THE TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY

AGENDA:

A CONFERENCE REPORT

 AND ANALYSIS

Stephen J. Blank

December 2001
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ISBN 1-58487-076-1

ii
FOREWORD

Immediately after the terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and

World Trade Center, NATO members unanimously voted their

support for the United States under Article V of the Washington

Treaty. This unprecedented action, the first time such a vote has

occurred in NATO’s history, underscores the vitality of the

Atlantic Alliance and its tremendous strategic value for its

members. This vote conferred great legitimacy upon any response

that the United States will make to those attacks and reminded

us that the solidity of NATO allows the United States to defend its

interests on the world stage with great confidence about

European security.

Nevertheless, the Alliance is not a wholly untroubled or static

relationship. In the first half of 2001, there were numerous public

signs of stress among the allies as they faced new challenges.

Many of the issues involved in these tensions are particularly

important to the future of European security and must be

resolved for NATO to move forward and continue playing the role

outlined above. In order for members of the Alliance states and

other interested parties to explore the issues at stake earlier in

2001, the Strategic Studies Institute, together with Harvard

University’s Belfer Center for the Study of Science and

International Affairs, cosponsored a conference to discuss

cardinal issues of the transatlantic security agenda. This report

presents a summary and analysis of the conference, which took

place at the Belfer Center, on March 26-27, 2001. Although the

world and the context within which these issues must be faced

have changed greatly since then, the issues have not gone away

nor will they do so anytime soon.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

STEPHEN J. BLANK has served as the Strategic Studies

Institute’s expert on the Soviet bloc and the post-Soviet

world since 1989. Prior to that he was Associate Professor of

Soviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace Doctrine,

Research, and Education, Maxwell Air Force Base, and

taught at the University of Texas, San Antonio, and at the

University of California, Riverside. Dr. Blank is the editor of

Imperial Decline: Russia’s Changing Position in Asia,

coeditor of Soviet Military and the Future, and author of The

Sorcerer as Apprentice: Stalin’s Commissariat of

Nationalities, 1917-1924. He has also written many articles

and conference papers on Russian, the Commonwealth of

Independent States, and Eastern European security issues.

Dr. Blank’s current research deals with weapons

proliferation and the revolution in military affairs, and

energy and security in Eurasia. His most recent SSI studies

include U.S. Military Engagement with the Transcaspian

States; European Security: Washington’s Shaping Strategy

in Action, with Drs. William T. Johnsen and Thomas-Durell

Young, March 2000; U.S. Military Engagement with

Transcaucasia and Central Asia, June 2000; and Threats to

Russian Security: The View From Moscow, July 2000. Dr.

Blank holds a B.A. in History from the University of

Pennsylvania, and a M.A. and Ph.D. in History from the

University of Chicago.

iv
THE TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY AGENDA:

CONFERENCE REPORT AND ANALYSIS

Introduction.

Numerous media accounts give the impression that the

Atlantic Alliance is collapsing or in danger of doing so.

Certainly unhappiness and concern over American policies

enjoy public popularity in Europe at the moment. In fact,

these fears are vastly overdrawn; although Europeans

allegedly regard America (and President Bush) as a rogue,

cowboy state that mindlessly executes people, pollutes the

environment, disregards arms control and international

treaties, and is generally destroying Western civilization as

we know it. More precisely, the disparities between the U.S.

and European approaches to international security

represent what one report called both sides’ sense of mutual

grievance. And similar complaints about America have

surfaced in every post-war decade. Moreover, often these

complaints are as much salvos in each state’s domestic

politics, as they are presentations of their foreign and

defense policies. Thus Pierre Moscovici, France’s Minister

for Europe, commented that Prime Minister Anthony

Blair’s reelection in Great Britain was good for Europe

because “In the final analysis, Europe is the natural place

for the expression of the progressive values that the left,

whether Labour, Socialist, or Social Democrat all cherish.”

1

Obviously the Bush administration and nonleftist parties

across Europe reject this partisan analysis, but it helps

explain some of the current mood. Finally, to some degree,

these complaints also represent the price of American

leadership in Europe.

Nonetheless, serious issues are at stake in the

transatlantic dialogue over European security.

Consequently, we must overcome the real and serious

disputes that affect this dialogue. Therefore as we approach

1
a new period of European enlargement—i.e., the

enlargement of both the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) and the European Union

(EU)—repairing the often fractious interallied dialogue is

an essential precondition of progress in securing Europe,

our most important alliance. With this concern in mind, the

Strategic Studies Institute, with Harvard University’s

Belfer Center for the Study of Science and International

Affairs, cosponsored a conference on the future of the

alliance with prominent European elites. This conference

took place at the Belfer Center at Harvard in Cambridge,

Massachusetts, on March 26-27, 2001. While everyone

spoke off the record to encourage an open, candid

discussion, this monograph summarizes the issues they

raised and analyzes the conference’s significance.

The issues discussed included NATO and EU

enlargement, these organizations’ mutual relationship now

that the EU is creating its own defense arm, the European

Security and Defense program (ESDP), defense spending

and interoperability among the NATO allies, and

engagement with Russia on a wide range of issues.

Obviously most, if not all, of these issues share a common

subtext, i.e., the question of adjusting the transatlantic

alliance to changing realities stemming from the

enlargement of Europe.

Reaching a functioning consensus on all or most of the

key issues that comprise the European and transatlantic

security agenda is a vital American interest. The

transatlantic alliance enables the United States and

Europe securely to project shared power, values, and

interests even beyond NATO’s borders.

2 U.S. statesmen

have always known that, if any one undemocratic power

dominated Europe and isolated America from other

democracies or if Europe collapsed into constant wars for

lack of a legitimate and durable political order, those

situations would threaten American security.

2
If the former condition prevailed, then Europe might

conceivably become, in President Thomas Jefferson’s words,

“a Breakfast for Bonaparte." Europe was the Cold War’s

primary “theater" so that it did not become a breakfast for

Soviet power. On the other hand, if a general European

anarchy prevailed, it would lead to the renationalization of

European security policies and then to incessant wars in

Europe. In that case, the danger was that one, probably

antiliberal, power would then ultimately prevail and

threaten American security as in World War I.

Furthermore, to the extent that genuine allied solidarity

exists, we and our allies can then face issues beyond

Europe’s geographical boundaries that materially affect

European security. These include Mediterranean security

issues from Morocco to the Middle East and issues of

security in the former Soviet Union. Signifying that

common concern for so-called out-of-area issues, NATO has

invited the Commonwealth of Independent States’ (CIS)

governments into the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the

Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),

and created its own Mediterranean Initiative. For its part,

the EU has established many important socio-economic

programs with CIS governments and devised its own

Mediterranean Initiative in Barcelona in 1995.

Conversely, diverging approaches to European security

issues ensure discord regarding both Mediterranean and

CIS issues. That discord generally impedes progress in

resolving these issues. Then neither the United States, nor

NATO, nor the EU can realize their objectives and interests

in those regions. And we know all too well that local conflicts

in the CIS and around the Mediterranean can easily become

major international crises. These considerations amply

justified the discussions at Harvard.

The ESDP.

Although the discussions ranged widely over the

European security agenda, the central theme running

3
through them was the enlargement of Europe. European

enlargement is a protean concept. Obviously it refers to

NATO’s and the EU’s formal expansion. But it also signifies

the expansion of both organizations’ missions, agendas, and

legitimate concerns about their own and other states’

behavior in world affairs.

The EU, beyond its purely geographical expansion, is

equally committed to expanding its capacity to confront

European security challenges at an early stage through

military means. Indeed, its spokesmen and official

proclamations, and many individual European statesmen,

assert that it now possesses all the means of preventing and

resolving conflicts: political, diplomatic, economic,

informational, and military.

3

 And participants at the

conference, particularly the French, strongly reiterated this

assertion. Today the EU seeks a global role as a security

provider and crisis manager, e.g., involvement in the

Korean peace process and more broadly across Asia.

4

 The

EU seeks to realize this expansive vision primarily by

materializing and enlarging the scope of its commitment

since 1998 to a Common Foreign and Security Policy

(CFSP). The EU’s military instrument here is the ESDP.

The EU’s assertions concerning its readiness and that of the

ESDP for conflict resolution underwent serious and

searching scrutiny at the conference.

The ESDP envisions the creation of a 60,000-man

ground force along with 100 naval vessels and 400 planes

made up of EU members’ militaries. The entire force could

arrive in a crisis or conflict zone within 60 days.

5 The

ESDP’s mandate has been officially agreed to be those

operations which NATO and the United States decide to

forego. Those operations were defined by the West

European Union (WEU) in 1992 in Petersberg, Germany,

and are called Petersberg missions. They specifically

include humanitarian operations, peacekeeping and peace

enforcement, and search and rescue operations. Obviously,

these operations pertain to conflicts at the lower end of the

spectrum of conflict and to peace operations. The EU is also

4
creating a 5000-man police force to enter these conflict

zones once they are secured and perform typical police

functions, thereby relieving soldiers of the burden of those

missions. However, it is not certain that either this police

force or the ESDP force suffices to execute the current

mission in Kosovo or one of similar scale, should such a

situation occur in the future.

6

Accordingly, the real questions concerning the ESDP’s

utility and viability are, first, the extent to which its

members will make the investments needed to realize the

ESDP’s and the EU’s capabilities for conflict prevention and

Petersberg operations; and, second, the nature and extent of

the ESDP and EU’s cooperation with NATO. At the

conference several members pointed out that the ESDP’s

actual military capability remains on paper. As NATO

Secretary General Lord George Robertson and others have

acidly observed, European governments’ continuing failure

to pay for the necessary defense capabilities undermines the

credibility of talk about a European pillar.

7

 Indeed 6 of

NATO’s 11 members (many of whom are EU members, too)

who announced they were raising defense spending,

actually cut it.

8 This revelation belies at least some of the

earlier assertions that Europe actually had turned a corner

and was now determined to upgrade its capabilities and

defense spending.

9

 The fact that so many states willfully

deceived their allies and NATO is an ominous sign for

NATO’s robustness and for the EU’s aspiration to an

exclusive capacity for preventing, managing, and resolving

future crises. Moreover, little likelihood exists that defense

spending will rise substantially in Europe anytime soon,

especially as a recession is now setting in. Indeed, it seems

that if one country, like Holland, increases its spending and

upgrades its real military capabilities, others cut their

defense budget or let it stagnate as France and Norway have

done.

10

 Although discussions about transnational and

shared payments from one state to another for defense

procurement are underway, European governments, as well

as the United States, still find it very hard to maintain, let

5
alone raise, defense spending and reach their targets for

military modernization.

11

 Moreover, overall European

defense spending in relation to U.S. defense spending is

falling in real terms as the Euro and other currencies

depreciate vis-à-vis the dollar.

While these trends have important consequences inside

NATO; if they persist, they will vitiate all efforts to create

the ESDP or make it an effective force. And if the ESDP

remains only a paper force, interallied and NATO-EU

relationships will become more acrimonious. Then both

organizations will lack conflict resolution mechanisms

suitable for the kinds of conflicts that we can envision in and

around Europe. If the ESDP cannot become effective due to

insufficient defense spending, Balkan peace operations will

put a greater strain on NATO members than they currently

do. That strain could easily stimulate those forces in the

United States who believe, wrongly, that Europe is not

carrying its fair share of the burden there and that

prolonged peace operations erode U.S. armed forces’

military effectiveness and capabilities.

Paradoxically, the upshot of this issue of European

defense spending, (if one goes beyond the discussion at the

conference) is that creating viable and fully capable

European defense forces, some of which can be assigned to

the ESDP, is actually in the U.S. interest. For if the ESDP is

not viable, neither will NATO be viable. If the Allies or the

EU’s members, many of whom are the same states, will not

pay for a credible ESDP, they will not pay either for NATO’s

Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) that seeks to overcome

the large gap between the U.S. and its Allies’ military

capabilities. Since the EU will then lack the appropriate

coercive mechanisms with which to terminate conflicts, it

will have to call on NATO and the United States to save it

from a calamity, as in 1995 in Bosnia. And should the Allies

continue to shirk their responsibilities for defense, recent or

potential new members of NATO will also not appropriate

funds needed to bring their armed forces up to an acceptable

level of quality and equipment. Thus arguments for NATO

6
enlargement will lose their coherence, and the enlargement

process will become a dubious one.

12

We should remember that to field a 60,000-man ground

force and equivalent naval and air commitments; the armed

forces, either of one state, an alliance, or a coalition, must

field troops three times that size to rotate people in and out

of the theater as appropriate. Hence, a truly viable ESDP

force actually should comprise a trained and modernized,

well-equipped force of some 180,000-250,000 troops. If the

EU is to become the all-round provider of security that its

resolutions seem to intend or at least obtain the requisite

capabilities for fulfilling Petersberg missions, the ESDP

must resemble or approach such a force by 2003. And it

must have the necessary technological base and capabilities

in sea and air lift; command, control, communications and

intelligence (C3I); logistics; etc., that EU members

presently lack and for which they depend on the United

States.

As one participant pointed out, in an age of technological

revolution, this force must master both the

strategic-political and the technological requirements

inherent in effective performance of Petersberg missions.

Since we cannot assume a priori that Petersberg operations

will be brief ones, the forces involved must be able to master

a wide range of missions and operations. And because we

also cannot take strategic-political consensus for granted,

especially if we seek to complete the operation within a

reasonable length of time, the participating allies must

build that consensus every day. The strategic-political

effectiveness of any mission presupposes that consensus

and implicitly raises the issue of an effective command

system and mechanism for political coordination among EU

members and between the EU and NATO. If the CFSP will

be that mechanism, it needs considerable strengthening, for

beyond it there is nothing else.

Strategic-political effectiveness also requires constant

political support for the forces in the field plus steady and

7
consistent funding. Technologically speaking, equipment

must be interoperable and up-to-date. Project management

must be effective throughout the operation. And forces

should be able to survive even in an environment where

there are or might be weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Naturally those requirements for capabilities impose a

high, and so far unattainable, bar, but as this was a

professional military officer’s viewpoint, it carried weight.

And it brought the discussion of the amount and direction of

European defense spending to a truly practical level.

Another professional officer at the conference observed

that Europe’s forces in stabilization forces (SFOR) and

Kosovo forces (KFOR) generally lack the requisite C3I

capabilities. Obviously a substantial upgrading in these

areas is necessary to field and maintain a truly effective

ESDP force. He also observed—and this logic is inherent in

a situation where all the governments involved, including

the United States, have limited opportunities to expand

defense spending—that the programs the ESDP must

undertake to match its operational and technological

requirements overlap with those needed in the DCI to

realize allied interoperability. These capabilities comprise

strategic and tactical level operations and include

command, control, communications and computers,

intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR);

precision strike capabilities; logistics; force protection; and

the general realization of the Revolution in Military Affairs

(RMA). Other observers, both in and out of the conference,

agree with this argument concerning such vital functions as

air and sea lift, C4ISR, and logistics. But not all conference

members agreed that there is an overlap between the DCI

and the ESDP. Still, a consensus apparently exists

concerning not only the deficiencies of European forces in

general and of the ESDP in particular relative to U.S. forces,

but also concerning the tactical and operational

requirements for making the ESDP a truly capable force.

The conference as well as leading European military and

political figures expressed this consensus.

13 

8
Unfortunately, there was no consensus as to the

likelihood of Europe making the ESDP into a truly viable

force. Clearly some governments, like France, Germany,

and Great Britain if we accept at face value the critiques by

some former officers of the Blair Government’s newest

budget, are unwilling to raise defense spending to meet the

true costs of acquiring the relevant capabilities.

14

 And some

governments, like France as the French participant stated,

even profess to see no need to do so.

15

 While this stance

reflects profoundly entrenched domestic political and

electoral considerations as well as the absence of a

discernible threat to European states’ vital interests, it also

could doom the ESDP to irrelevance and injure NATO’s

cohesion. The capabilities gap between America and its

allies would soon become even more visible, especially as the

United States launches a new round of strategic

modernization. And it would trigger more interallied

wrangling over burdensharing, leadership of NATO, and so

on. 

This European stance also reflects a vision of world

politics and threat assessment that is profoundly regional

while the U.S. world view must necessarily remain global.

As British analyst Mark Smith of the Mountbatten Centre

for International Studies at the University of Southampton

recently wrote,

To put it simply, the United States is a globally engaged

superpower, and therefore practices extended deterrence and

power projection in a way that its European allies do not. The

deterrent relationships of the European states are confined to

general, central deterrence, and for this reason their military

activities with “states of concern” in the Middle East are

issue-driven rather than alliance-driven, and conducted

through ad hoc “coalitions of the willing” such as the anti-Iraq

coalition of 1990.

16

The notion of the EU as an essentially civilian power,

coupled with the refusal to squarely address military needs,

consigns it to an essentially “sedentary” role.

17

 The United

States, as a power seeking to bring about, underwrite, and

9
consolidate a global or “new world order,” cannot follow that

path. If America renounced its global perspective, none of its

allies, not just NATO, could then count on it to protect them

against the real threats that they face, treaty or other

commitments notwithstanding. Therefore the disparate

outlooks of our European allies could lead Washington to

focus on Asia (including the Middle East) more than Europe

and widen the conceptual gaps among the Allies. Allied

refusal to fulfill their commitments only confirms those, like

former Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, who

call European leadership an oxymoron and who believe that

we no longer need the European allies because they “are no

longer vital to the defence of our interests in the world,” or

those who support American unilateralist tendencies.

18

If this capabilities gap between NATO and the ESDP

widens, NATO, short of manpower, the requisite funding, or

technologies, will have to step into the breach left by the

ESDP, should a new Petersberg mission become necessary

or a new crisis break out in Europe. NATO would then be

hamstrung by the gap between shrinking U.S. capabilities

in Europe and the still greater shrinkage of European

capabilities that seems to be occurring.

19

 Therefore U.S. Air

Force General Joseph Ralston, Supreme Allied Commander

Europe (SACEUR), testified to Congress that the gap

between the United States and its allies is his most serious

problem.

20

While some European members of the conference

insisted that the ESDP “train has left the station,”

American discussants were notably more skeptical and

cited the gap between rhetoric and reality. Some of them

also argued that the capabilities needed by the ESDP and

those needed to fulfill the DCI do not overlap. The ESDP

might need capabilities that duplicate those of NATO, while

the DCI’s program should not seek to provide the Europeans

with capabilities that duplicate NATO’s existing ones but

rather with complementary ones. While political leadership

at the highest level in each state will have to decide those

questions, if the perception grows that there is no threat, no

10
need to spend more and modernize, and no need to reform

European economies to provide their forces with updated

systems, the ESDP will not be viable. If it does materialize

under those conditions, it will only do so then at the expense

of NATO and allied cohesion.

The military officers and many others at the conference

agreed that the potential gap between a U.S. military

performing higher-order missions and a European force

performing smaller-scale missions can be very harmful to

allied unity. The officers argued that the ESDP must

approximate the size of a reinforced corps, exploit

technologies to reduce risks to its men, and reap the full

benefit of the RMA and information technologies. Its

landpower component must be something more than a

long-range strike force, because only armies can occupy

territory and vital enemy resources. Otherwise coalition

unity will become very problematic. They also lamented the

absence of coordinating mechanisms between NATO and

the EU at the level of allied command, of an

interorganizational consensus on project management

between the EU and NATO, and of a complete tool bag of

instruments needed for conflict prevention or

peacebuilding. 

At least two American discussants also raised the issue

of the absence of sufficient police forces, e.g., in Kosovo,

despite commitments to send them. Despite the EU’s claim

that, thanks to its declarations on the ESDP and

accompanying police forces, it now disposes of all the

instruments necessary to be an autonomous provider of

security to resolve or prevent conflicts, it was painfully clear

that, in fact, this was not the case. Moreover, unless the

requisite political and economic commitments were

present, this claim would also not be accurate in the future.

Ultimately, the political commitment of the

governments involved will determine the ESDP’s destiny.

And because that is a political question par excellence, it is

the main question confronting all those who seek to convert

11
the ESDP into a reality. But if the ESDP becomes a reality,

then the relationship between the ESDP and the EU on the

one hand and NATO on the other (or perhaps between at

least some European governments and Washington) will

become even more intense an issue than it presently is. For

the ESDP to become a truly viable force, its relationship to

NATO must be worked out in advance of crises, not on an ad

hoc basis. Not surprisingly, even though the issues

discussed above determine the ESDP’s fate; this political or

“architectural" question of EU-NATO relations was the

main subject of the conference’s discussions.

NATO and the EU/ESDP.

Unless NATO and the EU can devise a mutually

beneficial relationship, progress in building a secure

Europe that is whole and free will stagnate, and Europe

could even regress towards the past. Yet, although an

American participant in the conference called this question

largely a “theological one," theology, whether it is sacred or

civil in nature, still divides states and can even cause wars.

Therefore, even at the risk of evading other pressing issues,

the participants felt obliged to take up this issue once again.

American suspicions of the ESDP and of some

governments’ intentions are still very strong even if

President Bush, as an American participant reminded us,

blessed the idea in his initial meetings with Prime Minister

Blair in February 2001. However that blessing was

conditional upon the ESDP remaining subordinate to

NATO or at least not independent of it.

21

 Certainly the

Pentagon and some officials of the State Department still

harbor reservations about the ESDP and fear it will become

a stalking horse for France’s continuing and not so hidden

desire to remake it into an independent European Army,

completely separate from NATO. In that case the ESDP

would become, to some degree, an instrument of French

national interests.

22

 In general, French policy reveals a

constant temptation to push the envelope on the ESDP. At

12
the same time, this French temptation embarrasses the

Blair government and attracts U.S. criticism. As Blair

charged during his reelection campaign in 2001, his

opponents in the conservative Party were “pouring poison”

into U.S. ears concerning the ESDP. Furthermore, he

added, “If we don’t get involved in European defence, it will

happen without Britain. The those people who really have

an agenda to destroy NATO will have control of it.”

23

Though he denies it, it is widely assumed that he meant

France or at least key figures in the French government.

This French temptation is reflected in earlier statements by

President Jacques Chirac, a statement at the time of the

conference by French Chief of Staff General Jean-Pierre

Kelche, and in remarks by the CINC of the ESDP, Finnish

General Gustav Hagglund.

24

 This same temptation also

manifested itself at the conference even if French

participants avoided the buzz word “independent" and kept

to the EU’s agreed term, “autonomous.”

25

 Nevertheless, this

temptation, and other EU leaders’ accompanying assertions

concerning the EU’s global role and genuine military

relevance in providing security and preventing and

resolving conflicts, cannot but inflame suspicions here and

abroad about the EU’s ultimate objectives vis-à-vis the

United States.

26

There is also perhaps some reason to be concerned that

certain members of the EU, e.g., German Foreign Minister

Joschka Fischer, envision the ESDP as a project that will

take us beyond the sovereignty of the nation-state whose

principal feature is that it alone can legitimately command

its troops or designate them for command under other

authorities.

2 7

 If the ESDP evolves into such a

supra-national organization that reserves for itself the most

decisive powers of the state, it will stand in sharp contrast to

NATO which is, first of all, an alliance of fully sovereign

states that was created to defend that sovereignty. Second,

such an evolution would put the ESDP into direct

confrontation with the Bush administration, and perhaps

broader American political trends that emphasize an

13
uncompromising assertion of America’s sovereign rights

and refusal to be bound by a nonelected European

bureaucracy.

28

While this issue of NATO-ESDP relations may seem to

be an academic or “theological” question, it clearly is a

question of utmost importance. For if this interorganizational relationship breaks down or even merely

malfunctions, that failure will have enormous and enduring

repercussions. This issue is particularly important to those

states who may be members of NATO but not EU, like

Turkey or Canada, or to states who are applying for

membership in either or both organizations, like the Baltic

states, or to those states who are members of the EU, but not

NATO, e.g., Finland and Sweden.

This last point emerged with particular clarity from a

Finnish participant who argued that Europe should be

undivided, and strong, if not necessarily militarily

self-sufficient. There should be no conflict between

European integration and transatlanticism. But if such a

dispute does occur, the transatlantic principle should be

preeminent. This point is crucial for Europe’s smaller states

who almost unanimously insist on a strong transatlantic

relationship and a leading U.S. role in Europe. They rightly

fear that otherwise they and their interests will be

sacrificed on the altar of the competing national interests of

the major allies: France, Germany, and Great Britain. They

also fear that one or more of those governments might be

tempted to make a deal with Russia at their expense.

29

 This

standpoint is not confined (though one might expect it to be)

solely to states bordering Russia, although they feel this

sentiment quite strongly. Therefore these governments

emphasize the centrality of NATO, the incarnation of

transatlanticism, in their and NATO’s relationship to the

EU. In this connection, many smaller European states, not

just Poland and the Baltic states, clearly still have

well-founded reservations about Russian policy.

30

14
Since Russia still stands aloof from the normative

moral-political-military values that make up Europe as a

political community and continues to threaten military

reprisals against the Baltic states for joining NATO or to

place tactical nuclear missiles in Kaliningrad, these small

states’ fears are justified as prudent long-term policies.

31

 It

is, in fact, a mark of the failure of Russian reform that 10

years after the end of Communism, Russian policies are still

universally regarded as unpredictable. Therefore, it is not

surprising that a U.S. participant argued that Lord Ismay’s

famous remark that NATO’s purpose was to keep the

Americans in, the Germans down, and the Russians out,

still had validity despite Germany’s unification and

pacification and the end of Communism and the Soviet

empire. While enlargement hedges against a future

resurgent Russia since present-day Russia cannot play that

aggressive role, both NATO and EU enlargement also

represent an effort to establish a gravitational field upon

Russia to pull it into Europe as a full member of this

normative and security community.

However, Russia is no longer necessarily the primary or

only justification for NATO enlargement or for NATO’s

primacy as a security provider. Both this American and his

Finnish counterpart as well as many other speakers,

including some from the NATO organization itself, stressed

that NATO must expand not only geographically but must

also confront the new security agenda that still divides and

confronts Europe. NATO must face many nonmilitary or

soft security questions and continue to become as much an

instrument for crisis management and collective security as

for collective defense. This American speaker stressed that

at least some would welcome (as the Clinton administration

clearly did) NATO becoming the preferred European

security mechanism for “out-of-area" challenges beyond

NATO’s present boundaries.

Certainly some American analysts strongly espouse this

viewpoint, and it has many supporters in the United States.

15
For example, a recent Rand Study of NATO by David

Ochmanek contained this statement,

The Balkans, in short, provide a test of the extent to which

NATO’s members are prepared to use their military forces (as

well as their limited economic and diplomatic resources) in

operations that aim to redress situations that threaten common

yet rather amorphous interests. The Balkans are also a factor

hastening the evolution of the Alliance towards a future in

which out-of-area peace enforcement operations are seen—by

its members and, increasingly, by the broader international

community—as an accepted part of the Alliance’s raison d’etre.

32

Former Secretary of Defense William Perry and Secretary

of State Warren Christopher, who probably argued for such

a line when they were in office, have written that,

The alliance needs to adapt its military strategy to today’s

reality: the danger to the security of its members is not

primarily potential aggression to their collective territory, but

threats to their collective interests beyond their territory.

Shifting the alliance’s emphasis from defense of members’

territory to defense of common interests is the strategic

imperative. These threats include the proliferation of weapons

of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of oil, terrorism,

genocidal violence, and wars of aggression in other regions that

threaten to cause great disruption. To deal with such threats

alliance members need to have a way to rapidly form military

coalitions that can accomplish goals beyond NATO territory.

33

As the conference’s discussions showed, this view is not

universally accepted. Many participants even expressed the

fear or presentiment that Western security institutions do

not keep pace with the new challenges. This disagreement

showed two things. First, it revealed the discord within the

Alliance about how to respond to new challenges or threats

like proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

Second, it revealed at least a rough consensus as to what

those new challenges are and an admission that it is very

difficult to find the appropriate mechanism by which to

respond to them collectively, either in EU or in NATO.

While a rhetorical consensus exists that NATO and the EU

16
must adapt to new realities and challenges; nobody knows

quite how to do so or how to map out a road for doing so.

We must view the discussion about NATO-EU/ESDP

relations in that context. At least some American

participants with wide experience in Europe and many of

the West European conferees agreed that Europe will not

long remain militarily impotent, and that the solidity of the

previous transatlantic connection will inevitably weaken in

the absence of a common enemy. Indeed, one American who

argued these points went further and stated that EU

enlargement should precede any subsequent NATO

enlargement, although this is frankly a remote possibility.

He cited, as did the French participant, French grievances

over NATO’s Southern Command as critical factors in Paris’

disaffection. The French discussant also argued that in any

future European conflict the United States may not act,

obliging Europe to defend itself.

These last points provoked a lively discussion. German

members and former military officers there rejected

France’s “grievances” and emphasized that NATO’s success

depends upon the quality of U.S. leadership. Kosovo pulled

NATO in multiple directions only because that leadership

was incoherent in 1998-99. Nonetheless, only the United

States can take a leadership role in managing Russia’s

decline, China’s rise, and the defense of Europe.

Unfortunately, European states cannot count on Europe to

defend their security unconditionally, a point made equally

strongly by Estonian participants. This observation is in

line with the lessons of Bosnia for, as former Supreme

Commander of Swedish Armed Forces General Ole

Wiktorin observed, in reference to Bosnia’s wars, “As a

result of Bosnia and other armed conflicts we have come to

accept war on European territory. The message is, in

particular for a small nation, that, if you do not take care of

your security, no one else may care.”

34

This Estonian viewpoint, shared by many, if not all,

observers in the Baltic states, reaffirms the centrality of the

17
U.S. presence in Europe to any true sense of security there.

It reflects smaller states’ quite rational apprehensions

concerning their larger allies. As the EU’s Nice summit of

December 2000 and continuing Franco-British-German

differences concerning the future direction of the EU

indicate, concerns about other states’ relative gains, e.g.,

Germany’s power after unification or French and German

power in the future EU organization, still drive much of

governments’ foreign policies. These concerns make it

difficult, if not impossible, to achieve unified European

policies. As former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl

observed, Germany’s dominance “would necessarily

provoke fear and envy among all our neighbors and move

them toward common action against Germany."

35

 Any

government that assumed the EU could soon lead Europe

even after creation of a supposedly independent CFSP and

ESDP based on the postulate of a harmony of interests on all

issues of European security, not to mention “out-of-area”

issues, would be both wrong and deluded. And that error

and delusion carry the risk of dangerous outcomes.

Therefore such illusions must not govern policy

formulation. 

Europe, according to this argument, rather than rushing

off to a united policy, actually craves the American

umbrella, for without it a “security competition” based on a

renationalization of foreign and defense policies would

necessarily ensue as Kohl and other European elites

believe.

36

 European pleas for American action and

leadership in Macedonia forcefully confirm that point.

While such a competition, absent American leadership, may

not lead to wars like those of 1914 or 1939, it would probably

lead to regional blocs, spheres of interests and of influence,

and old time power politics. Central European officials,

despite their friendship with Germany, desire NATO

membership, not only because of their residual fears of

Russian policy, but also because they do not want to be left

alone in Europe with a unified Germany.

37 And Berlin, as

Kohl’s remarks show, knows it.

18
Thus Washington cannot and should not take European

integration and unity for granted. Similarly, support for one

or another brick in the West European security architecture

is generally motivated as much by fears of other states’

relative gains or an attempt to make such gains as they are

by a desire to do something for Europe. Thus when we hear

politicians or analysts tell us that Europe has reached the

millennium and has renounced power politics, etc., or

identify their state’s interests with those of “Europe,”

Bismarck’s acid comment that politicians who invoked the

name of Europe generally did so because they were afraid to

ask for something that was in their selfish national interest,

comes to mind.

38

 The French participant as much as

confirmed that the Anglo-French initiative at St. Malo in

1998 that triggered the creation of the ESDP derived from

Europe’s awful Bosnian and Kosovo experiences and the

common determination to avoid exclusive reliance on an

uncertain U.S. policy. This explanation does not exclude

other considerations like Blair’s desire to play a bigger role

in Europe by an accord on defense, the only instrument

available to London to pursue this goal. A British

participant confirmed this point.

39

This participant also argued that the new ESDP would

be wholly transparent to NATO since 11 states are members

of EU and NATO. He added that the EU’s Nice summit

agreed to extensive preparations for transparency and

consultations with NATO, more or less giving NATO the

first right of refusal on any future military contingency that

falls within the scope of Petersberg missions and on the use

of its equipment and forces for an ESDP operation.

40 He, too,

argued that these decisions rendered the issue of the

NATO-ESDP relationship a “theological” one. While U.S.

participation is ensured by the Nice agreements, he argued

that a European defense force will eventually be decided.

The Nice accords only provided for crisis management, and

members of the ESDP/EU will not support anything beyond

that if the issue becomes the American commitment to

19
NATO, for nobody wants to make that commitment an

issue. 

Nevertheless, even this way of presenting the question

made some members uneasy. A German participant warned

that Europe did not need Washington to get into trouble and

raised the issue of the ESDP’s lack of funding and

effectiveness. Not only did he cite the widening

technological gap among NATO members and between

America and Europe, he also worried that even a mission

based on Petersberg tasks could foster divided counsels

concerning members’ objectives and interests. He also

worried about obtaining Security Council authorization for

Petersberg missions, given Russian proclivities to obstruct

such operations. Although he believed that the very effort to

realize the ESDP’s autonomy will force it to confront and

overcome these kinds of issues, he also concurred that

Europe will not oppose NATO.

However, this argument, too, did not reassure everyone.

Another German participant warned that the ESDP was

not ready for action, and, since the EU members were not

fulfilling the DCI, it probably would not be ready in time for

even small-scale operations. He warned against any

distancing from the United States because U.S.-European

relations rest on a systematic process of interallied

interactions going back years as well as profound economic

and generational relations. A British speaker likewise

warned about the ESDP, calling its structures “dreadful.”

He feared a differentiation between European forces who

would undertake small-scale Petersberg missions and the

U.S. military that would take on the really tough missions.

He stated that, while Europe emphasized soft security, the

United States stressed hard security. Implicitly, he clearly

feared, as did many there, that this perceptual gap could

undermine the concept of shared risk that governs NATO

operations and split the allies.

Moreover, he openly stated that these “dreadful” EU

structures were also undemocratic and untransparent.

20
Hence, no direct democratic control over the EU’s use of

forces existed. Given the present controversies in Europe,

heightened by Ireland’s rejection of the Nice accords over

the EU’s “democratic deficit” and NATO’s insistence upon

just such controls, this was a palpable hit upon the idea of an

ESDP.

41

 Arguably, some analysts also maintain that,

unless a true democratic legitimacy emerges, any talk of a

legitimate, not to say common, foreign and security policy of

the EU will be compromised at the source.

42 Even so, this

participant agreed that the ESDP was the only way to

persuade Europe to spend on defense since it would have

ownership of the idea. The ESDP was also an insurance

policy against a contingency from which the United States

would, in fact, abstain.

Some participants agreed with this last point and called

for the United States to loosen export controls to allow for

interoperability and for Europe to master and implement

the RMA. An American participant from the State

Department observed that not only did the administration

support ESDI, the Pentagon and other reservations

notwithstanding, the United States had also listed some 17

steps to facilitate this loosening of export controls at the

Florence meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in

2000. It is now up to industries who wish to play in foreign

markets to ease burdensome licensing agreements and

restrictions. Otherwise, the call for loosening export

controls did not provoke much discussion.

However, it is clear that there was a great concern, not

only among Americans, that the ESDP would be a fiction

until and unless the financial and technological issues,

signifying real political will in European capitals, were

satisfactorily addressed. On this last point, some

disagreement ensued, specifically over the question of

whether the DCI and force planning and building

requirements for the ESDP overlapped. Some argued that

they did, in fact, overlap, presumably because these forces

all belonged to members of both EU and NATO.

Alternatively, these processes overlapped because of the

21
commonality of the technologies involved in both processes.

Others disagreed with this outlook. A former officer insisted

that we do not have common EU and NATO force standards,

and NATO should not accept the claim of those who have

done nothing to improve their capabilities. Rather, it should

publicly name and shame them and insist upon

modernization, not only for aspirants to membership but

also for members. Something resembling that process has

taken place vis-à-vis the Czech Republic, although it is too

early to say whether that will achieve the desired objectives

in the foreseeable future.

43

NATO Enlargement.

The foregoing discussion and analysis suggest the

importance of NATO enlargement for the West, the

candidates, and for Russia; and why the next round of

enlargement will crucially affect so many state destinies in

Europe and North America. Here the discussion was

particularly revealing. First of all, there were few divisions

among the participants. Everyone concurred with the

frequently stated view that it was necessary now to begin

discussing the criteria for new members to be invited in

November 2002 at NATO’s Prague summit. Even more

surprising was the general agreement that it was up to

Washington to define the NATO consensus concerning

criteria and who should be invited at Prague, and that, if it

did so, NATO would follow its lead. Obviously this is a far

cry from the terrible press the United States recently was

receiving in Europe.

This last consensus transcended the conference’s

discussions. President Jacques Chirac of France, on his

Baltic trip in July 2001, said that the decision about Baltic

membership in NATO was essentially Washington’s

decision. Moreover, he also strongly hinted at support for

their membership in both NATO and EU.

44

 One suspects

this consensus emerged at NATO’s Brussels summit in

June 2001 and owes much to President Bush’s Warsaw

22
University speech, laying out an expansive and inclusive

vision of the future map of European security.

45

 Even so, the

issues involved in this consensus were the subjects of a

vigorous discussion. One question is whether NATO will

respond to “out-of-area” crises and challenges beyond

Europe and, if so, how. Another question is how NATO and

Russia are to relate to one another so that Russia truly

integrates as a democratic, peaceful, status quo power into

Europe. 

Baltic participants naturally strongly advocated their

membership, underscoring their commitment to a

democratic order and to liberal and cooperative security

perspectives. They also insisted that they are taking the

requisite military steps to bring their military forces and

defense spending to levels compatible with NATO’s

demands. They stressed that their actions indicate both

their ability and desire to contribute to European security

rather than to be mere security consumers. Not

surprisingly, they urged NATO to disregard Russian

objections and reiterated that Russia continues at every

opportunity to pressure and threaten them or to conjure up

new and spurious issues and charges to retard or prevent

Baltic membership in NATO. At the same time, they

insisted that only NATO, and not the EU’s notional “rapid

reaction forces,” can defend them against real threats.

They see NATO enlargement not in terms of preserving

or extending new dividing lines in Europe but rather as a

way to end the ambiguity of the Baltic states’ status and

Russia’s talk of red lines. NATO and EU must show that

Russia no longer can define for itself a privileged sphere of

influence in the Baltic or in Europe more generally. Indeed,

if Russia truly considers using tactical nuclear weapons in

Europe against the Baltic states and NATO, then that is all

the more reason to act and not hold back.

While one speaker argued personally for Baltic

membership and insisted that no Baltic state’s membership

threatened Russia, he equally insisted that NATO must

23
engage Russia (although neither he nor anyone else could

say exactly how or to what end this engagement should

proceed). He also lamented Russia’s seeming inability to

come to grips with the new view of security and the inclusive

approach now being employed by NATO. He cautioned

against saying who will get in now in order to maintain the

momentum for continuing reforms among applicants and

believed that Russia may not like enlargement but will

accept it.

Although the Russian participant disputed many of

these points, most of the discussion on enlargement did not

revolve around the merits, or lack thereof, of the Baltic

states’ cause. Rather, it focused on the overall question of

the military criteria for new members. Speakers from

NATO emphasized the importance of the new membership

action plans (MAPs) as a tool for engaging applicants

politically, economically, and militarily; supporting their

economic and military reforms; and giving them affordable

targets for defense spending. The MAPs and associated

programs also ensured that applicants did not cause

problems with their neighbors or with their own ethnic

minorities and reformed their security structures.

American speakers, not surprisingly, adopted a much

more robust, positive, and expansive view of the goals of

enlargement. One saw it as part of a broader Euroatlantic

security strategy to make Europe whole and free. While

preserving the best of the past and the robust transatlantic

tie, NATO would reintegrate European states who had just

entered history after being kept in Soviet captivity, engage

Russia, stop conflicts, and deal with new threats, including

those outside of Europe. Programs like the PfP prepared

states for the responsibilities of membership, and alleviated

concerns over so-called gray zones of European security.

The “alphabet soup” of new programs ensured that all those

willing to play by those rules obtained tangible gains,

participation in SFOR and KFOR with the Russians,

agreement with the Ukrainians, and so on.

24
Nevertheless, he discerned real concerns about

enlargement that had to be faced. There are no more easy

choices among the applicant governments. Germany is no

longer an engine for enlargement. While the United States

must forge the consensus, getting one will be very difficult.

Among other things, the new candidates for membership all

have a mixed record. The danger exists that, since NATO

does not allow its members to fail, they may not reach

NATO’s standards once they are accepted. NATO

enlargement may also not reach those states who are most

in need of it. However, NATO cannot accept Russian red

lines and should also aim for the so called “big bang,” taking

as many members as possible rather than meting out

regular dosage to Russia.

He insisted that there must be some expansion of NATO

and that the MAPs are essential so that those states who do

not get in are not stigmatized. We and NATO must help

stabilize the Balkans, give economic help for Russian

reform, and eliminate the “theological” disputes over the

ESDP. NATO must get on with the DCI and have confidence

in American leadership and specifically in President Bush.

Finally, U.S. leadership is vital to enlargement because

there will be intense bargaining under the best of

circumstances concerning who does get in.

A second American noted that NATO is not soliciting

new members but responding to other states. The concept of

an open door means just that, it is open to all who wish to

enter. While NATO still has not reached consensus

concerning the added value that any particular new

members may bring to it, if those who perform best under

the MAPs do not get in, that will raise serious questions as

to the utility and meaning of the entire program.

This point led to the question of defining the military

criteria for new members so that their entry into NATO

gives it real added value. Because the MAPs enhance the

technical issues of military development and their

corresponding purpose is to enhance stability, whatever

25
decision NATO makes will destabilize Eastern Europe

because someone will be left out. New members’

contributions already have left much to be desired, and

there are many structural obstacles to improved military

performance throughout Central and Eastern Europe.

Consequently, taking in new members will be difficult to

justify on military grounds, especially if they have failed to

meet their own MAP programs.

This discussion, in fact, set the stage for a

comprehensive discussion among the members as to what

U.S. policy was and where it was going. The U.S. participant

from the State Department said that there was a reasonable

amount of continuity from the Clinton administration to the

Bush administration regarding the importance of NATO

and the Alliance. The United States remains committed to

NATO and recognizes that the Alliance makes it easier to

solve many more problems than would otherwise be the

case. While OSCE is a useful forum for discussing

transnational threats, our policy is inclusive and collective.

It aims to give everyone a voice. Meanwhile, even the

Russians know that NATO is the only effective force for

collective security in Europe.

He observed that, despite press accounts, the United

States supports the ESDP and wishes to make it work. But

the EU must not promise what it cannot deliver. We will not

sacrifice NATO enlargement for other goals, but troop

deployment decisions probably do not have to be made until

after the Prague Summit. Meanwhile, the debate over

enlargement has begun, and the key issue is enlargement to

the Baltic. Russia has not changed its view about

enlargement and believes that European support for the

Baltic states is at best lukewarm, or that Europe would like

the problem to go away.

It would appear that, while NATO enlargement is an

important issue to the Europeans, it is less important to

them than the relationship between EU and NATO.

Perhaps that explains why they seek U.S. leadership to

26
forge a consensus in order to minimize what would

otherwise be a frenzied and fractious Prague summit.

NATO’s importance and utility are not questioned, and its

purposes are universally acknowledged.

The real question for Europe, however, is dealing with

existing and foreseeable threats: Russia, strategic arms

control, the Balkans, and other issues. It is most interesting

in this connection that only one or two people mentioned

Ukraine. One American commented that we must focus on

Ukraine which he believed was the most dangerous security

issue in Europe, much more than the Balkans. Yet nobody

else even spoke to that issue. This suggests that most elites

still view the Ukraine and any question of Western security

involvement in the CIS through a Russian prism. This also

suggests that neither Washington nor Western Europe has

good ideas concerning helping Ukraine reach stability other

than repeated exhortations. Frankly, that may not be

enough, given Ukraine’s stagnation and political regression

especially as it is also not clear what Europe tangibly hopes

to accomplish vis-à-vis Russia except through endless

dialogue. Neither is it clear what price the West will make

Russia pay for integrating with it.

Strategic Arms Control and Weapons Proliferation.

One American predicted that, as happened in Genoa in

July, Russia and America would negotiate reductions in

strategic arms control concurrently with negotiations on

missile defenses. This is part of the Bush administration’s

new framework for relations with Russia. But it is also clear

that the administration will soon “bump up” against the

restrictions of the antiballistic missile treaty within 6

months to a year. These negotiations could encounter some

major problems by 2002, since there is good reason to

suspect that Russia aims to drag this issue out in

inconclusive negotiations while it tries to harvest any gains

that may accrue to it from the general foreign skepticism

about our missile defense program.

46

27
In that connection, U.S. participants noted the Bush

administration’s general skepticism about binding treaties

and the long drawn-out negotiations that precede them.

This skepticism likely is influenced by suspicions that

Russia will not bargain seriously and merely play for time.

It probably also owes something to the difficulty in passing

treaties through Congress. Still, it appears that, above all,

the administration wants the flexibility to act in almost

unilateral fashion, although missile defense will be shared

with NATO. It is precisely this desire for the utmost

flexibility that arouses in Europeans the fear of American

unilateralism. The administration’s perceived

unilateralism arouses fears that America seeks to free itself

from all constraints in world affairs, to increase its range of

strategic options for using force on its own without reference

to others’ opinions, and even to dismantle parts or all of the

system of arms control treaties that has been laboriously

constructed over the years. Indeed, some Europeans fear

that we will accept Perle’s formulation that Europe is no

longer vital to American interests, and essentially convert

our alliances into purely ad hoc and temporary

arrangements or coalitions, leaving Europe both adrift

strategically and inferior technologically. Given those

perceptions, it is not surprising that more than a few

European statesmen publicly voice the idea that the EU is

“one of the few institutions we can develop as a balance to

U.S. world domination.”

47 

While this fear of U.S. unilateralism and hegemony may

be exaggerated, it is real and must be confronted. Although

the State Department participant observed that the Bush

administration cannot decide for Russia what its goals and

interests are or solve its problems because those are

Russia’s responsibilities, this may not ultimately satisfy

Europe, given Russia’s historic importance and geographic

proximity. Many U.S. statements that the administration is

less likely to make decisions on the basis of what Russia

wants and that a vision of U.S. interests takes precedence

over everything else confirm his remarks. This U.S. vision is

28
not a general acceptance of all multilateral programs and

negotiations but rather, in the words of the State

Department’s Director of Policy Planning, Richard Haass,

“a la carte multilateralism.”

48

 This is precisely what worries

many Europeans whose implicit demand is not only that we

engage Russia, but that we do so on the basis of existing

arms control agreements.

Clearly this orientation among many, but by no means

all, European analysts and governments diverges from

what is emerging as the administration’s approach to

Russia and strategic nuclear issues. As this State

Department participant reported, we focus on Russia’s

strategic potential and aim to maintain strategic stability

and reliable command, control, and communications of its

nuclear forces. While engaging Russia in dialogue, we do not

obsess about it. We will help Russia to help itself, but we

should accept that not every problem involving Russia can

or perhaps should be solved at once. Finally, we have made

it clear that Russian support for weapons proliferation will

have real consequences.

At the same time, our strategic review seeks to fashion

and sustain deterrence in a manner appropriate to the

current strategic environment. Deterrence as we knew it is

no longer adequate or sufficient to today’s environment. We

need a new doctrine because the old one that ensures

massive response to attacks on allies does not provide

enough options to deal with strategic conventional weapons

attacks against them. The current defense review also aims

to improve the readiness and sustainability of deployed

forces. This requires a high level of investment and a

priority on force protection since we are not ready to assume

or incur a higher degree of risk for our soldiers.

Transformation of the armed forces therefore aims to move

to a 21st century force capable of deterring and defeating

threats. It entails modernizing C3I and space capabilities

and a general reform of Pentagon procedures, structures,

and organizations to foster more responsive and effective

interallied decisionmaking.

29
He continued by noting that we are consulting with our

allies on the most efficacious architecture against ballistic

missile threats from several unpredictable states who could

use them, not against Russia or China. This Euroatlantic

system will cover and be available to others, including

Russia if it is serious about its earlier proposal for a joint

Russo-European missile defense. The system will be

affordable, and consultations will precede any decisions

about architecture. These observations coincide with the

fact that many U.S. allies, in and out of Europe, are

participating in building defenses against missiles.

49

Seconding these remarks, a British speaker emphasized

the need for a process to move Russia and the United States

away from locking in high numbers of offensive strategic

weapons and towards giving the United States the option of

strategic defense and the capability to deter and defeat

threats either unilaterally or with allies. We must move

away from outmoded ideas of arms control and deterrence,

and decouple U.S. and Russian nuclear forces from each

other as the administration’s proposals would do. The less

adversarial U.S.-Russian relationship that would then

ensue could also benefit Europe.

On the other hand, relying on fewer and fewer foreign

U.S. bases, especially in Asia and on long-range

precision-strike weapons, could complicate interoperability

among allies. This might again lead to the dreaded division

of labor between the United States at the high end of the

conflict spectrum and Europe at the lower end. Indeed,

unless Europe modernized its forces as promised,

Washington might be less inclined to provide both

leadership and reassurance.

Looking to new issues, he argued that, while EU should

modernize its forces and show more interest in Asian

security, Washington should place a higher value on broad

multilateral arms control regimes. Instead, it unilaterally

focuses on denying capabilities to weapons proliferators

rather than engaging them. These remarks encapsulate an

30
increasingly visible difference between U.S. and European

perspectives on weapons proliferation where Europe

believes in prolonged negotiations and engagement with

those states, while the United States allegedly believes in

unilateralism and coercion, even force.

50

 This difference

appears to be real, but it also reflects the difference cited

above between U.S. global responsibilities and the

insularity or parochialism of European thinking. In fact,

some European governments are apparently going out of

their way to pretend that there are no threats. Spain, for

example, has told Libya that it sees no threat to Europe from

Libya regarding WMD and is not participating in a U.S.

missile defense umbrella for Southern Europe even though

Libya’s efforts to achieve biological and chemical weapons

and a long-range missile capability are well known, and

Libya is the only country ever to launch missiles at

European allies (in 1986 at Italy in retaliation for the U.S.

raids on Libya).

51

Therefore, it is difficult to see how engagement alone

deters Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, not to mention India,

Pakistan, and Israel, from building nuclear and strategic

systems to defend themselves. While each state’s reasons

may vary, in the end they each feel some degree of threat

that nobody else is prepared to overcome for them,

especially as some, like Iran and Israel, have been overtly

threatened or attacked by WMD. And according to some

U.S. aerospace executives, here Europe cannot be trusted

with American secrets but will sell the technology abroad to

weapons proliferators.

52

 While Sweden felt sufficiently

secure in what was a covert American guarantee during the

Cold War to forego nuclear weapons, for the reasons cited

above, these governments do not share that feeling and for

that matter neither did France or China in the 1950s and

1960s.

53

 Moreover, as long as Russia, Europe, and the

United States continue promoting weapons proliferation

and/or technologies, engagement seems to be an

insufficient, albeit necessary, means of reducing weapons

31
proliferators’ incentives to go nuclear and their fears lest

they do not do so.

Clearly no resolution of these questions was possible

here or in the real world at one meeting. But we can be

certain that these issues will continue to trouble NATO

because officials in both the Clinton and Bush

administrations feel strongly that the proliferation of

WMD, and perhaps of advanced conventional systems as

well, is the greatest threat we face. Europeans, even if they

support or do not obstruct our missile defense program,

clearly do not feel this way. In many cases, they see little

threat from weapons proliferation to their security, thus

signifying the gap in threat assessments alluded to above.

54

Either they remain more concerned about so-called soft

security threats or they worry more about Russia’s future.

Therefore they place a higher emphasis on engaging Russia,

although they are uncertain about the objectives involved in

this engagement. This European disposition also suggests

that a unilateral American move toward missile defense

without truly substantive negotiations with Russia will

arouse great antagonism in Europe.

55

Russia.

While Europe’s smaller states fear Russia, the larger

states also distrust it. Nor can we say that reform and

democracy have triumphed or that Russia’s national

security policies conform to those of Europe. Continuing

weapons proliferation, Chechnya, moves to integrate the

CIS under its control, and growing signs of a police state all

belie the hoped for goals of democracy, prosperity, peace,

and security and create much anxiety in Europe. As the

distinguished German analyst of Russia, Alexander Rahr,

recently wrote,

Throughout the recent years, Russian news broadcasts were

dominated by frightening stories, mostly borrowed from the

Russian media, about the disastrous state of the population in

the Russian regions, about infighting between Russian

32
oligarchs, behind-the-scenes intrigues in the upper echelons of

power, criminal turf wars, and military operations in

Chechnya. These could not but breed apprehensions among

the German public concerning their own well-being and

security. Thus the likelihood of where Russia would head in its

further development—down the path of democratic reforms or

in the direction of a criminal state with a totalitarian

regime—ceased to be a purely Russian affair and became, as it

were, a part of the German home policy. And for that matter,

[so] did the elections of the “strongest" man in Russia, the

intricate twists and turns of which the German public followed

with no less interest than the shaping of their own

government.

56

European observers have noted that Russian national

security policy diverges from European standards and

isolates Russia from Europe.

57

 As Quentin Peel of the

Financial Times wrote,

But the real problem remains Chechnya and all it represents.

Unless Mr. Putin can find a peaceful solution to the

confrontation in that remote mountainous enclave, he cannot

and should not be embraced by the rest of Europe. It

represents a continuing affront to basic human rights.

58

Unfortunately, as these points were raised during the

discussions, when it came the turn of the Russian

participant from the embassy in Washington to reply, he did

so in a way that confirmed Western misgivings.

He started by charging that the only Russia that would

apparently satisfy the West is one that would be

hermetically sealed or debarred from military exports or

where those exports were fully transparent. This ideal

Russia should applaud NATO enlargement and all its

works, negotiate with the Chechens, pay its debts, but

forgive Ukraine its debts to Russia, and accept that EU

enlargement might marginalize Russia in Europe even

though it supports that enlargement. He complained that,

although Russia has many proposals for European security

and a new model for it, it has been denied an equal access to

decisionmaking in Europe. Therefore it searches for

33
alternatives by which to defend its national interests.

Finally, a new security treaty with NATO that goes beyond

the Founding Act is needed.

One suspects that this will be Moscow’s price for both the

negotiations over missile defenses and NATO enlargement,

and that the ensuing accord should, from Moscow’s

standpoint, turn a blind eye to reintegration of the CIS and

the trampling of democracy and democratic controls over

the multiple police and armed forces in Russia. Although

many Russians, including official speakers, have frequently

voiced this litany of complaints against the West, in many

respects these complaints are misplaced. It is precisely the

refusal to pay debts, negotiate with the Chechens, and

accept the fact that it no longer controls the destiny of

Eastern Europe or to reform internally that excludes Russia

from Europe because these policies antagonize and alarm

Europe. While Europe must engage Russia to make it more

European, Russia has to take the decisive actions towards

this end.

Until and unless Russia realizes that to be fully included

in Europe it must act in a European manner and conform to

European standards, it will suffer repeated frustrations,

losses, and assaults to its own excessive great power

chauvinism. For Russia to be integrated with Europe, it

must join the political and normative community that now

makes up the West. Russia’s atavistic outlook precludes its

full integration into Europe and thus its own democracy,

peace, prosperity, and security.

The Balkans.

Sadly, the conference hardly addressed the Balkans.

One fears again that this omission was not accidental but

reflects either exhaustion with the problems of the former

Yugoslavia, a lack of answers, or unwillingness to truly

think through the requirements of lasting solutions to

Balkan problems. The problems here are well-known and

typify the new security threats, failing states, ethnopolitical

34
conflict, peace operations, criminality, and so on. A Greek

speaker indicated the basic orientation of goodwill that now

characterizes Greek policy, most importantly includes its

policy towards Turkey. Nevertheless Cyprus’s status must

be addressed, and a just and comprehensive solution found.

In the Balkans as a whole, peace, stability, and regional

economic integration are preconditions for prosperity and

an undefined “arms prevention” program might be useful in

stopping current revisionist states or movements. Finally,

Russia’s interests here are especially important to it, so

Russian interests must be considered and acknowledged in

any lasting solution.

However, these points are all well-known or truisms.

They do not tell us how to get there from here. Nor did

anyone at the conference seem to have an idea how to bring

about NATO’s stated objective, a Kosovo under some form of

Serbia’s formal, but legitimate, sovereignty. Clearly, unless

some real solution to the Kosovo and Bosnia problems is

found, Macedonia and those two entities will continue to be

insecure and NATO forces will be deployed there until

somebody devises a workable outcome. Indeed, NATO

members are quietly preparing to stay in Macedonia longer

than the agreement for 30 days to help disarm the Albanian

rebels there because of the deep skepticism that they will

collect a meaningful number of weapons, stop weapons

smuggling into Macedonia, or that either or both sides will

then keep the peace.

59

 To say this is not to dismiss the

staggering complexities of Balkan issues. But having

accepted the burden of collective security and crisis

management there, NATO is now the Balkans’ security

manager. NATO cannot evade its responsibilities to find a

viable solution without compromising its aspirations to be

Europe’s primary effective security provider. NATO

cohesion, the success of future enlargements, and many

other critical issues now depend upon successful resolution

of Balkan issues. As in the past, Balkan and European

security are inextricable.

35
Conclusions.

That last point is another way of stating the

indivisibility of European security. Europe cannot be part

secure and part insecure. This is the fundamental rationale

for an enlargement process that must ultimately be taken in

Russia and Ukraine. This need not be accomplished all at

once, but we must think about how it can be done and take

the required actions. However, absent allied consensus

concerning the threats to Europe and how to meet them,

that denouement will be a long time in coming. And that end

game also requires cooperation from elites in Russia,

Ukraine, and the Balkans who have hitherto not fully

accepted or have impeded European integration. While they

must be invited to the party, they cannot be allowed to crash

it and impose their own values and demands upon the other

guests.

This conference was very frank and wide-ranging, but

ultimately could not come to terms with issues beyond the

Russo-Polish border. Once the EU enlarges to the Baltic,

and Poland and those states accept the Schengen borders

that are part of the EU’s conditions for membership, that

border will be the temporary dividing line in Europe. But it

cannot be allowed to harden into a lasting one. Like the

other preceding lines that divided Europe, it must come

down so that all of Europe can realize the blessings of

security, prosperity, peace, and democracy.

This conference only sketched out some of the markings,

signs, and detours along the road to European integration.

In the future we must travel down that road and, while

avoiding those pitfalls, push that road further into hitherto

unexplored areas. For if we do not do so, we will not be able

to avoid even the pitfalls that we clearly see now. Then,

rather than moving forward, we will regress to a new,

unforeseeable, undefinable, but clearly retrograde point.

And at that point, the goal of Europe whole and free will only

signify what we have lost, not what we want.

36
ENDNOTES

1. Joseph Fitchett, “European Leaders Hope Bush Takes Poll

Results As A Wake-Up Call," International Herald Tribune, August 17,

2001; “The Future of Trans-Atlantic Relations: Collaboration or

Confrontation?" Speech by House Democratic Leader Congressman

Richard A. Gephardt, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,

Washington, DC, August 2, 2001, www.ceip.org/files/

events/gephardtprepared remarks.asp; Hugo Young, “We’ve Lost That

Allied Feeling," Washington Post, April 1, 2001, p. BO1; Edmund L.

Andrews, “Bush Angers Europe by Eroding Pact on Warming," New

York Times, April 1, 2001, www.partners.nytimes.com/

2001/04/01/world/01Germ.html. For the domestic politics aspect of

this campaign, see Thomas Ferenczi, “Les Impasses de

l’antiamericanisme,” Le Monde, June 9, 1999, pp. 1, 22, quoted in Sten

Rynning, “French Defence Reforms After Kosovo: On Track or

Derailed,” European Security, Vol. IX, No. 2, Summer, 2000, pp. 75-76.

On Moscovici’s quote, see Pierre Moscovici, “Blair’s Triumph Is Good for

Europe,” Financial Times, June 12, 2001, p. 14. On the sense of mutual

grievance, see From An Alliance of Necessity to an Alignment of Choice,

Seminar Report Aspen Institute of Berlin and the Freie Universitaet

Berlin, www.aspenberlin.org, 1999.

2. Adrian Hyde-Price, “The Antinomies of European Security: Dual

Enlargement and the Reshaping of European Order,” Contemporary

Security Policy, Vol. XXIU, No. 3, December 2000, pp. 145-147.

3. Javier Solana, “Why Europe Needs the Military Option,”

Financial Times, September 29, 2000, p. 17 (Solana is the high

Representative of the EU for the CFSP).

4. Ibid.; William Drozdiak, “EU Seeks To Fill U.S. Role in Korea,”

Washington Post, March 25, 2001, p. 1; Shada Islam, “EU In, U.S. Out,”

Far Eastern Economic Review, June 7, 2001; Marc-Andre Ryter, EU

Capabilities For Autonomous Military Crisis Management: Possibilities

and Limits, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies, Finnish

National Defence College, Series 2, No. 11, 2001, p. 7; “EU To Step Up

Diplomatic Presence in East Asia,” Deutsche Press-Agentur, July 5,

2001.

5. European Council, Helsinki, “December 10-11, 1999: Presidency

Conclusions Part II, Common European Policy on Security and Defence,

Annex IV: Presidency Reports on ‘Strengthening the Common

European Policy on Security and Defence’ and on ‘Non-Military Crisis

Management of the European Union’,” Maartje Rutten, compiler, From

37
ST. Malo To Nice: European Defence: Core Documents, Chaillot Papers,

No. 47, 2001, pp. 82-91.

6. Speech By Dr. Javier Solana, Secretary-General of WEU at the

Forschungsinstitut der Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Auswaertige Politik,

“Where Does the EU Stand on Common Foreign and Security Policy?”

Berlin, November 14, 2000, www.weu.int/eng/speeches/s001114a.htm; 

David Yost, “The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union,”

Survival, Vol. XLII, No. 4, Winter, 2000-2001, pp. 97-128. 

7. Ibid.; “NATO Leader Dismisses European Force,” Washington

Times, July 7, 2001, p. 7; “A Long March,” The Economist, February 27,

2001, p. 54; James Kitfeld, “Will Europe Ruin NATO?” Air Force

Magazine, October, 2000, pp. 59-66; Ryter, pp. 34-35.

8. David Wastell and Julian Coman, “America Duped By Claims of

European Defence Spending,” London Sunday Telegraph, March 4,

2001, p. 28; Michael R. Gordon, “Armies of NATO Failing To Meet Goals,

Sapping NATO,” New York Times, June 7, 2001, p. A6; Alexander Nicoll,

”Europe’s Defence Spending Falling,” Financial Times, June 17, 2001,

p. 2; Michael Smith, “Germany Cannot Pay for Planes To Carry

Euro-Army,” London Daily Telegraph, June 18, 2001, p. 6.

9. “Speech by the Secretary General to the NATO Parliamentary

Assembly Annual Assembly,” M2 Presswire, November 21, 2000,

retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.

10. Quentin Peel, “Marching To Different Drums,” Financial Times,

March 5, 2001, p. 13; Robert Graham, “Chirac and Jospin Agree on

French Defence Spending Plan,” Financial Times, August 1, 2001, p.6;

Robert Graham, “France Counts the Costs of Liberty: The Country’s

Decision to End Conscription Will Increase the Military’s Expenses as

the Defence Budget Shrinks,” Financial Times, August 3, 2001, p. 13;

Pierre Sparaco, “France Completes 6-Year Defense Plan,” Aviation

Week & Space Technology, August 6, 2001, pp. 32-34; J. A. C. Lewis,

“France Budgets for Less Spending on Equipment,” Jane’s Defence

Weekly, August 1, 2000, p. 11; J. A. C. Lewis, “France Details Spending

Programme,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, August 8, 2001, p. 2; Christina

Mackenzie, “France’s Procurement Plan Commits to EU Force,” Defense 

News, August 6-12, 2001, p. 5; “Interview with Major General Roar

Haugen, Royal Norwegian Army Chief of Staff,” Jane’s Defence Weekly,

March 28, 2001, p. 32; Douglas Barrie, “Norway Aims To Patch Defense

Funding Cracks,” Defense News, February 26, 2001, p. 44; John Berg,

“Norway Continues with Force Cuts,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, February

28, 2001, p. 4.

38
11. Ines Musiol-Kaldas, “Trans-Atlantic Divergence,” Defense

News, June 11-17, 2001, p. 36; Peel, p. 13.

12. Yost, pp. 97-128; Martin Aguera, “European Budgets Hold Key

To Trans-Atlantic Relations,” Defense News.com, April 2, 2001. 

13. Yost, pp. 97-128; Italy’s then Minister of Defense Sergio

Mattarella argued that the modernization required for the ESDP

overlapped with that of the DCI, “Italy’s New Defence Model and its

contribution to CESDP,” The International Spectator, Vol. XXXVI, No.

1, January-March, 2001, pp. 63-64.

14. Sparaco, pp. 32-34; Lewis, p. 11; Michael Smith, “Generals

Attack EU Defence Force,”London Daily Telegraph, June 12, 2001, p. 1;

George Jones, “EU Defence Force ‘Could Lead To the Break-Up of

NATO’,” London Daily Telegraph, January 11, 2001; Tim Ripley and

Richard Scott, “Leaked Document Reveals Strains on RN Capability,”

Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 4, 2001, p. 4; Michael Smith, “Woodward

attacks Euro-Army,” London Daily Telegraph, June 13, 2001; David

Cracknell, “European Military Idea Attacked,” Washington Times,

November 27, 2000, p. 1.

15. Sparaco, pp. 32-34; Lewis, p. 11.

16. Mark Smith, “European Perspectives on Ballistic Missile

Proliferation and Missile Defenses,” Missile proliferation and Defenses:

Problems and Prospects, Occasional Paper No. 7, Center for

Nonproliferation Studies and the Mountbatten Centre for International

Studies, Monterey, CA, and Highfield, Southampton, UK, 2001, pp.

72-73.

17. Charles Grant, “Euro-Muscle,” Washington Post, July 8, 2001, p.

B2. 

18. Stephen Fidler, “Bush’s Charm offensive,” Financial Times,

June 12, 2001, p. 14; Kitfeld, pp. 59-66; Hearings of the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee: Current Situation in Macedonia and the Balkans,

Federal News Service, Washington, DC, June 13, 2001.

19. “US Defence and Europe,” Financial Times, August 14, 2001, p.

12.

20. Paul Mann, “Technology Gap Called NATO’s Salient Issue,”

Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 26, 2001, p. 33.

21. David E. Sanger, “Bush Tells Blair He Doesn’t Oppose New

Europe Force,” New York Times, February 24, 2001, p. 1.

39
22. Adrian Treacher, “Europe as a Power Multiplier for French

Security Policy: Strategic Consistency, Tactical Adaptation,” European

Security, Vol. X, No. 1, Spring, 2001, pp. 37-41.

23. Joe Murphy, “U.S. Launches Attack on Euro Army,” London

Sunday Telegraph, March 18, 2001, p. 18; Sarah Womack, “Blair ‘Misled

Public’ Over EU Reaction Force,” London Daily Telegraph, April 12,

2001, p. 1; James Kitfeld, “A Tale of Two Allies,” National Journal,

February 10, 2001, pp. 398-406; Francis Maude, “Euro-Army Fact and

Fantasy,” The Washington Times, April 29, 2001, p. B4; Trudy Rubin,

“As Europe Builds More Strength, White House Must Show Support,”

Philadelphia Inquirer, March 2, 2001.

24. Carey Schofield and Michael Smith, “EU Force Will Not Need

NATO, Says French Military Chief,” The Daily Telegraph, March 28,

2001, p. 1; Womack, p. 1; “Europe’s Rogue State,” London Daily

Telegraph, March 29, 2001, p. 29; Testimony of General Wesley Clark

(USA RET) to the European Affairs Subcommittee, Senate Foreign

Relations Committee, 107th Congress, February 27, 2001.

25. Rutten, comp., pp. 168-209.

26. Murphy, p. 1.

27. Rubin; see also Sylvie Goulard, “Squaring the Triangle?”

Internationale Politik English Edition, Vol. I, No. 4, Winter, 2000, pp.

27-31; Dominique Moisi, “A European Foreign Policy Built on Sacrifice,”

Financial Times, June 4, 2001, p. 13.

28. Lee A. Casey and David B. Rivkin Jr., “Europe in the Balance:

The Alarmingly Undemocratic Drift of the European Union,” Policy

Review, June-July, 2001, pp. 41-53; Frank Gaffney Jr., “The Isolationist

President? It’s U.S. Sovereignty, Stupid,” National Review Online, July

26, 2001.

29. Author’s interviews with Czech officials in 1994 and 1997, and

with Baltic officials in Tallinn and Vilnius, May 2000; Lars Wallin and

Bengt Andersson, “A Defence Model for the Baltic States,” European

Security, Vol. X, No. 1, Spring, 2001, pp. 94-97; Tallinn, Baltic News

Service, in English, November 24, 1999, Foreign Broadcast Information

Service, Central Eurasia, (henceforth FBIS SOV), November 24, 1999.

30. Budapest, Magyar Hirlap, in Hungarian, September 16, 2000,

Foreign Broadcast information Service, Eastern Europe (henceforth

FBIS EEU), September 18, 2000; Sarah Means, “Expanding Democracy

to Russia’s Back Door,”The Washington Times, May 18, 2001, p. A19; Ed

40
Holt, “Europe: U.S.-Slovak Report Angers Russia Over NATO

Membership,” Inter Press Service, May 11, 2001; Sofia, Monitor, in

Bulgarian, July 6, 2000, FBIS EEU, July 6, 2000; “Russia’s Overseas

Investment,” The Economist, February 17-23, 2001, from Johnson’s

Russia List, No. 5097, February 16, 2001, www.davidjohnson@cdi.org.

31. Stephen Blank, “Map Reading: NATO’s and Russia’s Pathways

to European Military Integration,” Occasional Papers of the Woodrow

Wilson Center, No. 61, February 2001; Bill Gertz, “Russia Transfers

Nuclear Arms to Baltics,” Washington Times, January 3, 2001, p. 1;

Tabassum Zakaria, “Russia Moved Nuclear Weapons Into

Kaliningrad-U.S.,” Reuters, January 3, 2001, also reprinted in

Johnson’s Russia List, No. 5505, January 3, 2001,

davidjohnson@erols.com.

32. David A. Ochmanek, NATO’s Future: Implications for U.S.

Military Capabilities and Posture, Santa Monica, CA: Rand

Corporation, 2000, p. 4. For other views, see Ambassador Matthew

Nimetz, “Mediterranean Security After the Cold War,” Mediterranean

Quarterly, Vol. VIII, No. 2, Spring, 1997, p. 29; Hans Binnendijk, “Next,

NATO Needs to Give Itself a Southern Strategy,” International Herald

Tribune, March 17, 1998; Statement by Secretary of State Madeleine K.

Albright at the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council Meeting, NATO

Headquarters, Brussels, December 17, 1997, Statement by Secretary of

State Madeleine K. Albright During the North Atlantic Council

Ministerial Meeting, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, December 16,

1997; and Statement by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright: Press

conference following North Atlantic Council Meeting, NATO

Headquarters, Brussels, December 16, 1997 (henceforth Albright,

“Statements”), NATO Internet, www.NATO; David C. Gompert and F.

Stephen Larrabee, eds., America and Europe: A Partnership for a New

Era, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997; Ronald Asmus,

“NATO’s Double Enlargement: New Tasks, New Members,” in Clay

Clemens, ed., NATO and the Quest for Post-Cold War Security,

Foreword by Baroness Margaret Thatcher, New York: St. Martin’s

Press, 1997, pp. 61-86; see also Enzo Cannizzaro, “NATO’s New

Strategic Concept and the Evolving Legal Regulation of Use of Force,”

The International Spectator, Vol. XXXVI, No. 1, January-March, 2001,

pp. 67-74.

33. Warren Christopher and William J. Perry, “NATO’s True

Mission,” New York Times, October 21, 1997, p. 25.

34. “The Jane’s Interview,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 15, 1994,

p. 56.

41
35. Quoted in Robert J. Art, “Why Western Europe Needs the United

States and NATO,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. CXI, No. 1, Fall,

1996, pp. 2-3.

36. Ibid., pp. 1-45; “Still the Best of Friends in the Franco-German

Motor,” The Economist, November 18, 2000, pp. 59-60.

37. Vladimir Handl, Vaclav Kural, and Michal Reiman, “The Czech

Republic and Germany,” Perspectives: Review of Central European

Affairs (Prague), Vol. VIII, Summer, 1997, pp. 29-44; Art, pp. 1-45;

author’s interviews with Czech officials in Prague, 1994 and 1997.

38. Thus German Minister of Defense Rudolph Scharping told an

Indian audience that “Thinking today about the national security of

Germany equals thinking about European security. And thinking about

European security requires thinking about security beyond Europe.

Security today is global in scope.” See Rudolph Scharping, “European

Security Policy and Global Stability,” Journal of the United Services

Institution of India, Vol. CXXXI, No. 43, January-March, 2001, p. 14.

39. Angus McKinnon, dispatch for Agence France Presse, October

25, 1998, FBIS WEU 98-298, October 25, 1998; Hugo Young, “Blair Is

Taking Us Out of the Past. So His Real Driving Passion Is Europe,” The

Guardian, October 29, 1998; The Rt. Honorable Tony Blair, Address to

the North Atlantic Assembly, Edinburg, November 13, 1998, cited in

Peter Rodman, Drifting Apart? Trends in U.S.-European Relations,

Washington, DC: The Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom, 1999, p. 33.

40. European Council, Nice, 7-9 December, 2000, Rutten, comp., pp.

168-211: Report Presented to the Nice European Council, Rutten, comp.,

pp. 212-221.

41. This democratic deficit and concern about it takes many forms.

One is the issue of the popular support for the EU which is flagging as

the Irish referendum and the EU’s response to it showed. A second

aspect is that the pressure exercised by the EU upon aspiring Central

and East European states to integrate with its structures and processes

may pull against their simultaneous efforts to democratize those

institutions and processes. Quentin Peel, “An Upset for Europe,”

Financial Times, June 11, 2001, p. 12; Peter Norman and Judy

Dempsey, “Foreign Ministers Say Irish Rejection Will Not Hold Back

EU Enlargement,” Financial Times, June 12, 2001, p. 16; Margit

Besseyney-Williams, “Exporting the Democratic Deficit: Hungary’s

Experience with EU Integration,” Problems of Post-Communism, Vol.

XLVIII, No. 1, January-February, 2001, pp. 27-38. Unfortunately, it is

42
likely that we will experience further examples of this phenomenon’s

many different manifestations.

42. As Werner Weidenfeld of the University of Munich writes, “In

general high integration density and intensified conflicts will collide.

Therefore the question of legitimization as a basic political category

becomes central.” Werner Weidenfeld, “Europe—Just a Zone of

Stability?” Internationale Politik, English Edition, No. 4, Winter 2000,

p. 5; Martin Walker, “Europe’s Existential Crisis,” Wilson Quarterly,

Spring, 2001, wwics.si.edu/outreach/wq/WQSELECT/EXIST.HTM;

Jean Guehenno, “A Foreign Policy in Search of a Polity,” Jan Zielonka,

ed., Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy, The Hague and Boston, MA:

Kluwer Law International, 1999, p. 32.

43. On the Czech Republic, see Thomas S. Szayna, “The Czech

Republic: A Small Contributor or a ‘Free Rider’?” Andrew A. Michta, ed.,

America’s New Allies: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in

NATO, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000, pp. 112-148;

“NATO Pushes Czechs on Arms,” International Herald Tribune,

February 22, 2001; Robert Anderson, Kester Eddy, and John Reed,

“NATO’s Newer Members Find it a Battle to Upgrade Their Military

Punch,” Financial Times, July 11, 2001, p. 2; “Czech Army Revising

Programmes to Meet NATO Obligations,” Prague, CTK News Agency,

March 10, 2001, www.cnnfn.com.

44. Tallinn, Baltic News Service, July 27, 2001, FBIS SOV, July 27,

2001. 

45. President George W. Bush, Address to the Faculty and Students

of Warsaw University, June 15, 2001, http://www.state.gov/

p/eur/rt/nato/index.cfm?docid=3662.

46. Pavel Felgengauer, “Duped by a Delayer,” Moscow Times, July

26, 2001; Frank J. Gaffney Jr., “A Putin Set-Up On Missile Defense?"

Washington Times, July 24, 2001, p. 18; Anatol Lieven, “A Delicate

Nuclear Balance,” New York Times, June 21, 2001.

47. Walter Uhler, “Unilateral Steps Undermine Foreign Security,”

Defense News, August 6-12, 2001, p. 13; Francois Gere, “French Offer

New Path,” Ibid.; Michael O’Hanlon, “Double Talk on Missile Defense,”

Washington Post, July 31, 2001, p. 23; Nicole Gnesotto, “Preface,” and

Harald Mueller, “The Future of Arms Control,” Burkard Schmitt, ed.,

Nuclear Weapons: A New Great Debate, Chaillot Papers No. 48,

Institute for Security Studies, West European Union, Paris, 2001, pp. vi,

and 37-38, respectively.

43
48. Speech by Director of Policy Planning, U.S. State Department,

Richard Haass, Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom, Washington, DC,

July 25, 2001.

49. Vernon Loeb, “Allies Join Pentagon Research on Zapping

Missiles,” Washington Post, August 4, 2001, p. A3.

50. Brooks Tigner, “EU Hopes Code of conduct Will Cool Missile

Proliferation,” Defense News, July 9-15, 2001, pp. 1, 4.

51. “Libya Is Assured by Spain Over Missile Threat,” Middle East

News Line, August 22, 2001; Smith, pp. 71-76. For an example of how

this disparity in perspective among the allies might affect joint

participation in “out-of-area” crises, see Richard Sokolsky, Stuart

Johnson, and F. Stephen Larrabee, Persian Gulf Security: Improving

Allied Military Contributions, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation,

2000, pp. 36-48, 71-105.

52. Stephen Blank, “Undeterred: The Return of Nuclear War,”

Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Vol. I, No. 2, Summer/Fall,

2000, pp. 55-63; Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, James J. Wirtz,

Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear,

Biological, and Chemical Weapons, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University

Press, 2000; Kenneth R. Timmerman, “Secrets Among Friends,” Insight

Magazine, July 23, 2001, ebird.dtic.mil?Jul2001s20010718secrets.htm.

53. On Sweden, Paul M. Cole, Sweden Without the Bomb: The

Conduct of a Nuclear-Capable Nation without Nuclear Weapons, Santa

Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1994.

54. Mark Smith, pp. 71-76; and Camille Grand, “Missile Defense:

The View from the Other Side of the Atlantic,” Arms Control Today,

September, 2000, pp. 12-18; are excellent introductions and have good

sources for those who wish to follow this transatlantic debate further.

55. Ivo H. Daalder, Christopher Makins, “A Consensus on Missile

Defence?” Survival, Vol. XLIII, No. 3, Autumn, 2001, pp. 61-66; The

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s conference, “Russia Ten

Years After the End of the Soviet Union,” June 2001,

www.ceip.org/files/programs/russia/tenyears/transcript11.htm. 

56. Alexander Rahr, “The ‘German’ in the Kremlin,” International

Affairs, No. 5, 2000, p. 148.

57. Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Russia Beyond 2000:

The Prospects for Russian Developments and Their Implications for

Finland, Helsinki, 1999, pp. 1-2; Olav Knudsen, “Introduction: A

44
General Perspective on the Security of the Baltic Region,” Olav

Knudsen, ed., Stability and Security in the Baltic Sea Region: Russian,

Nordic, and European Aspects, London: Frank Cass, 1999, p. 14; Sergei

Medvedev, “Power, Space, and Russian Foreign Policy,” Ted Hopf, ed.,

Understandings of Russian Foreign Policy, University Park,

Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999, p. 46; Monika Wohlfeld, “A

Survey of Strategic Interests of the Countries of the European Security

Space,” Guido Lenzi and Laurence Martin, eds., The European Security

Space, Working Papers by the European Strategy Groups and the

Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, Paris:

Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 1996, p. 12.

58. Quentin Peel, “A Bloody Flaw in Putin’s Plans,” Financial

Times, July 23, 2001, p. 13.

59. For examples of NATO’s and Russia’s skepticism concerning the

success of NATO’s current Operation ESSENTIAL HARVEST in

Macedonia, see Joseph Fitchett, “NATO Stresses Limited Objectives in

Macedonia,” International Herald Tribune, August 24, 2001, p. 1;

Michael Smith, “NATO Power Over How Many Guns Rebels Have,”

London Daily Telegraph, August 23, 2001; Radio Free Europe/Radio

Liberty Newsline, August 27, 2001; Charles M. Sennott, “NATO Enters

A Well-Armed Land,” Boston Globe, August 26, 2001, p. 1; “President

Stresses Need to Fight Terrorism in Balkans,” Interfax and BBC

Monitoring, August 24, 2001.

45
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Author

Dr. Stephen J. Blank

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Ms. Kimberly A. Rockwell