ESDP AND MISSILE DEFENSE:

EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

FOR A MORE BALANCED

TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP

Martin Agüera

December 2001
*****

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necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the

Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report

is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

The author would like to thank Gregory E. Marshall for helpful

comments and suggestions in preparation of this article.

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ISBN 1-58487-075-3

ii
FOREWORD

Security cooperation with Europe has been the bedrock

of American strategy for more than 50 years. Today, that

relationship is undergoing both stress and refinement as

Europe moves toward a more unified political and security

identity, and as the United States responds to a changing

global security environment. While many issues have the

potential to complicate U.S.-European security cooperation,

few are more pressing than the U.S. pursuit of missile

defense and Europe’s construction of European Security

and Defense Policy (ESDP).

In this study Martin Agüera, a prominent German

defense analyst, explains the relationship between missile

defense and ESDP. He shows that rather than serving as

wedges between the United States and Europe, both of

these can help construct a better security relationship. In

fact, transatlantic cooperation and understanding of these

issues is necessary for either of them to succeed.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this

study to help American leaders sustain and augment the

crucial security cooperation with Europe.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

MARTIN AGÜERA is German Correspondent for Defense

News. He has published pieces on foreign, security, and

defense policy in newspapers and journals such as Defense

News, Die Welt, Welt am Sonntag, Europäische Sicherheit,

Soldat und Technik, Small Wars & Insurgencies,

Comparative Strategy, Defense Analysis, and a contribution

to an edited volume.

iv
SUMMARY

Are transatlantic relations currently in a crisis? The

public debates over U.S. plans for a missile defense shield

and European efforts to create a coherent and stronger

military force might support such a thesis. However, as the

author argues, transatlantic relations with NATO as its

main security institution are not in a crisis. Rather, the

European Security and Defense Policy as well as missile

defense are transatlantic approaches, although not always

commonly organized in the past, that seek to adjust to a

more fragile international system. These new approaches

have become necessary since the end of the Cold War, but

only cooperation and mutual understanding for both

projects will guarantee their final realization.

v
ESDP AND MISSILE DEFENSE:

EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

FOR A MORE BALANCED

TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP

No Crisis, But It is Time for Talk.

Before the horrible terrorist attacks on the United

States on September 11, 2001, one could easily have had the

impression that transatlantic security relations were in a

crisis. The immediate and overwhelming fight against

international terrorism, in the aftermath of New York and

Washington DC, has brought Americans and Europeans

closer together again. Yet, two “hot topics” are still likely to

dominate the political debates across the Atlantic and

Europe in the foreseeable future, and both sides find it

increasingly difficult to achieve a consensus on these

important security and defense issues. It seems as if politics

on both continents are dominated by a strong unilateralism

when it comes to future security aspects, although—as this

monograph will hopefully and convincingly show—these so

seemingly different projects can only be realized in

cooperation. What, however, are these topics that seem to

have considerably cooled the political climate between the

United States and Europe?

On the one hand, America fears that the prospect of

creating a common European Security and Defense Policy

(ESDP) with robust and flexible military forces for the

future could undermine the NATO alliance. On the other

hand, Europe is tempted to believe that U.S. plans for a

National Missile Defense (NMD), or more recently simply

referred to as Missile Defense (MD), could seriously put

global strategic balance at risk by creating a new arms race.

In addition to that, Europe claims such a system would

undermine the Atlantic alliance as well since it would create

different spheres of security within NATO. Given that the

1
claims of each side have some apparent merit, it is

worthwhile to look deeper into these arguments. Despite

the missile defense program still being in its technical and

political infancy, it is currently the most hotly debated of the

two programs.

ESDP and MD—Getting Priorities Right.

However, for the near future both sides of the Atlantic

should focus with the same intensity, if not more, on the

more eminent and realizable of the two projects: that is,

creating capable European military forces to both

strengthen NATO and enhance Europe’s ability to operate

with less heavy dependence on U.S. assets during

multinational military operations. There looms the danger

that the European goal of building military capacities could

too easily be lost from sight through the overwhelming

debate on MD. But just as important as missile defense is to

protect against weapons of mass destruction by “states of

concern,” NATO, for instance, must be a strong and

mission-ready alliance for future conflict resolution. The

September 11 terrorist attacks and the following military

fight against international terrorism in Afghanistan

against the Taliban regime only give evidence to this.

It is therefore necessary to stress that ESDP will not

undermine NATO. Since the end of the Cold War, U.S.

decisionmakers have repeatedly expressed their approval of

a Europe with advanced military capabilities. Political

pressure from the United States, as well as negative

experiences during resolution of local conflicts of the 1990s,

has shaped significantly European awareness that inherent

advanced military capabilities are necessary in order to

preserve and to stabilize NATO.

NATO Will Not Be Hampered.

The United States as the world’s only superpower cannot

shape international security alone. Constant military

commitments all around the globe have severely stretched

2
U.S. forces to their limit.1 It needs capable partners and, at

last, Europe has understood that. To support the United

States should truly be Europe’s aim. All of Europe has

benefited too long from American protection and friendship

that it could simply destroy these important political and

cultural links. Countries that extraordinarily shape this

European process like Germany or the United Kingdom

appreciate transatlantic relations and would not let

anything drift Europe away from the United States. In

addition, they should be (and probably are) realistic enough

to know that Europe, for many years to come, will not

become whole and free without America’s global security

shield and military might.

At the same time, America should look at ESDP in a

more relaxed and supporting manner.2 One point of

unnecessary confusion is the American call for “no

duplication of assets”3 since this definition is relatively

vague. One needs to make an important distinction between

“unnecessary” and “necessary” duplications.

“Unnecessary Duplications.”

The United States is right to urge Europe to be included

in the ESDP process. Accordingly, Europe should guarantee

America full transparency over what it does.4 That means

the political and strategic planning process between the

European Union (EU) and NATO on military issues should

be merged.5 Creating separate political and military

planning staffs that do not offer transparency over each

other’s intentions and plans is not useful. Therefore,

whatever progress the European defense efforts are going to

make in the future, they should be harmonized and

coordinated with and possibly through NATO. In fact, the

term European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), that

now basically turned into ESDP since the last important

European Union summits in Helsinki and Cologne in 1999

and Nice in 2000, was originally given by NATO to satisfy

America’s demand of a more balanced burden-sharing role

3
of Europe within the alliance. Ever since that topic became a

high priority on the political agenda of the EU and to its

leaders (after Kosovo, the debate again very much heated

up), the efforts gained a somewhat different dynamic. The

U.S. policy of “NATO first” remains, but it appeared as if

certain European countries regarded the intensified

negotiations over ESDP as a way to create new institutions

to keep the United States out of future European affairs. On

this issue, however, European countries were deeply

divided.

Whereas the United States clearly prefers the “top down

approach,” meaning that Western security institutions are

structured within a hierarchy that has NATO at its top,

France, for instance, apparently wishes to maximize

autonomy for ESDP. On the other hand, the United

Kingdom, which regards itself as the closest European ally

to the United States, has always made a strong case that

NATO must remain Europe’s premier security institution.

Therefore, Britain’s increased participation in the ESDP

efforts should be regarded as a good sign in the United

States. Most certainly, Britain will not try to create

autonomous European defense forces that could endanger

NATO.

Germany found itself in a somewhat awkward position,

having problems clearly defining a position. It stood right in

between its (probably) most important allies—the United

States and France. Both of Germany’s partners expected it

to take sides with their position, although the positions of

the United States and France over the European defense

efforts were-–and probably still are—contradictory to each

other. Consequently, Germany tried not to intimidate

either ally by trying to formulate an approach that would

satisfy both. This included positioning itself in favor of

NATO. Finally, Germany declared that the transatlantic

alliance remained the “cornerstone” and “the first address”

for European security but, at the same time, emphasized

that Europe would also have to build up capable forces in

order to act when “NATO as a whole” would not want to

4
commit forces to a possible crisis scenario in Europe’s back

yard. However, Germany also declared that European

would guarantee full transparency and close cooperation to

NATO on the ESDP process.6

“Necessary Duplications.”

On the other hand, there are going to be “duplications.”

Those may include operational assets that European

nations are lacking or that could help to close existing

NATO or even U.S. military gaps. Such “duplications” are

all but worrisome. In fact, they are absolutely necessary.

Without them, a strong European military pillar within

NATO is clearly unthinkable. Just to name a few, Europe

will procure a Future Transport Aircraft—the Airbus 400M.

This can be viewed as a first step to build up desperately

needed European strategic airlift capabilities. Although the

United States possesses a quite admirable airlift fleet, the

procurement of transport aircraft for European armed

forces poses a “welcome duplication” for NATO as a whole.

For instance, the world’s premier aerospace force, the

U.S. Air Force (USAF), has identified significant shortfalls

of airlift capabilities that disable meaningful support for the

“stated national strategy of being able to win two widely

separated Major Theater Wars fought in close succession.”7

In the words of former Air Force Secretary F. Whitten

Peters, the USAF is “going to require more strategic airlift.

Today, we cannot meet the wartime requirements we

already have without accepting risk—and we never

could—and our future requirements are growing.”8

The United States had a requirement of some 66 million

tons miles per day during the closing days of the Cold War.9

Since the USAF could not attain this goal, it was

subsequently lowered to some 49.7 million ton miles by the

Clinton administration in 1993. However, even this lowered

goal could not be met. In June 2000, for instance, the United

States was 5.2 million ton miles short of meeting the 49.7

goal, while the real airlift requirement ranges between 51.1

5
and 67 million ton miles per day.10 Problems mainly arise

from the high operations that Air Mobility Command units

have with increasingly old aircraft such as the C-141

Starlifter and the C-5 Galaxy. Many of the C-5 aircraft

require intensive maintenance and are often not available.

Although their required mission readiness rate was

supposed to be 75 percent, the C-5 fleet was only 63.3

percent mission ready in August 2000.11 Even the USAF’s

new workhorse, the C-17 Globemaster, is not fully mission

ready. Due to spare part shortages, etc., its availability rate

only “ranged from 37.6 percent to 64.3 percent in 2000.”12

The same necessity applies for increasing European

air-refueling capacities. In order to sustain intensive air

operations abroad and to mobilize NATO troops within

short time, the Alliance must start duplicating such efforts

as soon as possible. In sum, the U.S. General Accounting

Office concluded that the U.S. Department of Defense “is

short (1) over 29 percent of the needed military airlift

capability, and (2) nearly 19 percent of the needed refueling

aircraft.”13 Maybe here lies one of Europe’s real tasks; that

is, increasing airlift capabilities for NATO while shaping its

ESDP. It would greatly make sense since countries such as

the United States are in process of transforming their

armies to becoming more flexible and easily deployable

forces for wartime scenarios.14 In order to realize these

Army visions, a strong airlift capability is required—one

that the United States cannot solely maintain. Besides the

lack of airlift capabilities, such developments make a strong

case for extended European strategic airlift in the future.

The ESDP process, however, will only lead to success if

both the United States and Europe work together. What

matters most in the end are the results. Dr. Hans

Binnendijk put it correctly when he said, it “is no longer

important whose aircraft, missiles, tanks, or shells are used

in combat; as long as they are effective.”15 Nonetheless,

Europe must provide the bulk of the work this time. Only by

credibly demonstrating16 their ambition to strengthen

NATO will they receive the full and ample support of the

6
United States. At stake is nothing less than the future

strength and credibility of the world’s most successful

military alliance. As retired General Klaus Naumann

rightly emphasizes,

There should be no doubt in anyone’s mind that Europe

continues to need NATO to cope with all issues concerning the

defense of Europe. If this is made unambiguously clear to our

American allies, most of their concerns about Europe and the

United States drifting apart could be put to rest.17

But it must also be clear to Americans that full equality

cannot be met by Europeans in the near- or mid-term.

Therefore, the United States should care less about the

sometimes strong rhetoric, but make sure it teaches its

allies well on how to take on responsibilities. In other words,

it should continue putting pressure on Europe to spend

more on defense to acquire capabilities that make them

full-fledged partners with the United States when acting

together. This remains important because “Europe,” as

General Naumann points out, still “could not contend with a

dictator equipped with, at best, a third class armed force.

The EU drew the right conclusions—and the progress

achieved so far is truly remarkable—but much remains to

be done to achieve even an initial ability to act.”18

For instance, while European countries are proudly

looking towards their soon-to-be operational Eurofighter

aircraft, the United States is already testing and evaluating

jets like the F-22 and the Joint Strike Fighter. In

comparison to the American jets that might be operating

with third, fourth, or fifth stealth generation, aircraft like

the Eurofighter will still not have such an advanced

technology at hand. That remaining technology and

capabilities gap will force the United States and Europe into

a temporary division of labor—a scenario of which

Binnendijk warns us. But that “strategic divergence” must

not remain a reality in the future because otherwise “major

divergences across the Atlantic... could seriously trouble

future coalition military operations. In a worst case

7
scenario, strategic divergence would lead to a point where

Americans and Europeans would be unable to fight

together.”19 Europe’s security was, is, and will remain

linked to America’s security, and NATO is the institution

that preserves this security. Neglecting such an important

issue would only be self-destructive. But this also implies

that American leadership is still critically needed. There

are no reasons for the United States to be less engaged in

European affairs in the future than it was in the past. Both

the United States and Europe must keep this in mind.

Just Dreamers?—From SDI to MD.

During recent months, however, far more attention has

been devoted to MD. The uproar and discussions it has

created within political, scholarly, and media circles have

been significant with regard to the yet remaining

uncertainty and maturity of the program. However, the

uproar is understandable due to MD’s global dimension that

goes far beyond the creation of a regional European crisis

reaction force. Yet, plans issued by the U.S. Government to

deploy a missile defense to defend its homeland against

ballistic missile attacks did not wholly come out of the blue.

Instead, they just made another comeback—their fourth. In

the 1960s, programs such as Sentinel or Safeguard entered

the stage as a system of Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

bases to protect “from the risk of a Soviet strike.”20 During

the 1980s, U.S. President Ronald Reagan recaptured the

idea of creating a ballistic missile system that would render

a Soviet missile attack on American soil useless. Reagan’s

so-called Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), then, did not

become reality due to nonexisting technological feasibility,

budgetary shortfalls, and, probably as importantly, the

rather quick disappearance in 1991 of the overwhelming

danger and rival it was supposed to be designed for—the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).21 The end of the

Cold War brought a fundamental new issue to the missile

defense debate that still serves the United States as one of

the most important reasons for building a MD: the danger of

8
accidental missile launches by states that have had access

to the technology for creating Weapons of Mass Destruction

(WMD). This U.S.-Russian cooperation program, brought to

life by then U.S. President George H. W. Bush and Russian

President Boris Yeltsin, was called Global Protection

Against Limited Strikes (GPALS)/Global Protection System

(GPS). But the soon-to-be following Democrat

administration under President William J. Clinton rejected

the plan, favoring research conducted on building theater

missile defenses that would protect U.S. forces during

military operations overseas.22

Nevertheless, the topic made its way back to the political

agenda. Although it had never really disappeared from the

scene, the discussions reappeared with a rather shocking

report by the Commission dated July 15, 1998, to assess the

Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, which later

became known as the “Rumsfeld Report.” The commission

concludes ballistic missiles armed with WMD payloads pose

a strategic threat to the United States. This is not a distant

threat. Characterizing foreign assistance as a wild card is

both incorrect and misleading. Foreign assistance is

pervasive, enabling, and often the preferred path to ballistic

missile and WMD capability.

A new strategic environment now gives emerging

ballistic missile powers the capacity, through a combination

of domestic development and foreign assistance, to acquire

the means to strike the United States within about 5 years

of a decision to acquire such a capability (10 years in the case

of Iraq). During several of those years, the United States

might not be aware that such a decision had been made.

Available alternative means of delivery can shorten the

warning time of deployment nearly to zero.

The threat is exacerbated by the ability of both existing

and emerging ballistic missile powers to hide their activities

from the United States and to deceive the United States

about the pace, scope, and direction of their development

and proliferation programs.

9
Therefore, we unanimously recommend that U.S. analyses,

practices, and policies that depend on expectations of extended

warning of deployment be reviewed and, as appropriate, revised

to reflect the reality of an environment in which there may be

little or no warning.23

As if this report needed any confirmation, a few weeks

later on August 31, 1998, North Korea shocked the world by

launching a Taepo-Dong I missile over Japanese waters.

This incident not only profoundly changed the

security-political situation in North East Asia,24 but it also

stirred the NMD debate in the United States. North Korea’s

actions intensified and justified America’s plans for a MD,

as a statement by former U.S. Secretary of Defense William

S. Cohen underlines, “The Taepo-Dong-1 test was another

strong indicator that the United States will, in fact, face a

rogue nation missiles threat to our homeland against which

we will have to defend the American people.”25

The continued debate over MD has created different

schools of thought among America’s allies, partners, and

within the United States itself, that range from fully

supporting the idea of a MD,26 to questioning its overall

technical feasibility,27 to arguing that MD could create

different spheres of security with NATO, should it indeed be

limited to a “national” program,28 to believing that MD

would create new global arms races. Despite all troubles

that MD may face and despite all its critics and worries, the

new Bush administration made it clear to the international

audience that the program is to be pursued at high speed.

Should the Bush administration—at least during its first 4

years in government—not receive an unmistakable

blueprint that a missile defense system will under no

circumstances work, they will continue pursuing it—no

matter what.29 Henry Kissinger, former U.S. Secretary of

State, put it point-blank to the international audience at

this year’s Munich Conference for Security Policy, “No

American president can neglect an alternative to using

nuclear weapons against a small nation poised to launch a

ballistic missile at the United States.”30

10
For America’s allies and partners, this has major

implications.31 It leaves them principally with two options

only: to participate in realizing MD, or not to participate.

The Way Ahead—Expanding the Idea of an MD to

the Allies.

However, the latter is not really an option for Europe.

The reason for this is twofold. First, the threat assessment

is real. Different international scholars agree that the

threat posed by WMD will unmistakably rise during the

next decades.32 Currently, some 25-plus countries possess

ballistic missiles. Out of these, only two have

intercontinental ballistic missiles, but that number may

soon be rising. Additionally, over 75 countries have or are

able to produce cruise missiles. While the United States is

not severely threatened by missiles coming from long

distances, the likelihood of a short-ranged terrorist

sea-launched attack increases.33 Not surprisingly, the

United States as the world’s only superpower feels the need

to protect itself against such upcoming and already existing

threats, as Antulio J. Echevarria II describes,

A WMD attack, whether delivered overtly by missiles or covertly by

other means, could result not only in massive casualties, disruption or

degradation of information infrastructures, contamination of public

health systems and foodstuffs, and degraded response capabilities, but

also in economic damage, loss of strategic world position,

social-psychological damage, and undesirable political change.34

Indeed, many European observers hold the view that it

is indeed a legitimate desire of the United States to explore

ways to defend itself against growing threats.3 5

Additionally, the knowledge that the proliferation of WMD

has risen and will continue to rise renders the argument

that MD would create new arms races in two ways

irrelevant. The existence of a missile defense belonging to

the United States and its allies and partners might, in fact,

discourage “states of concern” from using them. Besides, the

“absence of missile defense does not seem to have retarded

11
WMD and missile proliferation over the last 30 years.”36

Then, only two states (Russia and China)—against whom

NMD is not directed—could possibly create an arms race

with the United States. All other “states of concern” would

simply bankrupt themselves in a “defensive-offensive arms

race with the United States.”37

Second, through the strong bond of NATO alliance,

Europe and the United States are strategic partners. If

“states of concern” should be threatening the American

homeland with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons,

they would be posing the same, if not even more inherent,

threat to European security.38 While the identified “states of

concern”39 might still have to undertake some efforts for

another 5 to 10 years in order to credibly threaten American

soil with long-range missiles, their arsenal of middle-range

or even short-range (depending on from where the missiles

are being launched) is able to reach European soil.

Is this a valid threat assessment for European states? It

is. NATO’s war for Kosovo in 1999 served as a turning point

for Europe since it made clear that by fighting its first “war”

outside of its principal territory, NATO and its European

members might be asked to become more active in terms of

using military force in “out-of-area” operations. Clearly,

such an extended role would be favored by the United States

that could well need the support in terms of maintaining

international security abroad. Should NATO, in fact, not be

able to fill such a role in the future, it might even become a

useless institution to the United States, some argue. Likely

scenarios and places of future military conflicts for NATO

operations lie at Europe’s insecure periphery (e.g., North

Africa, Caucasus, Middle and Near East)—exactly in areas

where experts also expect a significant rise in the

production of WMD. By acting in a war coalition along with

the United States, Europe could easily become a target for

states with WMD, not being able to reach America itself but

able to severely hurt its allies. Therefore, out of self-interest,

Europe would do well to address this danger and to

cooperate with the United States on MD. At this year’s

12
Munich Conference on Security Policy, Friedrich Merz,

Chairman of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian

Socialist Union group in the German parliament, urged the

German government to embrace MD and help make it an

“Allied Missile Defense” (AMD), rather than simply a U.S.

“National Missile Defense” program.40

In fact, Merz’ view is likely to be closer to the truth than

anything else. The political implications of such a system go

way too far to limit it to a purely national missile defense

system designed to only protect the United States. Over the

course of the MD debate, it became obvious for U.S. and

European experts alike that an extended defense shield is

the only feasible way to “sell” missile defense to the

world—not just to America’s closest allies in order to

cooperate but also to prospective “rivals” to avoid new arms

races.41 Nevertheless, the question remains: How can such

an AMD or MD be realized?

Create a Limited or Theater Missile Defense System

for Now.

A major issue that determines the realization of this

project is the scope of the planned missile defense system.

Limited missile defenses or something closer to a widened

Theater Missile Defense (TMD) could, for the foreseeable

future, be the best way to generate a consensus among

America and its allies and partners. James Lindsay and

Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellows of the Brookings

Institution and missile defense experts, made a convincing

case for a limited, two-tier system. Such a system, both

argue, would limit the total number to 200 defensive

interceptors, which would be in accordance with the

ABM-Treaty.42 A first tier, a boost-phase system either

land-, sea-, or air-based, would be located relatively close to

the “states of concern” from which a WMD attack by

missiles would be most expected. Such a system seems the

most feasible since:

13
enemy missiles are easiest to locate when their rocket motors are burning,

and there are few countermeasures to foil a boost-phase intercept because

it is difficult to hide or mimic a large, burning rocket. By contrast,

midcourse defenses like the one the Clinton administration proposed

attempt to intercept warheads in space. But the cold vacuum of space

makes it extremely difficult, given the foreseeable state of sensor

technology, to distinguish between decoys and the real thing.43

However, boost-phase is less than perfect. One difficulty

could be the basing of such systems. Given the relatively

short time one has to shoot down the missile while in its

boost-phase, basing has to be relatively close to the “states of

concern” and covering all possible angles of attack. For most

“states of concern,” such a basing could possibly be found

(North Korea, Iraq, Libya), but probably not for all (Iran).

Depending on which way the missile tracked, they could

escape from such a boost-phase system.

For that reason, a second tier, a small mid-course

system, is proposed.

Given the uncertainties about whether a boost-phase defense could be

deployed near all threatening states or whether it would be 100 percent

effective in practice, it would be prudent to supplement any boost-phase

defenses with a midcourse interceptor system based on U.S. territory.

NATO allies might also consider deploying such a system in central

Europe.44

Its main purpose will be to intercept any incoming missiles

that might have made their way past the boost-phase

intercept.

This concept seems promising because it is a modest and

reality-based scenario description. The threat posed by

“states of concern” is, without question, existing, but yet,

most of these countries’ capabilities to launch a mid-range

or long-range attack with intercontinental ballistic missiles

are limited. (Therefore, an SDI or “Star Wars” scenario of a

overwhelming missile defense does not make sense and

would be unnecessarily expensive and provocative.) Their

capabilities are limited in a way that at least “two, and

probably three or four, interceptors would be desirable for

14
each enemy missile. Assuming a worst case scenario of three

possible threatening countries, four interceptors per

missile, and up to 12 ICBMs per country makes for a total of

almost 150 boost-phase interceptors.”45

For European nations operating with tight defense

budgets that are unlikely to vastly increase in the

foreseeable future, such a limited version of missile defense

would give them a chance to play an active part in

developing and constructing such a system. For Russia,

which has also officially recognized the threat posed to its

homeland by WMD, a TMD-like missile defense would

comfort worries that the United States might be longing for

global governance and invulnerability with MD. In the case

of Russia, it will increasingly become a task for Europeans

to safeguard that U.S.-Russian relations do not worsen over

the debate on missile defense. Countries such as Germany

can and should use its favorable contacts to both the United

States and Russia to help find a consensus over a truly

important topic.46 Again, threats posed by WMD are not

solely affecting America but also Europe. To waste too much

time in heated debates would not serve the case. However,

both countries have to discuss and find consensus to a

possible new arrangement of the Anti-Ballistic Missile

Treaty or further reduce the number of nuclear weapons on

both sides to accommodate an agreement on missile

defense. Yet, the most important issue here will certainly be

to make a strong case for including Russia in missile defense

talks and taking Russia under a unified missile defense

umbrella later on.

Such cooperation could be offered to China as well, but

here remains a major obstacle with a possible TMD system

as a preliminary missile defense. China views TMD as a

grave problem since it could put the status quo in the

Taiwan question—namely Chinese military superiority

over Taiwanese capabilities—at risk.47 Accordingly, this

will require intense strategic dialogues with the Chinese in

the future as “America’s relationship with China is one of

the key foreign policy challenges”48 that the international

15
community, not just the United States alone, faces in the

21st century. However, since the United States believes

that China, “irrespective of what we do on NMD, will in fact

modernize and increase its ICBM capability,”49 the

deployment decision of a missile defense system will not be

drawn exclusively on this issue.

Conclusion.

In conclusion, a few worthy points should be summed up.

Transatlantic relations are in no crisis,50 but Europe and

the United States are reorganizing their security

structures. These are changes that have become necessary

with the end of the Cold War and that are affecting not just

international security as a whole but also the world’s most

successful military alliance.

ESDP and MD are transatlantic approaches, although

not always commonly organized, that seek to adjust to a

more fragile international system characterized by many

intrastate conflicts with severe human rights violations or

the proliferation of WMD by weak states, terrorist groups,

etc. The 1990s have vividly demonstrated this new, fragile

international system. They have also demonstrated that,

more than ever before, an alliance such as NATO is the key

to safeguarding not just transatlantic security, but also

international security.51 There is no replacement for it—not

now nor in the foreseeable future. Its member states must

do all to safeguard this important cornerstone to

international security and avoid all that could drive wedges

into the common bond.

For Europe, this discussion has brought up two major

conclusions: First, it must shape up its rhetoric as far as

ESDP is concerned. Europe must reassure the United

States at all times that ESDP is a worthy project which is to

support the NATO alliance, maintain transatlantic

partnership, and not just create a standing European army

out of frustration over American hegemony. Then, Europe

should, in any case, delete the word “autonomous” from its

16
vocabulary because it is a contradiction. Europe’s unified

defense efforts will create everything but an “autonomous”

force compared to NATO or U.S. military superiority.

Wherever the Europeans might be called upon to intervene

militarily, they will be in need of NATO and, subsequently

almost certainly, U.S. assets in order to prepare, to conduct

or to sustain their mission. Light peacekeeping operations

may pose a difference here since Europeans have well

proven themselves in Bosnia or Kosovo where they carry the

bulk of responsibility today. Yet, every other type of military

intervention which succeeds peacekeeping in scope or

intensity—such as peace enforcement or war-fighting

interventions52—will be a bridge too far for European

capabilities alone.

The second implication, arguing from a moralistic

standpoint, is embracing the transatlantic relationship as

one of the luckiest things that has happened to the West in

the last 100 years. Europe has simply far too long benefited

from American protection and friendship. The transatlantic

relationship was overall characterized through sincere

cooperation, not animosity. Of course, American leadership

within NATO served both sides and interests. It preserved

America’s influence in Europe, but served European

interests as well. Europeans knew all too well that there

was a strong partner at their side whenever they may have

needed one. Now, the time has come to possibly rebalance

this transatlantic relationship—again, in favor of both

sides. It is in the interest of the United States to have a

militarily stronger partner in Europe. This interest not only

stems from the fact that the United States will shift much of

its security policy efforts away from Europe to Asia in the

coming years, but also because U.S. forces were, for decades

now, heavily committed worldwide. This has partly put at

risk America’s ability to maintain an overwhelming

military force due to a very high operations tempo. Europe,

on the other side, cannot continue the path it has been

walking on for too many years. “The degree of dependence

on the United States is unhealthy.”53 It must build a strong

17
European Expeditionary Force that can be rapidly

deployable and still make a meaningful contribution for the

whole spectrum of crisis reaction operations. However, the

Europeans should not focus on creating such a European

Expeditionary Force primarily for peacekeeping operations,

but rather designed for high-intensity warfare operations

comparable to a 1991 Gulf War scenario. Leaning on

American concepts such as the Air Expeditionary Force of

the USAF could be helpful in this regard.

As far as the United States is concerned, it should

continue pursuing its plans for a missile defense, though in

a more cooperative and limited manner. The reasoning for a

missile defense, as was made unambiguously clear, is the

growing threat through the proliferation of WMD in the

hands of actors that are not controllable by international

norms. For that reason, the strategy of deterrence as we

know it, is indeed no longer enough. Accordingly, the

advocates of missile defense made the right strategic

assessment by claiming that international treaties such as

the ABM-Treaty need modification. President George W.

Bush explained correctly in his May 2, 2001, speech at the

National Defense University why that is the case,

Like Saddam Hussein, some of today’s tyrants are gripped by an

implacable hatred of the United States of America. They hate

our friends, they hate our values, and they hate democracy and

freedom and individual liberty. Many care little for the lives of

their own people. In such a world, Cold War deterrence is no

longer enough. . . . We need new concepts of deterrence that rely

on both offensive and defensive forces. Deterrence can no longer

be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation. Defenses can

strengthen deterrence by reducing the incentive for

proliferation.54

But, at the same time, this should not mean that the

ABM Treaty has become obsolete. It needs modification due

to the changed international security circumstances, but it

was and should remain a very important controlling

measure for global disarmament between two nations, the

United States and Russia, that still possess thousands of

18
intercontinental nuclear missiles. With the modest

deployment of a missile defense system and by agreeing to

cut back further nuclear arms, the United States could

make a significant step forward in achieving a consensus

with Russia.5 5 A one-sided withdrawal from the

ABM-Treaty by the United States would resemble a “foreign

policy disaster” since:

Russia would respond by abandoning its commitment under the

START-2 Treaty to slash its nuclear forces and by suspending bilateral

programs designed to secure and destroy its ageing arsenal. Russia’s

more than 5,000 strategic nuclear warheads still pose the single largest

threat to Western security, and the possibility that terrorists might steal a

Russian nuclear weapon remains a grave concern.56

In addition to that, the build-up of a missile defense will

not happen unilaterally for several reasons. A fully operable

system will most likely end up being a “protection package”

for a number of countries that work along with the United

States. Only through cooperation with close allies and

partners can a missile defense receive the international

consensus it is still lacking today. “Even Mr. Big needs

friends” to realize all this.57 Having reached such a

consensus, we could indeed be living in a safer world, if as

many states as possible finally benefit from such a limited

missile defense umbrella. Certainly, the United States can

neither undertake all initiatives alone nor can it be best

friends with everybody. However, the United States has an

enormous responsibility within the international system

and missile defense is a topic that is extraordinarily

affecting it. For a positive outcome of this process, the

United States must pave the way for it, along with its allies

and friends. With this, in return, the United States could

pass the ball back to its closest allies. Europe’s

understanding and support will be extremely helpful, as Dr.

Simon Serfaty rightly points out.

The transatlantic partnership need not be made hostage

of a consensus over NMD, but Europe’s support for, and

involvement with, (N)MD development and deployment

19
will help. Our European allies and friends often

misunderstand the U.S. interest in NMD as a replay of past

debates over missile defenses or as the hidden reflection of a

continued interest in disengagement. The reverse is true on

both accounts: missile defense is the down payment for a

major debate over the nature of deterrence in the 21st

century, and it is a precondition for the continued

engagement of U.S. forces abroad during and beyond the

coming decade.58

Then, creating the currently most-feasible missile

defense system—that is favoring the so-called “boost-phase”

system—the United States would need many allied nations

to station radar stations or missile defense systems close to

those “states of concern.” Intimidating the allies or partners

means losing their support for a missile defense and that

could most likely equal no workable missile defense at all.

Cooperation, as well as vivid communication, will be the

key to creating the new transatlantic partnership in the

future that equals the strong transatlantic bond we had in

the past. The strategic parameters of the international

system—not a new conclusion—have changed. However,

this does not automatically mean the end for an alliance

such as NATO or benevolent transatlantic relations in

general. In fact, it does mean exactly the opposite. Since the

areas of responsibility for the United States as the world’s

leading nation have increased, especially after September

11, the responsibilities for the Europeans as important

allies have increased as well. The increased number of

possible and actual conflict areas have shown that nothing

can replace multinational military operations, once the

military is called upon to resolve a crisis. No Western

country will use its military unilaterally unless the survival

of its country is at stake. Yet, much of NATO’s continued

prosperity and that of transatlantic relations as a whole will

strongly depend on its member countries and their will and

ambitions to keep these important ties effective.

20
ENDNOTES

1. David S. Yost well pointed out that “America’s European allies

would be well-advised to recognize the limits to U.S. military power and

the multiplicity of U.S. security commitments in other regions of the

world. U.S. military power is finite.” See David S. Yost, “The NATO

Capabilities Gap and the European Union,” Survival, Vol. 42, No. 4,

Winter 2000-01, p. 111. For additional reading on this topic, see Martin

Agüera, “The Transatlantic Way Ahead. U.S. Readiness Problems Show

Why European Capabilities Will Be So Important,” Comparative

Strategy, Vol. 20, No. 3, July 2001, pp. 271-276.

2. Flora Lewis, “To Counter Trans-Atlantic Drift, Let’s Talk Face to

Face,” International Herald Tribune, April 6, 2001.

3. In fact, this phrase was extended by then U.S. Secretary of State

Albright to the so-called three d’s—no decoupling, no duplication, no

discrimination. See Madeleine Albright, “The right balance will secure

NATO’s future,” Financial Times, December 7, 1998. However, the

main fear for Americans over the whole duplication debates seems to be

that the European Union might create its own military and planning

staffs that could leave the United States outside the information loop on

ESDP.

4. A claim that Charles A. Kupchan of the Council of Foreign

Relations also makes. See Charles A. Kupchan, “In Defense of European

Defense: An American Perspective,” Survival, Vol. 42, No. 2, Summer

2000, p. 23.

5. For a more in-depth analysis of this point, read Yost, pp. 112-115.

6. This topic is extensively and superbly discussed in Franz-Josef

Meiers, Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsidentität (ESVI)

oder Gemeinsame europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik

(GESVP)?, Discussion Paper C79, Bonn: Center for European

Integration Studies, 2000.

7. John A. Tirpak, “A Clamor for Airlift,” Air Force Magazine,

December 2000, p. 24.

8. Ibid.

9. The term “ton mile” means the airlift capability required for the

movement of one ton a distance of one nautical mile. See Keith

Hutcheson and U.S. Rep. James Saxton, “U.S. Military Needs More

21
Airlift. Speed, Ability To Deploy Severely Hampered,” Defense News,

February 12, 2001, p. 15.

10. Ibid.

11. Tirpak, p. 28. See also Seena Simon, “Fuselage Cracks Appear

Throughout Galaxy Fleet Continues Doubts About Transport’s Future

Reliability,” Defense News, December 18, 2000, p. 44.

12. Seena Simon, “U.S. C-17 Globemasters Fall Short on Tests of

Reliability,” Defense News, March 12, 2001, p. 13.

13. Military Readiness: Air Transport Capability Falls Short of

Requirements, NSIAD-00-135, Washington, DC: U.S. General

Accounting Office, June 23, 2000, http://www.gao.gov/

cgi-bin/ftechrpt?rptno=NSIAD-00-135, accessed April 11, 2001.

14. Daniel Gouré, “Army Leads Transformation. Shinseki Moves

Past Talk To Build Revolution,” Defense News, February 26, 2001, p. 32;

David L. Grange, “Full-Spectrum Transformation-Now! Void In Army’s

Maneuver And Mobility Capability Must Be Filled,” Armed Forces

Journal International, March 2001, pp. 46-47; Barry M. Blechman and

Zachary Lum, “Rethinking Transformation. Army’s GroundPower-Dominant Concept Undercuts Potential Full-Dimensional U.S.

Warfighting Capabilities,” Armed Forces Journal International, March

2001, pp. 38-42; Huba Wass De Czege and Antulio J. Echevarria,

“Precision Decisions. To Build A Balanced Force, The QDR Might

Consider These Four Propositions,” Armed Forces Journal

International, October 2000, pp. 54-56.

15. Hans Binnendijk, “A Trans-Atlantic Division of Labor Could

Undermine NATO,” International Herald Tribune, April 7, 2001.

16. In other words, Europe’s rhetoric must be backed with concrete

action that clearly points toward ESDP being a supportive element to

NATO and takes some heavy military burden from America’s shoulder.

Countries significantly pushing Europe’s process ahead (France,

Germany, United Kingdom) must avoid having the United States feel

the emergence of ESDP as some kind of “frustration” to American

hegemony. For a good discussion, read Michael Rühle,

“Transatlantische Dissonanzen. Sieben Thesen zu den

Sicherheitsbeziehungen,” Internationale Politik, April 2000, pp. 43-46.

17. Klaus Naumann, “Implementing the European Security and

Defense Policy: A Practical Vision for Europe,” Speech delivered to a

joint conference of the Atlantic Council of the United States/National

22
Defense University, Washington, DC, August 2000, http://www.acus.

org/Publications/bulletins/internationalsecurity/naumann.pdf,

accessed April 14, 2001.

18. Ibid.

19. See Martin Agüera, “European Budgets Hold Key to

Trans-Atlantic Relations,” Defense News, April 2, 2001, p. 28.

20. Bruno Tertrais, U.S. Missile Defense. Strategically sound,

politically questionable, working paper, London: Centre for European

Reform, April 2001, p. 5.

21. Joachim Krause, “Kommt der kleine Bruder von SDI? Die

amerikanischen Pläne für ein nationales Raketenabwehrsystem,”

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 3, 2000.

22. Tertrais, p. 5.

23. Executive Summary of the Report of the Commission to Assess the

Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, Pursuant to Public Law

201, 104th Congress, Washington, DC, July 15, 1998;

http://www.brook.edu.

24. Sebastian Harnisch, “Erst verhandeln, dann rüsten? Die

nordkoreanische Bedrohung in der amerikanischen

Raketenabwehrdebatte,” Raketenabwehr-Bulletin No. 14, Frankfurt:

Peace Research Institute, Summer 2000, p. 2, http://www.hsfk.de/

fg1/proj/abm/bulletin/pdfs/harnis1.pdf, accessed April 6, 2001.

25. Ibid., p. 3.

26. Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Goldgeier and James M. Lindsay,

“Deploying NMD: Not Whether, But How,” Survival, Vol. 42, No. 1,

Spring 2000, pp. 6-28.

27. See, for example, Richard L. Garwin, “A Defense that Will Not

Defend,” The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2000, pp. 109-123; and

Edward Luttwak, “Raketen-Trugschluss. Die amerikanische

Sehnsucht nach einseitiger Sicherheit wird nicht erfüllt werden,”

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, July 7, 2000.

28. For a good overview, see Karl-Heinz Kamp, “Specious NMD

Arguments Stress Trans-Atlantic Relations,” Defense News, August 21,

2000, p. 15.

23
29. Another possibility for not pursuing NMD could, of course, also

be if the economic power and wealth of the United States would decrease

rapidly.

30. Joseph Fitchett, “Bush Can’t Afford to Ignore Missile Defense,

Envoys Tell Europeans,” International Herald Tribune, February 6,

2001.

31. In this context, the author limits the term “allies” mainly to

Europe and, here specifically, NATO member countries, “partners” in

the most benevolent way to countries such as Russia and China.

32. See, for example, Richard Meng, “Nach der Abschreckung. Auch

auf die Europäer kommt mit NMD eine Entscheidung zu,” Frankfurter

Rundschau, February 3, 2001, p. 7; Karl-Heinz Kamp, “Nukleare

Proliferation. Neun Thesen zur Weiterverbreitung von Kernwaffen,”

Internationale Politik, November 2000, pp. 43-46; Global Trends 2015:

A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernmental Experts, NIC

2000-02, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, December

2000, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/globaltrends2015/

index.html, accessed January 5, 2001; “Chemiewaffenprogramm

ausgeweitet,” BND: Auch Fortschritte beim Bau von großer

Trägerrakete im Irak," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 24,

2001; Nikolas Busse, “Atombomben auf Berlin und München? Die

Proliferation von Raketen hat sich in den vergangenen zwanzig Jahren

merklich beschleunigt,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 15,

2001.

33. Antulio J. Echevarria II, The Army and Homeland Security: A

Strategic Perspective, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies

Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 2001, pp. 2-6.

34. Ibid., p. 5.

35. See the report of Dr. Karl A. Lamers, Das Nationale

Raketenabwehrsystem (NMD) und sein Folgewirkungen für die Allianz,

Brussels: North Atlantic Council, October 6, 2000, p. 17.

36. David C. Gompert and Klaus Arnhold, Ballistic Missile Defense.

A German-American Analysis, Berlin: RAND Europe and Stiftung

Wissenschaft und Politik, January 2001, p. 13.

37. Ibid., p. 14.

38. Martin Agüera, “Vom U.S.-Raketenschutzschild profitieren

auch die Europäer. Deutschland kann Russland ins Boot ziehen,” Die

Welt, February 16, 2001; and Joachim Krause and Oliver Thränert,

24
“Raketenabwehr und nukleare Abrüstung gehören zusammen,”

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 14, 2001; wysiwyg://34/

http://www.weltpolitik.net/policy-forum/article/212.html, accessed

April 10, 2001.

39. In the U.S. debate on NMD, these so-called “states of concern”

include Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya, and Syria.

40. Remarks by Dr. Friedrich Merz at the 37th Munich Conference

on Security Policy, Munich, February 3, 2001.

41. James Rubin, “Keine U.S.-Alleingänge bei der Raketenabwehr.

Bush sollte NMD eng mit Europa und Russland abstimmen, sonst droht

ein neues Wettrüsten,” Financial Times Deutschland, February 6, 2001;

Hans Binnendijk, “How to Build an International Consensus for Missile

Defense,” International Herald Tribune, March 7, 2001; Ivo H. Daalder

and James M. Lindsay, “A Chance to Make Moscow a Defensive

Partner,” International Herald Tribune, March 7, 2001; and Lothar

Rühl, “Das Ende des exklusiven Bilateralismus. Warum ein

strategischer Dialog zwischen Washington, Moskau und Peking

zwingend zu sein scheint,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February

28, 2001.

42. James Lindsay and Michael O’Hanlon, “Defending America: A

Plan for a Limited National Missile Defense,” Policy Brief #70,

Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, February 2001,

http://www.brook.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb070/pb70.htm,

accessed April 27, 2001.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. See Oliver Thränert, “Europa sollte sich hüten, zu Amerika auf

Distanz zu gehen. Unterstützung heißt jedoch nicht, Washingtons neue

Politik kritiklos gutzuheißen—Bündnispartner sollten weiter an

Rüstungskontrolle festhalten,” Die Welt, April 10, 2001.

47. Xuewu Gu, “China kann sich ein Wettrüsten nicht leisten. Die

amerikanischen Pläne für ein Raketenabwehrsystem gefährden das

geopolitische Gleichgewicht im Asien-Pazifik-Raum,” Frankfurter

Allgemeine Zeitung, April 9, 2001.

48. U.S. Senator Jon Kyl, “U.S.-China Strategic Relationship,”

Speech delivered on the Senate Floor, Washington, DC, March 30, 2001,

25
http://www.defensenews.com/current/doc/Kyl_China_Speech.doc,

accessed April 10, 2001.

49. In the words of former U.S. Secretary of Defense, William S.

Cohen. See Kyl, “U.S.-China Strategic Relationship.”

50. For quite a different perspective, see Christopher Layne, “Death

Knell for NATO? The Bush Administration Confronts the European

Security and Defense Policy,” Policy Analysis, No. 394, Washington DC:

Cato Institute, April 4, 2001, http://www.cato.org.

51. One example is the second Gulf War 1991. Although NATO as an

alliance did not fight this war, many member countries supported the

lead country, the United States, in freeing Kuwait.

52. In order to understand the various dimensions of the different

types of military interventions, see the great discussion by Richard N.

Haass, Intervention. The Use of American Military Force in the

Post-Cold War World, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 1994.

53. Agüera.

54. Remarks by the President to students and faculty at National

Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington DC, May 1,

2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/

20010501-10.html, accessed May 2, 2001.

55. See Michael O’Hanlon, “ABM Treaty Under Attack,” The New

York Times, April 26, 2001; and Lee Feinstein, “Russia the key to missile

plan,” The Baltimore Sun, May 9, 2001.

56. Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, “Unilateral Withdrawal

From the ABM Treaty Is a Bad Idea,” International Herald Tribune,

April 30, 2001.

57. Josef Joffe, “America über Alles? Take Care, Even Mr. Big Needs

Friends,” International Herald Tribune, April 16, 2001.

58. Dr. Simon Serfaty, “The U.S.-European Relationship:

Opportunities and Challenges,” Testimony Before The International

Relations Committee Subcommittee on Europe, Washington, DC, April

25, 2001, http://www.csis.org, accessed April 30, 2001.

26
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Author

Mr. Martin Agüera

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Ms. Kimberly A. Rockwell