THE AMERICAN ARMY IN THE BALKANS

STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES

AND IMPLICATIONS

Steven Metz

January 2001
The views expressed in this report are those of the author an

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Departmen

Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Thi

is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. The autho

like to thank Major General Robert Ivany, Dr. Thomas You

William Johnsen, Dr. Stephen Blank, Dr. Craig Nation, P

Douglas Lovelace, Alan von Egmond, Colonel Philip Coker, 

James Coyne, Colonel Jeffrey McCausland, Colonel Wa

Anderson, Lieutenant Colonel William Delaney, Major Stewart 

Dr. Earl Tilford, and, particularly, Colonel John Martin for in

comments on the briefing that preceded this study or on earlier d

the manuscript. While most of the good ideas found her

“liberated” from these experts, any errors or misinterpretation

remain do so despite their best efforts.

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ISBN 1-58487-042-7

ii
Since 1995, peace operations in the Balkans hav

an important part of the Army’s contribution to 

national security. When these operations began, the 

institutionally focused on conventional warfighting. 

then, it has made significant changes to become 

effective at peace operations, but this evolution cont

The goals that led the United States into the Balkan

not yet been fully realized. To meet them require

sustained involvement in the region and continued 

ment of the Army’s peace operations capabilities.

In this report, Dr. Steven Metz examines U.S. st

in the Balkans and the Army’s role in it. He recom

continued U.S. involvement, consideration of a long

American military presence in the region, and 

significant changes in the role of the Army. From a b

perspective, Dr. Metz argues that, if U.S. political le

decide that involvement in protracted peace operatio

be an enduring part of American strategy, the Depar

of Defense should help form specialized joint and 

agency peacekeeping organizations to augment the ex

military. The Army should clearly play a leading r

that.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offe

report to help the nation continue to develop its abi

undertake peace operations to further its National Se

Strategy.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
STEVEN METZ became Acting Chairman, Strateg

Planning Department, in September 2000. He has 

Research Professor of National Security Affairs 

Strategic Studies Institute since 1993. Dr. Metz al

held the Henry L. Stimson Chair of Military Studies 

U.S. Army War College. Prior to that, he served o

faculty of the Air War College, the U.S. Army Comman

General Staff College, and several universities. He ha

served as an advisor to U.S. political organization

campaigns, testified in the U.S. Senate and Ho

Representatives, and spoken on military and se

issues around the world. He is author of more th

articles, essays, and book chapters on such topics as n

war, insurgency, U.S. policy in the Third World, m

strategy, South African security policy, and United N

peace operations. Dr. Metz’s current research deal

U.S. security policy toward Turkey and Pakistan. He h

B.A. in Philosophy and a M.A. in International Studie

the University of South Carolina, and a Ph.D. in Po

Science from the Johns Hopkins University.

iv
STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES

AND IMPLICATIONS

Introduction.

When President Clinton committed U.S. ground 

to peace support operations in the Balkans, the U.S. 

was irrevocably changed. As part of the NAT

Implementation Force (IFOR), the Army played a vit

in helping to end the Bosnian civil war. For the Arm

was a seminal step in the transition from a tight fo

conventional warfighting to more wide-ranging supp

U.S. National Security Strategy. The importance o

cannot be overestimated: the Army’s successes 

Balkans have been as impressive as its combat victo

the Gulf War.

Today, though, the Army’s role in the Balkans con

to evolve, driven both by conditions in that region a

shifts in American strategy. 2001 is likely to be a wate

year. With the change of presidents, the reshuffl

Congress, and the ongoing Quadrennial Defense R

U.S. strategy in the Balkans may undergo sign

change. In August 2000, Vice President-elect Dick C

said that it was time to consider recalling American g

troops from Kosovo and Bosnia.

1

 Condolezza Rice, 

President-elect Bush’s primary national security adv

amplified this in October, calling for a “new divis

labor” in which European nations alone provide the 

for peacekeeping in their region.

2

 And, Secreta

State-designate Colin Powell indicated that,

Our plan is to undertake a review right after the Presiden

inaugurated, and take a look not only at our deployments 

Bosnia, but in Kosovo and many other places around t

world, and make sure those deployments are proper.

3

1
happen, but one thing is clear: the time is ripe for a rig

assessment of the role of the U.S. Army in the Balkan

of the effect the Balkans have had on the U.S. Army.

4

 

new president refines his national security strateg

approach to the Balkans, the Army, which has the h

stake of all the Services in this process, should d

things. First, it should make the case for cont

engagement in the Balkans, explaining to national po

leaders that the American objectives remain vali

engagement of the U.S. military is the best way to a

that these are attained. Second, it should explore way

even more effective and efficient in the Balkans shou

new administration opt for continued engagement. 

should the new administration decide to disengage fro

Balkans, the Army should begin to analyze ways tha

can be done with minimum risk to U.S. national inter

Europe. And fourth, should national political leaders 

to make involvement in protracted peace operatio

enduring mission for the U.S. military, the Army s

continue to assess the wider strategic lessons drawn 

its experience in the Balkans. This study is inten

provide analysis and recommendations to Army lead

these four topics.

The Context.

The complexity and deep roots of the current B

conflict make framing a coherent strategy difficul

problem grew from the breakup of Yugoslavia in the 

1990s. That complex state was formed after World 

from a diverse patchwork of cultures, ethnic g

religions, traditions and histories.

5

 There was no histo

unified and independent Yugoslavia before that 

Croatia, Slovenia, and, for a short period of time, Bosn

been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Croati

Slovenia were predominantly Roman Catholi

culturally part of Central Europe. The southern parts 

Balkans, by contrast, had belonged to the Ottoman E

2
and were more eastern in orientation. Serbia, for ins

only gained its independence in 1878 and Albania in 

The former was predominantly Orthodox Christian 

created a cultural connection with Russia, while the 

was the only predominantly Muslim nation in Europe

polyglot combination made Yugoslavia a fragile stat

its inception with many fissures that could be manip

by ambitious or unscrupulous political leaders.

Following World War II, Josip Broz Tito, Yugos

leader, held his fractious state together through a co

system of rights and overlapping sovereig

Yugoslavia’s federal system granted near-statehood 

individual republics.

6

 This minimized the chances of 

competition or conflict. In the 1980s, though, Yugos

economy began to falter at the same time that Tit

without leaving a successor who could manage the na

multiple fissures. This exacerbated ethnic tension

gave force to separatist movements. No successor t

emerged who could unify the parts of Yugoslavia. In 

3

The Balkans.
provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, prompting Albani

Kosovo to agitate for independence. Between 199

1992, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia all se

from Yugoslavia, leaving Serbia and Montenegro 

constituent parts of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

7

Unfortunately, Serbs, who dominated Yugoslavia

determined to preserve as much of their state as possi

a result, the break up was tempestuous, leading to 

waves of conflict and war. The first involved Yugos

northern tier states: Slovenia and Croatia. When Sl

opted for independence in 1990, Yugoslav military 

initially attempted to stop the secession but, after a 

and nearly bloodless war, Yugoslav forces with

leaving Slovenia to seek its economic and political 

with Western Europe. The divorce between Croati

Yugoslavia was more difficult. Soon after Croatia de

its independence in June 25, 1991, a civil war fue

Serbian invasion broke out in the Krajina—the f

Austro-Hungarian military border area settled by 

Croatians, Germans, Hungarians, Serbs, and other 

January 1992 brought a U.N.-sponsored cease-fir

hostilities resumed the next year when Croatia fou

regain territory taken by Serbs. A second cease-fir

enacted in May 1993. In September 1993, howeve

Croatian Army led an offensive against the Ser

“Republic of Krajina.” A third cease-fire was sign

March 1994, but it was broken the next May when Cr

forces again attempted to reclaim lost territory. In 

August, Croatian forces recaptured Krajina with a 

offensive and some 150,000 Serbs fled the region, m

Serb-held areas in Bosnia.

The conflict in Bosnia proved even bloodier and 

complex. In contrast to the other Balkan states 

tended to have a dominant ethnic group, Bosnia is 

evenly split among ethnic Serbs (40 percent), Bo

Muslims known as “Bosniaks” (38 percent), and 

Croats (22 percent).

8

 In February 1992, the Bo

4
Bosnian Serbs, supported by neighboring Serbia, resp

with armed resistance in an effort to partition the re

along ethnic lines and drive other ethnic groups fro

territory they controlled. In March 1994 the Bosniak

ethnic Croats agreed to create the Federation of Bosn

Herzegovina, leaving two warring parties—the M

Croat Federation and the Serb-dominated Repu

Srpska. War between them continued through most of 

Serb forces in particular undertook “ethnic cleansing” 

regions they controlled. Much of the combat ta

civilians (most notably during the siege of Sara

Thousands of refugees left their homes in both Fede

territory and the Republika Srpska. Eventual

Bosnian War became the most costly armed conf

Europe since World War II. It was ended by ext

outside pressure and the sheer exhaustion o

combatants. The formal conclusion came with the G

Framework Agreement for Peace (usually known 

Dayton Accord) in December 1995. 9

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1031 gave NAT

mandate to implement the military aspects of the D

Accord. IFOR was created to maintain the cessat

hostilities, separate the armed forces of the Federatio

the Republika Srpska, transfer territory between th

entities, and move military forces and heavy weapon

approved sites.

10

 After the peaceful conduct o

September 1996 elections, IFOR’s mission was com

However, Bosnia was not fully stable. In December 

NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers concluded 

Bosnia needed a continued external military prese

consolidate the peace. In December 1996, NATO act

the Stabilization Force (SFOR) to implement the m

aspects of the Dayton Accord as the legal successor to 

Like IFOR, SFOR operates under Chapter VII of th

Charter (peace enforcement). According to NAT

specific tasks are to: (1) deter or prevent a resump

hostilities or new threats to peace; (2) promote a clim

5
(3) provide selective support to civilian organizations w

its capabilities.

11

 Today SFOR retains slightly over 2

troops in Bosnia, including 3,900 Americans.

12

The third phase of the Balkan conflict came in K

Serbs considered that region their cultural homelan

its population had become predominantly ethnic Alb

by the 1990s. It was also one of the poorest regions 

Balkans, with ethnic Albanians at the bottom 

economic ladder. This intensified tensions. In late 

Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic unleashed a 

and military campaign against separatist insurge

Kosovo. This provoked a military response from 

which consisted primarily of aerial bombing and laste

late March 1999 to mid-June 1999.

13

 During this 

many ethnic Albanians were either displaced from 

homes in Kosovo or killed by Serbian troops or police

After Milosevic buckled under pressure and wit

his forces from Kosovo, U.N. Security Council Reso

1244 of June 10, 1999 authorized the deploymen

NATO-led international force primarily to provide a 

environment (KFOR). KFOR operates in conjunction 

civilian interim U.N. administration which ove

economic and social reconstruction, conducts elec

monitors human rights, ensures the protection and r

return of refugees, and will eventually facilitate the p

of deciding on Kosovo’s future.

14

 The United N

Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) provides the transi

administration while establishing and overseein

development of provisional democratic self-gove

institutions. According to General Wesley Clark, f

Commander of the United States European Comman

NATO, UNMIK started slowly but is making pr

towards civil implementation and normalizing Kosov

of December 2000, there were 29 maneuver battali

KFOR of which 3 are Russian. The nearly 44,000 

include over 5,300 Americans (about 15 percent of the 

Italy provides over 6,300 troops; Germany and F

6
contribute over 7,700.

To craft a strategy for the future security of the Ba

it is important to understand why the region lapse

violence in the first place. Scholars differ on thi

instance, Susan L. Woodward stresses the economic r

the Balkan conflict. Changes in the global economic s

that began in the 1970s and 1980s such as the skyroc

interest rate on the U.S. dollar, the ensuing global eco

recession, and the hardening division of Europe tha

from the economic integration of the European Comm

caused poorly planned attempts at economic re

austerity, and high unemployment in Yugoslavia

upsetting a fragile balance and opening the way f

ethnicization of politics.

16

 Robert Kaplan, by con

blames ancient ethnic enmities and the intersection o

great cultures—Orthodox Christian, Muslim, and W

Christian.

17

 Another perspective lays the blame at th

of leaders who deliberately stoked ethnic difference

turned them into violence as the old order collapsed. W

Zimmermann, the last U.S. ambassador to a u

Yugoslavia, considers Slobodan Milosevic, former pre

of Serbia, and Franjo Tudjman, the late presid

Croatia, as the most culpable, even though it was 

cronies and subordinates who engineered the war

massacres that swept the Balkans.

18

All three perspectives are accurate to some extent

were economic pressures, traditional ethnic mistrus

evil leaders at play in the Balkans. But other factor

equally important. Because it has been subjugat

outside powers for so long, the Balkans has alway

underdeveloped mechanisms for conflict resolutio

consensus building. Through most of history, stabili

something imposed on the people of the Balkans rathe

built and maintained by them. Unfortunately, duri

early stages of the Balkan conflicts when it might hav

possible to control or deter the violence, no outside 

assumed responsibility and Balkan leaders them

7
in the region was of prime concern to Western Europ

therefore “Europe”—whoever that is—should lead. W

Europe proved unable or unwilling to do this. By th

the United States and its NATO allies finally took con

action, the thousands of burned houses and mass g

across the Balkans made conflict resolution much ha

The residue of the Cold War added fuel to the fire

result of Tito’s “nation in arms” strategy, the Balkan

awash in weapons and men with military training. Th

years of Tito’s dictatorship also brought a tradit

perception manipulation, relying heavily on elec

media. As a result, the Yugoslav people—like an

recently escaped the yoke of dictatorship—found it d

to distinguish propaganda from truth. While Yugo

disintegrated, political leaders made use of this psyc

ical vulnerability to inflame ethnic mistrust and b

their own power bases. By the 1990s, the maturation 

international drug trade and other forms of transna

organized crime, in combination with the prosperity 

various Balkan émigré communities spread throu

Western Europe and North America, provided fund

the bevy of militias, armies, insurgent movement

bands of thugs that blossomed in Southeast Europ

Balkan conflict, then, is multicausal, multidimens

and complex. Resolution will not come easily or quic

The Case for Engagement.

Although many Americans trace their ancestry 

Balkans, it is not a region of traditional political, eco

or military involvement for the United States. Duri

Cold War, Tito balanced East and West, avoiding f

membership in either bloc. U.S. policymakers foun

acceptable since nonalignment, while it was less des

than a pro-Western posture, at least was better than j

the Warsaw Pact. As a result, Washington cultiva

modest security relationship with Yugoslavia.

19

 But 

8
region of more substantial U.S. concern, both durin

after the Cold War. Strategic geography explains th

Balkans are important to the United States because 

conflict-ridden region near areas of more substantia

interest, including traditional economic and po

partners like Greece, Turkey, Germany, and Italy a

the post-Cold War period, new partners like Hu

Bulgaria, and Romania. It matters to the United 

because it matters to American allies.

While Washington would have preferred that so

else assume responsibility for stability in the Ba

during the 1990s, this was not to be. After several ye

relative inaction as Yugoslavia broke up, the C

administration concluded that failing to addres

Balkans would endanger European stability, da

NATO, and thus threaten important U.S. na

interests.

20

 According to the December 1999 U.S. Na

Security Strategy:

European stability is vital to our own security. The Uni

States has two strategic goals in Europe. The first is to buil

Europe that is truly integrated, democratic, prosperous and 

peace—a realization of the vision the United States launch

50 years ago with the Marshall Plan and the North Atlan

Treaty Organization. Our second goal is to work with our all

and partners across the Atlantic to meet the global challeng

no nation can meet alone . . . NATO remains the anchor 

American engagement in Europe and the linchpin 

transatlantic security. As the leading guarantor of Europe

security and a force for European stability, NATO must pla

leading role in promoting a more integrated and secu

Europe, prepared to respond to new challenges.

21

Balkan instability threatens wider European secu

generating refugees; challenging rule by law, respe

human rights, and the peaceful resolution of conflict

by having the potential to divide European states a

one another, draw them into the conflict, or spark terr

As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright phras

9
is not secure, and events have reminded us repeated

Europe cannot be secure when conflict engulf

Balkans.”

22

 “The United States is engaged there,” a

Daalder and Michael O’Hanlon of the Broo

Institution, “not because Europe is shirking its du

because the stability and security of the region are 

U.S. interest.”

23

The United States also has symbolic and humani

interests at stake in the Balkans. Intervention ther

intended to show the world that genocide and 

cleansing will be punished and its rewards revers

least some of the time). During the NATO air cam

against Serbia in 1999, President Clinton stated:

We and our 18 NATO allies are in Kosovo today because 

want to stop the slaughter and the ethnic cleansing; because 

want to build a stable, united, prosperous Europe that inclu

the Balkans and its neighbors; and because we don’t want 

21st century to be dominated by the dark marriage of mod

weapons and ancient ethnic, racial and religious hatred. 

cannot simply watch as hundreds of thousands of people 

brutalized, murdered, raped, forced from their homes, th

family histories erased—all in the name of ethnic pride 

purity. . . . the stand we have taken, first in Bosnia, now 

Kosovo, against organized ethnic hatred is a moral imperativ

U.S. strategy in the Balkans, then, is a subset of 

American national security strategy in Europe which 

a mature partnership that can deal not only with defe

the traditional sense, but also with conflict preve

crisis management, and common solutions to threa

crises beyond Europe.

25

 U.S. objectives in the Balkan

(1) maximizing the chances that the region will b

stable, prosperous, and integrated into Europ

sustaining NATO’s leading role in European security

(3) doing so in such a way that the U.S. military re

able to implement the National Military Strate

particular to fight and win two nearly simultaneous 

theater wars.

10
Grossman, “We want a U.S.-Europe partnership comm

to the goals and values that matter: security, pros

and democracy.”

26

 The pillars of this partnership are N

the relationship between the United States an

European Union (EU) and its emerging common foreig

defense policy, and the Organization for Securit

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) which American 

makers see as occupying the middle ground be

diplomacy and force, thus helping to prevent confli

champion human rights and rule of law.

27

U.S. policy toward the Balkans and Southea

Europe seeks to cooperate with state and non-state pa

like NATO and the EU to promote democratic, eco

and military reforms, thus integrating the region’

democracies into the European political and eco

mainstream.

28

 The Clinton administration conclude

the Balkans will only be stable and secure when the 

is composed of democratic states with market-

economies integrated into the new European structu

Today, stability and security in the Balkan

important to the United States not only because 

impact that instability there can have on all of Europ

also because it has become a test of NATO’s viability 

post-Cold War security environment. European diplo

officials, and analysts have all suggested tha

precipitous American withdrawal from the region 

divide NATO, undermine Europe’s efforts to increa

military capacity, and call NATO’s strategic relevanc

question.

30

 European nations provide the vast majo

the peacekeeping forces deployed to the Balkans an

largest amount of foreign assistance.

31

 Even so, th

military presence in Bosnia and Kosovo admittedly is 

both in money and in its broader effects on the Army (a

a lesser extent, the other services). But this is a price 

paying for sustaining the influence and relevance of N

at least in terms of money. Certainly the United State

be selective in involving its military in protr

11
get involved. The United States should never have a

peacekeeping in the Balkans to become the test of N

viability. But it did. That cannot be changed. In 

conflicts and other places, it may be appropriate f

United States to let others lead. But right now, the Ba

is not the place to begin it. U.S. interests in Europe ha

changed since American forces entered the Balkan co

thus the case for sustained engagement is a strong o

Refining the Strategy of Engagement.

Should President Bush decide that current 

objectives in the Balkans are worth pursuing, Am

strategy will be defined by two issues: the duration o

military engagement in the Balkans and the form 

engagement should take.

There are three alternatives concerning the dura

U.S. military engagement: (1) the quick hand over 

security functions—whether purely milita

constabulary—to others, whether European natio

Balkans forces themselves; (2) a modulated hand ove

security functions, or (3) a strategy that plans for lon

American involvement in the region. Each of 

alternatives might attain U.S. objectives but e

advantages, costs, and risks. A quick hand over 

minimize the amount of turbulence, stress, and distr

from warfighting faced by the Army due to its B

commitments. In the short term, however, it might r

increased effort if the Army were to complete the vita

necessary for stability before withdrawing or handin

responsibilities. This option also risks being seen 

abdication of U.S. leadership and thus dimini

Washington’s ability to influence events not only 

Balkans, but in Europe as a whole. It might also in

the chances that the Balkans remain a festering pr

and a drain on international resources for an ext

period of time. If violence exploded again, the United 

12
removing a cast from a broken limb too early can re

greater damage than the initial injury, so too 

withdrawal from the Balkans before establi

self-sustaining security. In the final reckoning, unle

believes that the European states are deliberately sh

responsibility for the security of their continent and 

some sort of shock treatment to change their tack, the 

hand over is a high-risk approach.

A strategy based on a modulated hand over of fun

would include a significant U.S. military presence in B

and Kosovo for at least 5 years with gradual decrease

10-20 years. The assumption underlying this option 

American dominance of European security is unnatu

undesirable but that the shift to a co-equal partn

must take place slowly, allowing European se

structures to mature gradually. This option would low

risk accompanying a shift from American domina

co-equal partnership (or even a secondary, supportin

for the United States) by modulating the pace of chang

still makes clear that such change must ha

Eventually, this would diminish the burden on th

military and allow it to focus on other regions of the 

less able to manage their own security. This option pro

would spark a decline in the influence and role of NA

other words, the United States cannot simultan

continue to dominate NATO, continue to insist that 

is the preeminent European security organization

diminish its leadership in one of Europe’s most pr

security problems. Because of decisions made durin

past decade, leadership in the Balkans is part of the f

United States must pay for influence in Europe. In ad

if the handover of functions takes place too qu

instability or even conflict could reemerge in the Balk

the organizations and states to which the burden is s

prove incapable of protecting regional security.

The final alternative is to sustain the leading role 

United States until American and NATO objectives 

13
but would also provide the United States the gr

degree of control over regional outcomes and hav

greatest chance of leading to ultimate success. But it 

the most costly in terms of money and the burden 

U.S. Army. It might lead to increased turbulence with

Army, with concomitant problems of recruitmen

retention. And it could degrade the Army’s proficie

other missions such as fighting major wars. If the se

situation in the Balkans deteriorates, NATO and 

forces, including American ones, could be the targ

terrorism, either in the region or outside of it. 

long-term U.S. involvement could limit the incentiv

the maturation of other elements of the European se

system and the modernization of European militarie

There are four potential forms of U.S. military acti

the Balkans:

• Provision of a ready reserve or rapid reaction fo

deterrence and to be used if violence reemerge

escalates beyond the point where local security 

or external peacekeepers can control it. Such a 

reserve could be stationed in the Balkans or n

To be most effective, it should be a joint force, bu

rapidly deployable landpower.

• Provision of day-to-day, local security, inc

functions such as local patrolling, manning o

blocks, observation, and monitoring.

• Nation assistance, including mine clearing, 

structure reconstruction and, potentially, in

ment in civil functions such as policing and elect

• Military-to-military activities designed to help 

the development and professionalization of 

security forces. This could include provis

professional military education using the 

national Military Education and Training (I

14
Training (EIMET) programs, security assis

mobile training teams (MTTs), and com

exercises.

Of these functions, the provision of day-to-day

security is the most draining on the Army both beca

requires a fairly large number of forces and because it 

the units involved away from training for warfig

Units providing a ready reserve or rapid reaction 

would spend most of their time training for warfightin

missions, and thus would find this duty less of a distra

Troops involved in nation assistance would most of

engineers and civil affairs specialists. Their activities 

Balkans would be closely related to their normal fun

and thus not a substantial distraction. Military-to-m

activities would involve few U.S. forces except during 

exercises. Much of the training could be done by contra

thus lessening the demands on the military. Exe

would not be a major distraction since they would be s

to the type of training the American unit might underg

regular basis.

Combining the two dimensions—the durat

American engagement and the form of Ame

engagement—leads to a substantial array of str

alternatives. While it might make sense to hand ov

four military functions at the same pace, more than 

the best approach will be to transfer functions at a dif

pace. In the most general sense, the United States s

seek to hand over nation assistance and day-to-day 

security functions in a short period of time, perhaps 2 

Military-to-military functions and the provision of a 

reaction force or ready reserve should continue. Both 

be facilitated by a modest long-term presence in the Ba

to include bases, most optimally in Bosnia (but poss

Croatia or Macedonia). As Richard Hoffman and T

Young contend, today the presence of the U.S. Army i

needed in the Balkans, not Germany.

32

 Redeploym

some forces to the region would exercise U.S. leaders

15
and Young, prove less expensive in the long term 

countries in or around the Balkans would probably p

garrison and training facilities at little or no cost. Mov

least a division to Hungary, where the U.S. Army a

has an important logistics presence, thus seems logi

Even though the United States provides the l

single component of the multinational forces in the Ba

it makes sense to have both SFOR and KFOR 

European command, particularly if the situation re

relatively benign. To date, Americans have comm

SFOR and Europeans have commanded KFOR.

3

ultimate goal is for the United States to refine its lead

role in Europe so that its primary function is pro

support to European states in the Balkans. Exerc

command by generals from America’s NATO allies 

way to show this. Along similar lines, EUCOM s

further focus attention on southeast Europe and co

creating a subunified command for southeast Europ

At a somewhat lower level, the Army could pote

use short-, medium-, or long-term rotations duri

operations in the Balkans whatever the form and du

of its engagement. Short-term rotations wou

unaccompanied temporary duty (TDY) assignment

months or less, with forces returning to their home s

following the assignment. Medium-term rotations 

involve 12 month unaccompanied tours. Long

rotations would be 2-3 year accompanied tours invol

permanent change of station (PCS). Unaccompan

month tours could be offered and promoted according 

specific job and location. Short-term rotations would 

the maximum use of the Reserve Component in the B

force, since it is difficult for members of either the Na

Guard or Army Reserve to deploy for longer than 6 m

Both short-term and medium-term deployments 

minimize the need for support facilities in the Ba

since no families would accompany deploying so

Facilities could be more austere since individuals or 

16
side, both short-term and mid-term deployments m

difficult for an individual or a unit to develop ext

expertise on the region in which they are deployed

might be acceptable if a unit serves purely as a str

ready reserve or rapid reaction force for emergencies, 

a major hindrance for those involved in day-to-day 

stability operations or other forms of engage

Short-term or medium-term rotation cycles might wor

if combined with a program of individual rather tha

replacements. That way a given unit would have a

some members with a few months of local experience 

given time rather than all being new at the same tim

the other hand, an individual replacement polic

challenge unit effectiveness, team-building, the ro

base, and the personnel system.

A program of long-term rotation makes more se

U.S. strategy calls for extended engagement in the Ba

While initially more costly since infrastructure—inc

family support infrastructure—would have to be b

ultimately might reduce turbulence since unit

individuals stationed in the Balkans would not be sep

from their families. Additionally, it would reinfor

perception of normalcy in the region. Long-term rot

make the most sense both if U.S. strategy is bas

extended engagement and the Balkan states con

movement toward stability and reform. If the le

tension and the potential for conflict remain high, or 

strategy treats engagement in the Balkans as temp

then the most logical solution might be the deploym

support and rapid reaction units for longer tours to Hu

or another location near to (but not in) the Balkans, a 

short-term and medium-term deployments int

Balkans, and, perhaps, 1-year or even 2-year deploy

for headquarters personnel.

The Balkans operations have represented one 

success stories of Active and Reserve integration f

Army. The deployment of a large contingent of the 

17
March 2000 represented the largest activation 

National Guard since the Korean War, and was one 

few times in Army history when a Guard unit comm

active duty forces.

34

 Beginning in June 2001, Army Na

Guard divisions will command six of the next nine 

rotations. Troops for the National Guard-led rotation

come largely from the Active Component, and vice ve

The reserve components have been central to all 

peace operations, in large part because a high propor

the type of combat support and combat service suppor

that are needed for these activities are in the reserve

Army accesses reservists either by seeking volunteer

an involuntary call-up using the Presidential Se

Reserve Call-up (PSRC). Volunteers have played a 

role in all Army operations since the end of the Cold 

but pose problems because there is no assuranc

enough reservists with the requisite skills will volu

This can create shortfalls and delays as units m

molded from individual volunteers.

35

 Excessive 

volunteers strips units of essential personnel, cr

shortages that must be remedied should the un

activated. PSRC avoids this problem, but can cause 

ones since frequent or extended call-ups disrupt the c

careers of reservists and hurt retention and recruitm

addition, PSRC can only be used once in a given operat

Clearly the Army forces deployed to the Balkans m

a mix of active and reserve components. If positive tre

Bosnia and Kosovo continue and the U.S. military mi

become predominantly stability and support, th

played by the reserve components can increase. 

probably make sense to keep a rapid reaction force 

strong aviation component in the Balkans or very nea

U.S. leaders decide to move toward permanent station

forces in the Balkans, those individuals filling lon

slots would most often be active component, while th

short-tour slots could be heavily reserve comp

(although this has the potential to create morale prob

18
“pulling their load”). Ultimately, though, the Arm

want to increase the number of “high demand, low de

support units in the active component so as to avoid lo

for future peace operations.

Determinants of American Strategy.

The most appropriate Balkans strategy for the U

States will be determined by an array of indepe

variables. Army leaders and planners must monitor 

making adjustments to the strategy as required. 

should also advise U.S. political leaders on the pre

policy and course of events.

One of the most important determinants of future 

the Army in the Balkans will be the national se

strategy of the new administration, as shaped b

ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The pre

outcome would be a QDR that both notes the importa

peace operations to U.S. national security but also 

that optimal performance in such operations requ

modest increase in force structure. The future U.S. d

budget and force size will also affect the role of the A

the Balkans. Nearly every analyst of American d

strategy admits that there is a mismatch be

national-level strategic objectives and the forc

strength.

36

 In simple terms, the high operational tem

recent years, including involvement in the Balkan

forced the military to postpone many procure

programs and, increasingly, to stretch out maintenan

replacement activities. At the same time, the Arm

begun a major transformation to become more strate

responsive and dominant across the spectrum. This t

entail substantial costs.

37

 While President Bush wi

an increase in the defense budget, the gains may 

enough. This could force Army leaders to requ

diminution of the U.S. involvement in the Balkans in 

19
to mitigate the impact on personnel.

Support for Balkan engagement from the Am

public and its elected leaders is an independent va

Existing support is adequate, but fragile. At the tim

President Clinton committed U.S. forces to Bosnia in 

55 percent of the respondents in a Time/CNN 

disapproved.

38

 During the air campaign against Ser

1999, less than 50 percent of those polled considere

U.S. interests at stake.

39

 In May 2000, the Senate na

defeated a bill co-sponsored by Senate Armed Se

Committee chairman John W. Warner (R-Va) that 

have pulled U.S. troops out of Kosovo by July 2001.

next Congress—which will be evenly divided betwe

parties and thus heavily constrained—is likely to r

lukewarm in its support for involvement in the Ba

While the American people may not be seized with th

to abandon the Balkans immediately, support for ext

U.S. involvement could easily crumble in the f

something like attacks on U.S. forces in the region 

result in casualties or—less likely—a repeat of the 

discipline problems that the United States has exper

in Kosovo.

41

The evolution of the European security architectu

also be an important determinant of U.S. strategy

analysts agree that no European security organi

other than NATO will be in a position for many ye

either assume control of Balkan activities or to tak

responsibility for other security threats of equal magn

U.S. national interests will be best served if NATO r

the leading role in the Balkans. That said, the Eur

states are building new security organizations 

will—depending on one’s perspective—complement 

or provide an alternative to it. The Kosovo crisis, whi

European leaders very frustrated at their lack of m

capability when compared to the United States, stim

efforts to provide the European Union with the m

means to back up its diplomatic efforts, thus leading 

20
(ESDP) at the EU’s December 1999 Helsinki summ

agreed-on force structure goals.

42

 According to Amba

Jürgen Chrobog, Germany’s representative to the U

States, “With ESDP, the European Union has comm

itself to making essential progress towards a political 

which is underpinned by credible political and m

action.”

43

 ESDP is intended to give Europeans a f

mechanism for crisis management; develop Eur

capabilities in key military areas and aug

transatlantic burden-sharing; and allow the EU to 

integrate non-NATO countries into the European se

system.

44

In November 2000 the EU began to give teeth to th

by pledging troops and equipment to create a 6

member rapid reaction force by 2003.

45

 Most Eur

leaders stress that ESDP and NATO are paralle

compatible rather than competing organizations.

46

 

experts, though, consider ESDP a potential thr

NATO’s solidarity and preeminence in European secu

According to a Dutch editorial, “The more detai

divulged about Europe’s plans, the clearer it becomes 

is no longer intent on complementing NATO, but 

replacing it.”

48

 John Major, former British Prime Mi

stated that the EU military force, “adds not one i

additional capacity. It offers no secure chain of com

and, in my judgment, it will undermine NATO.”

49

How quickly and how far the evolution of the Eur

security architecture will develop remains to be seen 

this takes off and diverges from NATO, Ame

policymakers undoubtedly will reconsider the exten

form of U.S. engagement in the Balkans. The goal f

United States should be to assure that ESDP develo

complementary fashion, while NATO’s leading r

sustained.

Similarly, decisions made at the 2002 NATO su

concerning enlargement will affect U.S. strategy 

21
who seek membership, including the Balkan state

rejected, then any sort of comprehensive regional st

based on offering carrots to nations and groups that su

greater security and sticks to those who do not 

become difficult to implement. On the other hand, if so

all of the Balkan states are admitted to NATO, then th

for long-term U.S. engagement and a permanent pr

becomes much stronger.

The post-Milosevic political, economic, and 

transition of Serbia will also help shape American str

While Vojislav Kostunica announced in November 

that he was prepared to restore diplomatic ties wi

United States, Germany, France, and Britain, he is li

keep the United States at arm’s length because of bitt

among the Serbian people over the 1999 air campaig

occupation of Kosovo, and the economic sanctions im

on their country.

50

 Through November of 2000, Kos

refused to meet with U.S. Secretary of State Mad

Albright.

51

 Belgrade’s mistrust of the United State

leave European states better positioned to work 

Kostunica than Washington.

Kostunica’s policy toward Kosovo will be a 

determinant of the future stability of the Balkans and 

American role in the region. While the Serbian lead

indicated that independence for Kosovo i

inconceivable, he also said that the issue could prove t

intractable as the Israeli-Palestinian contest 

Jerusalem.

52

 At this time, Kostunica seems willing t

talks with Kosovar Albanian leaders, but they ha

been receptive. Serbia’s policy toward Montenegro w

equally important. Montenegro continues to attem

change its relationship with Serbia, seeking a 

confederation where each state controls the troops on 

while coordinating foreign and economic policy.

53

 

Kostunica has backed off from Milosevic’s threat of m

action against Montenegro, he has not accepte

confederation plan, so the future relationship betwe

22
restrain Milo Djukanovic, Montenegro’s pro-indepen

president, by threatening to cut off aid, but this ha

little effect.

55

 In November 2000, for instance, Djuk

appealed to other European leaders to back independe

Other issues like Serbia’s relationship with Macedon

Croatia, its policy toward the Hungarian minor

Vojvodina, and its ability to attract capital and int

into the European economy will also affect Am

strategy in the Balkans. The process of eco

reconstruction may prove even more difficult 

resolution of political and territorial issues. The 1999 

air campaign and years of sanctions degraded Se

infrastructure which will put it at a severe disadva

when competing with other Balkan and Eastern Eur

states for investment capital. And, under Milo

corruption became ingrained.

57

 This will take many ye

root out and will also deter investors. Still, given Se

central role in the Balkans, the United States seeks a s

democratic, prosperous state with a working relatio

with Washington.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ability of political lead

transcend the hatred and violence of the past decad

make the awkward ethnic power-sharing arrangem

the Dayton Accord work (or to renegotiate it) will 

major role in shaping future U.S. strategy.

58

 Whi

shooting has stopped there, mistrust and enmity re

leading to a “bitter peace.”

59

 “Bosnia has come a long 

write the editors of the Christian Science Monitor, “

rebuilt cities mask simmering nationalist policie

deep-set habits of graft and corruption.”

60

 Vo

Kostunica’s groundbreaking October 2000 visit 

hopes of a diplomatic breakthrough between Bosn

Serbia.

61

 This would go a long way in moving Bosnian 

toward reconciliation with the other segments of 

nation’s society. Armed forces from the various factio

beginning to work together and have agreed on 

reductions in the size of their forces.

62

 There is progr

23
tolerance.

64

But all is not rosy in Bosnia. The November 

elections failed to grant a clear mandate t

pro-Western, multi-ethnic political party, suggestin

most Bosnians have not transcended a strongly 

approach to politics.

65

 Small groups of armed 

organized and controlled by extremist leaders still o

in the country.

66

 The ability of Bosnians to bu

functioning legal and criminal justice system and to a

investment and integrate into the European econom

will be vital. So far, Bosnia has made only limited pr

on the economic front. As Benn Steil and Sus

Woodward write, “after $4.5 billion of multil

commitments in 1996-1998 and a massive inflow of bil

aid, the Bosnian economy is scarcely more viable than 

when the Dayton Accord was signed in 1995.”

67

There is a vicious circle: to build a viable multi

society, refugees need to return home, but for this to h

jobs must be created and ethnic barriers removed. Fo

to be created, the culture of corruption, communism

control must be altered. So far this has not hap

Bosnia still depends on the flow of foreign aid wh

already declining and, according to a recent report 

General Accounting Office, pervasive corruption is s

economic growth.

68

 Many large aid donors, includin

United States, the World Bank and the United Na

plan to cut their assistance to Bosnia in 2001.

69

 Many 

refugees, particularly those in Germany, see little eco

incentive to return. In addition, the fact that many in

war criminals remain at large and retain influ

particularly in the Republika Srpska, is troubling.

70

The ability of Kosovo to overcome endemic corru

stifle crime, and build a legal system and funct

economy also will affect U.S. strategy in the Balk

Despite a significant drop during the latter half of 

crime, according to the commander of the United 

24
larger perspective, the ability of Kosovar Albanians 

to accept affiliation with Serbia that includes some 

autonomy, or negotiate separation with Belgrade w

part, determine U.S. policy. Today, the ethnically Alb

population in Kosovo considers itself on the ro

independence. Leaders like Ibrahim Rugova have 

“Independence is very much the goal,” and there are w

that the disbanded Kosovo Liberation Army w

reconstituted and renew its armed struggle agains

forces—perhaps even against NATO peacekeepers—

movement toward independence is thwarted

November 2000, for instance, Kosovar Albanian 

launched a series of attacks in the border region be

Kosovo and Serbia proper which left four Serbian poli

dead.

74

 In response, Serbia threatened to return tro

the buffer zone between Kosovo and Serbia proper 

KFOR halted the attacks.

75

The November 2000 violence in Kosovo indicates 

problems. Violence persists throughout the region. Se

transitional government, in fact, claims that sin

arrival of KFOR, Albanian terrorists have carried out 

attacks which have killed 1,055 people.

76

 While this p

figure may be questioned, the sporadic outbreak of vi

is serious. The continuing pressure for independenc

the United States and its NATO allies in an extr

difficult position. As Michael Mandelbaum notes, 

“intervened in a civil war and defeated one sid

embraced the position of the party it had defeated 

issue over which the war had been fought.”

77

 Most obs

contend that the fall of Milosevic has hurt the de

Kosovar Albanians for independence. As Steven Erlan

the New York Times writes, “Independence is lik

become not just a dream deferred, but a dream denie

From the perspective of the United States and the 

European states, independence for Kosovo could 

destabilizing factor throughout the region, cer

affecting Macedonia with its substantial Albanian mi

25
matter how unlikely that may appear at the pre

Unlike Bosnia where there was a functioning, low-lev

society to serve as a foundation for the post-war p

nothing like this exists in Kosovo. There the only sou

legal and political authority were the Serbian gover

and the informal regulatory system based on clans.

80

independent Kosovo, the former would be removed a

latter cannot be the building block of a modern demo

state.

Despite reports that the United States is willing to 

with its NATO allies and accept Kosovo indepen

official U.S. policy is that Kosovo should gain re

status within Yugoslavia, making it the co-eq

Montenegro and Serbia.

81

 But it is not clear wheth

Kosovar Albanians, most of whom suffered personal 

the hands of the Serbian military and militias, will 

this. If reforms in Serbia move forward, the United 

could find itself protecting a Kosovo controlled by m

and criminal organizations against a democratic 

whose claim to sovereignty over Kosovo is recogniz

most of the international community, incl

Washington. Within a few years, NATO forces could g

being seen as liberators to foreign occupiers by K

Albanians. In either case, the longer that ult

resolution of the independence issue is postponed, th

likely it will be violent.

The success or failure of reforms elsewhere 

Balkans will also affect the extent and length of Am

engagement. Slovenia has made substantial econom

political progress, and is moving steadily toward the 

integration into Europe for all Balkan states th

United States seeks. Ljubljana’s failure to be invited 

first round of NATO enlargement disappointed Slov

leaders and caused a number of political changes that 

the creation of a strategy aimed at membership in 

and the European Union.

82

 Igor Bavcar, deputy presid

the dominant Liberal Democrat Party, stated, “we p

26
year [2001] and to privatize some major economic sect

then, reform public administration, and unde

agricultural reform.”

83

These efforts clearly support the ultimate U.S. obj

of an integrated, prosperous, stable Europe, and sho

encouraged. The U.S. military, particularly the 

should continue to work closely with its Slov

counterparts to help them prepare for NATO members

Croatia’s war of separation from Yugoslavia was 

and more costly than that of Slovenia, its involvement 

Bosnia conflict was deeper, and the authoritaria

corrupt Tudjman resisted reform. As a result, Croat

further to go than Slovenia to successfully integrat

Europe. There has been progress though. Since Tudj

death in December 1999, a reformist regime has 

abandoned support for hard-line ethnic Croats in B

which was one of the obstacles to better relations wi

West.

84

 Croatia is developing close relationships 

NATO. The government led by Ivica Racan is se

membership in both NATO and the EU.

85

 NATO cou

are actively involved in helping the Croatian military 

to democratic rule and civilian control.

86

 And in May 

Croatia became the 26th state to join the Partnersh

Peace. At the ceremony welcoming the new me

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated, “In 

short months, Croatia has made dramatic progress tow

democratic society, has demonstrated a ren

commitment to the Dayton process, and has taken st

promote stability and security in Southea

Europe...Today’s ceremony recognizes the remar

gains Croatia has made toward integration int

Euro-Atlantic community.”

87

 Still, Croatia’s reform 

work-in-progress. Much remains to be done in ter

rooting out authoritarian tendencies and makin

country hospitable to the Serb minority in the Krajin

27
Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in 1993 s

off impending disaster but that small country stil

substantial problems, particularly concerning K

refugees and border disagreements with Serbi

Albania.

88

 More ominously, tensions between e

Macedonians and Albanians in Macedonia could 

armed conflict.

89

 Such an event might disillusio

American public on the prospects for stability 

Balkans and intensify demands for disengageme

similar pattern holds in Albania. Tirana has been a 

partner of the United States as Yugoslavia fell apart a

Balkans conflicts broke out. The U.S. militar

undertaken a number of modest but important engag

activities in Albania, including programs to 

professionalize the military.

90

 Still, as the 1997 viole

Albania sparked by the collapse of the economy sh

instability in that country—which is probably the 

developed and poorest in Europe—always looms

general, the more that the Balkans stay on the tr

reform and eventual integration into European eco

political and perhaps military structures, the bett

chances that the United States will remain engag

Bosnia, Kosovo, and elsewhere in the region.

Finally, the status of the global security system 

affect U.S. strategy in the Balkans. The more peacef

global security system, the more likely the United St

to undertake sustained and extensive engagement 

Balkans. Should some other part of the world 

up—whether the Middle East, the arc of crisis 

Northern Andean region, the Pacific Rim, or some

else—American policymakers and military leaders 

consider the Balkans to be an unacceptable distractio

thus shift toward lower levels of engagement or withd

28
U.S. objectives in the Balkans are to maximiz

chances that the region will become stable, prosperou

integrated into Europe, doing so in a way that su

NATO’s leading role in European security and do

entail unbearable costs or unacceptable risk to Am

security in other parts of the world. Withdrawal woul

make sense if one of three conditions held: (1) the c

level of involvement is creating unacceptable risk else

in the world; (2) U.S. objectives are unlikely to be m

reasonable cost, so the nation wants to “cut its losse

the European nations are not bearing their fair sh

stabilizing and rebuilding the Balkans, and thus n

“kick in the pants.” There is little evidence to support 

these three ideas, so withdrawal would ultim

represent a strategic failure. Even so, congressiona

public support for involvement is weak enough th

Army should begin thinking about the method

implications of withdrawal. If political leaders do opt f

against advice, the goal should be damage limita

finding a method of disengagement that does the least 

to European stability and U.S. leadership in Europe

could take three forms.

The “1995” Alternative. The least radical fo

disengagement would pull the American military out 

conflictive parts of Balkans but seek to preserve the 

quo elsewhere in Europe. It would, in other words, at

to return to the situation that held in Europe in 

American political leaders would probably use the A

contain the Balkan conflict by strengthening the state

border on the region, particularly Hungary, G

Bulgaria, and Romania. Potentially, the Ba

themselves could be divided for the purposes of str

with the United States strengthening the non-conf

states of Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia while av

engagement in the conflict zone of Bosnia, Serbia, K

and Montenegro. In either case, the Army could 

29
these states. This might require an augmentation of 

forces in Europe, or at least an intra-theater redeplo

of some forces from Germany to southeastern E

Unless this is done by redeploying Army units 

Germany to southeastern Europe, it would not ha

desired effect of diminishing turbulence and stress.

The “1988” Alternative. The second for

disengagement would pull U.S. units from the Balka

return them to bases in Germany and elsewhere 

making it clear that the military serves as a deterrent 

necessary, a warfighting force, but will not be u

protracted peace operations or large scale sh

activities. This would require little adjustment on th

of the Army since it would represent a return to a Col

posture, but is very unlikely to be politically sustai

This alternative would disengage the U.S. Army fro

type of problem most likely to threaten European se

today so European states might request Ame

withdrawal from their region.

The “1940” Alternative. The third form of disengag

would remove most U.S. forces from Europe, leavin

states of the region full responsibility for security

withdrawal itself would be relatively easy for the 

since it would simply be a matter of closing Eur

facilities and building more facilities in the United St

base the units that were withdrawn. From a str

perspective, though, withdrawal from Europe would 

that the Army would have to deploy over greater dis

should it ever be used in Europe, North Africa, or the M

East. It would also diminish the chances that Eur

states would serve as coalition partners for f

operations outside Europe. Thus the Army would h

build and acquire methods for longer range deployme

sustainment, and plan for more unilateral oper

rather than coalition ones. These would both be extr

difficult steps. In all likelihood, if the U.S. Army 

30
size of the Army would decrease.

Strategic Lessons from the Balkans.

The Army’s involvement in the Balkans has gen

questions with significance beyond that particular r

The Army must decide how to best prepare for 

operations while maintaining its warfighting compe

Specifically, Army participation in protracted 

operations raises a number of questions:

• Is the Army appropriately structured to und

protracted peace operations while retaini

warfighting competency and has it developed th

possible personnel policies?

• Does the shortage of certain types of units 

active force hinder Army effectiveness in 

operations?

• If so, should the Army increase the number of 

units in the force structure?

• Is the existing distribution of capabilities amo

active and reserve components appropriate for 

operations?

• Will participation in protracted peace oper

detract from the Army’s ability to contribute 

Joint Team’s ability to fight and win wars?

92

Based on the Balkans and other operations like So

American leaders and strategists know or can ass

number of things. First, while the political cost of rej

involvement in protracted peace operations eventual

be greater than the cost of involvement, peace oper

are invariably expensive in money, people, and str

risk. There are debates over the quantitative res

required by an extended peace operation. Using ex

31
ratio, meaning that for every unit deployed, one m

recovering and one preparing to deploy. Some belie

true figure may be closer to 5 to 1 while a few belie

ratio to be less than 3 to 1. In any case, that peace oper

have ripple effects and cause turbulence througho

military is beyond dispute. In addition to ca

turbulence, protracted peace operations entail subst

financial costs. Analysts estimate that U.S. operati

Kosovo cost about $2-3.5 billion a year, and in Bosni

billion per year.

93

Second, American leaders can assume that under

a peace support mission and doing it badly or failin

entail greater political and strategic costs than not d

at all. The nation should not accept a peace support m

unless it is willing to devote enough resources over 

enough period of time to attain success. This po

common sense and almost seems trite, but the U

States is notorious for initially underestimatin

investment required and then losing patience with m

involvement in noncritical regions. There are signs o

in the Balkans already. To eschew involvement might 

America’s reputation but, in most cases, this damage 

repaired. To accept engagement and then pull out co

politically disastrous.

Third, American leaders and strategists know 

military force is vital for success in protracted 

operations, particularly in the early stages, but is n

sole determinant. The ultimate solutions most often f

economic, political, legal, cultural, and social compo

The military can establish the conditions under 

civilian organizations—whether state ones or non

organizations and businesses—can generate de

success. In the Balkans, for instance, the ultimate 

success is the Stability Pact, a comprehensive, coordi

and strategic approach to the region initiated b

European Union in 1999 which seeks to create v

market economies and foster regional cooperati

32
ment, and encouraging democratization, reconciliatio

security.

94

 Ultimately militaries can lose a peace ope

if they do not establish security and stability, but c

win one on their own.

Given these assumptions, it makes sense to think 

U.S. military’s role in protracted peace operations in 

of three phases. No peace support operation re

ultimate success without all three.

Phase I: Prepare. This stage is primarily politi

entails using the interagency process to formu

strategy; developing and refining the intelligence pic

the conflict; undertaking diplomatic activities like co

building and establishing a basis of legitima

multinational intervention, often under the authority 

United Nations; and, under some conditions, taking s

isolate, pressure, and deter the forces of instability 

political, psychological, economic or military mean

role of the U.S. military in Phase I is to: (1) provide ad

assist with strategy formulation; (2) contribute 

development and refinement of the intelligence pict

the conflict; (3) plan for combined operations once a co

is formed; (4) demonstrate the ability of the United St

intervene militarily; and, (5) if appropriate, use st

strikes and other means of force to pressure or isola

forces of instability. The U.S. military’s contribution d

Phase I, then, is primarily supporting and indirect.

Phase II: Establish Security. Phase II is the 

intensely military part of a protracted peace operatio

primary objective is to establish security, stopping as 

violence as possible. The role of the U.S. military is 

undertake operational planning, in combination 

partners if the operation is a coalition one; (2) establi

logistical infrastructure for deployment; (3) prepare f

undertake the initial deployment (of decisive forc

peace enforcement or peace making situation; of mo

and other lightly armed forces in a benign peaceke

33
assist civilian organizations and authorities with tas

refugee support, establishment of basic civil authority

infrastructure construction or reconstruction; (6) co

refinement of the intelligence picture; and (7) if appro

continue using standoff strikes and other means to pr

or isolate the forces of instability.

Phase III: Build Sustainable Stability. Phases I 

may take days, weeks, or months. Phase III is likely t

years, but without it, no peace support operation s

much chance of success. During Phase III, the re

importance of civilian organizations including 

agencies, nongovernmental organizations, interna

organizations, and commercial entities steadily increa

comparison to the military. At some point in Phase II

security forces should have assumed responsibility fo

activities, leaving international forces, including th

military, as a strategic reserve or rapid reaction 

Throughout Phase III, the role of the U.S. military mi

to provide all or part of the strategic reserve or 

reaction force, and undertake military-to-military act

to help local armed forces improve their effectivene

professionalism. Early in Phase III, the U.S. military 

also provide support to civilian organization

reconstruction of infrastructure, civil affairs, logistic

similar activities.

In all three phases of a protracted peace operatio

Army’s most important contribution will be the provi

security and deterrence in hostile environments. Bu

will not be its only contribution. Given this, the Army 

continue to refine the way it is organized for peace su

seeking to optimize effectiveness and efficiency at th

of activity without eroding warfighting capabilities

broad sense, the Army and the Department of Defe

general have two alternatives:

Alternative I: Use Existing Forces for Peace Operati

Needed. If American political leaders decide that 

34
military but one that is secondary to warfighting, the 

should improve its capabilities by: (1) increasin

peacekeeping training received by all units; (2) revis

notion of what constitutes 100 percent strength 

division in order minimize the turbulence and per

problems caused by peace operations; (3) increasin

types of existing units important to peace operation

divisions have, particularly combat support and c

service support ones; (4) continuing the transform

process to make all Army units more versatile. In the 

term, an increase in Army force size, particularly in 

are known as “high demand, low density” unit

Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs, Engineers

Military Police, would greatly improve the ability 

Army to simultaneously fulfill its responsibilities 

Balkans and sustain its ability to implement the 

dimensions of the National Military Strategy.

The Army’s practice since the end of the Cold W

been to use existing forces for peace operations, retr

them as necessary. Rather than having a standa

training program that all units follow, commanders s

build training programs around their mission essentia

list (METL). Since unit commanders should construc

METLs, the amount of peace operations training 

with the commander.

95

 Most often, units do not under

peacekeeping training unless they are slate

deployment to a peacekeeping operation. For ins

peacekeeping training for U.S. troops deployed to K

has varied from a few days to more than two months.

practice has generally worked well: the vast majo

Army units deployed for peace support operations 

performed at a very high level. In December 2000 G

Eric Shinseki named the units to see service in Bosn

Kosovo through May 2005. This was intended, in p

provide adequate time for specialized training.

9

training is a zero sum game: if peace support train

increased, something else has to be decreased. This 

35
the expense of warfighting proficiency. Ultimately the 

existing forces for peace operations, with or w

increased training, makes sense only if peace oper

remain a secondary strategic function. It is not th

alternative if national political leaders revise Am

strategy so that peace operations are a primary m

function.

Alternative II: Create New Organizations. S

national policymakers alter U.S. strategy and 

participation in protracted peace operations a 

strategic function, the Department of Defense shoul

dedicated, joint, interagency peacekeeping organizati

an augmentation to existing force structure. This pr

could be under Army leadership, but the new organiz

would probably look substantially different than trad

Army units. The most logical approach would be to f

standing interagency task force which includes a sign

Army contribution, but also includes specialis

infrastructure reconstruction; the building of po

administrative, criminal justice, and legal systems; r

issues; public health; conflict resolution; disarmamen

intelligence. The Peace Support Interagency Task 

would form a cadre with other organizations and m

units added to it as necessary. During the initial pha

peace enforcement operation, significant ground c

forces might be attached. The Peace Support Intera

Task Force might also be multinational. At a minim

would be trained in multinational cooperation. As a 

support operation matures, the Army’s contribution 

be: (1) providing a small number of experts t

Interagency Task Force; (2) shaping and engag

activities with local security forces, including se

assistance, training, professional military educatio

combined exercises; and (3) provision of limited 

assistance, particularly mine clearing, and a rapid re

force to serve as a deterrent and to respond to emerge

The rapid reaction force could be stationed in-coun

36
stances. From a strategic perspective, this Peace Su

Interagency Task Force would serve as a bridge betwe

time when much of the effort is borne by military force

outside and Phase III, where local forces and organiz

are in the forefront.

In this alternative, U.S. Army warfighting units 

not have to train for the non-combat component of 

support operations, thus leaving them to foc

warfighting skills. This alternative would optimize th

military’s effectiveness and efficiency at protracted 

support operations while retaining the ability to figh

win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars. Its 

downside is expense. The new units would requ

significant increase in the defense budget top li

addition, it could be difficult to recruit and retain th

organizations, and they would have little flexibility.

Conclusions.

The basic U.S. political goals in the Balkans are 

attaining. Stabilizing the region would both help pr

European security and help preserve NATO’s leadin

Sustaining the U.S. military presence in the Balka

focusing on high security and military-to-mi

engagement would stand the best chance of attaining 

goals while assuring that the U.S. military remains a

implement the National Military Strategy.

The Army can take important steps to be more eff

in the Balkans. The recent program to clarify and sta

the deployment cycle and improve personnel polici

examples. Still, many of the things the Army most ne

be more effective in the Balkans are beyond its co

Greater clarity of strategy and policy is one of these

objectives in Southeast Europe in general and the Ba

in particular are reasonably clear, but what is neede

concrete statement concerning the long-term involv

and role of the American military. Does the United 

37
Washington’s ultimate goals are met, even if this 

years or decades? If the role of the U.S. military 

diminish, how and how soon is this to be done? Will th

military stay involved in civil affairs and nation assis

or will it become purely a provider of security? What a

indicators of success?

Public opinion data, congressional activity, an

rhetoric of the 2000 presidential campaign all show 

support for long-term engagement in the Balkan

seeing through what has been started—is fr

Sustaining this support will require persistent lead

from the White House, the Pentagon, and the 

Department. It will also require that Army lead

vigilant in force protection. Taking significant casual

the Balkans would not automatically lead to Am

disengagement, but it would certainly complicate the 

retaining public and congressional support fo

operations. 

The Balkan conflict also shows that NATO needs 

more effective means of deterring, preemptin

responding to politically ambiguous challenges. 

United States stays the course in the Balkans and se

operations through to ultimate success, NATO is lik

emerge stronger. If the United States loses patienc

foregoes its Balkans commitments, this is likely to spa

greatest challenge to NATO since the cruise missi

medium range ballistic missile (Pershing II) controve

the 1980s, perhaps even a greater one than tha

bluntly, if the United States abandons the Balkans, 

will probably begin a slow slide into strategic irrelev

Finally, the Balkans operations have shown bo

strengths and weaknesses of the United States a

Army. They have shown the immense strides that the 

had made in adapting to the post-Cold War se

environment. They have shown that the United Stat

has an unparalleled ability to organize and lead co

38
today’s Army, if given sufficient time, can respond 

extensive range of challenges. But they have also 

that sometimes the current Army has difficulty creati

appropriate organizations, doctrine, and methods fo

complex challenges. In the Balkans, the Army had to 

on the fly. This worked, but has not led to op

effectiveness and efficiency. General Shinseki’s tra

mation of the Army may help remedy the problem

come from using units in ways other than what they 

designed and trained for, but there is much to 

President Bush decides that the U.S. military w

become involved in protracted peace operations o

approaching them as a secondary function is accep

then the current configuration of the Army is approp

But if the trend toward greater U.S. involveme

protracted peace operations continues, the Army an

Department of Defense probably will be forced to relo

way the Army approaches them and consider refo

units on peace support or forming new organizations

Recommendations.

To be more effective in the Balkans and in other 

operations, then, the Army should:

• Support a continued U.S. presence in the Ba

until American political objectives are met;

• Develop programs to hand over the maintena

nation assistance and day-to-day security funct

European and Balkan forces within 2 years;

• Develop a long-term presence in the Balka

minimize turbulence and to provide a rapid re

force for crises, serve as a foundation for future 

operations should they become necessary

provide day-to-day engagement with B

militaries as they develop and professionalize;

39
yy , py 

and training, to assist with the developmen

professionalization of Balkan militaries;

• Seek a modest increase in force size with the b

this going to “high demand, low density” units 

play a vital role in peace operations;

• Should American political leaders decide to 

peace operations an enduring and central func

U.S. strategy, support the formation of dedicate

and interagency peacekeeping organizations 

augmentation to the existing force.

ENDNOTES

1. Michael Cooper, “Cheney Urges Rethinking Use of U.S. 

Forces in Bosnia and Kosovo,” New York Times, September 1, 2

2. Michael R. Gordon, “Bush Would Stop U.S. Peacekee

Balkan Fights,” New York Times, October 21, 2000.

3. Quoted in James Kitfield, “Peacekeepers’ Progress,” N

Journal, December 23, 2000.

4. For instance, George Robertson, the NATO Secretary G

said that Bush’s campaign team assured him that the United 

would not unilaterally withdraw from the Balkans but would wo

disengagement plan with NATO. (Michael R. Gordon, “NATO 

Says Bush Aide Reassured Him on Balkan Stance,” New York 

November 1, 2000).

5. For analysis, see William T. Johnsen, Deciphering the 

Enigma: Using History to Inform Policy, revised edition, C

Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institut

pp. 11-26 and 30-47.

6. Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Diss

After the Cold War, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Pres

p. 45.

7. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, C

Background Notes: Serbia and Montenegro, August 1999.

40
Background Notes: Bosnia, August 1999.

9. For background on the Bosnian civil war and the Dayton 

see Richard Holbrooke, To End a War, New York: Modern Librar

and Ivo H. Daalder, Getting to Dayton: The Making of America’s 

Policy, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000.

10. “History of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in 

and Herzegovina,”reprinted at http://hq.nato.int/sfor/

d981116a.htm.

11. “History of SFOR,” reprinted at http://hq.nato.int/sfor

d981116a.htm. 

12. As of October 2000, SFOR included contingents from A

Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Re

Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hu

Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Morocco, Nethe

Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia

Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United State

http://hq.nato.int/sfor/nations/sfornations.htm.

13. The Rambouillet Agreement is reprinted at http:/

state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo_rambouillet_text.html. 

conflict in general, particularly the NATO air campaign, see 

Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War 

Kosovo, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000.

14. Security Council Resolution 1244, which established thes

is reprinted at http://www.kforonline.com/resources/docu

unscr1244.htm.

15. General Wesley K. Clark, statement before the United 

House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, 100th c

session, February 17, 2000.

16. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 47-145.

17. Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through H

New York: Vintage, 1994, p. xxiii.

18. Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugosla

Its Destroyers, New York: Times Books, 1999, pp. viii-ix.

19. See Lorraine M. Lees, Keeping Tito Afloat: The United 

Yugoslavia, and the Cold War, University Park: Pennsylvani

41
from Stalin in the late 1940s. Both the Truman and Eise

administrations, for instance, signed assistance treatie

Yugoslavia.

20. Richard Holbrooke attributes the hesitance of both the B

Clinton administrations to “post-Iraq American fatigue” and co

that the Balkans were the worst possible place to attempt to fo

Europeans to play a more active role in their region’s security. 

End a War, pp. 26-28. This same point is made by David Gom

member of the Bush National Security Council Staff. (Da

Gompert, “The United States and Yugoslavia’s Wars,” in Rich

Ullman, ed., The World and Yugoslavia’s Wars, New York: Cou

Foreign Relations, pp. 122-134).

21. A National Security Strategy For a New Century, Wash

DC: The White House, December 1999, p. 29.

22. Madeleine K. Albright, “Our Stake in Kosovo,” New York 

March 28, 2000.

23. Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, “The United S

the Balkans: There to Stay,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 23

Autumn 2000, p. 158.

24. Remarks by the President to American Society of New

Editors, Fairmont Hotel, San Francisco, CA, April 15, 1999, repr

http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/New/html/19990415-432

For a thorough analysis of NATO’s air campaign, see Ivo H. Daal

Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save 

Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000.

25. For detail, see Strengthening Transatlantic Security: 

Strategy for the 21st Century, Washington, DC: Department of D

December 2000.

26. Assistant Secretary of State for European Affair

Grossman, “U.S.-European Security Beyond Kosovo,” address 

Washington Semester Program of American University, Wash

DC, October 15, 1999, reprinted at http://www.state.gov/

policy_remarks/1999/991015_grossman_osce.html.

27. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Eur

regional security organization composed of 55 states from 

Central Asia and North America. The OSCE was establishe

primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention

42
Charter of the United Nations. See the OSCE web p

http://www.osce.org/general/gen_info.htm.

28. A National Security Strategy For a New Century, p. 30.

29. Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering, “The B

Rung,” address to the Business Council for Interna

Understanding, Washington, DC, August 7, 2000, reprin

http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/2000/00807_pic

balkans.html.

30. Steven Erlanger, “Europeans Say Bush’s Pledge to Pul

Balkans Could Split NATO,” New York Times, October 25, 200

31. Chris Patten, “A European Vision for the Balkans,” 

Review, Vol. 48, No. 2, Summer-Autumn 2000, pp. 13-15.

32. Richard Hoffman and Thomas Young, “Shift U.S

Attention,” Defense News, October 9, 2000, p. 31.

33. SFOR has a unified command and is NATO-led un

political direction and control of the Alliance’s North Atlantic C

as stipulated by the Peace Agreement (Annex 1A). U.S. Arm

Michael L. Dodson is the current Commander of SFOR (COM

Previous commanders (all U.S. Army) include LTG Ronald E

Adams, GEN Montgomery C. Meigs, GEN Eric K. Shinseki, an

William Crouch. KFOR commanders have included British Lieu

General Michael Jackson, German General Dr. Klaus Rei

Spanish Lieutenant General Juan Ortuño, and Italian Lieu

General Carlo Cabigiosu. For an assessment of this task, see G

Klaus Reinhardt, “Commanding KFOR,” NATO Review, Vol. 48

Summer-Autumn 2000, pp. 16-19.

34. Paul Stone, “Bosnia Mission Helps Solidify Tota

Integration,” Armed Forces Information Service, February 4

Task Force Eagle, which is the United States component of the 

force, was formed in December 1995. Command and control wa

1st Armored Division. In November 1996, command and control 

to the 1st Infantry Division. In October 1997, it returned to 

Armored Division. In June 1998, SFOR shifted to a slightly 

force led by the 1st Cavalry Division. In August 1999, the 10th M

Division assumed command. From March 2000 to October 20

49th Armored Division controlled Task Force Eagle. In Octobe

the 3rd Infantry Division assumed this role. See the history of S

http://www.tfeagle.army.mil/TFE/SFOR_History.htm.

43
The Challenges of U.S. Military Participation in Peace Ope

Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, National S

Division, December 1999, p. 6.

36. For elaboration, see Steven Metz, American Strategy: Iss

Alternatives for the Quadrennial Defense Review, Carlisle Barrac

U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2000, pp. 5

37. While the ultimate price tag for Army transforma

unknown, few question that it will be high. See Ron Laurenzo

‘Vision’ to Cost $70 Billion Through 2014,” Defense Week, Febru

2000, p. 1; and Jeffrey R. Barnett, “Funding Two Armies,” Armed 

Journal International, May 2000, p. 14.

38. Brett Schaefer, “Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Pol

Defense Issues,” in Issues ’96: The Candidate’s Briefing 

Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 1996.

39. American Enterprise Institute compilation of public 

data on Kosovo, reprinted at http://www.aei.org/kosovo.htm.

40. Eric Pianin and Helen Dewar, “Senate Sinks Propo

Kosovo Withdrawal Deadline,” Washington Post, May 19, 2000, 

and David R. Sands, “Kosovo Mission End Not In Sight,” Was

Times, September 30, 2000, p. 1.

41. Robert Suro, “In Kosovo, an Uncertain Mission,” Was

Post, September 20, 2000, p. A1; and, Carol J. Williams

Peacekeepers’ Tough Stance Mars Image in Kosovo,”Los Angeles 

September 30, 2000, p. 1.

42. Peter van Ham, “Europe’s Common Defense Policy: Impl

for the Trans-Atlantic Relationship,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 31

June 2000, pp. 215-218. See also the speech by Ambassador F

Bujon de l’Estang at the CSIS conference “European Secur

Defense Policy (ESDP) and Its Implications for the United Sta

NATO,” Washington, DC, October 10, 2000, reprin

http://www.csis.org/europe/sp00bujon.html

43. Speech by Ambassador Jürgen Chrobog at the CSIS con

“European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and Its Implicat

the United States and NATO,” Washington, DC, October 10

reprinted at http://www.csis.org/europe/sp00chrobog.html.

44
Security: The Debate in NATO and the European Union, Wash

DC: Congressional Research Service, April 2000.

45. Michael R. Gordon, “Europe Acts To Build Own Military 

New York Times, November 21, 2000.

46. For instance, the statement of Elmar Brok, Chairman 

Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, and Common S

and Defence Policy, the European Parliament in “European C

Foreign, Security and Defense Policies—Implications For the 

States and the Atlantic Alliance,” hearing before the Comm

International Relations of the House of Representatives, 106t

1st sess., November 10, 1999, p. 8.

47. See the written comments of Ian Duncan Smith, S

Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom and John B

the American Enterprise Institute at the hearings cited above.

48. “Europe’s Ambitions Extend to Replacing NATO, Not 

Complementing It,” NRC Handelsblad (Rotterdam), Novem

2000, p. 9, translated and reprinted by the Foreign Bro

Information Service (FBIS), November 22, 2000.

49. Quoted in Richard Norton-Taylor, “Europe’s Rapid R

Force: Supporters and Doubters,” The Guardian, November 24

50. John Lancaster, “U.S., Yugoslavia to Resume Rel

Washington, Post, November 17, 2000, p. A36; Michael 

“Kostunica Hesitant On Talks With U.S.” Washington Post, No

3, 2000, p. A24.

51. Jane Perlez, “Albright’s Ambition to Meet Yugoslav Le

Unrequited,” New York Times, November 24, 2000.

52. R. Jeffrey Smith and Peter Finn, “Yugoslav Leader M

Mend Diplomatic Ties,” Washington Post, October 10, 2000, p. 

53. Carlotta Gall, “New Yugoslav Leader Tries to Calm 

Montenegro,” New York Times, October 18, 2000.

54. Peter Finn and R. Jeffrey Smith, “Kostunica’s Monteneg

Fails to Fix Ties,” Washington Post, October 18, 2000, p. A18.

55. John Lancaster, “U.S. Tries To Rein In Monte

Washington Post, November 21, 2000, p. 23.

45
Angeles Times, November 25, 2000, p. 14. See also Milo Djuk

“Yugoslavia Is Still Dead,” Wall Street Journal, November 24, 

57. R. Jeffrey Smith and Peter Finn, “Depth of Corruption Su

in Yugoslavia,” Washington Post, October 22, 2000, p. A24; R. 

Smith, “Fund Misuse Tied To a Top Bosnian,” Washingto

November 9, 2000, p. A20.

58. On the formation of SFOR and its initial operations, see 

Peace Operation: Mission, Structure, and Transition Strategy of 

Stabilization Force, report to the Chairman, Committee on 

Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC: United States G

Accounting Office, October 1998.

59. R. Jeffrey Smith, “Ethnic Hatred Permeates Bosnia’s 

Peace,” Washington Post, November 10, 2000, p. A30.

60. “EU Gives Leg Up To Balkans,” Christian Science M

November 28, 2000.

61. Michael Dobbs, “Kostunica Visits Bosnian Leade

Washington Post, October 23, 2000, p. A18.

62. Linda D. Kozaryn, “Balkan Tensions Persist, SACEUR 

Armed Forces Information Service, December 1, 1999, repri

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec1999/n12101999_991

ml.

63. Linda D. Kozaryn, “NATO Chief Says Bosnia Missi

Vital,” Armed Forces Information Service, February 8, 2000, re

at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2000/n02082000_2000208

64. Scott Peterson, “Balkan Nationalism Loses Steam,” Ch

Science Monitor, October 25, 2000.

65. R. Jeffrey Smith, “No Clear Mandate in Bosnia 

Washington Post, November 13, 2000, p. A16; Carlotta Gall, “B

Election Returns Point To Little Change, Analysts Say,” Ne

Times, November 20, 2000.

66. Balkans Security: Current and Projected Factors A

Regional Stability, Briefing report to the Chairman, Commi

Armed Services, House of Representatives, Washington, DC: 

States General Accounting Office, April 2000, p. 25.

46
the Balkans, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 6, November/Decembe

p. 96.

68. Ivo H. Daalder and Michael B.G. Froman, “Dayton’s Inco

Peace,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 6, November/December 1

110; Christopher Marquis with Carlotta Gall, “Congressional 

Says Corruption Is Stifling Bosnia,” New York Times, July 7, 20

Statement of James W. Pardew, Principal Deputy Special Adviso

President and Secretary of State for Democracy in the Balkan

Department of State, July 19, 2000, House Committee on Intern

Relations, reprinted at http://www.house.gov/interna

relations/full/bosnia/pardew.html.

69. R. Jeffrey Smith, “West Is Tiring of Struggle to Rebuild B

Washington Post, November 25, 2000, p. A1.

70. “ICG Report Shows ‘Most’ Indicted War Criminals Still in 

Office in RS,” Sarajevo ONASA, November 2, 2000, translat

reprinted by FBIS, November 2, 2000.

71. For the rise of criminality in Kosovo, see Barry Jame

Zone Turns to Crime,” International Herald Tribune, March 1

Imer Mushkolaj, “Now Drug Dealers Are Invading Kosovo

Francisco Examiner, June 28, 2000; and for a broader treatm

Alessandro Politi, “European Security: The New Transnational 

Chaillot Papers, No. 29, October, 1997 for a discussion that i

strong evidence of the KLA’s tendencies towards criminal actio

before the U.S. intervention in Kosovo.

72. Brigadier General Dennis Hardy, quoted in Gregory 

“KFOR Soldiers’ Roles Changing In Kosovo,” Stars and S

November 27, 2000, p. 3. On the drop in crime, see James K

“Lessons From Kosovo and Bosnia,” National Journal, Decem

2000.

73. Peter Finn, “Change Seen in Kosovo, Montenegro,” Was

Post, October 7, 2000, p. A18; Michael Smith and Lutz Kle

“Kosovo: KLA May Resume the Battle,” London Daily Tel

October 6, 2000; and, David Sands, “Election Rivals United In 

For Kosovo Independence,” Washington Times, October 27, 200

74. Aleksandar Vasovic, “Kostunica Confronts Albanian Reb

Washington Times, November 24, 2000.

47
Buffer-Zone Raids,” Washington Post, November 26, 2000, p. A

76. “Serbian Government Blames KFOR, UNMIK for Att

Albanian ‘Terrorists’,” report by Tanjug, the official Yugosla

agency (Belgrade), November 23, 2000, transcript by FBIS, No

23, 2000.

77. Michael Mandelbaum, “A Perfect Failure: NATO’s War A

Yugoslavia,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 5, September/October 

5.

78. Steven Erlanger, “Is Serbia’s Victory Kosovo’s Loss?” Ne

Times, October 29, 2000.

79. R. Jeffrey Smith, “Kosovo Towns Set to End R

Ex-Guerrillas,” Washington Post, October 28, 2000, p. A16; M

Kaminski, “Outlook For Democracy Remains Bright in Balkan

Street Journal, November 1, 2000.

80. This point was made to the author by Colonel 

McCausland.

81. Ewen MacAskill, ”U.S. Shift on Independent Kosovo 

Allies,” The Guardian, October 30, 2000; “U.S. Wants Kosov

Third Republic Within Yugoslavia,” Baltimore Sun, October 16

82. Background Notes: Slovenia, U.S. Department of State, 

of European Affairs, February 1999, reprinted at http://www.st

www/background_notes/slovenia_9902_bgn.html.

83. Quoted in Marja Novak, “Slovenes Vote for Party Seek

NATO Ties,” Washington Post, October 17, 2000, p. A21.

84. Scott Peterson, “Balkan Nationalism Loses Steam,” Ch

Science Monitor, October 25, 2000.

85. Ivica Racan, “Making Up For Lost Time,” NATO Review, 

No. 2, Summer-Autumn 2000, pp. 8-9.

86. Kristan J. Wheaton, “Cultivating Croatia’s Military,” 

Review, Vol. 48, No. 2, Summer-Autumn 2000, pp. 10-12.

87. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, “Statement on 

Joining the Partnership for Peace,” Florence, Italy, May 25, 2

released by the Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department o

48
000525b.html.

88. On UNPREDEP, see http://www.un.org/Depts/D

Missions/unpredep.htm. The U.S. contribution is Task Force 

originally known as Task Force Able Sentry. On 

http://www.eucom.mil/operations/tfs/index.htm.

89. Balkans Security: Current and Projected Factors A

Regional Stability, Briefing report to the Chairman, Commi

Armed Services, House of Representatives, Washington, DC: 

States General Accounting Office, April 2000, p. 55.

90. “US General Assures Meidani of US Support for Albania

Reforms,” Tirana ATA broadcast of November 1, 2000, transla

reprinted by FBIS, November 1, 2000. Information 

military-to-military programs with Albanian run by the United 

European Command can be found at http://www.euco

programs/jctp/albania/al background.ppt.

91. For background on the 1997 violence, see British H

Human Rights Group, “Albania 1997: Politics and Purg

http://www.bhhrg.org/albania/albania1997/albania1997.htm

92. Making Peace While Staying Ready For War, Section 3.

93. After the War: Kosovo Peacekeeping Costs, Washingto

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, June 7, 1999

94. See Steven Erlanger, “West’s Plan for Balkans Tries 

Footing,” New York Times, November 26, 2000; and Pat

European Vision For the Balkans,” pp. 13-14.

95. Making Peace While Staying Ready For War, chapter II

96. Suro, “In Kosovo, an Uncertain Mission,” p. A1.

97. Army News Service, “Army Sets Five-Year Balkans Ro

December 4, 2000.

49
Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

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STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

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Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

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Author

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