Evolution of the Secretary of Defense in the Era of Massive Retaliation

Special Study 3

Historical Office

Office of the Secretary of Defense

SEPTEMBER 2012

Charles Wilson, Neil McElroy, and Thomas Gates

1953-1961

Evolution of the Secretary OF Defense

IN THE ERA OF

Massive Retaliation
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 3 Evolution of the Secretary of Defense in the Era of Massive Retaliation

Cover Photos: Charles Wilson, Neil McElroy, Thomas Gates, Jr.

Source: Official DoD Photo Library, used with permission.

Cover Design: OSD Graphics, Pentagon.

Evolution of the Secretary of Defense

in the Era of

Massive Retaliation

Charles Wilson, Neil McElroy,

and Thomas Gates

1953-1961
ii iii

Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 3 Evolution of the Secretary of Defense in the Era of Massive Retaliation

Charles Wilson, Neil McElroy, and Thomas Gates

1953-1961

Historical Office

Office of the Secretary of Defense

September 2012

Series Editors

Erin R. Mahan, Ph.D.

Chief Historian, Office of the Secretary of Defense

Jeffrey A. Larsen, Ph.D.

President, Larsen Consulting Group

Special Study 3

Evolution of the Secretary OF Defense

IN THE ERA OF

Massive Retaliation
Evolution of the Secretary of Defense in the Era of Massive Retaliation

iv v

Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 3

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied 

within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the 

views of the Department of Defense, the Historical Office of the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense, Larsen Consulting Group, or any other agency 

of the Federal Government. 

Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.

Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission, 

provided that a standard source credit line is included. The Historical 

Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense would appreciate a 

courtesy copy of reprints or reviews.

Contents

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Eisenhower, Wilson, and the Policy Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

McElroy: Caretaker Secretary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Gates: Reasserting the Secretary’s Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

About the Editors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 3 Evolution of the Secretary of Defense in the Era of Massive Retaliation

vi vii

Foreword

This is the third special study in a series by the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (OSD) Historical Office that emphasizes the 

Secretary’s role in the U.S. foreign policy making process and how 

the position evolved between 1947 and the end of the Cold War. 

The study presented here concentrates on the three Secretaries who 

served President Dwight D. Eisenhower: Charles Wilson, Neil 

McElroy, and Thomas Gates. The first two of these Secretaries were 

primarily caretakers and administrators, leaving much of the lead 

role in American foreign policy making to Secretary of State John 

Foster Dulles in this era of increasing foreign policy and national 

security challenges. But Thomas Gates reinvigorated the role of the 

office in the last year of the Eisenhower Presidency, providing a 

springboard for Robert McNamara, his successor in the John F. 

Kennedy administration, to increase the power of the position to 

unprecedented levels.

This study is not meant to be a comprehensive look at the Secretary’s 

involvement in foreign affairs. But as a member of the President’s 

cabinet and the National Security Council and as the person 

charged with managing the largest and most complex department 

in the government, the Secretary of Defense routinely participated 

in a variety of actions that affected the substance and conduct of 

U.S. affairs abroad.

This series of special studies by the Historical Office is part of an 

ongoing effort to highlight various aspects of the Secretary’s mission 

and achievements. The series on the role of the Secretary of Defense 

in U.S. foreign policy making during the Cold War began as a book 

manuscript by Dr. Steve Rearden, author of The Formative Years, 

1947–1950, in our Secretaries of Defense Historical Series. I wish 

to thank Dr. Alfred Goldberg, former OSD Chief Historian, and 
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viii ix

Executive Summary

Despite the promising revival of the Secretary’s role in foreign 

affairs during Thomas Gates’s tenure at the end of the Dwight 

D. Eisenhower administration, the Eisenhower years were 

predominantly a period in which administrative and managerial 

matters took priority in Defense. This reflected the personal 

inclination of President Eisenhower, one of the nation’s best known 

and most respected military leaders, who was superbly equipped 

to give close attention to national security affairs. Concerning 

themselves with the business side of the Defense Department—

the formulation and execution of budgets, the procurement of new 

weapons and equipment, research and development—was perhaps 

the soundest approach the first two Secretaries of Defense under 

Eisenhower, Charles Wilson and Neil McElroy, could have taken, 

given their limited experience and the constraints under which 

they operated. Yet in the long run, they did not serve as a model for 

subsequent Secretaries. 

The story of the three men—Charles Wilson, Neil McElroy, and 

Thomas Gates—who bridged the gap between the early Secretaries 

and the innovative and highly influential Robert McNamara 

shows an evolution in the role of the Secretary of Defense from 

being principally administrative to having more involvement in 

the making of foreign policy. Even in an administration with the 

diplomatic prowess of President Dwight Eisenhower and Secretary 

of State John Foster Dulles, two seasoned foreign affairs experts 

and statesmen, the Defense Secretaries were able to make their 

mark on policy as the Cold War continued to unfurl, tackling 

the administrative hurdles of reorganization, austerity, and 

Mr. Robert Shelala II of Larsen Consulting Group for their critique, 

additional research, and helpful suggestions. Thanks also to Lisa M. 

Yambrick, senior editor in the OSD Historical Office, and to OSD 

Graphics in the Pentagon for their efforts and continued support.

We anticipate that future study series will cover a variety of defense 

topics. We invite you to peruse our other publications at <http://

history.defense.gov/>.

Erin R. Mahan

Chief Historian

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 3 Evolution of the Secretary of Defense in the Era of Massive Retaliation

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Secretary in December 1959. But his brief tenure (barely more 

than 13 months) and his preoccupation with interservice matters 

(particularly the strategic targeting dispute) did not permit him to 

devote as much close thought and attention to foreign affairs as he 

felt they deserved. Coming as it did at the end of the Eisenhower 

administration, moreover, his period in office saw a winding down, 

not a launching, of new foreign policy initiatives.

What made the Secretary’s role in foreign affairs during this period 

significant, then, was less the direct influence the Secretary himself 

exercised and more the continuing growth of military power as a 

key instrument of U.S. Cold War policy. Although Eisenhower’s 

Defense Secretaries may not have been as significantly involved in 

decisions as Harry Truman’s had been, they and their subordinates 

constituted an important part of a policy process that depended 

heavily on the military’s contributions and assets. This became 

evident in framing an overarching strategic policy under the 

rubric “massive retaliation.” It was also clear in the management 

of policy at the senior staff level, which Eisenhower entrusted to 

an NSC refashioned to reflect lines of command and authority 

familiar to him from his military days. While Wilson, McElroy, 

and Gates may not have enjoyed the prestige and influence of 

their immediate predecessors, their department had to respond to 

increasing responsibilities for sustaining American foreign policy. 

In the course of doing so, they set the stage for Robert McNamara’s 

advent in 1961. 

centralization while offering a more salient voice in discussions 

of foreign affairs. As military matters became more important 

throughout the 1950s, the views of the Secretary of Defense naturally 

became more integrated into policymaking, especially through the 

reworked policymaking structure of the National Security Council 

(NSC). While Eisenhower’s first two Defense Secretaries were 

former businessmen without a background in foreign policy or 

international relations, the defense background possessed by his 

final Secretary, coupled with Secretary of State Dulles’s departure, 

allowed the Secretary of Defense to become more entrenched in 

the making of foreign policy. In many respects acting as his own 

Secretary of Defense, President Eisenhower reserved for himself 

some of the key policy functions previously exercised by the 

Secretary. Having served as Supreme Allied Commander in World 

War II, Army Chief of Staff, and commander of North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) forces, he felt thoroughly qualified 

to personally oversee national security affairs. As President, in 

reaching decisions on strategy, force levels, weapons, and the like, 

he either trusted his own instincts or consulted the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff (JCS). For advice and guidance on foreign affairs, he generally 

turned to his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles.

Eisenhower’s executive style had the net effect of emphasizing 

the role of Secretary of Defense as the manager of the Pentagon, 

a role the President stressed upon entering the White House and 

throughout his Presidency. Three Secretaries of Defense served 

under Eisenhower: Charles Wilson, Neil McElroy, and Thomas 

Gates, Jr. The first two were highly successful former business 

executives—Wilson as president of the automobile giant General 

Motors, and McElroy as head of Procter and Gamble, a major 

soap and household goods company. Both were able industrial 

managers who knew a lot about running large organizations with 

large budgets but comparatively little about foreign affairs or 

national security. Gates, to be sure, fell into a somewhat different 

category, having served as Under Secretary of the Navy, Secretary 

of the Navy, and Deputy Secretary of Defense before being named 
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 3 Evolution of the Secretary of Defense in the Era of Massive Retaliation

xii1

he 1952 Presidential election brought to the White House 

Dwight D. Eisenhower, one of the nation’s best known and 

most respected military leaders. His choice for Secretary of Defense, 

Charles E. Wilson, had achieved notable success as a business 

executive. Because Eisenhower was superbly equipped and inclined 

to give close personal attention to national security affairs, the new 

Secretary was expected to concentrate on defense management 

rather than formulation of basic national security policy.

1

Wilson was still head of General Motors when Eisenhower 

selected him to be Secretary of Defense in January 1953. Wilson’s 

nomination sparked a major controversy during his confirmation 

hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee, specifically 

over his large stockholdings in General Motors. Although reluctant 

to sell the stock, valued at more than $2.5 million, Wilson agreed to 

do so under committee pressure. When asked during the hearings 

whether, as Secretary of Defense, he could make a decision adverse 

to the interests of General Motors, Wilson answered affirmatively 

but added that he could not conceive of such a situation “because 

for years I thought what was good for the country was good for 

General Motors and vice versa.” Later, this statement was often 

garbled when quoted, suggesting that Wilson had said simply, 

“What’s good for General Motors is good for the country.” 

Although finally approved by a Senate vote of 77–6, Wilson began 

his duties in the Pentagon with his standing somewhat diminished 

by the confirmation debate.

2

Eisenhower, Wilson, and the Policy Process

Wilson’s tenure proved crucial in setting precedents and establishing 

procedures for those to follow. Aware from the outset that he would 

have limited duties in making foreign policy, Wilson seemed T
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2 3

John Foster Dulles’s) major foreign policy positions, though he 

was not so reticent as to avoid asking questions that would, as one 

observer recalled, “sort of blow a proposition out of the water.”6

 

Wilson’s views on foreign affairs, such as they were, understandably 

lacked the mastery of detail and air of authority that characterized 

Dulles’s thinking and certainly could not match the worldly 

common sense that Eisenhower possessed. On those occasions 

when Wilson ventured to offer an opinion in public, he sometimes 

wound up causing Eisenhower considerable embarrassment—as 

occurred in 1955, when Wilson suggested that the United States 

had a weapon more horrible than the hydrogen bomb and that the 

loss of the Chinese Nationalist–held islands of Quemoy and Matsu 

to communist control would make little difference to American 

security.7

 The danger with Wilson, as one source close to the 

President reportedly said, was twofold: whenever he “put his foot 

in the mouth” and “what he did when he took it out again.”8

Though often mocked and criticized, Wilson remained a steadfast 

and reliable member of what amounted to Eisenhower’s board 

of directors: the National Security Council. Given greater 

prominence by Eisenhower, the NSC remained the heart of the 

policy process throughout his Presidency. Outwardly, the changes 

Eisenhower ordered—the redesignation of the Senior NSC Staff as 

the NSC Planning Board, the appointment of a full-time Special 

Assistant for National Security Affairs to oversee the NSC staff, 

and the creation of an Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) 

to assign responsibility for the execution of policy and to oversee 

psychological warfare strategy—seemed relatively minor, aimed 

ostensibly at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the 

system.9

 But they also signaled Eisenhower’s clear intention to 

infuse the policy process with a greater sense of order and purpose. 

Consistent with a campaign pledge he had made, he resolved to 

upgrade the NSC and make broader use of the body’s resources and 

potential than Truman ever had.10

genuinely glad to be spared the responsibility. He never pretended 

to be knowledgeable about foreign affairs, nor did Eisenhower 

expect him to be. The President wanted him instead to concentrate 

on the managerial side of national security—in short, to be an 

administrator. “Charlie,” he reportedly told Wilson at one point, 

“You run defense. We both can’t do it, and I won’t do it. I was 

elected to worry about a lot of other things than the day-to-day 

operations of a department.”3

Wilson proved ideal for what Eisenhower had in mind. According 

to Emmet John Hughes, a speechwriter in the Eisenhower White 

House, Wilson was the quintessential corporate executive—

“basically apolitical and certainly unphilosophic, aggressive in 

action and direct in speech.” His appointment, Hughes maintained, 

reflected Eisenhower’s long-standing admiration of the business 

community and his belief that success in business could be translated 

into a capacity for government administration.4

 As his experience 

as Secretary would show, however, the results were mixed. Although 

loyal, hard-working, and generally capable as an administrator, he 

may have proved too businesslike for Eisenhower’s taste. Moreover, 

he was prone to rambling, exploratory discourses that left 

Eisenhower feeling “discombobulated.” The more uncomfortable 

Eisenhower felt, the less tolerant he became, even to the point of 

practically denying Wilson access to the Oval Office during the 

waning days of his tenure.5

Under Wilson there occurred little of the overt rivalry and 

competition that had marred State-Defense relations off and on 

during Harry Truman’s Presidency, especially during the brief Dean 

Acheson–Louis Johnson period. These tensions were also largely 

absent during the interlude between Johnson and Wilson, while the 

Pentagon was under the leadership of George Marshall and Robert 

Lovett, two men with experience as leaders in both departments. 

State-Defense differences during Wilson’s tenure were more likely 

to occur over policy choices than personalities. Even then, Wilson 

was generally reluctant to challenge State Department’s (that is, 
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The appointment of a full-time Special Assistant for National 

Security Affairs (or National Security Advisor, as the post became 

more generally known) would prove to be one of Eisenhower’s most 

significant, enduring, and controversial legacies. In sharp contrast 

to later years, when incumbents (especially Henry Kissinger in the 

1970s) amassed and exercised extraordinary power and influence, 

the first Special Assistant, Robert Cutler, and his immediate 

successors, Dillon Anderson, William H. Jackson, and Gordon 

Gray, operated under a restricted mandate that consigned them to 

a low-key role. With the exception of Gray, none had expertise in 

foreign affairs or defense policy. As conceived by Eisenhower, the 

Special Assistant’s job was to expedite the flow of business, supply 

the council with its agenda, preside over the Planning Board, 

represent the President on the OCB, and monitor the work of the 

NSC staff. Though the Special Assistant could from time to time 

bring substantive matters to the President’s attention, he rarely 

acted as a policy advocate.11

There can be no doubt that Eisenhower made extensive use of the 

NSC. During his eight years in office, the NSC held 346 regular 

meetings, as opposed to 128 meetings during the NSC’s five 

years under Truman, and processed 187 serially numbered policy 

papers, 67 of which were still current when Eisenhower stepped 

down. The President typically presided and took an active part in 

discussions at NSC meetings that lasted two-and-a-half hours or 

more.12 While President Truman had attended only 12 meetings 

of the NSC, Eisenhower presided over 339 and missed only 29, 

reflecting the high priority he put on the council’s work.13 Besides 

the five statutory members (the President, the Vice President, the 

Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Director of Civil and 

Defense Mobilization), Eisenhower insisted that the Secretary of 

the Treasury and the Budget Director attend meetings as well, 

functioning as “regular participant” members.14 All involved could 

bring aides and advisors, so that anywhere from a dozen to a score 

or more people might be present.15 Discussions, which centered on 

policy papers worked up under the direction of the Planning Board, 

often fell into a line-by-line examination of the contents. Yet for 

all their faults and drawbacks, Eisenhower believed these meetings 

to be eminently useful, both for hashing out problems and for 

providing a mechanism through which “the members of the NSC 

became familiar, not only with each other, but with the basic factors 

of problems that might on some future date, face the president.” 

Eisenhower felt that this experience helped him and his advisors to 

get to know one another better and promoted closer consultation 

and coordination, and that he was more likely to receive honest, 

objective advice rather than self-serving recommendations.16

The President wanted NSC members to participate in deliberations 

as individual advisors rather than as representatives of their 

respective departments or agencies.17 But Wilson’s most active 

involvement and greatest contributions, as might be expected, came 

in connection with defense matters entailed in the annual reviews 

of basic national security policy. Instead of targeting U.S. security 

programs on a “year of maximum danger” as Truman had done, 

Eisenhower wanted to minimize the country’s defense burdens 

by sizing programs to meet the Soviet threat over the long term. 

Accordingly, in the autumn of 1953, this approach was embodied 

in a paper, NSC 162/2, that essentially guided the course of defense 

policy through the rest of the decade. Known as the “New Look,” 

the policy gave priority to strategic airpower and tactical nuclear 

weapons, with diminished emphasis on maintaining large and 

ready conventional capabilities.18 Eisenhower did not doubt the 

continuing importance of land and naval forces in the nuclear age, 

but he felt that the need to conserve resources took precedence and 

that, in any case, the atomic bomb was “simply another weapon in 

our arsenal.”19

It fell to Secretary of State Dulles, not the Secretary of Defense, to 

provide the most memorable public rationale for the administration’s 

national security thinking. Addressing the Council on Foreign 

Relations in January 1954, Dulles sketched a blueprint for security 

with “more reliance on deterrent power and less dependence on 
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6 7

local defensive power,” a concept that came to be known as the 

massive retaliation doctrine.20 This encouraged some military 

planners to assume that fewer constraints might be placed on use 

of the nuclear option. However, as early tests of this assumption 

revealed during the Indochina (1954) and Quemoy-Matsu (1955) 

crises, Eisenhower backed away when confronted with crossing the 

nuclear threshold.21 Nonetheless, the New Look and its corollary, 

massive retaliation, remained the basic guides used by Wilson 

and his successors for resource planning and allocation until the 

Eisenhower administration left office in 1961.22

Although the NSC functioned well in hammering out long-range 

plans and basic policy, its rather cumbersome and slow machinery 

proved less suited for coping with unexpected day-to-day problems 

of crisis management or sensitive diplomatic and intelligence 

matters. Accordingly, when such occasions arose, Eisenhower 

tended to respond by convening small informal meetings with senior 

advisors in the Oval Office. In such crises as Indochina, the Taiwan 

Straits, and the Suez Canal, Eisenhower routinely met privately 

with selected advisors, often after lengthy deliberations in the NSC, 

to finalize decisions. Though Wilson normally participated in these 

private sessions, his role was more to apprise the President as to 

the availability and use of military assets than to comment on the 

pros and cons of foreign policy. Eisenhower perceived a distinction 

between diplomacy and national security policy. With Wilson’s 

responsibilities concentrated on the Department of Defense 

(DoD), his role as a manager outweighed his contributions as a 

policy advisor.23

Advice and Staff Support

Although probably not at the top of Wilson’s day-to-day agenda, 

foreign affairs remained a necessary part of the Pentagon’s ongoing 

business.24 Containing communism, the number-one priority, was 

a multifaceted task that involved DoD in a variety of functions in 

support of American foreign policy. These functions generally fell 

into two categories. The first included the responsibilities arising 

from the increased U.S. presence abroad. The threat of communist 

aggression required prior defense arrangements with U.S. allies, 

including formal alliances such as NATO and the Southeast Asia 

Treaty Organization (SEATO), access to overseas bases, and the 

buildup, equipping, and training of allied forces under U.S. aid 

programs. Accordingly, provisions had to be made with the host 

countries for what Philip E. Barringer, a longtime OSD official in 

the Office of International Security Affairs (ISA), aptly described as 

“keeping the machinery oiled properly,” to handle the influx of U.S. 

military personnel, the administration and allocation of assistance, 

the duties of U.S. advisors, and the negotiation of agreements 

governing the status of forces, usually with ISA providing the initial 

liaison and coordination.25 

The second category embraced a wholly new set of defense 

problems arising from advances in military technology and 

corresponding decisions by the President and the NSC on how to 

exploit these advances. The advent of thermonuclear and tactical 

nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology raised problems 

of unprecedented political complexity and diplomatic sensitivity. 

Never before had any country possessed such enormous power 

with so few guiding precedents on how to manage it. Some of 

these new weapons would be deployed abroad and shared with 

America’s allies. How much control, if any, the host country would 

have in the storage, movement, and use of these weapons invariably 

invited prolonged discussion, both within the U.S. Government 

and between Washington and foreign capitals.

In trying to arrive at a Defense position on the many security 

problems that arose, it soon became clear that Wilson depended 

on his staff for advice and help more than any previous Secretary 

of Defense. This dependence created numerous opportunities 

for subordinates to make larger and more decisive inputs than 

they had in the past. Accepting management and administration 

as his primary tasks, Wilson heavily staffed his office with aides 
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and deputies from the business community, among them his first 

Deputy Secretary, Roger Kyes, like Wilson a former General Motors 

executive and not inclined to show any great initiative in foreign 

affairs. The burden of dealing with such matters fell, for the most 

part, on officials at the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) level. 

Though ISA officials predominated, others participated as well, 

including the OSD Comptroller’s organization, which became 

routinely involved in NSC affairs because of a requirement that 

each major policy paper include a financial appendix. 26

Understanding the urgent importance of being able to deal with 

problems abroad, in February 1953, Wilson encouraged President 

Eisenhower to use the forthcoming Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 

30 June 1953 to elevate the position of Assistant to the Secretary of 

Defense (ISA) to the rank of Assistant Secretary (ISA). Later that 

same year, also under Reorganization Plan No. 6, the Eisenhower 

administration also abolished the Munitions Board and transferred 

its international programs division to ISA, further consolidating 

politico-military and economic affairs under one roof.27 The 

decision to elevate the ISA position to the Assistant Secretary level 

(a move Lovett was on the verge of making when he left office in 

1952) was, to be sure, long overdue, but as a practical matter its real 

significance was to reaffirm the office’s already well established place 

among the Pentagon’s elite.28 In 1956, Wilson went a step further 

and tried to upgrade the office to the rank of Under Secretary, but 

legislation to effect the change died in the House Armed Services 

Committee.29

Besides requiring someone with a background and expertise in 

foreign affairs, the ASD(ISA) position was also one of the most 

politically sensitive in the Pentagon. The incumbent when Wilson 

arrived, Frank Nash, wanted to step down for health reasons. 

Wilson initially offered the job to Paul Nitze, director of the State 

Department’s Policy Planning Staff since 1950 and a key figure in 

the drafting of NSC 68. But because of his close association with 

Acheson during the Truman years, he was persona non grata to 

conservative Republicans in Congress.30 Wilson hastily withdrew 

Nitze’s name and persuaded Nash to stay on until February 1954 

when he was replaced by Struve Hensel, a Forrestal protégé and 

former Navy official. Three more Assistant Secretaries followed: 

Gordon Gray (July 1955–February 1957), who left to become 

President Eisenhower’s National Security Advisor, Mansfield 

Sprague (February 1957–September 1958), and John Irwin II 

(September 1958–January 1961).

The high rate of turnover at ISA may be explained in part by the 

demanding nature of the job. Although much of the ASD(ISA)’s 

work still consisted of administrative matters arising from ongoing 

programs (military assistance being by far the biggest and most 

complex to administer), the ASD found himself increasingly 

involved in substantive problems as well, particularly in connection 

with NSC affairs. The key figure who oversaw most of the 

necessary organizational adjustments, Gordon Gray, reorganized 

ISA in 1956 on the basis of planning initiated by Struve Hensel. 

He effectively divided the office into two functional branches. In 

one part Gray concentrated ISA’s military assistance and budget 

responsibilities, organized around the Office of Programming and 

Control (which monitored the dispersal of grant assistance and 

other aid) and the Office of the ISA Comptroller (which reviewed 

and prepared budget requests). Gray made policy matters the focus 

of the other part of the organization. This contained the Office 

of Planning (including the ISA Policy Planning Staff), which 

worked in conjunction with the military services, the Joint Staff, 

and other agencies to anticipate their long-term security needs; 

four regional directorates (for Europe, the Middle East and Africa, 

the Far East, and the Western Hemisphere), which operated in 

comparable fashion to the State Department’s country desks; and 

the Offices of NSC Affairs and the OCB, which handled highlevel policy coordination. Problems that fell into neither of these 

two general categories—such as economic matters, arms control 

and disarmament, and international conference planning—were 

assigned to the Office of Special International Affairs, which 
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10 11

was also charged with responsibility for security affairs relating 

to the United Nations, NATO, SEATO, and other international 

organizations.31

Wilson made two major changes in ISA’s mission. One delegated 

to the ASD(ISA) full authority and responsibility, as prescribed 

under the Mutual Security Act of 1954, for the “development, 

coordination, and establishment” of all policies, plans, and 

procedures in the area of foreign military assistance, the aim 

being to bring operational and administrative responsibility closer 

together.32 When the Military Assistance Program (MAP) started 

in the late 1940s, the Secretary of Defense, through what was then 

ISA, exercised little more than general policy supervision, leaving 

operational control to the military services acting as “executive 

agents.” The Secretary gave broad guidance to the services and 

relied on spot checks by OISA to ensure compliance with overall 

policy. With Wilson’s transfer of responsibility and authority to ISA 

came greater involvement in the operational side of MAP, which in 

turn increased ISA’s administrative duties and created new needs 

for personnel with know-how in every phase of the operation.33

The other important mission change related to the ASD(ISA)’s 

involvement in high-level policy coordination and NSC affairs. 

Although ISA had performed similar tasks in the preceding 

administration, its coordinating function had been a relatively minor 

part of its duties in view of Truman’s guarded use of the NSC and 

regular direct contacts between Acheson and the Joint Chiefs after 

the autumn of 1950. But with Eisenhower stressing primary reliance 

on the NSC, with carefully laid-out procedures and channels, 

more work needed to be done to coordinate Defense responses. 

Accordingly, in April 1954, Wilson gave ISA “general supervision” 

of all DoD activities relating to NSC affairs. At the same time he 

appointed a Special Assistant for National Security Affairs who also 

served as the Defense member of the NSC Planning Board. Initially, 

the Special Assistant operated under the authority and supervision of 

the ASD(ISA). But from Gray’s time on, the two jobs became one.34

Increased authority for ISA was not without resistance. Its overall 

control of politico-military affairs in relation to the military 

services remained fluid throughout the 1950s. Wilson never 

imposed the strict discipline on outside contacts—particularly 

with the State Department—that Secretary of Defense Louis 

Johnson had demanded. In this effort Wilson received substantially 

less cooperation from the military services than he expected. 

Each service continued to maintain its own politico-military and 

international affairs section that could be used for back-channel 

contacts to circumvent the Secretary of Defense and his deputies. 

The best organized for this purpose was within the Navy, which 

regularly communicated directly with State through its PoliticoMilitary Policy Division. While ISA was responsible for policies 

governing the programming of foreign military aid, it often 

encountered resistance from the JCS and the military departments 

when it attempted to probe the details of their recommendations 

concerning program development and implementation practices.35

Had Wilson taken a greater personal interest in foreign affairs, 

some of these problems might have been avoided. But uncertain of 

the Secretary of Defense’s involvement, the ASD(ISA) generally felt 

constrained from pressing his authority too far.36

JCS–OSD Relations

Even with the growing resources available to him through ISA, 

the Secretary of Defense remained reliant on the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff for all manner of help in dealing with politico-military 

matters, especially the planning and analysis provided through 

the Joint Staff (the JCS bureaucracy). Following the custom of 

previous Secretaries of Defense, Wilson solicited advice from the 

Joint Chiefs as a corporate body, but it also became increasingly 

common for him to deal directly, if not exclusively, with the JCS 

Chairman, Admiral Arthur Radford. As early as their first meeting, 

Radford impressed Wilson with his professional expertise and won 

him over. From then on, Wilson looked to Radford not merely 

for guidance in military matters but also for advice across a wide 
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spectrum of policy problems having domestic and international 

economic and political impact.37

Radford recalled that when he accepted the invitation to 

become Chairman, Eisenhower assured him that he would have 

clearer responsibilities and greater authority than his immediate 

predecessor, General Omar Bradley.38 The National Security Act 

of 1947 had made no provision for a Chairman, bestowing any and 

all advisory duties as the President or the Secretary might direct 

on the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body. When Congress 

authorized the appointment of a Chairman in 1949, it included 

him as a member of the JCS but failed to stipulate whether the 

advisory responsibilities conferred upon his colleagues extended 

to him as well. Although someone else might have treated this 

as a minor oversight, the first Chairman, General Bradley, felt 

sufficiently inhibited to adopt an exceedingly narrow interpretation 

of his advisory powers, especially where non-military matters were 

concerned. Whenever he met with Secretary of State Acheson to 

discuss an issue with foreign policy implications, Bradley invariably 

prefaced his remarks with the caveat that he was speaking “from 

a military point of view,” the implication being that it was up to 

Acheson or the President to supply “the political point of view.”39

A naval aviator with a distinguished record as a commander 

in the Pacific in World War II, Radford was rarely so reticent 

or circumspect. He had been a leader of the 1949 “revolt of the 

admirals” against Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson’s cancellation 

of the flush-deck supercarrier, the United States. Afterward, he 

found himself, in effect, exiled to a succession of commands in 

the Far East and Pacific. In 1953, Eisenhower brought him 

back to Washington to preside over the JCS, a shrewd ploy on 

Eisenhower’s part that helped to counter Navy criticism of the Air 

Force–oriented New Look defense posture. In addition, Radford 

had long advocated a more active policy in the Far East, a position 

that appealed to both Dulles and those Republicans who felt that 

the previous administration had concentrated too much on Europe 

and not enough on Asia.40 Personable, articulate, and adaptable, 

Radford was one of the most politically astute senior officers in the 

armed forces at the time. Though not overly enthusiastic about the 

New Look at first, he was a longtime advocate of defense through 

the exploitation of science and technology, the same approach 

Eisenhower preferred. Soon, Radford metamorphosed into one of 

the New Look’s most ardent supporters.41

During his two terms as Chairman, from August 1953 to August 1957, 

which overlapped closely with Wilson’s tenure as Secretary, Radford 

enjoyed direct access to Wilson, Secretary of State Dulles, and President 

Eisenhower.42 Accordingly, it was not uncommon to find him operating 

in the forefront for DoD in foreign affairs matters, representing and 

speaking for the Department in a manner that one might expect the 

Secretary to do. For someone like Forrestal or Lovett, who preferred 

to handle important foreign affairs issues themselves, Radford would 

have been redundant, his presence probably an unwelcome nuisance. 

But for Wilson he was a useful adjunct of the Secretary’s office. That 

the two got along exceptionally well made the job of collaboration that 

much easier. Radford’s importance and influence received a further 

boost when the 1953 defense reorganization gave the JCS Chairman 

management of the Joint Staff.

Defense-State Relations

The growing reliance on ready strategic forces and threats of massive 

retaliation during the Eisenhower years brought about changes in 

the traditionally accepted notions about spheres of responsibility in 

foreign affairs. The more the administration’s foreign policy came 

to rely on the threat of military sanctions, the more interested and 

involved Defense became in formulating policy. The NSC became 

a chief forum where Defense voiced its position on various foreign 

policy matters. Though Wilson was essentially deferential to 

Dulles, Defense-State relations remained, for all practical purposes, 

institution-minded and fraught with recurring conflicts below the 

Secretary level.43
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Some of the most highly documented State-Defense disagreements 

occurred in connection with the annual NSC reviews of basic 

national security policy. During the first such exercise, held in the 

autumn of 1953 to fashion what became the New Look, Dulles 

stayed in the background, apparently not yet fully confident 

of where he stood in relation to the President and his military 

advisors. Though he exercised a strong conceptual influence on the 

resulting policy paper (NSC 162/2), he limited his involvement in 

the particulars, especially military matters, to a handful of inputs 

from State’s Policy Planning Staff.44

A year later, however, Dulles was most vocal in the debate over a 

follow-on paper (NSC 5501). The central issue concerned whether 

the new paper should reflect a more hard-line attitude toward 

the Soviets, as urged by the Joint Chiefs and ISA, or the soft 

line advocated by Dulles, who wanted more stress on diplomacy 

and negotiations. Within ISA, dissatisfaction with U.S. policy 

coalesced around Brig. Gen. Charles Bonesteel III, director of ISA’s 

policy planning staff and the ranking Defense representative on the 

NSC Planning Board, who was the most outspoken, articulate, and 

influential spokesman for the tougher line. Like the JCS, Bonesteel 

and his ISA colleagues believed that time was running out for the 

United States to reap substantial political and diplomatic benefits 

from its strategic superiority. They argued that the United States 

should adopt more risk-prone policies to leverage concessions from 

Moscow.45 Wilson initially endorsed the JCS–ISA position, but 

Dulles’s opposition prevailed, and President Eisenhower endorsed 

Dulles’s position.46

Dulles took advantage of divisions within the Pentagon to 

strengthen his own position, often siding with the uniformed 

services. He assiduously courted the Joint Chiefs, particularly 

Chairman Radford, with whom he shared an interest in paying 

more attention to the Far East.47 During the Taiwan Straits crisis 

in the spring of 1955, Dulles talked tough about applying military 

sanctions, including use of tactical nuclear weapons, unless the 

Communist Chinese lifted their bombardment of Quemoy and 

Matsu, even though he had campaigned vigorously against a JCS–

ISA hard line only a few months earlier.48 This astonishing shift 

in Dulles’s thinking prompted fears from Wilson that U.S. policy 

was “underwriting a war in that area” and doing more “to heat up 

the situation rather than cool it off.” To mitigate further tension, 

Wilson urged the Secretary of State to wait 60 days “in order to 

see what might develop.” Dulles, however, concurred with Radford 

that diplomatic efforts “to cool off the situation” had failed and 

that it was imperative to proceed on the assumption that military 

sanctions might have to be applied sooner rather than later, lest 

the Communist Chinese complete their buildup of invasion forces. 

Although Dulles declined to endorse a specific military course of 

action, he mentioned several times the importance of bringing “our 

actions in line with our words” and of getting away from the habit 

of “talking one way and acting another.”49

Whether actually prepared to go as far as his rhetoric suggested, 

Dulles cultivated the image of a no-nonsense diplomat who 

understood the military viewpoint and stood ready to use military 

force. This came out most clearly in a 1956 interview published in 

Life magazine in which he claimed that U.S. threats to use nuclear 

weapons had brought an end to the Korean War in 1953 and had 

repeatedly deterred Soviet and Chinese Communist aggression 

since then. Basking in the presumed success of his “brinkmanship” 

diplomacy, Dulles hinted broadly that he would not hesitate to 

threaten the use of nuclear weapons again should the need and 

occasion arise.50

In reality, Dulles remained extremely cautious about the use of 

military power. But it was the impression he gave that mattered, 

both in his public pronouncements and in his private dealings with 

Radford and other military officers. DoD leaders found common 

ground with Dulles, perhaps given the Secretary’s reputation as one 

of the administration’s “strong men” and his expertise in security.51
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NATO Affairs

NATO provided the Defense Department a potential primary 

focus for much of its strategic planning and military assistance 

obligations. Wilson, however, had difficulties coming to grips with 

NATO from the beginning of his tenure. A quasi-isolationist at 

heart (like many Republicans of his generation), he was aware of the 

dangers that a Soviet-dominated Europe could pose to American 

security but was still uncomfortable with the sizable numbers of U.S. 

troops stationed there to honor U.S. commitments. He deplored 

“the great cost of keeping these American divisions in Europe 

indefinitely.”52 Yet each time he saw what might be an opportunity 

to cut U.S. strength he encountered objections—typically from the 

State Department, which claimed either that the moment was not 

propitious or that the effects on European opinion would involve 

“unacceptable political risks.”53 Matters came to a head over the socalled Radford Plan, leaked to the press in 1956, which projected 

large-scale troop withdrawals from NATO Europe in conjunction 

with an 800,000-man reduction in U.S. forces. When queried by 

the press, State summarily denied that the United States had any 

such intention, whereupon Wilson beat a hasty retreat, first refusing 

to confirm that the Radford plan existed, and then characterizing 

the whole controversy as a misunderstanding growing out of a 

hypothetical budget exercise.54

As the level of U.S. troop strength in Europe typified, Dulles left 

no doubt that the path of foreign policy power and influence in 

Washington ran through his office in the State Department. Those 

who thought to do business otherwise were invariably reminded 

in no uncertain terms, as happened during negotiations with the 

British in 1956–1957 to deploy U.S. intermediate-range ballistic 

missiles (IRBMs) in the United Kingdom. Finding their own Blue 

Streak IRBM encountering unexpected delays, the British Air 

Ministry entered into preliminary talks in the summer of 1956 

with U.S. Air Force representatives, who had previously asked to 

base the new American Thor IRBM in the United Kingdom. The 

United Kingdom was viewed by the Air Force and the JCS as an 

ideal location to base the missiles, prompting the 1956 offer.55

In October of that year, however, as the negotiations seemed 

about to bear fruit, the Suez Canal crisis erupted, followed by the 

Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt. The British and French 

governments largely blamed lack of U.S. support for their eventual 

withdrawal. Dulles chose to halt the IRBM issue pending a more 

complete examination of other basing options and the restoration 

of more harmonious Anglo-American relations.56 

A delay may have made sense to Dulles for diplomatic reasons, but 

to Wilson it meant setting back the timetable for the entire IRBM 

program at the risk of cost overruns and other complications.57 Intent 

on keeping the IRBM program on track, he used the opportunity 

of a visit to Washington in late January 1957 by British Defence 

Minister Duncan Sandys to try to patch up differences between 

Dulles and the British and to expedite the missile deployment. 

Sandys and Wilson had worked together earlier on a 1954 scientific 

exchange agreement that had been successful in establishing a U.S.-

U.K. joint scientific committee on ballistic missiles.58 This time, 

however, they faced a tougher set of problems. Resorting to an “end 

run,” the British had Deputy Secretary Reuben Robertson put a 

draft agreement before Eisenhower for his signature, but he found 

the President averse to any immediate action.59 By making the 

British and the U.S. Air Force bide their time, Dulles effectively 

demonstrated both his strong influence in high-level defense 

matters and his power to discipline wayward allies. This episode, a 

setback for the IRBM program, was also a personal embarrassment 

for Wilson. Ironically, when a deal finally was struck in March 

1957 at the Bermuda summit between Eisenhower and Prime 

Minister Harold Macmillan, it was Dulles rather than Wilson who 

accompanied the President and was involved with the negotiating, 

even though the agreement, subject to the resolution of numerous 

details, encompassed the basic terms that Wilson and Sandys had 

earlier discussed.60
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Wilson did make one final, important contribution to the IRBM 

negotiations. This took the form of participating in an exchange 

of letters with Sandys confirming the Bermuda agreement and 

establishing broad terms for cooperative custody and control of 

the missiles, the model for the dual-key approach that became the 

standard throughout NATO in the 1960s.61 Rarely was Wilson 

enthusiastic about sharing U.S. nuclear technology with other 

countries, even NATO allies. Nor, for that matter, was he a great 

admirer of the British, whom he regarded along with the French as 

great powers in eclipse.62 As Secretary of Defense, however, he had 

no choice on occasion but to put his prejudices aside. In one such 

instance, the negotiations over the Thor missiles, Dulles rather than 

the British gave him the most trouble.

McElroy: Caretaker Secretary

Wilson never intended to stay in office more than four years. In 

March 1957, he informed President Eisenhower that he would 

resign as soon as the President could find a successor. Finding a 

replacement took longer than expected, causing Wilson to postpone 

his departure until early autumn. On 4 October 1957, five days 

before Wilson’s successor, Neil McElroy, took office, the Soviets 

used rocket technology from their intercontinental ballistic missile 

(ICBM) program to launch the first Earth orbiting satellite, Sputnik 

I. That stunning and ominous achievement overshadowed everything 

else the Eisenhower administration did in foreign and defense policy 

until its last day in office.63

Like Wilson, McElroy was a former business executive, highly 

capable of managing a large, modern corporation but with no 

prior experience in national security affairs. He informed President 

Eisenhower from the outset that he did not intend to serve longer 

than two years.64 Considering McElroy’s unfamiliarity with the 

problems of his new job and his lack of experience, it was hardly 

surprising that he stuck closely to the policies, practices, and 

personnel of his predecessor. He launched few initiatives, instead 

describing himself as “captain of President Eisenhower’s defense 

team,”65 eagerly welcoming White House guidance and direction.66

The launching of Sputnik I and a second Soviet satellite a month 

later prevented McElroy from easing into his new duties as Secretary 

of Defense. A favorite quip at the Pentagon, widely attributed to 

General Nathan Twining, Radford’s successor as JCS chairman, 

held that McElroy soared into office with Sputnik and remained 

in orbit thereafter.67 To meet the concern generated by the satellite 

launches, McElroy attempted both to clarify the relative positions 

of the United States and the Soviet Union in missile development 

and to speed up the U.S. effort. Placing considerable emphasis 

on the IRBMs the United States then had under development, 

McElroy argued that with proper deployment in overseas locations 

they would serve as effectively as Soviet ICBMs. Without waiting 

for completion of final tests and evaluations, McElroy ordered 

the Air Force Thor and Army Jupiter IRBMs into production and 

planned to begin their deployment in the United Kingdom before 

the end of 1958 and in Western Europe shortly thereafter. McElroy 

also ordered accelerated development of the Navy solid-fuel Polaris 

IRBM and the Air Force liquid-fuel Atlas and Titan ICBMs. In 

February 1958, he authorized the Air Force to begin development 

of the Minuteman, a solid-fuel ICBM to be deployed in hardened 

underground silos, with operational status expected in the early 

1960s.68 

The Soviet Sputnik launch in October 1957 also ignited a firestorm 

of criticism and argument about U.S. technology, budgets, and 

DoD, thrusting the question of Defense reorganization into public 

scrutiny. Sputnik developments offered President Eisenhower an 

opportunity to make changes to the Department of Defense, and 

he asked his new Secretary on 11 October 1957 to examine the 

Defense structure with a view toward reorganization. The Defense 

Reorganization Act of 1958 that emerged from a long process of 

executive and legislative deliberation gave President Eisenhower 

most of what he proposed. The act moved DoD further in the 
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direction of centralization and unification through the following 

provisions: strengthening the authority of the Secretary of Defense, 

including greater control over the military departments; elevating 

the status of JCS Chairman and eliminating the prohibition on 

his having a vote in JCS decisions; almost doubling the size of the 

Joint Staff; prescribing the establishment of unified and specified 

commands by the President; stipulating the number of Assistant 

Secretaries; and creating the position of Director of Research and 

Engineering.69

Although the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act did not address 

the role of the Secretary of Defense in foreign affairs per se, 

the legislation and DoD directives that flowed from it greatly 

increased Secretarial authorities that McElroy’s successors would 

use creatively to expand their reach in national security affairs 

writ large. The new legislation increased the responsibilities of the 

Secretary of Defense, particularly in the operational direction of the 

armed forces and in research and development. During McElroy’s 

tenure, one immediate change was in the authority of the Assistant 

Secretaries, including the ASD(ISA), to issue orders to the military 

departments if authorized in writing by the Secretary of Defense. 

This provision drew criticism from the service Secretaries who, seeing 

their authority steadily erode, preferred a more limited assignment 

of functions. Further bargaining produced a compromise under 

which ISA would “establish” positions, plans, and procedures for 

military assistance but merely “monitor” Defense participation in 

NSC business and “develop and coordinate” all other aspects of 

DoD involvement in politico-military affairs.70

More significant were changes that McElroy directed in ISA 

administration of the military assistance program. The impetus 

came from the findings of the Draper Committee, a blue-ribbon 

panel named by President Eisenhower in 1958 in response to 

congressional complaints about the handling and policy objectives 

of foreign military aid.71 In its second interim report the following 

year, the committee concurred with critics that there should be 

closer collaboration between State and Defense and tighter 

administrative control of MAP within the Pentagon. The committee 

further recommended the appointment of a full-time director of 

military assistance (DMA), who would be fully responsible for 

the operation of the program under the ISA, and creation of an 

independent evaluation staff.72 Although the ASD(ISA) already 

had a deputy for military assistance, the new position would 

have broader authority and responsibilities, extending to policy 

and operational aspects of the program and not merely financial 

recordkeeping. The Assistant Secretary for ISA, John Irwin II, 

saw no immediate need for a change, but McElroy, deeming the 

matter “urgent,” moved ahead with implementation of practically 

the entire package of the Draper Committee’s recommendations, 

though it was not until after he left office that most of the reforms, 

including the appointment of a DMA, took effect.73

Although often preoccupied with administrative and budgetary 

matters, McElroy was far from oblivious to the importance of foreign 

affairs. A quick learner with a facile mind, he seemed genuinely 

eager to overcome his limitations by finding out more about foreign 

problems and foreign leaders. Yet he managed only four trips 

abroad during his two years as Secretary and never acquired superb 

diplomatic skills. When faced with difficult situations, he tended 

to rely on the prestige of his position. Thus, while meeting in Paris 

in December 1957 with French Defense Minister Jacques ChabanDelmas to discuss the possible deployment of U.S. IRBMs in France, 

McElroy brushed aside French reservations and all but demanded 

an early favorable French decision.74 Assuming that eventually the 

French would acquiesce, McElroy found his confidence misplaced 

as the French government rejected the presence of any U.S. missiles 

on its territory.75

As with his predecessor, McElroy found that the foreign affairs 

problems most often engaging his attention were the annual NSC 

policy reviews. Here, for McElroy, the problems of foreign policy 
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and resource management came together in a way that he could 

readily grasp. Interservice rivalry continued to bedevil the budget 

process, as did differences of concepts between State and Defense 

over how and where to mete out resources to cope with emerging 

threats. Although hardly new, the problem took on a somewhat 

different appearance in the aftermath of Sputnik and what Dulles 

saw as an approaching East-West stalemate in strategic nuclear 

power. Henceforth, Dulles believed that effective foreign policy—

meaning the ability of the United States to retain its allies’ loyalty 

and prevent defections to the Soviet bloc—would depend on the 

capacity to wage “defensive wars” that would neither trigger an 

all-out nuclear war nor “involve the total defeat of the enemy.” 

This, he thought, pointed to the need for larger and more mobile 

conventional forces, the kind of support provided by aircraft 

carriers. Although JCS Chairman General Twining disagreed that 

U.S. conventional capabilities for limited war were as deficient as 

the Secretary of State implied, he and McElroy both feared the 

practical consequences of what Dulles was suggesting: namely, that 

any expansion of conventional forces earmarked for limited war 

would require either increased expenditures or a reallocation of 

resources that would inevitably weaken the strategic deterrent.76

Defense-State relations on the whole, however, remained 

remarkably free from serious rifts during McElroy’s tenure. Because 

of Dulles’s deteriorating health, his Deputy and eventual successor, 

Under Secretary Christian Herter, with whom McElroy developed 

a positive and productive working relationship, was playing an 

increasingly key role at State. Open-minded about staff-level 

contacts, McElroy raised no objection when Herter asked in May 

1959 that State be kept “closely informed” on the status of military 

planning during the Berlin crisis.77 He later approved a State 

Department request to participate in direct consultations with the 

JCS on overseas base planning.78

Keeping true to his intent for a two-year term, McElroy focused 

almost exclusively on budgetary matters during his final months in 

office and increasingly relied on aides and assistants for other issues. 

He turned over to his Deputy, Thomas Gates, Jr., many of the 

routine daily matters of running the Department, as well as heavy 

foreign affairs responsibilities, including State-JCS discussions of 

overseas base requirements, IRBM deployment, the simmering 

Berlin crisis, readiness measures in relation to Communist China, 

and contingency planning for limited war situations. Gates’s 

intimate and visible involvement in foreign affairs marked a 

significant departure from the customary role of the Deputy.79 

Gates: Reasserting the Secretary’s Influence

It was a foregone conclusion when Gates became McElroy’s Deputy 

in June 1959 that he would succeed him. Gates’s credentials as one 

of the emerging new generation of “defense professionals” were 

unimpeachable—a background of active military experience and 

more than six years in the Department of Defense. A Philadelphia 

investment banker in private life, Gates had come to Washington 

at the outset of the Eisenhower administration to serve as Under 

Secretary of the Navy and since then had risen steadily in the 

Pentagon hierarchy. Gates had interests and ambitions that went 

beyond those of Wilson and McElroy, who typically concentrated 

on management and administration. An increase in the Secretary’s 

participation in foreign affairs matters would occur under Gates.80 

For President Eisenhower, as much as anything, choosing Gates 

may have been a tacit admission that the job of Secretary of Defense 

had become too big and complex for foreign policy amateurs. 

Whatever Wilson and McElroy may have achieved, their lack of 

background in foreign and defense affairs circumscribed their role. 

After Dulles stepped down in April 1959 (he died the following 

month), Eisenhower had to make new arrangements for help and 

advice. Gates’s appointment thus served a dual purpose: it helped 

to fill the void left by Dulles’s death, and it restored the Pentagon 

to the care and supervision of a professional familiar with the inner 

workings of defense and foreign policy.81
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For Gates, as for his immediate predecessors, NSC affairs were a 

top priority, but he believed that the council existed to serve the 

President, not the Secretary of Defense. Therefore, in his view, the 

Secretary of Defense had an obligation to establish and sustain his 

own network of interdepartmental contacts, most notably with 

State.82 Looking back, Gates estimated that he spent as much as 

75 percent of his time on State Department–related business, and 

he made a point of meeting privately every Sunday with Secretary 

of State Herter.83 “We have long realized,” he told the Jackson 

Committee in 1960, “that the defense program cannot be prepared 

in isolation.”84 Although Wilson and McElroy would have had no 

quarrel with this statement, their habit of deferring to State’s lead 

while Dulles was alive had limited DoD influence in the national 

security policy process. Gates was more assertive. He insisted on 

the following conception: 

The relationship of State and Defense must be a partnership. 

In years past, apparently, we had a system in the Defense 

Department of reaction to State Department papers. State 

Department wrote the policy; then we scurried around with 

some very energetic, hard-working people and found a way 

to react—usually 10 minutes before a meeting of the NSC. I 

feel the Defense Department must also take the initiative in 

providing counsel in politico-military matters. The Defense 

Department must be a full partner of the State Department 

in developing policy. The military point of view must be 

expressed—and it can be expressed well by the dedicated 

people who work at these things. We must participate in 

creating policy rather than just reacting to papers written by 

the State Department.85

While Gates disavowed any desire to supplant the Secretary of 

State as the President’s senior foreign policy advisor, his assertion 

of coequal status struck some members of a Senate committee 

as an unsettling departure from tradition and established 

protocol.86 In fact, Gates hoped to achieve not an assumption of 

additional functions but rather a closer collaboration at all levels 

of State-Defense relations that would yield more truly integrated 

policies with less interdepartmental friction and parochialism. 

Citing what he estimated to be several hundred separate daily 

contacts—telephone calls, meetings, correspondence, and other 

communications between State and Defense officials—he saw a 

growing trend toward “a common recognition on both sides of 

the Potomac that most foreign policy issues have major defense 

connotations, and conversely that even routine military activity 

may have major foreign policy implications.”87

Besides broadening State-Defense contacts, Gates tried to make 

foreign affairs a more integral part of policy planning within the 

Pentagon—for one, by including ISA in the budget process at a 

point where ISA’s contributions would “put the foreign policy 

implications into the budget earlier in the Pentagon planning than 

it has been heretofore.”88 This proved easier said than done. ISA’s 

initial input, tendered in May 1960—a summary of politico-military 

considerations bearing on the fiscal year 1962 Defense budget—

did little more than restate the obvious about American obligations 

to NATO, the importance of a strong strategic retaliatory force, 

and the value of effective capabilities for limited war. It did not, 

as one might have thought, make any effort to correlate American 

commitments abroad with the dollar costs of American defense; 

nor did it venture to speculate on what new burdens to expect or 

how existing obligations might be rendered more manageable. But 

it provided a start for others to build on later, and that in itself was 

an accomplishment.89

As a pragmatist, Secretary Gates knew not to expect too much 

too soon. Despite his advocacy of coequal status in foreign affairs, 

there is little to suggest any substantial change in State-Defense 

relations during his tenure. Whatever added influence DoD may 

have exercised, apart from its involvement in NSC affairs, tended 

to be the result of the close personal and working relationship 

Gates established with Herter, who was likewise eager to improve 
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State-Defense contacts. Yet even with Dulles no longer around, the 

initiative in foreign affairs remained as a rule with the NSC for 

broad, long-range policy or with State in day-to-day operational 

matters.90 Although Herter saw the two departments making 

progress on closer collaboration in planning, he also felt that much 

remained to be done on State’s part to keep Defense better apprised 

with political guidance, and for Defense to provide State with more 

timely military advice.91

Gates was fated to serve during the most troubled year of 

Eisenhower’s presidency. The Cold War grew increasingly hot. 

The bitter end of the Geneva test ban conference in December 

1959 was followed by the disastrous breakup of the Paris summit 

in May 1960 caused by the Soviet downing over its territory of 

a U.S. U–2 reconnaissance aircraft. Then came the unrest in the 

Congo, signifying obvious Soviet readiness to fish in troubled 

African waters; the rise of a pro-communist regime in Cuba in 

the Caribbean backyard of the United States; and the steadily 

worsening situation in Laos that raised the specter of U.S. military 

intervention. With foreign policy problems emerging daily, Gates 

selected carefully those to which he gave his personal attention, ever 

mindful of the competing demands on his time.92 His brief tenure 

was absorbed by unusually difficult strategic policy problems, 

including allegations that the Eisenhower administration was not 

doing enough to close a purported “missile gap” with the Soviets, 

and a strategic targeting controversy between the Air Force and the 

Navy that led Gates in August 1960 to establish a Joint Strategic 

Target Planning Staff (JSTPS).93 

The impetus in Gates’s mind for the creation of the JSTPS was the 

inadequate coordination of targeting plans between the Strategic 

Air Command (SAC) and the Navy, which he believed led to 

redundancy and disputed priorities. Those differences became 

especially significant with the advent of the Navy’s sea-based Polaris 

ballistic missiles. Acting on a proposal by SAC Commander-inChief General Thomas Power that SAC control strategic weapons 

targeting, Gates set up JSTPS. The SAC commander, supported 

by an integrated joint staff, assumed separate duties as director 

of strategic target planning. When Chief of Naval Operations 

Admiral Arleigh Burke objected to the new arrangement, Gates 

encouraged him to argue his case before President Eisenhower, who 

ultimately upheld Gates’s decision. By December 1960, the JSTPS 

had prepared the first Single Integrated Operational Plan, which 

specified for various attack options the timing, weapons, delivery 

systems, and targets to be used by U.S. strategic forces.94

In foreign affairs, Gates proved especially adept in managing the 

flow of business and in keeping small problems from getting bigger. 

Having previously served in a variety of high-level positions, he was 

generally acquainted with foreign leaders and their key advisors. 

In particular, Gates enjoyed close relations with British Defence 

Minister Harold Watkinson, with whom he directly negotiated 

many of the details of the proposed Skybolt missile transfer and 

access to base facilities for U.S. missile submarines at Holy Loch, 

Scotland. Although the Skybolt missile system sharing issue, which 

is beyond the scope of this study, would cause considerable trouble 

for his successor, Robert McNamara, Gates was adept at keeping it 

from becoming a source of Anglo-American contention during his 

short tenure.95

Gates had a strong hand in shaping Defense responses in 

another crucial area of foreign policy area—arms control and 

disarmament—where previously the Pentagon’s support and 

endorsement had been barely lukewarm. Although Wilson and 

McElroy had spent considerable time and energy studying arms 

control proposals passing across their desks, they were forever 

confronted by the unremitting skepticism and apprehension of the 

Joint Chiefs, whose opinions on such matters carried considerable 

weight both inside the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill. Since the 

Chiefs knew that it was impossible for political reasons to keep 

arms control off the national agenda, they focused their objections 

instead on technical matters—the lack of adequate and effective 
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verification measures, for example, or the harmful consequences 

for current research and development. As delaying actions, these 

arguments worked well against such popular proposals as a ban on 

atmospheric testing and a cutoff of nuclear production. But such 

arguments wore thin after a while, giving DoD a reputation for 

contentiousness.96

Decidedly more inclined than his two immediate predecessors to 

bring arms control and disarmament into the mainstream of American 

defense policy, Gates readily acknowledged the “negative attitude” in 

the Pentagon toward arms control. Prepared to entertain any and all 

suggestions, he told Eisenhower that he had in mind appointing a 

special assistant on disarmament matters.97 Personally, Gates favored 

a cutoff of nuclear weapons production, preferably sooner rather than 

later, not so much for disarmament purposes but to preserve what 

he estimated as a two-to-one American advantage over the Soviets in 

nuclear bombs and warheads. Moreover, he fully agreed with the Joint 

Chiefs that arms control for its own sake was inherently dangerous 

and that the administration should not allow itself to be stampeded 

into reaching agreements merely because of public opinion.98

Whether Gates could—and should—have been tougher with 

the military on accepting the need for arms control is a matter of 

conjecture. Gates himself, although more open-minded toward such 

matters than Wilson and McElroy had been, remained very much 

committed to the concept of foreign and defense policies resting in the 

first instance on ready military power rather than the negotiation of 

agreements with one’s potential adversaries. Like Forrestal and Lovett, 

he came from a generation whose view of international politics derived 

from memories and experiences of the 1930s, when military weakness 

and appeasement had seemed to invite aggression and oppression. 

International communism, to Gates’s way of thinking, did not differ 

from the Axis alliance of Nazi Germany, fascist Italy, and imperial 

Japan in World War II. Despite rumors and diplomatic reports of 

a growing Sino-Soviet rift, Gates remained convinced that there 

existed no fundamental ideological differences between Beijing and 

Moscow and that U.S. foreign policy should treat such commentaries 

with utmost caution. Such a hard-line Cold War viewpoint was not 

uncommon or out of place for the time.99 

Conclusion

Despite the promising revival of the Secretary’s role in foreign affairs 

during Gates’s tenure, the Eisenhower years were predominantly 

a period in which administrative and managerial matters took 

priority in Defense. This reflected the personal inclination of 

President Eisenhower, one of the nation’s best known and most 

respected military leaders, who was superbly equipped to give close 

attention to national security affairs. Concerning themselves with 

the business side of the Defense Department—the formulation 

and execution of budgets, the procurement of new weapons and 

equipment, research and development—was perhaps the soundest 

approach Wilson and McElroy could have taken, given their 

limited experience and the constraints under which they operated. 

Yet in the long run, they did not serve as a model for subsequent 

Secretaries.

The growing U.S. military presence abroad carried with it compelling 

and unavoidable responsibilities that drove Defense officials in 

Washington to wrestle with the questions of how, where, and when 

to use these forces—necessitating that foreign affairs become a vital 

and important part of every Secretary’s agenda. In handling these 

problems, Eisenhower’s three Secretaries of Defense relied heavily on 

the expertise from the newly created Assistant Secretary of Defense 

(International Security Assistance). Eisenhower’s use of the NSC 

as his principal forum for basic policymaking added further to the 

opportunities for ISA to have an impact. The carefully structured 

system through which policy papers and decisions evolved made 

ISA, the designated DoD coordinator, virtually indispensable to 

the smooth flow of business and forced it to branch out into more 

policy-related and analytical fields. Though not yet the major source 

of policy initiatives that it would later become, ISA moved steadily 
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in that direction, helped along by Secretaries of Defense who found 

it necessary and desirable to delegate authority and responsibility.

Increased DoD involvement in foreign affairs did not, however, 

invariably translate into increased influence. Dulles, while Secretary 

of State, remained the principal spokesman for and sometimes 

symbol of U.S. foreign policy during Eisenhower’s Presidency. 

Moreover, even though he preferred diplomatic solutions, he also 

readily acknowledged the military aspects of national security. His 

appreciation of the role of military power in foreign policy—and 

his avowed willingness to apply it—earned him enormous respect 

among senior uniformed officers and helped him to establish a 

rapport with them.

In contrast to Wilson and McElroy, Gates took a more balanced 

view of his role as Secretary, treating defense and foreign affairs 

as part of the same large problem. Although his tenure was short, 

he reestablished the Secretary of Defense as a key figure in foreign 

policy decisionmaking. His personal role notwithstanding, by the 

time Gates left office, much remained to be done to make foreign 

affairs a more integral and accepted part of policy planning within 

the Pentagon. Gates’s post-tenure claim in 1960 that State-Defense 

relations had never been better reflected a limited perspective with 

which Secretary of State Herter only partially concurred.100 Herter 

still saw room for improvement, but he agreed with Gates that they 

were moving in the direction of closer collaboration. To this extent 

State welcomed greater interest and involvement by the Secretary 

of Defense in foreign affairs, for it gave State a greater insight on 

what to expect in terms of military support for policy initiatives 

abroad. That Gates’s tenure marked some change in direction from 

the previous seven years there could be no doubt. What could not 

have been predicted was how much further his successor, Robert S. 

McNamara, would carry this process.

Notes

1 For an overview of policymaking in the Eisenhower administration, 

see John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of 

Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University 

Press, 1982), 127–197, and Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower, vol. II, The 

President (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984). Two recent popular 

biographies of Eisenhower that offer overviews of the administration’s 

foreign policy are Jean Edward Smith, Eisenhower in War and Peace (New 

York: Random House, 2012), and Jim Newton, Eisenhower: The White 

House Years (New York: Doubleday, 2011).

2 Charles A. Stevenson, SECDEF: The Nearly Impossible Job of 

Secretary of Defense (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, Inc., 2006), 14–

15. 

3 Quoted in E. Bruce Geelhoed, Charles E. Wilson and Controversy 

at the Pentagon, 1953 to 1957 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 

1979), 19.

4 Emmet John Hughes, The Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of 

the Eisenhower Years (New York: Atheneum, 1963), 75.

5 Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston: 

Little, Brown, 1973), 140.

6 Dillon Anderson interview, quoted in Phillip G. Henderson, 

Managing the Presidency: The Eisenhower Legacy—From Kennedy to Reagan

(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), 96. Also see Herbert S. Parmet, 

Eisenhower and the American Crusades (New York: Macmillan, 1972), 

189.

7 Robert H. Ferrell, ed., The Eisenhower Diaries (New York: W.W. 

Norton, 1981), 296.

8 Parmet, Eisenhower and the American Crusades, 170.

9 “Report of Recommendations Relative to the National Security 

Council,” 16 Mar 53, encl to memo, Cutler for Eisenhower, 16 Mar 

53, sub: Recommendations Regarding NSC, OASD(ISA) records, 330–

68A4024, Organization–NSC folder, box 7; James S. Lay, Jr., and Robert 
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H. Johnson, Organizational History of the National Security Council during 

the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations (Washington, DC: National 

Security Council, nd, released Aug 1960), 23–25, 35–46.

10 On the reform and evolution of the Eisenhower NSC, see John 

Prados, Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council (New 

York: William Morrow, 1991), 61–65; Anna Kasten Nelson, “The ‘Top 

of Policy Hill’: President Eisenhower and the National Security Council,” 

Diplomatic History 7 (Fall 1983): 307–326; Phillip G. Henderson, “Advice 

and Decision: The Eisenhower National Security Council Reappraised,” 

in The President and National Security Policy, ed. R. Gordon Hoxie (New 

York: Center for the Study of the Presidency, 1984), 153–184; and Stanley 

L. Falk, “The NSC Under Truman and Eisenhower,” in Fateful Decisions: 

Inside the National Security Council, ed. Karl Indefurth and Loch Johnson 

(New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 40–43.

11 “Report of Recommendations Relative to the National Security 

Council,” 16 Mar 53, 8–9, and ltr, Eisenhower to Cutler, 7 Jan 57, both 

in OASD(ISA) records, 330–68A4024, Organization–NSC folder, box 7; 

also see Joseph G. Bock, The White House Staff and the National Security 

Assistant (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), 31–42; Robert H. Johnson, 

“The National Security Council: The Relevance of Its Past to Its Future,” 

Orbis 13 (Fall 1969): 716; Lay and Johnson, Organizational History, 26; 

and Henderson, “Advice and Decision,” 156.

12 Dillon Anderson, “The President and National Security,” reprinted 

in U.S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Organizing for 

National Security: Selected Materials (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 

Printing Office, 1960), 41–48; I.M. Destler, “The Presidency and National 

Security Organization,” in The National Security: Its Theory and Practice, 

1945–1960, ed. Norman A. Graebner (New York: Oxford University 

Press, 1986), 229.

13 Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower’s New-Look National Security Policy, 

1953–1961 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 23.

14 Lay and Johnson, Organizational History, 28–29.

15 Henderson, Managing the Presidency, 82.

16 Eisenhower quoted in Nelson, “President Eisenhower and the 

NSC,” 310.

17 Memo, Lay for NSC, 15 Oct 53, sub: Concept of the NSC and 

its Advisory and Support Groups, OASD(ISA) records, 330–68A4024, 

Organization–NSC folder, box 7.

18 NSC 162/2, “Basic National Security Policy” (30 Oct 53), Foreign 

Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1952–1954, vol. II (Washington, 

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 577–597.

19 Eisenhower paraphrased in memo of discussion, 143rd mtg NSC, 

6 May 53, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. XV (1984), 977.

20 Address by Dulles, “The Evolution of Foreign Policy,” 12 Jan 54, 

Department of State Bulletin 30 (25 Jan 54): 107–110.

21 See John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of 

the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 123–141.

22 On the origins and development of the Eisenhower administration’s 

defense policies, see Glenn H. Snyder, “The ‘New Look’ of 1953,” 

in Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets, ed. Warner R. Schilling, Paul 

Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder (New York: Columbia University 

Press, 1962), 492–504; Samuel F. Wells, Jr., “The Origins of Massive 

Retaliation,” in National Security and Nuclear Strategy, ed. Robert H. 

Connery and Demetrios Caraley (New York: Academy of Political Science, 

1983), 52–73; and H.W. Brands, “The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower 

and the National Security State,” American Historical Review 94 (October 

1989): 963–989.

23 Nelson, “President Eisenhower and the NSC,” 315.

24 Richard M. Leighton, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

vol. III, Strategy, Money, and the New Look, 1953–1956 (Washington, DC: 

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 13, 16–20. Leighton highlights 

Wilson’s administrative rather than policymaking focus as Secretary.

25 Philip E. Barringer, interview with Alfred Goldberg and Roger 

Trask, 20 Jun 95, 8, OSD Historical Office.

26 Lay and Johnson, Organizational History, 32–33.

27 Timothy W. Stanley, American Defense and National Security 

(Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1956), 48.

28 Doris Condit, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, vol. 

II, The Test of War (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 

1988), 525–531.

29 Ltr, Robert Tripp Ross to Eisenhower, 18 May 56; unsigned 

memrec, ca. 14 Jun 56, both in OSD Historian’s files, ISA 1953–56 folder.

30 Paul H. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision

(New York: Grove Books, 1989), 146–148.
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31 OASD(ISA), Organization, Responsibilities, and Functions (29 Dec 

55). Also see Stanley, American Defense, 49–50, 52–53, and Thomas J. 

Bigley, “The Office of International Security Affairs,” United States Naval 

Institute Proceedings 92 (April 1966): 64–65.

32 DoD Directive 5132.3 (14 Jul 55), “Policy, Organization and 

Responsibilities in the Dept. of Defense Relating to the Conduct of 

International Security Affairs,” par. II.B.2. Also see Stanley, American 

Defense, 52–53.

33 Memo, Gray for Wilson, 11 May 56, sub: Reorganization of 

OASD(ISA), ISA 1953–56 folder, OSD Historian’s files.

34 Stanley, American Defense, 48–49; DoD Directive 5132.2 (26 Apr 

54), “Responsibilities of the ASD(ISA)”; DoD Directive 5132.4 (26 Apr 

54), “Designation of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs”; ltr, 

Eisenhower to Gray, 10 Feb 56, ISA Notebook, OSD Historical Office.

35 Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises 

(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 70, 152; Cresap, 

McCormick, and Paget Management Consultants, “Survey of Major 

Department of Defense Organizational Relationships in International 

Security Affairs” (Oct 1956), 7f.

36 See Geoffrey Piller, “DOD’s Office of International Security 

Affairs: The Brief Ascendancy of an Advisory System,” Political Science 

Quarterly 98 (Spring 1983): 60–62.

37 Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises, 66.

38 Arthur W. Radford, From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: The Memoirs of 

Admiral Arthur W. Radford, ed. Stephen Jurika, Jr. (Stanford, CA: Hoover 

Institution Press, 1980), 318.

39 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 441.

40 Snyder, “New Look,” 412.

41 Radford, From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam, 316–327. Also see Mark 

Perry, Four Stars (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989), 51–59.

42 Radford, From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam, 323.

43 Falk in Inderfurth and Johnson, 43–44. The difficulties involved 

in reaching agreement between the different constituent departments of 

the NSC in planning and executing foreign policy are highlighted.

44 Snyder, “New Look,” 435; John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of 

Containment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 127–163.

45 Bonesteel’s views are set forth in a two-part paper, “The Emerging 

Danger,” 5 Nov 54 and 10 Nov 54, filed in Record Group (RG) 330, 

NSC 5440 BNSP(1), OASD(ISA) files, acc. no. 65A–3500, box 9, cited 

in Leighton, Strategy, Money, and the New Look, 1953–1956, 335–336. 

For JCS views, see memo, Wilson for Ex. Sec. NSC, 22 Nov 54, sub: 

Review of BNSP (NSC 162/2 and NSC 5422/2), FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 

II, 785–787.

46 See memcon, 229th mtg NSC, 21 Dec 54, FRUS 1952–1954, 

vol. II, pt. 1, 839–841. See also Leighton, 449.

47 Richard D. Challener, “John Foster Dulles: The Moralist Armed,” 

in Soldiers and Statesmen: The Proceedings of the 4th Military History 

Symposium, United States Air Force Academy, 22–23 October 1970, eds. 

Monte D. Wright and Lawrence J. Paszek (Washington, DC: Office of Air 

Force History, 1973), 151–153.

48 See memcon, 243rd mtg NSC, 31 Mar 55, FRUS 1955–1957, 

vol. II (1986), 431–433.

49 Memrec by Col. C.A. Randall, 26 Mar 55, sub: Conversation held 

in Office of the Secretary of Defense, 26 Mar 55, Wilson Papers, 1953–

57, 330–63A1768. Also see FRUS 1955–1957, vol. II, 400–404.

50 James Shepley, “How Dulles Averted War,” Life (16 Jan 56): 78.

51 Robert J. Watson, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, vol. 

IV, Into the Missile Age, 1956–1960 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 

Printing Office, 1997), 26, 326 (quote from 26).

52 Memcon, 187th mtg NSC, 4 Mar 54, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. V 

(1983), 889.

53 See for example ltr, Dulles to Wilson, 13 Sep 56, encl draft memo 

for the President, nd, sub: U.S. Position on Review of NATO Strategy and 

Force Levels, NATO (Sensitive) 1950–60 folder, 330–71A6489, box 3; 

also see Challener, “John Foster Dulles: The Moralist Armed,” 153–155, 

and Ronald Landa, draft manuscript, History of Western European Defense, 

ch. 1, OSD Historical Office.

54 Wilson press conf., 7 Aug 56, Public Statements of Secretary of 

Defense Wilson, 1956, vol. III (Washington, DC: OSD Historical Office, 

1956), 972–979.

55 Ian Clark and David Angell, “Britain, the United States and the 

Control of Nuclear Weapons: The Diplomacy of the Thor Deployment, 

1956–58,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 2 (Nov 1991): 153–177; see also 

Watson, Into the Missile Age, 512.
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56 For Dulles’s reaction to the Suez crisis see Herman Finer, Dulles 

over Suez: The Theory and Practice of His Diplomacy (Chicago: Quadrangle 

Books, 1964); and Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles, chs. 23–24. 

For Dulles’s policy decision, see memcon, 24 Dec 56, FRUS 1955–1957, 

vol. XXVII (1992), 678–679.

57 Wilson to Eisenhower, 28 Jan 57, Eisenhower Papers (Whitman 

file), Administration File, Dwight David Eisenhower Library.

58 See Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 1956–1959 (New York: 

Harper and Row, 1971), 200–201, and Alistair Horne, Harold Macmillan, 

1957–1986 (New York: Viking, 1989), 21.

59 FRUS 1955–1957, vol. XXVII, 685–693, commentary on 693 

most relevant. For the Defense records of these discussions, see RG 330, 

Sandys-Wilson Talks Jan-Feb 1957 folder, 330–67A4739, box 1.

60 E. Bruce Geelhoed and Anthony O. Edmonds, Eisenhower, 

Macmillan and Allied Unity, 1957–1961 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 

2003), 17; Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956–1961 (New York: 

Doubleday and Co., 1965), 121–125.

61 See Wilson to Sandys, 18 Apr 57, and Sandys to Wilson, 11 Jun 

57, both in RG 330, UK 471.94 (4 Jan 57), and FRUS 1955–1957, vol. 

XXVII, 777–778.

62 See, for example, Wilson’s comments in FRUS 1952–1954, vol. V 

(1983), 889, 1266; FRUS 1955–1957, vol. XVI (1981), 171, 1128. The 

comments from the latter source show Wilson’s criticism of British and 

French policies toward the Suez Canal and the broader implications of 

those policies on their international standing.

63 Watson, 127–129.

64 Ibid., 128.

65 Stevenson, SECDEF, 15.

66 See generally, Watson, Into the Missile Age, 129–132, and 

Stevenson, SECDEF, 15–16.

67 Charles J.V. Murphy, “The Embattled Mr. McElroy,” Fortune (Apr 

1959).

68 The most detailed account of McElroy’s involvement in missile 

development remains Watson, Into the Missile Age, 157–202.

69 See Carter, “Eisenhower Versus the Generals,” 1170–1171, 1193–

1194, 1197–1198. The 1958 Defense Reorganization Act and its effects on 

the national security decisionmaking structure are discussed in great depth.

70 Watson, Into the Missile Age, 274–275, 283–286; DoD Directive 

No. 5132.2, 27 Feb 59, sub: Assistant Secretary of Defense (International 

Security Affairs), ISA Notebook, OSD Historical Office.

71 Arnold Kotz, “Planning for International Security,” Public 

Administration Review 22 (1962): 214–215.

72 President’s Committee to Study the U.S. Military Assistance 

Program, Second Interim Report: The Organization and Administration of 

the Military Assistance Program (3 Jun 1959): 25–26.

73 Watson, Into the Missile Age, 672–673, n 71; Annual Report of the 

Secretary of Defense: July 1, 1959, to June 30, 1960, 86.

74 Cable 3056, Yost to State Dept, 20 Dec 57, File 751.13/12–2057, 

Dept of State Records.

75 See Frank Costigliola, France and the United States: The Cold War 

Alliance Since World War II (New York: Twayne, 1992), 118–159, and 

Michael M. Harrison, The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security 

(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).

76 Memcon, 364th mtg NSC, 1 May 58, FRUS 1958–1960, vol. III 

(1996), 79–97.

77 FRUS 1958–1960, vol. VIII (1993), 764.

78 Memo by Gates, 17 Jun 59, sub: Planning in Connection with 

Overseas Bases, Gates’s Reading File, 330–65A3078, box 32.

79 Watson, Into the Missile Age, 346–348; memo by Gates, 17 Jun 

59, sub: JUPITER in Italy; memo, Gates for SecState and DCI, 1 Jul 

59, sub: Capabilities of Forces for Limited Military Operations; ltr, Gates 

to Gordon Gray, 1 Jul 59, encl draft memo to CJCS, nd, sub: Study of 

Capabilities of Forces for Limited Military Operations; memo, Gates for 

JCS, 13 Aug 59, sub: Readiness Measures in the Pacific; and memo for 

CJCS and ASD(ISA), 30 Oct 59, sub: Nash Rpt on Overseas Bases, all in 

RG 330, Gates Reading File, acc. no. 65A3078, box 32.

80 Stevenson, SECDEF, 16. The author specifically mentions Gates 

encouraging liaison with the State Department, meeting weekly with the 

Secretary of State, and creating an environment conducive to the Secretary 

playing a role in foreign affairs.

81 Ibid., 16; Douglas Kinnard, The Secretary of Defense (Lexington, 

KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1980), 69–71.
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82 Gates testimony, 13 Jun 60, in U.S. Congress, Senate, Cte on Govt 

Operations, Subcte on National Policy Machinery, Hearings: Organizing 

for National Security, 86:2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 

Office, 1960), pt. V, 730.

83 Interview with Gates by Richard D. Challener, New York City, 13 

July 65, John Foster Dulles Oral History Project, Princeton University, 

Princeton, NJ.

84 Gates testimony, 13 Jun 60, Cte on Govt Operations, Hearings: 

Organizing for National Security, pt. V, 731.

85 “Remarks at Conference on Management Problems of Military 

Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation,” 6 Jul 60, Public Statements 

of Secretary of Defense Gates, 1959–1960, vol. III (Washington, DC: OSD 

Historical Office, 1960), 738.

86 Cte on Govt Operations, Hearings: Organizing for National 

Security, pt. V, 737–738, 742–743.

87 Ibid., 731.

88 Ibid., 755.

89 “Foreign Policy and Politico-Military Considerations Bearing 

on the Development of the 1962 DoD Budget,” encl to memo, Haydn 

Williams, DASD(ISA), to SecDef, 5 May 60, sub: FY 1962 Defense 

Budget Preparation, OASD(C)(A) files, AFPC May-Jun 1960 folder, 

330–77–0062, box 6.

90 Herter testimony, 10 Jun 60, Cte on Govt Operations, Hearings: 

Organizing for National Security, pt. V, 709.

91 Ibid., 698.

92 See ltr, Gates to Jarvis Cromwell, 21 Sep 60, Gates’s Reading File, 

330–65A3078, box 32.

93 Goodpaster memcon, 13 Aug 60, sub: Mtg with the President, 11 

Aug 60, Whitman file, Dwight David Eisenhower Diary Series, box 51, 

Aug 1960 Staff Notes (3) folder, Eisenhower Papers. On the missile gap 

controversy, see Prados, Soviet Estimate, 67–95, and Lawrence Freedman, 

U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, 2nd ed. (Princeton, NJ: 

Princeton University Press, 1986), 62–80.

94 Watson, Into the Missile Age, 473–496.

95 Ibid., 564–570.

96 See JCS and National Policy, 1957–60, 105–106. 

97 Goodpaster memo, 26 Mar 60, sub: Conversation with President, 

18 Mar 60, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman file, Diary Series.

98 Memcon, NSC Special Mtg, 18 Feb 60, Eisenhower Papers, 

Whitman file.

99 Memcon, 448th Mtg NSC, 27 Jun 60, Eisenhower Papers, 

Whitman file.

100Gates testimony, 13 Jun 60, in Cte on Govt Operations, Hearings: 

Organizing for National Security, pt. V, 731.
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About the Editors

Erin R. Mahan has been Chief Historian for the Secretary of Defense since 

2010. Previously, she worked in the Center for the Study of Weapons of 

Mass Destruction at National Defense University and in the Historian’s 

Office at the U.S. Department of State, where she was an editor of the 

Foreign Relations of the United States series. Dr. Mahan holds a Ph.D. in 

history from the University of Virginia.

Jeffrey A. Larsen is president of Larsen Consulting Group and a senior 

scientist with a major U.S. defense contractor. He also serves as an 

adjunct professor at Denver, Northwestern, and Texas A&M universities. 

Widely published, Dr. Larsen holds an MA in national security affairs 

from the Naval Postgraduate School and an MA and Ph.D. in politics 

from Princeton University.
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Historical Office

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Washington, DC