ARMY TRANSFORMATION:

A VIEW FROM THE U.S. ARMY WAR COLLE

Edited by

Williamson Murray

July 2001
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ISBN 1-58487-059-1

ii
CONTENTS

Foreword ........................

1. INTRODUCTION

 Williamson Murray .................

2. NEW AGE MILITARY PROGRESSIVES:

 U.S. Army Officer Professionalism

 in the Information Age

 David R. Gray ....................

3. DISCOVERING THE ARMY’S CORE

 COMPETENCIES

 Frederick S. Rudesheim ...............

4. THE ARMY THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS

 William F. Grimsley .................

5. BUILDING IRREVERSIBLE MOMENTUM

 Michael D. Formica.................. 

6. IMPROVING THE STRATEGIC RESPONSIVENE

 OF THE TRANSFORMING FORCE

 James W. Shufelt, Jr.................. 

7. ADAPTIVE TRANSFORMATION MODEL:

 A Branch to the Army Transformation Campaign P

 Michael J. McMahon ................. 

8. FORCE PROJECTION RESEARCH AND

 DEVELOPMENT: The Key Enabler for Army

 Transformation

 Genaro J. Dellarocco ................. 

9. TRANSFORMING THE ARMY SUSTAINING BAS

 Danny G. Nobles ................... 

10. PROJECTING INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANC

 AND RECONNAISSANCE IN SUPPORT OF THE

 INTERIM BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

 Stephen P. Perkins ................. 

 ABOUT THE AUTHORS ............... 

iii
FOREWORD

The famous British general, the Duke of Wellington

that, “The country must have a large and efficient arm

capable of meeting the enemy abroad, or they must ex

meet him at home.” These words written almost 200 yea

are no less true for our own country today. Our se

interests and the need for landpower to secure them sp

globe. The U.S. Army is now in the process of transfo

itself to meet those needs in the future. The following 

are representative of current thinking at the U.S. Arm

College by students considering the nature and direc

this transformation. Dr. Williamson Murray’s introd

sets the historical context for military transform

comparing the modern European example with recen

efforts in military innovation. The remaining essays a

four themes: the nature of the transformed Army, bu

irreversible momentum for transformation, imp

strategic responsiveness, and how to achieve transform

in key areas.

Officers who participated in the Advanced Strateg

Program (ASAP) during their year at the U.S. Arm

College wrote these essays. The ASAP is a unique pr

that offers selected students a rigorous course of instruc

theater strategy. Solidly based in theory, doctrine, and h

the program provides these students a rich profes

experience that includes staff rides, exercises, and th

expertise available. The program is designed to provi

joint community with the best strategists and planners 

world. In the case of these officers and their work, the

already begun to make a difference. They and their 

graduates of the U.S. Army War College will continue to 

the Army and the nation for many years to come.

ROBERT R. IVANY

Major General, U.S. Army

Commandant

v
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Williamson Murray

As the United States enters a new century, its 

confronts the difficult problems associated 

transformation in an uncertain world. Moreove

strategic environment makes it entirely unclear wh

when, or for what strategic purposes U.S. ground forc

find themselves committed to battle in coming dec

Yet, both the strategic environment as well as the 

lessons of the past have a direct bearing on why the 

has begun the processes of transformation.

2

The study of the past cannot lead to prediction as 

nature and conduct of war in the 21st century, but 

underline that sometime in the future the Army wi

itself committed to a major conflict. Moreover, the na

the current strategic environment suggests the param

within which the future Army will have to operate. F

history is crucial to understanding what factor

approaches might best prepare the Army to meet 

threats.

This introduction, then, represents an attempt to s

for the reader the issues—past, present, and future

could best frame the Army’s approach to transform

and innovation. The past is crucial to understandin

ground forces will always be essential to achievin

political aims for which wars are fought. Moreove

current strategic environment indicates that U.S. m

forces are going to have to readdress the two old quest

time and distance. The United States cannot esca

geographic realities that two great oceans separate i

much of the rest of the world by two great continents

Equally important, the past suggests how best to 

about the complex problems of transformation in a pe

1
rapid technological change.

4

 What are the most imp

attributes of an innovative military institution?

5

 

impediments have existed in the past to succ

innovation and transformation? What kind of m

culture is most conducive to transformation? What ro

leadership played in transforming military instituti

the past? And how best can a military organization d

and maintain the momentum required for substa

long-term change in its basic approach to war? There 

easy answers to these questions, but they lie at the h

how the Army must think about transformation in th

decades of this new century.

The Strategic Environment: Imperative and

Difficulties.

At the start of the 21st century, the Army confron

reality that the ending of the Cold War a decade 

altered the strategic landscape that virtually all 

strategic verities of a 50-year period disappeared

adjustment to that reality is still going on. In a ma

months, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 199

removed the great power threat to the security of the U

States. The presence of that threat had provide

American military, and especially the Army, with a 

strategic and operational framework for thinking 

future war. With the exception of the 7-year period d

the Vietnam War, from 1950 on, the Army focused a

single-mindedly on how best to deter and, if dete

failed, fight a war in Central Europe.

However since 1991, at the upper end of the c

spectrum the Army has only confronted reg

challengers—and not particularly impressive on

that—and at the lower end of the spectrum, a num

peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions. N

these have fit within the cultural and opera

framework developed to fight World War II and to 

World War III. Exacerbating the Army’s difficult

2
adjusting to its new role has been dealing with the d

problems associated with the major downsizing of its f

Innumerable commentators have noted the imp

that change in threat as well as that of the downsiz

the Army’s psyche. But an additional factor of 

importance is now in play. Since the end of the Cold 

U.S. forces have been coming home from their Col

positions in Europe and the Far East, either to be ret

the reserves or relocated to new bases in North Amer

is entirely conceivable that by the end of the next d

the United States will have virtually no troops sta

permanently on the far side of either the Atlantic 

Pacific.

The return of those forces to North Americ

obviously led to the closing of many American ba

foreign soil as well. The continuation of that proces

have important implications for the projection 

sustainability of U.S. military forces throughout the 

in the future, especially where the United States 

protect its interests against significant challenges

worth noting, for example, that the world’s crucial e

resources lie in the Middle East—not just on the far 

the Pacific or Atlantic, but on the other side of the wo

As U.S. military planners discovered in both world 

there is a negative side to the protection the Pacif

Atlantic Oceans afford their country. U.S. military 

and their equipment must now move across oc

distances and then be supported in any major conflict. 

critics of the performance of the U.S. military in Worl

II, who so vociferously criticize the supposed Am

overemphasis on logistics in comparison to the Wehrm

largely ignore the realities of geography.

7

 In effec

return of the American military to North Americ

resurrected the knotty problem of how to get military 

to the next war and then support them in the figh

sustained periods of time.

8

 As usual, in life there a

simple “silver-bullet” solutions on the horizon. A

3
British General Sir James Wolfe said at the opening 

campaign against Quebec in 1759, “war is an opt

difficulties.”

9

There is a second problem that has only recently 

to emerge, ironically a decade after the end of the Cold 

It has to do with the funding of the U.S. milita

continued levels—high at least in comparison 

American peacetime traditions or the levels cur

maintained by other nations. Certainly, the trad

American approach after the nation’s great wars has b

begin a massive downsizing immediately upon conclu

war and to continue that process for a sustained per

the period between the world wars, the decline in m

budgets continued into the late 1930s, well beyond 

good sense should have suggested was reasona

Admittedly, the Great Depression had placed consid

and economic impediments in the way of any se

program of preparedness for much of the 1

Nevertheless, the growing dangers in the Pacifi

Europe were all too obvious by the mid-1930s. How

those dangers had virtually no impact on the Am

polity until war broke out in Europe in September 1

Thus, for the foreseeable future, the prospects 

substantial increase in defense spending withou

appearance of a major power threat to the actual secu

the United States is highly unlikely. It is all very w

hope that the nation’s political leadership might b

enough to devote 4 percent of the gross national prod

defense, as the Commandant of the Marine Corp

recently suggested, but that possibility is simply not 

cards. Instead, it is far more likely the military wil

slow, steady erosion of defense budgets over c

decades. Two factors will work to drive those budgets 

The first is that, even were the economy to gr

reasonable rates, pressures on social security will st

increase, as the “baby boomers” begin to retire.

12

 The 

of the baby boomers will also result in substantial inc

in health care costs over coming decades. Finall

4
present administration’s tax cuts, even if mitigat

Congress, make it unlikely there will be sufficient fu

available for major increases in defense spending.

13

A third factor that could place pressure on d

budgets may well come from the success U.S. military 

has enjoyed in keeping the peace around the world

death of the World War II generation, with its col

memory of the cost of unpreparedness, will fu

exacerbate the attitudes of Americans that de

spending represents a luxury they can do wi

Moreover, the more successful that U.S. military forc

in keeping the peace over coming decades, the more d

it will be to maintain the political consensus in the U

States necessary to keep defense budgets at present 

That possibility suggests the pressures on a defense b

that must not only keep the peace, but make long

investments in research and development and procur

of new systems.

Most probably, there will not be a cataclysmic dow

plunge, but rather the death of a thousand knives. I

an environment, military leaders, including those 

Army, will have to become increasingly sophistica

making their arguments to Congress. Any strate

transformation must take into account the diffic

involved in persuading the American people to su

defense spending during a period when it is diffic

enunciate clear and direct threats to the territory 

United States.

The Problem of Military Transformation

in Peacetime. 

Perhaps the most daunting challenge confrontin

Army in its efforts to transform itself has to do wi

fundamental nature of war and the military professio

must prepare for combat.

14

 Simply put, one cannot rep

in peacetime the conditions of combat, where m

organizations attempt to destroy each other 

5
terrifying conditions. As Michael Howard has sug

about the profession of arms (officership and leaders

First, his [the officer’s] profession is almost unique in that 

may only have to exercise it once in a lifetime, if indeed t

often. It is as if a surgeon had to practice throughout his life 

dummies for one real operation . . . Secondly the comp

problem of running a [military service] at all is liable to occ

his mind and skill so completely that it is easy to forget what 

being run for.

15

Thus, the full impact and implications of technol

doctrinal, and tactical changes can never be cle

peacetime until war actually begins.

Military institutions may understand in peac

substantial technological change is taking 

Nevertheless, a number of complex questions co

them. The first is to estimate and then to attem

understand how things might work out on the battl

Will new weapons systems favor the offensive o

defensive? How can they best integrate new techno

into tactical concepts? Or do the concepts themselve

to change? And what are the training and doc

implications of such changes?

In the above sense, the pre-World War I Ge

military were able to grasp most of the implications 

vast improvement in technology and weapons system

the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. As one historia

suggested: “The [Germans] had not only recognize

problem, but had also hammered out the fundam

principles that defined modern warfare, at least f

tactical and operational standpoint.”

16

 The difficulty 

Germans (as well as the other European armies) w

fact that it took 3 years of bloody combat to work o

complex details during World War I.

17

Unfortunately, historians have tended to mudd

understanding of the processes of successful or unsucc

military transformation.

18

 For the most part, they 

6
that military organizations study what happened in t

war, and that is why they do badly in the next. N

could be farther from the truth. Instead, most m

organizations fail to study past military experience, e

the most recent variety—including their own. Thus

tend to build up a picture of future war that fits the

preconceptions and assumptions. If they use the past 

it is to validate those assumptions. A comparison 

German army in the interwar period with the Frenc

British armies underlines this point. General Han

Seeckt, the German Army’s commander-in-chief from 

to 1926, established no less than 57 different commit

examine what had actually happened on the battlefi

1918. He explicitly tasked those committees that the

to produce short, concise studies on the newly g

experiences of the war and consider the following poi

What new situations arose in the war that had no

considered before the war? b) How effective were our p

views in dealing with the above situations? c) Wha

guidelines have been developed from the use o

weaponry in the war? and d) Which new problem

forward by the war have not yet found a solution?

19

In comparison, the British Army failed to estab

committee to study the lessons of the last war until 

Then when its critical report came in, Chief of the Im

General Staff Field Marshal Sir Arch

Montgomery-Massingberd deep-sixed the stud

replaced it with one that presented a far more fav

(and unrealistic) view of how the British Arm

performed in World War I.

20

Moreover, the business of soldiering in peacetime 

requires immense time and energy to train, org

educate, and prepare units for the day-to-day task

military forces must perform in remaining mi

institutions. To make matters even more difficul

lessons of even recent combat experience are never 

while military institutions must struggle with 

technologies that become available. Finally, the len

7
interwar periods is clear only to military historians, w

pick over the wreckage after the war is over in their eff

Monday morning quarterbacking.

It is the indeterminate length of interwar period

makes the task of preparing for war doubly difficult. R

scholarship, to a great extent supported by the Office 

Assessment in the Pentagon, has focused on the 1920

1930s for an examination of military innovatio

transformation during peacetime.

21

 There is indeed m

be learned from that period, as the concluding section 

chapter will suggest.

But there are several aspects to the history of the 

and 1930s that may well distort the understanding 

complex issues involved in transformation. Most o

involved in innovative efforts in that interwar perio

experienced combat in World War I. Thus, they could 

on experiences directly relevant to the problems they 

confronting. Moreover, most of the major transform

that exploded on the battlefields of the 1940s were a

emerging by 1918. The one exception, airborne opera

suggests how similar the framework of 1940 was to t

1918; strategic bombing, carrier operations, subm

warfare over extended distances, exploitation, com

arms mechanized operations, and close air support al

emergent concepts at the end of World War I.

At present, there appears to be little chance 

military forces will find themselves engaged in a majo

Instead, it is possible that the Army may not find its 

engaged in a major conflict for a much longer period o

as was the case with the Royal Navy between 181

1914.

22

 The result of a century without a serious cha

to the Royal Navy’s maritime superiority was the crea

a service culture that increasingly emphasize

polishing of brass and looking good over the s

business of intellectually and tactically preparing fo

The problems raised by an extended period of peace ca

be exacerbated, if that period occurs during a time of 

8
technological change. In that case, even serious inno

and transformation can have its limitations. In the 4

period between the ending of the Franco-Prussian W

the outbreak of World War I, the Prusso-German 

seriously prepared for the next war.

It was not, however, merely the imperativ

technological change that caused the problem. Rat

was the difficulty of understanding the full ramificat

technological changes on doctrine and tactical prepara

As one commentator has noted:

Technological determinism also oversimplifies the difficulty 

integrating new technology into existing structures, a proc

that usually entails a considerable amount of friction and a

number of unintended consequences. On the contrary, t

technological signposts that appeared during the wars foug

between 1870 and 1914 pointed in a number of confusing a

often contradictory directions. The nonlinear unfolding 

Western society’s technological transformation during t

period would, in fact, consistently surprise conservative a

visionary alike. Technology was dynamic and unstable at t

turn of the century, with breakthroughs occurri

concurrently and unpredictably in any number of fields, so

of which had the potential to upset the balance of power with

a very short period.

23

In a period that also confronts a number of disconti

changes in a number of fields, it would seem likel

today’s Army will find no easier path to new capabiliti

doctrine. The problem of integrating new technologie

doctrine and structures that can realistically addre

wars of the 21st century will remain as difficult as the

in the last century. But as the current Army leadersh

grasped, the Army has no choice but to transform. Wh

past may not provide answers to problems al

confronting transformation, it does suggest avenue

questions one might ask as one embarks on the jo

Above all, the past indicates there are no simple o

solutions to the intractable problems military organiz

confront in innovation and transformation.

9
The Past as a Guide.

As uncertain a guide as the past may be, it at 

suggests the patterns and cultural aspects that have 

earlier military organizations to innovate in transfo

their tactical and operational approaches to war. I

suggests the factors that have been favorable to inno

and which, most probably, will contribute to succ

transformation and innovation in the future. It ca

underline many of the negative factors impacti

transformation. But as in all things dealing with h

institutions, the processes of past transformations 

been uncertain, ambiguous, and difficult.

The most obvious lesson from history is that techn

while an important contributor, is rarely, if ever, the 

important component of change. In a number of his

cases, the military organizations that most succes

transformed themselves possessed inferior technol

those whom they outperformed. The most obvious ca

World War II had to do with the Wehrmacht, 

possessed inferior armored fighting vehicles to 

possessed by the French and particularly the Soviets d

the 1940 and 1941 campaigns.

24

 This is, of course, 

argue that technology does not play an important r

transformation, but rather that its most important fu

is as an enabler. And as an enabler, it opens up possib

that then depend on the culture, doctrine, and organi

of those military forces that are involved in s

innovation.

25

The context within which transformation takes p

also important. If transformation efforts address a str

challenge that threatens the survival of the state, it is 

to have the greatest impact.

26

 In this sense, the crea

Fighter Command and a system of air defense capa

defending the British Isles from air attack between 

and 1939 represents one of the most important revol

in military affairs (RMAs) that occurred in the first 

the 20th century. Moreover, it is the one case in the 

10
and 1930s where radical change took place over a very 

period of time.

27

 By building a system of air defens

integrated the new technologies of radar an

stressed-wing, mono-plane fighter, Air Marshal Sir 

Dowding entirely altered the balance in the coming Ba

Britain.

28

But most of the RMAs took longer to create

reflected not only the technological, tactical

operational difficulties involved, but the context as 

Most military leaders involved in the process

transforming their forces confronted the prospect of c

well in the future. And the context of time proved imp

in pushing the parameters of technological developm

well as developing more complete concepts of employ

Thus, most of the other RMAs occurring through this 

involved evolutionary, rather than revolutionary proc

The German development of mechanized, com

arms tactics between the wars represented a proces

began in the early 1920s and lasted well into 1

Certainly, few of the Germans who participated in the 

through the Ardennes and across the Meuse though

they were realizing an RMA.

30

 Since the senior office

been involved in a process of transformation that had 

with Seeckt, they would have seen little that app

revolutionary in their victory, except perhap

ideological factor.

The pattern of most past RMAs would thus sug

number of enabling factors. First would be the sustai

of a long-term vision. In some cases, this resulted 

positioning of key individuals in positions of respons

for sustained periods of time. Admiral William 

remained the head of BuAer [Bureau of Aeronautics] 

charge of naval aviation for three terms despite a num

attempts to move him on to other positions during th

1920s and early 1930s. In effect, as a skilled “bureau

entrepreneur,” Moffet manipulated not only the N

internal system, but to a considerable extent the ex

11
environment as well.

31

 Moreover, Moffet got the job 

head of BuAer through his political connections, and h

that job through those connections. While he plac

imprint solidly on the aviation community, h

somewhat less successful with the rest of the Navy. 

end, it did not matter because his connections 

Congress protected him and protected his offspring

after his death in the crash of the rigid airship Akron

Even more important in transformation in the 192

1930s would seem to be the culture of the mi

organizations themselves that were engag

transformation and innovation. Here, General Han

Seeckt played the crucial role on setting the German 

on the right track. By setting in motion a major ef

study the lessons of World War I, Seeckt ensured th

German Army would be the only military organizat

Europe to understand fully the combined arms revo

that had occurred in 1918.

32

 This was not an easy 

because the real lessons of the war would not be cl

most historians in the English-speaking world un

early 1980s.

33

At the same time that Seeckt was setting in mo

detailed examination of what had happened in the w

was also carrying out fundamental changes i

Reichsheer’s culture.

34

 Confronted by the demand 

victorious Allied powers that the German Army dras

reduce its officer corps in the aftermath of the war, S

chose to place the army entirely in the hands of the G

Staff, while at the same time he purged the great majo

officers with reputations as Frontsoldaten as w

aristocrats from the officer corps, unless they were su

material for the General Staff.

The result was that within a short period

Reichsheer’s culture reflected the traditional values 

Great General Staff’s emphasis on rigorous stud

serious debate—a culture that emphasized military h

and intellectual preparation for war. This was so m

12
that Erwin Rommel, the pre-eminent German “m

boots” soldier, not only read extensively in military h

but even wrote one of the classics in the literat

military history.

35

 The fact that in 1932 three 

Reichsheer’s senior generals wrote Die Truppenführun

most impressive doctrinal manual of the interwar p

suggests the extent of the intellectual bent of the G

officer corps.

36

 One of those generals, Werner von F

assumed command of the army in 1933, while an

Ludwig Beck, became the Chief of the General Staff 

same time.

The German military culture stands in stark cont

the French efforts at transformation in the interwar p

What is most remarkable about the French military c

was the absence of serious debate about how the F

Army should prepare for the coming test again

Germans, a test which virtually everyone in the army 

was coming. A combination of intellectual arroganc

indecision at the top led the French to miss much 

potential offered by their technological development

army’s leader in the last years of peace, General M

Gamelin, refused to stomach dissenting opinions. In 

he established the high command as the sole arb

doctrine. From that point on, all lectures, articles, and 

by serving officers had to receive the approval of th

command before publication. As French General 

Beufre noted in his postwar memoirs: “Everyone g

message and a profound silence reigned unt

awakening of 1940.”

37

 Equally important in the F

failure was the dilatory approach taken to the is

creating mechanized formations. A series of meetings 

highest levels beginning in 1937 finally resulted 

creation of two weak armored divisions in early 1939

the tables of organization for those divisions 

undetermined at the end of 1938.

38

Yet the most impressive culture of innovatio

transformation existed within the U.S. military. Wh

considers the shortage of resources, the lack of fundin

13
the general disdain for most things military on the p

most Americans, this was a particularly impr

accomplishment by the officer corps of the various se

The path that the U.S. services followed underline

seriously they took the intellectual aspects of the prof

of arms.

To a certain extent, given the funding levels an

resources available, they had little choice. But the oth

of the coin is that the military leaders of the services c

believed that they were members of a profession

profession of arms.

39

 The role that professional m

education played in the American military s

throughout the interwar period is suggested by the a

of time a profession required serious study, as well as 

in the real world, and the seriousness with whic

services took their profession.

40

Professional military education in the United 

emphasized not only the education of officers, but w

significant instances, a direct player in the transform

process itself. Justifiably worried about its futur

Marine Corps quite literally shut down the Marine 

Schools at Quantico in 1931 to undertake the writin

basic manual for amphibious operations. The res

product, “The Tentative Manual for Landing Opera

became the foundation document on amphibious oper

for all the services and provided the intelle

underpinnings for the amphibious assaults that w

important in both Europe and the Pacific during Worl

II. Quantico and the Naval War College then pr

fertile ground for debate about the results of a se

exercises and experiments carried out in the late 193

Similarly, the Naval War College played a crucial 

the development of carrier capabilities before the 

possessed a single carrier. Under the leadership of Ad

William Sims, the head of U.S. naval forces in the U

Kingdom during World War I who had returned by ch

become president of the war college, the facult

14
students carried out a number of war games that in

carriers as well as the battle line. What they discovere

that pulses of air power rather than streams of a

would add substantially to the lethality of carrier

naval power.

42

 But the Naval War College was to m

major contribution not just in carrier aviation in the 

1920s. In 1921 two officers at the college develope

concept of the mobile advanced base, which provid

concept of the forward operating logistic base, the b

the devastating drive across the central Pacific in 19

Throughout much of the 1980s, the U.S. Army’s g

forces received a terrible press for their in

performance against the Wehrmacht in Italy and No

France from 1943 to 1945.

44

 Subsequent historical res

has substantially revised that view. In fact, much li

German Army after World War I, the U.S. Army und

a major study of the lessons of the last war, and 

lessons were incorporated into the Field Se

Regulations of 1923.

45

 At least on the tactical level, th

Army built a framework for training and preparatio

served most American ground combat units well in 

War II. It had less success on the operational l

partially because the U.S. Army Command and G

Staff College at Leavenworth never wrote a field man

the operational level, but rather in 1930 la

appropriated and translated from the French their m

for “grand tactics.”

46

But a straight tactical comparison of the U.S. Arm

the Wehrmacht misses a number of critical points, th

important of which is that the rebuilding of Am

ground forces only began in summer 1940 afte

catastrophe in France. Thus, the Army had barely 2 ye

get ready for war before commitment to combat in 

Guinea and Tunisia. The Germans on the other hand 

1/2 years before the Polish campaign and then ano

months to get ready for their offensive against W

Europe. The comparison of the U.S. military forces w

Wehrmacht’s military excellence also misse

15
considerable weaknesses in the “German way of war.

Germans displayed extraordinary capabilities o

tactical battlefield, their definition of the operationa

of war left little room for either logistics or intellige

And in both those areas their weaknesses contr

enormously to their catastrophic defeat.

48

The British Army had approximately the same len

time to get ready for the war, but its performance, wi

exception of Field Marshal William Slim’s Fourt

Army, improved little over the course of the war. This 

sharp contrast to what occurred across the board in th

Army. Like the other American services during the int

period, the Army took the intellectual preparation fo

seriously. While the curriculum at the Comman

General Staff College left much to be desired, the v

schools, particularly the Infantry School under Geo

Marshall, encouraged the serious study of war. Mor

Marshall identified those officers with the 

professionalism, and intelligence to lead the Army 

coming war. In fact, Marshall’s selection criteria may 

been tougher than any entrance examination t

Kriegsakademie.

49

Marshall’s attitude towards professional mi

education is best summed up by the choice of faculty 

U.S. Army War College during the 2 years of des

preparation that the Army underwent from 1939 to 

Harbor. Of seven officers on the faculty for the 1939

academic year, two (J. Lawton Collins and W. H. Sim

would go on to very senior commands in World War I

following year, Alexander Patch, also an Army comm

in World War II, would find himself assigned to the fac

The Army’s emphasis on the faculty of its senior 

was nothing exceptional in the culture of all the Am

services during this period. The future Admiral Ray

Spruance would serve not one, but two, tours on the f

of the Naval War College, along with other luminarie

as Richmond Kelley Turner, the main driver on the 

16
side behind the great amphibious drive across the c

Pacific. The Air Corps tactical school at Montgomer

the Marine Schools at Quantico would likewise 

number of the future leaders of those services serving 

faculties of those institutions. The point here is th

culture of serious professionalism in the U.S. services 

education and serious study, and those attitudes 

enormous dividends in the imaginative and com

projection of American military power across two 

oceans. Like Germany, the United States fought a two

war. Unlike the Germans, the United States won both 

The transformation of the U.S. military beginning in 

reflected the dedicated professionalism of service cu

that took the profession of arms very seriously indee

Conclusion.

The Army will undergo substantial transformatio

coming decades whether it wants to or not. No 

organization, and the Army is a living organizatio

survive without change. And the U.S. Army has 

history of significant transformations—from the min

Army of 1860 to the massive Union Army of 1865; fro

Indian Army of 1898 to the European Army of 1918

the depression Army of 1939 to the massive force

destroyed the Third Reich and Imperial Japan. Of a

transformations the Army has undergone, perhaps 

has been so remarkable as the transformation 

defeated, broken Army of 1973 to the vibrant, intellec

alive Army of the mid- to late-1980s. And many o

serving today were part of that remarkable transform

that resulted in the devastating victory of U.S. g

forces over the Iraqi Army in Operation DESERT STO

Thus, it would seem appropriate for those interes

transformation of the Army today to examine how 

predecessors drove the processes of innovation and c

so successfully barely 2 decades ago. A key element 

transformation processes in the late 1970s wa

17
communication of a vision throughout the Army. 

process was at times inadvertent. The publication of 

Manual 100-5 (FM 100-5), “Operations,” by the Tr

and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), at the 

commanded by General William Depuy, with its em

on “the active defense,” resulted in a storm of d

throughout the Army. The dust from the en

arguments did not finally begin to settle until the mid

with the publication of FM 100-5 and the general accep

of the tenants of maneuver warfare and AirLand batt

the debates themselves drove the entire proces

transformation and resulted in an educated and in

officer corps.

The intellectual and training journey that the 

underwent over the course of a decade from the mid

to the mid-1980s created an entirely new Arm

possessed innovative and imaginative concepts hon

debate and equally important by experiments and exe

that ensured the relevance of doctrine and conce

number of officers who would eventually emerge amo

Army’s senior leadership in the early 1990s partic

and contributed to the debate. While senior generals 

late 1970s may not have been enthralled by the cri

their doctrinal concepts received, their outspoken jun

not seem to have suffered. It was that openness to arg

and the refinement of ideas that makes the innovat

this period so interesting.

The current lack of debate within the Army is in

worrisome trend. As one perceptive commentator has 

“That too little of this debate and discussion still goes 

perhaps, indicative of the need to continue pressi

further development of the operational art concept 

armed forces once more caught up in a perc

technology-based revolution in military affairs.”

50

 

Army is to realize the full benefits from the m

technological changes that are currently taking place

it clearly needs to look back at its recent past wh

achieved such significant and important changes and 

18
close study of that past in thinking through the probl

transformation that currently confront it. Change is a

difficult, but it makes little sense to magnify the diffic

by ignoring such a salient, recent period of its own hist

The U.S. Army confronts enormous challenges in c

decades. It confronts uncertainties and ambiguities 

where, when, and for what it will fight. Adding 

difficulties is the fact that the world is going thro

technological revolution with immense implications f

conduct of war. But sometime in the future the Arm

confront an enemy who has prepared his forces to cha

U.S. forces. That is what General Erik Shinseki’s ef

transform the Army is all about. The chapters i

volume represent the efforts of some of the best stude

today’s U.S. Army War College to come to grips wi

problems of Army transformation. They do not pres

easy set of solutions; nor do they shy away from contro

Above all, they aim at encouraging serious debat

discussion throughout the Army as to the best 

towards transformation. That informed debate mus

the core of current efforts to move into the future.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. And committed to battle they will be. See Lieutenant G

Paul Van Riper, USMC, and Major General Robert Scales

“Preparing for War in the 21st Century,” Strategic Review, S

1997.

2. As Thucydides suggested in his monumental history 

Peloponnesian War: “It will be enough for me, however, if these w

mine are judged useful by those who want to understand clea

events which happened in the past and which (human natur

what it is) will, at some time or other and in much the same w

repeated in the future.” Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesia

Rex Warner, trans., New York: Penguin Books, 1983.

3. See Williamson Murray, “America, Geography, and t

Century: The Limits of Power,” scheduled for publication in Th

War College Review, Fall 2001.

19
4. See Williamson Murray, “The Emerging Strategic Enviro

An Historians Thoughts,” Strategic Review, Winter 1999.

5. For a discussion of what the 1920s and 1930s sugges

innovation in the future, see Williamson Murray and Barry D

“Military Innovation in Peacetime,” in Military Innovation 

Interwar Period, Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

6. The Cold War was in many ways simply a continuation o

War II’s effort by the United States and its Allies to prevent a 

hostile power from dominating the Eurasian land mass. In the fir

the attainment of the goals of U.S. strategy required a m

commitment of U.S. military forces to operations again

Wehrmacht and the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy. The C

again saw the massive commitment of U.S. military forces to 

and the Far East—this time in the service of deterrence.

7. Along these lines, see particularly Martin Van Creveld, F

Power, German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945, Westp

Greenwood, 1982.

8. There is considerable talk within the beltway about the ne

with special emphasis on information war. In fact, given 

difficulties the United States confronts in projecting military 

from its shores, the most important RMA should probably c

logistics. Unfortunately, the Pentagon has yet to focus its resea

development resources on this area.

9. For a brilliant recreation of that campaign in North Amer

occasioned Wolfe’s remark, see Fred Anderson,The Crucible of W

Seven Year’s War and the Fate of Empire in British North A

1754-1766, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000.

10. Serious rearmament for the Army’s ground forces 

actually begin until after the fall of France, perilously close to th

involvement of those ground forces in combat on the battlef

North Africa and New Guinea in the summer and fall 1942.

11. And even then it is worth remembering that the Congres

United States renewed the draft by a single vote in the H

Representatives in July 1941—at a time when the Pacific trem

the brink of conflict and when German mechanized spearhea

already reached Smolensk—two thirds of the way to Moscow.

20
12. And in view of the economic troubles that have appeare

beginning of January 2001, the assumption of continued ec

growth may not be realistic.

13. Both the president and congress have shown consi

interest in funding major increases in the federal budget for te

14. On the possibilities involved in war in the future, see B

Watts, Friction in Future War, Washington, DC: National D

University Press, 1996.

15. Michael Howard, “The Uses and Abuses of Military H

Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, February 1962.

16. Antulio J. Echevarria II, After Clausewitz, German M

Thinkers Before the Great War, Lawrence: University of Kansa

2001.

17. For a discussion of these issues, see Williamson Murr

MacGregor Knox, “Thinking About Revolutions in Warfar

Jonathan B. A. Bailey, “The First World War and the Birth of 

Warfare,” in The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 130

MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, eds., Cambridge: Cam

University Press, 2001.

18. A prime example of such distortions is the exaggerate

that many historians have given to General Heinz Guderian 

creation of the Blitzkrieg. In fact, Guderian was a comp

latecomer to the development of combined arms mechanized wa

the Germans during the interwar period. See Williamson M

“Armored Warfare,” in Military Innovation in the Interwar Perio

1.

19. James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, Hans von See

German Military Reform, Lawrence: University of Kansas Pres

p. 37.

20. Harold R. Winton, To Change an Army, General S

Burnett-Stuart and British Armored Doctrine, 1927-1938, La

University of Kansas Press, 1988, pp. 130-131.

21. Among such studies, see Allan R. Millett and Will

Murray, Military Effectiveness, vol. 2, The Interwar Period, L

Allen and Unwin, 1988; Murray and Millett, Military Innovatio

Interwar Period; Thomas C. Hone, Norman Friedman, and M

Mandeles, American and British Aircraft Carrier Develo

1919-1941, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000; and S

21
Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War, Innovation and the 

Military, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991.

22. For the debilitating impact of that prolonged period of p

the Royal Navy, see Andrew Gordon’s brilliant study, The Rule

Game, Jutland and British Naval Command, London: John M

1996.

23. Echevarria, p. 4.

24. The Soviet T-34 was a terrible shock to the Germans in s

1941, although panzer general Heinz Guderian indicates in his m

that the Germans had some indicators before the start of Op

BARBAROSSA that the Soviets had made major advances 

design. At the time of the Battle of Britain, British radar technol

distinctly inferior to the radar technology possessed by the Ge

But the essential point is that Fighter Command employed its ra

part of the overall system of air defense—something the German

not replicate until July 1943 after Royal Air Force Bomber Com

devastating attacks had destroyed much of Hamburg.

25. As this author suggested in the mid 1990s:

What [current technological] changes mean or where they 

going is not certain even in the aftermath of the Gulf W

Nothing, however, suggests that the rapid pace of innovatio

underlined by the conduct of the war against Iraq—will 

continue into the next century.

Williamson Murray, “Innovation Past and Present,” in M

Innovation in the Interwar Period, Murray and Millett, eds., p. 

26. This is not always the case. The French Army confron

distinct possibility of another major war with the Germans fo

20-year period and in the end botched its transformation.

27. For a discussion of the parameters of RMA, see Kn

Murray, The Dynamics of Military Revolution, chaps. 1 and 9.

28. One of the major factors in the German defeat was t

Luftwaffe’s high command never understood that its forces w

against a system of air defense rather than a series of ground 

intercept sites controlling individual intercepts. See Will

Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War To Be Won, Fighting the 

World War, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000, p

22
29. On the development of German combined arms mec

warfare, see Murray, “Armored Warfare,” in Military Innovatio

Interwar Period, chap. 1. The traditional picture of the tank-Stuk

was, in fact, largely a figment of Dr. Goebbels’ overw

imagination. It was not until after the French campaign t

Germans developed the tactics and procedures for providing c

support to the panzer spearheads. See Williamson Murra

Luftwaffe Experience,” in Case Studies in the Development of C

Support, B.F. Cooling, ed., Washington, DC: U.S. Government P

Office, 1990.

30. The one exception in the literature is General Erich Marc

soon after the defeat of France was to be responsible for drawing 

first plan for Operation BARBAROSSA. Marcks noted in hi

shortly after the Fall of France: “the change in men weighs more 

than that in technology. The French we met in battle were no 

those of 14/18. The relationship was like that between the revolu

armies of 1796 and those of the [First] Coalition—only this time w

the revolutionaries and Sans-Culottes.” In other words

revolutionary ideology had played the key role in the v

Generalmajor Erich Marcks, June 19, 1940, quoted by MacGrego

“The `Prussian Idea of Freedom’ and the Career Open to 

Battlefield Initiative and Social Ascent from Prussian Reform 

Revolution, 1807-1944,” in MacGregor Knox, Common D

Dictatorship, Foreign Policy, and War in Fascist Italy an

Germany, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

31.The term “bureaucratic entrepreneur” comes from 

Friedman, and Mandeles in their description of Moffet’s s

American and British Aircraft Carrier Development, p. 181.

32. Ibid.

33. The first book in English to make clear the processes b

the Germans developed their offensive and defensive conce

ground war appeared in 1940 with the publication of G. C. Wy

Germany Attacks, London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1940. Unfortu

the implications of Wynne’s work remained buried in the catastr

1940. It was not until the early 1980s with the publication of T

Lupfer’s The Dynamics of Doctrine, The Changes in German T

Doctrine During the First World War, Leavenworth: Combat 

Institute, 1981, that historians really began understanding w

happened in 1918.

34. For Seeckt’s reforms of the German Army, see part

Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg.

23
35. Rommel’s book was, of course, Infantrie Greift [I

Attacks], Berlin, 1939. For the best biography of Rommel in Engl

covers both his intellectual dimensions as well as his performanc

battlefields of two world wars, see Field Marshal David Fraser, K

Cross, A Life of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, New York: 

Collins, 1993.

36. Die Truppenführung, Berlin, 1933.

37. André Beufre, 1940, The Fall of France, New York: 

1968, p. 43.

38. Assemblé Nationale, “Séance du Conseil superieur de la 

tenue le 2 décembre 1938 sous la présidence de général Ga

Rapport au nom de la commission chargé d’enquêter sur les évén

survens en France de 1933 à 1945, Vol. 2.

39. For the professionalization of the American milita

particularly Allan R. Millett, The General: Robert L. Bulla

Officership in the United States Army, 1881-1925, Westpo

Greenwood, 1975; and In Many a Strife: General Gerald C. Thom

the U.S. Marine Corps, 1917-1956, Annapolis, MD: Naval In

Press, 1993.

40. For professions such as engineering, the law, and m

American society saw an increasing emphasis in the last decade

19th century into the 20th century on schooling and the establi

of a body of corporate knowledge for the professions. The establi

of the Naval War College at Newport, RI, and the Comma

General Staff College at Leavenworth, KS, in the 19th century 

Army War College at Carlisle, PA, in the early 20th century we

part of a larger social phenomenon.

41. Allan R. Millett, “Assault from the Sea,” in Military Inn

in the Interwar Period, Murray and Millett, eds., pp. 74-77.

42. Hone, Friedman, and Mandeles, American and British A

Carrier Development, pp. 33-42, 151. The authors’ discussion 

contribution made by the Naval War College to actual experime

in the fleet is particularly good.

43. Ibid., p. 33.

44. See in particular, Van Creveld, Fighting Power.

24
45. See William Odom, After the Trenches, The Transform

US Army Doctrine, 1918-1939, College Station: Texas A&M Pres

pp. 15-46.

46. Ibid., pp. 120-121. Part of the Army’s problem in t

through the difficulties involved in conducting large unit ope

was, while it was the same size as the Reichsheer through to th

1930s when the Germans began to expand their ground forces, t

Army had its units spread all over North America, where 

impossible to bring division-sized units together for annual tr

The German army, concentrated in a much smaller area

concentrate their forces for their annual maneuvers.

47. Part of any military organizations’ understanding of w

much to do with the geographical position of the nation. The G

have never had to get to the war, so they do not place logistics at 

of the priorities. Americans, on the other hand, have always had 

about the projection of military power—how to get to the war. 

they have had to begin with logistics. The same has been the ca

intelligence. The Germans thought only about their ne

neighbors, the Poles, the Chechs, and the French. The catastr

December 1941 underlines how little they had thought ab

Soviets. They thought not at all about the United States, a

declaration of war on the United States on December 11

underlines.

48. In the area of logistics, the German conduct of Op

BARBAROSSA, especially the fall campaign, represents th

appalling contempt for the logistical side of the equation. 

intelligence, the fact that the Germans had their top level 

broken throughout almost the entire course of World War II sugg

arrogance and incompetence that beggars the imagination, es

on the part of the Kriegsmarine which had had its ciphers broke

British in World War I. On these issues, see Murray and Millett

to Be Won, pp. 131-137, 244-247.

49. It is worth noting that Wilhelm Keitel pass

Kriegsakademie entrance examination.

50. B. J. C. McKercher and Michael A. Hennessy, The Oper

Art, Developments in Theories of War, Westport, CT: Praeger, 

166.

25
CHAPTER 2

NEW AGE MILITARY PROGRESSIVES

U.S. ARMY OFFICER PROFESSIONALIS

IN THE INFORMATION AGE

David R. Gray

I now regard the Indians as substantially eliminated from t

problems of the Army . . . such Indian wars as have hithe

disturbed the public peace and tranquility are not probabl

Lieutenant General William T. Sherm

Commanding General, US Army (188

The war with Spain . . . procured us a prominent place amo

the nations . . . [and] although we abstain from call

ourselves as such we are virtually one of the Great Powers a

one of the greatest of them. With our new position there h

descended on our shoulders a heavy burden resting on 

Great Powers, of assisting in the regulating and shaping 

human affairs. From the moral and intellectual view no nat

is better qualified for such a task.

Captain Carl Reichman, USA (190

In the quarter century separating Sherman’

Reichman’s observations, the U.S. Army experienc

identity crisis, sought out a new raison d’être

transformed itself to meet new responsibilities. Even 

organized hostilities on the frontier came to a 

thoughtful officers were considering the Army’s 

mission and role in society. The scale and complexities 

Civil War had profoundly affected the outlook 

significant portion of the officer corps. Mindful also 

sweeping changes in modern weaponry and imp

military command methods in Europe, broad-m

officers anxiously watched as warfare grew progres

more complicated. Most concluded that only an officer 

of professional soldiers, not frontier policemen, 

27
master modern war. Calling for internal reforms to ad

a new century, progressive “Young Turks” conceptua

fresh role for the Army.

An increasingly professionalized officer corps con

the Army’s mission to be one of perpetual readiness fo

The institution would now serve as a “school” to 

soldiers how to fight and win future wars. Spurr

institutional in-fighting, technological development

international concerns, the Army improved its troops

conditions, reconfigured its organization, acquired m

equipment, and developed new operational con

Officer reformers argued that modern warfare requ

lifetime of study and pressed for an extensive syst

military post-graduate education. Establishment of 

system contributed to a “renaissance” in military th

in the 1870s and 1880s that redefined officership. D

its continued performance of constabulary duties, the 

corps’ stress on readiness for war profoundly a

institutional culture, enabling the Army to change in 

and character. Moreover, acquisition of an overseas e

paved the way for further reforms to forge an Arm

could advance national interests abroad. Addi

improvements, including the creation of a general sta

recognition of the National Guard as the nation’s pr

military reserve, continued a successful transform

process and set the conditions for America’s imp

participation in World War I. 3

A century later, the Army’s raison d’être is ag

question. Victorious in two world wars in the first half 

20th century, the Army spent the next 40 years det

and containing communist expansionism during th

War. The officer corps’ professional ethos found

readiness for war served the Army well during this p

as containment involved fighting several “hot,” but l

wars. However, strategic conditions at the end of th

century require the Army to adjust to fundame

different circumstances. Victory in the Cold War elim

the West’s major enemy and calls the Army’s institu

28
purpose in the “New World Order” into question. That 

events coincided with a period of domestic cu

upheaval and dramatic technological innovatio

further confounded the Army’s efforts to redefi

relevancy. In the post-Cold War era, it has performed 

range of missions—most not involving “tradit

combat—in support of an activist national se

strategy. Like its late 19th century predecessor, the A

officer corps must again reassess the range 

professional duties and transform itself to meet th

century’s evolving societal, political, and str

conditions.

Besides acquisition of new equipment 

organizational restructuring, the Army must adju

institutional military culture for the cu

transformation process. Just as it did during the m

renaissance of the late 19th century, the officer corp

have to establish the institution’s intellectual directio

manage the associated cultural changes. Today’s s

norms, the rapid pace of technological change, 

complex strategic environment are already influenci

Army’s culture significantly. The character o

“information age,” like the industrial age that prece

requires the officer corps to extend its corporate o

from the strict military functionalism of the Cold Wa

more holistic view of professionalism. By adopt

fusionist perspective of professionalism, the officer 

can best broaden the dimensions of its martial exp

renew its professional identity, and enhance its po

effectiveness with civilian leaders.

Military Professionalism and American Strateg

Culture.

Military professionalism and strategic cultur

inseparably intertwined. A profession is a peculiar t

functional group with distinctive characteristics. S

expertise acquired through theoretical study and 

29
practice, the application of that abstract knowled

distinct problems, the memberships’ identification w

job as a life-long calling, and the primacy of the c

needs distinguish the professions. Moreover, societies 

professions relative autonomy to determine recruit

performance, and ethical standards. Mil

professionalism refers primarily to the officer corps

collective body possesses professional status because 

responsibilities and accountability to the na

leadership for military effectiveness.

4

 The chief func

the profession of arms is the application and managem

organized, socially sanctioned force in pursuit 

nation’s interests. Combat and success in battle a

profession’s main concerns. Unique to the mi

profession is the willingness to sacrifice life and limb 

service of the state.

5

The singular requirements of military profession

shape an armed force’s organizational culture. C

refers to the nexus of attitudes, norms, values, cu

beliefs, and education that produce the group’s col

sense of identity. Culture involves both ideas and beh

it establishes the group’s world-view as well 

normative behavior for responding to particular pro

In short, culture is the “glue” that consistently bin

organization together despite changes in leader

Warfighting, the military’s core competency, define

culture. That culture shapes the context of profes

soldiers’ understanding of warfare in all of its ma

dimensions. The virtues of physical courage, self-d

self-sacrifice, obedience, and discipline embodie

traditional ethos of military professionalism.

7

 Its ico

those of the masculine warrior—the infantry

paratrooper, or tank crewman, for example—

personifies the martial ethos. Structured in hierarch

facilitate unity of command and mission achieve

military societies are undemocratic and stress the va

the group over individual desires. General Sir 

Hackett, a former commander of the British Army 

30
Rhine and brilliant classicist, has succinctly summed 

essence of military culture:

The essential basis of military life is ordered application 

force under an unlimited liability. It is the unlimited liabil

that sets the man who embraces this life somewhat apart. 

will (or should) always be a citizen; as long as he serves he w

never be a civilian.

8

Although the military profession—and by extensi

Army—possess distinctive characteristics from c

society, the state it serves shapes its organization, pu

and behavior. Unique geographical, social, ideologica

technological factors also contribute to a na

consensual image of war.

9

 This image of war, or str

culture, profoundly influences the status of m

professionalism in society and conditions its m

behavior. America’s individualistic, freedom-based po

ideology, pluralistic military institutions, abso

conception of national security, penchant for ma

solutions to problems—especially technological ones

geographical isolation are the basis for the American 

war. That strategic culture has molded the Army

tasks and organizational ethos.

Not surprisingly, American ideology and po

culture have forged the nation’s attitude toward m

institutions and the use of force. Founded on the i

natural rights, American culture emphasizes li

individualism, capitalism, entrepreneurship, and di

of centralized power. The latter point espe

underscores fear of charismatic military “m

horseback” and standing armies, which repr

tyrannical threats to civil liberties. To balance na

security needs with individual freedoms, the rep

Founding Fathers enshrined the concept of ci

supremacy over military forces in law. Constitu

provisions split responsibility for military com

organization, and oversight between the Presiden

Congress. The Constitution also established a dual 

31
composed of regulars and militia; this concept provid

immediate security needs, while ensuring the na

citizens’ had a stake in the outcome of its wars. 

pluralistic institutions provided socially acceptable 

to achieve the Constitution’s stated purposes to “

domestic tranquility” and “provide for the common de

against external threats.

10

Grounded in classic liberal tradition, American s

regards peace and war as diametrical conditions. Wa

aberration, a breakdown in otherwise peaceful rel

between states. Appealing to the unique destiny 

United States to spread its democratic ideals, Am

political leaders often cast the nation’s conflic

ideological crusades to mobilize popular support. D

war, America seeks clear-cut victory at the lowes

through the application of massive military force to r

normalcy. American armed forces rely on the na

material might and technology to overwhelm the e

while minimizing their own casualties.

11

Besides ideology, geography has also shape

American way of war. Isolated by two oceans and bo

by two militarily weak nation-states, the United 

enjoys relative freedom from external invasion, red

the need for conventional defenses of its terr

Conversely, that same geography makes projection o

power especially difficult. The expeditionary nat

American power projection requires a high deg

interservice cooperation, a cooperation often marr

institutional rivalries and conflicting missions. Mor

America’s geographical position ensures that land 

depends upon both sea and air power just to get its leg

overseas battlefields. Knowledge and understand

joint operations is, therefore, a fundamental elem

professional military expertise.

These ideals and material factors had impo

consequences for the development of mil

professionalism in the Army. First, from the earliest o

32
of the republic, an acute tension has existed betwe

ideals of liberalism and the traditional military val

subordination, discipline, and obedience to a hierar

chain of command. While inculcating military virtue

professional socialization process dampens, but do

completely eliminate, that tension. Second, the officer 

responded to the nation’s historical distrust of gover

power, especially in the military form, by adopting ove

the principle, if not entirely the practice, of m

noninterference in political matters. The roles of offic

politician were distinct; officers offered advice to civ

only on military matters, not political issues. This tra

reinforced the notion that peace and war were se

spheres governed by independent rules and with dif

overseers. Third, the conceptual isolation of politic

military operations created a military preferen

absolute solutions to external security problems

absolutist approach expressed itself in the officer 

affinity for total victories as expressed by G

unconditional surrender demands in the Civil War 

destruction of hostile Indian tribes blocking wes

expansion.

The officer corps’ conception of warfare is congruen

the nation’s strategic culture and the Army’s his

experience. The belief that the international syste

largely remain the same underlies American assum

regarding war, as well as assumptions that the Westp

system of sovereign nation-states will continue to co

in an anarchic world dominated by national self-int

and where armed combat serves as an instrument of 

The use of force remains the exclusive province of r

military establishments directed by an officer elit

governed by rules and customs. When engaged in 

America will interpret national objectives in absolute 

by seeking the complete overthrow of its opponents’ ca

to resist. As a result, Americans expect to dictat

negotiate, settlement terms that end a war, regard

whether it is total or limited in character. America’s 

33
forces, therefore, prefer strategies of annihilation to d

an enemy’s military capabilities as the quickest 

toward achieving victory. Towards this end, the Arm

to overwhelm the enemy by applying decisive forc

combination of massed effects, material overmatch

sophisticated weaponry. Optimism that force of Am

arms can achieve ultimate victory in war underpi

officer corps’ professional self-esteem.

12

 This “abso

perspective, entrenched in a pessimistic belief 

permanency of war and stress on military victor

consistently dominated the Army’s military culture.

1

The increasing professionalism of the Army’s 

corps set in motion during the dark days of consta

duty on the Western frontiers paid dividends durin

20th century. In two World Wars, professionals orga

equipped, and deployed immense armies compo

citizen soldiers to overseas theaters. The professional

led their citizen soldiers to clear-cut military vic

Cooperative civil-military relations reached their 

during World War II with General George C. Ma

serving as the model for professional selfless service

The Cold War, however, challenged the high st

military professionalism achieved by 1945. Paradox

the Cold War’s increasing militarization of Am

society coincided with the declining credibility of the 

corps’ claim to sole expertise in employing military 

The nation’s reliance on a strategy of nuclear deter

the rise of civilian defense intellectuals in policy circle

the limited wars in Korea and Vietnam undermin

officer corps’ professional ethos and invoked resista

wars without military victory. The possibility of n

Armageddon—an absolute war so terrible th

threatened to make traditional notions of 

obsolete—struck at the underpinnings of mi

professionalism. The nuclear age restricted tradi

military practice to a narrow spectrum of conflicts w

clear distinctions between war and politics. It cer

ended the possibility of achieving an uncondi

34
surrender. The new era of limited war frustrated the A

officer corps, which chaffed at restrictions on w

decisive land warfare.

14

Following a bitter defeat in Vietnam, the Army’s 

corps reformed the institution and restored the trad

focus on conventional war against a major power, i

case against the Soviet Union in Europe. The rig

emphasis placed on officer professionalism during the 

and 1980s restored morale and increased m

expertise.

15

 The efforts seemed well placed as the Col

ended in a bloodless victory with the collapse of the e

The decisive use of force in Panama and Iraq reinforc

notion that the officer corps had achieved a le

competent professionalism not seen since World W

Once again professional and civilian conceptions of h

fight a war converged and established the vision for 

conflicts—civilians setting clear policy goals an

military using overwhelming force, founded on the na

technological advantages, to achieve discernible r

This image of future war resembled, as one schola

asserted, “a reprise of World War II in the fancy dr

high technology.”

16

 But the New World Order has p

more different than imagined. Changes in America’s 

norms, technological innovations, and evolving 

geo-political commitments call for professional reapp

of the military art for the new age.

As it crafts the future direction of the professio

officer corps must recognize the effect of these changes 

distinctive ethos and culture. Out of habit, the officer 

will routinely choose operational responses consisten

American strategic culture and traditional mi

practices. But the new era will require adaptatio

rethinking of some traditional concepts to meet 

America’s evolving security requirements. Alt

readiness for war must remain its central defining fe

officer professionalism in the 21st century must ad

corporate view that is more fusionist in perspe

Fusionism emphasizes expertise in technical m

35
matters, but also consideration of the potential imp

political, economic, technological, and social facto

military operations.

17

 A fusionist officer corps will be 

able to reconcile the distinctiveness of soldiers’ callin

changing social norms, to broaden the scope of m

expertise to meet complex security demands, a

enhance their credibility with civilian leaders by pro

realistic advice on national security matters.

Officer Professionalism in an Age of Military

Indeterminacy.

Adapting to the challenges of the new century 

daunting a task for today’s officer corps as it was for 

professionals a century ago. Like their predecessors, o

anxiously prepare for the future in a period of c

characterized by the military’s declining importa

society and indeterminate threats to security. Assim

post-modernist ideology and the effects of sophist

technologies, American society is in a period of 

transition as sweeping in impact as occurred durin

century’s reshaping of life by the Industrial Revo

Military concerns, largely preeminent in the Cold War

begun to slip into the background of social and po

discourse, except perhaps for debates regardin

military’s slowness to adopt prevailing cultural n

Externally, the United States faces no military p

capable of threatening its sovereignty or survival 

through all-out nuclear attack.

A number of lesser perils, however, jeopardiz

relative peace. Because the United States has assum

role as enforcer of global stability, the American m

must be capable of operating in a broad ran

circumstances often perceived as incongruent wit

traditional professional ethos. These changing dyn

have blurred lines between civilian and military exp

and called into question the Army’s self-identity and n

perform close combat, its defining competency.

36
Post-modernist cultural mores contradict the cor

norms the Army historically has needed to wage sus

land warfare and engage in close combat. Army c

identifies team effort to achieve success in battle: disc

obedience, and loyalty to a hierarchical chain of com

as the essential military virtues. In post-modernist cu

all values are subject to interpretation, truth is relativ

relationships to institutions, especially governmenta

are suspect. Ironically, as America honors the col

sacrifices of the “Greatest Generation” during World W

post-modern models for behavior prize asse

individualism, portable loyalty, and self-actualiz

Diversity and self-affirmation are the corner stones 

culture. Moreover, the melting away of long-held so

taboos associated with gender and sexual orientat

post-modern society have affected the essence of m

life. The masculine nature of military culture, rest

men’s physical prowess and singular role as fighter

devolved with the opening of more career fields to w

After acrimonious public confrontation over the is

homosexuals in the military and a series of sex scanda

Army adopted compromise measures to combat abus

make its culture more open to prevailing social mores

character of post-modern culture, therefore, under

traditional aspects of the professional ethos and cor

cohesion.

19

Changing social mores have coincided with m

technological advances, which have also caused the A

examine the way it will fight in the Information 

According to the prevailing view in academic and se

studies circles, the world has entered a drama

different era of warfare. The sheer momentu

technological progress, especially the rapid spre

computer-based information systems, has spar

revolution in military affairs (RMA). The scop

character of this RMA varies according to the s

consulted; however, the Army has accepted many 

basic premises in crafting its vision of future warfar

37
Central to its transformation efforts is the Army’s 

that information technologies will play the major r

shaping the conduct of future land combat. Spee

knowledge are the fundamental features of Informatio

warfare.

21

 Swift advances in information technologi

provide forces with better situational awareness, both 

enemy’s and one’s own location on the battlefield. Su

battlefield awareness allows small, mobile units to c

greater areas. On the nonlinear battlefields of the f

more modular combined arms teams will employ pre

munitions at greater ranges with exacting acc

Moreover, information superiority will enable fr

forces to reduce their vulnerability through dispe

make decisions more rapidly than the enemy, and ope

faster tempo. Precision strikes, rapid maneuver

simultaneous assaults will overwhelm opponents 

they can react. Flatter, more “networked” fighting forc

more effective than “hierarchical organizations th

large, slow and nonstealthy” in this style of warfare

stressing conventional warfare between opposing a

and use of high technology to overcome enemies in 

decisive operations, this vision of future warfare coi

closely with the traditional American way of war.

Post-modern mores and technological imper

together have profound implications for the m

profession. First, the officer corps will continue to dr

entrants from a decreased pool of manpower. Part 

problem is demographic, a shrinking base of ava

military age manpower in the early 2000s, and 

economic. What Generation Xers may lack in m

virtues, they make up for in technological lit

Arguably, information technologies further enhan

trend toward individualism by providing access to a 

base of knowledge and increasing personal produc

The military must compete in an expanding eco

dependent on high technology for sustained growth

economy has produced a huge job market for “do

savvy” individuals. Finding the right incentives to a

38
high-quality, technologically-oriented officer cand

willing to subordinate some of their individuality to co

to hierarchical, organizational discipline and control 

challenging. Indeed, the Army’s newest recruiting s

“An Army of One,” addresses this dynamic by attemp

persuade potential recruits that they will not lose 

individual identity upon entry into the organization.

Second, the boundaries between combat and nonc

activities have become more indistinct. Are inform

technicians who use computer code to disrupt power 

telephone exchanges, or water supplies engaging 

supporting combat? And if this action constitutes “com

then how can the military profession lay claim to a s

expertise, since many civilian computer technicians 

perform the same task as effectively? Similarl

accelerating use of long-range, over-the-horizon pre

munitions to engage targets will redefine the mean

close combat and potentially realign the dynamics 

Army’s professional ethos. The adjustment in profes

ethos would likely be more akin to that of bomber p

nuclear missileer culture than that of traditional c

arms culture, which willingly accepted killing the e

within observable range of direct fires as an inh

necessity. The distinctions are important because 

degree of emphasis placed on individual tech

competence rather than demonstrated leadership. 

can reduce warfare to the destruction of a few key t

sets by small teams of warriors rather than the appli

of organized violence by large operational forma

military culture would then place more value on the f

rather than the latter. The opposite is true today. Thu

interaction of changing cultural mores and acceptan

technological view of warfare replaces the fighter wi

computer “geek” as the icon of military professionalism

in some cases, civilian contractors, like the mercena

the 16th and 17th centuries, may supercede trained so

as the practitioners of new age warfare, placing the 

and prestige of the military profession at risk.

39
The post-modern mechanistic view of war, so app

in its near bloodless, video game-like qualities, vir

ignores other forms of warfare that American soldie

likely to face in the future. Information war enthu

persistently tend to minimize examples whe

opponent’s will has overcome technological and org

tional superiority. Recent examples abound, beginnin

Vietnam (which the U.S. Army, as an instit

steadfastly refuses to examine with any deep intell

honesty), Afghanistan, Chechnya, as well as the c

trouble between the Israelis and Palestinia

Technological superiority failed to produce quick, de

results in any of these conflicts. Human factors pla

greater role in determining the outcome, as 

well-equipped opponents effectively found adaptive 

to mitigate the effects of more technologically sophist

weaponry. Indeed, the most effective strategies em

by a technologically weaker power—the Maoist strat

people’s war and dau tranh, the North Vietna

variant—stress the enduring power of man over ma

The point is that technological advances will not alt

fundamental features of war: fear, uncertainty

ambiguity. Although mastering the tools of war will r

a fundamental part of military expertise, more cruci

be the rapid comprehension of a war’s political conte

an enemy’s approach to fighting, which will likely b

different than described in information war literatur

Moreover, in coming decades the officer corps will 

confront wars more akin to Vietnam than Sta

Troopers. Arguably, Vietnam represented the 

Information Age war. The war contained most 

features now touted as unique to the knowledge

warfare of the 21st century. American forces employ

impressive array of advanced technologies—sophist

seismic and acoustic sensors, the first generat

air-launched precision-guided missiles, and comput

processing intelligence and battlefield results—agai

elusive enemy. Within one geographically diverse the

40
war, American forces fought toe-to-toe with 

Vietnamese regular army, engaged Viet Cong insur

rebuilt villages as part of pacification efforts, and bo

targets in North Vietnam, all in full view of a seem

ubiquitous media. These activities occurred simultan

in widely separated areas of responsibility. Determ

what kind of war to fight and with what type of forces p

as problematic for small unit commanders as fo

Commander, Military Assistance Command Vietnam

multi-faceted nature of the war considerably stress

officer corps’ intellectual agility to adjust rapidly to 

different hostile environments. The complexity of swi

among conventional, counterinsurgency, and pacifi

operations proved especially daunting.

26

 Vie

therefore, provides a glimpse of the type of “full spe

operations” officers must prepare themselves to fight 

future.

27

Fortunately, the national security strategy of en

ment has nudged, if not forced, military profession

confront troublesome small wars and disparate for

conflict. The strategy emerged in the heady aftermath 

Cold War, when the United States became not just one 

Great Powers, but the world’s sole Superpower. Reac

sweeping international change and fresh from de

victories in Operations JUST CAUSE and DE

STORM, President George Bush adopted “peac

engagement” as the new American national se

strategy in 1991. The strategy focused on prevention 

than reaction. Henceforth, American power would at

to reduce the “root causes” of conflict through heigh

nation assistance, multilateral responses to se

problems, and, when required, the discriminate appli

of overwhelming military power to keep the peace.

28

first tested the strategy during Operation RESTORE 

in Somalia shortly before leaving office. The C

administration clearly accepted the logic and gramm

peacetime engagement. The Clintonian strate

“engagement and enlargement” held that global stab

41
the new world order depended upon a vastly different 

military force structure, more innovative mi

strategies to “shape” the international context, and pe

even a different type of officer corps than that requi

the Cold War.

29

The dynamics of the post-Cold War world an

strategy of peacetime engagement have forced the A

prepare for high-end conventional combat 

simultaneously performing many “military oper

other than war.” These latter operations inc

peacekeeping, counterdrug operations, humanit

assistance, and disaster relief in such diverse locati

Bosnia, Columbia, Haiti, and East Timor. During the 

operations other than war became routine, causing m

leaders to pay greater sensitivity to political, econom

cultural factors than they might have during c

operations against a clearly defined enemy. Acting d

in concert with a number of governmental agencies, 

and host nation forces, media contingents, and c

nongovernmental agencies has further compl

military planning and execution. The ambiguous nat

operations other than war has produced some frust

and grumbling in professional military ranks. Refl

traditional concerns about appropriate military roles, 

complain that such tasks are nontraditional, imprope

detrimental to combat readiness.

Peacetime engagement has created two v

conundrums for the American military profession. Fir

officer corps has resisted the use of military force in m

the past decades’ humanitarian interventions becaus

appeared antithetical to its preferred operational sty

strategic culture. After the devastating firefig

Mogadishu, Somalia in 1992, the military chaffed a

so-called humanitarian interventions that lacked cle

objectives and applied force discretely, but not neces

decisively. For an officer corps that identified with 

leadership in conventional battles, peace operations s

too much like police work that could sap the combat 

42
Many officers worried that prolonged participation in 

operations would damage the warrior ethic requir

success in combat.

30

 Restrictive rules of engagemen

political pressures (real and perceived) to avoid casu

undermined the professional ethos of sacrific

unlimited liability. That overemphasis on force prot

was having a pernicious effect on the professio

apparent as commanders told subordinates that “the

nothing worth dying for in Bosnia.”

31

 Reluctance to 

out missions that do not comply with the mili

preferred operational style may have undermine

credibility of military advice with civilian leaders, 

acrimonious exchange between Colin Powell and Mad

Albright over the Bosnian intervention suggested.

32

Peacetime engagement also underscored the blur

traditional boundaries between civilian and m

responsibilities. Military officers have become no

practitioners of the military art, but also age

diplomacy. At the tactical level, for example, officers 

ranks engaged in negotiations with local civilian le

factional military commanders, and members o

international community during peace operations in 

Bosnia, and Kosovo. Because of the national se

strategy’s emphasis on “shaping” the peacetime en

ment, geographic commanders in chief (CINCs) of re

commands have become important emissaries of f

policy at the strategic and operational levels. W

alongside the U.S. ambassadors within their region

CINCs increasingly have become involved in high 

military-to-military and diplomatic contacts that 

develop into personal relationships with key elites in 

theaters of operation. These relationships have a 

impact on the CINCs’ ability to implement portions o

theater engagement plan and influence events du

crisis. With access to great resources and ability to e

engagement programs, the CINCs’ influence in some 

exceeds that of the U.S. Ambassadors. A recent Wash

Post article characterized the CINCs as the “moder

43
equivalent of the Roman Empire’s pro-consuls: well-fu

semi-autonomous, unconventional centers of U.S. f

policy.”

33

 The impetus to prevent instability in the re

commands, therefore, often places the CINCs i

forefront of diplomacy, traditionally a State Depar

function.

The practical effect of peacetime engagement is to 

the military professional mind-set away from abso

toward pragmatism. One can only measure the succ

the CINCs’ shaping strategies and military commitme

Bosnia and Kosovo in the long term, not short de

victories over hostile factions. Some form of engag

will likely remain America’s strategy for the fores

future. Therefore, the officer corps must understan

subtle distinctions between military power (pot

capability) and military force (the product of capabilit

and fighting spirit), as well as to the socio-political dyn

associated with their use. The pragmatic code prim

emphasizes the measured application of force a

political consequences. Despite the pragmatic 

embodiment of Clausewitzian and fusionist perspe

many civilian leaders and academics worry that the 

corps’ greater sensitivity to political factors is underm

civil-military relations.

Political Savvy and Effectiveness.

Since the late 19th century, Army leaders from Sh

to Marshall have emphasized the separation of m

from political advice and discouraged active po

partisanship. Although the Army’s continued perfor

of constabulary missions prior to World War I re

officers to exercise political skills, the preferred profes

outlook denigrated politics and “political officers.” O

of Marshall’s generation, and Marshall himself, d

even vote lest even the hint that partisan political con

taint their military advice.

34

 The professional etho

helped insulate officers from partisan political m

44
slowly eroded during the Cold War. Disputes over s

roles and missions, inequitable distribution of 

resources, and evolving global strategy all contribu

civil-military tensions. The tensions simmered within 

administration during the Cold War and often boile

into public view. The revolt of the admirals, MacAr

relief as Commander in Chief in the Far East, Ridg

and Taylor’s feuds with Eisenhower’s “New Look” 

and the outright rejection or manipulation of m

advice during the Kennedy and Johnson administr

provide just a few examples of deteriorating relat

Muted for a short time during the 1980s, the te

resurfaced shortly after Operation DESERT STORM 

Bush and Clinton administrations considered the sh

the New World Order.

The military’s increasing role in political ma

especially at the highest policy level, during the 199

raised red flags of warning in civilian academia and 

circles. Some fear that, by expanding the scope of m

advice into areas traditionally dominated by civilian 

makers, a fusionist officer corps has become o

politicized, seriously jeopardizing civilian control 

military. Critics cite General Colin Powell’s behav

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as proof of corr

military professionalism that had gone “out of contro

Powell’s shaping of military strategy and public ai

his strong views on military intervention in B

provoked considerable controversy. Viewing the str

problem within the context of American experien

Korea and Vietnam, Powell argued: “As soon as they t

it is limited, it means they do not care whether you ach

result or not. As soon as they tell me, ‘surgical,’ I head 

bushes.” “Decisive means and results are to be prefe

the Chairman asserted, “even if they are not a

possible.”

37

 Critics lambasted Powell as an insubor

and labeled him the new “McClellan.”

38

 That the C

administration initially accepted the wisdom of Po

arguments appeared even more troubling to critic

45
Chairman’s directness, candor, and subsequent “po

maneuverings” in offering alternatives to Pres

Clinton’s plan to lift the ban on homosexuality 

military convinced one noted scholar that “the milit

more alienated from its civilian leadership than at an

in American history and more vocal about it.”

39

However, the critics’ views ignored the critical 

military advice in policy formulation, recent legislatio

historical traditions in helping to balance civil-m

relations. Clausewitz clearly recognized that officers 

consider all relevant factors when giving advice to 

civilian masters. The Prussian theorist correctly a

that a “purely military opinion is unacceptable and 

damaging,” because “no major proposal required for w

operations other than war for that matter] can be w

out in ignorance of political factors.” To ensure th

coordination and integration, Clausewitz ad

governments to appoint the commander-in-chief 

cabinet where he and his country’s political leaders 

jointly discuss strategic policies.

40

 Clausewitzi

character, the 1986 Department of Defense Reorgani

(Goldwater-Nichols) Act legally mandated the posit

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff as the President’s “pri

military adviser.” On all matters relating to the mi

Powell, therefore, had a responsibility to make his 

and those of the Joint Chiefs known to the Presiden

law also required the Chairman to present dissenting 

within the Joint Chiefs to air all sides of an issu

decision to accept or reject the Chairman’s advice re

the President’s.

Many critics worry that the law has created a Cha

with too much power and a highly adept Prussian

General Staff skilled at manipulating civilian autho

This concern overstates the case because the four se

officer corps approach security issues from dif

cultural perspectives and lack a homogenous cor

outlook. Besides strong traditions of military subordi

to civilian authority, Constitutional and administ

46
barriers continue to prevent the military from gaini

much control over policymaking. Moreover, participa

the policymaking process, which involves tho

considerations of ends, ways, and means relationsh

more likely to generate greater loyalty to the natio

enhance, rather than detract from, civilian control 

military. 

The role of uniformed officers, especially the top 

and those in strategy or policy planning billets, is prim

to advise civilian political leaders on the armed se

capabilities, limitations, and appropriate uses for m

power. Always keeping the human dimension in 

officers recommend how military means can best a

policy aims. Strategists, while serving as the experts 

management of violence, must also consider 

recommendations within the overall context of the str

environment. Since military action taken by state

never exist in isolation from domestic and foreign p

economic issues, or media coverage, military plans ba

“real-world” considerations will carry greater weigh

civilian policymakers.

41

 As former Chairman of the 

Chiefs of Staff Maxwell Taylor once noted, “nothing 

likely to repel the civilian decisionmakers as a m

argument which omits obvious considerations whi

President cannot omit.” If an officer wanted to “per

the President,” Taylor further argued, then he had “

look at the totality of [the President’s] problem and 

give maximum help.”

42

 Placing military advice wi

broader perspective is likely to have more influenc

civilian leaders than that confined to essential m

aspects.

The last decade’s civil-military tensions have ch

away at the Army’s political effectiveness. Po

effectiveness refers to the ability of the Army’s 

leadership to secure consistently the resources requ

maintain, expand, and reconstitute itself. To remain v

the Army requires reliable access to financial suppo

adequate military-industrial base, sufficient quanti

47
quality of manpower, and control over the convers

resources into actual capabilities. Because dec

regarding the allocation of these resources involve po

issues, military leaders must obtain the cooperation 

national political elite. Political effectiveness hinges 

the civilian political leadership’s beliefs about m

activities. Whether they believe military activ

legitimate and view officership as a profession req

special expertise determines the credibility and we

arguments for resources. To what extent Army leade

more persuasively articulate their service’s need

those of their competitors provides the measure of po

effectiveness.

43

 Continued questioning of peaceke

missions, the unveiling of weapons systems deemed m

for the Cold War than future conflicts, a ser

well-publicized sex scandals, and the inability to p

rapidly heavy forces to Kosovo have all marred the A

political effectiveness in recent years.

The officer corps has a responsibility to increa

political effectiveness, without which the Army will 

from insufficient resources and institutional de

Civilian leaders routinely ask officers for their 

military advice on a variety of issues. To mak

institution’s voice heard, officers must develop “po

savvy” and participate in “constructive political en

ment.”

44

 A politically savvy officer corps deriv

credibility from proven military skills and cons

impartial advice rooted in the contextual interconne

between politics, policy, and strategy. By off

intellectually sound advice, a politically savvy officer 

can educate civilian leaders on military perspectives

requires increased understanding of the Constitu

division of war making powers and the tensions it c

between the President and Congress, the relations

military to society, and connections between politics a

application of military force.

Realistic political education focused on the role 

military, especially the Army’s, in society can addre

48
first relationship. This process must not stop 

pre-commissioning courses but form a significant por

the entire professional education system. It should 

with the fundamental requirement for office

understand the Constitution and basic civics—the 

presidential election showed just how ignorant Ame

in general are about their country’s basic princip

governance. Although the curriculums at the U.S. 

Command and General Staff College and the U.S. 

War College address some aspects, field-grade stu

should study more deeply the connections betwee

branches of government, both in law making and na

security formulation. Understanding the dynamics 

American legislative process is essential in the polic

budgeting arenas, especially how political compromi

local politics influence the outcome of budgeting, we

procurement, and base realignment decisions. W

such a background and consideration of the check

balances in American government, the officer corps w

unable to influence government leaders on mi

matters.

The second relationship between politics an

requires not only theoretical training, but a

reassessment of the meaning and ethics of profes

military advice. Currently, the Professional Mi

Education (PME) system exposes field grade offic

military theory, especially the work of Prussian th

Carl von Clausewitz. In On War, Clausewitz state

“war is the continuation of policy by other means” an

“war should never be thought of as something auton

but always as an instrument of policy.” Because “w

branch of political activity,” Clausewitz further argue

it “cannot be divorced from political life; and whenev

occurs in our thinking about war, the many link

connect the two elements are destroyed and we are lef

something pointless and devoid of sense.”

45

 

statements underline that officers serving on highe

49
staffs involved in national security must possess a tho

understanding of the political policymaking process.

Political sophistication does not mean officers 

should become involved in partisan politics. Neverth

the officer corps cannot remain completely aloof 

political issues that affect the profession in an 

intrusive, around-the-clock media coverage. The nat

the American political system and the various sym

links between the defense industry and governmen

prevent the officer corps from doing so when expert m

advice is needed. Moreover, the officer corps must be a

address honestly the impact of contentious social iss

military effectiveness. The close connection of po

strategy, and resources make apoliticism, if it ever 

existed, an unobtainable ideal. Indeed, Powell cou

officers attending the National Defense University to 

better understanding of politics and the media be

“politics is fundamental.” According to the f

Chairman, “there isn’t a general in Washington wh

political, not if he’s going to be successful, because tha

nature of our system.”

46

 The real civil-military 

involve avoidance of partisan, interest-group politic

the delineation of what constitutes legitimate dissen

civilian leaders. The line between advice, advocacy

activism is a fine one that officers must walk carefull

it is on this issue that critics have correctly no

significant change in the professional culture.

A recent comprehensive study of civil-military rel

by the Triangle Institute of Strategic Studies foun

evolving professional norms contradict tradi

understandings of civilian control. The survey ind

that a majority of officers believe it is proper for the m

to “insist rather than merely advise (or even advoc

private) on key matters, especially those involving the 

force.” This extends to senior military officers having 

in determining exit strategies, rules of engagemen

force tailoring for the mission. Many officers cite Dere

of Duty, H.R. McMaster’s influential study of civil-m

50
relations in the Johnson administration durin

Vietnam War, as justification for the senior leaders’ r

assert themselves on policy matters. Company and 

grade officers also believe that senior officers h

responsibility to resist civilian political pressure

resign or retire in protest if they believe senior c

authorities to be pursuing reckless policies. According 

survey, “nearly half of the mid-level officers said they 

resign from service if their senior uniformed lead

[did] not stand up for what is right in military policy

The troubling rise of civil-military distrust an

discord it has caused in the ranks of the officer 

represent unexpected Cold War legacies on military cu

The conduct of limited wars in Korea and Vietnam s

relations between civilians and the officer corps

frustrations of those “never again” generations influ

the current crop of officers, who believe they ha

obligation to make their voice heard on policy matt

prevent another Vietnam.

Embracing “no more Vietnams,” much of the 

corps has become confused over their professional du

the state, their sole client. They misconstrue their d

voice professional military advice with a perceived r

vote on policy matters. The officer corps does not hav

such right to decide national policy, nor can it und

American Constitutional system. A significant num

officers have unthinkingly accepted MacArt

wrong-headed notion of civil-military relations. MacA

objected to:

a new and heretofore unknown and dangerous concept, th

members of our armed forces owe primary allegiance or loya

to those who temporarily exercise the authority of t

Executive Branch of Government rather than to the coun

and its Constitution which they are sworn to defend. 

proposition could be more dangerous.

48

MacArthur is right on one point: his falla

proposition inherently endangers the professional 

51
The President is the duly elected representative 

people; his actions as commander in chief 

Constitutional legitimacy. Sworn to uphold and defe

Constitution, the officer corps cannot legally or eth

pick and choose which policies they will execute. Nor 

notion of mass resignation as a weapon to be used a

civilian authorities concerning policy disagreemen

ethically permissible option. George Washi

essentially settled the matter at Newburgh, New Yo

1783, when he dissuaded dissident officers from ma

on Congress or striking.

49

Rising civil-military tensions clearly undersco

points made above regarding political literacy and th

for enlightened discourse between soldier and ci

Moreover, the deterioration of the professional 

requires the officer corps to reexamine the logic of c

control of the military. “Mid-level officers seem to thi

can insist on things in the Oval Office,“ a senior 

recently complained; “That is not how the system wo

that level.”

50

 Officers do have a responsibility to ques

policy they consider to be wrong or mistaken and dis

candidly with civilian government leaders. H

disagreements over policy matters do not equa

disloyalty to civilian authorities. But the forum in 

military and civilian leaders discuss disagreeme

important. Public challenges and resistance to presid

or congressional proposals regarding military ma

especially if they involve controversial partisan po

issues, undermine the impartially and trust of the 

corps’ military advice. To avoid politicization of its 

the officer corps needs to discuss and reconsid

professional responsibilities to the nation. The officer 

credibility and effectiveness depend upon a 

understanding of proper boundaries between legit

military advice and politicization of issues.

The Information Age presents several paradox

officership in the 21st century. While the technologica

of the Information Age prizes specialization and indi

52
technical skills, their integration and synchronizatio

a useful system for warfighting demands an officer 

much broader range of generalized knowledge. Mas

traditional branch specialty skills and the moral inspi

of soldiers fighting in chaotic conditions continue 

fundamental areas of officer expertise. Stra

requirements, however, oblige even low-level offic

understand joint and combined operations, as w

diplomacy and the art of negotiation. Condition

post-modern individualism and empowered by the ab

communicate instantaneously and with global 

military subordinates often challenge the moral aut

of more senior leaders’ decisions, even as obedienc

discipline under a chain of command must continue 

basis of effective military professionalism. Thu

uncertainties of the strategic environment created 

flood of data and societal change demand officers wit

greater moral courage as well as technical mastery of t

and science of war.

Officers at all levels participate in political matte

greater degree than in the past. These activities rang

negotiating disarmament of ethnic clans at the tactica

to discussions of policy with civilian elites at the str

level. But how to speak out on matters affectin

profession of arms without the officer corps bec

politicized remains a tricky issue. The solution l

reconciling the demands of traditional military cultur

the dynamics of the new age. Military effectiveness 

next century will depend on a professional ethos fo

upon the willingness always to fight when require

selfless service to nation above all.

New Age Military Progressives.

On the eve of an impending military revolution, a 

of Young Turks in the late 19th century set out a se

reforms to improve the Army’s military effectivenes

period of indeterminate security challenges. Their ca

53
personnel reform and demands for professional edu

sparked an intellectual renaissance that provided im

for cultural change. These early efforts paved the w

the Army’s increased professionalism in the 20th ce

Now a new set of military progressives from all officer 

must lead, rather than follow, change as the Army pre

to meet the demands of the new age.

The most important challenges for the officer co

the 21st century are intellectual and cultural. Firs

officer corps must reassert its traditional authorit

conceptual matters pertaining to war. Since 1945 a

birth of the atomic age, the officer corps has largely 

serious thinking about military theory and strate

civilian defense intellectuals.

51

 During the current str

pause, the officer corps needs to do some hard th

about the full spectrum of conflict. The experimen

process begun with the Louisiana Maneuvers, Forc

and Army after Next provided laudable first steps. B

work of these groups centered on conventional hig

warfare, the Army’s preferred operational style. Theo

future war need to incorporate not only technol

possibilities, but also consider the involvement of c

populations and the strategies that may effectively co

America’s use of decisive force. Officers must hav

mental flexibility to adjust to rapidly changing cond

to switch from one form of warfare to another, a

improvise. Mental flexibility remains wedded to pra

mastery of branch specific skills in the field and con

study of the profession through formal schoolin

individual reflection.

The intellectual and cultural changes necessary f

officer corps to fight America’s next wars must begin 

schoolhouse. The Army provides officers with a progr

and comprehensive professional education. The 

system synchronizes an officer’s intellectual growth 

with increasing rank and responsibilities. The s

works well as far as it goes. Curriculums at the staff an

colleges, however, need to spend more time ser

54
considering the meaning of full spectrum warfare

people’s war to urban combat in the high tech ag

officer corps must do hard thinking about war a

mentally prepared to execute rapid coup de mains as w

to fight protracted conflicts against determined enem

The officer corps must change its cultural att

toward education and the desirability of fa

assignments. The Army needs to assign up-and-c

talent to its faculties. The best and brightest shou

teaching as career enhancing, not career ending. Duri

1920s and 1930s, the Army’s institutional ethos in

that it was important for officers to go to school, and m

the best must serve on school faculties. Omar B

taught at West Point and the Infantry School. Jacob D

also instructed at West Point as well as the Field Ar

School. Walter Krueger, Alexander Patch, W

Simpson, Joseph McNarny, Charles Bolté, and J. L

Collins served on the U.S. Army War College’s fa

Faculty duty fostered a climate of intellectual curiosit

encouraged those officers to think through many 

problems of war beforehand. All of these officers wen

high command; one cannot over state their prepara

and impact on the generation of officers who fought in 

War II and Korea. Additionally, institutional commi

to education during the interwar period produced a c

officers open to innovation. The Army must a

assignment policies to encourage a new crop of ta

officers to seek out faculty duty without fear that 

career will suffer. The Army’s transformation cam

recognizes the importance of education; it must now 

that recognition with resources and an appreciat

contributions that the educators make in preparing le

for battlefield success.

52

The Army should open up more opportuniti

qualified officers to spend a year of residency at a c

graduate school. Although technical specialists will a

be needed, the Army should direct more officers t

subjects in the humanities and social sciences. A 

55
liberal arts education provides officers with greater de

intellectual insights into the human factors preval

war. Liberal arts curriculums also develop critical cog

skills—analysis, synthesis, and comprehension—

equip officers to deal with war’s ambiguitie

nonlinearity. Officer students would also have a cha

evaluate emerging civilian technologies that may 

future military uses. Because the Army will rou

operate as part of a coalition, officers should learn a f

language to enhance their communication skills. B

having the time to reflect free from the distraction

frenzied pace of a unit, officers attending graduate 

will reconnect with the American people and expand 

understanding of civilian society.

53

Individual self-study will always remain a c

component of officer education. Officers can effectively 

variety of computer simulations, including 

commercial games, to hone their individual ta

decisionmaking. The Army should continue to impro

distance learning capabilities and create web-

professional development courses for indiv

self-improvement. But short of actual combat experie

thorough grounding in history and leadership r

essential for understanding war. Officers can also gain 

perspective on their institution’s traditions and cor

spirit through well-structured individual re

programs. The Chief of Staff’s reading list provides 

start. However, the list contains only one small p

specifically on the Army’s institutional history—Dav

Hogan, Jr.’s 225 Years of Service—aimed primar

cadets. The Chief’s reading list should include other 

on the Army’s institutional history and incorporate 

works into U.S. Army Command and General 

College-level and above professional military edu

(PME) curriculums. Books such as Allan R. Mille

Peter Maslowski’s For a Common Defense, R

Weigley’s History of the United States Army, or the co

essays in Kenneth Hagan and William Robert’s Agai

56
Enemies highlight not only the Army’s peace- and wa

achievements, but the institution’s recurring struggle

manning, strategy, organization, and reserve issues a

Many of these themes resonate today, and a 

perspective might help in addressing them realistica

Besides educational development, the Army s

review career patterns and mandatory retirement 

with a view toward extending the service tour len

career officers. OPMS XXI has redefined career tra

anticipation of the special needs of the Information 

Time will tell whether the system is effective, but two 

need further study. First, the nature of Officer Per

Management System (OPMS) XXI has, perhaps unw

reintroduced a form of the line versus staff antagonis

affected the officer corps through the 19th and earl

centuries.

54

 At issue is the value of command 

institution and individual officers. If the technologica

of warfare in fact prevails, then individual special

violence, the information warriors, will displace 

commanders as the new elite, having the most des

career path.

55

 This would likely result in the most ta

officers moving to those branches rather than leading 

Emphasis on technical specialization for high

network-centric warfare may hurt recruiting efforts f

combat leaders charged to fight the full spectr

operations. Thus, the Army will need to monito

continually rebalance requirements between various 

tracks to ensure the best distribution of talented offi

A second point, needing further study, is wheth

current career length remains germane in the 21st ce

Congress fashioned the current career during the Cold 

Improved nutrition, better health-care practices

emphasis on physical fitness have increased the g

health and life span of the officer population

increasingly complexity and technical nature o

profession of arms requires more time to master all re

skills. The officer corps is hard-pressed to understand

less master, the requirements associated with b

57
qualification, joint service, high level staff duty

command, and service as an active duty adviser 

reserve components assignments. Extending the 

span to thirty-five or more years would take advant

greater longevity and provide more time to comprehe

expanding range of professional skills.

To establish a common outlook for the future direc

the officer corps, the Chief of Staff should release a 

Paper on professionalism. The Army released a s

paper in 1985 titled The Professional Developm

Officers Study. Like that document, the Chief’s White 

should stress the special attributes of officership, esp

the mastery of the art and science of war an

development of the warrior spirit as its principal th

The 1985 definition of the warrior spirit remains app

today:

Officers accept the responsibility of being entrusted with 

protection of the Nation; are prepared physically and ment

to lead units to fight and support in combat; [are] skilled in 

use of weapons, tactics, and doctrine; inspire confidence 

eagerness to be part of a team; have the ability to analyze, 

vision to see, and the integrity to choose, and the courag

execute.

56

The Chief’s White Paper should emphasize the na

special trust and confidence in the officer corps. In thi

the document should discuss what the nation expect

Army officers, their roles and responsibilities in demo

society, standards of conduct and ethical behavio

bounds of acceptable involvement in policy making a

in need of strict clarification. Amplification of this p

necessary because there is, as Eliot Cohen has observ

fine but essential distinction between pol

literacy—vital for an officer engaged in the complex ta

peacekeeping or armed diplomacy—and politicizat

Following publication, distribution, and posting o

Army home page, the chain of command should discu

pamphlet’s contents with the officer corps us

58
chain-teaching program. This method, effectively us

other important matters, will ensure the entire officer 

understands the pamphlet’s message. Even with t

busy schedules, a dialogue about officership an

profession of arms is certainly time well spent.

The scope of officer professionalism in the new ce

must expand its area of martial expertise, rene

corporate spirit, and develop political savvy to 

America’s evolving security needs. As it moves into th

century, the officer corps must address sweeping ch

occurring in both its internal and external ope

environments. The officer corps needs more tho

intellectual grounding to prepare effectively for wa

carry out the broader range of missions of Am

engagement strategy. The importance of intell

preparation cannot be overstated. As General Pe

Schoomaker, Commander in Chief of Special Oper

Command, succinctly put it to his troops, “warriors m

proficient in core competencies, training for certaint

educating for uncertainty.”

58

 Officers must develop a 

diverse range of interpersonal skills to lead a 

generation of soldiers but also to interact effectivel

allies or host nation forces. Because of the blurr

civilian and military roles, officers must be attuned 

political dimensions of military issues and be a

articulate well-reasoned professional views on 

subjects. Above all the officer corps must reinfor

essence of its military culture—psychological and ph

preparation to kill the enemy through orga

force—while loyally performing other missions as se

of the American public.

The officer corps must become the new mi

progressives and lead efforts to transform the Army f

new century. The uncertainty of the new world 

demands an officer corps that is well educated and ca

of adapting the military instrument to a wide var

potential uses. Military leaders will likely find them

giving advice not only on the application of force in c

59
situations, but also in a peacetime environment fr

with ambiguity. Besides military options, officer

increasingly have to consider alternatives designed a

the other instruments of power. Indeed, the CINCs’ t

engagement plans and the operational products pro

within the joint operation planning and execution s

(JOPES) already furnish such details.

59

 Thus, in m

recommendations to policy makers, military leaders 

avoid narrow professionalism and embrace a “fus

perspective that heeds the effects and consequen

political, economic, and technological factors. Measu

terms of its contributions to military expertis

enhanced responsibility to the state, the fusionist app

best prepares the officer corps to perform its dut

combat leaders, military statesmen, innovators

teachers in the 21st century.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. William T. Sherman, quoted in Jerry M. Cooper, “The 

Search For a Mission,” in Against All Enemies: Interpretat

American Military History from Colonial Times to the Present, K

J. Hagan and William R. Roberts, eds., Westport, CT: Greenwoo

p. 182.

2. Captain Carl Reichman, “In Pace Para Bellum,” I

Journal, Vol. II, January 1906, p. 5, quoted in James L. Abrah

America Arms For the New Century: The Making of a Great M

Power, New York: Free Press, 1981, p. 63.

3. The professionalization of the officer corps during the Prog

Period set the intellectual foundations for the modern 

Intellectual change preceded many of the actual physical change

Army described above. On the crucial military developments 

Progressive Period, see Russell F. Weigley, History of the United 

Army, enlarged edition, Bloomington: Indiana University Pres

pp. 265-354; Allan R. Millett, The General: Robert L. Bulla

Officership in the United States Army 1881-1925, Westpo

Greenwood Press, 1975; Abrahamson, America Arms for a New C

Peter Karsten, “Armed Progressives: The Military Reorganizes 

American Century,” in The Military in America from the Colonia

the Present, Revised Edition, Peter Karsten, ed., New York: Fre

1986, pp. 239-274. Jerry M. Cooper’s, William R. Roberts’, and T

60
Nenninger’s articles in Against All Enemies: Interpretat

American Military History from Colonial Times to Present, pp. 1

are excellent.

4. Warrant and noncommissioned officers are also ac

professional status under the Army’s larger institutional um

However, this essay focuses on commissioned officers because 

institutional responsibilities as senior leaders, strategy make

agents of change.

5. On the characteristics of military professionalism, see Sa

Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Po

Civil-Military Relations, Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1957, p

Allan R. Millett, “Military Professionalism and Officership in Am

Mershon Center Briefing Paper, Ohio State University, 1975, 

Sam C. Sarkesian and Robert E. Connor, Jr.,The US Military Pr

into the 21st Century: War, Peace and Politics, London: Fran

1999, pp. 19-30.

6. For further discussions of organizational culture, see 

Snider, “An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture,” Orbis, 

1999, pp. 11-26; and Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and 

Military Doctrine Between the Wars, Princeton: Princeton Un

Press, 1997, pp. 27-32.

7. Other useful insights on military culture include Wil

Murray, “Does Military Culture Matter?” Orbis, Winter 1999, pp

and idem, “Military Culture Does Matter,” Strategic Review, 

1999, pp. 32-40; John Hillen, “Must U.S. Military Culture R

Orbis, Winter 1999, pp. 43-67.

8. Sir John Hackett, The Profession of Arms, New York: Mac

1983, p. 202.

9. On the factors that influence strategy making a

development of a strategic culture, see Williamson Murray, Mac

Knox, and Alvin Berstein, eds., The Making of Strategy: Rulers

and War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 1-2

S. Gray, Modern Strategy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 19

129-151.

10. The military provisions of the Constitution of the United 

of America are in the Preamble, Article I, Section 8, and Ar

Section 2.

61
11. On these points, see Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslow

the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States, Ne

Free Press, 1984, especially Chapters 1-4; Robert E. Osgoo

American Approach to War,” in US National Security: A Framew

Analysis, Daniel J. Kaufman, et al., eds., Lexington, MA: D. C. 

1985, pp. 91-106; Thomas S. Langston, “The Civilian Side of M

Culture,” Parameters, Autumn 2000, pp. 21-29.

12. On these and other assumptions that underpin the Am

Way of War, see Russell F. Weigley, The American Way o

Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973, F.G. Hoffman, D

Force: The New American Way of War, Westport, CT: Praege

especially pp. 1-18, 99-133; John Shy, “American Military Exp

History and Learning,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 

1971, pp. 205-228.

13. In his sociological study of military professionalism, 

Janowitz distinguished between absolutists and pragm

Absolutists are those officers who prefer total victory and m

civilian interference in matters relating to war. Pragmatists a

concerned with measured application of force and its political ou

See Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and P

Portrait, New York: Free Press, 1970, pp. 264-279, 305-320.

14. For an insightful analysis of the impact of total war a

nuclear age on American military professionalism, see A

Bacevich, “The Use of Force in Our Time,” Wilson Quarterly, 

1995, pp. 51-63.

15. See James Kitfield, Prodigal Soldiers: How the Gener

Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized the American Style 

Washington: Brassey’s, 1995.

16. Andrew Bacevich, “New Rules: Modern War and M

Professionalism,” Parameters, December 1990, p. 14.

17. For a discussion of the fusionist model of officer professio

see Huntington, The Soldier and State, pp. 350-354, 430, 4

Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, especially pp. 417-442; A

Jordan, William J. Taylor, and Lawrence J. Korb, American N

Security: Policy and Process, 3d ed., Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 

1989, pp. 173-178.

18. Distribution of “values” cards and institutionaliza

quarterly Consideration of Others classes are two examples 

62
Army’s indoctrination efforts to make the command climat

inclusive and instill character in its membership.

19. For various descriptions of post-modern culture 

juxtaposition with military culture, see Charles C. Moskos, J

Williams, and David R. Segal, The Post-modern Military: Armed 

After the Cold War, New York: Oxford University Press

Stephanie Gutmann, The Kinder, Gentler Military: Can Am

Gender-Neutral Fighting Forces Still Win Wars? New York: S

2000; Leonard Wong, Generations Apart: Xers and Boomers 

Officer Corps, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2000; Th

Langston, ”The Civilian Side of Military Culture,” Parameters, 

Autumn 2000, pp. 21-29; and Don M. Snider, “An Uninformed De

Military Culture,” Orbis, Winter 1999, pp. 11-26; and “Am

Post-modern Military,” World Policy Journal, Spring 2000, pp. 

20. For a brief sampling of views on the RMA, see Clifford J. 

ed., The Military Revolution Debate, Boulder: Westview Press

Andrew Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of M

Revolutions,” The National Interest, Fall 1994, pp. 30-42; E

Cohen, “Come the Revolution,” National Review, Vol. 47, No. 1

31, 1995; and “A Revolution in Warfare,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75

March/April 1996, pp. 37-54; Joseph Nye and William 

“America’s Information Edge,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, 

March/April 1996, pp. 21-36; A. J. Bacevich, “Preserving the W

Horse,” The National Interest, Fall 94, pp. 23-40; and The Dyna

Military Revolution, 1300-2050, MacGregor Knox and Will

Murray, eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, es

chapters 1 and 9.

21. On various aspects of warfare described below, see 

General Robert H. Scales, Jr., Future Warfare Anthology, Carli

Strategic Studies Institute, 1999. Also see Steven Metz, “The Am

Army in the 21st Century,” Strategic Review, Fall 1999, pp. 12

22. Thomas G. Mahnken, “War and Culture in the Infor

Age,” Strategic Review, Winter 2000, p. 41.

23. At this writing the controversial advertising campaign 

begun. On its meaning, intended audience, and reasons for contr

see Jane McHugh, “An Army of One: Soldiers Hate It, Teens 

What’s Next?” and idem, “It’s Working: ‘Army of One’ is 

Attention from Target Group”; and Matthew Cox, “Play

Generation ‘Gets’ New Slogan,” Army Times, February 5, 20

14-16, 18.

63
24. Vietnam has produced an enormous body of literature fro

military and civilian writers. This includes the writings of ma

decisionmakers. However, the Army shifted its institutional foc

the war from counterinsurgency operations and search and 

missions to conventional war scenarios with the Soviet Union

than Harry G. Summers, Jr.’s On Strategy: A Critical Analysi

Vietnam, Novato, CA: Presidio, 1982, written for the Strategic 

Institute at the U.S. Army War College, the Army as an ins

quickly abandoned serious study of the war. The war deserve

more critical study within the officer corps for two reasons: first, 

of its enormous cultural impact on the profession even tod

second, it provides potential opponents with a model to 

successful war against a first class, high-tech power. The fo

paragraph will explore this thought further. For other im

critiques of the Army in Vietnam, see Andrew Krepenevich,The A

Vietnam, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986; and 

Sarkesian, Beyond the Battlefield: The New Military Professio

New York: Pergamon Press, 1981, pp. 75-111.

25. On the real dangers and difficulties for the Western po

fight irregular warfare in the locations listed, see Anatol Lieven

Little Wars,” The National Interest, Winter 2000/0, pp. 65-76.

26. The difficulty of assessing the overall nature of the w

developing effective counter-strategies is a recurrent theme 

conflict. The Objective Force will likely face opponents who w

both symmetrically and asymmetrically as the situation dictates

the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong did. For brief recounting 

difficulties of developing counter-strategies and fighting in Vi

complex environment, see George V. Herring, “American Stra

Vietnam: The Postwar Debate,” Military Affairs, No. 46, April 1

57-63; Lieutenant General Philip B. Davidson, Vietnam at W

History 1946-1975, Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988, pp. 333-369, 3

Also see Carnes Lord, “American Strategic Culture in Small 

Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 3, No. 3, Winter 1992, pp. 2

27. This term refers to the range of operations—offense, d

stability, and support—the Army performs in war, smalle

contingencies, or peacetime engagement environments. See U.S

Command and General Staff College, Student Text 3.0 Ope

Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff C

2000, pp. 1-14 to 1-17.

28. The White House, National Security Strategy of the 

States, Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991

64
29. William J. Clinton, National Security Strategy of Enga

and Enlargement, Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing 

1993.

30. See, for example, Gregory D. Foster, “The Effect of Deterr

the Fighting Ethic,” Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 10, No. 2, 

1984, pp. 276-292; David R. Segal and Barbara Foley M

“Peacekeeping, Warfighting, and Professionalism: At

Organization and Change Among Combat Soldiers on Const

Duty,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology, No. 13, Fall 1

167-181; David R. Segal and Ronald B. Tiggle, “Attitu

Citizen-Soldiers Toward Military Missions in the Post-Co

World,” Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 23, No. 3, Spring 19

373-390; David R. Segal, Brian J. Reed, and David E. 

“Constabulary Attitudes of National Guard and Regular Soldier

U.S. Army,” Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 24, No. 4, Summer 1

535-548; and Volker C. Franke, “Warriors for Peace: Th

Generation of US Military Leaders,” Armed Forces and Society, 

No. 1, Fall 1997, pp. 33-57.

31. Unnamed officer quoted in Don M. Snider, John A. Na

Tony Pfaff, Army Professionalism, The Military Ethic, and Off

in the 21st Century, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 199

32. While debating Bosnia policy, then U.S. Ambassador 

United Nations Madeleine Albright asked “what was the p

having this superb military that you’re always talking about if w

use it?” On the exchange, see Colin L. Powell with Joseph E. Pers

American Journey, New York: Random House, 1995, pp. 576-5

33. Dana Priest, “A Four Star Foreign Policy?” Washingto

September 28, 2000, p. A1; “An Engagement in 10 Time 

Washington Post, September 29, 2000, p. A1; and “Standing Up 

and Congress,” Washington Post, September 30, 2000, p. A1.

34. See Forrest C. Pogue, “George C. Marshall on Civil Rela

the United States,” in The United States Military Und

Constitution of the United States, 1789-1989, Richard H. Kohn, e

York: New York University, 1991, pp. 193-222.

35. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, pp. 345-373; A

Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A M

History of the United States of America, New York: Free Pres

Chapters 15-17.

65
36. Richard H. Kohn, “Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-M

Relations,” The National Interest, Spring 1994, pp. 3-17.

37. Michael R. Gordon, “Powell Delivers a Resounding No O

Military Force in Bosnia,” New York Times, September 28, 1992, 

A5; General Colin L. Powell, “Why Generals Get Nervous,” Ne

Times, October 8, 1992, pp. A 35, A47.

38. Editor, “Our ‘No Can Do’ Military,” New York Times, Oc

1992, A4; Russell F. Weigley, “The American Military and the P

of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell,” The Journal of M

History Special Issue, No. 57, October 1993, pp. 27-58.

39. Kohn, “Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relat

3. For more on the civil-military crisis, see Colin Powell, John L

William Odom, Samuel Huntington, and Richard Kohn, “An Ex

on Civil-Military Relations,” The National Interest, Summer 19

23-31; Thomas E. Ricks, “Is American Professionalism Dec

Proceedings, July 1998, pp. 26-29; William Pfaff, “The Pra

Guard,” The National Interest, Winter 2000/01, pp. 57-64

Bacevich, “Civilian Control: A Useful Fiction?” Joint Forces Qu

Autumn/Winter 1994-95, pp. 76-79; Mackubin T. Owens, “C

Control: A National Crisis?” Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn

1994-95, pp. 80-83.

40. This also provided a mechanism for civilian oversigh

military. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard an

Paret, eds., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 60

41. For perspectives on the role and training of military stra

see General John R. Galvin, “What’s the Matter with B

Strategist?” Parameters, March 1989, pp. 2-10; Major General G

Stadler, “A Shortage of Strategists,” Army History, No. 16, Fall 1

1, 3.

42. Maxwell Taylor, quoted in Jordan, et al., American N

Security, p. 175.

43. Military Effectiveness, Volume I, Allan R. Mille

Williamson Murray, eds., Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1988, pp. 4-6

44. For a discussion of the terms and concepts, see Sam Sar

“The US Military Must Find Its Voice,” Orbis, Summer 19

423-435; Sam Sarkesian and Robert E. Connor, Jr., The US M

Profession into the 21st Century, pp. 159-169.

45. Clausewitz, On War, pp. 99-100; 731-732.

66
46. Colin Powell, quoted in Bob Woodward, The Commande

York: Simon and Schuster, 1991, p. 155.

47. Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, “The Gap: S

Civilians and their Mutual Misunderstandings,” The National I

Fall 2000, pp. 34, 36. For further discussion of civil-military iss

Eliot Cohen, “Why the Gap Matters,” The National Interest, Fa

pp. 38-48; and Edward N. Luttwak, “From Vietnam to Dese

Civil-Military Relations in Modern Democracies,” Survival, Vol. 

1, Spring 1999, pp. 99-112.

48. Douglas MacArthur to Massachusetts legislature, quote

John Hackett, “The Military in the Service of the State,” i

Morality, and the Military Profession, 2nd edition, Malham M. 

ed., Boulder: Westview Press, 1986, pp. 114-115. Roy K. Flin

Truman-MacArthur Conflict: Dilemmas in Civil-Military Rela

the Nuclear Age,” The United States Military Under the Constit

the United States, pp. 223-267, is excellent on the related issue

brief but excellent discussion of the ethical issues discussed be

Paul Christopher, “Unjust War and Moral Obligation: What 

Officers Do?” Parameters, Autumn 1995, pp. 4-8.

49. Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, pp. 83

50. Feaver and Kohn, “The Gap,“ pp. 36-37.

51. For example, civilian defense intellectuals developed det

and limited war theory to define the use of military force in the 

age. Subsequently, civilian policymakers applied these conc

conventional warfare scenarios, such as limited war in Vietnam

hard-pressed to think of an active duty Army officer who is 

regarded in the policy arena as a military theorist or strateg

officer corps has done a better job in formulating operation

tactical doctrine, admittedly its forte. The officer corps needs to 

as much intellectual energy in developing new strategic conce

operational doctrine for the emerging century as it did when it 

out Air Land Battle doctrine in the 1970s and 1980s. See Weig

American Way of War, pp. 399-477; John L. Romjue, From 

Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army D

1973-1982, Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC, 1984.

52. On the importance of instructor assignments to the inte

development of the officers corps and for ideas on future PM

Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, Williamson Murr

Allan R. Millett, eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres

Williamson Murray, “Clausewitz Out, Computers In Military 

67
and Technological Hubris,” The National Interest, No. 48, S

1997, pp. 57-64; Leonard D. Holder, Jr., and Williamson M

“Prospects for Military Education,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Sprin

pp. 81-90.

53. On the value of civilian graduate school, see Sarkesian, 

the Battlefield, pp. 164-193; Richard H. Kohn, “An Officer Corps 

Next Century,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 1998, pp. 76-80; 

A. Vitas, “Civilian Graduate Education and the Professional O

Available from http://www.cgsc.army.mil/milrev/En

MayJun99/Vitas.htm. Internet, accessed November 9, 2000.

54. Prior to 1903 autonomous staff bureaus set poli

administered the Army. Officers often sought out service on a 

staff because it brought faster promotion and greater p

Frustrated by their own lack of control over the institution, the 

regimental officers resented the power of the bureaus. In the co

this chapter, the staff-line controversy refers to the potential for 

between traditional combat and command-related branch offic

competing career fields, such as information operations, espe

they are accorded equal or greater status without actual servic

field.

55. Stephen Rosen argues that peacetime innovation is p

when “senior officers with traditional credentials . . . create 

promotion pathway for junior officers practicing the new 

warfare.” Some of these “new warfare” officers will eventually ris

top ranks of their institutions. He points to naval aviato

submariners as two examples of this trend. Within the U.S. Arm

pathways are both formal and informal. The creation of the 

Aviation branch founded on the use of helicopters is an exam

formal career path. Paratrooper duty in one of the airborne d

created an informal, if recognized, path to higher responsibilities 

the Infantry branch during the 1950s. See Stephen Rosen, Winn

Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military, Ithaca, NY: C

1991, p. 127.

56. Department of the Army Pamphlet 360-888, “Commande

Special Issue, The Professional Development of Officers 

Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of the Army, Public 

May-June 1985, p. 5. For a discussion of the essential attribute

warrior spirit, see John C. Bahnsen and Robert W. Cone, “Defin

American Warrior Leader,” Parameters, December 1990, pp. 24

57. Cohen, “Why the Gap Matters,” p. 47.

68
58. General Peter J. Schoomaker, “Special Operations Forc

Way Ahead,” U.S. Special Forces Command, 1999.

59. Armed Forces Staff College, The Joint Staff Officer’s 

Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997. Ch

explains the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JO

69
CHAPTER 3

DISCOVERING THE ARMY’S CORE

COMPETENCIES

Frederick S. Rudesheim

In pursuit of its roles in peace and war, the Armed Forces 

United States develop and maintain core military capabilit

that enable their success across the range of milita

operations. At the highest professional levels, senior lead

develop joint warfighting core competencies that are t

capstone to American military power (emphasis added).

1

Joint Pub 1 (November 20

Perhaps the greatest challenge facing the U.S. 

today is defining why it is transforming and, ultim

what the transformed Army will look like. The difficu

determining a direction without a defined destination 

inevitably to the tried-and-true truism that, if you 

know where you’re going, then all roads lead “there

you will never know when you arrived. What, then, 

beacon that can illuminate a direction for the U.S. Ar

the near future? Core competencies can serve a

foundation for a transformational process that 

achieve and maintain momentum. The Army uses it

competencies to articulate its essential relevance to bo

soldiers and civilian leaders. If the core competencies 

to illuminate the direction of transformation, then 

leaders must ensure they have accurately distille

essence of their service to match not only today’s na

military requirements but those of the future as wel

This chapter, then, seeks to answer the question, 

we correctly identified our core competencies to ensu

Army can adequately respond to the national m

strategy?” The question, though simple when posite

various levels of complexity. First, I will sort ou

definitional differences between service roles, mis

71
functions, and core competencies. This will lead 

examination of the business origins from which on

establish a working definition. Next, I will present th

competencies of each of the services to identify po

points of friction. I will use the Department of D

(DOD) Directive that enumerates services’ function

point of departure for comparison. Thirdly, I w

enduring service competencies to the nature and cond

war and address specifically what might cause th

change. Finally, I will propose a common definition 

competencies and recommend those enduring Arm

competencies to provide the thread of continuity f

Army’s focus as it undergoes transformation in th

century.

Definitional Distinctions.

As Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed 

(UNAAF), indicates, “the ‘terms roles, missions

functions are often used interchangeably, bu

distinctions are important.”

2

 Roles are the “broa

enduring purposes” for which Congress establishe

services. Missions are the tasks assigned by the Pre

and his advisors to combatant commanders. Functio

the specific responsibilities that enable the services to 

their legally established roles. Therefore, Congres

mandated a review of these roles and missions.

Under the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols 

Reorganization Act of 1986, the Chairman, Joint Ch

Staff, has specific duties with regard to service-relate

and missions. The Chairman has received the foll

direction:

Not less than once every three years, or upon the request of 

President or the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman s

submit to the Secretary of Defense a report containing s

recommendations for changes in the assignment of functions 

roles and missions) to the Armed Forces as the Chairm

72
considers necessary to achieve maximum effectiveness of t

Armed Forces.

3

The last such review was in May 1995. The report 

“Directions for Defense, the Roles and Missions Co

sion of the Armed Forces” offered no recommendatio

substantive changes in the operational functions 

Armed Forces. It did, however, recognize examples o

competencies" that “define the services or agencies ess

contributions.” These were:

• Air Force: air superiority; global strike/deep a

air mobility.

• Army: mobile armored warfare; airborne opera

and light infantry operations.

• Navy: carrier-based air-amphibious power proje

sea-based air and missile defense; antisubm

warfare.

• Marine Corps: amphibious operations; over the 

forced entry operations; maritime prepositioni

• Coast Guard: humanitarian operations; ma

defense; safety; law-enforcement; environm

protection.

The introduction of this heretofore-unused category 

competencies may well have provided the impetus f

services to adopt and expand on these to define and s

for civilian leadership their contributions to na

defense.

History of Core Competencies. 

Core competency represents a business term that 

its way into the military’s lexicon in the 1990s. The o

of the term trace back to a work published by the bu

strategist Hiroyuki Itami, in his 1987 work 

Mobilizing Invisible Assets. Itami’s principal argume

73
that “the essence of successful strategy lies in . . . dy

strategic fit,” the match of external and internal fact

well as the content of the strategy itself.

4

 Itami’s ”inv

assets,” such as technological know-how or cus

loyalty, equated to a firm’s core competencies. 

authors have elaborated on Itami’s invisible assets, c

them the core competencies of a firm. To develop this co

two authors draw the allusion of a “competency tree

The diversified corporation is a large tree. The trunk and m

limbs are core products, the smaller branches are busin

units; the leaves, flowers, and fruit are end products. The 

system that provides nourishment, sustenance, and stabilit

the core competence. You can miss the strength of competi

by looking only at the end products in the same way you miss 

strength of the tree if you look only at its leaves.

5

 (emph

added).

Competitive advantage “derives from deeply-

abilities which lie behind the products that a 

produces.” These deeply-rooted abilities allow a f

enter new markets by leveraging what it does bes

hidden (deeply-rooted) and not easily imi

competencies are a business’s underlying source of str

and success. Accordingly, the secret to success is n

product but the unique set of abilities that allow a f

create great products.

6

 Thus, core competencies a

consequence of the “collective learning of the organiz

especially how to coordinate diverse production skil

integrate multiple streams of technology.” While a 

might acquire some of the technologies that compri

core competence, it will find it more difficult to duplica

pattern of internal coordination and learning.

Others have also developed the notion of 

competence. Mahen Tampoe, in his essay “Exploiti

Core Competence of Your Organization,” develope

following extensive checklist to determine whet

competence was really considered “core”:

74
It must be essential to corporate survival in a short a

long-term, invisible to competitors, difficult to imitate, uniq

to the Corporation, a mix of skills, resources and processes

capability which the organization can sustain over tim

greater than the competence of an individual, essential to t

development of core products and eventually to end produc

essential to the implementation of the strategic vision of t

Corporation, essential to the strategic decisions of t

Corporation, marketable and commercially viable, and few 

number.

7

There is much that one can take from this compreh

list. If correctly identified, core competencies are ess

to the strategic vision and decisions of the organiz

These works provide a basis for understanding the bu

theory underpinnings of core competencies, but how d

help in understanding the definitions established 

services? 

Before examining the core competencies of each 

services, one must derive a clear understanding of 

constitutes a core competency to use as a baseli

comparison. Based on the existing business re

definitions and criteria, core competencies are unique

to replicate, and enduring attributes (not products) 

services whose continued existence provides the sou

strength, strategic focus and direction to their institu

Core competencies are unique and hard to rep

because knowing the “product” does not divulg

“process.” Core competencies are enduring because 

transcend the temporal limitations associated 

concepts and technology whose obsolescence the 

generation of hardware defines. These compet

provide strength, strategic focus, and direction be

regardless of innovation and external threats

maintain the organization’s synchronization wi

overarching purpose for being.

75
Service Core Competencies.

The current U.S. National Military Strategy 

1997) states, U.S. “forces must be proficient in the

competencies and able to transition smoothly f

peacetime posture to swift execution of multiple mi

across the full spectrum of operation.” With a clear ma

for each service to remain proficient in its 

competencies, there exists a logical expectation tha

will possess articulated clear, commonly defined 

competencies. This is not the case.

One might best begin with the Air Force because, 

youngest service and the first to produce a post-Col

vision, it has done the best job in staking out it

competencies. DoD Directive 5100.1 (dated Septemb

1987) states that the first of the Air Force’s pr

functions is:

To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the conduc

prompt and sustained combat operations in 

air—specifically, forces to defend the United States against 

attack in accordance with doctrines established by the JCS, g

and maintain general air supremacy, defeat enemy air for

conduct space operations, control vital air areas, a

established local air superiority except as otherwise assig

herein.

8

General Ronald R. Fogleman, Air Force Chief o

from 1993-1996, addressed core competencies at a

Force Association symposium conducted in Los Ang

1996. He discussed his view of Air Force core compet

and enumerated the following:

• Air and space superiority

• Global attack

• Rapid global mobility

• Precision engagement

76
• Information superiority

• Agile combat generation

In this unveiling of Air Force core competencies

eleaborated in Air Force Doctrine Document 1 (Sept

1997), the Air Force chose to add a core competency—

attack. This was a calculated effort to ensure that t

Force would acquire an expeditionary nature. As Fog

told his audience, “The primary aspect of global attack 

ability to find an attack target anywhere on the globe 

the synergy generated by air and space assets to oper

the strategic level of war.”

9

 The second major aspect 

core competency was the expeditionary nature of t

Force. This the service leveraged from the 1995 Role

Missions Commission Report that said, “Overseas pr

is a core competency of all the services.” This f

softened the Navy’s claim that the aircraft carrier w

instrument of U.S. presence abroad. The Air Force ha

been the most successful at linking its core competen

weapons platforms. Its leaders have provided a dire

from the general core competencies, throug

capabilities those competencies enable, to the s

aircraft that provide those capabilities, providing a 

picture of “what you get for your money.”

The Marine Corps has also aggressively articula

core competencies in support of national strategy. M

Corps’ Concept and Issues ’98 states, “The U.S. mil

overall strength as a fighting force is ultimately a func

service competencies—reflecting distinct capabi

cultures, and traditions.” For the Marines, 

competencies are the following:

• Expeditionary Readiness

• Expeditionary Operations

• Forced Entry from the Sea

77
• Sea Based Operations

• Reserve Integration

The Marines focus on their traditionally accepted 

an expeditionary force. With their long history 

expeditionary force, they claim that they are not 

midst of transformation to ensure relevance, but 

reaffirmation to ensure viability.

The Army is a relative newcomer to the business 

competencies. The latest draft of Army doctrine 

Manual (FM) 1, The Army, defines core competencies a

essential and enduring capabilities of our service. 

they are not necessarily unique to the Army, they defi

fundamental contributions to our Nation’s secur

There are seven core competencies according to FM 1

one of them possessing five supporting competencies

are as follows:

• Sustained Land Dominance

 Precision Fires and Maneuver

 Information Superiority

 Command and Control of Joint and Multina

Forces

 Control and Defend Land, People, and N

Resources

 Conduct Sustainment Operations

• Prompt Response

• Forcible Entry Operations

• Close With and Destroy Enemy Forces

• Mobilize the Army

78
• Shape the Security Environment

• Support Civil Authorities

FM 1 also states that core competencies “enable 

forces to carry out any mission, anytime, anywhere 

world,”

11

 but makes the distinction that “quality p

turn competencies into capabilities. To further confu

precise intent for selecting core competencies, the 

draft of FM 3-0, Operations, states that the Army’s m

essential tasks are the “operational expression” 

Army’s core competencies,

12

 and posits that the

actually one in the same. If one were to examine e

these core competencies using the definitional con

provided earlier, one might propose that core compet

are the attributes that span the gap between the natu

conduct of war.

The Nature and Conduct of War.

It is important to draw the distinction betwee

nature and conduct of war. If the nature of 21st centu

will remain essentially unchanged from war throu

history, then there are certain constants one would ex

observe. First, is the Clausewitzian notion that wa

continuation of politics by other means. One woul

expect that states would engage in war because of d

political objectives. Second, those who conduct wa

continue to confront uncertainty and risk, a combi

made even more difficult to discern when combati

intelligent foe. Third, nations prosecute war to a

conclusive results. Lastly, war will remain in the ph

domain of personal and oftentimes brutal destruc

Conversely, the conduct of war will continue to evolv

the introduction of new concepts, technologies

capabilities. The judicious selection and compleme

application of these technologies and capabilitie

represent the greatest challenge to Army transforma

79
If the nature of war has not changed, then the 

must leverage core competencies as “way points” to na

the uncharted waters of technological innovatio

information operations. The Army must jealously gu

core competencies from the one source that could 

disastrous deviation—itself. The Army must ensur

what defines its unique contribution to the nation re

viable even in the most turbulent of times. 

competencies are the attributes that span the gap be

the nature and conduct of war.

Core competencies are neither predictive in natu

easily duplicated once identified. Potential adversarie

“go to school” on how the United States conducts wa

knowledge of America’s core competencies has 

intrinsic value to them. Their value lies in their appli

by the service they represent. If the distilled essence 

Army is its core competencies, then these can serv

“sanity check” to ensure that its leaders do not stray 

that which they must never compromise. The Arm

competencies are a “hedge” on whatever risk it assum

new techniques and technologies appear. Even wh

Army gets a particular direction in innovation wro

core competencies will ensure it can respond quickl

the necessary course corrections.

The Army’s Institutional and Operational Core

Competencies.

Title 10, DoD Directive 5100.1, Functions 

Department of Defense and Its Major Components, and 

Vision 2020 mandates roles, missions, and functions 

Services. The Army defines its own service 

competencies. The Army’s draft core compete

represent generalized statements, describin

congressionally mandated roles and missions an

functions assigned by the Department of Defense. Th

not provide the Services with the source for thei

competencies. Core competencies should not 

80
reiteration or refinement of Service roles, missio

functions. 

The Army, unlike most of civilian organizations

combine operational experience with institutio

sponsored schooling for the continued education 

leaders. Its officers and noncommissioned officers (N

are “grown” through the combination of experi

maturation (on-the-job-training) and a selection proc

schooling to prepare for future assignments of incr

responsibility. There is no opportunity for la

integration of leadership external to the Army—one 

come up through the ranks. Regardless of techno

innovations, a leader’s “judgment, creativity

adaptability in the face of highly dynamic situations w

essential to the success of future joint operations.”

14 

the development of adaptive, mentally agile leaders 

Army core competency. The Army develops leaders th

a combination of unit level mentorship, leader train

the Combined Arms Training Centers (CTCs), a

professsional military education system. This lead

training is an institutional Army core competency

these leadership attributes, imprinted on Army le

and not the leaders themselves, that indicate the exi

of a core competency. But does leader development th

the military education system meet the definition o

competencies?

One must examine leader development usin

various elements of this essay’s definition o

competencies. First, is leader development unique an

to replicate? Perhaps, at first blush, it is not. After all

talking about leadership training, one is referr

something that is part of virtually every profes

military in the world. However, on reflection, it is n

existence of the training so much as it is the qualit

depth of its institutionalization that makes the diffe

The Army’s NCOs, in particular, are the envy of most 

armies because of their ability to act independently of 

supervision. They do what most armies require of 

81
junior commissioned officers. There exis

well-established and rigorous process of bringing o

and NCOs back to school based on the merit of 

operational performance and demonstrated potent

future responsibility. Many visiting military dign

have seen first hand how our professional mi

education system works. Even with a thor

understanding of the program of instruction (POI) a

screening requirements for students, other mili

cannot easily replicate our military education sy

Again, one cannot copy the product simply by identify

constituent parts. The “secret ingredient” in the 

military education system is the soldier, as much a p

of the American society as of the Army that trains h

her. The “institutional Army” does not refer to a specif

or icon, but to the military education system that is bo

caretaker and the continuity for the standard

traditions of the service. Paradoxically, it is als

institutional vehicle for generating change.

The Army can generate irreversible momentum 

transformation by using the military education sys

produce leaders who know how to think, not what to 

One can make, with some trepidation, the analogy 

business sector. A profit-oriented business grow

remains viable by reapplying and reconfiguring what

does best. It can never “rest on its laurels,” le

competition gain the initiative because of its inactivel

secret to success is not the product but the unique 

abilities that lead to creation of the product. While the 

is not a profit oriented business, it is the unique 

abilities resident in the military education system 

allow for the development and continued growth of 

leaders. These same leaders are the source of str

strategic focus and direction for the Army—fu

validating the military education system as a 

competency. 

The ability to produce leaders with the req

attributes to lead the Army into the 21st century is n

82
itself, the defining aspect of what the Army is and its r

for being. If the products of the military education s

are one of the Army’s “invisible assets,” then the arm

only half of what is required, or “the sound of one 

clapping,” if that leadership fails to meet the require

of congressional legislation and DoD directives. The A

second core competency is operational in nature

necessary complement to its institutional 

competency—to close with and destroy the enemy. 

called upon, this competency is the active means by 

the Army has defended the nation for over 200 years

As one of the seven proposed Army core compete

FM 1 (Draft) states, “The ability to close with and d

the enemy forces, occupy his territory, and contr

population removes his will to resist. To close wit

destroy the enemy is the ability to terminate conflict 

terms.”

15

 But is close combat necessary?

The nature of warfare and the essence of land c

have not changed with the beginning of a new millen

Carl von Clausewitz, in his enduring description of w

the 18th century, argued,

Kind-hearted people might think there was some ingenio

way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodsh

and might imagine that this is the true goal of war. Pleasant 

it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is suc

dangerous business that the mistakes which come fr

kindness are the very worst.

16

When called upon, the Army will still have to close wi

destroy the enemy even as information-age pre

technology offers the allure of long-range, “sur

engagements.

For those looking for the means to avoid the 

reality of close combat, there is the illusory hop

somehow, even after armed conflict occurs, the enem

capitulate because of a well-orchestrated pre

munitions campaign. Can one argue that the judicio

83
of technological superiority alone will cause the ene

surrender? One of the Army’s leading intellectua

written:

The enemy quits not because of what has already happened, 

because of what he believes might happen if he does not. Fi

whether stand off or close are transient. They have great m

influence, but only for the duration of their existence. Exten

range fires can set the terms of close combat, but the ene

quits because he fears the inevitability of defeat. There is 

sure way to demonstrate that inevitability than with 

overwhelming and imminent threat on the ground. Gro

combat veterans and military historians generally agree t

instances of defenses to the last man are rare, and attacks to 

last man are even more rare. The psychological breaking p

is reached as soon as the inevitability of continued resistanc

clear.

17

This point is central to understanding the Army’s n

maintain proficiency in the one capability it cannot q

regenerate, if it is unable to take the fight to the e

Emerging doctrine has closing with and destroyin

enemy as one of the Army’s core competencies, when, i

it is the overarching competency that subsumes all 

others. Destruction of enemy forces is certainly not a

applicable (or required) across the spectrum of confli

it is the one capability that the Army must never al

atrophy. Because of its ability to grow and train ad

leaders (the Army’s other core competency), the Arm

perform virtually any mission assigned. Let us ex

each of the other proposed core competencies.

Shape the security environment describes of 

element in the current national security strategy of 

respond, and prepare. The FM 1 articulation o

competency refers to “providing presence—boots o

ground” to “deter conflict, reassure allies, promote re

stability, encourage democratic institutions, and resp

crises.”

18

 While certainly an important element 

regional Commanders in Chief’s (CINCs) Th

Engagement Plan (TEP), military presence, regard

84
its purpose, is not per se a core competency, but ra

basic requirement for the prevention of hostile escala

the first step in any follow-on actions.

The core competencies, mobilize the Army, p

response, and sustained land combat dominance, 

directly from the primary functions of the Army as fo

the DoD Directive 5100.1.

19

 As such, these DOD-di

functions, albeit important because of their contribu

closing with and destroying the enemy, do not me

definitional requirements of a service core compe

These directed functions, necessarily specified by D

ensure emphasis and compliance, are, in fact, subor

to the Army’s singular operational core competency

enduring attribute of closing with and destroyin

enemy. 

Forcible entry operations, while not stipulated in a 

directive,

20

 are a logical requirement for an Army tha

project its forces, with the aid of the Air Force and Na

employment. Again, the inherent utility of this 

competency is in the end a necessary prerequisite f

eventual close fight that the Army must eventually co

As with other proposed core competencies, it 

important, but subordinate, consideration to what the 

must always be capable of executing—taking the fight 

enemy and destroying him.

Supporting civil authority is a basic, indisputable t

for all U.S. armed forces. It is the “catch-all” requir

that, within the limits of posse comitatus, has the 

Army ready to support civilian authority whereve

whenever necessary. The Army enjoys a sp

relationship with the American people, when it come

integrated support with the Reserve and National G

These citizen soldiers are a visible reminder 

Americans that the Army is always ready to provide p

assistance when called upon for support. As with the 

proposed competencies, this is an inherent function 

Army rather than a core competency.

85
Core Competencies and Army Transformation

The Linkage.

The Army’s mission, according to its Transform

Campaign Plan, is to transform itself “into a force t

strategically responsive and dominant at every point 

spectrum of operations.”

21

 That is a “tall order” f

Army. If the U.S. military is the most studied force 

world,

22

 then what is it that will keep it from becom

victim of its own success? Edward Luttwak best summ

the paradoxical logic of a successful military endeavor 

he noted,” The reason that something might not wo

next time is precisely because it worked the last time.”

Army rightly assesses its greatest challenge as follow

Overall, potential adversaries are basing their investment

military technologies on their perceptions of how the US 

historically operated. Those who believe themselves to 

threatened by the US are developing adaptive strateg

tactics, and force designs suitable to exploit percei

vulnerabilities and counter or mitigate US strengths.

24

The good news is that the Army realizes the importa

this unprecedented period in American history.

2

nation finds itself at the temporal confluence of 

leadership, uncertain peace, and ill-defined, but ubiq

threats. This is the time to transform the Army so that 

not have it “too wrong,” when next called upon b

nation’s leaders.

26

 If properly identified, nurtured

inculcated, the Army’s core competencies will p

strategic focus and direction throughout this tur

period of transformation.

The institutional development of adaptive, me

agile leaders, coupled with an operational focus on c

with and destroying the enemy, will ensure 

transformation maintains the necessary strategic foc

direction. Legacy, Interim, and Objective forces will r

bound together by these two core competencies. If “

are the centerpiece of our formations, and leadership 

86
stock in trade,”

27

 then the linkage between Army le

and their readiness to execute their most difficul

(enemy destruction) remains paramount in 

transformation process.

Conclusions. 

Core competencies provide the one true vector that 

transformation must follow. Today, the Army attem

hedge future uncertainty with a viable transformatio

as a road map for strategic direction. It is incumbent 

Army’s leadership to articulate clearly these tw

competencies to both its soldiers and the nation’s le

Unfortunately, this mandate lacks a clear definition 

competencies. As suggested above, FM 1, The 

(Prototype Draft), defines core competencies as “ess

and enduring capabilities” that “define our fundam

contributions “ to the national security.

28

 A 

definition, based on the business origins of the ter

vetted in the practical requirements of the military se

would be unique, hard to replicate, and enduring attr

(not products) of the services, whose continued exi

provides the source of strength, strategic focus and dir

to their institutions. Given this definition, two Arm

competencies emerge.

Unfortunately, the Army has not correctly identif

core competencies to respond to the national m

strategy. The Army should adopt and maintain as it

competencies the developing of adaptive, mentally 

leaders and closing with and destroying the enemy. 

two competencies encapsulate the two principal line

continuity, institutional as well as operational. 

synthesized to the essence of the Army’s “reason for b

it continues to be about training and educating leade

are capable of leading soldiers into close combat to d

the enemy. Core competencies are for the Army’s in

consumption—an “azimuth check” for the str

direction into an uncertain future. The inclusion of 

87
proposed core competencies only dilutes the strategic 

and direction the Army seeks to achieve. If such so

competencies are actually “Cliff notes” for civilian lead

better understand the role of land power, then call 

something else.

The Army enters the 21st century with a clear ma

to transform itself to meet the challenging require

and global responsibilities our nation imposes. The 

must maintain the flexibility to conduct operations 

the entire spectrum of conflict, but it must not waive

its commitment to protect and inculcate these 

competencies. It must either nurture and develop it

competencies or suffer the ignominious fate of having 

the nation and its soldiers, when called to duty. Amid

promise of today’s opportunities and the uncertai

tomorrow’s threat lies the Army’s sacred trust—to fig

win the nation’s wars.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfa

Armed Forces of the United States, November 14, 2000, p. III-2

2. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action 

Forces (UNAAF), February 24, 1995, pp. I-6.

3. Goldwater-Nichols Act 1986, U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle 

I, Chapter 5, Sec. 153 (b) (1, (accessed January 26, 2001).

4. Henry Mintzberg, Bruce Ahlstrand, and Joseph Lampel, S

Safari, New York: Free Press, 1998, p. 217.

5. Ibid., p. 217.

6. Ibid., p. 218.

7. Ibid., p. 219.

8. Department of Defense Directive Number 5100.1, “Func

the Department of Defense and Its Major Components,” Septem

1987, p. 24.

88
9. General Ronald R. Fogelman, Remarks at the Air 

Association Symoposium, Los Angeles, October 18, 1996.

10. Department of the Army, Field Manual 1 (Prototype Dra

Army, Version K, June 2000, p.16.

11. Ibid., p. 19.

12. Field Manual 3-0, Operations, Fort Leavenworth: U.S

Command and General Staff College, October 1, 2000, pp. 1-4.

13. Department of the Army, “The Foundations of 

Transformation and the Objective Force Concept,” Ft Monr

Training and Doctrine Command, January 17, 2001, Final Dra

14. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Concept for Joint Future Ope

May 1997, p. 17.

15. Field Manual 1 (Prototype Draft), p.18.

16. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Pete

trans. and eds., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984

17. Huba Wass de Czege, “Closing with the Enemy: Th

Competency of an Army,” Military Review, May-June 2000, p. 

18. Field Manual 1 (Prototype Draft), p. 19.

19. DoD Directive Number 5100.1, pp. 17-18.

20. DOD Directive 5100.1, p. 18. This directive alludes to “

forces for the occupation of territory abroad.”

21. United States Army Transformation Plan, p. 4.

22. Ibid., p. 2.

23. Edward Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and 

Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press

quoted in Colin Gray, Modern Strategy, Oxford: Oxford Un

Press, 1999, p. 42.

24. United States Army Transformation Plan, p. 7.

25. There is a good argument for comparing this period to the 

the last century. The army found itself an expeditionary force 

89
primarily on small scale contingencies. See LTC David Gray’s ch

this book.

26. Paraphrasing Sir Michael Howard’s quote in refer

doctrine.

27. United States Army Transformation Plan, p. 4.

28. Field Manual 1, (Prototype Draft), p. 16.

90
CHAPTER 4

THE ARMY THROUGH THE LOOKING GL

William F. Grimsley

“Who are you?" said the caterpillar. “I-I hardly know, Sir, j

at present—at least I know who I was when I got up t

morning, but I think I must have changed several times sin

that.” “What do you mean by that?” said the caterpill

“explain yourself!” “I can’t explain myself, I’m afraid, sir,” s

Alice, “because I’m not myself, you see.” “I don’t see,” said t

caterpillar. “I’m afraid I can’t put it more clearly,” Alice repl

very politely, “for I can’t understand it myself, and really to 

so many sizes in one day is very confusing.” “It isn’t,” said t

caterpillar. “Well perhaps you haven’t found it so yet,” s

Alice, “but when you have to turn into a chrysalis, you kno

and then after that into a butterfly, I should think it’ll feel a 

queer, don’t you think so?” “Not a bit,” said the caterpillar. “

I know is,” said Alice, “it would feel queer to me.” “You!” s

the caterpillar contemptuously, “who are you?”

 Lewis Car

Introduction.

In Lewis Carroll’s tale, Alice has followed a talking 

rabbit with a waistcoat and pocket watch down a hole

finally come to a stop after a seemingly endless journe

finds a key, opens a door, and glimpses a beautiful g

perhaps a place she would like to stay. But Alice c

make herself fit through the door; she has to resize h

somehow. Her quest to enter the garden leads her th

many toils and challenges, like swimming in a pool 

own tears and contact with characters of disorder and 

All of her efforts to change herself leave Alice cons

asking the question posed to the caterpillar above: “W

I?” In the end, Alice makes it into the garden, only to 

not at all what she expected. Disillusioned and angr

loudly voices her displeasure; startling herself aw

91
discover that the whole strange journey had been a d

and she was safely back on the banks of the stream wi

sister; her life again orderly.

Many in the current Army feel much like Alice 

adventures in Wonderland. Taking risks to move fro

certain into the uncertain without familiar waypo

undoubtedly as disconcerting to soldiers, who thr

order, as it was to Alice. But it may not be her underg

adventures that provide the proper allegory for an Ar

it seeks to succeed in transformation. If Alice provides 

illustrative reference, it may lie in her later adventu

Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass. There, Alice als

conflicting and strange happenings. But there are som

so subtle differences between her underground adve

and those on the other side of the mirror. In the latt

environment retains some semblance of the ordinar

world is laid out much like a chessboard. The char

within the world are certainly different, but Alice ca

define herself in their terms. In fact, she no longer po

who she is, but instead seeks to establish herself in re

to the other characters in their world; hence, her desir

the Queen on the chessboard. When Alice returns fro

fantasy world, she possesses a sense that she has re

the lessons of her time beyond and can bring that know

with her into maturity.

1

Looking into a mirror provides individuals esse

two images: a reflection of themselves as they cur

exist and the background in which they exist. To take 

step further, the standard looking glass provid

objective self-image portrayed in the context of whe

object is and has been. For the U.S. Army, this s

represent a snapshot in time of a current state t

familiar, explainable, rational: an Army that is pow

successful, and currently without peer in the world. 

time moves from the present into the future, it may a

circular and perhaps paradoxical to assume tha

two-dimensional image and contextual backg

provided by the “traditional” use of the mirror provi

92
accurate assessment of the Army in the future se

environments. In other words, that what has worked 

past will continue to work in the future.

2

 Alice cer

found differences when she crossed the mante

“through her looking glass.” As soldiers and their le

continue on the road to transform their Army into the 

force, they must look beyond the reflection with whic

are comfortable and into a world like that Alice found 

she first crossed into that new place, “and noticed tha

could be seen from the old room was quite commo

uninteresting, but that all the rest was as differe

possible.”

3

Background.

The United States emerged victorious from the Co

and instantly inherited the status as the world’

superpower. With this mantle, however, came imm

responsibilities. The first tests, Operations URG

FURY in Panama and DESERT SHIELD/STORM 

Middle East, provided proof that the conventional 

built and trained to defeat the Soviet Union were mor

adequate to do the same to others. But the “o

continued to adapt, in a world that increasingly look

help and leadership. Missions in Somalia, Haiti, Rw

Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Kosovo, and else

proved that the United States had the commitmen

power to act when called, but with forces and traini

ideally suited to the changing nature of conflict.

Clausewitz warns that “the first, the supreme, th

far-reaching act of judgment that the statesma

commander must make is to establish...the kind of w

which they are embarking; neither mistaking it fo

trying to turn it into something that is alien to its na

Equally important is that the forces chosen to prosecu

war possess the means for successfully accomplishing 

mission within acceptable risk. So, if the United 

wishes to maintain its position as the sole superpower 

93
future, it must continue to develop the military po

deter potential enemies by the threat of force. Mor

when ordered to fight its military forces must be able 

decisively. 

The Secretary of the Army, Louis Caldera, and C

Staff of the Army, General Eric K. Shinseki, jointly is

vision for such a force in October 1999. Its banner s

“Soldiers on point for the nation, persuasive in 

...invincible in war” summed up their view of the A

role in the post-Cold War world order.

5

 Soldiers wi

themselves engaged throughout the world in purs

national interests as directed by American po

leadership to deter potential enemies. Concurren

Secretary Caldera and General Shinseki’s state

however, came the recognition that the Army’s curren

structure would be hard-pressed to support such a v

Moreover, they recognized that its capabilities 

consistently decline into the future. Thus was bo

Army Transformation, a three-pronged approach to 

power in the present to meet varied global str

demands, while simultaneously building a force to me

demands of the future security environment.

Many would argue that transformation is mer

inevitable extension of the global revolution in m

affairs (RMA) brought on by the near simulta

explosion of information technology and the Soviet U

demise. There have been consistent and conscie

efforts in the U.S. Army to lead in the applicat

technology to future combat through measures such 

Force XXI/Advanced Warfighting Experiments. 

certainly true that difficult work continues alon

avenue, but this approach is only one porti

transformation. The RMA, if one is really occurring, 

far more than technology alone. In fact, 

transformation demands first of all is a complet

ongoing estimate of the strategic environmen

America’s strategic ends. An honest evaluation of the 

necessary to achieve the ends must follow wit

94
determination and formulation of the means to e

those steps successfully. Finally, and perhaps 

importantly, the Army must accomplish these go

concert with the other services. By working the proces

the objective backwards, much like planning a t

attack, the Army’s leaders must define those capab

that provide the potential for success and determine 

of risk. This is especially important in an era with 

resources and no clearly definable threat. Thus, the 

must prepare for the future by developing flexibl

tailorable capabilities.

6

Whether there is an ongoing RMA or not rem

debatable point. What is clear, however, is that soldie

now in an Army in transformation and not simply be

Secretary Caldera and General Shinseki said so

present murky strategic environment and the fores

future are the real drivers, and the security of the 

demands nothing less. But change is never easy, esp

in a tradition-bound, hierarchical structure like the 

For real change to occur, soldiers must embrace it and 

it to life. Ground-swell support for the leadership’s 

requires the inculcation of the true rationa

transformation. The only method by which the Arm

build the conditions of irreversible momentum lies 

Chief’s campaign plan: “. . . a rate and scope of chang

can survive individual decision-makers and sin

discrete decisions...generally perceptions based: the

it is frequently associated with strategic communic

efforts.”

7

 Communication, up, down, and laterally, 

key to success for building irreversible momentum.

The leaders and the led must understand the dyn

at work when trying to change the Army. The A

history provides some excellent examples of how to 

right, and some pitfalls to avoid. The key is to commu

the method of transformation and continue to emp

the relevance of the need for change. Up to this 

soldiers understand the objective; the leadership has 

them a general course of action, and now they must id

95
those criteria of success and points of risk that r

thoughtful attention. The succeeding pages identify s

the major challenges associated with change and p

some ideas for mitigating risk. There are many meth

which one can make judgments, but one that draws 

experience of past leaders in leading change 

appropriate. 

In an article about military innovation i

inter-World War years, Dennis Showalter, a noted m

historian, comes to four general conclusions that w

useful in reviewing the current Army’s transformat

He suggests that change is contextual, based o

environment in which it operates (How has change 

successful in the past?). 2) Military organization

especially armies have external constraints impos

them by their societies and governments they serve 

do they want an Army for?). 3) Internal groups or s

cultures are essential to successful change (How ca

provide the environment for healthy professional deb

achieve the best product without being dragged dow

Military organizations must submit the change to ru

examination before committing to the next “first b

(How does one know if course corrections are requi

Each of these questions could evolve into a book by itse

the goal of this paper is to provide basic illustrative po

consideration. Hopefully, it can also spark further d

and use by the Army’s leaders and soldiers to enhan

Army’s transformation into an organization as releva

dominant in the future as it is today: in other words, 

through the looking glass and beyond and not to r

trapped underground.

Change In Context.

. . . Specific innovations, technical or institutional, are 

significant than the creation of a positive synergy am

material and doctrine, service cultures and the wider social 

political systems to which these cultures belong. The creatio

such a synergy, however, is not an end in itself. It is rathe

96
sophisticated tool in the hands of reformers whose ultim

responsibility is to enhance the security of the state and t

society they serve by changing military institutions to m

the problematical demands of an uncertain future.

9

The quotation above could easily describe the c

challenges faced by the U.S. Army in 2001, but it ac

refers to the period between the World Wars. C

remains a constant in history and provides illuminat

current discussions bearing on Army transformatio

method of critical analysis outlined by Clausewit

updated by Eliot Cohen and John Gooch is a proven m

to evaluate several critical change periods in the his

the U.S. Army: Discover the facts (what happened?)

the effects back to their causes (what was or was no

which led to what happened?), and evaluate the 

employed (what contributed to the outcome, eith

omission or commission?).

10

 The potential exampl

numerous, but for the purpose of brevity, and clarity a

this paper focuses on two relatively recent period

continue to impact our Army today: the post-Worl

II/Korean War period and the post-Vietnam War per

Williamson Murray suggests that military inno

can be revolutionary or evolutionary. In the forme

innovation is almost autocratic. Something so radic

happened in technology, or intellectual conception, 

threat that change must occur immediately and with 

room for debate. Because of this radical departure fro

norm, the results of change afford small margins for 

the leaders either get it very right or very wro

evolutionary change, the results are slower in co

because the innovation requires an organizational 

over sustained periods rather than a top-down decla

shift. Evolutionary change provides more roo

experimentation and course correction enroute, b

virtue of the factor of relatively slow speed, the resu

less immediately visible or tangible to others.

11

 Each 

effective in its own right, largely dependent o

innovation and its implementation.

97
An example of revolutionary innovation occurred 

U.S. Army with the advent of nuclear weapons. The le

in 1945 viewed a strategic horizon that should have 

fairly clear. There were obvious winners and losers of 

War II. The joint and combined weight of the Allies de

Nazi Germany through conventional application o

from ground, sea and air into military, politica

economic capitulation. But the emergence of a new 

from a former ally, the Soviet Union and its decla

policy of communist expansionism, deeply muddie

international security environment. In the Pacific Th

the Allies threatened Japan by land, sea, and air fro

combined forces, but ultimately the Japanese surren

when attacked by unconventional means: the atomic 

on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The dramatic techno

impact of nuclear weapons opened a phase of histor

change in the global security apparatus that was, a

irrevocable. 

The period immediately following Allied victor

drastic reductions in military forces and budge

priorities shifted to domestic issues. The sec

environment remained extraordinarily dange

however, as events in Europe, Korea, and Indo-

among others quickly bore out. Carl Builder describes 

as “landscape features,” which have large commonalit

the present security environment. In addition t

enormous technological and political change

irrevocable shift in global security, and declining m

budgets/shifting priorities, he also outlines the f

called “disorientation” and “hanging on.” The f

alludes to the continued application of prevailing co

that are no longer applicable to the current situatio

have no obvious replacement. The latter is the m

habit of attempting to make what the services ha

despite obvious changes in the security environmen

Korean War was certainly fought with World War I

units, equipment, and tactics, while the threat of n

weapons kept Europe in its own state of armed truce in

98
mid-1950s, supported on the ground by a U.S. Arm

equipped or manned to defeat Soviet forces in conven

battle.

12

So, in the face of declining budgets, reliance on n

weapons, and questioning of the relevance of a conven

ground force, the leadership of the Army develo

revolutionary plan for transformation within Pre

Eisenhower’s overarching security theme of the 

Look.” The Army in the mid-1950s shared some st

similarities to the present successor; difficulties in m

enlisted retention goals, political debates on the rele

of sustaining a large standing army, and disenchan

with the Army among junior officers leading t

resignation of approximately 132,000 between 195

1956.

13

 This environment, when added to the overwhe

strategic dimension framed by the increasing prolife

and destructive power of nuclear weapons posed a 

challenge to the U.S. Army.

Generals Matthew Ridgway, Maxwell Taylor

James Gavin, among others, developed a process of ch

which resulted in the Pentomic series of organiz

building each level of formation blocks of five in or

meet the Army’s requirements of dispersion, flexibilit

mobility to provide a multi-functional force to fight 

the spectrum of foreseeable conflict. One historian su

the focus of the revolutionary change in this era by s

that 

. . . A great institution like the Army is always in transition 

grappling for the first time with the perplexing implications 

nuclear warfare; seeking ways of adapting its organizat

and doctrine to accommodate rapid technological advan

and attempting to square apparently revolutionary chan

with traditional habits and practical constraints of t

military art.

14

This is not to imply that the entire Army was ena

with the Pentomic system or its apparent focus o

seemingly technological solution that nuclear we

99
provided for the security strategy of the day. Much 

criticism of the time, and in history, lies in the A

apparent reliance on technology to solve the problem

nuclear weapons posed to the continuing releva

ground forces. There is, however, a strong argumen

the leadership of the day took a more holistic view 

importance of ground forces and the need to demon

their relevance. The leaders instituted revoluti

innovation first in the doctrine and organization, fo

by shifts in training of units and leaders, and then f

new materiel; a classic use of the model of doctrine, tra

leader development, organization, materiel, and so

(DTLOMS); or the model by which the Army pre

analyzes its ability to meet the nation’s stra

requirements. Despite the revolutionary or top

nature of the innovation of the Pentomic era, 

remained a strong exchange of ideas on the specifics 

Army transformation. In 1955-1959 alone, various s

journals and magazines published over 130 articles 

doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, organiza

training, and materiel requirements of the relevant g

force in the era of nuclear/atomic combat.

15

There was the pressing problem posed by n

weapons, but there was also a large Soviet Army oste

posed for the invasion of Western Europe. There was 

growing trend toward “smaller” wars on the horizon

was evident by American involvement in the Korea

and Lebanon along with the French experience in Indo

and the British experience with multiple insurgencie

message was equally clear: these type wars required t

and ready ground forces with the capability of ope

under the principles of dispersion, flexibility, and mo

albeit without the specter of nuclear weapons. Lieut

General Gavin described this necessity in 1955 as “fo

being”; units sustaining high levels of combat rea

that are organized, trained, and equipped for imm

deployment and employment across the spectr

conflict.

16

100
To apply the critical analysis model to the Pentom

version of Army transformation may be a bit disinge

because that Army was never really challenged. Pe

that is a measure of success in its own right. Th

nuclear arsenal provided the main deterrent capabili

the Army as a supporting player provided other imp

means; forward deployed tactical formations capa

surviving the nuclear battlefield to occupy groun

defeat other ground forces. By taking a revolutionary s

innovation, the Army retained force structure and res

and therefore provided itself with the means to contin

development and experimentation of other conce

emerging warfare, such as the airmobile concept and 

unconventional special operations forces. The Pen

structure was short-lived as an organization and do

but its impact as a means of innovation was enor

Given the environment of the mid-1950s, the execu

revolutionary innovation was probably the only cou

action available to Ridgway and Taylor.

If the Pentomic era offers an example of revolut

innovation, then a complementary example of evolut

innovation in the U.S. Army with impressive results 

the post-Vietnam War era. Certainly the experiences 

war remained with the Army—perhaps remaining w

institution even today. Regardless of any assessment 

tactical outcome of the war, however, the leadership 

Army in the mid-1970s clearly recognized that it conf

a need for change. One military historian describes pa

of innovation in the inter-World War years as driven b

distinct yet interrelated factors; the influence of str

context, technological change, the military organizat

a body politic and its encouragement/discouragem

innovation, and the civil-military relationship with p

technological and organizational development.

17

 

factors were equally applicable to the U.S. Army in 1

The Soviet Union remained the threat and n

weapons were omnipresent. In addition to thei

nuclear arsenal, however, the Soviets had also contin

101
build and modernize conventional capabilities 

exported to numerous client states throughout the 

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War was a surrogate showcase 

world on modern conventional combined arms battle 

Soviet and U.S. equipment; both sides watched with 

interest as the events of the Fall of 1973 unfolded.

The military organization charged with exec

analysis of events and innovation for the U.S. Army w

newly formed Training and Doctrine Command (TRA

under General William DePuy. The external environ

which provided TRADOC the medium in which to wo

well as the prevailing climate within TRADOC 

provides the truest model for successful transform

today. The Army leadership provided by General Cre

Abrams established both the organization and its cha

be innovative, but also worked tirelessly to ensure th

required resources would be available to mak

necessary innovations feasible. The assurance of 

structure, funding, manning, and equipment develop

modernization were all key factors for the future suc

the Army for which TRADOC was writing doctrin

training programs.

The results of TRADOC’s efforts, beginning wi

1976 edition of Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Opera

continue to permeate the fabric of the Army today

manual “. . . confronted directly the prime strategic pr

the Army faced: a U.S. force quantitatively inferior i

and equipment on an armor-dominated Euro

battlefield.”

18

 Greater than the product itself, howe

the process by which it and other emerging ideas 

developed. In a letter to the various Army schoo

centers under his command in July 1974, General D

provided a concept paper on doctrine and tactic

precursor to FM 100-5. He likened the concepts to a 

soup in a French peasant’s house; always on the 

available for consumption and open for adding ingre

to make it better.

19

 The analogy for evolutionary inno

is clear; one gets a better product when the base is set 

102
all to consume and the “cook” encourages useful inpu

all quarters. It takes longer and may be more inefficie

given the availability of time and the willingness to 

additional risk in the present, the future product m

considerably better.

The development of FM 100-5 based on the pot o

principle was much less inclusive than originally inte

Despite the initial consensus for overarching c

engendered by initiatives such as the Octob

Conference and the maintenance of dialogue betwe

schools and the field, the Army failed to move in a 

united direction. Tensions among many members 

TRADOC community over the purpose and scope of do

prevailed. The best example of this lies in the d

between the role and impact of the Combined Arms C

at Fort Leavenworth as an integrating agency for do

Lieutenant General John Cushman, Commandant 

mid-1970s, developed a version of FM 100-5 bas

General DePuy’s original concept paper that di

considerably from the TRADOC view. The diffe

resulted from a difference in philosophy over the natu

purpose of doctrine itself. The Leavenworth sch

thought viewed doctrine as a natural result of the A

thoughts on war in general as derived from theory as a 

for action, and not tied to specific problems or s

conditions. 

The DePuy/TRADOC school viewed doctrine as a h

approach to institutional change in support of the 

likely events confronting the Army.

20

 While not mu

exclusive, the two schools differed sufficiently that G

Depuy kept the writing and publishing responsibilit

the 1976 FM 100-5 as well as the supporting doctrin

training documents in TRADOC. While this p

efficient, it did not engender universal consensus on c

or scope, as subsequently proven by the backlash and d

following publication in mid-1976. As then Major G

Starry wrote to General DePuy, “It will not suffice sim

send our training circulars out and trust they w

103
acclaimed on the basis of their eminent logic.”

21

 Desp

absence of complete acceptance within the Arm

development and publishing of the 1976 FM 100-5 re

a watershed event in the institution’s history. A

historian states:

In thus defining doctrine as an issue of central importance to 

Army and a key integrating mechanism, DePuy wrough

revolution in post World War II American military think

The subsequent editions of FM 100-5 that appeared in 1982 

1986 were attempts to fill the role first put into practice 

General DePuy. In that sense, they were evolutionary, howe

much they may have differed in substance.

22

Evolutionary innovation was clearly at work 

post-Vietnam war period. The results were not q

forthcoming, and there were certainly some dark day

progress was evolutionary; in every component of DT

the Army improved. Further refinements of the doctr

to the emergence of “AirLand Battle” and “Ar

Excellence” initiatives. New studies emerged bas

General Starry’s vision, now the TRADOC comman

“concepts-based acquisition,” the translation of 

operational concepts into necessary equip

development and acquisition in a streamlined pro

Other innovations, such as the Combat Training C

and the dynamic revitalization of rigorous profes

education for junior NCOs and officers were immedia

strong by-products of the revolution sparked by th

100-5 initiatives.

Against the factors of critical analysis, the Army 

got to test the means on the battlefields of Europe beca

the demise of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the det

factor posed by the Army’s conventional ground for

concert with the combined air, naval, and nuclear po

the nation was enormous. That the Army was a

execute numerous successful operations outside of E

using the innovations provided by the leaders o

evolutionary era is an additional, if unforeseen, test

104
to its enduring quality. The strategic ends of na

survival, proliferation of democracy, supporting eco

growth, and support of allies were all superbly met 

military. 

Both revolutionary and evolutionary innovation

feasible methods of producing real and enduring ch

they are not mutually exclusive. The central theme 

establishment of a clear vision or purpose for the chan

the translation of that vision into a plan of a

articulated and understood to the lowest levels 

organization. For a large and bureaucratic organizatio

the Army, it is imperative that change be both le

managed. This requires soldiers, leaders and l

maintain some key competencies relevant to eff

change: 

• Management of attention through consistent 

and goals.

• Management of meaningopen communicati

down, and laterally.

• Management of trustconstancy and reliabi

the institution and its goals/methods.

• Management of self-sustaining focus and balan

Williamson Murray and Barry Watts further ela

on the environment of effective innovation in peaceti

arguing that a leader’s vision must find a balance 

operational reality, acceptance by senior leaders

“change agents” with an open voice, explai

testing/refining future concepts, and controlling the n

of chance and its contingent factors.

25

 The root of a

discussion on the examples of effective change from h

and their application to Army transformation lies 

factors of leadership and communication. These 

central theme of effectiveness in military units or any 

organization. Open and honest dialogue on matters o

105
importance not only leads to better products, but a se

inclusion in the process and pride in the end result 

part of the participants.

Why an Army?

Why indeed does the United States have any Arm

Constitution only provides for Congress to raise and su

one, not maintain one.

26

 There is no clear and credibl

peer competitor on the global strategic horizon. The U

States certainly reigns supreme in air, naval, and n

power; and it has repeatedly demonstrated the capab

address threats to national interests by the use of pre

guided conventional means without placing an Ameri

harm’s way. The Marine Corps, an expeditionary fo

organization, forward presence, and traditi

demonstrably capable of handling the small-sca

short-notice contingencies that continue to be the pre

requirement for our armed forces, and Marines do so q

and visibly.

So again the question, why an Army? Becaus

present strategic environment, and the foreseeable f

dictates the need for a force with unique capabilit

deterrence and fighting on land. This requires the m

and complementary effects provided by the combined 

of air, sea, littoral, land, and space capabilities. The A

leadership states the purpose clearly:

Soldiers enable America to fulfill its world leaders

responsibilities of safeguarding our national intere

preventing global calamity, and making the world a safer pl

. . . by finding peaceful solutions to the frictions betw

nation-states, addressing the problems of human suffering, 

when required, fighting and winning our Nation’s wars—

non-negotiable contract with the American people.

27

Given that the above quotation is a straightforwar

cogent statement of purpose for the Army, why is the

question as to the need?

106
The answer lies in the notion of national strategy a

Army’s relative and relevant position as an executor 

strategy. In the period since the demise of the Soviet 

and the overwhelming military accomplishments of D

Storm, there has been a marked increase in the use 

Army in roles other than the one “non-negotiable con

from the Army vision of 1999. Many view this is a dep

from a warrior ethos; that these missions perf

superbly by soldiers are “. . . often praiseworthy, (but

clearly broadened the myriad tasks that military unit

master . . . and (have) altered perceptions about the e

of the military profession.”

28

Whether they are alien or not is basically an irre

question, when viewed through the prism of str

requirements. More bluntly, in an era of constant o

shrinking resources the Army must be a relevant me

achieve the strategic ends it purports to serve or “

discontent with the purposes to which the Army’s effo

applied in time inevitably come to include frustratio

discontent with the Army itself.”

29

 Such frust

manifested itself overtly during Vietnam, when pr

over government policy inevitably turned to actions a

soldiers themselves. More recently, the frustratio

evident over decisions to employ the Army in the Balk

stability and support operations. That frustration co

with the perceived or real inability to be strateg

responsive provides the impetus and necessary catal

transformation.

There is also a necessary question of relevance sim

the challenges faced by the Army in the Pentom

Instead of nuclear weapons, the Army finds itself cur

working to define its relevance relative to the inc

reliance on precision munitions and the proliferat

information technology. Granted there may be no nea

competitor today, but there is no similar assurance f

future. As two authors stated in 1973, when there was 

clear threat from the Soviet Union, “. . . one cannot pro

need for any particular level of ground forces, but pru

107
dictates that we ought to retain one for unknow

probable contingencies which will take place with

uncertain future political context.”

30

 Certainly then

era of increasing uncertainty, there is not only a ne

maintaining current U.S. land power strength

potentially an even greater requirement for powerf

capable ground forces.

Power equals the capability and political will to e

force, even military force, to achieve a stated strateg

If power serves the capability portion of its pu

correctly, then a prudent potential adversary weig

cost of challenging the United States before pursu

military option. If the cost exceeds the gain, military 

becomes a sub-optimal course of action and the m

therefore serves as a tool of deterrence. Colin S. Gra

expanded on the traditional Clausewitzian definit

strategy to account for the strength of deterrence as fo

“Strategy is the use that is made of force, and the th

force (emphasis added) for the ends of policy.”

31

 The Ar

a component of military force must therefore be seen 

world as powerful, as much by capability as by commit

This is not to suggest that the Army and others be us

the sake of using. But the Army must remain enga

missions to achieve strategic ends in pursuit of na

interests, and can only do so if it remains powerfu

capable. As Dr. William Perry stated in his address 

inauguration of the Paul H. Nitze award in 1994,

I believe we can participate in creating the best kind of wo

tomorrow if we take the approach that made Paul (Nitze) a ti

of strategic thinkingrealism, pragmatism, hedging aga

uncertain outcomes, but not being afraid to try to influe

outcomes in a positive direction.

32

Exerting influence globally implies the need for a 

of Army capabilities beyond those successfully design

built for meeting and defeating the Soviet Union in E

capabilities that stood the test of combat and rem

powerful force today. But as recent missions 

108
demonstrated, that organization may not be suit

current or emerging missions. The assumption th

current U.S. strategy of global engagement remains 

for the foreseeable future necessitates a change in 

aspect of the DTLOMS model. Army transformat

therefore an important component, but it will on

ultimately effective if the entire armed forces evolve a

“into a strategically relevant force or (risk) perpetuati

status quo at high cost.”

33

 Power implies capabilit

there still must be the means and will to use it.

So, what does the nation really want an Army for? 

is in fact the need for an Army that is enormously pow

that provides a wide range of capabilities to ena

strategy of the nation by deterrence first, and overwhe

decisive force when required. This implies that the 

will remain busy and visible, perhaps in operatio

training missions that must relate to its non-nego

contract of fighting and winning the nation’s wa

perhaps in support missions that assure regional st

in troubled parts of the world. But it is that ta

demonstration of power by the Army in every dim

that provides deterrence and the ability to influen

actions of potential adversaries before we have to figh

when called to fight, the Army retains the means to a

the strategic ends as directed by policy. War will occur 

at some indeterminate point in the future again

opponent not yet identified, in political conditions th

unpredictable, and in an arena of violence and bru

which cannot be replicated beforehand.

34

 The mess

this is obvious: the Army had better prepare now an

ready into the future.

The requirement for transformation is clear, and i

to the Army in the field to embrace the tenets of 

provide honest feedback on its effectiveness t

leadership. The Army cannot accept the status quo a

enough, nor can it blindly assume that every asp

transformation as planned will be perfect or smooth. 

are now and into the future, just as there were in the 

109
great ideas that will result from trying new avenue

approaches. It is up to the Army to remain committe

engaged in the process and open to dialogue to impro

end product. One cannot predict today what 2025 wi

like in terms of threats, the geo-strategic climate, o

the available technologies, but the Army must get o

the process and evolve as an entity. Much like n

selection, those that do not adapt to their environme

become stronger and relevant will become extinct.

Military Culture.

It may be oxymoronic to place military and culture 

same phrase, much as the old joke about mi

intelligence. Culture in this sense, however, is an imp

component to the implementation of innovation. To 

this discussion, this paper uses the definition of cult

. . . the prevailing values, philosophies, customs, traditions, 

structures that collectively over time, have created sha

individual expectations within the institution ab

appropriate attitudes, personal beliefs, and behaviors.

35

Much of the point of culture lies rooted in the pr

section on why the nation needs an Army. The point 

Army’s existence directly relates to national securit

survival. It is a not so subtle difference, however, that 

inside the organization often define themselves diffe

from those outside. In her trip underground, Alice t

retain her form and position relative to the abs

around her in order to fit, but was only ultimately succ

in gaining entrance to the garden, not in influencin

change to the environment. In her trip through the lo

glass, however, Alice adapted her character t

environment and worked diligently to assume the role 

chess Queen, arguably the most adaptive and po

piece on the board.

The Army’s culture by nature remains rooted 

order and hierarchy inherent in the structure 

110
military. It thrives on order and expects tha

organization can maintain itself under the most inte

pressure. It is by virtue of this reliance on orde

discipline that an effective military can withstand th

of war, the most extreme of human experiences. It ma

be because of this culture that military organizatio

often so resistant to change. They want to be like Alic

take on the characteristics of the chess Queen, but g

there often requires a leap of faith into the unknow

can be painful and disruptive to the natural state of 

Eliot Cohen and John Gooch, in their work, M

Misfortunes, The Anatomy of Failure in War, outlin

inherent rigidity as failures to learn, anticipate, or 

Individually, each is a simple failure that is recoverab

collectively the failures can result in catastrophe.

3

therefore an equally important point of transform

that the culture of the military must evolve to 

anticipate, and adapt to the ever-changing str

environment without discarding the tenets in whic

grounded: not in the specifics of how the military ac

its strategic purposes, but why.

37

Soldiers have a natural bias for action and a prag

approach to getting the job done quickly and decisi

That is the military hallmark and the reason they are 

the organization of choice in difficult situations outsi

normal scope of operations. Humanitarian assista

Hurricane Andrew in Florida is such an example

“can-do” factor may be desirable when ordered to exe

of a mission, but perhaps not when attempting the ove

of the organization itself. The tension inherent 

dynamic of attempting to transform the Army for the f

while maintaining readiness to fight rests in the e

discussion of revolutionary versus evolutionary innov

To the average soldier, it would appear that the A

current transformation contains elements of both ty

innovation. The Army possesses consistency fro

present in the legacy force, some revolutionary innov

111
occurring in support of the interim force, and a combi

of both in the objective force. The achievement 

revolutionary portion will happen because it is, a

names imply, a legacy from the present and an in

solution for the present and near-term future. The r

are also tangible and realizable within relative re

constraints. In this case, the strategic ends dicta

chosen way, and the means are being visibly app

achieve success.

The objective force faces a different problem

statement of need appears to imply revoluti

innovation, but the absence of concrete solutions an

reliance on emerging or undeveloped techn

necessitates evolutionary innovation. In this cas

strategic ends are less easily defined. Although the

clear requirement to do something new, it rests more 

desired effects to be gained from employment of a s

force than the specific identity of the threat force itse

ways and means to achieve the desired strategic 

therefore deserve a healthy skepticism and debate 

within the Army and the joint community.

The Army’s culture, the notion of service to n

rooted but not mired in tradition, must remain a con

The Army as an entity must remain engaged in bo

process and the product. Ground swell suppo

innovation and transformation comes with inclus

being part of the solution. The organization can only a

that, however, with a combination of support both 

within and outside, and that base of support is cur

difficult to discern. This is not a new phenomenon, but 

history is any guide, sustaining an effective military c

in this time of transformation will require the supp

timeless values and adequate resources coupled w

improved capacity for rapid adaptation to cha

circumstances.”

39

So, how does the Army achieve something this eno

within the confines of the ambiguous strategic enviro

112
and its inherently hierarchical military structure? Ag

is wise to fall back on history; not to rely on what so

has worked in the past, but as a framework on which to 

the future. If past military misfortune has resulted 

failures to learn, anticipate, adapt, or a combin

thereof, then the Army must therefore learn, anti

and/or adapt.

Learning requires that “. . . military organiz

should inculcate in their members a relentless empir

a disdain for a priori theorizing if they are to suc

Anticipation is maintaining focus on the external str

environment and “. . . think(ing) hard and realis

about the politico-military conditions under which it 

will occur.” Adaptation is mostly about the initiat

subordinates to meet the challenges of the future und

overarching intent and the underwriting of mistakes 

Army’s senior leadership.

40

 Whether using the A

extensive professional military education system, the 

in the field, the battle laboratories, contra

publications, or any other means, transformation re

that each soldier buy into the importance of the na

security requirement. The revolutionary aspe

streamlining equipment acquisition and ensurin

resources are available to execute transformation a

responsibility of the Army’s senior leaders and Con

The evolutionary aspect is the responsibility of all so

and absolutely dictates the intellectual involve

through debate, experimentation, and honest com

cation.

William Crockett, writing in 1977 on “Introd

Change to a Government Agency,” stated 

organizational change does not necessarily guar

behavioral change; but that the “real power and aut

for achieving the spirit envisaged for the change lie w

people themselves...that change must be well-pla

coordinated, and communicated.”

41

 What transforma

striving for is a proactive adaptation to the curren

emerging strategic environment, but without disca

113
those aspects of the culture that define soldiers a

United States Army. Again, not defining themsel

much in how they execute the Army’s missions, but b

they are while doing them. Army culture must tran

traditional notions of specific branch or backgroun

move ahead if the Army wants to be a viable and re

strategic element of power. Soldiers are like “prem

paid for accident insurance...the likely kinds of m

influence the form of protection we buy.”

42

 But to co

that analogy, “If we are in a buyer’s market, we must 

it, not dictate our terms to it . . . (we must) provide a 

range of capabilities.”

43

 It is up to the Army to build 

strength of the tradition of service the culture pr

without resorting to the inherent and sometimes par

rigidity that it produces.

Experimentation.

. . . in view of all these new conditions and the prospect of m

more to come, we should seek to become an adaptive soci

detached from allegiances to specific products or procedu

which will change; committed instead to engagements in 

process of living . . .

44

Testing or experimenting with transformation ma

once the simplest and most difficult thing to achiev

Army cannot currently even identify what the obj

force looks like, only what its capabilities ought to b

some things are fairly familiar or on the edge of famil

There is an entire community and infrastructure alre

the Army devoted to testing and experimentation. A

point in the current environment of innovation

significantly more important to discuss the intell

basis of testing innovations and how to incorpora

results into a higher quality evolutionary product.

Transformation is larger than innovation, howev

definition, transformation is “to change complet

essentially in composition or structure.” This 

certainly occur accidentally, as a result of ex

114
pressures, or, as in the current Army transform

executed because of external pressures from the 

security environment, coupled with a vision and pla

within. Again, senior leaders must recognize and m

the dynamic balance of external and internal pressur

impart that to soldiers.

There are formal and informal methods by which t

and experimentation must occur for transformat

achieve maximum effectiveness. Within the total 

services, Joint Forces Command in Norfolk 

responsibility for joint experimentation with the m

“. . . to lead the transformation of America’s milita

through an iterative process . . . to explore the most c

war fighting challenges at the operational level . . .” 

will be accomplished through a series of exercises s

UNIFIED VISION ’01 and MILLENNIUM CHALL

’02.

45

Within the Army there are numerous tools of f

experimentation designed to execute individual or col

complementary experimentation of future concept

equipment. This process has been significantly highl

during the recent and ongoing series of Adv

Warfighting Experiments in support of the digitized 

XXI. Again, TRADOC is the overarching headqu

providing the “strategic and operational overwatch 

process of ongoing experimentation coupled with fiel

new force.”

46

 Subordinate organizations and g

Concept Experimentation Programs use the 

laboratories and others to “evaluate and capital

emerging technology, material initiatives, and warfi

ideas . . . (and) facilitates experiments to determi

military utility on the potential of an idea to bec

DTLOMS solution to a future operational capability.”

work provided by these organizations will be critical 

testing and ultimate fielding of important new capab

especially those revolutionary innovations tha

top-down and require more rapid assessment.

115
In the case of transformation, however, there is a 

revolutionary and evolutionary innovation at work, an

requires a larger community of “testers” than those ch

with that specific requirement. It is necessary to 

those parts of the Army’s culture which define 

soldiers are, while allowing them the opportunity to e

the “how.” As stated earlier, evolutionary innovat

more inefficient in terms of time, but true transform

requires that the society, in this case soldiers, buy in

process and the product. This is not to imply that the 

will not follow orders, but rather that an inclusive pro

more likely to produce better results.

There are numerous studies on corporate innov

Specific to the subject at hand, however, is the ques

how can the Army make course corrections i

transformation that has already begun. Congress wil

the same choices, particularly in the allocation of res

to achieve the various components of transformat

seems an obvious imperative for the success of this end

that the Army’s leadership makes the relevance of the 

as the decisive land power the consistent theme both w

and outside the organization. The Army must speak 

singular voice that the power of the Nation to deter w

with the ability to project and sustain decisive land p

potentially for a protracted time, in order to a

strategic results.

The best method to accomplish that objective is f

Army to be a large and inclusive experimental comm

one willing to take some risk in the present for a 

product in the future. The value of the combat tr

centers in helping shape the forces that overwhelm

defeated U.S. enemies in Operations JUST CAUS

DESERT STORM is but one example of inclusiv

evolutionary experimentation. The “society” had a st

the results and bought into the concept. The tr

currently being conducted by the Interim Brigade C

Teams at Fort Lewis is another example of ad

experimentation by the Army. As demonstrated the

116
elsewhere, the technological or linear solution ma

produce the best result, thus a return to the not

DTLOMS as a construct for evaluating a concep

implementing change as required.

Lieutenant Colonel Bryon Greenwald, in his 

Warfare Paper, provides some insights into ach

success in military innovation by use of proper t

continuity for change agents, and consensus in supp

that change. Among these, consensus is the most impo

and can only be obtained

. . . within the Army using the irrefutable logic of their ide

backed by empirical evidence obtained through realis

objective trials. Only when the Field Army accepts the benef

of change and believes it has a stake in the modernization w

the rank and file tear down the bureaucratic barri

impeding the progress of innovation and support the change

The Army is not by nature open to change. So

remain deeply rooted in tradition and hierarchy. B

Army also has a tradition of adaptation at the lower t

level, one that has produced tremendous success ov

history. The true value of experimentation with reg

transformation will be the effective combination of 

strengths to produce a lasting high-quality product, be

in “. . . view of all these new conditions and the pros

many more to come we should seek to become an ad

society, detached from allegiances to specific produ

procedures which will change; committed inste

engagements in the process of living.

49

Conclusions.

The Army, much like the nation, has been follow

evolutionary path since its inception. Because of its u

relationship to the society it serves, the Army m

responsive and adaptive to the changing str

environment. Transformation should be nothing new

117
another step in the evolutionary process. But that do

appear to be the case.

The strategic context drove the innovations 

Pentomic and post-Vietnam war period, just as it is d

the ongoing transformation. What made the his

examples successful was the awareness of the cont

nature of change and the need to play to the strengths

mitigating risk inherent in weaknesses. The United 

is currently in an era of being the sole superpower, w

near-peer military competitor on the horizon. Histor

this should be a point where the nation can afford to a

some risk for the present, while building for the f

There are competing budget demands internally as 

however, and the lack of tangible major military t

makes increasing the defense budget a difficult s

Congress and the American people. This is neither 

nor unique phenomenon in U.S. history, but one 

demands strict attention as it will be the most imm

limiting factor on the Army’s ability to ac

transformation. 

Numerous theorists, historians, and others who 

and debate about the issues of national security argu

the Army’s path to the future begins with study of th

Two examples cited earlier are small but impo

illustrations of innovation. Those who built the Army 

frontier constabulary into the expeditionary force of 

War I; or those who endured the inter-World War yea

led the military to victory in World War II provide 

extraordinary examples of innovation in the face of 

budgets and the primacy of domestic issues. The qu

for the Army today then lies with understanding h

predecessors accomplished so much and what fram

they provided as we look to the future? “Innov

demands officers in the mainstream of their profe

with some prospect of reaching the highest ranks, wh

peer respect, and who are willing to take risk

bureaucratization of innovationparticularly i

118
current framework of the U.S. militaryguarante

death.”

50

 There are six pillars to such an appraisal.

1. Focus efforts within a realistic frameworkwor

strategic ends backwards. While the Army is workin

capabilities-based force without a clearly recogn

threat, it must develop each aspect of the DTLOMS a

a real opponent with real counter-capabilities. 

“fighting” its capabilities, whether in simulation 

force-on-force exercises, the opponent must be skillful

doggedly fought as well, making every effort poss

defeat U.S. forces being exercised. The exercises fou

the various service schools in the inter-World War 

that resulted in the development of products such a

Orange, the strategic and operational response 

Japanese threat in the Pacific, are examples of this.

Two other aspects of developing the strategy fir

also very important. The first is that, although 

transformation is the subject at hand, no chan

innovation will realistically occur without incorpo

into an overall joint force transformation. This is e

true in the weapons and support systems the Army de

and procures as in the methods by which they are emp

because “. . . without the consensual support of the o

who must implement joint operations, a coherent v

warfare that cuts across service lines will not emerge

jointly developing the best ways to meet the strategic 

the Army will retain its appropriate position as the w

dominant land power.

The second aspect, and perhaps the reigning one

ensure that the means to implement the ways to achie

ends are present. That assumes adequate resourc

available to provide the means. It requires enormous 

on the part of the senior military leadership to convey 

the civilian leadership in the executive and legis

branches. It must be a two-pronged statement o

however, that is emphasized when discussing mean

first is a needs statement of the required forces in so

119
equipment, research, and development. The secon

factual statement of strategic risk that must be unde

at the highest levels, if the means are not provided

this can accurately convey Army capabilitie

limitations in the strategic environment.

2. Develop and execute realistic operational exercis

fewer better. The Army continues to work at a furious p

pursuit of assigned missions. The operational tempo i

deployments are many, and the pace shows its str

units in the field. Being busy is nothing new, no

inherently bad. Where tension lies is in the question o

doing what? There will continue to be requiremen

operational and training deployments throughout the 

in support of strategic ends. That fact, coupled with tr

readiness requirements, is what the Army in the 

should be doing. As discussed earlier, the power of the 

lies first in the inherent deterrence provided by ta

demonstrations of its land power.

But the value of tactical exercises, as demonstra

the combat training centers, lies as much in the after-

reviews as in the execution. Having an objective asses

of the strengths and weaknesses of a particular oper

as well as being able to take that assessment as a ba

building a better product through the DTLOMS proc

an enormous strength in the U.S. Army. The same s

logically be true of higher-level exercises as well. 

more exercises, however, does not necessarily connot

they will be better.

To make Army transformation as envisioned b

Army’s leaders into a dynamic era of innovation, exe

and testing must become distributed and relevant. As 

post-Vietnam era, participants must feel they are part 

solution; that their efforts are important; and the sc

participation must also increase. Again, the use 

various service schools at all levels provides many 

resources required for exercising concepts and “dist

results for debate and analysis.

120
3. Don’t allow results to automatically va

proposals. Alice made an a priori assumption that th

place she would be happy underground was in the g

the most familiar place. She worked diligently b

intelligently to make herself fit through the door 

there. This is the “self-licking ice cream cone” appro

analyzing results of experiments or exercises: decide 

result you want to achieve and then build an event to 

success. This approach, however, does not provide the 

with an accurate assessment of the hypothesis being 

and is therefore flawed. The design of the event is esp

important in the testing of innovations in order to de

true picture of results. This is especially true 

evaluating revolutionary innovation because o

top-down nature and the relatively short initiation of 

cycle. 

In the Interim and Legacy forces, for example, 

exercises must be careful to realistically ide

shortcomings and provide mitigation where po

without jeopardizing soldiers or investments i

Objective forces. This implies a cogent assessment 

risks involved in operational employment of these 

both strategically for the country and operatio

tactically for the warfighters themselves. It also re

rigorous examination under the most realisti

challenging conditions at every opportunity again

extraordinarily capable opposing force in every dime

There will be dark days in terms of results, just as 

were in the early 1980s at the combat training cente

the end absolutely justifies the means; just as “D

Storm” did for the National Training Center. Results 

be used as a bottom-up feedback loop within the DT

construct to make the product better.

The Objective force must also be realistically exa

against a highly capable and effectively employed op

force. Because of the heavy reliance on emerging and 

technologies in the Objective force, the initial 

exercises will be in simulation. This more evolut

121
innovation approach, however, affords the opportun

test entirely new concepts, while continuing to devel

necessary materiel in parallel experiments. It is perh

this arena that the use of institutions and organiz

such as the service schools, working cooperatively wi

vast network of civilian organizations devoted to st

and national security, could assist in producing the be

of soup.”

4. Develop and implement realistic and useful me

of effectiveness. This relates directly back to the quest

what the nation wants an Army for and how do so

define themselves? The first question must lead 

straight line to the National Security and National M

Strategies and therefore must find its answer 

political leadership and people of the United States. 

are an infinite number of options in the spectr

potential conflict, especially when considered in the c

strategy of global engagement. The strategic ends, how

dictate that the U.S. Army is today and must rema

dominant land power in the world, if the nation is to 

its position of global superpower.

The second question, therefore, is directly tied 

notion of power. If the Army will find its role as part 

joint team first in deterrence, and then by actual fo

required in pursuit of national policy, then self-defi

seems to fairly easy. There will be, however, mission

as those in the Balkans, which seem to divert from 

the threat of force or actual force. Nevertheless, 

missions are a demonstration of national power beca

presence, and perhaps it is in the choice of who ex

those missions rather than whether they ought 

executed. The highly visible incorporation of all elem

“The Army,” for example, into the Bosnia and K

rotations, is an important statement of national pow

The Army must apply some strong intellectua

historical thought into self-examination in this 

transformation, if it truly wants to accept the full defi

122
The Army must preserve the notion of profession

deeply rooted values and traditions of its culture, and 

itself to the dynamic strategic environment of the c

and emerging world. The Army in the late 19th ce

fighting on the geographical frontiers of the expa

nation could scarcely have conceived that their units 

shortly be fighting in the Caribbean, China, an

Philippine Islands by the turn of the century; or in a 

European War by 1917. Realistic measures of effectiv

lie therefore in both the why and the how.

5. Professional education and its institutions are k

fostering innovation. This may be a blinding flash 

obvious, but the military schools system pro

extraordinary potential for promoting and le

innovation. Especially in the current era of transform

the Army professional education apparatus shou

buzzing with curiosity, debate, and exercise of the co

surrounding all aspects of the change. Certainly 

process of transformation continues, there should also 

increased use of the education apparatus to tes

concepts and provide the opportunity for some ref

thought and active debate on the relevant issues.

An important component of transformation, the p

of complete structural change, may be the emergence 

importance of professional education and its influe

actions in the operational force. The value of educati

crucial part of the national culture, but its importance 

be equally and obviously evident in the military cult

well. The operational requirements of the force should 

the instructional curriculum of the schools. In other w

tie the education to the realities of the opera

environment, as opposed to creating fictitious scena

refighting the last war.

6. Recognize the importance of nonlinear ana

Popularized as thinking outside of the box, the not

nonlinear analysis may at once be the most obvious a

the most difficult aspect of building and ens

123
irreversible momentum. Most military people by n

seem to be cause and effect thinkers and actors. The 

likes to see reasonably predictable results from its a

It is ironic, therefore, that the military consists at its 

people, and it is that human interaction that often 

nonlinear results.

The Army must continually evaluate the conc

basis of transformation and its testing and appli

against equal or greater opposing concepts in human 

More simply put, there must be a thinking h

interaction in the decision loop of innovation 

transformation. Whether it is in the initial and on

stage of strategic assessment or the developm

concepts to prosecute the strategy, there must be a dy

and human interaction determining the appropria

and effectiveness of the product; rather than sheer re

on technological adequacy. Again, the profess

education system must reinforce this interaction, ex

programs must include it in their design, and, 

importantly, the senior leadership must sustain 

maintaining a healthy professional dialogue.

Transformation for the Army in 2001 and beyon

vital strategic importance to the security of the U

States. The Army must transform to meet the stated 

of the leadership, to be a viable and relevant compon

the joint services team. It must also transform to me

strategic realities imposed by domestic and interna

policies, and the capabilities of threats to the na

interests of the nation. The Army may not be able to id

the specific person, group, or nation that will cho

employ that capability to threaten the United States

must be prepared today and into the future. Sun Tzu a

that the acme of skill was to place oneself in a posi

strength, where one did not have to fight; to win by vi

deterrence through power. The Army must aim at tha

while remaining prepared to fight and win the na

wars: the non-negotiable contract.

124
Building irreversible momentum for ensuring succ

transformation requires planning, hard work, 

commitment from the Army. The leadershi

established the vision within the national strateg

developed a campaign plan for execution. “Line of Ope

13: Strategic Communications, requires that the 

communicate...to internal and external audien

inform, educate, and build consensus, garner suppor

to acquire the resources for Army Transformation.”

time for the Army to get through the looking glass 

present, question every assumption and try new thi

make itself better; committed to remaining the de

choice of land power dominance in support of na

strategic objectives today and in the future.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. Donald Raekin, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and T

The Looking Glass; Nonsense, Sense, and Meaning, New York: T

Publishers, 1991, p. 87.

2. Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy, The Logic of War and 

Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Pres

pp. 7-11.

3. Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass and What Alice 

There, New York: The MacMillan Co., 1930, p. 13.

4. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Pete

eds. and trans., Princeton, NJ: The Princeton University Pres

pp. 88-89.

5. U.S. Army Transformation Campaign Plan-

Memorandum, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 

Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, October 30, 2000, p. 1.

6. Jeffrey R. Cooper, Another View of the Revolution in M

Affairs, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, S

Studies Institute, July 15, 1994.

7. Ibid., U.S. Army Transformation Campaign Plan

Memorandum, p. 19.

125
8. Dennis Showalter, “Military Innovation and Whig Perspe

History” in The Challenge of Change, Military Institutions an

Realities 1918-1941, Harold R. Winton and David R. Mets, eds., L

University of Nebraska Press, 2000, pp. 229-230.

9. Ibid.; Showalter, p. 232.

10. Clausewitz, p. 141; and Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, M

Misfortunes, The Anatomy of Failure in War, New York: The Fre

1991, pp. 47-55.

11. Williamson Murray, “Innovation Past and Future” in M

Innovation in the Interwar Period, Williamson Murray and A

Millett, eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19

306-309.

12. Carl H. Builder, “Rethinking National Security and the 

the Military,” Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1995, pp. 5-6

13. Colonel Kenneth G. Wickham, “What the Cordiner 

Proposes,” in Army, No. 7, July 1957, p. 21. Cited from A. J. Ba

The Pentomic Era, Washington, DC: National Defense Un

Press, 1986, p. 160.

14. Bacevich, p. 4.

15. John P. Rose, The Evolution of U.S. Army Nuclear D

1945-1980, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980, p. 57.

16. Ibid.; Bacevich, pp. 57-60.

17. Allan R. Millett, “Patterns of Military Innovation 

Interwar Years” in Murray and Millett, eds., pp. 335-336.

18. John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Bat

Development of Army Doctrine, 1973-1982, Fort Monroe, VA: U.S

Training and Doctrine Command, June 1984, p. 5.

19. Ibid., p. 80.

20. Major Paul H. Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done: G

William E. DePuy and the 1976 Version of FM 100-5, Operatio

Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 1988, pp. 4

21. Ibid., p. 41.

22. Ibid., p. 106.

126
23. John L. Romjue, The Army of Excellence: The Developme

1980’s Army, Fort Monroe: U.S. Army TRADOC Publication, 19

27-29. 

24. Warren Bennis, Why Leaders Can’t Lead, San Francisco

Bass Publishers, 1990, p. 15.

25. Williamson Murray and Barry Watts, “Military Innova

Peacetime,” in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, Wil

Murray and Allan R. Millett, eds., Cambridge: Cambridge Un

Press, 1996, pp. 406-418.

26. The Constitution of the United States, Article 1, Sectio

27. Secretary Louis Caldera and General Eric K. Shinsek

Army Vision: Soldiers on Point for the Nation . . . Persuasive in 

Invincible in War,” October 1999. p. 1.

28. “American Military Culture in the Twenty First Ce

Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International 

Press, February 2000, p. 20.

29. Zeb B. Bradford, Jr., and Frederic J. Brown, The United 

Army in Transition, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973, p. 

30. Ibid., p. 33.

31. Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy, Oxford: Oxford Un

Press, 1999, p. 17.

32. Sir Michael Howard and The Honorable William J. Perr

Inaugural Paul H. Nitze Award: A Lecture and Comme

Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, May 1994, pp. 18-1

33. Colonel Douglas A. Macgregor, “Transformation and the 

of Change,” National Strategic Studies Quarterly, Autumn 200

34. Ibid.; Murray, “Innovation Past and Future,” p. 301.

35. Ibid.; CSIS, p. 3.

36. Ibid.; Cohen and Gooch, pp. 26-27.

37. Elting E. Morison, Men, Machines, and Modern 

Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1966

127
38. F. G. Hoffman, Decisive Force, The New American Way 

Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1996, p. 5.

39. Ibid.; CSIS, p. 47.

40. Ibid.; Cohen and Gooch, pp. 236-242.

41. William Crockett, “Introducing Change to a Gove

Agency,” in Failures in Organization Development and Change

H. Minvis and David N. Berg, eds., New York: John Wiley and So

1977, pp. 142-144.

42. Ibid.; Bradford and Brown, pp. 32-33.

43. Carl H. Builder, “Military Planning Today: Calc

Charade?” Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1993, p. 22.

44. Ibid.; Morison, p. 219.

45. “Information Paper for TRADOC Modeling and Sim

Advisory Board,” prepared by Annette Ratzenberge

approved/signed by Major General Dean W. Cash, Director

Experimentation, U.S. Joint Forces Command.

46. “Joint Vision Background and Process,” http://jointv

monroe.army.mil, downloaded December 12, 2000.

47. “Concept Experimentation Program CEP,” http://www

eustis.army.mil/battlelab, downloaded December 12, 2000.

48. Lieutenant Colonel Bryon E. Greenwald, “The Anat

Change: Why Armies Succeed or Fail at Transformation,” Ar

VA: The Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United 

Army, September 2000, p. 16. Lieutenant Colonel Greenwald a

General Donn A. Starry on this particular point.

49. Ibid.; Morrison, p. 219.

50. Ibid.; Murray, “Innovation Past and Future, pp. 326-32

51. Ibid.; MacGregor, p. 5.

52. Ibid.; Transformation Campaign Plan, p. 17.

128
CHAPTER 5

BUILDING IRREVERSIBLE MOMENTU

Michael D. Formica

We are on track . . . we understood that the first year was abo

building momentum for transformation and then looking 

opportunities to keep building it.

General Erik Shinseki, October 20

In October 2000 General Erik Shinseki, Chief of S

the U.S. Army, began his second year of transformi

United States Army. His remarks in an interview 

Armed Forces Journal International suggest that the 

had achieved success in the first year of that 

Nevertheless, the second part of the Chief’s com

implied a sense of uncertainty as to whether the 

would also yield similar successes for his transform

plan. General Shinseki has identified the critica

building momentum. And, given the political dynami

new administration and Congress; a less robus

economy; and barely more than 2 years remaining 

tour as Chief of Staff, the gaining of irreversible mom

is indeed a daunting challenge.

The difficulties involved in implementing change a

new. As Machiavelli wrote in his book, The Prince, “I

be considered that there is nothing more difficult to 

out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more danger

handle, than to initiate a new order of things.”

2

 Chan

the how to manage change have confronted men sin

beginning of time. In fact, the continuity of chang

constant.

3

 The catalysts for military transform

generally fall into three sources. These are the emerge

new capabilities that can provide current forces sign

improvements or cause them to become obsolete, irrel

or at great risk; loss in a war; and political pressure

129
require new mission capabilities.

4

 Unfortun

America’s, and specifically the Army’s, track rec

managing change has not been all that good. Char

Heller and William A. Stofft, in their edited book, Am

First Battles: 1776-1965, have evocatively describe

Army’s inability to adapt in response to cha

environments. That failure has had its effect on the A

preparedness to fight and often resulted in tactica

operational losses. The Army’s current transform

effort aims to break the paradigm of past failure. The 

of Staff’s intent is to initiate and manage change so 

occurs in the manner in which the Army prescribes in

of coming as a result of external factors such as a de

war.

The Army’s Final Draft Transformation Campaig

defines the conditions of irreversible momentum as “

and scope of change that can survive individual de

makers and singular, discrete decisions.” The Army

continues that such transformation must re

perceptions and therefore upon strategic communic

efforts. Using this definition, transformation can a

irreversible momentum only when the whole Army (

reserve, and civilian), the other services

administration, the Congress, and the American 

become convinced of the need, suitability, and feasibi

that transformation. The purpose of this chapter, the

determine the critical elements for irreversible mom

and to propose several recommendations for the Ar

achieve that momentum, so that it becomes an intrins

of thinking about transformation.

This chapter consists of three sections. The 

introduces the reader to current thoughts on managin

succeeding in transformation, offers a template for g

irreversible momentum, and concludes by comparin

template to historical examples of military transform

The second section reviews the current status of the A

transformation plan to the proposed template, and th

130
section offers recommendations to assist in ach

irreversible momentum.

THEORIES ON TRANSFORMATION

Organizational.

Influenced by increasingly effective foreign comp

and the emergence of information technologies in th

1970s and 1980s, U.S. business began to rega

competitive advantage.

5

 A multitude of theories, stra

and techniques of management emerged throughou

period. They sought to describe the steps necess

achieving an effective organization. These organiza

theories are relevant to military institutions becaus

rest upon the human and institutional dynamics asso

with resistance, control, and power present during p

of change or transformation. The following theoris

those most applicable to the military.

Kotter. In his book, Leading Change, John P. Ko

Professor of Leadership at the Harvard Business S

identified eight steps required to transfor

organization. The first is establishing a sense of ur

Kotter contends that the failure to instill a sense of ur

is the biggest mistake leaders make when try

transform their organization. Establishing a se

urgency and eliminating complacency are crucial to g

the cooperation needed to drive the transform

process.

6

 His second step is to form a powerful g

coalition. Transformation requires such a force to s

the process. No individual, regardless of formal or inf

power or weak committees, can lead or ma

transformation by himself or herself. The magnitude 

task requires a coalition composed of the right peop

demands considerable trust and the sharing of co

objectives.

7

 The third step is the creation of a vision

vision performs three tasks: it provides general dir

and therefore simplifies the number of decisions a bu

131
needs to make; it motivates people; and it coord

actions.

8

Kotter’s fourth step is communicating the v

Communications are essential to ensuring that 

within the organization have a common understandin

shared sense of commitment to the future.

9

 The fifth 

empowering others to act on the vision. Effec

empowering subordinates consists of four actions: 

removal of structural barriers; 2) the provision of n

training; 3) the alignment of organizational systems 

vision; and 4) dealing with troublesome supervisors.

sixth step for transformation is planning for and cr

short-term successes. Short-term successes pr

credibility to the transformation effort and help sus

over the duration. The seventh step lies in consoli

improvements and producing still more ch

Organizations must use the credibility afford

short-term victories to tackle bigger problems with

transformation plan.

1 1

 The last step req

institutionalizing new approaches. Here, leaders n

anchor change within the organization’s culture to e

long-term success.

12

Kotter concludes that there are two fundamental l

on change. The first is that as change involves num

inter-related phases over a sustained period, skipping 

or performing steps out of sequence “creates only an il

of speed and never produces a satisfying result.”

1

second lesson is that a critical mistake in any pha

have a devastating impact on transformation by s

momentum or negating hard won gains.

14

Miles. Robert Miles is an academician and profes

consultant who focuses on change and transformati

his 1997 book, Leading Corporate Transformatio

defines the fundamental attributes associated 

successful transformation as: 1) the ability to thr

directed energy; 2) a total system perspective

comprehensive implementation plan; and 4) a dema

132
transformational leader. He describes the leadership 

that support these attributes: The first is generating e

for transformation.

15

 The second is to develop a vis

the future. According to Miles, a vision should 1) ide

purpose and mission for the organization; 2) crea

emotional view for the future organizational state; 

provide direction to get to the vision state.

16

 The thir

is to align the organization and culture. The lead

must deliberately orchestrate all of the elements 

organization’s total system—strategy, struc

infrastructure, people, culture, and core competencies

dynamic alignment as well as facilitate h

development and organizational learning that 

forward movement without excessive risk.

17

 Th

leadership task is the creation of transformation p

architecture. That architecture enables the transform

leader to orchestrate the transformation process.

1

Kotter, Miles claims that failure in any one of 

transformation leadership tasks will result in a fail

transform the organization.

19

Morris and Raben. Kathleen Morris and Charles R

professional management consultants, offer a mod

change based on 10 years of experience. Their model b

down into three related areas. The first relates 

problems encountered within transformation—resis

control, and power. The second area deals wit

implications of these problems on the transform

effort—the need to motivate change, the need to mana

transition, and the need to shape the political dynam

change. The last area consists of the action steps nec

to overcome these problems. Figure 1 illustrate

mode.

20

While the fundamentals of these theories ap

military institutions, there are two substantial diffe

between the military and other institutions that 

theories cannot address. The first is what Professor M

Howard defines as the tension between the mil

disciplined adherence to authority required for batt

133
performance and the questioning attitude of the s

required for successful adaptation.

21

 Because this t

does not exist to the same degree within other institu

creativity is less likely in military institutions. Willia

Murray contends that the acceptance and the reward

imagination and creativity are central to the success 

innovation.

22

 Murray states, “One of the most imp

components of successful innovation during the int

period had to do with the ability of officers to use 

imaginations in examining potential innovations.”

second difference is the ability to measure the results 

transformation effort. The business world is a

measure the results from their transformation e

consistently and relatively rapidly. Their metric c

productivity, quality, sales, profit margin, or the va

their stock. Furthermore, this feedback may a

relatively quickly—sometimes within days or w

Conversely, the military often does not recognize succ

failure from its military innovation until it is invol

134

Resistance

Control

Power

Need to

Motivate

Change

Need to

Manage

the

Transition

Need to

Shape the

Political

Dynamics

of Change

PROBLEM IMPLICATION ACTION STEPS

1. Surface dissatisfaction with the present state

2. Promote participation in change.

3. Give rewards for behavior.

4. Provide time and opportunity to disengage fro

present state.

5. Develop and communicate a clear image of th

future.

6. Use multiple and consistent leverage points.

7. Develop Organizational arrangements for the

transition.

8. Build in feedback mechanisms.

9. Assure the support of key power groups.

10. Use leader behavior to generate energy in

support of change.

11. Use symbols and language.

12. Build in stability.

Figure 1. Change Management Model.
war. As Peter Paret notes, in his forward of Harold Wi

book, To Change an Army, 

The strategy and operations of any war can be understood o

in the light of conditions of the ten or twenty years before 

beginning. Technology, organization, doctrine, trainin

command and staff appointments—all the essentials of act

in war—are put in place and developed in peacetime. T

testing experience of combat will bring about change, b

prewar elements continue to affect many events througho

the longest of conflicts.

24

Murray further highlights the difficulty that m

institutions face in preparing for a war “. . . that will oc

some indeterminate point in the future again

unidentified opponent, in political conditions that can

accurately predicted, and in an arena of brutalit

violence which one cannot replicate.”

25

Military Theories on Change and Transformat

Confronted with the peculiar challenges associate

managing change within the military, General Do

Starry (1982) and General Gordon Sullivan, along 

Colonel Michael Harper (1996), developed thei

thoughts on transformation.

Starry. General Starry, former commander of the U

States Army Training and Doctrine Command, fac

challenge of developing a doctrine to enable the U.S. 

to confront a larger Soviet land force successfully. 

process he identified seven general requiremen

effecting military change:

26

 First, the military lea

coalition must identify an institution or mechani

manage change. This newly appointed institut

mechanism must then define the need for change; de

the requirements to effect change; and finally defin

the change is different from past practices. The s

requirement is to ensure the principal staff and com

personalities possess an educational backgr

sufficiently rigorous, demanding, and relevant to est

135
a common cultural framework to problem solving. The 

is to appoint a spokesman or institution to be the cha

for change. The fourth requirement is to build consen

change that will give the new ideas and the need to 

them a wider audience of converts and believers. S

fifth requirement is continuity of leadership. He con

that continuity is a basic requirement of change s

consistency of effort occurs during the process. The 

requirement is to gain support from the senior leade

That leadership must be willing to hear out argume

change, agree to the need, embrace the new concept

become at least a supporter, if not a champion for ch

The last requirement for change is to conduct field tria

experiments. The supporters of change must demon

the relevance of proposed changes through the use of 

challenging, and realistic experiments. In additi

sustain the support of the wide audience, the insti

must modify the change, based on the results of 

experiments. 

Sullivan and Harper. General Gordon R. Su

former Chief of Staff of the Army (1991—1995), and C

Michael V. Harper, former director of the Army C

Staff’s Staff Group, list eleven rules for guiding cha

their book, Hope is Not a Method. They identified thes

as they led the Army through its initial post-Cold 

reorganization. First, change is hard work. Leading c

requires leaders to do two jobs at once. They must co

today’s operations, while leading the organizatio

tomorrow.

27

 Second, leadership begins with values

leader uses values to signal what will not change wit

organization and in so doing provides stability and dir

during the uncertain times.

28

 Third, the intellectua

the physical. The first step in transformation is intelle

The leader and his team must expend a great deal of m

effort to build a solid intellectual framework for the fu

Fourth, real change takes real change. The leader 

alter the critical process within the organization, 

wishes to effect true change. Simply working o

136
margins—incremental change—will not effect subst

and enduring transformation.

30

 Fifth, leadership is a 

sport. Effective leaders build teams and forge allian

teamwork is critical to transformation. Teamwork pr

individuals with a sense of responsibility fo

organization and thereby creates momentum.

31

 

surprise is an inherent part of change in the real 

Resiliency and flexibility are critical for the organiza

deal with the unexpected and maintain the c

throughout transformation.

32

 Seventh, today com

with tomorrow. The transformation leader must st

balance between resources—people, funds, time

energy—to meet today’s requirements and tho

tomorrow.

33

 Eighth, “better” is better. In transform

one cannot define “better” using current quali

values—better quality, reduced cycle times, s

information, (lethal, mobile, survivable). “Better

include all these characteristics and more.

34

 Ninth, fo

the future. The leader must inculcate the organizatio

a positive, optimistic, and creative vision of the fu

Tenth, learn from doing. A learning organization—on

learns from doing and sharing information—is crit

transformation. These actions will spark a sp

innovation and growth within the organization.

3

lastly, grow people. Creative people are what e

organizations to transform. Leaders must understan

and reward creativity among those who step outside t

within the organization.

37

 What is perplexing t

military is that this “rule” is hard to support, give

tension between adherence to discipline an

questioning attitude required for innovative and cr

thought.

A Guiding Template.

Because the human and institutional dyn

associated with resistance, control, and power exist i

the military and other institutions, similarities 

between the theories/models for change. First, the m

137
identify the need to establish a sense of urgency with

organization. Second, they all also highlight the impo

of leadership in successful transformation—

specifically, a coalition of leaders. Third, the models 

the criticality of vision and strategy in transform

Fourth, they identify the need for open communicat

build consensus and support for change. Fifth, exc

Starry, the models identify the need to empower indiv

throughout the organization to achieve the vision

finally, the models stress the need to institutio

transformation within the organization’s cu

Therefore, it appears that a template for ga

irreversible momentum includes these six tasks.

1. Instill a sense of urgency for change.

2. Establish a powerful coalition to guide that cha

3. Develop a vision of the future and a strate

implementation.

4. Communicate the vision and need for change.

5. Empower individuals within the organizatio

especially reward imagination and creat

Empowerment also includes providing people educa

experiences sufficiently rigorous, demanding, and re

to ensure the organization’s members possess a co

cultural bias toward solving problems.

6. Institutionalize the change within the organiza

German Interwar Innovation. 

The history of German and British efforts to inn

during the World War I and World War II interwar 

supports this template. The following is an extrapola

those interwar efforts to innovate using the above tem

1. Establish a sense of urgency. The loss of the wa

resulting restrictions of the Versailles Treaty reduc

German Army to less than 100,000 men of whom only 

were officers. The defeat and ensuing sense of vulnera

138
due to the drastic reductions in the Army, were cataly

German military reform.

2. Establish a powerful coalition to guide the ch

Colonel General Hans von Seeckt, commander-in-c

the army, used the general staff to affect doctrina

organizational changes in the army.

38

3. Develop a vision of the future and a strategy to a

it. Seeckt developed the vision based on his experien

his exceptional critical intellectual skills.

39

 He estab

57 different committees of general staff officers and s

matter experts to examine the broad and specific que

World War I had raised. The general staff used the res

these studies to develop the basis of German opera

doctrine, “Army Regulation 487, Leadership and 

with Combined Arms.”

40

4. Communicate the vision and need for change. H

respected by his fellow officers, Seeckt convinced Germ

political leaders and officer corps to adopt his vision an

doctrine as their own. He accomplished this by reori

and re-educating them towards the doctrines of m

maneuver warfare.

41

5. Empower individuals within the organization

the German general staff developed such inno

solutions to the problems of modern war was a reflec

the army’s strong tradition (culture) of studyin

critically and encouraging open debate, creativity

imagination among the officers.

42

 In addition, the G

Army exposed these doctrinal concepts to extensiv

tests and trials.

6. Institutionalize the change within the organiz

Seeckt institutionalized the change by first encou

open discussion within the officer corps and th

ensuring continuity of leadership after his retire

Generals Ludwig Beck, Werner von Fritsch, and Os

Lutz were all Seeckt protégés and ensured the centra

maneuver warfare in the army’s doctrine.

43

139
British Interwar Innovation. 

1. Instill a sense of urgency for change. Initially, as 

the victors of World War I, the British Army failed to 

need to change or even reexamine their doctrine. 

Cavan, chief of the Imperial General Staff (C.I.G.S.

1922 to 1926 and other senior military men o

immediate post-war years seem to be content wi

status quo.”

44

 And while attempts to reform the do

and mechanize the force were present from the late 19

the early 1930s under Lord Milne, the British c

leadership selected General Archibald Montgo

Massingberd, who vigorously opposed change.

45

2. Establish a powerful coalition to guide the ch

Since the senior leadership did not perceive a need for 

in the case of Montgomery-Massingberd, actively o

change, the British Army did not establish such a coal

3. Develop a vision and strategy to achieve chang

British senior officers failed to develop a vision and st

to achieve it. “With few notable exceptions, the 

officers of the army neither possessed nor articula

reasonably accurate vision of the nature of future wa

4. Communicate the vision and need for change. 

the British did not develop a vision of war or need to ch

they had nothing to communicate.

5. Empower individuals within the organization. B

efforts to empower officers were sporadic. The deg

empowerment—open debate, dialogues, 

experimentation—present within the army depend

who was the C.I.G.S. Lord Milne fostered such c

ingredients. Conversely Montgomery-Massingber

successor, did not. Rather the latter imposed a 

centralization doctrine on the army; restricted distri

of anything slightly critical of the Army’s performance 

last war; and perpetuated the notion that the next c

would replicate the last.

47

 Nor did the British stre

requirement for rigorous and demanding education 

140
officer corps. The British saw soldiering as an agreeab

honorable occupation, rather than a profession 

required intellectual dedication equivalent to the m

legal, and engineering professions.

48

 The British regim

system exacerbated these problems. Senior of

dissuaded junior officers from seeking staff c

assignments and those who did attend were s

intellectually challenged by the curriculum.

49

6. Institutionalize the change within the organiz

There was no institutionalization of change with

army. Two points support this statement: 1) the l

continuity in senior command positions; and 2) the ab

of a coherent combined-arms doctrine.

50

ARMY TRANSFORMATION—ACTIONS TO DA

In the words of former Secretary of the Army 

Caldera, “The amount of momentum that we [Army

been able to generate for transformation in less than 

is remarkable.”

51

 The question, however, remains; a

efforts the Army has expended to gain this mom

consistent with the six tasks needed to gain irreve

momentum? The following is a brief summary of the A

actions and a comparison of them to the tasks th

organization should employ to successfully exec

transformation.

Creating A Sense of Urgency.

The Army’s mantra for transforming is that the str

conditions are present for the United States to transfo

Army. A failure to transform now could result in l

preparedness in the future.

52

 General Shinsek

highlighted this point:

We are attempting to transform ourselves during 

unprecedented period—a time of relative peace, of unriva

economic prosperity and of stampeding technologi

progress. The conditions are most favorable for our succe

141
but the window of opportunity may have already begun to cl

[Emphasis added]

53

General Shinseki concluded his article by citin

testimony of General George C. Marshall before Cong

1940, “Yesterday we had time but no money. Today w

money but no time.” Marshall’s words came shortly 

France had fallen in the catastrophic 1940 cam

Today, as in 1940, the Army’s challenges to transfor

similar. It must convince an administration, a Con

and a nation that the Army is a critical compon

national defense; that the Army’s current superio

fleeting; and the nation needs to invest now in 

transformation to ensure it remains able to perfo

missions. 

Establish A Coalition to Guide the Change.

It is difficult to determine the composition of the A

change coalition. It is clear that General Shinseki, G

John Keene, Vice Chief of Staff, and General John Ab

Commanding General of Training and Doctrine Com

are all members of the coalition. And since th

administration seems to support Army transformatio

reasonable to deduce that the new Secretary of the 

will be a member of the coalition.

Vision and Strategy.

On October 12, 1999, General Shinseki articulat

Army Vision entitled, “Soldiers on point for the Nati

Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War,” during the a

Association of United States Army convention. The t

the vision conveys three messages. First, “Soldiers on 

for the Nation” sends two messages: the Army cons

soldiers (people) and, like the “point-man” in an in

squad, the Army is a critical instrument of national 

The second and third parts of the vision—“Persuas

Peace” and “Invincible in War”—define the strategic r

142
and environments in which the Army must operate 

“on point." The text of the Army Vision defines three 

maintaining and caring for people, sustaining the rea

to respond strategically throughout the world

transforming the Army into a force capable of domina

every point on the operational spectrum. As Ge

Shinseki stated, the purpose of the vision is to s

direction for the Army to meet the nation’s str

requirements in the 21st century.

54

 The Army’s 

provides a general direction, motivates, and coord

actions. It does not outline the necessity for land po

the current and future world environments or discu

Army’s role within the Joint arena. Yet, both of the

essential to gaining Congressional support.

To achieve this vision, the Army develope

transformation strategy and campaign plan. The st

emerged in spring 2000 as part of the General Shin

testimony to Congress. The strategy consisted of a

along three paths: sustain and recapitalize the Legacy 

(current force), build an Interim Force to meet the ne

small to medium-scale contingencies, and devel

Objective Force to succeed the Legacy and Interim fo

The Department of Army published the 

coordination draft of its campaign plan on Novemb

2000. The plan stated that its purpose was to “transla

vision [Army Vision] from concept to reality.”

5

Transformation Campaign Plan identified three axis a

subordinate actions that the Army must take to accom

transformation. It also designates responsi

throughout the Army to accomplish these tasks.

One of these major actions has to do with resourcin

Army estimates its unfunded requirement

transformation to be $26 billion.

5 6

 Critic

transformation’s success is the Army’s ability to co

Congress and administration of its need to fund 

requirements. To accomplish this and 

communication’s tasks, the transformation campaig

143
tasks the Chief’s Special Studies Group to deve

strategic communications plan to “Synchroniz

coordinate the transformation strategic communic

efforts to internal and external audiences to inform, ed

and build consensus, to garner support, and to acqu

resources for Army transformation.”

57

However, as of February 28, 2001, The Special S

Group had not published its communication 

Regardless of the existence of a plan, the Army ha

communicating its vision and the need to tran

General Shinseki and, to a limited extent, other 

officers have presented the vision and transform

strategy throughout the Army and to the Congre

addition, the Army has published or “sponsored” a n

of articles in Soldier and Army and supported a 

Broadcasting Frontline episode entitled, “The Fut

War.” Lastly, General Shinseki has testified 

Congress to gain Congressional support for 

transformation. His efforts netted 1.6 billion dollar in 

year 2001.

Based on a review of these actions, it appears th

Army has accomplished or is in the proce

accomplishing, three of the six tasks critical to irreve

momentum. It is attempting to instill a sense of urgen

change. It has established a coalition to guide the ch

And finally, it has developed a vision of the future

uncovered are the tasks for communicating the visio

need for change; empowering those within the organiz

and institutionalizing change.

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

Based on a comparison between the Army’s effo

date and the template of six tasks, there are three tas

Army needs to perform to gain irreversible momentu

change. These are communicating the vision, empow

individuals within the organization, and institutiona

144
the change within the Army. This section will recom

actions that the Army might use to achieve these tas

Communication.

Transformation is impossible unless hundreds of thousands 

people are willing to help, often to the point of mak

short-term sacrifices... Without credible communication, a

lots of it, the hearts and minds of the troops are nev

captured.

58

Credible communication is critical to succ

transformation. In communicating the vision and ne

transformation, the Army must build a persu

argument tailored to each of its diverse audienc

essence, the Army must build consensus for chan

consensus that will give new ideas and need to adopt t

wider audience of converts and believers.

59

 Again, 

words of the Final Draft of the Army Transform

Campaign Plan, “Develop a communications pl

synchronize and coordinate the transformation str

communications efforts to internal and external aud

to inform, educate and build consensus, to garner su

and to acquire the resources for Army transformat

These audiences include the administration, the Con

the American people, the Army (active, reserve, and r

soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers), an

sister services—the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Co

Convincing these audiences is essential to ga

irreversible momentum. As the House Appropri

Defense Panel commented in its mark-up of the FY 

Spending Bill,

The committee believes that if this effort is to avoid the fate 

previously well intended Army efforts, it will require 

sustained level of commitment from the Army, the Secreta

of Defense, and Congress, a demonstrated dedication 

change and willingness to make tough choices and concer

effort to make this a top DOD priority. The committee a

believes that if the defense department and the ne

145
administration does not accord Army transformation 

budgeting priority it deserves, it will languish and eventuall

homogenized in the traditional Army structure along w

many past initiatives, producing only marginal long te

effect.

61

To prevent failure, the Army could use four th

First, the United States currently possesses a wind

opportunity to transform the Army under relatively b

terms. This security is the result of two thing

establishment of the Interim Force and the recapitali

of the Legacy Force as envisioned within the transform

plan; and the time it will take for potential enem

develop the capabilities to challenge the U.S. m

power. Unfortunately, as the capability and stren

potential enemies’ increases, the utility of the curren

will diminish and thereby result in greater risks.

Second, Army transformation provides the natio

an Army that is more strategically, operationally

tactically mobile than current forces. Third, land pow

remain decisive in future wars. While air, sea, and 

power can employ the military, economic, and psycho

levers of power to affect an enemy’s forces, econom

political will,

62

 land power, as Colin Gray states, “

most conclusive, yet also the least exclusive, o

geographically focused branches of conflict.”

63

 He cont

“The inherent strength of land power is that it carri

promise of achieving decision. Whereas dominance at 

the air, or in space might enable a war to be won, dom

on land should translate as victory in war as a wh

Fourth, the Army is inherently linked to the Am

people through the extensive and essential integra

active and reserve component forces. And as such, it 

with it the critical public support and will need

prosecute war.

As Michael Howard has stated, “society is a

indifferent and at worst hostile to its [milit

activities.”

65

 While this may define the condition in 

146
the Army must seek public support there are several 

the Army must use in stressing its case. First, the his

the United States and its Army remain inextricably l

A communications plan that addresses the contrib

the Army has made to U.S. history, and continues to 

on a day-to-day basis would help to raise public awa

of the Army’s role. Simultaneously, the Army s

communicate the changes occurring in the external 

and relate the need for Army transformation to 

changes. This might assist in gaining public understa

and support for transformation. Obtaining public su

would go far towards gaining Congressiona

Administration support as well.

The Army’s internal communication plan must pe

several tasks. First it must convince the Army of th

for change. Second, it must work to eliminate par

interests by defining the Army’s purpose as instit

Lastly, the Army must maintain open communic

across the force. The Army, like society, consists of 

subunits and cultures. These cultures (armor, inf

airborne, mechanized, etc.) each have a view on ho

Army should best organize itself to fight. Often these 

conflict and internal struggles result. For transforma

occur senior leaders must fight, through strength o

and will, to gain a consensus.

66

 Consensus and suppo

critical for transformation to occur. As General 

stated, “Only when the field Army accepts the bene

change and believes it has a stake in transformation w

rank and file tear down the bureaucratic barriers imp

the progress of innovation and support the change.”

6

For the Army to succeed, it must use all ex

communications channels to open dialogu

transformation.

68

 A recent Army Research Institute s

of 177 Army lieutenant colonels and colonels indicate

the Army’s efforts to communicate key aspe

transformation were judged as “good,” “very goo

“excellent” by 52 percent of respondents. Converse

same survey indicated that 50 percent of the respon

147
were uncomfortable or very uncomfortable wit

changes, as the Army transforms to the objective f

This suggests a greater need for dialogue within the A

Moreover, the Army must recognize ther

sub-units/cultures whose very reason for being appe

be jeopardized by the new vision, e.g., the A

community. The Army must address these cul

Pronouncements that the Legacy Force will contin

remain in existence for the next “X-number” of year

not help young lieutenants and captains who see 

chances at commanding “relevant” combat-arms 

dissolving with each heavy brigade converted to an In

Brigade Combat Team or Objective Brigade. If the 

has already thought through this problem, and deter

a solution, then it should communicate that sol

Failure to address such concerns may cause these aud

to resist transformation.

There are several reasons that this is a difficult 

One is the services may see the transformed Ar

lessening their influence/role in certain mi

environments. Another reason is competition for 

resources. Competition for strategic airlift between t

Force and Army has increased with the introduction 

Interim Brigade Combat Teams. This competit

because the Air Force needs up to 70 percent of the na

strategic airlift capacity to support the buildu

sustainment of air operations.

70

 The Army’s developm

a viable force that depends upon strategic airl

strategic mobility will compete for that same airlift. L

all the services are operating in a fiscally constrained

“zero-sum,” environment. This is an environment in 

for the past 10 years they have experienced difficul

sustaining day-to-day operations, procuring replac

weapons systems, and funding research and developm

future weapons systems. Given this context, the 

services may perceive the cost of transforming the Ar

requiring the Department of Defense to increase the A

funding levels and reduce their funding levels.

148
To ameliorate this competition the Army 

communicate at least three themes to its sister se

First, analysis of current trends indicates pot

adversaries will be more creative and adapti

countering U.S. intervention.

71

 The future enviro

requires an Army which is versatile and adaptive 

manner in which it can achieve its objectives—an Arm

can react faster than the enemy. The Army must achie

joint tactical, operational, and possibly strategic obje

through targeting (fires), maneuver, and/or the secu

terrain in any weather and under any condition—nu

biological, and chemical. Second, the Army is not com

with any of the other services for missions. Rather, i

transform to enable the Department of Defense to r

future joint concepts embodied within JV 20

Specifically, as part of a joint team the Army must dom

land warfare within the joint campaign. This requir

Army to possess the capabilities to deny sanc

dominate all environments; conduct simultaneo

near-simultaneous shaping, decisive, and susta

operations; and destroy regime-ensuring forces in de

ensure long lasting decisions.

73

Finally, the Army must prepare for sustained oper

against an adversary whose principal aim is to prolo

conflict and avoid decision.

74 As TRADOC’s final 

document, “The Foundations of Army Transformatio

the Objective Force Concept” states,

. . . The Objective Force must provide modernized capabilit

to dominate land warfare. These capabilities will be employ

in the conduct of battles and engagements in shaping a

decisive operations nested within the joint campaign. It m

possess capabilities to support other components in certa

phases of the campaign and to be supported by t

interdependent joint force for decisive land operations. It m

be strategically responsive to expand the range of milita

options available to the NCA and the combatant command

as well as to create the conditions for operational and tacti

maneuver from the outset of operations. Finally, it must a

149
be full spectrum capable to not only dominate land warfare 

also situations in the military operations other than war.

75

General Shinseki has set the stage over the pas

with the development of a sound vision and conce

transformation. The task is now to build the momen

internal and external support to sustain the 

Communications must be a critical part of that pr

There are numerous themes that the Army can develo

use in its communications plan. Developing the 

themes and presenting them in an appropriate and eff

manner is an essential step towards achieving irreve

momentum. 

Empower People—Get the Entire Army Involv

Another critical step in gaining irreversible mom

needs to be involving the entire Army in the proces

Secretary of the Army and the Chief took the first 

towards this with development and communication 

Army vision and transformation plan. The next s

putting into place those mechanisms that foster team

and lead to a sense of ownership/ contribution throu

the Army.

As General Sullivan and Colonel Harper poin

teamwork empowers people with a sense of respons

for the organization and thereby, creates momentu

transformation.

76

 Directly linked to teamwork is ins

and rewarding creativity. Business and historical exa

support the thesis that creative people enable organiz

to transform.

77

 Sustaining the creative juices with

organization and gaining the most from their e

requires the Army to approach transformation as a lea

organization—one that learns from doing and sh

information. This is not a difficult task as the Arm

learning organization. After-action reviews are a n

occurrence at all levels within the Army. From c

crews to divisions and corps, the Army aggressively se

learn from its successes and failures. Transformation 

150
any different. To make it work, though, will requi

Army to foster a dialogue throughout the organi

about the lessons learned. These actions will further s

spirit of innovation and growth within the Army.

78

By providing people the power to act by rem

obstacles to their contributing to the vision is c

Transformation requires enormous amounts of energ

of the catalysts to generate this energy is the leade

must model required new behaviors.

79

 In the case of 

transformation, this entails ensuring that senior field 

officers (lieutenant colonel and colonel) and general o

within the Army have joined the coalitio

transformation and are actively demonstrating supp

it to their subordinates. As Kotter states, “No

disempowers people the way a bad boss [superviso

undercuts change] can.”

80

 Again, as the survey conduc

the Army Research Institute indicates, 50 percent 

surveyed population of lieutenant colonels and co

were not comfortable with the forthcoming changes 

Army moves to the objective force.

8 1

 Aside 

communications, there are several other means to ga

support of this critical group. These are ensurin

concept receives the widest possible examinatio

scrutiny by using a red team concept and cond

thorough field tests and experiments.

Major General (Retired) Edward Atkeson in a 

article in Army argued the Army needs to put in p

mechanism to provide early, timely, and pert

commentary on transformation—a designated 

advocate to examine the concept for flaws before it be

a done deal.

82

 He further argues,

The Army needs a designated Red Team. It needs a loy

supportive yet independent agency capable of challenging n

concepts of organization, operation, and support. Ideally 

would not be limited to nay saying but chartered to propo

alternatives directly, when necessary to the highest author

of the Army.

83

 [Emphasis added]

151
In addition to strengthening the product, a red team 

assist in making the senior field grade officers 

comfortable with transformation through the use o

trial and experiments.

General Sullivan and Colonel Harper believe the 

should design and use specific activities and eve

illustrate and test the new paradigm and thereby enco

those within the organization.

84

 General Starry takes 

bit further by specifying that to test the validity 

proposed change, the tests need to be open to rig

examination and scrutiny.

85

 General Atkeson use

Army’s High Technology Light Division concept 

example of what happens when an organization do

perform open, objective, and reliable field trials. I

case, because the 9th Infantry Division designed and 

this concept on itself, the Army did not view the resu

reliable.

86

 General Atkeson concluded that, althoug

Army Chief of Staff sponsored the concept, the Ar

large regarded the results as suspect and the co

collapsed when the Chief of Staff retired.

87

 While TRA

is designing and testing the Interim and Objective F

the more open, objective, and reliable the field tria

experiments, the greater the likelihood of ga

consensus from within and outside the Army to su

transformation.

88

CONCLUSION

Institutionalizing the transformation of the Ar

gaining irreversible momentum is a challenging ta

requires strong and consistent leadership emp

communication, and teamwork. And it will also 

time—possibly 5 to 10 years.

89

 As defined by the 

transformation campaign plan, the momentu

transformation will be irreversible when the rate and 

of change can survive individual decisionmaker

singular, discrete decisions. The metric of irreve

momentum is the level of support the new administr

152
the Congress, the American public, and the Army g

Army transformation.

General Shinseki has set the stage in the past yea

the development of a sound vision and conce

transformation. The task now is to build the intern

external support the Army needs to sustain the 

Communications is a critical part of that process. The 

can develop and use numerous themes i

communications plan. Developing the right theme

presenting them in an appropriate and effective mann

essential steps towards achieving irreversible mome

Obtaining support from within the Army also re

putting into place those mechanisms that foster team

and lead to a sense of ownership/contribution throu

the Army. To accomplish these tasks, the Army 

continue to leverage its commitments to creativity 

being a learning organization. The mortar that binds 

critical traits is the trust and credibility betwee

institution of the Army and its people. To sustain thi

and ensure the validity of its transformation concep

Army needs what General Atkeson describes as a 

supportive yet independent agency—a red tea

challenge the new concepts of organization, operatio

support. The Army must continue to ensure all of it

and experiments remain open, objective, and rigorou

Army must also modify its doctrine and concepts based 

the lessons learned from these tests. Tes

experimentation, and modification will act as a har

within the mortar of trust and credibility. To preven

foundation from cracking, the Army must maintain 

lines of communication and dialogue within the 

Lastly, to keep the momentum going, the Army 

institutionalize transformation through continu

leadership. 

153
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. Jason Sherman, “Momentum, Mo’ Money,” Armed Forces J

International, October 2000, p. 46.

2. Nicollo Machiavelli, The Prince, Vol. 23, W.K. Marriot, tr

The Great Books of the Western World, Chicago: Encyc

Britannica, 1952, p. 17.

3. David Jablonski, The Owl of Minerva Flies at Twilight: D

Change and Continuity and the Revolution in Military Affairs, C

Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War Colle

1994, p. 2.

4. Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, Ithac

Cornell University Press, 1984, p. 57.

5. Robert H. Miles, Leading Corporate Transformation: A Bl

for Business Renewal, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1997, p. 28.

6. John P. Kotter, Leading Change, Boston: Harvard B

School Press, 1996, p. 4.

7. Ibid., p. 52.

8. Ibid., p. 68.

9. Ibid., pp. 85, 90.

10. Ibid., p. 115.

11. Ibid., p. 140.

12. Ibid., p. 157.

13. John P. Kotter, “Leading Change—Why Transformation 

Fail," Harvard Business Review on Change, Boston, 1998, p. 2.

14. Ibid., p. 3.

15. Miles, Leading Corporate Transformation, p. 16. Miles id

four catalysts to generate this energy: 1) confront all levels 

organization with reality; 2) create or reallocate resources; 3) r

standards of performance; and 4) and encourage leaders at all l

model required new behaviors.

16. Ibid., p. 29.

154
17. Ibid., p. 48.

18. Ibid., p. 57.

19. Ibid., p. 57.

20. Kathleen F. Morris and Charles S. Raben, “The Fundame

Change Management," Discontinuous Change: Leading Organ

Transformation, David A. Nadler, et al., eds., San Fra

Jossey-Bass, 1995, pp. 63-64.

21. Michael Howard, “Military Science in the Age of Peace,” J

of the Royal United Service Institute for Defense Studies, March 

5.

22. Williamson Murray, “Innovation Past and Present,” M

Innovation in the Interwar Period, Williamson Murray and A

Millet, eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 

23. Ibid.

24. Peter Paret, Foreword, in To Change an Army: General S

Burnett-Stuart and British Armoured Doctrine, 1927-1938, 

Winton, ed., Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1988, 

25. Murray, “Innovation Past and Present,” p. 301.

26. General Donn A. Starry, “To Change an Army," remark

U.S. Army War College Committee on a Theory of Combat, C

Barracks, PA, June 10, 1982.

27. General Gordon R. Sullivan and Colonel Michael V. 

Hope is Not a Method, New York: Times Business, 1996, p. 236

28. Ibid., p. 237.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid., p. 238.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

155
35. Ibid.

36. Ibid., p. 239.

37. Ibid.

38. James S. Corum, “A Comprehensive Approach to Chang

Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Re

1918-1941, Harold R. Winton, and David R. Mets, eds., Linco

2000, p. 40.

39. Ibid., pp. 38-39.

40. Ibid., p. 41.

41. Ibid., pp. 38-39.

42. Ibid., p. 64.

43. Ibid., p. 64.

44. Ibid., p. 225.

45. Williamson Murray, “Armored Warfare,” in Military Inn

in the Interwar Period, p. 22.

46. Winton, The Challenge of Change, p. 232.

47. Ibid., p. 225.

48. Michael Howard, “The Liddell Hart Memoirs,” Journa

Royal United Services Institute, February 1966, p. 61.

49. Murray, “Armored Warfare,” pp. 23-24.

50. Ibid., pp. 27-29.

51. Jason Sherman, “Momentum, Mo’ Money,” p. 52.

52. Eric K. Shinseki, “The Army Transformation: A H

Opportunity," Association of the United States Army Green 

October 2000, p. 21.

53. Ibid.

156
54. Louis Caldera and Eric K. Shinseki, “United State

Transformation Campaign Plan—Pre-Decisional Final Coord

Draft,” Washington, DC: HQ Department of the Army, 2000, p

55. Ibid., p. 1.

56. Edward Francis, “Transformation Brief to USAWC," Oct

2000. This is broken down into the following categories: Modern

and re-capitalization of Legacy Force, $21.5 billion; Fielding 

interim brigades, $3 billion; and Science and technology te

evaluation in support of the objective force, $2.1 billion.

57. Caldera and Shinseki, “U.S. Army Transformation Ca

Plan,” p. 17.

58. Kotter, Leading Change, p. 85.

59. Starry, “To Change an Army,” p. 23.

60. Caldera and Shinseki, “U.S. Army Transformation Ca

Plan,” p. 17.

61. Sherman, “Momentum, Mo Money,” p. 52.

62. Philip S. Melinger power point presentation, “Air Power 

Future of War,” slides 27, 32, and 34.

63. Collin S. Gray, Modern Strategy, New York: Oxford Un

Press, 1999, p. 212.

64. Ibid., p. 214.

65. Michael Howard, “Military Science in the Age of Peace,

66. Bryon E. Greenwald, “The Anatomy of Change: Why 

Succeed or Fail at Transformation," Arlington, VA: The Inst

Land Warfare, September 2000, p. 10.

67. Starry, “To Change an Army,” p. 23.

68. Kotter, Leading Change, p. 12.

69. Dr. Morris Peterson and Ms. Sharon Johnson, “Chief o

Army Transformation Survey," U.S. Army Research Ins

December 5, 2000, slide 23.

157
70. John Kreul, “Son of QDR: Prospects for the Army," Ar

VA: Institute of Land Warfare, July 2000.

71. “The Foundations of Army Transformation and The O

Force Concept – Final Draft,” Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Train

Doctrine Command, January 2001, p. 15.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid., p. 10.

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid., p. 22.

76. Sullivan and Harper, Hope Is Not a Method, p. 237.

77. Ibid., p. 239.

78. Ibid.

79. Miles, Leading Corporate Transformation, p. 16.

80. Kotter, Leading Change, p. 115.

81. Peterson and Johnson, slide 7.

82. Edward B. Atkeson, “The Army Needs a Red Team," 

January 2001, pp. 12-13.

83. Ibid., p. 13.

84. Sullivan and Harper, Hope Is Not a Method, p. 238.

85. Starry, “To Change an Army,” p. 23.

86. Atkeson, “The Army Needs a Red Team,” p. 12.

87. Ibid.

88. Greenwald, “The Anatomy of Change,” p. 11.

89. Ibid.

158
CHAPTER 6

IMPROVING THE STRATEGIC

RESPONSIVENESS

OF THE TRANSFORMING FORCE

James W. Shufelt, Jr.

Challenged by the last decade’s dynamic str

environment and a wide range of potential future th

the U.S. Army has embarked on a journey to transform 

into a force of greater relevance. The creation of th

redesigned units and the selection of an Interim Ar

Vehicle for procurement have established the momen

begin, as well as sustain, the process of change.

transformation will ultimately alter the Army’s 

combat organization and increase its strategic respo

ness, while still maintaining its critical characteris

decisive and dominant force. The purpose of this cha

not to recommend fundamental changes 

transformation process that has already started, 

attack the logic behind the decision to change. Indee

need for change is an imperative and the basic ro

appropriate. Rather, this chapter will look at the l

learned that drove the decision to change, revie

transformation process, examine alternative transf

tion designs to identify potential concepts usef

improving the current transformation process

recommend appropriate adjustments to that process

Envisioned as a 30-year process, this evolution w

especially difficult because the Army must still exec

current commitments, while undergoing transform

An additional challenge is the fact that the Objective F

operational concepts, tactical organization designs

core combat vehicle, the Future Combat System, d

currently exist. These key pieces will have to be the pr

of hands-on experimentation, the application of curre

future lessons-learned analyses, and the incorporat

159
research and development efforts conducted durin

initial years of the transformation process.

2

There are a number of models for the transforma

the U.S. Army, ranging from incremental moderniza

its current combat systems and fighting organizati

radical revision of the Army’s basic systems, unit

methods of fighting. By selecting a path that pr

focused near-term fixes to documented deficiencies in 

to free up resources to support a more radical transf

tion of the future force, the Army has rejected its pr

path of gradual modernization, as well as more swe

and immediate changes proposed by others. While the 

has consciously refused alternate reorganization m

such as those presented by Colonel Douglas Macgre

Breaking the Phalanx and retired Brigadier General 

Grange’s team in Air-Mech Strike, these controv

proposals include a number of concepts that could im

the Army’s strategic responsiveness. Incorporation 

Army-wide rotating unit readiness structure, increas

of reserve components for existing long-term opera

requirements, adjustments in unit stationing, and ta

mobility enhancements for light forces could al

improve the Army’s near-term strategic responsiv

The positive impact of other ongoing Army actions, s

improvements in manning critical units, the developm

a consolidated operational rotation plan, and the crea

additional rapid-response capabilities, would fu

enhance the value of these initiatives.

THE ORIGIN OF ARMY TRANSFORMATION

REQUIREMENTS

The need to transform the Army from its cu

structure lies in its experiences since the end of th

War. In the challenges of the past decade, the 

succeeded despite the limitations of its available tools

and heavy forces with Cold War structures. The conun

that it confronts today is simple in its clarity and pro

160
in its operational implications. The Transform

Campaign Plan explains:

. . . today’s Army force structure and supporting systems w

designed for a different era and enemy. The Army’s supe

heavy forces are unequalled in their ability to gain and h

terrain in the most intense, direct fire combat imagina

and—once deployed—are the most decisive element in ma

theater wars. The current heavy forces lack strate

responsiveness and deployability. They also have a la

logistical footprint and have significant support requiremen

On the other hand, the Army’s current light forces can str

quickly but lack survivability, lethality and tactical mobil

once inserted. The result is a near-term capabilities gap th

the Army must address as a matter of the utmost urgency

Operational Lessons Learned.

Operation JUST CAUSE, the U.S military’s succ

operation in 1989 to overthrow Panamanian stron

Manuel Noriega’s regime, demonstrated the strength

weaknesses of the Army’s Cold War force structure. 

CAUSE’s success would seem to suggest a mod

decisive, simultaneous distributed operations. S

judgement, however, obscures the fact that the ope

was the product of a deliberate planning proces

months of preparation, including in-country rehearsa

pre-positioning of selected heavy equipment. Mor

U.S. forces fought against a generally inept foe

possessed neither will nor ideological commitment. 

fact was that most of the Army’s force structure w

heavy to operate on Panama’s primitive roads. As a 

the mechanized elements in this operation possessed 

of the lightest and oldest equipment in the A

inventory: M113A1 Armored Personnel Carrier

M551A1 Sheridan Airborne Armored Reconnais

Vehicles.

4

Similarly, the success of Operations DESERT SH

and DESERT STORM obscured the high risks incur

the initial force deployments and the limited uti

161
American light forces during the Allied offensive again

Iraqi Army in February 1991. The rapid deployment 

82nd Airborne Division may have had conside

deterrence value, but the division possessed limited 

to stop an Iraqi attack of Saudi Arabia. Once 

deployments were complete, offensive operations b

Allies’ conventional heavy forces proved decisive. How

the U.S. Army’s light forces in the theater had less 

due to their limited tactical mobility during fast

offensive operations. They thus received a seco

mission on the western flank of the main operation.

While military operations in Somalia from 1992 t

were significantly different from DESERT STORM, b

mission objectives and deployment, these oper

demonstrated that there is a role for heavy forces in 

operations. Moreover, it underlined that rapid deplo

of such forces is critical, if peace operations le

conventional combat. Similarly, military operatio

Haiti demonstrated that, while existing Ame

conventional heavy force equipment may b

cumbersome for potential third world venues, the co

effect of their presence can make them useful in 

situations.

5

Peacekeeping operations in Bosnia further illum

deployability weaknesses in the Army’s structure. C

heavy equipment and constrained deploy

infrastructures, exacerbated by the challeng

conventional forces executing peacekeeping opera

presented major difficulties to U.S. forces in the Ba

While the initial movement to Bosnia received consid

publicity, problems with the use of Army heavy equi

for a variety of missions received less attention. Even

the Army had to issue additional wheeled tactical ve

to the deployed heavy and light units in order for th

perform their missions better. The provisi

lighter-weight vehicles allowed heavy units to minim

road-damaging movement of M1 Abrams tanks and M

162
Bradley Fighting Vehicles and helped improve the t

mobility of resource-poor light units.

The most recent deployment, the provision of U.S. 

to Kosovo in 2000, confronted similar difficulties

deployment, training, and employment problems of 

Force Hawk,” the Army’s AH-64 “Apache” and M

Launched Rocket System task force, have received 

attention. The initial operations of “Task Force Falco

U.S. component of the Kosovo Force, provide an even 

example of the Army’s limited strategic responsiv

Major infrastructure limitations, coupled with po

decisions not to preposition significant U.S. force

equipment in Macedonia in anticipation of po

operations in Kosovo, resulted in a hastily assemble

force as the initial American component of the Kosovo 

Comprised of selected “Task Force Hawk” compone

Marine Corps Infantry Battalion Landing Tea

airborne infantry battalion from the United State

command and control elements from the U.S. 

Europe’s First Infantry Division, “Task Force F

achieved its missions, but at some initial tactical risk 

its hasty assembly.

6

Future Operational Requirements.

As tumultuous as the last decade has been, the fu

likely to see the Army’s continued involvement in s

operational missions. Faced with a multi-polar and co

environment, the United States will confront chal

from a number of regional competitors. Adaptiv

evolving adversaries will recognize weaknesse

constraints in U.S. capabilities and adjust their meth

develop and leverage short-term advantages again

American vulnerabilities. The Army’s roadmap f

change process, the Transformation Campaign Plan

up the threat in this fashion:

The adaptive and unpredictable nature of the envision

future adversary mandates that the Army have a rap

163
decisive capability to respond across the full spectrum 

operations. The Army’s current capabilities with regard to 

envisioned operational environment clearly indicates that th

is a near-term strategic capabilities gap which impacts on 

ability to provide the NCA [National Command Authority] 

CINCs [Commanders in Chief] the full range of landpo

options necessary to operate in this dynamic secu

environment.

7

Chief of Staff of the Army General Eric Shinsek

Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera further defin

need for change in terms of the broad spectrum of pot

missions and the need for dominance throughou

spectrum of war:

The spectrum of likely operations describes a need for land fo

in joint, combined, and multinational formations for a variet

missions extending from humanitarian assistance and disa

relief to peacekeeping and peacemaking to major theater w

including conflicts involving the potential use of weapon

mass destruction. The Army will be responsive and dominan

every point on that spectrum. We will provide to the Nation 

array of deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable 

sustainable formations, which are affordable and capabl

reversing the conditions of human suffering rapidly 

resolving conflicts decisively. The Army’s deployment is 

surest sign of America’s commitment to accomplishing 

mission that occurs on land.

8

The Army’s experiences over the past decad

challenges of the future underline the need to transfo

Army to correct past deficiencies and meet its curre

anticipated future requirements more effectively.

DEFINITIONS OF KEY TERMS AND PRINCIP

According to General Shinseki, transformation 

process of changing the Army “into a force capa

dominating at every point on the spectrum of opera

The Army’s Transformation Strategy will result 

Objective Force that is more responsive, deployable, 

versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable tha

164
present force.”

9

 Other key requirements for this for

the ability to deploy a combat-capable brigade globall

hours, have a division on the ground in 120 hour

deploy five divisions in theater within 30 days.

1

transformation process supports changing the Arm

the Objective Force, while simultaneously keepi

current forces trained and ready to meet na

requirements at all times.

11

 The Army’s Transform

Strategy, captured in the Transformation Campaign 

tracks the evolution of the three forces that will com

the Army during transformation: the Legacy Forc

Interim Force, and the Objective Force.

The Three Components of the Transforming Fo

The Legacy Force consists of the current heavy an

forces. The Army must continue to support and en

these forces to maintain its combat capabilities a

transformation process evolves. Continued sustai

and modernization of the Legacy Force, along 

recapitalization of selected Legacy Force equipment

as the “Abrams” tank, is critical, as the Legacy Force

. . . will continue to guarantee our nonnegotiable contract w

the American people, to fight and win the nation’s wars, fo

decade or more. The trained and ready Legacy Fo

maintains the credible deterrent that will cause o

adversaries to hesitate before challenging American interes

It keeps open the current window of opportunity to transfo

The Army. Its readiness is indispensable to that enterprise.

The Interim Force will provide an improved capab

meet current and future requirements for worl

operational deployments. The Interim Force will con

six to eight converted heavy and light brigades, depe

on funding, restructured into Interim Brigade C

Teams equipped with off-the-shelf Interim Arm

Vehicles that are significantly lighter and therefore 

strategically deployable than current armored vehicle

first Interim Brigade Combat Team, stationed a

165
Lewis, Washington, will provide the Army wi

immediate, enhanced capability for strategic deploy

Exercises and tests will validate the organizationa

operational model for the Interim Force.

13

 The or

Army plan was to commence Interim Armored V

procurement in 2001 and conduct operat

demonstration of the first Interim Brigade Combat te

2002. However, acquisition and production challenge

delayed the first operational demonstration unt

2003-2004 timeframe.

14

The Interim Brigade Combat Team will 

infantry-heavy organization possessing improved t

mobility and a robust dismounted assault capability. 

motorized infantry battalions, equipped with In

Armored Vehicles, will form the brigade’s pr

maneuver elements. Each infantry battalion will in

three combined-arms infantry company teams. The b

will also include a reconnaissance, surveillance, and 

acquisition squadron, as well as an organic an

company, artillery battalion, engineer company, 

company, military intelligence company, and b

support battalion. The Interim Brigade Combat 

possesses a design that will allow its rapid expansion, 

on mission requirements, through the addition of s

forces, or by augmentation by forces not common 

brigade, such as military police or air defense.

15

State of Army Transformation.

A dedicated research and development effort ov

next decade will aim at satisfying of the req

capabilities of this enhanced force: imp

responsiveness, agility, versatility, deployability, let

survivability, and sustainability. Legacy Force uni

convert directly to the Objective Force design, const

around the capabilities of its primary combat syste

Future Combat System, followed by conversion 

Interim Force which possesses the Interim Ar

166
Vehicle. The current plan sees this conversion as a 1

year process, ending in approximately 2030.

Strategic Responsiveness.

Improved strategic responsiveness is the c

requirement for the Interim Force and the Objective 

as this characteristic will address the key shortcom

the Legacy Force. The June 2000 Draft of Army 

Manual (FM) 3-50, Decisive Force, explains that:

Strategic responsiveness is the ability to establish or reinfo

credible force, when and where required by the joint for

commander (JFC), to maintain peace, deter conflict, or w

war. Army forces meet the goal of strategic responsiveness

they are trained and ready to respond globally with decis

forces capable of executing prompt and sustained operatio

that span the full spectrum of military operations. The Uni

States Army is the world’s premier land force. Retaining t

superiority, however, requires the Army to be strategica

responsive. The Army has to move with a greater velocity a

sustained lethality to continue its role as the guarantor 

victory. The Army must have the capability to maneuv

operationally from strategic distances as part of a joint force 

provide the joint force commander (JFC) the capability 

early and continuous application of interdiction a

maneuver. 16

Key components in this definition are “credible 

the appropriate force needed to accomplish the missio

the inclusion of a range of potential missions that in

“maintain peace, deter conflict, or win war.” The defi

thus underlines the full-spectrum aspect of the miss

other words, strategic responsiveness does not mea

the ability to deploy a small, light force for a peaceke

operation. It must include deployment of a large, 

force necessary to win a major theater war. This defi

highlights the current challenge facing the Army 

respect to strategic responsiveness—the need to 

large forces more quickly with greater lethality

further reinforces the need to transform the Army.

167
The Attributes of a Strategically Responsive F

The Command and General Staff College’s Studen

3-0 Operations (October 2000) discusses seven attr

that strategically responsive forces must po

responsiveness, deployability, agility, versatility, let

survivability, and sustainability.

17

 These attribute

presently driving programmatic and operat

requirements for the redesign of the Army an

accompanying force redesign and doctrinal develo

processes. 

The essence of responsiveness is the ability to dep

right Army forces, to the right place, at the right tim

combination of forward deployed units, forward posi

capabilities, peacetime military engagement, and 

projection can provide the needed capabilitie

responsiveness today and in the future. Training, pla

and preparation for deployment, to include indi

preparation, equipment readiness, and frequent prac

alert and deployment plans and procedures, mus

influence responsiveness.

18

Deployability is a holistic attribute that combin

characteristics of a unit and its equipment with the ph

characteristics of deployment support facilities, plan

transportation modes.

19

 For now and the foreseeable f

Army ground units possess no inherent capabili

strategic deployment—transportation of Army per

and equipment depends on airlift, or sealift provid

other services or commercial sources. The capabili

deployment support facilities and intermediate s

bases, if required, further define force deployability. 

the Army can request acquisition of additional str

airlift and sealift assets and can recommend improve

to strategic deployment support facilities, action i

realm lies within the purview of the other services and 

loses out in annual budget struggles. As a resu

simplest way the Army can improve its stra

deployability is to redesign and re-equip its units to en

168
their inherent deployability, preposition heavy equi

in the vicinity of likely areas of conflict, and base se

units within or in close proximity to potential ar

conflict.

Agility is a tenet of Army operations as well 

attribute of a responsive force. A responsive, agile, f

sustainable and possesses sufficiently tactical mobi

accomplish the mission. However, limitations on str

lift currently compel commanders to balance com

mission requirements and develop compromise solu

Agile commanders and units are capable of transit

between types of operations without loss of mome

Agility is the product of tough, realistic training in dy

environments.

20

Versatility is also a tenet of Army operations

attribute accounts for the requirement for Army for

conduct full spectrum operations with forces appropr

tailored for accomplishment of the specific mi

Versatility also requires that Army force packag

capable of reorganizing and adapting based on cha

missions. Versatility requires that commanders car

tailor and sequence forces during deployment, 

ensuring the presence of necessary command and co

combat, combat support, and combat service support 

to accomplish assigned missions.

21

Army forces combine the elements of combat po

maximize lethality against the enemy. Commanders 

insure deployed Army forces have sufficient combat 

to overwhelm potential adversaries. Commanders 

also balance the ability to mass the effects of lethal c

systems against the requirement to deploy, suppor

sustain the units that employ these systems.

22

 Surviv

combines technology and methods of providing max

protection to Army forces. Survivability can be a func

lethality; lethal forces destroy the enemy before h

strike and can retaliate, if necessary. Depl

169
commanders must integrate sufficient force prot

assets to ensure mission accomplishment.

23

The generation and sustainment of combat po

fundamental to strategic responsiveness. Comma

must reconcile the competing requirements to accom

assigned missions immediately, while also dep

adequate sustainment for extended operat

Commanders must tailor force packages to pr

adequate combat service support, while utilizing 

option to reduce the footprint of these forces.

24

ALTERNATIVE FORCE DESIGNS

There are two major force designs that this chapt

consider that could provide alternatives to the A

current plan for transformation: Colonel Do

Macgregor’s Phalanx and Brigadier General 

Grange’s Air-Mech-Strike Force. These two force d

were selected because the former initiated intense 

debate over the Army’s future force structure, whi

latter appeared after the Army had determined its pa

transformation.

Macgregor’s Phalanx.

Written by a professional soldier during his yea

Military Fellow at the Center for Strategic and 

national Studies, Colonel Macgregor’s Breakin

Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st C

has inspired intense debates on the redesign of the A

His analysis of the role of landpower in joint operatio

resulting recommendations for Army reorganization 

immediately controversial, both in scope and the res

they inspired. Macgregor argued that the Army nee

evolve due to changes in the strategic environment, a

as the necessity of leveraging the technology 

information revolution better and integrating itself 

closely with joint operations. He recommended reorga

the Army into mobile combat groups. These g

170
designed for rapid and decisive action, would th

task-organized, based on the situation, under the com

and control of corps headquarters designated as a 

Task Force Headquarters.

Basing his recommendations on historical analy

the decisive role of landpower in combat and the diffic

achieving revolutionary changes in peac

organizations, Macgregor identified the Army’s 

pressing requirement as the “. . . need to emp

qualitative improvements to compensate for re

numbers of Army ground forces and the need for ada

warfighting structures that can fill a wide range of m

requirements.” 26 Combining this argument w

historical trend toward smaller, more mobile, inte

“all arms” combat formations, Macgregor recommend

formation of four types of 4,000-5,000-man combat g

heavy combat groups, airborne-air assault groups, 

reconnaissance-strike groups, and light reconnais

strike groups.

27

 All combat groups would be self-cont

all-arms, self-supporting organizations, command

brigadier generals.

28

 Macgregor further recommend

formation of additional functional groups to p

operational level support: general support groups, en

support groups, rocket artillery groups, theater 

altitude air defense groups, air defense groups, av

strike groups, aviation support groups, and com

control, communication, computers, and intelligence 

groups.

29

 Under his concept, the entire Army, to in

reserve components, would reorganize into a group

structure. 

The most controversial aspect of Macgre

recommendation was the elimination of the di

command and control echelon, in favor of corps-leve

task force headquarters, that would directly com

assigned groups.

30

 He argued that such an approach 

allow force tailoring without the removal of assigned 

or headquarters from divisions, as occurs today, which 

leaves a division incapable of executing other opera

171
missions.

31

 He further argued that this organization 

prove more capable of rapidly executing operations ba

Joint Intelligence, due to its elimination of a redu

echelon of command, the division headquart

Macgregor also argued that his reorganization 

inherently better prepare the Army for commitmen

would also facilitate a tiered system of rotating read

According to his argument, the combat groups would 

through three 6-months long operational readiness cy

peacetime, enabling one-third of the combat groups 

Continental United States (CONUS) to be availab

worldwide deployment at any time.

33

Macgregor also recommended changes to other a

of the force. He proposed minor adjustments in c

overseas stationing plans, specifically reducing for

Europe and Korea, while increasing forces perma

stationed in the Middle East. He argued that such 

changes would actually increase the overall siz

number of contingency forces available for commitm

wartime theaters.

34

 He further advocated the co-evo

of doctrine with organizational change and incorpora

new technology, as well as more rigorous and dy

training programs.

35

Macgregor concluded that the entire national d

establishment demands transformation. He espe

argued for eliminating redundant service capabilitie

unjustified new weapons systems.

36

 He stresse

importance of revolutionary change for the U.S. Arm

order to deter future aggression, where the strategic 

justify the risks, the United States must be willing an

to respond vigorously with ground forces.

37

 Howev

noted, “attempts to graft large-scale technological c

onto old thinking and old structures can only be a temp

expedient; new capabilities demand their 

organizations and operational culture.”

38

Macgregor’s book inspired immediate and vig

response from many critics. The most common arg

172
challenged his elimination of the divisional eche

command. Critics argued that its elimination would 

potential span of control problems. One critic stress

low probability of getting support for this recommen

“from senior leaders who are well aware of the div

proven flexibility and staying power.”

39

 As antici

many critics focused on the unpopularity of specific ch

for their service or branch, but most concurred wi

argument for the need to think innovatively both o

battlefield and in redesigning the Army.

40

Despite these criticisms, there are many attr

features to Macgregor’s proposals. His small, self-con

combat groups possess inherent responsivenes

deployability, especially in comparison to current 

divisions. The all-arms nature of his groups would en

their agility and versatility, and the modularity of 

design would provide even greater versatility to the 

Task Force Commander, who could construct his g

forces based on a menu of available groups. The c

groups would provide varying lethality and allow 

selection commensurate with potential th

Survivability and sustainability of these organiz

would be inherent in their self-contained, self-supp

design.

Grange’s Air-Mech-Strike Force.

Air-Mech-Strike Force, co-authored in 2000 by r

Brigadier General David Grange, retired Brigadier G

Huba Wass De Czege, Lieutenant Colonel Richa

Liebert (Army Reserve), Major Charles A. Jarnot (

Army), and Mike Sparks (Army National Guard), 

another innovative force design.

41

 Its line of arg

recommended conversion of Army divisions 

organizations more strategically deployable and tac

mobile than current forces. Organizational redesig

incorporation of light mechanized equipmen

commercial all-terrain vehicles would increase str

173
and tactical mobility. According to the author

Air-Mech-Strike concept, “provides a flexible, land c

force with the capability of air, mechanized

dismounted maneuver to achieve decisive action th

positional advantage regardless of open or rest

terrain.”

42

The key component of this concept would be the fi

of medium-weight tracked infantry carriers (modified 

Armored Personnel Carriers—nicknamed Gavin fi

vehicles), the M8 Armored Gun System, lightw

tracked reconnaissance vehicles (modified 4-ton G

Wiesel vehicles—nicknamed Ridgway fighting veh

and commercial all terrain vehicles. The key feature 

Gavin fighting vehicle would be the ability of C

Medium Lift Helicopters to transport it. The Ri

fighting vehicles and all terrain vehicles wou

transportable on commercial cargo aircraft, U.S. Air 

(USAF) strategic and tactical transport aircraft, as w

the Army’s CH47 and UH60 helicopters.

43

Under the Air-Mech-Strike concept, all heavy br

would consist of a Ridgway fighting vehicle and all t

vehicle-equipped reconnaissance troop, a Gavin fi

vehicle mechanized infantry battalion, an M2 B

fighting vehicle mechanized infantry battalion, and 

Abrams tank battalion. This combination of organiz

would allow three-dimensional maneuver within a b

combat team, while retaining a significant direc

combat capability. Light brigades would improve 

tactical mobility by converting one infantry battali

brigade to a Gavin fighting vehicle mechanized in

battalion organization and equipping the remainin

infantry battalions with Ridgway fighting vehicles a

terrain vehicles.

The vigorous exploitation of the restructured 

third dimension of maneuver, the rapid air movem

light mechanized forces, forms the key element 

Air-Mech-Strike operational concept. This new capab

174
strike enemy forces at unexpected times and location

conduct simultaneous attacks throughout the depth 

battlefield, the authors claim, would facilitate the rap

decisive defeat of the enemy.

44

 By converting all 

Army forces in accordance with this concept, every t

Army division could execute the Air-Mech-S

operational concept. In this design, the most sign

enhancements would occur in the Army’s light, air

and air assault divisions due to significant increases i

tactical mobility, survivability, and lethality.

While the conversion of the Army to the Air-Mech-

design would theoretically improve stra

responsiveness, at least in terms of its stra

deployability, the operational impact of convers

currently unknown. An Army converted to the d

presented in Air-Mech-Strike appears to be more 

versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable th

predecessor. However, the operational conce

three-dimensional warfare presented by the auth

Air-Mech-Strike remains unproven, and the lo

immediately changing the organization of the entire 

based on an unproven operational concept is question

Improving the tactical mobility of light infantry 

through the acquisition of light mechanized vehicles a

terrain vehicles does deserve study and han

experimentation. Moreover, analysis and experimen

with the Air-Mech-Strike operational concepts may p

significant insights into concepts applicable to the Obj

Force and could help define required capabilities f

Future Combat System.

CURRENT ACTIONS TO IMPROVE ARMY

STRATEGIC RESPONSIVENESS

The Army, under General Shinseki’s leadersh

already taking steps to improve its stra

responsiveness. The formation of the first redes

Brigade Combat Teams at Fort Lewis, Washin

175
development of the organizational design and opera

concept for the Interim Brigade Combat Team, an

selection of an Interim Armored Vehicle for procur

are important measures to improve stra

responsiveness. Recognizing the complexity of the pro

change, the Army has developed and implemen

Transformation Campaign Plan, a methodolog

managing a 30 year change process. Two actions—the 

of Staff of the Army’s unit manning initiatives an

development of a consolidated unit operational ro

plan—underline the initiation of this process. The

already improving strategic readiness.

The Chief of Staff of the Army’s Unit Manning

Initiative.

The Chief of Staff of the Army’s unit manning init

announced in November 1999, improves the manning 

Army’s primary war-fighting organizations: its activ

divisions and armored cavalry regiments. U

traditional tiered manning schemes where only a se

set of high priority units were fully manned, G

Shinseki directed the manning of active duty division

armored cavalry regiments at 100 percent of 

authorized grades and skill levels. Achieving this obj

will occur in several phases. During Fiscal Year 200

Army goal was to fill the ten active component divisio

the armored cavalry regiments to 100 percent of 

aggregate personnel authorizations. The next step, ta

for second quarter of Fiscal Year 2001, is to fill the 

divisions and armored cavalry regiments to 100 perc

authorizations by skill within three grade bands: 

(junior enlisted soldiers), E5-E6 (junior noncommis

officers), and E7-E9 (senior noncommissioned officers

simple directive has significantly improve

responsiveness of all divisions and armored ca

regiments by ensuring they have adequate person

accomplish peacetime and wartime tasks. Neverth

this initiative is painful to both the institutional arm

176
corps-level and higher units, who have suffered re

manning as a result of the initiative. Cont

implementation of the manning initiative will foc

improved manning of other critical units, su

corps-level field artillery and logistics support units.

Implementation of a Consolidated Operational

Rotation Plan.

The development of a consolidated operational ro

plan has also had a positive impact on the Army’s str

responsiveness, as it provides greater predictabilit

shares the burden of standing operational require

throughout service components. The plan includes ex

operational rotations through June 2005. It ide

specific divisions and corps responsible for providing 

and headquarters for unit rotation to Bosnia-Herzeg

the Kosovo Force, the observer force in the Sina

Operation INTRINSIC ACTION in Southwest Asia

stabilization force rotation, in particular, is unique 

direct incorporation of National Guard unit

headquarters. The implementation of this plan faci

improved strategic responsiveness by providing ad

notice of deployments to units, thus improving unit st

and supporting focused training. This plan also estab

a precedent for expanded use of National Guard un

perform other standing operational requirements

freeing up active duty units for other missions.

47

USAREUR’s Immediate Ready Force.

A new initiative that has directly improved the str

responsiveness of the force has been the creat

additional rapid-response capabilities such as U.S. 

Europe’s (USAREUR) Immediate Ready Force. This f

a battalion-sized force consisting of a heavy company 

equipped with “Abrams” tanks and “Bradley” Fig

Vehicles, a medium-weight mechanized infantry com

equipped with M113A3 armored personnel carrier

177
scout, engineer, military police and communic

platoons, designed for deployment in 24 to 48 hour

notification. The responsibility for providing the Imm

Ready Force rotates every 6 months among USAR

four heavy maneuver brigades. The force is tailorable, 

on the mission, and thus provides the USAR

Commander with a range of force options in a quick-re

scenario. The most likely employment of the Imm

Ready Force is in conjunction with commitment 

Southern European Task Force (SETAF), the U.S. air

infantry brigade combat team, based in Italy. The inc

of a non-standard M113A3-equipped mechanized in

company leverages the in-theater availability of Air 

C-130 airlift and creates a unique, medium-w

mechanized capability in Europe. Deployment 

Immediate Ready Force’s heavy team would re

allocation of USAF C-17s or C5As, strategic airlift a

based in the United States, due the weight of the “Ab

tanks and “Bradley” fighting vehicles.

48

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING

STRATEGIC RESPONSIVENESS

Although the Army has already made the basic de

on the path it will follow for transformation, alternati

more radical transformation designs such as Macgr

Phalanx and the Air-Mech Strike Concept include fe

that could improve the Army’s current and f

readiness. Features that deserve study for inclusion 

present plan for transformation could inclu

Army-wide rotating unit readiness system, increased 

reserve units for long-term operational requirem

adjustments in unit stationing, and tactical mo

enhancements for light forces.

An Army-Wide Rotating Unit Readiness System

As discussed earlier, the execution of a centralized 

operational deployment plan would have positive imp

178
the Army’s strategic responsiveness, as it would r

active unit commitments, provide increased tra

predictability, and directly improve stability and tra

The continued use of centralized scheduling for opera

deployments, in coordination with the centrally ma

rotating unit readiness system urged by Macgregor, 

have an even greater impact by improving the A

overall strategic responsiveness.

An Army-wide rotational unit readiness plan 

existing active duty organizations could parallel rota

readiness systems currently utilized by every other b

of military service.

49

 Macgregor bases his rotational p

his combat groups. A similar rotating readiness plan 

Army today would depend on divisions, since cu

brigades are neither self-contained, nor self-supp

organizations. Analysis of the forces in today’s 

indicates that the active army possesses a total of 3

Infantry or heavy brigade-size units, ten div

headquarters, and four corps headquarters. Six of 

brigades are not available because of other commitm

such as general strategic commitments (the 75th R

Regiment), ceremonial duty (the 3rd Inf

Regiment—the Old Guard), operational missions in 

(one heavy brigade and one light brigade), and the on

Interim Brigade Combat Team conversions at Fort 

(one heavy brigade and one light brigade). Similarl

division headquarters (the 2d Infantry Divisi

unavailable due to its operational missions in Korea a

corps headquarters (I Corps) is unavailable due to re

manning authorizations. This leaves a total of 29 br

(15 heavy brigades, 12 light brigades, 1 armored c

regiment, and 1 light armored cavalry regiment)

division headquarters (five heavy divisions and fou

divisions), and three corps headquarters availab

incorporation in the rotating force readiness system.

Macgregor proposed an 18-months readiness 

starting with a 6-months training cycle, followed 

6-months ready cycle, followed by a 6-months reconsti

179
cycle. During the training cycle, units would co

collective training, to include a Combat Training C

rotation, while higher headquarters would cond

simulation exercise, all in direct preparation for tran

to the highest readiness cycle, the ready cycle. Durin

second cycle, units would maintain their individua

collective training proficiency and serve as the A

primary designated crisis response forces. After 6 mon

duty in the ready cycle, units would then move 

reconstitution cycle, where they conduct indiv

replacement, education, leave, changes of comman

other necessary actions prior to starting the training 

once again.

This model of rotating readiness is applicable to th

of available units in several different fashions. Based 

available number of units, the Army could have a 

headquarters, three division headquarters, a

combination of nine light infantry and heavy briga

each cycle. The simplest rotational system would be 

existing unit assignments and corps structures as m

possible (see Table 1). For example, if III Corps we

training cycle corps headquarters, it could command t

Infantry, 1st Cavalry, and 25th Infantry Div

headquarters and combat brigades from all three div

augmented with brigades from the 101st Air Assau

82nd Airborne Divisions. Similarly, if the U.S. 

Europe’s V Corps were the ready cycle corps headqua

the ready corps could consist of the 1st Infantry Di

(Mechanized), 1st Armored Division, and 10th Mou

Division headquarters and combat brigades cur

assigned to the divisions, along with the 187th Air

Brigade, which would provide forced entry capa

Forces in the reconstitution cycle would be the X

Airborne Corps Headquarters, 3rd Infantry Di

(Mechanized), 82nd Airborne, and 101st Air A

Division Headquarters, heavy brigades from the 3r

4th Infantry Divisions (Mechanized), the 3rd Ar

Cavalry Regiment, and light brigades from the 

180
Airborne and 101st Air Assault Divisions. The gr

difficulties with such a pattern of readiness would be 

would maximize the demand for local training res

within a narrow band in time and rigidly perpetuate c

relationships without using the potential capabilitie

broad pool of available units.

181

Organization/

Cycle

Training Cycle Ready Cycle

Reconst

Cycle

Corps

Headquarters

III Corps V Corps XVIII Abn 

Division

Headquarters

4th ID(M) 1st ID(M) 3d ID(M)

Division

Headquarters

1st Cav 1st AD 82d Abn D

Division

Headquarters

25th ID(L) 10th Mtn Div 101st AA 

Heavy Brigade 1/4th ID 1/1st ID 1/3d ID

Heavy Brigade 2/4th ID 2/1st ID 2/3d ID

Heavy Brigade 1/1st Cav 3/1st ID 3/3d ID

Heavy Brigade 2/1st Cav 1/1st AD 3/4th ID

Heavy Brigade 3/1st Cav 2/1st AD 3d ACR

Light Brigade 1/25th ID 1/10th MD 1/82d Abn

Light Brigade 2/25th ID 2/10th MD 2/82d Abn

Light Brigade 3/101AA 3/10th MD 1/101 AA

Light Brigade 3/82d Abn 187th Abn 2/101AA

Note: This leaves 2 Brigades unassigned plus 2 converting to IBCT

 Table 1. Readiness Cycles with Traditio

Unit Alignments.
An alternative example of unit readiness rot

might spread brigades in a division across the v

readiness cycles, thus minimizing competition for tr

resources and supporting training priority rotation sc

already followed internally in most divisions, at le

those divisions stationed in the United States (see Ta

While this rotational readiness scheme wou

theoretically more efficient in utilization of ava

training resources than one based on traditiona

relationships, the complexity of command and contr

182

Organization/

Cycle

Training Cycle Ready Cycle

Reconsti

Cycle

Corps

Headquarters

III Corps V Corps XVIII Abn 

Division

Headquarters

4th ID(M) 1st ID(M) 3rd ID(M)

Division

Headquarters

101st AA Div 10th Mtn Div 82nd Abn 

Division

Headquarters

25th ID 1st Cav 1st AD

Heavy Brigade 1/4th ID 2/4th ID 3/4th ID

Heavy Brigade 2/1st ID 1/1st ID 3/1st ID

Heavy Brigade 3/3d ID 2/3rd ID 1/3d ID

Heavy Brigade 1/1st Cav 2/1st Cav 3/1st Cav

Heavy Brigade 3d ACR 1/1st AD 2/1st AD

Light Brigade 1/25th ID 2/25th ID 1/82d Abn

Light Brigade 2/82d Abn 3/82d Abn 2/101st AA

Light Brigade 1/101st AA 3/101st AA 187th Abn

Light Brigade 2/10th Mtn 1/10th Mtn 3/10th MD

Note: This leaves 2 Brigades unassigned plus 2 converting to IBCT

Table 2. Readiness Cycles with Nontraditi

Unit Alignments.
support relationships would limit its utility. S

readiness scheme could only work if the Army w

restructure brigades to be more independent, self-con

organizations, and if division and corps headquarter

more generic in capability. This alternative would p

enhanced efficiency, as well as the benefits of the imp

unit and headquarters self-sufficiency and modula

advantages worth considering in the transformation 

force—especially with respect to improving the str

responsiveness of the legacy forces over the next 30 y

Improving Light Force Tactical Mobility.

Macgregor’s and Grange’s proposals also addre

question of improving the tactical mobility of light for

Macgregor’s model, light forces are multipurpose 

capable of airborne or air-assault forced entry. 

committed, Macgregor sees Army helicopters a

primary provider of light unit mobility on the battl

The Air-Mech-Strike concept improves light unit ta

mobility by fielding additional light mechanize

wheeled vehicles to all light infantry units. While ligh

selected for conversion to the Interim Brigade C

Team design will also have increased tactical mobilit

the Interim Armored Vehicle, current plans fail to p

legacy force light-infantry units not converted 

enhancements to their tactical mobility. This defi

demands further study and experimentation

Air-Mech-Strike concept proposes several metho

improve light infantry tactical mobility.

Increased Utilization of Reserve Component U

Both Macgregor and Grange note that the conver

reserve units is a more complex issue than that of 

duty units for political and operational reasons

increased use of reserve component units to pe

long-term deployment requirements could further r

the burden on over-taxed active units and would offer 

183
as well as indirect benefits to the reserves. By perfo

long-notice operational missions, reserve component 

could demonstrate their contribution to the maintena

national defense. Performing such deployments, 

feature adequate time for member notificatio

individual and unit preparation, would demonstra

strengths of the reserve component with mi

degradation to mission performance. The Texas Na

Guard’s 49th Armored Division’s recent missi

Bosnia-Herzegovina has already demonstrated this a

Increased use of reserve component units to perform 

long-term operational requirements, such as the K

and multinational observer missions, would further r

active duty unit operational deployment requiremen

allow active duty units to focus on training and prepa

for no-notice deployments, a major improvement 

army’s strategic responsiveness. Nevertheless, 

increased use of reserve forces carries with it the heigh

difficulty of attracting and maintaining soldiers in r

units.

Adjusting Unit Stationing.

Minor stationing adjustments could also contrib

improved strategic responsiveness. While fu

reductions in Army components in Europe and Kore

be difficult because of treaty obligations, such actions 

increase the size of contingency forces in the United S

Furthermore, the permanent stationing of a heavy b

in the Middle East, as Macgregor recommends, has 

strategic utility. A permanent force would provide inc

deterrence with its increase in combat power compa

current rotating forces. Moreover, the removal 

“Intrinsic Action” unit operational deployment requir

would eliminate turbulence created by current ro

cycles. Conversion of at least one Europe-based 

brigade to the Interim Armored Vehicle-equipped In

Brigade Combat Team design is also wort

consideration. A forward-stationed Interim Br

184
Combat Team would then be immediately available f

in the European Command’s area of responsibility, f

reducing strategic lift requirements.

IBCT Conversion Decisions.

The Army should also consider creating a fl

prepositioned set of Interim Brigade Combat 

equipment. While it is difficult to predict where a cris

occur and the Army cannot afford multiple sets of In

Brigade Combat Team equipment scattered acro

world, the creation of even a single floating Interim B

Combat Team equipment set would improve str

responsiveness. Deployment of a floating set to likely 

of conflict would signal U.S. intentions, as well as fac

rapid deployment of an Interim Brigade Combat Team

greatest value of a floating Interim Brigade Combat 

however, would lie in a situation where the Army 

deploy multiple brigades. In a future Balkan cris

example, the combination of a self-deploying Europe

Interim Brigade Combat Team, a floating Interim B

Combat Team set linked with personnel airlifted to E

coupled with deployment of a third Interim Brigade C

Team by USAF strategic airlift, would enable the 

arrival and commitment of a division-size force, pe

even within General Shinseki’s 120-hour deploymen

for a division.

Consideration of the issues involved in the station

Interim Brigade Combat Teams, prepositioned equip

and the role of Reserve Components has direct imp

fielding/conversion decisions. Table 3 presents a conv

and stationing recommendation, based on issue

recommendations previously discussed. The firs

Interim Brigade Combat Team conversions refle

ongoing conversion of two brigades at Fort Lewis.

5

chapter does not recommend any changes to 

conversions due to the adverse impact that changes 

current conversion schedule would have on o

185
momentum of transformation. The selection of an 

Coast-based brigade for the third brigade for conv

would result in a pool of three CONUS-based In

Brigade Combat Teams. This would facilitate a rota

readiness plan incorporating the three Interim B

Combat Teams and utilize strategic deployment pla

on both U.S. coasts. Creation of the fourth Interim B

Combat Team from a European-based brigade would 

an improved capability for strategic responsiveness w

that theater and would support the constant availab

an Interim battalion-size ready force in Europe. Final

use of the fifth set of equipment to create an floating 

prepositioned equipment would provide a capabi

preposition equipment in the proximity of a likely the

employment and provide the nation’s leaders wi

additional tool for deterrence, while supporting 

strategic deployment of forces by a variety of means.

186

IBCT #1: Heavy Brigade, Fort Lewis, WA

IBCT #2: Light Brigade, Fort Lewis, WA

IBCT #3: Light Brigade, Fort Drum, NY

IBCT #4: Heavy Brigade, Europe 

IBCT #5: Prepositioned equipment set, floating

IBCT #6: Light Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort 

 (if funded)

IBCT #7: Light Brigade, Fort Drum, NY (if funde

IBCT #8: Air Assault Brigade, Fort Campbell, K

 or prepositioned equipment set, floatin

 (if funded)

Table 3. Proposed IBCT Conversions

and Locations.
If congressional funding supports convers

additional Interim Brigade Combat Teams, convers

the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment to a structure sim

that of the Interim Brigade Combat Team would p

additional flexibility due to its ability to ex

economy-of-force missions and the inherent 

supportability of its component Armored Ca

Squadrons. Conversion of an additional brigade a

Drum would create the first division composed of In

Brigade Combat Teams and provide an ideal opportun

experimentation with such an organization, as w

further expanding the readiness pool of ava

CONUS-based Interim Brigade Combat Teams. Sel

an air assault brigade from the 101st Air Assault Divi

Fort Campbell for the next conversion would su

experimentation within a different type of divisio

assault) and further expand the Interim Brigade C

Team readiness pool. As an alternative, creation 

additional floating set of equipment would allo

positioning of floating sets of equipment in two pot

areas of conflict, or the staging of two floating In

Brigade Combat Team sets in a single potential a

conflict, further improving strategic responsiveness.

This recommendation does not include the conver

any reserve component brigades to the Interim B

Combat Team structure, as such a move woul

appreciably improve Army responsiveness. Unt

deployment readiness of a converted reserve comp

brigade changes to match that of any active comp

Interim Brigade Combat Team in the pool of ava

brigades, diversion of Interim Brigade Combat 

equipment to the reserves does little to improve o

responsiveness. Reserve component units would find 

use during Army’s transformation by performing 

lead-time operational requirements such as stabili

force and Kosovo Force rotations and providing temp

augmentation, when Joint Strategic Capabi

187
Plan-apportioned forces are unavailable due to on

conversion to the Interim Brigade Combat Team des

CONCLUSION

The Army’s transformation process has the poten

correct short-term deficiencies and will fundame

change the Army in the long term. This process, guid

the Transformation Campaign Plan, must be dyn

reflecting funding realities, experimental results, on

lessons learned, and emerging joint warfighting con

In addition, the process must address all components 

Army to ensure that improvements in overall str

responsiveness occur throughout the service, not just 

Interim Force or the Active Component. Althoug

addressed in this chapter, evolving training and doc

issues caused by Army transformation are not trivia

Army will have to wrestle with the employment of v

combinations of forces and changing conflict scenario

these issues must also play a role in transformation.

As this chapter suggests, there are a number of o

the Army should consider in improving its str

responsiveness. While the exact plan selecte

transformation is not as radical as some alternatives

as Macgregor’s Phalanx and Grange’s Air-Mech-

concepts, the Army Transformation Campaign Plan 

allow the Army to move forward in a process tha

simultaneously address short-term responsiv

deficiencies and lead to better determination of ho

Army will fight in the future. The selected path also ap

to have sufficient flexibility to allow incorporat

selected components from alternate transform

proposals. For example, a rotational readiness schem

incorporates centralized management of opera

requirements and increased utilization of the re

components offers the potential to improve the entire 

strategic readiness. Decisions about Interim Br

Combat Team conversion and the creation of a fl

188
Interim Brigade Combat Team equipment set coul

have a positive impact on force readiness. Regard

which decisions the Army’s leadership renders, execu

Army Transformation is a necessity. Accomplishm

any step of the process—even the creation of only a 

Interim Brigade Combat Team—will significantly im

the Army’s current strategic responsiveness.

Improving the Army’s future strategic responsive

a greater challenge, due to the difficulties involv

accurately predicting future threats and the 

requirement for ever more tightly linked and inte

joint operations. Because future joint warfighting co

are still emerging at the same time the Army’s 

systems drift into obsolescence, the Army confro

conundrum—force modernization decisions must oc

the near term—perhaps even before joint warfig

concepts develop sufficiently to provide guidance fo

modernization decisions. The greatest value the A

Objective Force concept could provide is its potential 

forcing the rapid resolution and detailed definition of 

joint warfighting concepts and requirements. The dan

proceeding with Objective Force development with

better view of the future joint fight is that the Army 

potentially develop the wrong Objective Force, pe

fitting Army requirements, while not meshing wel

future joint warfighting concepts.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6

1. James Dubik, “ICBT at Fort Lewis,” Military R

September-October 2000, pp. 17-23; Steven Lee Myers, “

Armored Vehicles are Already Behind Schedule,” New York 

November 18, 2000, p. A-10.

2. In January 2001, the Army’s Training and Doctrine Co

issued a briefing slide package and a paper that presen

“Foundations of Transformation” and the current version 

Objective Force Concept.” These two documents discuss futu

operational requirements, present objective force key oper

concepts derived from future joint requirements, and present an 

189
set of required capabilities for the Objective Force. The r

capabilities list is, however, still general and provides limited d

the future force’s specific organizations, equipment, and op

characteristics. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Comman

Foundations of Army Transformation and the Objective Force Co

January 17, 2001, Final Draft, and “The Objective Force: Founda

Transformation and the Objective Force Concept,” Briefing 

January 24, 2001, version.

3. U.S. Army, “Transformation Campaign Plan” (Pre-de

Final Coordination Draft), October 27, 2000.

4. By 1997, both mechanized units utilized in this opera

longer existed. The M551A1 battalion at Fort Bragg, North C

the 3rd Battalion, 73rd Armor (Airborne), was deactivated 

cancellation of procurement of the Armored Gun System (AG

designated replacement vehicle for the obsolete M551A1, and 

Infantry Division at Fort Polk, Louisiana, was relocated to F

Texas, and converted to an M1 tank and M2/M3 Bradley F

Vehicle organization.

5. Elements of the 3d Battalion, 73d Armor (Airborne

deployed to Haiti in 1995 for 30 days to provide additiona

firepower to the Army forces there and to enhance security of s

facilities.

6. Dennis Steele, “The Army Magazine Hooah Guide to 

Transformation: A 30-Minute Course on the Army’s 30-Year Ove

Army Magazine, February 2001, p. 33.

7. “Transformation Campaign Plan.”

8. Louis Caldera and Eric K. Shinseki, “Army Vision: Sold

Point for the Nation . . . Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War,” M

Review, September-October 2000, p. 3.

9. Eric K. Shinseki, “The Army Transformation: A H

Opportunity,” Army Magazine, October 2000, p. 28.

10. Ibid.

11. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on 

Services, “Statement of the Fiscal Year 2001 Budget and Postur

United States Army by General Eric K. Shinseki, Chief of Staff, 

States Army,” 106th Cong., 2nd Sess., February 10, 2000, p. 12

12. Ibid.

190
13. Ibid.

14. Myers, “Army’s Armored Vehicles are Already 

Schedule,” p. A-10.

15. Dubik, “ICBT at Fort Lewis,” p. 21. The organizati

capabilities of the IBCT are reviewed in greater detail in U.S

Training and Doctrine Command, “The Interim Brigade Comba

Organizational and Operational Concept, Version 4.0,” April 1

pp. 8-19.

16. Department of the Army, “Decisive Force: The Army in T

Operations,” Field Manual 3-50 (100-7), First Draft, July 2000, p

17. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, “Oper

ST 3-0, Fort Leavenworth, KS, U.S. Army Command and Gener

College, October 1, 2000, p. 3-2. This document is the curren

version of the replacement for Army FM 100-5, “Operations.”

18. Ibid., p. 3-3.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., p. 3-4.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., p. 3-5.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Douglas A. Macgregor, Breaking the Phalanx: A New De

Landpower in the 21st Century, Westport, CT, 1997, p. xv.

26. Ibid., p. 52.

27. Ibid., p. 53. The heavy combat group is designed to 

decisive offensive and defensive maneuver operations and cons

reconnaissance squadron, three balanced combined arms battal

indirect fire battalion, a command/control/communic

computers/intelligence (C4I) battalion and a group support ba

The airborne-air assault group is designed to be air-delivered in 

conduct forced entry operations, close and deep economy o

operations in support of decisive operations, contingency ope

and operations other than war as needed. In order to conduct it

191
entry and deep economy of force operations, the airborne-air 

group consists of three airborne-air assault infantry battalions

attack squadron, three helicopter assault battalions, an indir

battalion, a C4I battalion, and a group support battalion. Th

recon-strike group is designed to conduct close and deep econ

force maneuver operations in support of the joint task forc

mission and security missions (guard, screen, cover) to protect t

The heavy recon-strike group is assigned three heavy reconna

squadrons, an air attack squadron, an indirect fire battalion, 

support squadron, and a C4I squadron. The light recon-strike g

designed to be air-deliverable and conducts close and deep econ

force maneuver operations, forced entry operations, conti

operations, and OOTW as needed. The light recon-strike g

equipped with three light reconnaissance squadrons, an air 

squadron, a combat engineer mobility battalion, a group 

squadron, and a C4I squadron.

28. Ibid., pp. 75-82.

29. Ibid., pp. 82-83.

30. Ibid., p. 84.

31. Ibid., p. 85.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid., p. 152.

34. Ibid., p. 155.

35. Ibid., pp. 143, 165.

36. Ibid., pp. 212-213. Macgregor argues that the Army’s “Cr

artillery system, the Navy’s F/A-18 E/F aircraft, the Air Force

aircraft, the Marine Corps’ V-22 “Osprey” aircraft, and its Ad

Amphibious Assault Vehicle should all be either reduced or can

37. Ibid., p. 226.

38 Ibid., p. 227.

39. Richard D. Hooker, Jr., “Breaking the Phalanx,” Nav

College Review, Summer 1998, p.143.

40. In two subsequent, but related, journal articles, Ma

specifically addressed the relationship between transformin

192
warfighting and transforming the Army. In “Transformation 

Illusion of Change,” National Security Studies Quarterly, Autum

p. 112, he explains that “. . . transformation means effectively com

and integrating service capabilities with new joint oper

structures.” The flaw in the Army’s transformation plans, he con

is that it is not occurring within a joint transformation p

Macgregor continues his argument in “Joint Operational Archi

The Key to Transformation,”Strategic Review, Fall 2000, p. 35. H

that development of a new joint operational architecture woul

better definition of the Army’s Objective Force and could accele

development.

41. David L Grange, Huba Wass de Czege, Richard D. 

Charles A. Jarnot, and Mike Sparks, Air-Mech-Strike: 3-Dime

Phalanx, Paducah, 2000, p. 1.

42. Ibid., pp.19-20.

43. Ibid., p. 31.

44. Ibid., pp. 27-28.

45. One critic, Lieutenant Colonel Steve Eden, writing in 

noted that, as intriguing as Grange’s notions are, the Air-Mech 

proposal is significantly limited by the poor quality of the prese

of its concepts, limited discussion of logistics and tactics, and the 

a coherent justification for the need for this radical reorgan

Lieutenant Colonel Steve Eden, “Air-Mech Strike Force Propo

Questions Persist,” Armor, March-April 2001, p. 48.

46. U.S. Army, “Army Begins Manning Initiatives,” U.S

Press Release #99-107, November 8, 1999.

47. Association of the United States Army, “Army Sets 

Balkan Rotation,” AUSA News, January 2001, p. 1.

48. Sean Naylor, “Ready—and Waiting,” Army Times, Nove

2000, p. 18.

49. Examples are the Air Force’s Air Expeditionary Wing c

Navy carrier battle group and submarine deployment scheduli

Marine Corps Marine Expeditionary Brigade and M

Expeditionary Unit deployment rotations.

50. A March 5, 2001, Army Times article, citing anonymou

Army officials, stated that the next two interim brigades (conv

number three and four) would probably be stationed in Haw

193
Alaska. The article also stated that the fifth converting brigade w

a National Guard heavy brigade. According to the article, the p

logic for the selection of the third and fourth interim brigades w

availability of support infrastructures, proximity of Air Force bas

the adequacy of existing training facilities in Alaska and 

Supporting reasons for these selections included an emerging 

national strategic emphasis from Europe to the Far East and th

to retain existing heavy forces for use if a major war occurs 

fielding of the Objective Force. The article concluded that 

Armored Cavalry Regiment was a candidate for the sixth 

brigade. However, as of April 8, 2001, the contents of this article 

been publicly confirmed by Army sources. Sean Naylor, “Pacific 

Army Times, March 5, 2001, p. 8.

194
CHAPTER 7

ADAPTIVE TRANSFORMATION MODE

A BRANCH TO THE ARMY

 TRANSFORMATION CAMPAIGN PLAN

Michael J. McMahon

Change is the law of life. And those that only look to the past 

the present are certain to miss the future.

President John F. Kennedy, January 25, 1

The U.S. armed forces have served our n

exceptionally well for over 225 years in war and in 

The citizens of the United States can rest every night 

the blanket of security provided by their soldiers, s

airmen, and Marines. In nearly every conflict in whic

have participated, U.S. armed forces have succes

defended the national interests, while demonstrati

ability to adapt to the realities they faced. At pres

seems unlikely that the United States will confront a 

challenger to the position of world hegemon. Howev

world is a changing place. The world of 2020 and beyon

present the United States and its armed forces w

different set of challenges than those of today. Thu

nation and its military must prepare for the future. 

common wisdom posits, the future is full of uncert

Thomas Hobbes said, “no man can have in his m

conception of the future, for it is not yet.”

1

Though one cannot know the future, there are 

reasonable assumptions one can make. There are 

aspects of the global environment of 2020 tha

particularly relevant to military strategists who will 

and prepare U.S. armed forces for future challenges. 

it is certain that the United States will continue to 

global interests and will therefore find itself engage

its world partners in a more complex environmen

195
second key aspect of the future environment is 

globalization will result in greater distribution o

access to, technology and commercial products, to i

militarily relevant technology and products. This 

that the United States will find it increasingly diffi

maintain a lasting technological edge over its pot

adversaries. Third, due to the increased ope

facilitated by globalization, as well as an increasing in

in the continuation (or discontinuation) of the 

hegemony, Americans can expect potential adversa

observe the U.S. military and adapt their capabilitie

operational concepts as the U.S. forces transform. 

adaptations will be rapid and varied, most likely res

in a proliferation of asymmetric approaches.

ARMY TRANSFORMATION

Given the changes to the global environment, th

military must adapt to meet the requirements 

changing strategic environment. The Army, spurred 

poor showing during the Kosovo crisis in 1999

developed a plan to transform itself into a more re

force. Recognizing the need to deploy sufficient force 

rapidly as the key to early prevention or resolut

conflicts, the Army Transformation Campaign 

addresses current vulnerabilities and limita

particularly in the area of force projection. In October 

the Army Chief of Staff charged the Army establis

with developing a future force that would be 

responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survi

and sustainable than current forces. Though the trad

Army approach has been one of incremental chan

minor improvements, the Army’s Chief of Staff has 

for a radical transformation. The challenge for the 

however, is that no one will relieve it of the responsib

defend the nation’s interests while under

transformation. Thus, the Army seeks a ra

transformation, but at the same time it must mainta

ability to respond to the requirements of the dynamic 

196
environment. To meet these complex requirement

Army transformation strategy attempts to balan

near-, mid-, and long-term needs through a three-pr

campaign.

The first axis of the Army Transformation Cam

Plan maintains and upgrades current forces (the L

Force) to retain the Army’s readiness to support the re

command requirements. (See Figure 1.) Second, the 

will rapidly develop several Interim Brigades, whic

address the critical need for rapid deployment. 

brigades will take advantage of lighter platforms and 

integrated organizations to provide forces that can r

deploy and are more easily sustained than current 

forces. But the brigades will also remain sufficiently 

to accomplish most of the tasks required of Army force

third axis of the campaign plan is development 

197

THE ARMY TRANSFORMATION CAMPAIGN P

Legacy

Force

Objective

Force

Interim

Force

2000 First

Interim

BCT

Tech

Solutions

2003 First Unit

Equipped

Objective

Figure 1. Army Transformation Campaign 
Objective Force—that force that will be in existence a

through the first half of this century. It will be a 

radically different from the Legacy Force in all asp

Doctrine, Training, Organization, Leader Develop

Materiel, and Soldiers. Current plans are for the Obj

Force to begin fielding in 2008, with completion by 

This timeline requires a decision in 2003 as to 

technologies the Army will pursue through researc

development, in order to meet fielding dates.

THE CHALLENGE

There are several challenges to the A

transformation strategy. First, there is some in

opposition, particularly from the armor community, 

holds that the envisioned Objective Force will lack suf

“punch” to be decisive. Furthermore, the Army lack

$130 billion that it needs for the transformation, t

cancellation of a number of programs could reduc

total. Finally, development of critical materiel fo

Objective Force relies on several technolo

breakthroughs that many scientists doubt will occur 

near future.

In developing its transformation strategy, the 

must ensure that it does not focus too heavily on tech

itself. It will simultaneously develop the doctrin

training strategies, build organizational framework

educate future leaders to deal with the complexitie

will face. This parallel and interrelated develo

process is termed spiral development, and should pro

more rapid force development cycle than tradi

sequential force development models.

The Army may eventually convince its int

opponents that its Chief of Staff, General Eric Shins

on the right track, and it may also work through bud

constraints. However, a fundamental challenge 

transformation strategy has to do with the abi

scientists to achieve the breakthroughs in technolog

198
will lead to the development of the systems required 

Objective Force. The reality is that while technolog

science are in the midst of radical breakthroughs 

electronics field, the scientific breakthroughs that 

allow the Army to change its weapons platforms rad

are not so far along.

Common wisdom is that the U.S. military may be 

midst of a revolution in military affairs (RMA). How

that revolution actually comprises two sub-revolution

of which is already here, and the second of whic

technology can not yet support. The first revolution re

information technologies, which allow the U.S. forces 

sensors, decisionmaking processes, and weapons 

system of systems, a major stride in information dom

and an opening of the door to decision superiority.

The second RMA has two axes. First, techno

advances in nanotechnology, composite materials, fu

propulsion systems, laser and other nonexplosive we

systems, along with continued advances in electronic

allow development of lighter but more protected and 

weapons systems and platforms, and provide 

capabilities envisioned for the Objective Force. (see F

2.) The other axis of this second RMA include

counter-capabilities and concepts that will emerge a

the systems developed through the first revolut

technology. Obviously, military planners will have t

with these challenges as they develop future force

operational concepts, preferably by anticipating po

enemy adaptations. The real RMA will result f

synthesis of the two RMAs discussed above.

2

The challenge for the Army is that there is virtua

possibility that the technologies for the second RMA w

available before the 2003 Objective Force techn

decision point. Indeed, there is little likelihood that t

desired capabilities will be available before 2010. The 

then is either to delay the decision (and the res

fielding of the forces) until the desired technologies b

199
available, or to continue development (and fielding) 

than desired capabilities. Obviously, neither of 

alternatives is desirable, nor acceptable withi

framework of the Army Chief of Staff’s visio

transformation. The developers of Joint Vision 

realized this eventuality as they argued that the mov

toward the 2020 force would have to be evolutionary. “

on the joint vision implementation program, 

capabilities will be operational well before 2020, 

others will continue to be explored and developed th

exercises and experimentation.”

3

A PROPOSED SOLUTION

Though the Army Transformation Strategy is c

moving in the right direction—the transformation to 

that is relevant to the changing strategic environmen

potential exists that it can become untracked

deviation may result from internal bureau

dysfunctions; it may come from budgetary challenges

almost certainly will result from technological limitat

200

RMA #1

Information-Based

RMA #2

MILITARY REVOLUTION

Figure 2. Two-Staged RMA.
meeting the optimistic timelines. The Army transform

strategy should include measures to alleviate the ful

of such challenges. Army planners can develop 

measures as branches to the current strategy, in or

provide the Army with alternatives to either postponi

Objective Force or selecting a less-than-desired 

capability. This chapter will discuss a possible branch 

current Army Transformation Strategy that would 

the Army to transform itself radically in an iterativ

while maintaining continual relevance in the dy

global environment.

As stated above, it is likely that America’s pot

adversaries will adapt their strategies, military force

operational concepts more rapidly than in the past. 

the future will become a struggle between adversa

terms of the pace of adaptation. The fundamental 

which the U.S. Army’s future strategy stands is th

organization must adapt rapidly, particularly relativ

potential adversaries. As one commentator notes, ". 

corollary to Newton’s fundamental law of physics res

with a sense of urgency—every technical or ta

innovation that provides a dominant military adva

eventually yields to a countervailing response that 

the advantages to the opposing force.”

4

The Army must close the gap between the develo

of new technologies and new ideas on how to fight, and 

absorption into doctrine. Return to Hobbes’ Leviatha

minute: “no man can have in his mind a conception 

future, for it is not yet.” As the future is inhe

uncertain, planners can not hope to be exactly right in 

forecasts. Nor is it likely that whatever force the 

develops for the future will be exactly the right one. Bu

is not really what is critical. What is important is th

Army is not so far wrong that it can not adapt to reali

the future becomes the present. As Michael H

suggests,

201
I am tempted to declare dogmatically that whatever doctr

the armed forces are working on now, they have got it wron

am also tempted to declare that it does not matter that they 

it wrong. What does matter is their capability to get it r

quickly when the moment arrives...it is the task of milit

science in an age of peace to prevent the doctrine from being 

badly wrong.

5

How does the Army best develop itself so that 

rapidly adapt to “what is right”? There are two ways. 

it can not afford to be too wrong, so it must develop it

in such a way that it continually adapts to the prese

better, to the foreseeable future. Second, the Army 

develop as an institution so that it can rapidly adapt 

realities of the near-future when required. The 

strength of the United States during two world wars, a

as the Cold War, was that it could mobilize its 

economy and innovative minds to develop the mea

decisive victory. However, it took years in each 

Forecasts of the future suggest that there will not be 

time to adapt. So, the organization’s responsiveness 

be faster. The greatest strategic requirement 

transformation, then, is to be able to adapt rapidly—

rapidly than potential adversaries.

In developing the Interim Brigades, the Army is n

the process of fielding two Initial Brigade Combat T

with two purposes. First, these brigades will p

responsive Army forces to combat commands with

next few years. Secondly, and more critical to the is

hand, they will provide the experimental bas

development of the Interim Brigades and the f

Objective Force. In this light, the greatest value 

Initial Brigade Combat Teams is that they are forci

Army to think and explore—potentially wi

institutional constraint. This exploration is not o

Doctrine, Training, Organization, Leader Develop

Materiel, and Soldier Development, but al

transformation of the Army’s institutional practic

development of new forces and ideas.

202
The goal of spiral development is to develop all asp

Doctrine, Training, Organization, Leader Develop

Materiel, and Soldiers simultaneously in order to spe

the overall processes of development, and field forces 

rapidly than under the old sequential develop

approach. In essence, the Initial Brigade Combat Tea

living example of spiral development, as 

simultaneously developing all aspects of Doc

Training, Organization, Leader Development, Ma

and Soldiers. The thesis of this chapter is that the A

transformation should follow a never-ending 

process—one that would allow it to adapt on a con

basis to the global environment, while taking advant

emerging technologies and ideas. Thus, the Objective 

should represent a journey, not an end state.

THE ADAPTIVE TRANSFORMATION MODEL

This proposed model attempts to address the chal

confronting the Army’s current transformation str

while maintaining Genral Shinseki’s vision. It 

adaptive strategy that follows an essentially evolut

track towards revolutionary changes in the A

capabilities and way of fighting. It would also mainta

capability to insert revolutionary potential at any 

along the track.

As described in the Army’s Transformation Cam

Plan, Army forces will fall into two categories. The fir

be units of employment, essentially division and 

structures, which will serve as higher headquarters i

operations. These headquarters will act as an 

component or as a Joint Task Force headquarters

augmentation as necessary. The other type of 

elements will be units of action, which are organizati

brigade level and below. They will actually perfor

Army’s operational tasks. Units of employment wil

units of action assigned or attached as required.

6

203
The Adaptive Transformation Model suggests f

segregating Army organizations into five module

purposes of modernization management. This segre

may also serve as a framework for employment option

organization of the modules would evolve as the A

leadership makes force structure decisions, but each 

include combat, combat support, combat service su

and headquarters elements. Army National Guar

Army Reserve elements would form portions of 

module. Figure 3 includes a notional organization 

Army into modules. For example, Module 1 might in

several Interim Brigade Combat Teams, a 

headquarters, several division headquarters, and c

support and combat service support augment

elements associated with the Interim Brigade C

Teams, as well as a slice of echelon above corps su

elements (from the active component and both r

204

MODULE 1

•I Corps

•25 ID

•10 ID

•3 x SIB(e)

•9 x BCT

•4 x Avn Bde

•4 x FS Bde

•COSCOM

•EAC Slice

MODULE 2

•V Corps

•1 AD

•1 ID

•2 ID

•9 X BCT

•4 x Avn Bde

•4 x FS Bde

•COSCOM

•EAC Slice

MODULE 3

•XVIII Corps

•82 ABN DIV

•101 AASLT D

•3 X SIB(e)

•9 X BCT

•4 x Avn Bde

•4 x FS Bde

•COSCOM

•EAC Slice

MODULE 4

•9 x SIB (e)

•9 x BCT

•4 x Avn Bde

•4 x FS Bde

•COSCOM

•EAC Slice

MODULE 5

•III Corps

•1 CD

•3 ID

•4 ID

•9 X BCT

•4 x Avn Bde

•4 x FS Bde

•COSCOM

•EAC Slice

MODULE 1

•I Corps

•25 ID

•10 ID

•3 x SIB(e)

•9 x BCT

•4 x Avn Bde

•4 x FS Bde

•COSCOM

•EAC Slice

MODULE 2

•V Corps

•1 AD

•1 ID

•2 ID

•9 X BCT

•4 x Avn Bde

•4 x FS Bde

•COSCOM

•EAC Slice

MODULE 3

•XVIII Corps

•82 ABN DIV

•101 AASLT D

•3 X SIB(e)

•9 X BCT

•4 x Avn Bde

•4 x FS Bde

•COSCOM

•EAC Slice

MODULE 4

•9 x SIB (e)

•9 x BCT

•4 x Avn Bde

•4 x FS Bde

•COSCOM

•EAC Slice

MODULE 5

•III Corps

•1 CD

•3 ID

•4 ID

•9 X BCT

•4 x Avn Bde

•4 x FS Bde

•COSCOM

•EAC Slice

Figure 3. Notional Force Module Composi
components). The module should include suff

elements to make it capable of independent employm

a Joint Task Force or Component Army Force el

(ARFOR). Module 2 might include the elements of one 

existing Army Corps, to include all of its associated c

support, combat service support, and headquarters 

and an echelon above corps support slice.

Module 5 corresponds roughly to III Corp

associated units that make up the most modernized p

the legacy force (including units from both activ

reserve components). It will undergo the currently pl

upgrade program. This module will serve as the A

“insurance policy” of lethal, survivable heavy forces a

deliver the decisive punch in the old fashion way 

modern transformed forces could assume that role. M

5 will be the last to undergo transformation.

Note from these examples that the modules a

necessarily of the same size, or composed of the 

structure. Army leaders should consider numerous f

in determining the composition of the modules. 

examples should not be construed to suggest that c

force structure concepts should be maintained. It is 

that there will be significant changes in both comman

control arrangements and in support requiremen

future force concepts develop. Indeed, the Army 

partner technological changes with conceptua

organizational changes to fully modernize its 

capability. (See Figure 4.)

Each module represents a generation in con

modernization. At the end of its life cycle, all elements 

module would undergo another transformation to th

generation. The cycle for each modernization gene

includes four phases: a science, technology

experimentation phase (STE); a research, developmen

acquisition phase (RDA); a fielding phase; an

operational phase. During the science, technology

experimentation phase, the main effort should lie 

205
science base to actualize potential technolo

breakthroughs that address anticipated needs. 

experimentation would identify force requirements d

this phase. At the end of the 3- to 5-year science, tech

and experimentation phase, force developers would 

technologies and concepts for use in designing the 

forces in the module. Those technologies and co

would mature through the research, developmen

acquisition phase. Though research, developmen

acquisition is an acquisition term normally associate

materiel development, this model uses the term to in

maturation of all aspects of doctrine, trai

organization, leader development, materiel, and so

The end state for the research, development

acquisition phase would be a package of materiel, do

training strategies, organization, and personnel p

ready for fielding. The units of the module would 

stand down from their current operational generatio

reorganize, reequip, reman as necessary, and retr

206

YEAR 2002 2006 2010 2014 2018 2022 2026 2030 2034 2038 2042 2046 2050 

RDA

ADAPTIVE TRANSFORMATION MODEL

FIELDING

STE

OPERATIONAL

STE -- Science, Technology, Experimentation Phase

RDA -- Research, Development, Acquisition Phase

Fielding -- Unit fielding and initial train

Operational -- Units available for empl

MOD1 MOD2 MOD3 MOD4 MOD5 MOD1 MOD2 MOD3 MOD4 MOD5 MOD

MOD1 MOD2 MOD3 MOD4 MOD5 MOD1 MOD2 MOD3 MOD4 MOD5 

MOD1 MOD2 MOD3 MOD4 MOD5 MOD1 MOD2 MOD3 MOD4 MOD

MOD1

MOD2

MOD3

MOD4

MOD5

MOD1 MOD1

MOD2

MOD3

MOD4

MOD5

MOD2

MOD

M

Figure 4. Adaptive Transformation Mod
become a new generation. At the end of the fielding 

the units of the module would return to the operati

available forces of the Army, and remain ready until t

field a new generation of the module.

This model suggests that each phase of the cycle s

be 4 years. This results in a 24-year life cycle for each 

including the overlapping science, technology

experimentation and research, developmen

acquisition phases. This corresponds roughly wit

normal expected life of a new major end item. Howev

period of each generation and of each phase of 

development of a generation would be flexible, and 

depend on budgetary considerations, the acceleratio

of science and technological advancement, and chan

the political-military environment. Individual units w

the module would be transformed and returned in a 

of less than 4 years, but the module would not be comp

modernized until the end of the fielding cycle. 

emergency, the Army’s leadership could accelera

fielding of the module to increase the available 

Additionally, new elements could also be fielded, and 

modules could be upgraded if necessary. The capa

accelerate such a change is inherent in the system, t

the budgetary requirements would obviously increas

For purposes of illustration, assume the 13th B

Combat Team is in Module 2. Beginning the sc

technology, and experimentation phase in 2002, res

development, and acquisition phase in 2006, and fi

phase in 2010, the 13th Brigade Combat Team wo

operational from 2014 through 2034, with sc

technology, and experimentation (STE) for its 

generation beginning in 2026. (See Figure 5.) Th

would stand down during its next fielding 

(2034-2038), in order to field systems, reorganize unit

train soldiers before training the unit up to readine

employment. Then, it would return to the operationa

in 2038. Similarly, the 14th Brigade Combat Team, a 

Module 3, would undergo science, technology

207
experimentation and research, development

acquisition from 2006 through 2014, field from 2014 to 

and be operational from 2018 through 2038, with it

generation fielding in 2038. The 14th Brigade Combat 

would return to the operational forces in its new gene

in 2042.

The concurrent development of doctrine, organiz

and training strategies must coincide with the sc

technology, and experimentation phase and res

development, and acquisition phase, along with per

procurement and management strategies. B

equipment is relatively simple compared to the g

challenge of transforming training, doctrine, manag

styles, and soldiers to meet battlefield conditions th

be more complex and demanding in the future, partic

in human terms. Therefore, the Army should follow a 

development strategy similar to the process used 

ongoing development of the Initial Brigade Combat T

This development should capitalize on rapid prototyp

new systems so that training strategies and do

development can occur concurrently with the system

soldiers. 

208

YEAR 2002 2006 2010 2014 2018 2022 2026 2030 2034 2038 2042 2046 2050 2054 2058

GENERATION

A

Operational

Forces

LIFE CYCLE OF ONE UNIT IN MODULE ONE

Operational

Forces

Operational

Forces

GENERATION

B

CURRENT

GENERATION

GENERATION

C

Figure 5. Life Cycle of One Unit.
To facilitate the rapid and concurrent developm

doctrine, training, organization, leader develop

materiel, and soldier development, developmen

fielding teams would form at the time of the technolog

concept decisions at the end of the science, technolog

experimentation phase. These teams would include of

noncommissioned officers, Department of the 

civilians, and contractors organized (and trained) to d

the training programs, doctrine (to include initial T

Techniques, and Procedures), and organizat

structures. Some institutional consistency w

necessary, suggesting a standing cadre of developers

standing force development cadre would serve as the 

the development and fielding team. Other officer

noncommissioned officers would augment the tea

development of the module they will join. These office

noncommissioned officers would then become the Fi

Team, providing an expert corps to stand up th

organizations. They would then become part of th

organizations. 

For example, a mid-grade captain may depart his u

Module 3 to join the fielding team 4 years prior 

fielding of the next generation of Module 3. He would 

in developing the doctrine for employment of his typ

throughout the research, development, and acqu

phase, while attending mid-level education durin

period. During the fielding phase, he would ass

standing up the new unit and training the officer

noncommissioned officers on doctrine and Ta

Techniques, and Procedures for the unit, then beco

operations officer in one of the new units. Likew

sergeant first class might leave his position as a p

sergeant to become an individual training developer

developing the program for training newly accessed so

of a certain specialty and completing senior nonco

sioned officer education, he would become a first serge

a training company 6 months prior to the beginning 

fielding phase to produce some trained soldiers for th

209
units. This continuity in function would assist in fi

the new units. Additionally, it would ensure tha

development community constantly receives new 

and energy.

Doctrine.

The Army will have to develop doctrine faster th

adversaries in order to remain dominant over the cou

the coming decades. While the United States 

dominance, its adversaries need only achieve d

capability. Thus, the U.S. military must be able to 

quickly to denial strategies and capabilities. The c

system for doctrine development is not conducive t

rapid development. With the adaptive transform

model, while some doctrine development could take p

the Department of the Army level, its more decentr

approach would speed the process, while also of

greater diversity in thought. A collaborative effort, s

to the method used in development of doctrine for the 

Brigade Combat Teams, offers promise. The develo

and fielding teams described above would serve 

responsible headquarters element that is part 

module. That unit of employment headquarters (per

selected corps or division headquarters) could serve 

lead for development of the doctrine for the next gene

of its module, in conjunction with the developm

corresponding Joint and Army doctrine by Joint 

Command and the Army Training and Doctrine Comm

Continued development of doctrine and Ta

Techniques, and Procedures to maintain integ

capability with the rest of the joint world should also b

decentralized. The corps or division headqua

responsible for development of the initial doctrine d

the research, development, and acquisition phase 

retain the responsibility for Tactics, Techniques

Procedures and doctrine development for the units 

module throughout its life cycle. This process 

210
facilitate continued systemic development of organiza

learning by the Army. Through testing of new conce

the operational test centers, and the tactical 

laboratories, through distributed simulation

experiments by the joint world and between and w

modules, and through a free-thinking cell of officer

noncommissioned officers recently from the field, the 

could develop new concepts and doctrine in a more h

manner. In addition, such a strategy would enhan

institution’s learning by encouraging free-thinking 

unrestricted, protected, and insulated environment.

Training.

Training of soldiers and units is perhaps the 

critical aspect of achieving and maintaining m

effectiveness. Given adequate technology, relatively 

improvements in individual and collective competen

yield disproportionately large increases in combat p

The adaptive transformation strategy capitalizes o

aspect through continued decentralized trai

Module-specific training development should occur 

module level. This would prevent the requireme

centralized individual training and would ensure 

knowledgeable training cadre is available. Howeve

Army should retain a central training base for initia

training and for low-density specialties common 

elements. The development and fielding teams wo

responsible for development of specialized individu

unit training to include simulations, devices and fac

and standards and programs of instruction. The 

would capitalize on emerging training techniques s

imbedded and distributed simulations and the 

nonharmful projectiles.

The Army would restructure the existing indi

training base so that each module has proponenc

ownership of the training facilities required

noncommissioned officers and officers required to st

211
module’s training base would come from the units 

module. Unit training would also be the responsibility 

module, though the Army and joint headquarters h

role in training the units of the module to operate as pa

Joint Task Force. The Combined Training Centers s

continue to play the preeminent role in training uni

demanding environment. However, the Combined Tr

Centers should tailor their training packages t

emerging threats in the strategic environment and 

capabilities and structure of the friendly and po

enemy units.

Organization.

Force structure will evolve rapidly along with th

equipment and ways of operating. Information tech

will allow better information sharing at all levels

sharing should obviate the need for some of the lev

control that now exist. However, it is not likely th

ability of human beings to command a greater num

elements simultaneously will increase. Indeed, give

greater complexity of the future environment an

demands on human commanders, it may be necess

reduce the span of control. Thus, though the size of 

may decline at levels of division and above, the leader

ratio in company and below may actually increas

additional consideration is that future require

suggest that units be organized in a modular fashion

model may be similar to the current concept used by S

Operations Forces, which organize small functional 

into mission-capable packages, tailored to the missi

enable this modularity, it is likely that sm

self-contained units will require higher leader ratios. 

are two aspects that suggest that force structure will r

an evolving phenomenon.

Each generation of modernization of the Army’s 

will require an independent analysis to determin

appropriate force structure. The organizational struc

212
the units in a module should undergo the same testin

experimentation that the doctrinal concepts and equi

would undergo during the science, technology

experimentation phase. Force structure decisions sho

zero-based, with no requirement to make changes 

current structure. Again, development and fielding 

should receive much latitude in developing innovativ

structure. Full-time force developers would form part 

team to assist in feasibility and cost analysis and fac

building the Tables of Organization and Equipme

units in the module. Unit force structure decisions s

occur early in the research, development, and acqu

phase, so that Tables of Organization and Equipment 

built and so that personnel and equipment acqu

strategies can mature prior to the fielding phase.

Detractors to this model may suggest that the 

would become too much of a hybrid organizatio

complex to receive the necessary logistica

organizational support. However, this non-homo

could be seen as a source of strength, in terms of flex

and unpredictability. Further, even following the c

transformation strategy, the Army through 203

remain a hybrid force, composed of some Objective 

units, some interim units, some remaining legacy uni

Rangers and special forces, and possibly the 101st 

82nd Airborne Divisions.

Leader Development.

The battlefield of the future will require 

independent action at lower levels. Thus, junior 

initiative, independence of thought, and innovation w

at a premium. As they do today, small unit leaders wi

to make decisions in the face of great uncertainty. Wh

technical and tactical aspects of warfighting de

through training, the qualities of innovation 

independence required of future leaders can on

developed through experience and education. As one 

213
leader noted, “we train for certainty, and educa

uncertainty.” 

Leader development should place great empha

education early in the careers of officers 

noncommissioned officers alike. Though there will co

to be a requirement for staff officers with highly tec

educational backgrounds, the education disciplin

develops initiative and innovation is more libera

general. Army professional development programs s

include more education opportunities for officer

noncommissioned officers, and at earlier stages th

currently the norm.

Materiel.

The adaptive transformation strategy is h

dependent on a robust science and techn

establishment. This effort will be in two parts. While 

the establishment would focus on development of nea

technological breakthroughs to support each mo

science, technology, and experimentation phas

remainder of the science and technology community 

focus farther out. At the beginning of a module’s sc

technology, and experimentation phase, those techno

with near-term promise will pass to the science, techn

and experimentation team. At the end of this phase, 

leaders would select the technologies to invest in deve

for the module. Those technologies not sufficiently m

or robust would pass to the next module’s sc

technology, and experimentation team. In this wa

Army would continue high risk technology develop

while mitigating risk in the near-term developm

forces. To mitigate the risk further, the ability to up

earlier generations selectively could occur thro

dynamic series of “on-the shelf-appliqués,” similar to 

used during the Persian Gulf conflict.

The acquisition and fielding process currently u

the Army requires radical transformation. Consid

214
fielding of the Paladin artillery system in the early 

Beginning in 1987, the battlefield requirement

development process took 18 months, followed b

decisions on structure, equipment, stationing, afford

and resourcing (an additional 12 months). This was fo

by the Modified Tables of Organization and Equi

documentation process (over 6 months), and the per

training and equipment distribution processes (30 mo

By the time the first unit stood up and began tra

almost 6 years had elapsed since the decision to 

Paladin battalions had occured. The earlier disc

about the likely pace of technological evolution su

that 6 years is far too long a period. Key to the 

development process for the adaptive transform

strategy is the rapid development of equipment proto

This would allow continued development of trainin

employment concepts, as well as providing an abi

make changes to the equipment early in the res

development, and acquisition process, based on 

testing. 

There will also be an increased need for ind

contractor support, particularly during the fielding 

but most likely into the early stages of the mo

operational phase. This would continue the trend see

in the development of high technology equipment. It 

allow for continuity of maintenance, as well as han

training by the contractors with the soldiers of the 

With the acquisition of more off-the-shelf equipmen

requirement will increase. Key would be integration 

contractors into the development and fielding team

the start.

Soldiers.

With the Army undergoing change, and the per

existence of at least five generations of forces (in addi

Special Operations Forces forces, considered separ

major changes to the current personnel system 

215
necessary. The degree of differentiated speciali

between modules suggests that soldiers would need 

specialized as well. Indeed, it is likely that a part

military occupation specialty will exist in the unit

single module. This, in turn, suggests that soldiers s

remain in units for longer periods than is currently th

Personnel policies would have to undergo ra

transformation, perhaps along lines closer to a 

regimental system, thus allowing for greater stabiliza

units.

Soldiers would start their careers in a modul

remain in that module throughout their career. In ad

to offering family stability and significantly reduce

turbulence, stabilization would allow a conside

reduction in training turbulence, because it would be 

to maintain standards. Moreover, units could expan

cycle of training through the echelons. The most app

aspect of a regimental system is the enhanced cohes

units, a quality that would be at a premium in 

decentralized and distributed operating environmen

One of the great impediments to implementatio

regimental system today is the requirement to 

overseas billets. Without forecasting a reduction 

Army’s overseas presence, this requirement could b

through unit rotations, most likely at the Brigade C

Team level. To reduce the logistical challenges to s

rotation scheme, the five modules could be aligned 

common overseas bases. In other words, a module 

sponsor a particular overseas requirement and wo

responsible for rotating units through the ove

deployments. 

The many requirements for staffing Army

Joint-wide organizations would be filled by unit sta

requirements. Thus, a mid-grade noncommissioned 

may leave his unit to become a recruiter for a few yea

would then return to the same unit. Similarly, an 

might leave company command to become an instr

216
then return to his unit. Promotions and school sele

would likewise be decentralized, at least to M

CW-4/First Sergeant, as the requirements for the u

one module would be different from those of another

ADVANTAGES OF THE ADAPTIVE

TRANSFORMATION MODEL

The adaptive transformation model outlined 

offers a number of advantages, each discussed below

• It would allow greater flexibility, as it would fac

adaptation to the strategic environment on a dy

basis.

• It would be less likely that potential adversaries 

predict the reaction of the United States to 

actions.

• It would force development of an institutional s

that could adapt rapidly in time of need.

• It would allow the Army to take advanta

technological breakthroughs and emerging co

in a timely manner.

Flexible adaptation to the strategic environmen

only thing certain about the future global environm

that it will be increasingly dynamic and unpredictabl

dangerous to think there is reasonable assurance the 

is preparing correctly for the future. Further

unreasonable to believe the United States has corner

market of technological advances, or the integration o

advances into military systems. The developme

constrained defensive spending, worldwide combine

increasing military technological potential, prec

accurate forecasts on which technologies, in what qu

and form, will be incorporated in the military syste

future adversaries.

7

 So, it is likely that “we will 

wrong," as Michael Howard suggests. In the abse

217
certainty, or even reasonable guesses, the logical app

is to keep options open—build a tool box with a lot of to

The absence of accurate prognosis of the future do

mean, however, that the Army should not devel

capabilities. Even though technological and doc

dominance may be fleeting, they are still advanta

Though the enemy may adapt, the superior forc

certainly have an advantage in the first stages of a co

Further, apparent military dominance provides a d

advantage in diplomacy. Most importantly, remain

the leading edge of technology and concepts provides 

jump start in adapting to the battlefield environment

a model would allow the Army to adapt continually 

changing environment, while maintaining modern fo

Difficult for adversaries to predict. The ability to d

and field new forces rapidly makes it less likely 

adversaries could predict the likely reaction of U.S. 

forces. Further, future opponents would find it diffi

predict how U.S. forces would fight. In developing forc

concepts for employment, Army planners must avoid 

so in a vacuum. Potential adversaries will also adap

large extent in reaction to adaptations by the U.S. 

forces. As Colin Gray has suggested, “new techno

extending through revolutions in military affairs, los

relative potency as others engage in parallel disc

emulate, or invest in capabilities and methods to evad

thwart the leading edge of supposedly revoluti

developments.”

8

 Sun Tzu noted that if one can predi

the enemy will fight, he has won half the battle be

starts. Having a continually changing force structu

concepts for operations makes it extremely difficu

potential adversaries to anticipate how the Arm

operate.

As the Army fields and employs forces, pot

adversaries will watch and learn. They will adapt 

ways and means to counter U.S. advantages. Sin

future environment is likely to include cont

218
distribution of technology, as well as a corresponding 

to acquire material and ideas, it is likely that adver

will adapt rapidly. The key for military planners wil

anticipate the reactions of adversaries and incor

counter-countermeasures into the forces, either in

module approaching fielding, or into the next modu

adaptive transformation model allows relatively 

counteractions to take place in force development.

Develops an institution that can adapt rapidly. The

three major components necessary to allow 

adaptation. First, the organization must com

individuals who can think rapidly and adaptively. S

the materiel development processes must be streamli

that the gap between the discovery of new technologi

the fielding of relevant systems is minimized. Thir

organization must rapidly develop concepts into do

and field that doctrine.

A consistent theme throughout this paper has bee

though technological dominance may be temporar

ability to adapt faster than potential adversaries is t

to success. Therefore, educated, trained, and inno

people offer the potential for timeless dominance, 

technologies and concepts for fighting come and go. 

writers of Joint Vision 2020 note, “thinking will b

premium since anyone can get access to the technolo

One of the greatest difficulties confronting the 

armed forces is the reality that it is more difficult for 

organizations (particularly those with a deep se

conservative tradition) to adapt than for smaller or 

organizations. This creates a danger that U.S. adver

may transform themselves faster than U.S. forc

essence, they might be able to get inside the idea-to-fi

cycle. As one scholar suggested,

although information technology is touted as a means to 

inside an adversary’s decision loop, the reality is that a str

fighter or warrior nation unencumbered by Western-st

procurement regulations might easily be able to get inside 

219
our acquisition loop, and field newer weaponry well before 

finish buying already-obsolete equipment.

10

An adaptive transformation model that stresses con

transformation of forces will discipline the institut

that it will be unlikely that a potential adversary cou

inside the “adaptation cycle.”

Allows for addition of technology as acquired w

slowing progress. This model allows for meeting ne

mid-term requirements, while continuing the m

towards the long-term needs. Even with signifi

streamlined acquisition systems, it is certain that a 

organization can not keep up with all advanc

technology. It is increasingly evident that, 

informational and other technologies relying on elect

are advancing rapidly, those technologies underw

vehicles and weapons platforms, such as prop

systems, composite materials, electronic and laser we

and munitions, are not advancing as fast. But the

become available at some point in the future. An

certain that advances in technology will con

indefinitely. If U.S. armed forces are to continue to re

technological advantage, they must take positive mea

to ensure they can retain that advantage. As the 

environment becomes more open and militarily-re

technologies become increasingly distributed, thi

become more of a challenge for the United States. M

O’Hanlon captured this point succinctly,

technology is continually advancing—particularly in a wo

that is systemically organized to conduct scientific 

engineering research on a large scale. The armed forces 

country, such as the United States, that depends heavily 

technology must innovate constantly in order to stay ahead

The proposed model allows fielding of systems usi

most current technologies available, with the know

that emerging technologies can be incorporated 

future generation, perhaps within a few years. 

though every Army unit may not be the most moder

220
Army will possess some units that are at the cutting 

while the rest of the Army is within 20 years of that ed

case of a national emergency that requires rapid field

more units with a given capability, or upgrading of ex

units, the system could be able to meet this requir

through “appliques” or complete fielding. By the 

reasoning, the new concepts for fighting and doctrine 

also be disseminated to new or rapidly transformed 

though admittedly, it may be more difficult to d

doctrine and training rapidly than technology.

THE ROAD TO THE FUTURE

The Army has recognized the need to change. The 

Chief of Staff’s plan to radically transform the Army 

right path. As with all plans, the Army must be prepa

alter the plan when the first shots are fired, while ret

the commander’s intent. There are several challenges 

current strategy, which suggests that the Army s

develop several alternative, or branch, strategies so th

train of transformation does not stop, but can take dif

tracks to the same destination. This chapter has sug

one such branch, one that will allow the Army to r

transform through an evolutionary strategy, whic

continue indefinitely.

Most critically, this chapter addresses the real 

facing the Army; that is, how to transform the Army n

for the environment of 2030, but for the undefined f

The Army must transform itself throughout the 

century, just as it did in the 20th century. Critical 

success of this endeavor must be transformation 

culture, systems, and processes inherent in the Arm

that it can adapt rapidly to changing environments. 

way, the Army can meet the challenges of the future

Technology is a critical aspect of the American w

war, but technology is only effective in the han

innovative, well-trained, and well-led soldiers in ef

and relevant organizations. The Adaptive Transform

221
Model provides an option to continue the spi

development in order to provide the American m

significant advantages over potential adversaries. Th

ensure that the U.S. Army remains poised to be pers

in peace, decisive in war, and able to promote and defe

nation’s vital interests in any environment. A

president of AT&T suggested in 1997, “when the p

change outside an organization is greater than the p

change inside the organization, the end is near.”

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7

1. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Chicago: Encyclopedia Brit

Inc., 1952, p, 54.

2. Williamson Murray, The Emerging Strategic Enviro

Challenges of the Twenty-First Century, Westport, CT: P

Publishers, 1999, p. xxxi.

3. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020, Washingt

U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000, p. 3.

4. Major General Robert Scales, Future Warfare Anthology, 

Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1998, p. 35.

5. Michael Howard, “Military Science in an Age of Peace,” C

Memorial Gold Medal Lecture, October 3, 1973.

6. Department of the Army, TRADOC, “Foundations o

Transformation and the Objective Force Concept," Final Draft, J

17, 2001, pp. 33-34.

7. National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2015: A D

About the Future with Non-Governmental Experts, Washingt

NIC, December 2000, p. 60.

8. Colin Gray, Explorations in Strategy, Westport, CT: Gre

Press, 1996, p. 244.

9. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. 3.

10. Charles J. Dunlap Jr., “21st Century Land Warfar

Dangerous Myths,” Parameters, No. 27, Autumn 1997, p. 31.

222
11. Michael O’Hanlon, Technological Change and the Fu

Warfare, Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2000, p. 

223
CHAPTER 8

FORCE PROJECTION RESEARCH

AND DEVELOPMENT:

THE KEY ENABLER FOR ARMY

TRANSFORMATION

Genaro J. Dellarocco

The first task of strategy is the final assembly of the fight

forces, the first deployment of the army. Here, multifario

political, geographic, and national considerations come in

question. A mistake in the original assembly of the ar

scarcely be [is] rectified in the entire course of the campaig

Helmuth von Molt

In spring 1998 in Albania, the Army was ready to 

but not ready to deploy. The Army’s deployment duri

Kosovo crisis illustrated that force projection rema

Achilles heel and underlines the fact that the remna

the Cold War infrastructure, thereby, and doctrine re

The Army has yet to make deployment a core compete

the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force have already 

Nevertheless, Kosovo inadvertently created a re

focus in the Army to reestablish its strategic responsiv

and value to deterrence. While the new Chief of Staff 

Army has put forth a new Army Vision, one that pu

Army on the path to becoming a relevant, decisive 

based on faster force projection capabilities, the reali

of that vision requires adequately resourced researc

development programs for logistics. If not, the 

becomes nothing more than a wish.

Creating Irreversible Momentum for Change.

General Eric K. Shinseki fired the opening sal

change by laying out a challenging vision for the Ar

October 12 1999.

2

 That vision represents the cataly

225
change. It reflects lessons from the past as well 

importance of strategic responsiveness (rapidly deplo

for the Army in the face of future threats—to deter, co

and reassure:

The Army will be responsive and dominant at every point 

that spectrum. We will provide to the Nation an array 

deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustaina

formations, which are affordable and capable of reversing 

conditions of human suffering rapidly and resolving confl

decisively. The Army’s deployment is the surest sign 

America’s commitment to accomplishing any mission t

occurs on land . . .

3

To maintain the momentum for change, the 

requires a visible commitment and resources for exec

This chapter argues that the vision must go beyond s

publishing briefings and elaborate websites. It must 

as the catalyst for changing the way the Army 

business, and therefore it must change organiz

Army-wide. The first step began with the creation 

initial brigade combat teams.

4

 While the point of this 

is already on the way to transformation, the ability to 

the new force to the battlefield and sustain it in c

remains another issue.

The vision sets the deployment mark on the wal

hours for the brigade, 120 hours for the division, and 3

for five divisions.

5

 The Army, however, cannot accom

this task alone. It must be part, the decisive part, of 

task force. It must lead all future joint task forces. Cha

the Army’s combat force structure and equipment is 

part of the solution. The force projection process requ

much attention and as many resources as the combat 

to accomplish the new goals of greater Army str

responsiveness. 

National Military Strategy.

The National Military Strategy rests on a na

culture of winning wars not in North America, but 

226
enemy’s soil.

6

 The 1997 National Military Str

recognizes the key importance of force projection. How

it rests on an earlier definition as power projectio

requires the U.S. military to have the ability to respon

full spectrum of crises under the concepts of str

agility, overseas presence, power projection, and de

force.

8

 It asserts “swift action by military forces 

sometimes be the best way to prevent, contain, or r

conflict, thereby precluding greater effort and inc

risk later.”

9

Strategically, decisive force provides deter

compellance, and reassurance.

10

 The U.S military ca

accomplish these goals by means of effective 

projection. A demonstrated force projection process, ca

of projecting a decisive force in a timely manner, provi

own deterrence. In fact, that capability can reso

prevent crises before they escalate. Deterrence is 

effective with enemies who recognize and fear the ab

U.S. political leaders to project military forces to 

neighborhood quickly and decisively.

11

The theory of decisive force first surfaced in Joint 

2020, which forms the foundation of the next Na

Military Strategy update.

12

 That document states

overarching focus of this vision is full spec

dominance—achieved through the interdepe

application of dominant maneuver, precision engage

focused logistics, and full dimensional protect

Decisive force, used with an enabling force proj

operation, represents both deterrence and response 

on the ability to project the necessary forces to a

preservation of all aspects of land, sea, air, and 

military power—in other words, strategic agility.

14

Force Projection Process.

Full spectrum operations will, as they do now, de

precision and simultaneous logistics opera

Consequentially, the force deployment process couple

227
the maneuver sustainment/distribution process equa

single force projection process. It is an operation 

process that flows through four transitional are

phases: Continental United States, Strategic Lift, Th

and Tactical Area (see Figure 1).

15

In the continental United States (CONUS) p

deploying units depart from home-station install

across CONUS, or from pre-positioned or forward-de

locations. These units deploy from either aerial 

seaports of embarkation. Strategic lift basically cons

two modes of transportation: airlift and sealift, mana

U.S. Transportation Command via the Service compo

of the Air Force’s Air Mobility Command, the N

Military Sealift Command, and the Army’s Military T

Management Command.

16

 Strategic lift is the bridg

228

Figure 1. The Force Projection Process
connects aerial and seaports of embarkation to aeri

seaports of debarkation in the next phase.

In the theater phase, three important activities 

These are: 1) the download or off-load of equipmen

personnel at the aerial and seaports of debarkation; 2) 

required, joint logistics for over-the-shore operations

3) reception, staging, onward movement, and integ

operations.

18

 In the deploying units, soldiers marry u

their equipment; and then move onto the next phase. 

departing the reception, staging, onward movemen

integration area move to the tactical phase of the 

projection process to conduct military operations that 

from combat to humanitarian assistance. The sustai

of maneuver, combat, or other operations of the de

forces becomes increasingly more important an

primary mission of the force projection process durin

phase.

Research and Development Focus.

The Department of Defense (DoD) and Army’s Str

Mobility Program have invested $34 billion 

Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STOR

improve the first two legs of the process. Despit

investment, the Army will not reach the goal of deplo

five-division contingency corps force in C+75 days 

2005.

19

 And now the Army Chief of Staff has raised th

to do the same at C+30 days. Using current processe

Army cannot meet these goals, unless se

improvements occur to achieve quicker throughput.

In order to improve the Force Projection pr

research and development must occur in three basic 

These areas are: lightening the force, shrinking the ta

getting there faster. To do this, a reallocation of res

and development funding needs to occur in conjunctio

this new focus. Currently, the majority of the A

Science and Technology funds focus on lethalit

survivability (see Figure 2).

20

 If the strategic respo

229
ness aspect of the Army vision is to achieve reality, th

Army needs to invest more money in deployability ar

improve the force projection process.

Of the three areas, lightening the force has receiv

most attention to date. For the near term, the In

Armored Vehicle is the centerpiece of the researc

development effort, followed by the objective force’s 

combat vehicle.

21

 While efforts here will yield g

deployability, they alone will not achieve the 96

deployment goals set forth in the Army Vision.

One aspect of lightening the load is to put more c

punch or lethality into a smaller, more versatile pack

number of critics have argued that the requirement fo

systems to be air transportable by C-130 is only th

enhance the intratheater warfighter agility of the T

Commander-in-Chief (CINC) and/or the Joint Task 

230

Figure 2. Key Research and Developme

Funding Allocations.
Commander. Actually, it is a forcing function that a

creating new systems that are smaller and lighter. Th

a common misunderstanding about the requireme

new systems, including the Interim Armored Vehicle

requirement allows the initial, interim, and obj

systems to be transported on larger systems more re

resulting in improved strategic agility.

22

Shrink the Tail.

The goal here must be to minimize the logistics foo

on the battlefield. This may not directly translate 

smaller CONUS logistics base to support force proj

operations. There is a set infrastructure required to su

all force projection and maneuver sustainment opera

However, there are several areas that can reduc

footprint. Since DESERT STORM, the Army has 

considerable progress in the information manag

areas that support force projection operations. Th

management systems focus on Total Asset Visibilit

Intransit Visibility. Improved logistics informatio

allow the Army to send only essential materiel to a join

force. That action alone will substantially reduce 

weight in the distribution channels and reduce the ne

lift.

The three most difficult commodities to sustain a 

from a logistics standpoint are ammunition, fuel, and 

Current research and development efforts need to fo

these areas intensely. Ammunition lethality, i.e., “on

one kill” as the worst case, with one shot, multiple ki

best, will only help reduce the logistics stain, 

warfighter has confidence in that claim. The lo

process must be responsive and demonstrate that a

using strategic configured loads, to build that confiden

In the fuels area, reducing the size of the footpri

require converting legacy vehicles to more fuel-ef

engines and capitalize on the commercial sector’s evo

of new engines. The Army needs to invest researc

231
development dollars in the conversion of military vehi

these new commercial power plants. However, batt

distribution of fuel will still remain a problem, as lega

interim forces will require fossil fuels for at least the n

years. Research and development efforts are necess

ensure that efficient fuel distribution enroute to and 

battlefield are commensurate with the Army’s Ti

responsibility for inland theater fuel distribution 

Services. 

Water presents similar challenges as fuel, as it t

bulk liquid. However, sources for water are some

readily available within theaters, which drive

requirement for purifying water near, or within the t

of operations. The primary challenge for water 

battlefield distribution. Research and development 

need to create an actual battlefield water distri

system down to the foxhole.

24

Another aspect of the C-130 transporta

requirement that many overlook is the impact on red

the logistics footprint. The smaller and lighter th

systems are, the less sustainment they require, i.e., 

fuel consumption and less handling equipment

requirement is a forcing function that maximizes str

and operational agility, as it forces down sustai

requirements. This aspect needs more emph

particularly with Congress.

25

Get There Faster.

Getting there faster demands quicker throughpu

force projection process consists of modes of transpor

(air, sea, and surface) punctuated with intermodal 

Within the theater, the future aviation craft may

common as the tactical truck on the battlefield. The A

currently looking at a family of new aerial platforms 

Light Aerial Multipurpose Vehicle for in-th

distribution, medical evacuation, conduct reconnais

or transport personnel. These vehicles would compl

232
and replace the high mobility, multiuse vehicles cur

in the legacy force.

26

DoD needs more C-17s.

27

 Several simulations su

this assertion, as does the U.S. General Accounting O

report that military airlift is 30 percent short 

capability needed to support current mi

requirements.

28

 In the near term, the U.S. Air Force (U

is promoting civilianizing the C-17 for the comm

sector. This would add a substantially new capability 

Civilian Reserve Air Fleet. Meanwhile, Boeing, maker 

C-17, is retrofitting and building new C-17s with ext

range capacity (20-30 percent).

29

The commercial sector is creating a new aspect 

global transportation market by developing a class of 

transport vehicles that can deliver greater tonnage 

other current aircraft. This sector is now deve

ultra-large aircraft concepts and prototypes.

30

 Thes

heavy lifters would satisfy the commercial need to 

goods to markets more quickly in the global environm

The objective transport tonnage exceeds 2.2 million p

(1000 short tons) per lift. The impact here of researc

development dollars would ensure that manufac

incorporate military interface requirements into the 

commercial designs.

What are the implications of such capabilities? 

systems would be available to the military in peaceti

normal contract channels and in time of crisis via C

Reserve Air Fleet.

32

 Additionally, their developmen

purchase would restructure the war reserves cur

carried onboard ships and would establish a CONUS

Prepositioned Material Configured to Unit Sets near 

remote airfields. This approach could substantially r

costs, while improving the strategic responsiveness 

forces and their equipment.

33

The next generation heavy lifters should includ

Advanced Tactical Transport to replace the C-130 f

For new systems, C-130 requirements were ch

233
slightly to ‘fit’ only within the C-130 envelo

accommodate advanced tactical transport develop

The recent DoD “Quick Look” indicates that the 

should invest in advanced tactical transport wit

capability of large heavy cargo with very short take-o

landing capability. Investment in this area would 

DoD to retire the C-130 legacy system within 10-15 ye

The other aspect of the next generation m

transportation relies on ports or over-the-shore opera

The shipping industry is developing shallow-draf

high-speed sealift that can attain double or trip

current speeds of logistics support vessels and fast s

ships. This future capability would provide the str

agility to project medium and heavy forces into rest

areas of operation. The Army’s research and develo

should complement the commercial ocean shipping s

desire to identify and accommodate military int

requirements, as well.

36

To increase throughput, research and developmen

look at the nodes of the Force Projection process. T

where there must be a change in the mode of transport

i.e., a physical handling of cargo. Anything tha

minimize the material handling of cargo needs to be a 

focus of Army research and development. This effort 

also encompass improvements to bypass traditional p

debarkation (airports and seaports) and must impro

current joint logistics over-the-shore capability. 

developments would ensure throughput to a joint tas

when conventional or asymmetrical enemy forces de

use of ports.

37

Shift that Paradigm.

It is time to shift an old paradigm into new ge

examining a new aspect on an old system that 

potentially lighten the force, shrink the logistics tail, h

getting there faster, and improve throughput. It 

truck’s role in the force projection process. Currently, 

234
cannot operate autonomously. Some models have 

close with on-board handling systems, such a

Palletized Loading System and on-board small cran

forklifts. However, such trucks have the mission of ha

specific battlefield distribution functions and r

limited to certain parts of the land battlefield.

What is needed is a new truck system 

next-generation load handling capabilities that can m

the container rollout platform, 20-foot standard conta

and 463L pallets.

3 8

 The Brigade Combat 

Organization and Operations Concept indicat

requirement for such a vehicle. According to this co

the Initial Brigade Combat Team (and the Objective 

will deploy using both 463L pallets and container r

platforms in a force projection operation. Both pla

and containers would sustain the force.

39

 The B

Combat Team has the ability to handle container r

platforms with 106 palletized loading system truck

heavy expanded mobility tactical trucks with the 

handling system and twenty-foot containers wit

addition of five container-handling kits. The 463L ha

capability of the Brigade Combat Team remains lim

its six organic forklifts.

40

 The new advanced load ha

system would have the ability to handle all three pla

with each vehicle equipped with the system.

41

 This 

that advanced load-handling trucks could: load/unlo

Force cargo aircraft directly without the aid of forkl

K-loaders; transload cargo; and load/unload itsel

vehicle would also need to be lightweight and sized t

the C-130 envelope. The advanced load handling s

would be a modular system integrated into semi-tr

commercial vehicles, and tactical trucks.

Limited research is at present occurring with c

platforms to improve aerial port of debarkation throu

from two perspectives. The first concerns the C-17. Bo

developing, separately and in conjunction with the A

Tank-automotive Armaments Command and the Air 

concepts for eliminating the need of K-loaders and for

235
These concepts focus on building this capability in

C-17 and range from the patented articulating 

tailgate that can load and unload 463L pallets onto a 

or trailer, to an internal crane that will do the sam

20-foot containers.

42

 The second area concerns pall

loading system/load handling system trucks and som

called the “Slipper.” This research and development 

has constructed a prototyped device that allows 

trucks to load and unload the container roll-out pla

directly from a C-17 without using a K-loader or for

The paradigm shift is starting, where some day soo

Force planes will offload directly to the Army soldier a

or her truck—another example of the “Army of 

capability.

44

The potential impact of the advanced load ha

system on ports of debarkation, reception, staging, o

movement and integration operations, and batt

ground distribution is substantial. Using the obj

brigade combat team as the example, the adv

load-handing system would integrate directly into th

palletized loading system, heavy expanded mobilit

medium tactical vehicles.

45

 At aerial ports of debark

Army advanced load handling system-equipped ve

would eliminate the need for the Air Force to br

tactical K-loaders and forklifts, thus reducing 

requirements. Furthermore, the advanced load-ha

system would increase the density of aircraft offlo

trucks, while most units of the objective brigade c

team would have organic advanced load-han

system-equipped vehicles. Air Force cargo aircraft 

off-load more quickly and cargo would clear the a

immediately. Consequently, reduced aircraft turna

times would allow more sorties to land and unload at a 

airfield within a 24-hour period.

The high density, expanded platform handling a

organic features of advanced load-handling system 

would speed cargo clearance through ocean termina

reception, staging, onward movement and integ

236
activities, as well. The greater throughput to combat 

on the battlefield would significantly enhance spee

combat logistics. For high volume fort, po

embarkation, ports of debarkation, and reception, st

onward movement and integration operations

advanced load handling system-equipped line

semi-trailers would add new efficiencies as they 

transload, and unload themselves without the 

forklifts and container handlers. While the adv

load-handling system may not entirely replace forklif

K-loaders on the battlefield, the system would shrin

logistics footprint, maximize the truck fleet in the 

structure, maximize battlefield distribution, im

airhead cargo clearance, and speed deployment throug

So, what is needed to determine requirements? Fir

Army needs to develop a battlefield (fort to fo

simulation with the fidelity to determine the optimu

platform for combat units. Despite the fact that the

numerous simulations that address various aspects 

process, there is none comprehensive enough with suf

fidelity to examine all the internal aspects of the no

the force projection process.

46

 Is the answer the con

roll-out platform or is something smaller needed? Do

463L pallet and system need modernization? Can 

platforms still be used? This reexamination would 

drive the requirements for an advanced load ha

system. Can the current palletized loading syste

modified or does it require a different design entire

adequately funded joint research and development ve

with the commercial sector (via the National Autom

Center) or through the U.S. Army Training and Do

Command’s (TRADOC) Concept Experimentation Pr

could answer these questions with sufficient resourc

New Organizational Transformations.

The first part of showing commitment to cr

irreversible momentum for a new vision is to cha

237
realign organizations to fit or support the new vision

the Gulf War, the Army Strategic Mobility Program a

Power Projection Council of Colonels provide

organizational synergy that created the momentum f

vision of its day. They accomplished much for the Arm

DoD.

48

The Army is entering an era of considerable uncer

with a vision that addresses the new global environme

vision that aims at transforming not only the Army, 

becoming the catalyst for transforming the other Serv

well. The Army Chief of Staff took the first step by crea

new combat entity called the initial brigade combat 

This organization is the precursor to the objective fo

coming decades. However, his work has only begun

truly wishes to transform of the whole Army. To gain 

commitment and create irreversible momentum fo

new vision, the Army requires larger organiza

change. 

For research and development, this change is cru

harness and focus the energies of widely disp

interests. There are over eighty organizations that 

role in the force projection process. However, there 

coherent organizational focus to provide directio

allocate scarce resources among these organizat

Consequentially, the effort to improve the force proj

capability of the Army remains diluted, both struct

and developmentally. It is time to move beyon

organizations of the last war and create a single po

contact for force projection, maneuver sustainmen

distribution.

50

To do this the Army needs to make four 

organizational changes to support the initial force str

developments illustrated by the initial brigade c

team. They are:

1. Create an Army Expeditionary Support Comm

238
2. Create a Deputy for Systems Acquisition repor

the Commander, Army Expeditionary Support Com

who would act as a Program Executive Officer for 

Projection and Maneuver Sustainment.

3. Establish the Force Projection Center of Excell

4. Change the name and focus of the Power Proj

Council of Colonels to the Force Projection Coun

Colonels.

AMC Transformation.

In its current form, the Army Materiel Command 

organization suboptimizes its vast resources in 

supporting Army transformation and transforming 

into a warfighter-relevant enterprise. There is a perc

in the warfighter community that the command is not 

committed to the Army transformation. This perc

ranges from no visible role to only the Interim A

Vehicle involvement. Moreover, many view the AM

vast outdated monolith, deeply rooted in wholesale lo

and rigid institutional practices that have lost touc

the warfighter. These perceptions may be misinforme

nonetheless they are widespread.

51

 Despite 

perceptions, the Commander of the AMC asserts, 

Transformation cannot happen without the AMC!”

52

So, what does the AMC need to do? To begin with, i

rebuild the linkage to the warfighter and focus on join

It must continue its current support for 

transformation, but do so more visibly and more v

Secondly, the command must fundamentally tran

itself, adapt to new missions, and begin the proc

becoming a major supporter of maneuver. In both ca

will take strong leadership to overcome the institu

barriers and change-resistant mindsets found throu

the command. Change will need to have genesis outs

structure, in effect, directed by the Army Senior lead

239
and progress toward an end state measured a

Readiness Review Committee’s level.

The AMC transformation should begin with the cr

of an Army Expeditionary Support Command, a thre

command (dual-hatted as the Deputy AMC Comm

that would focus on force projection and distrib

processes that support Army expeditionary force

Figure 3).

Its mission would be:

53

• Integrate development, transportation, distrib

and maneuver sustainment functions to achieve the 

Vision of Strategic Responsiveness via improvin

executing the force projection process.

• Assist CINC, Joint Task Force, Army S

Component Command, Commander Army Forces, and 

Forces Land Component Commander planners in th

projection, distribution, and maneuver sustainm

Army Legacy, Interim, and Objective forces.

240

Figure 3. A New Structure for the Arm

Materiel Command.
• Support the Army’s role in joint force proj

operations and serve as the Army’s operational foca

for the process inside the Army as well as with the 

Services, CINCs, Joint Staff, and DoD at large (inc

the Defense Logistics Agency).

• Provide the force projection platform for the Obj

Force’s Expeditionary Support Forces.

• The command would have three two-star comm

Military Traffic Management Command, Opera

Support Command, and Army Expeditionary Su

Command Deputy for Systems Acquisition for 

Projection and Maneuver Sustainment (new). Bot

Military Traffic Management Command and Oper

Support Command would incorporate their e

subordinate organizations including their on

commands, Deployment Support Command and 

Support Command. Additionally, the Logistics Integ

Agency and Logistics Support Activity would fall und

Army Expeditionary Support Command. Lastly

Objective Force Expeditionary Support Forces, on

commands, would exist as separate entities rep

directly to the Army Expeditionary Support Com

when not deployed to a Theater Support Command.

benefits of creating the Army Expeditionary Su

Command would be as follows:

 The Military Traffic Management Comm

Deployment Support Command is the compl

of Operations Support Command’s Field Su

Command. It would enable the force proj

process of deploying war reserves at the po

embarkation and points of debarkation.

5

Military Traffic Management Command 

maintain its current relationship with the c

U.S. Transportation Command.

 The Logistics Support Agency would handle 

the transactions through its vast inform

241
systems, data management and analytical su

capabilities and support deployments wi

deployable Logistics Support Elements. It 

simplify the information flow.

 The Logistics Integration Agency would p

critical strategic logistics planning, handle th

reserves requirements process, and condu

logistics research and development in coordi

with the Deputy for Systems Acquisition, 

Projection and Maneuver Sustainment

Logistics Integration Agency maintains its c

level of support to the Army’s Deputy Chief o

for Logistics.

• With the three-star level command within the 

the Army Expeditionary Support Command could a

additional synergies with the other AMC tw

commodity commands. It would produce better coordi

between the sustainment, development, transport

and expeditionary functional areas. At this level, it 

become the catalyst to foster cooperation and team

between the highly institutionalized commodity comm

This would be the Army Expeditionary Support Com

Commander’s greatest challenge. Achieving internal 

Expeditionary Support Command synergies will seem 

in comparison.

• For the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, the tran

the Military Traffic Management Command to the 

would eliminate an organization that repor

Headquarters, Department of the Army and plac

operating two-star command within an operating fou

command with a new expeditionary support m

focused on the joint warfighter.

• The addition of transportation functions 

complement the current AMC’s sustainment an

reserve responsibilities. In effect, it would crea

distribution command function within the AMC that 

242
control and improvements to force projection opera

throughput and reduces the logistics footprint in th

operations area.

• This organizational combination would serve 

first step to the National Defense Panel R

recommending the creation of a Logistics Command 

CINC level. It suggests that the U.S. Transpor

Command and Defense Logistics Agency be combined 

single command.

56

 DoD can capture the lessons le

from the Army level restructuring before proceedin

this recommendation.

• The Army would be on equal footing with the 

Services in regard to the U.S. Transportation Com

The AMC would be at the same four-star level as the N

Military Sealift Command and the Air Force’s Air M

Command. This equal footing would provide a 

opportunity for Army logistics three-star generals to 

the four-star level and to become a CINC (which do

exist today).

• Lastly, the Army Expeditionary Support Com

would provide the AMC with a new focus, new missi

transforming itself. It would tie Army logisticians 

closely to both the Army and joint warfighter

demonstrate a solid commitment to the A

transformation. 

Force Projection and Maneuver Sustainment.

The Army needs to create a Deputy for Sy

Acquisition for Force Projection and Man

Sustainment. That office would focus on the deplo

and logistics/distribution systems which impact the A

ability to deploy, force project, distribute, and susta

only the legacy force, but also the interim and obj

forces.

57

 Such an organization would have b

non-traditional and an operational focus. It woul

together all aspects of the materiel development of th

243
projection and maneuver sustainment enable

modernize, develop, acquire, and field such systems. 

are the same for both areas. It would develop key syn

with the Military Traffic Management Comm

Operations Support Command, Logistics Support A

and Logistics Integration Agency.

These systems would include watercraft, all ty

trucks and trailers, locomotives and railcars, ma

handling equipment, construction equipment, port op

equipment, air transport systems (current and futur

drop systems, aerial delivery equipment and plat

water purification and distribution systems, petr

distribution systems, applicable soldier support sy

(i.e., Force Provider), and logistics command and c

information systems. Additionally, it serves as the rec

for formally transitioned research and develop

projects (when ready) to become legitimate develo

and acquisition programs from engineering ce

Logistics Integration Agency, Army Research Labs, a

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.

The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program woul

part of the Deputy for Systems Acquisition to levera

acquisition process synergies to support its opera

mission.

This reform would create the appropriate proje

product level management organizations to speci

focus on complementary force projection and man

sustainment process within this Deputy for Sy

Acquisition organization. The new project manageme

support organizations would provide a concentrate

synergistic focus on development acquisition 

sustainment of the materiel needed to improve 

process. It would allow the Deputy for Systems Acqu

to employ a system of systems approach to meetin

Army Vision targets. However, the systems it 

manage would come from the AMC’s commodity comm

244
and in the end produce a geographically disp

organization.

Although geographical dispersion is not uncommo

Deputy for Systems Acquisition, the coupling wit

diversity, complexity, and budget of the assigned sy

would warrant this Deputy for Systems Acquisition po

to be a two-star billet. The AMC’s Commodity Com

one-star Deputy for Systems Acquisition would 

stepping-stone to the two-star Army Expeditionary Su

Command’s Deputy for Systems Acquisition. It 

become an organization that would require support fr

the AMC’s commodity commands to achieve s

synergies—a task that will require strong and dy

leadership. 

No matter how organized, the reorganization 

represent a paradigm shift. The Deputy for Sy

Acquisition for Force Projection and Man

Sustainment would serve under the Army Expedit

Support Command’s Commander and the 

Commander. This could prompt the Secretary of the 

to appoint the AMC Commander as the Acqui

Executive for these assigned systems, if he des

Program Executive Organization.

Force Projection Center of Excellence.

The Army also needs to create a consortium calle

Force Projection Center of Excellence” and have it cha

by the Chief of Staff of the Army. The Force Proj

Center of Excellence would report out twice a year 

Vice Chief of Staff of the Army on the prog

programming, and budgeting aspects of the Army’s 

projection improvements. The Center of Excellence 

function as part of a Force Projection Council of Co

and General Officer Steering Committee. There are o

organizations that in some way participate in the 

projection process. At present, there is no clear lea

forum for this critical strategic capability. Whi

245
membership would remain primarily Army agencies

key players from the other Services, the Office 

Secretary of Defense and other federal agencies sho

included. 

The Force Projection Center of Excellence would se

promote the Army’s strategic agility objectives and g

three important ways. First, it would foster and pr

cultural changes in developing the Army’s force proj

and subsequent maneuver sustainment and distri

into Army Core Competencies. The new Field Man

dances around the issue, but “Prompt Response” f

address the importance of getting the Army to the fi

speaks of ends and ways, but not means.

58

 It suggest

force projection is still an additional duty for the Arm

Second, the Center of Excellence would provide a 

to review and plan all aspects of force projection to a

interservice and interagency synergies, enh

communications, and improve coordination 

stewardship of scarce resources. The immediate be

would be to find out who is doing what and how cr

partnerships can leverage cooperation and im

communications. This would lead to the reductio

eventual elimination of duplicative efforts, particula

research and development areas within the Army, 

Services, and agencies. It would provide better coordi

on models and simulations, science and technology obj

projects, concept evaluation programs, and adv

technology demonstrations to name a few. In short, it 

promote and support value-added efforts and 

terminate the nonvalue added. In particular, the 

needs to look more closely at those research 

development efforts that have only changed their na

suggest linkage to Army transformation. In reality

popular tactic has hidden scarce research and develo

funding in small projects with little value-added.

Lastly, the Force Projection Center of Excellence 

create a stronger connection between the Army and th

246
warfighter. This organization would build strong ti

only to the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, but 

Joint Forces Command and the CINCs. The Army de

on these organizations to conduct the fight or operatio

these same cannot achieve long-term mission s

without the Army.

Force Projection Council of Colonels.

In response to DESERT STORM’s deploy

problems, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics creat

Power Projection Council of Colonels to focus on the A

Strategic Mobility Program. Great strides have occur

the program since DESERT STORM with a num

mobility projection platforms, CONUS and OCO

improved during this period. The total budget 

influenced exceeded $34 billion in the 1990s.

59

 With th

Army Vision, this council needs to refocus and ren

energies. First, it should change its name to reflect th

focus on Force Projection: the Force Projection Cou

Colonels. Secondly, the Army should formally charte

organization and have it provide oversight to the 

Projection Center of Excellence. Third, the council s

build on its old Army Strategic Mobility Program focu

expand that focus to include the entire Force Projectio

Maneuver Sustainment processes from the fort 

foxhole. 

Conclusion

For Army Transformation to create irreve

momentum for change, the Army must invest in its 

beyond the point of the spear. It requires a reallocatio

research and development effort to insure that enable

project and sustain the Legacy, Interim, and Obj

forces. Being lethal and survivable is useless, i

capability cannot get to the fight in a timely manner

often than not, the willingness to undergo organiza

change indicates a commitment. History illustrate

247
well. The current Army Transformation is another cas

requires vast organizational changes, as it evolves 

Objective Force. Again change is not new, it just ne

happen.

Once the Army changes and reorganizes, it ne

practice and demonstrate its new strategic agilit

galvanize the capability into a solid core competen

other words, the Army needs to achieve or surpass the 

Marine Corps, and Air Force force projection compete

Simulating it at the National Training Center does l

foster deterrence—nor does the cancellation of four 

last five joint logistics over-the-shore exercises.

60

It will take actual force projection exercises and 

partnerships with Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Fo

hone these Army skills. The foundation is in place in 

areas for these partnerships. For example, the 

already has officer instructors on staff with Navy’s P

Expeditionary Warfare Training Group.

61

 Perhaps on

when CINC planners see Marine Corps Mar

Preposition Ships and Army Preposition Sets on an 

footing, the Army will have earned again serving 

expeditionary force.

Decisive force can provide global reassurance on

can demonstrate routinely and convincingly its 

projection. From a strategy perspective the Army ha

begun to move in that direction as the way the United 

will wage war as it protects itself, its interests, and its 

in the future. The Army will become the central part 

Nation’s military power, when its strategic agility ma

the force of choice when joint decisive operation

required. If nothing is done to improve the Army’s str

agility, given the new timelines, the Army will only b

to project its power into Canada or Mexico. Then, the 

becomes only an idle wish.

248
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8

1. Daniel J. Hughes, ed., Moltke on the Art of War, Selected W

Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993, p. 45.

2. General Eric K. Shinseki, Chief of Staff, Army, “The Army 

Soldiers On Point for the Nation . . . Persuasive in Peace, Invin

War, October 2000,” available from http://www.arm

armyvision/default.htm, Internet, January 4, 2001.

3. Shinseki, p. 3.

4. Department of the Army, “United States Army Transfor

Campaign Plan, (TCP)," draft plan, Deputy Chief of S

Operations, October 30, 2000, p. 10.

5. Shinseki, pp. 4-5.

6. Department of Defense, National Military Strategy, Wash

DC, 1997, executive summary.

7.This use of “power” verses “force” projection predates the ch

in definitions as they now appear in Joint Publication 1.02.

8. National Military Strategy, pp. 19-20.

9. Ibid. p. 16.

10.Michael Howard, “Lessons of the Cold War,” Survival, 

No. 4, Winter 1994-95, pp. 161-166.

11. F. G. Hoffman, Decisive Force: The New American Way 

Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996, p. 94.

12. Ibid., pp. 99-100.

13. Department of Defense, Joint Vision 2020, Washingt

June 2000, p. 2.

14. Ibid.

15. Colonel Samuel M. Cannon, “Perspectives of Force Pr

Initiatives,” briefing slides, Warren, MI: Project Manager

Projection, U.S. Army Tank-automotive Armaments Com

January 9, 2001, p. 9.

249
16. Department of Defense, Doctrine for Logistics Support 

Operations, Joint Publication 4-0, Washington, DC, April 6, 20

I-11, I-12.

17. Department of the Army, The Foundations of 

Transformation and The Objective Force ConceptFinal Dra

Monroe, VA, January 2001, p. 38.

18. Department of Defense, Joint Tactics, Technique

Procedures for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Moveme

Integration, Joint Publication 4-01.8, Washington, D.C, April 1

pp. I-3, I-5.

19. Cannon, p. 3.

20. Ibid., p. 18.

21. Army Transformation Campaign Plan, p. 13.

22. Ibid., p. 8.

23. Cannon, p. 16.

24. Colonel Larry Harman, “Logistics in the Army Transfor

and the Objective Force,” briefing slides, Fort Lee, VA, Direct

Battle Lab, U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command, Feb

2001, p. 13.

25. Discussions concerning Army transformation and the 

requirement took place between U S. Army War College stude

congressional committee staffers who specialize on Army m

These discussions were conducted on a nonattribution basis as 

the DC Field Trip. It was clear that the staffers did not underst

complete rationale for the C-130 transportability requirement.

26. Harman, pp. 30-32.

27. The ideas here are based on remarks made by several s

participating in the Commandant’s Lecture Series.

28. Christian Lowe, “Military Not Able To Meet 

Requirements For War,” Defense Week, December 18, 2000, p. 

29. Daniel Page, Program Manager for the C-17 Follow-on Pr

Boeing, interviewed by author, February 23, 2001, Long Beach

30. Ibid.

250
31. Christopher Miller, “Airships Rise Again,” Popular S

January 2001, pp. 78-83.

32. Lieutenant Colonel William G. Palmby, “Ultra Large Air

briefing slides, Washington, DC, Joint Staff, J-4 Mobility D

Department of Defense, February 6, 2001, pp. 8-9.

33. “Army Deployability,” Inside the Army, January 8, 2001

34. “Army Transformation Campaign Plan," p. 7.

35. “A Strategy For A Long Peace: A ‘Quick Look’ Asses

briefing slides, Washington, DC, Center for Strategic and Bu

Assessments, Department of Defense, February 12, 2001.

36. “Army Deployability,” p. 1.

37. Department of the Army, The Foundations of 

Transformation and The Objective Force ConceptFinal Draft

38. The container roll out platform (CROP) is a slightly 

version of the original PLS flatrack. The CROP can fit inside a st

shipping container where the flatrack cannot. The 463L system 

load handling system used by the USAF in its cargo planes a

Army in its CH47 Helicopters. It is uses the 463L pallet (88” x108

primary platform. However, it has less intermodal characterist

the CROP does.

39. Department of the Army, Brigade Combat Team Organ

and Operations Concept—Revised Draft, Fort Monroe: VA, U.S

Training and Doctrine Command, April 18, 2000, Chapter 10, pp

40. Ibid., pp. 45-48.

41. Major Genaro J. Dellarocco, “The Pallet Cradle,” M

Thesis, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and Gener

College, 1992, p. iii.

42. Engineer/Scientist Andy Garcia, Boeing Corp., intervie

author, February 23, 2001, Long Beach, CA.

43. However, there is no R&D activity concerning modify

PLS/HEMTT-LHS to handle 463L pallets.

44. Garcia interview.

251
45. Tom Reinshagen, “Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Comp

spreadsheets for the IBCT, Fort Eustis: U.S. Army Transpo

School, November 20, 2000. There are 1,005 vehicles in the IB

this amount, 242 vehicles would be suitable for the Ad

Load-Handling System (ALHS).

46. Lieutenant Colonel Donald G. Drummer, “An Assess

Modeling and Simulation Tools for Force Projection,” St

Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War Colleg

3, 2000, p. 15; Ken Foley, Branch Chief, Battle Lab Support E

Deployment Process Management Office, interview by a

November 28, 2000, Fort Eustis, VA. Also, the ideas in this par

are based on remarks made by two speakers participating 

Commandant’s Lecture Series.

47. Department of the Army, “Force Developmen

Requirements Determination,” TRADOC PAM 71-9, Washingt

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, November 5, 199

8-4.

48. Cannon, p. 5.

49. This reflects the number of different organizations found 

attendance roster for the Army Force Projection Center of Exc

Summit II held at Fort Eustis, VA, October 26-27, 2000.

50. Lieutenant General (Retired) Gus Pagonis, U.S. 

interview with the author, January 16, 2001, Sears Headqu

Chicago, IL.

51. The ideas in this paragraph are based on remarks m

speaker participating in the Commandant Lecture Series and 

other nonattribution forums at the U.S. Army War College.

52. General John G. Coburn, Commander of the U.S

interview by author at the Quartermaster Senior Service 

Conference, March 31, 2001, Fort Belvoir, VA.

53. Colonel Genaro J. Dellarocco, “Army Transformation P

The Army Expeditionary Support Command,” briefing 

Quartermaster Senior Service College Conference, Fort Belvo

March 31, 2001.

54. Harman, p. 23.

55. The Field Support Command is responsible for all of the 

war reserves, CONUS, OCONUS, and afloat.

252
56. National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense N

Security in the 21st Century, Arlington, VA, 1997, p. 73.

57. Major General William E. Mortensen, “Acqu

Transformation for the Army,” electronic mail message to Lieu

General Roy E. Beauchamp, January 18, 2001.

58. Department of the Army, The Army, Prototype Dra

Manual 1, Version K, June 2000, p. 18.

59. Cannon, p. 5.

60. Captain Kenneth Butrym, U.S. Navy, Commander of 

Amphibious Construction Battalion, Seabees, interview by au

Exercise “Turbo Patriot 2000,” February 22, 2001, Coronado, C

61. Captain Robert H. Howe, U.S. Navy, Comm

Expeditionary Warfare Training Group–Pacific, interview by 

February 22, 2001, Coronado, CA.

253
CHAPTER 9

TRANSFORMING THE ARMY SUSTAINI

BASE

Danny G. Nobles

Fort Concho is one of the most beautiful and best-order

posts on the Texas border. Its arrangement was artistic a

every feature bespoke comfort and convenience. On the sou

side of the ample parade grounds stood the officers’ quarte

tasty, elegant, imposing; on the north, the commodious a

handsome barracks; on the east side the commissary a

quartermaster’s buildings, while the west side of the groun

was closed with an ornamental fence with a large gateway 

the center.

Captain Robert Carter, 18

Attempts to discover methods of effective and ef

installation management are not new or unique 

American Army. Well managed posts, camps, and st

have been a symbol of military order and discipline fro

time of the garrisons that secured the Roman Empire 

post that secured frontier America. During the pa

years, the United States has developed from a stru

experiment of democracy into the world’s sole superp

The nation’s army also evolved from a humble bi

patriotic militiamen into a professional, highly traine

technologically equipped landpower. However, its c

posts, and stations continue to symbolize the orde

discipline of the Army. The Army is preparing for a 

that is radically different from the past. Technolog

economic globalization offer promises of enriched qua

life, but regimented hatred and the proliferation of we

of mass destruction threaten every region of the worl

Army must change to maintain its capability to resp

any threat and protect American interests wherever 

interests are threatened. As the Army transforms, 

255
discover new needs that only an efficient and ef

sustaining base can provide.

In an October 1999 address to the Association 

United States Army, General Eric Shinseki unveil

vision to transform the most powerful army in the wor

a force capable of maintaining its combat power well in

21st century. His vision requires that the A

transformed “Objective Force” be more sustainable 

current light forces, more deployable than existing 

forces, and yet possess a capability and lethality th

remain unmatched by any potential adversary.

2

 Wit

vision articulated, the U.S. Army embarked 

transformation to revolutionize its organizational str

and equipment, as well as warfighting doctrine. 

changes demand new ways of doing business at 

camps, and depots. Moreover, a transformed Arm

place new and different demands on an army infrastr

that must now support power projection, tra

maintenance, force protection, and quality of life. 

leaders must anticipate these demands and pr

installations to support those needs. The abil

organizations to anticipate, organize, and perform mi

effectively in the face of changing environments will b

element in successful transformation.

3

 Above 

transformed sustaining base is necessary to sup

transformed Army.

The transformation vision trades heavy armor pro

weapon systems for the protection afforded by enh

commanders’ situational awareness leading disp

highly mobile combat forces. A logistical system capa

reaching back to installations in the United Stat

equipment, maintenance, and other sustain

requirements will sustain the transformed Army

structure will reduce the footprint of combat suppo

service support forces in the theater, but will enhan

importance of the Army’s posts, camps, and station

home. Installations must become integral force mult

by directly impacting the sustained readiness of 

256
engaged in combat. Experts from proponent sc

laboratories, and centers will provide technical serv

combat forces. Posts and depots will provide log

support directly to units in the field. Finally, install

will continue to provide their traditional roles as ho

soldiers and their families, places of work and train

units, and deployment platforms for force projection. 

transformation will require more than the installation

approach the army has previously taken. The entir

support structure must change at every level.

Unfortunately, there has been little dialogue conc

the infrastructure changes within the Army’s sust

base that will be necessary to support the transformed 

The intent of this chapter is to describe the cu

sustaining base, consider the effectiveness of pas

present management practices, and recommend conc

transform installation management into a system tha

serves the army and nation.

The Language of Transformation.

The language of transformation consists of unique 

and phrases that one must understand before disc

transformation. Words and phrases such as linea

nonlinear, equilibrium and far-from-equilib

self-organizing and organizational intelligence de

characteristics of the transformation process. Sha

common language enables organizations to change. M

McMaster, reengineering consultant for m

corporations, such as BMW and ARCO, and author 

Intelligence Advantage, argues that “to begin to c

anything, we must change the way we speak about i

First, one must consider the characteristics of lin

and non-linearity. Linear systems are both additiv

proportional. The sum is equal to the parts; that is, o

break the system down into subparts and then recon

it with the same outcome each time.

5

 Thus, linear sy

are consistent. Linear systems behave according 

257
economic rule of “constant returns to scale,” making 

predictable.

6

 However, linear systems tend to resist ch

They lack the internal ability to recognize changes 

surrounding environment. They often become ob

without external intervention. A freight train offe

example of a linear system in action. The train, w

massive weight, stands idly on a set of tracks. To cha

stable, equilibrium condition, a locomotive must ge

sufficient power to overcome the resistance of its stat

cars, before the train can move smoothly down the tra

given speed. This works well until the train encounte

need for change. The inertia of the system works agai

ability to switch tracks, slow down, or stop and c

directions. Any change in the momentum of the 

requires extra power from the locomotive to overcom

system’s resistance to change.

7

 Similar conditions e

rigidly hierarchical organizational structures, which 

Machiavelli underlined the unwillingness of h

societies to change. Human organizations often 

efficiently and effectively in stable environments. How

any change creates resistance that consumes much 

organization’s energy.

A nonlinear organization, on the other hand, 

change due to its internal structure.

8

It is design

change. Water is a particularly good nonlinear exam

room temperature, it remains at equilibrium wi

molecules densely packed in a liquid state. Howeve

molecules rapidly spread out from one anoth

temperature rises and change the condition of equilib

When water reaches the boiling point, transform

occurs. The far-from-equilibrium alteration i

environment enables the water to change from its 

state into steam with the result of a tremendous rele

energy. The energy increases exponentially to the deg

heat applied. Steam can perform a myriad of tasks 

powering engines to generating electricity. Likewis

key to “managing” nonlinear organizations is unlocki

synergistic potential for change by creating the 

258
conditions. In nonlinear systems, the whole is exponen

greater than the sum of the parts.

9

The self-organizing feature of transformation 

occurs as one heats water. The temperature of the 

varies depending on its proximity to the source of 

Water density also varies with temperature differ

The differences in temperature and density create cu

that transfer energy throughout the various lay

Likewise, nonlinear organizational structures form 

reform to communicate information in the most ef

and effective manner. Rather than resisting ch

nonlinear organizations use change to unlock 

potential.

An organization that enables rapid communicat

ideas throughout its structure produces a cultu

organizational intelligence. It encourages a fl

information about environmental changes and resp

actions throughout the organization. This process 

upwards, as well as downwards. Transfo

organizations develop integrated networks of intell

throughout their structures. Organizat

transformation occurs as the corporation recog

changes in the environment and adapts itself efficient

effectively to respond.

11

 The challenge of the Army’s c

transformation effort is to change its current 

structures that have fulfilled requirements in the pa

dynamic nonlinear organizations that can mee

ambiguous challenges of the future.

Transformation discussions commonly revolve a

technology and advanced weapon systems. However

discussions limit the perspective of transformation

processes of transformation are more fundamental c

rather than new “things.” Transformation is a non

phenomenon that creates organizational intelli

capable of receiving, analyzing, and respondi

information. Transformed organizations respo

changing conditions in the external environmen

259
self-organize (transform) to take advantage of 

available resources, thereby maximizing their potent

success. Understanding these few concepts prov

framework to focus on the Army’s sustaining base.

Focus on the Sustaining Base.

Perhaps the main reason there has been so 

discussion concerning the transformation of the sust

base is that the subject is simply not exciting. 

transformation debates have focused on doctrine, c

force structure, revolutionary weapons systems

emerging technology. These are valid discussion

Army’s reason for being continues to be its ability t

and win the nation’s wars. However, base operations 

key link to readiness. The Army risks its ability to p

and sustain ground forces if it fails to consider its sust

base. Defense analysts tend to be obsessed with the “p

the spear” which, in isolation, is not an effective w

The point requires a spear shaft to provide the weap

balance and stability in flight and sustain its energy

strikes its target. The Army’s sustaining base, compr

installations and depots, along with their req

commands and staffs responsible for managin

sustaining base, is analogous to the shaft of the spea

Army Sustaining Base management starts wit

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Instal

Management (ACSIM). The ACSIM is responsib

programming infrastructure requirements and reso

as well as preparing guidance and policies fo

Department of the Army. The sustaining base in

staffs at the Major Army Commands (MACOMs

promulgate installation management policie

distribute base operations resources to installation

installations, where the Army garrisons its personn

where soldiers and their families live and work, com

the sustaining base network. The role of the sustainin

is to provide an efficient and effective infrastructur

260
includes power projection platforms, training base

centers, camps, and depots located around the 

Looking at one part of the structure requires consider

levels of base support operations. For the purpose 

chapter, installation management, base su

operations, and sustaining base managemen

interchangeable terms. Whatever the term, they ha

clear fact in common—they represent major investme

resources!

The Business of Installation Management.

Installation management is an expensive and co

enterprise. More than 28 percent of the Army’s fu

supports installation management programs. Opera

maintenance, repairs, and utilities costs associated 

operating the virtual cities, known as installa

consume the majority of these funds. In the current 

year, more than $6.3 billion supported this operation

maintenance function. Furthermore, the Army in

another $400 million in environmental protectio

mitigation projects. New military construction projec

$1 billion. Army family housing absorbed another $1 b

Other operating costs, including civilian employee pa

consumed the remaining installation management b

(approximately $11 billion in fiscal year 20

Installation management is a large capital ve

Nevertheless, it is a necessary investment in the A

ability to house, train, equip, project, and sustain th

in a safe and protected environment. The role 

installation is more essential than ever in the era of 

transformation.

Army transformation places new demands o

sustaining base that it is currently incapable of perfor

The physical infrastructure of installation

deteriorated from neglect caused by underfu

requirements. Most posts lack the robust communic

systems required to support the objective force. Mos

261
inadequate storage capability for their current needs

less the demands of theater logistic support. The pa

lies in the great amount of excess facilities 

throughout the Army’s real property inventory. How

the excess facilities are old, in poor repair, an

configured to meet requirements. Moreover, the Ar

failing to manage and resource the sustaining base at 

needed to enable it to perform its current requirem

much less its emerging support roles for transforma

Throughout the last half of the 20th century, the D

Department struggled with the inherent conflict be

fiscal efficiency and military effectiveness. In its ef

reduce costs by eliminating “redundant capabilities

leverage private sector services, resource managers h

times compromised the effectiveness of military un

respond to the ambiguous nature of national de

Unlike the commercial sector, efficiency must not be t

objective of military operations. Well-managed busi

attempt to standardize to the lowest level possible. Un

systems, like a standard aircraft, truck, or tools will si

operations, maintenance requirements, and inc

operational efficiency. However, businesses do not 

war. They do not contend with an enemy that is sea

for opportunities to exploit shortcomings in systems in 

to defeat them.

13

 When a United Parcel Service groun

aircraft for unscheduled maintenance, it inconven

people because they do not receive their packages. 

commanders fail to receive required intelli

information, ammunition, or fuel in combat becau

enemy has disrupted or destroyed communicatio

logistics networks, soldiers die. There is a compellin

for some redundancy in military capabilities, includi

Army’s infrastructure.

Moreover, installations are vulnerable targets th

become increasingly attractive to terrorists and belli

operatives. The sustaining base role of force projectio

sustainment makes it a classic operational hub of pow

the Army’s combat forces. The installation’s transform

262
role to provide field forces with technical intelli

engineer, and logistics support increases its value 

center of gravity. It does not matter how capable the 

combat forces are, if an enemy can cripple its install

and curtail deployment or sustainment operations

most lethal force is only as effective as its ability to 

and be supported in the fight. Dialogue about insta

management must address three legitimate ques

What does the Army get from its substantial investm

this investment managed in the most efficient and ef

manner possible? What can be done to transfor

sustaining base?

The Sustaining Base—A Foundation for Readin

The Army’s desired return on its sustaining 

investment is an infrastructure that enables 

readiness. Base operations contribute to the three ke

readiness areas: personnel, equipment, and tra

Garrison commanders, staffs, and facilities enable u

maintain each facet of readiness. The sustaining 

provides facilities and services for soldier readine

processing, reviewing, and updating soldiers personn

and personal records, as well as medical teams to 

that soldiers are physically fit to fight. Garrison 

manage the maintenance facilities, ammunition s

sites, and rail stations, where equipment is loade

deployed to ports of debarkation. Installation man

maintain qualification ranges, maneuver training 

and classrooms. These are only a few examp

installation contributions to readiness. The global na

the modern Army demands a sustaining base capa

equipping, training, projecting, and sustaining for

home and abroad.

More than 116 Army posts, camps and depots arou

world share a constrained base operations budget. 

are approximately 166,000 facilities within 

installations.

14

 (These numbers do not includ

263
numerous Army Reserve Centers and Army Na

Guard Armories existing in communities across Amer

Installations serve a common goal; each one contribu

equipping, training, sustaining, and projecting a t

and ready force anywhere and anytime. Some posts se

training centers for basic training, advanced s

training, or officer skill training. Some installations, s

Fort Irwin and Fort Polk, provide the basis for man

training exercises. Depots provide for specialized sup

maintenance activities. Still other sites are home to v

technical laboratories, such as the Water

Experimental Station in Vicksburg, Mississippi, an

Construction Engineering Research Laborato

Champaign, Illinois. Other installations, such as Fort 

Fort Bragg, and Fort Campbell, are base installatio

combat forces and serve as power projection platform

which the Army will project its forces, when orde

deploy into contingency operations.

16

Installations are as unique as the units that occupy 

and the regions of the world where located. They i

depots, training posts, power projection, and power su

platforms. Such generic labels may cause some to 

such installations are mirror images of one an

However, that would be a totally erroneous conclusio

example, consider Fort Hood and Fort Bragg. Both are 

power projection platforms, yet the characteristic

requirements of the tenant organizations make them 

different installations. Fort Hood is home to III 

headquarters, as well as two heavy maneuver divisio

Cavalry and 4th Infantry Divisions). Their trainin

deployment requirements are very different fro

training and deployment requirements of the XVIII 

or the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg. Likewise

Fort Leonard Wood and Fort Jackson are training 

yet, each produces different skills at various lev

training. The tenant organizations on installation

communities that surround them, and the 

environment all contribute to make each instal

264
unique. These unique characteristics create dif

challenges that require tailored organizations and cr

solutions based on ever changing requirements. Alt

installations may perform similar functions, no tw

alike. A former Assistant Chief of Staff for Insta

Management enjoyed saying, “when you’ve see

installation, you’ve seen one installation.”

17

Managing the Sustaining Base.

Past Army initiatives have attempted to deal wi

challenge of managing installations as efficien

possible. Sustaining base leaders have given little att

to methods of improving the effectiveness of prog

policies and resourcing provided by the upper areas 

sustaining base. Installation management propo

seeking to improve operational efficiency, experim

with methods and systems to manage the A

infrastructure. In this process, they attempted to re

the organization of garrison staffs, realign function

dispose of installations. They have leveraged p

industry and contracted for services that govern

employees have traditionally provided. Sophist

computer models helped analysts to depict the condi

facilities and forecast operational costs. These initi

yielded various degrees of success. Some 

demonstrated the potential to enable transformation

others have fallen short of the mark.

The Army tried to establish an efficient organiza

structure by taking a cookie cutter approach w

published Army Regulation 5-3, Installation Manag

and Organization, in 1978. That regulation provi

generic organization and functions manual for all 

installations. Garrisons were to establish 

organizations with Directorates for Personne

Community Activities (DPCA), Plans, Trainin

Mobilization (DPTM), Logistics (DOL), Engineerin

Housing (DEH). These directorates loosely related 

265
G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, and special staff of a maneuver div

This structure proved useful in combat, but less effect

the “city management” operation performed by ga

commanders.

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Install

Management realized that installations vary widely, 

1994 he rescinded the old regulation and replaced it 

Manual 100-22, Installation Management. This m

described general functions performed by installat

Installations took the opportunity to experiment w

variety of staff structures. Fort Bragg and Fort Cam

adopted a business center approach that combined co

activities such as military police, fire, and ambulance 

public safety business center. They also integrated 

contracting offices, civilian personnel, and res

management activities into a common installation bu

office, and combined other related functions. Fort Hoo

a different approach and leveraged Corps-level asset

garrison responsibilities; for example, the leaders 

combined the DPTM with the Corps G-3, and task

Corps Support Command to manage storage and c

functions at installation ammunition storage points

Leonard Wood established both a Directorate of M

Personnel and a Directorate of Community and F

Activities by separating its personnel functions fro

community activity directorate. These examples illu

that there are a number of organizational possibilit

installations. The common denominator in all 

examples is the ability of the local commander to rec

which activities and services are necessary to fulf

mission, and then to establish an organization capa

adapting to new or changing demands.

19

A separate initiative that impacted garrison oper

was privatization. For more than 2 decades, senior d

leaders have sought reductions in the size of gover

overhead by letting private contracts for instal

functions.

20

 The Army referred to its privatiz

programs by a variety of names, including; Comm

266
Activities, A-76 (taken from the OMB Circular 

Commercial Activities), and Competitive Sourcing

privatization process requires installations to co

in-house (civil service) workforce operating costs to th

of contracting for the same services through p

industry. Garrisons must prepare a performance 

statement that specifies the tasks, conditions

standards required for the service under study. The 

solicits competitive proposals from private industry. 

the commercial market prepares and submits contrac

the organization (e.g., Directorate of Logistics, 

Works, etc.) must reengineer its workforce in accor

with the work statement and attempt to establish it

the Most Efficient Organization (MEO). Finally, the 

selects the “best value," as defined by the l

comparative cost between the government and p

proposals.

21

The premise of reengineering an organizat

maximize efficiency is a worthy goal. However, the p

must not compromise organizational effectiveness. Th

service workforce contributes more to the organizatio

simply the basic duties written in their job description

most important contribution it provides is its abi

receive information from the work environment (custo

fellow employees, community, etc.), interpret 

information according to the organization vision, ge

flexible options, and make decisions. In others w

government employees are more valuable for 

intelligence than simply their job descriptions. Indi

intellect is fundamental to developing the netw

organizational intelligence that is require

transformation.

22

 The civilian component of the Arm

dedicated, loyal, and enduring resource. They perfor

duties that they were hired to do on the installation, a

as many other “duties as assigned” that accountan

human resource managers fail to measure. These ded

professionals, from warehouse workers to 

maintenance crews to budget analysts, are 

267
ambassadors of the army to their communities. 

innovations and suggestions contribute to the conti

improvement of posts, camps, and depots, where they 

When a private firm replaces government labor

“in-house” intelligence resource is lost. People will co

to perform the required tasks specified in the term

negotiated contract with a company that depends on a 

margin. However, the people will do those tas

employees whose allegiance is to the contractor.

The budgeting process for the Army’s sustaining b

another challenge. As the Army proponent for installa

the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Manag

distributes the resources budgeted by the Departm

the Army through the Major Commands to the v

installations. Using a system known as “AIM-HI” (

acronym, but the name of the program), the A

determines what base operations costs should be, ba

the tenant units’ organizations, as well as the numb

types of facilities located on the installations.

23

 Fig

depicts the key aspects of “AIM-HI.” Generally, “AI

calculates costs by comparing the real property inv

(list of the facilities on an installation) to the streng

tenant organizations. The “AIM-HI” model deduc

tenants’ authorized square footage of facilities fro

installation’s real property inventory. That calcu

usually shows that an installation has more square f

than is authorized for the units. The model also dedu

installation’s excess square footage from its overa

property inventory and the difference become

programmed inventory. The smaller program

inventory figures form the basis for budget an

purposes. Numerous algorithms are used by “AIM-

establish projected square foot costs for various f

categories. The projected costs are applied t

programmed inventory to establish the basic 

operations funding budget-level for an installation.

268
The costing models used by ACSIM do not refle

requirement realities at the installation level. Dif

management systems with greater ability to determ

of the costs associated with a service or activit

necessary to support intelligent decisionmakin

determine budget requirements. There is an alterna

the traditional manufacturing approach to costing t

reflected by “AIM-HI.” Innovative industrial leaders 

adopted operational management tools such as a

based costing and service based costing. Thes

management systems recognize change in both ex

markets and internal operations and provide inform

concerning the impact of those changes on quality and 

of an activity or service. Activity Based Manag

provides a more accurate cost picture by identifyin

drivers (e.g., labor-hours, machine hours, etc.

measuring the performance output of the activity, as F

2 illustrates.

24

 This costing method is a valuable me

measuring the effectiveness and efficiency of act

performance and the total production costs of 

activities.

25

 Sustaining base leaders make better dec

when they know what things cost and why.

Some installations have incorporated activit

service based costing measures into their res

269

RPLANS

Real Property Inventory

ASIP

Tenant Unit Strength

Space Authorized

(AR 405-70)

PROGRAMMED INVENTORY

A

I

M

H

I

ALGORITHM

---

PROGRAMMED

COSTS/SF

DELTA BETWEEN

ACTUAL AND AUTHORIZED

INVENTORY IS FUNDED AT

THE LOWER FIGURE

RPLANS IDENTIFIES REAL PROPERTY

FROM INTEGRATED FACILITIES DATABASE

---

ASIP IDENTIFIES TENANT UNITS BASED ON

PERMENANT ORDERS

Figure 1. AIM-HI Flow Diagram.
management activities. Fort Hood implemented A

Based Management to gain the insight and flex

needed to transform its garrison operations to me

requirements. Leaders must know the true co

activities in order to make informed reengine

decisions. This method of tracing cost sources asso

with each activity helps to discover opportunities fo

improvements. Identifying improvement opportuni

crucial to developing and building a contin

improvement plan.

26

 Pittsburgh University Bu

Professor Narcyz Roztocki recommends using A

Based Management when four conditions exist: overh

high, products (services) are diverse, costs of erro

high, and competition is stiff.

27

 Those criteria cer

apply to the army’s installation management.

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Install

Management also developed the Installation Status R

(ISR) system. Commanders use the ISR to repo

conditions of their facilities, environmental program

installation services to higher headquarters.

28

 

leaders patterned the ISR after unit status reports. C

leaders are familiar with the unit status reporting sy

Therefore, the ISR used a similar reporting forma

270

Resource Cost

Assignment

Resources

Work

Activities

Activity Cost

Assignment

Objects

of Work

Operational

Cost Drivers

Resource

Drivers

Activity Cost

Drivers

Performance

Measures

Activity Based Cost

Cost Assignment View

Activity Base Mgt

Process View

- Cost reduction

- Reengineering

- Cost of quality

- Continuous Improvement

- Waste reduction

- Benchmarking

What things

cost

Why things

cost

Better

Decision

Making

Figure 2. Activity-Based Management Mo
C-ratings equating to readiness capabilities. Part 1 

ISR measures quantity and quality of various ty

facilities at each installation. The quantity of fac

measures the installation’s ability to provide for m

requirements. The quality measurement, based 

published standard developed by the U.S. Army Co

Engineers, provides a fair picture of the existing cond

of the infrastructure. What this system does not pro

the ability to anticipate future requirements. No me

exist to assist leaders in determining what constr

projects might improve the infrastructure’s m

readiness. Part 2 of the ISR provides an exc

management tool for identifying and monitoring eff

restore, secure, and protect the environment at indi

installations. Part 3 of the ISR (Services) attem

establish a minimum level of a common set of service

any installation should provide. Unfortunately, iden

and defining services provided by the sustaining bas

establishing conditions and standards to measure 

services has been a difficult task. This segment of th

remains under development.

A major improvement in sustaining base manag

came in 1993 when the Army Communities of Exce

program adopted the Malcomb Baldridge criter

organizational excellence as its means of evaluating q

at army installations. Before 1993, ACOE en

installations to improve their physical appearance

result, they painted the street signs brown and paint

rocks white. Garrisons gave inspection teams “red c

treatment as the teams judged installations on appea

and a very subjective evaluation of customer service

The Army Performance Improvement Criteria (A

based on Malcomb Baldridge measures, created a str

for managing and measuring performance plan

assessment, and training. The criteria stresse

importance of an integrated quality system that inc

leaders, employees, and customers working toget

improve performance and service. It provided a fram

271
for performance excellence. The core values and conc

APIC are embodied in seven categories: leade

strategic planning, customer and market focus, inform

and analysis, human resources, process managemen

results. Figure 3 illustrates the category relationship

system comprises the six categories in the center 

figure underpinned by information and analysis nec

to measure performance and identify areas of excellen

well as areas needing improvement. Leadership, str

planning, and customer and market focus form a lead

triad for senior leaders to focus organizational effo

effective service, and seek future opportunities f

organization. Human resources, process managemen

measured results form the results triad. An installa

employees and its key processes accomplish the miss

the installation. The interrelations of these two 

generate the organizational intelligence and effectiv

of an organization.

29

The Army Performance Improvement Criteria d

assume that all installations were the same. It d

prescribe rigid techniques that demanded conforman

cookie-cutter set of rules. The criteria provi

results-focused framework for management to u

organizing for change. It also offered a means for ass

272

Strategic

Planning

Leadership

Customer

and Market

Focus

Information and Analysis

Human Resources

Focus

Process

Management

Results

Figure 3. APIC Framework.
performance against demonstrated quality. It establi

common language to encourage dialogue withi

without the sustaining base community.

30

 The c

provided a nonlinear approach to reengineering sust

base management at the installation level. In short, A

a structure for sustaining Base Transformation.

Some of the past installation management appro

particularly privatization and resource manage

initiatives, fail to support transformation. They la

flexibility and organizational framework to factor in 

conditions, anticipate changes, and respond to em

requirements associated with a transforming army. 

are the very conditions that McMaster warns against 

book, The Intelligence Advantage: Organizin

Complexity. When leaders manage organizatio

machines and design their organizations as rigid, 

structures, then guidance and communications b

hierarchical and directional. Under these cond

McMaster wrote, “There is no allowance for creativ

intelligent reaction to unpredictable changes i

environment.”

31

 With further refinement, other initi

(such as the ACSIM, ISR, and APIC) provide a sound b

begin the transformation of the sustaining base.

Transformation Obstacles.

A quick look at the ACSIM web site reveals a num

initiatives to improve the efficiency of installation

there are some institutional obstacles to transformati

information paper entitled “Reengineering the Insta

Garrison” describes the ACSIM’s current positi

installation management.

32

 That paper discusses 

ongoing challenges at installations. The author of the 

argues that garrisons developed over the course of th

War—an erroneous view. Actually, since the beginn

the Army, garrisons have housed soldiers and pr

areas to train and drill troops, facilities to repai

273
maintain equipment, and bases to project force a

potential threats.

Time has not changed these basic funct

“Reengineering the Installation Garrison” discuss

changing nature of the world and the Army and emph

that “business as usual will not succeed.” It accu

describes those garrisons with rigid stovepipe func

structures as inefficient organizations that resisted c

and failed to serve their customers’ needs. The paper a

that rigid compliance to bureaucratic processes is no 

acceptable. Actually, it was never acceptable, bu

tolerated because no one offered alternatives. It con

that garrisons must change to better focus their energ

core competencies. Many of the points made by the A

paper are valid and deserve attention. Howeve

attitude and focus of the paper itself demonstrates 

the major obstacles to achieving sustaining 

transformation. First, the paper reveals a prevalen

misplaced attitude in the higher echelons of the insta

management community, when the writer s

“Installation garrisons are businesses.”

33

 In fact, gar

are not businesses any more than city governmen

businesses. Garrisons are service providing organiz

and tactical-level caretakers of army infrastructure.

The danger of taking a business view of the sust

base is to forget that it is a vital enabler of the A

combat forces. Army leaders would never con

demanding that a maneuver brigade radically chan

way it fights without also considering required chan

doctrine and the support structure. Neither should 

expect installations to change without considerin

entire sustaining base structure.

The tone and focus of the ACSIM paper illuminat

second obstacle to transformation—the tendency to 

solely at the installation level. The author of that 

perhaps inadvertently, merely provides “go and be 

advice to garrisons that are grossly underbudgetted t

274
for requirements. The apparent opinion of 

sustaining-base leaders is that the key to fixin

sustaining base management problems is at the insta

level. They seem to think one can correct the proble

costly overhead, tight budgets, and poor customer ser

installations are more efficient. Regardless of how ef

garrisons attempt to become, the management str

limits real progress. Major progress will require all a

of the sustaining base to change.

There have been innovative improvemen

installations throughout the Army. Even though gar

are not businesses, there are potential benefits 

utilizing relevant business practices. There is 

unexplored room for improving garrison operations, b

time to analyze and reengineer every level of insta

management.

Transforming the Sustaining Base.

The transformation vision recognizes the potent

many different outcomes.

34

 Army transformation de

on an organizational structure that maxi

communications and encourages dialogue tha

recognize change and make instant innovative respon

It is a nonlinear development with unpredictable re

but it is not chaos.

36

 It requires a special form of lead

and structure. The leader’s role is to establish a f

structure that can recognize shifts in external cond

and empower the organization to respond effectivel

organization’s structure must be permeable to allo

organization to recognize environmental change

communicate necessary actions, but strong enou

maintain integrity of purpose and focus o

organization’s vision.

Organizational intelligence is a key enab

transformation. The installation’s workforce is the 

organizational intelligence. Organizational intell

requires the knowledge and innovation that each m

275
can contribute. Networked ideas by all personnel are c

to develop intelligence in the organization. Privati

eliminates the fundamental resource of intelligenc

in-house workforce. Private industry has discovere

valuable individuals are for reengineering. David Gon

director of physical facilities at the University of Calif

Santa Barbara, stated the preferred position o

Association of Higher Education Facilities Officers w

wrote that “contracting is not an option” for mainte

employees in the University of California sys

Certainly contracts can be negotiated to perform fun

but the loyalty and mental innovation of in-

employees cannot be replaced. The reason tha

Gonzales rejected contracting was the cost of losin

innovative capacity of the in-house workforce. All 

employees are members of his reengineering team

contribute valuable ideas that improve organiza

effectiveness. They are encouraged to share their tho

and empowered to make changes. Privatization s

ignore the power of organizational intelligence. Howe

is the source of energy that will unlock transformat

private industry has recognized the value of retain

own capable workforce, the government should ca

reconsider its fascination with privatization.

Another requirement to enable transformation 

change the budgeting process. Installation operations 

be resourced through a nonlinear budgeting system

costing model currently used is a traditional, linea

analysis approach to resource management. That sys

not capable of rapidly recognizing and providing f

ambiguous changes that occur at installations. A 

costing approach is necessary to enable the sustainin

to transform. The Installation Status Report can p

the first step toward fully implementing Activity 

Management throughout the sustaining base. For exa

installation services are defined and minimum stan

are identified in part 3 of the ISR. Costing measures 

276
be applied to the services identified in the ISR and us

Activity Based Management and budget planning.

A key vehicle for transforming the sustaining b

Army Performance Improvement Criteria. Howev

must be vastly expanded beyond the installation level

more than 7 years of emphasis on performance im

ment, sustaining base leaders continue to struggle w

obsolete and aging infrastructure. The shortfall shou

be blamed on APIC itself. The problem has b

short-sighted implementation of the criteria. Senior le

applied this reengineering tool to one level o

installation management system (the installa

themselves) while ignoring the remainder o

components (MACOMs and HQDA). In fact, APIC 

excellent tool to instill organizational intelligence. It i

to imbed the APIC framework throughout the sust

base system, from the installation up to the ACSIM

reengineer the entire installation management stru

APIC should be delinked from the Army Commun

Excellence (ACOE) program. ACOE served a useful 

generating interests in reengineering and improvin

operations. However, it has become a competiti

bragging rights between installations rather than a t

self-improvement. The time has come to eliminate AC

a program, and use those funds to defray base support 

Finally, for the Army to achieve meaningful Sust

Base Transformation, it must reengineer the 

installation management community. Gar

commanders are admonished to identify and elim

redundant activities at installations. However, the 

echelons maintain redundant installation manag

staff sections at most of the Army’s MACOMs. Elimi

those staffs and consolidating the installation manag

responsibilities of the Army under a single Sustainin

Command would result in significant savings, as w

effectiveness. One possibility would be to expand the 

the ACSIM to assume both command and 

responsibilities, similar to the Surgeon General or the 

277
of Engineers. In his staff capacity, ACSIM would se

the principal installation management advisor to the 

of Staff of the Army. Additionally, the ACSIM would 

as the Commanding General of a newly cr

MACOM—the Sustaining Base Command. All gar

would report directly to the Sustaining Base Comma

other MACOMs would be relieved of their insta

management responsibility, permitting them to foc

their Title 10 responsibilities to ensure that equ

trained, and ready forces are available for deployment

the Sustaining Base Command would require a 

operations support staff, since the other MACOMs wo

longer manage the funds for base support prog

Instead, the sole mission of the Sustaining Base Com

would be to ensure that army installations suppor

readiness, power projection and sustainment requirem

The command would be capable of distributing resour

budgeted requirements directly to the installation

Sustaining Base Command improves the effectiven

sustaining base management by reducing the li

communications between policymakers and executor

organization is more efficient than the current str

because it would eliminate intermediate laye

redundant staffs at the various MACOMs and reduc

funding pipeline as resources flow directly from the A

to the installations. A flatter organization i

installation management community would be 

effective and more efficient than the current structu

Conclusion.

The sustaining base of the transformed Army w

challenged to provide training facilities and ra

maintenance facilities, and support structures to 

and sustain the highly mobile objective force. Th

require flexible installation organizational stru

capable of recognizing changing requirements, and r

responding to those requirements. Only the 

transformation of every installation management are

278
result in the needed ability to adapt to new demand

changes.

38

 Innovative leaders must guide fle

intelligent organizations that are constantly strivi

excellence. The Chief of Staff of the Army has boldly 

the Army to embrace change and transform itself into 

force of sustained relevance. The transformed 

(including active and reserve components) will creat

and different demands on the infrastructures that su

power projection, training, maintenance, force prote

and quality of life. Those demands must be anticipate

posts, camps, and stations developed to support 

needs. The enduring nature of the Army install

continues to reflect the good order and discipline 

service. However, as sure as the Army is challeng

inevitable transformation, the process by which 

manages its posts, camps, and stations mu

revolutionized. A transformed sustaining base is nec

in order to support a transformed Army.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 9

1. Wayne Daniel and Carol Schmidt, “Fort Concho,” Febru

1999; available from http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/han

online/articles/view/FF/qbf11.html; Internet; accessed Decem

2000.

2. Eric Shinseki, “Address to Eisenhower Luncheon, 45th 

Meeting of AUSA,” October 12, 1999; available from http:/

tradoc.army.mil/transformation; Internet; accessed Decem

2000.

3. Jeffrey Goldstein, The Unshackled Organization, Po

Productivity Press, 1994, pp. 37-39.

4. Michael D. McMaster,The Intelligence Advantage: Organi

Complexity, Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1996, p. 31.

5. Goldstein, p. 32.

6. Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, a

Unpredicatability of War,” International Security, Vol. 17, 

Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992, p. 62.

279
7. Goldstein, p. 10.

8. Ibid., p. 69.

9. Ibid., p. 24.

10. Ibid., p. 45.

11. McMaster, p. 64.

12. Wolf Kutter, et al., Fiscal Year 2001 Army Budget; An A

Arlington: AUSA, 2000, pp. 48, 85-87.

13. Edward Luttwak, The Pentagon and the Art of War, Ne

Simon and Schuster, 1984, p. 134.

14. Robert Van Antwerp, Jr., “Fiscal Year 2001 National D

Authorization Act Real Property Congressional Testimony”; av

from http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/has0

000/has061030_0.htm>; Internet; accessed December 21, 2000

15. The Army Reserve reported facilities in 835 se

communities; the Army National Guard reported facilities i

communities. Reserve Component Programs, Reserve Forces 

Board Report, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 

1999, p. 129.

16. Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integratio

Manual 100-17-3, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the 

March 17, 1999, p. 14.

17. Major General (Retired) David H. Whaley, U.S. Army, p

conversations, 1998.

18. Installation Management, Field Manual 100-22, Wash

DC: U.S. Department of the Army, October 11, 1994.

19. Goldstein, pp. 37-39.

20. How the Army Runs, Carlisle: Department of Com

Leadership and Management, 1999, pp. 17-21.

21. “A-76 Studies,” available from http://www.hqda

mil/acsim/ca/igapend.htm; Internet; accessed December 25, 2

22. McMaster, p. 11.

280
23. “BASOPS Business Rules,” available from http:/

hqda.army.mil/acsim/ops/BASOPS%20Business%20Rul

Internet; accessed December 25, 2000.

24. Timothy S. White, The 60-Minute ABC Book: Activity

Costing for Operations Management, Bedford, TX: Consort

Advanced Manufacturing International, 1997, p. 19.

25. Malcolm Smith, “Managing your ABC System: Activity

Costing,” Management Accounting, April 1994, pp. 46-47.

26. Robert W. Kohler, “Triple-Threat Strategy,” Mana

Accounting, October 1991, pp. 30-34.

27. “Activity Based Costing,” available from http:/

pitt.edu/~roztocki/abc/abctutor/index.htm; Internet; acces

December 26, 2000.

28. “Installation Status Report,” available from http

xservices.com; Internet; accessed December 24, 2000.

29. Chief of Staff of the Army, 1998 Army Performance Impro

Criteria, Washington, DC: Strategic Management and Inno

Division, p. 7.

30.Daniel J. Cleary, “Army Performance Improvement C

Executive Development.” Briefing slides with scripted comm

Washington, DC, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, December 5, 

31. McMaster, p. 6.

32. “Reengineering the Installation Garrison,” availab

http://www.hqda.army.mil/acsim/ops/rgi.htm; Internet; a

December 21, 2000.

33. “Reengineering the Installation Garrison."

34. McMaster, p. 183.

35. Ibid., p. 135.

36. Goldstein, p. 51.

37. David Gonzales, “It Takes a Revolution—A Case S

Facilities Service Improvements at UCSB,” availabl

http://www.appa.org/fmep; Internet; accessed December 21, 2

281
38. Goldstein, pp. 37-39.

282
CHAPTER 10

PROJECTING INTELLIGENCE,

SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANC

SUPPORT OF THE INTERIM BRIGADE

COMBAT TEAM

Stephen P. Perkins

The Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) gains its lethal

and survivability from maneuver and maintaining positio

advantage over an opponent. To capitalize fully on t

tremendous capabilities of the IBCT, the organization m

achieve superior situational understanding. Milita

Intelligence is a major contributor to achieving this capabili

 Major General John D. Thomas

1

 Commandant

 U.S. Army Intelligence School

The Chairman’s Joint Vision (JV) 2020 calls for 

century joint force capable of achieving full spe

dominance in peace and war, and in any form of conflic

first articulated in JV 2010, full-spectrum dominanc

at harnessing the potential of the information revol

Evolving concepts of dominant maneuver, pre

engagement, focused logistics, and full dimen

protection will replace today’s capabilities of man

strike, logistics, and protection.

3

 Above al

achievement of full-spectrum dominance rests on the 

of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to p

friendly forces with situational understanding, 

allows them to achieve decision superiority.

Likewise, situational understanding is the fundam

force enabler across all Interim Brigade Combat 

battlefield operating systems and is the foundation f

mitigation with respect to its vulnerabilities, partic

the lack of substantial armor protection. The In

Brigade (Figure 1) will employ an integrated su

283
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capab

and digitized battle command systems to develo

disseminate a common operational picture through

units. That picture, in time, will lead to situa

understanding. As the commander applies judgmen

experience, he attains decision superiority.

5

 

situational understanding and information superiori

enable the force to avoid surprise, make rapid dec

control the time and place for combat, conduct pre

maneuver, shape the battlespace with precision fire

effects, and achieve decisive outcomes.

6

Thus intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais

support is most important to the Interim Force. It re

a coordinated effort by the Intelligence Comm

(services, joint, and national/interagency) to provi

Army or Joint Strike Force

8

 with the ability to a

intelligence superiority throughout the battlespace

chapter will look at possible scenarios that could fa

284

Figure 1. Interim Brigade Structure.
Interim Force, and the capabilities of current and pl

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets w

the Army to address such threats. Finally, it wil

recommendations aimed at increasing intellig

surveillance, and reconnaissance support to the In

Force, and Army Force acting as a part of a Joint Str

Joint Contingency Force.

9

THE FUTURE ENVIRONMENT

The Army Transformation Plan projects a comple

multi-polar strategic environment over the next 20 

There have been more than 50 ethnic wars, over 150 

conflicts, and two major wars involving extra-re

forces over the past decade.

10

 It is not likely that the 

the United States will diminish over coming decad

anything, America’s global engagement may increase 

world comes to grips with a more complex, uncertai

challenging future. Although the United States do

confront a single conventional military power capa

threatening its security, the establishment of re

alliances as well as changing priorities of other n

could change the strategic environment and le

situations that would represent a direct threat 

national security interests of the United Sta

Moreover, “many of the threats to our interests th

2010 and beyond will fall into (the) gray area of “impo

but not “vital.”

12

Asymmetric threats may result from the prolifera

transnational crime, terrorism, and illicit drug traffi

as well as from traditional military forces that ar

significant technological disadvantage compared 

United States. National security concerns may stem 

shortages of critical resources (oil, water

environmental problems (pollution, proliferation of n

and chemical agents). Potential state and non

challengers are studying the American militar

285
adapting their capabilities to neutralize U.S. m

advantages.

13

One author sums up the future threat:

The soldiers of the U.S. Army are brilliantly prepared to de

other soldiers. Unfortunately, the enemies we are likely to f

through this decade and beyond will not be “soldiers,” with 

disciplined modernity that term conveys in Euro-America, 

“warriors:”

14

 . . .

(W)arriors do not play by our rules, do not respect our treat

and do not obey orders they do not like. The warrior is back

brutal as ever and distinctly better armed.

15

The adaptive and unpredictable nature of external t

along with the strategic need to reach “trouble 

around the world prompted the Army to seek develo

of rapid, decisive capabilities. Some observed a nea

capability gap in the Army’s ability to ensure th

president and regional commanders-in-chief (CINCs

the full range of ground options necessary to operate 

uncertain environment. Moreover, the Army mu

capable of operating in a joint, interagency, and 

national environment.

16

 Specifically, the deploym

Task Force “Hawk” to Albania for Operation J

FORCE displayed the difficulty moving a heavy Arm

to a contingency area within the time constraints of a 

crisis.

17

The most challenging scenario for American forc

the Intelligence Community lies in a nonlinear, asym

battlefield that encompasses America, its allies, a

geographic command’s area of operations. Major G

Robert Scales (U.S. Army, Retired) in his article, “Ad

Enemies,” argues that the United States is “adve

casualties and collateral damage, sensitive to domest

world opinion, and (has a ) lack of commitment to co

measured in years rather than months.”

18

 F

scenarios, which have high casualty rates, may pu

limits of popular support of the American people. A 

286
conflict may involve attacks against the continental U

States(CONUS); intermediate staging bases us

military forces; and ship movements from CONUS 

theater. American forces will face an array of enemies 

in urban combat, mechanized warfare, and guerrilla ta

The use of intelligence to understand the threat t

military forces is essential to counter the dynam

pervasive threats of the future. “There can be no qu

but that information and intelligence qualify as a dim

of strategy, statecraft, and war. The perspective str

effect likely to be harvested from superior informatio

intelligence, however, has varied radically with the s

technologies, politics, geographies, and logistics of w

We are in a time where America’s enemies will atte

deny the United States access to information 

intelligence. A “system of systems” approach, usi

Interim Brigade as a building block, will attem

overcome this threat. The challenge to the Intell

Community is to harvest the vast amounts of inform

and ensure commanders are not overwhelmed or de

during their decisionmaking process.

TRANSFORMATION REQUIRES INCREASED

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND

RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITIES

The dynamic nature of the future battlespace chal

all of the battlefield operating systems. Howeve

intelligence battlefield operating system has the mis

providing the Interim Brigade’s situational awarenes

is critical to dominate maneuver and precision 

requirements. The doctrine, training, leade

organization, materiel, and soldier (DTLOMS) 

provides a framework for the evaluation of In

Brigade’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais

support. Based on the Army’s need to increase its 

projection capability, the Interim Brigade addr

organization and equipment in an effort to reduce i

while enhancing its lethality and cohesiveness.

287
Organization and Equipment.

The Interim Brigade’s organization is uni

information-centric. It embeds intelligence, survei

and reconnaissance to the lowest levels and througho

organization. The addition of a Reconnaiss

Surveillance, and Target Acquisition Squadron

20

 allo

Interim Brigade to “see, know, and understan

operational environment in detail, instead of ap

traditional reconnaissance, focused primarily on e

forces, with the objective of creating an umbre

understanding . . .”

21

 Figure 2 displays the nat

systems across the spectrum of operations. The cente

highlights the full-spectrum environment in whic

Interim Brigade operates and the requirement to a

all intelligence disciplines to meet the variety of chal

that an adversary may possess. Together with in

patrols, Recon Squadron operations are an integral p

the Interim Brigade’s intelligence gathering efforts. 

Squadron operations integrate with the activities 

infantry battalion reconnaissance platoons and 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

managed at brigade level. The squadron employs t

human intelligence and counterintelligence expe

complement existing sensor capabilities that are 

suited for open terrain and unit/force-based informa

288

Figure 2. Spectrum of Operations.
The Recon Squadron contains enhanced capabi

perform conventional reconnaissance by using st

fighting for information, and using human intell

assets. It prefers to use stealth for both the cond

traditional reconnaissance against conventional form

and while interacting with the civilian community

Recon Squadron fights for information when the t

situation requires. The squadron usually conduct

mission under high-risk conditions involving limite

local attacks while avoiding decisive engagement. 

Interim Brigade’s robust human intelligence asse

obtain an in-depth understanding of its area through 

interaction with special police, politicians, military

military organizations, nongovernmental and interna

organizations, and groups within the populace.

23

The second key intelligence player in the In

Brigade is the military intelligence company. The com

consists of a company headquarters element, an an

platoon, an integration platoon, and a tactical h

intelligence platoon.

24

 It essentially operates 

extension of the brigade intelligence staff (S-2) for in

and external management of intelligence, surveillanc

reconnaissance collection assets. It provides analy

support the development of the Interim Brigade’s co

operational picture, targeting/effects, and intell

preparation of the battlefield. The company co

organic systems necessary to interface with intelli

surveillance, and reconnaissance systems reside

division, Army Force, joint, theater, and national leve

supports the tactical human intelligence activities re

in the small scale contingency environment.

25

Key among the Interim Brigade’s intellig

surveillance, and reconnaissance features will be the 

a standard vehicle, making maintenance and se

easier. The brigade must balance the ability to 

rapidly with the capability of dominating the situ

when it arrives on scene. Intelligence must redu

sustainment requirements, minimize its personne

289
logistical footprint, use common vehicular platform

accomplish more of its functions out of theate

“reach-back”

26

 to higher echelons within the 

Contingency Force or within the United States

integration of counterintelligence and human intell

into the Recon Squadrons will allow for b

understanding of intelligence, surveillance

reconnaissance capabilities and better integration in

common operating picture.

The Interim Brigade has the newest mi

intelligence systems and offers a true multidisc

capability. While the signals intelligence capability 

tactical commander is different, it addresses the bri

dynamic operating environment. Specifically, the In

Brigade’s Prophet signals intelligence systems will ev

“internal” signals characteristics to “map” the e

situation.

28

 Currently, most units deploying to the c

training centers have signals intelligence systems att

or in a general support reinforcing role. Based o

complexity of current signals, the Interim Brigade 

have special purpose systems to truly exploit sign

must export “external” signals to a higher echel

exploitation.

29

 Due to the limitations of legacy s

intelligence systems, the Prophet-Ground systems o

to the Interim Brigade provide a better capability to 

and jam. At division-level, Prophet-Air system

eventually fill the void created by the transition 

Quickfix II collection and jamming helicopters (EH

Prophet-Air will use a unmanned aerial vehicle pla

that has a “plug and play” capability, allowing for a c

from a signals intelligence mode to infrared/electron-o

collection. The Prophet-Air platforms at the In

Division-level require a “Hunter”-like range 

kilometers) vice the tactical unmanned aerial vehic

kilometers).

30

The success of the Interim Brigade’s intelli

surveillance, and reconnaissance effort is extr

dependent on the signal community’s ability to pro

290
broad bandwidth backbone for dissemination 

collaboration. The creation of the Trojan-netwo

Operation DESERT STORM was military intellig

answer to the same shortfall in 1991. Additionall

common operating picture will require a near-rea

input capability for the collectors of information. The 

should equip counterintelligence and human intell

teams with personal digital assistants (“palm pilo

record information and make reports.

31

 The s

backbone must allow for remoted inputs, instead of 

teams to their vehicles. The bandwidth of signal equi

must continue to grow to enable thorough and ef

dissemination and flexible reachback.

Using the Joint Strike Force as a model for future o

forces and a potential higher headquarters for the In

Brigade and its Interim Division, it is essenti

Intelligence to integrate the intelligence, surveillanc

reconnaissance assets for the Interim Brigade wi

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance theat

national-level assets and analytical headquarters to 

a relevant common operating picture. The Interim B

must be a part of the joint collaborative communit

concept for the Joint Strike Force relies on s

maneuvering, networking and cross-cuing to enhan

situational awareness and understanding.

32

 The In

Brigade’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais

resources are an essential part of this multila

multifunction sensor network. State-of-the art com

systems and networks enable the Interim Brigade an

to be a part of this collaborative network. As unm

aerial vehicles, unmanned ground sensors and r

vehicles become a part of a more mature Interim For

sensors must integrate to ensure commanders and 

staffs have a relevant common operating picture.

The search for a “God’s eye view” of the batt

requires integration of division, corps, and th

intelligence assets. The Interim Brigade depends on 

levels to provide nonorganic collection and for add

291
analytic support. The Interim Division’s mi

intelligence battalion will provide multidiscip

intelligence support to the division, inclu

communications intercept, direction finding, elec

countermeasure, and limited surveillance. It will p

the division analysis and control element, which nor

locates in the sustainment command post but respo

the division intelligence officer (G-2) in the main com

post.

33

 The military intelligence battalion uses unm

aerial vehicles, counterintelligence and human intell

teams, processing resources, and the division analys

control element to gain the situational understa

necessary for maneuver dominance and precision 

The Interim Brigade and Interim Division may r

intelligence support from the corps military intell

brigade. Currently, a typical Corps intelligence b

provides analytic support, additional aerial exploi

assets (unmanned aerial vehicles and Guardrail Co

Sensor aircraft), and may have counterintelligenc

human intelligence and long-range surveillance 

assigned.

34

 A Theater Intelligence Brigade, unde

command of the Army Intelligence and Security Com

and under the operational control of the Army S

Component Command may deploy all or part of the b

to conduct theater level multi-discipline intelligenc

security operations in support of Army compone

regional CINC’s as directed during war and securit

stability operations.

35

 The generic Theater Intell

Brigade has an analytic, counterintelligence and h

intelligence collection and exploitation capability

provides aerial signals intelligence and im

intelligence using a one-of-a-kind aircraft (DeHav

Dash 7).

36

Doctrine.

The Interim Brigade will incorporate the fiv

principles of intelligence support to force proje

commander driven intelligence; intelligence sync

292
zation; split-based operations; tactical tailoring

broadcast dissemination.

37

First, the Interim Brigade focuses on the acquisi

intelligence as its first priority, allowing low densit

demand intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais

resources to target the most important areas of in

Since the common operating picture requires the ef

use of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais

commanders must tie their priorities to available reso

Second, using organic intelligence systems, the In

Brigade will have to “hook” into the intelligence hierar

systems. The intelligence “system of systems” con

allows for the synchronization of the entire intelli

surveillance, and reconnaissance apparatus and a 

common operating picture. When the Interim Br

operating as part of a joint force, is the initial Army u

theater, intelligence synchronization is essential. Thi

lack of airlift sorties and the requirement to get 

battlefield within 96 hours makes split-based operatio

all battlefield operating systems a critical feature 

Interim Brigade. Using rear command posts in “sanct

the Interim Brigade can gain valuable information fro

entire Intelligence Community using “reach-

capabilities.

38

 Recent experiences in Bosnia, Kosov

Kuwait underline the importance of split-based oper

to the commander and his staff as they conduct assess

of the battlespace. They are able to leverage the exp

and staffing that are available in reach-back loca

regional and national.

39

 Fourth, while the Interim B

is uniquely postured to meet its own intellig

surveillance, and reconnaissance requirements in 

scale contingencies, future scenarios will require 

specific assets. A Bosnia-like scenario may re

near-real time signals intelligence collection that do

reside in the Interim Brigade. Using “tactical tail

techniques and “standing” force enhancement modul

Interim Brigade could integrate special-purpose 

systems that address specific sources (cellular telep

293
are a possible example) to exploit in the opera

environment. Finally, the capability to pull intell

from broadcast dissemination systems allows for a co

operating picture with more granularity. A high-reso

picture is essential for the Interim Brigade to con

multitude of operations across a nonlinear battlefiel

The variety of field manuals produced by the U.S. 

Intelligence Center and School address holistic m

intelligence procedures. The challenges facing intell

derive from the dynamic nature of the intelligence t

techniques, and procedures and keeping these t

techniques, and procedures in pace with the cha

operational environment. Military intelligence 

throughout the Army continue to struggle with 

problem. New equipment, software, and ideas mak

training of soldiers and leaders extremely difficult.

40

the Interim Brigade incorporates the principles 

intelligence support, a methodology for updati

doctrine in a timely manner must become a centerp

maintaining one of the intelligence’s pri

features—disciplined operations.

Training.

The Interim Brigade offers expanded opportunit

military intelligence soldiers to conduct the 

operations. Their ability to work as a team is essential 

Interim Brigade’s intelligence, surveillance

reconnaissance and common operating picture e

Brigadier General Richard Quirk, Deputy Command

the Army Intelligence School, highlighted the ne

better training across the Intelligence Battlefield Ope

System stating, “The intelligence soldier of tomorro

require a professional education; our traditional m

training will not be sufficient.”

41

The soldier will remain the key independent varia

future operations. Thus, education efforts must 

technical proficiency tasks as the art of intelligence

294
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, analysts addre

variety of unpredictable threats. The Intelligence 

must develop and rigorously institute an educa

system focused on future threats and an ambi

environment.

42

 Education at Fort Huachuca 

concentrate more on the “how to think” and less “w

think.” Most units have the expertise to work the latt

can build on a good foundation of the former. Unit tr

programs must continue to orient on individual and 

drill, but the harder task is developing the so

analytical skills. It is also critical for the intelligence b

to start with intelligent and adaptable people and

more importantly, to retain them past their i

enlistment.

The Intelligence School must continue its efforts to 

web-based education. Using the Army’s warrant 

corps (active, reserve, and retired) as a resource, so

should be able to develop and enhance their tr

through an on-line mentorship program. Although pa

of simulations resulted in effective signals intell

training, the use of simulations for counterintelligen

human intelligence soldiers requires improve

Counterintelligence and human intelligence exper

critical to the Interim Brigade’s employment. 

effective, counterintelligence and human intelli

including the S-2X, must integrate trained teams wi

combat forces and train regularly with other f

agencies to gain expertise on their technique

procedures. Commanders and “warfighters” mus

experience using them and valuing their ability to s

the “human” element. Further, the Intelligence Schoo

work with the other services, joint headquarters

national agencies to ensure trainee analysts and ope

share a common base of knowledge and that service u

tactics, techniques, and procedures are incorporate

simulations. To meet the future challenge, we mus

institutionalized joint and interagency education pro

in each of the services.

295
Leadership.

Army transformation requires more than just a c

to force structure and equipment. It requires “a new 

thinking.” Key to the transformation is forward-lo

leadership. The Interim Brigade structure is a direct 

of senior military intelligence branch leaders recog

the need for a different intelligence, surveillance

reconnaissance structure in the Interim Brigade. W

would have been easier to put a status quo organiza

the Interim Brigade, the Deputy Chief of Sta

Intelligence and the Intelligence School’s leade

exploited the opportunity to build an organization to 

future requirements. The Interim Brigade stretch

system and requires a different way of leading soldie

The intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais

“director” for the Interim Brigade is a military intell

officer serving as the S-2. This military intelligence of

critical to the success of the Interim Brigade an

military intelligence branch’s credibility. The In

Brigade organization tables authorize a major fo

battalion S-2 job, and it is critical that a major fill tha

A common complaint at the combat training centers 

S-2 is not experienced enough.”

43

 Often the Army a

captains to serve as brigade S-2s, because of a short

majors. The complexity of the Interim Brig

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance effor

require a senior military intelligence officer and a 

trained professional. Military Intelligence branch 

assign majors to Interim Brigade S-2 jobs, ensure th

trained to meet the rigors, and assign appropriate b

qualification to successful completion. Recent field

training at Intelligence School for Division G2

Analysis and Control Element Chiefs provides a good 

Additionally, Interim Brigade S-2 should be residen

Army Command and General Staff College grad

making them equal to their Interim Brigade oper

officer (S-3) counterparts.

296
The Intelligence School must develop an edu

program for the Surveillance Troop commander an

Interim Brigade’s military intelligence com

commander. The requirement to act independently o

part of a Joint Task Force (or Joint Strike Force) dict

broader knowledge base. The Officer Pers

Management System (OPMS) XXI system may facilita

assignments and understanding that the Interim Bri

leaders will need. A new education system, as discus

General Quirk and mentioned earlier, may addres

critical requirement. It is too important to gloss 

Further, the junior military intelligence leaders 

Interim Brigade may face similar challenges and r

specific training modules to be added to current and 

institutional training. Ultimately, we must chang

mindset from, “Leaders are important” to “quality le

are essential.” Unlike our current “alert > train > d

approach to war, the “train > alert > deploy” approac

require more of our leaders than previously.

44

Soldiers.

Despite the evolution of technologies, soldier

continue to play the crucial role in future conflic

Interim Brigade, as the lead ground unit into a “hot 

will demand new and innovative recruitment, trainin

retention techniques to man a force capable of meeti

Army’s stated goals. As displayed in Figure 2, the upp

of the spectrum of operations is extremely dangerou

the lower end is extremely complicated and dynami

small scale contingency environment is as dangerou

major theater of war and, like a security and st

operations environment, small scale contingencies o

diverse set of circumstances. Future rules of engag

require situational and cultural understanding by 

leaders and soldiers. The potential impact of f

decisions at the team- and squad-level has str

significance and affects American policy. The In

Brigade’s rapid reaction capability will require tho

297
training before it assumes a dynamic power projectio

a synchronized effort during deployment, and an ab

fight upon entry into the target area. The intelli

surveillance, and reconnaissance effort is conti

throughout the deployment process, including in

updates and, upon arrival, situational awareness 

analytical footprint expands. The real challenge w

balancing all of the requirements of the soldier.

RECOMMENDATIONS

There are three key recommendations for imp

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance suppor

Interim Brigade acting as a part of an Army Force, a 

Strike Force, or a Joint Contingency Force.

• First, the Army must continue to support th

formation of relevant intelligence organizations

Interim Brigade organization must have the right b

of collectors, analysts, and leaders. It must have o

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance suppo

the ability to receive force enhancement module

reach-back to multi-echeloned intelligence organiz

and agencies. The Interim Brigade concept address

need to put counterintelligence and human intell

resources at the brigade level. This is critical to addr

the needs of the Interim Brigade and addresses the sh

of Army counterintelligence assets available for st

and support operations. The deactivation of two corp

tactical exploitation battalions in 1996 exacerbat

already stretched counterintelligence and h

intelligence force. While the Army is adjusting its str

from the brigade level and working its way up

important to integrate elements of the intelli

battlefield operating system. Concept developers mu

at the organization of intelligence resources holist

Since the structure of the Interim Brigade will r

augmentation from Division, Corps, and the Th

Intelligence Brigade, it is essential that these ec

298
evolve in parallel fashion to the Interim Brigade an

sequentially. The nesting of missions requires ec

above corps units to develop adaptable force enhanc

modules capable of meeting the Interim Brig

deployment timelines.

• Second, Army intelligence must continue to lev

technology and innovative management technique

work with the other Services, the Intelligence Comm

and international partners to have all intelli

organizations using compatible systems. It must int

efforts to use the All-Source Analysis System as the co

platform for all Army operations. The Army must si

tactics, techniques, and procedures and share inform

with joint and international partners. It must conti

develop virtual collaborative analysis as an ess

component of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais

support to the Interim Brigade. In addition to imp

interoperability, training is essential to the In

Brigade’s ability to gain information domin

Simulations and joint education form the foundati

future training. Recent experiences from the All Se

Combat Identification Equipment Tests displa

shortcomings of joint intelligence gathering and an

Specifically, Marine Corps and Army intelligence an

cannot create a common operating picture withou

Army providing a liaison with an All-Source An

System remote workstation. Army and Air Force cou

share battlefield damage assessment until the Air 

provided a specific radio with a digital feed.

45

• Third, Army intelligence must work closely with 

signal to ensure adequate broad-band communicati

the lowest level. The Interim Brigade relies on multi

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance inp

maintain an accurate and relevant common ope

picture. Conceptually, the vehicle in the Interim Brig

not as important as what it represents: an enable

allows soldiers to act and fight as an intern

networked, and combined-arms team.

46

 While the 

299
Trojan Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intell

Terminal (also called “Trojan SPIRIT”) communic

has allowed Army intelligence to meet its split-

operational requirements, Army intelligence used its 

and out-of-hide manning for this communications sy

Expeditious fielding of new signal systems is essentia

Interim Brigade’s ability to reach-back for intelli

surveillance, and reconnaissance support.

47

 S

personnel must be a part of the Interim Brig

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance struct

maintain intelligence center networking.

CONCLUSION

The end of the Cold War destroyed the balance of 

throughout the world, and created instability 

uncertainty. The Persian Gulf War was not only a 

success for the United States, but it also brough

military new challenges. The decade of the 1990s disp

how unstable the world could be. A number of smal

contingencies, accentuated by the inability of Task 

“Hawk” to meet deployment requirements, highlight

need for the United States to maintain a lethal, surv

Army, capable of rapid deployment. The Interim B

provides the nation with a viable Army option t

capable of winning wars and contributing to 

Leveraging intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais

is essential to the Interim Brigade’s ability to dom

maneuver and provide precision engagement. Situa

understanding, gained by intelligence, surveillance

reconnaissance, allows all battlefield operating syste

enhance their effectiveness and for the Interim Brig

mitigate risk.

Recently, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intell

articulated the mission of Army intelligence mission

goal of Army intelligence is to facilitate situa

dominance by Army decisionmakers and warfighter

key to situational dominance is information superiorit

300
enables the seven operational characteristics of the 

Objective Force: responsiveness, deployability, a

versatility, lethality, survivability, and sustainabilit

complete intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais

system will give commanders the ability to face ad

enemies using myriad advanced technologies to atta

United States asymmetrically using low technolog

lethal, weapons of the past.

General Shinseki has the Army postured to me

long term goal, “To adjust the condition of the Army to 

meet the requirements of the next century, we arti

this vision: ‘Soldiers on point for the nation transfo

this, the most respected army in the world, i

strategically responsive force that is dominant acro

full spectrum of operations.”

49

 While the challenges 

future are daunting, Army intelligence can meet the 

of Staff’s challenge.

The discussion and analysis in this chapter des

how important intelligence, surveillance, 

reconnaissance support is to the Interim Br

Integration of intelligence, surveillance, and reco

sance sensors provides a relevant common ope

picture for analysts throughout the battlespace. U

collaborative analytical effort, intelligence officers p

their commanders actionable intelligence that su

their decisionmaking. Emphasizing training an

development of leaders, intelligence, surveillance

reconnaissance’s holistic approach will ensure the In

Force has the ability to operate in the dynamic and v

world of the 21st century.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 10

1. Major General John D. Thomas, “VANTAGE POINT: The 

Brigade Combat Team,” Military Intelligence, No. 26, April-Jun

p. 2.

2. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020, Washington, DC,20

301
3. Ibid., p. 2.

4. After this point, “Interim Brigade” replaces the term “

Brigade Combat Team.”

5. Colonel Michael Mehaffey, “Vanguard of the Objective 

Military Review, No. 80, September-October 2000, p. 10. The c

operating picture (COP) is the current set of command an

estimates, situation graphics, and other relevant data th

understood by and digitally accessible to all parts of the force.

6. Ibid., p. 10.

7. George J. Tenet, A Consumer’s Guide to Intelligence, Wash

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999, p. 44. The Inte

Community is the aggregate of the executive branch and organ

and agencies involved in intelligence activities: CIA; NSA; DIA; 

NRO; State; four armed services; DOD; FBI; Treasury; Energy; 

Office of the Director of CIA.

8. Joint Strike Force Implementation, Final Draft, Colon

Lynch, ed., Institute of Defense Analysis, September 20, 2000, p

Joint Strike Force (JSF) is a standing joint headquarters assigne

warfighting CINCs with synchronized, aligned joint mission-

forces. The JSF is an innovative approach to commanding, cont

and employing joint forces to resolve small scale contingencies w

CINC’s area of responsibility using rapid and decisive operation

2004-2007 timeframe.

9. Department of the Army, Tactics, Techniques, and Proced

Brigade Intelligence Operations in a Joint Contingency Forc

Manual 34-10-6/ST, Initial Draft-v1.0, Fort Huachuca, AZ: U.S

Intelligence Center, February 29, 2000, pp. 2-12. The Joint Cont

Force, or Joint Task Force, is a complex system of per

organizations, and equipment.

10. Lieutenant General Larry R. Ellis, Deputy Chief of S

Operations, Army Staff, “United States Army Transfor

Campaign Plan,” memorandum for Under Secretary of the 

Washington, DC, October 30, 2000.

11. Ibid.

12. Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr., America’s Army: Pr

for Tomorrow’s Security Challenges, Carlisle Barracks, PA: S

Studies Institute, 1998, p. 4.

302
13. Ellis.

14. According to Ralph Peters, “warriors” are erratic primi

shifting allegiance, habituated to violence, with no stake in civil o

15. Ralph Peters, Fighting For The Future: Will America Tri

Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1999, p. 33.

16. Ellis.

17. Colonel Robert C. Owen, and Captain Todd A. Fog

Mobility Command and the Objective Force: A Case for Coop

Revolution,” Military Review, No. 81, January–February 2001, 

18. Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr., “Adaptive E

Achieving Victory by Avoiding Defeat,” Joint Forces Quarterly, 

Autumn/Winter 1999-2000, pp. 12-13.

19. Colin Gray, Modern Strategy, New York: Oxford Un

Press, 1999, p. 35.

20. After this point, “Recon Squadron” replaces th

“Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition Squadr

21. Mahaffey, p. 11.

22. Ibid.

23. The Interim Brigade Combat Team Organization

Operational Concept, Washington, DC: Department of the Arm

30, 2000, pp. 38-39.

24. Department of the Army, Field Manual 34-80-2/ST, p. 8

25. Ibid., p. 22-23.

26. Department of the Army, “The Interim Division Organiz

and Operational Concept,” Version 3.7, Fort Monroe, VA: U.S

Training and Doctrine Command, June 30, 2000, p. 64. The co

“reachback” encompasses the capability of the Interim Brigade 

Team (IBCT) to exploit a multitude of non-organic resou

accomplish its assigned missions. The IBCT executes reach-ba

routine, deliberate basis as a combat power and sustainment mu

in five primary areas: fires/effects; intelligence and inform

planning and analysis; force protection; and sustainment. Reach

based on: advanced command, control, communications, com

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, also called 

303
systems with the appropriate interfaces with higher headquart

outside agencies and the appropriate connectivity for dist

operations at range and in urban and complex terrain; a set of 

techniques, and procedures, also called TTPs, to govern staff ac

well-trained staff that understands the capabilities available t

reach-back; and how best to employ them for mission requirem

27. Department of the Army, “The Interim Brigade Comba

Organizational and Operational Concept,” p. 12.

28. The term “internal signals” refers to frequencies and fre

characteristics of radios and radars. Signals intelligence process

exploit these “internals” and through analysis determine the 

system and/or the unit for exploitation.

29. The term “external signals” refers to plain or en

communications. Signals intelligence analysts, using either stan

“black box” collection systems, translate the “externals” for explo

30. Colonel Kevin C. Peterson, “Prophet: Tactical SIGINT 

21st Century,“ Military Intelligence, No. 26, July-September 20

40-42; and Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, Acquisit

Technology, UAV Annual Report FY 96, Washington, DC: Direct

Airborne Reconnaissance Office, November 6, 1996, p. 15. Follow

October 1995 Joint Requirements Oversight Committee 

recommendation, the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisiti

Technology decided to let the “Hunter” contract expire after del

its seven “Low Rate Initial Program” systems. The 15th M

Intelligence Battalion at Fort Hood, Texas, received these “H

unmanned aerial vehicles and in 1999 deployed to Kosovo to 

Operation ALLIED FORCE. Originally, the Army wanted to f

“Hunter” system to Corps-level aerial exploitation battalions.

31. Lieutenant Colonel Gus E. Greene, Sr., former action 

Directorate of Combat Developments, U.S. Army Intelligence 

and School and former commander, 104th Military Intel

Battalion, interview by author, January 4, 2000.

32. Lynch, pp. 57-60.

33. Department of the Army, “The Interim Division Organiz

and Operational Concept,” p. 62.

34. Lieutenant Colonel Michael A. Fant, former commande

Military Intelligence Battalion, Aerial Exploitation, interv

author, January 26, 2001.

304
35. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-100, pp. 7-40 t

7-42.

36. Colonel Brian Keller, commander, 513th Military Inte

Brigade, “Theater Intelligence Support,” electronic mail mes

Stephen Perkins, February 27, 2001. There are two Theater Inte

Brigades that support the two Major Theater of War (MTW) c

The 501st Military Intelligence Brigade in Korea supports MTW 

The 513th MI Brigade at Fort Gordon, Georgia supports MTW 

Each has a different force structure and their capabilities supp

needs of the Army Service Component Commander and the CI

37. Department of the Army, Intelligence and Electronic W

Operations, Field Manual 34-1, Washington, DC, 1994, p. 1-4.

38. The author defines the term “sanctuary” as the area, n

out of the theater, where organizations reach-back to access a 

information resource. For deploying units, the sanctuary is usu

deployed unit’s home facility. Stay-behind personnel usually 

support or contact outside organizations for assistance.

39. The author bases this comment on his personal exp

during Operations VIGILANT WARRIOR (1994) and DESER

(1998), and his discussion with members of the 103d M

Intelligence Battalion Analysis and Control Element abou

experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo from June 1998 to June 2000

40. Lieutenant Colonel William J. Tait, Commander, 104th M

Intelligence Battalion, interview by author, December 15, 2000

41. Brigadier General Richard J Quirk, III, “Training the M

for the Future, Military Intelligence, No. 26, October-December 

30.

42. Ibid.

43. Lieutenant Colonel Frederick A. Rudesheim, 

observer/controller at the National Training Center and the B

Command Training Program, interview by author, January 24

44. Major General James M. Dubik, “ICBT [sic IBCT] 

Lewis,” Military Review, No. 80, September-October 2000, p. 2

45. Based on the author’s evaluation of the All Services 

Identification Equipment Tests (ASCIET) in 1999 and 2000 con

at Fort Stewart, Georgia. The author was the commander of th

305
Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion; the 103d MI was a partic

unit during ASCIET 99 and 00.

46. Major Raul E. Escribano and Major Phillip J. 

“Transforming the Army for the Next Century—The Future 

Today!” Military Intelligence, No. 26, September-December 2000

47. Colonel William A. Carrington and Major Jerry L. Sch

“The MI-Signal ‘Rock Drill’ for the Initial Brigade Combat 

Military Review, No. 26, July-September 2000, p. 18. Author’s co

The new signal systems referred to are the SMART-T and the S

The acronym “SMART-T” is an abbreviation for “Secure 

Anti-jam Reliable Tactical Terminal.” The SMART-T is a l

HMMWV-mounted extremely high frequency (20-40 GHz) s

terminal, which provides unattended, robust, worl

low-probability of detection, jam resistant, multi-ch

communications in support of field commander at the division-le

above. The acronym “STAR-T” is an abbreviation for “Sup

frequency (SHF) Triband Advanced Range extension Termina

STAR-T is a low cost HMMWV-mounted, triband (C, X, Ku

station capable of providing quick reaction communicatio

satellite. The STAR-T replaces the Trojan SPIRIT, which is th

haul” system in military intelligence organizations at the IB

echelons division and above.

48. Lieutenant General Robert W. Noonan, Jr.

Transformation of Army Intelligence,” Military Intelligence, 

September-December 2000, p. 9.

49. Dennis Steele, “The ARMY Magazine Hooah Guide t

Transformation,” Army, No. 51, February 2001, p. 22. This quo

from an October 1999 speech launching Army Transformation.

306
ABOUT THE AUTHORS

GENARO J. DELLAROCCO is a colonel in the U.S. 

Following graduation from the U.S. Army War Colle

now serves as the Project Manager for Force Project

the U.S. Army Tank-automotive Armaments Com

(TACOM). Prior to attending the U.S. Army War C

Colonel Dellarocco was assigned as the Product Ma

Petroleum and Water Systems, TACOM; the Office 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Rese

Development, and Acquisition; and the Ballistic M

Defense Organization. He spent a year in the Trainin

Industry Program at the McDonnell Douglas Astron

(Space Systems) Company. Additionally, he serv

several logistics assignments. Colonel Dellarocco ea

B.S. degree in Business Administration from Lake Su

State College, an M.S. in Material Acquisition Manag

from the Florida Institute of Technology, and a Mas

Military Art and Science. Colonel Dellarocco 

commissioned into the Regular Army (Quarterm

Corps) in 1978.

MICHAEL D. FORMICA, a lieutenant colonel in th

Army, is an armor officer and a member of the U.S. 

War College Class of 2001. He has served in a var

command and staff positions in Europe, CONUS

Korea. Most recently, he commanded the 4th Squadro

Cavalry in the Republic of Korea. Lieutenant C

Formica holds a master’s degree in Public Administ

from the University of Missouri at Kansas City.

DAVID R. GRAY, a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Ar

an infantry officer and a member of the U.S. Arm

College Class of 2001. He has served in a vari

command and staff positions in CONUS and Hawaii

recently, he commanded 2nd Battalion, 87th Infan

Fort Drum, New York. Lieutenant Colonel Gray 

masters and doctorate degrees in military history from 

State University.

307
WILLIAM F. GRIMSLEY, a lieutenant colonel in th

Army, is an Infantry officer currently serving in J5 

Joint Staff in Washington, DC. He has served in a var

command and staff positions throughout the Conti

United States, Europe and Korea. Lieutenant C

Grimsley holds a B.A. in History from Davidson C

North Carolina; a Master of Military Arts and Science

the School of Advanced Military Studies at 

Leavenworth, Kansas; and is a 2001 graduate of th

Army War College and member of the Advanced Str

Arts Program.

MICHAEL J. MCMAHON, a lieutenant colonel in th

Army, is currently a Strategic Analyst at Joint 

Command. Prior to assuming his current position, he 

student at the U.S. Army War College. Lieutenant C

McMahon commanded the 1st battalion, 14th Infantr

has commanded and been a staff officer in the 25th In

Division (Light), the 101st Airborne Division (Air As

and the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized). He also s

as a Program Analyst on the Department of the Army 

Commissioned an officer of the Infantry after grad

from the U.S. Military Academy in 1981, Lieut

Colonel McMahon was awarded a Masters of Scie

Systems Technology from the Naval Postgraduate Sch

1990, and a Masters of Military Arts and Sciences fro

School of Advanced Military Studies in 1994.

WILLIAMSON MURRAY is currently professor emer

history at Ohio State University. He has served 

Harold Johnson Professor of Military History at th

Army War College. Dr. Murray is also the author and 

of a number of major works, the most recent of whic

War To Be Won, Fighting the Second World War, pub

by Harvard University Press.

DANNY G. NOBLES, a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. 

Reserves, is an Army Engineer Officer with an ext

background in base operations and install

management. He has served on active duty for the p

308
years in various command and staff assignments an

been selected for assignment as Joint Engineer 

Officer in the J-4 of the Joint Staff. Lieutenant C

Nobles has served at all levels of the Army, inc

engineer operations officer on division staff; chief of 

and operations at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; en

operations officer in U.S. Army Europe; and 

installation planner (subsequently executive officer) 

Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Manage

Department of the Army. Prior to attending the U.S. 

War College, he was the deputy garrison commander a

Hood, Texas. Lieutenant Colonel Nobles has earned 

from the University of the State of New York and a m

degree in International Relations from Syr

University. His military education includes En

Officer Basic and Advance Courses, the U.S. 

Command and General Staff College, and the U.S. 

War College.

STEPHEN P. PERKINS, a lieutenant colonel in th

Army, is assigned to the J2 staff, Joint Forces Com

Norfolk, Virginia. His active Army service includes 

infantry company command and battalion S3 duty 

25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, H

and battalion command of the 103d Military Intell

Battalion, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort St

Georgia. Lieutenant Colonel Perkins has also served 

intelligence staff officer on the Joint Staff. A vete

Operation URGENT FURY, he has published num

articles in Infantry magazine and the Military Intell

professional bulletin on light infantry operation

tactical intelligence, respectively. Lieutenant C

Perkins is a graduate of Cameron University, La

Oklahoma; the U.S. Air Command and Staff C

(distinguished graduate), Maxwell Air Force 

Alabama; and the U.S. Army War College (Adv

Strategic Art Program), Carlisle, Pennsylvania. He 

master’s in Public Administration from Auburn Univ

309
Auburn, Alabama; and a master’s in Strategic Studie

the U.S. Army War College.

FREDERICK S. RUDESHEIM is a U.S. Army In

officer and was a member of the U.S. Army War C

Class of 2001. Following graduation he be

Commander, Operations Group A in the U.S. Army 

Command Training Program, Ft. Leavenworth. H

served in a variety of command in staff positio

Germany, CONUS, and Korea. Most recent

commanded 1st Battalion, 9th Cavalry Regimen

Cavalry Division, and was the Senior Mechanized In

Trainer at the National Training Center. Lieut

Colonel Rudesheim holds a master’s degree in Interna

Relations from Troy State University and a mast

Military Arts and Science from the U.S. Army Com

and General Staff College.

JAMES W. SHUFELT, JR., a lieutenant colonel in th

Army, is serving in the U.S. Army Office on the Joint 

He was a student in the Advanced Strategic Art Prog

the U.S. Army War College, Class of 2001. Pr

attending the U.S. Army War College, he served as 

Task Force Falcon in Kosovo (1999-2000) and as Squ

Commander of the 1st Squadron, 4th U.S. Cavalr

divisional cavalry squadron of the 1st Infantry Di

(Mechanized) (1997-1999). He has served 21 years 

U.S. Army, including assignments with the 4th In

Division (Mechanized), the 11th Armored Ca

Regiment, the 82d Airborne Division, and the TRA

Systems Manager–FORCE XXI. Lieutenant C

Shufelt received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academ

is a graduate of the School of Advanced Military Stu

310
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Editor

Dr. Williamson Murray

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams