U.S. SUPPORT OF PLAN COLOMBIA:

RETHINKING THE ENDS AND MEANS

Stephen E. Flynn

May 2001
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ii
FOREWORD

This is one of the monographs in the series fro

February 2001 conference onPlan Colombia cosponso

the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army 

College and The Dante B. Fascell North-South Center 

University of Miami. In this short essay, Stephen E. 

provides an intended counterpoint to Dr. Gabriel Mar

lead-off monograph in which he argues that Plan Col

is a brilliantly conceived grand strategy for democrati

and national security.

Dr. Flynn argues that the U.S. emphasis on drug c

in its support of Plan Colombia is misguided and a

prescribing an antibiotic regime to combat a disea

caused by bacteria or similar micro-organisms. The 

drug industry in Colombia is not the cause of that cou

fragile socio-political system, but a symptom of 

contributor to the fragility of the Colombian 

Continuing the analogy, Flynn argues that U.S

Colombian emphasis on combating illicit drug culti

and trafficking leads to several undesirable side effe

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offe

monograph as part of the ongoing clarification 

uncertainty and confusion that permeate the na

security debate involving U.S. policy in Colombia a

implementation of Plan Colombia.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
PREFACE

Stephen Flynn’s credibility on the issue of ant

policy is hard to match. Not only is he a respected s

and a broad strategic thinker, but as a commander 

U.S. Coast Guard, he knows the problems directly fro

front lines.

For those reasons, this monograph, even more th

popular film “Traffic,” is profoundly disquieting. Flyn

us, among another things, that the policy that this co

has been pursuing in Colombia at a huge cost is l

futile. If present U.S. antidrug efforts have been sold 

American public as leading to reduced amounts of 

available on the street, such a suggestion, he tells 

“either naive or duplicitous . . .”

What is even worse, according to Flynn, is that 

drug trade in Colombia is seriously disrupted, it will s

be pushed to Mexico. The result would be “disastrous

Mexico being adjacent to the United States, and w

better organized operation than presently exi

Colombia.

We live in a world of porous borders in which free 

and open-market capitalism are the order of the 

Millions of people, automobiles, trucks, and ma

containers enter this country, as Flynn points out with 

remarkable statistics.

What is to be done? Flynn offers serious alterna

The most important and most obvious is to deal diffe

with this country’s 5 million addicts and frequent 

who consume the overwhelming majority of drugs. 

Simply “invest in long-term treatment,” i.e., rehabilit

which is not now the top priority.

He also advocates a costly and ambitious progr

transparency and enforcement in cross-border acti

v
Add to that a program of spotlighting businesses 

operate outside of established codes and atta

transnational crime more efficiently through eff

international cooperation, which includes the press, ju

systems, and government officials on a broad scale.

If this country is unwilling to make all 

investments, Flynn concludes, it should recognize t

failed prohibitionary approach to drug control does 

harm than good for it ends up serving the intere

organized crime . . .”

What is he telling us? Flynn does not go further int

issues as “lifting the prohibitions.” They will be the s

of national debate, however, as the failures of present 

are more clearly understood.

There could be a number of alternatives. One mi

this: do not legalize or even decriminalize illegal drug 

but re-focus massive expenditures on educatio

treatment. Then deal with the 5 million addicts as 

health patients, not criminals, by offering them a pres

drug dosage with immediate treatment (voluntary) 

will accept it. If each addict spends an avera

hypothetically, $15,000 per year, then removal 

addicts from the market would remove $75 billion fr

delivering potentially a knockout blow to illegal drug 

in this country.

Flynn’s monograph is a great starting point to wak

country’s leaders to realistic analysis and imagi

changes of program and policy. Let the debate begin 

Ambler H. Moss, Jr.

Director

The Dante B. Fascell North-So

 Center

University of Miami

vi
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTH

STEPHEN E. FLYNN is a senior fellow with the Na

Security Studies Program at the Council on Fo

Relations, New York. He is also a Commander in th

Coast Guard as well as Associate Professor of Interna

Relations and Director of the Center for Advanced S

at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy. Currently he dir

national study group at the Council on Foreign Relati

“Globalization and the Future of Border Control.” 

1991 to 1992, Dr. Flynn was a guest scholar in the F

Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution

1993 to 1994, he was an Annenberg Scholar-in-Reside

the University of Pennsylvania. A 1982 graduate of th

Coast Guard Academy, he served twice in command 

He served in the White House Military Office duri

first Bush Administration and as Director for Global 

on the National Security Council staff during the C

Administration. Dr. Flynn is author of several articl

book chapters on border control, the illicit drug trad

organized crime. Most recently, his article “Beyond B

Control” appeared in the November/December 2000 is

Foreign Affairs. He received an M.A.L.D. in 1990 

Ph.D. in 1991 from the Fletcher School of Law 

Diplomacy at Tufts University. The views expressed 

monograph are his own and do not reflect the o

positions of the U.S. government or the Council on F

Relations.

vii
U.S. SUPPORT OF PLAN COLOMBIA:

RETHINKING THE ENDS AND MEANS

Introduction.

The development of antibiotics is one of the 

medical breakthroughs of the 20th century. But too 

antibiotics are being prescribed for ailments the

powerless to combat, or patients are not taking 

antibiotics as directed. The result has been a worr

growth of drug-resistant micro-organisms that are p

ever more costly and, in some cases, impossible to 

There is a lesson here—the wrong or a partial cu

matter how well-meaning the doctor or patien

embraces it—may end up making matters worse, bo

the patient and the community at large.

The U.S. emphasis on drug control in its support o

Colombia has all the ingredients of a flawed ant

regime. First, it relies too heavily on a diagno

“narco-terrorism” as what ails Colombia when there i

more complex and deadly virus at work. Second, as m

the patient may want to get better, Colombia lac

means to carry out the prescribed treatment. Final

drug trade “infection” is already mutating and prom

be a more daunting and dangerous threat to the regio

the very serious military and security crisis that cur

embroils Colombia.

The Colombian Disease.

The production and trafficking of illicit drugs are n

cause of Colombia’s fragile socio-political system—th

symptoms of and contributors to that fragility. As 

while confronting the drug trade must be part o

strategy that aims to bolster the Colombian state, 

always be insufficient. Illicit coca cultivation thri

1
Colombia because this country possesses most 

optimal ingredients to attract and sustain that produ

As a huge country of 439,513 square miles, split by 

mountain ranges, Colombia would be a difficult nat

rule under the best of circumstances. As a nation emb

in a half-century of violent civil war where the reach 

state’s services has rarely extended beyond the major 

centers, conditions for exercising the sovereign prerog

of the state over this huge land mass have always 

marginal at best. Throughout the countryside there 

shortage of impoverished farmers to be recruited or co

and no shortage of guerrillas and paramilitary groups 

and abet them in the cultivation of coca and the prod

of cocaine.

The Colombian civil war has persisted in no sma

due to the paucity of real socio-economic ref

particularly land reform, the lack of which fue

widespread sense of political injustice exploited by ra

and despots. The longstanding practice of resolving co

through violence traces its roots in part to the lac

competent and credible criminal justice system. Final

ability of drug barons to reap the rewards of their 

labors can be credited to the robust informal econo

Colombia that makes it possible to launder billi

dollars in drug profits with virtual impunity. Any p

bolster the Colombian state that fails to seriously a

these core issues is doomed to fail.

U.S. Counter-Drug Assistance: A Flawed Antib

The primary drivers of the drug trade are ubiqu

they are money, self-gratification, and addiction. Thu

drug control mandate requires that states use their co

powers, first, to rein in the desire by some individu

consume mind-altering drugs; and second, to unde

the market that aims to profit by satisfying 

consumers. This is a daunting challenge for even a 

state, particularly if it supports free markets and re

2
basic civil liberties. But even the most draconian sta

to reckon with the fact that the drug trade is a transna

one that promises to thrive as long as there are dark c

of the international systems where traditional sov

controls are weak or non-existent. The illicit drug s

can be cultivated wherever local enforcement bodies a

primitive or corrupt to take the actions necessary to st

production of drug raw materials within their bo

Moving cocaine or heroin from remote production ar

distant consumers will be possible as long as 

traffickers can count on the mounting odds against s

in sifting contraband from the rising tide of legit

goods, services, and people that now wash across na

borders as a result of the explosive growth of the 

economy and the twin trends of liberalization 

privatization. Finally, as democratization has take

around the planet, drug consumers in places like Russ

Eastern Europe can pursue socially-proscribed act

with less risk of arrest by police authorities whose ca

to intrude into the lives of citizens has been properly 

in.

1

In short, contemporary drug control must take 

against a backdrop where drugs are produced, traff

and consumed by individuals who find borders esse

meaningless. As long as there are gaps between d

sovereignty and de facto sovereignty, there will 

shortage of space through which the drug trade can 

Unfortunately, there is an abundance of such locales w

Colombia and among the states that border it with

Andean region. Things are little better closer to 

where despite two decades of stepped-up efforts to pol

Caribbean Sea and U.S. borders, there remain 

opportunities to smuggle illicit drugs into the U

States. In the year 2000 alone, 477 million peopl

million automobiles, 11.5 million trucks, and 5.8 m

maritime containers entered U.S. territory.

2

 The U

States has nearly 100,000 miles of shoreline and a

6,000 miles of borders with its neighbors. People and 

3
arrive daily at more than 3,700 terminals in 301 p

entry. Intercepting within this tidal wave of commer

requisite equivalent of 15 40-foot containers presen

enforcement with the kind of odds one expects for win

lottery.

3

Accordingly, since access into the major marke

illicit drugs is not likely to be seriously challenge

market will inevitably adapt to a stepped-up investm

Colombia’s counter-drug efforts. Accordingly, while 

efforts may help to disrupt an important source of fu

for guerrillas and paramilitary groups who rule imp

sections of the Colombian countryside, they hold vir

no hope for reducing the amount of cocaine or 

available on American streets. The Clinton Administ

was either naïve or duplicitous to suggest otherwise.

Producing a New Virulent Strain.

It is easy to predict what intensified efforts to c

drug cultivation and trafficking, particularly in Putu

will do to the region. Already reports are rolli

documenting the spillover of kidnappings, crime, vio

and refugees into Ecuador, Venezuela, Brazil

Panama.

4

 Unfortunately, none of these countries i

position to cope with this, particularly Ecuado

Panama. Throughout this region there are few res

and little in the way of infrastructure for promoting th

of law or advancing economic development in the area

susceptible to the dollars and intimidation drug traff

can bring to bear. Nowhere is there the capacity to a

the potential for millions of refugees from Colombia

war. Even if Brazilian, Venezuelan, and Ecuadorian 

and soldiers are moved into the areas so as to hard

borders with southern Colombia, the costs are likely 

prohibitively high in economic and diplomatic t

Militarizing the border regions will inevitably compr

the cross-border flow of trade and likely sour diplo

relations among the neighboring countries.

4
Stepped-up efforts to disrupt drug trafficking act

in Colombia may also produce harmful unint

consequences. Such efforts inevitably spawn g

innovation on the part of the drug barons. The 

enforcement community often touts this result as pr

since it presumably “raises the cost of doing business.

may sound like a worthy objective, but it can in fact pr

be counterproductive if enforcement ends up taking ou

the low-lying fruit. More specifically, if “raising 

applies only to entry-level competitors, the result may 

that more sophisticated trafficking organizations ac

benefit from enforcement activities since they can ha

result of eliminating those who might otherwise th

their market share.

Enforcement-generated innovation that 

traffickers to move from traditional non-comm

smuggling activities to more sophisticated sch

involving manufacturers, commercial carriers, exp

and financiers can also prove to be a cure worse th

disease. This is because of the corrosive effect drug 

can have across the entire commercial spec

undermining confidence in the private sector an

regulators charged with policing it. In additio

legitimate trade becomes increasingly contaminated 

illicit narcotics, it elevates the risk that all exports w

subject to delays and added costs associated with 

inspections and destructive searches.

Perhaps the most disturbing consequence of 

aggressive attacks on Colombian drug traffickers is th

likely beneficiaries will be Mexican traffi

organizations. For some time Mexican traffickers 

benefited from the disruption of the cocaine trade 

Caribbean that led the Colombians to seek o

alternative route to the United States via its sout

border. Successes in the early 1990s associated wi

Colombian “king-pin” elimination strategy created 

opportunities for Mexican narco-traffickers to get in

wholesale cocaine distribution business in the U

5
States.

6

 If Colombian drug supplies begin to dry up, t

little to prevent Mexican organizations from spon

coca production and refinement in Peru and Boli

elsewhere in the Andean region, emulating the exam

the Colombian drug barons in the 1970s.

It should require little in the way of elaborat

explain why a transfer of control over the cocaine tr

Mexican traffickers would be so disastrous. Mexico 

United States’ second largest trading partner. At jus

100 million, its population is two and one-half times 

Colombia. Arguably, its institutions may prov

resistant than those in Colombia to the corrosive th

“plata o plomo” (silver or lead).

7

 Its historic movemen

from a one-party state has just begun. Political pow

Mexico is more decentralized, with governors posses

great deal of autonomy. Corruption within the police 

and some elements of the military is rampant

Colombia, it has its own problems with insurge

particularly in the Chiapas. If Mexico were to becom

hemisphere’s new capital of drug trade, scarring its 

political and economic institutions in ways similar to 

that have afflicted Colombia, the repercussions fo

domestic and regional interests would be enormous.

Alternative Prescriptions.

The analysis outlined above should give pause t

those minimalists who argue that the planned 

contribution to Plan Colombia is better than provid

assistance at all. If Colombia were an island and th

trade had no place to go, this would undoubtedly be 

Unfortunately, Colombia cannot be isolated fro

volatile region in which it sits nor can the cocaine and 

industries be isolated within its borders. Most import

the only thing we can count on if Colombian traff

organizations are dismantled is that other traffic

most likely Mexican—will be the prime beneficiaries

the dangers associated with misprescribing an anti

6
placing primary emphasis on the drug control eleme

Plan Colombia may have the end-result of spa

problems more daunting than the one we started wit

Defeatism is not the only alternative here, but a c

stepping-off point is to acknowledge that the s

associated with Plan Colombia are considerably 

than the Clinton Administration led the public to b

Preventing Colombia from spinning into a free-fa

taking down some of its neighbors with it means th

United States will have to invest the resources in ta

the root causes that made the region such an attractiv

for the narcotics trade. The rural population of Col

and much of the surrounding region is unlikely to be w

off of drug traffickers or guerrillas without fundam

political reform and economic development. It will ta

equivalent of a Marshall Plan to turn the tide.

Efforts to combat drug trafficking must also take a 

ambitious, comprehensive, and nuanced approach. Su

approach would include four broad elements. First, we 

move from rhetoric to reality in addressing de

reduction, which means we must place primary em

on providing adequate medical and social servic

treating drug addicts. The strategic rationale for 

straightforward: of the estimated 77 million American

have experimented with drugs at least once in their lif

five million frequent drug users consume

overwhelming majority of drugs.

8

 The 50 percent dec

casual use in the United States over the past decad

very positive development. But from a drug m

standpoint, the fact that there has been little change 

number of drug addicts means that this drop in recrea

drug use has had virtually no effect on the overall de

for cocaine and heroin. Thanks to drug preve

programs, the cocaine industry may not be a g

business in the United States, but the demand for co

poppies will be unchanged as long as Americans ref

invest in long-term drug treatment.

7
Second, we need to recognize that the narcotics 

and the illicit dollars that go with it cannot be divorce

the informal economy that is burgeoning within the 

and around the world. Trade fraud, tax evasion, swea

that thrive off underground labor, and the smuggl

legal products ranging from from VCRs to cigaret

provide a growing haystack within which drugs and 

laundering activities can hide. To a large extent, we s

look at the drug trade as something akin to th

cardiologists use to detect blockages in the circu

system. It highlights the gaping holes in the interna

economic system that have facilitated the unsettling g

of what Susan Strange has called “casino capitalism

If we are serious about stemming the scourge of 

we must get serious about closing these holes by adopt

enforceable code covering regional business, transpor

and logistics, and investment regulatory codes that 

transparency in cross-border activities. Part

attention should be paid to developing meaningfu

binding guidelines for trade, transshipment, and fin

record-keeping. Commercial records should be transm

electronically at or as near to the point of origin as po

so enforcement and regulatory authorities can 

effectively target their inspections. Also, the Organi

of American States should be tasked and resour

regularly publish an “Accessories to Transnational 

Report” that spotlights business institution

individuals who routinely fail to abide by the estab

codes. The goal should be to shame the participants 

black economy and shine light in their corridors, th

enhancing the risk of detection for criminals or ter

who are attempting to capitalize on the legitimate f

commerce to move contraband, weapons, or money.

Third, we need to develop and execute a compreh

organized crime strategy that strives to deter and d

the ability of criminal networks to form, co

governments, and prosper from their ill-gotten ga

opposed to placing primary emphasis on prosecutions

8
counter-terrorist tactics that have been developed ov

past two decades provide a more promising model for 

confront organized crime than does the Colombian k

elimination strategy of the 1990s. There will alway

new face to fill a vacancy on the “10 Most Wanted 

Initiatives may include establishing a desig

Organized Crime Intelligence Unit within each coope

country that is assigned the responsibility for coordi

crime intelligence collection and analysis within its b

and working with the intelligence units from the 

countries.

Finally, we must be mindful of the human dim

associated with any effort to work internationa

attacking a transnational challenge like the drug tra

ongoing effort must be made to improve cu

understanding and linguistic abilities among ag

cooperating in multilateral efforts. Journalist

investigative reporters who write stories on crim

corruption, often at significant personal risk, de

greater support from the international community. E

to intimidate news media professionals or to underm

free press should be condemned in the strongest po

terms and, when government officials are involved, s

to sanctions. A common fund should be established to 

journalists as well as intelligence, judicial, financia

law enforcement representatives; and to support exc

programs. 

Many may see policy initiatives such as the

impractical within the current political and bud

environment. But if such skeptics ultimately carry th

what alternatives remain? The current situati

Colombia makes clear that one option which is unacce

is continuing business as usual. Sticking to an app

that narrowly focuses on drug control as if it can be div

from the wider political, economic, and social cont

which it operates practically assures that drug

continue to be widely available, and, concurrently, th

criminal organizations involved in the trade will r

9
powerful and corrosive—they will just operate 

different locales. The only remaining logical cou

pursue if we are unable to muster the political w

undertake the ambitious proposals outlined above wo

to consider dismantling the prohibitionary regime. T

because, in the final analysis, a failed prohibit

approach to drug control does more harm than good

ends up serving the interests of organized crim

insurgents who benefit from the trade while ac

disserving the interests and the national and interna

community. If the United States and the global comm

are unprepared to repair the systemic weakn

facilitating and motivating drug production, traffi

and consumption, they should begin to accommodate 

disquieting reality thus revealed: namely, that wides

drug use and its harmful social consequences a

unfortunate fact of life, the inevitable byproduct of liv

an open global capitalist system that promotes the va

self-indulgence and instant gratification to a far g

extent than those of community and self-sacrifice.

ENDNOTES

1. Stephen E. Flynn, “The Global Drug Trade vs. The Natio

Why the Thugs Are Winning,” in Beyond Sovereignty, ed. Ma

Cusimano, New York: St. Martins Press, 1999, pp. 44-66.

2. Public Affairs Office, U.S. Customs Service, Washingt

January 2001.

3. Based on the White House’s Office of National Drug 

Policy estimate of maximum annual cocaine availability at 376 

tons included in its National Drug Control Strategy 1999, a

average size of a kilogram brick, 72 cubic inches. A 40-foot co

could hold 55,753 kilo bricks.

4. Suzanne Timmons, “The War on Coca: How Far Will the U

Business Week, November 20, 2000.

5. Testimony of Barry McCaffrey, Director, Office of Nation

Control Policy, before the House Government Reform and Ov

Committee, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Poli

10
Human Resources, “The Drug Legalization Movement in Am

June 16, 1999.

6. Testimony of Donnie R. Marshall, Acting Administrato

Enforcement Administration, before the Senate Drug Cau

International Narcotics Control, March 21, 2000.

7. That is, officials are confronted by traffickers with the c

accepting a bribe or being gunned down by a bullet.

8. According to the White House Office of National Drug 

Policy’s U.S. National Drug Control Strategy: 2001, the

approximately five million drug abusers who need imm

treatment.

9. See Susan Strange, Casino Capitalism, Mancheste

Manchester University Press, 1997.

10. In this regard, the White House publications Intern

Crime Control Strategy, June 1998, and its International 

Assessment, December 2000, offer a useful stepping-off point.

11
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Author

Dr. Stephen E. Flynn

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Cover Artist

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