In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo 

 

No. 07-23-00336-CR 

 

CHARLES JOVAN WILLIAMS, APPELLANT 

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE 

On Appeal from the 19th District Court 

McLennan County, Texas1 

Trial Court No. 2017-2066-C1, Honorable Thomas C. West, Presiding 

May 23, 2024 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before PARKER and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ. 

Appellant, Charles Jovan Williams, appeals his convictions on two counts of 

indecency with a child by contact and resulting sentences of eighteen and two years’ 

incarceration.2 Appellant contends that the trial court’s polling of the jury as to its 

1 Originally appealed to the Tenth Court of Appeals, this appeal was transferred to this Court by the 

Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. Should 

a conflict exist between precedent of the transferor court and this Court on any relevant issue, this appeal 

will be decided in accordance with the precedent of the transferor court. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.

2 Appellant was also fined $500 as part of the sentence for each count of conviction.
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numerical division during deliberations was coercive and deprived Appellant of his 

constitutional right to an impartial jury. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

BACKGROUND

As Appellant’s sole issue challenges the procedure leading to his conviction, we 

will not discuss the facts underlying his convictions. Appellant was indicted for one count 

of continuous sexual abuse of a young child3 and six counts of indecency with a child by 

contact.4 Appellant pleaded not guilty to all counts of the indictment. 

At the close of evidence, the case was submitted to the jury. After approximately 

four hours of deliberation, the jury sent a note to the trial court asking, “If we can come to 

an agreement on some but not all accounts [sic] is that okay?” In response, the trial court 

indicated that it “would like to know the vote on the non-unanimous counts.” The jury 

responded with a numerical breakdown as to each count other than count seven, where 

it appeared that the jury had reached a unanimous decision. In response, the trial court 

instructed the jury to “Please continue your deliberations.” Thirty-eight minutes later, the 

jury sent a note indicating that it had reached a verdict as to all counts. The jury’s verdict 

found Appellant guilty on counts two and seven. After the presentation of punishment 

evidence, the jury recommended that Appellant be sentenced to eighteen years’ 

incarceration and a $500 fine as to count two, and two years’ incarceration and a $500 

3 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02.

4 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11.
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fine as to count seven. After the trial court entered judgment in accordance with the jury’s 

verdicts, Appellant timely filed the instant appeal.

By his appeal, Appellant presents one issue. Appellant contends that the trial 

court’s inquiry into how the jury stood numerically as to the counts upon which the jury 

could not agree was coercive and deprived Appellant of his constitutional right to an 

impartial jury. Appellant does not identify any specific Texas authority providing that a 

trial court’s inquiry into the jury’s numerical division, without more, is coercive and 

deprives a defendant of an impartial jury.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

“Any criminal defendant . . . being tried by a jury is entitled to the uncoerced verdict 

of that body.” Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 241, 108 S. Ct. 546, 98 L. Ed. 2d 568 

(1988). It is not inherently improper for a trial court to require a jury to continue 

deliberating after it indicates that it is deadlocked. See Montoya v. State, 810 S.W.2d 

160, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc). However, a claim of jury coercion can arise 

when a trial court attempts to encourage a deadlocked jury to reach a verdict. Barnett v. 

State, 161 S.W.3d 128, 133 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005), aff’d, 189 S.W.3d 272 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2006). 

The Supreme Court of the United States has indicated that the mere inquiry by the 

trial court into the numerical division is error per se. Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 

448, 450, 47 S. Ct. 135, 71 L. Ed. 345 (1926). But the Supreme Court has subsequently 

noted that its decision was not based on any constitutional provision, but was an exercise 

of its supervisory powers, and need not be followed by state courts. Lowenfield, 484 U.S. 
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at 239–40 & n.3. Texas courts have held that a mere inquiry into a jury’s numerical 

division is not reversible error per se. See Howard v. State, 941 S.W.2d 102, 124 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1996) (en banc); Melancon v. State, 66 S.W.3d 375, 384–85 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d) (op. on en banc reh’g); Chairs v. State, 878 S.W.2d 

250, 252 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 1994, no pet.); Odom v. State, 682 S.W.2d 

445, 448 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1984, pet. ref’d). While not per se erroneous, it is 

possible that an inquiry into the numerical division will have an improper coercive effect 

on the jury. See Hollies v. State, 967 S.W.2d 516, 521–22 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, 

pet. ref’d) (per curiam) (combination of supplemental instructions and jury polling might 

result in constitutional violation). However, the determination of whether jury polling or 

supplemental instructions will have an improper coercive effect on the jury must be 

decided based on the facts and circumstances present in each case. Id.

In the present case, upon notification that the jury was deadlocked on certain 

counts, the trial court inquired as to the numerical divide amongst the jury. See Odom, 

682 S.W.2d at 448 (as here, appellant did not cite a single Texas case establishing that 

making inquiry into numerical division is reversible error per se). It did not inquire into 

how many were in favor of or opposition to conviction. See Hollies, 967 S.W.2d at 522 

(“in a search for error of constitutional dimension, the fact that a trial court does not search 

out and publicly target, specifically or inferentially, specific members of the jury and by a 

supplemental Allen charge urge them to re-evaluate their views, is very important vis-àvis coercion of a verdict” (emphasis in original)). Its supplemental instruction simply 

directed the jury to continue its deliberations. See Ford v. State, 14 S.W.3d 382, 395 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (“A trial court’s instruction to a jury to 
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continue deliberating will not be construed as coercive unless it pressures the jurors into 

reaching a verdict or contains additional instructions as to the law.”). In this case, the trial 

court’s inquiry into the numeric division of the jury, made without actively identifying jurors 

with minority viewpoints and instructing them to reexamine their perspectives, is not 

coercive. Howard, 941 S.W.2d at 124. As such, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Judy C. Parker

 Justice

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