AFGHANISTAN: RECONSTITUTING A COLLAPSED STATE

Raymond A. Millen

April 2005

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FOREWORD

There must be a beginning of any great matter, but the continuing unto the end 

until it be thoroughly finished yields the true glory.

 Sir Francis Drake

 Sooner or later it seems, all great powers have found themselves 

in Afghanistan, and their experience is replete with bitter resistance, 

harsh conditions, and failure. In contrast to its predecessors, the 

United States came not as a conqueror, but as a liberator. Equally 

unprecedented, the United States seeks to reinstitute Afghanistan as 

a fully sovereign and functioning state.

 In this monograph, Lieutenant Colonel Raymond A. Millen 

examines warlordism as the principal impediment to Afghanistan’s 

revival and offers a shift in strategy that addresses the war of 

ideas, the counternarcotics initiative, and the incorporation of the 

Afghan National Army into the provincial reconstruction teams. As 

Lieutenant Colonel Millen observes, all the resources are in place; 

they simply need a shift in focus.

 Lieutenant Colonel Millen takes into account the historical, 

cultural, and economic factors that impede central authority and the 

reforms needed for modern states. His problem-solving approach is 

insightful, pragmatic, and innovative.

 The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph 

as a topic of debate concerning post-conflict operations and counterinsurgency warfare.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

LIEUTENANT COLONEL RAYMOND A. MILLEN is currently 

assigned as the Director of European Security Studies at the Strategic 

Studies Institute. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 

1982, was commissioned as an infantry officer, and has held a variety 

of command and staff assignments in Germany and Continental 

United States. He has also served as the U.S. Army Infantry School 

Liaison Officer to the German Infantry School at Hammelburg, 

Germany; Battalion Executive Officer, 3-502d Infantry, Fort Campbell, 

Kentucky; and Chief of Intelligence Section and Balkans Team 

Chief, Survey Section, SHAPE, Belgium. He served in Kabul from 

July through November 2003 on the staff of the Office of Military 

Cooperation-Afghanistan, focusing on the Afghan National Army 

and the General Staff. Lieutenant Colonel Millen is a Foreign Area 

Officer for Western Europe. He has published articles in a number 

of scholarly and professional journals to include Comparative Strategy 

Journal, Infantry Magazine, and the Swiss Military Journal. His book, 

Command Legacy, was published by Brasseys in April 2002. Lieutenant 

Colonel Millen is a graduate of the U.S. Army’s Command and 

General Staff College, and holds an M.A. degree in National Security 

Studies from Georgetown University. He is currently pursuing a 

Ph.D. in World Politics at Catholic University of America.
v

SUMMARY

 Over 2 decades of incessant warfare destroyed Afghanistan as 

a functioning state, fracturing its institutions and devastating its 

economy. In the maelstrom of incessant internecine fighting in the 

1990s, the Taliban clawed its way to power and installed a medieval 

regime, providing stability through brutality. The Taliban regime 

likely would have defeated the last of the resisting warlords and 

continued its rule had Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda not provoked the 

United States into a war with the Taliban as a result of September 11, 

2001 (9-11). The swift expulsion of the Taliban and al Qaeda militants 

resulted in yet another regime change, but it did not ameliorate the 

fundamental malaise afflicting Afghanistan―warlordism. Because of 

their power and wealth, Afghan warlords and their militias represent 

the greatest challenge to Afghanistan’s rehabilitation as a functioning 

state, but any strategy which seeks a direct confrontation with them 

will likely ignite a war. Ultimately, resuscitation of Afghanistan lies 

with the Afghan people, and government policies must be geared 

towards garnering their loyalty and trust.

 It would be a mistake to demonize the warlords, however. 

Without a doubt, they and their militias had a hand in the ruination 

of Afghanistan, but they are also regarded as patriots and providers 

of security and livelihood. One must recognize that xenophobia, 

regionalism, and distrust of centralized authority are entrenched in 

Afghan society. It therefore follows that the warlords will attempt 

to safeguard their powerbase by maintaining a well-armed militia, 

profiting from the opium market, and preserving the allegiance 

of their constituents. President Hamid Karzai certainly recognizes 

the dynamic tensions keeping Afghanistan intact but could just as 

quickly tear it asunder if he miscalculates. In this sense, it would be 

more prudent to view each warlord as a latent insurgent rather than 

a mere nuisance to the central government.

 Recognizing warlordism as Afghanistan’s salient challenge 

requires no radical shift in strategy. For the most part, the resources 

are in place; they simply need a shift in emphasis. This monograph 

proposes a slight shift in coalition strategy, placing greater stress 
vi

on three approaches: 1) initiating a sophisticated public awareness 

campaign to win the war of ideas; 2) weaning Afghan society off 

the opium market; and 3) ending the culture of warlordism without 

sparking an insurgency.

 The public awareness campaign must be an open and public 

enterprise, and should not carry any hint of subterfuge. In this 

nation of Madison Avenue and Hollywood certainly, the various 

information media have no qualms with unabashedly influencing 

American cultural behavior, so marketing ideas in support of policy 

objectives would be no great leap. A sophisticated public awareness 

campaign requires the marrying of marketing experts with the 

expatriate Afghan artists in order to entertain Afghan citizens first, 

and foremost, then inform and persuade them, as well as rebut 

adversarial propaganda. Once firmly established in the Afghan 

society, the media can be adapted to address any variety of issues―

Islamic extremism, the opium trade, warlord oppression, and the 

virtues of the Afghan National Army.

 The failure of the counternarcotics strategy for Afghanistan 

reflects fundamental inattentiveness to the economics of the opium 

culture, the potential ethical and social forces, and the opiate 

processing nodes. The central actors in weaning Afghanistan off 

opium are the farmers. Persuading the farmer to grow legitimate 

crops requires crop subsidies that permit profits equal to opium and 

access to foreign markets. Although subsidies may be exorbitant, 

given that 75 percent of the world’s opiates come from Afghanistan, 

it is actually cheaper to pay off farmers as compared to the costs 

associated with national and international drug interdiction, law 

enforcement, and criminal prosecution. Permitting greater access to 

global markets is a matter of lifting trade barriers. Because nearly all 

the heroin in Europe originates in Afghanistan, a major incentive to 

relax Europe’s agricultural trade barriers with Afghanistan exists. 

Moreover, the United Nations (UN) can assist in providing special 

access into Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

 Addressing the ethical and social aspects of poppy cultivation is 

a powerful tool in targeting Afghan behavior. In this regard, a public 

awareness campaign would be particularly effective in reaching the 

greatest audience. Making an appeal that narcotics violate the tenets 
vii

of Islam and are dishonorable will likely resonate with the deeply 

religious Afghan citizens.

 The British and American forces in Afghanistan are assisting in 

training and supporting Afghan drug interdiction forces. In view 

of the limited opium processing plants and smuggling routes, the 

central government can apply pressure against the warlords and 

their lieutenants without hurting the farmers directly. This approach 

is less volatile than attempting to eradicate poppy growth directly. 

In view of the ease and speed with which poppies are grown, as well 

as the financial investment farmers have in their fields, focusing on 

interdiction will likely be more effective over time than hunting for 

will-o-the-wisp poppy fields.

 Ending the culture of warlordism would represent the culmination 

of effort in Afghanistan. In order to end this culture, an alternative 

must be available. Warlords provide two commodities for their 

constituents―security and a livelihood. The central government and 

coalition can assume both commodities using the Afghan National 

Army (ANA) and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). The 

ANA has only recently achieved the necessary numbers to establish 

a presence in the provinces. Some may decry this use of the ANA as 

a diversion from its main task of providing security (e.g., fighting 

insurgents). The fact is that the coalition has been managing the 

Taliban/al Qaeda insurgency for the past 4 years, and for practical 

purposes, this insurgency is defanged. Although insurgent remnants 

may continue low level activities for years, the Afghan police forces 

should be able to shoulder a greater part of the burden in 2005. 

Under these circumstances, the ANA can bolster the legitimacy of 

the central government by establishing security and participating in 

local projects that resonate with the people, such as reconstruction, 

agricultural events, and ceremonies. The increased interaction 

between the ANA and the local Afghans will enhance recruitment of 

quality soldiers and provide a tangible association with the central 

government.

 Correspondingly, the coalition PRTs are an excellent vehicle for 

introducing the ANA and perhaps police forces into the provinces, as 

well as providing local employment through reconstruction projects. 

The number and size of PRTs can increase, with the increase of ANA 
viii

soldiers into them. PRTs may be the best method for transforming 

international financial aid into reconstruction and local vocational 

training. Providing labor and skills to local individuals is an effective 

way to help the Afghans help themselves. In the long term, providing 

manual labor tools for dozens of workers and supervising the work 

projects over a period of weeks may yield a greater payoff than a 

PRT conducting reconstruction with bulldozers, backhoes, and other 

equipment in a matter of days. The use of PRTs with ANA soldiers 

offers an unobtrusive way to increase the presence and influence 

of the central government without a direct confrontation with the 

warlords. Their use also provides a benign way for Afghanistan to 

permit the passage of warlordism into history.

Recommendations:

 • Adapt ways and means to support the main objective―the 

legitimacy of the central government in the eyes of the Afghan 

people.

 • Invest resources for a public media campaign and test it in 

Afghanistan. Adapt it to other operations in the pursuit of the 

global war on terror.

 • Wean Afghan society off the opium market by targeting the 

economics of the trade, emphasizing the un-Islam dimensions 

of illicit drugs, and interdicting the trade before it leaves 

Afghanistan.

 • Invest heavily in PRTs and then populate with ANA soldiers 

and coalition cadre.

 • Remain cognizant of Afghanistan’s propensity towards 

xenophobia, regionalism, and conflict when executing sector 

security reform and supporting stratagems.
1

AFGHANISTAN:

RECONSTITUTING A COLLAPSED STATE

Preconceived notions, especially in war, are dangerous, because they give their 

own particular colour to all information that comes in; and . . . stifle any real 

understanding of the actual situation . . .

General Aleksei A. Brusilov

Introduction.

 Every insurgency is unique, requiring a unique counterinsurgency 

strategy. The most egregious error in conducting a counterinsurgency 

campaign is to attempt a cookie-cutter approach from one insurgency 

to another. Afghanistan’s uniqueness stems not from the series of 

insurgencies that have plagued the state for over 2 decades; rather, 

it is the state of commonplace lawlessness that challenges the central 

government, coalition, and the United Nations (UN).

 The collapse of Afghanistan as a state can be traced to events 

leading up to and including the Soviet Union’s invasion in December 

1979.1 During their 1980-88 war to destroy the mujahidin insurgents, 

the Soviets destroyed the socio-economic fabric of Afghanistan by 

killing 1.3 million Afghans, expelling another 5.5 million, destroying 

crops and irrigation systems, bombing granaries, razing villages, 

mining pastures and fields, and killing livestock.2

 The withdrawal 

of the Soviet army in 1989 led to a further descent into chaos as 

mujahidin insurgents continued to fight the communist government, 

which slowly lost control of Afghanistan over the next 4 years.3

The mujahidin, or more accurately at this stage in the conflict, the 

warlord militias, did not discriminate between combatants and 

noncombatants. From 1992 through 1994, militia forces killed 

between 40,000 to 50,000 noncombatants in the course of fighting 

around Kabul alone. Their sheer rapacity throughout Afghanistan 

simply ravaged the economy.4

 The rise of the Taliban in 1994 only 

exchanged rapacity for a medieval reign, but the civil war continued 

until the U.S.-supported Afghan Militia Forces (warlord militias) 

ousted the Taliban in late 2001.5
2

 By the time President Hamid Karzai’s Islamic Transitional 

Government of Afghanistan was established as a result of the 

December 2001 Bonn Agreement, Afghanistan was in the worst sense 

a collapsed state as described by William Zartman.6 Afghanistan could 

no longer perform the basic functions of a sovereign government. 

It no longer possessed a decisionmaking center of government; 

centralized law and order were nonexistent, and social cohesion 

only existed at the tribal level; it was no longer a symbol of identity, 

as the inhabitants reserved their allegiance to their warlords or tribal 

chiefs; and it had lost its domestic legitimacy as it could not provide 

any socioeconomic services to the citizens.7

 Twenty-three years of 

war had destroyed all vestiges of state functions.

 Regarding the road to rehabilitation, Zartman recommends 

reversing the process of collapse as follows: 1) the central government 

must gain control of its state agents (functioning, uncorrupt military 

and police forces, subordinated to the government); 2) government 

authorities must practice positive politics (elections, platforms, 

and legislation); 3) the central government must make progressive 

reforms (not eschew difficult decisions); 4) the central government 

must expand its political power base beyond the immediate circle 

or capital; and 5) the central government must extend its authority 

throughout the state so that local warlords and neighboring states do 

not fill the vacuum.8 Technically, Zartman is correct in his assessment, 

and technically, the UN-mandated International Security Assistance 

Force (ISAF) is attempting to reverse the process with its Sector 

Security Reform (SSR) strategy.9 However, rebuilding Afghanistan’s 

sovereignty is not a matter of putting the pieces back in place and 

hoping Afghanistan will reanimate automatically as a functioning 

state.

 It may surprise some to know that the main purveyors of 

Afghanistan’s continued lawlessness are the warlords and not the 

Taliban/al Qaeda militants. Because of their power and wealth, 

Afghan warlords and their militias represent the greatest challenge 

to Afghanistan’s rehabilitation, but a confrontational strategy with 

them will likely lead to widespread fighting. Coalition strategy must 

not forget that the ultimate medium for change resides in the Afghan 

people, and every aspect of SSR must nurture their allegiance towards 
3

and trust in the Afghan central government. Afghanistan’s domestic 

legitimacy necessitates this recognition. For the most part, the needed 

resources for strategy implementation are readily available and only 

require a change in focus. 

 This monograph proposes a slight shift in coalition strategy, 

placing greater stress on three approaches: 1) initiating a 

sophisticated public awareness campaign to win the war of ideas; 

2) weaning Afghan society off the opium market; and 3) ending 

the culture of warlordism without sparking an insurgency. As this 

monograph will seek to demonstrate, all elements of this strategy are 

mutually supporting and synergistic. This strategy not only creates a 

compelling methodology for restoring Afghanistan as a functioning 

state, but it also possesses tools useful for similar nation-building 

efforts elsewhere.

The Warlord Gordian Knot.

 Recognizing that the warlords are the central problem to 

Afghanistan’s future is one thing, but finding a way to deal with 

them is quite another. Not only were the warlords and their militias 

the freedom fighters against the Soviet occupation, they were also 

the principal allies of the United States against the Taliban and al 

Qaeda.10 Not surprisingly, the United States continues “to rely on the 

independent warlords for help hunting down remnant units of the 

Taliban and al Qaeda.”11 And as the central government and coalition 

pursue a host of activities, the warlord militias still function as a 

home guard, protecting their provinces from militant infiltration.

 Yet, the warlords and their militias are a double-edged sword. 

Despite their service to Afghanistan, they and their militias are not 

yielding to the authority of Karzai’s central government. Three years 

have passed since the UN stipulated the subordination of the 200 

or more warlords and their militias to the central government.12

The principal vehicle for the dissolution of the militias is the 

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) initiative 

as part of the Japanese-led Afghan New Beginnings Program 

(ANBP). In early 2003, ANBP established an arbitrary DDR target 

goal of 100,000 militiamen because the true size of the Afghan Militia 

Force was unknown and remains unknown due to warlord and 
4

militia commander obstructionism.13 United Kingdom (UK) Colonel 

Peter Babbington, who is responsible for executing DDR, regards 

the necessity for warlord compliance as the fatal flaw in the whole 

process, with a persistent gulf between their words and deeds.14

Warlords and militia leaders are able to shroud their troop strengths 

by paying their militiamen with profits from the illicit opium trade. 

Without government fiscal oversight, the true size of the militia 

forces is not knowable; hence force estimates have ranged wildly 

from 60,000 to 250,000.15 Militia end-strengths are practically a side 

issue, though, since few militia forces (under 17,000) have processed 

through DDR, and those that have are considered by the warlords as 

the most expendable.16 Moreover, contrary to the spirit of DDR, the 

warlords have turned in obsolete, incomplete, and nonfunctioning 

weapons and equipment for the fledgling Afghan National Army 

(ANA), reserving the most modern and well-maintained weapons 

and equipment for their militia.17 One conclusion is incontestable: 

DDR alone will not defang the warlords.

 In response to warlord recalcitrance, Karzai recently proclaimed 

warlord militias as the greatest threat to Afghanistan, a threat even 

greater than the Taliban insurgents, and that he planned to institute 

new measures to disarm them.18 Exactly what new measures Karzai 

intends to employ are inscrutable. In the past he has used various 

stratagems to pare the power of various warlords: persuading some 

to comply with DDR and co-opting others by appointing them as 

provincial governors, cabinet ministers, and to similar positions;19

and in some cases, deploying elements of the ANA ostensibly to quell 

fighting among warlords, but in reality, a subtle way of establishing 

his authority without being too confrontational. His boldest and 

riskiest move was the recent dismissal of Ismail Khan, the governor 

of the Herat province and a warlord thought to be untouchable. 

Throughout his political maneuvering, Karzai remains sensitive 

to honoring the past sacrifices and patriotism of the warlords and 

militia. Reflecting Karzai’s sensitivities, U.S. Ambassador Zalmay 

Khalilzad avers that the government must balance the use of force 

with incentives when addressing the warlords and their militias: 

“There must be a place of honor for those who cooperate.”20

 Such a measured approach is much more than yielding to 

nostalgia. A government and coalition military campaign to crush 
5

the warlords would likely lead to renewed fighting or even a full 

fledged insurrection. Afghanistan has a “long tradition of resistance to 

central authority and foreign interference.”21 A product of numerous 

historical invasions and compartmentalized geography, Afghan 

society is actually a quilt-work of “village states” comprising various 

tribes and ethnicities. The basic subnational unit is the Qawm, a social 

“identity based on kinship, residence, and sometimes occupation.”22

When not fighting foreign invaders, Afghans have a rich history of 

internecine warfare among regions or between warlords and the 

central government due to tribal rivalries, ungovernable tribes, 

blood feuds, and chieftain ambitions. With loyalties devolving to 

the family and tribe, progress at the national level remains a slow 

process, but from the Afghan perspective, these arrangements also 

serve to protect the Qawm from an oppressive central government or 

invader.23

 It would be wise to regard Afghan warlordism as a latent 

insurgency. Regardless of any exigencies justifying the use of force 

against the warlords, even small operations risk sparking a visceral 

uprising that could easily spread throughout Afghanistan. The 

Taliban, al Qaeda, and Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) insurgents 

would be quick to exploit this change in fortunes for a revival of their 

jihad against the West.24 Hence, confronted by powerful and often 

irascible warlords, a low-level insurgent threat from the Taliban and 

other militants, and a country left destitute by 23 years of warfare, the 

central government and coalition must be open to new approaches if 

the path to a functioning state is to continue.

Public Awareness Campaign.

 A public awareness campaign is an integral part of information 

operations, but it should not be regarded as merely a news provider 

or a clandestine operation. A sophisticated public awareness 

campaign seeks to engage its audience by being entertaining, first 

and foremost. In the process, it weaves in daily themes to inform 

and persuade the public, and to rebut adversarial propaganda. To 

illustrate, the U.S. propaganda efforts during World War II provide a 

useful framework for reference. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 
6

designed a clandestine media operation to connect with the German 

people and soldiers by recruiting German and Austrian expatriate 

actors, musicians, comedians, and playwrights to produce radio 

programs, which provided entertainment while subtlely weaving 

in OSS themes. The expatriates possessed the linguistic, cultural, 

and political skills needed to resonate with German listeners.25 The 

operation was a resounding success, albeit never advertised even 

after the war. German soldiers and civilians eagerly but secretly 

tuned into the programs for their entertainment value. The subtle 

messages and humor poking fun at the Nazi regime had the desired 

effect and even prompted an uprising in Bavaria near the end of the 

war.26

 Care must be taken not to use the public awareness campaign 

for deception, which is a specific intelligence operation aimed at 

deluding enemy leaders.27 Deception performs a valuable service 

during a conflict, but in this role it would be counterproductive 

because credibility is crucial. A public awareness campaign should 

be an open enterprise and rely on facts to inform and persuade the 

public.

 To launch the campaign with the greatest and most immediate 

effect, the coalition should recruit expatriate Afghan entertainers 

and journalists from coalition member states for radio and television 

programs. Naturally, qualified Afghans living in Afghanistan would 

be eligible, and close cooperation with the Afghan government would 

be a prerequisite for such an operation. Like the German case, only 

these professionals possess the requisite skills to reach the Afghan 

people. To provide coherence of effort, the production staff should 

be comprised of professional marketing and media executives, 

anthropologists, and government policy officials (both U.S. and 

Afghan). Because Afghanistan is comprised of diverse ethnic groups 

and languages (Pashtu, Dari, and Turkic, among others), the programs 

would need to adapt the content for the targeted audience.

 Approximately 36 percent of the population is literate,28 so the 

campaign should rely predominantly on the visual and oral media. In 

this pursuit, the enterprise would require an investment in sufficient 

station equipment, studios, and towers to cover all of Afghanistan, as 

well as enough transistor radios and televisions (for community TV 
7

centers) for adequate reach. Because of the mountainous geography, 

satellite radio and television transmissions may be better. Besides the 

entertainment value with interwoven themes, the programs could 

gradually expand to panel debates, talk shows, and so forth, so as to 

air differing viewpoints, hearsay, and grievances. It stands to reason 

that once the audience grows, the law of economics will take over 

and the programs will turn a profit. By opening a public dialogue, the 

people will not be as susceptible to extremist rhetoric, rumors, and 

disinformation. Feedback through surveys and polls will enhance the 

quality of the public awareness campaign. Initially, the public media 

focus should be on the insurgents, but as the medium matures, it can 

shift to other issues, such as the opium problem, warlord corruption, 

the progress of the ANA, and other government initiatives.

 Despite the intrinsic value of a public media campaign, the U.S. 

Government may be reticent to adopt it due to preconceived ideas. 

In a recent article, Charles Krohn, a former deputy chief of public 

affairs in Iraq, believes that, in general, Americans view public media 

operations as dishonorable and underhanded.29 Krohn develops his 

thesis further. Ironically, the media is engrained in American culture 

because it is used to market ideas (e.g., speeches, press conferences, 

and news programs) and to market products (e.g., basic advertising, 

the armed forces, and coalitions). A public media campaign in reality 

is a form of advertising, and the product is the promotion of democracy 

as well as the free exchange of ideas. Regional Islamic extremists 

and their affiliates readily and unabashedly attempt to marginalize 

the United States in the war of ideas, so refusing to engage the local 

citizens in this arena places the coalition on the defensive. The public 

awareness campaign seeks to win the allegiance of the undecided, 

and the initial step in separating the extremists from the moderate 

Moslems is to persuade them that the efforts of the United States are 

noble and to their benefit.30

 The appropriate agency for the public media campaign should 

probably lie in the government-civilian sector. Mr. Krohn observes 

that the Department of Defense has made such operations an 

unintended secret enterprise by relegating them to psychological 

operations (PSYOP) units within the Special Operations Command.31

The Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) and the ISAF 
8

operate five PSYOP radio stations, and CFC-A supports numerous 

independent radio stations for PSYOP and public affairs messages.32

CFC-A also uses Afghanistan’s existing radio and TV stations, 

as well as the international media, to disseminate information.33

Because surveys have revealed that radio is the most effective 

media for spreading messages, CFC-A gives away transistor radios 

to Afghans.34 The question remains whether these efforts resonate 

effectively with the Afghan people. More importantly, does the fact 

that PSYOP units operate these stations evoke any suspicions with 

the Afghans? In the long term, a professional media effort operating 

as a public service will most likely provide the greatest payoff.

Resolving Afghanistan’s Addiction to Opium.

With its poppy cultivation increasing unabated, Afghanistan 

produces 75 percent of the world’s illicit opium.35 Years of poverty, 

conflict, and shattered central authority have created, or significantly 

contributed to, the entrenchment of opium in Afghan society. 

Afghanistan’s poppy cultivation has gained international attention 

because it exacerbates drug problems in other countries, and its 

drug trade provides tremendous wealth for organized crime and 

terrorist organizations.36 Poppy growth in Afghanistan is rampant, 

taking place in 28 of the 32 provinces. Farmers are drawn to poppy 

cultivation because poppies are easy to grow in arid climates and 

generate vastly greater profits than other crops. For example, the aid 

organization, German Agro Action, estimates that profits for opium 

are $600 to $1,000 per kilogram, as opposed to $1 per kilogram for 

rice or wheat.37 Afghanistan could easily become a narco-state with 

traffickers and drug lords increasing their hold over the farmers and 

the economy, generating billions in profits and providing between 

50 to 60 percent of Afghanistan’s economy. Although the farmers are 

drawn to poppy cultivation for a living, the majority of the profits go 

to the traffickers, warlords, militia leaders, and even the Taliban, al 

Qaeda, and Hizb-i-Islami (HIG).38

 Earlier errors by the UK and the UN contributed to Afghanistan’s 

current socio-economic addiction to opium. In accordance with its 

counternarcotics strategy, the British paid poppy farmers to eradicate 
9

their crops for legal crops; however the strategy backfired because it 

prompted other farmers to start growing poppies in order to enjoy the 

windfall as well. The UN alternative crops program failed because 

the UN imported wheat into Afghanistan at the same time Afghan 

farmers were growing wheat. As a result, the UN unintentionally 

crippled the domestic market for Afghan wheat farmers.39

 Although U.S. and other agencies have discussed using the U.S. 

military in counternarcotics efforts, to include crop eradication, 

both carry unintended consequences. Senior U.S. military and 

civilian leaders recommend confining the antidrug campaign to law 

enforcement. “Enmeshing U.S. troops in drug fights . . . would alienate 

many Afghans―some of whom have become useful intelligence 

sources―and also divert attention from the core U.S. military missions 

of combating insurgents and aiding reconstruction.”40 Aid workers 

warn that Afghans depend on the opium trade for their livelihood, 

and senior coalition military leaders believe eradication could spark 

an additional insurgency by the warlords.41 The one imperative of 

the counternarcotics campaign must be to avoid driving the Afghans 

into the arms of the warlords.

 The counternarcotics strategy should target three poppy pressure 

points in Afghanistan: the economic, the ethical/social, and the 

opiate processing nodal points. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime 

asserts that the laws of economics can be used to diminish the 

opium market.42 The United States and European Union (EU) should 

subsidize legal crops, paying farmers as much for them as they would 

receive for opium. Although such subsidies appear exorbitant, given 

the amount of money and resources devoted to combating drug 

trafficking globally, shifting more money to nip the market in the bud 

seems relatively cheap.43 The UN, United States, and EU can bolster 

Afghanistan’s legal agricultural exports by providing greater access 

to foreign markets. In 2004, 35 countries worldwide required external 

food assistance: 24 in Africa, 5 in Asia/Near East, 5 in Latin America, 

and 1 in Europe.44 Because Europe receives the lion’s share of opiates 

from Afghanistan, representing 95 percent of its heroin consumption, 

it is in the EU’s best interests to relax some provisions of its Common 

Agricultural Policy (CAP), permitting Afghan agricultural products 

into the EU.45 In this case, the EU could collaborate with Afghanistan 
10

to import a high value agricultural product for European consumers. 

The UN can permit greater agricultural access to other needed areas as 

well to provide an enduring market. The bottom line must transcend 

domestic agricultural concerns and barriers and permit Afghanistan 

to develop its agricultural market so as to undercut the illegal opium 

market. Understandably, the warlords will likely coerce these profits 

from the farmers, but the immediate goal is to interrupt poppy 

cultivation long enough for the institutional knowledge to dissipate 

and the market to shift to other regions. Once this shift occurs, then 

the government can focus on warlord racketeering.

 Increasing comprehension through the public awareness 

campaign accentuates the unethical aspects of poppy cultivation. 

Specifically, the media campaign would target Afghan ethical 

values by emphasizing that opium consumption is against the tenets 

of Islam and is dishonorable.46 For those Afghans that rationalize 

opium consumption as affecting only nonbelievers, the public 

awareness campaign should emphasize the legal ramifications of 

getting caught, as well as the human tragedy stories related to opium 

use among Afghans. Highlighting one’s honor in this enterprise 

taps into the Afghan psyche. Lastly, emphasizing that warlords and 

Islamic extremists are reaping huge profits from the drug trade, 

while Afghans struggle with poverty, helps to isolate the former 

from Afghan society.

 A greater emphasis on targeting processing laboratories and 

movement of opium products places pressure on the drug lords 

without affecting the farmers directly. Only around 12 industrial 

labs process the opium into heroin in the northern, eastern, and 

southern provinces. Forty percent is smuggled through Uzbekistan, 

Tajikistan, and other northern states, whereas 30 percent goes 

through Iran and Pakistan.47 In response, the British have trained 

an Afghan narcotics interdiction force, and existing counternarcotics 

police units are expanding. A special judiciary task force comprising 

prosecutors and judges is planned to operate in a secure facility near 

Kabul. Moreover, the U.S. military plans to support Afghan narcotics 

interdiction operations with airlift and intelligence to increase border 

security.48 Ostensibly, attempting to interdict the finished product 

appears much more difficult than simply eradicating poppy fields, 

but in 2004 alone, an estimated 321,236 acres were used for poppy 
11

growth, much of it in small, isolated fields.49 Because poppies are so 

easy to grow in Afghanistan, farmers can rapidly establish new fields 

as fast as they are eradicated. Focusing intelligence and interdiction 

forces on processing laboratories and smuggling routes makes more 

practical sense than attempting to scour Afghanistan for poppy 

fields, and the farmers are not directly affected.

 If the opium market can be eliminated in Afghanistan, the 

resulting diminution of global supplies and higher prices will cause 

the opium/heroin market to collapse. Even if opium cultivation 

shifts to other countries, such as Myanmar and Laos, their low 

opium yield areas will not restore supply levels for cheap heroin at 

the current level. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Afghans would 

not grow poppies if a viable agricultural market was available. In 

this regard, integrating the ethics of the illicit drug trade into the 

counternarcotics campaign is a powerful tool in Afghanistan’s deeply 

religious culture. Persuading the EU to relax its Common Agricultural 

Policy to accept Afghan agricultural products will be much more 

difficult, but the heavy consumption of heroin in Europe provides 

a powerful incentive. Lastly, concentrating on the processing and 

smuggling nodal points makes greater use of the finite intelligence 

and interdiction forces. With the loss of their largest source of wealth, 

the warlords would not be able to maintain their militia forces at 

current levels and they would find their power flagging. In short, 

the counternarcotics campaign has the greatest potential for setting 

Afghanistan on a progressive course.

Ending the Culture of Warlordism.

The warlords provide two services for their constituents―security 

and employment―which in turn generate local fealty. For the central 

government to challenge the warlords’ traditional position in Afghan 

society, it must present an image which resonates with the average 

citizen. Ultimately, the central government wants to be the primary 

authority in Afghanistan, but it risks sparking an uprising if it becomes 

too confrontational. In this regard, a steady encroachment into the 

provinces stands a better chance of a peaceful change in authority. 

Since Karzai is co-opting many warlords into the government, the 

transition to legitimate central authority is complementary.
12

 Currently, the ANA is the embodiment of the central government 

and has the greatest potential concerning citizen identification with 

the central government. As such, it becomes necessary to promote 

a greater presence of the ANA in the provinces, even though this 

measure may provoke an outcry within the military because of its 

diversion from a traditional security role. Nonetheless, the ANA has 

two stated missions: to protect the national government and to project 

government authority and influence throughout all the provinces. Hence, 

a greater ANA presence in the provinces would be an appropriate 

role.50

 Critics still may question whether assigning the ANA to an 

essentially image-enhancing role rather than fighting insurgents is 

not counterproductive. After all, the idea behind training the ANA 

is to permit the central government to assume the task of security 

rather than relying on coalition forces. Realistically, CFC-A has been 

fulfilling this security mission for several years, and during this 

window of opportunity, the ANA can be utilized for greater political 

effect.51 The 18,000 coalition forces and the Pakistani forces across 

the border have successfully neutralized the Taliban, al Qaeda, and 

HIG insurgents. The greatest indication of Taliban weakness was its 

inability to interrupt the October 9, 2004, presidential election. Recent 

revelations indicate that rivalries within Taliban ranks, internal 

dissension, and loss of its former Pakistani sponsors have severely 

reduced its capabilities.52 More promising, Taliban militants recently 

have indicated that they wish to lay down their arms in exchange for 

amnesty.53 Residual Taliban and al Qaeda militants may possess the 

funding and capability to continue a low level insurgency for years, 

but the threat will remain manageable, especially once Afghanistan’s 

law enforcement assumes a greater role.54

 To date, the Germans have trained 20,000 policemen with 

an ultimate goal of 50,000 policemen by 2005 and 12,000 border 

police thereafter. The U.S. Department of State has built four police 

academies, with another two planned.55 Law enforcement agencies 

will become more professional as better vetting of recruits, greater 

salaries, and adequate equipment are introduced.56 Since the coalition 

has the insurgency contained, it only makes sense to focus the ANA 

where it can do the most good, and that is to extend the authority of 

the central government throughout the provinces.
13

 In view of Afghanistan’s traditions and history, the question arises 

whether the ANA can compete with the militia forces for the pride 

and respect of the local citizens. The warlord militia forces probably 

enjoy some residual approbation as a result of the mythological lore 

that surrounds the mujahidin, but they are also stigmatized by their 

predacious behavior throughout the warring years. It is well-known 

that the warlords were responsible for pre-Taliban oppression and 

atrocities that pervaded Afghanistan after the Soviets withdrew. 

Presently, many warlords and militia forces are complicit in the 

opium market, corruption, extortion, and intimidation of Afghan 

citizens.57 Notwithstanding the contrast in ethical behavior, the ANA 

is better trained, disciplined, and led than the militia forces.58

 This sanguine assessment may be surprising in view of the ANA’s 

precarious start. Established in May 2002, the ANA has a headline 

goal of 70,000 by 2008. As previously mentioned, the warlords only 

contributed their worst soldiers and equipment to the national army, 

and the majority of recruits were pressed into service. Consequently, 

desertion rates as high as 50 percent plagued the ANA due to poor 

motivation, low pay, corruption, and hazing. The second half of 

2004 revealed a leveling off of the high attrition primarily due to 

military and government reforms, although the specter of Soviet 

military doctrine may linger in some circles.59 To secure the ANA’s 

recruitment base, the coalition has established 23 National Army 

Volunteer Centers throughout Afghanistan, with a final goal of 35. 

The ANA has the capacity to train 3,000 recruits organized into four 

training battalions every 10 weeks. By September 2004, the ANA had 

an end-strength of 13,400, with an expected end-strength of 16,000 

by the end of 2004.60 Thus, the ANA now has the numbers to start 

making an impact throughout Afghanistan.

 The media awareness campaign can enhance the ANA’s image 

in the eyes of the people through general advertisements but also 

by ANA participation in reconstruction programs, farming projects, 

ceremonial events, and presence patrols in villages. Devoting air time 

to soldiers helping to rebuild the country and rendering assistance 

to the people not only enhances the appeal of the ANA, but also 

establishes a national bond between the people and the central 

government. Consequently, recruitment of quality volunteers for 
14

national service will gain momentum, extending the appeal of the 

central government and loosening the regional parochialism. Given 

the choice between the militia and the ANA, Afghan youths will 

increasingly choose the ANA.

 Correspondingly, the coalition provincial reconstruction 

teams (PRT) are an excellent vehicle for introducing the ANA and 

perhaps police forces into the provinces, as well as providing local 

employment through reconstruction projects. PRTs already conduct a 

host of activities in consultation with the local authorities that extend 

the authority and legitimacy of the central government through 

reconstruction projects, good governance initiatives, promotion of 

security, and other SSR related projects.61 Currently, the coalition 

operates 19 PRTs in the north and west, with future expansion to the 

south and east planned. Still, the PRTs are relatively small, ranging in 

size from 50 to 500 soldiers and depending on coalition member states 

to fill the ranks, a precarious source of manpower.62 Incorporating 

ANA soldiers into PRTs would permit an increase in the number 

and size of PRTs, as well as enhancing local cooperation, trust, and 

security. Through an expanded PRT labor and training program, 

local people could acquire new vocational skills, employment, and 

self-worth.

 The interface between the PRTs and local officials has been 

facilitated by the central government’s Afghan Reconstruction 

Group, which organizes reconstruction efforts among the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), UN, Afghan agencies, and 

nongovernment organizations (NGOs).63 Moreover, the central 

government has established the “National Solidarity Program 

which seeks to create local governing councils and to empower these 

councils to make decisions about local reconstruction priorities.”64

Reckoning that democracy in Afghanistan is best cultivated at the 

local level, the development council members are elected by secret 

ballot. By giving the inhabitants a voice and assistance, they can 

reconstruct the country on their own.65 With this in mind and because 

the Afghans will inevitably assume the task of reconstruction, it may 

serve the interests of the coalition to place more ANA soldiers under 

coalition leadership into the PRTs.

 PRTs may be the best method for transforming international 

financial aid into reconstruction and local vocational training. 
15

Although it is troubling that international aid pledges have proven 

to be more rhetoric than reality, reconstruction and assistance efforts 

must continue.66 PRTs can become the primary means for translating 

aid into assistance. PRTs are best placed to maximize monetary and 

equipment contributions by employing local labor. From an Afghan 

perspective, it may be more self-affirming for local Afghans and 

PRT personnel to work with picks, shovels, and wheelbarrows over 

a period of weeks rather than watch a PRT accomplish the same task 

alone with dump trucks, bulldozers, and backhoes in a week. Which 

method builds stronger bonds? Supplemented by a public awareness 

campaign, PRTs can become the locomotion of rapid reconstruction 

and social change to the farthest reaches of Afghanistan.

 The use of PRTs is not without controversy though. NGOs in 

Afghanistan believe they confuse the local inhabitants, who cannot 

differentiate between PRTs and NGOs. NGOs fear compromise 

by association,67 and many practice strict impartiality and eschew 

coordination with military forces and government authorities 

as a matter of political philosophy.68 This distinct separation is, 

from the standpoint of the NGOs, nonnegotiable. For coalition 

and central government efforts, this arrangement translates into 

some redundancies and inefficiencies. This leads to a meditative 

question: are NGOs a valued commodity to post-conflict operations 

or an obstacle to recovery? Afghanistan’s Ministry of Planning has 

2,296 NGOs and 321 international governmental organizations 

(IGOs) registered in its books, but only 100 are well-established 

organizations.69 Ramazan Bachardoust, the former head of the 

Ministry of Planning, has claimed that most of the NGOs are not 

legitimate aid organizations and are only interested in the money.70

Fair or not, the spreading perception among Afghans that NGOs are 

motivated by profits rather than reconstruction and assistance badly 

tarnishes their image, resulting in hostility and noncooperation. 

Add to this stigma the fact that NGOs and IGOs cannot visit parts 

of Afghanistan because of the security risks, the need for more PRTs 

becomes imperative. The intent of this section is not to denigrate 

NGOs, but merely to point out that self-serving aid organizations in 

Afghanistan have compromised the standing of NGOs. By necessity, 

military organizations like CFC-A will take a pragmatic stance, 
16

devoid of niceties―reinforce success, not failure. In this regard, PRTs 

have greater potential and should get the resources.

 Expanding the role of the ANA and the PRTs into the provinces 

increasingly will provide security and jobs. The increased interaction 

between the ANA and the local Afghans will enhance recruitment of 

quality soldiers and provide a tangible association with the central 

government. PRTs have the potential to generate jobs and skill sets 

among the local citizens, as well as increasing their sense of security 

and stability. Once law and order becomes self-perpetuating, the 

influence of the warlords will fade. The task of the central government 

is to set the conditions for the graceful exit of warlordism.

Conclusions.

Turning Afghanistan into a functioning state would be a very 

difficult enterprise, even without an ongoing insurgency, illicit 

opium market, and powerful warlords. As current trends portend, 

SSR will not fail catastrophically per se, but neither will it achieve 

the desired end state. Warlords remain the most virulent obstacle 

to Afghanistan’s future as a self-functioning and sovereign state. 

Because an open confrontation with the warlords would likely spark 

a widespread insurgency, which the Taliban, al Qaeda, and HIG 

would exploit, the coalition must seek imaginative stratagems to 

divorce Afghanistan from warlordism. Winning the hearts and minds 

requires an investment in a public awareness campaign, weaning the 

society off opium, and providing security and legitimate sources of 

livelihood which give Afghans hope in the future. These programs 

must complement and supplement SSR.

Recommendations.

 • Adapt ways and means to support the main objective―the 

legitimacy of the central government in the eyes Afghan 

people.

 • Invest resources for a public media campaign and test it in 

Afghanistan. Adapt it to other operations in the pursuit of the 

global war on terror.
17

 • Wean Afghan society off the opium market by targeting the 

economics of the trade, emphasizing the un-Islam dimensions 

of illicit drugs, and interdicting the trade before it leaves 

Afghanistan.

 • Invest heavily in PRTs and then populate with ANA soldiers 

and coalition cadre.

 • Remain cognizant of Afghanistan’s propensity towards 

xenophobia, regionalism, and conflict when executing SSR 

and supporting stratagems.

Regarding the last recommendation, many warlords are potent 

adversaries who will be quick to counter threats to their powerbase. 

But, given past warlord oppression and exploitation of the Afghan 

people, the aforementioned stratagems provide a powerful means 

to isolate the warlords from the people subtlely. Without a source of 

revenues and manpower, the majority of warlords will likely reach 

the appropriate conclusions, and seek accommodations with the 

central government or retire with honor. Should a few warlords opt to 

resist and seek a confrontation, the government will have the means 

in place to manage the threat. The public awareness campaign will 

assist in isolating these recalcitrant warlords politically, and the better 

trained and supported ANA will bring them to justice, solidifying the 

authority and legitimacy of the central government. The situation in 

Afghanistan is unique, but the use of a public awareness campaign, 

adaptive economic programs, and PRTs provides a paradigm for 

nation-building that resonates with the affected people. Failed states 

likely will remain on the international agenda; the leading powers 

should pursue effective and cost-effective ways to manage them.

ENDNOTES

1. The military coup by Mohammed Daoud in 1973 created discontent as a result of his 

harsh rule. Following his assassination on April 27, 1978, Afghan communists seized power 

and created the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The influx of Soviet advisors and 

communist-inspired reforms created a backlash throughout Afghanistan, leading to greater 

Soviet involvement until it concluded that only an invasion could stabilize the communist 

government. Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the 

Fall of the Taliban, New York: De Capo Press, 2002, pp. 229-241. 

 2. The Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost, 

Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress, trans. and eds., Lawrence, Kansas: University Press 

of Kansas, 2002, p. xxv; Tanner, pp. 255-256.
18

 3. Tanner, pp. 271-276.

 4. Christian Parenti, “Who Rules Afghanistan,” The Nation, November 15, 2004, p. 13, 

internet; Tanner, pp. 277-279.

 5. Tanner, pp. 279-287.

 6. William Zartman, Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate 

Authority, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995.

 7. Ibid., p. 5.

 8. Ibid., p. 10.

 9. Sector Security Reform is a lead-nation approach to rebuilding Afghanistan as a 

sovereign state. The five pillars of the strategy are: establishing the Afghan National Army 

(United States); establishing the judiciary system (Italy); establishing law enforcement 

agencies (Germany); disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating the Afghan Militia Forces 

into society (Japan); and counter-narcotics (United Kingdom). 

 10. For superb analysis and unique insights regarding the American-Northern Alliance 

war against the Taliban and al Qaeda, see Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of War: 

Implications for the Army and Defense Policy, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 

Army War College, November 2002.

 11. Kathy Gannon, “Afghanistan Unbound,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 3, May/June 

2004, p. 38.

 12. In accordance with the December 2001 Bonn Agreement: “Upon the official 

transfer of power, all mujahidin, Afghan armed forces and armed groups in the country 

shall come under the command and control of the Interim Authority, and be reorganized 

according to the requirements of the new Afghan security and armed forces.” “Agreement 

on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending The Re-establishment of Permanent 

Government Institutions,” UN Talks on Afghanistan, Bonn, December 5, 2001, Paragraph 

V, Final Provisions, internet, http://www.uno.de/frieden/afghanistan/talks/agreement.htm; James 

Astill, “Disarming Militiamen Vexes U.N. Force,” Washington Times, April 12, 2004, p. 14, 

internet.

 13. By June 2004, only 21,371 names were submitted for DDR. Minister of Defense 

Mohammed Fahim, the principal Afghan government official for DDR, is one of the 

principal DDR obstructionists. Jon Sawyer, “Optimistic Rhetoric Collides With Reality,” St. 

Louis Post-Dispatch, June 27, 2004, internet.

 14. As an incentive, processed militiamen are given $200 for their rifle, some food, 

and vocational training. Even here, the militia commanders undercut the incentives by 

seizing the $200 afterwards, claiming the rifles belonged to them. Astill, internet; Michael 

Bhatia, Kevin Lanigan, and Phillip Wilkinson, “Minimum Investments, Minimal Results: 

The Failure of Security Policy in Afghanistan,” Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 

June 2004, p. 16, internet, http://www.areu.org.af. Hereafter referred to as AREU.

 15. Carlotta Gall, “Afghan Poppy Growing Reaches Record Level, U.N. Says,” New 

York Times, November 19, 2004, internet; Malcolm Garcia, “Afghan Narcotics Industry 

Rebounds,” Miami Herald, April 20, 2004, internet; AREU, p. 16.

 16. As of September 2004, only 16,861 militiamen processed through DDR, far below 

the interim goal of 40,000 by the October 9 presidential elections. P. M. Cruickshank, “ANBP 

Status Report for 23 September,” Planning and Interim A&F. Colonel Randy Pullen, Public 

Affairs Officer, Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan, provided the weekly ANBP 

Status Reports via email.
19

 17. Hamida Ghafour, “Afghan Warlords Hand Over Heavy (And Old) Weapons,” Los 

Angeles Times, January 16, 2004, internet; Collection of heavy weapons is also part of DDR, 

but the warlords have only turned in antiquated weapons. Pamela Constable, “Karzai 

Attempts Diplomacy with Afghan Warlords,” WashingtonPost.com, May 19, 2004, p. A12, 

internet, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A37736-2004May18.

 18. Carlotta Gall and David Rohde, “Assessing The Afghan Election,” New York Times, 

October 20, 2004, p. 1, internet.

 19. Hamida Ghafour, “Karzai Shifts 3 Militia Leaders to Civilian Posts,” Los Angeles 

Times, July 21, 2004, internet; Christian Parenti, “Who Rules Afghanistan,” The Nation, 

November 15, 2004, p. 13, internet; A July 2004 British House of Commons Foreign Affairs 

Committee (CFAC) report concluded that co-opting the warlords was the only way to 

stem militia violence. Although warlords are part of the problem, they are also part of the 

solution. They will remain influential in Afghanistan and that can be either negative or 

positive. The warlords must be persuaded that cooperation, and not disruption, is in their 

best interests. Mevlut Katik, “Afghan Warlords Not Only Part of the Problem, But Also 

Part of the Solution—Expert,” Eurasia Insight, October 5, 2004, internet, http://eurasianet.org/

departments/insight/articles/eav081804a.shtm.

 20. Constable, p. A12.

21. Grau, p. xx; Tanner.

22. Ibid., p. xxi.

 23. Ibid., p. xxi; Tanner.

 24. Gulbuddin Hikmatyar founded Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) as a faction of the 

Hizb-I-Islami party in 1977, and it was one of the major mujahedin groups in the war against 

the Soviets. HIG has long established ties with Bin Ladin. In the early 1990s, Hikmatyar ran 

several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and was a pioneer in sending mercenary 

fighters to other Islamic conflicts. Hikmatyar offered to shelter Bin Ladin after the latter 

fled Sudan in 1996. HIG operates in Eastern Afghanistan, particularly Konar and Nurestan 

Provinces and adjacent to Pakistan’s tribal areas. Intelligence Research Program, “HizbI-Islami Gulbuddin, HIG,” Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/

para/hig.htm.

 25. Despite regime threats to punish violators, German citizens and soldiers tuned into 

this radio station for its entertainment value.

 26. Christof Mauch, The Shadow War Against Hitler, Jeremiah Riemer, trans., New York: 

Columbia University Press, 2003, pp. 149-162.

 27. Joseph W. Caddell, Deception 101―Primer on Deception, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, U.S. Army War College, December 2004.

 28. “Afghanistan,” Central Intelligence Agency—The World Factbook, November 2, 2004, 

internet, http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/af.html.

 29. Mr. Krohn uses the term “propaganda,” which, by strict definition, is a neutral 

term. However, the historical context gives the term such a pejorative flavor that it unduly 

distracts the reader from the main points. As a result, I have adopted the term public 

awareness campaign. Charles A. Krohn, “The Role of Propaganda in Fighting Terrorism,” 

Army Magazine, Vol. 54, No. 12, Association of the U.S. Army, December 2004, pp. 7-8.

 30. Krohn believes U.S. assumptions regarding the nature of warfare are behind the 

neglect of propaganda. With the U.S. military superiority in conventional warfare, the need 

for propaganda seems an unnecessary appendage. After all, once the United States has 
20

defeated the enemy forces on the battlefield, the enemy government is supposed to reach 

the appropriate conclusions and surrender. But what does the United States do if the enemy 

resorts to insurgent operations as part of a contingency plan, or post-conflict operations 

result in wide-spread internal power struggles? Ibid., pp. 7-8.

 31. Ibid., p. 7.

 32. Major Scott Nelson, Deputy Joint Interagency Effects Chief and CFC-A Spokesman, 

email inquiry, September 2004. “The Taliban is very effective with the use of information to 

influence the local population and the international community. They take credit for widely 

reported incidents and use intimidation, threats, night letters, and calls to Pakistan [sic], 

Afghan, and Western Media outlets to spread their messages.”

 33. Ibid.

 34. For a variety of technical reasons, coalition patrols meeting with village elders 

remains the primary means of disseminating coalition messages. Ibid.

 35. “2004 World Drug Report, Vol. 1: Analysis,” United Nations Office on Drugs and 

Crime, Vienna, Austria: United Nations Publication, 2004, p. 11, internet, http://www.unodc.

org.

 36. Ibid., pp. 11, 13. 

 37. F. Andy Messing, Jr. and Sarah J. Lippitt, “Perilous Afghan Undercurrents,” 

Washington Times, April 28, 2004, internet; Malcolm Garcia, “Afghan Narcotics Industry 

Rebounds,” Miami Herald, April 20, 2004, internet.

 38. Carlotta Gall, “Afghan Poppy Growing Reaches Record Level, U.N. Says,” New 

York Times, November 19, 2004, internet. Experts believe the Taliban and Hizb-i-Islami 

militants are relying on drug profits for funding. Ten to fifteen percent of the opium trade 

goes to HIG warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who funds Islamic militants in Chechnya and 

Uzbekistan with $120 million per year. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Pakistan’s InterServices Intelligence (ISI) agency receives payoffs from traffickers and assists in trafficking 

the heroin once inside the country. Logically, because the ISI is the patron of the Taliban, 

it, too, must profit from the heroin trade. Hamida Ghafour, “Opium Trade Still Entrenched 

Across Desperate Afghanistan,” Los Angeles Times, September 1, 2004, internet. 

 39. Hubert E. Bagley, Afghanistan: Opium Cultivation and its Impact on Reconstruction, 

U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project, Carlisle, PA, March 19, 2004, pp. 8-9.

 40. Bradley Graham, “U.S. Plans Assault on Afghan Heroin,” Washington Post, 

November 15, 2004, internet.

 41. Guy Dinmore, “US Plans to Eradicate Afghan Opium Crop,” London Financial Times, 

November 18, 2004, internet.

 42. “2004 World Drug Report, Volume 1: Analysis,” United Nations Office on Drugs and 

Crime, Vienna, Austria: United Nations Publication, 2004, pp. 13-14, internet, http://www.

unodc.org.

 43. Bagley, p. 9.

 44. “Foodcrops and Shortages—No 2,” Food and Agricultural Organization of the United 

Nations, May 2, 2004, internet, http://www.fao.org/documents/show_cdr.asp?url_file=/docrep/006/

J2254e/J2254e00.htm.

 45. Graham.

 46. Graham; Bagley.
21

 47. Carlotta Gall, “Afghan Poppy Growing Reaches Record Level, U.N. Says,” New 

York Times, November 19, 2004, internet. 

 48. Graham; Dinmore. In the future, Robert Charles, the Assistant Secretary of State 

for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, points out that the U.S. and 

UK authorities will assist in target selection, such as heroin laboratories, and provide 

support and training to the Afghans. The U.S. development agency, USAID, will provide 

development projects and aid packages to Afghan farmers before eradication occurs.

 49. Gall, “Afghan Poppy Growing Reaches Record Level, U.N. Says.”

 50. In support of these goals, the key to establishing the ANA as an enduring institution 

rests on the creation of three pillars: 1) well-trained and disciplined combat forces, 2) creation 

of military educational and training institutions, and 3) a reformed Ministry of Defense 

and General Staff. “ANA Building Program Briefing,” Office of Military CooperationAfghanistan, ANA Plans and Design Team, October 2003. Presented by Colonel Michael 

Taliento.

 51. The ANA should continue its rotation of units in counterinsurgency operations for 

combat experience, but the rest of the ANA needs to place unit training schedules on hiatus 

until warlordism is excised.

 52. Parenti, p. 13; Lieutenant General David W. Barno, “Special DoD News Briefing 

on Operations and Mission in Afghanistan,” Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense—

Public Affairs, October 19, 2004, internet, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/

tr20041019-1461.html; Keith B. Richburg, “Karzai Vows To Crack Down On Warlords, Drug 

Dealers,” Washington Post, November 5, 2004, p. 14, internet.

 53. Gretchen Peters and Aleem Agha, “Weary Taliban Coming in from the Cold,” 

Christian Science Monitor, December 14, 2004, p. 1, internet; “Goodbye, Taliban,” Wall Street 

Journal, December 22, 2004, p. 14, internet.

 54. Carlotta Gall and David Rohde, “Assessing The Afghan Election,” New York Times, 

October 20, 2004, internet.

 55. Robert B. Charles, “Accelerated Training in Iraq,” Washington Times, November 5, 

2004, p. 19, internet.

 56. “Poppies and Afghanistan,” Washington Times, August 22, 2004, p. B2, internet; 

Robert B. Charles, “Accelerated Training in Iraq,” Washington Times, November 5, 2004, 

internet. The International Development Law Organization has hitherto trained 2,450 judges 

and lawyers. Judicial sector reform has progressed the least and needs greater funding and 

resources if Afghanistan is to have the rule of law. Michael Bhatia, Kevin Lanigan, and 

Phillip Wilkinson, “Minimum Investments, Minimal Results: The Failure of Security Policy 

in Afghanistan,” Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, June 2004, pp. 17-19, internet, 

http://www.areu.org.af. 

 57. Gannon, pp. 36, 39-40.

 58. “New Afghan Army Asserts Itself,” Christian Science Monitor, August 23, 2004, 

internet.

 59. Hamida Ghafour, “Afghan Army Faces Long Campaign To Win Over Local 

Militias,” London Daily Telegraph, October 7, 2003, internet; “New Afghan Army Hit by 3,000 

Deserters,” London Daily Telegraph, January 12, 2004, internet. The author was a member of 

the ANA Plans and Design Team, Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan from July 

through November 2003. Although the ANA is a volunteer army, the stories of forced 
22

impressment, abuses, and corruption were prevalent. Dating back to 1919, the SovietAfghan military cooperation has left an enduring imprint. Grau, p. 10. 

 60. “Defending the Nation: The New Afghan Army is Struggling,” Economist, September 

11-17, 2004, internet; Randy Pullen, “Newest National Army Volunteer Center Opens 

in Sar-e-Pul,” Defend America, U.S. Department of Defense News, July 14, 2004, internet. 

Information on NAVC provided by Colonel Randy Pullen, Public Affairs Officer, Office of 

Military Cooperation-Afghanistan on December 10, 2004; Bhatia, p. 16.

 61. Barno; and “Afghanistan,” UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, downloaded from 

Internet on November 3, 2004, http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?parename=OpenMarket/

Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1077047464976.

 62. Charlie Coon, “Jones, NATO Recruiting In Europe For Afghanistan Effort,” European 

Stars and Stripes, November 3, 2004, internet.

 63. Stanley A. Weiss, “Afghanistan’s Need For Good Neighbors,” International Herald 

Tribune, September 2, 2004, internet.

 64. Zalmay Khalilzad, “Democracy Bubbles Up,” Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2004, p. 

16, internet.

 65. Ibid, p. 16.

 66. It was apparent by June 2004 that NATO had fallen short on its pledges to 

Afghanistan. The United States had provided $1.42 billion out of $3.3 pledged, and the 

European Commission, $386 million out of $1.24 billion pledged. Secretary General Jaap 

de Hoop Scheffer had tried in vain to compel NATO member states to fulfill their pledges 

ranging from supplies, equipment, manpower, headquarters, transport planes, helicopters, 

and intelligence assets. Even the initiative to deploy five more PRTs fell short of pledges. “A 

NATO Meeting of the Minds?” Washington Times, June 28, 2004, p. 16, internet.

 67. Gannon, pp. 42-43.

 68. Bhatia, p. 14.

 69. Sawyer, internet; Ramazan Bachardoust, the head of the Ministry of Planning, has 

335 IGOs and 2,300 Afghan Groups in his registry. He charged that 1,935 were not operating 

in accordance with the law and planned to dissolve them, but instead he has resigned over 

the issue. Carlotta Gall and Amy Waldman, “Under Siege In Afghanistan, Aid Groups Say 

Their Effort Is Being Criticized Unfairly,” New York Times, December 19, 2004, internet.

 70. Ibid.