INTERNAL WARS:

RETHINKING PROBLEM

AND RESPONSE

Max G. Manwaring

September 2001
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ISBN 1-58487-068-0

ii
FOREWORD

Dr. Max Manwaring wrote this monograph in res

to the fact that today over half the countries in the 

community are faced with one variation or anot

asymmetric guerrilla war. Insurgencies, internal war

other small-scale contingencies (SSCs) are the 

pervasive and likely type of conflict in the post-Col

era. That the United States will become involved dire

indirectly in some of these conflicts is almost certai

Balkans, Colombia, Mexico, Somalia, and the Phili

are only a few cases in point. Yet, little or no recognitio

application of the strategic-level lessons of the Vietna

and the hundreds of other smaller conflicts that have 

place over the past several years are evident.

The purpose of this monograph is not to find fa

identify villains. It is to draw from the lessons of the 

past to better prepare today’s civilian and military le

to meet the unconventional and asymmetric w

challenges that face the United States and the rest 

international community. This country is in a new 

security environment that involves the integration 

markets, technologies, and countries to a degree 

before witnessed. The growling, nuclear-armed Sovie

was relatively easy to understand and deal with. The 

“smaller” threats—and benefits—that stem from 

integration are not easy to understand and respond t

as the country that benefits most from global integr

the United States has a pressing national inter

maintaining and enhancing the new order. By com

grips analytically with the most salient strategic less

rules that dominate contemporary SSCs, politica

military leaders can maximize opportunities in the c

and future chaos.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offe

monograph, the second of our “Studies in Asymmet

iii
part of the ongoing refinement of our na

understanding of the strategic risks and opportu

arising from asymmetry.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iv
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTH

MAX G. MANWARING is a Professor of Military St

at the U.S. Army War College. He is a retired U.S. 

colonel and Adjunct Professor of Political Scien

Dickinson College. He has served in various civilia

military positions at the U.S. Army War College, th

Southern Command, and the Defense Intelligence A

Dr. Manwaring holds a B.S. in Economics as well as 

an M.A., and a Ph.D. in Political Science from 

University of Illinois. A graduate of the U.S. Arm

College, Dr. Manwaring’s areas of expertise include 

of grand strategy, U.S. national security polic

strategy, military strategy, military and nonm

operations other than war, political-military affair

Latin America. Dr. Manwaring is the author and co-a

of several articles, chapters, and reports dealing 

political-military affairs. He is also the editor or co-ed

El Salvador at War; Gray Area Phenomena: Confronti

New World Disorder; Managing Contemporary Co

Pillars of Success; Beyond Declaring Victory and C

Home: The Challenges of Peace and Stability Opera

and Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century.

v
SUMMARY

The end of the Cold War did not produce an e

internal or regional conflict and the expected 

dividend. Today, over half the countries in the interna

community are faced with one variation or anot

asymmetric small (i.e., guerrilla) wars. Insurge

internal wars, and other small-scale contingencies (

are the most pervasive and likely type of conflict in th

world order. It is almost certain that, sooner or late

United States will become involved, directly or indirec

many of these conflicts. It is also certain that the depl

experience of Vietnam distorts and blurs Ame

thinking about guerrilla insurgency. As a result, 

appears to be little or no recognition and application 

strategic-level lessons of the Vietnam War an

hundreds of other smaller conflicts that have taken 

over the past several years.

These lessons are not being lost on the new po

actors emerging into the contemporary multi-polar 

security arena. Ironically, strategies being develop

protect or further the interests of a number of new p

on the international scene are inspired by the dual i

evading and frustrating superior conventional m

force within the global chaos. The better a power such 

United States becomes at the operational le

conventional war, the more a potential opponent tu

asymmetric solutions. Thus, the purpose of this mono

is to draw from the lessons of the recent past to 

prepare today’s civilian and military leaders fo

unconventional and asymmetric warfare challenge

face the United States and the rest of the global comm

To help leaders come to grips analytically with th

salient strategic lessons and rules that dom

contemporary asymmetry, we do four things. Fir

clarify the strategic lessons of Vietnam. These l

vii
provide a short list of fundamental rules for dealin

contemporary conflict. Second, with this as backgrou

develop lessons from several other guerrilla wars tha

taken place since the end of World War II

complementary lessons from 69 additional 

demonstrate important “intermediate” rules for play

the contemporary global security arena. Third, we ex

the future of guerrilla war. This examination includ

analysis of the signposts along the road to the 21st ce

and concludes that the hard-learned lessons of th

remain valid. Finally, we outline two “advanced” stru

rules for generating strategic clarity and success in c

and future conflict. All this, hopefully, will genera

broad strategic vision necessary to win a war—not ju

battles, but the war itself.

The Fundamental Strategic Lessons of Vietnam

Relearning from the Theory and Experience

of the Past.

If the lessons of Vietnam teach anything, they tea

need to go back to basics. The fact that the U.S. armed 

were never defeated on the Vietnam battlefield ob

another important fact of that war. Although Am

forces never lost a battle, in the end it was the Vietcon

their North Vietnamese allies who achieved their str

objectives and emerged victorious. Americans though

were fighting a limited war of attrition against a trad

enemy—dressed in black pajamas. The threat the 

Vietnamese government and the United States had t

with was not a limited or a traditional one. Rathe

Vietcong—on another level, and dressed in their c

black pajamas—were making unconventional prepar

to take control of the state.

This reality takes us back to where we began. It ta

to the question: “How could the United States have w

the battles in Vietnam, but lose the war?” The ans

straight-forward. American leadership failed to app

viii
fundamental principles of military theory and 

strategy in that conflict. More specifically:

• The assessment of the nature of the conflic

incorrect.

• The strategic environment within which the wa

taking place was misunderstood or ignored.

• The primary centers of gravity were not carefu

continually assessed, prioritized, or consider

nonmilitary (e.g., socio-political) terms.

• There was no appreciation of the centrality of rec

and moral legitimacy in supporting the counter-gu

effort.

• These fundamental principles were not br

together and put into a strategic paradigm through wh

understand and conduct the war.

The central unifying theme of these lessons is de

The instruments of national power must be orga

trained, and equipped within prescribed budg

considerations. But, those actions must be preceded 

clear, holistic, and logical policy direction—an

structure, roles, missions, and strategy that will ensu

achievement of the political ends established in that 

This is a fundamental “rule” that is as valid for curre

future conflict as it has been in the past.

Lessons from 69 Post-World War II Internal Wa

Intermediate “Rules” for Playing

in the Contemporary Global Security Arena.

In the mid-1980s practitioners and academics dee

important to begin to face the so-called Vietnam syn

and try to understand the variables that mak

difference between wining and losing asymmetric gu

wars. The intent was to improve prospects for succ

contemporary and future internal conflict situations 

do a better job of protecting and advancing U.S. na

ix
interests in the developing global instability. One 

effort, never widely publicized, was initiated in 1984 b

Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army General M

Thurman.

The results of most of the mandated researc

available at the National Security Archives in Washi

DC. There is nothing really startling or radical about 

The results suggest basic security strategy and nation

international asset management. Importantly, how

the research points out that no successful strategy, on 

side of the conflict spectrum, has been formulated ov

past 50 years that has not explicitly or implicitly take

account all the following strategic dimensions—or 

within the general internal war. They are:

• A “legitimacy war” to attack or defend the mora

of an incumbent regime to exist.

• A more traditional police-military “shooting 

between belligerents.

• “Wars” to isolate belligerents from their in

and/or external support.

• A closely related “war to stay the course”—that 

effort to provide consistent and long-term support to a

• Intelligence and information “wars.”

• “Wars” to unify multilateral, multidimensiona

multi-organizational elements into a single effective e

It is important to note that the application of 

dynamic elements in a successful grand strategy sub

a realistic strategic vision and policy that is based 

fundamental principles discussed in the previous sec

The Future of Asymmetric Internal Wars: Som

Signposts on the Road Ahead.

Even though prudent armies must prepare for hig

low-probability conventional war, there is a high prob

x
that the President and Congress of the United Stat

continue to require military participation in small in

guerrilla wars well into the future. These wars will 

have new names, new motives, and new levels of vi

that will be a new part of the old problem. Neverth

whether they are called “Teapot wars,” “Camou

wars,” “Unrestricted wars,” “Operations Other Than 

or something else, future guerrilla wars can be identif

the lowest common denominator of motive. And

corollary, whether they are considered “spi

insurgencies,” “commercial insurgencies,” or anythin

guerrillas wars are the organized application of viol

nonmilitary coercion or threatened coercion intend

resist, oppose, change, or overthrow an ex

government, and to bring about political change.

It is daunting and sometimes overwhelming to th

the implications for guerrillas, or other self-app

saviors, who might employ nuclear, chemical, biol

electronic, and informational weapons to attain 

objectives. Thus, although present and future asym

conflicts may have different trappings, it is impera

remember the lessons of the past. The continuing rele

of relatively recent experience can be seen in on

conflicts. That is:

• Moral legitimacy remains the most impo

principle of the post-World War II era. It can been se

examples, in the Kurdish problem in Iraq, Iran, Turke

Russia from at least 1961 to the present; Sierra Leone 

1991; the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria since 199

in Chechnya since 1999.

• Appropriate use of military force is still a key el

in determining success or failure of counterguerrilla 

Importantly, the irrelevance of heavy Russian m

equipment and conventional training can be seen 

Peruvian effort against the Sendero Luminoso, and 

Ethiopian case.

xi
• The logical need to isolate belligerents from sou

support is obvious in any number of contemporary 

Two contemporary examples are Colombia and Chec

In Colombia, the insurgent alliance formed 

narco-traffickers is providing generous financial assi

in return for protection of narcotics operation

Chechnya—and earlier in Afghanistan—the war a

Russian domination would be impossible wi

substantial outside aid from state and nonstate po

actors.

• In this connection, the need to “stay the c

remains constant. Without outside aid and in

support, the Irish Republican Army could not fu

effectively in Northern Ireland. Likewise, the M

Eastern Kurds would be unable to carry on their camp

for national liberation.

• Intelligence and information are more vital tha

to the success or failure of contemporary guerrilla 

Some argue, for example, that the failure of the st

operations in Somalia was due in large part to a fai

the United States and United Nations (U.N.) to d

adequate and timely human intelligence. On the 

hand, and as only one example, information camp

have been key to the success of the Zapatista insurge

Mexico.

• Unity of Effort is the last principle that will be 

here. Suffice it to say that the many problems of th

operation in the Congo (UNOC), the U.N. operat

Somalia (UNOSOM II), the U.N. operations in the f

Yugoslavia, and the NATO operations in Bosnia and K

stem from a lack of unity of effort among the v

players.

As in the past, to the extent that these fact

dimensions are strongly present in any given strategy

favor success. To the extent that any one is absent, o

present in a weak form, the probability of succ

minimal.

xii
Two Advanced Structural “Rules” for Success

in the Global Security Arena.

Two characteristics of asymmetric guerrilla t

have been identified as particularly significant. 

defense planners today cannot know precisely what 

threats will emerge and what types will prove eff

Second, the effectiveness of asymmetric threats tha

an impact will sooner or later decline as an enemy ad

Some argue that by maximizing conceptua

organizational adaptability and flexibility, the U

States can assure that it will rapidly counter em

asymmetric threats, and speed the process by wh

threat becomes insignificant or ineffective. Ph

differently, in a time of strategic fluidity and asym

like the current one, the political actor that develop

concepts and concomitant leader judgment—and un

organizational structure—better and more quickly th

opponent will have a decided advantage.

Given today’s realities, failure to prepare adequat

small war (i.e., guerrilla) contingencies is unconscio

At a minimum, there are two basic cultural and o

zational imperatives. They are:

• Leader Judgment. In that context, there are s

fundamental educational and cultural requireme

modify Cold War mind-sets and to develop the 

judgment that is needed to deal effectively with ambi

complex, politically dominated, multidimens

multi-organizational, multinational, and multicu

internal war situations. The study of conventional w

always been considered to be essential preparati

leaders involved in war. The study of “unconvent

asymmetric war is no less essential.

• Unity of Effort. Operations at any level will a

strategic clarity and maximum effectiveness as a re

integrating both horizontal and vertical plannin

implementation processes from the outset. Th

xiii
integrating horizontal (i.e., multinational) pol

military planning and operations with vertical na

(e.g., U.S. interagency) political-military plannin

operations achieves a synergy toward the achievemen

agreed political vision. These are two fundam

organizational mechanisms necessary to help elim

“strategic ambiguity,” “ad-hoc-ery,” and “mission-cre

Conclusions.

These are lessons that should have been learned 

the U.S. experience in Vietnam, and the analysis of a 

sample of other relatively recent small (i.e., guerrilla) 

The value of the ideas or “rules” derived from 

experience lies in their utility as a conceptual fram

within which data from specific situations might be 

and understood. If American and other leaders co

these ideas not as a template, but, with serious inten

may be able to translate battlefield courage, log

superiority, and tactical victories into strategic succes

the current and future asymmetric global security a

xiv
INTERNAL WARS:

RETHINKING PROBLEM AND RESPONS

The end of the Cold War did not produce an e

internal or regional conflict and the expected 

dividend. Ethiopia, the Balkans, Sudan, Mexico, an

Philippines are cases in point. As this monograph is 

written, over half the countries in the global commun

faced with one variation or another on guerrilla 

Insurgencies, internal wars, and other small

contingencies, then, appear to be the most pervasiv

most likely type of conflict in the new world order

almost certain that, sooner or later, the United Stat

become involved in some of these small (i.e., guerrilla) 

It is also certain that the deplorable experience of Vi

distorts and blurs American thinking about gu

insurgency. Yet, the post-Vietnam experiences in 

guerrillas in Afghanistan and helping to combat insu

in El Salvador demonstrate that the United State

operate with or against guerrillas under di

circumstances and achieve important objectives.

2

What we hear and see in the year 2001 

encouraging, however. Three examples should suf

make the point. First, the debate regarding the transi

the armed forces into a viable instrument of U.S. na

power for now and into the 21st century centers 

categorical need for X number of Army divisions, X n

of Navy ships, and X number of Air Force squadron

also hear of the need to defend outer space and the nee

missile shield to protect the United States and its a

The questions unanswered in these debates are: “Wh

what purposes? Against whom? And, how will these 

be used to achieve a political end?” It would appear th

civilian and military leaders avoiding these questio

still expecting some equivalent of Soviet combined 

1
armies to come crashing into West Germany, or Iraqi a

to again maneuver in the open desert.

In this connection, there appears to be no recogni

the fact that the lessons of the Vietnam War, the P

Gulf War, and any of the hundreds of smaller conflict

have taken place over the past several years are not 

lost on the new political actors emerging int

contemporary multipolar global security arena. Iron

strategies being developed to protect or further the int

of a number of new players on the international sce

inspired by the dual idea of evading and frust

superior conventional military force.

4

 The better a 

such as the United States becomes at the operational l

conventional war, the more a potential opponent tu

asymmetrical solutions.

5

 Ralph Peters warns us t

current and future conflict, “Wise competitors . . . wi

to shift the playing field away from conventional m

confrontations toward unconventional forms of assa

Only the foolish will fight fair.”

6

Third, U.S. policy tends to ignore the guerrilla thr

general instability and specific counterdrug e

Examples over the past several years from Thaila

Southeast Asia to Colombia in South America demon

that American advice, training, and equipment may b

only against illegal drug traffickers. That has been a d

problem in a large number of lethal confrontations w

is virtually impossible to distinguish armed oppone

either insurgents or narcotraffickers—until after th

and probably too late. The rationale behind the prac

ignoring the guerrilla reality while confronting the 

narcotrafficker threat within the same opera

environment is that if the United States allows its adv

weaponry, and equipment to be used against guerrill

country will slide down the slippery slope into an

Vietnam. Thus, “We are committed to maintaining 

between counternarcotics and counterinsurgency.”

7

2
The primary implication here is that broad str

concerns have played little part in the debates as to w

do with the billions of dollars allocated to nationa

global security. The United States has faced se

problems on an ad hoc case by case and situati

situation basis. The American experience in Vi

demonstrated that as far as logistics and operations 

concerned, the United States succeeded in everything 

out to accomplish. At the height of the war, the Arm

able to move almost a million soldiers a year in and 

Vietnam, feed them, cloth them, house them, supply 

and sustain them in the field. This was an operationa

task of enormous magnitude, and the U.S. logistical s

was adequate to that task.

8

 On the battlefield, th

armed forces were unbeatable. In engagement 

engagement—including the great Tet Offensive—the 

of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army 

repeatedly defeated.

9

 Yet, in the end, the military pr

of the United States did not prevail.

North Vietnam, not the United States, achiev

strategic objectives and emerged victorious. How cou

United States have succeeded so well, but fai

miserably? The answers to those questions focus o

problem of ignoring fundamental strategic require

and approaching strategic issues with opera

solutions. That is the basis of this monograph. The pu

is not to find fault or identify villains. It is to draw fro

lessons of the past to better prepare today’s civilia

military leaders to meet the unconventional w

challenges that will almost certainly face the United 

and the rest of the global community in the future. A

Army (Retired) Colonel Harry Summers express

paraphrasing General Douglas MacArthur’s guida

the Army in 1935, the quintessential strategic lesson 

learned from the Vietnam War (or any other conflic

“bring to light those fundamental principles, and 

combinations and applications, which, in the past

been productive of success.”

10

3
Thus, we clarify the most salient lessons of Vie

These strategic-level lessons provide a short l

fundamental rules for dealing with contemporary co

Second, with this as background, we develop lesson

several other guerrilla wars that have taken place sin

end of World War II. These complementary lessons f

large sample of 69 additional cases demonstrate imp

“intermediate” rules for playing in the contemporary 

security arena. Third, we examine the future of gu

war. This examination includes an analysis of the sig

along the road to the 21st century and concludes th

hard-learned lessons of the past remain valid. Fina

outline two “advanced” structural rules for gene

strategic clarity and success in current and future co

By coming to grips analytically with the most imp

lessons or rules that dominate modern internal 

political and military leaders should be able to devel

broad strategic vision necessary to maximize opportu

in the current and future global chaos and to win a 

(i.e., guerrilla) war—not just the battles, but the war it

THE FUNDAMENTAL STRATEGIC LESSONS O

VIETNAM: RELEARNING FROM THE THEORY

AND EXPERIENCE OF THE PAST

If the lessons of Vietnam teach anything, they tea

need to go back to basics. Sun Tzu prophetically argue

“War is of vital importance to the State; the province 

or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory 

be thoroughly studied.”

11

 And Clausewitz reminds u

“The first, the supreme, the most far reaching 

judgment that the statesman and commander have to 

is to establish . . . the kind of war on which the

embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to t

into, something that is alien to its nature.”

12

 Determ

the nature of the conflict is thus “the first of all str

questions and the most comprehensive.”

13

These dictums imply five highly interrelate

reinforcing strategic-level lessons that should have 

4
learned from the American experience in Vietnam. Th

the need to (1) carefully examine and define the natu

given conflict; (2) fully understand the stra

environment within which the conflict is taking pla

determine the primary centers of gravity within 

strategic environment that must be attacked and defe

(4) appreciate the “centrality of rectitude” in pursu

given strategy or in supporting a given 

counterinsurgency) effort; and (5) examine these less

a strategic whole. This last lesson takes us back to wh

began and is the foundational basis for success.

Understanding the Nature of the Conflict.

The most fundamental principle that Ame

leadership ignored in Vietnam was the need to unde

the kind of conflict it was getting into. Then, as th

continued, civilian and military leaders tried to tur

guerrilla war into “something that it was not.” 

consequence, the failure to correctly define the nature 

conflict provided an erroneous guiding basis t

subsequent conduct of the war. That, in turn, seal

unsuccessful outcome of the war even as American 

began arriving in Vietnam. The final result wa

exhaustion of the American army against a seco

guerrilla force, and the ultimate failure of the milit

support the national policy of containment of comm

expansion.

14

In the tradition of the American way of war, civilia

military leaders thought that “kicking ass” and dest

the enemy military force was the goal of policy. M

violence was the principal tool.

15

 At the same time, be

a “limited war,” such as that in Vietnam, imp

low-effort task unworthy of serious concern, i

something to be conducted with complaisance. It 

became a traditional war of attrition “writ small.”

16

 I

limited war of attrition, 58,000 Americans and 3.6 m

Vietnamese died. In terms of total populations, 3.6 m

5
Vietnamese is proportionally equivalent to 27 m

Americans.

Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNa

observed that “there are some people to whom life is n

same as to us, . . . we’d better understand that and w

down.”

17

 That is perhaps true, but in the strategic con

the Vietnam conflict, relative regard for life was 

simple cultural issue. General Vo Nguyen Giap exp

unequivocally that the Vietnamese took those 

casualties because they were involved in a national 

liberation, and that the people participated enthusias

in the resistance and consented “to make every sacrif

its victory.”

18

Many American military officers and civilian of

complained that the war in Vietnam had been 

militarily but “lost” politically—as if these dimensions 

conflict were not completely interdependent. In bec

involved in a modern guerrilla conflict—some

relatively straight-forward such as that in Chechn

something more complex such as the Colombian cris

actor is likely to be involved in a set of simultan

waged political-psychological wars within a general co

In those terms, an actor will not be engaged only 

military war. Rather, as one of Clausewitz’s trans

Michael Howard, points out—operational and tec

military factors are in fact subordinate to the “forg

political-social-psychological dimensions of contemp

conflict. If the struggle is not conducted with skill and 

on a realistic understanding of the situation in questio

amount of operational expertise, logistical back-

technical know-how could possibly help.”

19

Thus, it is imperative that senior decisionm

policymakers, and their staffs correctly identify the n

of the conflict in which they are involved; determi

central strategic problem and the primary political obj

associated with it; prioritize the others; and link 

strategy, force structure and equipment, and coord

6
political-economic-psychological-military campaign 

to solving the central strategic problem. This li

encompasses Clausewitz’s “forgotten dimensio

strategy” and what Sun Tzu indicates is the in

approach to conflict.

20

 The idea is that ther

other—more effective—ways to “render the e

powerless” than to attack his military force.

21

 It follow

a political-psychological-military effort would be a 

combination of ways to control a conflict such a

experienced against the Vietcong guerrillas in Vie

Such a conceptual exercise may be difficult, bu

absolutely necessary given the obvious alternative.

Understanding the Strategic Environment.

Another reason for the American defeat in Vietna

that U.S. leadership paid little or no attention 

strategic environment within which the conflict was 

place. Once the nature of the conflict has been define

next step in the counterinsurgency war process is t

consideration of the strategic situation—and the 

important threats implicit in it. That is, the conc

foundation from which to further develop a strategic 

for the successful pursuit of the war. The pr

consequence of ignoring the strategic environmen

complete frustration on the part of leadership and 

involved in the guerrilla war, and the American pu

home.

22

What happened was that American and S

Vietnamese forces would conduct series after ser

highly effective military operations that devastate

Vietcong infrastructure and continually forced them 

their North Vietnamese allies to withdraw fro

immediate battlefield. Yet, despite traditional defea

insurgents and their allies kept coming back. They 

coming back from different directions, and they were a

refreshed, resupplied, and rededicated. Eventua

course, they prevailed.

23

7
Americans could not understand the tenacity an

persistence of the Vietcong guerrillas or how the e

could keep coming back defeat after defeat. 

consequence, analysts argue that the U.S. leadersh

not understand three crucial things. They d

understand the enemy, they didn’t really know their 

and they ignored the geopolitical aspects of the g

security environment.

24

Understanding the Enemy. First, American leade

not analyze the socio-political situation in Vietnam a

not understand the implications of the fact tha

guerrilla war in which they were involved was on

latest in a long series of wars of national liberation a

foreign invaders. Vietnamese guerrilla roots and men

were located in struggles against the Chinese, a

French colonialism, against the Japanese invaders d

World War II, against the French again from the end 

Japanese occupation to the French defeat at Dien Bie

in 1954, and, finally, against American “neocolonialis

a result, the North Vietnamese and their South Vietn

guerrilla allies were involved in a total wa

independence. The will to overcome the foreign inv

had been inculcated into generations of highly nation

patriots for well over 100 years.

25

 General Giap summ

the socio-political situation in the following terms:

The guiding principal of the people’s war was long-te

resistance and self-reliance. That inspired in the people and 

army a completely revolutionary spirit which instilled into 

whole people the will to overcome all difficulties, to endure 

privations, the spirit of a long resistance, of resistance to 

end.

26

The Guerrilla Threat. Americans thought they 

fighting a limited war of attrition against a trad

enemy—dressed in black pajamas. The threat the 

Vietnamese government and the United States had t

with was not a limited or a traditional one. Rathe

Vietcong—dressed in their comical black pajamas—

8
making unconventional preparations to take control 

state.

27

At the strategic level, the Vietcong focuse

primary—indirect—attack on the legitimacy of the c

and American-dominated South Vietnamese govern

Aside from spectacular actions like the Tet Offensiv

shows of force to keep South Vietnamese and Am

troops off-balance and frustrated, the main military 

was that of “armed propaganda.” Operationall

guerrillas expanded political, military, and su

components and consolidated their position wit

“masses.” The purpose was to convince the people th

Vietcong was the real power in the country, and th

incumbent regime in Saigon was unwilling and una

perform its fundamental security and service fun

Tactically, except for shows of force, the guerrillas op

in relatively small units with political, psychologica

military objectives—in that order. “Armed propag

was conducted not to “win,” but to further discred

South Vietnamese government and the Americans. 

also intended to give the country and the wor

impression that the Vietcong was more powerful t

really was.

28

Knowing Your Ally and the Associated Threat. S

U.S. leadership did not take the trouble to get to know 

allies. To be sure, some great friendships were gen

between many American and South Vietnamese m

and between some American and South Vietna

civilians. Nevertheless, American civilian and m

leadership did not understand that the struggle be

Vietcong challengers and the incumbent South Vietn

government was a struggle over the moral right to g

American leaders did not fully appreciate the psychol

political fact that the Vietcong focus was not so mu

soldiers and politicians as on social classes and g

Guerrilla attacks on the South Vietnamese gover

were generally indirect and relied on societal griev

such as political and economic injustice, racial and re

9
discrimination, and debilitating internal corruptio

unwelcome foreign domination.

29

This is the essential nature of the threat from 

insurgent organization, and it is here that any res

must begin. A counterinsurgency effort that doe

respond to legitimate internal socio-political concern

deals only with enemy military capabilities is ultim

destined to fail. In Clausewitzian terms, the m

instrument for success in war depends on the othe

elements of the “remarkable trinity”—that is, m

success depends on the perceived justice o

government’s political objectives and the resultant p

passions.

30

 The war in Vietnam is a case in point.

The Geo-strategic Environment and the Asso

Threat. Third, the thread that allows an insurge

develop, grow, and succeed is adequate freedom of 

over time and space. Guerrillas maintain their freed

action and movement through the establishmen

maintenance of remote base areas, sanctuaries, and s

routes. At the same time, they establish and ma

supporting infrastructure within a population.

31

 T

Chi Minh Trail provides a good example of how the U

States failed to deal effectively with one geogra

element in the strategic environment and one of 

Vietnam’s most effective geo-strategic weapons. Th

became a network of roads from North Vietnam th

“neutral” Laos and Cambodia into South Vietnam. G

Maxwell Taylor argues that, as early as 1961, he inf

President Kennedy that the Vietcong insurgents cou

be beaten as long as infiltration by means of the H

Minh Trail remained unchecked.

32

 Tony Joes explain

The failure both to close the Trail and to adopt an alterna

strategy that would have neutralized its effects also meant t

Hanoi could fight on interior lines, a tremendous advantage

meant that the enemy was free to invade South Vietn

continuously: The NVA’s (North Vietnam Army’s) colossal 1

Easter (Tet) Offensive would have been quite imposs

without the Laotian springboard. It meant that when h

10
pressed by allied forces, the enemy could simply retreat in

Laos or Cambodia. Thus the policies of the Johns

administration made a lasting, or even a temporary, Americ

military victory impossible. And that fact, in turn, meant th

attrition . . . would take longer than key segments of t

American public would accept.

33

Summary. The war in Vietnam was consider

American leadership to be a “unique” problem and 

with on an ad hoc, piecemeal, and operational basis a

separate crisis or issue arose.

34

 What was worse wa

the assumptions upon which U.S.—and, thus, 

Vietnamese—actions were based were not well-info

were erroneous, or were ignored. As a consequence 

understanding the enemy, not knowing the entirety 

South Vietnamese situation, and not dealing effec

with the reality of the geo-strategic situation outsi

boundaries of Vietnam—and not responding appropr

to the threats implicit within that strategic environm

the counter-guerrilla war could not be won.

Centers of Gravity and Implications for a Strat

of Success or Failure.

Another fundamental principle that U.S. leaders 

too difficult to address was that of attacking cent

gravity.

35

 Theoretically and practically, it is necess

correctly determine and aggressively attack the pr

sources of a political actor’s physical, psychologica

moral strength. These are the hubs of “all powe

movement on which everything depends.”

36

 And, as a 

centers of gravity provide the basic architecture from 

to develop a viable ends, ways, and means strategy. B

attacking the traditional enemy military formation

some of their support structure, American leadership 

that it was easier to deal with tactical and operationa

“nodes of vulnerability.”

37

 As a war of attrition dictat

unconscionable number of people were killed and hu

the sources of Vietcong and North Vietnamese str

were virtually unscathed.

11
Michael Howard reminds us that an adequate res

must be essentially a strategic political-economic-

psychological-security effort. The most refined ta

doctrine, operational expertise, and logistical backu

are carried out by the optimum military or police str

in pursuit of a policy that ignores the strategic who

include the populace—will be irrelevant.

38

 It must a

remembered that if one wants strategic clarity to op

effectiveness, one must precede tactical and opera

efforts with relevant policy direction—and an ends, 

and means strategy to achieve it.

The major implication of this situation is tha

primary centers of gravity defined in the guiding str

vision constitute a possible set of simultaneously 

political-psychological-social-moral-military wars wi

general conflict. In becoming involved in a war such a

in Vietnam, centers of gravity may change as the sit

changes and the so-called wars-within-the-war wi

change.

39

 Strategy, of necessity, will also change. 

example, Clausewitz points of that:

In countries subject to domestic strife [such as Vietnam], 

center of gravity is generally the capital. In small countries t

rely on large ones [such as the United States for South Vietn

and North Vietnam for the Vietcong], it is usually the arm

their protector. Among alliances, it lies in the communit

interest, and in popular uprisings, it is the personalities of 

leaders and public opinion. It is against these that our ener

should be directed . . . Not by taking things the easy way—us

superior strength to filch [some piece of territory] preferring 

security of this minor conquest to great success—but 

constantly seeking out the center of his power, by daring to 

all, will one really defeat the enemy.

40

Summers provides some illustrations of the dyna

of the centers of gravity in the later part of the Vi

conflict. After the Paris Accords of 1973, “one of th

questions [the North Vietnamese] asked was wheth

center of gravity had shifted from the U.S-S

Vietnamese alliance to new centers of gravity

12
destruction of the South Vietnamese armed forces a

capture of Saigon.”

41

 Once the North Vietna

determined that the alliance was indeed irrele

preparations were begun that led to the defeat in de

the South Vietnamese army, the fall of Saigon, an

unconditional capitulation of the South Vietna

government and the final unification of the country

the center of gravity changed three times—fro

“community of interest” of the United States and 

Vietnam, to the classical enemy military force, to the c

city.

A major implication here is the fact that cent

gravity must be attacked—and defended. It is as imp

for an attacker to take the necessary measures to defe

own centers of gravity as it is for him to deal wi

opponent’s centers of gravity. Again, and in this co

U.S. leadership failed to defend American public o

against the full-scale “propaganda war” that was cond

by North Vietnam and its allies throughout the 

American leadership failed to understand that the “s

of Peoria” and the “halls of Congress” were decis

determining the outcome of the war thousands of 

away in Vietnam.

It is important for senior leadership to remembe

each facet of conflict has its corresponding threat and 

of gravity. The basic problem is to reevaluate constan

principal threat and the proper order of priority f

others. The secondary problem is to develop the capab

apply long-term political, moral, psychological

economic resources—as well as military—again

various centers of gravity that a guerrilla or other t

war generates. Shrinking from these inevi

requirements for success in contemporary conflic

prolongs the struggle. Sun Tzu reminds us that, “. . 

has never been a protracted war from which a count

benefited.”

42

13
The Centrality of Rectitude and Moral Legitim

A central principle that emerged out of the w

Vietnam was that of rectitude or moral legitimacy

essential beginning of understanding the centrality 

principle in pursuing the counterguerrilla strategy a

the Vietcong was to come to terms with the fact th

conflict was conducted in an essentially political

context. This umbrella concept focused on the moral r

the South Vietnamese government to govern 

demonstrated that legitimacy constituted the c

strategic problem. It was the hub of all power and mov

on which virtually everything depended. Po

perceptions of right and wrong, poverty, lack of u

mobility, and corruption threatened the right—an

ability—of the South Vietnamese regime to condu

business of the state. And, these popular perception

key to the outcome of the conflict.

43

The primary objective of the Vietcong was to destr

take control of the South Vietnamese governmen

transforming the emphasis of the war from the le

military violence to the level of a struggle for 

legitimacy, the guerrillas could strive for total object

the overthrow of the government—instead of s

attempting to obtain leverage and influence for “li

political, economic, or territorial objectives i

traditional sense. Thus, the use of indirect mora

permitted the Vietcong to engage in a secret and pro

war—striking at the government’s right to govern—

appearing to the people to pursue altruistic purpos

these terms, this war was not an extension of politics

war was politics. Thus, because it was a zero-sum ga

which there would be only one winner, it was also a 

war.

44

The major implication here is that to counte

socio-political challenge, the government must 

recognize what is happening and then be will

acknowledge that its civil support is fragile and its c

14
over the populace contested. General John R. Galvin a

that to establish its moral legitimacy, the governmen

address contentious, long ignored, but popular issues 

key facets of national life—socio-political, econ

educational, juridical—as well as engaging the guerri

the battlefield.

The resulting burden on the military institution is large. N

only must it subdue an armed adversary while attempting 

provide security to the civilian population, it must also av

inadvertently furthering the insurgents’ cause. If, 

example, the military’s actions in killing 50 guerrillas cau

200 previously uncommitted citizens to join the insurge

cause, the use of force will have been counterproductive.

45

Another set of implications is obvious. Every 

every program, and every action taken by a governm

and its external allies—involved in an internal war sc

must contribute positively and directly to devel

maintaining, and enhancing the ability and willingn

that regime to control its territory and govern its peo

that territory with rectitude. This provides an umbr

moral legitimacy and is the prime lesson for vuln

governments in the coming decades.

46

Indigenous and foreign allied leadership must r

that the highest priority must be to strengthe

legitimize the state. Thus, critical points about 

legitimacy must be understood at three different 

First, regime legitimacy is the primary target 

insurgents. Second, the regime and its allies must p

and enhance moral legitimacy as the primary mea

which that regime might survive. Third, a bes

government looking abroad for support ag

guerrillas—or to deny support to guerrillas—

understand that rectitude and legitimacy is a double

moral issue that will either assist or constrain f

willingness and ability to become effectively involved

Again, Sun Tzu reminds us that “Those who excel 

first cultivate their own humanity and justice and ma

15
their laws and institutions. By these means they mak

governments invincible.”

47

Looking at the Strategic Whole.

The fact that the U.S. armed forces were never de

on the Vietnam battlefield obscures another importa

of that war. American tactical and operational suc

tend to dim the strategic defeat. Thus, there is a n

examine the problems and lessons of Vietnam as a str

whole. This is the combination of fundamental prin

which in the past have been the basis of success. In 

terms, it is important to remember that success in a

component of grand strategy cannot generate o

success. Success only becomes a viable possibility wh

the components of a strategy form a logical conc

framework, architecture, or strategic paradigm w

which judgments, comparisons, and data may be 

meaning.

This reality takes us back to where we began. It ta

to the question: “How could the United States have w

the battles in Vietnam, but lose the war?” The ans

straightforward. American leadership failed to app

fundamental principles of military theory and 

strategy in that conflict. More specifically:

• The assessment of the nature of the conflic

incorrect.

• The strategic environment within which the wa

taking place was misunderstood or ignored.

• The primary centers of gravity were not carefu

continually assessed, prioritized, or consider

nonmilitary (e.g., socio-political) terms.

• There was no appreciation of the centrality of rec

and moral legitimacy in supporting the countergu

effort.

16
• These fundamental principles were not br

together and put into a strategic paradigm through wh

understand and conduct the war.

The central unifying theme of these lessons is decis

a country such as the United States wants efficienc

effectiveness in a matter as crucial as war, the civil-m

leadership must concern itself with two things. Clear

instruments of national power must be organized, tr

and equipped within prescribed budgetary considera

But, those actions must be preceded with clear, holist

logical policy direction—and the structure, roles, mis

and strategy that will ensure the achievement 

political ends established in that policy. This fundam

“rule” is as valid for current and future conflict as it ha

in the past.

LESSONS FROM 69 POST-WORLD WAR II

INTERNAL WARS: “INTERMEDIATE” RULES 

PLAYING IN THE CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL

SECURITY ARENA

In the mid-1980s practitioners and academics dee

important to begin to face the so-called Vietnam syn

and try to understand the variables that mak

difference between wining and losing guerrilla war

intent was to improve prospects for success in contemp

and future internal conflict situations and to do a bet

of protecting and advancing U.S. national interests 

developing global instability. One such effort, never w

publicized, was initiated in 1984 by then-Vice Chief o

of the U.S. Army General Maxwell Thurman. He man

the empirical examination of an initial sample 

(subsequently expanded to 69) internal wars that wo

allow the testing of competing theoretical approache

strategic paradigms) to internal guerrilla conflic

determine the extent to which the success or fail outc

such conflicts is predictable; and (3) generate a 

paradigm to improve prospects for success in future s

situations.

48

17
The results of part of the mandated research 

published in 1992.

49

 There is nothing really startl

radical about them. The results suggest basic se

strategy and national and international asset manage

The theoretical construct of the SWORD model su

that even though every conflict is situation specific, it 

completely unique. Throughout the universe, the

analytical commonalities at the strategic and 

operational levels. Seven dimensions (i.e., depe

variables), each composed of multiple indepe

variables, determine the success or failure of an in

war. In essence, they may be considered “wars with

general war.” In that connection, it should be emph

that the resultant paradigm has power and virtue i

because of the symmetry of its application—both 

besieged government and its allies, and for a v

internal challenger and its allies. That is to sa

successful strategy—on either side of the co

spectrum—has been formulated over the past 50 year

has not explicitly or implicitly taken into account a

following strategic dimensions—or wars within the g

internal war.

They are (1) a legitimacy “war” to attack or defe

moral right of an incumbent regime to exist; (2) a 

traditional police-military “shooting war” be

belligerents: (3) “wars” to isolate belligerents from 

internal and external support; (4) the closely related “

stay the course”—that is, the effort to provide cons

and long-term support to a host government; (5) intell

and information “wars”; and (6) “wars” to unify multid

sional, multilateral, and multiorganizational elemen

a single effective effort. It is important to note th

application of these dynamic dimensions in a succ

strategy subsumes that a realistic strategic visio

policy are based on the fundamental principles discus

the “Strategic Lessons of Vietnam” section above.

18
The Legitimacy “War.”

The data show that the moral right of a regime to g

is the most important single dimension in a co

guerrilla war. Thus, a politically strong and m

legitimate government is vital to any winning intern

strategy. The rectitude and legitimacy of the incu

regime is the primary target—the primary cen

gravity—as far as the insurgent organization is conc

In that connection, the interaction between an allied o

power and the incumbent government, especially 

regard to the publicly perceived level of the “Ame

zation” of a conflict, is critical to success. A counter

gency campaign that fails to understand the la

rectitude and morally legitimate governance proble

responds only to “enemy” military forces is very lik

fail.

50

As an example, leaders on both sides recognized e

the conflict in El Salvador that this dimension would 

to success or failure for the insurgents or the govern

Speaking for the insurgents, Guillermo M. Ungo ide

the legitimacy of the regimes as the primary cen

gravity in that situation.

51

 President Jose Napoleon D

understood the problem and countered with a nation

program designed to preempt the efforts of the For

Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) guerrilla

argument was simple: “If the Christian Demo

demonstrate in El Salvador that a democratic syste

bring about structured changes peacefully, the

polarized choice between domination by the ri

oligarchy and violent revolution by the Left will no lon

valid.”

52

The Shooting “War.”

Experience affirms that military force should n

applied ad hoc in response to either political or m

failure, or in an attempt to “try something that might w

If military force must be inserted into a nationalistic m

19
it should be done overwhelmingly at the o

Nevertheless, the data indicate that the best possible 

“foreign” military personnel in an internal conflict 

variation or another on the “train the trainer” 

Accordingly, the “outside” forces that might be broug

most counterguerrilla situations do not necessarily ne

skills required for success against combined arms arm

the north German plain. What they do need is a high d

of professionalism, the ability to insert them

unobtrusively into a nationalistic environment, and t

build and equip an indigenous military force capa

achieving political and psychological as well as 

military objectives. In this regard, it is important fo

security organization to have the mentality to e

guerrillas without alienating the citizenry.

53

Successful examples of this type of effort would i

U.S. Military Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) traini

first Cazador (Hunter) units of the Venezuelan Arm

superior organizations during 1961-64 and the Bo

Ranger units that destroyed Che Guevara’s gu

organization in Bolivia in 1968. This approach d

require many “foreign” troops; they were in relatively 

physical danger; and they kept a low political profile

The “Wars” to Isolate the Guerrillas.

The objective here is for a belligerent to isola

opponent politically, psychologically, and militarily 

his primary sources of support and sanctuaries—wh

and wherever they may be. To ignore this dimens

internal conflict as too difficult and too dangerous 

domestic and foreign political-military ramification

deny the possibility of ultimate success.

55

This dimension is clearly demonstrated in virtua

the 69 cases examined, but the classic example of this 

war is Greece, 1946-49. In this case, the Greek insu

forces received logistical and other support from G

Communist neighbors—Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugos

20
This support included food, clothing, arms, ammu

training, transit areas, replacement centers, field hos

and supply depots. Countermeasures undertaken to c

those borders by the Greek government and the army 

to have any significant effect on reducing the off

capabilities of the guerrillas. The Greek National Arm

only capable of pushing its insurgent enemies from on

to another. In the north, the insurgents would simply 

into adjacent Communist territory and subsequ

reappear in another part of Greece. However, in the 

of 1949, the Yugoslavian and other frontiers were clo

the Communist guerrillas as a result of negotiation

political decisions made in London, Moscow, and Bel

Denial of the various external supporting facilities 

insurgents made it only a matter of a short time befo

insurgency was brought under control.

56

A more recent example of the isolation of bellig

from internal sources of support is found in the I

“counterterrorism” case during the late 1970s and the 

1980s. The Red Brigades and the other 297 leftist g

claiming responsibility for various terrorist and insu

acts were isolated from the rest of the Italian commun

a result of the effects of the legitimacy war, the intell

and information wars, and the paramilitary shootin

As the “terrorists” withdrew more and more into the

compartmentalized secret organizational stru

isolation from the rest of the world became more and 

complete. That separation from the outside world f

restricted access to the internal Italian political reali

capability to recruit new members, and the abi

organize significant actions.

57

The “War” to Stay the Course.

All support to a besieged government or, converse

supported violent internal guerrilla challenger, m

consistent to be effective. Examination of the post-

War II conflict spectrum clearly indicates that 

21
military, economic, and/or political aid to a clien

withdrawn by an “ally” or coalition of allies during a co

or when any of this support was provided inconsistent

possibilities for success in the general war were mi

The data indicate that when aid was provided consis

over the long-term, chances for success in an intern

were considerably enhanced. It must be remembere

an important center of gravity lies in the “commun

interest” of the supporting ally(s) and the supp

government or insurgent organization. In these terms

happens politically and psychologically in capitals 

world thousands of miles from a “war zone” may be 

decisive than any series of military engagements.

58

A host of cases from the Algerian war, 1954-6

Vietnamese reunification, 1954-73; the El Salvadora

1980-89; the Afghan war, 1979-89, to the current sit

in the former Yugoslavia provide examples o

phenomenon. Nevertheless, in most of the cases in 

the British were involved, they managed to crea

perception that they were “there to stay” until the c

was clearly under control. This was the situation in G

1946-49; Malaysia, 1948-60; and Oman, 1965-

mention a few. This was not the case in Aden, howev

1966 Britain announced its intention to withdra

security forces on the date when that country was to b

independent in 1968. Importantly, this meant th

British would pull out of Aden regardless of the ability 

new government to deal with the ongoing insurgency

result, the intended government never really 

chance.

59

The Intelligence and Information Wars.

Individual men and women lead, plan, execute

support a given conflict. As a result, a major concern 

internal war must be individuals. The intelli

apparatus must be in place, or created, that can 

isolate, and neutralize an opposing bellige

22
organizational and leadership structure. The 

demonstrate clearly that the best police, paramilita

military forces are of little consequence without appro

and timely intelligence. Likewise, willing support 

state on the part of a majority of the populace, motiva

legal, democratic, and honest informational actions 

part of the government are directly related to the syne

and effectiveness of a counterguerrilla war. In the 

analysis, legitimate long-term military and political 

depend on the proverbial “hearts and minds” of a peo

The key role of effective—or ineffective—intellige

clearly demonstrated in the Cuban and Nicaraguan c

1956-59 and 1979, respectively. In these classic case

intelligence organizations of the Batista and Sa

regimes continued a “business as usual” attitude duri

insurgencies. That is, priority targets tended to b

personal enemies and legitimate internal po

opposition of the two dictators. Because of the misdi

effort and lack of concern for any kind of rectitude inv

citizens—innocent or not—the real motives of the C

and Nicaraguan dictators came into focus. Consequ

the sacrifices necessary to press a fight against insu

who promised serious reform were not readily forthc

from either citizen or soldier—and the key element of 

legitimacy was totally subverted.

61

A good example of an Information “War” aga

violent internal enemy is, again, found in the Italian c

that situation, the state and the media embarked 

strong countersubversive public diplomacy campaig

objective was to expose and exploit the fact that the v

left-wing, right-wing, and separatist, pacifist, and 

subversive groups operating in Italy during the late 

and the early 1980s were not organizations of the m

Rather, they were self-appointed elites whose goals 

not what the people wanted or needed—those goals 

what the insurgent leaderships wanted or needed

antisubversive information “war” demonstrated th

the Red Brigades and their allies, those Italians wh

23
not fellow ideological “true believers” were not really p

As an example, the thousands of victims killed, maim

abducted by the would-be insurgents were not conside

be human beings deserving of some personal dignity

were considered “tools of the system, pigs, and watch 

Moreover, the government and media exposed the fa

Red Brigadists considered everyone else—even 

comrades on the Left—to be mere “shit.” Their legit

was greatly eroded, supporters were obviously alie

and counterinsurgent intelligence was willingly provi

The “War” for Unity of Effort.

This dimension of counterguerrilla war inv

overcoming parochial bureaucratic interests, fightin

battles,” overcoming cultural obstacles, and ensurin

all efforts are centered on the ultimate goal—success

is to say, the necessary organization at the highest 

must exist to coordinate and implement an effective u

political-diplomatic, socio-economic, psychological-

and security-stability efforts against those who 

violently depose a government. Again, this applies e

to an organization that threatens an incumbent regi

any case, the ability to accomplish these things in a m

acceptable to the populace is key. And, that equates b

legitimacy. Without an organization that can esta

enforce, and continually refine a holistic plan and ge

consistent national and international support, autho

fragmented and ineffective in resolving the m

problems endemic to survival in contemporary con

thus, failure.

63

Ambassador Robert Komer has pointed out that u

effort was a major deficiency in the Vietnam War.

6

was also the case at the Bay of Pigs (Cuba) in 1961; A

1968; and the Spanish experience in the Western Sah

1975-76. Others have observed that the “str

ambiguity” of the past United Nations (U.N.) and c

NATO efforts in the former Yugoslavia is also a resu

24
lack of national and international unity of effort. O

positive side of the unity of effort dimension, wi

exception of the 1968 fiasco in Aden, B

counterinsurgency experiences seem to dominat

instance, an overall coordinator of all military an

activities has usually been appointed by the prime mi

A committee of the cabinet provides periodic ge

direction and support of this individual. The coord

has the authority to deal with people in his own gover

and with officials in the threatened country. Tog

long-term and short-term mutually supportive obje

are determined and pursued.

65

THE FUTURE OF GUERRILLA WAR: SOME

SIGNPOSTS ON THE ROAD AHEAD

Even though prudent armies must prepare for hig

low-probability conventional war, there is a high prob

that the President and Congress of the United Stat

continue to require military participation in small in

guerrilla wars well into the future.

66

 The harsh reali

the new world disorder are caused by myriad destabi

The causes include increasing poverty, human starv

widespread disease, and lack of political and socio-eco

justice. The consequences are seen in such forms as 

violence, criminal anarchy, refugee flows, illegal 

trafficking and organized crime, extreme nation

irredentism, religious fundamentalism, insurgency, 

cleansing, and environmental devastation.

The Problem.

These destabilizing conditions tend to be exploi

militant nationalists, militant reformers, militant re

fundamentalists, ideologues, civil and mil

bureaucrats, terrorists, insurgents, warlords, and 

states working to achieve their own narrow purposes

result, the interdependent global commun

experiencing “wars of national debilitation, a steady 

25
uncivil wars sundering fragile but functioning nation 

and gnawing at the well-being of stable nations.”

threats to national and international stability w

gravely complicated by “l,000 other snakes w

cause”

68—and the will to resort to illegal and asym

measures to achieve their nefarious objectives. I

security environment, military and police forces hav

choice but to rethink security as it applies to gu

menaces that many governments have tended to wish 

The Challenge.

Guerrilla wars will likely have new names, new m

and new levels of violence that will be a new part of t

problem. Nevertheless, whether they are called “

wars,”

69

 “camouflaged wars,”

70

 “unrestricted wars

something else, future guerrilla wars can be identif

the lowest common denominator motive. And, as a cor

whether they are considered “spiritual” insurge

“commercial”

72

 insurgencies, or anything else, gu

wars are the organized application of violent or nonm

coercion or threatened coercion intended to resist, opp

overthrow an existing government, and to bring 

political change.

73

 It is daunting, and some

overwhelming, to think of the implications for guerril

other self-appointed saviors, who might employ nu

chemical, biological, electronic, and informational we

to attain their objectives. The point remains, howeve

whatever it is called, whatever rationale justif

whatever means it uses, guerrilla war is widely percei

an effective means of achieving power and influence

In this context, every guerrilla war will be unique. 

reflect the history, geography, and culture of the soc

which it occurs. Yet, there will be analytical commonal

and strategic-level principles—that continue to be rel

Ian Beckett is eloquent when he states that “The p

guerrilla warfare and insurgency represents bot

shadow of things that have been and of those that will 

26
The Reality.

Although present and future internal conflicts ma

different trappings, it is important to remembe

hard-learned lessons of the past. The continuing rele

of relatively recent experience can be seen in the 

elements that define threat and dictate response th

derived from the SWORD model, and that can been s

ongoing conflicts.

75

• Moral legitimacy remains the most impo

principle of the post-World War II era. It can be se

examples, in the Kurdish problem in Iraq, Iran, Turke

Russia from at least 1961 to the present; Sierra Leone 

1991; the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria since 199

in Chechnya since 1999.

• Appropriate use of military force is still a key el

in determining success or failure of counterguerrilla 

Importantly, the irrelevance of heavy Russian m

equipment and conventional training can been seen 

Peruvian effort against the Sendero Luminoso, and 

Ethiopian case.

• The logical need to isolate belligerents from sou

support is obvious in any number of contemporary 

Two examples would include Colombia and Chechn

Colombia, the alliance formed with narcotraffick

providing generous financial assistance in retu

protection of narcotics operations. In Chechnya

earlier in Afghanistan—the war against Ru

domination would be impossible without subst

outside aid from state and nonstate political actors.

• In this connection, the need to “stay the c

remains constant. Without outside aid and in

support, the Irish Republican Army could not fu

effectively in Northern Ireland. Likewise, the M

Eastern Kurds would be unable to carry on their wa

national liberation.

27
• Intelligence and information also remain vital 

success or failure of contemporary guerrilla 

Participants and observers argue, for example, th

failure of the stability operations in Somalia was d

large part to a failure of the United States and the U

develop adequate and timely human intelligence 

militia groups in that country. On the other 

information campaigns have been key to the success 

Zapatista insurgency in Mexico.

• Unity of effort is the last principle that will be 

here. Suffice it to say that the many problems of th

operation in the Congo (UNOC), the U.N. operat

Somalia (UNOSOM II), the U.N. operations in the f

Yugoslavia, and the NATO operation in Kosovo stem 

lack of unity of effort among the various mi

contingents making up the specific force.

The Task.

Steve Metz and others have identified 

characteristics of asymmetric guerrilla threats th

particularly important. First, defense planners 

cannot know precisely what sort of threats will emerg

what types will prove effective. Second, the effectiven

asymmetric threats that have an impact will sooner o

decline as an enemy adjusts. Metz argues th

maximizing conceptual and organizational adapta

and flexibility, the United States can assure that 

rapidly counter emerging asymmetric threats, and 

the process by which a guerrilla threat bec

insignificant or ineffective. Phrased differently, in a t

strategic fluidity and asymmetry like the current on

political actor that develops new concepts and concom

leader judgment—and unifying organizational struc

better and more quickly than its opponents, will h

decided advantage.

76

28
Conclusions.

Victory in any kind of war—including internal gu

war—is not simply the sum of the battles won ov

course of a conflict. Rather, it is the product of conn

and weighting the various elements of national 

within the context of strategic appraisals, strategic v

and strategic objectives. Sun Tzu warns us that “in 

numbers alone confer no advantage. Do not advance r

on sheer military power.”

77

 The promulgation of s

concept requires a somewhat different approach to m

conflict than that generally used by the United State

the past several years.

The strategic paradigm outlined above acknow

the fact that the ultimate outcome of any counterinsur

effort is not primarily determined by the sk

manipulation of violence in the many military battle

take place once a war of this nature is recognized to 

begun. Rather, control of the situation is determined 

level of moral legitimacy; organization for unity of 

type and consistency of support, intelligenc

information; the ability to reduce internal and extern

to the insurgents; and the discipline and capabilities 

security organization involved in the “shooting war.” 

extent that these factors are strongly present in any 

strategy, they favor success. To the extent that an

component of the model is absent, or only present in a 

form, the probability of success is minimal.

TWO “ADVANCED” STRUCTURAL RULES FO

SUCCESS IN THE GLOBAL SECURITY ARENA

The United States is embroiled in a world of dang

uncertainty in which time-honored concepts of na

security and the classical military means to attain it

still necessary, are no longer sufficient. In bec

involved in modern conflict—relatively straightfo

guerrilla war as in Chechnya or something more co

such as the Colombian crisis—a player is likely 

29
involved in a set of simultaneously waged pol

psychological wars within a general conflict. In this 

in which one or a dozen political actors are exerting dif

types and levels of power within a set of cross-c

alliances, the playing field, rules, and players are 

complex, and identifying the objectives of the game is 

perplexing. 

The political-military complexity of contemp

conflict requires the highest level of strategic though

exceptional civil-military and military-military diplo

cooperation, and coordination. This issue dom

insurgency and other internal wars at two levels—th

to understand the nature of unconventional conflict, a

high levels of cooperation needed to deal with it. Th

requirement pertains to the development of l

judgment. The second imperative involves the organi

for unity of effort. Substantive changes in bot

leadership development and unity of effort areas of co

require a carefully staffed, phased, and long

validation, planning, and implementation program

recommended basic direction for such efforts is ou

below.

Leader Judgment.

The study of the fundamental nature of confli

always been the philosophical cornerstone for u

standing conventional war. It is no less releva

nontraditional war. In the past, some wars—such as t

Vietnam—tended to be unrealistically viewed as pro

military solutions to military problems. Presentl

complex realities of these kinds of wars must be unde

as a holistic process that relies on various civilia

military agencies and contingents working together 

integrated fashion to achieve common political ends.

Given today’s realities, failure to prepare adequat

small war (i.e., guerrilla) contingencies in unconscio

At a minimum, there are eight basic educationa

30
cultural imperatives to modify Cold War mind-sets 

develop the leader judgment needed to deal effectivel

complex, politically dominated, multidimens

multiorganizational, multinational, and multicu

internal war situations. They are:

• Concepts from “asymmetry,” “center of gra

“deterrence,” and “enemy” to “victory” and “war” m

reconsidered and redefined for intrastate conflict.

• Civilian and military leaders at all levels must 

the fundamental nature of subversion and insurgenc

particular reference to the way in which force c

employed to achieve political ends and the way in 

political considerations affect the use of force. In ad

leaders need to understand the strategic 

political-psychological implications of operationa

tactical actions.

• Civilian and military leaders at all levels must 

that power is not simply combat firepower directed 

enemy military formation or industrial capacity. Po

multilevel and combined “hard” and “soft” pol

psychological, moral, informational, economic, so

military, police, and civil bureaucratic activity that 

brought to bear directly and indirectly within a 

security environment.

• Civilian and military personnel are expected to b

to operate effectively and collegially in coalitio

multinational contingents. They must also acqui

ability to deal collegially with civilian populations, an

and global media. As a consequence, efforts that en

interagency as well as international cultural awar

such as civilian and military exchange programs, lan

training programs, and combined (multinational) exe

must be revitalized and expanded.

• In that connection, planners and negotiators wh

operate at the strategic and high operational levels m

nurtured to function in coalitional decisionmakin

31
planning situations that can blend U.S. deliberate pla

processes with concurrent multinational and multi

izational practices. Additionally, there is a cr

requirement to teach people how to put a campaign 

together using a combination of civil and military res

to achieve a single comprehensive political aim.

• Leaders must learn that an intelligence cap

several steps beyond the usual is required for small in

wars. This capability involves active utilizat

intelligence operations as a dominant element o

strategy and tactics. Thus, commanders at all levels m

responsible for collecting and exploiting timely intelli

The lowest echelon where adequate intelligence asset

been generally concentrated is the division or brigad

operations in small wars such as insurgencies are nor

conducted independently by battalion and smaller u

• Civilian and military leaders must learn the tota

guerrilla wars. These small, intrastate wars are not 

of appendage—a lesser or limited thing—to the 

comfortable conventional military paradigm. They 

great deal more.

• Negotiations, agreements, and accords no

standing, guerrilla war is a zero-sum game in which t

only one winner.

• Finally, leader development must prepare m

peacekeepers (i.e., peace enforcers) to be effectiv

fighters. Political actors in an intrastate conflict are li

have at their disposal an awesome array of conven

and unconventional weaponry. The “savage wars of 

have and will continue to put military forces and c

support contingents into harm’s way.

Unity of Effort.

Continuous and cooperative planning amon

between national and international civilian and m

organizations, beginning with a strategic assessment 

32
situation, can establish a mechanism for develop

common vision for ultimate political success (i.e., str

clarity). Then, shared goals and objectives, a 

understanding of what must be done or not done or cha

and a common understanding of possibilitie

constraints will generate an overarching political m

campaign plan that becomes the basis for deve

subordinate plans that will make direct contributions 

achievement of the desired political goals and obje

Thus, the roles and missions of the various civilia

military elements evolve deliberately—rather th

response to “mission creep”—as the situation chan

accommodate progress toward the achievemen

mutually agreed political vision.

79

In these terms, operations will achieve strategic 

and maximum effectiveness as a result of integratin

horizontal and vertical planning and implemen

processes from the outset. That is, integrating hori

(i.e., multinational) political-military plannin

operations with vertical national (e.g., U.S. intera

political-military planning and operations achie

synergy toward the achievement of an agreed po

vision. Two fundamental organizational mechanism

necessary to help eliminate “ad-hoc-ery” and to help e

vertical and horizontal unity of effort. They are:

• A national executive-level management structur

can and will ensure continuous cooperative plannin

execution of policy among and between the relevan

civilian and military agencies (i.e., vertical coordin

That organizational structure must also ensure th

civil-military action at the operational and tactical 

directly contributes to the achievement of an agree

national strategic political vision.

• An ad hoc international executive-level manag

structure that can—when necessary—integrate co

military, international organization, and nongovernm

organization processes with American political-m

33
planning and implementing processes (i.e., hori

coordination). That organization, too, must ensure t

multilateral civil-military actions directly contribute 

internationally agreed political vision.

Summary and Conclusions.

In sum, the lessons from over a half-century of 

experience suffered by governments involved in d

with guerrilla wars, and similar global destabilizers

that a given international intervention often ends sh

achieving the desired peace. Too often this is because s

mid-, and long-term objectives are irrelevant or uncle

“end-game” is undefined, consistent and appro

support is not provided, and national and interna

civil-military unity of purpose remains unachieved. 

despite acknowledged difficulties, it is imperat

develop leaders and organizational structures tha

generate strategic clarity and make it work.

Even though every conflict situation differs in 

place, and circumstance, none is ever truly un

Throughout the universe of contemporary guerrilla 

there are salient analytical commonalities. The 

outcome of conflicts such as those in Vietna

Colombia—or the nearly 100 conflicts the U.N. Se

Council has recognized since 1990 as destabi

intrastate struggles—is not determined primarily 

skillful manipulation of violence on the battlefield. C

of the situation and its resolution are determined 

qualitative leader judgments and the syner

organizational processes established before, during

after a small internal war is politically recognized t

begun. These are the fundamental components of str

clarity. And strategic clarity is essential to success 

new millennium.

34
AFTERWORD

These are the lessons that should have been le

from experience in 69 relatively recent small (i.e., gue

wars. The value of the ideas or rules derived from 

experience lies in their utility as a conceptual fram

within which data from specific situations might be 

and understood. If U.S. and other leaders consider 

ideas not as a template, but with serious intent, they m

able to translate battlefield courage, logistical super

and tactical victories into strategic successes in the c

and future global security arena.

ENDNOTES

1. Guerrilla war is defined as a small war. The word comes f

Peninsular Campaign in Spain during the Napoleonic Wars. The 

this note can be found in World Conflict & Human Rights Ma

prepared by PIOOM for IIMCR with the support of the G

Americans Foundation, St. Louis, MO.

2. This is an argument developed in Anthony James Joes, A

and Guerrilla Warfare, Lexington, KY: The University P

Kentucky, 2000, pp. 2-4.

3. For succinct reviews of these issues, see: “Rumsfeld’s 

dilemma,” The Economist, June 30-July 6, 2001, pp. 25-26; and “

defenses: What’s the real point?”The Economist, July 21-27, 200

4. As one important example, see: Qiao Liang and Wang Xi

Unrestricted Warfare, Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Pub

House, 1999.

5. Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II, Asymmetry an

Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Co

Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001.

6. Ralph Peters, “Constant Conflict,” Parameters, Summer 

10. See also “The Culture of Future Conflict,” Parameters, 

1995-96, pp. 18-27.

7. This and subsequent assertions are derived from statistic

based on interviews with more than 400 civilian and military 

and scholars with direct experience in 69 internal conflicts. Th

35
was originally mandated by Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army G

Maxwell Thurman during 1984-86. It was subsequently take

Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command General J

Galvin; Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command Gener

F. Woerner, Jr.; and others during from 1986-95. The model pre

an impressive 88.37 percent of the cases examined, and is stat

significant at the .001 level. The model, originally called SSI 1 a

21, has also been called the SWORD model. The SWORD 

although long out of print, are archived in their entirety by a 

research organization, the National Security Archives, in Wash

DC. The quote, however, is taken from a formal statement made 

Department of State Director of Andean Affairs Phil Chicola 

conference on “Landpower and Ambiguous Warfare: The Chal

Colombia in the 21st Century,” Carlisle, PA, U.S. Army War C

December 10-11, 1998. Mr. Chicola reaffirmed that position ag

conversation with the author on February 2, 2001, in Mia

Hereinafter cited as “Author interviews.”

8. Several diverse sources agree on these and subs

assertions. They include, inter alia: Eric M. Bergerud, The Dyna

Defeat: The Viet Nam War in Hau Nghia Province, Bould

Westview Press, 1991; Phillip B. Davidson, Viet Nam at W

History, 1946-1975, Norton, OK: Providio Press, 1988; Bernard 

“Indochina, 1946-1954” and “South Viet-Nam, 1956 to Novembe

in D.M. Condit, and others, eds., Challenge and Response in I

Conflict: The Experience in Asia, Volume I, Washington, D

American University Center for Research in Social Systems, 19

237-266, 333-368; Michael A. Hennessy, Strategy in Viet Na

Marines and Revolutionary Warfare in I Corps, 1965-1972, W

CT: Praeger, 1997; Richard A. Hunt, Pacification: The Am

Struggle for Viet Nam’s Hearts and Minds, Boulder, CO: W

Press, 1995; Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vie

Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986; Bruce 

Jr., The Twenty-Five-year War: America’s Military Role in V

Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1984; Dave R

Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet, San Rafael, CA: Presidio Pres

Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An, Berkeley: University of Ca

Press, 1972; U.S. Grant Sharp, Strategy for Defeat: Viet N

Retrospect, San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978; and Ha

Summers, Jr., On Strategy, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic 

Institute, 1989, Fifth Printing. Hereinafter cited as Bergerud, e

9. Ibid.

10. Summers, p. 121.

36
11. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Samuel B. Griffith, trans., L

Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 63.

12. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Pete

ed. and trans., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976

13. Ibid., pp. 88-89.

14. Summers, p. 1.

15. Author interviews; and Bergerud, et.al.

16. Author interviews.

17. Quote attributed to former Secretary of Defense 

McNamara in David K. Shipler, “Robert McNamara Meets the E

New York Times Magazine, August 10, 1997, p. 50.

18. General Vo Nguyen Giap, People’s War, Peoples’ Arm

York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962, p. 34.

19. Michael Howard, “The Forgotten Dimensions of Strat

The Causes of War, London: Temple-Smith, 1981, pp. 101-115.

20. Sun Tzu, pp. 63-64, 77-79.

21. Clausewitz, pp. 92-93.

22. Bergerud, et.al.; and Author interviews.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Giap, p. 36.

27. Author interviews.

28. Ibid.; Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An: Revolu

Conflict in a Vietnamese Province, Berkeley, CA: Univer

California Press, 1972; Edward G. Lansdale, In the Midst of W

American’s Mission to Southeast Asia, New York: Harper an

1972; John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary W

Strategy of Counterinsurgency, Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Book

Robert W. Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institu

37
Constraints on US- GVN Performance in Vietnam, Santa Mon

Rand Corporation, 1972.

29. Ibid.

30. Clausewitz, pp. 80-81; 89.

31. Author interviews.

32. Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, New York: 

1972, p. 247; Norman B. Hannah, The Key to Failure: Laos and 

Nam War, Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1987.

33. Joes, pp. 241-242.

34. Author interviews; Summers, p. 1.

35. Author interviews

36. Clausewitz, p. 596.

37. Author interviews.

38. Howard.

39. Clausewitz.

40. Ibid.

41. Summers, p. 83.

42. Sun Tzu, p. 73.

43. Author interviews.

44. Ibid.

45. General John R. Galvin, “Uncomfortable Wars: Toward 

Paradigm,” Parameters, December 1986, pp. 2-8.

46. Author interviews.

47. Sun Tzu, p. 88.

48. This research is based on more than 400 interviews condu

Dr. Max G. Manwaring and Colonel Alfred W. Baker, noted a

endnote 7. Additionally, it should be understood that the SWORD 

38
is statistically significant at the .001 level, and the adjusted R 

equals .900. That is to say that the SWORD model predicts at a

percent. Six models were tested: the SWORD model, two U.S. So

Command models proposed by General Paul Gorman at differen

a Central Intelligence Agency model, and General Sir 

Thompson’s model. General Gorman’s second model tested close

SWORD model at R square equals .727. Other models with 

variables include those of General Vo Nguyen Giap (“Fac

Success"), John Norton Moore (“Radical Regime Syndrome"), B

Blechman (“Force without War"), and Bard E. O’Neill (“Insurg

the Modern World”).

49. The first publication of the paradigm dealt specifically 

very closely defined “insurgencies,” in Max G. Manwaring and 

Fishel, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Towards a New An

Approach,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, Winter 1992, pp. 272-30

work and the original SWORD effort have been validated in Ed

Corr and Stephen Sloan, eds., Low-intensity Conflict: Old Thre

New World, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992; and John T. Fis

The Savage Wars of Peace: Toward a New Paradigm of 

Operations, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998. Finally, the S

model has generated and informed a slowly growing literature 

with contemporary conflict that has been reviewed by Ernest 

“Our Savage Wars of Peace,” World Affairs, Fall 2000, pp. 

Hereafter cited as SWORD Papers.

50. Ibid.

51. Guillermo M. Ungo, “The People’s Struggle,” Foreign Pol

1983, pp. 51-63; and Author interviews.

52. Jose Napoleon Duarte, Duarte: My Story, New York

Putman’s Sons, 1986, p. 279; and Author interviews.

53. SWORD Papers.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. This and the subsequent statement regarding the Itali

are consensus statements based on author interviews with 

Italian Caribineiri officials. The author is particularly inde

General Carlo Alfiero for his guiding remarks. However, the int

39
allow anonymity for those who object to their names being made 

Thus, these statements are cited as author interviews.

58. SWORD Papers.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

62. Author interviews.

63. SWORD Papers.

64. Komer.

65. SWORD Papers.

66. The reality of this assertion is demonstrated in former-Pr

Clinton’s speech that opened the summit meeting of world leader

U.N. in September 2000. In that speech, he urged the gathe

prepare national and international institutions for a new age i

unilateral and international forces will have to “reach rapid

regularly inside national boundaries to protect threatened peopl

York Times, September 7, 2000, p. 1.

67. Leslie H. Gelb, “Quelling the Teacup Wars,” Foreign 

November-December 1994, p. 5.

68. Author interviews.

69. Gelb.

70. B. H. Liddlle-Hart, Strategy, second revised edition, Ne

Signet, 1967, p. 367.

71. Qiao, pp. 10-11.

72. Steven Metz, The Future of Insurgency, Carlisle Barrac

Strategic Studies Institute, 1993.

73. Field Manual 90-8, Counterguerrilla Operations, Wash

DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1986.

74. Ian Beckett, “Forward to the Past: Insurgency in Our 

Harvard International Review, Summer 2001, p. 63.

40
75. The assertions in this section are derived from 

interviews.

76. Metz, p. 15.

77. Sun Tzu, p. 122.

78. Author interviews with Lieutenant General William G

III, U.S. Army (Retired) on November 30, 1998, and March 2, 1

Washington, DC. Also, an important contribution to this issue h

made by United Kingdom General Frank Kitson, Warfare as a 

London: Faber and Faber, 1987.

79. Author interview with General John R. Galvin, U.S

(Retired) on August 6, 1997, in Boston, MA. The complete inte

included in the Spring 1998 special issue of Small Wars & Insur

Vol. 9, No. 1.

41
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Author

Dr. Max G. Manwaring

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams