COUP D’OEIL:

STRATEGIC INTUITION IN ARMY PLANNING

William Duggan

November 2005

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ISBN 1-58487-218-7
iii

FOREWORD

 In our military professions, formal analytical methods co-exist 

with intuitive decisionmaking by leaders in action. For the most part, 

there is no harm done. But many officers can recount times when 

they knew they should have “gone with their gut,” but followed 

instead the results of their analytical methods. The gap between 

these two forms of decisionmaking perhaps has grown wider in 

recent times, especially in Iraq, where adaptive leadership seems to 

have overshadowed formal methods of planning. Departing from 

formal methods increasingly seems to be the mark of an effective 

commander, as we learn from Dr. Leonard Wong’s recent Strategic 

Studies Institute (SSI) report, Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible 

Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom (July 2004).

 But must it be so? Dr. William Duggan shows how to reconcile 

analytical and intuitive methods of decisionmaking by drawing 

on recent scientific research that brings the two together. He 

applies this new research to the Army’s core methods of analytical 

decisionmaking as found in Field Manual (FM) 5-0, Army Planning 

and Orders Production. The result is “strategic intuition,” which bears 

remarkable resemblance to von Clausewitz’s idea of coup d’oeil in 

his classic work, On War. Dr. Duggan’s monograph provides a 

theoretical overview of strategic intuition and practical suggestions 

for amending FM 5-0 to take it into account. 

 The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph 

as a contribution to the ongoing effort to make our military forces 

ever more adaptable in both theory and practice.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

WILLIAM DUGGAN teaches strategy and leadership at Columbia 

Business School. He has 20 years of experience as a strategy advisor 

and consultant. He is the author of several books, the two most recent 

on strategic intuition: Napoleon’s Glance—The Secret of Strategy, and 

The Art of What Works—How Success Really Happens. Dr. Duggan is a 

frequent guest lecturer at the U.S. Army War College. He received 

BA, MA, and Ph.D. degrees from Colombia University.
v

SUMMARY

 This monongraph reviews the U.S. Army’s standard methods for 

problem solving and decisionmaking to see how they might take 

more account of a commander’s intuition at every step. The ideas 

offered here go beyond the Army’s current view of intuition in its 

latest version of Field Manual (FM) 5-0, Army Planning and Orders 

Production, issued January 2005. That version presents “analytical” 

and “intuitive” as two different types of decisionmaking, for two 

different situations:

 • The analytical approach to decisionmaking serves well when 

time is available to analyze all facets affecting the problem 

and its solution. However, analytical decisionmaking 

consumes time and does not work well in all situations—

especially during execution, when circumstances often 

require immediate decisions. 

 • Intuitive decisionmaking is especially appropriate in 

time-constrained conditions. It significantly speeds up 

decisionmaking. Intuitive decisionmaking, however, does not 

work well when the situation includes inexperienced leaders, 

complex or unfamiliar situations, or competing courses of 

action (COAs).

 This divide between analysis and intuition reflects an outmoded 

view of the human mind that science no longer supports. Recent 

advances in how the mind works have overturned the old idea that 

analysis and intuition are two separate functions that take place in 

two different parts of the brain. In the new view, analysis and intuition 

are so intertwined that it is impossible to sort them out. There is 

no good analysis without intuition, and no good intuition without 

analysis. They go together in all situations. Some scientists call the 

new model of the brain “intelligent memory,” where analysis puts 

elements into your brain and intuition pulls them out and combines 

them into action.

 This new model of the brain finds two striking precedents: 

research in cognitive psychology on expert intuition, especially by 
vi

Gary Klein; and On War by Carl von Clausewitz. Both Klein and 

von Clausewitz put flashes of insight at the heart of problem solving 

and decisionmaking. Their views on how those flashes happen 

match quite well what neuroscience now tells us about how the 

brain works. To describe this phenomenon, Von Clausewitz used 

the term coup d’oeil, or “glance” in French. Here we use coup d’oeil as 

a shorthand, thanks to its military origins, and “strategic intuition” 

as a more formal term, where a COA forms in the mind through a 

mix of strategic analysis, intelligent memory, and expert intuition. 

 This monograph reviews the Army’s core procedures on 

problemsolving and decisionmaking from our new view of strategic 

intuition. We go step-by-step through the four main chapters of FM 

5-0, which embody the Army’s common methods for how 

commanders of every rank decide what COA to take. We see in detail 

where these methods do and do not match our new understanding 

of strategic intuition. Then we consider the case of a brigade in Iraq 

that recently developed a shorter version of FM 5-0, to compare this 

real-time experiment to what we suggest in this report.

 This in no way criticizes the Army or its commanders. When 

Gary Klein tests methods closer to strategic intuition with Army 

officers in action, they tend to comment, “That’s what we do.” 

Good commanders use strategic intuition. They treat manuals only 

as guides, and adapt procedures as they see fit. Coup d’oeil is really 

a description of what Army leaders already do. We have gained 

enough scientific knowledge on how a commander’s mind works 

to revise our manuals accordingly, so there are fewer adaptations 

needed. Everyone takes FM 5-0 with a grain of salt: now that we 

know how the salt works, we can add it directly to the recipe.
1

COUP D’OEIL:

STRATEGIC INTUITION IN ARMY PLANNING

Introduction. 

 In recent years, science has made great strides in understanding 

how thinking really happens. A generation ago, scientists believed in 

two main modes of thought where analysis and intuition were two 

different functions, on two different sides of the brain. But scientists 

no longer believe that. Instead, they recognize a single mode of 

thought that combines analysis and intuition. Scientists now see the 

brain take in elements, store them in short- or long-term memory, and 

then select and combine them in flashes of insight. Some scientists call 

this new model “intelligent memory,” where analysis and intuition 

are impossible to sort out.1 Neuroscientist Barry Gordon tells us:

Intelligent Memory . . . is like connecting dots to form a picture. The 

dots are pieces or ideas, the lines between them are your connections 

or associations. The lines can coalesce into larger fragments, and these 

fragments can merge to form a whole thought. This whole thought may 

be a visual image, a piece of knowledge, an idea, or even a solution to a 

problem. Individual pieces, the connections, and the mental processing 

that orchestrates them generally work together so they appear to be a 

single cognitive event. That’s what happens when ideas or concepts 

“pop” into your mind.2

 Perhaps the best way to understand this new model of the brain 

is to think of a giant warehouse. Your brain is the greatest inventory 

system on earth. It constantly takes in information, breaks it down, 

and puts in on its warehouse shelves—that’s analysis. Your brain 

then compares the new information with other items on other shelves. 

When it finds a match, it pulls those items off the shelves and puts 

them together in a flash of intuition. The combination of analysis 

and intuition becomes “creative insight,” which is “the ability to 

take existing pieces of information and combine them in novel ways 

that lead to greater understanding and suggest new behaviors and 

responses.”3
2

 This view, in turn, confirms previous research on expert intuition, 

especially by Gary Klein.4

 An expert’s brain stores up cases from 

direct experience and the experience of others acquired through 

learning. Answers then come to the expert in flashes of insight, large 

and small. Klein followed experts in action—firefighters, emergency 

room nurses, soldiers in battle—and interviewed them on the details 

of their decisions. At first they said, “It was just my intuition.” But 

every time, Klein was able to pull from them the elements they 

combined from what they saw and what was already in their brains. 

He especially noted that experts often change the goal or the problem 

to be solved after they see what to do. That overturns conventional 

methods of linear problem solving, where you define the goal or 

problem first. Klein tells us:

What triggers active problem solving is the ability to recognize when 

a goal is reachable . . . There must be an experiential ability to judge 

the solvability of problems prior to working on them . . . Experience lets 

us recognize the existence of opportunities. When the opportunity is 

recognized, the problem solver working out its implications is looking 

for a way to make good use of it, trying to shape it into a reasonable 

goal.5

 This modern research on intelligent memory and expert intuition 

finds a surprising precedent in the writings of Carl Clausewitz in the 

early 19th century. His great work, On War, was the first scholarly 

study of strategy. Clausewitz set out to explain the success of 

Napoleon Bonaparte, who won more battles than any other general in 

recorded history. With our new knowledge of how the mind works, 

we can pick out one key term that Clausewitz used for the flash of 

insight when a strategist sees what to do, despite the uncertainties all 

around. He called it coup d’oeil, which means “glance” in French. Coup 

d’oeil cuts through the fog of war. Clausewitz explains, “Now, if one 

is to get safely through this perpetual conflict with the unexpected, 

two qualities are indispensable . . . The first is figuratively expressed 

by the French phrase coup d’oeil. The other is resolution.”6

 For Clausewitz, coup d’oeil is “the rapid discovery of a truth which 

to the ordinary mind is either not visible at all or only becomes so 

after long examination and reflection.”7

 After you see what to do, you 

need resolve to carry through despite the remaining uncertainties. 
3

For Clausewitz resolution means “removing the torments of doubt 

. . . when there are no sufficient motives for guidance.”8

 To these 

two qualities, Clausewitz adds a third: “From the coup d’oeil and 

resolution, we are naturally led to speak of its kindred quality, 

presence of mind, which in a region of the unexpected like War must 

act a great part, for it is indeed nothing but a great conquest over the 

unexpected.”9

 To these three—coup d’oeil, resolution, and presence of mind—

Clausewitz adds a fourth element: the content of the coup d’oeil itself. 

In theory, an infinite number of possible goals and courses of action 

(COAs) exist in any situation. Clausewitz asks, “How does strategy 

arrive at a complete list of these things?” He answers: “Strategy 

deduces only from experience the ends and means to be examined 

. . . It therefore turns to experience, and directs its attention on 

those combinations which military history can furnish.”10 Note that 

“experience” here means not only the commander’s experience, but 

all of human history. Napoleon himself told us he borrowed his 

strategy from the campaigns of the “great captains” he studied.11

Elsewhere, Clausewitz calls this historical experience “examples 

from history” which “make everything clear, and furnish the best 

description of proof in the empirical sciences.”12

 Clausewitz’s discussion of coup d’oeil and its three accompanying 

elements—resolution, presence of mind, and examples from 

history—shows remarkable similarity to what modern research tells 

us about strategic intuition.13 Yet U.S. Army planning methods have 

followed more Clausewitz’s leading competitor, Antoine Jomini, 

whose Summary of the Art of War won over many military academies 

of the 19th century, including West Point. For logistics, which Jomini 

founded as a discipline, there is no harm done. But for strategy at 

all levels—that is, figuring out your COA and the end state it leads 

to—modern science favors Clausewitz.14

 The resolution that follows coup d’oeil is especially important 

in modern professions. You might have a coup d’oeil but then fail 

to carry it through, because you cannot explain it using the formal 

tools of your trade. Many key insights are lost this way. We have 

so many advanced methods of analysis and decisionmaking today, 

that we sometimes forget they are aids to problem solving, not 

the problem solvers themselves. Human beings are the problem 
4

solvers. Our brains solve problems through insight. The science of 

intelligent memory and expert intuition—as well as our old friend, 

Clausewitz—can help us put insight back at the center of what we 

do. 

 This monograph aims to help the Army put a commander’s insight 

more firmly at the center of its core methods for problem solving 

and decisionmaking. We adopt “coup d’oeil” as a shorthand, and 

“strategic intuition” as a more formal term, to convey what studies 

of intelligent memory and expert intuition now confirm about what 

Clausewitz told us. We define strategic intuition as follows:

Strategic intuition. The selective projection of past elements into the 

future in a new combination as a course of action that might or might not 

fit your previous goals, with the personal commitment to follow through 

and work out the details along the way.

 The next sections of this monograph work through the implications 

of this definition for the Army’s methods of command, using Field 

Manual (FM) 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, as our core 

manual. In the Preface to FM 5-0, we learn that it is “the common 

reference for planning within the Army education system.” It applies 

to “all Army leaders . . . at all echelons,” and “across the spectrum 

of conflict . . . and the range of operations.” So every Army leader 

should use the methods of FM 5-0 for every problem or decision. 

This certainly makes our effort worthwhile: if strategic intuition can 

improve the methods in FM 5-0, it will benefit the Army’s whole 

leadership corps. 

 Of course, Army leaders at present do not follow FM 5-0 exactly. 

They already apply strategic intuition and adapt the methods of 

FM 5-0 to their own styles. If coup d’oeil is merely relabeling what 

Army leaders already do, this study might help the Army adapt FM 

5-0 accordingly. That would save time in training and in the field, 

through common methods that conform more closely to how a 

commander’s mind really works. 

Fundamentals of Planning.

 Chapter 1 of FM 5-0, “Fundamentals of Planning,” begins with 

a quote from General George Patton: “Successful generals make 
5

plans to fit circumstances, but do not try to create circumstances to 

fit plans.” 

 Let’s pause right here. We know that Patton was famous for 

his “sixth sense”—flashes of insight that showed him his strategy. 

His commander, Omar Bradley, complained that Patton was a bad 

planner. Patton only worked out all the details after his coup d’oeil

clicked in. Before that, he left everyday planning to his staff. Patton 

made no secret of the source of his insights: “For years I have been 

accused of indulging in snap judgments. Honestly this is not the case 

because . . . I am a profound military student and the thoughts I 

express . . . are the result of years of thought and study.”15

 Patton’s study of past battles was so intense that he seemed to 

believe in reincarnation, by recounting their details as if he had been 

there. A great soldier must become:

. . . so thoroughly conversant with all sorts of military possibilities that 

whenever an occasion arises he has at hand without effort on his part a 

parallel. . . to attain this end, I think it is necessary for a man to begin to 

read military history in its earliest and hence crudest form and to follow 

it down in natural sequence permitting his mind to grow with his subject 

until he can grasp without effort the most abstruse question of the science 

of war.16

Patton was a striking example of strategic intuition by applying 

examples from history through coup d’oeil. FM 5-0 seems to quote 

Patton for a more general purpose, however, to stress that: “Military 

operations are uncertain and unpredictable . . . Any plan is a 

framework from which to adapt, not a script to be followed to the 

letter.”17 We might add that Patton used strategic intuition to handle 

uncertainty and adaptability. We shall see that FM 5-0 handles these 

factors in a very different way. 

 We read on to find that Army planning takes three main forms: 

Army problem solving, the military decisionmaking process 

(MDMP), and troop leading procedures (TLP). In all three forms, 

the “planning process structures the thinking of commanders and 

staffs while supporting their insight, creativity, and initiative.”18 On 

the surface, there is nothing wrong with this statement. But look 

deeper, and you find the old model of the brain: structured analysis 

on one side, and unstructured insight and creativity on the other. 
6

Strategic intuition, in contrast, blends analysis, structure, insight, 

and creativity so thoroughly that you cannot unravel them. Let’s 

keep going to see exactly how.

 Army problem solving “provides a standard, systematic 

approach to define and analyze a problem, develop and analyze 

possible solutions, choose the best solution, and implement a plan of 

action that solves the problem.”19 This four-step sequence is a classic 

statement of analytical problem solving. We cannot trace exactly in 

history where the sequence came from. It just seems “logical,” so it 

is rare for anyone to question it or ask its origin. But we know now 

that strategic intuition does not follow this four-step sequence. We 

will see exactly why when we work through the details of specific 

planning methods. 

 Next we learn that “Planning is both science and art.” The 

quantifiable aspects are the science—“such as movement rates, fuel 

consumption, and weapons effects. . . . While not easy, the science of 

planning is straightforward.” The art covers dynamic relationships: 

“the combination of forces, choice of tactics, and arrangement of 

activities, for example . . . The art of planning involves choosing 

from interrelated options.”20 Again, we find that on the surface this 

distinction between science and art makes sense. It allows planning 

to embrace both hard facts and creative judgment. But when we look 

deeper, we find the old two-brain model: one side is scientific, and 

the other side is artistic. 

 It would be better to say that the quantifiable aspects of military 

problem solving give us facts, not science. Science itself is an art, 

as Thomas Kuhn shows us in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 

Scientific advance happens much more by strategic intuition than 

by the four-step logical sequence of Army problem solving. Kuhn 

tells us further that science advances by “flashes of intuition” that 

re-combine elements in a new way, to give a new solution to a new 

problem.21 Kuhn especially notes that a problem and its solution 

arise at the same time, much as Gary Klein found that experts only 

know what problem they can solve when they see a way to solve it. 

 As we read on in Chapter 1 of FM 5-0, we soon come to an explicit 

divide between analysis and intuition: “When developing plans, 

commanders usually choose between analytic or intuitive means of 
7

decisionmaking.”22 Let’s dive into the details here, to see why this 

split between the two methods puts commanders at a disadvantage. 

Here we have analysis:23

Analytic decisionmaking approaches a problem systematically. Leaders 

analyze a problem, generate several possible solutions, analyze and 

compare them to a set of criteria, and select the best solution. The analytic 

approach aims to produce the optimal solution to a problem from among 

those solutions identified. This approach is methodical, and it serves 

well for decisionmaking in complex or unfamiliar situations by allowing 

the breakdown of tasks into recognizable elements. It ensures that the 

commander and staff consider, analyze, and evaluate all relevant factors. 

It may help inexperienced leaders by giving them a methodology for 

their lack of experience.

The analytic approach to decisionmaking serves well when time is 

available to analyze all facets affecting the problem and its solution. 

However, analytic decisionmaking consumes time and does not work 

well in all situations—especially during execution, where circumstances 

often require immediate decisions. 

And here we have intuition:24

Intuitive decisionmaking is the act of reaching a conclusion that emphasizes 

pattern recognition based on knowledge, judgment, experience, education, 

intelligence, boldness, perception, and character. This approach focuses 

on assessment of the situation vice comparison of multiple options. It 

is used when time is short, or speed of decision is important. Intuitive 

decisionmaking is faster than analytic decisionmaking in that it involves 

making decisions based on assessment of the situation rather than a 

comparison of multiple COAs. It relies on the experienced leader’s ability 

to recognize the key elements and implications of a particular problem 

or situation, reject the impractical, and select an adequate (rather than 

optimal) COA. 

Intuitive decisionmaking is especially appropriate in time-constrained 

conditions. It significantly speeds up decisionmaking. Intuitive decisionmaking, however, does not work well when the situation includes 

inexperienced leaders, complex or unfamiliar situations, or competing 

COAs. Additionally, substituting assessment for detailed analysis means 

that some implications may be overlooked. Commanders use intuitive 

decisionmaking when time is short and problems straightforward. It is 

usually appropriate during execution. 
8

 These passages on analysis and intuition are out of date. They 

reflect the state of knowledge about how the mind works that 

predates recent research on intelligent memory. That is no surprise: 

it takes time for such advances to work their way into everyday 

practice. This present analysis aims to help out on exactly that. 

 When we compare the two passages, we find that the statements 

on intuition come close to strategic intuition, with these exceptions: 

strategic intuition is usually, but not always, faster than analytic 

decisionmaking; it is not limited to experienced leaders; it works 

well in complex and unfamiliar situations, and with competing 

COAs; it does not overlook more implications than analysis does; 

and it applies just as well when time is short as when it is not. It is 

appropriate during execution, but then so is analysis. 

 Let’s go through the passage on analysis to see where it goes 

astray. First, analysis is no more systematic than strategic intuition: 

the systems are simply different. We meet again the four logical 

steps of the analytic method: analyze the problem (step 1), generate 

several possible solutions (step 2), analyze and compare them to a 

set of criteria (step 3), and select the best solution (step 4). Even if we 

follow this sequence, we cannot do it without intuition. To analyze a 

problem (step 1), we draw on concepts and examples that are familiar 

to us—that we have in our brains. We cannot draw on concepts and 

examples we do not have. 

 So why is analysis better suited to an inexperienced leader? You 

would think that the more experience you have, the better your 

analysis (step 1). Same with generating possible solutions (step 2): 

where do these solutions come from? We reach into our brains for 

something familiar that suits the situation from our past experience 

or learning. Again, experienced commanders have an advantage 

here because of their intuition. 

 Next, when we analyze and compare the solutions to a set of 

criteria (step 3), we might ask: where do the criteria come from? 

There are countless criteria we could use: what makes us choose 

certain ones for this situation? Again, in practice we look for familiar 

patterns according to our intuition. And last but not least, when 

we select the best solution (step 4), on what basis do we decide? Is 

there a numerical score we use to weigh factors? If so, we assign the 
9

weights by making our best guess—intuition again. If we do not 

use numerical weights, we rely directly on intuition to tell us which 

solution is best. And how do we assess “relevant factors”? We must 

use our intuition about which factors are relevant and which ones 

are not. There is no other way to do it.

 So even if we use the four-step method of analytic decisionmaking, 

we cannot do it without a major dose of intuition. But in reality, 

decisionmakers only use this four-step method if they have to—if 

official procedures make them do it. When left to their own devices, 

they use strategic intuition. And the more complex or unfamiliar a 

situation, the more they must do so. Yet there seems to be something 

sacred in the world of planning about this four-step method, and 

about the second step especially: generate multiple solutions. We 

know how Patton handled this step: at the Battle of the Bulge, he 

prepared for Eisenhower three variations of a plan his coup d’oeil

showed him. Patton really did not care which one Eisenhower picked. 

They were not three different solutions at all: they were one solution, 

in three different packages. In any event, it worked. Eisenhower 

picked one, and Patton swung into action. Actually, he had already 

sent his troops in motion, with orders to follow on which exact way 

to turn.25

 As Gary Klein shows us, expert decisionmakers do not generate 

multiple options. They study a situation (step A), and the problem 

and solution come to them at the same time (step B). They think 

through the implications to arrive at a course of action (step C), 

and then commit to it, or reject it if it they think it will not work 

(step D).26 In all four steps, they look for patterns of similarity and 

difference with other situations they have lived or learned about. 

Every step is fair game for opposing views and full debate, just like 

any analytical method. This four-step method of strategic intuition is 

what inexperienced leaders need to learn. Making them use the four 

steps of analytic decisionmaking only retards their development and 

does not help them make better decisions in the first place.

 Last, but not least, these four steps of strategic intuition are by 

nature faster than analysis, but not always. For strategic intuition, 

you study the situation until you see the solution and problem it 

solves, in one coup d’oeil or a series of them. You cannot force the 
10

answer. This is why people solve so many problems in the shower, 

taking long walks, or at night as they fall asleep. You have to let 

your mind make its own connections. If it doesn’t, you take in more 

information. Masters of strategic intuition like Patton and Napoleon 

took in vast amounts of information all the time. Analysis does not 

rely more on data than intuition does: it just handles it differently. 

 Back to our analysis of FM 5-0. We learn next about “Combining 

Analytic and Intuitive Decisionmaking.” We find that the “two 

approaches are rarely mutually exclusive. Commanders often base an 

intuitive decision during execution on the situational understanding 

and products generated as part of a preceding” analysis. And “in 

a time-constrained environment, many of the techniques, such as 

choosing only one COA, depend on intuitive decisions. Even in the 

most rigorous analytic decisionmaking, intuitive decisionmaking 

helps set boundaries for the analysis and fills in the gaps that 

remain.”27 On the one hand, it is good to read that you can combine 

analysis and intuition. On the other hand, it is a mistake to think 

that analysis comes first and that intuition kicks in only later, during 

execution. Another mistake is to rely on intuition only when time is 

short, rather than in all situations. 

 It is good to recognize that intuition accompanies analytic 

decisionmaking, but strategic intuition goes farther: it offers an 

alternative to, rather than a support for, analytic methods of 

decisionmaking. In the end, FM 5-0 advises a commander to choose 

between analysis and intuition: 

Each method of decisionmaking has its strengths and weaknesses. 

Selecting one over the other depends primarily on the experience of 

the commander and staff, and how much time and information are 

available. The analytic approach is more appropriate when enough time 

and information are available to choose among different COAs, or when 

the staff is inexperienced. The majority of tactical decisions made during 

execution, when time is short and information is lacking or doubtful, are 

intuitive.28

 Strategic intuition disagrees with this entire passage. There are 

not two methods with different characteristics, but one method that 

combines analysis and intuition at every step. Analysis is never 

perfect, and neither is intuition. They have strengths and weaknesses, 
11

but knowing that does not help you choose between them: it helps 

you use them both and know their limits. You do not select one over 

the other, but apply them at the same time. The balance between 

them does not depend on the experience of the planners, nor on how 

much time and information are available. No matter who you are, no 

matter how much time or information you have, strategic intuition is 

the best method. 

 And whether or not you choose among different COAs does not 

depend on the time and information available, but whether or not 

you decide to include choosing among COAs as a step. For example, 

I could have very little information and very little time, and still 

decide to choose among COAs. Imagine that we have stopped for 

the night on a convoy, and we awake to gunfire at a distance of what 

seems a mile away. In two minutes, we can lay our three possible 

COAs: offense, defense, retreat. Analytic decisionmaking is quite 

possible in this situation, even with very little time and information, 

so we can apply analytic methods to tactical execution if we so 

choose. Strategic intuition is best not when time and information are 

lacking in tactical execution, but in all cases, because it gives better 

answers than other methods.

 Let’s take an opposite example, where there seems to be a lot 

of time and information. We get the assignment to put a land base 

somewhere in Region X by 24 months from now. We have plenty of 

time and information, so we start our four-step method of analytic 

decisionmaking. In the first month, we analyze the problem (step 1). 

In the second month, we generate possible solutions (step 2). In the 

third month, we analyze and compare the possible solutions to a set 

of criteria (step 3). In the fourth month, we select the best solution 

(step 4). FM 5-0 tells us that an inexperienced commander is able 

to follow this analytic method, thanks to the time and information 

available. 

 But was this the right thing to do? Hardly. In month one—day 

one, really—we need to ask, “How much time do we really have?” 

Region X is not standing still, waiting for us to finish our analysis. 

There might be something we need to do right away. For example, 

if we find that a close ally is thinking about a base in Country A, we 

might need to alert them or at least our superiors to the possibility 
12

of joint decisionmaking as soon as possible. If we do that, how they 

respond will affect what we do next. And so on. At each step, we 

marshal as many facts as we can, as quickly as we can, but our COA 

starts unfolding, in execution or at least in our minds, very soon after 

we start. And we might have little or no information on the most 

important piece of the puzzle—for example, the political future of 

Country A. We might even conclude we do not need a new base, 

but rather access to the ally’s base. So our problem changes, and we 

work on how to get that access.

 In reality, our method would look more like Gary Klein’s four 

steps of how experts think (A-D above) than the analytic methods of 

FM 5-0. But as good soldiers, we would write down everything in the 

formats FM 5-0 requires, even if it is extra work and does not match 

what we actually do. We make sure to follow procedure, at least on 

paper. In our minds, though, we are doing something else entirely. 

Strategic intuition is how experienced commanders think—and how 

we want inexperienced commanders to learn to think—even for 

situations that seem to feature plenty of time and information. 

 Next we find the “Fundamentals of Planning.” We read:

Every commander needs a high degree of creativity and clarity of 

thought to outwit a willing and able opponent. Commanders and staffs 

consider certain planning fundamentals to assist them in developing 

effective plans. These fundamentals lend rigor and focus to the purely 

creative aspect of planning and provide a crucial link between concept 

and application.29

Again, this passage is fine on the surface. Deeper, we see the same 

split between analysis and intuition, here called “rigor” versus 

“creativity.” Planning fundamentals supply the rigor. But in strategic 

intuition, creativity is already rigorous. In the old model of the brain, 

creativity was a mysterious force that defied analysis. In the new 

model, creativity is connection and combination among existing 

elements. That form of creativity supplies its own rigor. It does not 

need analytic methods for that. 

 FM 5-0 seems to treat creativity and intuition as mysteries, as fits 

the old model of the brain. That means Army planning concentrates 

instead on analytic tools: 
13

The Army’s doctrinal planning processes (problem solving, MDMP, and 

TLP) are based on analytic decisionmaking. They provide a common 

way to think about solving problems. When faced with a tactical mission, 

Army leaders define the problem; gather information relevant to it; 

develop, analyze, and compare COAs; and select the optimal solution. 

The MDMP provides a standard organized framework for commanders 

and staffs to approach and solve tactical problems. Using common 

processes, understood Army-wide, helps commanders standardize 

planning techniques. Standard techniques facilitate effective planning 

between echelons and with cross-attached and adjacent units.30

 This aim for standard methods makes great sense. It is possible, 

though, to integrate strategic intuition into those standard methods. 

We no longer have to treat creativity and intuition as mysteries in 

our planning. We know now how they work. And this integration of 

strategic intuition would leave most of FM 5-0 intact. For example, 

the list of 11 Key Planning Concepts would remain the same—such as 

Control Measures, Risk Mitigation, and Planning Horizons.31 These 

concepts make up most of the planning fundamentals that guide FM 

5-0. Strategic intuition does not change them, or at least not much. 

 Here’s an instance of one such change. In a section called “Effective 

Planning,” we read:

Although planning attempts to project the commander’s thoughts 

and designs forward in time, it involves an appreciation for planning 

horizons. Because the future is always uncertain, plans should not specify 

future actions with precision. Rather, they remain flexible and adaptable, 

allowing the opportunity to pursue a variety of options.32

On the one hand, this passage is good advice. On the other, it misses 

a key element of “the commander’s thoughts and designs”—that 

is, they come with a time all their own. A commander’s coup d’oeil

projects action into the future, and it is impossible to predict 

beforehand how far that is, in what detail. The time horizon and level 

of detail should follow what the commander sees. So they differ for 

each situation.

 The section on “Planning Horizons” gives three levels: shorterrange or low-uncertainty commitment planning with most detail; 

medium-range or medium-certainty contingency planning with some 

detail; and longer-range uncertain orientation planning with least 
14

detail.33 This is a fine method. We simply need some modification: 

a commander’s coup d’oeil might sometimes give most detail for 

longer-range and uncertain planning. For example, you might see 

that however they get there, including deception and feints, in a 

month you see two units joining up at a precise place and taking 

precise action. So your plans reflect greater detail at the far end than 

at the near end. It all depends on what your coup d’oeil shows you. 

Army Problem Solving.

 The second chapter of FM 5-0, “Army Problem Solving,” begins 

by restating the four-step analytic model: “Army problem solving 

is a form of decisionmaking. It is a systematic approach to defining 

a problem, developing possible solutions to solve the problem, 

arriving at the best solution, and implementing it.34 We read that 

simple problems do not need lengthy analysis, but “for complicated 

problems involving a variety of factors, a systematic problem solving 

approach is essential.”35 Strategic intuition agrees—it just uses a 

different system. Especially in complex situations, coup d’oeil cuts 

through the mass of information to arrive at a COA.

 Let’s go to the main problem solving model, which appears as 

a diagram with the four analytic steps broken down further into 

seven (see Figure 1). From the view of strategic intuition, this model 

is wrong on many counts. Most important is the sequence. The 

instructions tell us that leaders must “clearly define the problem 

before moving on to other steps of the problem solving process.”36 In 

strategic intuition, your idea of what the problem is often changes as 

you get deeper into it. Instead of starting by defining the problem, 

strategic intuition tells you to study the situation, with an open mind 

as to what the problem really is. So your first step should be #2: 

gather information. 

 The instructions give us an example of a problem statement that 

results from defining the problem: “To determine the best location 

for constructing a multipurpose vehicle wash rack facility during this 

fiscal year.”37 This example seems well suited to the seven steps: we 

consider several possible locations, and assess them all on common 

criteria, like cost of construction and distance from the vehicles. 

This is a simple problem without many factors at play—so it seems 
15

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1 - ID the problem

2 - Gather information

3 - Develop criteria

4 - Generate possible solutions

5 - Analyze possible solutions

6 - Compare possible solutions

7 - Make and implement the decision

Who, what, when, where and why?

Facts, assumptions, and interests

Screening & Evaluation

Suitable, feasible, acceptable, 

distinguishable, and complete

Benchmark (Does the solution achieve 

the desired state?)

Determine the best solution

Decide and act

LINKED

Figure 1. Seven-Step Problem Solving Model.

like a candidate for intuition, as FM 5-0 presents it. But the reality 

is that simple problems like this one are more suited to structured 

analysis in these seven steps. Complex problems are not. They call 

for strategic intuition instead. 

 A complex problem would be that we need a multipurpose vehicle 

wash rack facility, but it looks like we won’t be able to build one at 

all. Step 3 in the diagram is meaningless now: we cannot even begin 

to establish criteria for something we have no idea about in the first 

place. Our true sequence in this case is step 2—gather information—

at the same time that we do step 4—generate possible solutions. But 

even in step 4, we are not really generating multiple solutions: we 

would be thankful to come up with even a single solution. And the 

answer will probably solve a different problem: washing vehicles. 

That is, we look for some way to do without a multipurpose vehicle 

wash rack and still keep our vehicles clean.
16

 What really happens is we do a combination of steps 1, 3, and 

4, all at once. As we study the situation, a possible COA pops into 

our mind suddenly or slowly takes shapes over time—either way, it 

is intelligent memory at work. Our brain breaks down the problem 

into myriad pieces and searches for parallels for each piece, until 

pieces comes together, and we are at last able to see what the puzzle 

looks like. Or the pieces do not come together. It is possible that we 

do our best and still end up with no way to keep our vehicles clean. 

 In practice, problems amenable to analysis versus intuition are 

the opposite of what FM 5-0 tells us. The seven-step analysis model 

works not for complex problems, but for simple ones, where you 

know the criteria and you can generate solutions easily—like wash 

rack costs and locations. Intuition—or at least, strategic intuition 

as we present it here—works best not for simple problems but for 

complex ones, where you do not know the criteria beforehand, and 

it is hard to generate any possible solution at all.

 Gary Klein and his colleagues offer an alternative model of 

decisionmaking that reflects how experts use their intuition (see 

Figure 2).38 This four-step model is very different from the seven-step 

problem solving model of FM 5-0. It shows the decision forming in 

the first step, while FM 5-0 puts the decision in step 7 and combines 

it with implementation. Klein’s first step combines identifying the 

mission and conceptualizing the COA, both at the same time. The 

problem and solution arise together. This fits Kuhn’s description of 

the scientific method in action. Klein and Kuhn are very similar in 

this regard: they study what professionals actually do, rather than 

what they say they do or what their formal methods tell them to do. 

 We also note that Klein’s model leaves out two key elements 

from the seven-step model: criteria and multiple solutions. 

Again, Klein’s way is more scientific, following Kuhn. Scientists 

do not establish criteria, generate multiple solutions, and then 

pick one that best fits the criteria. Instead, they study the results 

of previous experiments—their own and others—and come up 

with a single hypothesis to explain something they think the 

previous work failed to explain. Then they test that hypothesis. If 

the experiment fails, they add those results to the previous ones 

they studied, think again, and come up with another hypothesis.
17

THE BASIC RECOGNITION PLANNING MODEL 

Situational 

information 

guidance/

Tasking 

from HHQ

The “decision” 

(subject to analysis 

and evaluation) Once the COA satisfices in the wargame

and/or analysis, it has become “the plan.”

No need to compare options.

Karol G. Ross, Gary A. Klein, Peter Thunholm, John F. Schmidt, and Holly C. Baxter,

“The Recognition-Primed Decision Model,” Military Review (July-August 2004): 7.

Disseminate

Execute

Improvise

Identify

Mission

Conceptualize

COA

Test/

Operationalize

COA

Wargame

COA

(for executors 

and planners) Develop

orders

This chart is reprinted with the permission of Military Review, the Professional 

Journal of the U.S. Army, Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. It 

was originally published in the July/August 2004 issue of Military Review.

Figure 2.

 Yet Klein’s four-part model leaves out a key part of his own 

research: “recognition.” He uses the word in the title of the model, 

but does not include it in the steps. Elsewhere, Klein has provided 

a more elaborate model for expert intuition that does include a 

“recognition” step (see Figure 3).39 In Klein’s Recognition-Primed 

Decision Model (RPDM), recognition happens in the second step, 

where the situation is “perceived as typical.” What the expert sees 
18

as familiar leads to four by-products, including an “action.” The 

expert thinks through the action, and then decides if it will work or 

not. A partial yes leads to modification and further evaluation. A full 

yes leads to implementation. A no leads back to the first step or to 

another action to think through. 

YES, BUT

YES

NO

Experience the situation in a changing context

Perceived as typical

[prototype or analog]

Recognition has four byproducts

Expectancies Relevant cues

Plausible goals Action 1 . . . n

Modify Will it work

Implement course of action

Evaluate action (n) 

[mental simulation]

The Recognition-Primed Decision Model (RPDM) in Gary Klein, Sources of Power: 

How People Make Decisions. (c) 1998 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Pp. 25. 

Reproduced with permission of the publisher: MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

Figure 3.

 In this form, RPDM does, in fact, apply to simple problems that 

result in one action rather than complex problems that result in a 

set of actions. That fits FM 5-0’s view that analytic methods apply to 

complex problems and intuition applies to simple ones. But we can 
19

take Klein’s work one step further and apply the lessons of expert 

intuition to complex problems, too. In RPDM, you recognize one 

“prototype or analog” that leads to one action. That is the simple 

case. In complex situations, you recognize more than one element as 

familiar, and it leads to a combination of more than one action. We 

move from expert intuition for a single action, to strategic intuition 

for a COA. 

 RPDM is complex enough: we refrain here from amending it to 

include more familiar elements and actions. If we seek to improve 

FM 5-0’s seven-step problem solving model, we need something just 

as clear and straightforward. We find guidance in that regard from 

the business world, where General Electric (GE) developed in the 

1990s a problem solving method that follows the steps of strategic 

intuition. We call it here the Insight Matrix—GE called it a Quality 

Matrix or Trotter Matrix, named after Lloyd Trotter, the GE executive 

who pioneered it (see Figure 4).40

INSIGHT MATRIX

Source 

1

Source 

2

Source 

3

Source 

4

Source 

5

Source 

6

Source

7

Action 1

Action 2

Action 3

Action 4

Etc.

Problem (draft)

SOURCES (draft)

SOLUTION (draft)

Robert Slater. Jack Welch and the G.E. Way: Management Insights and Leadership 

Secrets of the Legendary CEO. (c) 1999. Reproduced with permission of the publisher: 

McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., New York, NY.

Figure 4.
20

 The Insight Matrix came from GE’s corporate training center at 

Crotonville, New York, headed by Steve Kerr, GE’s Chief Learning 

Officer. Under Jack Welch, GE comprised some 24 major divisions, 

with about 300,000 employees. Every year, most of GE’s managers 

spent time at Crotonville. They were put on a team that mixed 

functions and divisions, and each team was given a real business 

problem to work on. Over 2 weeks, each team developed a solution. At 

the end, the solutions were presented to a panel of senior executives. 

If they approved the solution, it entered GE’s formal planning. So 

the Crotonville training program became an incubator for actual 

business strategy. 

 Your Crotonville problem team used the Insight Matrix. 

Crotonville instructors did not teach it to you: the matrix was just 

part of what everyone knew how to do. So many people passed 

through Crotonville, they took the matrix back to their divisions 

and used it there, too. So you and your teammates probably already 

knew it before you arrived in Crotonville. You get your problem and 

draw your matrix. 

 At the top of the matrix you write your problem—in draft, because 

your definition of what the problem is might change. Then you ask, 

“What do we have to do well to solve the problem?” You make a list 

in the left-hand column. Again it is in draft, for the list might change. 

Then across the other columns, you write in the sources to search, also 

in draft. At GE, they had the advantage of so many diverse divisions 

that they usually just wrote those in as the sources. But depending 

on the problem, you might write in other companies too, or specific 

units within GE divisions. The matrix of solution elements (rows) 

and sources to search (columns) produces a matrix of boxes. That is 

where you look for the answer. 

 You ask, “Has anyone else solved any part of this problem 

already?” Your team comes from some of those sources, so they 

can tell you the story of their divisions. Steve Kerr made sure that 

Crotonville compiled and updated their records of best practices over 

the years. You call or e-mail to follow-up leads. It is a treasure hunt 

where you seek good ideas that already exist, to find a combination 

that works. As you proceed, you might alter the list of solution 

elements, sources, and even the problem statement—the goal—as 

many times as you need.
21

 The whole cycle ends when the team has an insight: when you 

find the two or three or ten elements that together solve the problem. 

That is when you stop. The Insight Matrix turned all of GE into one 

big brain where you search all the shelves for examples from history 

that fit the current situation. Jack Welch made this corporate treasure 

hunt the centerpiece of his leadership. He called it “Plagiarism,” 

with a healthy dose of “gut instinct”—and called his autobiography 

Straight From the Gut.

41 Welch explained: “The operative assumption 

is that someone, somewhere, has a better idea, and the operative 

compulsion is to find out who has that better idea, learn it, and put it 

into action—fast.”42

 The Insight Matrix offers a worthy alternative to FM 5-0’s sevenstep problem solving method. We can convert the matrix into clear 

directives to match the seven-step format (see Figure 5). These 

seven steps match the Insight Matrix as much as possible. Note that 

objectives only emerge in steps 4 and 5. In most cases, steps 6 and 7 

will result in going forward with the COA. But in some cases, they 

give junior officers the duty to report that they do not see how to 

achieve their mission. That gives senior officers the choice of revising 

the mission or helping the junior officers to find a solution. 

 Although this strategic intuition model is most crucial in complex 

situations, it can cover simple ones, too. Let’s return to our problem 

of siting a vehicle wash rack. This seven-step model tells us to find 

out how our unit and other units have succeeded before in placing 

their racks: perhaps near water, on sloping ground, alongside a 

main road, or inside the vehicle park. In FM 5-0’s seven-step model, 

we would probably do this step in our heads as part of “generate 

possible solutions.” The strategic intuition model makes the sources 

of our solution more transparent and thus easier to evaluate. If I 

propose something and you ask, “Where did you get that idea?”—in 

the strategic intuition model, I cite precedents. In the FM 5-0 model, 

I have to run you through my entire analysis. 

 If I am a very junior officer and do not have any experience with 

vehicle wash racks, the strategic intuition model pushes me to seek 

out the experience of others. The FM 5-0 model does not. If I am a 

senior officer with a lot of relevant experience, the strategic intuition 

model simply makes explicit what I do anyway, as Klein’s research 
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1 - Assess the situation

2 - Identify precedents

3 - Identify previous actions

4 - Combine previous actions

5 - State feasible and worthy objectives

6 - Compare objectives to mission

7 - Decide and act or seek revised mission

History, current state, future prediction

Which elements has anyone faced before?

What previous actions have worked before?

Course of action that achieves feasible

and worthy objectives

Are these the most ambitious 

objectives possible?

Is the mission possible?

Do or ask up

LINKED

Figure 5. Seven-Step Strategic Intuition Model.

has shown us. If I am a senior officer with no relevant experience in 

this situation, the strategic intuition model reminds me to do what 

the junior officer must do: look beyond my own experience.

 For a complex problem with no apparent solution, this strategic 

intuition model offers a method to search for one. Let’s return to 

our complex situation where we need a multipurpose vehicle wash 

rack facility but we cannot build one: has anyone else ever faced this 

situation, and if so, what did they do? Or maybe we find a partial 

solution, where other units have worked out tit-for-tat equipment 

lending that we might try to apply to wash racks. For both simple 

and complex situations, the Army’s huge investments in lessons 

learned and rapid communication can make the search for previous 

elements far easier than it ever was for GE. And it fits the Army’s 

culture—where I am not shy about asking, and you are glad to 

answer as best you can. For GE’s culture, it took Welch a decade to 

get to that point. The Army is already there. 
23

The Military Decisionmaking Process.

 The third chapter of FM 5-0, “The Military Decisionmaking 

Process,” begins with another quote from Patton: “A good plan 

violently executed NOW is better than a perfect plan next week.” 

Let’s pause to understand this quote. Patton was impatient with 

elaborate planning before his coup d’oeil, but was a master of planning 

after it.43 He seems a prime example of Klein’s experts who think 

through a good-enough solution and act, rather than taking more 

time to generate several solutions and analyze each one to find the 

optimal COA. But FM 5-0 seems to quote Patton here for a different 

reason: to introduce “ways to shorten the process when planning in 

time-constrained environment.”44 Let’s study the longer and shorter 

versions of the MDMP to see how to integrate strategic intuition in 

both. 

 Right away we learn that the MDMP “is an established and 

proven analytical planning process.”45 But is it? We know that it is 

established, but have there been scientific experiments to prove it 

works, especially versus other methods? FM 5-0 cites no proof. And 

Kuhn tells us that even scientists do not really “prove” anything: 

they present evidence to support a hypothesis. The scientific 

community—not the experimenter—decides whether the evidence 

is strong enough to declare the hypothesis “true for now”—that 

is, until some future evidence modifies or overturns it. Only pure 

mathematics has “proofs”—which are abstract logic models rather 

than descriptions of anything real.46

 We do not fault MDMP for lacking real proof. So far no one has 

figured out how to test one decisionmaking method versus another 

in real-life situations—simply because, by definition, every real 

situation is different. You cannot perform a controlled experiment 

in real life. We simply note here that MDMP is an established 

method, not a proven one in any scientific sense. In a practical sense, 

MDMP has stood the test of time. Enough Army leaders find MDMP 

sufficiently useful to keep it a core method. But the Army should 

be open to—and actively seek out—other methods that might work 

better. Science marches on, and so should the Army’s methods, if 

indeed something better arises. This monograph offers strategic 

intuition as one such alternative for the Army to consider. 
24

 We read on to find that MDMP “is a planning model that establishes 

procedures for analyzing a mission, developing, analyzing, and 

comparing courses of action against criteria of success and each other, 

selecting the optimum COA, and producing a plan or order.”47 The 

basic MDMP has seven steps that differ somewhat from the Army 

planning model (see Figure 6). 

Step 1:

Receipt of Mission

Step 2:

Mission Analysis

Step 3:

COA Development

Step 4: COA

Analysis (War Game)

Step 5:

COA Comparison

Step 6:

COA Approval

Step 7:

Orders Production

Preparation

Execution

Figure 6. The Military Decisionmaking Process.

 The full MDMP diagram in FM 5-0 shows inputs and outputs at 

each step, for a total of 21:48
25

Mission from higher HQ IPB products Decision support templates

Commander’s guidance ISR plan COA statements and sketches

Higher HQ’s order/plan Enemy COAs Mission to subordinate units

Commander’s intent CCIR Criteria for comparison

Preliminary movement WARNO High pay-off target list

OPLAN/OPORD Staff estimates Task organization

War-Game results Decision matrix Higher HQ’s IPB

 Most of these items appear more than once, as drafts that different 

steps refine. These inputs and outputs are part of the glue that holds 

the Army together as it coordinates action of myriad kinds. All 

are documents, with one exception: preliminary movement. That 

appears as an output of step 2, Mission Analysis. The instructions 

that accompany the diagram say it might also be an output of step 1. 

In either case, the movement seems to have two possible sources: a 

direct command from HQ, or the commander’s strategic intuition. 

 Also in step 1, the commander does a timeline to determine 

whether to use the full MDMP or a shorter one. Let’s jump ahead to 

the end of Chapter 3 for a look at what that shorter MDMP looks like. 

We find that the greatest time saver at every step is “to increase the 

commander’s involvement,”49 and so breeze through some of the substeps and leave others out entirely. That fits strategic intuition, as the 

commander typically has the most knowledge and direct experience. 

But there is only one full step you can skip completely—step 5, COA 

Comparison—and only rarely: “The fastest way to develop a plan is 

for the commander to direct development of one COA with branches 

against the most likely enemy COA. The technique should be used 

only when time is severely limited.”50 Leaving out step 5 makes steps 

3 and 4 easier too: you develop and war-game only one COA at a 

time.

 If you leave out step 5, the MDMP fits Klein’s model of expert 

intuition and our newer model of strategic intuition. But strategic 

intuition applies to all situations, not just urgent ones. And it can 

take as much time as the full MDMP: if you do not see an answer 

quickly, you keep going until you do. And even with one COA, your 

wargame might result in rejecting it or at least putting it on hold, so 

you go back and develop another. That takes time too.
26

 We can revise the MDMP to take these changes into account (see 

Figure 7). We would then modify the inputs and outputs as needed 

to make explicit the search for precedents and their combination as 

the COA develops in the commander’s mind or the minds of the 

planning team. Two items disappear entirely: criteria for comparison, 

and the decision matrix. 

Step 1:

Receipt of Mission

Step 2:

Mission Analysis

Step 3:

COA Development

Step 4: COA

Analysis (War Game)

Step 5: Go back to

Step 2 or 3 as needed

Step 6:

COA Approval

Step 7:

Orders Production

Preparation

Execution

Figure 7. MDMP with Strategic Intuition.

 Even when you end up lukewarm about your first COA and 

go back and develop another, you judge between them for some 

unexpected reason that pre-set criteria or a decision matrix cannot 

capture. If you need to explain to others why you picked one COA 

over the other, you simply brief or write down the reasons. Even 

if you use a decision matrix to decide among COAs, you are really 
27

using your strategic intuition. A decision matrix for a real-world 

situation is never a purely analytic task. Let’s look at a sample from 

FM 5-0 (see Figure 8) to understand why. 

 The notes to the decision matrix call the numbers in it “objective,” 

but they are nothing of the sort. Every single number comes from 

an educated guess by the commander and staff. And at the end of 

the exercise, the decisionmaker still must decide whether to “alter 

or delete” the COA with the best numbers. But how? By strategic 

intuition. 

 The criteria in the decision matrix are fine factors to think about, 

but the decision matrix itself is not the best way to organize your 

thoughts about them. The Insight Matrix gives planners a better 

tool, because it identifies the sources of their guesses. In contrast, 

the decision matrix gives a false sense of hard data, and so does not 

encourage us to think through where our guesses come from. Instead, 

it treats our guesses as facts. We spend a lot of energy juggling madeup numbers instead of juggling elements for action to come up with 

a series of them, as in the Insight Matrix. And the different COAs on 

your decision matrix might all have worthy elements: instead of just 

choosing one option or the other, the Insight Matrix helps you think 

through ways to combine parts of them in a single COA. 

 As a result, the Insight Matrix is more scientific than the decision 

matrix. A typical scientific research paper reviews past achievement 

in a field, builds on it with a further hypothesis, and tests that 

hypothesis in action. Strategic intuition does the same. FM 5-0’s only 

claim to science is COA comparison through the decision matrix: 

but that is not how science really works. Scientists do not compare 

hypotheses to choose the best one: they review past experiments 

and their competing theories to choose a single hypothesis to test. 

Most scientific experiments fail, of course: their hypotheses turn out 

wrong. Likewise, strategic intuition does not guarantee a correct 

COA. But neither does a decision matrix, which merely summarizes 

the best guesses by the planners about a list of criteria they guess 

to be relevant. The only hard science in the decision matrix is the 

simple arithmetic of multiplying the score by the weight. The scores 

and weights themselves are not scientific at all.
28

Criteria Weight COA 1 COA 2 COA 3

(Note 1) (Note 2) (Note 3) (Note 3) (Note 3)

Maneuver 3 2 (6) 3 (9) 1 (3)

Simplicity 3 3 (9) 1 (3) 2 (6)

Fires 4 2 (8) 1 (4) 3 (12)

Intelligence 1 3 (3) 2 (2) 1 (1)

ADA 1 1 (1) 3 (3) 2 (2)

Mobility/Survivability 1 3 (3) 2 (2) 1 (1)

CSS 1 2 (2) 1 (1) 3 (3)

C2 1 1 (1) 2 (2) 3 (3)

Residual Risk 2 1 (2) 2 (4) 3 (6)

IO 1 2 (2) 1 (1) 3 (3)

Total/Weighted TOTAL 20 (37) 18 (31) 22 (40)

Notes:

1. Criteria are those assigned in step 5 of COA analysis.

2. The chief of staff/executive officer may emphasize one or more criteria by assigning 

weights to them based on their relative importance.

3. COAs are those selected for wargaming.

Procedure: The staff assigns numerical values for each criterion after wargaming the 

COA. Values reflect the relative advantages or disadvantages of each criterion for each 

COA action. The lowest number is best. The initially assigned score in each column 

is multiplied by the weight, and the product put in parenthesis in the column. When 

using weighted value, the lower value assigned indicates the best option. The numbers 

are totaled to provide a subjective evaluation of the best COA without weighting one 

criterion over another. The scores are then totaled to provide a “best” (lowest number 

value) COA based on weights the commander assigns. Although the lowest value 

denotes the best solution, the best solution may be more subjective than the objective 

numbers indicate. The matrix must be examined for sensitivity. For example, COA 2 

is the “best” COA, however, it may not be supportable from a ADA standpoint. The 

decisionmaker must either determine if he can acquire additional support of if he must 

alter or delete the COA.

Procedure: The staff assigns numerical values for each criterion after wargaming the 

COA. Values reflect the relative advantages or disadvantages of each criterion for each 

COA action. The lowest number is best. The initially assigned score in each column 

is multiplied by the weight, and the product put in parenthesis in the column. When 

using weighted value, the lower value assigned indicates the best option. The numbers 

are totaled to provide a subjective evaluation of the best COA without weighting one 

criterion over another. The scores are then totaled to provide a “best” (lowest number 

value) COA based on weights the commander assigns. Although the lowest value 

denotes the best solution, the best solution may be more subjective than the objective 

numbers indicate. The matrix must be examined for sensitivity. For example, COA 2 

is the “best” COA, however it may not be supportable from a ADA standpoint. The 

decisionmaker must either determine if he can acquire additional support of if he must 

alter or delete the COA.

Figure 8. Sample Decision Matrix—Numerical Analysis.
29

 We do not have space here to assess all the other inputs and 

outputs of the MDMP from the view of strategic intuition. Let’s single 

out just two more for a closer look: staff estimates and commander’s 

intent. The estimates are the principal input that gives a commander 

information on the situation. Updates to the estimates record the 

outcome of each step of the MDMP. Commander’s intent is one 

of the principal outputs of the MDMP: it gives others the essence 

for what COA to take. In strategic intuition, coup d’oeil feeds both 

staff estimates and commander’s intent. How might we modify the 

instructions for both? 

 Let’s look at the standard format for estimates, and a revision that 

takes account of strategic intuition (see Figures 9a and 9b).51 Nothing 

changes in the Mission. For Situation and Considerations, we add 

two new questions: what elements of this situation have others faced 

before, and what has worked best each time? These questions might 

fit under Assumptions. For COAs, Analysis, and Comparison, the 

estimate needs major amendment. We might replace these sections 

with a single COA, a Rationale, and Implications. These are three 

outputs of coup d’oeil: a preferred path, an understanding of why 

it’s best, and implications for action that give you some preliminary 

detail on execution. 

Note that the revised estimate format has a strong link between 

Situation and Considerations on the one hand, and COA on the other: 

2d (1) and 2d (2) match 3b. The FM 5-0 format has no such link. The 

revised format shows clearly where the COA came from. Where does 

it come from in FM 5-0? Under COA Development, we find a chart 

that puts “generate options” in a series of steps (see Figure 10).52 The 

instructions to the chart tell us the options themselves arise in this way:

Brainstorming is the preferred technique for generating options. It 

requires time, imagination, and creativity, but it produces the widest 

range of options.The staff remains unbiased and open-minded in 

evaluating proposed options. Staff members quickly identify COAs that 

are not feasible due to factors in their functional areas. They also quickly 

decide if a COA can be modified to accomplish the requirement or should 

be eliminated immediately. Staff members who identify information that 

might affect other functional areas share it immediately. This eliminates 

wasted time and effort.53
30

FM 5-0, Figure E-1.

Generic Staff Estimate Format

1. MISSION. Show the restated mission 

resulting from mission analysis.

2. SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS.

a. Characteristics of the Area of Operations

(1) Weather. State how the military 

aspects of weather affect the staff section’s 

functional area.

(2) Terrain. State how aspects of the terrain 

affect the staff section’s functional area.

(3) Civil Considerations. State how political, 

economical, sociological, and psychological 

factors and infrastructure affect the staff 

section’s functional area.

(4) Other Pertinent Facts. State any other 

pertinent facts and how they affect the staff 

section’s functional area.

b. Enemy Forces. Discuss enemy dispositions, composition, strength, capabilities, 

and COAs as they affect the staff section’s 

functional area.

c. Friendly Forces.

(1) List the current status of resources 

within the staff section’s functional area.

(2) List the current status of other resources 

that affect the staff section’s functional area.

(3) Compare requirements with capabilities 

and recommended solutions for discrepancies.

d. Assumptions. List any assumptions that 

affect the staff section’s functional area.

3. COAs

a. List the friendly COAs that were 

wargamed.

b. List evaluation criteria identified during 

COA analysis. All staff sections use the same 

evaluation criteria.

4. ANALYSIS. Analyze each COA using the 

evaluation criteria identified during COA analysis.

5. COMPARISON. Compare COAs. Rank order 

COAs for each key consideration. A decision 

matrix usually supports comparison.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

a. Recommend the most supportable COA 

from the specific staff perspective.

b. List issues, deficiencies, and risks with 

recommendations to reduce their impacts.

Generic Staff Estimate Format 

with Strategic Intuition

1. MISSION. Show the restated mission 

resulting from mission analysis.

2. SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS.

a. Characteristics of the Area of Operations

(1) Weather. State how the military 

aspects of weather affect the staff.

(2) Terrain. State how aspects of the terrain 

affect the staff section’s functional area.

(3) Civil Considerations. State how political, 

economical, sociological, and psychological 

factors and infrastructure affect the staff 

section’s functional area.

(4) Other Pertinent Facts. State any other 

pertinent facts and how they affect the staff 

section’s functional area.

b. Enemy Forces. Discuss enemy dispositions, composition, strength, capabilities, 

and COAs as they affect the staff section’s 

functional area.

c. Friendly Forces.

(1) List the current status of resources 

within the staff section’s functional area.

(2) List the current status of other resources 

that affect the staff section’s functional area.

(3) Compare requirements with capabilities 

and recommended solutions for discrepancies.

d. Assumptions.

(1) List what elements of this situation others 

have faced before.

(2) List what has worked best for each element.

(3) List any other assumptions that affect 

the staff section’s functional area.

3. COA

a. List the friendly COA you recommend and 

its wargame results.

b. Identify the elements from previous situations in your COA.

4. RATIONALE. Explain why you believe this 

COA is the best way to fulfill the mission.

5. IMPLICATIONS. List any details of execution 

that arose during your COA development or 

wargame.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

a. Summarize your COA, rationale, and 

implications. 

b. List issues, deficiencies, and risks with 

recommendations to reduce their impacts.

Figure 9a. Figure 9b.
31

Input Process Output

• Restated mission

• Cdr’s intent

• Cdr’s planning guidance

• Initial CCIR

• Updated staff estimates

 & products

• Enemy COAs 

 (event templates)

• Analyze relative combat power

• Generate options

• Array initial forces

• Develop the concept 

 of operations

• Assign headquarters

• Develop COA statements 

 and sketches

• Updates staff estimates

 & products

• COA statements and

 sketches

• Course of action briefing

• Refined Cdr’s guidance

Figure 10. COA Development.

 This is an old view of brainstorming that leaves the generation of 

options to the mystery of imagination and creativity. The only detail 

we get is that staff members quickly reject, modify, or add to the 

option—by intuition? There is nothing about how the option itself 

appears. Strategic intuition, in contrast, gives a method to how the 

option arises that matches how the brain works: new combinations 

of past elements. And the Insight Matrix gives us a tool for making 

those combinations. It produces one option at a time, though, while 

FM 5-0 asks for several. 

 In any event, we can alter the diagram on COA Development 

to account for strategic intuition (see Figure 11). There are only 

three differences. First, “Use Insight Matrix” replaces “Generate 

options.” Second, we develop one COA statement at a time. Third, 

commander’s intent becomes an output of COA development, not an 

input: the commander’s intent expresses a coup d’oeil, which includes 

the essence of the COA. This view of commander’s intent has some 

basis in other parts of FM 5-0. Here is how FM 5-0 defines it: 

Commander’s Intent. A clear, concise statement of what the force 

must do and the conditions the force must meet to succeed with 
32

respect to the enemy, terrain, and the desired end state. . . The 

components of the commander’s intent include: 

 • End state

 • Key tasks

 • Expanded purpose (if desired).54

Input Process Output

• Restated mission

• Cdr’s planning guidance

• Initial CCIR

• Updated staff estimates

 & products

• Enemy COAs 

 (event templates)

• Analyze relative combat power

• Use insight matrix

• Array initial forces

• Develop the concept 

 of operations

• Assign headquarters

• Develop COA statements 

 and sketches

• Updates staff estimates

 & products

• COA statements and

 sketches

• Course of action briefing

• Cdr’s intent

• Refined Cdr’s guidance

Figure 11. COA Development with Strategic Intuition.

 This definition of commander’s intent seems to include the COA, 

not precede it. How else do we interpret “what the force must do” 

and “key tasks?” In this way, the commander’s intent is very much a 

product of coup d’oeil, where the commander sees what path to take 

(COA/key tasks), where that leads (end state), and why (purpose). 

You cannot establish the end state first, other than repeating your 

mission from HQ. For example, if HQ tells you to secure Section G, 

your commander’s intent will give more detail than that, as your 

coup d’oeil tells you that certain of your units end up in certain places 

in Section G. For that you have to have at least an idea of a COA: 

which units take which actions. Your COA and end state arise and 

develop together, not in sequence. 

 So commander’s intent should be an output, not an input, for 

developing a COA. Brainstorming—or the Insight Matrix—gives us 
33

both. But FM 5-0 goes on to limit severely what kind of options you 

generate for the COA. On the one hand, we brainstorm, but on the 

other, we read this:

To develop options, the staff starts with the decisive operation identified in 

the commander’s planning guidance. . . The staff determines the decisive 

operation’s purpose (if not stated by the commander) and considers ways 

to mass the effects of overwhelming combat power to achieve it.55

 So we don’t brainstorm to generate options to meet the mission: 

we generate options to mass overwhelming combat power. This 

is a very narrow range of options. What about options other than 

mass? We have pin and flank, disperse and concentrate, encircle, 

breakthrough and pursuit, interior lines, deception, selective shock, 

and many others. Mass is not the only answer in combat, as many 

great generals of history have shown us. They do more with less, 

as our Army will have to do in the future, because of our volunteer 

professional corps and multiple wars. And military problems include 

noncombat situations where mass is not the answer either, from our 

wash rack facility to disaster relief and nation-building. 

 We understand FM 5-0’s attempt to provide guidance for COA 

development beyond brainstorming, creativity and imagination. But 

instead of narrowing the options—as mass or any other preference—

strategic intuition offers the widest range of realistic options possible. 

To develop a COA, we ask, “What does previous human experience 

tell us about situations with similar elements?” This is what goes 

through a seasoned commander’s head anyway: strategic intuition 

just makes it an explicit part of Army planning.

 MDMP gives one final source for COA and commander’s intent: 

visualization. Here is how FM 5-describes it:

Commander’s visualization is the mental process of achieving a clear 

understanding of the force’s current state with relation to the enemy and 

the environment (situational understanding), and developing a desired 

end state that represents mission accomplishment and the key tasks that 

move the force from its current state to the end state (commander’s intent). 

Commander’s visualization begins in planning and continues throughout 

the operations process until the force accomplishes the mission.56
34

 Here FM 5-0 tells us that three elements come together in the 

commander’s mind: the situation, the COA, and the end state. We 

are very close to coup d’oeil. The key difference is sequence: in FM 

5-0, the three elements appear in order, while in a coup d’oeil they arise 

together. The situation has many sides, angles, and complications: 

what matters most comes to the fore only after you see what to do. 

For example, rain may cause you to slow down (to let the storm pass) 

or speed up (before it’s too muddy), or the rain may factor not at all 

in your decision. You only know whether rain matters as part of the 

situation when you see what COA to take. Same with the end state: 

there are many end states that can fulfill the mission. You only know 

which one to choose when you see a way to get there. 

 Still, FM 5-0 elevates commander’s visualization to the highest 

plane: it is where the plan really takes shape. Strategic intuition 

agrees. It just updates from recent research how the commander’s 

brain really visualizes. Intelligent memory works like a movie, 

where you literally see what you remember.57 The thoughts that 

make up a commander’s visualization come from combinations of 

what the commander recalls. Strategic intuition makes explicit the 

components of visualization that appear in a commander’s mind. 

Troop Leading Procedures (TLP).

 The fourth chapter of FM 5-0, “Troop Leading Procedures,” tells 

us that TLP extends the MDMP to small units. The steps are a bit 

different, because our smaller units must wait for the higher level to 

complete its MDMP before issuing final orders. The result is Parallel 

Planning (see Figure 12).58

 For a company or platoon commander, these steps might seem 

a bit different from MDMP, but the key elements are the same: to 

make a tentative plan, you still go through COA development and 

comparison. The real difference is there are extra steps, as you initiate 

movement and conduct reconnaissance before completing your plan. 

As such, our previous comments on strategic intuition in the MDMP 

apply to TLP, too. 
35

Battalion Company Platoon

Military Decision 

Making Process

Troop-Leading 

Procedures

Troop-Leading 

Procedures

Warning Order

Warning Order

Warning Order

Receipt of Mission

Mission Analysis

COA Development

COA Analysis

COA Comparison

COA Approval

Orders Production

OPLAN or OPORD

Receive the Mission

Issue a Warning Order

Make a Tentative Plan

Initiate Movement

Conduct Reconnaissance

Complete the Plan

Issue the Order

Supervise and Refine

Receive the Mission

Issue a Warning Order

Make a Tentative Plan

Initiate Movement

Conduct Reconnaissance

Complete the Plan

Issue the Order

Supervise and Refine

Figure 12. Parallel Planning.

 We note two further elements of TLP: comfirmation brief and 

backbrief. In both cases, subordinate officers explain what they think 

to their superior officers. In the confirmation brief, they explain their 

understanding of the order they just received. In the backbrief, they 

explain the plan they came up with to execute the order. From the 

view of strategic intuition, these two briefs are key elements that 

hold Army planning together. It is the chance for commanders to 

pass up and down to each other what they see—and don’t see—

about their situation and their own COA. Commanders should view 

the confirmation briefs and backbriefs of their subordinates as vital 

input into their own evolving plans. These briefs deserve a place on 

the Parallel Planning diagram, with arrows in both directions (see 

Figure 13), in addition to the revision of the battalion procedures for 

strategic intuition.
36

Battalion Company Platoon

Military Decision 

Making Process

Troop-Leading 

Procedures

Troop-Leading 

Procedures

Warning Order

Warning Order

Warning Order

Receipt of Mission

COA Development

COA Analysis

COA Comparison

COA Approval

Orders Production

OPLAN or OPORD

Receive the Mission

Make a Tentative Plan

Initiate Movement

Conduct Reconnaissance

Issue the Order

Supervise and Refine

Issue a Warning Order

Make a Tentative Plan

Initiate Movement

Conduct Reconnaissance

Issue the Order

Supervise and Refine

Complete the Plan Complete the Plan

Receive the Mission

Issue a Warning Order

Mission Analysis

backbrief

backbrief

backbrief

conf. brief

conf. brief

Figure 13. Parallel Planning with Strategic Intuition.

 After all, a coup d’oeil gives you just a sketch of what to do. 

You have to fill in many details, and make plenty of mid-course 

corrections. Your COA is a puzzle you keep filling in. Briefs back 

and forth help you do that. This is another reason to favor methods 

of strategic intuition over formal analytic methods: we acknowledge 

coup d’oeil as an educated guess and no more, while analytic methods 

give a false impression of certainty, completeness, and rigor. It is 

easy to fall into the trap of thinking your decision matrix has real 

numbers on it, and yields an answer that is objectively true. Briefs 

from your subordinates give you the real-world details of your plan, 

in a way that formal analytic methods never can. People make plans. 

People turn them into action. Confirmation briefs and backbriefs are 

the only occasion where superiors and subordinates get a chance to 
37

see what is in each other’s brains, and to express what they see in 

terms that might not fit on paper or a particular Army format. It’s a 

way to visualize to each other. 

 We suspect that officers, in fact, use the confirmation brief and 

backbrief in exactly that way. Integrating these steps into the core 

TLP—and the MDMP, too—would give the briefs the official attention 

they deserve. As with commander’s intent, strategic intuition would 

make the brief contain what the briefing officers see, in whatever detail 

they see it. And that might alter the superior officers’ understanding 

of the end state and thus the COA, for further backbrief up the chain 

of command. Recent experience shows that company and platoon 

commanders increasingly face surprising situations, and handle 

them in surprising ways. Higher plans need to take account of the 

coups d’oeil of officers lower down, as the entire operation emerges 

from the fog of war. 

Case Study: 101st Aviation Brigade. 

 In 2003, Lieutenant Colonel William Gayler of the 101st Aviation 

Brigade developed a revised MDMP to speed up planning. In Iraq, the 

101st was able to plan a series of missions, with contingencies, at the 

same time that other brigades planned only one mission. Let’s take a 

look at what the 101st did in light of our review of strategic intuition 

in FM 5-0. An Appendix contains the 101st’s full version.59 Let’s 

compare their summary chart (see Figure 14) with the amendments 

we suggest in this monograph.

 The first thing we notice is the format: the 101st did not use any 

of the basic charts we find in FM 5-0. Instead they worked out what 

procedures they needed first, and then mapped out what they did. 

In this way, their method follows how Klein conducts research, in 

writing down faithfully what experts do without a prior model to 

go by. We see that the 101st organizes their planning around three 

possible Warning Orders (WARNORD), three briefs, and a rehearsal 

for the COA itself through the Operations Order. This basic format of 

orders, briefs, and rehearsal emphasizes action above all else, again 

as Klein and strategic intuition would lead us to expect. 
38

Hours:

12 hr.

24 hr.

36 hr.

1

2

3

4

8

12

6

12

24

8

16

28

10.5

22.5

34.5

12

24

36

1

2 3

= WARNORD

MSN

Analysis

Brief

COA

Brief

Receive

Mission

C o m m a n d e r ’ s G u l d a n c e

LZ/OBJ

Sketch

A2C2

Plan

AMPS

Load

MSN

Analysis

Cutsheet

Begin

Base

Order

War

Game

Exec

Matrix

Rehearse

OPORD

Brief

OPORD

Synch

Matrix

COA

Sketch &

Statements

IPB

Process

Collection

Plan

DSM

Graphics

Annexes

Complete

Rehearse

IAW BN

Timelines

Figure 14. 101st AVN BDE Abbreviated MDMP.

 We note next there is only one COA. The 101st usually skips the 

steps of developing multiple COAs and criteria to assess them, and 

then comparing COAs. As we know, FM 5-0 allows this shortcut when 

there is not enough time for the full MDMP. The 101st’s instructions 

offer a somewhat different rationale, which gives us further clues to 

their method:

The ultimate goal of the process, of course, is to produce an OPORD that 

is thorough and executable while giving subordinate units adequate time 

to analyze and produce their own orders. Often the time (critical resource) 

allocated to units to perform this full process is limited. Therefore, units 

must have established techniques for the production of orders in a timeconstrained environment. Corps and Division plans sections are robust 

enough to take advantage of the full process, in most cases. At brigade and 

below, however, units must understand the full process, but abbreviate, 

where able, to meet the goal of orders production. Units can then spend 

time on the rehearsal of the operation that is critical to mission success.60
39

 On the one hand, the 101st tells us they do their version because 

time is shorter at the brigade level and lower than for corps and 

division. They note further that brigade and lower simply do not 

have enough staff to do the full MDMP in a timely manner. Yet 

the 101st’s shorter method is not simply a shorter MDMP. They 

have revised the entire MDMP. With the time they do have, they 

trade analysis and COA comparison for briefs and rehearsal. Their 

instructions above tell us clearly that “rehearsal of the operation . . . 

is critical to mission success.” In a way, the 101st’s rehearsal is a 

shortened Insight Matrix. It works through a full series of actions so 

that everyone has a picture of the whole operation unfolding. The 

Insight Matrix also works out a full list of actions, but the 101st skips 

the step of identifying the source of each one. When time is short or 

staff are few, this abbreviation makes great sense.

 As a result, the 101st gives us not a reduced MDMP when time is 

short for brigade and lower, but an alternative MDMP for all levels, 

at all times. If we have enough time and staff, we can add the Insight 

Matrix early on, as a worksheet that carries through to rehearsal. The 

101st does not make this grand claim for its method—as a possible 

replacement for the MDMP. They are simply reporting what they 

do. Yet the rationale they offer for themselves can apply to higher 

levels as well as lower. 

 Note their timeline: it tells you how long each step takes when 

you have 12, 24, or 36 hours for the entire method. We can easily 

adapt the same timeline for 48 hours, or a week, a month, or more. 

If all levels adopted the same method, they would all have time for 

rehearsals and briefings that culminate in final orders. This kind of 

back-and-forth produces much greater alignment for a single COA, 

and so aids execution. Even a full staff at corps and division is better 

off fleshing out a single COA in rehearsal, and updating it from 

briefs by lower levels, than comparing COAs that they only end up 

discarding. 

 The 101st has developed a method that seems to fit well Patton’s 

advice for a good plan now versus a perfect plan next week. Their 

method applied at all levels offers a way for all commanders to use 

their strategic intuition to full advantage, with maximum harmony 

among their different COAs. The 101st’s MDMP totals eight pages of 

formats and instructions, and at each step emphasizes what actions 
40

the commander “sees.” As such, it stands out as a strong alternative 

to our amendments to FM 5-0 that preserve the structure of the 

MDMP and integrate strategic intuition at every step. 

 Perhaps that is right: not just for brigade and lower, but all the 

way up the chain of command. The Insight Matrix offers a way for 

commanders or staff teams to give supporting evidence for their 

COA, without comparing it to alternatives. The 101st gives support 

for its COA in a very different way: with detail on how to carry it 

out, worked through in a rehearsal. If your superior asks, “Why this 

COA?” FM 5-0 replies, “Because it is the best one we analyzed.” 

Our amended version with strategic intuition replies, “Because its 

elements worked before.” The 101st replies, “Because we see how to 

do it.” The 101st might very well have the best answer. It puts the most 

trust in the strategic intuition of the Army’s own commanders.

Conclusion.

 This study reviews the Army’s planning procedures to see where 

strategic intuition might and should come in. It offers these particular 

suggestions for revision:

• the Insight Matrix (Figure 4) instead of the decision matrix in 

the MDMP;

• a revised Seven Step Problem Solving Model (Figure 5);

• a revised MDMP (Figure 7);

• a revised Generic Staff Estimate Format for use in the MDMP 

(Figure 9b);

• a revised COA Development as a step of the MDMP (Figure 

11); and,

• a revised Parallel Planning in TLP (Figure 12).

A more extreme alternative comes from the 101st Aviation Brigade 

in Iraq (Figure 14), which reduces the MDMP to eight pages that 

all levels—not just brigade and lower—would do well to consider. 

Perhaps other units have experimented with amended planning 

methods in action, and it would be worth further inquiry to gather 

and assess them all.

 If the Army would like to try out any of the revisions cited in this 

monograph, the U.S. Army War College might be a place to start, 
41

as a parallel to GE’s Crotonville Institute. Officers come through 

the College with real assignments behind and before them, and the 

Army might have other assignments for them during their time at 

the College. That makes for plenty of real problems to work on, in a 

learning environment where College faculty can run and assess the 

trials. 

 Beyond these particular revisions to FM 5-0, strategic intuition 

offers an overall shift from “planning and orders production” to 

“strategizing and communicating.” In current Army methods, there 

is no step, no process, no procedure to “strategize”—which is how 

human beings really solve problems and make decisions of all kinds. 

When you strategize, you let your mind wander among possible end 

states, actions, timelines, and particular details of the situation you 

face. Different pieces emerge, in different combinations, as your brain 

pieces together the whole picture. The revised procedures suggested 

here slow down the normal process of the mind to a more deliberate 

pace, with more explicit steps, so everyone is more aware of what 

they are doing and so that teams can know what is in the minds of 

their members. 

 Orders production becomes a matter of communicating the 

picture you see, in whatever detail you see it. Whoever receives the 

orders fills in the blanks with what they see, and communicates it 

back to help their commanders fill in more of the picture and keep 

up with changes as the operation unfolds. In this way, strategic 

intuition is not just faster than current methods: it is less bureaucratic, 

too. That is, the steps of strategic intuition follow naturally how 

good commanders strategize and communicate. Formal procedures 

become aids to thinking rather than hoops to jump through for their 

own sake. And strategic intuition is closer to the scientific method 

than current procedures, so above all it gives the best answer. 

 We end with a warning: strategic intuition poorly done results in 

the worst kind of lazy thinking. The easiest kind of planning is: “This 

resembles that, so let’s do the same thing again.” That is wrong. Done 

well, strategic intuition results in a unique solution every time. No 

situation is ever the same as a previous one, so no solution is ever 

the same either. Strategic intuition uses elements from the past, but 

always in a new combination. The future comes out of the past: it 

does not mirror it. The discipline of strategic intuition gives us this 
42

kind of planning instead: “This part resembles X, that part resembles 

Y, that other part resembles D, and we know that other thing is not 

Z, but what the heck is it?”

 If you cannot find a precedent for some element of the situation, 

then for that you have to guess. That is true of both strategic intuition 

and analytic methods. There is no other way for the mind to handle 

a truly novel element. But true novelty is extremely rare in human 

history. Innovation happens through creative combination. The 

attacks of 9/11, for example, came as a surprise only to nonexperts. 

The more you knew about the terrorists beforehand, the more you 

expected something like 9/11. Those terrorists used past elements in 

a new combination, just as the enemy does in Afghanistan, Iraq, and 

wherever else we fight next. To defeat them, we need our officers 

to be up-to-the-minute experts in war, “conversant with all sorts of 

military possibilities,” as Patton told us. Boots on the ground, yes, 

but also brains on the ground. And brains solve problems by coup 

d’oeil. 

ENDNOTES

 1. Roger Sperry won the Nobel Prize in 1981 for his work on the two-sided 

brain, while Eric Kandel and others won it in 2000 for work that replaced the twosided model with the current view. For a review of the research that led to this 

advance, see L. Squire and E. Kandel, Memory: From Mind to Molecules, New York: 

Freeman & Co., 1999. For more general treatments of the research, see B. Gordon 

and L. Berger, Intelligent Memory, London, UK: Viking, 2003; and G. Edelman, 

Wider Than the Sky, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004. For an example 

of recent research, see M. Jung-Beeman, et al., “Neural Activity When People Solve 

Verbal Problems with Insight,” PLOS Biology, April 2004. “Intelligent memory” is 

but one of several names for the new view of the brain. Others include “recognition 

sciences” and “learning and memory.”

 2. Gordon and Berger, Intelligent Memory, pp. 8-9.

 3. R. Stickgold and M. Walker, “To Sleep, Perchance to Gain Creative Insight?” 

Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Vol. 8, No. 5, May 2004, p. 191. Stickgold and Walker 

gave two groups of subjects the same set of mathematical problems. One group 

got a sleep break halfway between. During sleep, the brains of the sleepers saw 

patterns that helped them afterward to solve the problems much faster than the 

nonsleepers did. 

 4. G. Klein, Sources of Power, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998; and Intuition at 

Work, New South Wales, Australia: Currency, 2002. Klein follows in the footsteps 

of Herbert Simon, who won the 1978 Nobel Prize in Economics for his work on 
43

expert decisionmaking. See especially H. Simon, Models of Thought, Vol. II, New 

Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989.

 5. Klein, Sources of Power, p. 125.

 6. Carl Clausewitz, On War, London,UK: Penguin, 1968 (1832), p. 141.

 7. Ibid., p. 142. For a concise scholarly essay on coup d’oeil, see K. Herbig, 

“Chance and Uncertainty in On War,” in M. Handel, Clausewitz and Modern Strategy, 

London, UK: Frank Cass Publishers, 1986. 

 8. Clausewitz, On War, p. 142.

 9. Ibid., On War, p. 143.

 10. Ibid., On War, p. 195.

 11. J. Herold, The Mind of Napoleon, New York: Columbia University Press, 1961 

(1955), p. 224. Napoleon wrote, “The principles of warfare are those which guided 

the great captains whose high deeds history has transmitted to us—Alexander, 

Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene of Savoy, Frederick the 

Great . . . The history of their 83 campaigns would constitute a complete treatise on 

the art of war . . .”

 12. Clausewitz, On War, p. 231.

 13. A War College reviewer pointed out an intriguing anomaly about coup d’oeil

in Colonel J. J. Graham’s English translation of On War. In the main discussion, in 

Book 3, Clausewitz uses the French term. In Book 8, Graham uses coup d’oeil but 

the German original appears as Überblick, which literally means over-glance and 

figuratively means overview or mental grasp: 

This facile [Überblick/coup d’oeil] of the General, this simple art of 

forming notions, this personification of the whole action of War, is so 

entirely and completely the soul of the right method of conducting War, 

that in no other but this broad way is it possible to conceive that freedom 

of the mind which is indispensable if it is to dominate events, not be 

overpowered by them.

We might wonder whether Clausewitz used Überblick as the closest German 

translation of coup d’oeil. See Clausewitz, On War, p. 366; and Carl Clausewitz, 

Vom Kriege, Bonn: Dümmlers, 1980, p. 950.

 14. See A. Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, Military Service Publishing, 1947 

(1838). For a comparison of Clausewitz and Jomini in modern strategy, see W. 

Duggan, The Art of What Works, New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003. 

 15. M. Blumenson, The Patton Papers, Vol. 2, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974, 

p. 169. For the details of Patton’s campaigns, see C. D’Este, Patton: A Genius for 

War, New York: Harpercollins, 1995. For Patton’s coup d’oeil, see “Strategy Reborn: 

Patton vs. the Planners,” in W. Duggan, Napoleon’s Glance: The Secret of Strategy, 

New York: Nation Books, 2002.

 16. D’Este, Patton, p. 94.

 17. FM 5-0, 1-1 and 1-3, citing FM 3-0.
44

 18. Ibid., 1-4.

 19. Ibid., 1-5.

 20. Ibid., 1-6.

 21. T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of 

Chicago Press, 1962, p. 122.

 22. FM 5-0, 1-19.

 23. Ibid., 1-20, 1-21.

 24. Ibid., 1-22, 1-23.

 25. See D’Este, Patton, p. 680; A. Irzyk, “Fourth Armored Division Spearhead 

at Bastogne,” World War II Magazine, Vol. 14, 1999; and Duggan, Napoleon’s Glance, 

pp. 175-181.

 26. Klein, Sources of Power, Figure 3.2, p. 27. These 4 steps are a simplified 

version of Klein’s “recognition-primed decision model.” See Figure 3 of this 

monograph. 

 27. FM 5-0, 1-24.

 28. Ibid., 1-25.

 29. Ibid., 1-31.

 30. Ibid., 1-49.

 31. Ibid., 1-59.

 32. Ibid., 1-123.

 33. Ibid., 1-87 to 1-89.

 34. Ibid., 2-1.

 35. Ibid., 2-2.

 36. Ibid., 2-24.

 37. Ibid., 2-28.

 38. Ross, et al., “The Recognition-Primed Decision Model,” Military Review, 

July-August 2004, p. 7.

 39. Klein, Sources of Power, p. 27.

 40. See R. Slater, Jack Welch and the GE Way Fieldbook, New York: McGraw-Hill, 

1999, pp. 93-99; and Duggan, The Art of What Works, pp. 183-185.

 41. J. Welch, Jack: Straight From the Gut, New York: Warner Business, 2001.

 42. R. Slater, Jack Welch and the GE Way, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998, p. 97. 

 43. See D’Este, Patton, pp. 626-630; and Duggan, Napoleon’s Glance, pp 172-

173. 

 44. FM 5-0, p. 3-1. 

 45. Ibid. 
45

 46. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 150-154. Einstein said of 

mathematics: “. . . as far as propositions of mathematics refer to reality, they are not 

certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality.” Albert Einstein, 

“Geometry and Experience,” Lecture at the Prussian Academy of Sciences, January 

27, 1921, cited in A. Einstein, Ideas and Opinions, New York: Crown, 1954, p. 233. 

 47. FM 5-0, 3-1. 

 48. Ibid., Figure 3-1. 

 49. Ibid., 3-217. 

 50. Ibid., 3-227. 

 51. See ibid., Figure E-1.

 52. See ibid., Figure 3-8.

 53. Ibid., 3-124.

 54. Ibid., 3-13.

 55. Ibid., 3-126.

 56. Ibid., 3-9.

 57. See T. Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens, New York: Harcourt, 1999.

 58. See FM 5-0, Figure 3-8. 

 59. Cited in Wolgast, “Command Decisionmaking,” p. 22. Lieutenant Colonel 

Gayler provided to the author the 101st’s revised MDMP and comments on its use 

in a personal communication.

 60. 101st Aviation Brigade, Abbreviated MDMP, p. 1.

47

APPENDIX

101st AVIATION BRIGADE ABBREVIATED MDMP

General. The Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) outlined 

in FM 101-5 is an excellent process to thoroughly flush out an 

Operations Order (OPORD) or Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) for 

a given operation/mission. The ultimate goal of the process, of 

course, is to produce an OPORD that is thorough and executable 

while giving subordinate units adequate time to analyze and 

produce their own orders. Often the time (critical resource) allocated 

to units to perform this full process is limited. Therefore, units 

must have established techniques for the production of orders in a 

time-constrained environment. Corps and Division plans sections 

are robust enough to take advantage of the full process, in most 

cases. At brigade and below, however, units must understand the 

full process, but abbreviate where able, to meet the goal of orders 

production. Units can then spend valuable time on the rehearsal 

of the operation that is critical to mission success. The abbreviated 

technique described below is used by the 101st Aviation Brigade to 

meet this requirement. 

 1. Baseline Products to Produce. Units should develop a baseline 

of products to develop as part of the orders process. Below is an 

example of the baseline products given from the 101st AVN BDE 

during an OPORD.

 • Base Order (OPORD/FRAGO)

 • Graphics

 • Execution Matrix (or Synch Matrix)

 • Concept Sketch

 • Intel Annex

 • Fire Support Annex

 • Service Support Annex

 • A2C2 Annex

 • Decision Support Graphic (Matrix) Abbreviated MDMP Table
48

Plan

Figure A1. Abbreviated MDMP Table.

The figure above describes the sequence of events in the abbreviated 

MDMP. The timeline at the bottom represents the time available to 

produce an order and the events that must be completed during the 

process. The XO establishes and drives the timeline upon mission 

receipt.

2. A Technique for the Abbreviated Process.

 A. Receive the Mission/Mission Analysis. During this process, 

each section has some specific duties and products to work. Once 

a mission is received (written or verbal), the XO alerts the staff 

(WARNORD 1). Immediately, each section begins work in their area. 

The most important piece of information to the abbreviated process 

is guidance from the commander. Guidance can be given verbally or 

with a Commander’ Guidance Worksheet (see Figure A2). 
49

Commander’s Guidance Worksheet

 

DTG: _______________

A. Commander’s Intent:

Key Tasks: _________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________

Endstate: ___________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________

B. Guidance:

Decisive Point: _____________________________________________

____________________________________________________________

Priority of Intel Collection: ___________________________________

____________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________

PIR: _______________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________

Deception: _________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________

Safety: _____________________________________________________

Risk (Areas where it is accepted: ______________________________

____________________________________________________________

(CCIR): ____________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________

COA(s) to Consider: (Most abbreviated when the commander directs a 

specific COA or some specific guidance to be addressed in each COA)

____________________________________________________________

Criteria to use (defined): _____________________________________

____________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________

Time Plan/Type Order/Type Rehearsal:

Figure A2.
50

 • The S3 begins to develop a sense of timing actions and events 

by transferring tasks from higher’s order to a Synch Matrix 

(see Figure A3). This is a useful tool to “see” the relationship 

of events-to-time during the operation. In doing this, the S3 

is simultaneously conducting his/her own mission analysis. 

The synch matrix helps the S3 plan for which elements must 

begin movement in order to support a directed task, i.e., FARP 

movement, CL III/V resupply, reconnaissance movement, etc. 

Additionally, the S3 can see all assets available for an operation 

that expedites the development of courses of action.

SYNCH MATRIX

Time

Enemy Action

Decision Points

M

A

N

E

U

V

E

R

Air Defense

Fire Support

Engineer

INTEL

C

S

S

MAN

ARM

FIX

FUEL

MOVE

SUSTAIN

C2

Figure A3.

 • The PLEX planners begin their mission analysis and start the 

products for the brief to the commander. Depending upon 

time available, the planners may use the Mission-Analysis 

Cut Sheet (see Figure A4) which has the entire briefing on one 

sheet of paper or put the information into a formal briefing 

format to present to the commander. Use the cut sheet when 

the commander desires a simple desk-side briefing.
51

Mission Analysis Cut Sheet

Mission Analysis Cut Sheet

Mission/OPORD 

Tasks ASSETS

1-101st (24 x AH-64D)

2-101st (24 x AH-64D)

3-101st (24 x AH-64A)

2/17 CAV (24 x OH58KW)

6-101st (24 x UH-60)

FACTS CCIR

SPECIFIED PIR

IMPLIED CONSTRAINTS ASSUMPTIONS EEFI

ESSENTIAL FFIR

OTHER INSTRUCTIONS: (TENTATIVE DPS)

RESTATED MISSION: RECOMMENDED TIMELINE:

Figure A4.

 • The S2 begins the IPB or continues the IPB (should be 

continuous). The S2 works closely with the S3 and TACOPS 

section to develop what the enemy looks like in the form of a 

Situational Template (SITEMP). Define the enemy in terms of 

location, disposition, composition, capabilities, and tactics. 

The S2 begins the formation of the collection plan to either task 

or request coverage from higher (in most cases, the brigade 

requests coverage. Aviation brigades do not have assets to 

dedicate to collection). 
52

 • The TACOPS section begins the development of LZ or OBJ 

sketches (Falcon View photo with graphics). Once developed, 

the TACOPS section reviews the ATO and SPINS for mission 

data (routes, A2C2 data).

 • The S4 and S1 continue their staff estimates and provide 

input to the Mission Analysis Briefing in the form of facts, 

assumptions, and constraints. 

 • SIGO continues staff estimates to determine assets available 

and options to support developed courses of action.

 • FSO continues staff estimate to determine assets available and 

options to support developed courses of action.

 • **Results of Mission Analysis are produced as WARNORD 2 

to subordinate units.

 B. COA Development/Analysis/Decision. Often the Commander will direct one or two specific courses of action (COA) in 

the abbreviated process. This Commander’s Guidance is critical to 

making the best use of time.

 • The S3 and PLEX draft out COAs to refine using a COA 

Worksheet (see Figure A5). Key differences in a COA in 

aviation units are: continuous, phased, or max destruction; 

size of reserve force; location of the FARP; use of USAF or 

Joint assets; planned artillery usage; and task organization. 

PLEX will sketch out the COA as the S3 assigns Task and 

Purpose to each element; then draft a COA Statement. When 

developing the COA, use the technique of Vision . . . What 

does the enemy look like (SITEMP)? What do we want him 

to look like? How do we make him look that way (assets 

available)?

 • The S2 will develop, with the S3, the collection plan to support 

each COA. To accomplish this, the S2 develops a series of 

NAIs, TAIs, and DPs to support the escalation of Readiness 

Conditions (REDCON) to meet the desired end-state. Once 

developed, these collection requirements are forwarded to 

higher headquarters for inclusion in the overall collection 

plan. Decision points come in three forms:
53

 — Triggers. These events on the battlefield cause an immediate 

action. They do not require the commander to truly make a 

decision; the decision has already been made. Example: 20 

armored vehicles pass NAI 402 (DP 1) moving South into 

EA SMASH [launch lead attack battalion along ROUTE 

ORION to EA SMASH].

 — Friendly Success. These events are planned as sequels. 

What options do we have available if the first contact is 

successful and there is an opportunity to exploit more 

success? Example: initial attack destroys all ADA in EA 

SMASH and the enemy is pulling out in a mass retrograde. 

Decision to launch additional assets into objective area to 

exploit. Should be in the form of a “be prepared task” to a 

subordinate unit.

 — Friendly Failure. These events are planned as branches. 

What options exist to reinforce a unit to cause a successful 

outcome? Example: lead element unsuccessful in the 

destruction of the ADA in EA SMASH. Launch second 

element to ensure the destruction. Again, should be in the 

form of a “be prepared task.”

 • The FSO and TACOPS sections refine the A2C2 and SEAD 

planning to support each COA.

 • The SIGO coordinates C2 options for each COA.

 • S4 and S1 continue to refine their staff estimates.
54

COA WORKSHEET

Mission: Intent:

Statement:

Unit:

Task:

Purpose:

Unit:

Task:

Purpose:

Unit:

Task:

Purpose:

Unit:

Task:

Purpose:

Unit:

Task:

Purpose:

Unit:

Task:

Purpose:

Task 

Organization:

Fighter Management: Employment 

Technique:

 Cont./ Phase / Max

Figure A5.
55

 • The staff then wargames each specific COA to determine 

which is best suited for the mission. Decision criteria will be 

developed for each mission separately. If time is critical, use 

a Wargame Worksheet (see Figure A6) and save the detailed 

war-game until the final COA approval by the commander. 

Then, synch it out in detail. Avoid getting into the weeds 

during the war-game. Limit the war-game to the critical 

events identified in the synch matrix developed in step one.

WARGAME WORKSHEET

Event Action Reaction Counter-action BPT/Coord Instr. DPs

1

2

3

4

5

6

1. Critical events are taken from the synch matrix. Only use 2-3 events, unless you are given a 

directed COA.

2. Wargame worksheet aids in the development of CCIR.

Figure A6.

 • The true value of the war-game is to determine any “Be 

Prepared Tasks,” “Coordinating Instructions,” or “Decision 

Points” for the operation. These will become apparent during 

the Action, Reaction, and Counteraction approach to the wargame and be captured on a Decision Support Graphic (Matrix) 

(see Figure A7).
56

DECISION SUPPORT GRAPHIC (MATRIX)

DP Est. 

Time

Event NAI CCIR Action

Figure A7.

 • The PLEX planner will simultaneously draft the formal base 

order during the COA process. This will expedite the orders 

production process.

 • Once a COA is approved the staff publishes WARNORD 3 to 

subordinate units.
57

 C. Orders Production. Each staff section has responsibility to 

complete their respective sections of the OPORD/FRAGO. Under 

the supervision of the XO, the order is finalized and preparations for 

the briefing begin. At a minimum, the following will be set up for the 

briefing:

 • Map with graphics

 • Agenda

 • Copies of OPORD with all annexes

 • Proxima with computer to run the OPORD slides to aid in the 

briefing 

 • (When possible) Blow up maps/photos of LZ and OBJ areas.

 D. Confirmation Briefs and Rehearsals. Immediately following 

the OPORD briefing, subordinate commanders will give the 

Commander a confirmation brief. 

 • A confirmation brief is simply an azimuth check to let 

the Commander know that each subordinate commander 

understands the essential tasks given to them. Subordinate 

commanders also can relay their expected combat power 

at time of execution, and pass on any issues they may have 

with the plan. Upon completion of the confirmation brief, 

subordinate units will begin/continue to work on their orders 

process.

 • A back brief is given to the commander to relay subordinate 

units’ concept of the operation and usually is given to the 

commander prior to the rehearsal. This allows sufficient 

time to adjust any plan prior to rehearsing it. Back brief 

format follows the COA Worksheet (Figure A5) format: task 

organization, mission, intent, concept of maneuver/support/

C2, fighter management cycle.

 • The most important event in the orders process is the 

rehearsal. This is where the entire plan can be orchestrated 

with the actual elements performing the mission. The goal of 

an abbreviated MDMP is to offer as much time as possible for 

subordinates to conduct an effective rehearsal. An effective 

Rehearsal Agenda (see Figure A8) follows the outline below: 
58

• Roll Call – (BDE CDR, S3, S2, FSO, SIGO, BN CDRs, S3s, FSOs, CO CDRs)

• GPS Time Hack

• Terrain Model Orientation

• Friendly Ops Update 

• Weather Update

• Intel Update 

• Mission 

• Intent

• Initial Set for Combat

• Fires

• Critical Events

• Rehearsal

• Issues

• Cdr’s Comments

Figure A8. Rehearsal Agenda.

 The Execution Matrix is shown at Figure A9.

Critical Events

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

Contingencies

- 

- 

- 

- 

-
59

TIME H-HOUR

LOCAL

X-FLOT

EN ENEMY CCIR

PIR

DP(s)

INTEL

JSTARS

UAV

ELINT

HUMINT

Q-36/37

MANEUVER

2/17 CAV

1-101

2-101

3-101

6-101

CODEWORDS

T/O

SP

PP/FLOT

RP

ABF(s)

SET COLD

SET HOT

10 MIN

EGRESS

SP

PP/FLOT

RP

FARP

FSCM

FSCL

CFL

NFA

 ADA ADA A2C2

INGRESS

EGRESS

ROZ

FIRES

FS EVENT

EA-6B

F-16 C/J

CAS

AI

ATACMS

C2

TAC

TOC

C2 ACFT

ABCCC

CSS

DPP/EAE

DART

FARP

FARP

Figure A9. Executive Matrix.