COLOMBIA’S CONFLICTS:

THE SPILLOVER EFFECTS

OF A WIDER WAR

Richard L. Millett

October 2002
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ISBN 1-58487-105-9

ii
FOREWORD

This is the first in a new Special Series of monographs

that stems from the February 2001 and the March 2002

conferences—co-sponsored by the Strategic Studies

Institute of the U.S. Army War College and The Dante B.

Fascell North-South Center of the University of

Miami—that dealt with the “Implementation of Plan

Colombia.” This similar but different series begins a

transition of focus from Colombia’s specific crises to broader

regional and global security concerns, and the upcoming

conference in March 2003 entitled “Shaping the Regional

Security Environment in Latin America.”

Colombia’s Conflicts: The Spillover Effects of a Wider

War, written by Dr. Richard L. Millett, is the lead

monograph for the new series. This timely monograph

provides a careful examination of the problems generated

by Colombia’s three simultaneous wars against illegal drug

traffickers, insurgents, and self-appointed paramilitary

groups. All seek, in one way or another, violently to change

or depose the state. All use the uncontrolled “gray areas” in

Colombia and its neighboring states to sustain, conduct,

and replenish their nefarious operations without risk of

significant interference. And, all these violent illegal

entities constitute threats to stability and security that

extend beyond Colombia and Latin America to Europe and

the United States. Colombia is therefore a paradigm of the

failing state that has enormous implications for U.S. foreign

policy and military asset management for now and into the

future.

The Colombian conflict and its extension into the global

community represent a major dilemma for the United

States at a time when this country is engaged in a great

world-wide terrorist war. The logic of the dilemma is that

Colombia’s security and stability are very fragile. That must

be and is being addressed. The “balloon” effect of dealing

iii
exclusively with the Colombian situation, however, is

allowing instability and insecurity to bulge out elsewhere,

and is weakening neighboring regimes. An insecure and

unstable hemisphere limits U.S. possibilities in the global

security arena. Thus, the United States must balance

support for Colombia with efforts to enhance regional

security. This takes us back to where we began—broader

security concerns. The intent of this new series of

monographs and the upcoming conference is to recognize

and respond to the strategic realities of the current

situation, and reframe Plan Colombia and related policy

and strategy in a new context.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to join with the

North-South Center in offering Dr. Millett’s monograph as

part of our ongoing attempt to clarify the issues regarding

the Colombian crisis, focus the debate, and learn from it.

That international security debate is critically important to

the vital interests of the United States, Colombia, the

hemisphere, and the global community.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iv
PREFACE

As this country’s leadership focuses on homeland

security, it is important that we look to our own Western

Hemisphere. Terrorism does not solely originate in the

Middle East. Colombia’s multifaceted conflicts are by no

means confined to that country, a fact long appreciated by

civilian and military strategists who are engaged in the

search for solutions there. Professor Richard L. Millett

documents succinctly in this monograph how the spillover

from Colombia affects each of the five countries on its border

(Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, Panama, and Brazil), as well as

those somewhat more distant (Bolivia, Paraguay, and the

Caribbean states).

When the U.S. Army War College and the North-South

Center organized a second conference on Colombia early in

2002, a primary objective was to analyze Colombia as an

“exporter of insecurity” (a phrase of Juan Gabriel

Tokatlián’s)—now a matter of serious hemispheric concern.

Colombia cannot be ignored or minimized, as it tends to be

in the highest-level inter-American deliberations. If any of

the broad, ambitious hemispheric projects, such as the Free

Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), are to succeed, a

common concern must be held for Colombia’s conflicts. They

will get in the way of the FTAA whether the trade

negotiators realize it or not.

It is not just a question of extraterritorial armed combat

across borders by Colombia’s guerrilla groups, the leftist

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and

Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN) and the rightist Auto

Defensas Unificados de Colombia (AUC), classified by

Washington as “terrorists” and known also to be into drug

trafficking. The growth of criminal organizations associated

with the drug trade, the flow of refugees from Colombia, and

the undermining of the national defense forces of all of

Colombia’s neighbors are the result of the spillover.

v
Millett reminds us that there is no purely military

solution to the Colombian conflict. He also points out,

however, that there is no solution without a meaningful

military component. The stakes are huge in terms of the

sustainability of democratic governance and of regional

stability in a large portion of the hemisphere.

Despite the large sums appropriated by the United

States toward Plan Colombia, no one, including Millett, has

suggested that the trendline has yet turned positive.

Although it seems difficult for the United States to give

concentrated attention beyond the Middle East, security in

the Western Hemisphere needs new focus, given present

circumstances. In view of the vital importance of the

spillover effects of the Colombia conflict on U.S. political,

economic, and security interests, the North-South Center

intends to devote a greater share of its resources to this

issue. Through commissioned papers, policy briefings, and

educational outreach activities, the Center will address

spillover effects in key areas such as economic growth,

political stability, migration, regional economic integration,

and the future of hemispheric security institutions.

AMBLER H. MOSS, JR.

Director

The Dante B. Fascell

North-South Center

University of Miami

vi
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

RICHARD L. MILLETT, a Senior Fellow at the

North-South Center, previously held the Oppenheimer

Chair of Modern Warfighting Strategy at the U.S. Marine

Corps University. He is Professor Emeritus of History at

Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville. Dr. Millett is

a member of the Executive Council of the American

Committees on Foreign Relations, and Senior Advisor for

Latin America to Political Risk Services. He has appeared

on every major national TV network, testified before

Congress on 19 occasions, and participated in election

supervision in four nations. He has taught at the University

of Miami, St. Louis University, the U.S. Air Force War

College, and the U.S. Marine Corps University. Dr. Millett

has published over 100 items in Foreign Policy, The Wilson

Quarterly, Current History, the New Republic, and

numerous other professional journals. His is also the author

of Beyond Praetorianism: The Latin American Military in

Transition.

vii
SUMMARY

In this monograph, Dr. Richard L. Millett succinctly

documents how the “spillover” from the ongoing crisis in

Colombia effects each of the five countries on its porous

borders—as well as somewhat more distant states and

regions. The author reminds us that this is not just a

question of extraterritorial armed combat across frontiers

with greedy illegal drug traffickers, leftist insurgents, and

rightist paramilitary groups.

In today’s global village, there is no such thing as a

purely national crisis or a purely military conflict. Every

conflict has global political, economic, social, and security

implications ranging from trade disruption to the growth of

criminal organizations to refugee flows to violent clashes to

local and regional political instability. Conditions of

instability also undermine efforts to nurture democracy and

free-market economies, and to install anything approaching

the rule of law and human rights. Moreover, no single

nation can confront these problems alone.

This takes us back to where Dr. Millett began—broader

security concerns. The bottom-line solution to the problem

presented in this monograph is straightforward. It is

incumbent on Colombia and the broader hemispheric and

global community to come together and collectively confront

the emerging alliance between organized crime, terrorism,

and the politics and economics of violence.

ix
COLOMBIA’S CONFLICTS:

THE SPILLOVER EFFECTS OF A WIDER WAR

Introduction.

In today’s global village there is no such thing as a purely

national crisis. Every conflict has spillover effects, ranging

from trade disruptions to refugee flows to violent clashes. In

the past it was common for nations to believe that

promoting conflict in neighboring states could somehow

enhance their security, but in the 21st century it has become

increasingly obvious that conflicts in one nation constitute a

security threat to all who share common borders. Today, it is

more often the weakness rather than the strength of states

which threatens to disrupt the search for peace and

stability.

Compounding the problem is what Ambassador Clovis

Maksoud of American University has described as “the

CNNization of the world.” A globalized media

communications network ensures that violent conflicts

almost anywhere are instantly communicated to

neighboring nations, often in a manner designed to

maximize shock and fear. Popular apprehensions are

magnified, increasing political pressures for governments

to respond to the situation, in the process inextricably

mixing political and security concerns. The current conflicts

in Colombia and their impact on and the responses by

Colombia’s neighbors present a graphic example of this

problem. Colombian scholar Juan Gabriel Tokatlian noted

that Colombia has “become an exporter of insecurity . . ., a

source of governmental insecurity and prospective danger.”1

Colombia’s former Defense Minister, Rafael Pardo, echoed

Tokatlian’s view, adding that the conflict was “boiling over”

as “guerrillas kidnap Venezuelans and Ecuadorians, the

paramilitaries smuggle weapons from bases along the

Panamanian border; and hundreds of citizens from dozens

1
of foreign countries are taken hostage annually.” As a

result, Pardo concluded, “Colombia has become a serious

security threat not only to the Andean region, but to the

broader hemisphere as well.”2

Concerns about the impact of Colombia’s conflicts and

about U.S. efforts to pursue its “war on drugs” in that nation

are broadly shared. When Latin America’s Roman Catholic

Bishops met in Bogota, Colombia, in July 2000, bishops

from Ecuador, Venezuela, and Brazil took the opportunity

to voice their concerns about the growing impact of

Colombia’s conflicts on their societies. They cited refugee

flows, narcotics trafficking, kidnappings, and even clashes

with police and military units as examples of the

increasingly destructive impacts in frontier regions.3 These

concerns were reinforced a year later when the United

Nation’s High Commissioner for Refugees warned of the

potential for a “severe humanitarian crisis with a flood of

refugees pouring into neighboring nations, most notably

Ecuador and Venezuela.4

Such concerns are not confined to neighboring nations.

An August meeting of senior security officials of Central

American devoted considerable attention to the danger that

escalated conflict within Colombia could “push those

engaged in the processing and shipment of narcotics” into

Central America, with Nicaragua’s Defense Minister

adding, “Our countries would be ideal nests enabling these

people to come here and take over territories once more,

bringing the Colombian problem to our region.”5 Rumors of

the presence of Colombian guerrillas and narcotraffickers

have surfaced in nations as distant as Paraguay, where

word of an active FARC presence was widespread in 2002.

Concerns about spillover effects extend beyond Latin

America. European political leaders have repeatedly

expressed their fears of a spreading conflict. Even stronger

expressions of concern have come from human rights

organizations in Europe and the United States.Perhaps less

predictable and therefore more significant have been

statements made by U.S. officials. U.S. Army War College

2
Professors Gabriel Marcella and Donald Schulz emphasized

that “the very weakness of Colombia as a nation-state

threatens international order in the region and the

well-being of any number of countries.” 6 Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director George Tenet told the

Senate Intelligence Committee in 2001 “as we make

progress against the FARC and the drug trafficking

organizations .... it’s going to spill over into those countries.

. . . This amoeba will just migrate.”7 His comments

reinforced the earlier observation of Under Secretary of

State Thomas Pickering that “The issue of spillover is

real. . . . I have talked of the balloon effect and others have:

that is if you push in one end it is bound to bulge out on

others.”8

All of this underscores a major dilemma for U.S. policy in

the Western Hemisphere. The Colombian conflict

represents the greatest security issue in the region. Dealing

with its tangled roots, multiple facets and international

dimensions presents a special challenge, especially since

most military analysts and civilian political leaders rule out

direct American military intervention. Strengthening

Colombia’s ability to prosecute the war is obviously a key

element, but in the regional context such potential good

news for Colombia could spell bad news for its neighbors as

illegal armed elements and criminal organizations would

certainly then attempt to transfer more of their operations

across borders. Balancing support for Colombia with efforts

to enhance regional security will be a daunting challenge.

Background.

Internal violence is nothing new to Colombia. The

current conflict has its roots in the 1947-58 period of civil

strife known as la Violencia, an epoch of savage partisan

slaughter that may have claimed as many as 200,000 lives.9

The line between political violence and criminality has also

long been blurred in the Colombian context, a situation

exacerbated in recent years by the flourishing narcotics

3
trade. While international criminal elements have long

taken advantage of the fertile environment afforded them

by Colombia’s prolonged civil conflicts, they did not create

this environment, and it would continue to exist even if their

activities were eliminated. Much of the criminal activity is

domestic. Colombia leads the world in kidnappings, is the

center of counterfeiting in the hemisphere, and has long

been plagued by high levels of violent common crime.

Such activities have been an integral part of internal

political conflicts and those engaged in such conflicts have

rarely drawn any meaningful distinction between legal and

illegal means of financing their activities. All of the major

armed illegal groups, the left wing Armed Revolutionary

Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army

(ELN) and the right-wing paramilitary United Self Defense

Forces of Colombia (AUC), engage in and increasingly

depend on income from criminal actions.

The Colombian state has never exercised effective

control over much of its national territory and nothing

approaching the rule of law has existed in many rural areas.

Rural elites have found this neither essential nor desirable,

and urban elites have lacked motivation for making the

effort necessary to alter this situation. Even when elements

of the state have attempted to establish some sort of

effective administration of justice in conflict areas, they

have lacked both financial and human resources, have had

little support from local populations with no experience of

the state as a potentially impartial dispenser of justice, and

have found rural elites suspicious of, if not positively

opposed to, any extension of central authority. Border

regions have especially resisted central authority, in part

because smuggling operations have often been an integral

part of local economies. All this complicates cross-border

issues, intermixing national, regional, and international

concerns, blurring distinctions between law enforcement

and military operations, and magnifying the impact of

Colombian developments on neighboring nations.

4
Colombia shares land borders with five nations: Brazil,

Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. In addition, its

Caribbean coast and its island territories are a distinct

presence in that region, the impact of which is magnified by

the narcotics trafficking which passes through and over the

Caribbean Sea. In each of these cases, Colombia’s internal

conflicts are producing a mounting array of political,

diplomatic, economic, and security concerns on the part of

Colombia and of its neighbors.

Colombia’s neighbors reflect a variety of the spillover

effects of internal conflicts. As the strength of the major

insurgent groups, the FARC and ELN, and the right-wing

paramilitary AUC, grew throughout the 1990s, the

concerns of neighboring nations increased proportionately.

Rising violence by criminal groups, combined with concerns

over growing U.S. involvement, further fueled these

concerns. For some the reaction was to seek closer ties with

and greater support from the United States, for others it

raised fears of a more aggressive American presence in the

region. In each case national concerns have overwhelmed

any potential for joint regional responses. Internal political

and economic problems in each nation have further

exacerbated the situation, making impossible any

meaningful regional consensus. Therefore, it is necessary to

examine the situation in each of Colombia’s neighbors

before making any general conclusions about the current

spillover effects and potential future developments.

Venezuela.

Perhaps the most complex and divisive case is that in

Venezuela. For decades Venezuela viewed the Colombian

state as a potential, if not actual, threat. Border disputes,

largely in the Gulf of Venezuela, were major factors.

Colombia held a similar view of Venezuela, as evidenced by

its opposition to the U.S. sale of F-16 combat jets to

Venezuela during the 1980s. But in the 1990s Venezuela

became increasingly preoccupied with Colombia’s weakness

5
rather than its strength, and some Colombians saw a

Venezuelan military buildup along their border as more of

an aid to dealing with the insurgents than as a threat to

national security. Several clashes between insurgent forces,

both FARC and ELN, and Venezuelan security units

demonstrated the growing instability in the border region.

The situation was further complicated by increased

narcotics trafficking across the border and a greater tide of

Colombian refugees. By the end of 1998 nearly three million

Colombians were living in Venezuela, and more sectors of

the public identified them with the nation’s rising crime

rate.10 Under the administration of President Rafael

Caldera in Venezuela, the armed forces of both nations

attempted to improve communications and, to the extent

possible, coordinate their actions. Venezuela even

encouraged increased colonization of border areas, notably

in the state of Apure, subsidizing housing and farms, and

increasing the military presence in the state from 1,500 to

5,000.11

Venezuelan involvement in the conflict began to change

in February 1999 when Colonel Hugo Chavez was

inaugurated as President. More sympathetic to the

insurgents than his predecessors and determined to play a

major role in regional politics, the new President’s

statements and actions regarding the conflict generated

growing controversy. Even before his inauguration, Chavez

had declared that he would “go wherever asked and do all he

could to achieve peace in Colombia.” Before his

inauguration, Chavez met with Colombia’s President

Andres Pastrana and Cuba’s Fidel Castro to discuss peace

prospects, then, shortly after taking office, hosted

preliminary meetings between the Colombian government

and the ELN. Chavez also began to concentrate public

criticism on Colombia’s right-wing paramilitaries,

portraying them as a threat at least equal to that posed by

the guerrillas.

Any Colombian hopes that Chavez might be able to

broker a deal with the insurgents rapidly were overtaken by

6
rising fears of his own ambitions to regional leadership and

by allegations that he was sympathetic to the insurgents’

cause.12 Colombia charged that Venezuelan citizens were

selling arms to the FARC and that its Air Force had

overflown Colombian territory. The Chavez administration

responded by denying these accusations and, in turn,

accusing Colombia of failing to secure its border and

violating the human rights of Venezuelan citizens.13

Insurgent incursions into Venezuelan territory including

the hijacking of an airplane did not seem to alter President

Chavez’s determination to treat the insurgents and

Colombia’s government as equals.14 While such efforts did

nothing to advance the peace process, they did strain

bilateral relations.

Relations between Colombia and Venezuela

deteriorated still further in 2001. With increasing

frequency, Colombian military and political leaders

charged that Venezuela was providing arms and sanctuary

to elements of the FARC and ELN. In January a Venezuelan

National Guard unit seized a shipment of semi-automatic

rifles apparently destined for the FARC.15 Cattle ranchers in

Venezuela increasingly complained that they were forced to

pay protection money to the FARC and ELN despite a

reported “nonaggression pact” between the insurgents and

the Venezuelan government. Colombian paramilitaries

began to follow the FARC into Venezuela, threatening to

extend their conflicts to that nation. A particular point of

tension involved Venezuelan reluctance to arrest and

extradite an ELN member who allegedly had led the

hijacking of a Colombian commercial airliner. A meeting

between Presidents Pastrana and Chavez temporarily

calmed the issue, but deep levels of distrust remained.16

Opposition politicians began accusing Chavez of

favoring the guerrillas and interfering in Colombian

internal affairs, with former ally Francisco Arias even

suggesting that the President might “be considering an

armed conflict with Colombia to distract public attention

from domestic policies that were not delivering results.”17

7
Within the Venezuelan military were reports of growing

discontent over the government’s failure to take a strong

stance against the guerrillas.

Another crisis erupted in January 2002, when

Venezuelan journalists showed a video of a meeting

between the FARC and Venezuelan military officers. At the

same time the Colombian Air Force intercepted a

Venezuelan aircraft loaded with ammunition which was

apparently destined for the FARC.18 While Colombia

eventually said it accepted Venezuela’s explanation that the

meeting was a “humanitarian effort” to obtain the release of

a kidnaped Venezuelan, tensions continued to mount.

Reports surfaced that Venezuelan military intelligence

admitted the presence of 750 armed guerrillas in

Venezuelan territory and that one unit of 500 was operating

with the implicit compliance of Venezuelan authorities.19 In

April Colombian General Martin Orlando Carreno charged

that his troops were attacked by a FARC column which

entered Colombia from Venezuela. When the Venezuelan

government responded by claiming that there was no

evidence that the FARC had launched an attack from

Venezuelan territory, the leaders of the AUC offered to show

reporters where FARC camps had been located.20 Things got

even more embarrassing for the Chavez administration

when a FARC leader admitted that his forces had camps

inside Venezuelan territory.21

Under such circumstances, it was hardly surprising that

a few days later many Colombians, including senior

government officials, seemed to welcome the coup which

briefly ousted Chavez from the presidency. When Chavez

was reinstated, relations deteriorated even further.22 The

collapse of the peace process and the election of Alvaro Uribe

as Colombia’s President, combined with the ongoing

political crisis in Venezuela, contributed to a climate of

tension both in the frontier regions and between the two

national governments.

8
One additional ingredient was added to this mix when

Carlos Castano, leader of the AUC, announced in July that

he was sending instructors to help train right-wing

paramilitaries in Venezuela. The Chavez administration

denied the existence of such a force and claimed that the

AUC intended to make his administration a target. Local

ranchers in frontier areas, however, seemed to confirm

Castano’s claims.23 Should major paramilitary activity

emerge in Venezuela, relations between the two nations

would become even more difficult.

In addition to the activities of illegal armed groups in

frontier areas, Venezuela has had to contend with the

Colombian refugees. While there were only a few hundred

official refugees, estimates were that between 50,000 and

75,000 Colombians were living in Venezuela in

“refugee-like circumstances.”24 Many others had been

forcibly returned by Venezuelan authorities. In August

2002, U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees

(UNHCR) spokesman Kris Janowski expressed the fear

that a new wave of refugees was heading for the border.25

Venezuela had adopted a law for dealing with refugees in

2001 and was supposedly making preparations for handling

this potential wave, but the issue was certain to exacerbate

further the conditions in frontier areas.

While many Colombian and U.S. officials have harshly

criticized the Chavez administration’s role in the Colombia

conflict, from a Venezuelan point of view, many of its actions

seem readily explicable. They fit Chavez’s desire to exercise

regional leadership. They may provide additional leverage

in dealing with ongoing territorial disputes with Colombia.

Blaming Colombia’s government for frontier problems plays

well in Venezuelan domestic politics. His critiques of Plan

Colombia respond to concerns by elements within the

Venezuelan military that U.S. assistance may be tipping

the regional balance of power in Colombia’s favor.

26 Finally,

the guerrillas have carefully cultivated Chavez’s

proclivities, praising his opposition to U.S. intervention and

stressing the similarities between his goals and their own,

9
including claiming affinity with his desire to revive the

“Bolivarian” heritage. At the same time, they released

Venezuelan captives and reduced their clashes with

Venezuelan military units, something obviously desired by

the Chavez administration.27 In a real sense, only by

negotiating with the insurgents, who represent the real

power in much of the border region, could Chavez hope to

curb their incursions into Venezuelan territory. In the short

run, the Chavez tilt may have achieved some success; in the

long run, its impact on the conflict, on the future of

Colombian-Venezuelan and Venezuelan-U.S. relations, and

on Chavez’s own prospects for political survival is much

more dubious. As Rand researchers Angel Rabasa and Peter

Chalk have noted, “Chavez’ relationship with the

Colombian guerrillas is a double-edged sword. He may be

able to provide political support for the guerrillas, perhaps

in the guise of peacemaking, but overt support could

generate a hostile regional and international reaction and

perhaps undermine his position at home.”28

Peru.

Peru’s involvement in Colombia’s conflicts has taken a

different course. While President Chavez was showing

growing sympathy for the guerrillas, Peru’s President

Alberto Fujimori was criticizing the Colombian government

for making concessions to the insurgents.29 Guerrilla

activities along the common border long have been a source

of concern in Peru, while Colombia has focused on the

shipment of coca from Peru to Colombia. However, neither

guerrilla incursions nor refugee flows have been as serious

in Peru as in Venezuela, Panama, or Ecuador, and narcotics

trafficking across the border has declined, as much of the

production of coca moved from Peru to Colombia. This

tempered Colombian criticisms of Peru and facilitated its

emergence in the 1990s as the Colombian government’s

staunchest regional ally. In a series of speeches delivered to

the Inter-American Defense College, the Council of the

Americas, and the United Nations in 1999, Fujimori

10
denounced links between guerrillas and narcotics

traffickers, and called for combating terrorists “without

concessions.” He further announced his strengthening of

forces along the border with Colombia and, while avoiding

any direct advocacy of outside intervention in the

Colombian conflict, declared that his forces were ready to

“combat, neutralize, and capture the terrorists of the FARC

and ELN.”30 Actions accompanied the President’s words.

Military units were shifted to border areas, and three new

airstrips were constructed in the region. Meetings were

arranged between Peruvian and Colombian officers to

exchange intelligence on border issues, Peruvian military

commanders in frontier areas met frequently with their

Colombian counterparts, and reports circulated that

Colombian officers were being trained in Peru. The First

Vice President of Peru’s Congress even declared publicly

that Peru was ready to offer more assistance if Colombia

requested it.31

Fujimori’s fall, however, was in part the product of

evidence that not all Peruvian officials were united in

fighting the insurgents. Instead, his close advisor and head

of the National Intelligence Service, Vladimiro Montesinos,

was tied directly to 1999 shipments of 10,000 East German

Kalasnikov assault rifles to the FARC. Russian and

Ukranian pilots flew from Jordan to Iquitos, Peru, then

dropped the weapons to FARC units in Colombia.32 The fall

of Fujimori and Montesinsos evidently did not stop FARC

efforts to move supplies through Peru. In October 2000, the

Colombian government announced that it had seized a large

shipment of ammunition made in Peru and destined for the

FARC.33

While the current Peruvian administration of President

Alejandro Toledo has not been as publicly supportive of

Colombia or of U.S. regional policy as was that of Fujimori,

relations generally have been good. The heads of both

nation’s armed forces have met and pledged mutual

cooperation. Both sides have an interest in keeping the

FARC from moving operations into Peruvian territory,

11
something that appeared increasingly likely with the

collapse of the Colombian peace process. In January 2002,

Newsweek published a story alleging that the FARC was

already well-established inside Peru.34 In March, FARC

representatives admitted their presence but claimed it was

simply temporary. However, in June, a Peruvian television

program, Contrapunto, produced documents which showed

a growing FARC presence, with some coming directly from

Colombia and others entering via Ecuador.35 Evidence was

mounting that the FARC was determined to increase its

presence in Peru and that Peru’s government lacked the

means and/or will to counter this threat effectively.

The specter that antinarcotics operations in Colombia

may again be pushing cultivation into Peruvian territory

has been of even greater concern to Peru. Evidence

substantiates that this time the cultivation includes opium

poppies as well as coca.36 The ultimate nightmare would be if

this led to ties between the FARC and the remnants of

Sendero Luminoso. While not as directly threatened as

Venezuela, Panama, or Ecuador by the spread of Colombia’s

conflicts, Peruvians were watching events across the border

with growing apprehension.

Bolivia.

While not sharing a border with Colombia, Bolivia found

itself facing some of the same problems as Peru. As early as

1999, there were reports of FARC activities, including

recruiting efforts, in Bolivia.37 Bolivia also feared that

antinarcotics operations in Colombia would result in a

revival of coca planting in their nation. This fear gained

additional ground as traditional coca farmers, cocaleros,

began to organize and protest the government’s

antinarcotics policies. The strong showing of cocalero leader

Evo Morales in the 2002 presidential elections further

fueled these fears. These concerns were compounded by

evidence of FARC financing for Morales’ campaign.

Fragmented politics, economic recession, and growing rural

12
discontent all threatened to make Bolivia a fertile ground

for the type of unrest which was plaguing Colombia’s

immediate neighbors.38

Ecuador.

For years Ecuador escaped the worst problems

connected with the Colombian conflict. The more populated

sector of its frontier had been peaceful for the most part, and

the refugee flow had been limited, reaching a total of about

3,500 by the end of 1998.39 Narcotics trafficking was less of a

problem since Ecuador neither produced nor consumed

large quantities of narcotics. Freed from major internal

conflicts, the military was able to maintain relative control

over much of the frontier. It also cultivated friendly

relations with the United States as an element of its

security policy, even granting the American military the use

of an Ecuadorian air base following the U.S. withdrawal

from Panama.

Before 1999 Ecuadorian sources generally played down

any spillover effects of Colombia’s conflict and emphasized

their government’s ability to control frontier areas. But in

February 1999, the Colombian news magazine, Semana,

reported that the border with Ecuador had become a

“strategic area for rebel logistical purposes,” and that this,

in turn, attracted right-wing paramilitary forces into the

area. In addition, the story alleged that narcotics trafficking

across the border had increased greatly in the previous 2

years, creating a “powder keg” which was “set to explode.”40

At least some confirmation of this story was provided a

few days later when Ecuador began building the first of a

dozen U.S.-financed counternarcotics police garrisons near

the Colombian border.41 At the same time, Ecuador’s

military confirmed that it had increased patrols in border

areas significantly to “stem problems which have already

arisen” because of Colombian guerrilla activities, including

146 attacks on oil installations vital to Ecuador’s economy.42

The intensified patrols soon found two large, but apparently

13
abandoned guerrilla bases in Ecuadorian territory. By

August, Ecuador’s Defense Minister confidently was

asserting that the border with Colombia was “secure.”43

This level of confidence did not long endure. The

following month a dozen foreigners were kidnapped in

Ecuadorian territory by the FARC. 4 4 Again, troop

reinforcements were hurried to the area, and by February,

having dismantled two additional guerrilla bases, the

Defense Minister could again assert that his forces had the

area under control. At the same time, however, he admitted

that fuel and weapons were being smuggled from Ecuador to

Colombia and predicted that “the Ecuadorian people will

feel the impact of the Colombian problem and we must

increasingly prepare ourselves.”45

Again, confident assertions proved short-lived. In April

Pablo Gariban of Reuters reported that FARC guerrillas had

virtually taken over the border town of Puerto El Carmen.

The story quoted Ecuadorian Lieutenant Colonel Fabio

Espinosa as saying, “Ecuador has turned into a country that

provides them [the FARC] with their most crucial needs,

from recreational areas to a place where they can bring their

injured for treatment.” He added, “if at any given moment

the FARC stopped seeing us as necessary for their logistics,

it’s likely that they would try to expand their territory, and

we would be the ones affected.”

46

By the summer of 2000 an increase in kidnappings, the

capture of a nine-member FARC patrol in Ecuadorian

territory, and growing fears that coca eradication efforts in

Colombia would produce a wave of refugees were all

contributing to rising levels of anxiety. Ecuador’s Foreign

Minister, Heinz Moeller, observed, “We don’t want anything

to do with the internal Colombian conflict other than to see a

negotiated peace, but if we are left with no alternative, we

will have to confront them militarily.”47

While the border situation was deteriorating, Ecuador

was also experiencing serious economic and political

problems. Banks failed, indigenous groups and military

14
units combined to oust a president, and poverty indices rose

dramatically. Hundreds of thousands migrated to other

nations at the same time that Colombian refugees were

flowing into Ecuador.48 As fighting flared along the border

the economy of towns of the Ecuadorian side declined

sharply and violence escalated. Kidnappings became more

common, as did narcotics trafficking.

Ecuador’s growing frustration with its efforts to contain

the effects of Colombia’s conflicts mirrored the experience of

much of the region. When the end of the border conflict with

Peru made it possible to redeploy units along the Colombian

frontier, there was a brief wave of optimism that the

situation could be controlled. But in short order, it became

apparent that problems would likely only increase, and that

Ecuador would steadily be drawn into a conflict in which it

had little to gain and much to lose. By July 2000 the

government was “considering declaring the border with

Colombia an area of emergency,” and was planning to spend

up to $200 million in the region in the next three years.

According to Foreign Minister Moeller, this was aimed at

“preventing what has occurred in Colombia from happening

in Ecuador.”49

These efforts bore little fruit. By 2001 Colombian

paramilitaries were openly battling with FARC units inside

Ecuador. Some Ecuadorian citizens, threatened by the

warring parties, fled from their homes.50 In June a small

ELN unit clashed with an Ecuadorian military patrol, and a

few weeks later other ELN members were caught trying to

kidnap a local farmer. Ecuador responded to the rising tide

of crime and violence by shifting even more troops from the

Peruvian to the Colombian border region and by

announcing a plan to recruit 24,000 new police.51 They also

began to lobby actively for increased financial support for

their efforts from the United States and from Europe to

strengthen border security and to deal with the growing

flow of refugees.52

15
Despite such efforts, the situation continued to

deteriorate through the summer of 2002. Ecuadorians fled

from the region while more Colombian refugees crossed the

border. The army began locating armed insurgent camps

within Ecuadorian territory. There were occasional brief

clashes with groups of armed Colombians, and even one

accidental exchange of fire between Ecuadorian and

Colombian military units.53 Despite the military buildup,

guerrillas and paramilitaries continued to operate openly in

much of the border region, using it for rest and for logistics.

Ecuadorian military sources estimated that at least 3,000

members of Colombia’s armed groups were operating in the

region. The FARC even made the border city of Lago Agrio a

major supply point for its purchase of propane cylinders

which it converted into crude, but deadly mortars.54

The rising tide of refugees strained Ecuador’s already

limited resources. By the end of 2001 there were 4,300

refugees and asylum seekers in the country, almost all from

Colombia. In addition, an estimated 30,000 Colombians

were “living in Ecuador in refugee-like circumstances.”55

The UNHCR warned in 2002 that this number could grow

by 11,000 in a six-month period, should fighting intensify.56

With its own economy deteriorating, facing rising ethnic

tensions and popular protests over oil company activities

near the border region, and a presidential election with no

clear favorite looming, Ecuador is hard-pressed to deal with

the rising crisis on the border. As Sandra Edwards of the

Washington Office on Latin America has observed:

With the establishment of U.S. troops at its coastal air base in

Manta and the violence between paramilitaries and guerillas

increasing at an alarming rate . . . Ecuador’s position in the

region is slowly losing the appearance of neutrality. Whether it

wants to or not, Ecuador may eventually become an active

regional player on the stage of both the Colombian conflict and

the U.S. war on terrorism.57

16
Panama.

In the view of those in the United States, concerned

about issues of Panama Canal security in the wake of the

U.S. military withdrawal, the spillover of Colombia’s

conflicts into Panama represents a particularly serious

threat. Panamanians have tended to downplay this, noting

that the border with Colombia is remote from any

installations related to the Canal and pointing out that it

was clearly in the guerrillas interest to abstain from any

actions which might provide an excuse for direct U.S.

military actions against them. Rand analysts Rabasa and

Chalk largely concur, pointing out that “the constraints

against a guerrilla move against Panama or the Canal are

largely political,” but adding that if the Colombian

government “succeeded in putting real pressure on the

guerrillas,” this might change their calculations.58 Of all the

bordering nations, Panama is the most vulnerable, having

neither regular armed forces nor direct land connections

with the border region, a long history of the usage of

Panamanian territory by Colombian narcotraffickers, and a

lack of any real capacity to control its land, sea, or air

frontiers.

Panama’s problems have three distinct, but interrelated

aspects. The first are the actions of armed Colombians,

insurgents, and/or paramilitaries in its national territory.

The second encompasses the wide range of criminal

activities, notably, but by no means exclusively, narcotics

trafficking, linked to Colombian organized crime. Finally,

problems are caused by refugees moving into the Darien,

representing a threat both to local inhabitants and to the

region’s fragile ecological balance. All of this not only

undermines Panama’s control over its remote Darien

Province, it also contains the potential seriously to disrupt

relations with the United States.

This situation has developed while Panama, for the first

time in its history, has become fully responsible for its own

national security. As Linda Robinson of U.S. News and

17
World Report has observed, the growing spillover of

Colombia’s conflicts comes “at an unpropitious time for

Panama.”59 The withdrawal of the last U.S. military units at

the end of 1999 gave this nation a responsibility for which it

had neither experience nor adequate forces. The Public

Force (PF) which had replaced the old Defense Forces,

abolished following the 1989 U.S. invasion, is essentially a

police force with very limited air and sea components. It has

no heavy weapons, very limited logistical and

communications capabilities, and largely inexperienced

leadership.

For a variety of reasons, during most of the 1990s

Panama tried to downplay its problems in the Darien.

Discussing the deteriorating situation risked scaring

potential foreign investors, emphasized the problems

inherent in the decision to abolish the military, and risked

weakening Panama’s position as it negotiated the

possibility of an extension of the U.S. military presence. The

response in this period to emerging threats from Colombia

might be characterized as strategic avoidance. Public Force

units were pulled back at least 15 kilometers from the

frontier and encouraged to avoid contact with armed

Colombian units from whatever source.60 Given the

undoubted superiority of the Colombians, whether

guerrillas or paramilitaries, in combat skills and

equipment, this strategy was not altogether unreasonable.

Predictably, the Colombian presence on Panamanian

soil steadily expanded. The guerrillas found remote Darien

villages ideal locations for rest and recreation, but where

the guerrillas went the paramilitaries followed. In 1997

reports surfaced that paramilitary commanders were

offering $2,000 for each guerrilla killed in Panama.61

In June 1999, Panamanian television showed

Colombian guerrillas marching through a Darien town, and

the government was forced to publicly acknowledge the

threat and dispatch additional forces to the border. Trying

to explain the shift in policy, Interior Minister Mariela

18
Sagel said that, while border crossings had been going on for

25 years, paramilitaries now “have threatened the

Panamanian townspeople with death if they continue

selling supplies to the rebels. The peaceful coexistence has

ended.”62

The reinforced Panamanian presence did little to slow

the escalation of conflict. In November the FARC hijacked

two helicopters in San Blas Province. A few days later a

clash between guerrillas and paramilitaries destroyed 10

Panamanian homes.63 As a result of the escalating violence,

public school teachers in the Darien asked the government

to suspend classes, and the Bishop of Darien, Romulo

Emiliani, declared that “armed groups have transformed

our peaceful province. Now kidnaping and assault have

become as common here as in Colombia.”64

In December 1999, heavy fighting near the border

caused over 300 refugees to pour into the Darien, further

exacerbating the region’s problems. By March 2000 the

number had reached 500, and Panama began urging

Colombia to accept their repatriation.65 The situation

continued to deteriorate, and in September Bishop Emiliani

fled to the United States following death threats from the

FARC. In an interview the Bishop noted that the FARC and

AUC moved freely in the Darien, “buying food, weapons,

everything they need. They pay with drugs, and the drugs

stay in Central America.”66

Panama’s government continued to appear largely

impotent in the face of these mounting threats. As Angel

Rabasa and Peter Chalk observed, Panamanian strategy

was evidently “to maintain a presence in the main town in

Darien Province to provide static protection to the

population, but without attempting to control the border . . .

or to confront the guerrillas.”67 The consequences of such

actions became clear in 2001 when Colombians, probably

from the AUC, attacked the small village of Nazare where

the FARC had been buying supplies, burning much of the

town and killing a young girl in the process.68

19
Problems generated by the Colombian conflict were by

no means confined to the Darien. Reports increasingly

circulated of the FARC’s presence in the area of Colon, on

the Caribbean end of the Canal. In June 2000 a joint

operation between Panamanian and Colombian forces

seized a vessel loaded with arms in the Atlantic port of Coco

Solo. A second vessel evidently escaped.69 This shipment

represented just a tiny portion of arms allegedly being

shipped through Panama to both guerrilla and paramilitary

forces in Colombia. Guerrillas, paramilitaries, and

narcotics traffickers found Panama a convenient place for

doing business and making contacts. There were even

reports that the AUC was forming Panamanian

paramilitary units in Colon to join in the fight against the

guerrillas,70 and that the FARC was using banks in Panama

to deposit and launder much of the money generated by its

criminal activities.71 The preliminary draft of a U.S.

Customs Intelligence Report noted that Panama remained

a major transhipment point for narcotics and a significant

source for money laundering. Panama’s security forces were

described as “corrupt,” “ill-trained,” and “overwhelmed.”72

In April 2002, the credibility of Panamanian efforts to

control arms trafficking and avoid involvement in the

Colombian conflict was further undermined by reports that

a shipment of 3000 AK-47 assault rifles supposedly

purchased from Nicaragua for the Panamanian Public

Force had actually been shipped to the AUC. The links to

this transaction began with two Israeli arms dealers based

in Guatemala who worked out a deal which would exchange

the AK-47s, plus bayonets and five million rounds of

ammunition, for Uzi submachine-guns and Jerico pistols

made in Israel. The dealers gave the Nicaraguans a

February 10 purchase order bearing the signatures of four

senior Panamanian officials. In October 2001 the bayonets

were air-freighted to Miami, while the AK-47s and

ammunition were loaded on a Nicaraguan vessel with a

manifest assigning them to Colon. Instead the vessel sailed

to the Colombian port of Turbo where it unloaded its cargo,

20
designating it as plastic balls. The AUC later admitted

receiving the shipment.73 Since the transaction was

revealed, Nicaragua and Panama have each blamed the

other. In June the Organization of American States set up a

Commission headed by former U.S. Ambassador to

Colombia, Morris Busby, to investigate the entire matter.74

All of this has posed a set of major dilemmas for the

administration of President Mireya Moscoso, which took

power in September 1999. Committed to not allowing

foreign military bases and to providing increased social

benefits for poorer Panamanians, it lacked both the

resources and the will needed to confront the issues

generated by Colombia’s conflicts. Suggestions by some

Panamanian officials that an Inter-American force be

created to police the Darien received a cold reception. The

Moscoso administration, with its approval ratings plunging

and its economy in recession, was unable or unwilling to do

anything to establish effective control over the Darien or

curb the use of Panama by Colombia’s illegally armed

groups for logistics and financial transactions. Yet, failing

to address these issues threatened to undermine relations

with the United States and damage the economy. Efforts to

develop a new national defense strategy seemed based as

much on wishful thinking as on any realistic assessment of

threats and capabilities. According to Panamanian

journalist Berta Thayer, the Colombian border remains

“thoroughly permeable and impossible to control,” and the

nation’s only real option is to try to “bend in the wind.”75

There seemed little reason to expect that the situation in the

Darien would improve and Panamanians could only hope

that the damage would be limited in the rest of the country.

Brazil.

The impact of Colombia’s conflicts on Brazil have been

considerably less dramatic. This reflects two basic factors,

the relative isolation and lack of population along the 1,644

kilometer common border, and the large size and relative

21
power of Brazil. The affected area is also far distant from

Brazil’s economic and population centers which helps limit

media coverage. But, despite these factors, the Colombian

situation has become the subject of growing concern in

Brazil, in good part because of increased narcotics

trafficking.

As early as 1996, in terms obviously aimed at Colombia,

Brazil’s national security doctrine recognized the problems

posed by what it described as “adjacent areas of instability”

afflicted by the operations of “armed bands,” and

“transnational crime.”76 The Brazilian military presence in

the region was strengthened, but much of the border still

remained essentially uncontrolled. As a result, Colombian

troops were able to transit Brazilian territory in November

1998 as part of their response to a FARC assault on the

nearby Colombian city of Mitu.77 This produced a brief crisis

in bilateral relations and contributed to a Brazilian

reevaluation of the border situation. The military presence

was further strengthened, and by the fall of 1999 an

8,000-man Army battalion was stationed in the region,

supported by additional Marine, Navy, and Air Force units.

In 2000 the Brazilian military initiated “Operation Cobra”

(name drawn from the first letters of Colombia and Brazil),

designed to combine an increase in Federal Police presence

in the region with the positioning of a highly mobile army

unit supported by helicopters.78 This was backed up by a $1.2

billion “Amazon Surveillance System” combining radar and

aircraft to track activities in the region.79 According to one

Brazilian military source, this represented both an effort to

continue a policy of nonintervention in Colombia’s conflict

and a growing fear that U.S.-supported escalation of the

conflict could push it into Brazilian territory.80 This

increased force has evidently had some success. In March

2002 Brazilian military units moved against suspected

FARC camps in their territory, producing an armed

encounter with a FARC unit which was wiped out.81

Efforts to control the border have been complicated by

disputes between Federal police and military units over

22
responsibilities in antinarcotics operations. In May 1999

the former commander of Federal Police in Amazonas State

testified before the Brazilian Congress that there were only

15 police agents assigned to antinarcotics operations in the

state.82 The same month a Brazilian Government report

called the border region “lawless,” and called for the signing

of joint agreements with Colombia and Peru to combat

narcotics trafficking.83

In August 1999, Brazil intercepted a plane loaded with

weapons traveling from Suriname to Colombia. In a speech

to the Armed Forces a few days later, Brazil’s President,

Fernando Henrique Cardoso, stressed the dangers in the

emergence of “zones of instability” and declared that “drug

trafficking and other illicit cross-border activities threaten

our people and our sovereignty.” But, he also stressed that

“the Armed Forces are not to be used on an everyday basis in

these battles, except to support the police.”84 This speech

was quickly followed by the announcement that the Federal

Police would begin an operation to block routes used to

transport food from Brazil to areas of Colombia controlled

by the FARC.85 Brazilian and Colombian officials also began

to cooperate in destroying clandestine airstrips in the

border region.

In 2001, several prominent leaders of Brazilian

organized crime, involved in smuggling arms into Brazil

and drugs into Brazil, were captured in Colombia. This

followed a Brazilian Congressional investigation which

found that Brazilian narcotraffickers were selling large

amounts of sophisticated weapons to the FARC, and with

the connivance of hundreds of Brazilian officials,

transporting them through the Amazon basin.86 This

underscored the growing importance of Brazil as a link in

the international narcotics trade and the rising levels of

domestic narcotics consumption. For Brazilian authorities,

the problem was expanding from its primary focus on

defending national sovereignty in the Amazon Basin to

include a growing concern about escalating international

criminal influences throughout the nation.

23
Operations continue to be hampered by problems of

jurisdiction and coordination between military and police

units, by local corruption, and by limited resources.

Meanwhile trafficking in arms and narcotics through or

over Brazilian territory has generated growing concern. In a

military sense, Brazil has sufficient force to discourage any

significant use of its territory by either guerrillas or

paramilitaries. Problems are unlikely ever to approach the

scale of those currently experienced in Venezuela, Ecuador,

or Panama. But the problem remains serious both for those

living in the region and for Brazil’s relations with the region

and with the United States. President Cardoso’s chief

security advisor has said, “For Brazil Colombia is causing

the biggest worry. Our attention is dedicated to the effects it

could have on Brazil like the flight of guerrillas and the

transfer of (drug) laboratories and plantations.”87

The Caribbean and Central America.

As noted previously, arms trafficking between Suriname

and Colombia is an ongoing issue, with weapons destined

both for the right-wing paramilitaries of Carlos Castano

and for the FARC. Some of the weapons may have come from

Surinamese military stores, others come from as far away

as Russia and China.88 Another flourishing arms for drugs

route has been established through Central America.

Weapons from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua are

being shipped to guerrillas, paramilitaries, and narcotics

dealers by both air and sea routes, some of which transit

Panama and/or Honduras. These shipments, which

allegedly include surface-to-air missiles, are frequently

paid for in drugs rather than cash, adding to narcotics

trafficking problems in Central America.89

The Caribbean has long had direct links with both

narcotics trafficking from and arms trafficking to Colombia.

As long ago as 1988, a major shipment of arms destined for

the FARC was seized in Jamaica.90 To these problems must

now be added those caused by the growing flight of

24
Colombians to other nations, a flight often facilitated by

organized criminal groups. Growing pressures by the

United States on smaller Caribbean nations to curb these

activities, coupled with the corrupting effect of both the vast

amounts of money and the ever-present threats of force

coming out of Colombia, represent a major threat to

sovereignty and democratic institutions in the region.

Even Mexico has not been immune to the impact of

Colombia’s conflicts. Ties between Colombian and Mexican

organized crime have undermined the administration of

justice and placed strains on relations with the United

States. While still Governor of Guanajuato, Mexico’s

President, Vincente Fox, began warning that his nation was

“undergoing a process of Colombianization in which

government officials and organized crime act in collusion.”91

Colombia and the “War on Terrorism.”

This danger of “Colombianization” concerns much of the

hemisphere. Virtually all nations hope for a negotiated

settlement which will end the fighting, curb arms

trafficking and the flows of refugees, and weaken the power

of criminal groups. But with the collapse of the peace

process and the prospect of an escalated conflict, this hope

has receded greatly. Instead the focus has shifted to dealing

with the dangers of an escalated conflict. These are by no

means confined to the direct impact of cross-border

operations by illegal armed groups. Fears are that both

antinarcotics operations and drug production may damage

ecological systems, that waves of refugees will strain

resources and exacerbate domestic economic problems, that

U.S. policies will detract attention from other regional

issues and prove divisive in bilateral relations, and that

rising cross-border criminal activity will further promote

domestic political corruption and undermine government

credibility. In a period in which each of Colombia’s

neighbors faces mounting political and economic problems,

these prospects seem especially daunting.

25
The situation is further complicated by the

post-September 11th U.S. focus on the “war on terrorism.”

The FARC, ELN, and AUC have all been added to the U.S.

list of terrorist organizations. While the extent of their

threat when compared to groups like Al Qaeda is certainly

debatable, there is no denying their growing international

connections and reach. The revelation that IRA agents were

involved in training the FARC, most likely in urban

terrorism, strengthened international support for Colombia

and further undermined FARC claims to political

legitimacy.92 Combined with evidence of FARC ties to the

Basque terrorist group ETA and reports of its hiring

ex-Yugoslav military as trainers, this bolstered Bogota’s

claims that it was facing a terrorist threat rather than any

legitimate political challenge.93 While the “war on terrorism”

lends credibility to the Colombian government’s cause and

undermines the legitimacy of the illegal armed opposition,

it also risks the danger of failing to give sufficient attention

to the purely domestic factors which produced and sustain

this conflict. The use of terror tactics has been largely

confined to Colombia, with infrequent spillovers into

neighboring states. The agenda of all three groups is

overwhelmingly domestic and the ultimate solutions to the

threats they pose will have to be largely domestic as well.

The “war on terrorism” has served to raise the profile of

Colombia’s conflicts, especially their international

dimensions, but it has not significantly advanced the search

for solutions.

Future Prospects.

Despite his public rejection of any suggestion that “we

are a threat to our neighbors,” President Pastrana found his

dealings with neighboring states dominated by issues

related to Colombia’s internal conflicts.94 This situation will

likely continue in the Uribe administration. Even before his

inauguration, the new President visited all the neighboring

South American states, seeking greater efforts to seal the

borders against narcotics trafficking, arms dealing, and

26
incursions by illegal armed groups. While providing

opportunities for face-to-face contacts and generating

statements of understanding and support, there is little

evidence that these visits generated any concrete results.95

No consensus exists among these states as to how they

and/or Colombia can best confront these issues. All fear an

escalation and expansion of existing conflicts; none seem to

have a coherent strategy for reversing these trends. They

also have demonstrated little ability to work together to

confront issues arising from the Colombian situation. Above

all, no tradition of or effective mechanism exists for

promoting regional security efforts when confronted by a

civil conflict in a neighboring state. A July 2002 report in a

Brazilian newspaper outlining a supposed plan to create a

regional military force to aid Colombia elicited a prompt

series of denials by regional governments of any intention to

participate in such a force. Even Colombia’s outgoing

President Pastrana quickly disavowed any interest in the

creation of a multinational force.96 Division, rather than

cooperation, characterizes the reaction of Colombia’s

neighbors. As Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT) has

observed, “Colombia’s problems are having a profound

impact on the stability and security of the entire region, yet

there is little or no sustained regional support for

Colombia’s efforts to deal with the narcoterrorist threat.”97

Conclusions.

The Colombian crisis demonstrates the continuing

evolution of threats to national security. Today many of the

greatest threats are generated by the growing nexus

between internal political violence and international

criminal activities. These exist around the world, as

exemplified by situations in areas as diverse as Sierra

Leone, Afghanistan, and the Balkans. There seems to be

little difference in the relationships, regardless of whether

the conflicts are the result of ethnic divisions, religious

conflicts, political ideology, or simply fear and ambition. The

result is more the proliferation of lawlessness than the

27
spread of terrorism. Today criminal activities, both

international (narcotics trafficking, arms and people

smuggling, money laundering) and domestic (kidnappings,

extortion, robberies), have become the essential life blood of

most insurgent and terrorist movements. The challenge for

the governments threatened, for the United States, and for

the world community is how to sever these links. Failure to

do so can reduce nation-states to the position of pawns

rather than principal actors in the violence which threatens

to engulf them.

A reflection of this is the increasing tendency by many to

privatize security. The rich turn to private security guards,

the poor to lynchings, and the administration of justice

becomes increasingly discredited. In such an atmosphere,

the rise of paramilitary forces is hardly surprising. Indeed,

as exemplified by AUC activities in Panama and Venezuela,

the exportation of paramilitary violence may be becoming

easier and more common than the spread of ideologically

driven insurgencies.

While the spillover of Colombia’s conflicts has

exacerbated the problems of the region significantly and has

reduced the resources available to confront mounting

political and economic dilemmas, it is by no means the

principal cause of these problems. The economies and/or the

political leadership of every one of Colombia’s neighbors are

in jeopardy. In part, this stems from global economic

problems further fueled by volatile commodity prices, the

U.S. recession and the Argentine economic collapse,

declines in investor confidence, and the difficulties of

adjusting to a globalized economy. Even more, it reflects the

failure of political leadership, dogged by traditions of

corruption and divisive politics.

In Ecuador and Brazil, no party can count on a majority

in Congress, and high levels of uncertainty cloud upcoming

presidential elections. The governments in Peru and

Panama must deal with the heritage of past corruption,

with a growing perception of them as weak and

28
incompetent, and with steadily declining levels of popular

support. In Venezuela, President Chavez came to power

largely because of a massive public rejection of the

traditional political class, but he has become a symbol of

divisiveness instead of unity, facing the constant threat of

ouster by constitutional or by unconstitutional means.

This mix of political and economic crisis provides the

fertile ground in which the alliance of political and criminal

violence thrives. It undermines efforts to stabilize

democracy and install anything approaching the rule of law.

An August 2002 poll showed this trend widespread

throughout Latin America. Citizens increasingly blamed

the political class for their problems and half said they

“wouldn’t mind if an authoritarian government came to

power.” Support for free market economics also showed a

sharp decline.98

Venezuela’s political crisis is the ultimate wild card in

efforts to promote any regional response to Colombia’s

conflicts. Until that is resolved, finding any common agenda

will be nearly impossible. Brazil’s regional power

ambitions, combined with its suspicions of any outside

involvement in the Amazon Basin, the traditional enmity

between Peru and Ecuador and between Venezuela and

Colombia, and the extreme weakness of the Panamanian

security apparatus, are also obstacles which will be difficult

to overcome. For the United States, this means that military

assistance and training, while necessary, are by themselves

insufficient to address the regional issues. Political issues

must be addressed if real progress is to be made in the

security arena.

The ongoing conflict demonstrates the limited ability of

the Colombian military to carry out missions related to the

defense of national sovereignty and the control of border

areas.99 This comes at a time in which the ability of any state

to control its frontiers has been undermined by the

emergence of a globalized economy and information system.

Dr. Stephen Flynn, Senior Fellow for National Security at

29
the Council on Foreign Relations, has noted that “borders

can no longer be effectively policed without seriously

disrupting the flow of peoples and goods that is so central to

the functioning of the global economy.” He concludes “if

tighter controls are adopted, they create powerful

incentives for corruption.”100 Lacking any consensus

between Colombia and its neighbors as to the nature of or

solutions to the threats emanating from the civil conflict,

prospects for exercising meaningful control over frontier

areas are dismal at best.

It is a truism that there is no military solution to the

Colombian crisis. It is also true that there is no solution

without a meaningful military component. The same

statements apply to the regional situation. No single nation

can confront the emerging security threats alone. External

sources such as the United States can provide training and

equipment, encourage collaboration, and improve

communications and intelligence. But ultimately none of

this will make much difference if the requisite political will

is absent, if the heritage of the past continues to block the

needed cooperation of the present, and if the broader

international community is not able to come together and

effectively confront the emerging alliance between

organized crime and the politics of violence.

While levels of civil conflict approaching those of

Colombia are unlikely to extend to any neighboring states at

least in the near future, increased violence and insecurity,

complicated by rising tides of refugees, are likely and

spillover effects of Colombia’s conflicts will remain a

dominant item on regional agendas. If this trend is not

reversed, the United States could find itself increasingly

drawn into a growing conflict without meaningful borders.

Refugee flows would grow, spreading far beyond the region.

Criminal organizations would thrive, magnifying the

problems already faced by the United States and the rest of

the developed world. National security concerns and

resources would increasingly turn southward. Over30
whelmed regional governments would be able to do less and

less in their own defense.

None of this is inevitable, but all of it is possible.

Avoiding it depends on the credibility of U.S. commitments

to strengthen the victims as well as to pursue the

perpetrators. There must be real economic alternatives

available to those caught up in spreading activities of

criminalized enterprises. It requires promoting the rule of

law and the administration of justice as an alternative to

privatized security and personal vengeance. It necessitates

recognition of and adjustment for the balloon effect which

will inevitably accompany any success in dealing with the

illegal armed actors. It involves neither asking too much nor

accepting too little from Colombia’s neighbors and from the

Colombian state itself. U.S. military assistance to its

neighbors is critical, but the United States taking responsibility for their security would be disastrous. The challenge is

daunting, the risks of failure are immense.

ENDNOTES

1. Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, “Un panorama dramatico,” El Tiempo,

Bogota, April 4, 1999, internet edition.

2. Rafael Pardo, “Colombia’s Two-Front War,” Foreign Affairs, Vol.

79, No. 4, July-August 2000, p. 64.

3. “Obispos del CELAM Dicen que el Conflicto Colmbiano Traspasa

Fronteras,” EFE, July 20, 2000.

4. Amy Taxin, “Colombia neighbors on alert over refugees,” Reuters,

August 24, 2001.

5. “Nicaragua worried Plan Colombia will shift drugs trade to

Central America,” BBC Monitoring Service, August 10, 2001.

6. Gabriel Marcella and Donald Schulz, Colombia’s Three Wars:

U.S. Strategy at the Crossroads, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1999, p. 6.

7. Al Giordano, “CIA Chief Predicts Drug Traffic Spill Over from

Plan Colombia,” In The News, February 11, 2001.

31
8. Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering during a November

2000 visit to Colombia, quoted in Russell Crandall, Driven by Drugs:

U.S. Policy Toward Colombia, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers,

2002, p. 160.

9. For a summary of the history and impact of civil violence on

Colombian history, see Comision de estudios sobre la violencia,

Colombia: Violencia y Democracia: Informe presentado al Ministerio de

Gobierno, Bogota: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1988.

10. Marcella and Schulz, p. 19.

11. “Venezuela Moves to Defend Borders,” Associated Press,

October 29, 1997.

12. Linda Robinson, “Where Angels Fear to Tread: Colombia and

Latin America’s Tier of Turmoil,” World Policy Journal, Winter,

1999-2000, p. 65.

13. Tim Johnson and Andres Oppenheimer, “Tensions Rise Between

Colombia, Venezuela,” Miami Herald, July 24, 1999; Giocando Soto,

“Las FFAA de Colombia son el fuente de armas,” El Nacional, Caracas,

August 21, 1999. (Both internet versions)

14. For a summary of Venezuelan arguments for granting

belligerent rights to the FARC and ELN, see Sergio Rodriguez

Gelfenstein, “Actores internacionales en el conflicto colombiano: El

Papel de Venezuela den el camino de la paz,” paper presented at

meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, March 16-18, 2000,

Miami, FL.

15. Andy Web-Vidal, “Venezuelan guns aiding guerrillas,”

Financial Times, January 25, 2001.

16. Alexandra Olson, “Chavez, Pastrana in Agreement,” Associated

Press, March 25, 2001.

17. Andy Webb-Vidal, “Venezuelan guns aiding guerrillas,”

Financial Times, January 25, 2001; Alexandra Olson, “Chavez,

Pastrana in Agreement,” Associated Press, March 25, 2001; Andy

Webb-Vidal, “Venezuela-Colombia tensions flare,” Financial Times,

March 19, 2001; “Acusan a Chavez de intervenir en los asuntos de

Colombia,” El Nuevo Herald, May 5, 2001.

18. “Relaciones Peligrosas,” Semana, Bogota, February 3, 2002.

32
19. “Las FARC y Venezuela,” El Comercio, Lima, Peru, April 5,

2002.

20. “Venezuela: Aqui no estan las FARC,” BBC Mundo.com, April 1,

2002; Fabiola Sanchez, “Chavez Demands Colombia Clarify Claim,”

Associated Press, April 2, 2002; “Rebel-camp allegations fuel tension in

Venezuela,” Miami Herald, April 5, 2001; “Mildred Pineda, ALas FARC

dividen a Colombia y Venezuela,” Radio Nederland, April 4, 2002.

21. “Asegura FARC que tiene campamentos en Venezuela,” Diario

del Pueblo, Beijing, April 9, 2002.

22. Susannah A. Nesmith, “Colombia, Venezuela Relations Tense,”

Associated Press, April 17, 2002.

23. “Ganaderos venezolanos confirman presencia de grupos

armados ilegales colombianos,” El Tiempo, July 2, 2002; “Carlos

Castano afirma que envio instructores a las Autodefensas Unidos de

Venezuela,” El Tiempo, July 2, 2002; “Asamblea nacional investigara

denuncias sobre presencia de paramilitares en la frontera,” El Nacional,

Caracas, July 2, 2002; Email from Dr. Patricia Olney, in Venezuela, July

4, 2002.

24. U.S. Committtee for Refugees, Country Report: Venezuela, 2002,

www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/amer-carib/venezuela.

25. Lis Schlein, “Violence in Colombia forces many to migrate,” VOA

News, August 25, 2002.

26. Robert Camona-Borjas, “Posible efectos del Plan Colombia en la

seguridad y defensa de Venezuela,” Argentina Global, No. 2,

July-September, 2000, www.geocities.com/globalargentina/Carm01.

27. “Colombia rebels free six kidnaped Venezuelans,” Reuters, April

16, 2000.

28. Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth: The

Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and its Implications for Regional

Stability, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp, 2001, p. 88.

29. Marcella and Schulz, p. 21.

30. “Que Pasa en las Fronteras,” La Republica, Lima, Peru, October

9, 1999; “Presidente Fujimori alerta sobre peligro del narcoterrorismo,”

El Commercio, Lima, Peru, September 22, 1999. Internet versions.

33
31. La Republica, August 25, 29, 1999; AFP, France, September 3,

1999, translations by Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter

FBIS).

32. William W. Mendel, “Colombia’s Threats to Regional Security,”

Military Review, May-June, 2001 (internet edition), pp. 8-9; German

Castro Caycedo, “Las Armas de las FARC,” Semana, June 17, 2001.

33. “Ammo headed for rebels was made in Peru, says Colombia,”

Reuters, October 2, 2000.

34. Sharon Stevenson, “The FARC’s Fifth Column,” Newsweek

International, internet edition, January 21, 2002.

35. Jerremy McDermott, “Analysis: Colombia’s conflict spills over,”

BBC News, April 5, 2002, news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/

1913475.stm. “Revelan la existencia de guerrilleros de las FARC en

territorio peruano,” Europa Press, June 2, 2002.

36. “Spectres stir in Peru,”The Economist, February 16, 2002, p. 33.

37. Tom Carter, “Colombia Guerrillas Alarm Bolivia,” Washington

Times, November 5, 1999; George Gedda, “Colombian Rebels Spotted in

Bolivia,” Associated Press, November 4, 1999.

38. Judith A. Gentleman, The Regional Security Crisis in the Andes:

Patterns of State Response, Implementing Plan Colombia: Special

Series, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, July, 2001, pp. 23-25.

39. Marcella and Schulz, p. 20.

40. Semana, February 1, 1999, translated by FBIS, February 8,

1999.

41. El Universario, Guayaquil, February 15, 1999, translated by

FBIS.

42. El Tiempo, Bogota, February 15, 1999, translated by FBIS,

February 16, 1999.

43. El Comercio, Quito, August 23, 1999, translated by FBIS,

August 25, 1999.

44. George Gedda, “Ecuador Kidnapping Blamed on Rebels,”

Associated Press, September 16, 1999.

34
45. “Voz de Los Andes Newscast,” Quito, February 2, 2000,

translated by FBIS, February 3, 2000.

46. Pablo Garibian, “Ecuador Border town home for Colombian

rebels,” Reuters, April 23, 2000.

47. Maria Cristina Caballero, “Ecuador fears refugee influx from

anti-drug war,” Miami Herald, June 22, 2000.

48. For a description of Ecuadors’s problems, see Sandra Edwards,

Colombian Conflict Impacts Ecuador, Washington, DC: Washington

Office on Latin America, June 2002, pp. 1-3.

49. “Ecuador reacts to US drugs war plan,” Financial Times, July

13, 2000, p. 7.

50. Amy Taxin, “Colombian Rebels, paramilitary battle in Ecuador,”

Reuters, January 12, 2001; “Ecuatorianos dejan sus casas por amenazas

de grupos colombianos,” El Nuevo Herald, Miami, February 9, 2001.

51. Ben Emanuel, “Ecuador worries about border,” Financial Times,

July 5, 2001.

52. Eun-Kyung Kim, “Ecuador Seeks U.S. Aid in Drug War,”

Associated Press, March 3, 2001; Nicholas Mosa, “Ecuador wants

money to strengthen border,” Financial Times, March 7, 2002.

53. “Ecuador, Colombia Exchange Fire,” Associated Press, June 28,

2002; Arie Farnam, “Colombia’s civil war drifts south into Ecuador,”

Christian Science Monitor, July 11, 2002.

54. “Ecuador identifica milicias colombianas,” BBC Mundo.com,

May 29, 2002; Robert Taylor, “Ecuador: Caught in the Crossfire,” World

Press Review, Vol. 49, September 2002.

55. U.S. Committee for Refugees, “Country Report: Ecuador, 2002,”

www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/amer-carib/ecuador.

56. “War-ravaged Colombians could flood Ecuador-UNHCR,”

Rueters, January 25, 2002.

57. Edwards, p. 1.

58. Rabasa and Chalk, pp. 85-86.

59. Robinson, p. 66.

35
60. This analysis is based on a series of interviews in Panama in

1999.

61. John T. Fishel, “The Institutional Reconversion of the

Panamanian Defense Forces,” in Post-Invasion Panama: The

Challenges of Democratization in the New World Order, Orlando J.

Perez, ed., Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2000, p. 23.

62. Andres Oppenheimer, “Colombia’s War a Regional Risk,” Miami

Herald, June 3, 1999.

63. “2 Helicopters Hijacked in Panama,” Associated Press,

November 2, 1999; “Panama Homes Razed in Latest Border Incursion,”

Reuters, November 19, 1999.

64. Roberto Fabricio, “La invasion silenciosa de la guerrilla

colombiana,” El Nuevo Herald, Miami, November 21, 1999.

65. Jahiro Polo, “Piden repatriacion de desplazados,” La Prensa,

Panama, March 13, 2000.

66. Andres Oppenheimer, “Colombian Guerrillas, Drug Traffickers

Pose a Threat Beyond Country’s Borders,” Miami Herald, October 5,

2000.

67. Rabasa and Chalk, p. 88.

68. Jeremy McDermot, “Analysis: Colombia’s conflict spills over,”

BBC News, April 5, 2002; Okke Ornstein, “Panama’s Time Bomb,”

August 9, 2001, www.narconews.com/ornstein1.

69. “Panama Police Seize Arms Bound for Colombian Rebels,”

Reuters, June 26, 2000.

70. “Asesorian colombianos,” El Tiempo, October 25, 2000.

71. “Investigan presuntos fondos de la guerrilla colombiana,” EFE,

Spanish International News Service, November 6, 2001.

72. David Gonzalez, “Panama Still Failing to Stem Narcotics

Traffic, U.S. Report Asserts,” New York Times, June 9, 2000, p. A12.

73. Juan O. Tamayo, “Mystery Deepens Over Diverted AK-47s,”

Miami Herald, June 14, 2002.

74. Robin Emmott, “OAS Steps In to Probe Centam Illegal Arms

Scandal,” Reuters, June 21, 2002.

36
75. Quoted in Richard Downes, Landpower and Ambiguous

Warfare: The Challenge of Colombia in the 21st Century, Carlisle

Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute Conference Report, U.S.

Army War College, 1999, p. 3.

76. Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, “A Dramatic Panorama,” El Tiempo,

Bogota, April 4, 1999.

77. Marcella and Schulz, p. 20.

78. McDermott.

79. Axel Bugge, “Brazil Amazon Radar System to Keep Jungles

Safe,” Reuters, October 18, 2000.

80. Confidential discussion with Brazilian officers, October 2000.

81. Katherine Baldwin, “Brazil Army Kills Colombia Rebels,”

Reuters, March 6, 2002.

82. Jailton de Carvalho, “Former Police Commissioner on

Vulnerability of Border to Drug Cartels,” Jornal do Brasil, Rio de

Janeiro, May 12, 1999, translated by FBIS, May 13, 1999.

83. Associated Press, Rio de Janeiro, May 29, 1999.

84. Fabiano Lana, “President Views Need to Tighten Border

Control,” Jornal do Brasil, Rio de Janeiro, August 19, 1999, translated

by FBIS, August 23, 1999.

85. Ilimar Franco, “PF to Block FARC Supply Routes in Amazon,”

Jornal do Brasil, Rio de Janeiro, August 20, 1999, translated by FBIS,

August 23, 1999.

86. Yana Marull, “Brasilia pie acapos del Cartel de brasil,” El Nuevo

Herald, March 27, 2001; Mendel, p. 7.

87. Quoted in Gentleman, pp. 28-29.

88. “Tracion en el mercado negro de armas,” El Tiempo, Bogota,

June 28, 2000.

89. “Colombia: Navy Seizes Weapons Coming from El Salvador,”

AFP, January 5, 1999, translated by FBIS, January 6, 1999; “Air Force

Discovers Routes Used by Self-defense Groups,” Television Canal A,

Bogota, May 12, 1999, translated by FBIS, May 14, 1999; “FARC

Weapons Supplies Revealed,” Semana, Bogota, September 6, 1999;

37
Andrew Bounds, “Colombian rebels trade drugs for arms,” Financial

Times, May 8, 2002.

90. Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, Drugs and Security in the Caribbean:

Sovereignty Under Seige, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State

University Press, 1997, p. 155.

91. “Fox Cites Colombianization Danger,” La Jornada, Mexico City,

March 1, 1999.

92. Richard Wolfe and John Murray Brown, “IRA Trained

Colombian Guerrillas, Says Report,” Financial Times, April 23, 2002.

93. James Wilson, Richard Lapper, and Jimmy Burns, “Army Sees

Guiding Hand of IRA in Colombia,” Financial Times, April 24, 2002.

Europeans were already growing increasingly disillusioned with the

FARC as demonstrated by the European Union’s decision in late 2001 to

stop issuing visas to its members. “Guerrillas or Terrorists,” The

Economist, December 8, 2001, p. 37.

94. “Pastrana Reaffirms Colombia not Regional Threat,” AFP,

August 19, 1999, translated by FBIS, August 20, 1999.

95. Nicholas Moss, “Uribe calls for tighter borders to fight drugs,”

Financial Times, July 13, 2002; “Uribe seeks support from Brazil,

Venezuela,” Reuters, July 21, 2002.

96. “Ecuador niega participacion en fuerza multinacional contra

guerrilla colombiana,” El Tiempo, July 22, 2002; Nicholas Moss,

“Regional Leaders Scotch Columbia Drugs Force,” Financial Times,

July 29, 2002; Juan Ramon Rios, “Paises Andinos no participaran en

invasion en Colombia,” Revista Koeyu Latinoamericano, August 23,

2002.

97. Transcript of Hearings on “Future U.S. Relations with

Colombia,” before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace

Corps and Narcotics Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S.

Senate, April 24, 2002, p. 3.

98. Mark Mulligan, Latin Americans Blame Politicians for Woes,”

Financial Times, August 26, 2002.

99. For a discussion of the ways in which internal conflicts have

impacted such missions, see Francisco Leal Buitrago, El Oficio de la

Guerra: La Seguridad Nacional en Colombia, Bogota: Tercer Mundo

Editores, 1994, pp. 242-46.

38
100. Stephen E. Flynn, “Drugs, Thugs, Terrorists and Trade: Border

Control in an Era of Hemispheric Integration,” paper prepared for the

Council on Foreign Relations Border Control Study Group, February 7,

2000, Rice University, Houston, Texas, p. 8.

39
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Author

Dr. Richard L. Millett

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple