GROWING U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS

IN CENTRAL ASIA

Elizabeth Wishnick

October 2002
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ISBN 1-58487-102-4

ii
FOREWORD

Among the many changes brought to American security

policy by the attacks of September 11, 2001, is a shift in the

strategic geography. Regions and nations that had been at

the periphery of concern have taken on new importance

because of their relationship to terrorists and the states that

sponsor them. Nowhere is this more true than in Central

Asia. Until recently, the United States paid very little

attention to Central Asia. Now the combination of energy

reserves and the region’s location has increased its strategic

significance a great deal.

In this study, Dr. Elizabeth Wishnick, currently a

Fulbright Visiting Scholar at Lingnan University, Hong

Kong, assesses U.S. security interests and military

activities in Central Asia. She notes that strengthening the

Central Asian states against terrorism and assisting their

transition to stable and prosperous nations are difficult and

fraught with danger. In particular, there is the risk that the

U.S. military presence in the region and security assistance

to repressive regimes might taint America. If not astutely

managed, this strategy could have the opposite of the

intended results and generate increased instability, spark

anti-Americanism, and antagonize Russia and China. To

avoid this, Dr. Wishnick advocates a multilateral strategy

that integrates the military, political, and economic

elements of national power and prods the Central Asian

regimes toward reform.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this

study to help U.S. defense leaders and strategic planners

assess U.S. security interests in Central Asia.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

ELIZABETH WISHNICK is an associate at the East Asian

Institute at Columbia University. In 2002-03 she will be a

Fulbright Visiting Scholar at Lingnan University in Hong

Kong. She is the author of Mending Fences: The Evolution of

Moscow’s China Policy from Brezhnev to Yeltsin (Seattle:

University of Washington Press, 2001) and of numerous

articles on great power relations and regional development

in Northeast Asia, published in Asian Survey, NBR

Analysis, SAIS Review, Journal of East Asian Affairs,

Issues and Studies, and Perspectives Chinoises, as well as in

several edited volumes. She has taught at Barnard College,

Columbia University and at Yale College, and has been a

research fellow at Taiwan’s Academia Sinica, the Hoover

Institution, and the Davis Center at Harvard University.

Dr. Wishnick’s current research focuses on Sino-Russian

relations, Chinese migration issues, Russia and

inter-Korean relations, and the integration of the Russian

Far East in Northeast Asia. She received a Ph.D. in Political

Science from Columbia University, an M.A. in Russian and

East European Studies from Yale University, and a B.A.

from Barnard College, and speaks both Russian and

Chinese.

iv
SUMMARY

As Secretary of State Colin Powell told the House

International Relations Committee in February 2002, the

United States “will have a continuing interest and presence

in Central Asia of a kind that we could not have dreamed of

before.” After providing background on the development of

U.S. security interests in Central Asia, this monograph

examines post-9/11 trends in U.S. policy and military

engagement.

In the 1990s the United States initiated military

engagement with Central Asia to support the region’s

integration with western political-military institutions, as

well as to protect the sovereignty and independence of these

states, assist them to improve their border security against

transnational threats, encourage them to adopt

market-oriented reform and democratization, and ensure

access to energy resources in the region. U.S. military

cooperation expanded rapidly with Central Asian states in

the immediate aftermath of 9/11 due to the framework of

relations that had been built piecemeal in the 1990s. For the

first time the United States acquired temporary basing in

this region in response to a changing security environment,

as Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan became

frontline states in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.

Anti-terrorism became the central focus of U.S. policy in the

region, although other goals still remain important.

The author argues that by placing a priority on

anti-terrorism in U.S. policy toward Central Asia and

rewarding Central Asian leaders for basing rights, the Bush

administration is shoring up authoritarian regimes and

encouraging public distrust of U.S. intentions in the region.

She points out that weak regional security organizations,

contingent support in Russia and China to the expanding

American military foothold in the region, and instability in

Central Asia will pose considerable challenges for the U.S.

v
military. In conclusion, the author recommends an

emphasis on rapid deployment from existing bases in

Turkey rather than continued basing in Central Asia, a

more coherent regional strategy and improved foreign area

expertise for the Central Asian region, and a multilateral

approach to addressing instability in the area.

vi
GROWING U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS

IN CENTRAL ASIA

In the 1990s the United States initiated military

engagement with Central Asia to support the region’s

integration with western political-military institutions, as

well as to protect the sovereignty and independence of these

states, assist them to improve their border security against

transnational threats, encourage them to adopt

market-oriented reform and democratization, and ensure

access to energy resources in the region. After 9/11, for the

first time the United States acquired temporary basing in

this region in response to a changing security environment,

as Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan became

frontline states in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.

Anti-terrorism has become the central focus of U.S. policy in

the region, although other goals still remain important. As

Secretary of State Colin Powell told the House International

Relations Committee, the United States “will have a

continuing interest and presence in Central Asia of a kind

that we could not have dreamed of before.”1

Prior to 9/11, Central Asia had been relatively marginal

to U.S. national security, but since then the region has

assumed a new importance as U.S. policymakers have used

the lessons of ENDURING FREEDOM to refashion the

American national security framework and revise

long-standing concepts of deterrence to address new threats

from international terrorism. Secretary of Defense Donald

Rumsfeld noted that the war in Afghanistan shows that the

United States is prepared to take preemptive action against

states sponsoring terrorism.2 Although as a presidential

candidate George W. Bush had criticized President William

Clinton for turning the United States into “the world’s

policeman,” the Bush administration is currently revising

the United States national security strategy to support

1
preemptive action against terrorists and the countries that

support them.3

In a June 1, 2002, address at the United States Military

Academy at West Point, President Bush outlined what he

termed the “three silos” of his foreign policy: defending the

peace against threats from terrorists and tyrants;

preserving the peace by building good relations among great

powers; and extending the peace by encouraging free and

open societies.4 This policy, as applied to Central Asia since

9/11, has proven to embrace mutually contradictory goals.

By placing a priority on anti-terrorism in U.S. policy toward

Central Asia and rewarding Central Asian leaders for

basing rights, the Bush administration is shoring up

authoritarian regimes and encouraging public distrust of

U.S. intentions in the region. Although Russia, and to a

lesser extent, China have cooperated with the U.S.-led

coalition against terrorism, their support is not unqualified

and could easily dissipate in the event the United States

decides to maintain a long-term military presence in

Central Asia or expand the war on terrorism in a major

ground attack against Iraq.

After providing background on the development of U.S.

security interests in Central Asia, this monograph

examines post-9/11 trends in U.S. policy and military

engagement.

The monograph points out that weak regional security

organizations, contingent support in Russia and China to

the expanding American military foothold in the region, and

instability in Central Asia will pose considerable challenges

for the United States military. In conclusion, the

monograph recommends an emphasis on rapid deployment

from existing bases in Turkey rather than continued basing

in Central Asia, a more coherent regional strategy and

improved foreign area expertise for the Central Asian

region, and a multilateral approach to addressing

instability in the area.

2
The Development of U.S. Security Interests

in Central Asia.

U.S. military cooperation with Central Asian states

expanded rapidly in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 due to

the framework of relations that had been built piecemeal in

the 1990s. After recognizing the newly independent Central

Asian states in late 1991, the United States developed

diplomatic relations with them in an effort to support

democratization and responsible security policies, and

provide a counterweight to the expansion of Russian,

Chinese, and Iranian influence.5 With the passage of the

Freedom Support Act on October 24, 1992, the United

States laid the foundation for multifaceted assistance to the

Central Asian states, initially focusing on democratization

and the promotion of free market economies. Security

cooperation increasingly would play an important role in

U.S. relations with these states because of the important

U.S. security interest in eliminating nuclear weapons based

in Kazakhstan and in preventing proliferation in the region.

Consequently, Kazakhstan was the initial focus of U.S.

security cooperation in Central Asia. In December 1993,

Vice-President Al Gore and Kazakhstan’s President

Nursultan Nazarbayev signed a cooperative threat

reduction (CTR) agreement to dismantle and destroy the

104 SS-18 missiles and silos in Kazakhstan. The following

year, U.S.-Kazakhstan security cooperation became

institutionalized in a joint commission.6 By mid-1994,

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan,

had joined NATO’s partnership for peace program (PfP),

and officers from these states, plus Tajikistan, began

participating in PfP exercises as of 1995.7 The inclusion of

the Central Asian states in the PfP program formalized

their relations with NATO, provided a mechanism for

regional security cooperation, and established a basis for

combined action. According to Strobe Talbott, Deputy

Secretary of State during the Clinton administration,

expanding military-to-military cooperation would help

reduce regional instability and promote mutual security in

3
an effort to avoid any replay of the 19th Century Great

Game with its zero-sum competition for influence among

great powers.8

Due to concern about the threat of proliferation of

nuclear materials from Kazakhstan, since 1994 the United

States has been assisting the country to shut down the

Aktau fast breeder reactor and remove nuclear materials.

In recognition of the geopolitical importance of Uzbekistan

in the struggle to eliminate Osama Bin Laden’s terrorist

network, a U.S.-Uzbekistan Joint Commission was formed

in February 1998.9 In 1999, the United States and

Uzbekistan signed a CTR agreement to dismantle and

decontaminate a biological weapons research facility and to

provide alternative employment for its scientists.

Uzbekistan’s importance to U.S. nonproliferation efforts

was highlighted in March 2000, when Uzbekistan used

American detectors to intercept radioactive materials from

Kazakhstan destined for the Pakistan-Afghanistan

border.10

In March 17, 1999, testimony to Congress, former NIS

Ambassador-at-Large Stephen Sestanovich summed up the

Clinton administration’s policy toward Central Asia as

pursuing four interrelated goals: (1) democratization;(2)

market-oriented reform; (3) greater integration with

western political and military institutions; and (4)

responsible security policies on nonproliferation,

anti-terrorism, and drug trafficking. Sestanovich noted that

securing the sovereignty, independence, and territorial

integrity of Central Asian states was the cornerstone of U.S.

policy.11

The Clinton administration’s national security strategy

elaborated on the security interests underpinning U.S.

policy toward Central Asia. These included establishing the

rule of law in an effort to combat crime and corruption,

creating a stable environment for energy exports (as a part

of a broader U.S. interest in diversifying energy supplies),

reducing regional threats (nonproliferation, terrorism), and

4
developing regional cooperation to encourage the Central

Asian states to support one another in the event of

instability or threats to peace.12

Congress reaffirmed the United States commitment to

military engagement with Central Asia with the passage on

March 10, 1999, of the Silk Road Strategy Act, which

amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to support the

economic and political independence in Central Asia and

the South Caucasus and promote regional reconciliation,

cooperation, and economic development. The new

legislation provided for border control assistance to

facilitate interdiction of drug trafficking, nonproliferation,

and transnational criminal activities, as well as for

humanitarian assistance to victims of conflicts in the

region, and assistance for the development of free market

economies and associated infrastructure.13 Anti-terrorism

became a more explicit component of U.S. policy toward

Central Asia in the aftermath of armed incursions by the

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan into Kyrgyzstan in

July-August 1999.

In April 2000, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright

announced a new Central Asian Border Security Initiative

(CASI), which provided $3 million in additional security

assistance to each of the Central Asian states, initially to

Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, and later to

Turkmenistan and Tajikistan as well. After further IMU

attacks in Uzbekistan in August 2000, during which several

Americans were held hostage, the State Department

included the IMU, linked to Osama bin Laden, in its list of

foreign terrorist organizations in September 2000.14 In its

initial year in office, the Bush administration maintained

the core components of the Clinton policy toward Central

Asia (regional security, political and economic reform),

while further accentuating the importance of energy

development.15

Yet, at the same time as Central Asia’s importance

increased for energy development and counterterrorism

5
efforts, by the end of the decade, U.S. policymakers,

especially in Congress,16 became increasingly disappointed

by the lack of progress toward democratization, particularly

in Kyrgyzstan, and by Uzbekistan’s continuing deplorable

human rights record.

Post-9/11 Policy Shifts.

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks,

anti-terrorism became the defining principle of U.S. foreign

policy, resulting in a major reshuffling of Washington’s

foreign relations.17 On the 6-month anniversary of the

attacks, Bush stated that the United States response

depended on the “critical support” of countries such as

Pakistan and Uzbekistan, a remarkable turnaround

considering that up until September 11 sanctions had been

imposed on Pakistan (and India) due to their 1998 nuclear

tests and Uzbekistan had been criticized sharply for its poor

human rights record.18

In Central Asia the change in U.S. priorities was felt

immediately, as Uzbekistan, in particular, and to a lesser

extent Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan suddenly

became frontline states in the U.S.-led struggle against the

Taliban and the Al Qaeda network. Top U.S. officials

streamed through Central Asian capitals. Uzbekistan’s

President Islam Karimov and Kazakhstan’s President

Nazarbayev both held summit meetings with President

Bush.

In testimony to a newly created Senate Foreign

Relations Sub-Committee on Central Asia and the

Caucasus (its formation in itself a testament to the

increasing importance of the region for U.S. foreign policy),

Assistant Secretary of State A. Elizabeth Jones hailed the

important role the Central Asian states played in providing

a corridor for shipments of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan

and in supporting coalition anti-terrorism efforts. She

outlined three sets of long-term interests the United States

would continue to pursue in the region: (1) preventing the

6
spread of terrorism; (2) assisting the Central Asian states

with economic and political reform and the rule of law, and

(3) ensuring the security and transparent development of

Caspian energy resources.19

Central Asian states, which had received a relatively

small share of U.S. assistance funds for the former Soviet

Union, saw their support increased across the board due to

emergency supplemental appropriations to facilitate their

participation in anti-terrorism activities. In 2001,

Uzbekistan gained the most from the additional funding,

receiving an extra $25 million in foreign military financing

(FMF), $18 million in nonproliferation, anti-terrorism,

demining, and related programs (NADR), and $40.5 million

in Freedom Support Act (FSA) funds. Despite the new

American largesse with respect to Uzbekistan, the Senate

succeeded in including an amendment to the Foreign

Appropriations Act on October 24, 2001, requiring the State

Department to report to Congress every 6 months on

Uzbekistan’s use of U.S. military assistance and human

rights violations.20

The war against terrorism also led to a fundamental

change in U.S. policy toward Azerbaijan, which received an

additional $3 million in NADR funding in FY 2001. In an

effort to facilitate military cooperation with that country,

the Senate amended U.S. legislation prohibiting any

American aid to Azerbaijan (with the exception of funds for

disarmament programs) until its government takes real

steps to end all blockades and use of force against the

Armenian enclave in Nagorno-Karabakh. The foreign

appropriations bill passed on October 24, 2001 gives the

president the authority to waive any restrictions on aid to

Azerbaijan if he determines it is in the national interest to

do so. The Bush administration requested $50 million for

Azerbaijan in FY2002 and $52.98 million in FY 2003,

including $3 million in FMF, $750,000 in International

Military Education and Training (IMET) and $46 million in

FSA funding.

7
At the same time, the Bush administration began a

reappraisal of the roles of the great powers in Central Asia,

a process with significant implications for the region’s

geopolitics. U.S. assessments of Russia’s role in Central

Asia always depended on the level of cooperation in

U.S.-Russia relations. During the Clinton administration,

for example, the National Security strategy noted that the

fate of Central Asia would depend on the prospects for

reform in Russia.21 Reflecting the initial skepticism of the

Bush administration about Russia, a U.S. official told

Congress that Washington had an interest in preventing

ties with Russia from complicating U.S. policy toward

Central Asia and in cooperating where Moscow and

Washington had common interests, for instance, in the

United States-Russia Working Group on Afghanistan.22

Since 9/11, U.S.-Russia cooperation has improved

dramatically, facilitating the expanding U.S. security role

in Central Asia. Despite Washington’s wariness of China,

China has proved a cooperative partner in persuading

Pakistan to work closely with the United States in the

anti-terrorism struggle, sharing intelligence and financial

information about terrorist groups.

Moreover, even though in its first year in office the Bush

administration displayed hostility to multilateralism, since

9/11 there has been a new awareness of the importance of

regional and international organizations in integrating

Central Asia within Western institutions and in facilitating

regional anti-terrorism initiatives. Indeed, in the months

since 9/11, the United States has sought to combat

transnational threats such as terrorism by seeking to bring

together states sharing U.S. values.23 Although the

anti-terrorism coalition was formed to fight the Taliban and

the Al Qaeda network, there is debate in the administration

regarding the type of security architecture necessary to

address future security needs.

Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian

Affairs Jones noted that the countries of Central Asia “will

8
play a critical role” in the campaign against terrorism, but

will require the support of organizations such as the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union

(EU), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE).24

On December 13-14, 2001, OSCE held an international

conference in Bishkek on enhancing security and stability

in Central Asia and strengthening efforts to counter

terrorism. In particular, the conference focused on

preventative measures, such as democratization, economic

development, crime prevention, and border control. In his

comments to the OSCE Permanent Council on December

20, 2001, U.S. Ambassador to OSCE Stephen Minikes noted

the importance of creating the social, economic, and political

conditions under which terrorism cannot thrive and called

upon the OSCE to take concrete steps, such as denying

terrorists access to funding and improving cooperation

among law enforcement agencies.25

U.S. Military Engagement in Central Asia.

As policymakers have defined U.S. security interests in

Central Asia, the United States military has taken a series

of steps to engage Central Asia and enhance

military-to-military cooperation. Reflecting the initial focus

on Kazakhstan as the cornerstone of U.S. security in

Central Asia, the United States and Kazakhstan signed a

defense cooperation agreement in 1994, which was to

involve dialogue on defense doctrine, training, and budgets.

A subsequent agreement in 1997 expanded U.S. military

cooperation with Kazakhstan to include nuclear security

and defense conversion assistance. In recognition of

Uzbekistan’s increasing importance in regional

counterterrorism efforts, similar agreements were signed

with Uzbekistan, which, in 2000 also became the first

recipient of a sizeable transfer of military equipment under

the Foreign Military Financing program.26 It was not until

2001 that the United States began to appreciate the

9
importance of stability in Tajikistan and the coalition

government’s vulnerability to Islamic militant groups.

During a May 2001 visit to Dushanbe, General Tommy

Franks, General Anthony Zinni’s successor as head of

Central Command (CENTCOM), called Tajikistan “a

strategically important country” and promised security

assistance. Tajikistan then committed to joining NATO’s

Partnership for Peace Program.27

Expanding U.S. military engagement with Central

Asian States has been viewed as a key mechanism to

promote their integration into Western political-military

institutions, encourage civilian control over militaries, and

institutionalize cooperative relations with the United

States military, while dissuading other regional

powers—especially Russia, China, and Iran—from seeking

to dominate the region.28 Beginning in 1993, military

officials from Central Asia began to receive training at the

George C. Marshall Center in Garmisch, Germany, as a part

of a German-American security initiative.29 By mid-1994,

all of the Central Asian states with the exception of

Tajikistan, had joined NATO’s PfP program. The program

hosted a series of exercises to provide training in

peacekeeping activities and develop interoperability.

Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan participated in Operation

NUGGET exercises in peacekeeping tactics for land forces,

which took place in August 1995 and in July 1997 at Fort

Polk, Louisiana, the latter with Kazakhstan’s participation.

The three also took part in a multicountry amphibious

exercise in North Carolina, along with the United States,

Canada, the Netherlands, and 16 other PfP members. In

March 2001, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan joined the United

States, five other NATO countries, and 13 PfP members in

exercises in Nova Scotia.30

In December 1995, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and

Uzbekistan formed a joint peacekeeping unit, with the

support of CENTCOM. The new unit, Centrazbat, was

created to maintain stability in Central Asia and enable the

three participating states to share information about tactics

10
in support of their bid to join U.N. peacekeeping missions.

Centrazbat exercises have been held annually, with the

participation of the United States,31 other NATO members,

and regional states, since 1997, with an alternating focus on

field and command training.

On October 1, 1999, CENTCOM assumed responsibility

for the five Central Asian states, which, as former Soviet

republics, previously fell under the purview of the European

Command. According to former CENTCOM Commander

General Zinni, it was essential to integrate these states into

CENTCOM’s overall collective engagement strategy, based

on the premise that “an ounce of proactive engagement

protection is cheaper than a pound of war fighting cure.”32

Thus, the United States supported efforts such as

Centrazbat to promote regional stability and deter efforts

by extremists to create instability. Marine Corps Brigadier

General Martin R. Berndt noted, not long after the

formation of the joint battalion, that another rationale for

U.S. participation in Centrazbat was to create working

relationships between U.S. forces and Central Asian

militaries prior to the eruption of a crisis requiring their

joint efforts.33

The 2001 exercise was held at a U.S. military base in

Germany and focused on regional cooperation. Exercises

were cancelled for 2002 due to ongoing cooperation with

Central Asian militaries as a part of Operation ENDURING

FREEDOM, but are likely to be continued in future years.34

New Challenges and U.S. Military Responses.

In October 2001, the U.S. Department of Defense’s

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) summarized many of

the general principles underlying U.S. security interests,

which clearly are underpinning U.S. diplomatic overtures

and military engagement with Central Asia: preventing the

hostile domination of key areas and maintaining a stable

balance of power; maintaining access to key markets and

11
strategic resources; addressing threats from territories of

weak states; sustaining coalitions; and preparing to

intervene in unexpected crises.35 The document noted the

emergence of Asia as a region especially vulnerable to

military conflict and characterized it as an “arc of

instability,” due to the area’s volatile mix of rising and

declining powers, and the presence of radical and extremist

movements, many of which have substantial military

capabilities and the potential to develop weapons of mass

destruction.36

The QDR outlined a shift in defense planning, from the

traditional threat-based model to a capabilities-based

approach. Instead of focusing on identifying potential

adversaries or areas of conflict, the new model of defense

planning seeks to “anticipate the capabilities that an

adversary might employ to coerce its neighbors, deter the

United Sates from acting in defense of its allies and friends,

or directly attack the United States or its deployed forces.”37

Specifically, the QDR emphasizes the importance of

preparing forward deployed forces for a variety of

contingencies worldwide by expanding basing options

beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, and securing

temporary access to facilities for training and exercises in

areas where the United States lacks bases.38 The QDR also

calls for strengthening U.S. alliances and partnerships by

increasing peacetime training and preparations for

coalition operations.39

The QDR purports to transform American defense to

incorporate new technologies and adapt existing

capabilities to a changeable strategic environment.

Operationally, this will require the U.S. military to protect

U.S. military assets at home and overseas, project and

sustain forces in distant hostile environments, maintain

secure information systems, employ means necessary to

deny sanctuary to enemies (intelligence, surveillance,

tracking, military engagement), and develop joint

operations and survivable space systems.40

12
In particular, the U.S. Army is called upon to accelerate

the introduction of forward-stationed Interim Brigade

Combat Teams (IBCT). In October 1999, prior to Secretary

of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s review of U.S. military

strategy culminating in the 2001 QDR,41 Army Chief of Staff

General Eric Shinseki proposed creating six ICBTs to

improve rapid power projection capacity. The ICBTs form

the core of an interim force, the near-term component of a

30-year strategy to shape the Army into a more responsive

and maneuverable force.42 In a November 2001 speech,

General Shinseki noted that current operations in Central

Asia reinforce the importance of acquiring a capability to

project conventional war-fighting power in remote areas

with inadequate infrastructure.43

As a part of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the U.S.

military’s involvement in Central Asia and the Caucasus

expanded to include: temporary forward basing in

Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan; access to airspace

and restricted use of bases in Kazakhstan and

Turkmenistan; train and equip missions in Georgia;

assistance for border security in Azerbaijan; and

coalition-building by high-level visits to Central Asia,

intelligence-sharing, improved coordination within

CENTCOM, and increased assistance.

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, U.S. officials

pressed Central Asian states for assistance with the

struggle against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Initially the

Central Asian states reacted cautiously to American

requests. Nevertheless, all five states offered to share

intelligence and grant U.S. access to their air space.

Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan also allowed

coalition aircraft to make emergency landings.44

Uzbekistan pledged the use of the Karshi Khanabad air

base, as long as it would not be involved in positioning

ground troops for an invasion of Afghanistan.45

Tajikistan offered the use of its air space and territory to

the U.S. military, but had to backtrack due to pressure from

13
Russia, which continues to station 7,000 troops from the

201st division and another 11,000 border guards in the

country. After Russia withdrew its opposition, Tajikistan

offered the Pentagon (and later the French military) the use

of the Dushanbe airport on a contingency basis.46

Although the coalition government, which includes

Islamic parties, feared the domestic consequences of close

military cooperation with the U.S.-led coalition effort

against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, on November 3, 2001,

Tajikistan’s leaders and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld

reached an agreement to allow the United States to consider

using three additional bases (Khujand, Kurgan-Tyube, and

Kulyab) in exchange for a substantial increase in aid.47

Ultimately 35 U.S., French, and Italian warplanes were

deployed at Kulyab, deemed the most suitable for

immediate use.48

These arrangements were kept private in the interest of

Tajikistan’s security, but access to basing in the country’s

south would prove significant to coalition efforts by

providing a land bridge to northern Afghanistan and

enabling aircraft located there to fly multiple missions daily

and reach their targets within an hour.49 By April 2002, the

United States was providing military equipment to

Tajikistan.50

After Rumsfeld visited Tashkent, on October 5, 2001,

Uzbekistan signed an agreement with U.S. officials

allowing a limited number of U.S. military personnel (not

more than 1,500 troops) to operate out of the Khanabad

airbase in exchange for security guarantees and U.S.

agreement to target training camps in Afghanistan, known

to harbor the IMU.51 The agreement also provided for

intelligence sharing and U.S. use of Uzbekistan’s airspace.

Uzbek officials reportedly stipulated that aircraft based at

Khanabad would be used primarily for humanitarian and

search-and-rescue attacks.52 Uzbek President Karimov

stated that no negotiations regarding the time frame of the

U.S. military presence had taken place.53

14
CENTCOM and Uzbekistan have been cooperating

closely. In December 2001, five Uzbek representatives were

posted to CENTCOM.54 During CENTCOM Commander

General Tommy Frank’s visit to Uzbekistan in January

2002, CENTCOM and the Ministry of Defense of

Uzbekistan signed an agreement to develop

military-to-military cooperation through joint seminars,

training, and partnerships with U.S. units.55

During his March 2002 visit to Washington, Karimov

told reporters that “the United States may remain in

Uzbekistan as long as they think it’s necessary; in other

words, as long as it takes to finish disrupting the terrorist

network.”56 In return, in agreements codifying a strategic

partnership with Uzbekistan, the United States pledged to

“regard with grave concern any external threat to

Uzbekistan.”57

In contrast to the largely secret agreements the U.S.

military concluded with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, on

December 5, 2001 the United States Department of State

and Kyrgyz officials signed a basing access agreement

allowing U.S. forces to use Manas airport. The agreement

allows for basing rights for Western forces for a 1-year

period, which President Askar Akayev has termed “the

optimal duration.”58 Kyrgyz Security Council Secretary

Misir Ashirkulov stated that these forces would remain at

Manas only as long as operations continue in Afghanistan,

and basing rights will only be extended beyond 2002 if these

operations take longer than expected.59 Australian, French,

Italian, Dutch, Norwegian, Korean, and Spanish aircraft

also will use Manas, bringing the total number of foreign

forces to approximately 3,000.60

The U.S. military also expanded cooperation with

Georgia and Azerbaijan in the aftermath of 9/11. Under a

U.S. train and equip program, 2000 elite Georgian troops

will be trained in counterterrorism tactics. Although the

United States has provided Georgia with significant

amounts of military equipment and training over the course

15
of the past decade, the new effort launched in March 2002

came at a time when Russia was threatening to intervene

militarily in Georgia in pursuit of Al Qaeda operatives who

allegedly fled to the Pankisi Gorge.61

Azerbaijan reportedly has provided its airbases for

coalition refueling en route to Central Asia since October

2001. By removing Azerbaijan (as well as Armenia) from the

list of countries barred from receiving U.S. military and

security assistance, the U.S. Government is laying the

foundation for increased military cooperation with the

Caucasus. In late March, Azerbaijani defense officials

signed the country’s first security agreement with the

United States, under which the Pentagon would provide

assistance with air traffic control and safety, military and

peace-keeping training, enhancing naval border control,

and upgrading military airports.62

Challenges for the U.S. Military.

Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz has noted

that the U.S. bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan “may be

more political than actually military,” i.e. they symbolize

the U.S. security commitment to these states and

Washington’s intention to protect them from future

terrorist threats.63 Nevertheless, the extension of basing

beyond the conflict in Afghanistan will have uncertain

political costs and may exacerbate regional geopolitical

rivalries and instability.

Washington’s ability to take the lead in protecting the

security of Central Asia, a region where the United States

previously has shown little inclination to intervene

militarily, reflects the weakness of the existing regional

security organizations and new cooperative trends in U.S.

relations with great powers in the region. How long these

cooperative trends will endure will depend on a variety of

inter-related factors, including the timeframe of the U.S.

military presence in Central Asia, the reactions of regional

powers to the growing U.S. security interests in Central

16
Asia, and the scope of the United States anti-terrorism

campaign, particularly its extension to Iraq.

Weak Regional Institutions.

In the past decade several regional organizations have

developed in Central Asia to address transnational threats

and promote economic cooperation. After the collapse of the

USSR, China and Russia began convening regular meetings

with their Central Asian neighbors, Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, to discuss confidence-building

along their common borders. After a meeting in June 1996

in Shanghai, the group became known as the Shanghai Five

and signed a number of agreements, paving the way for

bilateral border negotiations and regional economic

cooperation.64

At the group’s June 2001 meeting members decided to

create a formal institutional framework for their meetings,

the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). China has

sought to play a leading role in the SCO and promote

economic cooperation among its members, in an effort to

counterbalance growing U.S. economic interests in Central

Asia, particularly in the energy sector.65 Reflecting the

broadening of the group’s mandate, in June 2001

Uzbekistan joined the group, and subsequently other

regional states, including Mongolia, Pakistan, and India,

have expressed interest in membership.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the

United States, the Central Asian members were quick to

cooperate with Washington in the war against the Taliban

and the SCO proved ineffective beyond issuing joint

statements against terrorism. Although, members signed

an organizational charter at the June 2002 meeting in St.

Petersburg, and agreed to establish a permanent

secretariat in Beijing and an anti-terrorism unit in Bishkek,

they remain divided over the SCO’s priorities.66

17
Initially, there was some reason to believe that

cooperation in the U.S.-led coalition would reinvigorate

GUUAM—the grouping including Georgia, Ukraine,

Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova—due to Uzbekistan’s

close partnership with Washington, increasing U.S.

military assistance to Georgia, and the development of

security ties to Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, member states

have preferred to develop their bilateral ties with the

United States. Uzbekistan, for example, withdrew from the

grouping due its “lack of progress” in addressing key

issues.67

Even though existing regional groupings have yet to

prove effective, a new Asian security organization, the

Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building

Measures in Asia (CICA), was founded on June 4, 2002, to

bring together representatives from Central Asia, South

Asia, and the Middle East to promote regional economic

cooperation and security.68

Kazakhstan’s President Nazarbayev had been

advocating the creation of such an organization for more

than a decade and its first meeting was held in Almaty.69

Kazakh officials noted that the new group could play a role

in addressing key regional issues, such as terrorism, drug

trafficking, illegal migration, and water resource

management, although they expected CICA to face greater

obstacles in achieving consensus due to the diversity of

membership.70 The first session concluded with the signing

of the Almaty Act, an appeal to the 16 participants

(Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel,

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, the

Palestinian Authority, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkey, and

Uzbekistan) to join forces against terrorism.71

Although both Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharaff

and India’s Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee attended

the conference, they refused to meet under its auspices and

U.S. shuttle diplomacy ended up playing a key role in

reducing tensions between the two neighbors over Kashmir.

18
Despite its initial ineffectiveness in conflict resolution,

CICA is poised to play a role in facilitating bilateral contacts

among some of its members. Just prior to the meeting, for

example, India and Kazakhstan signed an agreement on

military cooperation and discussed potential cooperation in

energy, transportation, and pharmaceuticals.72

Regional security has been difficult to ensure, even when

goals are more narrowly focused, as the case of the “6+2”

working group, established under U.N. auspices to promote

a region-wide solution to the conflict in Afghanistan attests.

The group was set up in August 1997 after Uzbekistan

suggested that the U.N. form a contact group on

Afghanistan to include its neighbors (Tajikistan,

Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, China, Iran, and Pakistan) plus

the United States and Russia. Although previously not

effective in finding a solution to Afghanistan’s security

problems, 6+2 provides an interesting model of a regional

security organization geared to resolution of a specific

conflict.73 It is also the only group in Central Asia inviting

U.S. participation.

Great Power Cooperation: Driving Forces

and Fault-lines.

In the absence of effective regional institutions, U.S.

bilateral diplomacy with China and Russia has proved

important in addressing growing U.S. security interests in

Central Asia. In the case of China, cooperation in the

anti-terrorism coalition has provided an impetus for more

frequent communication and enabled the two countries to

put tensions over the April 2001 spy plane incident behind

them.74 Initially Chinese leaders believed that the U.S.

focus on anti-terrorism coalition-building would counter

unilateralist trends and reduce the focus on China as a

potential threat to U.S. interests in Asia. China also saw an

opportunity to find a new area of cooperation with the

United States, despite reservations about the use of

military force in response to the 9/11 attacks, and hoped

19
that Chinese cooperation with the United States would

result in concessions on Taiwan and support for Chinese

policies to combat Uighur separatism.75 In an effort to avoid

condoning U.S. intervention in the domestic affairs of other

countries, Chinese officials have stressed the importance of

establishing “concrete evidence” before intervening

militarily and operating within the U.N. framework.76 They

have been quite clear about China’s opposition to the

”willful expansion of the war against terror” to Iraq or other

countries the United States has chosen to include in the

“axis of evil” rubric.77

Chinese leaders are concerned about the security

implications of a long-term U.S. military presence in South

and Central Asia and enhanced U.S. military cooperation

with Southeast Asian states. Nevertheless, since 9/11

China has shared information about financial flows of

suspected terrorist groups, held talks with U.S. officials

about coordinating anti-terrorism activities, provided

humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, and urged its ally,

Pakistan, to assist the U.S.-led coalition and reduce

tensions in Kashmir. In addition to providing a new issue

area for cooperation with the United States, Chinese

officials view their participation in the anti-terrorism

coalition as justifying an intensified crackdown on Uighur

separatists, whom Beijing alleges have received training

from Al Qaeda camps.78

Although the anti-terrorism struggle has provided new

impetus for U.S.-China cooperation, China’s security

environment has deteriorated since 9/11 as Chinese leaders

saw key allies, such as Russia and Pakistan, tilt toward the

United States; relations between Washington and India

improve; U.S. military cooperation with Southeast Asian

states increase; instability along China’s western borders

deepen; the United States confirm for Chinese leaders

Washington’s increasing aspiration for global dominance by

revising the United States nuclear posture and national

security strategy; Japanese officials discuss a nuclear

option; and the U.S. military establish bases for the first

20
time in Central Asia. These dramatic shifts in global politics

have prompted Chinese experts to reevaluate the strategic

context of China’s security policy and discuss various

possible responses, including greater reliance on

multilateral cooperation (to counteract perceived U.S.

unilateralist tendencies) or a “readjustment” of China’s

security policy in response to mounting U.S. pressures.79

Given that this series of negative developments in

China’s security environment has developed at a time when

Chinese leaders have been preoccupied by leadership

succession, thus far they have focused their attention on

their overriding current concern in U.S.-China relations,

the Taiwan issue, and have not directly criticized the U.S.

military presence in Central Asia. Nonetheless, Chinese

commentary emphasizes that Central Asia is likely to be the

locus of great power rivalry, especially over energy.80

Chinese leaders have responded to the increased U.S.

military cooperation with Central Asia by reinvigorating

Chinese diplomacy in the region and advocating

cooperation in regional security frameworks, excluding U.S.

participation, a surprising development considering

Beijing’s usual caution about multilateralism. Jiang Zemin

held bilateral talks with Central Asian leaders in

connection with the meetings of CICA in Almaty in May

2002 and of the SCO in Petersburg in June 2002. According

to Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, Jiang’s

Eurasian initiative was a “major diplomatic move” to

respond to profound changes in the international security

environment of the region.81 Jiang used these meetings to

put forward a vision of Central Asian security maintained

by Asians.82 In the short term, China is seeking to expand

economic cooperation with Kazakhstan in the energy sector

and to boost security ties with Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan

by providing military aid.83

Considering Russia’s historical ties to the region, the

substantial investment the United States has been making

there since 9/11, and the wary reaction in Central Asia to

21
Beijing’s inroads, Chinese diplomatic efforts are unlikely to

bear fruit. While the Kazakh leadership is interested in

economic cooperation with China, there is concern in

Kazakhstan about the potential for Chinese economic

domination.84 In Kyrgyzstan, the border demarcation with

China, involving the return of territory, sparked mass

demonstrations in March 2002 and opposition by the

parliament. Public opinion polling in Kazakhstan,

Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan reveals considerable distrust

of China’s intentions in the region: 56% in Kyrgyzstan, 40%

in Uzbekistan, and 52% in Kazakhstan stated that China

could not be trusted to act responsibly in Central Asia.85

Instead China is likely to seek to boost its own military

might, and extend its economic influence in Central Asia

and Southeast Asia. According to a Russian analysis, one of

the reasons behind China’s decision to purchase eight diesel

Kilo-class submarines was to protect Chinese interests in

Southeast Asia against further U.S. encroachments, as

Beijing is convinced that the United States will seek to take

over the Russian base at the Cam Ranh Bay naval base.86

Chinese cooperation with the U.S.-led coalition has

provided important support, but China’s role has been

limited compared to Russia’s. Without a cooperative

U.S.-Russian relationship, President Putin’s acquiescence

to an American military presence in Moscow’s sphere of

influence would have been hard to imagine.87

Although Putin was the first leader to offer moral

support after the 9/11 attacks, it was the Central Asian

states who pushed Russia into greater cooperation with the

anti-terrorism effort than might otherwise have been

forthcoming.88 Initially Russian leaders opposed any U.S.

use of bases in Central Asia. Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov

stated that he failed to see any “reasons whatsoever, even

hypothetical, for any suppositions about conducting NATO

operations from territories of Central Asian countries,

members of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent

States].”89 At first President Putin tried to pressure the

22
Central Asian leaders to follow Moscow’s lead, by

telephoning them on September 17 and urging them to act

according to the CIS framework on anti-terrorism issues.

Although initially seeking Moscow’s approval, U.S.

officials then went directly to the Central Asian leaders to

seek their support. Uzbekistan is not a member of the CIS

and extended the use of its bases to the U.S.-led coalition.

Kazakhstan, and then Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, after

securing Moscow’s approval, also opened up bases and

offered their air space for the coalition’s use. Russian

officials were then obliged to reverse their previous

opposition to U.S. basing in Central Asia.90 Putin, who kept

silent on the matter for nearly two weeks, gave a speech on

September 24, 2001 in which he pledged Russia’s

cooperation with U.S. plans to attack Afghanistan, but only

once the U.N. Security Council had approved them.91

For Putin, the 9/11 events represented an opportunity to

rejoin the superpower club. By participating in the U.S.-led

anti-terrorism coalition, closing bases in Vietnam and Cuba

(albeit in decisions made prior to 9/11) and taking a

conciliatory stance on President Bush’s December 13, 2002

decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty, Putin hoped that

the United States would once again see the need to treat

Russia as a great power.92 The Russian president also

expected some concessions in return, especially an end to

criticism of Russia’s policies toward Chechnya, carte

blanche to conduct anti-terrorism operations in Georgia,

and perhaps also preferential terms for repayment of Soviet

era debt and World Trade Organization (WTO) entry.93

Russian cooperation in the anti-terrorism coalition has

been wide-ranging, including sharing intelligence about the

Taliban, offering the use of Russian air space, providing

humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, and supporting the

Northern Alliance. To coordinate their activities, Russian

and U.S. officials are meeting in a wide range of venues.

Russia dispatched representatives to CENTCOM. On

October 19, 2001, the United States and Russia held

23
consultations on Central Asia for the first time. The United

States and Russia are cooperating on Afghanistan and

regional anti-terrorism issues in a joint working group on

counter-terrorism, established in 2000, the U.S.-Russia

working group on Afghanistan, the 6+2 framework, and the

Russia-NATO Council, formed in December 2001.

American officials choose to emphasize the positive

post-9/11 U.S.-Russia relations. General Franks has noted

the intersection of U.S. and Russian interests in Central

Asia.94 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Jones has called

attention to the “extraordinary cooperation with Russia in a

region... that Russia naturally regards as its own

backyard.”95 Yet Putin’s initial failure to show substantial

immediate benefits for Russian cooperation with

Washington on Afghanistan and underlying wariness of an

increased American military presence in Central Asia made

the Russian leader vulnerable to more nationalist critics at

home in early 2002. Prior to 9/11, Russian policymakers

were already suspicious of U.S. intentions in Central Asia

and concerned that Washington was using programs such

as PfP to squeeze Russia out of the region.96

By early 2002, after the United States concluded basing

agreements with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan,

critical voices began to be heard in Moscow. In January

2002, Gennady Seleznev, speaker of the Russian Duma,

spoke out against any permanent U.S. basing in Central

Asia.97 Moscow newspapers lamented Russia’s loss of

influence in the region.98

The Russian public also proved skeptical. A ROMIR poll

taken in October 2001 showed that 63.5% of Russians were

opposed to U.S. access to bases in Central Asia, with 39.8%

in favor.99 According to a November 2001 poll by the

Russian Center for Public Opinion, only 20% of Russians

saw fundamental change in U.S.-Russia relations resulting

from Russian participation in the anti-terrorism

coalition.100

24
The Russian leader’s immediate concern has been to

recoup Russia’s dwindling clout in the region through a

series of diplomatic initiatives. In October 2001, the

Kremlin unsuccessfully sought to coordinate intelligence

sharing between the Central Asian states and the United

States in an effort to control their cooperation.101 At a

December 2001 CIS summit, Putin emphasized that 9/11

highlighted the importance of multilateral cooperation and

noted that “the tragic events of September 11 showed how

vulnerable a country is on its own—even a country that is

very powerful, economically and militarily.”102 In his

State-of-the-Nation speech on April 18, 2002, the Russian

president sought to give the entire credit to the

CIS—without even mentioning the United States role—for

success in the struggle against terrorism in Afghanistan.103

At the May 2002 CIS summit, Putin proposed creating a

joint military body, which would be commanded by the

Russian Chief of the General Staff Kvashin, but no

agreement was reached on the issue. Nevertheless,

signatories to the collective security treaty formed a new

collective security organization, which would ensure

regional security and cooperate with other organizations,

such as NATO and the SCO.104

Many Russian appeals to enhance CIS integration have

largely fallen on deaf ears and Putin has sought a variety of

other economic and political levers of influence. In January

2002, the Russian president called for the formation of a

Eurasian gas alliance, including Turkmenistan,

Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Russia. The alliance would

export gas to Europe via the Russian state-owned monopoly

Gazprom, effectively granting Moscow the power to cut off

exports from Central Asian states should they fail to be

sufficiently loyal to Moscow.105 At the SCO summit, Putin

called attention to a 15-year agreement to export oil from

Kazakhstan via Russia and noted the recent improvement

in trade relations with Uzbekistan.106 Later on in June,

when Kyrgyzstan’s President Akayev faced continuous

mass demonstrations protesting the treatment of an

25
opposition figure and the border settlement with China, top

Russian officials were dispatched to Bishkek to show their

support for the embattled president and offered to improve

military cooperation with Kyrgyzstan.107

Moreover, Russia has been competing with the United

States for influence in Afghanistan, a development that

some observers have compared to the great power rivalry in

Europe right before the fall of Berlin in 1945. Although

Russia did not contribute troops to the war against the

Taliban, Moscow dispatched twelve planeloads of

‘specialists” to Kabul in early December, a move described

by Secretary of State Colin Powell as potentially creating

tensions in U.S.-Russia relations.108 Russia was the second

country (after Great Britain) to reopen its embassy in Kabul

and its support for the Northern Alliance ensured it a key

role in post-Taliban Afghanistan.109

While it is true that the United States-Russian

partnership has deepened in the spring of 2002, after

successful arms control talks and a productive summit

meeting in May, Russian support for the U.S.-led

anti-terrorism coalition has never been unconditional.

Above all, Russia fully expects the U.S. military presence in

Central Asia to be temporary. Should basing rights be

extended indefinitely, this would embolden latent

opposition to Putin in the military and intelligence services

in particular.

Furthermore, the expansion of the war on terrorism to

Iraq would place the new Russian-American partnership

under considerable stress. Although the Russian president

may be able to tolerate limited air strikes, if the United

States went forward with preemptive ground attack against

Iraq,110 the Russian president would find himself in a very

difficult position politically. After acquiescing to U.S. basing

in Central Asia and a U.S. pull-out from the ABM treaty,

Russia would be asked to sacrifice its economic interests in

Iraq, a move unlikely to garner support in Russian policy

circles and, to the contrary, one with the potential to

26
undermine Putin’s support for U.S. policies on other issues.

Prior consultation would be insufficient to achieve Russian

concurrence to a preemptive U.S. ground attack, as Russian

leaders would be expecting substantial financial

compensation for their losses. Even so, if the United States

intervened unilaterally in Iraq, domestic opposition in

Russia to Putin’s westward-leaning diplomacy would

increase and, as was the case with the United States

intervention in Kosovo in 1999, would strengthen voices in

Moscow advocating a partnership with China and India to

counteract Washington’s efforts to impose its will on global

affairs.

Deepening Domestic Instability in Central Asia.

Expanding U.S. military engagement with Central Asia

is designed to shore up weak states that are vulnerable to

terrorism, promote their integration into western

institutions, provide support for moderate Islamic regimes,

as well as to stabilize Afghanistan’s immediate external

environment.111 Yet as Andrew Bacevich noted, “to venture

into the steppes is to venture into a minefield.”112

The largely secular regimes of Central Asia have faced

challenges from radical Islamic movements within their

borders, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and

Hizb-ut-Tahrir. Although the IMU had bases in Northern

Afghanistan and links to the Taliban and Al Qaeda, the

group mounted its 1999 and 2000 incursions into

Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan from Tajikistan as a part of a

broader effort to control drug trafficking routes within the

Ferghana valley.113 Although the IMU’s bases in

Afghanistan were targeted during the Afghanistan war, the

group has maintained an underground network in Central

Asia and there is some evidence that IMU fighters from

Afghanistan are seeking to return to Tajikistan and

Kyrgyzstan.114

Hizb-ut-Tahrir, founded in Jordan and Saudi Arabia in

1953, seeks to create a united Islamic super-state in Central

27
Asia, which would be ruled by sharia law. Although it does

not advocate the overthrow of existing states by violent

means and is not officially regarded as a terrorist group by

the U.S.-led coalition or the Central Asian states, it is not

allowed to register legally as a political party and operates

mostly underground.115 As one of the few alternatives in a

region where political opposition is repressed, the group has

become increasingly popular, especially among the

impoverished rural residents of Ferghana, where

unemployment reaches 80%.116 Since the United States has

been using the Manas base, Hizb-ut-Tahrir has been

distributing leaflets opposing the American military

presence.117

Although Central Asians are mainly moderate Sunni

Muslims, repressive regimes, corrupt elites, and pervasive

poverty have made the region a breeding ground for

terrorists and other radical movements.118 The United

States hoped that by developing the energy sector in these

countries, overall increases in development would trickle

down to the population, but corruption and lack of

transparency have facilitated the formation of a

criminalized elite, increasing public dissatisfaction with

their own governments and cooperation with the West.119

The new military assistance money pouring into Central

Asia since 9/11 is likely to exacerbate this problem. In

Kyrgyzstan, the United States pays approximately $7,000

per take-off from Manas, used for about 30 coalitions flights

daily, as well as $1,000 per truck and $500 per car entering

the airport, plus $3.5 million for helicopter parts and

aircraft repairs.120 Just as with oil revenue in Kazakhstan,

corruption in Krygyzstan renders unlikely any fair

distribution of these funds to impoverished citizens.

Uzbekistan has received the lion’s share of increased

funding post-9/11—nearly $172 million—more than ten

times the total amounts budgeted for each of the other

Central Asian states in aid requests in FY2001-2003. In FY

2001 Uzbekistan was the only Central Asian country to

28
receive additional foreign military financing, in the amount

of $25 million, $5 million more than NATO ally Turkey.121

NGOs have faulted the Bush administration for focusing

excessively on security assistance to the detriment of other

needs in Central Asia.122

The increased U.S. military presence in Central Asia

gives the public the impression that Washington supports

these repressive regimes, while providing authoritarian

leaders reason to hope that U.S. forces would back them up

in case of a mass effort to oust them. The protest marches

taking place in Kyrgyzstan in the spring of 2002, attracting

thousands of supporters, could lead to a widespread

movement to oust President Akayev,123 a very real example

of a situation in which the U.S. military presence appears to

be supporting a less than democratic leader instead of

encouraging the development of political pluralism. U.S.

troops stationed in Central Asia also make good targets for

anti-government insurgents and are as vulnerable as the

weak states that host them.

U.S. policymakers are well aware that democratic and

prosperous Central Asian states would provide the

strongest bulwark against terrorism and are funding an

impressive list of economic, social, and political programs in

addition to military aid. Yet the emphasis has been on

rewarding the Central Asian states for their cooperation

and providing aid incentives for continued participation in

the anti-terrorism coalition, rather than on using closer

cooperation to encourage higher standards of economic and

political openness.

Although prior to 9/11 U.S. policymakers highlighted

the lack of progress toward democratization in Uzbekistan,

Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, the increasing

consolidation of one-party rule in Tajikistan, and the

continued erosion of democratic norms in Kyrgyzstan, many

American officials now overstate the degree of progress

currently taking place in these countries to make a case for

continued close security cooperation. U.S. officials note that

29
Uzbekistan, for example, has taken some unprecedented

steps—allowing a visit by the U.N. Rapporteur on Torture,

permitting the International Committee of the Red Cross to

visit detention centers, and registering one human rights

organization.

According to Human Rights Watch, however, there is no

reason to point to any fundamental change in the country’s

overall appalling human rights record, which includes

inhumane treatment of prisoners, the use of torture in

detention, tight restrictions on the media, and a continuing

ban on independent parties and social movements. More

than 7,000 remain imprisoned on religious and political

charges.124

Assured of U.S. support, President Karimov saw the

opportunity to renege on a pre-9/11 pledge to release

thousands of political prisoners: approximately 800 were

released but kept under tight surveillance, while the rest

lost their chance for amnesty.125 Despite such evidence of

backsliding, the U.S. Government removed Uzbekistan

from the list of countries of particular concern for religious

freedom, mandated by the 1998 U.S. International

Religious Freedom Act.126 Meanwhile, Muslim believers

and the human rights personnel who defend them continue

to be arrested in Uzbekistan on the pretext of their

association with terrorists.

Enhanced cooperation with the United States in

anti-terrorism is unlikely to secure integration of these

states in western institutions and transform them into

liberal democracies unless Washington establishes clear

benchmarks for progress and links increases in aid,

especially military assistance, to evidence of movement

toward these goals. For its own part, the U.S Government

would have to make a much larger long-term commitment

to assist these countries, especially in poverty reduction.

Moreover, the June 2002 scare over the possible

contamination of the Khanabad base in Uzbekistan by

nerve gas left behind after the Soviets’ departure showed

30
that greater assistance to the environmental health of

Central Asia also should be viewed as a U.S. security

interest.

Instead of the United States exerting leverage over

Central Asia to move toward democratization, states like

Uzbekistan have proven to be the tougher negotiators, as

the debacle over the opening of Friendship Bridge

demonstrated. The United States had urged Uzbekistan to

open the 1km land link to Afghanistan in an effort to

expedite delivery of humanitarian aid to hundreds of

thousands of refugees living in desperate conditions there.

Uzbekistan demurred for several months, citing security

concerns. Consequently, the coalition had to resort to more

time-consuming methods, such as shipping the supplies by

river barge across the Amu-Darya or even by mule from

Tajikistan. Finally it took a visit by Secretary of State Colin

Powell to Uzbekistan in December, during which he pledged

a long-term commitment to a cooperative relationship with

Uzbekistan. After Powell’s visit, Karimov agreed to reopen

the bridge, closed since 1997, as soon as a last technical

assessment was made.127 Karimov’s hard bargaining also

delayed the initial entry of French troops destined for the

Mazar-e-Sharif base in Afghanistan.128

Although Central Asian leaders have sought out closer

military cooperation with the United States and rebuffed

Russian pressure for greater coordination of anti-terrorism

cooperation within the CIS, public opinion surveys taken in

Central Asia in the fall-winter 2001-2 indicate considerable

popular opposition to the US military presence in the

region. Majorities in three of four countries surveyed by

local polling organizations hired by the United States

government came out against a permanent U.S. military

presence in the region: Azerbaijan (43% opposed, 20% in

favor), Kazakhstan (77% opposed, 8% in favor) and

Kyrgyzstan (72% opposed, 22% in favor). Only in

Uzbekistan does a majority support a permanent U.S.

military presence (61% in favor, 21% opposed).129

31
Similarly, respondents in Kyrgyzstan were split on the

wisdom of their government’s decision to allow the basing of

U.S. fighter planes in their country: 47% supported the

policy, while 49.7% disagreed.130 In Kazakhstan, 86%

supported their government’s decision to refuse basing

rights to U.S. and coalition forces. In Uzbekistan, however,

82.4% of those surveyed supported their government’s

decision to allow U.S. forces to use Khanabad.

Nevertheless, all three Central Asian states are more

comfortable with a greater United Nations role in

peace-keeping in the region than with a U.S. military

presence: 71.2% of respondents in Kazakhstan, 72.3% in

Uzbekistan, and 82.1% in Kyrgyzstan expressed a

preference for the U.N. alone or in cooperation with local

Afghan groups to take charge of peace-keeping duties.

Conversely, 10.6% in Kazakhstan supported a role for the

West in cooperation with the UN, 7.5% in Uzbekistan, and

8.9% in Kyrgyzstan.131

Several factors explain Uzbekistan’s greater receptivity

to U.S. forces in the region. To some extent, public opinion

reflects the preferences expressed in the region’s media.

Uzbekistan’s government-controlled media were largely

supportive of the U.S. military presence and intervention in

Afghanistan, while coverage has been more skeptical in

Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan and negative in Kazakhstan.132

Only Uzbekistan appears to believe U.S. assurances

that it will not maintain a permanent military presence in

Central Asia (54%, with 21% disagreeing) while this pledge

is disputed in Azerbaijan where 50% of respondents believe

that the U.S. military will remain in the region (with 17%

saying the United States will not) and in Kazakhstan (51%

believe U.S. will stay, 35% disagree). Opinion was more

evenly divided in Kyrgyzstan (40% say the United States

will maintain a permanent military presence, 54%

disagree).133 Similarly, Uzbekistan is the only country of

those surveyed with a majority believing that the U.S.

military intervention in Afghanistan was justified (71%,

32
compared to 45% for Kazakhstan, 50% for Kyrgyzstan, and

21% for Azerbaijan) and approving of the military campaign

(79% compared to 20% for Azerbaijan, 39% for Kazakhstan,

and 53% for Kyrgyzstan).134

Although the greater U.S. security interest in fighting

terrorism in Central Asia was a policy departure for

Washington, elites in Kazakhstan, for example, see more

continuity in their security environment. While not

discounting the potential for terrorism in their region, elites

interviewed in Kazakhstan in the immediate aftermath of

9/11 appeared to be more concerned about illegal drug

trafficking (84%) and at least as much concerned about

health and environmental problems (60%) as about the

threat from terrorism (61%) and Islamic extremism

(57%).135

Opposition in some Central Asian states to a U.S.

military presence in the region also reflects their concern

about its impact on the regional balance of power.

Respondents in Kyrgystan are the most wary of a shift in

favor of Uzbekistan. When asked whether Uzbekistan’s

cooperation with the United States in Afghanistan

indicates a U.S. preference for Tashkent, 44.1% said yes and

45.9% said no, compared to 29.7% and 53.8% for

Kazakhstan. In results appearing to confirm regional fears,

a majority of respondents in Uzbekistan interprets the new

cooperation with the United States as a sign of preference

(70.5% yes, 14% no).136

Despite the new cooperative thrust in U.S.-Russian

relations, an underlying rationale for U.S. security interests

in Central Asia has been to prevent Russian domination.

Polling of Central Asian publics reveals an understanding

of this dynamic and opposition to it. When asked how much

trust they have in various countries to address their region’s

problems, they placed the most trust in Russia (92% in

Kyrgyzstan, 80% in Uzbekistan, and 76% in Kazakhstan).

The U.N. came in second (77% in Kyrgyzstan, 74% in

Uzbekistan, and 62% in Kazakhstan), while the United

33
States ranked third (68% in Kyrgyzstan, 74% in

Uzbekistan, and 51% in Kazakhstan).137 According to this

polling research, majorities in these three Central Asian

countries fear that a permanent U.S. presence will weaken

Russian influence in the region (61% in Kyrgyzstan, 43% in

Uzbekistan, and 48% in Kazakhstan) and that this would be

bad for Central Asia (92% in Kyrgyzstan, 64% in

Uzbekistan, and 67% in Kazakhstan).138 This study

concludes that support remains for Russia because its

policies are more familiar and viewed as supporting

stability, while U.S. motives remain less clear.139 Other

public opinion research has shown some discomfort with

U.S. global policies and their potential impact on Central

Asia.140

Thus, U.S. policymakers should be wary of equating the

self-interested cooperation by Central Asian leaders in the

anti-terrorism coalition with public support for a U.S.

military presence. For Central Asian publics, terrorism is

just one of a long list of problems, dominated by concerns

such as drug trafficking, poverty, and public health, while

Central Asian leaders see the political value of overstating a

terrorist threat to bring in the foreign military assistance

needed to maintain their own power and repress political

opponents.

Conclusions and Policy Recommendations.

There is a danger that U.S. policy toward Central Asia

may prove counterproductive: to defend the peace against

terrorism, the United States has ended up cooperating with

the very tyrants responsible for the repression that

increases support for home-grown anti-government and

transnational movements. With greater U.S. involvement

in the region, popular expectations of change will rise, and

should the authoritarian regimes of Central Asia fail to

reform, social explosions may occur in the region,

perpetuating instability and harming U.S. interests.141

While the United States should continue to provide military

34
assistance designed to provide border security and interdict

narcotics and weapons trafficking, strict conditionality

should be applied to ensure that the Central Asian states do

not use American aid to further institutionalize social

repression and instead are obliged to achieve clearly defined

benchmarks in economic and political reform.

The U.S. military should withdraw completely from all

Central Asian bases as soon as hostilities in Afghanistan

end to avoid becoming a target or an inspiration for domestic

anti-government or transnational terrorist movements.

Instead, the U.S. military should focus its efforts on

developing rapid deployment capabilities that could be

located in existing bases in Turkey (Incirlik and Antalya).

While U.S. forces remain in Central Asia, greater resources

should be devoted to civil affairs projects and an effort

should be made to rely as much as possible on local suppliers

for base needs to provide some immediate socio-economic

benefits to host communities.

Coordination in the development of military, economic,

political, and economic assistance will help ensure that the

goals of U.S. aid will be mutually supportive, but

appropriate policies require a more detailed understanding

of the region. In particular, the U.S. military should devote

greater resources to foreign area training for Central Asia

and develop a corps of experts with knowledge of Central

Asian languages and background in Near East and Middle

East studies, as well as CIS affairs.

Although anti-terrorism cooperation has dominated

U.S. security interests in Central Asia since 9/11, over the

long term domestic insurgencies within these states and

inter-state rivalry will pose a greater threat to the region

than transnational terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda.142 To

avoid compounding instability in these states, the United

States needs a regional strategy for Central Asia that

addresses a wide range of potential sources of regional

instability, including conflicts over water resource

35
management, border disputes, refugee issues,

environmental concerns, and drug trafficking.143

In particular, the United States should take care to avoid

singling out Uzbekistan, admittedly a key partner in the

anti-terrorism coalition, but a potential regional hegemon

in Central Asia.144 Since 9/11, the focus of U.S. security

interests has shifted from Kazakhstan, the initial target of

U.S. security aid due to proliferation concerns, to

Uzbekistan, accentuating the rivalry between these two

states and exposing weaker regional states such as

Kyrgyzstan to Uzbek encroachments on its borders in the

name of anti-terrorism activities.

With the successful conclusion of ENDURING

FREEDOM, the United States government faces a choice of

two vastly different policy directions. One would involve a

unilateral strategy, based on self-defense and preemptive

attack against terrorist groups and regimes, while the

second would support continued multilateral collaboration

against transnational threats.145

A unilateral strategy would accentuate public suspicion

of U.S. intentions in Central Asia and erode support in

Russia and China for Washington’s regional anti-terrorism

efforts, potentially resurrecting regional initiatives aimed

at minimizing the United States role in the region.

Multilateral collaboration, on the other hand, would

encourage the Central Asian militaries to work with each

other and within the framework of western military and

political institutions. To this end, intelligence-sharing, PfP

and joint peace-keeping activities should be continued and

greater training for Central Asian military and security

officials should be provided. In deference to regional

sensitivities, the United States should recognize its

outsider status in Central Asia and work within existing

regional structures, such as the 6+2 framework.

One of the key lessons of 9/11 is that despite its

preponderant power, the United States remains vulnerable

to transnational threats and requires the collaboration of

36
other states to combat them. In Central Asia, this will

require a redefinition of U.S. security interests and

development of a regional strategy that would address the

interrelated nature of political, economic, and security

problems in the region.

ENDNOTES

1. Vernon Loeb, “Footprints in Steppes of Central Asia,” The

Washington Post, February 9, 2002, p. A9.

2. Edward Alden, “America Strives to Reshape Military Doctrine,”

Financial Times, June 18, 2002, p. 2. For background see David E.

Sanger, “Bush to Formalize a Defense Policy of Hitting First,” The New

York Times, June 17, 2002, pp. A1, A6.

3. Critics claim that preemption should not give the U.S. carte

blanche—Congress and allies should be consulted; a rationale for

intervention must be presented; the threat must be identified precisely

prior to any preemptive action; and there is no justification for first use

of nuclear weapons. Moreover, should the U.S. adopt a preemptive

doctrine, this may encourage others (for example, India and Pakistan)

to act accordingly. See Editorial, ‘striking First,” The New York Times,

June 23, 2002, p. 12; Editorial, “The Dangers of Jumping the Gun,”

Financial Times (London), June 18, 2002, p. 14. U.S. military doctrine

already is being revised to allow for preemptive strikes against states

threatening to use weapons of mass destruction. Walter Pincus, “U.S.

Nuclear Arms Stance Modified by Policy Study,” The Washington Post,

March 23, 2002, p. A14.

4. Mike Allen and Karen DeYoung, “U.S. Will Strike First at

Enemies; In West Point Speech, President Lays Out Broader U.S.

Policy,” The Washington Post, June 2, 2002, p. A1.

5. Jim Nichol, Central Asia’s New States: Political Developments

and Implications for U.S. Interests, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, May

18, 2001, p. 3; http://cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/international.

6. Ibid., p.9.

7. Ibid., p.8.

8. Strobe Talbott, “The Great Game Is Over,” Financial Times,

Sepember 1, 1997, p. 18.

37
9. Ibid., p. 3.

10. Ibid., p. 9.

11. Frank T. Tsongos, “Central Asia: Official Outlines U.S. Policy,”

RFE/RL, March 18, 1999, http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1999.

12. A National Security Strategy for a New Century, Washington,

DC: The White House, December 1999, released, January 5, 2000,

http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil.

13. Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999, 106th Congress, 1st Session, pp.

1-5, http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/regional/silkroad.html.

14. U.S. Policy in Central Asia, Hearing before the Subcommittee on

the Middle East and South Asia of the Committee on International

Relations, House of Representatives, 107th Congress, First Session,

June 6, 2001, Serial No. 107-21, p. 10, http://commdocs.house.gov/

committees.

15. Testimony by Clifford Bond, Acting Principal Deputy Special

Advisor to the Secretary of State for NIS, in ibid., p. 7.

16. A September 13, 2000, resolution by the House of

Representatives, for example, noted Congressional concern about the

pattern of human rights abuses in Central Asia and called upon these

states to meet their OSCE obligations. Asia and Pacific Subcommittee of

the House International Relations Committee, September 13, 2000,

http://www.lexis-nexis.com. Also U.S. Policy in Central Asia, p. 6.

17. “The State of the Union; Transcript of the President’s Address,”

The Los Angeles Times, Part A, Part I, p. 20.

18. On September 22, 2001, President Bush lifted sanctions

(required by the 1976 Arms Export Control Act) against both India and

Pakistan. Human Rights Watch, Dangerous Dealings, February 2002,

Vol. 14, No.1, p. 4.

19. A. Elizabeth Jones, “U.S.-Central Asian Cooperation,”

Testimony to the Subcomittee on Central Asia and the Caucasus,

Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate, December 13, 2001, p. 9.

20. Dangerous Dealings, p. 5; Tarnoff, p. 8.

21. A National Security Strategy for a New Century, op.cit.

22. Also see U.S. Policy in Central Asia, p. 8.

38
23. Richard N. Haass, Director, Policy Planning Staff, “Defining

U.S. Foreign Policy in a Post-Post-Cold War World,” The 2002 Arthur

Ross Lecture, Remarks to Foreign Policy Association, New York, NY,

April 22, 2002, http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/9632pf.htm.

24. Elizabeth Jones, “Anti-Terror Cooperation a New Foreign Policy

Standard, Jones Says,” Speech to the German Studies Association

annual conference, October 5, 2001, http://www.usinfo.state.gov.

25. “U.S. Statement on Bishkek Conference on Terrorism,”

December 20, 2001, http://usinfo.state.gov.

26. Uzbekistan received 16 military transport vehicles.

Turkemnistan and Kazakhstan later obtained coast guard vessels.

Nichol, p. 8.

27. Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central

Asia, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), p. 111.

28. Stephen J. Blank, U.S. Military Engagement with

Transcaucasia and Central Asia, Strategic Studies Institute, June

2000, p.2.

29. The Marshall Center also works closely with CENTCOM. Ron

Martz, “War on Terrorism: U.S. Allies: Initiative Laid Foundation for

Central Asian Cooperation,” The Atlanta Constitution, January 12,

2002, p. 9A. Central Asian military personnel also attended U.S.

military schools and received in-country training from Special Forces

teams. C. J. Chivers, “A Nation Challenged: Special Forces: Long Before

the War, Green Berets Built Military Ties to Uzbekistan,”The New York

Times, October 25, 2001, p. A1.

30. Kenley Butler, “U.S. Military Cooperation with the Central

Asian States,” September 17, 2001, p. 2, http://www.cns.miis.edu.

31. The 82nd airborne division participated in 1997 and 2000

exercises in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, while the U.S. 10th Mountain

Division joined a 1998 exercise in Uzbekistan. Butler, pp. 1-2.

32. “Command in the News—U.S. Central Command,” February 1,

2002, p. 8, http://www.army.mil./usar/news/2002archives/

January/USCENTCOM.html.

33. Butler, p. 2.

34. Robert Karnio, “Anti-Terror Needs Cancel CENTRASBAT,”

January 23, 2002, http://www.janes.com.

39
35. U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review

Report (QDR), September 30, 2001, p. 2.

36. Ibid., p. 4.

37. Ibid., p. 13.

38. Ibid., p. 9.

39. Ibid., p. 15.

40. Ibid., p. 30.

41. For a discussion of the Rumsfeld review, see Bill Keller, “How to

Fight the Next War,” The New York Times, March 10, 2002; Andrew

Krepinovich, “The Bush Administration’s Call for Defense

Transformation: A Congressional Guide,” May 19, 2001,

http://www.cabaonline.org; Steven Kosiak, Andrew Krepinovich and

Micheal Vickers, “A Strategy for a Long Peace,” January 30, 2001,

http/www.cabaonline.

42. This transformed force will be known as the Objective Force. For

a detailed description see “Concept for the Objective Force,” November

8, 2001, http://www.mil/features/WhitePaper default.htm. The goal is

to deploy a combat-ready brigade anywhere in the world within 96 hours

after liftoff, one war-fighting division on the ground within 120 hours,

and five such divisions within 30 days. “Army Announces Vision for the

Future,” U.S. Army News Release, October 12, 1999; http://

www.dtic.mil/armylink.news.

43. Prepared Remarks General Eric K. Shinseki, Chief of Staff,

United States Army, at the Association of the United States Army

Seminar, November 8, 2001, Washington, DC, U.S. Army News

Release, November 8, 2001, http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/news.

44. Kazakhstan’s defense minister, Colonel-General Mukhtar

Altynbaev, offered the Chimkent airport as a “reserve” option for the

coalition and proposed that Kazakhstan’s rapid deployment unit,

KazBat, join international forces in Afghanistan. Jamestown

Foundation, Fortnight in Review, January 4, 2002, p. 7.

45. Rashid, p. 183. According to U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan

Larry Napper, U.S. and Kazakh leaders discussed allowing

international coalition forces to use an airbase in certain unspecified

emergency situations. RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 6, No. 62, Part I, April 3,

2002, http://www.rferl.org.

40
46. RFE/RL Central Asia Report, September 28, 2001, Vol. 1, No.

10; http://www.rferl.org and Idem, October 11, 2001, Vol. 1, No. 12, in

ibid.

47. Vernon Loeb and Susan B. Glasser,”Tajikistan Allows U.S. to

Assess 3 Air Bases,” The Washington Post, November 3, 2001, p. A3;

Michael R. Gordon with C.J. Chivers, “A Nation Challenged: U.S. May

Gain Use of More Air Bases to Strike Taliban,” The New York Times,

November 5, 2001, p. A1; Michael Blanchfield, “U.S. Exchanges Aid for

Use of Tajik Bases,” Ottawa Citizen, November 5, 2001, p. B1. Japanese

diplomats based in Dushanbe reportedly played a role in convincing the

coalition-government to grant the U.S. basing rights. See Rashid, p.

185.

48. Jamestown Foundation, Fortnight Review, December 14, 2001,

p. 5.

49. Robert J. Caldwell, “The List of Allies Grows in the War against

Terrorism,”The San Diego Union-Tribune, November 11, 2001, p. G-4.

50. President Bush signed a memorandum on April 19, 2002,

approving the deliveries under the Foreign Assistance Act and Arms

Control Act. Jamestown Foundation, Fortnight Review, May 3, 2002, p.

7.

51. Central Asia Report, October 11, 2001, Vol. 1, No. 12,

http://www.rferl.org. According to an October 12, 2001 U.S.-

Uzbekistan joint statement, the two states would “consult on an urgent

basis about appropriate steps to address the situation in the event of a

direct threat to the security or territorial integrity of the Republic of

Uzbekistan.” “Joint Statement between the Government of the United

States of America and the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan,”

October 12, 2001, http://usinfo.state.gov; Eric Schmitt and James Dao,

“U.S. Is Building Up Its Military Bases in Afghan Region,” The New

York Times, January 9, 2002, p. A10.

52. Tamara Makarenko and Daphne Billiouri, “Central Asian

States to Pay the Price of US Strikes,” October 19, 2001, http://www.

janes.com.

53. Tamara Makarenko, “The Changing Dynamics of Central Asian

Terrorism,” January 23, 2002, http://www.janes.com.

54. Fact Sheet on Coalition Partners’ Contributions in War on

Terrorism, U.S. Department of State, February 26, 2002,

http://usinfo.state.gov.

41
55. Press conference with CENTCOM CINC General Tommy

Franks, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, January 24, 2002.

56. Todd S. Purdum, “Uzbekistan’s Leader Doubts Chances for

Afghan Peace,” The New York Times, March 14, 2002, p. A18.

57. Under the agreement Uzbekistan is obligated “to intensify the

democratic transformation of its society politically and economically.”

Dana Milbank, “Uzbekistan Thanked for Role in War; U.S. Tashkent

Sign Cooperation Pact,”The Washington Post, March 13, 2002, p. A23.

58. Interview on Russian televion, cited in Pierre L’Huillery,”RAAF

Off to Battle as Kyrgyzstan Offers Base,” The Daily Telegraph (Sydney),

December 7, 2001, p. 4.

59. RFE/RL Newsline, Vol 6, No. 70, Part I, April 15, 2002;

http://www.rferl.org.

60. Vernon Loeb, “Footprints in Steppes of Central Asia,” The

Washington Post, February 9, 2002, p. A1; Fact Sheet on Coalition

Partners’ Contributions in War on Terrorism, U.S. Department of State,

February 26, 2002, http://usinfo.state.gov.

61. Jamestown Foundation, Fortnight in Review, March 1, 2002, p.

5.

62. Jamestown Foundation, Fortnight in Review, April 19, 2001, pp.

5-6.

63. Cited in Vernon Loeb, “Footprints in Steppes of Central Asia,”

The Washington Post, February 9, 2002, p. A1.

64. Gregory Gleason, “Policy Dimensions of West Afghan Borders

after the Shanghai Accord,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2001, pp.

107-108; 116-25.

65. Andrew Higgins and Charles Hutzler, “China Pursues a Great

Game of Its Own,”The Wall Street Journal, June 14, 2001, pp. A14, A17.

66. RFE/RL Central Asian Report, Vol. 2, No. 23, June 2002, pp. 1-2,

http://www.rferl.org.

67. RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 6, No. 111, Part I, June 14, 2002,

http://www.rferl.org. Uzbekistan later claimed that its withdrawal

was temporary. RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 6, No. 119, Part I., June 26,

2002, http://www.rferl.org.

42
68. RFE/RL Central Asia Report, Vol. 2, No. 22, June 6, 2002, p. 1,

http://www.rferl.org. Although modeled on the OSCE, which also

seeks to commit members to international human rights norms, this

issue is not on the CICA’s agenda.

69. Nazarbayev proposed the idea for the creation of CICA in his

first address to the U.N. General Assembly in 1992. Christopher Pala,

“Nazarbayev Aiming for Peace and Stability,” The St. Petersburg

Times, June 11, 2002, http://www.securities.com.

70. RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 6, No. 104, Part I, June 5, 2002,

http://www.rferl.org.

71. Ibid., p. 2.

72. RFE/RL Newsline Vol. 6, No. 103, Part I, June 4, 2002,

http://www.rferl.org.

73. Roy Allison, ‘structures and Frameworks for Security Policy

Cooperation in Central Asia,” in eds. Roy Allison and Lena Johnson,

Central Asian Security (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution,

2001), p. 225.

74. Michael Vatikiotis, Ben Dolven, and David Murphy, “Terror

Throws Us Together, For Now,” The Far Eastern Economic Review

(FEER), November 21, 2001, pp. 36-39; Susan V. Lawrence, “It Takes

More to make a Revolution,” FEER, February 14, 2002, pp. 26-28.

75. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “The Terror Attack and China’s Deeper

Concerns,” China Brief, Volume 1, Issue 6, September 27, 2001,

http://www.jamestown.org.

76. Jing-dong Yuan, “The War on Terrorism: China’s

Opportunities and Dilemmas,” Nautilus Special Forum, September

26, 2001, http://www.nautilus.org.

77. Bao Erwen, “Chinese Agency Says Bush’s “Axis of Evil” Does

Not Exist,” Xinhua, February 3, 2002, http://www.securities.org.

This statement also cited Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov’s

opposition to the extension of the war on terrorism to Iraq.

78. China also has been urging Central Asian neighbors to help

fight Uighur separatists. BBC Monitoring, June 4, 2002, http://www.

securities.com. On China’s effort to link Uighur separatists to Osama

Bin Laden’s terrorist activities, see “PRC Foreign Ministry

Spokesman Zhu on ‘East Turkestan’ Forces Receiving Support from

Bin Laden,” Beijing Renmin Ribao (internet version), November 16,

43
2001, in Foreign Broadcast International China (henceforth

FBIS-CHI)-2001-1116, http://wnc.fedworld.gov; “Text of PRC State

Council Article on East Turkistan ‘Terrorist Forces’,” Xinhua, January

21, 2002, FBIS-CHI- 2002-0121, http://wnc.fedworld.gov; Chen

Guohua, “Xinjiang Adopts Measures to Crack Down on Splittists,”

Zhongguo Xinwen She, June 23, 2002, http://www.securities.com.

While satisfied with the limited cooperation achieved with China in

anti-terrorism activities, U.S. officials have pointed out that countries

should not interpret anti-terrorism as license to suppress ethnic

minorities.

79. “U.S. Views China as No.1 Rival, Chinese Experts Say,” China

Online News, June 14, 2002, http://www.securities.com. On multilateralism as a solution, see Zhou Shuchun, “11 September Accelerates

Change of World Order, Intensifies U.S. Unilateralism and Russian Tilt

to West,” June 3, 2002, pp. 10-13, http://www.securities.com.

80. Lu Yousheng, “New Developments in the International Security

Situation,” Liaowang, May 13, 2002, No. 20, pp. 58-59 in FBIS-CHI2002-0521, http://www.securities.com; Zheng Li, “Oil Interests Prompt

the US to Exhaust Its Military Options,” Beijing Renmin Ribao

(Guangzhou China News Supplement), April 9, 2002, p. 2 in FBIS-CHI2002-0409, April 9, 2002, http://www.securities.com.

81. Zeng Hu and Che Yuming, “Chinese Foreign Minister Tang

Jiaxun Comments 17 June on Jiang Zemin’s Recent Eurasian Trip,”

Xinhua, June 18, 2002,FBIS-CHI-2002-0618, http://wnc.fedworld.gov.

82. “Presidents Emphasize Regional Security,” Cbnet – China Daily,

May 18, 2002, http://www.securities.com.

83. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, China is providing

$3 million in military assistance to Kazakhstan and $1.2 million to

Kyrygzstan. “Chinese Politics: China Using Separatists to Influence

Central Asia,”STRATFOR, May 29, 2002, http://www.securities.com.

84. “US Presence Prompts China to Get Closer to Russia, Expand

into Central Asia,” Ekspress-K (Almaty), in Russian, April 11, 2002, p. 3,

in BBC Monitoring, April 11, 2002, http://www.securities.com.

85. Office of Research, U.S. Department of State, Opinion Analysis,

“Russia Tops U.S. in Central Asia,” May 31, 2002, M-44-02. p. 3.

86. Vladimir Urban,” “China Getting Ready for the Americans’

Arrival to Cam Ranh,” Novye Izvestiya, June 27, 2002, pp. 1, 5,

http://www.securities.com. On Chinese efforts to improve power

44
projection capabilities in Southeast Asia, see Mark J. Valencia,

“Tension in the South China Sea,” FEER, April 19, 2001, p. 31.

87. Andrew C. Kuchins, ‘summit with Substance: Creating Payoffs

in an Unequal Partnership,” Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace Policy Brief, No. 16, May 2002, p. 2.

88. Central Asian Report, September 20, 2001, Volume 1, Number 9

and October 11, 2001, Volume 1, Number 12, http://www.rferl.org.

89. Vladimir Mukhin, “Fight against Terrorism Raises Political

Issues,” The Russia Journal, September 21, 2001, http://www.

securities.com. Chief of the General Staff Anatolii Kvashin and Foreign

Minister Igor Ivanov issued similar denials. Also see Michael Wines, “To

Free the Way for the U.S., or Not? Either Way, a Fateful Choice for

Russia, The New York Times, September 21, 2001, p. B2.

90. Jamestown Foundation, Fortnight in Review, September 28,

2001, pp. 5-6.

91. Agence France-Presse, September 22, 2001.

92. Taras Kazio, “The U.S.-Russian Strategic Partnership:

Permanent Fixture or Temporary Marriage of Convenience?” Central

Asian Insight, December 4, 2001, http://www.eurasianet.org.

93. On the link between Putin’s anti-terrorism policy and Russia’s

war against Chechnya, see Stephen J. Blank, “Putin’s Twelve-Step

Program,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2001, p. 147.

94. Cited in Rashid, Jihad, p. 193.

95. Jones, “U.S.-Central Asian Cooperation,” p. 12.

96. Gennady Chufrin, Russia and Asia: The Emerging Security

Agenda, (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2000), p. 480.

97. Agence France-Presse, January 9, 2002.

98. Yuri Chernogaev, “srednaya Aziia, kotoruiu my poteriali” (“The

Central Asia that We Have Lost”, Kommersant, January 11, 2002,

http://www.securities.com; Aleksei Nikolaev, “Tema nedeli – Chto

imeem v Sredney Azii?” “Theme of the Week—What’s Happening in

Central Asia?”), Ekspert, December 3, 2001, http://www.securities.com.

99. Michael McFaul, “Putin’s Risky Westward Turn,” The Christian

Science Monitor, November 9, 2001, p. 11.

45
100. Igor Torbakov, “Good Bush-Putin Rapport Can’t Hide

Obstacles to Long-Term US-Russian Cooperation,” Eurasia Insight,

November 19, 2001, http://www.eurasianet.org.

101. Jamestown Foundation, Fortnight in Review, October 12, 2001,

p. 6.

102. Sarah Karush, “Putin Calls for Closer Integration of CIS,” The

St. Petersburg Times, December 4, 2001, http://www.securities.com.

103. In subsequent individual statements Central Asian leaders

noted the U.S. leadership of the anti-terrorism effort. Jamestown

Foundation, Fortnight in Review, May 3, 2002, pp. 6-7.

104. Sergei Blagov, “Russia Pushes for Deeper Post-Soviet

Integration,”AsiaTimesOnline,May16,2002,http://www.securities.com.

105. Agence France-Presse, January 21, 2002; Anna Raef,

“Presidents Get a Grip on Central Asian Gas,” The Moscow Times,

January 22, 2002, http://www.securities.com; “Russian Manoeuvres

over Energy Export Routes to Safeguard Position in Central Asia,”

Panorama (Almaty), January 27, 2002, p. 9.

106. RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 6, No. 107, Part I, June 10, 2002,

http://www.rferl.org.

107. Sergei Blagov, “Russia Boosts Military Ties with Kyrygzstan,”

Asia Times Online, June 15, 2002, http://www.securities.com.

108. Igor Tabakov, “Russia’s Growing Presence in Afghanistan

Hints at Regional Rivalry with Western Powers,” Eurasia Insight,

December 3, 2001, http://www.eurasianet.org.

109. Viktor Kvashnin, the chief of the General Staff, was put in

charge of aid to the Northern Alliance. Glen Howard, “Is Russia

Outmanoeuvering the USA in Afghanistan?” Jane’s Terrorism and

Security Monitor, January 14, 2002, http://www.janes.com.

110. Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Plan for Iraq Is Said to Include Attack on 3

Sides: Preliminary Document Envisions Tens of Thousands of Troops,”

The New York Times, July 5, 2002, p. A1, A6.

111. Charles Fairbanks, “Bases of Debate: America in Central

Asia,” The National Interest, Summer 2002, pp. 45-53.

112. Andrew J. Bacevich, “Steppes to Empire,” The National

Interest, Summer 2002, p.52.

46
113. Svante E. Cornell and Regine A. Spector, “Central Asia: More

than Islamic Extremists,” The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2002, p.

196.

114. Ahmed Rashid, “Trouble Ahead,” FEER, May 9, 2002, p. 18;

RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 6, No. 114, Part I, June 19, 2002,

http://www.rferl.org.

115. Tamara Makarenko, “The Changing Dynamics of Central

Asian Terrorism,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1, 2002,

www.janes.com.

116. Rashid, Jihad, pp. 116-117.

117. Idem, “Trouble Ahead,” p. 18.

118. Idem, Jihad, p. 228.

119. Stephen J. Blank, “The United States and Central Asia,” in

Allison, op.cit., p. 142.

120. Makarenko, op.cit.

121. Matt Schroeder, “War on Terrorism Aid Tables,” Washington,

DC: Federation of American Scientists, May 2002.

122. Edward Epstein, “Bush Foreign Aid Budget Called Way Too

Low,” The San Francisco Chronicle, February 13, 2002, p. A13.

123. Supporters of parliamentary deputy Azimbek Beknazarov

staged marches across Kyrgyzstan to protest against what they viewed

as politically motivated efforts by the Akayev government to deprive the

opposition leader of his seat. See RFE/RL Central Asia Report, Vol. 2,

No. 24, June 20, 2002, http://www.rferl.org.

124. Human Rights Watch World Report 2001, New York, 2002, pp.

370-378.

125. Muhammad Salih, “America’s Shady Ally against Terror,” The

New York Times, March 11, 2002, p. A21. Salih is the exiled leader of the

Erk (Freedom) party of Uzbekistan.

126. Human Rights Watch World Report 2002, p. 377.

127. Robin Wright, “Powell Seeks Deeper U.S. Ties with Central

Asian Nations,” The Los Angeles Times, Part A, p. 30.

47
128. David Stern, “Uzbek Paralysis Slows Aid to a Trickle,”

Financial Times, November 26, 2001, p. 6.

129. “Russia Tops U.S. in Central Asia,” Opinion Analysis, Office of

Research, Department of State, M-44-02, May 31, 2002, p. 5.

130. Information on Central Asian views of their countries’ policies

on basing rights comes from unpublished data gathered for “Russia in

Central Asia” op.cit.

131. Unpublished data from ibid.

132. “Russia Tops U.S. in Central Asia,” p. 1.

133. Ibid., p. 4.

134. Ibid., p. 7.

135. “CIS Elites’ Security Concerns Post-September 11: More than

Just Terrorism,” Office of Research, Department of State, Washington,

DC, M-249-01, December 31, 2001, p. 3.

136. Unpublished data from “Russia Tops U.S. in Central Asia.”

137. “Russia Tops U.S. in Central Asia,” p. 2. Central Asian publics

ranked other regional powers, such as Turkey, Pakistan, China, and

Iran, considerably lower. See p. 3.

138. Ibid., pp. 5-6. For background on the evolution of Central Asian

Views of Central Asia, see Regina Feranda, “Ties That Bind, Opinions

That Divide: How Neighboring Countries Have Viewed Russia,

1991-2001,” Research Report, Office of Research, U.S. Department of

State, May 21, 2001, R-2-01.

139. Ibid., p. 10.

140. “Regard for American Society High in Central Asia,

Azerbaijan; Views More Mixed on U.S. Global Role,” Opinion Analysis,

Office of Research, Department of State, M-46-02, June 11, 2001, p. 1.

141. Jonathan Curiel, “Q&A; Ahmed Rashid; The Toughest Beat in

the World,” The San Francisco Chronicle, Sunday Review, March 3,

2002, p. 2.

142. Michael T. Klare, “Can the Alliance Hold?” Newsday, January

6, 2002, p. B4.

48
143. Martha Brill Olcott, “Preventing New Afghanistans: A

Regional Strategy for Reconstruction,” Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace Policy Brief, No. 11, January 2002, pp. 6-7.

144. Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal, “New Friends, New

Fears in Central Asia,” Foreign Affairs, March-April 2002, p. 61.

145. G. John Ikenberry, “American Grand Strategy in the Age of

Terror,” Survival, Vol. 43, No. 4, Winter 2001-2, p. 28.

49
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Author

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Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

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Composition

Ms. Kimberly A. Rockwell