LEARNING FROM THE STONES:

A GO APPROACH TO

MASTERING CHINA’S STRATEGIC CONCEPT, SHI

David Lai

May 2004
ii

*****

The author sincerely thanks Eric E. Fox, Lt Colonel USAF, for coining the title 

of this study—Learning from the Stones.

*****

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not 

necessarily refl ect the offi cial policy or position of the Department of the Air Force, 

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 

This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded 

to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes 

Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of this report may be obtained from the 

Publications Offi ce by calling (717) 245-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or by e-mail at 

Rita.Rummel@carlisle.army.mil

*****

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs are available on the SSI 

Homepage for electronic dissemination. SSI’s Homepage address is: http://

www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/

*****

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update 

the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and 

forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. 

Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research 

analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please let us know by 

e-mail at outreach@carlisle.army.mil or by calling (717) 245-3133.

ISBN 1-58487-158-X
iii

FOREWORD

Most of the ideas that form of the foundation of American 

defense policy and military strategy today were once new and 

untested concepts at the far edge of strategic thought. It took 

thinkers of vision and creativity to give them life and refi ne them to 

the point they could be adopted by the defense community and used 

for strategy and force development. This is a never ending process: 

new strategic concepts constantly emerge, some fade away, a few 

pass the tests of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability and make it 

into the mainstream.

To help with this process of identifying those new and untested 

strategic concepts that merit further examination, the Strategic 

Studies Institute is publishing a special series called “Advancing 

Strategic Thought.” This provides a venue--a safe haven--for 

creative, innovative, and experimental thinking about national 

security policy and military strategy.

The following study by David Lai is the inaugural publication 

in the Advancing Strategic Thought Series. In it, Dr. Lai uses the 

ancient game of Go as a metaphor for the Chinese approach to 

strategy. He shows that this is very different than the linear method 

that underlies American strategy. By better understanding Go, 

Lai argues, American strategists could better understand Chinese 

strategy.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offi cer this unique 

and creative analysis as part of the Advancing Strategic Thought 

Series.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

DAVID LAI is on the faculty of the U.S. Air War College. He earned 

his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Colorado in 

1997. Prior to his graduate study at the University of Colorado, Lai 

was a diplomat in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Dr. Lai’s 

teaching and research interests are in international relations theory, 

war and peace studies, comparative foreign policy, Asian security 

affairs, and Chinese politics. He has published widely in his teaching 

and research subject areas and is currently writing on issues related 

to the China-Taiwan question, U.S.-Asian relations, and Chinese 

strategic thinking.
v

SUMMARY

Most U.S. political and military leaders are aware of the difference 

in strategic thinking and international behavior between the United 

States and China. Many have also studied Sun Tzu’s Art of War and 

can recite the Chinese master strategist’s famous saying: “Know 

the enemy and know yourself, in a hundred battles you will never 

be in peril.” However, few really understand the essence of the 

difference. 

The author introduces a new approach to learning about the 

different ways of strategic thinking and interaction in Chinese 

culture. It is through learning the Chinese board game called go. This 

game is a living refl ection of Chinese philosophy, culture, strategic 

thinking, warfare, military tactics, and diplomatic bargaining. The 

author also sheds light on the remarkable connection between go

and the strategic concepts in Sun Tzu’s Art of War.

A modest claim is made in this writing that a little knowledge of 

go will take U.S. leaders a long way in understanding the essence of 

the Chinese way of war and diplomacy.

1

LEARNING FROM THE STONES:

A GO APPROACH TO MASTERING CHINA’S 

STRATEGIC CONCEPT, SHI

In its July 2002 report to Congress, the China Security Review 

Commission states, “Chinese strategic thinking and military planning 

differ markedly from our own, underscoring the need to study such 

differences more carefully.” The report also warns “the possibilities 

of miscalculation, miscommunication, and misunderstanding are 

high, given the substantial differences in each country’s thinking 

and planning, and require far more attention from U.S. policymakers 

and the Congress.”1

Coincidentally the Department of Defense (DoD) also released 

its annual report on Chinese military power in July 2002. The 

Pentagon report calls attention to several knowledge gaps in the 

U.S. understanding of China’s strategic thinking. Particularly, it 

mentions a concept, shi, putatively a strategy China uses to exploit 

the “strategic confi guration of power” to its advantage and maximize 

its ability to preserve its national independence and develop its 

comprehensive national power. The Pentagon report notes: 

There is no Western equivalent to the concept of “shi.” Chinese linguists 

explain it as “the alignment of forces,” the “propensity of things,” or the 

“potential born of disposition,” that only a skilled strategist can exploit 

to ensure victory over a superior force. Similarly, only a sophisticated 

assessment by an adversary can recognize the potential exploitation of 

“shi.” 2

Indeed, shi is such an important concept that Sun Tzu, the Chinese 

grand master of military strategy, uses it for the title of a chapter in 

his Art of War Art of War, the world’s oldest military treasure. , the world’s oldest military treasure.3 In this chapter, 

Sun Tzu has discussed four key aspects of shi. First, it is the idea of 

qi and zheng. Zheng is the regular way of doing things, or in military 

terms, the regular order of battle. A commander deploys troops in 

regular (zheng) ways. However, the commander must mobilize his 

troops to engage the enemy in extraordinary (qi) ways. Zheng is, in 

essence, a given. It is open knowledge to friends and foes. Yet qi is a 
2

variable and its variation inexhaustible. The second aspect of shi is 

about creating an overwhelming force with irresistible unleashing 

power (a grindstone against eggs, and the strike of a hawk at its prey). 

The third aspect of shi is about developing a favorable situation with 

great potential to achieve the political objectives. Finally, shi is about 

taking and maintaining the initiative. As Sun Tzu puts it, “those 

skilled at making the enemy move do so by creating a situation to 

which he must conform.”

These aspects of shi are also found in Sun Tzu’s discussion of 

other key concepts in the Art of War Art of War such as deception, stratagem, such as deception, stratagem, 

intelligence, deterrence, and so on. Sun Tzu maintains that these 

key concepts are vital to victory; one must study and master them 

during peacetime; and it will be too late to consult experts (books or 

specialists) when grave occasions arise. In essence, Sun Tzu suggests 

that national leaders, political and military alike, make strategic 

thinking and employment of tactical skills part of their second 

nature. 

How does one nurture this second nature? Learning and practice 

are the ways to go. The author offers a new approach to learn 

and practice Sun Tzu’s strategic and operational ideas—through 

learning the game of go.

4 Go is of Chinese origin and is the world’s 

oldest board game, yet still remarkably popular and viable. It is 

probably the most sophisticated game as well. This game bears 

striking resemblance to the Chinese way of war and diplomacy. Its 

concepts and tactics are living refl ections of Chinese philosophy, 

strategic thinking, stratagems, and tactical interactions. This game, 

in turn, infl uences the way Chinese think and act. This work brings 

to light another important feature of this game—its connection to the 

Chinese military classics. The four key aspects of shi in Sun Tzu’s Art 

of War are also guiding principles of go. 

In the American culture, many liken the American way of war 

and diplomacy to the games of chess (power-based fi ght), poker 

(bluffi ng and risk-taking), boxing (force on force), and American 

football (in many ways, resembles the American war machine). The 

game of go is different from chess, poker, boxing, and American 

football in many key aspects. While the American way of war has its 

strengths, a little knowledge and experience of the game of go will be 
3

a valuable addition to the American political and military wisdom; 

and it will take U.S. political and military leaders a long way in 

understanding the Chinese way of war and diplomacy. 

CHINESE WAY OF WAR AND DIPLOMACY

A popular saying in the Chinese diplomatic and defense 

communities is about the Chinese way of war and diplomacy and 

its difference to that of the West: Chinese place heavy emphasis 

on strategy and stratagems whereas the West relies more on 

overwhelming force and advanced capability. By many accounts, 

this is an accurate characterization. The Chinese even go so far to call 

China the birthplace of stratagems. After all, China has the world’s 

fi rst comprehensive military classic, the Art of War, and the largest , and the largest 

number of ancient military writings. While these military writings 

address many aspects of military affairs, they all emphasize strategy 

and stratagems. 

Among these military classics, Sun Tzu’s Art of War is 

undoubtedly the epitome of the Chinese way of war and diplomacy. 

In this work, Sun Tzu expounds on many key thoughts on warfare 

and the conduct of war. Three of them are of great signifi cance: a 

broad conception of the art of war, an emphasis on strategy and 

stratagem, and a dialectic view on the way to fi ght.

In the Art of War Art of War, Sun Tzu treats the political, diplomatic, and , Sun Tzu treats the political, diplomatic, and 

logistical preparation for war, war fi ghting, and the handling of the 

aftermath of war as integral parts of the art of war. In this broad 

framework, the art of war is, in essence, the process of diplomacy; 

war fi ghting is only diplomacy by other means. 

Sun Tzu’s emphasis on strategy and stratagems follows from his 

prudent view on war—it is a vital matter of the state, survival or ruin. 

Sun Tzu is especially cautious on the cost of war—while waging war 

can advance a state’s interest, it can bring a state disaster as well. As 

an old Chinese saying goes, when you kill 10,000 enemy soldiers, 

you are likely to lose 3,000 lives as well. Hence, as Sun Tzu puts it, a 

farsighted ruler thinks about warfare carefully; a good commander 

exploits the art of war fully; if there is no benefi t, advantage, or real 

danger, a state must not set the war machine in motion. “Thus those 
4

unable to understand the dangers inherent in employing troops 

are equally unable to understand the advantageous ways of doing 

so.” Preserving the vital interest of a state without the use of force 

therefore is the fi rst principle in Sun Tzu’s Art of War. To achieve 

this goal, Sun Tzu places great emphasis on strategy and stratagems. 

Thus in the Art of War Art of War, Sun Tzu treats warfare, from its preparation to , Sun Tzu treats warfare, from its preparation to 

execution and termination as fi rst and foremost a contest of wisdom. 

Use of force is secondary. From Sun Tzu’s perspective, a winning 

side uses force to consolidate assured victory, whereas a losing side 

uses force only to make a gamble or a desperate attempt for survival, 

neither of which is a good strategy of war.

Adding complexity to the battle of wits is Sun Tzu’s remarkably 

sophisticated dialectic view on nature, warfare, strategy, and 

stratagem. The Art of War Art of War is full of observations about the dialectic is full of observations about the dialectic 

nature of strategic concepts such as weak vs. strong, more vs. few, 

defense vs. offense, regular vs. extraordinary (qi and zheng), direct vs. 

indirect, division vs. unity, laboring vs. resting, advance vs. retreat, 

far vs. near, and the relativity and mutual transformation of these 

strategic situations. Sun Tzu’s teaching is to exploit the opposite of 

the enemy’s strategy and action. 

Therefore, when capable, feign incapacity; when active, inactivity. When 

near, make it appear that you are far away; when far away, that you 

are near. Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike 

him. When he concentrates, prepare against him; where he is strong, 

avoid him. Anger his general and confuse him. Pretend inferiority and 

encourage his arrogance. Keep him under stress and wear him down. 

When he is united, divide him. Attack when he is unprepared; sally out 

when he does not expect you. 

Sun Tzu’s dialectic views are in complete harmony with the 

philosophies of Yin and Yang and Daoism. Sun Tzu and Lao Tzu, 

the intellect of the Daoist School of thought, particularly liken the 

character of the military and the way of war and diplomacy to the 

fl ow of water. Water is perhaps the best example of the dialectic 

nature of things. It has no constant shape. There is nothing softer 

and weaker than water, yet nothing is more penetrating and capable 

of attacking the hard and strong. The fl ow of water, carrying with it 

the shi, can wash away anything standing in its way. 
5

With over 2,000 years of infl uence from Sun Tzu’s teaching, 

along with the infl uence of other signifi cant philosophical and 

military writings, the Chinese are particularly comfortable with 

viewing war and diplomacy in comprehensive and dialectic ways 

and acting accordingly. Indeed, many of these observations have 

become proverbial components of the Chinese way of war and 

diplomacy. The most notable ones are bing yi zha li (war is based on 

deception), shang-bing fa-mou (supreme importance in war is to attack 

the enemy’s strategy), qi-zheng xiang-sheng (mutual reproduction of 

regular and extraordinary forces and tactics), chu-qi zhi-sheng (win 

through unexpected moves), yin-di zhi-sheng (gain victory by varying 

one’s strategy and tactics according to the enemy’s situation), yi-rou 

ke-gang (use the soft and gentle to overcome the hard and strong), bishi ji-xu (stay clear of the enemy’s main force and strike at his weak 

point), yi-yu wei-zhi (to make the devious route the most direct), 

hou-fa zhi-ren (fi ght back and gain the upper hand only after the 

enemy has initiated fi ghting), sheng-dong ji-xi (make a feint to the 

east but attack in the west), and so on. All of these special Chinese 

four-character proverbs are strategic and dialectic in nature. All bear 

some character of fl owing water. 

This Chinese way of war and diplomacy is in striking difference 

to the Western way of war from ancient Greece to the United States 

today. In the Western tradition, there is a heavy emphasis on the use 

of force; the art of war is largely limited to the battlefi elds; and the 

way to fi ght is force on force. As one observer puts it, “the Greeks 

developed what has been called the Western way of war―a collision 

of soldiers on an open plain in a magnifi cent display of courage, 

skill, physical prowess, honor, and fair play, and a concomitant 

repugnance for decoy, ambush, sneak attacks, and the involvement 

of noncombatants.” With respect to stratagem, Alexander the Great 

said, when he was advised to launch a surprise night attack against 

the Persians: 

The policy which you are suggesting is one of bandits and thieves, the 

only purpose of which is deception. I cannot allow my glory always to 

be diminished by Darius’ absence, or by narrow terrain, or by tricks of 

night. I am resolved to attack openly and by daylight. I choose to regret 

my good fortune rather than be ashamed of my victory.5
6

The Western way of war fi nds its comprehensive theoretical 

expressions in the Western military classics of Carl von Clausewitz 

and Baron Antoine-Henri de Jomini. It has also made its impressive 

footprints in battlefi elds throughout the ages and across the globe. 

Today, the American way of war has become a more popular term 

for the Western way of war. As described by military historian 

Russell F. Weigley, the American way of war uses massive power, 

excels in advanced technology, and pursues total victory.6 Backed 

by U.S. mighty military power, the American way of war has put 

on impressive shows in wars in Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, and 

Afghanistan. In the most recent war on Iraq, the 2003 Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM, the United States used a “leaner force” (smaller 

in number as compared to the massive buildup against Iraq in 1991), 

yet faster in maneuver, armed with sharper precision fi repower, 

and advanced with surprise attacks. Some observers call this 

revolution in the Western way of war.7 However, one can see that 

the fundamentals of the Western way of war remain unaltered. The 

revolution has only made it more powerful. 

Comparing the Chinese and Western ways of war and diplomacy, 

one cannot but wonder which one is better. The Chinese believe their 

strategic traditions are superior to those of the West, both ethically 

and effectively. Chinese strategists tend to stress the signfi icance 

of culture and end up stereotyping U.S. and Western ways of war.8

While a good answer to this question is diffi cult to qualify, one has 

to see that the West has dominated world politics with its superior 

comprehensive power over several centuries. The Chinese are aware 

of this fact. They also understand that without solid and credible 

capability, the play of strategy is empty. That is why the Chinese are 

so determined to develop China’s comprehensive national power. 

That said, one must see that while the Chinese are doing their 

homework (developing their capabilities), the West should spend 

some time learning about Chinese strategic thought and stratagem 

skills. As Sun Tzu puts it, “know your opponent and know yourself, 

in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.” 
7

LESSONS FROM THE GAME OF GO

In many ways, the game of go resembles the Chinese way of war 

and diplomacy. This game has its origin in China about 4,000 years 

ago and is the oldest board game in the world. The original Chinese 

name of this game is called weiqi (pronounced wei ch’i); literally, 

encircling territory, an essential component of a nation state. Two 

players compete for territories. The one who acquires more wins. 

The game board is conceived to be the earth (back in ancient times, 

people believed the earth was fl at and square). The board is square, 

representing stability (See Figure 1). The four corners represent the 

four seasons, indicating the cyclical change of time. The game pieces, 

the stones, are round, hence mobile. The spread of stones on the 

board refl ect activities on earth. The shape of the stone engagements 

on the board is like the fl ow of water, an echo in Sun Tzu’s view 

that the positioning of troops be likened to water: “as water varies 

its fl ow according to the fall of the land, a military varies its method 

of gaining victory according to the enemy situations.” Sun Tzu also 

uses stones to describe military affairs: rolling boulders create shi.

The two players take turns to place black and white stones on 

the intersections (but not the open squares) of a 19 x 19 line matrix, 

one piece at a time. The black and white stones engage with one 

another in the game, exemplifying the concept of yin and yang and 

penetrating each other’s territories as the fl ow of water. 

Figure 1.
8

The stones have equal physical power (there is no almighty 

queen or little pawn as in chess), resembling the relatively equal 

physical size of individuals. Yet the importance and potential of 

the stones in the game are beyond imagination, resembling the 

boundless creativity of human individuals. Even a super computer 

today cannot map out their alternatives. Of note here is that in 

1997, the IBM super computer Deep Blue fi nally defeated the chess 

grand master Garry Kasparov. Yet at the celebration ceremony, the 

designers of Deep Blue also admitted that they could not write a 

program to beat even a mediocre go player, not any time soon. 

The game of go starts with the game board completely open. This 

special design allows for creative strategic thinking and interaction. 

By game rule, the one who plays Black goes fi rst. Once played, the 

stones stay in place unless captured and removed by the opposing 

player. The game will become more complicated as the two players 

put more stones on the board (unlike chess, where the further the 

game goes, the fewer pieces on the board, hence simpler). 

The basic objective of the game is to secure more space on the 

board (or more territory). The players do so by encircling more 

space on the board. The competition for more territory thus leads to 

invasion, engagement, confrontation, and war fi ghting. Sun Tzu’s 

thoughts and the essential features of the Chinese way of war are all 

played out in the game. As the game unfolds, it becomes a war with 

multiple campaigns and battlefronts. Or in terms of international 

affairs, it is a competition between two nations over multiple interest 

areas. 

Figure 2 shows the initial fi ve moves of a game between two 

Chinese professional players.9 In the game of go, the fi rst 50-

some moves are called the opening-stage moves. At this point, 

players develop their strategic plans, adjusting constantly to the 

new situation created by the opponent’s countermoves. Strategic 

moves, diplomatic posturing, and testing each other’s waters are 

the hallmarks of the opening of the game. These early moves set the 

stage for the entire game, affecting the battles and campaigns 50 to a 

100 moves later and throughout the game (long-term and calculated 

strategy is a key aspect of this game). 
9

Figure 2.

Black 3 and 5 have created a fi rm command of the corner, 

securing a “theater” in the lower right side of the war plain. Working 

in concert with Black 1 at the top, the three black stones make a large 

claim of “sphere of infl uence” on the right side of the board. 

White must respond to Black’s claim. But at this early stage with 

only a few stones on the board, it is diffi cult to locate the “center 

of gravity” or “decisive point” (in Clausewitz and Jomini’s terms, 

respectively). Sun Tzu’s teaching to attack your opponent’s strategy 

comes into play. In Figure 3 we see that White immediately placed 

stone 6 on the board to counter Black’s posturing. White 6 instantly 

changed the strategic outlook on the board. The three white stones in 

turn have made a much larger claim of sphere of infl uence on the 

left-hand side. Both players have tried to develop an advantageous 

situation that is consistent with Sun Tzu’s third aspect of shi.

Black did not let White’s claim stay long. Black 7 struck deep 

into White’s claimed sphere of infl uence. It went also as an attack on 

White’s strategy (Sun Tzu’s teaching), interrupting White’s strategic 

outlook instantly (Figure 4). 
10

Figure 3.

Figure 4.
11

Black 7, however, is a very subtle move. It engages White 4 but 

does not pose a life-threatening situation to White. It is in White’s 

claimed sphere of infl uence but keeps an arm’s length from White 4. 

At its position, Black 7’s strategic potentials are open to imagination. 

This is a move of long-term and calculated strategic interest. 

Black 7 is a typical go-style engagement, one that serves to 

test White’s intention (whether White wants to keep the corner 

or compete for the center). It is also characteristic of the Chinese 

calculated strategic thinking and behavior. One Chinese act in the 

1960s is a good example. During the 1960s, China made much effort 

to solicit African support for its quest to become a member of the 

United Nations (UN) (African countries formed a large voting block 

at the UN General Assembly). One of the Chinese efforts was to 

build sports stadiums in many African countries. This seemingly 

unconnected act went a long way to help China get the African votes 

at the UN (China won the fi ght and became a UN member in 1971). 

The thought and play on Black 7, however, is rather 

uncharacteristic of American mindset and behavior. Generally, 

Americans are more straightforward. When Americans take action, 

they expect immediate return. U.S. policy toward North Korea, 

for instance, emphasizes reciprocity. Because quick and desirable 

response from North Korea is diffi cult to obtain, U.S. decision

makers often feel frustrated and tend to see their policy as a failure. 

South Korea, however, pursues a Sunshine policy toward the North. 

This policy takes its title from an Aesop fable about “The Sun and 

the Wind.”10 It counts on long-term and gradual efforts to promote 

change in North Korea. Americans, not surprisingly, have no 

patience for such a policy. South Korean leaders in the last several 

years have been calling on the United States to show more patience 

and understanding towards their Sunshine policy. Unfortunately, 

both are in short supply on the American side. 

A play like Black 7, which promises no immediate and concrete 

response from White, is diffi cult for Americans to make. But this game 

offers Americans the opportunity to nurture such sensibilities.

In Figure 5 we see that the two players have exchanged a few 

directly engaged moves. These are standard moves in a situation like 

this (in Sun Tzu’s terms, they are regular engagements, zheng moves; 

and in go, they are, joseki). 
12

Figure 5.

Consistent with the subtle thought on Black 7, these early 

engagements are not for the kill, but a testing of the other’s reaction 

and intention. White reinforced his hold on the corner. Black took 

an outward posturing. The two players exchanged messages: White 

went after tangible interest (territory) in the corner; Black created a 

shi to pursue interest in the center.

This is also a “live and let live” play. Both are satisfi ed with the 

outcome. There has been much writing in Japan about this kind 

of engagement. The Japanese compare this engagement to the 

competition for market share between fi rms.11 In go, as well as in 

business, it is diffi cult to have all the gains and profi ts. Although 

there is a natural tendency for one to seek landslide victory, a player 

should guard against this temptation and be prepared to settle with 

a win-win outcome. Overly aggressive usually leads to disaster.

Black troops 7, 9, and 13 have formed a creative stronghold. This 

group of three has room to make a secure base along the left-hand 

side, making this group invincible and able to expand into the center 

(a good implementation of Sun Tzu’s strategy: you must fi rst make 

yourself invincible and then wait for the enemy to show signs of 

vulnerability and launch an attack from your secured base).
13

Black 11 took the initiative to engage White 2 on the upper lefthand corner. Now the reader should look at the overall situation as 

shown in Figure 5 (looking at the whole picture is a typical Chinese 

way of assessment). Black’s strategic design is clearly on the center 

and the right side of the war plain. The four groups of Black stones 

stand in dynamic echoing positions. A promising strategic design is 

taking shape. Yet it is still premature for Black to celebrate victory 

at this moment. Indeed, White is waiting for every turn to frustrate 

Black’s strategy. The two white stones 2 and 12 are already eyeing 

the open area in the center. White 6 at the bottom occupies a critical 

strategic position. It keeps White’s reach into the center wide open. 

This is a critical countermeasure White made at the early stage of 

the game against Black’s strategic design. Its potential grows as the 

game unfolds.

At this point, one can say that the two players score fairly in 

their opening-stage strategic designs. Black has a secured corner 

on the lower right-hand side. White’s countermeasure is a similar 

sized corner on the lower left-hand side. White 2 and 12 hold part 

of the upper left-hand corner. Black 11 is waiting for the right 

moment to penetrate into the corner. Therefore it is a shared claim 

on the upper left-hand side. On the upper right-hand corner, Black 

1 occupies a key strategic position. However, there are wide-open 

areas on its two sides, making Black’s claims vulnerable to challenge 

from White. During go games, players constantly make this kind of 

assessment till the end. 

Figure 6 shows a well-matched engagement between the two 

players. White 14 has strengthened White 6’s strategic claim at the 

bottom and reinforced White’s determination to compete for the 

center (or to frustrate Black’s strategy for the center). At the upper 

right-hand side theater, White has successfully made an invasion 

deep into Black’s claimed area. Black fought back and effectively 

separated the white troops into two unconnected groups, while 

securing its hold on the corner. This is a perfect example of divide 

and rule, another key feature of go. The two white groups have room 

to maneuver and secure a foothold for survival locally. However, at 

this moment, they are still vulnerable to attacks from Black.
14

Figure 6.

Of note is another key feature in the game of go―the relativity of 

offense and defense. In Figure 6, while the three Black groups focus 

on attacking the two White groups, from the left, in the middle, and 

from the right, the three Black stones at the top (11, 17, and 27) are 

under a pincer attack from the White groups on their left and right. 

Who is attacking whom? It is a matter of perspective. 

In Figure 7 we see the battle over the fate of the White groups at 

the top turned bloody. The line of Black troops 21, 43, 45, 53, 49, 39, 

and 57 threatens the survival of the White group. The battle hinges 

upon a fi ght over a ko at the intersection of M-14. 

Ko is a unique feature. There is no equivalent in other board 

games. Here is how it comes about and affects the course of the 

game. The last move on the board is Black’s 57. This play removed 

a White stone from the intersection M-14. By playing this move, 

Black 57 immediately fi nds itself surrounded tightly by the three 

White stones 42, 44, and 46. White can recapture the intersection by 

removing Black 57. However, this recapturing will then result in an 

endless play of capture and recapture between the two players. To 

avoid such a vicious circling play, go creates the concept of ko and 

sets a rule that White cannot immediately recapture Black 57, but 

must make a move elsewhere and give Black a chance to decide if 

1) he wants to close the ko by fi lling the intersection with another 
15

Figure 7.

black stone, or 2) if he wants to respond to White’s move elsewhere, 

allowing White to recapture the ko at the next move. In fi ghting for 

the ko, a player’s move elsewhere is always a threat to the opponent’s 

other battle group or territory bigger or equal to the one under siege 

in the ko. As such, the opponent is compelled to respond to the threat, 

unwillingly allowing the player to recapture the ko. The threats are 

explicit and measurable. It is a fair bargaining game.

This aspect of ko can shed some light on the U.S. failure to get 

China to come to terms with the U.S. demand on changes in China’s 

human rights conduct in order to have its most-favored nation 

(MFN) trade status continued during the 1990s. Three problems 

made the U.S. threat a failure. First, human rights conduct covers a 

wide range of issues. It was diffi cult to single out changes and relate 

the cost of failing to make such changes to the cost of losing MFN. 

Second, and making the all-encompassing concept of human rights 

conduct worse, the United States kept moving the goal post; that 

is, the changes it wanted China to make. Finally, a termination of 

MFN cut both ways―China and the United States were both losers if 

MFN was discontinued. The ko in this case was not well-established. 

The result was that the United States continued to make ill-defi ned 

threats; China continued to show defi ance; and the MFN continued 
16

to be renewed every year.

The ko in Figure 7 is well-established. The stakes are clear and 

high for White. In winning the ko, Black would capture the entire 

White group on the upper side, turning the huge upper side into 

Black territory. Black could then easily expand this victory into the 

center. White would have to throw in the towel and concede defeat. 

For White, this ko is a life and death situation, a must-win fi ght. 

In Figure 8 we see that White played 58 at the top, a move that 

threatens the two Black stones 51 and 27. Black responded with 59, 

keeping the two White stones under Black’s control. If Black does 

not respond to White’s threat (White 58) but chooses to close the ko, 

White will capture the two Black stones 51 and 27. This result will 

allow White to make a secured garrison at the upper side. If this 

scenario happens, the Black stones to the left of the White garrison, 

Black 11, 55, and 17, will be in danger. This is clearly not Black’s 

intent to start this ko―Black wanted to profi t from this bargaining.

After the exchange between 58 and 59, White turned around to 

recapture the ko by removing Black 57 and placing White 60 into 

the intersection. It is now Black’s turn to make a move elsewhere 

to continue this ko. In Figure 9 we see that Black played 61 (close to 

the edge on the right). White did not respond to Black’s threat to the 

White group on the right, but chose to eliminate the ko by playing 

64 at the top to remove the two Black stones 45 and 53. In so doing, 

White has saved the White group at the top and gained a passage to 

the center through White stone 60 (resembling a canal). The White 

troops 42, 44, and 46 are now free of the death threat and are ready 

to fi ght in concert with the White troops at the bottom for the open 

area in the center. 

Black followed through with the ko threat to remove White 32 by 

playing Black 65 (on the intersection S-11). In so doing, the line of 

Black troops 31, 37, 61, 65, and 35 has trapped the fi ve White stones 

36, 38, 18, 28, and 30 inside Black’s encirclement (they are now 

prisoners inside Black’s territory). White paid a heavy price for the 

ko. The loss of the White group on the right-hand side has become 

a huge expansion of Black’s territory from the upper right corner 

to a large portion of the right-hand side. At the same time, White 

34 has become helplessly isolated. This situation has a remarkable 

resemblance to the China-Taiwan case. The go concepts can inform 

us how the mainland Chinese view the Taiwan situation. 
17

Figure 8.

Figure 9.
18

From the go perspective, one should not try to rescue the lone 

stone 34. There is not enough space for White to build a survivable 

garrison around White 34. But if White sends a rescue team to 

reconnect with 34, Black will attack this rescue team from both sides. 

In doing so, Black will acquire more territory through the offense. 

The most sensible strategy therefore is to play 34 as a bargaining 

chip in another ko situation. 

This is exactly what the mainland Chinese believe the United 

States has been doing with Taiwan throughout the years―it is a 

leverage to hold against China from time to time. This is also what 

China tells Taiwan: you are only a bargaining chip on a go board (or 

a pawn in the U.S. chessboard). 

However, Taiwan has also been a liability for the United 

States―it carries the risk of involving the United States in an armed 

confl ict with mainland China over the fate of Taiwan. From the go

perspective, many Chinese would ridicule Americans for their lack 

of understanding of this geo-strategic situation between Taiwan and 

mainland China―it is a lone stone against a huge mass. The United 

States, believing in its ability to project power in the Western Pacifi c, 

nevertheless dismisses China’s view. However, the cost of defending 

Taiwan must not be underestimated. The go perspective provides a 

theoretical and strategic insight into the costs.

Returning to the game here, we see that Black took advantage of 

the huge shi from the upper side, and working in concert with the 

stronghold of Black 3 and 5 at the bottom, launched a campaign to 

expand into the center from the right. 

The closure of the ko also concluded the fi rst mid-game battle. 

Black was a clear winner in this fi rst fi ght. In an attempt to turn this 

disadvantage around, White made an advance at the bottom with 

White 66. This move has expanded White’s territory at the bottom. 

It also posed a threat to the Black stronghold of 3 and 5. This move 

also signifi ed the start of the second mid-game battle in a separate 

theater. 

Black answered White’s threat by reinforcing the stronghold and 

building a “wall” with stones 3, 77, 5, 73, 79, 87, and 89. Through 

these efforts, Black has effectively consolidated the control on the 

entire right-hand side. The two White stones 34 and 82 have become 

captives. 
19

White, however, was able to reinforce the hold at the bottom 

part (with white stones 66, 70, 88, and 6 lining up a border). During 

the engagement, the two players have both separated a portion of 

the other’s troops from the main forces (divide and rule). The three 

baseless White 84, 86, and 90 are trying to reconnect with the White 

group in the middle. The Black troops 71, 85, 69, and 91, however, 

are in a different mindset. They worked in concert with the Black 

troops 87 and 89 to chase the fl eeing White troops. This is clearly 

an example of “the best defense is offense.” While attacking the 

fl eeing White group, Black 91 also occupies a key strategic position 

to reconnect with the Black group on the left if it is under attack. 

This situation shows a key aspect of warfare―the yin and yang and 

relativity of defense and offense.

With Black 91 on the board, the second mid-game battle came 

to a truce. The two players then turned to the left side and started 

another mid-game battle. As shown in Figure 10, the two opponents 

have started another ko battle. This ko holds the fate of the two 

groups, Black 16, 95, and 97 on one side and White 92, 96, and 98 on 

the other. From go players’ experience, whoever wins this ko wins 

the game. 

Figure 10.
20

In Figure 11 we see that Black has captured a fairly large portion 

of the center. Black has also captured the fl eeing White 84, 86, and 90 

and three extra White stones 72, 78, and 80 (those White stones have 

been removed, leaving the vacated intersections in Black’s territory 

(L-9, L-8, M-8, N-7, N-6, and O-7). Black has obviously gotten more 

territory out of the fi ght over the ko.

Figure 11.

In Figure 12, those “dead” stones are removed to provide a better 

view of the settled territories. The borders are all sealed. These 

irregular lines of border happen to look like real-world national 

borders. We see that Black has the entire right-hand side territory. 

This black territory then expands into the center area. There is a selfsustained black territory at the top. The sum of these areas is Black’s 

hard-earned territory (the borders and open space inside inclusive.)

White has the left-hand side, but it is narrower than Black’s 

territory on the right. White also has about two-thirds of the bottom 

side. In addition, White has a self-sustained group on the upper 

middle part. 
21

Figure 12.

There are two ways to count the points. One is the Japanese way 

that counts the open intersections inside one’s secured territory. The 

other is the Chinese way of counting all the intersections, occupied 

and open. The two ways of counting come to the same conclusion. 

The one who has more points (intersections) wins. In this game, 

Black won by having 3 3/4 intersections more than White has.

The presentation in this section gives the reader a taste of go. 

It really shows how patient the Chinese are in playing strategic 

games. 

This discussion of the game is focused on the strategic level of 

engagements. Go is very rich in tactical operations as well. Studying 

and practicing the tactics in local life-and-death situations are equally 

challenging in go. There are many books about go in English at all 

levels nowadays. Interested readers should check out the American 

Go Association web site. You can fi nd the most basic books about go

and learn about the latest development in go-related activities.12

SHI IN ACTION

China is home to Sun Tzu. There is also a long tradition of 

strategic thinking in China. However, this cultural heritage was laid 
22

aside during the early turbulent years of the People’s Republic. Since 

China embarked on the mission of national development in 1978, 

there has been a revival of interest in Sun Tzu and other classical 

Chinese military thoughts in China. The proliferation of publications 

in China on studies of classical Chinese military thought and 

reprints of the original military classics is a good testimony.13 There 

is also ample indication that China is following the wisdom of its 

classical strategic thought to make impressive progress in pursuing 

its national objectives, particularly the objectives to develop China 

and retake Taiwan. A noted success in China’s strategy is its efforts 

in creating the shi for its missions.

Developing the Shi to Secure a Home Base.

In 1978, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, Chinese leaders 

launched the now acclaimed economic reform in China. The Chinese 

leaders were determined to turn China into a true great power in 50 

to 100 years. To achieve this goal, China needs a favorable internal 

and external environment. 

Internally, Chinese leaders follow the model of economic 

development under authoritarian rule. Externally, they take a threepronged strategy to create a favorable environment for China’s 

development. First and foremost, Chinese leaders seek a constructive 

relationship with the United States. Second, they mend fences with 

China’s neighboring countries. Third, they aggressively integrate 

China into the global community. 

In all fairness, this strategy has born fruit. On the home front, 

economic reform has reached all corners of China. Chinese 

government has loosened control on pricing, labor market, housing, 

and many other areas. A fl ourishing market economy has taken hold 

in China. Economic reform has also come to China’s fi nancial and 

banking industries. With its entry to the World Trade Organization 

(WTO) as a catalyst for bigger changes, China is expected to 

accelerate its economic reform and become completely integrated 

into the world market economy. 

On the external front, one cannot dismiss China’s three-pronged 

efforts. In the last 10 years, China has gradually built a “ring of 

friends” around its borders. It has normalized relations with Russia 
23

(1991), the Central Asia former Soviet republics (1992), South Korea 

(1992), Laos (1989), Indonesia (1990), Brunei (1991), Vietnam (1991), 

and Singapore (1990). 

China has also settled border disputes with Laos (complete), 

Vietnam (all except for the South China Sea islands), Russia (97 

percent borders delimited), the three Central Asian former Soviet 

republics of Kazakstan, Kirgizstan, and Tajikistan (all complete), 

and stabilized border disputes with India and Bhutan. 

Through these internal and external efforts, China has secured 

a fi rm home base, and a sound strategic shi to pursue its national 

objectives. 

Developing the Shi on Taiwan.

Recovering Taiwan is China’s historical mission. China’s 

objective is to take Taiwan whole and intact. To achieve this goal, 

China tries to follow Sun Tzu’s teaching to win without resorting to 

force. Developing the shi thus is a critical strategy. This strategy has 

three components. The fi rst is economic and social integration; the 

second is to establish a credible deterrence against attempts inside 

Taiwan to make a desperate run for independence; and the third is 

to hold the United States committed to the one-China policy. 

By many accounts, China has been successful in executing 

this strategy. Perhaps the biggest achievement of this strategy 

is in developing the shi through the cross-Strait economic and 

social integration. As the numbers in Table 1 show, since the late 

1980s, cross-Strait trade has a cumulative amount of $302.8 billion. 

According to another Taiwan government statistic, the share of 

annual cross-Strait trade in Taiwan’s total trade has grown from less 

than 1 percent in 1983 to 15.39 percent in 2002.14

China has also attracted a large amount of capital investment 

from Taiwan. The cumulative sum is over $30 billion from 1991 to 

2003. It is 44.53 percent of Taiwan’s total foreign investment over 

this period. 

Between 1988 and 2003, over 28 million Taiwan visitor entries 

to the mainland have been recorded. Many Taiwan people, most of 

them business executives, high-tech gurus, and people with highdemand skills, have relocated to the mainland. Shanghai alone has 

housed over 50,000. 
24

Reference Statistics by Mainland Jan-Mar 2003 1979-Mar 2003

Projects 1,040 56,731 Ministry of

Contracted Amount 16.9 631.6 Foreign Trade

(U.S. $100 million) and Economic

Realized Amount Cooperation

(U.S.$100 million) 8.9 340.0 (PRC)

Exchange of Visits Apr 2003 Jan-Apr 2003 1988-Apr 2003

Taiwan Visitors Arrivals in 108.5 (-68.4%) 909.8 (-22.0%) 28,144.4 China Monthly

Mainland (1,000 persons) Statistics

May 2003 Jan-May 2003 1988-May 2003

Mainland People Visit 3,654 (-71.0%) 55,544 (-12.3%) 914,600 Bureau of

Immigration,

Ministry of the

Interior (ROC)

Notes: 1. Numbers in () stand for growth rate compared withn the same period of the last year.

2. "Taiwan People Visit Mainland" monthly figures are not available since May 2000.

The statistics are replaced by "Taiwan Visitors Arrivals in Mainland" which is from China Monthly Statistics

published by China Statistical Information and Consulting Co. Ltd. (Beijing).

Source: Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, August 7, 2003.

Item Current Month Year to Date Cumulative Source

The Cross-Strait Indirect Trade May 2003 Jan-May 2003 1987-May 2003

Total (U.S.$100 million) 35.4 (12.8%) 172.9 (25.7%) 3,028.0 Hong Kong

Exports 27.1 (8.4%) 132.8 (22.1%) 2,527.0 Customs,

Imports 8.3 (30.1%) 40.1 (39.4%) 501.0 Ministry of

Trade Balance 18.8 (0.9%) 92.7 (15.9%) 2,026.0 Finance (ROC)

Indirect Investment to Mainland May 2003 Jan-May 2003 1991-May 2003

Cases 138 (1.0%) 797 (56.0%) 30,075* Investment

Commission

Amount (U.S.$100 million) 3.17 (4.0%) 17.34 (44.0%0 313.1* Ministry of

Economic

Affairs (ROC)

Table 1. Preliminary Statistics of Cross-Strait 

Economic Relations, May 2003.

Many factories have also been relocated from Taiwan to the 

mainland. China has become such a “giant sucking ground” for 

Taiwan’s business, capital, and talented people that Japan’s “Mr. 

Strategy” and business guru, Kenichi Ohmae, predicts that by 2005 

Taiwan will have to submit to unifi cation with China. Or, if Taiwan 

refuses to accept this fate, it will become “Taiwan passing, Taiwan 

nothing!”15

Ohmae’s call may sound too demanding. The rapid and largescale cross-Strait economic and social integration surely suggests a 

virtual unifi cation is possible in 10 years.

On the military front, China has gradually built up several rings 

of missiles along its eastern seaboard since the early 1990s. These 

missiles pose a credible threat to Taiwan. In addition, China has also 

strengthened its overall air and naval capabilities. This military shi
25

has reinforced China’s resolve to keep Taiwan in the fold. 

On the U.S. front, China has strengthened ties with the United 

States. The U.S.-China relationship was at low ebb when President 

Bush took offi ce. It hit an all time low when the two countries found 

themselves in a standoff over a military aircraft collision on April 

1, 2001 (the U.S. EP-3 spy plane and Chinese J-8 fi ghter jet collision 

incident over the South China Sea). Later in April 2001, following 

the release of the 24 EP-3 crew members from China, President Bush 

authorized a large sale of weapons to Taiwan and promised to “do 

whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend themselves.”16 Chinese 

leaders, however, made much effort to reverse the downward trend 

in the U.S.-China relations afterwards. By July of 2001, China had 

Secretary of State Colin Powell visit China. Powell was all smiles 

in Beijing, calling China a friend. Then came the September 11 

terrorist attacks on the United States. Chinese leaders jumped on the 

opportunity to cooperate with the United States in its war against 

terrorism. With its hands full with heavy involvements in the 

Middle East and North Korea, the United States clearly values the 

U.S.-China ties more than distractions from Taiwan. A shi is clearly 

established in China’s favor.

Against this backdrop, Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian started 

to push aggressively for two referendums in Taiwan, one on the 

issue of a nuclear power plant, and the other on Taiwan’s quest to 

become an observer to the World Health Organization. Although 

many see these proposed referendums as Chen’s attempt to create 

issues for his reelection in March 2004, the real purpose for is Chen’s 

agenda to have a referendum for Taiwan’s formal independence. 

This hidden agenda has the potential to trigger an armed 

confl ict in the Taiwan Strait. In the past, China would have taken 

up the issue with Chen Shui-bian and intensify its threat to use force 

against Taiwan’s attempts. But this time China was looking on with 

folded arms. The United States was more concerned with this issue. 

An armed confl ict in the Taiwan Strait would involve the United 

States because of its commitment to Taiwan’s defense through the 

Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. However, the United States had no 

desire whatsoever to have an armed confl ict with China over Taiwan 

at this time. Thus as a precaution, U.S. representative to Taiwan 

Doug Paal (a de facto ambassador) expressed concern to Chen. The 
26

latter unwillingly had reassured the United States that a referendum 

on Taiwan independence would not come up in the upcoming 

presidential election. China did not have to fi re missiles this time. Its 

shi was working.

Chen, however, did not give up his efforts. As Taiwan’s 

presidential election campaigns intensifi ed during the fi nal months 

of 2003, Chen proposed to hold two more referendums on the 

election day in March 2004 (one “defensive referendum” against 

China’s missile threat and another referendum to amend Taiwan’s 

constitution). Chen’s controversial efforts made the United States 

more concerned. Thus at a joint news conference with the visiting 

Chinese premier at the White House on December 9, 2003, President 

George W. Bush bluntly stated that the United States opposed 

Taiwan’s attempt to unilaterally change the status quo of the Taiwan 

Strait. 

Having President Bush take such a clear stand was clearly a 

score on the Chinese side. However, the Chinese would not just sit 

back and relax. They continued to maintain the shi over the Taiwan 

issue. As explained by People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Lieutenant 

General, Li Jijun: 

The extensive and profound Chinese culture has nurtured an oriental 

military science that is unique and has lasting infl uence. Ancient 

Chinese military science was one that exalted resourcefulness, 

stratagem and prudence in waging any war or resorting force. This 

military culture based on refl ecting on war, having evolved from war’s 

primitive form of fi ghting each other, later reached the stage where a 

strategist is not a militarist. It showed the beauty of philosophic wisdom. 

Because of this culture, unifi cation war planners, while structuring their 

strategies, would follow the principle that, “in drawing up a military 

strategy, importance should be given to stratagem.” The objective 

was “complete” victory without having to resort to force. To this end, 

they would comprehensively analyze the strategic situation, carefully 

structure their strategic policies, set proper strategic objectives, correctly 

choose their strategic course, specifi cally plan their strategic moves, and 

properly employ strategic means.17

STONES FROM OTHER HILLS

U.S. political and military leaders are familiar with games such 

as chess, poker, boxing, and American football. These games to a 
27

large extent refl ect and in turn infl uence American culture, strategic 

thinking, and the American way of war. Former National Security 

Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski’s thought on The Grand Chessboard: 

American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives is a prime 

example.18

The common feature of these favorite American games is the 

centrality of physical force and its application. While these games 

and the American way of war have much strength, they also have 

weaknesses. The strong aspect is the American and the West’s edge 

on capability. The weak point is the lack of sophisticated skill on 

strategy and stratagem. The Chinese way of war and the game of 

go have much to offer in helping the Americans overcome their 

shortcomings. As a Chinese proverb goes, stones from other hills 

may serve to polish the jade of this one. American leaders will do 

themselves a great service in learning about go and the Chinese way 

of war. The following discussion highlights the key features of the 

American favorite games, their infl uence on the American way of 

war, and their differences to go and the Chinese way of war. 

Chess is a game of power-based competition. Each piece on the 

chessboard carries different weight—a hierarchy of power and rank 

refl ecting a political and military entity. The outcome of the game can 

be predicted by counting the pieces and their strength on the board. 

Go is a skill-based game. In the game of go, each piece has the same 

tangible power, but their intangible and potential power, based on 

the near-infi nite combinations and alternative ways of engagement, 

is situational and limitless. The stones on the board work collectively 

and always in concert with one another to fi ght battles. It is diffi cult 

to predict victory with a casual look at the individual pieces.

Under the infl uence of chess with heavy emphasis on capability, 

Americans tend to pay more attention to the balance of military 

power in confl ict situations. Many conclusions also come from the 

analysis of military balance. The analysis of military balance across 

the Taiwan Strait is a prime example. Repeated studies and reports 

show that China does not currently have suffi cient military power 

to launch an invasion on Taiwan. Some would then dismiss China’s 

threat on Taiwan and encourage Taiwan to pursue its agenda. 

Another difference between chess and go is in their different 

designs for committing fi ghting resources. In chess, all the fi ghting 
28

resources are lined up at the beginning of the war. The two players 

eliminate each other’s resources (pieces) to death. In go, the two 

players start with the battlefi elds open and then deploy troops in the 

theaters at the early stage of the game. They initiate a fi ght here and 

there at the mid-game stage, constantly making decisions as to where 

to commit troops and how much more resources (more stones) for 

such commitments. If they sense a losing battle or that a particular 

operation is not feasible, they will stop committing more resources 

there (recall the discussion on the Taiwan example resembling an 

isolated stone in Figure 11). Thus a chess mindset-guided military 

analysis focuses on what one can achieve given limited resources at 

the moment, whereas a go player thinks about what he can bring to 

bear with additional resources. 

The philosophy behind chess is to win decisively. For the 

winner, victory is absolute, as is defeat for the loser. In chess, both 

players have the same clear and overriding objective―capturing 

the opposing king―and accomplish this objective by decimating 

whatever opposing forces are standing in the way. In go, total victory 

usually happens between two mismatched players. That kind of 

victory, as Sun Tzu puts it, is not the pinnacle of excellence. In a go

game between two well-matched players, the margin between win 

and lose is usually very small, often decided by only a few points. 

The philosophy behind go therefore is to compete for relative gain 

rather than seeking complete annihilation of the opponent forces. 

It is dangerous to play go with the chess mindset. One can become 

overly aggressive so that he will stretch his force thin and expose his 

vulnerable parts in the battlefi elds.

In chess, the focus is on the king. All the moves are geared toward 

checking the king. In designs to capture the king, chess players always 

try to eliminate the powerful pieces such as the queen, knight, castle, 

and bishop. Chess players typically focus on these powerful military 

units as the “center of gravity” and “decisive point” (in Clausewitz 

and Jomini’s terms). Naturally, chess players are single-minded. In 

go, it is a war with multiple campaigns and battlefi elds. There is no 

one single focus on the board. A go player must always keep the 

whole situation in mind. Attacking the opponent’s strategy therefore 

is much more appropriate in go. As a prolonged and complex game, 

go players focus on building or creating rather than chess players’ 
29

emphases on removal and destruction. 

Another favorite American game is poker. This game also has 

strong infl uence on U.S. foreign policy conduct. The key features of 

poker are risk-taking and bluffi ng. Poker players have no control 

over what appears in their hands. Risk-taking and bluffi ng therefore 

are the best strategies to make the most out of the cards in hand. 

Typical manifestations of poker-type foreign policy are threats 

and ultimatums. Most of these acts are short-term and gambling 

approaches. While poker-like international interactions do exist, 

calculated and long-term-based strategies to achieve foreign policy 

goals are clearly more important. Go is probably the most calculated 

game in the world. When players put their troops (stones) in 

uncertain situations, they do so by placing their troops in places 

where they will have a good fi ghting strategy to make a foothold 

locally or reconnect with the home base. Testing water rather than 

bluffi ng is the way of go. Go players set up negotiation as in the case 

of ko but do not utilize a risky ultimatum as in poker.19

Still another sport that resembles the U.S. use of force is boxing. 

Boxing is a fi ght of hard force on force. Boxers meet incoming 

punches with punches. The more powerful boxer wins the fi ght. 

The Chinese counterpart to boxing is Taiji Quan (Tai Chi Chuan). 

Taiji practitioners never meet incoming hits with forceful returns. 

Instead, they always try to defl ect incoming hits and then return 

with a seemingly soft but powerful push. Taiji is perhaps the best 

example of the Chinese philosophy of yi-rou ke-gang (use the soft and 

gentle to overcome the hard and strong). It is in complete harmony 

with the philosophies behind go and Sun Tzu’s Art of War. 

Finally, American football also embodies the U.S. use of force. 

Football is a game of intense violence. It has powerful players on 

the fi eld. Forceful collision known as the tackling is the hallmark 

of football plays. The running back’s quick hitter charging into the 

line of defense is perhaps the best example of the concentration 

of forces and the philosophy of force on force competition. U.S. 

armed forces and their emphasis on the use of overwhelming force 

greatly resemble American football. As National Security Advisor 

Condoleezza Rice puts it, American football is deeply embedded 

in the American psyche of competition; it is the U.S. national 

pastime and an important American institution. Dr. Rice has made 
30

repeated remarks that she would like to become the commissioner 

of the National Football League after her service at the National 

Security Council.20 Indeed, U.S. military has incorporated football 

terminology in its combat language and vice versa. Football has its 

“blitz,” “trenches,” and “bombs,” while the U.S. military named some 

of its tactics in the Persian Gulf War as the “Hail Mary maneuver” 

and “Operation LINEBACKER” in Vietnam. In the most recent war 

on Iraq (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM), U.S. commanders used the 

term “red zone operation” to describe their advance into downtown 

Baghdad. In Lieutenant General David McKiernan’s words, “I came 

up with the term, ‘the red zone,’ kind of based on that analogy that, 

you know, you get inside the 20 yard line and maybe it gets a little 

harder to move the ball. And you got to pound it out a little bit 

then.”21

American football has no “peer competitor.” Although the 

National Football League has tried for years to promote football 

overseas by having some pre-season games in foreign soils, no other 

country has been able to adopt this sport. American football does 

have a counterpart. It is soccer, which has a completely different 

paradigm of war that relies on skills and maneuvers rather than 

force on force play. Soccer is also a national game of China. In fact, 

soccer-like sport also has a long history in China. In many ways, 

soccer is also a paradigm of Sun Tzu’s way of war. It does not seek 

annihilation of the opponent. Instead, it uses strategies and tactics of 

surprise, fi nesse, and continual movement of the ball in attempts to 

create strategic opportunities for goals. 

Another key feature in American football is its clear division 

between offense and defense. When the team is on offense, the 

offense lineup is in charge. When the opponents are on the offense, 

the defense lineup comes in to play. The strategies and plays in 

offense and defense are completely different. In soccer, go, and Sun 

Tzu’s teaching, offense and defense are a dialectic whole. Soccer 

players constantly switch between offense and defense. In the game 

of go, there is no clear-cut frontline―defense or offense is relative; 

it is a matter of perspective. Operating in the American football 

mindset, one is single-minded.22

The above comparisons and the analysis in this monograph 

drive home a point: a clear difference exists between the Chinese 
31

and American (Western) ways of war and diplomacy. The question 

is whether the Chinese way is worth learning. After all, as a popular 

saying in the West goes, with superior force, a lousy general can 

win a war. As long as the United States and the West maintain their 

capability edge, they have nothing to worry about. The answer from 

this author, as this monograph has built the case, is a resounding 

yes. This answer stands on three good reasons (and can certainly 

have more). First, ever since warfare came into being part of human 

affairs, it has been a contest of physical force as well as wits. In the 

evolution of warfare, the battle of wits has become more important 

than the actual use of force to achieve war aims (political goals). 

Today, we call the battle of wits, “strategy.” It is about the ways to 

use force. The United States is the most powerful country in force 

capability terms, but less so in resourcefulness. The Chinese way of 

war and diplomacy can be a great supplement to American power. If 

one looks at American power as the yang (the upfront force) and the 

Chinese stratagems as the yin (the behind-the-scene wits), it is only 

natural that the two should complement each other. The Chinese are 

determined to improve their capabilities; Americans should improve 

their strategies and stratagems.

Second, as Sun Tzu suggests, use of force is only diplomacy by 

other means; if we only focus on the use of force, we miss a big part 

of diplomacy. American and Western conception of strategy, in the 

words of Clausewitz, is “the use of engagement for the object of 

the war.”23 This focus is inadequate. International politics contains 

war as well as nonwar interactions. The Chinese way of war and 

diplomacy will help the United States strengthen its leadership in 

the whole process of diplomacy. 

Finally, it pays to learn about your opponents. The world knows 

the United States is the most powerful nation in the history of 

mankind. Other nations also understand that confronting the United 

States directly is an invitation to defeat and humiliation. How can 

weaker countries deal with the United States? They will resort to 

“unrestricted warfare” strategies and tactics. The Chinese way of 

war and diplomacy is about strategy and stratagems; it is about how 

one can win from the position of the weak. The two Chinese senior 

colonels who wrote the controversial book, Unrestricted Warfare, 
32

followed Sun Tzu’s teaching closely to develop their thoughts 

in this book.24 Terrorists and weaker powers can employ those 

unconventional approaches to frustrate the superpower. They can 

also employ the go, Taiji, and soccer strategies to maneuver with 

the United States. Americans will do themselves a great service to 

follow Sun Tzu’s dictum to learn about the Chinese way of war and 

diplomacy, and as this writing suggests, learning from the stones is 

the way to go.

ENDNOTES

1. China Security Review Commission, Report to the Congress of the United 

States, July 2002.

2. Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress on the Military Power of 

the People’s Republic of China, July 2002, p. 6. Pentagon’s 2003 report reiterates this 

observation.

3. The international publishing community is now using the pinyin spelling 

system. This article also follows this new practice. However, I keep the traditional 

spelling of Sun Tzu in this writing. The quotes from Sun Tzu’s Art of War are from are from 

Samuel B. Griffi th’s translation, Oxford University Press, 1963, unless footnoted 

otherwise. 

4. The Chinese name for go is weiqi, pronounced as wei ch’i. Literally, it means 

a game of encircling territories. Japanese call the game Igo, Koreans call it Baduk, 

Americans call this game Go, so goes it in the rest of the world. 

5. Roger D. McGrath, “The Western Way of War: From Plato to NATO,” 

Chronicles: A Magazine of American Culture, February 2001, pp. 13-15.

6. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States 

Military Strategy and Policy, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973.

7. Max Boot, “The New American Way of War.” Foreign Affairs, July/August 

2003.

8. See Andrew Scobell, China and Strategic Culture, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army 

War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2002. For an articulation of Chinese 

strategic culture by a leading Chinese military strategist, see Li Jijun, Traditional 

Military Thinking and the Defensive Strategy of China, Letort Paper No. 1, Carlisle, 

PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1997.
33

9. This sample game is taken from Qisheng Daochang, an Internet weiqi site 

www.tom.com. It is a national tournament game between two Chinese professional 

players, Chen Linxin and Zhou Junxun, played on August 7, 2003. Chen played 

black and won the game by 3 3/4 stones.

10. “The Wind and the Sun,” Edna Johnson, ed., an Aesop’s fable in Anthology 

of Children’s Literature, Boston: Houghton Miffl in Company, 1959, p. 114.

11. Miura Yasuyuki, Go: An Asian Paradigm for Business Strategy, San Francisco: 

Ishi Press, 1995.

12. Check out the web site at http://www.usgo.org/.

13. A search on the World Book Catalogue through the First Search engine 

will show the numbers.

14. Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of China, www.mca.org, 2003.

15. Kenichi Ohmae, The Emergence of the United States of Chunghwa, Taipei: 

Business Weekly Publications, 2002.

16. Interview with ABC Good Morning America anchor Charles Gibson, April 

24, 2001.

17. Li Jijun, “The Unifi cation Belief of the Chinese Nation,.” Liao Wang, a 

Beijing-based magazine, December 8, 2003, No. 49, p. 1. Li is a leading PLA 

fi gure in the promotion of Chinese strategic culture and the Chinese way of 

war and diplomacy. His 1997 speech at the U.S. Army War College, which was 

subsequently published as an Army War College Letort Paper entitled “Traditional 

Military Thinking and the Defense Strategy of China,” stands as a leading publication 

on China’s view on its strategic culture.

18. New York: Basicbooks, 1997.

19. See David Lai and Gary W. Hamby, “East Meets West: An Ancient Game 

Sheds New Light on U.S.-Asian Strategic Relations,” The Korean Journal of Defense 

Analysis, Vol. XIV, No. 1, Spring 2002, for an in-depth discussion of the difference 

between go, chess, and poker, and their infl uences on international relations. 

20. Interview with National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Sports by 

Brooks, April 17, 2002. Rice also made these remarks at the Meet the Press with 

NBC’s Tim Russet.

21. Interview with CNN, June 29, 2003. Lieutenant General McKiernan was 

the commander of the Third U.S. Army, a main force in the Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM.
34

22. See Joel F. Cassman and David Lai, “Football vs. Soccer: American Warfare 

in an Era of Unconventional Threats,” Armed Forces Journal, November 2003, for a 

thought-provoking discussion of the two paradigms of war.

23. Carl von Clausewitz, On War , Michael Howard and Peter Paret, trans., , Michael Howard and Peter Paret, trans., 

Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 128.

24. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare: Assumptions on War 

and Tactics in the Age of Globalization, Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing 

House, 1999.
35