Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Labor, HHS 

and Education, Committee on 

Appropriations, U.S. Senate 

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO 

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 11:00 a.m. EST 

Monday, January 23, 2006 MINE SAFETY

MSHA’s Programs for 

Ensuring the Safety and 

Health of Coal Miners Could 

Be Strengthened 

Statement for the Record by Robert E. Robertson, Director 

Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues 

GAO-06-370T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-370T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Robert E. 

Robertson at (202) 512-7215 or 

robertsonr@gao.gov.. 

Highlights of GAO-06-370T, a report to 

Subcommittee on Labor, HHS and 

Education, Committee on Appropriations, 

U.S. Senate 

January 23, 2006

MINE SAFETY

MSHA's Programs for Ensuring the Safety 

and Health of Coal Miners Could Be 

Strengthened 

As of 2003, to help ensure the safety and health of underground coal miners, 

MSHA staff reviewed and approved mine plans, conducted inspections, and 

investigated serious accidents. In these three areas, MSHA had extensive 

procedures and qualified staff. However, we concluded that MSHA could 

improve its oversight, guidance, and human-capital-planning efforts. 

We found that MSHA was not effectively monitoring a few key areas. MSHA 

headquarters did not ensure that 6-month inspections of ventilation and roof 

support plans were being completed on a timely basis. This failure could 

have led to mines operating without up-to-date plans or mine operators not 

following all requirements of the plans. Additionally, MSHA officials did not 

always ensure that hazards found during inspections were corrected 

promptly. Gaps were found in the information that MSHA used to monitor 

fatal and nonfatal injuries, limiting trend analysis and agency oversight. 

Specifically, the agency did not collect information on hours worked by 

independent contractors staff needed to compute fatality and nonfatal injury 

rates for specific mines, and it was difficult to link information on accidents 

at underground coal mines with MSHA’s investigations. 

We also concluded that the guidance provided by MSHA management to 

agency employees could be strengthened. Some inspections procedures 

were unclear and were contained in many sources, leading to differing 

interpretations by mine inspectors. The guidance on coordinating 

inspections conducted by specialists and regular inspectors was also 

unclear, resulting in some duplication of effort. 

Finally, as of 2003, although about 44 percent of MSHA’s underground 

coal mine inspectors were going to be eligible to retire within 5 years, the 

agency had no plan for replacing them or using other human capital 

flexibilities available to retain its highly qualified and trained inspectors. 

Miners Exiting an Underground Coal Mine 

The Chairman, Subcommittee on 

Labor, HHS and Education, Senate 

Committee on Appropriations, 

asked GAO to submit a statement 

for the record highlighting findings 

from our 2003 report on how well 

the Department of Labor’s Mine 

Safety and Health Administration 

(MSHA) oversees its process for 

reviewing and approving critical 

types of mine plans and the extent 

to which MSHA’s inspections and 

accident investigations processes 

help ensure the safety and health of 

underground coal miners. 

What GAO Recommends

In our September 2003 report, GAO 

recommended that MSHA 

• monitor the timeliness of 

inspections conducted as part 

of the 6-month review of 

certain mine plans; 

• ensure that mine operators are 

correcting hazards identified 

during inspections in a timely 

manner; 

• develop a plan for addressing 

anticipated shortages in the 

number of qualified inspectors 

due to upcoming retirements; 

and 

• revise the systems used to 

collect information on 

accidents and investigations.

Although MSHA did not comment 

on our recommendations in its 

written response to the report, it 

subsequently agreed to implement 

all of the recommendations. We 

have not, however, evaluated the 

effectiveness MSHA’s actions. 
Page i GAO-06-370T 

Letter 1

Background 2 

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 11 

Figures 

Figure 1: Fatality Rates for Underground and Surface Coal Mines, 

1993 to 2002 4 

Figure 2: Percentage of All Citations Issued from 1993 to 2002 for 

Which Inspectors Did Not Follow Up by the Specified 

Deadlines 9 

Contents 

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Page 1 GAO-06-370T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

I am pleased to have the opportunity to comment on important issues 

related to the recent tragedies in the coal mining community. The 

oversight that the Department of Labor’s Mine Safety and Health 

Administration (MSHA) provides over coal mines is an essential element 

of properly safeguarding the lives of the thousands of workers who 

provide us with much of the fuel needed to meet the increasing energy 

needs of our country. 

In 1977, Congress gave much of the responsibility for ensuring the safety 

and health of mine workers to MSHA. Since that time, the nation’s mines 

have become much safer—the number of deaths dropped dramatically in 

the past 25 years and injury rates are also lower. However, despite these 

trends, mining remains a dangerous industry, as the recent tragic deaths 

illustrate. Data collected by MSHA on serious injuries (those involving 

days away from work) shows that coal mining remains one of the most 

dangerous industries in the United States. 

My statement is based on work we reported in September 2003 and 

presents key findings and recommendations from that report.1

 That work 

was completed in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. 

In summary, we reported in 2003 that 

• Although MSHA devoted substantial effort to reviewing and approving 

mine plans, it did not provide adequate oversight of the plan approval 

process. MSHA had extensive procedures for approving mine plans 

and, for two of the three types of plans we reviewed—ventilation and 

roof support2

 plans—assigns highly qualified staff to the review and 

approval process. However, MSHA headquarters did not verify that 

mine operators were updating the plans as required. As a result, some 

mines may have been operating without adequate ventilation or roof 

support plans, which could have directly affected the safety and health 

of mine workers. 

 1

See U.S. General Accounting Office, Mine Safety: MSHA Devotes Substantial Effort to 

Ensuring the Safety and Health of Coal Miners, but Its Programs Could Be Strengthened, 

GAO-03-945 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 5, 2003). 

2

MSHA refers to these plans as “roof control” plans. 
Page 2 GAO-06-370T 

• MSHA had extensive procedures for conducting inspections of mines, 

had highly trained and experienced staff, and conducted most mine 

inspections as required. However, the extent to which the inspections 

process helped ensure the safety and health of mine workers was 

limited by several factors. For example, we found that, from 1993 to 

2002, MSHA headquarters did not provide adequate oversight to ensure 

that mine operators corrected hazards identified during inspections. In 

addition, as of 2003, MSHA had no plan for addressing the fact that 

about 44 percent of its inspectors were going to be eligible to retire 

within 5 years. 

• MSHA had a comprehensive process for conducting investigations of 

mine accidents, but it did not use the process to the fullest extent 

possible to improve the future safety and health of mine workers. 

Weaknesses in the databases MSHA used to track mine accidents and 

accident investigations limited its ability to monitor trends in mine 

hazards and ensure that all serious accidents were investigated. 

We made a number of recommendations to the Secretary of Labor 

designed improve MSHA’s ability to protect the safety and health of coal 

miners by providing better oversight over its operations and improving its 

mine plan review and approval, inspections, and accident investigation 

processes. We are pleased that MSHA has taken action to implement these 

recommendations. We have not, however, examined the effectiveness of 

the agency’s actions or the extent to which these actions have addressed 

the issues we reported in 2003. 

In passing the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (the “Mine 

Act”), Congress gave much of the responsibility for ensuring the safety and 

health of mine workers to MSHA. Under the stringent requirements of the 

Mine Act, MSHA must protect the health and safety of miners by 

thoroughly inspecting each underground coal mine at least four times a 

year, citing mine operators for violations of the Mine Act, ensuring that 

hazards are quickly corrected, restricting operations or closing mines for 

more serious violations, and investigating serious mine accidents. In 

addition, MSHA must approve the initial plans that mine operators prepare 

for essential systems that protect mine workers—such as ventilation and 

roof support systems—and revisions to the plans. To carry out these 

responsibilities, in 2003, MSHA had approximately 350 inspectors and 210 

specialists in eleven district offices. 

At the end of 2002, the United States had approximately 2,050 coal 

mines—about 700 underground coal mines and 1,350 surface mines. From 

1993 to 2002, the number of underground and surface coal mines in the 

Background 
Page 3 GAO-06-370T 

United States declined and the number of mine workers decreased. 

Despite this decrease in the number of mines and miners, production 

remained constant because of the increased use of mechanized mining 

equipment and more efficient mining techniques. In addition, over the past 

several decades, coal production has shifted from primarily underground 

mines to large surface mines, including mines in Wyoming and other areas 

west of the Mississippi that produce millions of tons of coal annually. 

Underground coal mines are more dangerous than surface mines for 

several reasons. One critical factor that contributes to the hazardous 

working conditions is highly explosive methane gas, which is often 

produced in large quantities when coal is extracted from underground 

mines. Additional factors are the geological conditions in many areas of 

the country that make the roofs of mines unstable, the danger posed by 

fire in an underground mine, coal and silica dust that can cause silicosis 

and pneumoconiosis (black lung disease), and the close proximity of 

unknown areas of abandoned mines, which can lead to flooding of the 

mine. As shown in figure 1, for the 10-year period from 1993 to 2002, 

fatality rates for underground coal mines were much higher than those for 

surface mines. 
Page 4 GAO-06-370T 

Figure 1: Fatality Rates for Underground and Surface Coal Mines, 1993 to 2002 

MSHA had extensive procedures and highly qualified staff for approving 

two of the three types of plans we reviewed—ventilation and roof support 

plans—and most of these plans were reviewed and approved on a timely 

basis. However, MSHA headquarters did not adequately monitor 

completion of required inspections of the ventilation and roof support 

plans; data maintained by the district offices indicates that some districts 

were not completing these inspections as required. In addition, MSHA 

headquarters had not provided clear guidance to the districts on 

coordinating inspections related to mine plans with quarterly inspections 

of underground coal mines in order to avoid duplication of effort by 

district staff. Finally, staffing shortages prevented MSHA from reviewing 

and approving plans for containing debris produced by the mines on a 

timely basis. 

MSHA had extensive procedures for approving ventilation and roof 

support plans. Mine operators were required to submit their initial 

ventilation and roof support plans to the MSHA district in which the mine 

was located for approval prior to operating a mine and were required to 

MSHA Devoted Substantial 

Effort to Approving Mine 

Plans, but Did Not Provide 

Adequate Oversight of the 

Approval Process 

1993

Year

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

0.00

0.01

0.02

0.03

0.04

0.05

0.06

0.07

0.08

Source: GAO analysis of MSHA data.

Fatality rate for underground coal mines

Fatality rate for surface coal mines

Fatality ratea
Page 5 GAO-06-370T 

submit revised plans to the district for approval at least every 6 months.3

The district managers were ultimately responsible for approving 

ventilation and roof support plans submitted to their districts. Generally, 

districts were required to approve ventilation and roof support plans 

within 45 days of receipt unless problems are found that must be resolved. 

In some of the districts we visited, state mine agencies were also required 

to approve the mine plans. We reviewed this information for a 5-year 

period, 1998 to 2002, and found that most districts approved these plans 

on a timely basis. 

However, MSHA headquarters did not adequately monitor completion of 

required inspections of ventilation and roof support plans by the district 

offices. Districts were required to conduct inspections at least once every 

6 months of the ventilation and roof support plans in order to ensure that 

mine operators were following the requirements of the plans and that they 

were updating the plans to reflect changes in the ventilation and roof 

support systems. The specialists who reviewed the mine plans during the 

approval process also conducted many of these inspections. Our analysis 

of the information submitted by the district offices to MSHA headquarters 

on the completion of these inspections for the 5-year period from 1998 to 

2002 indicated that several districts had not completed the inspections as 

required. As a result of districts not completing these inspections, some 

mines may have been operating without adequate ventilation or roof 

support plans. 

Inspections of the mines’ ventilation and roof support plans are essential 

in ensuring adequate airflow and controlling the accumulation of dust 

particles in underground coal mines as well as ensuring that the roofs are 

adequately supported. Inadequate ventilation systems or roof support 

systems can directly affect the safety and health of mine workers. For 

example, our review of MSHA’s data on fatalities at underground coal 

mines from 1998 to 2002 showed that problems related to ventilation and 

roof support systems accounted for high proportions of fatalities in 

underground coal mines. For this 5-year period, ignitions or explosions 

from excessive gas or coal dust accounted for the third largest percentage 

of all fatalities—14 percent—and roof falls accounted for the largest 

percentage—34 percent. 

 3

Mine operators were required to submit revised ventilation and roof support plans to the 

district for approval whenever significant changes were made to the plans. 
Page 6 GAO-06-370T 

In addition, MSHA did not always effectively coordinate its inspections of 

mine plans with the comprehensive quarterly inspections of underground 

coal mines in order to avoid duplication of effort by district staff. In two 

of the five districts we visited, we found that, in some instances, the 

specialists who conduct the inspections of mine plans and inspectors who 

conduct quarterly inspections were duplicating each other’s work, 

resulting in an inefficient use of MSHA’s resources. 

MSHA is also responsible for approving plans for containing mine debris, 

called impoundment plans.4

 As of 2003, MSHA had responsibility for 

approximately 600 coal impoundments. Many of these plans are extremely 

complex and require highly qualified engineers who are familiar with 

technical areas such as dam building techniques, hydrology, and soil 

conditions. Failure of an impoundment can be devastating to nearby 

communities, which may be flooded with water and sludge, and to the 

environment, affecting streams and water supplies for years afterwards. 

Because of the potential for failure, such as the impoundment dam failure 

in 1972 in Buffalo Creek, West Virginia, in which 125 people were killed 

and 500 homes were destroyed, MSHA is extremely careful about 

approving impoundment plans. 5

 

At the time of our 2003 report, MSHA had conducted two reviews of its 

procedures for approving impoundment plans, and has begun to take steps 

for improving the process. One review identified several weaknesses in the 

procedures, including the need for the agency to develop guidance for 

determining which impoundment plans should receive expedited review 

as well as evaluating the staffing levels needed to ensure timely and 

complete review of the plans. MSHA officials acknowledged that the 

delays in the review and approval of impoundment plans had been a 

problem for a number of years. They also told us that they had taken a 

number of steps to alleviate these delays, such as hiring additional 

engineers to review impoundment plans and provide assistance to staff in 

its district offices. 

 4

MSHA refers to the large embankment dams built to contain debris produced by the mines 

(debris that consists mainly of water, rock, and coal) as “impoundments.” 

5

The Bureau of Mines had responsibility for overseeing impoundments at the time of the 

Buffalo Creek disaster. 
Page 7 GAO-06-370T 

MSHA’s procedures for conducting inspections of underground coal mines 

were comprehensive; its inspectors were highly qualified; and it conducted 

almost all quarterly inspections as required, but the agency’s inspection 

process could be improved in a number of ways. Although MSHA had 

extensive inspection procedures, some of them were unclear, while others 

were difficult to locate because they were contained in so many different 

sources. In addition, MSHA conducted over 96 percent of required 

quarterly inspections each year over the 10-year period from 1993 to 2002, 

but MSHA headquarters did not provide adequate oversight to ensure that 

its district offices followed through to make sure that unsafe conditions 

identified during inspections were corrected by the deadlines set by 

inspectors. And, although MSHA had highly qualified inspectors, as of 

2003, it had no plan for addressing the fact that about a large percentage of 

them (44 percent) were going to be eligible to retire within 5 years. Finally, 

MSHA did not collect all of the information it needed to assess the 

effectiveness of its enforcement efforts because it did not collect data on 

contractor staff who work at each mine. 

Although MSHA had extensive inspection procedures, we found that some 

of them were unclear and were located in so many different sources that 

they could be difficult to find. Some procedures did not clearly specify the 

criteria inspectors should use in citing violations. For example, several 

district officials in two of the districts we visited told us that the lack of 

specific criteria for floating coal dust made it difficult to determine what 

was an allowable level. 6 As a result, mine inspectors had to rely on their 

own experience and personal opinion to determine if the accumulation of 

floating coal dust was a safety hazard that constituted a violation. In some 

instances, according to the inspectors and district managers, this led to 

inconsistencies in inspectors’ interpretations of the procedures; inspectors 

have cited violations for levels of floating coal dust that have not brought 

citations from other inspectors. In addition, the inspections procedures 

were located in so many different handbooks, manuals, policy bulletins, 

policy letters, and memorandums that it could be difficult for inspectors to 

make sure that they were using the most recent guidance and procedures. 

MSHA headquarters officials told us that they were working to clarify the 

agency’s procedures and consolidate the number of sources in which they 

were located. 

 6

MSHA referred to this as “float” coal dust. It is extremely combustible and can cause 

explosions in underground coal mines. 

MSHA Had Extensive 

Procedures, Highly 

Qualified Staff, and 

Conducted Most Quarterly 

Inspections as Required, 

but Its Inspection Process 

Could Have Been 

Improved 
Page 8 GAO-06-370T 

MSHA’s data on its quarterly inspection completion rates indicated that, 

from fiscal year 1993 to 2002, its district offices completed over 96 percent 

of these inspections as required. However, MSHA headquarters did not 

monitor district office performance to ensure that inspectors followed up 

with mine operators to determine that unsafe conditions identified during 

these inspections were corrected. The deadlines that inspectors set for 

mine operators to correct safety and health hazards varied based on a 

number of factors, including the degree of danger to miners affected by 

the violation. They ranged from 15 minutes from the time the inspector 

wrote the citation to 27 days afterwards. MSHA’s procedures required 

inspectors to follow up with mine operators within the deadline set or to 

extend the deadline. Inspectors could extend the deadlines under certain 

circumstances, such as when a mine had temporarily shut down its 

operations or when a mine operator was unable to obtain a part needed to 

correct a violation cited for a piece of equipment. 

Our analysis of MSHA’s data for the 10-year period from 1993 to 2002 

showed that, for almost half of the 536,966 citations for which a deadline 

was established, inspectors did not follow up in a timely manner to make 

sure mine operators had corrected the hazards.7

 However, as shown in 

figure 2, of the citations for which the inspectors did not follow up on a 

timely basis, they followed up on most within 4 days of the deadline and, 

for all but 11 percent of the citations, they followed up within 14 days. 

 7

MSHA did not set a deadline for correction of every type of violation. For example, 

inspectors were not required to set a deadline for an order in which the mine was closed 

due to “imminent danger.” 
Page 9 GAO-06-370T 

Figure 2: Percentage of All Citations Issued from 1993 to 2002 for Which Inspectors 

Did Not Follow Up by the Specified Deadlines

The more serious type of violations—“significant and substantial” 

violations—accounted for a significant proportion of the citations for 

which inspectors did not follow up by the deadlines. For the over 235,447 

significant and substantial violations from 1993 to 2002 for which a 

deadline was specified, inspectors did not follow up on more than 48 

percent of the citations by the deadline. However, inspectors followed up 

on all but about 10 percent of the citations for significant and substantial 

violations within 14 days of the deadline. 

MSHA headquarters and district officials told us that there were many 

different reasons why inspectors may not have followed up by the 

deadlines specified in their citations. One of these, according to several 

district officials, was scheduling conflicts that prevented inspectors from 

visiting the mine within the specified deadline. In addition, there were 

circumstances in which inspectors were not able to follow up, such as 

when a mine operator suspended a mine’s operations. However, in these 

instances, the inspector should have updated the database to show that 

the deadline was extended. 

In addition, although we found that, as of 2003, about 44 percent of 

MSHA’s highly trained and experienced underground coal mine inspectors 

would be eligible to retire within 5 years—and the agency’s historic 

attrition rates indicated that many of them would actually retire—the 

agency had not developed a plan for replacing these inspectors. MSHA 

also had fewer inspector trainees on board than vacancies that would need 
Page 10 GAO-06-370T 

to be filled when inspectors retired. MSHA headquarters officials told us 

that it would be difficult for them quickly hire and train replacements for 

the inspectors who retired. In addition to the fact that at least 18 months 

were needed to train each new inspector, it took the agency several 

months from the date an individual retired to advertise and fill each vacant 

position. As a result of losing these inspectors, MSHA may find it difficult 

to complete all quarterly inspections of underground coal mines. 

MSHA also did not collect all of the information on contractor staff who 

work in underground coal mines needed to assess the effectiveness of its 

enforcement activities. Because MSHA does not collect information on 

injuries to or hours worked by contractor staff who mine coal in each 

underground coal mine, it cannot calculate accurate fatality or nonfatal 

injury rates for mines that use contractor staff to mine coal—rates used to 

evaluate the effectiveness of its enforcement efforts. In addition, MSHA 

could not track trends in fatal or nonfatal injury rates at specific mines to 

use to target its enforcement resources. The fact that MSHA did not track 

the number of contractor staff who worked in each mine was important 

because the proportion of miners who work for contractors had grown 

significantly since 1981, when they represented only 5 percent of all mine 

workers. Our analysis showed that the percentage of underground coal 

miners who work for contractors increased from 13 percent in 1993 to 18 

percent in 2002, and the percentage who incurred nonfatal injuries also 

increased over this period.

MSHA had extensive guidance and thorough procedures for conducting 

accident investigations, but it did not use these investigations to the fullest 

extent to improve the future safety of mine workers. Although MSHA had 

detailed policies and rigorous requirements for how investigations must be 

conducted and reported, weaknesses in its databases made it difficult for 

MSHA to track key data on mine hazards and potentially useful indicators 

of its own performance. 

We made several recommendations in our report designed to improve 

MSHA’s operations. We recommended that the Secretary of Labor direct 

the Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and Health to 

• monitor the timeliness of inspections of ventilation and roof control 

plans to ensure that all inspections are completed by district offices as 

required; 

• monitor follow-up actions taken by its district offices to ensure that 

mine operators are correcting hazards identified during inspections on 

a timely basis; 

MSHA Had a 

Comprehensive Process 

for Conducting Accident 

Investigations, but Did Not 

Fully Utilize It to Prevent 

Future Accidents 
Page 11 GAO-06-370T 

• update and consolidate guidance provided to its district offices on plan 

approval and inspections to eliminate inconsistencies and outdated 

instructions, including clarifying guidance on coordinating regular 

quarterly inspections of mines with other inspections; 

• develop a plan for addressing anticipated shortages in the number of 

qualified inspectors due to upcoming retirements, including 

considering options such as streamlining the agency’s hiring process 

and offering retention allowances; 

• amend the guidance provided to independent contractors engaged in 

high-hazard activities requiring them to report information on the 

number of hours worked by their staff at specific mines so that MSHA 

can use this information to compute the injury and fatality rates used 

to measure the effectiveness of its enforcement efforts; and 

• revise the systems MSHA uses to collect information on accidents and 

investigations to provide better data on accidents and make it easier to 

link injuries, accidents, and investigations. 

MSHA did not comment on the recommendations in its written response 

to the report and disagreed with some of our findings. However, MSHA 

later agreed to implement all of the recommendations and provided us 

with information on how it had implemented or was in the process of 

implementing them. We are pleased that MSHA has taken action to 

implement these recommendations but note that we have not examined 

the effectiveness of the agency’s actions or the extent to which these 

actions have addressed the issues we reported in 2003. 

For further information, please contact Robert E. Robertson at (202) 512-

7215. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include 

Revae Moran and Karen Brown. 

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(130553) 
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