CANADA, GETTING IT RIGHT THIS TIME:

THE 1994 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER

Joel J. Sokolsky

May 31, 1995
ii

 *******

 The views expressed in this report are those of the

author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or

position of the Royal Military College of Canada or any

other agency of the Government of Canada, the U.S.

Department of the Army, the U.S. Department of Defense, or

the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public

release; distribution is unlimited.

 *******

 Comments pertaining to this report are invited and

should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies

Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA

17013-5050. Comments also may be conveyed directly to the

Conference Organizer, Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr., by calling

commercial (717) 245-4086 or DSN 242-4086.

 *******

 This study was originally presented at the U.S. Army

War College Sixth Annual Strategy Conference held April 26-

28, 1995, with the assistance of the Office of Net

Assessment. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to

publish the paper as part of its Conference Series.
iii

FOREWORD

 In April the Army War College’s Strategic Studies

Institute hosted its Annual Strategy Conference. This year’s

theme, “Strategy During the Lean Years: Learning From the

Past and the Present,” brought together scholars, serving

and retired military officers, and civilian defense

officials from the United States, Canada, and the United

Kingdom to discuss strategy formulation during times of

penury from Tactitus to Force XXI.

 Dr. Joel J. Sokolsky of the Royal Military College of

Canada made the point that for Canada defense policy and

strategy traditionally have been made in “times of penury.”

During the Cold War, Canadian policy was one of a “strategy

of commitment.” Since the end of the Cold War, Ottawa has

adopted a “strategy of choice” derived from Canadian

national interests.

 The document upon which Canada bases its defense

policy is the 1994 Canadian White Paper. Dr. Sokolsky argues

that the current defense policy acknowledges the problems

endemic to peacekeeping, but that the rising tide of

peacekeeping operations may have passed. Fortunately, Dr.

Sokolsky maintains, the current White Paper also allows for

a general commitment to multilateral approaches to security.

 Canada and the United States have stood together for

more than half a century; allies and partners in war and

peace. As the Canadian Defence Forces and the U.S. Army seek

to shape change rather than to be shaped by it, they cannot

help but profit from an open debate of the difficult issues

that confront them. To that end, the Strategic Studies

Institute presents Dr. Sokolsky’s views for your

consideration.

WILLIAM W. ALLEN

Colonel, U.S. Army

Acting Director

Strategic Studies Institute
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

JOEL J. SOKOLSKY earned his Ph.D. in the Department of

Government at Harvard University. He is a Professor of

Political Science at the Royal Military College of Canada

and Director of the Graduate Program in War Studies. Dr.

Sokolsky also serves as an adjunct professor at Queen’s

University and is a Senior Fellow at the Queen’s Centre for

International Relations. He is the author and editor of a

number of books and articles on Canadian defense policy and

modern naval strategy. He has served as a consultant to

several government offices including that of the Associate

Assistant Deputy Minister of National Defence (Policy and

Communications).
1

CANADA, GETTING IT RIGHT THIS TIME:

THE 1994 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER

Introduction.

A cynic might claim that Canada should have no

difficulties adjusting to “strategy during the lean years.”

In the first place, the Ottawa government has never had to

worry about formulating its own national security strategy.

Since confederation in 1867, in war and peace it simply

adopted the strategy of its allies. And in the second, with

the exception of the world wars and the early years of the

Cold War, the Canadian Forces (CF)1 have known little else

but lean times. Indeed, it has been charged that Canada

began collecting its “peace dividend” the first time the

Cold War ended, during the detente of the late 1960s and

early 1970s. For the last 20 years it has spent only 2 per

cent of Gross National Product (GDP) on defense. The socalled “commitment-capability gap” has plagued the CF into

the 1980s, while heightened peacekeeping duties have

continued to place a strain on resources in the first 5

years of the post-Cold War era.

The latest White Paper on defense, released in December

1994, seeks to chart a course that will allow Canada to

better cope with the transformed international security

environment that it faces abroad and the stark fiscal

realities that it faces at home.2

 These realities were

brought home by the Federal budget reductions in February

1995. Here, too, the past practice may foster a measure of

scepticism. The three previous White Papers, and the budgets

to fund them, proved to be poor predictors of both global

and domestic trends. Their policy prescriptions seemed to be

more appropriate to the situations which preceded their

release rather than those which followed. As a result, they

had extremely short lives as guides to subsequent defense

policy and force posture decisions.

 It is argued here that this time, the White Paper

seems to have gotten it right. It contains a reasoned and

realistic assessment of global trends and, more importantly,

of what domestic politics will allow. While not articulating

a ‘strategy’ in the classic understanding of the term, the
2

White Paper does provide an approach to the role of defense

policy in support of overall Canadian foreign objectives

which more closely matches commitments with capabilities.

This is not, however, because the CF are to be given the

capabilities they have so long been denied, but rather

because the current policy adopts a leaner view of what

Canada’s commitments should be.

Getting It Wrong: White Papers 1964-1987.

The fundamentals of post-1945 Canadian defense policy

were set during the early years of the Cold War and remained

remarkably constant until the late 1980s. Canada accepted

the need for containment and deterrence of the Soviet Union,

especially in Europe, and sought its security in alliance

with the United States and other NATO powers. To this

extent, the late R.B. Byers noted that Canadian defense

policy did not contain a great deal of “independent

strategic thought and analysis.”4

This meant that force development decisions were

largely driven by allied strategies and political

requirements. Thus, ground and air forces were dispatched to

Europe after the outbreak of the Korean War, while naval

forces were postured primarily to support NATO’s AntiSubmarine Warfare (ASW) requirements in the Atlantic. For

North American defense, the air force maintained

interceptors and radar lines to meet the Soviet bomber

threat under the NORAD combined command with the United

States. As Soviet Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)

and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) forces grew,

NORAD’s role became that of missile warning and attack

assessment, combined with a declining air defense and air

sovereignty role. At sea, the Canadian Navy collaborated

with the United States Navy (USN) in monitoring the ocean

approaches to the continent. In the early 1960s, Canada even

equipped its European and North American forces with

tactical nuclear weapons (under a standard “two-key”

arrangement with the U.S.).

The domestic tasks of the CF, the protection of

sovereignty against nonmilitary threats and assistance to

the civil authorities, were performed by the forces acquired
3

to meet the more demanding NATO and NORAD missions. After

the Suez Crisis of 1956, Canada became a major contributor

to United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operations. But, the

forces dispatched for peacekeeping duties were also drawn

from those raised and maintained to fulfil allied roles.

Although at the operational level the CF trained for

nuclear and conventional warfare along side the forces of

allies, at the highest governmental levels the general view

was that the forces bought Ottawa a “seat at the table.”

They allowed Canada to participate in discussions that

touched on global security issues. This involvement

complemented Canada’s status as a major Western industrial

nation. The approach was summed up by James Eayrs in 1965:

. . . the main and overriding motive for the

maintenance of Canadian military establishment

since the second world war has had little to do

with our national security as such . . . it has

had everything to do with underpinning our

diplomatic and negotiating position vis-a-vis

various international organizations and other

countries.5

In general, this approach to defense policy enjoyed

broad public support throughout the Cold War. Defense was

not a priority public policy item for most Canadians,

therefore, there was relatively little public or media

attention devoted to it. Canadians wanted their country to

remain in NATO and NORAD, and there was a particularly high

acceptance of peacekeeping which many saw as something

distinctively Canadian. However, the public did not want

large amounts of funds spent on defense, even for national

sovereignty purposes.

As a percentage of GDP and the federal budget, defense

spending peaked in the early 1950s. By the early 1960s, the

high cost of weapons, combined with new demands on the

federal government to allocate more to social programs,

compelled a reevaluation of defense policy and how it was

conducted. The White Paper on Defence of March 19646

 was

“not so much interested in international aspects of Canadian

defence policies” as in “reorganizing the Canadian Forces.”7
4

In the next few years, the headquarters of the separate

services were integrated under a single Chief of the Defence

Staff (CDS), and eventually a National Defence Headquarters

(NDHQ) emerged, combining the military and civilian

leadership of the CF and DND. In 1968, the three services

were themselves unified into a single entity–the Canadian

Forces–divided along environmental or functional lines. The

government argued that the savings derived from this

reorganization could be channelled into new equipment.

While fiscal considerations were the major concern, the

“flexible response” ideas then being put forth by U.S.

Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara were used to justify

unification. DND contended this new organization would make

the CF highly mobile and flexible, able to combine air, sea,

and ground units. Such forces, the Minister argued, would be

available to meet the needs of peacekeeping and “brush-fire”

wars and related missions.”8

The problem was that, since the Korean War, Canada had

deliberately avoided participating in limited or “brush-fire

wars” (and would not do so again until the Gulf War in

1990). Peacekeeping did not involve the deployment of

Canadian troops in the face of hostile fire. As David Burke

observed: “Canada’s world-wide intervention force . . . was

literally all dressed up with nowhere to go . . . Canada had

a structurally unified defence force without a mission to

match. Moreover, since no allied commitment has been

dropped, Canada continued to supply discrete air, sea and 

land units to NATO and NORAD.”9

 In addition, any savings

from unification, which were supposed to go into capital,

were lost both by reduced defense budgets and inflation.

By the late 1960s, with detente, the Vietnam War, and

concerns about Canadian independence and sovereignty, the

very fundamentals of the Cold War defense policy were being

challenged. In 1969, Liberal Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau

complained that NATO had come to determine all of Canada’s

defense policy and defense policy had come to determine “all

our foreign policy” and thus Canada “had no foreign policy

except that which flowed from NATO.”10 He set about trying to

change this. Henceforth, foreign policy would be the

extension abroad of domestic priorities and defense policy
5

would fall in line.

Such an approach was now possible because of the

changed international security environment. The government

assumed that East-West tensions would continue to ease and

that mutual nuclear deterrence reduced the risk of war, and

the European allies could assume more of the burden for

conventional defense. It cut the size of Canada’s forces in

Europe in half, moving the ground forces away from the

inter-German border; discarded tactical nuclear weapons;

said it would not replace the existing tank forces;

indicated less emphasis would be placed on ASW; and looked

forward to curtailing contributions to NORAD. This was

accompanied by cuts in personnel and real reductions in

defense expenditures. All of this was repeated in the 1971

White Paper, Defence in the 70’s,11 which stressed that

domestic roles, especially the protecting of Canadian

sovereignty against nonmilitary threats, fishing violations,

and environmental dangers, would take priority over allied

commitments, as well as peacekeeping, in day-to-day

operations and force posture decisions.

Although reflecting the period of detente, the document

was out of step with NATO’s new strategy of flexible

response and its emphasis upon conventional forces. Yet, as

with the previous White Paper, the 1971 statement did not

withdraw Canada from any allied commitments. In addition,

Canada continued to remain an active contributor to U.N.

peacekeeping operations. Indeed, the Trudeau government had

actually added a pledge to reinforce northern Norway. Thus,

detente began to wane as reduced defense budgets quickly

took their toll, and the 1971 policy was already being

reversed by 1974. As a result of the Defence Structure

Review (DSR), allied commitments, especially those to NATO

as opposed to sovereignty protection, reemerged as the key

determinant of force posture decisions. Defense budgets were

increased. Over the next 10 years, Canada reequipped its

land forces in Germany with new tanks, acquired a new

interceptor for the NATO and NORAD roles and new ASW longrange patrol aircraft (LRPA), and began construction of a

fleet of ASW frigates. In 1985 agreement was reached on the

modernization of NORAD’s air defense capabilities. At the

same time, defense budgets, though rising, meant that
6

equipment replacement was slow and fewer were bought.

 It was 1987 before the next White Paper was issued,

this time by the Progressive Conservative government of

Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. Entitled Challenge and

Commitment,12 this document stated explicitly that the

previous Liberal government had gotten it wrong. The

Liberals had been overly optimistic about the course of

East-West relations, had undermined Canada’s credibility

with its allies, and had allowed a dangerous “commitmentcapability gap” to emerge within the CF. In the meantime,

new factors had emerged, especially the advent of cruise

missiles and the growing strategic importance of the Arctic,

which directly threatened North American and Canadian

security. To meet these challenges, the Mulroney government

pledged to dramatically increase defense spending. It would

acquire new and more tanks for the ground forces in Germany,

additional surface ships and LRPAs, and, most ambitiously, a

fleet of 10-12 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs)

capable of under-ice operations. The SSNs were also

justified on the grounds of the need to assert Canadian

sovereignty in waters American SSNs were known to transit.

Of all the three White Papers discussed above, the 1987

document “got it wrong” the most profoundly and had the

shortest life. Its tone reflected the increased East-West

acrimony of the early 1980s and thus found itself caught by

the rapidly changing situation of the Gorbachev years.

Within a few months after its release, the Intermediate

Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was signed. The Mulroney

government might be excused for not predicting the

subsequent abrupt end to the Cold War, but it had also

completely misread the domestic situation. While public

opinion polls had shown some concern about poor Arctic

sovereignty and the state of the CF equipment, there turned

out to be very little support for SSNs or for major defense

expenditures given the improved international security

environment.13 In addition, it turned out that the Minister

of Defence had secured only tepid and conditional support

from his cabinet colleagues, especially the Minister of

Finance, on the funding formula necessary to implement

Challenge and Commitment.14
7

The Mulroney government began to hedge on its defense

pledges and deliberately avoided discussing the White Paper

during the 1988 federal election campaign. Once returned to

office, its 1989 budget essentially gutted the 1987 White

Paper, cancelling the SSN program and postponing the tank

purchase. Subsequent budgets further reduced defense

expenditures, eventually abandoning new tanks and other

equipment, although continuing with the building of 12 new

frigates and plans to replace land and seaborne helicopters

with the EH 101. Between 1989 and 1992 planned DND

expenditures were reduced by $5.6 billion.15

A statement on defense policy released in April 199216

announced that the CF would be reduced from 81,000 to 75,000

regular force, but the reserves increased from 29,000 to

40,000. Most significantly, while the document reaffirmed 

Canada’s commitment to NORAD and NATO, it also announced

that Canada was withdrawing all of its air and ground forces

from Germany. Heretofore, a physical presence in Europe, no

matter how small, was considered a sine qua non for Canadian

defense policy, the necessary price for a seat at the table.

However, as the Conservatives cutback on defense, they

also, following a now familiar Canadian pattern, increased

their commitments and activities. Canada sent forces to

fight in the Gulf War and expanded its peacekeeping

obligations. A new version of the “commitment-capability

gap” appeared to be emerging, one which focused primarily on

the Army which bore the brunt of peacekeeping duties and

which had been least favored in the equipment purchases of

the late 1970s and early 1980s.

In October 1993, the Liberals returned to power in

Ottawa under Prime Minister Jean Chretien. While in

opposition and during the election campaign, they had

criticized the Mulroney government for adopting a Cold War

defense policy, one that was too supportive of the Reagan

and Bush administrations. Among other things, the Liberals

promised a total review of defense and foreign policy,

including public consultations and parliamentary hearings.

In the meantime, the new government moved to curtail defense

spending, including the cancellation of the EH 101

helicopter, whose cost and sophisticated ASW capabilities
8

were said to be inconsistent with the changed global

environment. In its February 1994 budget, DND was again hit

with reductions and base closures, including two of the

three military colleges.17

A Special Joint Committee of the House of Commons and

the Senate began hearings on defense policy in the spring of

1994. It became apparent that two views on the future of the

CF were emerging. The first, set forth by the Canada 21

Council, a group of former governmental officials, senior

officers and academics, argued that Canada should

concentrate on contributing to “common security” throughout

the U.N. and other multilateral organizations. The CF,

especially the Army, should be postured primarily for

traditional peacekeeping as opposed to high intensity

combat. Canada would maintain its alliance ties, such as

NATO and NORAD, but only insofar as these were consistent

with the emphasis upon common security. Many of the Air

Force and the Navy’s larger units could be retired.18 The

second view was that Canada still confronted a “dangerous

world,” wherein alliance ties would be important and wherein

the CF had to maintain a balanced combat-capable posture.19

In its report,20 the Special Joint Committee favored

maintaining combat-capable forces and existing alliance

ties. This was the direction the CF wanted to go in the new

White Paper. But, in doing so, the forces had to fashion a

policy that was consistent with the post-Cold War security

environment, overall Canadian foreign policy, and, above

all, domestic political and fiscal realities.

Doing Less and Doing With Less: The 1994 White Paper.

The 1994 White Paper reflects the more secure, yet

uncertain international strategic environment that Canada

now faces. It begins by declaring that “the primary

obligation” of the Department of National Defence (DND) and

the Canadian Forces “is to protect the country and its

citizens from challenges to their security . . . In the

final analysis, a nation not worth defending is a nation not

worth preserving.”21 The document stresses that the basic

nature of the threats to Canadian security has changed–that

regional and ethnic conflict, weapons proliferation, global
9

overpopulation and environmental degradation all compete for

attention on the global security stage. But, as the February

1995 government statement on foreign policy, Canada in the

World, emphasizes, “direct threats to Canada’s territory are

diminished.”22 Future challenges to Canadian security are

likely to be of a nonmilitary nature, economic,

environmental and demographic. Thus, while the “Government

considers it necessary to maintain a military capability

appropriate to this still uncertain and evolving

international environment, including continued membership in

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the North

American Aerospace Defence Command, “we are making

adjustments within that capability to enhance our ability to

contain conflict.” In the February 1995 budget, DND took

more hits over and above those announced last year. It would

appear then, that while Canada is worth preserving and

defending, it can be done with less military capability.

Overall, the current defense policy is based more upon

domestic determinants rather than trying to fashion the CF

to keep pace with allied demands and strategies. Most

notable is the diminished role given NATO, heretofore the

central pillar of Canadian defense policy and force

structure. At the same time, multiple roles and, indeed,

multilateralism, are very much a part of the new defense

policy and, certainly, the White Paper calls for the

establishment of new military ties with countries of Latin

America and the Pacific. But while the White Paper promises

a global presence for Canada, it, along with the budget,

does imply global commitments.

As in previous White Papers, the current policy largely

retains the four traditional roles for the Canadian Forces;

sovereignty protection, NATO, bilateral military cooperation

with the United States (especially NORAD), and peacekeeping

will be retained. Previous White Papers have rhetorically

reordered priorities, but actual practice and force building

have tended to reinforce the centrality of NATO and, to a

lesser extent, bilateral cooperation as key determinants in

defense policy. The 1994 Defence White Paper and the 1995

budget mark a significant change in this approach. Canada

has already withdrawn its air and ground forces from

Germany. The government will continue to supply maritime
10

forces to the Standing Naval Force Atlantic and to provide

crews to the NATO Airborne Warning and Control aircraft and

 individual personnel to various NATO staff positions.

Forces withdrawn and retained in Canada will be available to

the Alliance consistent with allied strategy, which foresees

no major challenge to Western European security and will

rely upon mobilized forces in the event one should emerge.

But in the White Paper, commitments and contributions to

NATO are included under general support for international

security and multilateral operations such as the United

Nations and ad hoc coalitions. Canada is also seeking to

reduce its financial contributions to the allied

infrastructure program.

In contrast, the 1994 White Paper devotes considerable

attention to the roles and missions of the CF in North

America. It devotes one whole chapter to the protection of

Canada and another to Canada-United States defense

cooperation. There is also discussion about expanding

military links to Latin America, the Middle East, Eastern

Europe and to countries in the Asia Pacific area.23 To this

extent, it would appear that in the post-Cold War era,

Ottawa intends to conduct a security policy more global in

scope than it has for the last 50 years, one firmly anchored

in North America but reaching out to new regions. For

example, there has always been some military presence in the

Pacific, but this generally took second place to the

Atlantic region. Now more emphasis is to be put on ties with

traditional Pacific partners, such as the U.S, Australia,

and New Zealand, as well as the new regional economic

powers.

While the CF may find itself operating further afield,

the government also intends to cut back on military

expenditures. The defense budget is to drop by 14.2 percent

between now and 1997, which entails a reduction in planned

spending by about $2.8 billion over the next 4 years, a

reduction in annual spending of just over $1.6 billion by

the 1997-98 fiscal year compared to spending in fiscal year

1994-95. In that year DND’s budget will be $9.2 billion

compared to the current level of $11.5 billion. By the end

of the decade, the regular force will cut from 74,900 to

60,000, the primary reserves from 29,400 to 20,000, and the
11

civilian work force will drop to 20,000 from the present

32,500. There will be commensurate reductions in the number

of senior officers, with generals cut by 25 percent and

colonels by 20 percent. In addition, “about $15 billion

worth of capital equipment will be delayed, reduced, or

cancelled over the next 15 years.” There is to be another

round of base closures and consolidations, most notably the

elimination of all three of the elemental command

headquarters: (Maritime Command (MARCOM), Air Command

(AIRCOM), Land Force Command (LANCOM)) and the relocation of

their functions to National Defence Headquarters.24 All of

this may make it difficult to accept the White Paper’s claim

that DND will maintain “multi-purpose, combat-capable armed

forces able to meet the challenges to Canada’s security both

at home and abroad.”25

The government argues, however, that in contrast to

previous Canadian experience, the budget is fully

consistent with the White Paper. And the savings derived

from personnel reductions and base closures can be

redirected into giving the Canadian Forces the equipment

they will need to carry out their national and international

missions.26 As announced in the White Paper, among the

cutbacks in equipment will include a 25 percent reduction

for fighter forces and support including the retirement of

all CF-5 fighters and the reduction of operational CF-18s

from 72 to “between 60 and 48" aircraft. But there will be

no reduction in the transport aircraft fleet of 30 C-130s, 5

CC-137s and 5 CC-150s (A110); and the VIP A-310 Airbus will

be re-fitted for a strategic lift and air cargo role. This

will support the ability of the CF to sustain peacekeeping

operations far afield. A replacement for the Labrador

search-and-rescue helicopters will depend upon a decision to

replace the Sea King maritime helicopters.27

For the Army, which lost its coveted armored role when

Canadian forces were withdrawn from Europe but which has

born the brunt of peacekeeping missions, there will be both

more personnel and new equipment. Its 114 Leopard I tanks,

now in Canada, will be retained for possible deployment

abroad. Some 3,000 troops are to be added to its ranks, and

the government has pledged to purchase new armored personnel

carriers (APCs) by 1997 and to modernize parts of the
12

current APC fleet.

The service which emerged the most unscathed from the

White Paper and budget was the Navy. As with the Army, the

Navy has seen wide service in support of U.N. peacekeeping

operations since the end of the Cold War, with deployments

to Haiti and the Adriatic. Canada will retain all 16 of its

surface warships, including 12 new city-class frigates, and

will be acquiring 12 new maritime coastal defense vessels

(MCDV) to “maintain sufficient capability to sealift troops,

equipment and supplies for multilateral operations.” One of

three support ships, the HMCS Provider, which had been

scheduled to be paid off in 1996, will be retained. Also

kept will be the existing force of 18 maritime long-range

patrol aircraft. Shortly after their election in 1993, the

Liberals fulfilled a campaign promise to cancel a $5 billion

program to acquire 50 new helicopters, including 30-year-old

Sea Kings carried by the surface ships. The White Paper

pledges to find an “affordable” replacement. Most

surprisingly, the Government has not ruled out new

submarines and will “explore the option” of acquiring

Upholder class submarines recently constructed by the United

Kingdom.

Thus, while DND will have to do with less, the White

Paper claims that Canada will still have forces capable of

providing for domestic surveillance and sovereignty tasks,

North American defense, and “make a significant contribution

to international peace and stability, within a UN framework,

through NATO, or in coalitions of like-minded countries.”28

Canada will maintain a naval task group in the Pacific and

Atlantic comprised of destroyers, frigates, submarines, a

support ship, and maritime air. On land, three “separable

battle groups or a brigade group with infantry, armor, and

artillery will be available for deployment. The air forces

will have two fighter squadrons available for NORAD but

could send a wing of tactical fighters and a squadron of

transport aircraft. Some of these forces will be earmarked

for immediate standby, short notice deployment for NATO or

the U.N. In the event of a major contingency abroad, Ottawa

would be prepared to send land, sea and air forces

simultaneously, and ”this could conceivably involve in the

order of 10,000 military personnel."29 However, the White
13

Paper indicates that Canada could not send substantial

forces to both contingencies at once, and thus forces would

have to be redeployed from other multilateral operations.

Given Canada’s budget crisis, the CF could have been

asked by the government to do with even smaller forces. For

fiscal year 1994-95, the federal deficit will be $37.9

billion, or more than 3 percent of Gross Domestic Product

(GDP), while the accumulated debt amounts to $546.1 billion.

By fiscal year 1996-97, the government hopes to bring the

deficit down to $24.3 billion, but interest on the debt will

still be $50.7 billion or nearly a quarter of the federal

budget.30

With roughly a third of the debt in foreign hands,

there has been continual downward pressure on the Canadian

dollar which now stands at just above 70 cents U.S.

International money markets were demanding a tough budget

from Finance Minister Paul Martin, and they got one. Ottawa

intends to implement major reductions in expenditures,

including on social services such as health care and

welfare. This will entail cutting back and changing the

transfer payments to the provinces. In addition, government

operating expenditures will be slashed. Over the next 3

years the federal civil service will be reduced by 14

percent or 45,000.31

Under these circumstances, DND is fortunate not to have

suffered further reductions. It will still have the largest

operating budget of any government department. While the

Canadian Forces might contend otherwise, it can be argued

with regard to the 1994 White Paper on defense and 1995

federal budget, that as the slogan of the famous American

beer from Milwaukee used to boast “it doesn’t get any better

than this.”

In addition, civil-military relations have not been

particularly good in Canada during the last several months.

There have been revelations of torture and murder of

civilians by members of the Airborne Regiment during

peacekeeping duties in Somalia leading to a series of courts

martial. This was compounded by exposure of unseemly conduct

recorded on videos and what the government viewed as failure
14

by senior officers to deal with the unit’s problems. All of

which led Defence Minister Collenette to disband the

regiment earlier this year even though the Chief of the

Defence Staff advised against it.

 Should the economy experience slower growth and rising

interests rates, Mr. Martin’s predictions may not come to

fruition. It likely would be, then, that in next year’s

budget, or even before, the Liberal government would not

hesitate to make further cuts in defense expenditures.

Indeed, it can be argued that as far as Prime Minister

Chretien and most of his Ministers are concerned, there is

always room for less defense spending. There would be little

public outcry in light of the fact that the public and the

provinces are being asked to do a lot with less.

Canada-U.S. Defense Relations.

The level and tempo of Canada-U.S. defense relations,

particularly in NORAD, has been decreasing since the late

1980s. The epoch-making transformation of global affairs

notwithstanding, the NORAD agreement was renewed in April

1991 for another 5 years. In sharp contrast to 1986, the

renewal went almost unnoticed, even in Canada. Also little

noticed was the emphasis placed upon NORAD’s role in

counter-narcotics activities, indicating that the air

sovereignty mission encompassed surveillance and monitoring

of aircraft suspected of smuggling illegal drugs. Counternarcotics had become an important task for the U.S. armed

forces in the late 1980s, and the Canadian Air Force was

cooperating in the air side of the effort.32

By the late 1980s, the frequency of Soviet Bear bomber

flights near North America was “significantly reduced during

1989,” down to just 21. In the 1986-1988 period, there had

been as many as 66 flights per year.33 A U.S. Senate Armed

Services Committee report released in July 1990 noted that

“the Soviets have ceased submarine patrols off the U.S.

coast, and flights by Bear bombers to Canada’s northern

border.” Accordingly, Washington cut back on plans contained

in the 1985 North American Air Defence Modernization

agreement, including cancellation of two and the

deactivation of one of the four new Over the Horizon
15

Backscatter (OTH-B) radars.34 Congress had stopped all

funding for the American contribution to the Forward

Operating Locations (FOLs), while budget cuts in the United

States Air Force were creating problems in the apportionment

of costs for the Northern Warning System (NWS).

More recent American actions with respect to air

defense, however, suggest that this NORAD role has been

significantly reduced in importance. After some delay and

difficulties over the apportionment of construction

expenditures, the full NWS will be completed. However, the

United States Air Force and Canada will run it at a very

reduced capacity in order to lower operation and maintenance

costs. Congress, though, has continued to refuse funding for

the American portion of the cost of the forward operating

locations, although Canada went ahead and constructed four

of them.

The classic air defense mission against massive bomber

attack has been put on the “back burner.” Forces for this

mission have been put in a “regeneration” category with

expectation that there will be as much as a 2-year strategic

warning of any insurgent air threat. There are no longer 

“war plans” but “concept plans” for North American air

defense.35 NORAD is also likely to scale back its counternarcotics role, as the United States has become persuaded

that this and other military measures were having little

impact in the drug war.36 If the USAF experiences additional

funding cuts, there may be even more reductions in NORAD’s

air defense and air sovereignty roles.

With the air defense mission waning and with the threat

of large scale ballistic missile attack all but gone, focus

has shifted to the possible role of NORAD in some kind of

limited missile defense, both for North America and abroad.

In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee,

former CINCNORAD American General Charles Horner stressed

the need for NORAD to continue with its binational air

sovereignty mission. He also emphasized “the national

necessity for an integrated ballistic missile defense . . .

system–a system that will best protect deployed forces, as

well as North American borders . . .”37 In a fall 1993

article, Executive Officer to the Deputy CINCNORAD Canadian
16

Lieutenant General Brian Smith seemed to suggest that the

command could become the North American component of a

multinational “global warning initiative” designed to meet

the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction and missile technology. In addition to meeting

threats against North America, the system could be applied

“in a regional content (sic) anywhere in the world.”38 For

the United States, the emphasis following upon the Gulf War

has been less on the massive Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

envisioned by the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and

more on Theater Missile Defense (TMD). Traditionally, Canada

has been wary of BMD because of its allegedly adverse

implications for strategic nuclear stability and arms

control. But when President Bush suggested a multilateral

approach to BMD two years ago, Prime Minister Mulroney

indicated Canadian interest.

In the meantime, the end of the Cold War saw a

continuation of close cooperation between the Canadian Navy

and the United States Navy (USN). In contrast to aerospace

ties which were concentrated in a single binational command,

naval relations have largely been on a strictly navy-to-navy

basis with a myriad of arrangements that have allowed the

two maritime forces to operate closely together. Reflecting

the USN’s own organization and the NATO emphasis of overall

Canadian defense policy, this cooperation has been much more

extensive in the Atlantic than in the Pacific, although

there have been long-standing arrangements and joint

exercises on the west coast. In the 1980s there was some

Canadian concern about the operation of USN submarines in

the Arctic which led to the proposal in the 1987 Canadian

White Paper to acquire a fleet of nuclear-power attack

submarines capable of under-ice operations. This project was

abandoned in 1989. As in the air, the end of the Cold War

saw a decline in the sea-based danger to North America,

which has reduced the importance of maritime surveillance.

Given the absence of a direct threat to the continent,

it is surprising that, as noted above, an entire chapter in

the White Paper is devoted to defense relations with the

United States. The DND argues that the defense ties with the

United States must be maintained if Canada is to continue

reaping its varied rewards, which have included increased
17

training and operational experience, retention of an

influential voice in American defense policy formulation,

continued access to significant defense-related

intelligence, and maintaining access to the large U.S.

defense industrial market.39 For these reasons, the

Canadian/American defense partnership has rightfully earned

a fair number of supporters.

Most noteworthy of the White Paper recommendations is

that the NORAD agreement should be renewed in 1996. The

document admits that direct threats to North American

security are unlikely in the foreseeable future and assumes

that any new threat will provide 1-2 years of strategic

warning. The White Paper therefore maintains that Canada

must continue to support a foundation of defense cooperation

with the United States which could be expanded if needed.

For the Air Force, the White paper states that Canada will

maintain aerospace surveillance, missile warning, and air

defense capabilities at a significantly reduced level, while

preserving the ability to regenerate forces should a

strategic threat to the continent arise.40

The White Paper also declares that greater emphasis

must be placed within the agreement on the examination of

ballistic missile defense options.41

The Government will examine closely those areas

which may require updating in accordance with

evolving challenges to continental security.

Canada will work towards an agreement that

furthers our national interest and meets our

defence needs, now and into the 21st century.42

Canada’s potential role in ballistic missile

defence will not be determined in isolation, but

in conjunction with the evolution of North

American and possibly NATO-wide aerospace defence

arrangements.43

Canada’s willingness to participate in the research and

development of a ballistic missile defensive system marks a

major departure from the previous Canadian view, especially

that of the Liberal Party. The American emphasis upon TMD
18

has made Canadian involvement more acceptable. As the Chief

of the Defence Staff John de Chastelain noted, the idea of

protecting North America is now “recognized as pie in the

sky.” Rather “We’re talking about joint involvement in the

development of a product that would produce a regional BDM

system.”44

It is, though, unclear how much emphasis the United

States intends to put into BMD for North America. The

Clinton administration is continuing the emphasis on TMD for

the protection of American forces forwardly deployed. In

February 1995 an effort by some Republicans in the House of

Representatives to speed up the fielding of a BMD system to

defend the United States was defeated in favor of more

funding for TMD.45

Test and evaluation agreements will also continue

under the White Paper–the February 1993 agreement to renew

the Canada-U.S. Test and Evaluation Program was reaffirmed

“as an integral part of our bilateral defence relationship.”

The White Paper also indicated that Canada will seek to

maintain cooperation in defense production through the

defense production/defense sharing agreements, which will

continue.46

In view of the declining threat (never that great in

the past), it should be possible to sustain joint

arrangements for the surveillance of the maritime approaches

to the continent. The existing maritime forces, plans to

augment the naval presence in the Pacific, recent

improvements to the underwater surveillance system, and

plans to upgrade Maritime Command’s information and tactical

data links, including those with NORAD, will make the

Canadian maritime contribution to continental defense

actually better than it is at present.47

Another somewhat new dimension to bilateral cooperation

is in the area of joint warfare–the effort to better

coordinate air, sea, and land forces. This has become a high

priority in the United States. In October 1993, the United

States Atlantic Command (USACOM), headquartered in Norfolk,

Virginia, became the joint headquarters for most American

forces in the continental United States (CONUS). In shifting
19

“from a predominately naval headquarters to a more balanced

combatant command headquarters,” USACOM will “facilitate the

identification, training, preparation, and rapid response of

designated CONUS-based forces currently under the Army’s

Forces Command, the Navy’s Atlantic Fleet, the Air Forces’s

Air Combat Command (ACC), and the Marine Corps’ Marine

Forces Atlantic.” As well as preparing forces for overseas

deployments, this new headquarters would be responsible for

the land defense of CONUS and direct any response to natural

disasters “and other requirements for military support to

civil authorities when requested by State Governors and as

directed by the President.”48

It is interesting to note that, although ACC will be a

component of USACOM, the new command was not given the

continental air defense role, leaving this role to NORAD.

The creation of USACOM will have other implications for

Canada. Its commander, now for the first time a Marine

general and not a USN Admiral, will still be NATO’s Supreme

Allied Commander Atlantic. In addition, to mesh with

USACOM’s joint approach, the Canadian forces will have their

own “joint task headquarters” to support the Canada-U.S.

basic security plan. This will give the Canadian Army more

of a role than in the past and a “brigade group and

associated support elements” will be assigned North American

roles (in additional to other missions).49

In general, Canada’s military capabilities will be more

than adequate for continued defense ties with the United

States in the defense of North America. At sea and in the

air there has always been the so-called “defence against

help” argument, which stresses that, unless Canada is

prepared to monitor its own air and sea approaches, the

United States will see to it, thereby challenging Canadian

sovereignty and independence. In accordance with this

argument, Canada has mounted a contribution to the air and

maritime defense of North America. Yet this argument is

losing much of its persuasiveness as the United States

itself questions the need for a major air and maritime

surveillance effort, a fact that has evidently not been lost

on Ottawa.

Moreover, the forces, especially naval and air units
20

required to sustain cooperation with the United States in

continental defense, are almost identical to those needed

for domestic tasks. This is especially the case for the

Navy, whose surface ships, aircraft and submarines are

expected to assert Canadian sovereignty and protect offshore resources. Indeed, since those earmarked for NATO and

the U.N. are also now based in Canada, they, too, are

available for North American tasks.

In the past, Canada’s security relations with the

United States have always been problematic, not so much from

an equipment standpoint but in the context of domestic

politics. This is because Canadian governments have been

caught between their support for collective defense, which

has made military cooperation with the United States

essential, and popular fears that national sovereignty and

independence would be compromised by too close an

association with the Pentagon. For this reason NATO, with

its multilateral framework, had always been stressed more

than the strictly bilateral NORAD or other continental

arrangements. In addition, the close working relationship

between the Canadian and American air forces and

bureaucracies has always lent a faint air of illegitimacy to

NORAD.50 The suggestion is that the Canadian military, eager

to play in the big leagues, has promoted an integration of

defense efforts of which the political leadership has not

always been fully cognizant.

In the present international circumstances with no real

threat to North America, a renewal of NORAD, especially one

that includes an explicit reference to BMD, might be

expected to encounter criticism that this is anachronistic

business, as usual at the expense of a new, more independent

Canadian defense policy. Moreover, with the North American

Free Trade Agreement binding Canada ever more closely to the

United States economically, Ottawa could anticipate a

reaction against further continentalist policies.

However, this is not 1986 when the Canadian “peace

movement” weighed in heavily against NORAD renewal, largely

on the grounds that it would draw Canada into the Strategic

Defense Initiative. For many in the movement, the problem

has not been the roles and missions of the Canadian Forces,
21

but the allegedly dangerous defense policies of the United

States. With the “threat of annihilation without

representation” gone and with the United States drawing down

its military and debating the merits of continued military

expenditure, there appears to be much less sensitivity in

the public and the media. Indeed, drawing upon media

commentary in the United States, the prevalent view in the

public mind is that the Clinton administration, pressured by

the Republicans, is not doing enough around the world and

may even be heading toward neo-isolationism.51 (Even former

New Democratic Party leader Edward Broadbent called upon the

United States to invade Haiti.) In this sense, peace has

weakened the peace movement, depriving it of its ability to

combine fear of nuclear war with Canadian nationalism.

Media, reporting on Secretary Perry’s visit in May 1994,

suggest that the popular concern over the link between

independence and bilateral defense cooperation appears to be

waning. (Secretary Perry even helped the new Liberal

government on the public relations front when he announced,

just prior to his visit, that the United States would no

longer need to test cruise missiles in Canada, something the

Liberals had pledged to stop during the election campaign).

There was scant mention made of NORAD in the testimony

by interests groups before the parliamentary committees on

foreign and defense policy. In their reports, the committees

called for renewal of NORAD. Indeed, the foreign policy

committee, while cautioning against greater economic

dependence on the United States, not only supported renewal

but called for a “further shift of emphasis from air defence

to global space surveillance.”52 The opposition parties, the

right-of-center Reform Party and the pro-Quebec

sovereigntist Bloc Quebecois, (BQ), for different reasons,

favor continued military ties with the United States and

will support a NORAD renewal.

Under these circumstances the Liberal government

clearly felt that it was safe in not only including its

intention to renew NORAD in the White Paper, but indicating

its interests in BMD. There is likely to be little public

opposition to renewal on grounds of national sovereignty and

independence. Indeed, it may be argued that the importance

attached to continuing bilateral defense relations in the
22

White Paper was only possible because the Canadian

government appreciates that such cooperation will not place

great demands upon the Canadian forces.

@LEFTHEADING = Contributions to International Security.

In the ultimately successful struggle of containment

and deterrence, it was always more important to Washington

that Canadian forces be deployed in Europe than in Canada.

Hence the anomaly in the 1950s and 1960s that, while

Canadians were in France and Germany, U.S. forces helped

stand the “long polar watch” in Canada. Similarly, in the

aftermath of the Cold War, Washington is quite interested in

Canada’s participation in peacekeeping and its recent

variations. Indeed, the Americans seem more concerned that

Canada play a full role in Bosnia than Bagotville, in

Cambodia than Cold Lake, in the Adriatic than in the Arctic.

During his visit to Ottawa last May, U.S. Secretary of

Defense Perry, while calling for continued bilateral

cooperation, also urged Canada to remain active in NATO and

to maintain “robust, flexible and sustainable” forces for

global operations.53

To a certain extent, therefore, the 1994 White Paper

with its multilateral orientation and pledge to maintain a

global combat capability would seem to mesh well with

current contemporary American defense policy, which stresses

the need to remain engaged abroad, including through

multilateral arrangements.54 In this regard, the links being

developed between the Canadian forces and USACOM could also

serve to foster Canada-U.S. cooperation since one of the

prime tasks of the new American command is preparing U.S.

forces for deployment overseas, including for peacekeeping

operations.

However, while cooperation outside North America

continues, it is premature to conclude that the two

countries are about to engage in a new joint approach to

international security threats, despite Ottawa’s commitment

to multilateralism. This is because there is a fundamental

difference between the two countries in how they approach

multilateral solutions and operations. For the United

States, multilateralism is a tool to be used when it can
23

support the achievement of American interests, legitimize

U.S. action, and harmonize western policies. In addition,

Washington wants allies, especially in NATO, to do more.55

Americans want to lead, on their own terms, and will be

looking for followers.

Canada views multilateralism as a means of continuing

to participate actively in global affairs so as to increase

the influence it might otherwise not exercise, including

influence over the United States. It does want to see

Washington take the lead on many issues but hopes to use

multilateralism as a mechanism of restraining unilateral

American actions and policies. Above all, Canada does not

equate a commitment to multilateralism as requiring that it

assume a greater share of the burden for defending western

interests around the globe. The limited Canadian involvement

in the Gulf War, though fully supportive of the U.S.-led

coalition, reflected Ottawa’s modest assessment of what

Canada can be expected to contribute.56

Although Ottawa is committed to continued participation

in NATO and has pledged to send forces to Europe in the

event of an emergency, the withdrawal of Canadian forces

from Germany, combined with a desire to reduce contributions

to allied infrastructure programs, sends a clear signal that

the Alliance is no longer the focal point of Canadian

defense policy. At the same time, Ottawa seems convinced

that it can still use its membership in NATO as an entry

point into European security affairs from a political

standpoint. The White Paper notes that:

@BLOCK QUOTE = Canada will be an active participant in

the Alliance’s ongoing efforts to reach out to the countries

of Central Europe as well as those of the Commonwealth of

Independent States. We give our full support to NATO

expansion, but continue to believe that this question must

be addressed very carefully–certainly, the process must not

exacerbate Russian fears of encirclement or exclusion.57

There is little doubt that the European allies, as well

as the United States, were not happy with this part of the

White Paper any more than with the 1992 decision to pull the

forces out of Germany. But given fiscal realities, this is
24

an appropriate position and one that is consistent with

current NATO strategies. If a major new threat emerges in

Europe, there is little doubt that Canada will respond.

Moreover, Ottawa can argue that with over 2,000 troops in

the former Yugoslavia for the last 3 years, Canada is doing

more than its share for European security and doing it in

situations where the Europeans are apparently unable to do

on their own.

But Canada’s involvement in any future security

arrangements that NATO may foster in Europe is to be

undertaken in such a way that they do not place new demands

upon the Canadian forces. As noted above, the forces

earmarked for the Alliance are also available to U.N.

peacekeeping and fall under the general heading of

multilateral operations, especially peacekeeping. Indeed, it

would appear that Ottawa wants NATO to follow its approach

by putting the Alliance at the service of the U.N.58

Canada has enjoyed a long-standing reputation for

active involvement and support of peacekeeping operations.

As the United Nations has increased its activities in the

post-Cold War era, so has Canadian participation. Since

1989, Canadian forces have been deployed to the Persian Gulf

to participate in Desert Storm and on a multitude of

peacekeeping missions, from Bosnia to Cambodia to Rwanda. As

of the beginning of 1995, 3.6 percent “of all peacekeepers

on duty in the world” were Canadian–some 2,900, with 2,000

of these in the former Yugoslavia. Additional forces were

preparing to deploy to Haiti.59 In addition to the Army, the

AIRCOM’s transport fleet continues to fly humanitarian

relief missions while the Navy has supported U.N.-mandated

embargoes in the Adriatic and off Haiti.

The White Paper applauds the humanitarian aspects of

U.N. action and supports the principles of the U.N. charter

but denigrates the woeful military efficiency of U.N.

peacekeeping missions.60 Chronic lack of funding, an

unmanageable bureaucracy, the archaic structure of the

permanent members of the Security Council, the over reliance

on the goodwill of member nations to contribute forces for

U.N. missions61–these failings encourage Canadian cynicism

and reluctance to participate in further U.N. peacekeeping
25

efforts.

Canada would like to see a more efficient military

command and operations structure put in place for U.N.

missions and believes such a tool is already available in

the current NATO Alliance. The White Paper notes that

“Canada believes that NATO’s reservoir of military

competence and capabilities should make a greater

contribution to U.N. operations,” by “providing the U.N.

with the vigorous military support that it currently

lacks.”62 More efficient and greater military contributions

from NATO would presumably increase the capacity of the U.N.

However, the military tools of NATO must not be decoupled

from the political direction of the U.N. The White Paper

strongly maintains that ultimate political and strategic

direction given by the U.N. must rest with the Security

Council. NATO’s means for U.N. ends can best encapsulate

Canada’s new NATO policy.

If U.N. reform and NATO support are not forthcoming,

then Ottawa might well begin reducing its peacekeeping

operations. This was suggested by the recent decision

regarding Canadian forces in the former Yugoslavia. Ten

Canadians have died in Yugoslavia over the last 3 years,

dozens more were injured, and there are reports of

depression leading to suicide among returning soldiers.63

Thus while agreeing to replace the units in Bosnia, the

government indicated that it might soon withdraw from there

and consolidate in Croatia where the intensity of the

fighting has been less. “Drawing a parallel with the 29-year

presence of Canadian U.N. peacekeepers in Cyprus which ended

in 1993,” the Minister of Defence told the House of Commons

that “it was urgent for the international community to

understand that it cannot count on Canada to keep troops in

the former Yugoslavia forever while the world waits for some

demonstration of the political will to resolve the

dispute.”64 Many Canadians have also noted that their

government is not included in the contact group seeking to

find a end to the conflict.

In some ways, Canada’s views on reforming the U.N and

partnering it to NATO are mirrored in the United States,

which therefore becomes especially relevant in Canada’s
26

relations with the United States in the NATO forum. Although

the United States would also like to see the forces of NATO

take a more active role in U.N missions, especially in the

former Yugoslavia, it is highly unlikely that the

maintenance of sole political direction from the security

council would be acceptable in the United States. The

American view is that reform of the U.N. must precede any

expansion of its military capabilities. The United States is

pressing to change the membership in the Security Council to

include both Japan and Germany,65 to reform the funding

procedures for U.N. operations,66 and to streamline the

bureaucratic process. Clearer political mandates and more

stringent criteria for measuring the likelihood of success

must be applied in future missions. In addition, the United

States will place more conditions on when, where, and how

American troops are to be placed under the operational

command of U.N. commanders, if at all.

Indeed, so strong is the American desire for management

reform of the United Nations that in 1993 the United States

withheld 10 percent of its U.N. dues until the post of

Inspector- General was established.67 Charges of waste,

corruption, and mismanagement may inhibit greater U.S.

endorsement of or participation in U.N. peacekeeping

missions.68 In addition, from the viewpoint of many

Americans, the United States should be charging the U.N. for

the costs which the Pentagon incurs “in peacekeeping

operations approved by the Security Council but not directed

 by the United Nations.” Included here would be the fall

1994 intervention into Haiti.69

In May 1994 the Clinton administration, responding to

congressional criticism, issued Presidential Decision

Directive 25 (PDD-25), which called for reform of the U.N.

and limits on American military participation.70 Opposition

to peacekeeping has increased with the new Republicancontrolled Congress. In February 1995 the House of

Representatives, by a vote of 241 to 181, approved a bill

that included provisions that went beyond PDD-25, curtailing

the authority of the President to participate in

peacekeeping operations and “set strict limits on when

American troops may serve under United Nations command.”

Congress would be afforded a greater role in determining
27

where, when, and how American troops were used. The bill

would also allow the United States to deduct from

Washington’s annual peacekeeping dues “the extra cost the

Pentagon incurs in American-run military missions that

receive the blessing of the United Nations,” such as the

Haitian operation. In 1994, those costs were estimated to be

$1.7 billion, an amount that would have wiped out the

American assessment. Although the bill provides for

Presidential waivers, these would only have amounted to

about $240 million.71

It is unclear whether the bill will pass the Senate in

its present form. On the recommendation of the Secretaries

of State and Defense, President Clinton has threatened to

veto it if it does. Given that a veto would be difficult to

override, it is likely that the provisions of the bill will

be moderated. Administration officials argue that if

implemented, the provisions would cripple U.N. peacekeeping

operations and provide an excuse for other nations to cut

back their contributions.

These indications of decreasing American willingness to

participate in or provide funds for U.N.-directed

peacekeeping missions, unless on American terms, could have

important effects on Canadian defense policy, compelling

further evaluation of Canada’s contributions. A U.N. budget

bereft of U.S. funds is not going to have the necessary

monies to carry out much in the way of peacekeeping.

Similarly, if the United States withholds certain

specialized equipment only it possesses–primarily the rapid

air and sealift capacity so necessary for quick deployment–

then peacekeeping missions will be grounded before they are

begun. If American participation and funding are reduced,

then so might Canadian participation in peacekeeping, which

has always relied on American monetary, logistical, and

military support.

Beyond peacekeeping, Canada is also showing a new

interest in other regions of the world, particularly with

the countries of the Far East and those of Latin America.

For example, Prime Minister Jean Chretien’s most publicized

trade missions have been to these two areas.72 This current

emphasis on bolstering trade relations in areas other than
28

Europe does not necessarily imply any lessening of Canada’s

strategic, cultural, and economic ties with that area–but it

does indicate that these newer areas are going to require

greater attention by Canadian defense planners as they

absorb an increasing portion of Canadian trade.

The White Paper reflects this state of affairs. It

documents how Canadian interest in the security of the Asia

Pacific region has become much more active–through the

encouragement of regional security dialogues such as the

Asia Regional Forum, the Council for Security Cooperation in

Asia Pacific, and the Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific

Security.73 Canada will expand the current program of

bilateral military contacts with a variety of Asian nations,

including Japan, South Korea, and members of the Association

of South East Asian Nations.74

Increased Canadian military ties in Latin America, the

Pacific, and elsewhere will involve cooperation with the

United States. But this new interest in broader security

issues cannot be equated with a Canadian commitment to the

security of these regions, a commitment necessitating

greatly expanded military operations. It must be

acknowledged that the key motivating factor behind expanding

defense ties is the economic consideration, not that of

traditional military security. Recently, a high-level

Canadian military delegation went to China to establish

contacts with the Peoples Liberation Army and to explore

opportunities for military exports.75 A cruise by Canada’s

newest warship into the Persian Gulf was likewise intended

to promote Canadian defense products. Here, Canada

encounters the United States trying to do the same thing.

Thus in the wider world, the two countries are sometimes

competitors, both seeking out new markets.

Ottawa believes that as Canada seeks out new trading

opportunities, there should be some commensurate

augmentation in military links with other regions and

countries outside the traditional North Atlantic triangle.

To this extent, it is unlikely that beyond staff talks,

exchanges of information, and the occasional port visit and

participation in joint exercises, Canada is prepared to

commit itself to new concrete security arrangements. The
29

emphasis upon naval ties is noteworthy since they are a

relatively inexpensive way to maintain a nominal “global”

presence. And just because forces exercise together does not

mean they will fight together. Indeed, the attractiveness of

these new links seems to rest for the most part in their

relatively low political, and above all financial, costs.

Even if the Canadian forces can hold the line on

further cuts, the reductions already announced will make it

difficult to retain more or less balanced air, sea and

ground forces. And while this may worry the military and its

supporters, it is evident that it is not especially

troublesome to the government whose approach to the role of

the armed forces in Canadian foreign policy, like that

followed during the Cold War, does not place an especially

high value on combat capability. In the present global

security environment, Ottawa apparently believes that not 

only can it secure its place in various international fora

with a lot less, but that military hardware is no longer the

coin of the realm in the highly competitive post-Cold War

global environment. Thus, Washington may well be

disappointed if it looks to Canada for support in meeting

regional contingencies in the post-Cold War world.

Conclusion.

As defense analyst Douglas Bland has observed, the new

policy moves away from a “strategy of commitments” toward

one of “strategy of choice derived from Canada’s national

interests.” The 1994 White Paper thus prepares “the way for

a national strategy and armed forces structure more

appropriate to the new security environment.” It is a

document about “choice and change.”76

The 1994 Canadian White Paper is indeed about change

and choice. Ottawa has changed defense policy from its Cold

War orientation. But it has also chosen to sustain its

traditional alliance ties that have marked Canadian defense

policy since 1945. But here, too, there is change. Thus, for

the first time in two generations, NATO will no longer be

the focal point, in either word or deed, of defense policy.

But it is also the result of fiscal realities. The

government evidently believes that membership in NORAD and
30

NATO, and any new military ties it forges, will be

inexpensive. It will afford Canada the ability to maintain

close defense relations with the world’s most powerful

nation and an array of medium powers at acceptable (and

indeed declining) levels of expenditure.

As with previous White Papers, the 1994 document very

much reflects the global trends that preceded its writing.

Not surprisingly, then, peacekeeping constitutes an

important part of the new policy. Here, it may be argued

that this White Paper will suffer the same fate of its

predecessors in that its proposal will be more appropriate

to the immediate past than the future. This is because the

rising tide of peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era may

well have peaked. But, the White Paper acknowledges the

problems of contemporary peacekeeping. It does not put its

emphasis upon this role exclusively, but rather in

maintaining a general commitment to multilateral approaches

to security. To be sure, there is a certain hollowness to

the White Paper’s claims for global combat capability. And

the new links, which the government indicates it wishes to

establish with regional powers, carry little implication of

solid security commitments. Nevertheless, the proposed

posture is about as much as the Canadian forces, and

Canada’s allies, could expect.

The 1994 Canadian White Paper on defense gets it right

this time. But this is not so much because it offers an

impeccably reasoned and clairvoyant national security

strategy. But, rather because it is largely consistent with

overall foreign policy objectives, what the public purse is

capable of paying for and what the Canadian people are

likely to support. As such, it responds to the challenge of

a more secure, yet unpredictable security situation abroad 

and the more precarious, yet inescapably certain realities

at home.

In an ironic sense, Canada may well find that it can

finally put its particular, if not always successful,

experience in setting national strategy in lean times to

good use.

ENDNOTES
31

1. In 1968 the Royal Canadian Navy, the Royal Canadian

Air Force, and the Canadian Army were “unified” into a

single service, with a single rank structure and even

uniform. Initially divided along “environmental” and

functional lines, eventually Maritime Command, Air Command

and Land Forces Command came to replace the older services.

Since the 1980s, more frequent mention has been made to the

Navy, Air Force, and Army and the distinctive uniforms

returned.

2. Canada Department of National Defence, (DND) 1994

Defence White Paper, Ottawa: Minister of Supply and

Services, 1994 (hereafter, 1994 White Paper).

3. For an overview of Canadian defense policy, see D.

W. Middlemiss and J. J. Sokolsky, Canadian Defense:

Decisions and Determinants, Toronto: Harcourt Brace

Jovanovich, Canada, 1989, Chapters 1-2; David B. Dewitt and

David Leyton-Brown, eds., Canada’s International Security

Policy, Toronto: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1995.

4. R. B. Byers, “Canadian Security and Defence: The

Legacy and the Challenges,” Adelphi Papers 214, Winter 1986,

London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986,

p. 72.

5. James Eayrs, “Military Policy and Middle Power: The

Canadian Experience,” in J. King Gordon, ed., Canada’s Role

as a Middle Power, Toronto: Canadian Institute of

International Affairs, 1965, p. 70.

6. Canada, DND, White Paper on Defence, Ottawa: 1964.

7. Douglas L. Bland, “Controlling the Defence Policy

Process in Canada: White Papers on Defence and Bureaucratic

Politics in the Department of National Defence,” Defence

Analysis, Vol. 5, 1989, p. 3.

8. Paul T. Hellyer, “Canadian Defense Policy,” Air

University Review, Vol. 18, November-December 1967, p. 3.

9. David P. Burke, “Canadian Armed Forces: Unification
32

Revisited,” paper presented to the International Studies

Association, Anaheim, CA, March 1986, p. 2.

10. Larry Stewart, ed. Canadian Defence Policy 1965-

1981: Selected Documents, Kingston, Ontario: Queen’s

University Centre for International Relations, 1982, p. 28.

11. Canada DND, Defence in the 70’s, Ottawa: Queen’s

Printer, 1971.

12. Canada DND, Challenge and Commitment: A Defence

Policy for Canada, Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Service,

1987.

13. See Michel Fortmann and Edouard Cloutier, “The

Domestic Context of Canadian Defence Policy: The Contours

of an Emerging Debate” Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol. 21,

Special No. 2, 1991.

14. Bland, “Controlling the Defence Policy Process in

Canada,” op. cit., p.13.

15. Canada DND, Canadian Defence Policy, Ottawa: April,

1992, p.14.

16. Ibid.

17. All three colleges, The Royal Military College

(RMC) at Kingston, College Militaire Royale (CMR) at Saint

Jean, Quebec, and Royal Roads Military College in Victoria,

British Columbia, trained officer cadets for all services.

Although all officer cadets are Canadian, the language of

instruction at CMR was primarily French.

18. Canada 21 Council, Canada and Common Security in

the Twenty-First Century, Toronto: Centre for International

Studies, University of Toronto, 1994.

19. See for example Colin Gray, Canadians in a

Dangerous World, Toronto: The Atlantic Council of Canada,

1994.

20. Canada Parliament, Special Joint Committee on
33

Canada’s Defence Policy, Security in a Changing World, 1994,

Ottawa: 1994.

21. 1994 White Paper, p.2.

22. Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and

International Trade, Canada and the World, Ottawa: 1995, p.

24.

23. 1994 White Paper, pp. 37-38.

24. Canada Department of National Defence, DND/CF

Bulletin, Budget 95 Edition, Ottawa: February 28, 1995.

Ibid., Highlights of the 1994 Defence White Paper, Ottawa:

December 1, 1994; Jeff Sallot, “Headquarters for Army, Navy,

Air Force to Close,” The Globe and Mail, February 28, 1995,

p. A4.

25. 1994 White Paper, p. 2.

26. The figures below are partially drawn from Canada,

Parliament, Special Joint Committee on Canada’s National

Defence, Security in a Changing World, Ottawa: 1994,

Appendices, p. 19.

27. Canada Department of National Defence, DND/CF

Bulletin, Budget 95 Edition, Ottawa: February 28, 1995.

Ibid., Highlights of the 1994 Defence White Paper, Ottawa:

December 1, 1994; Jeff Sallot, “Headquarters for Army, Navy,

Air Force to Close,” The Globe and Mail, February 28, 1995,

p. A4.

28. 1994 White Paper, p. 38.

29. Ibid., p. 34

30. Alan Freedman, “Ottawa Aims to Shrink Deficit,” The

Globe and Mail, February 28, 1995, pp. A1, A4.

31. Ibid.

32. Marcie McDonald, “Turning NORAD into Drug-buster,”

The Toronto Star, October 12, 1993, p. A21.
34

33. Briefing by Major General J. D. O’Blenis,

Commander, Fighter Group Canadian NORAD Region, Ottawa, May

 31, 1990.

34. Andrew Richter, “North American Aerospace Defence

Cooperation in the 1990s: Issues and Prospects,” Extra-Mural

Paper No. 57, Ottawa: Department of National Defence,

Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, 1991, p.

36.

35. Remarks of Deputy CINCNORAD Major General J. D.

O’Blenis to a conference on “Rethinking the Canada-United

States Military Relationship,” Ottawa, March 19-20, 1994.

36. Marcie McDonald, “Canada’s Role in Rebirth of Star

Wars,” The Toronto Star, October 13, 1993, p. A17.

37. United States Department of Defense, “Testimony by

General Charles A. Horner, USAF, Commander in Chief, North

American Aerospace Defense Command, Commander in Chief,

United States Space Command, Commander, Air Force Space

Command, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee.”

38. Lieutenant Colonel David Bashow, “NORAD, Past,

Present and Future,” Forum 8, Fall 1993. See also McDonald,

“Canada’s Role in Rebirth of Star Wars,” p. A17.

39. 1994 White Paper, p. 25.

40. Ibid., p. 23.

41. Ibid., p. 26.

42. Ibid., p. 23.

43. Ibid., p. 25.

44. “Ready to Join ‘Star Wars’ de Chastelain says,” The

Globe and Mail, January 13, 1995, p. A3.

45. Eric Schmitt, “Foreign Policy Plan of G.O.P. Is Set

Back Over Missiles,” The New York Times, February 16, 1995,
35

p. A9.

46. 1994 White Paper, p. 24.

47. Canada Department of National Defence, Maritime

Command, The Naval Vision: Charting The Course for Canada’s

Maritime Forces into the 21st Century, Halifax: 1994, pp.

17-25.

48. United States Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, Roles, Missions and Functions of the Armed Forces of

the United States, Washington, DC: February, 1993, pp. III-4

- III-5.

49. 1994 White Paper, p. 22.

50. See Joseph T. Jockel, “The Military Establishments

and the Creation of NORAD,” American Review of Canadian

Studies, Vol. 12, 1982.

51. “The America Firsters,” The Globe and Mail, March

22, 1995, p. A20.

52. Canada Parliament, Special Joint Committee

Reviewing Canada’s Foreign Policy, Canada’s Foreign Policy:

Principles and Priorities for the Future, Ottawa: 1994, p.

22.

53. Jeff Sallot, “Maintain Military Might U.S. Official

Tells Canada,” Globe and Mail, May 18, 1994, p. A5.

54. See United States White House, A National Security

Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, Washington DC: July

1994.

55. See David Gompert and Richard King, “Free Rider

Redux,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, January/February 1995.

56. See Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgot, and Kim Nossal,

“Bound to Follow? Leadership and Follwership in the Gulf

Conflict,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 106, Fall 1993.

57. 1994 White Paper, p. 35.
36

58. Ibid, p. 30.

59. Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and

International Trade, Context, “Canada and Peacekeeping,”

Ottawa: January 1995, pp. 1-3.

60. 1994 White Paper, pp. 29-30.

61. Ibid., p. 30.

62. Ibid.

63. Jeff Sallot, “Van Doos Suicide Probe Ordered,”

Globe and Mail, March 31, 1995, pp. A1, A4.

64. David Todd, “Canada Rethinks Peacekeeping Role,”

The Ottawa Citizen, March 30, 1995, p. A7.

65. Donald J. Patchily, “Clinton Abandons

Multilateralism,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 17, Autumn

1994, p. 164.

66. Ibid., p. 166. The United States feels that it is

paying an unduly harsh 30 percent of the U.N.’s peacekeeping

costs. It would like to see that percentage drop to 25

percent, with the corresponding shortfall made up from

contributions of other member states.

67. Ibid., p. 167.

68. Eric Schmitt, “Foreign Policy Plan of GOP Is Set

Back Over Missiles,” The New York Times, February 16, 1995,

p. A9.

69. Eric Schmitt, “House Votes Bill to Cut U.N. Funds,”

The New York Times, February 17, 1995, p. A9.

70. United States White House, The U.S. Policy on

Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, unclassified

version, Washington, DC: May 1994.

71. Ibid., p. A1, A9.
37

72. Prime Minister Chretien, along with a group of

provincial Premiers, embarked to China in the fall of 1994

in an attempt to increase trade relations between Canada and

the Far East. In early 1995 a similar delegation travelled

throughout Latin America in an attempt to increase Canadian

business in that region as well.

73. 1994 White Paper, p. 37.

74. Ibid.

75. Rod Mickleburgh, “Canada Holds Talks With Chinese

Military,” The Globe and Mail, March 18, 1995, pp. A1, A13.

76. Douglas Bland, “New Direction for Defence,” The

Ottawa Citizen, December 5, 1994, p. A9.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

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Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

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Editor

Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretary

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

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Composition

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Cover Artist

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