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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS 

DIVISION I 

No. CR-16-855 

BRIAN DAWAYNE AUSTIN

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

Opinion Delivered: March 1, 2017

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, 

SEVENTH DIVISION 

[NOS. 60CR-16-765; 60CR-16-766] 

HONORABLE BARRY SIMS, 

JUDGE

AFFIRMED

RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge

Appellant Brian Dawayne Austin (DOB: 03-24-00) appeals from the circuit court’s 

denial of his motion to transfer his case to the juvenile division of circuit court. He argues 

that the trial court’s denial of his motion to transfer was clearly erroneous. We affirm.

Austin was charged, along with a codefendant, G.S., in the Pulaski County Circuit 

Court with aggravated robbery and first-degree battery stemming from two robberies that 

occurred on January 31 and February 1, 2016. On May 23, 2016, the public defender 

entered his appearance and moved that the cases be transferred to the juvenile division of 

circuit court. A juvenile-transfer hearing was held on June 20, 2016, and the circuit court 

denied the motion from the bench. An order reflecting such was entered on July 11, 2016.

The interlocutory appeal is properly before this court. 

At the hearing on the motion to transfer, the investigating officer in the case, 
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Detective Robert Martin, testified that on January 31, 2016, officers responded at 5:06 p.m.

to the shooting of Edward Avery. Avery was in his car when he was approached by two 

African-American males. Avery recounted to officers that the smaller of the two males put 

a gun to his head, and when Avery attempted to grab the gun, he was shot in the mouth. 

The two males then fled. Avery later identified both G.S. and Austin from a photo line-up; 

he described G.S. as the gunman and Austin as the lookout. Ironically, Avery was able to 

first identify his assailants after seeing local news coverage on area crime in which both G.S. 

and Austin gave interviews where they stated their fear of violence and their intention to 

stay off the streets. The televised interviews aired at both 6:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. on 

February 1, 2016. 

That same night, around 11:40 p.m., Austin approached Luis Reyes while he was 

pumping gas and begged for money; Reyes complied with Austin’s demands. When Austin 

asked for more money and Reyes refused, Austin intimated that he was armed and took all 

of Reyes’s belongings including his car. Austin and G.S. were subsequently stopped in 

Reyes’s car, and Reyes later identified them as the males who had robbed him. Upon his

arrest, Austin admitted his involvement in the robbery of Reyes. The State also introduced 

evidence of at least one prior juvenile case that resulted from a criminal trespass, as well as 

one truancy case. 

Dewayne Wilkins, Austin’s former probation officer, testified that Austin had been 

placed on probation in 2013. While on probation, Austin’s mother had died, and he had 

not exhausted the services available to him. Wilkins testified that he had not seen Austin 

since he was thirteen years old. 
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Juvenile ombudsman Scott Tanner testified that there are services that would be 

available to Austin in juvenile court. Austin’s father, Eric, explained that he obtained custody 

of his son in 2013 after Austin’s mother died. Eric Austin testified that his son went into a 

“huge depression” after her death, so Eric sent him to receive treatment at Pinnacle Pointe.

On appeal, Austin challenges the circuit court’s findings and argues that the decision 

should be reversed because the circuit court clearly erred in finding that the case should not 

be transferred. The substantive and procedural requirements for the transfer of a case to the 

juvenile division of circuit court are set forth in Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-318

(Repl. 2015). On motion of the court or any party, the court in which the charges have 

been filed shall conduct a transfer hearing to determine whether to transfer the case to 

another division of circuit court. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(e). 

The moving party bears the burden of proving that the case should be transferred. 

Z.T. v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 282. The court shall order the case transferred to another 

division of circuit court only upon a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the case 

should be transferred. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(h)(2). Clear and convincing evidence is 

the degree of proof that will produce in the trier of fact a firm conviction as to the allegation 

sought to be established. R.W.G. v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 545, 444 S.W.3d 376. We will 

not reverse a circuit court’s determination of whether to transfer a case unless that decision 

is clearly erroneous. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to 

support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a firm conviction that a 

mistake has been committed. Id. 
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Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-318(g) sets forth all of the factors the court 

shall consider in a transfer hearing:

(1) The seriousness of the alleged offense and whether the protection of society 

requires prosecution in the criminal division of circuit court; 

(2) Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, 

premeditated, or willful manner; 

(3) Whether the offense was against a person or property, with greater weight being 

given to offenses against persons, especially if personal injury resulted;

(4) The culpability of the juvenile, including the level of planning and participation 

in the alleged offense;

(5) The previous history of the juvenile, including whether the juvenile had been 

adjudicated a juvenile offender and, if so, whether the offenses were against persons 

or property, and any other previous history of antisocial behavior or patterns of 

physical violence;

(6) The sophistication or maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration of 

the juvenile’s home, environment, emotional attitude, pattern of living, or desire to 

be treated as an adult;

(7) Whether there are facilities or programs available to the judge of the juvenile 

division of circuit court that are likely to rehabilitate the juvenile before the 

expiration of the juvenile’s twenty-first birthday; 

(8) Whether the juvenile acted alone or was part of a group in the commission of 

the alleged offense;

(9) Written reports and other materials relating to the juvenile’s mental, physical, 

educational, and social history; and 

(10) Any other factors deemed relevant by the judge.

The trial court is required to make written findings on all of the above factors. Ark. 

Code Ann. § 9-27-318(h)(1). However, there is no requirement that proof be introduced 

against the juvenile on each factor, and the circuit court is not obligated to give equal weight 

to each of these factors in determining whether a case should be transferred. Neal v. State, 

2010 Ark. App. 744, 378 S.W.3d 634. 

Here, the circuit court heard the evidence, weighed it, reached its decision, and 

enumerated its conclusions in an order. The circuit court considered the evidence on all of 

the factors, as required by the statute, and it was free to use its discretion in the weight 
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afforded to each factor. D.A.S. v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 144, at 6. As noted, the circuit 

court is not required to give equal weight to each of the statutory factors; it can rely on any 

of the factors so long as it considered and made written findings with regard to all the factors. 

In the instant case, the circuit court considered all of the factors and determined that 

the seriousness of the offenses, that the offenses were committed against persons, the need 

for societal protection, and the level of participation in the offenses outweighed any other 

factors. This determination is supported by the record. Moreover, when reviewing the 

entire evidence, we cannot say with firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. 

We hold that the circuit court properly considered all of the factors in section 9-27-318(g) 

and did not clearly err in denying the motion to transfer. Accordingly, we affirm. 

Affirmed. 

VIRDEN and GLADWIN, JJ., agree. 

Fernando Padilla, Public Defender Conflicts, for appellant. 

Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Valerie Glover Fortner, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.