CHINA AND STRATEGIC CULTURE

Andrew Scobell

May 2002
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An earlier version of this monograph was presented to the “China’s

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(DIA). This monograph benefited from a research trip to Asia which was

partially funded by the DIA.

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ISBN 1-58487-090-7

ii
FOREWORD

Culture influences the way strategists in a particular

country think about matters of war and peace. Culture is

especially influential in a country like China, with an

ancient civilization and strategic tradition dating back

thousands of years. The author of this monograph, Dr.

Andrew Scobell, examines the impact of strategic culture on

21st century China. He contends that the People’s Republic

of China’s security policies and its tendency to use military

force are influenced not only by elite understandings of

China’s own strategic tradition, but also by their

understandings of the strategic cultures of other states.

Gaining a fuller appreciation for how Chinese strategists

view the United States and Japan, our key ally in the

Asia-Pacific, will better enable us to assess regional and

global security issues.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this

monograph as a contribution to the public debate on China’s

strategic disposition.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

ANDREW SCOBELL joined the Strategic Studies Institute

(SSI) in August 1999 and is SSI’s specialist on Asia. He

taught at the University of Louisville, Kentucky, and

Rutgers University, New Jersey. Since 1988 Dr. Scobell has

published articles in such journals as Armed Forces and

Society, Asian Survey, China Quarterly, Comparative

Politics, Journal of Political and Military Sociology, and

Political Science Quarterly. Recent articles and

monographs have focused on China’s military

modernization, Asia-Pacific security, and Chinese strategic

culture. Dr. Scobell holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from

Columbia University.

iv
SUMMARY

China has been identified as a looming strategic threat.

Considerable attention has been given to China’s assertive

rhetoric and militant behavior. The author uses the rubric

of strategic culture to assess China’s strategic disposition.

Two dimensions are examined: the nature and impact of

China’s assessment of its own strategic culture, and the

nature and impact of China’s depictions of the strategic

cultures of Japan and the United States.

Beijing has been depicted as increasingly belligerent

over the past decade, a perception in direct conflict with

earlier images of China. Ancient China is usually portrayed

as possessing a weak martial tradition, a cultural

predisposition to seek nonviolent solutions to problems of

statecraft, and a defensive-mindedness, favoring sturdy

fortifications over expansionism and invasion.

The author contends that existing depictions of China’s

strategic culture are flawed. China’s strategic disposition

cannot accurately be characterized as either pacifist or

bellicose. Rather, the country has a dualistic strategic

culture. The two main strands are a Confucian-Mencian one

that is conflict averse and defensive minded; and a

Realpolitik one which favors military solutions and is

offensive oriented. Both strands are operative and both

influence and combine in dialectic fashion to form a

“Chinese Cult of Defense.” This cult paradoxically tends to

dispose Chinese leaders to pursue offensive military

operations as a primary alternative in pursuit of national

goals, while rationalizing these actions as being purely

defensive and last resort. This dualistic strategic culture

has been a constant, and China has not become more

bellicose or aggressive in recent years except to the extent

that the warfighting capabilities of the People’s Liberation

Army have improved or that military doctrine has changed.

v
The author also examines China’s images of Japanese

and American strategic cultures. Significantly, Chinese

strategists tend to depict China’s own strategic culture in

very positive terms and contrast it with what are seen as the

very negative images of Japan and the United States. As

viewed from Chinese eyes, Japan possesses an extremely

warped, violent, and militaristic strategic culture; while the

United States possesses an expansionist, offensive-minded,

conflict-prone strategic culture that is obsessed with

technology. The author concludes by outlining a number of

important recommendations for U.S. defense policy.

vi
CHINA AND STRATEGIC CULTURE

Strategic culture should be considered a significant

dimension in analyses of China’s use of force for two

reasons. First, the subject of national cultures has become

widely recognized as a key dimension in strategy, including

in the impact of culture on a country’s tendency to use force.1

Indeed, the impact of culture is vital to understanding

China’s military and security affairs. The contention that

contemporary Chinese international relations have been

heavily influenced by an ancient and enduring civilization

is particularly prevalent.2

Second, scholars, analysts, and policymakers in the

People’s Republic of China (PRC) frequently assert that

past and present policy and behavior are conditioned by a

distinctive traditional Chinese philosophy of international

relations. One influential military thinker, Lieutenant

General Li Jijun, former vice president of the Academy of

Military Sciences, reasons that:

Culture is the root and foundation of strategy. Strategic

thinking, in the process of its evolutionary history, flows into

the mainstream of a country or a nation’s culture. Each

country or nation’s strategic culture cannot but bear the

imprint of cultural traditions, which in a subconscious and

complex way, prescribes and defines strategy making.3

Indeed, the author of the above words and many others in

the same Chinese elite community also perceive culture to

exert a substantial impact on the strategic behavior of other

countries.4

Furthermore, contemporary Chinese perceptions of

other states are strongly colored by China’s interpretations

of their assumed cultural proclivities. These cultural

images of other countries, particularly the images of the

strategic cultures of other countries, are influential as

China assesses threats and potential threats in the

1
international environment. This is especially so where

Japan and the United States are concerned. Chinese images

of both countries are heavily colored by the cultural baggage

accumulated over more than 100 years of historical memory

of Chinese-Japanese and Chinese-U.S. interactions.5 While

there is a considerable amount of literature on

contemporary Chinese images of the United States, there is

significantly less in the way of such studies on Chinese

images of contemporary Japan. In each case, however, there

is no focused study of China’s culturally-based images of

that country’s strategic tradition.6

This monoraph is divided into four sections. The first

explains the two main interpretations of Chinese strategic

culture, and the nature and impact of strategic culture on

China’s use of force. The second examines the Chinese

images of Japanese and U.S. strategic cultures. The third

analyzes the implications of Chinese strategic culture, and

the fourth offers recommendations for U.S. defense policy.

Definitions and Parameters.

I define strategic culture as the fundamental and

enduring assumptions about the role of war (both interstate

and intrastate) in human affairs and the efficacy of applying

force held by political and military elites in a country.7

These assumptions will vary from country to country.

Also important are the perceptions prevalent among the

elite within one country regarding the nature of another

country’s strategic culture. The sum total of these

assumptions tends to result, for example, in a composite

image held by China of the United States. Borrowing from

Allen Whiting, I define the strategic cultural image to be

“the preconceived stereotype of the strategic disposition of

another nation, state, or people that is derived from a

selective interpretation of history, traditions, and

self-image.”8

2
Chinese elites are not of one mind on either the nature of

their own strategic culture or on the images of those of other

countries. China’s self-image of its strategic culture is

essentially a Confucian one, comprising a widely-held and

hegemonic set of assumptions—although certainly not

universal.

However, China’s actual strategic culture is the result of

interplay between Confucian and Realpolitik strands. The

outcome is what I call a “Cult of Defense,” whereby Chinese

elites believe strongly that their country’s strategic

tradition is pacifist, nonexpansionist, and purely defensive

but at the same time able to justify virtually any use of

force—including offensive and preemptive strikes—as

defensive in nature.9

Chinese perceptions of the strategic cultures of other

states tend to be formed by military strategists and thus are

skewed towards negative images of Japan and the United

States.

Contrasting Depictions of China’s Use of Force.

Culture has long been considered a critical dimension in

China’s approach to strategy and warfare. While the term

“strategic culture” was not used until 1988,10 conventional

thinking was that China’s Confucian tradition was a key

determining factor in Chinese strategic thinking. Because

of Confucianism, in this interpretation China tends to favor

harmony over conflict and defense over offense.11 Other

analysts, usually focusing on Sun Zi’s Art of War, have

stressed a Chinese predisposition for stratagem over

combat and psychological and symbolic warfare over

head-to-head combat on the battlefield.12 At the very least,

these interpretations of Confucius and Sun Zi created the

image of a China whose use of force is cautious and

restrained.13 More recently, analysts have argued that

China’s leaders are actually influenced by a realpolitik (or

parabellum) strand of strategic culture.14 According this

3
interpretation, the elite has been and continues to be quite

willing to use force.

Both major interpretations of China’s strategic tradition

(Confucius/Sun Zi and Realpolitik) tend to assume its

strategic culture as monistic and make no attempt to link it

to domestic policy. It is a mistake to assume that a country’s

strategic culture can be subsumed within a single tradition

and focussed exclusively on interstate violence. Indeed, it is

likely that multiple strands of strategic culture exist.

Ignoring trends in intrastate and societal violence risks

overlooking diverse and important values and beliefs about

the use of force and violence.15

A CHINESE CULT OF DEFENSE

Two dominant strands of Chinese strategic culture—a

Confucius/Sun Zi one and a Reapolitik one exist

side-by-side. Both of these are operative, and the interaction

between the two strands produces a distinctive strategic

culture: what I have dubbed the “Chinese Cult of Defense.”16

Most Chinese strategic thinkers believe that Chinese

strategic culture is pacifistic, defensive-minded, and

nonexpansionist. However, at least in the contemporary

era, these sincerely held beliefs are essentially negated, or

rather twisted by its assumptions that any war China fights

is just and any military action is defensive, even when it is

offensive in nature. Two further assumptions reinforce this:

that threats to China’s national security are very real and

domestic threats are as dangerous as foreign threats, and

that national unification is a traditional Chinese core

strategic cultural value. The combined effect of these beliefs

and assumptions is paradoxical: while most of China’s

leaders, analysts, and researchers believe profoundly that

the legacy of Chinese civilization is fundamentally pacifist,

they are nevertheless predisposed to deploy force when

confronting crises.

The Chinese are particularly smitten with what they

view as China’s special gifts to the theory and practice of

4
statecraft and international relations.17 While the leaders of

most countries tend to believe they use military power in a

strictly defensive manner,18 this cluster of beliefs seems to

be particularly inviolable among the Chinese.19 Such beliefs

are so prevalent among Chinese elites that it is rare to find

civilian and military leaders who do not hold some or all of

them.20 Each of the three “Confucian” elements of Chinese

strategic culture can be highlighted with reference to a

phrase or saying.

“Peace is Precious.”

A deeply-held belief in elite circles is that China

possesses a pacifist strategic culture. Certainly majorities

of people in most countries, including the United States, say

they love peace—indeed it seems a near universal human

desire. What is striking in the case of China, however, is the

extreme degree to which this is stressed—to the extent that

Chinese civilization is viewed as being uniquely pacifist,

totally distinct from other strategic traditions in the world.

One of the most recent official articulations of this appears

in China’s 1998 Defense White Paper:

The defensive nature of China’s national defense policy...

springs from the country’s historical and cultural traditions.

China is a country with 5,000 years of civilization, and a

peace-loving tradition. Ancient Chinese thinkers advocated

“associating with benevolent gentlemen and befriending good

neighbors,” which shows that throughout history the Chinese

people have longed for peace in the world and for relations of

friendship with the people of other countries.21

Numerous Chinese leaders and researchers in the PRC

contend that the Chinese people value peace. In 1995,

Admiral Liu Huaqing, then a Vice Chair of the Central

Military Commission, told a pro-Communist Hong Kong

newspaper:

China has consistently pursued a foreign policy of peace and

insists that various countries should, in line with the charter

of the United Nations and the Five Principles of Peaceful

5
Coexistence . . . maintain a peaceful international environment

and that disputes between countries should be settled through

negotiations.22

Military researchers trace this preference for peace and

harmony back in history. According to the General Xing

Shizhong, Commandant of the National Defense

University:

The Chinese people have always dearly loved peace.... This

historical tradition and national psychology have a profound

influence on national defense objectives and strategic policies of

the new socialist China.23

According to Li Jijun, former Deputy Director of the

Academy of Military Sciences:

China’s ancient strategic culture is rooted in the philosophical

idea of “unity between man and nature” [tian ren he yi], which

pursues overall harmony between man and nature and

harmony among men.24

Researchers also frequently mention the Confucian saying:

“peace is precious” (he wei gui).25

In more recent times, leaders and researchers stress

that China pursues peaceful solutions rather than violent

ones. Chinese civilian and military leaders repeatedly

stress China’s adherence to the “Five Principles of Peaceful

Coexistence” as Liu Huaqing does in the above quote.26

According to one civilian scholar, the ancient principle of

“trying peaceful means before resorting to force” (xianli

houbing) has been a major influence on post-1949 China.

Thus, while the “leaders of Mao’s generation were willing to

use force to serve China’s security, and more broadly,

foreign policy goals whenever necessary . . . in most cases,

China sent strong warnings or protests or engaged in

negotiations” prior to employing armed force.27 In a

discussion of the military thought of Deng Xiaoping, two

scholars observed:

6
For many years we employed the thinking that, in whatever

method we adopt to solve a problem, we should not use the

means of war [but rather] peaceful means.28

And Deng felt it important to stress that one of China’s

three main missions for the 1980s was supporting world

peace.29 Beijing’s policy on reunification with Taiwan

regularly is cited to bolster this assertion. China’s preferred

means of unifying since 1979 is by nonmilitary means.30 It is

true that under Deng, China’s policy altered dramatically

from liberation by force to peaceful unification. But it is also

important to note that the change is more tactical than

strategic. Indeed, Beijing has refused to renounce the use of

force.31

“Never Seek Hegemony.”

A second deeply-held belief is that China has never been

an aggressive or expansionist state. According to many

leaders and researchers, China has never fought an

aggressive war throughout its long history. And China has

not threatened other countries. In post-1949 China, this has

taken the form of constant pronouncements of the fact that

“China will never seek hegemony.”32 Senior soldier Liu

Huaqing told a Hong Kong interviewer in 1995:

China is opposed to the use of force and to threatening with

force.... China is against hegemonism and power politics in

any form . . . China does not seek hegemony now, nor will it

ever do so in the future.33

And Deng Xiaoping asserted in 1980 that one of the main

tasks for the decade of supporting peace was intimately

linked to “opposing hegemony” [fandui baquanzhuyi].34 Of

course, at the time, hegemony was code word for the Soviet

Union. Since the end of the Cold War, it has come to mean

U.S. domination. But the term hegemony (ba) has a deeper

meaning in Chinese political thought. Badao or “rule by

force” has extremely negative connotations in contrast to

wangdao or “kingly way” or “benevolent rule.”35

7
According to many Chinese analysts, when China goes to

war, it does so only in “self-defense.” These analysts assert

that virtually all of the wars China has fought have been

waged to protect itself from external threats or to unify the

country. One prominent Chinese military scholar insists

that virtually all of the approximately 3,700 to 4,000 wars

China has fought in more than 4,000 years of dynasties

(ending with the collapse of the Qing in 1911) have been civil

wars or wars to unify the country. And all of the eight

“military actions” since 1949, the scholar asserts, have been

waged in “self-defense.”36 When Chinese forces have

ventured abroad, they have done so for a limited time and

for nonexpansionist purposes. According to one analyst:

The facts are: There are no records showing China’s invasion of

other countries or that China stations any soldiers abroad.37

Researchers regularly cite Mao’s statement: “We [China] do

not desire one inch of foreign soil.”38

Examples often cited to support this interpretation

include the famous voyages of Ming dynasty admiral Zheng

He. Chinese researchers emphasize these expeditions were

nonmilitary, and no attempt was made by the Chinese

armada to conquer or colonize the lands it visited. The

imperial eunuch’s travels to East Africa and South Asia

seem to have been purely voyages of exploration. According

to several scholars, unlike Western adventurers such as

Christopher Columbus and Vasco Da Gama, Zheng did not

attempt to establish colonies or use force against peoples

with whom he came in contact.39

“If Someone Doesn’t Attack Us, We Won’t Attack

Them.”

The third central tenet of this cult is that China

possesses a purely defensive strategic culture. According to

Li Jijun: “The Chinese are a defensive-minded people.”40

The classic illustration of this tendency regularly cited by

Chinese scholars is, not surprisingly, the Great Wall.

8
According to Li: “China’s Great Wall has always been a

symbol of a defense, not the symbol of a national

boundary.”41 In the 1990s, some Chinese researchers sought

to validate this point by citing Western scholarship, notably

the work of John Fairbank and Mark Mancall.42 They also

seek to make their case by drawing a direct comparison

between Western and Chinese strategic traditions.

According to Major General Yao Youzhi, Director of the

Department of Strategic Studies at the Academy of Military

Sciences, China’s military tradition places “complete stress

on a defensive stance” whereas, in contrast, Western

military tradition “emphasizes offense.”43

Another example of the defensive nature of China’s

strategic posture is the “No First Use” pledge regarding

nuclear weapons.44 Chinese officials also point to the

military reforms China has undertaken over the past 2

decades as proof of China’ purely defensive stance. Liu

Huaqing said in 1995:

As is known to all, China possesses a strategy of active

defense, and cut its troops by 1 million several years ago,

something no other country has thus far achieved. Our present

military strength is of a defensive nature and the Chinese

Government strictly limits defensive expenditure to the

minimum level necessary to ensure national security.45

Perhaps the most commonly touted evidence is Mao’s

admonition: “If someone doesn’t attack us, we won’t attack

them; however if someone does attack us, we will definitely

[counter] attack” [Ren bu fan wo, wo bu fan ren; ren fan wo,

wo bi fan ren].46 This quote appears in China’s 1998 Defense

White Paper. The late Marshal Xu Xiangqian also

mentioned it in practically the same breath as he discussed

Vietnam’s invasion and occupation of Cambodia during a

1980 interview.47 Significantly, China’s largest military

conflict in the post-Mao era—an attack against Vietnam in

February 1979—was triggered by Vietnam’s invasion of

Cambodia. Although it was China that invaded Vietnam,

Beijing officially labeled this war a “self-defensive

9
counterattack” [ziwei huanji]. According to two military

thinkers: “[A] strategic counterattack implies a strategic

offensive.” The strategists continued:

the February 1979 self-defense counterattack against Vietnam,

from the military operational standpoint, offensive actions were

employed. Nevertheless, the essence of this kind of offense was a

self-defense counterattack.48

The same logic applied to China’s brief but bloody border

wars with India in 1962 and with the Soviet Union in 1969.

Both conflicts are labeled “self-defense counter-attacks”

[ziwei fanji].49

GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR EXTERNAL

SECURITY

Counteracting these three core elements are four key

strategic constants that justify the external use of military

force. The concepts of just war, the value placed on national

unification, the principle of active defense, and high threat

sensitivity in practice negate the pacifying effects of the

above core elements.

Contemporary Chinese Just War Theory.

Considerable attention by Chinese strategic analysts is

given to the concept of just war. Authors tend to stress that

Chinese thinking about just or righteous war [yizhan] dates

back thousands of years.50 The principle of just war seems to

be a crucial element of China’s traditional approach to war,

in the view of many contemporary military researchers.51

Indeed it is ancient: Confucius adopted the concept, and

Mao later absorbed it.52

The distinction is simple: just wars are good wars, and

unjust wars are bad ones. Just wars are those fought by

oppressed groups against oppressors; unjust wars are ones

waged by oppressors against the oppressed. In

contemporary Chinese thinking, China long has been a

10
weak, oppressed country fighting against powerful

imperialist oppressors. Thus for many Chinese, any war

fought by their country is by definition a just conflict—even

a war in which China strikes first.53 This might include any

war fought to “restore or protect national territory or to

maintain national prestige.”54 The 1979 border war China

fought with Vietnam is viewed as a just conflict.55 Needless

to say, virtually any war fought by a hegemonic power such

as United States is an unjust war.

National Unification.

National unification is a core value in China’s national

security calculus on which no compromise is possible. It is

an immutable principle in part because of China’s history of

division and inability to stop exploitation and oppression by

foreign powers. But it is also an emotional and unwavering

public stand precisely because the leadership of the PRC

seems to lack any other inviolable principles.56 According to

Li Jijun:

The most important strategic legacy of the Chinese nation is

the awareness of identification with the concept of unification,

and this is where lies the secret for the immortality of...

Chinese civilization... [s]eeking unification... [is] the soul of .

. . Chinese military strategy endowed by... Chinese

civilization.57

According to another analyst, the “principle of

unification”: “hoping for unification, defending unification

is a dimension of the Chinese people’s... thought culture

and is a special feature of its strategic thought.”58

Threat Perceptions.

China’s political and military leaders see threats

everywhere. The full extent of the siege mentality of China’s

leaders is not always appreciated. This siege mentality

results in elites viewing the foreign as well as domestic

environments as treacherous landscapes filled with threats

11
and conspiracies.59 The current campaign against

corruption in China and the crackdown on the Falungong

Sect suggest the depth of the regime’s fear of domestic

threats.60

This mindset may explain the need of the Chinese

authorities during the Maoist era to come up with the

seemingly innocuous phrase, “China has friends all over the

world.”61 By the same token, one would expect that China

had also at least some enemies in the world. Indeed, one is

tempted to conclude that the slogan itself was prompted by

Chinese insecurities. If a country has friendly states around

the world, why is it necessary to recite this ad nauseum?

And the reality was in the late Maoist era that China

actually had few staunch friends: the handful that come to

mind are Albania, North Korea, and Pakistan. The fact of

the matter is that Maoist China believed itself surrounded

by enemies. This was true of Deng’s China, and also holds

true for Jiang Zemin’s China.

Active Defense.

The strategic principle of active defense is key to Chinese

strategic thinkers. Most thinkers believe this is of central

importance to Chinese strategy. According to the PLA’s

officer handbook, “All military experts, ancient and

contemporary, Chinese and foreign, recognize the

importance of active defense.”62 The tendency is for

researchers and policymakers to broadly define defense as

virtually anything, including a preemptive strike!

Successive conflicts, including the 1962 border war with

India, are labeled “self-defense wars” or “self-defense

counterattacks” [ziwei zhanzheng, ziwei fanjizhan or ziwei

huanjizhan].

63

The idea of “active defense” (jiji fangyu) is a relatively

recent concept in Chinese strategic thought. It is an idea

that crops up frequently in spoken and written material by

Chinese strategic thinkers—it is mentioned in the 1995

interview with Liu quoted above, for example. While at least

12
one scholar dismisses active defense as mere propaganda,64

the strategy appears to have real significance. Indeed it has

been a key guiding principle in Mao’s day, in Deng’s time,

and remains important at the dawn of the 21st century.

Indeed, it figures prominently in China’s 1998 Defense

White Paper.

According to Deng Xiaoping:

active defense is not merely defense per se, but includes

defensive offensives. Active defense includes our going out, so

that if we are attacked we will certainly counter attack.65

Senior Colonel Wang Naiming explains:

[active defense] . . . emphasizes that the nature of our military

strategy is defensive, but also active in requirements. It

requires the organic integration of offense and defense, and

achieving the strategic goal of defense by active offense; when

the conditions are ripe, the strategic defense should be led [sic]

to counterattack and offense.66

The “organic integration” between offense and defense is

very much a part of the concept of “absolute flexibility”

[quanbian] highlighted by Iain Johnston.67 In a real sense

then, the line between offense and defense is blurred. In the

final analysis: “Active defense strategy does not

acknowledge the difference... between defense and

offense.”68 In fact, according to a researcher at the Academy

of Military Sciences, active defense does not rule out a first

strike:

Our strategic principle of “striking only after the enemy has

struck” certainly does not exclude sudden “first strikes” in

campaign battles or counterattacks in self-defense into enemy

territory.69

In sum, the impact of the Cult of Defense is a

predisposition by Chinese elites to opt for force because they

perceive its use by China as always defensive in nature.

13
But the impact of strategic culture does not end here.

The impact on China’s elites is two-fold. First, the strategic

culture of their own country (articulated above) affects how

they think and act. What is also influential is the way in

which these same elites perceive the strategic culture of

major powers viewed as rivals.

STRATEGIC CULTURE IMAGES OF JAPAN AND

THE UNITED STATES

Chinese threat perceptions of the United States and

Japan are heavily influenced by the intimate involvement of

both with the prime objective of China’s unification policy:

the island of Taiwan. The United States strongly supported

the Kuomintang (KMT) regime led by Chiang Kai-shek

during World War II when it was based on the Chinese

mainland. Following the KMT collapse on the mainland and

its relocation to Taiwan, the Truman administration was

ready to cut its ties with Chiang. However, the outbreak of

the Korean War prompted Washington to come to the

defense of the KMT regime in Taipei. In a series of crises in

the Taiwan Strait, it has stood by the KMT government. It

has also, in China’s view, actively encouraged Taiwanese

leaders to pursue independence (see below). Japan’s 50-year

occupation of the island (1895-1945) and the continued

contacts between Japanese politicians and their Taiwanese

counterparts underline Tokyo’s link to Taipei. The strong

ties that former Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui had with

Japan reinforced the connection. Lee speaks good Japanese,

and it was in an interview with a Japanese newspaper that,

by Beijing’s reckoning, Lee first revealed his scheme to turn

Taiwan down the road of independence.70

Japan: A Mutant Ninja Strategic Culture.

There is a “duality” to Chinese views of Japan. On the

one hand, there is much admiration and appreciation for the

economic benefits Japan offers to China. Particularly in the

late 1970s and 1980s, Chinese leaders were very interested

14
in learning from Japan.71 This even included the PLA, as it

appears that the PLA was looking at militaries around the

world in search of an appropriate model to emulate.72 In

more recent years, however, the PLA appears to view

military-to-military ties with the Japanese Self Defense

Force (SDF) through more of a negative strategic culture

lens. The PLA has resisted efforts to build regular ties with

the SDF out of suspicions of Japan and the “implied

acceptance of Japan’s forces as a legitimate national army”

that such relations would carry with it.73

For many Chinese strategists, central to understanding

the warped strategic culture of Japan is “Bushido”

(wushidao in Chinese) or “way of the warrior.”74 According

to Li Jijun, the “rather primitive” [bijiao yuanshi] religion of

Shintoism and Bushido combine to produce a “bloody

thirsty” [shisha] and “barbaric” [yeman] strategic culture.

“In essence, bushido is the inhumane ethical outlook of

conquering warriors and exaltation of slaughter . . . .”75 Li

then asks: ”how can one explain Japan’s wartime atrocities

in China?" “The fundamental answer,” he writes, “can only

be found in its [Japan’s] national policies [guojia zhengce]

and strategic culture [zhanlue wenhua].”76

On the one hand, Japan is seen as a modernized and

wealthy, high tech, advanced capitalist state. On the other,

however, Japan is considered a country without a deep

and/or vibrant philosophical tradition.77 It is the example

used to provide the stark contrast to the pacifistic,

nonmilitarist culture of China. Japan is, in the words of Li

Jijun, an “inbred [Japanese] freak” [ziwo peiyu guitai]. He

also believes there is “no capacity [within Japan] for

national introspection” [buihui fanxing de minzu],

confession, and redemptive healing.78

China refuses to accept at face value the pacifist leaf that

Japan has turned since the U.S. occupation after World War

II. This is nurtured not just by the existence of a substantial

and well-equipped SDF, but also by paranoia of Chinese

leaders combined with memories of Japanese invasion,

15
occupation, and associated atrocities and violence, most

infamously the Nanjing massacre of 1937. Many Chinese

are convinced that Japan will continue to upgrade militarily

despite its “Peace Constitution.” They are also fearful of a

revival of militarism and ultra-nationalism.79 One Chinese

analyst speaking in the mid-1980s attributed his concern to

the “aggressive Japanese ‘national character’.”80 Other

researchers commented on the “arrogance” and “cunning” of

the Japanese.81 The modicum of support in the 1980s among

Chinese elites for a robust Japanese defense and close

Japanese-American alliance appears to have vanished with

the end of the Cold War.82

The United States: A Star Wars Strategic Culture.

Just as with Chinese images of Japan, there is a duality

of Chinese views of the United States. On the one hand, the

United States is seen as a model; on the other, the United

States is derided as threat. As David Shambaugh notes, a

dominant theme in China’s America watchers across the

20th century was “ambivalence.”83

Today, on the threshold of the 21st century, many

Chinese strategic thinkers view the United States as the

primary threat to China. 84 The United States is not so much

a direct military threat as a broader security threat,

because of the perception that the United States is trying to

contain China and undermine China through “peaceful

evolution” and prevent unification with Taiwan. The view is

particularly prevalent in the PLA.85 According to one group

of military researchers, “Since the end of the Cold War,

Taiwan has increasingly been used by the United States as

an extremely important chess piece to contain China.”86

General Zhang Wannian, Vice Chairman of the Central

Military Commission in an emotionally charged address to

senior PLA leaders in mid-May 1999—in the aftermath of

the Belgrade bombing—reportedly claimed that “U.S.

hegemonism is public enemy number one of the PLA.”87

16
This perception is based on the fact that Washington is

the sole global superpower, the troubled history of bilateral

relations, U.S. national security objectives, and an

interpretation of U.S. strategic culture. Certainly U.S.

hegemony and the contentious history of U.S.-China

relations are important factors in and of themselves. And

official U.S. foreign policy pronouncements reinforce the

belief in an American threat. But this is all compounded by

Chinese interpretations of U.S. strategic culture.

American strategic culture tends to be subsumed within

the broader category of a widely assumed “Western”

[Xifang] way of war. This Occidental strategic culture is

depicted as expansionist and realist in direct contrast to

China’s own pacific and principled tradition. According to

one researcher, the West emphasizes “military means to

achieve political objectives of geographic and political

expansion.” In comparison, “China [has] a defensive

military tradition.”88 Indeed the “vast majority of Western

national [strategic] cultural traditions emphasize obtaining

“material benefits” [shiji liyi] instead of “ethical thinking.”89

In fact, it is not uncommon for Chinese strategists to insist

that Westerners have “no ethical principles.”90 According to

one military scholar, China possesses a “continental

culture” that stresses “moral self-cultivation,” while most

Western countries have “maritime cultures” that stress

“courage, strength, and technology.” Western countries

tend to view war with an adventurous and “romantic

attitude.”91

Core features of U.S. strategic culture in Chinese eyes

are expansionism and hegemonism. The United States,

according to Li Jijun, has “greatly expanded its territory

through several wars . . . and expanded its interests and

influence throughout the world through two world wars and

the Cold War.” The U.S. strategic culture is “highly

offensive oriented” [fuyu jingongxing].

92 In the view of many

Chinese analysts, the United States “tries to force other

countries to accept its will through political and economic

17
measures.” In short, the United States is acting like a

hegemon in the Chinese view.93

Another element of American strategic culture is what

might be dubbed cultural or ideological hegemonism that

“makes promotion of its own values a major part of its global

strategy.”94 The flip side of this element is a fervent

anti-communism in the United States that most Chinese

analysts believe persists in the post-Cold War era. Many

Chinese analysts puzzled over the logic behind U.S.

intervention in Kosovo: what possible strategic interests

could Washington have in this area? Beijing analysts

concluded the intervention was based on U.S. opposition to

a communist regime in Belgrade.95

According to many Chinese strategic thinkers, the U.S.

defense elite worships technology. The U.S. military seeks

to overcome all challenges through advances in

technology.96 This is typified by President Ronald Reagan’s

belief that American ingenuity would develop space age or

“Star Wars” technology to enable the United States to

protect itself from Soviet missile attack. More recently,

researchers in China see the worship of technology evident

in the appeal of missile defense proposals and the use of

“stand off” technology which gives U.S. forces the capacity to

wage war at a distance. The latter enables the military to

avoid face-to-face combat and greatly reduces the potential

for casualties. According to one Chinese analyst writing in

the official People’s Daily in June 1999, the United States

seized the opportunity presented by Kosovo for

experimental usage of “high-tech weapons to attack...

civilian facilities... [and] treat innocent and peaceful

civilians as live targets.”97

Another key feature of this cultural approach is the

American predilection for “strategic misdirection [zhanlue

wudao].”98 This is used to refer to the feints and thrusts

aimed at sending the opponent the wrong way. According to

Li Jijun, during the Reagan and George Bush

administrations, the United States used this to great effect

18
against the Soviet Union and against Iraq. Star Wars (or the

Strategic Defense Initiative) is viewed primarily as a

ruse—Washington never intended to deliver, but alarm

over it prompted the Soviets to increase spending on defense

that, in turn, contributed to the eventual collapse of the

Soviet regime. Li Jijun argues that the United States

deliberately led Sadam Hussein to believe that there would

be no American intervention in the event Iraq invaded

another state.

The outcome of this characterization of U.S. strategic

culture is the suspicion and indeed assumption of many

analysts in China that the United States is intent on

pursuing a similar tack with China. For example, most

Chinese analysts were very skeptical of the United States

“intelligence failures” in the Indian nuclear tests of May

1998 and the Belgrade embassy bombing a year later. Many

were convinced that both were devious plots to throw China

off balance and refused to believe the official explanations

offered by the U.S. Government.99 After all, Washington’s

goal is assumed to be the destruction or dismemberment of

China.

Chinese analysts, however, identify some prime

weaknesses in American strategic culture. One flaw is

inconsistency. This is the result of several factors. A number

of Chinese analysts conclude that U.S. administrations

flip-flop between realism and liberalism.100 This contributes

to a lack of long-term strategic vision. An important factor

in the view of one thinker is the fact that “public opinion and

national aspirations” are “important factors” in the

formulation of U.S. “foreign and domestic policies, and

military strategy.” In short, “national attitudes toward war

are directly linked to the outcome of strategy.” Because

public opinion, and to a lesser extent national aspirations,

fluctuate, it is very difficult for the United States to

maintain consistent policies and take a long-term view. A

prime example in the analyst’s view was the U.S. decision

first to intervene in Somalia and then, in a sudden reversal

of policy, to pull out of Somalia. Clinton’s “new

19
interventionism” collapsed under adverse public reaction to

U.S. fatalities on the ground.101

While the technological edge that the United States

enjoys appears daunting, several analysts consider this

reliance on technology to resolve all problems as an Achilles’

heel. The U.S. military, for example, will find it difficult to

keep up with rapidly changing technology for a number of

reasons. First, there are significant political constraints:

the cost in an era of declining defense budgets and

interservice rivalry in the vicious competition for control

over limited resources. Second, some analysts argue, the

technological systems are so complex that they are difficult

to operate and integrate within a larger system of systems.

Third, Chinese analysts assert, high tech systems are

vulnerable to disabling from external attack.102 Fourth,

U.S. arrogance inhibits the development of necessary

innovations and the spread of technology will enable other

states to acquire and utilize similar technology relatively

quickly.103

A final weakness is a lack of understanding about the

history and cultures of the rest of the world. Li Jijun quotes

approvingly the judgement of another Chinese strategic

thinker: “almost all U.S. politicians (strategists) have no

sense of history at all.”104 While there is a deep admiration

for realists (and friends of China) with this outlook such as

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger, and the late Richard

Nixon, who are seen as the exception to the rule, most U.S.

leaders are viewed more disdainfully.105

Analysis.

China’s dominant self-image (Confucian strategic

culture) and its images of other states will be influential in

how China fights and whom it prepares to confront. China’s

civil and military elites perceive China’s strategic culture as

pacific, anti-hegemonic, and purely defensive in nature.

This self-image belies the nature of China’s actual strategic

culture—the outcome of a dialectic produced by two strands

20
of strategic culture: Confucian and Realpolitik. The value of

strategic culture in discerning patterns in China’s use of

force lies not only in identifying the nature of, and

explaining the impact of, China’s actual strategic culture.

Strategic culture can also be used to understand how China

perceives the strategic traditions of other states and uses

these assumptions/beliefs to formulate threat assessments.

China’s Use of Force. China will use force quite readily,

always insisting it is defensive in nature. The Cult of

Defense articulated above reveals a cultural tendency in

China to, on the one hand, see itself as a pacific,

defensive-minded civilization, while on the other, defining

just war and active defense in ways that actually predispose

China to use force. Chinese elites also consider national

unification as a core principle and, within that, the PLA sees

itself shouldering a sacred trust—primary responsibility for

returning Taiwan to the motherland.106 The Chinese

leadership also assumes that threats surround China and

anti-China conspiracies abound.

The PRC leadership will continue to deploy armed forces

to confront domestic challenges and counter perceived

international threats. Domestically, the People’s Armed

Police will continue to serve as frontline troops to confront

independent-minded ethnic minorities, disgruntled

workers, and peasants. But the PLA is the ultimate

guarantor of internal security, as the events of June 1989

revealed. At China’s borders and beyond, the air, sea, and

land services of the PLA will engage the militaries of other

states perceived as hostile to the Chinese state.

Current Chinese Threat Perceptions. As the United

States reassesses the security environment in Northeast

Asia in the early 21st century, it is important to gain an

appreciation for and understanding of Chinese threat

perceptions. The Chinese leadership views the key

enduring external threats to China as emanating from

Washington and Tokyo, and they see both capitals as

supporting Taiwan’s ambitions of independence. Thus

21
Taiwan is the key flash point. The PLA is preparing to use

force against the United States in a Taiwan scenario. After

the deployment of two aircraft carrier battle groups in the

1996 Strait crisis, most senior officers in the PLA assume

the United States will become involved in any Chinese

military operation against Taiwan.107

Chinese leaders, grounded in culturally-based

assumptions about U.S. and Japanese strategic thinking

and intentions, perceive the United States as the key threat

to China for the foreseeable future and Japan as the

presumptive challenge to China.

U.S. Threat. Whatever the United States does will be

viewed with suspicion by China, and Washington should

anticipate hot blasts of harsh rhetoric. But these should not

simply be dismissed as propaganda—these words are also

the manifestation of real Chinese fears. These concerns are

a combination of China’s own strategic culture and its image

of U.S. strategic culture. Given this, the logic of U.S. moves

should be clearly articulated with the recognition that the

rhetoric may not be accepted at face value. Any changes in

the U.S. forward presence in the Asia-Pacific (Northeast

Asia in particular) and in U.S. alliance structures should be

undertaken with this in mind.

Future Threat: Fear of a Resurgent Japan. The United

States should also be sensitive to Chinese concerns about

Japanese rearmament, given Chinese images of Japan’s

strategic culture. Any draw down of U.S. forces in Northeast

Asia would likely mean a corresponding rise in Japanese

defense spending and buildup of strategic capabilities. This

could easily raise tensions in the region and trigger an arms

race.

China uses force to achieve specific political goals—

usually not to achieve a resounding military victory but to

send a warning or a message of deterrence or compellance.

Certainly an important part of the reason why China does

not seek a stunning battlefield victory is because its military

resources are limited relative to its potential foes. But there

22
is an important cultural dimension that accounts for this

way of thinking, and China’s predilection for the limited use

of force should not be confused with a reluctance to use force

at all. In fact, since 1949 China deployed force in ways that

reveal a tendency to take significant, albeit calculated,

risks. In the Taiwan Strait crises of the 1950s, in the 1969

border clashes with the Soviet Union, and in the 1979

border war with Vietnam, China could not be 100 percent

certain that any of these actions would not provoke an

escalating response from a superpower.

China’s emphasis on unification and perceptions of

threats within the Chinese state suggest force will be used

domestically. There remains a genuine possibility that force

will be used to achieve unification with Taiwan. Certainly

military means are not the most desirable option for Beijing,

but the use of force may be viewed as necessary.108

Moreover, Chinese perceptions of Japanese and American

strategic cultures reveal a predisposition to make Tokyo

and Washington the headquarters of states with menacing

designs on China’s sovereignty and security. In sum,

strategic culture has important influence not only on why

China uses force, but where and against whom.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. DEFENSE POLICY

As the September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review

(QDR) notes, “Asia is gradually emerging as a region

susceptible to large-scale military competition.” The

continent is increasingly important to U.S. security

interests. Asia “contains a volatile mix of rising and

declining powers” as the QDR also notes, and China is

certainly the most significant rising power in the region.109

If the findings of this study are accurate, China’s leaders

and strategists are convinced that their country harbors no

aggressive intentions towards other countries. Because

China is a peace-loving country that only uses force in

self-defense, its defense modernization and territorial

claims regarding Taiwan in the East and South China Sea

23
should not alarm anyone. Beijing’s leaders, in other words,

tend to remain oblivious to the possibility that other

countries might feel threatened or uneasy about China’s

growing military power, saber rattling in the Taiwan Strait,

or increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea.

This study also reveals that the feelings of ambivalence

and suspicion with which many in the United States view

China are mirrored in China. That is, many in China’s

national security community hold similar views of

ambivalence and suspicion about the U.S. strategic

disposition vis-à-vis China.

Such mutual suspicion and distrust make it difficult—

albeit not impossible—for the two sides to hold a meaningful

dialogue and cooperate on security issues.

Recommendations.

1. Any change in the size of the U.S. force presence

in Northeast Asia should be carefully considered and

the logic or rationale should be articulated clearly.

China could very easily misread a change in the size of the

U.S. military presence in Northeast Asia. A reduction, for

example, could be interpreted as a decline in U.S.

commitment. Land power adjustments in particular should

be considered very carefully, since the size of U.S. ground

forces in Northeast Asia tends to be considered a very

significant indicator of the depth of U.S. defense

commitment to the area. There is nothing wrong with the

concept of “places, not bases” but in terms of “dissuading

adversaries” and “deterring aggression”—two of the “key

goals” outlined by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in

the QDR report—one should not underestimate the value of

forward deployed ground forces. China, for example,

interprets American “boots on the ground” as a key symbol

of U.S. steadfastness. This is true not only in the case for the

continued U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula, but also

in the dispatch of American ground forces to Central Asia in

the aftermath of September 11, 2001.

24
2. Robust and agile forward deployed land power

with in-theater experience is a key determinant of

success in future conflicts. As Rumsfeld stated in his

January 30, 2002, speech at the National Defense

University (NDU), one of the lessons he drew from phase

one of the War on Terrorism in Afghanistan was “don’t rule

out ground forces.” While technology and airpower were

invaluable in Afghanistan, without the presence of ground

forces in the country, these elements would have been far

less effective. Defense transformation does not render

“boots on the ground (or in the stirrup!)” obsolete. He

stressed that defense transformation is about using “new

and existing capabilities” and putting them “together in

unprecedented ways.” Moreover, the fact that Special

Operations Forces had trained with colleagues in

Uzbekistan was instrumental in facilitating the access of

U.S. forces to the region and provided firsthand experience

of operating in Central Asia.

3. When making changes in the U.S.-Japan defense

relationship, give due consideration to how this will

be interpreted by China. Any changes in U.S.-Japanese

defense ties will be minutely scrutinized by Beijing. Almost

certainly, Beijing will interpret virtually any change as

resulting in a closer military alliance. Moreover, given the

dominant Chinese perception of the strategic cultures of

these two countries, Beijing will tend to conclude the change

results in a greater threat to China.

4. Any change in the policy of “strategic

ambiguity” vis-à-vis Taiwan should be weighed very

carefully. If the policy of “strategic ambiguity” shifted

toward “clarity,” Beijing would almost certainly perceive

this to be a serious strengthening of U.S. commitment to

Taiwan.110 In such a situation, Beijing could easily

determine that there had been a qualitative change of policy

toward Washington, one that called for a significant

Chinese response. This might easily trigger some kind of

military action by China. Even if China limited itself to a

display of force short of an actual military attack on Taiwan,

25
the likely increase in tensions would have a negative impact

throughout East Asia. It is important to recognize that the

majority of security analysts in Beijing and Shanghai are

convinced that, despite the current U.S. policy of “strategic

ambiguity” in the event of an unprovoked Chinese attack on

Taiwan, the United States would come to the island’s

defense.111 Indeed, ambiguity does not refer to doubts about

whether the United States is committed to Taiwan’s

security; rather, the ambiguity refers to what precisely

would trigger U.S. intervention and what the nature of that

intervention would be.

5. Make protection of U.S. military C4

ISR assets

and defense against information attacks a high

priority. China has identified technology, and information

technology in particular, as an Achilles’ heel of the United

States. Exploiting this weakness is clearly a priority for the

PLA identified by Chinese military researchers. While it is

unclear just how far along China is in developing actual

information warfare capabilities, the potential challenge

from China must be taken seriously.112 Significantly,

Rumsfeld stressed the importance of “protecting

information networks from attack” in his January speech at

NDU. Upgrading the protection of U.S. defense information

networks must be made a high priority.

6. Carefully and continuously monitor Chinese

strategic thinking and perceptions of the United

States, Japan, and Taiwan. Staying abreast of trends in

Chinese strategic thought and perceptions of the United

States, Japan, and Taiwan is a critical and continual

challenge. Monitoring Chinese thinking on these subjects

provides significant insights and indications of possible

future courses of action. Military-to-military ties are a core

component of this (see recommendation 7). It is also

essential to keep up on the ever-growing number of books

and periodicals published by the Chinese defense

intellectual community. Since this presents an immense

challenge to Pentagon analysts, tapping the expertise of

outside experts becomes increasingly essential. The size

26
and publication output of the PLA watching community has

also grown. A manageable way to keep current with their

research is to consult the series of papers from two annual

PLA conferences. One, founded by the Chinese Council of

Advanced Policy Studies (or CAPS—a Taiwan-based think

tank) has in recent years been co-sponsored by the RAND

Corporation, and the papers are published as edited

volumes by RAND. The other was founded by the

Washington-based American Enterprise Institute (AEI). In

recent years this conference has been co-sponsored by the

Heritage Foundation and the U.S. Army War College. Since

1999 the annual conference volume has been published by

the War College’s Strategic Studies Institute.

7. Getting security cooperation with China back

on a more routine footing should be a priority.

Resuming security cooperation or military-to-military

relations between the Pentagon and the PLA is important

because it opens up multiple channels of communications

where members of the two armed forces can learn more

about each other firsthand, and the myths and stereotypes

each hold of the other can be dispelled. Routine does not

mean that the program is not well-conceived and prudently

tailored to serve the interests of U.S. national security.

Rather, it means that security cooperation should not be

subject to turbulence of day-to-day Washington politics and

ad hoc tinkering. One way to help ensure this is to avoid

those aspects that are likely to be controversial and prone to

be cancelled whenever there is a downturn in the

relationship.113 For the United States, the Army is the

service best suited to take the lead role in security

cooperation.114

ENDNOTES

1. For discussion of strategic culture in general, see Alastair I.

Johnston, “Thinking About Strategic Culture,” International Security,

Vol 19, No. 4, Spring 1995, pp. 32-64; Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The

Culture of National Security, New York: Columbia University Press,

1996; and Ken Booth and Russell Trood, eds., Strategic Cultures in the

27
Asia-Pacific Region, Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999.

For a recent critique of the approach, see Michael C. Desch, “Cultural

Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies,”

International Security, Vol. 23, Summer 1999, pp. 141-170. For

discussion of the utility of strategic culture in security studies of China,

see Robert S. Ross and Paul H. B. Godwin, “New Directions in Chinese

Security Studies,” in David Shambaugh, ed., American Studies of

Contemporary China, Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1993, p. 144; and

Samuel S. Kim, “China and the World in Theory and Practice,” in

Samuel S. Kim, ed., China and the World, 3rd ed., Boulder: Westview

Press, 1998, pp. 14-15.

2. On China’s international relations, see the writings of John K.

Fairbank and Mark Mancall; on China’s military and security affairs,

see John K. Fairbank, “Introduction,” in Frank A. Kierman, Jr., and

John K. Fairbank, eds., Chinese Ways in Warfare, Cambridge: Harvard

University Press, 1974.

3. Li Jijun, “Lun zhanlue wenhua,” [on strategic culture] Zhongguo

junshi kexue [China military science—hereafter ZGJSKX] No. 1, 1997,

p. 8. See also Li Jijun, Traditional Military Thinking and the Defense

Strategy of China, An address to the U.S. War College [sic] Letort Paper

No. 1, Introduction by Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., Carlisle Barracks, PA:

Strategic Studies Institute, August 29, 1997. For the Chinese language

version, see Li Jijun, “Zhongguo junshi sixiang chuantong yu fangyu

zhanlue,” Zhongguo junshi kexue [China Military Science] No. 4, Winter

1997, pp. 62-64.

4. See also, for example, Ni Lexiong, zhanzheng yu wenhua

chuantong: dui lishi de ling yi zhong guancha [war and cultural

tradition: another perspective on history] Shanghai: Shanghai Shudian

Chubanshe, March 2000.

5. Of course, this dynamic works both ways. See, for example, Susan

M. Puska, New Century, Old Thinking: The Dangers of the Perceptual

Gap in U.S.-China Relations, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies

Institute, April 10, 1998.

6. On images of the United States in the late 20th century, see for

example, David Shambaugh, Beautiful Imperialist, Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1991. For a more recent effort, see Phillip

Saunders, “China’s America Watchers,” The China Quarterly, No. 161,

March 2000, pp. 41-65. On images of Japan in the late 20th century, see

Allen S. Whiting, China Eyes Japan, Berkeley and Los Angeles:

University of California Press, 1989; and Michael Pillsbury, China

Debates the Future Security Environment, Washington, DC: National

28
Defense University Press, 2000, pp. 107-138, 153. The role of culture in

Chinese perceptions of the United States and Japan is downplayed, if

not ignored. In his study of China’s Americanists, David Shambaugh

notes, “culture [is]...a factor that conditions the broader intellectual

milieu shaping the America Watchers’ perceptions.” Beautiful

Imperialist, p. 297. Shambaugh has several pages of discussion on this

aspect, but culture is not the focus of his study. By contrast, in his study

of Japan watchers in China, Allen Whiting completely downplays the

influence of culturally influenced images. See China Eyes Japan.

Michael Pillsbury discusses in passing the cultural dimension of

Chinese perceptions of the United States and Japan. See Pillsbury,

China Debates the Future . . . , pp. xlv-xlvi, for the United States, and

108-109, 153, for Japan.

7. Jack Snyder formulated the term “strategic culture” in an effort to

understand the nuclear strategy of the Soviet Union. Jack Snyder, The

Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations,

Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, September 1977. The term often

goes undefined. The following examples are taken from the China

literature, although these uses of strategic culture are not unique to

China studies. See two studies by Shu Guang Zhang: Deterrence and

Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958,

Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992; and “China: Traditional and

Revolutionary Heritage” in Ken Booth and Russell Trood, eds., Strategic

Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region, Houndsmills, Basingstoke,

Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 1999, pp. 29-50. For broad definitions, see

Ross and Godwin, “New Directions in Chinese Security Studies,” p. 144.

Rosita Dellios states: “Strategic culture pertains to a people’s distinctive

style of dealing with and thinking about the problems of national

security.” Rosita Dellios, “‘How May the World Be at Peace?’: Idealism

as Realism in China’s Strategic Culture,” in Valerie M. Hudson, ed.,

Culture and Foreign Policy, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997, p. 203. For a

focused and rigorous definition, see Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural

Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in China History,

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.

8. Allen S. Whiting, China Eyes Japan, Berkeley and Los Angeles:

University of California Press, 1989.

9. Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great

Wall and the Long March, New York: Cambridge University Press,

chap. 2, forthcoming 2003; Andrew Scobell, “The Chinese Cult of

Defense,” Issues and Studies, Vol. 37, No. 5, September/October 2001,

pp. 100-127.

29
10. Chong-Pin Lin, China’s Nuclear Strategy: Evolution Within

Tradition, Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1988.

11. Fairbank, “Introduction,” in Fairbank and Kierman, eds.,

Chinese Ways in Warfare, pp. 1-26. For a similar type of argument which

stresses the influence of Daoism, see Rosita Dellios, “How May the

World Be at Peace?”

12. Jonathan R. Adelman and Chih-yu Shih, Symbolic War: The

Chinese Use of Force, 1840-1980, Taipei: Institute for International

Relations, 1993; Howard L. Boorman and Scott A. Boorman, “Strategy

and National Psychology in China,” The Annals of the Academy of

Political and Social Sciences, 1967, pp. 143-155; Edward S. Boylan, “The

Chinese Cultural Style of Warfare,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 3, No. 4,

1982, pp. 341-366.

13. See, for example, Davis B. Bobrow, “Peking’s Military Calculus,”

World Politics, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1964, pp. 287-301; Steve Chan, “Chinese

Conflict Calculus and Behavior: Assessment from the Perspective of

Conflict Management,” World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 3, 1978, pp. 391-410;

Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, Ann Arbor:

University of Michigan Press, 1975; Melvin Gurtov and Byung-Moo

Hwang, China Under Threat, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University

Press, 1982.

14. Johnston, Cultural Realism; Alastair I. Johnson, “Cultural

Realism and Grand Strategy in Maoist China,” in Katzenstein, ed., The

Culture of National Security. While the fullest articulation of the

realpolitik approach by Iain Johnston discerns the presence of two

strands of strategic culture (Confucian-Mencian and Parabellum), he

asserts that only one—the parabellum—is operative. See also

Christensen, “Chinese Realpolitik,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 4,

September/October 1997, pp. 37-53; Mark Burles and Abraham N.

Shulsky, Patterns in China’s Use of Force: Evidence from History and

Doctrinal Writings, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2000. See in

particular the appendix in this RAND monograph.

15. Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force, chap. 2.

16. This depiction of China’s strategic culture draws heavily on a

larger study of China’s use of force funded by the Smith Richardson

Foundation. See Scobell, “The Chinese Cult of Defense”; and Scobell,

China’s Use of Military Force, chap. 2. The cult of defense is a refinement

of the “Cult of the Offensive” concept. See Jack Snyder, “Civil-Military

Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984,” International

Security, Vol. 9, No. 1, Summer 1984, pp. 108-146; and Stephen Van

30
Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World

War,” International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1, Summer 1984, pp. 58-107.

Unlike the conception of Snyder and Van Evera which has

bureaucratic/organizational origins, the Chinese Cult of Defense is

grounded in psycho-cultural mindset. The concept of a “Cult of Defense”

owes intellectual debts to the work of Stephen Van Evera, Jack Snyder,

and Shu Guang Zhang. See Shu Guang Zhang, Mao’s Military

Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953, Lawrence:

University Press of Kansas, 1995.

17. Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force, chap. 2.

18. Lawrence Freedman, cited in Carl H. Builder,The Masks of War:

American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis, Baltimore: Johns

Hopkins University Press, 1989, p. 6.

19. The extent to which these ideas are prevalent throughout

Chinese society, while important to ascertain, is not central to my

analysis. Here I concentrate on China’s civilian and military elites.

Nevertheless, such beliefs seem widespread within China. “The

self-perception of China as a pacific, nonthreatening country that

wishes nothing more than to live in peace with its neighbors is

extremely common in China, both among the elite and ordinary people.”

John Garver, quoted in Nayan Chanda, “Fear of the Dragon,” Far

Eastern Economic Review, April 13, 1995, p. 24.

20. The cluster of beliefs outlined below appears to be held by a

significant number of leaders in China. The cult of defense articulated

here is derived from writings published primarily in the 1980s and

1990s, and from interviews conducted in 1998 and 2000.

21. “White Paper on China’s National Defense,” Beijing Xinhua

Domestic Service, July 27, 1998, in Foreign Broadcast Information

Service Daily Reports-China Daily Report (hereafter FBIS-CHI)-July

29, 1998.

22. “Liu Huaqing On the Stand of the Military Towards Taiwan,” Ta

Kung Pao (Hong Kong), September 4, 1995, in FBIS-CHI, September, 7,

1995.

23. Xing Shizhong, “China Threat Theory May Be Forgotten,”

Quishi [Seeking truth], No. 3, February 1996, in FBIS-CHI, February 1,

1996. See also Gao Jiquan, “China Holds High Banner of Peace,”

Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily) June 27, 1996, in

FBIS-CHI-96-133.

31
24. Li Jijun, “Lun zhanlue wenhua,” p. 9.

25. Ibid. See also Chen Zhou, “Zhongguo xiandai jubu zhanzheng

lilun yu Meiguo youxian zhanzheng lilun zhi butong,” [Differences

between China’s theory of modern local war and America’s theory of

limited war], ZGJSKX, No. 4, 1995, p. 6; Interviews with civilian and

military researchers in Beijing and Shanghai, May-June 1998

[hereafter “Interviews, 1998”].

26. The five principles, first outlined by Zhou Enlai in the 1950s, are

mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, nonaggression,

noninterference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and

peaceful coexistence.

27. Wu Xinbo, “China: Security Practice of a Modernizing and

Ascending Power,” in Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Practice, pp.

121-122.

28. Wang Zhongyan and Cui Haiming, “Deng Xiaoping de junshi

sixiang chutan’ [Preliminary exploration of Deng Xiaoping’s military

thought] in Pan Shiying, chief editor, Dangdai Zhongguo Junshi

Sixiang Jingyao [The Essence of Contemporary Chinese Military

Thinking], Beijing: Jiefangjun Chubanshe, 1992, p. 121. See also Peng

Dehuai, “Junshi jianshe gaikuang” [General situation of military

construction], July 16, 1957, in Peng Dehuai Junshi Wenxuan [Collected

Military Works of Peng Dehuai], Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian

Chubanshe, 1988, p. 588.

29. Deng Xiaoping, “Muqian de xingshi he renwu” [Present situation

and tasks], January 16, 1980, in Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan (1975-1982)

[Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping 1975-1982], Beijing: Renmin

Chubanshe, 1984, pp. 203-204.

30. Wang and Cui, “Deng Xiaoping de junshi,” p. 121; interviews,

1998.

31. Another example offered is the way ethnic Chinese cooperated

with the Manchu rulers of the Qing dynasty. The Chinese, for instance,

according to one military scholar, did not object to shaving their heads

and wearing queues! Interviews.

32. See the succinct discussion in Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S.

Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China’s Search for

Security, New York: W.W. Norton, 1997, p. 5.

33. “Liu Huaqing Refutes Argument,” p. 31. See also Xing Shizhong,

“China Threat Theory May be Forgotten.”

32
34. Deng Xiaoping, “Muqian de xingshi he renwu,” pp. 203-204.

35. The importance of these concepts was stressed by Chinese

researchers during interviews I conducted in May and June 1998.

36. Li Jijun, “Lun junshi zhanlue siwei” [On military strategic

thinking], ZGJSKX, No. 2, 1996, p. 78.

37. Gao Jiquan, “China Holds High Banner of Peace.”

38. Li Jijun, “Lun zhanlue wenhua,” p. 10; interviews, 1998.

39. Li Jijun, “Lun junshi zhanlue siwei,” p. 78; Li Jijun, “Zhongguo

junshi sixiang chuantong,” p. 62; interviews.

40. Li Jijun, “Zhongguo junshi sixiang chuantong,” p. 63.

41. Li Jijun, “Lun zhanlue wenhua,” p. 9. See also Li Jijun,

“Zhongguo junshi sixiang chuantong,” p. 63.

42. Li Jijun, “Lun zhanlue wenhua,” p. 9; interviews, 1998.

43. Yao Youzhi, “Gudai Zhong-Xi junshi chuantong zhi bijiao” [A

comparison of Chinese and Western ancient military traditions],

ZGJSKX, No. 3, 1995, pp. 93-94.

44. Author’s interviews with civilian and military researchers in

Beijing and Shanghai, September 2000 [hereafter “Interviews 2000.”].

45. “Liu Huaqing on Stand of Military Towards Taiwan.”

46. Li Jijun, “Lun zhanlue wenhua,” p. 10; Chen Zhou, “Zhongguo

xiandai jubu zhanzheng,” p. 45; Xing Shizhong, “China Threat Theory

May Be Forgotten”; Gao Jiquan, “China Holds High Banner of Peace”;

Xiong Guangkai, “Zhongguo de guofang zhengce,” [China’s national

defense policy], Guoji Zhanlue Yanjiu [International Strategic Studies],

No. 55, January 2000, p. 4; interviews 1998.

47. “Huijian Yidali jizhe Naxi.Polasishi de tanhua jiyao’ (17 August

1980) [Summary of a talk in an interview with Italian journalist . . . .] in

Xu Xiangqian Junshi Wenxuan [Selected Military Works of Xu

Xiangqian], Beijing: Jiefangjun Chubanshe, 1993, p. 305.

48. Zhang Jing and Yao Yanjin, Jiji Fangyu Zhanlue Qianshuo

[Introduction to Active Defense Strategy], Beijing: Jiefangjun

Chubanshe, 1985, p. 137.

33
49. See, for example, Junshi Kexueyuan Junshi Lishi Yanjiubu, ed.,

Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun de qishinian [Seventy years of the

Chinese People’s Liberation Army], Beijing: Junshi Kexue Chubanshe,

1997, pp. 541-547, 580-582. Moreover, China’s intervention in Korea in

October 1950 was also a counterattack, since in Beijing’s view the

United States had made the first aggressive moves against China on the

Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. Song Shilun, Mao Zedong

Junshi Sixiang de Xingcheng Jiqi Fazhan [Formation and Development

of Mao Zedong’s Military Thought], Beijing: Junshi Kexue Chubanshe,

1984, p. 222.

50. For a discussion of just war in the Confucian tradition, see

Huang Pumin, “Rujia junshi sixiang yu Zhongguo gudai junshi wenhua

chuantong” [Confucian military thinking and the military cultural

tradition of ancient China], ZGJSKX, No. 4, Winter 1997, pp. 73-74.

51. Wang Zhiping and Li Dezhou, “Zhong-Xi gudai junshi lilun de

zhexue jichu” (Philosophical foundation of Chinese and Western

military theories in ancient times), ZGJSKX, No. 4, 1995, pp. 30-31,

34-35; Yao Youzhi, “Gudai Zhong-Xi junshi chuantong,” pp. 95-96.

52. Johnston, “Cultural Realism and Strategy,” pp. 231-232. The

theme of just or righteous war was a significant one in many popular

histories and novels that Mao—and other leaders—read. See ibid., p.

247.

53. A first strike is only just if China can claim that the attack was

launched to preempt an attack being prepared by an opponent.

54. Ted K. Gong, China: Tradition, Nationalism and Just War,

Strategic Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War

College, January 17, 1999, p. 23.

55. Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun junguan shouce (lujun fence)

[Chinese People’s Liberation Army officer handbook (landpower

edition)], Qingdao: Qingdao Chubanshe, 1991, p. 221.

56. See Bruce Cummings, Parallax Visions: Making Sense of

American-East Asian Relations at the End of the Century, Durham:

Duke University Press, 1999, p. 166.

57. Li Jijun, “International Military Strategy and China’s Security

at the Turn of the Century,” Zhongguo Pinglun (Hong Kong), August 5,

1998, in FBIS, August 13, 1998.

34
58. Fan Yihua, “Shi lun Zhongguo xiandai sixiang wenhua de xing

chao ji zhanlue qu” [on the form and strategic trend of modern thought

culture in China], ZGJSKX, No. 1, 1997, p. 26.

59. See, for example, Li Zhisui, The Private Life of Chairman Mao,

New York: Random House, 1994; Liz Sly, “A State of Paranoia,” Bulletin

of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 1999, pp. 38-43; Michael

Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment,

Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2000.

60. On the corruption campaign, see John Schauble, “China’s

Communists Fear the Enemy from Within,” Sydney Morning Herald,

September 27, 2000, p. 8. See also more generally, Sly, “A State of

Paranoia.”

61. For recent use of this slogan, see, for example, Gao Jiquan,

“China Holds High Banner of Peace,” Jiefangjun Bao, June 27, 1996 in

FBIS, July 12, 1996.

62. Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun junguan shouce (lujun fence), p.

199.

63. The 1969 clash with the Soviet Union and the 1979 Vietnam

conflict are similarly labeled. Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun junguan

shouce (lujun fence), pp. 514-515.

64. Iain Johnston contends that the term “defense” is employed for

propaganda purposes so that every military action can be labeled as

defense and hence more justified than anything called “offensive.” See

Johnston, “Cultural Realism and Strategy,” pp. 249-250, especially

footnote 63.

65. Chen Zhou, “Zhongguo xiandai jubu zhanzheng,” p. 46. See also

Mi Zhenyu, “Zhongguo jiji fangyu zhanlue fangzhen” (China’s strategic

plan of active defense), in Shi Boke, ed., Zhongguo Daqushi

(Megatrends China), Beijing: Hualing Chubanshe, 1996, p. 53.

66. Senior Colonel Wang Naiming, “Adhere to Active Defense and

Modern People’s War,” in Michael Pillsbury, ed., Chinese Views of

Future Warfare, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press,

1997, p. 37.

67. Johnston, Cultural Realism, p. 102 ff.

68. Jianxiang Bi, “The PRC’s Active Defense Strategy: New Wars,

Old Concepts,” Issues and Studies, Vol. 31, No. 11, November 1995, p.

94.

35
69. Chen Zhou, “Zhongguo xiandai jubu zhanzheng,” p. 46. See also

Nan Li, “The PLA’s Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strategy, and

Tactics, 1985-95: A Chinese Perspective,” The China Quarterly, No. 146,

June 1996, pp. 443-463.

70. Li Jiaquan, “Where are the Chinese People’s Feelings?” Renmin

ribao [People’s Daily] (Beijing), June 17, 1994.

71. On the duality of Chinese views of Japan, see Whiting, China

Eyes Japan, pp. 27-28. On Japan as a model, see ibid., chapter 5.

72. See Whiting, China Eyes Japan, p. 133.

73. See, for example, Kenneth W. Allen and Eric A. McVadon,

China’s Foreign Military Relations, Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson

Center, October 1999, p. 65.

74. Li, “lun zhanlue wenhua,” p. 11-12; “Riben junshi sixiang”

(Japanese Military Thought), entry in Zhongguo Junshi Baikequan

Shubian Shen Weiyuanhui, compiler, Zhongguo Junshi Baike

Quanshu, Vol. 1, Junshi sixiang, Beijing: Junshi Kexue Chubanshe,

1997, p. 246 [hereafter Zhongguo Junshi Baike Quanshu].

75. Li Jijun, “lun zhanlue wenhua,” p. 12. This image was reinforced

by the author’s interviews with civilian and military analysts in Beijing

and Shanghai, September 2000.

76. Ibid.

77. Interviews, 2000.

78. Li Jijun, “lun zhanlue wenhua,” pp. 11, 13.

79. See, for example, Zhongguo Junshi Baike Quanshu, 1:246-247;

interviews, 2000.

80. Whiting, China Eyes Japan, p. 148. The belief in a “Japanese

cultural tendency toward aggression” seems widespread among

Chinese strategic thinkers. This quote is from a recent book by a

PRC-born international relations scholar who is now based in the

United States: Suisheng Zhao, Power Competition in East Asia: From

the Old Chinese World Order to Post-Cold War Regional Multipolarity,

New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1998, p. 219.

81. Whiting, China Eyes Japan, pp. 127, 196; interviews, 2000.

82. Ibid., p. 7; Pillsbury, China Debates the Future, pp. 113-114.

36
83. Shambaugh, Beautiful Imperialist, pp. 297-298.

84. See, for example, Allen S. Whiting, “The PLA and China’s Threat

Perceptions,” The China Quarterly, No. 146, June 1996, pp. 607-609;

Mel Gurtov and Byung Moo Hwang, China’s Security: the New Roles of

the Military, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998, pp. 70-73.

85. Andrew Scobell, “Show of Force: Chinese Soldiers, Statesmen,

and the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996,” Political Science Quarterly,

Vol. 115, No. 2, Summer 2000, p. 241. But this belief is not limited to

soldiers. According to a leading civilian America watcher:

The enduring, unchanging fundamental goal of the U.S. strategy on China is

to change China. The U.S. Government and U.S. strategists and politicians

firmly believe that the phenomenon of the “fall of the Berlin Wall” will happen

again in China sooner or later. The U.S. strategy on China is based on the idea

that China will change, and the fundamental purpose is to promote China’s

evolution in the direction wanted by the United States, that is, to Westernize

China.

Chu Shulong, “China’s National Interest, National Power, and

National Strategy,” zhanlue yu guanli, August 1, 1999, in FBIS, October

26, 1999.

86. Zhu Chenghu, chief editor, Zhongmei guanxi de fazhan bianhua

ji qi qushi [Changing developments and trends in China-U.S. relations],

Nanjing: Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, 1998, p. 194.

87. Cited in Li Tzu-ching, “The Chinese Military Clamors for War:

Vowing to Have a Fight with the United States,” Cheng Ming, Hong

Kong, June 1, 1999, in FBIS, June 28, 1999. More than likely, these

news reports are somewhat sensationalized and embellished.

Nevertheless, given the outrage and anger in China over the May 1999

bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, the account in Cheng

Ming is quite plausible. See also, Li Tzu-ching, “CPC Thinks China and

U.S. Will Eventually Go to War,” Cheng Ming, May 1, 1997, in

FBIS-011-97-126. This article is also quoted by Pillsbury, China Views

the Future, p. xxii.

88. Fan Yihua, “Shi lun Zhongguo xiandai sixiang wenhua de

xingchao ji zhanlue qu,” pp. 23, 22.

89. Wang Xuhe, “Jianyi minzu wenhua dui junshi zhanlue de

yingxiang” [comment on the influence of national culture on military

strategic thinking], ZGJSKX, No. 1, 1997, p. 44.

37
90. Peng Huaidong, “Lun zhan Xi Zhan-Zhong guan zhi yancha yi,”

[on the basic differences between Chinese and Western viewpoints of

war], ZGJSKX, No. 1, 1997, p. 127.

91. Peng Huaidong, “Lun zhan Xi Zhan-Zhong guan zhi yancha yi,”

p. 127; interviews, September 2000.

92. Li Jijun, “lun zhanlue wenhua,” p. 14.

93. Interviews, 2000.

94. Li Jijun, “lun zhanlue wenhua,” p. 12.

95. Interviews, 2000.

96. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Chaoxian zhan [unrestricted

warfare], Beijing: Jiefangjun Wenyi Chubanshe, February 1999, pp.

96-101.

97. Observer, “We Urge Hegemonism Today To Take a Look At the

Mirror of History,” People’s Daily, June 22, 1999, cited in Pillsbury,

China Debates the Future, p. 101.

98. This paragraph is drawn from Li Jijun, “lun zhanlue wenhua,”

pp. 14-15. See also, Pillsbury, China Debates the Future, pp. xlv-xlvi.

99. The information on Chinese perceptions of Indian nuclear tests

of May 1998 come from author’s interviews with civilian and military

researchers in Beijing and Shanghai, May-June 1998. On Chinese

perceptions of the May 1999 bombing of its Belgrade Embassy, see Li

Tzu-ching, “The Chinese Military Clamors for War”; and Scobell, “Show

of Force,” p. 241.

100. Interviews, 2000.

101. Wang Xuhe, “Jianyi minzu wenhua dui junshi zhanlue de

yingxiang,” p. 45.

102. Han Shengmin, ed., Zouxiang 21 shiji waiguo junshi jianshe

[foreign military construction as the 21st century draws near], Beijing:

Junshi Kexueyuan Chubanshe, 1996, pp. 47-48, cited in Pillsbury,

China Debates the Future, pp. 66-67.

103. Zhu Xiaoli and Zhao Xiaozhuo, Mei-E xin junshi geming [the

new revolution in military affairs in the United States and Russia],

Beijing: Junshi Kexue Chubanshe, 1996, pp. 41-45, cited in Pillsbury,

China Debates the Future, p. 67.

38
104. Li Jijun, “lun zhanlue wenhua,” p. 14.

105. Interviews, September 2000.

106. Scobell, “Show of Force,” p. 240.

107. Author’s interviews in Beijing and Shanghai with civilian and

military researchers, February-March 2000; Scobell, “Show of Force.”

However, a minority of researchers appear to believe that the United

States would blink.

108. Andrew Scobell, Chinese Army Building in the Era of Jiang

Zemin, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September

2000, p. 26.

109. Quadrennial Defense Review, Washington, DC: Department of

Defense, September 2001, p. 4.

110. Indeed, China reacted strongly to Bush’s remarks in late April

2001 that the United States would do “whatever it took to help Taiwan

defend herself.” See, for example, Philip P. Pan, “China ‘Concerned’ By

Bush Remark: Beijing Says U.S. Drifting Down a Dangerous Road,”

Washington Post, April 27, 2001. The author witnessed this reaction

first hand at a conference in early May 2001. Chinese participants

insisted that Bush’s statement was the end of “strategic ambiguity.”

111. Andrew Scobell, The U.S. Army and the Asia-Pacific, Carlisle

Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, April 2001, p. 11. This does not

mean that China would be completely deterred from launching an

operation against Taiwan, but it does make Chinese military planning

much more complicated and significantly lessens the probability of

success.

112. Toshi Yoshihara, Chinese Information Warfare: Phantom

Menace or Emerging Threat? Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War

College, November 20001; Mark Stokes, China’s Strategic

Modernization: Implications for the United States, Carlisle Barracks,

PA: U.S. Army War College, September 1999.

113. For more detailed discussion of security cooperation with

China, see Scobell, The U.S. Army and the Asia-Pacific, pp. 31-32.

114. On why the Army is suited for this lead role, see Scobell, The

U.S. Army and the Asia-Pacific, pp. 31-32.

39
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Author

Dr. Andrew Scobell

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Ms. Kimberly A. Rockwell