IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2017 WY 3

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2016

January 11, 2017

MATTHEW SCOTT WORLEY,

Appellant

(Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee

(Plaintiff).

MATTHEW SCOTT WORLEY,

Appellant

(Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee

(Plaintiff).

MATTHEW SCOTT WORLEY,

Appellant

(Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee

(Plaintiff).

S-15-0114

S-16-0082

S-16-0083
Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County

The Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

Representing Appellant:

Office of the Public Defender: Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. 

Olson, Chief Appellate Counsel. Argument by Ms. Olson.

Representing Appellee:

Peter K. Michael, Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy 

Attorney General; Christyne Martens, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Timothy 

W. Miller, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Miller.

Before BURKE, C.J., and HILL, DAVIS, FOX, and KAUTZ, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. 

Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, 

Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made 

before final publication in the permanent volume.
1

KAUTZ, Justice.

[¶1] A jury convicted Matthew Scott Worley of one count of first-degree sexual assault 

and one count of battery of a household member.1 On appeal, Mr. Worley claims he 

received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the prosecutor failed to disclose 

information as required by Brady v. Maryland, 371 U.S. 812, 83 S. Ct. 56, 9 L. Ed. 2d 54 

(1962) and the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain the battery conviction. We 

affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2] Mr. Worley presents the following issues on appeal:

I. Was trial counsel for [Mr. Worley] ineffective when 

he failed to challenge the credibility of the alleged 

victim?

II. Did the prosecutor commit misconduct when he failed 

to disclose exculpatory evidence relating to the 

alleged victim?

III. Was there sufficient evidence to support [Mr. 

Worley’s] conviction of battery?

FACTS

[¶3] On Thanksgiving Day of 2013, Officers Ryan Mussell and Dennis Deur with the 

Gillette Police Department responded to a report of a 911 hang up call. They responded 

to the address in question and first made contact with Mr. Worley. Mr. Worley invited 

the officers inside, and Officer Mussell interviewed Mr. Worley while Officer Deur 

interviewed Mr. Worley’s wife, Rebecca Worley. Officer Mussell learned that, although 

Mr. and Mrs. Worley were married, Mr. Worley did not live at the apartment with Mrs. 

Worley. Mr. Worley also told Officer Mussell that he thought Mrs. Worley would claim 

that Mr. Worley punched her in the face. Mr. Worley explained that he had been 

drinking whiskey throughout the day and did not recall punching his wife in the face. 

[¶4] Officer Deur observed cut marks on Mrs. Worley’s collarbone and noticed that her 

right eye was swollen. Mrs. Worley told Officer Deur that Mr. Worley had hit her with 

 

1 At the time the State filed charges in this matter, battery of a household member was a crime under 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501(b) and (f) (Lexis Nexis 2013). In July 2014, the Wyoming legislature repealed 

§ 6-2-501(f) and created a separate crime of domestic assault. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-501 and 6-2-

510 (Lexis Nexis 2015). The repeal of that portion of the statute, however, did not affect any of the 

charges in Mr. Worley’s pending prosecution. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 8-1-107 (Lexis Nexis 2015).
2

an open hand, and then, while she was performing fellatio on Mr. Worley, he told her she 

was “doing it wrong” and punched her in the face. Based on Mrs. Worley’s injuries, the 

officers arrested Mr. Worley for battery. 

[¶5] At the police station, Mrs. Worley gave Officer Deur further information about the 

events of the evening. Mrs. Worley stated that Mr. Worley forced her to perform fellatio 

by saying if she did not, he would “beat her ass.” She further alleged that Mr. Worley 

forced her to engage in anal sex followed by more fellatio. She said that Mr. Worley was 

holding an open folding knife and told her he would kill her if she did not comply. She 

also told Officer Deur that Mr. Worley had cut three moles off of her body with a pair of 

scissors without her consent. Mrs. Worley explained she had fled the apartment and hid 

in the basement of the building. Once she believed Mr. Worley had left the building, she 

returned to her apartment and attempted to barricade the door with a coffee table, couch 

and chair. However, Mr. Worley returned and forced his way back into the apartment. 

Mrs. Worley tried to lock herself in the bathroom, but Mr. Worley broke his way into the 

bathroom. It was then that Mrs. Worley called for law enforcement assistance. 

[¶6] The State charged Mr. Worley with two counts of first-degree sexual assault (one 

for fellatio and one for anal penetration), one count of aggravated assault and battery, and 

one count of battery of a household member. The case proceeded to a two day jury trial. 

Mrs. Worley testified about the events of that day and was extensively cross-examined 

regarding her recollection. Mr. Worley also testified. He did not deny cutting a mole 

from his wife’s body, striking her, or engaging in sexual conduct with her that day. 

However, he testified that the behavior was consensual and that “rough sex” was not 

unusual in their relationship. The State presented a cell phone video found on Mr. 

Worley’s phone that showed Mr. Worley strike his wife in the face several times while 

she was performing fellatio. The jury convicted Mr. Worley of one count of first-degree 

sexual assault (fellatio) and battery of a household member. It acquitted him of the other 

charge of first-degree sexual assault (anal penetration) and aggravated assault and battery. 

[¶7] Mr. Worley timely appealed his convictions and filed a motion under Wyoming 

Rule of Appellate Procedure 21, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel. Mr. Worley argued that his trial attorney could have done more to attack Mrs. 

Worley’s credibility using evidence under Wyoming Rules of Evidence 404(b), 608(a) 

and 609. Specifically, he claimed that his trial counsel did not investigate Mrs. Worley’s 

previous criminal convictions, including felony convictions, or statements she made in a 

neglect case involving their two children. 

[¶8] Following a hearing in which the district court heard testimony from Mr. Worley’s 

trial attorney, the court concluded that Mr. Worley had not established ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel. The district court acknowledged that the ineffective assistance 

of counsel standard required Mr. Worley to prove that counsel’s performance was 

deficient and that performance was prejudicial to the outcome of his case. However, the 
3

court determined it did not need to evaluate whether counsel’s performance was deficient 

because Mr. Worley could not prove prejudice. The district court concluded that no 

amount of impeachment evidence could overcome the video of Mr. Worley repeatedly 

striking his wife while she performed fellatio. Additionally, Mr. Worley testified that the 

video recording was an accurate depiction of the events portrayed, giving further 

credence to the video. Mr. Worley now appeals that decision and also argues that there 

was prosecutorial misconduct and insufficient evidence presented at the trial.

 

DISCUSSION

1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

[¶9] Mr. Worley argues his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to conduct a 

sufficient investigation into Mrs. Worley’s criminal history and some allegedly false 

statements she made to the Department of Family Services in a neglect case involving 

their children. He argues that had counsel conducted a more thorough investigation, he 

would have discovered information that could have been used to further impeach Mrs. 

Worley during her trial testimony. As mentioned above, the district court held an 

evidentiary hearing under W.R.A.P. 21 and determined that Mr. Worley did not establish 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel requiring a new trial. When reviewing the district 

court’s decision, we utilize the following standard of review:

Review of a trial court’s ruling on an ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim involves mixed questions of law and fact. 

Osborne [v. State, 2012 WY 123], ¶ 17, 285 P.3d [248,] 252 

[(Wyo. 2012)]. We defer to the district court’s findings of 

fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Cooper [v. State, 2014 

WY 36], ¶ 20, 319 P.3d [914,] 920 [(Wyo. 2014)], citing 

Strandlien v. State, 2007 WY 66, ¶ 20, 156 P.3d 986, 992 

(Wyo. 2007). The district court’s conclusions of law, which 

include the question of whether counsel’s conduct was 

deficient and the question of whether the appellant was 

prejudiced by that deficient conduct, are reviewed de novo. 

Strandlien, ¶ 20, 56 P.3d at 992, quoting Robinson v. State, 

2003 WY 32, ¶ 16, 64 P.3d 743, 748 (Wyo. 2003).

Griggs v. State, 2016 WY 16, ¶ 37, 367 P.3d 1108, 1124 (Wyo. 2016).

[¶10] In order to prove he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel necessitating a 

new trial, Mr. Worley is required to show two things. First, he must demonstrate his trial 

counsel’s performance was deficient. Id., ¶ 36, 367 P.3d at 1124. To show deficient 

performance, Mr. Worley must demonstrate that “‘counsel failed to render such 

assistance as would have been offered by a reasonably competent attorney.’” Id. 
4

(quoting Cooper, ¶ 19, 319 P.3d at 920). Second, Mr. Worley must show that he was 

prejudiced by his trial counsel’s deficient performance. Id. “Prejudice is established if ‘a 

reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome 

would have been different.’” Id. (quoting Osborne, ¶ 19, 285 P.3d at 252). Although 

Mr. Worley must affirmatively show both of these factors, courts are not required to 

analyze both factors if a defendant makes an insufficient showing of one of the factors. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). 

Further, courts need not analyze whether counsel’s performance was deficient before 

considering whether the defendant suffered prejudice. Id.

[¶11] Here, the district court disposed of Mr. Worley’s claim on the prejudice factor and 

did not consider whether trial counsel’s performance was deficient. Specifically, the 

district court concluded that even if each piece of proposed evidence had been used to 

further attack Mrs. Worley’s credibility, the jury would have reached the same verdict. 

Based on the trial testimony, the court found Mrs. Worley’s testimony generally not 

credible due to inconsistencies and failures of logic. However, the jury saw the video of 

Mrs. Worley performing fellatio while being struck repeatedly by Mr. Worley, saw a 

photo of the mole that Mr. Worley cut from his wife’s body, and heard Mr. Worley’s 

testimony admitting to all of this behavior. The court concluded the jury members also 

likely found Mrs. Worley not credible but could not disregard what they saw with their 

own eyes. The jury convicted Mr. Worley of the crimes associated with the behavior 

contained in the video and photo, while acquitting him of the crimes to which there was 

no video or photographic evidence. 

[¶12] The district court’s findings of fact are fully supported by the record. While trial 

counsel did not use Mrs. Worley’s criminal history or statements to the Department of 

Family Services, he did extensively and effectively cross-examine Mrs. Worley. That 

cross-examination brought out many inconsistencies and other problems with her 

testimony. While Mrs. Worley’s testimony is suspect at best, this Court has also seen the 

video, photographs of the victim taken when law enforcement officers arrived, and the 

photographs of the mole, and agrees with the district court’s conclusion that this evidence 

is damning. The video and photographic evidence is even more compelling because Mr. 

Worley testified the video accurately depicted his sexual encounter with his wife, and that 

he hit her several times in the face. Based upon the video and Mr. Worley’s admissions, 

we conclude—just as the district court did—that even if trial counsel had discovered and 

utilized the evidence Mr. Worley claims he should have, there is not a reasonable 

probability the result of the proceeding would have been different. Therefore, Mr. 

Worley has failed to demonstrate he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

2. Prosecutorial Misconduct

[¶13] Mr. Worley contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by failing to 

disclose information required by Brady. Specifically, Mr. Worley argues the prosecutor 
5

failed to notify Mr. Worley and his trial counsel about a plea agreement Mrs. Worley 

received in an unrelated case. The question of whether evidence was improperly 

withheld under Brady is of constitutional magnitude; therefore, we review this claim de 

novo. Wilkening v. State, 2007 WY 187, ¶ 7, 172 P.3d 385, 386 (Wyo. 2007).

[¶14] In Brady, the United States Supreme Court stated that “‘suppression by the 

prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where 

the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or 

bad faith of the prosecution.’” Id., ¶ 7, 172 P.3d at 386-87 (quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 

87, 83 S. Ct. at 1196-97). The Court later held that due process also requires the 

prosecution to disclose impeachment evidence, including plea agreements made with 

witnesses. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3380, 87 L.

Ed. 2d 481 (1985); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S. Ct. 763, 766, 31 L.

Ed. 2d 104 (1972). In order to demonstrate a Brady violation, Mr. Worley has the burden 

of showing three things: (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence was 

favorable to the defense; and (3) the evidence was material because there is a reasonable 

probably that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceedings would have 

been different. Wilkening, ¶ 7, 172 P.3d at 387. 

[¶15] Mr. Worley’s Brady claim fails for two reasons. First, the record does not contain 

the plea agreement Mr. Worley claims was suppressed by the prosecution. Piecing 

together different parts of the record, it appears Mrs. Worley had been charged with 

taking a controlled substance into a jail, but that charge was dismissed as part of a plea 

agreement in a separate forgery case. She also may have received first offender treatment 

under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-301 (LexisNexis 2015) for the forgery charge. 

Importantly, however, the specific terms of the plea agreement are not in the record and, 

therefore, we are left to speculate about the content of the plea agreement and its potential 

impact on Mrs. Worley’s testimony and credibility in the case against her husband. This 

Court will not rely on speculation in reviewing a Brady claim. See Mascarenas v. State, 

2003 WY 124, ¶ 18, 76 P.3d 1258, 1265 (Wyo. 2003); see also Wilkening, ¶ 9, 172 P.3d 

at 387.

[¶16] Second, without a complete record regarding Mrs. Worley’s plea agreement, it is 

difficult for this Court to determine the materiality of the agreement. However, we are 

certain that additional impeachment material would not have led to a reasonable 

probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. As mentioned 

above, Mrs. Worley was extensively cross-examined and was not perceived as a credible 

witness by trial counsel, the district court, and most likely the jury. Although this 

evidence may have given the jury another reason to question Mrs. Worley’s veracity, it 

merely would have been cumulative to the other evidence and testimony questioning her 

veracity. It is unlikely the plea agreement is material to Mr. Worley’s defense. See 

Kovach v. State, 2013 WY 46, ¶ 21, 299 P.3d 97, 104 (Wyo. 2013) (evidence that is 
6

cumulative is not material). For these reasons, Mr. Worley has failed to establish a Brady

violation.

3. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[¶17] Finally, Mr. Worley claims the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain his 

conviction for battery of a household member. When reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence:

this Court examines the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the State. Faubion v. State, 2010 WY 79, ¶ 12, 233 P.3d 

926, 929 (Wyo. 2010). We accept all evidence favorable to 

the State as true and give the State’s evidence every favorable 

inference which can reasonably and fairly be drawn from it. 

We also disregard any evidence favorable to the appellant that 

conflicts with the State’s evidence. Id.

Harnden v. State, 2016 WY 92, ¶ 5, 378 P.3d 611, 612-13 (Wyo. 2016) (quoting Pena v. 

State, 2015 WY 149, ¶ 16, 361 P.3d 862, 866 (Wyo. 2015)).

[¶18] Mr. Worley’s argument, however, is not the run of the mill sufficiency of the 

evidence claim. Instead of arguing that the State did not present sufficient evidence of 

any particular element of battery, he argues the record does not indicate which facts the 

jury unanimously determined constituted the element of bodily injury—whether it was 

Mr. Worley cutting the mole from Mrs. Worley’s body or striking her in the face while 

she performed fellatio. Mr. Worley likens this situation to that found in Tanner v. State, 

2002 WY 170, ¶ 14, 57 P.3d 1242, 1246 (Wyo. 2002), wherein we required the State to 

affirmatively choose which theory it was pursuing in a prosecution when the crime 

charged contained alternative elements. 

[¶19] Mr. Worley’s reliance on Tanner is misplaced. The crime of battery does not 

contain any alternative elements and, therefore, the State did not need to elect one 

alternative element over another. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501 (LexisNexis 2015). Mr. 

Worley has not provided any authority that suggests the jury must be unanimous 

regarding what facts constituted the elements of each crime. In fact, United States 

Supreme Court precedent is directly contrary to that position. In Schad v. Arizona, 501 

U.S. 624, 632, 111 S. Ct 2491, 115 L. Ed. 2d 555 (1991), the Court stated, “Plainly there 

is no general requirement that the jury reach agreement on the preliminary factual issues 

which underlie the verdict.” Id. (citing McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 449 

(1990) (Blackmun, J., concurring)). The Court reiterated that stance in Richardson v. 

United States, 526 U.S. 813, 119 S. Ct. 1707, 143 L. Ed. 2d 985 (1999):
7

The question before us arises because a federal jury 

need not always decide unanimously which of several 

possible sets of underlying brute facts make up a particular 

element, say, which of several possible means the defendant 

used to commit an element of the crime. Schad v. Arizona, 

501 U.S. 624, 631-32, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 

(1991) (plurality opinion); Anderson v. United States, 170 

U.S. 481, 499-501, 18 S.Ct. 689, 42 L.Ed. 1116 (1898). 

Where, for example, an element of robbery is force or the 

threat of force, some jurors might conclude that the defendant 

used a knife to create the threat; others might conclude he use 

a gun. But that disagreement—a disagreement about 

means—would not matter as long as all 12 jurors 

unanimously concluded that the Government had proved the 

necessary related element, namely, that the defendant had 

threatened force. See McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 

433, 449, 110 S.Ct. 1227, 108 L.Ed.2d 369 (1990) 

(Blackmun, J., concurring).

Id. at 817. 

[¶20] Here, Mr. Worley committed various acts that caused Mrs. Worley bodily injury, 

and which of those particular acts the individual jurors relied upon is irrelevant. So long 

as all twelve jurors concluded he caused bodily injury, the State appropriately carried its 

burden of proof. The jury saw photographs taken by law enforcement officers that 

showed marks on Mrs. Worley’s body where moles had been removed and a photo of a 

mole lying near the bathroom sink. Mrs. Worley testified Mr. Worley cut the moles from 

her body, and Mr. Worley admitted to removing one of those moles. Furthermore, the 

jury watched the video of Mr. Worley repeatedly slapping his wife, saw photos of Mrs. 

Worley’s injuries, heard Mrs. Worley testify that Mr. Worley struck her in the face, and 

Mr. Worley admitted to hitting his wife in the face. Regardless of which act or acts the 

individual jury members relied upon, the State presented more than sufficient evidence at 

trial that Mr. Worley caused his wife bodily injury. 

CONCLUSION

[¶21] After a thorough review of the entire record, we conclude that Mr. Worley was not 

prejudiced by his trial counsel’s performance and he has failed to demonstrate the State 

committed a Brady violation. Furthermore, the State presented sufficient evidence that 

Mr. Worley caused his wife’s bodily injury. 

[¶22] Affirmed.