OCK WASTES, ARID, BARREN,

desolate terrain, interspersed

with patches of sand, where

meagre clumps of desert thorns grow,

where the African sun burns down

mercilessly in July -- that was the

Alamein Front. It was situated between the rock-bound heights of Tel

el Eisa on the Mediterranean coast

and the 200-meter-high pyramid of

Garet el Himeimat on the Qattara

Depression, the only position secure

against encirclement on either flank

on the entire North African desert.

There stood what remained of

Rommel's army, exhausted after the

heavy battles of Tobruk and the

pursuit which followed- opposed

by, it is true, the defeated, but still

battle-worthy troops of the Empire.

The infantry had to build stone

walls about them, since the hard

rock floor of the terrain offered no

cover from enemy fire. "Our strength

has waned," wrote Rommel in his

diary on 3 July 1942. With only 13

battle-worthy tanks we had arrived

before Alamein. Of the 4 British

defensive emplacements on this position we were only able to seize one

in the first attack. Two additional

emplacements fell into our hands

later. The main position of Alamein

with the only fresh-water well in

this entire desolate area remained in

the hands of the British in spite of

our desperate attacks. Already, in

these July days, the battle of el Alamein had begun.

"The British Fleet is hastily abandoning Alexandria and heading

east," reported our air reconnaissance. We later heard that the British took precautionary measures for

the defense of the Nile Delta in case

Rommel should succeed in breaking

through the gates of Egypt. And, as

a precaution, they had prepared

plans for a retreat to Palestine, and

if necessary, as far as Iraq, in the

event that the Nile Delta could not

be held.

Gen Auchinleck, however, had no

intentions of giving up el Alamein.

We felt that immediately. Throughout all of July the Eighth Army attacked our position in order to seize

the initiative again. On 10 July the

Australians seized the heights of Tel

el Eisa west of Alamein. They held

this position despite our heavy counterattacks. On 14 July the New

Zealanders and Indians launched a

night attack, designed to capture

the terrain of the strategically important area of Ruweisat Ridge.

During the night of 16 July the Australians took the high ridge of Al

Makh Ahad in the south.

Rommel conducted an attack

against Ruweisat on 18 and 19 July.

It was repulsed. While the Australians pushed forward again in the

Rock-hard terrain offered no cover

north on 21 July, a New Zealand

division, reinforced with tanks, attacked the center of our front in

order to dislodge us from our position. The breakthrough failed. A

new offensive was launched in the

north at Tel el Eisa on 26 July by

the 9th Australian Div. Our counterattack was able to ward off a

catastrophe.

Auchinleck obviously came to the

conclusion, on 30 July, that with the

forces available he was not able to

conduct further operations. The

Alamein Front was stabilized.

In August, Churchill appeared in

Cairo on his flight to Moscow. We

soon knew from the regrouping of

forces in the Western Desert, that

the nervous tension which the presence of our Panzers at the gates of

Egypt had created, was now over.

Gen Sir Harold Alexander was

named Commander-in-Chief for the

M\iddle East-one of the best strategic as well as political brains available to the Empire.

At the same time, the command of

the British Eighth Army was taken

over by Sir Bernard Law Montgomery, one of the most unusual but

also gifted generals of the British

Army - a discerning strategist who

had a great understanding for the

requirements of mechanized war.

Montgomery could be as arbitrary

and unpredictable in his associations

with his superiors as with his subordinates, but his strategic plans nevertheless bore the stamp of a rigid system. His requirement for each battle

which he conducted was complete

materiel superiority.

According to his own war memoirs

(Alamein to the River Sangro) he
saw as his most important assignment the strengthening and deepening of the British defenses of the

Alamein position. All the previous

instructions and plans for any further retreat of the Eighth Army to

the Middle East he rescinded immediately. He left no doubt that a

surrender of the Alamein line was

completely out of question. In case

Rommel attacked again he would

engage in battle immediately-on

position. He ordered each division

to commit their troops only as complete units. The practice of splitting

units which had led to defeat, came

to an end. Along with this tactical transposition he also ordered

that tanks and artillery be committed only in mass from now on,

in recognition of the fact that one

can never be strong enough at the

decisive point and that the shortage

of men must be equalized or overcome by an overwhelming amount

of materiel. After he had taken the

necessary steps for the strengthening

of the defense, he turned his attention to the basic reorganization ol

the army and the formation of a

new corps, which was to be capable

of exploiting success in a battle of

materiel following an effective

breakthrough. The materiel superiority of the British, thanks to the

complete mobilization of the British

industry and the tremendous American support, gradually became overpowering. Tanks, aircraft, artillery

of all calibers, trucks, gasoline and

ammunition, came in vast quantities

around the Cape of Good Hope into

Port Said, Suez and Alexandria.

For us, on the other hand, our

supplies, which came across the seas,

sank to 6,000 tons of supply goods

per month - only /5 of our normal

requirements. Three quarters of all

convoys were sunk by British air and

sea power. To build a stock pile for

the decisive battle of the future was

impossible. The Royal Air Force

had reached hitherto unprecedented

heights of strength and combat effectiveness. Against it the air power of

Kesselring gradually melted away.

He did not receive any replacements. Hitler needed everything in

Russia. The German fighter squadrons became very small in numbers;

even Capt Marsaille, ace of the African sky, with 158 air victories, had

met a hero's death.

Malta won its importance as a

base for the fight against the convoys back and forth between Italy

and North Africa, inasmuch as the

greater portion of the transports

went from southern Italy to Benghasi, the principal transfer point

for German and Italian supplies.

The convoy routes lay within effective striking range of Malta. Tobruk

did not have sufficient tonnage capacity; therefore there was an endless column of supply vehicles from

the harbor to the positions before

Alamein. These wsere constantly

menaced by the Royal Air Force.

This method of supply consumed

precious fuel and required that the

transport columns were overburdened more than necessary. The

distance from the battlefront to

Tobruk was 550 km; from the major

port of Benghasi, 1,000 km; and

from Tripoli, where many supplies

also arrived, it was over 2,000 km.

On the other hand the British supply lines from Alexandria and Suez

were only 90 km and 350 km, respectively.

If Malta remained in British

hands and Kesselring's air power was

not increased at the same time, then

sufficient support for the front in

Africa was impossible. But at that

time Hitler would not consider seizing the island fortress. It was maintained that Alamein could have very

easily been resupplied from Crete,

and Malta could have been neutralized by heavy air attacks as was

Dunkirk in 1940. (At that time Adolf

Hitler announced with arrogant

pride, "Dunkirk will be turned over

to the German Luftwaffe"-thereby

delivering the British Expeditionary

Corps.) In a sober strategic estimate

of our situation in August 1942, it

had to be recognized that now a

situation existed in which neither

of the deadly threats to the axes of

supply in the rear of the army

(Allied control of the air on one

hand and naval base of Malta on

the other) had been destroyed. Nor

could the situation be expected to

improve, by gaining the Nile Delta

right in the lap of British strength

in the Eastern Mediterranean. Rommel's army was halted in the middle

of the desert, far from its base of

supply, while the enemy superiority

in the air grew stronger daily. On

-19-

Endless supply columns - always

menaced by the RAF

German airpower melted away

Troops were weary and exhausted

Bayerlein

\/An\X/rl SI
Bayerlein

On the Alamein Front the possibilities to

refresh and rest the troops were negligible

the other hand the possibilities for

improving our own combat effectiveness, even to rest and refresh the

exhausted troop units, were negligible at best.

These considerations then raised

a question. In spite of the advantage

of the Alamein position, anchored

on both flanks--would it not be

wiser to break off contact and move

away from the enemy in time, and

thereby abandon the worthless

desert terrain and the long supply

route to the enemy? The offensive

power of our army could have been

renewed, undisturbed by the enemy,

in one of the prepared defensive

positions closer to the supply center,

perhaps at Sollum. In the meantime, we could have conducted a

landing operation on Malta. This

was Rommel's own idea. However,

Hitler completely closed his mind

to any such thoughts of moving

backward; his goal was the Suez

Canal.

Consequently nothing happened.

Neither was Malta attacked nor did

Rommel's army move back. That

was the decision upon which the life

or death of the Alamein Front depended. Rommel's supply situation

necessarily had to become catastrophic. Every expectation of winning the Nile Delta and the Suez

Canal now vanished. Thereby the

hopes of a great pincer movement

to be conducted from the north out

of the Ukraine and over the Caucasus; and from the south out of the

Western Desert over the Suez Canal

and on to the oil fields of the Middle East, exposing the wide open

southern flank of the Soviet Unionfaded away more and more.

Now or Never - Alam el Haifa

In spite of this, Hitler calmly

ordered preparations for the attack

on the Nile Delta. Even the Italian

High Command implored Rommel

not to move back under any circumstance. Mussolini himself came to

North Africa and waited impatiently in Derna for the moment when

the Panzers of the Axis would appear among the pyramids and parade before him.

Soon, however, Rommel had to

settle with both of his dictators. The

troops originally destined for the

attack on Malta were now given to

him as reinforcements. Finally it

had to happen, that Rommel was

forced to make his decision to attack

the British Alamein position and to

break through to the Suez Canal.

He made this contingent upon his

receiving several thousand cubic

meters of gasoline by water or by

air. Now or never, it was Rommel's

belief that he could once more attempt the drive to the Delta. In

conversations on 27 August, Marshals Kesselring and Cavallero guaranteed him that he would receive

6,000 tons of gasoline, of which 1,000

would come by air. Rommel stated,

"The battle is dependent upon the

prompt delivery of this gasoline."

Cavallero answered, "You can begin

Marshal Cavallero and Rommel: "You

can begin the battle now, Herr Feldmarschall, the gasoline is already

underway."

Bayerlein

Kesselring guaranteed 1,000 tons of

gasoline would be delivered by air

the battle now, Herr Feldmarschall,

the gasoline is already under way."

In the night of 31 August Rommel launched the attack. Even then

the British had a superiority in artillery, ammunition and tanks. Unopposed, the RAF controlled the air.

We were short of tanks and ammunition. A frontal attack through

the strong British line therefore was

out. Rommel searched for the only

other possibility, the enveloping attack. He conducted diversionary attacks in the northern part of the

front, an audacious secondary attack

from the center, then the main attack in the south. His intention was

to break through along the Qattara

Depression where the British concentrations were weakest, then to swing

in to the north, passing east of Alam

el Halfa and on to the coast at El

Hammam. Thereby, he hoped to

roll up the entire enemy position,

exactly as he had three months

earlier at Gazala. Had this plan

succeeded, then the Eighth Army

would have been encircled and its

access to its supply in the rear cut

off. Both Generals Alexander and

Montgomery had reckoned with this

plan. Montgomery, as soon as he

had arrived in the Western Desertas we later learned -- heavily fortified the most important ridge, Alam

el Halfa, and prepared it for defense by placing the greater part of

his armor there. He even allowed a

map to fall into our hands on which

the terrain south of Alam el Halfa

was shown as trafficable for armored

vehicles. Actually, it was bottomless

sand which would create extreme

difficulties for our wheeled vehicles.

-20-
Ddytellrem Dayreri eml

Rommel watches an Italian unit move up the coast road at Sidi Abd el Rhaman Panzers moving up along the telegraph lines

south of Abd el Rhaman

Bayerlein

. . .the battle is dependent upon

the prompt delivery of gasoline!

The author in the desert

The rock wastes of the desert floor in the center of the Alamein line

A0 ..rL^1.r;

The Qattara Depression as seen from Abu Dweis