Joint Special Operations University

and the Strategic Studies Department

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about 

Joint Special Operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and 

recommendations of national security professionals and Special Operations Forces’ students and leaders for consideration by the SOF 

community and defense leadership. 

JSOU is a subordinate organization of the US Special Operations 

Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The mission 

of the Joint Special Operations University is to educate SOF executive, 

senior and intermediate leaders and selected other national and international security decision makers, both military and civilian, through 

teaching, outreach, and research in the science and art of joint special 

operations. JSOU provides education to the men and women of Special 

Operations Forces and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint 

environment. 

JSOU conducts research through its Strategic Studies Department 

where effort centers upon the USSOCOM mission and these operational priorities: 

• Preempting global terrorist and CBRNE threats

• Enhancing homeland security

• Performing unconventional warfare and serving as a conven-

 tional force multiplier in conflict against state adversaries

• Conducting proactive stability operations

• Executing small-scale contingencies

The Strategic Studies Department also provides teaching and curriculum support to Professional Military Education institutions—the 

staff colleges and war colleges. It advances SOF strategic influence 

by its interaction in academic, interagency and US military communities.

The JSOU portal to the World Wide Web is https://www.jsou.socom.mil. 

Joint Special Operations University

Brigadier General Steven J. Hashem

President

Dr. Brian A. Maher

Vice President

Strategic Studies Department

Lieutenant Colonel Michael C. McMahon

Director

James D. Anderson

Director of Research
JSOU Report 05-2

The JSOU Press

Hurlburt Field, Florida

2005

Operationalizing

COIN

Joseph D. Celeski

Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired
ii

The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the 

author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy or position of 

the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, USSOCOM, or the 

Joint Special Operations University. 

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*******

Comments about this report are invited and should be forwarded 

to Director, Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations 

University, 357 Tully Street, Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, Florida 32544. Copies of this report may be obtained by calling JSOU 

at 850-884-2763; FAX 850-884-4732. The Point of Contact for research support to SOF PME students and the JSOU/NDIA essay 

contest is James D. Anderson (james.d.anderson@hurlburt.af.mil). 

*******

This report and other JSOU publications can be found on the 

SOF Education Gateway at https://jsou.socom.mil/gateway/. Click 

on “Highlighted Research” to view. The Strategic Studies Department, JSOU is currently accepting written works relevant to special 

operations for potential publication. For more information please 

contact Mr. Jim Anderson, JSOU Director of Research, at 850-884-

1569, DSN 579-1569, james.d.anderson@hurlburt.af.mil. Thank 

you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

ISBN 0-9767393-3-X
iii

Contents

Foreword ...............................................................................v

Introduction ..........................................................................1

Continued Involvement ......................................................... 1

Understanding COIN ............................................................ 3

1. Framing the Requirement ..................................................7

USSOCOM and LIC .............................................................. 8

Developing COIN Capability .............................................. 10

2. The Nature of the Threat .................................................17

Extremist Islamic Insurgents ................................................. 18

Terro-Guerrilla Insurgencies ................................................ 20

The New Radicalism ........................................................... 22

Adapting COIN to the “Gray Stew” ..................................... 27

3. A Modern Counterinsurgency Theory ..............................31

4. Developing the COIN Campaign ....................................39

Development of COIN Strategy ........................................... 39

Operational Art of COIN ..................................................... 44

The Conceptual Component ................................................ 44

The Static Component ......................................................... 45

The Active Component ........................................................ 48

Phasing of the COIN Campaign ........................................... 50

Lines of Operation ............................................................... 51

Effects-based Campaigning in COIN .................................... 54

Task Organization for SOF COIN ........................................ 55

Measures of Effectiveness .................................................... 59

5. The War in Afghanistan, 2002–2004 ................................63

Afghanistan Case Study Analysis .......................................... 64

The Conduct of the War ...................................................... 70

COIN Principles Validated ................................................... 72

6. Conclusion ......................................................................81
iv

Appendix A. Principles, Axioms & Rules .............................87

Principles for Successful Insurgencies .................................. 87

Principles for Successful COIN Operations .......................... 90

Appendix B. Acronyms ........................................................97

Appendix C. Definitions ....................................................101

References .........................................................................107

Additional Reading ............................................................111

About the Author ...............................................................113
v

Foreword

The doctrine for strategy and campaign planning has been well 

established in the military literature, but the focus has been 

on conventional war fighting—decisive combat with large formations to seize terrain and destroy enemy units. Since the Soviets have faded from the scene and Desert Storm is now a distant 

memory, the area of operations has become the “human terrain” of 

insurgency, guerrilla war, and terrorism. 

In this paper, Colonel Joseph D. Celeski, U.S. Army, Retired, 

provides his thoughts on how we might think about, plan and conduct operations in the new threat environment of “Terro-Insurgency.” In this environment insurgents are joined by various terrorists, 

drug traffickers and other criminals to create what he calls the “Gray 

Stew” mix that confronts us today in Afghanistan and elsewhere. 

Based on his understanding of the new environment, Colonel Celeski posits a theory of counterinsurgency (COIN) and suggests techniques for developing the COIN plan and executing it employing special operations forces. He reinforces his concepts concerning COIN 

with a review of the war in Afghanistan. 

This paper is important because it reflects the experiences and 

thoughts of a recent special operations commander who dealt with 

the exigencies of COIN combat every day on the battlefield. Through 

a former 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) commander and twotime commander of the Combined Joint Special Operations Task 

Force-Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A), the reader, too, can gain a sense of 

urgency for improving our COIN strategy and doctrine and enhancing our abilities for “Operationalizing COIN.” 

Lieutenant Colonel Michael C. McMahon, U.S. Air Force

Director, Strategic Studies Department

September 2005

1

Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

Introduction

The prevailing form of irregular warfare confronting us today 

is unconventional in nature—insurgency often combined with 

terrorism. The effects of globalization, modernity, and economic interconnectedness create stresses on developing, undeveloped, and underdeveloped societies, often with costly repercussions 

to the world’s major powers. Across the globe, zones of instability 

exist where the aggregation of factors such as frustrated youth, religious zealots, and poverty provide a fertile ground for the recruitment of future insurgents who blame modernity for their social ills. 

Insurgency, terrorism and guerrilla 

war are the manifestations of weak actors 

choosing asymmetric strategies against 

strong actors. Combining these three 

means to an end is the deadliest of options 

weak actors may choose. In ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we are already cast in the role of counterinsurgents 

against this congruence of actors. In prior decades, we confronted 

manifestations of communist ideology and often became embroiled 

in insurgencies either through direct intervention or through proxy 

wars with surrogates. 

Continued Involvement

The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and the charter to promote liberty and freedom as part of our national policy will predictably mean 

confrontation with those who are opposed to our national strategy. 

We should expect to see our continued involvement in insurgencies, 

including those of a transnational nature. The problem is immutably 

asymmetric in nature. Correlation of forces will not work, massive 

firepower will not overwhelm the enemy, and conventional tactics 

will need to be tailored to adapt and fight within the exigencies of the 

environment. The enemy is characterized by insurgents, guerrillas, 

and terrorists. One can even throw in the criminal or drug lord who 

Insurgency, terrorism 

and guerrilla war are 

the manifestations of 

weak actors choosing 

asymmetric strategies 

against strong actors.
2

 JSOU Report 05-2

survives within this environment in a symbiotic relationship with the 

irregular warfare enemies.

Shifting our national security focus from the conventional mode 

of war into increasing involvement with the unconventional (small 

wars and irregular warfare) will require increased prominence given 

to the art of COIN. While a preponderance of theory and literature 

exists on insurgency, counterinsurgency theory and art has been a 

neglected subject and an underdeveloped area in the U.S. military 

arena. New joint doctrine in the form of JCS Draft Publication 3-0, 

Joint Operations, will introduce terminology such as the range of 

military operations (ROMO) to capture the notion that insurgency 

is a form of war, rather than a military operation other than war 

(MOOTW). This is important as we are now decisively engaged in 

combating insurgency in several areas of the globe. 

Today we find clear examples of a partnership between insurgents and terrorists in 

Afghanistan, Iraq, and in the Philippines. In the 

case of Iraq, it is difficult to ascertain the exact nature of the insurgency because no clearly 

defined head organization seems to be running 

it; there appear to be loosely netted pockets of 

insurgents and terrorists who join together when 

conditions are beneficial, then rapidly separate. 

In some aspects, this blending of the threat becomes more insidious in nature when additional partners join, such 

as we have seen in Afghanistan. Added to the mix today there are 

tribal warlords, regional drug lords and transnational criminals. 

This is a vicious and dangerous brew, which I label as “Gray Stew” 

for the sake of discussion.

In prior times, the remedies were fairly clear for combating insurgents. Tried and proven principles of COIN worked and were validated over and over again, given patience on the part of the practitioner 

to apply them. However, this required a different form of warrior than 

the counterterrorist warrior in action today. Combat advisors, light 

infantry units, and practitioners of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) 

were the considered experts in this arena. Experts of COIN agreed 

that attrition and force-on-force strategies alone could not work. 

Today we find 

clear examples of 

a partnership between insurgents 

and terrorists 

in Afghanistan, 

Iraq, and in the 

Philippines.
3

Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

Solving the political and social grievances and winning the “hearts 

and minds” of the populace were very important building blocks towards the strategy of defeating the insurgents and achieving overall 

victory for the oppressed country in question. 

With the new congruence of “gray stew,” classic approaches to 

COIN may no longer guarantee success. This paper suggests some 

solutions for unconventional warriors to help them defeat this new 

style of insurgency. One of those areas will be to “Operationalize 

COIN”—translating the joint commander’s strategy into viable ways 

and means to reach a successful end state. Additionally, it attempts 

to consolidate the collected experiences of counterinsurgents into a 

useful form for military professionals who may fight in the new “gray” 

arena. 

Understanding COIN

To date, the only path to becoming an expert in the field of COIN has 

been an eclectic approach to sampling of various courses in disparate 

schools, reading, self-development, and, possibly on rare occasion, 

having the opportunity to actually participate in a COIN contingency. 

This work is intended to promote an understanding on this form of 

warfare for special operations forces’ (SOF) professionals as well as 

other practitioners of COIN. Techniques for translating the operational art of COIN into a viable campaign are included, along with a 

representative case study of the insurgency in Afghanistan, to assist 

the practitioners of the art in understanding this form of warfare. 

Operationalizing COIN is organized to provide insight about 

emerging terrorist-guerrilla threats, to suggest techniques for planning and operating, and further the understanding of COIN issues 

via a case study. 

Chapter 1, Framing the Requirement

 Explores the need for SOF to conduct unconventional operations in a COIN environment. 

Chapter 2, The Nature of the Threat 

 Explores the changing nature of the new threat—the convergence of nonstate actors, insurgents, guerrillas, and terrorists. 
4

 JSOU Report 05-2

Chapter 3, A Modern Counterinsurgency Theory 

 Describes a theory for COIN warfare, examines previous 

U.S. approaches, and suggests a set of principles by which 

we might operate in the security environment of the 21st 

century. 

Chapter 4, Developing the COIN Campaign 

 Establishes operating principles for campaign planning to 

facilitate translating the operational art of COIN into battlefield effects. 

Chapter 5, The War in Afghanistan 2002-2004

 Provides a case study of lessons about the unconventional warfare environment and the associated challenges for 

COIN professionals. 

Chapter 6, Conclusion

 Provides the author’s concluding remarks.

Appendix A, Principles, Axioms, and Rules

 Consolidates time-honored ideas about insurgency and 

COIN for use by counterinsurgents and COIN campaign 

planners. 

Appendix B, Acronyms

Appendix C, Definitions

As with any research study, a body of established work forms the 

basis of the project. Much of professional military development is in 

the domain of self-learning, and I would recommend at least the following readings for those interested in the art of COIN: 

1. Bard E. O’Neill’s Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern 

Revolutionary Warfare

2. Anthony James Joes’ Resisting Rebellion: History and Politics of Counterinsurgency

3. Robert Taber’s War of the Flea—The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare 

4. John A. Nagl’s Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya 

and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife

5. David Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare—Theory and 

Practice

6. Ted Robert Gurr’s Why Men Rebel 
5

Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

Of course, there are a myriad of other sources, but these 

should certainly serve as the first on the bookshelves of the modern 

counterinsurgent.

As always, it is the duty of counterinsurgents and unconventional warfare professionals to pass the lessons learned of their experiences to the next generation of warriors. As we continue to fight the 

insurgency wars of the 21st century, this work hopefully adds to the 

body of collected lessons.

Joseph D. Celeski

U.S. Army, Retired

Atlanta, Georgia

June 2005

7

Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

1. Framing the Requirement

“This is another type of war new in its intensity, ancient in its origins—war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war 

by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy 

instead of engaging him ... it requires in those situations where 

we must counter it ... a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly 

different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different 

kind of military training.”

– President John F. Kennedy, 1962

I

n the fall of 1944, the British government attempted to restore 

order in the formerly German-occupied Greece. It was clear to 

the nationalist, royalist and communist resistance fighters that 

Great Britain favored restoration of the old monarchy, and thus the 

impetus for an uprising developed among those eager to ensure such 

a thing would not happen. The December 1944 uprising formed the 

launching point for the Greek insurgents and British forces found 

themselves embroiled in the Greek Civil War—one of the first tests of 

Allied democracies’ resolve against Soviet expansion. 

Not recognizing the nature of the insurgency, General Scobie, 

commander of the British forces and the post-war stability government, represented what is often all too common in a counterinsurgency (COIN) fight. General Scobie’s disdain for insurgent and 

guerrilla fighters over regular conventional forces, his lack of COIN 

military training, and an overall misunderstanding of the theoretical 

nature of how to defeat an insurgency led to a protracted insurgency, 

the eventual decline of the British military effort, and their diplomatic withdrawal from the affairs of Greece. Surprisingly, the United 

States stepped in as a willing partner to the fledgling Greek government and chose to conduct a COIN campaign by proxy, buttressed 

with massive aid and military advice, which eventually succeeded 

with the surrender of the insurgent movement in 1949.1

Effort and interest in counterinsurgency within the U.S. military 

peaked during the Vietnam War; but after that experience, the body 
8

 JSOU Report 05-2

of military knowledge pertaining to COIN was virtually excised from 

doctrine and military education in favor of conventional war fighting 

subjects. A form of institutional bias against small and messy wars 

occurred with our ultimately favoring the Powell and Weinburger 

doctrines of massive force conventional operations if use of American military forces were considered. By default, many believed this 

unconventional “art” to be the purview of the U.S. Special Forces 

(Green Berets) and the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and 

School. Even today, an impressive bevy of academics and renowned 

strategists would contend we have no strategy or military theory for 

irregular warfare and one of its branches—COIN. 

USSOCOM and LIC

The very inception of United States Special Operations Command 

(USSOCOM) met the intent of Congress to focus attention on Low 

Intensity Conflict (LIC). This impetus originated in the Reagan military doctrine of the 1980s, designed to counteract the various “proxy 

wars” sponsored by the Soviet Union. One of Reagan’s major policy 

goals for irregular warfare was limiting the involvement of U.S. military forces by designing national special operations forces (SOF) with 

unique unconventional warfare capabilities. 

This bolstering of U.S. SOF would presumably restore the “art” of 

LIC and prepare a select body of officers to become the future Lawrences (reference to Lawrence of Arabia and the Arab Revolt). General Lindsay outlined some of the thought behind the creation of USSOCOM during a January 1989 Low Intensity Conflict Curriculum 

Symposium held by ASD (SO/LIC) and the DIA/DIC at the Army and 

Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict on Langley AFB, Virginia. 

General Lindsay recommended USSOCOM should be the proponent 

for the development of low intensity conflict doctrine. He stated the 

two forces generating the congressional interest in increasing national SOF were primarily to enhance our capabilities in direct action (DA) and counterterrorism (CT), and secondly to enhance our 

capabilities in low intensity conflict.2 Along with the development 

of a congressionally-directed formation of a new unified command, 

USSOCOM, Congress additionally created the Assistant Security of 
9

Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

Defense (ASD) position to oversee its running with a unique charter 

and responsibility for Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC). 

In reality, ASD SO/LIC leads in low intensity conflict responsibilities, which include insurgencies, and USSOCOM was divested of 

COIN as a mission set (although the command retained the core task 

of the Foreign Internal Defense (FID) mission presumably to play a 

trainer and combat advisor role in internal wars characterized as insurgencies). This is changing, however, based on the adoption of USSOCOM’s newly established Ninth Core Task: Synchronization DoD 

efforts in the GWOT3. With insurgency 

and Islamic militancy on the rise and 

increasing as a favored form of warfare 

in the 21st century, many will look to 

the SOF community to provide lead 

and guidance in this form of irregular 

warfare. 

If insurgency and guerrilla war are 

not “conventional,” then they easily fit 

into the category of being “unconventional.” Unconventional is the realm of 

irregular warfare. Special operations professionals have long trained 

for and practiced unconventional warfare in the event this type of 

warfare becomes important to the national interest. The very purpose of SOF is to provide low-key and discrete responses to a set of 

unique circumstances not appropriate for larger conventional forces. 

Ross S. Kelly captured the essence of this role for SOF in his book 

Special Operations and National Purpose:

“Special operations in the generic sense address a 

spectrum of challenges not normally considered 

appropriate for regular armed military or national 

forces. Nations facing threats by terrorists and/or 

insurgents have felt the need to develop specialized capabilities targeted against these threats. Nations with more complex interests and commitments 

(such as the United States, Great Britain, France 

and the Soviet Union) have seen special operations 

in the guerrilla-counter-guerrilla, mobile training 

With insurgency and Islamic 

militancy on the rise and 

increasing as a favored form 

of warfare in the 21st Century, many will look to the 

SOF community to provide 

the lead and guidance in 

this form of irregular warfare challenge. 
10

 JSOU Report 05-2

team, and strategic reconnaissance roles as offering 

minimum-escalation options in a variety of politically sensitive situations. In all cases, special operations constitute specific missions or tasks, involving individual risks, to meet specific situations that 

threaten national interests but that do not warrant 

commitment of general purpose forces.” 4

Developing the COIN Capability

As we have seen over the last three decades, and predictably will 

see in the next several decades, insurgency as a form of warfare has 

been more prevalent than main force, conventional conflicts. Special 

operators are being called upon more and more for their expertise 

in this arena and thus it becomes imperative to explore the theoretical underpinning of COIN and conversely insurgent strategies to 

enhance the application of its “art” amongst the USSOCOM community. Special Forces (SF) are considered to be the Army’s experts on 

guerrilla warfare in conflict and experts in advisory assistance and 

Foreign Internal Defense (FID) during peacetime engagement. Combined with Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) 

units and their doctrinal underpinning of the Unconventional Warfare (UW) mission set, they also will be considered as the most capable COIN, counter-guerrilla warfare, and counter-terrorist assets 

in a joint COIN campaign effort. Other elements of SOF will fight at 

the congruence of terrorists and insurgents and conduct counterterrorist (CT) missions in a form of nodal warfare where this nexus 

occurs. 

Why shoulder the responsibility? Dr. Steven Metz posed this question by exploring “strategic rationale” for COIN requirements in his 

28 February 1995 paper on “Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the 

Phoenix of American Capability,” published by the Strategic Studies 

Institute, U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 

Dr. Metz’s theory explored the hypothesis for why the U.S. military 

has never been serious on the formulation of COIN theory and education. He concluded this deficiency in a form of military operational 

art exists because the “strategic rationale” for it has barely existed 
11

Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

since the days of the Vietnam War, excluding some small forays into 

COIN operations in El Salvador and in Columbia.5

However, the elevation of terrorism to a global, strategic war by 

the U.S. Government should be the impetus for developing a more 

robust COIN capability as a newly emerging strategic rationale—the 

global fight between the Islamic extremists with their global Jihad 

against modernity and the western world. The 

insidiousness and danger of this “global insurgency” has put American society and values at 

their highest risk than ever before. The survival and protection of the American people is 

the “strategic rationale” for resurrecting and 

developing a unique American COIN theory for 

the 21st century and its associated doctrinal 

application by the military. The GWOT charter given to USSOCOM is forcing special operators to shoulder the 

responsibilities of becoming more and more the practitioners and 

strategists of this 21st century style of COIN.

Who is responsible for the collection of the aggregate experiences and lessons learned in the American way of war with respect to 

COIN? The capturing of the philosophical and theoretical nature of 

fighting is one of the many functions of our assorted war colleges and 

military staff colleges. Combined with service doctrinal centers and 

joint centers for lessons learned, much could be explored and synthesized on the subject of COIN. And yet, one still finds it difficult to 

pin the rose on the one center or one service with overall primary responsibility as the dedicated agent for synthesizing all of the material 

on this subject. COIN is a land-centric endeavor and the U.S. Army 

is the executive agent for the development of doctrine for COIN operations. The United States Marine Corps (USMC), recognizing a long 

history of fighting in small wars of punitive raids or interventions 

which have often included counterinsurgency, developed its famous 

Small Wars manual (recently revised and updated). The USSOCOM 

community embodies a significant slice of the learned lessons of insurgency and counterinsurgency with organic capabilities and units 

with demonstrated skill in unconventional and asymmetric expertise 

required to fight insurgents and terrorists. USSOCOM is also the 

The insidiousness 

and danger of 

this “global insurgency” has put 

American society 

and values at their 

highest risk ...
12

 JSOU Report 05-2

lead agent for development of tactics, techniques and procedures 

(TTP) for foreign internal defense operations. USSOCOM should take 

the lead to develop an overall U.S. military doctrine and theory on 

COIN under its wider umbrella as the lead for GWOT.

Several works exist on insurgency and counterinsurgency along 

with their associated case studies and allow the unconventional 

warrior to develop a theoretical framework for an operational art of 

this unique form of warfare. As we turned the century, however, a 

convergence of factors is changing our view of the nature of an insurgency. There is a new asymmetry in insurgency with the added 

dimension of ideological warfare and the nexus of terrorist organizations with insurgents which may increase the chances of success for 

insurgents never seen before. This new form of unconventional war 

may last for decades. Understanding this evolvement will be imperative to strategists, theorists and practitioners to get the “counter” 

portions of their operational and tactical efforts correct. We cannot 

afford to incorrectly analyze modern insurgencies before developing 

appropriate COIN strategies and forming tailored COIN military formations or we may have similar experiences like the British effort in 

post-war Greece. 

COIN fits in the context of unconventional warfare by the simple 

premise that it is not “conventional” warfare. In and of itself, it is a 

limited war and can fit within the USMC’s rubric of being a type of 

“small war.” It is also a low intensity conflict. What is important to 

get right, however, is it being unconventional (nonconventional) as we 

develop a theory of war for how we are going to fight in the 21st century. To correctly develop and espouse a 21st century COIN theory, we 

must stay focused on the nature of the environment, i.e., unconventional, in order to clearly set it apart from conventional war fighting. 

This clarification provides the roadmap for training unconventional 

warriors with the same fervor as we have trained conventional warriors to date. 

An additional challenge will be to train future militaries for the 

mix of conventional and unconventional aspects proffered by this 

form of warfare. On the one hand we will always need generalists 

and conventional warriors who have a modicum of understanding 

of irregular and unconventional warfare, while on the other hand 
13

Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

needing many more specialists who can be the “go to” experts and 

future commanders in the application of this art. We may also need 

to develop additional COIN forces to fight asymmetric war. 

SOF doctrinally provide a joint commander with an economy 

of force option, a force multiplier option, and a specialized mission 

(high risk) force within the context of larger military operations, but 

in and of themselves have not been used as the primary lead organization for COIN due to lack of robustness in their organizational 

strength and limited logistics (USSOCOM is not the executive agent 

for COIN). 

SOF can expect to be actively employed in COIN operations for 

doctrinal reasons alone. Some of the doctrinal U.S. responses to assisting a nation plagued with insurgency are the options to provide 

indirect support such as security assistance (SA) and military exercises, direct support such as advisory training and assistance, or 

combat operations involving U.S. forces. These actions are collectively known as U.S. FID efforts designed to support a host nation’s program of Internal Defense and Development (IDAD). Joint Publication 

3-07.1 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID), promulgated by USSOCOM, defines FID as: “FID 

is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government 

in any of the action programs taken by another government or other 

designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.”6

 FID activities include military 

assistance as one of the measures to provide security within the 

IDAD and COIN environments. Of relevance is this doctrine is currently the standing procedure for how we will conduct COIN; there is 

no other joint doctrine specifically for COIN.

Joint Publication 3-07.1 focuses almost exclusively on IDAD to 

the host nation to protect itself against internal threats, including insurgency. The elements of national power—the Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic model (DIME)—provide the mediums 

for application. The doctrine for FID TTP highly prescribes the use of 

the military aspect of American power focused and directed at supporting the internal host nation executing the IDAD program (and 

cautions against becoming focused on the COIN campaign itself). 

However, the manual does not go far enough to address what our ac-
14

 JSOU Report 05-2

tions might be if we are the ones primarily fighting the COIN effort, 

as we have found ourselves in Afghanistan and Iraq. SOF is highly 

touted as the premier force of choice for FID and UW, with Theater 

Special Operations Commands (TSOC) integral in leading the efforts to assist countries in their IDAD programs. Conventional forces 

should be used as a last resort. The doctrine defines the primary role 

of a U.S. sponsored Joint Task Force (JTF) as force protection and 

defensive missions, rather than offensive COIN and counter-guerrilla 

operations. There is some attempt to provide a template for analyzing insurgencies and an appendix for COIN planning, but overall the 

doctrine is dated when held up to the light of today’s enemy and still 

does not serve as COIN doctrine when the U.S. leads the effort. 

Although the U.S. Army is currently the lead agent for the development of the COIN mission and doctrine, USSOCOM inherently will 

participate in future COIN operations, primarily in a FID role (when 

not in direct combat operations). In recognition of its overall importance, FID is one of the core missions of SOF. 

Foreign Internal 

Defense (FID). FID is 

participation by civilian 

and military agencies of a 

government in any of the 

action programs taken by 

another government to 

free and protect its society 

from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. SOF’s 

primary contribution in this 

interagency activity is to 

organize, train, advise, and 

assist host nation military 

and paramilitary forces. The generic capabilities required for FID include: instructional skills; foreign language proficiency; area and cultural orientation; tactical 

skills; advanced medical skills; rudimentary construction and engineering skills; 

familiarity with a wide variety of demolitions, weapons, weapon systems, and communications equipment; and basic PSYOP and CA skills. (SOF Reference Manual—

Photo courtesy of the United States Army Special Forces Command)
15

Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

FID strategies rely heavily on the capability of SOF to train host 

nation forces, provide CA assets to assist in humanitarian and civic 

assistance, and provide PSYOP forces to assist the host nation win 

the war of ideas against the insurgents. The historical involvement 

of SOF was focused on the COIN aspect of FID, and all indications 

are this will continue to remain the focus of FID operations into the 

early 21st century.

As we turn the corner into the 21st century, we find our enemies 

increasing in their choice of the employment of insurgency as a form 

of asymmetric warfare. If this trend by our enemies continues, a 

commensurate measure may necessarily follow to readjust our strategies, doctrine, and military formations to meet these threats. Case 

studies abound on how to successfully conduct counterinsurgency 

and counter-guerrilla operations but, for the most part, these are 

drawn from the unique environments they were fought in during the 

19th and 20th centuries. Will these proven principles of the past work 

when brought forward and used in the 21st century? We are clearly 

seeing a new dynamic affecting these modern struggles. What worked 

over the last 200 years may not necessarily work in the messy world 

of today. A comprehensive reexamination of the old tactics synthesized with what we are experiencing today should be the most important task of serious military academics and scholars. Once someone 

writes it, the resulting new theoretical piece on COIN and its translation into an operational art form could clearly transform our way of 

fighting and serve as a bridging piece relevant to the 21st century. 

Publishing a new theoretical work on an emerging way of war 

will have its challenges. The new theory must capture the dynamic 

changes occurring in the practical application of LIC; the fact that 

terrorists and insurgents have joined forces together to further their 

goals and aspirations in a form of ideological warfare.

The problem for practitioners of COIN and CT is to correctly analyze this emerging trend and develop new methodologies in combating them. This paper seeks to contribute toward emerging COIN 

theory and doctrine that will address the terrorism and insurgency 

threats. The following chapter reviews the nature of those threats so 

that we can consider a COIN theory. 

17

Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

2. The Nature of the Threat

“Across the world, in the tropical jungles of Burma, another 

group of people inhabits a parallel reality as palpable as that of 

the compas in El Salvador. For their vision of life, these guerrillas 

look not so much to a fresh, untested future as to an idealized 

past, comfortable and snug with nostalgia. Ethnically distinct 

from their enemies, in their war they exalt their own cultural 

identity in an attempt to stave off assimilation. Here, there are 

no ‘hearts and minds’ to be won.”7

John Lee Anderson on the Karen’s Guerrilla war 

(from his book, Guerrillas: Journeys in the Insurgent World)

A new view of the GWOT is warranted given the convergence of 

terrorist groups with insurgent groups and criminality. What’s 

different about the threat? If we have elevated combating terrorism to a global effort, then certainly it is because the terrorists 

have transcended in our eyes to a 

much more significant threat with 

capabilities we have not seen before. The blending of terrorism with 

guerrillas and insurgents manifests 

itself in an exceedingly dangerous 

form of increasingly brutal acts of 

terror; in the past, guerrillas and 

insurgents at least understood 

some conventions of the rules of 

war when applying violence. 

Guerrilla warfare’s military objectives were previously focused on 

the state-sponsored forms of authority symbolized in the state’s security forces, i.e., police forces, militia, army, etc. and state centers 

of economic gravity and political power. Terrorists do not have the 

same focus. The purpose of terrorism is extreme violence to get the 

actors to change their political outcomes in favor of the terrorists. 

Actors include civilians with the capacity to participate in the political process. Today, with the convergence of terrorists and guerrilThe blending of terrorism with 

guerrillas and insurgents manifests itself in an exceedingly 

dangerous form of increasingly 

brutal acts of terror; in the past, 

guerrillas and insurgents at 

least understood some conventions of the rules of war when 

applying violence.
18

 JSOU Report 05-2

las, the distinction between violence directed at combatants versus 

noncombatants is virtually erased, and civilians are now targeted 

by guerrillas in acts of terror elevating the tactical level of war to the 

strategic level of war (transnational and global affecting the political 

actions of major nation states). 

Extremist Islamic Insurgents

The insurgents we predominantly face in the GWOT are militant and 

extremist Islamic warriors and present a unique irregular warfare 

challenge. They are persistent in their strategy to gain power and 

practice a form of protracted warfare by teaching and educating new 

generations of militants to continue the struggle. They do not follow 

or practice international rules of law or war. They exist both locally 

and globally and are characterized by their adaptiveness and malleability. They can migrate and regenerate if defeated in one area. Their 

capability to conduct franchise operations makes them even more 

insidious. They practice a form of netwar: flat and linear organizations, autonomous and highly decentralized oftentimes not needing 

traditional hierarchical command relationships. They cooperate between groups with similar interests and work together when mutual 

benefit can be achieved. Attrition theories will not work against this 

type of threat. 

It may be characterized as a global insurgency. An ongoing revolution is occurring by this new form of enemy against traditionally 

formed governments and nation states with the object of replacing 

the power structures of those nations who promote modernity and 

globalization, secular institutions, and for those who aid, abet, and 

support Israel. Their ultimate goal is an alternate, Islamic state, and 

they are driven by the engine of power and control. They are not 

afraid to use religion as an element of power. They are willing to use 

terror and intimidation of the populace to gain allegiance (no ‘hearts 

and minds’ at work here) and may ultimately transform themselves 

into political parties to eventually take over and influence the outcomes of the state (similar to Hamas in Lebanon and the Palestinian 

Territories). 

Taliban insurgents are aligned with Al Qaeda and drug lords; 

communist insurgents of the Abu Sayf in the Philippines have be-
19

Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

come aligned with Al Qaeda and the Sunni Muslim Army insurgents 

in Iraq are aligned with Jihadists under the control of Al Qaeda operatives and fed and supported with black market money from criminal 

actions. This convergence challenge was described by the former CIA 

Director George Tenet as the “Gray World” in Newt Gingrich’s book, 

Winning the Future:

“Even small terrorists organizations can have global reach through the global criminal system of the 

Gray World: illegal narcotics and drug-dealing, illegal transportation across borders, international 

arms dealers, traditional international crime, and 

people smuggling.”8

What is overwhelmingly obvious is that these nonassociated actors have converged, morphed and transformed to conduct nodal or 

nexus operations, often driven by similar motivations. This nexus 

forms a dangerous hybrid enemy—a “gray stew” brew - and provide 

COIN operators the significant challenge of defeating an “eclectic” 

insurgency. 

This hybrid enemy consists of nonhierarchical actors who pick 

and choose their targets and conduct operations via networking with 

other terrorist and insurgent cells and bodies. Insurgencies are devolving down to tribal and clan levels with very loose organizational 

The nexus and 

convergence of 

insurgents, guerrilas, terrorists 

and criminality 

(financing from 

drugs, smuggling, 

etc.) forms a 

dangerous brew 

of “gray stew” 

opponents for 

counterinsurgents. 

(Photo courtesy 

of CJSOTF

-Afghanistan)
20

 JSOU Report 05-2

structures. Convergence of operations for these types of insurgents 

includes “accomplices” rather than traditional allies. 

Terro-Guerrilla Insurgencies

Another significant trait of modern terro-guerrilla (terrorists-guerrilla cooperation) insurgencies is their modus operandi. Between World 

War II and the end of the last century, most insurgencies followed 

one of three models in terms of their strategies: 

– the people’s revolutionary war model as espoused by Mao 

Tse Tung, 

– the urban insurgency as espoused by Carlos Marighella, or

– the foco-military style insurgency as espoused and practiced by Che Geuvara and Castro. 

Modern insurgencies in this century seem to have “cut to the 

chase” and are not concerned with the mass mobilization and political aspects of the classic people’s war. The foco-military style insurgency has been adopted by the militants in Iraq and clearly was 

the operating methodology of the Taliban (although the case can be 

made that all of these Islamic radical-sponsored insurgencies are 

Maoist in principle based on their phasing and protracted nature). 

Terro-guerrilla warfare type insurgencies pose extreme dilemmas 

to counterinsurgents. A combination of factors may confront the 

counterinsurgent and represent an asymmetric form of war so problematic that it becomes nonwinnable. For instance, the congruence 

of terrorists like Al Qaeda operating with insurgents gives a form of 

legality to their actions—the terrorists can now become fighters in a 

“Jihadi” army and thus may demand protections as combatants under international law. Conversely, guerrillas are now becoming more 

terrorist-like. Where they previously used acts of terror and sabotage as tactical tools, aimed at the government’s security apparatus, 

today’s guerrillas are emboldened by their association with terrorists 

and conduct terrorism as an operational and strategic level action. 

In its most lethal form, the trend to include noncombatants as viable 

targets has become increasingly the insurgents’ preferred form of ensuring they have the will of the people, albeit through intimidation.
21

Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

The purpose of insurgents choosing terror as a means-to-an-end 

was formerly considered a way of gaining recognition, seeking support from the populace, and gaining acceptance politically or diplomatically. Thus, it was not pure terror for terror’s sake. In this 

challenging new form of insurgency, acts of pure terror can be fueled merely by a religious dogma which seeks an alternate and parallel world, punishes so-called idolaters, rewards martyrdom, and 

attempts to eliminate politics altogether (although establishing a 

theocracy has its own political connotations). The well-recognized insurgency and counterinsurgency author, Ian Beckett, calls these insurgents “ideological warriors” (a most appropriate nom de guerre) in 

his work Modern Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: Guerrillas 

and Their Opponents Since 1750 (Routledge, 2001). The challenge 

for counterinsurgents is recognizing the form of power or politics 

insurgents are attempting to achieve with various brands of terrorist 

acts found in this type of insurgency. 

The metaphorical “sea” in which the guerrillas swim has also 

changed. For counterinsurgents, “hearts and minds” techniques to 

keep the sea may no longer apply. It is far easier to terrorize and intimidate the populace in order to change the politics than it is to gain 

their support. Insurgents and terrorists have moved to a networked 

and loosely connected support base of clan, tribal, and ethnic communities throughout the world which more closely resembles a set 

of interlocking lakes or an archipelago, than a “sea.” Refugee movements and ethnic diasporas are the highest contributors, financially, 

materially, and manpower-wise, to these insurgent movements. The 

transparency of the populace to separate the fish becomes increasingly difficult when modern insurgents are conducting a very MacArthur-like campaign of “island-hopping.” Sanctuary, previously based 

on territory, is also moving to the Internet, which will pose its own 

problems for counterinsurgents to counteract. Mark Baillie describes 

this phenomenon in a paper written for the Center for Defence and 

International Security Studies, titled “Islamist Terrorism: A Primer”:

“It is already too late for us because the condition 

for successful guerrilla or terrorist warfare is not 

just volunteers or money, but a social environment 

of useful tools and fellow-travelers: volunteers are 
22

 JSOU Report 05-2

easy enough to find, however, made your cause, and 

money can simply be stolen or extorted (...the Bader-Meinhof gang, the IRA) if you do not have a rich 

backer. What you need above all is an informal network of normal civilians, friends of friends or relatives, who will give you a bed, lend you a car, buy 

you a meal, give you a temporary job or let you use 

their telephone without asking too many questions. 

Western Europe is attractive in this respect for AlQaeda. This is similar to what Mao meant by ‘...the 

relationship that should exist between the people 

and the troops. The former may be likened to water 

the latter to the fish who inhabit it.’ Mao advocated 

integration with and full support from the population but even without that full cooperation a community can be used as camouflage.” 9

A new support base for terro-guerrillas is emerging at the ultranational level. Insurgents and terrorists can now swim in a variety 

of United Nations (UN) and international aid organizations. Refugee 

camps are becoming notorious for breeding and recruitment areas 

for modern insurgents. International humanitarian organizations, 

private humanitarian organizations, and nongovernmental humanitarian organizations (lOs, PVOs, and NGOs) may be unwittingly providing sanctuary and resources to the enemy.

The classic strategy for counterinsurgents confronted with Maoist-style insurgencies was to attack the strengths held by the insurgents of revolutionary war: time, space and will. This quintessential 

operational art may no longer work. In terror-guerrilla warfare fueled 

by Islamic-radical fundamentalism, insurgents are guided by the Koran and by the rhetoric of radicals, not by any known principles of 

insurgent warfare doctrine. Their will to succeed is strengthened by 

this religious dogma. 

The New Radicalism

Clearly the number one motivator contributing to today’s rise in terrorists, insurgents and guerrilla factions is that of religious ideol-
23

Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

ogy. Without a doubt, the number of radical Islamic militants has 

risen steadily since the 1970s, in part motivated by the successful 

revolution of the clerics in Iran. Originally recognized as a rise in a 

return to a more fundamentalist Islam, a shift has occurred from the 

early political objectives of this 

movement to one of more radical 

and increasingly dangerous actions, indicating a shift from the 

political to the purely ideological. 

This new brand of “Islamicism” 

has been labeled “Islamo-facist” 

by the pundits. The impact raises the realm of activity from the 

tactical level to the strategic level 

of concern because it portends 

a spread of this virulent form of 

religion beyond the sovereignty 

of recognized borders. In fact, it 

has its roots in earlier forms of communist revolutionary theory, specifically the precept of “mass mobilization” of the populace. 

Radical and Jihadist Islamicism can transcend borders with the 

potential capability for impact on a global scale. Previous COIN and 

CT strategists could depend on identifying the political causes and 

motivators of the enemy and develop proportional measures to ensure their defeat. Getting at the root causes of an ideological form of 

warfare becomes more challenging, but, can be analyzed for potential counter-motivation techniques.

There are several root causes for the rise in this radicalism. The 

after-effects of World War II created the decay of the colonial system 

of the major powers. With the rise of newly independent nations created throughout the Middle East, came the concurrent rise in the 

struggle to create Arab nationalism. Westernization would be rejected since it symbolized the colonization of several of the Arab countries. Socialism and Marxism were more attractive alternatives to 

these nascent states because their tenets seemed to be more in line 

with Islamic thought. Once communism collapsed and many of these 

states lost their benefactors, socialism continued to be a panacea. 

Previously, counterinsurgency 

and counter-terrorists strategists 

could depend on identifying 

the political causes and motivators of the enemy and develop 

proportional measures to ensure 

their defeat. Getting at the root 

causes of an ideological form of 

warfare becomes more challenging, but none-the-less, can be 

analyzed for potential countermotivation techniques.
24

 JSOU Report 05-2

This gave rise to several socialist-nationalist movements such as the 

Baathist party in Syria and Iraq. Egypt also marched on the path of 

socialism. Of particular note, these were Sunni-dominated endeavors. Saudi Arabia, a Sunni-dominant country, saw the need to balance the rising power of the Egyptian movement and began a series 

of programs to counter any dominance they would gain. Financed by 

their oil boom, Saudi Arabia began the push to export their Wahabbist version of Islam to many of their neighbors. As Arab socialism 

failed to alleviate the political and social grievances of their populace, 

a return to fundamentalist Islam, as espoused by Wahhabism, crept 

into the daily lives of the religious as the only answer to addressing 

modernity—thus, not only was westernization rejected, but also socialism and Marxism. 

It did not take long to find the answer in the glorious past of 

Islam during the golden ages of the caliphs. The Islamic caliphate 

system represented the purest form of governance over the ulemma (the body of Islamic populace). Power resided in one man who 

ruled benevolently over people in strict accordance with the Islamic 

faith—religion and government were inseparable. Islam thrived and 

bloomed under this system, and it is clear to see why it is becoming 

attractive as an alternative to today’s corrupt governments. We can 

see the manifestations of this thought in the choosing of Omar in Afghanistan to be the Emir Il Manoofeen, ruler of all the Islamic people, 

as a throwback to the title of the Caliphs and in the manifestos written and spoken by Osama Bin Laden when he calls for a return to 

the Caliphate system to rule the world.

 The Taliban accomplished the takeover 

of Afghanistan using a foco-military type 

insurgency method; it was not imperative they gain support of the populace as 

a first measure. They attempted to first install a fundamentalist theocracy based on 

a traditionalist form of the Golden Caliphate, and anticipated the populace would 

later support their efforts. They joined 

with Al Qaeda to further their cause. 

(Photo courtesy of CJSOTF-Afghanistan.)
25

Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

The concept of Jihad has become increasingly radicalized and its 

verbiage captured and twisted by today’s enemies. It comes from the 

root Arabic trilateral stem of J-H-D, also pronounced as “Jahada,” 

meaning to strive and endeavor. Its second meaning is to conduct 

war to defend one’s lands, religion, or way of life.10 There is debate 

on the meanings of “greater” and “lesser” Jihad amongst secular and 

religious intellectuals. Some attribute these modifiers to Mohammed 

(the Prophet) speaking upon his return from conducting war. (His 

“sayings” have been captured in the Hadith, the other holy work 

used along with the Koran.) Mohammed alluded to his return to the 

“greater” Jihad, now that he completed the “lesser” Jihad. For many, 

the greater Jihad was the struggle to improve one’s self. Fasco-Islamics claim this interpretation of the use of these identifiers for 

Jihad as false writings, and that the “greater” Jihad is to conduct 

war against one’s enemies. Thus, we see the recent rise in the call 

to Jihad to symbolize a time to conduct war against the enemies of 

Islam and the growth in militancy. Fighting and terrorism are now 

sanctioned within the context of religion. This is a powerful motivator and illustrates the use of religion as an element of power.

“Today’s global Jihadi movements, from the Taliban 

in Afghanistan to Osama Bin Laden’s worldwide Al 

Qaeda to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), 

ignore the greater Jihad advocated by The Prophet 

and adopt the lesser jihad as a complete political 

and social philosophy. Yet nowhere in Muslim writings or tradition does jihad sanction the killing of 

innocent non-Muslim men, women, and children, or 

even fellow Muslims, on the basis of ethnicity, sect, 

or belief. It is this perversion of Jihad—as a justification to slaughter the innocent—which in part 

defines the radical new fundamentalism of today’s 

most extremist Islamic movements.”11

The beacon for Jihadists in recent decades was the war against 

the Soviets in Afghanistan. Based on the success of the Mujahadeen to drive out the invaders, a romantic and mythic aura now 

surrounds the endeavor. The ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict and 
26

 JSOU Report 05-2

its never-ending dispute continues to be a large contributor to the 

radicalization of Muslim freedom fighters today. 

Religious ideology is shaped primarily from the writings and 

thought of its adherents. A contributing factor to radical Islam and 

its rising militancy comes from three key Islamic theologians: Ibn 

Taymiyya, Sayyid Qutb, and Al Mauddudi. These works have become 

the cornerstone of religious indoctrination for new recruits. Osama 

Bin Laden espouses their thoughts and writings and ensures that 

Al Qaeda operatives teach these to new recruits. An understanding 

of these works is one of the most important intellectual studies for 

counterterrorist and counterinsurgency students—know your enemy and what motivates him! Walter Laquer has published one of 

the best compendiums of writings and manifestos by terrorists and 

Islamic radicals in his work Voices of Terror (Reed Press: New York, 

NY, 2004).

Counterinsurgents will now require more than political will to 

defeat these types of insurgents; counterinsurgents may require an 

ideological will that may have to last them decades. Certainly insurgents in their current form, the “gray stew” may prove that they can 

outlast the will of democracies. 

Why do Islamo-Fascists choose to adopt a terro-guerrilla style 

insurgency as a means to an end? Insurgency is an asymmetric form 

of warfare, conducted in an unconventional warfare environment. 

Insurgencies do succeed as shown by examples in the last century—

against the French in Algeria, the United States in Vietnam, and the 

British in Palestine. (Success is defined as the eventual overthrow 

of the government and its replacement by the insurgent movement 

and cause. Success is also defined as insurgents gaining conciliation 

from the government more favorable to their cause than prior to the 

insurgency.) Modern insurgents can increase their chances of success in a newer form asymmetry when they cooperate and network 

with terrorists and transnational criminals, on a global scale, within 

the context of an ideology which no longer requires the will of the 

people.
27

Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

Adapting COIN to the “Gray Stew”

There are no new and profound measures to be taken here for 

counterinsurgents, and no unique idea is presented to solve this 

dilemma posed by the enemy I described as “gray stew.” However, 

COIN operational art must adapt and change as the threat changes. 

Blending a form of transnational COIN techniques with international 

and internal law enforcement measures may be the best method for 

defeating “gray stew.” Clearly, a robust intelligence capability shared 

across friendly nations is desirable. 

A new style of “hearts and minds” campaigns will have to be 

developed for application within ethnic communities. Support and 

funding to secure marriages, buy homes, and provide a system of job 

security and education are important ethnic, tribal, clan and family 

values and for a relatively small investment, would neutralize the 

message of the insurgents and disrupt their recruiting systems. Separating the guerrillas from the people might require “taking a back 

seat” to first separating the insurgents from terrorist organizations 

who may be helping to further 

their cause.

Military operations will shift 

to a form of nodal warfare to 

counteract the nexus of insurgents, terrorists and criminals 

who combine assets to conduct 

operations when they are favorable to all of them, then disperse. Intelligence preparation 

of the environment at the operational level and intelligence 

preparation of the battlefield 

at the tactical level will shift 

from the old model developed 

for force-on-force fights, to one 

more consistent with law enforcement and detective work against criminal organizations and 

gangs—link diagramming and ethnic/cultural demographic studies. 

Military operations will shift to a 

form of nodal warfare to counteract the nexus of insurgents, 

terrorists and criminals who 

combine assets to conduct operations when they are favorable to 

all of them, then disperse. Intelligence preparation ... will shift 

from the old model developed for 

force-on-force fights, to one more 

consistent with law enforcement 

and detective work against criminal organizations and gangs—link 

diagramming and ethnic/cultural 

demographic studies. 
28

 JSOU Report 05-2

At the tactical level, the terro-guerrilla insurgents still operate much as guerrillas have always operated—light infantry, small 

arms, surprise attacks of ambush, hit-and-run, etc. Suicide bombers are merely substitutes for insurgent mortars, artillery and aircraft which they do not own. Suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) provide the insurgents a commensurate form 

of precision weapons to use against the counterinsurgent. Effective 

force protection measures can go a long way to nullify their effects. 

Contemporary methods and procedures of counter-guerrilla tactics 

and counterterrorism techniques are still useful, once adapted to 

the new threat. An interesting new work on the subject is John H. 

Poole’s Tactics of the Crescent Moon—Militant Muslim Combat Methods (Posterity Press, 2004). Additional works of value to the modern 

counterinsurgent practitioner are Gilles Kepel’s Jihad—The Trail of 

Political Islam (Press 2002) (it is eventually all about political power 

as the final goal) and T. P. Schwartz-Barcott’s work on the form of Islamic warfare style, War, Terror and Peace in the Qur’an and in Islam: 

Insights for Military & Government Leaders (Press 2004).

Police work, intelligence, and law enforcement measures focused 

on the new threat will assist in isolating the insurgents, their support systems, and deterring new recruits. Measures could be taken 

to hack, penetrate, and disrupt the computer sites and chat rooms 

utilized by the insurgents. Other measures which could be taken 

would range from deportation of suspected insurgents as a disruption tool to assimilation as a co-option tool to neutralize the insurgent 

sanctuary. Immigration controls and measures can be tightened to 

ensure the movement of insurgent supporters between “archipelagos’ is halted. The international community, in consort with the UN, 

must pay closer attention to the internal dynamics going on within 

refugee movements and camps to prevent the recruitment of insurgent manpower. Finally, moderate and secular religious leaders can 

contribute in turning around the radical rhetoric espoused by the 

insurgents. 

Understanding the nature of the threat is vital to the correct 

analysis of an insurgency. Counterinsurgents develop appropriate 

strategies and campaigns with respect to the situational and environmental factors they find before them. “Know your enemy” is a 
29

Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

time honored dictum relevant to the operational art of COIN and 

ensures a greater rate of success when the practitioners of the art 

formulate countermeasures. 

The threat described here suggests the need to update our theories concerning COIN so that we can envision effective COIN campaigns. The nature of the threat described above suggests the need 

to update our theories concerning COIN so that we can envision effective campaigns. The next two chapters address COIN theory and 

campaigns. 

31

Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

3. A Modern 

 Counterinsurgency Theory

Theory (n) – belief, policy, or procedure proposed or followed 

as the basis of action. 12

Military theorists often bemoan the lack of distinct COIN theory in the American way of war. By its very nature, a COIN theory will be a national security level endeavor that formulates a long-range social, political, and military approach to the 

changing dynamics of the 21st century. In essence, it modernizes our 

foreign policy based on the DIME model. Our informational element 

of power will play heavily in reinforcing moderate religious beliefs in 

any information campaign to counteract the use of extreme and radical religious ideology used as one of the tools clearly used by modern 

insurgents (and most appropriate for religious ideological warfare). 

Though fraught with complexity, a GWOT DIME model for foreign 

relations policy and national military policy may well need to consider the added cultural factors of indigenous religious beliefs to lend 

special support in exercising economic power benevolently in the affected region to counteract the message of religious extremists. 

The foundations of a modern COIN theory would incorporate the 

characteristics of insurgencies by the triad of Politics, People, and 

Patience (P3). Politics embodies the acts of a host nation and its allies 

to maintain legitimacy by enacting the reforms necessary to solve the 

root causes of the insurgency. People are a critical consideration for 

any successful COIN effort, and their support is essential to support 

the government and deny legitimacy for the cause of the insurgents. 

Patience is the national will and endurance required to counteract 

the protracted nature of the insurgency as well as to gain time for 

needed social and democratic reforms to take place. 

Formulating a theory of COIN can take two paths—a political/social theory or a military theory of a way of modern war. The political 

/social theory is the most attractive paradigm as historically it has 
32

 JSOU Report 05-2

proven itself as one with the best chance for success in the irregular 

warfare environment. 

Pure military theories of COIN tend to migrate to attrition strategies through counter-guerrilla operations such as seen in German 

anti-partisan activities in the Balkans during World War II and in the 

Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Attrition can be successful as a 

key strategy, but most modern democratic armies are limited and 

constrained by their counter violence strategies within the context of 

just-and-morally-legal-actions. 

A social and political theory of COIN has as its overarching premise the prevention of a takeover by the insurgents or guerrillas of a 

society. Thus, war is not a continuation of politics; war is grounded 

in politics. Successful COIN strategies have all kept political solutions combined with social civic actions as the number one operational objective of their campaigns. For example, a concept forwarded 

in a recent strategy discussion attended by the author is based on a 

different form of preemption than counter-violence offered by a pure 

military option: a Marshall Plan-style project in either the Middle 

East or in Africa. Improving the economic and social conditions of 

struggling or failed states would preempt the conditions that create 

insurgency and social unrest. In other words, a preemptive COIN 

campaign (preventative COIN) characterized by political and social 

actions which focus on IDAD and “hearts and minds” prior to any 

outbreak of insurgency. 

Anthony James Joes gets at the essence of this political and social aspect of COIN in his new book, Resisting Rebellion: History and 

Politics of Counterinsurgency. He appeared on the C-Span television 

show in early January 2005 and was asked by the moderator to describe the method in which we would conduct an appropriate COIN 

strategy if we knew what we were getting ourselves in for, once committing to the endeavor. He replied that “a COIN end state is peace 

and the reintegration of the disaffected into society.” He offered COIN 

as a political and social theorem, with COIN becoming more of a lawand-order operation, vice a military victory. Further in the discussion, he added that the “...insurgent strategy is to not lose power.” 

His book outlines some general principles of success in COIN that 

remain valid for the 21st century. Of note, the political and social 
33

Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

domains of activity all maintain their primacy as key facets of the 

strategy and any commensurate campaign. The following is a paraphrasing from the program on his relevant section of the book: 13

• An attractive amnesty program for the insurgents and disaffected

• A government seen as legitimate by its populace

• Limited military actions

• Redress of social and political grievances

• Conservative military policies (limited in scope)

He also concluded that the nature of the enemy threat was different in the 21st century and also agreed it was a convergence of many 

different types of groups and criminals. One of the counter techniques he forwarded for combating this nexus was to create doubt 

and divisions between different factions of the insurgents through an 

adept and shrewd PSYOP and subversion effort.

Articulating COIN as a political/social theory, with a subordinate role for the military, allows us to put the theory into a context 

of social dynamics. It has oft been said amongst counterinsurgent 

experts that the success of COIN is due to operating on “human terrain” vice geographical terrain. Having a social and politically based 

theory also assists in analyzing and understanding the enemy from 

a social and political organizational standpoint. As most insurgencies go, one can extrapolate a life cycle: first, it requires a political 

ideology (this can be in religious terms) or a social community which 

supports its cause (or both); second, it must have some semblance of 

an organization made up of people and political agendas to produce 

the insurgency; and last, it must be made of individuals with motivations to belong to the insurgency and participate in the movement.

For all of the attempts at analyzing modern insurgency movement, most insurgencies resemble Maoist Revolutionary Warfare, 

and any COIN theory must take the human and political aspects of 

that theory of insurgency into account to develop the proper counter 

measures. If people are the “sea” that guerrillas and insurgents swim 

in, then the theoretical underpinnings of any COIN way of warfare 

must address the need to operate in this medium and alter it as re-
34

 JSOU Report 05-2

quired: drain the sea, catch the fish, make the people transparent so 

the enemy cannot “swim” amongst them, etc. 

Figure 1 illustrates the Clausewitz “trinity” (people, government, 

military) adapted to revolutionary war. In essence, both the government and the insurgents compete for the people as the source of 

power for their legitimacy. The insurgent vanguard must match the 

government in designing an alternate state with the appropriate institutions to provide essential services to the people and solve their 

perceived deprivations. It is essential to insurgent strategies to build 

the organizational architecture first in order to function as the replacement government upon victory. This organizational structure 

becomes a key vulnerability for attack by counterinsurgents (counter-organization techniques). 

Currently, as shown in figure 1, U.S. participation in insurgency 

is not direct. Our FID doctrine steers our efforts toward indirect support through aid, financing, and military training and assistance, 

with direct combat actions only as a last resort. However, if we “break 

Figure 1. Clausewitz’s “trinity” adapted for irregular warfare with the populace 

as the source of power which the host nation government and the insurgent 

replacement political system compete over for legitimacy.
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Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

it,” we “own it.” In other words, we may take the lead as the military 

political government with responsibility to solve social deprivations 

while simultaneously combating insurgents until the host nation can 

restore governance and enough indigenous forces are generated to 

take on the fight. We conducted this type of COIN effort in the Philippine War at the turn of the 20th century and find ourselves embroiled 

in this scenario in Afghanistan and Iraq. FID doctrine alone cannot suffice. A 21st century theory for American COIN is useful here. 

Figure 2 illustrates the practical reality of what has occurred to the 

“insurgency triad.” 

Helpful in designing an American military COIN theory is to develop the principles by which we would implement the theory and 

translate it into appropriate strategy. The Nixon Doctrine formulated 

in 1969 (or sometimes called the Guam Doctrine being named after the site where Nixon delivered his first speech outlining his new 

Figure 2. Depiction of insurgency relationships when the U.S. takes the lead 

as military government and provides initial security and COIN forces. In this 

model, the U.S. participation serves to maintain a balance which corrects for 

providing essential services to the populace while helping build governmental 

institutions to legitimize the effort and restore peace and a civil society. 
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policy, 25 July 1969) should certainly become one of the defining 

principles for a consolidated national theory on COIN based on its 

application in both realms of foreign and defense policies. The doctrine was based on pragmatism to recognize and accept the world as 

it exists and on guiding principles on which America stands (democracy, liberty, individual rights, freedom, etc.). President Nixon’s doctrine was formulated as a National Security Strategy as a prevention 

and deterrence measure, using elements of national power (much 

like a national COIN doctrine could comprise a National Security 

Strategy). The doctrine was pragmatic in that it was based not so 

much on America doing everything to defend interests around the 

world, but rather the recognition of what we expected other nations 

to do in their own defense. As Melvin Laird said at a town hall meeting sponsored by the American Institute for Public Policy Research, 

America did not expect to be the “...cop on every beat.”14 Nixon urged 

our partners in the world to play a larger role in their own defense 

and assume more responsibility in those matters. This premise is 

very similar to the overriding principle in COIN whereby greater success is achieved by the host nation solving its own political and social 

grievances through a political process while keeping their military 

effort to combat insurgency at as minimal a level as possible. 

One of the premises for our involvement in any COIN operation 

should be the requirement to have a government in the affected 

country willing to work out the social and political grievances (with 

host nation dominance in this activities) while insisting on basic human rights and good governance within the international framework of 

sovereign nations. 

For our part, once 

we are committed to the 

COIN endeavor we must, 

in theory, be committed 

to combining all the elements of national power, 

along with additional 

tools, such as religion 

For our part, once we are committed to 

the COIN endeavor we must, in theory, 

be committed to combining all the 

elements of national power, along with 

additional tools, such as religion and 

culture, and then wield them through a 

methodology which coordinates the elements of power into a unified aim with 

the host nations we are assisting; strategic concepts similar to a national plan at 

the grand strategy level. 
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Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

and culture, and then wield them through a methodology which coordinates the elements of power into a unified aim with the host nations we are assisting; strategic concepts similar to a national plan at 

the grand strategy level. The structure will require both interagency 

and military leaders with an overall, politically astute COIN czar in 

charge. 

Our COIN theory should adopt the principle that any COIN conducted by the U.S. is under the clear political leadership of the State 

Department through the appropriate ambassadors and country 

teams, with the geographic military commander’s role as subordinate. In this manner, we could preserve unity of command/effort 

and ensure all lines of operation are directed to the political end 

state. Military COIN forces would be minimal and focused only on 

the sources of the enemy’s power—primarily targeting the insurgents 

will to fight. 

Characteristically our theoretical framework for the conduct of 

COIN should have the principle of indirectness at its core. Unconventional warfare art within the SF community is built on the foundation of “through, with and by” indigenous forces. President Reagan’s 

policy during the 1980s towards COIN and small wars emphasized 

the U.S. providing economic, political and military help commensurate with the endangered country’s ability to perform “self help” 

before the introduction of American military forces. Within this indirect context, we are capable and could take the lead for using direct American power against external factors that are threatening the 

success of a host nation IDAD measures and the COIN campaign. 

Confronting the insurgent’s out-of-country sanctuaries, external financing and equipping, and external political support should be the 

focus of a total national effort with all elements of power (DIME). 

A great degree of patience is required to outlast the insurgents 

and thus neutralize one of their operational weapons—time. COIN is 

a long-term endeavor, and our leadership must prepare the American public for long, protracted operations. Part of this long-term effort will require the need to provide a shift to law enforcement and 

intelligence operations once military operations are concluded. Many 

insurgencies die out slowly with the diehards performing activities 

that are basically antisocial and criminal.
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Finally, our COIN strategy should be an indirect form of warfare 

against another indirect form of warfare, thus maximizing on the 

asymmetric nature of our unconventional warfare capability. 

Given the above discussion, the following derived principles 

would constitute a COIN theory, taking into account three key factors: Politics, People, and Patience (P3).

P3 Principles for COIN Theory and Doctrine

• Indirect U.S. role, leverage and influence regional actors, 

burden-sharing

• The host nation helped must be willing to enact major institutional reform, if required

• Clearly in the U.S. national interest with backing of the will 

of the people

• Directed by order of the President, with concurrence from 

Congress

• Political solution as preeminent strategy

• Theory must be social-political, not purely military response 

• U.S. response will be limited in nature with tailored COIN 

forces conducting predominantly FID

• Overall unity of effort embodied within lead from the State 

Department

• Has as its nature asymmetric or unconventional warfare

• Accounts for shift to law enforcement and intelligence operations after military options are concluded

• Includes a “preemptive” option of nation-building and assistance to forestall potential outbreak of insurgency (like 

the Marshall Plan)

The foundations for organizing a unique American response to insurgency will require an agreed-upon theory for the conduct of COIN. 

The P3 theory of COIN (considering politics, people, and patience as 

its foundation) serves as a conceptual model for the development of 

COIN campaigns—the subject of the following chapter.
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Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

4. Developing the COIN Campaign

“The beginning of wisdom is to grasp and hold on tightly to the idea 

that insurgency is a profoundly political problem.”15

Anthony James Joes, Modern Guerrilla Insurgency

The first step in conducting the operational art of COIN is a 

thorough analysis of the factors which comprise the insurgency. Every insurgency has its own context. There are a variety of sources existing to assist the planner in this process; most 

recently the revised U.S. Army doctrinal publication FMI 3-07.22, 

Counterinsurgency Operations, published 1 October 2004. One of the 

best sources for analysis of insurgency still remains Bard E. O’Neill’s 

publication, Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary 

Warfare, published by Brassey’s, Inc., in 1990. This work includes 

in-depth sections on understanding the nature of insurgency, various strategies used by insurgents, how the environment in which the 

insurgency exists should be viewed (taking into account the populace, the insurgent military and political organizations, and the capabilities of the threatened government), and the wider issue of external support to insurgents. 

Development of COIN Strategy

A strategy for COIN is developed based on an analysis of the insurgency—what motivates it, what the insurgent strategy comprises, the 

government’s capacity to engage in COIN, etc. Strategy in this context consists of ends to be achieved, the strategic concepts required 

to achieve them, and the necessary resources—all to guide and sustain the operational level activities that will achieve the strategic objectives. The ends are the objective of the campaign. In other words, 

what to accomplish. Ends in COIN campaigns may be to achieve a 

status quo ante, create a democratic government friendly to the U.S. 

or western interests, or merely removal of conditions which create a 

haven for insurgents and terrorists. The ways refer to the strategic 

concepts used and how to get the job done—such as the employment 
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 JSOU Report 05-2

of all elements of power to conduct a COIN campaign under the aegis 

of an IDAD program utilizing FID as our mechanism. The means are 

the resources required to get the job done. These may include tailored military COIN forces to be deployed, logistics required to sustain the campaign, financing, etc.

COIN is a type of asymmetric war and, therefore, requires us to 

look at asymmetric concepts to accomplish our objectives. On the 

whole, insurgencies have been successful when the will of the insurgents is greater than the will of the conventional forces and their 

state’s response. Insurgents gain even higher chances of success 

when the COIN strategy is mismatched vis-à-vis the insurgent strategy. The challenge for the counterinsurgent professional is to get the 

right strategy to mitigate, neutralize or destroy the insurgent strategy, and thus dramatically improve the chances for victory. 

Key to the analysis must include a cultural “assessment,” even 

prior to entering the area of operations, to understand the forces 

at play concerning ethnicity, language (to include dialects), religion, 

and nationalism (or ideology). This assessment must take into account the social influence networks which buttress the society—political, academic, criminal, business, technology, etc. The data provides a start point for the links and nodes sought for in the target 

analysis of human terrain systems (human nodes, influence links, 

nexus areas, etc.)

The war in Vietnam illustrates the case in point; for the entire 

first phase of the war, the strategy was to develop conventional South 

Vietnam (SVN) forces to take on a perceived future threat of the North 

Vietnam (NVN) forces. Meanwhile, U.S. forces chose to operate conventionally to attack and destroy the Viet Cong and NVA in “searchand-sweep” missions, with battalion-sized or larger operations. This 

strategy did not work. 

Ivan Arreguin-Toft explored this phenomenon in his work on 

asymmetric conflict, “How the Weak Win Wars.” His “Strategic Interaction” hypothesis separated all strategy into two venues: direct and 

indirect. He then went on to illustrate how weaker actors in asymmetric war win because of the very nature of the asymmetry—thus, 

a strong actor applying a direct force strategy against a weak actor 
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Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

utilizing an indirect strategy, will lose.16 Toft viewed the works of Mao 

as illustrative of this concept:

“Building on Mao’s insight, I argue that the universe 

of potential strategies and counterstrategies can 

be reduced to two distinct ideal-type strategic approaches: direct and indirect. Direct approaches 

target an adversary’s armed forces in order to destroy that adversary’s capacity to fight. Indirect approaches seek to destroy an adversary’s will to fight: 

Toward this end, a GWS [Guerrilla Warfare Strategy] 

targets enemy soldiers, and barbarism targets enemy noncombatants. Same approach interactions 

(direct-direct or indirect-indirect) imply defeat for 

weak actors because there is nothing to mediate 

or deflect a strong actor’s power advantages. These 

interactions will therefore be resolved quickly. By 

contrast, opposite-approach interactions (direct-indirect or indirect-direct) imply victory for the weak 

actors because the strong actor’s power advantage 

is deflected or dodged. These therefore tend to be 

protracted, with time favoring the weak.”17

The point of the theoretical review is for the COIN practitioner 

to choose a strategy with the highest chance of success in defeating 

the insurgency. An indirect strategy approach serves best. Indirect 

strategies must counter the asymmetric strengths of the insurgent—

his time, space and will. The strategy must make provisions for a 

sufficient amount of time in the campaign to counteract the effect 

achieved by the enemy conducting protracted war. It is possible to 

bring the insurgents to a level of war weariness, if one is patient and 

can maintain popular will for the effort. A clear and concise understanding of centers of gravity in COIN is imperative. Among the key 

considerations for both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent is 

will. Other important factors could include the populace, the government, the military forces, U.S. support and assistance, key ground 

such as the insurgents’ sanctuary, or external support mechanisms 

for the insurgents. An indirect strategy would also focus on the de-
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struction of the enemy’s will, the denial of the support of the populace (focusing your strength against the enemy’s center of gravity 

and his inherent weakness), and the denial of space in his sanctuaries and strategic bases (again, indirectly applying your strength to 

his weakness).

The COIN strategy considers the ends, ways and means to accomplish the campaign. The ends should consist of political objectives considered legitimate in the eyes of the populace and may include legitimacy in the view of the international community. The way

of a COIN strategy embodies indirectness against insurgent indirectness (i.e. a “hearts and minds” campaign, denial of sanctuary and the 

use of limited, discrete military actions against the insurgents), and 

the means to accomplish it. The means are centered on the forces 

required for the protection of vital assets (our centers of gravity), consolidation and expansion forces, the fielding of a mobile and tailored 

COIN force (with a prominence of indigenous and host nation forces), 

and a focus on the assets required to foster the social reforms and 

political development in order to delegitimize the insurgents. Most 

of these measures are already embodied in FID methodologies and 

IDAD strategies. 

Any strategy chosen 

must be relevant and valid 

in the context of the insurgency at hand. Historically, successful COIN 

strategies have been those 

which are highly flexible 

and adaptable and combine law enforcement (police take the lead when the 

insurgents challenge the 

law with the military supporting law enforcement 

efforts), protection of key 

assets and institutions, 

and the holding, consolidating, and expanding of security and stability by the government in contested areas. These principles are 

Any strategy chosen must be relevant 

and valid in the context of the insurgency at hand. Historically, successful 

COIN strategies have been those which 

are highly flexible and adaptable and 

combine law enforcement (police take 

the lead when the insurgents challenge 

the law with the military supporting law 

enforcement efforts), protection of key 

assets and institutions, and the holding, 

consolidating, and expanding of security and stability by the government in 

contested areas. 
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Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

currently embodied within our joint doctrine for FID. Certainly, any 

strategy chosen must be backed by a ways and means to implement, 

as the French learned in Indochina when General Leclerc attempted 

to implement his COIN campaign strategy:

“The method chosen was the so-called “oil-slick 

technique.” It involved the establishment of strong 

points in a region, from which ‘pacification’ forces 

would spread out to cut the country-side into small 

squares and then to comb each square on the grid, 

working from the outside, until the rebel forces within the net were finally brought to close quarters and 

exterminated. It is, in effect, a police method. The 

trouble was that Leclerc did not have a sufficient 

number of policemen for the rattisage, the combing 

without which the whole plan fell to pieces.”18

Taking a lesson from our own U.S. Army history during the Vietnam War experience, we were slow to understand that the “direct vs. 

indirect” strategy of attrition, typified by the “search and destroy” tactic of large, conventional unit sweeps, was not working. After study 

and analysis of why the strategy chosen by General Westmoreland 

was not working, Henry Kissinger commented introspectively in his 

article published in January 1969 in the magazine Foreign Affairs:

“We fought a military war; our opponent fought a political one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents aimed for our psychological exhaustion. In the 

process, we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims 

of guerrilla war: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose; 

the conventional army loses if it does not win.”19

General Abrams shifted the strategy in the remaining time of his 

command in Vietnam to emphasizing security and stability for the 

populace (known euphemistically as “hold and sweep”), and de-emphasized the strategy of attrition and body count. He inherently understood the COIN would be won in the realm of “hearts and minds” 

of the populace. 
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Operational Art of COIN

To conduct any operational art of war, you must translate your strategy so that it can be applied on the battlefield. The art of COIN at 

the operational level has a set of attributes described as conceptual 

(knowledge and intuition), static, and active components.

The Conceptual Component

The conceptual component is achieved by the gleaning of all intelligence and information sources to ascertain trends and deviations 

which analyzed by themselves are not obvious. The intent is to reach 

an intuitive level of decision-making with respect to the insurgency 

and afford the counterinsurgent the capability to remain one or two 

steps ahead of the game. A myriad of sources are utilized to achieve 

this level of knowledge. Knowledge is far more powerful a tool to 

the counterinsurgent than just having information. Knowledge must 

start with a historical and cultural understanding of the environment. The daily situation reports (SITREPS), periodic on the ground 

assessments, conversations of CA and PSYOP personnel with indigenous populace, local news media, results of interrogations, intelligence summaries, and even the daily reports of the various humanitarian and relief organizations must be digested and reviewed daily, 

put into context, and then absorbed to determine its overall meaning. This will require time each day to conduct reflective thinking 

(some call it “staring at the map”). There are just times when sitting 

at the map or internalizing all of the information results in an intuitive or informed decision as to what action to take next. Where do 

we go next to stay one or two steps ahead of the enemy and thwart 

his objectives? This elevates military skill levels to the “art” found in 

the operational level of war. Identify and employ those military leaders and strategists who have vast knowledge and cumulative background experience in the “art” of small wars and the intuitiveness to 

operate in this fashion. 

A variation of this conceptualizing is used to detect and disrupt 

the insurgent organization and infrastructure (counter-organization). This is very similar to law enforcement and detective work 

through link-diagram analysis. A combined unit of law enforcement, 
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Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

paramilitary and military operators, integrated into a judicial system 

with special powers to confront the insurgency, can be one of the 

best methods for disrupting and destroying insurgent membership 

and infrastructure. 

The counterinsurgent’s PSYOP and IO activities are another form 

of the conceptual component of COIN. The goal of these efforts is to 

destroy the belief system and message of the insurgents and ruin the 

myth and glamour of their cause. This is the war of ideas, and yours 

has to be better than the insurgents’ message. Although PSYOP and 

IO are used predominantly to influence the population and win the 

“hearts and minds” campaign, a separate program dedicated to counter the motivations of the insurgent, ruin his morale, or co-opt him 

will have much greater effect for the success of the COIN campaign. 

The Static Component

The static component comprises the measures taken to implement 

the operational maneuver of Hold and Consolidate or Hold and Expand. In Hold and Consolidate, the counterinsurgent and the host 

nation determine those key areas of physical vulnerability which are 

critical to the success of the COIN campaign, and assign forces to 

garrison and protect them. These may include exposed lines of communication. A good mission for the introduction of newly trained 

forces is in the role of static guard and area security as one of their 

first confidence-building measures. This type of operational maneuver is defensive in nature. Hold and Consolidate activities can also 

be used in conjunction with weather cycles in order to bottle up insurgents in mountainous terrain during winter. Occupying the lower 

mountain passes and key routes in and out of mountainous strongholds can block guerrilla movement and bottle them up until winter 

snows restrict their movements. However, this can only be construed 

as a temporary measure in order to buy time for other lines of effort 

to work until the weather and trafficability improve in the spring. 

In Hold and Expand, forces are assigned to contested areas to 

regain government presence and control, and then conduct military 

and civic action programs to expand the control and edge out the 

insurgents. (This is very similar to the spreading ink blot used by 

the French in Indochina.) The COIN force is kept to a bare minimum 
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 JSOU Report 05-2

and is supported with CA and PSYOP troops. A company of infantry 

is normally provided for area patrolling and security for any immediate threat to the unit. Quick reaction forces in the form of close air 

support assets or reinforcing units back up these outposts whenever 

insurgent forces threaten to overrun them, but the tailoring of forces 

and the design of the force protection measures should allow friendly 

forces to defend themselves until the arrival of additional assistance. 

This option affords the counterinsurgent the ability to conduct minimal military operations with the capability to increase in scope as 

the situation dictates.

Hold and Expand forces conduct operations in ever increasing 

zones around their base. The first measure for force protection is to 

target and eliminate the insurgents living within the inner zone, defined by mission, enemy, troops, terrain and time (METT-T), around 

their base. This requires living amongst the local populace for long 

durations to gain their trust and support and to separate the locals 

from the insurgents. The secondary zone is the transit and support 

zone for the insurgents. Hold and Expand forces cast a wide net of 

operations outside their force protection zone to disrupt and interdict insurgent operations. Again, this requires patience and discrete 

intelligence work to ascertain the locations of weapons caches, safe 

houses, and transit support systems afforded the insurgents. The 

outer zone can be described as very remote locations or areas where 

the populace is neither friendly nor hostile to the COIN unit efforts. 

Occasional operations are conducted in these areas to show the flag 

and to at least keep the populace “neutral” to the idea of supporting 

the insurgents. Battalion-sized sweeps and clearing operations by 

conventional forces generally reap far less than their effort due to the 

extreme difficulty of finding and fixing elusive insurgents, but if used 

are more advantageous in the Hold and Expand option. 

For example, one of the means to successfully translate the operational art of COIN and Counter-GW (Guerrilla Warfare) into a 

Hold and Expand effect in Afghanistan was to implement a form of 

the “strategic hamlet” program. A hybrid coalition military unit (SOF 

and conventional forces), in consort with host nation and indigenous 

forces, moves into and occupies one of the key and decisive areas 

designated from the risk analysis. The premise is to provide a long-
47

Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

term presence and stability operation to the region. In essence, these 

operations became very similar to the “cop on the block” approach 

to law enforcement in major cities. Once you live somewhere and get 

to know the factors affecting that region, the populace will see the 

benefits of your presence and begin to participate in the process to 

move their region in a positive manner. Key to these operations in Afghanistan was to solve basic grievances of the Afghan people: provide 

some sense of law and order from warlordism and criminality (the 

very reason Afghan people whole-heartedly supported the Taliban 

in the beginning). Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon captured this 

sentiment in chapter 4, “Raiders on the Path of God,” from the book 

The Age of Sacred Terror:

“Within Afghanistan, The Taliban enjoyed a growing 

popularity. It provided something that ordinary Afghans longed for: a modicum of order. Chaos had 

reigned for so many years that people had become 

accustomed to being treated like the chattel of the 

warlords, or worse. The Taliban vanquished many 

marauding bands and disarmed trouble makers.”20

Civil affairs actions followed closely once stability was gained, followed by the establishment of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams 

(PRTs) to provide a conduit for host nation and international humanitarian organizations to move in and operate. 

A very successful tool for continuity was the ability to conduct 

long-term operations of over six to nine months with the same forces, 

further enhanced by redeploying these forces back to Afghanistan 

into the same locations on follow-up tours. The background knowledge and efficacy of those military personnel and advisors became 

immense as the local Afghans in their region came to know them over 

time. The personal relationships of trust built up by these small unit 

commanders with their village elder counterparts was immense. 

The Active Component

The active components of COIN operational maneuver consist of an 

armed reconnaissance capability and a specialized raiding force. 

Armed reconnaissance is defined as the patrolling of suspected in-
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surgent areas in order to glean information on their activities, initiate contact and conduct battle, or to confirm the area is clear. Armed 

reconnaissance is a form of combat patrolling utilized in counterguerrilla operations. Armed reconnaissance patrols are equipped for 

long durations and have the commensurate level of organic firepower to engage the insurgents. Armed reconnaissance is accomplished 

with a variety of platforms and measures. These all are tailored for 

“hunter-killer” type missions—search for, hunt down, gain contact 

with, and keep contact with insurgents. AC-130 gunships, Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (TUAVs), and ground reconnaissance 

patrols (mounted) all serve to accomplish this mission and to keep 

insurgents off-balance and disrupt their timing. A gridded-overlay 

method of operation can be employed to cover large sectors of suspected insurgent territory. This is similar to playing checkers: highrisk and medium-risk areas are subdivided in sort of a checkerboard 

fashion. Commanders choose the time and place to move into black 

squares or red squares to “check” the enemy (disruption and denial), 

or remove him altogether (destruction). 

Each square or grid is covered by one method of surveillance and 

either confirmed as empty or containing suspicious activity. Once 

suspicious activity is noted, the counterinsurgent continues to develop the situation and may introduce additional forces into the area 

to destroy the threat. Timing is everything for the counterinsurgent. 

Long hours and numerous assets are utilized in counter-guerrilla operations to find insurgent forces—whether they be three insurgents 

or thirty. Hunter-killer platforms should engage insurgent forces immediately upon their discovery, and then continue efforts to maintain contact while reinforcements are being sent to the area. Over 

time, vast areas of the checkerboard could be identified as friendly or 

neutral, thus allowing friendly forces to focus on the most threatened 

portions of the board. 

A specialized raiding force is required to conduct time-sensitive 

targeting beyond the scope of conventional forces in nodal operations. Nodal refers to key points identified from link-analysis or systems analysis and are the nerve points for the insurgent organization. These may include the interrelated systems of infrastructure, 

financing, social demographics (tribal affiliations), or behavioral sys-
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Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

tems. Insurgent nodes are links to identifying decisive points and 

allow the counterinsurgent the ability to achieve a desirable effect or 

gain a marked advantage over the insurgents. Raiding forces are also 

utilized against insurgent nexus areas. Nexus operations are areas 

where a variety of insurgent support systems, such as smuggling 

routes, infiltration routes, etc., come together and are utilized by a 

variety of insurgent guerrillas, auxiliaries, and underground support 

structures simultaneously. 

Specialized raiding forces may be in the form of a counter-terrorist unit, an indigenous strike force, pseudo-guerrilla forces (those 

made up to resemble enemy forces and operate in their areas), or a 

specially formed and trained unit from organic forces (a combination 

of general purpose forces and SOF). To ensure the highest chances 

for success, this unit will require dedicated mobility platforms and 

an extremely high level of access to intelligence assets. The sensorto-shooter links should be uncluttered by removing noncontributing 

layers of decision makers. The number one role for this unit is to 

target insurgent organizational structure and leadership. A secondary role for this unit would be to conduct raids in sanctuaries where 

political sensitivities may preclude larger operations.

The COIN practitioner may find the need to combine conceptual, 

static and active components of his plan to conduct effects-based 

operations such as border interdiction and denial. Effects-based operations are conducted to change your opponent’s overall behavior 

favorable to your goals. Living on the border in firebases, combined 

with search and destroy missions, armed reconnaissance, and huntSpecially-equipped, long-range 

assets in the form of “hunterkiller” teams with dedicated 

mobility platforms are utilized to 

conduct armed reconnaissance 

patrols to seek out insurgents 

or deny them a base of operations. (Photo courtesy of 

CJSOTF-Afghanistan)
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er-killer operations all backed up with an effective PSYOP and IO 

campaign can change the behavior and actions of insurgents using 

the border as a transit and sanctuary. Technological measures, such 

as fences, minefields, and remote sensor fields can enhance the effect achieved to deny a border sanctuary to insurgents. 

Phasing of the COIN Campaign

Campaign plans are phased to arrange operations and help to systematically achieve objectives. When shaping operations cannot contain an insurgency and deterrence fails, COIN forces and assets are 

mobilized and prepared for deployment. Phasing of a COIN campaign 

can be broken down within the construct of the remaining five phases 

recommended in the newly drafted Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations (Deter, Seize the Initiative, Dominate, Stabilize, and enable Civil 

Authority): the initial phase - Prepare-Hold-Defensively Consolidate 

- is conducted to establish the COIN effort. It consists of the analysis 

and planning with the host nation and the preparation and deployment of the COIN forces along with the commensurate FID programs 

and IDAD resources to deter the insurgents. Key in this preparation 

phase will be the force-generation of indigenous units. Our efforts 

may take on more of a combat advisory role, initially, than combat 

operations. This phase is typified by holding and consolidation activities in order to deter the insurgents or at least reach a stalemate 

period with the insurgents and allow time for the COIN strategy to 

begin working. Friendly centers of gravity and host nation decisive 

points must be protected in this phase.

The second phase is designed to seize the initiative and dominate 

the battlespace. The Offensive-Pol Mil-Internal Defense and Development phase is the application of the indirect strategy with the aim of 

destruction of the enemy’s will to fight and winning the “hearts and 

minds” of the populace by resolving social and political grievances 

as its centerpiece. It also includes FID to strengthen the nation’s 

capability to secure and safeguard its populace. This phase is typified by the government’s reoccupation and expansion of contested 

areas in order to delegitimize the message of the insurgents and deny 

them the support of the populace and space for their operations. The 

military focuses primarily on the neutralization or destruction of the 
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Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

insurgents by denial of their support and denial of their sanctuary 

measures. Subphases within this could be focused on achieving key 

political objectives as they occur, such as buying time for elections, 

or could be climatic dependent such as operations in winter or summer due to the unique characteristics and impacts on operations. 

(Interestingly enough, the sowing, tending, cutting and selling of the 

poppy crops in Afghanistan dictated subphases of military operations.) 

The third phase of the COIN campaign is typified by stabilizing 

the situation and the beginning of the enablement of the civil authorities in the host nation. It includes winning the war of ideas, destroying the enemy’s will, and accomplishing the political end state 

(Transition - Conciliation and Reintegration Phase). The government is 

no longer threatened, and they exhibit good governance and rule of 

law; social grievances are resolved; and the insurgents have surrendered or reached a stage of conciliation with the government and are 

reintegrated back into society. A transition occurs from the security 

lines of operation against the insurgents to the rule of law, utilizing 

the existing legal system to identify, monitor, arrest and prosecute 

insurgents for their continual criminal activities. This phase is more 

characteristic of stability and support operations, as doctrinally 

known by U.S. forces and is still heavily dependent on intelligence.

The fourth and final phase is the long-term nation building and 

development required to complete the enablement of civil authorities 

and move the affected nation into modernization (Nation-building). It 

is by this measure alone that any resurgence of the insurgency can 

be eliminated. 

Lines of Operation

Lines of operation may be physical—the arrangement of military forces on the ground with respect to geography or the enemy force—or 

logical. Logical lines of operation are used to achieve desired results 

which may bear no relation to the insurgent’s physical activities. 

Logical lines of operation have inherent logic of purpose: they link 

decisive points with the desired effect to be achieved. Logical lines of 

operation help commanders visualize how they can assist and support nonmilitary means of national power with military assets. For 
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 JSOU Report 05-2

example, to achieve the “good governance” in a COIN campaign plan, 

a logical line of operation may link decisive points such as establishment of governmental institutions, elimination of corruption, providing basic social services, rule of law, etc., to achieve the desired 

objective of legitimacy in the eyes of the populace.

The security lines of operation are normally reserved for the military means of power. These may include: counter-guerrilla operations to destroy or disarm the existing insurgents, security for critical vulnerabilities, and development of host nation military forces 

into a professional army.

A key principle discussed earlier was the requirement for unity 

of effort. Development of lines of operation provides a system for the 

coordination and synchronization of all COIN, FID and IDAD efforts, 

and must include the efforts of both the military and civil institutions. Each insurgency will have its own complexities, but some examples for logical lines of operations may include:

1. Governmental Institution-Building Measures. These include 

measures to build-up, assist, and even reform the government, law enforcement, national organizations such as the 

judicial branch, customs and border patrol, paramilitary 

and regular military forces. It may also include civil organizations such as the transportation industry, the health 

system, the judicial system, and work to repair and restore 

the economy. All good governance measures need to be 

backed up with an aggressive IO campaign to destroy the 

insurgent’s legitimacy.

2. Employment and Reconstruction. One of the key tasks to 

prevent additional populace grievances and to help restore 

the legitimacy of the government is to redress grievances 

at the local level and to restore basic services. Employment 

of disaffected youth will help prevent their recruitment by 

insurgents. Reconstruction projects, on a small and large 

scale can be effectively used in a “carrot or stick” fashion 

to reward compliant behavior and separate the insurgents 

from the populace. The key here is to understand the cultural norms by working with village elders and through cultural paternal systems when administering money or supplies for these efforts. Small unit commanders should have 
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Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

some type of emergency funds to begin programs of this 

nature locally. 

3. Diplomatic and Political. These include all measures to gain 

legitimacy for the government and the COIN effort, as well 

as to deny the insurgents venues for external support. They 

include international efforts to maintain support for the 

host nation and to thwart any external support sought by 

the insurgents.

4. Military and Security Operations. This line of operation is 

used to synchronize all conventional military, special operations and irregular and paramilitary COIN operations 

across the area of operations. Military operations should be 

focused on measures to enhance the achievement of political objectives and are limited and discrete in nature.

5. Development of Civil Defense Forces. Part of the consolidation measures required to ensure security and stability for 

the populace is the creation of self-defense forces. Conventional COIN forces will never be sufficient in numbers 

to adequately conduct all the tasks required to secure the 

population. This measure is a necessity in order to relieve 

COIN forces for higher priority tasks.

6. Border Patrol and Interdiction. Based on the uniqueness of 

the insurgency, part of the COIN effort will be diverted to 

this action in order to deny the insurgents freedom of maneuver and their lines of communication.

7. IO and PSYOP. Key to winning the war of ideas and destroying the will of the insurgents is to have a professional and 

well-thought-out IO campaign. The PSYOP aspect of the 

campaign focuses on the “hearts and minds” of the populace and conversely on measures which destroy the morale 

and capabilities of the enemy.

8. Civil-Military Operations. A vast amount of effort may be 

required to develop rural and urban infrastructure and 

to provide for the enhancement of social services such as 

health systems. This line of operation should also focus on 

international efforts to provide resettlement of refugees and 

rebuilding assistance with the support and input of NGOs 

and PVOs. 
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 JSOU Report 05-2

9. Humanitarian Aid. This line of operation is utilized to relieve 

suffering of the populace in affected areas not serviced by 

government or organized institutions. Military assets may 

be used to provide food and relief supplies to mitigate the 

suffering and serve as a temporary bridging device until 

social services are restored. This was one of the lines of 

operation chosen by General Franks early in the Operation 

ENDURING FREEDOM campaign.

Effects-based Campaigning in COIN

Although difficult, effects-based operations designed for major conventional war campaigns can be applied to COIN environments. Effects-based operations were primarily designed for conventional military operations to quicken results, focus on centers of gravity, and 

synchronize operational level resources. These were characterized 

more as a kinetic targeting process. 

Effects-based operations can also be aimed at influencing and 

changing the behavior of insurgents in a way conducive to the counterinsurgent’s plan. Effects-based operations do not focus on any distinct target but are, in fact, a systems perspective of the operational 

environment. Effects-based operations can be used to dissuade the 

insurgents, assure allies of the effort, and shape perceptions. The 

result of effects-based operations overwhelms the enemy—it gets inside his decision cycle and forces him to react to so many complex 

situations presented him until his command and control becomes 

chaotic and his forces are neutralized or destroyed. The prime factors are speed of operations, time, and a cost-benefit analysis which 

identifies high-value, high-payoff results. How can this be applied to 

COIN, if the essence of successful COIN is patience? If we delink the 

speed and time factors, and focus on high-value, high-payoff operations, effects-based operations can be applied to a COIN model. 

In Afghanistan, operational planners were very apt at identifying the areas of the battlefield that would give the highest rate of 

success, once desired objectives, known as lines of operation, were 

applied. A risk analysis identified clearly where the thrust of efforts 

should be conducted by the host nation and the coalition forces. 

More importantly, we began to tie combat operations to political ob-
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Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

jectives, resulting in a much more efficient use of military power. 

The application of military power was based on gradualism. Only the 

most necessary military force was used in any one location but could 

rapidly be built upon and reinforced by a variety of methods. Clearly 

the first desire on the part of all was to use indigenous forces whenever possible, bolstered by combat advisors. 

There are several operational level effects which can be achieved 

by COIN-tailored forces. The most over-arching is the immediate 

benefit provided by their presence in high and medium-risk areas. 

Presence and stability operations bring an immediate form of legitimacy and law and order, facilitate the rebuilding of governmental 

and provincial institutions, and provide a platform for the reintroduction of humanitarian and reconstruction aid.

COIN forces provide a platform for strategic information operations. Combined with the visible presence of legitimate government 

agencies, such as the Afghan National Army, great effects can be 

achieved to counteract the propaganda of the enemy. PSYOPs and 

CA units are critical to these efforts. The most critical task, and the 

hardest to achieve, is to break the motivators that create recruitment 

in the insurgent camp. 

COIN forces with unique specialties can be employed operationally to conduct disruption and interdiction operations, all preceded 

by surveillance and reconnaissance using operational-level resources. Larger conventional COIN forces are then allowed to concentrate 

on the knowledge gleaned from these actions.

Small specialized forces can also fill the gaps in the campaign to 

conduct economy of force operations in medium- and low-risk areas 

as a preventative measure against the enemy moving to establish 

sanctuaries or conduct operations. Combat advisors become force 

multipliers in these arenas by generating combat power with indigenous forces. At a peak of operations in Afghanistan, combat advisors were able to field up to twelve to fifteen battalions of local militia 

and irregular forces allowing conventional and main-stream forces to 

concentrate on more important operations. 
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 JSOU Report 05-2

Task Organization for SOF COIN 

This paper does not address the organization and composition of 

larger conventional forces in COIN. Suffice it to say they are needed, 

if for no other reason than to stand as a deterrent to any attempts 

by insurgents to conduct a quick campaign utilizing the foco-military 

strategy (primarily by conducting battalion-sized counter-guerrilla 

operations). The best use of conventional forces is in the protection 

of key assets, consolidation of formerly contested areas, and the expansion of government control to newer areas. Conventional forces 

are also used as Quick Reaction Forces (QRF) when lighter, less capable unconventional and SOF become engaged by insurgents. Last, 

conventional forces will play the lead role in any direct confrontation with insurgent main forces if the insurgents make the decision 

to transition to a conventional force-on-force phase. Light infantry 

units make the best COIN conventional forces, but armor and artillery can also play an important role. 

SOF COIN forces will normally be organized in the model of a theater Joint and Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) commanded 

by a senior special operations officer. For a counterinsurgency, the 

Special Forces Group is highly adept at forming the nucleus of the 

theater JSOTF, given the expertise in guerrilla warfare, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense and COIN which reside in 

this organization. COIN is land-centric by nature and Army Special 

Forces, along with Army CA and PSYOP personnel, will form the bulk 

of the SOF COIN force. 

Naval SOF could also be part of the JSOTF providing DA strike 

assets and riverine patrol platforms. Additional joint SOF might include assets in the form of a Joint Special Operations Air Component 

(JSOAC) providing the Army SOF and the Air Force SOF aviation assets. Coalition SOF assets could also be provided to the task force. 

Attachments may further consist of conventional forces (e.g., U.S. or 

host nation infantry) and unconventional, irregular forces such as 

local militia, paramilitary and pseudo-guerrilla forces. 

The operational art aspect is to ensure the forces match the strategic and operational needs of the joint force commander. Theoretically, SOF is the unconventional force and should not be used in 
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Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

conventional operations. SOF provides the joint force commander 

a specialized, high-risk mission force, economy of force tool, and a 

force multiplier capability (with the ability to generate indigenous 

forces). SOF also provides a joint force commander some enabling 

and facilitating functions (operating at the seams): CA, PSYOP, monitors and observers, advisors, liaisons, etc. 

The development of a SOF COIN task organization begins with 

the analysis of the insurgency, an analysis of the mission, and a 

troop to task analysis. An understanding of the principles of insurgency and COIN provides a foundation for key tasks best served by 

unconventional forces. The physical and logical lines of operation in 

the campaign plan will also serve as a source for tasks best served 

by SOF and unconventional forces. Generically, once this process is 

complete, SOF COIN organizations can be organized around these 

key functions:

1. COIN Military Operations and Combat (UW/GW), consisting 

of operations in consolidated and contested areas—counterguerrilla. These forces primarily consist of SF, paramilitary 

(rural self-defense forces), militia, indigenous and pseudoguerrilla forces. CA and PSYOP units are attached and are 

an essential part of these operations. 

2. A Specialized Raid Force, for discrete, surgical military operations and for counterterrorism operations, if required. This 

force consists of SOF direct action (DA) forces and may also 

combine conventional, joint and coalition assets. 

3. Quick Reaction Forces (QRF) capable of adding combat power, in general support - reinforcing, to unconventional forces 

as required. These forces will have secondary functions 

such as personnel recovery, asset security, and personal 

security detail.

4. Foreign Internal Defense Trainers and Advisors. FID forces 

will focus on the IDAD portion of COIN strategy to help build 

professional military and paramilitary forces. They provide 

combat advisory assistance.

5. PSYOP and IO. Information and perception shaping forces 

are comprised of PSYOP and to some extent CA units. Information operations experts and planning cells are incorporated into the staff.
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 JSOU Report 05-2

6. Combat Support. Combat support forces which consist of 

mobility assets and operational firepower assets (aviation, 

maritime, etc.) should be incorporated into the task organization.

7. Coordinating and Liaison assets. Organizations such as 

the Special Operations Command and Coordination Element (SOCCE), the Special Forces Liaison Element (SFLE), 

the Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE) into the air 

operations center, various SOF Liaison Officers, etc., and 

requisite coalition coordination and integration centers are 

required to perform transactions with higher, lateral, and 

subordinate units. One of their key functions is the prevention of fratricide. 

8. Administration and Support. These functions are required 

to run bases, force protection, and logistical systems and 

will utilize both joint doctrine and service regulations to 

perform their job. 

The size of the units, amount of bases required, and type of command and control mechanisms required are based on METT-T. Figure 3 illustrates a generic SOF COIN force within a coalition and 

Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) command structure. 

This Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) organization is within joint SOF doctrinal norms.

The leadership style best suited for this type of campaign should 

be characterized by the willingness to decentralize authority down 

to small unit level. Due to the array of forces assigned to a CJSOTF 

commander, a collegial style of leadership works best to recognize 

that commanders will be varied in rank, but certainly representing 

their respective nations. The CJSOTF commander will have to display the competencies required at the operational level in order to 

provide well-thought-out guidance: he must be reflective, analytical, 

and intuitive in order to overcome the ambiguity and complexity of 

an irregular warfare environment. Command and control must be 

flattened out from hierarchical to more horizontal, including more 

flexible and adaptive command and control mechanisms with other 

maneuver commanders on the battlefield. “Supporting and Supported” command and control measures between other major maneuver elements and SOF are the preferred C2 arrangement given the 
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Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

nature of the fluid operations being conducted and responsiveness 

required for emerging operations. The CJSOTF commander must at 

all times attempt to maintain the flexibility and speed afforded by 

SOF to achieve operational level effects by maintaining tight control 

(OPCON) over his assigned forces.

Measures of Effectiveness

Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) are difficult to design and judge in a 

COIN campaign. By their nature, insurgencies are political wars and 

asymmetric. Everyone understands what victory should look like: 

the insurgents are defeated, the host nation is restored in its legitimacy, and the factors creating the grievances are fixed. 

Key tactical MOE include the number of insurgent incidents, 

the number of successful COIN force initiated fights, the number of 

IEDs and bombings, how many caches and what amounts of weapCJSOTF HQs

NAVSOF COALITION SOF

SEAL

BOAT

DET

JSOACC

AFSOF

SOAR

Coordination and liaison cells

SOLE, SOCCE, SFLE,

SOF LNO’s, CIC, etc.

ARSOF

SF

CA

PSYOP

INF

HOST NATION

& INDIGENOUS

FORCES Task Force

Local

Militia

HN Conv

Forces 

Pseudo

“G”

Forces

Civil

Defense

Forces

Intelligence Integration

Cells

QRF

DA RAID

TF

Base

Defense

Force

HQs

Cmdt

Interagency Integration

Legend:

ARSOF: Army Special Operations Forces

NAVSOF: Navy Special Operations Forces

JSOACC: Joint Special Operations Air

 Component Commander

AFSOF: Air Force Special Operations Forces

SOAR: Special Operations Air Regiment

CIC: Coalition Integration Center

CJSOTF: Coalition & Joint Special Operations

 Task Force

Figure 3. Notional Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force for COIN 

operations.
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 JSOU Report 05-2

ons are hauled off the street, distribution of media in PSYOP form, 

etc. Counting the number of dead insurgents, the infamous “body 

count,” although useful, may not be an accurate assessment of their 

strength. The number of insurgent defectors or enemy personnel 

turned is more useful down at the tactical (and sometimes operational level), as it is a measure of the will of the insurgents and how 

effectively your PSYOP, IO or subversion programs may be going. 

However, the asymmetric tools of the insurgent are time, space, 

and will, all used within a political context of legitimacy. At the 

strategic and operational level, the MOE must take these elements 

into account. T. E. Lawrence in his work Science of Guerrilla Warfare remarked, “Guerrilla War is far more intellectual than a bayonet 

charge.” Figure 4 outlines 

one method to ascertain 

who is winning during the 

insurgency. Much of the 

metrics proposed are subjective and abstract. The 

chart is used during key 

and critical times during 

the campaign or during 

transition of phases or after major operations. It is 

designed as an “operational 

art” tool and is not reflective 

of tactical metrics such as 

the number of incidents, insurgents killed, caches recovered, etc.

The three major trengths of the insurgents which comprise their 

asymmetric weapons are time, space and will. Denying the insurgents these modes of operation must go into any device which attempts to measure effectiveness. All insurgencies have politics as 

the crux of the operational environment, and all insurgencies are 

ultimately about power and politics. Therefore, legitimacy, and who 

has it in the eyes of the populace, becomes an important metric. 

TIME

SPACE

WILL

LEGITIMACY

Govt Insurgents

Figure 4. Operational Art Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) diagram.
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Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

Time reflects the patience required to go the long-haul and also 

the timing and operations tempo of military battles to keep the insurgents off balance. Space is required by insurgents to have sanctuary 

or base camps. Will requires endurance and support of the effort by 

the populace (this includes the war of ideas). A subordinate measure 

of will should be the willingness and amount of the populace to participate in the government’s security projects and assist by providing 

information and intelligence which leads to the capture or destruction of the insurgents and their supplies. (In some cultural contexts, 

this measure of effectiveness may be the percentage of village elders 

and local leaders currently supporting the government’s efforts.) Legitimacy requires providing good governance, security, and stability. 

Reconstruction projects provide a metric of legitimacy and should be 

included in this tally along with any positive economic indicators. At 

key phases within the campaign, this proposed mechanism for MOE 

is used to evaluate these four areas (legitimacy, time, space, will) and 

ascertain who is rightfully gaining ground. To be on the path to success, the government must have more overall checks in the blocks 

than the insurgents.

Conducting a successful COIN campaign will require the knowledge of operational art to ensure the strategy fits the situation and 

the campaign plan is synchronized with all aspects of the FID and 

IDAD programs ongoing by the host nation government. Unity of 

effort can be achieved by developing physical and logical lines of 

operation intended to overwhelm the efforts of the insurgents and 

deny them freedom of movement. Applying the military art of COIN 

using conceptual, static and active components as the means and 

ways of a strategy will contribute to the end state sought by the 

counterinsurgent. In the following chapter an example of COIN strategy and operations is provided in a case study about the recent war 

in Afghanistan.

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Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

5. The War in Afghanistan, 

 2002–2004

“I don’t know how everyone else sees it, but to me it’s starting to 

look like an insurgency with a political front, area commands, 

and guerrillas as the action arm.”

CJSOTF-Afghanistan commander, summer of 2002

The emergence of a Taliban-inspired insurgency in Afghanistan 

during the spring of 2002 provides the counterinsurgent a 

unique study of an example of insurgency in the 21st century. This case study is offered to provide reinforcement of the salient 

points made in this paper. 

The Hindu Kush mountain range. (Photo courtesy of CJSOTF-Afghanistan)
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 JSOU Report 05-2

Afghanistan Case Study Analysis21

In the spring of 2002, coalition and Northern Alliance forces had 

routed the Taliban, controlled the major cities, and smashed the existing Al Qaeda (AQ) remaining in Afghanistan. Operation ANACONDA pushed hardcore Taliban and AQ into cross-border sanctuaries. 

The focus of the conflict then turned to establishing the new interim 

Afghan government through the Loya Jirga process. The Loya Jirga 

was a time-honored method of gaining consensus from tribal leaders 

throughout Afghanistan. Key Afghan leaders came to Kabul to meet 

under a large tent, and after days, of debate cast their vote and promised their 

loyalty to support Hamid Karzai as the 

interim ruler of Afghanistan until more 

formal elections could be held. The Interim Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 

a NATO contingent of several European 

countries (numbering around 5,000+ 

personnel), was established in Kabul to 

protect the fledgling new government, 

and by May 2002 the training of the new 

Afghan National Army began. All the 

while, friendly forces occupied key territory throughout Afghanistan to keep a wary eye on any resurgence 

of AQ. Although a tenuous peace existed for Afghanistan, pockets of 

lawlessness, warlordism, and instability remained outside Kabul.

By summer 2002, increased attacks by predominantly Taliban 

forces captured the attention of the coalition. Astute military leaders 

and strategists came to recognize the re-emergence of a new threat—

an insurgency fomented by the Taliban and in concert with terrorists (Al Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and the Hezb 

Il Islami [HIG] - political party). Cojoined in the effort and often in 

league with Taliban forces were criminals, opportunist, anti-coalition 

militants, and drug lords. 

The reasons for the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan were primarily due to a lack of a cohesive government caused by the fragmentation and diffusion of political power to the warlords who were 

The war in Afghanistan 

provides the clearest 

example of how insurgencies blended with terrorism could affect military 

operations in the 21st 

century. Understanding its 

dynamics could lead to a 

reformulation of theories 

and doctrine for how to 

fight this new form of war. 
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Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

left in place upon the withdrawal of the Soviet army. This condition 

was further exacerbated by existing divisions within Afghan society, 

ethnically and politically (but surprisingly, not religious). Afghanistan had long-suffered economic underdevelopment in conjunction 

with lack of social services for the populace. Shattered from several 

years of war, no formal tax system or economic revenue was available 

to mitigate the misery. In fact, the major industry providing work 

and dollars into the economy during the 1990s was the humanitarian NGOs. As is typical in a failed state, crime and banditry became 

rampant and unchecked by any legal authority. The Taliban were 

initially welcomed by the people as they reduced crime, defeated the 

warlords and removed them from power, and attempted to limit the 

effects of the drug trade.

The strategy of the Taliban insurgents resembled a mix between 

the protracted war strategy defined by 

Mao and the foco-military strategy, or 

guerrilla foco, articulated by Che Guevara. The objective was establishing 

a totalitarian theocracy, an alternate 

world based on the Islamic Caliphates 

of the past and led by a vanguard of 

religious mullahs. The golden age of the 

Caliphates was considered the highlight of Islamic rule and jurisprudence; 

an enlightened Muslim leader reigned 

over the Islamic people and territories 

and ruled in accordance with the law 

of God. This would obviate the need for 

nation-states ruled by a myriad of kings and despots throughout the 

Middle East.

The Taliban insurgent movement was highly dependent on external support, considering they initially were surrogates of Pakistan. 

The Taliban were not concerned about the will of the people and were 

not resorting to a political solution. Their organization was selective, 

and the leadership was comprised of small, elite groups who did 

not view mass mobilization as one of the requirements to sustain 

The nature of the insurgency created by the 

Taliban was typified by a 

foco-military style campaign with the objective 

of establishing a totalitarian theocracy, an alternate 

world based on the Islamic Caliphates of the past 

and led by a vanguard of 

religious mullahs. 
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 JSOU Report 05-2

the movement. Their insurgency can be characterized by two of the 

seven types of insurgency outlined in Bard E. O’Neill’s work:22

1. Anarchist. The Taliban viewed the standing political arrangements in Afghanistan as unnecessary and illegitimate.

2. Reactionary-Traditionalist. The Taliban carried out violence 

based on the radical Salafist movement (militant traditionalists) with a desire to revert the Afghan society back to the 

golden age of the Caliphate.

Initially, the Taliban demonstrated the capability to conduct conventional warfare (albeit Third world in nature and sophistication) 

against the Northern Alliance, but after the Taliban defeat and rout 

in 2001 and 2002, adopted guerrilla warfare as the prominent form 

of conflict against the coalition forces and the Afghan government. 

This type of warfare was typified by mobile hit-and-run operations, 

harassment operations, and ambushes designed to discredit the government and wear down the will of the coalition. The insurgents (the 

Taliban, anticoalition militants, and the various terrorist organizations in the region) operated from bases in both rural and urban 

areas. Although the insurgents have demonstrated the capability 

to conduct terrorist acts, these are very discriminate in nature and 

have an intended political purpose. Some of the minor acts of terror 

were clearly intended to seek revenge or punish some of the population who did not support the insurgents.

Upon their major defeat and rout by Northern Alliance and coalition forces in spring 2002, the Taliban insurgent movement entered 

a strategic defense stage. At first, this was not recognized by coalition forces. The Taliban did not go away, they merely melted into the 

population (the Taliban are indigenous Afghans) to bide their time 

for a resurgence. In this strategic defense stage, they built up their 

bases, recruited and trained new members, and continued attempts 

to implement a shadow government. Once they were prepared to resume operations, they remained fixated on the foco-military strategy 

because they perceived popular support as insufficient or nonexistent. Therefore, they did not see the need to involve political development of the populace. The insurgents were, and still are to this 

day, dominated and led by key, charismatic leaders (such as Mullah 
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Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

Omar and Mullah Berader) who form the vanguard and elite of the 

insurgency. 

The Taliban insurgents increased their level of guerrilla warfare 

operations throughout the remainder of 2002 and into 2003, but as 

of 2004, the insurgency was characterized as reaching a strategic 

stalemate. An even tempo of operations has been reached; the capabilities and effects achieved by the insurgents do not rise in any 

dramatic sense.

An analysis of the environment for the insurgency reveals advantages and disadvantages for the Taliban-led insurgency. The insurgents overwhelmingly took advantage of the mountainous terrain in 

the central region of the country and along their eastern border with 

Pakistan. These large unimproved areas, with proximity to Pakistan, 

provide key sanctuary and strategic basing for the Taliban. Unimproved roads, the few which exist, canalize mobility and limit the 

reaction times of counterinsurgent forces. The poppy crops in these 

areas of Afghanistan are vast, and the illegal trade in this drug, along 

with revenues from traditional smuggling, provides much of the financing for the insurgency. 

What limits the counterinsurgent also limits the insurgent. Due 

to the vast and separated nature of the border and central region 

sanctuaries, the insurgents have difficulty conducting large-scale, 

coordinated guerrilla operations. The various area commands are 

also hampered by this physical dislocation from one another. The 

insurgents are forced to conduct roving guerrilla operations, making 

them vulnerable to counterinsurgent forces. 

The climatic conditions in Afghanistan also cut both ways. The 

extreme heat of the summer and the cold, deep snowfall in the mountains during the winter limits military operations, particularly air 

operations. Normally, the Afghans pass the winter by remaining at 

home, maximizing family time, and visit with relatives during winter 

holidays.

The cultural and political environment for the insurgency is based 

on ethnic, tribal, and elder system of society. The tribal autonomy 

contributes to the lack of political engagement by the populace on 

national matters; there is a distrust of the central government. The 

insurgents are predominantly from the Pushtun tribal background 
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 JSOU Report 05-2

and are motivated by their code of Pushtunwali: a code which orders 

their conduct. Ideologically, they are against foreigners or any intervention in their affairs. They have an abiding respect for hospitality 

and protection of their guests and a system of “face” which dictates 

revenge (badal) if affronted. The Pushtuns are Sunni Muslims and 

their religious values foster their will to maintain the insurgency and 

replace the current Afghan government with their idealized form of 

Islamic utopia.

The Afghan government is based on the precepts of a Federal 

Republic. It is an Islamic, constitutional government, recently legitimized in a nationwide election conducted in 2005. Even so, some 

Afghans remarkably remain bitter about the makeup of the government as being too dominated by the former Northern Alliance factions. This provides some of the enmity the Taliban insurgents tap 

into for their propaganda campaign. Warlords still rule and govern, 

although they are appointed as “governors” from the central government but, in some areas, are not seen as fully legitimate representatives of the people. 

The Taliban do not enjoy popular support of the people. There 

may be active support in very limited regions, and any other support is passive in nature. The social and political grievances of the 

people still remain crime, social services, warlordism, and lack of 

international reconstruction support, but the Afghan government 

and the coalition provide a better message for hope and opportunity 

than the insurgent alternatives. Military actions, for the most part, 

have been kept small in scale and limited in scope and duration. The 

implementation of the PRTs in over nine sectors of Afghanistan has 

begun to improve social services and infrastructure, something the 

insurgents cannot accomplish. The government and the coalition are 

also helped in this endeavor by superior resources and assets in the 

information media, allowing them to get their message relayed to the 

population and to win the war of ideas. Although the insurgency has 

charismatic leadership, and it uses theological appeals to the masses 

for a better Islamic government and society, it has never delivered on 

this promise in any significant way. Ironically, the insurgent’s use of 

terrorism remains discrete and limited in order to not lose what support of the populace they may enjoy.
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Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

The organization of the insurgents is not cohesive and is still 

plagued by factionalism. It is difficult to ascertain what constitutes 

the head of the insurgency; not apparent is any existence of a main 

headquarters or political party running overall policy. The major political faction is the Hezb Al-Islami Group (HIG) led by Hekmatyr. 

The military arm is the Taliban, still led and orchestrated by Mullah 

Omar. The Al Qaeda is a pure terrorist organization and still aligns 

with and enjoys support from the Taliban dominated insurgency. 

All these elements have exhibited the ability to form various area 

and district commands and are highly conspiratorial and secret. The 

leadership is small, executive style. They are very adept at using 

the network of mosques and madrassas existing in contested areas 

for meetings, planning, and recruitment. Within urban areas, the 

insurgents form classic cellular structures with distinct specialties: 

bomb-making, propaganda, and support. 

The analysis of external support is the key to understanding the 

lifeblood of this insurgency. Sanctuary provided by crossing into the 

eastern border into the Pakistani tribal areas, or into eastern Iran 

in the Baluchistan area, has contributed more to the survival of the 

insurgents than any other factor. Fighting under the ideological banner of a global Jihad ensures sympathetic support for the Taliban, in 

the form of funding, from various Islamic nations and Islamic charities. External material support in the form of logistics and weaponry 

is also provided from the drug trade, smuggling, and black marketing. The Taliban receive moral support from Al Qaeda and from propaganda generated in Pakistani cities and on the television airwaves 

with the Al Jazeera news media. 

Finally, this analysis examines what the government and coalition response has been. When the Taliban insurgency re-emerged 

in the late summer 2002, the coalition predominantly handled the 

COIN effort in order to buy time for the political development of the 

Afghan interim government. The strategy focused on consolidating 

and holding ground and areas clearly pro-Afghan and pro-coalition; 

protecting the government and other key resources (lines of communications, major cities, the capital city of Kabul, etc.); and simultaneously deploying coalition COIN forces to conduct counter-guerrilla 

operations in insurgent-contested areas of Afghanistan. Deploying 
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forces into insurgent areas was designed to deny sanctuary, interdict 

the border, and expand governmental and coalition presence. Each 

time a new area was occupied then cleared of guerrillas, civil affairs 

activities and reconstruction activities followed.

The interim government kept on the path towards legitimacy. A 

Loya Jirga was held in summer 2002 to elect the first interim government. This political activity was followed months later by an assembly to write the national constitution. Parallel efforts were underway 

to develop the Afghan National Army, the Ministry of Defense, and 

other governmental institutions needed to run the Afghan nation. 

The interim president, Mr. Karzai, revived the tax system and began 

to replace warlords and recalcitrant governors to indicate he understood the grievances of the populace. Although the drug trade contributed immensely to the breakdown of law and order in Afghanistan, its elimination did not become the highest priority measure in 

order to first focus on defeating the insurgency. While Karzai focused 

his efforts on rebuilding the national government, the international 

community provided the earliest response to social improvements in 

the form of new schools, roads and bridges, medical centers, telecommunications system, and housing for the return of millions of 

refugees. These efforts could not be matched by the Taliban insurgents. Karzai’s most recent response to the insurgency is to offer 

conciliation and reintegration of the Taliban insurgents back into 

Afghan society.

The Conduct of the War

A focused analysis helped to develop a clear picture of the emerging 

insurgency—the formation of area commands, urban cells, a political 

front, guerrilla bands, a drug-financed support system, and even a 

psychological operations support cell. With this coherent view of the 

threat as insight, countermeasures were developed in fall 2002 and 

applied on the battlefield continuing on into the onset of winter. 

The COIN effort dramatically improved in 2003 with the deployment of Afghan National Army units (in consort with coalition 

military advisors) and the use of local militia, Afghan Militia Forces 

(AMF), and indigenous forces to focus on the remaining pockets of 

insurgent areas. To deny the Taliban their previous border sanctuary 
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with Pakistan, coalition forces conducted combined operations with 

Pakistani forces to limit access of the Taliban to previous safe areas. Combined with an effective “hearts and minds” campaign using 

PSYOP and humanitarian reconstruction assets, the coalition was 

quite effective in delegitimizing the message of the insurgents. Even 

if some segments of the populace were not in support of the government, at least these efforts kept them neutral toward supporting the 

insurgency. Because the popular support for the insurgents was very 

low, population and resource control measures were not needed, or 

instituted as one of the COIN measures. 

The arrival of spring 2003 brought on 

the first, theater-wide coordinated strategy 

to conduct COIN, as the coalition came to 

understand an accurate picture of the battlefield. Pakistan began a series of military 

maneuvers to put an end to the sanctuary 

afforded the insurgents in their northwest 

tribal areas. With the addition of the ready 

and capable battalions of the Afghan National Army and the local AMF, an aggressive 

campaign was instituted focused on those 

areas under predominant insurgent influence. Operationalizing the 

military effort of COIN resulted in the disruption, dispersion, and the 

destruction of enemy forces and the removal of hundreds of Taliban 

and Al Qaeda combatants from the equation. Attacking their sanctuaries and associated support and command and control networks 

was equally successful. One of the key, contributing factors to the 

success of this campaign was a constant update and revision of the 

original analysis of the nature of the insurgency (“gray stew”) combined with accepting risk to concentrate efforts on high payoff effects. A different approach to the enemy’s winter hiatus put coalition 

and Afghan forces on the offensive to continue to take the fight to the 

enemy and thus disrupt his emergence in spring 2004. The results 

allowed the necessary political and social solutions to work—legitimizing more and more the Afghan Interim Government. 

The operational concept devised to conduct the campaign, all 

based on joint interoperability, became a blend of COIN, CT, and 

The arrival of spring 

2003 brought on the 

first, theater-wide 

coordinated strategy 

to conduct COIN, as 

the coalition came to 

understand an 

accurate picture of 

the battlefield. 
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counter-guerrilla operations, or the “C3” technique. There are intersecting points of agreement in each of these three applications which 

can be used by commanders when faced with a war such as that 

found in Afghanistan. A lesson learned from experience, the practitioners of unconventional warfare and COIN were fused with the 

practitioners of combating terrorism by a very simplistic formula: 

COIN + Knowledge + Patience = Successful Combating Terrorism. 

(This in no way hampered or diminished CT operations when there 

was actionable intelligence.)

Given the application of successful COIN principles combined 

with the patience to gain knowledge and “finger-tip feeling” of the 

regions (operational prescience), friendly forces were able to asymmetrically approach a level of capability that would lead to successful operations against terrorists. This helped to solve one of the dilemmas posed by the “gray stew” (the cooperation of the Taliban, 

anticoalition militants, criminals, and terrorists) in separating the 

terrorists from the insurgents.

The momentum for winning the COIN campaign is on the side of 

the government and coalition forces. There still remains the requirement for the expansion of government and social services, combined 

with the establishment of some form of national economy (and a 

commensurate elimination of the drug trade). However, the Taliban 

insurgency, even though protracted in nature, may be losing its will 

to continue as they see Afghanistan improve socially and politically. 

President Karzai and the government and people of Afghanistan still 

enjoy vast international support for their cause; the Taliban, Hizb-I 

Islami Gulbuddin faction (HIG), and Al Qaeda do not.

In 2004, the Afghans conducted their first democratic election. 

Success will be achieved as more government institutions mature, 

borders are secured, the drug trade is suppressed and ongoing reconstruction continues. The Afghan government and coalition forces 

are well-positioned to win the COIN campaign in Afghanistan. 

COIN Principles Validated

From these experiences, some conclusions were drawn about principles of COIN that work in this ongoing irregular war. The observa-
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tions can hopefully serve to further help future commanders combating insurgents and terrorists in this century:

1. A correct analysis of the threat and what type of “small war” 

you are in is an absolute imperative.

 Thorough study is required in understanding the motivations and the factors which created the insurgency, its environment, and the social dynamics of the populace. Equally important is the understanding of the interrelated and 

networked nature of criminals, terrorists and insurgents 

and how they are supported and financed. Traditional Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IOE) and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) methodologies 

must be modified to perform guerrilla and insurgent IPEs. 

Law enforcement tools such as link-diagramming of criminal nets are appropriate for use in this arena. Additionally, the overall analysis should scrutinize friendly factors 

such as the capability of the host nation government to deliver social programs, provide for stability, and a look at 

its military and paramilitary forces capabilities. Removing 

and preventing the factors which created the Taliban were 

an important task in all of the lines of operation used in 

this COIN campaign: provide stability where there was lawlessness; begin education of the children in governmentsponsored schools; remove offending warlords; and, most 

importantly, remove the political patronage the Taliban and 

HIG previously held with Pakistan.

2. The political solution is the final answer to winning. 

 Even with enemy opposition in the form of “gray stew,” military operations must complement the political objectives. 

International forces, in consort with international bodies, 

must help the threatened country have a concrete “country plan” such as an IDAD strategy (and a large percentage of that plan should be developed by the host nation). 

A country plan helps to keep everyone on the same sheet 

of music and will prevent stove-piping of efforts. Of equal 

importance is to have an understanding and appreciation 

of the geo-politics of the region. For a land-locked country 

like Afghanistan sitting astride trade routes to and from 

Central Asia, the countries of Russia, Pakistan, Iran, and 

the former Soviet countries of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and 
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Kyrgyzstan have tremendous influences which shape the 

politics and nature of society internal to Afghanistan. 

3. You cannot ultimately win a war of attrition in a COIN environment. 

 Military operations must be finely-tuned to gain a favorable 

payoff. A counterstrategy to foco-military adopted by the 

insurgents is to attack the insurgents militarily in order to 

attrit and defeat their momentum. However, as the nature 

of the insurgency becomes more protracted (such as happened in Afghanistan), the strategy must shift. It is vastly 

more important to change the ideological motivators of the 

enemy and reduce his supporting capabilities. All attempts 

should be made to counter the “romanticism” of being a 

guerrilla fighter. This involves a deeper, more precise use of 

PSYOP and IO to destroy any image of an alternate or parallel existence. 

4. Intelligence is Job #1.

 The classic role of intelligence is changing in this new form 

of war. Much of what used to be considered intelligence has 

now become real-time information. All venues of information must be read and analyzed to glean “actionable” data. 

A system of monthly or quarterly assessments prepared by 

military forces stationed in each region was quite helpful 

in identifying trends and progress. Nontraditional forms of 

information lend a perspective quite helpful to commanders—UN reports, NGO/IO/PVO reports, local press, interviews by CA personnel, etc. Daily SITREPs and INTSUMs 

provide a baseline, but combined with other forms of information, a commander can gain the most precious resource 

at his mind’s disposal—knowledge. Key areas of nexus can 

be identified and attacked as critical vulnerabilities of the 

enemy. A good example may be a supply route where drug 

smugglers, gun smugglers, terrorists, and insurgents all 

traffic the same route. Hitting this nexus achieves success 

against all.

5. Use the indigenous forces. 

 The Army and militia, the police forces, trusted interpreters, local government and religious leaders, and area social 

workers put on a local face when dealing with the populace. 

The nuances of language, customs and cultures can only 
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Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

be navigated by native-born people. We are not operating 

against a terrain-oriented enemy; we are operating on “human terrain.” The best counter-guerrilla force is one made 

up of “hunter-killer” teams formed from men indigenous to 

the region.

6. You must identify who are the external supporters and how 

they are supporting the insurgents.

 A variety of pressure can then be brought to bear diplomatically to shut down these mechanisms and deny sanctuary. 

The solution may not only be military but have to include 

political repercussions. For instance, the opium trade has 

enormous bearing on the fight in Afghanistan. The poppy 

crops are planted in spring, and then harvested early summer. During this time, a certain percentage of enemy fighters are absent from the battlefield as they tend to the crop. 

By mid-summer, the drug trade starts up with fresh opium 

products and a corresponding flow of money fills the coffers 

of the enemy. With fresh money, more weapons and guerrilla fighters can be bought. Thus, in a dangerous cycle, 

fighting in Afghanistan surges in late summer and on into 

the fall, until the onset of winter. Knowing these cycles and 

how they affect the fight is a tremendous tool for where 

and how to position COIN efforts. Eventually, a more roUse of 

indigenous 

forces, to 

include the 

Afghan National Army, 

the local 

security 

forces, and 

the militia 

forces of 

the various 

governors 

was key to 

successful COIN operations throughout Afghanistan. This form of force 

multiplier often added four to six light infantry style maneuver battalions to the battlefield. (Photo courtesy of CJSOTF-Afghanistan)
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 JSOU Report 05-2

bust campaign to eradicate the poppy fields will have to be 

accomplished as a necessary line of operation to shrink terrorist and insurgent financing. The local leaders will need 

to divest themselves of this lucrative trade in order to finally 

gain legitimacy in the eyes of the populace.

7. Engage the power of religion to help solve problems. 

 The stark reality for most of these conflicts is that there 

exists a religious ideology as part of the mix. Positively engaging prominent national religious leaders along with local 

religious leaders to help further the cause of the country 

can be a powerful dynamic. The forces of religion can also 

be utilized to delegitimatize the insurgents. This is a reversing of the “liberation theology” we saw sustaining South 

American insurgents.

8. Create innovative and hybrid fighting units with mobility better than the insurgents.

 This is going to require a flattening of command and control structures while decentralizing the efforts on the battlefield. A mixture of capability utilizing indigenous forces, 

light infantry, some mechanized and armored units, CA and 

PSYOP units, SF, and appropriate intelligence and information-gathering assets is required. This hybrid unit should 

also have air and land mobility required to sustain the effort. 

Any hybrid unit must also have enough lethality, both from 

organic weapons and from theater operational resources 

close air support (CAS), to handle any fight brought on by 

the insurgents. The hybrid unit must be directly connected 

to intelligence sources without the requirement for interSpecially modified vehicles allow for long-range operations 

and several weeks of duration 

on the battlefield. Shown are 

the Ground Mobility Vehicles 

(GMVs) used by Army SF 

teams. (Photo courtesy of the 

3rd Special forces Group)
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Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

vening layers of staff. The need for backup, Quick Reaction 

Forces (QRFs) was validated as still required on this type of 

battlefield. QRFs allowed commanders flexibility to shape 

the battlefield. QRFs can be local militia or multinational 

force units.

9. The old “hamlet” idea still works. 

 The USMC was highly effective in Vietnam with the Combined Action Program, administered by Combined Action 

Platoons. The strategic hamlet idea worked successfully in 

Afghanistan. These notions are based on the “spreading 

ink blot” strategies of the French during their Indochina 

war. Small units of SF or conventional military forces adopt 

a region, then move in and provide presence and stability 

over long periods of time. Living with the indigenous populace brings its own benefits in co-opting or neutralizing a 

disaffected populace. A greater synergy is gained by developing local economies and security structures run by the 

populace. In Afghanistan, this is extremely important as 

the cultural norms of individualism, autonomy from central 

government, and the elder system of tribal and village government are prevalent. 

A typical SF firebase located in central Afghanistan. (Photo courtesy of CJSOTF-Afghanistan)
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 JSOU Report 05-2

 Success is co-opting the village and region, and success 

is also keeping the populace at least neutral toward supporting the insurgents. Combined with an aggressive humanitarian effort from CA units and NGOs/IOs/PVOs to 

bring benefits to the region, commanders were able to glean 

vast amounts of information in each village or region, allowing them to disrupt insurgents. Surprisingly, this did not 

require major financial efforts. The repair or building of a 

school, drilling a well, building a dirt road, and repairing a 

bridge were all minor construction projects with large payoff. Commanders had authority to spend up to $1,000 in 

their region to improve relations and raise the importance 

of the tribal elders who suggested the projects. An additional benefit can be gleaned by using local labor and materials—thus improving the local economy. Although this 

is characterized as “winning the hearts and minds” of the 

populace, it really was more important for providing the 

stability and presence needed by tribal and village elders to 

move their communities in a positive direction.

10. Assimilation and repatriation of the enemy is still a viable 

program. 

 Reaching out to disaffected elements of the enemy to incorporate and reintegrate them into society has to be one of 

the tools of COIN. President Karzai and the regional governors have moved in this direction and for Afghanistan, it is 

a positive direction. An additional tool at the commander’s 

disposal is to trade the guerrilla’s job and weapon for a paid 

job with the government. Allowing insurgents to “come back 

into the fold” is a powerful tool that military commanders 

should support. Being a moderate Taliban, in support of 

the Afghan government, is not a crime in Afghanistan. Being a Taliban is an ideological way of thinking. Allowing the 

moderates to eventually form legitimate political parties will 

dissuade them from becoming militarily active. This type of 

program worked with great success in bringing the insurgents in El Salvador back into the folds of society. 

11. Patience, Patience, Patience is a virtue. 

 Military commanders and governmental agencies need to 

be often reminded that COIN is a long-term investment if 

you want to achieve success. We gained success in the El 

Salvador COIN effort after 13 years’ perseverance.
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Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

12. Information Operations is old wine in a new bottle but the 

speed provided by information technology is staggering.

 Failure to get and keep highly qualified people who understand this “art” will hamstring COIN efforts. Friendly information operations have to win the race with the enemy to 

be effective—the message you want to get out must get out 

first. We cannot afford to get sidelined by sensational news 

and then go into a defensive IO campaign.

13. Once you gain contact with insurgents or terrorists keep contact and press the fight.

 Whether it is 3 personnel or 30, your COIN units and organizations must have the flexibility and adaptability needed 

to keep in contact and keep the fight going. On a cost-benefit analysis alone, it probably takes 90 percent of your resources to get the 10 percent effect of destroying or disrupting the enemy. You do not want to let the opportunity slip 

out of your hands. When the populace sees the ugliness of 

dead insurgents, it helps to demystify the cause. 

14. Population and resource control is effective, if done correctly. 

 There have been some egregious historical examples of misuse of this technique, such as relocating whole villages or 

clans. However, surrounding a town or village and controlling the traffic in and out often led to the capture of anticoalition militants and cleansed the village of the insurgents.

15. Dearming and demilitarization programs are necessary evils 

that really do not have high payoff.

 This includes the never-ending search for caches of weapons and ammunition. You have to do this to prevent the use 

of these weapons and supplies by the insurgents against 

your forces, but just like attrition strategies, these often are 

meaningless statistics, and commanders should be wary of 

giving them too much credibility. Most of the populace is 

astute enough to hide their best weaponry, if for no other 

reason than for their self-defense.

16. You have to plug the leaks and holes on the battlefield. 

 Isolating and destroying insurgents in sanctuaries is a must, 

along with interdiction of guerrilla bases and infiltration 

and exfiltration routes of insurgents. Conduct an aggressive surveillance campaign along lines of communications 
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for the enemy and design effective interdiction campaigns 

to damage and hinder enemy operations. The new enemy 

has migrated to urban areas, so a tremendous amount of 

effort must be spent on the location of enemy safe houses 

and identifying agents who support the enemy. Developing 

governmental institutions like the border security forces 

and customs agencies, while developing and growing local 

police and intelligence personnel, will strengthen this effort.

The war in Afghanistan provides the clearest example of how insurgencies blended with terrorism could affect military operations in 

the 21st century. Understanding its dynamics could lead to a reformulation of theories and doctrine for how to fight this new form of 

war. There are valid lessons learned from the experiences of the Afghan conflict which could be potentially helpful to future commanders. The conduct of COIN, CT and counter-guerrilla operations in 

Afghanistan is succeeding. Patience, combined with taking a longterm view to visualize the end state, will result in one of the most 

successful COIN campaigns. The experiences of fighting insurgents 

in Afghanistan provide a study for one of the first outbreaks of insurgency in the 21st century, and its eventual resolution will provide a 

variety of lessons learned for counterinsurgents.
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Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

6. Conclusion

Special Operations Forces are uniquely organized and equipped 

to fight in the changing unconventional warfare environment 

of the 21st century. This paper was an effort to contribute 

to formulating the theoretical aspects concerning insurgencies and 

counterinsurgency. It provides a source of information for professionals of counterinsurgency and irregular warfare. If the trend in 

warfare for the 21st century is increasing outbreaks of insurgency, 

then we must prioritize and focus a new generation of warriors by 

shifting the organizational culture of our armed forces from conventional-direct war-making to the unconventional-indirect style of warfare. This includes a robust effort within the SOF community to serve 

as the lead and repository of theory and experience in this “art” of 

warfare. We will need to recognize and foster those in our ranks who 

have the appreciation and experience of counterinsurgency theory 

and application. 

SOF will continue to have a unique role in this form of unconventional warfare and a vast amount of expertise concerning counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare already resides in the community. 

SOF have proven in El Salvador, the Philippines, and in Afghanistan that they can successfully execute COIN. If insurgency, guerrilla warfare and terrorism, continue to be the prevailing form of 

warfare we will experience as a result of the GWOT, then SOF will be 

looked upon as the expert source for translating the theory and art 

of this form of unconventional warfare into practical application on 

the ground. 

As the U.S. military power grows unchallengeable in the conventional realm, our enemies have sought to engage us militarily in the 

unconventional arena of asymmetric operations—terrorism, insurgency, and guerrilla warfare. These forms of irregular warfare are 

operating in a congruence of effort and transcending into a new form 

of asymmetric war known as the “gray” area. 

Historically, these forms of conflict prove quite attractive to a 

weaker foe, but the body of evidence indicates the stronger actor, applying successful principles of counterinsurgency, counter guerrilla 
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and counterterrorism techniques, can still prevail in a large percentage of cases. Insurgents can win, however, and have proven so in 

roughly a third of the instances where asymmetric warfare is chosen 

as the means to challenge the stronger actor. 

The new challenge of “gray stew”, the nexus of terrorism, insurgency, criminality, and negative transnational factors, poses new 

dilemmas for war fighters. Can there be a political concession or 

solution for this new type of enemy, once they combine? Formerly, 

we separated the populace from the guerrillas, but how do we now 

separate the terrorists from the guerrillas is a more important step? 

While we apply strategies to win similar to playing chess and checkers, the forces of “gray stew” surprise us by playing poker and raising the ante. How do we win the “hearts and minds” of the populace 

when they live in parallel and alternate worlds created by this new 

form of threat? (Or even worse, they are “heartless” and “mindless!”) 

How can we compete with tribal, religious and ethnic factors that 

neutralize our countermeasures?

New strategies are required. Along with existing countermeasures, we should explore other asymmetric options to employ against 

this enemy such as co-option, neutralization, subversion, sabotage, 

coercion and what Dr. Boaz Ganor, famed Israeli counterterrorist 

theorist of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism in 

Herzliya, Israel, describes as “counter-motivation”.23

“Know your enemy” must include a more comprehensive study 

of what makes him tick than just a study of his tactical methods. 

Philosophical, theoretical, ideological, religious and historic motivators should be taken into account to understand the world of today’s 

insurgents. In Afghanistan, the Taliban are Afghans, and to some 

extent still enjoy support of the populace for some of their more moderate agendas. Getting at the root causes for this support involves a 

scholarly approach beyond traditional military studies. 

A “hearts and minds” campaign may not work when alternate 

and parallel worlds exist between the insurgents, the disaffected and 

the government. The war of the minds has been elevated to an ideological battle. This will be the most challenging problem to solve for 

contemporary theorists of counterinsurgency. At best, neutralization 
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Celeski: Operationalizing COIN.

and suppression of this effect may be the only solution rather than 

winning.

Command and control mechanisms must be tailored to support 

hybrid units and ensure flexibility and responsiveness to levels never 

before imagined. This will necessitate the “flattening” of traditional 

staff systems and the retraining of key staff as COIN experts. Sensor-to-shooter links need to be shortened as well as informationto-shooter links. Quicker and more responsive arrangements for 

command and control (supporting and supported vs. traditional OPCON/TACON arrangements) provide the flexibility for forces on the 

battlefield. Major headquarters will assume more and more of the 

responsibility of becoming force and resource providers vice commanding and maneuvering combat forces directly.

As the enemy becomes “gray”, hybrid units should become “gray.” 

We should see specialty stovepipes being erased. New hybrid units 

must be self-contained to have the skills and capabilities of unconventional, specialized, conventional, and humanitarian organizations with their own robust organic firepower and intelligence and 

information fusion cells.

The SOF warrior of tomorrow will need a variety of skills and tools 

to act much more capably than the infantrymen or special operations 

warrior we know today. This new warrior will need law enforcement 

tools, intelligence agent skills, and humanitarian and peacekeeping 

skills in addition to his previous warfighting skills. Most importantly, 

he will need the education, the insight, and the appreciation of the 

“human terrain” to develop his COIN campaigns. For this, a modern 

theory and doctrine for operationalizing COIN is essential. 

Endnotes

 1. Gerolymatos, Andre. Red Acropolis, Black Terror: The Greek Civil War 

and the Origins of Soviet- American Rivalry, 1943-1949. Basic Books, 

Perseus Book Group: Cambridge, MA, 2004, pp. 147-147. The US 

intervention in the Greek Civil War was the first post-war example of 

foreign internal defense and foreign assistance provided by the US to 

defeat a revolutionary insurgency. Many of the lessons learned by the 

US in this conflict would make up the techniques used later during 

the Vietnam War and the development of our own FID doctrine. 

 2. General Lindsay’s remarked were recorded in the outgoing publication “A CLIC Conference Report” published in January of 1989 by the 
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Army and Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, Langley AFB, 

pp. 24-25.

 3. “Synchronization is the arrangement of military actions in time, space, 

and purpose to maximum relative combat power at a decisive place 

and time. USSOCOM synchronizes operations against terrorist networks by arranging military actions in time and space and leading a 

global planning process against extremists in coordination with other 

Combatant Commanders, the Interagency and partner nations. The 

purpose of synchronizing DoD’s plans and operations is to leverage 

fully the capabilities of the Department of Defense in support of the 

USG’s Global War on Terrorism.” USSOCOM intends to combine the 

earlier core tasks of PSYOP and IO into the 8th task. Courtesy of the 

Joint Special Operations University SOED-F. 

 4. Kelly, Ross S. Special Operations and National Purpose. Lexington 

Books, D.C Heath and Company: Lexington, MA, 1989, pp. xvi-xvii. 

Kelly provides one of the few works on the strategic and operational 

purpose for having a national SOF.

 5. Dr. Steve Metz was an Associate Professor of National Security Affairs 

at the Strategic Studies Institute of the Army War College in Carlisle 

Barracks, PA. He earned his doctorate degree in political science from 

John Hopkins University. He was extraordinarily prescient in the writing of his paper in the mid-90s, basically advocating to the U.S. Army 

that a revival of counterinsurgency expertise was required. 

 6. Joint Publication 3-07.1 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 

for Foreign Internal Defense (FID), The Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, US Govt Printing Office, Wash, D.C., 30 Apr 2004, p. I-1. 

Surprisingly, this JP serves as the only joint doctrine source for an 

American way of war to conduct counterinsurgency. Joint Doctrine 

officers have confirmed no work is currently in progress specifically to 

address joint doctrine for counterinsurgency, even though the United 

States is currently embroiled in two counterinsurgencies, Iraq and Afghanistan. Overall, this joint publication suggests the American military take efforts to not become engaged in counterinsurgency and is 

defensive in nature. 

 7. Anderson, John Lee. Guerrillas – Journeys in the Insurgent World, 

(New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 64. Anderson traveled extensively to 

visit a variety of existing guerrilla and insurgent activities and recognized a constant theme of their attempts to create an alternate government to legitimize their efforts to the affected populace. In some cases, 

he explained this phenomenon as creating an ‘alternate reality’.

 8. Gingrich, Newt. Winning the Future – A 21st Century Contract with 

America. Regnery Publishing, Inc.,: Washington D.C., 2005, pp. 8-9. 

Gingrich, along with other contemporary writers, recognizes the growing trend on the convergence of irregular warfare enemies. 

 9. Baillie, Mark. “Islamist Terrorism: A Primer” CDISS Paper #1: The 

Center for Defence and International Security Studies: Henley-onThames, UK, 2004, p. 8. Note the trend to cast a wider net in describ-
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ing the battlespace of the new terrorists. A shift is occurring from 

transnational to ultra-national. 

 10. Islamic Glossary Term: Jihad. www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/reference/

glossary/term.JIHAD. 17 Nov 2004.

 11. Rashid, Ahmed. Jihad – The rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia. New 

Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002. pg. 2.

 12. Webster’s Collegiate Thesaurus. Merriam-Webster, Inc., Springfield, 

MA: 1976. p. 826.

 13. Joes, Anthony James. Resisting Rebellion: History and Politics of 

Counterinsurgency. Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 

2004.

 14. Laird, Melvin R. & McGee, Griffin, Schelling. The Nixon Doctrine. Notes 

and essays from a town hall meeting held by the American Enterprise 

Institute for Public Policy Research: Washington, D.C. 1972, p. 4.

 15. Joes, Anthony James. Modern Guerrilla Insurgency. Praeger: Westport, CT, 1992. p. 209.

 16. Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. “How the Weak Win Wars – A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict.” International Security 26.1 (2001), pp. 93-128. Copyright 

2001 The Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

 17. Ibid, pg 105.

 18. Taber, Robert. War of the Flea – The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare. Brassey’s Inc.: Dulles, VA, 2002, p. 81.

 19. Nagl, John A. Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam 

– Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife. Praeger, Westport, CT: 1966, pp. 

170-171. LTC Nagl provides an illuminating review on the development of doctrine and leadership for irregular warfare challenges by 

comparing British and US models for counterinsurgency. Much of 

what he has identified contributed to the aversion of the US military 

from pursuing doctrinal and practical work in the art of counterinsurgency.

 20. Benjamin, Daniel and Steven Simon. The Age of Sacred Terror. (NY: 

Random House, 2003), 135-136.

 21. A systematic methodology for analysis of insurgency was developed 

by Bard E. O’Neill in his work Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare (published by Brassey’s, Inc., Dulles, VA, 

1990). His work examines the reasons for insurgency, the nature of 

the insurgency, insurgent strategies, the environment of the insurgency, the measure of popular support, insurgent organizations, external 

support, and the government response. 

 22. O’Neill, Bard. Insurgency & Terrorism – Inside Modern Revolutionary 

Warfare. Dulles, VA: Brassey’s Inc., 1990, pp. 17-19. O’Neill’s work 

defines the standard for any analysis of insurgency or terrorism. 

 23. (Dr. Boaz Ganor from a lecture at the JSOU annual Counter Terrorism 

conference, 25 Sep – 1 Oct 2004, Orlando, FL. Dr. Ganor is the Staff 

Executive Director and contributing writer for the International Policy 

Institute for Counter-Terrorism in Herzliya, Israel. Website www.ict.

org.il.) 

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Appendix A. 

Principles, Axioms & Rules

“Insurgency, of course, is hardly a new phenomenon, as Roman 

armies could have reported from Gaul, Judea, or elsewhere. 

Indeed, insurgency has probably been the most prevalent type 

of armed conflict since the creation or organized political communities. It would be difficult and perhaps impossible to find 

many volumes on political history that do not mention rebellions, revolutions, uprisings, and the like.”1

– Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism

Principles for Successful Insurgencies

Know your enemy is a time-honored maxim from Sun Tzu’s The Art of 

War. Practitioners in the operational art of COIN, in order to achieve 

success, must be familiar with enduring lessons and generally applicable principles for insurgency deduced from these lessons. A key 

caveat for the commander and planner is to not fall into the trap of 

drawing lessons from the analysis of any one insurgency as being 

valid for all others. Each case of insurgency must be analyzed within 

its own context. However, some generalized lessons can be drawn 

from insurgent theory, insurgent strategies, and historical case studies in order to understand why insurgencies can be successful: 

1. The political has primacy over the military effort. 

 The insurgents who can make the case for a better message to solve political and social grievances, who can develop parallel state or political systems which outperform 

the government, and who can make the status quo political 

situation intolerant for the populace have a better chance 

for success. 

2. Legitimacy. 

 Insurgents who have more legitimacy than the government 

in the eyes of the populace and the wider diplomatic world, 

while at the same time, delegitimizing the current government can be successful.
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3. Popular Support. 

 If the insurgents have wide appeal by the populace for the 

cause, combined with mass mobilization, it is pretty much 

a “done deal”—they tend to be highly successful (Mao and 

the Chinese Revolution).

4. Outstanding Leadership and Organization. 

 Highly charismatic leadership, who are themselves intellectual enough to provide strategy, focus, and drive to the 

insurgency, backed up by an outstanding political and military organization, can contribute highly to the success of 

the effort. They also contribute in motivating and rallying 

the populace to win over their support, as well as keep up 

the morale of the insurgents.

5. Use of Indigenous Forces. 

 Insurgencies are most successful when the military forces 

of the insurgency are comprised from within the indigenous 

populace. Guerrillas and insurgents from outside the area 

do not receive the welcome of the populace and tend to not 

establish the rapport needed to “swim in the sea.” We have 

seen in some of the current insurgencies, such as in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, the insurgents enjoy enough external 

support and financing they seem to not require the support 

of the populace.

6. Adoption of Correct Strategy. 

 Mao’s strategy of revolutionary warfare and Che’s treatise 

on the strategy of guerrilla warfare tend to be widely adopted and used successfully by insurgents, even after modifications by the insurgents due to local conditions and context. Insurgents who can successfully translate the essence 

of the strategic and operational art factors of time, space,

and will into the elements of their campaign tend to be successful. However, picking the wrong strategy is often fatal 

- terrorism and barbarism can achieve political effects as 

well as intimidate a populace to get their support, but traditionally fails in the long run as a strategy. Choosing to conduct an urban-based insurgency is not highly regarded as 

a good strategy either (note the effects of the destruction of 

the insurgents and terrorists in Fallujah, Iraq, during COIN 

operations in the fall 2004). Whichever strategy chosen, the 
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one with best success incorporates flexibility, innovation 

and has a dynamic nature to them.

7. Conduct Protracted Warfare. 

 The extension of time to wear down and attrit the enemy 

and to allow time for the achievement of political objectives 

is a successful tactic in insurgency. Protracted warfare also 

contributes to allow for the husbanding of strength of guerrilla forces and allowing their buildup and development into 

a larger force, allows for the building and development of 

strategic bases and sanctuaries, and facilitates the time 

needed to build the political mobilization of the populace. 

As the axiom goes: insurgents win if they are never defeated. Prolonging the war also contributes to wearing down the 

will of the conventional forces and invoking “war weariness” 

on the populace and the government.

Guerrillas typically will be armed with a variety of small arms rather 

than major combat systems in order to preserve their mobility. (Photo 

courtesy of CJSOTF-Afghanistan)
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8. Superb Intelligence System. 

 The successful insurgencies develop an intelligence and espionage system superior to their opposition. This includes 

detailed knowledge of terrain, the enemy forces, and the 

operating locales.

9. Mobility. 

 Successful insurgents must not be outmatched in mobility. 

Higher mobility than conventional forces prevents defeat 

during combat operations and allows insurgents to pick the 

time and place of their operations. 

10. Strategic Basing and Sanctuary. 

 Insurgents require and need a base of operations which 

allow them survivability and refuge while negating the 

strength and technology of COIN forces. The correct choice 

of a strategic basing area also allows the insurgent forces 

to fight on grounds favorable to them and contributes to 

the prolonging of the war. Strategic bases and sanctuary 

provide the space required for insurgent maneuver, support 

areas, and protection. Insurgents who are adept at creating 

space which works for them also help create conditions for 

success. 

Of course, not any single one of these actions in isolation will 

translate into victory for insurgents. Rather, an astute insurgent 

leader combines many of these principles to increase chances for 

success, all within the context of his local conditions. 

Principles for Successful COIN Operations

Conducting a successful COIN campaign is achievable but very difficult for nations and armies trained for conventional war. No two 

successful COIN campaigns have ever provided all the answers to 

develop the next successful COIN campaign. The most important 

consideration taken to operationalize your COIN efforts is the correct analysis of what you really have before you. In fact, the success 

of your COIN campaign will hinge on that factor. Get the analysis 

right, pick the correct COIN strategy, apply the oft-recognized COIN 

principles for success, and you will build the conditions for success 

of the COIN operation. The second most important consideration is 
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to be flexible in the adoption of the following countermeasures and 

ensure you tailor your efforts to fix problems within the context of 

your campaign:

1. The Political Objective outweighs the Military Objective. 

 The penultimate choice for success in any COIN is to solve 

the political and social grievances which foster the discontent. This can only be done by good governance, not by a 

war of attrition with insurgents. Both the ability and capabilities of the government and the support of the populace 

become important factors in your campaign plan. 

2. Legitimacy. 

 Your demonstration of good governance and provisions for 

security and economic success must be better than the 

alternate state proposed by the insurgents, and it must 

be recognized as legitimate in the eyes of the people and 

the wider diplomatic community. You must win the war of 

ideas. Governmental institutions must respect the rule of 

law and human rights. This may require COIN forces to assist in the development of civil and administrative functions 

(state building) and be prepared to conduct SASO. There 

must be an adequate state government which can work to 

provide the solutions for political and social grievances. To 

be successful, the counterinsurgency efforts of all must destroy whatever message the insurgency is promising and 

conversely delegitimize and isolate them militarily and politically. This may include the co-option of the insurgents.

3. Selection of Appropriate and Adaptable Strategy. 

 We have clearly learned from experience that you cannot 

fight an unconventional war in a conventional manner. 

Force-on-force strategies cannot be adopted in asymmetric 

situations. Selection of an indirect strategy is more appropriate to counter an unconventional, asymmetric force. A 

synthesized strategy formulated from multiple counterinsurgency techniques, which allows for flexibility and adaptation to changing local conditions, has the best chance for 

success.

4. Unity of Effort and Unity of Command. 

There must be unity of effort and command between the 

civil and military authorities to have a successful coun-
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terinsurgency. Coordination along objectives derived from 

the strategic concept must exist at federal and state levels 

of government in intelligence matters, civil administrative 

matters, law enforcement, and in military operations (counter guerrilla and counter terrorist).

5. Coordinated and Multi-layered Intelligence and Information 

System. 

 Historically, 90 percent of the effort in finding and defeating insurgents is the result of good old police and detective 

work combined with military intelligence. A well-integrated 

and well-resourced intelligence and information gathering 

system, coordinated and fused at all levels, has proven to 

be one of the most highly successful COIN techniques. It 

must also be capable of shortening the sensor-to-shooter 

execution cycle. 

6. Win the ‘Hearts and Minds’ of the Populace. 

 As Mao elucidated, the populace is the sea in which the 

guerrillas (the fish) swim in; draining the sea and removing 

the support of the populace for the insurgents is another 

highly successful technique in counterinsurgency. The inConducting a “Hearts and Minds” campaign, utilizing government 

forces, is a classic principle for success in any COIN campaign. (Photo 

courtesy of CJSOTF- Afghanistan)
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surgency is fought on human terrain through the war of 

ideas. Without the populace, the insurgents are denied 

operating space, support systems, recruitment, etc. Winning the ‘hearts and minds’ may involve population and 

resource control measures if the insurgents are adept at 

terrorizing and intimidating the populace for their support. 

If the populace is the number one center of gravity in your 

COIN campaign (and not the institutions of government), 

then the security and stability of populated areas will become paramount as an objective.

8) Utilization of Professional Counterinsurgency Forces & the 

Conduct of Minimal Military Operations.

 Conventionally trained forces will find it challenging to convert to tactics and procedures required for COIN if they are 

not developed and trained in those skills prior to their insertion in combat. A core cadre of specialized light infantry, 

special operations forces, and intelligence personnel should 

be developed with extra training and consideration given to 

their capabilities in counterinsurgency warfare, language, 

regional expertise, and interpersonal skills. They are reCOIN forces will require a mobility capability greater than or equal to 

the insurgents. (Modified Toyota gun truck in Afghanistan—photo courtesy of CJSOTF – Afghanistan)
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ally diplo-warriors. They will require mobility as great as 

or better than the insurgents and staying power to remain 

in the field for long periods of time. However, there is a 

substantial role for conventional forces to operate alongside 

of tailored COIN forces to buttress and consolidate areas 

under governmental control, provide reaction forces, and 

to take on insurgent main forces if they choose to fight. 

Historical evidence indicates that required force ratios of 

counterinsurgents to insurgents on the ground is about 

10:1 through 15:1, but these ratios can be mitigated with 

technology. 

 Military actions should be kept to the barest minimum, 

subordinate to wider civil-political objectives and be of a 

very discerning and discriminating nature. Combat must 

be tailored to isolate the insurgent without affecting the 

populace or one runs the risk of alienating the populace. 

Counterinsurgency forces are typified by their decentralized, small-unit actions giving them the best chance for 

success against insurgents.

9. Use of Indigenous Forces - Counterorganization.

Nobody knows the area and the populace best than police 

and military personnel formed from the indigenous population. Using host nation populace in conscripted units and 

volunteer units assists efforts to mobilize the populace to 

defend themselves and help fight the war. One of the first 

efforts in preparing to conduct COIN will be the need to 

generate enough indigenous force structure to provide this 

security. Counterorganization forces are those forces who 

adopt the style and tactics of the insurgents—to match 

them. They are best utilized in counterinsurgency formations as scouts, hunter-killer teams, pseudo-guerrillas, 

and commandos. They are extremely useful in local and 

regional paramilitary outfits as an economy of force. Gendarme type units of local law enforcement personnel help 

foster governmental legitimacy and rule of law at local and 

district outposts. At the higher organizational level, national forces put a legitimate face on larger conventional operations when conducted. Foreign military forces and outside 

advisors can often be seen as occupiers of the country or 

manipulators of the government’s armed forces.
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10. Denial of Sanctuary and External Support. 

 Insurgent space must constantly be threatened in order to 

throw off their timing and their will to continue. This may 

require the shutting down of a border, or a raid into an adjoining country supporting the insurgency. External support in the form of finance, equipment and diplomatic will 

need to be eliminated, interdicted, or neutralized using all 

elements of power. This saps the will and the lifeline of the 

insurgent organization and is a key measure to be accomplished to have a successful counterinsurgency program.

11. Patience. 

 If you do not have the patience to outlast the will of the insurgents and their strategy for protracted war and wars of 

attrition, you will ultimately fail. Tailor your national will, 

your forces, and your sustainment base for operations over 

the long haul, and you will be more successful. 

Adoption of these time-honored principles, tailored to the exigencies of the insurgency you are dealing with, tends to foster success. 

Again, not any one in isolation will work; in fact, utilizing all of these 

in conjunction with each other increases the level of success. 

 Caveat: no two insurgencies are alike; do not make 

the mistake of blindly, or without analysis, applying measures which may have worked in other insurgencies! Use them as a guide for application to 

your situation. Success is never guaranteed, due to 

all the variety of factors which could occur throughout a counterinsurgency.

Notes

 1. O’Neill, Bard. Insurgency & Terrorism—Inside Modern Revolutionary 

Warfare. Dulles, VA: Brassey’s Inc., 1990, pg. 1.

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Appendix B. Acronyms

ACM. . . . . . . . . . . . . anti-coalition militants

AFSOF . . . . . . . . . . . air force special operations forces 

AMF. . . . . . . . . . . . . Afghan Militia Forces

AOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . area of responsibility

ARSOF. . . . . . . . . . . army special operations forces

ARVN . . . . . . . . . . . . Army of the Republic of Vietnam 

ASD(SO/LIC) . . . . . . Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special 

Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict)

AQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Al Qaeda

C2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . command and control

C4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . command, control, communications, and 

computers

CA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . civil affairs

CAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . close air support

CBT . . . . . . . . . . . . . combating terrorism 

CDRUSSOCOM . . . . Commander, United States Special Operations Command

CI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . counterintelligence

CIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . Central Intelligence Agency

CJSOTF . . . . . . . . . . Combined Joint Special Operations Task 

Force

CMO . . . . . . . . . . . . civil-military operations

COA. . . . . . . . . . . . . course of action

COIN . . . . . . . . . . . . counterinsurgency

CONPLAN . . . . . . . . operation plan in concept format

CT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . counterterrorism

DA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . direct action

DATT . . . . . . . . . . . . defense attaché

DIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . Defense Intelligence Agency

DIME . . . . . . . . . . . . Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and 

Economic 

DOD . . . . . . . . . . . . Department of Defense

DOS. . . . . . . . . . . . . Department of State

FID . . . . . . . . . . . . . foreign internal defense
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FM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . field manual

GMV . . . . . . . . . . . . ground mobility vehicle

GW . . . . . . . . . . . . . guerrilla warfare

GWOT . . . . . . . . . . . global war on terrorism

HIG . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hezb Il-Islamiya terrorist Group

HN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . host nation

HUMINT. . . . . . . . . . human intelligence

IDAD . . . . . . . . . . . . internal defense and development

IED . . . . . . . . . . . . . improvised explosive device

IMU . . . . . . . . . . . . . Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

INTSUM . . . . . . . . . . intelligence summary

IO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . information operations

IO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . international organizations

IPE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . intelligence preparation of the environment

IPB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . intelligence preparation of the battlefield

ISAF. . . . . . . . . . . . . Interim Security Assistance Force

JOA . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint operations area

JP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint publication

JPOTF . . . . . . . . . . . joint psychological operations task force

JSCP . . . . . . . . . . . . Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

JSOAC . . . . . . . . . . . joint special operations air component 

JSOTF . . . . . . . . . . . joint special operations task force

JTF . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint task force

LIC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Low Intensity Conflict

LOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . line of communications

METT-T . . . . . . . . . . mission, enemy, troops, terrain, time

MOE . . . . . . . . . . . . measure of effectiveness

MOOTW . . . . . . . . . . Military Operations Other Than War 

MTT . . . . . . . . . . . . . mobile training team

NATO . . . . . . . . . . . . North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAVSOF. . . . . . . . . . naval special operations forces

NCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . national command authority

NGO. . . . . . . . . . . . . non-governmental organization

NMS. . . . . . . . . . . . . national military strategy

NVN . . . . . . . . . . . . . North Vietnam

NVA . . . . . . . . . . . . . North Vietnamese Army
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OPCON . . . . . . . . . . operational control

OPLAN . . . . . . . . . . . operation plan

PAO . . . . . . . . . . . . . public affairs officer

POLAD . . . . . . . . . . . political advisor

PRT . . . . . . . . . . . . . Provincial Reconstruction Team

PSYOP . . . . . . . . . . . psychological operations

PVO . . . . . . . . . . . . . private organization

QRF . . . . . . . . . . . . . quick reaction force

ROE. . . . . . . . . . . . . rules of engagement

ROMO . . . . . . . . . . . range of military operations

SA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . security assistance

SAO . . . . . . . . . . . . . security assistance organization

SASO . . . . . . . . . . . . stability and support operations

SF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . special forces

SFLE . . . . . . . . . . . . special forces liaison element

SITREP . . . . . . . . . . situation report

SOCCE . . . . . . . . . . special operations control and coordination element

SOCOORD . . . . . . . . special operations coordinating element

SOF . . . . . . . . . . . . . special operations forces

SOLE . . . . . . . . . . . . special operations liaison element

SVN . . . . . . . . . . . . . South Vietnam

TACON. . . . . . . . . . . tactical control

TSOC . . . . . . . . . . . . Theater Special Operations Command

TTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . tactics, techniques, and procedures 

TUAV . . . . . . . . . . . . tactical unmanned aerial vehicle 

USDAO . . . . . . . . . . United States defense attaché office

USMC . . . . . . . . . . . United States Marine Corps

USSOCOM . . . . . . . . United States Special Operations Command

UW . . . . . . . . . . . . . Unconventional Warfare

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Appendix C. Definitions

campaign. A campaign is joint by nature and generally described as a series of related major operations aimed at 

achieving a strategic or operational objective within a given 

time and space. Within a campaign, major operations consist of coordinated actions in a single phase of a campaign 

and usually decide the course of the campaign. Campaigns 

synchronize and integrate necessary joint force operations 

as well as multinational operations and, when appropriate, the activities of the HN, OGAs, IGOs, and select NGOs. 

(Draft JP 3-0)

campaign plan. A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1-02)

civil administration. An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local 

government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United 

States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous 

civil government can be established. Also called CA administration. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs. Designated Active and Reserve component forces 

and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to 

conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military 

operations. Also called CA. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs activities. Activities performed or supported by 

civil affairs that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military 

forces are present; and (2) involve application of civil affairs 

functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of civil-military operations. (JP1-02)

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that 

establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between 

military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian 

organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in 
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a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include 

performance by military forces of activities and functions 

normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national 

government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or 

subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, 

if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil 

military operations may be performed by designated civil 

affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil 

affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02)

combatting terrorism. Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken 

to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism) taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. Also 

called CBT. (JP 1-02)

conventional forces. 1. Those forces capable of conducting 

operations using nonnuclear weapons. 2. Those forces other than designated special operations forces. (JP 1-02)

counterinsurgency. Those military, paramilitary, political, 

economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Also called COIN. (JP 1-02)

counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on 

behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign 

organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorists 

activities. Also called CI. (JP 1-02)

counterterrorism. Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. (JP 1-02)

country team. The senior, in-country, US coordinating and 

supervising body, headed by the chief of the US diplomatic 

mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented US department or agency, as desired by the chief 

of the US diplomatic mission. (JP 1-02)

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military 

agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization 
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to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, 

and insurgency. Also called FID. (JP 1-02)

host nation. A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies 

of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its 

territory. Also called HN. (JP 1-02)

insurgency. An organized movement aimed at the overthrow 

of a constituted government through use of subversion and 

armed conflict. (JP 1-02)

internal defense and development. The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It 

focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, 

social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. 

Also called IDAD. (JP 1-02)

irregular challenges. Employment of “unconventional” forms 

of competition and resistance such as terrorism, insurgency, insurrection, and criminality to counter traditional U.S. 

advantages. (OSD)

joint task force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, 

a subordinate unified command commander, or an existing 

joint task force commander. Also called JTF. (JP 1-02)

lines of operation. A line of operation defines the orientation 

of the force in time and space, or purpose in relation to an 

adversary or objective. Commanders may describe the operation along lines of operations that are physical, logical, 

or both. A physical line of operation connects a series of 

decisive points over time that lead to control of a geographic 

objective or defeat of an enemy force. A logical line of operation links multiple decisive points with the logic of purpose 

to defeat an enemy or achieve an objective. (Draft JP 3-0)

military civic action. The use of preponderantly indigenous 

military forces on projects useful to the local population at 

all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, 

agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing 

of the military forces with the population. (US forces may at 
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times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas 

areas.) (JP 1-02)

nation assistance. Civil and/or military assistance rendered 

to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory 

during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on 

agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation 

assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other US Code title 

10 (DOD) programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or international organizations. (JP 1-02)

operational art. Operational art is the employment of military 

forces to achieve strategic and/or operational objectives 

through the design, organization, integration, and conduct 

of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. It 

translates the combatant commander’s strategy into operational design, and ultimately into tactical action, by integrating ends, ways, and means across the levels of war. 

Operational art is the creative model and thought process 

commanders use to determine how best to efficiently and 

effectively employ military capabilities to accomplish their 

mission. Operational art also promotes unified action by 

helping JFCs and planners understand how to facilitate the 

integration of other agencies and multinational partners toward achieving the desired end state. (Draft JP 3-0)

paramilitary forces. Forces or groups distinct from the regular 

armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. (JP 1-02)

propaganda. Any form of communication in support of national objectives designed to influence the opinions, emotions, 

attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the 

sponsor, either directly or indirectly. (JP 1-02)

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to 

influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and 

ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and 

behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called 

PSYOP. (JP 1-02)
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security assistance. Group of programs authorized by the 

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms 

Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related 

statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense related services, 

by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Also called SA. (JP 1-02)

security assistance organization. All Department of Defense 

elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance management 

functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, 

military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance functions. 

Also called SAO. (JP 1-02)

special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and 

equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also 

called SOF. (JP 1-02)

stability operations. As sustained combat operations conclude, military forces must focus their priority on stability operations, which likely will involve both combat and 

noncombat. Of particular importance will be CMO; initially 

conducted to secure and safeguard the populace, reestablishing civil law and order, protect or rebuild key infrastructure, and restore public services. The long-term goal of stability operations is to develop an indigenous capacity for 

securing essential services, a viable market economy, and 

rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society. US military forces should be prepared to support the 

activities necessary to accomplish these tasks when indigenous civil authorities are unable to follow through. PSYOP 

will play an important role in providing public information 

to foreign populations during this period. (Draft JP 3-0) 

subversion. Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a 

regime. See also unconventional warfare. (JP 1-02)

terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat 

of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce 
JSOU Report 05-2

106

or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of 

goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. 

(JP 1-02) 

unconventional warfare. A broad spectrum of military and 

paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous 

or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, 

supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external 

source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, 

subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. Also called UW. (JP 1-02)
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Additional Reading

Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. “How the Weak Win Wars – A Theory of 

Asymmetric Conflict.” International Security 26.1 (2001), 

pp. 93-128. Copyright 2001 The Massachusetts Institute 

of Technology.

Baillie, Mark. “Islamist Terrorism: A Primer” CDISS Paper #1: 

The Center for Defence and International Security Studies: 

Henley-on-Thames, UK, 2004

Byman, Daniel and Chalk, Hoffman, Rosenau, Brannan. 

“Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements. 

RAND National Security Research Division: Arlington, VA, 

2001. 

Che Guevarra Guerrilla Warfare

Laird, Melvin R. & McGee, Griffin, Schelling. The Nixon Doctrine. The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 

Research: Washington, D.C. 1972

Mao Tse Tung On Guerrilla Warfare, translated by Samuel B. 

Griffith II., Champaign, IL: The University of Illinois Press, 

2000.

Small Wars and Insurgencies. Vol 12, No. 2, Summer 2001. 

Southgate, London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 2001

Brian McAllister Linn. The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in 

the Philippine War, 1899 – 1902. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989.

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About the Author

COL Joseph D. Celeski retired from a 30-year career with the U.S. 

Army in September, 2004 after successful completion of commanding the 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne), Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He assumed command of the Group in May 2002 in Afghanistan 

where he also served as the commander of the Combined and Joint 

Special Operations Task Force - Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) for two 

tours in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM where his responsibilities 

included the operational maneuver of Joint SOF, Coalition SOF, and 

indigenous irregular forces for the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. He is currently a contributing writer and Senior SOF Fellow 

to the Joint Special Operations University, Hurlburt Field, Florida.