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i 

94–747 2015

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–36] 

THE RISK OF LOSING MILITARY 

TECHNOLOGY SUPERIORITY AND ITS 

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY, 

STRATEGY, AND POSTURE IN 

THE ASIA–PACIFIC 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 15, 2015 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

THOMAS MACARTHUR, New Jersey 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

PETE AGUILAR, California 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

KARI BINGEN, Professional Staff Member 

MIKE CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

MICHAEL TEHRANI, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, Committee on 

Armed Services ..................................................................................................... 2 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac,’’ a Representative from Texas, Chairman, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Locklear, ADM Samuel J., USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command .............. 6 

Scaparrotti, GEN Curtis M., USA, Commander, United Nations Command, 

Combined Forces Command, and U.S. Forces Korea ........................................ 7 

Wormuth, Hon. Christine, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense .................................................................................................... 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Locklear, ADM Samuel J. ................................................................................ 49 

Scaparrotti, GEN Curtis M. ............................................................................. 81 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ..................................................................... 41 

Wormuth, Hon. Christine ................................................................................ 42 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 103 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 103 

Mr. Scott ............................................................................................................ 103 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

THE RISK OF LOSING MILITARY TECHNOLOGY SUPERIORITY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY, 

STRATEGY, AND POSTURE IN THE ASIA–PACIFIC 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 15, 2015. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ 

Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Let me thank 

our members, witnesses, and guests for being here today. 

Before we start on the topic of today’s hearing, let me just take 

a moment to welcome formally the newest member of the House 

Armed Services Committee. Steve Russell represents Oklahoma’s 

Fifth District. A retired lieutenant colonel in the Army, Steve has 

deployed to Kosovo, Kuwait, Afghanistan, and commanded the 1st 

Battalion’s 22nd Infantry in Tikrit. His unit played a key role in 

the capture of Saddam Hussein. So he has already, in our briefings 

and so forth, made an important contribution to the committee. We 

are very glad to have Steve join our numbers. 

Today, we hold a hearing on the risk of losing military technological superiority and its implications for U.S. policy, strategy, and 

posture in the Asia-Pacific. We probably need to get a little better 

about succinct titles for our hearings, but it does bring together a 

lot of what we have been examining over the past couple, 3 

months. 

And I appreciate the senior-level attention within the Department on the Asia-Pacific region, as well as technological superiority. I realize that there are a number of serious security issues 

around the world all happening at the same time, the reason that 

we have had some people testify that it is unprecedented in our 

country’s history to have so many serious security issues all happening at the same time. But we cannot, either on this committee, 

the Department of Defense, or the country in general, cannot allow 

limited bandwidth to have us ignore what is happening in the AsiaPacific. 

Among the issues that come to the fore, I think, in the region for 

which you all have responsibility is the technological superiority 

issue, which has been a key focus of this committee. We have had 

Under Secretary Kendall, for example, testify about our eroding 
2 

technological superiority, especially in light of some of the key investments that China is making. 

It also brings together some individual unconventional warfare 

tactics. We focused a lot on what Russia has been doing with little 

green men, but it wasn’t that long ago I read a paper about the 

three warfares of China, including psychological, media, and legal 

warfare. They have their own unconventional tactics. 

And of course we have in the region North Korea and its asymmetric attempts both with its cyber, its missile and nuclear programs, just to keep everyone off balance. 

So this region brings together a lot of what we have talked about 

so far this year. And, again, we appreciate everybody being here. 

Mr. Smith is not able to be with us this week, but I would yield 

to the distinguished gentlelady from California, Ms. Sanchez, in his 

place for any comments she would like to make. 

STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, again, to our panel, thank you for being before us. 

Obviously, the Indo-Asia-Pacific arena is an incredibly important 

one to our United States and to security in our world. I am always 

a little amused with the fact that everybody talks about pivoting 

towards that direction. I am a Californian. We have always been 

on the Pacific. 

So, to a large extent we have had the opportunity to look across 

that Pacific and work with the nations and accept a lot of people 

who are originally from those countries to our California. So I 

think that we are well-positioned, in particular, as Californians, 

with respect to understanding and having ties to those regions. 

The collective security of our world is not only one of defense and 

high-tech solutions to some of that, but it is also about culture and 

the economy. And so I believe that we should continue to work in 

the many myriad of ways to—as we look towards that region. 

Maintaining a significant U.S. military capability advantage is 

clearly a top priority for us from a national security perspective. 

And it is entirely appropriate to take a look at the capabilities, especially with high technology that these countries in that region 

are doing. 

Again, we should not presuppose, I think, that there is malice involved when somebody is beefing up their military or working towards higher military capabilities. And we shouldn’t, I think, presume that conflict is inevitable. Rather, we should be geared toward working together in good faith of preservation of our international order. 

And I think that the most significant thing that Congress can do 

to help bolster the U.S. military’s technological edge and to help 

advance strategic objectives in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region is to 

eliminate sequestration. And I am talking not just here in the defense committee, but across the Federal board. As I remember Secretary Gates once said, if we don’t educate our people, if our economy is not good—and I am paraphrasing, I am not saying directly—then we don’t have to worry about our military because it 

is about our economy and about our people. 
3 

So I am looking forward to hearing the testimony today. And, 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit Mr. Smith’s statement for 

the record. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Without objection, it is so ordered. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 41.] 

The CHAIRMAN. And without objection, the witnesses’ complete 

written statements will be made part of the record. 

We are pleased to have with us today the Honorable Christine 

Wormuth, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Admiral Samuel 

Locklear, Commander of U.S. Pacific Command; and General Curtis Scaparrotti, the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea. 

Again, thank you all for being with us. As I said, your complete 

statements will be made part of the record. And we would appreciate you summarizing in your opening comments before we turn 

to questions. 

Ms. Wormuth. 

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTINE WORMUTH, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Secretary WORMUTH. Thank you very much, Chairman Thornberry and distinguished members of the committee, for having us 

here today. We are looking forward to the conversation. And I am 

sending my best wishes to Ranking Member Smith for a speedy recovery. I know he is not enjoying that process. 

The CHAIRMAN. Madam, excuse me. Would you mind getting that 

microphone right in front of you? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Sure. That better? 

The CHAIRMAN. That is better. The only way it works is talking 

right into it. So thank you. 

Secretary WORMUTH. It is a pleasure to be here to talk with you 

about certainly a top priority for Secretary Carter and myself, 

which is our rebalance to Asia-Pacific. 

I am also very pleased to be here alongside Admiral Locklear and 

General Scaparrotti. We work closely together on a lot of different 

issues. They are doing a tremendous job, and the men and women 

who are out there working in Pacific Command and at U.S. Forces 

Korea are really the day-to-day face of our rebalance for a lot of 

countries in the region. So we really appreciate the work that they 

do. 

Both Secretary Carter and I have recently come back from Asia, 

different parts of the region, but I think we both heard in a very 

resounding way a lot of support from the countries out there for 

the rebalance that we have undertaken, and also a lot of desire to 

have even greater U.S. leadership and engagement with the countries that are there. 

In the past 70 years it has obviously been a time of tremendous 

change and opportunity for the Asia-Pacific region. As nations 

there rise and become more prosperous it has created a lot of opportunity. At the same time, the dynamism in the region has also 

created a much more complex security environment in which we 

are now operating. 
4 

In particular, China’s very rapid military modernization, its 

opaque defense budget, the—its actions in space and cyberspace, 

and its behavior in places like the East and South China Seas raise 

a number of serious questions for us. Though China’s expanding interests are a natural part of its rise, it does continue to pursue activities and to make investments that lead many countries in the 

region, including the United States, to have some serious questions 

about its long-term intentions. 

China’s behavior in the maritime domain, I think, in particular, 

has created significant friction for its neighbors. The government’s 

efforts to incrementally advance its claims in the East and South 

China Sea, and its extensive land reclamation activities, particularly the prospect of further militarizing those outposts, are very 

concerning to us. We have urged China to show restraint and to 

refrain from further activities that undermine regional trust. 

We also have continued to urge China to clarify the meaning of 

its ambiguous ‘‘nine-dash line’’ claim as a starting point as a way 

to start reducing tensions and provide greater transparency to 

countries in the region. 

While the United States and China are not allies, we also don’t 

have to be adversaries. I think both of us, both the United States 

and China recognize that a constructive U.S.-China relationship is 

essential for global peace and prosperity. We are therefore not only 

talking to China about actions they undertake that concern us, but 

we are also talking to them and undertaking activities to build 

transparency and to improve understanding, particularly through 

our military-to-military engagement with the PLA [People’s Liberation Army]. 

We also face a number of other challenges, obviously, in the region. Particularly I think of greatest concern to us in DOD [Department of Defense] is North Korea’s dangerous pursuit of ballistic 

missiles and its weapons of mass destruction program. North 

Korea, as you all know, has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to use provocations as a means to achieve its ends. And just 

in the last year, we saw a very significant cyber attack on Sony 

Pictures Entertainment. 

There are also other challenges in the region that are magnified 

by a growing range of nontraditional threats, such as the increased 

flow of foreign fighters both to and from Asia, the trafficking of illegal goods and people, and devastating natural disasters such as the 

cyclone we saw last month in Vanuatu. 

So in response to these shifting dynamics, DOD has consistently 

worked to implement President Obama’s whole-of-government 

strategy towards rebalancing in the Asia-Pacific. One of the most 

important pieces of the administration’s work in the area of the rebalance is to finalize the Trans-Pacific Partnership [TPP]. Our military strength ultimately rests on the foundation of our vibrant and 

growing economy, so we believe strongly that TPP is not just part 

of our economic agenda, but is also a very important part of our 

national security agenda. And I would urge Congress to pass Trade 

Promotion Authority and allow negotiators to conclude this very 

important agreement. 

In DOD, we are really focused in terms of the rebalance on a couple of key lines of effort. First is strengthening our security rela-
5 

tionships with allies and partners in the region. In Japan, for example, we are very close to completing a historic update of the defense guidelines, which really wouldn’t have been possible a decade 

ago. We are also working with the Republic of Korea to develop a 

comprehensive set of alliance capabilities to counter the North Korean threat. And in Australia and the Philippines, last year we 

signed important, groundbreaking posture agreements that will 

give us enhanced access for our forces and also allow us a lot of 

new, combined training opportunities for our partners in Australia 

and the Philippines. 

Our strong friendships in the region also go beyond traditional 

alliances to some of our new relationships, particularly in South 

and Southeast Asia. In addition to our very strong partnership 

with Singapore, where I just visited a couple weeks ago, we also 

are strengthening our relationships with countries like Indonesia, 

Malaysia, and Vietnam. And finally, we are investing, of course, in 

our partnership with ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations], which is really leading the way in terms of trying to build 

a more robust security architecture in the region. 

And lastly, in terms of relationships, the U.S.-India relationship 

is a very important and very exciting partnership. As you all know, 

just this January, President Obama and Prime Minister Modi 

signed a Joint Vision Statement. We also completed the first update in 10 years to our Defense Framework with India, and we concluded four ‘‘pathfinder’’ projects for technology development with 

India under the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative. 

In tandem with our efforts to modernize relationships in the Pacific, the Department is also updating our forward presence. And 

this isn’t just about putting more assets into the region. It is also 

about using those assets in new ways. For example, we have developed a more distributed model for our Marine Corps that is reducing our concentrated presence in Okinawa through relocating marines to Australia, Guam, Hawaii, and mainland Japan. 

The Navy is also working more on its rotational presence concept 

to include being on track to have our goal of having four Littoral 

Combat Ships [LCS] rotating through Singapore by 2017. We have 

had two of our LCS ships go to Singapore already. And the Army 

will be initiating its first rotational deployment of a brigade combat 

team to the Korean Peninsula later this spring. 

Finally, and I think going very much to the issue of the technology concerns that the committee is interested in, we are also 

bringing our best capabilities to the Asia-Pacific region. We are 

making significant investments to sustain our American technological edge into the future in the air, land, sea, and undersea domains. We are investing in precision munitions that will increase 

our ability to strike adversaries from greater standoff distances and 

we are working on new capabilities to allow us to continue to operate freely in space and cyberspace. 

All of these efforts demonstrate the seriousness of our Department’s commitment to protecting U.S. military primacy in the AsiaPacific theater. And our focus on technology is really the impetus 

for our Defense Innovation Initiative, which is a long-term, comprehensive effort to make sure that we enhance our military competitive edge even as we face budget constraints. 
6 

The Department’s rebalance efforts, as well those of our interagency colleagues, are part of a long-term project that reflect, I 

think, the enduring interest the United States has in the AsiaPacific region. We look forward to continuing to work with Congress on the rebalance. And I look forward to questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Wormuth can be found in 

the Appendix on page 42.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Admiral. 

STATEMENT OF ADM SAMUEL J. LOCKLEAR, USN, 

COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND 

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Sanchez, 

and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today with Secretary Wormuth and 

General Scaparrotti, who I work very closely with both of them. Before we begin I would like to ask that my written testimony be submitted for the record. 

For more than 3 years I have had the honor and the privilege 

of leading the exceptional men and women, military and civilian, 

of the United States Pacific Command [USPACOM]. These volunteers are skilled professionals dedicated to defense of our Nation. 

They are serving as superb ambassadors to represent the values 

and strengths that make our Nation what it is: great. I want to go 

on record to formally thank our service members, civilians, and 

their families for their sacrifices. 

USPACOM continues to strengthen alliances and partnerships, 

maintain an assured presence in the region, and demonstrate U.S. 

intent and resolve to safeguard our U.S. national interest. When I 

spoke to you last year I highlighted my concern for several issues 

that could challenge the security environment across the Indo-AsiaPacific. Those challenges included responding to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief events; dealing with an increasingly 

dangerous and unpredictable North Korea, a challenge that General Scaparrotti and I remain aligned in addressing; a continued 

escalation of complex territorial disputes; increasing regional 

transnational threats; and the complexity associated with China’s 

continuous rise. 

In the past years these challenges have not eased. They will not 

go away soon. But the Asia rebalance strategy is and has taken 

hold. It is achieving its intended goals. 

However, the greatest challenge remains the continued physical 

uncertainty resulting from sequestration. If the Budget Control Act 

remains in force, the greatest challenge in the Indo-Asia-Pacific 

will be dealing with the consequences to the security of our national interest as we respond to a rapidly changing world. I echo 

the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the 

service chiefs’ testimony before Congress. Our Nation is being 

forced into a resource-driven national security strategy instead of 

one properly resourced and driven by our enduring national interest. 

In the Indo-Asia-Pacific we are accepting more risk, not less. Sequestration will force harmful reductions in force size, structure, 

and readiness that will reduce my ability to manage crisis space 
7 

and provide options to the President and the Congress, and diminishes United States prestige and credibility in the region and 

around the globe. 

In the last year, at great expense to the readiness of the surge 

forces’ position in the continental United States, USPACOM has 

maintained its forward forces, focused on protecting the homeland, 

deterring aggressors, such as North Korea, strengthening alliances 

and partnerships, and developing the concepts and capabilities required for us to remain dominant in a world that is growing in 

complexity with threats that continually increase against a seemingly unending stream of constraints. 

Without adequate resources, we will be forced to make difficult 

choices today that will have strategic consequences to our future. 

I would like to thank the committee for your continued interest 

and support. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Locklear can be found in the 

Appendix on page 49.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. 

General. 

STATEMENT OF GEN CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, COMBINED FORCES 

COMMAND, AND U.S. FORCES KOREA 

General SCAPARROTTI. Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Sanchez, 

and distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to testify today as the Commander of the United Nations Command, 

Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea, and 

also alongside Admiral Locklear and Under Secretary Wormuth. 

On behalf of the service members, civilians, contractors, and their 

families who serve our great Nation in the Republic of Korea, one 

of our most important allies, thank you for your support. I have 

prepared some brief opening remarks and I thank you for submitting them to the record. 

Last year, I testified that the combined and joint forces of the 

United States and the Republic of Korea were capable and ready 

to deter, and if necessary, respond to North Korean threats and actions. Due to our accomplishments in 2014, I report to you that our 

strong alliance is more capable of addressing the rapidly evolving 

and increasingly asymmetric North Korean threat. 

In recent years, North Korea has aggressively developed and utilized asymmetric capabilities, such as cyber warfare, nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles to advance its interests. To put this in 

perspective over time, in 2012, my predecessor noted North Korea’s 

advancements in cyber and nuclear capabilities during his opening 

statement to this committee. A year later, North Korea conducted 

cyber attacks on South Korea’s banks and broadcasting stations. 

And in 2014, they boldly projected their cyber capabilities against 

Sony Pictures in the United States, in an effort to inflict economic 

damage and suppress free speech. 

This example represents a trend that is persistent across several 

North Korean asymmetric capabilities. My top concern is that we 

will have little to no warning of a North Korean asymmetric provocation, which could start a cycle of action and counteraction, lead-
8 

ing to unintended escalation. This underscores the need for the alliance to maintain a high level of readiness and vigilance. 

Last year, the alliance took significant steps in improving its capabilities and capacities that deter aggression and to reduce its 

operational risk. But our work is not done. In 2015, we will maintain this momentum by focusing on my top priority, sustaining and 

strengthening the alliance, with an emphasis on our combined 

readiness. This includes ensuring the rapid flow of ready forces 

into Korea in the early phases of hostilities and improving our ISR 

[intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] capabilities and 

critical munitions. 

Based on the national security strategies of both our nations, the 

United States will continue to be a steadfast strategic partner to 

South Korea, and South Korea is poised to be a long-lasting and 

important ally to America. Our enduring military partnership in 

South Korea is the preeminent example of bilateral security cooperation and a visible element of American leadership and our 

Nation’s commitment to the Asia-Pacific region. 

The men and women serving on freedom’s frontier, defending the 

Republic of Korea remain thankful for this committee’s unwavering 

support in prioritizing resources that enable us to defend our national interests in Asia, while advancing universal values and 

international order. 

I am extremely proud of our service members, civilians, and their 

families serving in the Republic of Korea, who never lose sight of 

the fact that they are at freedom’s frontier, defending one of our 

most important allies and vital American interests. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Scaparrotti can be found in 

the Appendix on page 81.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

I want to ask, Admiral and General, each of you, about this issue 

of technological superiority. I mentioned Under Secretary Kendall 

has testified that our technological superiority that we have enjoyed for years is eroding, and we have had many other witnesses 

support that. There are a variety of factors that have played into 

it, what we have done to ourselves with budget cuts, a procurement 

process that cannot keep up with changes in technology, the fact 

that some of our competitors have stolen incredible amounts of information from us and benefitted from it. I mean, all of these 

things, and probably others, contribute to it. 

But, each of you are responsible for dealing with the world today 

as we find it and being prepared with plans and contingencies and 

using the forces that we have today. So I would be interested, as 

a combatant commander, as a commander responsible for a key 

area of the world, are you concerned about these trends in technology and our ability to keep up? Are there some areas that concern you more than others given your area of responsibility? And 

are there suggestions you have about how we, the United States, 

could and should adjust to meet these changes? Kind of a broad 

picture of what it is like from your end, as warfighting commanders. 

Admiral. 

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, thank you, sir. 
9 

Over my career, my observation is that when we were dealing 

with the Soviet Union in the Cold War, that we had a concerted 

effort as a military to have that technological edge that really provided a great, a tremendous amount of benefit and allowed us to 

prevail, I think, during that time. 

As we entered the last part of this past century and we started 

efforts in the Middle East, we predominantly were dealing with 

wars and events that—where we had such a large technological superiority, that it didn’t—we had air dominance, we had undersea 

dominance, we had dominance in every area. And that was good, 

I think, and we used that dominance. 

But during that time I think that our priorities for watching 

what the rest of the world was doing as countries came along that 

had the ability and the desire to want to improve their militaries 

and improve their technological capabilities, that we kind of took 

a little bit of a break and didn’t make the types of investments that 

we needed to make. So during that time our relative superiority, 

I think, has declined, and continues to decline. 

Some of the reasons for that I think are because countries have 

more money to spend. There is a greater proliferation of technology. Some of it has been stolen through intellectual property. 

Some of it has been sold around the world in different venues that 

you are all aware of. 

The other thing that makes it challenging for us is our general 

vulnerability. I mean, when it comes to the Asia-Pacific, we are a 

Pacific nation, but we are also an island nation. So we rely very 

heavily on power projection, which means we have to be able to get 

forces forward, to sustain them forward, and we rely heavily on 

systems that several decades ago weren’t even known about or 

thought about too much, and that really exists now in the cyber 

world and the space world, which unveils, if we are not careful, will 

unveil vulnerabilities that we have to pace with technological advancements. 

To the degree of how we address these, what is important for me 

is making sure that the forces we have, number one, can—are dominant. You never want to go into any crisis or even in deterrence 

to try to manage a situation where the force is not dominant. It 

needs to be technologically superior across multiple domains. So if 

you start at the top and you go from space, to cyber, to air, to integrated air and missile defense, to sea, maritime, to subsurface maritime, there is technological challenges as all of the militaries in 

the world get better in these domains, that we must continue to 

pace for us to be able to be relevant in the domains that allow us 

to project U.S. power in defense of U.S. interests. 

Now, in the buildup to this Presidential budget submission, I 

made it clear through a series of processes in the Pentagon, the 

types of key areas where we need to maintain our focus on technological advancement, and I think most of those were adequately— 

accurately—represented in Secretary Kendall’s testimony. And I 

think that if the President’s budget is supported in those areas, 

that it will continue to get at the types of technological advances 

that are critical for us to stay forward and to protect U.S. interests 

in the Asia-Pacific. 
10 

General SCAPARROTTI. Mr. Chairman, I would echo what Admiral 

Locklear had to say, particularly on the peninsula. You discussed 

earlier the asymmetric capabilities that are being developed by 

North Korea. Really, as they develop those asymmetric capabilities, 

they are specifically orienting on what they consider to be some of 

our vulnerabilities, and through their development they are trying 

to close our dominance, basically. And so we have to continue to 

develop our capabilities, to change our posture, our concepts, our 

employment in order to ensure that we maintain dominance. 

The last thing I would say in a peninsula is because we are operating on a peninsula, it is a relatively small theater. Air and naval 

dominance is very important to the agility that I have on the peninsula itself if we have a crisis. So all of those things are things 

that I think about quite often. 

And finally, the specific asymmetric capabilities that I think 

about the most is the ballistic missile capability North Korea possesses and our continued ability to be able to counter that. 

And then finally, on ISR. Many of our adversaries are becoming 

more proficient in determining how to work inside of our capabilities, our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, 

and also how to use deception and other means in order to limit 

that advantage that we have today. 

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me in no area of the world is it more 

true that a loss of technological superiority means increased risk 

to American lives than on the Korean Peninsula. So I think that 

is another way to keep in mind. 

Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you again for your testimonies. 

I represent the largest Vietnamese population outside of Vietnam 

in the world sitting right there in Orange County, California. As 

I said, we have always had our view to what is going out in the 

Asian countries and the Pacific region. And last year, Vietnam and 

the United States agreed to ease its lethal weapons embargo on 

Vietnam in order to improve the maritime security and to address 

the ongoing conflicts in regards to the islands in the East Sea. 

You know, but on the other hand, I have worked enough on the 

Vietnamese issues to understand that Vietnam still is lacking so 

much with respect to its human rights issues. In particular, in 

2000, when I went with President Clinton for the bilateral trade 

agreement, and then later when we took the, took Vietnam off of 

the Countries of Particular Concern list with respect to religious infractions, in order for them to be able to go into the World Trade 

Organization. So we continue to see that things don’t get better 

with respect to the human rights issues, or marginally at times, 

and then worse. 

So can you address for me the roadmap for weapon sales to Vietnam and what types of lethal weapons your—would be precluded 

if Vietnam continues on its road of not changing its human rights 

record. Even with respect, for example, for Human Rights Watch 

and our own State Department. They are consistently marked very, 

very low with respect to human rights. 
11 

So what do you see, or what can we expect from this administration and this Pentagon with respect to weapons sales to Vietnam? 

And are we going to tie any conditions to lifting that embargo? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Congresswoman Sanchez, thank you very 

much for that question. 

We are still in the process now of working with the Department 

of State, our colleagues there, to work through how best to leverage 

the partial lifting of the lethal weapons ban. But certainly a part 

of those consultations is looking at the human rights picture in 

Vietnam. And we are very much, even as we in the Department of 

Defense are very interested in deepening our relationship with 

Vietnam, we also are committed to pushing for greater progress on 

the human rights front. So that is something that we are very 

much taking into account as we look at how best to work with Vietnam. 

I think it is fair to say that, broadly speaking, the kinds of capabilities that we think that would be most useful for Vietnam in 

terms of its security needs are those that are—that would be helpful to them in terms of maritime security, in terms of maritime domain awareness, in terms of helping them strengthen their ability 

to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. 

So those are the kinds of areas that we are focused on with them 

and looking at what kinds of arms might be relevant to that. But 

we are still in the process of figuring out how best to approach specific items they might be interested in. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And, Madam Secretary, we have also seen, obviously, a pretty aggressive stance by China with respect to territorial rights or claimed territorial rights in the East Sea. What 

types of help could we give to Vietnam to ensure its sovereignty 

over the islands that it believes are part of their integral country? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Well, I think, first, as you know, we don’t 

take a position on the territorial claims, but we are very much committed to wanting to see countries in the region work through diplomacy to try to resolve those territorial disputes. So we are focused on encouraging all of the countries to seek peaceful means 

for resolution and to use diplomacy and use available mechanisms. 

At the same time, I think helping countries in the region like 

Vietnam, but other countries as well, strengthen, again, their own 

maritime security capabilities and their own maritime domain 

awareness capabilities is helpful to them in terms of them being 

able to, again, maintain some visibility over their territorial waters, for example. And I don’t know whether Admiral Locklear 

would want to add on that. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And might you also explain to me the timeline or 

how we could work together to ensure that this partial release of 

the weapons ban is not detrimental with respect, in particular, to 

our, I believe what should be, and it is for me at least, a requirement that we see better human rights from Vietnam? What is the 

process in which you are going through to take a look and figure 

out how we will help militarily? 

Secretary WORMUTH. First and foremost, we are working with 

the State Department, again, I think, to try to make sure that we 

have agreement on what are the basic policy parameters for how 

we would approach how best to leverage the partial lifting of the 
12 

ban. We are then in consultations with Vietnam about what their 

needs are. 

So the State Department really has the lead on the—on talking 

with them about human rights and the importance of making 

progress in that area. We reinforce that message. But we have a 

process internal to our government to sort of lay out our basic parameters, and then we have an ongoing dialogue with Vietnam 

about what their needs are. 

And that is a very active dialogue. My Assistant Secretary for 

Asia-Pacific Affairs is actually a former ambassador to Vietnam, so 

we have a very active conversation with them. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

And, I want to—Madam Secretary, I took down some notes, what 

you had said in your prepared remarks, and also what you said 

today: We urge the Chinese, actions that concern us, we bring this 

to the Chinese’s attention. I am one of the individuals in the Congress that for years have been speaking out publicly back in my 

district, the Third District of North Carolina, about the growing 

debt of our Nation because I believe sincerely that that is the biggest threat to our national security, is the growing debt. 

Admiral, that is why we passed the bill—I did not vote for it, to 

be honest about it—the sequestration. 

And then I see we continue to play a shell game with the budget 

and with the American people’s money and find ways to continue 

to pump up the needs for our military. 

I believe in honesty in budgeting. I don’t believe in dishonesty, 

but, anyway, in budgeting. But I am for honesty in budgeting. 

This is my question to you. I have long thought, maybe it is because I was raised in eastern North Carolina, that if you owe someone money and you can’t pay them back, they just don’t have the 

same respect for you. And I look at the fact that President Bush 

raised the debt ceiling 7 out of 8 years that he was the President. 

Mr. Obama has raised the debt ceiling 7 out of 6 years that he has 

been the President. And you know, when we raise the debt ceiling 

what we are saying to the world is we can’t pay our bills; that we 

have to sell our financial instruments and somehow finance our 

debt. Okay. 

The Chinese buy a lot of our debt. So I really would like to know, 

when our representatives of our government, whether it be military 

or non-military, are sitting there facing the Chinese, if it is a respect, because we continue to have to borrow money from the Chinese to pay our bills. And they see all of the news articles of how 

we are spending billions and billions in Afghanistan, that much of 

it, according to John Sopko, is wasted. And yet, we are taking the 

billions and billions that we are spending overseas that is wasted, 

taken away from rebuild—from building our military, which needs 

to be rebuilt. 

And I get to a point that I just don’t understand an administration—and I would say this if it was a Republican administration— 

how in the world can we continue to play this game of spending, 

spending, spending, and borrow, borrow, borrow, and then we think 
13 

we have got equal placement to talk to the Chinese about we are 

concerned about this and we urge you to do that. Do they really 

listen to us? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, I certainly agree that, as I 

said in my opening remarks, the foundation of our vitality as a 

country is a strong economy, and that underpins our ability to have 

a strong military. And, again, I think that is one of the reasons 

why we in the Defense Department have been expressing our support for important agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 

for example. 

I think China, again, you know we have a very independent global—interdependent global economy at this point, and we are very 

important customers for China, as are many other countries 

around the world. So I think having a robust and growing economy 

in the United States is important and the Chinese see the value 

of that for them. We have—and I also think they recognize very 

much that even as they modernize their military, the United States 

military remains the premier military force in the world. 

And then, in addition to our very strong technological track 

record, we also have an operational track record that is unmatched. 

I mean, our military’s combat experience is unmatched by almost 

any country in the world, and it has been honed over the last more 

than 10 years. And I think China very much respects that as we, 

as we talk to them about our concerns. 

Mr. JONES. Well, I also found it very interesting that you mentioned Trade Promotion Authority in your comments. There are 

many of us who believe sincerely that any President, Democrat or 

Republican, if you give them Trade Promotion Authority, then you 

are damaging our constitutional ability to maintain fairness in 

trade, so. 

But thank you for your testimony. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank our witnesses for your testimony today. In particular, Admiral Locklear, I want to thank you for your leadership 

at PACOM [Pacific Command] for the last 3 years. I thank you for 

your service and I wish you all the best of luck in your future endeavors. 

If I could start with you, Admiral. You mentioned China’s aggressive shipbuilding program in addition to their significant advances 

in electronic warfare capabilities, Admiral. How do our forces in 

PACOM compare in those aspects? And where do you believe improvements need to be made, besides continued and sustained investment in the U.S. nuclear submarine force, as you mentioned? 

I am particularly concerned and interested. I think that the Chinese at this point are—have confidence that they could potentially 

turn the lights off on our use of cyber capabilities on our fleet and 

our ability to respond, both figuratively and literally. 

So I want to know where you—what your views are and how we 

stand. 

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, thank you, sir. It is my assessment 

that we remain the most dominant military power in the world 

from all aspects. And I think that there is hardly a country—there 
14 

is not a country in the world that would disagree with that today, 

even though I think they would recognize that the relative parity 

of our relative gap between how good we are versus how some of 

the other forces may be developing is shrinking. 

In the case of the maritime forces that you have talked about 

with the PRC [People’s Republic of China], they are on an aggressive strategy, an aggressive shipbuilding campaign. They seem to 

have limited restrictions on how fast they can produce systems, 

how fast they can produce ships, submarines. And they are producing what I would consider to be pretty good ships and submarines. 

But I still believe that we remain and we have the best ships. 

We have clearly the best ships, the best submarines, the best aircraft carriers, and the best people running them in the world. So 

I am generally pretty good in that case. 

But when it comes to dealing day to day in the Asia-Pacific, what 

I require, first of all, we have a forward-deployed force that operates with our host nations—Japan, Korea—operates extensively in 

that region. And that force needs to be ready, because it is not only 

ready for day to day to maintaining the deterrent oversight security of the region, but it is also critical to ensure that we are prepared for a quick reaction if we have to do something in North 

Korea. 

So those forces need to be ready. They need to be the best that 

we have. They need to be of the highest technical capability that 

we have. And to the degree that we can get host—continue to get 

good host nation support, which I think we have today, we need to 

pursue that. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. But I want to speak specifically to electronic warfare capabilities if you could, Admiral. 

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Yeah. In the electronic warfare arena, I 

think that we are, because we have operated in environments, as 

I have said in earlier statements, around the globe that—where we 

have limited denied area through electronic means, I think our 

electronic warfare capability has diminished, has not kept pace 

with where we need to be in the future. And we are taking some 

steps to take a harder look at how we get at electronic warfare. 

Of course, as you talk about electronic warfare then it starts to 

get into the whole cyber issues, which are now being—we are working hard to try to determine how we best defend our cyber assets, 

how we organize ourselves to do that, how we train a workforce to 

be able to do that. And that is all part of the President’s budget 

that has come forward that gets at those particular issues. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Good. Well, I share your concern there, Admiral. 

With regards to North Korea, both you and General Scaparrotti 

mentioned in your testimonies that their cyber actors continue to 

conduct cyber actions against South Korean military and civilian 

networks. How confident are you that this isn’t happening to our 

U.S. Forces Korea infrastructure as well? And additionally, how 

are we defending ourselves, as you mentioned in your testimony, 

China generating insights into our U.S. security policies, defense 

networks, logistics and military capabilities through their cyber 

program? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Thank you. 
15 

In regards to Korea and the threat from North Korea, I am confident of our ability to defend our military networks. We work very 

closely with the Republic of Korea, our partners and allies, to ensure that, because we have a combined command and control system, that we close any vulnerabilities there. And we have been 

working in the past year very hard to develop our cyber capabilities 

as a team. 

However, you know, that is an ongoing challenge that we have 

to stay on top of. North Korea is getting better every day. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Madam Secretary, General, Admiral, thank you so much for your 

service to our country. Thank you for being here today. 

We have had a couple of milestones in the last few weeks. One, 

the Japanese have now exceeded the number of planes they have 

had to scramble against Chinese and Russian planes since the Cold 

War, as I understand it. We also had the Office of Naval Intelligence print this report, first time they have done it since 2009, 

talking about a compelling concern about Chinese activity in the 

disputed waters off the East and South China Sea. 

I also concur with your comments about sequestration as it relates to national defense, although I really question anyone on this 

committee or the administration that would suggest that we 

shouldn’t remove defense sequestration unless we can also give the 

EPA [Environmental Protection Agency], the IRS [Internal Revenue Service], and the GSA [General Services Administration] all 

the money they want or unless we can quench the thirst of every 

other agency that drinks from every Federal trough. To hold defense sequestration hostage against that would be unconscionable. 

My concern today as we talked about it, Admiral Locklear, in 

this committee, we talked about the high-end technological superiority. But I am also concerned about what we are seeing happen 

at the lower end. You mentioned, I think correctly, China launched 

more naval ships than any other country in 2013 and 2014, and 

they expect the same for 2014 and 2015. But I am also concerned 

about what they are doing with their Coast Guard. They now have 

95 large cutters, 110 small cutters. That is a total of 205. That is 

68 ships less than the entire U.S. Navy, and they have more ships 

in their Coast Guard than Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, 

and Singapore have combined. 

We don’t always rate those as naval ships, but you have seen 

this picture, I am sure. This picture is of a Chinese Coast Guard 

vessel. They have labeled on here Tugboat number 25. It is painted 

white. This is one of their amphibious naval ships. It is number 

908. It is painted gray. Other than being painted gray and the 

number on there, there is virtually no difference, I don’t think, between these two ships. And that is something that is really concerning me, because we don’t always measure those. 

[The pictures referred to were not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FORBES. So my question for you today is not the high-end 

technological superiority, but when we are seeing Iranians in 

Yemen, we are seeing Russians in the Ukraine, we are seeing Chi-
16 

nese on the Senkakus and the artificial islands they are building 

up, what strategies, concepts, forces, and capabilities do you think 

we need to counter this kind of gray-zone aggression we are seeing 

in Asia? 

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, thank you, sir. Your—the two pictures 

you showed I think were accurate, the way I understand it. The 

Chinese are engaging in a comprehensive military modernization 

program that wants to transform not only the PLA into a high-end 

kind of network-centric military capable of large-scale operations— 

we have talked about that—but they are also working on the lower 

end to ensure that they have a maritime security force, which we 

would equate to a Coast Guard or a fisheries patrol, that by numbers, you add up all their numbers and everybody else’s in Asia, 

in that category they exceed everybody else’s put together. 

And I think that they went down that path after they saw what 

was happening in the Senkakus. They took some of the gray hulls, 

and we observed them, shipped those over to be what they would 

call noncombatants or maritime patrol ships by maybe just changing the color of them. 

They show no slowdown in the pace of their military modernization, particularly in their Navy, even though their economy has 

dropped a little bit. They are still on about a 10 percent increase 

in 2014; 2015, it will be a little bit more. That is the fifth straight 

year we have seen them do double-digit increases. 

Of course, their military is, on the high end prepares for issues 

around Taiwan and what they would call their near seas. Their 

maritime security are put in a position to be able to gain influence, 

particularly in the South China Sea and in the East China Sea, to 

further their, what they consider their national interests there. 

Now, they are doing this in combination with what we have seen 

to be a fairly massive land reclamation in the Spratly Islands and 

upgrades to facilities in the Paracel Islands, which are the two regions in the South China Sea. 

Now, the implications of that for us are that it provides an ability for them to deploy more of these lower-end ships down there, 

provides ability to base them down there, to resupply them. It allows them to exert basically greater influence over what is now a 

contested area. Its expanded land features down there also could 

eventually lead to the deployment of things such as long-range radars, military and advanced missile systems, and it might be a 

platform for them if they ever wanted to establish an air defense, 

an ADIZ [Air Defense Identification Zone], an air defense zone 

down there for them to be able to enforce that from. 

Up to this point in time, the nations around them, the Southeast 

Asian claimants have really had little success in formulating an effective response to the PRC actions down there. None of their efforts have slowed the PRC in the South China Sea. And they recognize that stopping the PRC would require a change in the strategic 

environment down there. 

So what are the types of things that we need to do down there? 

First, the forces we need to stay forward. We need to have the 

types of intelligence and search, ISR assets that allow us to maintain our knowledge of what is going on. These are globally stressed 

because of the things that we are doing in Afghanistan and in Iraq 
17 

and in Yemen, and those—many of those assets are similar in type 

to ones we would use in that arena. So we need to ensure that we 

can sense and see what is going on because it allows me to optimally use the forces that we have. 

Mr. FORBES. Admiral, my time has expired, but would you mind 

submitting that to us for the record? It is important that we have 

it as a committee. 

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Absolutely, sir. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 103.] 

Mr. FORBES. And I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I appreciate it. 

Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Wormuth and Admiral Locklear and General Scaparrotti, I want to thank you for coming today. 

And as the representative from Guam, I appreciate, Mr. Chairman, your calling the committee together, for taking time to further examine our posture in the Asia-Pacific region. 

Admiral Locklear, I have a question for you. As the ranking 

member of the Readiness Subcommittee, I would like to focus on 

training capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region. Our Marines in Okinawa have degraded training capabilities, and the Army and the 

Air Force have significant degradation of training capabilities elsewhere in the region. 

Can you comment on how the Department is looking at improving these capabilities? We are moving forward with a live-fire 

training range on Guam, but what about larger training exercises 

and the need for improving training capabilities in the Northern 

Marianas Islands? I think that the committee has questions about 

the cost, and I understand PACOM has a handle on many of these 

matters. So could you answer that for me? 

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, thanks for the question. 

It is clear that for us to be as far forward as we are, that we 

need to have adequate facilities to be able to train and keep our 

forces ready at the high end. So it requires, I think, a multipronged 

strategy. One is, you mentioned first, is your home, is in Guam, is 

ensuring that the Guam plan that we have for the relocation of the 

Marines there stays on track, and we really appreciate the support 

of this committee in doing that as we go forward. And it is on 

track. 

As we look at the entire Guam complex and bringing those Marines there, we envision, with the support of the Marianas Islands, 

the Northern Marianas Islands’ governments up there to be able to 

put in place a range up there that allows not only us to keep our 

marines that are there ready, but also could bring other nations 

into play in that strategic part of the world for us to be able to 

learn together and train together and maximize the opportunity for 

interoperability between our militaries. 

It is also very important that in Alaska, that we get the range 

systems in Alaska correct and we maintain those, because that is 

where we get much of our high-end training, in those ranges in 

Alaska. 
18 

As you know, we are also working very closely with our allies in 

Australia, and in Northern Australia for having access to those 

really magnificent, broad ranges that are there so that we can 

work together with them. 

So I think that we have a good plan if we can bring it all together. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Admiral, I have another question for you. Can you comment on 

the progress of the U.S.-Japan defense guidelines, and what do you 

envision occurring to implement these guidelines in the near term? 

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, the guidelines process is ongoing, and 

we anticipate that later this year that the guidelines will be completed and signed. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I was going to ask, yes, the Secretary as well. 

Admiral LOCKLEAR. And what we—the real key to the guidelines 

is making sure that, first of all, that we militarily, both countries 

recognize the importance the alliance. This is one of the most important alliances in the world, for not only Japan, but for the 

United States, but also for the region, and ensuring that we get 

this right and that we are able to go forward in a military way that 

provides the peace and security and prosperity for the region for 

both countries is important. And it starts to get at more specifics 

of how we are going to do that. And it also forces, I think in this 

case, or encourages the Japanese to kind of look at how they view 

the alliance and how they are going to participate as we go forward. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. 

Madam Secretary. 

Secretary WORMUTH. Just to add on that, I think we anticipate 

finishing up the defense guidelines right around the time that 

Prime Minister Abe comes to Washington later this month. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good. 

Secretary WORMUTH. And a couple of things I think that are 

really notable and important about the defense guidelines are, first 

of all, that there will be a whole section that really speaks to the 

collective self-defense vision that Japan has for the role of its SelfDefense Forces. But it also will have a new alliance coordination 

mechanism which will again further our ability to work with 

Japan, to help Japan with its security needs, but also to look at 

our security needs. 

There will be a section on peacetime cooperation in the areas of 

ISR, maritime domain awareness, missile defense. We will also 

have a whole section that looks at international activities, as well 

as additional cooperation in space and cyber. 

So I think it will be, you know, a really important document to 

bring the alliance to the next level. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, I have just one quick question. 

Admiral Locklear, what will be the impact of our rebalance strategy if sequestration remains in place? 

Admiral LOCKLEAR. If it remains in place, in general, in short, 

you will have less force, that are less ready, that are less technologically capable in an increasingly technological environment. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much. 
19 

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES [presiding]. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

The chair recognizes the distinguished gentleman from South 

Carolina, Mr. Wilson, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank each of you for being here today. 

I just really have been impressed, Ms. Wormuth, your comments. 

And, Admiral, I am just grateful that I have a son who is currently serving in the Navy, and I have got three in the Army. 

And my visits, General, to the DMZ [demilitarized zone], again, 

such extraordinary people that you serve with, and making such a 

difference, indeed, for the Republic of Korea and their protection. 

And that is why, as I am thinking about the cyber offensive of 

North Korea, General, how is that being countered, and, with the 

efforts that they have made to disrupt the banks of South Korea 

and other activities? How is this being addressed? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, sir, I think, first of all, we are working very closely with our allies as a multinational community in 

this regard. And we have a very good cyber capability in the 

United States that is growing as well. This is a domain that we 

don’t necessarily have superiority in. I think there is a lot—there 

is a lot of simultaneity out there in this domain. 

So we are working very hard. I think we stayed ahead of it well, 

but it will take that kind of effort and resourcing in order to continue to develop our capability. That is about what I would say 

here. It is difficult to get into that much without, you know, in an 

open hearing. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, again, we just appreciate your efforts so 

much. 

Additionally, Ms. Wormuth, I am really grateful to be the chairman of the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee. The 

unconventional warfare tactics are a great concern to the entire 

committee and to myself. 

Could you please characterize your assessment of the unconventional strategy and tactics being used by China and the challenge 

these pose to the DOD’s ability to counter them? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Thank you, Congressman. 

I think, as Congressman Forbes talked about in terms of the 

Coast Guard capabilities, for example, or the maritime law enforcement capabilities that China has, China has been—China uses 

those assets to assert, to try to assert additional control over what 

it sees as its territorial claims. And I think that is a way where 

they are sort of using assets in an unconventional way. 

We are really focused, I think, on the building partner capacity 

side in trying to help partners in the region. Some of the smaller 

countries in Southeast Asia, for example, work on their own maritime security capabilities to try to counter that kind of unconventional use of assets. 

We also, though, are looking at, on the more technology side, we 

are looking at certainly our intelligence capabilities and are trying 

to strengthen our information operation capabilities, for example. 

And those capabilities are relevant, obviously, not just in the AsiaPacific theater, but in many theaters around the world. I think, 

you know, we have seen a considerable use of unconventional tech-
20 

niques in Europe recently, given Russia’s activities in Ukraine, for 

example. 

Mr. WILSON. And certainly that is to me such a tragedy, the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation. I know that I had 

just so hoped for a modern European-inclined Russian Federation 

and that doesn’t seem to be developing. 

Additionally, I am very concerned about North Korea’s nuclear 

weapons policy. And, Ms. Wormuth, what does North Korea, the regime, what is their, what do you see as their capability of enhancing nuclear weapons delivery capabilities? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Well, Congressman, we are certainly concerned, obviously, about North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction capability, and its nuclear program in particular. You know, 

we—North Korea has not tested some of its capabilities, and we 

don’t yet fully know what they are able to do in terms of their ability to miniaturize, for example, a nuclear weapon. But it is our assessment that it is prudent to plan for the worst-case scenario, 

which is why we are so focused on our national missile defense program, for example, and why we have made the investments to expand the number of Ground-Based Interceptors from 30 to 44, to 

try to make sure that we are keeping track with that, with that 

threat. 

I think fundamentally the North Korean regime believes that 

having a nuclear capability under—basically guarantees their regime survival, which is why they see it as so important. I would 

ask, I think, General Scaparrotti to elaborate. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman’s time has expired, so would ask the 

General if he could do that for the record. 

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. FORBES. And the chair recognizes Ms. Gabbard from Hawaii 

for 5 minutes. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I will continue along the same topic here, and I think it is important for us to recognize that North Korea remains the most immediate military threat, not to only our interests within the region, 

but really to the U.S. directly, and important for us to focus on this 

immediate threat, especially within the context of the greater conversation that is taking place now and seeing how we can prevent 

Iran from getting to the point of having this nuclear capability. 

General Scaparrotti, I am wondering if you can speak to Mr. Wilson’s question, but also specifically to the status of ballistic missile 

defense policy within the region and the level of cooperation that 

you are getting from our partners there, within the Republic of 

Korea and Japan specifically. 

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, thank you. 

First of all, to the North Korean nuclear capability, I would state 

it this way, that they claim to have a capability to deliver a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile. They have paraded it, they have 

shown it to us. But they haven’t tested it, as the Under Secretary 

mentioned, and that is very important in something that is as complex as this. But as a commander, I have to be prudent and assume 

that they can deliver one and act on that basis. 
21 

Secondly, in terms of ballistic missile defense, we bring our best 

systems to the peninsula. We work very closely with the Republic 

of Korea. This year, just this funding year, they committed in the 

last couple of months to upgrade their PAC–2 systems to PAC–3, 

and they will be doing that over the next couple of years, And we 

are working closely with them over the next year or so to increase 

our interoperability and the ability to have a common operating 

picture. 

So I think we are moving in the right direction, given the threat. 

We have to keep pace with that, we have to continue to keep our 

focus on that. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

Admiral Locklear, in your written statement you stated that currently there are roughly 1,300 ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and 

Syria] foreign fighters who are coming from the Indo-Asia-Pacific 

region. Can you speak to specifically which countries predominantly they are coming from? What is drawing them to ISIS specifically? And how do you characterize the threat of these foreign 

fighters coming back and returning to their home countries in the 

region and continuing these activities there? 

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, thank you, Congresswoman. 

We are working closely with our fellow COCOM [combatant command] in CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] to actually have a, 

try to get a better sense of this phenomenon of foreign fighters that 

would be moving out of predominantly Asia, Southeast Asia. 

They come from a broad range of countries. It wouldn’t—you 

know if you took a look at the list, it would surprise you, it 

wouldn’t be what you thought. They come from a number of different places. We are not sure how many of them are dedicated 

fighters that go forward or are they just kind of wannabes that 

kind of trundle over there and decide they want to sign up for a 

new cause. 

And the numbers that are coming back, we don’t have good fidelity on that at this point in time. But what it has done, it has 

opened up our information-sharing with all the countries in the region that are concerned about this problem, which all of them are. 

And this isn’t just a mil to mil [military to military], this is a whole 

of government, agency, FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], 

those types of agencies are working hard on the problem. 

So the implications for Asia, in this, is if you just kind of just 

add up the number of Islam that is in Asia, it greatly overwhelms 

the number that are in the Middle East. So there is probably 400 

million-plus, I would just say, just kind of making an estimate off 

it. 

Now, the difference is that they are generally moderate and they 

are less, I think, susceptible to violent extremism. And they have 

good governments, most of them do. They have better security environments that can monitor what is going on in the countries. So 

I think these are advantages that the Asia-Pacific has that might 

not be available in all countries in the Middle East. 

So what we have is an opportunity here. We have an opportunity 

to assist them, to assist each other, to improve our informationsharing networks to see where this type is going, and then to be 
22 

more predictable rather than reactive should it occur in the theater, and we are making good inroads in that. 

Ms. GABBARD. Do the governments of some of these countries recognize this threat? And are they reaching out to work with us in 

partnership to make sure that it doesn’t grow? 

Mr. FORBES. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. So, Admiral, if you could answer that for the record, 

we would appreciate it. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 103.] 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Rogers, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Scaparrotti, I know that we are in discussions with 

South Korea’s government about the deployment of a THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] battery on the peninsula. Can 

you tell us why that would be important for the protection of our 

deployed forces in South Korea to have put on that peninsula? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, the employment of a THAAD would 

give us a high-tier defense. And so, therefore rather—we would 

have a layered defense and those systems would enhance the capability of our present Patriot systems that are on the peninsula 

today. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. 

Admiral, how many Chinese land-based cruise and ballistic missiles are located in your area of responsibility? And can you give 

me an estimate in the dozens or hundreds to keep it unclassified? 

And how many of these are between 500 and 5,500 kilometers in 

range? 

Admiral LOCKLEAR. If you let me take that for the record, I 

would, and I will provide you a complete answer. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 103.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. 

Ms. Wormuth, when will the administration make a decision on 

INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty] violation responses? And has the Principals Committee even met on this issue? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, we are again, I think, at this 

point in time of the view that it would be beneficial to remain in 

the INF Treaty if possible if Russia comes back into compliance, 

and we continue to have conversations with Russia about that. 

There will come a point in time where, if Russia continues to be 

noncompliant, I think we will have to take action to deal with the 

military capabilities that they are potentially putting in place that 

are not compliant with the treaty. This is something that is discussed at very senior levels. You know, there are any number of 

Principals Committee meetings where this type of conversation 

may come up. 

Mr. ROGERS. They have been noncompliant for years. How much 

longer is this going to go on? 

Secretary WORMUTH. I think, Congressman, again, this is something that we are looking at very carefully. I think, you know, our 

view is it would be beneficial to keep them in the treaty if possible. 
23 

So we have not yet made that decision, but we recognize that we 

cannot let the current situation go on for an indeterminate period. 

Mr. ROGERS. Yeah, in order to keep them into compliance, we 

have to get them in compliance, and they haven’t been for years 

and they are not going to be. I hope that you all will start talking 

more seriously about some consequences. 

Admiral, with China increasing its capability in nuclear attack 

submarines, ballistic missile submarines, and even aircraft carriers, how do those developments and deployments affect U.S. force 

structure and planning? 

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, certainly any increase of military forces 

by the PRC require us to think through: Are the forces we have 

adequate to be able to understand what is going on day to day? 

In the case of their SSBN [ballistic missile nuclear submarine] 

forces, it becomes a homeland security, homeland defense issue, 

that will require resources for us to try to understand it and try 

to ensure that our country remains safe under all scenarios. 

In the case of aircraft carriers, I believe primarily they will use 

aircraft carriers for—just like we do, to project power. That is one 

of the deficiencies I think they are trying to overcome now, is the 

projection of power, and that may have, down the road could have 

global implications, and it will just put further stress on the ISR 

assets we have and it will change the calculus on how we might 

deal with any contingencies down the road. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you believe that the U.S. Government should be 

making it a priority to ensure that China is not able to obtain U.S. 

technology in our defense capabilities? 

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I do. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

That is all I have got, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman yields back. 

The gentleman from Hawaii, Mr. Takai, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. TAKAI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you also for focusing today’s hearing on the Asia-Pacific as you know, that is very 

important for people from Hawaii. 

I wanted to welcome our witnesses. Under Secretary, Admiral, 

and General, thank you very much for coming. 

Admiral Locklear, it is my understanding that the Pacific Fleet 

and the Atlantic Fleet are funded through separate budget offices. 

Can you speak to what advantages that has and how it supports 

the geographical combatant commander? 

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, I would refer specific questions of that 

back to the Navy, because it is their internal workings. But my observation, it is of a historical nature. It was put that way because 

of the way that our fleets are laid down globally, and the significant influence that the Pacific Fleet has in the power projection of 

U.S. interest into what is over half the world. And I believe that 

there have been historic benefits to having that divide be there. 

Mr. TAKAI. Great. I appreciate that answer. 

And then are there any efforts underway to expand the use of 

training areas in the Pacific to support engagements of our regional 

partners and allies and more broadly connect ranges throughout 

the AOR [area of responsibility]? And can you speak specifically to 
24 

the Pohakuloa Training Area on the Big Island and the Pacific Missile Range on Kauai, some of the infrastructure needs there, and 

more importantly, how resources are being allocated to support upgrades at training ranges in the PACOM AOR? 

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Thank you. 

As I previously laid out, you know we have a series of ranges 

that we need to support our forward forces. During that dialogue 

I did not mention Hawaii and I should have because that is where 

I live and where I breathe and where we have tremendous requirements. 

So in the case of the ranges on the Big Island, I am a supporter 

of moving forward with those ranges. We are in need of those if we 

intend to maintain a forward footprint of Marines and Army personnel in Hawaii, which I very fully support a robust presence 

there. 

The PMRF [Pacific Missile Range Facility] missile facility or missile range out there is a premier facility in the world as far as I 

am concerned, and that the investments will need to be made to 

keep it such. It has access to open space and open airways and 

open sea space that allow us to do, from Missile Defense Agency 

to all the other services, to be able do the right testing and evaluation of those systems that allow us to be relevant in the 21st century. 

Mr. TAKAI. Thank you. 

And, you know, this last question is something very important 

for people, especially on Oahu, and it is in regards to our groundwater supply. 

So it is my understanding that recently meetings were conducted 

between PACOM and the DLA [Defense Logistics Agency] Energy 

regarding the Red Hill underground fuel facility. And though we 

know that fuel storage is necessary and important to support strategy and posture of your AOR, what is the plan to upgrade the 

aging infrastructure to ensure that communities that surround Red 

Hill, in addition the Halawa Aquifer that supplies about half the 

island with their water, are safe from contamination of, are safe regarding the water supply? 

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Yes, sir. This is a high priority for me because we very much respect the opportunity to be in Hawaii and 

to have these facilities there. 

The need for fuel—I mean, the PACOM commander and the 

forces that are under me, I think, are the largest user of petroleum 

products probably in the world on any given day, and they have to 

be distributed throughout a vast area on only a very small number 

of nodes to be able to get at it. 

And, historically, the Red Hill facility has provided a huge strategic reserve in case something happens out here. And I anticipate 

we are going to need that strategic reserve for a number of decades. I can’t put an end state on it, but it will be a number of decades before we have visibility on how we might address that with 

different types of fuels or different types of forces. 

So what we have done is, once we discovered that there was a 

potential leak in a couple of the tanks, we took immediate action 

to ensure there wasn’t any damage to the water systems, and we 

have a comprehensive plan that both DLA and my staff have 
25 

brought back to the legislature in Hawaii. I am happy to have 

somebody come brief you on that if you desire. 

But I think at this point in time we are in general agreement on 

the way forward that it is a good sound plan and it does what you 

indicated, it protects the environment of such a beautiful State. 

Mr. TAKAI. Thank you. 

And, thank you Mr. Speaker. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman yields back the balance of his time. 

The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Wormuth, my question is for the admiral and general, but 

I would like to say I am interested in any language suggestions 

that would cut this ridiculous appeals process that I think is one 

of the problems with us fielding the equipment. And some of these 

games that get played, if you will, from the people who are purchasing the equipment from—that slow down our ability to field 

the equipment I think is one of the reasons that the other countries 

are able to catch us, if you will. They don’t have to deal with that 

bureaucratic process. And that is a pretty simple thing I think we 

could put an end to that would help national security. 

Gentlemen, I represent Robins Air Force Base and the airmen 

and the women that fly and operate the JSTARS [Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System] aircraft. Last year we had 

worked with the Air Force, there was a proposal to retire six of the 

E–8, since you know they are old aircraft, with old technology, and 

to begin the recapitalization of a new plane with a more modern 

radar that would give you more information. 

There was a proposal for a business class jet. I understand there 

has been a new analysis, a demand from the combat commanders, 

a decision is made to keep the entire fleet operational at this point. 

I would like for you to speak to the value of the JSTARS, how it 

benefits each of your missions. 

And then the Air Force’s analysis of the alternatives for the 

JSTARS and the recapitalization concluded that a manned aircraft 

was necessary and absolutely essential. And the Korea Command 

and Pacific Command both have benefitted from this manned platform and the on-board battle management provided by the 

JSTARS. And can you discuss the extent to which your command’s 

ISRs or requirements are being met? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes, sir. Thank you for that question. 

My top priority in terms of my requirements and requests 

through Department of Defense has been ISR. And specifically that 

aircraft, the JSTARS, is one that I need greater capability in terms 

of JSTARS, primarily because it provides us the MTI, Movement 

Target Indicator, and it allows us to queue, my other assets. So it 

doesn’t work alone, it works in tandem with the other assets that 

are airborne. And I could use more than I have today. 

I appreciate the fact that the Air Force, because of the budgeting, 

needs to get a newer aircraft, but I appreciate the fact that they 

are retaining what we have, because even the loss of hours of the 

one that I have today would make a difference in my indicators 

and warnings on the peninsula. 
26 

Admiral LOCKLEAR. It is a critically important capability in the 

ISR world, also in the battle management world, particularly when 

you operate in potentially contested environments, where other 

parts of your command and control may be under cyber attack or 

space attack. Having an aircraft that is manned that has that ability to have that functionality and thinking work is good. 

I understand the Air Force’s need to recap [recapitalize], and so 

we have to manage the risk on how they bring the new systems 

forward. Manned versus unmanned. I think there—my concern 

right now is that we don’t have the technology able to put everything we need to in an unmanned system. I think that is what the 

Air Force is probably grappling with. So what would not be beneficial to me or to General Scaparrotti would be a replacement system that didn’t replace it. 

Mr. SCOTT. One of my concerns is, as you are forced to make, 

through all of the DOD and the agencies, as you are forced to make 

decisions based on the sequester instead of based on what the national security needs are, is that we end up with Army standing 

up for Army, and Navy standing up for Navy, and Air Force for Air 

Force. And we just need to make sure that those platforms, those 

ISR platforms that we use that operate across those what should 

be imaginary lines, if you will, don’t get sacrificed. 

And, I just, I appreciate all of you and what you do for our country and look forward to continuing to work with you to provide 

those JSTARS and that ISR platform. 

And, ma’am, if you have suggestions on language that will stop 

that bureaucratic problem, we would happy to work with you in the 

NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] to put it in there. 

Secretary WORMUTH. Thank you. I will take that back and we 

will get back to you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 103.] 

Mr. SCOTT. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman yields back the balance of time. 

Mr. Ashford, you are recognized for 5 minutes. No questions. 

Mr. Nugent from Florida is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank 

our panel for being here today. 

And, General, having been to South Korea, I think I was there 

in 2005 or 2006, not—I was not in this job, but I visiting my son 

who was stationed there, that is a special area. And you certainly 

are at great risk there, all of our service men and women and civilians that are there are certainly at great risk, particularly close in 

Seoul and on up. So I certainly do appreciate that. 

I had the opportunity here just recently to go out. I did not get 

back out that far, nor did I get to Guam, but I got out to Hawaii 

and San Diego in regards to visiting our naval forces and some of 

our Marines that are stationed out there. And I was impressed 

with, I guess, the leadership. 

And, Admiral, I met with you in Hawaii. I was impressed, 

though, not only with your leadership, but the leadership of those 

that are in your command, from a destroyer skipper, to an LCS– 

4 skipper, and others, in regards to how they take their mission 

and how they accomplish it, and also at the BUD/S [Basic Under-
27 

water Demolition/SEAL] training facility in Coronado with our 

SEALs [Sea, Air, Land]. We have, and we talk about this all the 

time about equipment, but it is the personnel that man that equipment that makes the difference, I think. 

But what I am concerned about as we move forward, and you 

have talked about it, that we have had to accept more risks and 

we are concerned about having adequate resources. Could you explain to us, and maybe we can do a better job of explaining this 

to the American people, first of all, why is the Asia-Pacific area so 

important to us? And (b), what are the additional risks that we are 

accepting because of the lack of providing the proper resources? 

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, thank you, sir, and thanks for your 

visit to PACOM. It was good for us. 

If you take a look at the Asia-Pacific today, my AOR is about 52 

percent of the world, 36 nations. Of those nations, there’s—seven 

of them are key allies. I mean five of them are key allies. We only 

have seven defense treaties and five of them are there, and they— 

we believe that they are historic and they will go forward and be 

important for the future. 

Today, about 6 out of 10 people alive live in the Asia-Pacific. My 

AOR, if you just characterize it as 83 percent water, 17 percent 

land, and on that 17 percent of the land, 6 out of every 10 people 

alive live there. Eventually, if the population goes to 10 billion like 

we expect it to, roughly, before it caps out, it will go to about 7 out 

of every 10 people. That is going to be the economic engine of the 

world. I think Secretary Carter in his speech to, the other day in 

Arizona pointed out, I think there is about half a billion middleclass consumers in the Asia-Pacific. And by 2030, he predicted in 

his speech, it would go to 3 billion. 

So this is where the people who are going to have money are 

going to be spending it in a global economy, and that global economy is where I want my four grandsons to be able to compete in. 

And I want American systems over there, systems that are similar 

to the value systems we have, systems of law and order, systems 

of economic, economic systems that they understand and then they 

can compete in. 

So what we have to do I think is to ensure that, number one, 

that we, to the degree we can, that we maintain a security environment that is similar to what we have enjoyed for the last 70 years, 

one that reflects the security of this country and the values of this 

country. 

To do that, you have to be there. You have to be there in many 

ways. It is not just about the military, but the military is a big 

component of it. Military forces have to be there, they have to be 

part of those nations there, they have to be in there working with 

them. They have to be shaping the day-to-day environment and the 

landscape. 

And so as the world changes, and as the military capabilities in 

this AOR over the countries change, we have to ensure that we 

have the right relevance there to ensure that we can compete in 

the Asia-Pacific for the next century. 

Mr. NUGENT. One of the things that we really haven’t touched 

on is Russia is playing in that area also. And I know we have 
28 

talked about China and we talk about all those things. But is Russia not playing in that area or starting to exert more? 

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, Russia in the last few months has returned to, I would say, nearly a Cold War level of activity that goes 

towards our homeland, with long-range attacks, you know, exercises, and those types of things. We also know that Russia will improve their strategic nuclear deterrent on what is their East Coast, 

which is in the Northern Pacific. 

They also are improving their submarine force that operates in 

that area and are exerting increased influence not only in the Arctic, which they will tend in that direction from my AOR in, but also 

in Northeast Asia. And we see a greater presence of them in, just 

this year in Southeast Asia as well. 

So it just adds to the amount of interesting things that a 

PACOM commander has to think about every day, and the amount 

of ISR that I need to track them, the sophistication of the systems 

I have to be able to deal with them. I mean, the key is for us to 

manage the security environment on our terms, not have to respond to someone else’s. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. NUGENT. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the indulgence, but, 

and the Chairman mentioned this about the INF Treaty. I think 

that is an important issue for us as we move forward, particularly 

as it results to Russia now playing again in a Cold War atmosphere 

in the Pacific. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

And the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Bridenstine, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have a question for Admiral Locklear and General Scaparrotti. 

When you think about the assessment of the technological imbalance between specifically us and China, and us and North Korea, 

can you share what your assessment is right now as it concerns 

cyber and space, those two elements, for each one of you as it relates to China and North Korea? 

Admiral Locklear. 

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, my observation is I am a firm believer 

that anything we choose to be dominant in we can be. So we just 

have to make that decision. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Are we currently dominant? 

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Yes. That is my assessment. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Is the trajectory going to sustain that dominance, the trajectory that is going on right now? 

Admiral LOCKLEAR. No. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. 

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Now, in the case of cyber, clearly PRC is a 

big actor, Russia is a big actor. I would say they are probably at 

the top tier. You drop down it would probably be North Korea and 

Iran. And then certainly we are in the top tier of cyber capabilities 

and probably lead the way in cyber defense capabilities, cyber understanding. But it is, as General Scaparrotti pointed out earlier, 

it is an interesting environment, it is an interesting domain that 

is changing rapidly. 
29 

In the case of space, I think what we have seen with the PRC 

that concerns us the most is their willingness to do offensive things 

in space, counter-space activity with the ASAT [anti-satellite] missile they fired a while back and some of the other programs I think 

they are developing that to, that would limit our ability to use 

those space assets in our favor, which we do need to stay forward 

globally. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. General Scaparrotti, will you address cyber as 

it relates to North Korea? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes. In terms of cyber, as I said, I agree 

with Admiral Locklear, I think they are probably the B team right 

now. But they, since 2009, have said they are going to develop that 

capability, and we have seen even in the past year that capability 

improve. 

So as I said, it is a dynamic domain. We are building teams. We 

are using our intelligence to develop our skills, the types of skills 

we need every day, and we are going to have to stay on that. And 

that has to be resourced. As you know, in DOD we are resourcing 

CYBERCOM [Cyber Command]. They train those teams that come 

out and help in PACOM’s headquarters and mine. And that would 

be difficult to do under sequestration, I think. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you for that. 

One of my concerns is that, and I have heard General Hyten talk 

about this, that, you know, satellites and networks, they don’t have 

mothers. And so when we think about defending our forces, those 

satellites and those networks directly affect the people, those of us 

who serve in our country’s uniform. We do have mothers. And so 

from my perspective, we need to maybe think about space a little 

differently. 

Ms. Wormuth, would you like to address this? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, if I may. I think, a, you are 

absolutely right, and both the admiral and general are right, that 

China in particular I think has identified space as a potential vulnerability area. They see that—they see being able to hit us in 

space as an important way to try to come after us if that were ever 

to come to pass. 

Given the importance of space to all of our joint force, that is one 

of the areas in the PB16 budget [President’s budget for fiscal year 

2016] where we made some very specific and significant targeted 

investments to try to make sure that we stay ahead of that curve. 

And I think it was very much coming from the place of recognizing 

that that is an important capability that sort of underpins all of 

our ability to be effective. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So as a Navy pilot we have rules of engagement and we have hostile intent and then hostile act. And depending on where you are in the world and what is happening you can 

respond different ways. 

When it comes to our space communication architecture, when it 

comes to our GPS [Global Positioning System] architecture, when 

these come under attack, whether it is jamming or kinetic, this directly impacts those of us who fight war. And to the extent that 

we are not fighting a war, it directly impacts the safety of those 

of us who happen to be on the other side of the world where there 

are hostile countries. 
30 

From a policy perspective, can you share with us, what is the position of the administration on how we treat, say, dazzling of an 

intelligence satellite or potentially, what is our, can we do kinetic 

affects if they jam GPS or if they jam our communication architecture in space? Can you share with us kind of the policy on that? 

Secretary WORMUTH. I think, Congressman, what I would say 

here is that, again, we very much recognize that one of the key advantages we have is the networked space-enabled force that our 

military has. And we want to make sure that we protect that capability and that we continue to have the ability to keep our forces 

able to operate in that networked environment, and we know that 

there are potential adversaries that are trying to break that capability. 

If it is all right with you, I would be happy to have a team come 

up and brief you about our space policy in a classified setting. I 

think that would be able to address your concerns. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Absolutely. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The chair recognizes the other gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. 

Russell, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Madam Secretary, Admiral, General. 

Part of the concerns that I hear, Madam Secretary, about a policy push on the trade Pacific authority, the trade partnership authority and the move to the Pacific is that if you look at history, 

when Commodore Perry went in and said we are going to open up 

Tokyo, and did, they immediately adopted our ways. We saw within 

two generations incredible industrial capability, military doctrine, 

to the point where they even defeated a world power. 

John Hay at the turn of the century then developed an open-door 

policy with China as a hedge on Japan, almost using the same 

terms, hegemony. And now we see this push into the Pacific, and 

while we have had briefings here in the last couple of years with 

the same talks of how we are going to expand or change our posture or do different things, now it does not seem that the diplomatic or military advances are keeping pace with the trade advances. 

Unfortunately, in 15 years we went from ally, making ships, 

signing naval treaties, to having to melt Japanese out of pillboxes 

and drop atomic bombs on their cities. I would hope that as we 

make an advance and a pivot into the Pacific, that we would not 

make those same policy errors. 

My question would really be to the admiral or to the general. 

Missile defense seems to be the greatest short-term threat that we 

could possibly face. You have limited AN/TPY–2 [Army Navy/ 

Transportable Radar Surveillance] radars. The funding for those 

and the building of those does not seem to be a priority, and yet 

they may be the very things that stand between us and this incredible threat. How is that being addressed? 

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, Congressman, I would refer the specific 

timelines to the Missile Defense Agency and the services who buy 

them. But let me just talk about missile defense in general. 

I am faced with two problems, and General Scaparrotti is part 

of the second one. One is I have a homeland defense support re-
31 

quirement where not only do I have to defend Guam and Hawaii 

from potential missile attacks, but also have to support 

NORTHCOM [Northern Command] as NORTHCOM were to transition to where we would have to defend the homeland from maybe 

a rogue attack from North Korea. And so we moved rapidly to put 

things in position in the last decade that I think give us a relative 

assurance on our homeland defense. 

We have guided missile destroyers that operate in the north. We 

put a—the THAAD radar, we put that in there in about less than 

a month into Guam when we knew that there was a potential for 

a launch from North Korea, which was really fabulous that the 

Army could move that fast and make it happen. We fast-tracked 

the TPY–2 radar that was put in Shariki in Japan, so now we have 

two of those going, and we are having dialogues about where a 

third THAAD may go. 

The second part of our problem is defending forces in the theater 

and defending forces in an ever-increasing environment of ballistic 

missiles. And these can be short range, they can be directed at aircraft carriers, directed at ships, they can be directed at land bases. 

And you can’t defend against all of them. There are just too many 

of them. You can’t buy enough interceptors. So what you do do is 

you buy enough to give you confidence that you can deter and that 

when conflict were to start, to give you enough time to be able to 

get the rest of your war plan going. 

Mr. RUSSELL. And I appreciate that, Admiral, and thank you. I— 

In fact, it brings up the larger concerns of power projection and 

even long logistical lines for reinforcement even if we can project 

power. This month in history over 100,000 Americans had to surrender at Bataan, not for a lack of fight, not for lack of leadership, 

but for lack of capacity to get to them. And with a lot of these 

things, I realize the constraints that each of you live under. And 

the policy has shifted, but we don’t necessarily see the resources 

coming your way. 

How would you—what counsel or what advice would you give to 

Members of the Congress of how we correct that as we look at a 

complete pivot in changing the economies globally and the friction 

points that that will create, and yet not have a Bataan-like future 

or an inability to project power and to also sustain it? Either one. 

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes, sir, thank you. 

I think, in terms of the projection of power, I am probably the 

best example of that requirement. I have 28,500 service members 

on the peninsula, sufficient for today, but certainly if we begin to 

escalate, specifically to BMD [ballistic missile defense], I will ask 

for additional ballistic missile defense assets very quickly in order 

to safeguard not only our military installations, but the American 

civilians we have there and along with our ROK [Republic of 

Korea] allies. 

So when we look at resourcing, the impact of sequestration in 

2013, et cetera, it reduces the readiness of the force. And what I 

will need on the peninsula are forces that arrive ready to fight in 

a high-intensity conflict. And then also the impact of sequestration 

or reduction of resources, as you mentioned, I will need them on 

a pretty specific timeline, because I have a large adversary in close 

proximity to the capital of South Korea. 
32 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Ms. McSally is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for your time and your testimony. 

General Scaparrotti, I want to talk about the potential impact of 

divesting in the A–10 and the impact that that is going to have on 

our capabilities with your mission. And then also, Admiral 

Locklear, in general in the theater. 

The depleted uranium on the 30 millimeter, specifically the antitank capabilities, I know you have shared in your testimony about 

how North Korea is going more towards asymmetric capabilities, 

but there is still a very real conventional threat, as you know. And 

should we have to deal with that, having been a part of units that 

were supposed to be heading your way to be reinforcements to 

those that are stationed right there, it is a pretty tight timeline to 

be able to react in a very short geographic area, as you know. 

So gaining and maintaining air superiority and then making sure 

that we have the anti-armor capability against North Korean capabilities is really important. 

So if the President’s budget were to be fulfilled and the A–10 

would be divested in, you would lose the capability of the depleted 

uranium, and the A–10 squadron is right there at Osan. What capability gap does that provide for you and what are the plans to 

fill that gap in order to address this particular threat? 

General SCAPARROTTI. I thank you. As you said, the A–10 was 

designed for a specific capability and it is very good at that. Being 

an infantryman, I have high regard for its ability to support 

ground troops. And in the region that I am in, particularly in 

mountainous region, it also can get low and it can turn in tight 

spots. 

Having said that, I recognize too the Air Force’s difficulty in 

terms of the funding and the need with an aging aircraft, with reduced funds, to perhaps move away from that and go to a multirole 

ship. And I have been assured that if the A–10 were to come out 

there would be a multirole aircraft that would replace that squadron on the peninsula. And I would need that. I would need additional air. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. But the F–16 doesn’t have the depleted uranium or the antitank. I want to focus specifically on antitank. We 

are often talking about close air support in Iraq and Afghanistan 

and other areas where the A–10 brings unique capabilities. But if 

we are talking about piercing armor and the antitank capability 

that the 30-millimeter with depleted uranium brings, and the F– 

16s, F–15s, they don’t have that capability. So what gap does that 

create for you and what do you think is going to be replacing that? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, I don’t know from the Air Force. I 

mean, frankly, I would use air in different ways, the multirole aircraft, and then use the systems that I have on the ground primarily against their armor threat. And, so it would open a gap in 

terms of having that aircraft for that specific capability. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. And I think the last thing that we want to 

be doing is be relying on having to have a tank battle, right, in a 

day and age where we have the capabilities to, and we have the 

plans, to be able to take out those capabilities from the air. We cer-
33 

tainly wouldn’t want to roll back that capability and have our guys 

on the ground having to fight that when we do actually possess the 

capability in the air to be doing that with the A–10. 

So you agree that it would create a gap. 

General SCAPARROTTI. It would, yes. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. 

And, Admiral Locklear, do you agree just in the larger plans, we 

have been very much focusing on near-peer, conventional, potential 

scenarios in the future. So the close air support and the antitank 

capabilities that you would be lacking without the A–10, is that 

something that you think is also a gap for the greater mission that 

you have? 

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, it is certainly nice to have everything 

you could have when you need it. I would say that in general in 

the Asia-Pacific, other than the Korean Peninsula, that the close 

air support mission is of a lesser concern to me in general. But as 

the Air Force moves forward with the systems they have to move 

forward in the future, I think you are going towards a close air 

support model with airplanes that have improved precision-guided 

missile weapons that can go against tanks and can deal with a 

broader array of them. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. Thank you. 

Again, we talked about the F–35 yesterday in a separate hearing, 

but the munitions capabilities on the F–35 actually are not an 

armor-penetrating capability, and survivability is in question, especially when you do get into that close fight. I mean, I agree, you 

have got a high-end challenge that you have to deal with for sure, 

and we have got to be able to meet that both with air and naval 

forces. But if we do have men and women on the ground in harm’s 

way in any potential scenario, we do want to make sure that obviously we can protect them with the best capability that we have. 

So I appreciate your responses. Thanks for your service as always. 

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentlelady yields back. 

And Mr. Courtney is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Forbes. 

And thank you to the witnesses for being here today. 

Yesterday morning Under Secretary Kendall was sort of a featured speaker at the sea, air, and space gathering over in Virginia, 

you know, packed room. Talked about a lot of the same issues that 

are being discussed here, that narrowing gap that, Admiral 

Locklear, you referred to earlier this morning. 

But what is interesting is at the end of his remarks he actually 

pretty passionately used a pretty good chunk of his time talking 

about STEM [science, technology, engineering, and mathematics] 

education in this country as really a critical component of our national security long term, and particularly with the narrowing gap 

that Admiral Locklear mentioned. 

The STEM Education Council, which is a pretty extraordinary 

coalition of Microsoft, National Association of Manufacturers, you 

know, all the hard-science professional educators, American Farm 

Bureau, released a report recently where they talked about 23 percent of the graduate degrees in STEM in the world today are China 
34 

and 10 percent are the U.S. And that kind of, I think, particularly 

when we talk about Asia-Pacific and the challenges, and again 

looking beyond just today’s budget year, that point that I think 

Under Secretary Kendall was making is pretty powerful. 

And we talk about sequestration and trying to balance defense 

and nondefense. I mean the fact is that education is one of those 

that could ‘‘pay the price,’’ quote, unquote, if we just had a sort of 

lopsided approach to dealing with sequestration. But long term, in 

terms of our defense, that is just adding to that disparity that is 

pretty disturbing right now. 

So, Ms. Wormuth, then just wonder if you maybe wanted to comment on that, anyone else, about what you see out there in terms 

of where China’s investment in education and the increase in capabilities that we are seeing emerging domestically from their country. 

Secretary WORMUTH. Thank you, Congressman. 

I think that Under Secretary Kendall, as he often does, was making a very good point. And we are very much looking at the strides 

that countries in the Asia-Pacific region are making in terms of 

science and technology and mathematics. And it is clear that in our 

country we don’t—have a harder time, for any number of reasons, 

convincing our young people to go into those areas, but it is critical. 

And making sure that we have the educational policy and funding 

for those types of skills is what we are going to need very much 

to be able to remain competitive in those fields in the future. 

And I think Secretary Carter has talked about this issue as well. 

And not only do we need to find ways to get more folks into those 

areas as they pursue their higher education, but also we are looking at how in the Department of Defense do we find ways to bring 

more people with those types of skills into our system, because part 

of what we need to do to be able to remain competitive and to be 

innovative and to get after some of these technology challenges is 

to be able to bring in those sort of fresh people with new, fresh 

ideas. And that is something that our Department probably needs 

to be a little more agile about. 

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I would agree. I mean, how we recruit the 

force of the future has to be part of a national dialogue. I mean, 

1 percent of the American people day to day defend it. Some of 

them are the most highly technical people that this country can 

produce. And if we don’t have a system underpinning it that produces enough for us to lead the world, we will not be as successful. 

I know the service chiefs are all engaged on this thought process. 

Where does that future force come from? 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. I mean, this is the 60th anniversary 

of the launching of the Nautilus. And Admiral Rickover in his final 

days actually almost stopped talking about the nuclear Navy and 

was really focused on U.S. education policy for precisely those reasons. 

And, again, the threat in Asia is where I think this imbalance 

is really the most acute. And, again, I think as we, this committee 

should look at the big picture here in terms of just what is national 

defense really, what are the building blocks of it. And having an 

educational system that is prepared to provide the workforce for 

both the military and obviously the people who develop our weapon 
35 

systems and weapons platforms has really got to be part of that 

discussion. 

So thank you for your testimony today. 

I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman yields back. 

And the chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio for 5 minutes. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

We have talked a lot about the region today, and I want to focus 

a little bit on our allies in the region. And maybe touch on a little 

bit, if you would, about their efforts of increasing their capabilities, 

not only in traditional warfare aspects, but, say, cyber and space 

and how we are coordinating with them, if you would. 

General SCAPARROTTI. Sir, if you would, I will go first with the 

Republic of Korea. First, overall within their defense budget over 

the past 4 years or so they have been averaging about 4 to 5 percent increase in their defense budget. This past year it was 2.5 percent of their GDP [gross domestic product], which is very good compared to, say, our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies, et cetera. 

And so they have been focused on meeting the capabilities that 

they need, given the evolving threat in North Korea, but also in 

order to meet the commitments that we made together as an alliance. An example being the funding of the PAC–3 upgrade and the 

missiles for those, this year Global Hawk, last year to assist in 

ISR, an improvement in their C4 systems, command control communications, computers, to enable them as we go to OPCON [operational control] transition, to ensure that they can lead a combined 

force in a high-intensity conflict. 

So overall I think they are focused on that. Within their budget 

they have the same challenges that we do in terms of the social demand and the competition with defense and the expense of the systems that they have to put in place in order to increase their military’s capability and to deal with the threat that is evolving in the 

north. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. And what about Japan? 

Secretary WORMUTH. I am happy to speak a little bit to Japan. 

Again, I think we have an incredibly strong relationship and alliance with Japan, and that will be renewed and I think brought to 

the next level with the completion of the defense guidelines that 

are going to be completed by the end of this month. 

They, as you know, are buying a large number of F–35s. They 

have expressed an intent to buy the V–22. They also are working 

on upgrading their Aegis platforms. They are working with us on 

Global Hawk. So they are also, I think, doing a tremendous amount 

to upgrade their capabilities. And then we also have a very significant cooperative production project with them for the SM–3 II missile. That is a $3.2 billion cooperative program with Japan. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Admiral. 

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, in addition I would say that the Philippines, who is another key ally of ours, we have in negotiation for 

an Enhanced Cooperative Defense Agreement. That is currently 

being debated inside the Philippines on the political side. But that 

has an opportunity to help them improve to get them to a better 

minimum credible defense. It also has the opportunity for us to 
36 

strengthen that alliance and strengthen our position in Southeast 

Asia. 

Our other ally, Australia, making good strides. I mean, it is a 

great alliance. As far as I can tell, they are increasing defense 

spending. They are having a good dialogue about how they will 

partner with us. They are thinking about extending their capabilities in submarine warfare and some other areas, amphibious warfare. 

So in general I would say the trend of our allies across the board 

is that they are investing more in their defense and in their security rather than less, and they are investing more in directions that 

are complementary to our capabilities, so that we all enjoy the 

same mutual benefits of that security architecture. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you very much. 

I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman yields back. 

And with that, Madam Secretary, General, Admiral, thank you 

so much for being with us today. We are getting you out right on 

time. And we appreciate, as you heard all of our members express, 

their appreciation to you for your service to our country, but thank 

you for being willing today to educate, advise, and consult with us 

as we try to be a component part of the national defense of this 

country. 

And with that, we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:59 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

APRIL 15, 2015 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

APRIL 15, 2015 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

APRIL 15, 2015 

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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Admiral LOCKLEAR. The solutions to many of the ‘‘grey zone’’ challenges in the region are not military in nature. As I stated during my testimony, the military needs 

enough persistent, deep-look ISR assets to better understand the activity in the region; however, the solutions to such challenges largely reside in other areas of government. Diplomacy, not aggression, is the regional trend and still the best course 

of action. PACOM, together with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of State, are working with our allies and partners in the region to create 

multilateral mechanisms to maintain peace and security in the region. One positive 

example of a multilateral effort that deserves continuing U.S. support is ASEAN’s 

role in addressing common security concerns and non-traditional threats. ASEAN is 

doing this through confidence building measures, preventive diplomacy, and its leadership on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the 

South China Sea and the development of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. 

[See page 17.] 

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Regional governments largely acknowledge the threat from 

ISIL and the potential return of Foreign Terrorist Fighters. In response, several 

countries have either passed new Counter-Terrorism (CT) legislation or reinterpreted existing legislation to hinder Foreign Terrorist Fighters activities. Some efforts are underway to impact on-line recruiting and radicalization activities. There 

are a variety of partnering opportunities in the region available to counter ISIL. 

Most have been built over the past decade as nations have worked diligently—individually and collectively—to address the problem of violent extremism. These have 

been strengthened and reinforced since the rise of the ISIL threat. Regional organizations like ASEAN recognize terrorism as a top concern, and counter-terrorism cooperation is a component of most of our bilateral relationships. [See page 22.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Admiral LOCKLEAR. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has approximately 

1,900 land-based cruise and ballistic missiles. Of these, about 1,540 have ranges of 

between 500 and 5,500 kilometers in range. [See page 22.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT 

Secretary WORMUTH. Regarding specific NDAA language proposals on streamlining the acquisition process and on improving the handling of contract award bid 

protests, I defer to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics, Mr. Frank Kendall. From a policy standpoint however, I share your concern that DOD needs a faster, more efficient, and more responsive acquisition process in order to retain our competitive technological edge and bring critical capabilities to our forces. This is the goal of DOD’s Better Buying Power 3.0 program, announced in 2015. This program is intended to implement best practices to strengthen DOD’s buying power, achieve greater efficiencies, and eliminate unproductive 

processes and bureaucracy, while promoting competition. [See page 26.] 

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