U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ:

PLANNING, COMBAT, AND OCCUPATION

Authors

Kate Phillips

Shane Lauth

Erin Schenck

Editor

W. Andrew Terrill

April 2006

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FOREWORD

Even before Operation IRAQI FREEDOM began, the Strategic 

Studies Institute (SSI) published a monograph about planning for 

transition to Phase IV operations. Now that we are 3 years beyond 

the start of that transition, the debate continues about the adequacy 

of planning for and proficiency of execution of Phase IV operations 

in Iraq and elsewhere. The debate most often surrounds three issues 

concerning this final operational phase: the relationship to preceding 

operational phases; responsibility for planning; and responsibility 

for execution. Inevitably, the interagency process becomes central to 

addressing each of these issues.

A colloquium on “U.S. Military Operations in Iraq: Planning, 

Combat, and Occupation” was held November 2, 2005, and was 

co-sponsored by SSI and Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced 

International Studies (SAIS). An exceptional combination of scholars, 

practitioners, and policymakers examined persistent issues central 

to the important and ongoing debate surrounding the colloquium 

theme. Much of the debate to this point has been an unproductive 

effort to assign blame for shortcomings in the planning for and 

execution of stability and reconstruction operations; participants in 

the colloquium moved beyond finding fault, began analyzing the 

central issues, and addressed solutions.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to provide this summary 

of the colloquium presentations, along with a distillation of conference findings and conclusions.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 

U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ:

PLANNING, COMBAT AND OCCUPATION

Introduction.

On November 2, 2005, a colloquium entitled “U.S. Military 

Operations in Iraq: Planning, Combat and Occupation” was held 

in Washington, DC, at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced 

International Studies (SAIS). The Merrill Center of the Johns Hopkins 

University organized the colloquium and co-sponsored it with the 

Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. Its objective 

was to gain insight from the apparent successes and problems of 

different phases of the 2003-05 Iraqi war. Distinguished military 

officers, national security scholars, leading authors, and journalists 

gave presentations.

Forging consensus was not a goal of the colloquium, but panelists’ 

presentations and participants’ comments and questions appeared 

generally to support the following significant conclusions:

• Military lessons, even for Phase III, of Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM remain subject to considerable controversy, and 

what we now see as conventional wisdom and insight will be 

increasingly challenged. 

• Appraisals of the importance of speed in military operations 

may be subject to considerable revisions as the study of 

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM continues. 

• The transition from Phase III to Phase IV of military operations 

is particularly challenging. Considerable effort may be needed 

to address aspects of Phase IV while Phase III is still being 

waged.

• All phases of future wars need to be coordinated to work 

towards the same end.

• Serious analysis must be given to the interplay between force 

protection and accomplishing stabilization requirements. 

With regard to Iraq, some commentators argued that force 

protection should not be a priority at the expense of winning, 

and protecting the Iraqis.
The remainder of this colloquium report is devoted to detailed 

summary and analysis of presentations from each panel, comments 

and questions from attendees, and keynote speaker’s comments.

Opening Remarks.

Professor Douglas Lovelace of the Strategic Studies Institute 

offered brief opening remarks, followed by remarks by Professor 

Elliot Cohen of the Merrill Center. In his remarks, Professor Lovelace 

noted several different schools of thought about current difficulties 

in Iraq. He stated that one school projected that the intervention 

was manageable and could have been effective, but that it was 

characterized by flawed planning. A second school of thought 

suggested that many problems that the United States faces in Iraq 

were inevitable, and more effective planning would probably not 

have done much to alleviate them. The final judgment is for future 

historians to provide, but under current circumstances, pre-war and 

wartime planning must be continuously reevaluated for historical 

lessons. He also noted that, under the current circumstances, it is not 

only imprudent but also insensitive to declare the policies to be a 

failure while troops are still in the field attempting to enforce them. 

To the greatest extent possible, finding solutions to present problems 

is a more pressing challenge than assessing blame.

Professor Lovelace suggested that the intersection between 

politics and operational planning was an unseemly, although perhaps 

inevitable, issue. He cautioned about the overuse of analogies in the 

planning process, noting that many observers have their own favorite 

analogies which are compelling to them but do not always reflect the 

reality of new situations. In conclusion, he noted that future planners 

would be well-served by listening to doubters and pessimists and 

not relying too readily on views that stress how quick and easy an 

operation may be. He also stated that every effort must be expended 

to avoid groupthink and the politicization of intelligence. Professor 

Lovelace suggested that a key lesson was to seek a broad range of 

expertise when deciding how best to proceed.

In his opening remarks, Professor Cohen introduced the problem 

of perception in assessing military operations in Iraq. He argued that 

it is difficult to maintain perspective because the war is yet unfinished 
and deeply contentious. Therefore, Professor Cohen attempted to 

project 30 to 40 years to assess how military historians might view the 

war in hindsight. He discussed possible disputes over when the Iraq 

War really began. One school of thought, he suggested, would look to 

the start of major combat operations in 2003. Another interpretation 

might focus on the Bush administration and its policies immediately 

after September 11, 2001 (9/11). And yet another interpretation will 

look back to the 1991 Gulf War and before, to the rise of Saddam 

Hussein’s Iraq as a gathering threat to American interests.

Professor Cohen also argued that combat operations and planning 

for the war will be viewed somewhat differently in the future. He 

said that there will be more focus on the Iraqi side of the question, 

especially in light of the vast amount of documentation that has been 

recovered, but not yet critically analyzed by military historians. To 

date, he argued that much of the analysis has been solipsistic, seeing 

the issue only from the American side. Professor Cohen further 

predicted that future military historians will seek to place the intense 

combat phase of the war in a larger framework of conventional war. 

They will focus more on broader themes such as the relationships 

between quality and quantity on the battlefield, rather than the dayto-day issues that are so closely monitored. He also suggested that 

more analysis on such issues as network command systems, the 

changing nature of the front line in warfare, and views about the 

relationship between air and ground forces will take place.

Professor Cohen forecasted another trend that will emerge 

in future military history: the debate about the influence of U.S. 

military institutions versus the influence of personalities. On the 

institutions side, many will analyze the U.S. military and whether or 

not it performed well in counterinsurgency operations, or whether 

there were differences in the ways the various services performed 

in these functions. On the personalities side, future historians 

might focus on the influence of such individuals as the combatant 

command (COCOM) generals, the Coalition Provisional Authority 

(CPA) Administrator L. Paul Bremer, or current Ambassador to 

Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad. Professor Cohen also suggested that a much 

different view about watershed events in OIF will probably emerge. 

Currently, he argued, the administration has focused on elections 

and day-to-day matters that may receive significantly less attention 

in the future. 
Professor Cohen also hoped that historians will draw parallels to 

previous wars in order to put the conflict in context. He argued that 

too many of the historical analogies and parallels have been polemical 

and have not offered a constructive framework. A final difference 

that Professor Cohen discussed, perhaps the most significant, is that 

future historians will know how the war turns out. Because there is 

a great amount of uncertainty regarding how the war might finish, 

our analysis is greatly restricted. Because the consequences of the 

war are yet unknown, Professor Cohen closed by remarking that we 

need a certain amount of modesty in predicting the outcome.

Defeating the Iraqi Regime.

The first presenter focused on what was referred to as “American 

Anabasis: The United States Army’s Entry into War in Iraq.” The 

speaker prefaced his remarks by mentioning ancient Greek history 

as recounted by Xenophon, on the subject of “Anabasis,” where 

ancient Greek soldiers faced deep difficulties in waging a war in 

Mesopotamia. He drew parallels between that war and OIF. Both 

wars were expeditionary. Both wars had limited political and military 

objectives that became protracted over time. And finally, both wars 

were tactical victories that later turned problematic. 

A great deal of this presentation was based on information drawn 

from a comprehensive understanding of the OIF Study Group 

(OIFSG), which, under the leadership of General Eric Shinseki, 

generated an early historiography of Phases I-III(b) of the war. 

The goal of the OIFSG was to produce a “lessons learned” volume 

drawn mainly from combat interviews. The speaker stated that 

OIF is the first coherent campaign since the Korean War. He also 

drew several other parallels to Korea—for example, the use of Army 

National Guard in combat operations. The presenter included other 

watersheds in OIF, such as the high levels of special operations force 

and general purpose force integration in such missions as protecting 

the oil fields. He further discussed new levels of air and ground force 

coordination and the prominence of net-centric warfare. While this 

work considered many recent phenomena of military operations, 

it also included continuities of warfare that OIF displayed. OIF 

demonstrated the continued centrality of ground operations, as well 
as the physical demand of these operations. The presenter also noted 

the difficulties of stabilizing population centers. 

The arguments included in this presentation suggested that many 

important lessons were gathered in the 12-year interregnum between 

Operation DESERT STORM and OIF, and that these lessons helped 

the U.S. military to build the sort of data base and infrastructure to 

achieve rapid tactical victory in Phases I-III. The presenter argued 

that much was done in the interregnum to change mindsets about 

the contemporary operating environment by going back to pre-Cold 

War models that emphasized dynamic and asymmetric elements 

of warfare. However, he also noted that, while the lessons were 

gathered, they were not learned fully and have contributed to 

problems in planning for insurgency operations. The speaker argued 

that a chasm exists between getting things right in planning and 

doctrine and getting things right on the ground. One such problem 

that he discussed is the blurred transition from Phase III to Phase IV. 

It was not only unclear when this would occur, the speaker argued, 

but it was also unclear who would lead the transition. Not only were 

there problems on the ground, but also significant problems in the 

interagency process tasked with planning for the transition.

The first speaker also highlighted certain areas where lessons were 

gathered and learned “on the fly” rather successfully. He pointed to 

the lessons drawn from the “darkest of days”—March 24, 2003—in 

which there was an incident of fratricide. Operators were able to 

quickly implement changes that prevented similar occurrences. In 

addition, he discussed lessons that were quickly incorporated about 

such things as employing simultaneous attacks to seize the initiative. 

He also suggested that the main area which OIFSG identified as 

needing improvement is how to operationalize noncontinuous and 

nonlinear formats into force structure and doctrine. He said that 

transformation is an ongoing issue, but that there is a lot to learn 

about force structure in these operating environments. The speaker 

closed by posing what he feels to be the biggest challenge to military 

planners: that in OIF, the military objective and the political objective 

did not coincide. This created significant tensions between plans 

and realities, and this has contributed to some of the post-Phase III 

difficulties that have emerged.

The second panelist’s presentation was entitled “Speed Kills? 

Reassessing the Role of Speed, Precision, and Situational Awareness 


in the Fall of Saddam.” He argued that many analysts believe that 

superior speed, precision, and situational awareness allowed the 

U.S. military to achieve such a quick tactical victory in OIF. He also 

suggested that these elements led to a relatively low casualty rate for 

Coalition forces and allowed the Coalition to prevent an Iraqi policy 

of “scorched earth.” However, he cautioned that the strengths of the 

U.S. military do not explain sufficiently the rapid victory in major 

combat operations in Iraq. Rather, he suggested that Iraqi military 

ineffectiveness and poor decisionmaking largely explain U.S. tactical 

success, and that we should be cautious about extrapolating this 

success in military planning for future opponents. 

He assessed the argument that speed prevented the Iraqis from 

massing fire on Coalition forces and preempted a policy of scorched 

earth. The argument made here is that the Iraqis faced standoff 

precision strike and that our speed demoralized Iraqi defenders. He 

also pointed out that speed did not take the will to fight out of most 

Iraqi soldiers, evidenced by the fact that resistance continued long 

into combat operations. Furthermore, speed could not eliminate 

the fact that paramilitary forces, with 10,000 troops predeployed in 

Baghdad, defended all critical Iraqi cities. Regardless of the speed 

of advance, we eventually would have to wage urban warfare and 

occupy cities to achieve our objective. 

He indicated that, while we were often able to outmaneuver Iraqi 

forces, speed did not deny them the opportunity to mass fire. He 

mentioned the instance of one “thunder run” in which every Coalition 

vehicle in the brigade was hit, not uncommon during major combat 

operations. He also noted that it was not speed that prevented Iraqis 

from sabotaging the oil fields, but rather decisions taken by Saddam 

Hussein. In the Rumaylah oil fields, only 22 of the 250 wells were 

rigged for demolition, and only 9 were detonated. Furthermore, 

those prepared for demolition were in the very south and appear 

to have been rigged for visibility to Coalition forces entering from 

Kuwait. In addition, the key bottlenecks in the Rumaylah oil fields 

were not prepared for demolition at all. In the Kirkuk oil fields in the 

north, Iraqis controlled the oil wells deep into the war. These fields, 

it was argued, appeared to be protected against destruction rather 

than rigged for demolition.

So, rather than speed preventing the Iraqis from massing fire and 

pursuing a scorched earth policy, the speaker suggested that Iraqi 
weaknesses and decisions also mattered. Our superior technology 

allowed Coalition forces to punish Iraqi tactical and strategic 

mistakes with severity. He argued that poor positions, tactics, and 

marksmanship explain Iraqi forces’ inability to survive against 

U.S. firepower. He also showed pictures in which rural Iraqi tank 

positions provided neither cover nor concealment, thus leaving them 

susceptible to airpower. In addition, he argued that poor exploitation 

of urban terrain by Iraqi forces contributed to the relatively low 

casualty levels faced in urban warfare. Rather than prepare the 

interior of buildings for warfare, Iraqis fought outdoors in the cities, 

thus forfeiting a principal advantage of asymmetric tactics in urban 

environments. 

This speaker concluded by emphasizing three main points. First, 

U.S. military strengths do not sufficiently explain our quick success 

in early combat operations in OIF. Second, the low cost in terms of 

lives and resources was shaped by Iraqi weakness and the resulting 

decisions they made. Finally, he argued that a better opponent 

would have the potential to make urban warfare much more costly 

to U.S. forces, and that it is dangerous to assume future opponents 

will share the weaknesses displayed by Iraqi forces. 

The next presentation was entitled “Air Power and the ‘Afghan 

Model’.” This speaker opened by explaining what he terms the 

“Afghan Model,” which he defines as U.S. Special Operations 

Forces employed alongside local indigenous forces, backed by U.S. 

airpower. This model was successful in deposing the Taliban regime 

in Afghanistan, and the speaker argued that we used this model in 

northern Iraq, where 13 of the 23 Iraqi divisions were positioned. He 

argued that if the Afghan Model can be employed, it has three distinct 

advantages. First, fewer forces are needed to achieve the military 

objective. Second, there is less U.S. “footprint” and therefore less 

resulting local anti-Americanism. A final advantage, he suggested, 

is that it presents an attractive option given that U.S. troops are 

generally overextended.

He then discussed a military technology revolution in airpower, 

led primarily by the rise in precision bombing capabilities. Today, 

targets are more easily located and more easily hit, which he stressed 

means that old models of airpower and lessons learned no longer 

apply. However, he also emphasized that technological change is 
not the final say in airpower. For example, NATO tried to fight a 

war in Kosovo without ground forces. One of the primary lessons 

learned is that if you cannot control the ground, it is very difficult to 

achieve your military objectives. Still, under certain conditions, the 

Afghan Model can lead to tremendous success while only employing 

limited ground forces. For example, hundreds of miles were taken in 

Afghanistan with very small numbers of U.S. Special Forces on the 

ground.

The presenter then discussed how the Afghan Model works. 

First, he argued that precision close air support (CAS) plays a much 

different role than previously. Precision CAS now has the ability to 

be much more destructive and significantly control the battlefield. 

However, the presentation included a warning that CAS capabilities 

are not all that is needed. For the Afghan Model to work, there is 

a high premium on command and control (C2) capabilities, and a 

significant amount of skill must accompany the advanced technology. 

A second element needed for the model to succeed is that airpower 

must disrupt enemy communications and force them to disperse 

throughout the theater before ground operations begin. This allows 

ground forces to seize the initiative without significant numbers of 

troops.

This presenter also evaluated the record of the Afghan Model in 

northern Iraq. He noted that Saddam had massed many of his forces 

in the north to prepare for an invasion through Turkey, but U.S. 

forces were denied access by the Turkish government. However, 

Coalition forces hoped to hold Iraqi forces in the north along the 

Green Line to prevent them from advancing to the south. The United 

States, therefore, put 50 Special Operations teams (600 personnel) in 

the north alongside Kurdish Peshmerga forces backed by airpower, 

to match 120,000 Iraqi forces. The presenter argued that the Afghan 

Model was successful in northern Iraq, citing the disruption of Iraqi 

C2 structure. For example, Saddam had been so far removed from 

the operational loop that he was still sending troops north when 

Baghdad fell. In addition, even though we were greatly outmatched 

in numbers in the north and there were difficulties with projecting 

airpower in the region, Iraqis were still prevented from massing 

firepower. 

The presenter also assessed the advantage we maintained through 

friendly relations with the Iraqi Kurds. He additionally suggested 
that one significant advantage of the Afghan Model is that allies are 

much easier to acquire when the United States offers precision CAS, 

which has huge implications in other countries. Furthermore, he 

suggested that this model also presents another advantage in that it 

means indigenous forces will largely bear the burden of their own 

liberation. In conclusion, the presenter noted some cautions and 

limitations to be considered in the Afghan Model. These included 

an assessment that the Iraqi Kurds may now be unable to dispense 

with U.S. support. Furthermore, he noted that serious mistakes were 

made in Afghanistan and Iraq after the successful employment of the 

Afghan Model. Rather than continue to work through local forces, 

the United States injected high troop levels in these areas after the 

initial routing of enemy forces. He warned that this type of action 

only serves to increase the U.S. footprint in the area and tends to 

alienate local populations.

During the question and answer period, participants raised many 

important issues about the major combat operations phase and the 

transition into Phase IV operations. One questioned the extent to 

which the planning for Phase III led to the problems encountered 

in Phase IV. One speaker responded that the difficulties faced in 

Phase IV arose from the fact that we had a military objective that 

did not match the political objective. Where the major combat 

operations phases were successful in deposing Saddam Hussein and 

the Ba’athist regime, the political objective of democratization and 

occupation should have required a much larger force, possibly as 

high as 700,000 troops. A second speaker touched upon the issue but 

also mentioned that, at some point, there is a diminishing marginal 

utility to increasing troop levels. He argued that this would not solve 

the problems of sectarian conflict that plague Iraq today. 

Another participant questioned whether the Afghan Model would 

be useful in other scenarios. One panelist discussed the implications 

of this approach on the Korean peninsula, suggesting that it appears 

to be one case in which the model might work. It has one of the 

basic ingredients for the Afghan Model to succeed—an indigenous 

ally with sufficient military competence, South Korea. However, he 

also cautioned that, while this approach appears useful, a war on the 

Korean peninsula is full of unknowns that cannot be predicted. One 

of the final questions had to do with whether the Afghan Model is 
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risky in practice because of the need to rely on indigenous forces that 

might not always share American interests. A panelist suggested 

that this is a relative question—risky compared to what? The Afghan 

Model was contrasted with what was called the “Roman Model,” 

which involves overwhelming force to pacify and occupy a territory. 

This model was presented as inevitably involving high American 

casualties. 

Reconstructing Iraq.

The second panel, entitled “Reconstructing Iraq,” began with a 

presentation entitled “Too Much Phase IV Planning: Coordinating 

the Theater Plans.” This presenter suggested that the problem with 

Phase IV involved too many plans. Support for this analysis involved 

examining some key decision points, without placing blame. The three 

key points were Afghanistan, the Central Command (CENTCOM) 

planning, and the creation of the Office of Reconstruction and 

Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). The analysis started with 

Afghanistan, because the roots of some of the later problems seen 

in Iraq can be located there. In Afghanistan, there was no Phase IV, 

and very little of the campaign planning we are used to. Soldiers 

needed to relearn how to fight, because the manner of fighting did 

not follow any of our typical ways of combat. It was a very different 

way of doing things, and not the way it is taught in our war colleges. 

For example, there were never enough headquarters, not enough 

people in the headquarters, and too many of those assigned to the 

headquarters were undertrained.

The presenter noted that there was a scramble to create a Phase IV 

plan in Afghanistan. It was done initially from a top down approach 

and modified to employ provisional reconstruction teams. The 

planners then had to compete with Iraq for resources. International 

organizations and nongovernment organizations (NGOS) became 

disillusioned by the chaos in Afghanistan, creating a reticence to 

provide aid in Iraq. Turning to the issue of CENTCOM planning, 

the presenter suggested that initial guidance indicated that the 

Department of State or the exile government would control Phase 

IV. This guidance changed in June 2002 to the concept of a military 

government. CENTCOM did most of its planning, focusing on 
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humanitarian affairs and stabilization. Everyone involved assumed 

someone else would do reconstruction. Headquarters were shorthanded and continually looked for additional support. 

The evolution of the planning process, according to this presenter, 

returned it to an unprecedented centralized control of reconstruction 

in the hands of the Department of Defense (DoD), and in the 

summer of 2002, stabilization planning began. It was a sophisticated 

planning process. There was an awareness of the need for Phase IV, 

yet no awareness of who would have long-term control of Phase IV. 

Initially it was to be done by the Coalition Forces Land Component 

Command (CFLCC), but with no follow-on organization named. 

By October 2002, leaders suggested that a military occupation was 

needed. Planners created and kept a task list of what was needed 

to rebuild Iraq. Implied, but not stated, was that the tasks would 

need many people, much time, and significant resources. The United 

States faced combat shortages, but more importantly, more troops 

were needed to win the peace than to win the war. 

Moreover, the presenter noted that Phase III and Phase IV were 

not distinct; they overlapped and merged. The ideal vision of Phase 

IV would be a hand-off from the military, to the civilians, to some 

indigenous organization. However, in reality, there was a hand-off 

from the military to the indigenous organizations, because there is 

no one to fill the civilian gap. Additionally, the creation of ORHA 

came too late and led to more confusion and incoherence because 

of a dispute about the chain of command. ORHA was poorly 

coordinated with CFLCC. The reconstruction plan assumed that 

more troops would continue to come after the war was over, but this 

did not happen. Units were leaving the theater, thinning coverage 

because there were no reserves. Throughout Iraq, divisions were 

short of units where they needed them. 

The presenter suggested that the disbanding of the Iraqi Army 

in May 2003 was one of the key post-war mistakes. CENTCOM 

successfully encouraged soldiers to leave, but expected to recall 

them within 2 weeks. However, that never happened. The army 

was disbanded without pay and with their guns. The way the 

announcement was made impugned the honor of the soldiers, 

something that was very important to them, virtually ensuring 

there would be problems afterwards. The presenter concluded 
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with an emphasis on two points. First, organizational rotations are 

not necessarily better than individual replacements at the higher 

levels. The old units that left took with them the lessons they had 

learned, leaving the new units to start the learning process again. 

Additionally, the primary goal of CENTCOM and CFLCC was to 

prevent an insurgency, not defeat one. The bombing of the United 

Nations (UN) headquarters in August 2003 was a serious sign that 

the United States and coalition forces had failed in this goal. The 

decreased UN presence created a ripple effect throughout Iraq, 

decreasing the number of international organizations throughout 

the country.

The next presentation was entitled “Phase IV Perspective from 

the Pentagon and the Palace.” The speaker began with a disclaimer 

that his presentation involved his views alone, and did not represent 

the opinions of the U.S. Government. His basic premise was that DoD 

and the Army need to be more concerned with stability operations. 

The American way of war sees a distinction between war and peace. 

In Iraq, the United States was after a “better state of peace.” Instead, 

we need to look at the war continuing into the peace. There is a 

blurred line between these two elements. The presenter provided 

two perspectives on Iraq. The first was a policy perspective, and 

the second was a tactical and strategic perspective. There were 

assumptions about how operations forces would be working, and 

how the war planning could be handled. The Army War Plans 

Division sought to determine if these assumptions were correct. 

They discussed who would provide stability in the post-conflict, 

and how they would do this. They looked at many possibilities of 

who would be in charge: the Army, the coalition, NGOs, the Iraqis, 

or international organizations. If these organizations did not have 

enough resources, it was obvious the Army would pick up the slack 

of needed personnel.

In dealing with the reconstruction, planners determined the 

United States would not need additional personnel for a number 

of reasons. First, there was to be heavy reliance on independent 

contractors before the war even began. Second, the planners expected 

to have a new Iraqi Army constructed from the “surrendering” army; 

that they would collect, vet, and put them to work. However, the 

soldiers were not surrendering, they were just leaving, and planners 
13

realized their numbers would not be sufficient. An alternative plan 

was needed. The Phase IV coalition assumptions about the number 

of coalition partners who would come on board for reconstruction 

and about what the security situation would be were incorrect. Both 

assumptions needed to change.

The speaker also noted some of his tactical experience in Northern 

Iraq. This involved work with the 101st Airborne in an area that 

included four provinces containing a quarter of the Iraqi population 

(6 million total, including 3 million Kurds), and included heavily 

militarized areas. In the absence of a detailed plan, commanders had to 

decide how to handle their individual situations in Iraq. The division 

accomplished tasks that were usually considered civil affairs work 

because public administration units were very small teams. In the 

North, they focused on civil affairs: food, fuel, shelter, getting money 

to people, deciphering the economy, fixing the infrastructure, getting 

students back to school, establishing security, and debathification 

and dissolution of the Baathist party (i.e., the need for reconciliation). 

The 101st was well-structured with the number of soldiers, but even 

though they were well-positioned, they faced security challenges. 

The presenter concluded with two key points. The first 

point involved the “outbox” mentality that is usually part of the 

reconstruction plan—planning to pass off the reconstruction effort to 

the next organization. It is essential to change the “outbox” mentality 

because, frequently, there will be no such organization to take charge. 

The U.S. Army is the usual answer as to who is responsible for 

reconstruction. The presentation indicated that this is being accepted 

and integrated into the doctrine and education. However, a capacity 

issue remains about who can handle reconstruction and how that 

should be integrated into military planning. Finally, the presenter 

discussed the interaction part of reconstruction. Reconstruction 

needs to be dealt with in terms of the complexity of the entire 

situation. From the outset, planners need to address what the policy 

aims are, and how willing the local population will be to accepting 

those aims. In Iraq, the United States demanded a high price of the 

Iraqis in order to change their society. These conditions made each 

task very difficult.

The next presentation concerned “Military and Civilian Interaction 

in Postwar Iraq.” It focused on the interactions between the military 

and civilian authorities, which were problematic at best. The presenter 
14

asserted that the roots for this can be found in the pre-war process. 

On November 28, 2001, the planning process for Iraq began, but there 

was no interaction with civilians in the initial process. DoD assumed 

the Department of State would deal with the reconstruction, but the 

Department of State was not informed of this until later. By August 

2002, the planning was almost complete, but with little consideration 

of the post-conflict (Phase IV). Everyone assumed someone else 

would take care of the post-conflict reconstruction. By this time, the 

interagency structure had discussed reconstruction only in terms 

of humanitarian relief. Humanitarian relief was the focus because 

of two basic pre-war assumptions that caused planners to focus on 

a best-case scenario planning strategy. First, they believed that the 

United States would be greeted as liberators, not occupiers, and they 

had no expectation of an insurgency. Second, they assumed the Iraqi 

government and infrastructure would continue to function without 

Saddam. 

DoD established itself as the lead post-war agency to ensure 

unity of command under the Secretary of Defense. There was a belief 

that the Department of State could not plan the reconstruction or 

carry it out well. This assumption was made during the beginning 

of the post-war period, but DoD itself did not have any experience 

with reconstruction. Eight weeks before combat began, ORHA was 

created to stabilize the post-war situation. Initially, most of the 

personnel in ORHA were military, not civilian. However, ORHA 

was not permitted to enter Iraq until the military command felt that 

it was safe/secure/stable enough for the civilian authority. This 

highlighted a disconnect between the civil and military authorities—

a fundamental problem that continued under the CPA. 

The CPA was an explicit occupying organization that inherited 

the situation. Tensions worsened between the military and civilian 

organizations, largely due to problems between the heads of the 

different command structures. The CPA was created to complete a 

job unforeseen in the planning process. It took a long time to set up; 

it had many problems with staffing and turnover; and, initially, it 

was radically understaffed. In the process, military forces had to deal 

with the problems in Iraq, being continually told that the CPA would 

deal with governance. The Army and Marine divisions waited for the 

CPA, but after a time, started actively to do reconstruction on their 
15

own. Then, realizing the security situation needed improvement, 

they started working locally on security. In this power vacuum, 

the military commanders also started to work on governance. They 

slowly accrued the responsibility for reconstruction because no one 

else was taking care of these issues. This created a problem when the 

CPA finally arrived on the scene, because of the implementation of 

different policies in different areas. 

The presenter noted that three lessons that can be learned from 

the Iraq situation. The first was a general lesson: Post-war planning 

cannot be separated from war planning. All phases of the war need 

to be coordinated to work towards the same end. The second was a 

lesson for the military: Ground forces need to be prepared to take 

on stabilization and reconstruction tasks after the conflict. Only they 

are able to do it in the immediate aftermath of the conflict because 

of the power vacuum. They must be given the proper training to 

handle these tasks. The final lesson was for the civilian authorities: 

Effective civilian interagency preparations and planning are needed 

to increase the capacity to handle reconstruction roles.

Countering the Insurgency.

The third panel of the day began with a presentation entitled 

“Leaving in Order to Win?” This presenter discussed the prospect of 

U.S. forces leaving Iraq, and whether, as some might say, the United 

States should “leave in order to win.” The speaker asserted that the 

recently popularized phrase presumes that the U.S. presence in Iraq 

is the principal cause of violence, and that as long as U.S. forces 

perform the security role there, no urgency will exist on the part of the 

Iraqis to assume responsibility. The speaker asserted that neither of 

these points are truly valid, and that it is wishful thinking to assume 

that violence in Iraq will subside enough for a 2006 withdrawal.

Similarly, he argued, the term “exit strategy” was criticized as 

unhealthy because it implies that it is more important to leave than 

to succeed. He stated that, to win, the United States must achieve 

the objective of a democratic, stable, peaceful Iraq. The presenter 

emphasized the importance of remembering that no effort at 

enforced democratization has been successful within a period of 

less than 7 years, and that average counterinsurgencies last 9 years. 

He also highlighted the importance of understanding the enemy. 
16

The insurgency is made up of 90 percent Iraqi Sunnis, driven by a 

concept of “good” resistance and the optimism of having yet to be 

defeated by a vastly superior U.S. force. The other 10 percent of the 

insurgency is made of foreign fighters and criminal armies. In total, 

there are around 20-30K insurgent combatants; if rough math holds, 

this indicates the presence of at least 5,000 active supporters and a 

large number of passive sympathizers. The presenter also warned 

that observers should not view the enemy as a homogeneous force. 

Such a view prevents a full understanding of different elements of 

the insurgency, and hinders the effectiveness of plans to change 

the social environment and eliminate the conditions that fuel the 

insurgency. 

Security in Iraq, while improved, continues to rely on U.S. 

leadership. The speaker predicted that coalition leadership will be 

required for at least 1-2 years before Iraqis can take the lead. Although 

Iraqi forces play an increasing role in security—particularly in 

Najaf, Karbala, and parts of Baghdad—the most important goal is in 

quality and not simply quantity of forces. Some field commanders 

estimate that Iraqis will be able to assume responsibility for security 

by the end of 2007. A key goal is to train and equip the Iraqis, and 

to help them develop a military infrastructure to handle logistics, 

maintenance, etc. Until the Iraqi police and army can perform duties 

throughout the country, however, the line of defense must be the 

American soldiers and Marines. 

The speaker noted that there is an important distinction between 

a counterinsurgency and a military battle, and emphasized that a 

successful counterinsurgency must rebuild the government and the 

economy, meeting the political, social, and economic expectations of 

the Iraqis. An example of success is Fallujah, where a steady longterm accumulation of successes was essential to stabilization. The 

presenter recommended that a strong effort be made to reform and 

functionalize the Iraqi government ministries, such as those for 

health, education, and trade. He concluded by noting the variety of 

roles that Coalition soldiers had to take in Iraq, including those of 

government advisors. He quoted a common phrase that “If someone 

in uniform isn’t doing it, it’s not being done.” Despite this, more 

effort—not less—is required from the United States and the U.S. 

military. In the end, “Leaving to Win” would be more accurately 

phrased, “Leaving is Losing.”
17

The next presentation concerned “Civil Affairs Operations to 

Counter Insurgency.” This presenter began with a discussion of the 

critical role of civil affairs soldiers in stabilizing Iraq. Although these 

soldiers do much different work than soldiers and Marines elsewhere 

in Iraq, the presenter argued that they are a key tool to facilitate 

progress and ultimately achieve victory in Iraq. Since leaving Iraq 

is contingent on forming a capable Iraqi state, he argued that the 

United States must assess its role over the next 3 years. An important 

aspect of this role is to show the Iraqis that the United States is in 

Iraq to help them and to work for them. To do this, the United States 

must develop an Iraqi civil affairs capability to show the Iraqis “what 

we’re all about.” In describing the success of operations at Fallujah, 

the speaker emphasized the importance of identifying cultural and 

economic leaders within Iraqi cities, and maintaining a dialogue 

and relationship with them during peace as well as during military 

operations. In Fallujah, U.S. forces maintained such a dialogue with 

the city leadership, even during the fight. The presenter attributed 

the success of the Fallujah operation to this communication, as well 

as the fact that U.S. forces permitted 90 percent of the citizens to 

evacuate.

He argued that a key goal must be to understand the true needs 

and wants of the Iraqis. They need a system of small business 

loans, electronic banking, and other systems that will improve 

their standard of living. Until this happens, they will support the 

insurgency. He described one of the successes of Fallujah being that 

in the immediate post-operation period when U.S. forces were able 

to help implement responsible governance in the city successfully. 

Thus commerce and street vendors were able to return quickly to the 

streets. An important need exists for national institutions in Iraq that 

can function well: no aid organizations ever came to Fallujah, nor did 

any independent electoral commission. The fear that prevents these 

organizations from engaging the Iraqis, he argued, must be reduced. 

Above all, the United States must help to build town councils, staff 

polling centers, and staff police forces, so we can show the Iraqis 

what we are doing for them. As the President has said, the United 

States must focus much effort—perhaps 50 percent—on countering 

ideological problems that lead to Iraqi resistance.

The presenter further argued that one of the current problems is 

that the Iraqis do not have a positive or common vision for the future 
18

of their country. He contended that if the United States can focus on 

ideology and continue its economic programs, tacit support for the 

insurgency will disappear. As it stands now, however, the Iraqis do 

not trust the United States. A key goal must be to show the Iraqis that 

there is a different future, and that if they are involved and engaged, 

they will be able to determine their own future successfully.

The next panelist discussed “Suppressing the Shi’a Rebellion” in 

southern Iraq in spring 2004. The speaker, who had been an important 

participant in this operation, began by noting the importance of 

discussing the Shi’a uprising and the battle for Karbala: Although it 

was the smallest of the insurgent problems in Iraq, it is the only one of 

three insurgencies that has been resolved. His presentation provided 

insights into how the uprising was satisfactorily closed, and how the 

lessons learned can be applied to other counterinsurgency efforts. 

The Shi’a rebellion in April 2004 was led by Muqtada al-Sadr, 

an extremely influential Shi’a cleric who has strongly opposed the 

Coalition presence in Iraq. Al-Sadr began gaining power in 2003, 

particularly among disaffected youth, and ultimately used this 

constituency as a power base to form a major stake following the 

Baathist collapse. The April 2004 clash developed after a prolonged 

buildup of tensions. Initially, the CPA did not have the courage to 

seize and disarm Sadr. However, in March 2004, Paul Bremer moved 

to close Sadr’s newspaper, and his followers demonstrated against 

the United States. One month later, following a number of arrests 

(including that of Sadr’s deputy, Mustafa al-Yacoubi), Sadr released 

a full insurgent effort in Karbala. The estimated 250 members of the 

Sadr militia (later estimated at 500) overran most of the city and 

were in control of the “old city,” which included the Hussein and 

Abbas shrines. They attacked city hall and overran the Governor’s 

building, the Baathist party headquarters, and other locations. The 

militia members began implementing traffic checkpoints (where 

they forced women to wear veils), and established an ammunition 

cache in an amusement park. 

Coalition forces—including U.S., Polish, and Iraqi forces—were 

sent under the control of the Polish combat team. It took 2 weeks for 

these forces to restore order to Karbala. Key events included May 4, 

when forces cleared Governor’s Street; May 5, when forces cleared 

the amusement park and confiscated a cache of insurgent explosives; 
19

and May 6-9, when forces retook the new city of Karbala. U.S. forces 

then worked 5 weeks on reconstruction efforts. The composition of 

the Coalition forces for attack was unique: one of the few times in 

Iraq where a very diverse coalition of forces worked together at a 

tactical level. There was a joint unit of more than 50 percent Iraqi 

soldiers (possibly even 80-90 percent), and close bonds were formed 

with the Polish soldiers. 

After discussing the operations, the presenter described the 

restoration of Karbala. This took $1.2 million of Commander’s 

Emergency Response Program (CERP) aid money for civic action 

projects. The weapons buy-back program was very successful. 

Coalition forces were able to rebuild the police academy and restore 

the Iraqi army in Karbala. They created a joint coordination center in 

case of a future emergency, and restored the electrical grid in the city. 

Karbala is now considered under control. The presenter concluded 

by discussing the keys to success of operations in Karbala. Among 

others, these successes included the integration of Iraqi forces into 

military operations, the support of local citizens, a visible and robust 

police presence, and a swift infusion of money to local businesses. 

In response to a question, one speaker with extensive 

experience in Iraq noted that the British are definitely prepared for 

counterinsurgency operations, and the Poles (“with whom I am 

hugely impressed”) would be if their rules of engagement allowed. 

Although he did not work closely with the rest, his sense was that 

they are not prepared to do counterinsurgency operations. In answer 

to a question about the composition of the insurgency, one speaker 

answered that the militia in the Southern Shi’a area that is controlled 

by the British is still a problem. The British have been losing some 

control in that area, and the militia has been facilitating transfer 

of weapons across the border. Asked if the media was adequately 

reporting success in Iraq, the same speaker answered that the media 

tends to over-report incidents and under-report everything else. It 

often misses the real stories and should be better at covering longerterm issues. The Coalition should help by providing the right kind of 

data and stories.

Another questioner asked if we had the right number of troops 

in Iraq. A panelist referred the questioner to a RAND report that 

concludes the right ratio for counterinsurgency is 20 security 

personnel per 1000 citizens. That means a half-million forces are 
20

needed in Iraq. However, the panelist noted that it is impossible to 

tune numbers so precisely. Suffice it to say that the more security 

forces are present, the sooner the insurgency can be suppressed. 

Concluding Session.

In the final session, Dr. Cohen introduced the two commentators 

who would provide their thoughts on the day’s panel discussions. 

He asked them to give their general thoughts, but also asked them 

specifically: Having reflected on events in Iraq (and bearing in mind 

normal expectations about performance of government and military 

organizations), how each commentator would evaluate the U.S. 

Government for:

a. planning major combat operations;

b. operations and counterinsurgency; and,

c. particular individuals or institutions.

The first commentator began by comparing operations against 

the insurgency in Algeria to the U.S. position in Iraq. Although he 

defined the good news as the fact that U.S. forces are adapting, the 

bad news is that we have wasted a year, spent billions of dollars, and 

alienated the Iraqi center. He argued that it will be difficult to reverse 

that. He stated that we are making military progress, but that he is 

concerned that the “political clock” will run out before we are ready. 

He framed the war as one of “containment”: the first Iraq war began 

in 1991, and he considered that an 11-year containment campaign. 

He asserted that there will be another 10 years of containment to 

come. He argued that force protection should not be a priority at the 

expense of winning and protecting the Iraqis. Too many officers fail 

to emphasize these goals.

On grading of officials, the speaker gave a firm “F” to the war 

planning, and asserted that the war plan was perhaps the worst in 

American history. On grading of the counterinsurgency, he gave an 

“incomplete.” He said that the U.S. military is correctly moving from 

anti-insurgency (killing insurgents) to counterinsurgency (a broader 

effort). He asserted that the focus must shift more toward protecting 

Iraqis: It is wrong that we are putting them in situations of greater 

vulnerability than our own soldiers.
21

He agreed with all the prior presentations on Phase IV. He asserted 

that it is important to create indigenous Iraqi forces, but there is 

much more to be done. On Fallujah, he reminded the audience that 

we should recall that the struggle there was actually a very wellfought urban battle by insurgents. On the topic of understanding the 

enemy, he reminded the audience of the Algerian insurgency, and 

the failure of the French to understand their enemy.

The second commentator noted that the panel on Planning and 

Execution was “very upbeat,” despite the grave problems of Phase 

IV. He emphasized that, indeed, “it was a great war if it wasn’t for 

the victory.” He assigned grades of “A” to military commanders. 

Everyone else, particularly those involved in political and diplomatic 

areas, received a “conditional” or “failing” mark. He praised the 

presentation entitled “Speed Kills,” but had some reservations. 

Although he agreed that we were fighting against an inept enemy 

and that we used speed as a great advantage, he remarked that the 

presentation raised the point that we still do not know whether a 

new transformation of the military can do the job against a first class 

enemy. Certainly, though, speed was helpful in Iraq. 

He found the Afghan model to be fascinating, and agreed that, 

with only a very few people, the United States was able to change 

the dimensions of battle strategically. He agreed with the presenter 

on the importance of operating with locals on the ground who are 

welcoming. He then examined the assumptions about key elements 

that drove what happened in the war. From the DoD point of view, 

the war in Iraq was laid out to be an industrial enterprise. Some of the 

key assumptions were that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons, 

that the Iraqis would destroy infrastructure, that Baghdad was the 

center of gravity, and that the Republican Guard was the military 

center of gravity. In the Phase IV stage, the DoD also assumed that 

the United States would receive international support. He asserted 

that the validity of all of these assumptions is arguable. 

However, some assumptions were indeed correct. One was that 

the Iraqi military was weak enough that a small, mobile force could 

do the job well. Another was that the United States would have nearperfect battle space awareness, and that “shock and awe” would be 

effective and would cut down Iraqi command and control. He pointed 

out that, although this was true, it was counterproductive in the 
22

sense that command and control would be needed for reconstruction 

efforts later on.

He argued that one element overlooked was the paramilitary 

Fedayeen. In the end, this was the force that the United States had to 

fight, and which was the military center of gravity—not the Republican 

Guard. This reflected an intelligence failure, and ultimately gave 

basis for the insurgency after Baghdad fell. Another element that 

he claimed was overlooked was post-combat operations. He argued 

that a disconnect remains between the military and politics: the 

military does almost everything in Iraq. The State Department gave 

responsibilities to DoD, and the only people with resources are the 

military, so nobody else takes the responsibility. 

He concluded by noting that changes to the National Security 

Act of 1947 are necessary for us to learn from the civil-military 

disconnect. We have seen in Iraq that civil-military operations 

cannot be disentangled, and that legal authorities must be properly 

distributed. 

A question was asked, “Was insurgency unavoidable? Is the 

presence of American troops supporting the insurgency, and would 

leaving help?” The second commentator answered that even if the 

United States had everything it needed, an insurgency would still 

have been likely. He asserted, however, that it would be a matter 

of degree: the insurgency would still exist, but perhaps not to the 

same extent. The first commentator discussed how the presence of 

the troops was fueling the insurgency. His primary worry, however, 

was the undisciplined behavior of the support structure (i.e., 

supply truck drivers, contractors not responsible to the U.S. chain 

of command, and personal security details). Reducing the presence 

of this support structure—rather than of the U.S. forces—might help 

against the insurgency.

Several panelists answered a question about embedding political 

advisors to support the military, addressing the possible role of 

State Department representatives. Although the consensus was that 

State representatives would play an important role, it would be a 

challenge, given limited staff and the difficulty of forcing staff to 

spend time in the field. 

Dr. Cohen then asked whether previous panelists would like 

to make any last comments. One speaker raised the issue of CERP 
23

and its usefulness as a short-term injection of money into rebuilding 

Iraqi infrastructure. He said that there was just not enough money: 

more aid could have given a major boost to Iraqi small businesses 

and communities. Another panelist noted that advisors available to 

suggest how to apply these funds also would have been useful.

Another speaker stated that the escalation to insurgency was a 

direct result of U.S. mistakes. He maintained that assumptions about 

post-war were wrong, were not challenged, and that the military did 

not do contingency planning. Another panelist commented on the 

difference between political and military objectives and recalled the 

Clausewitzian concept of war as policy. He asserted that the agenda 

for Iraq, as it was written, was a political and not a military object. 

However, he noted that the United States operationalized plans 

based on the military objective, and then implemented the policy. 

However, this did not equate to a strategic victory.

Cohen noted that the most effective wartime conduct of 

operations often occurs when civilian-military relations are in-depth 

and heated. He asserted that this did not happen during the war 

in Iraq, and that there were limits to the willingness of the military 

to argue and debate with civilian authorities. Ultimately, civilians 

are responsible, but such debates are important to effective wartime 

decisionmaking.