Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-1993 | February 27, 2020 Page 1 of 11

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Brian A. Karle

Ball Eggleston, P.C.

Lafayette, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General

Marjorie Lawyer-Smith

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Brittany Nicole Mullins,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

February 27, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-1993

Appeal from the Tippecanoe 

Superior Court

The Honorable Steven Meyer, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos.

79D02-1808-F4-34

79D02-1904-F2-18

Pyle, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] Brittany Mullins (“Mullins”) appeals the twenty-four-and-one-half-year (24.5)

aggregate sentence imposed after she pleaded guilty to Level 2 felony 
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conspiracy to commit dealing in methamphetamine1 and two counts of Level 2 

felony dealing in methamphetamine2in Cause Number 79D02-1904-F2-18 

(“Cause Number 18”) and Level 4 felony dealing in methamphetamine3in 

Cause Number 79D02-1808-F4-34 (“Cause Number 34”). She argues that the 

trial court abused its discretion when it: (1) ordered the sentences in the two 

causes to run consecutively to each other; and (2) identified the seriousness of 

the offense as an aggravating factor. Concluding that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion, we affirm Mullins’ sentence.

[2] We affirm. 

Issues

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it 

ordered the sentences in the two causes to run 

consecutively to each other.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it

identified the seriousness of the offense as an aggravating 

factor.

Facts

[3] Twenty-two-year-old Mullins sold sixty-one (61) grams of methamphetamine to 

undercover agents in four controlled buys in August 2018. The State 

1

IND. CODE §§ 35-48-4-1.1 and 35-41-5-2.

2

I.C. § 35-48-4-1.1

3

Id.
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subsequently charged her under Cause Number 18 with Level 2 felony 

conspiracy to commit dealing in methamphetamine; three counts of Level 2 

felony dealing in methamphetamine; Level 3 felony dealing in 

methamphetamine; three counts of Level 4 felony possession of 

methamphetamine; and Level 5 felony possession of methamphetamine.

[4] One week after the last controlled buy, a Lafayette Police Department Officer 

stopped a van after its driver failed to signal a turn. Mullins was a passenger in 

the van. A search of the van revealed more than three grams of 

methamphetamine, scales, baggies, a marijuana pipe, syringes, and a drug 

transaction ledger. Mullins admitted that the items found in the vehicle 

belonged to her and that she was dealing the methamphetamine. The State 

charged Mullins in Cause Number 34 with Level 4 felony dealing in 

methamphetamine; Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine; Level 6 

felony unlawful possession of a syringe; and Class C felony possession of 

paraphernalia.

[5] In August 2019, Mullins pleaded guilty to Level 2 felony conspiracy to commit 

dealing in methamphetamine and two counts of Level 2 felony dealing in 

methamphetamine in Cause Number 18 and to Level 4 felony dealing in 

methamphetamine in Cause Number 34. The State dismissed the remaining 

counts. The plea agreement left sentencing to the trial court’s discretion.

[6] At the conclusion of the combined sentencing hearing, the trial court found the 

following aggravating factors: (1) Mullins’ criminal history, which included a 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-1993 | February 27, 2020 Page 4 of 11

misdemeanor conviction for possession of methamphetamine, a felony 

conviction for possession of methamphetamine, two petitions to revoke 

probation, one of which was found to be true; and a pending charge for felony 

auto theft; (2) “the offenses occurred just within months of being released from 

jail on another offense;” (3) “the seriousness of the offense, the 61 grams of 

drugs that were dealt within a three-week period of time is very serious to this 

Court;” (4) prior attempts at rehabilitation had failed; and (5) the repetitive 

nature of her crimes as demonstrated by her prior possession and dealing

convictions. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 54). The trial court specifically observed that 

Mullins “just was not learning her lesson[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 55). Mullins’ PSI 

also revealed an extensive drug use history that included daily use of 

methamphetamine and heroin for the previous four years. Mullins also 

admitted to engaging in prostitution and selling drugs to support her $400.00-

per-day habit.

[7] At the end of the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Mullins to 

eighteen (18) years for each of the three Level 2 felony convictions in Cause 

Number 18. The trial court further ordered the sentences for each felony to run 

concurrently to each other because they “were controlled buys.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 

56). In Cause Number 34, the trial court sentenced Mullins to six and one half

years for the Level 4 felony conviction. The trial court also ordered the 

sentence in Cause Number 34 and the sentence in Cause Number 18 to run 

consecutively to each other because Cause Number 34 “was a separate traffic 

stop in which they found a lot of meth on her at that time. It involved different 
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officers. It was a random stop when she was on the streets, a passenger in a car, 

and it was not related to a controlled buy.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 56).

[8] Mullins now appeals her sentence. 

Decision

[9] Mullins argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it: (1) ordered the 

sentences in the two causes to run consecutively to each other; and (2)

identified the seriousness of the offense as an aggravating factor. Before 

addressing these issues, we set forth the standard of review for sentencing cases. 

[10] Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court. 

Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007). So long as the sentence is 

within the statutory range, it is subject to review only for an abuse of discretion. 

Id. An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and 

effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable, 

probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id. at 491. A trial 

court may abuse its discretion in a number of ways, including: (1) failing to 

enter a sentencing statement at all; (2) entering a sentencing statement that 

includes aggravating and mitigating factors that are unsupported by the record; 

(3) entering a sentencing statement that omits reasons that are clearly supported 

by the record; or (4) entering a sentencing statement that includes reasons that 

are improper as a matter of law. Id. at 490-91. 

1. Consecutive Sentences
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[11] Mullins first argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered the 

sentences in the two causes to run consecutively to each other. In support of 

her argument, Mullins directs us to Beno v. State, 581 N.E.2d 922 (Ind. 1991). 

Therein, the Indiana Supreme Court held that it was manifestly unreasonable to 

impose consecutive sentences for multiple drug dealing convictions where the 

convictions were based upon nearly identical State-sponsored sales to a police 

informant as part of an ongoing sting operation. Id. at 924. 

[12] Here, the trial court acknowledged and followed Beno when it ordered the 

controlled buy convictions in Cause Number 18 to run concurrently to each 

other. Thereafter, the trial court acknowledged and distinguished Beno when it 

ordered the sentence in Cause Number 18 to run consecutively to the sentence 

in Cause Number 34. Specifically, the trial court pointed out that the 

conviction in Cause Number 34 resulted from a separate traffic stop that 

involved different officers and that it was in no way related to a controlled buy. 

It was a random stop when Mullins was simply a passenger in the van. 

[13] We agree with the State that “the trial court followed the Beno holding and 

subsequent cases when it imposed concurrent sentences in [Cause Number 18], 

but it was not prevented by that precedent from ordering those convictions to 

run consecutively to the sentence in [Cause Number 34] for an unrelated 

offense.” (State’s Br. 13). We find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion.

2. Aggravating Factor
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[14] Mullins also argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it identified 

the seriousness of the offense as an aggravating factor. Specifically, the trial 

court explained that it took very seriously that “61 grams of drugs . . . were 

dealt within a three-week period of time[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 54).

[15] The trial court’s consideration of the total amount of drugs that Mullins sold 

during such a short time period is no different than the trial court considering 

the particularized circumstances of the factual elements as aggravating factors 

when evaluating the nature of the offense. See McElroy v. State, 865 N.E.2d 584, 

589-90 (Ind. 2007) (explaining that when evaluating the nature of the offense, 

the trial court may properly consider the particularized circumstances of the 

factual elements as aggravating factors). We find no abuse of the trial court’s 

discretion.

[16] We further note that even if the trial court had erred in identifying this 

aggravating factor, we would not remand Mullins’ case to the trial court for 

resentencing. When a trial court abuses its discretion by considering an 

improper aggravating circumstance, we remand for resentencing only “if we 

cannot say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same 

sentence had it properly considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.” 

Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. 

[17] Here, the trial court found the following additional aggravating factors: (1) 

Mullins’ extensive criminal history, which included a misdemeanor and a 

felony conviction as well as a pending felony charge; (2) the offenses occurred 
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within months of being released from jail on another offense; (3) prior attempts 

at rehabilitation had failed; and (4) the repetitive nature of her crimes as 

demonstrated by prior possession and dealing convictions. Mullins does not 

challenge the validity of these additional aggravating circumstances. In light of 

these additional unchallenged aggravating circumstances, we are confident that 

the trial court would have imposed the same sentence irrespective of its 

consideration of the seriousness of the offense. 

[18] Affirmed.

May, J., concurs. 

Crone, J., dissents with opinion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-1993 | February 27, 2020 Page 9 of 11

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Brittany Nicole Mullins,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-1993

Crone, Judge, dissenting.

[19] I agree with my colleagues that the imposition of consecutive sentences in this 

case does not constitute an abuse of discretion. I respectfully dissent, however, 

because the sentence in this case is an outlier that warrants our independent 

review and revision pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). As our supreme 

court stated in Wampler v. State, 67 N.E.3d 633 (Ind. 2017), “[e]ven where a 

trial court has not abused its discretion in sentencing, the Indiana Constitution 

authorizes independent appellate review and revision of a trial court’s 

sentencing decision.” Id. at 634 (citing Ind. Const. art 7, §§ 4, 6; Anglemyer v. 

State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind. 2007). This constitutional authority is

implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), which states, “The Court may revise 

a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s 

decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature 

of the offense and the character of the offender.” Thus, even when the trial 
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court has not abused its discretion, an Appellate Rule 7(B) analysis can result in 

a downward revision of the sentence. Wampler, 67 N.E.3d at 634.

[20] Here, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of twenty-four and a half 

years. In determining whether the nature of Mullins’s offenses and her 

character render her sentence inappropriate, “we may look to any factors 

appearing in the record.” Boling v. State, 982 N.E.2d 1055, 1060 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2013).

[21] Turning first to the nature of the offenses, Mullins sold methamphetamine to an 

undercover detective in controlled buys on August 6, 13, 16, and 20, 2018. The 

police could have arrested her after any one of these buys. During the buys, the 

undercover detective met Mullins’s co-conspirator. A week after the last 

controlled buy, in an apparently pretexual stop, the police pulled over a vehicle,

in which both Mullins and her co-conspirator were passengers, for failing to 

signal a turn into a gas station. The cumulative amount of the 

methamphetamine involved in these five incidents was sixty-one grams, worth 

approximately $5000.

[22] As to Mullins’s character, the record reveals that she has a history of childhood 

sexual molestation and physical abuse, early exposure to drugs and alcohol, 

untreated mental health issues, and longstanding substance abuse as a means of 

self-medication. Defendant’s Ex. D. Mullins was first introduced to opiates at 

the age of fourteen, when she was involuntarily injected with heroin by her 

aunt. Id. After that, she began using a variety of drugs and clearly has a 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-1993 | February 27, 2020 Page 11 of 11

significant addiction to illegal substances. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 125. She 

has been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, schizoaffective disorder, and 

paranoid schizophrenia. Id. at 119; Defendant’s Ex. D. She resorted to 

prostitution and has been homeless since April 2018. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 

at 124. She was a desperate and damaged twenty-two-year old when she 

committed these offenses. She expressed hopelessness that she had no way out 

of her situation and had hit rock bottom, and she said that she did not want that 

life anymore. Defendant’s Ex. D. At sentencing, Mullins reiterated that she 

wanted to change, to participate in substance abuse rehabilitation, to learn to 

cope with herself, and to someday be a part of society. Tr. Vol. 2 at 43-44. 

[23] The trial court sentenced Mullins to eighteen years in cause number 79D02-

1904-F2-18 and to six and a half years in cause number 79D02-1808-F4-34 and 

ordered the sentences in the two cause numbers to be served consecutively for 

an aggregate term of twenty-four and a half years. Given the nonviolent nature 

of Mullins’s offenses, the value of the drugs and relatively brief time involved,

her young age, and her traumatic childhood, I believe that the twenty-four and 

a half-year aggregate sentence created by consecutive sentences is inappropriate. 

I would exercise our authority under Appellate Rule 7(B) to revise Mullins’s 

sentences to have the sentences in the two causes to run concurrently for an 

aggregate term of eighteen years. Accordingly, I must dissent from my 

colleagues’ decision to affirm Mullins’s sentence.