DECEPTION 101―PRIMER ON DECEPTION

Joseph W. Caddell

December 2004
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 This monograph is based on a presentation made at the Conf

Strategic Deception in Modern Democracies: Ethical, Legal, and Policy C

sponsored by the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Naval Academy

Triangle Institute of Security Studies on October 31, 2003, at the W

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iii

FOREWORD

 This monograph reviews the basic concepts related to “deception.” The author, Dr. Joseph Caddell, defines terms, provides 

historical examples, and discusses problems associated with 

deception. His monograph provides a general overview, a “primer,” 

and is not directed at those who already possess a working knowledge 

of deception operations. Nevertheless, given the complex and ever 

changing nature of deception in the political-military environment, 

it may serve as a useful reminder of the basic assumptions and 

methods concerning the subject.

 The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this work as 

part of our External Research Associates Program.

 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. Joseph Caddell is a Lecturer on Military History at North Carolina 

State University in Raleigh.
1

DECEPTION 101―PRIMER ON DECEPTION

Introduction. 

 Deception is a traditional component of political and military 

conflict. Indeed, many argue that it is intrinsic to all human 

interaction. It is sometimes mistakenly confused with unintentional 

confusion or misinformation. Disinformation, intentional deception, 

should not be confused with misinformation. Deception depends on 

two criteria: first, it is intentional; and, second, it is designed to gain 

an advantage for the practitioner.1

 Deception in the forms of concealment and activity designed to 

mislead is common in nature. Protective coloration serves to protect 

some flora and fauna―either by making them difficult to see or by 

causing them to resemble something of little interest to predators. 

Some animals will feign injury to lure predators away from nests 

or offspring. Students of deception note these examples as evidence 

of the utility and effectiveness of disinformation even beyond the 

human experience.2

Fabrication and Manipulation.

 In the economic and political arenas, deception may appear in 

a wide variety of forms. Indeed, cynical observers might argue that 

a synonym for economic disinformation is “advertising.” In any 

case, examining the use of deception in marketing helps illustrate 

the difference between “fabrication and manipulation.” If false 

information is created and presented as true, this is fabrication. It is 

fabricated for the purpose of disinformation and is simply not true. 

Manipulation, on the other hand, is the use of information 

which is technically true, but is being presented out of context in 

order to create a false implication. This deception may be achieved 

by leaving out information or by associating valid information in 

such a way as to create false correlations. In the advertising world, 

companies usually avoid making false claims based on “fabricated” 

information. The laws against false advertising make such behavior 

problematical. Presenting “true” information “manipulated” to create 
2

a false impression, however, is difficult to prosecute. An example of 

such activity occurred in the gasoline shortages of the 1970s when 

some automobile manufacturers advertised cars with inefficient fuel 

consumption by noting how the range of their vehicles compared to 

smaller, more fuel efficient automobiles. They simply neglected to 

point out that their gas tanks were considerably larger than those in 

the smaller vehicles.

 The distinction between fabrication and manipulation is relevant 

to military deception operations. Both forms have proven useful in 

the history of warfare. Dummy weapons and false orders “leaked” 

to the enemy are examples of fabrication. But when it is impossible 

to disguise the presence of large forces or an interest in a given area, 

partial truths―manipulation―may prove more advantageous.3

Political Deception.

 Similar considerations relating to fabrication vs. manipulation 

exist in the political realm. And, while disinformation in the business 

world is only tangentially of interest to a military audience, political 

deception may have a close relationship to and impact on military 

operations. This is not to say that political deception is limited to 

issues relating to defense or national security, but a quick review of 

American political history reveals that defense issues have certainly 

been subject to disinformation―often in the form of manipulation. 

Here are some examples.

 On April 14, 1846, an American military patrol engaged a Mexican 

force south of the Nueces River in the newly annexed state of Texas. 

There were 16 American casualties. On May 11, President James K. 

Polk announced that “Mexico has passed the boundary of the United 

States, has invaded our territory, and shed American blood upon the 

American soil.” In fact, the presence of U.S. troops in the disputed 

area south of the Nueces was a questionable action. The area 

between the Nueces and Rio Grande rivers was disputed territory, 

and negotiations were underway to resolve the issue. Neither nation 

was supposed to have troops there. Somehow this fact was left out of 

Polk’s impassioned call to arms. A young congressman from Illinois 

raised awkward questions about “the sacred spot.” Indeed, concern 

by young Mr. Lincoln and others in the Congress that information 
3

was being “manipulated” led to the famous “Spot Resolution.” 

This registered suspicion concerning Polk’s rhetoric and signified 

a growing regional division, but it did not prevent the MexicanAmerican War.4

 In 1898 the destruction of the U.S.S. Maine in Havana Harbor 

created a situation where manipulation of information, primarily by 

the media rather than by the government, played a critical role in 

precipitating the war with Spain. The explosion, which destroyed 

the Maine on the night of February 15, 1898, has been examined by 

investigators for the past 106 years. The conclusions are varied and 

often contradictory. The initial board of inquiry (March 1898) was 

unable to arrive at a definite conclusion.5

 American newspapers, however, were not so ambivalent. Nor 

were they restrained. Speculation as to the Spanish motives for 

destroying the Maine ran rampant. The strained relations between 

Madrid and Washington deteriorated even further. The “yellow 

press” did not cause the subsequent Spanish-American War by itself, 

but its role was seminal.6

 This event provides an interesting case study where political, 

military, and economic interests intertwined to the point that one is 

hard pressed to segregate them. To what extent is the government 

responsible for correcting false impressions which appear in a 

free press? What if a government takes advantage of fabricated or 

manipulated data to serve its own policy ends?

 Examples of specifically governmental disinformation can be 

found in the period prior to the U.S. entry into World War II. On 

a number of occasions, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) 

played fast and loose with the truth. Everything from the Destroyer 

Deal of 1940 to the Lend-Lease Act of 1941 involved a certain amount 

of information manipulation. In the latter example, the President 

compared the Lend-Lease aid to Great Britain to the loan of a fire hose 

to a neighbor to put out a house fire. The analogy, made in a “Fireside 

Chat” radio address, was effective and generated empathy. Critics, 

however, pointed out that it was hopelessly inaccurate. Unlike the 

water hose mentioned in the analogy, the weapons, food, and fuel 

shipped to Great Britain could not be reeled up and returned “after 

the fire is out.” 
4

 An even better example of Roosevelt shading the truth involved 

a purported German plan to invade the western hemisphere. The 

plan centered on a map which apparently showed German designs 

on nations in South and Central America. In his Navy Day speech 

on October 27, 1941, Roosevelt said he had “a secret map, made in 

Germany by Hitler’s government by the planners of the new world 

order.” The President continued by claiming, “That map, my friends, 

makes clear the Nazi design not only against South America, but 

against the United States as well.”7

 The problem here is the simple fact that the map was part of a 

British disinformation operation, and that it is likely that FDR knew 

it. William Stephenson, a British intelligence operative (M.I.6 code 

name “Intrepid”), fabricated the map sometime in 1941 to create 

alarm in the United States. By September 1941, the State Department 

was onto Stephenson’s ruses. The probability that Roosevelt knew 

that the map was false when he cited it on Navy Day is quite high. 

The President was concerned about the threat posed by Nazi 

Germany and was willing to be deceptive if it was necessary to rouse 

the American public. As he confided to Secretary of the Treasury 

Morgenthau in 1942, after the United States had entered the war, 

“I may have one policy for Europe and one diametrically opposite 

for North and South America. I may be entirely inconsistent, and 

furthermore, I am perfectly willing to mislead and tell untruths if it 

will help us win the war.”8

 Roosevelt is not usually castigated too severely by critics, because 

most sympathize with his desire to resist Axis aggression in World 

War II. Similarly, many sympathize with President Dwight D. 

Eisenhower’s later attempt to “cover” the U-2 reconnaissance sorties 

over the Soviet Union by describing them as National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration (NASA) weather research flights. In the 

U-2 case, however, the problems associated with deception being 

“found out” were exploited by the Soviets in their show trial of the 

U-2 pilot, Francis Gary Powers, after his shoot-down on May Day 

1960.9

 The use of deception concerning national security issues could 

also be found in the domestic political arena during the Cold 

War. Senator Joseph McCarthy’s infamous accusations concerning 
5

communist infiltration of the government ultimately demonstrated 

the cost of being caught practicing deception. But they also showed 

how effective someone could be in making accusations with virtually 

no concrete evidence if the limited evidence was couched in the right 

context.

 The “missile gap” of the 1960 presidential campaign was an 

effective issue used by the Kennedy campaign to challenge Vice 

President Nixon’s supposed strength in foreign and national security

policy experience. The fact hat the “missile gap”did not exist may

or may not have been known by Senator Kennedy and his staff. If

he did not know, this was an example of simple misinformation. 

If he did know, and many believe he did, it was equally simple

disinformation.10

 The recitation of political deception involving defense issues 

could go on to cover Nixon’s claim in the 1968 presidential campaign 

that he had a plan to end the Vietnam War, to the Iran-Contra 

Scandal, and the stories of babies being ejected from incubators by 

Iraqi soldiers in Kuwait in 1990. In these cases, and others like them, 

national security issues were clouded by various forms of deception. 

The point here is that such behavior should not be unexpected. While 

it has proven effective on occasion, there is a price to be paid if a 

specific deception fails. 

 Furthermore, an overarching cost, regardless of success or failure, 

has been the damage it has done to government credibility. Because 

governments have practiced deception involving issues as important 

as national security, it is difficult for many in the media, and the 

public at large, to discount totally the possibility that government 

announcements could be disinformation. Recent debates concerning 

the nature of the 2003 Iraq War have only added to preexisting 

skepticism.

 The debate over whether a democratic republic should engage 

in deceptions which may deceive their own citizens rests outside 

the scope of this monograph. Nevertheless, anyone engaged in 

deception operations, offensively or defensively, should be aware of 

the credibility issues inherent to this subject. Often there is more at 

stake than a temporary political or military advantage. 
6

Military Deception.

 Many problems are associated with the study of military deception. 

Military deception is, by its very nature, covert or clandestine. It comes 

in a wide variety of forms, and there are disagreements regarding 

definitions. The Department of Defense (DoD) defines deception as: 

“those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, 

distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in 

a manner prejudicial to the enemy’s interests.”11

 Deception in warfare is probably as old as armed conflict itself. 

The logic of confusing an adversary is obvious, and the rewards can 

be realized very quickly. Our first recorded history of war involves 

the Mycenaean Greek siege of Troy in the 12th century BC and also 

provides us with our first recorded example of deception in warfare, 

the famous Trojan Horse. The narrative of military history over the 

succeeding 3,200 years provides a wealth of examples.12

 A fundamental dichotomy to be found in this confusing world 

is the division of deception into “active” and “passive” categories. 

Put simply, passive deception is designed to hide real intentions and 

capabilities from an adversary. You are hiding something which 

really exists. Active deception, on the other hand, is the process of 

providing an adversary with evidence of intentions and capabilities 

which you do not, in fact, possess. Here you are showing your enemy 

something which is not real. This dichotomy is most often associated 

with camouflage, but is not limited to this field.

 Another distinction is made in regard to the degree of “specificity 

of deception.” In their 1982 work, Strategic Military Deception, Donald 

Daniel and Katherine Herbig note the existence of what they term “Atype” and “M-type” deception.13 A-type, or “ambiguity increasing,” 

deception is designed to create general confusion and to distract an 

adversary by making “noise.” An example of this was the presence 

of Japanese Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu in Washington, DC, 

prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. By continuing diplomatic 

negotiations, the Japanese made it more difficult for the United States 

to ascertain Tokyo’s intentions. The Americans had to consider a 

variety of possible Japanese intentions and objectives. This made it 

more difficult to narrow the analysis and to conclude that military 

action was the only Japanese option.14
7

 M-type, or “misleading variety,” deception is more ambitious 

in that it is designed to mislead an enemy into believing a specific 

deception plan. Here you engage in an array of deception operations 

which should supplement and complement one another, all designed 

to cause your opponent to believe an “alternative” to what you 

are actually doing. This “alternative” is, of course, not true. This 

type of deception is more complicated and more ambitious than 

simple “ambiguity.” It requires more preparation, more resources, 

and usually more time. A modern historical example often cited is 

Operation BODYGUARD, the deception plan designed to protect 

Operation OVERLORD, the allied landings in Normandy on June 6, 

1944. 

 BODYGUARD was actually an umbrella project that included a 

variety of deception plans of the “M-type.” The two most famous 

of these were Operations FORTITUDE NORTH and FORTITUDE 

SOUTH. These plans were designed to lead the Germans to believe 

that the main allied offensive in the West would land, respectively, 

in Norway or the Pas de Calais (Straits of Dover). Over time, 

FORTITUDE SOUTH became the most plausible, and the bulk of the 

deception resources were expended on convincing the Germans that 

the real invasion would cross the English Channel in the Straits of 

Dover, almost 100 miles from the Normandy beaches. Its success can 

be seen in that many German commanders believed that, when the 

actual invasion took place in Normandy, it was merely a diversion 

from the “real” invasion which would be occurring later at Calais.15

 The Operation FORTITUDE deceptions included a number of 

military deception methodologies. The most common of these was 

camouflage. Camouflage, like deception, comes in both active and 

passive variants. When the word “camouflage” is used, most people 

think of passive camouflage―the disguise or cloaking of forces and/or 

facilities to prevent their detection by an enemy. This can include 

hiding Greek infantry inside a large ceremonial horse, wearing 

clothing designed to blend into the surrounding terrain, placing 

cut branches from trees over important equipment, and an almost 

infinite variety of other techniques. It can even include disguising a 

bombed, but repaired, airfield runway to look like it is still cratered. 

Anytime you try to hide something that possesses real capabilities, 

you are practicing passive camouflage.16
8

Active camouflage entails the artificial creation of the image or 

impression that you have a force or capability that does not actually 

exist. In the American Civil War, the Confederate Army charred large 

tree trunks to resemble artillery barrels and marched infantry units 

in circles to convince Union officers that they had more weapons 

and more troops than they actually did. In Operation FORTITUDE 

SOUTH, the allies used dummy tanks, trucks, aircraft, and landing 

vessels to give the impression they possessed weapons they did 

not have. To complement this, they used false radio messages to 

create the illusion of military units which did not exist. In recent 

operations in the Balkans and the Persian Gulf, American forces have 

encountered similar deceptions. Any attempt to create the illusion of 

a real capability where there is none is active camouflage.17

 Camouflage may simply be tactical deception designed to make it 

harder for an enemy to see where to attack your resources. It may be 

part of a larger deception plan. Active camouflage must always be used 

carefully. If one is too eager to reveal active camouflage, the enemy 

may become suspicious of obvious targets. Here the methodology 

becomes more complicated. If one is going to use active camouflage, 

say a dummy tank, it is a good idea to use passive camouflage to 

appear to be hiding the “tank.” Otherwise, the deception may not be 

convincing. Passive camouflage should be used on active camouflage 

in order to make the false image more credible―only it must not be 

so good as to actually hide the dummy tank. It must be good enough 

to be credible, but not so good as to be effective. By the same token, 

it may be possible to place poorly done active camouflage over a 

real resource to mislead an enemy away from that resource. The 

complexities should never be underestimated.18

 Camouflage is often tied to the design of diversions. A diversion 

is the intentional distraction of an enemy’s attention away from 

the area of interest or attack. There are two basic types, feints and 

demonstrations. A feint is an attack by friendly forces to distract 

enemy attention from the main area of interest or attack. Closely 

related to this is the concept of the demonstration. A demonstration

involves the deployment of forces to distract an enemy, but such a 

deployment does not usually include actual contact or combat. The 

purpose of a diversion is simple―to mislead an enemy away from 

your real operations and objectives.19
9

 Two other specialized terms utilized in military deception are 

conditioning and cover. Conditioning is the repetition of what could be 

preparations for a hostile action which you do not commit―thereby 

lulling the victim into a false sense of security. It is a variation of the 

“familiarity breeds contempt” theme. This is a concept which is often 

associated with the outbreak of warfare and relates to peacetime 

activities which might or might not be preparations for war. It could 

also, however, refer to repetitive behavior in the conduct of ongoing 

military operations which is used to desensitize an enemy to a 

threat. 

Cover is the use of an apparently nonthreatening activity to 

disguise preparation for or initiation of a hostile act. A common 

example is the use of a training exercise to hide preparations for an 

attack. If the training exercise was the last in a long series of training 

exercises which had not led to actual hostile action in the past, this 

could also be an example of conditioning―hence the tendency to refer 

to “conditioning and cover.” The two concepts are linked by their 

complementary definitions. In recent years, both the Yom Kippur 

War of 1973 and the Falklands War of 1982 were launched under the 

cover of training exercises similar to exercises which had occurred 

before. 

Levels of Military Deception.

 The U.S. military community traditionally recognizes three 

levels of deception―based on the nature of the intent. Strategic 

Deception intends to “disguise basic objectives, intentions, strategies, 

and capabilities.” This contrasts with operational deception, which 

confuses an adversary regarding “a specific operation or action you 

are preparing to conduct.” And, last, but not least, in the American 

doctrines, there is tactical deception. This is intended to mislead 

“others while they are actively involved in competition with you, your 

interests, or your forces.”20

 What is important to note here is that the categorization 

of deception into these three levels is not based on the type of 

deception being practiced. Rather, it depends on the objective of 

the deception. Phony tanks or dummy aircraft could be examples 

of tactical deception if the purpose was to distract an attacker and 
10

cause them not to fire on real equipment and personnel. They could 

be operational deception if they were part of a larger deception plan 

designed to mislead an adversary about the timing, place, and nature 

of a specific military operation. Or, if they were part of an even larger 

deception plan intended to confuse an enemy as to a basic strategy 

or strategic objectives, they would be part of strategic deception. The 

taxonomy is based on objectives, not methodologies. 

Conditions Affecting Deception.

 A quick review of the historical literature reveals scholarly 

interest in the nature of deception dating back to Sun Tzu, Vegetius, 

Machiavelli, and the oft-quoted Clausewitz. In more recent years, 

the evolution of the “Principles of War” in the American and British 

armies embraced the advantages of “surprise” and “security.” 

Intrinsic to both of these principles is recognition of the importance 

of fooling your opponent and, in turn, not being fooled yourself.

 What may be more problematical is finding consensus as to how 

deception works and how best to avoid being taken in. In broad terms, 

it is obvious that flaws in logical analysis and synthesis make being 

deceived more likely. Ignorance, arrogance, and fear all complicate 

one’s ability to detect false information. 

 Preconceived ideas or simple prejudice often lead to that 

phenomenon known as “cognitive dissonance,” where one ignores 

vital information simply because it interferes with preexisting 

concepts or theories. A similar, if less precise, problem is the so-called 

“inertia of rest.” This refers to a tendency of people to believe certain 

assumptions remain valid even after they have been undermined by 

events. In physics, “inertia of rest” refers to the tendency of an object 

at rest to remain at rest until acted upon by an outside force. Students 

of intelligence sometimes refer to the inertia of rest as the tendency 

in the mind of decisionmakers to remain at peace until acted upon 

by a hostile force. All of these issues can be used by practitioners of 

deception to their advantage. 

 The significance here is that effective deception is often based 

on exploitation of the victim’s cognitive assumptions. The German 

philosopher Goethe is remembered for his observation that “We 
11

are never deceived, we deceive ourselves.”21 This is more than a 

philosophical truism. It is both a recipe for formulating deception 

and a warning for those who wish to avoid being deceived.

Deception and Intelligence Operations. 

 Someone practicing deception needs a route through which to send 

their disinformation―their adversary’s intelligence organizations 

often provide that route. All intelligence organizations vet the 

credibility and reliability of information they discover. Practitioners 

of deception know this and prepare their disinformation, at the least, 

to confuse and, at the most, to mislead the intelligence services of 

their enemy. 

 All intelligence collection methodologies are subject to deception. 

Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is susceptible to false signals, phony 

messages, bogus codes, and other forms of disinformation. 

Photographic or imagery intelligence (PHOTINT and IMINT) must 

deal with active and passive camouflage in a wide array of forms. 

Similar problems plague communications intelligence (COMINT), 

electronic intelligence (ELINT), acoustical intelligence (ACOUINT), 

and seismic intelligence (SEISINT). In any medium where information 

can be found, disinformation can be planted or devised. 

 Human intelligence (HUMINT) involves the use of double agents, 

the passing of false data, and the like. Human sources may serve as 

knowing or unknowing conduits of false information. Some in the 

counterintelligence business note that one can detect double agents 

by identifying sources which persistently provide false information. 

At the same time, because this is well-known, double agents can be 

given valid and verifiable information to establish their credibility―

a form of conditioning. Some cynics in this line of work, therefore, 

observe that you only have to be suspicious of those who provide 

you with good information and those who provide you with bad 

information. Detecting deception obviously can be trying work.22

 Intelligence organizations may practice deception in order to 

protect their own resources and capabilities. Most of this involves 

some form of passive deception. In addition to the use of double 

agents, false intelligence operations can be mounted to feign interest 

in something extraneous to your real interests―a form of diversion. 
12

 In recent years, intelligence agencies have even found themselves 

in the business of conducting training sessions for the media on 

how to spot deception. Given the importance of public opinion in 

international affairs, it is not enough that intelligence agencies be 

able to detect deception by their adversaries. It is essential that the 

deceptions be revealed to the world. And because no one is sure 

whom to believe in the deception game, it is sometimes important 

to have a nongovernment voice reveal the deceptions of others. 

Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, as preparation for military 

operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Defense Intelligence Agency 

(DIA) held briefings for the media to point out some basic methods 

for testing claims other nations might make concerning American 

atrocities. Based largely on the experience of Iraqi and Serb attempts 

to make false claims about U.S. bomb damage, DoD offered basic 

“how to detect deception” training sessions for members of the 

Fourth Estate.23 From this, it is clear that the Pentagon appreciates 

that deception is about more than immediate military utility. 

Deception and Terrorism.

 Despite the fact that most of the historical examples of military 

deception discussed to this point allude to conventional military 

operations, it is important to note that terrorists can use all of the techniques discussed in this monograph. Terrorists rely upon both 

active and passive deception to operate and to survive. Passive 

deception includes the use of aliases, secure methods of communication, and bases in areas both difficult to reach and to observe. 

Active deception may include diversions, conditioning, and cover―

often in combination. 

 If terrorists provide indications that they have hostile intentions 

against a specific set of targets but then fail to strike those targets, 

they may gain several advantages. They generate fear, force security 

forces to expend time and treasure, and create general aggravation 

and inconvenience (e.g., airlines flight cancellations over holidays). 

They may cause you to doubt your methodologies and to be less 

sensitive to such information in the future. Or, tangentially, they 

could use such information to distract you away from the target they 

actually mean to strike. Given that terrorism uses fear as a method 
13

to an ends, any activity that generates some degree of fear and 

uncertainty provides a partial success for the terrorists. 

 An oft-quoted sound byte which has come out of the “War on 

Terrorism” is the advice to “think outside of the box.” Politicians, 

media experts, academics, and others have repeated this cliché. 

Unfortunately, it is virtually useless. “Outside the box” defines all 

of infinity―minus your “box.” The fact that terrorists use a wide 

array of deception techniques makes this problem all the more 

obvious.24

The Ethics of Deception.

 No discussion of the fundamentals of deception would be complete 

without a brief mention of the legal and ethical aspects of the subject. 

As one might expect, there has been considerable disagreement in 

this area for some time. Still, a few basic observations are in order.

 Surprising to many, the specific legal restraints on the use of 

deception are relatively clear and precise. Domestic law imposes few 

restrictions regarding military deception. Unless one tells a falsehood 

while under oath in a court of law or makes a false statement in some 

other setting where they are legally bound to be truthful, domestic 

law does not apply to military deception. As one legal scholar puts 

it, “there is no constitutional principle that says that the President of 

the United States or the Executive Branch must tell the truth.”25

 International law provides more limitations. Generally speaking, 

the United States recognizes the restrictions established in the Hague 

and Geneva Conventions over the past 140 years. In combination, 

these form the “Laws of Warfare,” recognized by the U.S. military 

and codified by official manuals. In the U.S. Army, this information 

is contained in Field Manual 27-10, The Laws of Land Warfare.

26

 The restrictions placed on “stratagems” or “ruses of war” include 

the prohibition of “treachery or perfidy.” Examples include the false 

use of flags of truce, wearing enemy uniforms or flying enemy colors 

while in combat, masquerading as international aid personnel, or 

using hospitals or other protected sites for military purposes. The 

prohibitions are explicit and specific.27

It is when one enters the realm of ethical considerations, that

one encounters the complexities inherent to the justification of deception. Unfortunately (or fortunately), lawyers, philosophers, and 
14

ethicists do not always agree as to how one sets out to judge the 

ethical and moral dimensions of the subject. Broadly speaking, 

two general approaches to such measurement exist. These include 

the idealist and the realist schools. Not everyone agrees how to 

define these approaches and each contains a number of subsets or 

permutations. Nevertheless, a basic distinction is generally accepted 

by all.

 The idealists make moral and ethical distinctions based on 

an absolute set of standards. If disinformation and falsehoods are 

wrong, all examples of such behavior are wrong. The ends do not 

justify the means. This is absolute. There are no exceptions.28

 The so-called realists, or pragmatists, argue that the question 

ultimately boils down to a cost-benefit analysis. Does the harm done 

by being deceptive outweigh the good the deception will accomplish? 

The nature of analysis required to answer that question and the 

values assigned to the various costs and benefits are subjective. In 

the eyes of the realists, the ethics of deception are both situational 

dependent and relative to the value structure of the observer.29

 This is closely related to the operational cost-benefit analysis 

that must always accompany a decision to implement deception 

operations. Clearly no one wishes to conduct deception operations 

which cost more than they contribute to success. The realist 

perspective on the ethical implications follows a similar path―and 

may, on occasion, overlap the operational considerations.30

 One reason nations agree to international restrictions on 

“treachery,” as noted above, is the realist concern that engaging in 

those acts could create problems out of proportion to the limited 

advantages such deception might provide. For example, the limitation 

on using hospitals or international aid symbols for military cover 

assumes that nations find the safety of such vital organizations more 

important than the limited advantages their abuse might afford.

 The realist school also notes that there are potential ethical 

costs inherent to any deception operation. A political or military 

organization which indulges in disinformation loses a corresponding 

amount of credibility. Indeed, if one is practicing deception in order 

to affect public or international opinion, the “blow back” from loss 

of credibility can easily prove quite damaging. This consideration 

gained international attention when it was revealed in early 2002 

that DoD had established an “Office of Strategic Influence.” While it 
15

was quickly asserted that this organization would not be deceptive, 

media sources implied that foreign media might be provided with 

manipulated information. This set off a flurry of charges and denials 

and the eventual closing of the office. Even the appearance of 

deception can be expensive.31

 This is especially true in nations which are democratic republics 

with a valued tradition of press freedom. The ability of the public 

to make informed decisions about all political policies, especially 

military policies, relies on a well-informed media. When the military 

serving a democratic republic misleads the public or is involved in 

an action which misleads the public, it is difficult to imagine that 

there are many advantages that would justify that cost.

 This is not to say that realists would deny military organizations 

the right to conduct deception operations. What they would 

advocate is a careful cost-benefit analysis of deception operations 

and a recommendation to favor those deception operations where 

it is possible to mislead the enemy without misleading your own 

people. 

Dealing with Deception. 

 A comprehensive methodology for dealing with deception will 

never be written. It is a nebulous and ever changing field of virtually 

infinite proportions. Indeed, to believe that such a methodology is 

possible would be to misunderstand the nature of deception.

 Nevertheless, a few useful observations may be possible. Over the 

years, many pundits have quoted the Faber College motto from the 

movie Animal House―“Knowledge is good.” Trite as it may sound, 

it is absolutely true regarding deception. The more that you know 

about your adversaries and about the events which are unfolding, 

the better prepared you will be to combat deception. Understanding 

your enemies’ intentions and capabilities helps to define the general 

limits of their objectives and operations. Never rely on a limited 

number of sources of information or a limited number of collection 

methodologies. The more sources one has, the more cross references 

one can make. The more one knows, the harder it is for someone 

to manipulate information out of context. The more one knows, the 

more likely one will detect a fabrication. 
16

 Knowledge should also include knowledge about oneself. 

Recognize the biases and assumptions that one, one’s organization, 

and one’s culture possess. Beware of “mirror imaging”―anytime 

one assumes that others will behave in a way similar to oneself, 

one is opening the door to self-deception.

 The old intelligence advice to “know your enemy” must 

encompass advice to study your enemy’s methods of deception. 

During the Cold War, western intelligence services studied Soviet 

Dezinformatsia and Maskirovka doctrines. This was quite helpful in 

detecting and dealing with many deceptions. Nevertheless, this 

familiarity never prevented the deception campaigns from posing a 

threat. Such study will never be fool-proof―there will always be new 

and unexpected techniques and approaches.

Summary.

 Deception comes in many forms and “types.” It has many 

objectives and can be accomplished by many methods. It may be 

active or passive. It operates on many levels. In short, there is much 

to know about deception.

 What is known about deception in the past is of considerable, 

if general, use in the present. We have developed terms to describe 

the different methods and levels of disinformation. This is useful. 

We know the dangers inherent to mirror imaging and cognitive 

dissonance. This is important. We can appreciate the need for the 

synthesis of intelligence methodologies. This is vital. But, despite 

these realizations, we can never be confident we are not being 

deceived. 

 These observations may seem self-evident to even a casual student 

of deception. Therefore, one might wonder why these obvious 

statements need repeating. The answer is simple. In successful 

deception operations, the perpetrator hopes that one or several of 

these self-evident observations will be over looked.
17

GLOSSARY OF TERMS RELATING TO DECEPTION

Strategic Deception: Deception which disguises your basic objectives, 

intentions, strategies, and capabilities.

Operational Deception: Deception which confuses or diverts an adversary 

in regard to a specific operation or action you are 

preparing to conduct.

Tactical Deception: Deception which misleads others while they are 

actively involved in competition with you, your 

interests, or your forces.

“A” Type Deception: “Ambiguity Deception” geared toward creating 

general confusion.

“M” Type Deception: “Misleading Deception” designed to mislead an 

adversary into a specific and preconceived 

direction. 

Fabrication: The creation of false information or images to 

mislead an adversary as to your intentions and/

or capabilities. This is deception via manufactured 

data (e.g., forgeries).

Manipulation: The use of true or factual data in such a way as to 

create a false impression. The information is not 

false, but through using it out of context, leaving 

out some of the details, or providing a false balance 

of emphasis, the impression is skewed (e.g., being 

quoted out of context).

Active Deception: Any attempt to create the impression of intentions 

and capabilities which you do not, in fact, possess.

Passive Deception: Efforts designed to prevent detection of your 

actual capabilities and intentions.

Denial: Methods used to conceal state and military secrets, 

particularly from foreign intelligence collection.
18

Deception (as used in the The manipulation of information and perceptions 

combination “Denial and to induce the target of that deception to take or not 

Deception”): take an action, thereby benefiting the deceiver.

Note: “Denial and deception are interrelated. Denial is the basis for a successful 

deception. One cannot manipulate or blur the truth or lie convincingly unless 

the truth is first concealed.” John Yurechko, Defense Intelligence Agency, “DoD 

Briefing on Iraqi Denial and Deception,” Tuesday, October 8, 2002, 12:58 p.m. 

EDT.

Dezinformatsia: The dissemination of false or misleading 

information intended to confuse, discredit or 

embarrass the enemy. (Marshals of the Soviet 

Union A. A. Grechko and N. V. Ogarkov [successive 

Chairmen of the Main Editorial Commission], 

The Soviet Military Encyclopedia; English Language 

Edition, Vol. 1, William C. Green and W. Robert 

Reeves, ed. and trans., Boulder, CO: Westview 

Press, 1993, pp. 345-346.

Maskirovka: “A means of securing the combat operations and 

daily activity of forces; a complex of measures 

designed to mislead the enemy as to the presence 

and disposition of forces and various military 

objects, their condition, combat readiness and 

operations and also the plans of the commander 

. . . Maskirovka contributes to the achievement of 

surprise for the actions of forces, the preservation 

of combat readiness and the increased survivability 

of objects” (Grechko and Ogarkov, pp. 277-280).

Passive Camouflage: The disguise or cloaking of forces and/or facilities 

to prevent their detection by an enemy.

Active Camouflage: The artificial creation of the image or impression 

that you have a force or capability that does not 

actually exist.

Diversion: The intentional distraction of an enemy’s attention 

away from the area of interest or attack. Two basic 

types: feint and demonstration.

Feint: An attack by friendly forces to distract enemy 

attention from your main area of interest or 

attack. 
19

Demonstration: The deployment of forces to distract an enemy, but 

such a deployment does not usually include actual 

contact or combat. The purpose of a diversion is 

simple―to mislead an enemy away from your real 

operations and objectives.

Conditioning: The repetition of what could be preparations for 

a hostile action without conducting hostilities―

thereby lulling the victim into a false sense of 

security. This is a variation of the “familiarity 

breeds contempt” theme.

Cover: The use of an apparently nonthreatening activity 

to disguise preparation for or initiation of a hostile 

act. A common example is the use of a training 

exercise to hide preparations for an attack.

Note: Conditioning and cover may occur in combination with one another―they 

can be mutually supportive. A common example is a military training exercise.
20

ENDNOTES

 1. For a general review of concepts of deception, see Colonel Michael Dewar, 

The Art of Deception in Warfare, Newton Abbot, Devon, UK: David & Charles 

Publishers, 1989, pp. 9-22; Jon Latimer, Deception in War: The Art of the Bluff, the 

Value of Deceit, and the Most Thrilling Episodes of Cunning in Military History, from 

the Trojan Horse to the Gulf War, Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press, 2001, pp. 

1-5; and James F. Dunnigan and Albert A. Nofi, Victory and Deceit: Deception and 

Trickery at War, San Jose, CA: Writers Club Press, 2001, pp. 1-31.

 2. An excellent overview of camouflage in nature is provided in Marco 

Ferrari, Colors for Survival: Mimicry and Camouflage in Nature, Charlottesville, VA: 

Thomasson Grant & Howell, 1993. How examples in nature have affected military 

deception is discussed in Guy Hartcup, Camouflage: A History of Concealment 

and Deception in War, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1980, pp. 9-11; and in 

J. Bowyer Bell and Barton Whaley, Cheating and Deception, New Brunswick, NJ: 

Transaction Publishers, 1991, pp. 48-52.

 3. The process of choosing methods of deception is examined in Latimer, 

pp. 71-100; while Bell and Whaley, pp. 45-74, discuss characteristics of types of 

deception.

 4. An introduction to this crisis is available at Digital History under “Western 

Expansion, The Mexican War,” at http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/database/article_

display.cfm?HHID=316, accessed July 20, 2004. For a variety of opinions as to the 

motives of the Polk administration, see Archie P. McDonald, ed., The Mexican 

War: Crisis for American Democracy, Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1969; and Ramón 

Eduardo Ruiz, The Mexican War: Was it Manifest Destiny? New York: Holt, Rinehart 

and Winston, 1963.

 5. See President McKinley’s “Report on the Findings of the Sampson Board’s 

Inquiry into the Maine’s Loss,” March 28, 1898, accessed at http://www.spanamwar.

com/McKinleymaine.htm, July 15, 2004.

 6. Philip Knightley and John Pilger, The First Casualty: The War Correspondent As 

Hero and Myth-Maker from the Crimea to Kosovo, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 

Press, 2002, provide a general survey of the role of the media in reporting events 

leading up to war and the wars themselves.

7. John F. Bratzel and Leslie B. Rout, Jr., “FDR and the ‘Secret Map’,” The 

Wilson Quarterly, Vol. 9, New Year’s 1985, pp. 167-173.

 8. This is discussed in “Ex-British Agent Says FDR’s Nazi Map Faked,” Foreign 

Intelligence Literary Scene, Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 

December 1984, pp. 1-3; “President Roosevelt’s Navy Day Address on World 

Affairs,” The New York Times, October 28, 1941; and Mark Weber, “Roosevelt’s 

‘Secret Map’ Speech,” The Journal for Historical Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, Spring 1986, p. 

125.

 9. See Michael Beschloss, Mayday: The U-2 Affair: The Untold Story of the Greatest 

US-USSR Spy Scandal, New York, Harper Collins, 1987.
21

 10. Robert McNamara’s explanation of the “missile gap” can be accessed in 

his 1996 interview for the CNN series “The Cold War,” at http://www.cnn.com/

SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/12/interviews/mcnamara/.

 11. The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 

amended as of June 9, 2004, is available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/. 

 12. Good background narratives discussing deception in warfare prior to the 

20th century can be found in Latimer, pp. 6-36; Dewar, pp. 23-34; and Dunnigan 

and Nofi, pp. 32-109.

 13. See Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig, Strategic Military Deception, 

Oxford, Pergamon, 1982, pp. 5-7.

 14. The importance of “noise” in the intelligence failure regarding Pearl Harbor 

is most clearly explained in Roberta Wohlstetter’s elderly, but seminal work, Pearl 

Harbor: Warning and Decision, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1962. 

 15. The D-Day deceptions are recounted in many sources, but the best analysis 

to date is to be found in the British official history, Michael Howard, British 

Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol. 5, Strategic Deception, London, HMSO, 

1990; Anthony Cave Brown, Bodyguard of Lies, New York, Harper & Row, 1975; 

and in Thaddeus Holt, The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World 

War, New York, Scribner, 2004.

 16. For examples of chicanery with runway craters, see Alfred Price, Targeting 

the Reich, London: Greenhill Books, 2003, p. 86; and Seymour Reit, Masquerade: 

The Amazing Camouflage Deceptions of World War II, New York: Hawthorn, 1978, 

photographs following p. 90.

 17. Biblical scholars will remember the accounts of Gideon in the Old 

Testament, and classical scholars will point to examples which range from the 

previously mentioned Trojan Horse to the ruses employed by Caesar in Gaul. For 

an overview of the origins of deception doctrines, see Everett L. Wheeler, Stratagem 

and the Vocabulary of Military Trickery, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988. 

 18. In an unsubstantiated story told to the author by a World War II U.S. 

Army Air Force pilot, American photo intelligence detected a number of Japanese 

dummy aircraft on dispersal sites on the island of Rabaul. These dummies fooled 

no one, and they were ignored by allied bombing raids. However, late in the 

war, when Rabaul had been by-passed by General MacArthur’s island hopping 

campaign, it was used as a “seasoning” target for newly arrived allied aircrew. 

On one of these raids, an inexperienced bombardier struck the dummy aircraft by 

mistake. The result was a series of secondary explosions which went on for hours. 

The Japanese had placed ammunition and fuel stockpiles under their obvious 

“active camouflage.” This story has not been confirmed by other sources to date, 

but, even if it is not true or is possibly embellished, the point remains valid―active 

camouflage could be used as passive camouflage.

 19. Each of these terms is defined in The Department of Defense Dictionary of 

Military and Associated Terms, amended as of June 9, 2004, and is available at http://

www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/.
22

 20. Again, each of these terms is defined in ibid.

 21. See a collection of Johannes von Goethe’s quotations in the John Petrie 

Collection at http://www.arches.uga.edu/~jpetrie/goethe.html.

 22. An examination of the counterintelligence problems associated with 

double agents can be found in David C. Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors, New York: 

Harper & Row, 1980. 

 23. DoD provided these briefings to media audiences in Washington, DC, 

in 2001 and 2002, and examples are available online at http://www.defenselink.mil/

news/Oct2001/g011024-D-6570C.html and http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2002/

t10082002_t1008dia.html.

 24. An interesting collection of essays is to be found in John Norton Moore, ed., 

Deception and Deterrence in “Wars of National Liberation,” State-Sponsored Terrorism 

and Other Forms of Secret Warfare, Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1997.

 25. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., “US Domestic Legal Constraints on Deception” at 

http://www.duke.edu/web/tiss/archives/conferencerecords/Deception/Nichol.html.

 26. FM 27-10, The Laws of Land Warfare, Foreword, at http://faculty.ed.umuc.

edu/~nstanton/FWD.htm.

 27. Ibid., Chapter 2, Section V. at http://faculty.ed.umuc.edu/~nstanton/Ch2.

htm#s5; and Scott L. Silliman “International Legal Constraints” at http://www.duke.

edu/web/tiss/archives/conferencerecords/Deception/Silliman.html.

 28. See the discussion in Elizabeth Kiss, “Strategic Deception in Modern 

Democracies: The Ethical Dimension” at http://www.duke.edu/web/tiss/archives/

conferencerecords/Deception/Kiss.pdf; Rushworth M. Kidder, “Ethical Deception?” at 

http://www.globalethics.org/newsline/members/issue.tmpl?articleid=11180122325517; 

and Major John Mark Mattox, “The Moral Status of Military Deception” at http://

www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/JSCOPE00/Mattox00.html. An interesting overview of the 

basic issues can be found in Sissela Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private 

Life, New York: Pantheon, 1978.

 29. Again, note the discussions to be found in Kiss and Mattox above. 

 30. See Walter Jajko’s overview of the role of ethical considerations in deception 

planning in his “Deception: Appeal for Acceptance; Discourse on Doctrine; Preface 

to Planning” at http://www.poliscitaylorandfrancis.com/pdfs/cst/novdec02_jajko.pdf.

 31. See the press coverage of this issue in CNN stories at http://www.cnn.

com/2002/US/02/19/gen.strategic influence and http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/02/26/

defense.office.