DRAGON ON TERRORISM: ASSESSING

CHINA’S TACTICAL GAINS AND STRATEGIC

LOSSES POST-SEPTEMBER 11

Mohan Malik

October 2002
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The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Asia-Pacific

Center for Security Studies, the Department of the Army, the

Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. The author is grateful

to Ronald Montaperto and Denny Roy for their valuable comments on an

earlier and shorter version published in Contemporary Southeast Asia,

Vol. 24, No. 2, August 2002. This report is cleared for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

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ISBN 1-58487-103-2

ii
FOREWORD

The U.S. relationship with China and the global war on

terrorism are the two most significant strategic challenges

faced by the Bush administration. Both are vital and

complex; the way the administration manages them will

shape American security for many years.

While there is a growing literature on both key strategic

issues, little analysis has been done on the intersection of

the two. In this monograph, Dr. Mohan Malik of the

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies fills this gap as he

assesses how the war on terrorism has affected China. He

concludes that the war on terrorism radically altered the

Asian strategic environment in ways that negated China’s

foreign policy gains of the last decade and undermined its

image as Asia’s only great power. Dr. Malik then offers a

range of recommendations for a more stable relationship

with China.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this

report to help U.S. defense leaders and strategic planners

refine their understanding of security in Asia and the

crucial U.S.-China relationship.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

MOHAN MALIK joined the Asia Pacific Center for Security

Studies in February 2001, and is currently on leave

from Deakin University in Australia where he was Director

of the postgraduate Defense Studies Program. Dr. Malik is

the author of The Gulf War: Australia’s Role and

Asian-Pacific Responses (Strategic and Defense Studies

Centre/A.N.U. Press, 1992) and editor of the three volumes

on Asian Defense Policies (Deakin University Press, 1994),

The Future Battlefield (Deakin University Press and

Directorate of Army Research and Analysis, 1997), and

Australia’s Security in the 21st Century (Allen and Unwin,

1999). He has contributed numerous chapters to books and

published over 90 articles on Asian-Pacific security issues in

refereed journals such as Asian Survey, Arms Control,

Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter, Australian Journal of

International Affairs, China Quarterly, China Report,

Comparative Strategy, Contemporary Security Policy,

Contemporary Southeast Asia, Current Affairs Bulletin,

Defense and Foreign Affairs, Issues and Studies, Jane’s

Sentinel, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Journal of Northeast

Asian Studies, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Orbis,

Pacifica Review, Strategic Digest, Strategic Policy and The

World Today. Dr Malik has also done consultancy work for

the Australian Department of Defense (Army), and the

United Kingdom-based Jane’s Information Group.

iv
SUMMARY

Every major event in history has unintended

consequences. A major unintended (and unsettling, from

Beijing’s standpoint) consequence of the U.S.-led War on

Terrorism has not only been to checkmate and roll-back

China’s recent moves at strategic expansion in Central,

South, and Southeast Asia but also to tilt the regional

balance of power decisively in Washington’s favor within a

short period of time, thereby highlighting how tenuous

Chinese power is when compared to that of the United

States. In this sense, September 11, 2001, should be seen as

a major discontinuity or nonlinearity in post-Cold War

international politics. New strategic and political realities

emerging in Asia put a question mark over Beijing’s earlier

certainties, assumptions and beliefs.

This monograph offers an overview of China’s foreign

policy goals and achievements prior to September 11,

examines Beijing’s response to terrorist attacks on the U.S.

mainland, provides an assessment of China’s tactical gains

and strategic losses following the September 11 attacks,

and concludes with an evaluation of Beijing’s future policy

options. It argues that if China was on a roll prior to 9/11, in

a complete reversal of roles post-9/11, it is now the United

States that is on the move. The U.S.-led War against

Terrorism has radically altered the strategic landscape,

severely constricted the strategic latitude that China has

enjoyed post-Cold War, undermined China’s carefully

projected image as the next superpower, and ushered in new

geopolitical alignments whose ramifications will be felt for a

long time to come.

v
DRAGON ON TERRORISM: ASSESSING

CHINA’S TACTICAL GAINS AND STRATEGIC

LOSSES POST-SEPTEMBER 11

The U.S.-led War against Terrorism in the aftermath of

the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks has radically

altered the strategic landscape and ushered in new

geopolitical alignments in Central, South, and Southeast

Asia whose ramifications will be felt for a long time to come.

This article argues that no other major power has been as

much affected by the geopolitical shifts unleashed by the

U.S. counteroffensive as China, which has seen its recent

foreign policy gains eroded; its long-term strategic goals

compromised by the growing U.S. military presence all

around China’s periphery; the role and profile of its Asian

rivals—India and Japan—increasing while its new-found

strategic partner, Russia, has almost defected to the

American camp; Beijing’s much-touted model for

multilateral diplomacy—the Shanghai Cooperation

Organization (SCO)—sidelined in the face of Washington’s

post-September 11 unilateralism; and, above all, China’s

carefully-cultivated image as Asia’s only true great power

dealt a severe body blow. Ironically, all this has happened as

China lined up along with the rest of the international

community to condemn terrorism in the strongest possible

terms and to declare solidarity with the United States in its

hour of need.

This monograph begins with an overview of China’s

foreign policy goals and achievements prior to September

11, 2001, Beijing’s response to the terrorist attacks on the

U.S. mainland, and China’s motivations and interests

behind its support for the U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition.

The second part provides a critical assessment of China’s

perceived tactical gains and strategic losses and concludes

with an evaluation of Beijing’s policy options in the fast

changing regional strategic environment.

1
China on the Move: Foreign Policy Goals and

Achievements Prior to September 11.

The last decade of the 20th century and the first year of

the 21st century had seen China increasingly acting as

Asia’s largest country and gradually moving closer to

realizing its primary objective of emerging as the

pre-eminent and pre-dominant power in Asia, over and

above Russia, Japan, and India. From Central Asia to the

South Pacific Islands, China was seeking greater influence

on a wider range of economic, military, and political issues

and increasingly challenging the dominant position that the

United States has held in Asia since the end of World War II.

Revitalized by two decades of high economic growth rates,

China was strengthening its traditional military alliances

with Pakistan, Burma, and North Korea while forging new

strategic and economic quasi-alliances with the former

Soviet republics in Central Asia. Beijing was actively

wooing Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, and Thailand in

Southeast Asia so as to redraw geopolitical boundaries and

to win the regional footholds it has long coveted to project its

influence around the Asia-Pacific. From Afghanistan to

Burma, Laos and Cambodia, Beijing was building

telecommunications networks, power stations, roads,

highways, ports and airports, and acquiring mining

concessions. In Kazakhstan, it was operating a

multibillion-dollar oil-drilling facility while investing

heavily in Mongolia’s cashmere trade, Nepal’s tourist

industry, and the South Pacific Islands fisheries trade.1

This expansion was part of a strategic decision taken in the

mid-1990s (after the Taiwan Straits Crisis and the U.S.

revitalization of military alliances with Japan and

Australia in 1995-96) to cultivate key partnerships with

major powers and those of China’s neighbors that do not

pose a threat to China’s security and/or have shared

cultural and political values while simultaneously

broadening efforts to bring an end to the U.S. military

presence and alliance network in the Asia-Pacific region.

Beijing’s efforts to establish constructive and cooperative

2
partnerships with Russia, the United States, the European

Union, and Japan were aimed at encouraging the trend

towards multipolarity as well as reducing the possibility

that the United States or other major powers (with or

without U.S. backing) will thwart China’s rise or frustrate

its regional and global aspirations.2

Shedding its initial reservations about the efficacy of

multilateralism, Beijing not only embraced it with full vigor

but also began promoting multilateralism as an alternative

to the Cold War-era U.S. alliance network by making it the

basis of its “new concept of security” (first outlined in 1997)

to enhance China’s reputation as a responsible, constructive

and cooperative player in both security and economic

deliberations. Chinese leaders and officials took every

opportunity to promote the formation of the Shanghai

Forum (renamed in 2001 as SCO) in Central Asia in 1996 as

an alternative to the Cold War-era alliances and power

politics. Furthermore, China’s self-restraint in currency

devaluation and economic assistance to Thailand and other

countries during the Asian economic crisis in 1997 marked

the high point of China’s “charm offensive.” Beijing’s

sophisticated diplomacy on the Comprehensive Test Ban

Treaty (CTBT) and World Trade Organization (WTO)

accession negotiations, cooperation on reducing tensions on

the Korean Peninsula and in South Asia, helped Beijing win

friends and influence people throughout Asia.3

At the same time, Beijing remained uncompromising on

core issues (such as Taiwan reunification, missile defense,

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

technologies, and human rights), and became increasingly

assertive (some would say aggressive) in defending its

territorial/maritime claims in the East and South China

Sea. Double-digit increases in defense expenditure since

1989 and the ongoing military modernization with its

special focus on the augmentation of air and maritime

warfare, nuclear force modernization, joint warfare

operations, and information warfare capabilities gave the

Chinese military a new sense of confidence and security.

3
The development and acquisition of air and naval bases in

Burma (close to the Strait of Malacca), Cambodia (Kompong

Som/Sihanoukville Port), and Pakistan (Gwadar Port at the

mouth of the Strait of Hormuz) were seen as part of China’s

maritime strategy to position itself along the chokepoints of

vital sea lanes from the Arabian Sea to the disputed Spratly

Islands in the South China Sea and monitor traffic between

the Indian and Pacific Oceans.4

As the world’s most populous and fastest-growing major

economic power, China was seeking a bigger voice in world

affairs and frequently voiced unease at what it saw as

unbridled U.S. power. Beijing also seemed confident of

being able to thwart any American moves to establish an

“Asian NATO” by strengthening bilateral economic

cooperation with Japan, South Korea, Australia, India,

Taiwan, and other Asia-Pacific countries.5 There was much

talk of Beijing’s coming challenge to U.S. supremacy in Asia.

China was becoming aligned with Russia and increasing its

strategic reach in the republics of Central Asia. In April

2001, China’s relations with the United States hit rock

bottom when a Chinese pilot was killed after his fighter

aircraft collided with a U.S. Navy EP-3 spy plane in

international airspace near Hainan Island. Having

demanded and obtained an apology from the Bush

administration for the spy plane incident, China not only

enhanced its image as a great power by demonstrating its

will and capability to stand up to the sole superpower, but

was also seen as defining the limits to U.S. power in the

Pacific. The incident also convinced many Asian countries

(especially small and middle powers) that the post-Cold

War Asia-Pacific region was once again witnessing a return

to the era of bipolarity, this time with the United States and

China as the region’s two great powers.6 Thus, nearly a

decade into its role as the world’s reigning superpower, the

United States was facing an expansive rival and getting

locked into another great power rivalry (and perhaps a new

cold war) with Asia’s rising superpower, the People’s

Republic of China (PRC).

4
China Checkmated: The September 11 Terrorist

Attacks on the United States and Beijing’s

Response.

It is said that every major event in history has

unintended consequences, and the U.S.-led War on

Terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist

attacks in New York and Washington was no exception to

this rule. As will be shown later, a major unintended (and

unsettling, from Beijing’s standpoint) consequence of the

War on Terrorism was that it served to highlight how

tenuous Chinese power remains when compared to that of

the United States. Within a short period of time, China not

only slipped down the regional pecking order but also

became more aware than before that the regional balance of

power had suddenly tilted decisively in favor of Washington

for reasons absolutely beyond Beijing’s control. Before

explaining the factors behind this sudden shift in power

balance, a brief overview of Afghanistan’s recent history is

in order, followed by an examination of Beijing’s official and

unofficial response to the September 11 attacks.

During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan from 1979

to 1989, the United States and China had collaborated in

financing and arming resistances forces of Afghan

mujahideens and Talibans (freedom fighters and Islamic

students) through their mutual ally and frontline state,

Pakistan, in order to evict the Soviets from that

country. China had trained and dispatched Uighurs to fight

against the Russians in Afghanistan, fearing that the old

silk route along the Karakoram highway built across

northern Kashmir could, in time, come under Moscow’s

domination if the Soviet Union was not dislodged from

Kabul. The communist regime in Kabul, which was backed

by Moscow and New Delhi, finally collapsed in 1996—7

years after the withdrawal of the Soviet Red Army from

Afghanistan in 1989, and was replaced by a Pakistani

military-backed radical Taliban Islamic militia which tried

to bring order to the war-torn country but failed. With

Osama bin Laden making Afghanistan and northwestern

5
Pakistan his base in the mid-1990s, the region became the

epicenter of Islamic extremism, terrorism, and

drug-trafficking. The blowback for Beijing was the return of

victorious Uighur jihadis (holy warriors) to Xinjiang, where

some of them fuelled the simmering insurgency for an

independent Muslim Eastern Turkestan.7 At the time of the

September 11 attacks, the Pushtun-dominated radical

Taliban regime was in control of 93 percent of Afghan

territory, but was recognized only by Pakistan, Saudi

Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, and was subjected to

a series of United Nations (U.N.) Security Council sanctions

for promoting terrorism, extremism, drug trafficking, and

human rights violations. The rest of the country was under

the control of the moderate Northern Alliance (dominated

by Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras) that enjoyed the backing of

Russia, India, and Iran.

China’s official response to the September 11 terrorist

attacks was prompt and unequivocal. Describing terrorism

as a “common scourge” for the international community,

President Jiang Zemin, in his message to President George

Bush, expressed “sincere sympathy” and offered

“condolences to the family members of the victims.”8

Subsequent official statements were, however, more

circumspect: China urged the United States and other

countries to conduct their anti-terrorism military

operations through the United Nations.9 Beijing wanted an

appropriate U.S. military response only after “consultations

with the UN,” and one directed at “those proven to be guilty”

and “clearly defined targets,” in “compliance with the

international law,” and that avoided “civilian casualties.”10

Jiang Zemin’s calls to other U.N. Security Council

permanent members to reinforce these preconditions,

however, did not please the Bush administration officials.

Given the frosty state of Sino-U.S. relations in the preceding

months, China-watchers were not surprised with Foreign

Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao’s statement of 18

September 2001:

6
The United States has asked China to provide assistance in

the fight against terrorism. China, by the same token, has

reasons to ask the United States to give its support and

understanding in the fight against terrorism and separatists.

We should not have double standards . . . [But] we are not

making bargains here.11

Despite his denial that “we are not making bargains

here,” Zhu meant exactly what he said. Beijing was indeed

“seeking a bargain—a Chinese promise not to veto proposed

antiterrorism operation in the U.N. Security Council in

exchange for reduced U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.”12 Not

surprisingly, this linkage unnerved Taipei. Taipei warned

that Beijing must not be allowed to use the War against

Terrorism as an excuse to damage Taiwan’s interests. U.S.

Secretary of State Colin Powell felt compelled to deny any

quid pro quo deal with Beijing.13 By the time Chinese

Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan arrived in Washington for

talks with his counterpart, the Chinese side had abandoned

all talk of linkage in favor of “unconditional, principled

support” for anti-terrorism operations. Having made its

expectations, if not conditions, known to the Americans,

China decided to earn some goodwill and gratitude by

backing U.N. Resolution 1373, endorsing the use of force.

The defeat of the radical Islamic forces in Afghanistan and

elsewhere would serve China’s long-term interests even

though they never posed a security problem to China in the

same way as they did to the United States, Russia, Israel,

and India.

From time to time, however, reports focusing on China’s

record of past dealings with the Taliban regime appeared in

the foreign media (see Table 1). These related to the

Taliban’s transfer of U.S. cruise missiles fired in August

1998 at al-Qaeda camps to China, Chinese firms’

involvement in setting up the Taliban’s telecommunications

system, and the shipment of weapons through Pakistan.

Describing such reports as “false,” “absurd” and

“anti-Chinese propaganda,” the Chinese Foreign Ministry

7
YEAR KEY DEVELOPMENTS

December

1998

- Following the escalation of separatist violence in

Xinjiang in 1998, contact facilitated by Pakistan

between China and Taliban at Beijing’s request. Five

senior Chinese diplomats held talks in Kabul with the

Taliban’s Deputy Chairman Mullah Muhammad

Hassan, Interior Minister Mullah Abdur Razzaq, and

Deputy Foreign Minister Abdurrahman Zayef and

obtained their assurance that the Taliban would not

allow Afghan territory to be used against China. The

Taliban also transferred two unexploded U.S.

Tomahawk cruise missiles to China for $20 million

each. In return, the Chinese agreed to:

• start direct flights between Kabul and Urumuqi;

• open formal trade ties;

• increase Chinese food aid to Afghanistan;

• institutionalize military-to-military contacts;

and

• provide arms and spares for Taliban’s aging

military equipment.

October

1999

- Annual felicitations conveyed by Mullah Omar (via

Radio Shariat) on the occasion of China’s National Day

from 1999.

November

2000

- A delegation from the Ministry of State Security-run

think tank, China Institute of Contemporary

International Relations, visited Kabul and Kandahar.

December

2000

- A delegation led by China’s ambassador to Pakistan,

Lu Shulin, met with Mullah Omar, following the

Taliban’s plea to veto U.S.-Russian moves to tighten

U.N. Security Council sanctions (including travel

restrictions against Taliban officials).

2000 - China’s Huawei Technologies Co., also accused of

helping Iraq to upgrade its military communications

system, signed a deal to install 12,000 fixed-line

telephones in Kandahar.

- Another Chinese telecom firm, ZTE, agreed to install

5,000 telephone lines in Kabul after Pakistan provided

a counter-guarantee for the project.

8

Table 1. China’s Taliban Connection, 1998-2001.
2001 - China started the repair work on Afghanistan’s power

grid, damaged by years of war. Repair and expansion

work on the Kajaki Dam in Helmand, Dahla Dam in

Kandahar and the Breshna-Kot Dam in Nangarhar

began.

- The Dongfeng Agricultural Machinery Company was

hired to add 16.5 MW to power generation. Work was

still in progress when the site was bombed in November

2001.

- The Chinese were involved in refurbishing the Herat

Cement Plant.

- By late 2001, China had become the biggest investor in

Afghanistan, with “legitimate” investments running to

several tens of millions of dollars.

July

2001

- A Taliban delegation, led by their Commercial Attaché

to Pakistan, spent a week in China as guests of the

government. The Chinese Commerce Ministry

facilitated their interaction with some Chinese

industrialists and businessmen.

- Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan met with a

Taliban delegation whilst visiting Pakistan, and agreed

to consider the Taliban’s position on U.N. sanctions

against Afghanistan.

August

2001

- Osama bin Laden called for cultivating closer TalibanChina ties to reduce U.S. influence.

September

2001

- A new protocol on Sino-Taliban commercial relations

was inked on September 11: the day of the World Trade

Center attacks.

October

2001

- A Taliban military commander, Maulvi Jalaluddin

Haqqani, told a Pakistani newspaper that China had

maintained contacts with the Islamic militia even after

U.S. air strikes had begun, and that Beijing was “also

extending support and cooperation to the Taliban, but

the shape of this cooperation cannot be disclosed.”

China’s government described the commander’s

statement as a “fabrication.”

- U.S. intelligence reported that China continued to

supply arms (including Chinese-made SA-7 shoulderfired missiles) to al-Qaeda terrorists after September 11.

9

Table 1. China’s Taliban Connection, 1998-2001

(continued).
December

2001

- Indian media reported that the Indian Government

was considering deporting 185 Chinese telecom experts

working at Huawei Company’s Bangalore office, who

were suspected of developing telecom surveillance

equipment for the Taliban. China’s ambassador to

India issued a denial.

- Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said Alliance

forces near Tora Bora had “captured a good deal of

Chinese ammunition.” The Chinese Foreign Ministry

spokesman said he had “no idea” what Rumsfeld was

referring to.

- U.S. officials acknowledged that a few Chinese

passport-holders were discovered among the fighters in

Afgha

SOURCE: A. Rashid, “Taliban temptation,” Far Eastern Economic

Review [hereafter FEER], March 11, 1999; R. Chattoapdhyay, “China’s

Taliban Connection,” Bharat Rakshak Monitor, Vol. 4, No. 3,

November-December 2001; T. S. Sahay, “Taliban-China deal puzzles

diplomats,” Rediff.com, February 12, 1999; “Bin Ladin Calls for

Taliban-China Good Relations to Reduce US Influence,” Ausaf

(Pakistan), August 14, 2001, trans. in FBIS; AFP, “China paid Laden for

access to Cruise missiles,” March 9, 2001; J. Pomfret, “China

Strengthens Ties With Taliban by Signing Economic Deal,” Washington

Post, September 13, 2001; M. Hasan, “Taliban team to visit China to

boost,” The Nation, July 4, 2001; D. Murphy and S. V. Lawrence,

“Beijing Hopes to gain from US raids,” FEER, October 4, 2001; D.

Bristow, “China flirts with an independent pro-active Afghan policy,”

Central Asia Analyst, January 3, 2001; “China Firm Trades with

Taliban,” FEER, March 15, 2001; C. McLeod, “China–Taliban Deal

Signed on Attack Day,” Washington Times, September 14, 2001, p. 1; J.

Iyengar, “Chinese geeks to be deported for Taliban links,” Economic

Times (India), December 10, 2001, p.1; B. Gertz and R. Scarborough

“Chinese help Taliban,” and “China-al-Qaeda nexus,” Washington

Times, November 23, December 21, 2001, p. 8; “China sold arms to

al-Qaeda after Sept 11,” December 22, 2001, http://headlines.sify.

com/399news4.html; B. Gertz, “China-Made Artillery Seized In

Afghanistan,” Washington Times, April 12, 2002, p. 1; “China

denounced ties with Taliban,” and “Anti-terrorism stance reiterated,”

Beijing Review, September 27, 2001 and November 1, 2001, p. 5.

Table 1. China’s Taliban Connection, 1998-2001

(concluded).

10
moved quickly to distance itself from the Taliban. However,

U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld acknowledged

that hundreds of Chinese artillery rockets, multiple-rocket

launchers, rocket-propelled grenades, mines and rifles were

found in raids on Taliban and al-Qaeda camps in Tora Bora

and elsewhere by troops of the 18-nation International

Security Assistance Force (ISAF). These weapons were

most likely either smuggled into Afghanistan from China

and Pakistan or left over from the 1980s, when Beijing,

along with Washington, was a major supplier of the

anti-Soviet mujahideen fighters. They could also have been

supplied before September 11, 2001, as part of China’s own

two-pronged “congagement” strategy to contain the

militancy through “strike hard” campaigns inside Xinjiang,

while nipping the Uighur separatist movement in the bud

by engaging its Taliban sponsors in Afghanistan.14

Beijing also dispatched a team of counter-terrorism

experts to Washington to explore ways in which both sides

could cooperate, amid positive signs that China was willing

to share “useful intelligence” on the al-Qaeda network. The

Chinese agreed to allow the United States to station Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) officials in Beijing—a request

that had lingered without action for at least 18 months. This

paved the way for the establishment of cooperation

mechanisms with Washington on sharing intelligence,

financial transactions and law enforcement. The Standing

Committee of the National People’s Congress ratified

China’s accession to the International Convention for the

Suppression of Terrorist Bombing and the State Council

decided to be party to the International Convention for the

Suppression of Financing of Terrorism. Beijing seized the

opportunity to redouble its efforts to crush various

opposition groups, including (but not limited to) Uighur

insurgents, some with al-Qaeda links, in Xinjiang province

where Beijing has long struggled to quell a nascent

insurgency. Worried about the spill-over effect of U.S.-led

military strikes resulting in the flight of al-Qaeda leaders

into China’s troubled western region bordering Afghanistan

11
and Pakistan, Beijing also sealed its borders with both

countries and put its border troops on high alert.

Furthermore, China supplied a significant amount of food

relief for refugees from Afghanistan. China also pledged

U.S.$150 million for the reconstruction of post-war

Afghanistan and indicated that it might provide troops to a

United Nations peacekeeping force in Afghanistan after

U.S. troops are withdrawn.15

While Jiang Zemin and others in the politburo realized

that China’s interests lay with Washington following the

September 11 terrorist attacks, some Chinese intellectuals

and officials reacted gleefully to the attacks. The state-run

media made much of the fall of the World Trade Center twin

towers as a humbling of American arrogance and a direct

consequence of American “bullying” around the world. In

other words, “America got what it deserved.” Student

postings on electronic bulletin boards were also highly

critical of the United States in its dealings with developing

countries. One comment was particularly telling: “We

Chinese will never fear these people [Americans] again;

they have been shown to be soft-bellied paper tigers.”

However, the Chinese authorities quickly cracked down on

celebrations and rejoicing among some of their citizens and

in Internet chat rooms. Still, the official media played down

the attacks, “suggesting a reluctance to acknowledge that

America as victim had a right to take the battle to the

aggressors.”16 There was also an expectation in official

circles that the U.S. military operation could turn out to be a

long drawn-out affair, perhaps another Vietnam. As one

commentary in the Beijing Review noted:

Will the U.S. soldiers get stuck fighting the opposition with the

same light weapons used by the Talibs, just as they once got

stuck while fighting the Vietnam War? The Talibs have, after

all, been fighting for 30 years and have grown up with rifles.

They know the terrain by heart, and are adept at making

ambushes. The ground forces of the United States and Britain

will not be able to protect its rear, as not all of their

communications and supply lines will be guaranteed.17

12
Apparently, behind China’s “unconditional and

principled support” lay the assumption that the United

States would get bogged down in Afghanistan, and

Washington’s need for greater support in the conduct of the

war would give Beijing the opportunity to extract

concessions in the near future. At least, this is what the

intelligence agency of China’s closest ally, Pakistan, had

told the rulers in Islamabad and Beijing. And Beijing

seemingly “fell into the trap of believing Inter-Services

Intelligence (ISI) assessments from Pakistan that the

anti-Taliban campaign would be protracted, that the US

would get stuck with an unending quagmire and get

seriously bloodied as the Soviets had experienced in the

1980s.”18

However, the quick, sudden and total collapse of the

Taliban/al-Qaeda “defences” took everyone—its mentors

(the Pakistani military), friends (Middle Eastern countries

and China), and enemies (United States, Russia, and

India)—by surprise. For Washington, the swift military

victory over the Taliban also obviated the need for any

trade-offs with other countries. The rapid advance of

Northern Alliance forces and the fall of Kabul upset

Beijing’s strategic calculations, made Pakistan feel

squeezed again on its western and eastern frontiers, and led

to a reconsideration of China’s strategy. Pakistan President

Parvez Musharraf was invited to Beijing for urgent

consultations on a “common strategy for establishing peace

and stability in the region.” China reportedly shared the

Pakistani concern over the situation arising out of

Afghanistan’s “occupation by the [Northern] Alliance

forces, in disregard to the wishes of the U.S. and the United

Nations.”19

Consequently, the Chinese made specific

recommendations for a post-Taliban government in

Afghanistan: political solutions should be home-made,

broad-based and balanced; foreign troop deployments must

be limited in both numbers and time; no one should pressure

the Afghans on how to sort out their affairs; and the

13
“moderate Taliban” (that is, the Pashtun friends of China’s

all-weather-friend, Pakistan) should rule. Pakistan,

desperate to salvage what it could from its Afghan

misadventure, had long been pushing for accommodating

less extreme Taliban elements in a post-war government,

and Powell had reluctantly agreed to this during his

October 2001 visit to Islamabad in order to keep the

Pakistani military regime on the U.S. side. Claiming that

“moderate Taliban is oxymoronic,” Russia and India,

however, reacted by issuing a joint statement rejecting the

U.S., Pakistani, and Chinese pleas for the inclusion of

“moderate Taliban” in an interim government.20 In an

interview with Italian daily La Stampa in late November

2001, Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan also demanded

“intervention by the United Nations and its Security Council

(where China has a say via its veto) in a more intensive and

active fashion” (apparently to stall the political domination

of the Northern Alliance forces), and cautioned that “the

United States should not decide the future of Afghanistan

all by itself.” Beijing made these demands on the grounds

that China is a neighbour of Afghanistan and therefore a

potential victim of hostility and instability there.

Furthermore, Tang for the first time officially gave a name

to the insurgency in Xinjiang province as the “struggle for

the independence of ‘Eastern Turkestan.’”21

Some China-watchers have argued that China did not

explicitly endorse the U.S. military action in Afghanistan

and that Beijing’s stance seemed “hesitant, tentative and

reserved.”22 While U.S. and Chinese interests converged on

the need to eradicate terrorist training camps and support

networks in Afghanistan, the two countries did not

necessarily agree on the best means to achieve this

objective. The official reaction was also at variance with

Chinese public opinion, which is highly nationalistic and

frequently anti-American. However, nor did the Bush

administration, still smarting from the EP-3 incident, seem

too eager to enlist China’s support and assistance. Beijing

was treated consistently as a secondary player, and in fact,

14
Jiang Zemin was not among the first round of world leaders

that Bush called before he authorized the U.S. military

attacks in Afghanistan. Others contended that China’s

major contribution to the U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition

was in delivering its long-term ally, Pakistan, to

Washington’s war effort, assuring Islamabad that decades

of unwavering Chinese support would continue, and by

bolstering frontline ally, Pakistan, with economic aid and

diplomatic support. Soon after the attacks, Jiang Zemin

tasked Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi as a go-between for

the United States and Pakistan. He traveled twice to

Islamabad, in late September and again in late November.23

Beijing reportedly worked behind the scenes to persuade

Pakistan to provide base access and overflight rights to U.S.

military forces headed into Afghanistan. Assuming that

was the case, the U.S. Government did not publicly

acknowledge any such Chinese assistance, as it might have

involved trade-offs. In fact, Washington made it very clear

shortly after September 11 that it would not engage in any

quid pro quo with Beijing.24

On balance, China’s response could at best be described

as “pragmatic” and at worst as “muddling through.” Since

this was the first time China endorsed U.S. military action

against a sovereign state, it was not an easy decision to

arrive at. Beijing’s attitude to U.S. action in Afghanistan

gradually evolved from an initial hesitance to backing as

China realized that it could reap significant benefits from

the U.S.-led War on Terrorism. Nonetheless, the fact

remains that Beijing’s four key requests—that the United

Nations should have a greater role in monitoring

Afghanistan’s peace; that the United States should view

Uighur Muslim separatists in China as terrorists; that

“moderate Taliban” be included in the future government;

and, more importantly, that there should be a cutback in

U.S. arms sales to Taiwan—remained unfulfilled.

15
Tactical Gains and Transitory Benefits.

A hard-nosed calculation of costs and benefits showed

that Beijing stood to reap a range of benefits, at least in the

short to near term, from its support for the U.S.-led War on

Terrorism.

First, it provided a welcome change from the U.S.

focus on “the China threat” to a new common enemy

requiring Sino-U.S. cooperation more than a decade

after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Prior to 9/11,

relations between the world’s most powerful country and its

most populous one were heading towards confrontation over

a whole range of issues. As soon as Bush took office in

January 2001, he telephoned every major world leader

except Jiang Zemin, a clear signal of how the Bush

administration felt about China, the “strategic competitor.”

Then Washington downgraded Beijing’s priority for U.S.

policymakers, placing China well behind its Asian

allies—Japan, South Korea, and Australia, and even India

and Russia—for core foreign policy attention. For example,

Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage was sent to

New Delhi to brief the Indian government on U.S. missile

defense plans, while the lower-ranking Assistant Secretary

of State James Kelly went to Beijing for the same purpose.25

Sino-U.S. relations hit their lowest point in April 2001 when

a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) pilot was killed after his

jet fighter and an American Navy EP-3 spy plane collided

near Hainan Island. With talks on Chinese nuclear and

missile proliferation to “rogue states” stalled, disputes over

U.S. support for Taiwan persisting, and U.S. withdrawal

from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with Russia

despite China’s objections, the anti-terrorism campaign

emerged as the only bright spot in relations.

Many Chinese analysts argued that Beijing should take

advantage of U.S. eagerness for support to shore up its own

often troubled relationship with Washington and thereby

benefit from pursuing Beijing’s own version of a

“congagement” strategy vis-à-vis Washington to keep U.S.

16
power in check. Jiang Lingfei noted with satisfaction that

the conflict between the United States and China was “no

longer the most important confrontation in the world” as

“three forces—national separatism, religious extremism,

and terrorism—have become the focus of international

strife.” This development “altered U.S. judgment of where

the threat comes from, and also changed [its] attitude

regarding China as the real strategic opponent, thus easing

the tension in Sino-U.S. relations.” He and others hoped

that the watershed of September 11 would curb U.S.

strategic expansion in Asia, and create conditions for

China’s peaceful reunification with Taiwan.26 Beijing’s

cautious support for the anti-terror campaign did indeed

bring China U.S. acquiescence when Taiwanese President

Chen Shui-bian was not invited to the Shanghai summit of

the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in

October 2001.

To match words with deeds, Beijing granted approval for

a U.S. aircraft carrier and its battle group to make a port call

in Hong Kong in late November on their way to the Arabian

Sea in what was seen as a sign of Beijing’s logistical support

for the War on Terrorism.27 Furthermore, at a time of

slowdown in the U.S economy, the Chinese government

placed a U.S.$1.6 billion order for Boeing aircraft, and made

little fuss over the discovery of bugging devices aboard the

U.S.-made airplane intended to serve as Jiang Zemin’s

private jet. The Chinese leadership’s response to the ring of

military encampments that the United States established

in Central and South Asia and the Philippines was

restrained, as was its view of a new Japanese law

authorizing military participation in the war. Some Chinese

officials have made it a point to emphasize that the U.S.

military presence in the region contributes to peace and

stability.28 For example, the Washington Post quoted a

senior strategist from the PLA as saying that the short-term

presence of U.S. troops in Central Asia “might even be good

for our [China’s] security,” a suggestion that would have

been considered blasphemous before September 11.29

17
For its part, the Bush administration responded by

dropping references to China as a “strategic competitor,” a

term used by the Bush administration to differentiate their

approach to China from that of the Clinton administration.

At the APEC meeting in October 2001, Bush referred to

China as a “great power” and emphasized Washington’s

desire to shape a constructive relationship with Beijing. To

some Chinese analysts, by the time President Bush arrived

in Beijing for his second visit in five months, in February

2002, relations between the two countries had started to

resemble the “constructive strategic partnership” that the

Clinton administration was aiming for. There is no denying

the fact that a dramatic shift in U.S. priorities after

September 11 contributed to an improvement in the overall

atmospherics and tone of the Sino-U.S. relationship. In

short, behind Beijing’s solidarity with the anti-terrorism

coalition lay great expectations of finding a common enemy

once again to reconstruct a co-operative and strategic

partnership with the United States after more than a

decade of drift, distrust, and acrimony following the Soviet

collapse.

Second, greater certainty and predictability in

Sino-U.S. relations would facilitate domestic

stability, ensure a smooth political leadership

transition and sustain high economic growth in

China. Maintaining a good, stable, and predictable

relationship with the United States is considered vitally

important for China’s continued economic growth as the

United States is the largest source of investment, capital,

and technology and provides the largest market for Chinese

goods. In addition, at a time of domestic political leadership

transition to the fourth generation (from Jiang Zemin to Hu

Jintao), Beijing hopes that the U.S. War on Terrorism could

be used internally to strengthen the hand of the Chinese

regime against its opponents. From Beijing’s perspective,

an underlying aspect of the American campaign is that its

thrust, throughout the world, will be to favor the cause of

order and stability over chaos and instability. And this also

18
works to Beijing’s advantage. After all, the examples of

Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Indonesia show that weak and

failed states usually become the hotbeds of terrorism and

extremism. In short, preoccupied with social and economic

problems following China’s accession to the WTO and

political leadership transition, Beijing wanted to avoid a

confrontation with Washington that could jeopardize the

economic benefits that flow from stable U.S.-China ties.

Third, given the Chinese economy’s growing

dependence on oil imports, Beijing also shares

Washington’s interest in ensuring unimpeded oil

supplies as well as stable and low oil prices. Should

major oil-producing countries in the Middle East and

Central Asia fall victim to radical Islamic fundamentalism,

such a development would potentially undermine China’s

economic development.

Fourth, Beijing has interpreted the resumption of

Sino-U.S. consultations on security issues of mutual

concern as an acknowledgement of the limitations of

U.S. unilateralism and as a net policy gain. Chinese

analysts concluded that the United States had learned that

in the age of globalization and economic interdependence,

security is indivisible. Washington could no longer afford to

go it alone and would have to stop being so “highhanded,

unilateralist, and hegemonic in its attitude toward others.”

Fifth, overall improvement in U.S.-Pakistan

relations is seen as a positive development for

Sino-U.S. relations as well as regional stability.

Beijing has become increasingly concerned in recent years

over the gradual shift in the regional balance of power in

South Asia with the steady rise of India, coupled with a

growing Indo-U.S. entente, talk of “India as a counterweight

to China” in Washington’s policy circles, and Pakistan’s

gradual descent into the ranks of failed states.30 Since the

end of the Cold War, a politically dysfunctional and

economically bankrupt Pakistan’s flirtation with Islamic

extremism and terrorism coupled with its nuclear and

19
missile programs had alienated Washington. However,

September 11 changed all that. Pakistan saw an

opportunity to revive its past close relations with the United

States, shed its near pariah international status, and

enhance its economic and strategic position vis-à-vis India

by instantaneously becoming a “frontline state” in the

international coalition to fight global terrorism. In return,

Washington lifted sanctions and agreed to provide Pakistan

with billions of dollars in aid and debt rescheduling. From

Washington’s perspective, courting Musharraf made

geopolitical sense because the Pakistani military not only

knew a great deal about the Taliban, Osama bin Laden, and

al-Qaeda but also because any U.S. military operation

against Afghanistan could not be successful without bases,

logistics, personnel, and airspace in neighboring Pakistan.

Had Beijing told its ally, Islamabad, to reject Washington’s

bid for an alliance against the Taliban, there may not have

been any Islamabad-Washington-Beijing cooperation

against terrorism. To old-timers in the three capitals, the

U.S., Pakistani and Chinese cooperation on Afghanistan is

reminiscent of an earlier confluence of interests—also

played out in Afghanistan a decade ago—to fight occupying

Soviet forces.

In Beijing, there were great expectations of a sharp

downturn in Indo-U.S. relations because in many ways

what happens on the Indian subcontinent is unavoidably a

zero-sum game and China and Pakistan’s new relationship

with the United States did affect India negatively.31 A

Chinese National Defense University’s specialist on South

Asia, Wang Baofu, noted with satisfaction that under the

new circumstances, “the United States, considering its own

security interests, readjusted its policies toward South

Asian countries and started paying more attention to the

important role of Pakistan in the anti-terrorism war,

therefore arousing the vigilance and jealousy of India.”

Wang criticized India for “defin[ing] resistance activities in

Kashmir as terrorism by taking advantage of U.S.

anti-terrorism war in Afghanistan, thus putting more

20
pressure on Pakistan through the United States,” and

praised Musharraf for his “clear-cut attitude toward

fighting against international terrorism.”32 As tensions

flared between India and Pakistan over suspected

Pakistani-backed terrorist attacks on the Indian

Parliament on December 13, 2001, Beijing rushed jet

fighters, nuclear and missile components, and other weapon

systems to shore up Pakistani defenses in the border face-off

with India.33 General Musharraf visited Beijing twice in

less than a fortnight for consultations with Jiang Zemin and

Zhu Rongji, while General Zhang Wannian, vice-chairman

of China’s Central Military Commission, met with General

Muhammad Aziz Khan, chairman of Pakistan’s Joint

Chiefs of the Staff Committee, and was quoted as telling

Khan: “For many years the militaries of our two nations

have maintained exchanges and cooperation at the highest

and all levels and in every field. This fully embodies the all

weather friendship our nations maintain.”34 Zhang’s

reference to “cooperation . . . in every field” (meaning

nuclear and missile fields) was a thinly veiled warning to

India to back off. Later, Beijing claimed some credit for

mediating between the two sub-continental rivals despite

the Indian government’s aversion to the dreaded “M” word:

“Mediated by the United States, China, Britain, and Russia,

leaders of India and Pakistan recently expressed their

desire to try to control the tense situation.”35 The

India-Pakistan border stand-off in May-June 2002 once

again demonstrated that broader geo-strategic concerns

would make China covertly side with Pakistan, while

publicly calling for restraint by both sides and appearing to

be even-handed.36

China also took other measures to put Pakistan at ease.

Chinese leaders lobbied the United States to provide liberal

and long-term economic assistance to their frontline ally.

Pakistan was promised about $1.5 billion in U.S. aid to

make up for war-related losses in tax revenue, investments,

and exports, with more to come. For its part, China gave

Pakistan emergency assistance totaling $1.2 million during

21
September-December 2001, in addition to an unspecified

amount of aid announced during Musharraf’s 5-day visit.

Chinese engineers and technicians, withdrawn from

Pakistan because of security concerns after September 11,

were ordered to resume work on extensive investment

projects there, which included copper mining, oil and gas

exploration, and a $200 million project to build a highway

and naval port in Gwadar on the Arabian Sea.37

Another major dividend was the muted criticism of

Beijing’s “Strike Hard” campaign against separatists

(in Xinjiang and Tibet), religious cults (such as

Falungong) and political dissidents. Knowing well that

the cases for Xinjiang and Tibet to exercise

self-determination historically are much stronger than that

of Kashmir or Chechnya, China has always very been

sensitive to the issue of territorial integrity. China’s support

for the anti-terrorism operation was based on the

assumption that its success would help Beijing solve one of

the oldest problems faced by the Chinese empire: how to

pacify, control and Sinicize its newly acquired territories in

Xinjiang and Tibet—two vast regions that occupy about 30

per cent of China’s landmass and are rich in mineral

resources, oil and gas. Within days of September 11, China

sought to link the worldwide campaign against terrorism

with its efforts against “separatism” in Xinjiang, Tibet, and

Taiwan. Cloaking its actions in the rhetoric of counterterrorism, Beijing seized the opportunity to redouble its

efforts to crush various opposition and separatist groups,

curtail religious freedom, and silence the voice of a restive

ethnic minority because “it could now cast its support of the

anti-terror campaign as morally correct, not merely

politically expedient, and without worrying too much about

human rights violations.”38 Nearly 4 months after al-Qaeda

was implicated in the September 11 terror attacks, China’s

State Council Information Office issued a document on

January 21, 2002, entitled “‘East Turkistan’ Terrorist

Forces Cannot Get Away With Impunity,” which marked by

far the most direct attempt by the Chinese government to

22
link—and thereby justify—its crackdown on Uighurs in

Xinjiang, with the American campaign against bin Laden’s

al-Qaeda.

39

Finally, participation in the War on Terrorism was

supposed to enhance China’s image as a responsible,

rational and constructive player, and a good

international citizen. Beijing’s search for allies to counter

U.S. global hegemony and its Asian rivals (India and Japan)

has led China into dangerous liaisons with the proliferators

of WMD and into the arms of dictators from North Korea to

Iraq. The War on Terrorism provided Beijing with the

opportunity to join the ranks of the world’s leading nations

rather than stand with rogue nations or be the “odd man

out.” The last thing Beijing wants to see is the United

States, Europe, and Japan getting together to make

decisions about the future of Asia without consulting China.

Strategic Losses, Shocks and Reverses.

However, it did not take long for the policymaking elite

in Beijing to realize that most of the perceived policy gains

and benefits were tactical, minor, and transitory in nature.

Not only that, the U.S.-led War on Terrorism was

developing in ways that could not have been anticipated or

foreseen, with potentially disastrous consequences for

China’s core strategic interests.40 The reverberations from

the military campaign against Taliban/al-Qaeda were being

felt largely outside Afghanistan’s borders and bringing

about a swift and radical shift in the regional balance of

power.

First, serious Sino-U.S. differences persist over

Taiwan, WMD proliferation, missile defense, human

rights, and religious freedom. Despite a significant

improvement in the atmospherics and exchanges of

high-level visits, the Sino-U.S. collaboration in the

anti-terrorism campaign has at best papered over, and, at

worst, widened the gulf between Beijing and Washington.

As noted earlier, Beijing was hoping that an overall

23
improvement in bilateral ties would make Washington

sensitive to China’s primary concern, that is, Taiwan.41

However, Beijing watched with dismay and consternation

as the Bush administration took a series of “provocative

measures”—granting a transit visa for Taiwanese

Vice-President’s New York visit in January 2002; inviting

the Taiwanese Defense Minister to the United States;

reiterating the primacy of the Taiwan Relations Act over

three joint communiqués, coupled with the promise to

defend Taiwan if China attacked; the launching of the U.S.

Congressional Taiwan Caucus; and, more importantly,

approval of weapons sales and training programs for

Taiwan’s military. These steps not only amounted to the

most unambiguous backing of Taiwan in two decades but

also unraveled decades of Chinese diplomacy aimed at

getting the United States to limit its support for the island.

The consolidation of power by President Chen Shui-bian’s

Democratic Progressive Party in Taiwan’s December 2001

elections and the decision to add the words “Issued in

Taiwan” to the cover of Taiwanese passports were seen as

setbacks to Beijing’s reunification drive. Beijing responded

by angrily warning Washington against testing Chinese

resolve on Taiwan and accused the latter of exhibiting

“dangerous tendencies” that risked confrontation.42

Furthermore, Chinese officials’ hopes for a softening of

the U.S. stance over the issue of WMD proliferation by

lifting all sanctions on Chinese companies (including those

imposed 10 days before the September 11 attacks because of

Beijing’s noncompliance with the November 2000

nonproliferation agreement) also evaporated when the

Bush administration announced its intention to tighten

controls on the exports of certain high-tech products to

China because of the perception that Beijing is a

“problematic proliferator.”43 A month before Bush’s visit to

China to commemorate the 30th anniversary of President

Richard Nixon’s first visit to the Middle Kingdom, U.S.

ambassador Clark Randt described China’s proliferation of

strategic technologies to Pakistan and Iran as “a

24
make-or-break issue for us.” Two days later, on January 24,

2002, the State Department imposed sanctions on three

Chinese entities found to be in violation of the Iran

Non-Proliferation Act of 2000.44 Apparently, the growing

threat of WMD terrorism after September 11, especially the

prospect of Chinese-supplied Pakistani nuclear weapons

falling into the hands of Islamic terrorists, had hardened

Washington’s stance over Chinese proliferation. In his

meeting with Jiang Zemin, President Bush urged him to

halt exports of missile technology and to cooperate with the

United States to keep WMD out of the hands of terrorists

and their state sponsors. However, the lack of progress on

the non-proliferation front led to the further imposition of

sanctions against Chinese entities twice (on May 9 and July

24, 2002) in 3 months.

Washington’s other actions were also far less reassuring.

For example, the Bush administration’s decision to abandon

the 1972 ABM Treaty with Russia in order to pave the way

for the development and deployment of missile defenses was

seen as an insensitive and ill-considered move that openly

humiliated China despite the latter’s support for

Washington’s War on Terrorism. The fact that Beijing

muted its once-fiery response to this “destabilizing” move

was a sign that China was feeling increasingly constrained

by Washington’s emerging global strategy.

Contrary to Beijing’s expectations, the Bush

administration also refused to tone down its criticisms of

Chinese policies on religious freedom and political liberties

even as it urged Beijing’s increased support for the

antiterrorism campaign. In fact, China’s intensification of

the crackdown on internal forces of extremism, separatism,

and subversion in Xinjiang and Tibet led Bush to caution

Jiang Zemin at the Shanghai APEC meeting that the war on

terror “must never be an excuse to persecute minorities.”

Again, in late January 2002 Ambassador Clark Randt

warned that Beijing’s membership in the coalition against

terrorism was not a “devil’s bargain” that gave it an excuse

25
to persecute its ethnic minorities.45 As one observer of

Sino-U.S. relations pointed out:

Post-September 11, the relationship between the U.S. and

China has not changed much. The rhetoric may have improved,

but ties remain fragile and unstable, and as vulnerable as ever

to sudden deterioration as a result of accidents, misperceptions,

and eruption of unresolved bilateral issues.46

In short, the War on Terrorism has shown that U.S.-China

relations are characterized more by shared exigencies than

shared objectives.

Second, sharp differences have emerged over

interpretations of terrorism and the broadening of the

War on Terrorism. As noted earlier, China’s support for

the U.S.-led anti-terrorism campaign stemmed from the

self-serving goal of seeking legitimacy for its own battle

against separatist forces in Xinjiang and Taiwan. However,

much to Beijing’s chagrin, the United States has flatly

rejected attempts to equate the Uighurs’ independence

movement in Xinjiang with the Taliban or al-Qaeda, and

has refused to lift post-Tiananmen sanctions that would

improve Chinese military capabilities in Xinjiang on the

grounds that China’s internal problems have little or

nothing to do with the events of September 11. And rightly

so. It is also well known that Osama bin Laden’s primary

focus has always been U.S. military presence in the Middle

East and its pro-Israel policy. He also trained fighters for

war in Chechnya against Russia and in Kashmir against

India, but he has never made the same effort to train

fighters for Xinjiang. This was partly because the

Taliban/al-Qaeda network was created and backed by

China’s surrogate, Pakistan.47 Moreover, Beijing’s claims

that the Uighurs have been inspired, encouraged and

supplied by al-Qaeda and the Taliban stationed in

neighboring Afghanistan flies in the face of reality that the

part of Afghanistan bordering China was never in Taliban

hands but under the Northern Alliance’s control, a

constraining factor for any type of relationship between the

26
Uighurs and terrorists across the border. It is also

noteworthy that China, with Pakistan’s help, tried all along

to prevent the moderate Northern Alliance forces’ victory

over the radical Taliban.48 Besides, China’s “Muslim

problem” has never been as serious as India’s in Kashmir or

Russia’s in Chechnya. Being an autocratic state, the

Chinese communist regime has often resorted to

strong-arm tactics and mass executions without worrying

about critical media scrutiny or public opinion fallout that

democracies like India and Russia have had to contend

with.

Such opportunism on Beijing’s part could also damage

the legitimacy of the global anti-terrorist campaigns in

Afghanistan and elsewhere.49 That is why General Francis

Taylor, the U.S. special envoy on counterterrorism, turned

down demands by Chinese officials for the repatriation of

Uighurs captured in Afghanistan, saying that Washington

did not support Beijing’s effort to paint Uighur Muslim

nationalists as terrorists. He revealed that the al-Qaeda

had cells in 50 countries but did not mention China as one of

those 50 countries. Taylor said: “Muslims in Xinjiang have

legitimate economic and social issues that . . . need political

solutions, not counter-terrorism.” To allay any

misconceptions, he added: “The United States hasn’t

changed its values. We continue to hold very dearly our

concern in areas such as human rights.”50 However, from

Beijing’s perspective, the U.S. stance on Xinjiang and

captured Uighurs was “just another example of

Washington’s double standards on international

issues—China’s terrorists are not the same as the United

States’ terrorists.” Differences over what constitutes

terrorism further adds to Beijing’s deep distrust of

Washington’s motives and intentions.51

Nor does Beijing like the idea of the anti-terrorism war

becoming an open-ended war from Pakistan to the

Philippines. The prospect of unilateral U.S. military

interventions against Iraq or North Korea would surely

exacerbate U.S.-China relations where Beijing has

27
significant strategic and commercial interests at stake. The

ongoing operations have received tacit acceptance by

Beijing, but a future Chinese response would include

insistence on the authority of the U.N. Security Council and

principles of nonintervention and noninterference in the

domestic jurisdiction of a sovereign state.

Third, the United States has emerged united and

stronger from the War on Terrorism and U.S. military

expansion and presence all around China’s periphery

in Central, South, and Southeast Asia is seen as part

of a strategy to “encircle and contain China.” U.S.

military superiority—as demonstrated in the swift victory

in Afghanistan—has once again stunned Chinese

strategists, reinforcing feelings of military inferiority and

potential vulnerability, and has upset their strategic

calculations of a long drawn-out Vietnam-type conflict in

Afghanistan. As a prominent Chinese defense analyst, Yan

Xuetong, has put it:

With an overall military budget of $331 billion—nearly 20 times

China’s stated defence budget—the U.S. is virtually

unstoppable. The gap between the U.S. and other military

powers is not just in quantity but also in quality. And this gap

will make the U.S. become more and more unilateralist and care

less and less about other countries’ interests.52

As the United States deployed troops in the energy-rich

regions of Central Asia and the Caucasus, acquired bases

and increased influence in South Asia, and returned to

South East Asia, the supposedly “brief” Unipolar moment in

history seemed to be turning into a long-lasting Imperial

moment—Pax Americana par excellence. Beneath the

smiles and handshakes and talk of opening a new chapter in

Sino-U.S. relations are the lurking fears of American

encirclement and containment of China—a hot topic among

Chinese strategists and foreign policy analysts. A powerful

undercurrent of opinion reflects rising concern about U.S.

actions and policies post-9/11, which many see as boosting

the already worrisome U.S. ascendancy on the world stage.

28
To make matters worse, China saw one after another

country that Beijing had hoped to woo as a potential ally in

the global coalition against American hegemony, including

Pakistan, Russia, and the Central Asian republics, forming

cozy new relationships with the United States.53 Seen from

Beijing’s perspective, any recent tour of the strategic

horizon is bleak and getting bleaker:

Due to the special strategic geographic importance of Central

and South Asia, the United States will not easily give up

expansion in this area. Afghanistan is the communication hub

of Central Eurasia. . . For the United States, control over

Afghanistan and Central Asia could enable NATO to push

forward its eastward expansion simultaneously from the east

and west, while helping join the U.S. military forces in Europe,

especially in Turkey, with those in the Asia-Pacific region. In

that case, the United States will be able to nibble away the

strategic space of Russia to the north and threaten the

security of west China to the east; while to the west, it will be

able to contain Iraq and Iran, thus providing coordinated

support for its troops in the Middle East, and, to the south,

control the two nuclear powers—India and Pakistan. . .

Terrorist attacks on the United States gave it a good

opportunity to expand globally. . . Complete U.S. withdrawal

from the region is unlikely and is even uncharacteristic of the

United States, as it has seldom withdrawn troops from its

overseas military bases since World War II.54

Chinese strategists warn that U.S. strategy includes boxing

China in through an increased U.S. military presence in

Central Asia (with long-term military bases in Kyrgyzstan,

Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan), by staying

militarily engaged in Pakistan while forming a long-term

strategic partnership with India in South Asia, and in

Southeast Asia, in places such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and

the Philippines, where it has returned with its special

forces, and increased presence at Singapore’s Changi Naval

Station, or perhaps at Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay, thereby

strengthening its strategic role from Central Asia to

Southeast Asia. Following the release of democracy leader

Aung San Suu Kyi, Burma—another linchpin in Beijing’s

29
regional strategic designs—could move away from China’s

orbit as well, as have some Southeast Asian countries which

have long been courted by China. Above all, “Beijing views a

potential U.S.-Indian military alignment with horror.

Paired with the U.S.-Japan alliance, it would bracket China

and bring into concert with Washington Asia’s other two

major powers.”55 If China was on a roll prior to 9/11, in a

complete reversal of roles post-9/11, it is now the United

States that is on a spectacular roll. The U.S. strategic

objective, according to Zhai Kun, is to “maintain its

dominant position and balance among big powers in the

region, and prevent China’s influence from rising in the

region.” With the United States taking a greater interest in

Southeast Asia, whose security concerns were neglected by

the Clinton administration, it makes it harder for China to

turn the South China Sea into a Chinese lake. The arrival of

American military advisers in the Philippines, with which

China has disputed territorial claims in the South China

Sea, drew mutterings of disapproval from Beijing.

Almost all U.S. official documents and academic reports believe

that geopolitical and military conflicts will inevitably take place

between China and the United States in Southeast Asia in the

future. . . Therefore, while strengthening its military alliance

with the Philippines, the United States is restoring formerly

suspended military exchanges with Indonesia and has listed

Indonesia as a potential partner in Southeast Asia. . . It is also

going to enhance its naval supremacy in Southeast Asia by

making full use of military facilities in Singapore, Malaysia and

Thailand through military agreements with these countries.56

The Chinese had obviously noted that the Pentagon’s

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), released on

September 30, 2001, had identified Northeast Asia and the

East Asian littoral as “critical areas” for U.S. interests,

which must not be allowed to fall under “hostile

domination.” The QDR characterized Asia as “emerging as a

region susceptible to large-scale military competition” with

a “volatile mix of rising and declining regional powers.”

Coyly avoiding naming the obvious challenger, China, the

30
Pentagon warned of the possibility that “a military

competitor with a formidable resource base will emerge in

the region,” adding that the lower “density of U.S. basing” in

this “critical region places a premium on securing additional

access and infrastructure agreements.”57

In short, long-standing fears of strategic encirclement

are becoming a reality right before Beijing’s eyes, and it is

feeling utterly powerless to do anything about it. The

Chinese believe that Russia, India, and Japan have all been

big winners in this, and that the United States is probably

going to have a better relationship with all of them, leaving

China out in the cold. The fast-changing strategic scene not

only undercuts Chinese ambitions to dominate Asia, but

also hems in the one country in the world with the most

demonstrable capacity to act independently of the United

States. Not surprisingly, the start of 2002 saw Chinese

leaders and generals shedding their earlier inhibitions

about publicly expressing concern over the growing

“Southern Discomfort”: that is, ever-expanding U.S.

military power and presence in southern Asia post-9/11.

China’s Chief of the General Staff Fu Quanyou publicly

warned the United States against using the War on

Terrorism to dominate global affairs by saying

“counter-terrorism should not be used to practice

hegemony.”58

Fourth, Beijing was shocked at President Bush’s

“Axis of Evil” speech and the Nuclear Posture Review

which made China part of a “Gang of Seven” for

possible nuclear strikes. China reacted angrily to Bush’s

characterization of North Korea, Iran, and Iraq as an “Axis

of Evil” in his State of the Union address in January 2002. If

these “terrorist states” have anything in common, it is their

“China connection.” They all shop at Beijing’s “WMD

Friendship Store” and have significant strategic and

commercial ties with China.59 Strongly disapproving the

phrase “Axis of Evil” in international relations, Chinese

Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan reiterated that

“China always holds that anti-terrorism campaigns should

31
be based on irrefutable evidence, and anti-terrorism attacks

should not be expanded arbitrarily.”60 Perceptions that the

anti-terrorism campaign is nothing but an excuse for

imposing U.S. hegemonism worldwide were exacerbated by

a classified Department of Defense document, “Nuclear

Posture Review,” leaked to the press in March 2002. It

revealed U.S. plans for the resumption of nuclear weapons

testing, contingency planning for nuclear strikes against

seven countries, including China (others were Russia,

North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya), and

consideration of a pre-emptive launch of nuclear weapons

against non-nuclear states to counter the use of chemical or

biological weapons against the United States. In addition,

the Bush administration was reportedly preparing to

develop a new generation of small, smart nuclear weapons

to fulfill a wider variety of purposes, and deepen the

integration of nuclear and non-nuclear weaponry in U.S.

force planning.

Fifth, China sees greater evidence of U.S.

unilateralism as a setback for multilateralism. In the

aftermath of the September 11 attacks, Beijing had hoped

that Washington’s need for allies in the War on Terrorism

would moderate U.S. ambitions for absolute security and

reverse the unilateralist trend characteristic of the Bush

administration’s muscular foreign policy, or at least cause

the Bush administration to abandon some of its more

controversial unilateralist positions on global warming,

liberalization of international trade and missile defense

plans, and its “overbearing and extremely supercilious”

attitude toward China and Russia. However, Beijing soon

found out that its optimism was completely misplaced. If

anything, America’s short and swift military victory in

Afghanistan emboldened the U.S. hawks to press ahead

with their “bad old unilateralist tendencies.” From its

treatment of Afghan prisoners to withdrawal from the ABM

Treaty and Bush’s labeling of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as

an “Axis of Evil,” the Chinese saw the United States

seemingly bent on doing whatever it wanted, against

32
whomever it wanted, under the convenient cover of

combating terror, with little regard for others. As Shen

Dingli noted: “After adjusting its way of handling

international affairs a bit, [the U.S.] is returning to

unilateralism.” Zhang Guoqing observed in the Southern

Weekend: “Under the banner of counter-terrorism, [the

U.S.] can strike at will at those with differing views; it can

loiter about and not leave Afghanistan or other strategically

important areas; it can undercut the United Nations; it can

use opposing terrorism as a bargaining chip in bilateral

relations with other countries.”61 With dismay, China’s

leading English-language weekly opened the new year with

a commentary claiming “The September 11 tragedy,

however, has not weakened America’s superior role in world

dynamics; the United States has not given up its demand for

world hegemony.”62 Many Chinese analysts now see the

United States as being even more potent, strident, and

implacable than ever before, a superpower able to get its

way in more places around the globe, including China’s

backyard.63 In short, China’s worst fears of a unilateralist

United States have come to pass and Beijing finds itself

ill-equipped to deal with it.

Sixth, Beijing’s much touted multilateral solution

to the security dilemma—the Shanghai Cooperation

Organization (SCO)—failed its first test, and has

been completely sidelined in the War on Terrorism.

The U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition has been a major

setback to China’s most serious foreign policy initiative of

the last decade—a Beijing-led and dominated regional

multilateral security forum, the SCO, which comprises

China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and

Uzbekistan. China sought to rely primarily on the SCO as

an instrument to project its power and gain allies in Central

Asia—a region which is the source of much needed strategic

energy resources as well as a launch-pad for China’s larger

strategic aspirations in Southwest Asia. By carving out

diplomatic space of its own in a region where Russia’s

presence and influence have been waning, Beijing has

33
sought to secure its western frontier by creating a buffer for

restive Xinjiang province, contain the forces of “separatism,

terrorism and extremism,” and most importantly, keep

China’s nemesis, the United States, out of the region.64

However, with the United States issuing a “with us or

against us” ultimatum after September 11 and

simultaneously dangling the carrot of long-term economic

and military assistance in return for logistic support for

America’s war effort, each Central Asian state rushed to

strike unilateral deals with the United States based on its

own self-interest, thereby allowing the United States to

establish a strategic foothold in Central Asia with little or

no thought for China’s concerns. For Central Asians, it was

a golden opportunity to lessen the overbearing influence of

their neighboring giants (Russia and China). They view the

expanded U.S. military presence in the region as an

insurance policy against any future bid by Russia and China

to reassert control. However, the lack of strategic policy

coordination post-September 11 among the SCO memberstates left the multilateral forum seriously weakened,

undercut the group’s solidarity, and represented a “major

failure for the fledgling group” established to provide a

regional response to terrorism in the region.65 It also

highlighted the tenuous nature of China’s “strategic

influence” in Central Asia where local ethnic and religious

rivalries and conflicting interests present formidable

obstacles to Beijing’s desire to knit the region’s

governments into a solid security partnership to further

China’s grand strategic objectives.

Nonetheless, Beijing (and Moscow) denied that the SCO

had “lost any substance,” and other Central Asian states

continued to pay lip service to the stated objectives of the

forum. China did try to breathe some life into the SCO. At

Beijing’s repeated and urgent insistence, the group held one

meeting on October 11 (exactly a month later) in Bishkek,

which produced a statement that did not even mention the

terrorist attacks against the United States and repeated

previous pledges to cooperate against terrorism. Another

34
attempt to salvage the SCO’s reputation was made in early

January 2002, again at China’s initiative. A “non-regular

meeting” of SCO foreign ministers articulated concerns

about a growing foreign presence in the region. “Any

attempts to impose this or that form of rule and drag

[Afghanistan] into anyone’s sphere of influence could lead to

a new crisis in and around the country,” stated a joint

declaration of the SCO foreign ministers. It insisted that

anti-terrorist efforts “must be devoid of bias and double

standards,” and stressed the importance of shifting the

anti-terrorism battle to the United Nations’ hands—

insinuating that Washington should no longer dominate the

issue, and strongly reflected other concerns of China but

offered little that was new regarding substantive

cooperation among SCO member-states.66

In short, within a matter of weeks, in a complete reversal

of roles, Beijing’s bête noire, the United States, an outsider

and an onlooker before September 11, had now virtually

emerged as the de facto leader of Central Asia and its third

powerful neighbor while China, the SCO founder and

leader, had been reduced to the status of a spectator to the

unfolding geopolitical machinations of Washington. In

strategic terms, the infusion of American presence into

Central Asia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan has not only

seriously upset China’s security calculations on which its

“expand west” strategy is predicated but also put a question

mark over the efficacy of China-sponsored multilateralism

in a period of American unilateralism.

Seventh, the greater prominence and growing

security profile of China’s Asian rivals—India and

Japan—in the War on Terrorism has worried Beijing.

In the post-September 11 era, the heightened significance of

India and Japan has emerged as an unpleasant reality for

China, thus unraveling Beijing’s Asia strategy of

“restraining Japan and containing India” (or keeping Japan

down and India out).67 China’s initial optimism that new

Sino-U.S.-Pakistan triangular cooperation will wean

Washington away from New Delhi turned out to be wishful

35
thinking as the Bush administration officials went out of

their way to assure India that America’s intensifying

alliance with Pakistan would not come at India’s expense. If

anything, the current crisis has strengthened American

commitment to building stronger relations, including

defense ties with South Asia’s superpower.68 However,

China does not want to see India raising its stature and

profile regionally and internationally. Chinese strategists

have long argued that China’s pursuit of great power status

is a historical right and perfectly legitimate, but India’s

pursuit of great power status is illegitimate, wrong,

dangerous, and a sign of hegemonic, imperial behavior. For

its part, New Delhi has long accused Beijing of doing

everything it can to undermine India’s interests and using

its ties with other states to contain India.69 New strategic

and political realities emerging in Asia, however, put a

question mark over Beijing’s long-held certainties,

assumptions, and beliefs. Checkmated in East Asia by three

great powers—the United States, Japan, and Russia—the

major thrust of Chinese diplomacy during the last decade

was at carving out a larger sphere of influence in Central

and Southern Asia. Soon after the Taliban’s overthrow in

Kabul, Beijing and Islamabad watched with trepidation as

the new foreign, defense, and home ministers of the interim

Afghan administration paid visits to New Delhi to express

their gratitude for India’s long-standing support to

anti-Taliban Northern Alliance forces and made critical

remarks about Pakistan’s expansionist designs from Indian

soil. Islamabad retaliated by turning down Kabul’s proposal

to allow transportation of Indian goods to Afghanistan

through the Wagah border post (on the Indo-Pakistan

border), but offered to open the Khunjerab Pass (on the

Sino-Pakistan border) for Chinese consignments.70 India

also stood to gain immensely both from the loss of Pakistan’s

“strategic depth” in Afghanistan with the collapse of the

Taliban and General Musharraf’s promise to finally

crackdown on Islamic fundamentalist organizations

fomenting unrest in Indian Kashmir.

36
Beijing is also alarmed over the growing talk in

right-wing policy circles in Washington and New Delhi of

India’s pivotal role as a counterweight to China on the one

hand and the fragile, radical Islamic states of West Asia on

the other. New Delhi is hoping that “a formal Indo-U.S.

quasi-alliance would mean the final burying of the Kashmir

issue—to India’s advantage and bring access to the most

advanced technology and capital essential to realizing its

great power ambitions.”71 Besides, India’s strategic

community supports the idea of a close and mutually

beneficial relationship with the United States as a restraint

on China’s “destabilizing activities” (such as WMD

proliferation, arms sales, and acquisition of naval bases in

Burma and Pakistan) in India’s neighborhood. Earlier,

when Bush had unveiled his missile defense plan, New

Delhi responded far more positively than did most U.S.

allies. Some Indian strategic thinkers even see in the

emerging Indo-U.S. quasi-alliance an opportunity for

“payback” to China. As former Indian ambassador to

Pakistan and Burma, G. Parthasarthy, put it: “Whether it

was the Bangladesh conflict of 1971, or in the Clinton-Jiang

Declaration in the aftermath of our nuclear tests, China has

never hesitated to use its leverage with the Americans to

undermine our security.”72 Growing Chinese strategic

pressure on the Malacca Straits has already led to a

strategic alignment between India and the United States

with their navies jointly patrolling the Straits. More

significantly, Indo-U.S. strategic engagement has scaled

new heights with the announcement of a series of measures

usually reserved for close U.S. allies and friends: joint

military exercises in Alaska that would boost India’s

high-altitude warfare capabilities in the Himalayan

glaciers of northern Kashmir where it faces Pakistan and

China; the sale of U.S. military hardware, including radars,

aircraft engines, and surveillance equipment to India; joint

naval exercises and the training of India’s special forces;

and intelligence sharing and joint naval patrols between the

Straits of Malacca and the Straits of Hormuz.73 Washington

also gave the green light for Israel to proceed with the sale of

37
Phalcon airborne early warning and control system

(AWACS) to India—something that was earlier denied to

China for fear of enhancing Beijing’s air surveillance and

early warning capabilities in the Taiwan Straits. All these

measures send an implicit signal to China of India’s growing

military prowess. A cover-story in authoritative Beijing

Review by China’s noted South Asia specialists expressed

concern over the sale of U.S. arms to India which “enables it

to become the first country to have close military relations

with the world’s two big powers—the United States and

Russia.”74 Beijing is now concerned that New Delhi would

use its strategic ties with Washington to bolster its position

in its dealings with China. Nearly 70 percent of China’s

trade with the European Union is carried by sea through the

Strait of Malacca, the Indian Ocean, and the Suez Canal,

and the predominance of the Indian Navy along these sea

lanes is viewed as a major threat to Chinese security.

To the east, Beijing sees Japanese warships operating

not only on China’s maritime frontiers but also in the Indian

Ocean—for the first time since 1942—as part of the

coalition against terrorism. Beijing believes that “Japan’s

unseemly rush to dispatch its troops overseas and to set up a

kind of comprehensive military intervention systems for

overseas” would ultimately have a negative impact on

regional stability” and would “force Japan’s neighboring

countries to react.”75 Even before September 11, the

Koizumi government was working towards the goal of a

stronger alliance with the United States and the reassertion

of Japanese geopolitical and military influence, as Tokyo’s

worst nightmare is when China emerges as superior to

Japan in terms of economic and military power. Premier

Zhu Rongji has warned that Japan should be “prudent” in

expanding its military role. Soon after Koizumi’s Cabinet

endorsed three new bills in April 2002 designed to give the

Japanese government and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF)

more power in the case of external aggression, China voiced

its concerns over Japan’s move to expand its military role,

urging Tokyo to abide by its commitment not to be a military

38
power for historical reasons.76 Over the long term, as Japan

widens its military cooperation with the United States,

there could be increased friction between regional rivals

Japan and China for power and influence in East Asia. In

early May 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi also called for a

broadening of Japan’s security cooperation with Beijing’s

other Asian rival, India, which views China as representing

a clear and future threat to its security. As one Asia-watcher

noted: “The PRC must now look carefully at any

Japanese-Indian political ties, to monitor the possible

implication of moves which would inhibit the growing PRC

moves to project overland toward the Arabian Sea, and by

sea through the South China Sea into South-East Asia and

the Indian Ocean.”77

For the foreseeable future, China has no option but to

engage in some sweet-talk with the Indians and Japanese

as the Asian strategic landscape transforms rapidly to

China’s disadvantage. An indication of this came in early

April 2002 when Beijing played down the provocative

remarks of a leading Japanese opposition leader, Ichiro

Ozawa, that “should China become too ‘conceited’, Japan

would go nuclear and . . . won’t lose [to China] in terms of

military strength.”78 Still, Beijing must now fear that just as

Chinese and Pakistani nuclear missiles targeted on India

prompted New Delhi to go nuclear and ballistic, Chinese

and North Korean missiles aimed at Japan could also tempt

Tokyo someday to shed all its nuclear inhibitions.

Undoubtedly, strategic shifts post-9/11 show that Beijing

has lost considerable ground to its Asian rivals.

Eighth, a question mark hangs over the future of

Pakistan and the future of Sino-Pakistan relations.

China’s strategic asset in Asia, Pakistan, where Beijing has

made heavy strategic and economic investments over the

decades, is now seen as a liability and as much a part of the

problem as it is of the solution. Though Beijing welcomes the

new U.S. commitment to prop up Beijing’s “all-weather

friend” after a decade of abandonment and estrangement,

some Chinese strategists worry about the possible

39
destabilizing consequences of a prolonged U.S. military

presence and increased influence on the future of

Sino-Pakistan ties as well as on Pakistan’s domestic

stability.79 Already, Beijing is reportedly upset over the

setting up of U.S. listening posts in Pakistan’s Northern

Areas, which border Xinjiang and Tibet, to monitor military

activities in the region. The Chinese are also believed to be

“highly uncomfortable” with the four U.S. military bases in

Pakistan at Jacobabad, Pasni, Dalbandhin, and Shamsi.80

The U.S. presence at Pasni in Belochistan is of special

concern to Beijing, as it complicates China’s construction of

a naval port at Gwadar, the inland Makran coastal highway

linking it with Karachi, and several oil and gas pipeline

projects. Beijing has long been eyeing Gwadar base at the

mouth of Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf as a bulwark

against the U.S. presence and India’s growing naval

power.81 Interestingly, the only thing that arch-rivals India

and Pakistan now agree on is that the United States should

remain strategically engaged in the South and Central

Asian region. “I don’t think America can give up its Central

Asian presence now,” Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant

Singh told the Washington Post’s Jim Hoagland. And

General Musharraf concurred: “The U.S. presence in the

region must remain as long as it is needed.”82 The U.S.

primary objectives (which enjoy India’s support) in

Pakistan are three-fold: (1) to de-Talibanize and stabilize

the country so that it does not become a failed state or a

haven for terrorists; (2) to ensure a stable control of

Pakistani nuclear weapons so that they do not fall into the

wrong hands; and (3) to facilitate Pakistan’s transition to a

moderate Islamic state and a functioning democracy.

While a certain degree of tension in Kashmir and

Pakistan’s ability to pin down Indian military forces on its

western frontiers are seen as enhancing China’s sense of

security, neither an all-out Indo-Pakistan war nor

Pakistan’s collapse would serve Beijing’s grand strategic

objectives.83 One Chinese national security analyst was

quoted as saying “what worries China more is the possibility

40
that it could be drawn into a conflict, not between Pakistan

and India per se, but between Pakistan and the U.S., with

the latter using India as a surrogate. This likelihood is

becoming even more plausible with the sweeping success of

the U.S. operations in Afghanistan.”84 As tensions mounted

in October-December 2001 between India and Pakistan

over terrorist attacks on the Kashmir Assembly and Indian

Parliament, PLA troops from the Military Regions of

Chengdu and Lanzhou and their respective subdivisions,

Xizang (Tibet) and Wulumuqi (Urumqi), along China’s

southern borders, were put on alert to test their war

preparedness should the conflict in the Indian subcontinent

spill over onto Chinese soil. 8 5 With the top

al-Qaeda/Taliban leadership fleeing into Pakistan’s wild

west, it was becoming increasingly clear that the war

against terrorism is zeroing in on Pakistan as the next

battlefield. However, this could bring the United States and

Pakistan on a collision course, with India acting as a U.S.

partner. Such a development would obviously present

China with difficult choices. Open support for its most allied

ally would jeopardize China’s relations with the United

States and India. But nonintervention on Pakistan’s behalf,

however, could encourage India to solve “the Pakistan

problem” once and for all with or without a nuclear

exchange and thereby tilt the regional balance of power

decisively in its favor. An unrestrained Indian power would

be seen as threatening China’s security along its soft

underbelly—Tibet and Xinjiang. Should Pakistan

disintegrate or be taken over by Islamic extremists,

instability would rock the region and increase tensions

among Pakistan, India, and China. Another dreadful

scenario is one wherein Chinese-made Pakistani nuclear

weapons fall into the hands of the United States, Israel, or

even India in the event of a civil war.86 Should Sino-U.S.

relations deteriorate, the U.S. military presence in

Pakistan could further sharpen the divide within the

Pakistani military between pro-West and pro-Beijing

factions, with China supporting the latter to regain lost

ground after September 11.87 For the time being, though,

41
the only consolation for Beijing is that a stronger Pakistan

aided by the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and

international financial institutions, would be better able to

contain rival India.

Ninth, a question mark hangs over the future of the

Russia-China “strategic partnership.” Since the end of

the Cold War, China has been strengthening ties with

Russia so as to counter U.S. global hegemony. These

diplomatic efforts finally culminated in the Jiang-Putin

Summit of July 2001, when Beijing and Moscow signed a

treaty of friendship and cooperation, which brought back

memories of the (short-lived) Sino-Soviet alliance of the

1950s against the United States. However, come September

11, barely two months later, Jiang found his Russian

partner defecting to the “enemy camp.” Putin seized the

opportunity presented by the War on Terrorism to forge a

cooperative strategic partnership with the United States.

Moscow’s response and actions were also qualitatively

different from Beijing’s as they went beyond rhetoric and

atmospherics. Putin agreed to share intelligence, opened

Russian airspace to U.S. humanitarian and support flights,

gave the green light to the stationing of U.S. troops and

equipment in the Central Asian republics, provided arms

and ammunition to anti-Taliban forces, and was

unambiguous in saying that the war against the

Taliban/al-Qaeda must be won, and decisively so. Russia

also opposed Pakistan’s entry into the SCO since Islamabad

backed the Taliban, which exported terrorism into

Chechnya and Central Asia.

Beijing was particularly irked by Moscow’s mild reaction

to the U.S. decision to pull out of the ABM Treaty at the end

of 2001. A sense of gloom and abandonment “permeated the

writings of Chinese commentators after Putin described it

as a mere ‘mistake’ and went as far as to cast the U.S. move

as a ‘difference between friends’ that should not crush ‘the

spirit of partnership and even alliance’” between Russia and

the United States.88 In return, Russia had obtained

membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

42
(NATO) and billions of dollars in economic assistance from

the West. Apparently, the gravitational pull of economic

(trade, capital, financial markets), historical (culture and

geopolitics), and political (shared values of democracy,

human rights and rule of law) forces is drawing Russia

westward. With Russia signing an agreement in May 2002

that incorporated Moscow into NATO, the state of

Washington-Moscow relationship has come full circle: from

cold war to condominium, leaving China out in the cold.89

There is no doubt that Putin’s Russia prefers to be a U.S.

junior partner rather than China’s junior partner in Asia.

Moscow was indirectly signaling that it was not willing to

concede hegemony to a rising China over the vast space

between the Caspian Sea and Xinjiang. Clearly, the Afghan

campaign marked the first stage of a new, and quite possibly

historic, rapprochement between Russia and the West. In

an interview with the Russian daily, Izvestiya, on July 10,

2002, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov surprised observers by

saying that “[t]he threat to Russia lies in the Caucasus and

on the Asian border.”90

Chinese strategists are already blaming Putin not only

for “losing Central Asia” but also for succumbing to a new

American imperialism. Arguing that “the cooperation in the

anti-terrorism campaign has not changed the long-term

strategic conflict between Russia and the United States,”

they warn (apparently to sow discord between Moscow and

Washington) that “no matter how Russia thinks, the United

States has never taken Russia’s military actions in

Chechnya to equal its anti-terrorism operations in

Afghanistan.”91 Beijing also expects an eventual clash

between Moscow and Washington over the control of

Central Asian oil and gas reserves. In an apparent attempt

to assuage China’s concerns about a growing

rapprochement between Russia and the West, Putin told

Jiang that “as Russia boosts ties with NATO, it will also

maintain close links to China in an effort to strengthen

global stability.”92 The message from Moscow is thus crystal

clear: Putin wants to make Russia the pivotal country in the

43
Eurasian balance-of-power game. But this is no comfort to

the Chinese, who want Beijing, not Moscow, to be the pivotal

player in Eurasia.

Tenth, growing U.S. and Russian influence in

Central Asia is seen as detrimental to China’s

interests (especially, control over energy resources) in

the Great Game II. Unlike in the past when the objective of

the Great Game was territorial control and imperial

expansion, major power rivalries now focus on who gets

access to the region’s vast oil and gas reserves in Central

Asia. With growing instability in the Middle East, the race

to exploit the energy resources of Central Asia has

intensified in what is clearly Round Two of “the Great

Game.” The establishment of some 13 U.S. military bases in

Afghanistan and Central Asia, much like the oil-rich Gulf

sheikhdoms, is a major strategic gain for Washington.

Beijing believes that American recognition of the legitimacy

of Russia’s great power status in Central Asia is clearly part

of the tacit bargain in the new U.S.-Russian realignment

(Moscow’s acquiescence to NATO expansion is the other

part). The Pentagon’s recent admission that it “is preparing

a military presence in Central Asia that could last for years

[and would include] periodic training exercises,” and

Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz’s contention that

“the bases’ function may be more political than military . . .

to send a message to everybody . . . that we have a capacity to

come back in and will come back in—we’re not just going to

forget about [the region]” reinforced Beijing’s fears of

long-term containment.93 Growing Chinese paranoia about

the deepening American footprint on China’s western

frontier was evident in the summoning of Kazakhstan’s

Foreign Minister to Beijing in early May 2002 “to discuss the

lawfulness of Kazakhstan providing bases to U.S. forces,”

which Beijing believes “runs counter to state agreements”—

i.e. the SCO agreement against terrorism signed by China,

Russia, and four Central Asian states in June 2001.94

According to the Central Asia director at the China

Institute on International Issues, Deng Hou: “By using

44
anti-terrorism as the excuse to enter Central Asia, the

United States has gained the upper hand in the bid to

control Central Asia.”95

From the Chinese viewpoint, Washington’s actions since

September 11 threaten to destabilize the Middle East and

Central Asia and, by extension, China’s access to vital

energy resources and undermine a protracted effort by

Beijing to expand its influence in Central Asia. Chinese

leaders are acutely aware of the need to diversify their

sources of energy supplies and China’s ability to project force

regionally and to the Middle East.96 The country’s growing oil

and energy requirements and the need to distance himself

from the U.S. global strategy prompted President Jiang

Zemin to undertake a whirlwind tour of Libya, Nigeria,

Tunisia, and Iran in April 2002, where he secured Beijing’s

access to these nations’ rich oil resources by pledging

investment and presenting China as a powerful ally to the

Islamic world.97

Overall, the War on Terrorism has negated China’s

foreign policy gains of the last decade, undermined its

carefully crafted image as Asia’s only true great power, and

energized the United States into playing a more assertive

role internationally. While there is a broad consensus on

crushing “the common scourge” of terrorism once and for all,

serious differences exist between the United States and

China (and others) on the ways and means of waging the

War on Terrorism that could defeat the very objective of the

war. Of all the major powers, China is the biggest loser

because, unlike Russia, Japan, and India, it seems to be

locked into a peer competitor relationship with the United

States. Within a short period of six months, China’s world

has been turned upside down. The War on Terrorism has

unleashed a number of potentially threatening

developments that could checkmate China’s strategic

expansion moves and call into question predictions about

China’s inevitable rise as the next superpower.

45
A major reason one cannot confidently predict the future

of international politics is that it is full of shocks and

discontinuities or nonlinearity. In linear forecasts, the past

is prologue, and forecasting is an exercise in linear

extrapolation of past trends into the future. Thus, a

straight-line, linear extrapolation of past experience into

the future is the most common form of forecasting where

continuity is the rule rather than the exception. However,

forecasts often fail because no technique has been developed

that allows one to predict, prior to the event itself, when a

nonlinearity (such as the September 11 terrorist attacks or

the collapse of the Soviet Union) will occur; that is, when

discontinuity will occur.98 Nonlinearity signals a complete

break from the past trend, a discontinuity. Japan and

Indonesia are the prime examples of why predictions of the

Asian security environment based on straight-line

projections do not work. In the late 1980s, a number of

studies based on linearity were published on “Japan as

Number One” and “the Coming Conflict with Japan” before

Japan went into prolonged economic recession. Likewise,

before the Asian economic crisis hit the country in 1997,

Indonesia was projected to have a GNP greater than

Australia’s by 2010. That looks like fairyland now because

discontinuity or nonlinearity is the norm rather than the

exception in life as well as in politics. Just look at the shocks

and discontinuities of the last 10 years: the collapse of the

Soviet Union, the Gulf War, China’s rise and Japan’s

decline, and now the War on Terrorism. That is why

predictions about “China as the Next Superpower” also need

to factor in the impact of shocks and discontinuities, both

domestic and external.

Whither Chinese National Security Policy

Post-September 11: Beijing’s Policy Options.

Post-9/11, China is confronted with many external

strategic challenges at a time (post-Jiang Zemin) when the

country is likely to have the weakest political leadership

(with a relatively weak support base) in the 50-year history

46
of the PRC. Hu Jintao and his team would feel increasingly

constrained by domestic and international institutions,

public opinion, powerful provincial leaders, and various

interest groups amidst growing social and political unrest.

Popular distrust of the United States and resentment of its

global power, fed by rising nationalism, run deep in Chinese

society and could prove additional problems for the new

leadership. The Chinese public views the United States as

increasingly posing obstacles to China’s emergence as a

great power and to the reunification of China and Taiwan.

Already, a direct consequence of the post-9/11 strategic

shocks and reverses has been the widening of the schism

within China’s national leadership and security

policymaking elite.99 The hardliners (a majority) focus on

the necessity of building a strong military in the light of an

uncertain security environment with regard to the United

States, Japan, India, Taiwan, and the South China Sea.

Believing in the “inevitability” of an ultimate showdown

with Washington, many PLA strategists and analysts

believe that Beijing needs to demonstrate its strength,

rather than look or act meek, in the wake of the U.S.

hegemonism, expansionism, and unilateralism.100 They

want their leaders to confront and checkmate the United

States over issues such as missile defense, Taiwan, and any

expansion of the war on terrorism against China’s friends

and allies before it is too late. On the other hand, moderates

(still an influential minority) prefer an accommodation with

the United States, believing that access to the American

market as well as to American capital and technology are

vitally important to China’s becoming a modern and

powerful country. They call for making tactical adjustments

and a mix of astute diplomacy and greater flexibility, even if

it means putting up with American provocations from time

to time. Although Chinese pride would demand otherwise,

Beijing cannot afford to get into a serious confrontation with

Washington for at least a decade or two. Classic Chinese

statecraft dictates that all diplomacy is the continuation of

war by other means. Ultimately, China’s remarkable

economic growth will certainly change the distribution of

47
wealth in the world and consequently tilt the military

balance of power in favor of Beijing.101 In other words,

geo-economics will eventually take care of any adverse

geo-political shifts.

Even though pieces on the strategic chessboard have

been rearranged by Washington since September 11,

Beijing remains steadfastly committed to the goal of

asserting the country’s place as a great and predominant

power in the world. Chinese national security policy

continues to be based on a careful, hard-nosed,

realpolitik-based calculation of national interest. While

domestic stability and economic growth remain priorities

(the only silver lining has been China’s strong economic

growth in an otherwise gloomy geopolitical setting), Beijing

will continue to resist perceived American attempts at

hegemony and the containment of China with less than

friendly Asian neighbors, or draw Taiwan away from the

mainland’s embrace. To achieve these key strategic

objectives, Beijing is likely to pursue one or more of the

following policy options.

Wait and Watch Policy: In the short term, Beijing is

likely to adopt a wait and watch policy because the war

against al-Qaeda is not yet over and it might still turn

against the United States. Many in the Chinese strategic

community believe that the pendulum will ultimately swing

back in favor of China which, unlike the United States, is a

neighbor of Central Asia by geography rather than by

choice. Besides, as in the past, the Central Asians would not

want to give up the option of playing “the China card” in

their relations with Moscow and Washington. Some in

Beijing believe that there is a dangerous calm (perhaps a

lull before the storm) at present, but one step in the wrong

direction or another major attack on the United States could

easily unleash the storm. And these false steps would come

from Pakistan as it becomes the next theater for the War on

Terrorism, or from the parties in post-war Afghanistan that

might or might not dance to the American tune, or from the

policy options that Washington adopts over the Middle

48
East, Iraq, and Kashmir imbroglio. In fact, Pakistan, a

country where China still has large influence, is, in the

words of former Italian foreign minister Gianni De Michelis,

“the fuse of the world.”102 Should another war between India

and Pakistan break out, New Delhi’s hopes of an Indo-U.S.

alliance to counter China may never materialize—a

welcome development from Beijing’s perspective. A

yawning chasm may in fact be emerging between the United

States and the Muslim world, and this cleavage is likely to

widen as the United States seeks to expand the War on

Terrorism in the near future, this time with possible action

against Iraq. Since openly confronting the United States is

not a viable option at the moment, the pragmatic Chinese

would like to soft peddle divisive issues, including Taiwan.

Moreover, U.S. military expansion is at best nothing more

than a temporary setback for China and at worst, a classic

example of imperial overreach that cannot be sustained

over a long period of time. In fact, the next U.S. presidential

election could well have its slogan: “Bring our boys back

home.” Then China can resume its march to great power

status. As long as China maintains robust high economic

growth rates, such transitory geopolitical alignments can

eventually be taken care of with a carrot-and-stick policy.

Countercontainment Strategy: Asia has become the

fulcrum of major power rivalries. Beijing sees Tokyo

aligning itself with a U.S.-led circle of containment that

stretches from India via Southeast Asia and Australia right

round to Japan. In response, Beijing could accelerate

attempts to break out of U.S. encirclement by forming a

“United Front” with like-minded countries that are critical

and apprehensive of the United States and its allies—in

other words, a countercontainment strategy that raises the

costs for Washington and puts pressure on countries to

choose sides. Chinese leaders have fanned out in recent

months to Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Middle East,

canvassing support from other countries for a fairer,

“multipolar” world order. On an official visit in April to Iran,

Jiang Zemin openly repudiated the U.S. stance against the

49
Iranian and Iraqi regimes, saying: “Our opinion [on

terrorism] is not the same as the United States,” while in

Germany, he told the Welt am Sonntag: “We all want to fight

terrorism. But the states involved in the fight against terror

each have their own specific viewpoint.”103 In South Asia,

China will maintain a close strategic alliance with Pakistan

to contain the growing strength of India. Despite significant

improvement in U.S.-Pakistan ties post-9/11, in the long

run Washington sees its interests in the region better

served through fostering a closer strategic partnership with

India. As Ehsan Ahrari points out:

India may end up intensifying its own rivalry with China by

remaining steadfast in its insistence that Musharraf kowtow to

its demands, especially if China calculates that U.S.-India ties

are harming its own regional interests. China, though still

concerned about the continued activism of Islamist groups in

Pakistan and contiguous areas, is not at all willing to see the

regional balance of power significantly tilt in favor of India.104

In Southeast Asia, China’s leaders are working on strong,

cooperative economic and political partnerships and have

made significant inroads, as demonstrated by the signing of

the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement in November

2001. Southeast Asia is now China’s fifth-largest trading

partner—after Japan, the United States, the European

Union, and Hong Kong. Elsewhere, Beijing will constantly

be on the lookout for ways to undo the damage inflicted by

unfavorable developments along its periphery.

WMD Proliferation: Beijing has long played “the

proliferation card” to infuriate Washington and curb U.S.

arms sales to Taiwan. China could step up WMD

proliferation to its friends in the Islamic world and North

Korea to gain strategic leverage (to countervail the United

States, India, and Japan) as well as for economic gains

(access to critical energy resources and to earn hard

currency).

Multilateralism: Beijing could place renewed

emphasis on regional and multilateral approaches and

50
demand a greater role for the United Nations in conflict

resolution.

Military Build-up: A short and swift U.S. military

victory in Afghanistan—its third victory in about a decade,

after the Gulf and Kosovo wars of 1991 and 1999

respectively—has once again stunned Chinese defense

planners and strengthened their resolve to accelerate

comprehensive military modernization and weapons

acquisition programs.

Improvement in Ties with Asian Rivals—India and

Japan: The dramatic changes in the security dynamics of

Asia may lead to a reassessment of the Chinese policy

towards its strategic rivals, India and Japan. This could

result in some conciliatory gestures aimed at buying time

that seek to promote common economic interests while

downplaying strategic differences.105 However, the

possibility of any major strategic breakthrough in

Sino-Japanese or Sino-Indian relations remains very low

because neither the end of the Cold War nor the War on

Terrorism has ended major power competition and rivalry.

In conclusion, the U.S.-led War on Terrorism has

presented the Chinese leadership with very difficult, and

mostly unpleasant, choices, and they have tried to salvage

what they could from a situation that is changing rapidly to

China’s disadvantage. Beijing is still counting its losses and

picking up the pieces from the wreckage of its regional

security design amidst shifting Asian alliances brought

about by the U.S.-led War on Terrorism. While it is true that

some of the strategic developments (such as the Bush

administration’s plans to establish missile defenses and

closer U.S. ties with Japan and India) were under way prior

to September 11, the War on Terrorism has undoubtedly

accelerated their pace and legitimized the anti-Chinese

geopolitical shifts in motion. Until the leadership transition

process is complete in Beijing and the new leadership

figures out how to deal with the new strategic equations,

China will continue to walk a fine line in dealing with the

51
United States, Russia, Japan, India, and Taiwan, while

never losing sight of long-term strategic conflicts that are

likely to arise. It is said that each conflict simply prepares

the ground for the next one, or every war contains the seeds

of another war. Whether the War on Terrorism will lead to

another war, a clash of civilizations, a nuclear jihad, or

great power cooperation, only time will tell. One thing is

certain, however: China will in the future be the most

important factor in both regional conflicts and security

cooperation.

Recommendations.

1. Hold periodic security consultations with China to

allay its security concerns and misconceptions regarding

the U.S. objectives in the War on Terrorism and increased

military presence in Asia.

2. U.S. support for democracy, human rights, and liberal

education infrastructure assistance in Central Asian states,

Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia would go a long way toward

curbing extremism, terrorism, and other fanatic ideologies.

3. Keep a close watch on China’s evolving strategic

thinking in general and Beijing’s military-diplomatic

strategies toward Central and Southern Asia in particular.

Recognize that despite recent setbacks and reverses,

Beijing will not abandon or compromise on its territorial

claims to the Spratlys, the Senkaku Islands, and Taiwan,

nor its goals for a decisive role in Northeast Asia, a leading

role in Southeast Asia, strategic depth and influence in

Central Asia, and, last but not least, a military presence in

the Indian Ocean.

4. Discourage China from linking its proliferation of

WMD technologies with the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

Otherwise, Washington should link its provision of missile

defense technologies to Japan, India, South Korea, and

Taiwan with China’s WMD proliferation and nuclear force

modernization programs. Should Beijing still persist with

52
its WMD proliferation practices, the issue could be put on

the agenda of the Group of Eight, the ASEAN Regional

Forum, and APEC.

5. Maintain a robust and effective balance-of-power in

the Asia-Pacific so as to prevent the possibility of too much

concentration of power in one regional major power (China,

for example), which could encourage it to alter the security

environment in the region. To this end, the Bush

administration’s policy of establishing closer strategic ties

with India, Japan, and Indonesia should be continued.

Likewise, efforts should be made to bolster Taiwan and

Vietnam’s defensive capabilities.

6. Make greater use of regional and global multilateral

institutions in order to develop common strategies to cope

with transnational threats such as terrorism and WMD

proliferation.

ENDNOTES

1. K. Leggett, “China Forges Alliances In Effort To Gain More

Influence In Asia,” Wall Street Journal, June 7, 2001, p. 1; J. Pomfret,

“In Its Own Neighborhood, China Emerges As Leader,” Washington

Post, October 18, 2001, p. 1.

2. See A. Goldstein, “The Diplomatic Face of China’s Grand

Strategy,” China Quarterly, No. 168, December 2001, pp. 835-864. On

partnerships as “quasi-alliances,” see Ye Zicheng, “Zhongguo shixing

daguo waijiao zhanlue shizaibixing” (“The imperative for China to

implement a great power diplomatic strategy”), Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi

(World Economics and Politics) No. 1, 2000, pp. 5-10.

3. Goldstein, pp. 836-8.

4. The maritime chokepoint strategy is both a clever strategy and a

cost-effective option at a time when China lacks a blue-water capability.

See F. J. Gaffney Jr., “Back on the China Front,” Washington Times,

July 16, 2002, p. 17; PTI, “Pak offers China monitoring facilities on

Makrana Coast,” Hindustan Times, June 29, 2002, p. 1; V. Sakhuja,

“Sino-Pakistan Maritime Initiatives,” No. 730, April 10, 2002,

http://www.ipcs.org/issues/700/730-cr-sakhuja.html; Mohan Malik,

“Burma’s Role in Regional Security," in M. B. Peterson, E. Rudland, R. J.

May (eds), Burma/Myanmar: Strong Regime Weak State? (London and

53
Adelaide: C. Hurst & Co/Crawford House Publishing, 2000), pp.

241-277; and P. Marks, “China’s Cambodia Strategy,” Parameters, Vol.

XXX, No. 3, Autumn 2000, pp. 92-108.

5. See, for example, Xiao Zan, “‘Mini NATO’ in Asia-Pacific Region

Plan by the U.S. and Australia,” Beijing Review, September 13, 2001, p.

10.

6. Pomfret, “In Its Own Neighborhood, China Emerges As Leader.”

7. R. Bedi, “The Chinese Connection,” Jane’s Intelligence Review,

February 2002, p. 7.

8. “Chinese President Expressed Sympathy to Bush, US

Government and People for Disastrous Attacks,” People’s Daily online,

September 12, 2001.

9. N. Kravel, “China, Iran Seek U.N. Role in Retaliation,”

Washington Times, September 19, 2001, p. 1.

10. “China demands US attack evidence,” BBC News online,

September 18, 2001.

11. J. Pomfret, “China Also Wants U.S. Help Against ‘Separatists’,”

Washington Post, September 19, 2001, p. 1.

12. D. Roy, “China and the War on terrorism,” Orbis, Summer 2002,

p. 3.

13. “Beijing accused of politicizing terror war” Asia Times online,

November 22, 2001. http://www.atimes.com/china/CK22Ad01.html;

C. Snyder, “Powell assures Taipei there’s no deal with China,” Taipei

Times online, September 23, 2001.

14. B. Gertz, “China-Made Artillery Seized In Afghanistan,”

Washington Times, April 12, 2002, p. 1. There was some media

speculation that such Chinese weapons transfers were aimed at making

the U.S. military operation launched on October 7, 2001, a long

drawn-out affair.

15. J. Pomfret, “China Sees Interests Tied to U.S.; Change Made

Clear In Wake of Sept. 11,” Washington Post, February 2, 2002, p. 1; C.

Hutzler, “U.S. And China Agree To Strengthen Coordinating

Combating Terrorism,” Wall Street Journal, December 7, 2001, p. 1.

54
16. Editorial, “China’s Gloating,” Asian Wall Street Journal,

September 14, 2001; A. Beichman, “Getting cozy with Red China,”

Washington Times, November 28, 2001.

17. Xiao Ding, “A Lasting War,” Beijing Review, November 1, 2001,

pp. 8-9.

18. M. Erikson, “Chinese strategic miscalculation?” Asia Times

online, December 5, 2001. http://www.atimes.com/china/CL05Ad05.

html.

19. B. M. Reddy, “Pak, China to chalk out common regional

strategy,” Hindu, November 20, 2001, p. 1.

20. AFP, “India, Russia rule out Taliban role in future Afghan govt,”

Hindustan Times, October 20, 2001, p. 1. In contrast, China never

talked directly about crushing or overthrowing the Taliban. It accepted

the Pakistani line that Taliban was a “reality” that had to be

“moderated” and “contained.”

21. Ibid. F. Sisci, “China breaks its silence,” Asia Times online,

November 28, 2001. http://www.atimes.com/china/CK28Ad01.html.

Italics mine.

22. Pei Minxin, “Shoring up Sino-US ties,” The Straits Times

(Singapore), January 11, 2002, p. 26.

23. C. Hutzler, “China’s Economic, Diplomatic Aid To Pakistan Has

Played Key Role In U.S. War On Terror,” Wall Street Journal, December

17, 2001, p. 1.

24. Erikson, “Chinese strategic miscalculation?”

25. A. Beichman, “Getting cozy with Red China,” Washington

Times, November 28, 2001, p. 1.

26. See Jiang Lingfei, “Sino-U.S. Relations And World Politics Since

9.11,” Beijing Review, January 3, 2002, pp. 7-8; Jia Qingguo quoted in T.

Shorrock, “Onus on Washington to maintain warmer ties,” Asia Times

online, October 20, 2001. http://www.atimes.com/china/CK20Ad01.

html.

27. G. Schloss, “US Carrier Visit ‘Shows China’s War Support’,”

South China Morning Post, November 24, 2001.

28. However, this should be seen as a mere acknowledgement of the

current geo-strategic reality. “Over the long term, there is no doubt that

55
China wants to see an end to the U.S. military presence and its alliances

as these constrain China’s freedom of action vis-à-vis its Asian

neighbors,” writes J. Pomfret, “China Sees Interests Tied to U.S.;

Change Made Clear In Wake of Sept. 11,” Washington Post, February 2,

2002, p. 1.

29. Ibid.

30. Ren Xu, Qian Feng, Fang Hua, “Mei Ri dou la long Indu: Genben

mudi shi ezhi Zhongguo” (“America and Japan Rope in India: Their

Basic Objective is to Contain China,”) Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily),

April 30, 2001, p. 4; and J. Mohan Malik, “China edgy over Clinton’s

India visit,” The Pioneer, March 2, 2000, p. 8.

31. J. Mann, “The Asian Challenge: The Unanticipated

Consequences of the War in India, Pakistan, China, and Japan,” The

American Prospect, November 19, 2001, p. 22.

32. Wang Baofu, “No Winner in Indian-Pakistani Conflicts,” Beijing

Review, February 28, 2002, p. 13. Italics mine.

33. B. Chellaney, “China frets over Indo-U.S. ties,” Washington

Times, February 2, 2002.

34. “China warns US against using terrorism fight to expand

influence,” Agence France Presse, January 16, 2002. Italics mine.

35. Wang, “No Winner in Indian-Pakistani Conflicts,” p. 13. Italics

mine. This contradicted India’s foreign minister Jaswant Singh’s

statement during Premier Zhu’s visit to India in mid-January that

“China has neither any intention, nor shall it play any mediatory role

between India and Pakistan.” Cited in Bedi, “The Chinese connection.”

36. For a detailed analysis of “the China factor” in the

India-Pakistan conflict post-9/11, see Mohan Malik, “China’s southern

discomfort,” Asia Times online, July 11, 2002, http://www.atimes.

com/atimes/South_Asia/DG11Df02.html.

37. Information here is based on Hutzler, “China’s Economic,

Diplomatic Aid To Pakistan.”

38. H. Chu, “For China, Ties With U.S. Stir Mix Of Hope And

Worry,” Los Angeles Times, February 21, 2002.

39. “‘East Turkistan’ Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away With

Impunity,” Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of

China, Beijing, January 21, 2002; E. Rosenthal, “Beijing Says Muslims

56
Were Trained with Bin laden Funds,” New York Times, January 21,

2002, p. 1.

40. A. L. Friedberg, “Terror Aside, U.S. And China Remain Far

Apart,” Wall Street Journal, February 20, 2002, p. 1.

41. In Taipei, Richard Bush, the unofficial U.S. ambassador to

Taiwan, poured cold water on Beijing’s hopes in a January 28, 2002,

speech in which he ruled out concessions over Taiwan in return for

Beijing’s support for the War on Terrorism. “And some of you may be

worried that Beijing may try to play upon American gratitude in order to

extract political concessions concerning Taiwan. Let me assure you as

categorically as I can: It will not happen.” Quoted in S. V. Lawrence, “It

takes more to make a revolution,” FEER, January 14, 2002, p. 7.

42. C. Hutzler, “More-Explicit U.S. Support For Taiwan

Complicates Visit From Chinese Leader,” Wall Street Journal, April 22,

2002, p. 1.

43. See Friedberg, “Terror Aside, U.S. And China Remain Far

Apart”; C. S. Smith, “Frustrating US, China Balks At Pact to Stem

Missile Sales,” New York Times, October 19, 2001, p. B4; J. Vandehei,

“Bush To Press China On Sales Of Gear For Weapons Of Mass

Destruction,” Wall Street Journal, February 21, 2002, p. 1.

44. J. Leahy, “US warns China over weapons of mass destruction,”

Financial Times (London), January 22, 2002, p. 6.

45. Friedberg, “Terror Aside, U.S. And China Remain Far Apart”;

Leahy, “US warns China over weapons of mass destruction.”

46. Pei Minxin, “Shoring up Sino-US ties,” Straits Times

(Singapore), January 11, 2002, p. 26.

47. Stratfor, “‘Terrorism’ Definition Testing U.S.-China Ties,”

Stratfor.com, December 14, 2001, http://www.stratfor.com/home/

0112142150.htm; W. R. Hawkins, “Challenging Chessboard Of Asia,”

Washington Times, February 8, 2002, p. 21; T. Donnelly, “China’s

Persecution Complex,” Weekly Standard, February 4, 2002, p. 10.

48. H. Peimani, “Beijing’s Harsher Uighur Policy a Shot in Two

Feet,” Asia Times online, April 24, 2002.

49. Some observers warn that deliberate playing up of China’s own

so-called “Muslim threat” could rebound against it in the long term and

could lead to further radicalization of the Uighurs and the expansion of

instability in China’s western province. See P. Bowring, “China’s

57
Xinjiang Problem Has Nothing Much to Do With Islam,” International

Herald Tribune, November 30, 2001, p. 1; Peimani, “Beijing’s Harsher

Uighur Policy a Shot in Two Feet.”

50. E. Eckholm, “Official Praises China For Its Cooperation In

Rooting Out Bin Laden’s Terror Network,” New York Times, December

7, 2001.

51. Stratfor, “‘Terrorism’ Definition Testing U.S.-China Ties.”

52. Yan Xuetong quoted in Chu, “For China, Ties With U.S. Stir Mix

Of Hope And Worry.”

53. L. Goering, “Strengthening Ties, Shifting Power: U.S. helps

itself in oil-rich region,” Chicago Tribune, December 12, 2001, p. 1.

54. Ge Lide, “Will the United States Withdraw from Central and

South Asia?” Beijing Review, January 17, 2001, pp. 8-9.

55. W. R. Hawkins, “Challenging Chessboard Of Asia,” Washington

Times, February 8, 2002, p. 21.

56. Zhai Kun, “What Underlies the U.S.-Philippine Joint Military

Exercise,” Beijing Review, March 14, 2002, p. 9.

57. The East Asian littoral is defined “as the region stretching from

south of Japan to through Australia and into the Bay of Bengal.”

Quadrennial Defense Review, Washington, DC: Department of Defense,

September 30, 2001, pp. 2, 4.

58. “China warns US against using terrorism fight to expand

influence,” Agence France Presse, January 16, 2002.

59. For details, see J. Mohan Malik, “China and the Nuclear

Non-Proliferation Regime,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 22, No.

3, December 2000, pp. 445-478; Mohan Malik, “China plays ‘the

proliferation card’,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 12, No. 7, July 2000,

pp. 34-37.

60. China Daily, February 4, 2002, p. 1.

61. Shen and Zhang cited in Chu, “For China, Ties With U.S. Stir

Mix Of Hope And Worry.”

62. Beijing Review, January 3, 2002, pp. 9, 13.

63. Chu, “For China, Ties With U.S. Stir Mix Of Hope And Worry.”

58
64. The SCO was the only regional security forum that excluded the

United States. “To symbolize . . . their desire to escape the shadow of the

world’s only superpower, they (SCO member-states) had unveiled a logo

for their new grouping: a stylized world map that excluded the United

States.” A. Higgins and C. Hutzler, “Chinese Goals Take A Backseat As

U.S. Rises To The Fore In Asia,” Wall Street Journal, October 19, 2001,

p. 1. Italics mine.

65. See Stratfor, “China Still Odd Man Out in Central Asia,”

Stratfor.com, January 7, 2002, http://www.stratfor.com/standard/

analysis_view.php?ID=201401.

66. See “Significance of the SCO Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,”

Beijing Review, January 31, 2002, pp. 10-13.

67. Beijing has long used North Korea against Japan and Pakistan

against India to keep its Asian rivals down and out. For details, see

Mohan Malik, “China’s Asia Policy: Restrain Japan, Contain India,”

Japan Times, June 12, 1999, p. 21.

68. P. Tyler and C. W. Dugger, “Powell’s Message: America’s

Courting of Pakistan Will Not Come At India’s Expense,” New York

Times, October 18, 2001, p. 1.

69. The Chinese do not want to see India playing a role beyond South

Asia. See Chen Tieyuan, “People are concerned over India’s ‘Dream of

Becoming a Great Power,’” Zhongguo Qingnian Bao, May 8, 2001, trans.

in FBIS-CHI, May 8, 2001; Shao Zhiyong, “India’s Big Power Dream,”

Beijing Review, April 12, 2001, p. 10; and J. Mohan Malik, “South Asia

in China’s Foreign Relations,” Pacifica Review, Vol. 13, No. 1, February

2001, pp. 73-90.

70. K. Kiani, “Pakistan refuses to open Wagah border:

India-Afghanistan trade,” Dawn, May 14, 2002, p.1.

71. P. Chawla, “Desperately Seeking India: Indo-US Military

Alliance,” India Today, November 19, 2001, pp. 12, 15.

72. G. Parthasarthy, “Tomorrow’s security—missile defence,” The

Pioneer, May 10, 2001, p. 8.

73. E. Luce, “Indian navy agrees to protect US shipping,” Financial

Times (London), February 6, 2002, p. 10; A. Dhillon, “US Troops Cement

Indian Alliance,” South China Morning Post, May 14, 2002, p. 7; V.

Thapar, “India, US Begin Joint Patrolling,” Hindustan Times, April 19,

2002, p. 1; S. Bhatia and D. Thirunarayanapuram, “Military To Train

With U.S. Forces In Alaska,” Washington Times, April 19, 2002, p. 15.

59
74. See articles by Wang Baofu, Rong Ying, Zheng Ruixiang, “Can

India Become a Military Power?” Beijing Review, February 28, 2002, pp.

13-15.

75. Zan Jifang, “Japan Overseas Military Action Arouses Concern,”

Beijing Review, November 22, 2001, p. 10. Also see articles by Sun

Cheng, Ding Bangquan and Jiang Ye, “Japan’s Role in the International

Community,” Beijing Review, February 14, 2002, pp. 10-13.

76. “China Shows Concern as Japan Reviews Military Role,”

People’s Daily online, April 19, 2002.

77. G. Copley, “The PRC Ponders Changes In Strategic Fortunes,”

Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, February 25, 2002, p. 1.

78. “Japan can be nuclear power, Ozawa,” Japan Times, April 7,

2002, p.1; Stratfor, “China Downplaying Japan Nuclear Issue . . . For

Now,” Stratfor.com, April 9, 2002; Commentary, “Don’t Regard

Politician’s Clamor as Ravings, How Far Japan Is Away from Nuke,”

People’s Daily online, April 10, 2002.

79. Syed S. Shahzad, “Army on collision course with Musharraf,”

Asia Times online, July 17, 2002; and A. Spaeth, “Should This Man Be

Smiling,” Time, July 22, 2002.

80. See Pakistan Today, 11 January 2002; “China threatens to walk

out of Pak military port project,” Rediff.com, January 7, 2002; C.

Horner, “The Other Orientalism: China’s Islamist Problem,” National

Interest, Spring 2002, p. 45; PTI, “US presence in Pak to have impact on

Sino-Pak ties,” Indian Express, November 26, 2001, p. 1.

81. Bedi, “The Chinese connection.”

82. Cited in Donnelly, “China’s Persecution Complex.”

83. However, some hawks in the PLA see China benefiting from an

Indo-Pakistani nuclear war. At the time of the 1999 Kargil War, one

Chinese military official reportedly told a Western diplomat that should

India and Pakistan destroy themselves in a nuclear war, there would be

peace along China’s south-western frontiers for at least 3 decades and

Beijing needs 20 to 30 years to consolidate its hold over restive Tibet and

Xinjiang provinces. Private conversation with a Western diplomat,

September 17, 1999.

84. Quoted in Ching Cheong, “China faces strategic dilemma in

South Asia,” Straits Times (Singapore), January 7, 2002, p. 18.

60
85. Ibid. Also see R. Marquand, “China worries about US troops in

Pakistan,” Christian Science Monitor, September 19, 2001, p. 1.

86. Cheong, “China faces strategic dilemma in South Asia.” “Beijing

would not want the US to get hold of information regarding Pakistan’s

nuclear programme that may lead to information regarding China’s

own nuclear programme and the extent of help provided by Beijing to

Islamabad,” Mann, “The Asian Challenge: The Unanticipated

Consequences of the War in India, Pakistan, China, and Japan.” News

reports during the Afghan war speculated on a possible joint

Israeli-U.S. attack on a Pakistani nuclear weapons cache to prevent

jihadis within the military from gaining control of it. Unconfirmed

reports talked of moving Pakistani nukes to China for safekeeping. See

B. Fenton, “US special unit ‘stands by to steal atomic warheads,’” Times

(London), October 29, 2001, p. 1; R. Bedi, “Israel and India draw closer,”

Jane’s Intelligence Review, March 2002; J. J. Fialka and S. Neuman,

“Weapons Experts Agree Nuclear Arsenal In Unstable Pakistan Is A

Major Concern,” Wall Street Journal October 14, 2001, p. 1.

87. The Pro-Beijing lobby in Pakistani military is reportedly getting

restive and waiting to strike if and when General Musharraf falters.

Pro-China faction within the Pakistani military could also join hands

with a pro-Islamic fundamentalist faction or those who find Pakistan’s

loss of its strategic depth in Afghanistan for elusive gains and U.S.

military presence on their soil very hard to digest. U.S. arms sales to

India may further sour Pakistan’s willingness to assist Washington in

its War on Terrorism.

88. Yu Bin, “Tales of Two U.S. Partners: Coping with Post-Taliban

Uncertainty,” Comparative Connections: An E-Journal on East Asian

Bilateral Relations, April 2002, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1st Quarter 2002,

http://www.csis.org’pacfor/cc/0201Qchina-rus.html.

89. F. Sisci, “Mega-NATO: China out in the cold,” Asia Times online,

May 24, 2002, http://www.atimes.com/china/DE24Ad01.html.

90. Commentary, “Russia Warily Finesses China Ties,”

Stratfor.com, July 24, 2002, http://www.stratfor.com/standard/

analysis_view.php?ID=205423.

91. Lin Dingxin, “Behind the Anti-terrorism Campaign,” Beijing

Review, December 13, 2001, p. 8.

92. “Putin Seeks Strong Ties With NATO And China,” Moscow

Times, April 22, 2002, p. 3.

61
93. A. Murray, “Challenge in the east: The US is using the war

against terror to establish new bases around China, its emerging rival

in Asia,” Guardian (London), January 30, 2002, p. 20.

94. J. Tkacik, “Has China Helped?” Defense News, May 20-26, 2002,

p. 1. Emphasis added.

95. Cited in Donnelly, “China’s Persecution Complex.”

96. Stratfor, “New Global Order Poses Crisis for China,”

Stratfor.com, March 4, 2002, http://www.stratfor.com/standard/

analysis_view.php?ID=203363.

97. A. Bezlova, “Jiang kills two birds with one tour,” Asia Times

online, April 20, 2002.

98. C. F. Doran, “Why Forecasts Fail: The Limits and potential of

Forecasting in International Relations and Economics,” International

Studies Review, Vol. 1, Issue 1, 1999, pp. 11-13.

99. Discussion below is largely based on the author’s private

conversations with Chinese diplomats and military officials during

December 2001-April 2002. Also see T. Shorrock, “China’s elite clearly

split over foreign policy,” Asia Times online, February 15, 2002.

http://www.atimes.com/china/DB15Ad01.html; Copley, “The PRC

Ponders Changes In Strategic Fortunes”; Stratfor, “New Global Order

Poses Crisis for China.”

100. In July 2002, two reports on U.S.-China relations mandated by

the Congress—the Pentagon’s Annual Report on the Military Power of

the People’s Republic of China and the U.S.-China Security Review

Commission—were made public. The Security Commission report noted

that “China’s leaders view the United States as a partner of

convenience, useful for its capital, technology, know-how and market,”

but regard America “as China’s long-term competitor for regional and

global military and economic influence.” And the Pentagon’s report

concluded: “While seeing opportunity and benefit in interactions with

the United States—primarily in terms of trade and technology—Beijing

apparently believes that the United States poses a significant long-term

challenge.” Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military

Power of the People’s Republic of China (Washington, DC: Report to

Congress, July 2002), p. 8. Also see T. Donnelly, “China without

Illusions,” Weekly Standard, July 29, 2002.

101. F. Ching, “China puts growth before ‘reunification’,” Japan

Times online, April 19, 2002; Shorrock, “China’s elite clearly split over

62
foreign policy”; Dingli Shen, “Chinese Whispers,” Outlook, February 18,

2002.

102. Cited in Sisci, “Mega-NATO: China out in the cold.” PTI,

“China using Pak against India, says Farooq,” Indian Express, May 27,

2002, p. 1.

103. Cited in J. Chan, “Chinese leaders seek allies against US

encirclement,” World Socialist Web Site, May 17, 2002, http://www.

wsws.org/articles/2002/may2002/chin-m17.shtml.

104. E. Ahrari, “The waiting game in South Asia,” Asia Times

online, May 15, 2002. Also see C. Hutzler, “China contends it has a role

to play in India-Pakistan crisis,” Wall Street Journal, June 7, 2002, p. 1.

105. On the enduring interest in not provoking others while China

remains weak, see Wang Sheng, “‘Taoguang yanghui’ bu shi quan yi zhi

ji,” (“‘Concealing one’s strength and biding one’s time’ is not a stopgap”),

Huanqiu shibao (Global Times), August 17, 2001.

63
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Author

Dr. Mohan Malik

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Ms. Kimberly A. Rockwell