POLITICAL CONTROL

OVER THE USE OF FORCE:

A CLAUSEWITZIAN PERSPECTIVE

Suzanne C. Nielsen

May 2001
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and the participants of the panel entititled “Theoretical Perspec

Civil-Military Relations” at the ISA meeting. I am especially gra

the panel’s discussant, Lieutenant Colonel Peter Hays (U.S. Air 

for his invaluable comments and encouragement.

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ii
FOREWORD

What is the ideal relationship between the command

the statesman in time of war? Is there a balance to be 

between political control and military operational exp

Given the importance of these questions, the range of an

that has been given to them by both theorists and practit

is striking. Major Suzanne Nielsen addresses these iss

examining what Carl von Clausewitz has to say 

civil-military relations and the use of force. T

Clausewitz’s insight that “War is a continuation of po

well-known, his arguments about the appropriaten

extensive political control during time of war are not a

discussed. Clausewitz provides an argument for ext

political influence over military operations—influenc

lacks a clear limit.

Major Nielsen looks in depth at Clausewitz’s argume

this point. After reviewing his theoretical approac

discusses four key implications of the basic idea that p

purposes govern war. Her argument suggests that Clau

has issued both statesmen and commanders a cha

Commanders must appreciate the necessity of subordi

military means to political ends, and statesmen must th

strategists as they make decisions about the relati

between ends and means and the achievement of their 

Major Nielsen examines these questions in a thou

and comprehensive manner. The Strategic Studies Inst

pleased to publish her study as part of our Letort Paper s

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTH

SUZANNE C. NIELSEN, a major in the U.S. Army

assistant professor in the Social Sciences Department 

U.S. Military Academy. Her teaching responsibilitie

included course directing the core course in interna

relations, and co-teaching senior seminars on cyberw

and politics and film. Prior to serving at West Point, 

Nielsen served in military intelligence units in Ge

and the United States. As the company commander 

intelligence company, she deployed her unit twice from 

Bragg, North Carolina, to Europe to support 

enforcement operations in Bosnia. Currently a do

student in the Harvard Government Departmen

research pertains to civil-military relations and m

effectiveness. Major Nielsen will leave West Point to a

the Command and General Staff College at 

Leavenworth, Kansas, in the summer of 2002.

iv
POLITICAL CONTROL

OVER THE USE OF FORCE:

A CLAUSEWITZIAN PERSPECTIVE

What is the ideal relationship between the comm

and the statesman in time of war? What are the o

limits, if any exist, on political control over m

operations? Is there such a thing as political guidanc

crosses the line and becomes interference? Give

importance of these questions, the range of answer

have been given to them by both theorists and practit

is striking. On the side of limiting the statesman’s ro

view is that the political leader should exercise, at 

limited control after hostilities have begun. Sun Tzu, 

believed to have written his great work The Art o

during the 4th century BC, appears to take this perspe

He argues that the decision to go to war must be a po

decision, but that the general must be free 

autonomously once that decision is made.

2

 This vie

survived to the modern day. Within the American m

experience, perhaps the most famous advocate o

position is General Douglas MacArthur. In a spe

Congress after his relief by President Truman, G

MacArthur claimed that: “Once war is forced upon us

is no alternative but to apply every available means to 

it to a swift end. War’s very object is victory—not pro

indecision.”

3

 MacArthur’s position implies that th

little room for political factors to moderate a conflict 

has begun.

There have also been those who have taken the op

view and taken steps to ensure extensive political c

over military operations. One leader whose co

exemplified this principle was Adolph Hitler. Not on

he override the strategic advice of his generals in the 

days of World War II, he also became increasingly in

in the details of military operations as the war progre

1
American history also provides examples of political le

who have taken this approach to the issue; se

presidents have chosen to be active participants 

making of military strategy and the planning of camp

During the American Civil War, for example, Pre

Abraham Lincoln was a very active commander-in-

More recently, President John F. Kennedy was 

involved in the operational details of the quarantine d

the Cuban Missile Crisis. Is such engagement appro

oversight or troubling interference? In the case 

blockade, the Chief of Naval Operations who re

Secretary of Defense McNamara’s repeated reques

operational details certainly thought it was the latte

This question of the proper level of political contro

military operations is crucially important, but do

seem to allow easy answers. It is important because t

of force usually suggests that significant interests 

stake—at times even state survival. Yet the ra

answers given by those who have seriously thought 

these issues, and those who have had to deal with th

practice, suggest that the solution is not obvious. Is t

balance to be struck between political control and m

operational expertise? If so, where is the line to be dra

This monograph will begin to address this quest

examining what Carl von Clausewitz had to say 

civil-military relations and the use of force. Claus

who lived from 1780-1831, was both a soldier w

distinguished record of service and a theorist of wa

wrote prolifically. His major work was On War, a b

which he attempted to record “the major eleme

strategy” as he saw them.

7

 Published posthumou

1832, On War has become a military classic. So

Clausewitz’s most enduring and powerful insights 

the relationship between war and politics. In On W

not only firmly establishes that political consider

must drive the conduct of war, he also usefully ide

some of the dynamics which may shape the relatio

between senior military and political leaders. His in

2
are all the more interesting given that his stand

strategic effectiveness. For Clausewitz, mainta

political control is not a question of values, but the 

success.

The following analysis of Clausewitz’s views o

subject is divided into four sections. In the first, 

provide background on Clausewitz’s approach to the 

of war. This will include his views on the utility of t

his argument that war is a unique and distinct h

activity, and his emphasis on the fact that wars a

products of political forces that not only cause them, b

powerfully shape their natures. This background is no

useful for understanding Clausewitz’s arguments, bu

establishes why On War is an especially useful work 

study of civil-military relations and the use of force. 

second section, I will explore the conclusion that Clau

draws from this that the political object must gui

conduct of war and four key implications of this idea. 

conclude this section with a discussion of Clausewitz’s 

on optimality—how can one judge the quality of a 

military strategy? In the third section, I will explore 

Clausewitz says about the extent and limits of the po

guidance of military operations. I will also discuss 

dynamics that Clausewitz introduces that might affe

divergence or convergence of views between the m

commander and the statesman. In the conclusion, 

summarize the above with an assessment of bot

strengths and limitations of Clausewitz’s approach. 

Before proceeding, however, some of the difficul

analyzing Clausewitz’s work must be faced. Raymond 

was surely correct when he wrote about On War tha

can find what you want to find in the treatise: all th

need is a selection of quotations, supported by pe

prejudice.”

8

 One major difficulty is that the work was 

draft form at the time of Clausewitz’s death. In an 

note, Clausewitz himself foresaw the problems tha

might cause: 

3
If an early death should terminate my work, what I have writ

so far would, of course, only deserve to be called a shape

mass of ideas. Being liable to endless misinterpretation it wo

be the target of much half-baked criticism . . .

9

His inability to complete this revision may explai

Clausewitz at times seems inconsistent on certain i

In attempting to deal with this problem fairly, 

emphasize the ideas that represent later stages 

thought. In On War, his most mature views are pro

reflected in the first few chapters of Book One, “O

Nature of War,” which he did revise.

10

 As for pe

prejudice, the recognition of its possible existence 

conscious striving to overcome its effects may be th

that one can do.

CLAUSEWITZ’S APPROACH

TO THE STUDY OF WAR

To appreciate Clausewitz’s insights, it is useful t

review three key aspects of his approach. The first 

though Clausewitz valued theory, he had li

expectations of what it could accomplish. The second 

Clausewitz viewed warfare as a unique human activi

off from all others as a realm of danger, physical exe

uncertainty, and chance. Third, Clausewitz thought 

was impossible to analyze wars without taking into a

their political and social context. Wars spring from po

sources, and take on their particular characters as a 

of these origins. I will address each of these points in t

Theorizing about War.

Clausewitz argues that the development of a the

war must be supported by a careful study of m

history. He writes: “Just as some plants bear fruit 

they don’t shoot up too high, so in the practical ar

leaves and flowers of theory must be pruned and the 

kept close to its proper soil—experience.”

1 1

requirement sets a limit on the value of abstract ana

4
For Clausewitz, there is little value in a theory of wa

manages to be logical, complete, and systematic at th

of separating itself from reality.

12

 A useful theory m

derived from, or at least checked against, the his

record.

13

 In a strong statement of this point, Clau

writes: “A great advantage offered by this method [re

on historical evidence] is that theory will have to r

realistic. It cannot allow itself to get lost in 

speculation, hairsplitting, and flights of fancy.”

14

In Chapter Two, “On the Theory of War,” of B

Clausewitz criticizes some existing approaches to the 

of war, and identifies some additional factors a the

this subject must address. He particularly targets 

theorists that attempt to establish positive doctrin

principles of war that are always valid.

15

 He argue

irreconcilable conflict exists between this type of theo

actual practice.”

16

 Two of Clausewitz’s contempo

whose theories he rejects on these grounds are He

Dietrich von Bülow and Antoine Henri de Jomini

Bülow’s writings emphasize the importance of the 

between the fighting forces and their base line, and J

focuses on the importance of interior lines.

17

 Clau

believes that theorists who focus on a single pri

particularly an abstract geometrical one, exclude 

factors from their analyses. Not only do they fail to 

the fact that war is a highly uncertain affair, they 

acknowledge that war is a product of the unpredi

interaction of living forces which are attempting to 

each other.

18

 In such an environment, not on

calculations regarding the relevant material forces d

to make, fear and danger make psychological factors 

important to the outcome.

19

Because of the need to be consistent with the evide

history, and the difficulty of accounting for all 

material and psychological forces that can be import

war, Clausewitz draws the conclusion “A positive doct

unattainable.”

20

 Theorizing about war is hard; so ha

fact, that perhaps the attempt could be considered 

5
However, Clausewitz also rejects this position, findin

theorizing about war can still be valuable for s

reasons. First, the problem is not the same at all level

easier to derive worthwhile principles on which to 

action at the tactical level of war. A second reason th

useful is that it can aid the education of a f

commander. Clausewitz writes:

Theory exists so that one need not start afresh each time sort

out the material and plowing through it, but will find it read

hand and in good order. It is meant to educate the mind of 

future commander, or, more accurately, to guide him in 

self-education, not to accompany him to the battlefield . . .

2

Reflection guided by theory is a crucial component 

education of military leaders. Finally, and most relev

the present argument, theory can guide the study o

and means. 

This last fact is important here because, 

Clausewitz’s elaboration on what those ends and mea

it is clear that his focus is very much on political guida

the use of force. For Clausewitz, warfare is a special a

because of the special nature of its means, and the me

warfare is always combat.

22

 At the lower (tactical) l

warfare, it is easy to be clear about the definition abou

ends and means. “In tactics the means are the fi

forces trained for combat; the end is victory.”

23

 Howe

the higher level of war, the ends are much more v

Clausewitz’s definition of strategy is “the use 

engagement for the purpose of the war.”

24

 As used he

term “engagement” refers to distinct instances of com

What is particularly worthy of attention in this defini

the fact that Clausewitz uses the vague formulation 

purpose of the war.” Clausewitz clearly and repe

establishes the concept that the ends of strategy “are 

objects which lead directly to peace,” and the nature o

objects may vary.

26

 The fact that Clausewitz refu

argue that the purpose of war is always victory, and in

argues that the end is the politically desired peac

6
crucial one. It begins to establish the dominance of po

considerations, a point that will be further deve

shortly. 

Above it was mentioned that Clausewitz requires 

to be consistent with history. It was also argued 

Clausewitz’s views on the difficulty of theorizing abou

particularly at the highest levels, lead him to focus 

relationship of ends and means. Clausewitz also lim

scope of his theory in a third way by focusing almost en

on the operational use of these means. He devotes 

effort to discussing the development of armed force

does not find it useful to pay much heed to the tec

crafts that provide commanders their tools. Accord

Clausewitz:

Strategy . . . does not inquire how a country should 

organized and a people trained and ruled in order to produ

the best military results. It takes these matters as it fin

them in the European community of nations, and ca

attention only to unusual circumstances that exert a mark

influence on war.

27

In other words, Clausewitz has little to say in O

about peacetime civil-military relations, to in

relationships between political and military elite

relationships between armed forces and their soc

These matters are not necessarily unimportant; th

merely beyond the scope of his theory of war and discu

of strategy.

28

 According to Clausewitz: “The theory 

proper . . . is concerned with the use of these means

they have been developed, for the purposes of the wa

Clausewitz raises one final point about the limitat

theory. He argues that as political aims become sm

and as wars of lesser intensity drift toward a state of 

observation, theory has less to say about its c

dynamics. First of all, general principles are more d

to derive in such circumstances because events are 

more contingent on a multiplicity of minor factors.

3

only are they harder to derive, Clausewitz also argue

7
general rules are less necessary: “. . . as the mod

principle gains a hold on military operations, or rath

the incentive fades away, the active element gra

becomes passive. Less and less happens, and g

principles will not be needed.”

31

 This may go some di

in explaining why Clausewitz mostly abstracts 

political aims in Books IV-VII of On War, which 

tactical engagements, military forces, and defens

offense. Political aims are one of the factors tha

moderate war, and therefore reduce its intensity. 

transition at the end of Book III, Clausewitz say

following:

Everything we shall have to say about the relation between 

attack and defense and the way in which this polarity deve

refers to the state of crisis in which the forces find themse

during periods of tension and movement. By contrast, 

activity that occurs during a state of equilibrium will 

regarded and treated as a mere corollary. The state of cris

the real war; the equilibrium is nothing but its reflex.

32

This limitation is important to note in the current c

because it suggests that Clausewitz may disproportio

focus his attention on conflicts on the higher end 

spectrum. 

“War is a special activity, different and separa

from any other pursued by man.”

33

Clausewitz’s rejections of the theories of von Bülo

Jomini partially stem from his belief that they fail t

recognize the implications of the unique nature of 

What makes war unique is not that its basic princip

intellectually complicated and difficult to grasp. I

Clausewitz holds the opposite to be true:

Everything in strategy is very simple . . . Once it has b

determined, from the political conditions, what a war is me

to achieve and what it can achieve, it is easy to chart the cou

But great strength of character, as well as great lucidity 

firmness of mind, is required in order to follow through stead

8
to carry out the plan, and not to be thrown off course 

thousands of diversions.

34

It is not the difficulty of arriving at strategic solution

rather the nature of the environment in which 

solutions must be carried out which gives war its u

nature.

Clausewitz groups many of the characteristic

make the environment of war uniquely difficult to o

in under the general category of “friction.” He feel

these factors are so important that he devotes four 

eight chapters of Book I to them, and mentions them i

of the others. In fact, the concept of friction is so cen

Clausewitz’s understanding of war that it literally per

his entire work. One of the key sources of friction is d

Since war is a realm of danger, especially those who a

to it sense that “the light of reason is refracted in a m

quite different from that which is normal in aca

speculation.”

35

 Because of this, “courage is the soldier

requirement.”

36

 Other key sources of friction are ph

exertion, the uncertainty of all information, and 

chance occurrences such as bad weather. “Friction 

only concept that more or less corresponds to the f

that distinguish real war from war on paper.”

37

 Be

friction is always present, “Action in war is like mov

in a resistant element.”

38

It is important to discuss friction here, not just beca

is central to Clausewitz’s thinking on war, but also be

understanding friction and having the ability to overc

are important components of the military comma

expertise. If there is an argument to be made 

commanders’ views on strategy deserve some he

because commanders have a superior understand

military means, knowledge of friction must be a c

component of that understanding. After all, any 

reasonable intellect could memorize capabilities of we

systems, compositions of units, march tables, and m

the other technical details of warfare. Clausewitz w

9
The good general must know friction in order to overcom

whenever possible, and in order not to expect a standard 

achievement in his operations which this very friction ma

impossible. Incidentally, it is a force that theory can never q

define. . . . Practice and experience dictate the answer: “th

possible, that is not.”

39

Although Clausewitz feels that challenging peac

maneuvers can begin to give officers an appreciati

friction, the only real lubricant for the military mach

combat experience.

40

When discussing the special nature of mi

expertise, the idea that war is a simple enterprise s

not be overstated. The intellectual abilities requi

commanders at higher levels are significant. In 

Clausewitz seems to be concerned that he may have m

the reader on this point when he states that “. . . the 

should not think that a brave but brainless fighter 

anything of outstanding significance in war.”

41

 In

Clausewitz argues that the commander-in-chief mus

considerable intellectual skills and intuition as well 

ability to overcome friction. True military genius re

“a harmonious combination of elements” which includ

intellectual gifts and strength of character.

42

“Politics . . . is the womb in which war develops 

Clausewitz feels that developing a theory of w

worthwhile, but that there should be limited expect

as to the guidance such a theory can provide. Because 

nature of the subject, Clausewitz feels that the

incapable of establishing positive doctrine, particula

the conduct of war at the highest levels. How

Clausewitz does believe that a theory of war can be use

aiding in the analysis of the relationship between end

means. The making of strategy involves the use of m

means to achieve political ends in particular instanc

the above analysis, I introduced Clausewitz’s view 

political considerations must be dominant in the mak

10
strategy. Below, I will further elaborate on this po

reviewing several ways in which Clausewitz estab

both the importance of politics as the source of war, a

primacy of political objectives. The relationship be

wars and their political contexts and purposes is a 

repeated throughout Clausewitz’s work.

One of the places in On War where Clausewitz dis

the primacy of politics is Chapter Six-B of Book VIII

as an Instrument of Policy.” In this chapter 

concluding book, Clausewitz begins by remindin

reader of the uniqueness of war as a human ac

Elsewhere, Clausewitz has established that w

distinguished by its distinctive means, which is com

As noted above, war is a realm of uncertainty, ph

exertion, and danger in which only men with a c

combination of character traits and intellectual abiliti

excel.

45

 After reminding the reader of this separat

however, Clausewitz quickly moves on to reestablish a 

between war and other human activities. “This unity 

the concept that war is only a branch of political activit

it is in no sense autonomous.”

46

 The following pa

which clarifies this point, is worth quoting in full:

It is, of course, well known that the only source of war 

politics—the intercourse of governments and peoples; but i

apt to be assumed that war suspends that intercourse a

replaces it by a wholly different condition, ruled by no law b

its own. We maintain, on the contrary, that war is simpl

continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of oth

means.

47

Clausewitz goes on to emphasize that not only 

rooted in political causes, but also “in itself does not su

political intercourse or change it into some

different.”

48

 War is a product of political forces, and 

forces continue to be at work as a war progresses. 

because of this that war is not autonomous. “Its gram

indeed, may be its own, but not its logic.”

49

11
The above establishes not only that the source of 

outside war itself, but also leads one to recognize th

ends of war must be shaped by the political forces that 

the conflict and continue to operate throughout. In 

words, it is a political logic rather than a purely milita

that decides the characteristics of the desired peace

insight is an interesting perspective to keep in mind 

reading Chapter One, “What is War?” of Book I—th

chapter of On War Clausewitz suggests that he is sa

with in his final note on the text.

50

 The method Clau

employs in this chapter, and the conclusions he draw

be seen as an attempt to play out the logic of war as if i

autonomous. His conclusion that this results 

inadequate view of war reestablishes the prima

political considerations.

In this opening chapter, Clausewitz examine

essence of war as an abstract concept, which he als

“absolute” war and the “pure concept of war.”

51

 In itse

is “nothing but a duel on a larger scale,” or in a 

modification that clarifies war’s means, “War is thus 

of force to compel the enemy to do our will.” In this ab

notion of war, conflict tends to extremes. There is no 

limit to the force that each side will use or the objective

each will seek. Even if one side attempts to aim for les

the complete overthrow of the enemy, since war is a se

reciprocal moves, conflict cannot be limited th

unilateral action. Finally, there is no logical limit 

means to be used. In a contest for ultimate surviva

side will use their entire physical strength, as w

strength of will. 

However, Clausewitz suggests that this war in th

actually nothing but a “logical fantasy” which is unlik

motivate actors in the real world.

52

 In the real worl

takes place between two real adversaries who have 

idea of each other’s power and will, as well as some wa

of the imminence of conflict. War in reality is also 

absolute because it does not consist of a single, short 

This is because a nation cannot bring the entirety 

12
resources, to include “the fighting forces proper, the co

. . . and its allies” to bear all at once, and because both 

may attempt to overcome initial shortcomings later 

conflict. Finally, war in reality is never absolute beca

is never final—even a defeated state may still recove

these reasons, the dynamic that leads to extremes 

and the political purpose which governs the co

reasserts itself.

53

 This analysis yields Clausewitz’s f

formula that “War is Merely the Continuation of Po

Other Means.” This result firmly establishes the domi

of political over military considerations.

The preceding analysis lays out two of the me

Clausewitz uses to make the point that war not on

political sources, but also that political purposes s

establish a war’s objectives. As discussed above, Clau

argues that war’s logic comes from outside itself in Ch

Six-B of Book VIII. Wars are produced by political 

that continue to operate while wars are in progress; 

same political forces establish the ends to be sough

Chapter One of Book I, Clausewitz plays out the pure l

war, which results in a view of war that is inadequat

attempt to understand war solely through an ab

development of its internal logic yields absolute war, 

must be rejected because it does not reflect reality. A

as the political context is taken to account, this ab

logic of war is immediately exposed as incom

particular wars will always be decisively shaped b

contexts that give rise to them. “If we keep in mind th

springs from some political purpose, it is natural th

prime cause of its existence will remain the su

consideration in conducting it.”

54

A third way Clausewitz makes clear his positio

political purposes should be dominant in war is 

depiction of war as a trinity. Clausewitz writes:

As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always ma

war a paradoxical trinity—composed of primordial violence

of the play of chance and probability within which the creat

13
spirit is free to roam; . . . and of its element of subordination

an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alo

The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; 

second the commander and his army; the third 

government.

55

The character of a given war will be conditioned by e

these elements. However, Clausewitz’s views o

dominance of the government and its political purpo

the governing forces in war come through clearly. 

restates later in the text: “Policy is the guiding intell

and war only the instrument, not vice versa. No 

possibility exists, then, than to subordinate the m

point of view to the political.”

56

Politics not only provide the “womb in whic

develops,” they are also the source of wars’ purposes. 

this analysis, Clausewitz’s conclusion that the po

object must guide the conduct of war is unsurprising

next section will further elaborate on what an accepta

this view entails. 

POLITICAL PURPOSES AND THE CONDUCT

OF WAR—IMPLICATIONS

This section will address four key implications 

idea that the political object must guide the conduct o

The first recognizes that, because these political objec

vary in scale, war will take on many different f

Second, because political interaction does not cease d

war itself, these purposes can change during the cou

the war. A third implication is related to this one; po

influence on the war must be continuous. Finally, be

governments are the custodians of the political inter

the states they represent, they can decisively affect s

or failure in war. Each of these implications affec

nature of the interaction between statesmen 

commanders in time of war. This section will conclud

an analysis of what Clausewitz would view as an o

management of political purposes and military mean

14
Political Purposes Will Vary in Scale.

57

Clausewitz points out that the political interests 

lead to war can vary greatly, ranging between the ext

of national survival to cases in which a state hesi

fights for an ally when it “no longer seems to refle

state’s true interests.”

58

 Wars can be either more to

more limited in character based on the political obje

that guide them.

59

 This observation begins to expla

variety of wars in human experience. Since war 

instrument of policy, a military objective should be s

which serves the political end. To the extent th

conduct of war is under the control of a rational govern

the interests at stake should also determine the le

effort to be made. In sum: “The political object—the or

motive for the war—will thus determine both the m

objective to be reached and the amount of eff

requires.”

60

Though the reconciliation of military means to w

varying political ends starts to explain the widely v

character of different wars, it is important to note th

Clausewitz it does not tell the whole story. Clause

trinitarian conception of war points to additional f

which also matter. First, the involvement o

people—whom Clausewitz identifies with the elem

hatred and primordial violence in war—can greatly c

a war’s character. For example, “Between two peopl

two states there can be such tensions, such a m

inflammable material, that the slightest quarre

produce a wholly disproportionate effect—a 

explosion.”

61

 A second reason viewing war as cons

only of rational calculations is inadequate is that s

conception leaves out the importance of military g

The commander with this trait can best exploit the re

chance and probability created by the uncertaint

danger of war. It must not be forgotten that “The art 

deals with living and with moral forces. . . . 

15
uncertainty in one scale, courage and self-confidence 

be thrown on the other to correct the balance.”

62

Because of all of these factors, Clausewitz argues “

more than a true chameleon that slightly adap

characteristics to a given case.”

63

 It is a “parad

trinity” affected by the role of the people, the character 

commander and his army, and the political purposes 

government. The complex interaction of these 

elements will shape the character of the war in any 

case. While the variety of political purposes is import

the explanation of the variety of forms taken by war, i

in itself sufficient.

Political Purposes Can Change during the Cou

of the War.

Another point to keep in mind while consid

Clausewitz’s argument that the political purpose 

guide the conduct of the war is that the purpose may c

during the course of a conflict. This is related to the 

above that politics do not cease when war begins. As th

progresses “the original political objects can greatly 

during the course of the war and may finally change en

since they are influenced by events and their pr

consequences.”

64

 This provides one more reason 

Clausewitz holds that the logic of war comes from o

itself. “War moves on its goal with varying speeds; 

always lasts long enough for influence to be exerted 

goal and for its own course to be changed in one w

another—long enough, in other words, to remain sub

the action of a superior intelligence.”

65

The Influence of the Political Object

on the Conduct of War Must Be Continuous.

A third implication of the idea that war springs 

political sources and has political purposes is th

influence of these political goals must shape the cond

16
the entire war. The following passage from On War 

this point clearly:

Were [war] a complete, untrammeled, absolute manifestat

of violence (as the pure concept would require), war would 

its own independent will usurp the place of policy the mome

policy had brought it into being; it would then drive policy o

of office and rule by the laws of its own nature, very much lik

mine that can explode only in the manner or direct

predetermined by the setting. This, in fact, is the view th

has been taken of the matter whenever some discord betwe

policy and the conduct of war has stimulated theoreti

distinctions of this kind. But in reality things are differe

and this view is thoroughly mistaken.

66

Again, this is a strong affirmation of Clausewitz’s vie

war lacks its own logic. “The main lines along 

military events progress, and to which they are rest

are political lines that continue throughout the war in

subsequent peace.”

67

Because war is an act of policy, and a means to a po

end, the determination of the amount of effort tha

justifies must be a political decision. This decision 

only required at the onset of war, but because of war’s 

uncertainties, must be continuously evaluated as 

progresses. According to Clausewitz:

Since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled 

its political object, the value of this object must determine t

sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and also in duratio

Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the politi

object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow.

6

Not only will the political object affect the level of effor

made, it will also affect the conduct of opera

Clausewitz rejects the idea that there is one best p

victory, finding instead that “many roads lead to succ

What is imperative is that the commander-in-chief 

thorough understanding of national policy an

accordingly.

70

 At the highest levels, the idea of a 

military opinion or purely military advice does not 

17
sense: “No major proposal for war can be worked 

ignorance of political factors.”

71

The Role of Government in Determining Succe

A final implication of the idea that policy must 

guiding intelligence behind military operations is th

government will have a great role to play in determi

country’s success or failure in war. Before elaborat

this point, however, it would be useful to clarify 

Clausewitz assumes in On War that governments a

custodians of their people’s interests. About gover

policy, Clausewitz says:

It can be taken as agreed that the aim of policy is to unify 

reconcile all aspects of internal administration as well a

spiritual values, and whatever else the moral philosopher m

care to add. Policy, of course, is nothing in itself; it is simply 

trustee for all these interests against other states. That it 

err, subserve the ambitions, private interests, and vanity 

those in power, is neither here nor there. In no sense can the 

of war ever be regarded as the preceptor of policy, and here 

can only treat policy as representative of all interests of 

community.

72

In this selection, Clausewitz clearly recognize

government’s policies may be misguided or serve 

purposes. Nevertheless, he finds it appropriate f

purpose of On War to assume that government po

made in the best interests of the political communit

whole. Policy provides the guiding intelligence th

military commander must serve.

However, even given Clausewitz’s assumption 

critique of policy is outside the scope of a theory of war

is one instance in On War in which he does cr

governments. It is useful to recall here that Clau

served in the Prussian armed forces during the Wars 

French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. In fact, h

captured during the Prussian defeat at the han

Napoleon in October 1806, and his subsequent inter

18
in France was a personally humiliating experience.

73

 

War, Clausewitz argued that the key to the decisiv

Napoleon brought to warfare was related to so

changes.

74

 The transformation of warfare in the 

century was political, and it was a political failure f

leadership of Prussia, as well as France’s other enemi

to have recognized the implications of these cha

“Clearly the tremendous effects of the French Revo

abroad were caused not so much by new military me

and concepts as by radical changes in policie

administration, by the new character of the French p

and the like.”

75

 It was Napoleon who realized an

advantage of the fact that the “heart and temper of a n

could make an enormous contribution to “the sum tota

politics, war potential, and fighting strength.”

76

 E

military leaders perceived these changes (and Clau

does not claim that they did), it would have been beyo

scope of their authority to act on them.

77

This brings out the general point that when Clau

is willing to judge policy in On War, it is based on whe

is in conformance with the spirit of the age. For this r

Clausewitz is able to praise the very different poli

both Napoleon and Frederick Great. In an earlie

Frederick the Great showed his wisdom by act

accordance with his true situation in his campaign of 1

As head of a small state resembling other states in m

respects, and distinguished from them only by the efficiency 

some branches of his administration, Frederick could not 

an Alexander . . . His whole conduct of war, therefore, sho

an element of restrained strength, . . . Neither vani

ambition, nor vindictiveness could move him from this cour

and it was this course alone that brought him success.

78

Operating under new conditions, the most import

which was the increased role of the people in wa

Napoleon deserves praise for acting with boldness 

pursuit of great objectives. He perfected and exploit

potential of the armed forces of the age, and is cal

19
Clausewitz the “God of War himself.”

79

 In an era of l

war, to pursue limited objectives with limited mean

mark of wisdom. However, when the Prussian

Austrians took the same approach against Napoleon 

campaigns of 1805, 1806, and 1809, it could only e

disaster.

80

The wisdom of both Frederick the Great and Napol

discussed above was that they not only understoo

potential of domestic resources, but also the character 

international environment. Governments can 

contribute to their state’s success in war by accu

interpreting the character of international relations. 

example, changes in international alignment

drastically affect the success of an offensive operation

depends on the existing political affiliations, inte

traditions, lines of policy, and the personalities of pr

ministers, favorites, mistresses, and so forth.”

81

 The 

to analyze these factors is the special expertise of po

leaders, not military commanders.

It was mentioned in the section on theory 

Clausewitz’s focus in On War is on the operational 

armed forces to meet political ends. He does not cl

address broader questions of how societies should b

organized for their defense, or issues associated wi

development of armed forces. Those issue

fundamentally political and are in the hands 

government. Nevertheless, Clausewitz does exp

willingness to judge the government’s performance

government must not only be a capable interpreter o

the current international environment will allow, it 

also adequately ensure that appropriate societal res

are mobilized in time of need.

82

So far in this section, four key implicatio

Clausewitz’s argument that political purposes must 

military operations have been explored. However, th

an additional point that should be clarified. What 

criterion against which Clausewitz is measuring the q

20
of strategic decisionmaking? In other words, how do

judge the merit of a given state’s strategy?

Clausewitz and Optimality.

Clausewitz seems to find the answer to this ques

the efficient use of resources. An optimal strateg

accomplish political objectives at the lowest possible 

According to Clausewitz:

A prince or a general can best demonstrate his genius 

managing a campaign exactly to suit his objectives and 

resources, doing neither too much nor too little. But the effe

of genius show not so much in novel forms of action as in t

ultimate success of the whole.

83

Not only is it contrary to good statecraft to 

resources, an attempt to apply a maximum effort w

does not appear justified by the political purpose is lik

fail.

84

 Minor purposes will be unlikely to adeq

motivate the human will to extreme exertions, and th

effort may falter for domestic reasons.

85

 Means sho

proportionate to ends.

86

Clausewitz makes this point clearly when discussi

effect that the political objective will have on m

operations. There are many places in On War wh

seems to emphasize the dominance of the destr

principle, and elevate the destruction of the enemy 

other military objectives. However, in Chapter Two o

II, “Purpose and Means in War,” he makes it clear th

war for minor purposes only minor exertions of str

may be appropriate. The following passage is a 

statement of this point:

When the motives and tensions of war are slight we c

imagine that the very faintest prospect of defeat might 

enough to cause one side to yield. If from the very start t

other side feels that this is probable, it will obviou

concentrate on bringing about this probability rather th

take the long way around and totally defeat the enemy.

87

21
The amount of effort to be expended should be proport

to the ends being sought. This not only implies a c

management of resources, but also implies that dif

ways of achieving objectives may be successful in dif

circumstances. Clausewitz again shows his resistan

positive doctrine for the conduct of war by statin

“. . . given certain conditions, different ways of reachi

objective are possible and that they are neither incons

absurd, nor even mistaken.”

88

When discussing optimality, Clausewitz is also cl

another point. The goal of warfare cannot be to min

bloodshed. In Chapter One of Book I, Clausewitz say

this goal may seem attractive, but: “Pleasant as it sou

is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dang

business that the mistakes which come from kindne

the very worst.”

89

 He returns to this point again a few 

later: “Avoidance of bloodshed, then, should not be ta

an act of policy if our main concern is to preserve our f

On the contrary, if such a policy did not suit the part

situation, it would lead our forces to disaster.”

90

 Clau

wants to make it clear that whenever armed forces are 

one must consider combat.

91

 Even if one wishes to 

victory through a means other than destroying the e

since war involves the interaction of living force

commander attempting this strategy must be aware t

does not have complete freedom of choice. Accord

Clausewitz, such a commander:

. . . must never forget that he is moving on devious paths wh

the god of war may catch him unawares. He must always k

an eye on his opponent so that he does not, if the latter has ta

up a sharp sword, approach him armed with only an ornamen

rapier.

92

A statesman may choose war as the optimum path 

political objective; however, he should not make the 

assumption that such a course of action will be w

costs.

22
Clausewitz asserts repeatedly that the central acti

war is fighting. However, the parallel he draws be

war and commerce clarifies his meaning on this poin

The decision by arms is what cash payment is for all major a

minor operations in war what cash payment is for commer

Regardless how complex the relationship between the t

parties, regardless how rarely settlements occur, they c

never be entirely absent.

93

A key point here is that the outcome of war depe

combat, but that does not mean that actual fighting a

takes place. Instead: “. . . all action is undertaken 

belief that if the ultimate test of arms should actually 

the outcome would be favorable.”

94

 Clausewitz restat

point again in a section entitled “Possible Engagemen

to be Regarded as Real Ones Because of 

Consequences.” He writes: “. . . the destruction 

enemy’s forces and the overthrow of the enemy’s pow

be accomplished only as the result of an engageme

matter whether it really took place or was merely o

but not accepted.”

95

 Again, combat is central to 

Although there may be results even if fighting does no

place, those results are due to expectations of who 

have prevailed in an actual trial of arms.

Of course, a further important question relates t

the various costs of war should be compared to one an

How can one weigh relative costs in resources, territor

lives? Clausewitz is unwilling to claim that s

comparison is easily made.

96

 However, he does impl

people may be willing to pay an extremely high p

preserve the existence of their political community.

97

 

survival is at stake, Clausewitz expects few limits 

application of means.

Clausewitz clearly argues that the dictates of 

must continuously shape the course of the war. In an

statement of this point, he says: “Policy, then, will per

all military operations, and, in so far as their violent n

will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them

23
addition to affirming political control, however, here 

introduced an interesting qualifier. He suggests th

influence of policy may be somewhat limited by the “v

nature” of military operations. Is there something u

about the nature of military means that dictates a li

appropriate political guidance and oversight? Th

section will address the tensions associated wit

relationship. Although Clausewitz does not estab

clear limit to appropriate political influence, his disc

makes it clear that political involvement will and sho

extensive.

POLITICAL PURPOSES AND THEIR INFLUEN

ON MILITARY OPERATIONS

In the concluding book of On War, Clausewitz retu

the relationship between ends and means and the con

of the strategist. He reminds the reader that: “. . . 

argued in the second chapter of Book One (purpos

means in war), the nature of the political aim, the s

demands put forth by either side, and the total po

situation of one’s own side, are all factors that in pr

must decisively influence the conduct of war.”

99

 A few 

later, the reader is also reminded that policy “is the g

intelligence and war only the instrument, not vice ver

other possibility exists, then, than to subordina

military point of view to the political.”

100

This section takes as its starting point Clausewitz

clear position on the dominance of political over m

considerations in war, and the implications of tha

which were discussed in the previous section. The qu

to be explored here is whether there are any limits t

dominance, or any aspects of warfare that mu

considered purely military. I will start by arguin

Clausewitz does not draw any clear lines between 

that are the proper concern of military commander

those that belong to the political leadership. I wil

examine Clausewitz’s depiction of the relationship be

24
senior political leaders and military commanders to 

better understanding of his expectations. I will con

this section with an analysis of the dynamics 

Clausewitz argues will affect the potential diverge

political and military perspectives.

Where is the Line?

When seeking to find where Clausewitz argues m

operational expertise ought to take over and po

control cease, the following quotation initially 

promising: “Only if statesmen look to certain m

moves and actions to produce effects that are foreign t

nature do political decisions influence operations f

worse.”

101

 If, because of an inadequate understanding 

grammar of war, statesmen give orders that are 

defeating, they can have a negative impact on the cond

war. However, Clausewitz’s response to this problem 

to draw a line beyond which political leaders should n

involved. Instead, he advocates a different solution

problem can be avoided if senior political leaders have 

familiarity with military affairs. However, even this 

essential—all that is really necessary is that stat

have ready access to military advice, and this should a

be possible.

102

 Of course, Clausewitz is assumin

statesmen inexperienced with warfare would be wil

and intelligently critical—consumers of that advice

main point, however, is that Clausewitz does not use l

professional expertise as a basis for arguing that po

influence over the conduct of war should observe c

limits.

Another possibility would be for Clausewitz to 

that political involvement is essential at the higher le

war, but inappropriate at lower ones.

103

 At first, it ap

that this is the position Clausewitz takes on the matt

has already been discussed, Clausewitz feels that po

leaders must establish the overall aims for the war

only limiting factor on this general proposition is th

25
political aims must adapt themselves to military m

“War in general, and the commander in any s

instance, is entitled to require that the trend and des

policy shall not be inconsistent with these means.”

10

may not be a small requirement, but Clausewitz argue

it will never do more than modify policy.

Moving on to a discussion of lower levels of 

Clausewitz argues that: “Policy, of course, will not e

its influence to operational details. Political consider

do not determine the posting of guards or the employm

patrols.” In so stating, Clausewitz seems to argu

decisions at the tactical level are the prerogative of m

commanders. However, his next sentence make

ambiguous again: “But they [political consideration

the more influential in the planning of war, of the cam

and often even of the battle.”

105

 The planning of a bat

to use another of Clausewitz’s terms, the engagem

generally thought to be a matter of tactics and not str

If political considerations may also be significant here

Clausewitz does not establish a clear limitation on po

control over military operations.

106

This result is consistent with Clausewitz’s 

doctrinaire approach to a theory of war. If war is ac

“more than a true chameleon” which can take on an a

infinite variety of forms, the establishment of an imm

dividing line between the proper realms of politica

military concern in the conduct of war is not possible. 

given case, the character of the political purpose

involvement of the people, and the nature of the comm

and his army would affect such decisions. Clau

explicitly states that at the highest level, the idea of a 

military opinion or purely military advice does not 

sense. Although he is not as explicit on this point, it 

consistent with his analysis to argue that, especiall

war for limited purposes, even tactical operations ma

be political in nature.

26
A second explanation for this result may be Clause

emphasis on the need for military commanders

especially the commander-in-chief, to clearly identi

nature of the war and act accordingly.

107

 Perhaps beca

his experiences in the Napoleonic Wars, Clausewitz 

particularly concerned that statesmen and comma

identify a near total war when that is what they f

However, Clausewitz also discusses the nee

commanders to recognize the character of the conflict 

they are engaged in wars for small purposes. Notin

many past wars took on this form, Clausewitz writes

. . . a battle might be fought to celebrate the birthday o

monarch (Hochkirch), to satisfy military honor (Kunersdo

or to assuage a commander’s vanity (Freiberg). It is o

opinion it is essential that a commander should recogn

these circumstances and act in concert with their spirit.

109

Therefore, recognizing the character of the war ma

involve accepting being involved in a war of “a

observation.”

110

 In either of these cases, the ne

political control at the lowest levels may not be an 

when commanders have internalized the political obje

and are already acting accordingly.

The Relationship of Senior Political and Milita

Leaders.

Given that Clausewitz does not establish a clear d

between the proper realms of political influenc

military operational expertise, what does his depic

the relationship between senior political and m

leaders say about his expectations? A first possibility 

one individual, such as Napoleon, has both roles. If 

the case, that person must have the attributes of 

statesman and a military leader. In Chapter Th

“Scale of the Military Objective and of the Effort 

Made,” in Book VIII of On War, Clausewitz discusses 

of the attributes that this individual should 

Clausewitz starts from the observation that, since w

27
political instrument, the degree of effort to be made s

be appropriate to the objective to be reached. How

figuring this out “clearly calls for the intuition of a ge

since one must take into account the scale of the po

demands, the situations and conditions of belligeren

governments’ and peoples’ strength of will, characte

abilities, and the political sympathies of other states

the two roles are combined in one person, this one p

needs not only the highly developed intuition nee

figure out the above puzzle, but also must have the ski

general. “On the one hand, he is aware of the entire po

situation; on the other, he knows exactly how much 

achieve with the means at his disposal.”

112

 In this 

though the demands on this individual are great, th

little to be said about civil-military tensions.

A second possibility is that the functions of po

leadership and military command may belong to se

individuals. When examining what Clausewitz has 

about this case, it quickly becomes clear that Clau

expects political leaders to exercise a great deal of infl

As Clausewitz notes: “. . . it is a matter of co

experience that despite the great variety and develo

of modern war its major lines are still laid dow

governments; in other words, if we are to be technical 

it, by a purely political and not a military body.”

113

 No

do political leaders establish the political aims, whic

the business of the government alone,”

114

 Clausewit

expects them to establish the size of the army,

115

 a

system of supply.

116

 The commander will accep

resources provided by the government, and make th

use of them.

Clausewitz also seems to expect a great d

communication between the commander-in-chief an

government. The mechanism that he proposes is t

practicable, the commander-in-chief should sit i

cabinet, so that cabinet members can be involved 

activities.

117

 Clausewitz praises the practice adopted 

allies in 1813-1815 of relocating the cabinet closer 

28
theater of operations in order to make this practica

Clausewitz gives another indication of the exte

communication he expects to occur between m

leaders and the government in Chapter Twenty-Two

Culminating Point of Victory,” of Book VII. In this ch

Clausewitz discusses the factors that cause an offen

lose power as it advances. He writes:

If a monarch does not command his troops in person . . . a n

and very serious handicap arises from the loss of time involv

in the transmission of messages. Even the widest pow

conferred on a commander will not suffice to meet eve

contingency that may arise in his sphere of action.

119

This passage is useful not only for what it reveals abo

anticipated character of relations between sup

military commanders and their governments, bu

expresses again Clausewitz’s emphasis that po

control of military operations must be continuous.

Although Clausewitz provides indications of wh

expects the relationship between the political leade

military commander to be like, he does not ad

problems that may arise. The following passage su

that Clausewitz feels that in establishing the domina

policy, he has resolved all questions:

From this point of view again, no conflict need arise any long

between political and military interests—not from the natu

of the case at any rate—and should it arise it will show no m

than lack of understanding. It might be thought that pol

could make demands on war which war could not fulfill; b

that hypothesis would challenge the natural and unavoida

assumption that policy knows the instrument it means to u

If policy reads the course of military events correctly, it 

wholly and exclusively entitled to decide which events a

trends are best for the objectives of the war.

120

By assuming that “policy knows the instrument it me

use,” Clausewitz makes it unnecessary to addre

actions that the military commander should take 

political leader’s direction is inconsistent with m

29
means. And what if policy does not read “the cou

military events correctly”? Does the military comm

have the right or obligation to disobey orders when h

them to be either contrary to the leader’s main purpo

impossible to carry out? Clausewitz gives us little gu

for navigating waters such as these.

One further point should be made on this issue. D

the many historical examples Clausewitz uses 

discussing other issues, he never provides an examp

confrontation between a military and a political leade

a strategic disagreement. In addition, when describi

extensive coordination that should occur between 

leaders in time of war, Clausewitz emphasize

importance of keeping the political leaders abre

military strategy more than he does political le

keeping the military commander informed of their i

One example from Chapter Six-A, “The Effect 

Political Aim on the Military Objective,” of Book VII

illustrate this point. In this chapter, Clausewitz desc

case in which one country contributes troops to supp

ally’s defense but does not support the ally’s cause wi

intensity. In this case, Clausewitz argues tha

contributing government is likely to maintain contro

its own forces. The commander of this deployed force i

“dependent only on his own government, and the obj

the latter sets him will be as ambiguous as its aims.”

12

interesting thing about this scenario is that Clau

never implies that this gives the commander ca

complain of his government’s management; he see

expect that the military commander should just acce

situation of ambiguity and act accordingly. In s

situation, the motives for war may gradually dissip

which case the real obligation of the commander “wil

make sure the delicate balance is not suddenly upset 

enemy’s favor and the half-hearted war does not bec

real war after all.”

122

 Although it seems consisten

Clausewitz’s approach to argue that communications 

highest level ought to be both extensive and two-w

30
does not provide an example in which a military comm

has a basis for complaint.

Recognizing that to do so one must depart 

Clausewitz, it is still useful to consider what one wou

by pushing this point a bit further. What if the po

leader is not knowledgeable about military means, lac

capability or willingness to take advantage of m

advice, and is giving what appears to be self-def

orders from a military perspective? Here it is useful to 

that Clausewitz’s basic justification for political con

strategic effectiveness, and even from this perspecti

argument for firm control is unmodified by any excep

If one were to add the context of a liberal democratic s

the argument for political control would only get str

In a government based on the principle of rule by the p

preservation of the system itself relies on civilian con

the military. As Peter Feaver argues, “Civilians shou

what they ask for, even if it is not what they really wa

other words, civilians have a right to be wrong.”

12

responsibility for holding elected political le

accountable for their choices rests with citizens

perhaps with other branches of government. The role 

military leader is to assist to as great extent as poss

the crafting of a policy that makes strategic sense, b

final choice rests with the statesman.

Dynamics of the Wartime Civil-Military

Relationship.

The argument to this point has been that Clau

does not establish a clear limit on the influence of po

leaders over the conduct of war, but that he does se

expect this political guidance to be extensive. The a

the war will be political, and these aims will ex

continuous influence over its conduct. His depiction 

relationship between political and military leader

suggests that he expects their coordination to be ext

to ensure that war remains a faithful instrument of p

31
However, this does not yet fully capture all that Clau

has to say on the subject of wartime civil-military rela

He also provides some indications of when 

relationships may be more or less harmonious. Two 

factors that may affect this are the intensity of th

(measured by the involvement of the population an

strain between states), and the scale of the objective

Before discussing his arguments on this point

useful to recall the logic of absolute war that Clau

discusses in Chapter One of Book I. Clausewitz argue

war’s internal logic drives it to an absolute state in 

there are no limits to the efforts to be devoted or the f

be used because the objective is the total overthrow 

enemy. In this abstract concept of war, the enemy is 

same situation and an escalation to extremes occurs a

sides struggle for survival. In On War, Clausewitz se

associate this logic of total victory with the m

perspective. Even when actual circumstances preve

logic from fully being realized, Clausewitz argue

commanders must keep it in mind. It becomes “a g

point of reference, so that he who wants to learn from 

becomes accustomed to keeping that point in 

constantly, to measuring all his hopes and fears by it, 

approximating it when he can or when he must.”

124

Given this association of the military perspectiv

the logic of total victory, Clausewitz’s argument that i

of greater intensity political and military perspectiv

tend to converge makes sense. In discussing wars of 

intensity, Clausewitz argues: “The less involve

population and the less serious the strains within stat

between them, the more political requiremen

themselves will dominate and tend to be decisive.”

125

 

situation, the military objective certainly cannot be 

defeat of the enemy because it would not be in accor

with political aims. It also seems reasonable to argu

the challenges associated with ensuring that mea

proportionate to the ends being sought could be signi

On the other hand:

32
The more powerful and inspiring the motives for war, the m

they affect the belligerent nations and the fiercer the tensio

that precede the outbreak, the closer will war approach 

abstract concept, the more important will be the destruction 

the enemy, the more closely will the military aims and politi

objects of war coincide, and the more military and less politi

will war appear to be.

126

After this passage, Clausewitz is quick to reassert th

is only a question of appearance; both limited and tota

are political in nature. However, the main point i

when the political aim is the total defeat of the enem

aim and the military objective will tend to conv

Ensuring that means are proportionate to the ends s

become less difficult as the more total nature of the obj

demands a more unlimited application of the means

A similar argument could be made about the scale 

political aims sought in a given conflict. Clau

approvingly quotes Napoleon in arguing that determ

the means appropriate to achieving political aim

require the genius of a Newton.

127

 However, the mo

aims approach the total overthrow of the enemy 

preservation of one’s survival, the more political aim

the military objectives that support them will becom

same. When the war’s stakes reach the upper most 

one could imagine also that the willingness to d

resources to that end would grow proportionately.

The idea that military and political perspective

converge as the stakes in warfare increase is intere

but may not apply in every case. One way to see th

drop the assumption Clausewitz generally maintains 

War that states are unitary, almost organic entities. 

that assumption is dropped, it becomes clear that o

only has to ask whether national survival is at stak

increasingly about threats to treasured goals of subna

groups. An example from Clausewitz’s political writin

be useful here. In his essay, “On the Political Advan

and Disadvantages of the Prussian Landwehr” (

Clausewitz makes the argument that the establishm

33
regional militias is in Prussia’s best interests. Howev

realizes that the dilemma is really the following: 

Landwehr increases the danger of revolution; disarmi

Landwehr increases the danger of invasion 

enslavement.”

128

 Preserving the militia may be a va

means of increasing Prussia’s security, but 

conservatives would prefer to see it abolished because 

threat that it poses to the existing social order.

129

question is not just about what is necessary to surviva

a matter of what exactly one its attempting to prese

similar dilemma is discussed in Chapter 26, “The Peo

Arms,” of Book VI of On War. In this chapter, Clau

recognizes but does not address the objection that a

the people in war puts a society on the path to revolut

If political perspectives are divided, it is unclear that 

constant military perspective will converge with th

any given case.

A second interesting aspect of Clausewitz’s discus

political aims and military objectives in total war 

association of the idea of total war with the m

perspective. Clausewitz associates military logic wi

pursuit of total victory. Samuel Huntington provid

interesting contrast to this point of view in his 1957 b

civil-military relations, Soldier and the State. Hunt

argues just the opposite when discussing Ame

civil-military relations in World War II. It was the civ

on a liberal crusade who adopted the goals of total vict

the extent that military figures adopted this view the

abandoning the professional military perspective 

would have led them to more conservative policies.

131

 

these very different interpretations of the abstract “m

perspective,” it is likely that the predispositions 

military and political decisionmakers are actually a m

for empirical investigation in any given case.

132

34
Conclusion.

There are several points concerning civil-m

relations and the use of force on which Clausew

extremely clear. The first is that, since war is an 

policy, political considerations must dominate the co

of war. The purpose of war is to achieve some politica

therefore military objectives must be chosen on this 

Because politics do not cease to function when war b

political considerations will exert a continuous influe

the conduct of military operations. In order to carry o

state’s policies, it is vital that the commander at the h

level be not only a good general with a tho

understanding of military means, but also a statesma

a strong grasp of national policy and the political con

A second clear expectation is that political leade

themselves be very engaged in the conduct of m

operations. Clausewitz’s working assumption is that

the initiation of war through the subsequent peac

political leader’s decisions are based on the sum total 

interests of his political community. (At a min

Clausewitz seems to be arguing that this is the most 

perspective for the military leader to take regardin

political leader’s purposes.) Possibly in conjunction w

military commander, the political leader will determi

means he is willing to devote to a war, taking care to e

that these means are proportionate to the ends 

sought. In planning as well as during operations, it 

be ideal if the military commander could sit in the cab

that political leaders could be involved in his activitie

political leader does not have a strong backgrou

military affairs, he can still maintain direction of oper

by seeking military advice. 

Third, though Clausewitz expects there to be opera

details that are beyond the scope of political leaders, h

not draw an immutable line separating the realms pro

political control and military operational expertis

seems consistent with his depiction of the great pot

35
diversity of war to argue that this division wou

particular to each specific case. When conflict is extr

intense or the purposes are total, it seems unlikel

tensions over minor operational details would arise

great concerns of both political and military leade

national survival may make minor operational detai

of an issue in this case.

Where Clausewitz is of less assistance is in th

through any difficulties that may arise between m

and political figures at the highest levels. One 

reasons for this is his assumption that “policy know

instrument it means to use.”

133

 It is not clear what 

Clausewitz expects the military commander to tak

case in which the political leader does not, in fact, kn

instrument he or she is attempting to use and 

potentially self-defeating orders. Clausewitz also do

discuss any exigencies in which the military comm

must have autonomy in the conduct of military operat

In the end, Clausewitz issues challenges to 

statesmen and commanders. Political leaders should 

like strategists, being clear at the outset about purpos

means—recognizing that these may change in the cou

events.

134

 Political leaders are expected to be the aut

on domestic strengths and weaknesses, as well a

international environment. Clausewitz also see

charge political leaders with the responsibility of 

familiar with military means; at a minimum, this 

being intelligent consumers of military advice.

135

 A

same time, military leaders are also challenged. No

are they called upon to be the experts in the “gramm

war, they must always remain aware that war’s pu

come from outside itself and that these political pu

must ultimately govern. The reader may decide wh

these challenges is the most demanding.

36
ENDNOTES

1. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated and with an introdu

Samuel B. Griffith, foreword by B.H. Liddell Hart, Oxford: 

University Press, 1963; Oxford University Press Paperback, 197

2. Ibid., pp. 81-84. According to Sun Tzu: “He whose gene

able and not interfered with by the sovereign will be victorious

3. William Manchester, The American Caesar, New York

Publishing Company, 1978, p. 789.

4. Raymond Aron discusses Hitler’s leadership in these t

Clausewitz Philosopher of War, trans. Christine Booker and N

Stone, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1985, pp. 277-289

5. According to Russell Weigley, “Through much of the Civ

President Lincoln as an activist Commander in Chief exercised t

of detailed supervision of the military conduct of the war—of st

operations, and on occasion tactics—that a century later 

exacerbate many officers when President Lyndon B. Johnson o

the Vietnam War.” See Russell F. Weigley, “The American Milit

the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell,”The J

of Military History Special Issue, Vol. 57, October 1993, pp. 37-

6. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision, 2nd ed., New 

Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers, Inc., 1999, p. 236.

7. Clausewitz, in an unpublished note on an early version of a 

of war. Republished in Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. a

Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton: Princeton Un

Press, 1976, p. 63. All citations from On War will be from this e

8. Aron, p. 235.

9. “Note of 10 July 1827,” reprinted in On War, p. 70. In a la

Clausewitz wrote: “The first chapter of Book One alone I re

finished.” This latter note is reprinted in On War as “Unfinishe

Presumably Written in 1830,” p. 70.

10. This statement agrees with Paret’s introductory essay 

War, p. 4. Aron also sees Chapter One of Book I as the expre

Clausewitz’s most mature views (p. 68). I also find compellin

Gat’s analysis that Clausewitz’s final ideas on the dual nature 

and the primacy of politics begin to show themselves in the latte

Book Six, “Defense”; Book Seven, “Offense”; and continue to ev

37
Book Eight, ”War Plans.” In any case, he agrees with Paret and 

their assessment of the late date of the revision of the first few c

of Book I. See Gat’s Appendix, “Clausewitz’s Final Notes Revis

11. “Author’s Preface to an Unpublished Manuscript on the 

of War, Written between 1816 and 1818,” reprinted in On War

12. An example in which Clausewitz applies this limitatio

own analysis can be drawn from Chapter Two, “Absolute and Rea

of Book VII “War Plans,” p. 580. In that chapter, Clausewitz argu

Napoleon managed to approximate absolute war throu

mobilization of national resources and energetic conduct of cam

However, one cannot reasonably argue that this is the only true 

war, because: “ . . . in that case, what are we to say about all the w

have been fought since the days of Alexander—excepting certain 

campaigns—down to Bonaparte? We should have to condem

outright, . . . Worse still, we should be bound to say that in spit

theory there may even be other wars of this kind [limited wars

next ten years, and that our theory, though strictly logical, wo

apply to reality.” For Clausewitz, this is too high a price to pay t

logical consistency. Clausewitz makes this point again in C

Three-B of the same book, pp. 593-594.

13. Clausewitz, On War, p. 144.

14. Ibid.

15. In a useful discussion of Clausewitz’s views on theory, M

Howard points out that Clausewitz actually rejects three e

positions on theory and war. The first overemphasizes the te

expertise that creates the tools of warfare. The second argues t

qualities that create gifted commanders are a product of ind

genius and therefore not subject to analysis. The third ap

Clausewitz rejects, and the one I am discussing here, emphas

development of absolute and always valid principles of wa

discussion is in Michael Howard, Clausewitz, Past Masters, ed

Thomas, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983, pp. 22-25.

16. Clausewitz, On War, p. 134.

17. Ibid., pp. 135-136. Peter Paret discusses Clausewitz’s cri

these two military theorists in “The Genesis of On War,” an intro

essay to Clausewitz’s text, On War, pp. 10-11.

18. In a similar vein, Clausewitz writes: “It is even more rid

when we consider that these very critics usually exclude al

38
qualities from strategic theory, and only examine material factor

reduce everything to a few mathematical formulas of equilibri

superiority, of time and space, limited by a few angles and lines

were really all, it would hardly provide a scientific problem 

schoolboy.” On War, p. 178.

19. Clausewitz, On War, pp. 138-140.

20. Ibid., p. 140.

21. Ibid., p. 141.

22. Ibid., p. 95.

23. Ibid., p. 142.

24. Ibid., p. 177.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid., p. 143. Clausewitz also addresses this point in C

Two, “Purpose and Means in War,” of Book I when he writes “. . . w

always consider with the conclusion of peace the purpose of the w

been achieved and its business is at an end.”

27. Ibid., p. 144.

28. Clausewitz did write on these questions. A particularly r

piece is “Our Military Institutions,” reprinted in Carl von Clau

Historical and Political Writings, trans. and eds. Peter Paret and 

Moran, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992, pp. 3

However, the fact that Clausewitz writes on these issues els

merely reaffirms the idea that he finds them extrinsic to a theory 

29. Clausewitz, On War, pp. 131-132.

30. This idea that principles are less easy to derive when wa

indecisive is discussed in at least two places. One of these is Cha

“Defense of a Theater of Operations—Concluded: Where a Dec

Not the Objective,” Book VI, pp. 516-517; another is Chap

“Maneuver,” Book VII, p. 542.

31. Ibid., p. 604.

32. Ibid., p. 222.

33. Ibid., p. 187.

39
34. Ibid., p. 178.

35. Ibid., p. 113.

36. Ibid., p. 101.

37. Ibid., p. 119.

38. Ibid., p. 120.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid., p. 122.

41. Ibid., p. 111.

42. Ibid., p. 100. The italics are in the original text. Cla

tended to use italics frequently, and when quoting him, I will kee

usage.

43. Ibid., p. 149.

44. “Essentially war is fighting, for fighting is the only e

principle in the manifold activities generally designated as war

though war depends on other products of human developmen

tools, “. . . fighting itself still remains a distinct activity; the more 

operates in a peculiar element—that of danger.” On War, p. 12

45. See Chapter Three, “On Military Genius,” Book I, On W

100-112.

46. Ibid., p. 605.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. “Unfinished Note, Presumably Written in 1830,” reprinte

War, p. 70.

51. The summary in this paragraph and the next is drawn f

War, pp. 75-87.

52. Ibid., p. 78.

40
53. In another useful summary, Clausewitz states that 

abstract world, “since the extreme must always be the goal, the g

effort must be exerted. However, any such pronouncement wou

abstraction and would leave the real world quite unaffected.” On 

78.

54. Ibid., p. 87.

55. Ibid., p. 89.

56. Ibid., p. 605.

57. Although Clausewitz makes this point in several chapte

War, he was apparently dissatisfied with his treatment of it. B

his note of 1827, Clausewitz wanted to bring two themes ou

clearly while revising the entire book. The first of these is that th

two kinds of war: in the first, “the objective is to overthrow the e

in the second, the objective is “merely to occupy some 

frontier-districts.” There may be a transition between the two k

war, but the aims are quite different, “and their po

irreconcilability” must be brought out. This discussion 

Clausewitz’s “Note of 10 July 1827,” reprinted in On War, p. 69

58. Ibid., p. 94.

59. This theme is reflected in Chapter One, Book I, and ela

on in Chapter Two, “Purpose and Means in War.” “But the 

disarming the enemy, the object of war in the abstract . . .) is in 

always encountered in reality, and need not be fully achiev

condition of peace. . . . The reason why the object of war that em

theory is sometimes inappropriate to actual conflict is that war c

two different kinds, a point we discussed in the first chapter.” On 

91.

60. Ibid., p. 81.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid., p. 86.

63. Ibid., p. 89.

64. Ibid., p. 92.

65. Ibid., p. 87.

66. Ibid.

41
67. Ibid., p. 605.

68. Ibid., p. 92.

69. Ibid., p. 94.

70. Ibid., p. 111.

71. Ibid., pp. 607-608. Peter Paret recounts an incident in 

Clausewitz was sent two academic strategy problems by a frie

asked to evaluate them. Clausewitz sent them back without so

He wrote to his friend that a solution would not make any sense 

there were more information given about the military aims of ea

and the overall relations between the two countries and other 

See Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State, Princeton: Pr

University Press, 1976, p. 379.

72. Clausewitz, On War, p. 607.

73. Peter Paret discusses the impact of this experience in Ch

“The Ideal of German Liberty,” of Clausewitz and the State. 

74. Clausewitz, On War, pp. 515, 593.

75. Ibid., p. 609.

76. Ibid., p. 220.

77. Ibid., p. 609.

78. Ibid., p. 179.

79. Ibid., p. 583.

80. Ibid., p. 584.

81. Ibid., p. 569.

82. Clausewitz addresses these issues in his political writin

fn. 28.

83. Clausewitz, On War, p. 177.

84. For a differing interpretation, see Michael Handel, Ma

War, London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1992, pp. 10-11. Handel 

that the Weinberger Doctrine, which sets limiting conditions o

U.S. military forces should become engaged in armed con

42
Clauswitzian—a proposition with which I would disagree on 

counts. The most relevant here is the Weinberger Doctrine’s inj

against “half-hearted” measures. Given very limited political 

believe Clausewitz would instead find that what some wou

“half-hearted measures” would be appropriate—as long as t

remained aware that his ability to get away with employing 

means also depends on enemy actions.

85. Clausewitz, On War, pp. 78, 585.

86. As Clausewitz clarifies, domestic concerns are only on

that affects the amount of effort to be applied in war. See On War

87. Ibid., p. 91.

88. Ibid., p. 93.

89. Ibid., p. 75.

90. Ibid., p. 98.

91. Ibid., pp. 95, 386.

92. Ibid., p. 99.

93. Ibid., p. 97.

94. Ibid.

95. Ibid., p. 181.

96. In Book V, “Military Forces,” Clausewitz recognizes t

way to decide upon the optimum mix of branches in the arme

would be to weigh the relative costs of establishing them again

relative effectiveness on the battlefield. However, he q

acknowledges the difficulty of doing this in any reliable way. On

intangibles, of course, is the value of human life—a value “. . . o

no one would be willing to set a price in cold figures.” On War, 

97. In his chapter on the “The People in Arms,” he considers w

bringing the people into warfare as a last ditch effort at ho

defense has justifiable costs. He seems to conclude that it does. 

will always be time enough to die; like a drowning man who wil

instinctively at a straw, it is a natural law of the moral world 

nation that finds itself on the brink of an abyss will try to save 

any means.” On War, p. 483.

43
98. Ibid., p. 87.

99. Ibid., p. 602.

100. Ibid., p. 607.

101. Ibid., p. 608. Clausewitz is careful to clarify here that h

trying to suggest that military leaders make the best policymak

example, he argues that “the military and political affairs of 

were never in worse hands than when the brothers Belle-Isle 

Duc de Choiseul were responsible—good soldiers though they all 

102. Ibid. Clausewitz argues, “What is needed in the post [p

leader] is distinguished intellect and strength of character. 

always get the necessary military information somehow or othe

103. This is the position Samuel Huntington takes in his 

work on American civil-military relations, though he also assum

actions at lower levels will lack political implications. For exam

argues, “The statesman has no business deciding, as Hitler did 

later phases of World War II, whether battalions in combat 

advance or retreat.” Samuel Huntington, Soldier and the 

Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957, p. 77.

104. Clausewitz, On War, p. 87.

105. Ibid., p. 606.

106. For an analysis that takes a different perspective, see H

Masters of War. Handel’s interpretation is that Clausewitz, l

Tzu and Jomini, warns of political interference in the lower leve

of running a war. See particularly p. 12 and pp. 49-57 of Handel’s 

cannot agree with Handel’s interpretation of Clausewitz’s views 

point. Although Clausewitz recognizes that political leaders m

detailed operational expertise, his solution is not to argue th

must not be involved.

107. Clausewitz argues that, before a war begins: “The fi

supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesm

commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of 

which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to 

into, something that is alien to its nature.” On War, p. 88. Sim

such awareness is necessary for the prosecution of a war to a su

conclusion. “To bring a war, or one of its campaigns, to a successf

requires a thorough grasp of national policy. On that level strat

policy coalesce: the commander-in-chief is simultaneo

statesman.” On War, p. 111.

44
108. Ibid., pp. 583-584.

109. Ibid., p. 222.

110. Ibid., p. 81. See also Clausewitz’s Chapter 18, “Tens

Rest,” of Book III, especially p. 222.

111. Ibid., pp. 585-596.

112. Ibid., p. 112.

113. Ibid., p. 608.

114. Ibid., p. 89.

115. Ibid., pp. 196, 360.

116. Ibid., p. 337.

117. Ibid., p. 608.

118. Ibid., pp. 608-609.

119. Ibid., p. 569.

120. Ibid., p. 607.

121. Ibid., p. 603.

122. Ibid., p. 604.

123. Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problem

Huntington, Janowitz and the Question of Civilian Control,” 

Forces and Society, Vol. 23, No. 2, Winter 1996, p. 154.

124. Clausewitz, On War, p. 581.

125. Ibid., p. 81.

126. Ibid., p. 87-88.

127. Ibid., pp. 112, 586.

128. Clausewitz, Historical and Political Writings, p. 332.

45
129. For a valuable discussion of Clausewitz’s involvemen

Prussian military reform movement, see Chapter 8, “The M

Reformers,” of Paret’s Clausewitz and the State.

130. Clausewitz, On War, p. 479.

131. Huntington, pp. 326-335.

132. Morris Janowitz discusses the presence of divergen

among senior leaders in the U.S. military in Chapter 13, “The 

War,” of his Professional Soldier, London: Collier-Macmillan L

1960; New York: The Free Press, 1964, pp. 257-279.

133. Clausewitz, On War, p. 607.

134. Ibid., p. 579.

135. Ibid., p. 608.

46
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