97-164

 No. 97-164

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

 1997

CENEX, INC.,

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

 v.

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR YELLOWSTONE COUNTY, 

acting through the Chairperson, MIKE MATHEW and its Members, 

JAMES A. ZIEGLER, SR., and BILL KENNEDY, THE COUNTY OF 

YELLOWSTONE, THE YELLOWSTONE COUNTY TREASURER, 

THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE FOR THE STATE OF 

MONTANA, and THE YELLOWSTONE COUNTY ASSESSOR,

 Defendants & Respondents.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Yellowstone,

 The Honorable Maurice R. Colberg, Jr., Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 David A. Veeder and Jolane D. Veeder, Veeder Law Firm,

 Billings, Montana

 For Respondents:

 Dennis Paxinos, Yellowstone County Attorney;

 Thomas D. Gai, Deputy County Attorney;

 Billings, Montana

 Submitted on Briefs: June 19, 1997

 Decided: July 2, 1997

Filed:

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 __________________________________________

 Clerk Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the 

opinion of the Court.

 The appellant, Cenex, Inc., filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the

District Court for the Thirteenth Judicial District in Yellowstone County in which

Yellowstone County and various County officials were named as defendants. Cenex

sought a determination that it was entitled to a property tax reduction as an 

expanding

industry. Cenex and the Board of Commissioners for Yellowstone County filed motions

for summary judgment. After a hearing, the District Court denied Cenex's motion and

granted the Board's motion. Cenex appeals. We affirm the judgment of the District

Court.

 The following issues are presented on appeal:

 1. Did the District Court err when it concluded that the plain language of

 15-24-1401 and -1402, MCA, gives the Board discretion to deny, in part, Cenex's

application for property tax reduction as a new or expanding industry?

 2. Did the District Court err when it awarded costs of suit to Yellowstone

County when no bill of costs had been filed?

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 Between March 1992 and December 1993, Cenex constructed a 92 million dollar

hydrodesulfurization ("HDS") unit and corresponding waste water facilities in

Yellowstone County. On December 22, 1993, Cenex applied to Yellowstone County for

an expanding industry property tax reduction, pursuant to 15-24-1401 and -1402,

MCA. On December 23, 1993, Cenex filed an additional application with the Air

Quality Division and the Water Quality Bureau of the Montana Department of Health and

Environmental Sciences ("MDHES") to have the HDS unit and waste water facilities

classified as Class 5 pollution control equipment, pursuant to 15-6-135, MCA; Class

5 property is taxed at a significantly reduced rate.

 The Board of Commissioners for Yellowstone County adopted the new and

expanding industry tax reduction provided for in 15-24-1401 and -1402, MCA, by

Resolution 92-12 on March 26, 1992. The resolution resolved that "it is in the 

public

interest to encourage economic development in Yellowstone County through the use of

amended tax incentives for new and expanding industry." It also described the

procedures for obtaining the tax incentives in an attached Exhibit A. The Board 

amended

Resolution 92-12 on May 31, 1994, by Resolution 94-42, which amended the definition

of "qualifying" to except "property that has already received a tax reduction 

through some

other incentive programs." On October 4, 1994, the Board further amended part of the

language in Resolution 92-12 to state that "Qualifying applicants may, in the 

discretion

of the County Commissioners, receive property tax reductions" where it had previously

stated that "Qualifying applicants will receive property tax reductions."

 After considering the application and conducting public hearings concerning the

application, the Board granted Cenex's application for its Class 4 and Class 8 

property

on June 29, 1995. After learning from MDHES that the majority of the HDS and waste

water facilities with a value of approximately 72 million dollar had been classified 

as

Class 5 property, it denied Cenex's application as it applied to the Class 5 

property. Had

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Cenex's application been fully granted, its tax reduction for the Class 5 property 

for 1994

would have been approximately $266,000. Prior to Cenex's application, the Board had

approved three other applications that included Class 5 property pursuant to 15-

24-

1401 and -1402, MCA. Since the rejection of Class 5 property in Cenex's application,

the Board has consistently denied tax incentive applications for Class 5 property.

 Cenex filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the District Court. Cenex

maintained that it was entitled to the tax incentive benefit pursuant to 15-24-

1401 and

-1402, MCA, and that the Board's partial denial of its application constituted an

unauthorized exercise of discretion pursuant to the statute. Cenex and the Board 

both

filed motions for summary judgment. After a hearing, the District Court denied 

Cenex's

motion and granted the Board's motion for summary judgment. The court held that the

Board is immune from suit pursuant to 2-9-111, MCA. It also held, however, that 

the

clear language of 15-24-1401 and -1402, MCA, gives the Board discretion to reject

or approve applications and, therefore, that the Board acted within its authority 

when it

excepted Cenex's Class 5 property from the tax reduction. Finally, it awarded costs 

to

Yellowstone County in the amount of $852.75 for deposition and photocopy expenses.

 DISCUSSION

 Did the District Court err when it concluded that the plain language of 15-

24-

1401 and -1402, MCA, gives the Board discretion to deny in part Cenex's application 

for

property tax reduction as a new and expanding industry?

 When we review a District Court's order granting summary judgment, we consider

the issue decided de novo. Mead v. M.S.B., Inc. (1994), 264 Mont. 465, 470, 872 P.2d

782, 785. We determine whether there is an absence of genuine issues of material 

fact

and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Brinkman &

Lenon v. P&D Land Enterprises (1994), 263 Mont. 238, 241, 867 P.2d 1112, 1114;

Minnie v. City of Roundup (1993), 257 Mont. 429, 431, 849 P.2d 212, 214.

 Section 15-24-1402, MCA, states in relevant part:

 (1) In the first 5 years after a construction permit is issued, qualifying

improvements or modernized processes that represent new industry or expansion

of an existing industry, as designated in the approving resolution, must be taxed

at 50% of their taxable value. Each year thereafter, the percentage must be

increased by equal percentages until the full taxable value is attained in the 10th

year. In subsequent years, the property must be taxed at 100% of its taxable value.

 (2) (a) In order for a taxpayer to receive the tax benefits described in

subsection (1), the governing body of the affected county or the incorporated city

or town must have approved by separate resolution for each project, following due

notice as defined in 76-15-103 and a public hearing, the use of the schedule

provided for in subsection (1) for its respective jurisdiction. The governing body

may not grant approval for the project until all of the applicant's taxes have been

paid in full. Taxes paid under protest do not preclude approval. 

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 (b) The governing body may end the tax benefits by majority vote at any

time, but the tax benefits may not be denied an industrial facility that previously

qualified for the benefits. 

 (c) The resolution provided for in subsection (2)(a) must include a definition

of the improvements or modernized processes that qualify for the tax treatment that

is to be allowed in the taxing jurisdiction. The resolution may provide that real

property other than land, personal property, improvements, or any combination

thereof is eligible for the tax benefits described in subsection (1). 

 (3) The taxpayer shall apply to the department for the tax treatment allowed

under subsection (1). The application by the taxpayer must first be approved by

the governing body of the appropriate local taxing jurisdiction, and the governing

body shall indicate in its approval that the property of the applicant qualifies for

the tax treatment provided for in this section. Upon receipt of the form with the

approval of the governing body of the affected taxing jurisdiction, the department

shall make the assessment change pursuant to this section. 

 In this case, Cenex contends that the language of the statute obligates the 

local

governing body to grant the tax incentive to applicants who have complied with the

specific application requirements. We recently stated:

 In interpreting a statute, the prime consideration must be defining the

objectives the legislature sought to achieve. Montana Wildlife Federation v. Sager

(1980), 190 Mont. 247, 264, 620 P.2d 1189, 1199. The legislative intent is to be

ascertained, in the first instance, from the plain meaning of the words used. 

Boegli v. Glacier Mountain Cheese Co. (1989), 238 Mont. 426, 429, 777 P.2d

1303, 1305. If the intent of the legislature can be determined from the plain

meaning of the words used in the statute, the plain meaning is controlling and the

Court need not go further and apply any other means of interpretation. Phelps v.

Hillhaven Corp. (1988), 231 Mont. 245, 251, 752 P.2d 737, 741.

Hern Farms, Inc. v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. (Mont. 1996), 930 P.2d 84, 87, 53 

St.

Rep. 1478, 1480. In this case, we conclude that the plain language of the statute 

clearly

reflects the Legislature's intent that tax reductions for improvements which 

constitute new

or expanded industry be granted at the discretion of the local governing body.

 The statute grants discretion to the local governing body in several ways. 

First,

as cited by the District Court, the plain language of 15-24-1402(2)(a), MCA, 

requires

Board "approv[al] by separate resolution for each project." Additionally, subsection

(2)(b) allows the Board to "end the tax benefits by majority vote at any time," and

subsection (2)(c) allows the Board to "provide that real property other than land, 

personal

property, improvements, or any combination thereof is eligible for the tax benefits

described in subsection (1)." If the Board can make eligible any combination of 

property,

it necessarily follows that the Board may exclude any combination of property.

 Thus, every application is subject to the Board's review and approval pursuant 

to

 1402 before it qualifies to receive the tax incentive. The statute's operation 

clearly

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contemplates a substantive role for the Board in its consideration of each 

application, and

the statute as a whole must be read to grant the Board discretion to approve or deny

applications for the tax incentive.

 Finally, we have previously discussed the implications of statutory use of the 

word

"approval" in McCarten v. Sanderson (1941), 111 Mont. 407, 415, 109 P.2d 1108, 1111. 

There, we stated, "'[a]pproval of the application' is not ordinarily limited in 

meaning to

a mere verification of the facts stated in the application. 'Approval' implies 

knowledge

and the exercise of discretion after knowledge, the exercise of judgment . . . unless

limited by the context of the statute." McCarten, 111 Mont. at 415, 109 P.2d at 1111

(citations omitted). Here, the statute neither limits the Board's authority to 

approve or

deny applications, nor does it provide specific requirements for the Board to follow 

in its

decision. Rather, the Board has the explicit authority both to end the benefit and 

to

determine that "any combination [of property] is eligible for the tax benefits." 

Section

15-24-1402(2)(c), MCA. Accordingly, "approve" must be interpreted in its ordinary

sense to confer discretion on the Board to approve or deny applications pursuant to 

the

statute.

 Cenex contends that the Board's denial of its application as to Class 5 property

constitutes an illegal and discriminatory exercise of discretion pursuant to the 

statute. 

First, however, the statute plainly grants the Board authority to approve or deny tax

applications, including the discretion to make certain kinds of property eligible 

and other

kinds ineligible. Second, the Board's approval of three previous applications that

included Class 5 property did not preclude a change in the Board's policy, based on 

its

continued experience with revenue impacts. As the District Court stated, "[t]he 

fact that

earlier taxpayers were allowed tax benefits on Class 5 property did not mean that the

Commissioners were required to grant such benefits forever concerning such property."

 In fact, the Board had previously been unaware of the full consequences of

approving the tax incentive pursuant to 15-24-1401 and -1402, MCA, for Class 5

property. Since its realization, the Board has consistently denied applicants the 

new or

expanding industry tax incentive for Class 5 property. The potential and 

significant loss

of tax revenue to the County and its schools if Class 5 property receives the 

additional

tax benefit is of legitimate interest to the County and one obvious reason why 

governing

bodies were granted discretion to approve or deny each application. Furthermore, the

means chosen by the Legislature to safeguard this interest is rationally related to 

that

objective and, therefore, does not violate substantive due process, as asserted by 

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Cenex. 

See Plumb v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court (Mont. 1996), 927 P.2d 1011, 1016, 53 St.

Rep. 1187, 1191.

 Cenex also contends that language in Exhibit A to Resolution 92-12 compels the

Board to grant the tax benefit upon Cenex's completion of the necessary 

administrative

procedures. It relies on the statement that "Qualifying applicants will receive 

property tax

reductions." However, Cenex ignores other language that clearly reaffirms the 

Board's

discretion. For example, Exhibit A's definition of "qualifying" tracks the language 

in

 15-24-1401, MCA, and the following statement plainly notifies the applicant that 

receipt

of the tax benefit is subject to the Board's approval: "The [Board] may approve an

application by separate resolution . . . only after the applicant has completed the

following . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Contrary to Cenex's assertion, this statement 

does

not render the statute's and Exhibit's definition of "qualifying" meaningless. 

Rather, it

serves to implement the statutory grant of discretion to the Board. As stated by the

District Court, none of the resolutions relied on by Cenex constituted the separate

resolution called for by statute to approve an application. Thus, regardless of 

which

resolution the Board applied in considering Cenex's application, ultimately, the 

Board was

statutorily entitled to either approve or to deny the application.

 Both parties spend considerable time addressing whether the Board has immunity

pursuant to 2-9-111, MCA, which pertains to legislative acts. Cenex's complaint,

however, seeks a declaratory judgment regarding the meaning of 15-24-1401 and -

1402, MCA. The Board's liability is not at issue. Therefore, we need not address 

the

issue of legislative immunity. We conclude that the plain language of 15-24-1401 

and

-1402, MCA, grants discretion to the local body to approve or disapprove tax 

reduction

for improvements related to new or expanding industry, and that the record discloses 

no

issues of material fact. For that reason, we affirm the judgment of the District 

Court.

 ISSUE 2

 Did the District Court err when it awarded costs of suit to Yellowstone County

when no bill of costs had been filed?

 Cenex has raised for the first time on appeal its objection to the District 

Court's

award of $852.75 to the Board for deposition and photocopy costs. Its objection is 

based

on the Board's failure to file a bill of costs pursuant to 25-10-201, MCA. 

Generally,

we will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Weeks 

(1995),

270 Mont. 63, 86, 891 P.2d 477, 491. Here, however, the Board's failure to file a 

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bill

of costs deprived Cenex of its opportunity to object in the District Court and, 

thus, we

conclude that Cenex cannot be deemed to have waived its right to appeal the award of

costs. 

 The Board's failure to file a bill of costs constitutes a waiver of its right 

to costs. 

See, e.g., Bloemsma v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n (Mich. App., 1991), 476 N.W.2d 487;

DeWald v. Isola (Mich. App. 1991), 470 N.W.2d 505; Hydratec, Inc. v. Sun Valley

(1990), 223 Cal. App. 3d 924, 272 Cal. Rptr. 899. Accordingly, we hold that the

District Court erred when it assessed the $852.75 for deposition and photocopy costs

against Cenex after the Board failed to file a bill of costs.

 We affirm the District Court's order granting summary judgment to the Board and

denying summary judgment to Cenex. We reverse the District Court's order awarding

costs to the Board, and remand to the District Court for entry of judgment 

consistent with

this opinion.

 /S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

We Concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

s

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