Energy, Economics, and Security in Central Asia:

 Russia and Its Rivals

Professor Stephen Blank

 Strategic Studies Institute

U.S. Army War College

Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 17013

March, 1995
ii

******

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do

not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the

Department of the Army, The Department of Defense, or the U.S.

Government. This report is approved for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may

be conveyed directly to the authors by calling commercial (717)

245-4085 or DSN 242-4085.
iii

FOREWORD

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to the creation

of five new states in Central Asia. These states: Kazkahstan,

Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan, have become

both the object of international rivalries in Central Asia and

the sources of new political forces as they act to enlarge their

independence in world politics. This monograph attempts to trace

the importance of the new forces unleashed by the advent of these

states by focusing on the struggle around energy and security

issues involving them.

These issues will have significant impact upon the security

of the Middle East; the Commonwealth of Independent States,

especially Russia; South Asia; and even China. Already the

impact of these new states is making itself felt in international

politics in these regions.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this

report as a contribution to greater understanding of Central

Asian issues whose significance in world politics can only grow.

William W. Allen

Colonel U.S. Army

Acting Director

Strategic Studies Institute
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

OF THE AUTHOR

STEPHEN J. BLANK has been an Associate Professor of

Russian/Soviet Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute since

1989. Prior to this appointment, Dr. Blank was Associate

Professor for Soviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace

Doctrine, Research, and Education of Air University at Maxwell

Air Force Base. Dr. Blank's M.A. and Ph.D. are in Russian

history from the University of Chicago. He has published

numerous articles on Soviet/Russian military and foreign

policies, notably in the Third World, and is the author of a

recent study of the Soviet Commissariat of Nationalities and

editor of a book on the future of the Soviet military.
v

SUMMARY

Five Central Asian states emerged out of the Soviet Union's

Central Asian republics in 1991. Although U.S. policymakers

presumed that Iran would inevitably sweep them into its sphere of

influence, this has not happened. Nor is it likely to occur. 

Instead there has developed a multi-state competition for

influence and even control of these new states. This competition

involves Russia as the leading force in the area and Moscow's

main rivals are Turkey, Iran, Pakistan (and India), China, and

the United States. This rivalry is particularly strong in the

struggle among these states to gain positions of leverage over

the energy economy, i.e. production, pipelines, and refining in

Central Asia because this region is blessed with enormous energy

deposits. These deposits are crucial to Central Asia's

integration with the world economy and economic progress. 

Indeed, energy exports may be the only way these governments can

hope for any economic stability and progress in the future.

Therefore, whoever controls the energy economy will

determine the destiny of the region. This monograph offers a

detailed look at how and why Russia is trying to control that

economy and thus the destiny of these states, as well as the

strategies of its rivals. Moscow is aiming to reintegrate

Central Asia into an economic, political, and ultimately military

union with Russia. It is trying to dominate their economies and

subject them to Muscovite direction. Russia, therefore, resorts

to blocking energy production, hindering foreign firms'

activities in Central Asia, obstructing exports, and conducting

currency policies that export inflation. Russia also has devised

policies that coerce Central Asian states into giving Russians

residing there dual citizenship. All of these policies signify

Russia's efforts to fashion a new model of economic and, hence,

military-political hegemony over the region and a new form of

Central Asia's colonial dependency upon Moscow. The monograph

argues that though Moscow is conducting a strong policy, it is

not ultimately able to achieve such control because Central Asian

states have alternatives in other states and because of Russia's

own economic weakness.

Presently, none of Russia's other rivals for influence in

Central Asia are able alone to check Russia's renewed imperial
vi

thrust. Should they combine their efforts, an option that has

some limited possibility of fruition, they might achieve

something in the way of lasting positions of leverage over

Central Asia. But China is likely to be an exception to that

general trend. China, arguably, is driven by compelling energy

and political needs of keeping its own Muslims docile to expand

its economic and political influence into Central Asia. Although

for now cooperation with Russia is a greater priority for China,

in the longer term there are significant possibilities for China

to become Russia's main rival in Central Asia. These conclusions

derive from a detailed examination of the role Central Asia plays

in the international policies of Turkey, Iran, India-Pakistan,

and China. In all these cases, energy and transportation, as

well as the Islamic factor, figure prominently in efforts to gain

leverage. However, detailed examination of their policies

suggests that if Moscow's rivals act alone, except for China,

they cannot save Central Asia from Russia.

Implicitly, however, a second factor is operating that will

make any Russian effort to reimpose empire difficult. Russia's

own economic situation will not permit it to use its economic

power to lift up and modernize Central Asia. Rather Central Asia

will remain trapped in an inequitable division of labor and

backwardness, not to mention authoritarianism, that will not lead

to internal stability. Indeed, quite the opposite will be the

result if Russian imperial policies prevail. Therefore the

monograph argues that the U.S. policy that has essentially

accepted Russian policies here is mistaken. If we want to foster

conditions of economic growth, democratic progress, and global

integration, we should promote policies that open Central Asia to

foreign investment and economic growth. We should not consign

the region to a Moscow-directed integration that leaves it as the

backward raw materials periphery of a stalled Russian economy.

That policy can only lead to further instabilities and conflicts

in the area which will then increasingly bring all of the rivals

into the conflict zone. Such an outcome conforms neither to

Central Asia's interests nor to those of the great powers which

contend for influence there. In that case regional economic and

political rivalry could become an intractable international

military rivalry.
1

ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND SECURITY IN CENTRAL ASIA:

RUSSIA AND ITS RIVALS

Introduction.

Five new states emerged in Central Asia when the Soviet

Union collapsed. They are Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrygzstan,

Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan. Then Secretary of State James

Baker and many U.S. pundits expected these largely Muslim

republics to fall soon to Iranian or fundamentalist influence.

This view stemmed from a superficial wrongheaded reading of the

area.1

 Instead, a complex, multi-state rivalry to influence and

control Central Asia's destiny, trade, and resources, especially

Kazakhstan's and Turkmenistan's oil and gas, has developed. The

main players are Russia, Iran, Turkey, India, Pakistan, China,

and the United States. Israel and Saudi Arabia play a lesser

role.2

Russia's sustained effort to subordinate Central Asia to its

policies is the most strongly perceived aspect of this rivalry.

However, Central Asian states are not helpless before foreign

machinations. The earlier view about the imminence of Iranian

takeover that U.S. policymakers had postulated has not been borne

out by events. Rather, Central Asian states are enhancing their

ability to deal freely with Russia's rivals.3 Since Moscow openly

employs economic pressure and a coercive energy policy to compel

Central Asian reintegration with Russia, those sectors figure

most prominently in this rivalry, whose outcome has vital

consequences for both regional as well as Russian security.

All the rival states' influence over Central Asia affects

important, often vital interests. For example, Israel aimed to

divert Central Asian states from pro-Iranian policies, prove its

bona fides in the Muslim world, and prevent nuclear proliferation

from Kazakhstan to other Muslim states.4 In the future U.S.

interests here could become vital if Russia or China enters local

conflicts. But to best understand what is now taking place in

this rivalry the focus should be on the international struggle

over Central Asian energy resources. This struggle takes place

in the broader context of the rivals' efforts to influence

Central Asia's economic and political global integration.

Focusing on the rivals' economic policies, especially in energy,
2

clarifies that context and this rivalry.

Energy as the Crucial Sector.

The enormous energy resources of Russia, Kazakhstan, and

Turkmenistan are vital to their economic and political future.

For all three states energy exports are the main, if not only,

path to the world economy and vital resources for future

investment and growth.5

 That is also true for China, Iran, and

Turkey, if not India and Pakistan. Energy producers' competition

for markets is a major factor of security policies.

The struggle to control energy resources, the pipelines

through which they travel, and trade routes is widely regarded as

a new form of the pre-1945 Great Game between the Russian and

British empires in Central Asia. Already Central Asian efforts to

act independently in their foreign economic policies have led to

Russian acts of economic warfare. Russian policies regarding

Central Asian economic and energy issues reject the notion of a

benign threat assessment in the CIS' energy producing areas.

Thus in energy and economic policies no quarter is given or

asked. Rather Russia reacts hyper-sensitively to any sign of

Central Asian self-assertion and sees foreign threats everywhere.

Moscow's actions show that it rejects the belief that,

If carefully articulated, Russian interests will find

broad support because few people have any great

interests in generating more 'great games' between East

and West or between North and South.6

Instead Russian actions demonstrate that this view is as

unfounded and naive as the earlier belief about imminent

fundamentalism. Russian threat perceptions impel Moscow to

transcend reintegration on mutually agreed upon bases and resort

to outright coercion and efforts to restore a neo-colonialist

relationship of dependency upon Moscow. That coercion does not

aim at immediate and total integration which is presently beyond

Russia. Rather, Russia is creating conditions for future

integration based on what it can afford and control now. Moscow

can control energy since its pipelines and refinery capabilities

enable it to shut off energy to and from Central Asia.

Moscow began using energy to compel Ukraine, the Baltic
3

states and Belarus into submission when Gorbachev tried to hold

the USSR together.7 In 1989-91 he habitually threatened to cut

off energy supplies to these rebellious states. Though some

predicted that the Soviet collapse would also trigger Russia's

and Central Asia's collapse, Russia aims to reintegrate the

Soviet 'economic space' on a Moscow-centric basis using energy

coercion as a key lever.8

 But its efforts to control energy

production and shipments stimulate this rivalry among other

producers, international oil companies, and states who would be

energy consumers.

Russia also desires the lucrative benefits accruing to key

players in the world energy business. Thus it restricts Central

Asian states' exports, and redirects energy trade flows to it and

its transport network. There also is at least some official

Russian interest in OPEC.9

 In April 1994, Russian Energy

Minister Yuri Shafranik stated a wish to further oil cooperation

with Iran.10 This coincided with reports of Moscow's desire to

ease the embargo against Iraq. Analysts, like Valerii Lipitskii,

argue that Arab states should invest in Russian oil to prevent a

Western "takeover" of the oil and OPEC's ensuing decline. They

also urge the Arabs to buy Russian arms.11 Therefore, a deal with

Iraq or OPEC may be brewing even as Russian pressure upon other

CIS states' energy resources grows. That would strike at the

U.S. policy of dual containment of Iraq and Iran.

In its 1994 Russian National Security Concept, the journal

Obozrevatel'-Observer stated that the entire current security

agenda boiled down to two linked issues: supplying Russian fuel

and raw materials to other members of the CIS, and Russian

troops' combat role in conflicts within the former Soviet

borders.12 This observation dramatized the importance of Russia's

control over Central Asian energy by linking it to Russia's

military operations in the CIS. This report (for that is the

form this "Concept" took) also thereby highlighted the centrality

of energy issues for Russia vis-a-vis Central Asia. The concept

statement also noted CIS members' growing dependence on restoring

foreign trade with Russia, especially in energy. This dependence

would now make it possible for Russia to regain its influence

over Central Asia through further integration with the world

economy. Russia had subsidized CIS energy use for years through

1993, with almost no reward. Instead, as the price of the

influence which subsidies brought to Moscow, Russia had accepted
4

massive economic losses and diverted its vital foreign trade away

from customers paying market prices. Thus, to regain that

foreign trade and to force Central Asia into further dependence

on the Russian economy, Obozrevatel'-Observer argued that Russia

must charge world market prices and end the subsidies.13

Meanwhile Russia's energy industry faces collapse, declining

production, under-investment, and massive state arrears. The

worst outcome for the industry and Russia is the emergence of new

Western-backed competitors in its non-paying customers' lands.

Russia's previous subsidies supposedly prove its benevolence

towards those customers, but cannot be sustained. Therefore,

Russia insists other states pose an energy threat.

But Russian coercion obliges Central Asia to reply in kind

even though it is landlocked and far from major world trade

routes. To trade abroad freely, they must invest massively in

transportation and infrastructure. Those sums are beyond them

and existing transportation systems all traverse Russia since

Soviet planners promoted regional dependence on Moscow. Because

Central Asia, as a whole, also faces desperate and worsening

economic, demographic, and ecological problems, investment in

transportation and infrastructure must be foreign.14 Only oil

revenues, or their prospect, can finance the investments needed

to modernize and diversify local economies. Otherwise, Central

Asia must rely on Russian transport and refineries for oil. This

would be a disaster since control over transportation is a

precondition to control of Central Asia.15 Whoever controls trade

and pipeline routes will decide the region's destiny.

Accordingly, Russia's energy policies particularly endanger

Central Asia and Azerbaidzhan. Russia "blackmails" Kazakhstan

and Turkmenistan over energy exploration and transhipment and

holds them "hostage."16 Western observers also note Russia's

"proprietary attitude" towards local oil deposits.17 Still more

dangerous is past Russian policy towards Azerbaidzhan. Russia

coerced Baku into granting Lukoil, Russia's oil company, a 10

percent share of revenues from future Caspian Sea oil finds

without Lukoil putting up a kopek of equity. Russia also tried

to prevent Western investors, led by a British Petroleum

consortium, from operating there.18 On April 28, 1994, the

Russian government sent London a demarche claiming a right to

veto any exploration in the Caspian Sea, and that oil projects in
5

the Caspian Sea "cannot be recognized" without Russian approval.

It thus threatened Azerbaidzhan's oil projects and the ChevronTengiz and Caspishelf projects in Kazakhstan (led by Mobil, BP,

British Gas, Agip, Statoil, Total, and Shell).19 The letter

states:

The Caspian Sea is an enclosed water reservoir and an

object of joint use within whose boundaries all issues

or activities including resource development must be

resolved by all the Caspian countries. Any unilateral

actions lack a legal basis.20

This letter is instructive in several regards. It asserts

Russia's preemptive rights over Caspian energy ventures (and

implicitly over all energy ventures in the CIS).21 Thus the

letter confirms Russia's belief in its proprietary and imperial

rights across the CIS over energy.22 Its timing and address to

London also suggest Russia's determination to extrude Western

investment and influence from CIS oil producing states.

The demarche's blunt tone, and address to London, not Baku,

also suggests that Russia sees this as an East-West issue. The

destination shows Moscow's disdain for Azerbaidzhan's or other

littoral states' sovereignty. If London or the West yields,

Moscow seems to believe, so will Baku. Evidently the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs and other high officials assume that if the

Azeris and other littoral states are not dominated by Russia they

will implicitly revert to an anti-Russian Western sphere of

influence. This principle underpinned Soviet policies, and much

of Tsarist thinking as well. Therefore this letter displays a

continuing Brezhnev-like doctrine of diminished sovereignty for

other CIS members and mafia-like tactics of threatening that bad

things will happen unless Russia gets its percentage. Although

Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin denied knowledge of this

letter, once it was published abroad Russia's press reiterated

its arguments and threat assessments.23

However, by this demarche Russia has had to come out into

the open. The use of such spurious arguments to deny states their

territorial waters and sovereignty with no basis in fact or

international law evokes past Soviet brazenness. It also shows

Moscow's weakness, frustration, and desperation over its eroding

imperial position. The letter's menacing tone actually reflects
6

Russia's awareness that Baku and the West were about to resist

its pressure successfully. It may be the opening shot in a

campaign, but the campaign is born of weakness, not strength.

Thus Western and local resistance to imperial claims safeguards

Central Asia's independence. Azerbaidzhan will not fall into

Russian hands if its diplomacy remains wily and resolute, and if

the West supports it.24 Given time and wise local policies, such

resistance could cancel any one power's overwhelming local

hegemony. While that is a demanding condition for local and

foreign statesmen, it is hardly an impossible one.

Russian Economic and Energy Policies.

Russia does not hide its ultimate objective: to compel

Central Asian reintegration on Moscow's terms, mainly by using

economic means. Though the Russian forces deployed in

Tadzhikistan's civil war give Moscow a military entree into the

region, economic and political forces are Russia's most effective

policy tools. For Russian elites economic factors objectively

impel reintegration of the CIS. President Yeltsin and Premier

Viktor Chernomyrdin have reiterated that economic unity is a

prelude to military and political reunion of the CIS.25 Although

the specific forms of this reunion are to be decided, Russian

leaders use economic factors at their disposal to shape their

desired political ends. But at the same time they resent any

other state's attempt to play this same game.26

Vice Premier Sergei Shakhray asserted that Russia bears

international legal responsibility for the Russians in the new

states. Until their legal status is fixed, "We will be at the

stage of a transitional period, and the methods and forms of

Russian guardianship of compatriots will largely correspond to

the quality of this transience."27 Here again Russia is trying to

diminish CIS members' sovereignty and make up unilateral legal

pretexts for expansive political ends. The notion that Russia,

or other states, have a unique international legal responsibility

for their citizens abroad above that of the state where they

reside is another example of the imperialist doctrine of extraterritoriality (that citizens abroad are not subject to the host

country's laws but only to those of the country from which they

are claimed--in this case--to have come). Such reasoning and

political claims, in and of themselves, evince extremely

dangerous trends in Russian policies vis-a-vis all its CIS
7

neighbors and the Baltic states which Foreign Minister Kozyrev

lists as the "near abroad." And the means to enforce such claims

is Russia's relative economic power vis-a-vis these states.

This power vis-a-vis Central Asia is therefore consciously

deployed to secure preferential treatment for Russia's state

interests and for ethnic Russians there. Ex-Vice Premier

Aleksandr' Shokhin stated in November 1993 that Russia would

deploy every instrument of economic policy to advance the causes

of reintegration and of the Russian diaspora. He stated that the

issue of Russian-speakers (not just Russians) abroad would appear

and be tied to all economic negotiations with Central Asia and

CIS members.28

In December 1993, at the Ashgabat CIS summit, Russia tried

to push through a dual citizenship clause for Russians in the

"near abroad." Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev

publicly charged that this evoked the earlier Nazi policy towards

the Sudeten Germans in the 1930s, and it was shelved. But

Kyrgyzstan, whose economy is in tatters, agreed to it to stem the

outflow of skilled personnel. Turkmenistan then followed suit.

However, in early 1995, after a year of the kind of pressure on

Kazakhstan's economy described here, Kazakhstan acceded to a farreaching economic union pact with Russia and to a formula for

dual citizenship.29

Russia not only wants to preserve Central Asia's dependence

upon its economy, it also seeks to codify a lasting privileged

position for Russians in Central Asia. Kozyrev stated that

Russia insisted on putting the Central Asian States into the CSCE

so that they could be arraigned there, for failing to protect the

civil rights of their Russian speaking minorities.30 In July

1994, Yeltsin's commission for questions of citizenship, helped

by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, drafted guidelines for

Russian policy towards CIS states where Russians live. The draft

went into effect in August and strictly tied economic and

military cooperation with CIS states to observance of their

Russian communities' rights and interests. It called for talks

on establishing Russian language radio and TV service. Businesses

with Russian workers and public Russian communal organizations

should also receive Russian and local support. Additionally, a

share of Russian credits to CIS members should go to support

"Russian" factories, legalizing routine practice vis a-vis
8

Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. This draft also represents extraterritoriality.31

Finally, more tangible oil interests are also at stake.

Lukoil's president, Vagit Alekperov, observed that if Russia did

not take such control over the Caspian shelf, it "risks losing

its positions on the Caspian Sea."32 This bluntness about the

rivalry with Turkey is more credible than Russian or Turkish

claims of concern for the environment.33

But Russia's policies must also be seen in their context of

domestic pressure to support the Russian diaspora, or the

imperatives of reform, or by both factors. For instance, ending

energy and other subsidies for wasteful consumers and inflation

trends involving the ruble are vital for Russia's own recovery.

Since Russia, as the largest player in the CIS, cannot conduct an

isolated economic policy, its major policies also have profound,

sometimes unforeseen impacts, upon Central Asian states which

also confront the contradiction between international

responsibilities to each other and the CIS as part of economic

interdependence and the imperative of domestic reform. All these

contradictions can become intense, even irreconcilable, a fact

rarely appreciated here or abroad.34 Shafiqul Islam notes:

The R-5 agreement to create a new ruble zone and the

CIS accord to create a new economic union are two

concrete (and confused) responses to the conundrum that

the Central Asian and other non-Russian republics of

the former Soviet Union face: efforts to speed up the

cessation of the former economic dependence on Mother

Russia and the dismantling of the Union economy's

centrally planned economic interdependence greatly

compound the macroeconomic and

social costs of building a national economy where

economic interdependence is determined largely by

market forces. (Emphasis in original)35

Similarly, objective economic conditions prevent Central

Asian states from operating armies for defense against very real

regional threats. Since they cannot provide for their own

security they need foreign help.36 Naturally, he who pays calls

the tune. However Russia shows its concerns about Central Asian
9

trends, it cannot remain oblivious to and aloof from them.

Russian soldiers are obviously one of many means of enforcing

hegemony.

Russian policies for gaining economic hegemony over Central

Asia evolved through several stages after the USSR collapsed. At

first subsidies to Central Asia for finished goods and energy

products continued. Russia also let republican central banks

issue ruble denominated credits so they could avoid economic

contraction that began when Russia's Gaidar Government freed

prices and launched economic reforms in 1992. This policy

greatly stimulated inflation at home and undermined Russia's own

economic interests. These subsidies cost an estimated 10-15

percent of Russia's GNP. Russia quickly decided to undo that

relationship and force Central Asia out of the ruble zone and

into a market-dominated system giving Russia substantial control

over their economies.37 In 1992-93 Russia began issuing ultimata

that the republics accept the Central Bank of Russia's monetary

authority or stop issuing rubles as their domestic currency. 

That policy triggered a series of moves that ultimately broke

down the ruble zone and led Central Asian states except

Tadzhikistan to create independent currencies. Though these

policies might seem to be a declaration of Central Asian

independence, they only altered the form of dependence on

Moscow.38 Indeed they triggered Kazakh, Uzbek, and Kyrgyz charges

that Russia exported its inflation to them, reneged on debts for

goods obtained from them, and held their oil pipelines hostage.39

Russia decided that the old economic relationship greatly

obstructed reform and its interests. Moscow also concluded that

Russia could not house an expected flood of Russian emigres from

Central Asia. In addition, Russia became convinced that Central

Asia, if it became truly independent, would inevitably revert to

a hostile power, probably radical fundamentalist Iran or some

version of Pan-Turkism. A fourth, and possibly decisive

consideration was that the government was under fierce attack for

not protecting the Russian diaspora. Thus to maintain ethnic

Russians' leading role in Central Asia's economy, prevent Islamic

or Turkish revolution from spreading, and redress inflationary

balances in the economy, a new policy and strategy whose

objective was reintegration and strategic denial of these areas

to neighboring states has emerged.40 Accordingly, Russian policy

in Central Asia has aimed to minimize and exclude any Turkish,
10

Western, and Iranian foreign investment or political presence in

the region. The 1993 security and military doctrines explicitly

state this objective.41

Russian experts and leaders asserted that foreign aid alone

cannot overcome Central Asia's profound crises. They postulated

that on its own the area will stagnate and become a major threat

to Russia. The sole alternative then becomes reintegration.42

Russia vigorously followed up this assessment by direct economic

pressure on weak states like Kyrgyzstan to grant Russians dual

citizenship and to hold Kazakhstan's oil pipeline projects

"hostage."43 For a long time to come, Russia can use its superior

economic leverage to export its inflation by manipulating ruble

balances and the supply of various vital petrochemical products.

Such policies allow it to preserve a role in Central Asia as

colonizer vis-a-vis the colonized. And as long as their oil

economies remain undeveloped, the Central Asian republics will

continue to be "quasi-autonomous appendages" of the Russian

economy.44 Russia also apparently intends for the West to

continue to see the area through Russian eyes and accept this

situation.45

Foreign energy and other investment to foster Central Asia's

economic independence from any one dominant economy or polity is

therefore essential to counter Russian imperial drives, though 

Moscow views that as a fundamental threat to its interests. The

campaign against Azerbaidzhan's contract with the British-led

consortium showed that. Thus, Moscow will make major efforts to

use its control over Central Asia and fear of Central Asia's

self-assertion as a way of winning friends in Asia. In other

words, Moscow will invoke the specter of Islamic fundamentalism

at every opportunity, even if it is irrelevant to actual regional

conditions, in order to persuade other states that its hegemony

there is legitimate.

For example, well aware of Chinese concerns about rising

Islamic or Turkic solidarity in neighboring Xinjiang, Russia

partly bases its entente with China on a common interest in

quieting the area.46 Moscow similarly deals with India as the

most recent communique of Premier Narishima Rao and President

Yeltsin attacking sectarian nationalism indicates.47 Likewise,

Turkey's initial efforts to invest in Central Asia, control the

pipelines, and bypass Russia in that domain triggered an intense
11

military and political antagonism toward Turkey. Russia's

successful resistance to Turkey in Central Asia and Transcaucasia

was the result.48 Finally, Moscow has also moved to keep Iran out

by controlling foreign trade and energy routes, by making Iran

depend on Russian arms sales, and by suppressing Baku's interest

in reuniting with Iran's Azeri population in return for a nonaggressive policy in Central Asia.49

The Current Situation.

Lately, emphasis has shifted to the struggle over energy

pipelines and explorations. That shift reflects developments in

Transcaucasia and the expectation of Western exploration and

massive investment there and in Central Asia. Fear of Western

presence has intensified Russian pressure in Kazakhstan and

Turkmenistan for oil privileges and for Russians' dual

citizenship. Kazakhstan grasps the meaning of Russian pressure

and openly proclaims its need for Western support against those

threats. Former Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev told NATO that

Kazakhstan must act in the real world without firm guarantees

that its security will not be at risk. Therefore it must

strengthen its own and regional security, gain economic

independence, and join the world economy. There is no option but

for it to join associations like NATO to that end.50 Ex-Prime

Minister Sergei Tereshchenko was even more specific in talking

about Kazakhstan's foreign economic relations. He said that

Nazarbayev's personal participation in--and guarantee of--foreign

ventures and of Kazakhstan's stable foreign relations was a major

reason for foreign investment there.51 These statements indicate

the stakes of energy independence for Kazakhstan and show how

much leverage Russia can employ to obstruct it.

Since Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan cannot refine and convert

their energy products into finished goods, they turned to Russia

to exchange oil for Central Asian cotton. But Russia learned

that Central Asians preferred selling cotton to foreign currency

buyers since Moscow was subsidizing their energy anyway. This

forced Russia to look abroad for cotton, reduce purchases from

Central Asia, and sell oil to Central Asia and others for foreign

currency.52 Transition to the market and global integration led

to bilateral economic rivalry. Each side sought customers who

could pay for their goods and options to avoid spending scarce

foreign currency. That search added to Russia's motives to end
12

energy subsidies and destroy the ruble union.

Russia then shifted tactics to "get them (i.e., the oilproducing states-author) by their pipelines."53 Exploiting

Central Asian dependence on Russian pipelines, Moscow

systematically coerced Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. In November

1993, Gazprom, Russia's natural gas company, cut off Turkmen gas

exports to Europe, their main source of profits.54 Gazprom also

made major demands on both states concerning oil exports. Seeing

oil debts as a way to foster integration, Russia promoted debt

for equity swaps where the equity was shares in state oil and gas

firms.55 That proposal meant effective Russian takeover of these

companies.

Russia also pressured Kazakhstan for preference in granting

exploration licenses and for participation in the massive

Chevron-Tengiz project.56 As in Azerbaidzhan, Russia then

demanded sizable percentages of Kazakhstan's oil and gas revenues

in return for use of its pipelines. Russia also reportedly

demanded a 20-40 percent interest in Kazakh fields under

exploration.57 Russia also insisted that the oil then be loaded

onto Russian tankers for export. Otherwise, as it has done in

the past, Russia would continue to block plans to ship oil

produced in Central Asia and Azerbaidzhan.58 There are unconfirmed

reports that Russia won this concession. If so, it was also

helped by President Clinton's public support for the Russian

route, and staunch U.S. opposition to any pipelines traversing

Iran.59 U.S. opposition to Iran's presence in Central Asian

energy affairs removes effective alternatives to Russian control

of pipelines.

Moscow also blocked almost all Kazakhstan's oil exports from

May-August 1994. This deprived Kazakhstan of foreign energy

sales, hard currency, and of means for developing economic ties

with the West, and forced its refineries to stop production.

Kazakh energy officials believed that the pressure was connected

to Russian demands for a share in Kazakhstan's oil projects.60

They duly hurried to commission construction of new pipelines and

kept searching for alternate pipelines.61 Here Russia signalled

Kazakhstan and its potential Western partners that unless they

recognized Russia's interest, they would not market any oil.

Russian pressure also slowed the start of Chevron's Tengiz

project and raised its costs. That led Chevron to cut back its
13

investment in May 1994. Since the project is a litmus test for

foreign ventures, cancellation would be a catastrophe for

Kazakhstan leaving it no option but Russia.62

Russia's pressure worked. By August 1994, Kazakhstan was

allowed to send twice the previous amount of petroleum products

through Russian pipelines and waterways.63 Kazakhstanmunaigaz, an

oil and gas producer, handed over its export transit volume of

one million tons of oil to Russia's oil company, Rosneft, for

reexport.64 These actions had major economic and, ultimately,

political implications. Kazakhstan's oil producers, bereft of

currency income, had to assume high-interest bank loans. Industry

experts said Kazakhstan must export at least 250,000 tons of oil

to pay off the loans. Almaty counts on Moscow's consent to ship

about 125,000 tons of oil through Russia in August and September

1994. Kazakhstan would receive about $20 million (about $160/tona ridiculously low price-author) from these exports.65

In Turkmenistan, Russia cut off Turkmen gas exports to

Europe and tried to cut itself in on any future pipeline

construction. Russia also apparently bought Turkmenistan's gas

supply at low prices and resold it to Turkey at a 300 percent

markup. In early 1994, Russia also negotiated with Turkmenistan,

Iran, and Turkey to construct a pipeline to ship oil and gas from

Turkmenistan to Europe and to build oil and gas complexes. But

in June, Turkish papers wrote that Russian obstruction had held

up work on the pipeline and no concrete project has been drawn up

yet. Consequently the $5 billion needed to lay the pipeline have

not been acquired.66 For Ankara, shipping this oil and gas

through Turkey by 1996 is essential, so delay hits its vital

interests.67

At the same time, Russia pressured Turkmenistan to grant the

Russians there dual citizenship. Its pressure on Turkmenistan's

energy programs was leverage to obtain this outcome. In

Ashagabat, Turkmenistan reversed course and joined the CIS so

Russia signed an accord with the Turkmen government granting

Russians parity rights and pledging joint regulation of migration

flows. Even so, Russian media attacked Yeltsin for selling out

and not getting an ironclad agreement. The Russian media ignored

the insult implicit in dual citizenship. But Turkmenistan hopes

to gain from having Russian troops defend it against military

threats or pressure on existing energy programs as it seeks
14

pipelines with its neighbor, Iran. In President Sapurmurad

Niyazov's words, "We have gained something by joining the CIS. 

We understand that. The only thing we don't want is to have the

decisions that it adopts be binding on our country."68 Such frank

cynicism is refreshing, and shows Turkmenistan's confidence that

it can escape dependence on Russia and still prosper.

For now authoritarian Turkmenistan appears relatively

stable.69If it can resist pressure to alter its economic and

domestic policies to Moscow's taste, it will prove Roland

Dannreuther's assertion that Central Asia's current dependence on

Russia is ending since Russia is retreating from Central Asia and

the Muslim world and its leverage is diminishing accordingly.70

Despite Russian pressure, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan still have,

and are exercising the option to find, other routes for their oil

and gas.71 Should other takers appear, they will move toward them

to gain freedom vis-a-vis Russia. Washington's earlier

preference for a Russian route certainly does not bind them. For

instance, in January 1995, the Clinton administration reversed

course and supported a pipeline from Azerbaidzhan (and by

implication Central Asia) through the Caspian Sea, directly to

Turkey.72 This decision certainly offers Central Asian states

more leeway in approaching pipeline issues.

But in military affairs Central Asia's dependence on Russia

is unavoidable and facilitates Russia's enduring belief that its

real border is that of Central Asia with China, Iran, and

Afghanistan. However, Russian military assistance also means

that Russia must spend scarce money to protect Central Asia.

Russian costs in Tadzhikistan are high and growing, but no

solution to that war is at hand. Russia, arguably, has

guaranteed authoritarianism in Tashkent by sending troops to

Tadzhikistan. But it cannot, in the end, break Central Asian

progress and foreign economic integration.73

Too harsh a policy, by costing too much, could rebound upon

a Russia that cannot afford an empire. Then Russia's allies' and

clients' interests, not Russian ones, would dictate policy. That

could be the real future of Russian relations with Central Asia.

Strategic denial of Central Asia to foreign states in an era of a

global economy is prohibitively costly, if not infeasible.

Central Asia can relate to foreign states whose regional

interests are incompatible with a new Russian empire, e.g. China,
15

Pakistan, Turkey, and Iran.

Too strong a Russian pressure could lead Central Asian

states to resist Moscow or to collaborate with Moscow's rivals

with possible Western and Japanese support in the background.

Since Moscow cannot monopolize the region, and Russian

populations are leaving Central Asia (emigration being about one

million a year for the last 5 years), its current economic

pressure on the region, though dangerous, may yet prove to be

unsustainable.

The most recent developments in Azerbaidzhan suggest that

Russia is encountering precisely these difficulties. Despite

Russian pressure, Baku signed a contract with a consortium led by

British Petroleum, SOCAR, including Lukoil, on September 20,

1994. Though Lukoil's presence at the signing signified its

hopes for sizable revenues from the projects, the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs publicly and strongly rejected Azerbaidzhan's

right to make this contract. Thus internal policy divisions

about Azerbaidzhan are roiling the Russian government. These

factions may yet reunite over the pipeline issue, since a purely

Transcaucasian pipeline would freeze Russia out of the

Transcaucasus and Central Asia while uniting those two regions.

Accordingly, in the future, pipeline routes are the real

question. Although Russia's factional divisions could possibly

be exploited and demonstrate the continuing incoherence of

Russian policymaking, viewed in the context of the drive for

reintegration and control over oil by controlling pipelines, the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs will likely reunite with the Ministry

of Fuel and Energy and Lukoil to secure their interests at the

next stage.74 But in any case, Russia will not soon cease trying

to subject Transcaucasia and Central Asia to its interests and

compel reunion. To determine if Russia can overcome potential or

real rivals in Central Asia we must look at Russia's challengers

there.

Russia's Rivals in Central Asia.

Even if Central Asian states are helpless "appendages" of

Russian policy that depend on its economy and army, other states

seek a long-term foothold precisely in those sectors where Russia

aims to dominate: energy, transportation, and trade. Just like

Russia, some rivals evince a great fear of Islamic assertiveness.
16

Iran, however seeks to exploit and facilitate this force. Other

states' involvement is growing and revolves around strategic

goals similar to those animating Russian policy. The themes that

drive Turkey's, Iran's, Pakistan's, China's, India's, and U.S.

policies (as well as those of Israel, Japan, and Saudi Arabia) in

Central Asia are energy, Islamism or Turkic solidarity, and a

broader relationship with Russia. Often, though not always,

these themes have a negative aspect. Russia's rivals are

motivated not only by economic opportunity but by a desire to

deny either Islam, or Russia--or both--from dominating the

region. Japan, for example, aims to check Russia in Asia due to

the frosty Russo-Japanese relations.75 Therefore, Tokyo is

displaying a rising interest in Central Asian economic growth.

Japan sponsored Central Asian states' membership in the Asian

Development Bank and explores bilateral oil and pipeline deals

and economic assistance programs there.76

Turkey. Turkey's approach to Central Asia has invoked

Islamic and Turkic solidarity and Realpolitik to restrain Russian

influence. At its grandest, Turkish policy, outlined by the late

Premier and President Turgut Ozal, sought to enhance Turkey's

international presence from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of

China, wherever Turkic peoples were involved. Though attacked as

neo-Ottomanism or reborn Pan-Turkism, it was more a policy of

economic penetration, especially in the Black Sea and Central

Asia, and of cultural diffusion, a kind of civilizing mission to

show the superiority of Turkey's brand of a secular, modernizing,

Islamic state to younger brothers. Ozal's thinking and policy

reflected Europe's ambivalence about including Turkey in the West

and the exuberance following the Gulf War and fall of Soviet

power. Backed by the Bush administration, Ankara pursued a

greater economic presence around its borders to stabilize those

areas, generate a new rationale for Turkey's inclusion in the

West--its "civilizing mission" to Central Asia and Transcaucasia-

-and present a counter-model of a secular, democratic,

Westernizing Muslim state that would check Iran ideologically and

Iran and Russia politically.77

Turkey has invested several billion dollars in Central Asia,

mainly in culture, education, telecommunications, and

transportation to draw Central Asia closer to it and to the West.

However, in 1994 Turkey has little to show for the policy. Today

Turkey is in headlong retreat from Ozal's grandiose vistas. Its
17

inability to help Azerbaidzhan in the Nagorno-Karabakh war and

refusal to confront Russia there allowed Russia to deny

Transcaucasia and Central Asia to Turkish military influence.

Unable to project military power, Turkey has lost ground. Its

Central Asian trade, despite its investments, is still small, and

cultural tensions inherent in posing as Central Asia's big

brother have arisen. For Central Asia today, the West is the

West, not Turkey.78

At home Turkey suffers from massive inflation and a

persistent Kurdish insurgency. This insurgency apparently has

caused half the annual inflation rate of 70 percent. Turkey's

military talked of martial law, or of intervening in Azerbaidzhan

but could do neither. Meanwhile Islamic parties have made major

gains in Turkish politics.79 Ankara's post-Cold War security

policy exceeded its means. As the threat of imminent

politicized Islam in Central Asia receded, the United States lost

interest in Turkey as a model, though it occasionally invokes

that line.80 More importantly, U.S. aid to Turkey is now tied to

a concessionary human rights policy toward the Kurds.

Increasingly Turkey feels isolated and neglected by allies who,

it believes, cannot fully grasp the nature of the looming Russian

or other threats facing Turkey.81 These domestic and foreign

policy setbacks have hobbled Turkey's drive to become a great

Central Asian factor.

Finally the centerpiece of Turkey's grand design to become

the Rotterdam of the Middle East is endangered because Russia

fights Turkey's pipeline policies. As part of a solution to the

Nagorno-Karabakh war involving territorial exchanges, Turkey

aimed to create a pipeline from Central Asia and Azerbaidzhan

through purely Muslim territories that bypassed Russia and Iran.82

It is unlikely that this can be achieved. Russian pressure on

the producers, and negotiations with Greece to reroute Greece's

pipeline to Russia from the Black Sea through Bulgaria's coast to

Thessaloniki, aim to outflank Turkey and its policies of closing

the Bosporous to tankers, allegedly on ecological grounds.83 In

any case, the Kurdish insurgency makes Turkey's oil policy moot

since it takes place where the pipelines are intended to go and

the Kurds have repeatedly targeted these pipelines.84 There is

also a growing likelihood that Russia will support the Kurds

against Turkey and further deflect Ankara from a vigorous

international policy.85
18

All these developments exposed the shaky foundations upon

which Ozal's vision rested. Clearly, only with vigorous and

consistent U.S. support can Turkey counter Russian policies.

Unless that support is forthcoming, constant and tangible, and

there is no real reason to expect it as President Clinton's

preferred pipeline policy shows, Turkey will either have to make

a deal on Russia's terms or join a broader anti-Russian coalition

on its allies' terms. When we also assess Turkey's meager

cultural and historic connection with Central Asia, it becomes

clear that the joint U.S.-Turkish initiative in 1991-92 deeply 

misread Turkey's true possibilities. Turkish success now depends

upon resolving its domestic problems and upon lasting, vigorous,

Western backing. Otherwise, in Central Asia Turkey will be

marginalized and distracted by unsolved domestic problems.

More recently Kurdish, domestic, economic, and Iraqi issues

led Ankara to mend relations with Iran and Iraq. As resistance to

America and disillusionment with the West grows, that move is

eminently sensible if Turkey seeks an enhanced position in the

CIS and more flexibility to resolve the Kurdish problem's foreign

dimensions. President Suleiman Demirel's trip to Tehran in July

1994 was very successful. The communique and post-summit reports

stated that both states discussed cooperation on shipping Central

Asian energy through Iranian and Turkish pipeline routes that

would bypass Russia.86 While this is far from an alliance, and

motives for cooperation transcend Russian policy, both states'

desire to increase their leverage in the CIS is only possible by

joint action. 

Iran. Washington also misread Iran's policies and prospects

in Central Asia in 1991-92. Top policymakers believed that since

the new states were Muslim ones, all Muslims were alike and

inherently predisposed to Khomeinism-the root of all evil. They

thus injected much nonsense into the public debate, e.g.

asserting that the differences between Sunni and Shiite Muslims

that are a major obstacle to Iranian domination were meaningless

and that all Muslims were "pretty much the same."87 Therefore

they were naturally vulnerable to Iranian-type rule. This

misguided viewpoint perpetuated the stereotype that the Central

Asian states were helpless objects of others' designs.88

In fact Iran's Central Asian policy has been quite cautious.
19

In Transcaucasia, Tehran has supported Christian Armenia against

Azerbaidzhan through 1994, fearing irredentism among its own

large Azeri population. If Iran has conducted terrorism and

subversion in Central Asia, it is well hidden. There is also no

concrete evidence that Iranian versions of Islam have displaced

indigenous Islam. Though Iran's relationship with Russia is

traditionally wary and edgy, its discords with Moscow are

confined to media polemics, not open rivalry.89

This is not to say Iran has been quiescent or passive.

Rather it seeks to enhance its ties in Central Asia through

bilateral accords on pipelines and the construction of

transportation routes, railways, air travel, roads to ports like

Bandar Abbas, and so forth. Iran also promotes multilateral fora

like the Muslim Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). Earlier

it challenged Turkey's Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone and

pipeline aims by creating a Caspian Sea organization. Iran also

particularly cultivates Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan on pipelines

and transport networks.90

Iran's relationship with Moscow is complex. Iran needs

Russia to gain entry into Transcaucasia, reassure its neighbors

in the Gulf, and depends upon Russia as a major arms supplier

when few will sell it arms. It also is allegedly susceptible to

Russian appeals to keep Westerners out of the Caspian Sea. But

it also suspects Russian aims in Tadzhikistan's civil war where

Russian troops are keeping a Soviet-type regime in power,

ostensibly against Iranian-type fundamentalists.91 While Iran's

connection to the Tajik rebels is unclear, Tehran is not eager

for Russian troops to dominate Tadzhikistan. Therefore, it

offered Iranian forces as peacekeepers to help settle the war,

something Russia staunchly rejects.92

 Internally Iran also confronts a severe economic and

political crisis. Rioting at home is spreading as regions demand

more autonomy from Tehran. Economic distress is real and

pervasive, and Iran remains isolated from the West.93 These

factors threaten Iran's stability and underscore the fact that

Iranian Islam might be a weapon of terror abroad, but has no

answer to the Muslim world's problems and is subject to the same

disenchantment and disillusion that incites other fundamentalist

uprisings. While Iran regards Russia as part of "the West," it

focuses its anger and disappointment on Washington, whom it
20

accuses of blocking pipeline deals with Kazakhstan and

Turkmenistan.94

 While there are signs of rapprochement with Turkey on

Kurdish, Transcaucasian, pipeline, and religious issues, both

states' volatile internal situations preclude easy formation of a

successful united front against Russia in Central Asia. Too many

domestic constituencies in both states will oppose a deal unless

both governments gain considerable backing abroad and overcome

their internal economic problems.95 That is the precondition for

Iran and Turkey to achieve their individual and joint (but

differently conceived) minimum goal of Central Asia's economic

freedom from Russia. Thus Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar

Velayati recently stressed that peace in Tadzhikistan is tied to

all Central Asia's independence (i.e. if Russian troops leave or

are balanced, these states gain more freedom to draw closer to

Iran). Local economic growth could then preserve and consolidate

that independence.96

 In the context of Iran's internal crisis, Iran alone

neither can, nor will, directly challenge Russia in Central Asia.

Nor will it align with Western policy as did Turkey. Since

repeated hints of a desire to approach the United States went for

nought, Iran ultimately risks strategic isolation from the big

powers.97 Rapprochement with Turkey is helpful but goes only so

far, as does an approach to Pakistan or India. India and China

firmly oppose any "Islamic policy" in Central Asia and will not

contest Russia on those grounds. Instead, they will support

Russian efforts against national or religious outbreaks in

Central Asia to defend their own domestic stability.98 If Central

Asia is important to Iran, the demand for influence there will

add to pressure for radical internal transformation to enhance

Iran's capabilities. By all accounts that is currently almost

impossible to achieve due to Iran's political gridlock.99

 Iran's options are limited to economic penetration and

support or to attempts to expand its cultural-ideological

influence. Economic weakness holds it back from a major role in

Central Asia. Although Iran sponsors the Central Asian states in

the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and has the major

goal of reestablishing the medieval silk road from the Middle

East to China, it cannot offer the tangible support these states

need. Furthermore, its price for doing so is regarded with
21

suspicion.100 Nor have Iran's cultural and ideological aspirations

fared well. The Sunni/Shiite religious cleavage and the TurcoIranian cultural/ethnic divide in Central Asia hinder Iranian

influence despite Iranian and pro-Iranian claims that local

culture basically derives from Persian culture.101 Central Asian

elites also view Khomeinism negatively, being educated in a more

technocratic Soviet style. Across Central Asia Islamic parties

are the opposition, and the regimes in power, particularly

Uzbekistan's, suppress them ruthlessly. While in time this

resistance to any reform may bring a politicized Islamic party to

power, the very nationalism that animated Iran since 1979 will

help block Iranian expansion.

Lastly, all the CIS' Muslim rulers know that Iran supported

Armenia in its war with Azerbaidzhan lest Azeri nationalism stir

up Azeris in Iran who feel oppressed by Tehran. This has not

helped Iran abroad, especially in Baku. Reportedly during

Aliyev's 1994 visit to Tehran, Iran's leaders sought his support

for their efforts against the Arab-Israeli peace process in the

name of Islamic solidarity. That gambit led him to chastise

Tehran's double standard of support for Armenia.102 More

recently, Uzbek President Islam Karimov again charged Iran with

supporting fundamentalists who want to subvert his government and

provoked Iran's expected counterblast.103

Consequently Iran alone cannot threaten Russia's regional

interests despite mounting Russian hysteria over fundamentalist

Islam. That hysteria owes more to atavistic Russian politicalcultural traditions and to the need to justify Russia's new

nationalism and neo-imperialism at home than it does to reality.

 Indeed, Iran competes with Pakistan, as with Turkey, for

influence over Central Asian energy and economies. The rivalry

with Pakistan, like the resulting cooperation with India, is

recognized abroad. Iran's foreign relations, therefore, hardly

manifest a purely Islamic policy.104 Like Turkey, Iran will remain

a player, but it cannot unilaterally and fundamentally assist

Central Asia or meaningfully shake the emerging status quo. If

it expands its rapprochement with Ankara, Iran could conceivably

block Russian ambitions and be a force upon which Central Asian

states might rely. But first both states must radically change

their policies, an unlikely prospect.

Pakistan, India, and Central Asia. Upon becoming
22

independent, Central Asian states also found themselves involved

in Pakistan's security agenda. Pakistan's interest in Central

Asia sharply increased after the USSR collapsed (since it

perceived a new strategic opportunity there). But Pakistan's

policies inevitably led India to show more interest in the

region, too. Central Asia in the Indo-Pakistani rivalry is more

than a sideshow. It is potentially Pakistan's or India's

strategic rear and, as such, merits both states' cultivation and

close attention.

Pakistani perceptions and policies reflect the melange of

Islamic, geopolitical, and economic interests cited above. 

Stresses on transportation linkages, at home to unite its

disparate provinces, and abroad to integrate first Afghanistan

and now Central Asia, are central and longstanding pillars of

Pakistan's strategy.105 Once Central Asia became free and

Moscow's influence in Afghanistan died, unexpected strategic

vistas opened up to Pakistan's policymakers. They saw their

opportunity in a context that tied together Islamism,

geopolitical and strategic rivalry with India, and economic

opportunity through trade and transport.

 Apparently, all factions in Pakistani politics agree on

the importance of the Central Asian opportunity presented to

Islamabad. But they disagree on whether to emphasize Islamic

unity against India, the creation of an economic hinterland and

vast market for Pakistani goods and services to join Central Asia

and Pakistan through major land and air transportation routes, or

 Central Asia as a strategic rear against India.106 Pakistan's

military is preoccupied with attaining such a rear against any

future Indian war. Pakistan would then allegedly have access to

military supplies that the superior Indian navy and air force

could not interdict.107 This projected Central Asia includes

Afghanistan and Xinjiang, China's Western province, with a large

Muslim population of Kazakhs and Kyrygz. The economic objective

in this analysis is an integrated bloc from these areas, with a

Pakistani transport hub, especially its roads and ports.108

Pakistan attempted all three objectives: strategicpolitical, economic, and religious-ideological. It quickly

recognized the new states and sponsored Pakistani Airlines (PIA)

linkages to the area and schemes of transport projects and oil

pipelines through Afghanistan into Pakistan and its ports.
23

Political support, economic integration, and Muslim solidarity,

it was believed, would pave the way for the broader strategic

unity envisioned in the strategy.109

 However, this strategic vision becomes unrealizable

because it is beyond Pakistan's capabilities. Nor does it square

with Central Asian interests. These governments cannot form an

Islamic league and benefit too much from trade with India just to

gratuitously enter the Indo-Pakistani rivalry. Second, Pakistan

cannot become a regional economic powerhouse. It lacks both the

resources and direct overland routes to Central Asia. To gain

that direct access it must link up with Xinjiang or Afghanistan.

Both options are currently out of the question. China strongly

opposes any "Islamic" policy and pursues a policy to integrate

Xinjiang's economy with its own and Central Asia's economies to

make the latter states more dependent upon China.110 For the same

reasons it strongly opposes Pakistan's sponsoring of Muslim

separatist movements in India and an independent Kashmir.111

 Afghanistan's continuing civil war also precludes major

investment there to build a trade route. No major foreign

investment will be forthcoming while fighting continues. 

Furthermore, Central Asian states told Pakistan that they regard

any Pakistani sponsorship of fundamentalist Afghan parties a

hostile and inflammatory act.112 Even in 1991, they warned

Pakistan that such policies would provoke the Tajiks there, lead

to a breakup of Tajikistan, generate violence, massive refugee

flows, and trigger an unacceptable possible domino effect.113

This warning mandates Pakistani caution in Central Asia.

 Finally, Pakistan's Islamic offensive in Kashmir, support

for Indian secessionists, and interest in Central Asia registered

in New Delhi as parts of an anti-Indian Islamic policy. India

reacted quickly to expand trade and economic ties with Central

Asia and cooperate with Iran and Russia against Pakistan's

influence. The recent Yeltsin-Rao declaration showed their joint

opposition to any efforts to incite inter-ethnic or interreligious discords and to destabilize states, governments, and

borders.114 That joint policy dates from 1992. India's

ambassador to Russia then commented that "Close to our borders

lies an important area of Asia, in which peace and stability are

in our common interests. Remembering this, we would like to

build up our joint efforts in this direction."115 Subsequently,
24

experts from both states viewed Central Asia as veering away from

Turkish influence and expressed joint concern about a long-term

period of unrest and instability that fundamentalists will try to

exploit.116 Accordingly, India supports Iran's efforts to build a

railway to Turkmenistan to divert trade from Pakistan.117 And in

state visits Central Asian and Indian leaders openly express

their antipathy to fundamentalist politics.118

 Therefore Pakistan, like Russia's other Muslim rivals,

cannot hope, on its own, to be a regional guarantor or hegemon.

Any effort to do so will disrupt overall regional power balances,

greatly increase instability, shatter its alliance with China,

and highlight Pakistan's inability to conduct a grand strategy

and policy. Pakistan can only achieve meaningful success in

Central Asia if it moderates its aims and collaborates with other

rivals of Russian policy, e.g. Iran and Turkey.

 Clearly Russia's Islamic rivals in Central Asia cannot

supplant Russia unless they collaborate together. Even then it

is doubtful that they have the necessary economic and ideological

requirements to overcome Russian influence in Central Asia.

Neither the fundamentalists nor prophets of Pan-Turkism or PanIslamism can compete with Russia or China, and the West, led by

the United States.119

China. China is Russia's likeliest and strongest future

competitor in Central Asia. This is not by default. China, as

Russian and Western observers understand, has many important

advantages in the contest. A recent Russian analysis concludes:

China, moving gradually toward a leading position in

the struggle for influence in the post-Soviet era, has

similar geographical advantages (of bordering directly

on the area--author). It has far fewer limitations than

its Middle Eastern rivals. A regulated economy, which

is more compatible with the economies of the Central

Asian republics, a secular state, and available

financial means are also on the plus side. China offers

the Central Asian states the use of its territory to

gain direct access to the Pacific and on to the Far

East and Southeast Asia.120

 Analysts are fully aware of China's growing wealth, power,
25

and reach across Asia. China is, in many ways, stronger than

Russia. Furthermore, Russia now needs Chinese help to enter East

and Southeast Asia.121 More importantly, China has a mature,

well-conceived strategic concept that addresses its interests and

goals in Central Asia. Not surprisingly, its concept also

connects the questions of trade routes, transportation networks,

Islam, and energy.

For now, China's objectives are to preclude rising Islamic

or nationalist agitation among its Muslim peoples (Kazakhs,

Kyrgyz, Uighur)in Xinjiang and its Western provinces bordering

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. China has good reasons to fear

Islamic unrest. In 1990, the widening division between the coast

and the periphery in economics and the devolution of powers to

regional governments led Western Xinjiang, on Central Asia's

border, to became a center of uprisings, undoubtedly inspired by

the centrifugal tendencies already visible across the Soviet

border. China had to send 200,000 troops there. That revolt

culminated an apparent series of constantly spreading annual

uprisings since 1980 that have not yet ceased. China has not

crushed Xinjiang's underground, and anti-Chinese feeling is

pervasive due to Chinese immigration, economic differentials

among the population, and the Chinese political domination.122

Given the oil deposits, the nearby location of the Lop Nor

nuclear center, and the looming succession struggle in Beijing,

this unrest and the threat it spawns had to be curbed.

China believes it can temper, if not minimize, the potential

for such Pan-Islamic or nationalist agitation by an economic

policy that more closely integrates Xinjiang and Central Asia

with the Chinese economy. This policy objective is achievable

only if China can establish intimate trading ties in Central

Asia, support existing governments and their relationship with

Russia, and greatly upgrade Xinjiang's economic development and

integration with its Eastern and coastal provinces. The intended

goal is to reestablish and expand the old silk road into a modern

trade route integrating Central Asia, Western China, the

interior, and Coastal China into one network. Developing

Xinjiang's enormous Tarym Basin energy deposits is essential to

this end because China has now become a net energy importer.

 Since China's energy consumption and demand are expected to

grow sharply, stability in Xinjiang and Central Asia is vital for
26

China's continued economic growth and modernization.123

Otherwise, China's ability to sustain its political posture and

economic growth will come into question. Equally importantly,

unless China faces the problems confronting Beijing in its Muslim

provinces: a devolution of power to the regions and economic

imbalances among them, ethnic unrest will increase.124 Projects

to link Turkmen and Kazakh energy deposits to pipelines running

through China rather than Russia are being encouraged.125

Strong ties with Russia and support for its Central Asian

policies are steps toward that goal. Strong trade relations and

development of Xinjiang's economy and oil deposits are other

steps. Those policies also support China's larger international

economic strategy of gaining more energy and growing presence in

Asia's international economies.126

Therefore, China prominently celebrates every advance in oil

production from 11 million tons from local fields in 1993 to the

scheduled 17 million in 1995.127 Integrating Central Asia's large

energy deposits with China's would reduce pressure on the Tarym

Basin, stimulate regional and political integration of Central

Asia and Xinjiang with China's coastal provinces and Beijing, and

ease ethnic tensions.128 Vice Premier and Politburo Member Zou

Jiahua, on an inspection tour to Xinjiang, tied all this

together, noting that higher production, particularly in energy,

was significant "in promoting the sustained growth of China's oil

and gas production; as well as in stimulating Xinjiang's economic

development, consolidating the frontier, and enhancing unity

among nationalities in the region."129

China's strategic profile in Xinjiang is also intimately

tied to the larger problems of China's role in Asian security and

its intense search for hegemonic positions in the offshore oil

deposits located in the South China Sea. As a Japanese analysis

observes, China's success is bound up with ability to build

infrastructure and transportation capabilities.130 Second,

China's role as a factor of Asian stability is bound up with its

ability to produce enough oil and gas and stabilize its economy.

Therefore policies to meet rising demand for energy are directly

linked to Xinjiang's stability and growth. Failure here means

that China must move more into its offshore areas and further

buildup its already growing navy which has heightened security

anxieties across Asia.131
27

Central Asia's rising importance for domestic stability,

economic growth, self-sufficiency, and Asian policy has a flip

side. Any serious outbreak of instability in Xinjiang or Central

Asia strikes at vital Chinese interests and demonstrates a

vulnerability that China must suppress or coopt. Since China and

Russia are both vulnerable to Islamic based threats, their

collaboration in Central Asia should be expected for some time to

come. This common threat perception of assertive Islamic or

nationalistic forces is part of the larger basic harmony in views

and strategic interests that has led to Sino-Russian entente in

Asia. China clearly benefits greatly from this relationship.132

These considerations also explain China's coolness towards

Turkey, which Beijing has long suspected of harboring Pan-Turkic

designs on Chinese Muslims.133 For a while China encouraged Iran

and Russia against Turkey's efforts which it regarded as support

for pan-Turkism. But that support also implies that China will

not support any Iranian adventures in Central Asia.134 Similarly,

China strongly opposed Kashmir separatism, even if it weakens

India, for fear of Islam.135

But despite China's present cooperation with Russia in

Central Asia, China is likely to emerge over time as the great

counterbalance of the Central Asian states to exclusive

dependence upon Russia. The reasons for this are China's weight,

growth, the urgency of its interests, ability to influence

events, and determination to play a role in the area. As China's

and Asia's need for energy grows, China's need to stabilize

Central Asia and prevent disruptions in energy and trade will

grow. Ultimately this will lead Beijing to invest more political

as well as economic resources and to expand its influence there.

These factors are already visible in the growth of trade with

China and the Central Asian states' search for alternative

pipelines to Russia. Since both South Korea and Japan are also

interested in investing in pipelines through Central Asia and

China, so, too, will their leverage in Central Asia grow. 

Ultimately this trend can only diminish Russian influence,

especially if Russia cannot mimic China's rapid economic growth.

China is altogether a more substantial partner than any

other potential Russian rival. And Chinese interests are

incompatible with reformers and religious fundamentalists in
28

power. For Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, it will be necessary to

play off Moscow against Beijing to avert excessive dependence on

either one. Although both Russia and China must find positions

in Central Asia's economy, Russia's attraction is based on

existing infrastructure and past ties, and will likely siphon

resources out of the area without materially helping to develop

it. China's attraction is based on a self-sustaining dynamism

that sees it to its advantage to develop Central Asia and truly

integrate it into China's economic orbit. Though China and

Russia are now allies, a long-term distancing and even mutual

rivalry in Central Asia is likely, and more probable since only

China has the local means and ability, and perhaps the will to

challenge Russian regional interests. Certainly China sees

itself as only now beginning to play its rightful role in world

affairs due to its wealth, power, and status. That feeling can

only grow as those attributes increase and they could easily lead

to a clash of vital interests in Central Asia.

The United States. Central Asian trends do not directly

affect vital U.S. interests, yet both the Clinton and Bush

administrations have expressed interest in Central Asia's

democratization, development of market economies,

denuclearization, and in discouraging fundamentalism. A

governing principle of U.S. policy has been its determination, as

part of the broader policy of dual containment of Iraq and Iran,

to obstruct Central Asia's rapprochement with Iran. In practice,

the main line is, as Under Secretary of State Strobe Talbott

stated, "focusing on those areas of the globe where success in

one country or region will have an influence on surrounding

areas."136 This means that support for Central Asian reform

focuses mainly on Russia in the belief that if reform succeeds

there it will likely succeed among Russia's neighbors. This

point appears as well in President Clinton's 1994 national

security statement.137

However, real Russian reform should renounce neo-imperialist

programs that coercively diminishes CIS members' sovereignty. 

Unfortunately, the opposite is happening. This does not

necessarily mean that reform in Russia has failed. Rather,

reform is not what foreign supporters claim it to be, i.e., a

model for Central Asia or a basis for an end to empire.138

Indeed, it is reformers who tried to force Central Asia into a

Russian bloc. When we cast foreign states as models for third
29

parties, those models: Turkey, and certainly Russia, take their

role too seriously. Since Russian policy in Central Asia

evidently tends towards neo-colonialism, any "strategic alliance

with Russian reform" means in practice accepting Russia's neocolonial relationship to Central Asia. This relationship cannot

sustain true market reforms or promote democracy in either

region.

U.S. calls for democratization, open doors for U.S.

investment, and support for Russia as a model and leader embrace

a contradictory logic since support for Russia means excluding

foreign investment and hindering democracy which cannot flourish

in conditions of neo-colonialism and Central Asia's blasted

ecologies and economies. Today, Russian pressure on Kazakhstan

may lead Chevron to reconsider its investment in the Tengiz oil

fields that is a litmus test for other Western investment.139 We

cannot reconcile demands for an open door and democratic market,

while supporting renewed Russian hegemonic aspirations.

Conclusions.

 Central Asian states, on their own have, made initiatives

for more unity and not submission to Moscow or anyone else.140 The

United States should encourage these joint efforts as well as

multilateral Western projects to meet regional economic and

ecological needs. Inclusion in a Russian bloc inhibits Central

Asia from real integration with the global economy at a time when

it is not standing still but seeking that integration.

This analysis strongly suggests that Russia is overplaying

its hand in Central Asia. Russia can obstruct the Kazakh and

Turkmen economies through its energy policies. But it then risks

inflaming all of Central Asia's desperate economic-ecological

situations and civil strife, such as presently exists in

Tadzhikistan. By forcing these states into a subservient

backwardness, Russia promotes conditions that virtually guarantee

continuing conflicts. Nor can Russia afford to reconstruct

Central Asia's economies to prevent future crises. A policy that

therefore ignores the region and focuses on Moscow abets its

current but misguided policies.

When viewed strategically, Central Asia, because it is

marginal to the West and important to the states discussed here,
30

becomes a prime example of how multilateral Western and Russian

help could jointly ease tensions in potential future hot spots.

Moreover, the threat here is not Islam, as such; political Islam

(the idea that the religious authorities and political

authorities should be the same or closely connected) has no

answer to Muslim civilization's present crisis. Rather political

Islam is a cry of despair over the failure of other alternatives.

Therefore we should not adopt policies that intensify the chances

for Western failure in Central Asia by not offering even a

minimum economic program of reconstruction.

Two conclusions flow from this. First, it is in everyone's

interest that Moscow and Washington help Central Asian states

reach full economic sovereignty and development. U.S. support

for Muscovite economic domination of local economies and energy

industry through its pipelines sends Moscow the wrong signal

regarding Russian imperial proclivities and tempts Moscow into

unaffordable engagements. That outcome will profoundly disturb

the whole region.

Nor will Russian domination contribute to the flowering of

market economics and democracy in these states. Rather that kind

of domination integrates them as backward dependencies into a

Moscow-centric economic system where Moscow has every reason to

continue supporting Central Asian authoritarianism. That makes

Central Asia once again a center of instability and the object of

strong international rivalries. Since Central Asia is

increasingly important to China, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and

India, a Moscow-oriented policy also weakens possibilities for a

broader Asian security system.

The second conclusion follows from this first one. Iran's

ability to threaten Moscow's or Washington's vital interests here

is steadily declining. Tehran is actually in retreat in the

Middle East and faces daunting domestic problems. U.S. policy in

Central Asia should not be based on an Iranian threat but rather

address real issues like economic reconstruction.141 That is

where all foreign efforts should go. The International Monetary

Fund (IMF), behind which stands the West, has recommended a

single package for Central Asia much like the one it recommended

with disastrous results for Russia.142 This will not save Central

Asia from an economic catastrophe. Instead, following the IMF

plan will lead them into deeper dependence on Russia and shatter
31

economic-political stability in Central Asia. Rather, it is

imperative that the Central Asian states trade freely with

whomever they want and sell and ship their oil as they please. 

In that manner they can avoid undue dependence on any one state.

There are several reasons for this. First, if foreigners

are excluded, Central Asians will have to rely on antiquated,

backward, and inadequate Russian infrastructure for their energy

production, extraction, and transportation that will only further

blight the already blasted Central Asian ecology.143 Western and

Japanese technology, on the other hand, offers much more

ecological promise and is more economical. Second, it is in the

West's interests to diversify oil suppliers, adding downward

pressure on oil prices and blocking Russian imperial temptations.

That policy might move Russia to reform its antiquated and

crisis-plagued energy economy rather than trying to avert the

needed structural reforms as has been the case until now.144 Only

Central Asian revenues and a lack of competition enables Russia's

energy industry to carry on its ruinous course and avoid the

needed reforms.

By fostering Central Asia's gradual but genuine integration

with the West, the United States can help it overcome its

problems and adopt rational and beneficial economic policies that

create real conditions for the political reforms we seek. One

rational step would be for Central Asia to deepen its ties with

the ECO despite the former internal Turco-Iranian rivalry there.

The ECO offers a Persian Gulf alternative to Russian trading

routes. The ECO could help efficiently exchange Iranian refined

oil for Central Asia's electricity surplus and local

infrastructural improvement. Local manufacturers and producers

of consumer goods should benefit from a larger market with

greater ability to market their product. And the ECO could

usefully discuss regional and transnational cooperation in

economics, ecology, and even security.145

Promoting Central Asian regional integration, sustained

economic reform, and economic growth meets local needs and

interests. Regional cooperation blocks Russian neo-imperialism,

diverts Russian energies to more cooperative avenues, and aids

Russian democratic reforms. Policies encouraging neo-imperialism

in Central Asia help neither Russia, Central Asia, nor the United

States. Regional integration also hinders Iran from maximizing a
32

negative influence when the inevitable crisis appears. It also

prevents any one power from feeling aggrieved or threatened by

local developments since all will benefit. Economic advancement

undercuts fundamentalist appeals that are based on

modernization's failures to date in the Muslim world. U.S.

promotion of regional cooperation strengthens our calls for

political reform because we then join with developing indigenous

forces who demand reform and a devolution of power. And lastly,

promoting such ventures creates a local balance that deters a new

great game and rivalry among other states.

Though these are not vital U.S. interests, they are vital

for local and adjoining states, none of whom alone can contest

Russia's imperial thrust. But that thrust cannot remedy either

local conditions or Russia's weakness. Rather, Russia's imperial

drive compounds both problems. While Central Asia itself may not

be seen to be vital to the United States, the explosion that will

ensue if we abandon the region to Moscow will spare nobody from

its wrath.

ENDNOTES

1. Many of these views were based on assumptions made by

Paul Goble, the State Department's expert at the time on Soviet

nationalities, e.g. Shiite and Sunnis were "pretty much alike."

David Hoffman, "Iran's Drive to Rebuild Seen Posing New

Challenges to West," The Washington Post, February 2, 1992, p.

Al; and A.D. Horne, "U.S. Loses Specialist Fluent in the

Nationalities," The Washington Post, January 14, 1992, p. A7.

2. Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Emma C. Murphy, "The Non-Arab

Middle East States and the Caucasian/Central Asian Republics:

Iran and Israel," International Interactions, Vol. XII, No. 1,

April 1994, pp. 95-104; Robert O. Freedman, "Israel and Central

Asia: A Preliminary Analysis," Central Asia Monitor, No. 2, 1993,

pp. 16-20.

3. Roland Dannreuther, in "Creating New States in Central

Asia," Adelphi Papers, No. 288, March 1994, asserts this argument

quite forcefully.

4. Ehteshami and Murphy, pp. 95-104; Freedman.
33

5. Fiona Hill, Pamela Jewett, "Back in the USSR": Russia's

Intervention in the Internal Affairs of the Former Soviet

Republics and the Implications United States Policy Toward

Russia, Cambridge, MA: Strengthening Democratic Institutions

Project, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard

University, 1994, passim; Jerry F. Hough, "Russia Aims Its Oil

Weapon," New York Times, June 17, 1993, p. A25; "President

Demirel Inaugurates the Second ECO Summit," Newspot, July 15,

1993, p. 2.

6. As stated by Paul A. Goble in "Russia as a Eurasian

Power: Moscow and the Post-Soviet Successor States," Stephen

Sestanovich, ed., and Foreword, Rethinking Russia's National

Interests, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International

Studies, Significant Issues Series, Vol. XVI, No. 1, 1994, p. 47.

For Russian threat assessments, see "Former Soviet Resources: Is

Russia Being Cut Out?", Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press,

(henceforth CDPP), Vol. XLVI, No. 43, November 23, 1994, pp. 10-

12.

7. Hill and Jewett, Andranik Migranyan, "Unequal

Partnership," New York Times, June 23, 1994, p. A23; and the

blunt remarks of Vitaly Naumkin, "Russia and the States of

Central Asia and the Transcaucasus," in Robert D. Blackwill and

Sergei A. Karaganov, eds., Damage Limitation or Crisis? Russia

and the Outside World, CSIA Studies in International Security No.

5, Washington, DC: Brassey's Inc., 1994, p. 199.

8. Paul A. Goble, "CIS, Boom, Bah: The Commonwealth of

Independent States and the Post-Soviet Successor States," in

Allen C. Lynch and Kenneth W. Thompson, eds., Soviet and PostSoviet Russia in A World of Change, Lanham, MD: University Press

of America, 1994, pp. 192-193; Hough, p. A25; Hill and Jewett,

Steve LeVine, "Moscow Pressures Its Neighbors To Share Their Oil,

Gas Revenues," The Washington Post, March 18, 1994, p. A24; J.

Robinson West, "Pipelines to Power," The Washington Post, June 8,

1994, p. A23; Elizabeth Teague, in John W.R. Lepingwell,

Alexander Rahr, Elizabeth Teague, and Vera Tolz, "Russia: A

Troubled Future," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research

Report, Vol. III, No. 24, June 17, 1994, pp. 9-10.

9. Moscow, ITAR-TASS in English, January 29, 1994, Foreign

Broadcast Information Service, Central Eurasia, (henceforth FBIS-
34

SOV)-94-020, January 31, 1994, p. 1; "Cutting Back Oil Exports

Under Consideration," FBIS-SOV-94-027, February 9, 1994, p. 22;

Moscow Kommersant-Daily in Russian, June 21, 1994, FBIS-SOV-94-

120, June 23, 1994, p. 25.

10. Teheran, IRNA in English, April 19, 1994, FBIS-SOV-94-

076, April 20, 1994, p. 17.

11. Moscow, Nezavisimaya Gazeta in Russian, March 30, 1994,

Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Eurasia: FBIS

Report (henceforth FBIS-USR)-94-041, April 20, 1994, pp. 31-32.

12. Moscow, Obozrevatel'-Observer in Russian, Special

Supplement 1993, December 14, 1993, "Russian National Security

Concept for 1994," FBIS-SOV-94-038-5 (Supplement), February 25,

1994, p. 40.

13. Ibid., pp. 43-44.

14. Boris Z. Rumer, Soviet Central Asia: A Tragic

Experiment, Winchester, MA: Unwin Hyman, 1989; and William

Fierman, ed., Soviet Central Asia: The Failed Transformation,

Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991.

15. Mahnaz Z. Ispahani, Roads and Rivals: The Political

uses of Access in the Borderlands of Asia, Ithaca, NY: Cornell

University Press, 1988. The centrality of transportation is

apparent to all players in Central Asia today, e.g. Iranian

Minister Velayati's observations that in his negotiations with

Kyrgyz officials those issues increasingly dominate the agenda

and in his broader remarks, Tehran, IRIB Television Second

Program, in Persian, Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Near

East and South Asia, (henceforth FBIS-NES)-94-161, August 19,

1994, p. 37; and Tehran, Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran,

in English, August 14, 1994, FBIS-NES-94-158, August 16, 1994, p.

63.

16. LeVine, p. A24.

17. Ibid.

18. Stephen Blank, Energy and Security in the Transcaucasus,

Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War
35

College, September 1994.

19. John Lloyd and Steve LeVine, "Russia Demands Veto Over

Caspian Oil Deals," Financial Times, May 31, 1994, p. 2.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. LeVine, p. A24.

23. Moscow, Komsomolskaya Gazeta, in Russian, October 4,

1994, FBIS-SOV-94-193, October 5, 1994, p. 37 cites Yeltsin,

Deputy Prime Minister Shokhin, and Arkady Volsky, as well as

Foreign Minister Kozyrev as officials who raised this point with

Great Britain on Yeltsin's recent London visit. See also,

Moscow, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, in Russian, June 15 1994, FBIS-USR94-072, July 7,1994, pp. 31-32; Moscow, Rossiiskaya Gazeta in

Russian, June 11, 1994, FBIS-SOV-94-114, June 14, 1994, p. 11;

International Affairs: Foreign Economic Relations, Current Digest

of the Post-Soviet Press (henceforth CDPP), Vol. XLVI, No. 23,

July 6, 1994, p. 17.

24. Michael Specter, "Azerbaidzhan, Potentially Rich, Is

Impoverished By Warfare," The New York Times, June 2, 1994, pp.

A1,10.

25. Ibid.; Blank, Energy and Security, FBIS-USR, July 7,

1994, pp. 31-32; Naumkin, p. 199; Yuri V. Gankovsky, "Russia's

Relations With the Central Asian States Since the Dissolution of

the Soviet Union," in Hafeez Malik, ed., Central Asia: Its

Strategic Importance and Future Prospects, New York: St. Martin's

Press, 1994, pp. 121-123; John Lloyd, "Slav States Pledge

Economic Union," The Financial Times, July 12, 1993, p. 2;

Moscow, Russian Television Network, in Russian, July 15, 1992,

FBIS-SOV-92-137 July 16, 1992, p. 21.

26. Moscow, Novaya Yezhednevnaya Gazeta, in Russian, July

6, 1994, FBIS-SOV-94-131, July 8, 1994, p. 1; Moscow, Trud, in

Russian, July 6, 1994, FBIS-SOV-94-135, July 14, 1994, p. 10.

27. Ibid.
36

28. Hill and Jewett, p. 36.

29. Almaty, Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, in Russian, January 21,

1995, FBIS-SOV-95-017, January 26, 1995, pp. 67-68.

30. Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, July 8, 1994, FBIS-SOV,

94-131, July 8, 1994, p. 10.

31. Moscow, Kommersant-Daily, in Russian, July 29, 1994,

FBIS-SOV-94-147, August 1, 1994, p. 1; Moscow, Rossiyskie Vesti,

in Russian, August 16, 1994, FBIS-SOV-94-159, August 17, 1994,

pp. 12-13; Moscow, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, in Russian, September 22,

1994, FBIS-SOV-94-187, September 27, 1994, pp. 1-4.

32. Moscow, Segodnya, in Russian, July 6, 1994, FBIS-SOV,

94-129, July 6, 1994, p. 5.

33. Moscow, Segodnya, in Russian, July 1, 1994, FBIS-USR94-077, July 19, 1994, pp. 53-54.

34. See Robert Jervis, "Systems and Interaction Effects,"

in Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds., Coping With Complexity in

the International System, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993, pp.

31-41 for a general discussion of this phenomenon.

35. Shafiqul Islam, "Capitalism on the Silk Route?" in

Michael Mandelbaum, ed., Central Asia and the World, New York:

Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994, p. 164.

36. Susan Clark, "The Central Asian States: Defining

Security Priorities and Developing Military Forces," Ibid., pp.

177-206.

37. Ilya Prizel, "The United States and a Resurgent Russia:

A New Cold War or a Balance of Power Recast?," in Stephen J.

Blank and Earl H. Tilford Jr. eds., Does Russian Democracy Have a

Future? Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.

Army War College, 1994, pp. 142-143.

38. Hill and Jewett, p. 30.

39. Moscow RIA, in English, September 1, 1993, FBIS-SOV-93-

170A, September 3, 1993, p. 11; Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English,
37

June 22, 1993, FBIS-SOV-93-119, June 23,1993, pp. 43-44; and

Nazarbayev's Complaints from Madrid ABC, in Spanish, March 23,

1994, FBIS-SOV-94-059, March 28, 1994, p. 52.

40. Hill and Jewett, pp. 29-43; Prizel, pp. 141-146; Neil

Melvin, "Forging the New Russian Nation," Royal Institute of

International Affairs, Discussion Paper, No. 50, London, 1994,

pp. 27-55. One recent example of the Pan-Islamic and/or PanTurkish hysteria is laid out in the report by the Russian Foreign

Intelligence Service of September 1994, Moscow, Rossiyskaya

Gazeta, in Russian, September 22, 1994, FBIS-SOV-94-185,

September 23, 1994, p. 3.

41. Ibid.; "Osnovnye Polozheniia Voennoi Doktriny

Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Izlozhenie," Rossisskie Vesti, November

19, 1993, pp. 3-8.

42. Gankovsky, p. 121.

43. LeVine, p. A24; Melvin, pp. 27-55.

44. Martha Brill Olcott, "Central Asia and the New RussianAmerican Rapprochement," in George Ginsburgs, Alvin Z.

Rubinstein, Oles Smolansky, eds., Russia and America: From

Rivalry to Reconciliation, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe & Co. Inc.,

1993, p. 129.

45. Ibid., p. 138.

46. Rajan Menon, "Russia, America, and Northeast Asia After

the Cold War," Ibid., pp. 258-259; Moscow, ITAR-TASS World

Service, in Russian, June 28, 1994, FBIS-SOV-94-125, June 29,

1994, p. 3.

47. Moscow, Interfax, in English, June 30, 1994, FBIS-SOV94-127, July 1, 1994, p. 4. S. Nihal Singh, "Indo-Russian Goals

for Central Asia," International Herald Tribune, September 22,

1993, p. 8, gives a fuller strategic background for these shared

aims.

48. Stephen J. Blank, "Turkey's Strategic Engagement in the

Former USSR and U.S. Interests," in Stephen J. Blank, LTC William

T. Johnsen, and Stephen C. Pelletiere, Turkey's Strategic
38

Position at the Crossroads of World Affairs, Carlisle Barracks,

PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1994, pp.

85-88.

49. Stephen Blank, "Russia and Iran in a New Middle East,"

Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. III, No. 2, Fall 1992, pp. 124-127.

50. H.E. Kanat Saudabayev, "Kazakhstan and NATO-Towards an

Eurasian Security System," NATO's Sixteen Nations, No. 2, 1994,

p. 33.

51. Almaty, Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, in Russian, October 12,

1993, FBIS-USR-94-005, January 26, 1994, p. 63.

52. Moscow, Kommersant-Daily, in Russian, May 5, 1993,

FBIS-USR-93-070, June 7, 1993, pp. 27-28.

53. LeVine, p. A24.

54. Julie Corwin, "Too Close for Comfort," U.S. News &

World Report, February 7, 1994, p. 43.

55. Moscow, Kommersant-Daily, in Russian, December 7, 1993,

FBIS-SOV-93-234, December 8, 1993, p. 2.

56. LeVine, p. A24; RFE/RL Daily Report, April 6, 1994;

RFE/RL Daily Report, February 10, 1994.

57. Ibid.; Ahmed Rashid, "Renewed Hegemony," Far Eastern

Economic Review, February 24, 1994, pp. 22-23; RFE/RL Daily

Report, September 1, 1994.

58. Blank, "Turkey's Strategic Engagement," pp. 75-77.

59. Ann Devroy, "Clinton Pledges Increase in Aid to

Kazakhstan, Citing Reforms," The Washington Post, February 15,

1994, p. A4.

60. Moscow, Interfax, in English, June 24, 1994, FBIS-SOV94-123, June 27,1994, p. 62; RFE/RL Daily Report, June 29, 1994,

Moscow, Interfax, in English, July 20, 1994, FBIS-SOV-94-140,

July 21, 1994, p. 62.
39

61. Almaty, Panorama, in Russian, July 2, 1994, FBIS-USR94-073, July 11, 1994, pp. 80-81. Kazakhstan also turned to Japan

which indicated a "basic agreement" in April 1994 to construct a

new refinery in Aktau and discuss modernizing the existing one at

Atyrau, two projects that are part of a pipeline project where

Mitsubishi is building a pipeline from Western to Eastern

Kazakhstan, joining the Caspian Sea deposits like Chimkent to the

Eastern half of the country. These projects are explicitly

intended to buttress Kazakhstan's oil independence, Foreign

Broadcast Information Service, Pacific Rim Economic Review,

August 10, 1994, pp. 13-15.

62. Andy Pasztor, "Chevron Cuts Investment at Big Project

in Kazakhstan, Hits Impasse on Pipeline," The Wall Street

Journal, May 9, 1994, p. A3; Moscow, Segodnya, in Russian, July

19, 1994, FBIS-USR-94-085, August 8, 1994, pp. 77-79. Apparently

Russian tactics have also led British Gas and Agip of Italy to

reconsider their $6 billion investment in Kazakhstan's

Karachagansk natural gas field. Russia is openly negotiating for

participation, using its pipeline system as leverage. "Kuwait by

the Caspian?", The Middle East, October 1994, p. 32.

63. Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, August 4, 1994, FBISS0V-94-151, August 4, 1994, p. 36; Moscow, Interfax, in English,

August 10, 1994, FBIS-SOV-94-1 55, August 11, 1994, p. 5.

64. Moscow, Interfax, in English, August 3, 1994, FBIS-SOV94-151, August 4, 1994, p. 36.

65. Ibid., pp. 36-37.

66. Corwin, p. 43; Moscow, Izvestiya, in Russian, April 7,

1994, FBIS-SOV-94-068, April 8, 1994, pp. 10-11; Moscow, ITARTASS, in English, April 5, 1994, FBIS-SOV-94-066, April 6, 1994,

p. 46; Ankara, Turkish Daily News, in English, June 21, 1994, 94-

123, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Western Europe,

(henceforth FBIS-WEU)-94-122, June 24, 1994, pp. 45-46.

67. Ibid.

68. "CIS Summit: Some Gains, New Snag on Karabakh," Current

Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, (henceforth CDPP), Vol. XLV, No.

52, January 26, 1994, pp. 17-18.
40

69. David Nissman, "Turkmenistan (Un)Transformed," Current

History, April 1994, p. 186.

70. Roland Dannreuther, "Russia, Central Asia and the

Persian Gulf," Survival, Vol. XXXV, No. 4, Winter 1993, p. 94;

this is his more general theme.

71. For one example of the search for more freedom, Steve

LeVine, "Central Asians Cut Loose From Moscow," Financial Times,

January 27, 1994, p. 2. More recently the European Bank for

Reconstruction and Development has expressed interest in

constructing an oil pipeline to supply oil from the Caspian Sea;

Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, November 18, 1994, FBIS-SOV-94-

224, November 21, 1994, p. 60.

72. Stephen Blank, "Russia, the Caucasus, and Europe,"

paper presented to the Annual Convention of the International

Studies Association, Chicago, IL, February 22, 1995.

73. Dannreuther, "Russia, Central Asia, and the Persian

Gulf," pp. 99-102.

74. Azer Mursaliyev, "Russian Government At Odds With Itself

Over Oil Deal, Moscow News, September 30, 1994, pp. 1, 5.

75. FBIS Pacific Rim Economic Review, August 10, 1994, pp.

13-15; Ibid., January 12, 1994, pp. 6-7; Ibid., August 24, 1994,

p. 8.

76. FBIS Pacific Rim Economic Review, August 24, 1994, p.

8; Ahmed Rashid, "No Smoke Screen," Far Eastern Economic Review

(henceforth FEER), December 16, 1993, pp. 46-47.

77. Thomas L. Friedman, "U.S. To Counter Iran in Central

Asia," The New York Times, February 6, 1992, p. A3; John E. Yang,

"U.S., Turkey Pledge Aid to New States," The Washington Post,

February 12, 1992, p. A30.

78. Blank, "Turkey's Strategic Engagement," pp. 55-88; and

"Conclusions and Recommendations," Ibid., pp. 88-98.
41

79. Ibid., pp. 70, 93.

80. Ibid., p. 92; Ankara, Turkish Probe, in English, August

5, 1994, FBIS-WEU-94-161, August 19, 1994, p. 44; Istanbul,

Turkiye, in Turkish, May 1, 1994, FBIS-WEU-94-088, May 6, 1994,

pp. 51-52; "Will Turkey be the Next Iran," U.S. News & World

Report, June 6, 1994, pp. 41-42.

81. Henry Kamm, "Turks Fear Role in Asia of Russians," The

New York Times, June 19, 1994, p. 4.

82. John Murray-Brown, "Prestige in the Pipeline,"

Financial Times, September 7, 1993, p. 18.

83. RFE/RL Daily Report, July 28, 1994.

84. Blank, "Turkey's Strategic Engagement," pp. 75-77.

85. Istanbul, Ozgur Ukle, in Turkish, July 18, 1994, FBISWEU-94-143, July 26, 1994, p. 50; RFE/RL Daily Report, September

8, 1994.

86. See the reports from Istanbul, TRT Television Network,

in Turkish, July 27, 1994, and Ankara, Anatolia, in English, July

27, 1994, in FBIS-WEU-94-146, July 29, 1994, pp. 53-54; and

"Demirel: Turkey and Iran Acknowledge Responsibility for

Stability of the Region," Newspot, No. 14, August 5, 1994, p.1. 

Recently Turkish and Iranian officials, "worried about Russia's

growing influence in Central Asian energy projects," came

together in Ankara for high-level consultations on joint

projects. Ankara, Turkish Daily News, in English, November 24,

1994, FBIS-WEU-94-232, December 2, 1994, p. 65.

87. These were Paul Goble's statements in Hoffman, p. A1;

Horne, p. A7.

88. Ibidem.

89. David Menashri, "Iran and Central Asia," paper

Presented to the conference, "Central Asia Meets the Middle

East," Tel-Aviv University, Tel Aviv, October 12-14, 1993;

Ehtehshami and Murphy, pp. 83-95. This is also recognized by more

sober Russian observers, e.g., Moscow, Izvestiya, in Russian,
42

October 29, 1993, FBIS-SOV-93-210, November 2, 1993, p. 20, which

attributes Iran's inability to expand in Central Asia to economic

weakness.

90. Ehteshami and Murphy, pp. 83-95 and Menashri both

clearly indicate the dominance of the economic motif in Tehran's

policy; Moscow, Interfax, in English, August 12, 1994 and Tehran,

IRNA, in English, August 13, 1994, FBIS-SOV-94-157, August 15,

1994, p. 49; Tehran, IRNA, in English, August 11, 1994, FBIS-SOV94-157, August 15, 1994, p. 53; "Iran", CDPP, Vol. XLVI, No. 34,

September 21, 1994, pp. 22-23.

91. Tehran, IRNA, in English, July 21, 1994, FBIS-NES-94-

141, July 22, 1994, p. 53.

92. FBIS-NES-94-161, August 19, 1994, p. 38.

93. Scheherazade Daneshkhu, "Iran Simmers With Discontent,"

Financial Times, August 14,1994, p. 4; Elaine Sciolino, "Iran's

Difficulties Lead Some in U.S. To Doubt Threat," The New York

Times, July 5, 1994, p. 1, 47; James Bruce, "Land of Crisis and

Upheaval," Jane's Defence Weekly, July 30, 1994, p. 30.

94. Tehran, Salam, in Persian, May 23, 1994, FBIS-NES-94-

131, July 8, 1994, p. 56.

95. On Turco-Iranian cooperation, see, e.g., Tehran, Voice

of the Islamic Republic of Iran, First Program Network, in

Persian, July 25, 1994, FBIS-NES-94-143, July 26, 1994, p. 54;

Ankara, Turkish Daily News, in English, July 22, 1994, FBIS-NES94-144, July 27, 1994, p. 70.

96. Tehran, IRNA, in English, August 10, 1994, FBIS-NES-94-

154, August 10, 1994, p. 47.

97. Daneshkhu, p. 4.

98. For example, J. Mohan Malik, "China, Central Asia,

India, and Pakistan Come Face-to-Face With Vigorous Separatism,"

Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, September 30, 1993,

pp. 10-13.

99. Sciolino, p. 1; Daneshkhu, p. 4.
43

100. For example the official Tehran Times complained that

the Uzbek leadership was 'openly hostile' to Iran and proZionist; Tehran, Tehran Times, in English, August 9, 1994, FBISNES-94-156, August 12, 1994, p. 71.

101. For such claims which are a staple of Iranian

assertions, even by those opposed to the regime, see R.K.

Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy: Both North and South," Middle

East Journal, Vol. XLVI, No. 3, Summer 1992, pp. 405-406.

102. "Middle East", CDPP, Vol. XLVI, No. 27, August 3, 1994,

pp. 21-22; Moscow, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, in Russian, June 21,

1994, FBIS-USR-94-088, August 15, 1994, pp. 103-106; Tehran,

Tehran Times in English, August 9, 1994, FBIS-NES-94-156, August

12, 1994, p. 40.

103. Moscow, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, in Russian, June 21, 1994,

FBIS-USR-94-088, August 15, 1994, pp. 103-106; Tehran, Tehran

Times in English, August 9, 1994, FBIS-NES-94-156, August 12,

1994, p. 40.

104. Moscow, Izvestiya, in Russian, October 1, 1993, FBISSOV-93-192, October 6, 1993, p. 1; Ankara, Turkish Daily News, in

English, August 30, 1994, FBIS-WEU-94-173, September 7, 1994, pp.

71-73.

105. Pakistan's policy in the region is the subject of many

sources which shall be listed here and below in subsequent end

notes. Syed Rifaat Hussein, "Pakistan and Central Asia," Colonel

David O. Smith, ed., From Containment to Stability: PakistanUnited States Relations in the Post Cold War Era, Washington, DC:

National Defense University Press, 1993, pp. 191-215; Hafeez

Malik, "New Relationships Between Central and Southwest Asia and

Pakistan's Regional Policies," in Malik, ed., pp. 249-260.

106. Dietrich Reetz, "Pakistan and the Central Asia

Hinterland Option: The Race for Regional Security and

Development," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies,

Vol. XVII, No. 1, Fall 1993, pp. 28-56; Ali Abbas Rizvi,

"Pakistan and Security of Central Asian States," Asian Defence

Journal, May 1994, pp. 54-57.
44

107. Reetz, p. 36; Malik, pp. 252-255.

108. Reetz, pp. 37-41.

109. Rizvi, pp. 54-546; Malik, pp. 249-260; Reetz, pp. 28-

56; Paul Proctor, "PIA Moves to Capture Growth in Central Asian

Business," Aviation Week & Strategic Technology, August 10, 1992,

pp. 38-39.

110. Ahmed Rashid, "The China Factor," FEER, January 13,

1994, pp. 12-13.

111. Ibid.

112. Reetz, pp. 49-50; Samina Yasmeen, "Pakistan's Cautious

Policy," Survival, Vol. XXXVI, No. 2, Summer 1994, p. 130.

113. Reetz, pp. 49-50.

114. Moscow, Interfax, in English, June 30, 1994, FBIS-SOV94-177, July 1, 1994, p. 4.

115. Moscow, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, in Russian, July 31, 1992,

FBIS-USR-92-107, August 24, 1992, p. 45.

116. S. Nihal Singh, "Indo-Russian Goals for Central Asia,"

International Herald Tribune, September 22, 1993, p. 8.

117. Moscow, Izvestiya, in Russian, October 1, 1993, FBISSOV-93-192, October 6, 1993, p. 1.

118. Delhi, All India Radio News Network, in English,

January 5, 1994, FBIS-NES-94-003, January 5, 1994, p. 49, 114.

This is also the conclusion of an Indian analysis that explicitly

calls for supporting Russia's leadership here and cooperation

among India, Russia, and China to that end of stabilizing Central

Asia. P. Slobdan, "International Aspects of the Conflict

Situation in Central Asia," Strategic Analysis (Delhi), June

1993, pp. 265-281.

119. This emerges clearly from the discussion below of

Chinese interests and from assessment of U.S. power vis-a-vis

that of these players taken individually.
45

120. Irina D. Zvyagelskaia, "Central Asia and the Caucasus:

New Geopolitics," in Vitaly Naumkin, ed., Central Asia and

Transcaucasia: Ethnicity and Conflict, Westport, CT: Greenwood

Publishing Group, 1994, p. 133. For Western observers, see

Justin Jon Rudelson, "The Uighurs in the Future of Central Asia,"

Nationalities Papers, Vol. XXII, No. 2, Fall 1994, pp. 301-306,

and Ross H. Munro, "China's Waxing Spheres of Influence," Orbis,

Vol. XXXVIII, No. 4, Fall 1994, pp. 585-606.

121. Moscow, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, in Russian, FBIS-USR-94-

041, April 20, 1994, pp. 33-35. It is worth noting that although

this dimension of Sino-Russian relations is stressed, the author,

Sergei Vostrikov, says nothing about Sino-Russian relations in

Central Asia, an omission worth pondering.

122. Munro, pp. 585-606; Gaye Christoffersen, "Xinjiang and

the Great Islamic Circle: The Impact of Transnational Forces on

Chinese Regional Planning," China Quarterly, No. 133, March 1993,

pp. 130-151; Lilian Craig Harris, "Xinjiang, Central Asia, and

the Implications for China's Policy in the Islamic World," China

Quarterly, No. 133, March 1993, pp. 111-129; J. Richard Walsh,

"China and the New Geopolitics of Central Asia," Asian Survey,

Vol. XXXIII, No. 3, March 1993, pp. 272-283.

123. Harris, pp. 113-118.

124. Christoffersen, pp. 136-151.

125. Keith Martin, "China and Central Asia: Between

Seduction and Suspicion," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. III, No.

25, June 24, 1994, pp. 31-34; Munro, p. 604.

126. Ibid., pp. 118-130; Christoffersen, pp. 136-151; Walsh,

pp. 279-281; Munro, pp. 598-605; Moscow, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, in

Russian, August 3, 1994, FBIS-USR-94-101, September 15, 1994, pp.

1-5.

127. Beijing, Xinhua, in English, July 7, 1994, Foreign

Broadcast Information Service: China (henceforth FBIS-CHI)-94-

130, July 7, 1994, p. 72; Beijing, Xinhua, in English, July 20,

1994, FBIS-CHI-94-140, July 21, 1994, p. 47.
46

128. Christoffersen, pp. 136-151; Harris, pp. 118-130.

129. Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service, in Chinese, FBISCHI-94-143, July 26, 1994, p. 18.

130. Ikuo Kayahara, "Will China Succeed in Implementing

Energy Strategy?" Sekai Shuno, May 10-17, 1994, U.S. Embassy,

Japan, Translation, pp. 21-24.

131. Ibid.

132. Stephen Blank, "The New Russia in the New Asia,"

Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War

College, 1994, discusses the broader aspects of this "alliance"

but Chinese officials are very unsentimental about it.

133. Walsh, p. 278.

134. "Washington Whispers," U.S. News & World Report,

September 4, 1994, p. 10.

135. Rashid, FEER, January 13, 1994, pp. 12-13.

136. Under Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, "Promoting

Democracy and Prosperity in Central Asia," address at the U.S.-

Central Asia Business Conference, Washington, DC, May 3, 1994,

U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Vol. V, No. 19, May 9, 1994,

p. 280.

137. Ibid., President William J. Clinton, A National

Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, Washington, DC:

U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1994, p. 19.

138. If anything the open scorn of Russia's leaders for the

sovereignty of the republics is being ever more openly voiced as

is pressure for economic integration, e.g., "Moscow," Interfax,

in English, August 18, 1994, FBIS-SOV-94-161, August 19, 1994, p.

1; and "Rumyantsev Calls for CIS to Be Turned Into Russian

Union," RFE/RL, Daily Report, August 29, 1994.

139. Pasztor, p. A3.
47

140. Moscow, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, in Russian, July 12,

1994, FBIS-USR-94 081, July 28, 1994, p. 5.

141. William E. Odom, "This Time Let's Dispense With the

Moral Self-Indulgence," Washington Post Weekly, October 24-30,

1994, p. 23; Laura Drake, "Still Fighting the Last War," Middle

East Insight, Vol. X, No. 6, September-October, 1994, p. 41. It

is revealing that in an interview in the same issue of this

journal, Martin Indyk, the National Security Council official for

the Middle East, does not even mention Central Asia in discussing

policy towards Iran, "Peace and Containment", Ibid., pp. 30-37.

142. Kiaras Gharabaghi, "Development Strategies for Central

Asia in the 1990s: In Search of Alternatives," Third World

Quarterly, Vol. XV, No. 1, March 1994, p. 117.

143. Ibid., pp. 112-113.

144. Peter Fuhrman, "What Boris Gives," Forbes, August 15,

1994, pp. 42-43; RFE/RL Daily Report, August 10, 1994, gives

evidence of the crisis in Russia's energy industry.

145. Gharabaghi, p. 116.
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