RUSSIAN SECURITY POLICY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION:

TWO VIEWS

Peggy Falkenheim Meyer

Major General (Retired) Anatoly Bolyatko

Edited by

Stephen J. Blank

May 27, 1996
ii

*******

These papers originally were presented to the conference on

"Russian Defense and Security Policy," King's College, London,

May 16-18, 1995, sponsored by the Ministry of Defence of Great

Britain, King's College, London, the U.S. Army War College's

Strategic Studies Institute, the U.S. Air Force Academy's

Institute for National Security Studies, and the RAND

Corporation. The views expressed in this report are those of the

authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or

position of the Department of the Army, the Department of

Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for

public release; distribution is unlimited.

*******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may

be conveyed directly to the Conference Organizer, Dr. Stephen J.

Blank, by calling commercial (717) 245-4085 or DSN 242-4085.

Copies of this report may be obtained from the Publications and

Production Office by calling commercial (717) 245-4133, DSN 242-

4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or via the Internet at

rummelr@carlisle-emh2.army.mil.

*******

All 1995 and later Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)

monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for electronic

dissemination. SSI's Homepage address is: http://carlislewww.army.mil/usassi/.
iii

FOREWORD

In May 1995, the British Ministry of Defence, the Strategic

Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, the RAND

Corporation, the Institute for National Security Studies of the

U.S. Air Force Academy, and King's College, London, hosted a

conference at King's College on "Russian Defense and Security

Policy."

The participants at the conference discussed a wide range of

Russian defense and security policies from civil-military

relations to defense economics, and regional policies: Europe,

the Caucasus and Central Asia, and the Asia-Pacific Region. The

two papers offered here, written by Dr. Peggy Falkenheim Meyer

and Major General (Retired) Anatoly Bolyatko, reflect Western and

Russian views on Russian policy in East Asia and its challenges.

In this form, as throughout the conference, the intent was to

juxtapose Western and Russian views on topical issues.

SSI welcomes reader comments on these papers and is pleased

to offer them to our audience in the spirit of continuing this

dialogue.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS

STEPHEN J. BLANK is the Douglas MacArthur Professor of Research

at the U.S. Army War College and has been an Associate Professor

of Russian/Soviet Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute

since 1989. Prior to this appointment, Dr. Blank was Associate

Professor for Soviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace

Doctrine, Research, and Education of Air University at Maxwell

Air Force Base. Dr. Blank's M.A. and Ph.D. are in Russian history

from the University of Chicago. He has published numerous

articles on Soviet/Russian military and foreign policies, notably

in the Third World, and is the author of The Sorcerer as

Apprentice: Stalin's Commissariat of Nationalities, 1917-1924<D>

(Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1994).

ANATOLY BOLYATKO is a Chief Researcher of the Far Eastern Studies

Institute, Professor of International Affairs, Doctor of Sciences

(military), Academician of the Russian Academy of Military

Sciences and International Information Sciences Academy, and

Major General (Retired). He was the head of the Soviet military

delegations in 1988-91 during the creation of agreements with the

United States, Canada, and Greece on the prevention of dangerous

military activities. He also took part in the creation of the

START-I and CFE Treaties. His areas of specialization include

many aspects of national security, nuclear weapons issues,

cooperative security in Northeast Asia and the Northern Pacific,

and prevention of dangerous military activities.

PEGGY FALKENHEIM MEYER is an Associate Professor of Political

Science at Simon Fraser University in Burnaby, British Columbia,

Canada, a suburb of Vancouver and has taught political science at

the University of Western Ontario. Professor Meyer has also

served as Director of the University of Toronto's international

office. Her articles on Soviet and Russian East Asian policy have

appeared in Asian Survey, Pacific Affairs, <D>and other journals.

She is now writing a book on Moscow's policy in Northeast Asia.

Professor Meyer received her M.A. and Ph.D. in political science

from Columbia University.
v

INTRODUCTION

Stephen J. Blank

Since the conquest of Siberia, Russia has been an Asian and

Pacific power. The end of the Cold War transformed this entire

region's security structure, a transformation that accelerated

when the Soviet Union fell apart and was replaced by Russia.

Russia faces new security challenges in this most dynamic of

regions, which still holds substantial possibilities of military

conflict. But there has been a tendency in the West to overlook

the new Russia's place in Asia.

Among the objectives of the London conference was the

intention to remedy this gap in our perceptions and bring to our

audience an understanding by both Russian and Western scholars of

the threats and challenges Russia faces here and its efforts to

deal with those challenges. Thus, these papers focus on Russia's

relations with key Asian states and with its efforts to obtain a

military detente with the United States and reduce the dangers

and threats of nuclear war with the United States. These papers

should help to improve our understanding of how Russian elites

view Asia and the challenges Russia faces, while at the same time

Russians learn how Western analysts view their policy. This

enhanced mutual understanding should contribute to the debate and

discussion that began in London and facilitate mutual

understanding among Russian, Asian, European, and American

observers and audiences.
1

FROM COLD WAR TO COLD PEACE?:

U.S.-RUSSIAN SECURITY RELATIONS IN THE FAR EAST

Peggy Falkenheim Meyer

Introduction.

Immediately after the Cold War, observers anticipated that a

new partnership, or even quasi-alliance, would replace the

conflictual relationship between the Soviet Union and the United

States. However, growing nationalism and anti-Western sentiments

in Russia and increasing U.S. distrust of Russian motives and

intentions have dashed these hopes. The past few years have seen

growing differences between Moscow and Washington over many

issues: the former Yugoslavia, NATO expansion, and arms sales to

Iran and other countries.

These growing conflicts have led observers in Russia and the

United States to predict the emergence of a more confrontational

relationship, one which some have dubbed a cold peace. This paper

will assess the growing differences between Russia and the West

in the Far East and their implications for U.S. policy. It will

argue that U.S.-Russian relations in East Asia have become more

contentious than was anticipated during the brief post-Cold War

honeymoon. However, Moscow and Washington still have a number of

common interests in East Asia that are worth pursuing.

The Sea of Okhotsk.

In the Far East, the atmosphere between Russia and the

United States has vastly improved since the end of the Cold War

but there still are remnants of the previous competition.

Russia's new military doctrine adopted in November 1993 does not

name any specific external threat. But the Russian military

continues to express concern about the potential threat that U.S.

and Japanese forces in the Northwest Pacific pose to their ports,

airfields, Navy, and other regional military assets whose

relative importance have increased now that Russia has lost

facilities in other former Soviet republics.

The Russian military is particularly concerned about 

protecting its strategic nuclear submarine bastion in the Sea of

Okhotsk. The importance of nuclear weapons as a deterrent against

conventional as well as nuclear attack was reaffirmed in Russia's

new military doctrine which also modifies Moscow's previous no

first-use pledge. If the START-II treaty is ratified and

implemented, the changes it mandates will further increase the

importance of Russia's submarine-based nuclear weapons by forcing

Moscow to deploy a larger proportion of its much reduced

strategic nuclear arsenal at sea.
2

Early in the next century, Russia may be forced to close

down its Sea of Okhotsk SSBN bastion and to base all of its

remaining strategic nuclear submarines in the Barents Sea.

Geoffrey Jukes has speculated that the substantial reductions in

Russia's strategic submarine fleet required by START-II, the

growing obsolescence of Russian submarines based in the Northwest

Pacific, the high cost of maintaining facilities there, and the

closing down of regional repair and maintenance facilities may

persuade Russian military officials that it no longer makes sense

to keep two SSBN bastions.1 At the moment, Russian military

officials are determined to resist these pressures and to keep

two SSBN bastions. However, financial stringency may force them

to change their mind. Unless and until this happens, the U.S. and

Japanese military deployments in this region will be perceived as

a threat by the Russian military because their SSBNs in the Sea

of Okhotsk have become more vulnerable to anti-submarine warfare

(ASW) attacks. And conversely, the United States and Japan may

perceive the deployment by the Russian military of forces

designed to protect their strategic nuclear submarines as a

threat.2

The Northern Territories.

The continuing importance of the Sea of Okhotsk SSBN bastion

complicates Russia's relations with Japan. During the brief postCold War honeymoon, it was anticipated that Russia and Japan

would make progress toward resolving their territorial dispute.

However, this did not occur. Instead, President Boris Yeltsin

postponed his planned September 1992 trip to Tokyo after meeting

strong opposition to any territorial concession from the military

and a broad spectrum of Russian politicians and society. At

parliamentary hearings in the summer of 1992, the Russian

military stressed the strategic significance of the disputed

Northern Territories, (the Japanese term for the Kurile Islands)

which border the Sea of Okhotsk, as the main reason for their

opposition to any territorial concession.3

The military's underlying motivation most likely was to use

the territorial issue as support for the struggle which then was

taking place against Foreign Minister Kozyrev's pro-Western

foreign policy. In mid-1992, policy toward Japan had become one

of the main arenas of this struggle. Cancellation of Yeltsin's

visit was one of the first triumphs of opponents of the proWestern line.

The failure to make progress toward resolving the

territorial dispute between Russia and Japan has caused problems

in their relations as have Russian coast guard attacks on

Japanese fishermen operating near the disputed islands and the
3

Russian navy's dumping of radioactive waste into the Sea of

Japan. Efforts are now being made to find solutions to these and

other problems. Russia and Japan are conducting negotiations on a

safe fishing operations agreement. Japan is helping Russia

construct nuclear waste reprocessing facilities. But nationalist

passions still impede the resolution of the territorial dispute

and are likely to do so for quite a long time.

Sino-Russian Relations.

If Russia's relations with Japan have been more strained

than was anticipated during the brief post-Cold War honeymoon,

Moscow's relations with Beijing have been much better. The

downfall of communism in the USSR and the coming to power of a

new reformist leadership in Moscow had created strains in SinoRussian relations. Chinese leaders had prior knowledge of and

tacitly supported the August 1991 coup against President Mikhail

Gorbachev. They were dismayed by the downfall of socialism in

East Europe and the USSR which had negative implications for

their own legitimacy. They were concerned when Russian Foreign

Minister Andrei Kozyrev and other Russian leaders talked about

the possibility of Russia's joining NATO. They were not amused

when then Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev came to Beijing in

early 1992 and lectured them on human rights.4

Despite these strains, the trend toward normalization, begun

under Gorbachev, has continued, moving to what Yeltsin and other

leaders now call a "constructive partnership." This trend was

encouraged by the reorientation of Russian foreign policy in mid1992 away from Kozyrev's initial pro-Western emphasis to a new

stress on improving relations with other former Soviet republics,

Islamic countries and Asian countries, in particular, China.

Chinese leaders, viewing the political chaos and economic crisis

in Russia, have become far less concerned that Russia poses a

threat to their own legitimacy. Yeltsin now is attracted by the

Chinese model which combines economic reform and rapid economic

growth with an authoritarian political system. Russian leaders,

like Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, undoubtedly feel

comfortable with Chinese leaders with similar training and

apparatchik backgrounds. The growing anti-Western mood in Moscow

is more in tune with Chinese views of the United States. Chinese

and Russian leaders have a shared concern with Islamic

fundamentalism in Central Asia which they fear could affect their

own Muslim populations.

In the security realm, Russia and China have taken steps to

reduce prospects for conflict and to reassure each other about

their peaceful intentions. Agreements delineating the SinoRussian border have been signed. The Joint Declaration on the

Principles of Relations Between the People's Republic of China
4

and the Russian Federation signed in 1992 commits Russia and

China not to join any political-military alliance directed

against the other side, not to allow third parties to use their

territory to the detriment of the other side's security, and not

to use force or the threat of force against each other. On

several occasions, Yeltsin, Kozyrev, and other high Russian

officials have promised that Russia would honor a no-first-use

pledge in its relations with China. In a symbolic gesture,

Yeltsin and President Jiang Zemin signed a joint communique,

during the latter's September 1994 visit to Moscow, in which they

pledged that Russia and China no longer would target nuclear

missiles against each other.

The opening of Russia's border with China to greatly

expanded trade and tourism has helped to create an atmosphere of

greater trust. During the height of the Sino-Soviet dispute,

normal interaction between the Chinese and Russians living near

the border was artificially cut off. New economic,

transportation, and other links are proliferating. Overall, this

opening of the border has had a positive impact on Sino-Russian

relations although it also has created some resentment,

particularly among Russians living in border regions not

benefiting from the growing economic ties.5

China is negotiating an agreement with Russia, Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan for the reduction of forces and the

restructuring of those forces along their mutual border. In a

memorandum signed during Yeltsin's December 1992 visit to

Beijing, it was stipulated that this agreement should provide for

the gradual reduction of forces along the border so that by the

year 2000 they would be at the minimum level consonant with goodneighborly and friendly relations. In addition, the agreement

should require the defensive restructuring of border zone forces,

the removal of the most destabilizing weapons systems from the

border zone and the reduction of military activity near the

border. Russia and China have agreed that the zone would extend

to 100 kilometers on each side of the border. China originally

had wanted to establish a zone extending 300 kilometers on either

side of the border, but Russia refused because it would have

meant withdrawing its troops to the Siberian taiga which lacks

infrastructure and power supplies. Russia has proposed to China

that the treaty cover not just the forces within a narrow border

zone but the entire territory of the Russian and Chinese border

regions, similar to the provisions of the agreement regulating

conventional forces in Europe.6

 Contacts and exchanges between

the Russian and Chinese militaries have expanded rapidly, and

there has been a marked improvement in their relations.7

In November 1993, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and

Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian signed a 5-year agreement

providing for regular consultations between top Defense Ministry
5

officials, the establishment of direct ties between adjoining

Russian and Chinese military districts, military exchanges

between the two countries' armed forces at all levels, and an

increase in the number of military attaches posted in each

other's capital. The Russian and Chinese defense ministers agreed

to inform each other of plans for military maneuvers in border

districts and to exchange information on military doctrine and

military construction.8

Contacts between the Russian and Chinese militaries have

been expanding, and there has been an exchange of naval vessels.

Three Russian naval vessels called at Qingdao in August 1993. The

following May three Chinese vessels visited Vladivostok. In April

1994, the Chief of Russia's General Staff, General Mikhail

Kolesnikov revealed, during a visit to Beijing, that Russia and

China were discussing plans to send Russian military specialists

to China to train the Chinese in the proper use of Russian arms

and to bring Chinese officers to Russia for training in military

schools up to the level of the General Staff Academy.9 In July,

the Russian and Chinese Defense Ministers signed an agreement to

prevent inadvertent or dangerous military confrontation between

their forces.10 In November 1994, Admiral Feliks Gromov, commander

of the Russian Navy, visited China and agreed to expand training

and technology exchanges between the Russian and Chinese navies.

It was reported during his visit that China had accepted Russia's

offer to train officers and crews of Chinese naval vessels.11

Russia has expanded its arms sales and military technology

transfer to China. There are strong motivations for this on both

sides. Beijing hopes to attain from Russia military equipment at

bargain basement prices and technology the West is unwilling to

provide. Russia is interested in earning hard currency and

keeping its defense industrial enterprises from going bankrupt.

In 1992-93, Russia sold China weapons worth $3-5 billion

including 26 Sukhoi-27 (SU-27) supersonic fighter bombers, 24

MiG-31 high altitude interceptors, heavy military transport

planes, T-72 tanks and other military vehicles. China and Russia

are discussing the possibility of Chinese production of

additional Su-27s under license.12 China has bought 4 S-300 antiaircraft missile complexes for testing and is considering the

purchase of 100 to 150 more launchers, each to be equipped with

approximately 8 missiles.13 In November 1994, China signed a

U.S.$1 billion contract to purchase four Kilo-class diesel

submarines from Russia.14 Subsequently, China agreed to buy 6

additional Kilo-class submarines and completed preliminary

discussions with Moscow about the purchase of 12 more over the

next 5 years.15

Despite a number of reports over the past few years that

China is negotiating to buy an aircraft carrier from Ukraine,

this sale has not been consummated. Various explanations have
6

been offered as to why this sale has not gone through, including

U.S. pressure, China's inability to pay for the carrier and

Russia's refusal to supply the electronics for the partially

completed carrier and/or to pay for its completion.16 Although

there were allegations in the Japanese press that two Kiev-class

aircraft carriers from Russia's Pacific Fleet, the Minsk and the

Novorossisk, sold to a South Korean company for scrap might end

up in China instead, this does not seem to be happening.17 The 

weapons, navigation equipment and communications equipment were

removed from the carriers before they were turned over to the

South Korean company, and Russian representatives are monitoring

implementation of the contract which provides for the carriers to

be cut up into strips no more than two meters wide.18

Besides these arms sales, there also is a significant

military technology transfer between Russia and China. China has

sent between 300 and 400 of its defense specialists to work in

Russia's aerospace research and development institutes. More than

one thousand Russian defense industry scientists and technicians

have gone to China since 1991 for shorter or longer periods to

consult with and work in China's defense industry.19 The Chinese

are particularly interested in acquiring aerospace, rocketry, air

defense and antisubmarine warfare technology.20 U.S. intelligence

agencies are concerned that Russia and perhaps Ukraine are

transferring technology to China from the advanced SS-25 mobile

missiles and from multiple and independently targetable

warheads.21

Russian officials have promised to control this flow of

Russian military specialists to China so as not harm their own

security and the security of other countries, but it is not clear

that they are able to do so. A Western diplomat, posted in

Beijing, noted that he and others often run into Russian defense

industry specialists on the street whose presence is not known to

the Russian embassy.22 An October 1993 article by Andrei

Kabannikov in Komsomolskaya Pravda cited a Russian military

expert in Beijing who acknowledged that there was no effective

state control over military specialists who can cross the border

easily. He mentioned that two Russian laser weapons' specialists

and one missile specialist were recognized on the streets of

Beijing quite by chance. 23

Russia's arms sales to China have become an irritant in

Russia's relations with the United States, Japan, Taiwan, and

other countries who fear that they may upset the balance of power

across the Taiwan Strait and in the South China Sea, a strategic

region where there are a number of territorial disputes involving

China. India and Vietnam also are uneasy about Russian arms sales

to China and about the improvement in Sino-Russian relations

which allows China to direct more of its forces to the south and

southwest.
7

Overall, Sino-Russian relations have improved so much that

some Western analysts have even expressed concern about the

reemergence of an anti-Western alliance or quasi-alliance between

Moscow and Beijing. Writing in the March 1993 issue of Asian

Survey, Hung P. Nguyen, for example, talks about the possibility

of a "strategic rapprochement" between China and Russia which he

describes as the modern Eastern version of the 1920's Rapallo

treaty between Germany and Russia, "two continental powers united

by their real or imagined grievances against the West." Nguyen

argues that geopolitical reversals in Europe may persuade Russian

nationalists that Russia is being shut out of that continent and

increase the likelihood that they will seek "geopolitical

compensation" in the East.24

The Korean Peninsula.

There also are some differences between Russian and U.S.

attitudes toward Korea although here they share a number of

common objectives. These include stopping North Korea's nuclear

program, ensuring a "soft landing" for the increasingly troubled

North Korean economy, and facilitating a peaceful resolution of

North-South differences. It is not hard to fathom why Russians

are concerned about stability on the Korean peninsula. Russia has

a border with North Korea not far from its main naval base at

Vladivostok. Russia would be directly affected by an economic

collapse in North Korea which produced a flood of refugees or

outburst of violence on the peninsula with conflict or nuclear

radiation spilling over the border. In order to reduce the danger

that Russia would become involved in a Korean conflict, Moscow

has reinterpreted its 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and

Mutual Assistance with Pyongyang. Russia has made it clear that

it will not come to Pyongyang's assistance if it commits an act

of aggression or a "provocative" act that invites aggression.

And, in September 1995, Russia proposed a new treaty to North

Korea that eliminates any reference to Russian military support

if it is attacked or the "victim of aggression," as in the 1961

treaty.

Although Russia and the United States have a number of

common objectives in Korea, they have at times disagreed about

the best means to achieve these objectives. In 1994 Moscow

favored negotiations over sanctions as a way to curtail North

Korea's reported nuclear program. Russian assessments of the

state of North Korea's nuclear program have tended to be less

alarmist than American assessments.

As is true in the Yugoslav case, Russia has reacted

negatively to any sign that it is being excluded from

international efforts to deal with Korean problems. Although
8

Yeltsin's Russia no longer has any pretense to be a superpower,

it does consider itself a great power. As affirmation of its

regional great power status, it wants to be included in

multilateral discussions of regional problems, particularly those

like Korea or the former Yugoslavia in which it has a clear

interest. Whenever Russia has felt that it is in danger of being

excluded, it has taken steps to try to make sure it is not

ignored. One example of this in the Korean case is Russia's

repeated calls for an 8-party conference, including itself, to

discuss Korean problems. In November 1994, Russia's Deputy

Foreign Minister Aleksandr' N. Panov reiterated the importance of

this proposal which, he said, had not been superseded by the

recent U.S.-North Korean nuclear agreement because the 8-party

conference is intended to deal with issues broader than the

nuclear dispute.25 More recently, Russia has tried to play a

greater role on the Korean peninsula and to earn hard currency by

offering to supply light water reactors to North Korea in

fulfillment of the U.S.-North Korean agreement. Although Russia's

efforts were reportedly supported by Pyongyang which does not

want the humiliation of having to accept South Korean reactors,

they have been adamantly rejected by Washington and Seoul. And in

the end Washington prevailed and North Korea had to accept the

South's reactors. The Russian Foreign Ministry reacted to this

rejection by threatening to refuse a U.S. invitation to join the

Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO), which is arranging

for the supply of these reactors, on the grounds that it does not

want to play a secondary role.26 But in the end Russia found it

had no alternative but to participate in the KEDO.

Common Concerns.

There is a danger that the United States may overreact to

these growing differences with Russia in the Far East. This

danger is particularly acute now because the increasingly antiWestern tone of Russia's foreign policy, the growing differences

between Russia and the United State over NATO expansion, arms

sales to Iran, and Russia's invasion and bloody subjugation of

Chechnya have created a sharply negative reaction in the United

States and other countries. There is a danger that problems

between Moscow and Washington in other regions will spill over

into East Asia and aggravate U.S.-Russian relations. It is

impossible to fully insulate U.S.-Russian relations in East Asia

from what happens elsewhere. But the United States should try.

Outrage over Russian behavior in other regions should not induce

Washington to ignore or downplay the fact that Russia and the

United States have a number of shared interests and concerns in

the Far East.

One common interest is in managing their strategic

competition around the Sea of Okhotsk in a way that avoids
9

accidents or destabilizing change. It is doubtful that the U.S.

Navy would agree to Moscow's proposals for limits on antisubmarine warfare activity. But it may be possible to negotiate

an agreement to prevent accidents between SSBNs and submarines

tracking them. An accord of this kind regulating underwater

activity could supplement the incidents-at-sea agreement which

regulates the activities of surface vessels.

Russia and the United States also have a shared interest in

denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and in maintaining

stability there. Any analysis of Russian policy that criticizes a

perceived growing pro-North Korea bias in Russian policy ignores

or discounts the fact that Russia recently has been trying to

improve its relations with Pyongyang in order to reestablish some

balance in its relations with the two Koreas which have tilted

very far in a pro-South Korean direction. Moscow is doing this in

order to regain some influence on the Korean peninsula and

thereby reverse the precipitous decline in its influence which

has occurred since the late Gorbachev period.

Without a doubt, some Russian extreme nationalists would

like to go farther than this and reestablish close relations with

Pyongyang. However, even if these "patriots" came to power, they

would find it difficult to do this. Russia's past relationship

with North Korea was heavily subsidized through the sale of

weapons and energy at below world market prices, in both cases

for credits which often were never repaid. Russia today would

find it difficult, if not impossible, to take on this kind of

economic burden. Moreover, it is not clear that Pyongyang would

want to return to its past close relations with Moscow since

North Korea has much to gain from improving its relations with

the economically better off and technologically more advanced

Western and East Asian countries.

Another common concern relates to Japan. Neither Russia nor

the United States would like to see Japan reemerge as a major

military power. U.S. and Japanese military forces around the Sea

of Okhotsk may be portrayed by Russian military officials as a

threat, but many influential Russians now support the U.S.-Japan

security alliance as a constraint on Japan. In November 1994,

Sergei Blagovolin reminded the participants at a Ministry of

Foreign Affairs Foreign Policy Council that Japan was capable of

developing a nuclear weapon in a short time. He said that

Russians should welcome Japan's ties with the United States

because without them "the situation could take a drastic turn for

the worse."27

Analysts who fear the reemergence of an alliance or quasi--

alliance between China and Russia ignore the underlying tensions

in their relations. Many Russians share with the West a concern

about China's future stability and ambitions. If China falls
10

apart, it could have negative repercussions on Russia, a

neighbor, and on the former Soviet republics in Central Asia, a

sphere of vital Russian interests. If China stays together and

prospers and turns to a more aggressive, expansionist foreign

policy, Russian interests could suffer.

Concern about China is not limited to one end of the Russian

political spectrum. A number of Russian conservatives as well as

moderates oppose moving too close to China. They do not want to

see Russia become too dependent on any one foreign power. They

fear that this kind of dependence would limit Russia's

flexibility in a multipolar world. Such dependence would be of

particular concern now because, unlike the 1950s, Russia would be

the junior partner in the relationship and China the senior

partner.

So it would be wrong to assume that the coming to power of a

more conservative or extreme nationalist leadership in Moscow

would necessarily lead to an alliance or quasi-alliance between

Russia and China. It also is not clear that China would want

that. Beijing was forced, in part, by the negative Western

reaction to Tiananmen into closer relations with Moscow. Now that

relations between China and the West are apparently improving,

the Chinese most likely would prefer to establish greater

equidistance in their relations with Russia and the West.

In the past, mutual distrust of Japan was one of the main

incentives for the Sino-Soviet alliance of the 1950s. More

recently, China and Russia have shared a growing disillusionment

with the United States. But neither the United States nor Japan

today presents a credible external threat to Russia or China. In

the absence of a mutual threat, there is little basis for longterm strategic cooperation between Russia and China. This

situation is likely to persist unless Japan or another country

emerges as a credible external threat.

The real danger in the eyes of some Russians is not that

Russia will reestablish an alliance or quasi-alliance with China

but that it will push China away. The China issue now is being

driven by Russian domestic politics in the way that the Japan

issue has been since the late Gorbachev period. Politicians at

both the national and local levels are trying to build up their

own popular support by playing on people's fears of the growing

number of Chinese in Russia and what they depict as the negative

results of the border demarcation process. Not surprisingly, some

of the most extreme statements have been made by Vladimir

Zhirinovsky. During a tour of Siberia in August 1994, Zhirinovsky

told audiences in Irkutsk and Khabarovsk that they should worry

about the two million Chinese in the Far East [meaning the

Russian Far East; this number is a gross exaggeration] and about

the 100 million over the border in China. "What will happen," he
11

warned, "if even 20 million Chinese come to visit their brothers

in Russia."28 Since the beginning of 1994, Russia has tightened up

on visa requirements for Chinese citizens, a change that has

contributed to a drop in Sino Russian border trade. In early

1995, Russia expelled more than 1,000 Chinese citizens from the

Russian Far East for carrying counterfeit passports or expired

visas.29

Relations between Russia and China have been strained by

local politicians in the Far East who have called for the

renunciation of the 1991 border agreement. Yevgeny Nazdratenko,

governor of Primorsky Krai (Russia's Maritime Province), claims

that Russian interests have not been protected during the border

demarcation process implementing the treaty. Officials in Chita

Oblast, which borders China, also are concerned about the treaty

and may not support its implementation. When Kozyrev visited

China in March 1995, he tried to reassure his Chinese hosts by

promising them that Russia would uphold the border treaty.

Some Russian officials have sharply criticized these

attempts to undermine the border demarcation process. One of

these critics is Vladimir Lukin, former Russian ambassador to

Washington, now Chair of the State Duma's International Affairs

Committee. Lukin previously was a harsh critic of Kozyrev's proWestern policy which he felt undermined Russia's national

interests. Lukin now warns that Russia is in danger of switching

from a masochistic foreign policy to a boorish policy which

threatens to alienate China and the West at the same time. He

argues that it would be very foolish for Russia to take actions

which run the risk of creating a new anti-Russian coalition.

Lukin calls for maintaining a balance in Russia's relations with

China and the West, arguing that the "level of our relations with

the PRC in the field of security must not be inferior to our

corresponding relations with the West but must not appreciably

exceed them either."30

Russians also share with the West a concern about stemming

proliferation. At present, Russia's desperate need for hard

currency sometimes overrides reservations that Russians may have

about the wisdom of selling arms to China and other countries.

Russia's weak state institutions, porous borders and the strong

influence of criminal organizations make it difficult to control

proliferation. This situation could change for the better if

Russia's economy recovers and if state institutions become strong

enough to control criminal activity and Russia's borders. A

stronger economy would reduce the incentive for Russian military

specialists to sell their expertise to foreign countries. On the

other hand, if Russia's economy fails to recover and if an

extreme nationalist regime comes to power in Moscow, the danger

of proliferation emanating from Russia could become much worse.
12

Another area of common concern is threats to the environment

and other unconventional threats. These include the management of

fish stock and other natural resources and combatting crime,

poaching and piracy. These concerns have become increasingly

important to Russians because of their effect on their standard

of living and quality of life which have suffered a precipitous

decline.

Multilateral Dialogue.

These common interests and shared concerns in the Far East

provide an ample basis for continuing East-West cooperation.

Recently, a number of formal and informal processes have been put

in place to dampen conflict and to facilitate cooperation. These

include, for example, an expansion of military exchanges and

confidence-building measures between the United States and

Russia, Japan and Russia, Russia and the Republic of Korea, and

Russia and China; the initiation of an unofficial trilateral

security dialogue among Washington, Tokyo and Moscow; the

convening of U.N.-sponsored, multilateral conferences to discuss

environmental management in East Asia; and, the initiation of

multilateral talks to manage fisheries resources in the Sea of

Okhotsk.31 These processes should be expanded and encouraged.

When the time is ripe, consideration should be given to

establishing a multilateral framework for security dialogue in

Northeast Asia to supplement the much larger Asian Regional Forum

(ARF) initiated by ASEAN. The creation of a Northeast Asian forum

would regularize and institutionalize dialogue at a time when

relations among most Northeast Asian countries are improving. If

relations deteriorate once again, it would be useful to have in

place a structure that brings representatives of various

countries together on a regular basis, giving them an opportunity

to hold informal "corridor" discussions outside the limelight of

official publicity.

Not too long ago, only minimal ties existed between some 

countries in Northeast Asia. Now the situation is improving but

it is not clear whether this change will last. Russia is not the

only country in the region experiencing political instability and

leadership struggle which could bring about a significant

reorientation of its domestic and foreign policy. It would make

sense to institutionalize and regularize new habits of dialogue

before new tensions arise.

It is important to include Russia in any such forum. Too

often Russia is either ignored or deliberately excluded. There

seems to be some lingering concern that Russia might try to use

an Asia-Pacific forum to undermine U.S. bilateral relationships

with Japan and other countries in Asia.32 This may have been
13

Moscow's intention in the early Gorbachev years. But it is not

likely to be Russia's intention today. And even if it is, there

is scant danger that Russia would be successful. If the U.S.-

Japan security alliance ends up being undermined, it will be

mostly for reasons confined to the bilateral relationship itself,

not because of anything Russia says or does at a multilateral

gathering.

The challenge today is to react intelligently to Russian

weakness, not to try to contain Russian strength. Russia today is

even less influential in East Asia than it was before.

Previously, Russia was a unidimensional military power in East

Asia with little political or economic influence. Now its

military power has declined, but there has not been a

commensurate increase in its economic and political strength.

Moscow's influence in East Asia is undermined by the

preoccupation of Russian leaders with urgent domestic problems

and with crises in other regions where there are strong

separatist movements and a large Russian diaspora.

Rather than worrying about Russia undermining U.S.

relationships in Asia, we should be concerned with devising ways

to treat a humiliated power so as not to cause future problems.

Here the lessons of Weimar Germany versus post-World War II West

Germany are instructive. West Germany was well treated and became

a constructive member of the international community. Weimar

Germany was not, with consequences we all know. The risks we take

by accepting and integrating Russia into the multilateral

security process in East Asia will be far less than the risk of

isolating and humiliating her.

ENDNOTES

1. Geoffrey Jukes, Russia's Military and the Northern

Territories Issue, Working Paper No. 277, Canberra: Australian

National University, Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, October

1993.

2. Vladimir I. Ivanov, "Russia's New Military Doctrine:

Implications for Asia," in Michael D. Bellows, ed. Asia in the

21st Century: Evolving Strategic Priorities, Washington, DC:

National Defense University Press, 1994, pp. 205-29.

3. Jukes casts doubt upon the validity of many of the

arguments made by the military to demonstrate the islands'

strategic significance.

4. This last point was made by Robert Legvold in "The

Collapse of the Soviet Union and the New Asian Order," NBR

Analysis, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1992, pp. 5-20.
14

5. Jacques Sapir has suggested to me that negative attitudes

toward China may be strongest in Russian border regions which are

not benefiting from the growing economic links.

6. Moscow ITAR-TASS, December 19, 1992, in FBIS: Daily

Report: Central Eurasia (hereinafter referred to as: FBIS-SOV),

December 21, 1992, pp. 11-12; Vladimir Skosyrev, Izvestiya,

December 3, 1992, p. 5, in FBIS-SOV, December 4, 1992, p. 2;

Trevor Findlay, "Sino/Soviet Border Talks, Pacific Research,

February 1991, p. 13.

7. INTERFAX, March 10, 1995, in FBIS-SOV, March 13, 1995, p.

14.

8. The New York Times, December 5, 1993; Komsomolskaya

Pravda, November 13, 1993, p. 3 in FBIS-SOV, November 16, 1993,

p. 5; Moscow ITAR-TASS, November 11, 1993, in FBIS-SOV, November

12, 1993, p. 17.

9. ITAR-TASS, April 14, 1994, in FBIS-SOV, April 14, 1994,

p. 15.

10. South China Morning Post, July 13, 1994.

11. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Daily Report, No. 213,

November 9, 1994.

12. Open Market Research Institute (OMRI) Daily Digest, No.

94, Part I, May 16, 1995. Earlier reports suggested that China

and Russia were negotiating the terms for a Chinese purchase of

24 additional Su-27s but were unable to agree on a price. A Hong

Kong newspaper, Lien Ho Pao, reported on September 21, 1994, that

the Russians were offering the planes for $30 million each in

cash while the Chinese were prepared to pay only $15 million each

in bartered goods (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Daily Report,

No. 181, September 22, 1994).

13. Moscow ITAR-TASS, August 10, 1994, in FBIS-SOV, August

10, 1994, p. 11.

14. "Subs from Russia," Far Eastern Economic Review,

February 23, 1995, p. 13. Jane's Defence Weekly reported that one

of the submarines had already been delivered, but this was later

denied by a Russian Navy spokesperson (OMRI Daily Digest, No. 31,

Part I, February 13, 1995). A Taiwan source reported that the

contract was for U.S. $750 million in currency with the rest of

the payment in goods (China News Digest, January 11, 1995).

15. OMRI Daily Digest, No. 46, Part I, March 6, 1995, citing

the South China Morning Post, March 4, 1995.
15

16. OMRI Daily Digest, No. 62, Part II, March 28, 1995.

17. Tokyo Shimbun, November 11, 1994, p. 1, in FBIS-SOV,

November 14, 1994, p. 14. The carriers are being sold scarcely

halfway through their service life because Russia's navy lacks

the money to carry out needed repairs.

18. Izvestiya, November 15, 1994, p. 3, in FBIS-SOV,

November 17, 1994, pp. 13-14.

19. Tai Ming Cheung, "China's Buying Spree," Far Eastern

Economic Review, July 8, 1993, pp. 24-25; The New York Times,

November 10, 1993.

20. The New York Times, November 10, 1993.

21. The New York Times, October 26, 1994.

22. The New York Times, November 10, 1993.

23. Komsomolskaya Pravda, October 19, 1993, p. 7, in FBISSOV, October 20, 1993, pp. 13-14.

24. Hung P. Nguyen, "Russia and China: The Genesis of an

Eastern Rapallo," Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 3, March 1993, pp.

285-86.

25. Diplomaticheskii Vestnik, No. 23-24, December 1994, pp.

32-35, in FBIS-SOV, March 23, 1995, pp. 2-5.

26. ITAR-TASS, January 25, 1995, in FBIS-SOV, January 25,

1995, p. 16.

27. Diplomaticheskii Vestnik, No. l, January 1995, pp. 66-

69, in FBIS-SOV, March 23, 1995, p. 7.

28. Zavtra, No. 33, August 1994, p. 3, in FBIS-SOV,

September 26, 1994, p. 14.

29. OMRI Daily Digest, No. 44, Part I, March 2, 1995.

30. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 14, 1994, p. 2, in FBIS-SOV,

June 2, 1994, pp. 60-62.

 31. These processes are described in greater detail in

Peggy Falkenheim Meyer, "Russia's Post-Cold War Security Policy

in Northeast Asia, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 4, Winter 1994-

1995, pp. 495-512.

32. See, for example, Stephen Blank, "The New Russia in the

New Asia, International Journal, Vol. 59, No. 4, Autumn 1994, p.
16

279.
17

RUSSIAN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR EAST ASIAN SECURITY

Major General (Retired) Anatoly Bolyatko

New Approaches to Russian Security.

Practically speaking, Russia is the successor to the former

Soviet Union in the Far East and Northeast Asia. As such, it has

also inherited M.S. Gorbachev's so called Vladivostok-Krasnoyarsk

program of peace, security and cooperation, that derived from his

speeches of 1986-88 in those cities. This program was connected

with Gorbachev's philosophy of "new thinking" based on the

freedom of choice, a new approach to international relations that

was not based on ideological stereotypes, respect for the

sovereign rights of peoples, and the balance of interests between

states. Other key points of this program were an unconditional

refusal of military-political confrontation with the United

States and the belief that our countries are no longer rivals

both in Europe and in Asia. These ideas formed the basis of new

Soviet and then Russian strategy for the Asian-Pacific region.

These initiatives should not be considered as a set of

concrete proposals but rather as a declaration of intention to

Northeast Asia, and the Asia-Pacific Region, and a strategic

estimate of the ways to resolve regional problems. But already,

in practice, these initiatives have given birth to many positive

results. The USSR and then Russia have made an important

contribution to stabilizing the situation in Northeast Asia,

overall and regional disarmament, and confidence-building

measures. Russia's and the Soviet Union's actions include:

• Normalizing relations with China;

• Establishing diplomatic relations with the Republic of

Korea;

• Eliminating short- and medium-range nuclear missiles;

• Refraining from increasing its nuclear weapons in the

Asia-Pacific region;

• Reducing the armed forces and conventional weapons in the

Asian part of Russia;

• Withdrawing troops from Mongolia; and,

• Negotiating on mutual reduction of troops and

strengthening military confidence-building measures near the

Russian-Chinese border.
18

The disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics (USSR) and creation of 15 independent states have

greatly complicated Russia's post-Soviet position in the AsianPacific Region and in the world as a whole. Russia now finds

itself in a difficult situation. Its geopolitical position has

severely deteriorated. The country has been pushed back from the

Baltic and Black Seas, coasts which it took centuries to reach

and which were vital to its security. Russia faces not only

general threats of a global character but many particular, i.e.,

local or regional, military threats. In some republics of the

former Soviet Union nationalists describe Russia as their enemy.

Territorial claims are being made along Russia's frontiers. There

are many serious contradictions between former republics who are

now independent states. Efforts are being made to isolate Russia

still further. Numerous armed conflicts are raging or threatening

to break out in the immediate proximity of Russian borders: in

the Caucasus and Central Asia.1

After the end of the Cold War, Asia-Pacific security matters

are no longer considered in the context of the East-West

confrontation. The region enjoys a relative stability which, by

the way, has become one of the sources for the rapid economic and

social progress in Northeast and Southeast Asia. However, this

stability can hardly be called solid because of such aggravating

factors as the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, the issue

of reunification of the People's Republic of China and Taiwan,

and the multilateral territorial dispute around the Spratly

Islands in the South China Sea. The South Kuriles issue that

divides Russia from Japan, together with other bilateral

territorial disputes, remain unresolved, and various

controversies over fishery zones and maritime borders of "special

economic zones" make the situation even more complicated.

Though leading countries have effected some reductions in

armed forces, the arms race continues, primarily in regard to

creating new weapons and modernizing existing ones. In the AsiaPacific region military budgets are growing in all countries of

Northeast and Southeast Asia, except the United States and

Russia. The preservation of tremendous military power in key

regions of the globe, including the Asia-Pacific region, is

potentially dangerous for Russia. Russian Defence Minister,

Marshal Pavel Grachev, has pointed out that 530 divisions, 42,000

tanks, and 12,000 combat aircraft are in the countries along

Russia's borders.2

As is emphasized in the "Basic Provisions of the Military

Doctrine of the Russian Federation" adopted in 1993,

In preventing wars and armed conflicts, politicaldiplomatic, international legal, economic, and other
19

nonmilitary means and collective actions of the world

community with regard to the threat to peace,

violations of peace, and acts of aggression are

acquiring priority.3

The national security of Russia depends on domestic and

international factors. Domestic factors include the resolution of

economic, political and social problems in the course of the

ongoing reforms in Russia. International factors include the

condition of Russia's relations with the rest of the world,

especially with the neighboring countries and leading powers.

On the international scene, according to the "Basic

Provisions":

• The Russian Federation abides by the principles of

peaceful settlement of international disputes, respect for

sovereignty, territorial integrity of the states, noninterference

into their domestic affairs, inviability of state borders and

other universally accepted principles of international law;

• Does not see any state as its adversary;

• Would not use its armed forces or other troops against any

state except for its individual or collective self-defense in

case of armed attack against the Russian Federation, its

citizens, territory, armed forces, other troops, or its allies;

• Contributes to the efforts of the world community and

various bodies of collective security in prevention of wars and

armed conflicts and in sustaining or restoring peace;

• Participates in the further development of international

law, and in elaboration, adoption and implementation by all

countries of a set of efficient measures for prevention of wars

and armed conflicts.4

Threats to Russian Security and Northeast Asian Stability.

Russia's complex security situation means that it now faces

many threats to its security. The main challenges and threats to

Russia are:

• Internal social and political instability. As long as

neither the fate of reforms nor the nature of the governmental

system are decided, and the political system and society at large

are riven by crime and corruption, as well as a general sense of

lawlessness, an acute political instability persists.

• Tendencies of separatism in some regions of Russia,
20

including Siberia and Far East. While the war in Chechnya is the

most prominent example of the dangers contained in local

aspirations to separatism, neither Chechnya nor the overall North

Caucasus region is unique. There are serous signs of growing

efforts by regional governments in Siberia, Asiatic Russia, and

the Far Eastern Maritime Province (Primorskii Krai) to usurp

central state prerogatives.5

• Economic crises, [especially the] necessity of conversion

of a major part of defense industry. There is no doubt that not

only do most citizens believe their conditions have deteriorated,

the economy has not yet shown signs of positive growth.

Furthermore, in the military sector, troops are going hungry, are

underfunded, and are unable to train. Likewise, procurement of

defense equipment and weapons has fallen and is still falling

dramatically. All of Russia's military forces, except perhaps the

strategic nuclear forces, are unable to get the weapons they need

to stay abreast of current requirements. Moreover, Russia will

not be able to maintain its existing nuclear weapons past 2003

and cannot afford the costs that are to be incurred in complying

with existing arms control treaties. Consequently, the defense

industry is failing and the armed forces are in danger of failing

with it.

• Aggressive nationalism. Here again, Chechnya is only the

most prominent example. But the continuing wars in Abkhazia,

Tajikistan, and Nagorno-Karabakh that have yet to be resolved,

underscore the threat to Russia because they all involve Russian

forces in protracted, inconclusive, unpopular, and costly

conflicts. If these wars spread, Russian analysts believe they

could ignite a general anti-Russian nationalist uprising,

especially among Muslims.

• Establishing a new system of relations with former Soviet

republics. Although Russia has officially proclaimed a policy of

integration in economics, politics, and defense as its goal with

the intention of forming a new (not Soviet) union, its

relationship with the former Soviet republics remains to varying

degrees a contested one, depending on the republic in question.

Ukraine is resisting virtually all forms of integration, and

Azerbaidzhan is following suit. There are also many difficulties

with Central Asian states. Furthermore, the borders between 

Russia and these states have not been formally delimited yet, and

this too is a source of concern among them, especially Ukraine.

• External isolation. Russia feels this particularly in

Europe and in Asia. It regards NATO expansion as the expansion of

a hostile military alliance (in the first instance) up to its

"heartlands" and borders and sees that as creating a dividing

line in Europe from which it would then be excluded. In the world

economy, Russia feels itself to be the object of a policy that
21

would exclude it from international participation in the

institutions of the global economy and leave it in a semicolonial position as an exporter of raw materials to more

developed states. And in the Far East it sees itself being

excluded from major trends like the international supervision of

North Korea's nuclear program and from institutions like the

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

• Reconstruction of the Russian armed forces, military

reform. As stated above, the armed forces are in a desperate

economic condition, yet at the same time they have not really

undergone the kind of reform that was talked about for years.

Civilian control is not recognized and today there are at least

five different armed forces (Ministry of Interior, Border Troops,

Federal Security Service, Railroad Troops, and the regular Armed

forces, not to mention special elite formations for the Kremlin

who are directly under presidential control, e.g., the Main

Administration Organization (GUO)). Many of these formations do

not answer to the Ministry of Defense. As long as there is no

agreed upon concept for reform, such conditions will persist and

diminish Russia's effective military power and means of selfdefense.

These challenges to Russia's security are the real problems

which have created the definite geostrategic destabilization

connected with the region of Northeast Asia. In Northeast Asia

these challenges to Russia's security assume a specific

reflection in regard to many aspects of Russia's security agenda.

The disintegration of the USSR and objective weakening of the

Russian position in Northeast Asia can create a geopolitical

vacuum there simply by taking a major player out of the game and

marginalizing it as a factor in the region's politics. At worst,

if this disintegration goes unchecked, it could lead to the

actual breakup of the state into a condition of secession or

where the center only enjoys a nominal authority over the

autonomous Asian provinces. This could then lead to a scramble

for influence or worse yet, territory, or to civil war/s where

one or more sides have access to nuclear materials or weapons.

The reduction of Russia's presence in the region demands, as

a compensating mechanism, a reconstructed system to ensure

stability in Northeast Asia. This task or responsibility falls

especially to the United States because it alone enjoys the power

and influence in both economics and military power, as well as

the relative confidence of the players to undertake this task.

More specifically, this also means that it is up to Washington to

take the initiative in launching a viable system of multilateral

security structures for Northeast Asia and to undertake

confidence and stability building measures (CSBMs) to lessen the

threat of war, especially in regard to nuclear weapons.
22

Russia must now build new relations with the regional

countries: China, Japan, North and South Korea. This means the

development of objectives, policies, strategies, and institutions

for managing those relations with these states in drastically

changed conditions and to a very large degree from a completely

new starting point.

Similarly the development of economic reform in Russia will

put the question of Russia's full-scale involvement in regional

trade and economic processes on the regional agenda. Russia seeks

international investment for itself on a large scale, and

nondiscriminatory, open access to world markets for its goods and

service. Russia also seeks equal participation in all of the

international economic institutions that are shaping the emerging

global and Asian international orders. Therefore any continuing

effort to hinder Russian membership there will probably be seen

as an unfriendly policy designed to isolate Russia.

By declaring the policy of openness and stimulation of

foreign participation in the development of Siberia and Russian

Far East, Russia has put on the agenda the question of creating

joint economic zones including the Russian Far East, Northeast

China and Korea (the U.N. Development Program for the Tiumen

River region--a project that includes North and South Korea,

China, Russia, and Japan). International investment is crucial to

overcoming Russia's economic crisis and the threat of the further

deterioration of socio-economic and political conditions in

Asiatic Russia. And if those regions fail to surmount the current

crisis then the threat of regionalism becomes acute.

Consequently, economic and political destabilization in

Northeast Asia can arise as a result of an uncontrolled growth of

regionalism and separatism in Siberia and Far East. This

separatism could arise owing to a failure to overcome the current

crisis, failure to attract foreign investment, a further

breakdown of central authority, or any of these factors arising

in tandem with contradictions emerging between the national

interests of Russia and other countries of the Commonwealth of

the Independent States or of other Asian states in this region.6

Toward a New Order in Northeast Asia.

Therefore the following precepts appear to Russian analysts

and policymakers as the principles by which a new order in

Northeast Asia might be created:

• Normalizing the diplomatic relations in the region. This

means establishing diplomatic relations between North Korea and

the United States and between North Korea and Japan;
23

• A transition from balance of power to balance of

interests, i.e., a refusal to resolve the regional problems by

force. Instead, purely political solutions that express the

interests of all concerned parties should be pursued;

• Definitive resolution of conflicts and disputes in the

region;

• Resolution of the territorial disputes and claims in

accordance with international law and on the basis of mutual

consideration of national interests;

• Stepping up trade and economic cooperation on the basis of

openness: free movement of ideas and capital;

• Observance of human rights and freedoms in all areas of

activities;

• Intensifying regional and interregional integration by the

United Nations and other global and regional international

organizations;

• Effective arms control and disarmament, including

denuclearization and prohibition of other means of mass

destruction;

• Respect for the freedom of social-political choice of all

countries and ethnicities;

• Broad cultural and humanitarian cooperation, cooperation

and co-development of different civilizations.

Fortunately, it seems the West is interested in keeping the

Russian state united as an alternative to civil strife, the

proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles, civil wars and

many fierce territorial disputes between many small states.

Otherwise, destabilization of the global situation is possible as

a result of an unreasonable approach to the crisis in Russia,

other former Soviet republics and East European countries. This

crisis could be overcome gradually by the development of

democracy and a market economy as a part of the world economic

system.

The analysis of Russia's involvement in the Northeast Asian

security-building process reveals the three categories of

military-political measures; those that are being taken

unilaterally, bilateral activities, and those occurring within

the framework of collective regional efforts.

Unilaterally, Russia has transformed its military doctrine

to a defensive one, and is transforming the armed force
24

structures proceeding from the criteria and dimensions of

reasonable defense sufficiency at the lowest possible levels that

provide equal security for all sides. Russia also continues to

reduce the groupings of its armed forces in the Far East. As a

result, today Russia has less troops in the area than South

Korea.

At the bilateral level, Russia's military security-building

efforts in Northeast Asia can be characterized by the effort to

achieve regional security cooperation with the United States.

Regional security cooperation between the United States and

Russia is of great importance in such areas as creating the new

order in Northeast Asia, conflict resolution, ensuring peace and

stability, fulfillment of the START-I and START-II treaties, and

the regulation of regional military activities. Russian-American

cooperation could become the core regional multilateral

cooperation for resolving regional security problems, arms

control, and developing multi-dimensional confidence-building

measures, not to mention problems of economy, ecology, etc. The

level of military-to-military contacts, exchanges, and visits

between the United States and Russia makes it possible to move to

such large-scale steps leading to reduction of armed forces and

their activities and to enacting the confidence-building measures

in the Northwest Pacific.

Similarly, Russian-Chinese negotiations focus mainly on the

reduction of armed forces across the common border. On July 12,

1994, the Russian and Chinese Ministers of Defense signed the

Russo-Chinese Agreement on Prevention of Dangerous Military

Activities. The document is to provide a reliable mechanism for

prevention and peaceful settlement of possible incidents between

the two armies. On September 3, 1994, when PRC Chairman Jiang

Zemin was visiting Moscow, the two sides also signed the

Agreement on Mutual Non-targeting of Missiles.

As far as security on the Korean peninsula is concerned,

Russia's main concern pertains to denuclearization of this

explosive area. An important step along this direction could be

made through realization of the Russian proposal to convene an

international conference on security and nuclear-free status of

the Korean peninsula. Moscow offers this proposal also to achieve

an overall solution of all problems of the Korean peninsula.

Participation in an international conference on security and

nuclear-free status of the Korean peninsula could include the

Permanent Five (Russia, United States, China, France, and

Britain) plus Japan, the DPRK, and the ROK, as well as the U.N.

Secretary General and the IAEA Director General. The stated

purpose of the proposed conference is to create a mechanism for

the comprehensive settlement of nuclear and other problems on the

Korean peninsula. Three major issues are proposed for the agenda:

the nuclear free status of the Korean peninsula; normalization of
25

DPRK relations with the participant countries, i.e., the United

States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea; and confidence-building

measures and improved relations between North and South Korea.

In his first Asian visit to the Republic of Korea, in 1992

the President of Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, put forward a

set of measures to enhance security and cooperation in the AsiaPacific region. During the negotiations in Seoul, Russia and

South Korea discussed the possibility of Russia renouncing the

Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance that had

been signed between the former Soviet Union and the DPRK. Yeltsin

assured Seoul that Moscow would discontinue military assistance

to North Korea and expressed his intention to revise Russia's

alliance relationship with the DPRK. These moves show Russia's

commitment to a peaceful settlement in Korea.

The practical solution of most of the military-political

problems with Japan is blocked by the maximalist position of the

Japanese leadership in respect to the Northern Territories. That

the task of resolving this dispute is not easy was revealed in

the case study of the military aspect of territorial

disengagement with Japan, carried out by a number of Russian

military analysts. This case study is focused on the scenario

which, being the worst case for Russia, reflects the developments

in case of a broad-scale conventional war in the Far East.

Actually, this scenario is withdrawn from the context of the

military-political changes in the world, the Russian-American

agreements, and the already-attained level of confidence. It

implies the total defense and protection of the Sea of Okhotsk

and adjacent territories against the massive attacks by the

adversary.7

It appears more reasonable to exercise another approach

according to which the military issues in the Kurile and SouthSakhalin zones should be solved on the trilateral basis, through

the reductions of Russian, Japanese, and U.S. forces. Further

bilateral efforts, especially Russia's negotiations on the key

problems of the region with the United States, People's Republic

of China, and Japan would help to expand existing arms control

measures to the Far East and to move to a regional consensus.

The general principles of a collective security system,

realized in Europe, can be used in Northeast Asia with due

consideration of the regional specifics. The first ministeriallevel international conference on the issues of peace in the

Asia-Pacific region in Bangkok in July 1994 was important not

only for ASEAN, but for the entire Asia-Pacific region. It

emphasized the need to develop an Asian mechanism of control and

settlement of disputes and prevention of armed conflicts over the

whole region.
26

In order to provide security in Northeast Asia, it appears

necessary to hold more active negotiations and discussions of

various principles and proposals in the context of ongoing

changes in the region and in Russian-American relations. As a

result, a good basis for regional agreements on easing the

military tensions and strengthening security and stability can

emerge.

Major outlines of the future security regime in Northeast

Asia could lead to the following goals:

• Disengagement of armed forces in the areas of their direct

confrontation and the high risk of surprised armed conflict;

• Creation of zones where armaments are limited, including

nuclear and chemical weapon free zones;

• Spatial and temporal limitation of military activities,

exercises and manoeuvres;

• Transparency and verification measures;

• Creation and institutionalization of bilateral and

multilateral confidence-building measures;

• Quantitative reduction of armed forces and armaments in

the countries of the region, qualitative limitation of arms race;

• Transfer of the armed forces' structure into a defensive

posture;

• Creation of multilateral mechanisms for strengthening

regional security, the discussion of military doctrines, etc.;

• Creation of a system of regional conflict resolution, and

of a regional center for conflict prevention and resolution;

• Creation of regional center of strategic studies.

Thus, regular and military diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific

region is working to develop the elements of a new security

system on the basis of non-confrontational approaches. First and

foremost, this diplomacy pertains to the level of military

confrontation and the development of prerequisites that would

enable states to build a stable infrastructure of security and

constructive interstate interaction in Northeast Asia.

Militarization of the states in the region is still not presently

curbed by any restriction and goes on beyond the framework of

existing international negotiations.
27

Arms Control and the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities.

Accordingly, Russia considers the prevention of dangerous

military activities to be an important aspect of building

confidence, understanding, and an improved climate in

international relations. As military equipment is becoming ever

more sophisticated, it is necessary to take precautions that some

technical or human factors will not cause irreparable damage to

relations between friendly neighboring states.

Dangerous military activities can be defined as peacetime

actions taken by armed forces, military units and individuals

which cause, or can cause, harm to military personnel and the

civil population, and/or cause or can cause damage to military or

civil equipment, properties and installations, the natural

environment, and strategic stability of states and the world at

large. Dangerous military activities, undertaken in local and

limited conflicts and other cases where military force is used,

are connected with the excessive and unreasonable losses of

military personnel and civil population, as well as with

destruction and other types of material damage which evidently

are not justified by the military need.

The issue of prevention of dangerous military activities is

connected with the ongoing reassessment of values after the end

of the Cold War and the global nuclear confrontation. Striving to

thwart the disaster, the leading powers built up their military

capabilities and actively prepared their armed forces for

hostilities which would have caused massive losses among both the

armed forces and the civilian population. Preparedness for any

sacrifice in the name of perceived great ideals was seen as the

indisputable truth. Armed incidents, e.g., losses of SSNs and

their crews due to technical malfunctions, sometimes with tragic

results, became the normal attribute of military operations

during the nuclear/conventional arms race of the Cold War era.

Considerable human losses occurring within the armed forces in

the circumstances of peacetime combat training become ever more

tangible in their impact and ever less understandable. In most

cases such losses result from catastrophes, equipment failures,

or accidents caused by unintentional negligence or dangerous

activities of armed people.

It should be noted that the absolute majority of human

losses has been caused by dangerous actions of the military taken

in their home country or within the units of armed forces as

such. As for the international scene, the aftermath of dangerous

military activities can be even worse than a mere danger to lives

of personnel or civil population. Such activities can cause a

threat of retaliatory action and the erroneous, accidental or

unauthorized use of conventional or even nuclear-missile weapons.
28

Naturally when such threats are raised, they complicate

international relations. In the circumstances of armed conflicts,

dangerous military activities would lead to unreasonable material

damage and excessive, unreasonable and useless losses among

military personnel and population.

Therefore, prevention of dangerous military incidents and

activities is a crucial domestic and international task. Domestic

activities to minimize conditions that could lead to accidents or

their aftermath include the publication of relevant charters,

guidelines, and instructions that regulate the everyday

activities and training of armed forces. Supervising the

implementation of safety regulations and preventing accidents are

important aspects in such army and naval activities as training

flights, target practice, field and high-sea exercises.

At the international level, the most dangerous effect of

incidents involving armed forces and units of two or more

countries is the threat of misunderstanding about them and the

ensuing mistaken and unnecessary armed reaction to the other

side's intention. Most dangerous effects can be caused by the

incidents that bear a potential of misunderstanding with regard

to strategic offensive forces which, in the circumstances of

sharp reduction, continue to be the instruments of regional and

global deterrence and stabilization. There have been reports of

dangerous malfunctions in the American and Soviet early warning

systems, as well as on the nuclear weapons defaults occurring in

the strategic nuclear forces of both countries.8

Politically and diplomatically, prevention of dangerous

military activities is being effected through declarations (at

the level of international treaties and law) and practical

realization of principles aiming at prevention of violation of

agreed standards of armed defense as well as prevention of harm

to individuals and property. The task is to be achieved through

the observance of the coordinated limits of activities and

implementation of other agreed confidence-building measures.

Current local conflicts manifest an impressive scale of

long-lasting hostilities. When these wars take place with the

added factor of the development of ever more powerful 

conventional weapons, they stimulate an international demand for

resolving issues surrounding the restriction of the use of

certain types of weapons and for unconditionally banning the most

lethal systems by a world-wide treaty (e.g., the nonproliferation treaty or treaties on biological and chemical

weapons).

The Agreement Between the USA and the USSR on the Prevention

of Incidents On and Over the High Seas (INCSEA-1972) provides for

safe navigation of the two parties' naval vessels throughout
29

their territorial waters and for safe overflights by their

military aircraft in their air-space. Following international

law, the agreement contains mutual commitments to lessen the

risks involved in the activities of their ships and aircraft in

proximity to one another. In particular, military ships should,

in all cases, stay "in sufficient distance" from the other side's

ships to avoid the risks of collision.

Military ships must not exercise simulation attacks that

involve targeting of cannons, launchers, torpedo devices and

other weapons against the approaching ships of the other party in

a manner that could pose a danger for approaching ships or hamper

navigation. The use of searchlights or other powerful light

devices to light the navigator's bridges of approaching vessels

is also banned.

Aircraft crew commanders, too, must be most cautious and

prudent in approaching the aircraft and ships of the other party.

Guided by the interests of mutual safety, they should not

simulate attacks against the aircraft and ships of the other

party, conduct dangerous maneuvers or engage in aerobatics over

the ships, or discharge any objects that might be dangerous for

the ships or hinder their navigation.

The procedure to consider mutual claims has been greatly

simplified. In conformity with the Incidents at Sea Agreement,

naval forces can dispense with official diplomatic presentation

and expeditiously exchange information on incidents at sea

through their naval attaches. The two parties also hold regular

consultations where their representatives (usually, admirals and

naval officers) professionally analyze the incidents of the

preceding year, work out mutually acceptable recommendations to

prevent such incidents in future, and discuss the proposals to

improve certain provisions.

The Agreement On The Prevention of Incidents at Sea was an

important link in the chain of bilateral confidence-building

agreements that have brought the tactical activities of Russian

and U.S. armed forces into harmony. In 1986 the USSR signed a

similar agreement with Great Britain, and since 1988 has signed

similar agreements with other countries including Japan. Regular

review meetings revealed the positive results attained in the

practical implementation of INCSEA agreements. However, these

meetings covered only naval activities undertaken on the high

seas.

On June 12, 1989, during the visit to Moscow of Admiral

William Crowe, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, he

and Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces' General Staff, Army-General

Mikhail Moiseyev, signed the new Soviet-American Agreement on

Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities, which entered into
30

force on January l, 1990. Like the INCSEA agreement, this

document refers to peacetime activities of military personnel

taking place in proximity to military personnel and equipment of

the other party. The new agreement was the first to cover the

activities of ground troops, air-forces and air-defense forces.

The growing number of similar bilateral agreements is

evidence of their positive role and viability. After the work had

been done with the United States, Russia signed the INCSEA

agreements with more than ten countries, and agreements on

prevention of dangerous military activities with Canada, Greece,

and China. These agreements have proved to be useful in building

confidence and security, and a valuable mechanism of conflict

prevention and resolution.

Work on preventing dangerous military activities in the

tactical field implies strengthening and developing the

agreements cited above. This can be done by supplementing them

with protocols on coordinated criteria of danger involved in

certain activities, extending the agreements to new types of

dangerous military activities, and elaborating the qualitative

and quantitative criteria for preventing these activities.

As present relations show, the INCSEA and DMA agreements

have created good prerequisites for prevention of dangerous

incidents in the following possible activities of the two

countries' armed forces:

• Activities in the border zone including territorial

waters;

• The use of radio-emitting means in close proximity to one

another;

• The use of dangerous technical means (such as lasers) in

the vicinity of each other;

• Establishment of special caution areas when the armed

forces' units of the two countries undertake activities in

dangerous regions;

• Encounters of ships and aircraft at high seas beyond the

limits of territorial waters.

Further work on the provisions of these agreements is

connected with coordination of many technical values and criteria

of dangerous action. The main emphasis should be on the

classification of danger by the level, dimension, and the

distance from the source of danger. Special attention should be

paid to the specific types of military activities which are seen

by the other party as a provocation or a cause of incidents to
31

include intelligence activities in proximity to the other side's

border, aircraft overflights in the areas of naval exercises, and

various activities by attack submarines.

Quantities and qualities of arms represent the most

important and salient aspect of military power. Another important

component is represented by the capability to effect reliable

command and control over the troops during the armed forces'

operational activities. Therefore, control over operational

activities of armed forces in general and strategic nuclear

forces in particular is a most important element in reducing

international tensions and eliminating risks of armed

confrontation. Arms reduction alone will not produce clearly

positive results in building mutual security if it is not

supplemented by limiting armed forces' operational activities,

controlling the possible intentional and unintentional use of

weapons, and coordinating principles for activities that the

armed forces conduct in various situations.

In the past, the problem of controlling the operational

activities of armed forces was left to the margins of disarmament

negotiations. The measures that the nuclear weapon states adopted

to prevent accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons were

unilateral ones. There was neither consultation nor

institutionalization of such measures in bilateral or

multilateral agreements. The continuous climate of tensions

blocked the necessary exchange of information and did not make it

possible to develop the proper regime for verification of these

agreements. For example, the very idea of providing the other

side (even on a mutual basis) with access to information on the

systems and procedures of command and control of strategic forces

and their operational activities was perceived as incompatible

with nuclear deterrence. Therefore, past agendas never implied

any serious discussion of the need to extend arms control to

operational activities or to issues of command and control.

Today, the entirely new approach to verification, embodied

in the U.S.-Soviet/Russian disarmament treaties and agreements,

lays down the basis for the new regime of military transparency.

The new Russian-U.S. relations must lead to a gradual evolution

from mutual to joint deterrence. Control over operational

activities should not only drive the transformation of both

countries' nuclear policies from confrontation to cooperation,

but also should become the central instrument to realize this new

deterrence regime.

U.S.-Russian Nuclear Stability.

Russian and American research proved that neither

quantitative nor qualititative build-ups of strategic nuclear
32

forces or strike capability could deprive other states of the

capability to retaliate effectively and cause irreparable damage

to the adversary. Today, as warhead numbers are reduced, the

trends in development of Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear

forces are such that their deterrence potentials (the efficiency

of retaliatory action) and the counterforce potentials

(capability to strike strategic nuclear installations in a

preventive action) are becoming practically equal.

However, there are some destabilizing factors that may break

the strategic balance. These include breakthroughs in military

technologies that can sharply reduce the survivability and

efficiency of the strategic forces' combat and support systems,

deployment of ABM systems, strikes against strategic nuclear

installations by conventional warheads, and, formation of

coalitions of nuclear states.

With the transition to radically reduced levels of strategic

offensive forces, it becomes most important to realize the

principle to prevent intentional and unintentional action

impeding the everyday activities of the ICBM, SSBN, and bomber

units. It is equally important to remove the threat of their

virtual destruction or neutralization by nuclear or conventional

strikes near their home bases. In the ICBMs' case, this could

mean the ABM system with outer space-basing elements that could

destroy these systems at or near their bases. Anti-submarine

defense systems that possess permanent capabilities for tracking

and striking (hunt and kill) SSBNs pose a serious threat to them.

The threat to strategic aviation (bombers) is variously-based

(land, air, and sea) long-range cruise missiles capable of

striking air force bases.

These unacceptable military activities bear a potential

threat to strategic offensive forces of the other side. If they

are deployed, they would violate the spirit of the START

agreements, increase mutual suspicion and distrust, and deprive

mutual military cooperation of trust. Such activities would also

endanger the stability of strategic offensive forces. To prevent

this outcome, Russia and the United States would likely start to

develop--quite often on a new technological basis--countermeasures against anti-missile, anti-submarine, and air defense

systems. These countermeasures would have the effect of

strengthening their strategic forces' offensive strike capability

and should include:

• More intensive surveillance and higher combat capability

at all levels of forces;

• Setting a mutual regime of operational activities of

strategic forces (to the largest possible extent);
33

• Creating a newly-based threat to the adversary's strategic

offensive forces.

Realizing these measures to improve strategic offensive

capabilities and require mobilization of a considerable number of

military industries could result in a new arms race. Moreover,

because the strategic offensive and the opposing forces operate

in vast expanses, other countries, too, could become involved in

the confrontation. In particular, the zone of the Okhotsk Sea and

the Sea of Japan can become an area of even more serious

contradictions, adding to the vestiges of the Cold War global

confrontation and the Northern Territories issue.

In this connection attempts to create strategic missile

defenses and to revise the ABM Treaty of 1972 would also

undermine the basis of cooperation related to development of

tactical or military theater ABM systems. Russia and the United

States might then eventually choose to cooperate in excluding

certain parts of their respective military industrial complexes

from nuclear agreements. They could then maintain their

scientific, technological and production potentials. But they

would then drift apart and start another round of their costly

and even more rigid rivalry that would make the situation even

more dangerous and uncertain for themselves and the world.

At a time when other countries still possess nuclear

weapons, the very spirit of Russian-American agreements on

reduction and limitation of strategic offensive weapons requires

these two states to construct a situation where:

• The two sides would have limited numbers of strategic

warheads and delivery systems and place no obstacles to each

other's strategic nuclear forces;

• The two countries (and, probably, other nuclear powers)

would upgrade their military and political interaction to a

higher level of interaction between their strategic nuclear

forces to prevent dangerous incidents. Ultimately the goals

should be to put the world's strategic nuclear forces under the

auspices of the United Nations.

Asian-Pacific regional specifics are marked by the emphasis

on naval weapons including nuclear powered submarines (SSNs and

missile-carrying submarines- SSBNs). It seems necessary to reach

a special agreement that would limit anti-submarine defense

capabilities and provide for the survivability of naval forces as

a stabilizing factor of deterrence. That agreement could be on

ocean zones free from strategic submarines and on reduction of

anti-submarine activities.

The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear
34

Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and

the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof was signed in 1971.

The Treaty provides the procedures to control its implementation

and to verify the sub-surface installations which cause suspicion

among the signatories, as well as the necessary measures to be

taken. However, the absence of an agreement that would fully ban

the use of the seabed and the ocean floor for military purposes

leads to development of conventional sub-surface weapons and

military equipment. A most dangerous example of such work is

represented by construction of stationary submarine detecting

systems which can be deployed on the continental shelf or in the

middle deep-water part of the ocean floor. Actually, these

systems become another component of strategic weapons as they can

help in obtaining data needed in order to destroy the sub-surface

carriers of nuclear weapons. The United States, Russia and other

nuclear powers could also facilitate the practical realization of

the principle of parity and equal security in the sphere of

strategic weapons through an agreement on setting the SSBN

navigation zones where any anti-submarine activities would be

prohibited.

The mutual commitments taken under the Russian- American ABM

Treaty suggest that freeing the ocean zones from the means of

detecting, monitoring and destroying submarines would give each

side, in all cases, the necessary survivable second-strike naval

strategic weapons capability. Each side would then possess a

reliable means of retaliation which would make the aggressor's

decision to start a nuclear attack senseless and substantially

diminish the probability of nuclear war. Given the specific

physical qualities of the ocean environment, naval sub-surface

carriers of nuclear weapons can become the most reliable means of

retaliation, while it would be rather simple to verify the

proposed agreement.9

Conclusion.

As a first step to foster a plan of regional security, it

appears useful to start with unofficial, expert, and academic

discussions on a bilateral (Russian-American, Russian- South

Korean, etc.) and multilateral basis. These discussions would

clarify the participants' positions and prepare the ground for

the official negotiations. Thus, a political impulse is needed to

start moving towards a system of collective or cooperative

security. In today's specific regional context, including the

differences of positions among various states, such a process is

hardly possible for the whole Asian-Pacific region. The task

seems more feasible at the sub-regional level of Northeast Asia

where the number of the involved countries is not too large. At

the same time, movement to an accord could be generated there

rather efficiently, considering the vast expanses of the Far East
35

and Northwestern Pacific.

In the context of a most complicated strategic, military,

and political situation in that region, progress on strategic

issues might be easier to achieve than discussions on

conventional disarmament and confidence-building measures. Thus

the Asian-Pacific countries face certain difficulties in

elaborating the new national strategy for the region, and even

more in working out the strategy for joint action. Attempts are

still being made to solve new issues on the basis of the old

stereotypes. Nevertheless, expanded and deeper military-tomilitary contacts, greater confidence, the lower level of

military confrontation, and Northeast Asian states' negotiations

on a system of collective/cooperative interaction would

contribute to military security and stability in this vast region

of the globe.

ENDNOTES

l. M. Gareev, Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn', 1994, No. 3.

2. P. Grachev. Voennaya Mysl', 1993, No. 6.

3. Izvestiya, November 18, 1993.

4. Ibid.

5. For an analysis of these issues in the Asian context see

Stephen Blank, Why Russian Policy is Failing in Asia,

forthcoming, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,

U.S. Army War College, 1996.

6. M. Titarenko, Russia and Eastern Asia, Moscow, 1994.

7. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, August 20, 1992.

8. Scott Sagan, Reducing the Risk of Dangerous Military

Activities, CISAC, Stanford University, July 1991.

9. Mirovoy Okean, Moscow, 1986.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

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STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

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