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STRATEGY AND THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS:

FROM THEORY TO POLICY

Steven Metz

James Kievit

June 27, 1995
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*******

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

*******

The authors would like to thank Douglas Lovelace, William

Johnsen, Douglas Johnson, Gerald Wilkes and Robert Bunker for

insightful comments on earlier drafts of this manuscript.

*******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may

be conveyed directly to the authors. Dr. Metz can be contacted at

(717) 245-3822, DSN 242-3822, FAX (717) 245-3820, or via Internet

at metzs@carlisle-emh2.army.mil. LTC Kievit can be contacted at

(717) 245-4140, DSN 242-4140, FAX (717) 245-3820, or via Internet

at kievitj@carlisle-emh2.army.mil.
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FOREWORD

A small band of “RMA” analysts has emerged in the military

and Department of Defense, in the academic strategic studies

community, and in defense-related think-tanks and consulting

firms. To these analysts, the Gulf War provided a vision of a

potential revolution in military affairs (RMA) in which

“Information Age” technology would be combined with appropriate

doctrine and training to allow a small but very advanced U.S.

military to protect national interests with unprecedented

efficiency.

In this study, the authors examine the open-source

literature on the RMA that has resulted. They find that much of

it has concentrated on defining and describing military

revolutions and that, despite the efforts of some of the finest

minds in the defense analytical community, it has not offered

either comprehensive basic theories or broad policy choices and

implications.

 The authors believe that in order to master a RMA rather

than be dragged along by it, Americans must debate its

theoretical underpinnings, strategic implications, core

assumptions, and normative choices. As a step in that direction

they provide a set of hypotheses regarding the configuration and

process of revolutions in military affairs, and examine some of

their potential policy implications.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this

report as a contribution to the informed debate regarding

development of a 21st century Army.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies

 Institute
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS

STEVEN METZ is Associate Research Professor of National Security

Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War

College. He has taught at the Air War College, U.S. Army Command

and General Staff College, and several universities. Dr. Metz

holds a B.A. and M.A. in international studies from the

University of South Carolina, and a Ph.D. in political science

from the Johns Hopkins University.

JAMES KIEVIT is a Strategic Research Analyst at the Strategic

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. Commissioned in the

Corps of Engineers, LTC Kievit has served in the 1st Cavalry

Division, the 7th Engineer Brigade, and the 8th Infantry Division

(Mechanized). He has also served as Assistant Professor of

History at the U.S. Military Academy, and as a force structure

analyst and study director at the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis

Agency. LTC Kievit holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy, a

M.M.A.S. from the School of Advanced Military Studies of the U.S.

Army Command and General Staff College, and a M.A. in history and

M.S.E. in construction management from the University of

Michigan.
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SUMMARY

Context.

American combat effectiveness in the Gulf War suggested that

a historic revolution in military affairs (RMA) is underway,

possibly solving many of the strategic dilemmas the United States

faces in the post-Cold War world. Inspired by this notion, a

small group of RMA analysts has emerged. So far they have

concentrated on defining and describing military revolutions. Now

broader theoretical and policy issues must be addressed.

Orthodoxy.

The notion of military revolutions grew from Soviet writing

of the 1970s and 1980s. Early studies talked of a “military

technical revolution” (MTR), but this quickly evolved into the

more holistic concept of revolutions in military affairs. Most

analysts define a RMA as a “discontinuous increase in military

capability and effectiveness” arising from simultaneous and

mutually supportive change in technology, systems, operational

methods, and military organizations. The current RMA is

characterized by four types of changes:

• extremely precise, stand-off strikes;

• dramatically improved command, control, and intelligence;

• information warfare; and

• nonlethality.

Analysts see a number of benefits from harnessing the 

current revolution in military affairs and using it to build 21st

century U.S. armed forces:

• rejuvenating the political utility of military power;

• delaying the emergence of a peer competitor;

• providing a blueprint for technology acquisition and force

reorganization; and,
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• inspiring conceptual, forward-looking thinking.

Most analysts believe the current RMA will have at least two

stages. The first is based on stand-off platforms, stealth,

precision, information dominance, improved communications,

computers, global positioning systems, digitization, “smart”

weapons systems, jointness, and use of ad hoc coalitions. The

second may be based on robotics, nonlethality, pyscho-technology,

cyberdefense, nanotechnology, “brilliant” weapons systems,

hyperflexible organizations, and “fire ant warfare.” If this idea

is correct, change that has occurred so far will soon be dwarfed

by even more fundamental transformation.

Theory.

Strategists who seek to understand and use the revolution in

military affairs do not have a mature theory to work from, but

need one. The raw materials of theory are hypotheses which can be

tested, debated, confirmed, or rejected. Examination of history

and the current RMA suggests a number of hypotheses concerning

the configuration and process of military revolutions.

Choices.

Key policy decisions made now will affect both the pace of

revolution and the shape of the 21st century U.S. military that

emerges from it. Perhaps the most fundamental choice of all

concerns the enthusiasm with which the United States should

pursue the current “minor” RMA and the extent to which it should

shape force development.

A case can be made that the costs and risks of vigorous

pursuit of the current RMA outweigh the expected benefits. These

include risk that:

• the current RMA will not generate increased combat

effectiveness against the most likely or most dangerous future

opponents;

• American pursuit of the RMA will encourage opponents or

potential opponents to seek countermeasures;

• the current RMA might lead the United States toward
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overreliance on military power; and,

• vigorous pursuit of the current RMA might increase

problems with friends and allies.

There are even more pressing reasons supporting U.S. pursuit

of the current RMA:

• it should bring significant increases in combat

effectiveness against some mid-level opponents;

• a force built around stand-off, precision weapons and

disruptive information warfare capabilities would be more

politically usable than a traditional force-projection military;

• the RMA could augment deterrence; and,

 • the United States may need to pursue the current RMA to

avoid stumbling into strategic inferiority.

If policymakers decide to pursue the revolution in military

affairs, strategy, rather than technological capability should

guide force development. The key question is: What do we want the

future U.S. military to be able to do?" The answer depends on

broad strategic objectives and expected opponents.

In terms of strategic objectives, the more the United States

stresses active engagement and the promulgation of open economies

and political systems, the more the U.S. military must be able to

project power and sustain protracted operations. The more that

the United States pursues political and military disengagement,

the less the need for power projection or sustained operations.

At this end of the spectrum, the appropriate military force would

be configured for defense and short deterrent strikes.

Force development must also be driven by some projected

priority among the threat types. Most current programs, including

the Army’s Force XXI, focus on conventional regional aggressors

and, to a lesser extent, subnational enemies. From this

perspective, stress on precision, stand-off strikes, stealth, and

coherent operations is logical. But if the future threat set

changes, these characteristics might not be the most important

ones for the future U.S. military.
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A peer competitor with armed forces as advanced as the U.S.

military (although perhaps not in precisely the same way) could

pose entirely different problems. To attempt projection of

conventional forces against a peer competitor would be

exceedingly dangerous, perhaps impossible. Under conditions of

direct confrontation with a peer competitor, the United States

should concentrate on projection of effects rather than objects.

Against a peer competitor, the United States would certainly need

a tightly integrated military-scientific-technological- economic

policy aimed at limiting the proliferation of military-relevant

knowledge.

A U.S. military configured for use against subnational or

nonmilitary enemies would be composed of small but very flexible

units (but the force as a whole might not be small). The entire

combat arms component of the Army might be composed of Special

Forces. High-tech policemen and scientists, whether computer

experts, ecologists, or something similar would be the most vital

parts of the security force with soldiers as adjuncts. Personal

protection technology including individual armor and

counterterror technology would be essential. Psychotechnology to

manipulate perceptions, beliefs and attitudes would also be

central.

Tasks.

The RMA is at a crossroads. In the broadest sense, there are

three options:

• push further along the road of precision, stand-off

strikes and disruptive information warfare aimed primarily at

conventionally-armed regional aggressors;

 • put a brake on the RMA and stand pat in order to

consolidate existing advantages; or,

• push the revolution in a different direction.

To structure the choice among these options, the U.S.

military must inspire and lead continued refinement of the theory

of military revolutions, cultivate internal creativity, and

expand debate on the RMA outside the military and defense
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community. It is particularly important to consider the normative

dimension of strategy. American leaders must decide not only what

the United States can do with a more effective military force,

but also what it should do. Only then will the RMA lead to

progress rather than simply change.


STRATEGY AND THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS:

FROM THEORY TO POLICY

Context.

American combat effectiveness in the Gulf War amazed

observers around the world. Out of Iraq and Kuwait came hints of

a future where the U.S. military could strike anywhere with

force, precision, and relative safety, its enemies electronically

confused into submission with little of warfare’s normal

collateral destruction. It seemed that “information age”

technology, if combined with appropriate doctrine and training,

might allow a small but advanced 21st century U.S. military to

protect national interests with unprecedented efficiency. The

Gulf War thus suggested that a historic revolution in military

affairs (RMA) is underway, bringing solutions to many of the

strategic dilemmas of the post-Cold War world.

This heady vision aroused tremendous excitement among

American defense planners. Given the requirement in current U.S.

military strategy to fight two nearly simultaneous “major

regional contingencies” in the face of rapidly declining force

size, increased effectiveness at reduced cost has become an

obsession.1

 To attain it requires breaking old intellectual

fetters. Consequently, seldom in American history have military

leaders and defense planners been more open to new ideas. This

holds even at the highest levels–Admiral William A. Owens, Vice

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has posted a public

message on the Internet providing his electronic mail address and

stating, “I’d like to open a dialogue on a few subjects that I

think are important and solicit your ideas . . . what is the

impact of the ongoing technology revolution and what does this

mean in terms of our strategy, our doctrine, our command

structures, etc?”2

 From this blend of urgency and exploration, a small band of

RMA analysts emerged in the military and Department of Defense,

the academic strategic studies community, and defense-related

think-tanks and consulting firms. Although this group includes

some brilliant thinkers, its output so far has not been

theoretically comprehensive and, as a result, has offered only

limited policy choices. Since the RMA is a relatively new concept

to Western strategic thinkers, much of the writing has


concentrated on defining and describing military revolutions and

possible future capabilities. Now is the time to push the

analysis to new levels. Andrew W. Marshall contends the “longer

term questions and issues” concerning goals and strategy “should

be addressed.”3 If anything, this is an understatement–they must

be addressed.

Military preeminence without an appropriate strategy to

shape and utilize it is both dangerous and fleeting. Yet crafting

such a strategy for the RMA is more difficult than simply

developing and applying technology. Americans are pragmatic.

Faced with the rush of day-to-day problems in a complex and

dangerous security environment, American strategists often

overlook the assumptions and concepts that undergird their

actions, focusing on short-term programs rather than long-term

goals. This can be hazardous. To master the RMA rather than be

dragged along by it, Americans must now debate its theoretical

underpinnings, strategic implications, core assumptions, and

normative choices, all as preface to the formulation of cogent

policy.

Orthodoxy.

The notion of military revolutions grew from Soviet writing

of the 1970s and 1980s, particularly a series of papers by

Marshal N.V. Ogarkov analyzing the revolutionary potential of new

military technologies.4

 As Marxists, Ogarkov and his colleagues

were comfortable with the idea that history is driven by

revolutions. When American defense analysts, more familiar with

scientific revolutions than Hegelian and Marxist revolutions of

consciousness, did turn to military revolutions they also

initially focused on the technology. Early studies talked of a

“military technical revolution” (MTR).5 But analysts quickly

found an exclusively technological focus too limiting and the MTR

evolved into the more holistic concept of revolutions in military

affairs.6

 The first step, then, was agreement that something

revolutionary might be underway or impending.7

The second step is harder. As could be expected with a

dramatically new idea, analysts of the RMA have not fully agreed

on its meaning. Futurists Alvin and Heidi Toffler, for instance,

use a restrictive definition based on macro-level economic

structure. They write:


A military revolution, in the fullest sense, occurs

only when a new civilization arises to challenge the

old, when an entire society transforms itself, forcing

its armed services to change at every level

simultaneously–from technology and culture to

organization, strategy, tactics, training, doctrine,

and logistics. When this happens, the relationship of

the military to the economy and society is transformed

and the military balance of power on earth is

shattered.8

From this grand perspective, there have been only two true

military revolutions, the first associated with the rise of

organized, agricultural society, and the second with the

industrial revolution. Robert Bunker has offered an equally

large-scale schema based on the “energy foundation” of war.9

Most analysts addressing the RMA, though, have adopted less

inclusive and restrictive definitions stressing a “discontinuous

increase in military capability and effective- ness.”10 According

to Andrew Krepinevich, a military revolution:

. . . occurs when the application of new technologies

into a significant number of military systems combines

with innovative operational concepts and organizational

adaptation in a way that fundamentally alters the

character and conduct of conflict. It does so by

producing a dramatic increase–often an order of

magnitude or greater–in the combat potential and

military effectiveness of armed forces.11

Analysts have concluded that a revolution in military

affairs dramatically increases combat effectiveness by four types

of simultaneous and mutually supportive change: technological

change; systems development; operational innovation; and,

organizational adaptation.12 The relative priority among these

elements varies from revolution to revolution. The current

revolution, for instance, is heavily shaped by technology.

In general, analysts agree more on the defining

characteristics and components of the current RMA than on

military revolutions in general. One such defining characteristic


is the alteration of the relationship of accuracy and distance in

the application of military force. Traditionally, accuracy

diminished with distance. At certain times technology has

dramatically altered this relationship by extending the distance

at which fires could be accurate. The invention of the compound

bow was one such time, as was the widespread rifling of small

arms, the invention of recoil mechanisms for rifled artillery,

the development of strategic bombing and close air support, and

the invention of guided missiles. To some extent, accuracy still

diminishes with distance, but emerging technology has made

extremely precise, stand-off strikes possible. Some analysts now

see stand-off strikes as a replacement for close-range encounters

rather than an adjunct to them. “Stealthy long-range precision

strike,” according to James R. Fitzsimonds and Jan M. Van Tol,

“may become the dominant operational approach.”13

Precise, stand-off conventional strikes, however complex,

are the least radical of the military capabilities associated

with the current RMA. Much of the requisite technology is fielded

or will be soon. The second defining characteristic of the

current RMA–an increasing interest in information warfare–

represents a greater departure from tradition. Information has

always been a vital part of war, whether in the form of

intelligence or psychological operations. Analysts now predict

that technology will dramatically improve command, control, and

intelligence. This will alter the traditional relationship

between operational complexity and effective control as

electronic, sometimes space-based, methods for acquiring,

analyzing, and disseminating information allow military activity

to be much more complex than in the past and still remain timely,

synchronized, and controllable. Simultaneous operations are now

possible across a military theater of operations under some

circumstances. Maturation of the current RMA may make them

possible under all conditions and across several theaters of

operations.

But analysts view information as more than simply a tool for

operational control, and increasingly consider it a strategic

asset. This is a seminal change, reflecting Alvin and Heidi

Toffler’s contention that information is becoming the basis of

economic strength, especially in what they call “Third Wave”

states.14 During the “First Wave” of human development, production

was primarily agricultural, so war sought to seize and hold


territory. During the “Second Wave,” industrial production

dominated, so war was often a struggle of attrition where

belligerents wore down their enemy’s capacity to feed, clothe,

and equip armies. Following this logic, “Third Wave” warfare will

seek to erode or destroy the enemy’s means of collecting,

processing, storing, and disseminating information. Since the

more dependent an enemy is on information the more vulnerable it

would be to information warfare, this would seem to have

potential as a counter to an advanced, peer threat.

So far, though, no consensus on information warfare’s

strategic or operational implications has emerged.15 Many analysts

within the military and Department of Defense have viewed

information warfare as an adjunct to conventional strikes–a force

multiplier–rather than a stand-alone method of warfare.16 There

has been some discussion of the potential strategic implications

of information warfare among the military and its associated

defense community, but only a few writers have proposed even the

beginning of a comprehensive framework for the strategic

utilization of such warfare.17

A third defining characteristic of the current RMA is a

reduction in both casualties and the collateral damage normally

associated with military combat operations. Partly this will

result from precision conventional strikes. But even more radical

change may be possible through nonlethality. Chris and Janet

Morris have provided some of the most systematic analysis of what

they call “weapons of mass protection” which are electromagnetic,

kinetic, or nonlethal chemical devices “that can be used earlier

to deter by denial in order to support diplomacy, to limit

aggression, to nonlethally disarm or dissuade, and to destroy

lethal capability with a minimum of damage to noncombatants,

combatants, and the environment.”18 Examples include acoustic,

laser and high power microwaves, nonnuclear electromagnetic

pulses, high power jamming, obscurants, foams, glues and slicks,

supercaustics, magnetohydrodynamics, information warfare, and

soldier protection. Since the Gulf War, interest by the U.S.

military in such nonlethal arms has increased.19 By 1995, U.S.

forces involved in peace operations deployed with early versions

of some of them.20 In fact, nonlethal weapons would seem to have

their greatest applicability in conflict short of war. The full

policy implications of nonlethality, though, are still under

exploration.21


Analysts see a number of benefits from harnessing the

current revolution in military affairs and using it to build 21st

century U.S. armed forces. One of the most widely discussed is a

rejuvenation of the political utility of military power. Due to

instantaneous global communications, the pervasiveness of the

electronic media, and the low American tolerance for casualties,

force seems to have become less usable just as the U.S. military

attained clear global preeminence. Most RMA analysts consider

intolerance of casualties the key variable; nonlethal weapons may

offer the solution. “Given the performance of certain modern

weapons,” Edward Luttwak writes, “if military planning is

appropriately modified to fully exploit their technical

potential, it may be possible to emulate the casualty-avoiding

methods of eighteenth-century warfare and thus conduct armed yet

virtually bloodless interventions.”22 Nonlethal weapons might

allow the world community to intervene earlier in a crisis when a

solution is more attainable or, at least, attainable at a lower

cost. Falling somewhere between a show of force and conventional

military intervention, “disabling weapons could provide a

deterrent prior to crisis development or could diffuse the crisis

before it expands.”23 If military action is bloody, it becomes a

last resort. But used only when conflicts have become nearly

intractable, it has the least chance of success. The argument is

sometimes made, for instance, that a multinational peacekeeping

force armed largely with nonlethal weaponry might have been able

to prevent the conflict in Bosnia from escalating to outright

war–a little force applied early in a crisis is better than

extensive force applied later.

In addition to augmenting the political utility of military

power, the RMA might allow the United States to preserve the

margin of military superiority it now has by delaying the

emergence of a peer competitor.24 Presumably other states would

recognize and eschew the immense cost of catching up and then

keeping pace with a United States that is improving an alreadypreeminent military. Some analysts–most persuasively Michael

Mazarr–argue that the RMA can also provide guidelines for

constructing a post-Cold War U.S. national security strategy,

suggesting which of the various emerging technologies should be

pursued and how the armed forces should be organized and

trained.25 Perhaps most importantly, the RMA, by introducing

American defense planners to the notion of historic military


revolutions, can spark conceptual, forward-looking thinking.

Andrew Krepinevich, following Marx, argues that what

distinguishes revolution from evolution is recognition and

acceptance of fundamental change by those involved.26

Many analysts agree on one other important fact: the current

 revolution in military affairs seems to have at least two stages

(see Figure 1). In the drive to limit military casualties, standoff platforms, stealth, precision, information dominance, and

missile defense are the first stage. The second may be robotics,

nonlethality, pyschotechnology, and elaborate cyberdefense. The

revolution in military affairs may see the transition from

concern with centers of gravity to a less mechanistic and more

sophisticated notion of interlinked systems.27 For coordination,

the first stage is improved communications, computers, global

positioning systems, digitization, and “smart” weapons systems.

The second stage may be nanotechnology which allows the

dispersion of thousands of tiny intelligence-gathering machines

and “brilliant” weapons systems able to make sophisticated

decisions about when and how to act. To organize for the RMA, the

first stage is composed of joint task forces and ad hoc

coalitions. This may be followed by a uniservice or non-service

structure for the U.S. military, abolition of the reserves (or

abolition of standing forces), hyperflexible organizations, and

what Martin Libicki calls “fire ant warfare” in which a web of

millions of small, smart weapons swarm on a target.28 If this two

stage idea is correct, change that has occurred so far will soon

be dwarfed by even more fundamental transformation. Most analysts

thus conclude that the world is only at the beginning of the

current military revolution.29

Theory.

Even though the revolution in military affairs has attracted

some brilliant thinkers, systematic strategic discourse remains

rare. Except for Andrew Krepinevich and Jeffrey Cooper, few

writers have attempted to place the current RMA in its broader

theoretic and historic context. While many writers admit that

larger questions need answers, the normal approach is to assume

continuity in the global security environment and to approach the

RMA programmatically. This is understandable. Faced with the

crush of day-to-day issues and problems, strategists and security


planners sometimes overlook the importance of theory to policy.

Targeteers in the Strategic Air Command (SAC) designing the

Single Integrated Operational Plan might not have been familiar

with the theory of nuclear war that coalesced in the 1950s and

1960s, but their work reflected it. The planners of Desert Storm

might not have thought consciously of Clausewitz as they

developed courses of action, but the Prussian’s theories

permeated their work. And, diplomats hammering out a new treaty

might not explicitly consider the theory of international

politics that undergirds their efforts, but its impact is there

nonetheless.

Unlike planners in SAC, Central Command, or the Department

of State, strategists who seek to understand and use the

revolution in military affairs do not have a mature theory to


work from, but need one. Theory-building is a collaborative

effort involving a community of analysts and scholars. Its raw

materials are hypotheses which can be tested, debated,

confirmed, or rejected. For the RMA, there are a number of

feasible ways to group such hypotheses, but one that seems to

make sense is by configuration and process.

Configuration (Figure 2). Both the Tofflers, who identify

only two historical military revolutions, and Krepinevich, who

distinguishes ten since the 14th century, are correct if the

theory is broad enough to account for both “major” and “minor”

revolutions in military affairs. “Minor” RMAs like the division

and corps organization of Napoleonic armies and the incorporation

of rifled weapons in the 19th century were constituent parts of a

“major” revolution which included fundamental social, economic,

and political change rather than simply a radical increase in

combat effectiveness.30 “Minor” RMAs can be shaped and controlled

by those who understand them. “Major” revolutions cannot be

controlled; strategists must respond and adapt to them. Not every

“minor” revolution must be pursued in order to remain a viable

actor in the international military arena, but the “major”

revolutions in military affairs cannot be ignored. In the past,

individual circumstance permitted nations, without inordinate

strategic risk, to choose not to build amphibious warfare

capabilities, create panzer armies, or adopt Maoist “people’s

war.” But every nation desiring to remain a strategic player was

forced to adopt some form of mass military backed by industrial

capacity or the ability to acquire manufactured goods.

The increase in combat effectiveness associated with

revolutions in military affairs is cumulative. Since the collapse

of the Roman Empire, there has been no instance of reversion to

pre-revolutionary levels. While the aggregate change may vary,

the trend in combat effectiveness has been steadily upward, with

short periods of intense movement (revolutions) and longer

periods of evolutionary development (see Figure 3).

Still, combat effectiveness is always relative. Percussioncap rifled muskets of the mid-19th century were certainly more

effective than flintlock smoothbores. Against poorly armed

tribesmen who were their primary adversaries, the rifle-armed

British military of the Victorian Age possessed a decisive

advantage. Against similarly equipped forces of potential


European opponents, however, British effectiveness decreased

because superior training and discipline no longer provided as

significant an edge against an opponent who could engage at much

greater range.31 Effectiveness, then, deals with a relationship

between real or potential enemies.

Furthermore, increased weapon system effectiveness does not

automatically translate into increased utility for military power

as a strategic instrument. In the American Civil War, rifleequipped infantry was more effective against other arms, but


______________________________________________________________

• There are "major" and "minor" revolutions in military

affairs.

• "Minor" revolutions in military affairs tend to be

initiated by individual technological or social changes, occur in

relatively short periods (less than a decade), and have their

greatest direct impact on the battlefield.

• "Major" revolutions in military affairs are the result of

combined multiple technological, economic, social, cultural, and/

or military changes, usually occur over relatively long periods

(greater than a decade), and have direct impact on strategy.

• "Minor" revolutions in military affairs can be deliberately shaped and controlled; "major" revolutions cannot.

• A "minor" revolution in military affairs driven by military applications of silicon-chip technology is underway, and the

next "minor" revolution will be driven by robotics and psychotechnology.

• In the future, "minor" revolutions in military affairs

will occur closer together than in the past, almost to the point

of continuous revolution.

• The world is potentially at the beginning of a "major"

revolution in military affairs resulting from the interaction of

multiple economic, social, and cultural changes driven by

silicon-chip, robotic, psycho- and bio-technologies.

• The increase in combat effectiveness due to sequential

revolutions in military affairs hs tendd to be cumulative, but

effectiveness is always a relative--not an absolute--measurement.

• Revolutions in military affairs, while increasing some

aspects of combat effectiveness, may either decrease or increase

in strategic utility of the military element of power.

_________________________________________________________________


Figure 2. Hypotheses on the Configuration

of Revolutions in Military Affairs.


unable to force a decision against similarly equipped opposing

infantry. Since, as Russell Weigley notes, “the military

commander in quest of decisiveness needs an effective arm of

mobile war,” the increased effectiveness of infantry against

cavalry combined with infantry’s inability to maneuver against

rifle-equipped enemy infantry actually degraded the strategic

utility of tactical engagements.32 This made the conflict’s

outcome depend more upon other considerations than on the direct

application of military power.


Process (Figure 4). Revolutions in military affairs appear

to follow a cyclical pattern with initial stasis followed by

initiation, critical mass, consolidation, response, and return to


_________________________________________________________________

• Revolutions in military affairs are cyclical processes.

• Revolutions in military affairs can be initiated by one

breakthrough power or by a group.

• In the modern security system, revolutions in military

affairs are usually inspired by outright defeat, or by a

perception of inferiority or decline versus a peer or niche

opponent.

• Initiating a revolutions in military affairs requires the

empowerment of visionaries.

• Revolutions in military affairs have a point of critical

mass when changes in concepts, organization, and technology meld.

• Once recognized, every revolutions breakthrough generates

responses.

• Responses to revolutions in military affairs can be

symmetric or asymmetric; asymmetric responses may be more

difficult to counter.

• The greatest advantage for the breakthrough power lies in

the period immediately following criticl mass; thus there may be

a temptation to initiate conflict before responses can be

effective.

• All revolutions in military affairs have a culminating

point determined by the interaction between the revolutionary

breakthrough and the responses, followed by a consolidation

phase.

• During the consolidation phase, superior training and

leadership may be the only ways to achieve superior relative

combat effectiveness against symmetric responses.

• During the consolidation phase, strategic advantage lies

with entities best able to employ politico-economic, as opposed

to strictly military power.


________________________________________________________________

Figure 4. Hypotheses on the Process

of Revolutions in Military Affairs.


stasis (see Figure 5). At times, a single state can initiate

revolution by recognizing how to effectively combine various

evolutionary developments, new ideas, and technology. Napoleonic

France and the Mongols of Genghis Khan were examples of single

state breakthroughs. At other times, there can be a collective

breakthrough as when the European powers of the mid-19th to early

20th centuries combined industrialization, railroads, improved

metallurgy and explosives, the telegraph, barbed wire, concrete,

improved methods of government funding, nationalism, breech

loading, rifled artillery and small arms, steam-driven, armored

ships, internal combustion engines, radio, increased literacy and

public health, improved explosives, and the machine gun. Always,

though, the essence of the revolution is not the invention of new

technology, but discovery of innovative ways to organize,

operate, and employ new technology.

Revolutions in military affairs begin when the potential

latent in technological, conceptual, political, economic, social,

and organizational changes that have occurred or are occurring is

recognized and converted to augment combat effectiveness. In premodern, heterogeneous security systems, revolution was often

initiated by states outside the system or on its periphery.

Sometimes their advantage accrued from superior morale, training,

organization, leadership, strategy, or tactics. Examples include

Alexander’s Macedonians, early Republican Rome, 8th century

Arabs, Mongols, Vikings, and the Swedes of Gustavus Adolphus. The

Assyrians were perhaps typical when they unleashed a military

revolution without new technology–many societies had iron weapons

and compound bows–but based on combined arms tactics that

integrated archers, spearmen, and charioteers.33 Other external or

peripheral revolutionaries such as the iron-armed Hittites and

chariot-riding Kassites, Hurrians, and Hyskos who challenged

Mesopotamia and Egypt, or the European conquerors of the

Americas, Asia, and Africa did capitalize on superior technology,

but did not attain victory purely because of it.34

In the modern, communications-intensive security system,

revolutions in military affairs have most frequently been

initiated by a state within the system. The motivating force

often has been defeat, a perception of inferiority, or a fear of

declining capability against evolutionary change on the part of

other actors. This is because fundamental change of any kind is

difficult, even frightening; those who unleash revolution never


know exactly where it will take them. Uncertainty as to the

eventual outcome means that political and military leaders

satisfied with their state’s security situation will seldom run

the risks of revolution. Usually, then, only real or imagined

danger can provide the spark. Revolutionary France, for instance,

unleashed a military revolution via the levee en mass primarily

because it was surrounded with powerful enemies and on the verge


of catastrophe. Europe’s conservative monarchies repudiated

Paris’ radical ideology, therefore rejected diplomatic

amelioration of the security threat, and possessed superior

traditional military capabilities. Military innovation was thus

the only alternative left to the beleaguered revolutionaries. In

the late 19th century, Britain, Germany, France, and, to a lesser

extent, Russia and Austria-Hungary, pursued land and naval

military revolutions from fear of each other. Similarly, the

Germans developed blitzkrieg between 1918 and 1940 because they

recognized that their political objectives were unlikely to be

attained without war, and they could not win such a war with

available military capabilities.35

Initiation of a revolution requires revolutionaries. RMAs

are led by armed forces that tolerate and, at the appropriate


time, empower visionaries. The decision to do this is a vital

juncture in military revolutions. In the past, only a peer

competitor could offer enough of a threat to empower military

visionaries and dispel the miasma of inertia and petrified

thinking. This may be changing. In the future, the United States

might face real threats from “niche” challengers that cannot

match American capability across the board, but can in some

specific type of conflict, perhaps terrorism. Actually niche

challengers have always existed, but were often overshadowed. In

the post-Cold War security environment, the absence of a peer

threat gives niche challengers greater strategic significance,

both real and perceptual. Phrased differently, niche threats will

be considered important if they are the only type around, but

will return to relative insignificance if a peer competitor

emerges.

Even when political and military leaders commit their state

to radical innovation and empower visionaries, they almost never

begin with a complete and clear blueprint for revolution. False

starts and dead ends are the rule rather than the exception. In

every RMA, though, there is a point of critical mass where

concepts, organizations, and technologies ripen and meld. For a

military revolution to reach critical mass, some factor must

protect the breakthrough state while it changes concepts,

reorganizes, and wanders down dead ends. Most often, this is

division or ignorance on the part of its enemies. These enemies

may not recognize the potential danger the breakthrough poses, or

may be wandering down dead ends of their own. While Germany

developed blitzkrieg, for instance, France refined preparation

for the set-piece battle to an art form.36

The period between initiation and critical mass may be 

short, particularly when the revolution frees latent creativity

within the armed forces and defense community rather than

generating it from scratch. The periods immediately before and

after critical mass may be particularly conflict-prone as other

states recognize the coming danger posed by the breakthrough and

attempt to preempt it or the breakthrough state tests its newfound prowess. Often small wars confirm the course of innovation,

add fuel to the revolutionary spark, and pave the way for even

more extensive change. This happened with the Crimean War, the

Franco-Prussian War, and the Russo-Japanese War. Many analysts

contend that the Gulf War will play the same role.37


Regardless of the reason for initiation or the time and

means required to achieve critical mass, revolutionary

breakthroughs eventually generate responses from other states.

Responses can be symmetric, asymmetric, or, most often, a

combination of the two. Symmetric responses seek to emulate the

breakthrough state. Prussian military reforms following the

Battle of Jena were a classic example.38 So, too, was the

development of the German battle fleet after the appointment of

Rear Admiral Alfred Tirpitz as State Secretary in 1897.39

Following their near-defeat by German blitzkrieg in 1941-42, the

Soviets emulated the Wehrmacht’s methods, eventually beating the

masters at their own game. Asymmetric responses, by contrast,

seek countermeasures to the breakthrough. They are to the process

of force and doctrine development what Liddell Hart’s “indirect

approach” or Edward Luttwak’s concept of “paradoxical logic” is

to strategy.40 To counter British battleships, for instance, both

the French and Germans focused, at different times and with

differing enthusiasm, on submarines, torpedo boats, and fast

commerce raiders. The strategy of guerrilla “people’s war” as

developed by Mao, Giap, and others is perhaps the starkest

illustration of an asymmetric approach to a superior military. In

today’s Third World, the drive for weapons of mass destruction

is, in part, an attempt to find asymmetric countermeasures to

American conventional military preeminence.

Responses to future military breakthroughs will be quicker

than in the past. Before the modern age, it could take decades,

even centuries before effective responses emerged. There was

always a period where other states simply did not understand the

breakthrough followed by a time when they understood the

revolutionary concepts, but had not yet adjusted their

organization, doctrine, training, attitudes, and technology. In

the 21st century, the quantum increase in the pace of

organizational adaptation and the extent of global communication

will make the advantages flowing from revolutionary breakthrough

fleeting. The revolutionary cycle, in other words, will be

compressed. Future RMAs will occur in such rapid sequence that

military affairs will appear to be in “permanent revolution” (to

misappropriate Trostsky’s phrase).

The period following critical mass, but before effective 

response, is a time of greatest relative advantage for the


revolutionary power. If conflict with other states arises during

this period, it will frequently seem to be in the revolutionary

power’s best interests to resort to military action immediately.

Thus, unless the political and military leaders of the

breakthrough state possess self-discipline and demonstrate

restraint, this period is susceptible to armed conflict as the

breakthrough state launches strategic spoiling attacks.41

Military revolutions have culminating points at which

innovation and change slow or stop. This may occur when leaders

become satisfied with the military balance and will no longer

risk radical change. It may also occur when costs of change are

thought to outweigh the benefits of further expenditure. At this

time, states which have adopted the revolution seek to

consolidate their advantage. Following culmination, remaining

improvements in military effectiveness come primarily through

superior training. This the reason that, following nearly

universal adoption of the gunpowder-bayonet tactical revolution

by 18th century European militaries, Frederick the Great was able

to dominate the battlefield. And, it could be argued that

American effectiveness in Desert Storm represented superior

training during the last phase of the blitzkrieg RMA.

The most successful revolutionary states turn military

advantage into economic and political dominance, but the

transition is difficult. Being the first to understand or

implement a RMA does not guarantee even military victory. A

breakthrough state or coalition which clearly understands the RMA

but which fails to develop an appropriate, balanced, strategy

can–and usually will–lose to a state or coalition which lags in

understanding but possesses superior strategic prowess. History

is littered with breakthrough military states which ultimately

failed, whether those of Genghis Khan, Napoleon Bonaparte, or

Imperial and Nazi Germany. In general, then, leaders and

strategists attempting to master military revolutions face a

series of key decisions:

• Should the RMA be pursued?

• What is the appropriate pace of change?

• Which path of change should be taken?


• How can the culminating point of the revolution be

recognized and what should be done when it is reached? and,

• How can increased combat effectiveness be turned into

strategic gain?

Choices.

The course of the current RMA is not preordained. Key policy

decisions made now will both affect the pace of revolution and

the shape of the 21st century U.S. military that emerges from it.

Perhaps the most fundamental choice of all concerns the

enthusiasm with which the United States should pursue the current

“minor” RMA and the extent to which it should shape force

development. Often this is not even considered due to the

traditional American approach to technology. The American ethos

holds that progress–defined, in part, as efficiency augmented by

technology–is inevitable and irrepressible. Technology is

respected, almost deified. There are sound historical reasons for

this. During its formative period, the nation suffered from

chronic shortages of skilled labor, thus forcing reliance on

labor-saving technology. Eli Whitney, Robert Fulton, Thomas

Edison, Henry Ford and thousands of other entrepreneurs and

inventors harnessed technology in the name of efficiency.

Reflecting this legacy, the U.S. military has often evinced an

unreflective trust in the ultimate benefit of technology. But a

reasonable case can be made that too vigorous pursuit of the

current “minor” RMA is undesirable or dangerous, that the costs

and risks outweigh the expected benefits.

One risk is that the current RMA, if it continues on its

present trajectory, will not generate increased combat

effectiveness against the most likely or most dangerous future

opponents. The “perfect” opponent for an military structured

around the current RMA is a “middle level” enemy with rigid,

centralized decisionmaking relying on limited range, easy-todetect weapons platforms such as tanks, conventional artillery,

and manned aircraft. But the utility of the current RMA, with its

stress on precision, stand-off strikes, falls off dramatically

toward the poles of the military/technology spectrum (see Figure

6). Opponents at the low end of the spectrum tend to operate in

widely dispersed fashion and emit a limited electronic signature,

thus complicating targeting.42 Their organization is often


cellular, making decapitation difficult. If they are insurgents,

they intermingle with the population, eroding the effectiveness

and morality of stand-off strikes. If they are terrorists, they

need only succeed in a limited number of military missions to

attain desired psychological objectives. To be popularly

perceived a success, counterterrorism must be very nearly

flawless. Even the RMA does not promise such perfection. While it

may be argued that a non-RMA force suffers these same

deficiencies, this overlooks the resource opportunity cost to

design, create, and field a RMA force.

A second risk is that the greater the intensity with which

the United States pursues the current RMA, the greater the

intensity with which opponents or potential opponents will seek

countermeasures. Potential competitors will no doubt respond to

existing U.S. military preeminence. But such counter- measures

are likely to take familiar forms against which superior U.S.

training and capabilities can prevail if hostilities result. U.S.

pursuit of revolutionary capabilities will produce a search for

asymmetric countermeasures, including perhaps new biological and

chemical weapons. Or American pursuit of the current RMA could

actually encourage the emergence of a peer competitor, either by

developing a Dreadnought-type weapon that instantly outmodes all

previous systems, or by inspiring fear of what the United States

intends to do with its increasing military capabilities among 

technologically-capable, but currently nonhostile, states.

Yet another risk is that fruition of the current RMA might

lead the United States to overreliance on the military element of

national power. This would be especially tempting if the global


economic position of the United States continues to erode. But as

Napoleon, Hitler and others discovered, military dominance is a

deadly siren when it causes leaders to ignore political and

economic power, leaving no foundation when military preeminence

fades (as it invariably does). If this happens, the current RMA

may prove less a groundwork for a more permanent world order than

a temporary expedient for keeping the dogs of war at bay.

Finally, there is the risk that overly vigorous pursuit of

the current RMA might increase problems with friends and allies.

Advocates contend the RMA will make the U.S. military capable of

successful, autonomous operations, and thus less dependent on

allies. This would be a mixed blessing. The 19th century French


social theorist Auguste Comte speculated that prehistoric humans

developed the economic division of labor as a means of preserving

social peace. Individuals reliant on the skills of others are

less likely to do violence to them. The same may hold for the

global system. Other nations would probably consider a U.S.

military freed from dependence on allies much more dangerous than

the pre-RMA one, thus tainting all aspects of cooperation.

Why, then, should the United States actively pursue the

current RMA? First, it should bring significant increases in

combat effectiveness against some mid-level opponents. Second, as

many analysts have pointed out, a force built around stand-off,

precision weapons and disruptive information warfare capabilities

would, because of decreased friendly casualties and reduced

collateral damage, be more politically usable than a traditional

force-projection military. Third, by removing some of the fetters

on the use of American military power, the RMA could augment

deterrence. Other than the Soviet Union, every recent enemy of

the United States has been militarily inferior, but many of them,

from Ho Chi Minh to Saddam Hussein, thought that political

constraints would counterbalance the U.S. military advantage.

Such aggressors might be deterred more easily if a 21st century

U.S. military could bypass or minimize certain types of political

constraints. Despots would thus be assured that aggression would

be punished. Finally, the United States may need to pursue the

current RMA to avoid stumbling into strategic inferiority. The

lead time for developing a new military based on the RMA is

great. Technological development is the easy part; reshaping

attitudes and adapting organizations, doctrine, education, and

training is extraordinarily hard. When other states pursue

revolutionary military developments, the United States must also.

If policymakers decide to enthusiastically pursue the

revolution in military affairs, strategy, rather than

technological capability, must be the lodestar. Over and over,

American leaders and defense experts should ask “What do we want

the future U.S. military to be able to do?” rather than “What

will emerging technology allow the future military to do?” One

way to think about what the 21st century U.S. military should be

able to do is to examine a combination of strategic objectives

and expected opponents.

Macro-level strategic objectives fall on a spectrum of


engagement. At one end is creation of a global system composed

exclusively of stable, prosperous, free-market democracies. At

the other end is political and military disengagement with focus

on internal problems. In the middle lies the current mixture of

promoting democracy when possible at a low cost, containing

aggressors, and pursuing special political and economic

relationships in key regions such as Latin America, Western

Europe, and the Pacific Rim. Where future U.S. strategy falls on

this spectrum has tremendous implications for the sort of

military force the nation needs. The more the United States

stresses active engagement and the promulgation of open economies

and political systems, the more the U.S. military must be able to

project power and sustain protracted operations. To build

democracy might require soldiers on the ground for extended

periods of time while the institutions and values that support

democracy are planted and take root. Large-scale strategic

mobility would remain vital. Military strategy would combine

precise, stand-off strikes with occupation and nation-building.

Occupation forces would be armed largely with nonlethal weaponry

and protected by high-tech armor and personal communications

equipment.

By contrast, the more that the United States pursues

political and military disengagement, the less the need for power

projection or sustained operations. At this end of the spectrum,

the appropriate military force would be configured for defense

and short deterrent strikes. There would still be a need for

precision, stand-off weapons systems. In fact, stand-off

capability would be even more relevant since the United States

would seldom operate with allies and would lack forward bases.

There would be little need, though, to deploy and sustain

occupying or nation-building forces. Strategic objectives in the

middle of the spectrum would require power projection and

deterrence, but occupation and nation-building functions might

often be shared or done by allies. Alternatively, the United

States could choose strategic objectives exclusively in concert

with other members of the global community. As military forces

become more expensive, the United States might decide that

possession of a full range of capabilities is not worth the cost.

This could lead to a global military division of labor, with the

U.S. military always operating in coalition and thus needing only

certain capabilities such as intelligence and information warfare

rather than a full range.


The threats expected in the 21st century will also have a

major effect on force development. When crafting an assessment of

future threats, it again makes sense to think in terms of a

spectrum.43 At one end would be a peer competitor, or perhaps a

coalition of complementary niche competitors organized along

high-technology RMA lines. Next would be regional aggressors with

large but less-developed military forces. Most of these would

have weapons of mass destruction deliverable via ballistic or

cruise missiles. They would also have some high-tech capabilities

such as the ability to wage limited space operations and

information warfare. Next on the spectrum would be subnational

threats such as ethnic militias and terrorist movements. Some of

these will remain primitive and rely on the traditional guerrilla

tools of small arms, rocket propelled grenades, mortars, and

mines, but many will have adopted a fair amount of emerging

technology. In fact, some of them may be as advanced in their

chosen form of combat as the U.S. military and thus constitute

niche threats, particularly in forms of combat that do not

require large numbers of participants like information warfare.

The final pole of the spectrum will include essentially

nonmilitary challengers that U.S. policymakers define as security

threats. Most of these will be criminal organizations of one type

or the other, some using traditional methods of violence, others

relying on economic subversion, ecological terrorism or

information warfare.44

The United States is likely to confront all of these types

of enemies at one time or another in the coming decades. Force

development must thus be driven by some projected priority among

the threat types. The specific priority of expected enemies

determines the specific types of military technology that should

be stressed, the number of systems needed, the requirement for

forces to perform sustained operations, whether mobilization will

be a factor or whether all wars will be “come as you are,” and

the relationship of the U.S. military to nonmilitary security

forces such as law enforcement agencies. Most current programs,

including the Army’s Force XXI, focus on conventional regional

aggressors and, to a lesser extent, subnational enemies. From

this perspective, stress on precision, stand-off strikes,

stealth, and coherent operations is logical. But if the future

threat set changes, these characteristics might not be the most

important ones for the future U.S. military.


A peer competitor with armed forces as advanced as the U.S.

military (although perhaps not in precisely the same way) could

pose entirely different problems. Some optimists argue that in

the future, wars can be won by crashing the enemy’s computers

rather than killing his soldiers and civilians. Unfortunately,

the current revolution in military affairs does not rule out

other, more deadly forms of combat. Warfare between advanced

opponents could lead to bloody, World War I-like stalemate.

Weapons could be so accurate and destructive that any emission of

an electronic signature would draw an attack. To turn on

equipment would be to die.

RMA-based warfare involving peer competitors might also

prove deadly to civilians. Many analysts believe future war will

resemble the stylized combat of medieval and 18th century Europe

or pre-colonial Mesoamerica in which highly-trained warriors

fought each other but usually did not kill civilians or lay waste

to the lands of the defeated.45 But if a revolution in military

affairs is combined with hate, whether based on ethnicity, race,

class, religion, ideology or some other factor, technology could

be harnessed to the complete and utter annihilation of enemies,

both civilian and military. Even societies “modern” enough to

master a revolution in military affairs have not transcended the

ability to hate, so salt could be plowed into the land a thousand

times more effectively and efficiently than in ancient times.

Coventry, Shanghai, Warsaw, Dresden, Hiroshima and a dozen other

cities remind us of the depths that civilized states reach when

hate, frustration, and technology combine.

Since such a war against a peer competitor would probably

not be decided by traditional systems such as armored land forces

and manned aircraft, to prepare for it the United States should

shift toward second stage technologies such as robotics,

psychotechnology, space domination, and “fire ant” capabilities.

And, since projection of conventional forces against a peer

competitor would be dangerous or impossible, in a direct

confrontation with such a foe the United States should

concentrate on projection of effects rather than objects. During

competition with a peer adversary, the United States would

certainly need a tightly integrated military-scientifictechnological-economic policy aimed at limiting the proliferation

of military-relevant knowledge. Finally, the line between


competition and hostilities, between peace and war, may be

extremely difficult to determine–particularly in the information

arena. This implies a military capable of continuous defensive

action rather than one configured for episodic offensive

employment.

Rather than peer warfare, what used to be called lowintensity conflict could pose the dominant threat in the 21st

century. Many writers have suggested this. In his seminal work,

The Transformation of War, Martin van Creveld argues, “war will

not be waged by armies but by groups whom we today call

terrorists, guerrillas, bandits, and robbers, but who will

undoubtedly hit on more formal titles to describe themselves.”46

Similarly, Ralph Peters considers the major threat to U.S.

security to be challenges ranging from “techno-capable crime

networks to the machete-swinging clans of warlords.”47 A U.S.

military configured exclusively for use against subnational or

nonmilitary enemies would look very different from the projected

Force XXI. Individual units would be small but very flexible,

able to deal with enemies with a tremendous range of

capabilities, from high-tech niche opponents to low-tech warlord

militias. In fact, the entire combat arms component of the Army

might be composed of Special Forces. Small units, however, would

not necessarily equate to a small total force, since defeating

this type of opponent tends to be people-intensive, timeconsuming and requires protracted commitment of forces. There

would be little or no distinction between the military and

nonmilitary elements of the U.S. security force. High-tech

policemen and scientists, whether computer experts, ecologists,

or something similar would be the most vital parts of the

security force with soldiers as adjuncts. And, since the American

public considers conflict short of war a low-stakes effort not

worth extensive casualties, personal protection technology

including individual armor and counterterror technology would be

essential. Psycho- technology to manipulate perceptions, beliefs

and attitudes would also be central. Some elements of the current

RMA like long range, stealth, and space domination would count

for little.

Tasks.

The RMA is at a crossroads. In the broadest sense, there are

three options: to push further along the road of precision,


stand-off strikes and disruptive information warfare aimed

primarily at conventionally-armed regional aggressors; to put a

brake on the RMA and stand pat in order to consolidate existing

advantages; or, to push the revolution in a different direction.

To structure this choice, the U.S. military must do a number of

things. First, it must inspire and lead continued refinement of

the theory of military revolutions. Second, it must examine how

to cultivate internal creativity. Third, it must expand the

debate.

To refine the theory of military revolutions, hypotheses

should debated, revised, confirmed, or abandoned. Three issues in

particular warrant further attention: the likely response of

other states, second order effects, and the ability to respond

across the spectrum of possible requirements (the “band-width

problem”).

In considering the response of other states, policymakers

and defense planners consistently overlook or ignore the fact

that U.S. power can be intimidating. Because Americans consider

their intentions benign and their stated goals– democracy and

free market economies–so clearly desirable, they fail to

understand that even free market democracies can be unsettled by

increases in U.S. military capability.48 Why, foreign leaders ask,

would the world’s only superpower seek radical improvement of its

armed forces in the absence of a clear threat? Given the expense

of accumulating national power, some may assume it is meant to be

used and conclude that the United States is improving its

military capabilities in order to impose its will on others. The

United States can either accept such suspicions or find a new,

less intimidating method of pursuing the revolution in military

affairs, perhaps through greater cooperation with potential

allies. The problem is that such cooperation could speed the

dissemination of new technology, techniques, and ideas, and thus

contribute to the emergence of challengers. But if the United

States unilaterally pursues the RMA, other states will respond,

whether symmetrically or asymmetrically. In turn, knowing the

benign intentions of the United States, American leaders and

planners will consider this threatening. Why, they will ask,

would other states seek to improve their military capability

unless contemplating aggression? Vigorous American pursuit of the

RMA may make other nations feel less secure and their response

will make the United States feel less secure. The result may be a


spiral of mutual misperception and a new arms race, albeit a

qualitative rather than quantitative one. American policymakers

must decide whether this is a cost worth bearing.

The second order effects of the RMA also warrant additional

study. It is possible, for instance, that the RMA might lead to

methods of warfighting incompatible with the ethos and tradition

of the U.S. military. One example concerns training. Throughout

history, military training has consisted of three interlinked

dimensions, each focused on a different relationship (see Figure

7). To a large extent, drill dealt with a soldier’s relationship

with his comrades; discipline dealt with his relationship with

superiors; simulation or actual combat practice dealt with his

relationship with the enemy. The RMA may replicate medieval

warfare where training focused on simulation to the almost-total

exclusion of drill and discipline (but without even the modicum

of control given medieval warfare by the code of chivalry). But

if all training becomes simulation or wargaming, can armed forces

still be disciplined and bonded into effective units? Will they

need to be? The answer to both questions may be “no.” In fact, if

warfighting is done from a computer terminal, it may not be

necessary to have distinct military forces instilled with

discipline and personal bravery.49 In any case, the implications

of this should be explored before the point of no return.

The RMA may also have unintended and undesired second order

effects on American society. One of the primary objectives of the

RMA is near-omniscience for military commanders. Sensor and

information-processing technology may give them full and

instantaneous access to information on both their own and enemy

soldiers. Commanders will know not only where their forces and

those of the enemy are located, but also their physical and

mental condition. And psychotechnology will allow commanders to

manipulate the perceptions and beliefs of their own soldiers, the

enemy, and noncombatants. Such capabilities could be used as

easily for domestic problems as for international ones, thus

challenging fundamental American beliefs about personal privacy

and the intrusion of the state in the lives of individuals. Is

the nation willing to accept the risk of an RMA pandora’s box? If

not, how can it avoid a spillover from the RMA to domestic

society?

The U.S. military must also examine the band-width problem


of the current RMA. A band-width problem arises when a military


force is so focused on one particular type of opponent that it

can be defeated by a different kind. During most of the Middle

Ages, for example, the only true threat to a well-armored, wellmounted, and well-trained knight was another knight. By the 15th

century, knights at Agincourt and other battles were devastated

by formerly insignificant types of opponents such as archers,

halberdiers, pikemen, and, later, arquebusiers. This problem has

haunted militaries throughout history, from British Redcoats

trumped by the “uncivilized” tactics of French, Indian, and

American opponents to Iraqi forces trained and configured for war

with Iran. In fact, the U.S. military experienced its own bandwidth problem a few decades ago. During the Eisenhower


administration, the United States, as it assumed global

responsibilities associated with the containment of communism,

sought a technological solution to the expense of standing armed

forces. The strategy of “massive retaliation” used American

superiority in nuclear weapons and strategic airpower to offset

the Soviets’ advantage in conventional military force.50 By the

late 1950s, a band-width problem emerged and the U.S. military

was ill-equipped for guerrilla conflict or for regional

expeditionary warfare during crises such as the Bay of Pigs

invasion.51

Most contemporary plans for the evolution of the U.S.

military, such as the Army’s Force XXI, focus on conventional,

armor-heavy enemies.52 Emergence of a band-width problem early in

the next century is likely if United States confronts low-tech,

niche, or peer opponents. While official documents note that “the

Army must expand its understanding of conflict beyond current

Western paradigms,”53 most descriptions of how the “digitized”

Army of the 21st century expects to fight sound suspiciously like

armored combat against the Warsaw Pact with new technology

grafted on.54 Since, in Daniel Bolger’s words, militaries tend to

prepare for “the last good war,” it is not surprising that

current plans for the future of the U.S. military foresee Iraqlike opponents.55 But American defense planners must recognize

that even if the Gulf War and Force XXI do represent a revolution

in military affairs, they may not represent the revolution. As

the French discovered in 1940, improving the structure that

brought victory in the last war does not guarantee victory in the

next. It is not yet clear whether the United States is pursuing

the right revolution. It is possible that policymakers, analysts,

and planners are concentrating on the current “minor” RMA while

ignoring the implications of the potential, even if more distant,

“major” one. Historically, “minor” RMAs have had significant

impact on battlefield effectiveness, but “major” RMAs have proven

greater impediments to attainment of strategic objectives. It is

far easier to determine a successful countermeasure to blitzkrieg

than to the industrialization of war. And there is the danger, in

A.J. Bacevich’s words, that “the phenomena preoccupying us today

may be mere blips distracting attention from other deeper

currents of change.”56

Refining the theory of military revolutions is not enough.

The U.S. military and the Department of Defense must also


discover how to better cultivate and reward creativity and

organizational entrepreneurialism–to find the revolutionaries to

lead the revolution. The military does not lack visionaries. As

the Tofflers note, “For all the conservatism of military

institutions, there have always been innovators calling for

revolutionary change.”57 In the future, successful militaries must

cultivate and preserve visionaries during noncrisis periods and

empower them during crises. Within the contemporary U.S.

military, visionaries are given voice in the service journals.

But the probing creativity seen in Parameters, Airpower Journal,

Joint Forces Quarterly and similar fora is counterbalanced by

force development programs that assume constancy in the type of

threats and the nature of U.S. objectives.

Admittedly, the time is not ripe for a full-blown,

revolutionary transformation of the U.S. military. Toleration of

visionaries is probably the best that can be expected in today’s

security environment. The key is developing the ability to know

when it is time to empower them. Anyone looking at European

military thinking between the world wars would have assumed that

the British or French would have been the masters of the new

forms of warfare. The conceptual writings of people like Charles

DeGaulle, B.H. Liddell Hart and J.F.C. Fuller outshone those of

their German counterparts. But the Germans, unlike the British,

empowered their visionaries and allowed them to restructure

doctrine, tactics, training, and all the other elements of

military art. In 1940 the British and French discovered that

tolerating eccentricity is not the same as cultivating vision.

The current U.S. military is dangerously close to the same trap.

As Bacevich puts it, “Pretending to stride confidently toward the

future, a military establishment fixated by revolution is more

truly engaged in an effort to evade the past.”58 To avoid this,

the United States must recognize that there may come a time when

essentially evolutionary developments like the current Force XXI

program are not enough and more radical ideas must be given

effect.

Until then, the military should institutionalize creative

thinking about the revolution in military affairs. This will

require a conceptual locomotive to draw on the intellectual power

of the military services without being their uncritical servant.

It is difficult to pull an officer from a mainstream career and

ask him to support ideas that obviate everything he has done. How


easily can an armor officer, for instance, advocate an Army

without tanks knowing that in the near future he will return to

an institution where tanks are central? The same holds for

fighter pilots, submarine captains or any other sort of officer.

So long as they are part of a conventional institution, their

creativity is constrained.59 A new, autonomous RMA organization–if

composed of analysts rather than advocates– could do what RAND

Corporation did for nuclear strategy in the 1950s.60 While

affiliated with the Department of Defense, it should be staffed

by a mix of civilians, officers on limited tours who will return

to their services, and active and retired officers who spend the

remainder of their career in the development and implementation

of the revolution in military affairs.61

Finally, the military must enlarge the RMA debate. German

strategy between 1871 and 1918 showed the danger of separating

military strategy and force development from broader national

policy.62 Yet that is what is happening in the United States

today. Every analysis of the RMA originates from the military or

from civilians with ties to the armed services. The 21st century

U.S. military should be designed to attain specific objectives

given a specific threat set. The military can participate in

broadening the debate over national objectives. It can inform and

inspire, perhaps even lead the effort. It cannot and should not

do it alone. The military must, then, draw political leaders and

the informed public into discussion of the RMA.

*******

Strategic thinking occurs in three dimensions. The vertical

dimension deals with time. Its grist is speculation about the

future and balancing short-term and long-term objectives.

Analysts of the RMA have given this a fair amount of attention.

The horizontal dimension seeks to integrate and synchronize

various types of power in a collective effort at a given point in

time. There is little of this in the current RMA literature: few

writers have explored the links between a military designed

around the RMA and diplomatic or economic power. This can and

should be done, but is not the most complex task. The third

dimension of strategy is the normative. However much political

realists deny it, strategy is about preferences, about value

judgements, about not just the type of world that is attainable,

but also what is preferable. With the exception of the Tofflers’


undeveloped notion of “anti-war,” explicit normative choices have

been almost entirely absent from analysis of the RMA. If the

United States is to lead and master the revolution rather than be

its eventual victim, this vacuum must be filled. American

leaders, in other words, must decide not only what the United

States can do with a more effective military force, but also what

it should do. Only then will the RMA lead to progress rather than

simply change.

ENDNOTES

1. John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy of the

United States: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement,

Washington, DC: Joint Staff, February 1995, pp. ii-iii.

2. Posted at World Wide Web site http:// www.dtic.dla.mil/

defenselink/ jcs/ vice_chairman.html.

3. Andrew W. Marshall, “Some Thoughts on Military

Revolutions – Second Version,” Memorandum for the Record, Office

of the Secretary of Defense, Office of Net Assessment, August 23,

1993, p. 3.

4. Jeffrey R. Cooper, Another View of the Revolution in

Military Affairs, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College,

Strategic Studies Institute, 1994, p. 27.

5. For example, Michael J. Mazarr, Jeffrey Shaffer, and

Benjamin Ederington, The Military Technical Revolution: A

Structural Framework, final report of the CSIS Study Group on the

MTR, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International

Studies, 1993; Dan Gouré, “Is There a Military-Technical

Revolution in America’s Future?” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 16,

No. 4, Autumn 1993, pp. 175-192; and, John W. Bodnar, “The

Military Technical Revolution: From Hardware to Information,”

Naval War College Review, Vol. 46, No. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 7-21.

6. An exception is Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., “Beyond

Luddites and Magicians: Examining the MTR,” Parameters, Vol. 25,

No. 2, Summer 1995, pp. 15-21. The author does not explain why he

uses a term or concept that has largely been abandoned by other

analysts.


7. Civilian analysts tend toward “underway.” Military

officers, perhaps inherently more conservative, see more

“evolution” than “revolution” in current events, but readily

acknowledge that the future implications of silicon-chip and

other advanced technologies may be revolutionary. See, for

example, The U.S. Air Force Roundtable on the Revolution in

Military Affairs, McLean, VA: Science Applications International

Corporation, January 1994; The U.S. Navy Roundtable on the

Revolution in Military Affairs, McLean, VA: Science Applications

International Corporation, July 1994; The Summary Roundtable on

the Revolution in Military Affairs, McLean, VA: Science

Applications International Corporation, October 1994.

8. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at

the Dawn of the 21st Century, Boston: Little, Brown, 1993, p. 32.

9. Robert J. Bunker, “The Transition To Fourth Epoch War,”

Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 78, No. 9, September 1994, pp. 20-34.

10. Cooper, Another View of the Revolution in Military

Affairs, p. 21.

11. Andrew F. Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern

of Military Revolutions,” The National Interest, No. 37, Fall

1994, p. 30.

12. Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computer,” p. 30; Cooper,

Another View of the Revolution in Military Affairs, p. 1; in

addition, each of the Department of Defense-sponsored service

roundtables on the RMA were organized around these four elements.

( See The U.S. Army Roundtable on the Revolution in Military

Affairs, McLean, VA: Science Applications International

Corporation, October 1993; The U.S. Air Force Roundtable on the

Revolution in Military Affairs; The U.S. Navy Roundtable on the

Revolution in Military Affairs; The Summary Roundtable on the

Revolution in Military Affairs.)

13. James R. Fitzsimonds and Jan M. Van Tol, “Revolutions in

Military Affairs,” Joint Force Quarterly, No. 4, Spring 1994, p.

27.

14. The “First Wave” was agricultural, the “Second Wave”

industrial. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival


at the Dawn of the 21st Century, Boston: Little, Brown, 1993,

pp. 33-85. See also Alvin and Heidi Toffler, The Third Wave, New

York: Bantam, 1980.

15. See, for example, Pat Cooper, “Information Warfare

Sparks Security Affairs Revolution,” Defense News, Vol. 10, No.

23, June 12-18, 1995, p. 1.

16. See, for instance, George J. Stein, “Information

Warfare,” Airpower Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, Spring 1995, pp. 30-

55; Edward Mann, “Desert Storm: The First Information War?”

Airpower Journal, Vol. 8, No. 4, Winter 1994, pp. 4-14; and, Owen

Jensen, “Information Warfare: Principles of Third-Wave War,”

Airpower Journal, Vol. 8, No. 4, Winter 1994, pp. 35-44.

17. For intra-military discussion, see The US Air Force

Roundtable on the Revolution in Military Affairs. For beginning

attempts to explore the strategic utilization of information

warfare, see Tofflers, War and Anti-War; Arquilla and Ronfeldt,

“Cyberwar is Coming!”; John Arquilla, “The Strategic Implications

of Information Dominance,” Strategic Review, Vol. 22, No. 3,

Summer 1994, pp. 24-30; and Winn Schwartau, Information Warfare:

Chaos on the Electronic Superhighway, New York: Thunder’s Mouth

Press, 1994.

18. Chris Morris, Janet Morris, and Thomas Baines, “Weapons

of Mass Protection: Nonlethality, Information Warfare and

Airpower in the Age of Chaos,” Airpower Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1,

Spring 1995, p. 27.

19. Thomas E. Ricks, “New Class of Weapons Could

Incapacitate Foe Yet Limit Casualties,” Wall Street Journal,

January 4, 1993, p. 1.

20. Bradley Graham, “Use of Nonlethal Arms Leaves Pentagon

Scrambling,” Washington Post, February 24, 1995, p. 8.

21. In June 1993 the Defense and Arms Control Studies

Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology sponsored a

conference on the policy implications of nonlethal warfare

technologies, but no major publications have yet grown from this.

Harvey Sapolsky argues that in the search for nonlethal methods

of warfare “isolationism will eventually be our answer.” Harvey


M. Sapolsky, “War without Killing,” in Sam C. Sarkesian and John

Mead Flanagin, eds., U.S. Domestic and National Security Agendas,

Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994, p. 39.

22. Edward N. Luttwak, “Toward Post-Heroic Warfare,” Foreign

Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 3, May/June 1995, p. 114.

23. Alan W. Debban, “Disabling Systems: War-Fighting Option

for the Future,” Airpower Journal, Vol. 7, No. 1, Spring 1993, p.

46.

24. Marshall, “Some Thoughts on Military Revolutions,” p. 5.

25. Michael J. Mazarr, The Revolution in Military Affairs: A

Framework for Defense Planning, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army

War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1994.

26. Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computer,” p. 31.

27. See John A. Warden III, “The Enemy as a System,”

Airpower Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, Spring 1995, pp. 40-55.

28. Martin C. Libicki, The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on

Armed Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon, Washington, DC:

National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic

Studies, 1994, pp. 28-38.

29. An exception is Ralph Peters who writes, “The latest

‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ occurred in the 1980s. It is

over now.” (“After the Revolution,” Parameters, Vol. 25, No. 2,

Summer 1995, p. 7.)

30. While the Tofflers’ linkage of economic and modes of

warfare is certainly accurate, their understanding of economic

and military history is occasionally thin as, for instance, when

they attribute the Napoleonic revolution to industrialization

despite the fact that the Emperor’s arms were made with the same

technology that had been used to equip the armies of Marlborough.

Probably a better schema links the military revolution of the

16th and 17th centuries–the predominance of gunpowder, squarerigged ships with artillery in broadside, drilled standing

armies, and the like–with the transition from a feudal to

commercial economy, while the military revolution of the late


19th century resulted from industrialization and the first stage

of the technological revolution.

31. Interestingly, by the early 20th century, maturation of

the bolt-action rifle technology restored the importance of

superior training and discipline–as the “Old Contemptibles” of

the BEF were able to demonstrate at Mons and Le Cateau in 1914.

By then, of course, other advances had made deciding the issue of

a great power conflict via infantry weapons unlikely. See William

McElwee, The Art of War: Waterloo to Mons, Bloomington: Indiana

University Press, 1975.

32. Russell F. Weigley, The Age of Battles: The Quest for

Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo, Bloomington:

Indiana University Press, 1991, p. xv.

33. Robert L. O’Connell, Of Arms and Men: A History of War,

Weapons, and Aggression, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989,

p. 40.

34. John Keegan, A History of Warfare, New York: Alfred A.

Knopf, 1993, pp. 168, 238; Michael Howard, “The Military Factor

in European Expansion,” in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., The

Expansion of International Society, Oxford: Clarendon, 1984.

35. For discussions of the German Army’s development of

Blitzkrieg, see Charles Messenger, The Blitzkrieg Story, New

York: Scribner, 1976; Len Deighton, Blitzkrieg: From the Rise of

Hitler to the Fall of Dunkirk, New York: Knopf, 1980; and Byran

Perrett, A History of Blitzkrieg, New York: Stein & Day, 1983.

36. See Robert A. Doughty, The Seeds of Disaster: The

Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939, Hamden, CT:

Archon, 1985.

37. Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computer,” p. 40; Marshall,

“Some Thoughts on Military Revolutions,” p. 3.

38. Hajo Holborn, “The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the

Rise of the General Staff,” in Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern

Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Princeton, NJ:

Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 281-284.


39. John Keegan, The Price of Admiralty: The Evolution of

Naval Warfare, New York: Viking, 1989, pp. 100-122.

40. B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2d revised edition, New

York: Signet, 1974; Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War

and Peace, Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1987.

41. The German attacks against both France and Russia during

World War II can be viewed in this light. Although the German

military made some arguments against initiating both campaigns

when they did, Hitler strongly felt that Germany’s advantage in

military capability would only erode as time passed.

42. The Air Force Roundtable on the RMA, after extensive

consideration of the targeting problem, concluded “While

technology will increasingly allow us to identify and target

specific aim points, one thing that has never changed, and that

technology is likely not to change, is the importance of knowing

where and when to aim.” The U.S. Air Force Roundtable on the

Revolution in Military Affairs, n.p.

43. Similarly, the U.S. Navy RMA Roundtable conferees

concluded: “The focus . . . should be less on identifying any

particular state as the most likely future challenger, and more

on the characteristics and capabilities of the kinds of states

likely to pose a challenge.” (italics in original) The U.S. Navy

Roundtable on the Revolution in Military Affairs, n.p.

44. On the vulnerability of the United States to nonmilitary

information warfare, see Schwartau, Information Warfare.

45. Luttwak, “Toward Post-Heroic Warfare.”

46. Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War, New York:

Free Press, 1991, p. 197.

47. Peters, “After the Revolution,” pp. 8, 9.

48. On this point, American liberalism is a less

sophisticated ideology than Soviet Marxism-Leninism, which at

least understood that there are powerful elites with vested

interests who will oppose the spread of “equality and justice.”

Americans remain perplexed at elites who oppose the spread of


free market democracy.

49. An interesting perspective on many of these issues can

be found in Orsan Scott Card, Ender’s Game, New York: Tom

Doherty, 1985.

50. For detail, see Steven Metz, “Eisenhower and the

Planning of American Grand Strategy,” Journal of Strategic

Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, March 1991, pp. 49-71.

51. See Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, New York:

Harper and Brothers, 1959.

52. The latest thinking on the Army’s Force XXI process can

be found at World Wide Web site http://204.7.227.67:1100/force21.

53. TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command) Pamphlet 525-5,

Force XXI Operations, August 1994, n.p. (electronic download).

54. For example, Bernard Gray, “Digital Troops on the

Horizon,” London Financial Times, May 19, 1995, p. 11.

55. Daniel P. Bolger, “The Ghosts of Omdurman,” Parameters,

Vol 21, No. 3, Autumn 1991, p. 32.

56. A.J. Bacevich, “Preserving the Well-Bred Horse,” The

National Interest, No. 37, Fall 1994, p. 49.

57. Tofflers, War and Anti-War, p. 29.

58. Bacevich, “Preserving the Well-Bred Horse,” p. 49.

59. In a recent series of RMA roundtables, each of the

individual services independently identified failure to create a

climate or culture that “nurtures innovators, revolutionaries, or

entrepreneurs” as an impediment to pursuit of the RMA. The U.S.

Army Roundtable on the Revolution in Military Affairs, n.p; The

U.S. Air Force Roundtable on the Revolution in Military Affairs,

n.p; The U.S. Navy Roundtable on the Revolution in Military

Affairs, n.p.

60. “There is a need for an organization free of current,

day-to-day operational concerns and charged by OSD with


developing R&D, training, operational, and other concepts to fit

scenarios in the 2020 timeframe.” The U.S. Navy Roundtable on the

Revolution in Military Affairs, Tab F, n.p.

61. Perhaps distinguished flag officers on their last tour

of duty. The Navy Board which fostered carrier and amphibious

warfare in the 1920s and 1930s was just so composed. See W.

Spencer Johnson, “Shifting Charts: The Navy and the Revolution in

Military Affairs,” in The U.S. Navy Roundtable on the Revolution

in Military Affairs, n.p.

62. Holger H. Herwig, “Strategic Uncertainties of a NationState: Prussia-Germany, 1871-1918,” in Williamson Murray,

MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein, eds., The Making of

Strategy: Rulers, States, and War, Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1994, pp. 242-277.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel Richard H. Witherspoon

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Authors

Dr. Dr. Steven Metz

Lieutenant Colonel James Kievit

Editor

Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretary

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mr. Daniel B. Barnett

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler