peripheral 

States against the West

Russia has historically maintained a ring 

of nations within its sphere of influence 

to compensate for its lack of geographic 

barriers to invasion. The policy of maintaining a buffer zone of friendly states 

was most explicitly expressed by Joseph 

Stalin after the devastation of World 

War II, a policy meant to ensure that 

Russia could never again be invaded by a 

Western force. The accession of the Baltic 

states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) 

and Poland into the EU and NATO 

marked a critical breakdown in the traditional security zone maintained by both the 

Russian Empire and the USSR. The persistent orientation of Georgia toward EU and 

NATO membership despite the 2008 Russo–Georgian War and the decisive steps 

toward an Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU were premonitions 

of a collapsing Eastern European buffer of friendly or vassal states, which would 

leave the Russian mainland vulnerable to Western influence and military action.

Strengthen EEU in the Former Soviet Sphere of Influence

Losing Russian security and economic influence in central Europe jeopardizes 

Putin’s geopolitical aspirations for the Russian state, and Ukraine’s westward shift 

through Euromaidan constitutes a devastating blow. Historically, Ukraine’s industry 

and agriculture were the most vital economic factors in maintaining the power and 

War furnishes the best 

opportunities to distract 

domestic public opinion and 

destroy the remnants of the 

political and intellectual 

opposition within Russia 

itself. An undemocratic 

regime worried about the 

prospect of domestic economic 

social and political crises—

such as those that now haunt 

Russia amid recession and 

falling oil prices—is likely to 

be pondering further acts of 

aggression.

—Andrei Illarionov (former economic 

adviser to Vladimir Putin)
40

influence of the Soviet Union. Today, Putin’s failure to compel Ukrainian membership in the EEU has rendered the organization largely impotent, echoing failed 

Russian attempts to establish a CIS in the early 1990s. Additionally, Ukrainian 

integration into the EU will restrict Russian access to Ukrainian markets and jobs, 

undermining Russia’s stalled economy and inflaming domestic issues that threaten 

the current regime.

Incorporate Ethnic Russians

Russia’s compatriot policy has long been a means of bolstering Russian soft power 

in post-Soviet states and has been used on several occasions to justify military 

intervention in neighboring regions (most notably in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine 

in 2014). Protection of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers is alternately a genuine 

motivation and an artificial contrivance for justifying intervention. Russian policy 

initially defined a compatriot as “any citizen of the former Soviet Union, even if he 

or she, or their forebears never lived in the [Russian Federation].” The definition 

of compatriot was broadened through several legal revisions to include any ethnic 

Russian outside of Russia who successfully applies for a Russian passport. The stated 

objective of these policies is the promotion of Russian culture and Russian language.

The persistent Russian demographic crisis, characterized by a low birth rate and high 

death rate that continue to keep the population growth rate near zero (–0.03 percent), is a factor influencing Russian compatriot policies. In his 2012 presidential 

campaign, then-Prime Minister Putin ran on an “effective complex people-saving 

strategy” to increase Russia’s population from 142.5 million to 154 million in an 

effort to successfully confront the existential “risk of turning into an ‘empty space’ 

whose fate will not be decided by us.” The ethnic Russian population in Russia is 

shrinking while Muslim populations continue to grow, suggesting the demographic 

landscape could change to majority Muslim by 2050. Combined with widely held 

pan-Russian nationalism that decries the division of Russian populations into former 

Soviet republics, the prospect of reunifying Russian diaspora is popular across 

the Russian political spectrum. Thus, the prospect of injecting 1.45 million ethnic 

Russians into the population by annexing Crimea became attractive.

Russian Order of Battle

To prosecute their campaign in Ukraine, the Russians used both military and intelligence services, along with imported volunteers and paramilitaries. Although some of 

the details of the actual units employed are unclear, the basic structure for supporting their unconventional warfare and the limited invasions that followed is known.
41

Military Forces

Russia embarked on a new national and military strategy in the mid-2000s, which 

in turn required it to relook at the military services. The emphasis of the new 

strategy was the near abroad, with emphasis on the Russian Federation’s periphery. 

The consequent “new-look” reforms aimed at a more streamlined, professional, 

and modernized force. Emerging challenges included international terrorism, 

narcotraffic, organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and 

regional and ethnic conflict. The old scenario of major theater war was retreating. 

In its place, Russia would seek to dominate, lead, and integrate CIS military security 

efforts (through the Collective Security Treaty Organization) while maintaining 

order along the periphery. Using both the Collective Security Treaty Organization 

and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Russia sought to influence nearby 

states to reject NATO and the EU in favor of close relations with Moscow. From 

2011, Putin sought to pressure peripheral states to join the EEU rather than associate with the EU. These efforts were attended by a renewed commitment from 

Moscow to foster and protect Russian diasporas abroad.

Putin and his associates saw NATO as the primary threat to their plans. Outright 

invasion from the West was not a likely scenario, but Russia foresaw that NATO 

and the EU, along with Western nongovernmental organizations, would attempt 

to intervene within peripheral states to turn them against Moscow. Simultaneously 

Putin sought ever greater cooperation with Beijing and pursued a lucrative deal to 

supply China with natural gas over the ensuing decades.

These changes in strategic outlook required corresponding changes in the military 

instrument. The 2008 Russo–Georgian War highlighted shortcomings throughout 

the Ministry of Defense and the armed forces in general. The war had been a 

watershed for Russia, representing, in essence, the last war of the twentieth century, 

fought with outdated tactics and equipment and with structures more suited to 

large-scale conventional war.32

The military new-look reforms therefore sought a professional and modernized 

force capable of conducting more effective operations, especially on the periphery. 

Key issues were command and control, personnel policies, training and readiness, 

equipment modernization, and the retention of nuclear deterrence.

To streamline command and control, new-look reforms organized the military into 

four geographic joint military districts: the Western, Central, Southern, and Eastern Military Districts. Divisions and regiments were eliminated and replaced by a 

brigade system for the Army, while the Air Force reorganized into air bases.33 Navy 

units came under the command of military districts.34 The Russian Army organized 

eighty-five brigades through 2009, including forty combined-arms brigades as well 
42

as specialized brigades for missiles, artillery, rocket artillery, air defense, engineers, 

electronic warfare, reconnaissance, and special forces.

A major focus of the new-look reforms was the issue of conscripts. Demographics 

indicated a drop in available recruits, and reports that the conscripts were often 

found unfit for duty stimulated the Russian government to press for a dramatic 

change in the composition of the force. To boost recruitment the government 

increased pay, improved military housing, and launched a comprehensive public 

information campaign designed to inspire patriotism and respect for military 

service. By 2008, most of the airborne forces were made up of professional soldiers 

(called contract soldiers). Although the costs were high, Putin’s administration 

saw the value of professionalizing the military and replacing conscripts with 

contract soldiers. The process is ongoing, and contract soldiers proved their worth 

in Ukraine.

The new-look reforms also took aim at equipment modernization. The emphasis 

was on command, control, information, navigation, and precision. At the individual level, Russian soldiers equipped with the “Ratnik” Future Soldier Individual 

Equipment Gear have better protection against small arms and employ a variety 

of subsystems, including reconnaissance, navigation, night optics, and communications. Mechanized forces benefited from procurement of lighter, more modern 

armored vehicles with digital communications. Old T-55 and T-62 tanks were 

replaced with modernized T-72B tanks.

In practice Russian Army Brigades do not deploy as whole organizations. Instead, 

operational commanders task organize Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) capable 

of independent combined-arms combat missions.35 In the summer of 2014, at least 

thirteen BTGs and elements of five SPETSNAZ units were poised on the Ukrainian 

border.36 The main military operations in Ukraine were commanded through 

Russia’s Southern Military District with its headquarters in Rostov-on-Don. This 

command has responsibility for the Caucasus and southern Russia, as well as the 

Black Sea and Caspian Fleets. Per treaty provisions the Russians had forces positioned in Crimea, primarily used to secure the port of Sevastopol. The following 

units were known or suspected to have been involved in operations or to have been 

preparing for operations in Crimea, eastern Ukraine, or both:

• 18th Detached Yevpatorian Red Banner Guard Motorized Rifle Brigade (from 

the Chechen Republic)

§ 1st Mechanized Battalion (also known as Vostok)

• 31st Air Assault Brigade (Airborne Forces, Ulyanovsk)

• 76th Guards Air Assault Division (Airborne Forces, Pskov)

• 106th Guards Airborne Division (Airborne Forces, Tula)
43

• 98th Guards Airborne Division (Airborne Forces, Ivanova)

• 7th Guards Airborne Division (Airborne Forces, Novorossiysk)

• 22nd SPETSNAZ Brigade (GRU, Krasnodar Krai)

• 45th Detached Reconnaissance Regiment (Moscow)

• Black Sea Fleet (Sevastopol)

§ 810th Naval Infantry Brigade

§ Kuban Cossacks

SPETSNAZ

Russian SPETSNAZ are irregular forces that operate covertly, providing the Russian 

government plausible deniability. They are found throughout the military, intelligence, and security services. The SPETSNAZ-GRU (military intelligence) featured 

prominently in the annexation of Crimea.37

SPETSNAZ from the various services have different roles. Those in the FSB are 

tasked with fighting terrorism and protecting the constitution. They are divided 

into three groups: (1) Group Alpha; (2) Group Vympel; and (3) the Special Purpose 

Service. Alpha responds to terrorists and other extremist movements and hostage 

rescue. Vympel focuses on deep penetration, sabotage, and assassination. They use 

their skill sets to “red team” or test Russian security infrastructure.38

Russia’s use of SPETSNAZ evolved since its involvement in Georgia in 2008. In 

Crimea and eastern Ukraine, SPETSNAZ operated in a clandestine manner, with 

their faces masked and wearing nondescript military clothing that bore no information identifying their unit.39 These infamous little green men appeared during 

the decisive seizures or buildings and facilities, only to disappear when associated 

militias and local troops arrived to consolidate the gains. In this way they provided 

a measure of deniability—however superficial or implausible—for Moscow.40

The conflict in Ukraine demonstrates that Russia recruits SPETSNAZ agents from 

among the local populations within target countries, including pro-Russian nationalists, minorities, political dissidents, and criminals. When deployed, agents initially 

confine their efforts to political agitation and other nonkinetic methods aimed at 

creating a political environment favorable to Russian policies.41

Russian-Backed Proxy Organizations in Ukraine

Moscow is funding, training, and equipping numerous groups with Russian nationalist agendas in Ukraine.42 They also employ sympathetic paramilitaries, such as 

former members of the Chechen “Vostok” Battalion.43 A paramilitary group called 
44

the Russian Orthodox Army began operating in the Donetsk region after the ouster 

of Yanukovych. Citing Igor Girkin (see next page) as its leader, the group boasts 

some four thousand operatives. They are motivated by their devotion to the Russian 

Orthodox Church and a strong sense of nationalistic outrage toward the encroachment of Western influence in the region. Members of the group train for and 

conduct special activities, including storming buildings, sniping, reconnaissance, 

and defense. They have admitted to journalists that some of their senior leaders 

are Russian.44

The Night Wolves motorcycle club is a proxy group of Russian nationalists founded 

in 1989. It has chapters in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Latvia, Serbia, Macedonia, 

Romania, Bulgaria, and Germany. Led by Aleksander Zaldostanov “Surgeon,” 

the group has an estimated five thousand members, including Vladimir Putin. 

The group is supported by the Russian Orthodox Church, and it often meets 

with domestic political and religious leaders. Many members are former soldiers, 

SPETSNAZ, or both. During the crisis in Crimea, the group arrived in the region, 

with members claiming that they wanted to ensure free and fair voting in the referendum for annexation and that they wanted to assist the people in their struggle 

against the “fascists” in Kyiv.45

Cossack paramilitaries operate in Ukraine and southern Russia. Since 2005 they 

have received support (including pay) from the Russian government. Forces are 

drawn from some six hundred thousand officially registered Cossacks in Russia. 

They are legally permitted to defend Russian borders, guard national forests, 

organize youth military training, fight terrorism, and protect local government 

facilities. During the Winter Olympics in Sochi, they engaged in security operations 

and were recorded using violence against protesters. Cossacks under Colonel Sergei 

Yurievich were used to defend Sevastopol and blockade and intimidate Ukrainian 

troops in Crimea. On orders of the FSB, Cossack irregular troops have also operated 

in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions in eastern Ukraine. Some of the Cossack 

groups are from Ukraine, while others came into the region from Russia. Elements 

of the former group intend to apply for integration into the Russian military after 

the annexation of Crimea.46

Chetnik Guards commanded by Bratislav Zivkovic formed an irregular unit in 

Crimea, and they operated in coordination with Cossack paramilitaries there. 

Chetnik soldiers typically have beards and wear a variety of camouflaged uniforms 

with shoulder patches including skull-and-crossbones insignia. They also wear 

distinctive black fur hats with tassels and carry long knives. The Chetniks came 

from Serbia, allegedly on their own initiative to assist their Slavic brothers in their 

fight against the West.47
45

Russian-Backed Agents in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine

Igor Girkin (also known as Igor Strelkov) is a Russian citizen who helped organize 

and lead the insurgency in the Donbass region. Previously he served in the 45th 

Detached Reconnaissance Regiment, the FSB, and 

the GRU and was involved in numerous other 

conflicts, including those in Bosnia, Chechnya, and 

Transnistria. He has been accused of organizing 

civilian massacres in Bosnia and kidnappings and 

murders in Chechnya. Before he entered eastern 

Ukraine, Girkin led paramilitary groups in Crimea 

and negotiated with Ukrainian military officers in 

attempts to induce them to defect to Russia. Girkin 

organized volunteer militia forces in Crimea, 

drawing on Russians with military experience and 

pro-Russian Ukrainians. Ukrainian intelligence 

(the Security Service of Ukraine, SBU) alleges that 

Girkin was under the direct authority of Moscow, 

which supplied him and other leaders with weapons, all with the approval of Putin. 

Girkin has been accused of murdering a local Ukrainian politician, Volodymyr 

Rybak, and a nineteen-year-old college student, Yury Popravko. 

In April 2014 Girkin emerged as the leader of the Donetsk People’s Republic and 

claimed he had command of all its forces, but he continued to deny Russian connections. On July 5 Girkin fled from Slovyansk as Ukrainian forces moved to retake the 

city—a move that attracted criticism and outright condemnation from fellow insurgents and ultranationalists in Russia. Girkin was later accused of involvement in the 

downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17. According to some reports, he ordered the 

collection of valuables from the dead passengers and crew, the proceeds of which 

would fund the insurgency in the Donetsk People’s Republic. He is also believed to 

be the author of a conspiracy theory that the aircraft was unmanned, deliberately 

downed, and then filled with corpses to create an international incident. Girkin’s 

status as of this writing is uncertain. He is alleged to have been wounded in battle, 

but other reports suggest the FSB removed him from leadership of the insurgency 

because he failed to fully comply with Moscow’s directives.

Alexander Borodai is a Ukrainian with strong ties to Russia and has lived and 

studied in Moscow. A close associate of Girkin and Konstantin Malofeev, Borodai was appointed the prime minister of the Donetsk People’s Republic but later 

resigned the office and returned to Russia. He is alleged to have served in the FSB 

as a director who achieved the rank of major general, a claim he denies.

Igor Besler, a former lieutenant colonel in the Russian GRU, also led insurgent operations in Crimea and Ukraine. Of mixed German-Ukrainian descent, he considers 

Igor Girkin (also known as 

Strelkov)
46

himself Russian and studied at the Dzerzhinsky Military Academy in the mid-1990s. 

According to Ukrainian intelligence, he was contacted by the GRU in February 2014 

and directed to move into Crimea and help organize the uprising there. He has been 

implicated in numerous murders and summary executions of captured combatants 

in Ukraine and was also tied to the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17.

Alexey Mozgovoy is a Ukrainian insurgent leader and commander of the so-called 

Ghost Brigade in eastern Ukraine. His ancestry emanates from the Don Cossacks, 

and he considers Russia to be his “second 

home.” He is a close associate of Girkin and 

lamented his departure in a September 2014 

interview, insisting that Girkin must return 

because “no one can replace him.” Mozgovoy 

claims that Russia is providing “mostly humanitarian aid” and that many of the pro-Russian 

fighters in Ukraine are foreigners who have 

come to fight against “fascism” and the Western imperialists. He also distanced himself 

from Yanukovych and the Party of Regions, 

insisting that the Ukrainian oligarchs who lead 

the party do not serve the interests of the 

people. Mozgovoy has been seen traveling 

openly in Moscow, where he enjoys celebrity 

status including requests for autographs. His 

Ghost Brigade, according to his interview, includes Russians, local Ukrainian 

militiamen, and foreign fighters from Germany, Bulgaria, and Slovakia.

Alexander Mozhaev is a Cossack militia leader operating in eastern Ukraine at the 

behest of the Putin regime. In interviews Mozhaev boasts of the ferocity of the Cossack warbands (e.g., the Wolf’s Hundred) who are fighting the Kyiv government in 

the interests of Russia. He and his followers are motivated by Russian nationalism, 

Russian Orthodoxy, and a hatred of Western encroachment into Russia’s sphere. 

Supported and authorized to act from Moscow, the Cossack leaders, including 

Mozhaev, maintain tenuous and deniable links to Russia to ensure they retain their 

freedom to act as volunteer paramilitaries.

Russian Information Warfare in Ukraine

Russian information operations (IO) include the use of cyberwarfare. Typical 

computer network operations feature attacks aimed at disrupting enemy infrastructure and command. Similar to the Russian prelude to its 2008 conflict in Georgia, 

Crimea’s landline, Internet, and mobile services were nearly eliminated. Hacktivists 

using the names Cyber Berkut and Ukraine Anonymous fought back, attacking 

Russian government sites and the Russia Today news agency.48

Alexey Mozgovoy
47

Igor Panarin’s thinking on Russian information warfare likely influenced Putin’s 

strategy in Ukraine. In March 2014 Panarin commented on the Crimean operation 

and stressed that through careful preparation of the information environment, 

Russia was able to obviate a more violent scenario. He contrasted this performance 

with operations in 2008, as well as with the poor performance of the West. He likewise praised what he termed “the valor of Berkut”—a reference to the Ukrainian 

secret police organization officially disestablished by the Kyiv government in the 

wake of the organization’s alleged massacres of protesters. The Crimean branch of 

Berkut was subsequently absorbed into the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs. 

Finally, he attributed the Crimean success to the personal leadership of Vladimir 

Putin, who centralized the control of all the key political, economic, financial, 

military, intelligence, and information tools.

Panarin accused the West (the United States in particular) of instigating Euromaidan in Ukraine. On the basis of that premise, he views the conflict as a 

battle between the US-led coalition and Russia, rather than as a spontaneous 

domestic movement in western Ukraine. He predicts the imminent collapse of the 

“American–British” empire that has dominated modern history and its replacement 

by a large coalition of powers stretching from Egypt to China and dominated by 

Russia. In its new role as the leader of a multipolar world, Russia’s three pillars of 

power will be spirituality, state power, and cyber-sovereignty.

Alexandr Dugin acknowledges that the country contains both ethnic Russians 

and pro-Russian populations on the one hand and West-leaning Europeans on 

the other. He regards the country as an artificial contrivance that inappropriately 

combined these two groups within a common border. Washington, he claims, is 

intent on pushing the divide between the two groups to the east—indeed, to the 

very border of Russia. Instead, Moscow must dominate that struggle through a 

vigorous information campaign and push the divide westward. In Crimea Russian 

spetzpropaganda developed the theme that pro-Russian intervention was necessary 

to save the people from succumbing to “Banderivtsy and fascists from the Maidan.”

When necessary, Russian information warfare must include the military dimension. 

But both Panarin and Dugin prescribe a paradigm of military operations that is 

utterly different from that of the massive Russian armies of World War II. In the 

Crimean operation, unidentified Russian military personnel entered the conflict 

region and preempted the adversary by rapidly occupying decisive points—airports, 

media outlets, and other key infrastructure. Armed but not wearing uniforms, the 

Russian agents provided Moscow with deniability—if not plausible deniability. The 

pro-Western press called the intruders little green men, but Dugin refers to them as 

“nice men”—citing their politeness and their diplomatic withdrawal once an area 

was secured. The goal is the very essence of Sun Tzu’s “winning without fighting” 

ideal. In Crimea, it worked. In eastern Ukraine, it fell short and led to bloodshed.
48

Russian proponents of information warfare are not shy about sharing some of the 

salacious details of the operations in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. One pundit 

applauded the Russians’ use of blackmail, psychological manipulation, and threats 

of nuclear war. But what makes these acts justifiable in the eyes of their champions 

is that they are defensive in nature. Each of the information warfare pundits portrays Russia’s operations as reactions to American provocation. Because the West is 

victimizing Russia, everything becomes permissible in the pursuit of “true justice.”

International Information Themes

Moscow combined secrecy, deception, threats, and accusations in crafting the narrative for the international community. Throughout the campaigns in Crimea and 

eastern Ukraine, Putin and his agents denied Russian involvement while simultaneously touting their military (including nuclear) capabilities if they were pushed 

too far. While dismissing evidence of Russian troops in the region, they accused the 

West of meddling in Ukrainian affairs and warmongering.

The coordinated information warfare campaign was carefully crafted to modify 

the messaging to the West. In Russian media outlets aimed at American and 

European audiences, the themes were changed slightly to tout the essential 

“democracy” of Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Everything came about because of the 

“people’s choice,” and Russia simply acted in accordance with local wishes. Other 

messaging targeted the pacifist sectors of the West by both threatening war and 

simultaneously assuring the world that Russia wanted peace. If Moscow fell short of 

convincing the more cynical critical thinkers in the West, it nevertheless persisted 

in reiterating its themes of justifiable intervention.

Indoctrination of Ethnic Russians in Ukraine

Russian information warfare likewise targeted key proxies in Crimea and eastern 

Ukraine, preparing them for resistance against Kyiv, a separatist insurgency, 

and, finally, annexation by Russia. Their challenge was difficult because the West 

seemingly offered democracy—a form of government that Western culture views 

as the sine qua non for personal liberty, security, peace, and prosperity. Conversely, 

Russian information warfare proselytizes for a different path: a neoconservative 

postliberal struggle for true justice in a multipolar world. This plan for governance, 

which the West contemptuously dismisses as autocratic, seeks to defend tradition, 

conservative values, and “true” liberty.

From Moscow’s viewpoint, the West likewise seeks to bedazzle and entice former 

Russian clients with promises of economic prosperity and opportunity. Russian 

information warfare countered by pointing out that the reverse was actually true: 

to achieve membership in the EU and the WTO, Ukrainians would be bullied into 

“austerity” programs aimed at curbing government spending. Conversely, align-
49

ment with Russia and integration into the EEU would bring immediate economic 

aid. This thesis was reinforced with action. Shortly after Crimea’s annexation, 

Russian funds and support programs arrived in abundance. Likewise, when Yanukovych bowed to Russian pressure, Putin immediately responded with a generous 

proposal to buy up Ukrainian debt and cut gas prices by a third. These actions were 

not simple acts of diplomacy or economics. They were integral parts of a broad 

information campaign designed to combat Western paradigms and reeducate 

Ukrainians along Moscow’s lines of thinking.

Within the Russian periphery, the RT (Russia Today) television network offers the 

best programming available. High standards for production attract viewers of all 

political persuasions who are drawn to the form, if not the content, of the television 

shows. By ensuring a sustained appeal, especially to the youth, RT gives Moscow 

the commanding heights of the information war and a strong voice wherever its 

signal is broadcast and not deliberately blocked.

Domestic Messaging

To garner support at home for Russian adventures in Ukraine and Crimea, the 

Putin administration crafted a picture of NATO encroachment toward the borders 

of Russia and even proposed that the West, led by the United States, intended to 

annex Crimea. Sevastopol would become a NATO naval base.

Related to this theme was the notion that the Russian people—with their history 

of religious, cultural, and military greatness—were artificially divided after the 

collapse of the Soviet Union. Once again the West was behind the nefarious plot 

to keep the Russian people from enjoying unity, peace, security, and their rightful 

place in the world order.

The Gerasimov Model in Action: Russian Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, 2013–2014

This study uses an analytical framework derived from the work of General Valery 

Gerasimov, chief of the general staff of the Russian Federation. General Gerasimov’s 

main thesis is that modern conflict differs significantly from the paradigm of World 

War II and even from Cold War conflict. In place of declared wars, strict delineation 

of military and nonmilitary efforts, and large conventional forces fighting climactic battles, modern conflict instead features undeclared wars, hybrid operations 

combining military and nonmilitary activities, and smaller precision-based forces. 

Gerasimov, observing American and European experiences in the Gulf War, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the intervention in Libya, notes that political, economic, 
50

cultural, and other nonmilitary factors play decisive roles. Indeed, even humanitarian operations should be considered part of an unconventional warfare campaign.

Gerasimov’s model is a useful construct for analyzing Russian actions in Crimea 

and Ukraine because it makes clear that political, economic, and intelligence efforts 

precede (indeed, can even bypass) military action. His explanation implies that the 

state prosecuting the unconventional warfare campaign must be in control of the 

catalysts and crises that lead to escalation and resolution, rather than simply react to 

events. In the 2014 campaigns in Crimea and Ukraine, Russia in fact controlled and 

exercised a strong grip on the pace of many of the headline events.

1. Covert origins

Emergence of differences

of interest

Differences transform into conict.

Military-political leaders become

aware of this change.

Intensifying contradictions

Crisis reactions

Localization of military conict

Neutralization of military conict

2. Escalations 4. Crisis 5. Resolution 6. Restoration of 

 peace (postconict 

 settlement)

Embargo Economy on 

a war footing

Change in military

Nonmilitary measures

political leadership

Military measures

Potential

military threat

Direct

military threat

Immediate

military threat

Military

conict

Formation of coalitions and unions Search for ways to resolve conict

Political and diplomatic pressure

Economic sanctions

Break diplomatic relations

Strategic deployment

Formation of political opposition Action of opposition forces

Conduct military operations

Military strategic deterrence measures

Conduct information warfare (ratio of nonmilitary to military measures = 4:1)

3. Start of 

 conict 

 activities

Main Phases (Stages) of Conict Development

Peacekeeping

operations

Comprehensive

measures to 

reduce tensions

The role of nonmilitary methods in interstate conflict resolution

The ouster of Yanukovych and the threat of armed action by the hard-right opposition led to the next phase of Russia’s effort to impose its will on Ukraine. At the 

start of the conflict Russia turned its focus on securing Crimea. Later, after the 

annexation of Crimea, Putin’s priority turned toward securing Russian influence 

and control over eastern Ukraine, in part to maintain a land bridge to Crimea. 

While the covert origins and escalations stages of Gerasimov’s model are 

related for both Crimea and eastern Ukraine, two different timelines began to 

manifest for the later stages: one for Crimea and the other for eastern Ukraine.
51

1. Covert origins

Q Dec. 1991

Ukraine declares 

independence. 

Pro-Western and proRussian factions form.

Q 2004–2005

Orange Revolution 

brings pro-Western 

President Yushchenko 

to power.

Q 2010–2013

Pro-Russian President 

Yanukovych elected. 

Under Russian pressure, 

he abandons deal with 

EU in late 2013, sparking Maidan protests.

Q Dec. 2013

Putin responds with 

trade and financial 

deals intended to calm 

protests and bring 

Ukraine into EEU.

2. Escalations

Q Feb. 18, 2014

Protests in Kyiv against 

President Victor Yanukovych become violent.

Q Feb. 21, 2014

Yanukovych flees 

Kyiv. Putin condemns 

interim pro-Western 

government.

Q Feb. 23, 2014

Pro-Russian protests in 

Sevastopol, supported 

by Russian elements.

Q Feb. 23, 2014

Russian naval infantry 

recon in Kherson 

isthmus.

3. Start of conflict 

activities

Q Feb. 27, 2014

Ukrainian naval 

bases in Sevastopol 

blockaded; proRussian gunmen seize 

government buildings in 

Simferopol.

4. Crisis

Q Feb. 28, 2014

Russian troops seize 

Crimean border crossings. IL-76 aircraft begin 

flying Russian troops 

into region.

Q Mar. 1, 2014

Russia formally authorizes use of Russian 

troops in Crimea. 

Kirovske air base 

seized.

Q Mar. 5, 2014

Russian navy blockades Ukrainian navy 

at Novoozerne. OSCE 

inspectors turned away 

at border crossing.

Q Mar. 8–22, 2014

Russian troops seize 

additional sites and 

consolidate positions.

5. Resolution

Q Mar. 11–18, 2014

Referendum and 

subsequent treaty leads 

to Russian annexation 

of Crimea into Russian 

Federation.

Q Mar. 21, 2014

Russia formally annexes 

Crimea.

Q Mar. 24, 2014

Ukraine orders troops to 

withdraw from Crimea.

6. Restoration of 

peace

Q Late Mar. 2014–

 Present

United States and EU 

impose sanctions, but 

annexation remains in 

effect; popular approval 

in Crimea and Russia 

boosts Putin’s political 

fortunes. Focus of conflict moves to eastern 

Ukraine.

Potential

military threat

Direct

military threat

Immediate

military threat

Military

conict

Differences transform into conict.

Military-political leaders become

aware of this change.

Intensifying contradictions

Crisis reactions

Localization of military conict

Neutralization of military conict

Emergence of differences

of interest

Gerasimov’s Model in Crimea

• The covert origins stage featured 

a long period of political infighting 

in Kyiv, culminating in an unforeseen crisis for Putin.

• During the escalations stage

Putin took actions calculated to 

de-escalate the situation, but they 

had the opposite effect.

• The start of conflict activities 

was relatively sudden and brief, 

quickly transitioning to the next 

stage. This suggests intensive and 

deliberate planning designed to 

preempt any embryonic resistance 

forming against Putin’s designs.

• The crisis stage featured nearly 

flawless execution of Russia’s new 

information-based warfare, culminating in a staged referendum and 

political decision.

• During the resolutions stage, 

Putin’s autocratic government 

rapidly sealed the annexation with 

a legal form. With Russian troops 

firmly in control of Crimea, he was 

able to present the world with a 

fait accompli.

• The restoration of peace stage 

was facilitated in part by the 

upswing of conflict in eastern 

Ukraine, so as to divert attention 

away from Crimea.

Main phases (stages) of conflict development in Crimea

Nonmilitary measures

Military measures
52

1. Covert origins

Q Dec. 1991

Ukraine declares independence. Pro-Western and 

pro-Russian factions form.

Q 2004–2005

Orange Revolution brings 

pro-Western President 

Yushchenko to power.

Q 2010–2013

Pro-Russian President 

Yanukovych elected. Under 

Russian pressure, he 

abandons deal with EU in 

late 2013, sparking Maidan 

protests.

Q Dec. 2013

Putin responds with trade 

and financial deals intended 

to calm protests and bring 

Ukraine into EEU.

2. Escalations

Q Feb. 18, 2014

Protests in Kyiv against 

President Victor Yanukovych 

become violent.

Q Feb. 21, 2014

Yanukovych flees Kyiv. 

Putin condemns interim 

pro-Western government.

Q Mar. 11–21, 2014

Referendum and subsequent 

treaty leads to Russian 

annexation of Crimea into 

the Russian Federation. Kyiv 

government signs Association 

Agreement with EU.

Q Mar. 22, 2014

Protesters in Donetsk call for 

referendum on integration 

with Russia.

3. Start of conflict 

activities

Q Mar.–Apr. 2014

Russian agents organize, 

lead, and cooperate with 

protesters in major cities and 

port of Mariupol. Pro-Russian 

crowds and “little green men” 

seize government buildings. 

Russians use bribery, 

intimidation, and subversion 

to neutralize government 

officials, police, and some 

military units.

Q Mar. 24, 2014

Russia expelled from G8.

Q Apr. 17, 2014

Geneva agreement (US, 

Ukraine, EU, Russia) calls for 

de-escalation, disarming militias. Russia fails to comply.

Q Apr. 27, 2014

Russian agents and militias 

seize television station in 

Donetsk, replacing Ukrainian 

media with Russia Today.

Q Mar.–Apr. 2014

Cossack militias, Chechens, 

and others begin operations 

in eastern Ukraine.

4. Crisis

Q May 1, 2014

Ukraine resumes conscription 

in face of ongoing aggression 

in east and south.

Q May 2, 2014

~40 pro-Russian activists die 

in a fire in Odessa.

Q May 11, 2014

Luhansk and Donestsk 

referenda on independence; 

alleged results strongly favor 

separation from Kyiv and 

annexation by Russia.

Q May 25, 2014

Poroshenko elected.

Q Jun. 16, 2014

Russia cuts off natural gas to 

Ukraine.

Q Jun. 27, 2014

Poroshenko signs trade 

agreement with EU.

Q Jul. 17, 2014

Malaysian Flight 17 downed.

Q Summer 2014

As Kyiv commences counteroffensive, Russian troops, 

armored vehicles, weapons, 

and supplies enter Ukraine.

Q Aug. 14, 2014

NATO confirms “Russian 

incursion.”

5. Resolution

Q Sep. 5, 2014

OSCE helps negotiate 

cease-fire.

Q Sep. 2014

President Poroshenko 

promises greater autonomy in 

eastern Ukraine.

Q Sep. 15, 2014

US-led NATO peacekeeping 

exercises commence in 

western Ukraine.

Q Oct. 18–31, 2014

Putin and Poroshenko 

negotiate natural gas deal.

Q Oct. 26, 2014

Ukrainians elect pro-Western–

majority parliament.

Q Nov. 2014

Separatists in Luhansk and 

Donetsk hold elections 

condemned by Kyiv. More 

Russian troops enter Ukraine.

Despite cease-fire, fighting 

continues, at times escalating 

to major battles. Russian 

tanks enter, but Western 

sanctions and Russia’s 

economic downturn chip away 

at Russians’ support for war.

6. Restoration of peace

Conflict continues.

Potential

military

threat

Direct

military

threat

Immediate

military

threat

Military

conict

Differences transform into conict.

Military-political leaders become

aware of this change.

Intensifying contradictions

Crisis reactions

Localization of military conict

Neutralization of military conict

Emergence of differences

of interest

Gerasimov’s Model in Eastern Ukraine

• The covert origins stage featured a 

long period of political infighting in 

Kyiv, culminating in an unforeseen 

crisis for Putin.

• During the escalations stage

Putin took actions calculated to 

de-escalate the situation, but they 

had the opposite effect. The March 

2014 annexation of Crimea led to an 

upswing of unrest in eastern Ukraine.

• The start of conflict activities

was framed by Russia’s deceptive 

diplomatic agreement at Geneva—

setting the stage for Putin’s sustained 

unconventional warfare campaign in 

eastern Ukraine under an umbrella of 

persistent denial.

• The crisis stage came to a head with 

the downing of Malaysian Airlines 

Flight 17, which fueled growing 

international condemnation of Putin’s 

intervention in Ukraine.

• The hoped-for resolutions stage

instead saw surprising political 

resilience from the Kyiv government 

and people of Ukraine against 

Russian aggression. US, EU, and 

NATO support, along with Russia’s 

severe economic downturn and 

President Poroshenko’s sustained 

counteroffensive, led Russia to resort 

to increasingly explicit invasion.

• The restoration of peace stage

remains in doubt as the US government passes a renewed sanctions law 

and threatens to begin giving military 

aid to Kyiv.

Main phases (stages) of conflict development in eastern Ukraine

Nonmilitary

measures

Military measures
53

Covert Origins

The late 1990s gave rise to what some Russian powerful elites considered their 

nightmare scenario: NATO extending eastward from Germany to the borders of 

Russia. When the government of Ukraine made a bid for inclusion into the alliance, Russian strategists, including Putin, laid plans to ensure Moscow’s control of 

eastern Ukraine and especially of Crimea—home to a key naval base. Therefore, 

since before the start of the new millennium the Russians had begun to exert covert 

pressure on Crimea and Ukraine. It would take the catalyst of Kyiv attempting 

an economic union with Western Europe to push the Putin regime into a more 

assertive strategy.

Russia’s actions against Ukraine began most notably with its diplomatic pressure on 

the government of President Yanukovych, leading to his volte-face regarding integration into the EU, announced on November 21, 2013. Putin’s government pushed 

Yanukovych to retreat from Ukraine’s stated intention to sign the Association 

Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the EU. At 

this point the Russian government had not necessarily decided to make the dramatic moves it later accomplished because the Yanukovych government complied 

with Moscow’s desires. Diplomatic pressure and contacts with key Ukrainian leaders also led to the parliament rejecting legislation that would have allowed former 

prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko to leave the country. These developments would 

have led Russian strategists following Gerasimov’s model to conclude that they had 

bypassed intermediate stages and achieved resolution and restoration of peace. But 

by the end of the month, growing popular protests against the Yanukovych government led to Kyiv police using violence in an attempt to disperse the crowds. Instead, 

the protesters’ numbers grew. The resulting Euromaidan movement demanded 

closer ties with the West, and the related Automaidan movement demanded the 

removal of Yanukovych. The crisis stimulated Russia’s use of “new-generation 

warfare” to achieve its goals in Ukraine.

The covert origins phase included key diplomatic and economic moves. On December 16, pursuant to Yanukovych’s visit to Moscow, Putin’s government announced 

$15 billion in loans to Ukraine and substantial discounts on imported natural gas. 

These actions targeted Ukraine’s financial vulnerability and fed one of Putin’s main 

information warfare themes—that alignment with Russia brings economic benefit 

to all Ukrainians. By way of contrast, the EU and IMF called for Ukraine to deal with 

its debt problem with austerity programs that were sure to alienate the population.

Russia’s measures over the Christmas holiday appear to have been successful in 

lessening popular resistance to the Yanukovych government, and Putin’s agents 

attempted to facilitate negotiations between the president and his opponents. Once 

again it may have appeared that Russia was on the verge of achieving its goals. 

But by mid-January 2014, ongoing protests led Yanukovych’s Party of Regions to 
54

pass legislation in the Rada targeting demonstrators and threatening them with 

harsh punishment, including imprisonment and fines. Over the next month violent 

clashes ensued, resulting in six anti-government demonstrators’ deaths and more 

than two hundred jailed.

Escalations (February 20–22)

Information warfare—primarily in the form of aggressive propaganda against 

Kyiv—along with diplomatic and political efforts, commenced in earnest in early 

February. Crimean Tatars protested the region’s Rada deputies who had labeled the 

resistance in Kyiv as fascist—a key argument of Putin’s information campaign. By 

associating the pro-Western faction in Ukraine as fascist and Nazi, the Russians 

aimed at preempting the battle for legitimacy. As the crisis deepened, Moscow 

began to unfold a two-pronged effort—ongoing involvement in the political chaos 

in Kyiv and a more focused effort to use the situation to facilitate Russia’s designs 

for Crimea.

On the heels of Yanukovych’s setbacks in late February, the Russian GRU dispatched several hundred members of 45th SPETSNAZ Regiment to Crimea to 

create a “popular uprising” aimed at facilitating Russia’s annexation of the region. 

Simultaneously GRU agents used bribery among the ethnic Russian population 

to win support for annexation. During this phase the Russian objective was to 

create the political conditions necessary for later decisive military and paramilitary action.49

On February 20, more than sixty people were killed in Kyiv in the bloodiest 

crackdown of the crisis. Putin’s government, smarting from a significant political 

setback, resorted to strong diplomatic and economic pressure aimed at dividing 

and disrupting the political opposition in Ukraine. But the opposition in Kyiv 

had been emboldened and moved on to negotiate a settlement agreement with 

the beleaguered Yanukovych on February 21. Under the agreement, mediated by 

Russia, France, Germany, and Poland (although Russia did not sign the resulting 

document), Ukraine would hold presidential elections by the end of the year and 

a national unity government would form by early March. The country would be 

returned to the 2004 constitution, with a consequent reduction in the powers of the 

president. Yanukovych fled the country that night and later resurfaced in Russia.

The United Nations reports that overt violence was paralleled by a wide array of 

human rights violations to include kidnapping, torture, and murder.50 In late January two activists, Yuriy Verbytsky and Ihor Lutsenko were abducted and beaten. 

Wounded and released into a wood with sub-freezing temperatures, Verbytsky died 

from exposure, Lutsenko made it back to safety.51
55

But while this political setback for Russia unfolded in Kyiv, Putin was making his 

more important diplomatic move in Crimea. Crimean member of parliament (MP) 

Vladimir Klychnikov called for constitutional amendments and a poll on the status 

of Crimea and suggested an “appeal to the President and the legislative assembly of 

the Russian Federation to be the guarantors of inviolability of the status of Crimean 

autonomy and rights and freedoms of Crimean residents.” MP Volodymyr Konstantinov stated that Crimea might secede from Ukraine if tensions escalated further. 

This sparked a reaction from Refat Chubarov, who responded, “This is our land, our 

country. We will not allow this to happen. This is sedition.” As before, Russia tried 

(and perhaps succeeded among the population) to seize the moral high ground 

in the battle for legitimacy by characterizing the actions of the Kyiv government 

as fascist.

The ongoing conflict led to Russia’s commencement of activities associated with the 

escalations phase of conflict. This stage is characterized mainly by a sharp increase 

in diplomatic and economic pressure on the subject state.

In accordance with the Gerasimov model, the third stage, start of conflict activities, 

began in Crimea. Eastern Ukraine remained in the escalations stage at this point 

and progressed into stage three only after Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Thus, this 

analysis first examines the application of Gerasimov’s stages three through six in 

Crimea, after which it will turn to the model’s application to eastern Ukraine.

Russian Operations in Crimea

Start of Conflict Activities (February 22–26)

This phase is characterized by the mobilization of active opposition forces, including demonstrators and armed militias. Nonkinetic factors still play the principal 

role in conflict resolution, but irregular forces—both domestic and those imported 

by the external supporter—begin to act. In addition, Russia increased the pace and 

visibility of its strategic mobilization of forces to assembly areas adjacent to the 

troubled regions.

Instead of backing down to Russian pressure, the invigorated Rada in Kyiv voted 

to impeach Yanukovych. An interim president was appointed—Oleksander 

Turchynov, formerly speaker of the parliament. Opposition leaders decided to move 

presidential elections to the coming spring. Yanukovych’s Party of Regions began 

to distance itself from the ousted president, and some of his allies and former 

ministers were arrested. These developments sparked pro-Russian demonstrations in Crimea, and Russian military forces from the Southern District began 

to mobilize and prepare for deployment to the region. In eastern Ukraine and 

Crimea, pro-Russian demonstrators labeled the new regime in Kyiv as fascist. The 

vilification of the Kyiv reformers as fascists—a key theme of Putin’s information 
56

campaign—suggests that Russia was working to influence, organize, and even lead 

the protests.

The pro-Western factions in Kyiv enjoyed a brief period of triumph, and they 

moved to disband the elite Berkut police unit that had been blamed for the deaths 

of protesters. The Putin government responded to its setback in Kyiv by sparking a 

crisis in Crimea.

Crisis (February 27–March 15)

During the crisis phase, Russian strategy calls for the commencement of explicit 

military action, as well as an embargo or similar economic suasion. Depending on 

which sources are consulted, Russia either supported or actively led an upsurge in 

pro-Russian demonstrations and violence in Crimea. On the heels of the Ukrainian 

Rada passing a bill removing Russian as an official language, pro-Russian groups 

in Crimea began mobilizing militias. Unidentified armed groups—most analysts 

concluded that they were Russian special forces and intelligence operatives—began 

military operations to seize airports and take control of the peninsula. Military 

assets moved in from Russia, including wheeled armored personnel carriers and 

helicopters. The unidentified operatives in Crimea used Russian military vehicles, 

but they otherwise hid their links to the Russian military, and Moscow denied any 

involvement. Local militias worked with and supported the unidentified troops. 

Despite initial denials, the headquarters of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol later admitted that its troops had moved into Crimea to secure the port. On 

March 6, the Russian Black Sea Fleet blockaded Ukrainian ships in Novoozerne, 

Donuzlav Lake. Russia likewise achieved an effective isolation of the region 

through military demonstrations along the Ukrainian border. On March 9 the 

Kyiv government confirmed that it did not intend to send Ukrainian military forces 

into Crimea. The following few days were marked by surrounding and isolating 

Ukrainian forces in their bases and mobilizing political support for regional regime 

change. The mayor of Sevastopol was replaced by a Russian citizen, Alexei Chaliy.

On March 1 the Russian Federation parliament approved President Putin’s request 

to use armed force in Ukraine to protect Russian interests. The newly installed 

pro-Russian mayor insisted to supportive crowds that Crimea would no longer 

accept orders from the illegal regime in Kyiv. Soon after, MPs in the Crimean Rada 

announced new planned measures to achieve greater autonomy for the region. 

Putin’s government chimed in, declaring to the international community that 

Moscow would support “greater federalism” in Ukraine. In March the State Duma 

Committee on CIS Affairs announced plans for new legal procedures to annex 

territories into the Russian Federation. Timed as it was with Crimea’s announcement that it wanted to be incorporated into Russia, it was a clear use of a political 

statement as a catalyst for separatism in the region.
57

Putin’s diplomatic arm held the international community at bay through the pretense of peace talks in Paris in early March. But the event served only to further 

Moscow’s disinformation campaign against the Kyiv government, because Russian 

foreign minister Sergey Lavrov refused to meet with Ukrainian foreign minister 

Andriy Deshchytsia, alleging that he represented an illegal government. When 

asked whether he had met with the Ukrainian representative, Lavrov replied, “Who 

is it? I didn’t see anyone.” The theme was parroted by the pro-Russian faction in 

Crimea on March 6, when the de facto prime minister Sergey Aksyonov refused to 

enter into negotiations with Kyiv on the grounds that the government there was an 

illegal entity.

During the crisis phase, Russian strategy calls for embargoes and other economic 

sanctions. On March 7 Gazprom announced that it might suspend service unless 

Ukraine settled its previous debt for natural gas and finance current supplies. This 

use of economic blackmail was obvious as it came on the heels of Crimea’s split 

from Ukraine.

In a move calculated to grab the attention of Western leaders, on March 8 Russia 

announced that it was considering ending START inspections in response to US 

and European agitation concerning Ukraine. The intent was to demonstrate to 

the West that while the matter of Ukraine may have some weight within NATO’s 

strategic formulation, it was no less than a vital interest to Russia. It would not be 

the last time that Putin rattled his nuclear sword.

Resolution (March 16–19)

During conflict resolution, military operations reach their zenith with decisive 

defeat of any armed adversaries. Once the political objectives have been secured, 

leaders then transition to the next phase—restoration of peace—as a way of signaling a successful resolution. In just over three weeks of conflict, the Russians had 

achieved the surrender of all 190 Ukrainian bases in Crimea without firing a shot.

On March 16, the interim Crimean government held a referendum concerning 

secession from Ukraine and annexation into Russia. They announced that some 

97 percent of the Crimean population supported such a move—a seeming impossibility, given the ethnic and language distribution on the peninsula. Two days 

later, Vladimir Putin signed a bill to absorb Crimea into the Russian Federation. In 

response the government of Ukraine, the EU, the G7, and the United States all stated 

that they would not recognize the results of the illegal referendum. The Venice Commission likewise ruled it illegal. On March 19, three hundred Crimean “self-defense” 

troops, likely led by Russian agents, stormed the headquarters of the Ukrainian 

Navy in Sevastopol and briefly detained Rear Admiral Sergey Gaiduk. Ukraine’s 

troops departed without violence, and the Russian flag was raised over captured 
58

installations. The same day officials in Kyiv announced plans to pull twenty-five 

thousand Ukrainian troops out of Crimea and declared their break with the CIS.

The bold gamble appeared to pay off. Western powers responded with threats of 

further sanctions, but they simultaneously called on Russia to “pull back its troops” 

rather than insisting on a return to Ukrainian sovereignty over Crimea. Even Kyiv 

seemed quickly distracted by events in eastern Ukraine, and the Crimean annexation seemingly became a fait accompli.

Restoration of Peace (March 19–31)

On March 31, 2014, Russian prime minister Dmitry Medvedev visited Crimea and 

promised substantial economic aid, marking the beginning of the restoration of 

peace phase in Crimea. Tensions were quickly reduced in the region, and Russian business leaders acted quickly to help integrate the region into the Russian 

economy. At the same time, leaders in Russia, Ukraine, and the West turned their 

attention to matters in eastern Ukraine, effectively acquiescing toward events 

in Crimea.

Russian Operations in Eastern Ukraine

Start of Conflict Activities (March 1–August 1)

Ukrainian officials accused Russia of assisting separatists. Foreign Minister Andriy 

Deschchytsya noted that the solider who captured government buildings carried 

Russian battle rifles, not Ukrainian weapons.52

Throughout March and April, pro-Russian demonstrators marched in the Donbass 

region, seizing government buildings in Donetsk, Luhansk, Slovyansk, Kharkiv, 

Kramatorsk, Horlivka, and the Black Sea port of Mariupol. Ukrainian and Western 

sources allege that Russian intelligence agents and special forces subordinate to the 

GRU led the demonstrations. Some observers claimed that Russia sent in operatives who acted in the role of local agitators, with some even appearing in various 

towns throughout the crisis. Although the demonstrators adopted the theme that 

they represented a large majority of separatists who desired incorporation into the 

Russian Federation, subsequent analysis makes clear that Russian agents staged the 

movement and that relatively few Ukrainians sympathized with the demonstrators.

On March 24 Russia was expelled from the G8 in a move that heralded the international community’s intent to bring diplomatic and economic pressure against 

Moscow’s adventuring in Ukraine. Putin’s response was to dismiss the move 

publicly, but he also pursued a diplomatic strategy that gave the appearance of 

cooperation with Western powers. Russia participated in four power talks in 

Geneva (United States, EU, Ukraine, Russia) that produced a broad agreement on 
59

de-escalation on April 17. Russia’s stated intentions, however, did not match its 

continued intervention in the east.

A key tactic in Russian unconventional warfare is using bribery or intimidation 

to coerce local officials to abandon their posts. On April 12, militants likely led by 

Russian agents stormed the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Donetsk and convinced 

the chief of office there to resign. Facing crumbling opposition, the demonstrators 

seized the public administration building on April 16 and the television station on 

April 27. With Russian assistance they curtailed Ukrainian broadcasts and replaced 

them with Russian television.

In a similar way, pro-Russian militants stormed public buildings in Slovyansk, and 

the mayor there, Nelya Shtepa, acquiesced in the seizures, acknowledging Russia’s 

control of the operation and welcoming its involvement. She was nevertheless 

detained and replaced with Vyacheslav Ponomaryov. When the militants went on to 

capture the police headquarters and seized the weapons there, government forces 

launched a counterattack (April 13) and retook the city on July 5.

Police officials in Horlivka also defected to the attacking rebel militias, while the 

chief of police was captured and beaten. A city council deputy, Volodymyr Rybak, 

was snatched by the militia and later killed. By July Ukrainian forces had retaken 

the city.

Coercion also targeted Ukrainian military forces. Militants claimed that on several 

occasions convoys from the 25th Airborne Brigade were stopped by angry locals. In 

one instance, the unit involved allegedly surrendered, and the militants commandeered their armored fighting vehicles. On another occasion, a convoy was forced 

to unload its weapons and hand over its magazines before the crowd let it proceed. 

Because of these episodes, the Ukrainian authorities disbanded the brigade.

Another characteristic of unconventional warfare is the use of proxies—local 

self-defense militias, mutineers from government forces, and imported militants. In 

eastern Ukraine the Russians have allegedly imported foreign paramilitary groups, 

including the Wolves’ Head Battalion—a Cossack group known to have fought with 

the Russians in Georgia in 2008. In eastern Ukraine, however, the group was not 

deployed as an auxiliary to the Russian main force. Instead, it fought as a proxy in 

the absence of Russian conventional forces. Members of the group claimed officially 

that they had come to the region on their own initiatives for ideological reasons, 

to defend Russian Orthodoxy and the Russian regime. But in interviews with Time

magazine journalists, they admitted that they are paid, equipped, and deployed by 

Vladimir Putin’s government. They were led by Evgeny Evgenievich Ponomaryov, a 

Russian citizen.

As the Kyiv government began “anti-terrorist” operations in mid-April to retake 

seized buildings and defeat the Russian-led “separatist” forces, the SPETSNAZ and 
60

associated operatives demonstrated another effective tactic. On several occasions, 

as government forces with mechanized combat vehicles arrived on scene, masses 

of pro-Russian citizens surrounded an armored vehicle to act as human shields, 

immobilizing the target. Then the Russian SPETSNAZ attacked and disarmed 

Ukrainian soldiers. The targeted soldiers, cut off from supplies and given vague 

orders, refrained from shooting and complied with demands for withdrawal after 

disabling their weapons. In other cases government forces successfully defended 

themselves and their installations from attacks.

As officials in Kyiv struggled to find a way to resist Russian aggression in the 

east, Yulia Tymoshenko formed a resistance movement with more than twenty 

thousand volunteers. She also called for the formation of a new modern Ukrainian 

Army.53 Similarly, in Dnipropetrovsk, oligarch Igor Kolomoisky formed a private 

army composed of fighters from as far away as the United States to thwart Russian aggression.54

In the run-up to Ukraine’s presidential election, the Kyiv government announced 

the resumption of conscription in response to increased Russian aggression. On 

May 2, in the deadliest day since February, some forty pro-Russian activists perished in Odessa when Kyiv loyalists set fire to a building they were sheltering in. 

The Russians condemned the incident, insisting it was a deliberate act of repression 

by the fascists in Kyiv.

On May 11 the self-proclaimed Peoples’ Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk 

conducted referenda, alleging that the results showed popular support for independence from Kyiv and annexation to Russia, along the lines followed by Crimea. 

Despite the distraction Ukraine went forward with the election against Russia’s 

wishes, and Poroshenko won handily. Despite Putin’s statement that he would seek 

to work with the new leader of Ukraine, relations quickly deteriorated. Poroshenko 

pursued trade agreements with the EU, and in June Russia cut off natural gas 

exports to the country, claiming that Ukraine would not receive further supplies 

until it paid for past shipments.

On July 17 Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 crashed in eastern Ukraine, killing 283 passengers and 15 flight crew. The aircraft was widely believed to have been hit by a 

surface-to-air missile fired by separatist militia forces. The horrendous loss of life 

and the subsequent obstruction of investigators trying to examine the site led to 

increased diplomatic isolation of Russia and the strengthening of economic sanctions against Putin and his supporters. Nonetheless, Moscow continued aggressive 

support to separatists, especially when their tactical situation deteriorated.
61

Crisis (August 1–31)

Armed rebels barricaded their positions in the major cities and towns in eastern 

Ukraine, and sources claimed that Russian armed forces made up 15–80 percent 

of the combatants. Russian armored personnel carriers, artillery, and air defense 

equipment permeated the theater, but Moscow continued to deny involvement, as it 

had in Crimea.

On August 14, two dozen armored personnel carriers and other vehicles with 

Russian military plates crossed into Ukraine near the insurgent-controlled Izvaryne 

border crossing. NATO secretary general Anders Fogh Rasmussen confirmed that a 

“Russian incursion” into Ukraine had occurred. Russia continued to deny that any 

of its forces were operating in eastern Ukraine, but reports from both sides confirmed that at least a thousand Russian military personnel were actively supporting 

the insurgents. By late August Ukrainian civilians were reporting the appearance 

of Russian special forces. Ukrainian forces captured ten Russian paratroopers, 

forcing Moscow to admit to the presence of Russian soldiers. However, Moscow 

claimed that the soldiers had crossed the border by accident. With the infusion of 

Russian forces and supplies, the insurgents began to capture towns in the southeast 

near the Sea of Azov. President Poroshenko declared that Russia had launched a 

full-scale invasion of the country, and Western officials described the incursion as a 

“stealth invasion.”

By the end of August, Russian-led insurgent forces brought renewed pressure on 

the airports in Luhansk and Donetsk and were threatening Mariupol again. It 

appeared that the government of Vladimir Putin refused to let the insurgents fail, 

and Russian forces intervened to the degree necessary to force cease-fire talks.

Resolution (September 1–November 30)

The OSCE coordinated peace talks in Minsk that resulted in a cease-fire on September 5. President Poroshenko had earlier proposed a fifteen-point peace plan, 

and its provisions were largely accepted by all sides. He promised greater autonomy 

for Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts as well as protection of the Russian language in 

the area. Heavy combat equipment was to be removed from the conflict areas, and 

prisoners were exchanged. Despite leaders in both Russia and Ukraine signaling 

their satisfaction with the cease-fire, fighting continued in the region.

The United States signaled increased support for Ukraine in September by leading 

a NATO peacekeeping exercise in the western part of the country. Resolution from 

the West and Poroshenko’s political resilience and determination pushed Putin 

into a posture of reluctantly dealing with the Kyiv regime, and the two powers 

concluded a renewed natural gas deal in October. But Putin’s hopes for a weakening 

of resolve among Ukraine’s citizens expired at the end of the month when parlia-
62

mentary elections returned a strong pro-Western majority in the Rada. In response 

the rebels in Donetsk and Luhansk conducted their own local elections, which were 

condemned and dismissed by Kyiv.

By early November the cease-fire had given way to increasing violence in eastern 

Ukraine. Russian tanks crossed the border as part of battalion tactical groups. The 

Kyiv government outlined possible further invasion schemes that Russia may be 

contemplating, including:

• Invasion from Russian soil into northern and eastern Ukraine with objectives 

including Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and Kyiv

• Invasion from Belarus into northeastern Ukraine

• Invasion from Transnistria into southeastern Ukraine (Note: Ukrainian 

intelligence reported that Russia had already deployed Cossack militias to 

Transnistria as provocateurs and possibly to spearhead an invasion.)

• Invasion from Crimea into eastern and central Ukraine

Restoration of Peace (November 30–Present)

As of this writing the Russians have failed to fully achieve their goals in eastern 

Ukraine, installing at best a “frozen conflict.” There has been no clear restoration 

of peace. The Kyiv government continues to reach out to the West for economic 

and military aid, and President Poroshenko hopes to keep the issue of the Crimean 

annexation on the table. Simultaneously, to prevent further bloodshed and possible 

Russian invasion, he has tried to walk a fine line between acquiescence to Russia’s 

gains and provocation that Putin could use as a pretext for further adventures. 

Russia, meanwhile, considers the Crimean annexation a fait accompli and has 

moved forward with economic development plans. Furthermore, Putin’s regime 

intends to leverage the increased autonomy in eastern and southern Ukraine to 

further its policy goals there, including a secure land bridge from Russia to Crimea.

In December the US Congress passed a new sanctions bill, and President Obama 

signed it into law. The new provisions included the option to sell lethal military 

supplies and equipment to Ukraine at the discretion of the American president—

another strong diplomatic signal to both Kyiv and Moscow.

Conclusion

Russian unconventional warfare and Moscow’s innovative approaches to IO largely 

succeeded in the recent annexation of Crimea. Nonetheless, Russia’s intervention 

in eastern Ukraine experienced difficulties, leading to an extended conflict. While 
63

the current outcome for the Russians is mixed, it is clear that Russian leaders have 

absorbed the painful lessons of their post-Cold War setbacks, most notably those 

in Georgia in 2008. Over time they have observed and adjusted to American moves 

during the color revolutions and the 2010 Arab Spring. By viewing US foreign policy 

initiatives through the lens of geopolitics, Russian neoconservatives have embraced 

an aggressive foreign policy designed to reverse the losses associated with the 

collapse of the Soviet Union, especially along the Russian periphery. Driven by a 

desire to roll back Western encroachment into the Russian sphere of influence, the 

current generation of siloviki have crafted a multidisciplinary art and science of 

unconventional warfare. Capitalizing on deception, psychological manipulation, 

and domination of the information domain, their approach represents a notable 

threat to Western security interests.

A critical first step toward confronting modern Russian information warfare is to 

develop an understanding of its character and conduct. In conventional warfare, 

defenders learn to anticipate the likely “avenues of approach” that an attacking 

army might use. Similarly, nations and regions, particularly those on the periphery 

of the Russian Federation, can learn to anticipate Moscow’s next steps in the use of 

unconventional warfare and its likely implications. When Western governments are 

knowledgeable of the broad range of capabilities associated with this new threat—

including the use of agents, imported paramilitaries, deception, intimidation, and 

bribery; infiltration of political groups and government services; and persistent 

denial—they can fortify vulnerable sectors of society, including the media, religious 

organizations, political parties, and government agencies.

The United States and its allies must coalesce their defense strategies into 

whole-of-government efforts to confront and address the new types of threats 

emanating from the Russian Federation. Existing security treaties, including the 

NATO Charter, along with military doctrine, training, and country team practices, 

must evolve toward effective resistance against this form of warfare.

Notes

1. Simon Ostrovsky, “Serbian War Veterans Operating in Crime: Russian Roulette in Ukraine (Dispatch 5),” 

VICE News, 1:03, March 9, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pFlLN9E2kcY&feature=youtu.

be&list=PLw613M86o5o%205zqF6WJR8zuC7Uwyv76h7R.

2. Vignette based on reporting through CENSOR.NET, a Russian-language online news site based in Ukraine, 

accessed November 25, 2014, http://censor.net.ua/photo_news/273993/na_maneje_vse_te_je_rossiyiskie_patriotki_

gastroliruyut_po_ukraine_fotoreportajvideo.

3. Simon Ostrovsky, “Getting Stuck on a Ukrainian Battleship: Russian Roulette in Ukraine (Dispatch 3),” 

VICE News, 7:45, March 6, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QnpXASPd1h4&feature=youtu.

be&list=PLw613M86o5o5zq%20F6WJR8zuC7Uwyv76h7R.

4. Jolanta Darczewska, “The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare: The Crimean Operation, A Case Study.” Point 

of View vol. 42 (Warsaw: Center for Eastern Studies, 2014), 14–17; 23-24.
64

5. Janis Berzins, Russia’s New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy (Riga: National 

Defence Academy of Latvia, 2014), 8.

6. Samuel P. Huntington (ed.), The Clash of Civilizations?: The Debate (Tampa, FL: Foreign Affairs, 1993), http://www.

foreignaffairs.com/articles/48950/samuel-p-huntington/the-clash-of-civilizations.

7. Vladimir Batyuk, “The End of the Cold War: A Russian View,” History Today 49, no. 4 (1999): http://www.

historytoday.com/vladimir-batyuk/end-cold-war-russian-view.

8. Mark Kramer, “The Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and the Polish Crisis of 1980-81,” in The Solidarity Movement 

and Perspectives on the Last Decade of the Cold War, ed. Lee Trepanier et al. (Krakow: AFM Publishing House, 2010).

9. Karl E. Meyer and Shareen B. Brysac, Tournament of Shadows: The Great Game and the Race for Empire in Central Asia

(New York: Basic Books, 1999), Prologue.

10. Graeme P. Herd and Ella Akerman, “Russian Strategic Realignment and the Post-Post-Cold War Era?,” Security 

Dialogue 33, no. 3 (2002).

11. Mykolas Gudelis, “Rethinking the People’s Revolution: The Role of the Soviet Union and National Elites 

in Lithuania’s Velvet Revolution,” Canon (Interdisciplinary Journal of the New School for Social Research) 

(Winter 2011): http://canononline.org/?s=Rethinking+the+People%E2%80%99s+Revolution.

12. Richard Humphries, “Transnistria: Relic of a Bygone Era,” Japan Times, October 8, 2001, http://www.japantimes.

co.jp/life/2001/10/08/travel/transnistria-relic-of-a-bygone-era-2/#.VLARqHYo6JA.

13. Michael Coffey, “Military Learning between the Chechen Wars,” Vestnik (Journal of Russian and Asian Studies), 

no. 5 (Fall 2006): http://www.sras.org/military_learning_between_the-chechen_wars.

14. Ibid.

15. “Oligarchs as Nation’s Saviors? Berezovsky Justifies Himself,” St. Petersburg Times, October 20, 2000.

16. Charles King, “The Five-Day War: Managing Moscow After the Georgia Crisis,” Foreign Affairs, November/

December 2008.

17. Darczewska, “Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare.”

18. Ibid., 14.

19. Ibid., 17.

20. Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science in Prediction,” Military-Industrial Kurier, February 27, 2013.

21. Nikolas K. Gvosdev, “Ukraine’s Ancient Hatreds,” National Interest, no. 132 (July–August 2014).

22. Ibid.

23. Adrian Karatnycky, “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2005.

24. Ibid.

25. glhermine, “Ukraine 2012,” World Elections (blog), January 19, 2010, https://welections.wordpress.com/2010/01/19/

ukraine-2010/.

26. For a general timeline of events during the Euromaidan crisis, see “The Ukraine Crisis Timeline,” Center for 

Strategic and International Studies, 2014, http://csis.org/ukraine/index.htm.

27. William Safire, “Siloviki Versus Oligarchy,” New York Times, November 5, 2003.

28. Gerasimov, “The Value of Science in Prediction.”

29. Bill Powell, “How the KGB (and Friends) Took Over Russia’s Economy,” Fortune, September 4, 2008, http://archive.

fortune.com/2008/09/04/news/international/powell_KGB.fortune/index.htm.

30. “Russia Defence & Security Report.” Russia Defence & Security Report, no. 3 07/01 (2014).

31. Merle Maigre, “Crimea—The Achilles Heel of Ukraine” (International Centre for Defence Studies, 2008).

32. Dale R. Herspring and Roger N. McDermott, “Serdyukov Promotes Systemic Russian Military Reform,” Orbis 54, 

no. 2 (2010): 284–301.

33. Dmitry Boltenkov et al., Russia’s New Army, ed. Mikhail Barabanov (Moscow: Centre for Analysis of Strategies and 

Technologies, 2011), 55.

34. Ibid., 81.

35. Ibid., 21.

36. Irakliy Kmakhidze, “Armed Forces of Russian Federation Spotted along the Ukrainian Border and in Donbas,” 

Euromaidan Press, August 27, 2014, http://euromaidanpress.com/2014/08/27/armed-forces-of-russian-federationspotted-along-the-ukrainian-border-and-in-donbas/.
65

37. Mathew Aid, “More on Russian Spetsnaz Operations in Crimea and along Ukrainian Border,” Personal blog, April 10, 

2014, http://www.matthewaid.com/post/82280374358/more-on-russian-spetsnaz-operations-in-crimea-and.

38. Sergi Kozlov, “FSB Special Forces: 1998-2010,” Argentura, September 8, 2010, http://www.argentura.ru/english/

spetsnaz/FSBspecialforces/.

39. David Ignatius, “Russia’s Military Delivers a Striking Lesson in Crimea,” Washington Post, March 18, 2014, 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-ignatius-russias-military-delivers-a-striking-lesson-incrimea/2014/03/18/c1273044-aed7-11e3-9627-c65021d6d572_story.html.

40. Ibid.

41. Matthew Aid, “The Role of the GRU in Russia’s Takeover of the Crimea,” Personal blog, March 26, 2014, http://

www.matthewaid.com/post/80776580075/the-role-of-the-gru-in-russias-takeover-of-the.

42. David Meadows, “Understanding Russia’s Proxy War in Eastern Ukraine,” Security Sector Reform Resource Centre, 

August 12, 2014, http://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/2014/08/12/understanding-russias-proxy-war-in-eastern-ukraine/.

43. Maksym Bugriy, “The Crimean Operation: Russian Force and Tactics,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 11 no. 61 

(April 1, 2014): http://www.jamestown.org/regions/europe/single/?tx_ttnews[pointer]=6&tx_ttnews[tt_

news]=42164&tx_ttnews[backPid]=51&cHash=fc393270652afcca3fe0563fcc63c5a0#.VT5gQpOjYgk.

44. Albina Kovalyova, “Meet the Russian Orthodox Army, Ukrainian Separatists’ Shock Troops,” NBC News, May 16, 

2014.

45. Alexander Marquardt, “Night Wolves Join Pro-Russia Side in Southern Ukraine,” ABC News, February 28, 2014.

46. Simon Shuster, “Meet the Cossack ‘Wolves’ Doing Russia’s Dirty Work in Ukraine” Time, May 14, 2014.

47. Alexander Vasovic, “Serbian Paramilitaries Join Pro-Russian Forces in Crimea,” Reuters, March 14, 2014.

48. Pierluigi Pagani,”Crimea—The Russian Cyber Strategy to Hit Ukraine,” InfoSec Institute, March 11, 2014, http://

resources.infosecinstitute.com/crimea-russian-cyber-strategy-hit-ukraine/.

49. Aid, “The Role of the GRU in Russia’s Takeover of the Crimea.”

50. Louis Charbonneau, “U.N. Says Pro-Russia Rebels in Ukraine Murder, Kidnap, and Torture,” Reuters, 

August 26, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/26/us-ukraine-crisis-rights-un-idUSKBN0gq1TA20140826.

51. Will Englund, “In Ukraine, Death and Protest Come with a History,” Washington Post, January 28, 2014, http://

www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/in-ukraine-death-and-protest-come-with-a-history/2014/01/28/087daa72-

85ca-11e3-8742-668814928ae4_story.html.

52. Daisy Sindelar, “In Eastern Ukraine, The Hunt for A Smoking Gun—And a Real Russian Holding It,” Radio Free 

Europe/Radio Liberty, April 15, 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-smoking-russian-gun/25334376.html.

53. Interfax-Ukraine, “Tymoshenko: ‘Resistance Movement’ in Ukraine Has over 20,000 Members,” KyivPost, 

May 16, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/tymoshenko-resistance-movement-in-ukraine-has-over20000-members-348207.html.

54. Tomas Hirst, “Meet the ‘Pocket Army’ Funded by Sacked Ukrainian Billionaire Igor Kolomoisky,” Business Insider, 

March 28, 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/meet-the-pocket-army-funded-by-sacked-ukrainian-billionaireigor-kolomoisky-2015-3.

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