NASA TM-2001-210256

Reducing/Eliminating ESD Hazards During

PYRO Operations

J. Francisco Soriano

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

John F. Kennedy Space Center, Kennedy Space Center, Florida 32899-0001

June 2001

https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20010056602 2018-05-15T10:36:39+00:00Z
REDUCING/ELIMINATING ESD HAZARDS DURING

PYRO OPERATIONS

J. Francisco Soriano 1

1 Aerospace Engineer and McNair Scholar, now at the Space Shuttle Mechanical

Systems Division, ET/SRB & Launch Accessories Branch, Pyrotechnics Systems

Engineering, NASA John F. Kennedy Space Center, Florida.

ABSTRACT

Several safety concerns have occurred during pyro operations at 30% or lower RH in the

OPF area based on the increase of electrostatic discharge (ESD). These concerns targeted

the safety of personnel, flight hardware and ground support equipment (GSE). Two

proposed methods considered to control ESDs during pyro operations at 30% or lower

RH are 1) the use of an ionizer blower and 2) to increase the moisture content. In order

to demonstrate that the ionizer is effective in neutralizing static charge, a series of

experimental runs were conducted in the Electrostatics Laboratory located in the

Operations & Checkout (O&C) Building at NASA KSC. I served as the NASA KSC

PYRO Systems Engineering representative as well as a laboratory research assistant to

Dr. Rupert Lee from NASA KSC Failure Analysis and Physical Testing Laboratory who

was in charge of performing the experiment (Job #: KSC-MSL-0331-2000-00-00). The

effectiveness of the ionizer blower was evaluated based upon the time lapse of a charged

metal plate from initial 1000 to 400 volts. These variables were studied: distance, RH,

and angle of attack. A full factorial experiment (2 3 = 8) was conducted. Since we did not

have a statistical analysis program, such as SAS available, calculations were done

manually based on the method of "ANOVA" (ANalyis of VAriances), but R 2 (fitness of

curve) was not obtained. As conjectured, distance was found to be the major

influencialvariable. Therefore, we concluded that the best possible combination of

situations would be to position the ionizer blower as close as possible and facing directly

into the charged plate. This scenario resulted in the quickest discharge rate, which would

be the most beneficial during pyro operations below 30% RH. The second method of

increasing the moisture content in the work environment through a modification of the

OPF ECS current configuration appeared to be dependent on budget constraints and

currently not planned to be modified. Finally, some recommendations are discussed such

as to test the ionizer in an actual field experiment with a mockup pyro connector and a

technician with all the NASA KSC Safety-compliant PPE to assess the realistic

effectiveness of the ionizer blower.
GENERAL ORDNANCE OPERATIONS

Mechanical Operation The term "mechanical" refers to all operations where the pyro

devices are hand-held, installed/removed as a single unit device or as part of an assembly

where no electrical connections/disconnections are performed. Some of the pyro devices

involving mechanical installation are the Avionics Bay Firex, NLG Strut Thruster,

MLG/NLG Uplock Release Thruster, MPM guillotine/jettison, Ku Band Antenna

guillotine/jettison pyro assemblies, devices with Faraday Caps on and are not removed

during installation, and separation nuts (8 installed on each SRB/MLP hold down post

location assembly and 2 located in the Aft structural attachments between the Orbiter &

ET).

Electrical Operation The term "electrical" refers to all operations where electrical

connections/disconnections are performed on pyro devices. These operations are usually

performed during open pin (exposed pin to the environment) during mating/demating of

pyro connectors. The pyro system is intimately related to the electrical system consisting

of all the wiring, cabling, interconnects, power supply, and additional electrical

interfaces.
NASA STANDARD INITIATOR (NSI)

The NASA Standard Initiator (NSI) is one of two types of Electro-Explosive Devices

(EED) used in the STS Program. This and the Orbiter Docking System (ODS) pyros are

the only approved EEDs for the Space Shuttle. NSIs are category "A" explosive devices.

A category "A" explosive device is that which by expenditure of its own energy, or

because it initiates a chain reaction of events, causes injury or death to people or damage

to equipment. They are designed for a minimum probability of initiation by static

electricity and are used in Orbiters for all pyro system initiation except for the crew

emergency escape systems.

NSIs contain 2 electrical contacts, which lead to a bridgewire that is surrounded by 0.114

grams of granular mixture of Zirconium Potassium Perchlorate (ZrKC104). An NSI

transforms electrical energy into explosive energy. Specifically, they have the following

characteristics:

1) The bridgewire is a 0.002" diameter stainless steel (304 Nilstain) with a resistance

of 0.95 to 1.15 _2. The bridge distance of 0.118" results in a circuit resistance of

1.05 + 0.10 _.

2) An electrical current of 3.5 to 5 amps will heat the bridgewire to 600 °F and cause

ignition.

3) Output pressure of 650 + 125 psi in a 10cc closed Volume.

4) Will not fire if subjected to 1 amp for 5 minutes.

5) Can auto-ignite if subjected to temperatures in excess of 400 °F.

6) An airtight thin stainless steel end closure welded to the cartridge will contribute

shrapnel when the NSI detonates.

Although NSIs are used mainly for initiating other secondary/high explosive pyros such

as NSI Detonators, NSI Booster Cartridges, NSI Pressure Cartridges, and Linear Shape

Charges (LSC), they have enough power to be used alone in some other Orbiter systems
suchasin theCrew ModuleFirex System,MPM Guillotine,andAft GasSamplers.An

expendedNSI will haveaholein theendwheretheexplosivechargewaslocated,andan

unexpendedNSI will havea smoothendcapwith novisiblehole.

NSI Detonator An NSI Detonator is a category "A" explosive device, and consists of an

NSI threaded into a detonator housing containing additional explosive mixtures. The NSI

acts on the detonator's Lead Azide (PbN6) primer/accelerator, which in turn acts on the

detonator's Cyclotrimethylene Trinitramine (RDX) high explosive. Detonators will

produce a 0.040"-dent in a steel block. An unexpended detonator has a protrusion on its

end. This protrusion is not present after the detonator is expended. NSI detonators, NSI

boosters, and NSI pressure cartridges all have wrench fiats for installation and removal.

Electrostatic Protection in NSIs The NSI used today is based on a design from the

Apollo era called the Apollo Standard Initiator. One of the design changes that the NSI

incorporated was electrostatic protection. Electrostatic safety is achieved in two ways.

The NSI utilizes the spark gap/air gap method, and also the ordnance cavity is electrically

isolated from ground.

Spark gaps are located in the electrical connector cavity where arcing is not dangerous.

The design scheme is to provide as high an internal breakdown voltage in the ordnance

area and as low an external spark gap breakdown voltage as possible. Providing a spark

gap between the pins and case involves the electrical breakdown of air dielectric.

Electrical breakdown in an air gap happens after the onset of voltage on the pins. If

voltage is applied to the pins an ionization process starts and a short time later, in the

order of Ix-seconds, the spark jumps from pin to case.

The dielectric strength specification for the NSI is that it shall withstand an AC voltage of

200+10 volts for 60 seconds between the case and the pins shorted together. The leakage

current shall not exceed 500 Ix-amperes. The initiator shall not ignite nor otherwise be

degraded. Isomica discs are installed at the top surface of the propellant and are secured

in place with an epoxy impregnated washer or sealing tape as an electrically insulating

feature. The metal disk welded in place across the output end is for hermetic sealing.

As a design consideration dielectric specifications calling for no breakdown pins to case

to 1500 volts AC can compromise the design of the external spark gap and thus

compromise electrostatic safety while at the same time adding nothing to functional

reliability over the 500 volts DC specifications.

Electrostatic specifications state that the EED shall not function when a 500-pF capacitor

charged to 25,000 volts is discharged from pins to case. A human on average is the

equivalent of 300 pF. NSIs are designed with a "no fire current" and "no fire power".

That requirement specifies that all NSIs will not fire nor be degraded with 1 amp/1 watt

applied for 5 minutes. According to Test Report TR82-106 "Verification of Electrical

Firing System Compatibility with NSI-I's on Appendage 2" dated July 22, 1982, it

appeared that the NSI-1 required -40 millijoules of energy to fire, provided this energy

was delivered fast enough.
A typical energy analysis for a human follows:

Capacitance of an average human is 300 pF. Maximum allowable voltage is 350 volts

during pyro operations, which result in a calculated energy of 18.3 _t-joules. A calculated

value of 16,300 volts is required for an average human to produce 40 millijoules. At

16,000 volts a human would have the same amount of energy that as a minimum is

known to have ignited an NSI.

Failure mode in which an NSI would fire are:

1. A manufacturing defect with the NSI spark gap.

2. Static generation around the NSI at a level >16,000 volts.

3. Failure of the wriststat to dissipate static.

4. Voltage potential not measured with a volt scanner.

5. Technician in some way does not touch the connector backshell when

connecting/disconnecting NSIs.

6. Technician reaches to the NSI in a way to touch one of the pins and the

spark current goes from pin through bridge wire then to ground.
SAFETY PROCEDURES AND REQUIREMENTS USED DURING

ELECTRICAL PYRO OPEERATIONS

NSIs are designed to be relatively insensitive to static electricity and RF radiation (the

two NSI connector pins may act as antenna to RF energy) as compared to other EEDs,

however they can still be initiated by either of these forms of energy if a high enough

level exists. Incorrect usage of meters or other energy sources may cause NSIs to be

inadvertently initiated. Therefore, during pyro operations the following NASA/KSC

safety practices and procedures must be followed.

KHB 1710.2 KENNEDY SPACE CENTER SAFETY PRACTICES HANDBOOK

This is the governing document for safety at NASA/KSC. This handbook, which is

Revision D dated November 1998, establishes and specifies safety policies and

requirements during design, operations and maintenance activities at NASA Kennedy

Space Center and areas of jurisdiction under KSC. These requirements identify and

minimize the hazards to personnel and property associated with daily industrial

operations. It is intended to assure the completion of the task to the safest possible

manner with maximum efficiency.

This manual is divided into seven chapters ranging from general information, weather,

personnel, control areas, operational safety, unique hazardous facilities requirements, and

use of plastic films and adhesive tapes in Space Shuttle/Payload Processing areas.

The remainder of this manual contains eleven annexes dealing with OSHA requirements,

NASA KSC safety and requirements document, National Electric Code, and NASA

safety policy for pressure vessels and pressurized systems, among others.

Of specific interest applicable to Pyro Systems and Pyro operations, there are two main

annexes:

Annex D. KSC Supplement to NFPA 70--National Electric Code

This section discusses all sources of static electricity discharges controls to avoid unsafe

situations. It outlines specific procedures for grounding of personnel, flight hardware,

tools, equipment, materials, grounding during hoisting of flight hardware, and threephase power connections.

All personnel should wear grounding devices when handling or working within 5 ft of

open grain, handling EEDs when Faraday Caps or Shorting Plugs are removed, also when

firing line extension cables are connected to EEDs. When using legstats or conductive

shoes, personnel should stand on a conductive surface. Resistance checks shall be

performed prior to operations.

The Orbiter shall be grounded and wheels chocked inside the OPF platforms. Payloads

or canisters containing explosives or hazardous fluids shall be grounded to facility ground

upon arrival at the facility/handling mechanism.
Pneumatictools usedon hardwarecontaining EEDs, within 10 ft of open grain, or in

petroleum/oil/lubricantareas shall be fitted with a conductive air supply hose or

connectedto facility ground. All materialsin contactwith opengrain shallbegrounded.

Conductiveplastic sheeting(velostat)shall begroundedto common groundwith railcar

prior to installation.

Annex F. KSC Supplement to NSS-1740.12-NASA Safety Standard for Explosives,

Propellants_ and Pyrotechnics

This section discusses the Relative Humidity (RH) requirements and Explosive

requirements.

Relative Humidity (RH) The RH shall be recorded prior to start and every 4 hrs during

operations. When RI-I_50%, if personnel is not wearing grounding devices then

personnel should be verified AV<350 volts, and electrostatic scanning shall be done <lhr

during operations and every time new equipment, personnel, or hardware are introduced

into the work area. When RH<30%, operations involving open grain except SRB

segments, and EEDs with Faraday Caps removed or firing circuits exposed, shall

not be permitted.

For SRB segment processing when RH=30%-10%: Electrostatic scanning shall be done

at 10-min intervals if propellant is exposed, and 30-min interval if propellant is covered.

Operations shall not continue if AV>350 volts measured on segment case of segments

with propellant or equipment and personnel within 5 ft of open grain.

When segment has end rings with shipping covers installed; if electrostatic scan readings

>lkv then stop operations (do not continue unless readings <1 kv). If scan readings on

case of covered propellant > 4kv then notify safety and evacuate personnel from area at

least 500-ft radius. If RH<10% then SRB segment processing shall not be permitted.

General Explosives Requirements

EEDs must be classified as category A or category B, handled only in approved areas and

by certified personnel only, and under control of the explosive storage area supervisor.

For operations requirements, facility doors and openings shall be closed during electrical

connection/disconnection of pyro devices. Controlled switching and RF silence shall also

be in effect during these operations or during the removal of Faraday Caps/Shorting

Plugs of pyro devices.

RF Transmission

Cell phones and pagers in VHF & UHF shall not transmit within 20 fl of flight hardware

or equipment containing EEDs. Mobile, KSC-controlled radio transceivers shall not

transmit within 50 ft. Unapproved radios shall not transmit within 600 ft.

S&As Rotation

For S&A devices pin removal, 2 firing inhibits shall remain when removing an S&A

safing pin. Rotation of the S&As during ground testing and processing shall be
performedwith theETA or CDF disconnectedfrom theS&A or at thepoint of terminus.

All therotationtestingshallbedoneprior to firing circuit electricalconnection. If firing

circuits must be connectedduringrotation test, safety assessmentshall be provided to

assureno hazardouscondition exists. Rotation testingof S&As (exceptSRB ignition)

with only theinitiators electricallyconnectedshallbedonewith a minimum clearanceof

10ft.

SRB ignition S&As shallnot berotatedin the VAB. S&A rotation duringPhase1 or 2

lightning warnings shall be prohibited. FaradayCaps shall remain on EEDs when

installing/removingtheS&A.

Orbiter Hatch T-Handle explosives

The pyro activation T-handle enclosure lock shall be available at each landing and TAL

site and shall be installed ASAP after Fwd Assessment Team inspection. The lock shall

not be removed during processing until the T-6 BDA clear for the start of ET tanking. A

pyro engineer shall control the T-handle enclosure whenever is unlocked unless the lock

is removed and transported to an approved explosive storage facility. Whenever the Thandle enclosure is unlocked, safety pip pins shall remain installed in the hatch and cabin

vent T-handles.

The following SSV (Orbiter, ET/SRB, and Orbiter-installed Payload) explosive

operations and safeguard requirements shall be followed from OMI $5009, Part I,

through launch:

1) During OMI $5009 Part I, all vehicle and GSE explosive items, except the Range

Safety initiators, Range Safety CDF, and the SRM Ignition S&A control cables, shall

be connected.

2) Prior to any explosive connection, functional tests shall be performed on critical MEC

PIC circuits.

3) After completion of the functional tests, the MEC Critical Commands shall be

disabled and the SSV and GSE PIC racks shall be powered down.

4) In parallel with the subsequent pad clear, the active version of TCS sequence VFC81

shall be replaced with a dummy version (Rev. 0) in the C10 console and any hot spare

console that is loaded with C10 software. Console dumps shall be performed to

verify that VFC81 Rev. 0 is loaded in both consoles.

5) After the PIC resistance tests, the SRBs shall be remotely powered-down. The MECs

shall be powered-down After SCO ingress.

6) After the SRBs are powered-down, the following safeguards shall be in effect:

• VFC81 Rev. 0 shall remain loaded at C10 and the hot spare(s).

• MEC Critical Commands shall remain disabled.

• GOAL programs capable of firing PICs, except SRSS PICs, shall not be activated.
SRB power shall be appliedfor instrumentationreadsonly, exceptin OMI S0024.

Pre-launch Propellant Loading, OMI $5009 Part II, and OMI S007 Launch

Countdown.

7) OMI $5009,PartII, shallbeperformedin thefollowing sequence:

• SSV powered up for the Range Safety Open Loop Test, flight code insertion and the

Closed Loop Test.

• SRBs, ET, OV, and MEC power removed, power off stray voltage checks performed,

and the SRSS NSIs, SRSS CDF, and SRM Ignition S&A control cables connected.

• SRM Ignition S&A sating pins removed.

• SSV and GSE PIC resistance tests performed.

• All S&As rotated to the armed position.

• SRBs remotely powered-down.

• MECs powered-down, After SCO ingress.

• S&As physically inspected to verify they are in the safe position.

8) After the SRBs are powered-down, the following safeguards shall be in effect:

• VFC81 Rev. 0 shall remain loaded at C10 and the hot spare(s).

• MEC Critical Commands shall remain disabled.

• GOAL programs capable of tiring PICs, except SRSS PICs, shall not be activated.

• SRB power shall be applied for instrumentation reads only, except in OMI S0024.

Pre-launch Propellant Loading, OMI $5009 Part II, and OMI S007 Launch

Countdown.

9) OMI $5009, Part II, shall be performed in the following sequence:

• SSV powered up for the Range Safety Open Loop Test, flight code insertion and the

Closed Loop Test.

• SRBs, ET, OV, and MEC power removed, power off stray voltage checks performed,

and the SRSS NSIs, SRSS CDF, and SRM Ignition S&A control cables connected.

• SRM Ignition S&A safing pins removed.

• SSV and GSE PIC resistance tests performed.

• All S&As rotated to the armed position.

• SRBs remotely powered-down.

• MECs powered-down, After SCO ingress.

• S&As physically inspected to verify they are in the safe position.

10) After completion of explosives Part II (S&A hookup), the fwd skirts and ET/IT doors

shall be controlled.

11)After SRB final power-down in OMI $5009 Part II, the following safeguard

restrictions shall be in effect in addition to those in effect for Part I:

• GOAL programs capable of arming/tiring SRSS PICs, or arming SRSS or SRM

Ignition S&A devices, shall not be activated.

• SRSS vehicle power shall remain off.

12) If OMI $5009, Part III is performed, the restrictions for Parts I and II shall apply.

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13) The Orbiter shall be powered down for disconnection of live drag chute explosives.

14) Orbiter power-down or controlled switching is not required when

connections/disconnections are made to pyro circuits that are shorted or isolated from

the Orbiter electrical system.

GSOP 5400 USA ® GROUND SAFETY OPERATING PROCEDURES Vol. 1

HANDBOOK

This document, which is a Revision C dated January 20, 2000, written per KHB 1710.2

Kennedy Space Center Safety Practices Handbook, is intended to identify and minimize

the hazards associated with ground processing and integration operations. This document

provides the requirements for safety of USA ® operations personnel in designated areas of

KSC. It outlines the applicability, responsibilities, safety monitoring, and implementation

of safety responsibilities.

GSOP 5400 Section 2.10 paragraph 2.10.1 requires an RH>30% for general STS and

payload operations where EED firing circuits are exposed. At RH<30% operations

involving explosives, except SRB processing, will cease. More specific, all operations

where NSIs and ODS pyros are electrically disconnected, or exposed for testing, or

reconnected will not be permitted where RH<30%.

Appendix G_ Space Shuttle Vehicle (SSV) Ordnance Operations and Safe_,uards

This section discusses the safeguards governing the installation, connection, verification,

and safety procedures to prevent inadvertent firing of SSV ordnance. The specific

information provided by this appendix, and pertaining to pyro devices around the SSV is

exactly the same outlined in the previous handbook.

Lightning policy as it is outlined in GSOP 5400 for major hazardous operations such as

ordnance operations for phase 1, shall not begin, and for phase 2, if already in progress

shall be terminated and secured.

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ELECTRICAL PYRO OPERATING PROCEDURES

For electrical pyro operations, the proper safety controls must be established per WAD

procedures. Electrical work with pyros is the most hazardous and the most critical.

Inadvertent initiation or failure of initiation at the proper time depends greatly upon the

quality of work in this portion of a pyro task.

For all hazardous portions of pyro operations, the task team leader (Pyro Engineer) is

required to give a pre-task briefing. The importance of pre-task briefings cannot be

overemphasized. This is the point when the task should be summarized with specific

coverage given to safety issues, hardware concerns, and paper status. Also, expected

duties of each person within the task team should be reviewed. Team communication

and professional interaction is extremely important at this early stage in a successful, safe

operation. All personnel involved in the commencing task should be present for the

briefing including QC/QA.

Prior to initiating the task, all non-essential personnel must be cleared from a 10-ft radius

of pyro electrical operations. Also, if applicable, this clear applies to the affected pyro

device if it's in an area different from the electrical work (i.e. pyro interrupt box

connectors require clear of middeck along with clears around Ku, gear uplocks, strut

thruster, and Fwd Sep Bolt). All essential personnel are required to wear blue-collar

flame retardant coveralls or nomex bunny suits (clean room only). RF silence is required

in OPF bay and safety radios are to be kept a minimum of 20 ft away from the electrical

connectors. Also, Fire/Rescue and Emergency Medical Personnel are required to be

notified to be on standby for the pyro operation. As part of RF silence, no lightning

advisories can be in effect prior to starting.

Prior to any electrical connection of pyros, all possible sources of energy must be verified

to be isolated or turned off (controlled switching). This protects both personnel and the

hardware from inadvertent initiation. To ensure no energy source is on, either orbiter

power must be off, or an interruption in the pyro circuit is required prior to reaching the

PIC circuitry (i.e. pyro interrupt boxes installed for forward separation bolt connection).

Each task involving electrical connections will call for some verification of being isolated

from energy sources. For any pyro disconnection, power down is required or controlled

switching is required. Power down or controlled switching provides protection to

personnel and hardware in that it ensures no accidental test configuration that would send

energy to the pyro device while personnel are working in that area.

A second verification of no stray energy source in the pyro circuitry, a power-off stray

voltage test is performed prior to any and all pyro NSI and ODS pyro connections. This

test requires use of a stray voltage test meter. This test should be performed within five

minutes of the planned actual connection to the NSI. If the time duration is longer prior

to connection, another stray voltage test should be performed. For NSI's, the maximum

allowable DC or AC voltage is 50 millivolts. For ODS pyros, the maximum allowable

DC or AC voltage is 20 millivolts. These allowable voltages are more than 100 times

lower than the minimum "All-Fire" voltage level required to initiate these devices.

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Also, to ensure the flight connection will be properly shielded from RF energy,

verification is also madewith the stray voltagemeterin the way of a shield-to-ground

check. The shieldingof all pyrowires is terminatedat eachRF connectorbackshell.The

shield-to-groundtest requires less than one ohm resistancebetween the connector

backshell and orbiter structure. After all verifications, the stray voltage meter is

disconnectedfrom theorbiterconnector.

Next, in preparationfor handlinga live NSI (or ODS) pyro connector,don a wriststat.

Connectthe wriststat groundclip to orbiter structureor an adjacentorbiter connector

backshell.Next,performaresistancecheckusinga SimpsonDVOM betweenthewearer

and wriststat groundclip or orbiter structure. The resistancebetweenthe wearerand

wriststatgroundclip/orbiter structuremust be between101_ and 1 MK2(10,000g2 and

1,000,000 if2). The purpose of the wriststat is to alleviate any voltage

potential/electrostatic charge between the wearer and the pyro connector. The resistor

within the wriststat limits the energy current to a non-harmful level in a case where the

voltage potential difference is high. After this wriststat verification, turn off the Simpson

DVOM and remove from the area. This meter has the ability to initiate or degrade NSI's

and ODS pyros if the conductors are accidentally touched with the meter leads.

After the task team is fully ready and everyone is in position, only a grounded technician

is allowed to handle any open pin pyro device including tiring line extension cables

connected to EEDs. The grounded technician should hold the pyro connector or wire

harness backshell with one hand and remove the Faraday Cap or sating plug with the

other hand. Holding the connector/backshell ensures two things: obviously this prevents

twisting of a connector/wire harness, and secondly this provides another ground path (in

addition to the wriststat) between the technician and the pyro device, thus preventing any

electrostatic discharge. Once the pyro pins are exposed, inspect to verify no

deformations, no bent pins, no contamination, and o-ring is in place at bottom of rubber

cushion. If contamination exists (usually originating from gold plating being removed as

normal wear and tear when pins and sockets are mated/demated), use an acid brush and

compressed air to remove contaminants. Isopropyl alcohol can also be used but a 20-

minute waiting time is required to allow all alcohol to flash off prior to final connections.

Next, after inspections of the connectors to be mated are complete, mate the connectors.

Verify good connections by identifying three bayonet-locking pins are visible through the

connector barrel-locking ring. Once mated, the pyro is safed and the wriststat is not

required any longer (unless other pyro connections in same area are being made). Before

leaving this connection, inspect wires to verify no damage or defects, verify backshell

and strain relief tang are not loose, and verify wire routing is such that no tight bends or

interference with other hardware exists.

In some electrical connections, an "upstream" break point test location is used to verify

downstream connections are correct and intact. For example, after the Forward

Separation Bolt pyros are connected, a resistance check is made "upstream" at the FLCA

pyro interrupt boxes to measure resistance down through the ship harness, connector just

mated at the Fwd Sep Bolt, and across the NSI bridgewire. Typical resistance is

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approximately 1.25to 1.75 _. To perform a resistancecheckon NSI or ODS pyro

bridgewires, only one type meter is allowed for use: the Valhalla 4314A. The output

energy of this meter is more than 100 times lower than the "All fire" energy level for

these pyros. Other meters such as the Simpson DVOM, Keithly 580, Honeywell, and

even other model number Valhalla meters have sufficient energy output when measuring

resistance to fire orbiter electro-explosive devices (EEDs). The safety controls for

resistance checks are the same as described earlier in this section for electrical

connections. The safety clear area includes both the location around the pyro device

being tested, and the "break" location in the pyro circuit from where the resistance test

will be made.

SAFETY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Orbiter Power Down

Required when mating live pyro connectors unless circuit is isolated from PIC card

(within "black boxes"). EXAMPLE - All pyros isolated from FLCAs may be connected

without power down if Pyro Interrupt Boxes are installed. The purpose is to keep any

energy source that could cause inadvertent initiation away from pyro device connectors.

EXAMPLE - Energized black box next to pyro connector could have sufficient energy to

initiate EED if contacted with connector.

Controlled Switchin_ (or Power Down)

The purpose is the same as outlined in the previous term. EXAMPLE - Test Operations

switch throws requiring FLCAs/MECs may affect circuits that energize PIC cards/pyro

initiation. Controlled Switching definition - No flight vehicle/element or GSE commands

issued, no switches or circuit breakers operated on flight elements or GSE electrically

connected to the flight elements. Safety requirement for demating live pyro connectors

unless circuit is isolated from PIC card as outlined in previous example.

RF Silence

The purpose is to prevent the two NSI connector pins from acting as an antenna to RF

energy. Energy from handheld radios or other RF transmitters can be enough for

inadvertent pyro initiation. Doors closed. Hand-held radios off within OPF bay. RF

Beacon in OPF Bays 1 and 2. No beepers. No AC powered electrical motors (i.e. fans)

or heat producing equipment (i.e. soldering irons) within 10 ft of open connector pyros.

Wriststats

Don Wriststat and verify resistance between wearer and wriststat ground clip. Then

attach ground clip to designated structural ground location and verify resistance between

wearer and structure. The purpose is to remove any voltage potential between personnel

and orbiter pyro connectors. Wriststats will bleed off any unwanted electrostatic energy.

Resistor in wriststat will limit the static electricity current dissipation.

Resistance between wearer and ground clip, and between wearer and orbiter structure

should be between 10kg2 and 1 M_. Wriststat verification precedes every step where

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pyro connectors are mated/demated or Faraday Caps/Shorting Plugs are removed (all

operations where pyro pins are exposed).

Clear Area

A 5 to 10-ft clear area is typically required in the area of electrical connections.

Expanded areas are sometimes required around the envelope where inadvertent activation

of a pyro system could cause injury to other personnel. EXAMPLE - Drag chute

electrical connections require clear area of entire rotating swing platforms and floor area

to OPF exterior door (per GP-1098). 10-ft clears do not go through floors, walls, ceilings,

or platforms.

CURRENT PROBLEMS WITH ECS EQUIPMENT DURING LOW RH

AMBIENT CONDITIONS

ORBITER PROCESSING FACILITY ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM

(OPF ECS)

The OPF ECS is used primarily for Space Shuttle Orbiter purge operations. The OPF

ECS consists of four individual airflow ducts that are connected to the Forward, Payload

Bay, Aft, and Cabin interface ducts of the Orbiter. The OPF ECS allows for the operator

to control flow rate and air temperature through these ducts. The air entering the ducts is

de-humidified and filtered with a High Efficiency Particle Accumulator (HEPA) and

Carbon filters.

A typical OPF ECS air process starts with outside ambient air entering the OPF ECS

through an inlet filter. The air is drawn through this filter via a centrifugal compressor

blower, which compresses and moves the air. Then the air goes through the cooling coil

were the air is de-humidified to no more than 37 grains of moisture/lb of dry air per

OPF ECS ICD requirements. After the air is de-humidified, it enters the mixing/manifold

chamber were it is mixed and distributed to the four purge ducts: FWD, PLB, AFT, and

Cabin. Then each circuit controls the purge airflow rate and temperature. Finally, the

purge air is filtered and exits the OPF ECS via the ECS duct system. This filtered air

enters the Orbiter through the LO2 T-0 for the FWD, PLB, and AFT circuits and through

the white room for the Cabin circuit.

Based on the current design and assuming ambient conditions of 50 °F and 50% RH, it

can be calculated from psychrometric equations that the delivered Orbiter purge air at 65

°F would be 29% RH and thus prohibit pgro operations. The Pad ECS is similar in

design and operation to the OPF ECS except for one major difference: The Pads ECS

have humidifiers in the AFT, PLB, and Cabin circuits, which will raise the humidity and

allow pyro operations during low ambient humidity days.

Before 1996, the RH level was measured by a "squirrel cage" type RH monitoring device

that measured the OPF Bay humidity for pyro operations in the OPF. However, these

measurements were misleading since they did not reflect accurately the actual RH value

inside the area within the Orbiter where pyro operations were performed. Typically the

14
OPF High Bay humidity is above 30% RH. It was not until the 1996-1997 time frame

when the first hand-held RH meters were used. At that time, a discrepancy was

discovered: the RH level inside the work area and specifically around pyro devices,

would drop below 30% although the High Bay RH level was above 30%.

In order to prevent possible mission delays and to assess safety of personnel and flight

hardware during pyro operations, USA ® Pyro Engineering Dept 5532 USK-251

submitted a Safety Variance Request (the latest was from December 11, 1999 to January

31, 2000. Currently there have been 4 variances requested: 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000)

in which the affected TOPs were V5032.002, V5032.003, V5032.004, and V5032.005.

Some of the impacts discussed in the request were the interruption of pyro operations

when RH<30% producing a hazardous situation for personnel and flight hardware, and

lengthy delays in the order of weeks and major milestones would be affected, including

launch.

The requests were approved for pyro operations for RH<30% and specified that the

potential hazards remained at an "acceptable level of risk" based on the following

rationales: Nomex/Blue-collar coveralls and wriststats shall be used and verified to be

common with wearer and ground clip/Orbiter structure, Pyro Engineering/TTL shall brief

personnel of increased hazards at Low RH levels, electrostatic scanning shall be

performed on all personnel, tools and equipment within a 5-ft radius prior to disconnect

and at 10-minute intervals, and finally, operations shall stop if RI-_10%.

ELECTROSTATIC DISCHARGE (ESD) PRINCIPLES AND BACKGROUND

INFORMATION

High electrical potentials on surfaces can result in uncontrolled ESD. The dissipation of

energy associated with ESD can cause ignition of solid propellants, explosives and

flammable/combustible materials, cause damage to or inadvertent actuation of electronic

devices/systems, and shock experienced by personnel. Shock to personnel causes

involuntary muscle reaction, which can result in injury or flight hardware/equipment

damage.

When an insulated person is charged, the charge will distribute itself in such a way that

all points on the person have the same voltage with respect to ground. This implies that

the charge will be densely located on areas close to the ground. For a standing person

who is not actually leaning against a wall, the shortest distance is through the soles and

the floor covering. Consequently, most of the charge will be located on the soles of the

feet and by induction bind an equally large, opposite charge in a conducting layer or the

floor. The capacitance of a person can be determined by using equation:

C= ( ereo)A/d

Where:

eris the relative permittivity or dielectric constant of the insulator.

e0 = 8.85 x 10 -z2 (F)(m-l), is the vacuum permittivity, which is a fundamental constant.

15
A is the area of the soles.

d is the effective thickness of the soles plus the insulating floor covering.

For a typical person, A _= 300 cm 2, d = 5 to 10 mm, Er = 4 to 10. This leads to a

capacitance of about 100 to 300 pF. If the parameters A, d and er are actually determined

for a given person, and if the capacitance is also measured directly, the value estimated

by this equation will normally be about 60 to 70% of the measured value, indicating that

this fraction of the total charge is on the feet.

Under normal circumstances, atmospheric air is considered a good insulator, and a

charged insulated or insulating body will lose its charge slowly when surrounded by air.

The reason for this is that air, as a rule, contains very few charged particles or ions, which

by being attracted to the charged body might neutralize its charge. The "natural" air ions

are formed primarily by radioactive radiation.

Ionization causes an electron to be knocked off an air molecule, 02 or N2, leaving the

molecule as a singly, positively charged elementary ion, which within a fraction of a

second will attract 10 to 15 molecules, mostly HEO, forming a molecular cluster called a

positive air ion.

The electron will almost immediately attach to an uncharged oxygen molecule and thus

form a negative elementary ion. The negative elementary ion will also attract about 8 to

12 H20 molecules to form a negative air ion. This ionization process will create, under

normal circumstances, only a small number of ion pairs (about 5 to 10 ion pairs per cm 3

per sec.), but the production rate will increase very markedly if the electric field strength

in the air exceeds a critical value, the breakdown field strength, Eb, which at atmospheric

pressure has the value of Eb -= 3 x 10 6 v/m.

When the electron gets knocked off a neutral molecule by natural ionization, and if this

happens in an electric field, the electron will move and be accelerated. If the accelerating

field strength exceeds Eb, the electron may, before it collides with a molecule, gain a

kinetic energy sufficiently large to enable it to ionize the molecule. This process is called

ionization by collision. The process will take place in the whole region where the field

strength exceeds Eb and will give rise to an electrical discharge in other words, a transport

of charge by the ions being moved by the field.

Many of the static electric problems are connected with a charged person and the

possibility of spark discharge from the person creating an ignition hazard when explosive

vapor-air mixtures may be present in the working environment.

If we consider charging by walking only, we can easily estimate an acceptable upper

limit for the grounding or decay resistance for the person. If a body voltage Vm can be

tolerated, walking across a floor with a step rate n (sl), and a charge transfer Aq (C), the

maximum acceptable grounding resistance Rm is given by

Rm = V,,,/ nLlq

16
The maximum permissiblevalue Vm of the body voltage depends upon the working

environment. If for instance, the atmosphere contains explosive mixtures of vapors with

known minimum ignition energy Wmin, Vm has to be smaller than the explosion-safe

voltage Ves. In the figure that follows, two graphs show a typical voltage buildup and

dissipation (charging/discharging) in two different scenarios, one walking across an

insulated floor (top graph) and the other standing still (bottom graph).

" !-'. ............ _ ............... T................... ]- ..................

t ea _ ',.I

Types of diseharees

There are three types of electrical discharges such as Corona Discharge, Brush Discharge,

and Spark Discharge.

Out of these three types, Spark Discharge is the best-known type of electric discharge

and is reserved for the discharge between two conductors at different potentials. In a

spark, ionization takes place along and the charge is transferred through a narrow channel

between the two conductors. In this channel most of the energy stored in the field

between the conductors will be dissipated. If the partial capacitance of the two conductors

is C and their potential difference is V, the energy W dissipated in the discharge is given

by

I,I1=(1/2) CV 2

Because the discharge channel is very narrow and short and the discharge as a whole very

fast, the energy density of a spark discharge can be very high, making the spark discharge

the most incendive (ability of an electrical discharge to start an ignition or explosion in a

gas/vapor or dust/vapor mixture) of all types of discharges.

The human body can precipitate an electrostatic discharge hazard when the material is

initiated by electrical discharges less than 0.015 joules.

17
Electrical Properties of ionized air

In any solid or liquid material, the charge, mobility, and concentration of possible charge

carriers are constant at constant temperature as long as electrical breakdown does not take

place. In a metallic conductor, the charge carriers are electrons with a concentration

characteristic for the metal in question; in a semiconductor the carriers may be holes. But

the careers are always there to yield a current, when a field is applied. The conductivity _'

(Unit is _'2-1m -1)

_' = nqk

where n is the charge carrier concentration, q is the charge, and k is the mobility, can be

ascribed a constant value during the decay. However, the situation is not simple when a

gas is the current-carrying medium. Gases inherently contain no or very few non-paired

charges that can be moved independently by an electric field to cause a net current. Gases

in general and, more specifically, atmospheric air can be ionized. Atmospheric ions,

however, differ from the charge carriers in other media in several ways.

The concentration of air ions will change with time and location because of processes like

recombination with other, oppositely charged ions, combination with particles, and plate

out (deposition of airborne particulates by diffusion or aided by an electric field) on

surfaces, or simply because the actual field-induced neutralization process may deplete

the air of ions faster than they are re-supplied by the ionizing device.

Explosive Mixtures of Gases and Powders

Explosions may occur not only in vapor-gas mixtures, but also, in clouds of dusts or

powders. The minimum ignition energy for a vapor-gas mixture depends on the nature

and concentrations of the vapor and the gas, but it is more complicated for powders.

Whereas mixtures of vapors and gases in closed environments are normally

homogeneous with the vapor concentration being the same throughout the whole mixture,

the concentration of powder particles in a cloud may vary from point to point, making the

determination of minimum ignition energy very difficult.

The ignition energy depends on grain size of the powder involved. Generally, it takes

more energy to start an explosion in a cloud of powders than in an explosive vapor-gas

mixture. The minimum ignition energies for vapors in atmospheric air are lower than 1

mJ, but powders will require a minimum of 10 to 100 rnJ to start combustion.

We can assume that any electrical discharge disseminating less than 0.2 mJ in the

atmosphere is not incendive. For a capacitive system with a typical capacitance of 300

pF, this means that an "explosion-safe" voltage Ves is given by

Ves "- (2 Wmin/C) I/2

So Ves --- 1100 to 1200 v. It should be stressed that this safe-voltage level refers only to

explosion risks. When dealing with electronic ESD problems, the acceptable levels are

often considerably lower. This safe-voltage level only applies to insulated conductors, as

voltage cannot be meaningfully determined for an insulating material.

18
MEANS OF CONTROLLING ESD AT RH<30%

To reduce the potential for ESD, proper bonding and grounding must be employed and

personnel must understand bonding/grounding reduces voltage potentials on conductive

materials. Non-conductive materials (i.e., wood, paper, glass, plastics, etc.) must be

eliminated, properly selected or be treated for the particular application and use. Voltage

potentials on surfaces are commonly induced from friction (rubbing or sliding) but can be

reduced by the simple act of separating two dissimilar materials.

ESD is not normally a concern when RH>50%. Moisture in the air will act as a high

resistance bleeder, dissipating voltage potentials on the surface before they can build up

to a level of about 350 volts and result in ESD. A few materials (i.e., Teflon, vinyl, etc.),

however, do not absorb moisture, will not bleed-off readily even in environments

RH>50% and should be avoided where ESD is a concern.

Environments where RH<50% require special attention. Operations where RH<30%

should be carefully assessed and avoided when possible. Voltages, especially on large

surfaces, should be dissipated using a high resistance resistor (100k_ to 1 M_) in series

with the ground wire until the charge is eliminated before going direct to ground.

Grounding of conductors

The basic rule of fighting electricity is to ground all conductors that might possibly

become charged or exposed to induction from other charged objects, such as insulated

charged conductors, which can produce energetic spark discharges.

The grounding must include all conducting objects, machinery and main structures

including each part of piping, tubing system, containers, and fixed and moving parts. A

direct connection to the ground is not necessary as long as all conducting parts are

interconnected, so that no voltage differences or bonding occurs.

Grounding people

Due to the insulating properties of footwear and floor coverings, a person may constitute

a capacitive system, with his/her own capacitance in the range of a few hundred pF and

with a leakage resistance ranging from almost zero to maybe 10 a4 to 1015 _2 or more.

This problem might be resolved by use of protective fire-retardant coveralls and

wriststats or other type of clothing.

Blue-collar Coveralls/Nomex Coveralls

(Safety requirement per GP-1098). Both Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) are used

at NASA KSC and provide excellent resistance to static electricity buildup. Cotton in

blue-collar coveralls retains moisture and does not allow static buildup. Nomex coveralls

have similar characteristics and are used for clean-room type environments. They

provide protection against momentary flashes of high heat or fire. Blue-collar coveralls

are made out of 100% cotton cloth impregnated with a proprietary chemical that allows

the cloth to meet NASA KSC flammability requirements. Westex Corporation

19
manufactures the particular cloth under the trade names Proban and Indura. It is used for

civilian industry for protection against short duration flash fires and electrical arcing.

Both Proban and Indura have undergone extensive testing by the NASA KSC Test

Laboratory and consistently satisfy ESD and flammability requirements. Flame retardant

clothing such as the blue-collar coveralls does not mean that the clothing will not burn; it

just means that the clothing will self-extinguish within a specified time limit when the

heat source is removed.

Wriststats

This device consists of a band or chain made of metal similar to an expandable

watchband, and conductive plastic or fibers, connected to ground by a strap, either made

of solid conductive plastic or of multistrand wire. Normally the strap includes a series of

safety resistor of 1 Mg2 for minimizing the shock from accidentally touching a live wire

while being tied to ground via the strap.

There are some problems associated with the wrist straps though, intermittent skin

contact with loose-fitting bands, bad skin contact caused by excessively dry skin or too

much body hair, or sluffing of the band material, resulting in contamination of

components.

Ioni_ation: Removal of ions from the Air

An air ion is an unstable structure and consequently has a limited lifetime. It may be

moved to some surface where it may be neutralized. It may combine with oppositely

charged ions or particles and hence cease to exist as an ion. Or a small ion may combine

with aerosol particles and then either be neutralized or become a large ion; in both cases

it again no longer exists as a small ion. The rate of combination is proportional to the

concentration of the species involved. The inverse relation between conductivity and

particle concentration can be used as an indicator of the particle level in the air.

loni_ers

Any ionization process in air starts with the removal of an electron from a neutral

molecule. The necessary energy may be delivered to the molecule from a colliding

particle or from a quantum of electromagnetic radiation energy. Only two ionization

methods are in practical technical use: radioactive ionization and field ionization.

In Field Ionization, if air is exposed to an electric field, ions will move in the field and

collide with neutral molecules after having traveled the mean free path characteristic for

the ions. However, even at the highest possible field strengths, the energy of the ions at

the end of their mean free path is not high enough to release an electron.

Controlled field ionization is normally achieved by creating the necessary high field

strength in front of a set of conducting electrodes in the form of sharp points or thin

wires, by keeping the electrodes at a high potential (-_-2-20 kv) with respect to some

suitable counter electrode, which may even be the walls of the room. Discharge

conditions are different for positives and negative voltages. The positive voltage

necessary to start ionization under given geometrical conditions is about 30% higher than

the corresponding negative voltage.

20
Types of loni_ers

Ionizers for neutralizing static charges were first put to practical use in the textile,

printing, and plastic industries. In most cases these ionizers were bar shaped and mounted

parallel with and at a short distance from charged sheets of material. There are several

types of ionizers: ionizer bars, passive ionizer, electrical ionizer, radioactive ionizer, ion

blower, whole-room ionization, and unipolar ionizer.

Radioactive ioniiers

In a radioactive ionizer the radioactive source is placed upon a base material and covered

with an extremely thin protective layer, often made out of gold. The ionizer is mounted

such that the radiation is directed towards the space immediately in front of the charged

material. When dealing with relatively low levels of static charges and specifically at

hard-to-reach places, radioactive ionizers are very handy.

They do not require electrical installation and they cannot cause potential harmful

electrical discharges. Their limitation lies in the fact that at high charge levels, one has to

use impractically high (radio) activities or the neutralization process will take too long.

Usually radioactive ionizers utilize an a-active nuclide with a half-life of about half a

year. Thus the active material is replaced at regular intervals, and the device does not

remain unchecked for extended periods of time.

21
INVESTIGATION OF PROPOSED MEANS OF CONTROLLING ESD AT

RH<30%

On February 16, 1999, there was a meeting between NASA Safety, NASA Materials Test

Laboratory representatives, USA ® Pyro Engineering, and NASA Pyro Systems

Engineering. In that meeting it was proposed the use of ionizers during ordnance

connections/disconnections with NSIs during conditions of RH<30%. During that

discussion, it was identified that a Safety Hazard Analysis should be performed assuming

the worst-case scenario, i.e.- SSV on the Pad and inadvertent initiation of the Aft

Separation Bolts with personnel in the Orbiter Aft compartment. It was concluded that

the NASA Material Test Laboratory should conduct tests with the ionizer before a

decision could be made on the proposed ionizer concept. The meeting resulted with USA

Pyro Engineering taking an action item to formally task the NASA Material Test Lab to

perform the ionizer test in conditions of less than 30 % RH.

Even though variance approvals have been implemented in most of the pyro operations in

and around the Orbiter, two extra avenues can be considered to add to the required

"safety umbrella" even when RH<30%, and perhaps as low as RH__10%. One avenue is

to increase the moisture content in the air and the other is to ionize the surrounding air by

use of a radioactive ionizer-blower combination as outlined in the following guidelines:

1. Post-flight pyro sating where the verification of expended pyros is required, and

removal/installation of Faraday Caps and/or Shorting Plugs and connecting NSIs

to PIC cabling may proceed with an area ionizer directed at the connector in

work.

2. NSI operations involving pin probes, and adapter cabling shall not be permitted.

3. Russian category EED operations with Faraday Caps removed or tiring circuits

exposed shall not be permitted.

4. All personnel shall wear clean, nomex or blue-collar coveralls with long sleeves

and long legs.

5. All personnel within 5 ft shall wear wriststats reading 10k_ to 1 Mff2 of

resistance.

6. Work-related paperwork should remain 5 ft from work area.

7. Personnel should avoid activities that produce static charges.

8. Electrostatic of the work area within 5 ft of the EED will be performed with a

maximum allowable of 350 volts at all times.

22
IONIZER EXPERIMENT/TEST

The experiment was conducted at the Electrostatics Laboratory located in Room 2275 on

the 2 nd Floor of the Operations & Checkout (O&C) Building at NASA KSC, which is

managed by Dr. Carlos I. Calle and Dr. Raymond H. Gompf. Mr. Douglas Kraft from

USA ® Pyro Engineering arranged for Dr. Rupert Lee from NASA KSC Failure Analysis

and Physical Testing Laboratory to be in charge of performing the experiment (Job #:

KSC-MSL-0331-2000-00-00. Title: "ESD Testing of Nuclear Ionizers". Description: To

demonstrate that the ionizer is effective in neutralizing static charge). I served as the

NASA KSC PYRO Systems Engineering representative as well as a laboratory research

assistant to Dr. Rupert Lee.

INSTRUMENTATION AND EQUIPMENT

Charged Plate/Probe Assembly Model 268A-1

A charged plate analyzer Model 268A-1 (manufactured by Monroe Electronics Inc.

Lyndonville, NY 14098) will be used to conduct the experiment. The assembly is

composed of two separate components connected by a 10-ft cable. The top part with the

attached plate contains the field meter portion of the instrument and was placed inside a

Plexiglas TM box. To separate the two components, we released the two over-center latches

near the rear of the unit and lifted at the rear of the top section.

A _A-20-threaded receptacle is provided inside of the top section for convenient tripod

mounting. Two foldout legs are provided underneath the bottom of the control unit to

elevate the front of the cabinet to permit easy viewing of the meters. The control panel is

a unit of 6 3/4" high, 6.3/4' wide, and 9 1/2" and weighs 5 lbs. Switches on the front

panel are alternate action push-push type with the exception of the three used for "plate

control". These are mechanically interlocked so that only one function can be selected at

a time.

Controls are grouped by function. Three pushbutton switches directly beneath the

"PLATE VOLTAGE" meter relate to meter range and function. Three switches at the

lower center of the panel labeled "PLATE CONTROL" affect the charge/discharge

condition of the plate. The "HV" control knobs, the "HV ON" indicator and the

"POLARITY" pushbutton switch relate to the polarity and magnitude of the initial charge

voltage on the plate. The "TIMER LIMIT" switch sets the start/stop voltage limits for

the timer. The "OUTPUT" BNC connector on the back panel allows an oscilloscope or

recorder to be connected to the output of the field meter. The signal here is 1/1000 th of

the actual voltage on the plate regardless of the settings of the meter range and function

switches.

The charged plate is a standard tripod mount plate of 6" X 6" with a capacitance rated for

a total discharge test circuit in the plate of 20 + 2pF. The plate self-discharge is less than

10% of set voltage within 5 minutes below RH = 50% at 25 °C. As far as the power

supply is concerned, +7500 volts maximum output, _+1000 volts/+5000 volts charging of

isolated plate available, adjustable from < +1000 to > +5000 volts.

23
1

Ionmaster" Ionizer NRD Model 4060

The Ionmaster" (Serial Number: SN36330) blower from NRD is a lightweight unit

equipped with an articulated arm and a bracket for attachment to the blower, compact and

a reliable source of ions for static control. The blower bracket contains four slots were

four small metallic grill-like (sealed cartridge) plates (Model 2U500, manufactured on

May, 2000 by NRD, Inc. Grand Island, NY 14072) containing the radioactive material

500uCi Po210 sit and are held in position by a plastic closure.

This unit is designed to remove static charge that cannot be controlled by conductive or

grounding methods. This apparatus delivers balanced ionized air. The ions are kept in

continuous balance by the unit's internal a-energy source. The o_-energy source, which

is contained safely in the sealed cartridges, poses no risk to personnel, and requires no

calibration. The Polonium 210 source is replaced annually.

The radiation emitted from the Polonium 210 element is called o_ radiation and is

harmless externally. Alpha rays travel through air very rapidly to a maximum distance of

24
1 3/oa' in still air, but have no power to penetrate the skin. In general, each person in the

U.S. receives an average of 80 millirems of radiation from natural sources and about 100

millirems from man-made sources. As the rays travel through air, they produce

ionization, and this ionized air is the one that dissipates static charges. The greatest

ionization occurs at the end of their path.

Plexiglas" Test Chamber

A transparent Plexiglas TM box was used as the test chamber that housed the ionizer blower,

the charge plate analyzer, and the relative humidity probe. The Plexiglas" box 62" long,

31" high, 31" deep, and 5/8" thick is usually used as an electromagnetic Physics testbed

mounted on top of a 33" high, 31" wide, and 72" long table. It has a flow meter valve

installed on the outside near the test entrance and outfitted with tubing going inside

supplying compressed breathing air (dm/dt) to regulate relative humidity.

25
Digital C_ Omega" Thermo-Hygrometer

A Digital £) Omega" Thermo-Hygrometer with probe was used to record the required

percentage of relative humidity and temperature inside the test chamber. The probe was

attached to the ionizer's movable arm away from the blower and without contacting any

metallic or non-metallic parts.

EXPERIMENTAL/TEST PROCEDURE

For the purposes of studying one of the two proposed alternate methods to eliminate ESD

during pyro operations at RH<30%, which is the main objective of this f'mal project, the

experimental procedure took the following sequence:

The sequence started by verifying that the ionizer would work under the conditions

required for the experiment. Aider carefully reading and understanding the operator's

manuals for both the replacement of ion cartridges into the ionizer blower and the

charged plate analyzer section respectively, we conducted a set of four experimental runs.

We measured the distance between the charged plate and ionizer blower, recorded the

relative humidity and temperature, and oriented the charged plate with respect to the

ionizer blower. Also, we identified the time and amount of compressed breathing air

(inspected by SGS and contained in "K" Bottles, spec: SES-0073-6.3-29 with a purity of

21.4% 02) needed to achieve the desired relative humidity.

The charged plate was wiped cleaned with Isopropanol and its polarity was maintained at

"+" setting as specified in the operator's manual. When running in the 1000-100 volt

regime, the decay rate (timing) stopped below 300 volts. The same situation occurred in

the 5000 - 500-volt range where the decay rate stopped at 1.7 sec when the voltage

reached 3000 volts. Also, in the region of 1000-100 volts, the decay rate continued

indefinitely in the order of-200 sec. These occurrences prompted Dr. Rupert Lee to

contact Monroe Electronics Inc. on August 17, 2000 at 11:00 AM EST to report the

charged plate behavior at those voltage regimes. For that reason we decided to arbitrarily

set up the voltage to 1000 - 400 v and 1000 - 300 v.

26
The opening of an existing orifice for venting and the installation of grounding wire for

the charge plate, ionizer blower, and stands to a common ground was done to neutralize

the remaining ion pairs in the test chamber, which produced a longer

charging/discharging rates indicating that equilibrium was not completely achieved as it

was observed with some experimental runs. Also, after placing 4 Engelhard/Desiccite

25 TM 16 Units Type I desiccant bags into the test chamber to speed up the drying process,

it was verified that the decay rate was shorter as expected.

Two plate orientations were used, direct impingement (charged plate perpendicular to

ionizer blower flow, high 90 °) and horizontal (charged plate parallel to ionizer blower

flow, low 0°). The ionizer blower remained at a fixed position while the charge plate was

allowed to move freely at different distances (near and far as we denoted them), which

depended on the size of the experimental chamber.

EXPERIMENT/TEST RESULTS

As stated earlier, we conducted 4 preliminary experimental runs to verify the following

parameters: the charged plate control panel properly working at the voltage range

specified by the manufacturer, RH meter probe position inside the test chamber, ionizer

blower positioning and minimum/maximum distance from charged plate inside the test

chamber. During these experimental runs, it was noticed that some air ion pairs remained

inside the chamber after each charging/discharging session and did not permit

equilibrium conditions to re-establish, producing longer rates. In order to correct this

situation, all stands and metallic parts were grounded to a common ground, the charged

plate was wiped-clean with Isopropanol, and venting of the chamber was achieved to

obtain faster charging/discharging rates.

Once all the experimental setup was properly chosen, a total of 21 experimental runs

were conducted whose results are shown below:

27
Ionizer Experiment for August 18, 2000

Position = Direct Impingement ( 90°)

Distance = 33.02 cm / 13 in

_elative Humidity RH = 30%

Temperature = 21 °C 170 °F

Voltage Setup (v) = 1000 - 400

Average Decay Rate = 2.0 sec

Exp. Run# Decay Rate (sec)

1 2

2 2

3 2

4 2

5 2

6 2

7 2

8 2

9 2

10 2

Ionizer Experiment for August 21_ 2000

Position = Direct Impingement ( 90°)

Distance = 33.02 cm / 13 in

_elative Humidity RH = 20%

Temperature = 21 °C 1 70 °F

Voltage

Average Decay

Exp. Run#

Setup (v) = 1000 - 400

Rate = 2.5 sec

Decay Rate (sec)

1 2

2 2

3 2

4 3

5 3

6 2

7 3

8 3

9 3

10 2

Ionizer Experiment for August 28, 2000

Position = Direct Impingement ( 90 °)

)istance = 33.02 cm / 13 in

Relative Humidity RH = 10%

temperature = 22 °C / 72 °F

Voltage Setup (v) = 1000 - 400

Average Decay Rate = 2.2 sec

Exp. Run# Decay Rate (sec)

1 2

2 2

3 2

4 2

5 2

6 2

7 2

8 3

9 2

10

Ionizer Experiment for August 16, 2000

Position = Direct Impingement ( 90°)

)istance = 33.02 cm / 13 in

Relative Humidity RH = 31% - 29%

temperature = 22 °C 172 °F

Voltage Setup (v) = 1000 - 500

Average Decay Rate = 3.4 sec

Exp. Run# Decay Rate(sec)

3

4 4

5 4

6 3

7 3

8 3

9 3

10 3

28
onizer Experiment for August 16, 2000

Position = Direct Impingement ( 90 °)

Distance = 33.02 cm / 13 in

F_elative Humidity RH - 31% - 29%

Temperature = 22 °C / 72 °F

Voltage Setup (v) = 1000 - 400

Average Decay Rate = 11.6 sec

Exp. Run# Decay Rate (sec)

1 2

2 14

3 22

4 15

5 16

6 13

7 10

8 9

9 8

10 7

Ionizer Experiment for August 28, 2000

Position = Direct Impingement ( 90°)

Distance - 55.88 cm / 22 in

Relative Humidity RH = 10%

Temperature = 22 °C ! 72 °F

Voltage Setup (v) = 1000 - 400

Average Decay Rate = 6.1 sec

Exp. Run# Decay Rate (sec)

1 6

2 6

3 6

4 6

5 8

6 6

7 6

8 5

9 6

10 6

Ionizer Experiment for August 30, 2000

Position = Direct Impingement ( 90 °)

Distance = 55.88 cm / 22 in

Relative Humidity RH = 30%

Temperature = 21 °C / 70 °F

Voltage Setup (v) = 1000 - 400

Average Decay Rate = 7.1 sec

Exp. Run# Decay Rate (sec)

1 8

2 9

3 6

4 6

5 6

6 7

7 8

8 8

9 7

10 6

Ionizer Experiment for August 30, 2000

Position = Direct Impingement ( 90 °)

Distance = 55.88 cm / 22 in

Relative Humidity RH = 30%

Temperature ---21 °C 170 °F

Voltage Setup (v) = 1000 - 300

Average Decay Rate = 12.2 sec

Exp. Run# Decay Rate (sec)

1 13

2 9

3 9

4 10

5 8

6 11

7 16

8 16

9 11

10 13

29
Ionizer Experiment for August 18, 2000

Position = Horizontal Position ( 0°)

Distance = 33.02 cm / 13 in

Relative Humidity RH --.30%

Temperature = 21 °C ! 70 °F

Voltage Setup (v) = 1000 - 400

Average Decay Rate = 3.6 sec

Exp. Run# Decay Rate (sec)

1 4

2 3

3 3

4 4

5 4

6 4

7 4

8 3

9 3

10 4

Ionizer Experiment for August 28, 2000

Position = Horizontal Position ( 0°)

Distance = 55.88 cm / 22 in

Relative Humidity RH = 10%

Temperature = 22 °C / 72 °F

Ionizer Experiment for August 29, 2000

Position = Horizontal Position ( 0°)

Distance = 33.02 cm / 13 in

Relative Humidity RH -- 20%

Temperature = 22 °C / 72 °F

Voltage Setup (v) -- 1000 - 400

Average Decay Rate = 3.6 sec

Exp. Run# Decay Rate (sec)

1 3

2 4

3 3

4 4

5 4

6 4

7 3

8 4

9 4

10

Voltage Setup (v) = 1000 - 300

Average Decay Rate = 21.9 sec

Exp. Run# Decay Rate (sec)

1 23

2 20

3 21

4 27

5 22

6 22

7 22

8 27

9 16

10 19

Ionizer Experiment for August 30, 2000

Position = Horizontal Position ( 0°)

Distance = 55.88 cm 122 in

Relative Humidity RH = 30%

Temperature = 21 °C / 70 °F

Voltage Setup (v) - 1000- 400

Average Decay Rate = 7.6 sec

Exp. Run#

1

2

3

Decay Rate (sec)

6

8

4 9

5 9

6 6

7 8

8 7

9 8

10 7

3O
IonizerExperiment for August 29, 2000

Position = Horizontal Position ( 0°)

Distance = 33.02 cm / 13 in

Relative Humidity RH = 20%

Temperature = 22 °C / 72 °F

Voltage Setup (v) = 1000 - 300

Average Decay Rate = 4.9 sec

Exp. Run# Decay Rate (sec)

1 4

2 5

3 4

4 5

5 5

6

7

8 5

9 5

10 6

Ionizer Experiment for August 29, 2000

Position -- Horizontal Position ( 0°)

Distance = 33.02 cm / 13 in

Relative Humidity RH - 10%

Temperature = 22 °C / 72 °F

Voltage Setup (v) = 1000 - 400

Average Decay Rate = 3.8 sec

Exp. Run# Decay Rate (sec)

1 4

2 4

3 4

4 4

5 4

6 3

7 3

8 3

9 5

10 4

Ionizer Experiment for August 29, 2000

Position = Horizontal Position ( 0°)

Distance - 55.88 cm / 22 in

IRelative Humidity RH - 6%

Temperature - 21 °C / 70 °F

Voltage Setup (v) = 1000 - 400

Average Decay Rate = 16.3 sec

Exp. Run# Decay Rate (sec)

1 15

2 16

3 15

4 19

5 21

6 13

7 14

8 16

9 17

10 17

Ionizer Experiment for August 30, 2000

_osition = Horizontal Position ( 0°)

Distance = 55.88 cm / 22 in

F_elative Humidity RH = 30%

Temperature = 21 °C / 70 °F

Voltage Setup (v) = 1000 - 300

Average Decay Rate = 10.0 sec

Exp. Run# Decay Rate (sec)

1 8

2 12

3 12

4 7

5 12

6 10

7 11

8 11

9 8

10 9

3]
Ionizer Experiment for August 29, 2000

Position = Horizontal Position ( 0°)

Distance = 33.02 cm / 13 in

_elative Humidity RH = 20%

Temperature = 22 °C / 72 °F

Voltage Setup (v) = 1000 - 300

Average Decay Rate = 5.2 sec

Exp. Run# Decay Rate (sec)

1 6

2 6

3 4

4 5

5 5

6 5

7 5

8 5

9 6

10 5

Ionizer Experiment for August 29, 2000

Position = Horizontal Position ( 0°)

Distance - 55.88 cm / 22 in

Relative Humidity RH = 6%

Temperature = 21 °C / 70 °F

Voltage Setup (v) = 1000 - 300

Average Decay Rate = 21.7 sec

Exp. Run# Decay Rate (sec)

1 20

2 27

3 17

4 19

5 21

6 21

7 23

8 26

9 24

10 19

Ionizer Experiment for August 29, 2000

Position ---Horizontal Position ( 0°)

Distance = 55.88 cm / 22 in

Relative Humidity RH = 20%

Temperature = 21 °C / 70 °F

Voltage Setup (v) = 1000 - 400

Average Decay Rate - 16.3 sec

Exp. Run# Decay Rate (sec)

1 16

2 18

3 17

4 16

5 14

6 17

7 16

8 19

9 15

10 15

Ionizer Experiment for August 29, 2000

Position -- Horizontal Position ( 0°)

Distance = 55.88 cm ! 22 in

Relative Humidity RH = 20%

Temperature = 21 °C 170 °F

Voltage Setup (v) = 1000 - 300

Average Decay Rate = 20.6 sec

Exp. Run# Decay Rate (sec)

1 21

2 21

3 18

4 23

5 18

6 21

7 20

8 20

9 22

10 22

32
Ionizer Experiment for August 28, 2000

Position = Horizontal Position (0°.)

Distance = 55.88 cm / 22 in

Relative Humidity RH = 10%

Temperature = 22 °C / 72 °F

Voltage Setup (v) = 1000 - 400

Average Decay Rate = 18.8 sec

Exp. Run# Decay Rate (sec)

1 17

2 27

3 21

4 18

5 21

6 23

7 19

8 13

9

10

14

15

33
DATA ANALYSIS

From the experimental runs, it appeared that the distance from the charged plate to the

ionizer blower is the ma,ior player of all three variables considered (i.e. Relative

Humidity, distance, and angle) in this experiment.

The graph displayed at the bottom of the analysis section, is intended for depicting the

interaction effect of the three variables simultaneously studied in the experiment whose

meaning is given by the statistical analysis of the experimental data. The results pattern

indicated a factorial design, three factors tested at two levels, i.e. # of experiments = 2 3 =

8. The statistical analysis process used to analyze this experimental data is called

"ANOVA" (ANalysis Of VAriances).

Low Distance = near (33.02 cm / 13 in)

High Distance = far (55.88 cm / 22 in)

Low RH = 10%

High RH = 30%

Low Angle = 0° (Horizontal Plate)

High Angle = 90° (Direct Impingement)

AVG = Average of 10 experimental values (no round off and with no decimal point)

In the following chart numbers 1 - 8 in the first column are the average values of 10 experimental data.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

A B C AVG

0 0 0 3.8

1 0 0 18.8

0 1 0 3.6

1 t 0 7.6

0 0 1 2.2

1 0 1 6.1

0 1 1 2

1 1 1 7.1

Single Independent Variables

A = Distance

B=RH

C = Angle

34
In the following chart, AB, AC, BC, and ABC represent the combined interaction of 2 and 3 single

independent variables.

** Number 4 here represents the number of differences or changes in the experimental conditions.

A B C AB AC BC ABC

1 -3.8 -3.8 -3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 -3.8

2 18.8 -18.8 -18.8 -18.8 -18.8 18.8 18.8

3 -3.6 3.6 -3.6 -3.6 3.6 -3.6 3.6

4 7.6 7.6 -7.6 7.6 -7.6 -7.6 -7.6

5 -2.2 -2.2 2.2 2.2 -2.2 -2.2 2.2

6 6.1 -6.1 6.1 -6.1 6.1 -6.1 -6.1

7 -2 2 2 -2 -2 2 -2

8 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1

Sum 28 -10.6 -16.4 -9.8 -10 12.2 12.2

**Sum/4 7 -2.65 -4.1 -2.45 -2.5 3.05 3.05

This chart represents the 4 paired scenarios where the distance changed from near to far.

The first set (1,2), represents the combined effect of low RH and low angle. The second set (3,4),

high RH and low angle. The third set (5,6), low RH and high angle. The last set (7,8), high RH and

high angle. The graph below represents the average between shortest and farthest distance in each set.

A B C AVG

1 0 0 0 3.8

1 0 0 18.8

431o[11o 1 1 0 367.6

(3.8 + 18.8) / 2 = 11.3

(3.6+7.6) 2=5.6

11.3 - 5.6 = 5.7

I 5101o11 6 1 0 1 226.1

71o11 8 1 1 lt21 7.1

(2.2 + 6.1 )

(2.0 + 7.1)

2 = 4.2

2 = 4.6

4.6-4.2=0.2

35
Interaction Effects of Distance, RH, and Angle for Ionizer

Experiment

A

O

O

O

¢=

n,

M

O

O

C_

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

• = •

I I II

: :

I _ II I

: .'b... :

5.6

. ,,. A.4.6

r ,,,vQ b

| I I

I I I

I l I

0 10 20 30 40

Relative Humidity RH (%)

I-e-- Low Angle _ High Angle ]

A further analysis of these experimental data would involve the use of a statistical

sottware package which, would fall beyond the scope of the purpose for this experiment

since a more complete variable analysis would involve the following interaction

sequence: TABC ----Average of the experimental values + main effect of A + main effect

orb + main effect ofC + interaction effect ofAB + interaction effect ofBC + interaction

effect of AC + interaction effect of ABC + experimental error (how good this model fits

the experimental data).

36
INCREASE OF MOISTURE CONTENT IN WORK AREA

The proposed alternative to allow for pyro operations to continue while RH_<30%, is in

fact, to raise the humidity level above 30%. This task wouM require a modification of the

OPF ECS configuration, similar to the ECS humidification modification at Pad B. The

Pad B ECS has the ability to control the RH to the AFT, PLB, and Cabin purge circuits

individually. The system consists of a humidifier, boiler, associated water piping, control

valves, controllers, and sensors. The system has the capability of controlling the RH of

the purge air going to the Orbiter above 30% while maintaining the maximum specific

moisture of no more than 37 grains of moisture per pound of dry air. Although this

method would work, it has two downsides: 1) this method could not be implemented at

DFRC due to the fact that the Portable Purge Unit could not be outfitted with such a

scheme, and 2) the modification would be costly as shown below.

The approximate cost break down for the modification of one OPF ECS is as follows (in

U.S. Dollars):

Two Required Sensors = $300.00 each

Humidifier = $2,500.00

Humidifier Chamber = $1,500.00

Steam Generator (Boiler) = $3,000.00

Piping and Control Valves = $1,500.00

Water Softener = $2,600.00

Design Costs = $5,000.00

Two Foxboro Controllers = $250.00 each

Labor = $4,000.00

Burden (Contractor Profit) = 1.8% of Parts and Labor

Estimated Total = $24,000.00

If this modification would be implemented to all three OPF ECSs, the total cost would be

approximately $72,000.00.

Dehumidifier already installed at Pad 39-B

37
Boiler Assembly at Pad 39-B

Humidifier Controller for the ECS at Pad 39-B

38
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ACTIONS

Some experimental issues and preliminary findings about ESDs and pyros were discussed

with Dr. Raymond Gompf, a NASA adjunct consultant in the Research Area at the O&C

Building and Mathematics Professor at Brevard Community College (BCC). He pointed

out that the ionizer used in the experiment was not designed for pyro operations, rather

we were just using it for testing purposes, and for future testing, we should contact the

vendor to ask if they manufacture ionizers for pyro operations. Also some other small

and important details such as how fast the technician is moving, body fat, weight, height,

protective equipment, etc. can make a difference when handling EEDs at low RH levels,

since these factors can trigger an inadvertent spark.

Future testing calls for a simulation on an OPF-like Pyro operation with RH<30% using

the ionizer to verify that the voltage drops down to about 350 volts. This could be

performed using wriststats, fire retardant coveralls, and personnel grounding. The key to

provide electrostatic protection lies on timing because the faster the breakdown or

switching time of the protective device after onset of applied electrostatic voltage, the

better the protection will be.

Another possibility is to extend the experimental setup to a field experiment in the real

environment of the OPF with a bigger ionizer blower and try to obtain some data.

Perhaps in this realistic setting, we may have different variables to consider within the

OPF. However, if further testing does not satisfy the safety community, then budgeting

for modifications to the OPF ECS must be considered. Also, to solve the low RH

problem at DFRC a portable dehumidifier may be considered. Of course, the portable

dehumidifier must go through the proper testing and analysis before such a device could

be used in the Orbiter.

39
°

2.

.

.

.

REFERENCES

Jonassen, Niels, "Electrostatics", Chapman & Hall, 1998.

"Orbiter Pyrotechnic Devices, OS-400-LSC Student Handbook", USA _ Technical

Training USK-155, April 28, 1998.

Pisacane, Vincent L. and Moore, Robert C., editors, "Fundamentals of Space

Systems" Oxford University Press, 1994.

Pollard, Frank B., and Arnold, Jack H. Jr., editors, "Aerospace Ordnance

Handbook", Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1996.

"Ordnance Safety Manual, ORD M 7-224 Ordnance Corps Manual" Ordnance

Corps, Department of the Army, September 4, 1951.

40