STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF THE CONFLICT

WITH IRAQ: LATIN AMERICA

Dr. Max G. Manwaring

March 2003
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ISBN 1-58487-120-2

ii
FOREWORD

War with Iraq signals the beginning of a new era in

American national security policy and alters strategic

balances and relationships around the world. The specific

effects of the war, though, will vary from region to region. In

some, America’s position will be strengthened. In others, it

may degrade without serious and sustained efforts.

To assess this dynamic, the Strategic Studies Institute

(SSI) has developed a special series of monographs entitled

Strategic Effects of the Conflict with Iraq. In each, the

author has been asked to analyze four issues: the position

that key states in their region are taking on U.S. military

action against Iraq; the role of America in the region after

the war with Iraq; the nature of security partnerships in the

region after the war with Iraq; and the effect that war with

Iraq will have on the war on terrorism in the region.

This monograph is one of the special series. SSI is

pleased to offer it to assist the Department of Army and

Department of Defense in crafting the most effective

strategy possible for dealing with the many consequences of

war with Iraq.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

MAX G. MANWARING is a Professor of Military Strategy

at the U.S. Army War College. He is a retired U.S. Army

colonel and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at

Dickinson College. He has served in various civilian and

military positions at the U.S. Army War College, the U.S.

Southern Command, and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Dr. Manwaring’s areas of expertise include theory of grand

strategy, U.S. national security policy and strategy,

military strategy, military and nonmilitary operations

other than war, political-military affairs; and Latin

America. Dr. Manwaring is the author and co-author of

several articles, chapters, and reports dealing with

political-military affairs. He is also the editor or co-editor of

El Salvador at War; Gray Area Phenomena: Confronting the

New World Disorder; Managing Contemporary Conflict:

Pillars of Success; Beyond Declaring Victory and Coming

Home: The Challenges of Peace and Stability Operations;

and Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century. Dr. Manwaring

holds a B.S. in Economics as well as a B.S., an M.A., and a

Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Illinois. He

is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College.

iv
STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF THE CONFLICT

WITH IRAQ: LATIN AMERICA*

1

Conclusions:

Latin Americans maintain a strong bias against North

American interventions.

At the same time, Latins perceive that a possible war

against Iraq and its leadership would be directed against

the wrong foe and in an inappropriate manner.

The U.S.-Latin American partnership is an unequal

relationship. The result of balancing Latin interests

against those of the “Colossus of the North” is a dilemma.

In realpolitik terms, it is not intelligent to be a “no show”

when the list of supporters is posted. Thus, in the best

Colonial tradition, “Obedesco pero no cumplo,” (I obey, but

I do not comply).

Even so, the United States shares with its Latin

American neighbors an increasingly and vitally important

financial, commercial, and security/stability stake in the

political and economic growth of the hemisphere. Any kind

of political-economic-social-security deterioration in the

region will profoundly affect the health of the U.S.

economy—and the concomitant power to act in the global

security arena.

The continuing U.S. Army responsibility goes beyond

the narrow purview of unilateral training and equipping to

broader multilateral professional military education

(PME) and leader development.

* Latin America is defined in this monograph as Hispanic America

(Mexico, Central America, Spanish-speaking South America),

Luso-America (Brazil), and the various non-Spanish speaking

nation-states in the Caribbean basin.
Latin Americans have long memories. For nearly 200

years every school child has been taught in great detail

about the more than 100 North American interventions that

have taken place in the Western Hemisphere. They range

from before the implementation of the No-Transfer

Resolution in 1811, to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, through

the period of the Roosevelt and Wilson Corollaries, to the

more recent invasions of Panama and Haiti.1 New

generations of Latin Americans in general have learned to

be most wary of North American “imperialism” and being

subjugated culturally, economically, and politically by the

materialistic interests of the “Colossus of the North.”

Mexicans, for example, can recall vividly the martyrdom of

their Military Academy cadets (ninos heroicos) bravely

jumping to their deaths rather than surrendering to the

U.S. forces invading Mexico City in 1847. Likewise,

Mexicans can recite date-by-date the progress of the

U.S.-Mexican War of 1846-47 that ended with the loss of a

third to a half of its national territory (i.e., 529,017 square

miles) to the “Great Hegemon.” As a consequence, a very

strong juridical-political bias has developed in Latin

America that tends to reject North American intervention—anywhere.

More Specific Latin American Perspectives

on a U.S.-Iraqi War and the War on Terrorism.

Latin American peoples and leadership may be expected

to become angry and possibly violent over a U.S. invasion of

Iraq. That will prompt governments to seek political and

military distance from the United States, while paying

minimal “lip-service.” The best case scenario would be a

quick and decisive U.S.-led effort and rapid subsequent

withdrawl. That would have to be based on a UN Security

Council Resolution that is based on irrefutable and clear

public evidence (not intelligence) of Iraqi wrongdoing.

Otherwise, “it would seem more reasonable to believe that

the real motives for the war are oil, and U.S. hegemony.”2

The worst case would be a long-term, destructive unilateral

2
U.S. invasion, and a long delegitimizing colonial-type

occupation. In the best case, present political, economic, and

military partnerships with the United States will likely be

not much affected.

In the worst case, the benign neglect occasioned by the

necessity of putting virtually all of North America’s

attention and resources into the Iraqi war and its aftermath

would likely result in the deterioration of Latin

American-U.S. ties. That neglect would also likely result in

a decrease in the minimal cooperation that now exists in the

war on terrorism, and an increase in direct security threats

from Latin-based terrorists to U.S. interests in the region

and to the United States.

A Further Perspective on “Who is the Enemy?” and the

Type of War that Should be Conducted. Generally, Latin

Americans argue that the terrorist enemy is not a single

state or group of “rogue” states. It is not a single terrorist

leadership—such as Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda. It

is not Saddam Hussien and Iraq. Rather, the enemy is the

violent terrorist doctrine of anyone’s extremism. In that

connection, the enemy is a lethal combination of

transnational nonstate actors who exploit for their own

narrow purposes poverty, disease, social discontent, refugee

flows, illegal drugs, instability, irredentism, and insurgency

regardless of geo-strategic location or level of power.3

In this more amorphous context, international

organizations such as the UN or the Organization of

American States (OAS), or individual national powers such

as the United States, should be called on to respond to a

given conflict and/or its aftermath. For Latin America, the

problems of fundamentalist Islamic terrorism or a Saddam

Hussein is not urgent in a context where political-socioeconomic instability threats compromise the continuity of

democratic systems and free market economies. This is a

radically different security environment than that being

addressed in U.S. policy.4 In the words of Colombian

President Alvaro Uribe, it is also “una amenaza mayor para

3
el mundo que Iraq” (i.e., “a greater threat to the world than

Iraq”).5

The view from the south of the Rio Grande is that the

main concerns of the United States regarding hemispheric

security and the war on terrorism are related almost

exclusively to the Colombian conflict situation. In

Colombia, the United States has focused its money,

training, and attention almost entirely on the counterdrug

campaign. It has seen the Colombian crisis in limited

terms—the number of hectares of coca eradicated, and the

number of kilos of coca and the number of laboratories that

have been detected and destroyed. Even though the United

States and Colombia have achieved a series of tactical

“successes” in the coca fields, the laboratories, and on the

streets, the various nonstate actors (i.e., drug traffickers,

leftist insurgents, and self-appointed vigilante paramilitary

organizations) remain strong and become ever more

wealthy. And Colombia continues to deteriorate and

becomes ever more fragile. The main argument is that the

Colombian drug issue is only one piece of a larger, more

complex, and multidimensional strategic puzzle that goes to

the entire hemisphere and the global community.6

Moreover, “War on terrorism—as it is now being conducted

by the United States in Colombia and the rest of Latin

America—will encourage even more terrorism.”7

Perspectives on Partnership with the United States. The

Latin American-U.S. partnership has always been one

conducted between unequals. That inequality is

demonstrated in several ways. In general terms, it is often

pointed out that North Americans hear far more about the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as one example, than about the

war in Colombia—though the latter has caused as much

carnage as the former and is much closer to home.8 More

specifically, at the highest political levels, the United States

often sends messages that reinforce the notion that Latin

America is not important, and that this country does not

care about the region.

4
Two examples will suffice. First, consider what

happened at the recent inauguration of Ecuador’s President

Lucio Gutierrez. The United States sent a delegation

head—Clay Johnson III, the Director of the Office of

Management and Budget—without sufficient rank to

participate in the heads of state meetings. The signal

received was that the United States is really not that

interested in bilateral relations with the countries of Latin

America.9 Second, the United States sent Robert Zoellick,

the U.S. Trade Representative, as delegation head to the

inauguration of Brazil’s Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. Again,

the message was loud and clear—the United States does not

care about the importance of the world’s eighth largest

economy and fifth largest population.10

Clearly, the United States continues to move

unilaterally in pursuit of its own agenda.11 A major

dilemma, then, is that of balancing Latin interests against

those of the “Colossus of the North.” The result in realpolitik

terms is that “It is not very intelligent to be a [Latin

American] ‘no show’ when the list of [North American]

supporters [of a given situation] is posted.”12 Thus, in the

best colonial tradition, “Obedesco pero no cumplo” (“I obey,

but I do not comply”). Yet, the United States needs Latin

American cooperation to prevent the expansion of terrorism

and attendant “lawless areas” and instability in the region.

Thus, a strong argument is made that the United States

should become more of a partner and less of the proverbial

“hegemon.”13

Changing Patterns. As a result of globalization, Latin

America generally has prospered. Today, the United States

sells more to Latin America and the Caribbean than to the

European Union. The United States sells more to the

Southern Cone common market (MERCOSUR) than to

China. Mexico has become the second largest goods export

market and trading partner of the United States. Brazil’s

current annual gross domestic product (GDP) of $514 billion

exceeds that of Russia ($392 billion) by over 100 billion.

And, despite its reported political-economic problems,

5
Brazil continues to build additional infrastructure steadily

at a GDP growth rate that has been averaging about 4

percent a year.14 Thus, the United States shares with its

Latin American neighbors an increasingly and vitally

important financial, commercial, and security/stability

stake in the economic growth and prosperity of the

hemisphere.15 That mutual prosperity and dependence

generates yet another dilemma.

When what mattered most in U.S. national security

policy toward the hemisphere were military bases,

preserving access to sea lines of communication, choke

points, and raw materials and hydrocarbons—and

militarily denying those assets to the Soviet Union and its

surrogates—the United States could ignore internal

conditions in Latin America. But, since the United States is

now interested in the need for nonhostile dispositions

toward the country, the capacity of neighbors to buy

American-made products, a commitment to international

economic cooperation, the continued development of

democratic and free market institutions and human

rights—the United States must concern itself with the

internal conditions that spawn subnational, national,

regional, and global insecurity and instability.16

This dilemma is critical. Continued neglect and

indifference to Latin America’s stability problems will

profoundly affect the health of the U.S. economy—and the

concomitant power to act in the international security

arena. At the same time, increasing instability in the

hemisphere will likely increase direct security threats from

terrorists to U.S. interests in the region and to the United

States. Much is at risk.17

A Developing New View of Future Cooperation on the

War on Terrorism. Clausewitz reminds us that “The first,

the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgment that the

statesman and commander have to make is to establish...

the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither

mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is

6
alien to its nature.”18 Determining the nature of the conflict

is thus “the first of all strategic questions and the most

comprehensive.”19 Thus, senior decisionmakers, policymakers, military leaders, and their staffs must correctly

identify the nature of the conflict in the Americas;

determine the central strategic problem and the primary

political objectives associated with it; prioritize the others;

and link policy, strategy, force structure and equipment,

and coordinated political-economic-psychological-military

campaign plans in solving the central strategic problem.

This linkage encompasses Clausewitz’s “forgotten

dimensions of strategy” and what Sun Tzu indicates is the

indirect approach to conflict.20

The idea is that there are other—more effective—ways

to “render the enemy powerless” than to attack his military

force.21 It follows that a multidimensional politicalpsychological-economic-military effort would be a potent

combination of ways to control the serious instability

problems developing in Latin America. “Such a coordinated

[U.S.-Latin American] exercise may be difficult, but it is

absolutely necessary, given the obvious alternative.”22

In the meantime, Latin Americans perceive that the

United States is prepared to go its own way in the war on

terrorism and deal militarily with Iraq, North Korea, and

other “rogues” as required. In this context, it is also

perceived that the United States wants to see Latin

Americans deal with their own internal stability threats.

The Latins, in turn, argue that they are willing to do that,

but that they need help from the United States and the

West.23 The help that has been forthcoming has tended to be

directed toward the tactical/operational drug issue and not

to the central strategic problems that spawn illegal drug

trafficking and myriad other instabilities that lead to more

violence, crime, corruption, and conflict. That help has also

tended to be piece-meal, ad hoc, and inconsistent. Tellingly,

Latin Americans argue that help provides as much support

back to the U.S. economy as to the security and stability of

Colombia and the rest of Latin America.24 The bottom-line

7
here is that a unifying U.S.-Latin American organization is

needed that can establish, enforce, and continually refine a

holistic political-military plan and generate consistent

national and international support. Otherwise, authority is

fragmented and ineffective in resolving the problems

endemic to survival in contemporary multidimensional

conflict and—thus—failure.25

Mexico has argued that the 1947 Rio Treaty (The

Inter-American Treaty for Reciprocal Assistance) provides

the necessary security architecture to deal with the

contemporary security and terrorism problems in Latin

America. That country has rejected the Rio Treaty as an

obsolete mechanism that should be replaced in order to face

new threats. Others, including Brazil, argue that a common

agenda for hemispheric security—building on the Rio

Treaty—is now imperative to the economic integration

proposed by the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)

and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).26

More recently, at the Defense Ministerial Meetings in

Santiago, Chile, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

proposed two things. First, he emphasized that the “Elected

governments [of Latin America] do have the responsibility

to exercise sovereign authority throughout their national

territories.” Second, Mr. Rumsfeld said:

I hope that this week’s conference will consider two initiatives

relative to increased [security] cooperation. The first is an

initiative to foster regional naval cooperation, to strengthen the

operational and planning capabilities of partner nations,

upgrade national command-and-control systems, and improve

regional information-sharing . . . The second is an initiative to

improve the hemisphere’s peacekeeping capabilities . . . We

should explore the possibility of integrating these various

specialized capabilities into larger regional capabilities, so that

we might better participate in peacekeeping and stability

operations, given what is clearly a growing need in the world.27

But, before the United States unilaterally initiates

“building blocks” based on the Rio Treaty to implement

Secretary Rumsfeld’s proposals; before proposals for

8
standing military and naval forces for the hemisphere are

initiated by such countries as Argentina and Chile; and

before the OAS is embarrassed into producing some sort of

ad hoc security architecture to confront the current and

future security environment—a few fundamental problems

and reforms must be addressed. Now is the time for concrete

action—not rhetoric. Otherwise, in addition to putting

broad security interests at risk, the OAS will encourage the

U.S. “hegemon” to do the job itself and to perhaps ignore

broader hemispheric interests.28

In these terms and because success against

transnational terrorism (TNT) requires close unilateral and

multilateral coordination and cooperation for an effective

unity of effort, the only viable approach to hemispheric

stability and security is to devolve the responsibility to the

OAS. That organization provides a moral position and

structural framework to which member states can transfer

the responsibility of the promulgation of binding

international agreements directed against terrorism and

terrorists; the development of an integrated multilateral

anti-terrorism action plan; the planning and implementation of a coordinated and legitimized policy; and the

establishment of a supportive security regime designed to

maximize advantage and compete effectively against

terrorists. Once the OAS leadership has created a strategic

political-military anti-terrorism vision regarding exactly

where it is going and how it is going to get there, it can

initiate a series of treaties and conventions to generate

“hard law.” “Hard” international agreements must contain

binding commitments by states and enforcement

mechanisms that provide harmony, accountability,

transparency, and means to impose effective sanctions on

noncomplying member states. These reforms, then, would

constitute a reasonable investment in effective multilateralism to combat “the grave common crime” perpetrated by

terrorists.29

9
The Continuing U.S. Army Responsibility

in the Hemisphere.

Latin American governments and supporting

international organizations must do two things to

accomplish the task of regaining control of national

territories within the context of the actual and anticipated

internal terrorism and violence. First, they must

professionalize and modernize national police/security

forces and judicial systems to the point where they can

enforce and administer the law fairly and effectively.

Second, governments must professionalize and modernize

the security institutions to a level where they have the

capability to neutralize and/or destroy all the illegal

perpetrators of violence—regardless of label. Governments

and organizations, such as the OAS, not responsive to these

requirements will find themselves in a “crisis of

governance.” They will face increasing social violence,

criminal anarchy, and undesired fundamental change.

Solutions to these problems take the United States beyond

unilateral training and equipping units for conducting

aggressive operations against narco-traffickers or

terrorist-insurgents to multilateral approaches to broader

professional military education (PME) and leader

development.30

The most important general areas in which the U.S.

Army might make a contribution to the improvement of

these capabilities are:

Development of strategy and campaign planning

capabilities.

Training and doctrine for joint and combined

operations.

Fundamental improvement in the collection,

evaluation, and timely dissemination of strategic and

operational intelligence.

10
Development of quick reaction capabilities.

Significant improvement in transport capability and

lift.

Recommendations specifically directed at broader PME

and leader development would include the following:

Study, understand, and apply the essence of

nontraditional conflict.

Study and understand the ways that military force

can be employed to achieve political and psychological

ends and understand and accept the ways that

political considerations affect the use of force.

Study, understand, and apply the concept of indirect

engagement versus direct involvement.

Develop the ability to interact collegially and

effectively with representatives of international

organizations, U.S. civilian agencies, indigenous

national civilian agencies, nongovernment

organizations, local and global news media, and

civilian populations.

Actions that the U.S. Army might facilitate in Latin

America would include:

Recommending repeal of the legal prohibition against

U.S. aid to foreign police forces.

Helping governments and military institutions

identify and correct key strategic political, economic,

and social shortcomings.

Ensuring that direct and indirect military aid to a

given government makes a direct contribution to the

strategic political objectives of that government.

11
Conclusions.

The contemporary security environment—to include the

war on terrorism that Latin American leaders perceive—is

a multipolar world in which one or 100 state and nonstate

actors are exerting differing types and levels of power

within a set of formal and informal cross-cutting alliances.

This situation is extremely volatile and dangerous, and

requires careful attention. In these terms, the United States

and the rest of the international community must

understand and cope with the threats imposed by diverse

actors engaged in the destabilizing and devastating

violence that is often called “terrorism.” If the United States

and its major allies concentrate interest and resources on

Iraq and ignore what is happening in Latin America—and

what is likely to happen without the implementation of the

sort of strategic reforms recommended in this monograph—

the expansion of terrorism, the expansion of “lawless areas,”

and the expansion of general instability could easily destroy

the democracy, free market economies, and prosperity that

has been achieved in recent years. In turn, that would

constitute a direct threat to U.S. national security and an

indirect threat to the U.S. position in the world.

ENDNOTES

1. Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People,

ninth ed., Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1970, pp. 286, 183-190,

505-507, 553-562, 676. Also see Graham H. Stuart and James L. Tigner,

Latin America and the United States, sixth ed., Englewood Cliffs, NJ:

Prentice-Hall, 1975, pp. 1, 4-5, 130-132; and A. Curtis Wilgus and Raul

D’Eca, Latin American History, New York: Barnes and Noble, 1968, pp.

403-404.

2. From an editorial in Brazil’s Folha de Sao Paulo, January 31,

2003.

3. “Uribe pide que EE.UU. intervenga en la region,” La Nacion,

January 17, 2003. Also see “Colombia’s Defense Chief (Marta Lucia

Ramirez) Makes Stand,” Associated Press, June 15, 2002.

12
4. At least one U.S. diplomat agrees with this position. See Otto

Reich, “The crucial battle for Colombia,” Washington Times, July 19,

2002.

5. President Alvaro Uribe, quoted in La Nacion.

6. David C. Jordan, Drug Politics: Dirty Money and Democracies,

Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999, p. 19; and Ana Maria

Bejarano and Eduardo Pizzaro, “The Crisis of Democracy in Colombia:

From ‘Restricted’ Democracy to ‘Besieged’ Democracy,” unpublished

manuscript, 2001.

7. Rensselaer W. Lee, “Perverse Effects of Andean Counternarcotics

Policy,” Orbis, Summer 2002, pp. 537-554. Also see Julio A. Cirino and

Silvana Elizondo, Hemispheric Security and “Lawless Areas,” Buenos

Aires, Argentina: Center for Hemispheric Studies Alexis de Tocqueville,

October 2002; and Julio A. Cirino, “Hacia una nueva ‘narcolandia’?” El

Tiempo, June 17, 2002.

8. Jorge Ramos, No Borders: A Journalist’s Search for Home,

Mexico: Rayo, 2003.

9. “Latin American Presidents in Ecuador Ask, Clay Who?” Miami

Herald, January 16, 2003.

10. Andres Openheimer, “Bush Policy toward Latin America Stuck

in Limbo,” Miami Herald, January 6, 2003.

11. K. Jack Bauer, The Mexican War, 1846-1848, New York:

Macmillan, 1974, pp. 279-323, 399. Also see Hubert Herring, A History

of Latin America, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972, pp. 309-313.

Reputedly, the best Mexican study is Jose Maria Roa Barcena,

Recuerdos de la Invasion Norte-Americana, 1846-1848, 3 volumes,

Mexico, 1947.

12. Julio A. Cirino, Terrorism in America: No Room for Spectators,

Buenos Aires, Argentina: Center for Hemispheric Studies Alexis de

Tocqueville, 2001, p. 2.

13. Ambassador Roger Noriega, U.S. Ambassador to the

Organization of American States (OAS), Statement to the OAS

Permanent Council “On Terrorism in Colombia,” February 13, 2003,

reported on http.//www.ciponline.org/demilita.htm. Also see Uribe,

Ramirez, Reich, and Abraham F. Lowenthal, “U.S. Can’t Afford to Turn

a Blind Eye to Latin America,” Chicago Tribune, December 15, 2002.

13
14. “The World in 2003,” The Economist, January 2003, pp. 81-87.

Also see Ibid.

15. Reported interview with Brazil’s Foreign Minister Celso

Amorim, by Andres Oppenheimer, “Region Offers No Support for War

Against Iraq,” Miami Herald, February 3, 2003.

16. Lars Schoultz, National Security and United States Policy

toward Latin America, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987,

pp. 322-324, 330.

17. Lowenthal, and Oppenheimer interview with Brazilian Foreign

Minister.

18. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret,

eds. and trans., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 88.

19. Ibid, pp. 88-89.

20. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Samuel B. Griffith, trans., Oxford:

Oxford University press, 1971, pp. 63-64; 77-79.

21. Clausewitz, pp. 92-93.

22. Author interview with Major General Henry Medina Uribe

(Colombian Army), Boston, MA, November 14, 2002.

23. President Alvaro Uribe, and Associated Press.

24. One example of such an accusation is that helicopter sales for

Colombia provided several millions of dollars to U.S. helicopter

manufacturers; author interviews, not for attribution.

25. Author interviews with General John R. Galvin, USA (Ret.),

Boston, MA, August 6, 1997, and General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC

(Ret.), Washington, DC, February 9, 2001, and June 22, 2001.

26. Ibid.

27. Statement by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld,

Defense Ministerial of the Americas, Santiago, Chile, November 19,

2002, reported by the U.S. Department of State’s Office of International

Information Programs.

28. Author interview, not for attribution.

14
29. Conference Brief, “Security in the Western Hemisphere:

International Terrorism and Organized Crime,” Strategic Forum, April

1998, National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic

Studies, pp. 1-4.

30. The bases of the recommendations that follow may be found in

Army International Activities Plan, Fiscal Years 2003-2004,

Washington, DC: Department of the Army, June 26, 2002; The Army

Strategic Planning Guidance (Draft), Washington, DC: Department of

the Army, June 10, 2002; and Max G. Manwaring, U.S. Security Policy

in the Western Hemisphere: Why Colombia, Why Now, and What Is To Be

Done? Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, June 2001.

15
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Author

Dr. Max G. Manwaring

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Ms. Kimberly A. Rockwell-Jacoby