VENEZUELA’S HUGO CHÁVEZ, BOLIVARIAN SOCIALISM,

AND ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

Max G. Manwaring

October 2005

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FOREWORD

 This monograph comes at a time when the U.S. and Venezuelan 

governments are intensifying an ongoing series of acrimonious 

charges and countercharges. Each country has argued repeatedly 

that the other is engaged in a political-economic-military struggle 

for Western Hemisphere hegemony. On a more personal level, the 

United States maintains that President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela 

is playing a destabilizing role in the region, and is compromising 

the quality of democracy and the exercise of power in Venezuela 

and other parts of the Americas. Chávez rebuts that the only 

destabilizing factor in the hemisphere is President George W. Bush, 

and that democracy and power long since have been perverted by 

American capitalists and local elites for their own purposes. And the 

U.S.-Venezuelan verbal sparing match continues unabated.

 The author’s intent is to explain who Hugo Chávez is, where it 

appears that he is going, and how he intends to get there; and the 

implications for democracy and stability in Latin America. He 

concludes that—in the worst case—Chávez is developing the 

conceptual and physical bases for an asymmetric “Super Insurgency.” 

 This timely monograph contributes significantly to an understanding of the new kinds of threats characteristic of a world in which 

instability and irregular conflict are no longer on the margins of 

global politics. For those responsible for making and implementing 

national security policy in the United States, the rest of the Western 

Hemisphere, and elsewhere in the world, this analysis is compelling. 

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph 

as part of the ongoing debate on global and regional security and 

stability.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

MAX G. MANWARING holds the General Douglas MacArthur 

Chair and is Professor of Military Strategy at the U.S. Army War 

College. He is a retired U.S. Army colonel and an Adjunct Professor 

of International Politics at Dickinson College. He has served in 

various civilian and military positions, including the U.S. Army War 

College, the U.S. Southern Command, and the Defense Intelligence 

Agency. Dr. Manwaring is the author and co-author of several 

articles, chapters, and reports dealing with political-military affairs, 

democratization and global ungovernability, and Latin American 

security affairs. He is also the editor or co-editor of El Salvador at 

War; Beyond Declaring Victory and Coming Home: The Challenges of 

Peace and Stability Operations; Deterrence in the 21st Century; and The 

Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century. 

Dr. Manwaring holds a B.S. in Economics, a B.S. in Political Science, 

an M.A. in Political Science, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the 

University of Illinois. He is also a graduate of the U.S. Army War 

College.
v

SUMMARY

 The author of this monograph answers questions regarding “Who 

is Hugo Chávez?” “What is the basis of Chávez’s bolivarianismo?”

“What is the context that defines Bolivarian threats?” “How does 

Chávez define contemporary asymmetric warfare, and what are the 

key components of success?” “How can the innumerable charges 

and countercharges between the Venezuelan and U.S. governments 

be interpreted?” And “What are the implications for democracy and 

stability in Latin America?” 

 His conclusions are, first, that Hugo Chávez might be a military 

caudillo, but he is no “nut case.” He is, in fact, what Ralph Peters 

calls a “wise competitor.” Second, as such, he will not even attempt 

to defeat his enemies on their own terms. Rather, he will seek to shift 

the playing field away from conventional military confrontations 

and turn to nontraditional forms of assault on a nation’s stability 

and integrity. Third, as a consequence, it is important to understand 

that Chávez understands that every player in the international 

community from small powers to the U.S. superpower must 

cope simultaneously with four levels of contemporary threat. 

Accordingly, all the types of threats in those four levels of conflict 

are seen as methods of choice—or areas for exploitation—for any 

commercial, ideological, or other movement that is dedicated to 

achieving control or radical change in a given nation-state. Fourth, 

Chávez understands that asymmetric warfare is the methodology of 

the weak against the strong. He understands that this type of conflict 

requires more than weaponry and technology. It requires lucid and 

incisive thinking, resourcefulness, determination, imagination, 

and a certain disregard for convention. Chávez considers three 

issues to be key to success (or failure) in contemporary asymmetric 

conflict. They are closely related to bolivarianismo’s security scheme, 

social programs, and communications efforts. In these terms, he 

understands the sophistication and complexity of war as a whole. 

He also understands the value of facilitating the processes of state 

failure to achieve his objectives of establishing socialism for the 21st 

century, economic and political integration, and Latin American 

grandeza (greatness). And Chávez understands the centrality of 
vi

relative moral legitimacy in conflict—and the critical importance of 

creating popular perceptions that his cause is morally correct, and 

will lead to a better life for all.

 Finally, taken all together, this is “war as a whole,” or what 

Chávez calls “Guerra de todo el pueblo” (interchangeably: war of all 

the people, asymmetric, fourth-generation, or irregular war). At a 

minimum, Chávez and Venezuela are developing the conceptual 

and physical capability to challenge the status quo in Latin America, 

and to generate a “Super Insurgency” intended to bring about 

fundamental political and economic change in the region. Thus, as 

one sees Chávez’s ideas developing and maturing, it is becoming 

more and more obvious that his bolivarianismo is resonating with large 

numbers of people in Venezuela and the rest of Latin America—and 

that he should not be taken lightly. 

 This is the starting point from which to understand where 

Chávez may be going and how he expects to get there. And it is the 

starting point from which to understand the side effects that will 

shape the hemispheric security environment now and for the future. 

The consequences of failing to take this challenge seriously are clear. 

Unless thinking, actions, and organization are reoriented at the 

highest levels to deal with contemporary asymmetric realities, the 

problems of global, regional, and subregional democracy, stability, 

and security will resolve themselves—and not likely for the better.
1

VENEZUELA’S HUGO CHÁVEZ, BOLIVARIAN SOCIALISM,

AND ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

 Beginning with the election of Lieutenant Colonel Hugo 

Chávez Frias as President of Venezuela in 1998, the United States 

and Venezuela have exchanged a continuing series of acrimonious 

charges and countercharges. Each country has argued repeatedly 

that the other is engaged in a political-economic-military struggle for 

Western Hemisphere hegemony. Relatively recently, U.S. Assistant 

Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roger Noriega 

called on the Organization of American States (OAS) to strengthen its 

Carta Democrática’s (Democratic Charter) mechanisms to deal more 

effectively with threats to democracy, stability, and peace in Latin 

America.1 In that connection, in testimony before the U.S. Congress 

in January 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice argued that 

President Chávez was minimizing democracy in Venezuela and 

destabilizing security in the Latin American region.2 Subsequently, 

the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) supported those arguments 

and added its concern regarding Venezuelan purchases of large 

quantities of arms. Then, in February 2005, Central Intelligence 

Agency (CIA) Director Porter Goss put Venezuela at the top of the 

list of Latin American countries described as “areas of concern,” with 

the potential of playing a destabilizing role in the region.3 And, again, 

in May and June 2005, respectively, Assistant Secretary Noriega and 

Secretary Rice proposed the creation of a mechanism in the OAS that 

would monitor the quality of democracy and the exercise of power 

in Latin America.4

 President Chávez responded to these and similar allegations 

in February 2005 by saying, “The only destabilizing factor here [in 

Venezuela] is [U.S. President George W.] Bush.”5 In March 2005, he 

repeated a familiar theme that the United States intends to assassinate 

him and prayed for God to “save us” from President Bush and 

to “save the world from the true threat [the U.S. Colossus of the 

North].”6 Additionally, Chávez argued that the intent of his actions 

was simply to defend the sovereignty and greatness of his country 

and the region.7

 It is in the context of defending sovereignty and 

greatness that Chávez consistently returns to the idea of a “Bolivarian 
2

Revolution” (bolivarianismo) that is intended to develop the potential 

of Latin America to achieve Simón Bolívar’s dream of South American 

political-economic integration and grandeza (magnificence), to 

reduce U.S. hegemony in the region, and to change the geopolitical 

map of the Western Hemisphere.8

 In that connection, in April 2005, 

The Economist reported that Chávez had met with Cuba’s Fidel 

Castro and, among other things, proclaimed a 21st century socialist 

“alternative” to U.S.-style capitalism in the Americas.9

 And, U.S.-

Venezuelan verbal sparing continues unabated. 

 Who is this man, Chávez? How can the innumerable charges and 

countercharges between the Venezuelan and U.S. governments be 

interpreted? What are the implications for democracy and stability in 

Latin America? In an attempt to answer these and related questions, 

we center our analysis on the contemporary geopolitical conflict 

context of current Venezuelan “Bolivarian” policy. To accomplish 

this, a basic understanding of the political-historical context within 

which Venezuelan national security policy is generated is an essential 

first step toward understanding the situation as a whole. The second 

step requires an introductory understanding of Chávez’s concept of 

21st century socialism, and the political-psychological-military ways 

he envisions to achieve it. Then, a “levels of analysis” approach 

will provide a systematic understanding of the geopolitical conflict 

options, which have a critical influence on the logic that determines 

how such a policy as bolivarianismo might continue be implemented 

by Venezuela or any other country in the contemporary world 

security arena. At the same time, this analysis will provide an 

understanding of how other countries in the Western Hemisphere 

and elsewhere might begin to respond to bolivarianismo’s possible 

threats. Finally, this is the point from which we can generate strategiclevel recommendations for maintaining and enhancing stability in 

Latin America.10

THE POLITICAL-HISTORICAL CONTEXT WITHIN WHICH 

VENEZUELAN NATIONAL SECURITY CHOICES ARE MADE 

AND IMPLEMENTED 

Caudillos (strong men)—including “The Liberator,” Simón 

Bolívar, himself—dominated Venezuela in a succession of military 
3

dictatorships, from Independence in 1821 to the coup against the 

dictatorship of President Marcos Pérez Jiménez and the subsequent 

military junta in 1958. During that 137-year period, more than 20 

constitutions were drafted, promulgated, and ignored. More than 

50 armed revolts took their toll of life and property. Political parties 

meant little and political principles even less. In all, Venezuela 

exhibited the characteristics of a traditional authoritarian society 

until the oil industry began to boom after World War II.11

The Period from World War II and the Venezuelan Commitment 

to Democracy.

 Beginning with the elections of 1958 that followed the military 

junta, Venezuelans began to elect their political leadership. However, 

their concept of democracy was not derived from the Anglo-American 

tradition of limited state power and strong individual human rights. 

Rather, the current tradition of Venezuelan democracy has its roots 

firmly in the outcome of the French Revolution, and subsequent 

perversions of the Rousseauian concept of “total” (totalitarian) 

democracy, wherein the individual surrenders his rights and personal 

interests to the state in return for the strict enforcement of social 

harmony and the General Will.12 Prior to the French Revolution, kings 

ruled by “Divine Right” and were sovereign. With the revolution, 

however, sovereignty was shifted from the king to the nation-state. 

Thus, the state enjoys absolute power—through the enforcement of 

Rousseau’s General Will—as an essential right.13

 As a result, the modern political forces set in motion by a robust 

oil economy produced an experiment in democracy that was 

tempered by a strong centralized government. That government 

included a corporatist executive authority and security apparatus 

organized to direct and control the political and economic life of 

the country.14 In this context, the Venezuelan political system has 

been built on a pact among members of the elites, under which the 

dominant political parties and their “caudilloistic” leaders have been 

the principal actors. As Robespierre did after the French Revolution, 

contemporary Venezuelan political actors determine what they 

believe is best for themselves and for all citizens (e.g., the General 
4

Will). Thus, the Venezuelan state controls the wealth produced by 

its petroleum and other industries, and is the principal distributor 

of the surpluses generated in a highly regulated and subsidized 

economy. In that connection, to one extent or another—and some 

more than others—all the people and every enterprise in Venezuela 

feed off what has been called the piñata (a suspended breakable pot 

filled with candies for children’s parties) of the state treasury.15

 The political turmoil that has been generated in Venezuela 

and other parts of Latin America by recent political and economic 

transition that challenges comfortable “status quos,” or does not 

satisfy the expectations of the people, opens the way to serious 

stability problems. In these conditions—and given an authoritarian 

Latin American political tradition—ambitious political leaders find 

it easy to exploit popular grievances to catapult themselves into 

power—and stay there. The success of these leaders stems from 

solemn promises made directly to the masses to solve national 

and individual problems without regard to slow, obstructive, and 

corrupted democratic processes. Thus, through mass mobilization, 

supporting demonstrations, and subtle and not-so-subtle coercion, 

demagogic populist leaders are in a position to claim a mandate to 

place themselves above elections, political parties, legislatures, and 

courts—and govern as they see fit.16 This becomes a national and 

hemispheric security issue—and possible threat—when a population 

becomes radicalized by a leader who uses direct violence and indirect 

coercion to achieve his political objectives.17

The Post-1992 “Crisis of Governance” 

and Two Related Security Issues.

 The political-economic-social turmoil that has surrounded 

Chávez and his Bolivarian Revolution since his nearly successful 

military coup in February 1992 to the present time is instructive. 

The imprisonment of Chávez for his role in a 1992 coup attempt, 

his subsequent release, his overwhelming victory in gaining the 

presidency of the Republic in 1998, the riots and near overthrow 

of his government in 2002, the referendum of 2004 that confirmed 

him in office, and his expected success in the upcoming elections of 
5

2006 dramatically illustrate a struggle for reform and an expression 

of popular frustration with the failures of previous “democratically 

elected” governments.18 Many Venezuelan citizens and foreign 

observers expected those governments to move Venezuela to a more 

open polity, economic development, civil peace, and individual 

prosperity. Instead, those governments stagnated. They remained 

as closed as ever, meaningful development failed to take place, 

political turmoil and limited violence prevailed, and ordinary 

people continued to live in relative poverty. In that environment, 

corporatism, crony capitalism, and authoritarianism grew—along 

with a widespread disillusionment with “democracy.”19

 The post-1992 “crisis of governance,” during which the state was 

unable or unwilling to provide for the legitimate needs and desires 

of the Venezuelan people, “opened the doors of power to the left,” 

and to caudilloistic populists such as Chávez, who “reinforce their 

radical positions by inflaming anti-U.S. sentiment.”20 In turn, several 

other issues have been exposed that relate closely to hemispheric 

civil-military relations and regional stability. Only two of those 

issues will be examined here: first, the Venezuelan reaction to 

“globalization,” and, second, the issue of governance and the role of 

the armed forces. 

Globalization and Fractured Society. In addition to the U.S. policy 

of “democratic enlargement” in Latin America, globalization is 

also focusing people on the concept of transparent and accountable 

democracy. The rapid change that has taken place in the world since 

the end of the Cold War has challenged traditional closed political 

practices, social structures, cultural mores, and business practices. 

As a result, global economic integration not only has fostered great 

wealth, but also great disruption and dislocation—and political 

instability within elites and the masses.21

 Like all revolutions, globalization represents a shift of power 

from one group to another. In most countries, including Venezuela, 

it involves a possible power shift from the state and its bureaucrats 

to the private sector and its entrepreneurs. As this happens, all those 

who derive their income and status from positions in governing 

political institutions—or subsidies from the governmental piñata—

have two choices. They can become winners if they take some 
6

chances in adapting to the global world, or they can become losers if 

they do not further entrench themselves in the highly regulated and 

guaranteed economy. This includes managers and cronies who have 

been awarded monopolies by the state, as well as ordinary people 

who rely on the state for cheap gas, foodstuffs, and other consumer 

goods.22

 As a consequence, globalization also means possible fundamental 

change in “quality of life” for important sectors of the society and 

possible social disintegration, as various sectors contend with each 

other in the very personal struggle for survival in an unguaranteed 

economy. At the same time, this struggle between those sectors who 

would and would not take the chances involved in changing the basic 

economic status quo means a possible dilemma for the armed forces. 

This issue and the one below center on the fact that many poorer 

Venezuelans see President Chávez as their savior and champion in 

an impoverished and failing country. Other Venezuelans—especially 

from the middle classes—see Chávez as an altogether more sinister 

figure. They see him replacing democracy with autocracy and a 

mildly socialistic economy with something close to Marxist-Leninist 

communism.23

 Governance and the Role of the Armed Forces. Whether or not the 

new globalization rules are unacceptably oppressive and socially 

disintegrating depends very much on how they are made and 

enforced. Whether or not governance generates a transparent and 

viable political competence that can and will manage, coordinate, and 

maintain social harmony, national well-being, and justice depends, 

again, on how the rules are made and enforced.24 This takes us to the 

idea of responsible governance and the role of the armed forces in 

Venezuelan politics.

 It is important to remember that the Venezuelan armed forces 

governed the country during the 19th century and through the first 

half of the 20th century. Since 1958–59, there has been a redefinition 

of the role of the armed forces to the benefit of responsible democratic 

influences. That redefinition and transition is, of course, not yet 

complete. The situation is delicate, and factors that nourish political 

upheaval and the armed forces’ involvement in it are latent. Thus, 

it is possible that the military could resume a major role in the 21st 

century political process.25
7

 In that connection, the armed forces of Venezuela have always 

assumed that they have an obligation to resolve various internal 

crises. That is, if a governing regime deviates too significantly from 

the general armed forces’ doctrinal concept of social harmony and 

good of the state, the military will step into the political situation 

and provide corrective action. As a result, the military institution 

will have a role in the political process. That role may be either 

positive or negative—depending on how President Chávez involves 

the armed forces in the security decisionmaking and implementing 

processes.26

Conclusions on the Political-Historical Context 

in which Venezuelan Security Policy is Generated.

 This takes us to two questions asked earlier. First, “Who is 

Chávez?” Second, “Given the political-historical context within 

which President Chávez is pursuing bolivarianismo, what are the 

implications for democracy and stability in Venezuela and the rest 

of Latin America?” Brazil’s former President, Fernando Henrique 

Cardoso, draws from his personal experience and succinctly states 

his perspective on Chávez and the challenges to Venezuela’s and 

Latin America’s democracies in the following terms:

Chávez is in essence the reincarnation of the old caudillo. He is populist 

and salvationist. In this sense, he is very different from Lula (the current 

Brazilian President, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva). Lula is not interested in 

saving the world . . . [and] Lula has no revolutionary agenda for Brazil 

or the world. Chávez, in contrast, does have a revolutionary agenda. The 

problem is that he does not exactly know what it is. It exists only as a 

slogan called bolivarianism, which means nothing and serves only as a 

base to throw Venezuela’s future out the window.

Nothing has changed with Chávez. The country remains basically what 

it always has been. Venezuela continues to be ruled by a parasitic 

dominant class dependent on oil. The majority of the people are being 

fooled, but remain as excluded as ever. 

Ultimately, the vitality of Latin America’s democracies will depend on . . . 

the willingness of those who believe in the universal values of liberty 

to remain vigilant and act decisively against the totalitarian temptations 

that continue to impoverish the quality of political life and promote the 
8

politics of false hopes. This means combating caudillismo in Venezuela . . . 

and political incompetence in the entire region.27

 Cardozo and much of the rest of the world were probably right 

in characterizing Chávez as not much more than a traditional Latin 

American military caudillo—and maybe something of a “nut case.”

Since those early evaluations, however, it has become more and more 

obvious that Chávez and his advisors are developing a doctrine for 

Bolivarian socialism and Latin American grandeza, and defining 

ways and means of achieving those objectives. That doctrine is not 

well-defined or completely coherent, but it is resonating with large 

numbers of people and should not be taken lightly. As a consequence, 

Cardozo’s warning remains valid—“Ultimately, the vitality of Latin 

American democracies will depend on . . . combating caudillismo in 

Venezuela . . . and political incompetence in the entire region.”28

This is the basis and the reality of Chávez’s challenge to the Western 

Hemisphere. It is the starting point from which to understand 

specific instances and to develop strategies and principles of action 

that would either support or attempt to counter bolivarianismo—it is 

two sides of the same proverbial coin.

CHÁVEZ’S CONCEPT OF 21st CENTURY SOCIALISM 

AND HOW TO ACHIEVE IT

 Socialism for the 21st century and the expected regional 

integration it would engender (bolivarianismo) begins with a 

premise that traditional post-World War II socialist and MarxistLeninist political-economic models made mistakes, but the theory 

remains totally valid. The idea is that representative democracy 

and the U.S.-dominated capitalism of the new global era are total 

failures. Representative democracy and capitalism serve only 

elites—not common people. These failures must now be replaced by 

“participatory democracy,” “direct democracy,” or what detractors 

have called radical populism. In these terms, Chávez is re-elaborating 

the concept of democracy and promoting a socialist economic system 

as two parts of an overarching political model for the Latin American 

region.29 As a precautionary note, we must remember that the key 

concepts and the various implementing programs of this model are 

works in progress and without established time lines. 
9

Key Concepts of the “New” Socialism.

 According to President Chávez and his advisors, in order to 

make the Bolivarian project work, it is necessary to implement 

diverse policies beginning with a “system of power.” That system is 

intended to ensure internal peace and societal harmony in Venezuela 

that will—in time—provide the foundations for a Latin Americanwide Regional Power Bloc (BRP), and economic and political 

integration.30

 The system of power upon which internal and external Bolivarian 

objectives will be achieved is based on the concept of direct 

democracy. Importantly, the main tenets dictate that: 1) the new 

authority in the state must be a leader who communicates directly 

with the people, interprets their needs, and emphasizes “social 

expenditure” to guarantee the legitimate needs and desires of the 

people; 2) elections, Congress, and the courts will provide formal 

democracy and international legitimacy, but will have no real role 

in governance or the economy; 3) the state will continue to own or 

control the major means of national production and distribution; and 

4) the national and regional political-economic integration function 

will be performed by the leader by means of his financial, material, 

and political-military support of people’s movements.31

 This takes us to the notion of “Guerra de todo el pueblo” (war of 

all the people, or people’s war)—asymmetric, fourth-generation, or 

irregular conflict.32 Lacking the conventional power to challenge the 

United States or any of Venezuela’s immediate neighbors, President 

Chávez seems to have decided that asymmetric conflict is a logical 

means of expression and self-assertion. It is a concept as old as war 

itself. This is the methodology of the weak against the strong. The 

primary characteristic is the use of disparity between the contending 

parties to gain advantage. Strategic asymmetry has been defined as 

“acting, organizing, and thinking differently than opponents in order 

to maximize one’s own advantages, exploit an opponent’s weaknesses, 

attain the initiative, or gain greater freedom of action. It can have both 

psychological and physical dimensions.”33 That is, Chávez’s concept 

of asymmetric conflict involves the organized application of coercive 

military or nonmilitary, lethal or nonlethal, direct or indirect, or a 
10

mix of various unconventional or irregular methods. This would be 

a “Super Insurgency” that integrates the fundamental instruments of 

political, economic, social-moral, informational, and military power. 

And, like all others, this insurgency is intended to resist, oppose, 

gain control of, or overthrow an existing government or symbol of 

power—and bring about fundamental political change.34

 To further elaborate, this kind of holistic conflict is based 

primarily on words, images, and ideas. Secondarily, it may be based 

on more traditional military means. More than anything, it is about 

perceptions, beliefs, expectations, legitimacy, and the political will 

to attempt such an ill-defined revolutionary vision as bolivarianismo. 

And, the more messianic the vision, the more likely the leader and 

his followers will remain committed to the use of these politicalpsychological means to achieve their ends. Thus, this type of 

asymmetric conflict is not won by seizing specific territory militarily 

or destroying specific buildings, cities, or industrial capability. It 

is won by altering the political-psychological factors that are most 

relevant in a targeted culture.35

Major Implementing Programs for the “New” Socialism.

 As might be expected of a caudillo with limited political experience, 

programs to implement this vision are numerous, ambitious, vast, 

and still incomplete. They include, however, three general social, 

communications, and military/security schemes.

Social Programs. To strengthen his personal position and internal 

power base, President Chávez is spending large amounts of money 

on an amorphous Plan Bolívar 2000 that builds and renovates schools, 

clinics, day nurseries, roads, and housing for the poor. Additionally, 

Chávez is developing education and literacy outreach programs, 

agrarian reform programs, and workers’ cooperatives. At the same 

time, he has established MERCAL, a state company that provides 

subsidized staple foodstuffs to the poor. Chávez also has imported 

16,000 Cuban doctors to help take care of the medical needs of the 

Venezuelan underclasses. Clearly, these programs offer tangible 

benefits to the mass of Venezuelans who were generally neglected 

by previous governments.36
11

Communications. The intent, in this effort, is to fabricate mass 

consensus. Bolivarianismo will require maximum media (radio, TV, 

and newspapers/magazines) support to purvey ideas, develop 

public opinion, and generate electoral successes. Ample evidence 

exists that Chávez-controlled media are using emotional arguments 

to gain attention, exploit real and imagined fears of the population 

and create outside enemies as scapegoats for internal failings, and to 

inculcate the notion that opposition to the regime equates to betrayal 

of the country. And, to help ensure the “irreversability” of the process 

for re-establishing Socialism for the 21st century, the Venezuelan 

penal code has been changed to include criminal penalties for “lack 

of [regime] respect” and “provoking fear or anxiety in the public.” 

 President Chávez’s personal involvement in the communications 

effort is also clear and strong. Reportedly, statements, speeches, and 

interviews of Chávez are being broadcast throughout Venezuela and 

the Caribbean Basin at least 4 hours a day, every day on Television del 

Sur.

37

The Security Scheme. First, the Venezuelan Constitution of 1999 

provides political and institutional autonomy for the armed forces, 

under the centralized control of the president and commander-inchief. President Chávez has also created an independent National 

Police Force, outside the traditional control of the armed forces, 

which is responsible to the president. At the same time, efforts have 

gone forward to establish a 1.5 million-person military reserve and 

two additional paramilitary organizations—the Frente Bolivariano 

de Liberación (Bolivarian Liberation Front) and the Ejército del 

Pueblo en Armas (Army of the People in Arms). The armed forces 

and the police perform traditional national defense and internal 

security missions, within the context of preparing for what Chávez 

calls fourth-generation, asymmetric, irregular conflict, or war of all 

the people. The military reserve and the paramilitary are charged to 

(1) protect the country from a U.S. and/or Colombian invasion, or 

resist such an invasion with an Iraqi-style insurgency; and (2) act as 

armed, anti-opposition forces.38 The institutional separation of the 

various security organizations ensures that no one institution can 

control the others, but the centralization of those institutions under 

the President ensures his absolute control of security and “social 

harmony” in Venezuela.39
12

Conclusions Regarding Chávez’s Model for the Achievement 

of a “New” Socialism.

 What President Chávez has achieved by improving the physical 

well-being of many poor Venezuelans and by continually verbalizing 

these successes on television and in the press is the formation of a large 

popular base of support. What he has accomplished by reorganizing 

the security apparatus of the Venezuelan state is to gain complete 

control of that apparatus; preclude any political independence, 

influence, or power it may have had; and give himself instruments of 

power that he can wield along with others who can make Venezuela 

a regional power. With this, the full political-military-economicsocial-informational power of the Venezuelan state is unified in the 

singular pursuit of Chávez’s strategic objectives. 

 At a minimum, then, Venezuela may be becoming capable of 

helping to destabilize large parts of Latin America. The political 

purpose of any given destabilization effort would be simply to prepare 

the way to force a radical restructuring of a targeted country and its 

governance.40 Venezuelan money, technology, and arms easily could 

be provided to radical movements and insurgent groups throughout 

Central and South America. Consider the example of contemporary 

Bolivia. Over the past 5 years, that country has experienced a series 

of political-psychological crises in which three presidents have 

been forced undemocratically to leave office. Most recently, former 

President Carlos Mesa resigned to defuse large-scale protests 

organized by powerful populist groups and to avert what he saw 

as a possible civil war. Nevertheless, opposition leaders refused to 

allow the next two constitutionally-designated individuals to assume 

the presidency. Agreement was finally reached when the third-inline for the presidency—President of the Supreme Court Eduardo 

Rodriguez—agreed to call quick elections.41 If Evo Morales, backed 

by his Movement to Socialism, wins that election (as expected)—or 

if he follows the pattern of imposición used to determine President 

Mesa’s replacement and imposes a new president of his choice—

what a coup that would be for his newest best friend, Chávez!

 This is the basis of the contemporary U.S.-Venezuelan diplomatic 

charge and countercharge syndrome and the answer to the question 
13

of democracy within the context of bolivarianismo. It is the starting 

point from which to understand where Chávez may be going and 

how he expects to get there. And, it is the starting point from which to 

understand the side effects that will shape the security environment 

for now and the future, in which Latin America and the rest of the 

hemisphere must struggle and survive. It is also the starting point 

from which to develop the strategic vision to counter radical populism 

and caudillismo, as well as the instability and chaos they engender. 

Thus, Noriega may have been right when he argued that the diverse, 

myriad, nontraditional threats [that Chávez appears to be gravitating 

toward] can “challenge our democracies and undermine the security 

and prosperity of our citizens in too many of our states.”42

THE VENEZUELAN AND HEMISPHERIC STABILITYSECURITY PROBLEM: A LEVELS OF ANALYSIS APPROACH

 The Latin American mainstream, juridically oriented, “absolutist”43 security dialogue demonstrates that many political and military 

leaders and scholars of international relations have not adjusted yet 

to the reality that internal and transnational nonstate actors can be as 

important as traditional nation-states in determining global political 

patterns and outcomes in world affairs. Similarly, many political and 

military leaders see nonstate actors as bit players in the international 

security arena. At most, many consider nontraditional actors to be 

low-level law enforcement problems, and, as a result, many argue 

that these actors do not require sustained national security policy 

attention.44 Yet more than half the countries in the world are struggling 

to maintain their political, economic, and territorial integrity in the 

face of diverse direct and indirect nonstate challenges, together with 

internal and transnational challenges.45

 Thus, a more realistic, contemporary, nontraditional security 

dialogue tends to focus on enhancing real and popular perceptions 

of relative stability and well-being. Stability and well-being 

tend to refer to the use of a variety of means—only one of which 

is specifically military—in the pursuit of national and regional 

security-stability objectives. In turn, enemies can be traditional 

nation-states, nontraditional external nonstate actors, violent 

nontraditional intrastate actors, or proxies or surrogates that might 
14

threaten the achievement of those objectives and the vitality of the 

state. Additionally, the security dialogue in Latin America, and 

much of the rest of the world, define poverty as an enemy and a 

threat to national and international stability and security. As a result, 

the enemy is not necessarily a recognizable military entity or an 

industrial/technical capability to make war. At base, the enemy now 

becomes the individual political actor who plans and implements 

the kind of violence that threatens national well-being and exploits 

the root causes of instability.46

 The major trend that permeates the security dialogue involves 

a slow, generalized move away from the absolutist concept of 

state security and sovereignty toward a “full spectrum” of closely 

related national, subnational, and individual political-military and 

socioeconomic security threats. These threats can lead to radical 

political change or to the failure of the traditional nation-state. 

The recognized interdependence of each component of the threat 

spectrum provides the point from which to develop the strategic 

vision to escape the intellectual vise-lock of the more restricted 

juridical definition of national security and sovereignty, and explore 

the idea of “effective” sovereignty. That is, effective but fair state 

control of all the national territory and the people in it.47

 In that connection, understanding the components of the spectrum as a holistic conceptual framework provides a more complete 

vision of the conflict arena and a more substantive comprehension of 

what Chávez calls war of all the people. But regardless of what the 

conflict threat is called, the logic of the situation further demonstrates 

that the conscious choices that the international community and 

individual nation-states make about how to deal with the broader, 

more realistic, concept of threat will define the processes of national, 

regional, and global security and well-being for now and into the 

future.48

Perspectives on a Full Spectrum of Threats within 

the Venezuelan and Latin American Security Environment. 

 It would be helpful at the outset, then, to consider the complex 

security environment with reference to four different levels of 

analysis—each with a regional (Latin American) corollary, oriented 
15

toward countering a possible Venezuelan threat. From that point, 

contemporary asymmetric conflict and its implications may be 

examined. 

The First Level. This is a more or less traditional-legal level of 

analysis at the nation-state level that involves the potential threat 

of conventional interstate war. For example, President Chávez has 

defined Colombia as Venezuela’s most critical external threat.49

Addtionally, although remote, an undeniable possibility of interstate 

war—based on old territorial quarrels—exists between Venezuela 

and Colombia and between Venezuela and Guyana.50

 The corollary concerns possible Venezuelan support to 

ongoing insurgencies and radical populist movements in various 

Latin American states—and resultant bilateral and multilateral 

tensions. The corollary also concerns the traditional principle of 

“nonintervention.” The question, simply put, is, “How to respond to 

a country that is helping to destabilize its neighbors?” 

 The implications are enormous. Under the absolutist concept of 

national security and sovereignty, there is no aggression unless it is 

blatantly obvious, or can be proved legally, that uniformed forces 

of one country have forcefully moved into the national territory of 

another. 

 Now we understand that an aggressor may not necessarily be a 

recognized military entity. The enemy could become the state itself 

or a nonstate actor that plans and implements the kind of direct or 

indirect, lethal or nonlethal, or military or nonmilitary activity that 

subverts stability in other countries. The associated question for the 

Western Hemisphere is, “How to operationalize a rule-based system 

and make multilateral security a reality?”

The Second Level. The second level of analysis is that of subnational 

threats to stability and sovereignty (effective control over what 

occurs within a given national territory). Subnational threats may be 

generated by elements operating within a state, but they may also 

operate between states—and be considered transnational threats. 

Examples include—but are not limited to—terrorists; insurgents; 

narco-traffickers; and other organized criminals, populists, warlords, 

and gangs. The threat, in any case, involves the intent either to control 

a targeted government politically, or to change radically or destroy 
16

a given nation-state. In these terms, a nonstate actor can do what has 

already been done in at least two Mexican states and one Brazilian 

state, as follows:

If the irregular attacker—terrorists, drug cartels, criminal gangs, militant 

religious fundamentalists, or a combination of such nonstate actors—

blends crime, terrorism, and war, he can extend his already significant 

influence. After embracing advanced weaponry, including Weapons of 

Mass Destruction [WMD] (including chemical and biological agents), radio 

frequency weapons, and advanced intelligence gathering technology, 

along with more common weapons systems and technology, the attacker 

can transcend drug running, robbery, kidnapping, and murder and pose 

a significant challenge to the nation-state and its institutions.

Then, using complicity, intimidation, corruption, and indifference, the 

irregular attacker can quietly and subtly co-opt individual politicians 

and bureaucrats and gain political control of a given geographical or 

political enclave. Such corruption and distortion can potentially lead to 

the emergence of a network of government protection of illicit activities, 

and the emergence of a virtual criminal state or political entity. A series 

of networked enclaves could, then, become a dominant political actor 

within a state or group of states. Thus, rather than violently competing 

with a nation-state, an irregular attacker can criminally co-opt and seize 

control of the state.51

Additionally, it is important to note that this second level of analysis 

would include proxies or surrogates of other countries. Many of the 

“Wars of National Liberation” and “People’s Wars” that were fought 

all over the world during the so-called Cold War are good examples 

of this phenomenon. In this context, it is important to note that, at a 

Forum on Fourth-Generation of Warfare and Asymmetric War, held 

in Caracas, Venezuela, in early 2004, President Chávez directed the 

armed forces to develop a new military doctrine for contemporary 

conflict: “I call upon everybody to start an . . . effort to apprehend . . . 

the ideas, concepts, and doctrine of asymmetric war.”52 This move 

has provided the conceptual basis upon which Venezuela might use 

all available networks—political, economic, social, informational, 

and military—to convince a targeted government’s decisionmakers 

and population that their present political situation is not legitimate 

and is hopeless. The development of doctrine for conduct of 

contemporary asymmetric war—and the accompanying publicity—
17

was also intended to be a clear signal to the rest of Latin America and 

the United States that it would be only a matter of time before the 

Bolivarian Revolution (bolivarianismo) prevails.53

 The corollary, again, has to do with the general possibility of 

Venezuela helping to destabilize selected parts of Latin America by 

funneling money and other support to various nonstate actors. More 

specifically, one should consider the ramifications for stability and 

security, given the possibility of Venezuelan money, technology, and 

arms being provided to radical movements and insurgent groups 

throughout Central and South America. Probably the most salient 

example of regional destabilization would be the possibility of 

Venezuelan support to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 

(FARC) in Colombia. And the question that plagued the West and its 

relations with the Soviet Union and China during the Cold War and 

continues into this contemporary situation is, “How to respond to a 

country that might be helping to change others through revolutionary 

means?” Also, “How to respond to a country that is helping legal 

political parties or movements—such as Nicaraguan Sandinistas 

and Bolivian and Ecuadorian populists—that are operating in 

democracies?” A closely associated question is, “What are the most 

effective means to help a country targeted for bolivarianismo to resist 

the revolutionary appeal?” 

 The implications at this second level of analysis are daunting. 

Given the interrelated, multidimensional, multiorganizational, and 

multinational nature of contemporary conflict, security and stability 

are too big and too important to remain relegated either to the military 

or the police of a single nation. It is a nation-state problem, and must 

be addressed in a unified manner by all the instruments of state 

power. At the same time, most subnational threats to security and 

sovereignty are supported by transnational actions. Transnational 

threats require transnational (multilateral) responses. Thus, a 

targeted nation’s security and stability are also problems for the 

regional and global communities. Another highly relevant question 

concerning hemispheric security is, “How can the nation-state and 

the multilateral community, together, generate a combination of 

military, law enforcement, intelligence, legal, informational, and 

moral capabilities adequate to combat contemporary asymmetric, 

fourth-generation threats?” 
18

The Third Level. The third level of analysis involves the personal 

security and well-being of the individual citizen. It then extends to 

protection of the entire population from violent, internal nonstate 

actors and external enemies—and, perhaps in some cases, from 

repressive internal (local and regional) governments. The individual 

security problem ends with the establishment of perceived firm but 

fair control of the entire national territory and the people in it. In 

these terms, it is helpful to think of human perpetrators of insecurity 

and violence as tertiary threats to individual security. Root causes—

poverty; lack of basic human services; and corrupt, underperforming, 

or nonexistent government security institutions within the national 

territory—must be recognized as secondary threats. The inability 

or unwillingness of government to address secondary and tertiary 

threats must be understood as the primary (the most fundamental) 

threat. As a result, strategic planners and decisionmakers must 

contemplate all the levels of threat in dealing with individual security 

matters.54

 The corollary takes us back to the problems of assessing 

democracy and nonintervention, as well as subnational, national, 

and regional instability in Venezuela and throughout the Latin 

American region. Associated questions involve the circular nature 

of the interdependent relationships among personal and collective 

security, stability, development, peace, prosperity, and democracy, 

and, “How to respond to these core human issues?” 

 In the context of the Latin American security dialogue, the most 

important implication of the third-level personal security component 

of the contemporary conflict spectrum is the issue of achieving a 

balanced socioeconomic development with freedom and security. 

Experience throughout the world and over time clearly indicates 

that the inability or unwillingness of a government to perform its 

fundamental governance and personal security functions leads to 

failing or failed state status.55 Clearly, many of the problems integral 

to the failing state process have their origins in weak or inadequate 

institutions that result in poor or thuggish responses to issues ranging 

from poverty to street gangs to organized crime. Thus, the question 

here is, “How to strengthen state institutions as they attempt perform 

their legitimate governance and security functions?”
19

The Fourth Level. Finally, at the fourth global level of analysis, 

much of the international community is involved in securing the 

benefits of global integration. The keys to those benefits are security 

and stability. A multipolar world in which one or a hundred state 

and nonstate actors are exerting differing types and levels of power 

within a set of cross-cutting alliances is volatile and dangerous. As 

a consequence, the countries and peoples that expect the benefits of 

global stability must understand and cope with the threats imposed 

by the new global security environment, think outside the proverbial 

hemispheric “box,” and make a contribution—however small—to 

world stability. 

 At the same time, President Chávez’s approach to Latin American 

security and stability requires a realignment from capitalist and 

“neo-liberal” economics and politics to his socialism for the 21st 

century. That realignment will likely generate instability, conflict, 

and probably exacerbate the processes of state failure in important 

parts of the hemisphere. Thus, the corollary at this level must address 

questions associated with “peacekeeping,” “stability operations,” 

“nation-building,” and “state failure.”

 The implications are straightforward. In the contemporary 

security environment, international organizations such as the UN 

and the OAS, and individual national powers, increasingly are being 

called on to respond to conflict generated by all kinds of material 

instabilities and human destabilizers. Likewise, the global community 

increasingly is being asked to respond to failing and failed states. In 

these terms, it is important to remember that state failure is a process, 

not an outcome. It is a process by which a state loses the capacity 

and/or the will to perform its essential legitimizing governance and 

security functions. In either case, the associated question is “How 

should the processes of state failure be addressed before they run 

their courses and achieve conflict and/or crisis proportions?” 

Conclusions from the Four Levels of Analysis.

 Chávez understands that every player in the international 

community from small powers to the U.S. superpower must cope 

simultaneously with four separate and potentially grave types of 
20

contemporary threat. These threats include, first, traditional and 

lingering boundary and territorial disputes, as well as balance of 

power concerns. Second, each protagonist must deal with the very 

real possibility that transnational and internal nonstate actors can be 

used by one nation-state to play serious roles in destabilizing and 

taking down another. Additionally, destabilizing nontraditional 

internal public and personal security threats can been seen all over 

the hemisphere in ungoverned territories, urban criminal gangs, 

more conventional terrorism, and insurgency. At the same time, 

real threats to effective sovereignty exist, stemming from chronic 

poverty, disease, and other “root causes” of conflict. Accordingly, 

all of the above types of threats are seen as methods of choice—or 

areas for exploitation—for various commercial (narco-traffickers and 

organized criminals), ideological (insurgencies such as Peru’s Sendero 

Luminoso) movements, and caudillos like Chávez who are completely 

and ruthlessly dedicated to achieving control or radical change in a 

given nation-state. Nevertheless, rather than considering each level 

of conflict as an independent form of warfare, Chávez finds that it is 

more useful to think of them as parts within his concept of total war, 

a people’s war, or a super insurgency.56

 The questions associated with the corollaries and implications of 

each of the above levels of analysis, thus, imply no easy set of tasks. 

However, if the United States and the other countries of the Americas 

ignore what is happening in the region, that inaction could destroy 

the democracy, free market economies, and prosperity that has been 

achieved, and place the posterity of the hemisphere at serious risk.

SOME FINAL THOUGHTS ON CHÁVEZ’S ASYMMETRICAL 

CONFLICT AS A CHALLENGE TO HEMISPHERIC SECURITY

 Chávez may be a military caudillo, but he is no “nut case.” He 

is, in fact, what Ralph Peters calls a “wise competitor.”57 He will 

not even attempt to defeat his enemies on their terms. Rather, he 

will seek to shift the playing field away from conventional military 

confrontations and turn to nontraditional forms of assault on a 

nation’s stability and integrity. Thus, it appears that this astute 

warrior is prepared to destabilize, to facilitate the processes of state 

failure, and thus to “destroy in order to rebuild” in true revolutionary 
21

fashion.58 As a consequence, it is important to understand that 

Chávez considers three issues to be key to success (or failure) in 

contemporary asymmetric conflict. They are closely related to his 

security scheme, social programs, and communications efforts. First, 

he understands the sophistication and complexity of war as a whole. 

He also understands the value of facilitating the processes of state 

failure to achieve the objectives of bolivarianismo. Finally, Chávez 

understands the centrality of relative moral legitimacy in conflict—

and the critical importance of creating popular perceptions that his 

cause is morally correct, and will lead to a better life. These are the 

bases of power—all else, to him, is illusion.

The Sophistication and Complexity of War as a Whole.

 Chávez understands that contemporary nontraditional war is not 

a kind of appendage (a lesser or limited thing) to the more comfortable 

conventional military attrition and maneuver warfare paradigms. It 

is a great deal more. Again, it may be military or nonmilitary, lethal 

or nonlethal, or a mix of everything within a state’s or a coalition 

of states’ array of instruments of power. As such, it may be a zerosum game in which only one winner emerges or, in a worst-case 

scenario, no winner. It is, thus, total. That is to say, the “battlefield” 

is extended to everyone, everything, and everywhere.59

 To give the mind as much room as possible to contemplate the 

sophistication and complexity—and the totality—of contemporary 

conflict, two Chinese colonels, Liang and Xiangsui, have provided a 

scenario that is instructive and sobering:

If the attacking side secretly musters large amounts of capital without the 

enemy nation being aware of this, and launches a sneak attack against its 

financial markets, then after causing a financial crisis, buries a computer 

virus and hacker detachment in the opponent’s computer system in 

advance, while at the same time carrying out a network attack against the 

enemy so that the civilian electricity network, traffic dispatching network, 

financial transaction network, telephone communications network, and 

mass media network are completely paralyzed, this will cause the enemy 

nation to fall into social panic, street riots, and a political crisis. There is 

finally the forceful bearing down by the army, and military means are 

utilized in gradual stages until the enemy is forced to sign a dishonorable 

peace treaty.60
22

 Chávez understands all this. He understands that war is no longer 

limited to using military violence to bring about desired political 

change. Rather, all means that can be brought to bear on a given 

situation must be used to compel a targeted government to do one’s 

will. This caudillo will tailor his campaign to his adversaries’ political 

and economic vulnerabilities, and to their psychological precepts. 

And this is the basis of Chávez’s instruction to the Venezuelan armed 

forces (at the “1st Military Forum on Fourth Generation War and 

Asymmetric War” in 2004) to develop a doctrinal paradigm change 

from conventional to people’s war.61

The Issue of State Failure.

 President Chávez also understands that the process leading to 

state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge 

facing the global community today. The argument in general is that 

failing and failed state status is the breeding ground for instability, 

criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism. These 

conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee 

flows. They can host “evil” networks of all kinds, whether they 

involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form 

of ideological crusade such as Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these 

conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such 

as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of 

infrastructure. These means of coercion and persuasion can spawn 

further human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease, 

the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and 

body parts, trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons 

systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and 

criminal anarchy. At the same time, these actions are usually 

unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, 

destabilization, and conflict.62

 Peru’s Sendero Luminoso calls violent and destructive activities 

that facilitate the processes of state failure “armed propaganda.” 

Drug cartels operating throughout the Andean Ridge of South 

America and elsewhere call these activities “business incentives.” 

Chávez considers these actions to be steps that must be taken to bring 
23

about the political conditions necessary to establish Latin American 

socialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide 

wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, 

state and nonstate actors’ strategic efforts are aimed at progressively 

lessening a targeted regime’s credibility and capability in terms of its 

ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory 

and society. Chávez’s intent is to focus his primary attack politically 

and psychologically on selected Latin American governments’ 

ability and right to govern. In that context, he understands that 

popular perceptions of corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, 

and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given 

regime to conduct the business of the state. Until a given populace 

generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and 

other basic issues of political, economic, and social injustice fairly 

and effectively, instability and the threat of subverting or destroying 

such a government are real.64

 But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually 

anyone can take advantage of such an unstable situation. The 

tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization 

on the scene will control that instability. As a consequence, failing 

and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal 

states, narco-states, or new people’s democracies. In connection with 

the creation of new people’s democracies, one can rest assured that 

Chávez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be available to provide 

money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity. And, of 

course, the longer dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states 

and people’s democracies persist, the more they and their associated 

problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity.65

The Centrality of Moral Legitimacy in Contemporary Conflict.

 North American and other Western observers attempting to 

assess and prescribe the best for a government or a people often 

fail to understand that their perception of freedom, equality, or 

economic viability may differ significantly from the perceptions of 

people living in other cultures. Chávez, however, understands that 

recognizing this essential difference in perceptions is central to the 

capability of assessing and developing strategies for contemporary 
24

asymmetric conflict. Thus, as noted above, the umbrella concept of

bolivarianismo centers on the challenge to a government’s moral right 

to govern. The basis for this challenge is rooted in the belief that 

the current governmental system is not providing, and cannot or 

will not provide, the necessary balance among equality, freedom, 

security, and prosperity for the people, and that the challenger’s 

political philosophy and system are truly representative. Chávez’s 

direct democracy is the philosophy and method that will provide 

that balance.66

 Chávez’s bolivarianismo also includes the concept that people’s 

perception of good and bad and right and wrong is the hub of all 

movement and power on which virtually everything depends. That 

is, moral legitimacy is the primary center of gravity in Latin America. 

Following the logic of the former leader of Peru’s Sendero Luminoso,

Abmael Guzman, Chávez has identified the lack of legitimacy of all 

governments since the Spanish conquest as the center of gravity in the 

ongoing conflict in Latin America.67 The strategic objective, then, must 

be to break the power of the foreign-dominated and undemocratic 

governing oligarchy, and to form a new legitimately democratic 

political entity. In this context, all past and present regimes are 

judged to be the equivalent of “occupying powers.” Bolivarianismo is 

considered to be a kind of “resistance movement” that will conduct 

a true people’s war to replace the illegitimate occupying regime, 

and liberate the country. In these terms, protagonists can and must 

persuade and coerce the people into supportive actions.68

 Importantly and interestingly, in bolivarianismo (socialism for 

the 21st century), a closely related Marxist-Leninist notion is that all 

means justify the socialist end. As such, elimination or neutralization 

of anyone and everything opposing that ultimate objective can be 

rationalized as legitimate.69 This is a very convenient philosophy 

for someone like Chávez to adopt. He can garner outside support, 

while at the same time pursuing all means from propaganda to 

terrorism to drug trafficking to total destruction of a targeted society 

to accomplish his goals. 

 The problem is to convince the people that the use of coercion and 

violence is necessary—and, thus, morally correct. So he is engaged, 

through his communications program, in a full-scale “propaganda 

war” aimed directly at people in the streets of Caracas, Quito, Lima, 
25

La Paz, Buenos Aires, Montevideo, and elsewhere. The intent is to 

persuade as many people as possible that the use of coercion and 

violence to replace illegitimate occupying regimes is necessary 

to establish morally correct Latin American democracy and 

grandeza. And, Chávez expects that this campaign will be decisive 

in determining the long-term outcome of the overall campaign to 

establish his model of socialism for the 21st century throughout the 

Latin American region.70

CONCLUSIONS

 Chávez understands contemporary asymmetric warfare. 

He understands that this type of conflict requires more than 

weaponry and technology. It requires lucid and incisive thinking, 

resourcefulness, determination, imagination, and a certain disregard 

for convention. The promulgation of such a concept requires a 

somewhat different approach to conflict than that generally used 

by the United States over the past several years. That is, Chávez’s 

strategic paradigm outlined above acknowledges that the ultimate 

outcome of any asymmetric war is not determined primarily by the 

skillful manipulation of violence in the many military battles that 

take place once a war of this nature is recognized to have begun. 

Rather, control of the situation and ultimate success is determined 

by 1) the sophisticated political-psychological application of all the 

instruments of power; 2) the skillful exploitation of the processes 

of state failure to bring about the political conditions necessary to 

establish socialism for the 21st century; and 3) the level of moral 

legitimacy the communications/propaganda campaign generates. 

To the extent that these factors are strongly present in any given 

strategy, they favor success. To the extent that any one component of 

the model is absent, or only present in a weak form, the probability 

of success is minimal. 

The above outline takes us back to where we began. It provides the 

basis for the understanding and judgment that civilian and military 

leaders must have to be clear on what the situation is in Venezuela and 

what it is not. The hard evidence over time underscores the wisdom of 

Clausewitz’s dictum, “The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching 
26

act of judgment that the statesman and the commander have to make 

is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking; 

neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is 

alien to its nature.”71 Chávez’s asymmetric war challenge is, thus, 

straightforward. Colonel Thomas X. Hammes reminds us that this 

kind of war is the only kind of war the United States has ever lost.72

RECOMMENDATIONS

 Asymmetric and irregular opponents are not invincible. They 

can be controlled and defeated, but only by coherent, patient action 

that encompasses all agencies of a targeted government and its 

international allies. That kind of action would include the fields 

of politics, diplomacy, defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and 

economic and social development. These efforts must be organized 

as a network rather than in the traditional vertical, top-down 

bureaucracies of most governments. Accomplishing such efforts 

will require fundamental changes in how governmental leaders and 

personnel at all levels are trained, developed, promoted, deployed, 

and employed. Additionally, this interagency and multilateral 

process must exert its collective influence for the entire duration 

of the conflict—from initial planning to the final achievement of a 

sustainable peace.73

The primary challenge, then, is to come to terms with the 

pressing need to shift from a singular military-police approach to 

a multidimensional and multinational paradigm for contemporary 

asymmetric conflict. That, in turn, requires a strategic-level 

conceptual framework and a supporting organizational structure to 

promulgate unified civil-military planning and the implementation 

of transnational responses to transnational threats. Given today’s 

realities, failure to prepare adequately for present and future 

asymmetric contingencies is unconscionable. At least five fundamental 

educational and organizational imperatives are needed to implement 

the challenges noted above.

 • Civilian and military leaders at all levels must learn the 

fundamental nature of subversion and insurgency, with 

particular reference to the way in which military and 

nonmilitary, lethal and nonlethal, and direct and indirect 
27

force can be employed to achieve political ends. Leaders must 

also understand the ways in which political-psychological 

considerations affect the use of force—and the ways in which 

force affects political-psychological efforts.

 • Civilian and military personnel are expected to be able to 

operate effectively and collegially in coalitions or multinational 

contingents. They must also acquire the ability to deal 

collegially with civilian populations and local and global 

media. As a consequence, efforts that enhance interagency as 

well as international cultural awareness—such as civilian and 

military exchange programs, language and cultural training 

programs, and combined (multinational) exercises—must be 

revitalized and expanded. 

 • Leaders must learn that an intelligence capability several 

steps beyond the present norm is required for irregular and 

asymmetric wars. This capability also must include active 

utilization of intelligence operations as a dominant element 

of both strategy and tactics.

 • Nonstate political actors in any kind of intrastate conflict 

are likely to have at their disposal an awesome array of 

conventional and unconventional technology and weaponry. 

The “savage wars of peace” have placed and will continue 

to place military forces and civilian support contingents into 

harm’s way. Thus, leadership development programs must 

prepare “peacekeepers” to be effective war fighters.

 • Governments and international organizations (for example, 

the OAS) must restructure themselves to the extent necessary 

to establish the appropriate political mechanisms to achieve 

an effective unity of effort. The intent is to ensure that the 

application of the various civil-military instruments of power 

directly contributes to a mutually agreed-upon political endstate.

These conceptual and organizational challenges and tasks are 

the basic realities of 21st century conflict. Long lists of additional 

recommendations will be irrelevant if the strategic-level foundational 
28

requirements listed above are not implemented first. One of Carl 

von Clausewitz’s translators, Michael Howard, warned years ago: 

“If [the political-psychological struggle] is not conducted with 

skill and based on realistic analysis . . . no amount of operational 

expertise, logistical back-up, or technical know-how could possibly 

help.”74 The consequences of failing to take the strategic politicalpsychological effort seriously are clear. Unless thinking, actions, 

and organization are reoriented at the highest levels to deal with 

asymmetric knowledge-based information and technology realities, 

the problems of global, regional, and subregional stability and 

security will resolve themselves—and not likely for the better. 

ENDNOTES

 1. Roger F. Noriega, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere 

Affairs, “Remarks to the Inter-American Defense College,” Washington, DC, 

October 28, 2004.

 2. “Transcript: Day Two of Rice Testimony,” Washington Post, January 19, 2005, 

at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A21135-2005Jan19.html.

 3. Author interview with U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Roger 

Pardo-Maurer in Washington, DC, February 2, 2004; and Radio Nacional de 

Venezuela, February 17, 2005.

 4. Joel Brinkley, “U.S. Proposal in the O.A.S. Draws Fire as an Attack on 

Venezuela,” New York Times, May 22, 2005; and Secretary Condoleezza Rice, 

“Remarks to the General Assembly of the Organization of American States,” 

Department of State, Washington, DC, June 5, 2005.

 5. El Universal, February 25, 2005; and U.S. Department of State, “Venezuela 

Playing ‘Destabilizing Role’ in Latin America,” March 31, 2005.

 6. Daily Times, March 14, 2005. 

 7. Europa Press, the European Union’s online press service, April 3, 2005.

 8. Radio Nacional de Venezuela, September 27, 2004, and September 28, 2004; 

and El Universal, April 8, 2005.

 9. “Special Report: Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela,” The Economist, May 14–20, 

2005, p. 25.

 10. Marilee S. Grindle and John W. Thomas, Public Choices and Policy Change, 

Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991.

 11. Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 

1972, pp. 513–514. Also see Winfield J. Burggraff, The Venezuelan Armed Forces in 

Politics, 1935–1959, Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1972.

 12. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America [ca. 1820–1840], J. P. Mayer 
29

and Max Lerner, eds., New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1966, pp. 213–226. 

Also see Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract [1762], G. D. H. Cole, trans., 

Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952; John Locke, Of Civil Government, 

Second Treatise of Civil Government [1689], New York: Gateway, n.d.; and Jacques 

Maritain, Man and the State, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1951.

 13. Thus, some states became totalitarian democracies even before Hegel 

began to write on the totalitarian state. See Maritain, pp. 13-27, 192. 

 14. For excellent discussions of general Latin American and specific 

Venezuelan corporate traditions, see Howard J. Wiarda, ed., Authoritarianism and 

Corporatism in Latin America, Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2004; David 

J. Meyers, “Venezuela’s Punto Fijo Party System,” in Wiarda, pp. 141–172; and 

John V. Lombardi, Venezuela: The Search for Order, the Dream of Progress, Oxford, 

UK: Oxford University Press, 1982. 

 15. Carlos Gueron, “Introduction,” in Venezuela in the Wake of Radical Reform, 

Joseph S. Tulchin, ed., Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993, pp. 1–3.

 16. These points are well-documented in Francisco Rojas Aravena, “Nuevo 

contexto de seguridad internacional: nuevos desafios, nuevas oportunidades?” in 

La seguridad en America Latina pos 11 Septiembre, Flaxo-Chile, 2003, pp. 23-43; and 

Felipe Agüero and Jeffrey Stark, Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-Transition Latin 

America, Miami, FL: North-South Center Press, 1998, pp. 103-104, 109, and 216. 

 17. Ibid. Also see testimony before the U.S. Congress on March 24, 2004, by 

General James T. Hill, U.S. Army, Commander of U.S. Southern Command, 

reported by Rudi Williams in American Forces Information Service, News Articles, 

March 31, 2004; Steve C. Ropp, The Strategic Implications of the Rise of Populism in 

Europe and South America, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005; 

and Andres Benavente Urbina and Julio Alberto Cirino, “El populismo Chavista en 

Venezuela,” in La democracia defraudada, Buenos Aires, Argentina: Grito Sagrado, 

2005, pp. 115-139. 

 18. Ibid. Also see Steve Ellner, “Revolutionary and Non-Revolutionary Paths 

of Radical Populism: Directions of the Chávez Movement in Venezuela,” Science 

and Society, April 2005, pp. 160–190.

 19. Ibid. Also see Francisco Rojas Aravena, “Una comunidad de seguridad 

en Las Américas: Una mirada a la Conferencia Especial de Seguridad,” Foro, 

Noviembre 2003, pp. 10–15.

 20. Alvaro Vargas Llosa, “The Return of Latin America’s Left,” New York 

Times, March 22, 2005. Also see comments attributed to General James T. Hill, 

Commander of U.S. Southern Command, in Rudi Williams, “SOUTHCOM Faces 

Threats to Peace in Latin America, Caribbean,” American Forces Press Service, 

March 31, 2004. 

 21. Tom Friedman has written extensively and eloquently on globalization 

and its implications. See, for example, Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive 

Tree, New York: Anchor Books, 1999. Also see Alvin Toffler, Power Shift, New York: 

Bantam Books, 1990. 
30

 22. Ibid.

 23. “Special Report: Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela,” The Economist, May 14–20, 

2005, pp. 23–24.

 24. See, as examples, De Tocqueville, Locke, Rousseau, and Maritain. 

 25. Author interviews with nonattribution in Miami, March 10, 2005.

 26. Ibid.

 27. Paulo Sotereo, of the Brazilian daily, O Estado de São Paulo, quoting from 

an interview with former President Cardozo, in an interview with the author in 

Washington, DC, February 17, 2005.

 28. Ibid.

 29. Consensus statement from a conference on “Southern Cone Security,” 

sponsored by the Office of External Research, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 

INR, U.S. Department of State, in Washington, DC, July 8, 2005. Also see Julio 

A. Cirino, “La Revolucion Mundial pasa por Hugo Chávez”, Part 1, in Panorama, 

April 20, 2005, and Part 2, April 27, 2005; and “Chvez le mete mass presion a 

Latinamerica, y a USA,” Urgente 24, August 11, 2005. 

 30. Ibid. Also see The Economist, Financial Times, El Universal, and La Voz.

 31. Ibid.

 32. These are terms Chávez uses interchangeably. 

 33. Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II, Asymmetry and U.S. Military 

Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 

Strategic Studies Institute, 2001, pp. 5–6.

 34. Consensus statement from July 2005 conference in Washington, DC. Also 

see Max G. Manwaring, Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency, Carlisle Barracks, 

PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005, p. 8. 

 35. Steven Metz, “Relearning Counterinsurgency,” a panel discussion at the 

American Enterprise Institute, January 10, 2005. Also see Paul E. Smith, On Political 

War, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1989.

 36. Interviews and The Economist, May 14–20, 2005.

 37. Ibid. Also see Financial Times, El Universal, La Voz, and Stephen Johnson, 

“South America’s Mad-TV: Hugo Chávez Makes Broadcasting a Battleground,” 

The Heritage Foundation Policy Research & Analysis, August 10, 2005.

 38. Ibid.; and El Universal, January 5, 2005; El Universal, March 8, 2005; Europa 

Press, April 3, 2005; La Voz, April 3, 2005; El Universal, April 8, 2005. 

 39. Consensus statement from March 2005 conference, Coral Gables, FL.

 40. For a good discussion of this set of points, see Thomas A. Marks, “Ideology 

of Insurgency: New Ethnic Focus or Old Cold War Distortions?” Small Wars & 

Insurgencies, Spring 2004, pp. 107-109.
31

 41. Juan Dorero, “No. 1 Quits in Bolivia, and Protesters Scorn Nos. 2 and 3,” 

New York Times, June 9, 2005; and “New Bolivia Leader Promises Early Election,” 

Global Security News & Reports, June 10, 2005.

 42. Roger Noriega, “Remarks,” October 28, 2004.

 43. A good explanation of absolutism is provided in Maritain, pp. 12-19. 

 44. To be fair, it must be noted that some scholars and journalists are beginning 

to understand this problem and are writing in these terms. See, as three examples, 

Anthony T. Bryan, Transnational Organized Crime: The Caribbean Context, Coral 

Gables, FL: University of Miami, The Dante B. Fascell North-South Center Press, 

2002; Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty Under 

Siege, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997; and “El 

delito como una amenaza geopolítica,” in Clarin.com, 3 de Julio de 2003. Related 

international relations theory may be found in Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear, 

2nd ed., Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991; Keith Krause and Michael 

C. Williams, eds., Critical Security Studies, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 

Press, 1997; and Mohammed Ayoob, “Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist 

Perspective,” in Krause and Williams, 1997, pp. 121–146.

 45. While it does not show many of the problems Kaplan points up, one 

published map does emphasize this particular point. See “World Conflict and 

Human Rights Map 2001/2002,” prepared by PIOOM for IIMCR with the support 

of the Goals for Americans Foundation, St. Louis, June 2003. It should also be noted 

that this idea was articulated by Robert D. Kaplan, in “The Coming Anarchy,” 

The Atlantic Monthly, February 1994, pp. 72–76; and Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming 

Anarchy, New York: Random House, 2000, pp. 3–57.

 46. As an example of this discussion, see Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, 

Jr., and Michael J. Mazarr, American National Security, 5th ed., Baltimore: The Johns 

Hopkins University Press, 1999, pp. 3–46. Also see Frank N. Trager and Philip 

S. Kronenberg, eds., National Security and American Society, Lawrence: University 

Press of Kansas, 1973, p. 47; and Lars Schoultz, National Security and United States 

Policy toward Latin America, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987, pp. 

143–330.

 47. Consensus statement from the Conference on “Charting New Approaches 

to Defense and Security Challenges in the Western Hemisphere,” cosponsored by 

the Latin American and Caribbean Center of Florida International University and 

the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, in Coral Gables, FL, 

March 9–11, 2005. 

 48. Max G. Manwaring, Conference Brief, “Charting New Approaches to 

Defense and Security Challenges in the Western Hemisphere,” Strategic Studies 

Institute, U.S. Army War College, and the Latin American and Caribbean Studies 

Center of Florida International University, March 5005.

 49. Financial Times, “Chávez Threatens to Cut All Ties with Colombia,”” at 

http://news. ft.com/cms/s/1db6dd82-6e37-11d9-a60a-00000e2511c8.html.
32

 50. Jack Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in South America: Quarrels Among 

Neighbors, New York: Praeger, 1985, pp. 58–60.

 51. Manwaring, Gangs, p. 17. 

 52. This charge to the National Armed Forces (FAN) was made before an 

audience gathered in the Military Academy auditorium for the 1st Military Forum 

on Fourth Generation War and Asymmetric War, Caracas, reported in El Universal, 

April 8, 2005.

 53. In January 2005, General Melvin Lopez Hidalgo, Secretary of the Venezuelan 

Defense Council, stated publicly that Venezuela was changing its security doctrine 

in order to better confront “la amenaza permanente de los Estados Uniidos” and 

that a document entitled Pueblo en Armas had been published that confirmed 

the primary military principles of President Chávez, noted above. Reported in

Panorama, April 27, 2005. 

 54. Consensus statement from March 2005 conference in Coral Gables, FL.

 55. Daniel C. Esty, Jack Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff, and Pamela 

T. Surko, “The State Failure Project: Early Warning Research for U.S. Foreign 

Policy Planning,” in Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early 

Warning Systems, John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., New York: Rowman 

& Littlefield, 1998.

 56. This concept is not new. Mao Tse-tung and General Vo Nguyen Giap used 

it in China and Vietnam, and General Sir Frank Kitson developed the idea a bit 

further in his Warfare as a Whole, London: Faber and Faber, 1987.

 57. Ralph Peters, “Constant Conflict,” Parameters, Summer 1997, p. 10. Also see 

“The Culture of Conflict,” Parameters, Winter 1995, pp. 18-27.

 58. Consensus statement from March 2005 conference in Coral Gables, FL.

 59. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, Beijing: PLA Literature 

and Arts Publishing House, 1999, p. 109.

 60. Ibid., p. 123.

 61. Author interviews with nonattribution in Miami, FL, March 10, 2005, and 

a consensus statement from the conference on July 8, 2005. Hereafter noted as 

Author interviews. 

 62. Chester A. Crocker, “Engaging Failed States,” Foreign Affairs, SeptemberOctober 2003, pp. 32-44.

 63. Author interviews.

 64. Ibid.

 65. Ibid.; and Crocker. Also see Robert H. Dorff, “Strategy, Grand Strategy, 

and the Search for Security,” in Max G. Manwaring, Edwin G. Corr, and Robert H. 

Dorff, The Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the 21st Century , Westport, 

CT: Praeger, 2003, pp. 127-140; David C. Jordan, Drug Politics: Dirty Money and 

Democracies, Norman: OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999; and Eduardo 
33

Pizarro and Ana Maria Bejarano, “Colombia: A Failing State?” ReVista: Harvard 

Review of Latin America, Spring 2003, pp. 1-6.

 66. Author interviews. 

 67. Ibid. Also see Abimael Guzman, “El Discurso del Dr. Guzman,” in Los partidos 

politicos en el Peru, Rogger U. Mercado, ed., Lima: Ediciones Latinamericanos, 

1985, pp. 85-90; Comité Central del partido Comunista del Peru, Desarrollar la 

guerra popular sirviendo a la revolucion mundial, Lima: Comité Central del Partido 

Comunista del Peru, 1986, pp. 82-88.

 68. Ibid.

 69. Ibid.

 70. Ibid.

 71. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and 

trans., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 88.

 72. Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, USMC, “4th Generation Warfare,” Armed 

Forces Journal, November 2004, pp. 40-44.

 73. Roger Noriega, “Remarks.” 

 74. Michael Howard, The Causes of Wars, 2nd ed., Cambridge, MA: Harvard 

University Press, 1983, p. 109.