THE ASIA-PACIFIC

 IN THE U.S. NATIONAL

 SECURITY CALCULUS

FOR A NEW MILLENNIUM

Andrew Scobell

Larry M. Wortzel

March 2000
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ISBN 1-58487-015-X

ii
FOREWORD

The Asia-Pacific region has become increasingly central

to U.S. national security concerns. The drawdown of U.S.

forces that began in the mid-1970s has not translated into a

decline in U.S. interest or engagement in the Asia-Pacific.

The United States continues to have a significant forward

presence, steadfast allies, and thriving trade and

investment in countries throughout the region.

While most countries there have enjoyed dramatic

economic growth rates and unparalleled prosperity in the

late 20th century, challenges to peace and stability remain.

The United States must continue to monitor carefully the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile

technology, simmering ethnic conflict, on-going territorial

disputes, and also be alert to the threats of terrorism,

international crime, and drug trafficking. Moreover, the

potential for a major theater war remains, as does the

prospect of small-scale contingencies.

The authors of this monograph survey the challenges to

U.S. national security that confront this diverse and

dynamic region, highlighting the particularly volatile

situation that continues on the Korean peninsula. Beyond

continued U.S. attention to maintaining a robust military

presence and steadfast U.S. alliances, they argue that the

United States, without ignoring the key dimensions in the

U.S. National Security Strategy of “responding” and

“preparing now,” should give a greater emphasis to

“shaping” the Asia-Pacific region. They contend that the

time is ripe for the United States to launch a major “shaping

initiative” to help ensure that the positive trends of

marketization, democratization, and regional integration

continue and strengthen in the 21st century. Building on a

bipartisan consensus with careful attention to interagency

coordination at home, and in close consultation with allies

iii
abroad, the United States, they recommend, should devise a

new road map to guide Asia-Pacific policy.

The authors conclude that, due to finite resources, the

United States should concentrate in particular on “pivotal”

states—those countries that serve as linchpins in the

region. They identify several such states and urge special

attention to these to help ensure that they evolve along

democratic, prosperous, and peaceful trajectories. The

authors conclude that the most serious concern remains

North Korea. They suggest a cautious, consistent, and

pragmatic approach to Pyongyang targeted at fostering

evolutionary change with incremental improvements in

bilateral relations by the United States depending on

positive moves by North Korea.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Interim Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iv
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

 OF THE AUTHORS

DR. ANDREW SCOBELL joined the Strategic Studies

Institute in August 1999 and is SSI’s expert on Asia. He

taught at the University of Louisville, Kentucky, and

Rutgers University, New Jersey. Since 1988 Dr. Scobell has

published articles in such journals as Armed Forces and

Society, Asian Survey, China Quarterly, Comparative

Politics, Journal of Political and Military Sociology, and

Problems of Post-Communism. Recent articles have focused

on China-Taiwan relations, the Korean War, and

paramilitary formations. He is currently completing a book

about China’s use of force since 1949. Dr. Scobell holds a

B.A. in History from Whitman College, an M.A. in

International Studies from the University of Washington,

and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University.

DR. LARRY M. WORTZEL is Director of the Asian Studies

Center of The Heritage Foundation, a public policy think

tank in Washington, DC. Prior to joining Heritage, he was a

colonel in the U.S. Army and the Director of the Strategic

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. During the 32

years of his military career, he lived and worked in the

Asia-Pacific region for 12 years, where he focused on

intelligence, policy, and security issues. He served as a

military attache at the U.S. Embassy in China twice

(1988-90 and 1995-97). Dr. Wortzel received his B.A. from

Columbus College, Georgia, and his M.A. and Ph.D. from

the University of Hawaii. His published works include Class 

in China (Greenwood Press, 1987), China’s Military

Modernization (Greenwood Press, 1988), The ASEAN

Regional Forum: Asian Security without an American

Umbrella (Strategic Studies Institute, 1996), Dictionary of

Contemporary Chinese Military History (Greenwood Press,

1999), and The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century

(Strategic Studies Institute, 1999).

v
THE ASIA-PACIFIC IN THE

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY CALCULUS

FOR A NEW MILLENNIUM

In the 20th century the Asia-Pacific region became a

focal point of U.S. national security interest.

1

 In the 21st

century the Asia-Pacific region threatens to supplant

Europe as the region of paramount national security

interest to the United States. Despite the strong Eurocentrism long dominant in the U.S. national security

establishment, the United States has long seen Asia as a

vast potential market and an important source of raw

materials. The United States has a 100-year history as an

Asia-Pacific power—an era that began with the annexation

of Hawaii and the Philippines in 1898. Since then, Asia’s

strategic importance has only grown. This is reflected in the

fact that U.S. Army battle deaths since 1945 were more than

double those incurred in the Asia-Pacific Theater during

World War II.

2

 Five of the seven defense and security

agreements and treaties to which the United States

committed itself since 1945 are in Asia.

3

 In addition to three

military conflicts in Asia during the 20th century, the

closest to the brink of war that the United States has come

in the 1990s has been in Asia: a confrontation with North

Korea over Pyongyang’s nuclear program in 1993-94 and

the crisis in the Taiwan Strait in early 1996.

4

The most serious flash point in Asia today continues to

be Korea. This was demonstrated by the launch of the Taepo 

Dong 1 ballistic missile on August 31, 1998, on a trajectory

over Japan and by the naval battle that took place between

North and South Korean vessels on June 13, 1999.

5

 In the

year 2000, a state of war continues to exist on the Korean

Peninsula. A North Korean regime that many predicted

would collapse has a significant weapons of mass

destruction (WMD) capability and missiles capable of

delivering a warhead perhaps as far away as Alaska and

Hawaii.

6

1
Today, foreign trade with Asia is as vital to the United

States as that with Europe, and approximately 100,000 U.S.

military personnel are stationed in the Asia-Pacific.

7

 The

United States places great emphasis on the region’s security

and stability. Unfettered access to the sea and air lines of

communication necessary to maintain commerce and

economic growth in Asia is vital to the United States, its

allies, and friends. As the Secretary of Defense wrote in the

1999 Annual Report to the President and the Congress: “The

United States seeks a stable and economically prosperous

East Asia that embraces democratic reform and market

economics.”

8

 Specifically, the report identifies as the most

significant danger to U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific

region the military threat posed by the Democratic People’s

Republic of Korea (DPRK) both to South Korea and to the

37,000 U.S. troops stationed there as part of our forward

presence.

9

 The United States seeks a peaceful resolution to

the Korean conflict, desires to maintain its current alliance

structure in Asia, and to build on its bilateral alliances. In a

departure from earlier policies, the United States also

supports multilateral security efforts in Asia, such as the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional

Forum (ARF).

10

The national interest of the United States is best served

by a region free of conflict, and the majority of countries in

the Asia-Pacific agree that the presence of American forces

is key to regional peace and stability.

11

 More broadly, in

addition to fulfilling a security role in the region, the United

States wants to use its influence and leadership to expand

democracy in the region and to counter such transnational

threats to peace as the proliferation of missiles and WMD,

illegal trafficking in drugs, and terrorism.

12

The U.S. role as a “security guarantor and regional

balancer” in the Asia-Pacific is important and worthy of

further discussion.

13

 In its most recent update of the East

Asia Strategy Review, the Department of Defense made it

clear that being the dominant power in the region is not part

of the U.S. vision. Rather, the United States seeks a balance

2
of power wherein no country is in a position to become a

hegemon by dictating to the other countries in the region

how territorial, security, or economic matters will be

solved.

14

 The enlargement of democracy and market

economies in Asia are also important U.S. interests related

to humanitarian concerns and the region’s vitality.

The cornerstone of U.S. policy in the Pacific is the strong

economic relationship and military alliance with Japan.

Relations with the Republic of Korea are also key to U.S.

interests in the Pacific. That said, special attention to China

is a feature of nearly all U.S. strategy documents on the

Asia-Pacific. China is the most populous country in the

world, has the largest military force, and by virtue of

geography, dominates the region. Historically, from the 3rd

century to the 19th century, China exercised suzerainty

over most of the region. U.S. foreign policy and security

strategy commits the nation to continued engagement with

the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a means to

encourage Beijing to fully integrate itself responsibly in the

world community.

15

 Despite the strains in U.S.-China

relations during 1999 over the accidental bombing of the

Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia by U.S aircraft during

Operation Allied Force, the Cox Report on Chinese

espionage, and allegations of illegal campaign financing in

the United States by China’s intelligence services, it is

simply impossible to ignore and isolate China today.

16

Neither the realities of the post-Cold War world nor the

actions of U. S. friends and allies in the Pacific or Europe

will permit a return to the past. Some form of engagement

with China has been a factor in U.S. security policy since

1971. Given China’s permanent membership on the United

Nations Security Council, its role and influence on the

Korean Peninsula, in Southeast Asia, and South Asia, its

economic weight, and its activities as a provider of advanced

weapons and technology to other countries, the United

States will maintain a basic policy of continued contact with

China. There will be some military and security component

of that engagement policy, despite recurrent strains. China

3
has a history of isolation, xenophobia, and the use of force

along its periphery.

17

 The United States seeks to encourage

China to become more politically, economically, and even

militarily integrated into the Asia-Pacific region.

Notwithstanding the emphasis on China, however, the most

important component of U.S. security policy in the region is

the alliance with Japan.

The Human Rights Issue.

There is a certain tension inherent in the American goals

of promoting democratic reform and the authoritarian

traditions in Asia. Leaders from countries with which the

United States enjoys some of the closest friendships in the

region, Singapore, for instance, argue forcibly for a different

understanding of human rights than Washington. Asian

values, explain the leaders from these countries, emphasize

the stability of society and the general well-being and health

of the populace over the emphasis placed by the United

States and the West on rights of individuals.

18

 China and a

number of ASEAN states share this alternative view.

19

 One

argument that is often heard from China in particular is

that a low “educational and cultural level,” as well as social

tradition, make the Western liberal form of human rights

with its emphasis on the individual and self-determination

inappropriate for Asia.

20

 Liberal democracy and free

elections, so successful in Japan and Thailand, are political

institutions that are characterized by critics of U.S. strategy

as foreign, and imposed there by the post-war American

presence. But that argument is belied by the successful

transitions to democracy of the Republic of Korea, the

Philippines, and Taiwan.

21

 The broad trend is toward the

establishment of a civil society and democratization, and

those countries that have embraced democracy in East Asia

have been successful.

4
The Security Environment Today.

The Military Dimension. The continued military threat

posed to the Republic of Korea (ROK) by the DPRK (North

Korea) is the greatest danger in the region.

22

 This threat

demands the presence of a United Nations Command on the

Korean Peninsula, because a state of war still exists there.

But other threats to peace and stability continue to exist.

China refuses to renounce the use of force against

Taiwan to reunite that island with the mainland.

23

 China’s

claims to the disputed Spratly Islands, in the South China

Sea, also pose a latent danger to security. Although Beijing

has told ASEAN that it will discuss joint development in the

South China Sea, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)

continues to establish new military outposts and upgrade

existing structures on reefs in the disputed areas, most

recently on Mischief Reef, claimed also by the Philippines.

24

China’s National Defense Law, which charges the PLA with

the responsibility to defend its extensive maritime claims, is

also threatening to China’s neighbors. Japan, China, and

Taiwan also dispute control of the Senkaku Islands, in the

East China Sea. There have been demonstrations of

military force there.

25

 Russia continues to occupy the

Northern Territories of Japan, which it occupied after

World War II.

26

 Despite the degraded capability of the

Russian military, that dispute has yet to be settled. Table 1

shows existing threats and conflicting territorial claims.

27

Instability and Non-military Conflicts. From a military

security standpoint, although the Asia-Pacific region has

been relatively stable since the U.S. withdrawal from

Vietnam, there have been serious conflicts. Vietnam was

unified by force in 1975 and then invaded Cambodia 3 years

later. China invaded Vietnam in 1979, Myanmar military

forces repeatedly have crossed the border into Thailand,

and China has threatened to invade Taiwan and attacked

ships from Vietnam in the South China Sea. The insurgency

in Sri Lanka continues to simmer, and India and Pakistan

5
TABLE 1

Country/Area International Dispute(s)

Bangladesh •boundary with India

Brunei •may wish to purchase the Malaysian salient

that divides the country

•Spratly Islands claims

•Louisa Reef “exclusive fishing zone”

proclaimed

Cambodia •offshore islands, boundary with Vietnam

•maritime boundary with Vietnam

•border with Thailand

•maritime boundary with Thailand

China •boundary with India

•two sections of the boundary with Russia

•boundary with Tajikistan

•boundary with North Korea

•Spratly Island claims

•maritime boundary with Vietnam

•Paracel Islands occupied by China, claimed

by Vietnam and Taiwan

•claims Japanese-administered Senkaku-shoto

(Senkaku Islands/Diaoyu Tai)

•land border with Vietnam

India •boundary with China

•status of Kashmir, against Pakistan

•Indus River water resources, with Pakistan

•boundary with Bangladesh

Indonesia •sovereignty over East Timor Province

•demarcation line with Vietnam on

continental shelf in South China Sea, near

Natuna Island

•two islands in dispute with Malaysia

Japan •Kurile Islands, against Russia

•Liancourt Rocks (Takeshima/Tokdo)

disputed with South Korea

• Senkaku-shoto (Senkaku Islands) claimed

by China and Taiwan

North Korea •33-km section of boundary with China

•Demarcation Line with South Korea

6
South Korea •Demarcation Line with North Korea

•Liancourt Rocks (Takeshima/Tokdo)

claimed by Japan

Laos •parts of the border with Thailand

Malaysia •Spratly Islands against China, Philippines,

Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei

•Sabah State claimed by the Philippines

•Malaysian salient dividing Brunei

•two islands in dispute with Singapore

•islands in Celebes Sea, in dispute with

Indonesia

•offshore demarcation line with Vietnam

Pakistan •status of Kashmir, with India

•Indus River water rights

Philippines •Spratly Islands

•claims Malaysian state of Sabah

Singapore •two islands in dispute with Malaysia

Spratly Islands •all of the Spratly Islands are claimed by China,

Taiwan, and Vietnam; parts of them are claimed

by Malaysia and the Philippines

•in 1984, Brunei established an exclusive fishing

zone, which encompasses Louisa Reef in the

southern Spratly Islands, but has not publicly

claimed the island

Taiwan •claims by China, Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam,

Brunei

•Paracel Islands occupied by China, but claimed

by Vietnam and Taiwan

•Japanese-administered Senkaku-shoto

(Senkaku Islands/Diaoyu Tai)

Thailand •parts of the border with Laos, Cambodia

•maritime boundary with Cambodia

Vietnam •maritime boundary with Cambodia

•Spratly Islands

•maritime boundaries with China, Malaysia

•Paracel Islands occupied by China

•Offshore islands and sections of boundary with

Cambodia

•sections of land border with China

•demarcation line with Indonesia on continental

shelf near Natuna Island

7
face each other on the Line of Control in the intractable

Kashmir dispute. And the Korean Peninsula is a continuing

source of tension. But other forms of conflict could also

destabilize the region. Conflict does not always mean war,

and factors with the potential for internal or external

competition and friction must be considered . 

Political instability, ethnic conflict, and religious strife

are also present in the Asia-Pacific. In South Asia the

disputed areas of Jammu and Kashmir have been the focus

of three wars between India and Pakistan. For months in

mid-1999, the two countries clashed as India used ground

and air forces to drive Pakistani guerrillas from Indiancontrolled Kashmir. This half-century-old conflict seems to

defy resolution. While both countries are loath to attribute

these conflicts solely to religious and ethnic differences,

they play a major role by placing the Indo-Pakistani border

in intractable dispute. With nuclear weapons and missile

delivery systems under the control of New Delhi and

Islamabad, the standoff on their border is now a far more

serious problem. It is unclear how the military regime that

seized power in October 1999 in Pakistan will affect the

situation on the subcontinent.

Before May 1998, it appeared that the state of tension

that existed between China and India over their mutual

border was being resolved. However, when India’s Defense

Minister George Fernandes strongly criticized Chinese

military intentions in the Indian press immediately after

the departure of General Fu Quanyou, the Chief of the

General Staff Department of the Chinese People’s

Liberation Army, it was clear that the Sino-Indian rift had

merely been papered over.

28

 Fernandes’ insult to General

Fu reminded the Chinese of the way that Jawaharlal Nehru

had treated Zhou Enlai in the negotiations over the

McMahon Line in 1960.

29

 India used the threat posed by

China’s existing nuclear arsenal as justification for its own

nuclear tests of May 1998, and Pakistan followed with tests

on May 28 and 30, 1998.

30

 The Pakistani missile systems

and nuclear weapons were built with considerable

8
assistance from China; a fact not lost on New Delhi, which

only compounds the poor state of Sino-Indian relations.

31

Mutual suspicion between China and India over intentions

in the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean also remain

factors that affect relations between the two countries and

create concerns in the rest of Asia. A security study by

Chinese scholars in 1993 expressed concerns over Indian

naval expansion into the South China Sea, also a latent

concern of Australia, Malaysia, and Singapore.

32

Indonesia, the fourth most populous country in the world

and the planet’s largest Muslim state has also been a center

of instability in the wake of the 1997-98 East Asian financial

crisis. Problems that were exacerbated by the economic

situation only worsened already-existing ethnic and

religious tensions. Malaysia shares similar economic and

stability problems, particularly with Chinese minorities

who, since well before independence, have been concentrated in the banking and commercial sectors. This

conspicuous ethnic concentration of wealth has made the

Chinese citizens of those countries the target of periodic

ethnic attacks.

In Indonesia pressure for political reform led to the

ouster of President Suharto in 1998 and the electoral defeat

of his successor, B.J. Habibie, in 1999. It is not clear how

well the new administration of President Abdurrahman

Wahid will cope with the myriad of problems confronting

the country. While the Indonesian parliament on October

20, 1999, ratified the August 30 pro-independence vote in

East Timor (as of this writing the former Portuguese colony

was under United Nations’ trusteeship and all Indonesian

military forces had left the territory), ethnic and religious

strife continue to plague the country and secessionist

movements persist in areas like the Aceh region of western

Sumatra.

In Malaysia, President Mahathir Mohamad has used a

series of legal maneuvers to suppress his political

challenger.

33

 Mahathir, the longest serving democratically

9
elected leader in Asia, led his party to another electoral

triumph in November 1999, although with a reduced

majority in the parliament. The most noteworthy outcome

of the election was the dramatically improved showing of

the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party known as PAS.

34

 This

tendency to use rule by law, rather than the rule of law, to

maintain its ruling People’s Action Party in power also

exists in Singapore, but does not presently threaten

stability there. In both places, but more sharply in

Indonesia, the ethnic and religious tensions have the

potential to explode out of control and turn into the sort of

mass-hatred and “ethnic cleansing” that engulfed the

Balkans, most notably in Kosovo, in the recent past. Such an

outcome would affect Australia, a traditional and staunch

ally of the United States, and Singapore, which has

permitted the United States to maintain a naval presence.

In Oceania, where Australia exercises the most

influence, there are also serious security problems. A coup

was attempted in Papua New Guinea by mercenaries and a

low-level insurgency continues on the island of

Bougainville.

Instability threatens Cambodia, where rival factions

still fight along the northern border with Laos and

Thailand. The March 6, 1999, arrest of Ta Mok, the Khmer

Rouge leader, helped stabilize the situation somewhat.

35

Moreover, the populace of Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos

face the continued threat of land mines. Many of these were

left from the Vietnam War, a legacy of the United States.

But the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and subsequent

internal war there with Chinese-supported forces also left a

considerable number of land mines behind. The U.N. still

manages a major demining effort in Cambodia.

Tensions persist along the Thailand-Myanmar border

fueled by the presence of refugees from Myanmar living in

camps along the Thai side of the border. The Thai

government, for example, has permitted the Karen ethnic

group to maintain camps inside.

36

 The Karen are opposed to

10
the rule of the existing regime in Myanmar, the State Peace

and Development Council (SPDC, formerly called the State

Law and Order Restoration Commission, or SLORC) and

are conducting a cross-border guerrilla war from refugee

camps in northwest Thailand.

37

 While the Thai and

Myanmar governments seem to have worked out a modus

vivendi, should the Karen rebels conduct a major offensive,

initiate acts of serious economic sabotage, or threaten the

rule of the SPDC, the potential exists for large-scale

incursions into Thailand by the Myanmar Army against

Karen camps. The extreme actions of radical groups from

Myanmar have also caused turmoil inside Thailand

recently. The most shocking incident was the seizure by 10

gunmen from Myanmar of a Thai hospital filled with

hundreds of staff and patients on January 24, 2000.

38

Finally, Southeast Asia, Myanmar and Thailand in

particular, are ravaged by prostitution, drugs, and the

AIDS epidemic wrought by these two social problems. An

indication of the magnitude of this problem is that in 1995

the HIV-positive rate among Thai military recruits was

more than 15 percent.

39

Security Structures in the Asia-Pacific.

In Asia, there is no multilateral security structure to

provide for collective defense or the management of regional

security issues such as the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Europe. In the Americas,

the United States relied on the Rio Pact to serve as a

security mechanism and bulwark against the Soviet Bloc. In

Asia, however, security issues have defied regional

approaches and, for the United States as well as for Russia,

bilateral or limited multilateral approaches have been the

norm.

The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), a

sub-regional grouping that was based on Cold War

containment strategy led by the United States, withered in

11
the heat of the U.S. war in Vietnam.

40

 Seeking to stabilize

peninsular Southeast Asia after independence for

Singapore, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia,

Singapore and Malaysia formed the Five-Power Defense

Arrangement (FPDA).

41

 While still extant, the FPDA is

strained today as much by new hostility between Singapore

and Malaysia as by the limitations of combined training

among the member countries because the financial crisis in

Asia has reduced defense budgets. It was far stronger and

served as a confidence-building and security mechanism in

the 1960s and 1970s, when a new Singapore was fearful it

would be swallowed by Malaysia; both of those countries

were wary of Indonesia; and a communist insurgency was

still simmering. The ANZUS pact, the trilateral

organization of Australia, New Zealand, and the United

States, was weakened considerably when New Zealand

refused to permit U.S. nuclear-armed (or powered) ships or

aircraft to visit or operate in its sovereign territory. U.S.

bonds with Australia remain strong, but American security

ties with New Zealand are weaker, and will continue to be

limited so long as New Zealand maintains its anti-nuclear

stance.

The bilateral alliances of the United States in Asia either

grew out of World War II or emerged during the Cold War.

Originally designed to guarantee security against

communism and the Soviet Union, the U.S.-Japan and

U.S.-Republic of Korea security agreements are strong

today. Our security ties with Japan are the most important.

They are the bedrock of the U.S.-Pacific presence.

42

 The

U.S.-Thailand security agreement perhaps had more teeth

during the Vietnam War era, but our bilateral ties with

Thailand are important to both countries and there is still

strategic glue in the treaty. The final U.S. security treaty

that existed in the region, the Mutual Security Treaty with

the Republic of China, was abrogated unilaterally by the

United States when President Carter recognized the PRC

as the sole government of China on January 1, 1979. The

U.S. is still obligated to maintain a security relationship

12
with Taiwan, however, by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)

of 1979.

43

 The TRA makes clear “that the U.S. decision to

establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of

China rests on the expectation that the future of Taiwan

will be determined by peaceful means.”

44

 The Act also

requires that the United States provide arms to Taiwan of a

defensive character and maintain its own (the United

States) capacity to resist any “resort to force or other forms

of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social

or economic system, of the people in Taiwan.”

45

 It is a finely

worded document with intentional ambiguity built into it,

which nevertheless makes it clear that some security

relationship remains between the United States and its

former ally. One source of controversy is the U.S.-Japan

Joint Logistics Support Agreement, renegotiated in 1997, as

it applies to contingencies involving Taiwan.

46

Future Challenges and Desired Outcomes.

How the division of the Korean Peninsula is resolved

presents the greatest challenge not only to the United

States, but to all of the countries in the region. There is no

single security problem in Asia that could bring us into war

with such certainty. The balance of forces in the Taiwan

Strait are also a matter of serious concern. Any attempt by

the PRC and its PLA either to blockade the island of Taiwan

to pressure its reunification through the use of force, or to

invade the island is sure to evoke a strong American

response. This was the case in March 1996, when two U.S.

aircraft carrier battle groups were sent south of Taiwan

when the PLA bracketed the island with M-9 ( Dong

Feng-15) missiles.

47

 In South Asia, the nuclear balance

between India and Pakistan has eroded U.S. security policy

and leadership, in the effort to counter the proliferation of

WMD and their delivery means. In Sri Lanka a bloody

communal war continues between the Tamil minority and

the Sinhalese majority. In Southeast Asia and the South

China Sea, the transition of Cambodia to stability and the

removal of land mines are important to the United States,

13
and affect directly a U.S. ally, Thailand. In neighboring

Myanmar the ruling military junta refused to accept the

outcome of a democratic election. This junta, the SPDC, is

engaged in a counter-insurgency war that often involves

cross-border military operations into Thailand against a

Myanmar minority group, the Karen. And in Indonesia, a

society with a precarious balance of Muslim, Christian,

Hindu, and Confucian faiths and cultures is percolating as

the country confronts major economic and political

challenges. These religious and ethnic schisms, as they

rupture, have the potential to boil over and affect the social

orders of Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines, which to

one extent or another share the diverse ethnic and religious

makeup of Indonesia.

48

Turning to Northeast Asia, North Korea now depends on

outside sources for about 25 percent of its food supply.

49

Despite the collapse of its policy of self-reliance and the near

collapse of its economy (as many as a million North Koreans

may have starved to death), the North maintains a strong

military with forward-emplaced artillery directly

threatening South Korea. The North also has a formidable

special operations capability that could cripple defenses in

the South and disrupt the economy. Despite its economic

problems, North Korea continues to launch dangerous,

provocative commando operations against the South. As

noted earlier, in August 1998, in a move that shocked

United States and Japanese observers, North Korea

launched a ballistic missile.

50

 Whether this was a failed

satellite launch, as claimed by Pyongyang, or not, North

Korea demonstrated that it may soon be able to hit the

United States with these missiles.

51

 This capability is

especially alarming because when the Agreed Framework

was negotiated with North Korea in 1994, the Central

Intelligence Agency concluded that Pyongyang’s nuclear

weapons program might have obtained enough plutonium

for one or two devices.

52

 Ideally, through patient diplomacy

backed by the teeth of our strong military presence on the

Korean Peninsula, the reconciliation of the two Koreas can

14
take place peacefully (see conclusion). But a sudden collapse

in the North or a last-ditch military adventure by

Pyongyang against the South is possible. In either case,

Chinese military leaders have made it clear that U.S. forces

would not be welcome along the Sino-North Korean border.

The North Korean missile launch has also raised the

specter of another eventuality that would send chills

throughout Asia—the possibility of Japanese remilitarization and military action. According to Akitaka Saiki,

deputy press secretary to Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi,

Japan’s constitution permits preemptive attacks for

self-defense, even if Japan has suffered no damage or

attack. Indeed, the concept of self-defense, according to

Defense Minister Hosei Norota, would permit Japan to

launch preemptive strikes on North Korean missile bases

or bases in other countries.

53

Regional Trends.

The broad trend in the Asia-Pacific region has been to

subordinate political and military competition to the

maintenance of an environment that encouraged economic

development and prosperity through trade. While matters

of national sovereignty occasionally flare, such as in

Kashmir, the Spratly Islands, and the Yellow Sea, nearly all

of the governments in the region seem to avoid serious

conflicts that would jeopardize economic growth. Most of the

countries affected by the Asian financial crisis in 1997-98

rankled at what they say as the heavy-handed approach of

the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

54

Nonetheless, all of the countries in the region have

instituted major structural and institutional economic

reforms. Defense spending, however, has dropped

significantly in many countries.

55

 This has lessened the

likelihood that an arms race would develop in the region,

but has had a negative effect on security cooperation. Those

countries with which the United States normally seeks to

engage with exercise or training activities have not had the

15
funds to be as active as in the past.

56

 There are two

significant, perhaps even alarming, departures from this

trend. First, North Korea is developing new classes of

missiles despite its economic problems. Second, China is

purchasing significant quantities of first-line military

weapons from Russia and is developing new classes of

ballistic and cruise missiles. The People’s Liberation Army

is slowly building its capability to project military force into

the South China Sea.

57

 China’s published defense budget

has only kept up with inflation, according to its July 1998

Defense White Paper, but its hardware purchases and the

missile buildup indicate that much more is being spent on

defense modernization than Beijing admits.

58

 The missile

build-ups in North Korea and in China are particularly

serious and have highlighted the question of whether or not

theater and national missile defenses (TMD and NMD) are

necessary for the Asia-Pacific region. If such missile

defenses are not carefully configured as part of a larger

cooperative security framework in the region, they may

trigger an arms race and increase tensions rather than

reduce them. However, with or without the introduction of

missile defense systems, current trends in Asia have the

potential to spark a serious arms race.

59

 China views missile

defense measures as destabilizing, especially as far as

Taiwan is concerned,because TMD for the island threatens

to negate China’s significant missile strike capability in the

Taiwan Strait.

60

 Moreover, the ambitions of China, Japan,

and the two Koreas could escalate into the militarization of

outer space.

61

Future Challenges.

The simplest way for defense planners and strategists to

deal with how the future may look is by conceiving of it as a

linear projection of the present. This sort of conception

requires a minimum of creative thinking and permits

resource planners to factor in parallel increases in defense

budgets. Even if least-preferred and most-preferred

outcomes are factored in, linear projections are simply

16
easier to deal with from a fiscal and psychological

standpoint. A linear projection of the security situation in

East Asia would have North Korea implode, explode, or

somehow muddle through its present troubles, only to

reconcile somehow into a unified Korean Peninsula. But the

U.S. presence in Asia would not change. This linear

projection does not foresee a world war or even regional

conflict resulting from a North Korean attack on the south.

Such a projection envisions China evolving into a

responsible, albeit authoritarian, power which seeks to

avoid dominating the region through military actions. The

status quo in the Taiwan Strait would remain, with

occasional military demonstrations on either side to deter

the other from action. Under this linear forecast, economic

recovery from the East Asian financial crisis would continue

for Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. These trends,

combined with continued diplomatic and military

engagement by the United States, should produce the sort of

region envisioned in the National Security Strategy.

62

 And

all of this is possible; not likely, but possible. Rather than

outline these bad-better-best scenarios in detail, we will

instead outline some of the significant types of upheavals

and departures from this vision that could seriously

challenge the United States in the next 20-25 years.

The Proliferation of Missiles and Weapons of Mass

Destruction.

 The use of missiles and precision weaponry so

successfully by the United States has made missiles,

especially, a weapon of choice. The lessons of the Gulf War

(1990-91), the ability to use anti-radar missiles to suppress

Iraq’s anti-aircraft batteries, the response to the bombings

of U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998, and the use of precision

weaponry in Kosovo during the air campaign in 1999, have,

for many countries, reinforced the belief that there is a

viable alternative to the sacrifice of soldiers in combat.

Longer-range cruise missiles are expensive, but are

effective in what will become “stand-off warfare.” While this

17
development is not new, what is new is how accurate these

missiles have become, and the ready availability of nuclear,

chemical, biological warheads. Shorter-range missiles, such

as over-the-horizon cruise missiles, are considerably

cheaper and would be effective in controlling contested

waters, straits, or across disputed land borders. These

systems are highly mobile and difficult to hit with

anti-missile systems. More seriously, the best defense

against them is to hunt down launch platforms or storage

areas and strike them. Thus the proliferation and use of

cruise and short-range ballistic missiles, which we see as

highly likely, are also particularly destabilizing because

defense against them requires some kind of strike. Thus the

emphasis by the United States on non-proliferation is

unlikely to succeed because of the very effectiveness

demonstrated by the United States and its allies in using

the weapons. Missile proliferation will be a tremendous

challenge for the U.S. armed forces in Asia. More seriously,

threatened countries or nation state-like actors (here

Taiwan comes to mind) will need to build up the capacity to

attack potential enemies and strike missile launch points or

production facilities.

63

 A volatile crisis, then, could escalate

much more quickly into war in the future, and the United

States could be involved.

Ballistic missiles are perhaps less destabilizing than

cruise missiles as weapons, since we may be able to develop

effective defenses against them, but they are cheaper and

easier to manufacture. These too, will proliferate. India,

Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and China all have

ballistic missile programs and nuclear capabilities.

64

 China

is building a formidable missile force opposite Taiwan to

coerce the people on that island not to opt for

independence.

65

 Right now, according to opinion polls on

Taiwan, that coercion appears to be working. Numerous

surveys conducted between 1995 and 1998 on the island

consistently show 45 percent or more of those interviewed

favor some form of the status quo.

66

 But future voters on

Taiwan may be more independence-minded. The scenario in

18
the Taiwan Strait is particularly alarming because China

continues to threaten the use of force to prevent a

declaration of independence by Taiwan.

67

 The March 2000

presidential election in Taiwan should provide a bellwether

of both the direction of political trends on the island and the

trajectory of Taiwan-mainland relations for the rest of 21

st

century. The goal of unification with Taiwan was

highlighted on the threshold of the new millennium with the

return of the small Portuguese colony of Macao to Chinese

control in December 1999 after more than 450 years of

foreign occupation. Beijing’s propaganda machine played

up this event as a proud day for all Chinese and President

Jiang Zemin recently remarked that now “the task of

resolving the Taiwan issue” is “increasingly urgent.”

68

North Korea’s No Dong and Taepo Dong series missiles

almost guarantee that some form of retaliatory or defense

capability must be developed in Japan and South Korea. In

fact, of all of the emerging threats from “rogue nations,”

North Korea stands out as the main threat in Northeast

Asia. While some doubt that North Korea can survive

another decade given its current problems, others

anticipate the Pyongyang regime will somehow muddle

through.

69

 In Japan, where a new sense of security is

developing, one security specialist at the Institute for

International Policy Studies insisted that China, not North

Korea, is the real target of regional defense buildups in

Asia.

70

The Nation-State as the Primary Actor. As the forgoing

discussion suggests, we believe that the nation-state will

continue to exist and remain the primary structural

component of relations in the region during the 20-25 year

period under discussion. Thus, issues of territorial

sovereignty, national self-determination, political and

economic interest will continue to be resolved between or

among nations. That said, regional groupings and

sub-groupings, such as ASEAN, the security-related

ASEAN regional Forum (ARF), the Asia-Pacific Economic

Cooperation (APEC), the Northeast Asia Cooperative

19
Dialogue (NEACD), and the South Pacific Forum will still

be influential. Non-governmental organizations like

NEACD or the Conference for Security Cooperation in the

Asia-Pacific (CSCAO) will be useful, but will only facilitate

state-to-state relations. The difficulty will be whether a

regional sub-grouping can, or should, successfully begin to

address security issues with a collective voice backed by

arms if necessary, instead of just discussing problems. The

strength of NATO is that it can act, even if it takes some

time to reach a political consensus. In Asia, no sub-regional

group has successfully made the transition from dialogue to

action. If there is a place where nations may come to address

security issues collectively it is probably Northeast Asia.

The periodic belligerence of North Korea combined with its

nuclear and missile capabilities has brought about no

concrete steps between Japan and South Korea to respond

to Pyongyang, but Tokyo and Seoul are talking about the

issue.

71

Ethnicity and Religion. The polarizing trend of ethnic or

religious division and strife that tore apart the Balkans

could manifest itself in Asia. Indeed, such tensions are

already present, as evidenced by the anti-Chinese riots in

Indonesia in 1998. One relic of the colonial period in Asia is

the disproportionate influence or control of national

economies, particularly in Southeast Asia, by minority

ethnic Chinese. Singapore aside, ethnic Chinese, who make

up no more than 10 percent of the population in the states of

Southeast Asia, control 70 to 90 percent of the wealth in

these countries.

72

 There is little tension in Thailand over

ethnicity, and most Chinese there have been assimilated. In

Vietnam, after unification in 1975, the massive expulsion of

ethnic Chinese led to problems in Malaysia, the Philippines,

and Thailand as refugees fled. In fact, one pretext used by

China as justification for its 1979 attack on Vietnam was to

“punish” that country for its treatment of what Beijing

called “overseas Chinese compatriots.”

That exodus from Vietnam was an irritant, but not a

threat to regional security and stability. Nor did it

20
fundamentally affect U.S. interests. A major, destructive

round of attacks on ethnic Chinese, such as what happened

in 1998 in Indonesia, however, could so destabilize that

country that an evacuation of U.S. citizens might be

necessary. The United States might also be asked to

cooperate with Australia to help stabilize the situation. One

of Australia’s security concerns is that serious unrest in

Indonesia could lead to destabilizing refugee outflows into

the Northern Territories. A similar scenario might affect

Malaysia. In both Indonesia and Malaysia, which are

predominantly Muslim, Chinese are not only ethnic, but

also religious minorities. If the U.S. Department of Defense

is currently maintaining approximately one division in the

Balkans on humanitarian missions, could it, or would it do

the same in Southeast Asia?

On the border between Myanmar and Thailand another

manageable irritant could turn into a major crisis with the

potential to involve the United States. In a small series of

enclaves on the Thai side of the border north and southwest

of Chiangmai, the Royal Thai Armed Forces have allowed

the Karen people to maintain villages and farms.

73

 The

Karen are a distinct ethnic group in Myanmar who are also

different from the predominant religion there because they

are primarily Christians (a legacy of the British colonial

period and the Karen’s service with British forces fighting

the Japanese in World War II). The Karen National

Liberation Army conducts a low-level insurgency against

the Myanmar Army, which could escalate. In the event that

the conflict grows more serious, Burmese troops would

undoubtedly violate the territorial sovereignty of Thailand

to suppress the guerrillas. They have done this before, in

small scale, resulting in clashes with the Royal Thai Army.

A larger scale offensive against the Karen could escalate to a

major clash with a traditional U.S. ally putting the United

States in the difficult position of somehow assisting in the

situation.

Control of Natural Resources. Resource conflicts are also

potential sources of regional instability. In Indochina, the

21
headwaters of the Mekong River begin in China and flow

along the Lao-Thai border through Cambodia into Vietnam.

Security thinkers at strategy institutes in Vietnam are

concerned that efforts to control the headwaters of the

Mekong in China or Laos could dry up the major source of

water for Cambodia and southern Vietnam’s rice crops.

74

Similar concerns are expressed in Hanoi about efforts in

China to control the headwaters of the Red River, which

feeds agriculture in the Hanoi-Haiphong delta. Resource

concerns like this may be of peripheral interest to the

United States today, but could become explosive security

issues that might disrupt regional security. Analysts in

Bangkok and in other institutes studying Asia make similar

arguments about control of the headwaters of the Chao

Phya, Salween, Irrawaddy, Brahamaputra, and Ganges

Rivers, all of which are in China. Major water control

projects in China, they argue, could have deleterious effects

on Thailand, Burma, Nepal, Bangladesh, and India.

75

Conclusion: “Shaping” and “Pivotal States.”

The greatest and most fundamental future challenge to

the United States in the Asia-Pacific region may simply be

to maintain a presence. A peaceful resolution of the division

of the Korean Peninsula could lead to broader challenges to

the continued forward stationing of U.S. troops in Northeast

Asia. A resurgent, expansionist, or nationalistic Russia

could emerge in the coming years, which would require a

response from the United States. And China, which many

analysts of strategic affairs believe is a country focused on

internal matters with no history of expansion, could turn

into a more modern state with an effective military force.

Thus any U.S. withdrawal from the Asia-Pacific could serve

as a catalyst for the destabilization of the region. The United

States must nurture and strengthen relationships with its

traditional allies: Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia,

Thailand, and the Philippines. Today all of these countries

are democracies and share our values.

22
Beyond this immediate attention to military presence

and alliances, the United States should pay greater

attention to “shaping” the Asia-Pacific region. The United

States tends to give most attention to the “responding” and

“preparing” aspects of our National Security Strategy and

National Military Strategy. In shaping, all the elements of

national power should be employed—including “soft”

dimensions—to decrease tensions and nurture the regional

trends of democratization and marketization. A comprehensive approach of engagement that includes commercial,

educational, and cultural programs as well as militaryto-military relations is necessary.

To have a reasonable chance of success, a concerted

“shaping initiative” in U.S. policy toward Asia must be

consensus-based, sustained, and focused. There must be a

bipartisan consensus that such an effort is important.

Furthermore, coordination and planning between the

executive branch agencies and the Congress is essential. It

is very difficult for any policy initiative to rise above the

bureaucratic infighting and partisan politics of

Washington.

76

 To be sustained, a presidential advisory

group should be established and charged with: (a) designing

a road map for U.S. policy toward Asia with a 20- to 25-year

time horizon, and (b) developing a coordinating mechanism

for whatever policy is devised—along the lines suggested by

the Perry Report that reviewed U.S. policy toward North

Korea.

77

The foundations for thriving democracies and vibrant

open markets are not formed in a matter of a few years;

rather, such institutions require decades of effort and

persistent optimism in the face of inevitable setbacks and

crises. Democratization in particular is a difficult and

frustrating process. And the Asia-Pacific region

encompasses dozens of extremely diverse countries, all in

different stages of political, economic, and social

development. A “one size fits all” approach is ill advised.

Moreover, in the current post-Cold War resource23
constrained policy environment, customizing an initiative

for each country is simply unworkable.

A shaping policy that is focused on a handful of linchpin

or “pivotal” states is the only realistic option.

78

 These are

volatile countries upon which the stability and prosperity of

the region or a sub-region hinge. Clearly, one such country is

China. Without a peaceful, prosperous China firmly

integrated into the global economic system, the bright

future of the Asia-Pacific region cannot be assured. The

critical bilateral relationship to facilitate this is the

U.S.-China relationship.

After some difficult years in the Washington-Beijing

ties, the trade and Belgrade embassy compensation

agreements reached in late 1999 hold out the promise of

continued improvement in bilateral ties.

79

 While a host of

other thorny issues confront bilateral relations, both sides

have important interests in continued cordial ties. The most

potentially explosive issue for the foreseeable future is

Taiwan. Tensions may periodically increase in the Taiwan

Strait and the threat of hostilities there is real.

80

Washington must continue to press both Beijing and Taipei

to work towards a peaceful resolution of their ongoing

dispute. And China has changed in profound ways over the

course of two decades of reforms. These changes are not

limited to market-oriented economic reforms—there have

also been significant political and social transformations

that might become building blocks for democratization in

the 21

st

 century.

81

Indonesia is the pivotal state in Southeast Asia.

82

 As the

most populous and expansive state in the sub-region,

Indonesia is very much also a pivot for the entire region. As

noted earlier in this monograph, this sprawling archipelago

confronts enormous political, economic, social, and ethnic

challenges. Nevertheless, dramatic changes in 1998 and

1999, including the election of a new president, acceptance

of independence for East Timor, and a surprisingly resilient

economy, hold significant promise for Jakarta.

24
North Korea is the pivotal country in Northeast Asia and

arguably a key state upon which the security and prosperity

of the entire Asia-Pacific region hinges. The Korean War is

still technically and de facto ongoing: since the hot war

finished with the 1953 armistice, a cold war has existed.

Now, half a century after the outbreak of hostilities in June

1950, it is time for the United States to seek a peace

settlement on the peninsula. After the dramatic and

remarkable progress in managing the communal conflicts

in the Middle East and Northern Ireland, the United States,

in coordination with its friends and allies, should begin a

peace process in Northeast Asia. However, no peace process

can move forward without our staunch ally, the Republic of

Korea, being fully consulted and in complete accord. The

goal should be to render obsolete the tripwire at the 38th

Parallel. Whether this entails the continued existence of

two Korean states or unification, the matter is ripe for

shaping. 

While in conventional wisdom the Pyongyang regime is

depicted as an irrational and unpredictable player, upon

closer examination its actions seem very rational and quite

predictable.

83

 Hence it is feasible to conceive of a

rapprochement with North Korea. Indeed, the major barrier

to improved relations may be the actions to date of the

United States. Too often the United States has concentrated

exclusively on either a ‘carrot’ or ‘stick’ approach rather

than attempting to use the two in tandem.

84

 Dealing with

North Korea is admittedly a tricky business even in the best

of circumstances. Focusing exclusively on Pyongyang’s

nuclear and missile capability and status as a proliferator

has its pitfalls. It is advisable to build a relationship across a

broader front. Certainly WMD capability and delivery

systems are the most critical aspects of the North Korean

issue but developing bilateral relations in this area alone

provides a fragile and narrow base upon which to build

future growth. Moreover, while the United States should

proceed expeditiously, Washington should avoid the

temptation to rush into agreements and appear to

25
reward—-and hence reinforce—Pyongyang’s brinkmanship

behavior with various material quid pro quos. The

establishment of liaison offices and the normalization of

relations should be done slowly and carefully, and only in

response to tangible progress and verifiable concessions

from North Korea. Starting modestly and gradually to

increase non-official and non-political interaction and

exchanges with Pyongyang would be well worth the effort.

We could build a relationship through cultural exchanges

and athletic competitions. Before one dismisses this as a

waste of energy or time, it is worth remembering that

“Ping-Pong diplomacy” was central to paving the way for a

rapprochement with China in the 1970s, and friendly soccer

and wrestling matches have warmed ties with Iran in the

1990s. Even the Women’s World Cup Final championship

game played between China and the United States in the

United States in July 1999 helped warm the chill in

relations between Washington and Beijing. While it is true

that the game took place during a troubled period of

U.S.-China relations and many Chinese believe the U.S.

team won the game unfairly (because the American

goalkeeper violated penalty kick rules), it did prompt an

exchange of goodwill at the highest levels. President Clinton

attended the game, met with the Chinese team afterwards,

and sent a personal note to Chinese President Jiang Zemin

congratulating him on the performance of the Chinese

women. President Jiang responded to President Clinton’s

note the very same day.

85

In fact, sporting and cultural diplomacy has already

begun. The North Korean national women’s soccer team

visited the United States in mid-1999 to participate in the

World Cup Finals. The U.S. team and North Korean teams

actually met on the soccer field in an opening round game.

The contest and, indeed, the North Korean visit itself, can

only be termed a success in regard to the goodwill it

generated. More recently, in December 1999, Roger Clinton,

President Clinton’s half brother, performed in a variety

show along with a troupe of popular entertainers from

26
South Korea before an elite North Korean audience in

Pyongyang. The younger Clinton also met with Kim Yong

Nam, North Korea’s number two leader.

86

 However, while

such people-to-people diplomacy proceeds, military

pressure must continue to be applied. The annual Foal

Eagle exercises between U.S. and South Korean forces

should continue, for example.

Beyond tangible economic benefits, North Korea seeks

international respect and acceptance. If Pyongyang is

forthcoming in other more substantive matters (e.g., lives

up to its agreements in the 1994 Agreed Framework and

1999 Berlin Accord), a full set of cultural and sporting

exchanges can get underway. These can begin on a very

modest basis at the grassroots level. American high school

or college bands and basketball or soccer teams, for

example, could visit North Korea and be reciprocated. Such

activities entail no substantial cost or risk to the United

States but build much needed understanding and goodwill

between populations. It is vital that Washington involve the

American people in the conduct of North Korea policy—the

American public must understand and support this policy

initiative if it is to be sustained and have a chance of

succeeding.

Perhaps, a way can be found for the North to provide a

venue for one or more games in the 2002 World Cup Soccer

Finals. Such a possibility is eminently feasible since, by

being awarded to two countries instead of the usual

one—the tournament is to be hosted jointly by Japan and

South Korea—the event is already unprecedented in world

soccer history.

87

 Possibly, if the U.S. team qualifies, there

exists the prospect of playing one of its opening round games

north of the 38th parallel. The goal of such efforts, of course,

is to reduce Pyongyang’s isolation, provide incentives for the

regime to cooperate on security issues, and beyond that for

North Korea to evolve into a more open and prosperous

society.

27
With an appropriate consensus-based, sustained, and

focused policy initiative on the part of the United States, the

new millennium can herald a new era of prolonged peace

with unprecedented political and economic development for

all the countries of the Asia-Pacific.

ENDNOTES

1. In this monograph the terms Asia-Pacific and Asia will be used

interchangeably to refer to the portion of the globe stretching from

Hawaii to Pakistan and the Aleutian Islands to Australia.

2. The Pacific Theater in World War II cost some 55,000 U. S. Army

lives. The Korean Conflict cost the United States about 54,000 dead, and

Vietnam about 58,000 dead. See The Washington Post, February 6,

1991, p. A17; War Department of the United States, General Staff,

Battle Casualties of the Army, Washington, DC: Office of the Adjutant

General, July 1, 1946; John Ellis, World War II: A Statistical Survey,

New York: Facts of File, 1993, pp. 254-259; Maris A. Vinovskis, “Have

Social Historians Lost the Civil War?,” Journal of American History,

June 1989, p. 34; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,

Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1987, Washington, DC:

Department of Commerce, 1986.

3. The United States has security or defense treaties with Australia

and New Zealand (although because of New Zealand’s stand on nuclear

weapons and warships, our ties to that nation are moribund), Japan,

South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines. In addition, the Taiwan

Relations Act of 1979 commits the United States to maintain the

capacity of that island to defend itself against China. It also declares

that the use of force by the mainland against Taiwan to be a serious

concern to the United States, and declares that blockades or embargoes

against Taiwan that could disrupt the stability of the Asia-Pacific region

to be of grave concern to the United States.

4. Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History,

Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997, chaps. 12 and 13; John W. Garver,

Face Off: China, the United States and Taiwan’s Democratization,

Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997.

5. The Washington Post, June 13, 1999, p. 1.

6. Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United

States, July 15, 1999, Pursuant to Public Law 201, 104th Congress,

28
Honorable Donald R. Rumsfeld, Chairman, accessed at www.fas.org

[hereafter Rumsfeld Report].

7. William S. Cohen, The United States Security Strategy for the

East-Asia-Pacific Region, Washington, DC: Department of Defense,

1998, p. 1 (hereafter cited as East Asia Strategy Report 1998 and

abbreviated as EASR 1998); A National Security Strategy for A New

Century, Washington, DC: The White House, October 1998, pp. 1-10

(hereafter cited as National Security Strategy and abbreviated as NSS).

8. William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the

Congress. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1999, p.

11.

9. Ibid.

10. Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines

to strengthen regional cohesion and self-reliance with special emphasis

on economic, social, and cultural cooperation and development on

August 9, 1967, formed the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN). These five countries are often referred to within ASEAN as

the “forming five.” Brunei was later admitted as a member nation.

Vietnam joined ASEAN in 1995, followed by Laos, Cambodia, and

Burma. The ASEAN dialogue partners are the United States, Canada,

Japan, Russia, South Korea, the European Union, Australia, New

Zealand, China, and India. In testimony before Congress on March 31,

1993, Assistant Secretary of State designate Winston Lord stated the

U.S. willingness to accept and support multilateral approaches to

security in the region. Testimony cited in Susumu Awanohara, “Group

Therapy,” Far Eastern Economic Review, April 15, 1993, accessed on

ProQuest Direct.

11. This was stated eloquently by Congressman Benjamin A.

Gilman in A Pacific Charter: A Blueprint for US Policy in the Pacific in

the 21st Century, Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 1997. See

also Robert H. Scales, Jr. and Larry M. Wortzel, The Future U.S.

Military Presence in Asia: Landpower and the Geostrategy of American

Commitment, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999.

12. National Security Strategy, pp. 1-10, 41-47. 

13. Cohen, Annual Report to the Congress, p. 11.

14. East Asia Strategy Report 1998, pp. 5-8.

15. EASR 1998, pp. 31-34; NSS, pp. 41-47.

29
16. Office of the White House Press Secretary, White House

Response to the Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security

and Commercial/Military Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, 

May 25, 1999; House International Relations Committee Press Release,

Gilman Reaction to Release of Cox Report, May 25, 1999; declassified

text of Cox Report, http://192.215.235.13/China Spy/CoxReport/

Overview.htm.

17. John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of

China, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993, pp. 253-284.

18. Goh Chok Tong, “Social Values, Singapore Style, Current

History, December 1944, pp. 417-422; Melanie Chew, “Human Rights in

Singapore: Perceptions and Problems,” Asian Survey, Vol. XXXIV, No.

11, November 1994, pp. 933-948; Meredith Woo-Cummings, “The ‘New

Authoritarianism’ in East Asia,” Current History, December 1994, pp.

413-416.

19. The Chinese position on human rights has emphasized

satisfying basic needs (food, clothing, shelter) before placing emphasis

on individual freedom. The needs of the individual are subordinated to

the welfare of the group in such a system. See Ding Guangen, “Wei dade

qidian, Lishi de shiming,” (A great starting point, a historical mission),

Qiu Shi, No. 2, October 1999, pp. 2-6. Despite an emphasis on human

rights in international relations, European countries have managed to

separate the human rights and security realms, supplying some defense

technologies to China while emphasizing democratic freedom by

supplying Taiwan with weapons. Christoph Nesshover, “Bonn et Paris

Face a Pekin (1989-1997): Vers une Strategie Commune?” Politique

Etrangere, No. 1, Vol. 64, 1999, pp. 91-106; International Institute for

Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1998/99, London: Oxford

University Press, 1998, pp. 197-198. See also Human Rights in China,

Promoting the Three Basic Freedoms, New York: Human Rights in

China, September 1997.

20. The seminal political science texts of the 1960s and 1970s have

argued to the contrary, making the case effectively that people

inherently know and choose what is in their best interest in the long

term, whether they are peasants or uneducated workers. States that

follow a Leninist model, however, such as China, Singapore, North

Korea, Vietnam, and Taiwan before its move to open elections, argue

that the masses are simply deluded by a “false consciousness” about

their fundamental interests and therefore require a “vanguard of the

party” to lead them. For some of these arguments, see James C. Scott,

The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in

Southeast Asia, London: Yale University Press, 1979; Samuel L.

30
Popkin, The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in

Vietnam, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,

1979; Merle Goldman,Literary Dissent in Communist China, New York:

Atheneum, 1967.

21. Deborah A. Brown, Eric P. Moon, and James A. Robinson,

“Taiwan’s 1998 Local Elections: Appraising Steps in Democratization,”

Asian Survey, Vol. XXXVIII, June 1988, pp. 569-584.

22. National Security Strategy. p. 42; Phil Finnegan, “North Korea

Threatens Uneasy Peace,” Army Times, September 13, 1999, pp. 20-21.

23. James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs, Crisis in the Taiwan Strait,

Washington, DC: National Defense University and American

Enterprise Institute, 1997, pp. 1-10.

24. Chang Pao-Ming, “A New Scramble for the South China Sea

Islands, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 12, No. 1, June 1990, pp.

20-39; ”Territorial Imperative," Far Eastern Economic Review,

February 23, 1995, pp. 14-16; Greg Austin, China’s Ocean Frontier:

International Law, Military Force, and National Development,

Canberra: Allen and Unwin, 1998; Ian James Storey, “Creeping

Assertiveness: China, the Philippines and the South China Sea

Dispute,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 21, No. 1, April 1999, pp.

95-118.

25. Austin, China’s Ocean Frontier, pp. 98-176.

26. Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1994, Tokyo: Japan

Times, 1995. 

27. Table 1 was taken from John Garofano’s article “Flexibility or

Irrevelance: Ways Forward to the ARF” which first appeared in

Contemporary Southeast Asia, April 1999, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 80-81.

Reproduced here with the kind permission of the publisher, Institute of

Southeast Asian Studies.

28. John Pomfret, “China’s Response to India Could Boost its

Reputation,” The Washington Post, May 15, 1998, p. A33.

29. The best and most comprehensive book on the Sino-Indian War

that captures this exchange between Zhou and Nehru is that of Neville

Maxwell, which was based on extensive access to Indian archives.

Neville Maxwell, India’s China War, Bombay: Jaico Publishing House,

1971, pp. 160-163. See also Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of

Deterrence: India and Indochina, Ann Arbor: The University of

Michigan Press, 1975.

31
30. On May 11, 1998, India exploded three nuclear devices, followed

by two more on May 13. Pakistan responded with its own series of tests,

firing five devices on May 28, 1998 and another on May 30. Far Eastern

Economic Review, June 4, 1998, pp. 27-30; Far Eastern Economic

Review, May 21, 1998, pp. 18-20.

31. Pakistan’s five explosions were three sub-kiloton blasts, one

25-kiloton blast and one 12-kiloton blast. See geo.princeton.edu,

Princeton University Bulletin, May 28, 1998. On Chinese transfers of

nuclear materials and missiles to Pakistan, see Far Eastern Economic

Review, June 4, 1998, pp. 30-34.

32. Chu Ko-Chien, Mu Tung, Li Lei, and Chao San-Hai, “China’s

National Security in the Year 2000,” Tang Tai, March 15, 1993, pp.

54-55, translated by Foreign Broadcast Information Service. See also

Larry M. Wortzel, “China Pursues Traditional Great Power Status,”

Orbis, Vol. 38, No. 2, Spring 1994, pp. 157-166.

33. In a long series of legal maneuvers, Mahathir accused his own

designated successor, Anwar Ibrabim, of assault and sodomy. Ibrabim

was arrested and brought to trial, effectively ending any challenge to

Mahathir. Far Eastern Economic Review, May 21, 1998, pp. 18, 21.

34. Keith B. Richburg, “Islamic Group Makes Big Inroads Into

Malaysian Ruler’s Constituency,” The Washington Post, December 1,

1999, p. A38.

35. Ta Mok was arrested in Cambodia on the Thai border, possibly

with the cooperation of the Thai government. Bangkok Post, March 7,

1999, p. 1; The Nation, (Bangkok) March 7, 1999, p. 1.

36. Far Eastern Economic Review,March 6, 1997, p. 34; Far Eastern

Economic Review, February 13, 1997, p. 25.

37. Jensine Larsen, “No Place to Go: Burmese Refugees Can’t Find a

Home,” The Progressive, Vol. 62, No. 11, February 24, 1998, pp. 24-29.

Discussions with Karen National Union and Karen National Liberation

Army officials in Thailand, March 3-6, 1999. Discussion with military

officials of the Royal Thai Armed Forces, Bangkok, Thailand, March 7-9,

1999.

38. Seth Mydans, “For Inept Burmese Rebel Band, Only Death Was

Clear,” New York Times (Washington edition) January 26, 2000, p. A8.

39. HIV positive individuals are those who have tested positive for

HIV antibodies but have yet to exhibit any actual symptoms of the AIDS

32
virus. The statistic comes from P. Renzullo, et al., “HIV Infection Risk in

Young Thai Men Discharged from the Army,” Walter Reed Army

Institute for Research, paper presented at the Third Annual Conference

on AIDS in Asia held in Chiang Mai, Thailand, September 18-21, 1995,

p. 42.

40. SEATO, founded in 1954, was composed of the United States,

the United Kingdom, France, the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan.

41. The Five-Power Defense Arrangement was established in

November 1971. See Phillip Methven, The Five-Power Defense

Arrangement and Military Cooperation among the ASEAN States,

Canberra: Strategic and Defense Studies Center, Australian National

University, 1992.

42. East Asia Strategy Report, 1998, p. 11.

43. The Taiwan Relations Act, Public Law 96-8, H.R. 2479, 22 USC

3301 through 3316; 26 USC 911, 913; 26 USC 3301; 42 USC 401.

44. Ibid., Sec. 2. (b) (3).

45. Ibid., Sec. 2. (b) (5) and (6).

46. The basic security treaty between Japan and the United States

was signed at San Francisco, CA, on September 8, 1951. It has been

updated, amended, and modified almost annually since then through

exchanges of notes. United Nations - Treaty Series216, 1955, No. 1835.

The Guidelines for U.S-Japan Defense Cooperation are listed in East

Asia Strategy Review 1998, p. 21.

47. Office of Naval Intelligence, Chinese Exercise Strait 961: 8-25

March 1996, Washington, DC: Office of Naval Intelligence, May 1996.

48. Goodman, “Ethnic Chinese,” Survival, pp. 140-155.

49. Statement of Admiral Dennis C. Blair, U.S. Navy, Commander

in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, March 3, 1999, http:// www.house.gov

/hasc/ testimony/106thcongress/99-03-03blair.htm, hereafter cited as

Blair Testimony.

50. Blair Testimony, p. 2.

51. The North Korean Taepo Dong I missile already threatens U.S.

forces in the Asia-Pacific region. It has a range of about 2,000 kilometers

and can carry a warhead of several hundred kilograms.

33
52. This assertion was hotly disputed by the Department of State

and nuclear experts in the U.S. Government. See Oberdorfer, The Two

Koreas, p. 307.

53. International Herald Tribune, March 20, 1999, p. 4.

54. Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Japan, and the Republic of

Korea have instituted substantial reforms, and China, which avoided

the crisis, is reforming its banking system.

55. For an analysis of how the crisis has affected Southeast Asia, see

Sheldon W. Simon, The Economic Crisis and ASEAN States’ Security,

Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, October 1998.

56. See East Asia in Crisis.

57. Chong-Pin Lin, “The Power Projection Capabilities of the

People’s Liberation Army,” in Lilley, Lane, et.al., eds, China’s Military

Modernization, London: Kegan Paul, 1996, pp. 100-124.

58. Taeho Kim, “New Trends of Air Force Build-up in East Asia:

Comparison of China, Japan, and Taiwan,” in Chung-in Moon and

Chung Min Lee, eds., Air Power Dynamics and Korean Security,Seoul:

Yonsei University Press, 1999, pp. 107-116, 130.

59. For a sobering analysis of the region, see Paul Bracken, Fire in

the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age,

New York: Harper Collins, 1999.

60. See, for example, Jim Mann, “China Snarls Against ‘Paper

Tiger’,” Los Angeles Times, January 19, 2000. For a thorough overview

of the pros and cons of TMD for Taiwan, see Thomas J. Christensen,

“Theater Missile Defense and Taiwan’s Security,” Orbis, Vol. 44, No. 1,

Winter 2000, pp. 79-90.

61. On China, see Susan V. Lawrence, “Celestial Reach,” Far

Eastern Economic Review December 2, 1999, p. 18; on South Korea, see

Calvin Sims, “South Korea Plans to Begin Rocket Program,” New York

Times, January 15, 2000. North Korea’s launch of the three stage rocket

in August 1998 demonstrates Pyongyang’s interest in space. Japan has

space ambitions although its space program recently suffered setbacks.

See, for example, “Japan Destroys Rocket in Midair as It Lifts $95

Million Satellite,” New York Times (Washington edition), November 16,

1999, p. A5.

62. NSS, pp. 41-47.

34
63. See Stanley J. Dougherty, Defense Suppression: Building some

Operational Concepts, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University

Press, May 1992. See also Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., The Evolution in

Military Affairs: Shaping the Future U.S. Armed Forces, Carlisle

Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, pp. 17-29.

64. Rumsfeld Report.

65. China is developing an entire new class of balllistic missiles

capable of hitting the United States that are mobile and designed as a

first strike weapon. The Washington Times, June 28, 1999, p. 1.

66. See, for example, Mainland Affairs Council, Zhonghuaminguo

Taiwan diqu minzhong dui liangan guanxi de kaifang (public opinion

on cross-strait relations in the Taiwan district of the Republic of China),

Taipei: Mainland Affairs Council, November 1998, p. 1.

67. The July 1999 crisis between Beijing and Taipei is an example of

how quickly the Taiwan-Mainland situation can explode. In an

interview with the press of Germany, Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui

characterized relations between the island and the Mainland as

“nation-to-nation . . . or at least special state-to-special state relations.”

Although Lee’s statement was not an announcement of independence,

and was probably directed toward influencing next year’s elections in

Taiwan, it immediately brought about a strong reaction from Beijing. In

1995, as a result of Lee’s unofficial visit to the United States, China

began a series of exercises in the straits opposite Taiwan and launched

ballistic missiles near the island. “Voice of Germany Interviews Li

Teng-hui,” Taipei Chung-yang Jih-pao, July 10, 1999 in Foreign

Broadcast Information Service online (FBIS), July 12, 1999;

Washington Post, July 14, 1999, p. A17. A Sharp retort from Beijing in

the People’s Liberation Army newspaper renewed the threat to use force

against China in Jiefanjun Bao, July 22, 1999, pp. 1, 4.

68. Elisabeth Rosenthal, “China’s Recovery of Macao Reignites

Dreams of Taiwan,” New York Times, December 18, 1999.

69. Christian Science Monitor, April 8, 1999, p. 12; Marcus Noland,

“Why North Korea Will Muddle Through,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76,

July/September 1997, pp. 105-118.

70. Ibid. See also International Herald Tribune, August 16, 1996, p.

6, where a security expert from Indonesia explicitly identifies China as

the major future threat to Asia.

35
71. The New York Times, August 4, 1999, pp. A1, 6. Defense

planners in Seoul and Tokyo have also discussed the possibility of a

combined military headquarters as a future response to contingencies

in Northeast Asia. See Scales and Wortzel, The Future U.S. Military

Presence in Asia, pp. 15-18.

72. David Goodman, “Are Asia’s ‘Ethnic Chinese’ a Regional

Security Threat,” Survival, Winter 1997-98, pp. 140-155.

73. Far Eastern Economic Review, April 2, 1998, p. 18; January 7,

1999, p.17-18; The News-Times, February 28, 1997, http://www. news

times.com/archive97/feb2897.inf.htm.

74. Interviews in Hanoi, July-August 1998.

75. Interviews in Thailand, April 1999. See also Sen-dao Chang,

“Qianyi Zhongguo Shui Ziyuan Texu Kaifa he Liyong,” (A preliminary

discussion of the special connections of the development and use of

China’s water resources), unpublished conference paper, University of

Hawaii, Summer 1998; “World Bank Considering Guarantee for

Controversial Dam in Laos,” Probe Alert, Toronto: Probe International,

April 1997, pa97apr.htm@www.nextcity.com.

76. A prime example is U.S. policy toward North Korea: compare the

Perry and the Gilman Reports. See Review of the United States Policy

Toward North Korea: Findings and Recommendations, Unclassified

Report by Dr. William J. Perry, U.S. North Korea Policy Coordinator

and Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State,

Washington, DC: October 12, 1999, [hereafter Perry Report] and North

Korea Advisory Group, Report to the Speaker U.S. House of

Representatives, Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman, November 1999, both

accessed online at www.fas.org.

77. See “Key Findings, #6” and “Key Policy Recommendations #2

and #4” in Perry Report.

78. For an elaboration of such an approach, see Robert Chase, Emily

Hill, and Paul Kennedy, eds., The Pivotal States: A New Framework for

U.S. Policy in the Developing World, New York: W.W. Norton, 1999.

79. The compensation package was particularly challenging to

negotiate. In the agreement the United States agreed to pay US$28

million for bomb damage inflicted on the PRC embassy in Belgrade,

Yugoslavia, and China agreed to pay the United States US$2.87 million

for damage done to U.S. diplomatic missions in China by rioting mobs.

See Elisabeth Rosenthal, “U.S. Agrees to Pay China $28 Million for

36
Bombing,” New York Times, December 16, 1999 (Washington edition), p.

A8. 

80. See The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait, Report to

Congress Pursuant to the FY99 Appropriations Bill, February 26, 1999,

accessed online at www.fas.org.

81. Andrew Scobell, “After Deng, What?: Reconsidering the

Prospects for a Democratic Transition in China,” Problems of

Post-Communism, Vol. 44, No. 5, September-October 1997, pp. 22-31.

82. See, for example, John Bresnan, “Indonesia,” in Chase et al., The

Pivotal States, pp. 15-39.

83. See, for example, David Kang, “North Korea: Deterrence

Through Danger,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Practices:

Material and Ideational Sources,Stanford: Stanford University Press,

1998, pp. 234-263; Chuck Downs, Over the Line: North Korea’s

Negotiating Strategy, Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1999.

84. Many argue that we have been too forthcoming with carrots to

the exclusion of the stick (e.g., Downs, Over theLine; Sheldon W. Simon,

“Is There a U.S. Strategy for East Asia?” Contemporary Southeast Asia,

Vol. 21, No. 3, December 1999, pp. 337-338, 340-341. But a case can also

be made for the opposite point of view.

85. Lis Sly, “Relations Score a Timely Reprieve,” South China

Morning Post (Hong Kong), July 17, 1999; Associated Press dispatch,

“Soccer Offers China, U.S. Bright Note,” July 14, 1999. The latter report

is taken from www.nytimes.com/aponline.

86. Associated Press dispatch, “Roger Clinton Meets N. Korean

Leader,” December 7, 1999 accessed in www.nytimes.com/aponline.

87. In fact, North Korea is only one of a handful of states that

declined to enter a team for the preliminary qualifying round of the 2002

World Cup. Significantly, however, the president of the international

soccer federation FIFA, Sepp Blatter, remains receptive to the

possibility of North Korea hosting two games in the final tournament.

Eric Talmadge, “North Korea Eyed for World Cup 2002,” Associated

Press dispatch, Tokyo, December 7, 1999, cited in NAPSNet Daily

Report December 7, 1999, accessed on www.natilus.org /napsnet/dr

/index.html.

37
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Interim Director

Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Authors

Dr. Andrew Scobell

Dr. Larry M. Wortzel

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler