STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF THE CONFLICT

WITH IRAQ: SOUTHEAST ASIA

Dr. Anthony L. Smith

March 2003
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ISBN 1-58487-122-9

ii
FOREWORD

War with Iraq signals the beginning of a new era in

American national security policy and alters strategic

balances and relationships around the world. The specific

effects of the war, though, will vary from region to region. In

some, America’s position will be strengthened. In others, it

may degrade without serious and sustained efforts.

To assess this dynamic, the Strategic Studies Institute

(SSI) has developed a special series of monographs entitled

Strategic Effects of the Conflict with Iraq. In each, the

author has been asked to analyze four issues: the position

that key states in their region are taking on U.S. military

action against Iraq; the role of America in the region after

the war with Iraq; the nature of security partnerships in the

region after the war with Iraq; and the effect that war with

Iraq will have on the war on terrorism in the region.

This monograph is one of the special series. SSI is

pleased to offer it to assist the Department of Army and

Department of Defense in crafting the most effective

strategy possible for dealing with the many consequences of

war with Iraq.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

ANTHONY L. SMITH is a Senior Research Fellow in the

Research Division of the Asia Pacific Center for Security

Studies. He focuses on domestic and regional issues in

Southeast Asia, with special reference to ASEAN,

Indonesia’s foreign policy and political developments,

conflict in Aceh, and East Timor. Previously Dr. Smith was

a lecturer in International Relations, Faculty of

International Studies, International Pacific College,

Palmerston North, New Zealand. He was also seconded to

the New Zealand Department of Prime Minister and

Cabinet in 1998. He was an official observer during the

Popular Consultation in East Timor in August 1999. From

2000-2002 he was a Fellow at the Institute of Southeast

Asian Studies in Singapore, and remains an Associate

Fellow. Dr. Smith’s journal articles include publications in

Asian Journal of Political Science, Harvard Asia Quarterly,

Contemporary Southeast Asia, Panorama, New Zealand

Journal of Asian Studies, New Zealand Journal of History,

and ASEAN Economic Bulletin. He is an Associate Editor of

the following publications: Contemporary Southeast Asia,

New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies, and the Berkshire

Encyclopedia of Modern Asia. He has published Strategic

Centrality: Indonesia’s Changing Role in ASEAN

(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000). His

edited and co-edited volumes are: Gus Dur and the

Indonesian Economy (2001); Southeast Asian Affairs (2001

and 2002 editions); and Governance in Indonesia:

Challenges Facing the Megawati Presidency (2002). Dr.

Smith is a graduate of the University of Waikato and the

University of Auckland.

iv
STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF THE CONFLICT

WITH IRAQ: SOUTHEAST ASIA

1

Conclusions:

The general consensus on what constitutes Southeast Asia is the

region covered by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN). The ten members of ASEAN are Brunei, Burma

(Myanmar),1 Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines,

Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.

Membership in ASEAN, which has concluded various agreements

on anti-terrorism, and has often forged a common foreign policy, does

not imply a unified approach to U.S. action in Iraq. U.S. relationships

in Southeast Asia range from intimate security relationships with

Singapore and the Philippines to a nonrelationship in the case of

Burma. Therefore the impact on U.S. relationships in this region will

be varied.

Most relationships will, in fact, ride out possible adverse

consequences from conflict in Iraq, but objections will be two-fold.

While states like the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand could be

described as generally supportive of the United States in the war

against terrorism and are not alarmed by the doctrine of preemption,

several other Southeast Asian states consistently have cited

nonintervention and absolute state sovereignty to either oppose, or

remain unengaged, in various interventions over the last decade. New

ASEAN members like Burma, Laos, and Vietnam have been unhappy

with “humanitarian intervention,” being critical of the NATO

operation in Kosovo, and refusing to be involved in the peacekeeping

operation in East Timor. Therefore, armed invasion of Iraq will not sit

well with these states, but they will do little more than verbally oppose

it. Disagreement over an intervention, however, is nothing new in

these relationships.

States with majority Muslim populations such as Indonesia and

Malaysia will face popular discontent over a U.S. invasion of Iraq.

States with minority Muslim populations will see similar discontent,

but these sentiments will not have the same impact on government

decisionmaking. The U.S. relationship with Indonesia is the most

likely to be damaged by a conflict with Iraq. A protracted war in Iraq

would be most damaging to U.S. relations with Southeast Asia’s

Islamic community.
Reactions to the Global War against Terrorism.

The attacks of September 11, 2001, outraged governments throughout Southeast Asia, as they did around the

world. All Southeast Asian countries condemned the

attacks and expressed sympathy to the United States and

its people. Washington sought support, in particular, from

both Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur in the aftermath of the

terrorist attacks. Within days President Megawati of

Indonesia made a trip to the United States—a trip that was

kept on track despite a general shut down of air traffic—in

which the Indonesian leader denounced terrorism. The

symbolism of the leader of the world’s largest Muslim

country decrying international terrorism was important to

U.S. policymakers.

Megawati’s resolve to back the United States evaporated

once she returned to Indonesia. While international news

media exaggerated the extent of potentially violent street

protests in Jakarta—principally aimed at the U.S.

Embassy—and tended to conflate them with wider public

opinion, it became clear that Megawati could not count on

the support of the Indonesian population to back up the

United States in the counterattack against al Qaeda—

namely the invasion of Afghanistan. First, many Indonesians surveyed were in denial about the nature of the

terrorist attacks. After all, was not the Oklahoma City

bombing initially blamed on Islamic terrorists? This event

is well-known to the Indonesian public. Second, rumors

circulated among the internet savvy that Mossad was

behind the attacks, and that all Jews were sent text

messages to stay away from the World Trade Center on

September 11—the origin of these rumors was from the

Middle East. Third, many Indonesians simply refused to

believe that Osama bin Laden was guilty of the September

11 attacks and the evidence for this. Fourth, even when

Osama bin Laden virtually confessed to the attacks, there

was no support for a U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan. Many

political and religious leaders (and not just Muslims)

2
argued that bin Laden’s guilt should be determined in an

international court, not through force of arms (incidentally,

this is entirely contrary to Indonesian obstinance over an

international court for crimes in East Timor). Fifth,

Megawati’s political opponents used the events

surrounding September 11 to pressure her. The Council of

Ulama—a body set up by former president Soeharto and

with ongoing links to the now opposition Golkar Party—

even issued a call for “Jihad” against the United States.2

Vice President and leader of the Islamist United

Development Party (PPP), Hamzah Haz, undermined his

president’s U.S. visit by suggesting that the September 11

might “cleanse” the United States of its “sins.” He would

later meet with the arrested head of the Islamist militia

group Laskar Jihad, Ja’far Umar Thalib, and visit the

boarding school of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, head of Jemaah

Islamiyah—an Al Qaeda affiliate. Megawati, as a woman

and a nominal syncretic Muslim, is vulnerable to the charge

that she is not an orthodox Muslim, and her opponents have

indirectly tried to use this against her. The Bali bombing of

October 12, 2002, which took around 200 lives (including 88

Australians), convinced a hitherto skeptical political and

religious elite of the problem of homegrown terrorism, and

strengthened the case for cooperation in the war against

international terrorism.

In Indonesia two overlapping themes generally feed into

distrust of U.S. motivations, especially as they relate to

Afghanistan. For most Indonesians—Muslim and nonMuslim—there is a distrust of U.S. foreign policy. The

reported CIA involvement in attempts to undermine

President Soekarno in the 1950s, and a probable role in the

counter-coup that took half a million lives in 1965-66, has

left an indelible impression of U.S. meddling in Indonesian

affairs. East Timor, hardships arising from the stipulations

of the International Monetary Fund, and human rights

demands are the latest manifestations. Also, a growing body

of Muslim opinion in Indonesia believes that the United

States, and the west in general, will intervene to defend

3
western interests or Christian populations, but fails to act

when Muslims are in trouble. Generally this line was

formed around the experience of East Timor, when in

actuality the west has intervened a number of times on

behalf of Muslim populations, for example, Somalia, Bosnia,

Kosovo, and so on. Nonetheless, while many Indonesian

officials view the U.S. military presence in the Asia/Pacific

as benign, deep-seated suspicion about U.S. intentions still

exists with regard to the Muslim world. Even moderates

have accused Washington of trying to weaken the world of

Islam. In this sense, the “clash of civilizations” hypothesis

enjoys some currency with opinion makers in Indonesia.

Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia was

equally vocal in condemning the terrorist attacks—and

later went on to propose at the Organization of Islamic

Conference that suicide bombings in Israel/Palestine also

should be considered acts of terrorism. Like Megawati,

however, Mahathir refused to support the U.S. counterattack in Afghanistan. Mahathir has been a vocal critic of

the west in the past, and the ruling United Malays National

Organisation (UMNO) party has shown Islamist tendencies

with apostasy laws proposed in some states. Mahathir

himself once declared that Malaysia was an “Islamic State.”

(Although the Malaysian Constitution establishes Islam as

the religion of the Federation of Malaysia, application of

religious laws is left to the state authorities, who have

interpreted this provision as a symbolic statement.)

Mahathir, after September 11, became one of the most vocal

Islamic leaders to criticize radical Islamist movements.

This dramatic shift can be explained in terms of national

interest and regime survival. Malaysia claimed to have

already uncovered a terrorist threat on its own soil prior to

September 11. Second, Mahathir saw an opportunity to

drive a wedge between the opposition coalition of the

Islamist PAS (Partai Islam SeMalaysia) and various

pro-democracy parties (the opposition coalition split on

September 22, 2001). In the 2000 election, UMNO had

suffered one of its worst results, but Mahathir was able to

4
use international events to paint his PAS rivals as

dangerous radicals—PAS played into his hands by

declaring a “Jihad” against the United States (like the

Indonesian Council of Ulama, they left this term

ambiguous). PAS’ fortunes have declined ever since, as

revealed in several by-election disappointments for the

Islamist party, and Malay voters have largely returned to

the UMNO fold.

In general, most Southeast Asian states have both

supported the United States in the war against terror, as

several of these states share the deep concern about the

challenge international terrorism poses, not least of all

because it has posed a direct threat to countries of

Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines (and to

a lesser extent Thailand and Cambodia). Indonesia

belatedly sought assistance in rounding up 40 members of

the Jemaah Islamiyah in the aftermath of the Bali blast,

and elite opinion has shifted to the extent that there is now

recognition of the problem.

Current Reactions to U.S. Policy on Iraq.

Reactions to current U.S. policy with regards to Iraq are

varied within Southeast Asia. The Philippines has been the

most supportive of American policy, with or without UN

backing. Singapore, the other nation-state in Southeast

Asia that enjoys a close security relationship with the

United States, is more guarded in arguing for a second

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution to

resolve the impasse. Singapore traditionally has

constructed its foreign policy in such a way as not to provoke

its larger Muslim neighbors, and one understands the need

to tread carefully. The other ASEAN states have all asked

for a UN approach to the problem of Iraq. Vietnam, a

constant proponent of absolute sovereignty, has argued for

a “political solution... based on the respect of the

independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Iraq

and in line with the United Nations Charter and

5
international law.”3 Cambodia argued against the use of

violence, but has also urged Iraq to accept the UN process.

Thailand has also urged the United States to go through UN

channels, as have Malaysia and Indonesia. While both

Malaysia and Indonesia accept that Iraq needs to dismantle

its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) capability, both

governments have opposed the war option in this

case—urging that inspectors be allowed to complete their

work. In February 2003, Kuala Lumpur was host to the

Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), in which

Mahathir stated that the issue of Iraq would be discussed.

Malaysia’s foreign minister, Syed Hamid Albar, did oppose

the suggestions of some at the OIC that Saddam Hussein be

encouraged into exile, urging that the UN process be

maintained on course. He added: “We hold the view that

whatever system of government practiced in a country or

the system of government to be installed should be

determined by the people of the country concerned.”4

In Indonesia’s case, Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda

publicly has poured cold water on U.S. claims of Iraqi

intransigence, saying that intelligence offered so far is less

than adequate and that the work of the UN weapons

inspectors is necessary to establish any guilt. Indonesia has

staunchly opposed a U.S.-led attack that falls outside the

UN process. Indonesia has long been an opponent of

sanctions against Iraq, which were imposed after the

1990-91 Gulf War. During Abdurrahman Wahid’s term as

head of state, the president made a visit to Iraq and used the

occasion to champion the repeal of the sanctions regime.

Reports of the plight of the Iraqi people are well-known in

Indonesia, and are a source of anger against the west (and

the United States in particular). It is significant, however,

that Indonesia would accept a UNSC resolution on the

current crisis, even if that meant a UN cover for any war

effort in Iraq. An Indonesian foreign affairs spokesman told

BBC News that while the government has faced domestic

opposition on many foreign policy issues in the past, on the

issue of Iraq the government is in accord with public

6
sentiment.5 In fact, Indonesia’s approach can be explained

on domestic grounds. Why should a UNSC resolution for

war be more palatable than U.S. “preemption”? Having a

UN sheen on an action in Iraq makes it far easier to explain

to a domestic audience. Clearly a broad section of the

Indonesian people are opposed to any war against Iraq, and

Muslim groups and NGO groups (including some women’s

syndicates) have demonstrated against U.S. action in the

Middle East. It is important to note that Indonesia’s

mainstream Muslim groups rejected Osama bin Laden’s

call for violent opposition to the United States. The Head of

Indonesia’s largest Muslim organization, Nahdlatul

Ulama, argues that the Iraq issue is principally political,

and Muslims should not see this as a religious struggle.

However, the fear, publicly expressed by both civic and

religious leaders in Indonesia and throughout Southeast

Asia, is that war in Iraq will lead many Southeast Asian

Muslims to view the conflict as religious in nature.

The Possible Impact of War in Iraq.

Singapore’s Foreign Minister S. Jayakumar was asked

in a CNN interview in January 2003 what the consequences

of a war with Iraq would be. He replied:

I think it will be a major complicating factor, particularly if it

is seen as an action outside the auspices of the United Nations,

and particularly if the presentation is not managed properly.

By that I mean, if it is presented as a conflict aimed at Muslim

populations or Muslim peoples, that will be unfortunate. It

should be presented for what it really is, the issue of Weapons

of Mass Destruction and disarmament. I think that it’s

important the presentation—focus on the WMD. If it is not,

then I think countries that have predominantly Muslim

population would find it a complicating issue.6

The great concern for Indonesia and Malaysia, and by

extension Singapore—due its proximity—and states like

Cambodia and Thailand with Muslim minorities that their

governments hope will remain integrated within society, is

7
that international events could have a destabilizing

influence.

As the U.S. counterattack against Afghanistan

demonstrates, the nature of the war in Iraq, rather than war

itself, will be the key determinant to the impact of any U.S.

action in Iraq. While the prospect of an Afghanistan war

initially elicited heated responses from Muslims in

Southeast Asia, the relatively easy dispatch of the Taleban

by the Northern Alliance, the clear rejoicing at the end of

Taleban rule (or at least the impression that the war to

defeat the Taleban enjoyed popular legitimacy), and the

U.S. success in minimizing civilian casualties, worked to

undermine public anger.

How a war with Iraq will affect Muslim populations in

Southeast Asia—already jaded towards U.S. foreign

policy—will depend greatly on the perceived conduct of the

war itself. Overall, war in Iraq will increase anger directed

at the United States. War in Iraq is an unknown entity. A

critical question is, will the removal of Saddam Hussein be

supported by the majority of Iraqi people? While military

estimates of victory against Iraq in a full-scale invasion

range from 2 weeks to a month, lack of domestic legitimacy

in Iraq for any action by the United States could lead to

widespread low level opposition (including the hard core of

the Republican Guard or general insurgency) to the U.S.-led

occupation. A further complication will be providing for the

60 percent of the Iraqi population who rely on government

distribution for food needs with sustenance once the Iraqi

lines of distribution have been disrupted.

If Saddam Hussein were to employ WMD whether in the

battlefield, against Israel, or the United States,

governments throughout Southeast Asia would accept that

Iraq represents the same type of terrorist threat that al

Qaeda poses (bearing in mind that some Southeast Asian

governments do not accept a Saddam-bin Laden link at

present). They also would largely go along with the UN

resolution which would surely result, enabling the United

8
States and its allies to occupy Iraq. In the court of public

opinion within Southeast Asia, massive attacks by Saddam

Hussein would not play well, however some more radical

groups would perceive such attacks as justice for America’s

“sins”—in fact, some Islamist groups may wholly support a

WMD strike on Israel, in particular. On balance, most

mainstream Muslim opinion, as wary as it is of U.S. policy

(especially on Israel/Palestine), would be as critical of

Saddam’s use of WMD as it was of the al Qaeda attacks.

Economic Impact.

The potential impact of a war in Iraq will be great for all

the Southeast Asian economies—with the exception of

Burma which is barely integrated into the world economy.

Most of the Southeast Asian economies depend heavily on

trade and are vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the global

economy, which is likely to experience a downturn in the

coming months. Rising prices will hit the oil consuming

countries, but will provide the small consolation of better

returns for Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia as net oil and

gas exporters. However, the picture looks most gloomy for

Indonesia, already coming off the worst financial meltdown

of the Asian Financial Crisis. In 2002, investment levels

halved from the previous year due to legal complications

over political devolution to more than 300 districts and the

emergence of domestic terrorism. The growth of a radical

fringe in Indonesia, coupled with perceptions in the investor

community (domestic and foreign) that Indonesia cannot

curb such Jihadi groups (in contrast to Malaysia), will be a

serious blow to Indonesia’s economic growth.

Perceptions of U.S. Intentions and Motivations.

In a sense, the war against terrorism in the long run can

only be won by winning public opinion within the Muslim

world. Southeast Asian Muslims, famed for their moderate

religious and political views and their smooth integration

into secular society (the Southern Philippines is a partial

9
exception), distrust U.S. power projection. This is most

evident in modern Indonesia for both nationalist and

co-religionist reasons. Political and religious elites in

Indonesia, and to some extent in Malaysia, see inconsistencies within the U.S. approach. Indonesian government

officials have questioned Washington’s view of what

constitutes a “terrorist,” given the refusal of the U.S. State

Department to add the Aceh separatists to the list of

international terror organizations—the United States will

only call a group “terrorist” when it impacts on western

interests, they argue. Both Malaysia and Indonesia note the

apparent uneven nature of policy towards Israel, which has

failed to allow a Palestinian state and also possesses WMD.

While both the Malaysian and Indonesian governments do

not fear encroachment by the United States and quietly

welcome the U.S. force presence in littoral Asia, there

remains, especially in Indonesia, a lingering fear of

American attempts to establish some kind of imperial rule

over the Islamic world.

For the rest of Southeast Asia, the dislike of intervention

by the new ASEAN members notwithstanding, little will

change. The United States will continue to be viewed as a

benign hegemon.

Post-Conflict Reconstruction.

Support from the Philippines will be forthcoming.

Singapore and Thailand, despite public pronouncements in

support of the UN process, will support U.S. action—

although for reasons of realpolitik, Singapore’s position will

be outwardly cautious. These three countries would be

involved in a post-conflict peace building exercise if

involvement in past UN operations is indicative. There is

little chance that Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam

will become involved in the war effort, or its aftermath—all

are domestically focused and disinclined to participate in

intervention missions, UN peacekeeping, or UN peacebuilding. For Malaysia and Indonesia, the constraints of

10
domestic opinion will be very obvious, and will limit possible

support for the United States, although UN support will be

the critical element for these countries. Regardless of the

process of the war, Malaysia, and probably Indonesia, too,

will attempt to contribute to a post-war settlement in Iraq.

Conclusions.

The Overall Impact on U.S. Standing and Partnerships

in Southeast Asia.

A U.S. war in Iraq will impact differently on the various

partnerships within Southeast Asia. Most of these

relationships will remain as they were, with possible

pressure on Malaysia and Indonesia over their ties to the

United States. Even in Malaysia, one suspects, the

Mahathir government can both control radical elements

and sway more moderate Muslim opinion, and this

relationship will ride out initial anger over the war. In

Indonesia, public anger, and the actions of fringe terror

groups, have the most potential to undermine the relationship—one that already has been under enormous strain.

There, too, the U.S.-Indonesia relationship will outlive a

disagreement over Iraq, but the levels of distrust in the

United States may be notched up further and have

implications for other sectors of interest.

The impact on the overall U.S. strategic position in

Southeast Asia largely will be unchanged. The large

number of port calls by the U.S. Navy to the countries of

maritime Southeast Asia will continue as before, although

there are no permanent bases in Southeast Asia. Two

rumored options for further military engagement in the

region, the re-establishment of a permanent presence in the

Philippines and port visits to Vietnam, will also not be

affected by war in Iraq. The impact of a war in Iraq will be

felt on the diplomatic front, and it will involve the war

against terrorism.

11
The Impact on the Pursuit of the War on Terrorism in

Southeast Asia.

It remains the case that Malaysia and Indonesia have

publicly expressed doubts about the links between Iraq and

al Qaeda, and it would be fair to say that the Muslim

community throughout Southeast Asia remains highly

skeptical. But the prospect of war in Iraq does have

implications for the war against terrorism, and again this is

principally in Indonesia. Since September 11, the United

States, Singapore, and Malaysia have had a very difficult

task in urging the Indonesian government to take seriously

the problem of international terrorism—especially as it

relates to the Indonesian-based Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)

group, an affiliate of al Qaeda. The Bali blast in 2002

changed this lethargy to some degree. Open opposition

within the Indonesian public for a war against Saddam

Hussein could translate into a strained relationship with

the United States, which would impact ultimately on

anti-terrorist efforts—or a government less inclined to be

seen to be yielding to foreign “demands.”

Prolonged conflict in Iraq that brings with it enormous

civilian deaths—from fighting or starvation—will touch an

existing raw nerve and radicalize some within the Muslim

community in Southeast Asia, possibly to join extremist

groups, or to give them succor or sympathy. It is impossible

to know the extent to which this might occur, but potentially

war in Iraq, which very well carries its own merits, could

prove to be seed for jihadi groups in Southeast Asia. A quick

conquest of Iraq, with widespread legitimacy, will undercut

this phenomenon.

The sizeable Muslim community in the Philippines,

which has been considered in little detail in this report, will

most likely be unhappy with U.S. intervention in Iraq;

however, this population is in no position to exert pressure

on government policy. The vast majority of Muslims are

confined to the south of the Philippines, and the various

ethnic groups of Mindanao and the surrounding islands are

12
very much alienated from the Philippines government. War

in Iraq will not alter, either way, the difficulties of the

Philippine Muslim south. The introduction of U.S.

personnel to assist in training for combat operations against

the Abu Sayyaf group (ASG) on Basilan island was the

direct result of September 11. Although many have

questioned whether ASG, largely a gang of kidnappers, are

linked to bin Laden, al Qaeda operatives have attempted to

contact separatist leaders in Mindanao. The United States

will continue to provide support for the Philippines

government in bringing its restive hinterland—not just the

south, but the Maoist-oriented New People’s Army (NPA)

areas—under control.

Recommendations.

Winning the hearts and minds of the Muslim

community in Southeast Asia, especially in Malaysia

and Indonesia, is important in America’s war against

global terrorism. Cooperation from governments in

Southeast Asia will help prevent jihadi relocating

from Central Asia, and will work against the

emergence of domestic terror networks.

The conduct of the war in Iraq could have a dramatic

impact on Southeast Asia’s Muslim communities. A

quick war in Iraq with few civilian casualties, and one

accepted by the Iraqi people, will convince Southeast

Asia’s Muslims that the conflict was justified—or at

least not some kind of latter day imperial conquest.

An invasion that lacks support by the Iraqi people,

one in which the United States become mired in low

level conflict, will radicalize fringe groups within

Southeast Asia against the United States.

Another critical component to legitimacy of action

against Iraq would be UN support. Ideally the United

States should work through the UN process in dealing

with the Iraq problem. Any military action in the

13
future, were it to be sanctioned by the UN, would be

vastly more palatable to countries like Indonesia and

Singapore.

For the most part, relationships with Southeast Asia

will be unaffected by war in Iraq, with Indonesia as

the possible exception. If the war in Iraq is in

America’s national interest, it must be expected that

this could have negative consequences for the war

against jihadi groups in Indonesia.

The United States needs to continue stressing that

Islam is not regarded as the enemy.

In the case of Iraq, the United States should continue

pressing the point that the key issue revolves around

removal of Saddam Hussein’s potential for regional

aggression, including WMD development, which

poses a serious threat to Iraq’s neighbors. Beyond the

post-Iraq War settlement, serious attention to other

conflict areas in the Middle East, particularly

Israel/Palestine, will go a long way in convincing

Muslim opinion in Southeast Asia the U.S. foreign

policy has some consistency.

ENDNOTES

1. Even the name of the country itself is the subject of controversy.

This paper utilizes “Burma” in accordance with the practice of the U.S.

Government.

2. The term Jihad in Islam simply means to “struggle.” The Council

of Ulama refused to clarify what they meant by Jihad, which is usually

seen as meaning “holy war” in the west.

3. Vietnam supports political solution to Iraqi issue,” BBC,

February 17, 2003.

4. “Malaysia Says No to Exile Proposal For Saddam,” Bernama,

February 10, 2003.

5. BBC Radio, February 14, 2003.

14
6. MFA Press Release, “CNN Interview with Singapore Foreign

Minister Prof S Jayakumar,” January 31, 2003. See www.mfa.gov.sg.

15
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Author

Dr. Anthony L. Smith

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Ms. Kimberly A. Rockwell-Jacoby