TRANSFORMATION CONCEPTS

FOR NATIONAL SECURITY IN

THE 21st CENTURY

Williamson Murray

Editor

September 2002
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ISBN 1-58487-104-0

ii
CONTENTS

Foreword ........................v

1. TRANSFORMATION: Volume II

Dr. Williamson Murray .................1

2. THE ARMY, TRANSFORMATION, AND

MODERNIZATION, 1945-91: Implications for Today

Colonel Arthur W. Connor, Jr. ............ 25

3. EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS: The End

of Dominant Maneuver?

Colonel Gary H. Cheek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

4. EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS: A New

Operational Model?

Lieutenant Colonel Allen W. Batschelet . . . . . . . 101

5. EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS: Theory,

Application, and the Role of Airpower

Lieutenant Colonel Brett T. Williams . . . . . . . . 133

6. RAPID DECISIVE OPERATIONS:

The Emperor’s New Clothes of Modern Warfare

Lieutenant Colonel James L. Boling . . . . . . . . . 167

7. OPERATION JUST CAUSE: Concepts

for Shaping Future Rapid Decisive Operations

Lieutenant Colonel James H. Embrey ........ 197

8. TRANSFORMING THE INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY

Lieutenant Colonel Steven L. Salazar . . . . . . . . 247

9. THE ARMY’S ROLE IN HOMELAND

SECURITY

Lieutenant Colonel Daniel J. Shanahan . . . . . . 285

iii
10. MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

FOR WARFARE IN THE 21st CENTURY:

Balancing Implications of Urban Operations

and Emerging Joint Operational Concepts

Lieutenant Colonel Charles L. Taylor . . . . . . . . 311

11. A U.S. GOVERNMENT INTERAGENCY

STRUCTURE TO COMBAT TRANSNATIONAL

TERRORISM

Lieutenant Colonel George J. Woods III . . . . . . . 347

12. RAPID DECISIVE OPERATIONS:

The Search for the Holy Grail of Joint Warfighting

Lieutenant Colonel David R. Hogg . . . . . . . . . . 375

ABOUT THE AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405

iv
FOREWORD

The famous Confederate General Stonewall Jackson

noted that “To move swiftly, strike vigorously, and secure

all the fruits of the victory is the secret of successful war.”

This observation is at the very heart of the current

discussion and experimentation on how the transformed

joint services of the United States should employ force in the

21st century. The services are exploring concepts such as

Effects Based Operations and Rapid Decisive Operations to

move swiftly and strike vigorously to secure victory in the

coming decades. At the same time the nation and its armed

forces are developing new concepts of homeland security to

defend the country in the war on terrorism. The following

chapters represent some of the thinking by students at the

U.S. Army War College, considering the nature and

direction of transformation concepts that deal with these

issues.

Officers who participated in the Advanced Strategic Art

Program (ASAP) during their year at the U.S. Army War

College wrote these chapters. The ASAP is a unique

program that offers selected students a rigorous course of

instruction in theater strategy. Solidly based in theory,

doctrine, and history, the program provides these students

a rich professional experience that includes staff rides,

exercises, and the best instructional expertise available.

The program is designed to provide the joint community

with the best strategists and planners in the world. In the

case of these officers and their work, they have already

begun to make a difference. They and their fellow graduates

of the U.S. Army War College will continue to serve the

Army and the nation for many years to come.

ROBERT R. IVANY

Major General, U.S. Army

Commandant

v
CHAPTER 1

TRANSFORMATION: VOLUME II

Dr. Williamson Murray

This is the second volume of essays written by the

students in the Advanced Strategic Arts Program at the

U.S. Army War College.1 Like last year’s volume, it

addresses the question of transformation, but this time

within the larger framework of joint concepts and

capabilities that are likely to drive processes within the

Army and other services over the coming decade. Already

joint or service concepts such as effects-based operations

and operational net assessment are having considerable

influence over how the Department of Defense (DoD) is

conceptualizing the problems of transformation. In one form

or another, the Army must address those concepts from the

perspective of its history—a history that encompasses the

whole strategic and operational framework of the U.S.

military from the American War of Independence to the

present. With that historical framework in mind, it must

become an active partner in bringing substance to what has

so far, more often than not, represented processes of

conceptual development long on claims and short on serious

intellectual content.

In the 1990s, as the services began to address the

question of transformation seriously, a number of concepts

emerged that aimed at utilizing rapidly advancing

technology and new capabilities to realize a future

revolution in military affairs—or, in the view of some,

revolutions in military affairs.2 Among the more recent

concepts that have emerged are those of effects-based

operations and operational net assessment. Unfortunately,

1
these efforts have for the most part remained immature. It

is the purpose of this introductory chapter and the following

essays to address some of the questions that such concepts

should raise, as well as the potential role they might play in

the processes of Army transformation.3

In the largest sense, the development of viable concepts

of operations demands a symbiosis among the worlds of the

intellect, the tactical and operational, and increasingly

advanced technology.4 As Michael Howard has suggested,

this is because the military profession is not only the most

demanding physically, it is the most demanding

intellectually of all the professions. The latter is the case

because military organizations rarely have the opportunity

to practice their profession—not necessarily a bad

thing—and military organizations can rarely, if ever,

replicate the conditions of war in peacetime — particularly

the fact that our enemy is trying to kill us.5 As Clausewitz

suggests:

[W]ar is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the

application of that force . . . War, however, is not the action of a

living force upon a lifeless mass, . . . but always the collision of

two living forces. . . . if you want to overcome your enemy, you

must match your effort against his powers of resistance, which

can be expressed as the product of two inseparable factors, viz.

the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will.6

This places a difficult burden on military organizations

on whose wisdom in preparing for war, a nation’s survival

can depend. Consequently, the development of concepts,

relevant and useful to thinking about and preparing for

future war, is of crucial importance.

In fact, the concepts of effects-based operations and

operational net assessment are not new, as many of their

advocates claim. They are a consistent theme through the

conduct of military campaigns by great commanders

throughout the military history of the Western world over

the past 3 centuries.7 When tied to the historical framework

and the evolution of American doctrine, particularly as it

2
emerged in the late 1970s and 1980s, these concepts offer

the opportunity to expand the understanding of the U.S.

military on the fundamental and unchanging nature of war,

with its constraints both in terms of politics and the impact

of friction. At the same time such concepts could allow the

incorporation of the technological and computer revolution,

clearly taking place in the external world, into service and

joint doctrinal and operational frameworks as well as the

education of future officers.8

When such concepts are not tied to the historical

framework, then they become nothing more than “slogans

and bumper stickers” that represent the re-invention of the

wheel—a wheel rickety, insubstantial, and incapable of

bearing any weight.9 Without an historical perspective, the

theorist of future war is left to dream of things that have not

happened without any reference to the real world of human

experience and understanding. Those who believe that

history offers no useful support to theories of future war

would do well to remember Clausewitz’s sharp words on the

relationship between military theory and history:

[theory] is an analytic investigation leading to a close

acquaintance with the subject; applied to experience—in our

case military history—it leads to thorough familiarity with

it... [When it does not, the result is that theories become]

absolutely useless... in the rules and regulations they offer...

they aim at fixed values, but in war everything is uncertain,

and calculations have to be made with variable quantities.10

Effects-Based Operations.

Over the past decade, there has been increasing interest

in a concept termed effects-based operations. The actual

derivation of the term comes from the design for the initial

night of the air campaign at the start of OPERATION

Desert Storm. Planners in the Black Hole, the center of

planning for the air campaign against Iraq, aimed do

something more than simply listing targets and then

attacking them one after another, with little regard for the

3
overall effect. The emphasis of the planners in the Black

Hole, harking back to air power thinking in the U.S. Army’s

Air Corps Tactical School before World War II, was on

achieving second and third order effects beyond the simple

destruction of targets, which had reflected so much of the

U.S. Air Force’s approach to air campaigns throughout

much of the Cold War.11

The end result of this effects-based planning was that a

mixture of stealth, precision, and electronics

countermeasures destroyed Iraq’s integrated air defense

system in the opening hours of the Gulf War.12 To many,

that success heralded a new age of air power employment,

one characterized by an emphasis on the effects and the

outcome rather than the inputs. Unfortunately, that

emphasis on air power employment has tended to give the

concept itself the flavor of an air force procurement

program, which has all too often been justified.

Moreover, advances in conceptual thinking have not

matched the advances in technology and precision over the

past 2 decades. Instead, much of the thinking about the

potential uses of precision to create effects-based operations

has focused on the tactical employment of weapons systems,

while the emphasis on precision has led most to focus on

target destruction instead of on the larger implications of

the conduct of effects-based campaign. Yet it would seem

that the most significant contribution that effects-based

thinking could make to the conduct of American military

operations in the 21st century would lie in the strategic

realm.

No matter how impressive the conduct of effects-based

operations might be at the tactical or operational levels,

there is no guarantee that linkages will exist to the

operational and strategic unless there is a coherent effort to

develop those linkages. The actual planning of an

effects-based campaign demands an intellectual effort to

think through the potential effects of policy decisions and

strategy, as well as the eventual contribution that tactical

4
actions might make to the achieving of operational or

strategic effects. The cruise missile attacks on Osama bin

Laden’s terrorist camps in the 1990s hit their targets with

exquisite precision. Undoubtedly, those attacks killed a

number of potential terrorists. However, they achieved

little or nothing at the strategic or operational levels—at

least as far as America’s war on terrorism goes, a fact that

the events transpiring on September 11, 2001, underlined

all too graphically.

If the political and strategic decisions are the crucial

element in the utilization of military power to achieve

national goals, then how might strategic decisionmakers

use the concept of effects-based operations to further the

articulation and conceptualization of strategy?13 First, the

development of a campaign that rests on effects-based

operations must begin with development of a realistic set of

strategic goals that could lead to an understood political

outcome. In other words, policymakers must have a

coherent vision of the strategic outcome towards which the

employment of military force must aim in order for planners

to think through the potential effects their military actions

might achieve. Thus, the processes of policy must develop a

coherent and adaptable strategic framework that provides

realistic guidance to the joint force commander responsible

for developing an effects-based campaign.

In the past, the creation of such a vision has often

represented a difficulty that has bedeviled policymakers.

And yet without some coherent and intelligent strategic

vision towards which policy and military action aim, the

results, more often than not, have been disastrous. In 1914

none of the major powers embarked on war with a clear idea

of the strategic outcome or the potential cost their societies

might have to pay.14 Once committed, they discovered

themselves in a conflict, the cost of which was so horrendous

they had no choice but to continue. The immediate political

price of admitting that the war had been a mistake was so

high that European political leaders simply soldiered on,

5
risking even greater catastrophe, rather than adapt

politically to the strategic and military realities.15

It is the political and strategic outcome towards which

policymakers aim that must exercise the greatest influence

over the development of military actions and effects. As

Clausewitz suggests in On War:

The political object—the original motive for the war— will thus

determine both the military objective to be reached and the

amount of effort it requires. The political object cannot,

however, in itself provide the standard of measurement. Since

we are dealing with realities, not with abstractions, it can do so

only in the context of two states at war. The same political

objective can elicit differing reactions from differing peoples,

and even from the same people at different times. We can

therefore take the political object as a standard only if we think

of the influence it can exert upon forces it is meant to move. The

nature of those forces therefore calls for study. Depending on

whether the characteristics increase or diminish the drive

towards a particular action, the outcome will vary [italics in the

original].16

Nevertheless, the devising of an outcome towards which

national policy aims is not enough. Policymakers and

military leaders must also develop a realistic

understanding of the nature of their opponent if they are to

determine a sensible strategic course. What might be the

enemy’s goals? What are his political, economic, and

military strengths? What are his weaknesses? How do his

culture and his political system influence the choices his

leadership will make? What is he willing to sacrifice in the

pursuit of his political objectives? What does history suggest

about his potential courses of action? And how will he react

to actions taken against him? In effect, such questions must

connect effects-based operations to some form of net

assessment in devising the strategy, means, and ends

equation.17

The answers to such questions should certainly have

suggested to senior policymakers in 1964 that the United

States should not involve its military forces in Vietnam.

6
And there was evidence available to answer such questions.

In 1964 the SIGMA II war game:

Ultimately . . . predicted that the escalation of American

military involvement would erode public support for the war

in the United States. Continued political instability in Saigon

drew into question the worthiness and dependability of

America’s ally, and the subtlety of the Communist strategy

made it difficult for the U.S. government to sustain the case for

military intervention . . . [Thus] SIGMA II questioned the

fundamental assumption on which graduated response

depended.18

But in 1964 and 1965, no one in Washington at the highest

levels of strategic or military policy was willing to ask such

questions, much less hear the dismal answers that such

questions would have elicited.

In the 21st century, U.S. policymakers cannot afford to

make such mistakes. If effects-based operations can make a

difference in the waging of the American “way of war,” then

military leaders must have a clear understanding of the

outcome towards which their military actions are to aim. If

they do not, they cannot design an effects-based campaign.

To achieve such clarity, military leaders may well have to

engage in extensive discourses with policymakers to force

political leaders to clarify their aims as well as the ends and

purposes for which they wish to employ military forces.

The Joint Advanced Warfighting Program at the

Institute of Defense Analyses is at present defining

discourses in its briefings on effects-based operations as: “a

continuous exchange of ideas or opinions (with feedback), 1)

on particular issues, 2) to seek clarity, and 3) with a view to

reaching a dynamic agreement.” The nature of the

discourses that a joint force commander should conduct will

“take many forms,” “occur at many levels,” “should be

ongoing (circumstances and environments are ever

changing, so agreements are ever changing, end state is

rarely [if ever] reached), . . . should be intellectually rigorous

7
(encourage debate, require honesty between all

participants, create effective feedback loops).”19

Such discourses, by their very nature, will not be easy or

without considerable pain but in the end, they are the only

means by which policymakers and military leaders can

connect the political ends and the military means that are

available to achieve the national objectives. In the evolution

of the strategic framework, military leaders must

contribute to the understanding of strategic decisionmakers

as to the potential costs as well as the limitations on the

employment of force. This understanding is in fact a

two-way street, for it is the operational commander, the

joint force commander in current parlance, who must also

gain a clear understanding of the strategic aim that

policymakers seek. And in the end, he must translate the

strategic and political outcome for which a war is being

fought into its operational context, which in turn will

determine how military forces will be used.

This translation of strategy into hard campaign plans

that seek the creation of effects to achieve the desired

outcome and the execution of those plans in the light of

strategic guidance is essential to success in war. The

discourses between the military and strategic

decisionmakers are the essential heart of the process of

developing an understanding of the required effects. Only

by such discourses can a real understanding of the strategic

framework for effects-based operations be developed. Those

at the highest levels must begin by asking sharp and

penetrating questions as to the possible strategic and

political effects that potential military courses of action

might have.

Those discussions must never abandon a recognition

that the potential enemy may react differently than

expected, or that international opinion may exert an

unexpected influence over the course of events; or that

chance, as always in human affairs, may exercise its baleful

influence. Man lives in an uncertain and ambiguous

8
universe,20 where chance can affect the best laid strategic

and operational plans for military action in the most

disastrous way.21 Clausewitz best described the importance

of the interrelationship between the strategic and the

operational in thinking about the future conduct of war:

war plans cover every aspect of war, and weave them all into a

single operation that must have a single, ultimate objective in

which all particular aims are reconciled. No one starts a

war—or rather no one in his senses ought to do so—without

first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that

war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political

purpose; the latter its operational objective. This is the

governing principle which will set its course, prescribe the

scale of means and effort which are required, and make its

influence felt throughout down to the smallest operational

detail.22

To a certain extent, in thinking through the implications

of effects-based operations, strategic decisionmakers and

military leaders are solving a complex maze. To do so, like

the solver of a maze, they must solve their puzzle by starting

at the center with the goals they wish to achieve and then

work backwards. It is the thinking through of a clear,

understandable outcome that provides the road map for the

potential uses of military force that can best achieve effects

that will contribute to that end.23 The greater the war and

the commitment, the easier will be the designing of the

strategic outcome. By 1941 even the democracies were clear

on the strategic outcome they sought from the great war

they were waging—the complete defeat of Nazi Germany

and Imperial Japan. The clarity of that awesome task made

the choice of means—massive mobilization of economies

and population as well as the projection of military forces

into the depths of the Japanese and Nazi Empires—

relatively easy to make.24

The great strategic conundrum that confronts U.S.

policymakers and military-leaders in the 21st century is

both an advantage and a disadvantage. It is unlikely that

the potential challenges confronting the United States over

9
the next half-century will be on the scale of World War II, or

even some of the conflicts that marked the Cold War.

However, the very ambiguity and uncertainty of future

threats will make it that much more difficult for

policymakers to develop strategic outcomes that are

relevant and acceptable to the majority of the American

people. And in this regard, it is worth remembering that

virtually the entire Democratic Party in fall 1990 saw no

reason for the United States to intervene militarily to

reverse Saddam Hussein’s rape of Kuwait and his potential

threat to the world’s oil supplies—a tyrant whose nation

was on the brink of achieving nuclear capabilities, which

only defeat in the Gulf War was to prevent.

There is, of course, no simple, clear framework for

establishing effects-based operations at the strategic level.

Rather, the aim must be to establish habits of thought and

processes that whether, at the onset of some great crisis or

in its midst, policymakers and military leaders have the

possibility of asking the right questions. What are

America’s strategic goals? What should the outcome look

like? What kind of political as well as military effects do we

need to seek? How might military effects best achieve those

political ends? What realistic possibilities are open to the

enemies of the United States? How can the nation best react

to unexpected courses of action by its adversaries? And how

might it best adapt, as the context, whether political,

strategic, operational, or tactical, proves resistant to its

efforts, or even to rest on faulty assumptions and

preconceived notions?

Operational Net Assessment.

Slightly over a year-and-a-half ago, Joint Forces

Command developed the idea that a crucial enabler for

effects-based operations to succeed against an adaptive

adversary was something its theorists termed “operational

net assessment.” Unfortunately, the term has not been

provided any significant theoretical examination or even an

10
historical vetting. Nevertheless, it has come to enjoy

widespread currency throughout that command, if not

throughout the remainder of the American military, or in

the world of intelligence agencies. It was given a rather

unsuccessful first examination at the command’s UV01 war

game in May 2001. Significantly, despite the over 30 years

that the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment has existed

under the directorship of Mr. Andrew Marshall, there are no

indications that anyone in Joint Forces Command has

bothered to check with that office as to the complexities and

ambiguities involved in performing a net assessment, much

less an operational net assessment. Nor is there any

indication that its “theorists” have examined the historical

record as to how nations and their intelligence agencies

have managed to perform net assessment of their opponents

in the past.25

Yet, however superficial Joint Forces Command’s

examination of operational net assessment has been thus

far, it has at least made the crucial point that traditional

methods of intelligence and battle damage assessment are

no longer satisfactory. Simply totaling up the number of

tanks, armored personnel carriers, numbers of brigades and

divisions, number of fighter aircraft by types, etc., in the

traditional order of battle yields little useful knowledge on

what matters: the enemy’s will and staying power. As the

Gulf War against Iraq underlined, all of the best Soviet

technology was useless in the hands of ill-trained and

prepared conscripts led by an officer corps throughout

which Saddam’s brutal tyranny squelched every sign of

initiative.26 As in Homer’s day, Patrocolus was not the equal

of Achilles. Similarly, as the planners in the “Black Hole”

intuitively understood before the launching of the air

offensive against Iraq’s integrated air defense system in

January 1991, the Air Force’s traditional method of

wracking up targets and destroying them one at a time

made little sense in the era of precision and stealth.27 The

current interest in conducting effects-based operations

suggests that a more sophisticated understanding and

11
picture of the enemy are required on which to base planning.

Again, Joint Forces Command has been correct to

emphasize that since the enemy will be by his very nature a

complex adaptive system, then operational net assessment

demands continuous assessment and reassessment of the

enemy, as he changes and adapts to U.S. military actions.

Finally, the command has performed a real service in

underlining that much more than just military actions must

form the equation of operational net assessment: the

enemy’s culture, his political system, and his economic

structure, all are factors of considerable importance in the

creation of an operational net assessment. That said, Joint

Forces Command has not moved much beyond the placing of

interesting ideas on the table for examination. Put simply,

its theorists are either incapable or unwilling to examine

the full implications of what a true operational net

assessment might actually involve. To think through how

U.S. military forces and intelligence agencies might

actually perform operational net assessments requires an

understanding of how difficult such estimates have proven

in the past and the difficulties that would be involved in

gaining not only deep knowledge of the enemy armed forces,

but also the mentality and culture that drive his political

processes, as well as motivate those who will fight.

The most fundamental problem is that intelligence

agencies throughout the 20th century have proven woefully

inept at anything more than counting the numbers and

suggesting the technological sophistication of potential

opponents. In actual fact, more often than not the numbers

have proven largely irrelevant to the actual results. What

has mattered have been the intangibles such as the enemy’s

will and the ability of his military organizations to place

competently trained and motivated troops on the battlefield

and to provide them with competent guidance at the

operational level.

Intelligence agencies consistently have proven either

enthusiastic worse casers of enemy capabilities, or all to

optimistic on the actual balance of military forces. In the

12
former case, British strategic policy in the late 1930s

foundered not only on the misreading of Hitler’s aims by

leading policymakers, but on the worst casing of military

appreciations by their military advisers.28 By providing the

appeasers with specious worst case arguments about the

inferiority of Allied military forces, British and French

intelligence ensured the surrender at Munich.

On the other hand, there are even more cases where

military leaders and their intelligence agencies have

posited optimistic prognostications that actual events soon

proved to be depressingly off the mark. German estimations

as to the ability of Britain to stand up to miliary pressure in

summer 1940 represents a particularly good case. At the

end of June 1940, Operations Deputy for the

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (armed forces high

command) General Alfred Jodl calculated that the war was

already won.29 Two weeks later, Luftwaffe intelligence

produced an assessment of the RAF’s capabilities that was

wrong in every single one of its estimates, except for the

number of Spitfires and Hurricanes available to Fighter

Command at the beginning of the battle.30 Eleven months

later, German intelligence would get virtually everything

wrong in estimating the capabilities of the Red Army and

Stalin’s regime to resist the Wehrmacht in Operation

BARBAROSSA.31 Americans have been no less susceptible

to cultural arrogance and overconfidence; in 1965 the U.S.

military had so much contempt for the Viet Minh that had

defeated the French in the First Vietnam War that the

services paid virtually no attention to the French

experience.32

But the business of net assessment is not just a matter of

underestimating one’s potential adversary. It can also

result in overestimates of enemy capabilities as well as a

general lack of understanding of the enemy’s historical and

cultural framework. A true understanding of the nature of

the enemy and his potential to resist requires a real

knowledge of his strengths as well as his weaknesses. In the

summer and fall of 1990, U.S. policymakers and military

13
leaders assessed the strength of the Iraqi regime as lying in

its military institutions, and its weak points as lying in the

stability of Saddam Hussein’s regime.33 That assessment,

as events soon proved, was 180 degrees out of kilter. The

miscalculation of Iraqi strengths and weaknesses at the

political and strategic levels had a serious impact on the

conduct of the war, as well as the armistice that U.S.

negotiators accepted in February 1991. Simple military

defeat, even of the most catastrophic kind, will not, in the

end, result in the overthrow of a ruthlessly efficient political

tyranny such as that run by individuals like Saddam

Hussein.34

One should also not forget that during the prolonged

40-plus years of the Cold War, U.S. intelligence agencies

had extraordinary difficulty in estimating the actual

military and economic strength of the Soviet Union. In fact,

they even failed to pick up the deep difficulties that the

Soviet regime had fallen into by the 1980s—so much so that

they were not able to predict the collapse of the Soviet

system until the actual collapse was well under way. Much

of the problem lay in the inability of intelligence analysts,

military experts, and policymakers to understand the

Soviets from any other perspective than that of the United

States. Throughout the period of the Cold War, “mirror

imaging” was the bane of the U.S. intelligence system, even

though there were indications that the Soviets were

running their system under fundamentally different

measures of effectiveness and calculations than Americans

ran their system.

The Office of Net Assessment in the Office of the

Secretary of Defense did struggle against the tide, but in the

end, futilely, to bring a more coherent understanding of the

Soviet Union. It argued that, if one were really to

comprehend what the Soviets were doing, then one had to

understand how they actually thought in calculating issues

such as the military balance, or the strategic competition

with the United States. In 1982 Andrew Marshall noted the

following about the Soviet methods of assessment:

14
Since the major American objective is deterrence of the Soviet

Union from a wide range of activities, a major component of

any assessment of the adequacy of the strategic balance

should be our best approximation to a Soviet-style

assessment. . . . But this must not be the standard U.S.

calculations done with slightly different assumptions about

missile accuracies, silo hardness, etc. Rather it should be, to

the extent possible, using those scenarios they see as most

likely and their criteria and ways of measuring outcomes. This

is not just a point of logical nicety since there is every reason to

believe that Soviet assessments are likely to be structured

much differently from their U.S. counterparts. The Soviet

calculations are likely to make different assumptions about

scenarios and objectives, focus attention on different

variables, include both long-range and theater forces

(conventional as well as nuclear), and may... perform

different calculations, use different measures of effectiveness,

and perhaps use different assessment processes and methods

[in reaching their conclusions].35

Marshall’s understanding of how to think about net

assessment, of course, reflected his thinking over the period

of more than a decade at the time. There is no reason to

believe that this view has changed over the subsequent 2

decades that he has held the position of the Director of the

Office of Net Assessment.

The work that the Office of Net Assessment has

performed over the past 3 decades suggests how far Joint

Forces Command and the U.S. military actually are from

realizing an operational net assessment, which aims not

just at a direct, current snapshot, but at a rolling

operational net assessment that calculates how military

actions from both sides affect the actual military balance in

war. The ability to perform an operational net assessment

will require a fundamental shift in the cultures and focus of

America’s civil and military intelligence agencies. An

operational net assessment requires more than intercepted

and translated messages, overhead satellite imagery,

calculations of enemy numbers and dispositions.

15
Instead, it will require a deep understanding of the

enemy’s cultural and political framework for making

decisions, his underlying religious and ideological

motivations, his conception of the military options on the

table, and, above all, language competency and historical

perspective. If American policymakers and intelligence

analysts found it virtually impossible to achieve such an

understanding of the motivations and rationale of their

Soviet opponent in the relative calm of a Cold War that

lasted over 40 years, how much more difficult is it going to be

to perform a rolling net assessment of an opponent which

most likely has only recently appeared to challenge some

major American interest?

The basic requirement for the ability to perform

operational net assessment must be a revolution in the

culture of intelligence. The knowledge of language, culture,

and history are going to be as important, if not more so, than

the kinds of expertise that American intelligence has been

emphasizing over the course of the last half-century. And

U.S. intelligence is going to have to move away from the

search for the predictive to an emphasis on a broader,

intuitive understanding of potential opponents. As one

recent commentator has noted about the difficulties

involved in the making of strategy in the 21st century:

Patterns do emerge from the past, and their study permits

educated guesses about the range of potential outcomes. But the

future is not an object of knowledge; no increase in processing

power will make the owl of history a daytime bird. Similar

causes do not always produce similar effects, and causes

interact in ways unforeseeable even by the historically

sophisticated. Worse still, individuals—with their ambitions,

vanities, and quirks—make strategy.... Finally, conflict is the

realm of contradiction and paradox.36

Thus, it would seem the Joint Forces Command has set for

itself a difficult agenda—one that most in the command

have yet to fathom.

16
Conclusion.

The problems that confront the U.S. military and the

Army in particular are daunting. In a time of revolutionary

change, driven to a great extent by technological

transformation in the external society, the American

military at the same time confronts the trying business of

preparing for war and carrying the burden of worldwide

strategic responsibilities. There is a real reason why the

U.S. military became interested in the concept of a potential

“revolution in military affairs” at the end of the Cold War.37

To a great extent, this situation presents challenges that

the American military have never before confronted.

Moreover, the onrush of technology has exacerbated the

tendency, always present not only in the American military

but American society as well, to dismiss the lessons of the

past as irrelevant to the challenges of the future. The

problem with such approach is that, since military

organizations cannot replicate the conditions of war, the

past represents the only laboratory available for

understanding the actual conditions under which war will

always occur. A recent paper on thinking about joint

warfare has commented on the implications of the Prussian

victories in 1866 and 1870 in the following terms:

[T]he adaptation of military method to changing requirements

and capabilities is neither automatic nor trivial. At stake are

not only expensive and difficult to replace weapons and

equipment, but also the ingrained mental sets of soldiers and

leaders that will give their behavior in battle. And yet . . . even

recognition that change is necessary offers no assurance that

competing military institutions will adapt to it in the same

way or to equal advantage.

Typically, . . . those militaries that have coped with change

most effectively have grasped the future from a firm foothold

in the past. What many call military revolutions often turn out

on closer examination to have been revolutionary only in

retrospect, and then only to their victims. From the

17
perspective of those making the changes in question, what was

taking place was thoughtful and deliberate adaptation.

The crucial difference between adaptive and revolutionary

change, in short, is respect for history. War remains above all a

violent struggle between independent and hostile human wills,

and the essential dynamics of that struggle, however variable

the means by which it is conducted, change as slowly as human

abilities, desires and fears....

Respect [for history], however, need not mean imprisonment. In

1866 and 1870, the Austrians and French were trapped by

history, the Prussians empowered by it. The difference was in

the way history was interpreted, evaluated, and applied. The

Austrians and the French, having taken little trouble to study

the past, were in no position to gauge the effect of new

capabilities on the future. Whereas, the Prussians, steeped in a

meticulous examination of war’s enduring dynamics confidently

could estimate how new tools would alter future military

operations.38

Those thinking about Army transformation over the coming

decade would do well not to forget that the past is crucial to

understanding the future of combat, no matter what

technological changes may occur.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. Last year’s volume: Williamson Murray, ed., Army

Transformation: A View from the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle

Barracks, 2001.

2. The significant milestone in this effort was Joint Vision 2010

(JV2010) which, whatever its defects, represented a serious effort to

push transformation to the top of the services’ agenda. But the leading

intellectual father of the idea of major transformation was Andrew

Marshall, whose Office of Net Assessment first developed the idea of

potential revolutions in military affairs and encouraged a wide number

of individuals to examine the processes of transformation: See in

particular Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, Military Innovation

in the Interwar Period, Cambridge, 1996; MacGregor Knox and

Williamson Murray, The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050,

Cambridge, 2001; and Thomas C. Hone, Norman Friedman, & Mark D.

Mandeles, American & British Aircraft Carrier Development,

Annapolis, MD, 1999.

18
3. “[W]e understood that the first year was about building

momentum for transformation and then looking for opportunities to

keep building it.” General Erik Shinseki, quoted in Jason Sherman,

“Momentum, Mo’ Money,” Armed Forces Journal, October 2000, p. 46.

4. For an example of how these processes worked properly to

develop the Prussian military machine that devastated its opponents in

the Seven Weeks’ War against Austria and in the Franco-Prussian War

against France, see, particularly, Geoffrey Wawro, The Austro-Prussian

War, Austria’s War with Prussia and Italy in 1866, Cambridge, 1996;

and Dennis E. Schowalter, Railroads and Rifles, Soldiers, Technology,

and the Unification of Germany, Hamden, CT, 1975.

5. As a result of this state of affairs, military organizations receive

little feedback on how well they are adapting, or not adapting to the

changes in technology and tactics that occur during times of peace. The

audit of war, however, suggests that all too often military organizations

do not do all that well in the crucial processes of transformation and

adaptation.

6. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret,

ed. and trans., Princeton, NJ, 1976, p. 77.

7. For the continuities and discontinuities in Western military

history, see, particularly, Victor Davis Hanson, The Western Way of

War: Infantry Battle in Classic Greece, Berkeley, CA, 1991; and Carnage

and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power, New York:

Doubleday; Russell F. Weigley, The Age of Battles: The Quest for

Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo, Bloomington, IN, 1991;

Geoffrey Parker, The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare: The

Triumph of the West, Cambridge, 1995; and William H. McNeill, The

Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force and Society Since A.D. 1000,

Chicago, 1984.

8. That technological revolution in computers and information

systems may represent what historians are now terming a “military

revolution”—a revolution so all encompassing and vast in its scope that

it changes the entire social, economic, and political landscape within

which wars occur. Previously such vast revolutions have included the

creation of the modern state, the French Revolution, the Industrial

Revolution, the symbiosis of those two revolutions during World War I,

and the nuclear revolution in 1945. In these great tidal waves of change,

military institutions have no chance to mold or determine the course of

the revolution. Only in relatively discrete areas, such as the

development of armored, mechanized warfare, or the development of

carrier war, have military institutions been able to mold the landscape

to their advantage. Historians are now terming such occurrences

“revolutions in military affairs.” For a further examination of these

issues, see MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, The Dynamics of

Military Revolution, 1300-2050, Cambridge, 2001, chap. 1.

19
9. I am indebted to Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper, U.S.

Marine Corps (retired), for the formulation of “bumper stickers and

slogans.”

10. Clausewitz, pp. 136, 141.

11. The reason for this state of affairs had much to do with the

nature of the Cold War’s strategic confrontation which was largely

framed by the threat of thermonuclear weapons. Thus, the planners,

preparing for nuclear war did not have to think very long or very deeply

about effects—beyond deterrence—because the extent of direct

destruction was going to be so great that second and third order effects

would be largely irrelevant.

12. For a discussion of the successes as well as the difficulties

involved in the air war against Iraq, see Williamson Murray, “Air War in

the Gulf: The Limits of Air Power,” Strategic Review, Winter 1998; see

also Williamson Murray, “Operations,” Vol. 2, Report 1, Gulf War Air

Power Survey, Eliot Cohen, ed., Washington, DC, 1993. See also Barry

D. Watts, “Effects and Effectiveness,” Vol. 2, Report 2, Gulf War Air

Power Survey.

13. For the complex processes involved in the making of strategy

through the ages, see Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin

Bernstein, The Making of Strategy, Rulers, States and War, Cambridge,

1994.

14. Winston Churchill commented thusly on the outbreak of the

Great War in his masterful history of that conflict published in the early

1930s: “events got onto certain lines, and no one could get them off

again. Germany clanked obstinately, recklessly, awkwardly towards

the crater and dragged us all in with her.” Winston Churchill, The World

Crisis, Toronto, 1931, p. 6.

15. In the case of the Germans, in one of the few cases of strategic

insight by one of their military leaders, General Eric von Falkenhyn,

chief of the Greater General Staff and Prussian War Minister, argued in

November 1914 that Germany could not win the war, given the failure of

the Schlieffen Plan in September 1914, and that it would be

advantageous to make peace sooner rather than later. The German

Chancellor, Theobold von Bethmann Hollweg, simply refused to

consider the proposal and “informed Falkenhyn that he was prepared to

fight to the bitter end, no matter how long it might take.” Holger Herwig,

The First World War, Germany and Austria Hungry, 1914-1918,

London, 1997, pp. 116-117.

16. Clausewitz, p. 81.

17. During much of the nearly 5 long decades of competition with

the Soviet Union, the Office of Net Assessment in the Pentagon

struggled to get the DoD and service bureaucracies to understand the

20
Soviet Union and its military forces in terms very different from the

processes of military and strategic decisionmaking in the United States.

That office’s noble efforts were rarely marked with success, which

should suggest how difficult it will be in the 21st century to perform net

assessments, much less “operational net assessments” against nations

and entities with whom the United States is far less familiar.

18. H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty, Lyndon Johnson, Robert

McNamara, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam, New York, 1997, p. 157.

19. Joint Advanced Warfighting Program, Institute of Defense

Analyses Brief: “Discourses and the Joint Force Commander,”

December 2001.

20. For a clear depiction of why friction and ambiguity will always

remain a basic element in not only the conduct of war, but also of the

whole international arena, see Barry D. Watts, Friction in Future War,

Washington, DC, 1996. Clausewitz commented on the role of chance in

war in the following terms: “No other human activity is so continuously

bound up with chance. And through the element of chance, guesswork

and luck come to play a great part in war.” Clausewitz, p. 85.

21. Along these lines, it is worth noting that over the night of

February 12/13, 1991, planners in the Black Hole had selected a wide

variety of targets to impact on the political stability of the Iraqi regime.

One of the targets, a newly operating backup bunker for the secret

police, the Al Firdos Bunker, also happened to be the air raid shelter for

a number of Iraqis. The resulting collateral damage in bombing the

bunker—namely the death of several hundred civilians, most with close

connections to the regime—sufficed to end the efforts to destabilize

Saddam’s regime by striking at its political command and control

systems. One last effort to strike the political heart of the regime at the

end of February was cancelled by a major storm that swept across Iraq

during the last night of the war. For the Al Firdos Bunker incident, see

Murray, Operations, Vol. 2, Report 1, Gulf War Air Power Survey, pp.

206-208.

22. Clausewitz, p. 579.

23. This is not to say that the means will not have to be adapted to

the actual situation and enemy against which military action is used. As

U.S. Grant notes in his memoirs:

up to [the Battle of Shiloh], I... believed that the rebellion

against the government would collapse suddenly and soon, if a

decisive victory could be gained by any of its armies. [Forts]

Donelson and Henry were such victories. An army of more

than 21,000 men was captured or destroyed. . . . But when

Confederate armies were collected which not only attempted

to hold the line farther south, from Memphis to Chattanooga,

Knoxville, and on to the Atlantic, but assumed the offensive

and made such a gallant effort to regain what had been lost,

21
then, indeed, I gave up all idea of saving the Union except by

complete conquest.

Ulysses S. Grant, Memoirs, Vol. 1, New York, 1885, pp. 368-369.

24. See Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War To Be Won,

Fighting the Second World War, Cambridge, MA, 2000.

25. For the historical background as to how net assessment was

performed in the 20th century, two titles offer useful historical case

studies on how to understand exactly what net assessment has or has

not been in the past. See Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett,

Calculations, Net Assessment and the Coming of the Second World War, New York, 1992; and Ernest R. May, Knowing One’s Enemies:

Intelligence Assessment Before Two World Wars, Princeton, NJ, 1984.

26. For the nature of Saddam Hussein’s tyranny and why there was

little possibility of military effectiveness in its military forces, see the

penetrating study by Samir al Khalil, Republic of Fear, The Politics of

Modern Iraq, Berkeley, CA, 1989.

27. See Murray, Operations, Vol. 2, Report 1, Gulf War Air Power

Survey, pp. 95-138.

28. The dismal strategic appreciations of the military balance by the

British Chiefs of Staff, and French military leaders as well) provided the

Chamberlain government and French political leaders with almost

irrefutable arguments in summer 1938 that Czechoslovakia could not

be defeated. For an examination of this line of argument and why in

actuality the situation was not nearly as advantageous for the Germans

as British military planners thought, see Williamson Murray, The

Change in the European Balance of Power, 1938-1939, The Path to Ruin,

Princeton, NJ, 1985.

29. Chef WFA, 30.6.40, “Der Weiterführung des Krieges gegen

England”; International Military Tribune, “Trial of Major War

Criminals,” Vol. XXVIII, pp. 301-303.

30. Francis K. Mason, Battle over Britain, A History of the German

Air Assaults on Great Britain, 1917-1918 and July-December 1940, and

the Development of Britain’s Air Defenses Between the Wars, Garden

City, NY, 1969, Appendix K, OKL, 16.7.40, Operations Staff IC,

Intelligence.

31. See Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War To Be Won,

Fighting the Second World War, Cambridge, MA, 2000, pp. 115-118.

32. In 1964 the French government, aware that the U.S.

Government was about to commit its military forces to combat in

Vietnam, provided a copy of its top secret after-action report on the

defeat of French forces in Indo-China. That report was not only not

22
translated, but was consigned to the archives of National Defense

University where it remained unread throughout the war.

33. Ironically, there were several works available in the academic

world that would have suggested how wrong were the initial estimates

of the intelligence agencies and policymakers, but none of them appear

to have been consulted. Along these lines, Khalil’s brilliant Republic of

Fear would have underlined that, in every respect, Saddam’s regime

resembled that of Stalin, and consequently military defeat in the desert

would have very little impact on the political stability of the regime.

34. The great error of strategic bombing theorists between the two

world wars did not lie in their belief that strategic bombing would have a

significant impact on the enemy. In fact, it did. What they entirely

missed was the ability of not only dictatorships but democracies to

control their populations under the stress of wartime conditions. For the

impact of the strategic bombing campaign, see Williamson Murray,

“Reflections on the Combined Bomber Offensive,” Militärgeschichtliche

Mitteilungen, Heft 1, 1992.

35. Quoted in Barry D. Watts, “`Thinking Red’ and the Art of Net

Assessment,” Thinking Red in Wargaming Conference, National

Defense University, Washington, DC, June 20-24, 1988.

36. MacGregor Knox, “Continuity and Revolution in the Making of

Strategy,” in The Making of Strategy, Rulers, States, and War, Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein, eds.,

Cambridge, 1994, p. 645.

37. For a discussion of the role of military revolutions and

revolutions in military affairs over the course of the past 700 years, see

MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, The Dynamics of Military

Revolution, 1300-2050, Cambridge, 2001.

38. Richard Sinnreich and Williamson Murray, “Joint Warfighting

in the 21st Century,” draft paper, Joint Advanced Warfighting

Program, Institute for Defense Analyses, April 2002.

23
CHAPTER 2

THE ARMY, TRANSFORMATION, AND

MODERNIZATION, 1945-1991:

IMPLICATIONS FOR TODAY

Colonel Arthur W. Connor, Jr.

All modern military history is filled with these records of

failure in which a nation places its reliance on one single arm

and learns too late that that arm will not suffice. It is a tragic

lesson and its message is clear, but to date we have not learned

it, for we still find political leaders—and plenty in uniform

too—forlornly hoping that we can defend ourselves, save

ourselves, by choosing what appears to be the easiest,

cheapest way.

General Matthew B. Ridgway1

From the end of World War II in 1945 until the collapse of

the Soviet Union in 1991, the Cold War dominated

American strategy and policy. For the U.S. Army, the Cold

War defined its roles, missions, and organizational

structure. Prior to World War II, the Army was a small and

dispersed force of battalion- and company-sized units,

scattered throughout the United States. After the war, the

exigencies of a changed strategic landscape dictated a large

standing army for the first time in the history of the

Republic. Throughout the decades bounded by the Cold

War, the Army attempted to transform itself several times

and fight several conflicts, all the while searching for the

proper organizational structure to meet the nation’s

threats.

By dividing the Cold War into distinct periods that

correspond with the changes in the Army and the nation, it

25
is possible to examine transformation and modernization.

There are several themes that are common to each of these

periods and how they relate to the Army, including the

impact of national strategy, especially nuclear strategy and

the concomitant rise of the Air Force; the impact of budget

and the economy; technology and its seductive promise of

“cleaner war”; and the endless quest within the Army for

relevancy.

Since the end of World War II, the Army has not

transformed. Transformation refers to dramatic changes in

organization, employment, and/or doctrine that affect

dramatically structure and purpose. Transformation is not

modernization, although technological advances are

important to both. In contrast, modernization is the

constant process of upgrading current weapons and

weapons systems, vehicles, and the general conventional

accoutrements of war needed by every army. Technological

advances make it possible to produce rifles that are lighter

and more accurate, trucks that can haul more cargo farther

and more efficiently, tanks that are deadlier, and artillery

that is more lethal and accurate. Modernization is a

constant imperative for all armies. The history of the Cold

War bears stark witness to an army that evolved slowly and

carefully through a series of incremental weapon’s

modernization programs, minor organization changes, and

doctrinal changes. Transformation was not needed, nor is it

likely to be needed in the future. It is modernization—the

introduction of new technologies and upgrades in command

and control and weapon’s systems—that is the imperative of

the future for the Army if it is to remain viable as the

primary instrument of the nation’s policy decisions.

Therefore, the period from 1945-91 is important as it

illustrates the many variegated issues that affected the

Army as it tried to transform and modernize during the Cold

War. The implications for the future are enormous, as many

of the issues facing the Army and transformation today are

the same issues faced in the previous 50 years.

26
The Post-War Army 1945-1950: Occupation and

Malaise.

On September 2, 1945, the representatives of the

Emperor of Japan signed the surrender documents on the

deck of the U.S.S. Missouri, ending the most devastating

conflict in human history. In commenting after the

ceremony, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur was

succinct: “We have had our last chance. If we do not devise

some greater and more equitable system, Armageddon will

be at our door.”2 If Armageddon were to come, it would

come, of course, in the guise of nuclear bombs and ballistic

missiles. For the U.S. Army in September 1945, however,

nuclear warfare with all its attendant complexities was not

the most pressing issue. Europe, both victor and

vanquished, was in ruins. Japan was equally devastated.

The territories of the former colonial powers seethed, while

an “Iron Curtain” was inexorably descending on Europe. To

fill the void created by the war, the Army embarked on a

vast system of military government led by Generals Joseph

T. McNarney and Lucius D. Clay in Germany, and Douglas

MacArthur in Japan.3 As it had in the aftermath of all

previous wars, the Army looked to demobilize its victorious

formations that triumphed from the Rhine to Tokyo Bay

and treat the war in many respects, as if it were merely an

“Indian raid writ large.”4

Demobilization was a daunting task. On August 15,

1945, General of the Army George C. Marshall made it the

Army’s primary mission. From a wartime high of more than

8 million soldiers, the Army mustered only 684,000 troops

on July 1, 1947.5 Underpinning this rapid decline was the

assumption by Marshall that Universal Military Training

would become law, requiring all young men to spend a year

in the service after graduating from high school. Universal

Military Training would, Marshall hoped, allow for the

rapid expansion of the Army in the event of war. Congress

and the budget, however, never provided for the cost of such

an expensive system, dooming it and clouding even further

the structure of the post-war Army. Most congressmen, like

27
most Americans, assumed that the days of massed armies

were a relic of the past.6

In making demobilization its highest priority in 1945,

Marshall only was reflecting the wishes of President Harry

S. Truman. On September 6, 1945, Truman sent Congress

eight specific policies he intended to follow in reestablishing

the peacetime functions of the nation. The first policy listed

is instructive: “Demobilize as soon as possible the armed

forces no longer needed.”7 Truman merely was reflecting

the mood of most Americans. The real question that

remained unanswered was the last part of the

policy—“forces no longer needed.” To demobilize effectively

and retain those forces needed to affect American security

aims, the second half of the policy must precede the first.

Without knowing what armed forces were needed, more

accurately what the national security strategy was, there

was no way to judge which forces to demobilize, and which to

retain.

From the beginning of the post-war demobilization,

Truman faced continuous domestic pressure to “bring the

boys home,” even while Army strength dropped

precipitously. From September 1, 1945, through June 30,

1947, the number of Army divisions fell from a war-time

high of 89 to just 12. A year later the Army could muster

only ten active divisions on its rolls.8 Truman and Congress

received numerous letters and telegrams pleading for the

release of soldiers every day.9 Even the soldiers themselves,

fresh from victories in Europe, gathered in town squares

protesting their retention in service. To General Matthew

Ridgway, such “disgraceful exhibitions” undermined

discipline and caused him nothing but anger and disgust.10

Disgraceful though they may have been, the soldiers only

reflected the desires of the American public to demobilize

even faster. Despite his misgivings, Truman empathized

with “parents still waiting for their sons, and with the wives

and children longing to see their husbands and fathers

again.”11 Domestic politics overshadowed any careful

examination of the proper size and mission of the post-war

28
Army by ensuring the demobilization would be frenetic.

The failure of Congress to consider funding Universal

Military Training exacerbated the difficulties.

Despite the seemingly chaotic activity associated with

demobilization, the Army had a sizable task to perform in

occupying Germany and Japan. As demobilization played

havoc with the divisions and units still on active duty; the

Army formed the U.S. Constabulary force from the

remaining units in Germany to execute law enforcement

responsibilities and to support civil authorities.12 In Korea

and Japan, demobilization had equally deleterious effects.

Of the three divisions sent to Korea in 1945, two were

deactivated and the third was sent to Japan in 1948, leaving

only a military advisory group on the peninsula. In Japan,

the 1st Cavalry Division operated at only 25 percent of its

authorized strength during its first year of occupation duty,

with minimally trained teenagers coming to the division as

replacements.13

Overwhelmed with demobilization and occupation

duties, the Army nonetheless tried to capture the

organizational and tactical lessons of the war. The

European Theater of Operations established the General

Board to examine all aspects of the Army’s experience. Its

committees focused on the division, with three types

recommended for retention in the Army: infantry, armored,

and airborne. Over the next 3 years, various conferences,

committees, general officers, and the Army staff all tinkered

with divisional organizations. In 1948, the Department of

the Army published the new tables of organization for each

of the three divisional types.14 The end result was an Army

that looked much like its World War II counterpart,

equipped with the same weapons, though undermanned,

and looking to a future in which it seemed increasingly

irrelevant.15 The newly achieved independence of the Air

Force and unification of the Armed Forces in 1947 only

served to reinforce this seeming irrelevance.

29
As the Army continued to help in rebuilding Germany

and Japan, Truman faced the harsh reality of Soviet designs

in Europe and elsewhere in the world. George Kennan’s

“long telegram” of February 1946 forced the U.S. leaders to

confront their failure to provide a national strategy. Just

over a year later, on March 12, 1947, the Truman Doctrine

was born with the proclamation by the President that “it

must be the policy of the United States to support free

peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed

minorities or outside pressures.”16 Yet, how was the United

States to do this, when the Army would continue to

demobilize through June of that same year? At the same

time Truman, a fiscal conservative, was steadily reducing

the financial resources available to defense. Defense

expenditures declined from $81.6 billion in 1945, to $44.7 in

1946, to a paltry $13.1 billion for 1947.17 Faith in the Air

Force and America’s nuclear monopoly allowed Truman to

dwell in an unreal world of flawed policy, while the Army

continued an inexorable slide into oblivion.

With a dearth of funding and no draft to replenish its

ranks, the Army numbered only 538,000 soldiers on June

30, 1948. Congress reluctantly passed the Selective Service

Act of 1948, but a difficult budget battle increased Army end

strength by only 100,000 troops. With U.S. policy fixed on

atomic power, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson

continued to cut defense expenditures below the ceiling set

even by Truman for 1949.18 Johnson’s actions precipitated

the “Revolt of the Admirals” when he canceled the aircraft

carrier United States. But his cuts also affected the Army.

Facing reality, Army Field Forces Headquarters issued

reduced Tables of Organization and Equipment, cutting

division strength by a third. The 2nd Infantry Division at

Fort Lewis, Washington, numbered only 12,000 men in

1949, but kept every unit in existence by making

across-the-board reductions, while overseas commands cut

one battalion per regiment.19 In essence, Truman’s

contradictory military and foreign policies forced the Army

to eat itself. As the 1940s ended, the Secretary of the Army

30
still considered occupation as the organization’s biggest

single task. Many problems remained unresolved,

including serious shortages of modern equipment and a

nonexistent research and development program.20 World

events would not wait for the Army to fix these problems.

The Shock of the Korean War: 1950-53.

When North Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel on

June 25, 1950, the U.S. Army numbered 591,000 soldiers

out of an authorized strength of 630,201, organized in ten

divisions.21 Containment as a national policy was limping

badly, and Truman himself sensed this many months prior

to the invasion of the South by the North Koreans. In

response to the Soviet Union’s explosion of a nuclear device,

the victory in China by the communists led by Mao

Tse-Tung, and the rising tide of anticommunist sentiment

in the Congress, Truman directed the Secretaries of Defense

and State to reexamine U.S. objectives and plans on

January 30, 1950. The resulting document, National

Security Council (NSC)-68, was a watershed in how the

United States would prosecute the Cold War.22 When

NSC-68 arrived on Truman’s desk in June 1950, it

recommended large increases in defense spending to build

up the American military and allies in order to balance the

Soviet Union’s growing world power and ambitions.

Characteristically, Truman refused to allow publication of

the document and decided to wait until after the November

elections before approaching Congress with any budget

increase.23 Truman chose to equivocate; the North Koreans

did not.

During the first few days of fighting, the United States

struggled to respond. In Washington, Matthew Ridgway

observed that senior military and civilian officials hoped air

and naval forces alone could contain the North Koreans.

The “bright delusion” of scaring the North Koreans with an

air and naval display quickly collapsed as the Republic of

Korea (ROK) Army crumbled under the hammer blows of

31
the enemy’s far more numerous tanks and better prepared

infantry.24 In Korea, MacArthur cabled Washington in the

early morning hours of June 30, asking to commit two

divisions to the fighting. Truman authorized the movement

of a regimental combat team to Korea immediately, while

acceding to MacArthur’s full request later that morning.25

Task Force Smith led the U.S. Army’s effort to stop the

North Koreans in early July 1950—with disastrous

results.26

The commitment of this under-strength task force was

not the product of rational analysis of the capabilities of the

Army in Japan to stop the North Koreans, or a testament to

its readiness and ability to deploy quickly. It was, in fact,

born of the desperation of domestic politics. American

politics in the Spring of 1950 was “infected by [a] sense of

betrayal” and by an ugly national mood of the fear of

communist conspiracy. Senator Joseph McCarthy of

Wisconsin was leading the charge to find communist

collaborators at all levels of the government and

bureaucracy. Faced with charges that the Democrats had

“lost” China to Mao, the explosion of an atomic bomb by the

Soviets in August 1949 and their boldness in blockading

Berlin, and the convictions of Alger Hiss on perjury and

Klaus Fuchs on passing atomic secrets to the Soviets in

early 1950, Truman had no choice but to commit America to

the defense of Korea.27

While the personnel decreases inherent in the penurious

defense budgets of the years 1945-50 ended with Task Force

Smith, there were many other problems that were not as

visible. The most serious problems facing the Army at the

start of the Korean War were the twin issues of supply and

training. There had been no Army modernization or

transformation in the 5 years after World War II; only an

attempt to refine the divisional organizations developed

during the war, while concentrating on demobilizing the

Army during the occupation. Army procurement stopped in

1945 with the exception of food, clothing, and medical

supplies. Units had to operate with equipment left over

32
from the war despite increasing obsolescence. Maintenance

became problematic as the Army failed to procure repair

parts, leaving equipment of all types in a deplorable state of

disrepair. Reductions in personnel and facilities allowed

only for minimal maintenance on most equipment, while

budgetary restrictions reduced the amount of spare parts

and assemblies available. Of the 3,202 medium “Sherman”

tanks in the United States in 1950, 1,326 were

unserviceable. The vast majority of the Army’s motor

transport was 6 or more years old, with conditions even

worse in Eighth Army in Japan.28 Since the end of the war,

Far East Command had received no new equipment of any

kind, including tanks and vehicles. Authorized 221

recoilless rifles, Eighth Army fielded only 21. While 13,780

two-and-a-half-ton trucks were on hand, only 4,441 were in

running condition; of the 18,000 “jeeps” in the command,

10,000 were unserviceable.29 Equally distressing, however,

was the state of other classes of supply in the theater.

Ammunition of all types was in short supply, and stocks

were out of balance. The vast quantities of ammunition

remaining from World War II rapidly declined from training

requirements, transfers to allies, and normal deterioration.

Since penurious budgets prevented new ammunition

acquisitions, there were inadequate amounts of most

types.30 Artillery ammunition, in particular, was always in

short supply throughout the Korean War, especially in the

last 2 years. As Ridgway (and later General James Van

Fleet) emphasized, American firepower was the major

counter to the massed attacks of the Chinese Communist

Forces. It was not unusual to have numerous artillery

battalions firing simultaneously in support of beleaguered

U.S. and United Nations (U.N.) soldiers. One battalion

fired 11,600 rounds in a 12-hour period, a rate of one round

per howitzer per minute. Ammunition for heavy artillery

battalions was always insufficient and had to be rationed;

this forced commanders to build special ramps for tanks so

that they could fire their main guns as artillery.31 While

ammunition was a problem, the lack of training in the

33
combat units fighting the war was an even bigger problem.

The sad tales of the 8064th Heavy Tank Platoon

(Provisional) and the 8066th Mechanized Reconnaissance

Platoon (Provisional) reflect both the training and

equipment problems facing Eighth Army.

Desperate to get some armored force into the fight in

Korea to counter the North Korean T-34 tanks, Eighth

Army formed the 8064th and 8066th platoons on July 10,

1950.32 During the nearly 5 years of occupation duty,

Eighth Army turned in all of its M-4 “Sherman” medium

tanks and reduced the tank battalion of each division to a

single company of 17 M-24 “Chaffee” light tanks. When the

M-24 tanks proved to be of dubious value in fighting the

North Korean T-34s, Eighth Army scoured its depots and

found three M-26 “Pershing” heavy tanks. All three tanks

suffered from a variety of mechanical problems after 5 years

of neglect. Desperate for anything that could stand up to the

North Korean tanks, it was decided to rebuild the

Pershings, form them into a provisional tank platoon (the

8064th), and crew them with men from the tank company of

the 1st Cavalry Division. Additionally, another provisional

unit, the 8066th, was formed from men out of Kobe Base,

Japan, who had previous armor experience. The platoon

consisted of five M-8 “Greyhound” armored cars used by the

military police in Tokyo for crowd control. The 8066th

arrived in Pusan in the middle of July, with the 8064th

following on July 16, 1950.

The 8064th Heavy Tank Platoon went into combat

almost immediately, moving northward from Pusan by rail

to Chinju in the southern sector of the now rapidly

diminishing U.N. perimeter. Arriving at the station in

Chinju at 0300 on July 28, the tanks’ engines overheated

immediately, as their fan belts stretched out of shape after

running only a few hours. Since there were no M-26 fan

belts in theater, attempts were made to fabricate new belts

in Japan. After 3 days, all efforts failed, and Eighth Army

ordered the tiny force out of Chinju and back to Pusan.

Unfortunately, the North Korean 6th Division beat the

34
evacuation train into town, forcing the 8064th to fight its

way out. After a brief fire fight, the tankers abandoned their

overheated machines, leaving 13 men killed or captured.

The 8066th Mechanized Reconnaissance Platoon

suffered a similar fate only 2 days later. Attached to the 1st

Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment, the 8066th was

ambushed while participating in a reconnaissance in force

westward from the village of Chungam-ni back toward

Chinju on August 2, 1950. The North Koreans destroyed

four of the five armored cars of the platoon and killed the

platoon leader.

The two provisional platoons led an evanescent life in

combat in Korea. They were the product of a desperate

command seeking a solution to the North Korean armored

threat. Hastily organized, operating equipment they had

never trained on, and haphazardly committed to combat,

the 8064th and 8066th failed to achieve even a modicum of

success, despite the heroics of individuals. A provisional

tank battalion was formed in August, and the Army scoured

the old Pacific battlefields in search of any Sherman tanks

left over from the war. The 70th Tank Battalion, formed at

Fort Knox, Kentucky, actually equipped its C Company

with M-26 Pershing tanks sitting on concrete pedestals

around the post. All of these problems, and the wastage of

men and materiel, were due to the hasty nature of the

post-war demobilization.

Building a tank requires a long lead time. Thousands of

parts must be manufactured and assembled. Specialized

tools and dies are required, as are skilled engineers and

workers. Because of the extensive time required to retool

and reenergize American tank production during the

Korean War, more troops were using the World War II

vintage Sherman tank than the newer M-46 “Patton” as late

as October 1952. The M-46 was not a new tank from the

ground up. It was simply a new turret mated to existing

M-26 hulls. Had the Army not been in the process of

converting 800 M-26s into M-46s, it is likely that only World

35
War II era tanks would have reached the battlefield prior to

1953.

Throughout the 5 years preceding the Korean War, the

time and quality of basic training provided to the incoming

Army private fluctuated wildly depending on funding

levels. At the end of World War II, a 17-week training cycle

was standard. Within a year, this had dropped to 8 weeks,

followed by another temporary cut to a mere 4 weeks in

November and December of 1946, as the Army struggled to

fill overseas occupation units. In May 1947 the cycle

increased to 13 weeks, only to fall once again to 8 weeks less

than a year later.33 The training cycle in the years prior to

Korea caused considerable upheavals in the training and

readiness of all Army units. Adding to the training

deficiencies was the lack of live-fire training. Immediately

following the end of World War II, General Jacob Devers,

Chief of Army Field Forces, suspended all unit live-fire

training, even though the Army had a well-developed,

wartime tested series of live fire exercises for squads,

platoons, and companies. His rationale, and that of his

successor, General Mark Clark, was simple: safety. Safety

was a greater concern to the Army’s peacetime leaders than

training readiness. A mere 12 days after Task Force Smith’s

destruction, the Army reconstituted live fire training.34

With the safety of peacetime shattered and the Korean War

seemingly validating the tenets of NSC-68, the fiscal

restraint of the Truman administration became another

casualty. For the Army, innovation and desperation

reigned as it struggled to get trained units and more

equipment into the fight.

The first order of business was to fill the divisions

fighting in Korea, while providing MacArthur the

reinforcements needed. The Army evolved a simple

strategy: fill the divisions fighting as quickly as possible,

while rebuilding the general reserve to meet threats that

might arise elsewhere. Eighth Army came up with a similar

solution. It cannibalized the 7th Infantry Division both of

people and equipment to fill out the three divisions fighting

36
in Korea. With the Army staff unable to send sufficient

replacements to the Far East to replace the heavy losses in

the initial fighting, the Army assigned South Koreans to

each division. As the fighting increased, MacArthur asked

for more and more troops. He received the 2d and 3d

Infantry Divisions, the last two divisions in the General

Reserve, from the United States. The Army continued to

expand piecemeal, and asked for and received permission

from Truman to federalize four under-strength National

Guard divisions in August 1950. It was not until the

Chinese intervention in November 1950 that the President

declared a national emergency. Within a year-and-a-half of

the war’s outbreak, the U.S. Army doubled in divisions from

ten to twenty.35

Ultimately, the Army mobilized nearly three million

men, stopped the combined North Korean and Chinese

armies, restored the status quo ante bellum, and continued

to defend against other threats, most notably in Europe.

There was, however, little in the way of transformation or

change in the Army. Instead, it adapted the weapons and

tactics of World War II to the enemy and terrain of Korea.

The division itself changed little, and the tactical innovation

of the first year of the war gave way to the enervating tactics

of firepower dominance in the positional warfare of the last

2 years of combat. The only real change occurred in a

personnel rotation policy that moved individuals rather

than units out of Korea. The program, designed by the

Army to share the combat burden, did keep experienced

staffs in Korea, but left platoons, companies, and battalions

bereft of cohesion or esprit de corps as soldiers rotated in and

out. The average tanker and infantryman rotated back to

the States after 9 and 10 months respectively, while service

support troops could stay as long as 18 months.36

As the war ended in 1953, so too did the Truman

administration. For 5 years following the surrender of

Japan, Truman tried to wage a Cold War by starving the

Army and relying on atomic supremacy. The shock of the

North Korean invasion of the South itself was not enough to

37
loosen Truman’s grip on the economy—only the

intervention of the Chinese in the war could do that. The

end result was a gigantic rearmament program—the

building of the hydrogen bomb, many different types of

lesser atomic weapons, new supercarriers, the B-52 bomber,

and missiles of all types.37 The Army spent the years

1945-53 in demobilizing initially, occupying Germany and

Japan, expanding during the Korean War, reinforcing

Europe, and, finally, fighting a limited war. At no time,

however, did the Army seriously contemplate more than

minor changes to its organization or approach to war. The

official position was that there was no need for doctrinal

changes.38 Bereft of ideas and the desire to change, the

Army entered the mid-1950s facing the same issues that

were extant in the mid 1940s.

An Uncertain Trumpet: The Pentomic Army,

1954-1960.

The inauguration of Dwight D. Eisenhower ushered in

the end of the Korean War and another national military

strategy based on the atomic bomb and airpower. If anyone

in the Army hoped for a more sympathetic attitude towards

its problems, they were dashed almost immediately by the

administration’s announcement of the “New Look”

defensive policy. Despite reservations from the Army, the

Eisenhower administration formalized its policy in July

1953 when it issued NSC-162.39 There was nothing really

that new about the New Look. The basic structure of the

policy was an expanded strategic air force and reliance on

technology, which allowed for a severe reduction in

conventional forces. Reductions in conventional forces also

meant lowered defense costs and savings to the nation. To

Eisenhower it was simple. “If we should proceed recklessly

and habitually to create budget deficits year after year, we

have with us an inflationary influence that can scarcely be

successfully combated. Our particular form of economy

could not endure.”40 Eisenhower was convinced that the

kind of force he led across the channel in 1944 offered no use

38
whatsoever in the world of the atomic bomb. “Now, our most

valued, our most costly asset is our young men. Let’s don’t

use them any more than we have to,” he told the Washington

Post.41

For the senior leadership of the Army, the lessons and

hardships of the Korean War seemed not to matter. When

he presented his first budget as Army Chief of Staff to

Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson in 1953, Ridgway

had an epiphany: “[The] military budget was not based so

much on military requirements, or on what the economy of

the country could stand, but as on political

considerations.”42 This is a timeless and important

observation that is just as true today. Political

considerations, both domestic and external, will always

supersede any logic for force structure requirements,

especially for the Army. Only the requirements of a “hot

war” dull the tendency to find economies in the

unglamorous and seemingly nonstrategic role the Army

plays in American security. Once the war is over, however,

the long knives of the bureaucrat and politician return to

carve away excess “fat.” To General Maxwell Taylor, now

commanding Eighth Army in Korea, the ultimate effect of

the Korean War was not to show the weaknesses inherent in

the reliance of the United States on airpower and atomic

weapons, but just the opposite. Faith in “atomic airpower”

was strengthened, not reduced. To Taylor, the New Look

was little more than the old air power dogma set forth in

Madison Avenue trappings.43 How would the Army

respond?

Facing another series of seemingly endless cuts with no

apparent role in national strategy other than civil defense,

tested Army leadership. The Army ended the Korean War

with 20 divisions and 1.5 million men. By 1955, however,

Army strength was 1.1 million, dropping steadily to 859,000

and 11 combat divisions during the last year of the

Eisenhower administration.44 During his 2 years as Chief of

Staff, Ridgway fought against large troop cuts by arguing

that U.S. commitments to the nascent NATO, South Korea,

39
and other allies precluded the types of reductions sought by

the administration. The French crisis at Dien Bien Phu in

the Spring of 1954 gave the New Look its first real test.

Sending in an Army survey team, Ridgway argued that five

to ten divisions and billions of dollars in infrastructure

improvements would be needed to fight and defeat the Viet

Minh. The Army did not have that combat force ready in the

United States, and Eisenhower was unwilling to drop

atomic weapons.45 Despite the apparent failure of the policy

of massive retaliation, the Army budget continued to shrink

as did Ridgway’s influence. By the end of his 2 years as

Army Chief of Staff, Ridgway was persona non grata in the

Eisenhower administration. His replacement, Taylor,

brought a sophistication and understanding of the

Washington political landscape his predecessor lacked. He

also brought a determination to keep the Army in the public

eye.

As Chief of Staff, Taylor faced the mounting problem of

an Army with an image problem. The seemingly indecisive

nature of the Korean War only further worsened the public

opinion of the Army. Taylor decided the olive-drab uniform,

worn since World War I, had to go. After a series of “fashion

shows,” Taylor decided to field a new Army green uniform.46

An Army spokesman predicted that the newly clad soldier

could “appear beside the other services without apology for

his appearance.”47 Uniforms, however, were the least of the

Army’s problems, but Taylor’s efforts at least signaled that

changes were coming for the senior service. A more tangible

effort came immediately from Taylor in the form of a paper

entitled “A National Military Program” in which he outlined

his ideas that came to be known as ”Flexible Response.”

Taylor proposed giving the limited war forces (the Army

and, to a lesser extent, the Navy and Marines) equal priority

with the nuclear deterrent forces (the Air Force, specifically

the Strategic Air Command).48

Taylor presented his program to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

in March 1956. It was promptly ignored and led the

chairman, Admiral Arthur Radford, to propose his own

40
program calling for radical reductions in the strength of the

Army. Embracing fully Eisenhower’s policy of massive

retaliation, Radford proposed reducing the Army to 575,000

men, leaving most of the ground combat to the Marines and

American allies.49 Radford’s proposal simply fit the

outcome of the spring 1956 3-year examination of defense

requirements initiated by Wilson. While calling for

sufficient deterrence to counter the growing Soviet nuclear

arsenal, the study also called for a defense budget ceiling of

$38 billion for the next year’s budget. By making drastic

cuts in personnel in the Army, Radford sought to meet this

ceiling.50 Taylor, faced with these reductions, embarked on

an interesting and somewhat disingenuous course of action.

Prior to becoming Chief of Staff, Taylor forwarded a copy

of his ideas on flexible response to the Army staff. The

document made it into the hands of a small group of five

colonels in the Operations Directorate who embraced the

Taylor position. The group divided themselves into an

“inside team” led by Brigadier General Lyal Metheney,

responsible for informing the Army on the aspects and

implications of Flexible Response, and an “outside team” led

by Colonel George Forsythe, responsible for being Taylor’s

and the Army’s media watchdogs, bringing the Army

message to the public and Congress.51 While Taylor battled

with Wilson, Radford, and Eisenhower on the proper role

and mission of the Army in official channels, Forsythe and

Metheney battled on other fronts. The members of the

“colonel’s revolt” knew they were on their own but enjoyed

the tacit support of Taylor, who emphasized that he

wouldn’t know them if they were ever uncovered.52 The first

volley from the clandestine group came in the form of a

“leak” to Anthony Leviero of the New York Times. On July

13, 1956, Leviero published an article detailing the Radford

plan and its massive personnel cuts, as well as the reduction

of Army units in Germany to small atomic task forces.53 The

resulting uproar in Europe over the implications to NATO

in the Radford plan caused Eisenhower to scrap any idea of

41
reducing the Army to a mere civil defense force, and saved

the Army temporarily. Taylor knew he had to do more.

Before he left his post as Chief of Staff, Ridgway started

the Army on the path towards its first real transformation

since World War I. In April 1954 he directed the

development of smaller, more mobile divisions that were

capable on the nuclear battlefield. The study, Atomic Field

Army (AFTA-1), was ready by the fall of 1954, and tested

throughout the next 2 years. Instead of creating smaller

units, however, all of the recommendations from the field

actually called for larger divisions than those of post-World

War II.54 Discarding AFTA-1, Taylor seized upon the work

done at the U.S. Army War College entitled “Doctrinal and

Organizational Concepts for Atomic-Nonatomic Army

During the Period 1960-1970,” PENTANA for short. The

PENTANA concept called for small, 8,600-man divisions

that were built around five small self-sufficient battle

groups. Taylor approved the study in June 1956, and used

the newly reactivated 101st Airborne Division as the test

bed.55 Showing his appreciation for the nuances of the

political and social climate, Taylor conjured up the

“Madison Avenue adjective, ‘pentomic,’” to describe the

changes to the division.56

In September 1956 the 101st Airborne was organized

under the pentomic concept, and by December 1956 the

Army recommended reorganization of all divisions to both

the Secretary of Defense and the President.57 After a series

of unit evaluations, the new design was considered suitable

for short duration, and the Army embarked on its most

ambitious reorganization since the start of World War I.

Over the next 4 months, new tables of organization and

equipment were designed and issued, and Taylor himself

visited the school commandants to discuss and sell the

reorganization.58 With a glamorous new name for its

divsions, Taylor began his second major effort to make the

Army more relevant when he created the Strategic Army

Corps (STRAC), centered around the XVIII Airborne Corps,

the newly formed 101st Airborne Division, and the 82d

42
Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. STRAC

was a mobile reserve for use supposedly on a moment’s

notice and maintained at a high state of readiness.59 New

divisions and a new strategically employable corps were not

enough, however.

Facing a Congress and nation fascinated with all things

atomic, Taylor directed the Army to embrace atomic

technology. New divisions still did not make the Army

budget more glamorous or more palatable, whatever

Madison Avenue labels were attached. Earlier, Wilson

returned the Army budget to Taylor, directing him to

substitute “requests for newfangled items with public

appeal,” instead of much needed small arms, trucks, and

tanks.60 Accordingly, Taylor embraced the development

and employment of tactical nuclear weapons and delivery

systems along with missile technology. Soon Army

literature was filled with ideas like the convertiplane and

flying platforms for the individual soldier. In a briefing on

May 12, 1956, by the Army staff to Taylor, he directed the

Commander of Continental Army Command to develop an

atomic capability for direct support artillery, because it was

“increasingly difficult to visualize a general war without the

use of tactical atomic weapons.”61 To Taylor the move was

clear, given the climate in Washington and the nation.

“Nuclear weapons were the going thing, and, by including

some in the division armament, the Army staked out its

claim to a share in the nuclear arsenal.”62 There was a

tremendous price to pay, however, for this move toward

atomics, and it came in conventional weapons modernization.

By embracing missiles and battlefield nuclear weapons,

Taylor was relegating conventional modernization to the

bottom of the Army priority list in the 1950s. Under the

guidance of Lieutenant General James Gavin and the

engineering team of Werner von Braun at Redstone Arsenal

in Alabama, Army missile technology was second to none. A

massive continental air defense program gave the Army

some relevance, but caused bitter inter-service fighting

43
with the Air Force over the control of missile technology. At

the end of June 1959, there were 62 surface-to-air missile

battalions on site around various cities and key

installations in the continental United States alone.63

While the Army won some and lost some of these

inter-service battles, the real impact was to see even more of

the Army budget drained away from modernization

programs.64 Battlefield atomic weapons also contributed to

the Army budget drain. In May 1953, the Army fired a small

nuclear shell from the 280-mm cannon and immediately

began production of the weapon. Throughout the 1950s, the

Army deployed nuclear cannons to Europe even though they

were obsolete as soon as they arrived. Weighing 83 tons, the

cannon could not be airlifted and took two tractors to move

its road-bound bulk. It was a glamorous weapon to be sure,

but it did not fit into the Pentomic structure of the Army,

and it siphoned off precious funding that the Army

desperately needed for modernization.65

As the 1950s and the Eisenhower administration came

to an end, so too would the Army’s great stillborn

transformation, the Pentomic Era. Despite the Madison

Avenue labels, exciting developments and accomplishments

in missile technology, atomic cannon, and even nuclear

tipped rockets, the size of the Army continued to decline.

Budgets never increased sufficiently, making the Army

choose between modernization and transformation. The

Army of 1959 was not mechanized, and most soldiers still

carried the World War II era M-1 Garand rifle, even though

the more modern M-14 was available. In 1957, the Army

devoted more than 43 percent of its research and

development budget to missiles and nuclear weapons and

only 4.5 percent to new vehicles.66 Conventional weapon

and equipment modernization, though desperately needed,

could not take place in conjunction with the transformation

to the Pentomic design without additional infusions of cash

that were not to come from the Eisenhower administration.

The end result was an Army more unprepared for limited

war than the one Taylor inherited. A fixation with

44
technology, and rapid organizational changes without

possessing the requisite weapons and equipment, was the

legacy of the Pentomic era. Changes in Washington were

coming, as were changes in the Army.

The ROAD Army and the Coming of Vietnam,

1961-75.

I am directing the Secretary of Defense to undertake a

complete reorganization and modernization of the Army’s

divisional structure, to increase its non-atomic firepower, to

improve its tactical mobility in any environment, to facilitate

its coordination with our major allies, and to provide modern

mechanized divisions in Europe and new airborne brigades in

both the Pacific and Europe.

So spoke President John F. Kennedy on May 25, 1961, to a

joint session of Congress.67 Embracing the ideas of Taylor

and Flexible Response, Kennedy eschewed the Massive

Retaliation policy of the Eisenhower administration. The

Army was ready. In January 1959 General Bruce C. Clarke,

commanding general of Continental Army Command,

directed the start of a new study, Modern Mobile Army

1965-70 (MOMAR I). Clarke wanted a design that was

capable of fighting anywhere in the world in a nuclear or

non-nuclear environment. MOMAR I increased tactical

mobility and maneuverability, as well as greater

conventional firepower in the division.68 Optimized for

limited war, the forces envisioned under the MOMAR were

capable of applying graduated combat power as events

dictated from “a fist to a megaton.” One of the key features

of the MOMAR I field army was the inclusion of separate

completely air transportable brigades. These brigades were

to be multi-capable and transportable on a minimum

number of air force strategic lift aircraft to anywhere in the

world in a matter of hours. There were two division designs,

medium and heavy, with the medium division also designed

to be air transportable.69 MOMAR I met resistance within

the Army and was never tested or adopted, but it served as a

45
reference point for the next phase—Reorganization

Objectives Army Division (ROAD) 1965.

The ROAD concept was approved quickly by the

Secretaries of the Army and Defense, followed by Kennedy’s

approval and announcement of the changes in May 1961.

The basic features of the ROAD concept were a common

division base, three brigade headquarters, with battalions

added in a building block fashion.70 For the first time in its

history, the U.S. Army would field a truly mechanized

division that could rapidly assemble and disperse on both

the conventional and nuclear battlefield. The three brigade

headquarters reflected the influence of the old armored

division combat command and had no units permanently

assigned. Brigades could control two to five maneuver

battalions, and this inherent flexibility meant that the

division could task organize brigades and battalions as it

saw fit. Although there was some criticism that the ROAD

division was too flexible, the Army approved the design

without testing. It concluded that the concept was merely a

return to a wartime proven design.71 The ROAD division

was merely the logical evolutionary successor to the World

War II armored division structure.72 The only true

transformation of the Army since the end of the Second

World War, the Pentomic Division, was dead. International

events, however, would keep the Pentomic formations alive

for a few more months, launch a major transformation with

the helicopter, and prove the soundness of structuring the

Army to fight non-nuclear wars.

In May 1961 conditions in Laos and South Vietnam

deteriorated to such a degree that a presidential task force

set up to analyze the situation recommended a massive

increase in U.S. forces in South Vietnam. In Laos, Secretary

of State Dean Rusk recommended preparations for military

action as part of the South East Asian Treaty Organization

(SEATO) to defend Indochina. The SEATO plan called for

30,000 combat troops from the treaty signatories, but both

Britain and France had no intention of sending troops.

Facing increased Soviet intransigence in Berlin, Kennedy

46
opted not to send any more troops to Southeast Asia.73 The

Army, structured to fight on the nuclear battlefield and

suffering from the deleterious effects visited on it by the

“New Look,” was in no position to operate in Vietnam and in

Europe simultaneously, where Soviet Premier Nikita

Krushchev once again threatened the security of Berlin. On

August 13, 1961, Berliners awoke to find a barbed wire

barricades separating the Soviet sector from that of the

three Western Powers. Concrete, guard dogs, watchtowers,

and land mines followed quickly, as the Iron Curtain took

physical form in the historic capital of Germany. The limits

of massive retaliation were tested once again, with the

Kennedy administration finding their options

unpalatable.74 The need for an Army capable of flexible

operations in limited wars became paramount. The

Pentomic Army lacked flexibility in its small, untested,

tactically immobile battle groups.

On July 25, 1961, JFK asked Congress for additional

funding to bring the understrength pentomic divisions up to

strength and modernize their equipment. In response to the

crisis in Berlin, Robert McNamara authorized the five

divisions posted to Europe an additional 1,000 soldiers each,

allowing them to finally mechanize completely with

armored personnel carriers. Additionally, new M14 rifles

replaced the venerable M1 Garand, the new light machine

gun M60 made its way to Europe while the production of the

M60 main battle tank accelerated.75 A major deficiency was

rectified in the Pentomic divisions with the fielding of the

armored personnel carriers, but the divisions were still

weak. The Army now modernized with zeal, a process

impossible when it transformed to the Pentomic structure

just 5 years prior. Although ready to implement the

reorganization of its divisions to the ROAD structure, it was

not prudent to try and convert in the midst of crisis.

Accordingly, McNamara approved the activation of two new

Regular Army divisions in January 1962 and delayed the

conversion of the rest of the Army until early 1963. On

February 3, the 1st Armored Division activated at Fort

47
Hood, and 2 weeks later the 5th Infantry Division activated

at Fort Carson. The discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba 3

months later caused 1st Armored Division to move to Fort

Stewart where it had access to the port of Savannah. “Old

Ironsides” conducted a series of amphibious exercises

throughout the fall, serving notice that the revitalized

ROAD Army was indeed an effective instrument of national

policy. The remainder of the Army reorganization was

complete by May 1964.76 A changed national security

strategy, coupled with the impetus of international crisis,

exposed the weaknesses of the Pentomic Army.

Although the ROAD concept was a return to the

traditional divisional concept of World War II and Korea, it

was different in scope and structure making it relevant for

the 1960s and beyond. The modernization program so

desperately needed by the Army accelerated in tandem with

the ROAD reorganization. Choked off from money and

personnel the previous 10 years, the Army gained strength,

tactical mobility, firepower, and relevance in the Cold War

arena. In two other areas of major importance,

counterinsurgency and air mobility, the Army also

advanced. On November 30, 1961, Kennedy summoned all

of the Army’s major commanders to the White House for an

extraordinary summit on counterinsurgency. “I want you

guys to get with it,” Kennedy admonished the Army officers.

Most Army officers thought that the Army could handle

guerrilla problems without special emphasis if the funding

and manpower issues of the previous administration were

rectified. Nothing else was needed outside of the already

hard working Special Forces units.77 While it is debatable if

the Army was prepared to fight the type of war it faced in

Vietnam, it embraced fully the other area of major

emphasis, air mobility.

As early as 1956 the Army was testing the helicopter and

the concept of “Sky Cavalry”78 at Fort Rucker, Alabama.

Under the out-spoken leadership of Brigadier General Carl

I. Hutton and Colonel J. D. Vanderpool, the Army conducted

a series of tests on the utility of the armed helicopter.

48
Fearing bureaucratic interference from the Air Force,

Vanderpool and his troopers conducted the tests with

volunteers on the weekends and in the evening. Touring the

country, both Vanderpool and Hutton met with industry

representatives and managed to get them to provide

expertise at no cost to the government. Scrounging through

Navy and Air Force depots, weapons and gun-sites made

their way to Fort Rucker and Fort Benning. Vanderpool met

with Farell T. Mayhood, chief engineer at a General Electric

branch plant in Vermont and got the engineer to agree to

fabricate a rocket kit for a helicopter at no cost to the Army.

The organizational concepts for Sky Cavalry came from the

1936 horse cavalry doctrine manual with helicopters

substituting for the horses.79 The Sky Cav experiment died

in 1958, another victim of the struggles of the Army to both

modernize and transform during the Pentomic era. The

seeds of success, however, were sown by those early sky

troopers and needed only a sympathetic person in the

administration to flower. McNamara was that unlikely

person.

In April 1962 McNamara sent memorandums to

Secretary of the Army Elvis J. Stahr in which he argued

Army was not doing enough to advance the potential of

helicopter aviation. McNamara instructed Stahr to take a

“bold new look, divorced from traditional viewpoints and

past policies, and free from veto or dilution by conservative

staff review.”80 Within a week, Lieutenant General

Hamilton H. Howze, commander of XVIII Airborne Corps,

was appointed president of the Mobility Requirements

Board (Howze Board). For 3 feverish months, the Howze

board tested and evaluated every aspect of air mobility.81

Forty different field tests consumed over 11,000 flying

hours at Fort Bragg. At the conclusion of this frenetic effort,

the Board submitted its report on August 20, recommending

that the Army develop an air assault division following the

ROAD division model. Sky troopers would be carried into

battle by 459 troop helicopters, while armed helicopters

49
provided aerial rocket support. The Air Force immediately

objected to the Howze Board findings.82

The Howze Board was the engine of modernization and

transformation in the post-World War II Army. The board

recommended a 5-year program whereby the Army would

transform into a 16-division force of 11 ROAD divisions, 5

air assault divisions, 3 air cavalry combat brigades, and 5

air transport brigades. Air assault divisions, air transport

brigades, and air cavalry brigades were envisioned as

extremely mobile reserves for Eighth Army in Korea,

counterattack forces in support of NATO in Germany, and

as part of the Strategic Army Corps in the United States.83

The flexibility and utility envisioned by Taylor in

developing the Pentomic division now was possible. The

helicopter would radically change how the Army moved men

and material on the battlefield. Coupled with the new wire

guided anti-tank missile technology emerging in the early

1960s, the helicopter had the potential to be a hard-hitting

mobile reserve in a general war with the Soviet Union. In

the growing war in Vietnam, Howze saw the helicopter

providing the “most effective” way to augment the fight in

South Vietnam. U.S. forces would be free “from local

limitations to surface transportation,” and that “their

extreme mobility will permit a flexibility of employment

much to be desired, perhaps as a counterattack reserve or as

a blocking or enveloping force.”84 The Army had answered

Kennedy’s call to “get with it” in combating guerrillas—and

the helicopter would be central to the approach.

Despite Air Force objections, McNamara ordered Army

Chief of Staff General Earl Wheeler to test the Board

recommendations. Wheeler ordered the formation of the

11th Air Assault Division (Test) at Fort Benning in

February 1963 under Major General Harry Kinnard. After

2 years of extensive tests, the 11th Air Assault Division

exchanged its colors for the 1st Cavalry Division and

prepared to deploy to South Vietnam.85 The tests of the new

air assault division did not occur in a cocoon insulated from

the events transpiring in Southeast Asia. For several years,

50
Army helicopter pilots had learned how to handle their

machines in a counterinsurgency environment. In fiscal

year 1963 alone, Army helicopters flew 100,000 sorties,

transported 275,000 Vietnamese soldiers, and 2000 tons of

cargo.86 Many airmobile concepts were combat tested in

Vietnam, while the 11th Air Assault Division continued to

explore the employment of an air assault division.87 The

“First Team” deployed to Vietnam in the summer of 1965

and fought its first major engagement in the Ia Drang

Valley in November 1965, validating the concept of the air

assault division.88

As the Army turned its full attention to fighting the war

in Vietnam, it was the ubiquitous helicopter that came to

symbolize American power during the war. The helicopter

freed the Army from enervating forced marches, and

allowed deep incursions by battalions and brigades into

enemy held terrain at nearly a moment’s notice. The new

national strategy of “Flexible Response,” coupled with the

support of McNamara, allowed the Army to overcome the

deleterious effects of the penurious defense budgets of the

1950s. Transformation, misguided under the PENTOMIC

concept, came to partial fruition with the ROAD division

and the concepts inherent in the air assault division and the

helicopter. The Army could now completely mechanize,

field new rifles, machine guns, tanks, and vehicles of all

types, as well as integrate the helicopter into every division.

Helicopters were vital instruments of war in every division,

with entire infantry battalions moving in a single lift of

helicopters. Fighting throughout Vietnam in 1966, the 1st

Infantry Division regularly had 90 lift helicopters available

to it on a daily basis.89

But it was the new family of helicopters, specifically the

Bell UH-1 series, which facilitated the partial

transformation of the Army. Despite the urgings of the

Howze Board, the Army never abandoned the traditional

divisional design, nor did it replace armored and

mechanized divisions with air assault divisions, air

transport brigades, or air cavalry brigades. The Vietnam

51
War required helicopters, air mobile units, and light

infantry formations, but the threat to the nation was still in

Europe. The same units and helicopters that were so

important in operations in Vietnam, were of marginal

utility in fighting the massed armored formations of the

Warsaw Pact. The Army prudently retained the

capabilities of the helicopter as espoused by the Howze

Board and demonstrated in war, but rejected a complete

transformation to a helicopter based force. The helicopter,

like the tank and machine gun before it, was integrated into

the Army writ large, making it only a partial

transformation. Indeed, the helicopter can be viewed as

simply the logical extension of Army modernization to the

air medium following the independence of the Air Force in

1947, and not truly transformational at all. The Army and

the nation regained the ability to fight limited wars, giving

the President more options than simply massive retaliation

or capitulation. The war in Vietnam, however, dragged on

for the next 10 years, sapping the Army’s strength and

savagely mauling its morale. The fall of Saigon in April

1975 saw the Army enter a new phase of reflection and

search for relevance.

Cold War Triumph, 1975-91.

Even before the first North Vietnamese tank rumbled

through the streets of Saigon in April 1975, the U.S. Army

was re-examining its roles and structure. As the last Army

combat units were departing Vietnam in 1973, the Arabs

and Israelis fought the devastating Yom Kippur War of

October 1973. The lethality of modern anti-tank weapons

supplied to the Arabs by the Soviet Union, and the

incredible devastation of the tank battles on the Golan

Heights served as a necessary corrective to the enervating

years of the war in Vietnam, and as a stimulus to doctrinal

change within the Army.90 The necessity of fighting the war

in Vietnam after 1965 stunted the continued modernization

of the Army as it required more and more of the nation’s

budget to fuel the expansion of the war. Consequently, the

52
Army faced a situation in 1973 where a generation of

modernization was “lost” from 1965 to 1972, while the

Soviet Union substantially modernized and strengthened

its forces.91 Understanding the severity of the situation, the

new Army Chief of Staff, General Creighton W. Abrams,

spurred the development of a new tank, a new infantry

fighting vehicle, and new cargo and attack helicopters.

Supporting combat operations in Vietnam pillaged the

Army in Europe. Abrams moved to correct the personnel

deficiencies facing these “hollow” divisions. Additionally, he

moved to restructure the Army by revitalizing the Army

Reserve forces, with the result that the Regular Army could

not go to war without mobilizing the reserves.92

While the Army sought to modernize and stabilize its

manpower, there was a concomitant effort to examine the

divisional structure and Army doctrine. The first effort at

divisional reorganization was titled the Division

Restructuring Group. Under the concept recommended by

the group, divisions would still have three brigades, but

each would be substantially larger by fielding more tank

and mechanized infantry battalions. Anti-tank companies

sporting new wire guided missiles and more organic

aviation support rounded out the larger divisions. Wanting

a rapid force redesign that would improve readiness and

improve the capability of the Army’s forward deployed

forces, Army Chief of Staff General Bernard W. Rogers

ordered a 1-year test of the design at the beginning of 1977.

The test ended 18 months later without the adoption of the

new organization by the Army.93 As the decade of the 1970s

came to end, the Army still searched for an organization

that could fight and win on the European battlefield without

resorting to tactical nuclear weapons.

In late 1978, General Donn Starry, commander of the

Army Training and Doctrine Command, moved to extend

the Division Restructuring Group work by initiating a study

titled “Division 86.” As before, the focus was on the heavy

division and the possible fight in Europe. The new division

numbered nearly 20,000 soldiers in ten tank and

53
mechanized infantry battalions. An aviation brigade

fielded attack helicopters that could extend the tank killing

ability of the division even further. Approved in August

1980, the Army restructured the heavy divisions even

though the new M-1 Abrams tank and M-2 Bradley Fighting

Vehicle would not be immediately available to every

division.94 The emphasis was on firepower: conventional

firepower that could stem the onslaught of Warsaw Pact

forces through the Fulda Gap and across the North German

plain. Division 86, however, was really nothing more than a

retooled and polished ROAD division. It would take the

election of 1980 to insure its success.

Inaugurated even as the humiliating Iranian hostage

crisis came to end, President Ronald Reagan immediately

labeled the Soviet Union as an outlaw empire prepared to go

to any lengths to obtain its goals. The national strategy of

the United States was no longer détente, but crusade and

conversion.95 As with the election of Kennedy 20 years

earlier, the Army’s modernization program would have

arrived stillborn without the political backing and

increased budgets of the Reagan administration.

With the M-1 tank and new helicopters rolling off the

assembly lines for the heavy divisions, the Army now

directed its efforts toward the “light divisions” (airborne, air

assault, and infantry). Initial efforts focused on the 9th

Infantry Division and new technologies and organizational

concepts in order to design a motorized division capable of

being airlifted anywhere in the world.96 Additionally, a new

focus on the infantry division resulted in a truly light

10,791-man light division capable of movement in 550

sorties in less than 4 days. The new light division cost less

and was easier to maintain than the old infantry division,

and it met the needs of the Army for an easily deployable

formation that enhanced strategic response. Under the

rubric Army of Excellence (AOE), the conversion of the

standard infantry divisions started in 1984.97 It seems

obvious that the AOE light division was really nothing more

than the logical extension of the Air Transport Brigade

54
recommended 20 years prior by the Howze Board. The one

division that actually held the possibility of transforming

the Army, the high technology 9th Division, languished.

The modernization program of the 1980s was expensive

and critical to Army readiness. The high technology

experimentation in the 9th Division was time-consuming,

however, and not deemed similarly critical. Congress,

focused on fielding the weapons systems needed for the AOE

division, did not support the expense engendered by the

experiments in a high technology motorized division.

Despite these obstacles, a heavily vehicle-dependent

motorized division design emerged in 1986, but without the

technology to support the design. No assault gun or

specialized wheeled vehicle was ever developed for the

division, leaving the Army to fill it with existing designs

that were inadequate to the task.98 Even though the

budgets of the Reagan years were generous, the

modernization needs of the Army after the years of combat

in Vietnam were more important than any possible

technological advantage offered by the experiments of the

9th Division.

The modernization efforts continued apace as the decade

of the 1980s came to a close. Coupled with the refined

AirLand Battle doctrine, the AOE Army triumphed in the

desert in February 1991 in the war with Iraq. The

modernization and design efforts begun in 1962 paid off in a

war of just 100 hours against a foe armed with the weapons

and tactics of a now defunct Soviet Union. The triumph of

the desert, however, was fleeting. For the next 10 years the

Army would drift, seeking only to maintain force structure

and manpower levels. In 1994 General Gordon R. Sullivan

initiated the Force XXI efforts in the Army. Force XXI is an

attempt to marry digitization and the Army’s

experimentation under one over-arching process. Doctrine

and force design revision along with system development

ran concurrently in the test bed 4th Infantry Division at

Fort Hood.99 Despite their efforts, however, there has been

no transformation in the Army since the end of the Gulf

55
War, and more cuts in end strength seem inevitable. What

does the future portend for the Army?

2015 and Beyond: Transformation, Rapid Decisive

Operations, and the Objective Force Army.

One of the first acts of General Eric Shinseki, current

Army Chief of Staff, was to replace the standard saucer cap

of the Army green uniform with the black beret. His actions

are strikingly similar to those of Maxwell Taylor 45 years

ago. The green uniform, like the beret, signaled that change

was coming. The scope and direction of the type and amount

of change that is needed are contentious. Does the Army

need to transform into the Objective Force, or does it really

need to modernize and adapt the current force structure?

Since the end of World War II, it is clearly the latter that

served both the Army and the nation best. Whatever the

mission—occupation, combat in Korea and Vietnam,

interventions in Lebanon and the Dominican Republic,

deterrence in Europe—gradual, persistent modernization

was instrumental in keeping the Army relevant and ready

to fight. There are several arguments used today by those

who argue that current Army force structure is increasingly

irrelevant in the post-Cold War security environment.

These individuals constantly tout the canard that the

current armored and mechanized formations, now

pejoratively termed the “Legacy Force,” are as useless today

as the horse cavalry was in the 1930s.

In an address to the Association of the U.S. Army on

November 8, 2001, General Shinseki told the audience “we

must be able to project power anywhere in the world . . . that

goal was critical as we crafted the Army vision over 2 years

ago.”100 The Army, however, does not control how it gets to

the fight. It is Air Force aircraft and Navy ships that

transport each and every soldier. The Army vision may be

clear, but the Navy and Air Force may not share a similar

view. When the Howze Board recommended the

far-reaching application of helicopter technology to the

56
Army writ large, it still did not solve the problem of the

dearth of strategic lift aircraft extant in the Air Force. It

took the direct intervention of McNamara to recognize that

the modernization of the Army would be for naught without

strategic airlift. Consequently, he initiated the

development of the C-141 long range transport, and

accelerated deliveries of the C-130E turboprop. By 1964,

with the 11th Air Assault Division testing and validating

the concepts proposed by the Howze Board, Air Force airlift

capability had increased 75 percent over what was available

just 3 years prior.101 It is instructive therefore, that recently

the largest contract ever awarded by the Department of

Defense was for the Joint Strike Fighter, and not a new

transport aircraft. The cost of the Joint Strike Fighter

would pay for the current program of Army transformation

four times over.102 How does the Army get to the fight

quickly if there are not enough transports? Without a

synthesizing and unifying concept within Department of

Defense, and indeed without a person willing to do this

difficult task, there will be no real strategic deployability for

the Army.

Deployability is an interesting concept that deserves

some discussion. What exactly does the word mean or

imply? The Army has sought a force that was easily

deployed since the end of World War II. The airborne

division seems to meet this demand quite nicely. Why, then,

the search for something “more deployable?” The Air

Transport Brigades recommended by the Howze Board and

the light division of the AOE Army all meet the requirement

to deploy quickly and easily. In fact, the ROAD organization

was so flexible that the 1st Infantry Division could deploy to

Vietnam minus its heavy equipment and fight effectively.103

The new Interim Brigade Combat Team is the latest

Army initiative to get a force quickly to the fight. Because

the heavy forces (tank, mechanized infantry) lack the

ability to deploy quickly goes the argument, and light forces

lack tactical mobility and survivability, the Army needs a

57
force mounted in light wheeled armored vehicles that are

transportable by C-130 “Hercules” aircraft. Without

dedicated assets, however, it does not matter how heavy or

how light the Army force is (or the type or number of

vehicles). The Interim Brigades still require strategic lift

assets to traverse the globe. C-130 aircraft will not move

them from the Continental United States to the Middle East

or Europe, C-17 jet transports will. These same Air Force

aircraft require secure runways and enormous amounts of

fuel, if they are available to the Army at all. Many, if not all

of the C-17s, will be busy moving Air Force supplies and

equipment in order to sustain the Air Expeditionary Force,

especially since the air arm has become the initial force used

in recent years.104 To Maxwell Taylor, there was a solution:

Because of the very high performance of their airplanes,

designed primarily to meet the needs of the air battle today, the

Air Force is not equipped to discharge its responsibilities to the

Army in ground combat. [The Army] should have its own

organic tactical air support and tactical air lift....Special

restrictions of size, weight, and in the case of weapons, of range

should be abolished forever and the Army encouraged to exploit

technology to the maximum....Such an Army would take over

much of the counterattrition function, which is now split up in

many quarters of the defense establishment, to the

simplification of our functional budgeting. It would have as its

motive force the concept of a hard, mobile striking force ready to

move and fight anywhere on the ground.105

A second “air force” is not appropriate, but the Army must

maintain a hard-hitting, mobile, strike force. It is

interesting to observe that the helicopter fulfilled Taylor’s

vision for tactical air support and air lift on the battlefield.

Without strategic lift, however, it does not matter how the

Army is structured—light, medium, or heavy. The

intervention in Lebanon in 1958 is a perfect example of the

problems the Army faces in the future.

As political conditions deteriorated in Lebanon in the

summer of 1958, it seemed as if the changes wrought by

Taylor in transforming the Army were going to pay off. The

58
101st Airborne Division was restructured under the

Pentomic structure and was part of the Strategic Army

Corps, formed by Taylor for just such a contingency

operation. Under the general war in Europe scenario, the

Army was to receive 80 million ton-miles of air transport

from the Air Force’s Military Air Transport Service, of the

188 million-ton miles it could deliver. To deliver the 101st to

Lebanon would require 143 million ton-miles of airlift

capacity, a total the JCS was unwilling to deliver.

Consequently, the Strategic Army Corps sat out the

operation in Lebanon while Army forces scrambled to get

into theater from bases in Germany.106 Legacy force,

interim force, objective force, pentomic force—the type and

structure of the force are irrelevant if there is nothing to

transport them to the fight.

“Strategy wears a dollar sign,” wrote Bernard Brodie in

1959.107 Although Brodie was referring primarily to nuclear

weapons, the cost of conventional weapons today continues

to increase exponentially due to the high cost of

sophisticated technology. Operations and maintenance

(O&M) costs for the Abrams tank and Bradley Fighting

Vehicle are double that of their predecessors, and today’s

combat aircraft cost 30-50 percent more to operate than

prior models.108 Delaying or canceling the modernization

programs and upgrades for weapons systems only increases

these costs. Both the Truman and Eisenhower

administrations insisted on budgetary efficiencies at the

expense of the Army. Are we seeing the same indications

today?

For the Army there is a clear warning in the Korean War

experience. The military is rightfully subordinate to the

policies of the president, despite the deleterious effect the

policies have on readiness and training. Truman was not

going to increase spending on the military despite the

explosion of a Soviet nuclear device in August 1949, the

triumph of Mao in China, the Berlin blockade, and

numerous other international warning signs. How to react

and modernize the force under such stultifying conditions is

59
important. The Army chose to maintain the status quo of

the World War II divisional structure, eventually issuing

reduced Tables of Organization and Equipment to meet the

realities of the penurious defense spending prior to the

outbreak of the war. The Army’s real mission was

occupation, plain and simple, and it carried out that mission

with great care and efficiency. Witness the strong and

stable nations of Japan and Germany today. More

importantly, despite the avowed or assumed national

strategy or strategic interest, the Army was the only force

that could save the fledgling South Korean government and

people from annihilation at the hands of the Communist

North Koreans. The “bright delusion” that air or naval

power alone will stop or intimidate a determined foe is just

as fallacious today as it was in June 1950. Bombing Serbs in

Bosnia or Al Quaeda terrorists in Afghanistan worked only

because a proxy ground force was used. And the extent of

the “victories” in both cases is debatable.

When faced with the increasingly stringent budgets of

the mid to late 1950s, Taylor chose to attack the strategy

upon which the budget was based. An opponent of the

administration’s New Look strategy of massive retaliation,

he actively organized and succored a clandestine group

within the Army Staff as soon as he became Chief of Staff.

Intent on disrupting the proposed cuts in Army end

strength advocated by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Admiral Arthur Radford and Secretary of Defense Wilson,

Taylor chose to have this group leak sensitive, indeed

classified, information to the press. Furious, Wilson had all

the Chiefs publicly proclaim their unity, with Taylor himself

averring that there was “no mutiny or revolt” in the

Army.109 Politically adept, Taylor reassigned the group of

colonels to great assignments, while the furor over the leaks

stemmed the plans of Wilson and Radford to cut drastically

the size of the Army.110 Taylor’s example, however, presents

an interesting dilemma. His actions saved the Army from

becoming merely a civil defense force for use only after a

nuclear holocaust, but his method was one of subterfuge and

60
deceit. Clearly, it is not prudent to sanction this sort of

guerrilla campaign now in pointing out the need to fund

Army modernization.

Strategy and doctrine provide venues to argue the need

to modernize the Army. Doctrine teaches what to think and

what to do while serving a vital intermediate function of

bridging the gap between strategic theory and war in

practice.111 Currently, U.S. Joint Forces Command is

working on a joint operational concept for the next decade

titled Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO). RDO is the

asymmetric assault of an adversary from directions and

dimensions from which the adversary has no counter. It will

integrate knowledge, command and control, and operations

to achieve the desired effect.112 The key to understanding

this concept is that once deterrence fails and military force

is employed, RDO will “provide the capability to rapidly and

decisively coerce, compel, or defeat the enemy to accomplish

strategic objectives without a lengthy campaign or an

extensive build up of forces.”113 It seems obvious that the

Army’s future Objective Force will provide forces for this

doctrine, but what type of force is needed? Will science and

technology breakthroughs in the future allow the Army to

field the Objective Force? The past 60 years detail the many

dangers in this approach. Is it prudent to substitute

knowledge and information for protection and combat

power? How do you coerce, compel, or defeat an 18-year-old

girl intent on blowing herself up in a crowded market

without physically dominating the area in which she lives?

The end result of the current push to get a lighter Army to

the fight quickly is the transformational equivalent of

getting Custer to the Little Big Horn faster.114

Current operations can easily overcome any impetus to

change or modernize as the 5 years immediately following

World War II demonstrated. It is entirely possible that

current peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and other

such operations created by the current “Global War on

Terrorism” will consume the Army for the next decade. Even

if real transformation is attempted, technological dead ends

61
and failures will exhaust limited funds and leave the force

simply small, as Taylor discovered with the anemic

pentomic battle groups. The quest for technology can also

lead to legitimizing a weapon system that is patently absurd

and unusable, like the Davy Crockett, a 150-pound

miniature nuclear rocket devised for use by the battalion

commander, while the true engine of modernization, the

helicopter, goes untapped.115 Of course, the greatest

obstacle to any change is war—both Korea and Vietnam

consumed the Army for years and the Global War on Terror

promises the same.

While I have no crystal ball, nor do I claim any degree of

prescience, there are solid lessons from the Cold War years.

The Army could face a crisis of historic proportions by the

year 2010. While the armed forces continue to fight terror

wherever it is found in the world, the initial surfeit of funds

lavished on the Department of Defense by the Congress

could dwindle to pre-war levels as social and domestic fiscal

issues reassert themselves. If current decisions are any

indication, the Army will continue to cancel modernization

programs, extend the service life of older weapons systems,

and cut force structure in order to meet the inevitable

monetary constraints imposed, all in an effort to continue

funding the science and technology experimentation

considered crucial to the Objective Force. Many of the

technologies needed to make the Objective Force a reality

will be delayed, others will be deemed unusable (a la the

Davey Crockett), and more still will simply not work. All the

while, the Legacy Force will molder in its motor pools and

barracks, underfunded and unmodernized.

The current approach to transformation, waiting on

technology to show us the way for the Objective Force, will

lead to the “Balkanization” of the Army into disparate

groupings, a process that has already begun. The 75th

Infantry Regiment (Ranger) used to be the elite light

infantry of the regular Army. Today, they are classified as a

“special” force, for use only in “special” operations. With the

signing of the Camp David peace accords in 1982, no one in

62
the Army envisioned the commitment of 1,000 soldiers to

the Sinai for an indefinite period, but the Army is still there,

and an infantry colonel is selected every year to command

this force. Bosnia and Kosovo continue to require

brigade-sized units that rotate every 6 months, keeping the

peace with no end to the duty in sight. Nearly 50 years after

the truce at Panmunjom, the U.S Army continues to man

the defenses in Korea with the 2d Infantry Division. How

long will U.S. forces stay in Afghanistan to maintain the

peace? Since special operations formations are smaller and

cheaper to maintain than conventional forces, and

peacekeeping operations do not require sophisticated

armored forces, a doctrine based on swift, clean conflicts,

and rapid decisive operations will naturally accentuate

“special” forces, the use of proxy ground forces, and high

technology solutions. The Army will provide either special

forces, or specialized peacekeeping/civil affairs

brigades—just as Eisenhower envisioned the use of the

Army after a nuclear war. The quest for deployability and

lightness will only exacerbate this phenomenon.

It is possible to look too far forward as the Pentomic era

showed. When General William Dupuy took over TRADOC

in 1979, he was convinced the Army spent too much time

trying to divine the future.

. . . people aren’t smart enough to see what we’ll need in the

year 2000. The reason we aren’t smart enough to do that is the

people we ask in 1979, for instance, to look at the shape of the

Army in the year 2000, possess a 1979 mentality. So, the Army

they see out there is simply a reflection of the 1979 Army with

some gimmicks. They’ll say “By then we’ll have more lasers,

and we may have atomic energy, and we may have this, and we

may have that.” But the concept is all based on a 1979

consciousness and information. I just don’t believe human

beings can look to the long-range future that well, so I stopped

most of the long range studies. I also tried to make some sense

out of the so-called weapons requirement process....Somebody

was supposed to sit down and visualize the perfect weapon of

the future. Then, after you have visualized and described it,

you turned it over to the engineers and the scientists and

63
asked them to make one....[but] there isn’t anybody in TRADOC

or CDC [Combat Developments Command] who can see further

than the scientists or the engineers have already seen.116

We, of course, possess a 2002 mentality, and Dupuy’s

advice is sound. Instead of repeating the tired dogma that

the current Army force structure is too heavy to get to the

fight quickly, should we not ask how quickly does the force

really need to be there, and then build the strategic lift

needed to meet that goal? The real answer to this question

and the others associated with transformation goes back to

the reason the Army exists at all—to fight and win the

nation’s wars by providing sustained ground combat forces.

Therefore, as the current legacy systems reach the end of

their lifecycle between the years 2010-15, the technologies

needed to make the Objective Force a reality could be

stillborn, forcing the Army to improvise in a major theater of

war, much as it did in 1950 in Korea.

Finally, the history of the Cold War shows clearly that

the Army will continue to lose budget battles to the high

technology weapons created for doctrines like Rapid

Decisive Operations. The current conventional force

structure will age and become obsolete. A decade of

modernization will be lost, factories closed, engineering and

scientific experts diverted to other areas. Congress will look

for economies in personnel costs and the force structure, cut

programs, and argue with the president on proper

“strategy,” while the Army continues keeping the peace and

fighting terrorism around the globe. And then in an area

assumed to be outside U.S interest, it will happen—a

conflict that presents no proxy, is not decided rapidly, and

with an enemy who is not affected by high technology

solutions, or who can counter American high technology

weapons with countermeasures of its own. Even in the 21st

century, we will discover too late that you still need to

physically dominate your foes in order to impose your will,

and that this cannot be done by high flying aircraft, smart

bombs, unmanned drones, satellites, or information

superiority.

64
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B.

Ridgway, New York, 1958, p. 192.

2. General Douglas MacArthur as quoted in Allan R. Millett and

Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the

United States of America, New York, 1984, p. 466.

3. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army, New York,

1967, p. 485.

4. Ibid., p. 486.

5. William W. Epley, America’s First Cold War Army, 1945-1950, Arlington, Virginia, August 1999, p. 4.

6. Stephen E. Ambrose, “The Armed Forces and American

Strategy, 1945-1953,” in Against All Enemies: Interpretations of

American Military History from Colonial Times to the Present, Kenneth

J. Hagan and William R. Roberts, eds., New York, 1986, p. 306.

7. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Vol.1, Years of

Decision, Garden City, N.Y, 1955, p. 484.

8. Epley, America’s First Cold War Army, p. 4.

9. Truman, Memoirs, p. 509.

10. Ridgway, Soldier, p. 166.

11. Truman, Memoirs, p. 509.

12. John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of

Divisions and Separate Brigades, Washington, DC, 1998, p. 211.

13. Ibid., pp. 211-212.

14. Ibid., pp. 222-225.

15. Weigley, History of the United States Army, p. 502.

16. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical

Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy, New York,

1982, p. 22.

17. Ibid., p. 23.

18. Weigley, History of the United States Army, p. 501.

19. Epley, America’s First Cold War Army, p. 17.

65
20. Department of Defense, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of

the Army, July 1 to December 31, 1949, Washington, DC, 1950, pp.

125-126.

21. James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year,

Washington, DC, 1972, pp. 43-45.

22. Doris M. Condit, The Test of War, 1950-1953. History of the

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Volume II, Washington, DC, 1988, pp.

5-6.

23. Ambrose, “The Armed Forces and American Strategy,

1945-1953,” p. 310.

24. Ridgway, Soldier, p. 192.

25. For an outstanding account of the events surrounding the

commitment of the U.S. Army to the Korean peninsula, see Joseph C.

Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War, New York, 1982, pp.

101-105.

26. For an outstanding description of the fighting of Task Force

Smith, see Roy K. Flint, “Task Force Smith and the 24th Infantry

Division: Delay and Withdrawal, 5-19 July 1950,” in Charles E. Heller

and William A. Stofft, eds., America’s First Battles, 1776-1965,

Lawrence, KS, 1986, p. 266.

27. Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis,

Credibility, and Command, New York, 1986, p. 36.

28. Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 45-46.

29. Ibid., p. 59.

30. Ibid., p. 46.

31. Robert A. Doughty, The Evolution of US Army Tactical

Doctrine, 1946-76. Leavenworth Paper Number 1, Fort Leavenworth,

KS, 1979, p. 11.

32. The story of these two provisional platoons is adapted from my

article, Arthur W. Connor, Jr., “The Armor Debacle in Korea 1950:

Implications for Today,” Parameters, Vol. XXII, No. 2, Summer 1992, pp.

66-76.

33. Epley, America’s First Cold War Army, pp. 12-13.

34. Ibid., pp. 12-13.

35. See Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of

Divisions and Separate Brigades, Chapter 9.

66
36. T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study in

Unpreparedness, New York, 1963, p. 505; Weigley, History of the United

States Army, p. 510.

37. Ambrose, “The Armed Forces and American Strategy,

1945-1953,” p. 317.

38. Doughty, The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76,

p. 12.

39. Daun Van EE, “From the New Look to Flexible Response,

1953-1964,” in Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American

Military History from Colonial Times to the Present, Kenneth J. Hagan

and William R. Roberts, eds., New York, 1986, p. 322.

40. Eisenhower, in a letter to Alfred M. Gruenther, May 4, 1953, in

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower. The Presidency: The Middle

Way XIV, Louis Galambos and Daun Van EE, eds., Baltimore, 1996, p.

203.

41. Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower, Volume II. The President, New York, 1984, p. 171.

42. Ridgway, Soldier, p. 272.

43. Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, New York: Harper

and Brothers, 1959, p. 17.

44. A. J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between

Korea and Vietnam, Washington, DC: National Defense University

Press, 1986, p. 19.

45. Van EE, “From the New Look to Flexible Response, 1953-1964,”

p. 328.

46. John M. Taylor, General Maxwell Taylor: The Sword and the

Pen, New York, 1989, p. 197.

47. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era, p. 23.

48. Van EE, “From the New Look to Flexible Response, 1953-1964,”

p. 330.

49. Ibid., p. 330.

50. Douglas Kinnard, President Eisenhower and Strategy

Management: A Study in Defense Politics, Washington, DC, 1989, p. 57.

51. Interview between Lieutenant Colonel Frank L. Henry and

Lieutenant General George I. Forsythe, U.S. Army Military History

67
Institute, Senior Officer’s Debriefing Program, Project 74-1, Carlisle

Barracks, PA, p. 326.

52. Taylor, The Sword and the Pen, p. 209.

53. Kinnard, President Eisenhower and Strategy Management, p.

57; Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, pp. 41-42. Taylor writes that Leviero

benefited from a “deliberate leak” and astute investigation, when it was

actually the inside group of the Operations Directorate who fed him the

details.

54. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, pp. 269-270.

55. Ibid., pp. 273-274.

56. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, p. 171.

57. Doughty, The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76,

p. 16.

58. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, pp. 277-279.

59. Van EE, “From the New Look to Flexible Response, 1953-1964,”

p. 332.

60. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, p. 171.

61. U.S. Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military

Operations. Briefing for Chief of Staff on Army Organization 1960-70,

PENTANA, May 15, 1956. Copy in the Military History Institute

archives, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

62. Ibid., p. 171.

63. Statement by General Maxwell D. Taylor before the Senate

Armed Services committee, January 22, 1959. Copy in the Military

History Institute archives, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

64. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era, pp. 98-100.

65. Ibid., pp. 83-84.

66. Ibid., p. 100.

67. E. F. Fisher, Relationships of the ROAD Concept to Moral

Considerations in Strategic Planning, OCMH Monograph No. 106S, 3.

Copy in the Military History Institute archives, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

68. Glen R. Hawkins and James Jay Carafano, Prelude to Army

XXI: U.S. Army Division Design Initiatives and Experiments,

1917-1995, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 15; Doughty, The Evolution of US

Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76, p. 19.

68
69. United States Army Continental Army Command, “MOMAR,

Modern Mobile Army 1965-70,” working papers, June 9, 1959. Copy in

the Military History Institute archives.

70. Doughty, The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76,

p. 21.

71. Hawkins and Carafano, Prelude to Army XXI, p. 17.

72. Fisher, Relationships of the ROAD Concept to Moral

Considerations in Strategic Planning, p. 83.

73. Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons

of Vietnam, with Brian VanDeMark, New York, 1995, p. 37.

74. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, New York, 1994, pp. 583-585.

75. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, p. 305.

76. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, pp. 306-308; Van EE, “From

the New Look to Flexible Response, 1953-1964,” p. 336.

77. Kennedy, as quoted in Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army

and Vietnam, Baltimore, 1986, p. 31. The entire thrust of the

Krepinevich book is that the Army did not prepare to fight a

counterinsurgency in Vietnam, hence the roots of the defeat.

78. See Lieutenant General James Gavin, “Cavalry, And I don’t

Mean Horses,” Armor 68, May-June 1954.

79. Frederic A. Bergerson, The Army Gets an Air Force: Tactics of

Insurgent Bureaucratic Politics, Baltimore, 1980, pp. 70-76.

80. McNamara as quoted in Hawkins and Carafano, Prelude to

Army XXI, p. 17.

81. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, p. 314.

82. Hawkins and Carfano, Prelude to Army XXI, pp. 17-18.

83. U.S. Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board, Final

Report, Fort Monroe, Virginia: Continental Army Command, August

20, 1962, p. 6. Copy in the Military History Institute archives.

84. Ibid., p. 15.

85. Bergerson, The Army Gets an Air Force, pp. 115-116.

86. Department of Defense, Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1963,

including the Reports of the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the

69
Army, Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Air Force, Washington,

DC, 1964, p. 111.

87. Doughty, The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76,

p. 29.

88. For the definitive account of that first fight in the Ia Drang see

LTG (Ret) Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway, We Were Soldiers

Once and Young: Ia Drang—The Battle That Changed the War in

Vietnam, New York, 1992.

89. Senior Officer Oral History Program, Changing an Army: An

Oral History of General William E. Dupuy, interviewed by Lieutenant

Colonel Romie L. Brownlee and Lieutenant Colonel William J. Mullen

III, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1986,

p. 148.

90. John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The

Development of Army Doctrine, 1973-1982, Fort Monroe, VA: United

States Army Training and Doctrine Command, June 1984, p. 2.

91. Doughty, The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76,

p. 41.

92. Harry G. Summers, “The Army After Vietnam,” in Against All

Enemies: Interpretations of American Military History from Colonial

Times to the Present, Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts, ed.,

New York, 1986, pp. 362-363.

93. Hawkins and Carfano, Prelude to Army XXI, pp. 19-20.

94. John L. Romjue,The Army of Excellence: The Development of the

1980s Army, Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine

Command, 1993, pp. 9-11.

95. Kissinger, Diplomacy, pp. 766-767.

96. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, p. 391.

97. Ibid, pp. 391-394.

98. Romjue, The Army of Excellence, pp. 75-77.

99. Hawkins and Carafano, Prelude to Army XXI, pp. 27-28.

100. General Eric Shinseki, address to the Association of the

United States Army, Washington, DC, November 8, 2001.

101. Department of Defense, Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1964,

including the Reports of the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the

Army, Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Air Force, Washington,

DC, 1966, p. 3.

70
102. See Greg Schneider, “Lockheed Martin Beats Boeing for

Fighter Contract,” The Washington Post, October 27, 2001, Section A,

page A01.

103. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, pp. 323-324.

104. Earl H. Tilford, Halt Phase Strategy: New Wine in Old Skins, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, July 23, 1998.

105. Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, pp. 169-171.

106. Roger J. Spiller, Not War But Like War: The American

Intervention in Lebanon, Leavenworth Paper No. 3, Fort Leavenworth,

KS: Combat Studies Institute, January 1981, pp. 8-9.

107. Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, Princeton NJ,

1959, Chapter 10.

108. Michele A. Flournoy editor, QDR 2001: Strategy Driven

Choices for America’s Security, Washington, DC, 2001, p. 121.

109. David T. Fatua, “The Inconsonant Culture: Ridgway, Taylor

and the Proper Role in Civil-Military Relations” A Paper Presented to

the Conference of Army Historians, 1996, June 19, 1996.

110. Taylor, The Sword and the Pen, pp. 209-210.

111. Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy, New York, 1999, p. 36.

112. U.S. Joint Force Command, A Concept for Rapid Decisive

Operations, Final Draft, Washington, DC: J9 Futures Lab, October 25,

2001, p. v.

113. Ibid., p. 11.

114. This idea comes from a discussion with my faculty advisor, Dr.

Conrad Crane, who heard Dr. Andrew Krepinevich make a similar

comment to the media. For a plausible scenario, see John A. Antal’s

essay “Battleshock XXI,” in Digital War: A View From the Front Lines,

Robert L. Batemen III, ed., Novato, CA, 1999, p. 81.

115. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era, p. 96.

116. Dupuy Oral History, p. 181.

71
CHAPTER 3

EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS:

THE END OF DOMINANT MANEUVER?

Colonel Gary Cheek

Airpower is an unusually seductive form of military strength

because, like modern courtship, it appears to offer all the

pleasures of gratification without the burdensof commitment. 1

Eliot Cohen

To many senior leaders in the U. S. Army, the concept of

effects-based operations is another attempt by strategic

bombing advocates to line Air Force coffers at the expense of

land forces. They see effects-based operations as old wine in

new skins—catchy phrases with a technological twist to

make air power “unusually seductive” to decisionmakers.

Recent efforts by the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program

at the Institute for Defense Analysis have “hijacked” the

term by seeking to expand the original concept into the

realm of strategic planning. This new version of

effects-based operations represents an effort to anticipate

intended and unintended effects, either to mitigate or

exploit effects for advantage: an approach “that has been

the foundation of a number of air, land, and naval

campaigns” throughout history.2 Nevertheless, while

adding to the intellectual debate, such an approach

exacerbates the problem of understanding effects-based

operations, since it suggests an almost universal

applicability for the concept from strategic to tactical levels.

However, like it or not the concept of effects-based

operations is gaining momentum and legitimacy. Joint

73
Forces Command is presently developing a conceptual basis

for effects-based operations as a precursor to future

experimentation and potential inclusion in joint doctrine. 3

To that end, this chapter will investigate effects-based

operations from an Army perspective. It will examine the

origins of the concept, conduct a theoretical and historical

assessment, and determine the concept’s applicability to

ground operations and dominant maneuver. Finally, the

chapter’s goal is to see whether effects-based operations can

provide the strategic “gratification” air power enthusiasts

so ardently advocate, as well as determine the implications

for dominant ground maneuver.

The Origins of Effects-Based Operations.

Air Force Colonel John Warden laid the intellectual

foundation for effects-based operations with his depiction of

the enemy as a system and future war as parallel warfare.

In the early 1990s, Warden argued that technology would

allow the United States to attack multiple, vital targets

simultaneously at the strategic level, and thus collapse an

adversary’s system, leaving him with no means to respond.

Warden contended that this “makes very real what

Clausewitz called the ideal form of war.” One can assume

that Warden would argue that proper execution of parallel

warfare would result in a near simultaneous capitulation as

well.4

The genesis of Effects-Based Operations began with an

analysis of the Gulf War air campaign’s targeting, outlined

in a monograph by then Brigadier General David A.

Deptula, entitled Effects-Based Operations: Change in the

Nature of Warfare. One of the leading planners in the famed

“Black Hole” planning group for strategic targeting during

the Gulf War, Deptula asserted that stealth technology and

precision-guided munitions have ushered in a new form of

warfare:

War colleges teach two principal forms of warfare—attrition

and annihilation. The Gulf War demonstrated another—

74
control, through the application of parallel war. The strategies

of annihilation and attrition rely on sequential, individual

target destruction as the ultimate method of success and

measure of progress—generally measured in terms of forces

applied, or input. Using effects-based operations, the

determinant of success is effective control of systems that the

enemy relies upon to exert influence— output. Changing the

way we think about the application of force may produce more

effective use of force. . . . The combination of stealth and

precision redefines the concept of mass. Mass, in the sense of

an agglomeration of a large number of forces, is no longer

required to achieve a devastating effect upon a system of

forces, infrastructure, government, or industry. No longer do

large numbers of surface forces require movement,

positioning, and extensive preparation before we can achieve

dominant effects on the enemy. . . . Surface forces will always

be an essential part of the military, but massing surface forces

to overwhelm an enemy is no longer an absolute prerequisite

to impose control over the enemy.5

Under the moniker of effects-based operations,

Deptula’s argument took parallel warfare further. His

notion was that it is the projection of force rather than the

presence of force that achieves effects. In some

circumstances the projection of force can replace deployed

forces and achieve the same effect.6 He clearly implies that

technology has decreased the relevance and necessity for

ground forces. In the end one can assume he would advocate

a reduction in the Army’s budget to resource an expansion of

Air Force stealth and precision capabilities.7 While this is no

doubt where the Army’s “visceral hatred”8 of effects-based

operations arises, it reveals the core issue at hand: can

effects-based operations, using stealth, precision, and

parallel warfare, “compel the enemy to do our will?”9 Do

effects-based operations signal the end of dominant ground

maneuver? Clausewitz would suggest that the answer lies

in a theoretical assessment—one that casts aside the

“visceral hatred” and objectively utilizes theory to “study

the ways and means” of effects-based operations.10

75
Effects-Based Operations: A Theoretical

Assessment.

Among the first theorists on the use of air power was

Guilio Douhet, who developed his theory against the

backdrop of World War I’s stalemate. Completing his work

in 1921, Douhet’s Command of the Air, argued for a number

of simple and direct propositions:

(1) Modern Warfare allows for no distinction between

combatants and noncombatants; (2) successful offensives by

surface forces are no longer possible; (3) the advantages of speed

and elevation in the three-dimensional arena of aerial warfare

have made it impossible to take defensive measures against an

offensive aerial strategy; (4) therefore, a nation must be

prepared at the outset to launch massive bombing attacks

against the enemy centers of population, government, and

industry—hit first and hit hard to shatter enemy civilian

morale, leaving the enemy government no option but to sue for

peace; (5) to do this an independent air force armed with

long-range bombardment aircraft, maintained in a constant

state of readiness, is the primary requirement.11

Billy Mitchell, an American airman in World War I,

while adopting Douhet’s strategic views, emphasized all

forms of air power. In particular, he argued that the Air

Force’s first task must be to defeat the enemy’s Air Force. He

also strongly argued for the ability of air power to dominate

ground and naval forces. To Mitchell, the overarching

importance was not strategic bombing. Rather, it was

“centralized coordination of all air assets under the control

of an autonomous air force command, freed from its

dependency on the army. If that goal could be achieved, he

felt, everything else would fall into its proper place.”12

These two theorists have had considerable impact: their

strongly held beliefs in an independent air force under the

command of an airman and their emphasis on strategic

attacks that break the enemy’s will to fight remain in

current Air Force Doctrine.13 They also form the starting

blocks for effects-based operations, systems thinking, and

76
parallel warfare. That their ideas still permeate Air Force

doctrinal thinking lends credence to the relevance of Douhet

and Mitchell and suggests that with the advance of

technology, the strategic “brass ring” draws ever nearer to

their 80-year-old vision. Thus, effects-based operations are

not just an idea that emerged from precision weapons and

stealth. They represent a manifestation of historic air power

theory coupled with the advance of air power technology

that seemingly promises the vindication of strategic

bombing. What is missing is the view from outside that

paradigm—what insights can traditional land warfare

theory and doctrine provide in assessing the potential of

effects-based operations?

Effects-Based Operations and the Elements of

Combat Power.

FM 3-0 Operations outlines the elements of combat

power as firepower, maneuver, leadership, protection, and a

recent addition—information.14 Effects-based operations

utilize multiple facets of these elements: information for

target location, leadership for execution, stealth for

protection, precision engagement for firepower, and

airborne maneuver to gain positional advantage. The

elements of combat power provide a useful construct in

assessing the components of effects-based operations and

insights into its claim to represent a new form of warfare.

Information, Leadership, and Decisionmaking.

Information is key to successful execution of effects-based

operations. The proper utilization of precision guided

munitions demands virtually perfect target information on

the enemy. This “know your enemy” requirement is not

entirely far fetched. Sensors, imagery, and computer

technology promise to yield considerable information

advantages to U.S. forces over potential adversaries. Sun

Tzu would applaud such technological efforts:

And as water shapes its flow in accordance with the ground, so

an army manages its victory in accordance with the situation

77
of the enemy. And as water has no constant form, there are in

war no constant conditions. Thus, one able to gain the victory by

modifying his tactics in accordance with the enemy situation

may be said to be divine.15

Indeed, this technological edge could provide a level of

information superiority enjoyed by no other force in history,

leaving U.S. forces well-positioned to execute effects-based

operations.

However, unfamiliar with current advances in

technology, Clausewitz would most likely disagree. He

cynically commented about intelligence in the past, stating:

Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more

are false, and most are uncertain. . . . one report tallies with

another, confirms it, magnifies it, lends it color, till [the

commander] has to make a quick decision—which is soon

recognized to be mistaken, just as the reports turn out to be lies,

exaggerations, errors, and so on. In short, most intelligence is

false, and the effect of fear is to multiply lies and inaccuracies.

As a rule most men would rather believe bad news than good,

and rather tend to exaggerate the bad news. . . . This difficulty of

accurate reflection constitutes one of the most serious sources of

friction in war, by making things appear entirely different from

what one had expected.16 [italics original]

While most modern commanders or military

commentators would not share Clausewitz’ pessimistic

view of intelligence, they would also recognize that it is not a

panacea of success. U.S. military forces were unable to stop

SCUD launches during the Gulf War, nor could they find

and destroy all of Iraq’s nuclear and chemical sites.17

Incomplete intelligence led to the bombing of the Al Firdos

bunker in Iraq and inaccurate intelligence to the bombing of

the Chinese embassy in Kosovo.18 Not much has changed in

the last decade. Targeting errors and incorrect information

about rival groups in Afghanistan have resulted in a

number of attacks on unintended targets and in friendly

casualties.19 While such incidents do not invalidate the

concept of effects-based operations, they suggest that the

U.S. military will never achieve perfection in knowledge of

78
the enemy. Effects-based operations will always contain a

human dimension that will introduce risk and error and

ultimately limit advances in technology. Clausewitz would

also suggest that in war the enemy reacts, and will no doubt

take actions to deceive sensors and imagery, or disperse in a

manner to mitigate vulnerabilities to acquisition and

attack.20

By itself, information is only a stream of data, of no value

unless acted upon. Leadership is the mechanism that

provides the necessary direction, manifested in the

commander and his ability to assess information and make

decisions. Effects-based operations must follow a similar

cycle to properly assess the enemy system, select the

vulnerable nodes, and then attack to collapse the enemy’s

system. However, the information age brings with it

additional issues that challenge the decision cycle:

dependency on information, potential for massive overload

of information, and over-centralization of command. As

Michael Handel has argued:

We now know more, but this makes us more, not less

uncertain. In the final analysis, intelligence problems are

human—problems of perception, subjectivity, and wishful

thinking—and thus are not likely to disappear no matter how

much the technological means of intelligence improve.

Therefore the suggestion that war since the time of Napoleon

and Clausewitz has lost much of its “friction” is baseless.21

Michael Handel concludes:

Thus while friction and uncertainty continue to exist, their

causes and origin have changed with time. Another modern

danger is that less-important decisions will be made at higher

echelons as political and military leaders attempt to centralize

the management of war by removing authority from

lower-level commanders on the battlefield. Field commanders

will thus become agents inspecting the implementation of

orders from the rear, rather than military decision-makers

grappling with the dangers and uncertainties of war.

Technology has changed the nature of intelligence by

eliminating some of the problems while creating others.22

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Thus, theory and science suggest the necessity for

perfect information and rapid decisionmaking is a major

weakness in the execution and assessment of effects-based

operations. While such an approach will do well using

precision munitions on known, fixed targets, such attacks

are less likely to succeed against dispersed, hidden, mobile,

or politically sensitive targets. Effects-based operations

depend on human intelligence assets to determine the real

effects on the enemy’s overarching system and will. If such

precision attacks do not produce immediate strategic

decision, enemy reactions could circumvent effects. This

may explain the unending controversies about the strategic

air campaign’s effectiveness in World War II and

subsequent campaigns.23 In each of these conflicts the

challenges of assessing battle damage, the enemy’s reaction

to attack, his resolve to continue, and the impact of strategic

attacks on the enemy’s political decisionmaking still elude

final resolution. Indeed, accurate intelligence may well be

the Achilles heel of all effects-based operations. A thesis

presented to the School of Advanced Airpower Studies at

Maxwell Air Force Base concludes:

Due to the fog of real-world operations, complete and perfect

intelligence will never exist. Even if perfect knowledge of the

physical battlespace did exist, many of the most sought-after

effects reside only in the enemy’s mind and will never be fully

known. We must be ever cognizant that the logical beauty of

effects-based theory tends to mask its practical limitations at

the higher levels of war.24

Protection. Stealth technology as a component of

protection is less controversial. Today stealth technology is

an asymmetrical advantage that allows certain U.S.

aircraft to strike enemies with virtual invincibility.

Deptula, in his arguments for changes in force structure,

makes the point that despite the increased cost of stealth,

the cost per target hit is far less because such aircraft

require virtually no supporting aircraft.25 However, one

must remember that the bombers in the age of Douhet were

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also “stealthy,” only to have scientists develop radar.

Stealth technology may yet prove not to be invincible.

Protection also applies to the target, and the enemy will

take every action possible to inhibit attacks and protect his

vulnerable points. This includes historical actions such as

camouflage, dispersion, and movement, as well as locating

critical capabilities among innocent civilians or structures

such as churches and hospitals.26 Nevertheless, the

advantages of protection lie with proponents of

effects-based operations as stealth at present has no

countermeasures, while sensor technology can do much to

defeat the traditional protective actions of adversaries.

Firepower. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0 Operations

defines firepower as “the destructive force essential to

overcoming the enemy’s ability and will to fight.”27 In its

purest form, firepower is without direction and contributes

only the potential attrition of the enemy. Used with other

elements of combat power, firepower attrition gains focus

and timing to produce a synergistic output far greater than

firepower alone. This is central to employment of

effects-based operations, as information, stealth, and

maneuver are what allow the precision munitions to strike

appropriate targets and generate desired synergistic effect.

The distinction, however, is not the application of firepower

or its relationship with the other elements of combat power.

It is the level of war at which that firepower seeks effect. For

the advocates of effects-based operations, it is its ability to

immediately strike at the strategic level of war that sets it

apart from other concepts of warfare.

Strategic attacks that either bypass, circumvent, or

negate ground combat are appealing to political leaders,

since such attacks could minimize casualties, expenses,

collateral damage, and conflict duration, while still

achieving the strategic and political objectives. The Air

Force defines strategic attack as:

those operations intended to directly achieve strategic effects

by striking at the enemy’s [centers of gravity]. These

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operations are designed to achieve their objectives without first

having to necessarily engage the adversary’s fielded military

forces in extended operations at the operational and tactical

levels of war. . . . Strategic attack objectives often include

producing effects to demoralize the enemy’s leadership, military

forces, and population, thus affecting an adversary’s capability

to continue the conflict.28

Strategic attack follows the historic influence of Douhet

and Mitchell with its notion that air power can unilaterally

attack strategic centers of gravity to meet national

objectives. However, history has not been kind to such

thinking, as the course of World War II’s air campaign

might suggest:

By claiming so much for air power before the war (and after the

war as well), airmen created false perceptions that

documentary and historical evidence simply does not support.

The strategic bombing offensives contributed to Allied victory

because they supported and were supported by the efforts of

Allied ground and naval forces.29

While strategic bombing played a crucial role in Nazi

Germany’s defeat, a number of pre-war assumptions proved

wrong: industrial infrastructure proved resilient,

immensely flexible, and adaptable “in the face of incredible

hardships and difficulties.” Civilian morale was an elusive

target, more prone to anger rather than panic or collapse.

Regimes—whether democratic or totalitarian—proved

adept at providing the necessary stiffening needed to

maintain political stability.30 Five years of strategic

bombing over the course of World War II killed hundreds of

thousands of German civilians, destroyed entire cities,

curtailed industrial output, and crippled transportation

nodes: all with immense effect. Yet such effects-based

operations still failed to render a strategic decision. What

can make current analysts so bold as to argue that stealth

and precision munitions will render such a decision in a

more media critical environment with arguably more

political restrictions on the application of force? Indeed,

effects-based operations using stealth and precision

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munitions may be a quantum leap in efficiency, but the

nature of strategic targets have changed little and the

likelihood of strategic success based on new weapons seems

dubious. There is a fundamental difference between

military efficiency and military effectiveness. However, at

the operational level, effects-based operations seem to offer

much greater promise.

Operational Fires. Army FM 3-0 defines operational

fires as “the operational level commander’s application of

nonlethal and lethal weapons effects to accomplish

objectives during the conduct of a campaign or major

operation.”31 Operational fires also need application of the

other elements of combat power to increase effects. In the

Korean War, this was certainly the case.

General O. P. Weyland, commander of the U.S. Far East Air

Forces, [commented that] the greatest level of effort by the air

forces was devoted to interdiction of enemy supplies and

reinforcements. Here the lesson of northern Italy in 1944 and

1945 had to be learned all over again: for air interdiction to be

effective, the surface forces had to be in control of the tactical

initiative.32

Current Army doctrine echoes Weyand’s point:

[O]perational maneuver does not necessarily depend on

operational fires. However, operational maneuver is most

effective when commanders synchronize it with, and exploit

opportunities developed by, operational fires. Combining

operational fires with operational maneuver generates

asymmetric, enormously destructive, one-sided battles, as the

Desert Storm ground offensive showed.33

Air Force doctrine agrees that “interdiction and

surface-force maneuver can be mutually supporting.”

Nevertheless, unlike Weyland, it leaves room for effects by

air power only.34 This belies the historical lessons that

underline the synergistic effects generated by combining

operational fires with operational maneuver: Neither is as

effective in the absence of the other. In this case, U.S.

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warfighting doctrine would suggest that inclusion of ground

maneuver enhances effects-based operations; and that

“parallel war” using air power alone would be less effective

than combining those effects with a ground maneuver force.

It also insinuates that application of combat power at the

strategic and operational levels is somehow different than

at the tactical level and that while persuasive, “parallel

war” lacks the compelling force of close combat. It begs the

question: Why?

To Compel: Effects-Based Operations or Close

Combat?

Clausewitz defines war as “not merely an act of policy

but a true political instrument, a continuation of political

intercourse, carried on by other means.”35 He describes war

as a true chameleon, a paradoxical trinity composed of the

government, the armed forces and the people—three

human forces that continuously interact.36 To Clausewitz,

war is a human endeavor, comparable to commerce as

opposed to an art or science.37 While he recognizes that

political constraints limit the use of force and prevent war

from achieving its absolute state,38 he underlines that war

is “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” His

choice of words is important—compel leaves no alternative

for the enemy; he must conform to our will. Had he chosen

“coerce” or “persuade,” he would have left the final decision

with the enemy. This is the critical difference between the

“control” warfare of effects-based operations and the

compelling force of close combat, born of fire and maneuver.

FM 3-0 states that “tactical fires destroy or neutralize

enemy forces, suppress enemy fires, and disrupt enemy

movement. Tactical fires create the conditions for decisive

close combat.”39 It notes that close combat is:

[I]nherent in maneuver and has one purpose—to decide the

outcome of battles and engagements. Close combat is combat

carried out with direct fire weapons, supported by indirect fire,

air delivered fires, and non-lethal engagement means. Close

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combat defeats or destroys enemy forces, or seizes and retains

ground. The range between combatants may vary from several

thousand meters to hand-to-hand combat. [emphasis in the

original]40

In essence, close combat is the final arbiter of war. It

combines ground maneuver with firepower to render the

enemy’s reactions ineffective and eventually drives him to

defeat. It forces resolution of the political issue on contested

terrain in the only possible way: through interpersonal,

human-to-human contact. From the perspective of the U.S.

Army,

Close combat is necessary if the enemy is skilled and resolute;

fires alone will neither drive him from his position nor

convince him to abandon his cause. Ultimately, the outcome of

battles, major operations, and campaigns depends on the

ability of Army forces to close with and destroy the enemy.41

By virtue of human interaction, continuous presence in

close proximity, and certainty of destructive force, close

combat compels the enemy to do our will—leaving him no

choice but capitulation. By contrast, effects-based

operations and its fires approach is impersonal, fleeting in

nature, and from the enemy’s eye, indiscriminate. While

persuasive, such fires leave the decision with the enemy—he

may decide to capitulate, or may decide to prolong the

conflict to the last man.42 This does not mean the United

States should pursue a “close combat only” approach; it

means that strategic policymakers must recognize that it is

the essential end to successful warfighting in conjunction

with strategic attack, with operational fires, and with

tactical fires. The assertion that effects-based operations

and “control warfare” have ushered in a new era in warfare

defies history, theory, and misreads the changes technology

offers. Some within the Air Force community agree, as a

recent article in the Airpower Journal concluded:

U.S. Air Force aerospace-power doctrine should be more

coercively oriented than idealistically decisive. Coercive

airpower is the most likely reality in future wars (outside

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nuclear conflict). . . . Current aerospace-power doctrine is a

two-edged sword. One edge utilizes doctrine as a marketing tool

to compete in the joint service arena for future military

programs, while the other edge attempts to guide airmen in

sound warfighting principles. The challenge is to minimize the

marketing utility of doctrine and maximize the operational

relevance to the warfighter.43

Thus, while air power is alluring because it does not

require American soldiers on the ground, by itself it lacks

the compelling force that ensures decision in conflict. Those

who advocate strategic attack for future wars will bear the

same burden as their predecessors: video effects which

titillate the media but which are painfully unable to produce

strategic decisions without a dominant ground maneuver

component. The greatest lesson is not the emergence of

effects-based operations to vindicate strategic attack and

control as a “new form of warfare,” but the vast power of

orchestrated joint operations utilizing the combat power of

all the services. Indeed, by cloaking strategic attack under

the mantel of effects-based operations, air power purists do

a disservice to a more joint oriented mainstream Air Force.44

Yet, if the technological advances of stealth, sensors, and

precision munitions are not by themselves decisive, are

there implications for the essence of dominant maneuver?

Decisive and Coercive Power: A Model.

Dividing the use of military power into component parts

of compelling and coercive force provides a model to

illustrate the use of such forces in war. The model begins

with compelling and coercive forces in being. A conflict

arises, requiring the use of force. A decision cycle must

assess the nature of the conflict and determines how to

apply both coercive and compelling force. During the

conflict, a reassessment process redirects the use of force

enroute to meeting policy objectives. Figure 1 illustrates

this point.

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Early in the conflict, coercive force dominates the

application of power. It sets the conditions for the use of

compelling force. It also offers the adversary an opportunity

to capitulate, should this coercive use of force persuade him

that defeat is inevitable. If the adversary refuses to

surrender, continuous reassessments must adjust the use of

force, shifting emphasis to compelling force, ultimately

imposing policy and strategic objectives on the enemy.

One can extend the model to substitute fires such as air

power and fire support for coercive force and ground

maneuver that uses physical presence and direct fire

weapons as compelling force to complete a mental picture of

warfare. This gives a more tangible application to the model

and allows for detailed analysis of the relationship between

fires—a coercive force, and maneuver—a compelling force.

It ultimately identifies the true impact of stealth, sensors

and precision munitions on dominant maneuver, outside

the paradigm of effects-based operations.

87

Figure 1.
Stealth, Precision, and Information Enter

the Empty Battlefield.

That the concept of effects-based operations and control

warfare has emerged from the stealth and precision of air

power misreads an age-old trend of ever increasing lethality

in all aspects of warfare—a trend that has affected

combatants since the beginning of time. While U.S. military

forces have achieved technological leaps in stealth, sensors,

and precision munitions, ground warfare has also become

more lethal with its own precision munitions, nonlineof-sight weapons, forward-looking infrared radar and

thermal imaging, and ever increasing ranges for weapons.

Through it all warfare has not changed; but it is just the

same, ever-changing. It is here that Clausewitz likened war

to a duel; and he reminds us that war “is not the action of a

living force upon a lifeless mass” but the “collision of two

living forces” that interact.45

Indeed, warfare continues to become more and more

lethal and man responds to that lethality. Lethality, be it an

air-launched cruise missile or a Javelin anti-tank weapon,

has produced reactions such as the “empty battlefield”46 and

strategies such as Mao’s “protracted war.”47 Advocates of

effects-based operations misread this trend in lethality, as if

enemies will not be able to react to the use stealth and

precision weapons. Indeed, they will react—and much as

the U.S. military would wish for enemies like Iraq, such

wishful thinking is just what the next “Ho Chi Minh” is

hoping for. But it is in this reaction that we can envision the

impact of precision fires on dominant ground maneuver.

Precision Fires and Their Impact on Dominant

Maneuver.

As part of the increasing trend in weapons lethality,

precision fires have the potential to cause significant

changes in the employment of maneuver forces. Because

these munitions offer greater destructive effects on the

enemy prior to maneuver contact, they have potential for

88
early exploitation and less emphasis on attrition for

maneuver forces. This, in turn, would also allow for lighter,

more dispersed maneuver forces that could cover increased

portions of the battlespace. It would require a new tactical

mindset; increased fighting in depth with a clear emphasis

on engagements out of contact. This match of precision

engagement with dominant maneuver will have significant

implications for Army objective force development and

operations. It suggests that lighter, more deployable forces

fighting on a dispersed battlefield with precision weapons

can be lethal, survivable, and effective.48

The larger the lethality gap with the opponent, the

greater the opportunity for precision engagement to enable

exploitation operations instead of traditional forms of

maneuver. This will be particularly true when U.S. forces

are fighting industrial age mechanized forces. But it will be

less true at the low end of the conflict spectrum in guerrilla

wars with few, if any, targets suitable for precision

munitions. Full spectrum operations demand flexible forces

capable of fighting many potential foes. Indeed, the

likelihood of low intensity operations becomes ever greater,

given the vulnerabilities of industrial age mechanized

forces to precision engagement and dominant maneuver.

Thus, as the Army transitions to the objective force it must

maintain a full spectrum capability and not rely upon

precision fires as a panacea. To that end, there is another

version of effects-based operations; one that looks beyond

precision weapons and stealth and instead focuses on

decision cycles at the tactical, operational and strategic

levels of war.

A New Version of Effects-Based Operations.

We shall always win by reason of pluck: and, if it is not the only

cause of victory, it is always the most essential factor and the

one without which we cannot hope to succeed.49

Sir Douglas Haig

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Haig’s argument speaks volumes about the mindset that

resulted in the bloodbath of World War I. Despite

overwhelming evidence that defensive firepower would

dominate the next battlefield, the British fixated on the élan

or “pluck” of the offense. Clinging to this notion gave rise to

extraordinary casualty rates for gains of mere yards of

terrain, as generals failed to adapt to the lethality of the

modern battlefield.50 Yet faith-based operations, such as

these, typify military units entering combat. Military

leaders combine their experience, doctrine, history, and

wargames to develop “rules” to guide operations. They

combine these rules with assumptions regarding the

enemy, environment, and themselves to produce a plan of

action.51 These plans equate to Haig’s “pluck-based”

operations; unfortunately plans that might be successful,

but without adaptation, produce excessive costs. One does

not have to look far for other examples of faith-based

operations. Bomber Command and the Eighth Air Force in

World War II clung to their peculiar strategic bombing

theories that “the bombers would always get through”

despite crippling losses from German Luftwaffe.52

Likewise, the United States fought 10 years of attrition

warfare in Vietnam against an enemy whose will to fight

and his tenacity to stay the course ultimately prevailed

despite enormous disadvantages in every measurable

element of national power.53 Of greater importance, the

United States may well be unavoidably building the

foundations for new, but similar faith-based operations

today, awaiting the crucible of war for resolution. What,

then is the solution? A new variant of effects-based

operations from the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program

at the Institute for Defense Analysis provides a wholly new

and different perspective on effects-based operations with

implications for all services.

Adapting From Faith-Based Operations. Historically,

successful commanders have always transcended

faith-based operations by understanding the enemy and his

intentions through a process of analyzing, assessing,

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adapting their force, and by executing based upon effects

and reality rather than hope and belief.54 It is here that the

Institute for Defense Analysis has advanced the concept of

effects-based operations into the realm of strategic and

operational decisionmaking. Its concept seeks to utilize

effects-based thinking to filter the vast amounts of

information provided by sensors into decision superiority to

produce decisive effects in combat. This strategic and

operational version of effects-based operations is not tied to

stealth and precision munitions capabilities, but provides a

theoretical foundation to maximize new and future

information technologies. It seeks to alter an enemy’s

actions by affecting his capabilities and decisionmaking

while avoiding undesired effects and mitigating or

exploiting unexpected effects.55 It does not claim to lift the

fog of war,56 but may serve to improve information

management challenges by focusing sensors on specific

areas to match decisions, much like current Army doctrine

posits the Commander’s Critical Information

Requirements. It also highlights two long-standing tenets of

Army operations: Agility and initiative.

FM 3-0 defines agility as “the ability to move and adjust

quickly and easily.” It further states that “agility is not

merely physical; it requires conceptual sophistication and

intellectual flexibility.... Agile commanders quickly

comprehend unfamiliar situations, creatively apply

doctrine, and make timely decisions.“57 This is the essence

of the version of effects-based operations developed by the

Institute for Defense Analysis. It emphasizes the use of

intellectual adaptability to comprehend what has changed

in warfare, adjust to new realities, and re-enter battle with

new methodologies to generate greater positive effects. Like

agility, this version of effects-based operations keys on the

ability to react to opportunity, make decisions more rapidly,

and exploit opportunities. Its nature is generally reactive;

coupled with the initiative, it is proactive—the greatest

challenge for effects-based operations.

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By its nature, an effects-based operation is an analytical

form of warfare; it anticipates events and enemy reactions,

then acts, assesses, and acts again. It is analogous a chess

match; methodical and deliberate—a contest of action and

reaction. Like the grand master, those who conduct

effects-based operations must strive to see many moves into

the future—anticipating the enemy and setting conditions

for friendly forces. However, such a concept becomes

increasingly more difficult to implement as one transcends

the levels of war from the strategic, to the operational, and

finally to the tactical level. At the tactical level, war more

closely resembles a boxing match than a game of chess. The

boxer strives to deliver a rapid series of blows to weaken,

then knock out his adversary, all while avoiding or

absorbing the blows of his opponent. There is some respite

between rounds, but the boxer must adapt to an

environment of blood, sweat, pain, and exhaustion—an

atmosphere that does not forgive faith-based operations,

but one that requires clear doctrine and established tactics,

techniques, and procedures.

When the bell sounds, the boxer must take advantage of

fleeting opportunities or the effects of his punches diminish.

He must rely on instinct, intuition, and training as much as

analysis and adaptation. Only such an approach allows him

to retain the initiative, a tenet FM 3-0 defines as follows:

initiative is setting or dictating the terms of action throughout

the battle or operation. Initiative implies an offensive spirit in all

operations. To set the terms of battle, commanders eliminate or

reduce the number of enemy options. They compel the enemy to

conform to friendly operational purposes and tempo, while

retaining freedom of action . . . In the offense, initiative involves

throwing the enemy off balance with powerful, unexpected

strikes. It implies never allowing the enemy to recover from the

initial shock of an attack. To do this, commanders mass the

effects of combat power and execute with speed, audacity, and

violence. They continually seek vulnerable spots and shift their

decisive operation when opportunities occur. To retain the

initiative, leaders press the fight tenaciously and aggressively.

They accept risk and push soldiers and systems to their limits.

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Retaining the initiative requires planning beyond the initial

operation and anticipating possible events. The higher the

echelon, the more possibilities the commander must

anticipate and the further in advance the staff must plan.

[emphasis in original]58

It would seem that initiative and effects-based

operations create an operational paradox: one utilizes

instinct and intuition to seize opportunity, while the other

applies intellectual analysis and reassessment in a more

cautious and efficient application of power. Indeed,

effects-based operations can diminish initiative in favor of

more careful analysis: more of a surgical approach than

Clausewitz’s blunt instrument. While well-intentioned,

they may serve to paralyze operations, in a search of

intellectual perfection to the detriment of good enough.

Likewise, ingrained instincts, intuitions, and training born

of flawed pre-war practices can lead to deadly initiatives at

the hands of an adaptive enemy. In the final analysis,

initiative and effects-based thinking are not incompatible;

effects-based thinking can assist determining the best

actions to maximize effects on the enemy and minimize

collateral effects that detract from desired outcomes. But

the environments of effects-based thinking are considerably

different at the tactical and strategic levels of war.

Effects-Based Tactics: Where Battles Are Won.

Army officer and military historian Michael Doubler

outlined in his works the innovative actions of the U.S.

Army to improve its operations in North Africa and Europe

during World War II. These include how tactical elements

adapted to the challenges of hedgerow country, air-ground

integration, urban fighting, river crossings, the Hûrtgen

Forest, and defense actions during the German Ardennes

offensive. Doubler notes:

Commanders learned to apply doctrine flexibly or to ignore it

altogether, as they sought ways to defeat a tenacious enemy

defending from inhospitable terrain and employing unique

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tactics. Combat revealed a number of shortcomings in

organization and capabilities. Americans implemented an

unusual variety of tactical and technical innovations, and

commanders altered both branch-specific combat techniques

and combined arms tactics to overcome different types of enemy

defenses under varying conditions of weather and terrain.59

In each case, innovation came from identification of a

problem, a reassessment of doctrine, experimentation with

various ideas, disseminating what worked, and training the

new technique. Sergeant Curtis Culin’s “rhinoceros”

hedgerow cutter coupled with the 29th Division’s hedgerow

tactics in the Normandy breakout is one such example.60

Thinking about tactical level effects and innovation

requires time and experimentation to develop. Rarely is it

the product of fragmentary orders or the commander’s

initiative in combat, but can clearly result from the

pressures of war. It can be a deliberate or informal process

that solicits solutions from all quarters to deal with near

term objectives and then allocates resources to accomplish

the mission. It requires positive and open command

climates in tactical units to encourage innovative thinking

from soldiers and junior leaders—not autocratic leadership

styles that engender fear and inhibit initiative. Tactical

success will not be a product of catchy rhetoric or claims to

being “effects-based,” but only the product of detailed

doctrine, hard training, and practiced battle drills.

Conclusion: The End of Dominant Maneuver?

There are many versions of effects-based operations—a

dangerous proposition when leaders agree to a concept that

has several different methodologies. As Joint Forces

Command develops the conceptual basis for effects-based

operations, its analysts would perform a great service to the

joint community by defining the parameters of effects-based

operations and its associated relevance to each level of war.

To that end, Joint Forces Command should consider the

three aspects of effects-based operations discussed in this

chapter.

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First, attempts to vindicate Guilio Douhet and strategic

bombing under the mantel of strategic attack, effects-based

operations, and control warfare have little basis in theory

and represent a risky proposition upon which to base

national defense. This version of effects-based operations

may be an effective strategy for air power procurement, but

is the antithesis of joint warfighting. Above all, it discounts

the considerable synergies that joint forces can generate.

Indeed, such thinking taints the term “effects-based

operations” to such an extent that Joint Forces Command

will face considerable resistance to their work based on the

origins of the concept, not the final quality of the product.

Second, effects-based targeting as part of strategic

attack and operational fires in conjunction with dominant

ground maneuver shows more promise. It has historical

precedents and can match those precedents with more

efficient and effective precision engagement. The use of

“Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities” would be

an excellent theoretical foundation upon which to develop

such a construct. Such a methodology using center of

gravity, critical capabilities, critical requirements, and

critical vulnerabilities, would provide direction to

effects-based strategic and operational targeting.61 It would

allow such attacks to set the conditions for exploitation

focused dominant ground maneuver.

Finally, effects-based thinking does have meaningful

insights to offer ground operations. Such a conceptual

approach provides a means to transcend faith-based

operations. It forms a useful paradigm for leadership,

professional schooling, wargaming, and experimentation.

But it is at the same time a dangerous concept to promote at

the tactical level. The analytical nature of effects-based

operations makes it foreign to tactics where battle drills,

standard operating procedures, and hard training are more

important to success. Indeed, the use of “effects-based”

terminology within tactical doctrine is most likely a smoke

screen for “no doctrine, tactics, techniques or procedures.”62

Such a clean slate approach at the tactical level would likely

95
cause extreme friction in execution and lead to battlefield

disaster.

The many faces of effects-based operations make it a

difficult concept to understand. As well, the proliferation of

“effects-based” terminology into doctrinal products without

regard to a defining construct makes it even more

problematic, if not dangerous. However, there is one

conclusion that is constant for every version of the concept:

effects-based operations will not end the requirement for

dominant ground maneuver. As T. R. Ferehenbach said, “If

free nations want a certain kind of world, they will have to

fight for it with courage, money, diplomacy—and legions.”63

Like the Romans, it will be the legions of dominant ground

maneuver that compel the enemy in war.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. Eliot A. Cohen, Revolution in Warfare? Air Power in the Persian

Gulf, Annapolis, MD, 1995, p. 213.

2. Williamson Murray, et al., “An Historical Perspective on

Effects-Based Operations,” Draft Working Paper, Joint Advanced

Warfighting Program, Institute for Defense Analysis, July 2001, p. 5.

3. U.S. Joint Forces Command J-9 Concepts Department,

“Effects-Based Operations White Paper Version 1.0,” Norfolk, VA,

October 18, 2001, p. ii.

4. John A. Warden III, “The Enemy as a System,” Airpower

Journal, Spring 1995, p. 54.

5. David A. Deptula, Effects-Based Operations: Change in the

Nature of Warfare, Washington, DC, 2001, p. 18.

6. Ibid., p. 19.

7. Ibid., pp. 23-26.

8. The reference to the Army’s “visceral hatred” of effects-based

operations was a remark made by a speaker participating in the

Commandant’s Lecture Series.

9. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret,

trans. and eds., Princeton, NJ, 1976, p. 75.

10. Ibid., pp. 141-142.

96
11. David MacIsaac, “Voices from the Central Blue: Air Power

Theorists,” in Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy, Princeton,

NJ, 1986, p. 630.

12. Ibid., p. 631.

13. Department of the Air Force, “Air Force Basic Doctrine,” Air

Force Doctrine Document 1, Washington DC, September 1997, pp. 51,

54. Referred to hereafter as “Air Force Basic Doctrine.”

14. Field Manual 3-0, “Operations,” Washington DC: Department

of the Army, June 14, 2001, pp. 4-3 - 4-11. Referred hereafter as FM 3-0.

15. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Samuel B. Griffith, trans., Oxford,

England, 1963, p. 101.

16. Clausewitz, On War, p. 117.

17. Cohen, Revolution in Warfare? pp. 66-78; 119.

18. For details concerning bombing of the Al Firdos bunker, see

Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, Washington DC, Vol. II,

1993, p. 89. For details concerning bombing of the Chinese Embassy in

Kosovo, see Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War, New York, 2001, pp.

296-297.

19. Larry Kaplow, Don Melvin, “A Tricky Time in Afghanistan U. S.

Accused of Bombing Convoy of Friendly Leaders,” Atlanta Constitution,

December 22, 2001 [database on-line]; available from UMI Pro Quest,

Bell & Howell. Accessed February 10, 2002. See also Paul Richter,

“RESPONSE TO TERROR; THE AFGHANISTAN CONFLICT;

‘Friendly Fire’ Still a Factor in Battles; Weapons: Despite Better

Bombing Precision and Battlefield Identification, Military Officials Say,

Inadvertent Casualties are Difficult to Avoid,” The Los Angeles Times,

December 6, 2001 [database on-line]; available from UMI Pro Quest,

Bell & Howell. Accessed February 10, 2002.

20. Clausewitz, On War, p. 77.

21. Michael I. Handel, Clausewitz and Modern Strategy, Ilford,

Essex, 1986, p. 69.

22. Ibid., p. 70.

23. Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win, Ithaca, NY, 1996, pp. 314-331.

Pape provides a historical assessment of various air campaigns. His

conclusions about the viability of strategic attack are discussed in the

pages above. Pape asserts that air power is coercive, not decisive, as an

element of military power.

97
24. T. W. Beagle, “Effects-Based Targeting: Another Empty

Promise?,” MA Thesis, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, June 2000, p. 110.

25. David A. Deptula, “Effects-Based Operations: Change in the

Nature of Warfare,” April 23, 2001, video webcast available from

http://www.connectlive.com/events/afa/; Internet. Accessed December

11, 2001.

26. Robert H. Scales, Firepower in Limited War, Novato, CA, 1995,

pp. 235-238. Scales describes the actions of an Iraqi field artillery firing

battery that eluded destruction by air power by burning tires, only to

have U. S. counterfire destroy the battery after its first mission.

27. FM 3-0, p. 4-6.

28. Air Force Basic Doctrine, p. 51.

29. Williamson Murray, “Reflections on the Combined Bomber

Offensive,” Militargeschichtliche Mitteillungen 51, 1992, Heft 1, p. 92.

30. Ibid., p. 93.

31. FM 3-0, p. 4-6.

32. MacIsaac, Voices from the Central Blue: Air Power Theorists, p.

643.

33. FM 3-0, pp. 4-6 - 4-7.

34. Air Force Basic Doctrine, p. 49.

35. Clausewitz, On War, p. 87.

36. Ibid., p. 89.

37. Ibid., p. 149.

38. Ibid., pp. 602-604.

39. FM 3-0, p. 4-7.

40. Ibid., p. 4-5.

41. Ibid., p. 4-6.

42. The reference to leaving the decision with the enemy was in

reference to the nonuse of ground forces during NATO operations in

Kosovo as part of remarks in a USAWC briefing. The leader contended

that the single issue that prolonged the conflict was the absence of a

viable ground threat, thereby leaving the decision to end the conflict

with Slobodan Milosevic.

98
43. Paul C. Strickland, “USAF Aerospace Power Doctrine Decisive

or Coercive?” Airpower Journal Online, Fall 2000; available from

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj00/fal00

strickland.htm; Internet; accessed January 11, 2002.

44. This idea reflects remarks made by a speaker in the U.S. Army

War College Commandant’s Lecture Series. The remarks noted those

that advocates of air power as a unilateral force do not reflect the main

stream U.S. Air Force perspective.

45. Clausewitz, On War, pp. 75, 77.

46. James J. Schneider, “The Theory of the Empty Battlefield,”

Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, September 1987, pp.

37-44.

47. Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung, Peking, China, 1967, pp. 211-214.

48. Coupling small maneuver forces with precision weapons is the

subject of much study in current operations in Afghanistan. Use of

special operations forces in conjunction with indigenous forces and air

power, both precision and conventional weapons, has thus far been

tactically successful. However, one must take great care in drawing

general lessons from a single conflict—particularly one that has not run

its course. But it seems logical to conclude that when one force has a

significant lethality advantage over an adversary, he would be able to

have greater effect with smaller forces.

49. Tim Travers, The Killing Ground, London, 1987, p. 89.

50. CS Forrester, The General, Annapolis, MD, 1947.

51. Gwen Linde, et al., New Perspectives on Effects-Based

Operations: Annotated Briefing, Washington, DC: Joint Advanced

Warfighting Program, Institute for Defense Analysis, June 2001, p. 16.

52. Murray, An Historical Perspective on Effects-Based Operations,

p. 32-48.

53. Andrew Krepinevich, The Army in Vietnam, Baltimore, MD,

1986, pp. 258-260. See also Harry Summers, On Strategy, Novato, CA,

1982, pp. 83-91.

54. Linde, New Perspectives on Effects-Based Operations, pp. 17-18.

55. Ibid., p. 18.

56. Ibid., p. 14.

57. FM 3-0, pp. 4-16 - 4-17.

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58. Ibid., p. 4-15.

59. Michael D. Doubler, Closing with the Enemy, Lawrence, KS,

1994, p. 5.

60. Ibid., pp. 45-50.

61. Joe Strange, Centers of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities, 2nd

ed., Quantico, VA, 1996, p. 43.

62. “Fires and Effects,” Chapter 8, IBCT Organizational and

Operational Concept, July 31, 2000, p. 1; available from http://www.

lewis.army.mil/transformation/O&O%20brief/8.pdf; Internet; accessed

February 13, 2002.

63. T. R. Feherenbach, This Kind of War: A Study in

Unpreparedness, New York, 1963, p. 659.

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CHAPTER 4

EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS:

A NEW OPERATIONAL MODEL?

Lieutenant Colonel Allen Batschelet

Preparing for an Uncertain Future.

The U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, published

on September 30, 2001, described the critical importance of

adapting the national security apparatus of the United

States to new challenges.1 It also emphasized the need for

U.S. military forces to maintain the ability to assure allies,

dissuade adversaries, deter aggressors, and defeat any

adversary, if deterrence were to fail, while modernizing the

force and exploiting the revolution in military affairs.2 The

successful addressing of these challenges requires an

appreciation of the environment in which U.S. military

forces will operate in the 21st century.

While there is considerable uncertainty in the emerging

U.S. security environment, several trends have appeared.

First, America’s geographic position offers diminishing

protection, as the events of September 11, 2001,

demonstrated. Second, the United States is not likely to face

a peer competitor in the near future. Third, regional powers

increasingly have the ability to threaten the stability of

regions critical to U.S. interests. Fourth, weak and failing

states provide a haven in which nonstate actors can operate

with impunity to acquire power and military capabilities.

Fifth, developing and sustaining regional security

arrangements ensures the ability of the United States to

operate with its allies in a manner consistent with common

interests. Moreover, there is an increasing diversity in the

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sources and unpredictability in the locations of conflict.3

Finally, as influential as these trends, the rapid

advancement of military technologies is providing the U.S.

military with new tools and capabilities.4

Meeting the demands of an ever changing strategic

context demands that the U.S. military develop forces

capable of achieving what Joint Vision 2020 describes as

“Full Spectrum Dominance.”5 Achieving such dominance

requires the integration of service core competencies at the

operational level. The building of effective military forces

for 2020 requires joint integration, intellectually,

operationally, organizationally, doctrinally, and

technically.6 At present, much of the responsibility for such

integration falls to the U.S. Joint Forces Command. In

keeping with this charter, that command is examining the

concept of effects-based operations.

Effects-based operations, as a “new” concept, emerged

following the Gulf War. From their observation of the

1990-91 Gulf War, some in the U.S. defense community

argued that the war in South West Asia demanded

fundamental changes in the “American way of war.”7 These

advocates posit that recent conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo

have demonstrated a maturation of this concept. According

to the argument, rather than relying on old approaches of

annihilation or attrition, this new way of conducting

operations will focus on generating desired effects, rather

than on objectives or the physical destruction of targets.

Examination of this idea by J9 Joint Forces Command

resulted in the publication of a White Paper on October 18,

2001, titled “Effects Based Operations.” The White Paper is,

according to its authors, “a result of pre-concept topic area

exploration and subsequent command decision to proceed

with concept development.”

What is this concept called effects-based operations? Is

this a new concept or is it an old idea in a new wrapper? Such

questions form the basis of this study, which begins by

defining effects-based operations. Then, in an attempt to

102
determine whether or not the idea is new, it examines the

historical basis of effects-based operations, eventually

comparing the concept with a component or enabling idea of

the Army’s AirLand Battle Doctrine, namely, target value

analysis.8

Defining Effects-Based Operations.

Current discussions of effects-based operations involve

various definitions and descriptions of the concept.

According to J9, effects-based operations are “a process for

obtaining a desired strategic outcome or effect on the enemy

through the synergistic and cumulative application of the

full range of military and nonmilitary capabilities at all

levels of conflict.” Furthermore, an “effect” is the physical,

functional, or psychological outcome, event, or consequence

that results from specific military or non-military actions.9

The defining elements in the J9 description include

emphasis on effects-based operations as a process,

beginning with developing knowledge of the adversary,

viewed as a complex adaptive system, the environment, and

U.S. capabilities. Knowledge of the enemy will enable the

commander to determine the effects he needs to achieve to

convince or compel the enemy to change his behavior. The

commander’s intent plays a central, critical role, in the

determination and explicit linking of tactical actions to

operational objectives and desired strategic outcomes.

Execution of the plan follows, the aim or task being the use

of all applicable and available capabilities, including

diplomatic, information, military, and economic.

The purpose then is to create a coordinated and

synergistic operation that will produce the desired effects.

Continuous assessment must measure and evaluate the

impact of the desired effects. Assessment includes

determining if military actions achieved the desired effects,

produced unintended effects, the overall impact of the

effort, and if tactical actions contributed to achievement of

the desired outcome. Finally, continuous assessment of the

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enemy, U.S. military and political actions as well as the

friendly situation will enable the commander to adjust his

course of action to reach his desired endstate efficiently and

rapidly.10

Figure 1. Effects-Based Operations Cycle.11

Effects-based operations, according to Air Force Major

General David Deptula, a prominent advocate, reflect a

fundamental change in the nature of warfare. He asserts

that the conduct of warfare has changed from campaigns

designed to achieve objectives through sequential attack, to

what he describes as parallel warfare, or simultaneous

attack against all the enemy’s vital systems.12 In Deptula’s

concept, prosecuting parallel warfare requires precision

weapons, the ability to suppress enemy air defenses, and an

operational concept that focuses principally on effects

rather than only on aggregate destruction to achieve

military objectives.13 The operational concept is

effects-based operations. Deptula acknowledges that

current doctrinal manuals include words about targeting to

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achieve effects. However, he argues that the present focus is

on physical target destruction with little concern for the

outcome. This focus on destruction comes from two

traditional concepts of war, he argues, annihilation and

attrition.14

Citing Sun Tzu and B.H. Liddell Hart, Deptula advances

an alternative concept of warfare based on control—the idea

that an enemy organization’s ability to operate as desired is

ultimately more important than destruction of its military

forces. He views destruction as a means to achieve control

over an enemy. Destruction, then, should aim at achieving

effects on enemy systems, not necessarily at destroying the

system but preventing its intended use as the adversary

desires.15 From the Gulf War examples that Deptula offers,

one can infer the importance of knowing the enemy,

understanding the commander’s intent, and achieving the

desired effects or outcomes. While he focuses more on

selection and employment of means, than on defining

effects-based operations, Deptula places the concept at the

heart of his study. He asserts that effects-based operations

will achieve desired effects through the successful

application of force to gain control of systems on which the

enemy relies.

A study done by the Institute for Defense Analyses offers

a third interpretation of effects-based operations. It begins

by arguing that effects-based operations rest on an explicit

linking of actions to desired strategic outcomes. It is thus

about producing desired futures. Moreover, effects-based

thinking must under grid the concept by providing a focus

on the entire continuum (peace, pre-conflict, conflict, and

post conflict), and not just on conflict.16 Understanding how

to think in this manner enables effects-based operations.

This study also emphasizes the need to understand and

model an adversary as a complex, adaptive system driven by

complex human interactions, rather than just collections of

physical targets. Therefore, one should be able to focus

operations more coherently.17 Furthermore, effects-based

operations have seven attributes: the need to focus on

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decision superiority, applicability in peace and war

(full-spectrum operations); a focus beyond direct,

immediate first-order effects; an understanding of the

adversary’s systems; the ability of disciplined adaptation,

the application of the elements of national power; and the

ability of decisionmaking to adapt rules and assumptions to

reality.18 This study also emphasizes that effects-based

operations must use a continuous process of analyzing and

understanding, planning, executing, assessing, and

adapting. Of note, this study places great importance on

communications between decisionmakers at the strategic,

operational, and tactical levels, and underlines the

criticality of “commander’s intent” for ensuring focused

efforts and effects.19 Finally, this work offers that those

engaging in effects-based operations must continuously

adapt plans, rules, and assumptions to existing reality, in

other words, effects based-thinking and operations help the

commander to fight the enemy and not the plan.

The above theories of effects-based operations share

some common ground. Each starts with an emphasis on the

importance of knowledge, knowledge of the enemy, viewed

as a complex adaptive system, and knowledge of self. A

greater understanding of the enemy enables commanders to

think in terms of outcomes expressed through his intent. It

allows planners and staffs to determine the tactical actions

necessary to accomplish those objectives and desired

outcomes. Clearly, the focus is on achieving an effect rather

than target destruction. Expression and communication of

the commander’s intent plays a unifying, focusing, and

essential role in ensuring the integration and use of

available capabilities to include elements of national power

other than military. Moreover, the commander’s intent

proves critical to the flexibility and adaptability of the plan

when the situation changes, a crucial acknowledgement of

the interactive nature of war.

Finally, continuous situational assessment measures

success or failure in achieving the desired effects against the

benchmark of the commander’s intent. Given the

106
predominant ideas in these theories, one might produce the

following definition: effects-based operations represent the

identification and engagement of an enemy’s vulnerabilities

and strengths in a unified, focused manner, and uses all

available assets to produce specific effects consistent with

the commander’s intent. Potentially then, the concept of

effects-based operations can serve as a common conceptual

denominator, or language, for executing joint operations in

a unified, holistic approach. Having provided a general

definition for effects-based operations, this chapter will

examine the historical and theoretical foundation of such

operations.

Theoretical and Historical Perspective.

As is the case with “new” ideas, theory and history can

offer a perspective on the future usefulness and thinking

about effects-based operations. Some believe that the

concept of conducting effects-based operations is new.

However, as this chapter will show, it is not. History

provides many examples of theorists arguing for and

commanders planning and executing military operations

focused on outcomes, in essence effects-based operations. In

fact, one can reach back to antiquity to see that classical

theorists advocated the efficacy of combining all elements of

power to compel an enemy to do one’s will and achieve one’s

aims.

Sun Tzu, the classical Chinese theorist, emphasized the

use of force as a last resort: “. . . those skilled in war subdue

the enemy’s army without battle” and “the best policy in war

is to take a state intact.”20 Michael I. Handel, in Masters of

War, interprets these statements as reflecting Confucian

idealism and a belief in the primacy of mental attitudes in

human affairs. Thus Sun Tzu, according to Handel,

possessed an idealistic preference for employing all other

means short of war, be they political, diplomatic, or

economic to compel an enemy to submit.21 Clausewitz, the

Prussian theorist, stated that:

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Destruction of the enemy forces is the overriding principle of

war, and, so far as positive action is concerned, the principal

way to achieve our object. Such destruction of forces can usually

be accomplished only by fighting.22 ...

We are not interested in generals who win victories without

bloodshed.23

Certainly, Clausewitz focused on the primacy of military

means and physical destruction of the opponent’s forces as

the best way to achieve desired ends. However, these

statements reflect acknowledgement of the potential of

defeating an opponent with means other than military

force. Clausewitz recognizes, more explicitly, the

importance of using all the elements of power, not just

military force, to create desired outcomes. In a discussion of

how to disrupt the alliances of an enemy, he argued:

But there is another way. It is possible to increase the likelihood

of success without defeating the enemy’s forces. I refer to

operations that have direct political repercussions, that are

designed in the first place to disrupt the opposing alliance, or to

paralyze it, that gains us new allies, favorably affect the

political scene, etc. If such operations are possible it is obvious

that they can greatly improve our prospects and that they can

form a much shorter route to the goal than the destruction of the

opposing armies.24

More recent theorists and advocates of effects-based

operations emerged in the 1920s and 1930s. Among others,

they include Guilio Douhet, Admiral Henry E. Eccles, who

discussed the need to view the enemy as a system, and J.C.

Slessor, eventually a Marshall of the Royal Air Force, who

lectured at Britain’s Army Staff College in the 1930s.

In 1936, Slessor published “Air Power and Armies.” In

this work, he argued that one must view the enemy as a

system. Moreover, he emphasized the attainment of desired

effects over physical destruction.

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This then is the object of attack on production, the dislocation

and restriction of output from war industry, not primarily the

material destruction of plant and stocks.25

. . . The method of attack on production . . . demands a detailed

and expert knowledge of the enemy’s industrial system, of the

communications linking the different parts of the system, and

of the installation supplying it with power and light. Detailed

intelligence about the enemy must be supplemented by expert

technical advice from representatives of our own supply and

transport services...26

Closer to home, the U.S. Army’s Air Corps Tactical

School gave serious thought to the concept of conducting

effects-based operations during the interwar period.

Established in 1926, the school functioned in no small

measure as a tool for those airmen who sought to develop an

independent service.27 However, it did teach its students to

think in terms of creating effects given that “interlaced

social, economic, political, and military divisions of a nation

acquire a state of absolute interdependence during war.”28

Furthermore, without entering the debate over the efficacy

or proper use of air power, the school underscored the

importance of viewing the enemy as a system and creating

desired effects against that system, primarily the enemy’s

will to fight. Its instructors argued that, “the resources of a

nation for the waging of war are contained in its social,

economic, political, and military systems. Pressure or the

threat of pressure, against these systems will break down

the morale and cause the defeat of the nation.”29 Clearly the

Air Corps Tactical School gave much thought to achieving

functional, desired effects, with air power in this case, and

not only to unfocused material destruction. More recently,

vocal promoters of effects-based operations have included

Colonel John Warden III, a retired Air Force officer, and Air

Force Major General David Deptula. Departing from the

realm of theory, a cursory review of history reveals clear

examples of commanders employing the concept of

effects-based operations. For a familiar example, but

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certainly not the first, of effects-based operations, this

chapter turns to the American Civil War.

The Union and Ulysses S. Grant conducted effects-based

operations against the Confederacy beginning in 1862.

While the Anaconda policy, a strategy aimed at isolating the

Confederacy from external support, was in reality an

effects-based strategy, in practice it proved ineffectual and

too slow, given the time constraints under which the Union

was operating.30 Upon his appointment as commander in

chief of all Union Armies in 1864, Grant embarked on an

effects-based based campaign. By design, he chose to pursue

the destruction of the main Confederate armies, force the

Confederacy to disperse its limited resources as much as

possible, and strike against the war resources of the south,

depriving it of the economic means to maintain armies

simultaneously.31 This idea of depriving an enemy of his

economic resources was not new. Sherman’s march through

Georgia, destroying the Confederacy’s industrial war

making capacity and agricultural heartland was the most

obvious example of this concept. Moreover, Sherman’s

operation evolved another aim besides destruction of the

enemy’s infrastructure. Sherman also directed his effects

against the minds of Southerners. “. . . we are not only

fighting hostile armies, but a hostile people,” said Sherman,

“and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard

hand of war, as well as the organized armies.”32

An Alabama-born major on Sherman’s staff provides a

more insightful description of Sherman’s operation.

But, while I deplore this necessity daily and cannot bear to see

the soldiers swarm as they do through fields and yards . . .

nothing can end this war but some demonstration of their

helplessness . . . This Union and its Government must be

sustained, at any and every cost; to sustain it, we must war upon

and destroy the organized rebel forces, must cut off their

supplies, destroy their communications . . . [and] produce among

the people of Georgia a thorough conviction of the personal

misery which attends war, and the utter helplessness and

inability of their “rulers,” State or Confederate, to protect them ...

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If that terror and grief and even want shall help to paralyze

their husbands and fathers who are fighting us . . . it is mercy

in the end.33

Clearly, Grant and Sherman saw the enemy as a system,

rather than the armies as the sole embodiment of the

Confederacy. They sought to achieve combined and

mutually supporting effects by attacking the enemy’s

armies, resources, and will.

A more modern example of the potential extent of

effects-based operations lies in World War II. Early in 1941,

the allies decided to focus on the defeat of European Axis

powers first, concentrating against Germany. Planning

efforts undertaken by the Army produced plan

RAINBOW-5 and as an adjunct, the Air War Plans Division

of the Army Air Forces’ Staff wrote Air War Plans Document

One. The basic thrust of these plans called for direct

confrontation with German forces via land power, while

simultaneously conducting a sustained air offensive against

the Reich’s industrial war-making capacity and will. These

plans reflected the clear strategic focus provided by

President Franklin Roosevelt and Secretary of War Henry

L. Stimson. Further validating the plan and commander’s

intent, General George C. Marshall and Stimson approved

Air War Plans Document One on September 1, 1941. While

specific strategic bombing targeting priorities would change

during the campaign, the focus remained on disrupting

German electric power, armament production,

transportation systems, and oil and petroleum

infrastructure.34 According to Albert Speer, Hitler’s

Minister of Armaments and Munitions, “The American

attacks, which followed a definite system of assault on

industrial targets, were by far the most dangerous. It was,

in fact, these attacks which caused the breakdown of the

German armaments industry.” 35

While some continue to debate the various contributions

played by land and air power in World War II, what is clear

is that simultaneous ground and air attacks prevented the

111
Germans from devoting adequate resources to counter

either effectively. Without the initial threat of an

amphibious assault and subsequent reality, the Germans

might have successfully countered the Allied bombing

effort, placed their jet fighter into earlier production, and

prosecuted their own bombing campaign against Britain. In

turn, the diversion of the Luftwaffe to combat the allied

bomber campaign contributed decisively to the successful

invasion of France and final land campaign against

Germany.36 The synergistic results produced by this

effects-based operation are clear in retrospect and hastened

the defeat of Germany.

One final, and most recent, example serves to describe

the potential efficacy of effects-based operations. Evidence

of effects-based thinking and operations show up clearly in

the planning and execution of the Gulf War in 1990-1991,

primarily in the use of air power. General H. Norman

Schwarzkopf, Commander in Chief, U.S. Central

Command, developed a four-phased operation to achieve

President George Bush’s objectives. A portion of his

commander’s intent stated:

We will initially attack into the Iraqi homeland using air power

to decapitate his leadership, command and control, and

eliminate his ability to reinforce Iraqi ground forces in Kuwait

and Southern Iraq. We will then gain undisputed air superiority

over Kuwait so that we can subsequently and selectively attack

Iraqi ground forces with air power in order to reduce his combat

power and destroy reinforcing units.37

From this commander’s intent, emerged six theater

objectives: attack Iraqi political/military leadership and

command and control; gain and maintain air superiority;

sever Iraqi supply lines; destroy chemical, biological, and

nuclear capability; destroy Republican Guard forces; and

liberate Kuwait City.38 Clearly, the commander’s intent

reflected a view of the enemy as a system and the effects

desired against that system. According to the planners of

the strategic air operation, they employed an effects-based

112
approach towards achieving the stated objectives.

Apparently, air planners continually thought through how

they could best employ force against enemy systems so that

every tactical strike contributed toward achieving a desired

effect on the system. Constant monitoring and assessment

of the engaged enemy system resulted in some targets on

the list going unserviced as an attack achieved the desired

effect prior to the exhaustion of the target list.39 A good

example of this approach comes from the attack of Iraqi air

defense sector operations centers. Initially air planners

determined that destruction of the facilities would require

eight F-117s delivering four 2,000 pound bombs against

each of the hardened underground facilities. Resource

constraints made this approach infeasible. However,

planners argued that to achieve the effect desired, the

facilities had only to be rendered inoperative. Therefore,

complete destruction was not necessary; forcing the

operators to abandon the facility and cease operations

would achieve the desired effect. This approach reduced the

number of required F-117s to one per sector operation

center, and freed up the reminder of the aircraft to attack

other targets. In this case, effects-based thinking and

operations produced the most efficient and effective way to

employ force, achieve the commander’s intent, and increase

flexibility and responsiveness, by freeing up scarce assets

for use elsewhere. One can see therefore that effects-based

thinking and operations are nothing new.

But why does the current debate on effects-based

operations appear to center mostly on discussions of air

power? Why does it seem that the leading writers and

thinkers regarding effects-based operations seem to be

primarily airmen? The answer is found in the Army’s

AirLand Battle doctrine and the most current joint

operations manual Joint Publication 3.0, Doctrine for Joint

Operations.

AirLand Battle doctrine evolved from the mid to late

1970s to the early 1980s. It culminated in the publication of

the Army’s Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, in 1982

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and in a revised version in 1986. Experiential observations

and thinking about modern combat by senior field

commanders in the 1970s, including General Don Starry,

moved the process of doctrine development from the central

battle, to the integrated battlefield, to the extended

battlefield, and, finally to AirLand Battle. General Glen

Otis, just prior to the official publication of the doctrine,

described AirLand Battle in Military Review:

AirLand Battle is now the doctrine of the United States Army. It

states that the battle against the second echelon forces is equal

in importance to the fight with the forces at the front. Thus, the

traditional concern of the ground commander with the close-in

fight at the forward line of own troops (FLOT) is now

inseparable from the deep attack against the enemy follow-on

forces. To be able to fight these simultaneous battles, all of the

armed services must work in close cooperation and harmony

with each other. If we are to find, to delay, to disrupt and kill the

enemy force, we will need the combined efforts of the Air-Army

team.40

In its discussions, the 1982 version of FM 100-5

Operations explains:

The Army’s basic operational concept is called AirLand Battle

doctrine. This doctrine is based upon securing or retaining the

initiative and exercising it aggressively to defeat the enemy.

Destruction of the opposing force is achieved by throwing the

enemy off balance with powerful initial blows from unexpected

directions and following up rapidly to prevent his recovery. The

best results are obtained with initial blows struck against

critical units and areas whose loss will degrade the coherence of

enemy operations.

AirLand Battle, thus, contains the key components of

effects-based thinking and operations. Further

examination of the doctrine reveals a methodology that

enables the idea of creating and achieving desired effects:

target value analysis.

The target value analysis process is an adjunct to the

Army’s current military decisionmaking process, a single,

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established, and proven analytical process for solving

problems. The purpose of the process is to produce an

integrated, coordinated, and detailed operational plan. This

process was the cornerstone methodology for the practical

application of AirLand Battle and remains so, as “the

estimate process” found in Doctrine for Joint Operations,

Joint Publication 3.0.41 Joint doctrine describes targeting as

the analysis of enemy situations relative to the mission,

objectives, and capabilities at the commander’s disposal, to

identify and nominate specific vulnerabilities that, if

exploited, will accomplish the commander’s purpose

through delaying, disrupting, disabling, or destroying

critical enemy forces or resources.42 In turn, target value

analysis offers the commander the means to identify effects

criteria, prioritize the engagement of targets, and plan for

contingencies based on the enemy’s likely adaptations when

his operation fails and enables the estimate of friendly unit

capabilities.43 Numerous planning, execution, and decision

aid products result from this methodology.

As a methodology, target value analysis assists is the

determination of assets critical to the enemy commander’s

likely strategy. Furthermore, it examines and anticipates

the enemy’s critical nodes and potential decision points and

suggests what might happen if the enemy commander’s

plan fails and what actions make up his failure options.

Evaluation of the potential and likely enemy strategies

results in identification of critical enemy functions and

determines where and when the commander can selectively

apply and maximize his combat power against the enemy to

achieve desired effects. Additionally, the process seeks to

identify specific enemy activities or events that confirm or

deny potential enemy strategies, thereby enabling

assessment of friendly desired effects and ultimately, as

necessary, adaptation of friendly actions.44 Decide, Detect,

Deliver, Assess serves as familiar shorthand for this

targeting and targeting value analysis process.45

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Figure 2. Targeting Methodology.

Current joint doctrine explains this process in much the

same manner. It prescribes a six-phase process: the

commander determines his objectives, guidance and intent;

develops, nominates and prioritizes targets; analyzes

friendly capabilities; decides on a course of action; plans and

executes the mission; and finally, assesses action taken.46 If,

as this study has proposed, effects-based operations are

operations that identify and engage an enemy’s

vulnerabilities and strengths in a unified, focused manner,

using all available assets to produce a specific effect

consistent with the commander’s intent, then this concept

should look very familiar. Certainly it does not look new to

practitioners of AirLand Battle doctrine. Because this is the

case, the Army is singularly well suited to lead the debate on

effects-based operations and may have a fleeting

opportunity to shape the conceptual foundation for

implementation of Joint Vision 2020.

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Conceptual Implications.

Most of the Army’s recent conceptual work on effectsbased operations originates from Training and Doctrine

Command’s Depth and Simultaneous Battle Lab at Ft. Sill,

Oklahoma. Technological developments and maturation of

the idea of effects-based operations spurred Ft. Sill to look

for ways to increase the effectiveness of fires. One of the

emerging concepts, the fires and effects coordination center,

focuses more on organizational changes designed to employ

fires, lethal and nonlethal, to create effects efficiently and

successfully. The initial brigade combat team at Ft. Lewis,

Washington, is testing this organizational design.

Naturally, the Depth and Simultaneous Battle Lab’s core

competency is thinking about the employment of fires with a

complementary professional expertise in targeting and

target value analysis processes. And because fire

supporters have shaped the nature of the Army’s discussion

of effects-based operations, the result has been a narrow

interpretation of the concept compared to the current

analysis. Many in the joint community perceive the Army’s

position on effects-based operations as limited to

discussions of creating effects solely with fires. Nothing

however could be further from the truth. Because the Army

has adopted effects-based operations and codified the

concept in its AirLand Battle doctrine, the idea and current

debate appear to many as the “same candy bar—different

wrapper.” There are however, some critical differences

between effects-based operations and AirLand Battle’s

target value analysis methodologies.

Like AirLand Battle doctrine and the enabling

methodology of target value analysis, effects-based

operations cause practitioners to think in terms of desired

outcomes and the importance of using all available assets.

The concept of effects-based operations differs in that it

places more emphasis on understanding the enemy, and

determining the linkages between cause and effect. It also

demands a greater capability to assess and adapt to the

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vagaries and unknowns of warfare. Thus, effects-based

operations, as a concept, is a refining and broadening

evolution of current Army doctrine. It offers the potential for

improving the Army’s ability to achieve desired effects

through a more holistic and systematic approach to

planning, executing, and assessing results of military

actions across the entire spectrum of conflict.

AirLand Battle doctrine and the Army’s approach to

effects-based operations focuses on the concept as the most

effective way of applying lethal and nonlethal force to

achieve objectives and ultimately the commander’s intent.

Clearly, this is an attack-based approach that views the

opponent as an enemy to be defeated and perhaps

destroyed, making it most useful for the upper end of the

spectrum of conflict. Effects-based operations lend

themselves to a broader application—one that encompasses

more than just military operations. They incorporate all the

applicable elements of national power—diplomatic,

economic, military, and information— for a given situation

and are relevant across the full spectrum of operations.

More so than current Army doctrine, effects-based

operations require commanders and staffs to link tactical

actions to operational objectives and desired strategic

effects. The interrelated focus at every level of command is

the achieving of a desired effect commensurate with the

commander’s intent.

Despite the emphasis on achieving a better

understanding of the enemy there are practical limits to

knowing an enemy’s capabilities and intentions. Assuredly,

adversaries will react and adapt to actions taken against

them. Therefore, commanders and staffs must recognize

that uncertainty, friction, and adaptive adversaries may

cause friendly actions to trigger additional effects beyond

those predicted and anticipated. Rather than trying to

eliminate such factors, successful commanders have always

accepted them and learned to work through an ambiguous

environment and adapt. The strengths of effects-based

operations include predicting, controlling, and achieving

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desired effects and the understanding that the goal is not

always achievable. Acknowledging this reality leads to the

requirement for adaptation in planning and

decisionmaking. The requirement to adapt and seize

opportunity relies on a thorough understanding of the

commander’s intent and leader’s ability to make sound

decisions that will achieve the desired effect without

creating unwanted or unpredicted second and third order

effects. However, it is not enough to say U.S. forces will

operate in an effects-based way.

Commanders and staffs must think in an effects-based

fashion, if they are to operate successfully. It may no longer

suffice to tolerate a subordinate’s cursory understanding of

the commander’s intent two levels up. Leaders everywhere

along the chain of command must have a clear

understanding of national security and campaign objectives

and at least a basic understanding of those actions

necessary to create effects that cumulatively result in the

desired end-state. Moreover, commanders must develop

and subordinates understand clear measures of success

that explain why the operations will work (planned actions,

causal linkages, desired effects). This requirement, along

with a thorough understanding of the commander’s intent,

provides the two elements that will enable subordinates to

exercise initiative and seize fleeting opportunities. Most

would agree that this emphasis on adaptation is a great

strength of effects-based operations. It also exposes a

critical vulnerability. The viability of effects-based

operations becomes questionable, if commanders fail to

provide clear intent or measures of success to subordinates.

Moreover, commanders must have trust and confidence in

their subordinates’ ability to exercise initiative and operate

within the intent. If they become overly concerned with the

need to control second and third order effects, the potential

exists for them to “reach into the turret” and personally

direct operations, negating the advantages of effects-based

operations.

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A key strength of effects-based operations is that they do

not focus exclusively on using target destruction to achieve

desired effects and outcomes. Moreover, the concept

imposes discipline on operational and strategic

commanders and staffs, requiring them to focus on linking

effects at one level to the achievement of objectives at the

next, negating the tendency to concentrate on tactical-level

actions. In turn, and despite no few technologists’ claims,

the aim of the concept is broader than just precision

engagement or targeting. Precision engagement of targets

is only one tool that might achieve effects. Effects-based

operations provide a powerful, unifying and holistic

conceptual methodology that commanders and staffs can

apply to all operations across the spectrum of conflict. They

are an evolutionary refinement and broadening of current

doctrine, a full dimensional concept. Furthermore, focused

by the stated intent, commanders and staffs must think in

an effects-based manner in order to plan, develop courses of

action, analyze, execute and assess effectively, while

adapting their actions in an interactive environment.

Finally, the underlying requirement exists to focus on

outcomes and the critical linkage of achieved effects to

accomplish objectives.

Practical Challenges of Implementation.

The differences found in the evolution, refinement, and

broadening of current doctrine and the conceptual dynamics

of effects-based operations will have practical implications

for leader training, organizational changes, and training

strategies. Implementing effects-based operations as a

concept described in this chapter will provide challenges, all

of which are surmountable. Implementing effects-based

operations in the Army should prove relatively easy.

However, leading the transition to effects-based operations

in the joint community is likely to be problematic and will

require a culture change within all the services. Perhaps the

most explicit challenge will be to overcome service

parochialism and the rejection of the concept due to the “not

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invented here” prejudice. Changing the culture will take

many years as leaders and staffs become familiar with the

concept and effects-based thinking becomes inculcated in

service and joint educational programs and institutions.

Despite AirLand Battle’s doctrinal focus on achieving

effects, experience has shown that commander’s and staffs

often focus more on process and destruction vice achieving

desired effects. One example serves to illustrate this point.

Recently, the Air Force conducted an exercise called

Global Engagement IV that examined, as one goal,

effects-based operations. During the exercise, evaluators

found that effects-based operations were effective when

decisionmakers and planners stayed focused on their

implementation. Unfortunately, it appeared difficult for

them to remain focused due primarily to their unfamiliarity

with effects-based thinking and processes. This resulted in

many of the players reverting to their previous operational

experiences and caused them to become distracted by the

details and routines of the Air Operations Center. The

second difficulty was a tendency to focus on the input part of

the process rather than output. Specifically, members

concentrated on the mechanics of weapons systems

employment almost to the exclusion of other important

considerations. They placed little emphasis on the output

part of the process, which was aimed at achieving the

desired effects. In particular, the functional, systemic, and

psychological effects, which were considered critical and key

to success during the planning process, were largely ignored

during the execution phase of the war game.47

This Air Force experience and example are not unique.

The Army’s Battle Command Training Program, the

Training and Doctrine Command’s organization

responsible for training division, corps, and selective joint

commanders and staffs offers similar observations. After

action reviews and observations provide a compilation of

perceptions common to most Army commanders and staffs.

Most exercise observations include the admonition to

commanders and staffs to “fight the enemy and not the

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plan,” and for the need to “keep the staff and subordinate

commanders focused during the preparation,

synchronization, and execution of a plan.” Here again, one

sees the tendency to focus on inputs instead of desired

effects and outcomes. Importantly, these same perceptions

and observations point out the successes that result when

commanders and staffs focus on outcomes and achieving

desired effects. The criticality of and benefits from a clear

and unifying commander’s intent provide the framework

and touchstone for the maintenance of focus.48

The evident utility but inconsistent application of

effects-based operations point out the potential power of the

concept. To explain fully the promise inherent in

effects-based operations will require modifying both Army

and joint doctrine. While this chapter proposed a definition

of the concept, it is apparent that an agreed upon definition,

incorporated into service and joint doctrine, is necessary

before the methodology can be of use. The definition offered

in this chapter is one of only many extant in the current

debate. The crucial point is that the further development of

effects-based operations as a joint concept cannot

productively proceed without a formally codified definition.

Almost as important as agreeing on a definition is the

need to establish a commonly accepted language. The Army

has an extensive but not always well-understood language

to define effects. A familiar example involves the use of the

terms disrupt, delay, limit, and destroy, which are so

nebulous as to be of little use.49 These terms have primarily

served to describe effects associated with the kinetic attack

of a specific target. Moreover, their intended use is to

provide guidance to those involved with providing fire

support to operations. In this context, effects-based

operations take on a narrow definition of the effects of fires

in support of maneuver. This limited viewpoint fails to

address other areas where effects are important, such as the

effects created by maneuver. On the other hand, the view

that associates effects-based operations as achieving effects

without fires or maneuver fails to address the concept in the

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holistic manner, in which its value is found. There are many

interpretations of the concept, employing unique

descriptions and terms of references. Clearly defining

effects-based terminology can go far in framing the debate

and creating a mutual understanding of the concept. A key

step in implementing any effects-based concept, then,

would be to get all the services and the joint community to

agree on usage of the relevant terms. Having demonstrated

the need for a common joint definition and language, this

chapter can move on to the development of organizations

and training of individuals necessary to apply effectively

the concept.

The application of any concept demands the certain

knowledge and expertise of those charged with its

implementation. The holistic nature of effects-based

operations with its comprehensive reliance on the

commander’s intent and linkage of action to desired effects

requires leaders at all levels, not just commanders, who can

think in effects-based terms and remain focused on the

broad perspectives. Of most importance is the need to field

organizations with a physical makeup that enables

commanders and their staffs to cooperate in dynamic and

orchestrated ways. Instead of having linked, but separate

centers for intelligence, operations, logistics, and

information operations among others, a combination of

generalist operators, functional area specialists, including

intelligence analysts, and technical equipment operators, is

needed. Maintenance of functional area awareness

wrapped in a comprehensive understanding of operations

will facilitate achievement of the desired effects and ensure

rapidity of decisions necessary to successful adaptation.

This team of experts, with an awareness of the desired

effects, linkages between objectives, and commander’s

intent, will be able to understand the why of changes in

policy goals, which inevitably occur during operations. More

importantly, they will be able to adapt to the new realities,

given the shared knowledge and cooperation derived from

the proposed organizational design. In this instance, the

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Army is well on its way toward the proposed command and

control organizational redesign.

Having experimented with command and control issues

connected to digitization and Force XXI, the Army has

moved forward in innovative and varied ways, including

conducting tests with effects coordination centers and deep

operation coordination centers. Supporting these

organizational initiatives are those system programs

involving the Army’s Battle Command System, which

provides digital communications among strategic,

operational, and tactical headquarters, down to the

individual soldier/weapon system level. This point is critical

to the successful use of effects-based operations, because of

the cyclic, nested nature of the concept. Determining correct

organizational design by itself is a necessary condition for

enabling effects-based operations and so too is the

requirement to develop leaders with the broad background

needed to apply the concept.

For reasons other than developing proficiency in

effects-based operations, the Army has initiated a new way

of conducting initial entry officer training, the basic officer

leadership course at Ft. Benning, Georgia. Designed to

expose every Army officer to basic war fighting

fundamentals, this training ground could provide an

institutional starting point for developing effects-based

operations as a common conceptual denominator, a way of

thinking, for the Army’s future leaders. The holistic, nested,

and integrated nature of effects-based operations places a

premium on leaders who understand the big picture and the

potential impact that their decisions may have on achieving

desired effects guided by the commander’s intent. Coupled

with the increased emphasis on rapid adaptation, leaders of

the future will have to think in new ways that are more

comprehensive. They will have to have the confidence to

deal with uncertainty, the willingness to bridge gaps with

thinking, the desire to take insightful calculated risks, and

the ability to visualize an abstract battlespace and think in

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nonlinear dynamic ways, incorporating multiple

perspectives—no small challenge!

The conceptual thinking skills required by practitioners

of effects-based operations will change the way the Army

must develop and train leaders. The Army’s current

approach to leader training focuses too much on process to

the detriment of outcome. Battle drills, situation lane

training, rote teaching of the military decisionmaking

process, all contribute to the development of leaders who are

able to apply proven, but limited responses to battlefield

realities. Faced with complex challenges, leaders often

resort to executing conditioned, practiced battle drills with

little regard to current realities. This technique offers

predictability of response, an important component for

success at the tactical level, but one that is increasingly less

useful in operational and strategic level decisionmaking.

Incorporating an effects-based approach to operations calls

into question the future utility of this approach even at the

tactical level of decisionmaking.

Effects-based operations demands that the Army

develop leaders capable of conceptual thinking. They must

be able to admit what they do not know, recognize patterns,

spend more time in problem identification and

determination, and ultimately be adaptable. Educating

leaders with these skills will require a shift in training

emphasis from process to outcome. Leaders of tomorrow,

employing effects-based operations must train in

environments that center on the student, not the instructor,

in situations where complexity is maintained, not removed;

checklists and process will remain important but the focus

must be on outcomes instead of getting the procedures right.

Of course, there is no substitute for leaders having a

complete knowledge of the art and science of military

operations. Implementation of effects-based operations will

expand the requirement for leaders to develop and

maintain, if not expertise, then a minimum competency in

areas previously deemed outside the purview of military

125
leaders. For example, proficiency in politics, domestic and

international, culture, diplomacy and economics will prove

critical to successful application of effects-based operations.

Leaders will rightly focus on being experts in the realm of

military art and science while developing the depth of

knowledge in other elements of power to effectively employ

them to achieve desired effects. Developing future leaders

with the right specific and general skills to use effects-based

operations will begin from the moment they enter the

service. The broader education requirements demanded by

this concept are achievable if instilled in leaders beginning

with their initial entry into service. Effects-based

operations demand that the Army produce leaders able to

think and execute conceptually, leaders who focus on

outcomes vice process and are able to integrate all elements

of national power to achieve desired effects.

Recommendations.

Successful leaders and commanders have always

focused on achieving effects and not on destruction for

destruction’s sake. The Army’s development of AirLand

Battle doctrine and its associated enabling methodology of

targeting and target value analysis reflect the recognition of

the value of focusing on effects, commensurate with the

commander’s intent. The concept of effects-based

operations therefore is not new. Rather, effects-based

operations amounts to an evolutionary refinement and

broadening of previous doctrine. Importantly, there are

conceptual differences that offer clear advantages for not

only the employment of military power but the extension of

the concept that offers the potential to achieve a

comprehensive, synergistic application of all elements of

national power.

The Army has an unparalleled familiarity and

understanding of effects-based operations. It is best suited

to “show the way” in the development of the concept as a

joint common conceptual denominator. This will require

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moving forward on two fronts simultaneously, one service

specific and the other, joint. First, the joint community and

the services must agree on a common definition of

effects-based operations. Realizing the potential of the

concept will require the Army to expand its current “fires

centric” notion of effects to a more comprehensive definition

such as the one suggested in this chapter. This should be a

relatively simple task, given the Army’s desire to focus on

creating effects with all means available. At the same time,

an agreed upon definition will require the concurrence of the

joint community and subsequent adoption into joint

doctrine. Agreeing upon a joint definition will enable the

development of joint terms of reference or the language to be

used in expanding the concept.

Hampering the debate over effects-based operations is

the ambiguity of the language in the many varied

descriptions of the concept, each employing unique

descriptions and terms of reference. Before going forward,

the services must reach consensus in defining effects-based

terminology. There is no small amount of danger inherent in

this requirement. Without a clear understanding provided

by jointly codified terms of reference, development of the

concept may deteriorate into service-centric views,

ultimately negating the unifying potential of effects-based

operations. Approved definitions and language will provide

the means to expand and begin the institutionalization of

effects-based operations.

Effects-based operations places a premium on leaders

with specific expertise in military art and science and a

working knowledge of the characteristics of the other

elements of national power. Necessarily, practitioners of the

methodology will use conceptual thinking, focused by

internalized and well-understood guidance in the form of

the commander’s intent. Institutionalizing the training and

education of leaders must begin at the outset of their careers

and continue for the duration. The same must be true for

each service. For the Army, the basic officer leadership

course is the place to start. However, service specific

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training and education alone will not suffice. If the concept

is to serve as common to the joint community it must also be

taught as part of Joint Professional Military Education.

These leaders, educated to employ effects-based

operations, must have facilities and communications

networks that enable their skills. Here too, each service

must develop and field organizations designed to take

advantage of the inherent potential of the concept. The

Army’s fires and effects coordination center is a step in the

right direction. While currently narrow in focus, the idea

brings together operators, intelligence analysts, as well as

system technicians to employ more efficiently and

successfully lethal and nonlethal fires. Easily expandable,

this idea provides a start point for the creation of a more

all-inclusive organization designed to orchestrate all

effects, not just fires. The bilateral command and control

relationship of Battlefield Coordination Detachments that

the Army resources in cooperation with the Air Force could

serve as a start point to expand the concept to Joint Task

Force organizational design. This proven command and

control tool, designed to synchronize and integrate fires, air

power and ground maneuver-effects, is expansible. And,

given the evident interests shown by both services in

effects-based operations, could serve as a platform for the

joint development of the concept as well as needed

experimentation.

As with any new idea, testing and proving the theory

through experimentation, practice, and limited application

are perquisites to specific service and joint adoption. The

U.S. Joint Forces Command has already begun

experimentation that includes looking at effects-based

operations. The command will do so again in August 2002 at

an exercise named “Millennium Challenge 2002.”50 Beyond

this initiative, separate service experimentation must

occur. In the Army’s case numerous venues and

organizations exist that could conduct experiments with

effects-based operations. Training and Doctrine Command

should task a specific battle lab with the lead. While the

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Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle lab is most familiar

with the issue, it may not be the right organization to lead

the Army’s effort. As this chapter has discussed,

effects-based operations represent more than effects

created by lethal and non-lethal fires. Experimentation

must examine the process, or the how, of effects-based

operations implementation, determination of correct

organizational design, and leader skills necessary to

successfully execute. The process of target value analysis

and the organizational design of the fires and effects

coordination center provide a useful departure point.

So, finally, we must ask is effects-based operations

something new and better than the current approach? If so,

what does it promise? Clearly, effects-based operations are

not new. However, only a select few successfully employed

the concept in the past. The renewed interest in the idea

provides an opportunity to expand effects-based operations

to the joint community. Most importantly, effects-based

operations require a focus on outcomes helping to enforce a

discipline in planning and execution of determining the

endstate and objectives before initiating action. It asks,

what is the task and purpose, what effects do U.S. forces

want to achieve? It can improve the application of military

power and can serve as a common conceptual denominator

for the coordinated, synergistic application of that power.

The Army is uniquely suited to take the lead in the further

development of the concept through a collaborative effort

involving all services. The evolutionary, refined, and

broadened concept of effects-based operations has large

potential to improve our way of employing Army forces and

using military power. Finally, it may provide the enabling

idea needed to achieve the goals of joint intellectual,

operational, organizational, doctrinal and technical

integration set out in Joint Vision 2020.

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ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001.

2. Ibid., p. iv.

3. Ibid., p. 6.

4. Ibid., p. 7.

5. Henry H. Shelton, Joint Vision 2020 America’s Military:

Preparing for Tomorrow, Washington, DC, 2000, p. 3.

6. Ibid., p. 2.

7. David A. Deptula, “Firing for Effect: Change in the Nature of

Warfare,” Defense and Airpower Series, August 24, 1995, p. 4.

8. Department of the Army, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

for the Targeting Process, Field Manual 6-20-10, Washington, DC, p.

A-1.

9. U.S. Joint Forces Command, “Effects-based Operations White

Paper Version 1.0,” Norfolk, VA, Concepts Department J9, 2001, p. 5.

10. Ibid., p. 6.

11. Brigadier General David A. Deptula, Effects-Based Operations:

Change in the Nature of Warfare, Arlington, VA, 2001, p. iii.

12. Ibid., p. 4.

13. Ibid., p. 7.

14. Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to

the Nuclear Age, Princeton, NJ, 1986, pp. 341-345.

15. Deptula, Effects-Based Operations: Change in the Nature of

Warfare, p. 11.

16. Institute for Defense Analyses, “New Perspectives on

Effects-Based Operations” Alexandria, VA, Institute for Defense

Analyses, June 30, 2001, pp. 2-3.

17. Ibid., p. 4.

18. Ibid., p. 10.

19. Ibid., p. 8.

130
20. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Samuel B. Griffith, trans., New York:

Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 79.

21. Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, Portland, OR, 2001, pp. 136-138.

22. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret,

trans. and eds., Princeton, NJ, 1976, p. 258.

23. Ibid., p. 260.

24. Ibid., pp. 92-93.

25. J. C. Slessor, Air Power and Armies, London, 1936, p. 66.

26. Ibid., p. 89.

27. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, eds., Military

Innovations in the Interwar Period, New York, NY, 1998, p. 123.

28. T. W. Beagle, “Effects-Based Targeting: Another Empty

Promise?,” Maxwell Air Force Base, School of Advanced Airpower

Studies, June 2000, p. 19.

29. Ibid., p. 19.

30. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of

United States Military Strategy and Policy, Bloomington, IN, 1977, p.

128.

31. Ibid., p. 145.

32. Ibid., p. 149.

33. James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, New York, 1988,

p. 811.

34. Ibid., pp. 319-359.

35. Ibid., p. 358.

36. Ibid.

37. T. W. Beagle, “Effects-Based Targeting: Another Empty

Promise?” p. 59.

38. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Revolution in Warfare?

Air Power in the Persian Gulf, Annapolis, MD, 1995, pp. 1-2.

131
39. David A. Deptula, “Firing for Effect: Change in the Nature of

Warfare,” p. 7.

40. General Glen Otis, “The AirLand Battle,” Military Review, Vol.

5, 1982, p. 2.

41. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint

Publication 3-0, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Staff, 2001, p. B-1-3.

42. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of

Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, Washington,

DC: United States Joint Staff, 2001, p. 429.

43. Department of the Army, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

for the Targeting Process, Field Manual 6-20-10, Washington, DC:

Department of the Army, May 8, 1996, p. A-9.

44. Ibid., p. A-1.

45. Ibid., pp. 1-5.

46. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, pp. III-28.

47. Department of the Air Force, Global Dynamic Operations,

Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, 2001.

48. Department of the Army, Battle Command Training Program

Perceptions, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1995-2001.

49. Department of the Army, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

for the Targeting Process, Field Manual 6-20-10, Washington, DC: U.S.

Department of the Army, 1996.

50. United States Joint Forces Command, “Millennium Challenge

2002,” available from http://www.acom.mil/About/ experiments/

mc02.htm; Internet; accessed January 23, 2002.

132
CHAPTER 5

EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS:

THEORY, APPLICATION,

AND THE ROLE OF AIRPOWER

Lieutenant Colonel Brett T. Williams

The concept of effects-based operations is unfairly

criticized in the joint community. Critics contend that the

concept relies on perfect information, advanced technology,

and precise air attack; therefore they argue, it represents an

unachievable, narrowly focused warfighting panacea that

ignores the fog and friction of war. This chapter proposes an

alternative view. Effects-based operations represents a

theory that should help determine how to use the various

elements of power to attain national security objectives.

Effects-based operations does not depend on information

dominance, high-end warfare, or even precision strike to

make it useful. Additionally, because it is not an operating

concept like “Rapid Decisive Operations,” effects-based

theory is applicable across the spectrum of conflict.1 The

first section of this chapter defines effects-based operations

theory and explains how it helps to develop and assess

strategy within the constraints of information analysis and

acceptable risk. Section two describes how to use

effects-based operations at the operational level with

emphasis on interagency coordination, effects-based

mission planning, and continuous assessment. The third

section addresses how the Air Force should use

effects-based operations to better define airpower’s role in

joint warfighting. It also argues that effects-based

operations is the only way to use airpower effectively in a

context of gradual employment.

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The Theory of Effects-Based Operations.

Major General David Deptula, an active advocate for

effects-based operations, has argued that during Operation

DESERT STORM, technological advances in airpower—

specifically stealth aircraft and precision guided

munitions—enabled the first application of the concept. As

the leading air planner in the war, he encouraged the Joint

Force Air Component Commander’s staff to change their

targeting paradigm and focus on desired effects instead of

just on target destruction. For example, achieving air

superiority meant disabling the Iraqi integrated air defense

system. Traditional operations would have focused on

destroying missile launchers, radars, and air defense

control centers. Instead of doing this, stealth aircraft,

armed with precision-guided munitions, attacked critical

links and nodes in the air defense system. The attacks

achieved the effect of functional system breakdowns and did

so with minimal operational risk and lower cost in terms of

sorties and weapons, when compared to traditional

methods. Deptula has bolstered his arguments by using

results from air operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. Based on

his analysis of these operations, he has defined

effects-based operations as a tool to support parallel attacks

on critical targets to cause paralysis in an enemy’s “system

of systems.” The desired effect is to control an enemy by

eliminating his capability to employ forces. Effects-based

operations improves on current warfighting methods,

because it reduces force requirements, casualties,

forward-basing needs, and conflict duration.2 Not

surprisingly, Deptula argued precision air attack is the best

way to exploit effects-based operations and, therefore, the

Air Force should be the decisive element of American

military power. Unfortunately, his strong advocacy for

airpower caused some critics, notably soldiers, to ignore the

valuable insights he offered.

U.S. Joint Forces Command is also a proponent of

effects-based operations, particularly at the strategic and

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operational levels of war. Like Deptula, Joint Forces

Command’s focus is on achieving desired effects, not

processing through target lists. Effects-based operations,

according to Joint Forces Command, is a knowledge-based

process that predicts enemy reactions. By predicting enemy

behavior and understanding his system, effects-based

planning can direct attacks against critical nodes and links

that should cause a breakdown in cohesion and destroy the

adversary’s ability to resist. Put “simply” according to Joint

Forces Command, effects-based operations generate

strategic effects “through the synergistic, multiplicative,

and cumulative application of the full range of military and

nonmilitary capabilities at the tactical, operational, and

strategic levels.”3 The result should be a quicker, cheaper

victory especially when compared against a strategy of

annihilation or attrition. Not surprisingly, Joint Forces

Command’s views have received considerable criticism,

especially from land power advocates.4

Both Deptula and Joint Forces Command have

emphasized the need to use national power to achieve a

particular strategic outcome. They also correctly identified

the synergies to be gained from integrating military with

nonmilitary instruments of power. Problematically, critics

have ignored the positive aspects of their arguments

because Deptula and Joint Forces Command have linked

effects-based operations to the emerging operational

concept called “Rapid Decisive Operations.”5 The concept of

“Rapid Decisive Operations” evolved from Joint Vision 2020

and has been the subject of sharp critiques. Criticisms have

included its narrow focus on high-end, small-scale

contingencies; reliance on near perfect information; an

enemy that operates as a compensating adaptive system of

systems with vulnerable critical nodes; and the assumption

that speedy execution will always achieve the political aim.6

Tying effects-based operations to “Rapid Decisive

Operations” has unfairly denigrated the potential benefits

of effects-based operations. The concept of “Rapid Decisive

Operations” relies on the ability to predict enemy reactions

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using effects-based operations, but effects-based operations

is more than an enabler for one specific operational method.

Effects-based operations provide a general guide for

employing national power to achieve strategic objectives in

almost any scenario.

Defining effects-based operations as theory is the first

step in divorcing it from specific operational concepts.

Clausewitz once noted, “The primary purpose of any theory

is to clarify concepts and ideas that have become, as it were,

confused and entangled.”7 Additionally, “[t]heory will have

fulfilled its main task when it is used to analyze the

constituent elements of war...to explain in full the

properties of the means employed and their probable

effects...”8 Effects-based operations, correctly explained,

fits the Clausewitzian definition of theory. For the purpose

of this argument then, effects-based operations theory is a

method of determining the correct application and

integration of national power to achieve specific effects and

outcomes within the bounds of acceptable risk. Effects can

physically, functionally, or psychologically impact the

enemy and coerce or compel him to change his behavior and

eventually lead to desired outcomes.9 Although effectsbased operations can enable strategic, operational, or

tactical outcomes, this chapter focuses on strategic and

operational outcomes, where effects-based operations offer

the greatest advantages over current planning and

execution methods.

Effects-Based Planning and Execution. A major

shortfall of traditional objectives-based planning is that it

assumes a linear relationship between action and objective;

the correct action executed perfectly will attain the desired

objective. (See Figure 1)

Figure 1. Traditional Objectives-Based Planning.

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Unfortunately, war is not linear. Instead, it is a

nonlinear activity, where military actions produce multiple

reactions that are difficult to predict.10 Current chaos

theory captures the nonlinear nature of war. The theory

states that within complex systems nearly all inputs will

“lead to unpredictable, irregular behavior.” In other words,

war is not proportional or additive.11 Even small, seemingly

insignificant actions can cause large and frequently

unforeseen effects. In addition, at the same time an action

generates effects on one objective, it can produce

unpredicted effects on a different objective. Thus, there is

not a linear relationship between actions and objectives.

Instead, actions produce a variety of effects, and the effects

determine whether or not the objective is achieved. Figure 2

adds the concept of effects to the traditional linear planning

model.12

In the event strategic aims are clear, the enemy is

politically isolated, and military force is the dominant

instrument, linear planning may succeed. Encountering

such a simple environment, however, is unlikely. Instead, a

host of complicating military and political factors will

nearly always exist. Most adversaries will take advantage

of such factors by adapting, substituting, and compensating

to overcome operational problems. They will try to change

the strategic environment by attacking alliances,

manipulating international opinion, or influencing U.S.

domestic politics. Saddam Hussein, for example, used

messengers to compensate for Iraq’s disrupted

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communication system, and he tried to bring Israel into the

war in an effort to weaken the U.S.-led coalition. Effectsbased operations offer commanders a methodology to cope

with the nonlinear nature of war.

The first step in effects-based planning is to determine

the effects that will attain the desired strategic outcome.

This step begins with the political aim as articulated by the

civilian leadership. The Joint Force Commander then

develops supporting theater objectives and selects the

physical, functional or psychological effects that might

generate the desired change in an enemy’s behavior.

Optimally, the Joint Force Commander and his component

commanders will reach agreement on the key strategic and

operational effects necessary for success. Typically though,

individual experience, service culture, and differences of

opinion will lead senior leaders to alternative solutions.

Operation ALLIED FORCE provided an example of how

debate over desired effects can cause friction at the highest

levels.

Operation ALLIED FORCE evolved into a 78-day NATO

air operation, in which one of the objectives was to stop

Yugoslav President Milosevic from using violence against

ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.13 U.S. Army General Wesley

Clark, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, led NATO

forces, and U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General Michael

Short was the Air Component Commander. The generals

agreed on the strategic objective—stop the ethnic

cleansing—but they disagreed on the effects needed to

achieve that end. Clark wanted a physical effect: attack the

armed forces committing the atrocities. Short wanted to

generate functional and psychological effects targeted

directly at Milosevic. He believed that attacking command,

control, and key infrastructure targets would cause

Milosevic to accept NATO’s demands.14 The debate was

never resolved, NATO attacked both target sets, and

Milosevic gave in. Success came from a combination of

factors that did not include unity of effort at the highest

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levels of command. Above all, the operation highlighted the

difficulties involved with determining appropriate effects.15

Once the senior staff determines desired effects,

planners can begin analyzing potential courses of action.

Proper analysis begins with a net assessment of the

strategic, operational, and tactical environment and the

analysis extends beyond military capabilities. Analysts

must consider culture, religion, economics, and diplomacy,

as such factors will impact on the conduct of the war as

much as the military balance of power, if not more. Other

aspects of the assessment must include the objectives of the

participants and the value they attach to their objectives.

The analysis must estimate enemy capabilities in all four

areas of power: diplomatic, economic, information, and

military. The military assessment should measure

organizational strengths and weaknesses in doctrine,

training, leadership, and equipment for both friends and

enemies. Finally, the assessment must determine what

peripheral allied interests could influence the course of the

war.

The quality of the net assessment and the commander’s

ability to use the net assessment to make decisions will

determine the ability to predict effects. Since net

assessments depend on collecting and analyzing

information, information is a critical enabler for

effects-based operations. Critics understand this dynamic

and perceive information as a limiting factor, because they

think information superiority is a requirement for

effects-based operations. Information superiority is a key

component of Joint Vision 2020, the Department of

Defense’s roadmap for developing future warfighting

capabilities.16 Information superiority, according to

detractors, is not attainable because no amount of

technology will deliver complete information. The

proliferation of information technology serves the enemy as

well as it serves the United States, and even infinite

information is useless without quality analysis. These

criticisms have merit, but they do not apply to effects-based

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operations. Effects-based operations do not require perfect

information, information superiority, or information

dominance. What effects-based operations require is

analysis sufficient to support decisionmaking. Excellent

information coupled with superior analysis helps in

predicting effects, but limited information and incomplete

analysis do not invalidate effects-based theory.

Commanders simply need to account for the quality of the

net assessment in evaluating courses of action. They need to

realize that poor net assessments will lead to a wider variety

of unpredicted effects.

Armed with a net assessment, effects-based planners

can evaluate courses of action. Planning doctrine requires

the selected course of action to be adequate, feasible,

acceptable and consistent with joint doctrine.17 Planners

can ensure the selected course of action meets these four

criteria only after considering that every action will produce

as many as four differing effects: predicted-desired effects,

predicted-undesired effects, unpredicted-desirable effects,

and unpredicted-undesirable effects. It is also important to

understand that a single action will impact the objective at

hand as well as other objectives in the campaign. (See

Figure 3.)

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The Joint Force Commander would like to select a course

of action that generates only predicted effects. Predicted

effects, even if not desired, make a cost-benefit analysis

possible and allow the commander to select courses of

action, where advantageous desired effects outweigh

undesired effects. Unfortunately, there will always be

unpredictable effects; war is inherently unpredictable

because it occurs between animate adversaries who interact

within complex environments subject to constant friction.

Clausewitz correctly observed:

[e]verything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is

difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a

friction...This tremendous friction...brings about effects that

cannot be measured, just because they are largely due to

chance.18

There are three sources of friction, one of which is the

chaotic, nonlinear nature of war. The second is the

unpredictable nature of human behavior, a factor

exacerbated by the pressures and dangers of war. The third

source is information uncertainty. Useful information is lost

in the system noise, incorrectly interpreted or analyzed, and

not always available to the commander in time for making

decisions.19 These three sources of friction produce chance

events that are a basic reality in war, regardless of advances

in technology.20 The existence of friction and chance does

not mean there is no predictability in war; it just means

there will always be surprises. The commander must use his

intuition, experience, training, and common sense to

compensate for unpredictable events because they will

frequently determine strategy’s success or failure.21 He can

never eliminate friction and chance; instead, his goal is to be

less affected by such elements than is the enemy.22

Understanding that combat will always be

unpredictable helps the Joint Force Commander assess

risk. In effects-based operations, risk is measured by the

potential for an action to produce unpredicted outcomes.

When the probability of unpredicted effects is low, risk is

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low. Conversely, when the probability of unpredicted effects

is high, risk is high. Allies, coalitions, and wide

international interest create complex strategic

environments in which the possibility of significant

unpredictable effects increases. Military parity also

increases risk because the operational outcome is less

certain. Additionally, risk is higher when one side is willing

to use an asymmetric capability like chemical weapons or

direct attacks on civilians. These factors all increase risk

because they increase the probability of unpredicted effects.

Figure 4 and the following three examples further illustrate

the relationship between unpredictable effects and risk.

An example of low risk is Operation JUST CAUSE, the

1989 U.S. invasion of Panama. The strategic environment

was benign because international interest in Panama

remained limited to regional actors, while events leading up

to the invasion put the U.S. on moral high ground.23 The net

assessment was accurate due to similar cultures, as well as

long-term U.S. presence in the country. These factors,

combined with overwhelming military force and no

requirement for allied support, meant the selected course of

action would likely produce predictable-desirable effects.

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Figure 4. Unpredictable Effects and Risk.
Operation DESERT STORM is an example of moderate

risk. The strategic environment was complex due to wide

international interest in the conflict and vastly different

cultures among the allies. The spectrum of potential

unpredicted effects was wide because of the ongoing

Arab-Israeli conflict, the uncertain roles countries like Iran,

Syria, Jordan, and Russia might play, and the possibility

that Iraq might use chemical or biological weapons. Factors

that mitigated risk included extended U.S. involvement in

the region, a marked military advantage, a brazen act of

Iraqi aggression, and an effective coalition that produced

political will, basing access, and a common strategic

endstate. The selected course of action, remove Iraqi forces

from Kuwait, promised to generate mostly predictable

effects and the desired effects outweighed the undesired

effects. The array of possible unpredictable effects included

coalition problems relating to Israel and the unknown

effects that would have resulted from Iraq’s use of chemical

or biological weapons. The political isolation of Iraq and

persistent attacks against weapons of mass destruction

facilities kept potential risk from unpredictable effects

within an acceptable range.

An example of high risk would have been the

continuation of Operation DESERT STORM. Continued

operations into Iraq would have increased the potential for

unpredicted and undesired effects. Limited Arab support

for further offensive operations would have increased risk

by threatening the coalition’s political cohesion and

reducing military and logistic support to forces continuing

the attack. Destroying the Iraqi army or taking down the

Iraqi regime would have had unpredictable effects on

regional stability. Threatening Saddam Hussein’s survival

might have created a catalyst for Iraqi chemical or biological

attacks. More extensive friendly casualties and collateral

damage might have turned popular opinion against the

operation. In sum, the potential array of unpredictable

effects created an unacceptably high risk level, and the

United States halted offensive operations.

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After the commander selects a course of action that

meets the risk criteria, he must establish measures of

effectiveness to determine if operations are producing the

predicted effects. Measures of effectiveness typically consist

of objective data points, evaluated numerically to determine

progress. It is sometimes difficult to define useful measures

because what to measure is not apparent or the best thing to

measure is unmeasurable. Additionally, information is

frequently sparse, there is limited time available for

analysis, and analysts looking at the same data can reach

different results based on personal experience and

organizational bias. Additionally, the fog and friction of war

introduce “noise” into the system, making it difficult to

discern valid data from spurious, random events. Lastly,

measuring effects does not always lend itself to numerical

evaluation. Nevertheless, commanders must measure

something, if they are going to make meaningful

adjustments to the campaign plan.24

Choosing the correct measures of effectiveness is critical

because evaluation against those measures will determine

resource allocation, movement between campaign phases,

and strategic and operational changes. Commanders must

devote personal attention to determining the correct

measures as component commanders with the same

operational objectives can select different measures of

effectiveness. For example, during the Vietnam War, the

Army and Marines had the same objective of eliminating

Viet Cong and North Vietnamese influence in South

Vietnam. The Army measure of effectiveness was dead

enemy soldiers, and this drove search and destroy tactics

with no long-term presence in any specific area. The

Marines measured effectiveness using rice crop production.

Increased rice production came from social, economic, and

political stability, which was only possible if the villagers

were free to live in peace. To drive their measures of

effectiveness, Marines established protected positions and

long-term presence with small teams to discourage enemy

action in their sectors. The theater commander was not

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measuring rice production; instead he was counting dead

enemy soldiers. The result was the Marines were forced to

change their tactics to show progress against the Army

measure of effectiveness. This example demonstrates how

measures of effectiveness can drive strategy and adversely

affect unity of effort. In addition, it demonstrates how the

wrong measures of effectiveness can distort the whole

operational effort.25

Once combat operations are underway, effects-based

operations theory facilitates the reassessment process.

Reassessment has two components: continuously evaluate

combat operations against established measures of

effectiveness and adjust strategy as required to generate

the desired effects. Good measures of effectiveness allow the

staff to evaluate predicted effects, both desired and

undesired. Assessing unpredicted effects will be more

difficult for several reasons. First, analysts may be slow to

recognize unpredicted effects because the post-attack

evaluation process will naturally look for indicators of

predicted effects. Second, preplanned measures of

effectiveness may not be helpful in evaluating unpredicted

effects. Third, unpredicted effects may impact not only on

the planned objective, but also on other operational or

strategic objectives. Finally, the time available for analysis

and reaction will always be constrained.26 These factors call

for an adaptive, flexible command structure that can

evaluate and react to unpredictable effects. Commanders

must take advantage of unpredicted-desirable effects and

minimize the adverse impact of unpredicted-undesirable

effects.

The presence of second and third-order effects will

complicate the process of assessing effects. Such effects are

commonly termed indirect effects, because they do not

result from direct actions taken, but instead result from the

cascading or sequential nature of effects within a complex

system.27 Multi-order effects are hard to evaluate because

they occur separately from the action in either time or space,

which makes it difficult to determine which action

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generated the effect. Without identifying the generating

action, it would be impossible to adjust the campaign plan to

leverage desirable effects or prevent additional undesirable

effects. Planners can predict some indirect effects, but

analysis will always be difficult even with accurate

measures of merit. Nevertheless, it is essential that

commanders account for multi-order effects because they

may impact friendly operations as much as they do enemy

operations.

The inevitability of unpredicted effects and the chaotic

nature of multi-order effects are factors which drive the

second component of reassessment: adjusting the campaign

plan to achieve the desired outcome. After the commander

evaluates results against pre-planned measures of

effectiveness and determines the source and impact of

unpredicted effects, he must be willing to change the

original plan, drastically if necessary. Before he makes

major adjustments however, he must have confidence that

the post-attack analysis was as specific and multi-faceted as

the original net assessment. The analysis must go beyond

simple battle-damage assessment and look for the physical,

functional, and psychological effects necessary to achieve

the desired outcome. If the desired effects are not

forthcoming or if it appears operations are exceeding the

limits of acceptable risk, the commander must change some

component of his strategy. Effects-based operations is a

process of net assessment, action, reassessment,

adjustment, and action. It is a continual process and,

properly implemented, should keep operations oriented on

the original aim; not on processing target lists or securing

decisive points. In addition, if the cycle is timely, it also will

generate a compounding positive effect because friendly

forces will act and react inside the enemy’s decision cycle.28

Bismarck and Effects-Based Operations. Effects-based

operations do not rely on technology, precision strike,

airpower, perfect information or other 21st century

warfighting tools. To prove this point, the following case

study illustrates how an effects-based campaign, employed

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at the strategic level, was instrumental to Prussian victory

in the 1866 Austro-Prussian War.

The Austro-Prussian War was the final chapter in the

struggle between Prussia and Austria for control of the

German Confederation. The German Confederation

consisted of 39 states and was formed in 1815 by the five

European Powers (England, France, Russia, Austria, and

Prussia) following the defeat of Napoleon. The purpose of

the confederation was to maintain the European balance of

power in two ways. First, the confederation joined Austria

and Prussia with the small German states in order to

prevent outside powers from annexing German territory for

economic and military gain. Second, while Austria and

Prussia had the most influence within the confederation,

the nature of the governing federal bureaucracy prevented

either of them from consolidating political control by

dispersing influence throughout the member states. After

1848, Austria and Prussia engaged in a number of attempts

to gain control of the confederation by forming alliances

among the various smaller states.29 The war’s precipitating

event was a disagreement over control of two recently

acquired northern provinces, Schleswig and Holstein.

Austria and Prussia had gained control of these provinces as

a result of the 1864 Danish War.

Otto von Bismarck, Prussia’s Chancellor, saw the

dispute over Schleswig and Holstein as an opportunity for

Prussia to gain complete control of the German

Confederation.30 With the strategic aim established,

Bismarck conducted a net assessment of the diplomatic and

military situation in Europe. Both diplomatic and military

courses of action were available, but Bismarck’s assessment

led him to select a military option with limited objectives:

defeat the Austrian Army and dictate terms. Bismarck

determined this course of action could produce significant

risk from unpredictable and undesirable effects unless he

could do two things. First, he needed to reduce the chances

that France or Russia would enter the war on behalf of

Austria. He accomplished this through a series of deft

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diplomatic maneuvers.31 Second, Bismarck had to ensure a

military advantage for Prussia because an indecisive or

prolonged conflict would not have forced Austria’s hand.

The Prussians had a significant military advantage in three

areas. First, they had the world’s only true General Staff; its

officers were trained, tested, and eminently capable of

commanding and controlling large military organizations.

Second, the Prussian commander-in-chief, Helmut von

Moltke, was militarily superior to the Austrian commander

Field Marshall Ludwig Benedek. Moltke was confidant,

willing to take calculated risks, and had the support of a

competent staff. Additionally, Moltke had trained the

Prussian army using various war-gaming scenarios that

prepared them to take the initiative on the battlefield. In

contrast, Benedek was “a hesitant, weak-willed pessimist”

who was slow to make decisions and unwilling to delegate

authority. Prussia’s third advantage came from superior

weapons, tactics, and training.32

Because Prussia’s strengths were not widely recognized,

Bismarck was able to enhance Prussia’s military prospects

by reinforcing the sentiment that Prussia was militarily

inferior to Austria. Bismarck further complicated Austria’s

problems by taking advantage of existing tensions between

Austria and Italy. He secured a military alliance with Italy

to open a second front along the Austrian-Italian border.33

Bismarck’s proactive approach at the strategic level

controlled risk and reduced the probability of unpredictable

effects generated by operational actions. His diplomacy

allowed Moltke to exercise operational art, and achieve a

decisive Prussian victory at Königgrätz.

The victory demonstrated that success as well as failure

requires a reassessment process. Prussian King Wilhelm,

despite his initial reluctance to attack Austria, wanted to

take advantage of the situation and march on Vienna.

Moltke, recognizing the need to end the war before Russia or

France could intervene, pressed the offensive south towards

the Austrian capital. At this point, Napoleon III proposed an

armistice that forced a strategic pause. Prussia could not

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ignore France’s interest in the conflict for fear of French

military action against its Rhine provinces—a dangerous

proposition with the Prussian army deployed so far east.

French intervention also bought the Austrians time and

opened up the possibility of an armistice between Austria

and Italy that would have freed Austrian forces to move

north and participate in the war against Prussia.34 Finally,

disease and logistics began to threaten Moltke’s strength.35

Bismarck conducted a reassessment that covered all

military and nonmilitary factors and subsequently

convinced Wilhelm that it was time to negotiate a

settlement. He argued that further offensive actions would

have generated unpredictable effects—most significantly,

outside power involvement that might have threatened

achieving the original strategic war aims. Bismarck clearly

understood that the character of the war had changed and

“nearly all the parameters had shifted in ways that were too

complicated, diffuse, and basic to be calculated with

confidence.”36 Bismarck had used effects-based thinking to

stay focused on the strategic outcome as well as effects.

Bismarck determined an achievable political aim and

established supporting objectives. He conducted a net

assessment, determined desired effects, evaluated courses

of action, assessed risk, and shaped the environment to

enable Prussian success. After the initial victory, he

reassessed the situation against pre-planned measures of

effectiveness and determined there was no need to change

the plan. Instead, it was time to declare victory and move on

to France. Thanks in large part to Bismarck’s use of

effects-based operations, Prussia was successful despite its

inability to conduct precision air attack under the umbrella

of information superiority.

Effects-Based Operations in Theater.

Effects-based operations can help commanders better

plan and execute campaigns. To achieve that end, Joint

Force Commanders first need a theater-level interagency

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coordination element; and second, they must form an

Effects Assessment Board to ensure the campaign remains

oriented on generating the effects necessary to attain the

operational and strategic objectives.

Interagency Coordination. The Secretary of Defense

noted that the commander of U.S. Central Command was

“left alone” by Washington to conduct military operations in

Afghanistan.37 On the surface, such autonomy seems

desirable when comparing Vietnam, where there was

significant guidance from Washington, with Operation

DESERT STORM, where the commander was relatively

free to conduct operations. Conflicts since Operation

DESERT STORM, however, including those in Somalia,

Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, have been like Vietnam.

Commanders in these conflicts confronted unclear military

objectives and discovered that political, diplomatic, and

coalition issues heavily influenced operational decisions. By

implication, when objectives are limited, the use of force

remains constrained and political considerations determine

military options. In such cases, the commander has no

choice but to work closely with Washington in order to

integrate military and non-military actions within a single

coherent strategy. Effects-based operations provide the

framework to coordinate diplomatic, information, economic,

and military actions, but to do so commanders require

interagency participation with their staffs.

Recently, several regional commanders have asked for

civilian agents to be assigned to their commands to improve

interagency coordination.38 Placing civilian representatives

on all combatant staffs is unlikely due to limited manning

within civilian agencies as well as organizational barriers.

Additionally, there may not be sufficient work for such

representatives in day-to-day operations. A better option

aligns itself with the Standing Joint Task Force

headquarters described in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense

Review. The review envisions standing headquarters

assigned to each of the regional commands. Their mission

would be to provide uniform operating procedures, utilize

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adaptive mission planning tools, and provide the capability

to move expertise among the commands. 39 One element of

such standing headquarters should be responsible for

interagency coordination. Since assigning an interagency

element to each region is infeasible, the Joint Staff could

stand up one element in a central location. Joint Forces

Command would be a logical place to facilitate interagency

coordination, because the element would be in close

proximity to joint exercises, experiments, and doctrine

development.

The standing interagency coordination element would

enhance effects-based operations in three ways. First, it

would allow individuals who do not typically work together

an opportunity to develop personal relationships, share

expertise, and explore innovative ways to combine the

elements of national power to achieve operational and

strategic effects. This is important because organizations

tend to develop new and better ways of doing things when

they routinely work together. An example of this occurred

when U.S. special forces developed techniques for providing

close air support from high altitude bombers in support of

Afghan fighters on horseback.40 The impetus to develop new

tactics and techniques would come from the element’s

second mission, which would be to help develop and review

theater war plans. The interagency element would

periodically travel to the regional headquarters and actively

participate in various stages of planning to include mission

analysis, course of action evaluation, and strategic concept

development. Additionally, the element would serve as the

conduit between the regional headquarters and the

interagency element during the plan review and approval

phase. Performing these functions would provide the

interagency element with regional expertise and ensure

each command an equal voice in the interagency

coordination process. The third mission of the interagency

element would be crisis response. The element would have

to be deployable, trained, and able to integrate with the rest

of the combat staff in theater. Its mission would be to help

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the Joint Force Commander mass effects by integrating

diplomatic, economic, and information activities with

military force.

The interagency element will only be effective if civilian

and military organizations provide capable people and give

them the authority to act on behalf of their respective

agencies. That authority will have bounds, and on occasion

the National Security Council will have to resolve

contentious issues that cross agency boundaries. Creating

an interagency element that is sufficiently staffed and

empowered to perform the mission outlined here is certain

to meet numerous organizational roadblocks. However,

they must be overcome if Joint Force Commanders are to

realize the benefits of effects-based operations.41

Effects-Based Missions. Using traditional objectivesbased planning, the commander analyzes the political aim

and develops supporting theater objectives. The staff

develops sub-objectives and supporting military tasks that

they assign to various component commanders for

execution. The process relies on a linear strategy-to-task

relationship focused on the intended results.42 The process

can produce “stove-piped” campaigns that do not generate

synergistic joint, interagency operations. This traditional

approach fails to maximize desired effects, and it allows for

the possibility that actions taken by one component may

work at cross-purposes to other ongoing military or

nonmilitary missions. Effects-based mission planning and

execution can correct such shortfalls.

Joint Force Commanders need staff elements that

always address effects. During deliberate and crisis action

planning, it is not difficult to focus on effects because

planners have time to evaluate actions and analyze the

possibilities. Once operations begin, a continued focus on

effects becomes a challenge. There is a tendency for senior

commanders to focus on operations and subsequently

equate tactical results with achieving the strategic or

operational objective.43 In Vietnam for example, body count

152
became the primary focus without connecting that metric to

the desired outcome. More recently, during a 1999 war

game emphasizing effects-based operations, the Air Force

found that planners had a difficult time staying oriented on

effects. Once the campaign started, their attention drifted

to operational details, and they lost focus on the effects

needed to attain campaign objectives.44 A reoriented and

renamed Joint Targeting and Coordination Board could

help overcome such tendencies.45 The board requires

reorientation to focus on strategic and operational effects

instead of just targeting issues. The Deputy Joint Force

Commander should continue to chair the board. Board

members typically include senior representatives from the

component and functional commands. To assess effects

fully, however, the interagency element would need to be

represented. Using the joint targeting board as an effects

board has two advantages. First, as currently structured,

the board has the seniority necessary to recommend major

changes to the campaign, if required. Second, the board’s

activities are already part of the staff’s battle rhythm. The

joint targeting board should be renamed the “Effects

Assessment Board.”

The “Effects Assessment Board” would have two tasks:

generating effects-based missions and overseeing the

reassessment process.46 In its first role, the board would use

effects-based operations theory to generate effects-based

missions. These would be broad missions focused on

generating high-level operational effects that would

directly influence strategic objectives. The board would

designate a lead element for each mission, based typically

on who controlled the preponderance of force for that

particular action. In cases where the selected action is

primarily nonmilitary, the supported element may have no

military force, but is best positioned to integrate military

and nonmilitary actions. The effects board would also

allocate forces, and apportion priority for air support to the

lead element. Creating effects-based missions would drive

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joint force integration and encourage interagency

cooperation as the following two examples illustrate.

In the first example, the desired effect might be to isolate

the enemy from a third country’s logistical support. The

land component commander would be the supported

element. He would deploy ground forces to block lines of

communication, use airpower to interdict choke points, and

integrate these actions with diplomatic efforts targeted at

those providing support to the enemy. The diplomatic

coordination would be critical to determine the acceptable

scope of military force. Could the commander direct attacks

inside a third country or against outside assets operating

within enemy territory? Additionally, coordination would

allow optimum timing between military actions and

diplomatic activity. The State Department could issue a

demarche against providing support in the morning, and

that afternoon military forces could destroy a supply convoy

that failed to reverse course after being warned. The second

example could be a mission to create an effect where the

enemy leader is unable to maintain popular support for

continued resistance. An information operations cell would

be the lead element. It would task military forces to provide

humanitarian assistance, destroy selected communication

nodes, and conduct attacks to diminish civilian or military

morale. Special operations forces would conduct

psychological operations in coordination with a State

Department public diplomacy campaign. Finally,

diplomatic efforts would focus on internationally isolating

the current leadership and supporting a replacement

regime. Such examples suggest how effects-based

operations could generate synergistic effects by integrating

and synchronizing military and non-military force

applications.

The second function of the Effects Assessment Board

would be to oversee the reassessment process.

Reassessment determines what mission changes are

needed. One reason changes may be a necessity is because

actions are not producing predicted effects or actions are

154
producing unpredicted effects that put the strategic or

operational objectives at risk. To rectify these problems, the

effects board would look for the causal linkages between

actions and effects. In other words, why did a given action

produce a particular effect?47 An example of this concept

comes from the World War II combined bomber offensive.

British strategic bombing doctrine, at the beginning of the

war, called for air attacks against the enemy’s industrial

centers, economic infrastructure, public utilities, and

transportation networks. Air planners hoped these attacks

would generate “war weariness” and destroy the nation’s

will to fight.48 They also suspected the attacks would

generate a popular revolution that might end the war.49

When it became apparent the Royal Air Force could not

bomb with sufficient precision to destroy the original

targets, the British took to bombing urban centers,

especially worker housing. The intent was to destroy the

industrial tools and instill such fear in the workers that they

would stay home.50 In effects-based operations terms,

strategic bombing was the selected action and reduced

industrial output or popular revolution was the desired

effect. Lower morale and war weariness was the postulated

causal link between action and effect. While there is

evidence that by 1943 the bombing was affecting German

morale, industrial output continued to increase and popular

discontent focused on the attackers not the Nazi regime.51

These facts suggest British actions did not produce the

desired effects, because they failed to identify the correct

causal link.

This analysis is not meant to imply that British strategic

bombing did not contribute to Allied victory. The bombing

generated unpredictable-desirable, multi-order effects. In

an attempt to retaliate against England, the Luftwaffe

wasted the majority of its bomber fleet in futile attacks on

Britain. In addition, the Germans diverted enormous

resources into the V-series rocket program. The rocket

attacks had no significant impact on the Allies. Yet the

diverted resources could have produced an additional

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24,000 German fighters.52 The end result was British

bombing diverted German resources into an area that had

minimal impact on Allied operations. The multi-order

desirable effects generated by their strategic bombing

would have been impossible for the British to predict. The

fact that 50 years later historians continue to debate the

effects of the Combined Bomber Offensive highlights the

difficulties in linking actions and effects.

Although it is difficult, the reassessment process must

attempt to identify causal linkages. Identifying causal

linkages will help determine why an action failed to

generate the desired effect or why it produced an

unpredicted effect. The problem could have been in tactical

execution or in the integration and synchronization of

military and nonmilitary means. It could have been because

second or third order effects from seemingly unrelated

actions were producing counterproductive effects. Another

possibility is that the strategic or operational environment

may have changed, and the original course of action is now

invalid. Perhaps the original net assessment

underestimated the enemy’s capability to adapt. Maybe the

problem was temporal, and the effect was not evident as

quickly as predicted, or maybe it was just the fog and

friction of war. These are all possibilities commanders could

accept, but there is another significant consideration.

Maybe the strategy was ineffective because it was based on

invalid doctrinal assumptions. This last case is potentially

the most dangerous, because military forces are typically

slow to acknowledge poor strategy or doctrine, even in the

face of contrary and sometimes overwhelming evidence.53

Identifying causal links, understanding the nature of

indirect effects, and having the courage to admit their

doctrine may be wrong will all help commanders make the

right adjustments and stay focused on the strategic goal.

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The Role of Airpower in Effects-Based Operations.

The Air Force is a strong proponent of effects-based

operations and airmen have contributed significantly to the

concept’s development. Unfortunately, Air Force

contributions have been eclipsed by arguments over the

source of decisive effects. Airmen must shift the debate from

which service is decisive, to airpower’s role in effects-based

operations. The Air Force must also better integrate

effects-based operations into its doctrine. Specifically, the

doctrine must acknowledge that effects-based operations

are key to making gradual airpower effective.

Is Airpower Decisive? Joint Doctrine states “any

dimension of combat power can be dominant—and even

decisive—in certain aspects of an operation or phase of a

campaign,” but victory will come from the commander’s

ability to synchronize and integrate joint force

capabilities.54 The most important part of this statement is

the emphasis on synchronization and integration. Yet

soldiers and airmen have a propensity to argue needlessly

over which service is dominant, or decisive. Soldiers contend

that since people live on the earth, that it is where decisive

events occur. Until a force takes and holds ground, marches

victoriously through the enemy capital, and dictates terms

to the king, the war was not been won, at least not

decisively. Thus the Army’s contention that its soldiers

“fight and win our Nation’s wars.”55

One problem with this line of argument is that without

the other elements of military power, most notably

airpower, this scenario will not play out. Another problem is

that just because people on the ground make decisions, the

Army is not the only element of force capable of compelling

or coercing an enemy. Finally, decisive victory is not always

the political aim. Since the end of World War II, the United

States has not sought to occupy the enemy capital and force

unconditional surrender. Instead, military force has

provided a means of coercive diplomacy in support of limited

strategic objectives. For their part, airmen since World War

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I have argued airpower can force enemy capitulation by

attacking enemy morale, destroying key industries, and

paralyzing enemy systems. Achieving success with these

methods relies heavily on second and third-order effects and

the ability to identify causal linkages. Since proving the

benefits of indirect effects is difficult, airmen are constantly

on the defensive trying to link air attack to enemy

capitulation.

The debate over decisiveness is counter-productive, and

it reinforces the unfair stereotype that airmen think they

can win wars alone. It is difficult to find proof that any

senior Air Force leader believes this, but the existence of the

myth makes advocating effects-based operations

problematic. However, senior Air Force leaders could

disarm many detractors of effects-based operations by

focusing on airpower’s role within joint operations. Recent

publications reflect an effort to do just that. Air Force Vision

2020 states that the Air Force is a “partner in our nation’s

security" and “dominates the aerospace domain to facilitate

the effectiveness of the Joint Team.”56 Other support is

found in Deptula’s writings. His effects-based operations

article published early in 2001 was airpower dominant and

described the concept mostly within the context of “Rapid

Decisive Operations.” His more recent article, however, on

Air Force transformation, described effects-based

operations as the method in which “[a]erospace forces

operate as part of a joint, interagency, and coalition team.”57

The best evidence that the Air Force sees the big picture

comes from general officers who recognize that airpower

advocates can be their own worst enemies by arguing that

airpower is the dominant force. In public presentations as

well as private conversations, senior leaders are now

stressing that the Air Force is only part of a larger effort.

They all firmly believe in the tenets of airpower and its

ability to be the critical component in many scenarios, but

they also argue it is not a stand-alone solution to national

security challenges.58 This attitude will allow airmen to

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help promote effects-based operations and properly define

the role of airpower in future joint doctrine.

Effects-Based Operations and Gradual Airpower.

Limiting the use of force traditionally has been anathema to

war fighters. Airmen, in particular, despise the concept of

limited or gradual airpower.59 They cite Vietnam’s “Rolling

Thunder” operation as the perfect example of how airpower

was marginalized as a result of political restrictions. How

these limitations may have contributed to the failed

Vietnam strategy continues to fuel debate, but air

operations during Operation ALLIED FORCE suggest

gradualism may have warfighting value. From the outset,

airpower planners wanted to go “downtown” and “cut off the

head of the snake.” Post-war analysis suggests such

aggressive attacks might have had undesired effects,

fractured the NATO coalition, and actually extended the

war. One reason is the time element. Early attacks directed

at the most valuable target sets might have short-circuited

ongoing diplomatic efforts directed at convincing Russia to

support NATO. Another reason is that attacking downtown

Belgrade from the outset might have convinced many Serb

leaders they had nothing further to lose and reduced their

incentive to cooperate. In addition, evidence suggests

constant air raid warnings had a cumulative effect on

civilians that resulted in war weariness and established a

political climate that permitted Milosevic to negotiate.

Lastly, the potential casualties might have overshadowed

the implications of Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing in the eyes of

international public opinion.60 Given these are all second

and third order effects, causal linkages are difficult to define

and gradualism’s value is hard to prove. Perhaps one reason

gradualism succeeded in Kosovo lies in the fact Milosevic

had almost no way to strike back at NATO, militarily or

otherwise. Even if Air Force planners do not accept this

evidence as a reason to investigate the value of gradualism,

it is clear political restraints will force airpower into limited

and gradual roles. The only way to leverage airpower’s

capability in a limited or gradual application is by using

159
effects-based operations. Limited airpower, combined

effectively with other instruments of military and

nonmilitary power, can still be a powerful coercive

instrument. The Air Force needs to write doctrine for

employing airpower in a limited or gradual fashion and the

doctrine must be grounded in the theory of effects-based

operations.61

Conclusion.

Critics who reject the emerging doctrine of effects-based

operations do so at their own peril. If they fail to embrace the

concept, Joint Force Commanders may be unable to

combine all the elements of power effectively. The theory of

effects-based operations offers the strategic and operational

artist a guide for organizing his thoughts and applying

available resources to the challenge at hand. The theory can

help commanders evaluate courses of action, analyze risk,

and conduct continual reassessment. Implementing

effects-based operations at the theater level requires

organizational changes to better integrate interagency

actions and ensure campaigns stay focused on operational

and strategic effects. The Air Force is a logical advocate for

effects-based operations because airpower theory rests on

many of the same concepts, particularly the ability to

generate and leverage second and third-order effects.

Unfortunately, overemphasis of airpower’s role in

effects-based operations has served to alienate portions of

the joint community. Air Force leaders must continue to

stress airpower as part of a joint, interagency team, and

they must update their doctrine to take advantage of

effects-based operations. The complexity of today’s

international environment will continue to challenge the

skills of those charged with using American power to protect

the nation. Effects-based operations are the key to bringing

that power to bear.

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ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. A Joint Operating Concept in development at U.S. Joint Forces

Command.

2. David A. Deptula, “Effects-Based Operations: Changes in the

Nature of War,” 2001, available from http://www.aef.org/pub/

psbook.pdf, Internet, accessed January 8, 2002.

3. U. S. Joint Forces Command, “A Concept Framework for

Effects-based Operations,” Draft White Paper, J9 Concepts

Department, Norfolk, VA, August 1, 2001, p. ii.

4. This assertion is based on views expressed by fellow Army War

College students. In addition, see Antulio J. Echevarria, Rapid Decisive

Operations: An Assumptions-based Critique, Carlisle Barracks, PA:

Strategic Studies Institute, 2001.

5. The concept of “Rapid Decisive Operations” is defined

as a joint operational concept for future operations. A

rapid decisive operation will integrate knowledge,

command and control, and effects-based operations to

achieve the desired political/military effect. In

preparing for and conducting a rapid decisive operation,

the military acts in concert with and leverages the other

instruments of national power to understand and

reduce the adversary’s critical capabilities and

coherence. The United States and its allies

asymmetrically assault the adversary from directions

and in dimensions against which he has no counter,

dictating the terms and tempo of the operation. The

adversary, suffering from the loss of coherence and

unable to achieve his objectives, chooses to cease actions

that are against US interests or has his capabilities

defeated.

See: U.S. Joint Forces Command, “A Concept for Rapid Decisive

Operations Coordinating Draft, version 2,” available from http://

www.saclant.nato.int/cde/Whitepapers/RDO.doc, Internet, accessed

October 14, 2001.

6. Echevarria, p. vi.

7. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret,

eds. and trans., Princeton NJ, 1976, p. 132.

8. Ibid., p. 141.

9. This definition is similar to Joint Forces Command’s, but

somewhat simpler. The use of “coerce” or “compel” is important. Many

see effects-based operations as a tool of coercion where the enemy is

161
persuaded to change his behavior while he still has the means to resist.

In other words, he loses the will to continue. Effects-based operations

are equally useful to compel. The enemy is compelled, when he has no

choice but to comply with demands, because he no longer has the

capability of resisting.

10. Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the

Unpredictability of War,” International Security, Vol. 17, Winter

1992/1993, p. 73.

11. Ibid., p. 66.

12. U. S. Joint Forces Command, “A Concept Framework for

Effects-based Operations,” p. 8.

13. Earl H Tilford Jr., “Operation Allied Force and the Role of Air

Power,” Parameters, Winter 1999-2000, p. 25.

14. John A. Tirpak, “Short’s View of the Air Campaign,” Air Force

Magazine Online, September 1999, available from http://

www.afa.org/magazine/watch/0999watch.html, Internet, accessed

February 13, 2002.

15. For a balanced analysis of why Milosevic surrendered when he

did, see Stephen T. Hosmer, The Conflict Over Kosovo. Why Milosevic

Decided to Settle when He Did, Santa Monica, CA, 2001; and Benjamin

S. Lambeth, NATO’S Air War For Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational

Assessment, Santa Monica, CA, 2001.

16. Information superiority is defined as the capability to collect,

process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while

exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same. It is a key

enabler to achieve full spectrum dominance. See Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020, Washington, DC, 2000, pp. 8-10.

17. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Planning

Joint Operations, Joint Publication 5.0, Washington, DC, 1995, p. x.

18. Clausewitz, pp. 119-120.

19. Barry D. Watts, Clausewitzian Friction and Future War,

Washington, DC, 1996, p. 123.

20. Ibid., p. 21.

21. Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy, The Logic of War and Peace, Cambridge, MA, 1987, pp. 4-5.

22. Watts, pp. 131-132.

162
23. There had been attacks on U.S. servicemen and their families,

and the United States had made a case in the media for Noriega’s

involvement in drug trafficking and other corruption.

24. Scott Sigmund Gartner, Strategic Assessment in War, New

Haven, CT, 1997, pp. 1-5.

25. Ibid., pp. 148-149.

26. For other considerations that impact on the ability to evaluate

effects, see U. S. Joint Forces Command, “A Concept Framework for

Effects-based Operations,” pp. 9-10.

27. Cascading effects result from the synergy generated from a

combination of effects smaller in scale. Cascading effects ripple through

the system usually from a higher to lower level of war. See U. S. Joint

Forces Command, “A Concept Framework for Effects-based

Operations,” p. 9.

28. This phenomenon is referred to as operating inside the enemy’s

Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) loop. See Grant T. Hammond, The

Mind of War, John Boyd and American Security, Washington, DC, 2001,

pp. 141-142.

29. Geoffrey Wawro, The Austro-Prussian War, Austria’s War with

Prussia and Italy in 1866, New York, 1996, pp. 36-37.

30. Ibid., p. 41.

31. Richard Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation, Cambridge, MA,

1977, pp. 80-146.

32. Arden Bucholz, Moltke and the German Wars, 1864-1871, New

York, 2001, pp. 104-105.

33. Wawro, p. 42.

34. Bucholz, p. 137.

35. Wawro, p. 276.

36. Smoke, p. 142.

37. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Press Conference, Arlington, VA:

Pentagon, November 15, 2001.

38. Eric Schmitt, “4 Commanders Say They Want Civilian Agents,”

New York Times, November 20, 2001, sec. A, p.1.

39. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review

Report, Washington, DC, 2001, pp. 34-35.

163
40. Jim Garamone, “Wolfowitz Shares Special Forces’ Afghanistan

Dispatches,” November 15, 2001; available from http:// www.

defenselink.mil/news/Nov2001/n11152001_200111155.html, Internet, accessed March 4, 2002.

41. The interagency element would not be effective without support

from the National Security Council. The National Security Council is

typically the focal point for coordinating government actions in the

event of a national security crisis. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff serves as a statutory advisor and the Vice-Chairman serves on the

Deputies Committee. In these capacities, they coordinate the efforts of

the warfighting commander with the rest of the interagency. Given the

Chairman and Vice-Chairman’s scope of responsibility however, it is

reasonable to assume they cannot always conduct the necessary

coordination for effects-based operations. The Defense Strategy, Force

Structure, and Planning Policy Coordination Committee should serve

as the link between the interagency element and the National Security

Council. A senior Department of Defense official chairs the committee

and answers to the Secretary of Defense. During day-to-day operations,

the interagency element would elevate issues requiring high-level

attention to the committee through the Joint Staff. During crises, the

Policy Coordinating Committee would support the interagency element

in theater. Because crisis management is not a normal role for the

committees, the regional commander’s Deputy Director for Plans and

Policy should augment the committee. His knowledge of the war plans

and familiarity with the region’s political issues would facilitate

coordination between the Policy Coordinating Committee and the

deployed interagency element. See George W. Bush, “National Security

Presidential Directive, Subject: Organization of the National Security

Council,” memorandum for the Vice President, et al, Washington, DC,

February 13, 2001.

42. U.S. Joint Forces Command, “A Concept Framework for

Effects-based Operations,” p. ii.

43. Williamson Murray, “Reflections on the Combined Bomber

Offensive,” Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, Vol. 51, 1992, p. 94.

44. Edward C. Mann III, Gary Endersby, and Thomas R. Searle,

“Dominant Effects: Effects Based Joint Operations,” Airpower Research

Institute Paper, Maxwell AFB, 2001, p. 2.

45. Joint Force Commanders will typically form Joint Targeting

and Coordination Boards to review target information, develop

targeting guidance and priorities, and prepare and refine joint target

lists. See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Doctrine for Joint Fire

Support,” Joint Publication 3-09, Washington, DC, 1998, p. I-4.

46. Concept for effects-based missions based on: Robert Schmidle,

“Dominant Maneuver Operational Concept,” briefing slides with

scripted commentary, Pentagon, Joint Staff J-8, 23 October 2001.

164
47. Timothy J. Sakulich, “Precision Engagement at the Strategic

Level of War: Guiding Promise or Wishful Thinking?” Maxwell AFB,

2001, p.14.

48. Phillip S. Meilinger, “Trenchard and ‘Morale Bombing’: The

Evolution of Royal Air Force Doctrine before World War II,” The Journal

of Military History, Vol. 60, April 1996 [database on-line]; available

from UMI ProQuest, Bell & Howell, accessed January 23, 2002.

49. Murray, “Reflections on the Combined Bomber Offensive,” p.

74.

50. Meilinger, “Trenchard and ‘Morale Bombing.’”

51. Murray, “Reflections on the Combined Bomber Offensive,” p.

81.

52. Ibid., p. 81.

53. Williamson Murray, “Strategic Bombing, The British,

American and German Experiences,” in Military Innovation in the

Interwar Period, Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, eds., New

York, 1996, p. 143.

54. Joint Publication 3.0, pp. III-10-11.

55. “The Army VISION: People, Readiness, and Transformation,”

available from http://www.army.mil/vision/default.htm, Internet,

accessed January 17, 2002.

56. “Global Vigilance, Reach & Power, America’s Air Force Vision

2020,” available from http://www.af.mil/vision, Internet, accessed on

March 9, 2002.

57. David A. Deptula, “Air Force Transformation, Past, Present

and Future,” available from http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.

mil/airchronicles/apj/apj01/fal01/phifal01.html, Internet, accessed

on January 17, 2002.

58. These assertions are based on statements by three Air Force

generals speaking in a nonattribution environment at the Army War

College.

59. Airpower is limited when certain target sets are excluded or the

attack intensity is limited by the number of platforms or ordnance made

available. Gradualism is pre-planned increases in intensity of air

attacks over time in response to enemy actions. The intensity may be in

the form of timing, i.e., more frequent attacks or in target types; for

example, moving from targets with little civilian impact to those with

more potential to produce collateral damage.

165
60. Hosmer, pp. 128-129.

61. Dr. Phillip Meilinger helped me think through the concept of

gradualism following a seminar he led on December 17, 2001, at the U.S.

Army War College as part of the Advanced Strategic Arts Program

curriculum.

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CHAPTER 6

RAPID DECISIVE OPERATIONS:

THE EMPEROR’S NEW CLOTHES

OF MODERN WARFARE

Lieutenant Colonel James L. Boling

What’s Past is Prologue.

At the dawn of the 21st century, the United States has

emerged as the only global superpower controlling what are

arguably the most powerful military forces in history. Yet

even as the United States occupies this pinnacle of power,

many speculate that a military preeminence based on

perfected industrial age warfare will have dubious value in

the new information age. Reacting to these and other

concerns, the U.S. military has embarked on an ambitious

attempt to prepare for an uncertain future by inculcating

and exploiting emerging technologies. This quest to

maintain its qualitative military edge has triggered a

comprehensive redesign of the joint force that will enhance,

evolve, and ultimately transform its warfighting capabilities.1

Fundamentally changing the military during peacetime

under conditions of reduced resources is not a new

experience for America’s military.2 When the Great War

ended in 1918, forward thinking military professionals

began to consider the likely shape of the next major war.

These officers had to envision and then vigorously promote

innovative warfighting concepts that relied on embryonic

technological capabilities to address speculative shortfalls

in military capability within the uncertain strategic context

of possible future warfare. Their pioneering efforts

167
overcame an entrenched conservatism and austere

resourcing to produce the vital operational pillars of mid20th century warfare—strategic bombardment, armored

warfare, carrier-borne naval aviation, submarine warfare,

close air support, radio and radar systems, and amphibious

warfare.

Each of these innovation success stories had a common

beginning as a warfighting concept that was a vision of the

future “. . . balanced and well connected to operational

realities”3 and alert to “[changes in]... national purposes

and the international security environment.”4 These initial

concepts were then passed through a rigorous gauntlet of

competing ideas under “. . . merciless institutional

scrutiny.”5 Accepting this interwar innovation methodology

as a touchstone for success, what is the assessment of

transformation’s operational concept?

This question is not simply an idle academic inquiry.

Rather, the fidelity and completeness of a nation’s vision of

future warfare is a matter of extraordinary importance. A

flawed conceptual foundation skews a nation’s military

strategy and creates second and third order effects on every

facet of force development, deployment, and employment

throughout the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of

war. The probable consequences of ill-disciplined

conceptual thinking are severe.6 At its worst, allowing a

contentious and ill-defined warfighting “concept” to

mushroom into doctrine without serious intellectual

challenge and reassessment is an error likely to prove

unrecoverable in crisis and fatal in war—as the French

learned so painfully in the opening campaign of World War I.

The lack of rigorous professional scrutiny of the

operational concept of the offensive induced the French

Army to develop “l’offense a l’outrance” (offense to the limit)

as its warfighting doctrine in 1914. This doctrine permeated

the entire officer corps and embedded its tenets in Plan

XVII, the only French war plan at the eve of World War I.

Plan XVII sought a swift strategic victory over Germany

168
through the psychological impact of a bold offensive stroke

culminating in decisive battle. Unfortunately for the

French, Plan XVII’s operational concentration for an

offensive into Alsace-Lorraine inadvertently enhanced the

success of the German Schlieffen Plan’s deep right wheel

through Belgium. The result was a French military disaster

in the opening battles of August 1914 that nearly forfeited

Paris and lost the war.7 The operational concepts that drive

doctrine matter; and it matters where they come from.

This chapter aims to provide a fresh look at Rapid

Decisive Operations (RDO) by examining it from theoretical

and the strategic perspectives. A comprehensive treatment

of this admittedly broad area would quickly exceed the

scope of a paper of this length. Therefore, this study

concentrates on selected aspects of RDO within the context

of conventional, state-to-state warfare.8 Section One

investigates the feasibility of RDO from a theoretical

viewpoint, using the RDO Whitepaper’s baseline

description. This is followed by Section Two which examines

the strategic context of the execution of counter factually

ideal RDO. Section Three concludes by providing an

assessment and recommendation for RDO.

Theoretical Aspects of RDO.

U.S. Joint Forces Command was established in October

1999 to centralize development and experimentation of

joint-force operational concepts and to explore the most

critical warfighting challenges at the operational level of

war.9 As a starting point, the command distilled and

grouped selected operational concepts culled from Joint

Vision 2010, Concept for Future Joint Operations, Joint

Vision 2020,10 and the April 2000 Defense Planning

Guidance,11 and coined the term “Rapid Decisive

Operations,” for these collected and fused concepts. In

August 2001, the Joint Forces Command published a

66-page RDO Whitepaper Version 2.0 to define and explain

the RDO concept.

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Defining and Describing the Concept.

Dale Carnegie once said, “If you can’t write your idea on

the back of my business card, you don’t have a clear idea.”

Using this standard, the RDO concept has an identity crisis.

The RDO Whitepaper presents a 117-word paragraph as its

“definition” of RDO.12 This is a superfluous five-fold

expansion of the Concept for Future Operations definition of

decisive operations: “Application of an overwhelming joint

capability, by the proper balance of the four new operational

concepts in any specific operation.”13 These 20 words just

might fit on Carnegie’s business card.

The Whitepaper’s lengthy definition is accompanied by a

sweeping catalog of ambiguous and conflicting statements

that attempt to explain just what exactly RDO are supposed

to accomplish. The authors see a place for RDO “across the

range of military operations,” in “striking terrorism directly

or to influence or coerce a regional power, or to defeat or

replace a regime.”14 However, except for perhaps the most

insignificant states, defeating and replacing regimes is

unlikely to be rapid and the forces designed and calibrated

to execute RDO would likely prove entirely inadequate for

the duration, magnitude, and character of tasks involved.

How does a lightweight strike-focused RDO force execute

“one massive counter-offensive to occupy an aggressor’s

capital and replace his regime” as envisioned by the

Secretary of Defense? 15 The Whitepaper goes on to assert

that RDO “creates the desired outcome itself or it

establishes the conditions to transition to [major regional

contingency] or security and stability operations.”16 But if it

fails to achieve the desired outcome itself, how can it still be

considered “decisive?” Later the document describes the

purpose of RDO as intended to “. . . contain, resolve, or

mitigate the consequences of a [high end SSC] conflict . . .”17

Again, if it’s only containing or mitigating, how is it

“decisive?” “If deterrence fails, RDO provide[s]...”18

indicates that RDO is not envisioned as a deterrent, yet it

claims to have utility across the spectrum of operations, of

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which flexible deterrent options are one. Moreover, if RDO

“. . . establishes the conditions to transition to [major

regional contingency] or security and stability operations”19

is this not essentially a flexible deterrent option? “Rapid

resolution is accomplished by intense unrelenting

operations or the threat thereof.”20 How exactly would one

“threaten” intense unrelenting operations? “Putting what

the adversary values most at risk of being threatened,

rendered unusable, or destroyed altogether”21 is an

acknowledged aim of RDO. However, endangering or

destroying these valued items is problematic when they are

not Centers of Gravity or have protections under the Law of

War. Additionally, how would one place intangible values,

such as “freedom” or “sovereignty” or “faith” at risk? “Also,

RDO can, if necessary, simultaneously defeat [adversary]

ability to conduct effective operations by destroying the

forces [or] the source of the adversary’s power.”22 It is

questionable whether forces organized, equipped, trained,

and deployed to optimize effects against “networks” and

“systems,” while minimizing their size and decrementing

their sustainment, are coincidentally capable of destroying

forces and centers of gravity.

Outright destruction may seem like a quaint obsolescent

idea in the information age, but the Whitepaper goes on to

say: “While achieving effects is our primary method of

influencing the enemy, in some cases the attrition of his

forces may in fact be a primary means of producing the

desired effect.”23 Said another way: if the preciselycalibrated, information-centric RDO fails to work, the force

can resort to the discredited legacy practice of wholesale

kinetic destruction, which, since it is admittedly attrition,

takes considerably longer, rendering RDO neither rapid nor

decisive.24 In the end, the RDO Whitepaper casts a wide but

poorly constructed net for RDO, presenting it as the fabled

milk-giving, egg-laying, wool-producing pig-able to do it all.

In execution, Joint Forces Command’s vision of RDO

calls for the military services, acting jointly, to execute

coordinated, distributed, multi-dimensional interagency

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(offensive) actions under conditions of America’s choosing

within the first hours of a crisis, focused against targets

designed to achieve specific effects against the enemy’s

“critical capabilities.”25

. . . RDO [RDO] provides the capability to rapidly and decisively

coerce, compel, or defeat an adversary in order to accomplish our

strategic objectives without a lengthy campaign or extensive

build-up of forces.26

[RDO] coerces . . . the adversary not to use military force by

disrupting the coherence of his efforts in such a way that he

becomes convinced that he cannot achieve his objectives and

that he will ultimately lose what he values most.27 The

adversary, suffering from the loss of coherence and unable to

achieve his objectives, chooses to cease actions that are against

US interests or has his capabilities defeated.28

[And in a disturbing echo of 1914] The rapid unfolding of

operations and the actual and perceived loss of coherent

capability will combine to break the will of the adversary.29

Theoretical Foundations of Force, Compellence,

and Victory.

Military doctrine is a cultural, historical, and

technological blend of theory, practicality, and reality. Any

rational military doctrine must be derived from and

thoroughly embrace military theory.30 Without a firm

theoretical and historical underpinning, doctrine becomes a

castle built on the sands of wistful speculation rather than

on the bedrock of exhaustive observation and rigorous

analysis. Even in the present era of revolutionary digital

high technology, it would be intellectually dishonest to

discount historical example as an essential ingredient in

theory. Colin Gray has noted: “. . . the relevance of historical

example does not decline arithmetically, geometrically, or

indeed at all, with time.”31 He believes that there is a

timelessness to war and victory; “. . . an essential unity to all

strategic experience in all periods of history because

nothing vital to the nature and function of war and strategy

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changes . . .”32 Yet sound military theory provides not so

much a retrospective “how to” formula, but a forward

thinking and intellectually reasoned examination of “how

war works.” “The chief utility of a general theory of war and

strategy lies in its ability not to point out lessons, but to

isolate things that need thinking about. Theory provides

insights and questions, not answers.”33 This suggests that if

RDO is to properly perform its role in experimentation or

aspire to candidacy for promotion to doctrinal status, then it

too must demonstrate a sound theoretical base firmly

grounded in history.

RDO—Coercion or Compellence?

Despite innumerable critics pronouncing its demise, On

War remains the acknowledged theoretical and doctrinal

foundation of every modern army. Advances in technology

may have eclipsed some portions of On War, but its

fundamental conclusions about the nature and conduct of

war at the national level are eternal. On War provides a

concept for the application of force that supports arguments

in favor of RDO.

The fundamental purpose of any national military

organization is to achieve the state’s political objectives

through the use or threat of armed force. More often than

not, international politics is about seeking revisions in the

domestic or international behavior of other states. There

are two fundamental methods to achieve political objectives

through military force—compellence and coercion.

A state’s overall capacity to wage war is the product of a

dynamic interaction between its means and its will.34

Compellence occurs when a state annihilates its adversary’s

means to resist and can impose its will entirely through the

application of force without the consent or acquiescence of

the vanquished. Victories of compelling annihilation are

spectacular and decisive, but difficult to achieve and

historically rare. Achieving quick decisive victory has more

often turned out to be a serendipitous fluke, rather than the

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result of artful deliberate planning for such an outcome.

Napoleon’s crushing defeat of the Prussians at JenaAuerstadt in 1806, the French humiliation in June 1940,

and Scipio Africanus’ obliteration of the Carthaginian

threat at the Battle of Zama in 202 BC are examples of such

victories.

On the other hand, coercion is the modern plan and

method of choice. Coercive strategies achieve victory when,

although a state retains the means to fight, it lacks the will

to continue its resistance and so accepts its adversary’s

objectives either in tacit agreement or through a formally

negotiated settlement. Coercion is not about the defeat of

military forces, but about the defeat of the enemy’s will.

Virtually every armed conflict since World War II has ended

in this manner, including everything in scale and intensity

from the Korean War to NATO operations in Kosovo.

Decisions for War and Peace—Clausewitz’s

Rational Calculus.

State warfare represents the tangible expression of the

choice by national leaders to initiate or continue combat in

pursuit of political objectives. Their choice is the end result

of deliberate, but complex, collective mental processes that

weigh the cost of victory against the value of the political

objective sought.35 Modern commentators, especially in the

discipline of political science, often refer to this evaluation

and decision as the “rational calculus.”

On War offers two possible conclusions from the rational

calculus that could precipitate an enemy decision not to

fight. First, national leaders may conclude that the

probability of victory is so low that the human and materiel

cost of fighting is not worth the likely end result.

Alternatively, the state’s leaders may determine that,

although achievable, the cost of victory is greater than the

value of the political objective. Therefore, the proper intent

of coercion is to so strongly influence the enemy’s

perceptions of cost and likelihood of victory that his rational

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calculus drives him to abandon his will to fight. RDO attain

coercive victory over an adversary when “. . . he becomes

convinced that he cannot achieve his objectives and that he

will ultimately lose what he values most36 [and through

rational calculus he] . . . chooses to cease actions that are

against U.S. interests . . .”37

Unfortunately, getting the enemy to do your will clearly

requires at least the grudging acceptance of the enemy’s

national leadership. Babe Ruth once commented, “It’s hard

to beat a man who won’t quit.” If a nation at war refuses to

accept the changes in its affairs desired by its adversary, the

war cannot truly end and the adversary’s will is thwarted.

Many of America’s recent adversaries have demonstrated a

strategic vision that equates victory with extending the

duration of conflict by simply avoiding or refusing to

acknowledge defeat.38 However, when faced with either the

improbability or unacceptable cost of victory an adversary

state should choose peace.39

The Will of the Enemy—The Irrational Calculus.

The key word in this discussion is “should,” because in

practice even when an adversary strategic reassessment

points to peace as the rational course of action, states do not

always choose it. The improbable Finnish decision to resist

“overwhelming” Soviet aggression in 1939 and the Melian’s

mulish insistence on defense against Athens in 416 BC are

classic cases of an “irrational calculus.”40 History indicates

that the international environment and the internal

workings of foreign governments are unpredictable, largely

because the rational calculus is never a purely scientific and

dispassionate “equation.” Not only are such calculations

largely guesswork on the adversary’s part, but they are

influenced internally by the psychological profile and

ideology of the national leadership and externally by real or

perceived actions, intentions, and capabilities of other

states, especially the enemy.

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Clausewitz believed that the actions of chance, friction,

human nature, passion, uncertainty, and politics skewed

rational decision and, especially when combined with the

inherently interactive nature of warfare, made any conflict

unpredictable.41 Modern technology has not diluted the

strength of Clausewitz’s argument. Writing for the National

Defense University in 1996, Barry D. Watts concluded that

no technology could ever succeed in eliminating friction in

war, and that this friction was the foundation of war’s

persistent unpredictability.42 This is affirmed in U.S. Air

Force Lieutenant General Jay W. Kelly’s summary

assessment of the air operations against Bosnia in 1995.

For all the capabilities of modern information technology, the

scale, pace, human factors [of] leadership, culture, and

conceptualization, and other non-technical elements of

[Operation] Deliberate Force ensured that Clausewitz’s trilogy

of fog, friction, and chance remained important in its ultimate

outcome.43

Chaos and Clausewitz.

General systems theory and chaos theory, from which

the transformation catch phrases “system-of-systems” and

“complex adaptive system” are derived, support

Clausewitz’s view of the unpredictability of war. Although

RDO advocates enthusiastically endorse these modern

systems concepts, this is a self-contradictory position since

general systems and chaos theories state emphatically that

the predictability within such systems is impossible. 44

Accepting systems theory requires abandoning linearity

and its neatly ordered predictability. One cannot have it

both ways. Commenting on Clausewitz and nonlinear

theory, Alan Beyerchern observed:

In a profoundly unconfused way [Clausewitz] understands that

seeking exact analytical solutions does not fit the nonlinear

reality of the problems posed by war, and hence that our ability

to predict the course of any outcome of any given conflict is

severely limited.45

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But is it? RDO advocates might assert that the power of

knowledge that is broadly and speedily disseminated and

then acted on by self-synchronizing autonomous military

units can tame war’s chaos and unpredictability by

eliminating, or anticipating and averting, its friction and

chance.46 The term “knowledge” rather than its

sub-component “information” is important. Information is

factual data, or at least it is what is accepted as factual.

Knowledge is the enlightened understanding that comes

with an individual’s correct contextual association of

information with objective reality.47 How does information

become knowledge in support of RDO? Enter the

Operational Net Assessment, upon which RDO’s seductive

promise of rapid decisive victory rests.

The Operational Net Assessment—The Labor of

Sisyphus.48

The planning and execution of RDO require detailed

knowledge of the multidisciplinary cause and effect

linkages that describe the causal relationships that

ultimately join attaining military objectives to the

psychological effects their accomplishment has on an

opposing nation’s leadership. For RDO, such knowledge is

resident in the Operational Net Assessment.

The [Operational Net Assessment] is a critical enabler for

achieving [RDO]. It is a process that uses a coherent

knowledge base to link national objectives and power to apply

integrated diplomatic, information, military, and economic

options that influence [an] adversary’s perceptions,

decisionmaking, and elements of national will . . . It produces

an operational support tool that provides the [Joint Force

Commander] visibility of effects-to-task linkages based on a

system-of-systems analysis of a potential adversary’s political,

military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information

elements of national power. . . . Analysis includes key links and

nodes within systems and proposes methods that will

influence, neutralize, or destroy them to achieve a desired

effect. The [Operational Net Assessment] is prepared

pre-crisis and is continually updated during crisis response.49

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Other than occasional ill-fated heroes of ancient Greek

tragedies, omniscience is rarely a trait attributed to

mortals. Yet, the Whitepaper’s discussion of the Operational

Net Assessment suggests that future United States

planners and decisionmakers will know even more about

the enemy than he knows about himself. Confidence in the

Operational Net Assessment is predicated on a

fundamental faith in the ability to see with absolute clarity

what the enemy thinks, how he thinks, why he thinks that

way, and the criteria, timing, and intent of the future

decisions he will make. Embedded in this is the

foreknowledge that identifies with precision which of the

endless series of branches of the action-reactioncounteraction cycle will precipitate an adversary’s decision

to abandon his desires and accept the political will of the

United States.50

Strategic Intelligence and the Science of Guessing

Wrong.

The past is littered with examples of nations that failed

miserably in their efforts to understand and predict the

actions and intentions of their enemies despite their best

efforts to do just that. The Germans failed to predict the

allied invasion of Normandy in 1944 and for some time

afterward persisted in their belief that the “actual” invasion

would occur at the Pas de Calais. Stalin refused to

acknowledge the indicators of the impending German

invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. The Egyptian assault

across the Suez and the Syrian attack into the Golan

Heights in 1973 surprised the Israelis, just as the Japanese

carrier strike at Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the North

Vietnamese Tet Offensive in 1968 surprised the Americans.

And the list goes on. While the preceding examples are from

nations already at war or anticipating warfare, true “bolts

from the blue” are found in the cases of the Argentinean

attack of the Falklands in 1982, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait

in 1990, and the series of terrorist attacks against the

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United States from Beirut in 1983, through to the World

Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001.

These strategic surprises demonstrate a pattern of

failure that is the result of parochial bureaucratic

influences within competitive parallel intelligence

communities and the personal agendas and idiosyncrasies

of senior intelligence officers and decisionmakers.51 These

chronic problems are generally immune from

techo-informational solutions and argue against the

drafting of a document with the attributes of an Operational

Net Assessment. In fact, the growth in data collection

enabled by the information age has exacerbated these

problems by creating its own kind of “needle in the

haystack” dilemma of trying to find the important among

the dross.52 “The blend of inefficiency, internal feuding and

underestimation of potential adversaries produces a

consistent result . . . the big intelligence organizations can

always be relied on for one thing—to get it wrong.”53 “Does

the information revolution really change anything in

intelligence at the top? The answer is still probably not.”54

Another intelligence issue that undermines Operational

Net Assessment is the fundamental inability of anyone to

really know in the requisite detail any other nation, leader,

or people. This is especially true for states whose benign

aspect, lack of international power, or distance from

American strategic interests have traditionally relegated

them to military and academic obscurity. Operational Net

Assessments developed from a narrow range of inputs, some

perhaps tainted by parochial interests and agendas, may

frustrate the intent to be “prepared pre-crisis”55 and

“continually updated during crisis response”56 by limiting

the depth or skewing the analysis of nonquantifiable social,

cultural, and political aspects of an adversary. In his

comprehensive analysis of great power national intelligence

estimates before the two world wars, Earnest R. May

concludes “. . . attempts by one government to see things

from the standpoint of another government were invariably

failures.”57 Williamson Murray and Allan Millett observed

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in their work on net assessments, “If it is difficult to

calculate one’s own strength, then how much more difficult

it is to calculate the strengths of others whose culture,

language, and nationality are so different?”58

The Systems View of the Operational Net

Assessment.

The Operational Net Assessment’s contribution to RDO

is entirely dependent on a systemic view of the adversary

that it claims it can capture in its most minute and

continuously updated detail.59 However, there is absolutely

no indication that this is an achievable goal; particularly

since the tenets of general system theory invalidate the

Operational Net Assessment’s promise of absolute

predictability. Yet even if a belligerent could achieve 100

percent accuracy in his pre-conflict estimates, simply taking

action against the enemy would invalidate these predictions

through the workings of the complex adaptive system of

systems which describes the aggressor, the defending

enemy, and the international environment in which each

exists. Under the stress of armed conflict the adversary may

adopt forms of decisionmaking and behavior unanticipated

under pre-crisis conditions because outside pressure or

intervention in complex political-military situations alters

both the situation and its dynamics.60

Operational Net Assessment advocates might argue

that, although it may fall short of its desired predictive

power, the Operational Net Assessment may still have

significant utility. A truncated Operational Net Assessment

might provide a sufficiently accurate view of the adversary’s

system of systems to enable identification of key nodes and

critical vulnerabilities, whose degradation would yield

disproportionate systemic or psychological results.

However, experience indicates that modern national

systems are too diverse, complex, and adaptive to yield to

analytic assessment regardless of how persistent,

well-resourced, or dedicated the analysis.

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World War II’s strategic bombing concepts evolved from

their crude World War I outlines into more solidified

doctrinal precepts in the 1920s and 1930s. In a train of

thought familiar today, a 1926 text at the U.S. Air Service

Field Officer’s School observed that industries consisted of a

“complex system of interlocking factories” and that “ . . . it is

necessary to destroy certain elements of the industry only,

in order to cripple the whole.”61 Although systemic bombing

for industrial incapacitation possessed an undeniable

simplicity and elegance, the “industrial bottleneck” turned

out to be an elusive target for the allies in World War II.

Together the British and Americans dropped hundreds

of thousands of tons of bombs on Germany and struck every

important target within the German society and economy

that a formidable and dedicated intelligence apparatus

could identify. Oil, steel, cities, aircraft production,

shipyards, industrial centers, ball bearings, and

transportation all received the attention of Britain’s

Bomber Command and the U.S. Eighth and Fifteenth Air

Forces. Although significantly hindered by Allied bombing,

German war production actually peaked at the height of the

bomber offensive in 1944, and the German Army continued

to resist house-by-house amid the ashes of Berlin. “By

February 1945, the Americans targeted just about

everything they could think of, hoping to hit upon some

means of affecting enemy behavior, either directly or

indirectly.”62 Despite the tremendous pressure from 3 years

of virtually unrestricted aerial bombardment the German

society, military forces, government, and economy proved to

be a frustratingly adaptive, durable, and enigmatic system

of systems.

During the Kosovo air operation in 1999, NATO

planners searched in vain for the key pressure point for

limited strikes with low collateral damage that would coerce

Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic into abiding by his

previous commitments to curb ethnic cleansing in Serbia

and resume negotiations.63 Many were hopeful of a quick

3-day operation that would demonstrate allied resolve and

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capability while threatening the Milosevic regime through

key target destruction. Yet with every modern intelligence

and operational capability available, it still took a

surprising 10 weeks of ever intensifying bombing, including

wide scale attacks in Belgrade itself, before NATO reached

its objectives.

Strategic Context of RDO.

The description and explanation of RDO presented by

the RDO Whitepaper do not establish a strategic context for

the execution of RDO. A comprehensive assessment of the

suitability of RDO as an operational concept requires the

consideration of the circumstances and environment that

influence the conduct of such operations.

Domestic Political Context.

The trend in U.S. foreign policy is a search for consensus

followed by incrementalism and the employment of every

other mean of persuasion short of armed conflict.64

Politicians, by virtue of their craft, perceive or fear wide

ramifications of action, prefer to fudge rather than focus, and

like to keep their options open as long as possible by making the

least decision as late as feasible.65

This assessment is echoed by the Rand Corporation’s

Report on the Army Transformation Wargame 2000, which

decried the wargame’s portrayal of proactive and timely

Presidential decisions as “. . . unlikely . . . in advance of

hostilities, even in the face of unambiguous warning.”66 This

indicates that although a rapid operational capability may

exist, delays in executive decisionmaking may forfeit the

optimum window of opportunity for its employment.

Conversely, if the ultimate promise of RDO is realized, the

low operational risk involved in its execution may prompt

hasty military action in dubious enterprises similar to the

Clinton administration’s conduct of missile-only strikes in

Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998.67

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Additionally, the overarching need to gain and maintain

domestic support may dictate compromises on military

action that influence timing, the nature and size of forces

employed, and specific operational matters such as

targeting and rules of engagement. Presidential approval of

individual targeting recommendations remains a feature of

American armed intervention as seen in Operations

DESERT STORM in 1991, DESERT FOX in 1998, and

Kosovo in 1999.68

Although a slow pace in decisionmaking enables the

open policy debate common to democratic policymaking, it

may inadvertently dilute the credibility of political

warnings and military deterrent efforts. In the ramp up to

operations in Kosovo, Milosevic misinterpreted the delay

required to gain support for intervention as timidity and

lack of resolution that hardened his policy position and

increased the pace and aggressiveness of his actions.69

The United States has not fought a well-led, evenly

matched conventional military opponent in over 50 years.

In the future, America may not have the gratuitous

advantage of fighting ill-equipped nations that are

“leadership impaired.”70 Efforts to build political consensus

for military operations may provide more competent future

adversaries time to begin aggressive information

operations, gain extra-national support, muddy the

regional political waters, and take action to reduce their

vulnerabilities and prepare for combat. Combined, these

actions would likely increase operational risk, lessen the

psychological impact of RDO, and increase the duration of

operations by requiring additional time to achieve similar

effects against a now alerted and prepared adversary.71

International Political Context.

The RDO Whitepaper correctly observes that

“Multinational operations . . . will be a key strategic feature

of future operations.”72 Coalitions are a political and

military necessity for the international legitimacy, regional

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access, and host nation support they bring. Unfortunately,

building a coalition within the complex and dynamically

interactive international system is typically a difficult and

time-consuming process. Regional states have different

perceptions of threats, different national objectives,

different visions of the endstate, different motives, and a

broad spectrum of conditionally based contributions to

provide or withhold. Simply obtaining agreement that

“something must be done” is often a significant diplomatic

accomplishment.

Just as the time required to build domestic consensus

plays into the hands of the adversary, so, too, does the time

required to develop a regional coalition. Building a coalition

quickly enough to support RDO may require concessions

and compromises that would degrade operational

effectiveness, extend the duration of operations, and

increase operational risk. Even after its formation, the

inherent friction of coalition operations may alter desired

operational practices through concerns over image,

interoperability, and rules of engagement. The cumulative

effect of these constraints and restraints may decrement the

speed or decisiveness of operations.

From a regional perspective, there is such a thing as “too

fast.” America could execute RDO unilaterally to avoid the

delays associated with building a robust coalition. However,

this would deny international legitimacy for U.S. actions,

encourage adverse international reaction to “irresponsible,

provocative, and destabilizing” American intervention,

seriously degrade U.S.-regional relationships, and severely

complicate post-hostility operations. Regional states

contemplating active support of American RDO may not

have adequate time in which to mobilize and deploy their

own forces to defend against potential adversary

conventional, missile, or asymmetric counterstrikes. In this

case, the “price of admission” to these states for basing or

even overflight may be the deployment of U.S. forces or

defensive weapons systems. Such deployments would

extend operational timelines, place additional stress on

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American strategic lift, and likely divulge friendly intent

thereby increasing operational risk. Unlike conventional

operations, RDO leaves no luxury of time between initiation

of decisive operations and the need for post-hostility

consensus. The likelihood of the regional spillover effect of

unintended consequences that may flow from RDO

complicates coalition building for post-hostility operations.

The Operational Net Assessment’s focus on adversary

states may degrade its understanding of regional dynamics,

nonstate actors, and transnational issues. Refugees,

ethno-religious autonomy, economic disruption,

consequence management, and balance of power are

regional concerns that endure beyond the execution of RDO

and whose lasting effects may resonate in U.S.-regional

political relationships for decades, including denial of

future access to U.S. forces.

Regional access is absolutely critical to RDO.73 RDO

must originate from somewhere. Unless this “somewhere” is

U.S. territory or a naval vessel in international waters, the

forces involved must obtain overflight rights for deployment

and also permission to occupy and use a regional basing

location that provides sufficient operational reach to attack

adversary targets. The Whitepaper downplays regional

basing needs and coalition support by assuming short

duration operations with extremely small supply

requirements, and then couching its presentation of

deployment and logistics concepts in language that implies

forced entry forces and their sustainment flow directly to an

area of operations in the adversary’s territory.74 Yet it

simultaneously highlights the advantages of intermediate

staging bases,75 forward presence, intra-theater lift, the

build-up of forces and sustainment, and prepositioned

equipment and supplies76—all of which require regional

overflight and basing.

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The Anti-Access Threat—Capability and

Countermeasure.

The Whitepaper’s description of deployment and

sustainment offers a blurred and contradictory vision of an

adversary who is:

. . . expected to employ anti-access or area denial capabilities

such as long-range [surface to] surface missiles, undersea

minefields and salvoes [sic] of anti-ship missiles; robust, widely

distributed surveillance and targeting against air and sea

forces; unconventional forces; integrated air defense systems;

long-range strike aircraft; and [Weapons of Mass Effects].77

Perhaps too conveniently, a home station-to-combat

deployment “. . . landing fully combat-ready . . .”78 negates

adversary anti-access capabilities that, if allowed to

interfere with operations, would require too much time to

defeat. Conversely, the Whitepaper states “Increased

anti-access threat . . . may preclude rapid direct insertion of

forces into the objective area . . .”79 and “Dimensional

superiority . . . localized in time and space . . . is a necessary

condition for maintaining friendly access.”80 What exactly is

the concept—direct deployment, indirect deployment, or

transient dimensional superiority? Moreover, what

adversary who possesses these formidable anti-access

capabilities is still a suitable target for RDO to accomplish

effects-based strategic tasks in “high-end SSCs” from

simple strike operations through regime change?

Conclusions.

This chapter began by presenting the historically

successful interwar innovation experience as a touchstone

to assess RDO as an operational concept. This same brief

historical example provided the evaluation criteria of

balance, connection to operational realities, sensitivity to

changes in national purposes and the international security

environment, and submission to merciless institutional

scrutiny. Measured against these criteria, the only

186
reasonable conclusion is that RDO is a fundamentally

flawed operational concept.

The RDO Whitepaper’s description of RDO is

unbalanced. It is a one-sided narcissistic “glossy sales

brochure” of the concept’s hoped for capabilities, permeated

with deterministic absolutism and over-simplified mirror

imaging. Its hollow theoretical foundation avoids historical

precedent, and treats On War and systems theory as a

buffet line of ideas, selecting and incorporating only those

that support its arguments. The Whitepaper’s unsupported

characterization of RDO as an appropriate operational

method across the spectrum of operations, from deterrence

through counterterrorism to regime change, is ludicrous.

The document’s dogmatic tone and disingenuous

explanatory method fail to present a balanced,

intellectually honest, critical assessment of RDO and

thereby call the entire concept into question.

RDO does not appear to be adequately grounded in

operational realities; rather, it appears to be a “faith-based”

concept. The Operational Net Assessment is the critical

enabler of RDO. However, its self-contradictory position

regarding systems theory versus predictability invalidates

its specious promise to provide the omniscience and

predictive foreknowledge of adversary decisionmaking and

societal adaptation necessary to support RDO. The gulf of

the unknown that exists between knowing a lot and

knowing everything is vast. Without the predictive power of

the Operational Net Assessment, RDO cannot perform as

described.

Above all, the RDO Whitepaper appears insensitive to

the international security environment. It presents RDO as

a unilateral capability, whose execution is divorced from

strategic context. This technique gilds the concept with an

unwarranted patina of feasibility by ignoring the potential

imposition of delays and operational restrictions, whose

cumulative effect would reduce whatever inherent

advantage rapidity may impart and attenuate the

187
operation’s desired decisiveness. RDO executed without

regard for specific regional factors and concerns may

preclude effective coalition development, deny key regional

support to operations, and seriously damage future

American international influence and prestige.

Although the RDO concept is being tested by Joint

Forces Command, this falls short of the criteria’s

comprehensive, repetitive, rigorous, and independent

“institutional scrutiny.” The Whitepaper’s consistent

deprecation of “legacy” planning and operational methods

and of kinetic annihilation-focused conventional combat

automatically excludes the concept’s greatest potential

challenger from consideration. No intellectual examination

of alternative concepts is possible without a sound

contending idea, which the RDO Whitepaper does not

provide.

Despite these serious flaws, RDO is still a worthy

candidate operational concept. But to continue to vie

successfully for consideration as a warfighting paradigm it

must be redesigned to reconcile its internal contradictions

and establish solid theoretical underpinnings. It must

realistically reappraise its aspirations to sweeping

capabilities and refine and align its characterization of

supporting deployment and sustainment concepts. Lastly,

it must embrace the strategic context of its execution and

honestly reevaluate the capabilities and criticality of the

Operational Net Assessment. In the aftermath of such a

rigorous reexamination unresolved issues may severely

truncate the concept, revealing it as a marginal

improvement over existing capabilities suitable only

against weak and fragile threats for which the opportunity

costs required to develop RDO can not be justified.

Alternatively, if this reassessment and redesign is not

conducted and the concept is allowed to mutate unchanged

into doctrine, then the fate of the Republic and the lives of its

servants are in jeopardy.

188
Perhaps one might excuse loose definitions, broad

assertions of capabilities, and a degree of incoherence in a

document that is intended as an exploratory effort rather

than doctrine. However, the Whitepaper claims to provide

commanders with “a way to... determine and employ the

right force in a focused, nonlinear campaign to achieve

desired political/military outcomes.81 This doctrinal

resemblance is more striking when the Whitepaper stands

as the only documentation of “. . . an evolving concept for

conducting ...missions,”82 and a “. . . concept for future joint

operations.”83

If the United States is going to retain its military

dominance into the 21st century, then developing

well-reasoned, theoretically sound, and realistic

warfighting concepts and doctrine is of the utmost

importance. Colonel David Fastabend, co-author of the 1997

edition of Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, has

excoriated the lack of mental rigor in current warfighting

concepts and sounds a clear warning of the grim

consequences of ill-disciplined near-doctrinal thinking.

The term operational concept has been hijacked and

colloquialized. At the joint level, pseudo-concepts occupy the

place of something far more important—a real visualization of

the future of joint combat. . . . If we do not offer a simple, clear

picture of how we will fight, our concept will be supplanted by

simpler, narrower images that are easy to sell but impossible

to execute.84

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6

1. David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and Frederick P. Stein,

Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information

Superiority, Washington, DC, 1999, Chpt 4. The authors provide an

outstanding summary of the military and commercial implications of

the Information Age, although focused on C4ISR issues. See also Sam J.

Tangredi, “The Future Security Environment, 2001-2025: Toward a

Consensus View,” and Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Modernizing and

Transforming U.S. Forces: Alternative Paths to the Force of Tomorrow.”

in QDR 2001: Strategy-Driven Choices for America’s Security, Michele

A, Flournoy, ed., Washington, DC, 2001, for excellent insights, albeit

pre-September 11, 2001, into 21st century security challenges and

transformation.

189
2. This brief synopsis of interwar innovation is drawn from Barry

Watts and Williamson Murray, “Military Innovation in Peacetime,” in

Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, Williamson Murray and

Allan R. Millett, eds., New York, NY, 1996, especially pp. 406-415.

3. Ibid., p. 407. See also James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg:

Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform, Lawrence, KS, 1992; and

Robert M. Citino, The Evolution of Blitzkrieg Tactics, New York, NY,

1987.

4. Watts and Murray, p. 406.

5. Ibid., p. 411. See also Maj Bruce H. McClintock, “Transformation

Trinity: Vision, Culture, Assessment,” Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn

2000, Washington, DC, 2000. The author provides a supporting

commentary on the elements of successful innovation and highlights the

requirement for “. . . military culture [that] allows advocates of the

vision to develop competing theories that are openly assessed,” p. 31.

See also Mark A. Johnstone, Stephen A. Ferrando, and Robert W.

Critchlow, “Joint Experimentation: A Necessity for Future War,” Joint

Force Quarterly, Autumn/Winter 1998-99, Washington, DC, 2001, pp.

15-24, for observations on historically successful innovation and options

for future U.S. joint experimentation.

6. Williamson Murray, ed., Army Transformation: A View from the

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2001, p. 18.

7. Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain

and Germany Between the World Wars, Ithaca, NY, 1984, pp. 14-15. See

also Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision

Making and the Disasters of 1914, Ithaca, NY, 1984, especially chapters

1 through 3.

8. United States Joint Forces Command, A Concept for RDO: RDO

Whitepaper Version 2.0, U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2001. Although

the “Whitepaper” claims that RDO are effective across the spectrum of

operations including counterterrorism and regime replacement, the

document is clearly focused on conventional state-to-state warfare. This

chapter retains the same orientation.

9. Thomas M. Cooke, “Reassessing Joint Experimentation,” Joint

Force Quarterly, Spring/Summer 2001, Washington, DC, 2001, p. 103.

10. Ibid. A quick synopsis of JV 2010’s joint operational concepts in

execution, as well as the putative intellectual beginning of RDO can be

found in David B. Haight, “Operation JUST CAUSE: Foreshadowing

Example of Joint Vision 2010 Concepts in Practice,” Research Paper,

U.S. Naval War College, February 13, 1998. Transition from JV 2010 to

JV 2020 is also addressed by Major General Pete Osman, “JV 2020,”

briefing; available from dtic,mil/jv2020.

190
11. U.S. Joint Forces Command, Whitepaper, p. i. See also Major

General Tim Peppe, “Joint Experimentation Program,” briefing slides,

April 25, 2000; available from http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/dgsp/

dda/presentation/07-Peppe-1_e.ppt.; Internet; accessed January 14,

2002.

12. Ibid., p. 11.

13. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Concept for Future Joint Operations:

Expanding Joint Vision 2010, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 83.

14. Ibid., p. iii.

15. Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, text of speech to

students of U.S. National Defense University, February 2002; available

from http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/

s20020131-secdef2.html; Internet; accessed February 10, 2002.

16. U.S. Joint Forces Command Whitepaper, p. v.

17. Ibid., p. 1.

18. Ibid., p. 11.

19. Ibid., p. v.

20. Ibid., p. 12.

21. Ibid., p. 35.

22. Ibid., p. 12.

23. Ibid.

24. Lieutenant Colonel Steven J. Eden, “Three Cheers for Attrition

Warfare,” ARMOR, March-April 2002, pp. 29-31. Eden provides an

exceptionally insightful commentary on the modern merits of “old style”

kinetic warfare. See also Richard Hart Sinnreich, “The Limits of

Lightness,” Washington Post, September 26, 2000, p. 27. See also

“Intervening in Short-Warning Conflicts,” Rand Research Brief;

Available from http://www.rand.org/publications/RB/ RB7110/;

Internet; Accessed January 14, 2002. This Rand product states, “In

many plausible military interventions along the ill-defined spectrum of

small-scale to large-scale conflicts, long-range precision fire alone would

not be sufficient, and the JTFs would need ground-maneuver forces . . .”

25. U.S. Joint Forces Command Whitepaper, p. 16. These

sentiments are ably addressed from an Air Force perspective in David A.

Ochmanek, et al., To Find and Not to Yield: How Advances in

Information and Firepower can Transform Theater Warfare, Santa

Monica, CA, 1998.

191
26. U.S. Joint Forces Command Whitepaper, p. v.

27. Ibid., p. 12.

28. Ibid., p. 11.

29. Ibid., p. 16.

30. Dr. James J. Schneider, “How War Works: The Origins, Nature,

and Purposes of Military Theory,” School of Advanced Military Studies

Course One Syllabus AY 96-97, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1996, p. 10. This

paper was written in June 1995 and later included in the U.S. Army

Command and General Staff College AY 96-97 syllabus.

31. Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy, New York, 1999, p. 15.

32. Ibid., p. 1. Gray’s observations on the eternal nature of war are

also reflected in George and Meredith Friedman, The Future of War:

Power, Technology and American World Dominance in the Twenty-First

Century, New York, 1998, p. xi.

33. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret,

eds. and trans., Princeton, NJ, 1976, p. 141.

34. Ibid., p. 92.

35. Ibid., p. 77.

36. U.S. Joint Forces Command Whitepaper, p. 12.

37. Ibid., p. 11.

38. Major General Robert H Scales, Jr., “Adaptive Enemies:

Achieving Victory by Avoiding Defeat,” Joint Force Quarterly,

Autumn/Winter 1999-2000, Washington, DC, 2000, p. 13.

39. Clausewitz, pp. 80-81.

40. Robert B. Strassler, ed., The Landmark Thucydides: A

Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War, New York, 1998, pp.

351-357.

41. Clausewitz, p. 139.

42. Barry D. Watts, “Clausewitzian Friction and Future War,”

McNair Papers #52, Washington, DC, 1996, p. 108.

43. Colonel Robert C. Owen, ed., Deliberate Force: A Case Study in

Effective Air Campaigning, Maxwell AFB, AL, 2000, p. xii.

192
44. Colonel Robert Schmidle, “Dominant Maneuver Operational

Concept,” briefing slides and commentary, Carlisle Barracks, PA,

October 23, 2001.

45. Alan Beyerchern, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the

Unpredictability of War,” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 3, 1992, p.

61. This notion of the nonlinear unpredictability of war is strongly

supported by Watt’s Clausewitzian Friction and Future War. Indeed,

Watt’s draws heavily from Beyerchern’s work. Watt’s Chapter 10 is

especially significant.

46. U.S. Joint Forces Command, Whitepaper, p. 35.

47. Ibid., p. 20.

48. Sisyphus is a character from Greek mythology; also found in

Albert Camus’ The Myth of Sisyphus. “The Gods had condemned

Sisyphus to ceaselessly rolling a rock to the top of the mountain, whence

the stone would fall back of its own weight. They had thought with some

reason that there is no more dreadful punishment than futile and

hopeless labor."

49. U.S. Joint Forces Command, Whitepaper, pp. 20-21.

50. Ibid. This is a synthesis of the characteristics attributed to

Operational Net Assessment.

51. Colonel John Hughes-Wilson, Military Intelligence Blunders,

New York, 1999, pp. 353-355. See also Williamson Murray and Allan R.

Millett, Calculations: Net Assessment and the Coming of World War II,

New York, 1992, p. 3.

52. Scales, p. 13.

53. Hughes-Wilson, p. 355.

54. Ibid., p. 358.

55. U.S. Joint Forces Command, Whitepaper, pp. 20-21.

56. Ibid.

57. Ernest R. May, ed., Knowing One’s Enemies: Intelligence

Assessments Before the Two World Wars, Princeton, NJ, 1984, p. 538.

58. Murray and Millett, Calculations: Net Assessment and the

Coming of World War II, p. 4. This notion of chronic inability to

understand other national leaders is echoed throughout Richard E.

Neustadt and Earnest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for

Decision Makers, New York, 1986.

193
59. U.S. Joint Forces Command, Whitepaper, p. 20.

60. General Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo,

and the Future of Conflict, New York, 2001, p. 167.

61. Dr. Tami Davis Biddle, “Spaatz, Harris, and Tedder,” Formal

Lecture, U.S. Army War College Military History Institute, January 16,

2002. Quotation is taken directly from lecture notes presented by Dr.

Biddle and used with permission.

62. Ibid. See also Tami Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air

Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas About Strategic

Bombing, 1914-1945, Princeton, NJ, 2002, pp. 253-254.

63. Clark, p. 423.

64. Ibid., pp. 419-420. Concerning Afghanistan, it can be argued

that, even as late as his address to a joint session of Congress in late

September 2001, President Bush provided an opportunity for Taliban

submission to the will of the United States that would have avoided war.

65. Colin S. Gray, “Why Strategy is Difficult,” Joint Force

Quarterly, Summer 1999, Washington, DC, 1999, p. 11.

66. Walter Perry, et al., A Report on the Army Transformation

Wargame 2000, Santa Monica, CA, 2001, p. 19.

67. General John A. Shaud, Retired, “From JUST CAUSE to

Kosovo and Beyond,” Air Force Association Symposium; Available from

http://www.afa.org/library/reports/ausa.html; Internet; accessed

January 14, 2002.

68. Clark, p. 178.

69. Ibid., p. 421.

70. Scales, pp. 12-14.

71. Clark, p. 178.

72. U.S. Joint Forces Command, Whitepaper, p. 34.

73. Ibid., p. 39.

74. Ibid., pp. 38-43.

75. Ibid., pp. 41, 42, 43.

76. Ibid., p. 42.

77. Ibid., p. 39.

194
78. Ibid., p. 42.

79. Ibid., p. 43.

80. Ibid., p. 39.

81. Ibid., Preface.

82. Ibid., p. iii.

83. Ibid., p. v.

84. Colonel David A. Fastabend, “That Elusive Operational

Concept,”, Unpublished Journal Article, June 2001, p. 8.

195
CHAPTER 7

OPERATION JUST CAUSE:

CONCEPTS FOR SHAPING FUTURE RAPID

DECISIVE OPERATIONS

Lieutenant Colonel James H. Embrey

So what in the nature of the world and warfare is so different?

The difference is that the world has shrunk in the satellite era

and war has become extremely lethal. We also are now a force

primarily based in the Continental United States. In the next

ten years, we will be asked to assemble and rapidly deploy to

distant target areas, fight decisively and precisely to achieve

the nation’s goals with a minimal loss of life, injury or damage.

We will be expected to conclude operations rapidly and to

redeploy to CONUS—all of these in the light of public

scrutiny.1

Shortly before his death, General Maxwell Thurman

penned the above quotation. To a considerable extent, his

view of the future reflects the way the United States wages

war at the beginning of the 21st century. Under emerging

concepts such as Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO),

American armed forces, in synchronization with other

elements of national power, will seek to dominate their

opponents rapidly and decisively. Through the precise

application of force, they will aim to achieve overwhelming

power against an enemy’s critical weaknesses or sources or

power, i.e., his “systems” in order to collapse his resistance

cataclysmically. If successful, “RDO” would terminate

conflict on favorable terms to the United States and its

allies, while limiting violence and minimizing

noncombatant casualties and collateral damage.2

197
RDO: Old Wine in New Bottles.

However, in no sense is this concept new. Commanders

and heads of state have always sought to achieve

overwhelming success with the least expense of time,

resources and power. No nation would willingly pursue

protracted, expensive conflict, when rapid, decisive, and

cost-effective methods are available. As Hans Delbruck

noted, of the two strategies of war, exhaustion and

annihilation, the latter is most usually the way stronger

powers seek a rapid conclusion to conflict. They do so not

only to overthrow the enemy by the most effective means,

but to conserve their power for future use while minimizing

the destruction, which might ultimately lead to future

conflict.3 Power is infinite when used for persuasion and

coercion, but finite and limited once committed to use. Thus,

the United States must make judicious use and conserve its

national resources in facing a diversity of complex,

ambiguous threats.

RDO are a method to this end. However, the concept is

over a decade old. Thurman, former Commander in Chief of

United States Southern Command, described the

challenges of future conflict in similar terms. In all, the

rapid, decisive, and simultaneous military operations

employed during Operation JUST CAUSE (the invasion of

Panama) provide salient lessons and challenges that are

relevant to the development of the current concept of RDO.

JUST CAUSE was a complex, joint operation that

yielded both rapid and decisive military results. In the wake

of failed diplomatic and economic pressure to remove the

corrupt Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega from power,

a joint force, over 20,000 strong, deployed from both the

United States and Panama. It struck 27 separate locations

simultaneously to overwhelm its adversary. In the process,

U.S. forces secured the Panama Canal unharmed, protected

30,000 U.S. nationals, and caused the total collapse of the

Panamanian Defense Forces. It thereby enabled the elected

government of President Guillermo Endara to assume

198
power and re-establish democracy in Panama. Such a rapid

and decisive defeat of Noriega’s Panamanian Defense Force

and paramilitary “Dignity Battalions” also limited civilian

casualties and the destruction of property. Even more

importantly, it prevented any prolonged resistance or

insurgency by the dictator’s “loyalists.” In all, within 30

hours the Panamanian Defense Forces had been eliminated

as a threat to U.S. forces; within 16 days as a threat to the

civilians of Panama. Six years after the difficulties

encountered in Grenada, U.S. forces had affected major

structural changes that enabled the head of the House

Armed Services Committee, Representative Les Aspin, to

characterize the operation as one where the “planning was

sound,... thoroughly prepared and rehearsed, and

well-executed.”4

In April 2000, the “Defense Planning Guidance” tasked

U.S. Joint Forces Command to develop new joint

warfighting concepts and capabilities. These capabilities

should provide the U.S. military by 2015 both the ability to

defeat an enemy rapidly and decisively. Focused on winning

high-end, small-scale contingencies (such as the Panama

operation), “fully networked and coherent joint forces” will

employ superior knowledge, precision, and mobility against

an enemy’s critical functions to “create maximum shock and

disruption, defeating his will and ability to fight.”5 In all,

Operation JUST CAUSE, conducted over a decade ago,

accomplished those same results. This chapter will examine

how Southern Command and its warfighting Joint Task

Force-SOUTH (JTFSO) organized, planned, prepared, and

executed joint operations that resulted in the total,

cataclysmic collapse of Manuel Noriega’s Panamanian

Defense Force. Using the factors that provided success, the

final section of this chapter will suggest elements that

should provide a guide to developing of future concepts and

structure for RDO.

199
Operation JUST CAUSE.

In 1985, American-Panamanian relations began a

steady decline. Noriega, head of a narco-militaristic regime

that controlled all facets of Panama, systemically violated

the American Panamanian Canal treaties and harassed

American nationals and military forces stationed in the

Canal Zone. When the United States declared drugs a major

threat to American society in 1988, a Florida federal court

indicted Noriega for drug trafficking and money laundering.

With this indictment, relations further deteriorated. 6

The Reagan administration hoped that a Panamanian

solution, such as a coup d’etat or election, would end

Noriega’s rule. However, the use of both overt and covert

operations to start popular uprisings and coups by assisting

the opposition failed. Other measures such as negotiations,

economic and diplomatic sanctions, and military threats

also failed, largely due to mismanagement within the

administration’s interagency process, bureaucratic

infighting, mixed messages, and incompetency. In all,

Noriega received mixed messages which led to his distrust

of U.S. intentions. The dictator’s defiance also strengthened

his position in Panama and made him more difficult to

remove, as he systemically eliminated his opposition. After

he invalidated the national election of May 1989 and

installed his own officials, Noriega felt immune from

American reprisals. In all, American political and

diplomatic failures in the mid- to late 1980s resulted in

confusing messages that undermined credible military

threats and made the direct use of military force (to remove

Noriega) more rather than less likely.

Planning and Preparation for the Operation. With rising

tensions, Southern Command began preparing for military

action. The existing plans for the defense of the canal zone

and U.S. citizens, Operation BLUE SPOON, was one

portion of the standard, off the shelf, set of contingency

plans in the PRAYER BOOK series. Operation BLUE

SPOON envisioned that in the face of a threat to American

200
interests, the U.S. military would land military forces at

Howard Air Force Base, which would then move out to deal

with conflict across the country.7 However, emerging

threats underlined that sequential operations would not be

possible. With the rise in tensions in June 1989, it became

clear that Noriega and the Panamanian Defense Force

aimed at maintaining power at any cost. Thus, a sequential

buildup of forces over time could not occur because, “the

tensions were already too high and things were already

developing in ways that wouldn’t make [deliberate

deployment] a very feasible notion.8

Moreover, the replacement of General Fred F. Woerner

with a more aggressive Thurman dictated a change in plans.

Upon notification in June that he would most probably

assume command, Thurman initiated a series of studies

and briefs in Washington, Ft. Bragg, and other locations

that led him to conclude that a sequential buildup was

neither acceptable nor feasible. A slow moving plan ran the

high risk of interdiction/preemption by Noriega and

Panamanian Forces who might not only block the buildup,

but move quickly to seize American hostages and facilities,

most critically the canal and its supporting facilities.

Consequently, even before Thurman’s arrival, Operation

BLUE SPOON was evolving into a more rapid, complex

operation focused on fixing Noriega and his henchmen. If

the initial moves could strip away the leadership and

command structure of the Defense Force, Noriega’s troops

would be incapable (and, most thought, unwilling) of

moving against and inflicting damage or injuries on U.S.

and Panamanian citizens and infrastructure.9 Thus, from

mid-1989 operations took a distinctive shift from the

methodical and sequential to the rapid, overwhelming, and

decisive.

The Direct Approach: “Noriega Must Go.” Inheriting a

deteriorating situation, the new president decided to take a

firmer approach. Following Noriega’s overturning of

elections in May, George Bush announced that the United

States had enough of the corruption and disregard for

201
democratic process in Panama. He proclaimed that

“Noriega must go.”10 Key also was the change in

SOUTHCOM’s leadership: the president was sending the

signal that America would take a tougher stance. During a

series of briefings and discussions in Washington prior to

assuming his duties as CINC, Thurman worked in

conjunction with the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,

General Colin Powell, to define American goals and

objectives. These objectives would be the basis for theater

level planning, and eventually became the operational

guidance by the president. American objectives would be to:

1. Create an environment safe for Americans;

2. Ensure the integrity of Panama Canal;

3. Provide a stable environment for the freely-elected

Endara Government; and,

4. Bring Noriega to justice.11

Using these goals, Thurman began a major

reassessment of the situation in September. He calculated

that the enemy’s center of gravity was not Noriega but the

Panamanian Defense Forces’ leadership, of which the

general was only a critical part. The head of the serpent

could be removed, but the systemic corruption in the

defense forces had built second and third layers of corrupt

leadership that would keep the snake functioning and

dangerous. Unless those too were removed, the

Panamanian Defense Forces would undermine any

movements toward democracy. Additionally, leaving

remnants in place would provide a possible basis for an

insurgency that would draw the United States into a

protracted, Vietnam-like conflict. Therefore, decisive action

required a broader approach—the decisive target would be

the destruction of the Panamanian Defense Forces and its

command structure.

Joint Task Force SOUTH as a Warfighting

Headquarters. In addition to this reorientation, Thurman

believed he needed a simple, but effective subunified

202
command to plan the action. His initial assessment was that

his in-house Joint Task Force PANAMA (JTFPN) lacked the

planning and robust warfighting capabilities needed for

planning an intricate operation. Additionally, both U.S.

Army South (USARSO) and his headquarters focused on the

close fight of performing the routine security, political, and

military requirements of day-to-day operations. Thurman

requested and received permission from Powell to use the

Army’s XVIII Airborne Corps as the planning and execution

nucleus of JTF-SOUTH. That organization would focus on

the preparing for the use of military force; they would focus

on planning, rehearsing and command all joint forces

during strike operations.12

In addition, Thurman obtained as his standing Joint

Task Force commander Lieutenant General Carl W. Stiner,

a seasoned, experienced warfighter whom Thurman trusted

to handle preparation and execution of the complex

operation. Most important, Thurman felt the original

concept of Operation BLUE SPOON for the standing up a

joint task force as the operation began was inadequate. In a

fluid, ill-defined environment, he might have to launch

operations at short notice to meet political “triggers” and to

achieve operational surprise. Execution of rapid,

simultaneous operations, with many dispersed, complex

203
pieces, required a headquarters that was already

functional, situationally aware of both friendly and enemy

forces, coherently joint capable, and ready to execute on

short notice without appreciable standup or shakeout time.

Consequently, he wanted a separate, detached joint

headquarters to focus specifically on developing an in-depth

picture of the Panamanian threat and prepare detailed,

synchronized, joint military operations to eliminate

Noriega’s organization.

Development of the Concept for an RDO. Key to

Thruman’s approach was the development of superior

knowledge of his enemy’s capabilities, dispositions, and

potential actions. To this end, SOUTHCOM focused on

intensive intelligence and information gathering efforts.

Intelligence preparation for military operations would

prove to be a critical factor in overall success. Both

in-country and forces deploying from the United States

developed a detailed lay-down of Panamanian troop

locations and dispositions, key facilities within the canal

zone, and approximate locations of major groups of U.S.

nationals who might be targets for kidnapping or terrorist

attacks.13

The information gained through SOUTHCOM

Headquarters at Quarry Heights, American units training

in Panama, and U.S. contacts with the Panamanian

Defense Forces and government proved crucial. These

sources provided in depth knowledge of terrain, road

networks, and unit capabilities, which then fed the

planning process to select the targets and objectives. The

intelligence picture further improved with the failed coup

on October 3, which provided accurate information on the

units loyal to Noriega, as well as the capabilities of

Panamanian Defense Forces to move rapidly with air and

armored forces. Among such units were the 7th Infantry

Company, which rescued Noriega through airmobile

movements, and Battalion 2000, with its armored vehicles,

which could move quickly to counter light infantry strikes

into Panama City. Also, intelligence revealed growing

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numbers of paramilitary “Dignity Battalions,” which

conducted pro-Noriega terror attacks. Quickly locating,

neutralizing, and preventing their escape and linkup with

Defense Force elements would be critical to safeguarding

Americans and preventing dispersed enemy units from

building up mass.14

However, there were also several critical gaps in

intelligence. There was a vague picture of the precise

strength and locations of many of Noriega’s Dignity

Battalions, a shortfall that led to an under-estimation of

their threat. Second, the lack of targetable intelligence on

Noriega’s location and activities would result in the failure

to capture the Panamanian dictator early in the operation—

a result which then turned the operation into a manhunt

that ended in his embarrassing escape to the Papal Nuncio’s

residence.15 Although these shortfalls prolonged the

operation, they did not detract from its overall success. In

all, American forces entering Panama on December 20 had a

well-defined picture of the major enemy strengths,

dispositions, and capabilities that they needed to strike in

order to defeat Panamanian forces rapidly and decisively,

and, in the end, dismember Noreiga’s grip on power.

Critical to successful preparation and execution was not

only the gathering of information, but the development of

superior knowledge of enemy intentions. Knowledge

superiority came through the selection of the right leaders,

with the background, experience, and intellect to interpret

the myriad of information and intelligence and develop a

clear picture of the enemy and the effects intended actions

might achieve. The selection of Brigadier General William

Hartzog as the J3 provided an officer with such qualities

and insight. Hartzog was not only experienced in the

theater, with a number of prior assignments to Panama, but

he had the ability to visualize the enemy’s centers of gravity

and key vulnerabilities and develop an integrated plan for

enemy destruction. As a result, the plan for simultaneous,

rapid action could promise decisive results, so much so that

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after receiving the briefing for the proposed operation the

Joint Chiefs approved it as written.

The plan, BLUE SPOON 1-90, included two scenarios.

For the no-notice, “reactive execution” scenario based on

triggers such as the seizure of hostages or threats to the

canal, Joint Task Force PANAMA forces already on the

ground would secure key facilities, defense sites, and the

housing of U.S. nationals, isolate the canal and the

Panamanian Defense Force headquarters at La

Comandancia from reinforcement, and prevent Noriega’s

escape. Air support would strike key Panamanian facilities,

while special forces—under a Joint Special Operations Task

Force—would capture Noriega and interdict or destroy

Panamanian forces in the areas outside Panama City and

Cologne. In the mean time, U.S. forces would flow rapidly

through American-controlled airfields and ports to reinforce

and expand operations.16

The more preferable “deliberate” option was the one

eventually executed as Operation JUST CAUSE.17 This

scenario used overwhelming air and land forces from both

the United States and Panama to strike simultaneously at

all critical military and political vulnerabilities. With at

least 60 hours notice, joint special operating forces would

conduct reconnaissance and surveillance of key targets such

as Fort Cimarron, Tinajitas, Panama Viejo, and the Pacora

River, while other Delta elements attempted to locate

Noriega. During this same period, Forces Command would

position more armor and aircraft in Panama, while

Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) would prepare to

airdrop over 5,000 assault troops and airland an additional

13,000 soldiers.

Special Operations forces would prepare the way. Task

Force GREEN, the Army Special Mission Unit (Delta)

would rescue U.S. citizens imprisoned near La

Comandancia, while Task Force BLACK would protect

opposition leaders. Task Force GREEN and BLUE of Army

Special Mission Unit and Navy SEALs would rescue other

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hostages, while Task Force WHITE’s Navy Special Warfare

Units would interdict enemy naval forces at three separate

harbors. Finally, Task Force RED made up of the Army

Ranger Regiment would make airborne assaults on key

Panamanian Defense Forces’ concentrations removed from

the Canal area, at Rio Hato in the west and at Torrijos

Tocumen Airport in the east.

Following these opening moves, the operation would

proceed in four phases. In the first phase, three of the four

conventional Task Forces would swing into action at H

Hour. In the northwest, Task Force ATLANTIC, made up of

a brigade of the 7th Infantry Division (Light) with a

battalion from the 82nd Airborne Division,18 would strike

the Panamanian Defense Forces in Colon and secure by air

assault the Madden Dam and El Renacer Prison, both in the

center of the Isthmus. At the same time, Task Force

BAYONET of the Panama-based 193rd Infantry Brigade

along with mechanized infantry under Task Force 4-6

Infantry would secure the embassy and other U.S. national

population centers and seize key sites in Panama City and

its environs, to include the Panamanian Defense Forces

nerve-center at La Comandancia. Finally, the Marine

infantry battalion Task Force SEMPER FI supplemented

by Army military police would secure the key airhead at

Howard AFB and block any enemy movements into the city

across the Bridge of the Americas. This “inner ring” of

strikes would secure the Panama Canal, protect Americans

against Dignity Battalion retribution, and decapitate the

Panamanian Defense Force’s command system and

security.

Closely following these strikes across the Canal Zone,

Army Rangers would airdrop to seize Torrijos-Tocumen

Airport. Task Force PACIFIC with the remainder of the

82nd Airborne Division would follow at H+45 minutes to

relieve the Rangers. At H+90 airborne forces would

airmobile aboard helicopters to destroy the Panamanian

Defense Force’s strongholds at Tinajitas, Fort Cimarron,

and Panama Viejo. Following these initial strikes, the

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remainder of the 7th Infantry Division (Light) and the 16th

Military Police Brigade would deploy from the U.S. to

reinforce on Day 2. In the final phase of the operation (D+3

through D+30 days) the 7th Division would relieve all

airborne forces and, together with forces stationed in

Panama, execute civil-military operations in support of the

new Panamanian government, Operation BLIND LOGIC.19

Overall success depended on a joint forces effort. In

support of the 23,000 man Army-Marine ground force would

be over 3,400 Air Force personnel, mostly from the 830th Air

Division. Their operations would be critical to success not

only in providing airlift/airdrop, but also in providing

electronic jamming, refueling, and most importantly

precision strikes in support of ground operations in urban

areas. Six F-117 stealth bombers would bomb barracks and

other locations to stun and disorganize the Defense Force

while AC-130 gunships directed precision fires to prepare

drop-zones, interdict counterattack, and strike specific

buildings, such as La Comandancia in the midst of

populated areas, where collateral damage from bombing

was not acceptable. Naval forces would control sea

approaches, stop all ships from entering the canal during

the operation, and prevent reinforcements or supplies from

Noriega’s supporters in Cuba. In addition, Naval Special

Warfare forces would disable the Panamanian Defense

Forces naval forces and conduct special boat and

countermine operations to keep sea lanes open.

With Stiner to answer questions, Hartzog provided what

Joint Staff Director of Operations Lieutenant General Kelly

characterized as the best operations briefings he had ever

heard.20 Armed with experience and the answers based on

in depth planning, Hartzog convinced Powell that the plan

was flexible and detailed enough to ensure success across a

complex and complicated operation. Powell agreed on the

use of overwhelming force to decimate the Panamanian

Defense Forces and preclude their ability to wage a

prolonged insurgency. On November 3, the Joint Chiefs

approved the plan as written.

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The Plan Moves Into Action. Rehearsals over the next 6

weeks reinforced understanding at all levels, perfected the

eventual execution, and provided feedback for further

improvements. By hostilities in mid-December, the joint

force was well-prepared to execute the invasion after events

spiraled out of control.21 In mid December, the Panamanian

national assembly proclaimed Noriega the country’s

“supreme ruler,” and under his direction issued a

declaration of war against the United States. Marked

increases in violence against Americans culminated on

December 17 with the abuse of a Navy couple and the killing

of a Marine officer. These provocations presented President

Bush with the imperative to act decisively.

Thurman saw four options available.22 First, the United

States could do nothing and continue to let diplomatic and

economic pressure work. This option was unlikely to work,

especially given the support of Noriega by Nicaragua and

Cuba, as well as illegal funds from South American drug

cartels. The second option was to use a series of special

operations to seize Noreiga and his supporters. Third, the

United States could use conventional and special forces

already in country to seize the Panamanian Defense Force’s

headquarters and capture Noriega. However, both

promised to be less than decisive; while they might have

captured of Noriega and his key supporters, they would fail

to eliminate the second-order of corrupt leaders, who might

well seek revenge against U.S. personnel and assets. They

also left open the possibility of a prolonged conflict by

Panamanians who were either loyal to Noriega or spurred

by nationalist impulses to resist foreign aggression. Such a

prolonged “Vietnam-like” conflict would have opened the

Bush Administration to both domestic and international

criticism and pressure during a long campaign.

The greatest promise for decisive success was in the

fourth option of using decisive and overwhelming force. A

broad, comprehensive and simultaneous strike at all

principal enemy installations, along with Noreiga’s key

control and administrative nodes could cataclysmically

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collapse the capability and will to resist of regular and

paramilitary forces, and prevent a protracted insurgency.

However, the risk of failure was also high. The operation

would be extremely complex in striking multiple, dispersed

targets, with a joint force of over 23,000 based in Panama

and the United States, and occur at night to maximize

surprise and minimize collateral damage. Bush chose the

path of most promise and risk; on December 17, he ordered

American forces to execute a complex, rapid, and decisive

strike to destroy the Panamanian Defense Forces. D-Day

would occur less than 60 hours later: 1:00 a.m. on December

20.

Operation JUST CAUSE: Deployment and Opening

Moves. Upon notification, U.S. forces began final

preparations by putting air and ground units in the United

States and Panama on alert. Military Airlift Command

positioned active and reserve aircraft at seven airlift sites,

while flying the final ground elements into Panama. Special

Operations forces, including Army Green Beret and Navy

SEAL teams, deployed to augment Task Force BAYONET

(193rd Infantry Brigade), watch Panamanian forces, and

locate Noriega. In the United States, ranger and airborne

units began movements under the guise of conducting a

“deployment readiness training exercise” as CBS television

broadcast footage of C-141s departing from Fort Bragg and

other locations. Additional Marines from the 6th Regiment

and the First Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team deployed

to flesh-out the remainder of Task Force SEMPER FI. By

sunset on December 19, an overwhelming force was in

motion to deal the Panamanian Defense Forces a crushing

blow.

Inside Panama, Army and Marine Task Forces began

moving in the Panama City and Cologne areas that

comprised an inner-ring of Panamanian forces and facilities

all within easy reach. Their attacks focused on eliminating

the Panamanian Defense Forces’ hold on major population

centers and government facilities, while simultaneously

destroying the centralized command at the La

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Commandancia headquarters in Panama City. However,

success here would not be decisive. The elite, armored

“Battalion 2000” and the 6th and 7th Companies of the

Panamanian Defense Force were stationed outside the

Canal Zone and would have to be taken down at the same

time to prevent counterattacks from outlying areas or a

withdrawal to fight a guerilla war. Frontal attacks by task

forces in the Canal Zone could not cut off and destroy these

forces, so rapid, surprise airborne and air assault operations

were aimed at overwhelming the enemy before he could

escape to the jungles. When Stiner arrived in Panama on

December 18 to make last minute adjustments, he knew

that both sets of objectives had to be taken simultaneously

to fragment the enemy physically and psychologically.

Special Forces Open the Operation. As Stiner arrived in

country, Task Force BLACK was moving into position.

Special Forces teams watched all major Panamanian

Defense Forces locations for signs of troop movements,

while Delta Force elements assaulted the Carcel Modelo

Prison to free captive American Kurt Muse whom Noriega

had threatened to execute if the United States attacked

Panama. Delta struck so quickly that the prison guards

never shouldered their weapons. However, machine guns

from a nearby barracks shot down the extraction helicopter

and forced rescuers to escape by an armored personnel

carrier brought in for support. In all, the raid lasted only 6

minutes.23 Army special forces also seized control of the

Pacora River Bridge and blocked armored counterattacks

into Ranger drop zones around Torrijos/Tocumen Airport.

As armored vehicles from Battalion 2000 moved down the

road to attack the airborne assault, special forces teams

called in AC-130 gunship fires that decimated the first ten

vehicles in the column. In response, Noriega’s “elite” unit

fled back to Fort Cimmaron and escaped into the jungles,

offering no further resistance.24

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In addition to setting the stage for ground forces, special

operations forces focused on locating and capturing

Noriega. Teams watched seven different locations and

raided four places frequented by Noriega, but he avoided

capture and remained on the run for the next 5 days.25

However, the Navy SEAL attempt to destroy Noriega’s

personal jet ran into difficulty. Just before the operation,

their orders were changed from destroying the plane to

disabling the landing gear to prevent collateral damage if

the plane exploded in its hanger at Patilla Airport. The

combination of last minute changes and inaccurate

intelligence proved fatal when 48 SEALS moved across the

open runways toward the plane. While intelligence had

reported only lightly armed civilian security, the SEALs

met heavy fire from some of Noriega’s hand-picked security

detail. After taking heavy fire, the SEALs destroyed the

plane and the surrounding hanger using an anti-tank

missile, but at the cost of four dead and three severely

wounded.26

The Inner Ring: Simultaneous Strikes by Conventional

Forces. As special operations forces moved at H-hour,

conventional forces struck simultaneously along the

inner-ring of objectives along the Colon-Panama City axis of

the Canal Zone. On the Pacific side, Task Force BAYONET

(centered around the 193rd Infantry Brigade) advanced

rapidly from staging areas around Quarry Heights and Fort

Clayton through the streets of Panama City. They

simultaneously struck the Panamanian Defense Forces

barracks at Fort Amador, the National Departments of

Investigation and Transportation, and the central

nerve-center of the Panamanian Defense Forces at La

Commandancia. Violent action eliminated resistance at the

first three sites, with the enemy attempting to escape Fort

Amador by swimming away, only to be picked up by Navy

forces in the bay.

However, the fight for the Commandancia typified the

fierce resistance that the Panamanian Defense Forces put

up when they found themselves trapped inside Panama

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City. Located inside the run-down El Chorillo

neighborhood, the 40-year-old headquarters was made of

reinforced concrete several feet thick. Inside its walls,

Dignity Battalion and Panamanian Defense Forces

companies used small arms, anti-tank, and anti-aircraft

weapons to block the assault of three infantry companies of

the 193rd Brigade. Fighting their way through sniper fire

and road-blocks to reach the headquarters, Task Force

BAYONET’s infantry, supported by armored personnel

carriers and Sheridan tanks, breached the outer walls but

were unable to carry the headquarters. While armored

forces ringed the perimeter to prevent counterattack,

AC-130 gunships pounded the Commandancia with

machineguns and 105mm fire that obliterated the

building’s third floor. Panamanian forces retreated from the

main building, and were pursued by U.S. infantry in a

house-to-house fight that continued into the afternoon. By

sundown, Task Force BAYONET had eliminated

resistance, but withdrawing enemy set fires that destroyed

much of the El Chorillo district. Although media initially

blamed U.S. forces for starting the fires with tracers, the

Task Force had exercised extreme caution to limit local

casualties. Throughout the fight, American commanders

withheld attack helicopter, tank, artillery, and mortar fire

to limit collateral damage and civilian casualties that could

have incited popular support for Noriega’s forces.

In conjunction with these operations, the Marine-based

Task Force SEMPER FI secured the area southwest of

Panama City. It consisted of 600 Marines from the 6th

Marine Regiment, armored vehicles from the 2nd Light

Armored Infantry battalion, and the First Fleet

Antiterrorism Security Team. At H-Hour, the force secured

Naval Station-Rodman, the Arraijan (Fuel) Tank Farm,

and Howard Air Force Base, the critical airhead for

American reinforcement and sustainment. In addition, they

secured the Bridge of the Americas and blocked the

Inter-American Highway to prevent enemy reinforcements

from relieving La Commandancia or escaping from Panama

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City. The major challenge was securing the single fuel

depot, the “Tank Farm,” which supported all air refueling

operations out of Howard AFB. Enemy compounds in and

around Arraijan controlled the area, but antiterrorism

teams overwhelmed Panamanian forces overlooking the

“Farm,” while a company of infantry with light armored

vehicles destroyed an enemy roadblock and platoon-sized

compound in the town.

On the other side of the Canal Zone, Task Force Atlantic

was equally successful in rapidly destroying enemy

resistance. In Colon a combined force of 7th Infantry

Division and 82nd Airborne27 overwhelmed the 8th

Panamanian Defense Forces Company and overcame stiff

resistance from a naval infantry unit at Coco Solo. Task

force elements air assaulted into the center of the canal zone

to attack the barracks at Gamboa and seize the El Renancer

Prison before guards could kill opposition leaders. In

addition, these forces safeguarded the operating

capabilities of the Canal by air assaults that secured the

Cerra Tigre electrical complex and Madden Dam. The later

provided the power and water essential to operation of the

Canal. If these sites had been destroyed, the canal could

have been disabled for a year or more.28

The Outer Ring: Simultaneous Strikes by U.S. Based

Airborne Forces. By the next day, the simultaneous attacks

by conventional Task Forces eliminated all major resistance

inside the Canal Zone. Airborne assaults by the 75th

Ranger Regiment and the 82nd Airborne Division ensured

the final defeat of Noriega and the Panamanian Defense

Forces by destroying capabilities to counterattack or

continue resistance from remote areas. While the inner-ring

strikes came from forces within Panama, the most

challenging attacks were made by forces moving over 5

hours by air from three different airfields in the United

States to strike within an hour of one another. Although the

Ranger assaults went forward on time, incomplete

intelligence and poor weather impeded the 82nd Airborne’s

drops. These factors delayed night air assaults on other

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targets into the early daylight hours. However, leader

flexibility and good training overcame many of these

difficulties and provided decisive results.

The Ranger Regiment’s Task Force RED (minus 1

battalion) dropped onto the airfield at Rio Hato, home to the

7th Panamanian Defense Company. Just prior to the jump,

two F-117A “Stealth” bombers dropped 2,000 pound bombs

within 300 meters of the barracks to intimidate and

disorganize the sleeping defenders. Despite this, the enemy

recovered enough to direct small arms and machine gun fire

at approaching C-130s. This fire forced the Rangers to jump

from 500 feet instead of 800 feet to reduce exposure to

ground fire. After quickly assembling on the ground, the

Rangers fought their way into the barracks complex as

AC-130 gunfire suppressed the Panamanian defenders.

Through often facing fierce resistance, the Rangers fought

through successive buildings to surround the enemy and

induce his surrender after special operations personnel

arrived with Spanish speakers to talk them out. An incident

during the assault displayed the high level of training and

restraint on the part of U.S. forces, when a young ranger

captain leading a small squad burst into a room where over

180 unarmed trainees were huddled against the back wall.

Amid much confusion and shouting in English and Spanish,

neither the captain nor the troops following him fired, thus

avoiding what could have been a disastrous situation.29

While Task Force RED cleared the barracks, C-130s air

landed additional forces from the 7th Infantry Division to

reinforce the Rangers. After the fight, U.S. forces found

indications that their decisive takedown of the airfield

averted what could have been a more costly operation.

Surrounding the airfield were four, multi-barreled

Soviet-style ZPU-4 anti-aircraft guns, the same type that

were so effective against slow, low-flying aircraft in

Vietnam. In addition, they found 48 rocket-propelled

grenades, 55 machine guns, 8 mortars and 16 armored cars,

all of which could have decimated Task Force RED, if U.S.

forces had not surprised and overwhelmed their enemy. In

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all, units sustained light losses of only 4 dead and 44

wounded, with 41 of these injured in the low level jump.30

Within a few short hours at Rio Hato, U.S. forces had

eliminated one of the two elements that Noriega had

counted on for salvation during the October coup.

As operations unfolded on the other side of the canal,

Noriega’s hopes disappeared as U.S. forces dropped onto

Tocumen-Torrijos Airport to the northeast of Panama City.

At H-Hour, AC-130 gunfire completed their preparations of

enemy positions just minutes before the 1st Ranger

Battalion jumped onto the airfield. Fighting through light

resistance, the Rangers capitalized on a combination of

aggressive assault and psychological operations to

surround Panamanian forces in the terminal and coerced

their surrender. Closely following the Rangers, lead

elements of the 82nd Airborne Division’s Task Force Pacific

parachuted onto the airfield at 1:55 a.m. to reinforce and

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expand operations into other enemy strongholds east of the

Canal Zone.

Unfortunately, an ice storm delayed over half of the 20

C141 transport aircraft that carried the 3,300 paratroopers

from Fort Bragg.31 Heavy equipment fell on drop zones

offset from the runways into grassy areas so as not to block

aircraft landing. Unfortunately, air reconnaissance and

satellite photography of the drop zones failed to recognize

the head-high grass, poor drainage, and soft soil that

swallowed heavy equipment in mud, separated troops and

delayed move-out to objectives. The combination of

transport delays with problems assembling on the ground

meant that Task Force PACIFIC had to delay operations

over 3 hours until after the last chalks landed at 5:15 a.m.32

This meant that air assaults onto Panamanian positions at

Fort Cimarron, Tinajitas, and Panama Viejo were daylight

attacks without the advantage of surprise and concealment

of darkness and with a greater risk of casualties. After

taking losses to AC-130 gunfire directed by special forces

elements, Battalion 2000 scattered, and the air assault into

Fort Cimarron went in unopposed. However, the 7:00 a.m.

assaults onto the Panamanian company at Tiajitas and

cavalry squadron at Panama Viejo met fierce resistance.

Intense fire damaged several helicopters as the 2nd

Battalion, 504 Airborne Infantry assaulted from two

landing zones around the Cuartel.33 As the battalion cleared

the area, Defense Forces and the local Dignity Battalion

fought on throughout the day. Nine cars were stopped or

destroyed as they attempted “drive by” attacks with

automatic weapons, while paratroopers destroyed a PDF

V300 light armored vehicle with an AT-4 light anti-tank

round. 34

The Critical Role of Air Forces. Although Operation

JUST CAUSE was an Army-centric fight, air forces were

essential in providing strategic transport for the airdrops

and reinforcements, as well as the firepower, observation,

and command and control capabilities critical to the success

of ground operations. As in every conflict since Korea, U.S.

218
forces enjoyed air superiority, with the ability to use the air

as an unchallenged platform for mobility and fires. Navy

fighter “caps” from offshore carriers protected troop

transports against interdiction from Cuban or Nicaraguan

aircraft. Complex, well-orchestrated air operations that

integrated strategic lift for air drops and supporting

suppressive fires in an extremely limited airspace (the size

of that over Washington, DC) were critical to projecting

decisive force. Military Airlift Command, using C-130s,

C141s, and C-5s, supported by Strategic Air Command

tankers, lifted 9,500 troops for a rapid buildup. A total of 82

aircraft from 27 units at 21 bases flew 3,500 miles to drop

over 3,700 paratroopers with heavy equipment into drop

zones at night, all synchronized within 1 hour’s time. In all,

over 7,000 troops arrived at H-Hour. In addition, a total of

274 subsequent sorties completed the rapid buildup of over

24 battalions by the end of the first day and provided the

capability to backhaul casualties and evacuate civilians.35

Air support was critical in providing more to the joint

force than a ride to the fight. Because ground units operated

in urban areas and lacked artillery, gunship fires provided

critical precision fires that avoided fratricide and kept

civilian casualties low. C-130 “Spectar” gunships along with

fighters and Army attack helicopters supported the initial

airdrops and urban operations, often within only a few

hundred yards of U.S. troops.36 Such precision firepower

enabled Thurman and Stiner to limit weapons effects and

reduce Panamanian casualties without significantly

raising U.S. casualties. They felt the “measured application

of force” would preclude stiffening resolve or inciting

resistance among the Panamanian Defense Force and

populace. For example, Stiner decided to direct F-117

bombing strike near and not on the barracks at Rio Hato to

induce the Panamanians to surrender instead of retreat

into the jungles. Likewise, U.S. forces substituted highly

accurate AC-130 gunship fire for artillery in urban areas.

Through this they limited destruction and civilian

casualties that would have fueled support for the Dignity

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Battalions. In all, the use of precision fires paid off: when

faced with focused destruction the Panamanian Defense

Forces chose to surrender rather than fight because the

populace distanced themselves from supporting their fellow

countrymen.37

Transition to Stability Operations: A Failure to Prepare.

Operation JUST CAUSE proved once again the old axiom of

military operations that a military force “performs well

what it plans and rehearses in depth.” While intensive

rehearsals by Joint Task Force SOUTH produced highly

successful combat operations, planning and preparation

shortfalls ensured difficulties in the transition to stability

operations. As the Panamanian Defense Force disappeared,

with it disappeared the iron grip that had kept order and

suppressed opposition and crime. Rioting and looting filled

the streets, while residents of the Chorillo barrio, burned

out of house and home, needed urgent supplies and

assistance. SOUTHCOM secured and supported President

Endara’s moves to establish a government, but he assumed

control of a bureaucracy dominated at all levels by Noriega’s

Panamanian Defense Force cronies. After 22 months of

contingency planning, there was no coherent plan or

civil-military operations task force deployed to assist the

transition to a new government as the old regime fell.

Neither SOUTHCOM nor the XVIII Corps was prepared for

the transition, the breakdown of social order, and the

temporary escape of Noriega.

In essence, both headquarters underestimated the

complex threat that would emerge as the Panamanian

Defense Forces dissolved and devoted little preparation for

civil-military operations. Throughout the final 3 months of

intensive planning, Thurman thought the stabilization

phase would be “the least of my problems” and focused

entirely on “putting together the campaign plan for

Operation JUST CAUSE and . . . not spend[ing] enough time

on the restoration.”38 SOUTHCOM’s Director of Policy and

Strategy (J5) completed some contingency planning, but

Thurman saw the Army Reserve’s 361st Civil Affairs

220
Brigade playing only a transitory role in civil operations.

After Noriega’s hold was broken, Thurman saw the U.S.

Embassy assuming primary responsibility for assisting a

functioning Endara government.

This approach was unworkable. First, success in

Operation JUST CAUSE depended on totally dismantling

the Panamanian Defense Forces, but made no provisions for

organizing governmental administration and security once

the Defense Force disintegrated. In retrospect, Thurman

acknowledged that the depth of civil government corruption

“was not well understood” and that its broad reach

“complicated the restoration of government . . . and

hampered a cogent post-conflict resolution approach.”39

Second, in order to maintain operational security and

surprise, little pre-operations planning ever moved outside

military channels. Consequently, there was little

coordination with the State Department or U.S. Embassy

for the agencies to assume the restoration mission.

Therefore, there was no broad, interagency approach to

follow military victory with political and economic support

for rebuilding Panama.40

As a result, civil-military operations became the only

tool for establishing a functioning government and were an

ad-hoc, Army-led program at best. There was no military

organization given primary responsibility to plan or execute

civil-military operations. Initially, SOUTHCOM J5 took

responsibility, but on December 12, only days before the

operation, Thurman gave U.S. Army South the lead since it

would provide the residual forces in country after XVIII

Corps redeployed. The result was confusion: on December

20, the final version of BLIND LOGIC went to the JCS for

approval as violence and disorganization gripped Panama.

Compounding the lack of planning was the fact that no

specialized, trained forces executed the operation to restore

a functioning government. The plan depended on

presidential authorization to call-up reservists of the 361st

Civil Affairs Brigade. When the President refused a call-up,

Thurman formed an ad hoc Civil-Military Operations Task

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Force out of the SOUTHCOM J-5 and detailed it to the

Embassy (reduced to only 43 personnel during the crisis) to

expedite establishment of the government. Eventually, a

civil-military task force formed around the Civil Affairs

Brigade, which used short-term volunteer civil affairs

reservists who arrived after Operation JUST CAUSE was

already underway. 41

This was too little and too late to prevent the anarchy in

the streets. American forces transitioned from combat to

stability operations but were unable to prevent looting that

caused between $500 million to $2 billion in damages to the

commercial districts of Panama City.42 Bolstered by the

16th Military Police Brigade and the 7th Infantry Division

reinforcements, American forces across the country

gradually subdued the crowds and secured the 142 sites

that provided the city’s sanitation, power, water,

telephones, and other public services. U.S. forces reinstated

order after what Panamanians called “three days of

anarchy.”43 Concurrently, U.S. forces reformed and

retrained a national police force to maintain public order,

re-established public services, and planned for rebuilding

the infrastructure and an economy wrecked by years of graft

and corruption.

A number of ad hoc organizations hastily stood up to deal

with the collapse of government and security. U.S. Army

South, under Major General Marc Cisneros, organized the

U.S. Forces Liaison Group to advise, train and equip a police

force out of the remnants of the Defense Forces. Unlike

Thurman, Cisernos saw the looting and destruction as an

immediate, vital concern that had to be remedied before

violence cycled out of control and complicated conflict

termination and withdrawal.44 The Liaison Group quickly

vetted, trained, and returned a workable police force to the

streets, where they re-established basic police functions by

the end of January. Building upon the J-5’s hasty work, on

January 17 SOUTHCOM created the U.S. Military Support

Group (USMSG) to “conduct nation building operation to

ensure democracy, . . . and professional public services . . .”45

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This group headed by Latin-American specialist Colonel

James Steele formulated a strategy for restoring basic

government, security, and services, and orchestrated joint

military support for the U.S. Embassy in rebuilding

Panama. By the end of January, civil-military efforts were

taking shape and security returned to the point that U.S.

military forces could re-deploy to the United States.

Operation JUST CAUSE accomplished the total,

decisive defeat of the enemy and set the conditions for the

return of freely-elected government to Panama. By the time

the early morning news began coverage on December 20,

U.S. forces had taken all primary objectives. Initiated less

than 60 hours after the President’s decision, Operation

JUST CAUSE accomplished a coordinated, highly complex

series of missions during darkness by utilizing

well-integrated joint forces in a swift, precise manner. In

less than 48 hours of operations, joint forces destroyed or

captured strategic positions across the breadth of Panama,

dismembered the Panamanian Defense Forces, broke the

control of dictator Manuel Noreiga, installed a previously

elected Panamanian government, and mopped up remnants

of the “Dignity Battalions” and stray Panamanian Defense

Forces. Although ill-prepared for the transition to stability

and civil-military operations, U.S. forces adapted to

emerging security and nation-building challenges quickly.

Critically, given U.S. concerns, a continued, lingering

insurgency which would have fixed international attention

and tied down U.S. forces to a protracted conflict did not

emerge. In military terms, Operational JUST CAUSE was

truly rapid and decisive in bringing the total, systemic

collapse of enemy resistance.

Lessons Relevant to RDO.

Future RDO will seek the same type of results. The April

2000 Defense Planning Guidance tasked U.S. Joint Forces

Command (JFCOM) to develop joint warfighting concepts

and capabilities that would enable U.S. forces to conduct

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rapid decisive operations across a broad spectrum by 2020.

Operations (such as those fought in Panama) will focus on

winning a “high-end, small scale contingency” that

achieves:

rapid victory by attacking the coherence of an enemy’s ability to

fight. It [will accomplish] the synchronous application of the full

range of our national capabilities by a fully networked and

coherent joint force in timely and direct effects-based operations

against the adversary as a system of systems. RDO employ our

asymmetric advantages in knowledge, precision, and mobility

of the joint force against an adversary’s critical functions to

create maximum shock and disruption, defeating his will and

ability to fight.46

While the United States will use all elements of national

power in a synchronized manner to influence or deter,

military forces will conduct “powerful, overwhelming,

unrelenting combat operations to rapidly [sic] achieve our

strategic objectives.” Operations will be “rapid” by

accomplishing campaign objectives in days or weeks rather

than months, and without an extensive buildup of forces.

They will be “decisive” by destroying the coherence of the

enemy’s ability to fight by striking his critical functions

from dimensions and directions against which he has no

counter. The objective will be to rapidly break an opponent’s

will to fight and, as necessary, destroy his ability to conduct

coherent operations. Key “enablers” within RDO will be

obtaining and maintaining knowledge superiority,

conducting well-focused effects-based operations, and

employing coherently joint and fully networked forces for

synchronized action.

The successes and shortcomings of Operation JUST

CAUSE provided a number of insights for charting a future

course. However, historical assessments have been

confusing and misleading. Critics of the operation have

noted that Operation JUST CAUSE was a “special case,”

where SOUTHCOM and Joint Task Force SOUTH enjoyed

advantages that would never be possible in future

contingency operations. The United States had been in

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Panama for over 80 years with military forces, thereby

developing an extensive knowledge of the area and the

threat. Second, approximately half the operational forces

were already in the country where they trained and

prepared extensively. Third, planners and leaders enjoyed

good intelligence, extensive planning time and in depth

reconnaissance, all of which produced a detailed plan that

was well-rehearsed and constantly updated across all

components. Moreover, the operation was not without fault,

as shown in the rough transition to stability and

civil-military operations. Major planning and preparation

shortfalls threatened to turn military success into slow,

indecisive reconstruction operations, while chaos reigned

and the Endara government struggled to establish control

over Panama.

On all counts, true. However, these criticisms also reveal

a number of key elements that must be present if U.S. forces

are to conduct future RDO. Regardless of how they were

obtained, the elements that led to decisive success will be

the same ones that must be present in future RDO. Without

the ability to replicate success in these areas through

knowledge-centric operations, well-calculated effects-based

operations, and superior strategic deployment, future

operations will have little chance of attaining the level of

success achieved in an operation conducted over a decade

ago.

Thurman’s Assessment: Five Critical Factors.

Many of the factors that enabled successful rapid and

decisive operations in Panama mirror those demanded in

future rapid decisive operations. In Thurman’s postoperations analysis entitled “Simultaneity,” the general

argued that success rested on:

. . . the use of superior military force in very precise

applications against an enemy in order to achieve

overwhelming power at all potential “centers of gravity” or

sources of power within a very short time span in order to

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collapse resistance cataclysmically. This confines the violence of

the conflict in time and space and permits rapid conflict

termination on favorable terms with minimum collateral

damage and minimizes casualties.47

He noted that forces achieved overwhelming mass even

though they were geographically dispersed: “actions whose

effects were concentrated to achieve a specific aim... [such

as] to paralyze the enemy’s decision process and create

indecision”48 provided overwhelming power against an

adversary. The application of “focused mass” through the

“concentration of force in time and space . . . [generated]

simultaneous effects which combine[d] to create

overwhelming and focused power relative to enemy sources

of power (i.e., their centers of gravity).”49 In focusing force at

these critical vulnerabilities, limited force achieved decisive

effects with “minimum collateral damage and rapid decisive

conflict termination, both very important in any use of

military force today.”

In all, Thurman and Hartzog’s “simultaneity” concept

spoke dramatically to concept developers about what RDO

must be. Many of the factors that enabled success in

Panama must be present in the future to move past

sequential, incremental approaches to achieve rapid,

decisive results through the focused, simultaneous use of

force. In their assessment, they noted there were five

essential conditions for rapid and decisive success: 1) good

intelligence, 2) clearly articulated, broadly supported, and

universally understood end states, 3) the opportunity for

creating surprise, 4) sufficient force of the right types, and 5)

decisive leadership.

Requirement for Good Intelligence. First, good

intelligence was the cornerstone in identifying the enemy’s

center of gravity and key vulnerabilities, i.e., “the places,

people, weaponry, information nodes or conditions that if

controlled take away the enemy’s flexibility,”50 that, if

decisively engaged, provided decisive results. An in-depth

and critical analysis identified the Panamanian Defense

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Forces’ leadership and not just Noriega as the enemy center

of gravity, because corruption was so widespread that

removing only the head would not disable the system that

controlled Panama. More importantly, SOUTHCOM’s

detailed analysis of the enemy system—its leaders,

locations, capabilities and tendencies—developed a

reasonably accurate picture of the enemy’s system and key

nodes. This detailed picture is similar to the future baseline

required for an “Operational Net Assessment.” This initial

assessment drove specific targeting and determined which

leaders and units had to be destroyed or defeated in the

initial, simultaneous strikes. In all, SOUTHCOM’s net

assessment was accurate and drove specific strikes. Amid

the myriad of possibilities, the 27 chosen for destruction

completely disorganized and dismembered the

Panamanian Defense Forces’ will and ability to resist in a

coordinated fashion.

However, the price for this level of clarity was time and

preparation in developing the operational assessment.

SOUTHCOM required months for intelligence collection

and analysis, much gathered through third party

discussions with Panamanian leaders or through physical

reconnaissance by planners who drove or flew objective

areas. National intelligence such as imagery and electronic

listening provided critical information on objectives, areas

and communications between key leaders, but much was

derived on a “pull” basis through specific requests to

agencies. In all, the process of developing the picture was an

extensive, manual process.

In future environments where time is short and direct

access not possible, intelligence planners and analysts must

have ready access to a interconnected, multiagency/source

data base. Such data bases must reduce the need to

manually search for specifics by providing a well-cataloged

system that groups imagery, electronic (to include cellular

phone and internet monitoring), and human intelligence in

subject/topic based categories, and which can be searched

readily from dispersed locations. In addition, the system

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must provide analysts the ability to compare assessments of

enemy strengths, vulnerabilities, and systems structure

with subject area experts in other agencies or the academic

community who are knowledgeable of the culture,

background, and tendencies of the key actors and

organizations. The system which supported the

Panamanian invasion was time and effort intensive; future

systems must interconnect analysts with the full spectrum

of sources across multiple disciplines/mediums and allow

them to collaborate from dispersed locations to achieve and

maintain a common intelligence picture. This picture must

extend to the interagency to facilitate policy formulation

that will enable civil-military planning and an effective

transition to the stability phase of operations.

Knowledge superiority in both enemy and friendly force

capabilities was also a powerful enabler during Operation

JUST CAUSE. Throughout the planning, rehearsal, and

refinement process, units provided feedback constantly to

joint planners on their capabilities, challenges and

difficulties that were used to refine and improve

synchronization. By D-Day, Joint Task Force SOUTH had

developed and implemented a simple command and control

process whereby units avoided routine, time-phased

reporting and submitted only final mission

accomplishments or challenges that required additional

support. In all, joint forces obtained basic levels of

“Knowledge Superiority,” the level of specific knowledge of

enemy and friendly factors, that enabled widely-dispersed,

but precise, focused applications of force.

Decisive End State. The second essential for success was

clearly articulated goals for the use of force. Before

operations begin, Thurman felt there must be “clearly

articulated, broadly supported and universally understood

end states” for the use of force. By beginning with the end in

mind, political and military leaders possessed both a

“guidepost and rally point” for sustaining the will to act

decisively throughout the operation. To achieve rapid,

decisive, and simultaneous action, all leaders had to have:

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a clearly-articulated vision of the “day after battle...

articulated in some detail and commonly held by national,

theater and tactical leaders . . . [which] must be consistently

reviewed and, if still valid, defended throughout the execution.

Ever-changing conditions pressure leaders, commander and

warriors at every level that could lead to unwarranted

changes and the loss of simultaneity. In this case, it was useful

to frequently review the concept against the intent of the

national command authority.51

Thurman had observed how badly the Reagan

Administration had bungled its attempts to persuade and

coerce Noriega to leave power. The United States had sent a

series of disjointed and confusing signals which convinced

the dictator that America lacked the resolve to act and may

have encouraged even more boldness on his part.52

Following Bush’s lead, the administration took a more

coordinated and consistently hard-line approach that

“Noriega must go,” under which the interagency process

moved in support of the commander in chief. In addition, the

Secretary of Defense and Chairman united in supporting

decisive, unified military action and supported Thurman

and Stiner’s approach of rapid, simultaneous, and

overwhelming force as the path to success.

In all, successful RDO and precise effects-based

operations originate and must be sustained from a similar

basis—common goals that are well-thought out, properly

articulated, commonly understood and broadly supported

at all levels of planning and execution. Equally important

must be the will to stay the course to generate and achieve

the violent, sometimes controversial effects that will cause

an opponent’s capitulation. Amid critique and criticism by

media, domestic politicians and diplomats on the

international stage, and political and military

decisionmakers, particularly in the interagency process,

must work in unison and be willing to endure short-term

criticism and second guessing in order to achieve success.

Without these two elements—clear intent and

perseverance—the employment of all elements of national

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power will not produce decisive, synergistic effects, when

one or two elements decide in mid-stream to alter their

course.

Critical to success will be the development of effective

systems that tie together political policy and objectives with

military planning and execution. Better organization and

procedures must be developed within the interagency to

deal with the complexities of quickly reaching and

articulating objectives. The Clinton administration

attempted to articulate a workable interagency process for

“Complex Contingencies” through Presidential Decision

Directive (PDD) 56, and the current Bush administration

continues to try to harness the process. However, both

efforts have met with little success. The problem is not one

of guidance, but one of unity of purpose: the interagency

process must provide timely parameters and guidance for

the effects desired, and then persevere in exercising national

power in a coherent, focused and determined manner. Key

will be the linkages and lines of communications between

the interagency, joint staff, and unified command staffs.

There must be continuous dialogue and feedback exchanged

between actors and policymakers, supported by common

situational awareness links, to tie the interagency process

to the unified commands in planning and synchronized

execution. The most difficult obstacle to overcome will be

the interagency culture of cautious calculation, followed by

conference and consensus building, prior to arriving upon

policy. Without timely, clearly articulated guidance and

ongoing, accurate reassessments, operations will have little

chance of being either rapid or decisive. Future conflicts

must move beyond the traditional Moltkean paradigm of

politics, followed by military action, to achieve a decision

that can then be handed over to policymakers after the fight

is finished. Future situations will demand talking and

fighting nearly simultaneously so the actions of one

generate the effects that enable the actions and achieve the

purposes of the other. As Thurman noted, decisiveness

came not only through rapid military action that eliminated

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a corrupt and oppressive regime but from the effects these

operations created through removing the threat of violence

and retribution that would have strangled future

democratic progress in Panama.

Operational Surprise. A third critical factor in Operation

JUST CAUSE was achieving surprise that enabled success,

while reducing risk and loss of life. Although Thurman

noted that “surprise was increasingly difficult in the

satellite age” amid the mass of instantaneous media

reporting, both operational security and deception

remained key factors in carrying out strikes in a manner

that the enemy would not anticipate or could not counter

without significant preparation.53 Tight security among

deploying units, night movements of equipment, and night

assaults involving airborne forces from over 6,000 miles

away achieved overwhelming surprise at a time when the

enemy was most likely to be away from their posts and least

prepared. No preparatory bombing and no visible,

methodical buildups meant the enemy was unprepared for

the decisive blow. Deception played a key role as well.

Extensive troop movements throughout the country and

“routine,” large-scale combined arms training in the United

States served to desensitize the enemy to American

capabilities and dispositions. In all, the Panamanian

leadership knew the United States had the overwhelming

capability to act, but was misled by its own misperceptions

and misreadings of U.S intent.

The same will be true for RDO in the future. Enemies are

beginning to recognize patterns in U.S. operations, such as

bombing strikes and the use of Naval and Marine forces for

the opening phases, asymmetric action through special

operations or direct ground strike. While the United States

may “signal” potential opponents through options such as

deploying forces for training in areas adjacent to a crisis

region, such forces must be ready to transition into rapid,

focused, and lethal joint operations. Deception through

false signals and information operations will dissuade and

confuse an enemy on the focus of U.S. operations. Extensive

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communication and media monitoring will reveal how and

what sources the enemy will use to develop its perceptions of

American intent, thus identifying the critical nodes that

information operations will use to coerce, persuade, or

dissuade the enemy as to U.S. intentions. In all, tactical,

operational, and strategic surprise, through deception and

security, will be key enablers for achieving perceptual

effects and impairing the enemy’s situational awareness to

facilitate RDO.

Tailored Joint Forces. A fourth factor that Thurman

noted was that rapid, decisive, and simultaneous operations

required “sufficient forces of the right sort to do the

job—overwhelming, prepared to operate jointly, well

rehearsed, [and employable in a] timely [manner].” Critics

of Operation JUST CAUSE pointed to the fact that over half

the troops in the operation were already in country at the

start of the operation. However, this ignores the key fact

that the decisive strikes against the elite units of the

Panamanian Defense Forces—at Tocumen-Torrijos and Rio

Hato—came from bases in the United States. Forces located

outside the isthmus provided air, naval, and special

operations support (and superiority) such as the F-117 and

AC-130 gunships operating from the United States. Over

7,000 soldiers who struck at H-hour came from six U.S.

bases using 182 sorties of heavy lift aircraft, supported by

an extensive in-flight refueling effort. Within 24 hours, over

13,000 additional soldiers were in country, providing the

rapid buildup of forces that enabled a rapid consolidation

and transition to stability operations.54 Following were

sustainment flights that evacuated wounded and brought in

time-critical supplies. In all, superior strategic agility and

interoperability of U.S. forces generated a significant

element of decisive force.

The quantity and availability of strategic lift was critical

to rapid, simultaneous success. However, over the last

decade American forces have lost the capability to conduct

such a rapid strike due to the deterioration of the lift

capabilities. In 1999, a study by the Association of the

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United States Army of strategic mobility noted that the

ability to transport military forces rapidly across

intercontinental distances was at severe risk due to a

combination of aging fleets, retirement of C-141s (which

were backbones of deployments in the 1990s) and less than

adequate procurement of replacements (with only one C-17

for every two C-141s retired).55 A major concern for future

RDO will be the numbers and availability of airlift to

support rapid strikes such as these. The opening phases to

secure access and lodgments through asymmetrical

airborne and airland strikes will be lift-intensive.

Additionally, rapidly landing an Army Interim Brigade

Combat Team behind the airborne forces will be critical in

areas with light armored threats (such as with the Battalion

2000 in Panama) to add medium armored vehicles and

infantry strength rapidly to the fight. However, these viable

and valuable options are dependent upon strategic airlift to

mass forces rapidly. The continued degradation of strategic

lift will eliminate options such as Operation JUST CAUSE

and force more deliberate, predictable options.

The key to success in Panama was not only rapid

deployment but the use of all capabilities in a synchronized,

effective action—what future concepts call a “coherently

joint force.” The rapid, effective joint operations of

Operation JUST CAUSE came from hard, battle-focused

training across all services in the 1980’s. For Army forces,

intensive small unit training at the National Training

Center and Joint Readiness Training Center produced both

highly effective ground forces and leaders capable of facing

rapidly changing, complex situations and developing

adaptive, mission-focused results. Navy, Air Force, and

Marine units and leaders were developed through similar

large-scale, demanding training experiences within their

own services. In essence, the force which fought Operation

JUST CAUSE had already faced similar situations before in

both field and simulations training. Leaders at all levels,

across all services, were prepared for a complex, adaptive

fight. Forces honed their capabilities through intensive

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rehearsals, many joint in nature, to ensure Joint Task Force

SOUTH was fully prepared. The feedback process was also

key, with each rehearsal producing lessons to both

components and planning headquarters that fed their

reassessment and revisions of plans.

Joint rehearsals were integral to success and warrant

consideration in future training approaches at the combat

training centers. Most training centers continue to be

service-centric, i.e., focused on a single service with a few

joint add-ons. Simply adding a naval gunfire liaison officer

or a tactical air control team to Army training does not make

it “joint” and consequently does not contribute to mutual

understanding and interoperability across services. The

extensive inter-service planning and rehearsals prior to this

operation illustrates the success that can be, and must be,

achieved in the future. Consequently, joint focus should be

an integral part of training center approaches across all the

services. In the future, with compressed time sequences for

rapid and decisive action, forces will not have the extensive

preparation time found here to build and solidify joint

interoperability. Units fought effectively in the joint arena

at battalion and brigade levels because they trained that

way. Future forces must be trained to the same or better

levels on a recurring basis to be ready on short-notice.

The linchpin of success in effectively launching 20,000

soldiers from over a dozen locations, via air and ground to

strike simultaneously 27 dispersed locations was built on

the high level of training among each of the service

components, combined with the familiarity and teamwork

produced through extensive rehearsals. No matter how

sophisticated and capable equipment may become,

effectiveness will rest upon the ability of soldiers, marines,

sailors, and airmen to operate the equipment as well as to

envision and achieve the intent their leaders. No matter

what else may change, rapid decisive operations will

ultimately depend on an extraordinarily high level of

leader, unit, and staff competence that is produced through

realistic, demanding, and increasingly joint training.

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Decisive Leadership. A fifth factor that Thurman noted

was the requirement for decisive leadership at all levels.

“Leadership that understood not only the explicit order but

the implicit challenges; who were able to persevere

regardless of the vagaries of rapidly changing conditions”

enabled decentralized, aggressive action to achieve the

objectives selected.56 Across 27 different objectives at

H-hour, leaders acted in unison based on their leader’s

intent and not on incremental instructions. In the future

greater connectivity and communications capabilities will

enable senior leaders to see the same picture as the small

unit leader at the forward edge of the battlefield. However,

greater awareness should not mean more centralized

direction of those at the point of the spear. Rapid, decisive

results in Panama rested on every member of the joint

forces knowing and performing their duties simultaneously.

Tactical level commanders accomplished the close fights,

while the Joint Task Force commander ensured

synchronization and CINCSOUTH dealt with

political-military challenges: simultaneous actions across

all levels produced the “self-enabling” operational results

needed across a complex operation. Future concepts must

capitalize upon and not constrain simultaneous action:

while forces are networked and become more situationally

aware, they must still focus on decentralized, intent-based

decision making by leaders in contact with the challenges.

Senior leaders must resist the temptation of controlling

battle through “squad leaders on a wire”; the ability to see

more should not lead to the temptation to directly control

more. In all, operations in Panama were successful across a

vague, complex and dispersed battlefield in which simplicity

of command and control, mission based orders and

decentralized decision making by leaders on the spot proved

the measure of success. Future knowledge-centric

capabilities must focus on enhancing and not replacing such

a process.

Joint Task Force SOUTH as a Separate Warfighting

Headquarters. A final key element of Operation JUST

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CAUSE’s rapid success was the establishment of a Joint

Task Force well in advance of the execution date for the

operation. While SOUTHCOM and U.S. Army South

focused on the crisis unfolding in Panama, Thurman needed

a subunified headquarters separate from SOUTHCOM that

could focus on the planning and execution of strike

operations. Establishing Joint Task Force SOUTH early on

enabled focused, synchronized, joint planning across four

separate major headquarters. The Joint Staff in

Washington worked policy and strategy among the

interagency, while specific strategic planning at

SOUTHCOM focused on containing the crisis in Panama.

The XVIII Airborne Corps as Joint Task Force SOUTH

accomplished campaign planning and coordination among

the service components and the Joint Special Operations

Command. U.S. Army South’s Joint Task Force PANAMA

at Fort Clayton accomplished in-country planning,

preparations and operations leading up to the invasion.

Finally, the air component at 830th Air Division and

Twelfth Air Force completed planning for airlift and close

air support.57 In all, a complex plan was coordinated among

a number of dispersed sites and constantly updated to take

advantage of lessons learned from rehearsals as well as

intelligence on the constantly changing Panamanian

Defense Forces’ threat.

Simultaneous planning and coordination from dispersed

locations was similar to the RDO concept of distributed,

integrated planning. However, continued synchronization

and common awareness came only through extensive

planning time, travel and face-to-face contact. Future

contingencies will not allow the luxury of extensive time, so

future planning must be done to the same level of precision,

but on more compressed time sequences and without

extensive travel and physical reconnaissance. During

preparation for Operation JUST CAUSE, Hartzog observed

that synchronization and concurrent planning with the

Joint Staff in Washington was almost nonexistent:

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To my knowledge there was no significant planning about that

operation that went on in Washington anywhere. I believe

that all of it was done, it’s fair to say, in Panama and Fort

Bragg and that it was briefed to Washington for approval.

There were a considerable amount of briefings that were given

in Washington to make Washington familiar with all the parts

of it and to seek their approval. That, in fact, was one of the

great processes; the whole way that thing was done.58

While the lower headquarters enjoyed significant

latitude in planning, this lack of situational awareness in

Washington led to sequential and not simultaneous

planning between the Joint Staff and the forward

headquarters. This approach to sequential development of

objectives and proposed effects, followed by briefings to

attune Washington to the plan, and then revising the plan

based on guidance significantly increased the friction and

time needed to gain guidance and approval.

Prior detailed preparation at all levels provided success,

but as operations moved past the first 48 hours, both

SOUTHCOM and Joint Task Force SOUTH began to run

into the frictions of American hostages, large-scale civil

disturbances, and Noriega’s taking refuge in the Papal

Nuncio’s compound. Media and diplomatic pressures in

Washington caused divergence in approaches with

Thurman and Stiner who continued a hard-line approach.

The most famous instance was Thurman’s use of rock music

for psychological operations against Noriega in the Nuncio

residence—an action that resulted in embarrassment in

Washington and Powell’s order to Thurman to cease this

tactic.59 Also indicative of the divergence in perspectives

amid a fast-moving situation were the civil disturbances

and rioting, which erupted as former Dignity Battalion

members dispersed among the populace. Situational

awareness in Washington suffered as policymakers in

Washington dealt with national and international media

through sparse reports, partial dispatches, and CNN-live

reports. Disconnects also inhibited dynamic and proactive

planning. As SOUTHCOM and Joint Task Force SOUTH

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became immersed in the close-fight, staff officers were

unable to get ahead of operations to conduct an operational

net reassessment to drive future force requirements for

emerging civil-military challenges. Since the Joint Staff

was separated from the situation, it lacked the specific

situational awareness to feed the interagency

synchronization process and allow Washington to

anticipate future policy and force requirements during the

stand-up of the Endara government.

These are not indictments of SOUTHCOM or Joint Task

Force SOUTH, but are facts of life in fast moving operations.

Units must deal with the “here and now” to ensure effective

execution and take chances with the future. However, the

forces and policies future success depended upon had to be

anticipated and coordinated simultaneously—rapidity

depends on this nonsequential approach. However, better

situational awareness tools that did not require “push to

talk” technology would have provided a Common Reference

Operational Picture (CROP) and enabled the interagency

process to be more proactive. Future planning tools must

provide integrated situational awareness and collaborative

planning nets using secure communications to tie together

military headquarters with the interagency. In place of

face-to-face coordination, lower-level VTC and interneted

collaborative tools with networked white-board capabilities

will allow planners to discuss alternatives without

time-consuming travel. Equally important is integration

into this of real time intelligence and media perspectives

that fuse fact and perceptions about events as they are

unfolding in order to gauge the success of operations and the

effects they generate.

Conclusions.

Operation JUST CAUSE demonstrated that the Army

has a critical role to play in RDO. Although in recent years

the Army has been relegated to “large” missions such as

major theater conflicts in Operations DESERT

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SHIELD/DESERT STORM and “long” missions such as

peacekeeping and humanitarian support in Somalia,

Bosnia, and Kosovo, while the other members of the joint

force were left to deliver precise, rapid and decisive defeat

upon adversaries in Kosovo and Afghanistan. However,

these missions were only successful when there was time for

effects to become decisive, and where bombs and small

packets of special operations forces supplemented the direct

actions of surrogate forces such as the Kosovo Liberation

Army or Afghan fighters. These surrogates assumed the

ground force role and presented a direct, viable threat that

showed defeat would follow the bombs and cruise missiles if

the enemy did not yield.

Operation JUST CAUSE also showed that dominant

maneuver, applied in a coherently joint, overwhelming and

focused manner, could achieve rapid, decisive results in

medium- to small-scale contingency situations. Through

Ranger, Airborne, and emerging Interim Brigade Combat

Team forces, the Army will have the capability to execute

long-range, precision strike operations to deliver forces

against an adversary, followed by rapid reinforcement to

build and sustain an overwhelming force. Army forces can

and will provide short-term, broad scale expeditionary

warfare capabilities in littoral areas as well as in a diversity

of inland terrain and population areas, utilizing precision

maneuver and fires where the pure destruction of enemy

infrastructure and facilities will not produce decisive

results. Lastly, Army forces will provide the ready, in-place

capability to quickly stabilize conditions and support

establishment of a favorable government through sustained

civil-military operations. As Operation JUST CAUSE

illustrated, Army forces can provide future RDO with the

full range of capabilities to create a larger, potent, and

overwhelming joint force that optimizes the capabilities of

other services. Additionally, Army forces at the center of a

coherently joint operation will provide overwhelming

land-centric strikes, followed by the immediate capabilities

for complete, continued domination of an adversary’s

239
territory, major population centers, and resources. These

contributions create decisive effects beyond physical

destruction of infrastructure which are less a factor in

underdeveloped regions. Army forces focused on dominant,

decisive maneuver present the enemy with the possibility

(and eventual reality) of total defeat and replacement of the

enemy’s regime.

Concept developments must focus on retaining the best

of the old as well as finding new capabilities that were

lacking during Operation JUST CAUSE. Hard,

battle-focused, joint training that develops flexible and

adaptive lower-level leaders who act on intent and not

instructions must remain the centerpiece of future

developments. In all, it was “the quality of the boys and not

the toys” that provided rapid, decisive victory in Panama,

and it will be so in the future. In turn, the structures

enabling RDO must be shaped around the imperative to

enhance and empower timely, focused planning and

decisionmaking that are distributed, decentralized, and

simultaneous at all levels. Second, as Thurman noted,

simultaneous operations will not fit all situations. RDO will

not be a “one size fits all” remedy for smaller contingencies,

and must be centered around a focused, demanding

intelligence and policy assessment and reassessment

process which indicates that RDO provide the greatest

likelihood of success given the time, place, and situation

presented for the United States, its coalition partners, and

the enemy. Thurman’s five criteria for successful

“simultaneous operations”—accurate intelligence,

well-articulated and broadly supported end-states, the

opportunity for surprise, sufficient joint forces of the right

type, and decisive, focused leadership—are excellent

guidelines for assessing whether decisive operations are a

feasible, suitable, and acceptable method for employing

national power.

Finally, RDO will not be low-risk warfare. Throughout

much of the last decade, the Clinton administration

committed U.S. forces to a variety of valuable, but

240
resource-consuming peacekeeping missions, most often

with imprecise or unclear guidance on the end-states

desired. Through these operations, the Army acquired a

penchant for casualty avoidance and risk aversion. During

peace operations where end-states are often vague or

articulated in terms of “maintaining a safe and secure

environment” and “forwarding the process of peaceful

development,” operations revolved around cautious,

calculated actions which focused heavily on reducing the

risk of injury to American servicemen so as not to subject the

mission to Congressional scrutiny or media criticism. This

process and mindset runs directly counter to that required

for decisive operations. A redesigned interagency process

must provide clear and concise guidance for the use of

national, and most specifically military, power. In turn,

military force must focus on accomplishing the

overwhelming defeat of the enemy through dominant,

decisive land operations, and not on producing calculated,

low-risk operations. Where the President and the nation

demand rapid and decisive results, the Army must plan,

prepare, and act quickly to provide rapid and decisive

victory.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7

1. General Maxwell Thurman and Lieutenant General William

Hartzog, “Simultaneity”, unpublished draft, Maxwell Thurman Papers,

Military History Institute (MHI), Box 217, p. 16.

2. Thurman, “Simultaneity,” p. 17; U.S. Joint Forces Command, “A

White Paper for Rapid Decisive Operations,” U.S. Joint Forces

Command (USJFCOM): J9 Joint Futures Lab, January 2002, pp. 2-4.

3. Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy, Princeton, NJ,

1986, pp. 341-342.

4. Honorable Les Aspin, “Operation JUST CAUSE: Lessons and

Warnings in the Future Use of Military Force,” U.S. Congress: House

Committee on Armed Services, January 12, 1990, p. 3; Maxwell

Thurman Papers, “JUST CAUSE,” MHI, Box 217.

5. USJFCOM, “White Paper,” pp. 3-5; USJFCOM, “Executive

Summary: A White Paper for Rapid Decisive Operations”, USJFCOM:

J9 Joint Futures Lab, January 2002, p. 1.

241
6. Eytan Bilboa, “The Panama Invasion Revisited: Lesson for the

Use of Force in the Post Cold War Era,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol.

110, No. 4, p. 539; Walter LaFeber, The Panama Canal: The Crisis in

Historical Perspective, Oxford, 1989, pp. 42-47.

7. Major General William Hartzog, “Oral History Program: JUST

CAUSE,” Fort Clayton, Panama: History Office, Headquarters, U.S.

Army South, p. 7; Ronald H. Cole, Operation JUST CAUSE: The

Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama, February

1988-January 1990, Washington, DC, 1995, pp. 12-25.

8. Hartzog, “Oral History,” pp. 7-8.

9. Ibid. Hartzog noted a “gradualist approach” had already begun

under General Woerner in June in response to rapidly deteriorating

events; in all he appraised the change that brought new urgency under

Thurman, as “a revolution within an evolution.” On the threat, Hartzog

noted that “we never felt the PDF was an enemy. . . . It was only that

Noriega and his immediate henchmen were the problem.”

10. “Lead-Pipe Politics,” Time, May 22, 1989.

11. General Maxwell Thurman, ”Brief Given to National Defense

University, January 31, 1990: Operation JUST CAUSE—Mission

Accomplished,” Thurman Papers, “CINC SOUTHCOM-JUST CAUSE,”

MHI, Box 217; Execute Order, CJCS, 182325ZDec89, Thurman Papers,

“CINCSOUTHCOM-JUST CAUSE,” Box 217, MHI.

12. This was not meant to be a condemnation of USARSO who

formed the nucleus of JTF-Panama, but they were concerned with the

day-to-day security, training, and stability within the country,

especially given the increased tensions and buildup of U.S. forces in

country. JTF-South would be able to stand-back from the situation and

focus on the planning and synchronization of such a complex operation,

without alerting the enemy to U.S. intentions. Cole, pp. 9-17. Major

General Marc Cisneros, Commander U.S. Army South, takes the

opposite opinion, that JTF-SO came too late to the fight to be fully

functional, but does not acknowledge the workload and diversity his

small headquarters suffered under. David Adams, “An Overlooked Hero

and the forgotten Victims,” New York Times, December 21, 1999, pp.1-4.

13. Just before the invasion, a PDF informant reported that Cuban

advisors assisted the PDF in forming a 250-man militia force to terrorize

and possibly kidnap U.S. citizens living in the canal zone with the idea of

preempting U.S. military action and discrediting the Bush

Administration. Subsequent attacks on U.S. servicemen, to include the

killing of Lieutenant Paz on December 17, 1989, tended to confirm these

reports. Michael E. Seitz, “Command, Control, Communications and

Intelligence Factors,” in Bruce Watson and Peter G. Tsouras, eds.,

Operation JUST CAUSE: The U.S. Intervention in Panama, Boulder,

CO, 1991, pp. 105-114.

242
14. Robert R. Ropelewski, “Planning, Precision, and Surprise Led

to Panama Success,” Armed Forces Journal International, February

1990, pp. 25-26.

15. “The Architect of ‘JUST CAUSE’,” Army Times, March 12, 1990,

p. 18; Bruce B. Auster, “Military Lessons of the Invasion,” U.S. News

and World Report, January 8, 1990, pp. 22-24.; Seitz, “Command,

Control, Communications,” pp. 109-110.

16. Thurman Brief; Cole, “Operation JUST CAUSE,” p. 20.

17. Cole, pp. 20-21.

18. The battalion, 3/504 Airborne Infantry, was one of the units

rotating through the Jungle Operations Training Center at Ft.

Sherman; it would not drop along with the remainder of its regiment but

remain under control of the 7th ID(L throughout). Dennis Steele,

“Operation JUST CAUSE,” Army, February 1990, p. 41; Cole,

“Operation JUST CAUSE,” p. 21; Thomas Donnelly, et al., Operation

JUST CAUSE: The Storming of Panama, New York, 1991, pp. 236-267.

19. Cole, “Operation JUST CAUSE,” p. 21.

20. Ibid.

21. Donnelly, et al., Operation JUST CAUSE, pp. 93-97.

22. Thurman Brief to NDU; Cole, “Operation JUST CAUSE,” p. 28.

23. Donnelly, et al., Operation JUST CAUSE, pp. 130-159; Lorenzo

Crowell, “The Anatomy of JUST CAUSE,” in Bruce Watson and Peter G.

Tsouras, eds., Operation JUST CAUSE: The U.S. Intervention in

Panama, Boulder, CO, 1991, pp. 84-85.

24. Donnelly, et al., Operation JUST CAUSE, pp. 122-130.

25. Crowell, “The Anatomy of JUST CAUSE,” p. 84. Special

Operations teams were watching a total of seven sites that Noriega had

been known to frequent, but his mistress later said that he was actually

in a hotel outside the Torrijos Airport when the Rangers made their

assault. Although he was not captured initially, the combined actions of

special forces ensured that he had no way of escaping the country.

26. Ibid., p. 87. This also exposed a problem in depending on air

evacuation for the wounded. As the SEALs were pinned down, they were

unable to evacuate their wounded for several hours until relieved by

elements of the 82nd Airborne.

27. This element of the 82nd was initially deployed for training at

the Jungle Operations Training Center and did not jump in the airborne

assault with the remainder of the division.

243
28. Crowell, “The Anatomy of JUST CAUSE,” p. 89.

29. Ibid., p. 90.

30. Ibid.; Donnelly, et al., Operation JUST CAUSE, pp. 192-213.

31. Crowell, p. 91. The departure airfield at Pope Air Force Base

had only enough de-icing equipment to handle six aircraft at a time. The

troops loaded the aircraft on time, but sat waiting while aircraft were

de-iced and the aircraft were launched in several serials, with all drops

finally completed just before dawn at 5:15 a.m.

32. Dennis Steele, “Operation JUST CAUSE,” Army, February

1990, p. 41.

33. Crowell, p. 91. The late arrival of Task Force PACIFIC forced a

daylight assault that made the helicopters very vulnerable to ground

fire; most of the 45 helicopters hit by hostile fire during the operation

were hit during daylight operations on the first day.

34. Daniel P. Bolger, Death Ground: Today’s American Infantry in

Battle, Novato, CA, 1999, pp. 48-60; USAWC Department of Strategy,

Planning and Operations, “Case Study: Operation JUST CAUSE,

Panama, 1989,” Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, 2002, p. 27.

35. Institute of Land Warfare, Strategic Mobility, and Responsive

Power Projection, Washington, DC, 1999, pp. 1-3; Crowell, “The

Anatomy of JUST CAUSE,” p. 75; Norris Lyn McCall, “Assessing the

Role of Air Power,” in Watson and Tsouras, Operation JUST CAUSE,

pp. 115-121.

36. Crowell, “The Anatomy of JUST CAUSE,” pp. 75-81.

37. Ibid., p. 81.

38. Richard H. Shultz, In the Aftermath of War: U.S. Support for

Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama Following JUST

CAUSE, Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1993, p. 16.

39. U.S. Army War College, “Case Study: Operation JUST

CAUSE,” p. 28; Shultz, In the Aftermath of War, pp. 16-19.

40. Ibid., p. 44. In all, there was little nonmilitary involvement in

the preintervention planning process. The Secretary of Defense was

undoubtedly briefed on the plan, but it remains unclear as to whether

the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy or the Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict, both charged by

Goldwater-Nichols to review military planning, were involved in the

planning process. Additionally, there is no indication that any

non-Defense Department agencies, particularly the State Department,

had enough knowledge of the operation to do their own contingency

244
planning. In all, there is no indication in developing a rapid and decisive

military option that the interagency process was energized to develop a

plan for following military victory with political-economic action to

emplace and support a new Panamanian government that replaced

Noriega and the PDF.

41. Shultz, In the Aftermath of War, pp. 15-22; Cole, “Operation

JUST CAUSE,” pp. 66-67. The first civil affairs reserve personnel did

not arrive until 6 days after the start of the operation; 25 civil affairs

reservists arrived on December 26, with 120 more on January 1, 1990,

and 155 on January 15, 1990. However, the key here is that most were

reservists on short tours of duty, 30 days or less, which led to a problem

of “revolving door” forces that were constantly transitioning through,

thus inhibiting any capability for civil-military operations to develop

continuity or build relationships with the Endara government.

42. Aspin, “Operation JUST CAUSE: Lessons and Warnings in the

Future Use of Military Force,” pp. 7-8.

43. Ibid.

44. Major General Marc A. Cisneros, “Oral History Program: JUST

CAUSE,” Fort Clayton, Panama, History Office, Headquarters, U.S.

Army South, June 12, 1990, pp. 9-13; David Adams, “An Overlooked

Hero and the Forgotten Victims,” New York Times, December 21, 1999,

pp. 1-4.

45. Shultz, In the Aftermath of War, p. 33; John T. Fishel, “The Fog

of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama,” Carlisle

Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 1992, p. 7.

46. Department of Defense, Defense Planning Guidance,

Washington, DC, 2000.

47. Thurman, “Simultaneity,” p. 18.

48. Ibid., p. 4.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid., pp. 8, 18.

51. Ibid., pp. 16-17.

52. Gilboa, “The Panama Invasion Revisited,” pp. 539-560.

53. Thurman, “Simultaneity,” pp. 21.

54. Institute of Land Warfare, Strategic Mobility and Responsive

Power Projection, pp. 1-4.

55. Ibid., pp. 7, 18-19.

245
56. Thurman, “Simultaneity,” p. 14.

57. Ibid.

58. Hartzog, Oral History, p. 8.

59. Cole, “Operation JUST CAUSE,” pp. 57-63.

246
CHAPTER 8

TRANSFORMING THE INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY

Lieutenant Colonel Steven L. Salazar

The challenge to the Intelligence Community is to harvest the

vast amounts of information and ensure commanders are not

overwhelmed or deceived during their decisionmaking

process.

Lieutenant General Robert W. Noonan

U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence1

President George W. Bush has set the United States on a

course to eradicate transnational terrorism. The U.S. Army

will clearly play a major role in this effort at home and

abroad. Essential to success will be the support provided by

the national intelligence community. Unfortunately,

America’s intelligence efforts, although well-meaning and

well-funded, are not organized to support national security

effectively. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is

“central” in name only. It does little to coordinate an overall

intelligence effort by the government’s different agencies.

As a result, the nation needs a restructuring of the roles and

responsibilities of the numerous and varied agencies that

conduct intelligence operations. Legislation is the only

feasible means to effect the changes necessary to provide

America with the security that a $30 billion budget for

intelligence should buy.2

Following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the

Pentagon, Bush declared war on terrorism. He and his

administration made clear they will use all the resources of

the national government, including diplomatic, military,

247
informational and economic, to destroy transnational

terrorism. The effort has begun in Afghanistan against the

Al Queda network and the Taliban regime. But Bush has

stated that operations in Afghanistan are only the

beginning. There are indications the military focus will

move to Somalia, while some call for direct action to

eliminate Sadam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. In his 2002 State

of the Union address, Bush argued there were at least a

dozen countries which harbored terrorists and mentioned

Iran, Iraq, and North Korea specifically.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Government is taking

unprecedented measures to ensure the security of the

Homeland. Bush has designated former Pennsylvania

Governor Tom Ridge as the first director for Homeland

Security, and the Department of Defense (DoD) has

proposed to modify the Unified Command Plan to establish

a new regional Commander in Chief (CINC) responsible for

defense of the homeland. In any case, the role of Army forces

in the continental United States has changed for the

foreseeable future. Soldiers patrol the nation’s airports and

guard nuclear power plants and other critical

infrastructures. The President himself has announced a $48

billion increase in the defense budget to provide, among

other things, defense of America’s borders.

The Army has a role in both aspects of this new war—the

elimination of transnational threats and homeland

security. In neither will the Army act alone. In each case, it

must operate supported by, in support of, or in coordination

with other services, agencies and, in some cases, other

national partners. In the strategic framework, the Army

may have to support the U.S. Government’s or coalition’s

diplomatic, military, informational, or economic efforts.

America has declared war on terrorism, but increasingly

the U.S. Government and Americans are realizing that the

threat, and the effort to eradicate it, are much greater than

initially thought. Terrorism itself is one of a group of

transnational threats, along with drug trafficking, weapons

248
of mass destruction (WMD), international organized crime,

and attacks on computer networks. One can characterize

such threats by their geography. Yet, they truly represent

asymmetric ways for groups, subnations, and even nations

to achieve their political aims. Regardless of how distorted

and legitimate those aims may seem, asymmetric means

will be an integral part of 21st century warfare. These new

and emerging threats have appeared at the same time that

a new American way of war has appeared—one in which,

although the undisputed world power, the United States

pays great deference to international and domestic opinion.

Collateral damage, civilian casualties, fratricide, and the

risk of casualties have all become major considerations in

the use of force.

The Army has begun its transformation to meet the

security requirements of the 21st century. Information

dominance is key to transformation success. The Army’s

intelligence transformation campaign plan describes a

future where “Army Intelligence will be a globally focused,

rapidly deployable, knowledge-based force,”3 with its basic

tenets “see first, act first, and finish decisively.”4 It aims to

link intelligence experts with decisionmakers and their

staffs. Its goal is an Army “that meshes with the intelligence

community as a whole to fill future requirements in its

multimission [sic] agenda.”5 Unfortunately, the intelligence

community is not on course to meet the Army’s

requirements.

The emergence and proliferation of asymmetric threats,

combined with the complex and accepted American way of

using force, creates unprecedented demands on

intelligence. No longer does American national security

depend on monitoring a single evil—the Soviet Union. But,

America’s intelligence community was organized, albeit not

well, to counter the Soviet threat. In the post-Cold War

security environment, intelligence requirements have

become increasingly complex, making the business of

identifying requirements, establishing priorities, collecting,

analyzing, and disseminating intelligence significantly

249
more challenging. Yet the Intelligence Community has

failed to transform itself to meet the challenges of the 21st

century.

The 13 organizations that comprise the intelligence

community are barely a community, much less a tightly

structured organization serving national security. They are

a community, and like neighbors, sometimes they share

valuable information—and sometimes not. The Director of

Central Intelligence has the responsibility for managing

collection priorities and the coordination and the analysis of

information to provide intelligence for decisionmakers. But

he has no statutory authority beyond the CIA itself to

accomplish these tasks. Instead, the Director must rely on a

network of collaboration and his powers of persuasion with

organizations larger and better funded than his.

Management of collection priorities and coordination of

information is a complex business. Moreover, the threats

facing America in the 21st century are complex and

multifunctional. These features alone would make analysis

a challenge. But to make matters worse, there is no central

collection or analysis function.

The poorly organized intelligence apparatus has

resorted to a conglomeration of ad hoc committees, cells,

centers, and studies that attempt to pull together a myriad

of intelligence functions and issues. In recent years, the

community has successfully consolidated some functions

under the DoD. The National Reconnaissance Organization

and National Imagery and Mapping Agency have

integrated functions formerly performed across various

governmental departments and agencies. As a result, they

have become the preeminent organizations in their fields.

The National Security Agency is already the world’s

preeminent signals, electronic, and communications

intelligence organization. Although preeminent in their

fields, none of these agencies answer directly to the Director

of Central Intelligence. The relationship between the

Director of Central Intelligence and DoD intelligence

organizations is exacerbated by the Director’s position as

250
the head of the CIA. The National Security Agency and the

CIA have developed cultures with a general disdain or at

best distrust of one another. The current situation is worse

than that faced by Dwight D. Eisenhower when he realized

that each of the military service’s intelligence agencies was

operating independently. The fix came in 1961 with the

formation of the Defense Intelligence Organization that

brought together each service office and a number of

functional offices within a single organization.

It took an act of Congress to create the intelligence

community, and it will take Congress to fix it. The National

Security Act of 1947 created the National Security Council,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the CIA. Each, as originally

organized, represented compromises between Congress, the

executive branch, and the military services. None possess

the organization and authorities warranted by their

mandated missions. The National Security Council has

evolved by presidential decree (Presidential Decision

Directives, or PDDs) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff through

Congressional oversight, debate, and, most significantly,

the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. Yet

Congress has failed to address organizational and statutory

authorities necessary to make the CIA the coordinating

body that it was originally intended to be. Whether the

solution is to give more authority to the Director of Central

Intelligence, transform the CIA into a true central

intelligence and analysis agency, or create new

organizations while eliminating others, Congress must

transform the intelligence community to meet the

challenges of the 21st century. The security threats of the

21st century require an intelligence apparatus that can

efficiently and effectively manage collection priorities,

conduct analysis, and disseminate intelligence to national

and tactical decisionmakers alike in a usable and timely

manner.

251
Transnational Threats.

A quick look at the extent of those threats suggests why

Congress must address the issues involved in a

fundamental reorganization of U.S. intelligence. America’s

war on terrorism has quickly broadened to include other

transnational threats. The Defense Intelligence Agency

(DIA) defines transnational threats as “any transnational

(across international borders) activity that threatens the

national security.”6 Terrorism, drug trafficking, and the

proliferation of WMD represent the predominant threats.

The Bush administration has made clear that each of these,

along with nations that support them, is a target for the war

on terrorism. These threats present a more complex

intelligence challenge than that posed by the former Soviet

Union.

U.S. law defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically

motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant

targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents,

usually intended to influence an audience.”7 A recent

National Intelligence Council report assessed that

terrorism:

. . . will be directed at the United States and its overseas

interests. Most anti-US terrorism will be based on perceived

ethnic, religious or cultural grievances. Terrorist groups will

continue to find ways to attack U.S. military and diplomatic

facilities abroad. Such attacks are likely to expand increasingly

to include U.S. companies and American citizens.8

International terrorist organizations such as Al Queda

are sophisticated in their use of legitimate and illegitimate

means to execute asymmetric attacks. Smuggling, drug

trafficking, international crime organizations, computer

networks, and in some cases sovereign nations provide the

means for terrorist organizations to achieve their aims. The

National Security Strategy states that additional

transnational threats include “other criminal activities, and

potential threats to critical infrastructure such as computer

252
network attacks.”9 The Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI) defines International Organized Crime as a

“continual criminal conspiracy having a firm organizational

structure.”10 It operates by “fear and corruption.” Some such

organizations are powerful enough to influence nations and

provide a means for the financing, equipping and

transportation of terrorists. President William J. Clinton’s

PDD-42 calls transnational criminal syndicates a “threat to

U.S. national security”11 and to countries and regions all

over the world. Such criminal activity includes narcotics

trafficking, illegal immigration, money laundering,

smuggling of nuclear and chemical weapons material,

assassinations, and bribery of government officials.

“Criminal enterprises now move large sums through the

international financial system that dwarf the gross national

product of some nations.”12

While illegal narcotics trade undermines U.S. society

and costs America “over $110 billion per year,”13 it also

provides substantial financial support for terrorist

organizations. Drug trafficking in Afghanistan, and Latin

and South America provides funds for terrorist

organizations that target America. There often is a nexus

between terrorism and organized crime, including drug

trafficking. Links between terrorist organizations and drug

traffickers take many forms, ranging from facilitation or

protection, transportation, and taxation to direct trafficking

by the terrorist organization itself in order to finance its

activities. Traffickers and terrorists have similar logistical

needs in terms of material and the covert movement of

goods, people, and money.

Relationships between drug traffickers and terrorists

benefit both. Drug traffickers benefit from the terrorists’

military skills, weapons supply, and access to clandestine

organizations. Terrorists gain a source of revenue and

expertise in illicit transfer and laundering of proceeds from

illicit transactions. Both groups corrupt officials whose

services provide mutual benefits, such as greater access to

253
fraudulent documents, including passports and customs

papers.

Drug traffickers may also gain considerable freedom of

movement when they operate in conjunction with terrorists

who control large amounts of territory. In the past, state

sponsors provided funding for terrorists, and their

relationships with terrorist organizations secured territory

or provided access to arms networks. Lately, however, as

state sponsorship of terrorism has come under increased

scrutiny and greater international condemnation, terrorist

groups have looked increasingly at drug trafficking as a

source of revenue. But trafficking often has a two-fold

purpose for the terrorists. Not only does it provide funds, it

also furthers the strategic objectives of the terrorists. Some

terrorist groups believe that they can weaken their enemies

by flooding their societies with addictive drugs.14 Cracking

into these organizations and their connections requires

sophisticated and tightly orchestrated intelligence efforts,

employing a variety of collection functions and agencies.

The threat posed by WMD presents the greatest concern

to U.S. officials. That threat includes the employment of

chemical, biological, nuclear, and high explosive weapons.

Thus far, the United States has witnessed the effects of both

biological (anthrax) and high explosive (commercial

aircraft) weapons. PDD-39 gives the WMD strategy with

“four elements: intelligence and warning; prevention and

deterrence; crisis and consequence management; and

acquisition of equipment and technology.”15 Information

obtained from caves in Afghanistan indicates the intent and

willingness of Al Queda to use WMD.

Unfortunately, both the technology and materials are

available. Following the demise of the Soviet Union, there

have been some indications of the smuggling of unsecured

fissile materials. There have been reports in 1993 of “tons of

weapons grade material and thousands of warheads in

Russian facilities” with rudimentary to nonexistent

security. Moreover, Russian counterintelligence reported

254
“90 thefts from military and nuclear camps and 700 of

related technology.”16 Tracking these materials requires a

vast effort across intelligence functions and in cooperation,

wittingly or otherwise, with a variety of actors.

Terrorist organizations themselves have become

increasingly adept at the use of modern technology. In a

recently released Al Jazeera interview conducted in October

2001, bin Laden scoffed at U.S. concerns that he might use

secret signals on media releases. In the interview, he

wonders how Americans could underestimate his use of

modern communications systems; saying, “as if we were

living in the time of mail by carrier pigeons, when there

were no phones, no travelers, no internet, no regular mail,

no express mail, no electronic mail.”17

In the 21st century, computer network attacks are

already a growing concern. Although merely a nuisance so

far, they could threaten the disruption of critical services

and economic systems. The Final Report of the President’s

Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection,

“estimates that by 2002, a worldwide population of

approximately 19 million will have the skills to mount a

cyber attack.”18 A recent public report by the DoD (the

National Communications System), indicates that

currently at least ten countries possess offensive

information warfare capabilities comparable to our own.

Moreover, the Government Accounting Office reports that

approximately 120 nations have some sort of computer

attack capability.19

Each of these represents a transnational threat based on

their geo-strategic nature. Yet, each represents an

asymmetric threat as well. Asymmetric means are “any

unconventional or inexpensive method or means used to

avoid our strengths, and exploit our vulnerabilities.”20 It is

more valuable to view transnational threats not as a

distinct set, but merely another approach for other nations,

sub-nations, or groups to achieve their objectives with the

available means. It would be naive to think that nations

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such as Iraq and China are not clever enough to recognize

they cannot match America’s conventional military

strength. Thus, it is in their interest to pursue asymmetric

methods. So, perhaps these threats should not be

characterized on the basis of their geographic nature, but

rather on their characteristics. The U.S. Government’s

approach to dealing with transnational threats should be no

different than that used to counter any threat to national

security. The National Security Strategy requires the

capacity to shape the environment, deter such threats,

detect and interdict activities, protect forces and civilian

population, and mitigate consequences should an attack

occur.21 In any case, the intelligence community is critical to

the implementation of strategy. Yet, the U.S. Intelligence

Community remains organized for the last war—the Cold

War.

The Intelligence Challenge.

Accurate intelligence significantly enhances the effectiveness of

diplomatic and military undertakings; while good intelligence

cannot guarantee good policy, poor intelligence frequently

contributes to policy failure.22

Intelligence requirements to support the National

Security Strategy and the Bush administration’s war on

terrorism and meet the challenges presented by

transnational and asymmetric threats are complex,

multifunctional, interagency, and multinational. The effort

requires intelligence functions from high-tech to human

intelligence and analysis of open sources; it requires a

variety of communications and interpretation systems; and

it challenges compartmentalization and civil liberties.

Requirements range from identifying Taliban or Al Queda

targets in Afghanistan to assessing the stability of the

Pakistani government; from protecting Americans abroad

to tracking WMD materials, or investigating illegal

immigrants. The intelligence challenge is complicated by

the way the U.S. Government employs the elements of its

national power—especially the use of force. Rather than

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transform the U.S. intelligence community to meet these

requirements, the national security establishment

continues to create ad hoc organizations to face new and

emerging threats.

Intelligence is “information not publicly available, or

analysis based at least in part on such information, that has

been prepared for policymakers or other actors inside the

government.”23 The ultimate purpose of U.S. intelligence is

to enhance national security by informing policymakers and

supporting military operations. To perform this function,

the intelligence community must identify intelligence

requirements, prioritize collection, conduct analysis, and

package it into a timely and useful product. The functions of

intelligence are generally identification of requirements,

prioritization, collection, analysis, and dissemination.

Requirements are what one needs to know to support policy

or operations. Prioritization involves the allocation of

resources to obtain information. Collection is the act of

obtaining information from open or protected sources using

active or passive means in various mediums such as human,

signals, electronic, or measures and signatures. Analysis is

the process of turning raw data or information into usable

intelligence. And, dissemination is the distribution of

intelligence in a timely and usable form to the customer.

In his article “Projecting Intelligence, Surveillance, and

Reconnaissance in Support of the Interim Brigade Combat

Team,” Lieutenant Colonel Stephen P. Perkins has

identified intelligence requirements for tactical units in the

future combat environment. He notes that it will require a

“coordinated effort by the Intelligence Community

(services, joint, and national/interagency) to provide an

Army or Joint Strike Force with the ability to achieve

intelligence superiority throughout the battle space.” He

anticipated before the events of September 11 that “the

most challenging scenario for American forces and the

Intelligence Community lies in a nonlinear, asymmetric

battlefield that encompasses America, its allies, and a

geographic command’s area of operations.” The current

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effort includes each of these, but with operations in nearly

every regional command.

Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence Lieutenant

General Robert Noonan notes that “the Army will require a

vast amount of information from a wide variety of

intelligence sources and needs to find new and better ways

of operating.” He argues that, the Army is “trying to

integrate what we call ‘space to mud,’ which is an

architecture that can leverage everything that pertains to

the commander’s requirements.” The accomplishment of

such an objective requires “a collaborative environment

that allows [the commander] to grab information that

resides within the intelligence community.”24 The ability to

reach back to this fusion of intelligence is essential for

success in the war on terrorism. Unfortunately, the

intelligence community Noonan wants to reach back to is

not organized to provide the “fused” intelligence he needs—

particularly given the complex way in which America uses

force.

The new American way of war pays deference to world

opinion and carefully considers the risk of casualties.

Collateral damage and the inadvertent killing of noncombatants have strategic implications. Perkins notes that

intelligence can support such rules of engagement by

providing situational and cultural understanding.

Consideration of risk must be a key aspect of how the

American government operates. Many perceive Americans

and especially the military as risk averse. Risk to forces and

consequences of action are considerations, but should not be

obstacles to action. Nonetheless, such considerations

demand a high level of resolution and certainty in

intelligence, whether to support the execution of dominant

maneuver and precision engagement or to defend the

homeland.

As the U.S. Government becomes increasingly

sophisticated in its use of the elements of national power,

intelligence requirements become likewise more

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sophisticated and complex. The orchestration of these

elements is the purview of the National Security Council.

Clinton added the National Economic Council to focus

government efforts on the economy. The attacks of

September 11 prompted Bush to establish the Office of

Homeland Security on a par with the National Security

Council. Further, National Security Advisor Dr.

Condoleezza Rice called on retired General Wayne Downing

to serve as Deputy Director for Counter Terrorism.

Together, these organizations are responsible for

orchestrating each element of the Government toward the

common security objective. The intelligence community

now must respond to the requirements of each of the

national offices. In recent years, the line between national

and tactical activities has become less distinct. In fact,

national and tactical capabilities are increasingly

complementary. Unfortunately, the U.S. Intelligence

Community is not effectively organized to coordinate

intelligence and create the fused, reach-back sources of

intelligence that Noonan hopes to get, nor is it optimized to

serve the increasing array of national level organizations.

Reorganization of the intelligence community must be the

basis for transforming U.S. intelligence. Organizational

changes are necessary to bring coherence to collection

functions, eliminate duplication in noncritical areas, and

integrate administrative activities. 25

The Intelligence Community.

The organization and leadership of the intelligence

community is a structural oddity.

Report of an Independent Task Force

on Making Intelligence Smarter:

The Future of U.S. Intelligence26

The U.S. intelligence community, although the largest

and most expensive in the world, is not organized to

effectively support national security requirements. The

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National Security Strategy states that the intelligence

community provides:

Critical support for the full range of our involvement abroad.

Comprehensive collection and analytic capabilities are needed

to provide early warning of threats to U.S. national security,

give analytical support to policy, law enforcement, and military

communities, enable near-real time intelligence while retaining

global perspectives, identify opportunities for advancing our

national interests, and maintain our information advantage in

the international arena. 27

The intelligence community is a concept through which

the intelligence functions of national agencies and

government departments coordinate and share

intelligence. It comprises 13 organizations representing

various functions and departments of government loosely

tied together under the auspices of the Director for Central

Intelligence.

Figure 1. The Intelligence Community.

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One can divide national intelligence into broad

categories that include 1) strategic—supporting policy

decisions, 2) operational and tactical—supporting military

commanders, 3) foreign intelligence—the charter of the

Director for Central Intelligence, and 4) domestic—the

purview of the Director of the FBI. Additionally, the

intelligence community supports national security

requirements by conducting clandestine, covert,

counterintelligence and counterterrorism operations. The

U.S. Government’s intelligence apparatus performs one or

more of these functions, to a greater or lesser extent, in each

of the 13 organizations. The Intelligence Community’s

efforts are tied together through community cells and

centers such as the Crime and Narcotics Center, the

Nonproliferation Center, and the Counterterrorism Center,

all managed by a series of 32 panels, committees, groups,

and boards.28 Congress provides operating funds through

the six different departments and agencies with oversight

from up to eight different Senate and House committees.

Finally, the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible

for coordinating the intelligence community’s effort to

provide the nation’s intelligence; he is the head of the

community and is responsible for “directing and conducting

all national foreign intelligence and counterintelligence

activities.”29

The Director of Central Intelligence. The Director of

Central Intelligence is responsible, as head of the

intelligence community, for carrying out intelligence

activities for the conduct of “foreign relations and U.S.

national security” to include the “production and

dissemination of finished intelligence.”30

Despite his title, the director of Central Intelligence neither by

law, directive, or otherwise, is the central director of the total

intelligence effort of the government. Actually, his control of

intelligence operations is restricted to those of the CIA. On the

other hand, he does have a broad responsibility for the

correlation, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence

related to national security.31

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Without statutory authority, the Director of Central

Intelligence’s “effectiveness in carrying out these activities

largely depends on continuous and effective communication

between personnel of the intelligence and policymaking

elements of the government.”32 Former Director of Central

Intelligence Richard Helms, in the wake of a series of

bureaucratic defeats, gave up on attempts at managing the

intelligence community. He later observed to his staff that,

while he

was theoretically responsible for 100 percent of the nation’s

intelligence activities, he in fact controlled less than 15 percent

of the community’s assets—and most of the other 85 percent

belonged to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of

Staff.33

Under such circumstances, Helms concluded, it was

unrealistic for any Director of Central Intelligence to think

that he could have a significant influence on U.S

intelligence resource decisions or the shaping of the

intelligence community.

The original intent behind creation of the CIA was to

serve as a coordinating body for government intelligence

activities. But, from the “outset no department was willing

to concede a centralized intelligence function to the CIA.”34

The National Security Act of 1947 established the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council, and the CIA.

As with most things American, each represented a

compromise of the optimal roles, responsibilities, and

organization. Legislation, particularly the GoldwaterNichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, has improved

coordination between the military services. The National

Security Council has been able to modify itself to the

requirements of each president. Unfortunately, the CIA

remains an organization without the authority to perform

its intended role of coordinating the American intelligence

effort.35

In fact, the CIA has focused its efforts on the Cold War

requirement for clandestine operations at the expense of

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analysis and is “considered one of the weakest links in our

national security.”36 It is really two organizations in one.

The Directorate of Intelligence is responsible for directing

and analyzing intelligence, while the Directorate of

Operations conducts covert and clandestine operations.

Each has evolved and operates now “with separate

personnel, vastly different cultures and missions...

[within] rigid organizational barriers.”37 Initially, the

Directorate of Operations flourished without ever having

been authorized by the National Security Act or any

subsequent legislation and with little Congressional

oversight because presidents wanted it too. It has conducted

operations “solely on the basis of presidential orders, memos

and directives.”38 Covert action is fundamentally different

from intelligence collection and analysis. It is intelligence

used as an instrument of foreign policy. Such actions seek to

influence the political, economic, or military situation in a

foreign country without revealing American involvement in

the activity.”39 While the clandestine role of the agency

flourished, its coordination efforts—those for which it was

created—have floundered.

Cultural problems in the intelligence community are

serious, but are most severe at the CIA. Former Director of

Central Intelligence Robert James Woolsey, Jr., was the

first to state publicly that culture was a problem at the CIA,

“but he showed little understanding of it and its

manifestations.”40 He also did little to change it before his

departure. Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch

noted the importance of changing the culture of the

Directorate of Operations during his confirmation

hearing.41 The Directorate of Operations “jealously guards

its information holdings, including those that could be of use

to the analytic community.” 4 2 Robin W. Winks,

distinguished Yale University historian who served in the

Office of Strategic Services during World War II and in its

successor, the CIA, concluded, “research and analysis are at

the core of intelligence. [Most] ‘facts’ are without meaning;

someone must analyze even the most easily obtained

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data.”43 Analysis organizations filter and evaluate raw

intelligence information for consumers. The Directorate of

Intelligence has, “in aggregate, [the] finest analytic

capabilities in the Intelligence Community, as well as the

broadest range of responsibilities and consumers.”44 The

overall performance of intelligence depends critically on

good analysis.

The National Security Act was a compromise that arose

from intense bureaucratic conflict. Formation of the CIA

challenged the roles within the State, Defense, and Justice

departments. The price was statutory provisions that

created a CIA that was incapable of centralizing

intelligence. So Truman did not get the centralizing

function he had hoped for and executives since “have

developed alternative ways of centralizing and analyzing

intelligence.”45 Consequently, 32 ad hoc organizations

(panels, committees, groups, and boards) manage national

intelligence and represent executive, legislative, or

administrative fixes to perceived problems or emerging

threats. The CIA receives “just over 10 percent of the

resources the United States spends on intelligence.”46 And,

it is the only one of the four “national” level intelligence

agencies not operated by the DoD.

Department of Defense.

At DIA and the military services, there is an element anti-CIA

feeling that probably reflects portions of jealousy, lack of

understanding, turf consciousness, and animosity toward

civilians doing national security work. At the same time, in my

experience, most uniformed personnel have little

understanding of CIA’s capabilities. If anything, the military’s

view of INR is even more negative—for even less reason. 47

The preponderance of national intelligence resides

within DoD. Defense Department elements of the

intelligence community include the National Security

Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National

Imagery and Mapping Agency, DIA, and the intelligence

components of each of the four military services—Army,

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Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps Intelligence. DIA is the

senior military intelligence component of the Intelligence

Community.

Established in 1961, DIA’s primary mission is to provide

all-source intelligence to the armed forces of the United

States. Its creation was intended to consolidate intelligence

“activities duplicated in each of the military services and at

major military commands.”48 Yet each service has retained

its intelligence roles to support its unique requirements.

Each, in turn, operates an intelligence center such as the

Army’s National Ground Intelligence Center. The National

Ground Intelligence Center provides “scientific and

technical intelligence (S&TI) and general military

intelligence (GMI) on foreign ground forces in support of the

warfighting commanders, force and material developers,

DA [Department of the Army], DOD, and National-level

decisionmakers.”49 The other service centers perform

similar medium based functions. In carrying out its

missions, DIA coordinates and synthesizes military

intelligence analysis for Defense officials and military

commanders worldwide, working in close concert with the

intelligence components of the military services and the

U.S. unified commands.50 According to a Georgetown

University study in early 1995, DIA and the services had

some 13,000 people conducting analysis, versus 1,500

analysts at the CIA.51

Truman directed the establishment of the National

Security Agency in 1952 as a separately organized agency

within the DoD. It is responsible for planning, coordinating,

directing, and performing foreign signals intelligence and

information security functions. In its signals intelligence

role, the National Security Agency intercepts and analyzes

foreign electromagnetic signals—many of them protected

by codes, ciphers, and complex electronic, countermeasures—to produce intelligence information for

decisionmakers and military commanders. A fundamental

mission and core competency of the National Security

Agency is the ability to understand foreign

265
communications, while protecting its own. The United

States leads the world in this capability. It confers a unique

competitive advantage, but maintaining this advantage

requires preservation of a healthy cryptological capability

in the face of unparalleled technical challenges.

Unfortunately, the valuable functions provided by the

National Security Agency are not as closely coordinated

with the CIA as they could be. Opportunities to achieve

synergistic effect between signals, communications or

electronic, and human intelligence are often missed. Each

agency operates in its own way, with different

communications networks, separate analysts, and unique

cultures.

The National Imagery and Mapping Agency was

established October 1, 1996, by the National Imagery and

Mapping Agency Act of 1996. The creation of the National

Imagery and Mapping Agency centralized responsibility for

imagery and mapping, representing a fundamental step

toward achieving the DoD vision of “dominant battle space

awareness.” The National Imagery and Mapping Agency

was created to exploit the potential of enhanced collection

systems, digital processing technology, and the prospective

expansion in commercial imagery than its separate

predecessor organizations. The creation of National

Imagery and Mapping Agency brought together the Defense

Mapping Agency, the Central Imagery Office, and the

Defense Dissemination Program Office in their entirety, as

well as the mission and functions of the CIA’s National

Photographic Interpretation Center.52

The National Reconnaissance Office is the single

national program to meet U.S. Government needs through

spaceborne reconnaissance. The National Reconnaissance

Office’s assets collect intelligence to support such functions

as indications and warning, monitoring of arms control

agreements, military operations and exercises, and

monitoring of natural disasters and other environmental

issues.

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The Intelligence Community also includes the agencies

or offices that perform disparate intelligence functions in

governmental departments and agencies. The Department

of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)

supports the development of intelligence community

products and provides daily summaries, regional and

functional summaries, and longer more substantive reports

on specific issues for the Secretary of State. It has no

collection capability, but analyzes information from other

agencies and U.S. diplomatic posts. It is a small

organization that focuses on conducting political analysis. A

larger organization with tasking authority could take

advantage of the information available to State Department

officers posted abroad. The Department of Treasury’s Office

of Intelligence Support is responsible for overt collection of

financial and monetary information in countries where

treasury officers are assigned. The Department of Energy’s

Office of Intelligence is responsible for intelligence on

nuclear proliferation, foreign nuclear weapons materials,

science and technology, international fossil and nuclear

energy safety and waste developments, and economic and

environmental assessments relevant to energy issues.53

Other departments performing intelligence functions, but

which are not formally members of the intelligence

community, include the Department of Commerce’s Office

of Executive Support and its Office of Export Enforcement

Intelligence and the Transportation Department’s Office of

Intelligence and Security Division. Neither has collection

capability. They each analyze information derived by overt

means and produce reports relating to their functional

areas.

Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The . . . terrorist attacks on our homeland proved that our

efforts at intelligence collecting, breaking up terrorist cells,

and limiting their movement, planning and organization are

not up to par. In spite of the fact that the FBI counterterrorism

budget and number of FBI agents assigned to counter267
terrorism had more than doubled since the bombing of the

World Trade Center in 1993.54

Law enforcement organizations also interact with the

Director of Central Intelligence through specific boards or

centers. The Drug Enforcement Administration’s

Intelligence Division supports counternarcotics and

interacts with the intelligence community through the

Director of Central Intelligence’s Crime and Narcotics

Center. The FBI is the law enforcement component of the

intelligence community. Its intelligence community

functions which support the war on terrorism include

counterterrorism, counterintelligence, counternarcotics,

and organized crime.

The FBI is responsible for protecting America from

terrorist attacks. Its counterterrorism mission is to

“identify and neutralize the threat in the United States

posed by terrorists and their supporters, whether nations,

groups, or individuals.”55 Although the preeminent criminal

investigative organization, the FBI is hamstrung in its

efforts to protect America from terrorist attacks. It has

dedicated considerable resources to develop a strong

response to the threats posed by domestic and international

terrorism. Between fiscal years 1993 and 2003, the number

of special agents dedicated to the FBI’s counterterrorism

programs grew by approximately 224 percent (to

1,669—nearly 16 percent of all FBI special agents).56 The

major challenge facing the FBI is keeping pace with the

explosion and complexity of information derived from

multidimensional terrorist activities. Senator Richard C.

Shelby, Republican-Alabama, the ranking minority

member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, has

said that the intelligence agencies were “caught flat-footed”

and insisted that “there had to be some evidence,

somewhere, of something being planned.” He has referred to

the events of September 11 as “a stunning intelligence

failure.”57

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Without an investment in personnel, analysis will

continue to lag significantly behind the rapid flow of

information. The number of analysts available to support

the FBI’s requirements in the Counterterrorism Program is

not sufficient to provide in-depth analytical coverage. For

fiscal year 2003, the FBI is requesting 110 new analytical

positions and $7,731,000 to address tactical and strategic

intelligence gaps.58 But the FBI is woefully short of qualified

linguists. After September 11, it “had to make a public

appeal for people fluent in Arabic, Pashtun, and other

languages.”59 These shortfalls give merit to the argument

for a reserve force of skilled analysts, academics, and

linguists that can be recalled to the payroll as required.

The FBI interacts with the intelligence community

through a variety of centers. These ad hoc organizations are

staffed by intelligence community members, and in some

cases the directors rotate between the FBI, CIA, and DoD.

The Director of the FBI takes his orders from the Attorney

General, not from the Director of Central Intelligence.

Nevertheless, President Ronald Reagan designated the FBI

as the lead agency for countering terrorism in the United

States. Congress expanded the FBI’s counterterrorism

responsibilities in 1984 and 1986 when it passed laws

permitting the Bureau to exercise federal jurisdiction

overseas when a U.S. national is murdered, assaulted, or

taken hostage by terrorists, or when certain U.S. interests

are attacked. Since the mid-1980s, the FBI has investigated

more than 500 extraterritorial cases. In addition to the

investigation into the September 11 attack, the FBI’s other

ongoing extraterritorial investigations include the 1996

bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, the bombings of

the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the

bombing of the USS Cole. Established in 1996, the FBI

Counterterrorism Center combats terrorism on three

fronts: international terrorism operations both within the

United States and in support of extraterritorial

investigations, domestic terrorism operations, and

countermeasures relating to both international and

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domestic terrorism. Eighteen federal agencies maintain a

regular presence in the center and participate in its daily

operations including the CIA, the Secret Service, and the

Department of State, among others.60

The FBI’s National Security Division supports its

counterintelligence function—a role that has expanded

greatly in recent years. In 1994, PDD-24 established the

National Counterintelligence Policy Board. The

establishment of the National Counterintelligence Center

quickly followed to coordinate national level

counterintelligence activities. The staff of the National

Counterintelligence Center includes members from the

FBI; CIA; Departments of Defense, Energy, and State; and

the National Security Agency. Its directorship rotates every

2 years. With respect to counterintelligence, the FBI is

responsible for detecting and counteracting foreign

intelligence activity that gathers information that

adversely affects U.S. national interests of security. Each of

these functions requires close cooperation with the entire

intelligence community. Each crosses the boundary

between domestic and foreign jurisdiction. The requirement

for cooperation between law enforcement and the

intelligence community is greater than ever. Unfortunately,

. . . in the security realm, the conflict between CIA and the FBI is

legendary. It goes back years, and has major cultural elements.

CIA is mainly “offensively” oriented—that is, toward the

recruitment of agents and the gathering of information—while

the FBI is mainly “defensively” focused. The mind sets of the

functions are very different.61

Intelligence and Law Enforcement.

Today there is no clear primacy for either the law

enforcement or intelligence communities in the realms of

international terrorism, narcotics, and proliferation (as well

as, in some cases, counterintelligence). Still the law

enforcement and intelligence communities remain designed

and operated in fundamentally dissimilar manners,

270
retaining different legal authorities, internal modes of

organization, and governing paradigms. 62

On October 26, 2001, Bush signed an antiterrorism law

known as the U.S.A. Patriot Act to provide the U.S.

Government the means with which to fight the war on

terrorism. The bill effectively tears down legal fire walls

erected 25 years ago during the Watergate era, when the

nation was stunned by disclosures about presidential

abuses of domestic intelligence gathering against political

activists. The new legislation foreshadows an end to that

separation by making key changes to the law underpinning

it, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. The

law empowers the government to shift the primary mission

of the FBI from solving crimes to gathering domestic

intelligence. The intent is to have a FBI that combines

intelligence with effective law enforcement.

The law provides authority for the CIA to access

domestic investigative information through direct liaison

with the FBI. The CIA will have the authority for the first

time to influence FBI surveillance operations inside the

United States and to obtain evidence gathered by federal

grand juries and criminal wiretaps. The Treasury

Department has been charged with building a financial

intelligence-gathering system, whose data can be accessed

by the CIA. The new law permits the FBI to give grand jury

information to the CIA without a court order, as long as the

information concerns foreign intelligence or international

terrorism. The information can also be shared widely

throughout the national security establishment. Congress

also authorized a secure, nationwide communications

system for the sharing of terrorism-related information

with local police.

These new authorities provide an opportunity for the

fusion of domestic and international intelligence.

Unfortunately the intelligence community is not structured

to integrate domestic and international intelligence

requirements, collection, and analysis. Again, the fused

271
effort is dependent on the working relationship between the

Director of the CIA and the Director of the FBI. Recognizing

the challenges associated with the merging of law

enforcement and intelligence functions, a recent

congressional report observed that:

[coordination] sounds simple in concept. In reality, it is likely to

prove very difficult, challenging constitutional limits on

law-enforcement activity while drawing intelligence officers

ever closer to proceedings that could compromise sources and

methods of intelligence collection. The momentum is clearly

headed toward something like a merger between the two

worlds. 63

The merging of law enforcement and intelligence is

fundamental to meeting today’s security requirements.

This integration will require more than legal authorities—it

requires a transformation of the intelligence community.

There must exist a clear authority for prioritizing

intelligence requirements, tasking collection across the

apparatus functions, and thorough analysis.

Role of Congress.

Agencies do not respond naturally or easily to changing

international events, conditions and problems. They do not

adapt to their environment. National Security agencies are

likely to be poorly designed and built to stay that way.64

Immediately following the September 11 attacks, the

Senate Intelligence Committee termed the intelligence

community the Nation’s “first line of defense” against

“transnational threats” like terrorism, and authorized a

first “installment of a 5-year effort to correct serious

deficiencies that have developed over the past decade.”65

Although the 2002 intelligence budget is classified, the

committee indicated it provided a “substantial” budget

increase for overall intelligence activities.66 But, money

alone will not limit the potential for another national

intelligence failure. Congress has historically avoided

intelligence oversight. Not until 1974, “after press reports of

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CIA domestic surveillance activities, did the House and

Senate begin to create an oversight structure.”67 The only

major reform legislation following the organization of the

national security structure by the National Security Act of

1947 has been the Goldwater-Nichols Defense

Reorganization Act of 1986.68 Congress “authorizes the

various instrumentalities [sic] of U.S. policy, appropriates

funds, and conducts oversight.”69 This responsibility, the

emergence of new threats and the failure of the intelligence

community, require Congress to act decisively. There are

two fundamental problems that Congress must address.

First, it must redesign the organizations created by the

National Security Act of 1947 for the Cold War for the

challenges of the 21st century. Second, it must optimize its

organization for oversight of the national security

establishment.

Since its inception the CIA has evolved with minimal

Congressional involvement. Congressional oversight was

limited prior to 1974 and since has been ineffectual in that it

has not addressed the central issue of organization and

coordination. “In the U.S. governmental system, the budget

is usually the focal point of policy. The budget process for

intelligence is overwhelmed by detail and unable to deal

with basic issues.”70

Oversight of law enforcement, foreign policy and

intelligence is undertaken by different sets of committees

with different agendas. The way Congress oversees law

enforcement and intelligence is not optimized.

Congressional oversight of the intelligence community is

essential in a democracy. Such oversight is more constructive

when it focuses on policy initiatives, such as reorganizing the

intelligence community, and evaluation of existing programs

and policies, rather than on attempting to manage current

operations.71

Law enforcement is overseen by the two judiciary

committees. However, the FBI’s intelligence activities are

under the purview of the Senate Select Committee on

273
Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence. These two organizations oversee intelligence

activities. However, there is shared jurisdiction with the

House and Senate Armed Services Committees because

DoD conducts the preponderance of intelligence. Such an

arrangement makes it difficult, at best, to provide seamless

oversight of intelligence, military, and law enforcement

activities.72 The intelligence and Armed Services

committees often focus on procurement of advanced

technologies and the links between intelligence and the

military services rather than on operational practices.”73

Transforming Intelligence.

Intelligence is like air. You don’t realize you are using it until

you don’t have it.

National Security Advisor Anthony Lake

First, the disparate intelligence organizations cannot be

a community. Only a hierarchical organization with clear

roles, responsibilities, and lines of communication can hope

to meet the intelligence requirements of the 21st century.

The intelligence community is even less an organization

than were the military services prior to the GoldwaterNichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986; wellintentioned in most cases, collaborative in others, but never

fully coordinated to the optimal benefit of national security.

Rather than trying to wrap his arms around a “community,”

the head of national intelligence must have authority

commensurate with his responsibilities. There must be a

central organization to support prioritization of

requirements and able to manage collection tasking in

support of analysis. Transformation will be difficult. In his

book on transforming organizations, Leading Change, John

P. Kotter notes that effective change requires, among other

things, a sense of urgency, a clear vision and strategy,

empowerment, and a managing coalition.

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The attacks of September 11, Bush’s declaration of war

on terrorism, and ongoing U.S. Government efforts should

provide sufficient sense of urgency. Clearly, it represents a

challenge to transform, while supporting current efforts.

But the end state for the “War on Terrorism” is a long way

off. U.S. National Security can not afford to wait for this

fight to end before transforming for the next challenge. The

Army has begun a transformation, not based on the

September 11 attacks, but on the changing post-Cold War

environment. The Army’s Intelligence Transformation Plan

observes that the “transformation extends far beyond the

Army,” and identifies the requirement to articulate its

needs “into the national intelligence community so that we

[the Army] are able to shape the development of both

theater and national intelligence capabilities.”

The vision should begin with the requirements

articulated in National Security Strategy 2000 and the

pending Bush National Security Strategy. Key should be

the formation of a hierarchical organization that gives

authority along with responsibility. Effective development

of intelligence requires an organization—perhaps, the

National Intelligence Agency—that can identify and

prioritize requirements, and then has the authority to task

specific collection agencies—regardless of who owns them.

This effort must be supported by and work directly with an

analysis organization with experts from each field capable

of conducting comprehensive analysis of information fused

from multiple sources. The CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence

should form the nucleus of the new organization. It could be

titled The National Intelligence or Analysis Center and be

augmented by analysts from each of the current intelligence

community agencies. The CIA should continue to conduct

covert and clandestine operations in support of the National

Intelligence Agency and in coordination with other

collection sources. This central analysis center could

provide the fused intelligence that would support national

level decisionmaking while providing the source for the

reach back capability Noonan envisions.

275
The position of the Director of Central Intelligence

should be strengthened and renamed so that the Director

can wield direct control over the various components of the

intelligence apparatus. “Greater centralization promises to

bring about high-quality, coordinated analysis and make

resource decisions that reflect national priorities, not

choices driven largely by those who oversee the technical

collection programs or who are concerned with military

programs alone.”74 The new head of the National

Intelligence Agency must have budget authority and should

hire the directors of the National Security Agency, the

National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Imagery

and Mapping Agency, and have primacy in operational

assignments for these three agencies in consultation with

the Secretary of Defense.75

In May 2001, former national security adviser Brent

Scowcroft was appointed head of the White House’s Foreign

Intelligence Advisory Board. He has formed a commission to

examine the restructuring of the intelligence community

and the results are widely anticipated. According to

commission participants, chief among the recommendations is a proposal that would move the National Security

Agency, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, and

the National Reconnaissance Office, from under the DoD to

the control of the Director of Central Intelligence. 76

Historically, the elements of tactical intelligence were

ceded to the military, while political intelligence had been

the purview of other organizations. This separation has

become increasingly awkward. This is a major issue in the

Defense Department’s transformation. The new emphases

on jointness, long-range operations, precision strike, and

global positioning system targeting are generating

enormous pressures on the defense intelligence

infrastructure. (Defense intelligence carves a new niche.)

This reduced level of Pentagon intelligence would come

as little surprise in some circles. Early last year a

commission headed by former senators Gary Hart and

276
Warren Rudman argued that national security is no longer

just a military issue, and, as a result, the Pentagon may not

be the best steward of agencies that now gather a wider

variety of intelligence. They observed in their final report

that “the U.S. intelligence community is adjusting only

slowly to the changed circumstances of the post-Cold War

era. ...While the economic and political components of

statecraft have assumed greater prominence, military

imperatives still largely drive the collection and analysis of

intelligence.”

Transformation will require vision, empowerment, and

oversight. Congress is the body that must perform this

function. Comprehensive legislation, similar to that applied

to defense by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, necessary to begin

transformation. Congressional oversight is key.

Additionally, Congress must also reorganize its oversight of

intelligence functions. Intelligence committees should be

standing and not select committees. Service on intelligence

committees should not be subject to term limits. These

changes would make the intelligence committees more like

other committees and “more representative of the House

and Senate as a whole and less reflective of the leadership.”

The intelligence committees should be given jurisdiction

over all components of the intelligence community—not

only the CIA. This will mean reducing the power of other

committees such as the Armed Services and Judiciary

committees.77

Conclusion.

The Nation cannot afford uncoordinated approaches among

the domains of strategy—military, economic, diplomatic, or

informational which often manifests themselves as

institutional and bureaucratic barriers to unity of thought and

action.

Richard A. Chilcoat78

277
Intelligence supports decisionmaking at all levels. It is

essential to national security. And the intelligence

challenges posed by today’s threats are more complex and

multifunctional than ever. Combined with the unique way

in which the U.S. Government uses the elements of national

power and the way in which its military employs force,

demands on the intelligence organizations are significant.

To meet these demands, the government’s intelligence

apparatus must be transformed from the existing

community of cooperating agencies into an efficient

organization equipped with the means to effectively

prioritize requirements, collect information utilizing all

available means, perform comprehensive analysis,

package, and disseminate intelligence efficiently. The

creation of a modern intelligence capacity in the United

States predated the Cold War. More than anything else,

“the desire to avoid another Pearl Harbor led to the creation

of a centralized intelligence apparatus in 1947.”79 The

legacy of the Pearl Harbor attack and the recognition of the

importance of intelligence to national security following

World War II led to the creation of the intelligence

community. And, although poorly designed, with numerous

failures and embarrassments over the last 50 years—“the

intelligence community failed to predict the end of the Cold

War and the collapse of the Soviet Union”80—it got us

through the Cold War. It is now time to take those lessons

and the forcing function of the September 11 attacks to

transform the intelligence community to support national

security requirements for the 21st century.

The Army Intelligence Transformation Campaign Plan

describes a future where “Army intelligence will be a

globally focused, rapidly deployable, knowledge-based

force.” The plan describes its basic tenets as “see first,

understand first, act first, and finish decisively.” These

basic principles hold fast despite the events of September 11

and the ensuing global war against terrorists. Traditional

national assets now have applicability to the tactical

commander, and many tactical intelligence assets are now

278
useful to strategic decisionmakers. The key to making

optimum use of all these assets lies in establishing strong

relationships with other members of the intelligence

community. Clearly, this is essential without a true

“central” intelligence organization.

The task is “not to politicize intelligence, but to make it

relevant.”81 Intelligence supports policy. American policy

from here on out will be influenced by the events of

September 11. The U.S. Government will use the elements

of its national power—diplomatic, economic, informational,

and military to provide national security. National

intelligence must support each element of the effort in a

complex world of competing requirements, priorities, and

capabilities. The intelligence community must transform to

more effectively support U.S. policy goals. More money and

more people will help, but a complete transformation—

including reorganization—is necessary.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8

1. In an interview, Lieutenant General Noonan discussed the

Army’s intelligence requirements and noted that 51 percent of today’s

population resides in China and India—an area of major arms

proliferation, both in conventional weapons and weapons of mass

destruction. By 2020, four of the five most populated nations of the world

(China, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia) will be in Asia. Marc Strauss,

“Army Intelligence to Shift Focus to Urban Battle in Asia,” Defense

Daily International, August 17, 2001.

2. The intelligence budget is classified, but various sources give a figure of approximately $30 billion. Walter Pincus, “Senate Clears Bill

Raising Intelligence Spending 7 percent; Graham Calls for

Reorganization of Collection Agencies,” The Washington Post, November 9, 2001.

3. Keith J. Masbach, “Army Intelligence Deals with Two

Transformations,” Signal, January 2002, p. 2.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. John T. Chenery, “Transnational Threats 101: Today’s

Asymmetric Battlefield,” Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, July-September 1999, p. 2.

279
7. Ibid.

8. National Foreign Intelligence Board, “Global Trends 2015: A

Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernment Experts,” December

2000.

9. William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy For a Global

Age, Washington, DC: The White House, December 2000, p. 9.

10. Chenery, p. 3.

11. Arnaud de Borchgrave, “Clinton Targets Global Organized

Crime As Security Threat,”The Washington Times, November 3, 1995.

12. Ibid.

13. Clinton, p. 25.

14. Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics

and Law Enforcement Affairs, and Francis X. Taylor, Ambassador-AtLarge For Counterterrorism, “Narco-Terror: The Worldwide

Connection Between Drugs and Terror, Testimony Before the Senate

Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism

and Government Information,” Washington, DC, March 13, 2002.

15. Aaron Weiss, “When Terror Strikes Who Should Respond?,”

Parameters, Autumn 2001.

16. Chenery, p. 2.

17. Despite objections from the Arabic-language television network

Al-Jazeera, CNN broadcast an exclusive interview that Al-Jazeera’s

correspondent in the Afghan capital Kabul conducted with Osama bin

Laden in October 2001. The Qatar-based network had never aired the

interview and had denied its existence at first. Al-Jazeera told CNN in

December 2001 that it would not air the interview because it did not

meet the network’s standards and was not newsworthy. CNN made the

decision after a meeting in October 2001 between U.S. Vice President

Dick Cheney and emir of Qatar Sheikh Hamad Bin-Khalifah Al Thani.

During that meeting, Cheney aired U.S. complaints about Al-Jazeera’s

broadcasts of tapes provided to it by bin Laden’s organization. bin

Laden’s interview is available from the internet at http://www.

cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/ trade.center/binladen.section.html.

18. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Transnational

Threats Resource Center, available from the internet at http://www.

csis.org/goc/threatsrc.html.

19. Ibid.

20. Chenery, p. 4.

280
21. Clinton, p 22.

22. Council on Foreign Relations, Making Intelligence Smarter: The

Future of U.S. Intelligence, New York, 1996, p. 2.

23. Ibid., p. 8.

24. General Noonan’s comments can be found in Strauss, p. 2.

25. Dr. John Hollister Hedley, Checklist for the Future of

Intelligence, Gaithersburg, MD, 1995, p. 29.

26. Council on Foreign Relations, p. 25.

27. Clinton, p. 9.

28. Central Intelligence Agency, “A Consumer’s Guide to

Intelligence,” Washington, DC, 2000, p. 30.

29. Ibid., p. 29.

30. Ibid.

31. Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, Cambridge, 1985, p. 339.

32. Central Intelligence Agency, p. 29.

33. Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of

Intelligence, New York: Dell Publishing, 1974, p. 95, available from the

internet at http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/ciastaff.htm.

34. Amy B. Zegart. Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA,

JCS and NSC, Stanford, 1999, p. 190.

35. Ibid., p. 185.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., pp. 185-186.

38. Ibid., p. 186.

39. Council on Foreign Relations, p. 10.

40. John A. Gentry, “A Framework for Reform of the U.S.

Intelligence Community,” June 6, 1995; available from the internet at

http://www.fas.org/irp/gentry/index.html.

41. Ibid.

281
42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45 Zegart, p. 186.

46. According to specialists, the combined intelligence budget, while classified, hovers around $30 billion a year. They estimate that

about half goes to the NSA, the NIMA, and the NRO, while the CIA

receives less than $4 billion annually for its entire operation. Bryan

Bender, “U.S. Weighs Overhaul of Spy Services To Fight Terror,” Boston

Globe, November 9, 2001.

47. Gentry.

48. Ibid., p. 4.

49. National Ground Intelligence Center, available from the

internet at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/inscom/ngic.html.

50. Director of Central Intelligence, “United States Intelligence

Community,” available from the internet at http://www.odci.gov/ic/

functions.html.

51. Walter Pincus, “Military Espionage Cuts Eyed,” The

Washington Post, March 17, 1995, p. A1.

52. Central Intelligence Agency, A Consumer’s Guide to

Intelligence, p. 8.

53. Ibid., p.10.

54. Gerry Alexander, “Focus,” Retired Officer Association National

Security Report, pp. 23, 30.

55. Director of Central Intelligence.

56. Louis J. Freeh, “Threat of Terrorism to the United States,”

statement for the record, Director Federal Bureau of Investigation

before the United States Senate Committees on Appropriations, Armed

Services, and Select Committee on Intelligence, May 10, 2001, available

from the internet at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress01/

freeh051001.htm.

57. R. W. Apple Jr., “Reticence on a Failure of Intelligence May

End,” New York Times, December 14, 2001.

282
58. FAS Intelligence Resource Program, “Intelligence Community

Budget Structure,” available from the internet at http://www.fas.

org/irp/budget/structure.htm.

59. Ibid.

60. Dale L. Watson, Executive Assistant Director,

Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence, Federal Bureau of

Investigation, Statement for the Record, “The Terrorist Threat

Confronting the United States,” Before the Senate Select Committee on

Intelligence, Washington, DC, February 6, 2002.

61. Gentry.

62. Richard A. Best, Jr., “Intelligence and Law Enforcement:

Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S.,” CRS Report for

Congress, Washington, DC, January, p. 2.

63. Quoted in Ibid., p. 3, by Jim McGee and Brian Duffy, “Main

Justice: The Men and Women Who Enforce the Nation’s Criminal Laws

and Guard Its Civil Liberties,” pp. 373, 374.

64. Zegart, p. 228.

65. Frank Morring, Jr., “Intelligence Community Struggles to

Transcend Cold War Roots,” Avaition Week and Space Technology,

September 24, 2001.

66. Ibid.

67. Zegart, p. 227.

68. Ibid.

69. Best, p. 4.

70. FAS Intelligence Resource Program.

71. Council on Foreign Relations, p. 6.

72. Ibid., p. 4.

73. Best, p. 4.

74. Council on Foreign Relations, p. 4.

75. Gentry.

76. Bryan Bender. “U.S. Weighs Overhaul of Spy Services To Fight

Terror,” Boston Globe, Boston, November 9, 2001.

283
77. Pat M. Holt, National Insecurity: U.S. Intelligence After the

Cold War, Philadelphia, 2000, p. 210.

78. Comments by Richard A Chilcoat in “USAWC Selected

Readings, Course 1 Strategic Leadership,” p. 19.

79. Council on Foreign Relations, p. 12.

80. Holt, p. 209.

81. Council on Foreign Relations, p. 16.

284
CHAPTER 9

THE ARMY’S ROLE IN HOMELAND SECURITY

Lieutenant Colonel Daniel J. Shanahan

Homeland security, in light of the events of September

11, 2001, has not received the attention—either critical

intellectual thought or resource allocation—to prevent

future asymmetrical attacks of the magnitude of what took

place at the World Trade Center and Pentagon. Over the

last several years, a number of reports have identified

critical vulnerabilities pertaining to homeland security.

Nevertheless, the federal government had allocated

resources to meet the threat. But in each case these

vulnerability assessments and resources failed to prevent

the tragedies in New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington,

DC. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld noted in his

foreword to the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)

Report:

On September 11, 2001, the United States came under vicious,

bloody attack. Americans died in their places of work. They

died on American soil. They died not as combatants, but as

innocent victims. They died not from traditional armies, but

from the brutal, faceless weapons of terror. They died as the

victims of war—a war that many had feared but whose sheer

horror took America by surprise.1

How Americans react to this terror should define who

they are as a people. Earlier generations defined themselves

by their resolute actions against, for example, Hitler and

Nazi Germany. It will be in the future actions of Americans,

how they organize to solve the problems that terrorists pose

to American homeland security, and how they confront

adversity that will define these times.

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The questions surrounding how the United States will

organize to solve homeland defense becomes clearer each

day. On October 8, 2002, former Pennsylvania Governor

Tom Ridge, the new chief of the Office of Homeland

Security, took control of an office whose mission was to

develop a comprehensive strategy to combat domestic

terrorism by strengthening preparedness and security at

federal, state, and local levels.2 Domestic policies for

homeland security are already taking shape at all levels of

government. Nevertheless, questions about how the

federal, state, local, and private institutions will organize to

support homeland defense are under debate. In all

likelihood, that debate will continue well into the future. As

these debates continue, the various levels of government are

making decisions on an incremental basis—defining how

the United States will act with regard to homeland security.

The Army’s role in homeland security falls within the

larger context of the Department of Defense (DoD)’s role of

protecting the nation. With the declaration of Secretary of

the Army Thomas White as the Department’s executive

agent for homeland defense, the Army will work directly

with Ridge to develop plans for addressing threats to

domestic security.3 White highlighted his tasks during an

October 12 press conference: “there are 11 million first

responders in this country that have the primary duty to

deal with emergencies, and we are a back-up for them.”4

This insight underlines that the Army will largely have a

support role in homeland defense. The external defense of

the nation remains its preeminent mission.

This chapter will examine what the potential role of the

Army should be in homeland security. The chapter will

define the current problems of homeland security and its

subcomponents and break out the homeland security

mission areas for the Army. And in so doing, it will set a

historical context and suggest relevance in what was

already in place for homeland security prior to September

11. The Hart-Rudman Commission Reports indicated that

the strategic environment had changed sufficiently over the

286
recent past to demand that the federal government needed

to address threats to American soil; and called for paying

greater attention to homeland security. Those reports called

for the paying of greater attention to homeland security.

The final portion of the chapter will address the potential

impacts of the Hart-Rudman recommendations on the

Army, the security needs following the tragedies of

September 11, and a future role for the Army in the daily

business of homeland security.

At this time, it appears that the Army National Guard

will have a major share of the Army’s contribution in

homeland security. However, in its present state of training

readiness, the National Guard is unable to perform many

homeland security support tasks, while its combat tasks do

not directly support civil assistance. In the future, the Army

National Guard should change and build organizations that

support civil authorities for homeland security. Such a

transformation includes dedicating military organizations

to the sole mission of supporting civil agencies in domestic

security.

Historical Setting.

The need to defend one’s society lies at the heart of

human political institutions, a fact that Thomas Hobbes

underlined in his work, The Leviathan. Hobbes asserted

that it was the banding together of individuals for mutual

defense that was the essence of the appearance of human

society.5 For Hobbes, society must combat evil, both internal

and external, that always threatens the social structure.

From the earliest days of the American colonies, the militia

provided basic protection. The colonies stood up the militia

to defend themselves against local threats. Individuals

could raise the collective security of the community by

banding together for the mutual defense of their land,

property, and livelihoods. This concept was similar to those

developed in most societies throughout the world and for the

same reasons. Since then, the defense of the United States

287
has matured into a system that relies on federal, state, local,

and private organizations working together for the mutual

defense. Starting with the British colonies, the struggle to

determine the right force and strategy to meet the problems

of defense of the homeland has continued.

The National Defense Act of 1916 “provided an increase

in strength for the Regular Army, enlarged and validated

the role of the National Guard, authorized a reserve force

and a Volunteer Army.”6 The legislation coincided with

threats along the Mexican border occasioned by Pancho

Villa’s raids. By raising the size of the Army, the federal

government had a growing force in place for the creation of

expeditionary forces to deploy to France for World War I.7

Additionally, the Army wanted provision for a reserve force

separate from state control that would contain a pool of

trained volunteers ready for immediate service.8 The

supporting legislation was the origin of the active, reserve,

and National Guard forces of today.

The Army’s large standing forces throughout the Cold

War were necessary to support a national strategy directed

toward deterring the Soviet Union from either a

conventional or nuclear war. The collapse of the Soviet

threat in the late 1980s brought about reduction in Army

forces in the 1990s. However, the dilemma remains as to

how much force is necessary to defend the nation.

The U.S. military, as a whole, is transforming to meet

future challenges. “As this transformation effort

matures—and as it produces significantly higher output of

military value from each element of the force—DoD will

explore additional opportunities to restructure and

reorganize the Armed forces."9 In the most recent QDR

report, the Department has acknowledged that it may have

to make changes in force structure and organization in

preparing forces for domestic security missions. The report

calls a reexamination of the roles and responsibilities of

active and reserve forces to ensure these forces are properly

trained, organized, manned, and equipped to defend the

288
continental United States.10 Transformation is inevitable,

but making the right changes for the right reasons by

anchoring the change in the culture of the Army will be a

critical component of success.

Homeland Security Defined.

While definitions of homeland security may continue to

evolve, the DoD’s definition is used for clarity within this

chapter. It serves as a starting point for determining the

role and scope of Army support to homeland security:

 Homeland Security—the prevention, deterrence, and

preemption of, and defense against aggression

targeted at U.S. territory, sovereignty, population,

and infrastructure, as well as the management of the

consequences of such aggression and other domestic

emergencies.

 Homeland Defense—the prevention, deterrence, and

preemption of, and defense against aggression

targeted at U.S. territory, population, and

infrastructure.

 Civil Support—DoD support to civilian authorities for

natural and manmade domestic emergencies, civil

disturbances, and designated law enforcement

efforts.

 Emergency Preparedness—planning activities

undertaken to ensure DoD processes, procedures and

resources are in place to support the President and

Secretary of Defense in a designated National

Security Emergency. 11

DoD’s definition possesses three subareas that focus on

the important aspects of the issues of security. The

definition points to decisions made within the department

respective to allocation of resources to confront the

challenges of domestic security. There are clearly no

289
independent actions. Homeland security will remain under

civil authority with military in support. Requirements to

assist with defense of the United States, support to civil

authorities in special circumstances, and a planning

requirement to prepare for future national emergencies are

the three areas the department will resource in this

endeavor.

A critical part missing from the DoD definition is

language to address the need to protect from inside or

outside the United States. Protection from inside raises

questions of legal authority in view of posse comitatus, when

using federal forces. Military forces under state control are

not affected by the limits of posse comitatus. But the attacks

of September 11 demand a reexamination of many basic

laws. The protection from outside the United States is more

in line with traditional military defense definitions. The

military has a major role in protecting the United States

outside the borders. The definition is broad enough to

consider both active and passive measures to protect the

United States, but clarification of the point on protecting

from inside or outside the United States will give greater

focus to roles for the military. Unfortunately, the definitions

are only a starting point. An analysis of homeland security

requires breaking out the mission areas and associated

tasks to better determine the right role for the Army. The

discussion will focus on the Army: likely missions and

separate tasks for Army forces.

Homeland Security Mission Areas.

Homeland security includes three broad mission areas:

homeland defense, civil support, and national emergency

preparedness.12 These Army mission areas further break

down into distinct operations, where forces trained to

provide support capabilities have to conduct the operations.

Homeland defense missions respond to acts or threats

against United States sovereign territory. The threats

associated with these mission areas include the following:

290
 Missile Attack;

 Air, Land, and/or Sea Sovereignty Incursion;

 An attack using Weapons of Mass Destruction

(WMD); and,

 Cyber Attack.13

Domestic support missions require anticipation of major

disasters, acts of civil disturbance, or assistance with

national-level events. The missions associated with

domestic support include assistance to the following areas:

 Disasters;

 Civil Disorder; and,

 Special Events.14

The Army does not separate combating terrorism, the

protection of critical infrastructure, and force protection

from the above mission areas. Instead, it recognizes that

these are inherent missions within all mission areas.15 This

is an important distinction—important because it was a

different version of a terror attack on September 11, one

that falls outside the homeland defense threats noted above.

National Emergency Preparedness is a potentially new

mission area still under debate. In time, this area may

develop from a planning effort into assigning specific tasks

and forces to support the federal emergency system.

Currently, much of the emergency preparedness effort is

within the consequence management arena; dealing with

national emergencies after the event happens.

When one compares and contrasts the first two broad

areas, homeland defense aligns with providing trained and

ready soldiers to deter or defend against threats, whereas

civil support relates to providing Army capabilities that

address a specific problem. Homeland defense addresses

291
specific individual technical skills or specific unit military

technical skills to deter or defend against a given threat.

Civil support is more generic in nature. The capability of the

existing structure requires augmentation to support a civil

structure overwhelmed by a terrorist or natural disaster.

The Army, in this case, would have provided excess

capability to meet the needs of the existing civil structure. It

has the forces and capability to support the two broad

mission areas, but the Army must balance domestic security

with the other operational demands of defending the United

States and its interests abroad.

The QDR clarifies the balance required in homeland

security by placing “new emphasis on the unique

operational demands associated with defense of the United

States and restoring the defense of the United States as the

[Defense] Department’s primary mission.”16 This shift in

policy from an emphasis on offensive overseas capabilities

to domestic defense capabilities confronts the Army with

the need to find the best ways to fulfill these new

obligations. The policy shift does not detract from the

mission to have forces trained and ready to win the nation’s

wars, but it does speak to the necessity for the Army to place

greater emphasis on a traditional role. “The Army has a

wide range of capabilities that are supportive of homeland

security, but with the exception of selected specialty units, it

is not sized, designed, trained, nor equipped specifically for

homeland security missions.”17 A discussion of the

mismatch of organizational structure, personnel, training,

and equipment will follow later in this chapter. Let us now

turn to an examination of the changes and implications of

the emerging strategic environment.

Hart-Rudman Commission.

The United States Commission on National

Security/21st Century, popularly known by the last names

of its chairmen, released three reports.18 The first examined

the strategic environment of the upcoming quarter century.

292
The second looked at national strategies to address the

upcoming strategic environment. The commission’s final

report, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for

Change, recommended changes in America’s existing

security structure to deal with the challenges of the future.

Overall, the reports concluded that changes in the security

environment since the end of the Cold War demand changes

in the structure and processes of U.S. national security.19

Additionally, it also posited a rise in threats with the

increased likelihood of attacks on the United States

resulting in thousands of casualties.20 The third report

recommended organizational change in five areas of the

federal government:

 ensuring the security of the American homeland;

 recapitalizing America’s strengths in science and

education;

 redesigning key institutions of the Executive Branch;

 overhauling the United States government personnel

system; and,

 reorganizing Congress’s role in national security

affairs.21

The call for domestic security was aimed at a better

utilization of the U.S. homeland security capabilities. Many

portions of this community are already in place. First, the

responders and regional partnerships are in place. Some of

the defense structure remains as a holdover from the

threats of nuclear war with the Soviet Union. Moreover,

since September 11 the nation has moved quickly in

response to new security challenges. The military

components already exist and many support connections

with civil authorities in training and through actual

military assistance have also developed over past decades.

The maturation of the security apparatus will occur as a

U.S. national security plan comes to fruition. It will

293
necessarily evolve toward a truly national program

extending well beyond the federal government.22 The

timing of the Hart-Rudman Commission’s report is

hauntingly reminiscent of warnings on the possibility of a

Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. However, the structure

failed to act on those warnings: the result, an attack on

American soil that inflicted thousands of casualties.

However, the United States does have a history of rapidly

responding to security challenges and, undoubtedly, will

continue to change to meet an uncertain strategic

environment.

The implications of the commission’s report on the

Defense Department and the Army are considerable. There

is a ground swell of support for increased security at home.

The current budget reflects a focused attention on securing

the nation. At the same time, there is also a call for political,

economic, and military change. The third Hart-Rudman

report asserts that the Army must adopt a balanced

strategy. It must win wars, deter aggression, provide

homeland security capabilities, provide humanitarian

relief, and provide constabulary capabilities.23 The basic

suggestion is that the Army needs to do it all. The Army can

no longer focus solely on activities outside the United

States, but rather must maintain a balance of support

between domestic and worldwide requirements. As the

Secretary of Defense’s QDR suggests, there is support for

adopting a greater role in homeland security. Not

surprisingly, the Army is already modifying its defense

strategy and looking to alter its organizational structure to

meet the new environment.

There is little doubt that change must take place. The

reaction of the military to support the war on drugs

underlines its ability to adapt to changing environments

and integrate itself into new roles. The passage of the

National Defense Authorization Act of 1989 created the

counterdrug roles and missions for DoD.24 The need for

military involvement came at a time when law enforcement

was perceived as loosing the war on drugs. The Army

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readily accepted its new roles and missions, with results

that continue today. The bottom line for the Army is that

adapting appropriately to meet the changes in the strategic

environment defines success.

Army Task Areas.

A useful construct in analyzing what contributions the

Army needs to make for homeland security is to begin by

addressing what the Army has provided to homeland

security since September 11, 2001. Identifying the resultant

tasks the Army performed is a useful starting point. These

tasks can be compared and contrasted with a systematically

developed list of homeland security tasks. Such a

comparison will assist in defining future roles and missions

for the Army. Additionally, defining homeland security is an

evolving process with changes in support roles expected

over time for the Army. The critical point is to start

immediately. One can chart a way ahead using a deliberate

process—a process likely to achieve a solution as close to a

desired endstate as possible.

The U.S. Army has had a visible role in supporting

homeland security. Overall, the DoD provides forces from

each of the military services throughout the United States

to assist with support activities. Within the first month

following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the

Pentagon, more than 7,750 soldiers in 87 National Guard

and reserve units reported for active duty service under

President George W. Bush’s partial mobilization for

Operation NOBLE EAGLE, the support to civil authorities

in the United States.25 The units included military police

companies to augment force protection at military

installations and airports, infantry battalions and

companies, military history detachments, transportation

units, an ordinance company, a supply company, an air

defense artillery command, military intelligence units,

engineer units, a special operations command element, and

others. In total, 48 National Guard units and 39 army

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reserve units reported for federal service from 20 states, the

District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.26 In addition,

approximately 30,000 troops had deployed overseas by

early October for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM,

military operations in Afghanistan, and against

terrorism.27

Thousands of other National Guard soldiers called to

state active duty supported their governors in recovery

operations and domestic defense. New York State Governor

George Pataki called out the New York National Guard to

fulfill consequence management duties with state and local

authorities. The governor used National Guard forces to

assist in securing portions of New York City.28 State and

federal authorities used Army forces to secure critical

infrastructure throughout the United States. Pennsylvania

Governor Mark Schweiker used National Guard forces to

bolster security at the Three Mile Island Nuclear facility.29

The federal government used National Guard troops to

increase security at 422 civil airports to boost the country’s

confidence in its aviation industry.30 Trained in Federal

Aviation Administration security procedures, Army forces

“monitor and reinforce airport security checkpoints,

monitor alertness and performance of the civilian screeners,

and assist screeners and supervisors and the airport police

as required.”31 Additional future calls from the Bush

administration to secure the Mexican border will put

soldiers in a border protection role.32 Each of these tasks are

observable deployments of American soldiers since

September 11.

Breaking the Army support tasks since September 11

into categories, the Army provided support in four areas:

point or border defense, recovery, administrative, and

missile defense. A fifth area, WMD protection, represents a

critical capability that the Army provides, but will not be

addressed here. The five support tasks serve as the

“resultant tasks” the Army performed following September

11. These resultant tasks will be compared with a list of

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tasks systematically developed from a study of threats to

American homeland security.

An Arroyo Center study for the United States Army

evaluated the range of threats facing homeland security and

the definitions of homeland security. Analysis of the

problem with an emphasis on preparing the Army for

homeland security was at the center of RAND’s work. The

study suggests five critical Army task areas:

 WMD domestic preparedness and civil support;

 Continuity of government (operations to ensure and

restore civil authority);

 Border and coastal defense, including prevention of

smuggling of WMD into the United States and

management of large-scale refugee flows that can

create threats to national security;

 Continuity of military operations, including force

protection—primarily for deploying units—

protection of mission-critical facilities and systems,

and protection of higher headquarters operations;

and

 National missile defense.33

These task areas encompass the types of tasks the Army

would likely fulfill in homeland security. The RAND study

task areas are similar to the homeland security mission

areas defined earlier in this chapter, but there are some

differences. The RAND study points to five homeland

security tasks for the Army: domestic preparedness,

continuity of government, border and coastline defense,

continuity of military operations, and missile defense. The

first three task areas are supporting tasks to civil

authorities, meaning that requesting agencies can receive

military assistance in these task areas. The last two areas

are military responsibilities for protection of personnel and

infrastructure that is part of military and specialized

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military capability for missile defense of the United States.

The differences include a greater specificity for the

homeland security mission areas emphasizing, for example,

cyber, missile, or WMD attack. Regardless, the distinctions

are slight, but important in capturing the entire security

issue. Let us now compare and contrast the actual Army

tasks being performed with the theoretical task areas from

the RAND study.

A review of the task lists in Table 1 shows many

similarities to the actual and theoretical tasks Army

soldiers perform in homeland security.

Current Tasks Theoretical Tasks

Point/border

defense

Domestic

preparedness

Recovery Continuity of

government

Administrative Border and coastal

defense

Missile defense Continuity of

operations

WMD protection Missile defense

Table 1. Task Lists.

The current tasks the Army provides in support of

homeland security are included in the theoretical list with

the exception of continuity of government. If the challenge

were a vast build-up of refugees in Mexico along the U.S.

border that would outstrip local civil capabilities, then the

Army could perform continuity of government tasks. The

theoretical list is broad enough to support federal, state, and

local leaders, and agencies with the types of military

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capability that leaders and agencies would need to train

first responders and support consequence management.

This review demonstrates that the Army is fulfilling the

tasks required in homeland security. From disaster relief to

civil disorder, the Army has met the traditional roles of

assisting in the security of the United States. The Army has

soldiers to perform an endless variety of tasks that could

support homeland security, but the question remains as to

whether the Army should drastically transform itself to

meet the growing need for homeland defense forces.

Another option is for civil or even paramilitary

organizations to fulfill most security responsibility.

Secretary of the Army Thomas White sent a letter to

Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta on January 23,

2002, requesting relief of the National Guard security

duties within 60 to 90 days. The approximately 6,000

soldiers patrolling more than 400 airports would be

replaced by Transportation Security Administration

enforcement officers in a transition plan.34 The

transportation administration will ultimately hire 25,000

to 30,000 people to ensure safety in airports and other

transportation infrastructures, while, in White’s words, the

guard “needs to get back to back to its core mission.”35 For

the transportation administration, a large civil workforce

will fill the security role. Other agencies facing similar

problems may come to the same solution or use various

other approaches. To secure America’s airports rapidly, the

Army was brought in to stabilize the situation and restore

confidence in air safety. With a new transportation

structure in place and a security situation stabilized, the

Army can return to preparing for its wartime missions.

Army Role in Homeland Security.

This chapter has come full circle back to ask the question

as to what should be the Army’s role in homeland security.

There is little doubt the Army has made a significant impact

in securing America since the birth of the Republic. Army

299
roles, prescribed in law, have evolved over time.36 The

current wave of popular support in the country and trends

in Defense Department correspondence will lead to

legislation that will outline roles for the Army in homeland

security. The key will be achieving the right roles with the

right levels of involvement. It is unwise to change the entire

structure of the Army in reaction to the events of September

11, but Army leaders can use the momentum for change in a

positive manner to transform the Army to better meet

future challenges.

Using the homeland security mission areas and task

lists, it is possible to discern a number of observations that

should be of assistance in determining roles for the Army.

First, there is a need for specialists in homeland defense.

These specialists fall into many groups: intelligence

analysts; police forces; nuclear, biological, and chemical

specialists; and engineers. Such specialists have utility both

in the Army and in support of homeland security. There is a

need to designate specific Army specialties and

corresponding detachments or units to possible use in

homeland security tasks. Other capabilities, for example,

national missile defense specialists perform a homeland

defense function already, but the capability and missions

fall primarily within the DoD. These specialists will support

homeland security from within the military, as the DoD has

the lead agency responsibility.

Second, there is a generic requirement to provide

military support to civil authorities. America’s first

responders have the primary responsibility for homeland

security, but the Army needs to have a surge capability to

meet both homeland defense requirements and domestic

support requirements. In this case, generic military

manpower can meet mass response necessities.

Third, there is a need for a single authority to provide

military support to homeland security. The command and

control issues are critical to meeting the needs of civil

authorities and accomplishing military missions. In an

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attempt to reduce friction caused by competing

requirements, there is a pressing need to establish a single

authority within the military for homeland security.

Specialized units in the Army benefit from homeland

security support missions, because of the obvious advantage

to training in their main competencies.37 Soldiers in medical

units supporting a homeland security mission have an

advantage in that their skills are enhanced in performing

the mission. This is not always true, but there is a greater

likelihood of a benefit for specialized units, as opposed to an

infantry battalion deployed to perform an airport security

mission. An infantry battalion trained to perform security

tasks by the Federal Aviation Administration gains

training in airport security skills, but infantry soldiers take

little away from the airport experience to translate into

combat mission essential tasks. Each unit welcomes the

chance to support homeland security, but the specialized

unit, used in their military specialty, gains more from the

experience.

The trade-off for military units performing security

missions involving tasks outside their mission essential

task list is a lower level of training proficiency. The

fundamental question is what training is the unit not

performing in order to support homeland defense. Generic

unit taskings are becoming more of an issue with the Army

in a period of high operational tempo. These taskings affect

Army National Guard units to a higher degree due to the

limited number of days available for training. There is less

time available to support homeland security missions and

prepare for wartime mission support. It is understood that

the Army will fulfill these homeland security tasks with

trained units. For Army National Guard units performing

homeland security tasks, this means, in many cases, not

being able to train to support their combat mission tasks.

A homeland security role for the Army National Guard is

possible with a diminished role in supporting the traditional

back-up to the active force. Could another Army

301
organization be utilized or created to accomplish this

mission? Certainly. Many organizations could be leveraged

to fill the homeland security role. But it is the right role for

Guard soldiers. The Army National Guard by assuming the

priority support for homeland security frees the active Army

to focus on defending U.S. interests abroad.

The Hart-Rudman Commission Report, Road Map for

National Security: Imperative for Change, made the

following recommendation: “The Secretary of Defense, at

the President’s direction, should make homeland security a

primary mission of the National Guard, and the Guard

should be reorganized, properly trained, and adequately

equipped to undertake that mission.”38 This is a bold

recommendation, but a suggestion that has distinct

advantages. The National Guard has a nationwide span of

nearly 3,300 locations in 2,700 communities across the

country. They are the “existing” forward-deployed military

force.39 The National Guard possesses an existing command

structure that could be stepped up to command and control

a national level organization for homeland defense. Major

General (Retired) Don Edwards, a Vermont National Guard

Adjutant General for 16 years, states “the National Guard is

so well-suited to this mission that, if it did not exist, the

United States would have to create an organization like it to

assume this mission.”40 Additionally, there is the prestige

for the National Guard in the possible creation of a four-star

general billet for the command.41 In a practical sense this

idea does have some merit, but there are difficulties.

The Army National Guard is inextricably linked with

the active force by providing 54 percent of combat units, 45

percent of combat support units, and 33 percent of combat

service support units.42 Some, like Edwards, believe that

the National Guard can fulfill the homeland security

mission and provide supplemental units to active

component forces.43 This is an attractive alternative, but

one that must fit in an overall DoD plan. Under no

circumstances should the National Guard be the lead

federal agency for homeland security, but there is a role for a

302
coordinating headquarters to assist the Office of Homeland

Security. Whether or not the National Guard is placed in

charge of Northern Command is not relevant. What is

important is that the National Guard does have a capacity

to support the mission of homeland security in the country,

as it has since the National Guard’s inception.

The lack of an overall national command structure of the

National Guard will hurt any effort to synchronize its

support. Each state has its own individual command

authority, with the National Guard Bureau managing the

federal resources. Any centralized plan seems hopeless at

the national level, but a regional planning effort, pooling

resources of many states, does make sense. The capabilities

state governors need from the Army could be available in

regions aligned with Federal Emergency Management

Agency regions for enhancing coordination. The perception

of an equal dissemination of resources and an equal overall

focus would assist in pacifying local, state, and federal levels

in the homeland security arena.

The establishment of Northern Command, a four-star

joint military headquarters responsible for coordinating

military support for defense of the continental United

States, will provide a unity of effort and better grasp of

military requirements for homeland security.44 This change

to the national military strategy will provide a central

authority to plan for and execute military support and

military operations, as directed by the Secretary of Defense

or the President. The greatest contribution of Northern

Command may be the development of a theater strategy—a

strategy that brings all elements of power together; a

strategy that addresses all threats to domestic security.

Transforming the Army National Guard to support

homeland security, while retaining a role in supporting and

supplementing the active component force, is a significant

challenge. In order to do both at the level of expertise

expected by the American people, the Army National Guard

needs to shift effort from a primary support role for the

303
active force to homeland security. Optimizing the Army’s

commitment in homeland security is the marker to define

the future Army National Guard. Any change to the

National Guard will take political action, and here the role

of the state governor in picking all senior guard officers in

the state should play a big part in pushing the National

Guard to assuming responsibility for homeland security. As

there is a valid requirement for military homeland security

forces, balancing the politics and the security needs will add

to the challenges of transforming the Army National Guard.

The Army National Guard can best support homeland

security in filling three critical roles: population control,

physical security, and logistical support.45 In each case, the

tasks of the National Guard will be to support the civil

authority’s request for military assistance. Other

capabilities like engineering or chemical and biological

protection should be shared between civil and military.

States will have responsibility inside their borders with

additional regional military capabilities they share in

common. Such an approach will provide the auxiliary

manpower that civil authorities require together with

specialized capability that neighboring states can share to

keep the necessary capability, but reduce overall costs.

Recruitment will come from within the communities the

soldiers protect.

The Army National Guard, at a reduced level, will

support the active component force with combat capability.

The fact that the National Guard is inextricably linked to

the active force is a positive and productive relationship.

Shifting Army National Guard capability from their most

recent role to a focus on homeland security will streamline

the mission profile and permit the Army National Guard to

train its forces to the highest levels of proficiency.

Simply saying the Army National Guard will change to

assume the major portion of the Army’s contribution to

domestic security is much different than the Army National

Guard actually changing. Change is always difficult. The

304
political sensitivities that surround the National Guard are

tremendous. It must be politically feasible to make the

changes to the Army National Guard. The addition of a

four-star billet, growth in size of the organization, growth in

prestige for the Army National Guard, reduction in costs to

maintain equipment (tanks to trucks), and training to a

higher level of proficiency in tasks that are germane to

security are possible issues that are politically palatable.

There are questions of how much of the National Guard

will need to serve in homeland security and how much

National Guard structure is dedicated to back up active and

reserve forces. These are valid requirements for research by

the Center for Army Analysis. What is critical for this

chapter is the understanding that a global view needs to be

maintained in terms of Army forces for homeland security

and warfighting abroad. The Army can support both

mission sets. Changing the National Guard to support

homeland security with certain forces and backing up active

and reserve forces with certain other forces streamlines the

Guard support. This action allows active and reserve forces

to better focus on the war on terrorism abroad. In the final

analysis, a political process will determine a final homeland

security role for the Army. The momentum for change is

present for the National Guard, using domestic security as

the driver.

Conclusion.

The Army must fulfill its promise to support and defend

American society. Since September 11, 2001, the Army’s

role in homeland security has been evident and ever

changing. In the near future, organizations within the DoD

will be apportioned to a “Homeland Commander in Chief” to

plan for and execute the defense of the United States. The

theater defense strategy will have a central controlling

authority and civil as well as military components.

Homeland security issues are being acted upon in the

country in a deliberate, calculated manner. The security

305
community will continue to work toward an unattainable

perfect solution, but we will be successful. Today’s

Americans define this time as a positive one in American

history.

The Army National Guard will be most effected by the

homeland security mission. Politics aside, it is the right

organization. Other Army organizations could do the

mission, but as Edwards puts it “the National Guard is so

well-suited to this mission that if it did not exist, the United

States would have to create an organization like it to

assume this mission.”46 The National Guard will need to

change organizations, personnel, training, and equipment

to fill this new role. Simultaneously, the Army, active and

reserve, will change to meet this need and transform to meet

the needs of the future. The momentum is present—the

Army will adapt to the changing strategic environment.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 9

1. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report,

Washington, DC, 2001, p. III.

2. Shelly Davis, “Ensuring Domestic Tranquility,” The Retired

Officer Magazine, December 2001, pp. 55-56.

3. Secretary of the Army Thomas White was named on October 2,

2001, to represent the military in the mission of homeland defense.

Mathew Cox, “White: New Top Guardian of U.S. Turf,” Army Times,

October 22, 2001, p. 13.

4. Ibid.

5. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Part I, Chicago, 1956, pp. 9-10.

6. Brigadier General Harold W. Nelson, Major General Bruce

Jacobs, and Colonel Raymond K. Bluhm, Jr., The Army, Arlington, VA,

2001, p. 307.

7. Ibid., pp. 307-308.

8. Ibid., p. 306.

9. Rumsfeld, p. 23.

10. Ibid., p. 19.

306
11. The definitions come from a briefing by Lieutenant Colonel

Antulio J. Echevarria II and Bert Tussing: “CSA STUDIES: Homeland

Security,” Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, March 12,

2002.

12. Ibid.

13. Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, “Army

Homeland Security Strategic Planning Guidance,” Coordinating Draft,

Washington, DC, 2001, p. 6.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Rumsfeld, p. 17.

17. Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, p. 7.

18. Phase I concluded in September 1999 with the publication of

New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century Washington,

DC, 1999; Phase II produced in April 2000, Seeking a National Strategy:

A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom Washington,

DC, 2000; Phase III, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for

Change, Washington, DC, 2001.

19. Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman, Road Map for National

Security: Imperative for Change. The Phase III Report of the United

States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Washington,

DC, 2001, p. viii.

20. Ian Roxborough, The Hart-Rudman Commission and

Homeland Defense, Carlisle Barracks, 2001, p. V.

21. Hart and Rudman, p. viii.

22. Admiral James M. Loy and Captain Robert G. Ross, U.S. Coast

Guard, “Meeting the Homeland Security Challenge: A Principled

Strategy for a Balanced and Practical Response,” Journal of Homeland

Security, September 2001, available from http://www.

homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/Ross_Loy_USCG.htm, p. 7.

23. Roxborough, p. 20.

24. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-07.4, Washington

DC, 1998, p. I-1.

25. Gary Sheftick, “Army Guard, Reserve Units Called Up,” Army

News Service, October 4, 2001.

26. Ibid.

307
27. Ibid.

28. David Finkel, “Four Planes Go Up the Usual Way And Come

Down in Sheer Terror; As Day Unfolds, A Stunned Nation Realizes It’s

One Like No Other,”The Washington Post, September 12, 2001, p. A8.

29. Brett Lieberman, “Bush Speech Raises Nuclear Concerns,” The

Patriot News, January 31, 2002, p. A12.

30. George W. Bush, “Remarks to Airline Employees in Chicago,

Illinois,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 37, No. 39,

Washington, DC, September 27, 2001, p. 1385.

31. Master Sergeant Bob Haskell and Specialist First Class Eric

Wedeking, “Guardsman Patrol National Airport,” Army News Service,

October 5, 2001.

32. Ken Ellingwood, “Guard Troops to Be Assigned to Mexican

Border,” The Los Angeles Times, February 23, 2002, p. B1.

33. Eric V. Larson and John E Peters, Preparing the U.S. Army for

Homeland Security: Concepts, Issues and Options, Santa Monica, CA,

2001, pp. xvii-xviii.

34. Jane McHugh, “Guard’s Airport Duty May End Soon,” Army

Times, February 4, 2002, p. 10.

35. Ibid.

36. Department of the Army, “Organization of the United States

Army,” Department of the Army Pamphlet 10-1, Washington, DC, 1994,

p. 3.

37. Larson and Peters, p. xx.

38. Hart and Rudman, p. 25.

39. Jeff Greenspan, “What is Homeland Security? Info from

Government Websites . . .,” September 27, 2001, available from

http:www.lewrockwell.com/orig2/greenspan1.html, p. 4.

40. Major General (Retired) Don Edwards and Colonel (Retired)

Richard Dunn, “The National Guard’s Enhanced Role in Homeland

Security,” Journal of Homeland Security, March 2001, available from

http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/Edwards_Dunn.

htm, pp. 5-6.

41. Colonel Michael P. Fleming, “National Security Roles for the

National Guard,” Journal of Homeland Security, August 2001,

available from http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/

Articles/Fleming.htm, p. 10.

308
42. Ibid., p. 3.

43. Edwards and Dunn, p. 6.

44. The ideas of Northern Command providing unity of effort and

better grasp of military requirements comes from Echevarria and

Tussing briefing.

45. John R. Brinkerhoff, “Restore the Militia for Homeland

Security,” Journal of Homeland Security, November 2001, available

from http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/

Brinkerhoff_Nov01.htm, p. 9.

46. Edwards and Dunn, pp. 5-6.

309
CHAPTER 10

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION FOR

WARFARE IN THE 21st CENTURY:

BALANCING IMPLICATIONS OF URBAN

OPERATIONS AND EMERGING JOINT

OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

Lieutenant Colonel Chuck Taylor

The overarching focus of Joint Vision 2020 is full spectrum

dominance—achieved through interdependent application of

dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics,

and full dimensional protection. Attaining that goal requires

the steady infusion of new technology and modernization...Of

greater importance is the development of doctrine and

organization, training and education, leaders and people that

can effectively take advantage of the technology.1

For the Germans, Stalingrad was the single most traumatic

event of the war. Never before had one of their elite armies

succumbed in the field. Stalingrad was a mind-paralyzing

calamity to a nation that believed it was invincible.2

Joint Vision 2020 establishes an objective of dominance

across the spectrum of military operations; it is a goal for a

new kind of warfighting enabled by information and

technology. But as the German Army discovered in

Stalingrad during World War II, a dominant force in one

form of warfare may not dominate in all environments.

Victory or defeat involves the ability to adapt operational

and tactical concepts, balancing technologies, concepts, and

organizations across the spectrum of conflict within the

strategic context. For Germany and the German Sixth

Army in Stalingrad, the “enemy at the gates” was as much

the urban environment and the inability to innovate and

311
adapt as it was the will and intensity of interests displayed

by Russia. The lack of understanding, preparation, and

execution for operational level urban warfare proved

catastrophic to a German Army oriented on firepower and

maneuver in open terrain.

In a similar manner, the joint operational concepts that

are emerging today aim to integrate information and

application of precision fires and maneuver based on

experiences in relatively open terrain against conventional

adversaries. Yet every war the United States has fought

over the past 60 years has involved urban operations to

some degree, usually not by choice, but as a result of the

adversary’s actions or the nature of the mission.3 Moreover,

based on increasing population densities and global

urbanization patterns, the United States and its allies will

continue to confront military operations on urban terrain

ranging from the potential of regime replacement to

increased peacekeeping operations.4 Without joint

operational concepts that address this urban environment,

whether operations other than war, small-scale

contingencies, or major theater combat operations, it will

not be possible for the United States to achieve the full

spectrum dominance of Joint Vision 2020 for offensive,

defensive, stability, and support operations.

The result is a two-fold challenge confronting the U.S.

military in the 21st century. The first is to field forces

capable of domination in complex urban environments

against varying adversaries across the entire spectrum of

conflict at both the tactical and operational levels of war.

The challenge of urban warfare is currently focused on a

complex, close ground maneuver tactical level fight. Both

the Army and Marine Corps have invested considerable

effort to achieve tactical dominance in the urban

environment through the means of increased small unit

capabilities. Nevertheless, such operations remain costly in

terms of ground maneuver force commitment and

sustainment in all types of military operations. Moreover,

the risks in casualties, both combatant and noncombatant,

312
increase significantly in urban environments.5 As U.S.

operations in Somalia emphasized, the requirement to

isolate, seize, and/or secure urban areas and

noncombatants can be costly. Moreover, the larger the

urban environment and forces employed, the more

significant the shortfalls that exist to accomplish even

operations at the low end of the spectrum.

The second challenge is to develop and define

requirements for a joint operational concept that integrates

service tactical capabilities and competencies into a fully

interoperable joint force to achieve theater level objectives.

Current evolving joint operational concepts rely heavily on

information for control and surveillance to develop

intelligence and employ precision fires. In particular, the

concept of Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) with its

emphasis on immediate, overwhelming standoff precision

fires is emerging as a preferred American way of war. It

could become the equivalent of the Army concept of

Air-Land Battle for joint integration. Such fires proved

effective in shaping the operational level of war in the

relatively open terrain of Kuwait, Iraq, and the initial phase

of Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the evidence of both Kosovo

and the latter phases of Afghanistan suggest that as

adversaries use complex terrain, there is a corresponding

increase in the complexity of targeting which causes a

decrease in the success of using fires without maneuver.

Furthermore, in complex environments like urban terrain,

where noncombatants and collateral damage affect rules of

engagement, the limitations to joint integration of control,

surveillance, and precision fires become more apparent. All

this notwithstanding, whatever joint operational concept

the services develop, it must define requirements to ensure

integration and interoperability for full spectrum

dominance. The current approaches to solving these

challenges pose divergent concepts concerning 21st century

warfare.

The purpose of this chapter is, first, to examine these two

challenges, looking for relationships that can illuminate the

313
operational and strategic issues involved in defining

requirements for transformation of the military. Second, by

focusing on solutions to the complex environment of joint

urban operations, the chapter will provide insights that

could help to enable emerging joint operational concepts to

achieve the necessary synergistic organizational and

technological means to achieve dominance in all

environments. It is essential to remember that the United

States may not get the war it wants; thus its military must

develop new ways and systems to address old challenges.

Combining these challenges to develop a balanced joint

operational concept of maneuver and fires should provide

important opportunities to achieve full spectrum dominant

capabilities.

The Strategic Context of the Urban and Joint

Operational Concept Challenges.

The nature of war in the 21st century will not differ

greatly from previous centuries. Conflict will remain about

people: their interests and intentions, will, and means.

Clausewitz’s depiction of friction and chance interacting

within the paradoxical trinity will remain relevant in

defining virtually all possible strategic contexts. The trinity

of the government, the people, and the military influenced

by rational, irrational, and nonrational behaviors and

tendencies will create a strategic environment that is

adaptive, complex, and nonlinear.6 Clausewitz highlighted

the importance of the trinitarian concept in understanding

the environment of war by adding that “a theory that

ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary

relationship between them would conflict with reality to

such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally

useless.”7 The strategic context that confronts the United

States shapes and affects the challenges to developing an

urban and joint operational concept. Illumination of the key

strategic issues that shape the U.S. strategic context

provides the basis for understanding the potential effects

and risks of the challenges on military transformation.

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Three major areas frame the U.S. strategic context.

First, the government, in the form of the national military

strategy, defines the scope of strategic ends. Second, the

emerging American way of war provides military ways and

means. Last, the public provides an important context to the

strategic culture. The nature of the urban environment

dynamically affects these three areas through friction and

chance.

The National Military Strategy is placing greater

emphasis on broader capabilities in the 21st century. The

2001 Quadrennial Defense Review has framed the new

military strategy; it lists four essential goals that will guide

the development, deployment, and use of military forces:

“Assuring allies and friends; dissuading future military

competition; deterring threats and coercion against U.S.

interests; and if deterrence fails, decisively defeating any

adversary.”8 Essential to the 2001 Quadrennial Defense

Review is a shift from a current threat-based approach to a

future capability-based force that could deter and defeat

emerging threats. However, with the initiation of the world

campaign on terrorism reaching every regional combatant

commander, the ability to balance strategic ends, ways, and

means focuses attention not on the future, but on the

present to accomplish a broad range of military operations.9

And yet there is risk inherent in not balancing current

capabilities against future requirements. The reality for the

U.S. military is that many new capabilities are needed now

to defeat the current unconventional adversaries. The

ability to “adapt . . . existing military capabilities to new

circumstances, while experimenting with the development

of new military capabilities” sets the basis for the new U.S.

strategic context.10

How the military wages war will also impact on the

strategic context. The roots of an American way of war go all

the way back to the Revolutionary War, a war waged by

attrition out of necessity due to a lack of resources.11 The

Civil War combined the vast resources and technology of the

North with a strategy of total war that aimed to destroy the

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Confederacy. From this conflict emerged an American

preference for a strategy of annihilation with the coupling of

overwhelming force with the moral will to accomplish

unlimited aims (unlimited means plus will).12 The realities

of limited war have only emerged in the aftermath of World

War II. The new version of the American way of war has

focused on the contention that past wars with unlimited

aims were an anomaly based on the national and

international context.13 Yet, with the end of the Cold War

and the success of coalition warfare in the Gulf War, the

United States has again shifted back to annihilation

strategy with a preference, as one analyst has noted, for “the

use of overwhelming force to achieve decisive military

results without exposing American forces to protracted or

indecisive conflict.”14 The result is a military preference for

rapid, overwhelming force to accomplish limited political

objectives.

Public support has also emerged as a key factor in the

new American way of war. Limitations on duration, scope,

and attainment of stated limited objectives are crucial to

sustaining this support. All this has fueled an evolution

towards increased reliance on standoff precision fires. One

result has been a public expectations that technology,

providing increasingly precise standoff fires, offers a new

approach to war and that close combat with ground forces

can be minimized or eliminated. Current doctrinal

publications coupled with Joint Vision 2020’s goal of full

spectrum dominance embody this new approach to war with

a reliance on force projection, information superiority, and

standoff precision fires, while minimizing maneuver forces.

Emerging joint operational concepts, in short, orient on the

effects of these characteristics accomplished rapidly and

decisively.

The nature of the urban environment, on the other hand,

affects the strategic context by countering the American

preference for RDO. It conjures perceptions of not only

protracted conflict and casualties, but also the old American

way of war centered on mass and firepower concepts. The

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density of noncombatants in urban areas coupled with the

complexity of the terrain presents significant challenges to

the way America prefers to fight because of the increased

risk of casualties and collateral damage with the

commitment of ground forces into such an environment.

The strategic significance of urban conflict, then, is that it

poses a barrier to achieving full spectrum dominance. Since

the national military strategy requires such dominance, it is

incumbent on the U.S. military to orient transformation

initiatives to address urban capabilities that remain

virtually unchanged since World War II.15 Initiatives must

provide for urban capabilities across the spectrum of

operations to ensure that developing concepts, doctrine,

technologies, and organizations can meet the challenges of

even the urban environment.

At issue for the preferred strategy is the reality that

neither the political aims nor the adversary may fit this

strategy across the spectrum of operations. The strategic

culture or confluence of political, social, and military

viewpoints and intensity of interests will shape the aims. 16

Adversaries know the preferred American approach to war

and are already adapting to use anti-access, area-denial,

and complex terrain to shape their strategies.17 These

adversaries can capitalize on time because the longer the

conflict, the greater the interplay of friction and chance on

the strategic context. From a political perspective, the

making of policy at the strategic level should not rest on

military preference for a strategy already constrained by

military limitations. From a military perspective, therefore,

the United States needs to develop and integrate a set of

broader capabilities.

The strategic culture inevitably shapes the ends, ways,

and means that comprise a national strategy. The military

may desire unlimited means for specific limited objectives;

but other key factors, both internal to the United States and

abroad, may expose forces to protracted or indecisive

conflicts. The degree of risk in any strategy depends on the

balance between the political objective and the means in the

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form of national elements of power that are available and

how they are employed.18 The basis of the acceptability of

risk relates to the intensity of interests as well as the desire

to display credible support for assurance, dissuasion,

deterrence, and defeat. In terms of the national elements of

power, the development of a balanced joint operational

concept demands solving the urban challenge that confronts

the United States and will shape military transformation in

the 21st century.

The Urban Challenge: Trends and Threats.

Numerous studies since 1994 have highlighted several

major points about urban operations: first, urbanization

around the world is increasing; second, the likelihood of U.S.

military operations in urban terrain remains high; and

third, the U.S. military does not have dominance in the

urban environment, particularly in the area of joint

command, control, communications, computers and

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR).19

Within the next 10 years, 75 percent of the world’s

population will live in urban areas, creating both

geographical and social effects with a significant impact on

military operations.20 In addition, the United States

possesses a strategic culture that demands quick, decisive

results. From a political standpoint, military leaders advise

political leaders that urban operations are costly in terms of

friendly and civilian casualties, and inevitably lead to

collateral damage. When political leaders visit military

urban training exercises and view tactical operations, they

see the complexity and dynamics of close combat. Such

experience may actually develop negative views about the

employment of ground forces in urban warfare. For the

public, memories of Somalia provide images of angry crowds

of noncombatants, prolonged operations, and casualties.

For the military, although there is increasing reliance on

deep strike to mitigate requirements for forward basing, the

need to control decisive terrain and choke points remains

critical to the accomplishment of operational and strategic

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objectives. This is increasingly important for regime

replacement and security of noncombatants. Although joint

forces can isolate urban areas, air interdiction alone in

complex terrain cannot find, fix, or finish an adversary or

secure noncombatants without ground support.21 The

situation is clear: urban operations are complex and costly

in people, material resources, and time, but necessary to

support full spectrum military operations.

The result is that potential adversaries may select the

urban battle space to counter U.S. technology and

approaches to warfare. “If an opponent can force the fight

onto complex urban...terrain,” one defense analyst has

observed, “sensors and weapons accuracy will be degraded,

and potential for U.S. casualties will rise. Choosing the

right ground may well prove to be the most significant

advantage available to an adversary.”22 One important

aspect of urban terrain involves enemy political and

military techniques in terms of anti-access and area denial.

Noncombatants and complex urban terrain around

airfields, ports, or centers of command and control often

provides adversaries the initiative and the ability to prolong

the campaign. Ultimately, because of the growing U.S. deep

strike capability and continued emphasis on precision fires,

potential adversaries face a strategic and pragmatic choice:

opponents have a growing incentive to avoid massed

formations in the open and emphasize dispersed operations.

The costs of dispersion in complex terrain are far lower than

slaughter in the open by U.S. air and missile strikes.23

In the end, the primary strategic problem with the urban

environment combines a strategic culture optimized for

major combat operations using increased precision fires

with the rise of competitors using complex terrain to their

advantage. As the force structure continues to orient on

capabilities for major theater war between nation states, a

likely fallacy emerges.24 The ideal form of major theater war

may be the least likely to occur because of U.S. military

dominance in terrain suitable for precision engagement and

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nation-state threats.25 The Gulf War’s success has fueled

this fallacy. The emergence of precision fires overshadowed

the contribution and necessity of ground maneuver forces to

assure coalition cohesion and create operational and

tactical opportunities by finding, fixing, and destroying

Iraqi forces, and securing/exploiting sensitive sites. It was

also a cultural factor in underlining to the world the defeat

of Iraqi forces, with the potential for complete destruction.

The cautionary strategic dilemma is that rarely will the

threat, environment, and scope be in harmony with the new

American way of war.

Increasingly, this situation will be the case as

competitors perceive the value of using attrition/exhaustion

strategies to erode American will and counter RDO and

stand off precision effects. To mitigate this possibility, the

U.S. military must dominate the urban environment, or at

least balance precision fires with close combat precision

maneuver without becoming decisively engaged.26 Strategic

credibility depends on operational and tactical capabilities,

a fact noted by the Defense Science Board’s Urban

Operations Task Force:

Our (U.S.) current military capability was developed in large

part for a massive, rural war in Central Europe. Since the future

looks much different, new capabilities will need to be developed.

To do less risks highly visible casualties and corresponding loss

of military credibility and National prestige.27

Joint Publication 3-0 states that Joint Urban Operations

are “joint operations planned and conducted across the

range of military operations on, or against objectives on, a

topographical complex and its adjacent terrain where

manmade construction and the density of noncombatants

are the dominant features.”28 The identification of Joint

Urban Operations in joint doctrine acknowledges emerging

trends and the unique requirements for specialized

organizations, training (leader and people), and material in

urban environments.

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In the wake of the October 1993 Mogadishu battle, in

which 18 U.S. soldiers and hundreds of Somali fighters and

noncombatants died, serious questions surfaced about U.S.

tactical concepts for meeting a wide variety of urban

requirements. These questions led to a series of RAND

studies in the 1990s that identified the scope and

complexity of not only the tactical urban environment, but

also the operational level of urban conflict.

The studies concluded that there were limited examples

of joint operations in urban environments and virtually no

significant interagency coordination for urban operations. 29

Instead, most urban operations resulted from

ground-centric Army or Marine Corps tactical approaches.

In addition, urban operations require decentralized,

smaller, task-organized, combined-arms teams for direct

support fires. At the same time, however, the density of

friendly, enemy, and noncombatants in urban

environments results in joint fire support targeting

challenges between operational and tactical level effects.

Added to this are dramatic reductions in C4ISR capabilities

due to structures and line of sight difficulties. Of particular

significance is that, in operations aimed at the replacement

of hostile regimes, planning and execution for operational

level urban operations is complex and dynamic in scope,

duration, and use of all elements of national power. In

numerous case studies, the character of urban warfare is

very different from that envisioned in the new American

way of war.30

The RAND studies drew their most significant

conclusion from the 1999-2000 operational urban

experiences of the capable, experienced, and relatively

modern Russian force in Chechnya. The Russians returned

to Chechnya in 1999 after their disastrous defeat in 1994

with policy and strategy aligned, operational and tactical

plans focused, improved training, combined arms

synchronization, technology, including unmanned aerial

vehicles, precision munitions, and a successful media

campaign for public support.31 However, the key lesson the

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Russians took away from 1994 proved nearly fatal again:

avoid urban close combat. As a consequence, the Russians

bypassed towns and used indigenous forces in urban areas

to minimize combat by Russian forces. The Russian

approach was reliant on surrogate forces and fires to

achieve objectives at the operational and tactical level.

If they could not persuade a town’s leadership by money

or threat of force to succumb, the Russians would attempt to

isolate the city, mass fires on “key” targets (local

government, power sources), and wait until submission.

Some bombardments lasted for weeks, pulverizing towns

and causing heavy collateral damage and civilian

casualties.32 Ultimately, commitment of Russian ground

forces was necessary to seize, secure, and maintain stability

in order to accomplish the strategic mission. The result was

protracted operations with heavy Russian and

noncombatant casualties and the virtual destruction of

every city in Chechnya.

The major lesson from all this for the United States is

that the new strategic environment may not be in

consonance with the American strategic context for the

preferred way of war. Full spectrum operations, ranging

from regime replacement to peace enforcement, will require

close combat capabilities in complex urban terrain to

counter asymmetric threats. How the U.S. military applies

or ignores lessons learned for transformation and the

development of joint operational concepts can have

profound effects on future capabilities. The capability

shortfalls identified by RAND, as well as the Russian

lessons from their recent experience at the operational level

in urban conflict, pose important issues for these emerging

concepts. The first lesson is that avoiding close combat may

actually prolong the conflict with all the attendant

implications for achieving the political ends. There is an

essential need to connect the tactical search for urban

dominance to new concepts and systems at the operational

level.33 In the urban environment, tactical shortfalls are

magnified in a way that creates disproportionate levels of

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friction and complexity at the operational and strategic

levels. A critical goal must focus on how to build on the

tactical base by identifying and defining operational level

joint requirements that can bridge the current tactical

shortfalls with the desired joint operational capabilities.

The Joint Operational Concept Challenge: Joint

Transformation Synchronization.

The urban environment provides a pressing and

relevant venue for refining not only joint operational

concepts, but also the joint information architecture to

support employment of joint fire support and maneuver.

Developing a new operational framework and applying

expanded joint means with interagency elements in urban

operations presents an important opportunity for military

transformation. The challenge is to link the new American

way of war with core Service competencies and emerging

technologies to achieve a synergistic joint operational

concept. The new joint operational concept must serve as

the catalyst to fuse doctrine, technology, and organization

development. However, there is no standard definition of an

operational concept for either scope or purpose; neither

current joint nor service publications address the definition.

At the same time, there are innumerable emerging joint and

service operational concepts. The Joint Staff J-8 is using the

following working definition of an operational concept: “An

end-to-end stream of activities that defines how force

elements, systems, organizations, and tactics combine to

accomplish a military task.”34 This definition defines

neither the scope nor purpose of an operational concept.

Colonel Douglas Macgregor, on the other hand, has added a

key component by defining a joint operational concept as

“the integration of service core tactical capabilities on the

operational level to achieve unity of purpose and action in

the conduct of military operations.”35 From this perspective,

the real challenge is to describe how the services can

integrate at the operational level to fight and win across the

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conflict spectrum in order to define the requirements for

training, systems, and organizations.

This is easier said than done. The strategic concept that

is shaping 21st century military operations is Joint Vision

2020. The document lists four operational concepts:

dominant maneuver, precision fires, focused logistics, and

full dimensional protection.36 The key enablers of

information superiority coupled with human and

technology innovation form the general framework for

achieving full spectrum dominance. However, this is not a

operational concept that describes how joint forces will

fight, but rather it represents a generic framework for

desired capabilities. Defining requirements for such a

concept largely rests not only on service capabilities and

competencies, but on the need for long-range precision fires

as well. The balance between fires, maneuver, and

information requirements is significant as the U.S. Army

struggles with developing new training, organizations, and

systems acquisition to achieve a new objective force. At the

core of this struggle are problems associated with the nature

of close combat and maneuver, the synchronization of

operational joint fires, and the definition of responsibilities

and capabilities between the Services.

Such is the case in the development of a joint operational

concept for full spectrum dominance as a part of the larger

military transformation process. The Joint Staff is

developing operational concepts of RDO and Effects Based

Operations. There is increasing reliance on using precision

information and operational fires to paralyze the enemy and

achieve endstates with minimum ground maneuver.

Moreover, RDO for full spectrum operations require a joint

network-centric communications architecture to support

information dominance across the services at levels below

division, battle groups, squadrons, and Marine Corps

expeditionary forces in order to support “plug and play”

Joint Task Force organizations. However, there is still no

consensus on defining how low the joint communications

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infrastructure needs to extend, and how the services can

integrate and couple joint fires and maneuver.

At the same time, service transformation efforts are

moving in accordance with tactical concepts within the

broad strategic vector of Joint Vision 2020. For Army

transformation, Major General James Dubik has

summarized the challenge in the following terms:

We know we will not get it precisely right. But our job is to not

get it so wrong that we hamstring the next generation of

leaders. We have to get it right enough, so in 2015, when the

nation asks the Army to do something, it is flexible enough to

accomplish any potential mission.37

A joint operational approach to get Joint Vision 2020

“right” hinges not on service transformation, but on the

development of, and service orientation toward, a joint

operational concept that addressees and overcomes old

challenges.

Developing balanced capabilities to address and

improve strategic, operational, and tactical weaknesses in

urban environments presents opportunities for such an

orientation. Both the Air Force and the Navy have a stake in

what the Army and Marine Corps require at the tactical

level because integration of fires through a common

communications architecture supports precision fires at the

theater-operational level. Moreover, a strategy that fuses

service efforts to shape a new joint operational concept

balancing precision fires and maneuver in close combat

urban operations will support U.S. political and military

flexibility. Joint transformation, in short, must be more

than the sum of the service transformation processes. There

must be a top down joint operational concept that defines

overarching requirements for the services to train, equip,

and organize.

Innovation is the key to the success of this complex

endeavor, as it was in the military transformations that

occurred in most of the great powers between World Wars I

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and II. Bold changes marked that period ranging from

armored warfare and carrier based aviation to amphibious

warfare. All resulted from an overarching operational

concept. In this context, military innovation “is more than

the incorporation of equipment and technical change into

current doctrine, practices, and tactics. Innovation in

tactics and operational concepts can prove as important on

the battlefield as changes in equipment.”38 Success in

innovation during the interwar years involved two major

influences.39 The first, specificity in the operational concept,

relates to the scope of the problem and the commitment of

the institution to solving the problem. For major innovation,

the scope extends to national strategic problems. The

second element of innovative success deals with how the

military culture adapts. A baseline definition of military

culture involves the intellectual, professional, and

traditional values of the officer corps. The military culture

determines the assessment of the environment and how

solutions are derived under civilian control.40 An expansion

on this definition leads to subcultures within the military

that relate to service, branch, and even niches within

branches that affect views on roles, missions, and

operational concepts to solve challenges. An example of the

impact of military culture is the transformation of the

German Army after World War I which, through changes in

leader training, equipment, concepts, and technology,

transformed the operational context of maneuver warfare.

The cultural commitment to change, coupled with strategic

interests requiring change, is a powerful combination.

Urgency and necessity also influence innovation. The

services have historically transformed out of necessity to

survive, from lessons-learned due to failure, or from the

need to face new threats, but always shaped by the strategic

context. But lessons from the interwar years also bring a

distinct warning about ignoring asymmetric capabilities.

The lack of innovation in submarine warfare for offensive

exploitation or defensive countermeasures by the United

States, Britain, and Germany after World War I created

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costly lessons relearned during World War II. The confusion

of submarine polices, coupled with the absence of coherent

concepts concerning operational employment, created a

strategic context that minimized or ignored both the

potential capability and threat posed by submarines.41 In

the end, submarine warfare, both offensively and

defensively, was guided by urgency and necessity

regardless of the attempts to operationally constrain or

politically restrain their employment.

On a more modern note, all of the concepts of innovation

were demonstrated at the service level by the evolution of

AirLand Battle. The Soviet Union posed a national threat,

creating urgency for the U.S. military to innovate based on a

receptive military culture. How the Army, in turn, initiated

approaches to defining the external environment captured

the scope of evolving operational concepts. To begin with,

the impact of fighting in Vietnam, coupled with a dominant

conventional Soviet threat, shaped the strategic context of

the Army in the 1970s. By 1982, after significant debate and

analysis, a fundamental definition of AirLand Battle had

emerged, one that emphasized initiative and attacks on key

debilitating nodes across the depth of the battlefield.42 At

the same time, the Army culture was also open to change.

The result was the evolution of a new Army, ranging from

new uniforms to virtually every major weapon system. Most

important, the new concept caused a top-to-bottom

revitalization of the Army’s educational system and

creation of unit combat training centers and programs to

inculcate the new doctrine at every level. In the 1986 Army

Field Manual 100-5, Operations, Airland Battle defined the

Army’s approach to generating and applying combat power

at the operational and tactical levels of war. The key to this

success was that AirLand Battle served as the capstone

operational concept to generate changes in organization,

weapons system research/development/selection, and

training.43

Defining an integrating capstone joint operational

concept could provide the same effect for the joint operations

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that AirLand Battle served for the Army. It must be specific

and build on a broad foundation of military culture, if new

ways are to be developed for combining core tactical

capabilities to achieve operational effects. With numerous

operational concepts in the current environment, the joint

force commander confronts the daunting challenge of how to

integrate and synchronize air, land, sea, space, and special

forces literally “on the fly.” The result is usually a broad

service-oriented division of the battlespace in developing of

the campaign plan. To develop a joint operational concept

that drives the warfight and the requirement process, one

must address the issue from a joint warfighting perspective.

In this regard, one way of addressing the challenges of

information fusion, precision fires, and maneuver at the

operational level in emerging joint operational concepts is to

focus on capabilities in the joint urban environment.

Dominance in this environment can provide the basis to

focus service efforts on achieving a better balance between

precision fires and maneuver. The key is to provide each

service with a stake in achieving that balance. For example,

how the Army shapes joint transformation rests not on

service dominance in the complex urban areas and terrain,

but rather on illumination of the joint operational level

challenges to support anti-access and area denial

operations in order to refine emerging joint operational

concepts such as RDO.

Innovation and integration in the essential areas of

doctrine, organization, training, and technologies must

start with a new joint operational concept. But this concept

needs focus. Shifting the urban environment challenge from

the tactical level to the joint operational level can provide

focus to the essential areas in the services in order to define

and develop the capabilities required to achieve decisive

operations by fusing joint information, precision fires, and

ground maneuver. In addition, joint urban operations

present significant opportunities for applying focus to

emerging joint concepts, combining new means with new

systems.

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Joint Urban Operations and the Joint Operational

Concept: Connecting Strategic Ends, Ways and

Means.

An innovative joint operational concept could be the

catalyst for military transformation, fusing service

initiatives. Since the focus of the Department of Defense

(DoD) has shifted from threat-based to capability-based,

urban operations can help shape the new operational

framework. Yet, the challenges of both the urban and joint

operational concept are being addressed separately and at

different levels. The origins of this dysfunctional approach

begin with the current DoD policy on joint urban operations.

Current DoD policy on urban operations has evolved

over the past 5 years and focuses on improving service and

joint urban warfighting capabilities. Three main strategic

documents form the basis for this policy. The Fiscal Year 01

Defense Authorization Act directed the Secretary of

Defense “to designate an appropriate executive agent with

the authority to develop and coordinate a master plan for a

DoD-wide strategy, with milestones, for improving service

and joint capabilities to conduct military operations in

urban environments.”44 The Defense Planning Guidance

2000 directed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and

the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Science and

Technology) to “develop a road map that integrates all

Department activities relating to military operations on

urban terrain.”45 Finally, the Quadrennial Defense Review

2001 report orients on developing a capability-based force to

address a broad range of challenges. It emphasizes that

threat-based geographic focus cannot address the

probability of intervention in “distant regions where urban

environments . . . present major operational challenges.”46

Although the Department’s policy on urban operations

recognizes the need for improved capabilities, there is

considerable debate about the level of effort and strategy

required to achieve joint urban improvements. The key

aspects in the debate focus on the likelihood, scope, and

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intensity of U.S. forces operating in urban environments. To

begin with, the Department’s desired endstate of

“improving service and joint capabilities in the urban

environment” poses significant issues in terms of defining

measures of effectiveness.47 And while a Government

Accounting Office Review in February 2000 praised service

level initiatives, it also stressed the lack of joint urban

concept of operations development, experimentation, and

interoperability.48 In addition, the Office of the Secretary of

Defense’s Urban Working Group identified numerous policy

issues for coordination among intra-service, inter-service,

and even inter-agency elements.49 A primary concern for

DoD is that there is no overarching joint operational concept

or joint C4ISR architecture that defines an end-to-end

combination of actions and information flowew

A defining of the information architecture is just one

example of how service requirements in urban

environments can meld into joint imperatives. The need to

illuminate various service requirements and integration of

command, control, communications, and computers with

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems in

the joint urban environment is essential to understanding

the performance parameters for a truly joint C4ISR

operational architecture. The implications of solving real

time control and surveillance challenges in the complex

urban environment, as opposed to open terrain, provide the

framework for balancing joint precision fires and maneuver

in any environment. Without a defined joint C4ISR

architecture, the services are developing and implementing

“stove-piped” tactical transformation plans based on core

capabilities, while failing to expand joint interoperability or

have joint mission requirements for the Joint Requirements

Oversight Council to evaluate for validation and

recommendation. Despite the Department’s concern in this

matter, it is the lack of a defined endstate for joint urban

operations improvement that has severely hampered

service unity of effort.

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The J-8 Dominant Maneuver Joint Warfighting

Capability Assessment team has the responsibility to build

the road map for the Department’s urban policy and reports

to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. In addition,

J-8 is developing the emerging joint operational concept,

while the Joint Requirements Oversight Council approves

priorities, assigns responsibilities, and measures

progress.50 The latest update of this organization’s charter

empowers it to develop and validate joint operational

concepts and architectures at the front end of the Joint

Requirements Process. The charter further incorporates

Joint Forces Command’s experimentation efforts into the

Joint Requirements Oversight Council’s process. The new

authorization also shifts the focus of the Joint Warfighting

Capability Assessment teams to the broad based joint

requirements of Joint Vision 2020. In particular, it requires

the J-8 assessment teams to develop and monitor a mix of

evolving joint and service concepts and technologies to

improve joint urban capabilities.51 The challenges of

identifying numerous systems, combinations of systems,

and other enablers in a synchronized fashion to improve

joint urban capabilities will be almost impossible without

in-depth operational level joint experimentation. Already,

the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment teams have

conducted numerous studies, assessments, and

experiments to define Joint Vision 2020 joint mission areas

without achieving service consensus.

This lack of operational concept consensus has serious

implications. The Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment

teams have proposed several narrow operational concepts

varying from general mission areas (e.g., Deep Strike) to

specific tasks (e.g., Attack Operations Against Critical

Mobile Targets) relating to combatant commanders’

integrated priority lists. For example, the Dominant

Maneuver Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment team

is now working on the concept of RDO. But the RDO concept

is still an emerging joint operational concept and has not

been accepted by the services. At the same time, with no

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overarching joint C4ISR architecture, the services are

procuring a variety of systems with various levels of

interoperability. In all this, the impact of an overarching

joint operational concept on the service acquisition plans

would be enormous. Identification of key performance

parameters for an enabling joint C4ISR architecture, and

other Acquisition Category I systems to focus the Joint

Requirements Process must shape service transformation

plans. But the absence of an accepted joint operational

concept is affecting the Joint Requirements Oversight

Council’s ability to validate service operational

requirements documents and link them to combatant

commander requirements in the midst of many service

visions. Finally, there remains the daunting challenge of

focusing and synchronizing joint experimentation.

The means of achieving an improved tactical urban

endstate currently hinge on service investments in time and

money. Applications of evolving joint urban operational

doctrine using simulations are intended to evaluate

emerging concepts of operations and identify requirements

for Joint Requirements Oversight Council investment

approval. The challenge is that no military operations on

urban terrain simulations exist at the operational level; in

fact, few urban simulations are available above the tactical

battalion level.52 In addition, the next Congressionally

mandated exercise, “Joint Experiment Millennium

Challenge 02,” will take place in the open desert terrain of

the National Training Center, which has no sizable site for

even battalion level urban operations.53 The combination of

service transformation efforts, the Millennium Challenge

joint experimentation process, and the lack of operational

level urban simulations ensure that developing

requirements for a joint force to dominate an enemy in an

urban environment will be a challenge.

The risks of continuing the Department’s current urban

policy with such strategic ends, ways, and means

imbalances are fourfold. First, without a defined endstate

for urban capability improvement, no unity of effort among

332
the services and government agencies can occur. Second,

the current concept of building an urban road map lacks the

integration of broader joint and interagency linkages to

joint experimentation that is necessary for a full

dimensional approach. Third, many current requirements

focus on ground forces at the tactical level. This limits

development of a joint operational concept and

identification of joint requirements. Finally, because of

differing service visions, even if breakthrough technologies

are identified, funding would not be available for their

incorporation into the joint transformation process. In any

event, urban combat initiatives over the past 5 years have

only identified requirements on the margins of the problem.

The overall result of these strategic imbalances is that there

has been minimal increase in joint operational level

capabilities for decisive operations above a city block, let

alone a small town or major city.

The Russian solution in Chechnya of avoiding the close

fight and of relying on fires to wage siege warfare is a prime

example of the cost to be paid in the urban environment for

strategic, operational, and tactical imbalances. By not

developing different ways to approach close combat in

urban areas, the Russians had to revert to World War II

techniques of systematic destruction of the city, all of which

produced lasting socio-military problems in the region.

Emerging evidence from Afghanistan is demonstrating

similar shortfalls in urban and complex terrain that have

strategic and operational implications. What is clear is that

the combination of precision fires with ground force

pressure is highly effective. The reality of the war in

Afghanistan is that the closer the fighting to the cities or

other complex terrain, the more requirements increase for

close combat forces to isolate, seize, and secure as well as

gain intelligence and ensure destruction of the enemy.

The Afghan War has also demonstrated again that the

United States cannot always depend on coalition partners

for the close fight. In other words, what would have been the

American option had the coalition been unwilling or unable

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to seize the cities occupied by the Taliban and al Qaeda?

Moreover, the dependence on local allies meant that U.S.

forces did not achieve, for the most part, the key objective of

isolating and seizing enemy leaders during the “decisive”

phase of the operation, primarily because of the lack of

ground force pressure and the lack of a C4ISR architecture

that could focus at the urban or complex terrain level. The

resulting prolonged operations to search for and attack

dispersed al Qaeda cells in remote villages and complex

terrain is increasing force numbers and casualties. Finally,

there is the challenge of control since the actions of coalition

forces may affect policy and strategy. For example, public

opinion, and therefore policy support, may not remain

intact if coalition fighters systematically destroy cities or

kill combatants and noncombatants.

As these recent examples demonstrate, continuing to

use only incremental, evolutionary, and tactical approaches

to solve the challenges of urban combat will not achieve

operational dominance in that environment. If a joint

operational concept is to emerge, as Macgregor has pointed

out in a larger context, there has to be “the integration of

service core capabilities on the operational level to achieve

unity of purpose and action in the conduct of military

operations.”54 The joint requirements for C4ISR

interoperability between the services will not be achieved

with a bottom-up approach. The lessons learned from

previous Army and Marine Corps experiments and combat

experience demonstrate the need for joint operational

concepts to refine new ways as well as new systems. The

lessons from Chechnya and Afghanistan only reinforce

these points. Using current and emerging service tactical

approaches with technology to resolve shortfalls in the close

combat urban environment will not take fully into account

joint operational capabilities and thereby will not identify

new requirements for the joint force.

There is, in short, little joint momentum for urban

operations because they are not considered at the

operational level, or even beyond the tactical level of brigade

334
operations. There is equally little momentum by the

services for a joint operational concept because of a general

over-reliance, fueled by the new American way of war, on

technology and long range fires, while minimizing the

importance and interdependence of joint fires with

maneuver.

The Way Ahead: Connecting the Challenges.

The fusing of joint urban operations into a joint

operational concept concerns not just Army but joint

transformation. The Navy, for instance, may require the

seizure of choke points for littoral entry or sustainment

operations. This central mission for the Marine Corps

illuminates the need for joint close combat capabilities,

since urban centers dominate most ports and airfields

throughout the world. Furthermore, the Air Force and even

Special Operations Command require access and forward

basing, necessitating seizure or security of operating bases

in or near major urban environments to accomplish full

spectrum operations.

From these requirements flow the manifold advantages

of using joint urban operations as the linchpin to develop the

overarching joint operational concept. First, defining an

overarching joint operational concept using complex urban

terrain would bring together the joint implementation

master plan and service transformation plans for

requirements and experimentation with the

Congressionally-mandated urban roadmap. In particular,

defining levels of interoperability and responsibilities for

procuring a joint C4ISR architecture would synchronize

service efforts to create a common relevant operational

picture needed for battlespace dominance in any

environment. This architecture, in short, could provide a

common picture in complex urban environments that will

enable a similar focus for joint requirements in other areas.

Secondly, if the joint operational concept and joint C4ISR

architecture remain ill-defined or focused on open terrain,

335
the services will develop concepts and forces that divide

battlespace rather than integrate joint capabilities in all

environments.

With a joint operational concept and joint C4ISR

architecture, experiment assessment can focus joint

requirements to achieve an overarching system of systems

for full spectrum capabilities. Without a joint operational

concept and joint C4ISR architecture, the current joint

experimentation plan will continue to deal with a mix of

near-term combatant commander integrated priority list

tasks and long-term partial operational concepts. The result

will leave numerous requirements and concomitant

capability gaps that no single service can address. Finally,

with no joint operational concept and joint C4ISR

architecture to assess joint requirements, the Joint

Requirements Oversight Council can only analyze service

procurement as parts of a puzzle that may combine as a joint

force without achieving full synergy. In terms of resource

efficiency, the joint operational concept and joint C4ISR

architecture can focus service procurement efforts to

achieve unity of effort for Joint Vision 2020.

For any approach using joint urban operations to

succeed, the DoD Urban Working Group must first

establish a definition orienting on joint force operational

level military operations on urban terrain improvement

relating to lethality, collateral damage, and survivability.

Next, the selection of a designated lead must include the

authority and responsibility to develop and link joint urban

requirements and a joint operational concept to overall

service transformation plans and joint experimentation.

Currently, the Army and Marine Corps have been de-facto

co-leads in developing initial urban tactical requirements;

but they lack the funding, authority, and responsibility for

joint operational requirements or integration. Unlike the

current system, the Department’s executive agent must

have the responsibility to work with the Joint Requirements

Oversight Council to pursue required technologies

regardless of which service provides the capability,

336
particularly in the area of C4ISR. Finally, the J-8 and

Department’s Urban Working Group must continue to

coordinate with all military and interagency elements to

exploit joint urban capability improvements.

From the Department’s perspective, it is also important

to exploit Congressionally-mandated joint experimentation

over the next decade, using the “Millennium Challenge”

experiments to fuse emerging service transformation units

to drive capability-focused joint interoperability

requirements.55 Synchronization of the Department’s

emerging Urban Operations Road Map with the

“Millennium Challenge” experiments would align the

resourcing and requirements processes. At the same time,

exploiting these joint experiments in the urban

environment can serve as a measure of effectiveness for the

emerging joint operational concepts that establish the

framework for Joint Vision 2020. Integrating the joint

C4ISR operational architecture into complex urban terrain

could enable new approaches with both unmanned air and

ground systems employed by lower levels. The capabilities

for precision fires coupled with ground maneuver can also

be synchronized with logistics and force protection within

the joint operational concept.

In all these efforts, the responsibility for balancing

operational precision fires and maneuver coordination

between the services should continue to rest with the Joint

Staff and Joint Forces Command. Both organizations are

working to define the specifics of a new joint operational

concept with enabling joint C4ISR architecture. Focusing

these initial efforts on the close combat joint urban

environment would provide critical analysis of the current

C4ISR system to help define required capabilities. At the

same time, further developing a joint synchronized urban

road map would integrate service joint experimentation,

and shape individual service transformation procurement

through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council based

on capability requirements. This approach would not only

address disconnects in the strategy to achieve the

337
Department’s urban policy objectives, but would also

establish the key performance parameters and

requirements for the most difficult environment that

potential adversaries can exploit.

By focusing efforts on the urban environment from a

joint perspective, joint planners can develop lessons learned

to influence all elements of the force to develop new

operational frameworks for organizing, equipping, and

training. The J-8 can then work with the services to develop

a capstone joint operational concept document with the

greatest potential to create a DoD policy with a joint vision

based on sufficient authority and means to integrate the

efforts under Joint Forces Command into the “Millennium

Challenge” joint experiments. In this manner,

synchronization between joint and service experiments can

be defined for long range planning and resourcing.

The key to this process would be to focus on evolution of

joint force capabilities to achieve full spectrum dominance

and synchronization within the Joint Requirements

Process. Joint Forces Command must synchronize the

development of the joint operational concept and joint

architecture through experimentation with service

transformation plans, initially focusing on joint warfighting

requirements in complex urban environments. In this

regard, building on the tactical requirements defined by the

initial urban advanced concepts technology demonstrations

conducted by the Army and Marine Corps would provide

crucial input for any joint operational concept as well as an

interoperable joint C4ISR operational architecture. The

assessment of required operational level capabilities should

then be compared to current doctrine, organization,

training, materiel, leader development, personnel, and

facilities followed by appropriate recommended changes

submitted to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council.

The Joint Requirements Oversight Council validation must

include service procurement responsibilities for the joint

C4ISR architecture as well as any new systems to support

the joint operational concept. The J-8 could then integrate

338
the joint operational concept and joint C4ISR architecture

into a Joint Vision 2020 implementation master plan as the

principal means to synchronize service transformation

initiatives and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council

determination of near and long-range joint requirements to

support combatant commanders. Finally, the Joint

Requirements Oversight Council would prioritize and

recommend to the Defense Acquisition Board the necessary

systems and system of systems for procurement based on

the joint operational concept and joint experimentation.

From the service perspective, this process would offer

significant opportunities to develop dominant joint

capabilities in the urban environment. To begin with, both

the Army and the Marine Corps have benefited from tactical

level urban experimentation. By shifting to the operational

level, the services could refine and develop requirements for

synchronizing multiple air assets and maneuver options to

achieve isolation, seizure, and security of urban areas. As

the services identify requirements, new ways and systems

could shape development of the Army Interim Brigade

Combat Team and Marine Corps expeditionary forces and

refine the joint strike fighter and naval surface fires. The

key is unity of effort with the other services, which is crucial

for identifying both a joint operational concept and

interdependent requirements. Understanding the synergy

of joint integration and interdependence is the foundation

for developing a joint force. The lessons learned from

developing the required joint technologies and concepts for

dominating the complex environment of urban operations

can be applied to dominate both asymmetrical as well as

symmetrical threats across the spectrum of conflict. In

identifying the current urban challenge approach, a new

strategy option emerges to accomplish the Department’s

desired objectives for increased urban capabilities,

increased joint interoperability, and, in turn, significantly

increased capabilities for full spectrum dominance.

Identifying linkages to the Department’s policy for these

challenges would provide the strategic issues and choices

339
for Army transformation and Joint Vision 2020 to align

ends, ways, and means to achieve full spectrum dominance.

Conclusion.

Winston Churchill once noted of the outbreak of World

War I that “the terrible ‘ifs’ accumulate.”56 This is no less

true when examining the potential role that urban

operations might play in the formulation of a new, effective

joint operational concept for full spectrum dominance. If the

DoD aims to improve joint urban operational capabilities, it

needs a new strategy. If transformation plans of the services

are to create synergistic joint operational level capabilities,

then they require a new joint operational concept to guide

their efforts. The use of the complex physical and social

environment of urban operations could provide an essential

litmus test for emerging joint concepts to balance

information, fires, and maneuver to address the complex

and dynamic nature of war.

America’s strategic culture is shaping an evolving

American way of war centered on overwhelming force used

to achieve decisive and rapid results across the operational

spectrum. At the same time, however, the U.S. military

lacks this ability in urban environments across that

spectrum, primarily because the nature of urban warfare

mitigates the effectiveness of long-range precision fires and

intensifies the difficulties of ground maneuver. The most

probable result in such an environment is a protracted

strategy of exhaustion that is unacceptable to the American

public and thus to American policymakers. Moreover, the

nature of this problem virtually ensures that adversaries in

the future will attempt to use urban environments to limit

American political and military options.

The status quo is not an acceptable solution. The Urban

environment is much more challenging than other

environments. Service focus at the tactical fringe of the

urban challenge risks dramatically different evolutionary

solutions that intensify the chasm between precision fires

340
and ground maneuver. These approaches limit joint,

interagency, and multinational integration. On the other

hand, by changing the context for urban operations to a joint

operational perspective, future training, organization, and

technology development would be able to exploit joint

precision fires using maneuver to seize positional

advantage. The resultant success in the most difficult of all

combat environments can have even larger consequences.

For by making urban combat the cornerstone of the joint

operational concept and by integrating joint urban

operations into the joint experimentation process, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff will be able to shape service transformation

plans in the overall joint image of that process.

Maturing the emerging joint operational concept and

C4ISR architecture required for full spectrum dominance in

urban operations is the sine qua non for achieving the Joint

Vision 2020 goal of operating decisively in any environment.

The key ingredients for innovation are present in the

military culture. The time is now for a joint operational

concept that addresses urban dominate maneuver to drive

doctrine, organizations, training, and material, and thus

ultimately the joint requirements process in order to ensure

that the United States can rapidly and decisively defeat any

enemy, regardless of the environment.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 10

1. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020, Washington,

DC, 2000, p. 3.

2. William Craig, Enemy At The Gates: The Battle for Stalingrad, New York, 1973, p. xv.

3. For example, Manila, 1945; Seoul, 1951; Saigon and Hue, 1968;

Panama, 1989; Mogadishu, 1993. Lessons about both U.S. as well as the

experiences of other countries can be found in Michael Dewar, War in

the Streets: The Story of Urban Combat from Calais to Kafji, Newton

Abbot, UK, 1992. MOUT has been a concern for the U.S. military since

World War II. Doctrine of avoidance permeates military manuals, FM

100-5, 1976, through the 1980s, largely because of the complexity and

large troop requirements for deliberate systematic clearing of urban

areas and a focus on open maneuver warfare against the former Soviet

Union.

341
4. Max Neiman, “Urban Operations: Social Meaning, the Urban

Built Form, and Economic Function,” and Barry R. Posen, “Urban

Operations: Tactical Realities and Strategic Ambiguities,” in Soldiers in

Cities: Military Operations On Urban Terrain, Michael C. Desch, ed.,

Carlisle, PA, 2001, pp. 139, 157.

5. The corresponding friendly and noncombatant casualty figures

from historical examples can be found in Russell Glenn, Denying the

Widow Maker, Santa Monica, CA, 1998, p. 6.

6. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret,

eds. and trans., Princeton, NJ, 1976, pp. 89, 75-119. See also Alan

Beyerchen “Clausewitz, Non-linearity, and the Unpredictability of

War,” International Security, Winter 1992/1993, pp. 69-70.

7. Ibid., p. 89.

8. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, hereafter

QDR 2001, Washington, DC, 2001, p. 11.

9. Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., “Toward an Understanding of Military

Strategy,” Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., ed., Military Strategy: Theory and

Application, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1989, pp. 3-8. The Army War

College uses a base definition of strategy as ends plus ways plus means.

10. Ibid., p. iv.

11. There is much discussion about an American way of war. Hans

Delbruck defines two types of strategy: annihilation and attrition. See

Gordon A. Craig, “Delbruck: The Military Historian,” in Edward Mead

Earle, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from

Machiavelli to Hitler, New York, 1966, pp. 272-275. Russell Weigley

used this theory to expand on the American way of war with a preference

towards annihilation with unlimited means. See Russell F. Weigley,

The American Way of War, A History of the United States Military

Strategy and Policy, Bloomington, IN, 1973, p. xxii.

12. Weigley, The American Way of War, A History of the United

States Military Strategy and Policy, p. xxii.

13. The lessons from Vietnam and Lebanon led to the

“Weinberger-Powell Doctrine” for guides to use of force. The basic

premise of overwhelming force, coupled with identification of national

interests and public support to achieve limited objectives, was applied to

Panama and the 1990 Gulf War.

14. F. G. Hoffman, Decisive Force: The New American Way of War, Westport, CT, 1996, p. 99.

342
15. Russell W. Glenn, Corralling the Trojan Horse: A Proposal for

Improving U.S. Urban Operations Preparedness in the Period

2000-2025, Santa Monica, CA, 2001, p. 1.

16. Hoffman,p. 2

17. Sam J. Tangredi, “The Future Security Environment,

2001-2025: Toward a Consensus View,” in Michele A. Flournoy, ed.,

QDR 2001: Strategy-Driven Choices For America’s Security, Washington, DC, 2001, pp. 56-59.

18. Lykke, pp. 3-8.

19. Anatol Lieven, “Nasty Little Wars,” National Interest, No 62,

Winter 2000/2001, pp. 65-76; and Glenn, Corralling the Trojan Horse, p.

vii.

20. Michael C. Desch, “Why MOUT Now?” in Desch, pp. 4-5.

21. Ibid., p.16; and Gerald Yonas and Timothy Moy, “Emerging

Technologies and Military Operations In Urban Terrain,” in Ibid., pp.

131-132.

22. Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., “The Rise of Asymmetric Threats:

Priorities for Defense Planning,” in Flourney, p. 88.

23. Stephen Biddle, “Balancing Deep Strike and Close Combat

Capability,” Carlisle, PA, unpublished paper, p. 1.

24. See Robert W. Komer, “Future of U.S. Conventional Forces: A

Coalition Approach,” in John Glenn, Barry E. Carter, Robert Komer,

eds., Rethinking Defenses and Conventional Forces, Washington, DC,

1983, p. 45.

25. Tangredi, p. 47.

26. The ability to dominate complex terrain, like urban

environments, balances the use of precision fires with precision

maneuver. See Robert H. Scales, Jr., America’s Army in Transition:

Preparing for War in the Precision Age, Carlisle, PA, 1999, p. 27.

27. Defense Science Board, “Report of the Defense Science Board

Task Force on Military Operations in Built Up Areas,” 1993, p. 9.

28. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Publication 3-0,” p.

#II-22-23.

29. The RAND Arroyo Center, in support of the Army, provides

some of the most prolific researchers on doctrine, organization, training,

and technology advancements to improve urban capabilities. See

Russell W. Glenn’s: Marching Under Darkening Skies, Santa Monica,

343
CA, 1998; Denying the Widow Maker, Santa Monica, CA, 1998; and The

City’s Many Faces, Santa Monica, CA, 2000. See also Michael C. Desch.

The research is based on lessons learned, current urban operations

capability, and the trends illuminating the likelihood of future urban

conflict. In numerous case studies ranging from unlimited aims and

means operations in World War II, Stalingrad and Berlin, through the

post-World War II environment of limited aims and means operations;

Hue: 1968; U.S. Marines in Lebanon: 1982-84; Panama: 1989; Somalia:

1993; and Russia’s Chechen Wars: 1994-1999, the themes of operational

and strategic balancing of ends, ways, and means were found to be as

important as the tactical requirements.

30. Barry R. Posen, “Urban Operations: Tactical Realties and

Strategic Ambiguities,” in Desch, p. 157.

31. Olga Oliker, Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from

Urban Combat, Santa Monica, CA, 2001, pp. 84-85.

32. Ibid., p. 85.

33. Glenn, Corralling the Trojan Horse: A Proposal for Improving

U.S. Urban Operations Preparedness in the Period 2000-2025, pp. 1-5.

34. J-8, The Joint Staff, “Dominant Maneuver Operational

Concept,” Briefing for the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, 2001.

35. Douglas A. Macgregor, Resurrecting Transformation for the

Post-Industrial Era, Washington, DC, 2001, p. 8.

36. Joint Vision 2020, p. 20.

37. James Dubik, “IBCT at Fort Lewis,” Military Review, Vol.

LXXX, NO. 5, September–October 2000, p. 18.

38. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, eds., Military

Innovation in the Interwar Period, New York, 1996, p. 306.

39. Ibid., p. 311.

40. Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State, The Theory and

Politics of Civil-Military Relations, Cambridge, MA, 1957, pp. 59, 85-89.

41. Holger H. Herwig, “Innovation Ignored: The Submarine

Problem,” in Murray and Millett, p. 261. The American, British, and

German naval establishments were firm in the belief that submarines

could not be decisive for sea control or denial. By ignoring the problem,

over 1.5 million tons of shipping was lost off the U.S. coast in 1942. The

Battle of the Atlantic raged well into the summer of 1943 when

operational concepts, coupled with technical and tactical procedures,

defeated the German U-Boat campaign. On the other hand, Japan never

disrupted the U.S. submarine campaign, which was initiated out of

344
necessity and ultimately accounted for the complete disruption of

Japanese supply lines.

42. David A. Fastabend, “That Elusive Operational Concept,”

Army, Vol. 51, No. 6, p. 37. See also Jeffrey J. Becker, “Operational

Concept Found: Rapid Decisive Operations As a Joint Operational

Concept,” Army, Vol. 52, No. 2, pp. 49-57.

43. For a review of the impact of AirLand Battle on the evolution of

Army operations, see Fredrick M. Franks, “Full Dimensional

Operations: A Doctrine for an Era of Change,” Military Review, Vol.

LXXIII, No. 12, January-December 1993, p. 5. See also Don A. Starry, “A

Perspective on American Military Thought,” Military Review, Vol.

LXIX, No. 7, July 1989, p. 3.

44. “Defense Authorization Act,” U.S. Code, Vol. 106-398, secs. 113,

2001.

45. Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Defense Planning Guidance,

Fiscal Year 2000-2005,” Washington, DC, 2000, p. 86.

46. QDR 2001, p. 6.

47. “Defense Authorization Act,” Sec. 113.

48. U.S. Government Accounting Office, “Military Operations:

Status of DoD’s Efforts to Develop Future Warfighting Capability” in

“Report to the Chairman, Committee on Armed Forces,” U.S. Senate,

Washington, DC, 1999.

49. Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Urban Working Group

Meeting,” May 2001, Notes and summary.

50. The Joint Staff, J-8, Dominant Maneuver Joint Warfighting

Capability Assessment, “Joint Urban Operations Assessment Phase II

Decision Brief,” 2000, slide 15. The JROC is the primary means to assist

the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to identify and assess joint

requirements and acquisition programs to meet existing and future

capabilities to support Combatant Commanders. The Joint Warfighting

Capability Assessment teams are the primary source to conduct

analysis for the Joint Requirements Oversight Council.

51. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff Instruction 5123.01: Charter of the Joint Requirements

Oversight Council,” Washington, DC, 2001, p. 2.

52. “Dismounted Battlespace Battle Lab,” MOUT ACTD Briefing,

Fort Benning, GA, 1999.

53. John W. Hendrix, “Warfighting Readiness Is the Highest

Priority,” Army Green Book, Vol. 51, No. 10, Washington, DC, 2001, p.

64.

345
54. Macgregor, p. 8.

55. “Defense Authorization Act,” 2001, Sec. 213. Although a

Standing Joint Task Force is discussed in the Quadrennial Defense

Review 2001 report, synchronizing both the Defense Planning Guidance

directive of a Joint Urban Operations roadmap with the Millennium

Challenge joint experiment roadmap is not discussed. See QDR 2001, p.

34.

56. Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis: 1911-1914, New York,

1928, p. 274.

346
CHAPTER 11

A U.S. GOVERNMENT INTERAGENCY

STRUCTURE TO COMBAT

TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM

Lieutenant Colonel George J. Woods III

Terrorists viciously attacked the United States on

September 11, 2001, and killed thousands of Americans and

foreign workers in near-simultaneous attacks on the World

Trade Center and the Pentagon. Another 44 Americans died

in Pennsylvania when they took action against the

terrorists aboard United Airlines Flight 93 destined for an

unknown target. Nineteen terrorists, supported by an

unknown number of cells, secretively planned and executed

these attacks for several months, maybe even years. They

caught the U.S. Government, its intelligence community,

law enforcement agencies, and the American people by

complete surprise. Yet, the terrorist threat is not new.

Terrorists have been a serious threat the past 30 years, but

these attacks clearly awakened the American people and

convinced them that America’s most critical national

interest—the welfare of its citizens and homeland—is

threatened by the diabolical threat of terrorism.

Since these events, the George W. Bush administration

has reacted quickly to the crisis, garnering international

cooperation and making initial headway in defeating

Usama bin Laden’s network of Al Qaeda terrorists.

However, Bush has said on numerous occasions that this

will not be a short war on terrorism. While U.S. and allied

actions have made significant progress in disrupting bin

Laden’s network, the President must organize the United

States for a sustained war on international terrorism. This

347
requires attacking the terrorist networks where they live,

while protecting the American homeland from terrorists

ready to attack from within its borders. Fighting terrorism

is a complex matter. It is not a fight that can be delegated to

one agency of the U.S. Government and be reasonably

assured of success. It is a fight that will require the focused

efforts of numerous federal agencies.1

The current U.S. national security structure, based on

the National Security Act of 1947, was enacted to coordinate

national security strategy against the threat raised by the

Soviet Union at the start of the Cold War. It is a system that

has expanded to handle a variety of broad and highly

complex national security issues. Nonetheless, the world

has changed dramatically and the national security

structure has not kept pace to deal with emerging threats.

Clearly the recent attacks demonstrate the need to

reexamine how the national security system is structured

relative to this new threat and make needed changes to

prevent more Americans from perishing at the terrorists’

hands. There is no single, correct answer that guarantees

the prevention of any more terrorists attacks on the United

States, but the government must act to eliminate

deficiencies when they are discovered. The purpose of this

chapter is to examine the current threat that terrorism

presents, assess our current preparedness to deal with this

problem and recommend organizational interagency

structural changes required to sustain a prolonged war to

defeat international terrorism.

The Environment—Terrorism.

To find solutions to the problem, one must define the

terrorist threat and its components. The following questions

must be asked and answered. What is the nature of the

terrorist threat? How have modern terrorists adapted in

this changed world? How are these changes different in

practice—the introduction of networks and netwar? These

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questions must be addressed before the national security

systems can reorganize to defeat them.

What is the Nature of the Terrorist Threat? Terrorism is

“the process of using terror, violence, and intimidation to

achieve an end.”2 In more recent articles this definition has

been more clearly linked to a political agenda by defining

terrorism as “politically motivated violence perpetrated

against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or

clandestine agents.”3 Gregory Copley takes exception to this

definition because he believes that terrorism can “infuse

military as well as civilian targets; terror can paralyze or

distort the minds of professional leaders as well as the

minds of ‘innocent bystanders’.”4 International or

transnational terrorism is the conduct of terrorist acts that

span national borders and are committed against nation’s

facilities or people abroad such as embassies, ships, bases or

aircraft, and U.S. citizens.5 They can also be acts committed

on a country’s homeland like those that occurred against the

World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

The United States is the sole “super” power that

survived the Cold War. Its global reach and influence have

grown while other nations in the world have struggled with

regional instability as nations redefine themselves in terms

of their interests, objectives, and internal forms of

government. Meanwhile, the United States, and

particularly its military although smaller in size, have

grown in global capability across the entire spectrum of

war—from low intensity conflicts to major theater war. The

Gulf War and other conflicts over the past decade have

shown the relative impotence of other nations to oppose the

United States militarily or by any other instrument of

national power. Since states (nations) with opposing

agendas have been unable to influence U.S. policy and

interests, non-state organizations have emerged in their

place to oppose U.S. policy.

How Have Modern Terrorists Adapted in this Changed

World? These nonstate organizations, including terrorist

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organizations, are not by themselves capable of directly

defeating the United States with similar means

(symmetrically); therefore, they have had to adopt other

strategies to disrupt systems or influence the political will of

the United States. Transnational terrorists have several

options. They can appeal to the rest of the world as a weapon

used on behalf of the weak attacking nation-states

asymmetrically (attacking means with unlike means). They

can use media-grabbing terrorist acts to assert their

identity, command attention, and damage the reputation of

the nations they attack. They may also use terrorism as a

strategy to destroy the current world political structure for

the purpose of creating a new order.6 With the United States

being the strategic center of gravity for world democracy

and global trade, their aim is increasingly directed towards

U.S. targets. Their purpose is to create enough fear,

destruction, and disruption to defeat the American will to

continue to prosecute policies that oppose the terrorists’

objectives, whether those objectives are political or religious

ones. And what better way to terrorize and discredit the

powerful world leader than to attack targets within its

borders by killing thousands of its own people with

“weapons” (fuel-filled commercial aircraft) made in the

United States itself?

But to prosecute this asymmetric strategy, terrorist

organizations have had to adapt. They have increasingly

become more amorphous and less hierarchical. They are

more likely inspired by religious or ideological agendas.

Technology and the information age have enabled terrorist

organizations to be more decentralized as well as more

effective and lethal. Sharing information has enabled them

to coordinate activities and learn the lessons from

successful terrorist acts as well as unsuccessful acts. Cell

phones and the Internet are key technological enablers for

them. These technological enablers have also allowed the

organizations to grow larger, admitting more “amateur”

terrorists—terrorists with less training. These amateurs

attain the level of knowledge they need to operate and build

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weapons. Weapons have become simpler to build and are

more frequently composed of legal products purchased

commercially, such as fertilizer.

In order to survive to move to their targets and achieve

surprise, terrorist organizations must remain invisible and

undetected to authorities and law enforcement agencies.

Yet they must be able to congregate to train, prepare, and

gather the resources they need. Further, for the most part,

terrorists still need support from state-sponsors to provide

these resources to train, sustain and operate their

organizations.7 State sponsorship increases their

effectiveness and reach. Terrorist organizations with

accessible resources increase their technical and tactical

capabilities. State-sponsored terrorists have an increased

chance of developing the technical knowledge and materials

to build weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear,

biological, or chemical bombs. They have increased

technological means to share this knowledge and develop

new tactics for employing these weapons in a secure

environment. Therefore, they are better trained, better

equipped, harder to detect, and deadlier. Network-centric

strategists have given their strategy and tactics a

name—netwar.

How are These Changes Different in Practice—the

Introduction of Networks and Netwar? Two experts on

network-centric warfare define netwar as an:

emerging mode of conflict (and crime) at societal levels,

involving measures short of war, in which the protagonists

use—indeed, depend on using—network forms of

organization, doctrine, strategy, and communication. These

protagonists generally consist of dispersed, often small groups

who agree to communicate, coordinate and act in an

internetted manner, often without a precise central

leadership or headquarters . . . It differs from traditional

modes of conflict and crime in which the protagonists prefer to

use hierarchical organizations, doctrines, and strategies as in

the past efforts to foster large, centralized mass movements.8

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The revolution of technology in the information age has

enabled this new form of warfare to develop. They further

describe how networked organizations remain widely

dispersed and secretive, while seeking targets to act upon.

Then, once identified and targeted, the netwarriors attack

stealthily from multiple approaches to “swarm” against

their target.9

Terrorists will become further diversified,

decentralized, and flexible in applying such techniques.

They will rely on networks enabled by information age

technology and will attempt to exploit weaknesses in U.S.

defenses.10 Network cells will remain secure by their

dispersion, assimilation into existing societies, and virtual

invisibility. Gaps created in U.S. defenses, such as those

areas not covered by law enforcement agencies, the

military, or other government agencies, will create the

infiltration lanes and battlespace for these terrorists and

those who support their operations. Terrorists will also seek

support and assistance from other terrorist groups, failed

states, or international crime organizations for the

resources they need to survive. Additionally, they will

continue to exploit the seams created by the U.S.

Government’s lack of cohesive and integrated policy and

structure to detect and arrest or attack these terrorist

organizations. What do these shifts in tactics and strategies

mean for U.S. national security?

John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt listed several

implications nation-states must consider. First,

hierarchically-structured organizations have a difficult

time fighting networked organizations. Hierarchical ones

are too slow to locate and coordinate actions against

netwarriors. Second, the authors believe networks must be

used to defeat other networks. Adopting the principles of

network structures is essential in defeating the terrorists’

decentralized, agile capabilities. Finally, they conclude that

the one who masters the network form first and best will

gain a major advantage.11 The inability of U.S. intelligence

to detect and stop the terrorist networks became evident on

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September 11. How is the U.S. Government presently

structured to handle networked terrorists and how must it

adapt to defeat these netwarriors?

The Current U.S. National Security Structure and

Issues.

Current U.S. Strategic Organization. The U.S.

Governmental structure at the strategic level is derived

from the National Security Act of 1947, as well as the Bush

administration’s own design before and in response to the

attacks on September 11. Shortly after assuming office in

January 2001, Bush published his National Security

Presidential Directive (PDD)-1 and organized his National

Security Council. His purpose was for the council “to advise

and assist the President in integrating all aspects of

national security policy as it affects the United

States—domestic, foreign, military, intelligence and

economics [in conjunction with the National Economic

Council].” He stated that the National Security Council

system is a “process to coordinate executive departments

and agencies in the effective development and

implementation of those national security policies.”12 He

organized the council system around interagency meetings

of principals and deputies where decisions could be made

and issues resolved below the presidential level. Policy

Coordination Committees (i.e., interagency working

groups), conduct the day-to-day interagency coordination

and “shall provide policy analysis . . . and ensure timely

responses to decisions made by the President.”13

As a result of the attacks on September 11, the Bush

administration took quick action to respond to the threat to

U.S. security. First, he appointed former Pennsylvania

Governor Tom Ridge to a cabinet level position. As the

first-ever Director of Homeland Security (also known as the

Assistant to the President for Homeland Security), Ridge

had to advise the President on the creation of a completely

new organization. Homeland Security requires the

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coordination of activities involving more than seventy

agencies within the U.S. federal government.14 Coupled

with the state and local agencies that would respond first in

subsequent attacks on the United States and the numerous

agencies required to prevent these attacks from occurring

again, the task has proven to be a daunting one. Second, the

administration looked at the National Security Council

system for handling national security issues as a template

for a new Homeland Security Council system. On October

29, 2001, Bush issued his first Homeland Security

Presidential Directive. This document, like National

Security PPD-1, created a Homeland Security Council

system similar to the National Security Council system

structure to “ensure the coordination of all homeland

security-related activities among executive departments

and agencies and promote the effective development and

implementation of all homeland security policies.”15

Additionally, Bush created two new positions. For

protection of information systems, the President appointed

a Special Adviser for Cyber-security. To coordinate and

integrate all other counterterrorism-related actions, he

appointed a Deputy National Security Adviser for

Counterterrorism. Both advisors report to the National

Security Adviser and the Homeland Security Director to

integrate all national security actions to combat

terrorism.16 Between the National Security Council and

Homeland Security Council systems, an integrated national

security strategy is supposed to emerge, but it has not.

Instead, he has established duplicate and competing

systems.

This lack of integration and competing interagency

processes stemming from the President’s directives create,

at the strategic level, the opportunities that terrorists could

take advantage of. As Frank Hoffman, a member of the

Hart-Rudman commission, aptly states,

. . . the Bush administration has taken a different tack. The

implication is that Ridge will coordinate domestic security,

while Dr. Condoleeza Rice and the National Security Council

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continue to focus on foreign policy, international relations and

defense. It is difficult to see how a comprehensive national

security strategy that incorporates the various components

relevant to homeland security—nonproliferation, threat

reduction, diplomatic efforts to limit terrorism, intelligence,

special operations, law enforcement, border security, and

economic interests—is going to be produced. The

administration divorced the defensive side of homeland

security from the international dimension potentially

confounding security priorities, confusing accountability and

diffusing responsibility. The National Security Council and

Homeland Security Council have competing staffs, with

overlapping responsibilities for directing intelligence,

contingency planning, exercises and investments that

contribute to homeland security. (italics added)17

Furthermore, the placement of the Counterterrorism

and Cyber-security Advisers within the structures further

confuses the lines of responsibilities. Hence, at the strategic

level, U.S. national security solutions intent on combating

terrorist networks begin to break down. Furthermore, the

problem is exacerbated by a reliance on traditional

bureaucratic and hierarchical systems in our executive

branch of government. This structure developed over time

and has established a proven track record that helped make

the United States the global power it is today. However, this

structure requires adaptation to defeat the networked

terrorist threat.

Bureaucracies and Hierarchical Organizations.

Although not ideal for combating new terrorist

organizations, bureaucracies and hierarchical

organizations are not completely without merit in

determining foreign policy or recommending national

security decisions. First, bureaucracies entail a division of

labor that provides for organizing and assigning tasks. This,

in turn, creates experts within those assigned fields.

Second, competing organizations with different tasks

ensure that different ideas or perspectives are considered in

the decisionmaking process (at least theoretically). Third,

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they provide for clear lines of responsibility and chains of

command to govern the execution of tasks. Fourth, rules

and standard operating procedures exist to regulate and

govern behavior of large organizations. Fifth, written

records document the bureaucracies’ activities. Sixth,

personnel within these organizations are compensated and

promoted allowing the “best and the brightest” within their

fields to rise to the top of the organizational ladder. Finally,

the expertise inherent in these organizations conditions

exist to promote proactive planning—the anticipation of

events rather than merely reacting to events that happen.18

These characteristics describe the “theoretical basis for the

view that bureaucracies contribute to the rational

decisionmaking” process.19 Some of these benefits

organizations actually experience in practice as well. But

there is a negative side to hierarchical bureaucracies that

many organizations including the U.S. Government

experience in how they deal with each other and how they

shape the behavior of their people.

Some academics describe organizations that exhibit

parochial behavior promoting their self-interests and

placing them before national interests. They also describe

bureaucracies as competitive organizations vying for

resources and decisions that favor their own agenda. These

organizations, seeking more resources and acting out of

self-interest, also seek to expand their roles in order to

establish their importance and value. Bigger budgets,

expanded roles, and missions usually translate into larger

organizations that wield more power and promote their

long-term survival. Bureaucracies develop cultures

centered on accomplishing their mission but also preserving

their existence and influence. Many of these behaviors

manifest themselves in organizational cultures that

promote exclusiveness and secrecy, conformity among its

members, deference to convention, and reliance upon

traditional solutions to solve new problems. Consequently,

these factors combine to create bureaucratic organizations

that, in practice, resist change, compete outright with other

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governmental organizations, and sometimes, willingly

commit “bureaucratic sabotage” of presidential decisions.20

Somewhere between the extremes of the theoretical

organizations and those in practice is the “ideal”

bureaucratic organization that needs development to

ensure U.S. security and well-being, both domestically and

abroad. Key to organizing the U.S. national security

structure for the purpose of protecting the nation from

future attacks will be to harness the advantages of

“theoretical” bureaucratic organizations and minimizing

the disadvantages described in “practicing” bureaucratic

structures. It will be necessary to restructure the U.S.

Government’s interagency bureaucracy to avoid traditional

solutions to combating the new terrorist threat and to

ensure coordination and cooperation exists at all levels—

from the strategic through the tactical level—to defeat

terrorism. The reorganization should take advantage of

institutional specialization that has proven its worth and

developed a core of seasoned veterans. Further, these new

structures must incorporate these experts and combine

them with others to solve the new and very complex

interagency problems the terrorists pose to U.S. national

security. Said another way,

. . . because their functions are different, military officers,

spies, diplomats, and lawyers see problems and their solutions

differently. No one of these different approaches is

expendable. To succeed, the U.S. government needs them all

and needs vigorous advocates for each. The best way to

increase interagency coordination will be the one that

promotes coordination while respecting these differences and

enhancing their forceful expression.21

Fixing the problem requires two major steps. First, clear

definitions of roles and responsibilities must be assigned to

existing hierarchical organizations to take advantage of

their size, procedures, and expertise. Second, interagency

structures must be inserted throughout these hierarchical

organizations to create the interagency networks that will

357
optimize the U.S. Government’s ability to combat terrorist

networks. These interagency networks will have to be

established at all levels: strategic, operational, and tactical,

to ensure that strategic objectives and policy are translated

into tactical missions executed by operators at the grass

roots level.

How Should the U.S. Government Organize for the

Sustained Fight Against Terrorism?

Defining Functions to Combat Terrorism. The fight

against terrorism is a complex problem involving numerous

agencies and departments at the national, state, and local

levels. It is both a domestic problem and an international

one. To protect U.S. national interests requires the defense

of the homeland and attacking the terrorist threat at its

source. The first step in reorganizing the U.S. Government

to achieve unity of effort is to establish clear definitions of

roles and responsibilities, and then assigning them to

organizations with “strategic” responsibilities. These

organizations would be responsible for coordinating and

integrating U.S. strategic policy across multiple

organizations to achieve the desired effect and successfully

combat terrorism. Joint Doctrine helps define the crucial

functions involved in combating terrorism—the offensive

and defensive ones.

“Antiterrorism” encompasses the defensive measures

taken to protect America and Americans. These defensive

measures aim to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts by

including training and other measures that balance the

protection of assets with the mission, infrastructure and

available manpower and resources.22 Antiterrorism

measures occur at home and abroad. These measures

involve the protection of infrastructure, citizens, and

systems in the United States and those national assets

abroad, most commonly U.S. embassies and consulates,

military installations, and other facilities worldwide.

Offensive measures taken to combat terrorism are called

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“Counterterrorism” measures. These measures prevent,

deter, and respond to terrorist acts and occur within the

United States and abroad. They include preemptive,

retaliatory, and rescue operations.23 They can involve

attacking terrorist cells located within the United States

and attacking terrorist sanctuaries worldwide, such as

those recently conducted in Afghanistan.

Two additional areas of importance help define roles and

responsibilities. To defeat terrorism, the U.S. Government

must also consider the offensive and defensive components

of informational warfare, or cyber-warfare.24 The U.S. Army

War College’s Information Operations Primer defines these

aspects. It states that Information Operations are:

. . . those actions taken to affect an adversary’s information

and information systems while defending one’s own

information and information systems. Information operations

also include actions taken in a noncombat or ambiguous

situation to protect one’s own information and information

systems as well as those taken to influence target information

and information systems.25

Information operations will have to be conducted

internationally and within the United States. Information

Operations, in the context of this chapter, focus solely on the

aspects of attacking and defending information systems and

refer exclusively to cyber-security measures, not the full

aspects of all information operations. Finally, the President

defined “Incident Management” as one of the

responsibilities that require policy and actions in order to

respond to terrorist acts that could not be prevented. Again,

terrorist incidents will occur within the United States and

abroad. These measures, because they span various

agencies, require one organization to define policy, devote

resources and monitor policy execution to ensure a coherent

national strategy exists for each of these functions. Keeping

these four functions in mind, the next step is to assign

responsibilities. Table 1 proposes an alignment of respon359
Table 1. Functions and Assignment of Roles and

Responsibilities.

Achieving Unity of Effort at the Strategic Level. First and

foremost, the President should eliminate the dual structure

currently in effect as a result of National Security

Presidential Directive and Homeland Security PDD-1, and

require a single organization and system rather than two

with shared responsibility. Additionally, the President

should expand the National Security Council’s role to

include homeland security. This will effectively assign all

four functions required at the strategic level to conduct the

global war on terrorism under one organization. The

National Security Council would be responsible for advising

the President on actions or policies to combat terrorism,

establish objectives and priorities to meet requirements,

and develop a coherent, integrated national security

strategy intent on protecting America and eliminating the

terrorist threat. The National Security Council and the

National Security Council system are best suited for this

responsibility because of the established interagency

network and inherent presidential or strategic viewpoint

the National Security Council system takes regarding

national security issues.26 Though it has its shortcomings,

the National Security Council system has proven effective

since 1947 with its well-established multiagency

connections and reputation for successfully managing

national crises.

360

NSA and NSC Staff - Coordinate/Advise President on Global War on Terrorism

Antiterrorism (AT) Counterterrorism (CT) Incident Management (IM) Information Ops

Within the USA HLS (DoD lead agency) HLS (DoJ lead agency) HLS (FEMA lead agency) CySA (DoJ lead agency)

xternal to USA CTA (DoS lead agency) CTA (DoD lead agency) CTA (DoS lead agency) CySA (DoD lead agency)

DOJ - Department of Justice

DOS - Department of State

DoD -Department of Defense

FEMA - Federal Emergency Management Agency

ibilities for functions required to combat terrorism and is

urther explained below.
Next, the President should reassign the Homeland

Security Adviser, the Cyber-security Adviser, and the

Counterterrorism Adviser to the National Security Council

staff. These advisers would be responsible for coordinating,

recommending, and supervising strategic policy with

regard to the functions shown in Table 1. The Homeland

Security Adviser would be responsible for policies within

the United States. The Counterterrorism Adviser would be

assigned responsibility for policy external to the U.S. The

Cyber-security Adviser would have responsibility for

integrating both the domestic and international policies

regarding cyber-security aspects of information operations

since this area tends to span international borders.

The National Security Council staff is relatively small

and would become ineffective if too large, and so the

complexity of integrating policy on each of the four functions

would overwhelm the existing structure. Therefore, within

these assigned functions, the National Security Council

would rely upon currently configured hierarchical

organizations with sufficient staffing and traditional

expertise to assist in coordinating, staffing, and supervising

policy decisions. They would also manage the resources and

execute budget integration and supervision for those

responsibilities. How might this concept look in practice?

Assignment of Responsibilities. Antiterrorism measures

would fall under the Homeland Security Adviser. He would

coordinate with Department of Defense (DoD) and its newly

established Northern Command (as well as other Federal

agencies) to plan, supervise, and resource interagency

activities. Specifically, these activities would be associated

with defending the national borders, protecting critical U.S.

infrastructure, ensuring the safety of U.S. airspace, and

directing national intelligence or law enforcement agencies

to collect intelligence against terrorists entering the

country or those already within it. Counterterrorism

measures, on the other hand, would be the Department of

Justice’s responsibility under the Homeland Security

Adviser, since attacking terrorist cells within the United

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States has primarily been a law enforcement issue.

Identifying terrorist activities and havens and arresting

suspected terrorists before they act is a role for which the

Federal Bureau of Investigation and other law enforcement

agencies at the local or community level are best suited. The

Homeland Security Adviser would depend on the Federal

Emergency Management Agency for its expertise in

organizing, training, and coordinating incident

management measures. This agency has evolved into an

effective structure within the United States for responding

to natural disasters and minimizing the effects of natural

disasters and other large-scale catastrophes.

External to the United States, the Counterterrorism

Adviser would have similar tasks coordinating and

supervising strategic policy for the global war on terrorism,

relying upon the Departments of Defense and State

primarily as his supporting agencies for coordinating,

supervising, and resourcing functional activities overseas.

For instance, the State Department would be responsible

for antiterrorism and incident management measures

overseas (except on military installations). Ambassadors

and their country teams already exist to represent the

interests of all U.S. personnel and facilities located in

numerous countries throughout the world. They would also

be responsible for coordinating host-nation support efforts

to respond to terrorist incidents that occur to U.S. personnel

or facilities countries where there is a U.S. presence. They

would establish policies to ensure the safety of U.S.

personnel and coordinate with U.S. and foreign intelligence

and law enforcement agencies of the host countries to

gather intelligence designed to identify and detect threats.

Attacking the sources of terrorism would be a DoD

responsibility. The Defense establishment, with its regional

focus, is best structured (than any other existing

organization) with the existing Joint Staff and regional

combatant commanders to devise strategy and implement

policy internationally to identify, detect, seek, and destroy

362
or neutralize sources of terrorism, either unilaterally or in

cooperation with other nations.

As stated earlier, information operations would come

under the auspices of the special Adviser to the President for

cyber-security as the lead for coordinating national policy

regarding information operations security measures. For

support, the cyber-security adviser would rely on the

Justice Department in its operating of the National

Infrastructure Protection Center. The National

Infrastructure Protection Center has been established

within the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is charged

with “developing information resources and working

relationships with infrastructure owners and operators and

providing a mechanism for information sharing between

the public and private sectors. The National Infrastructure

Protection Center will develop all necessary assets and

capabilities to support operations aimed at disrupting and

defeating threats to critical infrastructures.”27 For

information operations outside the United States, DoD has

already assigned Space Command responsibility for

information operations within the military structure for

both defensive and offensive measures.28 Space Command

has made significant progress in developing measures to

protect information security and has developed the means

of attacking threats through this medium. It is also a

supporting command for the regional combatant commands

worldwide and can leverage this existing relationship to

integrate Information Operations into the established DoD

structure. This would enhance integration of cyber-security

policy and, with additional interagency assistance, should

enable it to be broadened to include designing policy and

developing measures to protect all governmental systems

located overseas.

Establishing the Interagency Network from Strategic to

the Tactical Levels. Responsibilities for activities would be

centrally coordinated and integrated at the National

Security Council level with staff support and expertise from

“lead agencies.” However, none of these departments can do

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it all alone and accomplish the strategic goals without

interagency support. Combating terrorism requires a

“diplomatic component, a law enforcement component, an

intelligence component, a financial component and a

military component as well.”29 Network-centric advocates

promote the concept that an interagency network must be

applied to the national security structure at all levels in

order to eliminate the terrorists’ freedom of movement, limit

their space, and seize the initiative. Netwar advocates

recommend using networks to combat networks. Several

types can work. However, the most effective is the

all-channel network. This type of network exists when all

participants of a network or node are connected to each

other. Although the most effective, they are also the most

difficult to establish and to sustain.30 They require robust,

integrated packages of information-sharing technology to

function effectively. They also require heavy investments in

human capital. Robust information-sharing technology

packages require people to use the equipment and make

decisions to use the shared information.

Policy Coordination Committees established by the

President’s National Security PPD-1 are interagency

structures by their nature and serve as the networked

system as the strategic level. However, combining and

reorganizing Policy Coordination Committees created by

both national security and homeland security presidential

directives will be necessary to achieve further efficiencies.

Additionally, interagency operations centers should be

established within appropriate executive branch

departments to effectively coordinate and close the strategic

level gaps within our current “stovepiped” system. Lastly,

establishing interagency networks at the operational and

tactical levels will be essential in order for the numerous

departments to carry out interagency policy and translate

strategic goals and objectives into operational and tactical

missions conducted by interagency organizations at the

lowest levels.

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Applying an all-channel network structure to current

forms within the U.S. Governmental structure will be no

easy task. Converting completely to a flat, decentralized,

and highly responsive structure that some suggest,

especially in the midst of fighting the current war on

terrorism, could be disastrous. Adding all-channel network

structures to augment current hierarchical organizations,

rather than dismantling and replacing existing structures

in the midst of the conflict, is the optimal solution. In some

cases, all-channel network principles are already being

applied within current government organizations below the

strategic level. In other cases, augmenting existing

organizations can be done with relatively minor difficulty.

How might the United States apply some of these principles

at the operational and tactical levels?

Use of interagency coordination groups and task forces

could augment existing structures to enable current

systems to adopt a networked structure to operate as part of

the counter-netwar Arquilla and Ronfeldt describe. Figure 1

depicts a proposed structure for organizing the U.S.

Government to combat terrorism. The depiction shows

interagency operations centers, interagency coordination

groups and interagency task forces imposed on existing

organizations and aligned functionally in accordance with

Table 1. The structure depicts organizations at the

strategic, operational and tactical levels. Interagency

coordination groups would exist primarily at the

operational levels while interagency task forces exist at the

tactical levels to execute interagency operations in the form

of an attack, an arrest or some other action requiring the

coordination and synchronization of multiple agency actors.

The interagency coordination groups would provide

expertise and advice to the commander or leader regarding

capabilities that each organization can apply to assist in

achieving desired operational objectives. They would

provide policy recommendations and engage in planning for

campaigns and major operations. Further, they would share

information with and coordinate the support of their parent

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agency actors to achieve the interagency result desired. An

example could be an interagency coordinating group

working for a combatant commander. This group would

consist of representatives from the Departments of Justice,

State, Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, and the Central

Intelligence Agency to synchronize the activities of their

respective departments to identify, detect, target, and

destroy, or arrest terrorists within a combatant

commander’s area of responsibility. They would also assist

planners in establishing appropriate additional

interagency organizations within an area of responsibility

366
such as a subordinate unified or functional command or

Joint Task Forces.

Interagency task forces, on the other hand, would be

interagency organizations that conduct tactical missions

much like those that the Joint Interagency Task Force-East

does in executing counterdrug tasks in support of the

SOUTHCOM area of responsibility. Their mission to

conduct

detection, monitoring, and handoff of suspected drug

trafficking events; coordinate counterdrug operations;

conduct counterdrug engagement; and support country team

and participating nation LEA (law enforcement agencies)

initiatives to achieve an effective and coordinated

multinational counterdrug effort in the U.S. Southern

Command area of responsibility.31

The task force supports the nation’s counterdrug strategy as

an interagency organization. Joint Interagency Task

Force-East is an organization that is relatively permanent

because of the sustained counterdrug effort the United

States has been performing. Congressional directives and

the 1994 National Interdiction Command and Control Plan

established the Task Force. Since 1994, Joint Interagency

Task Force-East has made significant inroads not only in

intercepting drugs smuggled into the United States, but

also in developing a viable working interagency

organization to serve as a model for other such

undertakings. Over the years, the organization has

developed bonds of trust and confidence among agency

actors and the department chiefs they represent to develop

effective interagency procedures that support achieving

tactical and operational objectives.32 One could reasonably

assume that similar organizations created in other regional

combatant commands and organizations, whether they are

coordinating groups or task forces, would have the same

success in overcoming parochial departmental agendas to

achieve national interests rather than parochial ones.

367
Figure 2 depicts how the interagency structure would

interconnect consistent with the requirements to conduct

counter-netwar activities to defeat the terrorists. Shared

information networks and databases would have to be

created to speed the exchange of information and establish

an all-channel network. The all-channel interconnectivity

this augmentation offers could leverage the strength of

existing traditional hierarchical structures, while

establishing the interagency coordination and action

required to identify, find, and take action against terrorists

before they act or minimize the effect of their actions with

rapid incident response. In effect, with structures in place to

affect interagency coordination and action, the freedom of

movement enjoyed by current terrorists would shrink and

restrict their options. But structures alone are insufficient

to ensure success. Procedural practices must be established

to create a common language among multiple

organizational cultures to aid in effectively and rapidly

assigning tasks and defining priorities.

368
Procedural Changes Required. At the strategic level, the

National Security Council should develop procedures that

dictate how the interagency process should work.33

Although not a panacea, PDD-56, which served as the

Clinton administration’s process for conducting complex

contingency operations, could serve as a starting point.

Admittedly an imperfect process for conducting interagency

operations at the strategic level, it does have its advantages.

PDD-56 provided a framework and planning tools under the

auspices of an executive committee answerable to the

National Security Council Deputies’ supervision. The

framework also provided for a fully integrated

political-military plan that, in theory, synchronized all

elements of national power in complex interagency

contingency operations. Additionally, rehearsals, after

action reviews, and training became standard practices in

conducting contingency operations. One report cited the

combination of these practices showed a significant

improvement in interagency effectiveness.34 However, it

had drawbacks as well.

Not all aspects the framework called for manifested

themselves in execution. One study identified areas where

improvement could be made to enhance the effectiveness of

PDD-56. First, the directive was best suited for the strategic

level. When applied below that level, it ceased to be

effective. Second, it functioned best with a strong leader

who championed the process. Third, the framework needed

to provide for more flexibility in the plan to achieve

versatility and acceptability. Finally, to be effective PDD-56

required dedicated funding to support training.35 Using this

analysis and developing procedures that the agencies can

agree upon while leveraging the advantages of this directive

and minimizing its drawbacks is useful. It increases the

probability that the National Security Council staff can

develop an effective framework to energize and focus

interagency planning to synchronize all elements of

national power into a coherent, integrated strategy to

prosecute the global war on terrorism. Since PDD-56 did not

369
apply below the strategic level, what about the operational

and tactical levels?

The Joint Staff has recently developed a generic

political-military plan template that lists the key

components of an interagency plan for contingency

operations. Both PDD-56 and the generic plan focus

primarily on humanitarian assistance operations or

peacekeeping operations. However, these plans can easily

be applied to operations to combat terrorism, since

interagency unity of effort is the desired outcome. To

complete the development of the standardized interagency

doctrine and interoperability procedures, the National

Security Council should task DoD with this responsibility.

Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, Virginia, has already

been assigned as DoD’s headquarters for capturing joint

lessons learned, conducting joint exercises and training,

assessing joint interoperability, and publishing joint

doctrine. This headquarters could readily adapt itself to an

interagency perspective with augmentation from the

various departments creating an interagency cell.

Initiatives along these lines are already underway.

Millennium Challenge 2002, an interagency exercise, is

planned for April 2002, with the goal of assessing and

improving interagency operations at the operational level.36

The Joint Forces Command coordination group should

consist of senior representatives from the various

departments who have had operational experience serving

on either an interagency task force or a regional interagency

coordination group. With experienced augmentation, Joint

Forces Command would better be able to execute the

assigned role of creating interagency doctrine at the

operational and tactical level.

Conclusion.

This chapter analyzed the current status of the

interagency system and processes vis-à-vis the current

terrorist threat. It identified how new terrorist

370
organizations are different. It described as well how their

organizational structures can take advantage of traditional

U.S. hierarchical structures. Finally, it proposed a potential

method of defining the problem and organizing the U.S.

Governmental structure to respond to this new threat.

The proposal recommends an organizational concept

using networks to combine the traditional strengths of

existing departmental expertise within the U.S.

Government with the advantages of interagency cells to

enhance connectivity and coordination. This concept is

designed to deal with the interagency complexity of

operations we confront as well as sustain the long-term U.S.

effort to conduct the global war on terrorism. By no means a

perfect or easy solution, it provides a realistic option to

consider for organizing the U.S. Government’s response to

international terrorism, with the ultimate goal of achieving

unity of effort in defeating transnational terrorists that

threaten the globe while protecting America’s homeland

and its citizens.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 11

1. Ivo Daalder and I. M. Destler, “Organizing for Homeland

Security,” Statement Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs,

U.S. Senate, October 12, 2001. Internet site http://www.brook.

edu/views/testimony/daalder/20011112.htm.

2. William Morris, ed., American Heritage Dictionary, Boston, MA:

Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976, p. 1, 330.

3. Raphael F. Perl, “Terrorism, The Future, and U.S. Foreign

Policy,” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of

Congress, September 2001, p. 3.

4. Gregory Copley, “Defining Terrorism,” Defense and Foreign

Affairs Strategic Policy, Vol. 29, No. 10, November 6, 2001, p. 4.

5. Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt,

Michele Zanini, “Countering the New Terrorism,” Santa Monica, CA,

1999, p. xii.

6. Ibid., pp. 39-40.

7. Ibid., p. 15.

371
8. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar, Santa

Monica, CA, 1996, p. 5.

9. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Future of

Conflict, Santa Monica, CA, 2000, p. 5.

10. Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Countering the New Terrorism, p. 54.

11. Ibid., pp. 47-55.

12. George W. Bush, “National Security Presidential Directive

Number 1: Organization of the National Security Council System,”

Washington, DC: The White House, February 13, 2001, p. 2.

13. Ibid., p. 4. The regional committees include Europe and

Eurasia, the Western Hemisphere, East Asia, South Asia, Near East

and East Africa, and Africa. The eleven functional committees include:

1) Democracy, Human Rights and International Operations, Assistant

to the President for National Security Affairs being the lead); 2)

International development and Humanitarian Assistance, led by the

Secretary of State); 3) Global Environment, co-led by the Assistant to

the President for National Security Affairs and the Assistant to the

President for Economic Policy); 4) International Finance, led by the

Secretary of the Treasury); 5) Transnational Economic Issues, led by the

Assistant to the President for Economic Policy); 6) Counter-Terrorism

and National Preparedness, led by the Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs); 7) Defense Strategy, Force Structure, and

Planning, led by the Secretary of Defense); 8) Army Control, led by the

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs); 9)

Proliferation, Counterproliferation, and Homeland Defense, led by the

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs); 10)

Intelligence and Counterintelligence, led by the Assistant to the

President for National Security Affairs); 11) Records Access and

Information Security, led by the Assistant to the President for National

Security Affairs).

14. Daalder and Destler.

15. George W. Bush, p. 1.

16. The White House, “New Counter-Terrorism and CyberSpace

Security Positions Announced,” Washington, DC: Office of the Press

Secretary, Official Press Release, October 9, 2001, The White House

Internet site, http://www.whitehouse.gov.

17. Frank G. Hoffman, “Homeland Security: Impossible?”

Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, November 2001, pp. 40-41.

18. Charles Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, “The Process of

Decision Making: Roles, Rationality and the Impact of Bureaucratic

Organization” American Foreign Policy, New York, 1996, pp. 475-476.

372
19. Ibid., p. 476.

20. Ibid., pp. 477-488.

21. David Tucker, “The RMA and the Interagency: Knowledge and

Speed vs. Ignorance and Sloth?” Parameters, Vol. 30, Autumn 2000, p.

71.

22. Department of Defense, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations

Other Than War,” Joint Publication 3-07, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint

Staff, June 16, 1995, p. III-2.

23. Ibid.

24. Bush, p.1. The President established the position of Special

Adviser for Cyber Security.

25. Information Operations Primer, Course Four CD-ROM entitled

Implementing National Military Strategy, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S.

Army War College, Academic Year 2001-2002, p. 2.

26. Christopher C. Shoemaker, The NSC Staff: Counseling the

Council, Boulder, CO, February 1991, p. 43.

27. Department of Justice, “Strategic Plan 2001-2006,” found at

Internet site http://www.usdoj.gov/05publications/05_04.html.

28. The ideas in this paragraph are based on remarks made by a

speaker participating in the Commandant Lecture’s Series.

29. White House Press Release, October 9, 2001.

30. Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Countering the New Terrorism, p. 49.

31. Joint Interagency Task Force—East unclassified briefing

comparing and contrasting the counterdrug and counterterrorism and

related interagency issues.

32. Conversations with a former Joint Interagency Task

Force-East operator.

33. Edward J. Filiberti, “National Strategic Guidance: Do We Need

a Standard Format?” Parameters, Vol. 25, Autumn 1995, p. 2. Filiberti

says that the interagency coordination at the strategic level is a White

House responsibility that therefore falls on the National Security

Council to develop.

34. National Defense University, “Improving the Utility of

Presidential Decision Directive 56—A Plan of Action for the Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff” Institute for National Strategic Studies pp. I,

16-19.

373
35. Ibid.

36. Joint Forces Command, “Improving U.S. Interagency

Operational Planning and Coordination,” White Paper Version 1.0,

January 2001.

374
CHAPTER 12

RAPID DECISIVE OPERATIONS:

THE SEARCH FOR THE HOLY GRAIL

OF JOINT WARFIGHTING

Lieutenant Colonel David R. Hogg

There can be little doubt that the [Holy] Grail is an elusive

idea. It has taken, and will continue to take, many different

forms in people’s minds. No one theory as yet has been able to

explain all the details in the Grail mystery.1

Much like the search for the coveted Holy Grail, nations

and armies have historically searched for the means to fight

quick, decisive battles that result in a painless victory,

while minimizing the expenditure of national resources in

terms of both men and equipment. Sun Tzu in his book, The

Art of War, written over 2,000 years ago, states plainly that

“those skilled in war subdue the enemy’s army without

battle. They capture his cities without assaulting them and

overthrow his state without protracted operations.”2

However, history is saturated with examples of nations

planning for decisive victory, only to become bogged down in

a combination of annihilation and attrition type battles due

to the complex nature of warfare. Clausewitz, in On War,

explains that war is not merely “an act of force to compel our

enemy to do our will,” but a more complicated affair because

of its role “as an instrument of policy.”3 It is because of this

necessary interaction between war and political objectives

that the U.S. current system of developing a National

Security Strategy (NSS) is directly linked to how the United

States conducts warfare and, in turn, develops its military

force to achieve these political goals when other means fails.

“War is never an isolated act.”4

375
The National Guidance.

The “National Security Strategy” published in

December 2000 and signed by Former President William J.

Clinton states that the United States “must transform [its]

capabilities and organizations”5 to meet the challenges of

the future and ensure that the nation can secure its vital,

important, humanitarian, and other interests. The most

recent Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR)

acknowledged the need to transform the military and has

established four distinct pillars for the transformation of

U.S. military forces. Those four pillars are:6

 Strengthening joint operations though standing joint

task force headquarters improved joint command and

control, joint training, and an expanded joint force

presence policy.

 Experimenting with new approaches to warfare,

operational concepts and capabilities, and

organizational constructs such as standing joint

forces through wargaming, simulations, and field

exercises focused on emerging challenges and

opportunities.

 Exploiting U.S. intelligence advantages through

multiple reconnaissance and enhanced exploitation

and dissemination.

 Developing transformational capabilities through

increased and wide-ranging science and technology,

selective increases in procurement, and innovations

in Department of Defense (DoD) processes.

The challenge in executing these four pillars is

essentially joint in nature. The implementation of the four

pillars represents a challenge in dollars, service

parochialism, and priorities. It is a challenge of shaping the

U.S. armed forces for the future while still dealing with the

present threats the nation faces.

376
Joint Vision 2020 has attempted to explain what

military capabilities are required for the future. Hence, it

represents a driving document in the process of

transformation. Joint Vision 2020 details three important

areas for the transformation, areas it tasks each of the

services to follow. The first is establishment of a common

framework and language to drive Service doctrine and

concepts to explain how they contribute to the joint fight.

The second lies in the processes of joint experimentation

and training to test new concepts and ideas. The third is the

process to manage transformation in terms of doctrine,

organization, training, materiel, leader development,

personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF).7 Joint Vision 2020

establishes a goal for future forces in terms of their

capabilities and concepts. It develops the broad concepts

and relies on each service to develop a transformation

campaign plan to bring into fruition the concepts it

envisions. The executive agent for joint transformation is

the U.S. Joint Forces Command. It is this command that

must bridge the gap between the individual Services, the

CINCs, and the joint environment. If U.S. Joint Forces

Command receives sufficient authority and congressional

support, the U.S. military should be able to make Joint

Vision 2020 a reality and ensure the transformation of the

U.S. military.

Joint Forces Command has a functional mission to act as

“the chief advocate for Jointness and leading edge of

transformation.”8 In addition to its role in transformation, it

also must provide forces to the CINCs and support domestic

missions in support of Homeland Defense. In its

transformation role, the command has recently adopted a

concept of joint warfighting called Rapid Decisive

Operations (RDO). The concept developers believe RDO is

the warfighting concept of the future—one which will allow

U.S. forces to achieve full spectrum dominance.

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The Nature of the Problem.

The development of the RDO concept is an attempt by

Joint Forces Command to execute joint transformation. In

the words of Commander General William F. Kernan, RDO

aims at infusing “our joint forces with new ideas that change

the way we [as a Nation] fight.”9 RDO rests not on the

concept of “holding out for silver bullet scientific

breakthroughs,”10 but instead looks at a new concept for

fighting. It depends on warfighting and not “any particular

array of technologies.”11 It aims at developing a warfighting

concept so powerful that the U.S. armed forces can “win a

war in one blow.”12 The question, then, is whether or not

RDO is the “Holy Grail” of Joint Warfighting.

Direction of Research Effort.

RDO represents a new and evolving concept that

continues to change and adapt as issues are defined and

resolved. Its developers present new terms that may or may

not be old concepts renamed and dressed up to support the

ideals of RDO. On the other hand, one must admit that

selling new concepts to well-entrenched audiences is tough;

there are more doubters then supporters when significant

change is involved. At present, the joint community is

attempting to address future issues, especially those of

interservice compatibility and capabilities, while

developing a common, acceptable doctrine of joint

warfighting. The reality of service Title X responsibilities

makes developing joint warfighting doctrine, and then

forcing the services to transform themselves in accordance

with that joint doctrine, a formidable task. There is a

general lack of linkage in the documentation to historical

analysis and a theoretical base. Part of this may be due to

over-reliance on technology or capabilities to address enemy

threats. But lacking in virtually all of the studies is the

human dimension of warfare: the harsh reality that future

U.S. adversaries may not be rational actors.

378
This chapter will focus on a number of issues dealing

with the future doctrine of Joint warfare and

transformation. The initial focus is on dissecting RDO,

using as its primary source material from Joint Forces

Command. It will examine what RDO are, what they hope to

accomplish, and the important assumptions associated with

RDO. Then this chapter will focus on the viability of RDO

based on the criteria of acceptability, feasibility, suitability,

and risk. Finally, it will provide an analysis and conclusion

on the future of RDO.

The U.S. armed forces are at a critical stage in their

evolution. Emerging technologies, fiscal constraints, an

increase in the number of failed states, international

terrorism, and the lack of a true peer competitor are some of

the many issues confronting the United States today. In

light of these issues, the military is attempting to transform

or evolve its capabilities to defeat any and all threats rapidly

and decisively in a Joint and Combined environment. RDO

is the catalyst used by Joint Forces Command to address

these issues. When looking at warfighting doctrine,

capabilities, and force structure, the important issue is not

so much in getting it absolutely right, as it is to make sure

that military analysts and planners do not get it too

wrong.13 Close should be good enough, and such an

approach allows for adaptation as future threat capabilities

emerge.14 However, if this focuses on force structure and

capabilities too narrowly, then the U.S. military may in fact

reduce its options, capabilities, and ability to deal with a

peer competitor in the future. This chapter will focus on

both the good and the bad, with its final analysis directed at

what may be major weaknesses in the RDO concept.

RDO— The Envisioned Concept.

RDO is a concept designed to take Joint Vision 2020 from

a vision into reality. It aims at the integration of Dominant

Maneuver, Precision Engagement, Focused Logistics, and

Full Dimensional Protection to establish “Full Spectrum

379
Dominance.” RDO envisions taking the old “linear” tenants

of joint operations (phasing, preparation, predictability,

and synchronization) and developing new tenants

(simultaneity, adaptivity, initiative, and cohesion) in order

to execute “nonlinear” joint operations.15 RDO envisions

being able to “to impose our will on the enemy, gaining a

decision in a week or so for a [small-scaled contingency

operation], or turning a [major theater of war] in our favor in

that same time frame.”16 The power of simultaneity will lie

in the massing of “effects in time, not space” to have the

maximum impact on breaking not only the enemy’s

coherence, but also his will, ending the war or conflict in a

single stroke.17 Along with adaptivity, initiative, and

cohesion, RDO aims to take advantage of the range of joint

capabilities and information technologies to develop a joint

team that has a “shared training, education, and military

culture.”18 In short, RDO is looking at the future of warfare

from the U.S. perspective as a fully integrated “purple

fight,” capable of overwhelming enemy forces across the

spectrum of conflict without an over-reliance on technology,

but also willing to absorb new technologies as they become

available. The concept developers at Joint Forces Command

argue that RDO might be the “equivalent of the 1980s

Army/Air Force Airland Battle, a capstone concept that can

be applied to the entire spectrum of military operations.”19

According to the authors, RDO is an operational concept

that envisions being able to “rapidly and decisively coerce,

compel, or defeat the enemy in order to accomplish our

strategic objectives” by overwhelming, unrelenting combat

operations. 20 RDO has an explicit aim of avoiding lengthy

campaigns or having to conduct extensive buildup of

logistical bases and forces. Instead, RDO looks to

accomplish its objectives using a concept that looks quite

similar to the decisive battle of Napoleonic times. Those

advocating RDO do, however, acknowledge that the decisive

battle may not in fact resolve the conflict. As such, RDO is a

concept that aims to win the initial battles of a conflict and

in doing so “establish the conditions to transition to a higher

380
(e.g., major regional contingency) or lower (e.g., security and

stability operation) level of commitment.”21 Another

refreshing factor in RDO is the recognition of the other

elements of national power: specifically the ability to

attempt to resolve a conflict before the commitment of

military forces by diplomatic, economic, and/or information

operations.

The current White Paper on RDO, dated October 25,

2001, defines both rapid and decisive operations. A rapid

operation is the ability to “accomplish the objectives of the

campaign with speed and timing that is superior, absolutely

and relatively, to the speed of the adversary.”22 Decisive is

defined as “imposing our will on the enemy by breaking his

coherence and defeating his will and ability to fight.”23

Decisiveness, according to the White Paper, is accomplished

by attacking an adversary using the full range of national

capabilities to destroy the coherence of his ability to fight by

striking his critical functions from dimensions and

directions against which he has no counter. The overall

objective is to break rapidly his will to fight and, as

necessary, destroy his ability to conduct coherent

operations. RDO are designed to attack and break the

enemy’s will to fight by demonstrating that he “cannot

achieve his objectives and that he will ultimately lose what

he values most if he does not concede.”24

The functional concepts of RDO are divided into three

categories: knowledge, command and control, and

operations. These functional concepts and their supporting

tenets encompass the anticipated characteristics or

enablers of future joint operations, which are defined as

knowledge-centric, effects based, fully networked, and

coherently joint.25

The first and most important enabler is referred to as

knowledge-centric. Knowledge-centric demands that U.S.

forces achieve and maintain information superiority over

their adversaries. Information superiority, according to

joint doctrine is “the capability to collect, process, and

381
disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while

exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the

same.”26 This is a modern adaptation and expansion of Sun

Tzu’s statement of “know your enemy and know yourself; in

a hundred battles you will never be in peril.”27 RDO

assumes that the United States will have complete

knowledge of its enemy because of its ability to conduct a full

and sufficient Operational Net Assessment (ONA).28

Knowledge-centric operations will rely on technology to

provide the United States informational advantage over its

adversaries in order to facilitate strategic and operational

decisions before the enemy can react to them or conduct

their own counteroperation. A complete and flawless ONA

will be critical in the ability of U.S. forces to execute RDO.

Effects-based operations is an enabler that allows the

United States to attack the enemy’s systems with both

military and nonmilitary means to produce “a desired

strategic outcome or effect.”29 The effects in this case can be

physical, functional, and/or psychological, and will allow

planners to predict second, third, and fourth order

consequences resulting from these operations.30 The United

States, because of its informational and technological

advantages, will be able to clearly identify the enemy’s

decisive points, links and critical path to the enemy’s

centers of gravity. Understanding the linkages between the

leadership, their warmaking capabilities and critical

vulnerabilities will allow the elements of national power to

apply leverage within the system to collapse the enemy

system and subsequently defeat the capability and the will

of the enemy, thus ending the conflict. Executing

effects-based operations will depend on a networked force

that is able to share both military and nonmilitary

information simultaneously, which is currently a major

shortfall in the execution of Joint operations.

Developing a fully networked joint force is another key

enabler to the execution of RDO. A “fully networked joint

force” implies a joint force that has a common relevant

operational picture referred to as CROP. The ability of

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ground, air, space, sea and nonmilitary assets to share the

same information and thus provide the strategic planners

and warfighters with a common operational picture is a

critical issue.31 Just as important will be the ability to

integrate this common operational picture with the other

elements of national power. As a major enabler of RDO,

developing a fully networked joint force also addresses the

issue of joint and interagency interoperability, a major

weakness in the current joint military environment.32

Without the enabler of a networked force, it will be difficult,

if not impossible, to conduct the envisioned, synchronized

operations, or be able to exploit rapidly the use of knowledge

and effects-based operations.

The realties of current and future operations is that they

will all be joint. The enabler of “inherently joint” highlights

this fact. This enabler, once again, focuses on the issue of

joint interoperability and the need to centrally drive service

procurement, training, leader development, and doctrine so

that they will support not only RDO but Joint Vision 2020.

Inherent in this process is Doctrine, Organization,

Training, Materiel, Leader Development, Personnel and

Facilities (DOTMLPF).33 This is the construct used for

analysis that each service currently conducts in system

development or when directed by Congress in support of the

joint effort. What impact a joint DOTMLPF analysis will

have in shaping each of the service’s support in joint

transformation and RDO is an issue and may necessitate a

Congressional mandate to have a true effect.

RDO and Joint Vision 2020 Linkage.

The objective of RDO is the “operationalizing of Joint

Vision 2020 in order to achieve full spectrum dominance.”34

To achieve this objective, Joint Forces Command has

established near-, mid-, and long-term objectives in order to

develop integrated joint operations capable of achieving

RDO. The near-term objective is to develop and exercise

selected forces capabilities needed to execute RDO. This

383
phase should be completed by 2005. The success of the

near-term objectives should reinforce, and provide the

motivation to the services and the DoD to accept the RDO

concept. Mid-term objectives go from 2006 to 2010 and are

designed to give selected elements of the armed forces Joint

Vision 2020 capabilities. Finally, the long-term objective

(2011-20) sees the U.S. armed forces achieving full

spectrum dominance as described by Joint Vision 2020. The

overall role of Joint Forces Command will be in the

integration of joint concepts, which includes RDO as the

centerpiece.

The Way Ahead for the Continued Development of

RDO.

The Joint Transformation campaign plan is centered

around the concept of CETA—Concept/Experimentation/

Training/Assessment cycle, and what is referred to by Joint

Forces Command as the “Big Three”—or the three

experiment/exercises which will incorporate “training

objectives of subordinate commands and Service

components” in 2-year cycles. 35 The “Big Three” consists of

Major Field Experiments (Millennium Challenge and

Olympic Challenge) conducted during the even years.

Scoping Limited Objective Experiments (Unified Vision)

will be conducted during the odd years, and, finally, the

integration of Joint Task Force Command Exercises

(Unified Challenge, Unified Endeavor, Roving Sands, etc.)

into the field experimentation cycle (even years). Based on

the outcomes of the first 2-year cycle, Joint Forces

Command will continue to relook and redefine RDO until

they are able to achieve Joint Vision 2020’s goal of full

spectrum dominance.

Assumptions Critical to the Success of RDO.

Assumptions according to joint doctrine are those

“supposition[s] on the current situation or a presupposition

on the future course of events . . . assumed to be true in the

384
absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the

commander . . . to . . . make a decision on the course of

action.”36 If an assumption is proven wrong, then it will

either negate the current course of action or result in a

branch plan or sequel to the overall operation. In the case of

the concept of RDO, a bad assumption may, in fact, negate

the concept as a whole and potentially lead to disaster for

the U.S. military, if alternative solutions are not planned or

accounted for. In the case of the concept of RDO, the critical

assumptions are as follows:

 Future U.S. forces will develop the capability for

perfect “knowledge” and subsequent analysis of an

adversary.

 The United States will retain its current dominance

in military technology and information superiority.

 Future adversaries will not develop the capability to

conduct an asymmetrical attack that will undermine

or cripple current and future U.S. military

advantages.

 Winning decisive, simultaneous battles will result in

overall victory and/or regime changes.

 If any of the above assumptions prove to be wrong,

then it will undermine the concept of RDO.

In the case of the first assumption, perfect “knowledge”

is a relative issue that must be addressed based on the

adversary’s abilities and speed to process information faster

than the United States. It also assumes that the analysis of

that information will be accurate and complete. The second

assumption implies that U.S. intelligence agencies must

continue to develop and implement future technologies into

U.S. military forces ahead of potential adversaries. This will

require continuous research and development and forward

thinking by both military and industrial complexes. The

third assumption is directly related to the U.S. ability to

385
conduct a thorough ONA on the current and future

capabilities of potential adversaries. It may also require the

United States to conduct preemptive, potentially unilateral

operations against an adversary to eliminate their

capability to conduct a crippling asymmetrical attack

against the United States—a politically dangerous path to

follow with potentially adverse results throughout the

international community. The fourth assumption addresses

the theory of winning wars through decisive battles. If war

was nothing more then battles, this theory has potential.

However, war is not a simple affair, and it continues to

become more complicated, especially in light of

globalization.

Acceptability—The American Way of War.37

Acceptability, for the purpose of this chapter, is whether

or not the concept of RDO is consistent with the American

strategic culture which subsequently defines the American

way of war.38 The strategic culture of a nation is a driving

factor in determining how a nation fights and how it

interacts with other nations. Strategic culture consists of

traits that define a nation (country, state, tribe, or other

organized groups) and gives them a distinct identity. It rests

on historical growth, geographic location, international

influence, traditional hates and fears, national quirks or

flaws, strengths and weaknesses, and economy, to name the

major pieces. Combine all of these traits, and one begins to

establish the strategic culture of the nation. America over

the years has developed a specific strategic culture that, in

turn, has defined the American way of war.

In looking at American strategic culture, one only needs

to examine its history—long term, not short term. America

is a nation of compromise, give and take. However, when the

American way of life is threatened or attacked, Americans

will respond in force until they achieve the desired objective.

America likes being seen and needs to been seen as standing

among the good guys. Americans expect their military

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forces to be dominant, and, subsequently, technology is an

important factor. Nevertheless, Americans will take and

accept casualties if they perceive the cause to be just.

Examples of this are the American Civil War, World War I,

and World War II. Americans are not afraid to fight, but

expect their leadership, military and political, to be

responsible when using military force, and only after other

elements of national power have failed to resolve the issue.

Americans, as a democratic nation, believe in the rights of

others, often to the extreme. If a nation attacks America,

then Americans are willing to suspend some of those rights

to protect their way of life. The passion of the American

people can never be underestimated. It will, and has in the

past, guided the reasoning of the government and, in the

event of an attack or atrocity, will demand justice (some

would also say vengeance) through the decisive use of

military force.

Based on the American strategic culture, America has

developed a unique way of war that is unprecedented in

modern times and is a direct reflection of geographic

positioning; economic, technological, and industrial

strengths; history; and democratic values. The American

way of war is thus defined as follows:39

 Emphasis on the use of overwhelming or decisive

force,

 Defined, clearly stated military objective,

 Emphasis on technological superiority,

 Risk and casualty adverse (for political reasons),

 Standing, professional, apolitical force (but not

politically naive).

The concept of RDO conforms to the American way of

war on a variety of levels. First, the concept envisions using

all elements of national power to overcome and defeat an

adversary quickly. It offers to the civilian leadership and

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strategic planner clearly defined objectives based on

information superiority and knowledge-centric based

operations. RDO offers to the American leadership and

public, the idea of quick, decisive battles that are technology

based, especially in terms of information superiority,

precision engagement, rapid deployability, and future

projected technological improvements in equipment and

capabilities. It is a concept that is based on using detailed,

precise overwhelming force that potentially will reduce the

overall risks and casualties to military force. And, finally, it

addresses the issue of maintaining a standing professional

force with its emphasis on establishing a joint based

DOTMLPF.

Suitability—Historical and Theoretical Basis for

RDO.

Suitability, for the purpose of this chapter, is whether

the employment of RDO will actually accomplish the

mission when carried out successfully. Successfully means

well planned, prepared, rehearsed, and executed. Does RDO

have a historical and theoretical basis for success?

On the theoretical issue, there are a number of theorists

who ideas support those envisioned by the authors of the

RDO concept. The first of these theorists is Sun Tzu.

Throughout Sun Tzu’s writings, there are a number of

points he highlights that directly relate to RDO. The first

one, previously mentioned, was the idea that generals who

were skilled in war could position themselves in such a way

that the enemy had no choice but to surrender or die.40 A

complete victory, without having to fight as a result of a

force’s disposition, was possible in the era of Sun Tzu. It was

possible because the warring factions in China were of

similar cultures and values. It consisted of a society or

culture where the military was the absolute power of the

warlords. To lose the army was to lose power, and,

subsequently, when the army was put in a precarious

position, it was best to retire from the field of battle in order

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to retain power. Today’s world is much more complicated,

more global, than it was in the time of Sun Tzu. Today, the

military is just one critical element of national power. Sun

Tzu also talked about the need for complete information and

knowledge about oneself, the enemy, and the environment.

RDO expresses a modern day version of this concept, using

information superiority and knowledge-centric operations

which includes an ONA.

Sun Tzu was a believer in rapid, decisive operations. He

states that “[v]ictory is the main object in war. If this is long

delayed, weapons are blunted and morale depressed . . . [f]or

there has never been a protracted war from which a country

has benefited.”41 Thus the idea of rapidly defeating your

enemy is at least as old as the writing of Sun Tzu. However,

the theories of Sun Tzu must be put into proper perspective

when one relates them to modern day warfare. First and

foremost, the emperors of Ancient China maintained their

position through the strength and effectiveness of their

army. When an army was defeated on the field of battle, it

was much more decisive in terms of regime changes and cost

with respect to human life than today’s modern democratic

societies. There were no war crime tribunals, and the power

of the emperor was absolute. These same criteria do not

exist in American democratic society. Fortunately, these

conditions have existed in other areas in which we have

fought. An example used by the proponents of RDO is the

1989 invasion of Panama, referred to as Operation JUST

CAUSE. By applying Sun Tzu’s writing in absolute terms to

today’s modern world, Operation JUST CAUSE is an

example of a well-planned and rehearsed operation that

successfully accomplished its initial military objectives.

However, Operation JUST CAUSE is not a good example to

use in supporting the concept of RDO, because it did not

adhere to the basic tenets of RDO as described by Joint

Forces Command.

On December 20, 1989, the United States executed

Operation JUST CAUSE, the invasion of Panama. Tensions

between the United States and the Panamanian dictator

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Manuel Noriega had been growing ever since Noriega forced

elected Panamanian President Dr. Nicolas Ardito Barletta

from office in 1985 and replaced him with then Vice

President Eric Arturo Delvalle.42 The following is a synopsis

of the critical events that ultimately lead to the decision to

invade Panama by the United States.43

 1986. The Reagan administration cuts aid to Panama

by 85 percent and sends national security advisor

John M. Poindexter to meet with Noriega and warn

him to stop dealing in illegal narcotics.

 1987. Noriega is publicly accused by former chief of

staff Colonel Roberto Diaz Herrera of the murder of

Dr. Spadafora (a critic of Noriega who was found dead

in 1984) and in the manipulation of the 1984

Panamanian elections. These allegations caused a

series of riots and ultimately led to the arrest of

Herrera by Noriega’s Panamanian Defense Force.

 1987. The U.S. Senate passed a resolution demanding

the removal of Noriega from power. This results in the

U.S. Embassy in Panama being targeted by rioters

who were supporters of Noriega.

 1988. The U.S. Department of Justice charges

Noriega with supporting the illegal drug trade.

Noriega removes President Delvalle from office.

 March 3, 1989. Panamanian Defense Forces stop 21

DoDo school buses full of school children because the

bus drivers were driving buses with U.S. Government

license plates.

 April 5, 1989. Alleged Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA) operative Kurt Muse is arrested by

Panamanian Defense Forces.

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 April 18, 1989. Noriega requires that all U.S. citizens

traveling to Panama must have visas to enter the

country.

 May 7, 1989. Panamanian elections are held.

 May 8, 1989. Panamanian Defense Forces raid

vote-counting sites and usurp the election process,

declaring Duque the winner.

 May 9, 1989. Noriega annuls the elections because of

“obstruction by foreigners.”44

 May 10, 1989. Opposition leaders Endara, Ford, and

Arias, along with their supporters, stage a

demonstration against Noriega which is brutally

dispersed by members of Noriega’s Dignity Battalion.

 October 3, 1989. Members of the Panamanian

Defense Force attempt a coup against Noriega, which

fails and leads to the execution of several members of

the Panamanian Defense Force.

 December 15, 1989. Noriega announces that a state of

war exists between the United States and Panama.

Noriega announces himself as the “Maximum

Leader.”

 December 16, 1989. Marine Lieutenant Paz is shot

and killed by Panamanian Defense Forces. That same

day a Navy officer and his wife are arrested and

abused by Panamanian Defense Forces.

 December 20, 2989. Operation JUST CAUSE is

executed.

Operation JUST CAUSE was designed as a campaign

with specific and limited military objectives. Those

objectives were:45

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 Protect U.S. lives and key sites and facilities.

 Capture and deliver Noriega to competent authority.

 Neutralize PDF forces.

 Neutralize PDF command and control.

 Support establishment of an U.S.-recognized

government in Panama.

 Restructure the Panamanian Defense Force.

A vital requirement of the campaign plan was the

simultaneous neutralization of 27 Panamanian Defense

Force objectives throughout Panama. Planing for Operation

JUST CAUSE had actually began as early as 1988 and was

originally called Operation BLUE SPOON. JUST CAUSE

was a joint operation with elements from every service

participating to one degree or the other. It was deliberately

planned and rehearsed, and targeted Noriega and his

defense forces. At the time of the operation, Noriega’s

support from the general population was low, and his center

of gravity was his security forces and members of his elite

circle. With this in mind, the United States executed a

quick, decisive military operation that effectively defeated

the Panamanian Defense Forces and ultimately led to the

capture of Noriega and the restoration of basic democratic

values.

The analysis of Operation JUST CAUSE suggests that

the advocates of RDO must address a few key issues. First

and most important is the fact that the simultaneity of the

operation was critical in the effects that it had on Noriega

and the Panamanian Defense Force. It shows that the

effects of simultaneity as expressed by RDO are possible,

but specific conditions existed that allowed for such

simultaneity. Secondly, the United States had a permanent

presence in Panama that, in effect, was a forward logistics

base for the operation. The build up and pre-positioning of

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logistics and forces of United States began as early as 1987

and continued until the actual execution of the operation. In

addition, the operation was rehearsed for 3 months prior its

actual execution. The United States fought an enemy that

allowed them to deliberately plan, execute, and control the

overall tempo of the operation. The enemy in this case did

not have a real vote, nor did it have the military or political

means to defend itself from the overwhelming forces

introduced into its country.

Joint operations worked because of a well-developed and

rehearsed plan. Its “knowledge” of the enemy came from the

experience of the men and women who had been stationed in

Panama and from the numerous contacts that had

developed over the years. However, even with collection

assets, both technical and human, the United States was

unable to initially track the location of their prime target,

Noriega. Four days after the invasion, the United States

was notified that Noriega was at the Papal Nuncio under

political asylum.46

Thus, Operation JUST CAUSE is a poor example of

effects-based operations. While the political leaders and

strategic planners understood the key to Noriega’s power

was his defense forces, they failed to take into consideration

the effects of eliminating the country’s security forces,

which resulted in wide spread looting until U.S. forces were

able to stabilize the situation. Effects-based operations

based on a total ONA might have identified this issue, but

this level of reasoning and analysis was not done.

Understanding second and third order effects of military

operations is critical, and Operation JUST CAUSE provided

many lessons for future operations of this nature.

The ability to remove a regime with a series of

simultaneous operations is one of the stated attributes of

RDO. But, as Operation JUST CAUSE suggests, unless

conditions are perfect, it cannot be done. Even when the

situation is ideal, as it was in Operation JUST CAUSE,

military forces still must contend with the human element

393
of conflict and most importantly the fog of war or friction. As

Clausewitz states, “[f]riction is the only concept that more or

less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war

from war on paper.”47

The suitability of RDO is questionable. Sun Tzu provides

some theoretical basis for the concept, but the world is much

more complicated than during his times. Today, decisions to

go to war and the political objectives are more complicated

because of advances in technology, the interactions of both

national and international governments, and the world

community as a whole. Perhaps the greatest difference is

that modern wars, fought by established nation-states,

involve limited conflicts that do not provide for ruthlessly

prosecution of war, as did the emperors of ancient China.

Thus, while Sun Tzu offers some imaginative theories, these

theories are not practical in the current strategic

environment of limited warfare.

Operation JUST CAUSE suggests that it is possible to

conduct simultaneous joint operations with overwhelming

forces and effect a regime change, but that is all it shows.

The build up of forces, establishment of a forward logistics

bases, coupled with the friction of war, all point to the fact

that the suitability of RDO accomplishing what it advertises

is questionable.

Feasibility—A Realistic Expectation of Future

Technologies and Capabilities?

In discussing the feasibility of RDO, the key issue is

whether or not future technology and capabilities will

realistically achieve the desired end state. The end state in

RDO is the ability to “rapidly and decisively coerce, compel,

or defeat the enemy in order to accomplish [the United

State’s] strategic objectives without a lengthy campaign or

an extensive buildup of forces.”48 The first issue is one of

technology, and the second issue is the ability to accurately

analyze the collected information. Is it possible to defeat an

adversary with a series of simultaneous attacks, both lethal

394
and nonlethal, to include the leveraging of all elements of

national power?

In the area of technology, the primary requirement is to

establish the network that enables a “knowledge-centric”

capability. This supposedly would allow the United States

to “know more about the enemy, the operational

environment, and [themselves], and the interrelationship of

each” as compared to future adversaries.49 The technical

means to gather and distribute information in terms of a

common relevant operational picture is within the reach of

the United States and currently exists, in limited

capabilities, at certain levels and within certain

organizations. What still must be accomplished is the fusing

of information between service and government agencies.

This, too, is work in progress. The technical ability to collect

and distribute information is not the issue. The issue is the

ability to accurately analyze, understand, and predict

future second and third order effects of all operations, and

the will of the enemy to continue to resist. This ability is a

critical concept in the success of RDO. An over reliance on

technology for the collection of information at the expense of

trained human collectors is a deficiency that has already

been identified at the national level, but not yet rectified.

Technical collectors cannot tell an organization what is in

the adversary’s mind, what the adversary is thinking, or

what the adversary is hiding. It cannot predict the future

second and third order effects of operations on the opponent.

For that one needs trained analysts with practical

experience in the region(s) to provide an element of ground

truth to the assessment.50 This task becomes even more

difficult, especially when dealing with an irrational actor or

an adversary with a different set of values and/or objectives

then those of the United States.

The ability to defeat an adversary with a series of

simultaneous attacks both lethal and nonlethal, to include

the leveraging of all elements of national power is a concept

that needs to be pursued. Fully integrating all elements of

national power, along with symmetrical and asymmetrical

395
capabilities, might give the United States the ability to fight

and win and/or prevent future wars. However, without the

establishment of a national strategic policy or strategy, the

U.S. military is developing future warfighting capabilities

in a vacuum. War is not an isolated act. As Clausewitz so

elegantly states, “war should never be thought of as

something autonomous but always as an instrument of

policy.”51 Without that policy, and without a national

strategy, then the capabilities potentially offered by RDO

will only succeed in winning battles and not wars.

Risks.

First and foremost is the fact that RDO is an evolving

concept designed to bring the tenets of Joint Vision 2020

into reality. RDO is not designed for long-term warfare. It is

designed to fight high-end smaller scale contingencies. It is

designed to fight and win battles and engagements quickly,

and, when situations are ideal, end a conflict early by

overwhelming adversaries through full spectrum

dominance. A major risk is that the U.S. military will

restructure itself to accomplish quick strikes, using high

technology elements that possesses little staying power

when fighting a peer competitor. The alternate risk is that

the United States will continue to work technology as a sole

solution to warfighting problems and forget that it still

takes troops on the ground to occupy territory and win wars.

Secondly, there are the assumptions that the military will

have perfect knowledge of the enemy, everyone will have the

same operational picture, and everyone will interpret that

information the same way. Friction or the fog of battle is

real. Warfare is and always will be a human endeavor that

cannot be replaced by technological solutions.

Finally, future warfare will involve the cooperation and

participation of coalition forces. The cooperation of allies

may be nothing more than providing basing and overflight

permission. Their participation could cover a wide variety of

assets from individuals to divisions and corps. The U.S.

396
military possesses the most advanced forces in history and

as it continues to push the technology envelope, it will

continue to overmatch future coalition partners.52 The

methods and techniques used by the United States are not

the same as those of the allies that U.S. forces might

cooperate with in future conflicts. This is an issue that will

continue to be a problem for potential allies in terms of cost,

training, doctrine, force development, and political will.

This fact alone will stress the issue of knowledge-centric

operations, the establishment of a common relevant

operational picture, and, more importantly, interoperability in future coalition operations. Moreover, allies

will want to have a vote, both politically and militarily. RDO

will not fix this issue and, as such, must be a consideration

as Joint Forces Command continues to develop the future

warfighting concepts of the United States.

Final Analysis and Conclusions.

RDO represents an evolving concept designed to

transform the way the United States currently conducts

military operations. It is an emerging concept, with a goal of

taking the best that each service and civilian industry has to

offer and mold the whole into a cohesive warfighting

program that will provide the United States full spectrum

dominance. The problem is that RDO is focusing on a

specific area of warfighting, high-end smaller-scale

contingencies. If RDO are unable to accomplish the nation’s

objectives, then RDO must rely on other forces to finish the

mission.

RDO as a concept appears to be acceptable when

compared to the American way of war. It is what Americans

want—quick, decisive, overwhelming battles with few

casualties. However, if those expectations are not met, then

the United States faces the problem of losing public and

political support. Without those two elements, the United

States will not be able to win. As Clausewitz states, “war is

never an isolated act.” 53 It takes the will and passion of the

397
people, the reasoning of the political powers, and, finally,

the capabilities of an army to prosecute war to its fullest. 54

RDO is questionable, when compared to the feasibility of

winning wars with a decisive blow. Panama was an

operation that fully demonstrates the effects of

simultaneous joint operations, but the conditions were

ideal, to include the advantages afforded to the American

forces by existing logistical bases, forces prepositioned, and

the time to plan and deliberately rehearse an extremely

complicated operation. Even with those advantages, the

problem of post-hostility operations was a major issue in the

overall execution of Operation JUST CAUSE. The concept

RDO does not address this aspect of war. The biggest

assumption and requirement of RDO is that the U.S.

military will maintain its technological superiority over

potential enemies. As long as the United States is able to

maintain air, sea, information, and ground superiority, it

will continue to be able to dominate its adversaries

militarily. However, enemies will work hard to find a way to

attack the United States asymmetrically and indirectly, to

counter our current and future advantages. As potential

adversaries turn to commercial technology to solve their

information requirements, the United States may not be

able to maintain information superiority.

In the area of suitability, the technology issues are being

worked and will become a reality in the near future.

However, technology is only a small part of the solution to

future warfare. The technology associated with

knowledge-centric operations will provide commanders

information near simultaneously and in theory will allow

the commander to make decisions and execute operations

much faster then his adversary. What is not considered is

that commanders may become reluctant to make quick

decisions because they do not have the 100 percent solution.

Instead of making quick decisions with 80 percent of the

information, commanders may opt for the 100 percent

solution, losing valuable time and thus negate whatever

advantage they have over their opponent’s decision cycle.

398
The underlining message is that future warfare will be

conducted in a joint environment. In order for the military to

remain relevant in the future, it must adapt a doctrine that

is based upon a “purple concept,” and RDO does provide the

basis for that concept. It could be the start for the

transformation of the U.S. military.

The concept of RDO is a potential catalyst to force

interoperability between the services and other agencies of

the U.S. government. It focuses on attacking the enemy

asymmetrically with all assets available to the United

States. To accomplish RDO, the force must have a structure

that emphasizes adaptivity, initiative, and cohesion, and is

able to take advantage of an entire range of joint capabilities

and information technologies. It must have a force that is

capable of operating in remote and austere environments,

physically isolated from other forces, but virtually

connected through the use of a common operating picture,

provided by joint capabilities.

To achieve RDO, the services must be more accountable

to the joint community. Currently each service is

responsible for providing trained and equipped forces to the

warfighting CINCs and the associated Joint Task Forces.

This will require interoperability, it will require service

members to understand a common language, and it will

require a common training base in order to develop cohesive

fighting units. In order to achieve Joint Vision 2020’s

objectives and RDO capabilities, a major adjustment in how

the U.S. military trains, equips, and mans the force must

occur. It may come to the point that the services are

eliminated or at least marginalized so that the U.S. military

eventually becomes a truly “purple” force.

RDO represents the beginning of a new joint

doctrine/concept of warfighting that has the possibility of

developing a joint team with a shared training, education,

and military culture. It is a doctrine/concept that will drive

the development of new technologies to support

warfighting. It is a doctrine/concept that should embed

399
jointness within all of the services as the United States

continues to transform its military forces to meet the

threats of the 21st century and beyond. But, much like the

search for the elusive Holy Grail, RDO is an ideal or goal

that nations and theorists have searched for since the early

days of warfare: a way to end a conflict with one decisive

blow.

Unfortunately, today, modern war is more complicated.

Just winning battles will not win wars or effect regime

changes. Clausewitz states that, to have victory in war, one

must first destroy the enemy’s army or force; second, one

must occupy his country; and, third, one must destroy the

enemy’s will to fight.55 RDO envisions being able to defeat

the enemy’s force, addresses breaking the will of the enemy

to continue to fight, but it does not discuss occupying the

enemy’s territory. To occupy a country or territory one

needs troops on the ground. All the technology in the world

cannot replace the effects, both locally and internationally,

of a nation committing its treasure, its youth, and its

future, to a potential life and death endeavor.

ENDNOTES-CHAPTER 12

1. Mariano Tomatis, “All the Theories about Grail,” October 18,

1997; available from www.geocities.com/thens/Delphi/3636/teoriee.

htm; Internet; accessed November 10, 2001.

2. Sun Tzu, The Art Of War, Samuel B. Griffith, trans., New York,

1971, p. 79.

3. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter

Paret, trans., Princeton, NJ, 1976, p. 75.

4. Ibid., pp. 78-89.

5. William J. Clinton, “A National Security Strategy For A Global

Age,” Washington, DC, December 2001, p. 3.

6. Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Quadrennial Defense Review Report,”

Washington, DC, September 30, 2001, p. 32.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Vision 2020,” Washington, DC,

2000, p. 4.

400
8. U.S. Joint Forces Command, “Toward Transformation 2001,”

Norfolk, VA, 2001, p. 5.

9. Ibid., p. 2.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., p. 23.

12. Ibid., p. 2.

13. Based on classroom discussions and the study of the history of

the development of Strategic Art. The idea of “not getting it too wrong” is

based on comments discussions led by Colonel Michael R. Matheny, the

director of the Advanced Strategic Arts Program at the Army War

College.

14. Ibid.

15. U.S. Joint Forces Command, “Toward Transformation 2001,” p.

18.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., p. 23.

18. Ibid., p. 25.

19. Ibid., p. 26.

20. U.S. Joint Forces Command, “A Concept For Rapid Decisive

Operations,” Norfolk, VA, 2001, p. v.

21. Ibid., p. 17.

22. Ibid., p. 12.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid..

25. Ibid., p. 8.

26. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Vision 2020,” p. 8.

27. Sun Tzu, p. 84.

28. U.S. Joint Forces Command, “A Concept for Rapid Decisive

Operations,” p. 19.

401
29. Ibid., p. 9.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., p. 10.

32. Based on the author’s discussions and observations with

members of the interagency, joint staff, and other military planners

throughout the course of the academic year at the Army War College

and past joint experiences in both SOUTHCOM and SHAPE.

33. U.S. Joint Forces Command, “A Concept for Rapid Decisive

Operations,” p. 9.

34. U.S. Joint Forces Command, “Toward Transformation 2001,” p.

29.

35. Ibid., p. 38.

36. Joint Forces Staff College, “The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide,”

JFSC Pub 1, Washington, DC, 2000, p. G-18.

37. The discussions and analysis presented in this section of the

study is based on the author’s interpretations of class room discussion as

part of the Advance Strategic Arts Program of the U.S. Army War

College. During these class discussions, the author has had the

opportunity to listen to and interact with fellow classmates, instructors.

and noted historians. such as Russell F. Weigley and F. G. Hoffman.

Additional endnotes are used to delineate from the author’s own

interpretation to those of others.

38. F. G. Hoffman, Decisive Force. The New American Way of War, Westport, CT, 1996, p. 1.

39. Author’s interpretations of class room discussion as part of the

Advance Strategic Arts Program of the United States Army War

College.

40. Sun Tzu, p. 79.

41. Ibid., p. 73.

42. Edward M. Flanagan, Jr., Battle for Panama, New York, 1993,

p. 9.

43. Ibid., pp. 9-20.

44. Ibid., p. 15.

45. The Center For Army Lessons Learned, “Operation Just Cause

Lessons Learned Volume I. Soldiers and Leadership,” Bulletin No. 90-9,

402
September 25, 1997; available from http://call.army.mil/ products/ctc

bull/90-9/9091toc.htm; Internet; accessed March 10, 2002.

46. Malcolm McConnell, Just Cause: The Real Story of America’s

High-Tech Invasion of Panama, New York, 1991, pp. 267-271.

47. Clausewitz, p. 119.

48. U.S. Joint Forces Command, “A Concept For Rapid Decisive

Operations,” p. v.

49. Ibid., p. 13.

50. Robert Baer, See No Evil: The True Story Of A Ground Soldier

In The CIA’s War On Terrorism, New York, 2002, pp. 74, 81.

51. Clausewitz, p. 88.

52. Based on the author’s experience in SHAPE and as the G3 of

Multi-National Brigade East in Kosovo, working with over eleven

different coalition partners.

53. Clausewitz, p. 78.

54. Ibid., pp. 75-89.

55. Ibid., pp. 90-91.

403
ABOUT THE AUTHORS

ALLEN W. BATSCHELET, a lieutenant colonel in the U.S.

Army, is a field artillery officer and a member of the U.S.

Army War College Class of 2002. He has served in a variety

of command and staff positions in Europe and CONUS.

Most recently, he commanded the 3rd Battalion, 82nd Field

Artillery in the 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas.

Lieutenant Colonel Batschelet holds masters’ degrees from

various institutions. He currently serves on the Joint Staff.

JAMES L. BOLING, a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army,

is a Strategic Plans officer and a 2002 graduate of the U.S.

Army War College. He has held a variety of positions in

Germany and the United States over the last 23 years. Most

recently, he served as the Major Theater War Branch Chief

in the Plans and Policy Directorate of U.S. Central

Command. Lieutenant Colonel Boling holds masters’

degrees in Political Science from the University of Louisville

and in National Security and Strategic Studies from the

U.S. Navy War College.

GARY H. CHEEK, a colonel in the U.S. Army, is a Field

Artillery officer and a member of the U.S. Army War College

Class of 2002. Commissioned from the U.S. Military

Academy in 1980, he has served in a variety of command

and staff positions in the United States, Germany, Canada,

and Kuwait. Most recently, Colonel Cheek served as the

Senior Fire Support Trainer at the National Training

Center, Fort Irwin, California. He also commanded 1st

Battalion, 9th Field Artillery, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort

Stewart, Georgia, and will be the commander of the 25th

Infantry Division Artillery, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, in

June 2002. Colonel Cheek holds a Master’s degree in

Military Arts and Sciences from the School of Advanced

Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

405
ARTHUR W. CONNOR, JR., a colonel in the U.S. Army, is

an armor officer and a member of the U.S. Army War

College Class of 2002. He has served in a variety of

command and staff positions in CONUS and Europe over

the past 21 years. Most recently, he commanded 1st

Battalion, 12th Cavalry at Fort Hood, Texas. Colonel

Connor holds a master’s degree in History from Temple

University, Philadelphia. He currently serves as the

commander of 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley,

Kansas.

JAMES H. EMBREY, a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army,

is an infantry officer and a member of the U.S. Army War

College Class of 2002. He currently serves as the Director,

Army Planning, in the Department of Military Strategy,

Policy and Operations, United States Army War College.

Lieutenant Colonel Embrey has served in a variety of

command and staff positions in Europe and CONUS. Most

recently, he commanded the 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry

(Mechanized) in the 1st Armored Division, Baumholder,

Germany, during Task Force Hawk and initial entry into

Kosovo, and served as G-3, Task Force Falcon/USKFOR in

Kosovo. Lieutenant Colonel Embrey holds a master’s degree

and doctorate in Military History from the University of

Kentucky.

DAVID R. HOGG, a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army, is a

member of the U.S. Army War College Class of 2002. An

armor officer, he has held a variety of positions in the United

States and Europe. His most recent assignments include

commander of 3-37 AR and G3 of the Multinational Brigade

(E) in Kosovo. Following graduation, he will be serving with

the G3, Army Staff.

WILLIAMSON MURRAY is currently professor emeritus of

history at Ohio State University. He has served as the

Harold Johnson Professor of Military History at the U.S.

Army War College. Dr. Murray is also the author and editor

of a number of major works, the most recent of which is A

406
War To Be Won, Fighting the Second World War, published

by Harvard University Press.

STEVEN L. SALAZAR, a lieutenant colonel in the U.S.

Army, is an infantry officer and member of the U.S. Army

War College Class of 2002. He has served in a variety of

command and staff positions in CONUS and Germany. He

has served as a Crisis Action Planner at the U.S. European

Command and J3 of a Joint, Interagency Task Force. Most

recently, he commanded 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry at Fort

Carson, Colorado.

DANIEL J. SHANAHAN, a lieutenant colonel in the U.S.

Army, is an Army aviator and a member of the U.S. Army

War College Centennial Class of 2002. He has served in a

number of command, staff, and training assignments in

CONUS and Europe. Most recently, he commanded 2nd

Battalion, 4th Aviation Regiment at Fort Hood, Texas.

Lieutenant Colonel Shanahan holds a master’s degree in

Public Administration from Central Michigan University.

CHARLES L. TAYLOR, a lieutenant colonel in the U.S.

Army, is an infantry officer and member of the U.S. Army

War College Class of 2002. He has served in a variety of

command and staff positions in CONUS, Hawaii, and the

Republic of Panama. His most recent assignments include

command of 5th Battalion 87th Infantry in the Republic of

Panama, and G3, 10th MTN DIV, Fort Drum, New York.

Lieutenant Colonel Taylor holds a master’s degree from

Central Michigan University.

BRETT T. WILLIAMS is a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Air

Force and a member of the U.S. Army War College Class of

2002. Colonel Williams was commissioned through ROTC

at Duke University in 1981. He is an F-15C pilot with more

than 3,300 flight hours, and most recently commanded the

94th Fighter Squadron at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia.

Colonel Williams also served at U.S. Central Command as a

planner in J5. He is a graduate of the Air Command and

Staff College, the School of Advanced Aerospace Studies,

and holds a master’s degree from Webster University.

407
Following graduation, Colonel Williams will take command

of the 363rd Expeditionary Operations Group at Prince

Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia.

GEORGE J. WOODS, III, a lieutenant colonel in the U.S.

Army, is an infantry officer and a member of the U.S. Army

War College Class of 2002. Commissioned in 1980, he has

served in a variety of command and staff positions in

CONUS and Germany. Most recently, he commanded 1st

Battalion, 41st Infantry at Fort Riley, Kansas, and was the

G3, 7th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colorado.

Lieutenant Colonel Woods holds a masters’ degrees in

Organizational Psychology from Columbia University and

in Military Art and Science from the Command and General

Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Editor

Dr. Williamson Murray

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Ms. Kimberly A. Rockwell