NONSTATE ACTORS IN COLOMBIA:

THREAT AND RESPONSE

Max G. Manwaring

May 2002
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ISBN 1-58487-088-5

ii
FOREWORD

The common denominator intent of any terrorist group

is to impose self-determined desires for “change” on a

society, a nation-state, and/or other perceived symbols of

power in the global community. The solution to the

terrorism threat is not simply to destroy small bands of

terrorist fanatics and the governments that support them.

Additional measures are needed. That is, once a terrorist

group is brought under control or neutralized, multifaceted

efforts must be taken to preclude the seeds that created that

organization from germinating again. Given these realities

within the context of the contemporary global security

environment, the United States has little choice but to

reexamine and rethink national and global stability and

security—and a peaceful and more prosperous tomorrow.

In these terms, the author, Dr. Max Manwaring, seeks to

do several things. He outlines the violent characteristics of

the new security-stability environment and briefly

examines the problem of terrorism and the related problem

of governance. Then he analyzes the complex threat and

response situation and outlines a multidimensional

response to these problems. Finally, he enumerates some

civil-military implications for playing effectively in the

contemporary global security arena. His recommendations

focus on the interagency arena and the military in general,

and the U.S. Army in particular. By airing this range of

geopolitical perspectives, the Strategic Studies Institute

hopes to contribute to the building of a new, 21st century

U.S. interagency and military strategy.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

MAX G. MANWARING is a Professor of Military Strategy

at the U.S. Army War College. He is a retired U.S. Army

colonel and adjunct professor of political science at

Dickinson College. He has served in various civilian and

military positions at the U.S. Army War College, the U.S.

Southern Command, and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Dr. Manwaring holds a B.S. in Economics as well as a B.S.,

an M.A., and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the

University of Illinois. A graduate of the U.S. Army War

College, Dr. Manwaring’s areas of expertise include theory

of grand strategy, U.S. national security policy and

strategy, military strategy, military and nonmilitary

operations other than war, political-military affairs; and

Latin America. Dr. Manwaring is the author and co-author

of several articles, chapters, and reports dealing with

political-military affairs. He is also the editor or co-editor of

El Salvador at War; Gray Area Phenomena: Confronting the

New World Disorder; Managing Contemporary Conflict:

Pillars of Success; Beyond Declaring Victory and Coming

Home: The Challenges of Peace and Stability Operations;

and Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century.

iv
SUMMARY

Global political violence is clashing with global economic

integration. More often than not, the causes and

consequences of the resultant instabilities tend to be

exploited by such destabilizers as rogue states, substate and

transnational political actors, insurgents, illegal drug

traffickers, organized criminals, warlords, ethnic cleansers,

militant fundamentalists, and 1,000 other “snakes with a

cause”—and the will to conduct terrorist and other

asymmetric warfare. The intent is to impose selfdetermined desires for “change” on a society, nation-state,

and/or other perceived symbols of power in the global

community—and, perhaps, revert to the questionable

glories of the 12th century.

In these conditions—exacerbated by the terrorist

attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, and by

the devastating U.S.-led attacks on Afghanistan

subsequently—the United States has little choice but to

reexamine and rethink national and global stability and

security—and a peaceful and more prosperous tomorrow.

To help civilian and military leaders analyze the

implications of the contemporary global security

environment, the author attempts several things. First, he

outlines the violent characteristics of the new security

arena. Second, he briefly examines the relationship of the

central strategic problems in the contemporary

environment—terrorism and governance. Third, he

describes the complex threat situation. Fourth, he presents

a basic outline for a reasoned multidimensional

political-economic stability capability- building response to

these problems. Finally, he enumerates some civil-military

implications for playing effectively in the global security

arena. His recommendations focus on implications for the

military in general and the U.S. Army in particular.

v
NONSTATE ACTORS IN COLOMBIA:

THREAT AND RESPONSE

The terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington,

DC, on September 11, 2001, reminded Americans of

realities long understood in Europe, the Middle East,

Africa, Asia, and Latin America. That is, terrorism is a very

practical, calculated, and cynical strategy of warfare for the

weak to use against the strong. It is a generalized

political-psychological asymmetric substitute for

conventional military war.1 The intent is to coerce

substantive political change.2

Now, for the first time since the end of the Cold War,

political and military leaders are rethinking the U.S. global

role and supporting strategies. They are now discussing

these issues in terms of the political and military transitions

required to deal more effectively with the global security

problems that were submerged in the morass of the

East-West conflict and unleashed by the Eastern European

revolutions of 1989. In these terms, Colombia is emerging as

the most compelling issue on the hemispheric agenda. That

country’s deeply rooted and ambiguous warfare has reached

crisis proportions in that Colombia’s “Hobbesian Trinity” of

illegal drug traffickers, insurgents, and paramilitary

organizations are creating a situation in which life is indeed

“nasty, brutish, and short.”3

The first step in developing a macro-level vision, policy,

and strategy to deal with the Colombian crisis in a global

context is to be clear on what the Colombian crisis is, and

what the fundamental threats implicit (and explicit) in it

are. Political and military leaders can start thinking about

the gravity of the terrorist strategy employed by Colombia’s

stateless adversaries from this point. It is also the point

from which leaders can begin developing responses

designed to secure Colombian, hemispheric, and global

stability. In this monograph, then, the author seeks to

1
explain the Colombian crisis in terms of nonstate threats to

the state and to the region—and appropriate strategic-level

responses.

The Context of the Colombian Crisis.

In the 1930s and 1940s, chronic political, economic, and

social problems created by a self-serving civilian oligarchy

began to bring about yet another crisis in a long list of

internal conflicts in Colombian history. In 1930, Liberal

reformists came to power and deprived Conservatives of the

control of the central government and extensive local

patronage. The Liberals also initiated an ambitious social

agenda that generated increasing civil violence between

Conservative and Liberal partisans.4

The catalyst that ignited the 18-year period called “the

violence” in April 1948 was the “assassination” of Liberal

populist, Jorge Eliecer Gaitan. That murder sparked a riot

known as the Bogotazo that left much of the capital

destroyed and an estimated 2,000 dead. Although the

government was able to contain the situation in Bogota, it

could not control the violence that spread through the

countryside. Rural violence became the norm as an

estimated 20,000 armed Liberal and Conservative

combatants settled old political scores. Over the period from

1948-66, la violencia claimed the lives of over 200,000

Colombians.5

The illegal drug industry began to grow and prosper in

this unstable environment of virtually uncontrolled

violence, rural poverty, political disarray, and government

weakness. That prosperity in turn provided resources that

allowed insurgent organizations to grow and expand. Later,

as the Colombian government proved less and less effective

in controlling the national territory and the people in it, the

self-defense paramilitary groups emerged.6 The thread that

permitted these violent nonstate actors to develop, grow,

and succeed was—and is—adequate freedom of movement

and action over time. The dynamics of the Hobbesian

2
Trinity, within the context of the almost constant instability

and violence over the past several decades, have

substantially expanded freedom of movement and action

and correspondingly eroded that of the state.7

Virtually anyone with any kind of resolve can take

advantage of the instability engendered by the ongoing

Colombian crisis. The tendency is that the best motivated

and best armed organization on the scene will eventually

control that instability for its own narrow purposes.

Colombia’s Three Wars.

The problem in Colombia is that this country and its

potential are deteriorating because of three ongoing,

simultaneous, and interrelated wars involving the illegal

drug industry; various insurgent organizations (primarily

the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia [FARC]); and

“vigilante” paramilitary groups (the United Self-Defense

Groups of Colombia [AUC]). This unholy trinity of nonstate

actors is perpetrating a level of corruption, criminality,

human horror, and internal (and external) instability

that—if left unchecked at the strategic level—can

ultimately threaten Colombia’s survival as an organized

democratic state and undermine the political stability and

sovereignty of its neighbors. In that connection, explicit

recognition now is that Colombia’s current situation has

reached crisis proportions.8 The critical point of this

argument is that the substance, or essence, of the

Colombian crisis centers on the general organization,

activities, and threats of the major violent stateless actors

at work in that country.

The Narcos. The illegal drug industry in Colombia can be

described as a consortium that functions in much the same

way as virtually any multinational Fortune 500 company.

Products are made, sold, and shipped; bankers and financial

planners handle the monetary issues; and lawyers deal with

the legal problems.9 The consortium is organized to achieve

super efficiency and maximum profit. It has its “capos”

3
(chief executive officers and boards of directors), its

councils, system of justice, public affairs officers,

negotiators, project managers—and its enforcers. And, it

operates in virtually every country in the Western

Hemisphere and Europe.10

Additionally, the illegal drug industry has at its disposal

a very efficient organizational structure, the latest in

high-tech communications equipment and systems, and

state-of-the-art weaponry. With these advantages,

decisions are made quickly that can ignore or supersede

laws, regulations, decisions, and actions of most of the

governments of the nation-states in which the organization

operates. Narcos also have assassinated, bribed, corrupted,

intimidated, and terrorized government leaders, members

of the Congress, judges, law enforcement and military

officers, journalists, and even soccer players. As such, the

illegal drug industry is a major agent for destabilizing and

weakening the state governmental apparatus.

At the same time, narco cosmetic patronage to the poor,

creation of their own electoral machinery, participation

openly in traditional political parties, and financing of

friendly election campaigns have facilitated even greater

influence over the executive, legislative, and judicial

branches of Colombian government. That activity

exacerbates the necessity of meeting the narcos’ needs and

demonstrates the necessity of meeting their expectations

and demands. All this mitigates against responsible

government—and against any allegiance to the notion of

the public good and political equality. In that process, the

consortium has achieved a symbiotic relationship with the

state and, in a sense, is becoming a virtual super-state

within the state.11

The Insurgents. The FARC insurgents are essentially a

Marxist-Leninist foco (i.e., insurrectionary armed enclave)

in search of a mass base.12 Because of the general lack of

appeal to the Colombian population, the insurgents have

developed a military organization designed to achieve the

4
“armed colonization” of successive areas within the

Colombian national territory.13 The intent is to liberate and

mobilize the “disaffected and the dispossessed” population

into an alternative society.14That is, FARC responded to the

lack of popular support, as did the communists in Vietnam,

by attempting to dominate the “human terrain.” In this

effort, FARC has proved every bit as ruthless as the Viet

Cong. Torture and assassination—to say nothing of

kidnapping, extortion, intimidation, and other terrorist

tactics—are so common as to go almost without comment

except in the most extreme cases.15 Strategically,

operationally, and tactically, the FARC approach is the

Vietnamese approach.16

All this probably would have remained more or less out

of sight and out of mind of mainstream Colombia in the

underpopulated and underconsidered rural areas of the

country if it had not been for the financial support provided

by the illegal drug phenomenon. In 1982, a decision was

taken by the Seventh Conference of the FARC to develop

links with the Colombian drug industry that would provide

the money—and manpower—necessary for the creation of a

“true democracy.”17 As a result, FARC expanded from

approximately 2,000 guerrilla fighters in 1982 to over 70

fronts (company-sized units) with 18,000-20,000 fighters in

2001. This illicit funding has provided the FARC with the

capability of confronting regular Colombian military units

up to battalion size, and of overrunning police and military

installations and smaller units. Moreover, insurgent

presence has spread from 173 municipalities in 1985 to 622

in 1995, out of a total of approximately 1,050.18

Thus, Colombian insurgents have taken control of large

portions of the countryside and placed themselves in

positions from which to move into or dominate the major

population centers. The stated intent is to create an army of

30,000 with which to stage a “final offensive” against the

regular armed forces and “do away with the state as it now

exists in Colombia.”19 In these terms, through the control of

large parts of the Colombian national territory, the

5
insurgents are replacing the state. In that connection, the

insurgents are denying the state its traditional “monopoly

on violence,” and are challenging central government

authority over the other parts of the country still under

government control.

The Paramilitaries. The AUC self-defense organizations

are semi-autonomous regional alliances relatively

independent of each other. Nevertheless, a central

organization exists primarily to develop a national

coordinated strategy against the insurgents. Additionally,

the AUC national front organization provides guidance,

training, and other help to member organizations as

necessary. Strategy and tactics of the AUC, interestingly,

mirror those of the insurgents. They seek to expand their

control of grass-roots levels of government—municipalities

or townships (municipios) and rural areas (corregemientos),

and to exercise political influence through the control,

intimidation, or replacement of local officials. And, like the

insurgents, the paramilitaries profit from drug

trafficking.20

These “vigilante” groups began as self-defense

organizations for the protection of family, property, and the

law and order of a given geographical area. Because of the

AUC’s orientation against the insurgents and willingness to

provide fundamental justice and personal security to those

defined as “noncollaborators” with the insurgents, they

have consistently improved their standing in the Colombian

society. As examples, the number of small AUC groups have

increased from 273 to more than 400, with an estimated

current total of up to 8,000 active combatants. Moreover,

the paramilitaries have organized, trained, and equipped

“shock brigades” that since 1996 have become capable of

successfully challenging insurgent military formations.

Finally, in 2001 AUC groups are estimated to have an

armed presence in about 40 percent of the municipalities in

the country.21

6
Despite paramilitary success against insurgents where

the state has been absent or ineffective and growing popular

support, the Colombian government has disavowed the

AUC. As such, the paramilitaries have become a third set of

competing nonstate actors—along with the various

insurgent organizations and the illegal drug

consortium—challenging the authority of the state, and

claiming the right to control all or a part of the national

territory.

Conclusion. Each of the three armed nonstate players in

the Colombian crisis separately generates formidable

problems, challenges, and threats to the state and the

region in its own right. What, then, of an alliance of the

willing—even if that alliance represents a complicated

mosaic of mutual and conflicting interests?

The Narco-Insurgent-Paramilitary Nexus.

Within the past 3 or 4 decades, the nature of

insurgencies has changed dramatically throughout the

world with what Dr. Steven Metz calls “commercial

insurgency and the search for wealth.”22 One of the most

far-reaching transformations began in the 1970s with the

growing involvement of insurgent forces with

narco-traffickers in the Middle East and Asia. Lebanon and

the Golden Triangle come quickly to mind.23 Thus, the

narco-insurgent connection is not new, and it is not confined

to Latin America. The question, then, is not whether there

might be an alliance between the illegal drug industry, the

insurgents, and the paramilitaries in Colombia. That has

been understood and admitted since the 1980s.24 The

question is whether the threats associated with that union

warrant real concern and a serious strategic response.

Motives and Linkages. The motives for the

narco-insurgent-paramilitary alliance are straightforward.

They are accumulation of wealth, control of territory and

people, freedom of movement and action, and legitimacy.

7
Together, these elements represent usable power—power to

allocate values and resources in a society.

The equation that links illegal narcotics trafficking to

insurgency and to the paramilitaries in Colombia—and

elsewhere—turns on a combination of need, organizational

infrastructure development, ability, and the availability of

sophisticated communications and weaponry.25 For

example, the drug industry possesses cash and lines of

transportation and communication. Insurgent and

paramilitary organizations have followers, organization,

and discipline. Traffickers need these to help protect their

assets and project their power within and among

nationstates. Insurgents and paramilitaries are in constant

need of logistical and communications support—and

money.26

Together, the alliance has the economic and military

power equal to or better than that of most nation-states in

the world today. This alliance also has another advantage.

All three groups possess relatively flat organizational

structures and sophisticated communications systems that,

when combined, create a mechanism that is considerably

more effective and efficient than any slow-moving

bureaucratic and hierarchical governmental system. That

combined organizational advantage is a major source of

power in itself.27

Internal Objectives. The narco-insurgent-paramilitary

alliance is not simply individual or institutional

intimidation for financial or criminal gain. And it is not just

the use of insurgents and AUC groups as “hired guns” to

protect illegal drug cultivation, production, and trafficking.

Those are only business transactions. Rather, the long-term

objective of the alliance is to control or substantively change

the Colombian political system.28

Narcos may not seek the overthrow of the

government—as long as the government is weak and can be

controlled to allow maximum freedom of movement and

action.29 The insurgents, on the other hand, seek the

8
eventual destruction of the state as it exists. Whether or not

the insurgents are reformers or criminals is irrelevant.

Their avowed objective is to take direct control of the

government and the state.30 Likewise, the paramilitaries

want fundamental change. It appears that they are

interested in creating a strong state that is capable of

unquestioned enforcement of law and order. Whether or not

the vigilante groups are “democratic” or authoritarian is

also irrelevant. For their own self-preservation, they have

little choice but to take direct or indirect control of the

state.31 The common narco-insurgent-paramilitary

governmental change or overthrow effort, therefore, is

directed at the political community and its institutions. In

this sense, the nexus is not simply criminal in nature. It is

more. It is a major political-psychological-moral-military

entity. At the same time, the countryside ceases to be a

simple theater for combat and becomes a setting for the

building of real local power.

The Latin American security dialogue does not generally

refer to the narco-insurgent-paramilitary nexus in terms of

their individual identities—at least in the sense of a

business organization striving to control the price of drugs,

weapons, or general protection. Rather, it tends to refer to

the whole entity as greater than the sum of its parts. The

security dialogue is concerned about a politicaleconomic-military force that has become a major national

and transnational nonstate actor. That actor threatens

national stability, development, and the future of the

democratic system not only in Colombia but in the entire

Western Hemisphere.32 To be sure, this is a loose and

dynamic merger subject to many vicissitudes, but the

“marriage of convenience” has lasted and appears to be

getting stronger.

External Objectives. The narco-insurgent-paramilitary

alliance appears to have developed a political agenda for

exerting leverage in the international as well as the

Colombian national arena. The perceived goal of a given

national agenda is to promote an “egalitarian social

9
revolution” that will open up opportunities for

“everybody”—and give the organization the legitimate basis

for controlling some sort of nationalistic “narcocracy.” The

objectives of the international political agenda are to

establish acceptance, credibility, and legitimacy among the

sovereign states with which the general organization must

negotiate.33

In that connection, the spill-over effects of the illegal

drug and arms trafficking industry have inspired criminal

violence, corruption, and instability throughout Latin

America in general and Caribbean transit countries in

particular. For some time, the illegal drug industry has

operated back and forth across Colombia’s borders and

adjacent seas. Colombian insurgents and paramilitary

groups have also made frequent incursions into the

neighboring countries of Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru,

and Venezuela. The resulting destabilization undermines

the security, well-being, and sovereignty of these

countries.34 A 1992 report by the West Indian Commission

captures the essence of the scope and gravity of this “equal

opportunity” phenomenon:

Nothing poses greater threats to civil society in [Caribbean]

countries than the drug problem, and nothing exemplifies the

powerlessness of regional governments more. That is the

magnitude of the damage that drug abuse and trafficking hold

for our Community. It is a many-layered danger. At base is the

human destruction implicit in drug addiction; but implicit also

is the corruption of individuals and systems by the sheer

enormity of the inducements of the illegal drug trade in

relatively poor societies. On top of all this lie the implications for

governance itself—at the hands of both external agencies

engaged in inter-national interdicting, and the drug barons

themselves—the “dons” of the modern Caribbean—who

threaten governance from within.35

Colombia is particularly important in this situation

because the narco-insurgent-paramilitary alliance

represents a dual threat to the authority of that

government—and to those of its hemispheric neighbors. It

10
challenges the central governance of countries affected, and

it undermines the vital institutional pillars of regime

legitimacy and stability.36

The Internal and External Responses. Colombia, the

United States, and other countries that might ultimately be

affected by the destabilizing consequences of the

narco-insurgent-paramilitary nexus in Colombia have

tended to deal with the problem in a piecemeal fashion or

even ignore it. For 40 years the various Colombian

governments dealt with the problem on a completely ad hoc

basis—without a strategic-level plan, without adequate or

timely intelligence, without a consensus among the

political, economic, and military elites about how to deal

with the armed opposition, and, importantly, within an

environment of mutual enmity between the civil

government and the armed forces.37 With the promulgation

of Plan Colombia in 2000, there is at least the basis of a

coherent political project, but not much else.38

The United States has tended to ignore the insurgent

and paramilitary problems in Colombia—except for making

rhetorical statements regarding the peace process, terrorist

activities, and human rights violations. The United States

has focused its money, training, and attention almost

entirely on the counterdrug campaign. It has seen the

Colombian crisis in limited terms—the number of hectares

of coca eradicated, and the number of kilos of coca that have

been detected and destroyed. And, even though the United

States and Colombia have achieved a series of tactical

“successes” in the coca fields, the laboratories, and on the

streets, the violent nonstate actors remain strong and

become ever more wealthy. In the meantime, Colombia

continues to deteriorate and becomes ever more fragile.39

Finally, the other countries that are affected by the

nefarious activities of the narco-insurgent-paramilitary

nexus tend to be doing little more than watching, debating,

and wrangling about what—if anything—to do about the

seemingly new and unknown phenomenon.40 As a

11
consequence, positive political sovereignty, territory,

infrastructure, stability, and security are quietly and slowly

destroyed—and tens of thousands of innocents continue to

be displaced and die.

Conclusion. These are the realities of power operating in

the Colombian crisis. Several years ago, Abmael Guzman

reminded us that “Except for power, everything else is

illusion.”41

Where the Hobbesian Trinity Leads.

Nonstate criminal-terrorist organizations such as those

that constitute the Colombian narco-insurgentparamilitary nexus are significant political actors with the

ability to compromise the integrity and sovereignty of

individual nation-states. This is a fact that neither the

public policy nor the academic International Relations

communities have completely grasped. Many political and

military leaders see the violent nonstate actor as a low-level

law enforcement issue that does not require sustained

policy attention. Many academicians are accustomed to

thinking of nonstate actors as bit players on a local stage.

That may be the case in the early stages of their

development, but is certainly not the case in Colombia

today.42

Threats from the “Hobbesian Trinity” at work in

Colombia today come in many forms and in a matrix of

different kinds of challenges—varying in scope and scale. If

they have a single feature in common, however, it is that

they are systemic and well-calculated attempts to achieve

political ends.43 In that connection, we briefly explore two of

the many consequences the narco-insurgent-paramilitary

union has generated. First, we examine the erosion of

Colombian democracy; then we consider the erosion of the

state.

The Erosion of Colombian Democracy. The

policy-oriented definition of democracy that has been

12
generally accepted and used in U.S. foreign policy over the

past several years is probably best described as “procedural

democracy.” This definition tends to focus on the election of

civilian political leadership and—perhaps—on a relatively

high level of participation on the part of the electorate.

Thus, as long as a country is able to hold elections, it is still

considered a democracy—regardless of the level of

accountability, transparency, corruption, and ability to

extract and distribute resources for national development

and protection of human rights and liberties.44

In Colombia we observe important paradoxes. Elections

are held on a regular basis—but leaders, candidates, and

elected politicians are also regularly assassinated. As an

example, numerous governmental officials have been

assassinated following their election—138 mayors and 569

members of parliament, deputies, and city council members

were murdered between 1989 and 1999, along with 174

public officials in other positions. This is not to mention the

judiciary. In 1987 alone, 53 members of the judiciary were

assassinated.45 Additionally, intimidation, direct threats,

and the use of violence on a given person and his family play

an important role prior to elections. And, as a corollary, it is

important to note that, although the media is free from state

censorship, journalists and academicians who make their

opinions known through the press are systematically

assassinated.46

It is hard to credit Colombian elections as “democratic”

or “free.” Neither competition nor participation in elections

can be complete in an environment where armed and

unscrupulous nonstate actors compete violently to control

government—before and after elections. Moreover, it is

hard to credit Colombia as a democratic state as long as

elected leaders are subject to controls or vetoes imposed by

vicious nonstate actors. As a consequence, Ambassador

David Jordan argues that Colombia is an “anocratic

democracy.” That is, Colombia is a state that has the

procedural features of democracy, but retains the features

of an autocracy where the ruling elite faces no

13
accountability.47 Professor Eduardo Pizarro describes

Colombia as a “besieged democracy” and writes about the

“partial collapse” of the state.48 In either case, the actions of

the narco-insurgent-paramilitary alliance have pernicious

effects on democracy, and tend to erode the ability of the

state to carry out its legitimizing functions.

The Partial Collapse of the State. The Colombian state

has undergone severe erosion on two general levels. First,

the state’s presence and authority has physically

diminished over large geographical portions of the country.

Second, the idea of the partial collapse of the state is closely

related to the nonphysical erosion of democracy. Jordan

argues that corruption is key in this regard and is a prime

mover toward “narcosocialism.”49

In the first instance, the notion of “partial collapse”

refers to the fact that there is an absence or only partial

presence of state institutions in over 60 percent of the rural

municipalities of the country. Also, even in those areas that

are not under the direct control of narco, insurgent, or

paramilitary organizations, institutions responsible for

protecting citizens—notably, the police and judiciary—have

eroded to the point where they are unable to carry out their

basic individual and collective security functions. Indicators

of this problem can be seen in two statistics. First, the

murder rate in Colombia is the highest per capita in the

world at 41,564 in 1999.50 Second, the proportion of

homicides that end with a conviction is less than 4 percent.51

These alarming indicators of impunity strongly confirm

that the state is not exercising adequate control of its

territory or people.

In the second instance, nonphysical erosion of the state

centers on the widespread and deeply entrenched issue of

corruption. As an example, in 1993 and 1994 the U.S.

Government alluded to the fact that former-President

Ernesto Samper had received money from narcotics

traffickers. Later, in 1996, based on that information, the

United States withdrew Samper’s visa and decertified

14
Colombia for not cooperating in combating illegal drug

trafficking. Subsequently, the Colombian Congress

absolved Samper of all drug charges by a vote of 111-43.52

Not surprisingly, another indicator of government

corruption at the highest levels is found in the Colombian

Congress. The Senate decriminalized the issue of “illicit

enrichment” by making it a misdemeanor that could be

prosecuted only after the commission of a felony.53

Moreover, a former U.S. Ambassador to Colombia

asserted—in public and without fear of contradiction—that

about 70 percent of the Colombian Congress “is bent.”54

Clearly, the reality of corruption in government favoring the

illegal drug industry in Colombia is inimical to the public

good.

Finally, contemporary nontraditional conflict with

nonstate actors is not a kind of appendage—a lesser or

limited thing—to the more comfortable military-to-military

paradigm. It is a great deal more. As long as opposition

exists that is willing to risk all to take down violently a

government and establish its own—or a surrogate—there is

war. This is a zero-sum game in which there is only one

winner. It is thus, total. In The Constant Gardner, John

LeCarre vividly captures the political implications of the

type of nonstate threats that must be confronted today. He

outlines the answer to the question of “When is a state not a

state?” from the point of view of a common sense

practitioner:

I would suggest to you that, these days, very roughly, the

qualifications for being a civilized state amount to—electoral

suffrage, ah—protection of life and property—um, justice,

health and education for all, at least to a certain level—then

the maintenance of a sound administrative infrastructure—and roads, transport, drains, et cetera—and—

what else is there?—ah yes, the equitable collection of taxes. If

a state fails to deliver on at least a quorum of the above—then

one has to say the contract between state and citizen begins to

look pretty shaky—and if it fails on all of the above, then it’s a

failed state, as we say these days.55

15
Nonstate actors using asymmetric terrorist

political-psychological strategies are pervasive in the world

today. The general threat(s) to regime stability and

existence generated by the Colombian narcoinsurgent-paramilitary nexus is only one case in point. In

light of the dynamics of violent stateless actors, there is

ample reason for worldwide concern—and action.

Where To from Here?

In the post-Cold War era, the dominant threats to

Colombia, the Western Hemisphere, and most of the rest of

the world are manifested in nontraditional ways. The most

acute national security challenges are transnational

threats that emanate from violent nonstate actors. If not

confronted effectively, they can corrupt and subvert the

very fabric of society and the fundamental institutions of

law and order. This type of conflict now involves entire civil

populations—not just “enemy” military formations. This

type of conflict also involves the relative ability of the

parties to a conflict such as that in Colombia to shift the

proverbial “hearts and minds”—and support—of the people

in their respective favor. Finally, this type of conflict

demands a coherent and multidimensional politicalpsychological, socio-economic, and military police-people

oriented response.

Toward a Populace Oriented Model. Sun Tzu warned

that, “In War, numbers alone confer no advantage. Do not

advance relying on sheer military power.”56 None other than

Clausewitz points out that, in the type of conflict taking

place in Colombia, there are two nontraditional centers of

gravity (i.e., the hub of all power and movement upon which

everything depends). They are public opinion and the

leadership that organizes and directs that opinion.57 In that

context, the dynamic competition for the allegiance of the

people demands a multidimensional model. Such a model

would depict the activities and efforts of the various political

actors involved in their attempts to achieve their strategic

16
vision and ultimate political objectives. It would portray the

allegiance of a people as the primary center of gravity.

The balance of persuasive and coercive attempts to

bring “hearts and minds” to one player or another will

determine success or failure. In these terms, the

government and its external allies can coerce, persuade,

and demonstrate the populace into supportive actions on

their own behalf. Internal illegal adversaries and their

allies can do the same thing. This is a dangerous

“double-edged sword.” Thus, a targeted government must

attack these “new” centers of gravity, while at the same time

protecting its own corresponding centers of gravity.

Importantly, the public opinion center of gravity is likely to

be the same for all parties to the conflict. It is in this dialectic

that only one victor can possibly emerge.58

Even though every internal conflict, such as that in

Colombia, is situation specific, it is not completely unique.

Throughout the universe of intranational war cases, there

are analytical commonalities. Three broadly inclusive

elements contribute most directly to the allegiance of the

populace and the achievement of a given end-state. The

essential foundational elements for a targeted government

are postulated as clusters of closely related political,

economic, social, and security activities that must be

performed at the strategic/macro level. There is very little

glamour, excitement, and sound-bite material in much of

the work outlined below. But these basic elements are the

proven keys to a stable, peaceful, and prosperous world.

They are: (1) establishing security, (2) capability building,

and (3) nurturing legitimate governance.59

Establishing Security. A fundamental societal

requirement is for its government to provide security—that

is, “to insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common

defense . . .”60 It begins with the provision of personal

security to individual members of the society. It extends to

protection from violent internal (including criminals) and

external enemies—and perhaps from repressive internal

17
institutions (e.g., the military, police, and self-appointed

vigilante groups). The security problem ends with the

establishment of firm but fair control over the entire

national territory.

Strategic planners must understand that once an illegal

internal enemy—such as Colombia’s “Hobbesian Trinity” of

insurgents, narco-barons, and “paramilitary” vigilante

groups—becomes firmly established, reform and

development efforts are insufficient to deal with the entire

security problem. The illegal violent adversaries will finally

be defeated only by a superior organization and a

political-military strategy designed to neutralize or

eliminate it. The sum of the parts of a desired countereffort

to deal with a major internal security threat requires not

only a certain political competence to coordinate a

wide-scale political-economic-psychological-military

security effort, but also to exert effective, discrete, and

deadly force.61 It must be remembered, too, that for ultimate

effectiveness, political and security forces must also be able

to deal with the illegal nonstate opposition on the basis of

the rule of law.62

In addition to the need to establish and maintain the rule

of law, personal and collective freedom from intimidation

and violence (i.e., providing security) includes two other

elements. First is a need to politically, psychologically,

economically, and militarily isolate the warring political

and criminal factions from all sources of internal and

external support. Second, security implicitly requires

sustaining life, relieving suffering, and regenerating a

distressed economy. At base, however, enforcing and

maintaining the rule of law takes us back to where we

began—to whatever it takes to establish and maintain the

effective control of the national territory and the people in

it.63

Capability Building for Sustainable Development and

Peace. Another societal requirement for popular support to

government and the state is that of political, economic, and

18
social development. The reasons are straightforward. This

is the basis for internal strengthening of the state and for

demonstrating that government is, in fact, responsive to the

needs of the people. Such a system is inherently “just” and

stable. Experience shows that the level of a regime’s ability

to fairly and effectively collect and allocate resources for

personal security and sustainable development is a

significant measure of legitimate governance.64

The international security dialogue focuses on the

problem of national economic development. Underdevelopment and resultant individual and collective

poverty are being recognized as the world’s most

overwhelming threats. On the positive side of

capability-building for sustainable development, the term

implies the development of political competence that can

and will manage the development of the national economy

honestly and effectively. On the negative side of this

problem, ignoring the political competence variable within

the context of a socio-economic development program

implies all of the instabilities and threats associated with

illegal nonstate corrosion of the fabric of society.65

In the past, it was expected that stimulation of the

economy would automatically lead to societal stability and

political development in the long term. Somehow,

stimulation of the economy was also expected to improve

economic disparities, equity, and justice. That has not

happened. Experience demonstrates that in order to

generate a viable political competence that can and will

manage, coordinate, and sustain security and economic

development, it is necessary to accomplish three additional

goals: to eliminate (or at least control) corruption; foster

political consent on the part of the various components of

the national population; and establish and maintain

popularly accepted peaceful societal conflict resolution

processes. With these building blocks in place, a legitimate

civil society and sustainable peace become real

possibilities.66

19
Nurturing a Civil Society and Legitimate Governance.

Finally, in nurturing a sustainable civil society and a

durable internal peace, it is also necessary to develop the

aggressive unified political-diplomatic, socio-economic,

psychological-moral, and military-police engagement in

society that can and will deal effectively with the

multidimensional root causes that brought on the

instability and violence in Colombia in the first place. The

intent and requirement is to eliminate the corruption and

generate the societal acceptance and support that

governing institutions need to adequately and fairly

manage internal governance—and to guarantee individual

and collective well-being.

Generally, this requires a concerted anticorruption and

public diplomacy effort. It is important to remember that no

policy, no strategy, and no internal or foreign engagement

can be sustained for any length of time without at least the

tacit support of the people involved. The hard evidence over

time from around the world demonstrates the absolute

necessity of protecting one’s own center of gravity while

taking the offensive against that of an adversary.

This takes us directly to the issue of legitimate

governance. No group or force can legislate or decree

legitimacy for itself. It must develop, sustain, and enhance

moral legitimacy by its actions over time. Legitimization

and internal stability derive from popular and institutional

perceptions that authority is genuine and effective, and

uses morally correct means for reasonable and fair

purposes. The wisdom of Sun Tzu is, again, relevant. He

argues that, “Those who excel in war first cultivate their

own humanity and justice and maintain their laws and

institutions. By these means they make their governments

invincible.”67 The implication is clear—a decision that the

political, psychological, economic, and security actions

necessary to address this societal requirement are “too

hard” will result in a final decision for failure.

20
Conclusions. Implementing the recommended

extraordinary challenges of reform and regeneration

outlined above will not be easy. That will, however, be far

less demanding and costly in political, economic, social, and

military terms than allowing the causes of the conflict to

continue to be exploited by Colombia’s Hobbesian

Trinity—and to continue to foster the crises that can lead to

the detriment and ultimate failure of the state.

Implications for the Military: Two Keys to Planning

and Implementing Strategic Clarity—and Success.

The common denominator of the security dialogue in

Colombia and the Western Hemisphere is the underlying

issue of national, regional, and international instability.

Solutions to the instability exploited by Colombia’s violent

Hobbesian Trinity of nonstate actors are based on the

fundamental requirement that the armed forces, police, and

civilian elements of society develop a working relationship

that will facilitate the achievement of legitimate national

security.

The accomplishment of this most formidable task within

the context of illegal insurgent, narco-trafficker, and

paramilitary violence requires two fundamental strategic

efforts. The first involves the political, coalitional, and

multiorganizational partnership requirements that

mandate doctrinal and organizational change for strategic

clarity and greater effectiveness in any conflict situation.

This in turn depends on a second effort: the development of

professional civil-military leadership that will ensure not

just unity of military command, but unity of civil-military

effort.68 Both these efforts demand a carefully staffed,

phased, and long-term validation, planning, and

implementation program. The recommended basic

direction for these efforts is outlined as follows.

Partnership Requirements. The United States is not the

only political actor in the global security arena, and it is not

the only player in more specific smaller-scale contingency or

21
stability operations. At the same time, the U.S. military is

not the only actor in any kind of U.S. involvement in the

global security environment. A bewildering array of U.S.

civilian agencies, international organizations, and

nongovernmental organizations, as well as coalition and

host country government civilian and military

organizations, respond to complex emergencies such as that

in Colombia. For any degree of success in “going beyond

declaring victory and going home” and actually providing

the foundations of a sustainable peace, involvement must be

understood as a holistic process that relies on various U.S.,

host country, international organization, and other civilian

and military agencies and institutions working together in

an integrated fashion. The creation of that unity of effort to

gain ultimate success must be addressed at different levels.

At the highest level, the primary parties to a given

conflict must be in general agreement with regard to the

objectives of a political vision and the associated set of

operations. And, although such an agreement regarding a

strategic or operational end-state is a necessary condition

for effective partnership, it is not sufficient. Sufficiency and

clarity are achieved by adding appropriate policy

implementation and military management structure—and

“mind-set adjustments”—at the following three additional

levels.

The next level of effort requires an executive-level

management structure that can and will ensure continuous

cooperative planning and execution of policy among and

between the relevant U.S. civilian and military agencies

(i.e., vertical coordination). That structure must also ensure

that all political-military action at the operational and

tactical levels directly contributes to the achievement of the

mutually agreed strategic political end-state. This

requirement reflects a need to improve coordination within

the operational theater, and between the theater

commander and Washington.69

22
Third, steps must be taken to ensure clarity, unity, and

effectiveness by integrating coalition military,

international organization, and nongovernmental

organization processes with U.S. political-military

planning and implementing processes (i.e., horizontal

coordination). It has become quite clear that the political

end-state is elusive, and operations suffer when there is no

strategic planning structure empowered to integrate the

key multinational and multiorganizational civil-military

elements of a given operation. It is also clear that

duplication of effort, and other immediate consequences of

the absence of such a strategic planning body, is costly in

political, personnel, and financial terms. The lessons have

been demonstrated over and over again in such diverse

cases as the relatively recent natural disaster hurricane

relief operation in Central America (i.e., Hurricane Mitch),

and the various man-made disaster relief operations in the

former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Afghanistan.70

At a base level, however, unity of effort requires

education as well as organizational solutions. Even with an

adequate planning and organizational structure,

ambiguity, confusion, and tensions are likely to emerge.

Only when and if the various civilian and military leaders

involved in an operation can develop the judgment and

empathy necessary to work cooperatively and collegially

will they be able to plan and conduct the operations that

meet the needs of the host nation, and use the appropriate

capabilities of the U.S. interagency community,

international organizations, nongovernmental

organizations, and coalition/partner military forces.

Effective partnership ultimately entails the type of

professional civilian and military education and leader

development that results in effective diplomacy, as well as

to professional competence.71

Leader Development and Professionalization. Until

civilian and military leaders learn to think and act

strategically and cooperatively within the global security

environment, the United States and the rest of the global

23
community face unattractive alternatives. They can either

leave forces in place to maintain a de facto military

occupation, as in Cyprus, or they can depart the scene with

the sure knowledge that a given conflict will erupt again and

again, as in Rwanda. As in the later case, the time, treasure,

and blood expended will have been for nothing. At a

minimum, there are five educational and cultural

imperatives to modify Cold War and ethno-centric

mind-sets, and to develop the leader judgment needed to

deal effectively with complex, politically dominated,

multidimensional, multiorganizational, multinational, and

multicultural contingencies.72

First is the need to attune military and police minds to

cope with the many ways that political and psychological

considerations affect the use—and nonuse—of force. Second

is a requirement to attune military, police, and civilian

minds to understand that the number of battlefield victories

or the number of “enemies” arrested or killed only has

meaning to the extent that such achievements contribute

directly to the legitimate strengthening of the state. Third is

a need to teach military, police, and civilian participants in

“our savage wars of peace” how to communicate and deal

with a diversity of civil-military cultures. Fourth is a

requirement to teach military and civilian officials at all

levels how to cooperatively plan and implement

interagency, international organization, nongovernmental

organization, and coalition/partnership civil-military

operations. Finally and importantly, nonstate actors in an

unstable situation such as that in Colombia are likely to

have at their disposal an awesome array of conventional

and unconventional weaponry. Thus, education and

training programs for peace-enforcement and stability

operations must prepare soldiers to be effective

warfighters.73

The professionalization and leader development

imperatives listed above provide the bases of the

understanding and judgment that civilian and military

leaders must have to be successful in a contemporary

24
conflict like that in Colombia. The ultimate requirement is

to generate and encourage a thinking process and an

understanding of grand strategy that will allow one to be

clear on what the situation in Colombia is and what itis not.

The hard evidence over time underscores the wisdom of

Clausewitz’s dictum, “The first, the supreme, the most far

reaching act of judgment that the statesman and the

commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on

which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor

trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.”74

A Cautionary Note. To dismiss the above strategic-level

recommendations for civilian and military leadership

development and professionalization as “too difficult,”

“unrealistic in the midst of war,” or “simply impossible” is to

accept the inevitability of defeat. Are there any examples in

history? A relatively recent and positive example is that of

El Salvador in its struggle against the externally supported

violent nonstate Farabundo Marti National Liberation

Front (FMLN) actors. Although that effort did not achieve

the ideal, from 1979 to 1989, “Salvadorans successfully

expanded what was essentially a twelve thousand-strong

‘Praetorian Guard’... into a sixty thousand-strong fighting

force . . .”75

Conclusions. The lessons from a half-century of bitter

experience suffered by governments involved in dealing

with internal instabilities and nonstate actors show that a

given international intervention often ends short of

achieving the mandated peace. Military efforts at the

tactical and operational levels—no matter how well

conducted—are insufficient to deal with the entire task. Too

often, this is because short-, mid-, and long-term strategic

political-military objectives are unclear, the “end-game” is

undefined, consistent and appropriate support is not

provided, and civil-military unity of purpose remains

unachieved. Thus, it is imperative to develop leaders and

organizational structures that can generate strategic

clarity and make it work. The sooner, the better.

25
Afterword.

Even though every internal conflict is situation specific,

it is not completely unique. Throughout the universe of

intranational war cases, there are analytical

commonalities. The evidence clearly indicates that once

security and the rule of law are firmly established,

legitimate governance ultimately defeats a violent nonstate

actor by removing the motives that created that adversary

in the first place.

ENDNOTES

1. Michael Howard, The Lessons of History, New Haven, CT: Yale

University Press, 1991, pp. 174-175.

2. “Counterguerrilla Operations,” Field Manual 90-8, Washington,

DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1986.

3. This term was coined by Joseph R. Nunez in Fighting the

Hobbesian Trinity in Colombia: A New Strategy for Peace, Carlisle

Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001.

4. A classic book on this topic is Vernon Lee Fluherty, Dance of the

Millions: Military Rule and the Social Revolution in Colombia,

1930-1956, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1957. Also

see Dennis M. Hanratty and Sandra W. Meditz, eds., Colombia: A

Country Study, Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of

Congress, 1990.

5. Ibid. Also see Luis Albert Restrepo, “The Crisis of the Current

Political Regime and Its Possible Outcomes,” in Charles Bergquist,

Ricardo Penaranda, and Gonzalo Sanchez, eds., Violence in Colombia:

The Contemporary Crisis in Historical Perspective, Wilmington, DE: SR

Books, 1992, pp. 273-292.

6. Ibid. Also see Angel Rabassa and Peter Chalk, Colombian

Labyrinth, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001, pp. 39-60; Eduardo Pizarro,

“Revolutionary Guerrilla Groups in Colombia,” in Bergquist, pp.

169-193; and Hal Klepak, “Colombia: Why Doesn’t the War End?” Jane’s

Intelligence Review, June 2000, pp. 41-45.

7. These and subsequent assertions are consensus statements based

on a series of author interviews with more than 90 senior U.S. and Latin

26
American civilian and military officials. These interviews were

conducted from October 1989 through July 1994, September 1996,

December 1998, November 2000, and February 2001. To allow

anonymity for those who have an objection to their names being made

public, these are cited hereafter as Author Interviews.

8. Michael Shifter, Toward Greater Peace and Security in Colombia,

New York: Council on Foreign Relations and the Inter-American

Dialogue, 2000, pp. viii, 1-2, 18.

9. Author Interviews.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid. and author interview with Ambassador Curtis Kamman at

Carlisle Barracks, PA, on December 7, 2000.

12. Ibid.; and Thomas A. Marks, Colombian Army Adaptation to

FARC Insurgency, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,

2002.

13. Pizarro, and Rabassa and Chalk.

14. Ibid., and Klepak.

15. Ibid., and Kamman interview.

16. Author Interviews, Marks; and Thomas A. Marks, Maoist

Insurgency since Vietnam, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1996.

17. Rabassa and Chalk. Also see Larry Rohter, “A Colombian

Guerrilla’s 50-year fight,” New York Times, July 19, 1999; Larry Rohter,

“Colombia Rebels Reign in Ceded Area,” New York Times, May 16, 1999;

Howard LaFranchi, “Guerrilla Commander Says, ‘This is a means,’”

Christian Science Monitor, July 19, 1999; Serge F. Kovaleski, “Rebel

Movement on the Rise: Colombian Guerrillas Use Military Force, Not

Ideology to Hold Power,” The Washington Post, February 5, 1999; Gary

M. Leech, “An interview with FARC Commander Simon Trinidad,”

NACLA Report on the Americas, September/October 2000; Clifford

Krauss, “Colombia’s Rebels Keep the Marxist Faith,” New York Times,

July 25, 2000; Alfred Molano, “The Evolution of the FARC: A Guerrilla

Group’s Long History,” NACLA Report on the Americas,

September/October 2000; and Jane’s Information Group, “FARC:

Finance Comes Full Circle for Bartering Revolutionaries,” January 19,

2001. Hereafter cited as Newspaper Reports/Interviews.

27
18. Ibid.; and The Economist, “Survey of Colombia,” April 21-27,

2001.

19. Ibid.

20. Rabassa and Chalk. Also see David Spencer, Colombia’s

Paramilitaries: Criminals or Political Force? Carlisle Barracks, PA:

Strategic Studies Institute, 2001; Juan Forero, “Colombian

Paramilitaries Adjust Attack Strategies,” New York Times, January 22,

2001; Juan Forero, “Rightist Chief in Colombia Shifts Focus to Politics,”

New York Times, June 7, 2001; and Tod Robberson, “Militia Leader’s

Revelations Igniting Fear in Colombia,” Dallas Morning News,

December 17, 2001.

21. Ibid.; and “Survey of Colombia.”

22. Steven Metz, The Future of Insurgency, Carlisle Barracks, PA:

Strategic Studies Institute, 1993, pp. 13-15.

23. Mark S. Steinitz, “Insurgents, Terrorists, and the Drug Trade,”

Washington Quarterly, Fall 1985, p. 147.

24. Newspaper Reports/Interviews.

25. Peter A. Lupsha, “The Role of Drugs and Drug Trafficking in the

Invisible Wars,” in Richard Ward and Herold Smith, eds., International

Terrorism: Operational Issues, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press,

1987, p. 181. Also see William J. Olson, “International Organized

Crime: The Silent Threat to Sovereignty,” The Fletcher Forum of World

Affairs, Summer/Fall 1997, pp. 70-74.

26. Ibid.; and Author Interviews.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.; and Peter A. Lupsha, “Towards an Etiology of Drug

Trafficking and Insurgent Relations: The Phenomenon of

Narco-Terrorism,” International Journal of Comparative and Applied

Criminal Justice, Fall 1989, p. 63.

29. Author Interviews.

30. Ibid.; and Newspaper Reports/Interviews.

31. Rabassa and Chalk; and Spencer.

32. Author Interviews.

28
33. Ibid.

34. Ibid. Also see Stephen E. Flynn, The Transnational Drug

Challenge and the New World Order, Washington, DC: Center for

Strategic and International Studies, 1993; and William O. Walker III,

“The Foreign Narcotics Policy of the United States since 1980: An End to

the War on Drugs,” International Journal of Narco-Diplomacy, Winter

1993-94, p. 64.

35. Cited in Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, Drugs and Security in the

Caribbean: Sovereignty Under Siege, University Park, PA:

Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997, p. 1.

36. Ibid.; and Walker.

37. Author Interviews.

38. Ibid.

39. Max Manwaring, “U.S. Too Narrowly Focused on Drug War in

Colombia,” The Miami Herald, August 15, 2001.

40. Author Interviews.

41. Quoted from “El Documento Oficial de Sendero,” in Rogger

Mercado U., Los Partidos Politicos en el Peru, Lima: Ediciones

Latinoamericanas, 1995, p. 110.

42. Author Interviews. Also see Martha Crenshaw, ed., Terrorism in

Context, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995.

43. This observation was made by former Secretary of State George

P. Shultz in an address before the Low-intensity Warfare Conference at

the National Defense University on January 15, 1986, in Washington,

DC.

44. David C. Jordan, Drug Politics: Dirty Money and Democracies,

Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999, p. 19.

45. Author Interviews. Also see Ana Maria Bejarano and Eduardo

Pizarro, “The Crisis of Democracy in Colombia: From ‘Restricted’

Democracy to ‘Besieged’ Democracy,” unpublished manuscript, 2001.

46. Author Interviews.

47. Jordan, p. 21.

29
48. Bejarano and Pizarro.

49. Jordan, pp. 158-170; 193-194.

50. Annual Report 1999, Washington, DC: Inter-American

Development Bank, 2000, p. 141.

51. Data taken from Mauricio Rubio, “La Justicia en una Sociedad

Violenta,” in Maria Victoria Llorente and Malcolm Deas, Reconocer la

Guerra para Construir la Paz, Bogota: Ediciones Uniandes—

CERED—Editorial Norma, 1999, p. 215.

52. Jordan, p. 161.

53. Ibid.

54. Kamman interview.

55. John LeCarre, The Constant Gardner, New York: Scribner,

2001, p. 137.

56. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Samuel B. Griffith, trans., Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 122.

57. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret,

trans. and eds., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 596.

58. Author Interviews.

59. Ibid. The argument is also made in Ernest Evans, “Our Savage

Wars of Peace,” World Affairs, Fall 2000, pp. 90-94.

60. From the Constitution of the United States.

61. Author interview with General Sir Robert Thompson,

Washington, DC, January 1986.

62. Ibid. Also see David Passage, The United States and Colombia:

Untying the Gordian Knot, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War

College, 2000, pp. 21-27.

63. Author Interviews.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

30
66. Ibid.

67. Sun Tzu, p. 88.

68. Author interview with General John R. Galvin, USA, Ret., in

Boston, MA, August 6, 1997. Author interviews with Lieutenant

General William G. Carter III, USA, Ret., in Washington, DC,

November 30, 1998, and March 2, 1990; author interviews with General

Anthony Zinni, USMC, Commander-in-Chief, United States Central

Command in Washington, DC, June 2, 1999, and October 6, 2000; and

author interviews with General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC, Ret., in

Washington, DC, February 9, 2001, and June 22, 2001.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.; and Author Interviews.

73. Ibid.

74. Clausewitz, p. 88.

75. Edwin G. Corr and Courtney E. Prisk, “El Salvador:

Transforming Society to Win the Peace,” in Edwin G. Corr and Stephen

Sloan, eds., Low-Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World,

Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992, p. 235.

31
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Author

Dr. Max G. Manwaring

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Ms. Kimberly A. Rockwell

Cover Artist

Mr. Gary L. Johnson