STRATEGIC THEORY FOR THE 21st CENTURY:

THE LITTLE BOOK ON BIG STRATEGY

Harry R. Yarger

February 2006

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iii

CONTENTS

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

II. A Theory Stated: Strategy’s Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

III. The Strategic Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

IV. Theory in the Real World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

V. The Strategy Paradigm in Short: A Theory Restated . . . . . . . . . 65

VI. Concluding Thoughts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

v

FOREWORD

 The word “strategy” pervades American conversation and our 

news media. We tend to use strategy as a general term for a plan, a 

concept, a course of action, or a “vision” of the direction in which to 

proceed at the personal, organizational, and governmental—local, 

state, or federal—levels. Such casual use of the term to describe 

nothing more than “what we would like to do next” is inappropriate 

and belies the complexity of true strategy and strategic thinking. It 

reduces strategy to just a good idea without the necessary underlying 

thought or development. It also leads to confusion between strategy 

and planning, confining strategic possibilities to near-time planning 

assumptions and details, while limiting the flexibility of strategic 

thought and setting inappropriately specific expectations of 

outcomes. 

 This “little book”—actually a monograph—talks about big 

strategy, strategy at the highest levels of the nation-state. It is 

applicable to grand strategy, national security strategy, national 

military strategy, and regional or theater strategy. The monograph 

does not propose a strategy for the United States; rather, it provides 

a framework for considering strategy at any of the levels mentioned 

above. It is an examination of theory, exploring those aspects of 

strategy that appear to have universal application. The theory also 

may have application to the strategy of nonstate actors, institutions, 

and businesses, but the explicit purpose and perspective offered 

herein focus on the nation-state. 

 This Letort Paper is written to expose emerging senior leaders 

and strategists at the U.S. Army War College to the vocabulary, 

ideas, and concepts that will enable them to construct a framework 

for developing their own strategic perspective of the trends, issues, 

opportunities, and threats confronting the United States in the 21st 

century.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 

vii

PREFACE

 This monograph has been constructed by borrowing freely 

from the ideas and concepts of others, some of whom have global 

recognition and others who toiled namelessly as faculty members 

and students at various senior service colleges. I apologize to all 

for those instances wherein I may have misrepresented their ideas 

or paraphrased too closely without proper recognition in my quest 

for a synthesis of thought that might qualify as pure theory. I also 

apologize to readers for the frequent redundancy and complexity of 

my work—but strategy is a complex thing that is better understood 

when examined from different perspectives. In the same light, I 

have used examples very sparingly and reluctantly, only as a means 

to indicate the path of my thinking. To do more would beg for 

the illustration to be challenged instead of the thought, or suggest 

the direct application of the “lessons” of the example to similar 

circumstances. A theory of strategy is neither a simple checklist 

nor a cookbook solution. It is a way to understand how you might 

develop a perspective and approach for defining and selecting 

alternative choices in an increasingly complex and rapidly changing 

world—focusing on “how to think” as opposed to “what to think”—

and articulating your choices in ways that can be understood and 

implemented. Strategy is neither simple nor easy, but the good 

strategist seeks to express the logic of strategy in the simplest, clearest 

terms.

ix

SUMMARY

 Strategy for the nation-state is neither simple nor easy. Good 

strategy demands much of the military professional whether he is 

formulating, articulating, evaluating, or executing strategy. Few do it 

well. It requires the professional to step out of the planning mindset 

and adopt one more suited for the strategic environment. This is 

particularly true in periods of great change and turmoil when a 

successful military strategy must be closely integrated with and may 

depend on other national strategies of the interagency community. A 

theory of strategy helps in this transition by educating the professional 

and disciplining his thinking in any of his roles. This monograph 

advances a theory of strategy that provides essential terminology 

and definitions, explanations of the underlying assumptions and 

premises, and substantive hypotheses that explain the nature of the 

strategic environment and the role and expectations of strategy. The 

environment is explained in theoretical and practical terms, and the 

implications for strategic thinking are developed with a distinction 

being made between strategy and planning mindsets. The typical 

problems practitioners have in formulating and articulating strategy 

are discussed. Strategy formulation is recognized as both an art and 

science, and the U.S. Army War College strategy model of ends, 

ways, and means is expounded on and advocated as a methodology 

for articulating strategies.

1

I. INTRODUCTION

Like politics, strategy is the art of the possible; but few can discern what 

is possible.1

William Murray and Mark Grimsley

 In simplistic terms, strategy at all levels is the calculation of 

objectives, concepts, and resources within acceptable bounds of risk to 

create more favorable outcomes than might otherwise exist by chance 

or at the hands of others. Strategy is defined in Joint Publication 1-

02 as “the art and science of developing and employing instruments 

of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to 

achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.”2 Both of 

these definitions are useful, but neither fully conveys the role and 

complexity of strategic thought at the highest levels of the state. At 

these levels, strategy is the art and science of developing and using 

the political, economic, social-psychological, and military powers of 

the state in accordance with policy guidance to create effects that 

protect or advance national interests relative to other states, actors, or 

circumstances. Strategy seeks a synergy and symmetry of objectives, 

concepts, and resources to increase the probability of policy success 

and the favorable consequences that follow from that success. It is 

a process that seeks to apply a degree of rationality and linearity to 

circumstances that may or may not be either. Strategy accomplishes 

this by expressing its logic in rational, linear terms—ends, ways, and 

means. 

 Strategy is far from simple, and understanding a theory of strategy 

allows us to grasp and work with its complexity by understanding 

its logic. A theory of strategy provides essential terminology and 

definitions, explanations of the underlying assumptions and premises, 

substantive propositions translated into testable hypotheses, and 

methods that can be used to test the hypotheses and modify the 

theory as appropriate.3

 Why study a theory of strategy? Theory’s value lies not in a 

prescription for success but in how it helps us expand and discipline 

our thinking. As Clausewitz reminds us, theory should be for study, 

not doctrine. 
2

Theory then becomes a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war 

from books; it will light his way, ease his progress, training his judgment, 

and help him to avoid pitfalls. . . . Theory exists so that one need not start 

afresh each time sorting out the material and plowing through it, but will 

find it ready to hand and in good order. It is meant to educate the mind 

of the future commander. . . .4

A theory of strategy educates the strategist’s mind. It helps discipline 

our thinking in order to deal with the complexity and volatility 

of the strategic environment and the changes and continuities, 

issues, opportunities, and threats inherent to it. It encourages us to 

rethink our own assumptions and prejudices, but it also encourages 

us to consider the possible assumptions and prejudices of our 

adversaries and other actors. Strategic theory opens the mind to 

all the possibilities and forces at play, prompting us to consider 

the costs and risks of our decisions and weigh the consequences of 

those of our adversaries, allies, and others. On another level, theory 

allows the members of the military profession and the interagency 

community to communicate intelligently in regard to strategy. It 

serves as a common frame of reference for the development and 

evaluation of an appropriate strategy and the communication of it to 

those who must implement it. A disciplined theory of strategy also 

allows the professional to evaluate the merits of a particular strategy 

and critique it in meaningful terms for those who determine policy 

and make decisions.

 Strategic thinking is difficult. It is best viewed as both an art 

and a science. The framework of theory provides a methodological 

basis for a disciplined thought process to assist the strategist 

in developing strategy, and it also serves as a guide for others to 

follow in comprehending, evaluating, and critiquing the merits of a 

particular strategy. While theory is an important aid for educating the 

mind, it is not a substitute for “genius” as described by Clausewitz. 

History’s great strategists possessed “a very highly developed mental 

aptitude” for both the art and science. They had the ability to perceive 

the realities and relationships of their environment, and apply them 

successfully in developing strategy.5

 True genius is rare, and some 

say that it is no longer applicable in the modern, complex world. It 

is, they argue, too difficult for a single person—even a genius—to 
3

comprehend all the nuances of the modern world, and they propose 

that strategy is better served by an organizational process. In spite 

of these views, however, strategies often are linked to individual 

personalities in the public eye, and some individuals appear to have 

a particular talent for this art and science.6

 It is useful to consider the roles of strategists today. At the U.S. 

Army War College, three roles for strategists are considered: leader, 

practitioner, and theorist. Each of these roles requires a distinct 

set of skills and competencies. The leader provides the vision, 

inspiration, organizational skills, direction, and personal impetus 

necessary to enable others to act in a focused and coherent manner. 

The practitioner thoroughly comprehends the levels of strategy and 

their relationships and develops strategy. He translates broad policy 

guidance into integrated strategies that lead to policy success. The 

theorist develops theoretical concepts through study and thought and 

teaches and mentors others. A master of the strategic art is proficient 

in all three of these areas and may approach Clausewitz’s genius.7

Strategists function at different levels or in different roles within 

the state’s organizational hierarchy, but they all need to understand 

comprehensive strategies and communicate them effectively among 

themselves and to the leadership, the planners, and the people who 

make up the organizations that ultimately implement strategy.

 Strategy, then, provides direction for the state, seeking to 

maximize positive outcomes and minimize negative outcomes, as the 

state moves through a complex and rapidly changing environment 

into the future. Strategists thoroughly examine the environment and 

develop a strategy that identifies objectives, concepts, and resources 

required to accomplish the goals established by policy. Theory 

disciplines strategic thinking by explaining strategy’s inherent logic; 

it serves to remind all involved with strategy neither to promise 

too much nor fail to consider any of the attributes of strategy. A 

coherent theory also helps leaders, planners, and others to evaluate 

and execute strategy.

5

II. A THEORY STATED: STRATEGY’S LOGIC

There is an essential unity to all strategic experience in all periods of 

history because nothing vital to the nature and function of war and 

strategy changes.8 

Colin S. Gray

 Strategy provides a coherent blueprint to bridge the gap between 

the realities of today and a desired future. It is the disciplined 

calculation of overarching objectives, concepts, and resources within 

acceptable bounds of risk to create more favorable future outcomes 

than might otherwise exist if left to chance or the hands of others. 

It is the consideration of the relation of how to apply resources to 

achieve desired results in a specific strategic environment over time. 

In the context of the state, strategy is the employment of specific 

instruments of power (political/diplomatic, economic, military, 

and informational) to achieve the political objectives of the state in 

cooperation or in competition with other actors pursuing their own—

possibly conflicting—objectives.9 In other words, it is the application 

of the power inherent in the natural and societal resources of the 

state toward policy ends in an emerging, dynamic, and competitive 

strategic environment. Both strategy and planning are subordinate 

to the nature of the environment. Strategy has distinct attributes and 

differs from planning in its scope, assumptions, and premises, but it 

provides the structure and parameters for more detailed long-range 

and short-term planning. Both strategy and planning use ends, ways, 

and means, and are bounded by the criteria of suitability, feasibility, 

and acceptability. Strategy has its own inherent logic that can be 

understood and applied.

 An underlying assumption of strategy from a national perspective 

is that all nation-states and nonstate actors have interests they will 

pursue to the best of their abilities. Interests are desired end states 

categorized in terms such as survival, economic well-being, favorable 

world order, and enduring national or group values. Interests are 

derived from these broad categories as reflected in the strategic 

environment and can be stated more specifically in the context of 

issues. The elements of power are the resources used to promote or 
6

advance national or group interests. Resources are applied through 

the use of instruments of power.

 The role of strategy is to ensure that the pursuit, protection, 

or advancement of these interests—which are achieved through 

the application of the instruments of power to specific objectives 

to create strategic effects in favor of the interest based on policy 

guidance—is accomplished in a coherent and optimal manner. 

Strategy is fundamentally about choices; it reflects a preference for 

a future state or condition and determines how best to get there. In 

doing so, strategy confronts adversaries, allies, and other actors; 

and it addresses resource and organizational issues; even then some 

factors simply will remain beyond control or maybe unforeseen.10

Rational choice, chance and probability, irrational actors, allies, 

and competitors are all part of the strategic paradigm.11 Strategy 

is inherently comprehensive; its foremost purpose is to favorably 

influence the complex and volatile strategic environment by 

providing direction for the judicious application of power toward 

achievement of policy-driven objectives.12

 The strategic process is all about how (concept or way) leadership 

will use the power (resources or means) available to the state to 

exercise control over sets of circumstances and geographic locations 

to achieve objectives (ends) in accordance with state policy.13 Strategy 

provides direction for the coercive or persuasive use of this power 

to achieve specified objectives. This direction is by nature proactive, 

but it is not predictive. Strategy assumes that while the future cannot 

be predicted, the strategic environment can be studied, assessed, 

and, to varying degrees, anticipated and manipulated. Only with 

proper analysis can trends, issues, opportunities, and threats be 

identified, influenced, and shaped through what the state chooses 

to do or not do. Thus good strategy seeks to influence and shape 

the future environment as opposed to merely reacting to it. Strategy 

is not crisis management. It is to a large degree its antithesis. Crisis 

management occurs when there is no strategy or the strategy fails to 

properly anticipate. Thus, the first premise of a theory of strategy is 

that strategy is proactive and anticipatory, but not predictive.

 A second premise is that political purpose dominates all strategy; 

this idea has been perhaps best set forth in Clausewitz’ famous 

dictum, “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means.”14
7

Political purpose is stated in policy. Policy is the expression of the 

desired end state sought by the government. In its finest form, 

policy is the clear articulation of guidance for the employment of 

the instruments of power towards the attainment of one or more 

objectives or end states. In practice, it tends to be much vaguer. 

Nonetheless, policy dominates strategy by its articulation of the end 

state and its guidance regarding resources, limitations on actions, or 

similar considerations. The analysis of the end state and guidance 

yields strategic objectives. Objectives provide purpose, focus, and 

justification for the actions embodied in a strategy.15 Achievement of 

the objectives creates strategic effects contributing to the desired end 

state. National strategy is concerned with a hierarchy of objectives 

determined by the political purpose. Yet, as Clausewitz notes, that 

does not mean that policy is a tyrant. The development of strategy 

informs policy; policy must adapt itself to the realities of the strategic 

environment and the limits of power. Thus, policy ensures that 

strategy pursues appropriate aims, while strategy informs policy of 

the art of the possible.16

 A third premise is that strategy is subordinate to the nature of 

the strategic environment. Strategy is developed from a thorough 

consideration of the strategic situation and knowledge of the nature 

of the strategic environment. The strategic environment possesses 

both physical and metaphysical attributes. It has both domestic and 

external components. The international environment is the external 

component, consisting of the physical geographic environment, the 

international system, and other external actors—and their cultures, 

beliefs, and actions. The domestic environment consists of internal 

physical realities and the internal actors, constituencies, institutions, 

and organizational roles at play within the United States. Indeed, 

within the United States, there are groups that have worldviews 

significantly different from those of the national leadership, which 

makes the domestic element of strategy formulation even more 

complex. Nascent contradictions always exist to challenge the status 

quo and initiate a search for a new equilibrium. Stability within the 

environment resists change; instability within the environment urges 

adoption of a new strategy. The nature of the strategic environment 

can be described as an interactive, chaotic, complex system of 
8

systems. Strategy must be consistent with the nature of the strategic 

environment in its formulation and execution.

 A fourth premise is that strategy is holistic in outlook. It demands 

comprehensive consideration. That is to say, while the strategist 

may be devising a strategy from a particular perspective, he must 

consider the whole of the strategic environment in his analysis in 

order to arrive at a proper strategy to serve his intended purpose 

at his level. He is concerned with external and internal factors at 

all levels and the horizontal and vertical integration of his strategy. 

In formulating a strategy, the strategist must also be cognizant 

that each aspect, objective, concept, and resource has effects on 

the environment around him. Thus, the strategist must have a 

comprehensive knowledge of what else is happening within the 

strategic environment and the potential first-, second-, third-, 

etc., order effects of his own choices on the efforts of those above, 

below, and on the same level with him, whether they be friendly, 

adversary, or indifferent actors. The strategist’s efforts must be 

integrated fully with the strategies or efforts of senior, coordinate, 

and subordinate elements. Strategists must think holistically—that is, 

comprehensively. They must be cognizant of both the “big picture,” 

their own organization’s capabilities and resources, and the impact 

of their actions on the whole of the environment. Good strategy is 

never developed piecemeal or in isolation.

 A fifth premise is that any strategy creates a security dilemma 

for the strategist and other actors.17 Any strategy, once known or 

implemented, introduces change into the strategic environment, 

even when it seeks to maintain the status quo. Change can occur 

on multiordered levels and may be nonlinear. Change threatens 

the existing equilibrium or status quo in the strategic environment, 

raising the question of whether the results of doing nothing are 

better or worse than the consequences of doing something. Strategy 

can anticipate the future though the pursuit of proper objectives, but 

strategy cannot predict the future with absolute certainty, neither 

the achievement of its objectives nor the precise consequences of 

achievement or failure. The strategist must determine whether the 

attainment of the specified end justifies the risks of initiating action, 

and the strategist must also consider how other actors may react. 
Dom

External Environment

National Security Strategy

All Elements of Power

National Interests

Desired End States in External Environment

National Military Strategy

Military Element of Power

National Policy

Grand Strategy

(All elements of power but rarely documented and published.)

Comprehensiveness of Strateg

National Policy National Policy

Theater Strategy Operational Art

Tactics

Theater Strategy Operational Art

Tactics

Theater Strategy Operational Art

Tactics

Figure 1. 

Strategy thus poses a dilemma for the strategist and other 

actors. 

A sixth premise is that strategy is grounded in wh

accomplished and why it is to be accomplished—strategy 

formulated in a policy or intellectual vacuum. The stra

know the end state he is trying to achieve. Strategy rightfu

on a desired or preferred end state among an array of p

states in a dynamic environment. Strategy provides direc

persuasive or coercive use of the instruments of power 

specified objectives to create strategic effects leading to the 

state. It is essential that the strategist analyze and fully und

desired end state in the context of the strategic environ

domestic and external) in order to develop appropriate o

regard to the desired end state. Hence, before proper objec

determined, the strategist must comprehend the nature of t

environment, the intent of the policy, and the nation’s 

interests as determinative of necessary and appropria

effects. 

9 
10

 A seventh premise is that strategy is an inherently human 

enterprise. Not solely a consideration of objective factors, “strategy 

involves human passions, values, and beliefs, few of which are 

quantifiable.”18 The role of belief systems, worldviews, and cultural 

perceptions of all the players is important in the formulation of 

strategy. Strategists must be careful to eliminate counterproductive 

bias while ensuring the strategy meets criteria of acceptability at 

home and abroad—compensating for differences as appropriate.

 An eighth premise is that friction is an inherent part of strategy. 

Friction is the difference between the ideal strategy and the applied 

strategy—how it is suppose to work versus how it actually unfolds 

in execution. Friction is a natural consequence of the chaotic and 

complex nature of the strategic environment, chance, and human 

frailty.19 Friction cannot be eliminated, but it can be understood and 

accounted for by the strategist to a greater or lesser extent in the 

formulation of the strategy.

 A ninth premise is that strategy focuses on root causes and 

purposes. Such primary foci make strategy inherently adaptable 

and flexible by emphasizing strategic purpose and empowering 

subordinate levels. Strategy incorporates learning from experience 

and is sufficiently broad in its construction to adapt to unfolding 

events and an adversary’s countermoves.20 Strategy addresses 

linear and nonlinear phenomena. Unlike planning, which is largely 

cause and effect, strategy is a process interacting with the strategic 

environment: “strategy is a process, a constant adaptation to shifting 

conditions and circumstances in a world where chance, uncertainty, 

and ambiguity dominate.”21 Process is facilitated by constructing 

strategy with flexibility and adaptability in its component parts. 

Strategy’s focus on root causes and purposes ensures that the 

direction provided to subordinate levels is sufficiently broad to 

allow adaptability and flexibility while not deviating from strategic 

purpose.

 A 10th premise is that strategy is hierarchical. The political 

leadership ensures and maintains its control and influence over 

the instruments of power through the hierarchical nature of state 

strategy. Strategy cascades from the national level down to the lower 

levels. Generally strategy originates at the top as a consequence of 

a grand strategy (often undocumented), national security strategy 
11

or other stated national-level strategies and policy statements in 

regard to specific issues. Grand and national security strategies lay 

out broad objectives and direction for the use of all the instruments 

of power. National policy provides broad strategic guidance from 

political leaders, generally articulating the national interests as they 

relate to specific strategic circumstances. From these strategies and 

policies the major activities and departments develop subordinate 

strategies. For the military, a National Defense Strategy and National 

Military Strategy are derived from the National Security Strategy. In 

turn, the National Military Strategy leads to theater strategies.

 The U.S. Army War College (in consonance with Joint Pub 1-02) 

defines the levels of strategy as they pertain to the military element 

of power within the state as:

Grand Strategy. An overarching strategy summarizing the 

national vision for developing, applying, and coordinating all 

the instruments of national power in order to accomplish the 

grand strategic objectives, viz., preserve national security; bolster 

national economic prosperity; and promote national values. 

Grand Strategy may be stated or implied.22

National Security Strategy (also sometimes referred to as Grand 

Strategy and National Strategy). The art and science of developing, 

applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power 

(diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve 

objectives that contribute to national security.23

National Military Strategy. The art and science of distributing and 

applying military power to attain national objectives in peace and 

war.24

Theater Strategy. The art and science of developing integrated 

strategic concepts and courses of action directed toward securing 

the objectives of national and alliance or coalition security policy 

and strategy by the use of force, threatened use of force, or 

operations not involving the use of force within a theater.25

 Other levels of strategy, such as The National Defense Strategy of The 

United States of America,may be inserted in the hierarchy by leadership 

at various times.26 The hierarchical nature of strategy facilitates span 

of control. It provides a logical means of delegating responsibility, 

authority, and accountability within the senior leadership. It also 
suggests that if strategy consists of objectives, conc

resources, each should be appropriate to the level of st

consistent with one another. Thus strategy at the nation

level should articulate military objectives at the national 

express the concepts and resources in terms appropri

national level for the specified objective. 

At some level, thinking and action fall below th

threshold. Under the National Military Strategy, the 

Commanders develop Theater Strategy and subsequent 

plans. At this juncture, the line between strategy and plan

with campaign planning that may be either at the theate

level or in the realm of pure operational art. Graph

relationship between strategy and the levels of war is 

Figure 2. 

Levels of War and Hierarchy of Strategy

Strategic Level

Operational Level

JTF’s & Corps

Tactical

Corps, Divisions

& Below

Theater Strategy

Campaign Planning

National Military Strategy

Tactical Planning

National Defense Strategy

National Security Strategy

Figure 2. 

Strategy differs from operational art and tactics in 

temporal, and geographic aspects. Functionally and t

tactics is the domain of battles, engagements of rela

12 
13

duration that can be as small as a firefight between two small units 

or as large as a battle between corps. Operational art is the domain of 

the campaign, a series of battles taking place over a longer period of 

time. Strategy is the domain of war which encompasses the spectrum 

of conflict among nations and other international actors. Tactics 

concerns itself with the parts or pieces, operational art with the 

combination of the pieces, and strategy with the combinations of these 

combinations. Geographically, tactics are very narrowly defined, 

the operational level is broader and more regional in orientation, 

and strategy is theater-wide, intercontinental, or global. The time 

horizon is greater at the strategic level than at the operational and 

tactical levels. However, it is worth noting that with the advances 

in transportation and communications, there has been a spatial 

and temporal convergence of strategy, operational art, and tactics. 

Increasingly, in part due to increasing communications capabilities, 

events at the tactical level have strategic consequences.27

 An 11th premise of strategic theory is that strategy has a symbiotic 

relationship with time. A key component of strategic competency is 

thinking in time—the ability to foresee continuity of strategic choices 

with the past and the consequences of their intended and unintended 

effects in the future. A strategic choice must have continuity with 

the past as it bridges to the future. Strategy must account for the 

past in its formulation, acknowledging preceding interaction and 

history within the strategic environment. A strategic action that has 

characteristics contrary to the past experience or culture of the society 

it affects is less likely to be successful. The strategist extrapolates 

the possible futures from the present strategic circumstances with a 

clear sense of the long past from which these possible futures flow; 

he then constructs a paradigm of change from which planning seeks 

to shape a more favorable future. Deciding when to undertake a 

strategy is also critical. If the historical timing is correct, then small 

actions can have large strategic effects. If the timing is wrong, results 

invariably take larger efforts and cost more in terms of tangible and 

intangible resources. The strategist is concerned with continuities 

and change, with both history and the future. History suggests 

the right questions to ask and provides perspective for the future 

consequences of the available choices.28 Futurism identifies the 
14

possibilities and probabilities of change. Strategic analysis suggests 

the timing.

 A 12th premise is that strategy is cumulative. Effects in the 

strategic environment are cumulative; once enacted, they become 

a part of the play of continuity and change. Strategy is cumulative 

from several different perspectives. It is cumulative from the 

perspective that once implemented, a strategy becomes part of the 

continuities of the strategic environment. Regardless of whether it 

is successful or not, it becomes a part of the fabric of change and 

interaction in the strategic environment, and its consequences must 

be considered in any future strategy. Strategy is cumulative from a 

stratified perspective also. The effect of a policy is the summation of 

the strategy and subordinate planning at all levels and the interaction 

related to them; the cumulative effect often exceeds the sum of the 

parts. It is also possible that the value of one level of strategic efforts 

might be negated by the effects of another level. Strategies at different 

levels interact, with the cumulative effects influencing the success of 

higher and lower strategy and planning over time. 

 A 13th premise is that efficiency is subordinate to effectiveness 

in strategy. This is not to say that efficiency is not desired. Good 

strategy is both effective and efficient, but the purpose of strategy 

is to create strategic effect. Strategic objectives, if accomplished, 

create or contribute to the creation of strategic effects that favor 

the achievement of the desired end state at the level of strategy 

being analyzed and, ultimately, serve national interests. Strategy 

must emphasize effectiveness because failure, however efficiently 

executed, creates much greater risk of undesirable and unanticipated 

multiordered consequences. Concepts and resources serve objectives 

without undue risk of failure or unintended effects—efficiency is 

necessarily subordinate to effectiveness in strategy.29

 A 14th premise is that strategy provides a proper relationship or 

balance among the objectives sought, the methods used to pursue 

the objectives, and the resources available for the effects sought at 

its level in the hierarchy. In formulating a strategy, the ends, ways, 

and means are part of an integral whole and work synergistically 

to achieve strategic effect at that level of the strategy, as well as 

contribute to cumulative effects at higher levels. Ends, ways, and 

means must be in concert qualitatively and quantitatively, internally 
15

and externally. Thus qualitatively, a National Security Strategy 

(NSS) objective seeks to achieve the desired effect using any of the 

necessary and appropriate instruments of power available to the 

state—the qualitative questions ask whether achieving the objective 

will produce the strategic effects and whether the effects will justify 

the objective chosen, the methods used, the resources required, and 

the social and political costs incurred. A National Military Strategy 

will identify at the national level appropriate military ends using 

national military concepts and resources. The National Military 

Strategy is bounded by the NSS and is subject to the qualitative 

questions, but the state cannot logically ask the military to do 

what it is incapable of accomplishing because of lack of ability or 

resources—which are qualitative relationships. In a similar manner, 

a theater or combatant commander would have appropriate theaterlevel objectives for which he would develop theater concepts and 

use resources allocated to his theater. In some cases, concepts might 

include the integration of other than military instruments of power, if 

they can be integrated and capabilities and resources are available. 

 The levels of strategy, as well as war, are distinct but interrelated 

because of the hierarchical and comprehensive nature of strategy 

and war. Hence, operational or tactical concepts achieve operational 

or tactical objectives and cannot be elevated to a strategic level even 

though operational or tactical objectives contribute to the cumulative 

nature of strategy, and actions at these levels on occasion create 

strategic consequences. In a similar manner, strategic objectives 

and concepts have a proper relationship within a strategy, but 

must also relate properly within the hierarchy. The quantitative 

relationship suggests that the concept employs and is resourced 

with the appropriate types and quantity of resources. From the 

synergistic balance of ends, ways, and means, the strategy achieves 

suitability and acceptability—the attainment of the objectives using 

the instruments of power in the manner envisioned accomplishes the 

strategic effects desired at acceptable costs. The synergistic balance 

also achieves feasibility—the strategic concept is executable with the 

resources made available. 

 The 15th and final premise of strategy is that risk is inherent in all 

activity. The best we can do is seriously consider the risks involved, 

producing a favorable balance against failure. Strategy is subject to 
16

the nature of the strategic environment, and uncertainty is inherent in 

that environment as a result of chance, nonlinearity, and interaction 

with other states and actors. Risk can be assessed and often mitigated 

by questioning the thinking behind the strategy. For example, what 

assumptions were made in developing the strategy, and what are the 

consequences if an assumption is wrong? What internal or external 

factors are the bases for this strategy? What changes would enhance 

or detract from this strategy? What flexibility or adaptability is 

inherent in the components of the strategy? How can the strategy be 

modified and at what costs? Nonetheless, no matter how probing the 

questions, risk of failure will always remain. Failure can be either the 

failure to achieve one’s own objectives, thus providing a significant 

advantage to one’s adversaries, or creating unintended adverse 

effects.

 In sum, strategy has an inherent logic that can be understood and 

applied. It is distinct from planning and serves a unique purpose. 

It differs from planning in its attributes, scope, assumptions, and 

premises, but provides the overall structure and parameters for 

more detailed long-range and short-term planning. Both strategy 

and planning use ends, ways, and means, and are bounded by the 

criteria of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. Good strategy 

is founded in a proper understanding and analysis of the strategic 

environment and national interests and policy, and an understanding 

of the theory and role of strategy. The strategist accepts that the 

future cannot be predicted, but believes that it can be anticipated 

and shaped in favorable terms through creation of judicious strategic 

effects. Strategic theory guides and disciplines the development and 

execution of good strategy.
17

III. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Everything in strategy is very simple, but that does not mean that 

everything is very easy.30

Clausewitz

Strategy seeks to cause specific effects in the environment—to 

advance favorable outcomes and preclude unfavorable ones. For the 

state, the strategic environment is the realm in which the leadership 

interacts with other states or actors to advance the well-being of the 

state. This environment consists of the internal and external context, 

conditions, relationships, trends, issues, threats, opportunities, 

interactions, and effects that influence the success of the state in 

relation to the physical world, other states and actors, chance, and 

the possible futures. The strategic environment functions as a selforganizing complex system. It seeks to maintain its current relative 

equilibrium, or to find a new acceptable balance. In this environment, 

some things are known (predictable), some are probable, some are 

plausible, some are possible, and some remain simply unknown. It 

is a dynamic environment that reacts to input but not necessarily in 

a direct cause-and-effect manner. Strategy may focus on a particular 

interest or policy, but the holistic nature of the environment results 

in both intended and unintended effects.31 The strategist ultimately 

seeks to protect and advance the interests of the state within the 

strategic environment through creation of multiordered effects. 

Conceptually, a model of strategy is simple—ends, ways, and 

means—but the nature of the strategic environment makes it difficult 

to apply. To be successful, the strategist must comprehend the nature 

of the strategic environment and construct strategy that is consistent 

with it, neither denying its nature nor capitulating to other actors or 

to chance.

 The nature of the strategic environment has been described 

numerous times by different authorities. This environment, 

encapsulated by the U.S. Army War College in the acronym VUCA, 

is marked by:

a world order where the threats are both diffuse and uncertain, where 

conflict is inherent yet unpredictable, and where our capability to defend 
18

and promote our national interests may be restricted by materiel and 

personnel resource constraints. In short, an environment marked by 

volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA).32

Characterized by the four earmarks—volatility, uncertainty, 

complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA)—the strategic environment is 

always in a greater or lesser state of dynamic instability or “chaos.” 

The role of the strategist is to exercise influence over the volatility, 

manage the uncertainty, simplify the complexity, and resolve the 

ambiguity, all in terms favorable to the interests of the state and in 

compliance with policy guidance. 

 VUCA thinking argues that the strategic environment is 

volatile. It is subject to rapid and explosive reaction and change, 

often characterized by violence. Uncertainty also characterizes this 

environment, which is inherently problematic and unstable. New 

issues appear, and old problems repeat or reveal themselves in new 

ways so that past solutions are dubious, and the perceived greater 

truth often vacillates with time. Everything is subject to question and 

change. This environment is extremely complex. It is composed of many 

parts that are intricately related in such a manner that understanding 

them collectively or separating them distinctly is extremely difficult 

and often impossible. Sometimes the environment is so complicated 

or entangled that complete understanding and permanent solutions 

are improbable. The strategic environment is also characterized 

by ambiguity. The environment can be interpreted from multiple 

perspectives with various conclusions that may suggest a variety of 

equally attractive solutions, some of which will prove to be good and 

others bad. Certain knowledge is often lacking and intentions may 

be surmised, but never entirely known. VUCA thinking describes 

the appearance of the environment without providing a theoretical 

understanding of it. Since the role of the strategist is ultimately to 

advocate actions that will lead to desirable outcomes while avoiding 

undesirable ones, the strategist must understand the nature of the 

environment in order to exert influence within it.33

 The nature of the strategic environment, as the VUCA acronym 

suggests, is difficult to grasp and is perhaps the most challenging task 

for the strategist. Yet understanding its nature explains strategy’s 

possibilities and limitations, and provides the insight and parameters 
19

for articulating strategic objectives, concepts, and resources. Two 

theories—chaos theory and complexity theory—serve as appropriate 

metaphors for understanding the nature of the strategic environment, 

providing an analogous description of its attributes and functioning. 

While founded in abstract mathematical extrapolations, these two 

theories capture the essence of the observed VUCA behavior of the 

strategic environment and have been adapted by some political 

scientists to describe the international strategic environment. Some 

even suggest these theories might be applied directly to the evaluation 

and selection of strategic choices, but that is not the purpose of their 

use in this monograph. 34 Here, chaos theory and complexity theory 

are used to help the strategist think conceptually and pragmatically 

about the functioning of the strategic environment.

 Chaos theory was popularized by Edward Lorenz, a diligent 

meteorologist who, while searching for a way to produce more 

accurate weather predictions, discovered the “butterfly effect.” He 

noticed that miniscule changes in his initial input to mathematical 

calculations for weather predictions could have extraordinary and 

unpredictable effects on the outcomes. He concluded that the future 

behavior of complex and dynamic systems is incredibly sensitive 

to tiny variations in initial conditions.35 Over 150 years earlier, 

Clausewitz understood and described this phenomenon in war and 

wrapped it into his definition of friction: “Everything in war is very 

simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate 

and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless 

one has experienced war.”36 Likewise, folklore captured this same 

reality: “For want of a nail, the shoe was lost; for want of a shoe, 

the horse was lost; for want of a horse . . . , the kingdom was lost!” 

Computers allow scientists to do the calculations to study this effect 

in mathematically simple systems, thereby illuminating the “chaotic” 

behavior of the strategic environment and other complex systems.

 Chaos theory is a different way of viewing reality. Prior to the 

development of chaos theory, two world views dominated thinking. 

Systems were defined as deterministic and predictable, or random 

and disordered—thus unpredictable. Deterministic systems are 

predictable because the same inputs will yield the same outputs 

every time the experiment is conducted. In math’s chaos theory, 

chaos is not a state of utter confusion—random, unpredictable, and 
20

uncontrollable—but an observable reality that adheres to certain rules 

even as it appears chaotic in the evident sense. It explains observed 

physical behavior that possesses characteristics in common with 

both order and randomness as opposed to the more traditional either 

orderliness or randomness. Put more scientifically, chaos theory 

describes unstable aperiodic behavior in deterministic nonlinear 

dynamical systems. A dynamical system is one that interacts and 

changes over time. Behavior in chaotic systems is aperiodic, meaning 

that no variable describing the state of the system undergoes a 

regular repetition of values—each changes in some part over time. 

The behavior in a chaotic system continues to manifest the effects 

of any small difference, and consequently a precise prediction of a 

future state in a given system that is aperiodic is impossible. On the 

other hand, chaotic behavior as a mathematical process does possess 

structure or patterns and, as a consequence, can be predicted and 

influenced to some extent, with the most influence occurring in the 

initial conditions.37

 Chaos theory is important because it helps explain why 

deterministic or linear systems sometimes produce unpredictable 

behavior. Chaos theory also demonstrates that much that appears 

as random, in reality is not—there are indirect cause-and-effect 

relationships at work, sometimes not detectable. The deterministic 

nature of a chaotic system ensures there is some manifestation of 

continuity from one state to the next, while the nonlinearity means 

that the consequences of any changes may appear as spontaneous 

and extreme. In a chaotic system, early changes can have an 

extraordinary effect on the long term, but the results are bounded 

from the extremity of total randomness. Thus chaotic systems are a 

mixture of continuities and change. The strategic environment can 

be viewed as a chaotic system in which human history represents 

aperiodic behavior—broad patterns in the rise and fall of civilizations 

are evident, but no event is ever repeated exactly.38

 Complexity theory also offers insights into the nature of the 

strategic environment, often shared by or augmenting chaos theory. 

The strategic environment is by definition a complex system. A system 

exists when a set of elements are interconnected so that changes in 

some elements or their relations produce changes in other parts of 

the system, and the system taken as a whole exhibits properties and 
21

behaviors that are different from those of the sum of the parts. Systems 

are generally dynamic, and social systems are especially so. Systems 

may be very large or very small, and in some complex systems, large 

and small components live cooperatively. Complexity occurs in both 

natural and man-made systems. The level of complexity depends on 

the character of the systems, the environment, and the nature of the 

interactions among them. The different parts of complex systems are 

linked and affect one another in a synergistic manner through both 

positive and negative feedback. In a complex system, the numerous 

independent elements continuously interact and spontaneously 

self-organize and adapt for survival in increasingly more elaborate 

and sophisticated structures over time. Cause and effect are not 

proportional to each other and often cannot be related. Such a system 

is neither completely deterministic nor completely random, but 

rather exhibits both characteristics—adhering to the chaos theory 

model. Complex systems, therefore, are not precisely predictable, 

and the sum of their interactions is greater than the parts. 

 Complex systems appear to evolve naturally to a state of selforganized criticality, at which time they lie on the border of order 

and disorder, teetering on the “edge of chaos.” At the point where a 

complex, dynamical, chaotic system becomes sufficiently unstable, an 

attractor (such as a minor event similar to Lorenz’s tiny mathematical 

changes) instigates the stress, and the system splits. This is called 

bifurcation—the point at which significant change occurs, and the 

newly resulting systems are distinct from the original while still 

having continuities. The edge of chaos is important; it is the stage 

when the system can carry out the most complex operations and 

the point when both opportunities (positive feedbacks) and threats 

(negative feedbacks) are greatest. If the system cannot maintain its 

balance, it seeks a new equilibrium. At the point of bifurcation, little 

changes produce great outcomes.39

 Chaos and complexity theories offer a perspective that describes 

the strategic environment as it is, as opposed to a direct and simplistic 

cause-and-effect linear model. These theories recognize that the world 

is composed of both linear and nonlinear dynamics. Grasping this 

distinction is critical to the kind of analysis the strategist undertakes! 

Complexity theory does not seek prediction but understanding of 

the various elements of the environment and the actors involved. It 
22

offers a complex worldview that accepts contradictions, anomalies, 

and dialectic processes. It alerts the strategist to the existence of 

multicausal situations, unintended consequences, circumstances ripe 

for change, the roles of feedback and self-fulfilling expectations, and 

other abnormalities discounted, or even disparaged, by the rational 

planning model.40

 Chaos and complexity theories serve as useful metaphors for 

the strategic environment because they provide insights to VUCA 

phenomena and the relationship between the strategic environment 

and strategy. The strategic environment is composed of elements 

representing both continuity and change. Relationships and 

interaction are the keys to understanding the nature and dynamism 

of the strategic environment. Characterized by instability and 

aperiodic behavior, it does not repeat itself precisely, although 

situations may closely approximate those of the past. Thus it 

possesses the attributes of both linearity and nonlinearity. The 

strategic environment is deterministic in that change is bounded by 

a variety of factors, including, to some degree, by what has occurred 

before. It will have continuities, but the exact nature and extremity 

of change are not necessarily predictable because of the nonlinear 

attributes. The strategic environment is often particularly sensitive 

to early changes at critical times, and the outcomes are often not 

proportional to the inputs, thus creating unpredictable, and at times 

unintended, outcomes. 

 Major changes at the strategic level often can have very 

simple causes. Any change that occurs creates feedback (effect) 

which eventually must be accounted for within the equilibrium 

of the strategic environment. Chaotic behavior is more evident in 

long-term systems than in short-term systems. This observation 

illuminates why planning’s shorter time horizons support more 

certainty than strategy’s longer view. At the same time, a chaotic 

system actually can evolve in a way that appears to be smooth and 

ordered, suggesting that strategy is practical and can produce results. 

Strategy therefore must account for the chaotic, complex nature of 

the strategic environment and shape it by creating and anticipating 

effects in order to be successful.41

 Often referred to as a system of systems in order to emphasize 

its complexity, the strategic environment is a composite of complex 
23

systems, linked vertically and horizontally. As such, the strategic 

environment exhibits complex, self-organizing behavior—it 

continuously seeks to find an acceptable order or relative balance in 

which it can exist. Its complexity results from individual decisions 

or acts and the interactions resulting from the decisions or changing 

circumstances. Its numerous parts and agents act individually or 

collectively, according to their own circumstances and interests. In 

acting, these parts and agents can globally affect the circumstances 

and interests of all other parts or agents. Some of the interactions are 

predicable, some are chaotic, and some are stochastic (determined 

by chance). What this means is that the strategic environment is 

inherently uncertain, and that unpredictability must be taken as a 

natural part of the system. As a result, traditional ideas of control—

direct cause and effect—are not as applicable. We find instead a 

form of control that is macroscopic, not seeking to impose precise 

domination over details because these are inherently uncontrollable 

at the strategic level. Strategy provides broad, meaningful direction 

and structure suitable to the changing complexity of the strategic 

environment—retaining adaptability and flexibility by directing 

actions to favorably alter the environment rather than trying to 

control it absolutely.42

 As the theories illustrate, all complex systems are inherently 

nonlinear, and outcomes cannot be predicted or understood by the 

simple act of adding up the parts and the relationships. In linear 

systems, changes in output are nearly proportional to input; the sum 

of the inputs equals the output in a more-or-less predictable fashion. 

Most people think from a linear perspective and in a linear fashion, 

and indeed planning operates in large measure on linear assumptions 

even though practical experience often belies this approach. The 

difference is accounted for in planning with reserve forces and 

planned branches and sequels. In a system at the strategic level, 

complexity enters the simplest actions, no matter how deterministic 

they appear. The effect of one action may depend on or conflict 

with the status of another variable, and the net effect may change 

the conditions that affect other or all variables. On a primary level, 

then, to understand outcomes the strategist must examine his own 

choices in light of the goals, resources, and policies of the opposing 

actor and the continuities and variables of the rest of the strategic 
24

environment. However, strategic acts are not one-sided, and the 

opposing or other actors may make choices in regard to responding 

to an action or even preempt it, so that the complexity confronting 

the strategist is compounded by what the other actors may choose 

to do. On yet another level, the chaotic nature of complex systems 

means that initial behaviors and outcomes cause changes that 

produce unintended dynamics with cascading effects that can alter, 

limit, enhance, or otherwise affect future choices or require reaction.43

Thus the nonlinear characteristics of the strategic environment result 

from the interaction among chance and subordinate or integral selforganizing and adaptive systems—states, other actors, and the 

physical world.

 Nonlinearity suggests a world in which the future has both 

continuities and unpredicted threats and opportunities. It suggests an 

interactive process in which strategic choices produce effects that in 

turn generate reactions that may or may not create major or complex 

changes. Other actors—friendly, adversarial, or indifferent—with 

regard to a strategy’s objectives may choose to act, react, or preempt. 

The smallest “friction,” whether by lack of foresight, slow execution, 

or factors beyond the actor’s control, can amplify itself into a cascade 

of things going wrong to create potential chaos. Further, chance 

events, purely stochastic phenomena, occur and shape the strategic 

environment in favor of or against the strategy. And, of course, 

actors, friction, and chance function interactively to further influence 

the strategic environment and affect the strategy. 

 Thus the world is more a place of instability, discontinuity, 

synergies, and unpredictability than planners prefer. Although a 

meaningful degree of linearity can be achieved, results often vary from 

the original intent, at times costing more than anticipated because 

of the need to manage the chaos within the strategic environment 

over the strategy’s timeline. Thus, in the strategy process, scientific 

analysis must be combined with historical perspective to create 

a comprehensive strategy that provides for dynamic change, 

innovation, responsiveness, flexibility, and adaptability.44 The art 

of strategy allows the strategist to see the nature of the strategic 

environment and a path or multiple paths to his goals; and the 

scientific aspect of strategy provides a methodology to quantify a 
25

path and marshal the resources to shape the strategic environment 

in favorable terms.

 As a complex system, the strategic environment is interactive and 

adaptive because the states and actors have the capacity to respond 

individually and collectively (in a myriad of bilateral and multilateral 

relationships) to new challenges to the relationships and structures 

that provided stability in the past. When the balance is lost, the states 

and actors, individually and collectively, seek to self-organize their 

patterns of behavior into new patterns intended either to restore the 

former equilibrium or to obtain changes favorable to their interests. 

As in any complex system, to do this they must accommodate change, 

changing or responding in ways that provide for success in the new 

environment. At the same time, continuities with the past remain and 

are embedded in the emergent order. The adaptive task for the state 

or other actor is to maintain an acceptable balance between internal 

needs and external demands; sufficient actions and resources must 

be dedicated to the demands of the external environment, but at the 

same time the needs and expectations of the domestic environment 

must be appropriately addressed. The actors must adapt more or 

less in concert with the strategic environment, making external 

adjustments of their relationships with each other and the overall 

environment in order to survive. 

 If sufficient coevolution does not occur—whether because of a 

lack of adaptability on the part of leadership, insufficient material 

resources, or whatever other reason—one or more states or actors and 

their internal systems collapse, and new structures and relationships 

emerge in their place. This process of adaptation and change does not 

have to occur continuously or evenly; varying periods of stasis may 

be punctuated by rapid change until a new equilibrium is reached. 

Given this phenomenon, small events can sometimes seemingly 

trigger major changes—the so-called “butterfly effect.” In a similar 

manner, small decisions made or not made early in a period of 

environmental change can have a dramatic impact, possibly leading 

to irreversible consequences that may result in significantly different 

outcomes than would otherwise be the case. The strategist can 

fall victim to this phenomenon—reacting to its consequences—or, 

through judicious study and analysis, seek to use it to advance the 

interests of the state.
26

 Again, the strategic environment is a complex system consisting 

of systems within systems. The strategist must recognize that, to 

be successful, a strategy must account for both the external and 

internal components of the strategic environment. For the political 

state, these can be identified as the domestic and international 

environments on a grand scale, but external elements can be further 

divided into adversaries, allies, and other actors. In addition, the 

physical or natural environment is one of the external elements, 

acting as another complex system within the strategic environment. 

Internal environments can be subdivided into the general public, 

interest groups, other parts of the governmental bureaucracy, and 

the subsystems or actors of the strategist’s own organization. The 

strategic environment on all its levels is characterized by VUCA, 

but to say that the strategic environment is VUCA is not to say that 

it defies study, analysis, and evaluation, or that future changes or 

developments cannot be anticipated. It is simply to say that to predict 

or control it with any significant degree of certainty is exceptionally 

complex and difficult. The chaotic and complex nature of the strategic 

environment has implications for the development of strategy at all 

levels.

 Like any complex system, the international environment is 

constantly subject to change, experiencing periods of stability and 

instability. Instability tends to increase as the degree of interaction 

rises, particularly if one or more actors seek to impose change on the 

strategic environment. Periods exhibiting lower degrees of interaction 

are generally more stable. Periods characterized by stability tend to 

favor linear approaches to problems or challenges, while periods 

exhibiting greater instability tend to require nonlinear perspectives 

and problem-solving. As the level or complexity of interaction rises, 

the strategic environment potentially moves into a state of selforganizing criticality, at which time it lies on the border of order and 

disorder, and then is highly susceptible to a radical new rebalancing. 

The strategic equilibrium is adjusted continuously, but on these 

occasions the strategic environment experiences dramatic change. 

Such major changes really reflect upheavals in the key continuities of 

the strategic environment. Strategists in the first quarter of the 21st 

century must recognize that the emerging strategic environment is 

the product of such an upheaval. In terms of chaos or complexity 
27

theory, the strategic environment is in the process of bifurcation. The 

order or relative balance of the bipolar Cold War becomes part of the 

past as a new order is formed. While not all the rules must change, 

many will need to be changed or reinterpreted as states and actors 

seek a new equilibrium.

Figure 3.

 What is the nature of this new strategic environment? A vast 

array of existing literature that attempts to grasp or describe the new 

strategic environment in terms meaningful to different communities—

business, government, academic, military, religion, etc.45 What they 

share in common is an appreciation that the strategic environment 

is in the midst of a major reshaping as a result of changes generally 

attributed to the convergence of a number of events or trends: the 

end of the Cold War, massive changes in economic relationships, 

the rise of globalization, and seminal advances in technology. At 

the heart of these changes is the “establishment of information 

and knowledge—their production, dissemination, storage, and 
28

use—as the fundamental social and economic activity, rather than 

the cultivation of agriculture or the production of manufactured 

goods.”46 It is a transformation of social and economic life on a 

global scale. Such a widespread change in multiple subsystems has 

dramatic implications for the strategic environment and the states 

and actors that compose the international system. Morever, it will 

impose further change both at the international and domestic levels 

of most, if not all, actors. 

 This period of great and rapid change presents both threats and 

opportunities. The period has already displayed its characteristics 

in broad terms. It favors service economies over industrial 

manufacturing economies; it is global and local in scope at the same 

time—global in its reach and local in its focus; it allows and encourages 

decentralized production while it democratizes decisionmaking; 

it challenges and replaces authorities who cannot compete; and it 

appears to be ushering in a period of hyper-competition among 

businesses, cultures, and nation-states or other new state-like 

actors.47 In essence, it will be a period of revolutionary change until 

a new equilibrium is achieved, with the strategic environment now 

teetering on the edge of chaos. It is a period of great opportunity 

and risk for the strategist in any system. In retrospect, the latter Cold 

War period appears to have been relatively stable, with established 

rules for the international strategic environment that orchestrated 

the relationships and interaction among the states and actors—in 

short, an equilibrium.

 Strategy is made difficult by the chaotic and complex nature 

of the strategic environment. It represents a daunting challenge 

for the military profession, but it is this very nature that justifies a 

discipline of strategy—otherwise, planning would suffice. If chaos 

and complexity theory apply, the radical alteration of the strategic 

environment that resulted from the end of the Cold War offers 

even greater opportunities and risks (or threats) as the strategic 

environment reorders itself toward a new and as-yet undefined 

equilibrium in the 21st century. The role of the strategist is even 

more critical in this period as policymakers seek help in ensuring 

that the reshaping of the strategic environment occurs in terms 

favorable to the state. The strategist’s role increases in importance 

as the instability and difficulty increase. Yet the fundamental tasks 
29

remain the same: understand the nature of the strategic environment 

and its various subsystems and construct a strategy that focuses the 

state on its long-term well-being. How well the strategist is able to 

do this depends on his ability to anticipate the interaction within the 

strategic environment and to develop appropriate strategic actions 

to serve national interests.

31

IV. THEORY IN THE REAL WORLD

In theory there is no difference between theory and practice. In practice 

there is.

Yogi Berra

 If strategy is simply the calculation of objectives, concepts, and 

resources within acceptable bounds of risk to create more favorable 

possibilities than might otherwise exist by chance or at the hands 

of others, why do effective strategies so often appear to elude the 

strategist? The answer, of course, is that successful strategy is much 

more complex than the calculation of objectives, concepts, and 

resources. Strategic theory in the real world confronts the dynamic 

nature of the strategic environment and the mind of the strategist—

how strategists approach strategy-making in the context of their 

strategic environments. It also depends on the caliber of the execution 

of the strategy. Good strategy flows from understanding the nature 

of the environment and creating a symmetry and synergy of objectives, 

concepts, and resources that offer the best probability of achieving the 

policy aims. The strategist is assisted by the logic of strategy and 

the construct of planning, but the strategist is not a planner. Good 

strategy development provides for flexibility and adaptability so 

that planning and execution can be tailored to more immediate 

circumstances and respond to unanticipated opportunities and 

constraints. Good strategy remains, however, valid in its focus and 

direction and achieves its intent even when these opportunities 

and constraints are taken into account. This chapter discusses the 

implications of the environment for strategy development, the 

necessary and distinct mindset required of the strategist, and the 

obstacles encountered as the theory of strategy is applied in the real 

world.

Implications of the Strategic Environment.

 Strategists must comprehend the nature of the environment in 

which the strategy they are developing is to be applied—understand 

the kind of world they live in or that will emerge.48 As advanced 

in Part III with the analogies of chaos and complexity theories, 
32

the strategic environment is not totally random, unpredictable, or 

uncontrollable. Rather, the environment exhibits some characteristics 

of both randomness and order. Change may be induced in it by 

design or chance, but, because of its complexity, any change may 

produce results totally out of proportion to the initiating change—

either greater or lesser than anticipated—and thus a degree of 

uncertainty and unpredictability is inherent to its nature. Changes 

come from actors, interactive circumstances, or chance. Actors may 

introduce rational and irrational changes through action or selective 

inaction, or through simple indifference or ignorance. Yet many 

strategists reduce strategy to overly linear and detailed directives 

that do not allow for the flexibility and adaptability to accommodate 

such unpredictability.

 On the other hand, much of the strategic environment is 

deterministic and adheres to certain rules; continuities guide its 

general behavior over time and extend—to varying degrees—into 

periods of major upheaval and new equilibriums. These rules are 

both physical, as is the case with gravity, geography, and weather, 

and incorporeal. Rules of international behavior are an example of 

an incorporeal continuity. When in effect, these rules bound what 

is workable and acceptable within the international environment. 

Continuities may be codified and thus formally acknowledged, or 

may just be accepted practices. In some cases, they exist below the 

awareness level of the actors in the environment. Continuities always 

seek to reassert themselves, but their validity cannot be taken for 

granted. Continuities can be leveraged so that a strategy is assisted by 

the environment’s natural inclinations, thus moving with the flow of 

history. Collective security is arguably a continuity that emerged in 

the 20th century and may be leveraged into the 21st century. On the 

other hand, a particular continuity’s role may not be the same even 

though it still exists. Gravity continued to exist after the invention of 

the airplane, but its effect on warfare changed. Too few strategists 

critically consider the role of continuities in strategy development, 

missing opportunities or making invalid assumptions. For example, 

with the collapse the Soviet Union, many strategists focused on the 

promises of liberal capitalism and globalization and missed the 

implications of the resurgence of the continuities of nationalism and 

religion. Critical examination of continuities and change focuses 
33

the strategist on what needs to change, what continuities can be 

leveraged for the necessary changes, and what should not or cannot 

be changed. All are important!

 Understanding the strategic environment as a system of systems 

is a daunting intellectual challenge. Each system within it has external 

and internal components—and all interrelate to varying degrees. The 

multilayered interaction results in complexity and nonlinearity. The 

chaotic nature of this interaction is difficult to fathom, and it is even 

more difficult to manipulate effectively. Nothing is ever quite what 

it seems and all is subject to greater or lesser changes. It is a world 

of unlimited possibilities and seemingly great promise, tempered 

by competing interests and often unclear or less than desirable 

alternatives. Much appears insidious and Machiavellian or subject to 

nature and chance. Policy is often stated in lofty and ideal terms with 

too little regard for political reality and available resources—leaving 

the strategist without practical goals and adequate resources. All are 

interrelated, often confusing and convoluted, and very complex. A 

strategist must be comfortable in the VUCA environment. Too few 

professional military officers are prepared for this actuality.

 The strategist is immersed in the complexity of the system of 

systems represented by the strategic environment. For example, a U.S. 

strategist assigned to NATO sees it from a national perspective as an 

external component even as he works within NATO to shape the rest 

of the international environment. Within NATO, he is an internal 

part of an organizational actor in the international environment. The 

complexity of relationships and interactions grows exponentially. 

The domestic environment is an internal component of the strategic 

environment relative to any national defense strategy. It consists of 

domestic actors, constituencies, institutions, and organizational roles, 

as well as the physical realities of resources and capabilities. The 

strategist is confronted with the domestic interaction of individuals, 

news media, special interest groups, civilian think tanks, branches of 

government, other departments of the executive branch, and offices 

and sub-organizations within DOD itself. Thus, any strategy is 

subject to interaction and reaction with domestic interests and actors, 

the nuances of interests within the strategist’s own organization, and 

the interests and actors of the international arena. Some domestic 

interests may actually be working at odds with the strategist, trying 
34

to frustrate his efforts for political or other reasons. Too few national 

security professionals are willingly capable of accepting and 

working with this complexity and nonlinearity. Strategy remains in 

the too-hard box, and insufficient time and resources are devoted 

to its consideration. As a result, strategic thinking is often reduced 

to simple assumptions that are often ill-founded, but misleadingly 

seem to allow “strategy” to unfold like good planning. Strategists 

must study and analyze the whole environment and then shape it by 

the design and articulation of strategy.

 Strategy is too critical to be ignored or placed at risk by virtue 

of erroneous assumptions or by relegating it to a planning model. 

Strategic environments may be difficult to analyze, but good 

strategy—which must be based on sound strategic-level analysis—

can shape the environment more positively than chance or lack of 

strategic direction. For as surely as uncertainty characterizes the 

future, the future will nonetheless come: “Strategy abhors a vacuum: 

if the strategic function is lacking, strategic effect will be generated 

by the casual accumulation of tactical and operational outcomes.”49

Carefully crafted strategic initiatives bound future results in 

outcomes more acceptable to policymakers than those offered by 

chance, expediency, or adversaries. As chaos theory suggests, early 

actions can have a disproportionate effect on the overall pattern of 

change in the strategic environment. Strategists, particularly when 

over-focused on immediate demands of decisionmakers, often fail 

to look to the future with sufficient depth of analysis and act too 

late to create positive strategic effects at relatively low costs. Relying 

on expediency and planning methodologies in lieu of proper 

strategic thinking ignores the advantages that accrue from intended 

cumulative effects and increases the costs for and risks to the state’s 

security.

 The strategic environment can be analyzed from different 

perspectives. In this monograph, the reader is asked to consider it from 

the perspective of systems within systems interacting in both linear and 

nonlinear ways. The strategist must understand the systems, but the 

proper focus of strategy is on the dimensions of interaction. Strategy 

has many dimensions, and all are in play to a greater or lesser extent 

at all times. A weakness in considering any one dimension can prove 

fatal to the whole enterprise. Colin Gray suggests that there are 17 
35

or more of these dimensions: people, society, culture, politics, ethics, 

economics and logistics, organization, administration, information 

and intelligence, strategic theory and doctrine, technology, 

operations, command, geography, friction/chance/uncertainty, 

adversary, and time. These must be considered holistically—that 

is, individually—but at the same time in context with the others.50

Some have argued that the transformation of strategy has occurred 

over the last 2,400 years on a more extended and integrated scale. 

They would list the major dimensions as bureaucracy, mass politics, 

ideology, technology and economic power. Here, too, it is recognized 

that the interaction of these affect outcomes exponentially.51 History 

makes clear that particular dimensions play a greater role or are 

more critical at particular times, and that none can be ignored over 

time. Hence, as the Cold War wound down and the new world order 

began to emerge, ideology (communism versus liberal capitalism) 

appeared to wane in importance only to reemerge in the Global War 

On Terror (radical Islam versus secularism). It matters significantly 

what the topic of confrontation or the dimension of competition or 

collaboration is in developing a strategy. An economic issue may 

demand a conceptualization or model of interaction different from 

an ideological one and a different weighting of effort among the 

instruments of power. Just so, any other dimension may be affected, 

and all must be considered in the development of a strategy. As a 

complex system of systems, the strategic environment may evolve 

into new dimensions that must also be considered. Many strategists 

think too little about interaction, the dimensions in which it occurs, 

and the relationships among the dimensions. 

 All strategy is about “the future.” The future is where strategy 

has its effect. In dealing with unknowns and uncertainties, strategy 

forecasts from a knowledge and understanding of the systems of the 

strategic environment—what they are (facts and assumptions) and 

how they interact (observation, reason, and assumptions) within 

the dimensions of strategy. From this understanding, the strategist 

derives the key factors which contribute causally to the achievement 

of policy aims—assisting or precluding success. These factors may be 

tangible or intangible, representing any aspect of the environment. 

The existence of other states and actors, internal and external, is one 

of many factors that must be considered in any strategy development 
36

effort. Factors constitute the key facts, continuities, and emerging 

trends—they are at the point of interaction within the system 

and among systems. In strategic analysis these factors are keys to 

developing an effective strategy, because using or influencing them is 

how policy goals are achieved. The strategist seeks to change, leverage, 

or overcome these, in effect modifying the equilibrium within the 

strategic environment to support policy aims. Balancing continuities 

and emerging trends is the most intellectually challenging task in 

developing strategy—seeking to address one aspect of a complex 

system without inducing unfavorable ripple effects elsewhere in the 

system. The strategist’s analysis of how best to do this is reflected 

in his selection of ends, ways, and means—the rational output of 

strategic thought. Too often in strategy development, insufficient 

analysis is applied to the identification and use of key factors, and as 

a consequence key factors are often overlooked, misidentified, or ill 

addressed.

 Strategy is about thinking big and over time. Strategic thinking 

is not about reductionism, although the strategy eventually will be 

simplified and stated clearly as ends, ways, and means. Strategic 

thinking is about thoroughness and holistic thinking. It seeks to 

understand how the parts interact to form the whole by looking 

at parts and relationships among them—the effects they have on 

one another in the past, present, and anticipated future. It shares 

this perspective with chaos and complexity theories. Articulating 

strategic thinking as ends, ways, and means is only one step in a 

sophisticated intellectual process seeking to create a synthesis 

of consensus, efforts, and circumstances to influence the overall 

environment favorably while managing the risks involved in 

pursuing opportunities or reacting to threats.52 While ends, ways, 

and means get at the essence of the strategy and must flow from 

a strategic perspective, thus collectively creating a strategic effect, 

they do not obviate an explanation of”why,” one of the paramount 

purposes of strategy. A strategy must work on different planes 

and speak to different audiences. In this sense, another purpose of 

strategy development is to explain and forecast in order to generate 

a domestic and foreign consensus in favor of the policy pursued. To 

do this, strategy must have a sense of where the state has been and 

where it is headed. Anything less in regard to the past “is to neglect 
37

the direction in which the historical winds have been blowing. And 

the best grand strategies, like the most efficient navigators, keep 

the winds behind them.”53 Anything less in regard to the future is 

to strike blindly into the dark at nothing, even while asking others 

to follow you into the darkness. Balancing continuities of the past 

and emerging possibilities is essential; a strategy must articulate the 

transition from the past state to the future in a manner that resonates 

with multiple audiences.

 As a result of the complexity of the environment, strategy 

inherently creates a “security dilemma” for other states and 

actors that must be considered. Actions taken or not taken by one 

state or actor always have the potential to affect other states and 

actors, particularly their role in the strategic environment and 

their perception of that role. Any action risks changing the status 

quo for friends and adversaries alike, creating an element of 

instability in the equilibrium and introducing an element of risk 

for all. Because of its chaotic nature, the environment is subject to 

unintended multiordered effects and chance.54 Strategy is never to 

be undertaken lightly and must be approached comprehensively. 

At the state level, according to MacGregor Knox, “Violence, chance, 

and politics; danger and friction; escalatory interaction between 

adversaries, remain the terrain of those who make strategy.”55 The 

stakes are always potentially high! Many strategists too often focus 

on one-dimensional first-order effects, foregoing consideration of 

second- and third-order effects, how a strategy will be perceived 

by others, or the role of chance. In failing to properly consider the 

multidimensional and multiordered effects, strategists increase the 

potential risks.

 Effects in the strategic environment are cumulative, but can 

be accommodated or nullified by interactions within the system, 

counterstrategies, or chance. As a complex system of systems, the 

environment seeks an equilibrium that allows its subsystems to 

coexist. As subsystems, states and actors seek to survive or advance 

in the environment according to what they deem acceptable and the 

system will tolerate. Changes can cancel one another in whole or 

part—although states and actors tend to have long memories, and 

important interests persevere. Once a change becomes part of the 

fabric of the environment, it lingers, influencing the nature of future 
38

change. It then becomes one level of consideration among many for 

future strategies but often reemerges in a different context. Much of 

this activity may appear below the noise level of the strategist, but 

the role of the strategist is to be aware of what and who influence the 

well-being of the state and how. Too few strategists give consideration 

to the role of continuities—what they are, the roles they play, and 

when they are important to strategy.

 As a chaotic, complex system, the strategic environment is 

also time sensitive—timing and rate of change matter. Somewhat 

paradoxically, periods of stability are the best time to contemplate 

bold shifts in strategy and the most difficult time to get a decision to 

do it. The environment is always rebalancing itself at the margins, 

and states apply the nuances of diplomacy and force in a peaceful 

world very carefully. At such times of relative stability, strategy 

rightfully focuses on what the state wants to achieve and then 

considers how the state will accomplish its goals over the long 

term. Yet few decisionmakers are willing to risk disturbances in 

the equilibrium or expend political capital for future gains without 

a clear threat or clarion opportunity, particularly in a democratic 

state. This makes it difficult to advocate strategies to preclude major 

upheavals in the environment. Thus, the governments of France 

and Great Britain appeased Germany during the 1930s instead of 

confronting it. President Franklin D. Roosevelt was able to move 

the United States only incrementally, and relatively insufficiently, 

toward preparedness for World War II. Yet strategy serves the state 

best when it anticipates and leads change. Preemptive or proactive 

strategies—or well-articulated grand strategies—too often are 

ignored by the strategic community as a result of the preference for 

near-term stability and the avoidance of political risk.

 When the strategic equilibrium is disrupted in a major way, in 

chaos theory termed a potential bifurcation, the more numerous, 

rapid, and complex changes require a much more responsive 

strategy. Again, paradoxically, periods of major instability are the 

best time to advocate bold, broad strategies but provide the least time 

for consideration, thus magnifying the risk. Here decisionmakers 

perceive the risks of not changing to be greater than the risks of 

adopting a bold strategy. Thus, Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor opened 

the way for Roosevelt to go to war to defeat Japan and the Axis 
39

Powers. But the Roosevelt administration, in concert with its allies, 

used success in the war to establish a “new world order” defined 

by the establishment of the United Nations and the institutions for 

international finance. In periods of great instability, strategy-making 

is accelerated but can be enhanced by the strategist’s preparation prior 

to the upheaval. The strategist who fully comprehends the nature 

of the environment and its continuities and manifestations during 

periods of stability can leverage this mastery during such periods. 

This leverage could be particularly useful if the instability cannot be 

preempted favorably through proactive strategies. Such mastery also 

allows the clarification of what constitutes well-being and anticipates 

objectives, while fostering familiarity with potential courses of action 

and resource requirements. In the unstable environment, the strategist 

gives great consideration to the multiordered effects of the rate and 

significance of change, and the fact that predictability decreases as 

change increases in rate and scope. This means that change itself is 

magnified in the process and must be managed carefully. In these 

circumstances, the strategist must compete on the edge, creating a 

relentless flow of competitive advantages that collectively move the 

state forward in the preferred strategic direction. The demands upon 

the strategist and strategy differ from those of a stable environment in 

that they are now confronting less clear boundaries, less predictable 

adversaries and allies, a more VUCA-like future, less time in which 

to develop strategy, or various combinations of these factors. In 

such an environment, the strategist anticipates whenever possible, 

reacts when necessary, and leads when circumstances are right.56

Strategists must prepare themselves in times of stability for periods 

of instability by mastering knowledge and understanding of the 

many subsystems and their interactions, as well as the whole of the 

strategic environment.

 The strategic environment readily compares to a chaotic, 

complex system. To be successful, the strategist and senior military 

professionals must understand its nature and implications for the 

development of good strategies that advance and protect the interests 

of the state. It requires that the professional maintain a level of interest 

and knowledge in the past, the present, and the future, and immerse 

himself in the continued study of the strategic environment.
40

The Strategist’s Mindset.

 Strategic thinking is both an art and science and an essential 

element of military professionalism. True strategic genius is able to 

comprehend the nature of the strategic environment, especially its 

complexity and multiordered interactions, and derive rational ends, 

ways, and means that solicit consensus and create strategic effects 

leading to the desired end state. Not all senior military officers can 

aspire to reach the apex of strategic skill, but all senior leaders should 

be able to evaluate and execute a coherent and relevant strategy. 

In this regard, a proper understanding of the strategist’s mindset 

further helps the professional, genius or not, to assess his role and 

responsibilities in regard to strategy. Leadership can delegate the 

strategy formulation function to strategic genius if it is present and 

can be recognized, but the leader retains responsibility for the quality 

of both the strategy and its execution.

 Strategy is essentially a human enterprise, with all of humanity’s 

genius, frailties, and shortcomings. It is both an individual and 

collective undertaking that bears fruit from its successful anticipation 

of requirements and effects and the successful execution of its 

methodology. The strategist and the implementers of strategy are 

actors pitted against other actors—including other strategists, 

circumstance, and chance in the chaotic and complex strategic 

environment. History is replete with examples of people making 

irrational, as opposed to rational, decisions, and wrong rational 

decisions based on inaccurate information and assumptions. 

Study can help gain insight into human behavior, but simplicity, 

stability, and universality do not apply to human behavior, even 

as assumptions about human behavior help us deal with it.57 As a 

human enterprise, every aspect of strategy is subject to exception, 

and the strategist must be open to this reality. This reality applies 

to all participant allies and their enemies, and even to onlookers, 

whether they be strategist, leader, or executor.

 Ideology and culture are powerful influences on the shaping 

of strategy and strategic success. Both influence the making and 

execution of strategy in multiple ways. Human participants in 

strategy all wear a set of analytical blinders composed of their 

ideological and cultural assumptions and preferences regarding 
41

the strategic environment and how to shape it. These blinders are 

a potential weakness for exploitation by our adversaries and other 

actors when we wear them, but opportunities for exploitation by us 

when they are worn by others.58 The strategist’s frame of reference 

affects how he sees the world and how he advocates interacting 

within it. These human preferences influence how strategy is 

constructed and executed. For example, strategists looking at the 

world from the perspective of realism, liberalism, or constructivism 

will have divergent worldviews and will likely arrive at different 

strategic approaches.59 Strategists are both aided and limited by these 

constructs. Such constructs discipline thinking but also potentially 

limit consideration of alternatives.

 Ideology and culture not only shape the expectations and goals 

of those who formulate and approve strategy but the ferocity and 

stamina of those who execute it. In addition, ideology and culture 

influence national popular support and global acceptance of the 

legitimacy of a national strategy.60 Consequently, the strategist 

must consider the cultural and ideological perspectives of strategy 

internally and externally, as well as personally. Internally, there 

are preferences that garner and sustain acceptability and support, 

and externally there are differences based on nationality, ideology, 

religion, and culture that must be considered in the development 

and execution of strategy. One needs to look no further than the 

American experience in Vietnam to illustrate this. Once the war 

was publicly reframed into a nationalist struggle for Vietnamese 

unity, both domestic and foreign support waned. For Americans, 

sustainment of a nonrepresentative South Vietnamese government 

no longer justified the costs in lives on both sides. The strategist must 

know what motivates him and others, and what meets the criteria of 

both internal and external acceptability. Strategy founded on false 

constructs or beliefs, or on inconsistency with acceptability criteria 

at home or abroad, is at greater risk. 

 Strategy must be consistent with national values and acceptable 

to international norms. For the United States, this can be particularly 

problematic. U.S. liberal culture (free markets, equal opportunity, 

free elections, liberal democracy, constitutionalism, rule of law, 

and individualism) fundamentally clashes with that of many other 

societies. Cultural conflicts about faith and identity are reflected 
42

at the individual and societal levels. As the universal nation, the 

modern United States has a distinct culture that does not include to 

the same degree the elements of hierarchy, community, tradition, and 

custom so evident in older, more stratified societies. Consequently, 

U.S. strategy is prone to clash with the elites and populations of 

non-Western cultures and to differ on specific issues even with 

traditional Europe.61 Historical experience and outlook differ by 

nationality and culture, with these differences often posing issues 

for strategy formulation and execution. It does not follow, however, 

that the United States must change these elements in other societies; 

they need only to be recognized and accommodated by strategy. 

Legitimacy, morality, and cultural appreciation are keys to longterm effective strategy because they address the human dimension 

of interaction within the strategic environment. Expediency in regard 

to them may produce short-term gains but risks alienating too many 

other actors. In the end, we must learn to see ourselves, our allies, 

our adversaries, and others as an integral part of strategy.62 We must 

understand that “strategy is as much about psychology as it is facts 

on the ground.”63 Above all, strategy is about seeing the complexity 

and long-term possibilities inherent in the strategic circumstances.

As a minimum they [strategists] must see clearly both themselves and 

potential adversaries, their strengths, weaknesses, preconceptions, and 

limits—through humility, relentless and historically informed critical 

analysis, and restless dissatisfaction even in victory. They must weigh 

imponderables through structured debates that pare away personal, 

organizational, and national illusions and conceits. They must squarely 

address issues that are bureaucratic orphans. They must unerringly 

discern and prepare to strike the enemy jugular—whether by surprise 

attack or attrition, in war or in political and economic struggle. And 

in the end, makers of strategy must cheerfully face the uncertainties of 

decision and the dangers of action.64

 Strategists must swim in complexity to understand the strategic 

environment and be open to all its possibilities, while planners seek 

to simplify and clarify so that they can act directly.65 These distinct 

roles call for two different thought processes, but Westerners, with 

their unitary outlooks, are culturally at a disadvantage in perceiving 

possibilities from the strategic realm, marked by complexity and 

ambiguity. Western thinking is primarily scientific or Newtonian. 
43

To get the rationality of western logic, the reality of the world is 

expressed in either or terms—it is assumed to be either black or white. 

The strategic environment is much less objective than Western logic 

portrays it, often containing more gray than black and white. Good 

strategists have always recognized this ambiguity and how to think 

about it. It is only recently that a discipline of so-called “fuzzy logic” 

has emerged to describe the greater complexity and corresponding 

openness in thinking required of the strategic environment. Fuzzy 

logic or “fuzzy thinking,” however poorly named, helps illuminate 

the realities of the strategic environment because it provides 

allowance for degree, probability, and ambiguity in the formulation 

of objectives and concepts.

 The science of fuzzy logic is an attempt to contrast reality with 

the binary logic inherent to Western scientific thought. Binary logic 

is rooted in Aristotle’s philosophical law that something is either A 

or “not A.” It cannot be A and “not A.” It is either true or false. Thus 

in Western science, math, logic, and much of culture, we assume a 

world of blacks and whites that does not change—this is bivalent 

logic—two-valuedness. This assumption permeates Western 

thinking. For example, you are either with us or against us. Every 

statement is either true or false; it has a truth value of 1 or 0. Thus if 

you are asked if a number is a 1 or a 0, it is clearly one or the other. In 

reality, the world is very much gray. If you are asked if 0.4 is a 1 or a 

0, in Western bivalent thinking you must decide which it is and act 

accordingly. In reality it is more than a 0 and less than a 1, something 

in between, or gray. Hence, fuzzy logic argues that everything is a 

matter of degree or multivalence—with three or more options or an 

infinite spectrum of options instead of the two extremes of true or 

false. Fuzzy logic advocates argue that, for the sake of simplicity, 

our culture traded off accuracy—the way the world is in reality—

for a black or white answer. Western scientific thought is limited or 

hindered by this bivalent logic. As shown by recent developments, 

“fuzzy thinking” better reflects reality in both math and science. New 

“smarter” appliances, computers, and other products are already in 

the marketplace as a result of the application of this science.66

 Fuzzy logic also has application in strategy, but scientific 

or Newtonian thought dominates most Western thought. As a 

result, military planners tend to seek certainty in their planning 
44

processes—direct cause and effect—even at the expense of accuracy 

or reality. In the sense that executors of strategy need to work from 

facts and concrete assumptions about cause and effect to coordinate 

and implement their activities, this practice serves organizational 

planning needs well. But such Newtonian thinking at the strategic 

levels distorts reality and obscures the actual complexity, leading to 

faulty assumptions and hiding potential issues and options. Strategic 

thinking is better served by openness to possibilities rather than a 

constrained perspective.

 Again, Clausewitz recognized the difference in reality and 

planning with his concept of friction. He cautions that: “The good 

general must know friction in order to overcome it whenever 

possible, and in order not to expect a standard of achievement in 

his operations which this very friction makes impossible.”67 Friction 

results from what cannot be known, what changes from what you 

knew, and all those glitches that can beset an operation—the reality 

of war. Friction at the operational and tactical levels is mitigated by 

proper planning and appropriate anticipation and reaction—branches 

and sequels to the plan. In essence, the good general creates a black 

and white reality by attempting to account for everything possible 

in the planning process. Since friction affects the enemy army as 

well as one’s own, the commander who creates reality best is at an 

advantage in overcoming friction and winning the engagement.68 At 

the strategic level, the degree of uncertainty and complexity is much 

greater because of the scope of time and nature of the environment. 

The future cannot be predicted with sufficient precision because 

the “frictions” are too great to plan for successfully. Good strategy 

is designed to accommodate, deter, and seek advantages in the 

realities of degree, probability, and ambiguity—all incident to a 

complex chaotic system. It accommodates and uses friction. Fuzzy 

logic helps to explain the ambiguity and uncertainty observed at this 

level—revealing more of the possibilities to the strategist, while at 

the same time qualifying expectations. The future is shaped from the 

structuring of these “possibilities” and expectations into a coherent 

strategy, expressed as ends, ways, and means, leading to a better end 

state.

 Since strategy can be formulated at different levels, the strategist 

should be clear in regard to the level at which he is working even 
45

as he remains holistic in his outlook. At the national level, strategy 

is concerned with maintaining internal systems in balance with one 

another, while creating effects in the external environment that favor 

the state over time. When it focuses on lower levels or specific issues, 

strategy is really a case of particular generalization—what strategic 

effect is required to what purpose and how does it affect the whole 

of the environment. On the other hand, strategy at any level is not 

problem-solving in a classic sense. It does not seek to solve a specific 

problem as much as to anticipate a future and shape an environment 

in which fewer problems arise and those that do can be resolved in 

favorable terms. Causation in strategy is contingent, not categorical. 

Context always matters. Ultimately the success of strategic effects 

depends on what the adversary and others choose to do and on 

what reality turns out to be. Hence strategists must cultivate a weblike sense of reality, seeing everything as connected in some way 

to everything else and being open to all possibilities. The strategist 

provides direction that is consistent with the past as it bridges to 

the future.69 In this process, strategy must be inherently flexible as 

it anticipates the future. Thus, strategy is always seeking a balance 

between specificity and flexibility in establishing boundaries for 

planning. Strategy does not dictate the future, but it does anticipate it 

and seeks to shape it in favorable terms at whatever level it functions, 

maintaining an appropriate degree of adaptability and flexibility.

 The true purpose of strategy is to create favorable effects in 

support of policy goals for the advancement or protection of national 

interests. Strategic effects are the impact that the accomplishment of 

strategic objectives has on the environment. Effect flows from strategic 

performance—the synergy of the objective(s) achieved, the concept(s) 

employed, and the resources used. Thus, strategic performance is 

the measure of the quality of actions actually executed to achieve 

the policy aims.70 Effects occur on different levels and from different 

causes within the environment. Effects must be comprehended in 

at least three dimensions. First, good strategy deliberately seeks 

to create multiple-order effects—a chain of effects that culminates 

in strategic-level success. Such intended first-, second-, and thirdorder effects, etc. are a rational product of the strategist’s analysis, 

with the purpose of stimulating and influencing interaction or 

conditions within the environment in favor of the policy aims. 
When a strategic concept is implemented to achieve an ob

produces an intended reaction from the adversary or a dir

within the environment—a first-order effect is created. 

strategist has foreseen and sought multiordered effects as 

the concept in action, he has deliberately created cascadin

intended second- and third-order effects. On the othe

different dimension of effects occurs when the strategist fa

comprehend the consequences of his choices, with th

creating unanticipated consequences in the environmen

dimension of effects that must be considered is the inter

chance or adversaries and others in reacting to the eff

original strategy. The good strategist seeks to understan

dimensions of effects and to capitalize on or compensate f

his strategy. Thus, he prepares for those effects he fo

maintains a degree of adaptability and flexibility for those 

foresee. Fuzzy “thinking” helps the strategist to unde

possible manifestations of effects by revealing the shades o

strategic effects

strategic effects

strategic effects

strateg

ci effects

strateg

ci effects

Strategic Environment

Ends

Ways Means

National Interest

National Policy

Strategy

Chance

Adversaries & 

Figure 4. 

46 
47

 Ultimately the role of the strategist is to evaluate the complex 

and evolving environment and translate policy goals into terms 

from which planning can proceed. Strategic thinking must see the 

environment as it actually is, identify the factors that favor or hinder 

the policy aims, and anticipate the possibilities for achievement 

of policy goals. The strategist is concerned with facts, factors, and 

assumptions in this process. Each must be right. Facts are reality as 

it is—the grayness of fuzzy thinking as opposed to invariable black 

and white. Factors are facts that affect policy aims. Assumptions 

bridge the unknown. Through the formulation of appropriate ends, 

ways, and means to manipulate the factors and take advantage of 

the possibilities, the strategist creates favorable effects on behalf 

of policy goals. Openness and recognition of personal biases and 

preferences move the strategist closer to a proper assessment of 

reality. This assessment tempered by an appreciation of chance and 

others’ ideological and cultural biases and preferences—in light of 

interests and policy goals—defines the effects desired. A proper 

mindset on the part of the strategist is critical to the development of 

good strategy.

Strategy is Not Planning.

 Military professionals come from a world of very adept planners; 

they learn planning methodologies from the day they enter service. 

Strategy is not planning. As described above, it partakes of a different 

mindset. Planning makes strategy actionable. It relies on a high 

degree of certainty—a world that is concrete and can be addressed 

in explicit terms. In essence, it takes a gray world and makes it black 

and white through its analysis of the facts and assumptions about the 

unknown. Planning is essentially linear and deterministic, focusing 

heavily on first-order cause and effect. It assumes that the future 

results can be precisely known if enough is known about the facts 

and the conditions affecting the undertaking. The planning process 

is essential to reduce uncertainty at the tactical level—it allows 

detailed actions to be prescribed. In reality, uncertainty can never 

quite be achieved even at that level, and it increases exponentially as 

we ascend from the tactical to the operational to the strategic level. 

The planning process works because the lower the level, the more 
48

limited the scope and complexity, and the shorter the timeline; hence, 

the number of unknowns is limited and can be compensated for in 

branches and sequels to create “certainty.” Planning is not strategy. 

It is essential for the successful execution of a strategy—making 

strategy actionable, but requires a different mindset. The military 

professional is trained for the certainty of planning throughout his 

career, but must be educated for uncertainty as he enters the strategic 

realm.

 The strategist must understand the difference between strategy 

and planning in order to produce good strategy. The planner must 

understand the difference between planning and strategy in order 

to execute strategy successfully. Planning bridges the gap between 

strategy and execution. The purpose of planning is to create certainty 

so that people and organizations can act. The purpose of strategy 

formulation is to clarify, influence, manage, or resolve the VUCA 

of the strategic environment through the identification and creation 

of strategic effects in support of policy goals. Strategy lays down 

what is important and to be achieved, sets the parameters for the 

necessary actions, and prescribes what the state is willing to allocate 

in terms of resources. Thus, strategy, through its hierarchal nature, 

identifies the objectives to be achieved and defines the box in which 

detailed planning can be accomplished—it bounds planning. Within 

that box, planning adapts strategy to a concrete world with facts, 

figures, and interrelated and sequenced actions calculated to achieve 

the strategy’s objectives. The planner is Newtonian or scientific in his 

approach; the strategist is more “fuzzy.” Both share the paradigm 

of ends, ways, and means. Too many military professionals confuse 

strategy and planning. As a consequence, planning-level thinking is 

often applied in the strategy development process or when planning 

objectives and concepts are elevated to the strategic level. When this 

occurs, even though the plan may be successful, the resulting strategic 

effects fail to adequately support, or are actually counterproductive 

to, the stated policy goals or other interests.

Development of Strategic Objectives.

 In strategy formulation, getting the objectives (ends) right 

matters most! Too often in strategy development, too little time is 
49

spent on consideration of the appropriate objectives in the context 

of the desired policy, national interests, and the environment. Yet 

it is the identification and achievement of the right objectives that 

creates the desired strategic effect. Objectives are the true focus of 

strategy formulation and, if not properly selected and articulated, a 

proposed strategy is fundamentally flawed and cannot be effective. 

If the wrong objectives are identified, the concepts and resources 

serve no strategic purpose. Thus, the logic of strategy argues that 

objectives are primary even though concepts and resources are also 

crucial to success—action and costs are subordinate to purpose in 

strategy. Yet in strategy formulation, efficiency is often confused 

with effectiveness by both strategists and leadership. Strategy must 

reflect a preference for effectiveness. In this regard, objectives are 

concerned with doing the right things. Concepts are concerned with 

doing things right. Resources are concerned with costs. Objectives 

determine effectiveness; concepts and resources are measures of 

efficiency. A lack of efficiency increases the cost of success, but a lack 

of effectiveness precludes success. Ultimately, strategy’s success can 

be measured only in terms of the degree to which its objectives are 

accomplished. Thus, again, efficiency is subordinate to effectiveness.71

At the point where constraints on concepts or resources risk 

achievement of the objectives, the strategy is in question.

 For the nation-state, strategy and strategic objectives are derived 

from the policy consideration of protecting or advancing national 

interests within the context of the strategic environment as it is, and 

as it may become. In the past, security policy largely has focused on 

the international strategic environment in regard to national security 

needs—the external strategic environment. The domestic strategic 

environment, the internal component, was less identified with 

national security concerns. “Globalization” and its derivatives, such 

as an integrated world economy and the Global War On Terror, have 

forced a general acceptance that the concept of internal and external 

strategic environments is less distinct than in the past. Within the 

United States, such realization has subordinated national security 

strategy to a larger grand strategy concerned with both domestic 

and international issues in many current theorists’ thinking. In either 

case, strategy is driven by national interests at the state level, and the 
50

strategist must consider both the external and internal components of 

the strategic environment in the development of strategy.

 Donald E. Nuechterlein, in America Overcommitted: United States 

National Interests in the 1980’s, describes national interests as the perceived 

needs and desires of a sovereign state in relation to other sovereign 

states which constitute its external environment.72 The DoD Dictionary 

of Military Terms defines national security interests as “the foundation 

for the development of valid national objectives that define U.S. 

goals or purposes. National security interests include preserving U.S. 

political identity, framework, and institutions; fostering economic 

well-being; and bolstering international order supporting the vital 

interests of the United States and its allies.”73 The nature of the 

strategic environment, as developed in this monograph, suggests a 

more generalized definition, such as “the perceived needs and desires 

of a sovereign state in relation to other sovereign states and actors in 

the emerging strategic environment expressed as desired end states.” 

This broader definition encapsulates the dynamism of a strategic 

environment in which multiple actors, chance, and interaction play 

a role, and both external and internal components are recognized. 

Interests are expressed as general or particular desired end states 

or conditions. “U.S. economic well-being” would be a generalized 

interest; “international access to Middle Eastern oil” illustrates a more 

particular economic interest. Interests may change over time, although 

general interests such as free trade and defense of the homeland are 

immutable.

 At the highest level, political leadership uses policy to articulate 

state interests and guidance in achieving them. Policy provides 

guidance for strategy. Such guidance may be quite general, as in a 

vision statement that relates interests to the strategic environment, 

or a more specific statement of guidance containing elements of 

ends, ways, and means. It is found in various documents, speeches, 

policy statements, and other pronouncements made on behalf of the 

government by various officials or provided by leadership as direct 

guidance for the development of strategy. Policy may be implied as 

well as stated. It may be the result of a detailed strategic appraisal 

or arrived at intuitively. The strategist must understand national 

interests and policy in order to formulate appropriate strategy. Given 

the complexity of the strategic environment, the strategist must 
51

be holistic in his deliberations and apprise the policymaker of the 

interaction and any conflict between a particular policy and larger 

interests or policies. Lower-level leaders may state more definitive 

guidance as policy, but such policy is subordinate to higher-level 

policy and strategy. Strategists at lower organizational levels must 

have a comprehensive grasp of interests, higher policy and strategy, 

and their own guidance in order to formulate subordinate strategies. 

In all cases, strategy is subordinate to policy and hierarchical in 

application. Nonetheless, the strategy development process by its 

nature evaluates the appropriateness, practicality, and consequences 

of policy, and thus informs policy of the art of the possible and the 

costs and benefits of achievement or failure.

 Military subordination to civilian policymakers is a recurring and 

sensitive issue in civil-military relations within the United States. The 

political leadership and the American people expect their military 

to execute the guidance provided by elected officials faithfully. 

Yet, the American people also demand that their military perform 

professionally and win the nation’s wars. Civil-military relations are 

not an exclusively American issue. Clausewitz provided a proper 

perspective on the relationship of the military and policy in On War: 

“The assertion that a major military development or the plan for one, 

should be a matter of purely military opinion is unacceptable and can 

be damaging. Nor indeed is it sensible to summon soldiers, as many 

governments do when they are planning for a war, and ask them 

for purely military advice.”74 Policy provides guidance for objectives 

and use of the instruments of power, but the strategy formulation 

process logically informs policy. In a democratic society, the military 

professional must build a relationship with civilian leadership that 

facilitates the essential two-way communication between policy and 

strategy. If policy misguides, asks the improbable, or unnecessarily 

confines strategy, the level of risk associated with the strategy rises.

 In the world of the military strategist, strategy can be demanded 

even when inadequate or no policy guidance has been provided. In 

such a case, the strategist’s responsibility is to seek policy clarification 

from leadership. Often this is best done by recommending alternative 

policy choices based on an analysis of interests in relation to strategic 

circumstances—a necessary analysis for strategy formulation also. 

The distinction is that the policy alternatives are derived directly from 
52

the interests. Both policy and strategy should be consistent with the 

protection or advancement of overall state interests in the strategic 

environment. It is the responsibility of the strategist to identify all 

the viable alternatives. 

 Strategy seeks to protect or advance a particular interest, or 

the general interest, of the state within the strategic environment 

relative to other actors, circumstances, and chance in accordance 

with guidance provided by policy. In doing this, strategy uses 

analysis to determine the relevant factors—facts, issues, threats, and 

opportunities—that act or interact to affect the interest. Strategy seeks 

to act on or use these factors to influence the strategic environment 

favorably without inadvertently creating other unfavorable 

circumstances within the environment. These factors are the primary 

focus of strategy; their relationship to the interest and policy 

guidance leads to appropriate objectives and concepts—what is to 

be accomplished and how to use the state’s instruments of power 

to accomplish the objectives. Instruments of power may be used 

singularly or in combination, and directly or indirectly. Given the 

complex and chaotic nature of the environment, defining the right 

objectives for desired strategic effect, developing a proper concept, 

and providing resources are all formidable tasks.

 Since strategy is hierarchical, the strategist must understand the 

level of strategy at which he is working, the nature of the strategic 

environment at his level in regard to internal and external factors, and 

the comprehensiveness of strategy—the consequences of his choices in 

regard to other levels of strategy. With this in mind, the strategist can 

develop objectives. Strategic objectives may be derived from policy, 

higher levels of strategy, or independent analysis of the strategic 

environment. The primary question in determining objectives is this: 

What end(s), if accomplished, will create the desired strategic effect in 

support of policy or interests without detrimental collateral effects? 

Objectives (ends) explain “what” is to be accomplished. They flow 

from a consideration of the interest, which is expressed as a desired 

end state, and the factors in the strategic environment affecting the 

realization of this desired end state. Objectives are bounded by policy 

guidance, higher strategy, the nature of the strategic environment, and 

the capabilities and limitations of the instruments of power available. 

Objectives are selected to create strategic effect. Strategic objectives, if 
53

accomplished, create or contribute to creation of strategic effects that 

lead to the achievement of the desired end state at the corresponding 

level of strategy, ultimately serving national interests. In strategy, 

objectives are expressed with explicit verbs (e.g., deter war, promote 

regional stability, destroy Iraqi armed forces). Explicit verbs force 

the strategist to consider and qualify what is to be accomplished and 

help establish the parameters for the use of power.

A number of problems plague the strategic community in regard 

to the development of objectives. Objectives too seldom receive the 

depth of thought and reflection they merit. The objectives establish 

the parameters of all that follows. Objectives must reflect a thorough 

understanding of the end state desired, the nature of the environment, 

policy guidance, and the multiordered effects required to create the 

conditions for the end state. The diversity of outcomes possible in 

the environment means that the totality of specific results rarely can 

be predicted at the outset.75 Strategy, as a matter of principle, must 

be flexible and adaptable. Thus, strategy cannot be made static by 

objectives that are too confining. In its formulation, it must focus 

on “comprehensive” objectives that reflect an understanding of the 

dynamic nature of the strategic environment and are sufficiently 

encompassing to allow for change in execution without losing focus 

on policy or interests. On the other hand, objectives so broad or 

vague that they can be misinterpreted or fail to provide appropriate 

direction risk the success of policy. Strategic objectives logically 

bound but do not unnecessarily confine subordinate levels.

 Strategic objectives maintain their validity, while providing 

for adaptability and flexibility, by focusing on root purposes and 

causes. If objectives are set at the strategic level with a focus on 

root purposes and causes and an appreciation of the nature of the 

strategic environment (chaos, complexity, human nature, chance, 

friction, etc.), they are logically of sufficient breadth to provide the 

necessary adaptability and flexibility to confront the unforeseen. 

In turn, they also logically broaden the scope of consideration 

for ways and means—further enhancing the preconsideration of 

adaptability. Most strategists make the objectives too narrow and 

precise, pushing their thinking down to the planning level. At the 

planning level, exactness of detail is more valued because it can be 

quantified and made actionable. Such detail works in the planning 
54

realm because of the reduced scope and greater certainty. Planninglevel objectives elevated to the strategic level are more susceptible 

to failure as a result of the scope and chaotic nature of the strategic 

environment, which exponentially multiplies possibilities for 

friction and asymmetric reactions by others. In strategy, the focus 

is on clarity of objectives appropriate for the level, not prescribing 

detailed instructions for lower levels. Strategic objectives directly 

serve the strategic purpose—the desired end state.

 Simply put, if the strategic objective is to win the war, then 

losing a battle is regrettable but does not necessarily preclude 

achievement of the strategic objective. The state can seek additional 

battles or apply other instruments of power. On the other hand, if 

the objective is to win every battle, then the state has been denied 

its strategic objective as soon as a single battle is lost. The strategy 

has failed, producing different repercussions in the internal and 

external components of the strategic environment, even if the war 

is ultimately won. The “win-every-battle” strategy also has confined 

its use of power to the military instrument. In modern war, winning 

battles is a planning objective; winning wars is a strategic objective. 

Strategy focuses on root purposes and causes. To do otherwise is 

to divert focus and power, lessening probabilities for success and 

increasing the probability of unintended second- and third-order 

effects. This eventuality appears evident in the U.S. national-level 

strategic approach in the second Iraq War.

 While the Bush administration has been somewhat ambiguous 

on root purposes in the second Iraq War, one expressed root purpose 

in going to war with Iraq was to effect a regime change in Baghdad 

so that international terrorists would be denied state sponsorship 

and potential weapons of mass destruction. A number of “strategic” 

objectives emerged from this purpose: (1) defeat Iraqi military forces in 

war, (2) remove Saddam Hussein from power, and (3) establish a new 

democratic Iraqi regime. One could postulate that the first objective, 

defeat Iraqi military forces, was inappropriate as a national securitylevel objective and should have been subordinated by locating it at 

the theater-military level. In practice, these objectives were sought 

sequentially. Through its elevation and sequential expression, the 

defeat of Iraq military forces became the focal point of the strategy 

when, in fact, the key objective and point of focus should have been 
55

the establishment of a new democratic regime, with the military 

defeat of Iraqi forces and the removal of Saddam Hussein expressed 

as acceptable strategic outcomes in guiding subordinate levels.

 As a consequence of this misdirected focus, the military objective 

occupied the time and talent of the policymakers and national-level 

military leadership with consequent neglect of the third objective. 

While this proposition is debatable, it is clear that the presumption 

of the strategy was that the defeat of the Iraqi military would lead 

directly to accomplishment of the other objectives. In actual fact, 

more thought and a more intense focus and effort on how to achieve 

the democratic regime objective was needed. The inappropriate 

elevation of the objective and the sequencing also illustrate the 

mindset that inflicting military defeat is essential to the achievement 

of the other two objectives. Again, this may or may not have been 

true, but the point is that defeat of the Iraq military forces was an 

appropriate focus for a lower level of strategy or planning. The closer 

you approach planning, the easier the conceptualization becomes—

it quantifies and can be made more precise. People prefer certainty 

and migrate toward it—it is more comfortable. Strategy deals with 

ambiguity and uncertainty. Most people are uncomfortable with these 

and seek to move toward the known at the expense of improperly 

analyzing and thus jeopardizing the recognition and achievement of 

the proper objectives. 

Developing Strategic Concepts.

Strategic concepts (ways) explain “how” the objectives are to be 

accomplished by the employment of the instruments of power. 

Instruments of power are the manifestation of the elements of power 

(the state’s resources) in action. Thus a naval blockade might be the 

instrument to apply the economic and military elements of power. 

Strategic concepts link resources to the objectives by addressing who 

does what, where, when, and why to explain how an objective will 

be achieved. Since concepts convey action, they often employ verbs 

in their construction, but are descriptions of “how” the objective 

of a strategy is to be accomplished. However, the verb choice is 

important, as is word choice throughout the articulation of strategy. 

Word choices imply levels of effort and degrees of acceptability. 
56

Strategic concepts provide direction and boundaries for subordinate 

strategies and planning—words matter! A strategic concept must 

be explicit enough to provide planning guidance to those selected 

to implement and resource it, but not so detailed as to eliminate 

creativity and initiative at subordinate strategy and planning levels. 

Logically, concepts become more specific at lower levels as details 

are pushed down to the subordinate strategic and planning levels, 

but the complexity of the strategic environment is resolved at the 

responsible strategic level. 

 Strategic concepts are often the central focus of a strategy. Some 

would label the concept as the strategy, but strategy always consists 

of ends, ways, and means—and the focus is on how they interact 

synergistically with the strategic environment to produce the desired 

effects. Some concepts are so accepted that their names have been 

given to specific strategies. Containment, forward defense, assured 

destruction, and forward presence are illustrative. In actual practice, 

these strategies had specific objectives and resources associated 

with them, and the concept was better developed than the short 

title might imply. Good strategy is an integral whole of the right 

objectives pursued through appropriate concepts and supported 

with the necessary resources. Wrong objectives supported by brilliant 

concepts will not protect or advance national interests.

 Concept development can be understood best as a competitive 

enterprise. Good ideas and capabilities compete for consideration and 

adoption and/or adaptation and inclusion. More than at the tactical, 

or even the operational, level, strategic success comes from diversity 

of thought and approaches that leads to a full consideration of the 

complexity involved and development of simple but comprehensive 

concepts that ensure accomplishment of the objectives. Few strategic 

objectives are accomplished with only one element or instrument of 

power, and strategy must consider, prioritize, and assign dominant 

and subordinate roles to the elements and instruments of power 

in the concepts and resources based on the environment and the 

objectives. Our earlier examination of the nature of the environment 

suggests how problematic this can be for the strategist in light of 

linear, nonlinear, and stochastic behavior. Given the nature of the 

environment, “how” you seek to accomplish an objective will itself 

produce interaction within the environment. Part of the complexity 
57

is that an inappropriate instrument or a faulty application may well 

produce undesired second- and third-order effects. It is entirely 

possible to achieve a specified strategic objective but have the positive 

results sought subverted in the long run by the negative effect of the 

methods used. For example, the German military strategy in 1914 

required that France be defeated rapidly first in order to preclude a 

prolonged two-front war. In order to accomplish the defeat of France, 

the German Army’s strategic concept called for the army to invade 

through Belgium. However, Belgium’s neutrality was guaranteed 

by treaty, and the British leadership honored its commitment. 

Implementation of the German strategic concept thus led to Great 

Britain’s entry into the war, which in turn precluded a rapid defeat 

of France and eventually led to the entry of the United States. The 

United States provided the resources to defeat Germany. 

 The strategist must actively seek and consider diverse and multiple 

concepts for the achievement of strategy’s objectives. A thorough 

examination of multiple strategic concepts allows the strategist to 

avoid concepts entailing the most egregious undesirable secondand third-order effects, or to develop appropriate ways to mitigate 

them. It allows for the selection of the concept that best meets the 

criteria of suitability, acceptability, and affordability. Examination 

of all strategic concepts has the additional advantage of allowing 

the strategist to consider flexibility and adaptability in the selection 

of an appropriate concept. Moreover, if a concept employed is not 

successful, the effort devoted to considering multiple approaches 

allows for the quicker shift to a new concept—so that national 

efforts can be more rapidly redirected toward accomplishment of 

the objective. Good strategy is about examining all viable concepts.

 One area of particular confusion associated with concepts results 

from the hierarchical nature of strategy. The concept for a higher 

strategy often states or implies the objectives of subordinate levels of 

strategy or planning as part of the “how” of achieving the strategic 

objective. Strategists or others often want to elevate these to an 

objective for the higher strategy. Such elevation is inappropriate as 

discussed earlier. It appears to add precision but actually detracts 

from the focus of what is most important to achieve. A simple test 

for distinguishing whether such an objective is part of the concept 
58

is to ask “in order to do what?” The answer to this question should 

lead directly back to the appropriate strategic objective. What you 

need to accomplish as an end when you ask this question is the real 

strategic objective. At the same time, a higher-level objective may 

transfer directly to the lower level, or the higher strategic concept 

may establish objectives for lower levels. Both the higher-level 

objective and concept may create implied objectives for the lower 

levels. In a hierarchical strategic system, higher strategy dictates to 

lower levels of strategy plus planning in objectives, concepts, and 

resources; lower levels inform higher but are subordinate to higher 

strategy.

 Another alluring trap for the strategist and leadership is strategic 

monism, the belief that one strategic concept fits all situations.76

History is replete with overzealous advocates of such strategic 

singularity. Usually the appeal appears to lie in its directness, 

application of technology, and appearance of efficiency—cheaper, 

quicker, and less complex. Nuclear deterrence was a strategic 

concept initially embraced by the United States following World 

War II in large part as a substitute for conventional forces. Yet when 

conflicts emerged, such as the Korean War, use of nuclear weapons 

was barred on policy grounds, and conventional military forces 

were required—a failure of the strategist to see the environment as 

it really existed. The initial strategic monism of nuclear deterrence 

left the United States without an appropriate military instrument 

to support policy short of nuclear war until the adoption by the 

Kennedy administration of a strategy of flexible response.77 The 

precision strike argument, a modern version of strategic bombing, 

is a potential contemporary military example of strategic monism. It 

substitutes technology for manpower, reduces casualties, and seeks 

to force the adversary to concede with limited collateral damage. It 

is a powerful capability, and may be an essential one, but it is not a 

singular solution to military strategy. Technology does not change 

the essence of war, or even the cruel face of it in all circumstances. 

Technology is an enabler at the strategic level, not a substitute for 

a strategic concept.78 But technology often outruns political and 

strategic maturity, creating strategic conditions or consequences that 

neither are prepared to deal with appropriately.79 The strategist thus 

must avoid strategic monism.
59

 Strategic monism can occur on a grander scale. Strategic flexibility 

and adaptability at the highest levels are relative to the ability of the 

state to bring to bear the whole range of the capabilities inherent 

to its elements of power. A State Department that is inadequately 

resourced limits the application of diplomatic instruments. An 

inadequately funded military would create a similar problem. On 

the other hand, if all the state has is a strong military, every strategic 

issue begins to look like a nail calling for the application of the 

military hammer. Expediency also can instigate a siren’s call for the 

use of an existing capability. Strategists at the highest levels must 

recognize the value of flexibility and, as a part of a grand strategy, 

determine what instruments to maintain and at what levels.

 Another disastrous tendency in concept development is to elevate 

an operational concept to the strategic level. German blitzkrieg in 

World War II offers a classic example. Blitzkrieg sought to capitalize 

on the combined technology of armor and air power to create a 

modern “Kesselschlacht,” in effect a strategic envelopment of the 

French army to force France’s capitulation. While this operational 

concept enjoyed initial success and indeed had significant strategic 

consequences for those nations overrun, as a strategic concept it did 

not have the ability to achieve Germany’s strategic objectives or create 

the strategic effects that Hitler sought at the national level. In the 

long run, it neither brought an end to the war in the west nor isolated 

England. It did not create the conditions to achieve Lebensraum or 

result in a better end state for Germany. It was rapidly negated by 

the Allied employment of strategic objectives and concepts that 

united multiple nations in opposition and sought to defeat Germany 

by total mobilization and a multi-front war. Hitler’s over-reliance 

on military operational superiority proved misplaced as the Allies 

developed countermeasures and brought superior forces to bear. 

In a similar manner, one could argue that the much-hyped “shock 

and awe” in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was elevated from an 

operational concept to a strategic one in the minds of some strategists 

and planners. In such a misconception, the operational concept does 

not have the sophistication or comprehensiveness to achieve and 

sustain strategic successes, and invariably produces contrary effects 

in the strategic environment. Good operational concepts are crucial 
60

in support of strategy, but are subordinate to the strategic concept 

and are part of operational art.

 The logic of strategy argues that the strategic concept answers the 

big question of “how” the objectives will be achieved by articulating 

clearly for subordinate levels who does what, when, where, how, 

and why in such a manner that the subordinate strategist or planner 

can see with clarity how the execution of the concept leads to the 

accomplishment of the objective and what he is required to do in 

order to support the strategy. It confines the subordinate strategy 

or planning to the strategic objectives and the relevant aspects of 

the strategic environment without unduly limiting the subordinate’s 

creativity or prerogatives.

Resources in Strategy.

Resources (means) in strategy formulation determine the types and 

levels of resources that are necessary to support the concepts of the 

strategy. In strategy, resources can be tangible or intangible. Examples 

of tangible resources include forces, people, equipment, money, and 

facilities. The primary issue with tangible resources is that they are 

seldom sufficient to support the best concept optimally. This shortage 

can be an actual inability to resource, or the result of the desire on 

the part of leadership to be prudent and efficient with government 

funding, or competing demands. Intangible resources include things 

like national will, international goodwill, courage, intellect, or even 

fanaticism. Intangible resources are problematic for the strategist in 

that they often are not measurable or are volatile. National will in a 

democracy is certainly an essential resource, particularly in a longterm strategy, but the issue for the strategist is that it is more apt 

to need engendering and sustainment than be a given and reliable. 

Hence, intangible resources should always be suspect. They require 

close examination to determine whether they are actually improperly 

expressed concepts or objectives. The responsibility of the strategist 

is to ensure that the resources necessary for the accomplishment 

of the objectives as envisioned by the concepts are articulated and 

available.

 The hierarchy and logic of strategy also function in consideration 

of resources. Resources increasingly are defined in detail as the 
61

planning level is approached. A national security or grand strategy 

could list “military forces” as a resource for its concepts, even if the 

appropriate type of forces did not exist, and still be consistent as long 

as the development of the forces was funded and the concept allowed 

the time for building the force. It would then be the responsibility of 

the subordinate level of strategy to develop an objective and concept 

for creating the force—moving from the general to the particular. 

Assignment of resources requires no verb. It merely expresses what 

is to be made available for use in applying the concepts to accomplish 

the objectives. Thus “to develop, build, or establish a larger force” is 

a way; the “force” itself, or the dollars to build it, is the resource. 

In articulating strategy, using the discussion of means to describe 

concepts should be avoided, as should articulating concepts as 

resources. In a very simplified manner, “diplomacy” is a strategic 

concept, but diplomats are among the resources required for the use 

of diplomacy. Imprecision in the vocabulary and logic of strategy 

leads to confusion and encourages friction at lower levels. The 

student of On War knows Clausewitz preferred “overthrow of the 

enemy’s government” as the end, to fight a decisive battle as the 

way, and a large army as the means. He saw the large army as an 

appropriate resource to support his way—the decisive battle. But 

saying “to use a large army” implies a range of different concepts for 

success. The employment of verbs to describe resources frequently 

suggests a problem within the logic of the strategy.

 The rule of thumb to apply is that resources can usually be 

quantified, if only in general terms: the Army, the Air Force, the Navy; 

units and armed forces of the United States; DoD personnel; dollars; 

facilities; equipment—trucks, planes, ships, etc.; and resources of 

organizations—Red Cross, NATO, etc. The strategist should state 

these as resources in terms that make clear to subordinate levels what 

is to be made available to support the concepts. How the resources 

are to be used is articulated in the concept. The specific development 

of resources is refined in the subordinate strategy and planning 

processes.

 Resource selection, like concepts, has implications in regard to 

multi-level effects. Military resources can do a lot of things—fight 

wars, conduct humanitarian operations, and perform nation-
62

building are examples. While military forces may be the only 

available resources, the choice may have consequences. Military 

forces providing tsunami relief may not be as effective as experienced 

civilian nongovernment agencies or may be perceived as a threat to 

the sovereignty of the supported nations. Military forces involved 

in nation-building may be perceived by some as an occupying force, 

thus becoming the problem as opposed to part of the solution. If 

policy or circumstances dictate the use of the resources in such 

circumstances, the strategist’s responsibility is to be aware of the 

potential second- and third-order effects and to consider such effects 

in the development of the strategy.

 Resources are an integral part of good strategy. And while 

efficiency can be gained in the aggregate by doing things better, 

resources are usually the focus of efficiency advocates who promote 

doing the same things with less. Allocating inadequate resources 

for a strategic concept is a recipe for disaster, and will cause even 

greater costs in recovering. Another commonly heard refrain among 

the military profession at large is that resources drive strategy. 

There is an element of truth in this statement. Resources are almost 

always limited at the strategic level because of competing demands 

from diverse needs. The strategist’s responsibility is to ensure that 

the strategic concept will accomplish the objective, and that it is 

resourced to do so. A better concept may require less or different 

resources. A strategy that is not adequately resourced is not a viable 

strategy at all.

Testing Strategy’s Logic and Risk.

 All strategy has its own inherent logic which can be assessed to 

determine validity and risk. The identification of resources in the 

development process is a good starting point for testing a strategy’s 

internal logic. The strategist should think backward through the 

process to ensure the resources provided are adequate to implement 

the concepts, that the concepts envisioned can achieve the stated 

objectives in an acceptable manner, that the accomplishment of the 

objectives will create the strategic effects to satisfy the policy aims 

and promote and protect the national interests, and so forth. Thus, 
63

the strategist questions suitability—will the strategy’s attainment 

accomplish the effect desired; he questions feasibility—can the 

action be accomplished by the means available; and he questions 

acceptability—are the effects as well as the methods and resources 

used to achieve those efforts justified and acceptable to the body 

politic? In this process, the strategist considers tangibles, such as 

resource availability, weapons capability, and geography, and 

intangibles, such as national will, public opinion, world opinion, and 

actions/reactions of U.S. allies, adversaries, and other nations and 

actors. A strategy that clearly can be labeled as unsuitable, infeasible, 

or unacceptable is not valid. However, if an appropriate strategy 

formulation process has been adhered to, this will rarely be the case. 

The strategy is likely to be assessed as valid with qualifications—the 

qualifications being the measure of risk.

Risk is an assessment of the balance among what is known, 

assumed, and unknown, as well as the correspondence between what 

is to be achieved, the concepts envisioned, and resources available. 

Risk assessment is not just a measure of the probability of success 

or failure. It is also an assessment of the probable consequences 

of success and failure. The strategic environment responds as a 

complex system—acting successfully, acting unsuccessfully, and 

failing to act must be anticipated and weighed. Since there are 

seldom enough resources or a clever enough concept to guarantee 

absolute success, there is always some risk in a dynamic strategic 

environment. Complexity, friction, and freedom of choice of other 

actors also guarantee some element of risk. Risk weighs the potential 

advantages and disadvantages of adopting the strategy.

 Risk assessment examines the strategy in its entire logic—ends, 

ways, and means—in the context of the environment and seeks to 

determine what effects are created by the implementation of the 

strategy. It seeks to determine how the equilibrium is affected, and 

whether the environment is more or less favorable for the state as a 

result of the strategy. It asks how other actors will react to what has 

been attempted or achieved; how they will react to the way in which 

the strategy was pursued; what the balance is between intended 

and unintended consequences; how chance or friction will play in 

this strategy. The strategist must assess how the assumptions made 
64

or factors that might change could impact on success or effects. He 

must ask how much flexibility is inherent to the strategy, how it can 

be changed or recovered, and at what cost; what are the elements 

of the strategic environment the strategy is relying on for success; 

and what are the consequences if these change, and is the strategy 

flexible or adaptable enough to accommodate these changes. Risk 

assessment is an integral part of the strategy formulation process and 

should lead to acceptance, modification, or rejection of the strategy.

 The strategist seeks to minimize risk through his development of 

the strategy—the relationship or balance of ends, ways, and means. 

But ultimately the strategist informs the decisionmakers of the risks 

in the strategy so the leaders can decide if the risks are acceptable or 

not. The strategist continuously contemplates the possibilities as the 

future unfolds.
65

V. THE STRATEGY PARADIGM IN SHORT: 

A THEORY RESTATED

[S]trategy has a complex nature and a function that is unchanging over 

the centuries.80

Colin S. Gray

 At the highest level of strategy, the nation-state has interests that 

it pursues to the best of its abilities through the use of the instruments 

of power. Policy articulates the reflection of these interests in the 

strategic environment. In pursuing its policies, the state confronts 

adversaries and other actors, while some factors simply remain 

beyond control or unforeseen. Strategy, acting within the confines 

of theory, is a method of creating strategic effects favorable to policy 

and interests by applying ends, ways, and means in the strategic 

environment. In doing this, strategy has an inherent logic that can be 

understood as a theoretical construct and applied in the development 

and consideration of strategy at all levels. 

 Strategy applies in the realm of the strategic environment which 

is characterized by greater or less degrees of chaotic behavior 

and complexity—VUCA. The environment can be addressed at 

different levels of strategy. It has external and internal components, 

i.e., the international environment and the domestic environment, 

respectively. Rational and irrational choice, chance and probability, 

competitors, allies, and other actors are all part of the strategic 

paradigm.

 Strategy is fundamentally a choice; it reflects a preference for a 

future state or condition in the strategic environment. It assumes 

that, while the future cannot be predicted, the strategic environment 

can be studied and assessed. Trends, issues, opportunities, and 

threats can be identified with analysis, and influenced and shaped 

through what the state chooses to do or not do. Thus strategy seeks 

to influence and shape the future environment as opposed simply to 

reacting to it. Strategy at the state level can be defined as:

The art and science of developing and using the political, economic, 

social-psychological, and military power of the state to create strategic 

effects that protect or advance national interests in the environment in 
66

accordance with policy guidance. Strategy seeks a synergy and symmetry 

of objectives, concepts, and resources to increase the probabilities and 

favorable consequences of policy success and to lessen the chances of 

policy failure.

Assumptions and Premises of Strategy.

1. Strategy is proactive and anticipatory but not predictive. 

Strategy seeks to promote or protect national interests as the 

future unfolds. In doing this, it must consider change and make 

assumptions. Both change and assumptions are bounded by 

existing facts and realistic possibilities. Strategy is clear on what 

are facts, assumptions, and possibilities.

2. Strategy is subordinate to policy. Political purpose dominates all 

levels of strategy. Policy ensures that strategy pursues appropriate 

aims in an acceptable manner. However, the development of 

strategy informs policy; policy must adapt itself to the realities 

of the environment and the limits of power. Thus, policy ensures 

that strategy pursues appropriate aims, and strategy informs 

policy of the art of the possible.

3. Strategy is subordinate to the nature of the environment. Strategy 

must identify an appropriate balance among the objectives 

sought, the methods to pursue the objectives, and the resources 

available within the particular strategic environment. Strategy 

must be consistent with the nature of the strategic environment. 

4. Strategy maintains a holistic perspective. It demands 

comprehensive consideration. Strategy is developed from a 

thorough consideration of the strategic situation and knowledge 

of the nature of the strategic environment. Strategic analysis 

highlights the internal and external factors in the strategic 

environment that help define strategic effect and the specific 

objectives, concepts, and resources of the strategy. Strategy 

reflects a comprehensive knowledge of what else is happening 

within the strategic environment and the potential first-, second-, 

and third-order effects of its own choices on the efforts of those 

above, below, and on the strategist’s own level. 
67

5. Strategy creates a security dilemma for the strategist and other 

actors. Any strategy, once known or implemented, threatens the 

status quo and creates risk for the equilibrium of the strategic 

environment.81 The strategist must determine if the end justifies 

the risks of initiating action, and other actors must decide whether 

to act and in what manner.

6. Strategy is founded in what is to be accomplished and why it 

is to be accomplished. Strategy focuses on a preferred end state 

among possible end states in a dynamic environment. It provides 

direction for the coercive or persuasive use of the instruments of 

power to achieve specified objectives, thereby creating strategic 

effects leading to the desired end state. The strategist must 

comprehend the nature of the strategic environment, the policy, 

and the nation’s aggregate interests to determine what strategic 

effect is necessary before proper objectives can be determined.

 7. Strategy is an inherently human enterprise. It is more than an 

intellectual consideration of objective factors. The role of belief 

systems and cultural perceptions of all the players is important 

in the development and execution of strategy.

8. Friction is an inherent part of strategy. Friction cannot be 

eliminated, but it can be understood and accounted for to a 

greater or lesser extent.

9. Strategy focuses on root purposes and causes. This focus makes 

strategy inherently adaptable and flexible. Strategy learns from 

experience and must be sufficiently broad and flexible in its 

construction to adapt to unfolding events and an adversary’s 

countermoves. Strategy’s focus on root causes and purposes 

ensures that direction of subordinate levels is sufficiently broad 

to be adaptable and flexible.

10. Strategy is hierarchical. Just as strategy is subordinate to policy, 

lower levels of strategy and planning are subordinate to higher 

levels of strategy. The hierarchical nature of strategy facilitates 

span of control. 

11. Strategy exists in a symbiotic relationship with time. Strategy must 

be integrated into the stream of history; it must be congruous with 

what has already happened and with the realistic possibilities of 
68

the future. Small changes at the right time can have large and 

unexpected consequences. Consequently, an intervention at an 

early date has greater effect at less cost than a later intervention. 

Strategy is about thinking and acting in time in a way that is 

fundamentally different from planning.

12. Strategy is cumulative. Effects in the strategic environment are 

cumulative; once given birth, they become a part of the play of 

continuity and change. Strategies at different levels interact and 

influence the success of higher and lower strategy and planning 

over time. 

13. Efficiency is subordinate to effectiveness in strategy. Strategic 

objectives, if accomplished, create or contribute to creation of 

strategic effects that lead to the achievement of the desired end 

state at the level of strategy being analyzed. In that way, they 

ultimately serve national interests. Good strategy is both effective 

and efficient, but effectiveness takes precedence over efficiency. 

Concepts and resources serve objectives without undue risk of 

failure or unintended effects.

14. Strategy provides a proper relationship or balance among the 

objectives sought, the methods used to pursue the objectives, and 

the resources available. In formulating a strategy, the ends, ways, 

and means are part of an integral whole and work synergistically 

to achieve strategic effect at that level of strategy, as well as 

contribute to cumulative effects at higher levels. Ends, ways, 

and means must be in concert qualitatively and quantitatively, 

internally and externally. From the synergistic balance of ends, 

ways, and means, the strategy achieves suitability, acceptability, 

and feasibility.

15. Risk is inherent to all strategy. Strategy is subordinate to 

the uncertain nature of the strategic environment. Success is 

contingent on implementation of an effective strategy—ends, 

ways, and means that positively interact with the strategic 

environment. Failure is the inability to achieve one’s objectives, 

the thwarting of achievement of one’s objectives by other actors 

or chance, or the creation of unintended adverse effects of such 

magnitude as to negate what would otherwise be regarded as 

strategic success.
69

Ends, Ways, Means.

 Strategy is expressed in terms of ends, ways and means. Ends, 

ways, and means that lead to the achievement of the desired end state 

within acceptable bounds of feasibility, suitability, acceptability, and 

risk are valid strategies for consideration by the decisionmaker.

Objectives (ends) explain “what” is to be accomplished. They 

flow from a consideration of the interests and factors in the strategic 

environment affecting the achievement of the desired end state. 

Objectives are bounded by policy guidance, higher strategy, the 

nature of the strategic environment, the capabilities and limitations of 

the instruments of power of the state, and resources made available. 

Objectives are selected to create strategic effect. Strategic objectives, 

if accomplished, create or contribute to creation of strategic effects 

that lead to the achievement of the desired end state at the level of 

strategy being analyzed and, ultimately, serve national interests. In 

strategy, objectives are expressed with explicit verbs (e.g., deter war, 

promote regional stability, destroy Iraqi armed forces). Explicit verbs 

force the strategist to consider and qualify what is to be accomplished 

and help establish the parameters for the use of power.

Strategic concepts (ways) answer the big question of “how” 

the objectives are to be accomplished by the employment of the 

instruments of power. They link resources to the objectives by 

addressing who does what, where, when, how, and why, with the 

answers to which explaining “how” an objective will be achieved. 

Since concepts convey action, they often employ verbs in their 

construction, but are actually descriptions of “how” the objective of 

a strategy is to be accomplished. Strategic concepts provide direction 

and boundaries for subordinate strategies and planning. A strategic 

concept must be explicit enough to provide planning guidance to 

those designated to implement and resource it, but not so detailed 

as to eliminate creativity and initiative at subordinate strategy and 

planning levels. Logically, concepts become more specific at lower 

levels.

Resources (means) in strategy formulation set the boundaries for 

the types and levels of support modalities that will be made available 

for pursuing concepts of the strategy. In strategy, resources can be 

tangible or intangible. Examples of the tangible include forces, people, 
70

equipment, money, and facilities. Intangible resources include 

things like will, courage, spirit, or intellect. Intangible resources are 

problematic for the strategist in that they are often immeasurable or 

volatile. Hence, intangible resources should always be suspect and 

closely examined to determine whether they are actually improperly 

expressed concepts or objectives. The rule of thumb to apply is that 

resources can usually be quantified, if only in general terms. The 

strategist expresses resources in terms that make clear to subordinate 

levels what is to be made available to support the concepts. 

Validity and Risk.

 Strategy has an inherent logic of suitability, feasibility, and 

acceptability. These would naturally be considered as the strategy is 

developed, but the strategy should be validated against them once it 

has been fully articulated. Thus, the strategist asks:

Suitability—Will the attainment of the objectives using the instruments 

of power in the manner stated accomplish the strategic effects desired?

Feasibility—Can the strategic concept be executed with the resources 

available? 

Acceptability—Do the strategic effects sought justify the objectives 

pursued, the methods used to achieve them, and the costs in blood, 

treasure, and potential insecurity for the domestic and international 

communities? In this process, one considers intangibles such as national 

will, public opinion, world opinion, and actions/reactions of U.S. allies, 

adversaries, and other nations and actors. 

 The questions of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability as 

expressed above are really questions about the validity of the 

strategy, not risk. If the answer to any of the three questions is “no,” 

the strategy is not valid. But strategy is not a black and white world, 

and the strategist may find that the answer to one or more of these 

questions is somewhat ambiguous. 

 Risk is determined through assessment of the probable 

consequences of success and failure. It examines the strategy in its 

entire logic—ends, ways, and means—in the context of the strategic 

environment, and seeks to determine what strategic effects are created 
71

by the implementation of the strategy. It seeks to determine how 

the equilibrium is affected and whether the strategic environment is 

more or less favorable for the state as a result of the strategy. Risk is 

clarified by asking:

 • What assumptions were made in this strategy, and what is 

the effect if any of them is wrong?

 • What internal or external factors were considered in the 

development of the strategy? What change in regard to these 

factors would positively or adversely affect the success or 

effects of the strategy?

 • What flexibility or adaptability is inherent to the components 

of the strategy? How can the strategy be modified and at what 

cost?

 • How will other actors react to what has been attempted or 

achieved? How will they react to the way in which the strategy 

was pursued?

 • What is the balance between intended and unintended 

consequences?

 • How will chance or friction play in this strategy? 

73

VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Power is a means, not an end.82

 Good strategy development requires the military professional 

to step out of the planning mindset and adopt one more suited for 

strategic thinking. In the strategic mindset, the professional military 

strategist embraces the complexity and chaos of the strategic 

environment and envisions all its continuities and possibilities in 

seeking to create favorable strategic effects in support of national 

interests. From an accurate analysis of the strategic environment, 

the strategist determines the threats to and opportunities for the 

advancement or protection of these interests. From policy, the 

strategist receives the political leadership’s vision, guidance, and 

priorities of effort in regard to interests. Thus, in constructing a 

valid strategy, the strategist is bounded by the nature of the strategic 

environment, the dictates of policy, and the logic of strategy. The 

strategist is responsible for mastering the external and internal 

facets of the strategic environment, adhering to policy or seeking 

change, and applying the logic of strategy to strategy formulation. 

He articulates the strategy in the rational model of ends, ways, and 

means; but leadership remains responsible for the decision to execute 

the strategy.

 Good strategy demands much of the strategist. The strategist 

must be a constant student of the strategic environment, both 

externally and internally. He must be emerged in the events of today 

while aware of the legacies of the past and the possibilities of the 

future. In one sense, the strategist must sort through an arena of 

cognitive dissonance to arrive at the “real” truth. The real truth best 

serves interests and policy in the long run; the strategist must reject 

the expedient, near-term solution for the long-term benefit. The 

strategist intervenes through action or selected nonaction to create 

a more favorable strategic environment. In this process, everything 

has meaning, and everything has potential consequences. The 

strategist cannot be omniscient, but the strategist can be open and 

aware—open to the possibilities and aware of the consequences. If 

the strategist is sufficiently open and aware, he can anticipate the 

future and formulate successful strategy. If in practice the strategist 
74

is not immersed in uncertainty and ambiguity and examining 

the context of the past, the emerging events of today, and the 

possibilities of tomorrow, he is probably not doing strategy—but 

rather planning under the label of strategy. Thus, the proper focus 

of strategy is to clarify and exert influence over the VUCA of the 

strategic environment in order to create strategic effects favorable to 

the policy and interests of the state. This is done by articulation of 

ends, ways, and means that create the desired strategic effect. 

 Strategy is neither simple nor easy. Nothing in this “little book” 

should suggest either. Strategic thinking is difficult because it 

deals with the incredible complexity and unpredictability of the 

strategic environment. Its essence is to simplify this complexity and 

uncertainty—the VUCA—in a rational expression of ends, ways, and 

means so that planners can create a degree of certainty and a more 

predictable outcome. In this regard, it bounds planning but does 

not unnecessarily restrict the planner. Nor should anything in this 

monograph suggest that strategy is vague or imprecise. The complex 

and ambiguous must be reduced and made clear without loss of 

understanding of the comprehensiveness of interaction within the 

strategic environment. Strategy seeks great clarity and precision in 

developing and articulating objectives and concepts—but it does this 

in a manner appropriate to the strategic level. The logic of strategy 

requires that these be expressed in terms that allow for flexibility 

and adaptation; thus they do not unnecessarily confine innovation 

and initiative at subordinate levels. This requirement reinforces the 

need for clarity of thought and word so that strategic purpose and 

direction are evident.

 Relative success is the product of good strategy: relative to 

objectives; relative to “current” reality; relative to the future; relative 

to risk; relative to costs; and relative to adversaries and allies. Strategy 

should be precise and clear its articulation, but it is anticipatory—

not predictive. The future changes as it unfolds because the strategic 

environment is dynamic. Core interests remain over time, but their 

expression in regard to strategic circumstances changes with time. 

Once implemented, strategy by definition changes the fundamental 

conditions and perspective generating it and is at risk in some part. 

Thus, strategy can be measured relatively against its objectives and 
75

the strategic effect they seek to produce, but it cannot guarantee the 

future. The future situation is always the product of more than the 

sum of the parts of a given strategy.

 The theory of strategy teaches the military professional “how to 

think” about strategy, not “what to think” for a strategy. It educates 

his mind and disciplines his thinking for the environment that 

confronts him as a strategic leader, practitioner, and theorist so he 

can serve the nation well. So armed, the professional is prepared to 

develop, evaluate, and execute strategy appropriate for his place 

and time. Strategy formulation and terminology are less pure in 

execution than in their original conception. “Strategic planning” 

and other such “strategic labeling” are commonplace, and zealous 

advocates of various concepts and practices often seek to co-opt 

such terms to gain visibility. The professional should be neither 

seduced nor distracted by these manipulations but remain focused 

on strategy proper—never confusing strategy with planning nor the 

strategic level of war with the others. In this way, the professional’s 

formulation, evaluation, and execution of strategy will adhere to 

strategy’s logic, and his advice and recommendations will fully 

support policy in achieving the desired end state. 

 And, finally, strategy formulation is not the domain for the 

thin of skin or self-serving. Detractors stand ever ready to magnify 

a strategy’s errors or limitations. Even success is open to criticism 

from pundits who question its role, methods, or continued validity. 

Furthermore, strategy achieves strategic consequences by the 

multiorder effects it creates over time—always a point of contention 

in a time-conscious society that values quick results and lacks 

patience with the “long view.” In the end, it is the destined role of 

the strategist to be underappreciated and often demeaned in his 

own time. Consequently, strategy remains the domain of the strong 

intellect, the life-long student, the dedicated professional, and the 

invulnerable ego.

77

ENDNOTES

 1. Williamson Murray and Mark Grimsley, “Introduction: On Strategy,” The 

Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 

1994; 1997, p. 22.

 2. Joint Staff, J-7, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary and 

Associated Terms, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Staff, November 30, 2004, p. 509.

 3. Gregory D. Foster, “A Conceptual Foundation for a Theory of Strategy,” The 

Washington Quarterly, Winter, 1990, p. 43. Foster’s analysis of the assumptions and 

premises of strategy is particularly thought-provoking.

 4. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and 

trans., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 141.

 5. Clausewitz, pp. 100-102.

 6. Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 

33-34, 51-54.

 7. Major General Richard A. Chilcoat, Strategic Art: The New Discipline for the 

21st Century, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 

College, 1995, pp. 6-9.

 8. Gray, p. 1.

 9. David Jablonsky, Why Is Strategy Difficult? Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992; repr. 1995, p. 10. 

 10. Foster, pp. 47-48.

 11. Clausewitz, p. 89.

 12. Foster, p. 50.

 13. Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., “Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy,” 

chap. in Military Strategy: Theory and Application, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Department 

of National Security and Strategy, U.S. Army War College, 1989, pp. 3-8.

 14. Clausewitz, p. 87.

 15. Foster, p. 50.

 16. Clausewiz, pp. 86-87, 607-608.

 17. Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life, Princeton, 

NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997, p. 60.

 18. Murray and Grimsley, pp. 1, 13; Clausewitz, pp. 86, 89.

 19. Stephen J. Cimbala, Clausewitz and Chaos: Friction in War and Military Policy, 

Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001, pp. 7-14. While somewhat controversial, this book 

contributes important insights to the nature of the strategic environment.

 20. Ibid., p. 8.

 21. Murray and Grimsley, p. 1.
78

 22. Course 2 Course Directive AY 2005: “War, National Security Policy & Strategy, 

Carlisle Barracks, PA: Department of National Security and Strategy, U.S. Army 

War College, 2004, p. 158.

 23. Joint Publication 1-02, p. 360.

 24. Ibid., p. 359.

 25. Ibid., p. 535.

 26. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, The National Defense Strategy 

of The United States of America, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, March 

2005.

 27. Foster, pp. 56-57.

 28. Murray and Grimsley, pp. 6-7. See also Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. 

May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decisionmakers, New York: The Free 

Press, 1986, for practices and examples of how to do this.

 29. Robert H. Dorff, “Strategy, Grand Strategy, and the Search for Security,” 

The Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century, Max G. 

Manwaring, Edwin G. Corr, and Robin H. Dorff, eds., Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003, 

pp. 128-129.

 30. Clausewitz, p. 178.

 31. William J. Doll, “Parsing the Future: A Frame of Reference to Scenario 

Building,” Unpublished Paper: Joint Warfare Analysis Center, 2005, pp. 2-3.

 32. Roderick R. Magee II, ed., Strategic Leadership Primer, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 

U.S. Army War College, 1998, p. 1.

 33. Alvin M. Saperstein, “Complexity, Chaos, and National Security Policy: 

Metaphors or Tools,” Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security, David 

S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, eds., 1997, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/

books%20-%201998/Complexity,%20Global%20Politics%20and%20Nat’l%20Sec%20-

%20Sept%2098/ch05.html, Internet, accessed December 8, 2004.

34. Alan D. Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Importance of 

Imagery,” Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security, David S. Alberts and 

Thomas J. Czerwinski, eds., 1997, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/books%20-%201998/

Complexity,%20Global%20Politics%20and%20Nat’l%20Sec%20-%20Sept%2098/

ch07.html, Internet, accessed December 8, 2004.

 35. Manus J. Donahue III, “ An Introduction to Mathematical Chaos Theory 

and Fractal Geometry,” December 1997; available from http://www.fractalfinance.

com/chaostheory.html, Internet, accessed December 13, 2004.

 36. Clausewitz, p. 119.

 37. Major Susan E. Durham, “Chaos Theory for the Practical Military Mind,” 

March 1997; available from http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/acsc/97-0229.pdf,

Internet, accessed on December 13, 2004. See also Donahue. 

 38. Donahue. See also Gaddis, The Landscape of History, pp. 71-90.
79

 39. Vicente Valle, Jr., “Chaos, Complexity and Deterrence,” Student Paper at 

National War College, April 19, 2000; available from http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/

awcgate/ndu/valle.pdf, Internet, accessed December 18, 2004, p. 4.

 40. James N. Rosenau, “Damn Things Simultaneously: Complexity Theory 

and World Affairs” Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security, David S. 

Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, eds., 1997, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/

books%20-%201998/Complexity,%20Global%20Politics%20and%20Nat’l%20Sec%20-

%20Sept%2098/ch03.html, Internet, accessed December 8, 2004.

 41. Valle, pp. 2-3.

42. John F. Schmitt, “Command and (Out of) Control: The Military Implications 

of Complexity Theory,” Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security, David 

S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, eds., 1997, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/

books%20-%201998/Complexity,%20Global%20Politics%20and%20Nat’l%20Sec%20-

%20Sept%2098/ch09.html, Internet, accessed December 8, 2004.

 43. Robert Jervis, “Complex Systems: The Role of Interactions,” Complexity, 

Global Politics, and National Security, David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, 

eds., 1997, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/books%20-%201998/Complexity,%20Glo

bal%20Politics%20and%20Nat’l%20Sec%20-%20Sept%2098/ch03.html; Internet, 

accessed December 8, 2004.

 44. Beyerchen.

 45. Any query into a research data base will substantiate this assertion. The 

subject is manifest in various sources ranging across a spectrum of interests: 

The New York Times, Washington Quarterly, New Political Economy, Foreign Affairs, 

Parameters, The World Economy, Journal of Business Ethics, Third World Quarterly, 

etc.

 46. Michael J. Mazarr, “Theory and U.S. Military Strategy: A ‘Leapfrog’ 

Strategy for U.S. Defense Policy,” Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security,

David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, eds., 1997, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/

books/books%20-%201998/Complexity,%20Global%20Politics%20and%20Nat’l%20Se

c%20-%20Sept%2098/ch11.html, Internet, accessed December 23, 2004 .

 47. Ibid.

 48. Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the 21st Century, 

New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003, p. 5.

 49. Gray, p. 50.

 50. Ibid., pp. 23-43.

 51. MacGregor Knox, “Conclusion: Continuity and Revolution in the Making 

of Strategy,” The Making of Strategy:Rulers,States, and War, Cambridge: Cambridge 

University Press, 1994; 1997, p. 615.

 52. John Lewis Gaddis, The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past, 

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 61.
80

 53. John Lewis Gaddis, “Grand Strategy in the Second Term,” Foreign Affairs, 

January-February 2005, p. 14.

 54. Jervis, pp. 10-28, 60.

 55. Knox, p. 643.

 56. Shona L. Brown and Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Competing on the Edge: Strategy 

as Structured Chaos, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1998, pp. 3-4, 7.

 57. Gaddis, The Landscape of History, pp. 56-57, 59. 

 58. Beyerchen.

 59. Jack Synder, “One World Rival Theories,” Foreign Policy, NovemberDecember 2004, pp. 53-62.

 60. Knox, p. 627.

 61. James Kurth, “Inside the Cave: The Banality of I. R. Studies,” The National 

Interest, Fall 1998, pp. 38-40.

 62. Knox, pp. 645.

 63. Gaddis, “Grand Strategy,” p. 10.

 64. Knox, p. 645

 65. Gaddis, The Landscape of History, p. 65.

 66. Bart Kosko, Fuzzy Thinking: The New Science of Fuzzy Logic, New York: 

Hyperion, 1993, pp. 4-22. The humanities are a noteworthy exception to this 

pervasiveness, but even here quantification has been applied by some to seek the 

“right” explanation.

 67. Clausewitz, p. 120.

 68. Ibid., p. 119.

 69. Gaddis, The Landscape of History, pp. 61, 64, 68-69.

 70. Gray, pp. 19-20.

 71. Dorff, pp. 128-129.

 72. Donald E. Nuechterlein, America Overcommitted: United States National 

Interests in the 1980s, Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1984, p. 4.

 73. Joint Publication 1-02, p. 360.

 74. Clausewitz, p. 607.

 75. Gaddis, The Landscape of History, p. 66. 

 76. Mackubin Thomas Owens, National Review Online, January 5, 2005; 

available from http://www.nationalreview.com/owens/owens200501050715.asp, 

Internet, accessed January 5, 2005.

 77. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States 

Military Policy and Strategy, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973, pp. 411-

424.
81

 78. Owens.

 79. Cooper, pp. viii-xi.

 80. Gray, p. 2.

 81. Jervis, p. 60.

 82. Murray and Grimsley, p. 13.

83

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

HARRY R. (Rich) YARGER is the Professor of National Security 

Policy in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the U.S. 

Army War College. Currently he teaches courses in Fundamentals of 

Strategic Thinking, Theory of War and Strategy, National Security 

Policy and Strategy, and Grand Strategy. His research focuses on 

national security policy, strategic theory, and the education and 

development of strategic level leaders. In addition to teaching 

positions, Dr. Yarger served 5 years as the Chairman of the War 

College’s Department of Distance Education and is considered one of 

the Army’s leading experts in on-line education. Dr. Yarger has also 

taught at the undergraduate level at several local colleges. A retired 

Army colonel, he is a Vietnam veteran and served in both Germany 

and Korea. Dr. Yarger is a graduate of the Army War College and 

obtained his doctorate in history from Temple University.