CLAUSEWITZ’S CENTER OF GRAVITY: 

CHANGING OUR WARFIGHTING

DOCTRINE—AGAIN!

Antulio J. Echevarria II

September 2002
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ii
FOREWORD

Over the last 25 years, the center of gravity concept has

grown increasingly central to the U.S. military’s

warfighting doctrine. It has been hailed by each of the

Services and the Joint community as the cornerstone of the

operational art; and it has come to occupy a common place in 

the vocabulary of professional soldiers. It is somewhat

surprising, therefore, that, over the last quarter-century

especially, the term has come to have so many different

meanings. 

In this monograph, the author, Lieutenant Colonel

Antulio Echevarria II, cuts through the myriad

interpretations surrounding the concept and gets back to

the original idea as conceived by its author, the Prussian

military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz. In going back to the

original concept, Lieutenant Colonel Echevarria reveals

that Clausewitz intended the center of gravity to function

much as its counterpart in the mechanical sciences does,

that is, as a focal point. Lieutenant Colonel Echevarria thus

argues, quite persuasively, that the Clausewitzian center of

gravity is not a strength, nor a weakness, nor even a source

of strength. A center of gravity is the one element within a

combatant’s entire structure or system that has the

necessary centripetal force to hold that structure together.

This is why Clausewitz wrote that a blow directed against a

center of gravity will have the greatest effect. The

monograph concludes with recommendations for revising

Joint and Service doctrine so that they will reflect a more

accurate and coherent definition of a center of gravity. It

also offers some considerations for the war planner when

applying the concept.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 

iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

ANTULIO J. ECHEVARRIA II, a lieutenant colonel in the

U.S. Army, is currently assigned as the Director of Strategic

Research at the Strategic Studies Institute. He graduated

from the U.S. Military Academy in 1981, was commissioned

as an armor officer, and has held a variety of command and

staff assignments in Germany and Continental United

States; he has also served as an assistant professor of

European history at the U.S. Military Academy; Squadron

S3 of 3/16 Cavalry; Chief of BN/TF and Bde Doctrine at the

U.S. Army Armor Center at Fort Knox; as an action officer

at the Army After Next project at HQ TRADOC, Ft. Monroe,

VA; and as a speechwriter for the U.S. Army Chief of Staff.

He is a graduate of the U.S. Army’s Command and General

Staff College, the U.S. Army War College, and holds M.A.

and Ph.D. degrees in History from Princeton University. He

has published articles in a number of scholarly and

professional journals to include the Journal of Strategic

Studies, Journal of Military History, War in History, War &

Society, Parameters, Joint Force Quarterly, Military

Review, and Airpower Journal. His book, After Clausewitz:

German Military Thinkers before the Great War, was

published by the University Press of Kansas in the spring of

2001.

iv
SUMMARY

The center of gravity has become one of today’s most

popular military concepts despite the fact that its origins

extend back to the early industrial-age. Clausewitz’s

military center of gravity (CoG) and the CoG of the

mechanical sciences share many of the same properties:

neither is a strength or a source of strength, per se, but

rather a focal point where physical (and psychological)

forces come together. The U.S. military’s doctrinal

publications—especially Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint

Operations, and Joint Pub 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for

Campaign Planning—should be revised to reflect a more

accurate definition of the CoG.

U.S. Military Doctrine and the CoG Concept.

Over the last 2 decades especially, the U.S. military has

struggled both to understand the CoG concept as developed

by Clausewitz, and to find practical ways to apply it. In the

process, however, it has drifted away from Clausewitz’s

original idea. For example, each of the services—shaped by

different roles, histories, and traditions—tended to view the 

CoG concept in their respective images. The CoG concept

has, therefore, been fitted with many guises over the years.

The Joint community attempted—though with only limited

success—to pull the various service perspectives together

into a single definition with the publication of Joint Pub 3-0

in 1995. In other words, Joint Pub 3-0 strove to achieve an

“authoritative” consensus by drawing together many of the

services’ predilections. However, in so doing, it defined

CoGs too broadly and offered no real method for

determining them.

The recently released Joint Pub 5-00.1 (January 2002)

builds upon Joint Pub 3-0 and attempts to provide a general

method for determining CoGs. However, the process that

v
Joint Pub 5-00.1 describes for determining a CoG actually

leads us not to a CoG, but to a set of critical (physical or

psychological) capabilities. This process appears to have

borrowed from Dr. Joseph Strange’s popular “CG (center of

gravity)—CC (critical capabilities)—CR (critical

requirements)—CV (critical vulnerabilities)” approach. In

theory, Strange’s approach linked CoGs (which he defined

as “dynamic agents of action or influence” to CVs in a way

that war planners could put to practical use. However,

because any number of “dynamic agents of action or

influence” can exist within a given nation or within a given

battlespace, his definition fails to offer a way to focus one’s

efforts and other resources on something that will prove

decisive. Strange’s method only brings war planners to the

enemy’s centers of critical capability, rather than to an

actual CoG. 

Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity.

Clausewitz’s original definition follows the physics

analogy more closely than previous analyses of his work

have appreciated. In fact, it is not a source of strength or a

critical capability, but a focal point that is essentially

effects-based, rather than capabilities-based. In modern

elementary physics, which was about the state of the

mechanical sciences in Clausewitz’s day, a CoG represents

the point where the forces of gravity converge within an

object. Striking at the CoG with enough force will usually

cause the object to lose its balance, or equilibrium, and fall.

A CoG is, therefore, not a source of strength, but a factor of

balance. 

A closer look at the German text shows that Clausewitz

never used the term “source” (Quelle). Moreover, the

concept remains valid only where the enemy possesses

sufficient “unity” or “interdependence” (Zusammenhang) to

act as a single body. Before applying the concept in war

planning, therefore, we must ask ourselves whether we can

consider the enemy to act as a single entity. If so, we should

vi
look for connections among the various parts of an

adversary, or adversaries, in order to determine what holds

them together. This is the CoG.

Furthermore, Clausewitz’s CoG focuses on achieving a

specific effect, the collapse of the enemy. Hence, it is an

effects-based approach, rather than a capabilities-based

one and it resembles an emerging concept called

Effects-Based Operations (EBO) more than it does the

capabilities-based notion that underpins today’s doctrine.

Another important point is that Clausewitz did not

distinguish between tactical, operational, or strategic CoGs. 

The CoG is defined by the entire system (or structure) of the

enemy, not by a level of war. In addition, Clausewitz

emphasized that we should look for CoGs only in wars

designed to defeat the enemy completely. Only the vast

amount of energy and other resources that go into wars

aimed at achieving decisive victory can cause CoGs and

their areas of influence to emerge.

Toward a Simple Method.

However, getting the definition of a CoG correct is only

half the battle. War planners need a practical method for

determining what a specific adversary’s CoG is. Such as:

Step 1: Determine whether identifying and attacking a

CoG is appropriate for the type of war we are going to wage. 

Step 2: Determine whether the adversary’s whole

structure or system is sufficiently connected to be treated as a

single body. 

Step 3: Determine what element has the necessary

centripetal force to hold the system together.

Additional Recommendations:

• Redefine CoG as follows: Centers of Gravity are focal

points that serve to hold a combatant’s entire system or

structure together and that draw power from a variety of

sources and provide it with purpose and direction. 

vii
• Refrain from applying the concept to every kind of war;

reduce the competition that can occur between CoGs and

political-military objectives. 

• Identify where the connections—and gaps—are in an

enemy’s entire structure or system before deciding whether

a CoG actually exists; CoGs only apply where a combatant is 

sufficiently interconnected to act with unity. 

• Focus more effort on identifying the specific effect(s) to

be achieved by attacking a CoG.

• Continually reassess CoGs. However, reevaluate the

need to attack CoGs that are extremely transitory. 

• Resist “salami-slicing” the adversary into tactical,

operational, and strategic CoGs. The bulk of our efforts and

intermediate objectives should focus on destroying the CoG. 

In conclusion, the CoG concept is one of several of

Clausewitz’s ideas—such as friction in war, culmination of

the attack, the roles of chance and uncertainty—that have a

quality that transcends his day and makes them relevant to

our own. However, we must apply it judiciously, especially

in today’s post-industrial era in which “networked”

opponents armed with chemical, biological, radiological,

nuclear, and high-yield explosive weapons can operate in a

globally decentralized manner.

viii
CLAUSEWITZ’S CENTER OF GRAVITY: 

CHANGING OUR WARFIGHTING

DOCTRINE—AGAIN!

The center of gravity has become one of today’s most

popular military concepts despite the fact that its origins

extend back to the early industrial-age. First introduced by

the Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, in the

late 1820s, the idea now appears in the doctrinal literature

of all U.S. military services, and in many European

militaries as well. Despite its popularity, a great deal of

confusion still surrounds the basic concept. Its definition

has evolved quite substantively over time; and, even after

decades of effort, identifying an opponent’s center of gravity

(CoG) remains more art—and often an arcane one at

that—than science. This state of affairs is rather ironic

since Clausewitz originally borrowed the idea of the CoG

from the sciences, from mechanical science—or physics—to

be exact. Why the great military theorist chose to apply an

essentially scientific concept to warfare, which he

considered neither an art nor a science, lies beyond the

scope of this monograph.1 Suffice to say that Clausewitz’s

military CoG and the CoG of the mechanical sciences share

many of the same properties: neither is a strength or a

source of strength, per se, but rather a focal point where

physical (and psychological) forces come together. The U.S.

military’s doctrinal publications—especially Joint Pub 3-0

Doctrine for Joint Operations and Joint Pub 5-00.1, Joint

Doctrine for Campaign Planning—should be revised to

reflect a more accurate definition of the CoG.2

U.S. Military Doctrine and the Center of Gravity

Concept.

Over the last 2 decades especially, the U.S. military has

struggled both to understand the center of gravity concept

as developed by Clausewitz, and to find practical ways to

1
apply it. In the process, however, it has drifted away from

Clausewitz’s original idea. The concept has evolved from a

Jominian “decisive point”—vital geographic features,

boundaries between army groups, and lines of

communication—into a key “source of strength.”3 In some

circles, it was used interchangeably with the German term

Schwerpunkt, usually translated as “main effort,” and

became synonymous with the location where one’s combat

forces were most densely concentrated. 4 Some maneuver

theorists, for instance, saw the CoG as a “critical

vulnerability” that, if neutralized, would paralyze the

enemy and achieve a quick decision, á la blitzkrieg.5

Striving for this goal distinguished maneuver warfare from

its less attractive counterpart, brute-force attrition-style

warfare. 

In addition, each of the services—shaped by different

roles, histories, and traditions—tended to view the CoG

concept in their respective images. The U.S. Army and U.S.

Navy, for example, typically thought in terms of a single

CoG, which usually resided at the core of one’s land or naval

power and provided the “source” of one’s physical and

psychological capacity to fight.6 The U.S. Air Force, on the

other hand, pursued the notion of multiple CoGs, each of

which could be “targeted” from the air to achieve the

paralysis of the enemy.7 And, finally, the U.S. Marine Corps

(USMC), with the difficult mission of conducting

amphibious forcible entry operations, preferred for a time to 

think of the CoG as a key weakness, or critical vulnerability, 

the exploitation of which would give it a decisive

advantage. 8 The CoG concept has, therefore, been fitted

with many guises over the years.

The Joint community attempted—though with only

limited success—to pull the various service perspectives

together into a single definition with the publication of Joint 

Pub 3-0 in 1995.9 This publication asserted that the essence

of the operational art resided in being able to mass effects

against the enemy’s sources of power, or CoGs, to gain a

decisive advantage. It defined CoGs as those “charac2
teristics, capabilities, or locations from which a military

force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will

to fight.”10 Joint Pub 3-0 also stated or implied that CoGs

existed for every level of war, and for all types of war.

Presumably, defeating tactical CoGs would facilitate the

accomplishment of tactical objectives, which, in turn, would

contribute to the defeat of operational CoGs, the destruction 

of which then would assist in the accomplishment of

operational objectives, and so on, until we achieve our

national security objectives. At the strategic level, CoGs

might include a military force, an alliance, national will or

public support, a set of critical capabilities or functions, or

national strategy itself. At the operational and tactical

levels, they would generally consist of the principal source of 

combat power—such as modern, mobile, or armored combat

forces—that can assure, or prevent, accomplishment of the

mission. In other words, Joint Pub 3-0 strove to achieve an

“authoritative” consensus by drawing together many of the

services’ predilections. However, in so doing, it defined

CoGs too broadly and offered no real method for

determining them.

The recently released Joint Pub 5-00.1 (January 2002)

builds upon Joint Pub 3-0 and attempts to provide a general

method for determining CoGs. It defines the CoG in a

manner similar to Joint Pub 3-0 with the exception that the

phrase “sources of strength” replaces the term “locations.”11

Also, the Executive Summary in Joint Pub 5-00.1 provides

some much-needed elaboration: CoGs consist of “those

aspects of the adversary’s overall capability that,

theoretically, if attacked and neutralized or destroyed will

lead either to the adversary’s inevitable defeat or force

opponents to abandon aims or change behavior.”12 The CoG

thus derives from the collective sum of the enemy’s

capabilities, and it is, therefore, a capabilities-based

definition, despite the presence of terms such as

“characteristics” or “sources of power.” Furthermore, Joint

Pub 5-00.1 stresses the importance of linking CoGs to

“critical vulnerabilities,” so that one can attack the enemy’s

3
CoG through weak points in his overall system. In a manner

reminiscent of the current USMC approach, CoGs and

critical vulnerabilities are treated as different, but

complementary concepts.13 The purpose of identifying a

CoG is, reasonably enough, to enable us to focus our efforts

and limited resources on something that will achieve

decisive results. The purpose of identifying critical

vulnerabilities is to allow us to be smart about how we

attack CoGs. As Brigadier General (Retired) Huba Wass de

Czege explained, using the concept of a CoG in war planning 

“leads you to see very quickly that some vulnerabilities are

interesting but a waste of resources because they do not lead 

anywhere useful in the end.”14

However, the process that Joint Pub 5-00.1 describes for

determining a CoG actually leads us not to a CoG, but to a

set of critical (physical or psychological) capabilities. This

process appears to have borrowed from Dr. Joseph Strange’s 

popular “CG-CC-CR-CV” approach.15 Strange correctly

showed that the Joint (and individual service) definitions of

CoGs were flawed and lacked precision. They tended to

equate CoGs with vulnerabilities or strengths and paid too

little attention to psychological centers of power. To rectify

that, he offered a “fix” that redefined CoGs as “dynamic

agents of action or influence” or, more specifically, “moral,

political and physical entities which possess certain

characteristics and capabilities, or benefit from a given

location/terrain.”16 Accordingly, his CG-CC-CR-CV

approach defined a CoG, such as a key combat force, by

those critical capabilities (CCs) that enabled it to function

as a CoG. Those CCs—the ability to shoot, move, and

communicate—in turn, have critical requirements (CRs)—

such as open lines of communication and supply—that

enable the CCs to keep functioning. A CR that is

inadequately protected—such as the North Korean army’s

lines of communication near Inchon—constitutes a critical

vulnerability (CV). If attacked and neutralized, these CVs

would contribute to defeating the enemy’s CoG. 

4
In theory, Strange’s approach linked CoGs to CVs in a

way that war planners could put to practical use. However,

because any number of “dynamic agents of action or

influence” can exist within a given nation or within a given

battlespace, his definition fails to offer a way to focus one’s

efforts and other resources on something that will prove

decisive. What makes one dynamic agent more important

than another? Strange’s fix does not actually build upon the

Clausewitzian definition—in which the CoG functions as a

focal point. Instead, his CoGs amount to centers of critical

capabilities. In fact, as his own approach makes clear, what

makes his CoGs important are their CCs, making this a

capabilities-based concept. To be sure, Strange’s approach

can help war planners make the important linkages

between critical strengths or capabilities and critical

vulnerabilities. However, his method will only bring war

planners to the enemy’s actual CoG—as opposed to merely

one of his centers of critical capability—by coincidence. 

The Joint Pub 5-00.1 definition and its approach to

determining CoGs, therefore, beg the question: Why not just 

call centers of critical capabilities what they are?—critical

centers or critical points. Identifying the enemy’s centers of

critical capabilities can be very useful. Indeed, as we shall

see under Clausewitz’s definition, an adversary might not

have a CoG, or at least not one that we can attack. In those

situations, we would do well to focus our efforts on

destroying the enemy’s critical centers. It stands to reason

that defeating them will eventually lead to the

accomplishment of our objectives. 

As the next section will show, Clausewitz’s original

definition follows the physics analogy more closely than

previous analyses of his work have appreciated. As such, it

differs substantively from the prevailing idea that a CoG is

a source of strength or a critical capability. In fact, it is

essentially an effects-based, rather than a capabilitiesbased concept. 

5
Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity.

The quintessential cerebral savage, Clausewitz

borrowed a number of intellectual constructs, theories, and

concepts from the leading philosophers, scientists, and

other thinkers of his day in order both to understand and to

describe the various aspects of war that he observed.17

Several of his concepts—friction, polarity, and center of

gravity—are analogies or metaphors drawn from the

mechanical sciences. In particular, the original German

text of Vom Kriege (On War) reveals that Clausewitz used

the term CoG—expressed primarily as Schwerpunkt—more 

than 50 times, though not all of them refer to the military

concept.18 He appears to have derived his idea of the CoG

after being influenced by a series of lectures presented by

German physicist Paul Erman, a professor at both the

University of Berlin and the Prussian Allgemeine

Kriegsschule (War College). Clausewitz served as director of 

the War College from 1818 to 1830, and we know that he and 

Erman had at least a cordial relationship in which they

exchanged ideas related to the mechanical sciences.19

In modern elementary physics, which was about the

state of the mechanical sciences in Clausewitz’s day, a CoG

represents the point where the forces of gravity converge

within an object.20 At that point an object’s weight is

balanced in all directions. A physical object can be thought

of in two ways: as a composite of many smaller particles,

each of which is acted upon by gravity; or as a single object,

which is acted upon by gravity only at a single point (See

Figure 1). 21 Understandably, physicists prefer the latter,

since it makes other calculations concerning the interaction

of force and matter much easier. However, physicists also

acknowledge that a CoG amounts to little more than a

mathematical approximation, since gravity acts upon all

the points in an object simultaneously.

6
Calculating a CoG for a simple, symmetrical object—a

ruler, a rock, a boomerang—is not difficult. The CoG for a

ruler is in the middle of it. The CoG for a sphere lies at its

geometric center. Interestingly, the CoG for a boomerang,

though not difficult to calculate, does not lie on the object

itself, but in the space between the “V” (See Figure 2).22 On

the other hand, calculating the CoG for complex

objects—such as a bolos or a human being with multiple

moving parts—is more difficult. Such objects must be

artificially “frozen” in time and space. When a complex

object changes the distribution of its weight, its body

position, or if external weight is added, the CoG requires

recalculation (See Figures 3 and 4). 

7

Figure 1. Cross-section of a Cube Showing How

Forces of Gravity Operate.

Figure 2. Center of

Gravity of a

Boomerang.
Striking at the CoG with enough force will usually cause

the object to lose its balance, or equilibrium, and fall. A CoG

is, therefore, not a source of strength, but a factor of balance.

An infantryman’s strength, for example, might derive from

his muscles, his brains, or his weapons, or any combination

of these, but they relate to his CoG only so far as he needs to

be balanced to use them. Also, a CoG is not a weakness. An

infantryman might be physically weak, intellectually

challenged, or wanting for weapons, but these conditions

have little to do with his equilibrium. Strictly speaking,

then, a CoG is neither a strength nor a weakness, though

striking it can compromise a strength or exploit a weakness. 

If one could direct a blow with enough force against the

infantryman’s CoG, he could be laid low, despite the sum of

his strengths and weaknesses, because his CoG is connected 

to those things by means of his physical body.

8

Figure 3. A Stationary

Soldier’s CoG.

Figure 4. A Moving Soldier’s

CoG.
Most of the U.S. military’s definitions of CoGs derive

from Sir Michael Howard’s and Peter Paret’s English

translation of Clausewitz’s On War, especially Book VI

(Defense) and Book VIII (War Plans). From these passages

we learn that a CoG is “always found where the mass is

concentrated most densely,” that it is “the hub of all power

and movement on which everything depends,” and that it

emerges from the “dominant characteristics of both

belligerents.” 23 Unfortunately, as the passage below

reveals, this translation, while the best available for many

years, creates the false impression that CoGs are akin to

sources of strength: 

The first principle is that the ultimate substance of enemy

strength must be traced back to the fewest possible sources,

and ideally to one alone. The attack on these sources must be

compressed into the fewest possible actions—again, ideally,

into one.

The task of reducing the sources of enemy strength to a single 

center of gravity will depend on: 1. The distribution of the

enemy’s political power . . . 2. The situation in the theater of

war where the various armies are operating.24

In fact, a closer look at the German text shows that

Clausewitz never used the term “source” (Quelle). Instead,

he advised tracing the full weight (Gewicht) of the enemy’s

force (Macht) to as few CoGs as possible.25 As in the previous 

physics example, the CoG connects the soldier’s various

strengths without being a strength itself. A more literal

translation of the above passage appears below: 

The first principle is: To trace the full weight (Gewicht) of the

enemy’s force (Macht) to as few centers of gravity as

possible, when feasible, to one; and, at the same time, to

reduce the blow against these centers of gravity to as few

major actions as possible, when feasible, to one. 

. . . reducing the enemy’s force (Macht) to one center of gravity

depends, first, upon the [enemy’s] political connectivity [or

unity] itself . . . and, second, upon the situation in the theater of 

9
war itself, and which of the various enemy armies appear

there.26

Further examination of Clausewitz’s references to the

CoG throughout the German text of On War reveals, first of

all, that the concept remains valid only where the enemy

possesses sufficient “unity” or “interdependence”

(Zusammenhang) to act as a single body: 

Just as the center of gravity is always found where the mass is

most concentrated, and just as every blow directed against the

body’s center of gravity yields the greatest effect, and—more to

the point—the strongest blow is the one delivered by the center

of gravity, the same is true in war. The armed forces of every

combatant, whether an individual state or an alliance of states,

have a certain unity and thus a certain interdependence [or

connectivity] (Zusammenhang ); and where such

interdependence exists, one can apply the center of

gravity concept. Accordingly, there exist within these armed

forces certain centers of gravity which, by their movement and

direction, exert a decisive influence over all other points; and

these centers of gravity exist where the forces are most

concentrated. However, just as in the world of inanimate bodies

where the effect on a center of gravity has its proportions and its

limits determined by the interdependence of the parts, the same 

is true in war.27

In other words, before applying the concept in war

planning, we must ask ourselves whether we can consider

the enemy to act as a single entity. If so, we should look for

connections among the various parts of an adversary, or

adversaries, in order to determine what holds them

together. In 1809, for example, Napoleon had to fight on two

fronts, against Anglo-Spanish forces in Spain and against

the Austrians in central Europe. Although they had a

common enemy, the Anglo-Spanish and Austrian forces did

little to coordinate their efforts. Hence, it would have been

correct for Napoleon to look for two CoGs, one on each front.

As Clausewitz stated, the degree of unity formed by military 

forces and the geographical spaces in which they have to

fight can create more than one CoG. He advocated tracing

10
multiple CoGs back to a single one whenever possible. Yet,

he allowed for the possibility that one specific CoG might

not exist. The key question we must ask, then, is whether

the enemy’s forces are connected sufficiently so that actions

against him in one area will still have a decisive effect on

him in other areas.

Second, just as in physics, the CoG refers to the thing

that holds the enemy’s force together, enabling it to act as a

single entity. Indeed, when we reexamine the German text

in one of the popular passages from Book VIII in which

Clausewitz described the CoG as it applies to war planning,

we find the emphasis on the CoG as a focal point becomes

clearer:

What theory can admit to thus far is the following: Everything

depends upon keeping the dominant characteristics of both

states in mind. From these emerge a certain center of gravity,

a focal point (Zentrum) of force and movement, upon which

the larger whole depends; and, it is against the enemy’s center

of gravity that the collective blow of all power must be

directed.28

To find the CoG in any particular situation, then, we

must look for the thing that is providing a certain

centripetal, or center-seeking, force (as opposed to

centrifugal, which is outward-seeking) for the enemy.

Clausewitz pointed out, for example, that in the February

1814 campaign against France, the allies’ CoG lay more

with Prussia’s Field Marshal Gebhard Leberecht Blücher

than with Austria’s Prince Karl Philip von Schwarzenberg,

even though the latter had a larger army (140,000) than the

former (100,000). “Blücher,” Clausewitz explained,

“although [numerically] weaker than Schwarzenberg, was

nonetheless the more important adversary due to his

enterprising spirit; hence, the center of gravity lay more

with him and it pulled the others in his direction.”29 In the

actual campaign, Napoleon (75,000) first defeated Blücher’s 

Prussian army, then turned on Schwarzenberg’s Austrians

and drove them back. Nonetheless, both Blücher’s and

11
Schwarzenberg’s armies recovered and defeated Bonaparte

one month later.30 Clausewitz criticized Napoleon’s

decision, arguing that the French Emperor should have

continued hammering away at Blücher—the allies’

CoG—until the Prussian force was completely defeated.

Such a victory, in Clausewitz’s view, would have induced

the Austrians to withdraw as well. As in the mechanical

sciences, therefore, Clausewitz’s military CoGs have a

centripetal quality; they represent a focal point, a location

where forces come together. 

Clausewitz gave several examples of such focal points.

The CoGs of Alexander the Great, Gustavus Adolphus,

Charles XII of Sweden, and Frederick the Great, for

instance, resided in their respective armies. In different

circumstances, the personalities of key leaders, a state’s

capital, or its network of allies and their community of

interest might serve as CoGs.31 What all of these various

elements have in common is not that they are sources of

power, but that they perform a centripetal or centralizing

function that holds power systems together and, in some

cases, even gives them purpose and direction. Strictly

speaking, an armed force is not a “source” of power. Rather,

it serves as a focal point that draws and organizes power

from a variety of sources: a population base (recruits); an

industrial base (weapons and materiel); and an agricultural 

base (foodstuffs). The same holds true for the personalities

of key leaders, state capitals, or alliance networks. These

things draw raw power from different sources and refine,

organize, and redirect it.

Furthermore, Clausewitz’s CoG focuses on achieving a

specific effect, the collapse of the enemy. Hence, it is an

effects-based approach, rather than a capabilities-based

one. To be sure, the two approaches are linked. Attacking

specific capabilities produces certain effects. Achieving

certain effects often requires attacking specific capabilities.

Indeed, one could say that these approaches represent the

proverbial two sides of the same coin. In the

capabilities-based approach, the first step is to identify the

12
key enemy strength or capability that could prevent us from

achieving our objective. In the effects-based approach, the

first step is to identify the effect we want to achieve and then 

to determine what actions we should take to achieve it.

Frequently those actions might go well beyond merely

neutralizing or destroying specific capabilities. In a manner

of speaking, the capabilities-based approach seeks a

negative aim, destruction of a certain capability. The

effects-based approach, on the other hand, pursues a

positive aim because it seeks to create a definite effect. The

U.S. military has gotten into the habit of narrowly focusing

on the former. It could well benefit from a broader approach

of the latter.

In one sense, Clausewitz’s effects-based CoG resembles

an emerging concept called Effects-Based Operations

(EBO) more than it does the current capabilities-based

notion, with the exception that only one particular effect is

sought—total collapse of the enemy.32 For Clausewitz’s

effects-based approach, the effect and the objective—total

collapse of the enemy—were always the same. EBO has the

benefit, as retired General Anthony Zinni remarked, of

forcing political and military leaders to focus on the specific

effects that they want military (and non-military) action to

achieve.33 When asked to describe effects-based operations,

one senior official replied that they were akin to dissolving

“the glue” that holds a table together, rather than striking

at its individual legs.34 Thus, while the officer’s analogy is

flawed in that it uses a static object to describe something

that has a dynamic nature, the similarities in the two

approaches are clear.

Like EBO, Clausewitz’s CoG requires the ability to

predict, with some reasonable probability, how to achieve at

least first and second-order effects, and possibly more. That

said, it is important to point out that Clausewitz eschewed

prescriptive formulae and considered the calculation of a

CoG a matter of “strategic judgment” (strategische Urteil) at 

the highest levels.35 It is a matter of judgment and, given

Clausewitz’s distaste for prescriptive formulae, it is

13
doubtful that he would have approved of some of the current

efforts to develop them by means of new kinds of

information technology and software. Educating senior

leaders to develop their strategic judgment in order to make

such determinations, on the other hand, was something he

certainly would have supported. This theme runs

consistently throughout On War.

Another important point is that Clausewitz did not

distinguish between tactical, operational, or strategic CoGs. 

The CoG is defined by the entire system (or structure) of the

enemy, not by a level of war. Consider the example of the

soldier (Figures 3 and 4); he can have only one CoG at a time. 

According to Clausewitz, a local commander might

determine a center of gravity for the portion of the enemy’s

forces that lay before him, providing those forces

demonstrated sufficient independence from the remainder

of the enemy’s forces. However, this separate CoG would

only amount to a local rather than a tactical or operational

CoG. For us to speak of a tactical CoG, the tactical level of

war would have to exist independent of the operational and

strategic levels of war. Similarly, for CoGs to exist at the

operational and strategic levels of war, those levels of war

would have to have an existence separate from the rest of

warfare. This notion defies the principle of unity—or

interconnectedness—that German military thinkers from

Clausewitz to Heinz Guderian had ascribed to warfare.36

For better or worse, the German way of war did not formally

recognize the operational level of war until after 1945, when

it was heavily influenced by U.S. doctrine. This is not to say

that understanding how to link engagements together into

a “campaign” is not important; only that a campaign should

not become an end in itself, or a justification for elevating

the operational art above strategy.

Clausewitz’s own references to strategy throughout On

War rarely rise above contemporary campaign strategy. He

never addressed the integration of the nonmilitary

elements of national power into a “grand strategy” of sorts.

He appears to have thought mainly in terms of the

14
employment of the military element of power; hence, his

focus is primarily on military strategy (and that almost

exclusively from a land perspective). Even his discussions of

operations within single or multiple theaters take place at

the level of military strategy, that is, from the standpoint of

purely military ends, ways, and means. Accordingly, we

should consider his CoG to be a strategic concept, a way. It is 

clear from his discussions in On War that he would have

supported the idea of individual CoGs based on geographic

circumstances. At the same time, it is highly unlikely that

he would have supported assigning CoGs by horizontally

“slicing” war into tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

In addition, Clausewitz emphasized that we should look

for CoGs only in wars designed to defeat the enemy

completely. Only the vast amount of energy and other

resources that go into wars aimed at achieving decisive

victory can cause CoGs and their areas of influence to

emerge.37 Perhaps more important, in such wars military

and political objectives—the total political and military

defeat of the enemy—essentially complement one another.

In such wars we want to achieve the total collapse of the

enemy and so we want to strike at his CoG. In limited wars,

on the other hand, CoGs—which focus on the total collapse

of the enemy—tend to compete with the typically more

restricted political objective(s). For example, during the

Gulf War the ground component planning staff of U.S.

Central Command (CENTCOM) spent more hours

attempting to identify the Iraqi CoG than planning how to

defeat it. 38 Ironically, under Clausewitz’s concept,

determining the Iraqi CoG would have been unnecessary

since the Gulf War was not a war of annihilation. Simply

translating the war’s strategic objectives—expulsion of

Iraqi forces from Kuwait and reduction of Iraqi offensive

capability—into operational and tactical objectives should

have given coalition forces all the operational guidance they

would have needed to succeed.39 This is not to say that the

CoG concept can only apply in wars of annihilation, but to

15
point out that it is neither appropriate nor necessary in all

cases. 

To sum up, Clausewitz’s CoG is a focal point, not a

strength nor a weakness, nor even a source of strength.

Second, CoGs are found only where sufficient connectivity

exists among the various parts of the enemy to form an

overarching system (or structure) that acts with a certain

unity, like a physical body. Unless the enemy’s parts have

sufficient connectivity, he may not necessarily have a CoG.

Third, CoGs possess a certain centripetal force that acts to

hold an entire system or structure together. A blow at the

enemy’s CoG would throw him off balance or, put

differently, cause his entire system (or structure) to

collapse. Fourth, the concept necessitates viewing the

enemy holistically, as a system. Finally, identifying CoGs is

not appropriate for all types of wars.

As we have seen, Joint doctrine’s definition of CoGs

departs from Clausewitz’s original concept. By equating

CoGs to critical capabilities, strengths, or sources of

strength, the Joint definition refers more to centers of

critical capability than centers of gravity. Moreover, as

Figure 5 (modified from Figure II-2, extracted from Joint

Pub 5-00.1) reveals, the flawed definition leads to some

mischaracterizations regarding an adversary’s (or our own)

CoG that could detrimentally affect war planning.

Toward a Simple Method.

However, getting the definition of a CoG correct is only

half the battle. War planners need a practical method for

determining a specific adversary’s CoG.40 The method

should be simple, in keeping with Clausewitz’s dictum that

in war even the simplest thing is difficult, and yet it should

make use of the best intelligence available and

accommodate revision as the result of rigorous analysis. 

Step 1: Determine whether identifying and attacking a

CoG is appropriate for the type of war we are going to wage .

16
For example, the campaign against Al Qaeda, though part of 

the larger global war on terrorism, is essentially a war that,

for the United States at least, cannot end without the

neutralization or destruction of that terrorist group; hence,

it is the kind of war in which the identification and pursuit of 

a CoG serves a constructive purpose.

Step 2: Determine whether the adversary’s whole

structure or system is sufficiently connected to be treated as a

single body. Al Qaeda has numerous cells operating

globally, most of which do not know of the existence of the

others. At least some of these cells—or certain individuals

within them—appear to have been linked to the group’s

leadership by networked electronic communications.

Messages and commands were thus passed via the internet,

cellular phones, and other electronic devices. It is also

possible that a fair number of cells already have

orders—and have had them for some time—that they will

attempt to execute at a certain time and place, if they

receive no other orders to the contrary. Thus, the physical

17

Figure 5. Characteristics of the Adversary’s Centers

of Gravity.
links are somewhat tenuous. Successful operations against

Al Qaeda cells in Europe will not likely cause those in

Singapore to collapse, particularly as a new breed of “super

cells” appears to be emerging that can act even more

independently.41 However, the group’s psychological—or

ideological—links appear strong. If they are not

particularly well-linked physically, the cells do appear to be

fairly united ideologically. It might be best, therefore, to

seek an ideological CoG.

Step 3: Determine what element has the necessary

centripetal force to hold the system together. One ideological

element does appear to have sufficient centrifugal force to

hold Al Qaeda together, that is its avowed “hatred of

apostasy.”42 It is probably that hatred, rooted in a radical

branch of Islam—rather than Osama bin Laden or another

individual leader—that serves as the group’s CoG. While

bin Laden appears to have done much of the ground work to

establish Al Qaeda, it does not appear that his removal will

cause his organization to collapse. Most analysts and

intelligence sources claim that if bin Laden were captured

or killed, another leader would simply take his place.43 That

leader can only turn out to be either more or less as effective

as bin Laden. Thus, Al Qaeda’s leadership really amounts to 

a center of critical capability, something we want to

neutralize but not something that will end the war. The

hatred of apostasy is what draws raw power—recruits,

money, and the support of other states—and serves to

motivate the group’s members to wage their particular style 

of asymmetric warfare. For this group, apostasy seems to

serve as the root cause of the poverty, corruption, the spread

of Western influences, and the social and political violence

that plague many Muslim societies. It will likely continue to

serve in such a capacity after bin Laden is removed.

Decisively defeating Al Qaeda, therefore, will require

neutralizing that CoG. However, accomplishing that will

mean employing the diplomatic and informational elements 

of national power in a deliberate campaign to discredit the

notion that apostasy is the root cause of injustice against

18
Muslims. It is a campaign that will, to be sure, require the

support of moderate branches of Islam. Yet, it will also

require deliberate military action against terrorist cells in

the field so that this brand of Muslim extremism becomes

associated with “failure” to achieve its ends.

Additional Recommendations:

To put its doctrinal definitions of CoG more in line with

Clausewitz’s idea and thereby bring the concept back under

control, U.S. military doctrine in general, and Joint Pub 3-0

and Joint Pub 5-00.1 in particular, should redefine the CoG

as follows:

• Centers of Gravity are focal points that serve to hold a

combatant’s entire system or structure together and that

draw power from a variety of sources and provide it with

purpose and direction. 

• War planners should refrain from applying the concept 

to every kind of war (or operation) so as to eliminate or

reduce the competition that can occur between CoGs and

political-military objectives. We must ask ourselves

whether the total military collapse of the enemy is

commensurate with our political objectives and end state.

• If so, then war planners should identify where the

connections—and gaps—are in an enemy’s entire structure

or system before deciding whether a CoG actually exists.

The CoG concept does not apply in a situation in which the

enemy is not connected enough to act with unity. Also, given

the anticipated proliferation of chemical, biological,

radiological, nuclear, and high-explosive (CBRNE) weapons 

over the next decade or so, some situations are likely in

which it is dangerous to assume that the individual

segments of the enemy can be defeated by a single knock-out 

blow. If several of Al Qaeda’s cells were armed with CBRNE, 

for instance, striking against one cell could trigger a

massive retaliation event. The continued proliferation of

CBRNE and information technologies could very well make

the CoG concept academic in the future.

19
• Employing Clausewitz’s CoG concept means that we

will have to train ourselves to think more about the specific

effect(s) we want to achieve and less about the capabilities

we want to destroy, though without denigrating the

importance of those capabilities. 

• CoGs can, of course, change in the course of a conflict if,

for example, allies enter or leave the fight, or other changes

occur within the combatants’ respective power structures.

We must, therefore, reassess any previous determination of

a CoG. However, we should reevaluate whether we need to

attack CoGs that are so transitory that once one is destroyed 

another quickly takes its place. If that occurs, perhaps we

have only found a center of critical capability rather than a

CoG.

• We should resist “salami-slicing” the adversary into

tactical, operational, and strategic CoGs. The bulk of our

efforts and intermediate objectives should focus on

destroying the CoG. Creating sub-CoGs is artificial, unless

our opponent is too dispersed or decentralized to have one

CoG. Yet, even in such cases, we may find it possible to trace

those individual CoGs back to a central one.

In conclusion, the U.S. military has come to a doctrinal

fork in the road. On the one hand, it can modify the CoG

concept, changing the term into a center of criticality so that

it more accurately reflects what the definition actually says. 

If it chooses this path, the U.S. military should drop the

term center of gravity from its lexicon entirely. On the other

hand, if it wishes to retain the CoG concept so that it can

continue to focus its efforts against something that would

force an adversary to collapse, then it should redefine the

CoG concept as a focal point. If it chooses this path, the U.S.

military would have a concept that behaves more like an

actual CoG. It would also find itself in a better position to

incorporate and apply information-age concepts like

Effects-Based Operations.

To be sure, the U.S. military is under no obligation to

accept a concept developed nearly two centuries ago by a

20
military theorist who was influenced by a distant culture

and who had different conceptual tools available to him.

Yet, each of the services believes its CoG derives from

Clausewitz’s. Presumably, the original concept had

something of value that attracted military artists to it in the

first place. Indeed, that original fascination was not

misplaced. The concept does have value. However, we need

to get back to the original idea to understand and benefit

from that value. Many of Clausewitz’s ideas—friction in

war, culmination of the attack, the roles of chance and

uncertainty—have a quality that transcends his day and

makes them relevant to our own. The CoG concept is one of

them. However, we must apply it judiciously. The risks of

misapplying it, especially in today’s post-industrial era in

which “networked” opponents armed with CBRNE can

operate in a globally decentralized manner, are too great.

ENDNOTES

1. In Book I, Chapter 2 of On War, Clausewitz concluded that

warfare is neither a science nor an art. Its outcomes are too

unpredictable to consider it a science, and it involves forces that react

when acted upon, so it can not be an art, like painting. Carl von

Clausewitz, On War, Indexed ed., Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. 

and trans., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989. Hereafter cited 

as On War .

2. Department of Defense, Doctrine for Joint Operations: Joint Pub

3-0, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, February 1995;

Department of Defense, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning: Joint

Pub 5-00.1, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January

2002.

3. Department of the Army, Operations: FM 100-5, Washington, DC: 

U.S. Department of the Army, 1986, pp. 179-180, Appendix B, identified

key command posts, key terrain, unit boundaries, logistics bases, and

lines of communication as CoGs. Jomini defined a decisive point as

anything “whose attack or capture would imperil or seriously weaken

the enemy.” John Shy, “Jomini,” in The Makers of Modern Strategy:

From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Peter Paret, ed., Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 152-154. For example, USMC

doctrine, like most U.S. doctrine, currently defines CoGs as key or

important “sources of strength.” Department of the Navy, Warfighting:

21
Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Washington, DC: U.S.

Department of the Navy, 1997, p. 46; and Strategy: MCDP 1-1, p. 86; and 

Campaigning: MCDP 1-2, p. 41.

4. William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, Boulder:

Westview, 1985, pp. 107-110. 

5. Robert R. Leonard, The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver Warfare

Theory and Airland Battle, Novato, CA: Presidio, 1991, esp. pp. 20-24.

6. FM 100-5, 1993, p. 6-13; Department of the Navy, Naval Warfare:

NDP 1, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Navy, March 1994, p.

72.

7. See John A. Warden III, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat, 

Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1988, pp. 9-10; and John A. Warden III,

“The Enemy as a System,” Airpower Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, Spring 1995,

pp. 40-55; and Department of the Air Force, Air Force Doctrine

Document 1, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Air Force,

September 1997, p. 79. 

8. Department of the Navy, Warfighting: FMFM 1, Washington, DC: 

U.S. Department of the Navy, 1989, p. 85.

9. Department of the Navy, Warfighting: MCDP 1, Washington, DC: 

U.S. Department of the Navy, June 20, 1997, pp. 44-45; and Department 

of the Army, Operations: FM 100-5, Washington, DC: U.S. Department

of the Army, 2001, pp. 5-7, generally follow the Joint Pub 3-0 definition.

10. Joint Pub 3-0, p. GL-4.

11. Joint Pub 5-00.1, p. II-6.

12. Joint Pub 5-00.1, p. ix. Emphasis added.

13. For examples of this approach, see: Warfighting: MCDP 1, 1997,

p. 46; and Strategy: MCDP 1-1, 1997, p. 86; and Campaigning: MCDP

1-2, 1997, p. 41.

14. Brigadier General (retired) Huba Wass de Czege, “Clausewitz:

Historical Theories Remain Sound Compass References: The Catch Is

Staying on Course,” ARMY, Vol. 38, No. 9, September 1988, p. 42.

15. Joseph Strange, Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities:

Building on the Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak

the Same Language, Perspectives on Warfighting Series No. 4, 2d Ed.,

Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association, 1996. 

22
16. Strange, Centers of Gravity, pp. 47-48 and 143. Emphasis

original.

17. For example, Clausewitz borrowed from German philosophers

Immanuel Kant, Georg Hegel, Friedrich Schiller, and Germany’s

famous literary figure, Wilhelm Goethe. Peter Paret, Clausewitz and

the State, New York: Oxford University Press, 1976.

18. Schwerpunkt is the term used most frequently; it appears at

least 53 times, though some uses do not reflect the sense of a CoG.

Clausewitz also used the terms Centra gravitatis , Kern or core, and

Zentrum or center, at times.

19. Paret, Clausewitz, pp. 310-311. 

20. Geoff Jones, Mary Jones, and Phillip Marchington, Cambridge

Coordinated Science: Physics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 

1993, pp. 52-55. 

21. In an environment where gravity does not exist, a CoG is

replaced by a center of mass, CoM, meaning where an object’s mass is

most heavily concentrated. 

22. Jones, et al., Physics, p. 53.

23. On War, pp. 485-486, 595-596. Emphasis added.

24. On War, p. 617. Emphasis added. In fairness to Howard and

Paret, they admit that at times their translation was more interpretive

than literal. They could not have foreseen the extent to which the U.S.

military would embrace the CoG concept and adhere to their

interpretation literally.

25. See Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, 19th Ed., Intr. by Werner

Hahlweg, Regensburg: Pustet, 1991. Hereafter, Vom Kriege.

26. “Der erste ist: das Gewicht der feindlichen Macht auf so wenig

Schwerpunkte als möglich zurückzuführen, wenn es sein kann, auf

einen; wiederum den Stoß gegen diese Schwerpunkte auf so wenig

Haupthandlungen als möglich zurückzuführen, wenn es sein kann, auf

eine; endlich alle untergeordnete Handlungen so untergeordnet als

möglich zu halten. Mit einem Wort, der erste Grundsatz ist: so

konzentriert als möglich zu handeln. Der zweite Grundsatz: so schnell

als möglich zu handeln, also keinen Aufenthalt und keinen Umweg

ohne hinreichenden Grund. Das Reduzieren der feindlichen Macht auf

einen Schwerpunkt hängt ab: Erstens von dem politischen

Zusammenhang derselben . . . Zweitens von der Lage des

23
Kriegstheaters, auf welchem die verschiedenen feindlichen Heere

erschienen.” Vom Kriege, pp. 1009-1010. Emphasis added.

27. “So wie sich der Schwerpunkt immer da findet, wo die meiste

Masse beisammen ist, und wie jeder Stoß gegen den Schwerpunkt der

Last am wirksamsten ist, wie ferner der stärkste Stoß mit dem

Schwerpunkt der Kraft erhalten wird, so ist es auch im Kriege. Die

Streitkräfte jedes Kriegführenden, sei es ein einzelner Staat oder ein

Bündnis von Staaten, haben eine gewisse Einheit und durch diese

Zusammenhang; wo aber Zusammenhang ist, da treten die Analogien

des Schwerpunktes ein. Es gibt also in diesen Streitkräften gewisse

Schwerpunkte, deren Bewegung und Richtung über die anderen

Punkte entscheidet, und diese Schwerpunkte finden sich da, wo die

meisten Streitkräfte beisammen sind. So wie aber in der toten

Körperwelt die Wirkung gegen den Schwerpunkt in dem

Zusammenhang der Teile ihr Maß und ihre Grenze hat, so ist es auch im

Kriege.” Emphasis added. Vom Kriege, pp. 810-811.

28. “Was sich die Theorie hier sagen kann, ist folgendes: Es kommt

darauf an, die vorherrschenden Verhältnisse beider Staaten im Auge zu 

haben. Aus ihnen wird sich ein gewisser Schwerpunkt, ein Zentrum der

Kraft und Bewegung bilden, von welchem das Ganze abhängt, und auf

diesen Schwerpunkt des Gegners muß der gesammelte Stoß aller Kräfte 

gerichtet sein.” Vom Kriege, p. 976. Emphasis added.

Compare: “What the theorist has to say here is this: one must keep

the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these

characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power

and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against

which all our energies should be directed.” On War, pp. 595-596.

29. “Weil Blücher, obgleich schwächer als Schwarzenberg, doch

wegen seines Unternehmungsgeistes der Bedeutendere war, daß in ihm 

also mehr der Schwerpunkt lag, der das Übrige in seiner Richtung mit

fortreißt.” Emphasis added. Vom Kriege , p. 324.

30. David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, New York:

MacMillan, 1966, pp. 960-976.

31. “Alexander, Gustav Adolf, Karl XII, Friedrich der Große hatten

ihren Schwerpunkt in ihrem Heer, wäre dies zertrümmert worden, so

würden sie ihre Rolle schlecht ausgespielt haben; bei Staaten, die durch

innere Parteiungen zerrissen sind, liegt er meistens in der Hauptstadt;

bei kleinen Staaten, die sich an mächtige stützen, liegt er im Heer dieser 

Bundesgenossen; bei Bündnissen liegt er in der Einheit des Interesses;

bei Volksbewaffnung in der Person der Hauptführer und in der

24
öffentlichen Meinung. Gegen diese Dinge muß der Stoß gerichtet sein.

Hat der Gegner dadurch das Gleichgewicht verloren, so muß ihm keine

Zeit gelassen werden, es wieder zu gewinnen; der Stoß muß immer in

dieser Richtung fortgesetzt werden, oder mit anderen Worten, der

Sieger muß ihn immer ganz und das Ganze nicht gegen einen Teil des

Gegners richten.” Vom Kriege, pp. 976-977.

32. Joint Forces Command, J9 Joint Futures Lab, Rapid Decisive

Operations White Paper, Coordinating Draft dated August 9, 2001,

Norfolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2001. It defines EBO as “A

process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or ‘effect’ on the

enemy, through the application of the full range of military and

non-military capabilities at the tactical, operational, and strategic

levels. An ‘effect’ is the physical, functional, or psychological outcome,

event, or consequence that results from a specific action or actions.” p.

A-2. However, the USAF currently has a vision of EBO that differs from

that of the J9. Bruce Rolfsen, “‘Effects-Based Operations’ Is New Way To 

Fight,” Air Force Times, May 7, 2001, p. 27.

33. Christian Lowe, “In Exercise, U.S. Military Practices

Unconventional Warfare,” Defense Week, May 21, 2001, p. 2. 

34. Lowe, “Unconventional Warfare,” p. 2.

35. “Diese Centra gravitatis in der feindlichen Kriegsmacht zu

unterscheiden, ihre Wirkungskreise zu erkennen, ist also ein Hauptakt

des strategischen Urteils. Man wird sich nämlich jedesmal fragen

müssen, welche Wirkungen das Vorgehen und Zurückgehen des einen

Teiles der gegenseitigen Streitkräfte auf die übrigen hervorbringen

wird.” Vom Kriege, pp. 810-811.

36. Based on the author’s research for a forthcoming manuscript

entitled, The German Way of War.

37. “Denn nur durch diese Entscheidung werden die Schwerpunkte

der gegenseitigen Macht und die von ihnen ausgehenden Kriegstheater

wirksame Dinge.” Vom Kriege , p. 813.

38. Cited from Seow Hiang Lee, “Center of Gravity or Center of

Confusion: Understanding the Mystique,” Wright Flyer Paper No. 10,

Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 1999, pp.

18-19.

39. These strategic objectives are condensed. The objectives for the

Gulf War as outlined by President Bush were: (1) withdrawal of Iraqi

forces from Kuwait, (2) restoration of legitimate government in Kuwait,

25
(3) assuring security and stability of the Persian Gulf region, and (4)

protecting American lives. Eliot Cohen, et al., Gulf War Air Power

Survey, 5 Vols., Vol. I: Planning and Command and Control,

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993, pp. 83-84.

40. Numerous methods, too many to list here, have been devised

over the years. The “Strategic Helix” method, for example, involves

attacking all potential CoGs until the real one is hit. Put simply, this

method amounts to a “recon by destruction” approach and assumes

unlimited resources. Discussed in detail in Lee, Center of Gravity or

Center of Confusion, pp. 27-28. Similarly, the “Onion method” amounts

to little more than eating one’s way through the multiple “layers” of the

enemy’s national power to get at the CoG. Colin Agee, Peeling the Onion: 

The Iraqis’ Center of Gravity, Ft. Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced

Military Studies, 1992, pp. 26-27. Both of these methods assume that

the enemy’s CoG lies within the Helix or the Onion.

41. Mike Boettcher, “Al Qaeda forming new cells worldwide,”

CNN.com, July 31, 2002; accessed August 1, 2002. The article reported

that “the new ‘super cells’ operate on their own without guidance from

the men who once trained and directed them.”

42. Al-Qa’ida, the Base, available from http://www.ict.org.il/

inter_ter, Internet, accessed April 3, 2002.

43. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said as much in a press

interview, “Secretary Rumsfeld Interview,” Washington Times, July 19,

2002; and in a question and answer period that followed his testimony to 

the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 31, 2002.

26
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Author

Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria II

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Ms. Kimberly A. Rockwell