COLOMBIA’S PARAMILITARIES:

 CRIMINALS OR POLITICAL FORCE?

David Spencer

December 2001
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ii
FOREWORD

 This monograph supplements a special series stemming from

a major conference entitled “Implementing Plan Colombia:

Strategic and Operational Imperative.” The conference was

cosponsored by the Dante B. Fascell North-South Center of the

University of Miami and the Strategic Studies Institute of the

U.S. Army War College. The intent was to explore the multiple

dimensions of Colombia’s ongoing crisis and inform the public

debate regarding the challenges faced by the statesmen,

intellectuals, military strategists, and others who take on the

responsibility to deal with that crisis.

Some of the monographs in the series have generated

passions. This is another one that is likely to do that. Hopefully, it

will also generate serious reflection about the tough choices

Colombian, U.S., and other global leaders face. The author, David

Spencer, points out, first, that the Colombian paramilitary

“self-defense” forces represent some important sectors of society,

and enjoy more popular support from Colombian society than the

insurgents. Second, the paramilitaries have developed into a

powerful irregular force that is proving itself capable of

challenging Colombian guerrillas. Third, while they commit

horrendous atrocities, they have been successful where the state

has not. Therefore, the paramilitaries are seen by many as a

viable solution to the conflict. Finally, he argues that until the

segments of the society represented by the paramilitaries

are—somehow—incorporated into the solution to the Colombian

crisis, there will be no solution.

This is a timely report. The Strategic Studies Institute and

the North-South Center are pleased to offer this monograph as a

contribution to the international security debate on the situation

in Colombia.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

DAVID SPENCER is a defense analyst who works on a

variety of contracts, mostly dealing with Latin America and

low intensity conflict. He also works part-time for the

Center for Naval Analyses. He is an expert on Latin

American insurgency and counterinsurgency strategy,

operations, and tactics, and has been a regular lecturer at

the Air Force Special Operations School since 1996. Mr.

Spencer has lived over 13 years in six Latin American

countries to include Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,

Guatemala, El Salvador, and Venezuela. He is completing

his Ph.D. dissertation on insurgent logistics in Latin

America at George Washington University. He has

published five books, two on strategy and tactics of the

Salvadoran FMLN guerrillas, and numerous articles on

different defense and military history subjects.

iv
SUMMARY

This monograph provides a sobering discussion of some

important facts regarding Colombia’s paramilitary

organizations. It points out that the paramilitary

“self-defense” organizations pose a complex problem for the

Colombian state in its search for a solution to current

40-plus-year-old internal war. First, the paramilitaries

represent some important sectors of society and enjoy more

popular support from the Colombian people than the

insurgents. Second, the paramilitaries have developed into

a powerful irregular military force that is proving itself

capable of challenging the guerrillas. Third, while they

commit horrendous atrocities, they have been successful

where the state has not. Therefore, they are seen by many as

a viable solution to the continuing conflict. The author

concludes with an admonition; that is, the paramilitary

issue must be addressed, and hard choices have to be made.

Until the segments of the society represented by the

paramilitaries are—somehow—incorporated into the

solution to the Colombian crisis, there will be no solution.

v
COLOMBIA’S PARAMILITARIES

1

:

 CRIMINALS OR POLITICAL FORCE?

Introduction.

The paramilitaries pose a complex problem for the

Colombian state in its search for a solution to the current

40-plus-year-old guerrilla war. Popular portrayals of the

movement attempt to characterize its members as heartless

indiscriminate killers at the service of drug lords and

renegade generals. While there is some truth to this

portrait, the problem is much more complex. Unfortunately,

throwing generals in jail, arresting drug traffickers, and

killing paramilitary leaders will not rid Colombia of the

phenomenon because this solution does not address the

origins and dynamics of the problem.

The reality is that, despite their numerous atrocities,

there will be no real peace settlement in Colombia without

addressing the grievances of these so-called “self-defense”

organizations. First, the paramilitaries represent some

fairly important sectors of society and enjoy more popular

support from Colombian society than the guerrillas. Second,

the paramilitaries have developed into a powerful irregular

force that is proving itself capable of challenging Colombia’s

guerrillas. Third, while they commit horrendous atrocities,

they have been successful where the state has not.

Therefore they are seen by some as a possible solution to the

conflict. 

This has made them a real third actor in the conflict. The

polemical argument that the paramilitaries are a child of

the armed forces and drug traffickers may at one time have

had merit. However, now this argument is anachronistic, as

over the last 10 years the paramilitaries have increasingly

demonstrated their independence. While they are not

antistate, they have the potential to develop into a

political-military antistate movement that could eventually

1
pose a greater threat to Colombian democracy than the

guerrillas, because of their greater popular support.

A Rational Explanation for the Existence of the

Paramilitaries.

This monograph is not an apology for the paramilitaries.

Their acts of murder are reprehensible and will only fuel the

continuing cycle of violence, preventing Colombia from

developing the strong democratic institutions it desperately

needs to bring lasting peace to that nation. The purpose of

this monograph is to try to develop some understanding of

the dynamics of a movement that is little understood inside

or outside Colombia. To understand the paramilitary

phenomenon, the context in which their violence occurs

needs to be explained.

The core of their intense violence is the pent-up anger

and frustration of important sectors of the rural population

at guerrillas who have terrorized the countryside for

30-plus years. This has been exacerbated by a state that has

been unable to provide more than fleeting relief from

insurgent violence. The atrocities of the paramilitaries are

not acts of abnormal men, but rather the acts of normal men

subjected to and victimized by unremitted violence, who see

the disappearance of the guerrillas as the only sure solution

to their plight. After 30 years of insurgent terror, the

supporters of the paramilitaries have little faith in

negotiations between the government and guerrillas, where

they are not represented. With one or two important

exceptions, the history of peace negotiations in Colombia

has largely been one of disappointment. These agreements

have never resulted in peace for rural areas. Even when

guerrilla groups such as the M-19 and the Popular

Liberation Army (EPL) demobilized, other insurgent

groups quickly filled the vacuum. The continual inability of

the government to bring peace or provide adequate

protection to the population in the rural areas has provoked

people to take matters into their own hands and protect

2
themselves against the insurgents. The paramilitaries are

the outcome of these efforts.

More Than Drug Traffickers and Army Thugs.

The guerrillas and human rights groups often describe

the paramilitaries in terms of their connections and

subordination to the armed forces and drug traffickers.

While there is quite a bit of literature that indicates that

high levels of collusion, cooperation, and support between

paramilitary groups and military officers as well as drug

trafficking organizations occurred, particularly in the

paramilitaries formative period, these links have

diminished over time. There are undoubtedly still

important links to individuals in the armed forces (some at

high levels) and drug traffickers. However, it is a serious

oversimplification to view the paramilitaries as an irregular

branch of the army, or as the armed wing of the narcotics

traffickers. Polemical characterizations of this movement

ignore the rapidly evolving dynamics of the group and its

increasing presence as an autonomous force in the

Colombian conflict. Calling the paramilitaries “narcos” or

“military death squads” is as unconstructive as calling

revolutionary movements “bandits” or “terrorists,” a

common practice designed to deny insurgent organizations

political legitimacy.

Whether or not official legitimacy is granted to the

paramilitary movement, the fact remains that they have a

real mass base, whose members and supporters view the

movement as the best solution to a number of serious

grievances that have not been and cannot be resolved under

current parameters by the Colombian state. More

importantly, this social base seems to be growing, not

diminishing. The paramilitaries have taken the law into

their own hands, and created highly sophisticated

“vigilante justice” groups. So whether they are granted

legitimacy or not is irrelevant. They are a real political and

3
military force and must be dealt with as such if Colombia

ever hopes to attain peace.

Origins of Paramilitaries.

To understand the paramilitaries, it is useful to look at

the context within which they developed. Colombia is a

country with a history of terrible political violence

extending back to 1948, and earlier. While the tide of battle

has ebbed and flowed and the players have changed over the

years, groups always have threatened the stability of the

state through violence. Over the last 30 years, the

destabilizing elements have largely been Marxist guerrilla

groups. During the last decade, the level of that violence

intensified largely because of the increasing role of drug

trafficking in the conflict. Since the dismantling of the

Medellín and Cali drug cartels by the Colombian

government, the monopolies held by the mafias have been

broken, and the benefits of the illicit trade have spread to a

much wider group of traffickers. Among the beneficiaries

have been the guerrilla organizations, primarily the

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), but also

the Ejircito de Liveracion Nacional (ELN). While the exact

level of their involvement in drug trafficking is still subject

to debate, no doubt exists that the insurgent role in

narcotics trafficking is a prominent one, no longer of a

marginal or subsidiary nature. This important role is

supported by increasing evidence of guerrilla involvement

at all levels of the business. FARC involvement in drug

trafficking began as a conscious strategic decision in 1982.

Taxing drug traffickers was regarded as the best way to

obtain resources to purchase arms and fund the revolution.

Although over the next 10 years the FARC condemned drug

trafficking and issued internal declarations that they

needed to get out of the business, the evidence indicates that

their involvement only deepened. The FARC became

addicted to the money. Also, the population involved in the

cultivation, harvesting, and processing of drug crops

became prime recruiting ground for the guerrilla armies.

4
Through the drug trade, the guerrillas acquired enough

resources to launch mobile warfare in 1996. They began

overrunning smaller military installations and defeating

army combat formations in open battle. The funds from

narcotics are supplemented by additional means of raising

revenue, such as kidnapping, extortion, protection rackets,

and other “war taxes.”

This is a predatory business with many victims,

especially in rural areas where the state has little presence.

For example, the federation of cattle ranchers (FEDEGAN)

reported that in 1997 they suffered losses of $750 million

dollars, largely to guerrilla theft and extorsion.

2

 The

consequences of resisting these extortive taxes is severe and

includes kidnapping, death, and destruction of property.

The usual victims of the guerrillas are not the very rich, who

mostly avoid the rural areas but instead the more

vulnerable small, independent farmers, ranchers,

professionals, and merchants. For the past 30 years, these

people have suffered greatly at the hands of the guerrilla

groups. The last 10 years have been particularly severe as

the latter have gained strength.

Not coincidentally, the paramilitary movement has seen

its greatest development over this same decade. To

understand the growth of the movement, it is useful to

recount the history of its most notorious leader, Carlos

Castaño, since his background is not atypical of the

constituents of the paramilitary groups. Castaño grew up in

rural Antioquia, the son of a small rancher, not far from

Medellín. When he was 15, FARC guerrillas kidnapped his

father. When the family was only able to pay part of the

huge ransom, the rebels killed their captive. After this, the

Castaño sons swore revenge. The four brothers went to the

army and volunteered to act as guides against the

insurgents. They enjoyed some initial success, but were

frustrated when many of the guerrillas captured due to

their efforts were released by the courts for lack of evidence.

Furthermore, the army never consolidated control over

rural areas, and when the soldiers withdrew, the rebels

5
returned and continued to terrorize the area and exact

revenge against those suspected of helping the army.

Subsequently, the Castaño brothers decided to quit

working with the army and create their own antiguerrilla

group. In the beginning, they tried to confront the

insurgents directly, but after suffering heavy losses during

the first skirmishes, they realized that the rebels were

better armed and had more resources and combat

experience than they did. So the Castaños decided to make a

tactical shift and fight the guerrillas with more irregular

warfare methods than the latter used against the

government. In other words, they would out-guerrilla the

guerrillas. Instead of attacking the rebels’ combat forces,

they focused on the guerrilla infrastructure, including their

noncombatant administrators, supply lines, communications, and those fighters who came into the towns for rest

and relaxation. This method proved successful, and as the

insurgents began to suffer losses, the self-defense

movement grew rapidly as those who paid protection money

to the guerrillas began to give money to the paramilitaries

instead. Other victims who had suffered like the Castaños

joined in significant numbers.

Because of the paramilitaries’ successes, a number of

individual Colombian army officers tolerated and

encouraged them. This included the provision of

intelligence and weapons, as well as putting them in touch

with retired officers who provided training and technical

assistance. Many retired officers and ex-soldiers also joined

the various groups. This tolerance and encouragement

occurred because of shared objectives and because the

paramilitaries made the army’s job of public security much

easier. In addition, former guerrillas who had laid down

their weapons during the various peace processes became

an unlikely source of paramilitary recruitment. Insurgents

who had refused to surrender their arms began an

extermination campaign against those who had “come in

from the cold.” After numerous murders, the surviving

6
ex-guerrillas formed paramilitary groups to defend

themselves against their former comrades.

Perhaps the most remarkable thing about the

paramilitary phenomenon is that it did not develop as a

monolithic group, which then spread in an organized

fashion to other areas, but rather as the spontaneous idea of

a number of people coming to the same conclusion around

the same time, who formed their organizations

independently of each other. During the mid- to late 1980s,

the paramilitaries were largely separate “self-defense”

groups, with the single common denominator of fighting the

guerrillas. Some were essentially defensive in nature,

either hired security for wealthy landowners, or citizen

militias that were legal up to 1989. Others were more

ambitious, their objective being to not only protect

themselves from the insurgents, but also to take the war to

guerrilla sanctuaries. Others still were hired killers of the

drug traffickers, seeking revenge on guerrilla groups trying

to make easy money by extorting the mafias. The strongest

movements of the latter type developed in the Urabá region

of Antioquia, the Eastern Grasslands south and east of

Bogotá, and the Middle Magdalena region in lands just

south of the Atlantic coast.

The Paramilitaries and the Medellín Cartel.

The paramilitaries gained notoriety when some of the

groups in the Middle Magdalena were created or co-opted by

the Medellín Cartel, particularly under Gonzalo Rodríguez

Gacha (“El Mejicano”). The mafiosos armed them, brought

in Israeli and British mercenaries to train them, and used

them to fight the cartel’s competitors in Cali. They were also

used against the guerrillas in order to avoid paying the high

fees the FARC was demanding to protect drug proccessing

laboratories. But the relationship began to wane in 1990,

when Fidel Castaño discovered that Pablo Escobar was

developing similar ties with the ELN and the FARC to fight

the state. Escobar provided money and resources to the

7
ELN in exchange for acts of terrorism that advanced the

interests of the traffickers. That same year Escobar

imported weapons for the FARC in exchange for unspecified

work. While Castaño had few qualms about drug trafficking

(that was an American problem), he was not antistate. The

conflict between Escobar and Fidel Castaño became open

and bitter, resulting in a number of killings on both sides.

Cartel support for the paramilitaries greatly diminished

during this time, with most of the ties finally broken when

Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha was killed in 1991.

The paramilitary units under the domination of the

Medellin Cartel committed barbarous atrocities, killing

peasants en masse for crimes of guilt by association. The

selection of targets varied from group to group, and some

were less discriminate than others. According to Castaño,

such methods were “mistakes” and “errors.” However, since

similar acts are still being committed, claims to have

corrected them must be taken with more than a few grains

of salt.

Successes of the Paramilitaries: Areas Cleared

of Guerrillas and Making Economic Progress.

Despite these “errors,” the paramilitary movement was

successful in its primary goal of fighting the guerrillas. The

paramilitaries claim that they played an important role in

forcing the guerrillas of the EPL to sue for peace and

demobilize. The evidence supports this assertion. In

addition, the paramilitaries eradicated guerrilla groups

from much of the Gulf of Uraba area in Antioquia and

enjoyed similar success in Córdoba and other parts of the

country. 

Also, evidence suggests that where the paramilitaries

have cleaned out the guerrillas, they have sometimes

restored a degree of economic prosperity. For example, a

journalist visiting San Pedro, Urabá, one of the towns that

was first “liberated” by the paramilitaries, noted that the

town is now doing well economically. In addition, there is no

8
crime or “antisocial” behavior in San Pedro. The town is

governed by a set of strict rules of conduct. While the cost of

disobeying these norms is high, the cost for opposing the

guerrillas in the areas they dominate has also been high, so

the local population probably does not notice much

difference. The difference for the locals is that, in the rebel

zones, farms have been abandoned and business is down. An

indicative statistic is property values. When the insurgents

dominated the area, property was worth about $35 per

hectare. Today, under the domination of the paramilitaries,

the same property is worth around $670 per hectare. The

guerrillas tear down public authority and are economic

predators, while the paramilitaries restore a form of law

and order and the economy. Because of this, those who

remain in the zones dominated by the paramilitaries feel

little sympathy for those who were killed or driven out.

3

This difference is highly appealing to sectors of the rural

zones affected by the guerrillas. Many people in these areas

are willing to pay the social costs to obtain the benefits

because the insurgents are already imposing a similar cost

on local inhabitants. If a social cost is to be paid, and the

choice is between economic prosperity and economic

depredation, logic seems to lean toward the former.

As the paramilitary movement has been increasingly

successful, it has received more monetary support and more

appeals from new areas to form units in zones affected by

the guerrillas. However, not all has been love and

fraternity, as there have been recent complaints by rural

towns that the paramilitary groups are making taxing

demands on their resources as well. As time passes, it is

being discovered that a switch between the paramilitaries

and the guerrillas is not much more than the difference

between one taskmaster and another, and the social group

which reaps the benefits.

Still, as matters now stand, an increasing number of

Colombians are looking to the paramilitaries as a solution to

the war. Between 1993 and 1997, the number of such groups

9
jumped from roughly 273 to more than 400, with between

3,000 and 6,000 active combatants.

4

 According to year 2001

army intelligence estimates, the number has increased to

7,400. Castaño explained how new organizations are

created in an interview with Bibiana Mercado of El Tiempo.

Representatives of a region approach him to ask for help in

forming a group. Castaño required the locals to recruit the

requisite number of men and collect a predetermined

budget. When these tasks were completed, he sent weapons

and advisers to train the new group, and an already active

unit to help them conduct their initial operations. After this

training, they were expected to operate independently, but

able to count on the support of the mother association when

in need.

5

 Castaño made claims that even a paramilitary

group was formed under his tutelage in Venezuela.

6

 He also

claimed that a similar group was formed in Ecuador.

7

Current Links to Drug Traffickers.

Until recently the paramilitaries emphatically denied

links to drug traffickers. However, in a recent interview

Castaño admitted that up to 70 percent of the money for the

Auto defensas Unificados de Colombia (AUC) came from

this illicit trade. Other contributors are businesses,

cattlemen, and land owners. Money from narcotics

activities for the paramilitaries is most evident in the

Southern plains area, in Putumayo, and in Southern

Bolivar. This is also where the greatest conflicts exist

between the paramilitaries and the guerrilla groups. The

problem is that there are few other accessible sources of

wealth in Colombia capable of providing all of the logistics

and material needed to compete with the guerrillas without

resorting to drug money. Prominent emerald merchants

such as Víctor Carranza have been accused of funding

paramilitary groups, and the latter have fought the

guerrillas for the control of gold mines, but neither of these

activities is as lucrative, fungible, or readily accessible as

drug trafficking.

10
However, because of the negative publicity and bad

experience in the Middle Magdalena with Gonzalo

Rodriguez Gacha, the paramilitaries in general seem to shy

away from public association with the narco-traffickers.

8

Occasionally, the connection will surface through ugly

events. In October 1997, for example, a paramilitary unit

ambushed a group of detectives investigating a drug

trafficker from whom they received pay, killing 11 police

and detectives. Castaño promptly expelled this group from

the AUC.

9

 However, Castaño was not upset about the drug

trafficking, he was upset at the killing of the policemen.

While Castaño was leader of the AUC he espoused a strict

policy of nonconfrontation with the state. Like just about

every illicit organization, the paramilitaries profit from

drug trafficking.

Even so, the guerrillas seem to be more heavily involved

in drug trafficking. For example, in a 1998 interview

between the author and members of the army’s antidrug

unit, the Special Army Commando (CEE), the officers could

not recall having ever raided a drug laboratory belonging to

anyone associated with the paramilitaries. On the other

hand, they could show physical evidence of dozens of raids

where the connection between the labs and the guerrillas

was plainly evident: drug labs adjacent to guerrilla camps,

drug labs surrounded by marked guerrilla minefields,

firefights in the labs with guerrillas, documentation,

photos, and so on. The point here is not to prove which is a

bigger drug-trafficking organization. The point is that it

does not make sense to accord political status and negotiate

with the guerrillas, who have less popular support and

traffic drugs, and claim that the same status cannot be

extended to the paramilitaries because they traffic in drugs.

11
Why Does the Movement Grow? Methods

and Tactics.

Why does this unsavory movement that commits human

rights abuses and profits from drug trafficking continue to

grow? The simple answer is because they are successful, and

this attracts the support of people desperate for a solution to

the war. As the paramilitary movement has gained strength

and expanded throughout Colombia, several things have

occurred. First, the level of warfare has increasingly moved

from a sole reliance on selective elimination to include direct

combat between equal forces. Starting in 1996, the

paramilitaries began using units and columns capable of

confronting guerrilla combat forces. These “shock brigades”

are fully equipped with the weapons and equipment of

regular military forces. Most importantly, the

paramilitaries enjoy communications that allow them to

coordinate actions between different units and regions.

They are equipped with automatic weapons that are at least

as good as those used by the guerrillas, and are steadily

acquiring heavier weaponry. During fighting in the latter

half of 1998 against the ELN in the San Lucas mountain

range of southern Bolívar, there were reports of the

paramilitaries employing heavy mortars, rockets, armed

helicopters, and other heavy weapons against the

guerrillas.

10

In addition to “regular” units, the paramilitaries of the

northwestern Antioquia region created a special operations

force that is capable of carrying out raids and assaults. In

April 1997, for instance, this special forces unit assaulted an

ELN guerrilla base in Bolívar department, successfully

rescuing a kidnapping victim.

11

 The regular forces have

carried out open warfare against the guerrillas, particularly

in northwestern Colombia. This violence has resulted in a

large stream of refugees from the zones in dispute, as well as

spillover into neighboring Panama. Again, the

paramilitaries have been successful in these battles.

12
Forming a National Front.

The increasing success of the paramilitaries caused

them to take even more ambitious steps. First, they

organized regional alliances to coordinate activities. The

best known of these is the Self-Defense Organizations of

Córdoba and Urabá, known by the acronym ACCU, but

there are a number of others. In 1997, the leadership of the

regional organizations met to form a national organization

known as the AUC. The main purpose of this national front

is to develop a coordinated strategy against the guerrillas.

This includes sending men, weapons, and resources from

one region to another to conduct operations in a specific

territory. Each organization still maintains its autonomy

and is responsible for its own finances and operations. Each

organization contributes to a common fund controlled at the

national level, which is kept as a reserve for times of crisis in

case of a lack of weapons or ammunition.

12

 In 1999 the

paramilitaries began talking about a parallel national

political front called the Alliance for the Unity of Colombia

(AUC). It is clear that as this group has been marginalized

and ignored; their response has not been complacency, but

further organization and sophistication.

Mapiripán.

The significance of national coordination became

evident in July and August 1997. On July 22, Colombian

newspapers reported that some 30 civilians had been

massacred in an armed excursion by the paramilitaries

against the town of Mapiripán in the department of Meta on

the Guaviare river.

13

 What the papers did not reveal is that

Mapiripán was long a strategic stronghold and support base

for the FARC. It was geographically important because it

was the point from which the FARC exercised control over

part of the Guaviare river, an important route for arms

trafficking and the transportation of drugs.

14

The attack on Mapiripán was a bold strike at the heart of

FARC-controlled territory. The people killed were not

13
chosen randomly, but were deliberately targeted for their

involvement with the FARC. The paramilitaries brought

with them a specific list of targets. Among those killed were

a man who collected a road-use tax for the guerrillas, a man

who dispatched FARC-controlled drug flights, a man who

was known as a longtime Communist Party militant, etc.

15

This attack hurt the FARC deeply. Subsequently, the leader

of its Southern Bloc, the notorious Jorge Suárez Briceño (“El

Mono Jojoy”), personally ordered several hundred

guerrillas to converge on Mapiripán.

16

 The paramilitaries

flew in their own reinforcements from Antioquia and

attacked the advancing insurgents. In a 6-day battle, they

claimed to have killed 49 FARC guerrillas and captured 47

weapons, admitting the loss of 12 of their own men.

17

 The

AUC agreement not only gave the paramilitaries the ability

to attack the rebels’ supporters, but also to strike their

combat forces. Most significantly, the victory set a

precedent. In Castaño’s words: “There will be many more

Mapiripáns."

18

 It was not long before similar attacks began

to occur elsewhere.

It is useful to dissect the Mapiripán episode, because it

proved to be the tactical model for virtually every

subsequent paramilitary operation. Essentially, it can best

be described as a two-tiered assault. The first tier consisted

of attacking the guerrillas’ masses and support base.

Intelligence operations were conducted to identify the

support and infrastructure elements of the rebels in the

area the paramilitaries wanted to attack. The latter then

made their incursion and, list in hand, detained and

executed the persons identified. The impunity with which

they were able to enter insurgent territory and carry out

these executions indicates that there were significant

numbers of people who were unhappy with the guerrillas’

control of the region. This discontent facilitated the

paramilitaries’ penetration and their identification and

elimination of rebel support elements.

The second tier of the attack involved giving battle to the

guerrilla combat forces. This was accomplished in two ways.

14
First, the elimination of the insurgents’ support,

communications, resources, and logistics elements forced

them to react to the incursion. If they wanted to maintain

domination of the territory, the guerrillas had to expel the

intruders and reestablish their networks. In such

operations, they exposed themselves to the paramilitaries’

use of the same kind of hit-and-run tactics used by the

guerrillas against government troops: ambushes, raids, and

booby traps.

Second, if the insurgents are sufficiently weakened by

the incursion, the paramilitaries will conduct search and

destroy operations of their own. This is done by using local

guides, often ex-guerrillas, who know the trails and camps

from which the guerrillas operate. Again, the ability of the

paramilitaries to find these camps and trails indicates that

there is a significant element of discontent among the

guerrilla membership and population under rebel control

that the paramilitaries are exploiting. The upshot has been

heavy casualties for both sides. Overall, however, it appears

that the paramilitaries have gained the greatest advantage,

as the guerrillas have steadily lost territory to them.

The State’s Reaction to the Paramilitaries.

The government has steadfastly refused to grant the

paramilitaries recognition other than as a criminal

element.

19

 Moreover, the latter’s continual offensive actions

after Mapiripán led to the formation of a special “search

group” to bring their leaders to justice. The organization of

this group was based on the model used to bring down the

Medellín and Cali cartels.

20

 Pastrana subsequently ordered

the armed forces to join the police in the struggle against the

paramilitaries. In 1998, approximately 450 paramilitaries

were captured and 60 killed in various operations.Government operations at that time hurt the

movement in their stronghold, Urabá, to such an extent

that, according to Castaño, the FARC was able to make bold

incursions into the region in an attempt to regain their lost

15
foothold.

21

 During the latter half of 1998, there were

large-scale battles in Urabá between the FARC and both the

army and the paramilitaries. The military suffered many

casualties to the renewed guerrilla attacks. Where the

government was effective against the paramilitaries, the

latter have paid a heavy price in blood to prevent the power

vacuum from being filled by the insurgents. In 1999, a

similar level of activity against the paramilitaries took

place.

In 2000-01, much more significant actions were taken

against the paramilitaries. Much of this was due to a

significant strengthening of the Colombian military and

battlefield success against the insurgents. The government

was strong enough that it could make headway against the

paramilitaries without leaving itself vulnerable to the

guerrillas. The army and marines conducted an

antiparamilitary operation in the Cauca valley in which a

column of 60 or so paramilitaries surrendered to the

marines rather than be destroyed by nearby guerrillas.

Later, the Attorney General’s office conducted a raid in

Cordoba, with the help of the military, against the finances

of the AUC. The latter operation provoked a crisis within

the AUC after which Carlos Castaño resigned as leader of

the organization because he would not approve of AUC

confrontation with the state. Despite what people think of

him, Castaño was a moderating force within the AUC, and it

is likely that the paramilitaries will start moving in a more

radical and confrontational direction.

 While the government has toyed with the idea of

conversations with the paramilitaries, including some sort

of political recognition, its position has recently hardened.

In part, it is because of the military successes and increased

strength of the military. The military is better able to fill the

vacuum when paramilitary forces are removed. It is also

because negotiations with the insurgents have gone badly.

Why open negotiations with a new group that can prove

equally fruitless? In addition, the Colombian government is

also under tremendous pressure from two important

16
sources to avoid according even a modicum of political

recognition to the paramilitaries. The first, obviously, is the

guerrillas, who are adamantly opposed to any kind of

political recognition or inclusion of the paramilitaries in the

peace process. The guerrilla’s contention is that the

paramilitaries are a creation of the state. They contend that

there is no reason to accord any special recognition or status

to the child, when conversations are already taking place

with the parent. The guerrillas have threatened several

times to withdraw from the peace talks if the paramilitaries

are given recognition. Instead, they insist that the state

must undo what it has done and disband the paramilitaries.

The reality is that the guerrillas are mortally afraid of the

paramilitaries. They consider them, not the state, their

most dangerous enemy, and in 2000-01, a majority of FARC

operations were directed at recovering lost rural terrain

from the paramilitaries.

The United States has also pressured Colombia to make

a major effort to fight the paramilitaries. Here, there are

two major concerns. The first is the desire to greatly reduce

human rights violations, which is a precondition for U.S.

assistance. Since human rights involves a government’s

treatment of its own people, the American position seems to

assume that the Colombian government or military

exercises some control over the activities of the

paramilitaries. Second, the United States is concerned

about the paramilitaries’ connections to drug trafficking,

the current major driver behind U.S. policy in Colombia,

and the region.

Solutions?

The Colombian government is caught between the

proverbial rock and hard place. The paramilitaries are

clearly the most public violators of human rights. For

example, a 1998 government study indicated that 70

percent of human rights abuses were committed by the

paramilitaries, 25 percent by the guerrillas, and 5 percent

17
by the public forces. The paramilitaries go into towns, kill

civilian supporters of the insurgents, force many others to

become refugees, and destroy property. On the other hand,

they have successfully cleared the rebels out of many areas,

so they are also contributing to the government’s

counterinsurgency effort. However, this contribution gives

the government, particularly the military, a black eye

because of the human rights abuses. It is like

chemotherapy. The treatment is as bad as the disease. The

methods employed by the paramilitaries do not strengthen

or support democratic institutions; rather, they foster

authoritarianism. 

Yet, because of the ineffectiveness of the Colombian

government’s attempts to protect the rural population from

the guerrillas through democratic institutions, the

paramilitaries are the natural response of a sector that feels

the need for relief at any price. Of what value is democracy if

it cannot protect its citizens? The paramilitaries are

unsavory, but they are not simply the servants of drug

traffickers, large landowners, and corrupt military officers.

They have grown beyond this and have become a rural

movement in their own right.

The Colombian government has largely chosen to fight

the paramilitaries. This is required of a rule-of-law regime.

The state has an obligation to punish the perpetrators of all

atrocities and crimes. The real problem is that by only

treating the paramilitaries as criminals, they provide no

long-term justice for the population represented by the

paramilitaries. Without addressing the political needs of

this population, there will be no long-term solution to the

war. The reality is that the paramilitaries represent an

important group of the Colombian populace that has had no

voice, a population greater than the supporters of the

guerrillas, and, unless the legitimate rights of this sector

are protected by the government, the problem will not

disappear. It will not matter if the major paramilitary

leaders are arrested and jailed. If the dynamics that led to

the creation of the movement are not resolved, new groups

18
will be created. We only have to look at the history of

Colombia’s Marxist insurgents. Each group that

disappeared was eventually replaced by a new group

because, while individuals tired of war, the system

remained broken. The paramilitaries feel they have found

the cure for the disease, and many Colombians apparently

agree because these groups continue to be formed at a brisk

rate despite their unsavory nature. In reality, their methods

are only very effective at suppressing the symptoms, giving

an illusion of a cure, while they sow the seeds of the next,

more virulent strain of the disease. With each evolution of

this type, both by the guerrillas and paramilitaries,

reaction, counterreaction, death, vengeance, and bloodshed

are part of this sickness.

In short, the government desperately needs to find some

way to incorporate people, who, because they have no other

recourse, support the paramilitaries, into a strategic plan to

pacify the country through legal, democratic means where

the anger of these people can be used in a constructive

manner. Perhaps the most effective alternative would be

the creation of a parallel, legal, civilian defense militia,

national guard, or constabulary under the control of the

police or another civilian entity that could prevent abuses

from occurring. The purpose would be to attract those

elements of the paramilitaries’ support base who would

prefer to operate within the law, but feel they cannot since

the state does not provide an effective alternative.

Such a strategy, if successful, might deny the guerrillas

territory “liberated” by the paramilitaries; moreover, it

would isolate the truly criminal elements in the latter. Then

having started to address the systemic problem, the state

can pursue the criminal elements and eliminate them

without fear of perpetuity. Unfortunately, this kind of

solution is not likely to be adopted in the short run. Because

of the cycle mentioned earlier, Colombia has a legacy of

rural civilian militias, official or otherwise, running amok.

The 1,000-day war at the turn of the 20th century, La

Violencia in the mid-20th century, and the current

19
paramilitaries are all part of this tradition. The problem is

that none of these militias were ever created with sufficient

controls in place to make them accountable. No matter,

there is great aversion to creating yet another such

organization because of the fear of what they might do. In

1998 Colombia dismantled several hundred of its very

weak, highly regulated, officially sponsored neighborhoodwatch type groups, known as Vigilance and Private Security

Services (CONVIVIR). The ghosts of the past may be

impossible in the current political climate to overcome.

This is not a good sign, as most successful

counterinsurgency and pacification strategies to date have

relied heavily on civil defense militias. These groups are

important because they have denied territory, and

consequently support, logistics, and communications, to the

guerrillas. They have also freed the armed forces from

security duties to conduct maneuver and combat

operations. The incentive for militias is that they are

empowered to defend their own homes and sources of

economic sustenance. Unlike army units or patrols that

move in and conduct operations on a short-term basis,

civilian militias have a personal stake in the security of the

local area. In neighboring Peru, civil defense militias have

been recognized as contributing heavily to the demise of

Sendero Luminoso. Most of rural Ayacucho is now safe for

tourists, something that was unheard of only a few years

ago. 

Colombia made the militias that had been operating

under army auspices illegal in 1989, and the result has been

disastrous—namely, the uncontrolled proliferation of the

paramilitaries. Essentially, the government cut off supply

of a service when it was in high demand. Like all services in

high demand, rather than ceasing to exist, it continued in a

less controlled and more volatile form through the informal

sector. Making the militias illegal did not uncreate them, it

merely encouraged the creation of multiple groups outside

the control of the state. The same thing happened in Peru,

but the militias there never reached the levels of

20
sophistication or depravity attained in Colombia. This was

largely due to their lack of access to resources. In contrast,

in Colombia drug money escalated the war to a much higher

level. In the end, however, the Peruvian military reluctantly

incorporated the civilian militias and provided them with

some leadership and weapons. It was not too long thereafter

that guerrilla activity began to significantly decline.

In Colombia, the uncontrolled paramilitary groups

quickly developed the most efficient and ruthless means of

operation, and are now a serious threat to state stability.

The original justification for eliminating the citizen militias

was that they were hard to control and committed excesses.

This cannot be disputed, but it is far easier to reform an

incorporated force than to control an unincorporated one.

The tortured history of the paramilitaries is an excellent

example of the latter. The abuses committed outside the

bounds of government control are probably much greater

than those that would have occurred had the militias

remained legal and under the direct supervision of the

authorities. The real question about the formation of a new

parallel force is whether the parent institution will exercise

the necessary control. In the past, the Colombian army and

police could probably not have been relied on to do this, but

things seem to be different today, especially with the police,

but with the army as well.

Regardless, this may not be a realistic solution for

Colombia. It may already be too late to form a parallel

militia. First, the 1991 constitution forbids such a force.

Second, the legal problems of CONVIVIR indicate that the

juridical battle for the creation of such an entity would be

fierce and might not be resolved in time to do much good.

Third, Colombia’s recent experience with the paramilitaries

has been so bad that there might be too much political

resistance to such a measure. A second alternative, then,

would be to deal with the paramilitaries as currently

constituted. This is certainly the paramilitaries’ preference.

The leadership of the paramilitaries has called on the

government to include the AUC in the peace talks,

21
indicating that there will be no peace in Colombia without

the participation of his group. The government has been

extremely loath to offer these elements the political status

to participate in the negotiations. However, it has been

forced to cede some ground. As the paramilitaries have

gained strength, the government has made unpublicized

contacts, and there is a certain consensus that at some point

peace negotiations will be conducted with them, though

separately from the talks with the guerrillas. Perhaps the

real issue for the government is timing. The hope seems to

have been that, once peace talks were on a firm footing with

the insurgents, some kind of conversations could then take

place with the paramilitaries. With the way things are going

with the peace talks with the insurgents, this is unlikely.

Conclusions.

Hard choices have to be made. Regardless of the

alternative chosen, if the segment of Colombian society

represented by the paramilitaries is not incorporated into

the solution, there will be no real solution. Unchecked,

uncountered, unco-opted, and unrepresented, the

paramilitary movement will continue to grow and become

increasingly radicalized. This will occur with or without its

current leaders, for the momentum is already established.

In turn, that will further weaken the efforts of the state to

bring law and order to Colombia.

The paramilitaries continually insist that they are not

antistate, and that their only raison d’etre is to fight the

guerrillas. They claim that once the insurgents are

defeated, they will demobilize. However, this is now highly

unlikely, even if the guerrillas are largely defeated. It is

unlikely that the latter would demobilize simply because

their objective had been accomplished. In the author’s

judgment, they would be loathe to lay down their weapons

and cede complete control to a state that allowed the

guerrillas to continue to exist, and failed to represent them

(the paramilitaries) in the attempt to find a solution. The

22
fear is that under such a state new guerrilla groups would

soon emerge. In such a scenario, the paramilitaries would

continue to exist as a guarantee to prevent the emergence of

new, powerful insurgent groups. They probably would not

attempt to take power, but would impose their will on the

state through the threat of violence.

If the Colombian government continues to treat the

paramilitaries as mere criminal organizations without

addressing their social, political, and economic foundations,

it will face several problems. First, it will have to

increasingly divide its resources, which are already

stretched thin. Second, the paramilitaries, who are

currently pro-state, will become antistate, and warfare will

take place between their forces and those of the

government. This will further weaken the latter’s

counterinsurgency efforts and create a three-way war.

Colombia is already having trouble fighting the guerrillas,

so the implications are not salutory.

The government needs to counter the criminal acts of the

paramilitaries, just as it does those of the guerrillas.

However, it needs to view the paramilitaries, like the

guerrillas, as a political-military movement, not merely a

criminal element. This does not imply granting the

paramilitaries immunity or approving their acts of terror.

Clearly, the government cannot tolerate certain types of

behavior. Their atrocities threaten the very foundations of

the democracy Colombia needs to build in order to bring

long-term peace. The perpetrators of gross violations of

human rights on all sides must be prosecuted, and elements

of the military that are involved with the paramilitaries

must be purged. But the government will not be successful if

it does not address the fundamental issues of the

paramilitaries’ constituents. Colombia needs to find a way

to incorporate and co-opt this constituency in order to

channel its efforts and momentum into a productive, legal,

and constructive program to bring peace to the nation.

23
ENDNOTES

1. The proper term here is self-defense groups, but the

paramilitaries will be used throughout because it is commonly used.

2. “Ganaderos pierden $750 mil millones por inseguridad,” El

Tiempo, December 12, 1997.

3. Jhon Jairo Torres Martínez, “El Máximo Santuario,” El País,

December 1, 1997.

4. “Paramilitaries de Paramilitaries?” El Pais, October 12, 1997.

5. Bibiana Mercado and Orlando Leon Restrepo, “Uraba: el fin de la

Pesadilla,” El Tiempo, September 28, 1997.

6. “Paramilitaries quieren controloar el Arauca y Casanare,” El

Pais, December 22, 1997.

7. “Habla Castaño,” Semana, August 17, 1998.

8. Mercado and Restrepo.

9. “Paramilitaries de Paramilitaries?”

10. “Investigan posibles helicopteros ‘paramilitaries,’” El Tiempo,

November 12, 1998.

11. “Paramilitaries exhiben su propio Gaula,” El Tiempo, April 23,

1997.

12. Mercado and Restrepo; also “Paramilitaries Atacan a Guerrilla,”

El Pais, April 23, 1997.

13. Freddy Canchon Naranjo, “Masacre en el Meta,” El Pais, July

22, 1997.

14. “Paramilitaries: un año de Terror,” El Pais, December 3, 1997.

15. Bibiana Mercado, “Cordoba y Uraba exportan paramilitares,” El 

Tiempo, August 31, 1997.

16. “Ojo por Ojo,” Semana, August 18-25, 1997.

17. Mercado and Restrepo.

18. Ibid.

24
19. “Gobierno rehusa reconocer paramilitares,” El Tiempo,

February 15, 1999.

20. “Se inicia caceria de paramilitaries,” El Pais, December 3, 1997.

21. “Habla Castaño.”

25
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Author

Mr. David Spencer

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Ms. Kimberly A. Rockwell