ASIA

PACIFIC SECURITY:

CHINA’S CONDITIONAL MULTILATERALIS

AND GREAT POWER ENTENTE

Jing-dong Yuan

January 2000
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ISBN 1-58487-012-5 

ii
This monograph provides an analysis of the Pe

Republic of China’s evaluation of multilateralism a

place in Chinese foreign relations in the Asia-Pacific r

In contrast to conventional scholarly wisdom, the a

Dr. Jing-dong Yuan, contends that China is not oppo

multilateral approaches. In fact, Dr. Yuan asserts 

China has adopted an approach he dubs “condi

multilateralism.”

According to Dr. Yuan, China now recognizes 

multilateral engagement is unavoidable and indeed c

useful in advancing China’s interests. China’s embr

multilateralism, however, varies depending upo

particular forum and specific issue. Furthermore, Dr. 

contends China remains leery of entering 

arrangements that might constrain its independenc

flexibility. This change in China’s attitude to

multilateralism is a significant one that has impo

implications for U.S. national security strategy and fo

interests in the Asia-Pacific.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offe

study as a contribution to ongoing analyses and de

over the future roles China will play in the interna

security environment.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR

Interim Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
JING-DONG YUAN is a Postdoctoral Fellow with the 

Asia Nonproliferation Project at the Cente

Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institu

International Studies. He was most recently a Vi

Research Scholar at the Cooperative Monitoring C

Sandia National Laboratories, and has had researc

teaching appointments at the University of B

Columbia, York University, and Queen’s University

research focuses on Asia-Pacific security, arms contr

nonproliferation, U.S. foreign policy, and Chinese de

and foreign policy. Dr. Yuan’s recent publications 

appeared in Contemporary Security Policy and the Jo

of East Asian Affairs, among others. He has a ma

degree in International Affairs from Carleton Univ

and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Queen’s Universi

is currently writing a book on U.S.-China military rel

since the 1980s.

iv
CHINA’S CONDITIONAL MULTILATERAL

AND GREAT POWER ENTENTE

Introduction.

The last few years have witnessed the emergence o

may be called Asia-Pacific multilateralism

multiplication of channels of dialogues on regional se

issues at both governmental and nongovernmental (

two”) levels. It has been acknowledged and increa

accepted among both policymakers and the aca

community that a multilateral approach to Asia-P

security issues, with its emphasis on confidence-bui

preventive diplomacy, and conflict resolution, can 

important contributions to the maintenance of re

stability and the promotion of the region’s eco

development and restoration of prosperity in the after

of the recent financial crisis. This security-building 

reflects a genuine belief that through regularized dial

and consultation, existing and potential regional co

can be more effectively managed (if not resolved) with

parameters of agreed-upon norms and establ

procedures, without recourse to threats, coercion, and/

use of force.

The extent to which this emerging Asia-P

multilateralism can succeed as an effective mechani

promoting Asia-Pacific cooperative security depends 

host of factors. Realist cautions against the “false prom

of neoliberal institutionalism aside, the perspective

attitudes of major powers toward regional multil

security dialogues can be important factors in determ

their chance of success as viable supplements to tradi

bilateral security arrangements and the regional bala

power. That the very catalyst of Asia-Pacific mu

eralism can be said to have arisen from uncertainty 

1
military drawdown, and hence a potential “power vac

inviting aspiring regional powers such as China and J

further underlines the importance of getting China ac

and positively involved in the security- building ende

This monograph traces the evolution of China’s thi

on multilateralism and regional security cooperatio

discusses some of the factors that have influenced Be

approaches over the past decade. While China’s ge

attitude has shifted from suspicion to qua

endorsement, it has yet to demonstrate that it accep

principles of multilateralism. Indeed, if anything, Beij

more interested in great power relationships even 

publicly attacks power politics. The ambivalence refle

some extent, the uncertainty with which China see

place in the Asia-Pacific and the inevitable intera

with other major players. The analysis offered her

important policy implications for the United Stat

particular with regard to its East Asian military strat

peacetime engagement through forward deployment, 

prevention, and fighting and winning war s

deterrence fail.

The monograph is organized as the following. Th

section examines the evolution of China’s post-Cold 

security agenda in the Asia-Pacific and its gradual en

ment of what can be termed conditional multilater

characterized by low degree of institutionalization. T

followed by discussions of Beijing’s approaches to the 

China Sea territorial disputes and the managem

peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. Clearly, 

is more interested in great power concert arrangeme

which it seeks to play a prominent role in regional a

multilateralism in this context only serves to provi

alternative to the existing bilateral military alliance

the United States maintains with its key allies. 

remain the core security structures in the region i

absence of Organization for Security Cooperation in E

(OSCE)-type security institutions. Finally, the a

2
interests and military strategy, and points to the n

resume and maintain stable and regularized Sin

military contacts as a key component of the U.S. po

engagement.

China’s Regional Agenda.

China’s basic assessment of the security situat

post-Cold War Asia-Pacific is a dialectic one. On th

hand, the security environment in the regi

characterized by Chinese analysts as stable and pea

with economic development the priority for most coun

on the other hand, there remain factors of uncertaint

sources of instability, highlighted by the recent eco

crisis in the region and political and social unres

number of countries, and the unresolved terri

disputes.

1

 Within such contexts, the establishment of 

political order in the region, according to Chinese ana

requires the following: (1) resolving existing conflict

preventing new ones; (2) promoting regional arms c

and disarmament; (3) establishing state-to-state rel

based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistenc

respecting each country’s right to decide its own cou

democratization conducive to political stabilit

promoting regional economic cooperation and prosp

and (6) setting up regional security dialogues bas

regional specificities.2

This rhetoric aside, what has really transpired ov

past few years is the fact that balance of power contin

feature prominently in Chinese thinking abou

post-Cold War order not by choice but out of necessity. 

short on specific proposals, there seems to be a wo

consensus among Chinese analysts as to the pre

mechanism for managing regional security problema

There is a marked emphasis on great power relation

how they may affect the contour of regional se

arrangement. What have emerged in recent Ch

3
“new trilateral relationship” (Japan, China, and the U

States) replacing the Cold-War strategic triangle 

United States, China, and the Soviet Union)

quadrangular-power relationships (China, Japan, R

and the United States), and the five-force interaction

four powers plus the Association of Southeast 

Nations). Chinese scholars contend that:

the future security of the region will depend primarily 

maintaining a balance of power in which no one country pla

dominant role. The prospects for such a stable power balance

have been substantially enhanced by the emergence o

pluralistic regional strategic environment in the post-Cold W

era in which the major powers—including the United Sta

Japan, China, Russia and the Association of Southeast As

Nations (ASEAN)—constrain each other. Stability of 

post-Cold War regional environment is strengthened not o

by this increasing diffusion of power, but also by 

improvement in relations among the major powers in 

region.

4

That is, stability in the region will be largely affec

the coordination and changes of relationships amon

five centers of force in the region—the United States, C

Japan, Russia, and ASEAN.

5

 The dynamics of 

relationships, we are told, can play a significant r

ensuring regional security and stability. 6 One C

scholar elaborates:

the international relationship in Asia-Pacific is moving towa

a new, relatively balanced pattern membered by quadrang

and multilateral forces. . . . By “quadrangular” we mea

quadrangular relationship among China, Japan, the Un

States and Russia, which has emerged out of the fa

U.S.-USSR-China triangle and resulted from the disintegra

of the former Soviet Union and the rise of Japan. Either judg

from the power equation or from the intra-regional relations

among East Asian countries, the new quadrangu

relationship is unprecedented in the history of East As

international relations. . . . The fore-said “multilate

structure has dual meanings. First, it refers to the multilate

4
quadrangle. Then it refers to the various rising forces 

Asia-Pacific other than the four countries as well as t

multilateral relations between these forces and the fo

countries.

7

One interesting point is that China seems to hav

recognized the growing role of ASEAN in regional a

including its role in building regional multilateral sec

Increasingly, ASEAN has been regarded as one of th

power centers in Asia-Pacific, along with China, J

Russia, and the United States. 8 There are a num

reasons for China’s taking ASEAN more seriously. Th

a common united front in human rights vis-à-vis the 

Beijing can use its economic power as a useful foreign 

tool to foster closer ties with ASEAN to fend off perc

threats such as the one represented by the strengt

U.S.-Japan security pact; and China can to play a 

confident and flexible and responsible role in reg

affairs.

9

 China has recently gone out of its way to rea

ASEAN countries. During the first informal China-AS

Summit held in December 1997, Chinese President 

Zemin called for strengthening bilateral relations.

10

 

recent Southeast Asian tour, Chinese Premier Li 

elaborated the so-called five points in China-AS

relations and reiterated China’s proposal for she

disputes and joint development of maritime resource

issue should be resolved peacefully and base

international law and the U.N. Conference on the La

the Sea (UNCLOS).

11

China’s emphasis on major power relations is bas

the principle of multipolarization in which it will ha

important place in regional affairs. In addition, re

stability will also be affected by a host of other fa

including continued economic growth and incre

interdependence among the region’s countries; 

values, in that the collective good takes precedence 

individual rights; the ASEAN way of nonconfront

consultation, and consensus; and simply most coun

5
stability will largely depend on the relationships be

the region’s major players; how existing disputes are 

resolved, including the establishment of sec

mechanisms; and how the diversity of the region (hi

culture, economic development, political systems, etc

be managed.

While proposing general principles for peac

settling any disputes in the region, China has not 

offered any specific mechanisms for managing pot

conflicts. Regarding emerging security-building initia

Beijing has been rather cautious in either endorsi

criticizing them, for obvious reasons. 13 Chinese an

have viewed the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) with m

ambivalence. For some, the purpose of the ARF in esse

to retain the influence of the United States in the regio

to cast some restraining net over the region’s 

powers.

14

 For others, there is the concern that re

multilateral security arrangements would be domina

the United States and become appendixes to ex

military alliances.

15 China is also keen on keeping th

process as informal as possible (e.g., Inter-Service G

[ISG] classified as meetings rather than “wo

groups”).

16

 For all intents and purposes, China’s vie

ASEAN’s role in regional security are mixed. On th

hand, a greater ASEAN will contribute to the proc

multipolarization in the region, and hence can ser

balance U.S. power and the U.S.-Japan military all

On the other hand, a more cohesive and integrated AS

can pose as an economic competitor and also a pot

adversary in South China Sea disputes.

17

Despite its ambivalence toward the regional se

mechanisms, China at least shows a toleration of 

mechanisms as long as the small and medium

countries are taking control, the process itself involves 

degree of institutionalization, and if such forums p

alternatives to existing military alliances.

18 Althoug

serves as a multilateral forum for dialogue on re

6
encounters, such as one between the United State

China. In this regard, ARF represents ASEAN’s abi

engage major powers, which is crucial for reg

security.

19

 However, its ability to manage regional se

issues remains limited due to its own institut

weakness and the fact that great powers continue to 

unsurpassed influence over the agenda, the pace

mechanisms regarding regional security iss

Meanwhile, China is strongly opposed to establishin

institutionalized mechanisms for dealing with reg

security issues since the countries in the region are 

different in terms of history, culture, political and 

systems, and different visions of national security 

priorities. An OSCE-type institutional arrangemen

only will not be able to deal with the complexity of issu

also likely falls under the control of certain powers. 2

Indeed, Chinese analysts assert that a direct tran

of the CSCE model to the Asia-Pacific region is impra

and may even be counterproductive. And Bei

understanding of the notion of comprehensive secu

premised on the recognition that different countries 

different focuses on different aspects of nationa

regional security: some on economic security; some mi

security; political and social security; etc. Dealing wit

multitude of issues should make use of a combinat

political, economic, military, and diplomatic mea

instead of solely relying on military force for mainta

security. At the same time, the negative side o

comprehensive security concept is that certain cou

may attempt to extend the scope of security; politiciz

internationalize domestic economic, social 

environmental issues; and use it as a pretex

interference in domestic affairs; and for power politic

hegemonism.

22

Nevertheless, Chinese positions on the multil

approach to Asia-Pacific security have undergone n

able changes.

23

 China seems to have gradually m

7
still hesitating about adopting institutiona

mechanisms right away. In March 1992, Chinese 

Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu proposed “to esta

gradually a bilateral, sub-regional, and reg

multi-channel and multi-layered security dia

mechanism so as to hold consultations on the i

concerned and to strengthen interchange and confide

Qian Jiadong, the deputy secretary general of the 

Council’s Center for International Studies, said t

unified regional security mechanism like the Conferen

Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) wa

appropriate to the diversity of the Asia-Pacific r

rather, multi-channeled, multi-tiered dialogues that 

both bilateral and multilateral, intergovernmenta

nongovernmental, were the most feasible answer fo

region.

25

During the 1994 ARF in Bangkok, Chinese Vice-Pr

and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen proposed the foll

principles and measures for Asia-Pacific sec

cooperation: 

• Establishing new types of state-to-state rel

characterized by mutual respect and amicable coexis

should be accomplished on the basis of the U.N. Charte

the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence; 

• Establishing economic ties on the basis of equalit

mutual benefit and mutual assistance with a vi

promoting common economic development; 

• Having consultations on an equal footing and pe

settlements as norms in handling disputes bet

countries in the Asia-Pacific region in order to grad

remove the destabilizing factors; 

• With the purpose of promoting peace and secur

the region, adhering to the principle that armament s

only be used for defensive purposes, and avoiding an 

race of any form. Avoiding nuclear proliferation. N

8
should not use or threaten to use them against non-n

states or nuclear-free zones. Proposals on establ

nuclear-free zones and zones of peace should be supp

and,

• Promoting bilateral and multilateral sec

dialogues and consultations in various forms in or

enhance understanding and confidence.

26

China’s evolving positions on Asia-Pacific securit

be characterized as what I call “conditional mult

alism.” Its essence is to present China as a supporter 

emerging regional security dialogues, while at the 

time avoid committing itself to a more institution

arrangement whose norms and rules may cons

Beijing’s freedom of action. Conditional multilater

allows China to be part of the process of building re

security, influencing its agenda, and having a voice 

pace and direction; selective involvement ac

experience in dealing with issues cooperatively 

preconditions for its participation would allow Beij

retain the ability to maneuver. Such posturing has as 

to do with Beijing’s inherent suspicion abou

effectiveness of multilateral approaches in han

regional security as with its concern that multil

forums may be used for “China bashing.”

There are a number of distinct features about C

conditional multilateralism: (1) The multi-ch

approach. Regional security issues should be dealt wit

variety of channels, including bilateral, multilatera

sometimes unilateral approaches at governmenta

nongovernmental levels. Indeed, China’s approa

regional security issues can be seen as distinctly bila

arguing that under certain circumstances bila

approaches can be more appropriate in resolving se

issues (e.g., Sino-Russian agreement on reducing mi

forces in the border areas); (2) The minilateral app

Beijing continues to emphasize the importance of 

9
gradualist approach. The regional security building p

should begin with bilateral dialogues, movi

sub-regional, and then region-wide ones. Issues shou

dealt with from an order of ascendance, i.e., from 

relatively easy to the more difficult; and (4) An Asia-P

approach. The region, because of its special char

istics–history, culture, economic development, po

systems, religion, etc., should not blindly copy the 

model; substance is more important than form. Dial

and confidence-building measures should serve to en

political trust, which is the basis of stable sec

relationships.

Multi-channel Approach. China continues to 

bilateral approaches as an effective way of dealing wi

only security issues but also inter-state relatio

general.

27

 Chinese experts maintain that bilateral rel

among the region’s major powers, rather than a multil

security structure, are the primary factors affe

security and stability in Asia-Pacific, with the 

China-Japan relationships as the key. 28 Indeed, 

Tiananmen Chinese diplomacy has been characteriz

its almost single-minded objective of improving bil

relations with all neighboring countries.

29

 Chin

regarded bilateral security dialogues as the ba

multilateral approaches. One Chinese analyst points 

bilateral problems can only be solved within the bilat

framework of the countries concerned. Attempts to so

bilateral problems within a multilateral framework of

complicate these problems and make them even more difficu

solve. Therefore, the security framework of the Asian-Pac

region should be based on bilateral security relations.

30

 The large number of local disputes and conflicts m

easily be susceptible to settlement through negot

mechanisms modeled on CSCE. “A more rea

approach,” suggests another Chinese analyst,

10
confrontation in the region. And parallel with this, ta

among indigenous Asia-Pacific countries concerned 

disputes over territorial claims, maritime rights and the l

through a certain dialogue mechanism. Thus, a unique form 

security mechanism geared to the peculiarities of t

Asia-Pacific region will gradually take shape in the course 

settling these disputes.31

Minilateral Approach. What China has shown 

interest in, with regard to Asia-Pacific security, is wh

be termed as a “minilateral” approach, i.e., how re

security issues can be managed through cooper

between major powers. Indeed, notwithstanding 

customary calls for the equitable participation of 

large and small in international affairs, recent Ch

writings on regional security are replete with 

prescriptions for major powers. One Chinese scholar 

that the current international order can be characteri

being composed of one superpower (the United States

four major powers or power centers—the European U

Japan, Russia, and China. The so-called “four trian

with the United States at the core of each spoke, would 

much impact on global and regional security ord

Another Chinese analyst suggests that:

what merits special attention is that the changes in t

relations among the four big powers, the United States, t

Soviet Union, China and Japan, are of great importance to t

political, economic and security relations in the Asia-Pac

region. . . . the maintenance of a balanced development 

relations in the Asia-Pacific region by the four big powers, . . 

of great significance to peace and stability in this region.33

There is an implied allusion to the concept of a con

powers, as the emphasis on relations between major p

would attest. In other words, regional security depend

constructive and cooperative relationship among the 

powers.

34

11
necessary, but indeed imperative, for regional security

Chinese analyst goes even further, arguing that:

any structure cannot go without balance of power or equilibr

in some form and to some extent, not to speak of the fact t

balance of power has been an important security mechan

dating back to ancient times, and has also been an import

constituent part of the present-day international secu

mechanism.

35

Chinese scholars have suggested that the proc

building regional security should follow the princip

moving from bilateral to regional/multilateral arr

ments; from confidence-building measures (CBM

security arrangements to regional disarmament; 

informal/nonofficial to formal/governmental discus

and a gradual process that requires time and pat

Given that the ARF remains limited in play

meaningful role in regional security issues, as contr

with that of the Asia-Pacific Economic Council (APE

sub-regional security framework in Northeast Asia 

be highly desirable. This design, coupled with the re

launched East Asia informal summits among AS

member states, China, Japan, and South Korea, could 

as a model for the development of East Asian regional

Overnight establishment of a security arrange

modeled after others may not be helpful.

37

 One C

analyst argues that given the region’s complexity in te

the different political systems, the variety of issues

different priorities countries face, a gradualist appro

more appropriate. The development of cooperative se

must be based on common security interests but it 

time to arrive at these common interests, give

divergent security concerns of states.

38 The logical 

should be to resolve regional hot spots and other bil

disputes first; enhance economic cooperation, and 

build the foundation for a region-wide, multila

framework upon improved bilateral relations.

3

emphasis is put on a gradual, step-by-step appr

12
through preliminary informal consultations 

discussions.

40

Asia-Pacific Approach. Finally, Asia-Pacific’s s

characteristics and diversity in history, culture, re

and economic development require a distinctly Asia-P

approach, particularly at a time when countries i

region are still in the process of adjusting their fo

policy objectives and priorities in view of the post-Col

realities. The essence of that approach is to recogniz

substance is more important than form, that inf

relations may be preferred over formal institutions

dialogue is valuable in and of itself, and that a 

overlapping informal dialogues at the bilat

sub-regional, and region-wide levels may be more a

priate at this moment than an overly institution

European model.

41

 Under such circumstances

European experience can be drawn upon—but not cop

in Asia-Pacific.

42

The broader contexts of Chinese approaches t

multilateralism are conditioned by a number of vari

They are the regional characteristics, China’s 

experience, and the dynamics of domestic politics. U

the case in Europe, where multilateral institutions su

the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (

dominated the security architecture during the Cold W

Asia-Pacific, approaches to security had been e

unilateral (self-reliance) or bilateral; indeed, most de

arrangements have involved the United States at on

and one of the Asia-Pacific countries at the other. Th

exceptions to this general rule, such as the Southeas

Treaty Organization (SEATO), or the Five-Power De

Arrangement (FPDA), have not played a predominan

in regional security.

43

 This probably explains the initia

response, which was lukewarm at best, to initiatives a

at setting up a multilateral, region-wide sec

framework.

44

13
consideration the particular features of its strategic cu

This includes:

longer time horizons and policy perspectives than those wh

characterize Western thinking and planning; reliance 

bilateral rather than multilateral approaches to conf

resolution and security planning; . . . commitment to 

principle of non-interference in the international affairs of ot

countries; styles of policymaking which feature informalit

structures and modalities, form and process as much 

substance and outcome, consensus rather than majority r

and pragmatism rather than idealism; multidimensiona

comprehensive approaches to security; and roles for the milit

that go beyond national defense to include politics, econo

development and social affairs.

45

Indeed, it was with such recognition that the North P

Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD), when i

proposed in 1990, deliberately “envisioned a more gr

approach to developing multilateral institut

recognized the value of existing bilateral arrangem

and encouraged ad hoc, informal dialogues (hab

dialogues), and inclusive participation until cond

mature for more formal institution-building.” 46

Another point that should be kept in mind is th

since the early 1990s have there emerged num

proposals for the regional multilateral sec

frameworks, and only since then has there been a ge

trend toward discussing new mechanisms for reg

cooperation on security matters. Today, there 

multitude of security dialogues at various levels, or 

may be called “multiplex,” “multi-layered,” or multifa

structure.47 Some of the principles of cooperative se

have only recently taken roots: assurance rather 

deterrence; multilateral process to replace or at least c

with bilateral military alliance; and promotion of 

military and nonmilitary security. If progre

Asia-Pacific multilateralism must be judged against it

past, considering, for instance, the fact that CSCE/

14
earlier, more serious efforts—the North Pacific Coope

Security Dialogue (NPCSD) initiative—had its 

merely 9 years ago, and the Asia-Pacific ve

approximate to CSCE/OSCE—the ARF—only bega

than 2 years ago, we may begin to assess China’s progr

quite a different light.

The differences between China and its neig

regarding their attitudes toward multilateralism 

simply reflect a matter of degree.

48 Indeed, it is unde

that ASEAN members have rejected the adoption 

CSCE-type institution but are more receptive to info

looser dialogues and consultations for exchanging 

within the sub-region or across Asia-Pacific over se

issues.

49

 At the same time, within ASEAN, conflic

normally resolved through ad hoc, bilateral consult

rather than resort to the more legal, multila

mechanism within the organization.

50

 And there are 

compatibilities between China and ASEAN coun

economic development as first priority, resistan

Western pressure on human rights issues, and po

stability.

51

Chinese approaches toward multilateralism shoul

be judged within the broader contexts of its 

experiences, its current concerns, and the dynamics 

domestic politics. China has been cautious about ado

multilateral approaches for a number of reasons

limited and negative experience; the fear of small 

ganging up against China (China bashing); and the co

that multilateral security forums may give legitima

Taiwan. China’s limited experiences with multilater

in the past were far from positive. A few example

suffice: The League of Nations and its acquiescence 

Japanese invasion of China in 1931; the Soviet attem

control China through both the 3rd Comm

International and later the Comecon. China also su

(and has tried to stop) that the territorial disputes 

South China Sea and China’s military buildup m

15
Beijing is highly sensitive about de facto recognit

Taiwan’s legitimacy through participation in some 

regional security dialogues. The stalemate conce

membership of both China and Taiwan in the Coun

Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), whic

resolved only recently, to a large extent is due to Be

objection to Taiwan’s participation.

53

Domestic politics has always featured prominen

China’s foreign policymaking; indeed, there are discer

linkages between domestic politics and foreign 

behavior.

54

 Such linkages become all the more prono

during periods of uncertainty due to leadership succe

and power transition, which makes flexibility difficul

current leadership does not wield the kind of power h

the old generation of revolutionaries and consequ

initiatives on their part are less of a possibility 

negotiated compromises. Within such a frame

important foreign policy decisions that touch 

important and sensitive issues such as state sovere

and territorial integrity will normally not be subj

multilateral considerations. Another factor that mu

considered is that external environment exerts les

direct impact on Chinese policymaking. Whil

international system acts to encourage certain beh

and discourage others, the defining variable re

domestic.

55

Another way of understanding Chinese approac

multilateralism is what Samuel Kim regards as the te

between rhetoric and practice, theory and praxis. 

tends to propose principles well beyond its capabilit

the same time, there is the practical side of Chinese fo

policy that seeks to realize maximum-security be

while minimizing moral and normative costs. This 

explain the meshing of principled stand (jiben luxian

practical adaptations under certain circumstances.

56

third way to understand Chinese multilateralism is 

can be called the rhetorical and substantive of Ch

16
flexibility in Chinese international behaviors. As lo

fundamental national interests can be secured, Beijin

been willing to be more flexible with regard to how c

issues should be handled.57

China and the South China Sea.

The origins of the South China Sea problems c

traced to the 1960s when deposits of oil and natura

were discovered. Thus began what China regards a

foreign occupation of what China considers to 

inalienable territories based on historical claims

matter is complicated also because of foreign po

interference.

58

 The reasons for the interest in the regi

simple enough: the large reserves of untapped oil reso

confirmed or otherwise, serve as a catalyst for claim

counter-claims, and disputes and possibly confront

Many claimants have displayed various ways to b

their claims: occupying islands, setting out explor

enacting national laws, publishing maps, building ma

and so on.

59

In addition to territorial disputes, Western an

suggest that in the future, resource scarcity can be

another serious source of conflicts as countries str

forever shrinking resources with ever-growing dem

China in particular will pose a challenge to the 

resource market as the country builds its prosperit

consumes more energy and food, which it already 

import. The attempt to meet this demand has driven 

and other countries looking for maritime resources 

potential collision course. The flashpoint in the South 

Sea may be a prime example. The security implicatio

obvious: unless the countries concerned reach some k

compromise, the scurry for oil can lead to se

confrontations threatening regional security 

international sea lanes of communications as well.

60

17
throughout the 1950s to 1970s and has from time to 

proposed that countries involved shelve their dispute

seek peaceful solutions; however, other claimants

Philippines in particular, began to occupy islands 

early 1970s. China only made its move in 1988. 61 Viet

seen as particularly active in asserting its terri

control. It is involved in various activities to achieve 

accompli and seek outside powers’ support by gra

concessions to foreign oil companies.

62

 Given the impo

of the marine resources for China’s economic develop

in the decades to come, there has been increasing call f

control of its maritime territories. General Mi Zhen

former vice-commandant of the People’s Liberation A

(PLA) Academy of Military Science, is quoted to argu

China must develop a strong sea power to protect an

yield a single inch of its three million-square kilomet

ocean territory. China must, according General Mi, “b

new Chinese maritime great wall.”

63

China’s own increasing interest in the South Chin

derives from its overall developmental strategy. One 

motivating factors for Chinese assertiveness with reg

the Spratly islands apparently is oil, for which Chin

have increasing demands as its economy further deve

For the Chinese, neither the 200-mile exclusive eco

zones (EEZ) nor the 350-mile continental shelf wou

sufficient for a country such as China. They note tha

for a small country like Japan, whose peace consti

notwithstanding, its interest extends to 1,000-mil

lanes of communications (SLOCs). Clearly, China sho

more for both economic and strategic reasons. 65 Accord

one Chinese estimate, China will rely on mar

resources SLOCs for 30 percent of its oil, 50 percent 

iron ore, and 80 percent of its international trade. Ind

propaganda campaign has been launched to arous

countrymen’s sea mentality. We are told that histor

great powers, from the Netherlands, to the U

Kingdom, to the United States, have also been 

18
maritime resources and consequently dominate

world.

66

At the same time, Beijing’s South China Sea polic

reflects its changing maritime strategy, which from 1

1989 was largely concerned with protecting coasta

immediate surrounding sea areas. Since the end of th

War, the policy reflects more of Beijing’s overall po

and strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region in t

both wants to assert its position of primacy a

restrained enough so as not to arouse the fear of a 

threat. In this context, China’s activities, including t

over the Mischief Reef, can be regarded as an indica

losing tolerance of encroachment on its mar

territories, but more important, its prestige as a 

power, by other claimants. Selective demonstration w

alarming neighboring states apparently has bee

adopted policy option.

67

China’s Spratly policy must therefore be seen 

broader contexts of its national development objective

its strategic view of the region as a whole.

68 This bei

case, Beijing’s top priority is economic growth a

foundation for building up comprehensive nat

strength. Therefore Beijing has sought to improve rel

with its neighbors as economic interdependence incr

to minimize the disruptive effects of territorial dis

and, at the same time, to act cautiously regarding Ja

potential and, in actuality, growing role in Southeast A

However, handling the Spratly issue remains a de

balancing act and poses a dilemma for Chinese p

makers. On the one hand, sovereignty is nonnegotiab

must be upheld. On the other hand, Beijing does not w

appear too assertive but rather as a responsible pow

other words, Beijing wants to defend its sovereignt

maintain its maritime rights and interests, but also 

good-neighborly relations with Southeast Asian coun

Two tracks are consequently followed: diplom

19
development; naval buildup in case diplomacy even

fails to protect China’s interests and force therefore m

resorted to.

70

The restraint is in part underlined by the gr

economic interdependence between China and 

regional states. This is particularly the case in Sino-AS

economic relations. Bilateral trade between Chin

ASEAN member states has increased dramatically ov

last decade: China-Indonesia, $2.15 billion (1

China-Singapore, $4.9 billion (1993); China-Mal

$2.27 billion (1994); trade with Thailand an

Philippines has also grown rapidly.

71

 China and A

countries have presented a common line in APEC 

resisted pressure from Western members for s

regional economic integration and dismantling of 

barriers. They have also resisted introducing se

issues into APEC deliberations.

72

 In addition, China s

with ASEAN members’ similar views on questions su

human rights and noninterference in domestic a

China appears to want the best of both worlds: me

fences politically with neighbors, or at least not ala

them, without conceding on territorial issues, which B

regards are nonnegotiable.

73

 Others, however, see C

more conciliatory gestures as a tactic to buy time as B

at the same time has encouraged if not directly 

implicated in various nonmilitary activities to a

sovereignty: oil exploration, scientific research, and l

radio amateurs’ expeditions.

74

Competing policy objectives have created confusio

the one hand, official Chinese statements call for pe

resolution of the issue and shelving disputes and se

joint developments; on the other hand, actual act

include announcing law on territorial waters and gra

foreign oil company concessions in disputed areas. 

after China issued the legislation on territorial wat

February 1992, Beijing began seismic survey to explo

and in May that year signed a contract wit

20
back up exploration with naval forces. These act

soured relations between Vietnam and China and 

concern in the region about China’s true intention

should be noted, though, that China has been r

cautious in carrying through its threat to use naval 

indeed, in an incident in 1994 when a Chinese se

research vessel chartered by Crestone was ordered to 

a disputed area by Vietnamese gunboats, it left a

ingly.

76

China’s issuance in 1992 of legislation asse

sovereignty over the Spratly, Paracel, and Diaoyutai i

groups drew protects from the other claimants. How

neighboring countries did not want a confrontation 

China.

77

 ASEAN’s policy of engaging China has 

regarded as a viable strategy, at least for now. The h

that over the long run, networks of security, economi

political institutions can be established and consolidat

which China has a clear stake, the framework of 

China has helped to build, and hence Beijing will ha

incentive to maintain.

78

 The question, of course, rem

what if China does not buy into it? For the time being

political costs of defection from a multilateral se

forum like the ARF have begun to outweigh the str

benefits accruing from an uncompromising terri

posture.”

79

 Indeed, regional states have misgivings 

China’s true intentions, Beijing’s assurance not

standing. They see China bent on using force to exerc

claims over the whole Spratly island group, wh

reinforced by its unbending stand on the issue and 

conflicts with Vietnam.

80

 The continuing controvers

China’s fortification of the Mischief Reef only reinforc

apprehension within ASEAN that Beijing is bent on g

its way: through diplomacy if possible; by flexing mus

necessary.

81

ASEAN’s 1992 Manila Declaration for the first 

dealt with security issues, particularly the terri

disputes over the Spratly Islands. In a joint statemen

21
of the issues and cooperation in ensuring safety of ma

navigation. China’s response was lukewarm in t

“appreciate[d]” certain principles contained i

statement.

82 If anything, Beijing has deliberately tr

avoid taking the Spratly issue to a multilateral foru

some of the ASEAN members hoped. Instead, it op

bilateral talks to resolve the issue.

83 According to Beij

rejects any attempt to “internationalize” the issue.

84

 

same time, China apparently regards any openly fo

measures in retaking the islets as contrary to its br

interests in the region.

85

 However, this has not prec

China from participating, informally, in workshops d

with issues related to the South China Sea, alth

confined to a more technical manner. Indeed, while Ch

objects to any suggestion that the sovereignty issue 

South China Sea be discussed in multilateral forums, 

declined Japan’s proposal to settle the East Chin

boundary issue bilaterally, insisting that it must invo

claimants, including South Korea.

86 Nevertheless

selective participation on China’s part, and the cha

attitudes over the years, at least demonstrate that Bei

not completely opposed to the spirit of multilaterali

not its constraining components and obligations.

87

To date, Beijing seems more comfortable in resolvi

disputes in bilateral settings. China and the Philip

issued a joint statement on the South China Sea 

pledged to settle their differences peacefully. They 

discussed other related issues such as joint develop

and maintaining regional peace and stability.

88

 The 

agreement also has been reached between China 

Vietnam. In addition, the China-ASEAN consul

forum serves to keep regular dialogues as a reassu

from Beijing to its neighbors.

89

 Vietnam, for one, has s

to move bilateral disputes to the multilateral forum w

Hanoi has called for support from its ASEAN fellow me

states. The result is that China called off its explor

22
coast.90

Meanwhile, if and how ASEAN as a group can dea

China successfully depends on whether its current str

will work. ASEAN has adopted a strategy of “bala

politics,” that is, siding with either Beijing or Washin

depending on the issue, without tightly tying itself to 

of the great powers. This gives ASEAN much n

flexibility in dealing with a variety of issues. The hop

avoid implicating China as a threat, to imply cont

support of U.S. presence in the region, integrate Chin

the growing regional economic interdependence, and 

China into the multilateral security arrangement to te

Beijing’s more assertive side of its regional policy by g

it great stakes in maintaining regional peace and stab

Concert of Power and China’s Korea Policy.

It has been pointed out that multilateralism ac

disguises what should be regarded as a concert of pow

what Robert Scalapino called “ad hoc multilateralism

which enough common interests drive major powe

coordinate their policies in tackling certain issues su

Cambodia and North Korea’s nuclear weapons progra

order for a concert of powers to work, major powers n

regulate their relations. This may also be its objectiv

size is small and it operates on the principle of flexi

thus is different from either the general princip

multilateralism and the alliance obligation. Wha

required are informal negotiations and some s

consensus on a particular issue. However, for a conc

powers to work, some minimum requirements mu

satisfied, such as most powers should be contented wi

status quo and that they share some common ideolog

agreement on common values like the avoidance of 

force in resolving issues among them.

93

 Given the diff

in achieving an ideal state of multilateralism, a conc

powers, while itself certainly is undemocratic 

23
in restraining conflicts and may continue to serv

function better than others for some time to come.

The Korean Peninsula and China’s Interests

Korean peninsula has always been considered as a se

buffer zone for China. This is the fundamental facto

influences Beijing’s policy. Additional factors in

calculating the regional balance of power; ideologica

domestic politics concerns; and more recently, eco

interests.

94

 China has always highly valued the str

importance of the Korean peninsula. It is the link be

the Asian continent and Japan, between the Eur

landmass and western Pacific, and sits on impo

SLOCs.

95

 Not surprisingly, Beijing is acutely conc

with the stability on the Korean peninsula; indee

potential or even actual conflicts in the South Chin

would pale against an escalation of tension on the peni

that could seriously threaten China’s security, just as 

in 1950.

96

Security concerns aside, China’s attitude towar

Korean issue must be seen in a broader strategic co

One consideration is the ideological connection be

Beijing and Pyongyang, which share, at least nomi

socialism. Therefore, sustaining the survival of North 

concords with fundamental national interest in prot

socialism. That explains why Beijing pushes Pyongya

adopt the policy of economic reform while maintaining 

political control. At the same time, China is wary of 

Korea’s reckless behavior and certainly does not wan

nuclear crisis to get out of control lest it lead to s

consequences. Beijing believes that Pyongyang’s n

gamble stems from its high sense of insecurity 

vulnerability and hence any resolution must addres

issue first. In addition, China does not believe that 

Korea possesses the technical capability to ass

nuclear weapons.

97

24
a largely pro-Pyongyang policy to a delicate “two K

policy. China’s decision to establish diplomatic rel

with South Korea in 1992 was well-timed and calcu

taking into consideration various strategic, politica

economic factors at both global and regional levels. 

doing, Beijing sought to enhance its position in a mul

of triangular relationships.

98 For instance, Chinese f

minister Qian Qichen reportedly told the party c

committee that by establishing diplomatic ties with 

Beijing had scored a number of points: isolating Ta

expanding economic ties with South Korea, dimin

Pyongyang’s constant demands for aid, and ga

bargaining leverage with the United States. The last 

according to South Korean officials, was to demonstra

indispensability of the China factor in the reshapin

new regional order in Northeast Asia.

99

The restructuring of China’s Korea policy 

ideological solidarity with North Korea toward a bal

two-Korea policy reflected Beijing’s overall stra

consideration in the post-Cold War era. As eco

development takes command, China requires a 

international environment for expanding trade, attra

foreign investment and technology transfers, and hen

a particular interest in seeing a stable, even 

continuously divided Korean peninsula. Managin

Korea policy becomes a delicate balancing act to rec

different interests: an economic tilt toward South Ko

security imperative to maintain a political and m

relationship with North Korea with the latter servin

buffer for China; promoting developments tha

diminish the presence of external power or at least not 

China’s interests; and using its unique position to 

promote peace and stability and enhance its own barga

position vis-à-vis other powers.

100

 One source o

power/international influence stems from be

permanent member of the United Nations Security C

(UNSC) and Beijing has since the Gulf War realized 

25
image and promoting its national interests. 101

Chinese analysts’ assessment of the Korean situa

that in overall terms the situation has become s

characterized by the two Koreas’ policy shift 

confrontation to mutual coexistence. The U.S. ro

peninsular affairs has been on the rise, with Washi

seeking an eventual development most compatible w

political, economic, and strategic interests. China’s po

has been to maintain peninsular peace and sta

expand China-Korea economic ties, and probably 

important, play a more active role if for no other pu

than to oppose any big power’s expansionist and hege

pretension in the region. In other words, any develop

must not affect China’s crucial security interests as w

its economic development plans. 102

Officially, Beijing’s position and policy regardin

Korean issue have been summarized as mainta

peninsular peace and stability; playing a constructiv

in Korea’s peaceful unification; and consolidating 

strengthening traditional China-Democratic Pe

Republic of Korea (DPRK) friendship while seek

develop good relations with the Republic of Korea (RO

specific terms, Beijing supports (1) dialogues and exch

between the two Koreas; (2) the two Koreas in their effo

resolve the problem independently; and (3) denuc

zation and peaceful unification.103 China holds th

Korean problem can only and must be resolved by th

Koreas themselves. Only through their efforts is ge

and long-lasting peace and stability possible. Wit

signing of basic accord between the two Koreas in late 

some Chinese analysts claimed that fundamental ch

had taken place, marked above all by the replacem

antagonism and confrontation with reconciliation 

cooperation. It was important for both sides to su

efforts to carry out the agreement. The interna

community, and in particular the major powers, shoul

an active facilitative role in promoting pos

26
role in encouraging and supporting inter-Korean dia

and exchanges, arms control, confidence-building

establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone, and pe

unification. Keeping good and cooperative major 

relationships is conducive to promoting peninsular 

and stability. The establishment of diplomatic rel

between North Korea and the United States and J

should be encouraged.

105

In practice, though, an even-handed “two Korea” 

proves all but elusive, in particular considering that B

seeks to at once maintain political ties with Pyon

while developing economic partnership with Seoul.

1

one thing seems quite certain; maintaining status q

the Korean peninsula, and friendly relationships with 

Koreas, rather than a disruptive unification 

denuclearization through sanctions, is Beijing

priority. China gains a lot in keeping the status quo

enhancing its own position as a swinging force or bal

Within this general framework, China tacitly acqu

the continued U.S.-ROK military alliance as b

deterrence against (the North’s) aggressive intentions 

military resurgence of Japan. However, a united Kore

remains a U.S. ally would pose a severe policy challe

Beijing’s leadership.

107

Hence China continues to support North Korea’s e

at seeking recognition from the United States and J

which is regarded as a necessary step toward red

Pyongyang’s sense of isolation and insecurity 

addressing its concern over legitimacy. While C

improved relations with South Korea strains Be

Pyongyang relations, both are aware that they have a

some common interests in maintaining a no

relationship.

108 At the same time, Beijing was nervous 

both North Korea’s nuclear programs and Washin

penchant for brinkmanship and sanctions to pre

Pyongyang into submission, which are seen by Ch

highly destabilizing. An improper handling of the situ

27
from the undesirable, namely, the potentia

nuclearization of the sub-region, to the unthinka

Clearly, China has high economic and security stak

managing the crisis and peacefully resolving the iss

both North Korea’s nuclear programs and unification 

two Koreas. 110 In this context, Beijing welcomed the O

1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, as it defused a h

explosive crisis.

Chinese analysts in general regard Kim Jong I

capable leader without serious challenges. While the r

may be facing some difficulties, the prospect of imm

collapse or the revolt against the junior Kim is un

given the North’s political structure. The economic situ

is grim, but reform of the Chinese model is unl

Meanwhile, the Agreed Framework may open some a

for expanding economic contacts with the outside.

111

 F

more immediate term, China is concerned with 

Korea’s economic difficulties and understandably 

oppose any overt action that could exacerbate the cris

lead to a disruptive collapse of the regime. In this co

China advises assistance on a humanitarian basi

advocates resumption of economic and political co

between the two Koreas. Interestingly enough, Ch

actually selling its own version of engagement. At the 

time, there are identifiable areas of common interes

understanding between Beijing and Seoul on issues 

role of the armistice regime, the need for direct inter-K

dialogues, and the undeniable role of the South i

implementation of the Geneva Accord.

112

 And Be

continued support of Pyongyang does not preclude it 

expanded opportunities in trade, investment

technology transfers with its new partner in Seoul.

1

said, China’s support in all of these areas is by no me

given; witness the recall of the Chinese delegation fro

Military Armistice Committee (MAC).

Beijing’s approach toward the Korean nuclear cr

illustrative. Notwithstanding its declared position 

28
objected to the use of coercive measures including san

against North Korea to the extent of an implied thr

veto in any U.S.-sponsored UNSC resolution condem

Pyongyang. Instead, China consistently called for dia

among the United States, North Korea, South Korea

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) rather 

sanctions.

114

 China obviously wants to use its u

position to play “honest broker” of Korean denucleariz

and its indispensability in other security-related i

therefore enhancing its own position vis-à-vis the U

States.

115

 However, that perceived influence may be o

wane as North Korea increasingly finds itself isolate

angry with China’s establishing diplomatic relations 

South Korea.

116

China insisted that the parties involved must re

cool-headed and seek resolution through negotia

rather than confrontation. To a certain degree, C

stance and in particular its preference for direct DPRK

dialogues served Pyongyang’s interests in achieving 

of breakthrough against an otherwise uncomfor

situation it stood in: isolation in the internat

community. However, as long as the general princi

nuclear nonproliferation on the Korean peninsula re

compatible with China’s overall security interests, B

likely will continue its support of the outcomes br

about by the Geneva Accord, although its suggested t

may be at odds with those preferred by Western power

as the United States. Indeed, there is strong indicatio

Beijing is highly interested in seeing the Accord 

implemented.

117

But there apparently are additional factors that ex

China’s response to the North Korean nuclear crisis, a

Korea policy in general, according to Samuel Kim.

11

are China’s own reportedly irresponsible prolifer

activities. This, coupled with Beijing’s high sens

toward state sovereignty, underpinned its strong po

against the imposition of sanctions, although presen

29
the corner). Second, China regarded the issue as a d

purely between the DPRK on the one hand, and the 

the United States, and the IAEA on the other and op

bringing the issue before the UNSC. Qian stated tha

China is opposed to the all too frequent arbitrary use 

sanctions by one country to bring pressure to bear on anot

under the pretext of controlling arms transfers while engag

in massive arms sales of one’s own which jeopardize 

sovereignty and security of the country concerned.

119

Third, China was more concerned with stability 

with the immediacy of the nuclear crisis. For the 

China first doubted Pyongyang’s capability to assem

nuclear device; and even if it could, that would be m

directed at the U.S. troops in South Korea and the 

rather than at China. On the other hand, sanctions 

force the Pyongyang leadership to resort to irra

action, with serious consequences for China. Beijing 

recognized that even if it wanted to, it had very li

capability to influence North Korea. But nevertheles

event could be used to enhance China’s bargaining po

vis-à-vis the United States, especially in the cont

post-Tiananmen difficulties and sanctions.

Finally, China’s concern over North Korea’s nu

weapons program derives from its fear of a domino 

that South Korea and Japan may resort to nuclear we

development of their own. This would change the re

strategic landscape, certainly one consequence of 

would be the reduced stature of China as a nuclear w

state. Another concern is the dilemma this may cau

that China would have to choose between its waywar

and the international community. 120 In this co

Chinese analysts have a positive view of the 1994 A

Framework, regarding it as a stabilizing factor. It h

defuse the nuclear tension; and provided an aven

external contacts that Pyongyang desperately seeks, a

as energy supplies that will relieve not only the press

30
supplies of oil. In addition, the U.S.-DPRK contact wi

Pyongyang a sense of balance and reduced sen

isolation. But perhaps more important, the agreeme

least will stall any attempt by other concerned pa

Japan and South Korea, to seek their own nu

options.

121

A Concert of Powers and China’s Role. To what exte

external environment can facilitate peace building o

Korean peninsula remains an important variable

requires a careful analysis of the major-power relation

in East Asia in the post-Cold War. The major powers 

region—the United States, China, Russia, 

Japan—harbor different threat perceptions and 

different national security interests. The divergent t

perceptions and preferred solutions present se

challenges to how these players can and will come tog

in a coordinated fashion to design a scheme for peac

stability on the peninsula.

122

 All the major powers c

want to influence developments on the Korean peni

The United States has shifted its policy focus from 

line, confrontational to a policy of selective engagemen

soft-landing for North Korea. The ultimate objecti

Washington is to maintain its key role and influenc

future unified Korea and therefore reserve its pla

Northeast Asia. Japan basically follows the United S

its negotiations with North Korea have been slow wi

many results. It wants to stablize the Korean peninsu

its own security interest. For the time being, the existe

two Koreas probably best serves Japan’s interest. R

clearly wants to increase its influence, having realiz

mistake in the early 1990s of too prompt recognition 

South and the desertion of the North.

123

The interactions among the four major powers and 

relationships with the two Koreas both reflect and rei

their conceptions of national interests and henc

pursuit of particular policies. Of the various pa

bilateral relationships, only a few can be regard

31
conflictual and cooperative) or constrained.

124

 With r

to the Korea issue, while none of the major powers see

benefit in overt military conflicts on the peninsula, 

interests in other areas do not necessarily coinci

anything, there may be a strong element of competitio

rivalry among Washington, Beijing, Moscow, and 

regarding such key issues as Korean unification, 

control and confidence-building, and the maintena

peace and stability on the peninsula.

125

Tokyo’s security outlook and interests are also cha

in the post-Cold War era. Already an economic superp

Japan now seeks to play a more active and assertive r

global and regional affairs. Japan’s immediate se

concerns are the uncertainty in North Korea and 

country’s missile programs, which pose a direct threa

longer-term challenges are the management o

U.S.-Japanese security alliance and peaceful coexis

(or competition) with a rising China.

126

Russia’s security interest in East Asia is to regain i

influence in the region. However, the designing 

implementing of an effective policy is rendered difficu

to domestic political and economic situations and comp

(and more urgent) security issues elsewhere, for ins

NATO’s eastward expansion and Chechnya. It has 

conclude a peace treaty with Japan, stalled largely be

of the unresolved territorial issue. Moscow also ne

rebuild its credibility and restore its contact 

Pyongyang. Neither proves to be easy task. For some t

come, Russia’s influence in the region will re

negligible.

127

However, by any account, the United States and 

are the key external powers likely to play relativ

greater role in affecting the development of peac

stability on the Korean peninsula. To a certain exten

divergent interests of the United States and China and 

conflicts have rendered cooperation regarding the K

32
bilateral relationship.

128 The Korea issue serves 

bargaining chip for Beijing in dealing with Washin

conversely, the United States, needing China’s coope

on the Korean issue, may try to prevent the bil

relationship from deteriorating into one of hosti

Within such a context, the recent U.S.-China summit

portend some good sign of cooperation to come regardi

Korean issue.

U.S. commitment to Korean security has been bas

three pillars: the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty, Com

Forces, and the annual Security Consultative proces

end of the Cold War notwithstanding, Washington h

been lulled into illusion and indeed regards North Ko

its current weakness and decline as a greater thr

South Korea and U.S. interests in the region than a

time since the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. T

especially the case when taking into consideration 

factors as North Korea’s massively forward deployed t

with well-trained special operation units, a growing ar

of short- and medium-range missiles, the covert n

weapons programs, chemical and biological weapons

an offensive military doctrine. There is greater concern 

ever that any accident, incidence, or miscalculation 

demilitarized zone (DMZ) may escalate out of control

taken as an excuse by the North to launch a rapid offe

into the South. The continued deployment of U.S. for

the ROK therefore demonstrates a firm commitmen

serves as a deterrent against potential North K

aggression. And Washington envisions a continued, r

U.S.-ROK security relationship for stability o

peninsula and in the region even if North Korean th

were to diminish.130

For the United States, its fundamental interests c

on the prevention of the rise of any single hegemonic 

in Asia-Pacific, access to the region’s expanding ma

nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (W

and the promotion of democratization.

131

 These int

33
the presence of forward-deployed troops, an

consolidation of U.S.-Japanese and U.S.-ROK se

alliances.

132 As much as it continues to maintain a 

vigilance, Washington has also made noticeable chan

its policy toward North Korea since the signing o

Agreed Framework in October 1994. That the United S

wants to enhance its position in the Korean issue is 

recognized by Chinese analysts. The Framework is se

the United States attempting to promote nonprolife

policy, enhance the sense of security for its allies, Japa

South Korea; strengthen the bilateral alliance

consolidate and enhance its position in the region.

133

There have been expanded contacts bet

Washington and Pyongyang. This policy shift from co

diplomacy to conditional engagement reflects Washin

interest in maintaining stability on the peninsula, sec

Pyongyang’s cooperation in implementing the terms 

Agreed Framework, and inducing gradual changes 

North Korean regime. The U.S. approach ca

characterized as one of emphasizing carrots and stick

mixing military, diplomatic, and arms control measu

deal with the Korean issue. While there is cont

emphasis that the U.S. role in the peninsular arms c

process should be one supporting South Korean pos

there are also suggestions that Washington use 

traditional levers such as sanctions relief, in addition t

aid, to entice North Korea to conventional arms cont

The new U.S. approaches, seen by some a

accommodating, have already strained the Washin

Seoul alliance. A recent instance has been the diffe

over the issue of seeking a North Korean apology f

September 1996 submarine intrusion into the South. 

Washington was looking beyond the incident to ensuri

overall policy objectives, including the implementat

the Geneva Accord, Seoul wanted a direct apology and 

to link food aid and light water nuclear reactors 

North’s acceptance of inter-Korean dialogue.

135

 With 

34
the recent submarine incident, the Clinton administ

has granted permission to export food to the North

apology may indeed serve this purpose: to get badly n

food aid. And there may be more: in return for the 

promise to open up a trade office in the North.

136

Of the four major powers, China is viewed as the on

still retaining some, although gradually diminis

influence over North Korea. This influence derives i

from Pyongyang’s reliance on Beijing for moral 

material support and Beijing’s need to sustain one of th

remaining socialist countries since the collap

communism in Eastern Europe and the former S

Union. From a security perspective, Beijing continu

regard stability on the peninsula as of crucial importa

its own national interest. There are, of course, br

national interests to be served through an effe

management of the Korean issue. China increasingly 

to South Korea for expanded trade, investment

technology transfers. This requires a subtle balanci

that both addresses South Korea’s security concerns 

North Korea’s nuclear weapons program) without u

alienating North Korea. Yet a third consideration i

Beijing increasingly recognizes the utility of usin

Korean issue to advance its fundamental national int

across the board, including its dealing with the U

States. These multi-, and indeed competing, interest

large extent explain the equivocal nature of Beijing’s 

policy that sometimes appears highly contradictory.

1

Sino-North Korean trade has been declining ove

past decade in absolute terms, made more difficu

Chinese demands for hard currency to settle account

growing trade between China and South Korea

because of the almost total disappearance of S

Russian assistance and diminishing volumes of tra

default China has occupied a greater position in 

Korea’s trade equation, representing close to one-th

Pyongyang’s total foreign trade.

138

 For instance, in 

35
food imports, 75 percent of its oil and 88 percent o

needed for steel production.

139

Even though North Korea has become highly depe

on China as a major supplier of key foodstuffs and 

commodities like oil, Beijing itself regards its leverag

Pyongyang as limited and is reluctant to dispense w

Instead, quiet diplomatic efforts were recommended 

Beijing values stability more than anything else. Sanc

on the other hand, may force North Korea into irra

actions, may be effective in resolving the nuclear issu

may have the rallying under the flag effect. However, 

may be other explanations. One of them is the fac

China probably does not want to see North Korea colla

a result of sanctions. After all, Pyongyang is one of th

remaining communist regimes in the world. Another i

Beijing did not want to be placed in a position that it 

have to choose between Pyongyang and the rest of the 

should the sanctions be imposed.

140

However, other players assume that China has 

credible influence over North Korea. China is argued 

in a unique position in which it channels to both Pyon

and Seoul.

141

 It has been suggested that Chi

manipulating the situation to gain a favorable posit

dealing with others; by at once declaring that it was op

to nuclear development on the Korean peninsula 

against the imposition of sanctions, Beijing was ac

encouraging Pyongyang to adopt a hard-line position

China has actively promoted its crucially importan

in settling the Korean issue, including the nuclear cri

the process it has sought to neutralize the role of 

Russia and Japan, leaving itself and the United Sta

the only important external players. The best situ

would be one in that a unified Korea would rely on 

with the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the penins

Beijing also provides the venue for the DPRK-ROK 

China is reputed to have normal relations with th

36
position.

144

As a signatory state to the 1953 Armistice Treaty, 

agreed to participate in the four-party talks on establ

a peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula and pled

play a cooperative and constructive role in the proc

China chaired the second round of four-party 

Assistant Foreign Minister Chen Jian, noting that the 

had moved from procedural discussion to substa

discussion, pointed out that, due to different situa

each side had different priorities and therefore diffic

were expected. Chen emphasized that each side s

adopt a responsible attitude toward the Korean p

Asian and global peace and stability, and move the 

forward. Fairness, balance, and flexibility should b

attitude in discussing various issues.

146

The official Chinese positions aside, there are que

about the consistency of policy implementation

particular example is China’s attitude toward the 

Armistice Agreement.147 On the one hand, China mai

that the existing armistice regime remains valid 

functional. During his official visit to Seoul in Nove

1995, Chinese President Jiang Zemin disclosed Be

disagreement with Pyongyang on the status o

Armistice Agreement. On the other hand, however, 

has withdrawn its representative from the MAC a

insistence of North Korea and has suggested tha

parties concerned look into the possibility of findin

mechanisms to replace the current armistice regime.

There are also questions about China’s know

about, and leverage with, North Korea’s nuclear we

and missiles programs. The assumption here is that 

may exercise considerable influence over the activi

the North Koreans now that Beijing is Pyongyang’s on

of weight. While this may be true although the extent c

far less significant than presumed, the reverse is 

probable. In other words, “the position of North Kore

37
the process.”

148

 Pyongyang is not necessarily always 

inferior position dealing with Beijing. It can, for exa

play the “Taiwan” and “Russia” cards. The r

Taiwan-DPRK deal in nuclear waste storage is a c

point. Pyongyang conceivably can also take advant

the Sino-Russian competition for exercising influen

North Korea.

149

Finally, as already discussed above, China may s

status quo on the peninsula as being to its own ben

anything, Beijing may not want to see a unified K

especially one with a strong military (and pro

nuclear-armed), highly nationalist, and allied wit

United States and Japan. Beijing has interest in conti

to play a central role in a divided Korea and seeing its 

relationship with North Korea a valuable asset that 

Beijing some leverage in dealing with Washington, T

and Seoul. China also needs a “buffer” for its own sec

In this sense, China’s advocacy for peace and stability 

peninsula can be interpreted as the maintenance of 

quo.

150

 In any event, unification “could sharply inc

insecurity in the region,” in particular given the fac

unification will have to take place in an uncertain se

environment without full-fledged multilateral institu

Other implications may include potential terri

disputes and an economic competitor in a unified Kore

further consideration would be whether a unified 

would remain an ally of the United States and 

continued American military presence that w

negatively affect China’s security.

152

China’s ability to influence North Korea has de

over the years but not totally disappeared. As the only 

remaining supplier of resources and ideological bedf

Beijing’s North Korea policy must be seen as being af

by a number of factors. To begin with, China certainl

not want to see the collapse of the Pyongyang regim

some kind of support, material as well as moral, w

rendered. China’s provision of food aid is a clear exam

38
push for developments favorable to its own inte

likewise, it will try to block situations that are harmfu

security. Thirdly, China may seek to use both its infl

and the perception of its possessing such influen

broader policy considerations: to be seen as a major pow

deciding regional issues, and to exert quid pro quo fro

United States on issues important to China. T

considerations determine Beijing’s policy toward 

Korea, in particular if not exclusively on the nuclear 

This being the case, then it is relatively understan

that China all along would oppose the impositi

sanctions or any other measures that would either g

weaken the Pyongyang regime or push it to the corner 

that irrational action may be taken. 154

Implications for U.S. Policy.

Chinese security policy has important implicatio

the United States, not the least of which directly con

the Department of Defense in the formulation 

execution of its East Asian strategy. Despite the 

efforts at improving bilateral relations as represent

Jiang Zemin’s visit to the United States in November 

and President Clinton’s visit to China in June 1998, 

exist within Chinese academic and policy circles s

views that the management of bilateral relations will 

remain the toughest challenge for Beijing. 155 The sa

also true within the U.S. policy and academic circ

Chinese scholars have identified a numb

characteristics that define post-Cold War Sino

relations.

157 First, with the end of the Cold War, C

weight in the previous strategic triangle has cha

conflicting views and interests previously conceal

relegated to second-place importance are now assu

greater salience. Second, Sino-U.S. relations may shif

a global outlook to a Asian-Pacific focus. Third, ideo

will pit China and theUnited States against each ot

Fourth, there is increasing economic interdepen

39
disposal greater leverage because of China’s gr

reliance on the United States concerning market a

technology transfers, and investment. But the exte

which Washington can apply such a leverage to ac

other political and diplomatic objectives is constrain

the consideration that China will grow more importa

the U.S. economy and the short-term abuse of eco

power may result in long-term economic losses whic

crucial to U.S. economic security. Finally, despit

changing international politico-strategic environmen

management of bilateral conflicts remains importa

the United States as China is crucial in a number of 

(such as the role of the U.N., nuclear nonproliferation

control and disarmament, Korea, and Asia-Pacific sta

and Beijing’s cooperation is not a forgone conclusion 

U.S. strategy in the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific a

maintain its alliances through forward basing of troo

minimize the impacts of the “tyranny of distance”

prevent the rise of any power in the region tha

challenge and even pose a threat to U.S. interests; a

continue to promote and support market economy 

democratization.

161

 Specifically, this strategy has 

components of military relevance:

peacetime engagement, which includes a forward prese

crisis response, which builds on forward-stationed forces, 

“boots-on-the ground”; and if necessary, fighting and winn

any conflict that might develop.

162

While the United States endorses and encourage

building of multilateral security mechanisms in the r

it continues to regard its military presence as a c

element of stability until such a cooperative security s

is established. The focuses of U.S. security concerns 

from the Korean peninsula, the China-Taiwan dis

and to the potential flashpoints in the South China S

Within this context, the United States has viewed Ch

posing a potential challenge over the next 20 years.

16

40
interests, which are further complicated by a perceptio

largely a result of different historical and cu

experiences, as well as strategic orientations

managing of this relationship will remain the challe

leaders in both Washington and Beijing for years to co

There are a number of potential points of conflict be

China and the United States that could lead to m

confrontation if mismanaged. These include the U.S.-J

military alliance and the future of Asia-Pacific se

mechanisms; the Taiwan issue and the U.S. role

theater missile defense (TMD) in the region. 

U.S.-Japan Military Alliance. The continued prese

U.S. military forces in the region and , in particu

resilient U.S.-Japan security alliance are viewed by B

as more of a threat to Chinese interests than as a bless

that they serve to keep Tokyo from seeking remi

zation.

166 One is the contention over the future re

security mechanism, pitting military alliances ag

multilateral security arrangements such as the ARF

post-Cold War U.S. strategy has been the enhancem

bilateral military alliances, in particular the elevat

the U.S.-Japan alliance from the defense of Japan t

that more actively involves Japan in maintaining re

security. China regards the updating of the U.S.-J

security alliance as having serious implications for it

security, in at least three ways. First, Beijing sees t

part of the U.S. strategy of containing China. After a

U.S.-Japan alliance was established during the Cold 

years and with clearly defined enemy and mission

Soviet Union and the defense of Japanese territories

the target clearly is China. As a result, U.S. effo

strengthening military alliances are interpreted in B

as a hedge against China. Second, Beijing is extr

worried about the consequences of a more actively inv

Japan: Tokyo can be set on a path to remilitarization. J

already maintains the second largest defense budget 

world and has a reasonably sized (given its 

41
region. In addition, Japan’s industrial and technol

wherewithal will provide it with ready resources sho

decide to become a military great power at short n

Third, China is concerned with the possible intervent

the U.S.-Japan alliance in its unification plan. T

ambiguity regarding its defense perimeter based n

geography but on events only raises Beijing’s anxiety

In obvious countermeasures, Beijing has in recent 

actively advocated the notion of “security coopera

emphasizing the importance of multilateral sec

dialogues and consultation, in an apparent effort to pu

an alternative to the current security structure in the r

that remains largely reliant on military alliance

forward military deployments at both the official (e.g., 

and Track II (e.g., CSCAP) levels.

167

Taiwan and U.S.-China Relations. A second poten

of conflict concerns Taiwan. U.S. forces in Asia-Pacif

increasingly seen as a major obstacle to Ch

political/diplomatic objectives in the region, in particu

drive for national unification. The two aircraft carrier 

groups that the United States dispatched to the 

during Chinese military exercises in March 1996 

vicinity of the Taiwan Strait shocked Chinese m

planners and were deeply resented as an uncall

provocation and gross interference in Chinese in

affairs. Indeed, the United States is seen as standing 

way in Beijing’s unification efforts, and the PLA is p

new emphasis on strategies and weaponry to counte

naval forces in the Asia-Pacific region. 168Some 

war-games were conducted with the U.S. Navy a

enemy.

169

Indeed, Washington’s Taiwan policy is of most s

security concern for Beijing. China has viewed 

increasing alarm and indignation the U.S. deviat

recent years from the “One China” principle set forth 

three Sino-U.S. joint communiqués. The sale of 150 

42
upgrade U.S.-Taiwan relations constitute the most s

violations of the principle and are responsible fo

downturn of bilateral relations. This shift of pol

attributed to U.S. domestic pressures, both politica

commercial, and Taiwan’s active “pragmatic diplo

and intense lobbying in U.S. federal and state legisla

The Chinese have interpreted the change in U.S. Ta

policy as aiming at “obstruct[ing] Chinese reunific

reinforce[ing] its bargaining chips in containing Chin

treat[ing] Taiwan as a prototype for the peaceful evo

of China.” 170At the same time, U.S. policy of providing 

sales to Taiwan to maintain the balance across the 

while encouraging dialogues continues to irritate B

and is therefore considered a major obstacle in bil

relations. In this context, Clinton’s publicly prono

“three nos” during his recent visit to China to some e

suppress but not eliminate the issue in bilateral relati

While Washington continues to regard the cross-

problem as a political one and hence encourages resolu

accordingly, the potential for military conflict put

United States in a delicate position: there remains a 

risk that future conflicts can entangle the U.S. mi

enhancing a direct military confrontation betwee

United States and China.

172

Theater Missile Defense (TMD) in East Asia. A 

potential point of conflict concerns regional arms c

and nonproliferation issues, in particular in the cont

the contentious theater missile defense (TMD) in 

Asia.

173 China has already voiced strong objection 

research, development and deployment of regional (

systems.

174

 Beijing’s concerns can be seen in at leas

areas. First, the Chinese see TMD as yet another delib

step that the United States has taken to strengthe

U.S.-Japanese military alliance, arguing tha

deployment of TMD in Northeast Asia would enhan

alliance’s offensive as well as defensive capabilitie

China, the pretext of using a North Korean missile lau

43
Pyongyang’s current situation. Second, China con

that TMD research and development encourage and p

a pretext for Japanese remilitarization. Beijing’s sus

of a post-Cold War assertive Japan is reinforced by T

reluctance to be forthcoming on its historical record

ambiguity regarding its defense perimeter 

“situational vs. geographical”); its potent and pot

military capabilities; and its potential involvement 

Taiwan.

Third, a regional TMD system, in particular if i

include Taiwan under its coverage, likely will give a 

sense of security to the independence elements on the 

and impede China’s reunification task. At the same 

incorporating Taiwan into the TMD system w

represent a gross violation of China’s territorial integ

blatant act of interference in China’s domestic affairs, 

de facto reinstatement of the 1954 U.S.-Taiwan De

Pact. 

Fourth, the development of TMD, in parallel 

National Missile Defense (NMD) system, represe

violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile System (ABM) T

derails global (read U.S.-Russian) nuclear disarma

and moves the arms race into outer space. In the re

context, the Chinese assert that TMD will lead to an 

race (the shield and sword dynamic). The message is 

should TMD go ahead, this may force China to reco

some of its arms control commitments, for example, 

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). B

probably will need more missiles if TMD deployment i

as inevitable, and the development of miniature n

warheads and multiple independently targeted re

vehicles (MIRV) missiles, which require testing an

simulation, may not be possible for China. In addition, 

is the need to keep the option to have sufficient we

grade fissile materials for nuclear weapons moderniz

Yet another response would be a resumption of m

44
retaliatory measure.

175

And finally, TMD threatens China’s limited deter

capability. Due to its proximity to China, TMD deploy

in Japan could well pose a threat to China’s str

retaliatory capability. The Chinese point out that h

advanced TMD systems, such as theater high altitud

defense (THAAD), can intercept missiles in outer spac

cover a wider area, and therefore they are able to neut

China’s limited strategic nuclear capability.

* * *

Given the high stakes involved in managing post

War U.S.-China relations, a policy of engaging 

without compromising fundamental U.S. interests 

region is called for. Such a policy must be based on a 

assessment of the regional realities, realistic and obta

objectives, available resources, and specific p

options.

176 A key strategy would be to find ways to inte

a rising China into the international and regional se

and economic frameworks so as to avoid the instabilit

often accompanies the arrival of a rising power.

177Wh

highly critical that the bilateral relationship mu

managed at the political level, military-to-military co

also constitute an important component of any U.S. 

strategy for a number of reasons. To begin with, histo

suggested that the rise of new powers tends to be h

destabilizing to the international system, with war oft

consequences of irreconcilable interests between the s

quo and rising powers. Needless to say, in all 

instances, the militaries have been the key instrum

power politics, at least until recently. We have now 

come to a critical historical juncture where the U

States for the time being enjoys the unipolar momen

with China poised to become a major contende

challenger. Secondly, Sino-U.S. military relations ov

past two decades have been subjected to drastic chan

45
environment, leading to situations of high uncertaint

grave danger (e.g., the Kitty Hawk incident in 1995 an

Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-96), with the distinct poss

of direct military confrontation. On the other ha

functioning bilateral military relationship, with gr

transparency and better understanding of each o

strategic outlooks and military doctrines, may help to

developing effective mechanisms for managing dis

Military counter-ballistic missiles (CBMs) are h

desirable, even (and perhaps particularly) bet

potential adversaries.

Thirdly, given the important role the PLA pla

Chinese national security policymaking,

178 the ext

which U.S.-Chinese military relations can have a po

impact, and under what conditions, makes a fascin

and policy-relevant case study in its own right. Fin

more cooperative bilateral military relationship could 

a potential contribution to regional stability. It 

encourage the PLA in peacekeeping, and search and r

activities, hence both satisfying the Chinese mili

desire to be seen as a major player in regional geop

and channeling the formidable and modernizing Ch

military to a stabilizing rather than disrupting role

will not be easy, especially at a time when the U.S. bom

of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the Cox Rep

alleged Chinese espionage have already inflicted casu

on bilateral relations, including military exchanges;

the precedent for building such a relationship exists.

Indeed, the last 5 years have witnessed a revitaliz

of Sino-U.S. military relations characterized by exch

of high-level visits at the defense ministerial and s

chief level, regular contacts at the functional level be

the two countries’ national defense universities 

military academies, port visits, and limited joint exe

in search and rescue operations. At the same time, th

militaries have also engaged each other in excha

views on doctrines, security perceptions, and de

46
given the unstable nature of overall bilateral relation

the same period, highlighted by tension over the T

issue and the continuing differences over issues suc

trade, human rights, weapons proliferation, and str

interests regarding regional and global security arr

ments in the post-Cold War era. The lessons learned 

be of significant value, especially at a time when bil

relations again sink to an all-time low in what C

Susan Puska has described as the boom-bust cycle.

18

How to maintain a policy continuity in a cont

drastic changes must be the toughest challenge ahe

U.S. policymakers, including the military leadership

earlier period of initiating bilateral military relation

clearly justified in meeting U.S. strategic objectiv

competing with the Soviet Union. With the end of the 

War and in particular the demise of the Soviet empir

focus of U.S. strategic priorities has shifted to re

stability and the development of greater abilit

intervention to maintain U.S. primacy. Within this co

China’s importance to the United States remains: i

growing power; it holds U.N. Security Council membe

and it has increasing influence in Asia-Pa

Consequently, continued exchanges between th

militaries, the world’s strongest and the world’s la

would serve post-Cold War U.S. interests of transpa

confidence building, and hence the avoidance of pot

conflict.

181

By actively engaging the Chinese militar

United States hopes to have a better understanding 

PLA military doctrines and security perspective; a

same time, greater transparency will also 

misunderstanding, especially in the context of a pot

conflict across the Taiwan Strait and the enha

U.S.-Japanese security alliance. The basic premise b

U.S. comprehensive engagement with the PRC is tha

a strategy will facilitate an orderly entry of Chin

acknowledged regional and potential global power

international and regional affairs and allow the wo

47
and Japan. Also recognized is the important role 

military in Chinese politics and foreign policy, which j

engaging the PLA.

The Chinese rationale may be different. To begin 

Beijing regards the Sino-U.S. military relationship 

important component of overall bilateral relations, 

enhanced military contacts should reflect imp

bilateral relations and vise versa. Secondly, ther

important psychological factors in that the PLA wants 

seen as a peer with the U.S. military, the strongest 

world. Port visits, for instance, can have good demo

tion effects where the PLA Navy can be showcased 

American public as well as to the domestic audienc

another reason may be to gain a better understand

U.S. military thinking, particularly in the area o

Revolution in Military Affairs, and to explore the poss

of greater cooperation involving, hopefully, the trans

military technology, although under the cu

circumstances the last would be most difficult to ac

But Beijing fully recognizes the uncertain nature 

Sino-U.S. relationship and is suspicious of Washin

true strategic intentions regarding the U.S.-Japan m

alliance, Washington’s meddling in China’s domestic a

(Taiwan) and its obstruction in China’s entry into the 

Trade Organization, and pressures on China to chan

arms transfer policy.

Conclusion.

How do we assess Chinese perspectives on 

approaches to multilateralism? One can examin

aspect along two different dimensions. One is the pre

of China in the various multilateral processes/institu

The other is the acceptance of multilateralism as a no

dealing with regional security issues. On the surface, C

has been a rather consistent, if only passive, particip

various multilateral forums as practiced in the Asia-P

48
conflict resolution (e.g. Cambodian peace process, the 

China Sea workshop); (2) “sub-regional” cooper

(ASEAN); (3) formal governmental efforts at the re

level (ARF); (4) track-two programs (CSCAP); an

U.N.-sponsored and multilateral institutions and pro

having a bearing on regional security issues. 182 On the 

hand, Beijing has demonstrated a clearly varie

approach toward multilateralism; in other words, the

different “scripts” or versions of Chinese multilateral

different environments (e.g., U.N. as opposed reg

forums), and for different issues (e.g., economic as op

to security). Conditional multilateralism represents b

version of what may be a whole repertoire of Ch

strategies of presenting its foreign policy.

To say that China has consistently held dubious, 

hostile, attitudes toward multilateral institution

regime-generated rules may be simplistic and 

misleading. What is clear, though, is that China’s app

to multilateralism betrays a degree of varigatednes

selectiveness. While Chinese policy declarations 

tended to be all things to all, Chinese behaviors in va

international organizations have demonstrated a gr

movement toward accepting the norms and princip

existing regimes rather than challenging them hea

Samuel Kim’s studies of Chinese behaviors in interna

organizations show that the degree of Chinese accepta

and compliance with norms, principles, and rules ma

function of the extent to which the so-called “g

learning,” which induces “global thinking,” is ac

taking place. Positive learning can be facilitated th

positive participatory experiences. However, there 

strong utilitarian element in the Chinese acceptance 

rules, norms, and principles. To the extent that ex

international order facilitates China’s goals of mo

zation (e.g., aid, and investment and technology tra

from the capitalist world), there is no need to challen

The learning process is important in that both domest

49
cognitive maps of what China’s interests, role, and 

should be.

183

China’s fundamental attitudes toward multil

security cooperation may be better understood 

consistent reflection of its holistic approach to the 

issues of national interests and the best means to pr

them. Beijing’s earlier suspicion and concern over re

multilateral enterprises have all but been removed, t

to ASEAN’s role in the process. China’s endorsement, 

other hand, may be a courtesy to its neighbors but mor

realization that refusal to participate incurs 

image-wise. But China is more interested in a conc

powers managing regional security issues. This falls 

with its recently adopted policy of maintaining 

great-power relations as fundamental to realizing 

policy objectives, including stability and a better cha

handling the Taiwan issue. In this regard, multilater

if it has any value, would remain less important tha

balance of powers and the bilateral mode of man

interstate relations. Given the complexity in 

Asia-Pacific region, one may find it hard to simply di

Chinese approaches as self-serving, which ca

summarized as containing the following key elem

stable major-power relations; nonconfrontati

nonalignment against third party; dialogue and pe

resolution of disputes; noninterference of domestic a

equal consultation; mutual security as opposed to se

through military alliance; and economic security 

prosperity.184

Military diplomacy and cooperation range from al

relationships to minimum confidence-building mea

the purpose of which is to avoid the risk of war. The cu

Sino-U.S. military relationship is somewhere in betwe

is neither an alliance relationship nor a direct adver

one. There are important differences in security ou

and military strategies between the two countries

United States sees its continued military presenc

50
defense alliance as crucial to regional stability. It rel

quick reaction and the ability to intervene as an impo

post-Cold War strategic requirement. The Chinese, o

other hand, want to regain regional prominence 

freedom in dealing with what they regard either as dom

or purely bilateral issues. China’s recent change of at

toward multilateral security structures and an empha

security cooperation partnerships run directly oppo

U.S. reliance on bilateral security alliance and fo

military deployments. Taking a cue from the Gulf Wa

PLA is actively modernizing its military forces to serve 

indispensable instrument of diplomacy. At the same 

the two do not see eye-to-eye with regard to such iss

transparency and regional security frameworks. Give

China and the United States have different str

objectives, interests, and priorities, and given the 

uneven development of the bilateral military relatio

what lessons can be learned and what condition

necessary to enhance cooperation in areas of com

interests and minimize and manage policy difference

avoid potential conflicts?

The Sino-U.S. military relationship has undergon

two decades of uneven development. There have 

periods and areas of better cooperation and on

suspicion and confrontation. This monograph suggest

for a more stable bilateral military relationship to de

longer-term strategies must be formulated that emph

engagement, exchange, and better understanding o

other’s interests, priorities, and policy options. Partic

important may be greater contacts between the 

militaries at the officer corps level where both sides 

increasingly similar makeup in terms of education 

selection criteria and share the ideals of profession

Such a relationship cannot be left untended to be sway

the vicissitude of bilateral relations during a crucial p

of transition in international politics and adjustmen

51
perhaps, one of the greatest challenges ahead.

ENDNOTES

1. Lu Zhongwei, “Yatai anquan xingshi xiangdui wend

Relatively Stable Asia-Pacific Security Environment],” Lia

[Outlook Weekly], No. 27, July 4, 1995, pp. 41-43; Liu Jingsong, 

fenbao zhongde yatai anquan [Asia-Pacific Security ami

Financial Storm],” Shijie zhishi [World Affairs], No. 7, 1998, p. 

2. Chen Qimao, “Guanyu zai yatai diqu jianli zhengzhi xinc

tansuo,” Guoji Wenti Yanju [“Seeking for a New Political Orde

Asia-Pacific Region”], International Studies (Beijing), No. 1, J

1992, pp. 5-8.

3. Xu Xin, “Changing Chinese Security Perceptions,” N

Working Paper, No. 27, Toronto: North Pacific Cooperative S

Dialogue: Research Programme, York University, April 1992, pp

4. Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, “Beijing’s V

Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific Region,” Contem

Southeast Asia, Vol. 15, No.1, June 1993, p. 16.

5. Guo Zhenyuan, “Prospects for Security Cooperation 

Asia-Pacific Region,” Beijing Review, Vol. 37, No. 38, July 11-17, 

21.

6. Chen Qimao, “Asia-Pacific Awaits Great Geo-Strategic Ch

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8. Shi Yongming, “ASEAN: A Strong Voice in the Post-Co

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9. Michael Vatikiotis, “Imperial Intrigue,” Far Eastern Ec

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52
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11. Renmin ribao, overseas edition, August 23, 1997, p. 6.

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14. Wu Xinbuo, “Dongya hezuo anquan de xianzhuang yu q

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15. You Ji, “China’s position on collective security,” 

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16. Robert Karniol, “Second ARF security summit held in B

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18. Jianwei Wang, “Chinese Perspectives on Multilateral S

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20. Sheldon Simon, “The Limits of Defense and S

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53
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23. Rosemary Foot, “China in the ASEAN Regional 

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25. Shirk, Chinese Views on Asia-Pacific Regional S

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26. “China’s Position on Asia-Pacific Security,” Beijing Revi

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27. Interview, China Centre for International Studies, Aug

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28. Garrett and Glaser, “Views from Beijing,” p. 18.

29. James C. Hsiung, “China’s Omni-Directional Dip

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31. Chen, “Asia-Pacific Awaits Great Geo-Strategic Chang

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32. Xue Mouhong, “The New World Order: Four Powers a

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1995, pp. 19-20.

33. Zhu Chun, “A Probe Into the Question of Security an

Order in the Asia-Pacific Region,” International Strategic Stud

1, March 1991, pp. 13-14.

34. See the speech by Chen Jian, PRC Assistant Foreign Min

the first CSCAP general meeting, June 4, 1997, Singapore.

54
Characteristics and Sensitivities,” Contemporary Intern

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36, Zhu Feng, “Quyu zhuyi yu dongya anquan [Regionali

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37. Si Chu, “Confidence-Building in Asia-Pacific,” Beijing 

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38. A Ying, “New Security Mechanism Needed for Asian

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39. Zhu Chun, “A Probe Into the Question of Security an

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1, March 1991, p. 15.

40. “Qian on Security Cooperation,” Foreign Broadcast Info

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1995, p. 1.

41. Shirk, Chinese Views on Asia-Pacific Regional S

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42. Guo Zhenyuan, “Asian-Pacific Region Remains Pe

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43. William T. Tow, “Contending Security Approaches 

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75-116.

44. James A. Baker, III, “America in Asia: Emerging Arch

for a Pacific Community,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 5, 

1991/92, pp. 1-18.

45. Desmond Ball, “Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific R

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46. David Dewitt, “Common, Comprehensive, and Coop

Security,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1994, pp. 7-8.

47. Paul M. Evans, “Building Security: The Council for S

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No. 2, 1994, pp. 125-139.

55
from the ‘ASEAN way’ to the ‘Asia-Pacific way’?,” The Pacific 

Vol. 10, No. 3, 1997, pp. 319-346.

49. Dewitt, “Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Se

p. 6.

50. Sheldon W. Simon, “Realism and Neoliberalism: Intern

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51. Simon, “Realism and neoliberalism,” p. 16.

52. Shirk, Chinese Views on Asia-Pacific Regional Security

53. Paul M. Evans, “The New Multilateralism in the Asia

and the Conditional Engagement of China,” in James Shi

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54. Wang Jisi, “Comparing Chinese and American Concep

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Cooperative Security Dialogue Research Programme, York Uni

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55. David Bachman, “Domestic Sources of Chinese Foreign 

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in the Post-Cold War Era, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, pp. 

56. Samuel S. Kim, “China and the Third World in the Ch

World Order,” in Kim, ed., China and the World, pp. 128-168.

57. Quansheng Zhao, “Patterns and Choices of Chinese 

Policy,” Asian Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 1, Spring 1993, pp. 3-15.

58. Sa Benwang, “Maixiang ershiyi shiji de yatai anquan 

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[Peace and Development], No. 58, December 1996, p. 2.

59. Mark J. Valencia, “Troubled Waters,” The Bulletin 

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60. Martin Walker, “China and the New Era of Resource Sc

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56
Report,” Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, January

1997, p. 34.

62. Zhang Changtai, “Some Views on the Current Situatio

Asia-Pacific Region,” International Strategic Studies, No. 43, J

1997, pp. 27-32.

63. John Zeng, “Focus China’s South China Sea,” Asia

Defence Reporter, July-August 1995, p. 10.

64. Mamdouh G. Salameh, “China, Oil and the Risk of R

Conflict,” Survival, Vol. 37, No. 4, Winter 1995-96, pp. 133-146

65. Xu Yong, “Zhongguoren de haiyang shidai: taipingya

bianyuanhai jinglue [The Ocean Era for Chinese: the Pacific 

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66. Zhongguo qingnian [Chinese Youth], No. 9, 1996.

67. Shee Poon Kim, “The South China Sea in China’s S

Thinking,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 19, No. 4, Marc

pp. 369-387.

68. Evan A. Feigenbaum, “China’s Military Posture and t

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71-88.

69. Robert S. Ross, “China’s Strategic View of Southeast 

Region in Transition,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 12

September 1990, pp. 101-119.

70. Ji Guoxing, “China Versus South China Sea Security,” S

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for China’s Defence and Foreign Policy,” Contemporary Southea

Vol. 16, No. 4, March 1995, pp. 375-403.

71. Qin Yongchun, “Fazhanzhongde zhongguo-dongmeng 

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72. Qin, “Sino-ASEAN Relationship in Development,” pp. 1

73. Frank Ching, “Scientific Meetings Being Held to 

Spratlys Tension,” FEER, May 27, 1993, p. 30.

57
20.

75. Murray Hiebert, “Ruffled waters,” FEER, September 2

p. 22; Michael Vatikiotis, “China stirs the pot,” FEER, July 9, 1

14-15.

76. Nayan Chanda, “Show of Force,”FEER, October 13, 1994

77. “Testing the waters,” FEER, March 12, 1992, pp. 8-9.

78. Jusuf Wanandi, “ASEAN’s China Strategy: Towards 

Engagement,” Survival, Vol. 38, No. 3, Autumn 1996, pp. 117-1

79. Amitav Acharya, “ARF’s challenges,” Trends, No. 60, 

26-27, 1995, p. 1.

80. Esmond D. Smith, Jr., “China’s Aspirations in the 

Islands,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 16, No. 3, Decembe

pp. 274-294; Michael Studeman, “Calculating China’s Advance

South China Sea: Identifying the Triggers of ‘Expansionism’,

War College Review, Vol. LI, No. 2, Spring 1998, in

http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/1998/spring/art5-sp8.ht

81. Michael Richardson, “Storm Alert for the Spr

International Herald Tribune, May 19, 1999, p. 6.

82. Rodney Tasker, “Facing up to security,” FEER, August 

pp. 8-9.

83. Nayan Chanda, “Divide and Rule,” FEER, August 11, 

18.

84. Barry Wain, “China Nibbles, ASEAN Dithers,” Asia

Street Journal, March 10, 1995.

85. Geoffrey Till, Trouble in Paradise: Maritime Risks and 

in the Western Pacific, Special Report No. 7, Jane’s Intelligence 

1995, p. 16.

86. Mark J. Valencia, “Insular possessions,” FEER, May 28, 

23.

87. William G. Stormont, “Managing potential conflicts in th

China Sea,” Marine Policy, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1994, pp. 353-356.

58
1995, p. 1.

89. “China Offers Accord to ‘Reassure’ ASEAN,” Jane’s 

Weekly, June 19, 1996, p. 27.

90. Michael Vatikiotis and Murray Hiebert, “Drawn to the 

FEER, April 3, 1997, pp. 14-16; Allen S. Whiting, “Asean Pr

China,” FEER, April 24, 1997, p. 28.

91. Allen S. Whiting, “ASEAN Eyes China: The S

Dimension,” Asian Survey, Vol. XXXVII, No. 4, April 1997, pp. 2

Derek Da Cunha, “Southeast Asian Perceptions of China’s 

Security Role in Its ‘Backyard’,” in Jonathan D. Pollack and Ric

Yang, eds., In China’s Shadow: Regional Perspectives on 

Foreign Policy and Military Development, Santa Monica, CA: 

1998, pp. 115-126.

92. Robert Scalapino, “The United States and Asia: 

Prospects,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 5, 1991-92, pp. 19-40.

93. Robert Jervis, “From Balance to Concert: A St

International Security Cooperation,” in Kenneth A. Oy

Cooperation under Anarchy, Princeton: Princeton University 

1986, pp. 58-79; Susan L. Shirk, “Asia-Pacific Regional S

Balance of Power or Concert of Powers?,” in David A. Lake and 

M. Morgan, eds., Regional Orders: Building Security in a New 

University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Pres

pp. 245-270; Douglas T. Stuart, “Toward Concert in Asia,” Asian 

Vol. 37, No. 3, March 1997, pp. 229-244.

94. Jia Hao and Zhuang Qubing, “China’s Policy Toward the 

Peninsula,” Asian Survey, Vol. XXXII, No. 12, December 19

1137-1156.

95. Lu Junyuan, “Chaoxian bandao de diyuan zhanlue jie

yanhua [Korean Peninsula’s Geostrategic Structure and Evol

Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International Relations]

September 1996, pp. 33-35.

96. Weixing Hu, “Beijing’s Defense Strategy and the 

Peninsula,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol. 14, No. 

1995, pp. 50-67; Zhang Xiaoming, “The Korean Peninsula and 

National Security: Past, Present, and Future,” Asian Perspect

22, No. 3, 1998, p. 259-272.

59
Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, Spring 1995, pp. 20-35.

98. Hong Liu, “The Sino-South Korean Normalization: A Tri

Explanation,” Asian Survey, Vol. XXXIII, No. 11, November 19

1083-1094.

99. Samuel S. Kim, “Chinese and Russian Perspectives and 

toward the Korean Reunification Issue,” Korea and World Affa

XVIII, No. 4, Winter 1994, p. 710.

100. For a comprehensive treatise of the evolution of China’

policy over the past five decades, see Chae-Jin Lee, China and 

Dynamic Relations, Stanford: The Hoover Institute, 1996.

101. Yitzhak Shichor, “China and the Gulf Crisis, No Esca

Predicaments,” Problems of Communism, November/Decembe

pp. 80-90.

102. Wang Chunyin, “Chaoxian bandao anquan xingshi zha

[Prospects for Security on the Korean Peninsula],”Xiandai guoj

[Contemporary International Relations], No. 6, June 1996, pp. 

103. Yu Meihua, “Chaoxian bandao xingshi ji zhongguo z

fenxi [An Analysis of the Situation on the Korean Peninsula and 

Policy],” Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International Re

No. 10, October 1996, pp. 34-38; Weixing Hu, “Beijing’s 

Strategy and the Korean Peninsula,” Journal of Northeas

Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3, Fall 1995, pp. 50-67.

104. Tao Bingwei, “Chaoxian bandao xingshi de lishixing zh

[A Historic Turning-Point in the Situation on the Korean Peni

Guoji wenti yanjiu [International Studies], No. 2, April 1992, p

105. Xiang Jiagu, “The Situation on the Korean Peninsula,” 

Unger and Ron Cleminson, eds., Promoting Peace on the 

Peninsula, Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and Intern

Trade, 1997, pp. 25-35.

106. Robert E. Bedeski, “Sino-Korean Relations: Tria

Tension, or Balancing a Divided Peninsula?” International J

Vol. 50, No. 3, Summer 1995, pp. 516-538.

107. Fei-Ling Wang, “Changing Views: Chinese Perception

United States-South Korea Alliance,” Problems of Post-Comm

Vol. 43, No. 4, July/August 1996, pp. 16-25.

60
Chinese Assessments of North Korea,” Asian Survey, Vol. XXXV

June 1995, pp. 528-545.

109. One Chinese diplomat told this author that the United 

does not seem to have slightest clue that the North Koreans are 

of not only bluffing but also acting in a most irrational ma

cornered, and not caring much about the consequences.

110. Garrett and Glaser, pp. 528-545; Robert E. B

“Sino-Korean Relations: Triangle of Tension, or Balancing a 

Peninsula?” International Journal, Vol. L, No. 3, Summer 19

516-538.

111. Barrett and Glaser, pp. 530-535.

112. Ji Guoxing, “Chinese Policy for Peace and Stability 

Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia,” in Lee, ed., Peace R

Building on the Korean Peninsula and the Role of Regional Pow

119-131.

113. Frank Ching, “Securing Northeast Asia,” FEER, Novem

1993, p. 42.

114. “China and Japan Urge More Korea Talks,” Intern

Herald Tribune, November 10, 1993.

115. Lincoln Kaye and Susumu Awanohara, “Peking Pilgr

FEER, October 8, 1992, pp. 10-11.

116. Nicholas D. Kristof, “China and North Korea: Not-So

Friends,” The New York Times, April 11, 1993.

117. Garrett and Glaser, pp. 544-545.

118. Samuel S. Kim, “The Dialectics of China’s North Kore

in a Changing Post-Cold War World,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 18

Fall-Winter 1994, pp. 5-36; Kim, “Chinese and Russian Perspe

pp. 720-723.

119. Qian’s speech in FBIS-CHI, September 30, 1993, pp. 1

120. James Cotton, “The Unravelling of ‘China’ a

China-Korea Relationships,” Korea and World Affairs, Vol. XVII

Spring 1994, pp. 67-82; Choi Choon Heum, “China’s Policies 

North Korea,” East Asian Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, Summer 1994, pp

61
122. Janice K. M. Heppell, “Addressing Divergent 

Perceptions in Northeast Asia: Linkages Between Bilater

Multilateral Confidence Building Measures,” in Steven Mata

Non-Proliferation and Multilateral Verification: The Compr

Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Toronto: Centre for Internatio

Strategic Studies, 1994, pp. 215-238. For a comprehensive tre

see Young Whan Kihl and Peter Hayes, eds., Peace and Sec

Northeast Asia: The Nuclear Issue and the Korean Peninsula, A

New York and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997.

123. Yu Meihua, “Xinshiqi meirier dui chaoxian bandao z

tedian jiqi zoushi [The Characteristics and Trends of the Korea 

of the United States, Japan, and Russia in the New Era],” Xiand

guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], No. 1, Januar

pp. 32-35.

124. George Lindsey, “The Multilateral Dimensions of the 

Problem,” in Unger and Cleminson, eds.,Promoting Peace on the 

Peninsula, pp. 1-24.

125. Kim, “No Way Out,” pp. 25, 71.

126. Tsuneo Akaha, “Japan’s Security Agenda in the Post-C

Era,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1995, pp. 45-76; Michael J

and Benjamin L. Self, “Japan’s Changing China Policy

Commercial Liberalism to Reluctant Realism,” Survival, Vol. 38

Summer 1996, pp. 35-58.

127. Stephen Blank, “Why Russian Policy is Failing in As

Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 1, Winter/Spring 1

267-298. See also Vassiluy Krivokhizha, “Problems of the 

Peninsula in the New Geopolitical Environment: A View from R

in Unger and Cleminson, eds., Promoting Peace on the 

Peninsula, pp. 37-54.

128. Kim, “The Impact of Sino-American Relations on 

Unification.”

129. See, for example, James Shinn, ed., Weaving t

Conditional Engagement with China, New York: Council on 

Relations Press, 1996.

130. U.S. Department of Defense, United States Security S

for the East Asia-Pacific Region, Washington, DC: Departm

Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, 1995; Insti

62
Force Structure, Washington, DC: Institute for National S

Studies (INSS), National Defense University, 1997, pp. 97-102

131. Douglas T. Stuart and William T. Tow, A U.S. Strateg

Asia-Pacific. Adelphi Paper 299, London: International Insti

Strategic Studies/Oxford University Press, 1995; Jonathan D. 

“Designing a New American Security Strategy for Asia,” in 

Shinn, ed., Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with Chi

York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1996, pp. 99-132.

132. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Case for Deep Engagement,” 

Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 4, July/August 1995, pp. 90-102; U.S. Depart

Defense, United States Security Strategy for the East Asia

Region, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Office of I

tional Security Affairs, 1995.

133. Zhang Ruhai, “Shixi meichao dacheng hexieyi houde do

xintaishi [An Analysis of the New Environment after the Concl

the U.S.-DPRK Framework],” Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contem

International Relations], No. 3, 1995, pp. 30-34.

134. Todd Rosenblum, “Arms Control Issues for the 

Peninsula,” in Unger and Cleminson, eds., Promoting Peace 

Korean Peninsula, pp. 141-148.

135. Shim Jae Hoon, “Who’s Sorry Now?” Far Eastern Ec

Review, December 12, 1996, p. 23.

136. Tim Healy and Laxmi Nakarmi, “Closer to Peace 

Momentum is Building for a Four-Way Parley,” Asiaweek, Janu

1997, pp. 21-22.

137. See, for example, Garrett and Glaser, pp. 528-545; Ro

Bedeski, “Sino-Korean Relations: Triangle of Tension, or Bala

Divided Peninsula?” International Journal, Vol. 50, No. 3, S

1995, pp. 516-538.

138. Kim, “Chinese and Russian Perspectives,” p. 718.

139. Kay Möller, “China and Korea: The Godfather, Part 

Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol. 15, No. 4, Winter 199

140. Yong-Sup Han, “China’s Leverage over North Korea,

and World Affairs, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, Summer 1994, pp. 233-24

141. “Pyongyang Puzzle,” Asiaweek, March 28, 1997, p. 20.

63
Korea Focus on Current Topics, Vol. 2, No. 4, July-August 19

57-65.

143. Möller, pp. 35-48.

144. Renmin ribao (overseas edition), April 13, 1998, p. 6.

145. Ibid., July 3, 1997, p. 4.

146. Ibid., March 18, 1998, p. 6.

147. Kim, “No Way Out,” p. 25.

148. Lee, “Building a Peace Regime on the Korean Penins

135.

149. Kim Wheegook, “The Impact of Sino-American Relat

Korean Unification,” The Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. 11

Winter/Spring 1997, pp. 42-43, 56.

150. Wang Fei-ling, “China and Korean Unification: A P

Status Quo,” Korea and World Affairs, Vol. XXII, No. 2, Summe

pp. 177-198.

151. Kang, “Korean Unification”; Garrett and Glaser, pp. 5

152. Wang Fei-ling, Tacit Acceptance and Watchful Eyes: B

Views about the U.S.-ROK Alliance, Carlisle Barracks, PA: S

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1997.

153. China provided some 120,000 tons of grain as floo

between April and June 1996. Hieyeon Keum, “Normalizati

After,” Korea and World Affairs, Vol. XX, No. 4, Winter 1996, p

154. Ya-chun Chang, “Zhonggong zai yaoxian bandao 

weijizhongde yingxiangli [Peking’s Role in the Nuclear Crisis 

Korean Peninsula],” Zhongguo dalu yanjiu [Mainland China S

Vol. 37, No. 8, August 1994, pp. 41-52.

155. Wang Jisi, “The role of the United States as a Global and 

Power: A View from China,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1

1-18.

156. For an overall U.S. assessment, see Hans Binnend

Ronald N. Montaperto, eds., Strategic Trends in China, Wash

64
University, 1998.

157. Interview, Institute of American Studies, China Acad

Social Sciences, August 25, 1998, Beijing.

158. Chinese analysts notice the rise of new conserva

American politics and its negative impact on U.S. China pol

Yuan Jian, “Xinbaoshoupai de waijiao shixiang jiqi zai me

yingxiang [The New Conservatives: Their Ideas and Imp

American Foreign Policy],” Guoji wenti yanjiu [International S

No. 2, April 1998, pp. 19-28.

159. Chu Shulong, “Zhongmei hezuo yu fenqi [Sino-U.S. Re

Cooperation and Divergence],” Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contem

International Relations], No. 6, June 1998, pp. 2-6.

160. William M. Steele, “Preparing the Army in the Pacific 

21st Century,” Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn/Winter 1997

62-66.

161. Office of International Security Affairs, Departm

Defense, The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia

Region, 1998. 

162. Robert H. Scales, Jr. and Larry M. Wortzel, The Futu

Military Presence in Asia: Landpower and the Geostrategy of A

Commitment, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institu

Army War College, April 1999.

163. Joseph W. Prueher, “Shaping Our Future in the Asia-P

Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn/Winter 1997-98, pp. 55-61.

164. It has been reported that the United States has conduct

war games with China as the adversary over the last few year

with any other countries, including Russia. Jim Mann, “F

Chinese Spying Only Deepens U.S. Mistrust,” The Los Angeles 

May 20, 1999, internet http://www.latimes.com/HOME

/NATION/topstory/html; accessed on May 20, 1999. 

comprehensive assessment, especially from a U.S. military pers

see Wortzel, China’s Military Potential.

165. Susan M. Puska, New Century, Old Thinking: The Da

the Perceptual Gap in U.S.-China Relations, Carlisle Barrac

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 1998

65
the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” International Security, Vol. 

4, Spring 1999, pp. 49-80.

167. Yan Xuetong, et al., Zhongguo yu yatai anquan [C

Asia-Pacific Security], Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 1999. 

168. Patrick E. Tyler, “China’s Military Stumbles Even as It

Grows,” New York Times, December 3, 1996, pp. A1, A6.

169. Barbara Opall, “China Sinks U.S. in Simulated War,” 

News, January 30-February 5, 1995, pp. 1, 26.

170. Luo Kaixiu, “U.S. Reasons and Motives for Adjust

Taiwan Policy,” Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Econom

Politics], No. 2, February 1995, pp. 74-75, in FBIS-CHI, May 1

pp. 3-5; quote at p. 4.

171. David M. Lampton and Gregory C. May, Managing U.S

Relations in the 21st Century, Washington, DC: The Nixon Cente

p. 48. 

172. Department of Defense, The Security Situation in the 

Strait, Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY99 Appropriatio

internet, http://www.usia.gov/regional/ea/uschina/twnstrt.htm

173. Stephen A. Cambone, “The United States and Theatre 

Defence in Northeast Asia,” Survival, Vol. 39, No. 3, Autumn 1

66-84; James Clay Moltz, “Missile Proliferation in East Asia

Control vs. TMD Responses,”The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 

Spring-Summer 1997, pp. 63-71.

174. Sha Zukang, “Some Thoughts on Non-Proliferation,” 

given at the 7th Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Con

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66
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Visits to Hong Kong,” International Herald Tribune, May 22-23, 

1.

180. Puska, p. 2.

181. Jer Donald Get, What’s with the Relationship B

America’s Army and China’s PLA?, Carlisle Barracks, PA: S

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, September 1996.

182. Evans, “The New Multilateralism in Asia-Pacific,” pp. 2

183. Samuel S. Kim, “Thinking Globally in Post-Mao 

Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 27, No. 2, May 1990, pp. 191-20

184. “Chinese Foreign Minister Stipulates Government Posi

the ARF,” Renmin ribao, overseas edition, July 28, 1998, p. 

Xuetong, “Zhongguo de xinanquanguan yu anquan hezuo go

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67
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Commandant

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