NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

YING LI, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, 

Respondent.

No. 18-71322 

Agency No. A205-742-097 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 5, 2020**

Honolulu, Hawaii

Before: FARRIS, McKEOWN, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

Ying Li (“Li”), a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal of an 

immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and 

protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Li argues that the IJ’s

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

FEB 14 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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adverse credibility determination, as affirmed by the BIA, is not supported by 

substantial evidence. “We review ‘denials of asylum, withholding of removal, and 

CAT relief for substantial evidence and will uphold a denial supported by 

reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a 

whole.’” Huang v. Holder, 744 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting GarciaMilian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2014)). We review adverse 

credibility determinations for substantial evidence. Garcia v. Holder, 749 F.3d 

785, 789 (9th Cir. 2014). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, see Huang, 

744 F.3d at 1152, and we deny the petition. 

I.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility 

determination. “Under the REAL ID Act, which applies here, there is no 

presumption that an applicant for relief is credible, and the IJ is authorized to base 

an adverse credibility determination on the totality of the circumstances and all 

relevant factors.” Manes v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 1261, 1263 (9th Cir. 2017) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Although adverse credibility 

determinations need not be based on inconsistencies that “go ‘to the heart of 

[petitioner’s] claim,’” Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1046 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(quoting Malkandi v. Holder, 576 F.3d 906, 918 (9th Cir. 2009)), an inconsistency 

supporting an adverse credibility determination “should not be a mere trivial error 
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such as a misspelling.” Id. at 1044 (citing Hassan v. Holder, 571 F.3d 631, 637 

(7th Cir. 2009)).

Li argues that the IJ’s adverse credibility determination erroneously relied 

on inconsistencies between her testimony and a hospital discharge summary 

regarding the number of her pregnancies and her abortion history. Li testified she 

had been pregnant twice. The first pregnancy resulted in a forced abortion in 

China, and the other resulted in the premature birth of her daughter in the United 

States. In contrast, the hospital discharge summary reported that Li had been 

pregnant four times, which resulted in one preterm birth and three elective 

abortions. Li claimed that she was eligible for asylum, withholding of removal, 

and CAT relief because she was forced to have an abortion under China’s onechild policy. Therefore, these inconsistencies between her testimony and the 

hospital discharge summary were not trivial. 

Furthermore, the BIA properly determined that the government’s inability to 

explain how it obtained the discharge summary did not undermine its probative 

value. Even though a document “lacks certain indicia of reliability,” an IJ’s use of 

it to support an adverse credibility determination is not necessarily reversible error 

“under [the court’s] ‘extremely deferential’ review.” Angov v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 

893, 902 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Wang v. INS, 352 F.3d 1250, 1257 (9th Cir. 

2003)). Li acknowledged that she was interviewed by hospital staff when her 
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daughter received medical care and that other information in the discharge 

summary is correct. Thus, the discharge summary’s unknown provenance does not 

undermine its probative value because it has other indicia of reliability. See Angov,

788 F.3d at 909. The IJ did not err by relying on the hospital discharge summary 

to find that Li was not credible. 

Li also argues that the IJ erred by relying on inconsistencies between her 

testimony and information in her Chinese household register and by failing to give 

her an opportunity to explain a discrepancy pertaining to whether the household 

register was sent to Li or her attorney. Li is correct that any purported discrepancy 

was too trivial to support an adverse credibility determination, see Shrestha, 590 

F.3d at 1043–44, and that the agency failed to provide Li with a “reasonable 

opportunity” to explain the perceived inconsistency regarding the provenance of 

the household register, see Campos-Sanchez v. INS, 164 F.3d 448, 450 (9th Cir. 

1999). Nevertheless, the major inconsistency between Li’s testimony and the 

information reported in the discharge summary constitutes substantial evidence in 

support of the agency’s adverse credibility determination. Such an inconsistency 

goes to the “heart of [Li’s] claim” for asylum and is consequently “of great 

weight.” Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1046–47. We affirm the agency’s adverse 

credibility determination. 

II.
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Absent credible testimony, Li failed to establish eligibility for asylum or 

withholding of removal. The IJ and BIA found that Li’s evidence was 

insufficiently probative to support her claims. These findings are supported by 

substantial evidence. See Garcia-Milian, 755 F.3d at 1031 (“The agency’s 

‘findings of fact are conclusive’ unless ‘any reasonable adjudicator’ would be 

compelled to conclude to the contrary.’”) (quoting Kamalyan v. Holder, 620 F.3d 

1054, 1057 (9th Cir. 2010); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). Therefore, the agency 

properly denied Li’s petition for relief under asylum and withholding of removal. 

III.

Li’s argument that she is entitled to relief under CAT is based solely on her 

assertion that she “was forced to undergo an abortion, harm that [she] contends is 

tantamount to torture.” Li’s claim to CAT relief relies on testimony that the 

agency determined was not credible. See Jiang v. Holder, 754 F.3d 733, 740 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (“Although an adverse credibility finding does not necessarily preclude 

[CAT] relief, a claim for relief under CAT may still be rejected when the petitioner 

fails to provide evidence beyond those statements that the IJ determined were not 

credible.”). The remaining documentary evidence in the record is insufficient to 

compel the conclusion that Li herself would likely be tortured if returned. See id. 

(citing Almaghzar v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 915, 922–23 (9th Cir. 2006)). Therefore, 

Li’s claim to CAT protection was properly denied. 
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PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.