AMERICAN STRATEGY:

ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES

FOR THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIE

Steven Metz

September 2000
*****

The views expressed in this report are those of the author an

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Departmen

Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Thi

is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. The autho

like to thank Douglas Johnson, Earl Tilford, Douglas Lovelace, W

Doll, Joseph Cerami, Conrad Crane, and John Troxell for in

comments on earlier drafts of the study. Any err

misintrepretations which remain do so despite their best effort

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and sh

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Arm

College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Comments a

be conveyed directly to the author by calling (717) 245-3822, fa

245-3820, or by email at steven.metz@carlisle.army.mil. Copies 

report may be obtained from the Publications and Production O

calling commercial (717) 245-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or 

Internet at rummelr@awc.carlisle.army.mil

*****

Most 1993, 1994, and all later Strategic Studies Institut

monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for ele

dissemination. SSI’s Homepage address is: http://carlisle-www

mil/usassi/welcome.htm

*****

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly 

newsletter to update the national security community on the res

our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and up

conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also pro

strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If y

interested in receiving this newsletter, please let us know by e

outreach@awc.carlisle.army.mil or by calling (717) 245-3133.

ISBN 1-58487-032-X

ii
CONTENTS

Foreword ........................

Summary .......................

Introduction ......................

Part I:

The Evolution of American Military

Strategy.........................

Part II:

Core Issues ......................

Part III:

The Evolution of American

Strategy ........................

Endnotes ........................ 

Appendix

Chronology of Key Strategic Documents

and Reports ...................... 

About the Author ................... 

iii
FOREWORD

The latter half of 2000 and the first 6 months of 2001 are 

to represent a seminal time in the evolution of U.S. m

strategy. The combination of a congressionally-man

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a change of presiden

shifts in the global security environment will force or 

American strategists to rethink some of the basic elements 

strategy and decide if any changes need to be made. It is vit

the defense transformation process be strategy driven 

than dictated by budgets or technology alone. In other wor

first step in assessing the status and the future of Am

strategy is to examine the concepts and broad alternati

which it is built.

The Strategic Studies Institute has undertaken s

projects to help Army leaders and defense policymakers id

key strategic issues and alternatives. One is a major conf

organized in collaboration with the Georgetown Univ

National Security Studies Program in September 200

present study by Steven Metz represents another. In it, Dr

begins with a survey of the evolution of American d

strategy since the end of the Cold War. He then describe

the key issues which will shape the upcoming QDR and ass

number of strategic alternatives ranging from the ex

strategy to some new and innovative ones. For each alter

he describes the key assumptions and the risks involved. H

with a slate of recommendations including a controlled shif

from the focus on large-scale regional war with “rogue sta

Decisions made in the next year will affect U.S. secur

decades to come. The Strategic Studies Institute is plea

offer this study as part of the debate and analysis which w

the process of defense transformation.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

v
SUMMARY

Because of the confluence of the congressio

mandated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) a

presidential election, the years 2000 and 2001 are lik

be important in the evolution of American military str

Basic strategic concepts and alternatives will be de

and analyzed. The results will shape U.S. strateg

several decades. This study provides a brief history 

evolution of American military strategy since the end 

Cold War, delineates the key issues which are lik

shape the upcoming QDR process, and assesses a ra

strategic alternatives.

Core Issues. Four broad strategic issues are likely 

particularly important during the QDR and as the 

president frames his defense policy:

Transformation. Beginning with the National De

Panel of 1997, a number of influential thinkers have 

for a full transformation of the American military to 

the potential of the information technology d

revolution in military affairs. While the specific traject

transformation is open to debate, the Pentagon an

military Services have established a number of prog

designed to energize change. But some advocat

transformation contend that the Department of Defe

less committed to transformation than it might be. O

argue that the current security environment does not j

the cost and risk which transformation would entail.

Force Shaping. During the early 1990s, Ame

strategists made two crucial force shaping decisions

was to use “major regional conflicts” like the Gulf Wa

yardstick. The second was to move from a predomin

threat-based force shaping methodology to capabi

based ones. For a number of reasons, the current app

to force shaping may not survive QDR 2001. Ho

vii
inadequate the two MTW yardstick, it is not clear 

should replace it. In an even broader sense, some de

analysts are beginning to question the use of capabilit

a force shaping criterion rather than existing threats. 

though the Department of Defense is not likely to aba

the capabilities approach in the near term, it wil

pressure from Congress, the media, and the public to a

a better match between the capabilities of the U.S. mi

and the threats it might face. DOD and the Service

unlikely to find a sympathetic ear for acquisition and 

development programs based on a hypothetical “nea

competitor” so long as there are few signs of one emerg

Strategic Focus. The appropriate focus for the 

military should depend on trends in the global se

environment. The key question is whether m

state-on-state war will remain common enough 

threatening enough to warrant building a military 

designed primarily to deal with it. There is no agreeme

this among strategic thinkers and defense leaders. 

this, QDR 2001 is likely to see several major que

concerning the post-MTW focus of the U.S. military:

• Should the U.S. military continue to foc

warfighting or treat warfighting and non-warfig

functions like peace operations, shaping

military-to-military engagement as co-equals?

• If U.S. national security strategy continues to 

participation in multinational peace su

operations, should the military seek greater effic

and effectiveness by developing specialized un

focus on these sorts of activities, including long

nation building?

• Can large-scale, cross-border, conventional w

deterred or defeated by some means other th

combined arms operations by a U.S. domi

coalition?

viii
• Should the U.S. military give greater empha

nontraditional adversaries or emerging en

rather than state militaries?

The Strategy-Budget Mismatch. Today nearly 

analyst agrees that the budget predictions which serv

the basis for the 1997 QDR are unrealistic. But as is a

true with economic and budgetary predictions, va

writers disagree on the extent of the shortfall. I

broadest sense, there are three solutions. One would 

Congress to authorize dramatically larger defense bu

perhaps linking defense spending to a specific percent

gross domestic product. Another is to attempt to clo

gap through greater efficiency. The third approach 

adjust strategy to budgetary realities by redefining na

interests and scaling back on security commitments. 

probability, QDR 2001 will not solve the problem and 

not even address it. Eventually, though, budgets, co

ments, and force levels must be synchronized.

The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. A ra

strategic alternatives has been developed and de

within the defense community as part of the preparati

QDR 2001. Consensus is emerging that this QDR sho

strategy driven rather than budget driven like QDR 

This places extra importance on the strategic concept

will be incorporated into the review process. The str

alternatives under scrutiny differ in their assump

focus, and risk. Five alternatives merit serious con

ation.

Alternative I: Shape, Prepare, Respond. Becaus

United States currently uses the shape/respond/pr

approach, it forms the baseline for the analysis 

alternatives. In fact, many of what are being called str

alternatives during the QDR preparations are ac

variants of the shape/respond/prepare approach r

than discrete strategies.

ix
Variant A: The Respond Approach (Current Stra

The current variant of the shape/respond/prepare app

gives responding priority in terms of money, time, 

and talent. Responding, which includes the Ame

reaction to both MTWs and SSCs, is “first among equ

the three functions. The Respond Approach does 

some strategic risks and costs. For instance, it dema

large and highly skilled force, and a large defense bud

can lead the United States to over-extension and 

discourage partners from adequately developing thei

military capabilities. Engagement can cause partner

the American public to overestimate the exte

Washington’s commitment to a nation or a region an

risk “guilt by association” if a military that has unde

American training or education, or which had 

combined exercises with the U.S. military commits h

rights violations, undertakes aggression, becomes co

or intervenes in the political system of its state. Fi

preparing now for an uncertain future can risk “earl

in” if predictions about the future prove incorrect.

Variant B: The Transformation Approach

“Transformation Approach” is based on the belief th

United States should accept greater short-term ri

limiting global engagement, canceling procureme

current or next-generation weapons systems, selec

lowering current readiness and operational tempo, cu

some force structure, and shrinking the de

infrastructure in order to accelerate the developmen

adoption of advanced systems, concepts, and organiza

If this succeeds, it could solidify American mi

preponderance for decades to come, thus helping ass

more stable global security system and protecting 

national interests.

The Transformation Approach is based on se

assumptions. First, while the United States is unlik

face a peer or near-peer competitor for several deca

hence the “strategic pause”—this approach assume

one will eventually emerge or, at least, try to emerge

x
Transformation Approach also assumes that the U

States has an accurate roadmap for the current revo

in military affairs so that any changes made bring str

advantages. And, it is based on the assumption that th

military, in conjunction with coalition partners and 

can overcome immediate or short-term challenges 

existing technology and forces.

Ultimately, the Transformation Approach e

accepting greater short-term risk in expectation 

long-term payoff. If one assumes that the United Stat

an accurate roadmap for transformation, that the cu

strategy is economically unsustainable, that a subst

American military preponderance over any conce

opponent should be sustained, that a decline in curren

influence in some regions is acceptable or can be rectif

a later date, and that the current “strategic pause

persist for several decades, the Transformation App

makes sense. If any of these assumptions do not hol

soundness of the Transformation Approach is question

Variant C: The Shaping Approach. The “Sh

Approach” grows from the conclusion that MTW

increasingly unlikely. This gives the United States a c

to place greater emphasis on the use of the milita

shaping and engagement to preempt conflict, inc

regional stability, augment the capabilities of Ame

partners, and deter the “states of concern.” It woul

allow significantly smaller defense budgets since sh

activities are less costly than warfighting, and since g

regional stability would allow force reductions.

While a Shaping Approach would help save de

dollars and potentially augment regional stability in 

parts of the world, it would be a risky venture if predi

about the demise of large-scale war prove wrong. Mor

a Shaping Approach assumes that the recent demo

reforms and economic growth will continue. Clearly th

military would not undertake engagement with oppre

nondemocratic partners. It is possible that the first d

xi
of the 21st century will prove to be the high water m

political reform and democratization, with regre

toward authoritarianism or fragmentation taking pl

the political and economic expectations of the citize

transitional states are frustrated. A Shaping Approac

risks guilt by association, creeping commitment, and 

extension.

Variant D: The Warfighting Approach. 

“Warfighting Approach” is based on the belief that sha

engagement, and preparing should be secondary fun

for the U.S. military. What distinguishes the Warfig

Approach from the Respond Approach is the separat

major war from smaller scale contingencies

warfighting approach is based on the belief that the fo

the American military should be MTWs or, at 

large-scale war, with SSCs accorded lower priority. Li

Transformation Approach, the Warfighting App

advocates diminishing American engagement in sh

and SSCs. But, rather than doing this as a means of sh

resources to transformation efforts, the warfig

approach advocates diminished engagement strictly o

basis of strategic prudence: by expending so much 

effort, and money in regions of the world less import

the United States, Washington is increasing the risk t

interests in the core regions.

While the Warfighting Approach to U.S. mi

strategy would be a more focused and cheaper one tha

current strategy, it would entail an increase in 

short-term and long-term risk. By abandoning shapin

engagement activities, conflicts that might have 

deterred or avoided may break out. The U.S. military 

play only a limited role in smaller conflicts in no

regions. This would erode the position of leade

currently held by the United States and could leave th

military unable to perform functions demanded of it b

American people and their elected leaders.

xii
Alternative II: A Counter-Asymmetry Strategy. Th

behind the counter-asymmetry strategy is that respo

to existing or potential threats should, in fact, rema

central focus of American military strategy, but the cu

strategy prepares for the wrong kind of challenge

counter-asymmetry approach to U.S. military str

recognizes this and would adjust force struc

operational concepts, and equipment accordingly

question then becomes: what forms of asymmetry w

most common and, more importantly, most problema

the United States?

A counter-asymmetry approach to U.S. military str

would de-emphasize forces and capabilities use

traditional force-on-force combat in open terrain, and 

instead on counter-terrorism, homeland defense, m

defense, urban operations, operations without 

in-theater bases, dispersed nonlinear operations, mi

robotics, and other activities that might thwart asymm

activities. The U.S. military would also need to de

hybrid hierarchy-network organizations to co

networked opponents.

The primary risk of a counter-asymmetry appro

guessing wrong. The United States could undertake 

efforts to prepare for a type of enemy or a type of conflic

never emerges. This would not only be expensive, but 

also undercut support from the American public a

elected leaders, and erode morale within the U.S. mi

Ultimately preparing for the wrong kind of asymm

threat could be just as dangerous as not preparing 

There is also the same risk seen in several other str

approaches under consideration, that shifting the fo

the American military away from MTW might make it 

likely to occur. In all probability, the time is not yet rig

the United States to shift to a counter-asymmetry stra

Alternative III: Preventive Defense. All variants 

shape/respond/prepare strategy reflect the belief tha

United States has three levels of national interest—

xiii
important, and humanitarian—and that U.S. mi

power should be used to promote or protect all three s

as the expected costs and risks are in accordance wi

significance of the interest at stake. It is, in other wo

military strategy appropriate for a superpower that h

ability and the will to become involved in many kin

issues and in many places. There is a growing move

though, that contends that such an unlimited na

security strategy will ultimately prove insolvent. Thu

United States needs to resist the temptation to use mi

force on problems and issues that are ultimately perip

or secondary and focus on truly important nat

interests. The United States needs, in other wor

national security strategy of constraint and focus r

than one of unconstrained enlargement and engagem

Former Clinton officials William Perry and A

Carter advocate a strategy that focuses on “A” list th

that might challenge the survival, way of life, and po

in the world of the United States. These include the d

that Russia might descend into chaos, isolation

aggression; the danger that Russia and other S

successor states might lose control of their weapons of 

destruction; the danger that China could be

increasingly hostile; the danger that weapons of 

destruction will proliferate and present a direct mi

threat to U.S. forces and territory; and the dange

catastrophic terrorism might occur on U.S. territory. 

issues do not capture the headlines like humanit

disasters but, according to Perry and Carter, will dete

the future security of the United States.

The preventive defense strategy is based on sever

assumptions. The most important is that shaping act

on the part of the U.S. military can have a positive eff

developments in China and Russia, and can lowe

danger from terrorism. The preventive defense str

also assumes that the threat from rogue states w

worst, remain steady and may actually decrease, 

modest improvement in U.S. forces will preserv

xiv
adequate military advantage. Finally, preventive de

assumes that “C” list problems will not expand or es

into more serious threats. They can, in other word

handled with a very modest effort or even ignored, w

long-term repercussions. Risks arise if any of 

assumptions prove false.

Alternative IV: Supporting Regional Structures. C

strategy notes that the U.S. military usually operates 

partners, but in every type of coalition operation e

peacekeeping in peripheral areas, the United States 

to be the dominant member. A strategy of supp

regional structures would reverse this so that the n

state of affairs would be for the U.S. military to b

supporting coalition partner rather than the supporte

This could diminish the chances that U.S. action

provoke opposition or intimidate other states. It coul

be a more affordable and sustainable strategy than o

which enemies are always defeated by America

coalitions.

A U.S. strategy of supporting regional sec

structures would reflect the fact that local states are 

interested in and better able to understand their re

security than are Americans. It would also take adva

of the fact that regional and subregional security orga

taking form in nearly all parts of the world. At the po

level, such a strategy would help with the format

multinational security structures where none exist

assist with the development of those that do. D

peacetime, the U.S. military would augmen

effectiveness of regional structures, primarily th

support to regional exercises, combined training

professional military education. During crises or co

the United States would provide support to reg

structures according to specific needs. This mig

improved command and control, missile def

intelligence support, transportation, medical or other 

of combat support, and combat service support. In 

xv
instances, the United States might bolster a reg

structure with long-range fire support or even landpo

To perform this support function, the U.S. military

the CINCs and the services, would need some reo

zation. The U.S. Army, for instance, would form ded

support divisions specifically designed to augment al

areas where they are weak. At the same time, the U

States would retain effective combat units for 

instances where regional structures are inadequa

where conditions dictate unilateral American mi

actions. It would also continue a robust proce

experimentation to explore and integrate eme

capabilities.

A strategy of supporting regional structures entai

important types of risk. The first is the risk that all

partner states may not be able to defeat aggression on 

own. Another risk is that a strategy of supporting reg

structures might lead to a decline in the ability of the U

States to dictate or control the outcome of crise

conflicts around the world. This is undeniable, but ma

be undesirable.

Alternative V: Strategic Reconfiguration. In 

alternative, the vital tasks of American strategy 

remain the same: responding to MTWs, responding to 

shaping/engagement, and preparing for the futur

components of the armed forces and the Departm

Defense would stress preparation, particularly exper

tation and concept development. But, responsibility f

immediate tasks—MTWs, SSC, and sha

engagement—would be reassigned. Strategic rec

uration would entail: (1) refocusing American strate

that SSCs are equal to or have a higher priority than M

and, (2) refocusing U.S. land forces on SSCs.

Strategic reconfiguration is based on se

assumptions: MTWs instigated by cross border aggre

by rogue states is becoming less likely; should it occ

could be defeated and reversed by a combination of reg

xvi
forces, standoff American fires, and other metho

American support; SSCs, shaping, and engagement w

the primary tasks of the U.S. military; and SSCs, sha

and engagement usually are not amenable to sta

solutions. If all of these assumptions hold, stra

reconfiguration entails acceptable risk. If any of them 

hold, strategic reconfiguration could increase the ch

that aggressor states will instigate MTW, make ult

defeat of MTWs impossible or more costly, and, as a r

diminish U.S. influence in those regions where MTW

possible.

The Evolution of American Strategy. Three ty

relationships form the building blocks of American na

security strategy: relationships of affinity, necess

humanity. Much of strategy can be distilled into dec

concerning the priority and forms of these relation

Even as U.S. strategy approaches the point of 

decisions that will shape the future, the Army tends to 

operationally rather than strategically. To assu

long-term relevance, the Army needs to place gr

emphasis on strategic level analysis. The confluence 

2001 QDR, a presidential transition, and the A

transformation process provides an excellent opportun

do this. This begins with basic concepts—what shou

done and what could be done.

The Army makes three defining contributions t

joint team. The first is versatility. The Army covers a 

part of the spectrum of military tasks than any of the 

Services. The second is ability to attain strateg

decisive results in war. The third is the potential to pr

broad-spectrum support to allies and friends. Given 

characteristics of the Army’s contribution to the joint 

Army leaders should do two things during the 2001 

The first is to design force and concept develop

programs that augment these defining characteris

versatility, full spectrum decisiveness, and broad-spe

support. The second is to assure that these de

characteristics become central components of Ame

xvii
military strategy. While versatility has moved in 

direction as the array of tasks given the U.S. m

expanded, greater effort is needed to amplify the r

full-spectrum decisiveness and broad-spectrum supp

The contours of the 21st century security environ

which were unclear in 1997, are moving into view. Th

not only the opportunity for more substantial str

change, but also a growing need for it. Given thi

soundest military strategy for the United States in co

years is one that blends components of all five o

strategic alternatives that have been discussed he

should integrate the following characteristics:

• Increased emphasis on joint, combined

inter-agency experimentation, research

development, but avoidance of lock-in t

particular type of future force. Phrased differ

the U.S. military should prepare for transform

but not yet undertake it ;

• Abandonment of the two MTW force shaping 

stick;

• Greater emphasis on asymmetric and nontradi

challenges (to include cancellation of procure

applicable only or primarily to MTWs);

• Movement toward a national security strategy 

stresses collaboration and partnership rather 

dominance and unilateralism. Developme

concepts and organizations designed specifica

support regional partners and allies d

peacetime, crisis, and war (including a na

security strategy that concentrates on aiding wi

formation and development of regional structu

• A broadened approach to the issue of decisiven

include a strategic meaning as well as an opera

one;

xviii
• A strategic focus on potential peer compet

specifically Russia and China. Modest engage

with these nations while retaining the capabi

shift to containment if they prove unwilli

cooperate on the construction of global and re

security systems.

xix
INTRODUCTION

Stiff and unbending is the principle of death.

Gentle and yielding is the principle of life.

Thus an Army without flexibility never wins a battle.

A tree that is unbending is easily broken.

— Tao Te Ching

The United States is as safe as any nation in 

memory yet remains obsessed with its security. Just 

nouveau riche are more aware than “old money” that w

can dissipate as easily as it comes, America, as 

entrant to the cast of great powers, worries that the na

influence will crumble and some yet-unnamed opp

will steal a march. Psychologically the United States 

insecure superpower. Rather than savoring predomin

American defense analysts and political lea

increasingly contend that the United States is approa

a point of danger or crisis for its military. Senator Bil

(R-Tenn), for instance, has argued that “the hollow st

readiness so many have warned about has al

arrived.”

1

 Daniel Goure and his colleagues at the influ

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS

of an imminent defense “train wreck” that may lead to 

military operations, an unwillingness on the pa

American political leaders to use the U.S. military, 

lack of confidence on the part of America’s allies.

analysts like John Hillen predict a defense “death spi

fundamental strategic changes aren’t forthcoming.

3

Whether the state of American defense is really s

can be debated, but tough decisions regarding Ame

military strategy have been avoided or postponed sin

downfall of the Soviet Union. Throughout the str

community, support grows for a serious and far-rea

reevaluation of U.S. military strategy. The most 

questions—why, when, and how armed force shou

used—are being asked. While it is very difficult to pr

1
strategic discourse from devolving into debates about 

expensive new system should or should not be boug

whether the military should or should not shrink, 

questions cannot be answered without clarity on str

concepts. Thinking about them is thus a process of imm

importance with repercussions not only for American

for the global security system as a whole.

While debate over American military strateg

simmered since the end of the Cold War, it is reachin

levels of intensity. Ironically, this is not the result 

event in the global security environment—a great succ

startling defeat—but rather the confluence 

congressionally mandated Quadrennial Defense R

(QDR) and a presidential election. The coming year m

a real revision of American military strategy or simply 

cosmetic alterations. But whether because of wha

decided or what was not decided, the years 2000 and 

are likely to be important ones in the evolution of Ame

military strategy.

This study is designed to support QDR-related an

by identifying major issues and strategic concepts. 

provides context and background. George Santay

aphorism that “those who do not remember the pa

condemned to repeat it," although a cliche, remains tr

this study will begin by tracing the documents, st

debates, and concepts which shaped the evolution o

defense strategy during the past decade. (A chronol

key strategic documents and reports is included i

appendix.) Part II focuses on issues and alternatives 

consideration as part of the QDR process. It wil

primarily with strategic concepts rather than 

acquisition or force structure issues. Whether t

systems like the Crusader or Joint Strike Fighter ar

important questions but they only can be answ

following debate and consensus on key strategic con

Acquisition and force structure are dependent vari

not independent ones; to decide what to buy and then 

what to do with it is not the most effective mea

2
promoting American security. Part III will offer conclu

and recommendations.

Finally, the analysis throughout this study w

landpower in orientation. Today the role of Ame

landpower and its strategic significance is being quest

Decisions that are made concerning key strategic con

will have immense implications for the size and role o

land forces. By understanding the concepts and issue

constitute U.S. military strategy, decisions about th

and relevance of landpower as well as the setti

strategic priorities will become easier.

3
PART I: THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN

MILITARY STRATEGY

The Base Force.

Containment, of course, was the bedrock str

concept during the Cold War. This reflected the defe

perspective on military force that dominated str

American thinking. Except for occasional spas

aggression, military power was not used for terr

expansion outside what Americans considered 

“natural” boundaries. During the Cold War, the pr

task of the U.S. military was to prevent the expans

communism by force. The main threats were convent

armor-heavy Warsaw Pact forces in Europe, comm

insurgents in other areas, Soviet nuclear forces, the S

Navy, and—ironically—the lingering isolationist ten

of the American people and their elected leaders. To co

these, U.S. defense leaders developed an arr

supporting strategic concepts. These included:

• Formation and sustainment of a web of alliance

security commitments;

• Forward deployed, heavy forces to serve 

guarantee of American commitment to the defe

allies and to minimize the chance that invaders 

have to be expelled from allied territory;

• The ability to augment forward deployed 

through rapid, long-distance reinforcement an

mobilization of large reserve component forces;

• Air and naval superiority;

• Interoperability with allied forces;

• Extended nuclear deterrence;

5
• Reliance on qualitative superiority in equip

technology, training and doctrine to compensa

quantitative inferiority;

• Cultivation of clients or proxies in are

less-than-vital concern, especially through se

assistance;

• Counterinsurgency support to friendly re

(eventually support to insurgents attempti

overthrow unfriendly regimes); and

• Limited use of the active component of the 

military in non-warfighting missions.

These strategic concepts were adapted and revised 

the demise of the Soviet Union. This task fell first o

defense and national security team of the 

administration. The initial reaction was a modest sh

least in terms of strategic concepts. Even had the 

administration been more inclined to undertake r

change in military strategy, Iraq’s August 1990 invas

Kuwait suggested that many elements of the strategy 

as germane in the post-Cold War world as they prev

were. To change from planning to defeat the Soviet mi

to planning the defeat of an enemy trained and equipp

the Soviets was not difficult. In addition, most o

equipment, training, and doctrine that had been deve

by the U.S. military during the latter stages of the Col

remained relevant.

Still, the Bush administration was not overly qu

pronounce the Soviet threat dead. The President rem

wary of Moscow’s intentions and capabilities, partic

its strategic nuclear weapons and the 3 million 

remaining in the Soviet armed forces.

4

 But the reali

was growing among key policymakers that, “i

aftermath of the Cold War, we will likely discover th

enemy we face is less an expansionistic communism t

is instability itself.”

5

 To deal with this, Bush propo

6
defense strategy built on four “fundamental dema

nuclear deterrence, forward presence, crisis response

reconstitution. These ideas were fleshed out when Ge

Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

published an unclassified National Military Strat

1992. The complexity of the security environment 

pervasive theme of this document. “[T]he old interna

order,” it stated, “was familiar, tangible, and it prov

focal point for Free World policies. Now that focus has 

blurred by a whirlwind of historic change.”

6

 The str

concepts that would allow the United States to create 

President Bush described as a “new world order,” th

were identical to earlier ones: readiness, collective sec

arms control, maritime and aerospace superiority, str

agility, power projection, technological superiority

decisive force. Powell did note that the threats the U

States would face were more regional than global

allowing the United States to exercise restraint in the 

force. The “new world order,” in other words, was 

zero-sum system than the old one. In the post-Cold 

world, Powell contended, American forces wou

committed to combat only when vital U.S. interests w

stake and all non-military solutions had been exhaus

President Bush and his top advisers knew 

convincing Congress and the American people of the n

sustain a robust military would not be easy. The Ame

tradition was quick and extensive demobilization at th

of a war. Administration officials thought this might 

as much to the Cold War as to the nation’s various hot 

The restrictive conditions on the use of force advocat

the influential General Powell might have added f

demands for demobilization. After all, the National M

Strategy said that U.S. military forces should only be 

when vital American interests were at stake and 

means had been exhausted. Such situations were ra

forestall or counter demands for radical demobilizatio

a slashing of the defense budget, General Powell, r

primarily on the Strategy Division of the Strategic 

7
and Policy Directorate and the Budget Analysis Divis

the Joint Staff, developed what he called the “base fo

This was what the Pentagon considered the min

necessary to do the things that had to be done i

post-Cold War security environment, including dete

aggression, providing overseas presence, respondi

regional crises, and, if strategic conditions changed, se

as a foundation to rebuild a global warfighting capa

The base force would include the nuclear triad, 18 

divisions (12 active, 6 reserve), 12 carrier battlegrou

Marine Expeditionary Forces, and 26 Air Force fighter 

equivalents (15 active, 11 reserve).

9

 To go below th

Pentagon held, would create unacceptable risks fo

United States.

By the end of the Bush administration, the Na

Security Strategy admitted that the demise of the 

Union—unlike that of Mark Twain—had not been g

exaggerated. But administration officials felt tha

made it even more difficult to convince the American 

and its elected leaders of the enduring need for 

engagement. The final National Security Strategy 

Bush administration stated:

While we no longer face the possibility of a Soviet-led Wars

Pact attack on Europe, regional instabilities continue 

threaten our interests and our security. The world rema

unpredictable and over-armed, and nations have n

eliminated the age-old temptation to use force or intimidat

to achieve their ends. The end of the Cold War has coincid

with a virtual explosion of long-dormant ethnic and aggress

nationalistic tensions around the world, many of which ha

degenerated into international crises. Proliferatio

terrorism, and the international drug trade still threat

stability.

10

This shift in the language of American strateg

subtle but significant. During the Cold War, the perc

military threat to U.S. interests was direct. The dang

outright conquest of friendly states. In the post-Cold 

world, the military threats were more indirect. Vio

8
particularly intra-state conflict, could lead to colla

friends and thwart efforts at reform. While Iraq’s inv

of Kuwait demonstrated that cross-border mi

aggression was still possible, American defense ex

searched for a strategy that could deal with both d

cross-border aggression and indirect, intra-state co

They knew how to deal with the former; the challeng

finding a way to use the extremely professional and eff

American military to deal with the latter.

President Bush’s National Security Strategy also 

that, “The most desirable and efficient security strat

to address the root causes of instability and to ease ten

before they result in conflict.”

11

 The question was how 

this. The Bush administration seized on multina

peacekeeping as a solution. While peacekeeping und

aegis of the United Nations had existed since the 195

effectiveness had long been limited by the Cold 

competition between the United States and the S

Union. Most internal wars became proxy conflicts f

superpowers, paralyzing the United Nations where 

held vetoes in the Security Council. When the Cold 

ended, the United Nations, under the vigorous leaders

Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, undert

massive increase in its peacekeeping commitments.

Bush administration saw this as a positive trend. 

address to the United Nations, President Bush stat

welcome the Secretary General’s call for a new agen

strengthen the United Nations’ ability to prevent, co

and resolve conflicts across the globe.”

13

 For the first t

decades, the interests of the United States and the U

Nations were at least parallel if not identical—an 

reinforced by the U.N.’s authorization of the U.S.-led e

to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait. To commit the 

military to greater participation in multinat

peacekeeping thus seemed a logical way to address th

causes of instability and contain conflicts that did eme

In 1992 President Bush decided that the obscure A

nation of Somalia was an appropriate testbed for thi

9
and the right place to begin establishing the rule

patterns which, he hoped, would define the post-Cold 

world order. As he committed U.S. forces to a humanit

relief action known as Operation Restore Hope, Pre

Bush stated:

...I understand the United States alone cannot right t

world’s wrongs. But we also know that some of the crises in t

world cannot be resolved without American involvement; th

American action is often necessary as a catalyst for broad

involvement of the community of nations. Only the Uni

States has the global reach to place a large security force 

the ground in such distant places quickly and efficiently a

thus save thousands of innocents from death.

14

In some ways, the catastrophe in Somalia w

inevitable by-product of the end of the Cold War. Und

former dictator Sid Barre, Somalia had actively playe

Cold War game, switching from a Soviet to an Ame

client as the winds of geostrategy shifted. When Sid 

was overthrown in 1991, Somalia, which was alw

precarious and conflict-prone place, collapsed into v

chaos, becoming what eventually would be known 

“failed state.”

15

 Famine ensued. As horrific pictures 

Somali humanitarian disaster were broadcast aroun

world, demands grew in the United States and elsewhe

intervention. Despite the absence of anything other 

symbolic U.S. national interests in Somalia, the 

administration, facing mounting criticism of its fail

act, became convinced that it could serve as a mode

new assertive style of multinational peacekeepi

peacemaking.

16

 In April 1992 the U.N. Security C

passed a resolution authorizing multinational for

provide security for the humanitarian organiza

distributing famine relief in Somalia.

17

 From 1992 to 

the United States participated in the U.N. Operat

Somalia (UNOSOM) and United Task Force (UNIT

But while these operations did help protect 

organizations and save Somali lives, they did lit

10
alleviate the root causes of the conflict, particularly the 

absence of effective government or administration.

The message that the Bush administration inten

send by involvement in Somalia was that the United S

would act in partnership with the United Natio

engineer stability and prevent humanitarian disa

wherever they occurred. Instead, Somalia showe

complexity and cost of rejuvenating “failed states” an

danger that such efforts could pose to American 

support for global engagement. By the time George 

left office in January 1993, the idea of using the 

military to address the root causes of conflict and the n

that the United Nations would serve as a co-equal pa

were being questioned. The message was clear: the 

victory over Iraq showed that conventional war cou

relatively quick and low-cost, and thus gain the enthus

support of the American people. Intervention in 

states and other forms of low-intensity conflict cou

difficult, bloody, protracted and confusing. Public su

for it was weak. It thus should be avoided whe

possible. The U.S. military took these lessons to hear

The Bottom Up Review.

The beginning of the Clinton administration gave 

of broad change in American strategy. When the Base 

was first developed, influential members of Congres

Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga) and Congressman Les 

(D-Wisc) were convinced that it was too large, contain

wrong kinds of capabilities, and was too expens

President Clinton and his top advisers subscribed t

idea. The United States, they felt, could remain a 

power with substantially lower levels of defense by wo

with partners, allies and the United Nations.

2

foundation for Clinton strategy was “engagemen

enlargement.” The stress on “engagement” was inten

both reassure friends and enemies that the United S

would remain active, and to counter sentimen

11
withdrawal among the American people. “Ame

leadership in the world,” the Clinton strategy held

never been more important.”

21

 “Enlargement”—a co

advocated most persistently by National Security Ad

Anthony Lake—committed the United States to expan

community of market democracies as a mea

augmenting American security and prosperity. This 

important idea. Since the beginning of U.S. history, d

has raged between those who favored a passive foreig

national security policy in which the United States 

protected itself and served as a “beacon” for others

those who wanted to use American power to s

democracy and free market policies. This schism is nea

old as the United States, pitting Thomas Jefferson’s cr

“peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all na

entangling alliances with none” and his ideas of str

independence and nonintervention, against the g

activism associated with presidents like The

Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson.

22

The schism between the limited and activist versi

American foreign policy erupted again during the 

years of the Cold War. As Washington struggled to adj

its new role as leader of the Free World, some policym

and analysts advocated a purely defensive strategy 

sought only to contain communism until its inh

weaknesses caused it to collapse. This perspective 

from the thinking of George Kennan, the “fath

containment.

2 3

 Other policymakers and ana

particularly those who saw greater danger from S

military power than from the ideological appe

communism, proposed a more active American strat

which the U.S. military blocked Soviet advances 

attempts were made to “roll back” communism.

2

debate between the passive and active versio

containment ebbed and flowed, exploding again durin

1980s and leading to the “Reagan Doctrine” of prov

support to insurgents attempting the overthr

12
pro-Moscow regimes in places like Nicaragua, Angola

Afghanistan.

Bush’s “new world order” and Clinton’s strate

“enlargement” represented the ascendance of activi

American foreign policy.

25

 To do this, Clinton realize

the United States needed “robust and flexible m

forces” able to deal with a wide range of tasks, includin

defeat of enemies like Iraq or North Korea, coun

weapons of mass destruction, contributing to multina

peace operations, and supporting counterterror

Clinton accepted Bush’s insistence that the decision 

force should be based on American national interest

degree of commitment from allies (although the U

States would retain the capability to act unilatera

necessary), whether nonmilitary means had been trie

whether the American public supported the action.

what characterized the Clinton strategy until the 

years of the administration was a steady expansion 

roles and functions of the U.S. military at the same 

that it became smaller and the defense budget shrun

To design a military strategy to reflect Pres

Clinton’s wider national security strategy, Secreta

Defense Les Aspin instigated what became known a

“Bottom Up Review” (BUR) immediately upon assu

leadership of the Pentagon. The name was based o

belief that the changes in the global security environ

were so profound that American defense needed 

reconsidered from the “bottom up.” Clearly, Aspin 

sense of urgency: the study was instigated in March 

and the final report was dated October 1993. The BUR

the Bush strategy that preceded it, stressed the comp

of the new security environment. It identified four 

dangers faced by the United States:

• Dangers posed by nuclear weapons and 

weapons of mass destruction;

13
• Regional dangers, primarily by the thre

large-scale aggression by major regional power

interests antithetical to those of the United S

but also from smaller, often internal conflicts ba

ethnic or religious animosities, state-spon

terrorism, or subversion of friendly governmen

• Dangers to democracy and reform in the former S

Union, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere; and

• Economic dangers to the United States in the ab

of a competitive and growing economy.

28

The new strategy committed the U.S. military t

sorts of activities: prevention and partnership. Preve

was the use of the military and other elements o

Department of Defense to attempt to forestall a

conflict by promoting democracy, economic gr

economic reform, human dignity, and the pea

resolution of disputes. Partnership linked the U.S. mi

to those of other countries, particularly ones undergoi

transition to democracy. The BUR, however, di

abandon the stress on major regional war w

undergirded the Base Force. Even the number of such 

used for planning and force development remaine

same. The BUR stated:

It is prudent for the United States to maintain military pow

to be able to win two major regional conflicts that occur nea

simultaneously. With this capability, we will be confident, a

our allies as well as potential enemies will know, that a sin

regional conflict will not leave our interest and allies in oth

regions at risk.

29

The BUR did define major regional conflicts (M

more specifically than the Base Force strategy had.

30

the BUR considered Iraq and North Korea the pr

aggressors who might cause an MRC, it used 

geography and military capabilities as a yardst

develop planning scenarios.

31

 Aggression took the fo

14
an armor-heavy, combined arms offensive agains

outnumbered forces of a neighboring state friendly 

United States with only limited U.S. military forces 

region before hostilities and the United States serv

the leader of a coalition. The American response inv

four phases: (1) halt the invasion; (2) build up U.S. co

power in the theater while reducing the enemy

decisively defeat the enemy; and (4) provide for pos

stability. To successfully counter an MRC, the U.S. mi

would need a force package composed of 4-5 Army divi

4-5 Marine Expeditionary Brigades, 10 Air Force f

wings, 100 Air Force heavy bombers, 4-5 Navy ai

carrier battlegroups, and various special operations f

In other words, Desert Storm served as the pla

template for major wars and these major wars, in 

formed the centerpiece of U.S. military strategy. The 

behind this was that such wars would be the 

dangerous kind that the U.S. military would face, and 

U.S. military prepared for them, it would by defa

prepared to handle other kinds of wars.

Although the BUR laid a strategic foundation for th

of the U.S. military in peacekeeping and peace enforce

it relied on MRCs as the main force shaping yardstick

Clinton administration assumed office committ

greater American involvement in multinational 

operations, but this position was soon overcome by e

By the time the BUR was completed, the debacle in So

had undercut American enthusiasm for multina

peacekeeping. An October 1993 battle in Mogadishu 

led to the deaths of eighteen American soldiers 

hundreds (perhaps thousands) of Somalis was partic

traumatic for an administration sensitive to public op

on foreign and national security policy.

32

 Most Ame

saw the ensuing withdrawal of U.N. forces and Ame

diplomats as failures of U.S. policy.

In response, the Clinton administration undert

broad reassessment of its entire approach to peaceke

and peace enforcement. This reflected a substantial s

15
thinking from “assertive multilateralism” under whic

U.S. leads efforts to engineer regional stability to a 

limited and indirect American role.

33

 On May 3, 

President Clinton replaced Bush’s NSD 7464 by si

Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 which outlin

new policy on peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

3

document stressed that warfighting remained the pr

mission of the American military but, under ce

conditions, multilateral peacekeeping or peace enforce

under the aegis of the United Nations can serve 

national interests. But the process by which the U

Nations formed and managed peace operations n

substantial improvement and reform. PDD 25 outli

number of these including exercising greater selec

when choosing where to intervene, involving reg

organizations where appropriate, reducing 

(specifically, decreasing the U.S. assessment for 

peacekeeping operations from 31.7% to 25%), expandi

U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations to incl

Plans Division and an Information and Research Div

establishing a professional Peace Operations Tra

Program, and reforming the process by which the 

manages the financial aspects of peacekeeping operati

Bowing to pressure from the Pentagon and Con

PDD 25 stated that the president would never relin

command authority over U.S. forces but would con

placing U.S. forces under operational control of a comp

U.N. commander for specific U.N. operations authoriz

the Security Council.

35

 PDD 25 also stressed that 

operations should be well-defined and linked to a con

political solution. They should provide a finite wind

opportunity for combatants to resolve their difference

failed societies to begin to reconstitute themselves r

than imposing peace on belligerents.

36

 When consid

whether to support a proposed new U.N. peace oper

the Clinton administration stated that it would con

whether involvement advanced U.S. interests, wh

there was an international community of intere

16
dealing with the problem, and whether there was a 

threat to international peace and security.

The BUR was the most comprehensive attempt to f

coherent post-Cold War military strategy to that 

However, it drew immediate criticism from acros

political spectrum. Carl J. Conetta, Co-director o

Project on Defense Alternatives, testified before the H

Armed Services Committee that the BUR, by failing 

clear priorities among goals and interests, prescrib

active force structure that was substantially larger 

needed. Mr. Conetta contended that there were onl

regions outside Western Europe where the interests 

United States and the needs of its allies might re

large-scale U.S. intervention: the Arabian and K

peninsulas. He advocated a strategy that focused on 

regions rather than building the capability to inte

around the world. Conetta also questioned the ne

retaining high levels of military readiness in the post

War world. “The BUR,” he stated, “transposes a Eur

central front logic onto regional contingencies, sugg

that short delays in deployment or reliance on defe

operations risk catastrophe.”

37

 Analysts from the He

Foundation were equally critical, arguing that the 

force would be unaffordable and its capabilities 

overstated.

38

 In particular, they attacked the B

emphasis on nonwarfighting missions for the U.S. mi

Finally, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assess

warned that maintaining the near-term U.S. mi

capabilities outlined in the BUR would come at the ex

of long-term development.

39

 The contours of the deb

post-Cold War U.S. security policy were thus clari

whether arguing that the strategy placed too much str

large scale war, not enough stress, too much stress o

near-term, or too much stress on the long-term, alm

one outside the Pentagon seemed satisfied.

Congress quickly weighed in with its own criticism 

BUR. Many members considered the proposed str

changes too modest, reflecting the Pentagon’s fear 

17
altering strategy might lead to further cuts in 

structure and budget. The charge was made tha

Pentagon clung to excess capabilities and redunda

largely because it was more concerned with preservi

size and budget than with adapting to new security th

To attempt a remedy for this, Congress used the Na

Defense Authorization Act for FY 1994 to establi

independent Commission on Roles and Missions (CO

Chaired by John P. White, Director of Harvard Unive

Kennedy School of Government, the CORM inclu

number of prestigious defense experts and senior r

military officers.

40

 But anyone who expected the CO

recommend radical change in the roles and missions 

military Services was disappointed. When the CORM r

was released in May 1995 it offered some suggestio

improving jointness, but did not provide the sort of obj

blueprint for fundamental restructuring of the Ame

military that its creators had hoped.

41

 Two C

recommendations, however, did have an impac

suggestion that the Department of Defense undert

major quadrennial strategy review, and that the Cha

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff develop a vision of future 

operations.

42

Even while the CORM was completing its wor

Clinton administration continued to refine its 

strategic concepts. While the Clinton strategy had a

linked U.S. defense strategy to national interests, i

vague on the priority assigned to various interests. 

1995 edition of the National Security Strategy, Pres

Clinton distinguished vital interests (those for whic

United States would be willing to use force unilate

important interests (those for which the United S

would use force in conjunction with partners)

humanitarian interests (those for which the large sca

of force was not appropriate).

43

 In 1996, Secreta

Defense William Perry began to describe U.S. m

strategy as one of “prevent, deter, defeat.” While 

language certainly did not reflect any radical transit

18
strategic thinking, it did have serious implication

Secretary Perry phrased it, the Clinton strategy p

“renewed” emphasis on prevention by using the 

military in ways that might limit the chances of f

conflict.

44

 Preventive defense was to include four 

activities”: (1) working with the successor states t

Soviet Union to reduce the nuclear threat; (2) lim

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

encouraging newly independent and newly demo

states to restructure their defenses; and (4) establ

cooperative military-to-military ties with states which 

not traditional American allies or coalition par

Preventive defense represented the beginning of 

would become known as “shaping” activities for the a

forces. 

But all of the changes that had taken place in 

military strategy during this time did not originate fro

White House, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

Joint Chiefs and Joint Staff. Since the end of the Cold 

the military Services too had been actively reconsid

the organizational structure, equipment, and opera

concepts they would need in the 21

st

 century se

environment. All concluded that the rapid pace of c

demanded that planning and thinking be based on a 

time frame. The Army, for instance, began its fu

program in 1992 with a series of battlelab simulation

exercises called Louisiana Maneuvers.

45

 This quickly 

into the elaborate “Force XXI” process that used 

laboratories, warfighting experiments, and adv

technology demonstrations to generate and test idea

the mid-1990s, Army Chief of Staff General Dennis R

decided that his service needed to look even deeper in

future. Since the main weapon platforms of the Army 

as the Abrams main battle tank, the Bradley fig

vehicle, and the Apache attack helicopter were expec

approach obsolescence around 2015, General R

thought it necessary to craft a rigorous method to d

whether the Army should seek a new generation of t

19
fighting vehicles, and helicopters or pursue “leap a

technology. To do this, he created the Army After 

Project—a series of wargames, workshops, studies

conferences to explore the future strategic environmen

speculate on the sort of technology, force structure

operational concepts that the U.S. Army might need.

The other Services also developed futures-oriented 

or organizations. The Chief of Staff of the Air 

commissioned the Air Force 2025 study to provide 

operational and strategic ideas. Often using teams w

senior researcher of colonel or lieutenant colonel rank 

number of majors, Air Force 2025 explored topics su

information warfare, unmanned aerial combat platf

organizations to deal with the gray area between peac

war, and ways to most efficiently erode an enemy’s 

and will.

48

 In a similar vein, the Marine Corps After 

(MCAN) Branch of the Marine Corps Warfig

Laboratory began exploring what it calls a “biol

systems inspiration” for future warfighting intend

explore the use of technology like biomimetic engin

materials; small, “bug like” robotics; neural or neu

nets capable of complex, adaptive responses; pa

computers; and, nanotechnology.

49

 The Marines 

developed futures programs like Sea Dragon and U

Warrior.

50

 Not to be left out, the Navy created a Str

Studies Group to explore revolutionary naval concep

By the mid 1990s there was a clear need to synch

the various Service visions of future warfighting. One 

most important steps in this process was the publicat

Joint Vision 2010 by General John Shalikashvili, Cha

of the Joints Chiefs of Staff. JV 2010—to use the docum

popular name—was to serve as “the conceptual templa

how America’s Armed Forces will channel the vitalit

innovation of our people and leverage technolo

opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in 

warfighting.”

52

 The focus was purely operational: JV 

did not analyze the changing political, social, economi

normative framework of armed conflict at the end of th

20
century. There were, however, some important im

beliefs about the use of military force, specificall

challenges to its political usability and legitimacy 

resulted from the information revolution and g

interconnectedness.

53

 According to JV 2010, the soluti

these challenges were greater speed and precision. A 

military able to defeat any opponent quickly with min

collateral damage and American casualties wou

politically usable. To operate on a lethal battlefield w

precision weapons, weapons of mass destruction

various types of missiles were common, the U.S. mi

would need increased stealth, mobility, dispersion

higher operational tempo. Four key technologies

observable/masking technologies, “smarter” wea

long-range precision capabilities, and inform

technology—were central. “Superior technology,” the 

Staff contended, “has been a cornerstone of US 

[National Military Strategy] since the dawn of the Col

and will remain so through the year 2010.”

54

The central concept of JV 2010 was “full spe

dominance”—superiority over any opponent in any t

military operation. While stressing that this was 

possible by retaining the high quality levels of p

leadership, and training, the focus of JV 2010 was 

information superiority to gain full spectrum dominan

four operational concepts:

• Dominant maneuver: the multidimens

application of information, engagement, and mo

to position and employ widely dispersed join

land, sea, and space forces.

• Precision engagement: a system of systems 

enables U.S. forces to locate objectives or ta

generate the desired effect, assess the level of su

and reengage.

• Full-dimensional protection: control o

battlespace to maintain freedom of action d

21
deployment, maneuver and engagement, 

providing multi-layered defenses.

• Focused logistics: the fusion of information, log

and transportation technologies to provide 

crisis response, track and shift assets even 

enroute, and directly deliver tailored log

packages and sustainment.

These concepts became the foundation for indiv

Service programs as each crafted specific program

plans to implement JV 2010. In the broadest sense, th

JV 2010 represented the codification of the idea t

revolution in military affairs (RMA) was underway

that its essence was information technology.

55

The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review

and National Defense Panel.

Following one of the CORM recommendations, Con

directed the Secretary of Defense to conduct a “fundam

and comprehensive examination of America’s de

needs” every 4 years, with the first due in 1997

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report was relea

May of that year. According to Secretary of Defense W

Cohen, it was “intended to provide a blueprint 

strategy-based, balanced and affordable defense pro

by examining threats, strategy, force structure, read

modernization, defense infrastructure and other ele

of the defense program out to the year 2015.

56

 In reali

1997 QDR became a budget-driven process that offere

new strategic ideas, but simplify codified the strateg

existed at the time. It described the strategy of “sha

responding, and preparing” in which the U.S. military 

simultaneously shape the security environment th

deterrence and engagement, remain prepared for 

spectrum of crises from smaller-scale contingencies (

to major regional contingencies (MRCs), and take st

prepare for an uncertain future. The foremost challeng

the focus of most effort remained “the threat of coercio

22
large-scale, cross-border aggression against U.S. allie

friends in key regions by hostile states with signi

military power”—Desert Storm-style attacks from 

Iran, or North Korea.

57

 The QDR did, however, men

wide array of additional threats including proliferat

advanced weapons and technologies, terrorism

international drug trade, international organized c

uncontrolled immigration, and threats to the 

homeland.

The “fundamental assumptions” of the QDR wer

the United States would remain globally engaged, an

the United States would maintain military superiorit

any adversary through the 2015 time period. The U

States was “the only power in the world that can org

effective military responses to larger-scale regional th

and “able to conduct large-scale, effective joint mi

operations far beyond its borders.”

58

 The basic go

American defense strategy were:

...fostering an international environment in which crit

regions are stable, at peace, and free from domination by hos

powers; the global economy and free trade are grow

democratic norms and respect for human rights are wid

accepted; the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical 

other potentially destabilizing technologies is minimized; 

the international community is willing and able to prevent a

if necessary, respond to calamitous events.

59

The 1997 QDR also introduced a concept which q

became a central part of American strategic thin

asymmetry. The report stated:

U.S. dominance in the conventional military arena m

encourage adversaries to use...asymmetric means to attack 

forces and interests overseas and Americans 

home...Strategically, an aggressor may seek to avoid di

military confrontation with the United States, using inst

means such as terrorism, NBC [nuclear, biological, chemi

threats, information warfare, or environmental sabotage 

achieve its goals.

60

23
Asymmetry could also be part of a conventional war 

enemy used it to deny U.S. forces access to a region, d

American operations, or deter U.S. involveme

increasing casualties. Dealing with or preparin

asymmetry thus “must be an important element o

defense strategy.”

61

The QDR, like the defense studies that preced

emphasized the wide range of demands placed on th

military. For instance, the U.S. military would oft

involved in SSCs. Since these could range from co

operations like limited strikes or peace enforcement to 

benign activities like humanitarian assistance and di

relief, training and other requirements on U.S. forces 

extensive. In fact, no military in history has been asked 

more things at a high level of proficiency than the post

War U.S. military. The QDR also noted that, “the abi

transition between peacetime operations and warfig

remains a fundamental requirement for virtually ever

in the U.S. military.” This represents one dimensio

broad-based stress on speed that was becoming a de

characteristic of post-Cold War American military str

The most enduring dilemma for U.S. strategists had be

finding ways to avoid a Vietnam-style loss of publi

congressional support for military engagement or a sp

military operation. Speed was seen as a solution. Sin

public tends to initially support the use of force 

president deems it necessary—the “rally ‘round the 

effect—political opposition was less likely to coales

grow during a short intervention or campaign. Sim

strategic, operational, and tactical speed were thou

minimize U.S. casualties, thus helping preserve 

support. Protracted conflict was invariably disa

tageous to the United States. For this reason, the 

QDR, like the strategy documents that preceded i

those that came later, emphasized the need for a s

resolution of crises.

The 1997 QDR retained the two MRC force sh

yardstick. “If the United States were to forego its abi

24
defeat aggression in more than one theater at a time

QDR report stated, “our standing as a global power, 

security partner of choice, and as the leader o

international community would be called into questi

one-theater war capacity would risk undermining 

deterrence and the credibility of U.S. security commitm

in key regions of the world.”

62

 After sometimes-in

debate over the sequencing of the two MRCs, the 

settled on the phrase “nearly simultaneous.” Again 

reflected general continuity in strategic thinking. One 

dilemmas of any public strategy document is h

simultaneously address an external audience compo

friends and potential enemies, and provide cogent gui

for one’s own planners. At times, there is tension be

these two functions. The 1997 QDR certainly showed 

While it might have been realistic to modify or even dr

two “nearly simultaneous” MRC yardstick, DOD fear

message this might send to external audiences. As a r

the QDR retained a standard that probably could n

met.

The 1997 QDR also devoted quite a bit of attention 

idea of “preparing now for an uncertain future.” By 

most of the American defense community agreed th

historic revolution in military affairs was underway.

by people like Andrew Marshall, (director of the Penta

Office of Net Assessment), Andrew Krepinevich (Cent

Strategic and Budgetary Analysis), and Admiral W

Owens (former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of S

the concept of military revolutions has gone from the 

to the foundation U.S. military thinking. This made p

sense since the type of military revolution that the Pen

had begun to pursue meshed with so many elements 

American strategic culture including a never-ending 

for technological solutions to problems, the desi

continuous improvement, the tendency to use quali

superiority to keep human costs low and thus r

political support for engagement, and the perceived ne

U.S. military preponderance. The QDR, along with JV 

25
codified this version of the RMA in American m

strategy. It described three “alterative paths” to the f

One was to focus on the near term, minimizing the m

and effort devoted to preparing for the long term

second path was to accept greater near-term risk by fu

reducing the size of the military, thus freeing mon

exploiting the RMA. The third was to balance cu

demands and an uncertain future, combining modest 

reductions with steady technological progress. Of c

this sort of analysis was “cooked.” The technique of de

three options, one calling for doing less of what is al

being done, one calling for doing more, and one calling 

continuation of existing actions is common a

bureaucracies not committed to substantial change. C

no rational decisionmaker would choose anything 

than the “balanced” approach which was defined as 

the Department of Defense was already doing. The 

while it placed slightly more emphasis than the BU

smaller scale contingencies and the potential for a f

peer competitor, thus recommended almost no chan

basic strategic concepts.

As with the BUR, the 1997 QDR drew sharp crit

Much of this dealt with the ingrained conservatism 

report, especially the lack of any recommended chan

service functions or cuts to major acquisition program

sense this was preordained by the organization 

structure of the QDR. Rather than beginning wi

assessment of an overarching strategy and then de

implications from it, the Office of the Secretary of De

organized the QDR into seven “panels”—stra

modernization, force assessment, readiness, infrastru

human resources, and information operat

intelligence—which worked in tandem.

64

 All of the p

had to make assumptions about the recommended str

since they had to complete their work before the str

panel itself issued its findings. Logically, they ass

general continuity. Moreover, because all of the play

the defense community, particularly the Serv

26
recognized the high stakes of the QDR in terms of bu

and force structure, the outcomes were often “l

common denominator” recommendations which 

garner consensus by bypassing or postponing 

decisions. Analysts have long noted that in absenc

powerful and clear vision from high-level lea

bureaucratic decisionmaking usually devolves i

process of avoiding dissention by deifying the status 

This seemed to characterize the 1997 QDR: neithe

President or the Secretary of Defense provide

alternative strategic vision or a vigorous directi

change, so the powerful organizations involved i

process invariably moved toward the sort of consensu

left everyone’s programs and forces intact.

Conservatism was not the only charge made again

1997 QDR. Analysts at the Center for Strategi

Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) contended that the r

leaned toward short-term expediency and did not h

robust and imaginative approach to the RMA.

66

Conetta of the Project on Defense Alternatives held th

QDR made no changes to a military that is “

structured, equipped, and budgeted to deal primarily 

contingencies and threats that grow less substa

everyday,” particularly large-scale, cross-border inv

by a “rogue state.”

67

 And a number of analysts pointe

serious mismatch between projected defense budget 

and the force called for by the QDR. For FY 2001-200

instance, Goure and Ranney estimate a shortfall of 

billion, or 29 percent.

68

Despite the criticism, the 1997 QDR provided “stea

you go” guidance that shaped the subsequent efforts 

Services and the Department of Defense. To assure th

military was in accordance with the QDR, Ge

Shalikashvili published a new National Military Stra

1997. Heavy on glossy photos and lists of accomplishm

this document provided a less clear vision of the 

means, and ends of U.S. strategy than its 1992 predec

It did sketch a joint force that must be capable of str

27
deterrence, decisive operations, special operations, fo

entry, force protection, countering weapons of 

destruction, focused logistics, and information opera

It specified the strategic concepts that had become cen

American military strategy during the 1990s:

• Strategic agility (defined as “the timely concentr

employment, and sustainment of U.S. military 

anywhere at our own initiative, at a speed and 

that our adversaries cannot match”)

• Overseas presence to give substance to po

commitments, ensure access to vital regions, pr

joint and combined training, assist with 

projection, and contribute to deterrence

• Power projection

• Decisive force (defined as “the commitme

sufficient military power to overwhelm all a

resistance in order to establish new mi

conditions and achieve political objectives).

69

Expecting that the QDR would be unlikely to pr

any truly new thinking, Congress had also commission

independent, senior-level National Defense Panel (ND

provide another perspective on the long-term issues 

U.S. defense and national security.

70

 Where the 

advocated continuity, the main theme of the NDP 

was that the United States should undertake “a 

transformation of its military and national sec

structures, operational concepts and equipment.” The 

concluded that:

Our military forces today are organized according to curre

threats. But today’s threats are not necessarily the ones 

will see in the future. Unless we are willing to pursue a n

course, we are likely to have forces that are ill-suited to prot

our security twenty years in the future. Our futu

adversaries will learn from the past and will likely confront 

in very different ways.

71

28
The Panel specified a “transformation strategy” a

at the quickest possible development and integration o

technology, military systems, concepts of operation

structures. It stressed that the security threats of the f

will be broad ones requiring changed and integ

alliances, intelligence structures, and interag

processes. The “two MRC” yardstick, which served a

foundation of American military strategy, was appro

for the present, but might need re-thought in coming 

In fact, the NDP’s de-emphasis on the two MRC con

was probably its most significant variance with the Q

The NDP advocated a number of steps to institutio

innovation, experimentation, and change in the mi

Services and the Department of Defense, with the emp

on jointness rather than independent (and 

disconnected) Service programs. The NDP transform

strategy also offered ideas on redesigning the U

Command Plan to change the allocation of responsibi

on transforming the defense industrial base

transforming the defense infrastructure. The stress 

the NDP placed on joint experimentation and innov

was important. The members of the Panel suggested 

the Department of Defense create a Joint Forces Com

which would, in turn, establish a Joint Battle L

undertake experimentation.

73

Despite extolling transformation, the NDP 

clarified the rationale for it. Certainly potential adver

will search for ways to circumvent American strengt

the NDP never made the case that one of these may ac

overtake a U.S. military that continues st

modernization. The NDP report did not assess sp

enemies, but dealt in generalities. It alluded to dange

did not describe them. And, the members of the NDP d

consider the fact that undertaking an expe

transformation of the American military whe

challenger was closing in would intimidate neutral na

and even traditional friends. The NDP, as an indepe

organization that did not have to be concerned 

29
“breaking rice bowls,” was much more forward-thi

than the QDR, but ultimately assumed an urgen

transformation that it could not or did not fully ju

Ultimately, the NDP reflected the Cold War log

American defense thinking where any improveme

military capability was, by definition, good and desi

regardless of political or monetary cost.

Military Strategy Fin-de-Siècle.

In the final years of the 1990s, several new con

entered the strategic discourse. In 1998, the Na

Security Strategy integrated the “shape, respond, pr

now” idea from the QDR, first mentioned the effec

globalization was having on the security environmen

began considering homeland defense, inclu

consequence management following a terrorist attac

critical infrastructure protection, as part of “respondi

All of these things reflected a blurring of the distin

between the various components of security that had 

underway for several decades. This was seen both 

realm of missions where the military was increa

involved in non-warfighting tasks like cou

narcotrafficking, military-to-military engagem

information warfare, environmental security

homeland defense, and in the realm of functions 

there was a broad trend toward privatizing or “outsou

things previously done by the uniformed military

questions of how much to expand the function o

military, how far to push the boundaries of “security

how much to privatize defense functions are likely to re

contentious for some time.

At the end of the 1990s, senior military and ci

defense officials also began to stress the conce

asymmetry. While the word was not used in U.S. m

strategy documents until that time, it quickly be

pervasive. According to Secretary of Defense Cohen, 

dominance in the conventional military are

30
encouraging adversaries to seek asymmetric mean

attacking U.S. forces and interests overseas and Ame

at home.”

75

 This was a recognition that the 

competitor” mentioned in American strategy docu

since the end of the Cold War was simply not feasible 

the year 2015. Furthermore, American strategists 

that future enemies would probably not be as stup

Saddam Hussein and challenge the United States 

sort of open-terrain, combined arms warfare tha

American military had mastered.

The key questions were: What sorts of asymm

methods might enemies use? and How could the

countered? So far, the Department of Defense an

military Services have focused on a fairly narrow ra

potential asymmetric methods, particularly terro

weapons of mass destruction, information wa

environmental sabotage, and actions designed to dela

deployment of U.S. forces, deny U.S. forces access to c

facilities, disrupt command, control, communica

computers, and intelligence (C

4

I), deter allies and pot

coalition partners, and weaken American resol

inflicting higher than expected casualties.

76

 Thes

important asymmetric threats, but the list is probab

complete.

During the late 1990s strategic thinkers also beg

warn that enemies using precision munitions or weap

mass destruction to

complicat e

deployment into a

theater of operations

could pose a serious

challenge to some of

the most basic tenets

of American strategy.

77

As the National

Defense Panel wrote,

“The days of the

six-month build-up and secure, large, rear-area bas

31

. . . The two interlinked concepts

RMA and the need for transf

tionreflect the emphasis on con

change and improvement that is p

American culture. This has reache

intensity in the digital age as the 

between the introduction of 

technology, software, techniques

ideas and their obsolescence shrin
almost certainly gone forever. WMD will require 

increase dramatically the means to project lethal 

from extended ranges.”

78

 Some attention within o

circles has been given to enemies who use “complex ter

whether urban environments, jungles, mountain

coastal and estuary areas with many islands, inlets

swamps.

79

 The general conclusion is that the U.S. m

is not yet fully prepared for urban combat or 

operations in complex terrain.

80

 There are other pot

types of asymmetry that would find the United States 

less prepared. Examples include political asymme

which an opponent uses information technology 

political actions to hinder or prohibit technologies in 

the United States has an advantage (like inform

warfare or robotics); and temporal asymmetry in wh

enemy finds a way to drag a conflict out hoping 

American patience will wear thin.

One of the most far-reaching changes in Ame

strategy during the late 1990s was growing accepta

the need for transformation. Like the idea that a revo

in military affairs is taking place, the contention th

U.S. military must undertake transformation sped 

introduction to canon with little debate. The two interl

concepts—the RMA and the need for transforma

reflect the emphasis on constant change and improve

that is part of American culture. This has reached 

intensity in the digital age as the time betwee

introduction of new technology, software, techniques

ideas and their obsolescence shrinks. The architects 

U.S. military have become accustomed to the idea t

future version of Windows, Powerpoint, or Excel is 

development at the same time that a new vers

introduced, or that a 1 GHz microprocessor will be fol

in a matter of months by a 2 GHz. Extrapolating this lo

makes sense to conclude that a future version of the 

military must be under development even while the cu

version has unmatched superiority over its opponent

32
Ultimately, this reflects a centuries-long sea chan

the nature of warfare, security, and government. Un

era of nationalism unleashed by the American and F

revolutions, governance and warfare were about dy

struggles. During the era of nationalism, governanc

thus warfare was about politics and ideology. T

governance is more and more about economics. T

changing attitudes toward military forces. In a syst

governance centered on politics and ideology, the obje

were the creation of balance and consensus. When 

were created, leaders acted to preserve them. W

military was created that could protect the state, i

preserved. But in an essentially economic and comm

system, constant “improvement” or, at least

replacement of “last year’s model” with “this year’s mo

an inherent dynamic. This year’s model must at leas

different than last year’s even if the essence is the sam

core logic of politics is the exercise of power and the bu

of consensus; the core logic of commerce is susta

demand by constant change. As the historic era of p

gives way to an era of commerce, the quest for “next 

model” among militaries becomes constant.

As transformation became canonized withi

Department of Defense, each Service undertook the s

for new strategic concepts and organizations. The Air 

for instance, now advocates “effects-based warfare.” T

the ability to permanently or temporarily disab

enemy’s infrastructure by attacking critical comman

control nodes.

81

 The key organization for this 

Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) which is “comp

of force modules tailored to meet the specific opera

requirements of joint force commanders across a wide 

of situations.”

82

 The Sea Services have begun s

efforts. More than any other service, the Navy saw its 

mission—protection of the sea lanes during global wa

the Soviet Union and defeat of the Red Fleet—disa

with the end of the Cold War. While the Air Force and 

could shift their attention to Soviet imitators like Ira

33
North Korea, the Navy could not. None of the “rogue s

had enough naval power to take seriously. As a resu

Navy stressed its value in shaping the global se

environment through forward presence operation

precision air and missile strikes launched from sea-

platforms, and at the projection of power to the 

littorals, which are the most heavily populated parts 

globe.

83

 The major building blocks were aircraft c

battle groups and amphibious ready groups of Marine

Marine Corps itself had developed a paralle

contributing concept called “operational maneuver fro

sea.”

84

 This was defined as “the extensive use of the se

means of gaining advantage, an avenue for fri

movement that is simultaneously a barrier to the e

and a means of avoiding disadvantageous engagemen

Some of the most creative thinking in the Navy has fo

on “network-centric warfare” in which a postm

military using networked sensors, decisionmaker

shooters collapses an enemy’s will to resist quickl

efficiently.

86

 According to Vice Admiral Arth

Cebrowski, President of the Naval War College, net

centric warfare, “enables a shift from attrition-style wa

to a much faster and more effective warfighting 

characterized by the new concepts of speed of comman

the ability of a well-informed force to organize 

coordinate complex warfare activities from the b

up.”

87

While the Army was in the lead in developing f

futures programs, in some ways it was the slow

embrace strategic transformation. Both the Force 

process and Army After Next Project projected 

transformative change for the Army only after 2015. 

committing to “digitization,” the Army continued to 

heavy, armor based formations engaged in land battle

other heavy, armor based opponents. But when Ge

Eric Shinseki became U.S. Army Chief of Staff in 19

recognized that American political leaders were begi

to question the short- and mid-term strategic releva

34
the Army, in part because of its focus on the s

large-scale, combined-arms, cross-border aggression 

seemed to be becoming less likely as the global se

environment evolved. The problem was not wheth

Army configured for heavy battle could deal with th

smaller scale contingencies that would invariably occ

could with enough time for re-training. The issue 

whether the Army could bring decisive force to bear in 

to deter or contain crises. To deal with this, Ge

Shinseki directed a transformation to improve the A

strategic responsiveness.

88

 In part, this process was to 

the Army’s structure and organization into congruenc

a concept that the Training and Doctrine Comman

been developing for several years: strategic prec

through advanced, full-dimensional operations.

89

called for Army participation in a joint force that 

respond rapidly to a crisis in order to contain it or pla

adversary at a decisive disadvantage.

90

General Shinseki’s goal is what he calls “the Obj

Force,” which will be “more responsive, deployable, 

versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable tha

present force.”

91

 Following widespread criticism o

Army’s slow deployment of Task Force Hawk d

operations against Serbia in 1999, Shinseki recognize

the Army had resisted the shift from a heavy, 

organization to a more strategically relevant middlew

force based on lighter, wheeled combat vehicles.

9

Objective Force is intended to address this pro

allowing the Army to put a combat capable br

anywhere in the world in 96 hours, a division withi

hours, and five divisions in 30 days. As the Army m

toward the Objective Force, it will retain a Legacy 

with modernized versions of today’s systems and equip

while developing an Interim Force that will bridge th

The Army has also begun a search for a Future Co

System (FCS) to replace heavy tanks and self-pro

artillery. While no prototype has been developed, the 

expects the FCS to be a vehicle tailorable for dif

35
missions including direct fire, indirect fire, air de

command and control, troop transport, combat suppor

combat service support.

93

 So far, though, the 

transformation has been driven by deployment spee

questions of appropriate vehicles. The Army has n

developed a full range of strategic or operational conce

explain precisely what the Objective Force will do 

deployed.

94

Despite the quest for transformation withi

Services, as the Clinton administration approaches it

months, the foundation of American strategy remains 

as it was in the years immediately after the collapse 

Soviet Union. Power projection, decisive force, ove

presence, and strategic agility remain the core con

Just as during the Cold War, American defense str

relies on superior technology, equipment, trai

leadership, and people. Admittedly, there has 

refinement during the Clinton administration, partic

in terms of shifting the military away from a p

warfighting stance. Although the main “rogues” sur

into the 21

st

 century, asymmetric threats including 

directed at the American homeland have taken on incr

priority. Thinking about asymmetry has challenged so

the most basic precepts of U.S. strategic thinking

instance, Joint Vision 2020—the successor to Joint 

2010—states that, “We will not necessarily sustain a 

technological advantage over our adversaries in all a

given the availability of commercial technology an

widespread dispersion of new information.

95

 The bes

can be hoped for was a “frictional imbalance” over en

brought about by information superiority and 

qualitative advantages. Whether this line of think

compatible with the goal of “full spectrum domin

remains to be seen. JV 2020 also shows other sig

maturation in American strategic thought includ

broader, more holistic perspective on strategy a

sustained discussion of multinational and intera

operations. Clearly, thinking on U.S. military strateg

36
changed since the end of the Cold War. The questi

What direction should this take? This is the driving 

behind the 2001 QDR.

37
PART II:

CORE ISSUES

The 2001 QDR could easily turn into a series of de

about specific acquisition programs or force stru

numbers. Hopefully it will not but will focus instead o

strategic issues. In particular, four issues should be ce

to the debate: the method and speed of transformation

shaping methodologies, strategic focus, and the sync

zation of defense budgets and the strategy.

Core Issue I: Transformation.

Transformation is an intrinsic element of the Ame

national character. After all, the United States was bo

transforming the English political and social orde

something new. Constant tinkering and improveme

natural. Americans change jobs, houses, cars, lifestyle

spouses with greater regularity than any people on 

Calls for the transformation of the U.S. military, then, 

receptive audience. Its champions include influ

thinkers like Andrew Krepinevich and William Ow

The U.S. Commission on National Security/21

st

 Ce

(also known as the Hart-Rudman Commission), a 

level group chartered to review the U.S. security syste

recommend changes, recently joined the cast of tra

mation advocates as it contended the “mix and effectiv

of overall American capabilities need to be rethough

adjusted.”

97

In a sense, the call for radical change in an organiz

that is superior to any conceivable challenger is str

Transformation advocates use both “push” and 

arguments to justify their position. New techn

particularly information technology organized 

knowledge systems, is thought to provide an opportun

transformative improvement. As a psychological leg

39
the Cold War, American military and civilian de

leaders are loath to let any opportunity slip away. D

the global confrontation with the Soviet Union, there 

need to seize every strategic and technological opening

notion persists so the idea of deliberately esch

improvements in the U.S. military—even if doing so 

entail substantial economic and political benefits—c

deep anxiety. Transformation advocates also contend 

the U.S. military remains configured for Soviet 

enemies using armor-heavy formations to 

international borders in relatively open terrain and 

territory to control resources, whether petro

industrial production, water, or something simila

defeat asymmetric and nontraditional enemies requ

very different type of American military. Transform

advocates also argue that if the United States doe

capitalize on the RMA, some other state will, thus er

the political and strategic advantages that accrue 

military superiority. Warnings are made abou

“complacency” of the U.S. military and the tendency to 

the last war (many of the U.S. military’s futures-ori

wargames still involve a conventional enemy attempt

seize the territory of a neighbor with armored format

While the specific trajectory of transformation wa

open by documents like the report of the National De

Panel and JV 2010, the Pentagon and the military Se

have established a number of programs design

energize change. These include seminars, studies

wargames designed to explore the RMA by the Penta

Office of Net Assessment, experiments within the Ser

and the Joint Concept Development and Experimen

effort of USJFCOM. All of the Services and at least so

the CINCs have strategies and roadmap

transformation. Within the Office of the Secreta

Defense, the Deputy Secretary chairs special meeti

the Defense Resource Board to oversee exploitation 

RMA and implementation of JV 2010/2020, whil

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and T

40
Reduction is developing a DOD-wide approach to 

implementation

98

 But despite the Pentagon’s app

acceptance of the need for transformation, actual pla

Andrew Krepinevich’s words, “leave the military o

near side of the coming transformational divi

According to the Defense Science Board, there 

DOD-wide strategy for transformation and thus no se

urgency for fundamental change.

100

 Some memb

Congress and defense analysts point out that nearly 

the Pentagon’s major acquisition programs are for sy

designed for large conventional battles rather than 

missions and threats including the F-22 air super

fighter, the Crusader artillery system, the Navy’s 

attack submarines, and the nine new antiarmor we

under development.

101

There are obvious reasons for the less-than

commitment to transformation on the part of the Ame

military. One is the intrinsic conservatism seen in all 

bureaucratic organizations. It would be extraordi

difficult for the senior leaders of the military an

Department of Defense to totally abandon 

organizations, concepts, and procedures they have sp

lifetime mastering. And, no element of the Departm

Defense is certain which Service or organization 

eventually gain from transformation. This sp

hesitance—even outright resistance. But there are 

explanations. Transformation advocates have not 

made their case. It is hard to conceive of any state cat

up with the United States, much less surpassing it for 

decades. China is the only potentially hostile n

attempting a serious modernization of its military, an

so far behind the United States that it will take a prol

period of intense (and visible) effort to even begin to 

the gap in key areas.

102

 A more generic version 

transformation argument does not name a sp

adversary that might overtake the United State

contends that “globalization” is making adva

technology available to all and this might, in the wo

41
the Defense Science Board, “empower adversaries in a 

time.”

103

 This idea merits consideration, but remain

an assertion.

As a counter to the push for transformation, 

analysts argue that the United States will experie

“strategic breathing space” with no pressing th

expected for some time.

104

 If some state or non-state 

should make inroads into the superiority of the 

military, there would be plenty of time to react. Given 

the cost of transformation is not justified. H

transformation also runs the risk of guessing wrong 

what concepts and technologies will dominate the f

battlefield. Such early “lock in” could leave the U.S. mi

with irrelevant capabilities and systems. History sug

that to transform first is much less important th

transform correctly. Finally, some experts contend th

technology to undertake the sort of RMA-b

transformation espoused by Krepinevich, Owens

National Defense Panel, the Defense Science Board

others is not yet available. Michael O’Hanlon, for ins

writes that “the technological basis for a radical 

transformation of the U.S. armed forces and U.S. se

policy is unsubstantiated.”

105

 To transform now befo

technology matures would at best waste a huge amo

money and, again, lead to early lock in to irrelevant me

and systems.

In any case, transformation will be a major issue d

QDR 2001 and for the new President and Secreta

Defense. Transformation advocates will be pitted ag

those who feel that the current strategic environmen

not justify its cost and risk. Based on statements 

during the presidential primary campaign, a 

administration would be more amenable to transform

arguments than a Gore administration. Either is lik

take a serious look at the specific trajectory of change. 

are at least two separate definitions of mil

transformation in use today. The technologically-de

transformation espoused by the National Defense P

42
the Defense Science Board, the Air Force, and the N

not the same as the geostrategically-defined transform

sought by General Shinseki. The former is a dr

augment operational effectiveness by integration o

technology; the later is change to make the U.S. Army 

deployable and thus more strategically relevant 

security environment where strategic speed is consi

vital. Debate also swirls around the exte

transformation. Should the U.S. military move away 

its traditional weapons systems and operational con

or should it, as General Shinseki proposes, retain a r

“legacy” capability even while it develops and field

style units? While the more conservative approach m

strategic sense, will the American people and their e

leaders fund two armies, two navies, two Marine Cor

two air forces?

Core Issue II: Force Shaping.

During the early 1990s, American strategists mad

crucial force shaping decisions. One was to us

MRC/MTW yardstick. As noted earlier, this was not 

on a prediction that Baghdad and Pyongyang or any 

potential aggressors would coordinate their strategi

way that Germany and Japan did in 1941, but rat

deter opportunism and provide a blueprint for a wors

military force. The second decision was to move fr

predominantly threat-based force shaping methodolog

capabilities-based one.

106

 The complexity and fluidity 

strategic environment made this necessary. Iraq’s inv

of Kuwait showed that a state could switch from a d

partner—Iraq had been seen as a bulwark against Ir

aggression—to an enemy in a short period of 

Moreover, politics dictated the use of a capabilities-

approach to force planning. While military strat

might have feared conflict with Russia, China, or 

India, the fact that the United States was attempt

improve its relations with these states would have m

difficult to explicitly configure the American armed 

43
against them. These three great powers as well as 

other new or potential friends remained suspicio

American military power and easily intimidated. 

result, force shaping was based on concepts like the a

to win a generic MTW or defeat a generic “major reg

competitor” or “near peer competitor.”

For a number of reasons, the current approach to 

shaping may not survive QDR 2001. As the world cha

the number of potential adversaries who might unde

aggression using cross-border, combined arms inv

appears to be diminishing. Recent events in Korea su

that tension there might lessen.

107

 Iran shows 

inclination to invade anyone except, perhaps, Iraq. It is 

to imagine the United States rushing to Baghdad’s de

A decade of sanctions against Iraq and exte

modernization of armed forces of the Gulf Coope

Council states diminish the chance that there wil

reprise of Desert Storm. The Russian military, whic

seen as a potential opponent in a major war during the 

1990s, is hard pressed to dodge defeat at the han

Chechen armed thugs. It would take years to resuscita

capability for sustained power projection, and Moscow 

no sign now of wanting to do so. And while China p

threat to Taiwan, should Beijing ever invade and the U

States come to Taipei’s defense, the generic MTW 

package would not be appropriate. The Ame

contribution would more likely be built on airpower, 

power, and missile defense.

A number of senior defense leaders and analysts 

pointed out that the United States could not undertak

nearly-simultaneous MTWs today, so retaining this co

makes little sense. This idea is not new. Soon afte

Bottom Up Review, Representative Ike Skelton (D-Mo

that “simple third-grade arithmetic” showed tha

proposed force could not handle two major conflicts.

10

recently General Michael Ryan, Air Force Chief of Sta

said that his service will never have enough strategic 

support two simultaneous MTWs despite on

44
modernization efforts.

109

 The United States, accord

General Ryan, has “a one-major theater war airlift f

There are shortages of other low density/high de

assets as well, including U-2 RIVET Joint, E-AWAC

JSTARS, EA-6B, tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (U

aerial refueling aircraft, and Special Forces, partic

psychological operations and civil affairs units.

110

 D

Goure of CSIS has written, “Those in key DoD leade

positions have known for years that they could not su

the strategy of fighting two near-simultaneous MTWs

kept silent principally out of a fear that to admit the 

would leave the services open to a new round of 

reductions.”

111

Many strategists recognized from the beginning th

“two nearly-simultaneous” MTW idea was an impo

goal. During the Bottom Up Review, for instance, Secr

of Defense Aspin advocated what was cal

“win-hold-win” approach where the United Stat

conjunction with allies, would hold off the second agg

until the first was defeated and military forces had 

shifted.

112

 Fierce opposition led Aspin to drop the ide

variants of the “win-hold-win” construct period

reemerge. In 1997, for instance, Senator Charles 

(D-VA) suggested that the forces used to defeat a s

MTW should come primarily from the reserve compo

units of which would be mobilized at the beginning 

first MTW.

113

 Even if one rejects the idea that a 

Storm-type invasion could be thwarted solely with sta

precision strikes rather than by a combined-arms U.S. 

the strategic environment has changed to the point t

no longer makes sense to use this sort of threat as the 

building block of American military strategy

Hart-Rudman Commission contends that the two 

yardstick is, in effect, distracting American strategist

problems that should be addressed. Rather than prod

military capabilities for increasingly unlikely MTW

Commission advocates greater emphasis on expediti

and stability operations.

114

45
But however inadequate the two MTW yardstick

not clear what should replace it. Whatever its shortcom

the concept was clear and coherent. By contrast the co

of smaller scale contingencies—which are some

proposed as the core force shaping concept—is 

broader and more amorphous. It is impossible to 

“basic” SSC force package the way that the BUR was a

do with a MRC/MTW. Put simply, another seismic sh

the strategic environment is underway: Desert Storm 

invasions are fading, but it is not clear what will re

them as the centerpiece of U.S. military strategy. 

this, the Pentagon may cling to something like the 

concept (whether one, two, or one plus) until a 

yardstick comes along. This will generate charges th

U.S. military is “preparing for the last war,” but n

really knows what the “next war” will be.

In an even broader sense, some defense analys

beginning to question the use of capabilities as a 

shaping criterion rather than existing threats. For ins

the Hart-Rudman Commission recommended that 

structure decisions be made “on the basis of real-

intelligence assessments rather than illustr

scenarios.”

115

 While defense strategists defen

capabilities approach as a logical response to the comp

of the global security environment, the quickness 

which friends can become enemies, and the rapidity 

which new challenges emerge, critics contend that 

simply a way to justify a larger military than is 

warranted. Even though the Department of Defense 

likely to abandon the capabilities approach in the 

term, it will face pressure from Congress, the media, an

public to assure a better match between the capabili

the U.S. military and the threats it might face. DOD an

Services are unlikely to find a sympathetic ea

acquisition and force development programs based 

hypothetical “near peer competitor” so long as there a

signs of one emerging.

46
Core Issue III: Strategic Focus.

Prior to World War I, the U.S. military generally fo

on activities other than large-scale war. The Army 

frontier constabulary force, played a major ro

infrastructure development, and provided assistan

civil authorities during domestic unrest. The Marine

order on naval vessels and later became an expediti

force in what today would be called SSCs. The 

protected the sea lines of communication, and c

pirates and smugglers. During the rare times tha

United States did become involved in major war, the 

military mobilized the forces necessary to deal wit

problem, won the war, demobilized, and returned 

emphasis on operations other than war. It was only 

involvement in the two world wars and Ame

emergence as a major global power that the armed 

shifted their peacetime focus to large-scale, conven

warfighting. But, in a sense, the transition wa

successful. When the United States became mir

Vietnam, military and DOD leaders initially treate

conflict there like another conventional war rather 

adapting organization, doctrine, and operat

methods.

116

 The argument made by Army general

others in the 1950s that a military able to fight a majo

could handle any and all “lesser conflicts” proved wro

Eventually, the U.S. military did develop eff

counterinsurgency capabilities, but these came too l

alter the course of events in Southeast Asia.

117

 Foll

Vietnam, the U.S. military focused on large-

conventional war. The Army “rediscovered” the opera

level of war, undertook serious study of the World W

German military’s success at it and the 1973 Arab-I

War, and developed a doctrinal framework—Air

Battle—which reflected the central place of large

combined operations in the American way of war

military’s leaders were convinced that involvement i

intensity conflict or operations other than war would 

47
public support for the military, have a deleterious eff

morale, and detract from the ability to defeat Sovie

Warsaw Pact forces should war ever come to Eu

Despite calls in the 1980s for greater attention to 

intensity conflict, including counterinsurg

counterterrorism, and new activities like countern

trafficking, the military resisted as much as possible

The U.S. military did develop organizations and do

for low-intensity conflict during the 1980s, but a

accorded these secondary status. A “fast track” caree

one that dealt with large scale warfighting. To concen

on anything else was a liability for an ambitious office

aspirations of flag rank. The goal of the Services and 

was to focus on conventional warfighting while bu

enough low-intensity conflict capability to satisf

political leaders pushing for greater effort at the lowe

of the spectrum of conflict.

118

 A similar dynamic em

again in the 1990s as the Bush and Clinton administra

committed the United States to an increasing num

multinational peacekeeping operations, shaping acti

and other types of SSCs but, again, the military tr

these as secondary tasks. Still, the success which Ame

forces had in the Balkans showed that units configure

trained for large-scale conventional war could succe

peacekeeping if given moderate amounts of retra

General Henry Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Ch

Staff, has written, “history clearly shows that the 

effective peacekeeping forces are those highly train

their warfighting skills and also prepared to conduct 

operations.”

119

 But while this might be an effective w

use the U.S. military, few would argue that it is the 

efficient. In fact, an argument can be made that the 

forces trained for high intensity conflict in peaceke

was possible precisely because of the declining likelih

MTW. And by the end of the 1990s the extensive use 

American military in SSCs, particularly protracted 

support operations like Bosnia, created serious proble

terms of readiness for warfighting and the retent

48
military personnel who were often deployed overse

The question of whether the U.S. military shou

predominantly organized, equipped, and trained to 

large-scale, cross-border, conventional war is th

persistent one that will be asked again as part of QDR 2

The appropriate focus for the U.S. military s

depend on trends in the global security environmen

key question is whether major, state-on-state wa

remain common enough and threatening enough to wa

building a military force designed primarily to deal w

There is no agreement on this. Many analysts conten

such conflicts will become increasingly unlikely in th

century. Michael Mandelbaum, for instance, argues 

major war where the most powerful members o

international system draw on all of their resources an

every weapon at their command over a period of 

leading to an outcome with revolutionary geopo

consequences, is obsolete.

121

 Israeli military his

Martin Van Creveld expands the point from war amon

great powers to war among the growing number of reg

powers able to acquire nuclear weapons. Proliferatio

holds, will obviate traditional state-on-state war.

12

argument can be taken even further: the incre

economic, political, and informational interconnecte

of the modern world is likely to make costs of old-fash

war to seize territory or resources far outweigh any exp

benefits. Admittedly, there may be a few states for w

particular piece of territory has such deep emotional 

that they are willing to pay the price to gain it but, in 

cases, aggression is as likely to be indirect, increment

proxies, and below the threshold which would prov

U.S.-led armed response rather than through tradi

armed invasion.

But despite signs that the likelihood of cross-b

invasion designed to seize territory or resources is decl

U.S. military strategy—and the forces, doct

equipment, and operational concepts to imple

it—remains focused on conventional war. This is not s

49
due to inertia or a lack of thinking: American strat

point out that one of the things making large-

cross-border, conventional war less probable i

demonstrated ability of the U.S. military to counter it. 

United States allows this capability to atrophy, large

cross-border invasion will again become a pref

technique of aggression. Focus on conventional war

this perspective, is an insurance policy. Even so

American people and their elected leaders may not con

to pay the premium for this policy if there is an ext

period of time without a major cross-border inv

Americans are impatient people with narrow hi

perspective. As the perceived threat from conventiona

declines, nontraditional threats will be accorded g

priority. 

The focus on conventional war may survive QDR 

but, unless a major war occurs, will come under 

scrutiny in QDR 2005. The speed of this shift depen

whether: (1) the tottering “rogue” regimes in Pyong

Baghdad, and Tehran moderate their behavior or col

(2) U.S.-China relations deteriorate or improve; (3) R

reverts to some form of authoritarianism and ex

aggression; (4) the U.S. President elected in 2000 re

committed to multinational peacekeeping and mi

involvement in shaping the global security environ

and, (5) nontraditional enemies develop the capabilit

seriously threaten important or vital U.S. nat

interests. Desert Storm type wars—meaning large

conventional conflict undertaken by a coalition in whi

United States provides the bulk of the forces because o

are unwilling and the threat to U.S. national intere

high—are unlikely. But Desert Storm remains the tem

for an MTW. Given this, QDR 2001 is likely to see se

major questions concerning the post-MTW focus of th

military: 

• Should the U.S. military continue to foc

warfighting or treat warfighting and non-warfig

50
functions like peace operations, shaping

military-to-military engagement as co-equals?

• If U.S. national security strategy continues to 

participation in multinational peace su

operations, should the military seek greater effic

and effectiveness by developing specialized un

focus on these sorts of activities, including long

nation building?

• Can large-scale, cross-border, conventional w

deterred or defeated by some means other th

combined arms operations by a U.S. domi

coalition?

• Should the U.S. military give greater empha

nontraditional adversaries or emerging en

rather than state militaries?

Core Issue IV: Strategy-Budget Mismatch.

Many of the major reviews of post-Cold War 

military strategy, including the Bottom-Up Review an

1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, were essen

attempts to develop strategies and force structures 

would allow lower defense budgets. Unfortun

synchronization between strategy and budget p

elusive. Today nearly every analyst agrees that the b

predictions which served as the basis for the 1997 QD

unrealistic. According to General Henry Shelton, cu

defense budgets are adequate to meet the military’s 

critical requirements, but not to meet all of its iden

requirements.

123

 But as is always true with econom

budgetary predictions, various writers disagree o

extent of the shortfall. Goure and Ranney are amon

most pessimistic as they anticipate budget shortfa

$100 billion per year to fund the 1997 QDR fo

Analysts at CSBA predict an annual shortfall o

billion.

125

 Although substantially less than the CSIS f

51
this is still potentially catastrophic. The Congres

Budget Office notes that while President Clinton’s FY 

budget proposals would increase weapons procure

from $49 billion in 1999 to $75 billion by 2005, this is st

below the $90 billion per year needed to sustain t

military force.

126

 The Army’s proposed transform

alone is estimated to cost about $70 billion between 

and 2014.

127

 The only possible source of such money 

be a redistribution of part of the defense budget from 

the other services to the Army, or a hefty increase in t

line.

128

 Whatever figures and predictions for eco

growth and inflation one accepts, there is a subst

strategy/budget mismatch that is likely to worsen in co

decades.

In the broadest sense, there are three solutions

would be for Congress to authorize dramatically 

defense budgets, perhaps linking defense spending 

specific percentage of gross domestic product. T

unlikely in the absence of some radical degradation 

global security environment. Another approach 

attempt to close the gap through greater efficiency. T

DOD’s preferred approach. Using the blueprint outlin

the November 1997 Defense Reform Initiative Repo

Pentagon has attempted to adopt better business proc

commercial alternatives, consolidation of redun

functions, and organizational streamlining.

129

 While 

are useful reforms, they alone are unlikely to solv

strategy/budget mismatch particularly so long as addi

base closings and radical shifts in service roles and mis

face insurmountable political opposition. The 

approach is to adjust strategy to budgetary realit

redefining national interests and scaling back on se

commitments.

Because none of the solutions to the strategy/b

mismatch—or even a politically palatable combinat

them—is easy, the tendency on the part of the Depar

of Defense, the Services, the Administration, and Con

has been to delay the day of reckoning. Procure

52
replacement, and maintenance programs have 

stretched out. Some acquisitions have been cancelled. 

to the most pressing and immediate problems have 

adopted without dealing with the long-term stru

elements of the mismatch. The alternatives are h

taxes, abandoning commitments, or accepting gr

strategic risk to the U.S. military as it economiz

maintenance and procurement. Because of the 

number of variables involved—the health of the 

economy, the nature of the global security environmen

so forth—no one can predict exactly when the po

decision will be reached. It could be months or it cou

decades. In all probability, QDR 2001 will not solv

problem and may not even address it. Eventually, th

budgets, commitments, and force levels mu

synchronized. 

The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review.

The 2001 QDR comes at a crucial time in the evolut

American military strategy, in large part because 

coterminous with the end of the Clinton administr

This opens the door for a substantial, perhaps 

fundamental shift in some key elements of the str

George W. Bush has indicated that as president he 

order a comprehensive military review to develop a 

architecture for American defense; skip a generat

weapons; encourage a spirit of innovation 

experimentation within the military; earmark at lea

percent of the procurement budget for “leap ahead” mi

technology; and increase defense R&D spending by at 

$20 billion from FY 2002 to FY 2006.

130

 While Al Gore 

be likely to retain more of the Clinton approach, he 

make major changes as well. QDR 2001 will not dete

the military strategy adopted by the new president, 

likely to affect it.

A range of strategic alternatives has been develope

debated within the defense community as part o

53
preparation for QDR 2001. The strategic alternatives 

scrutiny differ in their assumptions, focus, and ris

issue of risk is a particularly important one. The ext

which this was assessed in QDR 1997 did not s

Congress, so steps have been taken to assure that the 

Staff does a rigorous risk assessment as part of QDR 

This requires greater refinement of the basic definit

strategic risk and a methodology for analyzing it.

In the broadest sense, strategic risk can be defined 

probability that an action or failure to act will have sp

disadvantageous effects. These effects can be ta

operational, or political. A partial list would include:

• Higher than expected casualties during an opera

• Mission failure

• Higher than expected loss of equipment

• An increase in enemy resolve

• An asymmetric response by an opponent (terro

WMD, etc.)

• Alienation of friends and neutrals

• A loss of prestige or influence

• Loss of the “moral high ground”

• Overextension leading to a decline in the abi

protect and promote some interests

• A loss of other opportunities, options and capabi

• Higher than expected economic costs

• Erosion of morale

• Future difficulties in recruiting

54
• Loss of domestic political support

• Creation of a new security commitment which m

demands on resources

• Encouragement of aggression.

Risk assessment is an inherent part of stra

planning, but is both an art and a science. It is a

because it deals with probabilities, and because the co

of acceptable risk, which is subjective and psycholo

plays such a central role. Acceptable risk varies 

individual to individual, from regime to regime, and 

culture to culture. Some are inherently risk adverse, o

risk tolerant or even risk prone. Acceptable risk also v

across time: if an individual, regime, or nation sees t

turning against it or expects greater danger or weakn

the future, it will become more risk tolerant. 

management entails balancing one sort of risk again

other, accurately assessing the degree of risk th

acceptable, and lowering the probability of ad

consequences given the cost of doing so, the intere

stake, the likelihood of success, and the chance 

decreasing one sort of risk will increase another.

Some of the strategic alternatives tabled in the 

process have little chance of adoption in part because 

entail unacceptable risk. The most important exam

this is American disengagement from global sec

commitments. This approach does reflect the Ame

strategic tradition. The historic norm for the United S

is global economic engagement but relatively li

military engagement, with this limited to geograph

contiguous areas like the Caribbean and Central Am

There is at least some support for a return to this trad

Perennial presidential candidate, pundit, and po

entrepreneur Patrick Buchanan, for instance, con

that the United States is “stretched to the limit” and s

eschew most military interventions.

131

 His r

mendation is that the United States return to be

55
“republic” rather than an “empire.”

132

 While Buchana

no chance of attaining the presidency, his positions r

the feelings of a significant number of Americans 

though not a majority). And, Buchanan is not the only 

of America’s global engagement. Organizations lik

Cato Institution have long advocated more rigid crite

military engagement.

133

 Unlike earlier times 

conservative Republicans pushed for global engage

(primarily to contain communism) and liberal Dem

favored a diminished American role in global securit

when George McGovern ran for president in 1972 wi

slogan “come home, America”—current suppo

disengagement comes from both ends of the po

spectrum. Ultimately, though, the strategy recomm

by QDR 2001 will call for some degree of global engage

The questions are what form of engagement and how m

Within this context, five strategic alternatives merit se

consideration.

Alternative I: Shape, Respond, Prepare.

Rich people are not forced to make the same so

compromises and accept the same risks as the poor. Th

do not have to choose between buying medicine or fo

take the chance that postponing expensive autom

maintenance will leave them stranded somewhere

same principle holds for military strategy. Those r

power and wealth may face problems, but they can 

many of the compromises and risks that enmesh the 

The shape, respond, and prepare approach to str

adopted by the Clinton administration is appropriate 

state rich in power resources. Many nations would like 

these three things simultaneously but only the 

powerful can.

Because the United States currently use

shape/respond/prepare approach, it forms the baseli

the analysis of all alternatives. In fact, many of wh

being called strategic alternatives during the 

56
preparations are actually variants of the shape/res

prepare approach rather than discrete strategies. Fo

reason, it makes sense to consider them as a group

starters, all variants share some common stra

assumptions:

• The world will remain a “loose” unipolar system 

only the United States capable of leadership 

regions.

° There is a modest chance of the rise of an

superpower, but this will not occur for s

decades.

° Regional partners will continue to wel

accept, or tolerate substantial Ame

involvement in regional security.

° Because most instability and conflict will 

outside of North America, the U.S. military 

retain a substantial power projection capab

• The military element of power will remain a c

part of American strategy.

° The United States has vital, importan

humanitarian interests.

° Military force will always be used to prot

promote vital interests, will often be us

protect or promote important interests when 

are threatened, and may be used in purs

humanitarian interests.

• Global engagement and leadership on the part 

United States is sustainable and should be susta

° The American economy will remain strong.

57
° The American public and its elected leader

continue to support U.S. leadership and 

engagement.

° U.S. defense budgets will be adequate to su

existing power projection capability a

undertake the process of experimentation 

research necessary to prepare for f

challenges.

• The global security environment will remain co

and fluid.

° There will be a wide variety of threats, 

traditional state-centric ones and non-tradi

ones.

° Regional grouping will shift with at least mod

frequency (but key relationships betwee

United States and other free-market democ

or traditional partners will remain strong).

• The global security system will see cont

economic and political progress, with occas

setbacks.

° The degree of American engagement 

leadership will affect the extent to which eco

and political progress outweighs neg

tendencies.

° The earlier a conflict is addressed, the low

cost and risk of resolving or containing it. A m

effort now will lower the chances that a 

effort will be required later.

134

• The current period is one of rapid and signi

change in the nature of armed conflict.

58
° Those who do not participate in this will 

adverse strategic consequences.

Within the parameters set by these assump

“shaping” is the use of the Department of Defense an

U.S. military in non-warfighting functions to 

strengthen regional defense systems and enco

partners to undertake reforms that will augment sta

and security. Shaping can take a number of forms su

arms control, security assistance, involveme

peacekeeping operations, the stationing of military 

abroad, participating in combined exercises, prov

training, and other military-to-military interactions su

staff talks, flag officer visits, and international m

education and training (IMET). IMET is particu

important for the militaries and defense establishme

states undergoing the transition to democ

Traditionally IMET has brought foreign students to a 

range of American military schools from those tea

basic skills to those providing upper level profes

military education such as staff and war colleges. 

recently, the Department of Defense has taken a “fo

deployment” approach to professional military edu

and established several regionally-focused senior 

schools specifically for international students (incl

both military students and civilian defense perso

These include the George C. Marshall Center for Se

Studies in Garmisch, Germany; the Asia-Pacific Cent

Security Studies in Honolulu; the Center for Hemisp

Defense Studies in Washington, DC; and the African C

for Strategic Studies which is headquartered i

Washington area but operates seminars and aca

sessions in various African locations.

135

 These scho

stress the cultivation of healthy civil-military rela

sound defense budgeting practices, and rational meth

strategy formulation (among other topics). They are w

seen as bringing a high return for the money spent. 

cases, shaping demands close cooperation betwee

Department of Defense and diplomatic efforts. It is al

59
strategic function that is the newest from an hi

perspective and the most “nontraditional” in the sens

it does not entail actual warfighting (although warfig

skills are often essential).

“Responding” occurs when shaping fails and cri

conflicts take place. The use of the word “respond” im

that the United States will not, in all or most cases, 

first to resort to force, but will react to adversaries w

While not made explicit in U.S. strategy documents, r

practice suggests that the most common objecti

responding will be to restore the status quo ante b

This represents a change from the “American way o

that dominated strategic thinking from the Civil 

through World War II and reflects altered attitudes to

the use of force both in the United States and aroun

world driven by the danger of escalation that arises 

global interconnectedness and the proliferation of we

of mass destruction.

136

 Whether correct or no

assumption made by U.S. political and military lead

that the American people see few if any threats toda

would justify the human and monetary costs of 

decisive victory, but are content with simply reve

aggression. As a result, American military strategy 

methods of warfighting that are as quick and bloodl

possible, whether in SSCs or MTWs.

“Preparing” means taking steps today to forest

respond to future challenges. Like the other eleme

current U.S. defense strategy, this is not new. Durin

Cold War the United States expended tremendous 

and money on developing next-generation weapons sy

and other forms of technology. Today, though, the 

horizon of the U.S. military is more extensive. Durin

Cold War, the pace of technological and strategic c

was slow enough that the Department of Defense 

focus on the “next” system or type of technology. Chang

escalated to the point that the U.S. military must th

terms of the system or organization “after next” at the 

time that they are fielding the current force or system

60
preparing to field the “next” force, system, or ty

technology.

137

 Because it is not clear what threats th

military may confront in a decade or two, preparing 

least partially a guessing process. Potential f

adversaries include everything from a resuscitated R

to some sort of networked, non-state enemy. In ge

though, the Department of Defense and all the services 

concentrated on what might be called “applique” techn

and technologies designed to improve the performa

the U.S. military at existing tasks rather than 

transformative technologies like biotechnolo

autonomous fighting systems.

Variant A: The Respond Approach (Current Str

The current variant of the shape/respond/prepare app

gives responding priority in terms of money, time, 

and talent. Responding, which includes the Ame

reaction to both MTWs and SSCs, is “first among equ

the three functions (see Figure 1).

61

Figure 1
While shaping and preparing have increased in impor

over the last decade, all the services and the Secret

Defense have stated that the primary mission of the 

military is to “fight and win the nation’s wars”—i

respond. The fact that the “Respond Approach” to 

military strategy represents continuity has 

advantages. For instance, the services and the u

commands have existing programs to implemen

strategy, including the futures programs, operations 

and theater engagement plans.

138

 In addition, the Re

Approach concentrates on a type of threats that has 

the greatest risk to U.S. national interests. Stressin

ability and willingness of the U.S. military to respon

wide range of challenges has augmented deterrenc

helped preserve American leadership.

In geographic terms, the Respond Approach app

all regions of the world, but with some variations in th

of military response that the United States would con

(see Figure 2).

The Respond Approach does entail some strategic 

and costs. For instance, it demands a large and h

skilled force, and a large defense budget. The approac

62

Figure 2
only work if the United States retains a wide ran

military capabilities, from nuclear deterrence 

futures-oriented battle labs to special forces. It also req

extensive strategic mobility, including airlift and s

Both are expensive. Since the United States 

experienced the longest period of sustained eco

growth in its history, these demands have been met. 

is a chance that this growth can be sustained into co

decades. But if the U.S. economy experiences 

problems, the response-oriented approach to mi

strategy may prove unbearably expensive and po

support for it will erode. It is important to remembe

shifts in the health of the U.S. economy, along with ch

in the global security environment and technol

advances, are “independent variables” that can 

changes in military strategy. The Response Approa

appropriate for a nation experiencing sustained eco

expansion, but not for one undergoing economic slow

or contraction.

The Respond Approach also risks over-extension. 

engaged in many regions of the world in many dif

ways can cause weaknesses in other places. Claus

warned “there is no higher and simpler law of strategy 

of keeping one’s forces concentrated.”

139

 For a super

like the United States, this is impossible, but dispe

always brings risk. By the same token, using the 

military in SSCs and in shaping activities risks weak

its ability to fight major wars. Recruitment and rete

become more difficult, maintenance and replaceme

equipment is delayed or postponed, and training sche

constricted. However much forces trained for respond

MTW can be used in shaping (or, preparing for the fu

this entails some cost in warfighting capabilities. Tra

and compromises are inevitable. This is acceptable 

because the probability of an MTW seems remote. I

situation changes, the current strategy may e

unacceptable risk to U.S. warfighting capabilities.

63
A Respond Approach may discourage partners 

adequately developing their own military capabilities

charge, of course, is often made toward Europe. 

though Western Europe has a population and eco

capacity that matches or exceeds that of the United S

the combined strength of the region’s armed forces 

below that of the U.S. military. It can be argued that E

has not undertaken efforts to increase defense spendin

augment its military capabilities because Ame

strategy commits the U.S. military to the region’s de

and, if necessary, to lead such efforts. The inverse i

true: by retaining a strategy based on power projectio

engagement in regions far from the United States w

tangible U.S. interests are limited, the current str

runs the risk of intimidating or alienating other s

Americans invariably see U.S. military power as be

used only to promote democracy and human rights, a

punish aggression. Other states do not necessarily 

this perception. Many worry about what they see 

increasing heavy-handedness on the part of Washi

made possible by U.S. military prowess. Eventually 

states may attempt to lessen U.S. influence in their re

or actively contain American power. The Respond App

increases the chances of this happening.

Engagement can cause partners and the Ame

public to overestimate the extent of Washing

commitment to a nation or a region. For exampl

United States military has been involved in a num

programs designed to shape the security environm

Sub-Saharan Africa and to improve ties with the re

militaries.

140

 This might cause African leaders to as

that the United States is willing to play an activ

integral role in the security of their region. But, in pra

the United States has refused anything other tha

indirect role in African security.

141

 Shaping can als

American policymakers to make commitments to ar

little intrinsic interest because it seems like a low-cost 

to do. When this happens, the United States beg

64
develop an interest in part to justify past efforts

tendency to reinforce failure is a military error 

difficult thing to resist since withdrawing from a st

region where U.S. forces have been involved in engage

or shaping is an admission of strategic failure.

Shaping and engagement also risk “guilt by associa

When a military that has undergone American train

education, or which had held combined exercises wi

U.S. military commits human rights violations, under

aggression, becomes corrupt, or intervenes in the po

system of its state, the United States is held p

responsible. One example of this is the protracted pr

against the School of the Americas. All of the good do

the school over the years in terms of imparting va

skills to Latin American militaries and helping shape 

attitudes toward civil-military relations is forgotten w

tiny percentage of the school’s alumni commit human 

violations. This could be repeated in other areas of the 

where the U.S. military undertakes shaping 

engagement activities, particularly with new democ

and transitional states.

Finally, preparing now for an uncertain future 

entails some risks. The most pressing is the danger of 

lock in” if predictions about the future prove incorrec

Army After Next Project, for instance, assumed tha

major challenge the United States will face in 202

beyond will be “near peer competitors.” The Army th

out to explore operational concepts, organizations

technology that would be useful against a near 

competitor armed with some precision weapons, ba

missiles, weapons of mass destruction, and the like

risk is that the Army (or the rest of the Departm

Defense) may so commit itself to the predicted ty

function or threat that it overlooks others and is unpre

for them. History has shown that it is often not the first 

to attempt to undertake a military revolution that 

succeeds, but those that learn from and correct the mis

65
of the leader. By leading the current revolution in mi

affairs, the United States runs the chance of this.

Variant B: The Transformation Approach

“Transformation Approach” emerged from the 

National Defense Panel. The basic idea is that the U

States is currently experiencing a “strategic pause” w

imminent, high-risk threats. This allows accepting g

short-term risk by limiting global engagement, can

procurement of current or next-generation wea

systems like the F-22 and Crusader, selectively low

current readiness and operational tempo, cutting 

force structure, and shrinking the defense infrastru

The savings that derive from these actions could th

used to accelerate the development and adopti

advanced systems, concepts, and organizations. I

Transformation Approach, then, preparing for the fut

the priority (see Figure 3). If this is adopted and succe

could solidify American military preponderance for de

to come, thus helping assure a more stable global se

66

Figure 3
system and protecting U.S. national interests. This 

enticing idea: Republican presidential nominee Geor

Bush, for instance, has adopted a position close t

Transformation Approach.

142

The Transformation Approach is based on se

assumptions. First, while the United States is unlik

face a peer or near-peer competitor for se

decades—hence the “strategic pause”—this app

assumes that one will eventually emerge or, at least, 

emerge. If not, there would be no reason for the effor

expense of transformation; any defense savings could 

to other use. The Transformation Approach also ass

that the United States has an accurate roadmap fo

current revolution in military affairs so that any ch

made bring strategic advantages. And, it is based o

assumption that the U.S. military, in conjunction 

coalition partners and allies, can overcome immedi

short-term challenges with existing technology and f

Today’s “rogue states” or regional aggressors, accord

this thinking, are growing weaker or, at best, standin

rather than becoming more powerful. Iraq, for ins

remains badly damaged by the Gulf War and a dec

sanctions, while the armed forces of the Gulf Coope

Council (GCC) states are markedly stronger than they 

in the early 1990s.

143

 The North Korean military is 

but years of economic decay, isolation, and famine 

greatly weakened Pyongyang and paved the wa

movement toward political reconciliation between 

Korea and South Korea. While the possibility of 

Korean aggression cannot be ruled out in the short ter

chances that it would succeed given the military 

economic power of South Korea and the American se

commitment to Seoul are very small. South Korea 

almost certainly defeat North Korea in a war today, an

is unlikely to change. Iran—the third candidate enem

potential MTW—is undertaking moderate improvem

its armed forces but, unlike Iraq and North Korea, h

waged aggressive war in recent years or given any 

67
sign that it would like to invade and occupy the territ

neighboring states.

A Transformation Approach to military strategy 

lead the United States to limit its involvement in regi

modest or limited national interest. In most cases, the

precisely the areas of the world where the deman

multinational peacekeeping forces is the highest. 

Transformation Approach, the United States w

probably only consider peacekeeping or stability opera

in high-value areas like the Caribbean or Central Am

In the short-term, a Transformation Approach would 

what might be called “limited commitment” military 

like aerospace and naval units rather than 

commitment” forces like major land formations. It 

certainly accord higher priority to experimental 

battle labs, concept development centers, war col

wargaming centers, and DOD think tanks. Geograph

a transformation approach to strategy could concentr

the regions of high, tangible U.S. interests, whether de

by geography, economic ties, or formal commitments

core regions of the Caribbean Basin, North Am

Central America, NATO Europe, parts of the Pacific 

and, to a lesser extent, the oil producing regions of th

would be important and warrant extensive mi

engagement. Others would not.

The Transformation Approach entails higher short

and mid-term risk than the Respond Approach. Lik

Respond Approach, the Transformation Approach 

intimidating other states and sparking arms race

adoption of asymmetric counters to American strengt

the coalescence of coalitions or alliances designed to co

U.S. power. Even today when foreign audiences hea

the United States, which is more secure than any 

state on earth and probably more secure than any sta

been for centuries, is willing to spend billions of dollar

radical increase in its military capabilities, they as

Washington intends to use this power to impose its w

others.

144

 In the short term, a transformation appro

68
strategy runs some risk of encouraging an aggressor st

strike out before the correlation of forces shifts even fu

against it. The argument is sometimes made that Ger

began World War I because it was afraid that po

reforms and industrialization in Imperial Russia 

eventually shift the balance of power. Aggressors are 

dangerous when they perceive adverse trends. To

aggressors might view a U.S. strategy based on tra

mation in this light. Similarly, the diminution of imme

engagement called for by the Transformation App

might erode America’s position of global leadersh

effect, Washington would be telling states outside of th

regions, “Although we’re withdrawing from your area 

we’ll be back in a few decades even stronger than be

But once a position of leadership is abandoned, it is 

difficult to regain. This means that a Transform

Approach might permanently end U.S. leadership o

the core areas.

Since no other state appears prepared to underta

transformation recommended by the National De

Panel, Office of Net Assessment, and Defense Sc

Board, unless the United States is prepared to retain 

“legacy” military and a transformed one, the process 

erode the ability of the U.S. military to operate 

coalition.

145

 Finally, as with the Respond Approa

undertake transformation now risks pursuing the w

sorts of changes if predictions about the nature of f

armed conflict, the trajectory of change in the g

security environment, and the evolution of technology 

wrong. If the U.S. military transforms prematurely, i

find itself like the French forces that manned the Ma

Line in 1940—unsurpassed at the sort of static defens

characterized World War I but irrelevant for the 

combined arms maneuver that dominated the firs

years of World War II.

Ultimately, the Transformation Approach e

accepting greater short-term risk in expectation 

long-term payoff. If one assumes that the United Stat

69
an accurate roadmap for transformation, that the cu

strategy is economically unsustainable, that a subst

American military preponderance over any conce

opponent should be sustained, that a decline in curren

influence in some regions is acceptable or can be rectif

a later date, and that the current “strategic pause

persist for several decades, the Transformation App

makes sense. If any of these assumptions do not hol

soundness of the Transformation Approach is question

Variant C: The Shaping Approach. The “Sh

Approach” grows from the conclusion that MTW

increasingly unlikely. The states that former Na

Security Adviser Anthony Lake labeled “rogues” have 

recast by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright as “sta

concern,” suggesting that they are modera

disintegrating, or contained.

146

 This, according to adv

of the Shaping Approach to U.S. military strategy, giv

United States a chance to place greater emphasis on th

of the military for shaping and engagement (see Figu

The idea is that this will preempt conflict, increase reg

70

Figure 4
stability, augment the capabilities of American par

and deter the “states of concern.” It would also 

significantly smaller defense budgets since sh

activities are less costly than warfighting, and since g

regional stability would allow force reductions.

While a Shaping Approach might initially dema

increase in the size of the U.S. military in order to de

relationships with a wide range of partner states, in th

term it could lead to a smaller force by preempting con

and increasing the ability of regional states to dea

those that do occur. When this happens, the U.S. m

would stress support to allies and partners in areas w

they are weak and the United States is strong su

command and control, intelligence, logistics

transportation. Combined exercises, particu

multinational ones, would increase in number, size

frequency. Engagement units like Army Special Force

National Guard units with experience in 

“partnership” programs would be particularly impo

Geographically, a shaping approach would focus on re

with emerging democracies, including Sub-Saharan A

South Asia, Central Asia, Southeast Europe

Asia-Pacific Rim, the Caribbean, and Latin Ameri

most instances, the United States would work closely 

existing regional security structures such as NATO, 

European security organizations, the Southern A

Development Council (SADC), the Economic Coun

West African States (ECOWAS), the East Af

Community (EAC), the Organization of African 

(OAU), the Association of South East Asian Na

(ASEAN), the Organization of American States (OAS

the GCC.

While a Shaping Approach would help save de

dollars and potentially augment regional stability in 

parts of the world, it would be a risky venture if predi

about the demise of large-scale war prove w

Nondemocratic states might be tempted to p

aggression if the U.S. military no longer actively cou

71
them. Even the traditional “rogues” might be

aggressive again. The influence of the United States 

then decline. Even if no invasions occur, regional partn

the United States might be susceptible to intimidat

revived Iraq or Iran might coerce the GCC, while AS

might, at some point, be intimidated by China. If sh

fails, the U.S. military might have to reverse an 

aggression that might have been deterred or thwarted

raising the risk and cost to U.S. and friendly f

Moreover, a Shaping Approach assumes that the r

democratic reforms and economic growth will con

Clearly the U.S. military would not undertake engage

with oppressive, nondemocratic partners. It is possibl

the first decade of the 21

st

 century will prove to be th

water mark of political reform and democratization

regression toward authoritarianism or fragment

taking place as the political and economic expectati

the citizens of transitional states are frustrated. A Sh

Approach also runs the risks mentioned earlier: gu

association, creeping commitment, and over extensio

Variant D: The Warfighting Approach. The first 

variants of the shape/respond/prepare strategy are c

related. The final variant—the “Warfighting Approa

represents a more substantial alteration. Lik

Responding Approach, the Warfighting Approach is 

on the belief that shaping, engagement, and prep

should be secondary functions for the U.S. mil

Advocates of this position feel strongly that the purp

the American military is to fight and win the nation’s 

(with war defined as traditional, large-scale co

involving state militaries). Everything else is a distra

Shaping and preparing may be necessary, but the

distractions. What distinguishes the Warfighting App

from the Respond Approach is the separation of majo

from smaller scale contingencies. The warfighting app

is based on the belief that the focus of the American mi

should be MTWs or, at least, large-scale war, with 

accorded lower priority (see Figure 5). Lik

72
Transformation Approach, the Warfighting App

advocates diminishing American engagement in sh

and SSCs. But, rather than doing this as a means of sh

resources to transformation efforts, the warfig

approach advocates diminished engagement strictly o

basis of strategic prudence: by expending so much 

effort, and money in regions of the world less import

the United States, Washington is increasing the risk t

interests in the core regions. The Warfighting App

assumes that the qualitative gap between the U.S. mi

and potential adversaries will remain acceptable if str

distractions are minimized and funding for mainte

and upgrades is adequate, so there is no need for a dra

transformation in the short- to mid-term. What is nee

concentration on threats that pose a risk to truly 

national interests, specifically large-scale aggression i

regions of the world.

One advantage of the Warfighting Approach to 

military strategy is that it would facilitate force and co

development by focusing on specific geostrategic zone

73

Figure 5
according clear priority to the MTW mission. The wid

range of functions performed by any organization, the 

complicated planning and development become an

greater the risk of failure in one function or the other. 

U.S. military could focus solely on MTWs, force and co

development would be both easier and, possibly, 

effective. Along these same lines, a Warfighting Appro

strategy would clarify the qualities desired among 

enlisted personnel and officers. The “warfighter” at

would be unambiguously prized and cultivated. 

likelihood, programs to change the institutional cultur

makeup of the military would be de-emphasiz

Warfighting Approach to strategy might also aug

deterrence against potential aggressors who contem

traditional cross-border war. There would be no chanc

they might consider the U.S. military so distracte

over-extended that it could not respond to aggress

Warfighting Approach might also improve morale w

the military and make recruitment and retention e

There is concern today that extensive involvement 

armed forces in shaping, engagement, and SSCs e

morale. Within the U.S. military, activities 

participation in multinational peacekeeping are some

called (with intended sarcasm) “operations other than 

I signed up for.” And, since major wars occur 

infrequently, the deployment rate of the forces w

decline. This would improve the quality of life for mi

personnel and extend the life of equipment. I

probability, the defense budget could be lowered or, at 

kept steady since the military could focus on a more li

range of functions and systems.

The force structure implications of the warfig

approach are clear: units and organizations design

shaping, engagement, or transformation activities wo

minimized, and those designed for MTW stressed

moves to “lighten” the Army would have to be designed 

to not detract from its capability for sustained combat. 

land forces like the 82d Airborne Division, 101

st

 Air

74
Division (Air Assault) and Marine Expeditionary F

would be accorded second priority or focused on dep

early in an MTW and delaying aggressor forces until 

units arrived. Geographically, a Warfighting Approa

strategy would concentrate on areas where U.S. na

interests are extensive and major war is pos

specifically NATO’s eastern perimeter, the Persian 

and Northeast Asia. There would be little or no U.S. mi

involvement in Africa, Central Asia, Latin America

South Asia.

While the Warfighting Approach to U.S. mi

strategy would be a more focused and cheaper one tha

current strategy, it would entail an increase in 

short-term and long-term risk. By abandoning shapin

engagement activities, conflicts that might have 

deterred or avoided may break out. The U.S. military 

play only a limited role in smaller conflicts in no

regions. This would erode the position of leade

currently held by the United States and could leave th

military unable to perform functions demanded of it b

American people and their elected leaders. The Ame

people want their military to be able to end or pr

egregious human suffering. The Warfighting App

disregards this. And, since much of the American publ

many of its elected leaders feel that the threat of 

involving rogue states is declining, the Warfig

Approach to U.S. military strategy may not be polit

supportable.

Alternative II: A Counter-Asymmetry Strategy

The idea behind the counter-asymmetry strategy i

responding to existing or potential threats should, in 

remain the central focus of American military strateg

the current strategy prepares for the wrong ki

challenge. While a cross-border invasion by the arm

columns of Iraq, Iran, or North Korea is improbabl

United States and its allies are likely to face asymm

75
threats of one kind or the other. As former Army Ch

Staff General Dennis Reimer admitted, “nobody is go

go against us, tank against tank, soldier against so

Instead, potential enemies will look for asymme

responses.”

147

 The counter-asymmetry approach to 

military strategy recognizes this and would adjust 

structure, operational concepts, and equipment accord

(see Figure 6).

The question then becomes: what forms of asym

will be most common and, more importantly, 

problematic for the United States? So far, the Depar

of Defense has focused on two broad categor

asymmetry: that designed to thwart the deployment 

U.S. military, and that designed to deter or defea

United States by raising the cost of a military oper

particularly an MTW or SSC. A counter-deploy

strategy would probably rely on missiles, other pre

munitions, submarines, naval mines, and weapons of 

destruction to complicate the strategic and inter-th

movement of the U.S. military. This could involve strik

76

Figure 6
embarkation points and supporting infrastructure 

United States, on forces enroute to a theater via air 

sea, and on bases, troop formations, and su

infrastructure in theater. A full spectrum cou

deployment strategy would also attempt to dissuade 

nations from providing the U.S. military with over

transit, or basing rights. To prevent a counter-deploy

strategy from working, the U.S. military would nee

means to minimize its footprint in theater, p

deploying forces from their home bases to the po

employment in theater, and project power from outsi

range of enemy weapons whenever possible.

An asymmetric strategy designed to deter or defe

United States by raising the cost of a military ope

would probably seek to erode American will by incre

casualties and dragging the conflict out. Sun Tzu w

“there has never been a protracted war from wh

country has benefited.”

148

 This may be an overg

alization, but it certainly holds for the United States t

Time is generally not on America’s side in 21

st

 ce

wars, in large part because the United States often fig

defense of important interests while its enemies fig

vital ones. An enemy could drag a conflict out and 

American will in a number of ways. Terrorism cou

used against Americans and American facilities in th

within the United States, or around the world. The t

or use of WMD terrorism might be particularly effe

especially if it takes place on American soil. Cybera

and information terrorism could be used against c

nodes of the U.S. infrastructure, including 

transportation, communication, and financial sys

Even enemies unable to project power via terrori

cyberattacks could seek to increase the cost of a mi

operation to the United States by guerrilla warfar

operations in complex terrain, particularly urban 

Urban conflict diminishes the effectiveness of U.S. s

webs and erodes precision. It largely negates the imm

American advantage in stand-off military capabilit

77
also increases the chances of civilian casualties whic

often of greater concern to the United States than 

enemies. 

Any enemy employing this type of asymmetric str

would not necessarily have to take action to increas

cost of intervention for U.S. forces. A calculating e

could combine this strategy with temporal asymm

methods. In doing so, the enemy could assess the le

aggression that would be required to provoke a 

response and be sure to keep aggressive acts below 

level. By developing incremental aggression of this n

over time, a determined enemy could achieve reg

dominance. The more costly it is to deploy U.S. forces in 

political and economic terms, the sooner the enemy 

reach its goals. This argues for a more agile and ver

U.S. military.

There are other types of asymmetric challenges th

feasible, but have not yet received adequate analysis

are particularly troubling. One might be c

political-ethical asymmetry. An enemy attemptin

would use information technology and the inte

nectedness of the 21

st

 century world to have ce

technologies or capabilities in which the U.S. militar

an advantage prohibited or controlled. Based o

experience of the anti-landmine movement—which 

extensive use of the Internet—a parallel moveme

control or ban nonlethal weapons is already coalescin

same may occur in other arenas, including the use of 

for military purposes, the use of military robotics

information warfare. Opponents using political-e

asymmetry during an actual conflict would se

manipulate opinion within the United States and a

neutral states, again making extensive use of the In

to communicate and link like-thinking organizations

interconnectedness of the modern world, particular

fact that information technology has given most of the 

an understanding of the American psyche, will pro

augment the ability of America’s enemies to craft eff

78
psychological campaigns. In all likelihood, the lead

future U.S. opponents will have spent time in the U

States and, perhaps, have graduated from an Ame

university, thus making them much more psycholog

savvy than bumpkins like Saddam Hussein. The Zap

movement in Mexico is a model for groups craft

strategy based on political-ethical asymmetry. This g

in conjunction with a plethora of left-leaning 

Americanists and human rights organizations, use

Internet to build international support with web 

housed on servers at the University of Califo

Swarthmore, and the University of Texas.

149

 This elec

coalition-building was so sophisticated that a gro

researchers from the RAND Corporation labeled it “

netwar.”

150

 Undoubtedly, more organizations will 

this path, blending the expertise of traditional po

movements with the cutting-edge advertising 

marketing techniques that the information revolutio

spawned.

A second type of asymmetry that the U.S. militar

face concerns opponents organized as networks rathe

as hierarchies. To avoid American strengths, such en

might undertake strategic as well as tactical dispe

There will be few sanctuaries in an era of global link

pervasive sensor webs, and standoff weapons, so netw

enemies might spread their command and co

apparatus around the world with their comma

exerting control from a lap top computer, satellite m

and web cam situated anywhere in the world, with 

transmissions encrypted and bounced throughout th

in order to complicate tracing. Networked enemies 

connect themselves to a broader global network unif

opposition to the existing political and economic orde

instance, an insurgent network attempting to over

the government of a state friendly to the United S

might cultivate loose ties with a range of titular 

including global criminal cartels, anti-government g

within the United States, or other political groups se

79
to constrain American power. Involvement in crime 

allow networked enemies to buy the state-of-the-art 

in key areas like information security or offe

information warfare, thus making them equal or supe

the security forces confronting them. Such an opp

would pose serious challenges to a U.S. military tha

retained a focus on MTWs.

Given all this, a counter-asymmetry approach to 

military strategy would de-emphasize forces 

capabilities used for traditional force-on-force comb

open terrain, and focus instead on counter-terro

homeland defense, missile defense, urban opera

operations without large in-theater bases, disp

nonlinear operations, military robotics, and other act

that might thwart asymmetric activities. The U.S. mi

would also need to develop hybrid hierarchy-netw

organizations to counter networked opponents

problem for American strategists is that they cannot 

what sorts of asymmetric methods future enemies 

use, or what might deter or counter them. Certainly th

military has faced asymmetric enemies in the past su

the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, or the Somali mi

In both conflicts, the United States eventually lost 

least, experienced what was perceived as a defeat

future enemies may or may not emulate the Vietnam

Somalis. The most dangerous enemy would be one 

somehow melds substantial conventional capability 

asymmetric methods. It is also not clear wh

asymmetric challenges can be deterred, or if they m

thwarted once they emerge. If the United States adop

counter-asymmetry approach to strategy, certain ch

could take place in the short-term, but the ultimate ou

would only be determined once the nature of the t

became clearer.

Because the nature of the asymmetric challenge

United States will face in coming decades is not clea

primary risk of a counter-asymmetry approach is gue

wrong. The United States could undertake great effo

80
prepare for a type of enemy or a type of conflict that 

emerges. This would not only be expensive, but coul

undercut support from the American public and its e

leaders, and erode morale within the U.S. mil

Ultimately, preparing for the wrong kind of asymm

threat could be just as dangerous as not preparing 

There is also the same risk seen in several other str

approaches under consideration, that shifting the fo

the American military away from MTW might make it 

likely to occur. In all probability, the time is not yet rig

the United States to shift to a counter-asymmetry stra

Alternative III: Preventive Defense.

All variants of the shape/respond/prepare str

reflect the belief that the United States has three lev

national interest—vital, important, and humanitar

and that U.S. military power should be used to prom

protect all three so long as the expected costs and ris

in accordance with the significance of the interest at 

It is, in other words, a military strategy appropriate 

superpower that has the ability and the will to b

involved in many kinds of issues and in many places. 

is a growing movement, though, that contends that su

unlimited national security strategy will ultimately 

insolvent. Thus the United States needs to resis

temptation to use military force on problems and issue

are ultimately peripheral or secondary and focus on 

important national interests. The United States ne

national security strategy of constraint and focus r

than one of unconstrained enlargement and engagem

One instance of support for a more constraine

focused national security strategy is seen from w

called The Commission on America’s National Intere

blue-ribbon panel affiliated with the Harvard Univ

Center for Science and International Affairs, the 

Center, and the RAND Corporation. This group inclu

stellar line-up of former policymakers, current po

81
leaders, strategic analysts, and likely future policym

including Robert Ellsworth, Andrew Goodpaster, 

Hauser, Graham T. Allison, Dimitri Simes, J

Thomson, Robert Blackwill, Sam Nunn, Richard Arm

Bob Graham, John McCain, Condoleezza Rice, and 

Scowcroft. The Commission has concluded that the U

States is today a “superpower adrift” that has lo

focus.

151

 They propose a slight refinement of the cate

of U.S. national interests, dividing them into “v

“extremely important,” “important,” and “less import

secondary.” But while this led the Commission to adv

lessened or minimal engagement in secondary issue

Africa or the Balkans and greater attention to hom

defense and proliferation, the actual recommendatio

American military strategy were not radical

Commission stated, for instance, that the U.S. m

must retain the ability to conduct large-scale mi

operations in two parts of the world simultaneously.

1

only real change in U.S. military strategy was dimin

engagement in shaping and peacekeeping.

After leaving office, former Secretary of Defense W

J. Perry and former Assistant Secretary of Defense A

B. Carter offered another approach to refocusing 

defense strategy. They began arguing in favor of a ret

the “preventive-defense strategy” that they had esp

while in the Pentagon.

153

 The experience, influence

wisdom of these two thinkers automatically gav

concept credence. Preventive defense is a blend o

transformation and shaping approaches, with 

significant distinctions. Perry and Carter accept the 

that U.S. military preponderance is both desirabl

sustainable. But, they contend, the Department of De

and the Services are not adapting quickly enou

changes in the global security environment. This 

eventually undercut or challenge American mi

preponderance.

Perry and Carter contend that the existing str

inverts the appropriate priority of effort. They divid

82
threats and tasks which U.S. defense strategy deals 

into an “A,” “B,” and “C” list. The “C” list includes con

and humanitarian disasters which do not thr

America’s vital interests. This list is, of course, exte

and includes Kosovo, Bosnia, East Timor, Haiti, Rw

and Somalia. “What is striking,” writes Joseph S. N

how the ‘C’ list has come to dominate today’s foreign 

agenda.”

154

 This may be striking, but it understan

Conflicts of this type mesmerize the public. The suf

they bring is immediate and public, broadcast aroun

world as it occurs. While Perry and Carter do not say 

intimation is that the current strategy has given 

conflicts more attention than they warrant be

President Clinton has been more prone to use public op

as a guide for security policy than any other recen

leader. This led to U.S. military involvement in place

were, by objective standards, peripheral. Perry and Ca

“B” list includes threats to U.S. interests that are dete

or defeatable with existing forces, particularly MTW

Northeast and Southwest Asia. While these do p

serious challenge, they do not threaten U.S. survival, w

life, or position in the world, especially if the U.S. mi

retains its qualitative advantage over the armed for

rogue states by capitalizing on the revolution in mi

affairs. But despite this, Perry and Carter argue, the “

shapes most of the force structure of the U.S. militar

consumes most of the defense budget. The mi

described in JV 2010 and JV 2020, for inst

concentrates almost wholly on “B” list threats. The “A

by contrast, includes things that might challeng

survival, way of life, and position in the world of the U

States. There are no imminent “A” list threats in tradi

military terms, but they might emerge if the United S

does not take steps today to head them off. Specific “A

dangers include:

• The danger that Russia might descend into 

isolation, and aggression;

83
• The danger that Russia and other Soviet suc

states might lose control of their weapons of 

destruction;

• The danger that China could become increa

hostile;

• The danger that weapons of mass destructio

proliferate and present a direct military threat t

forces and territory;

• The danger that catastrophic terrorism might 

on U.S. territory.

155

Such issues do not capture the headlines like “C

humanitarian disasters but, according to Perry and C

will determine the future security of the United Stat

The appropriate response to “A” list dangers 

prevent them from developing and, if that fails, prep

meet them. Preventive defense is thus a strategy that “

to forestall dangerous A-list developments before 

require drastic military remedies.”

156

 It entails engag

and shaping but, in contrast to existing shaping acti

would concentrate on “A” list issues rather than “B” an

list ones. Engagement with Russia and China ma

engagement with Uganda or Paraguay is less impo

“A” list shaping activities might include a ran

cooperative threat reduction programs, military-to-mi

contacts like combined exercises, training, and plan

and cooperative ventures pairing the U.S. military an

allies with Russia and China. In addition, Perry and C

advocate bringing greater coherence to the way the U

States approaches terrorism, particularly on America

This should tightly integrate the military int

prevention of and response to terrorism. In terms of 

structure and budget priorities, Perry and Carter 

devoting greater effort to countering asymm

challenges. In particular, they mention defenses ag

weapons of mass destruction and missiles, inform

84
warfare capabilities, protection of critical dom

infrastructure, and protection of forces and facilities 

for power projection. They also recommend organiza

reforms that would further augment jointness and pro

central systems architecture to take advantage o

information revolution.

The preventive defense strategy is based on sever

assumptions. The most important is that shaping act

on the part of the U.S. military can have a positive eff

developments in China and Russia, and can lowe

danger from terrorism. The preventive defense str

also assumes that the threat from rogue states w

worst, remain steady and may actually decrease, 

modest improvement in U.S. forces will preserv

adequate military advantage. Finally, preventive de

assumes that “C” list problems will not expand or es

into more serious threats. They can, in other word

handled with a very modest effort or even ignored, w

long-term repercussions.

Risks arise if any of these assumptions prove false

at least conceivable that both Beijing and Moscow 

determined to expand or reconstitute their influence. 

is true, military-to-military engagement on the part 

United States would only strengthen them and speed u

process of defense modernization. If, in fact, either of 

two powers are actually seeking greater influence 

diminution of U.S. influence, the appropriate Ame

strategy would be to contain and weaken them, perha

playing on internal schisms. After all, the United S

sought to shape Soviet behavior immediately after W

War II through offers of assistance and by designin

United Nations in a way that gave Moscow a great deg

influence. This failed because it was based on the f

assumption that Stalin’s objectives and world view 

essentially the same as Washington’s. It is possible 

preventive defense could repeat this stra

miscalculation. In the case of rogue states, the preve

defense strategy carries the same risk as many 

85
proposals: the emphasis the United States has plac

MTW may very well have deterred it. To de-empha

may weaken this deterrence. Finally, by ignoring “C

crises or minimizing U.S. participation in them

preventive defense strategy could weaken U.S. leade

in places like Africa and South Asia (assuming t

desirable) and could allow internal wars and humanit

disasters to spread. In other words, sparks left unt

can turn into bonfires. If one accepts the notion of cont

or “death by a thousand small cuts”—ideas given g

credence by ongoing processes of globalization 

interconnectedness—preventive defense may b

extraordinarily risky strategy.

Alternative IV: Supporting Regional Structure

Alternatives I through III are distinguished b

priority given the missions and tasks that the U.S. mi

currently performs. Alternatives IV and V suggest 

substantial changes in how the U.S. military might pe

its tasks or the nature of the tasks themselves. For ins

a strategy based on supporting regional structures 

commit the U.S. military to develop concepts, doc

technology, and organizations designed specifica

strengthen friendly states and coalitions during peace

crisis, and war. Current strategy notes that the 

military usually operates with partners, but in every t

coalition operation except peacekeeping in perip

areas, the United States plans to be the dominant me

A strategy of supporting regional structures would re

this so that the normal state of affairs would be for th

military to be the supporting coalition partner rathe

the supported one.

There are solid geostrategic and political reason

such a shift would make sense. Robert W. Tucker w

“Once again Americans are in a period of incre

contention over foreign policy...The central issue i

present debate is a recurring one: whether America s

86
act alone or with others.”

157

 All of the alternative stra

discussed so far share a belief in the desirability o

dominance in both the peacetime maintenance of reg

security and in forming and leading military respon

crises or acts of aggression. As Peter Rodman

unabashed advocate of the preservation of Ame

preeminence—points out, there is growing unease 

Washington’s unilateralism even among friends.

158

 T

due in large part to the sometimes clumsy 

heavy-handed way that the United States has exe

global leadership. U.S. military strategy is a p

illustration of this. Washington has sought a major r

the design and maintenance of nearly every reg

security system. The United States seeks friends and 

but always makes them junior partners. This made p

sense during the Cold War and in its immediate after

when only the United States could orchestrate reg

security but, as the global security system mature

regional structures form and solidify, U.S. dominance 

become unsustainable and counterproductive. “The 

indictment at home as well as abroad of a dom

America,” writes Tucker, “is the result not of wha

nation has done in the world, but...what it sooner or 

will do. And even if this view misreads the Ame

disposition, other nations will still be only too rea

believe that it does not.”

159

In addition to the risk of provoking opposition

insistence on dominating regional security syste

expensive. As discussed earlier, American strategy 

budgets are unsynchronized. U.S. dominance contribu

this. It is also politically risky, easily intimidati

alienating other states as they come to question Ame

dominance of their part of the world. U.S. dominanc

risks losing the support of the American people if bloo

money continue to be expended in far away places

intense effort by both the Bush and Clinton administra

to justify global engagement shows that American po

leaders recognize the fragility of public support for it. 

87
for American withdrawal from some regions are on

disaster away. Given all this, a strategy in which the 

focus is to help build and strengthen emerging re

security structures might be more affordable 

sustainable than a U.S.-dominated one in which en

are defeated by American-led coalitions. (see Figure 

A U.S. strategy of supporting regional sec

structures would reflect the fact that local states are 

interested in and better able to understand their re

security than Americans. It would also take advant

the fact that regional and subregional security organ

taking form in nearly all parts of the world. At the po

level, such a strategy would help with the format

multinational security structures where none exist

assist with the development of those that do. D

peacetime, the U.S. military would augmen

effectiveness of regional structures, primarily th

support to regional exercises, combined training

professional military education. During crises or co

the United States would provide support to reg

88

Figure 7
structures according to specific needs. This mig

improved command and control, missile def

intelligence support, transportation, medical or other 

of combat support, and combat service support. In 

instances, the United States might bolster a reg

structure with long-range fire support or even landp

To perform this support function, the U.S. military, bo

CINCs and the services, would need some reorganiz

Currently, if the U.S. Army provides support to an 

military, it often has to strip units, supplies, and equip

from its own divisions. In a strategy based on supp

regional structures, the U.S. Army would form ded

support divisions specifically designed to augment al

areas where they are weak. At the same time, the U

States would retain effective combat units for 

instances where regional structures are inadequa

where conditions dictate unilateral American mi

actions. It would also continue a robust proce

experimentation to explore and integrate eme

capabilities.

An associated strategy of supporting regional struc

entails two important types of risk. The first is the ris

allied or partner states may not be able to defeat aggre

on their own. In the long term, though, this argu

becomes circular. Allies have been able to keep their de

budgets lower than might be necessary because they 

rely on the United States to preserve regional stabil

U.S. strategy made clear that it would support re

actors but not substitute for them, this might ch

Ultimately, though, this is an assumption. If key reg

actors are not willing or able to shoulder a greater b

for security, then a strategy based on supporting them 

fail to protect important U.S. national interests. And e

cases where regional actors are willing to pay the pr

protect their interests, the United States in its supp

role will sacrifice control over the extent to which 

interests are protected or promoted.

89
Another risk is that a strategy of supporting re

structures might lead to a decline in the ability of the U

States to dictate or control the outcome of crise

conflicts around the world. This is undeniable, but ma

be undesirable. There are regions like Europe that 

manage their own security today if forced to. Even 

United States is not a major player in determining ho

transpires, the outcome is not likely to be adverse to 

interests. Put simply, the cost of retaining U.S. domi

of the European security system today may not be wor

political and economic costs. In other regions with 

effective existing security systems (or less potential to 

them), the role of the United States would vary accord

geography and the extent of American national inte

Clearly the U.S. role in Sub-Saharan Africa shou

limited, while that in Pacific Rim, Central America, an

Caribbean more substantial. In all regions, though, th

choice strategic option should be to strengthen reg

structures. 

A third problem with a strategy of supporting re

structures has to do with the command and control o

forces. While there have been some rare exception

American public as well as governmental leaders have 

loathe to place U.S. troops under foreign command

current administration has been the most willi

consider this but still drew a clear line when it ca

giving foreign leaders command of U.S. forces as whe

instance, PDD 25 stated that the president would 

relinquish command authority over U.S. forces but 

consider placing U.S. forces under operational contro

competent U.N. commander for specific U.N. opera

authorized by the Security Council. A future, 

conservative administration can be expected to object 

strenuously. Nonetheless, it is difficult to conceive 

combined command structure in which U.S. force

purely supporting an allied force but not unde

command of a foreign military leader.

90
This strategy is not, then, one of disengagement b

built on a fundamentally different form of engageme

adopt it would require a massive psychological adjus

on the part of Americans plus clear, committed and vig

leadership from the highest levels. One of the most c

yet difficult components of leadership is knowing whe

to exercise authority or control. Great leaders—wh

individuals or nations—master this skill. For s

dominance is intoxicating but, history suggests, it i

fleeting. Better to control its passing than to have it wr

from you.

Alternative V: Strategic Reconfiguration.

The 1995 Commission on Roles and Missions 

intended to take a hard look at the division of labor a

the services and the Department of Defense. The C

though, offered only the most cautious recommenda

leaving the Cold War division-of-labor intact. Now it 

be appropriate to revisit that issue and consider wh

the U.S. military should undergo a true stra

reconfiguration. In this alternative, the vital tas

American strategy would remain the same: respond

MTWs, responding to SSCs, shaping/engagement

preparing for the future. All components of the armed 

and the Department of Defense would stress prepar

particularly experimentation and concept develop

But, responsibility for the immediate tasks—MTWs, 

and shaping/engagement—would be reassigned.

Since the concept of MTWs entered discussio

American military strategy in the early 1990s, de

leaders agreed that the proper response was an all-s

effort utilizing every element of American military p

This made sense when MTWs were likely and 

dangerous enough to constitute the central focus o

military strategy. Today, the rogue states which 

instigate MTW have, to one degree or the other, 

contained. Regional structures to defend ag

91
MTW—whether the South Korean military o

GCC—are stronger than they were ten years ago

means that the chances of an MTW occurring at a

small. And, if one does occur, the chances that an agg

will succeed or an act of aggression will be reverse

miniscule. Even if a rogue state could grab a pi

territory and hold it, the political and economic costs o

action would far outweigh any benefits. O

characteristics of MTW also suggest that the U.S. mi

should rethink them. Only states can instigate M

States are inherently more “deterrable” than non

actors since they usually have some system for ra

strategy-making which allows them to grasp the 

consequences of aggression. In addition, state

vulnerable to other means of pressure or coercion su

economic sanctions. It is easier to identify likely sour

MTWs and to deter them than for SSCs. Currently MT

• Are diminishing in likelihood;

• Are easier to predict in terms of location and out

than SSCs;

• Are more deterrable than SSCs;

• Involve fewer political constraints and broader 

of engagement, since they are instigate

aggression and likely to generate interna

disapproval.

This suggests the United States should move away 

the use of Desert Storm-style MTWs as the central bu

block of military strategy. Certainly the U.S. military 

retain some capability to help thwart challenges o

type, but will find that they are unlikely to occur and, i

do, primary responsibility for stopping them will be 

hands of regional actors. If an MTW does occur, the r

the U.S. military is likely to be standoff fires to st

invasion in its early stages, and support to regional 

who play the primary role in defeating or reversin

92
invasion. Most of the close combat, in other words, cou

should be handled by regional forces. The same hol

SSCs, but the U.S. military is likely to be called on for 

sorts of missions, whether involving non-combat act

like humanitarian relief or protracted, low-level war. 

SSCs will be amenable to standoff strikes but many of 

will require “hands on” effort for full mission accom

ment, particularly those where saving noncombatan

is a primary goal. In these, American land forces, both 

and Marines, will play the most vital roles. This is n

issue of high-tech versus low-tech approaches. In fact, 

is a great need for an effort to apply RMA-type eme

technology to SSCs rather than to purely focus on majo

as is currently done. Strategic reconfiguration, then, 

entail: (1) refocusing American strategy so that SSC

equal to or have a higher priority than MTWs in ter

force shaping, doctrine development, procurement

research; and, (2) refocusing U.S. land forces on SSC

Strategic reconfiguration would demand the gr

degree of change from the Army. The Air Force and 

are already configured for standoff strikes in an 

environment; the Marines are already focused on SSC

Army, though, would need to change its stress on susta

heavy combat and continue the type of transform

directed by General Shinseki toward a more ra

deployable, middle weight force. It would also need to 

other adjustments to organization and concepts to be

more effective at SSCs, engagement, and shaping. A

same time, the boundary between the functions of the 

and the Marines would need to be rethought. If the 

becomes more active in SSCs, shaping, and engage

and the Marines continue to develop the capabil

operate further from the shore than in the past, there w

increasing overlap between the two and, potent

increasing competition.

Strategic reconfiguration, then, is based on se

assumptions:

93
• MTWs instigated by cross border aggression by 

states whose military is an armor-heavy Soviet

one are becoming less likely;

• Should MTW occur, it could be defeated and rev

by a combination of regional forces, sta

American fires, and other methods of Ame

support;

• SSCs, shaping, and engagement will be the pr

tasks of the U.S. military;

• SSCs, shaping, and engagement usually ar

amenable to standoff solutions.

If all of these assumptions hold, strategic reconfigu

entails acceptable risk. If any of them do not hold, str

reconfiguration could increase the chances that agg

states will instigate MTW, make ultimate defeat of M

impossible or more costly, and, as a result, diminish 

influence in those regions where MTWs are possible.

94
PART III:

THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN STRATE

Three types of relationships form the building blo

American national security strategy. Relationsh

affinity bind the United States and other state

organizations that share its core values: belief in 

government, rule by law, human rights, the market sy

and the desirability of creating stable systems for reg

security. Some relationships of affinity are long-sta

such as those with Canada, Great Britain, and Aust

others are medium term like the relationships with I

Germany, and Japan; and some are newer, connectin

United States and states that have recently unde

democratic transitions. Relationships of necessity are 

complex. They can be based on either some fo

partnership or on containment. One type of relations

necessity links the United States to other states th

important because of their military, economic, and po

power. Clearly Russia, China, and India are the 

significant states of this type. Other relationsh

necessity link the United States and nations impo

because of geographic location or possession of vital na

resources. A third type of relationship of necessity lin

United States to states important because of aggr

intent. This clearly includes the traditional “rogues

Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. The third form of str

relationship is one of humanity. This would cer

characterize the ties between Washington and most 

states of Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as others in Asi

Latin America. The key question in relationsh

humanity is the salience of humanitarian interve

using force. Current U.S. strategy accepts this 

conditions, especially limits on the U.S. role an

participation of partners, but this may change in the fu

95
A relationship between the United States an

individual state or organization may mix elemen

affinity, necessity, and humanity. Some relationship

based on a one of these elements, some two, some all 

Relationships often evolve and mature. U.S.-Mexican 

for instance, were once based purely on geogr

necessity, but appear to be evolving into ones based m

affinity. And, the nature of the relationship betwee

United States and another state is largely determin

the actions and intent of the other state. In any cas

U.S. military is a vital component in relationships of af

and necessity, and an important one in relationsh

humanity. Much of strategy can be distilled into dec

concerning the priority and forms of these relationsh

Even as U.S. strategy approaches the point of 

decisions that will shape the future, the Army tends to 

operationally rather than strategically. To think in te

the rapid deployment of force rather than co

prevention or resolution seems to be enough. In an 

strategic transition, this is an encumbrance. To assu

long-term relevance, the Army needs to place gr

emphasis on strategic level analysis. The confluence 

2001 QDR, a presidential transition, and the A

transformation process provide an excellent opportun

do this. This begins with basic concepts—what sho

done and what could be done.

The Army makes three defining contributions t

joint team. The first is versatility. The Army covers a 

part of the spectrum of military tasks than any of the 

Services. It is capable of sustained conventional co

using both close engagement and precision, standoff st

It can seize and hold territory, and undertak

post-conflict reconstruction of a defeated enemy. 

proficient at peacekeeping, nation building, peac

engagement, and special operations. Deployment o

Army also remains the greatest symbol of Ame

commitment, so it carries political weight. The s

defining Army contribution to the joint team is abi

96
attain strategically decisive results in war. Decisiven

not an “either/or” condition, but rather a spectru

outcomes (see Figure 8). Standoff strikes, if 

appropriately, can approach the upper ran

decisiveness, theoretically even collapsing the enemy

(although this has never been accomplished). Only eff

landpower, though, can attain the full spectru

decisiveness. It is possible that the United States w

seek the upper ranges of decisiveness in the contemp

security environment. But to be denuded of the capa

for full-spectrum decisiveness erodes deterrence sinc

the upper range of decisiveness strips an aggressor 

ability to “fight again another day.” In addition, if th

military does not have the capability of attaining the 

ranges of the spectrum of decisiveness, the options ava

to American political leaders is more limited.

The third defining Army contribution to the joint te

the potential to provide broad-spectrum support to an 

and friends. The fact that the U.S. Army itself has s

wide range of capabilities gives it the ability to assist 

97

Figure 8
with everything from urban combat, to engineerin

logistics, through command and control of land forma

The Army is not currently configured to provide supp

allies and friends with maximum effectiveness 

efficiency, but easily could be.

Given these three defining characteristics of the A

contribution to the joint team, Army leaders should d

things during the 2001 QDR. The first is to design forc

concept development programs that augment 

defining characteristics—versatility, full spec

decisiveness, and broad-spectrum support. The secon

assure that these defining characteristics become c

components of American military strategy. W

versatility has moved in this direction as the array of 

given the U.S. military expanded, greater effort is nee

amplify the role of full-spectrum decisiveness 

broad-spectrum support. As American military strat

adjusted via the 2001 QDR and the beginning of a 

presidential administration, the Army should inte

these three defining characteristics into the transform

process.

But what of the QDR? The 1997 QDR recommende

modest changes in the concepts on which U.S. m

strategy is based. This was appropriate: the contours 

new security environment were unclear at that poin

U.S. military was in the midst of adjustmen

downsizing. The risk of MTW instigated by rogue state

high enough that it had to be the centerpiece of Ame

strategic thinking. In the broadest sense, Ame

strategy was not “broken” and thus did not need “fixed

these conditions are less applicable to the 2001 QDR

contours of the 21

st

 century security environment, 

were unclear in 1997, are moving into view. There 

only the opportunity for more substantial strategic ch

but also a growing need for it. Given this, the sou

military strategy for the United States in coming ye

one that blends components of all five of the str

98
alternatives that have been discussed here. It s

integrate the following characteristics:

• Increased emphasis on joint, combined

inter-agency experimentation, research

development, but avoidance of lock-in t

particular type of future force. Phrased differ

the U.S. military should prepare for transform

but not yet commit to a particular technol

trajectory;

• Development of an architecture to create intera

strategic concepts and operational procedur

addition to purely joint ones;

• Abandonment of the two MTW force sh

yardstick;

• Greater emphasis on asymmetric and nontradi

challenges (to include cancellation of procure

applicable only or primarily to MTWs);

• Movement toward a national security strategy 

stresses collaboration and partnership rather 

dominance and unilateralism. Developme

concepts and organizations designed specifica

support regional partners and allies d

peacetime, crisis, and war (including a na

security strategy that concentrates on aiding wi

formation and development of regional structu

• A broadened approach to the issue of decisiven

include a strategic meaning as well as an opera

one;

• A strategic focus on potential peer compet

specifically Russia and China. Modest engage

with these nations while retaining the capabi

shift to containment if they prove unwilli

99
cooperate on the construction of global and re

security systems.

* * * * *

“Complexity” and “uncertainty” are the words most 

used to describe the current global security environ

This is true. Because the global security system is in 

flux, the process of regular defense reviews and str

adjustments which the United States undertak

healthy. Institutionalization of it will keep American

for many decades. As the Department of Defense an

Services learn how to undertake effective review

adjustments, they will get even better at it. It is a lea

process. Given this, QDR 1997—the inau

effort—brought little change. QDR 2001 is likely 

moderate adjustments. QDR 2005 and beyond will 

even further. The wild card is the outcome of the 

presidential election. As president, George Bush 

probably adopt something close to the Transform

Approach to U.S. military strategy.

160

 Since the offici

site of the Gore-Lieberman campaign states, “Al Gor

developed a plan for American leadership on the world 

a policy of Forward Engagement to address new se

issues before they become crises and to seiz

opportunities of a Global Age,” as president Gore 

probably favor a Shaping Approach.

161

 In any case, th

the years 2000 and 2001 will set the stage for all the re

and adjustments that come later.

100
ENDNOTES

1. Senator Bill Frist, “Our Hollow Military,” reprin

Congressional Record, September 30, 1998, p. S11187.

2. Don M. Snider, Daniel Gouré, and Stephen A. Cambone, 

in the Late 1990s: Avoiding the Train Wreck, Washington, DC: 

for Strategic and International Studies, 1995; Daniel Gour

Resource Gap,” Armed Forces Journal International, May 2000

Daniel Goure and Jeffrey M. Ranney, Averting the Defense Trai

in the New Millennium, Washington, DC: Center for Strate

International Studies, 1999.

3. John Hillen, “Defense’s Death Spiral,” Foreign Affairs, 

No. 4, July/August 1999, pp. 2-7.

4. George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United 

Washington, DC: The White House, August 1991, p. 1.

5. Ibid., p. 25.

6. Colin L. Powell, National Military Strategy of the United 

Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1992, p. 1.

7. Ibid., p. 15.

8. John F. Troxell, Force Planning in an Era of Uncertain

MRCs as a Force Sizing Framework, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S

War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1997, pp. 9-10. For de

Lorna S. Jaffe, The Development of the Base Force 198

Washington, DC: Joint History Office, 1993.

9. Troxell, Force Planning in an Era of Uncertainty, p. 19.

10. George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United 

Washington, DC: The White House, January 1993, p. 13.

11. Ibid., p. 7.

12. For his thinking on this issue, see An Agenda for 

Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, Repor

Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the S

Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, repri

http://www.unog.ch/archives/agendas/agpeace.htm.

101
13. President Bush, “The United Nations: Forging a Genuine 

Community,” address before the U.N. General Assembly, Ne

City, September 21, 1992, reprinted in U.S. Department o

Dispatch, Vol. 3, No. 39, September 28, 1992, p. 722.

14. Quoted in “Fact Sheet: Somalia—Operation Restore Hop

Department of State Dispatch, Vol. 3, No. 51, December 21, 1992, 

15. See Walter S. Clarke, Somalia: Background For Op

Restore Hope, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College S

Studies Institute, 1992.

16. See, for instance, President Bush, “America’s Role in the 

Address at the West Point Military Academy, West Point, New 

January 5, 1993, reprinted in U.S. Department of State Dispatch

No. 2, January 11, 1993, also at http://dosfan.l

edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1993/html/Dispatchv4no02.htm

17. Security Council Resolution 751 (1992), April 24, 1992.

18. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, The United Nations and S

1992-1996, New York: United Nations Department of 

Information, 1996. For a wide range of sources, see Walter S. 

Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia: Bibliography, C

Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Center for Strategic Lead

1995.

19. See John T. Correll, “The Base Force Meets Option C,” A

Magazine, Vol. 74, No. 6, June 1992, reprinted at http://www.a

magazine/0692watch.html; Les Aspin, “National Security in the 

Defining a New Basis for U.S. Military Forces,” briefing to the A

Council of the United States, Washington, DC: House Armed S

Committee, January 6, 1992; and John Lancaster, “Nunn P

5-Year Defense Cut of $85 Billion,” Washington Post, March 25, 

A1.

20. Goure and Ranney, Averting the Defense Train Wreck in 

Millennium, p. 23.

21. William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Enga

and Enlargement, Washington, DC: The White House, July 19

Henceforth National Security Strategy 1994.

22. Today, the Cato Institute of Washington DC is th

pervasive advocate of a Jeffersonian foreign policy. See their we

http://www.cato.org/research/for-st.html.

102
23. Most famously in his article “The Sources of Soviet C

which was published in Foreign Affairs in 1947 under the pseu

“X” (since Kennan was a serving government official).

24. In a 1950 document usually known as NSC-68, for instan

H. Nitze argued that containment must be a military stra

addition to the political one suggested by Kennan. NSC-68 is re

and analyzed in S. Nelson Drew, ed., NSC-68: Forging the Str

Containment, Washington, DC: National Defense University In

for National Strategic Studies, 1994.

25. In 1997 the Clinton Administration dropped th

“enlargement” from its strategic lexicon. This was probably a wi

since the phrase often caused unease among other states about 

United States would use its powerful military. The author expe

this problem first hand when giving talks on U.S. national s

strategy in Latin America. The Spanish word that is the 

translation of “enlargement” implies imperialism or the sp

influence by force.

26. National Security Strategy 1994, p. 6.

27. Ibid., p. 10.

28. Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, Section I, “N

Security in the Post-Cold War Era,” reprinted at http://www.f

man/docs/bur/part01.htm.

29. Ibid., Section II, “A Defense Strategy for the New Era.”

30. Before the Bottom Up Review, “MRC” meant “major r

contingency.” The change in the lexicon was subtle but importa

31. Troxell, Force Planning in an Era of Uncertainty, pp. 11

32. For a detailed narrative of the battle, see Mark Bowden

Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War, New York: Atlantic Monthl

1999.

33. William H. Lewis, “’Assertive Multilateralism’: Rhet

Reality,” in William H. Lewis, ed., Peacekeeping: The Way 

Washington, DC: National Defense University Institute for N

Strategic Studies, 1993, pp. 13-28.

34. See Nina M. Serafino, Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S. M

Involvement, Congressional Research Service Issue Brief 

December 3, 1996.

103
35. The distinction between operational command and oper

control is important for the U.S. military. Operational control “n

provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to 

those forces as the commander in operational control co

necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational contr

not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logi

matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, 

training.” Command authority does include administration, dis

internal organization, and unit training. Source: Joint Publicati

DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, January 24

36. Edmund J. Hull, “UN Peacekeeping Operations: Wor

Investments in Peace,” U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, Vol. 3, No. 

1998, p. 6.

37. Carl J. Conetta, “Mismatch: The ‘Bottom Up Revie

America’s Security Requirements in the New Era,” written tes

for the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Represen

March 10, 1994, reprinted at http://www.comw. org/pda/congr

Emphasis in original.

38. Lawrence T. DiRita, Baker Spring, and John Luddy, “T

Down to the Bottom-Up Review,” The Heritage Foun

Backgrounder No. 957, September 24, 1993.

39. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis, “Bott

Review,” reprinted at http://www.csbaonline.org/ 2st

_Studies/6DoD_Strategy_and_Policy/5Bottom_Up_Review/B

Up_Review.htm.

40. The CORM members were John P. White, Chairman, Les 

Antonia H. Chayes, Robert J. Murray, Franklin D. Raines, Je

Smith, Admiral (ret) Leon A. Edney, Major General (ret) J

Matthews, General (ret) Robert W. RisCassi, Lieutenant Gene

Bernard E. Trainor, and General (ret) Larry D. Welch. Aspin, w

been replaced by William Perry as Secretary of Defense, died w

CORM report was being finalized. John White later served as 

Secretary of Defense.

41. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis, “Commis

Roles and Missions,” reprinted at http://www.csba

org/2Strategic_Studies/6DoD_Strategy_and_Policy/4Commi

oles_Missions/.

42. The JCS already had begun preparation of what would 

Joint Vision 2010.

104
43. William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Enga

and Enlargement, Washington, DC: The White House, Februar

p. 12.

44. William J. Perry, Annual Report to the President a

Congress, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, March 1996

45. Battle Labs: Maintaining the Edge, Fort Monroe, VA: 

States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1994, pp. 6 and 

The name “Louisiana Maneuvers” was an allusion to a series of m

training exercises held in the fall of 1941 as the U.S. Army 

preparation for World War II. See James W. Dunn, “The 1941 Lo

Maneuvers” at http://www.wood.army.mil/engrmag/pb

review.htm. The U.S. Army’s Louisiana Maneuver Task For

disbanded in 1996 as it gave way to the Force XXI process.

46. See Force XXI...America’s Army of the 21

st

 Century, Wash

DC: Department of the Army, 1995.

47. For an excellent explanation of the role that wargaming 

the Army After Next process, see Robert B. Killebrew, “Learnin

Wargames: A Status Report,” Parameters, Vol. 28, No. 1, Sprin

pp. 122-135.

48. See, for instance, Joseph A. Engelbrecht, Jr., et al., “Alte

Futures for 2025: Security Planning to Avoid Surprise,” a r

paper presented to Air Force 2025, April 1996; William B. Osb

al., “Information Operations: A New War-Fighting Capabi

research paper presented to Air Force 2025, August 1996; Je

Theiret, et al., “Hit ‘em Where It Hurts: Strategic Attack in 2

research paper presented to Air Force 2025, August 1996; Br

Carmichael, et al., “Strikestar 2025,” a research paper presente

Force 2025, August 1996; and Edward F. Murphy, “Infor

Operations: Wisdom Warfare For 2025,” a research paper prese

Air Force 2025, August 1996. These papers are availa

http://www.au.af.mil/au/2025/.

49. http://208.198.29.7/mcwl-hot/home/index.html

50. See http://www.mcwl.quantico.usmc.mil/mcwl/home

html.

51. See the organization’s home page at http:/

nwc.navy.mil/ssg/.

52. Joint Vision 2010, Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, n.

JV 2010 was published in 1995 but, for reasons known only to G

105
Shalikashvili and the Joint Staff, does not indicate a publicati

anywhere in the printed version. The concepts in JV 201

elaborated in Concept for Future Joint Operations: Expandin

Vision 2010, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 1997.

53. This is explored in detail in Steven Metz, Armed Confli

21

st

 Century: The Information Revolution and Post-Modern W

Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2000, pp. 5-

54. Concept for Future Joint Operations, p. 24.

55. For assessments and explanations of the official DOD vie

RMA, see Metz, Armed Conflict in the 21

st

 Century, pp. 27-40

Gray, The American Revolution in Military Affairs: An 

Assessment, Camberley, UK: Strategic and Combat Studies In

1997; and Bill Owens, Lifting the Fog of War, New York: Farrar, 

Giroux, 2000.

56. William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense 

Washington, DC: Department of Defense, May 1997, Section I.

57. Ibid., Section II.

58. Ibid., Section III.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid., Section, II.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid., Section III.

63. There were a few analysts who argued that the revolut

taken place in the 1980s and the current period is simply 

consolidation. See, for instance, Ralph Peters, “After the Revo

Parameters, Vol. 25, No. 2, Summer 1995, pp. 7-14; and 

Jablonsky, The Owl of Minerva Flies at Twilight: Doctrinal Cha

Continuity and the Revolution in Military Affairs, Carlisle Ba

PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1994.

64. David E. Snodgrass, “The QDR: Improve the Process to I

the Product,” Parameters, Vol. 30, No. 1, Spring 2000, pp. 57-6

65. The classic study of this process is Morton H. Ha

Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, Washington, DC: Br

Institution Press, 1974.

106
66. Michael Vickers and Steven Kosiak, The Quadrennial 

Review—An Assessment, Washington, DC: Center for Strate

Budgetary Assessments, December 1997.

67. Carl Conetta, “Backwards into the Future: H

Quadrennial Defense Review Prepares America for the 

Century,” Columbia International Affairs Online, April 1999. 

mission statement of the Project on Defense Alternativ

http://www.comw. org/pda/mission.html.

68. Goure and Ranney, Averting the Defense Train Wreck in 

Millennium, p. 13. In fairness, other analysts question the 

proposed by Goure and Ranney. See, for instance, Steve Kosiak

Train Wreck Analysis is Off Track,” February 7, 2000, Cen

Strategic and Budgetary Assessments website, http:

csbaonline.org/4Publications/Archive/H.20000207.CSIS_Tra

ck_A/H.20000207.CSIS_Train_Wreck_A.htm.

69. John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy, repr

http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/core/nms.html.

70. The NDP was chaired by Philip A. Odeen and included R

L. Armitage, General Richard D. Hearney (USMC, ret), Admira

E. Jeremiah (USN, ret), Robert M. Kimmitt, Andrew F. Krep

General James P. McCarthy (USAF, ret), Janne E. Nolan, and G

Robert W. RisCassi (USA, ret).

71. Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21

st

 C

Report of the National Defense Panel, December 1997, p.1.

72. John A. Tirpak, “The NDP and the Transformation St

Air Force, Vol. 81, No. 3, March 1998, reprinted at http://www.a

magazine/0398ndp.html.

73. This recommendation was implemented. On May 15, 19

Secretary of Defense signed a charter naming the Commander 

of the U.S. Atlantic Command (CINCACOM) the Executive Ag

joint experimentation within the Department of Defense. In 

1997 the U.S. Atlantic Command was renamed the United Stat

Forces Command or USJFCOM and designated “the primary c

for joint force integration, training, experimentation, d

development and testing.”

74. While the Department of Defense is a major player 

protection of critical infrastructure, responsibility for fram

overarching strategy is assigned to the President’s Commis

107
Critical Infrastructure Protection. See Critical Foundations: Pr

America’s Infrastructures, Report of the President’s Commis

Critical Infrastructure Protection, October 1997, reprin

http://www.ciao.gov/CIAO_Document_Library/PCCIP_Repo

75. William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President 

Congress, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1998, pp. 2

76. Ibid., p. 3.

77. For elaboration, see Andrew Krepinevich, Executive Dir

the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, “Em

Threats, Revolutionary Capabilities, and Military Transform

testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcom

on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, March 5, 1999, repri

http://www.csbahome.com/Publications/ETACtestimony.htm

78. Transforming Defense, p. 42.

79. Eventually, military strategists are likely to use the n

“complex terrain” to assess cyberspace and outer space a

particularly as military activities in these environments 

interspersed among heavily concentrated commercial activities

80. See Thomas E. Ricks, “Urban Warfare: Where Inn

Hasn’t Helped,” Wall Street Journal, October 12, 1999, p. 10; Wi

Rosenau, “Every Room Is a New Battle: The Lessons of Modern 

Warfare,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 20, No. 4, 1997

Russell W. Glenn, Marching Under Darkening Skies: The A

Military and the Impending Urban Operations Threat, Santa 

CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 1998, p. viii..

81. “Air Force to Push Effects-Based Warfare in Upcoming D

Review,” Inside the Air Force, June 2, 1000, p. 1. For detail 

thinking behind this, see Phillip S. Meilinger, “Air Strategy: Ta

For Effect,” Aerospace Power Journal, Vol. 13, No. 4, Winter 19

48-61.

82. William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President 

Congress, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1999, Cha

83. See ...From the Sea, Washington, DC: Department of th

1992, and Forward...From the Sea, Washington, DC: Departmen

Navy, 1997.

84. See http://usmc.sra.com/omfts/.

108
85. Charles C. Krulak, Operational Maneuver From the 

Concept for the Projection of Naval Power Ashore, Washingt

Headquarters Marine Corps, n.d., p. 5; and idem., “Oper

Maneuver From the Sea,” Joint Force Quarterly, No. 21, Sprin

pp. 78-86.

86. See David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and Frederick P

Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Info

Superiority, Washington, DC: Center for Advanced Concep

Technology, 1999.

87. Arthur K. Cebrowski, “Sea, Space, Cyberspace: Bor

Domains,” speech presented February 26, 1999, reprin

http://www.nwc.navy.mil/pres/speeches/borderless.h

“Network-centric Warfare: An Emerging Military Response 

Information Age,” a presentation at the 1999 Command and 

Research and Technology Symposium, June 29, 1999, repri

http://www.nwc.navy.mil/pres/speeches/ccrp2_.htm. S

Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka, “Network-Centric W

Its Origin and Future,”Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, V

No. 1, January 1998, pp. 28-35.

88. General Eric K. Shinseki, Address to the Eisenhower Lu

45

th

 Annual Meeting of the Association of the United States 

October 12, 1999, reprinted at http://www.hqda

mil/ocsa/991012.htm. 

89. Dennis J. Reimer, “Leaping Ahead to the 21

st

 Century

Force Quarterly, No. 17, p. 21. Like General Shinseki, General 

was aware of the need to make the Army more strategically mo

sought to do this by encouraging the other Services to acquir

heavy sealift and airlift rather than by lightening Army comba

90. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congres

Chapter 11.

91. General Eric, K. Shinseki, statement before the Comm

Armed Services, United States Senate, March 1, 2000.

92. Andrew Krepinevich, “Whither the Army,” January 18

published on the web site of the Center for Strategic and Bu

Assessments at http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/A

H.20000118.Whither_the_Army/H.20000118.Whither_the_Arm

93. Jason Sherman, “Dream Work,” Armed Forces J

International, May 2000, pp. 25-30.

109
94. Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “The New-Model Army,” N

Journal, June 3, 2000. p. 1750.

95. Joint Vision 2020, Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2000

96. For instance, Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., “Why No Tr

mation?” Joint Force Quarterly, No. 20, Autumn/Winter 1999-2

97-101; and Owens, Lifting the Fog of War, pp. 3-26 and ff.

97. New World Coming: American Security in the 21

st

 C

Phase I Report on the Emerging Global Security Environment 

First Quarter of the 21

st

 Century, Washington, DC: United 

Commission on National Security/21

st

 Century, September 1

141.

98. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force 

Warfighting Transformation, Washington, DC: Office of the 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, August 19

10-11.

99. Krepinevich, “Why No Transformation?” p. 97.

100. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force 

Warfighting Transformation, p. 18.

101. Bradley Graham, “Pentagon’s Wish List: Based on 

Battles?” Washington Post, August 25, 1999, p. A3.

102. Admiral Owens is an example of a transformation a

who points to the Chinese military modernization program as a 

for embracing the revolution in military affairs (which he def

using information technology to build a “system of systems

Lifting the Fog of War, pp. 220-224 and, idem., The Emergi

System-of-Systems, Strategic Forum No. 63, Washington, DC: N

Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies, 199

argument is made in greater detail in Mark A. Stokes, China’s S

Modernization: Implications for the United States, Carlisle Ba

PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institu

assessments more skeptical of China’s ability to under

transformation that turns it into the equal of the United Sta

Larry M. Wortzel, China’s Military Potential, Carlisle Barrac

U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1998; Bates G

Lonnie Henley, China and the Revolution in Military Affairs, C

Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institut

and Bernard D. Cole and Paul H.B. Godwin, “Advanced M

Technology and the PLA: Priorities and Capabilities for t

110
Century,” in Larry M. Wortzel, ed., The Chinese Armed Forces in 

Century, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College S

Studies Institute, 1999, pp. 159-216.

103. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force 

Warfighting Transformation, p. 7.

104. For instance, Russell E. Travers, “A New Millennium 

Strategic Breathing Space,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 20, 

Spring 1997, pp. 91-114; and, Ivan Eland, “Tilting at Win

Post-Cold War Military Threats to U.S. Security,” Cato Institut

Analysis, No. 32, February 8, 1999.

105. Michael O’Hanlon, Technological Change and the F

Warfare, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000, p

106. On the distinction between and use of threat-bas

capabilities-based force planning, see Troxell, Force Planning in 

of Uncertainty, pp. 2-9.

107. See, for instance, Doug Struck, “North Korea’s Dip

Strides Pay Off,” Washington, Post, July 27, 2000, p. A16.

108. Quoted in John T. Correll, “The Problem With the St

Air Force Magazine, Vol. 77, No. 7, July 1994.

109. “Ryan: ‘We Will Never Have Enough Lift’ For Two R

Wars,” Aerospace Daily, June 22, 2000, p. 1.

110. Goure and Ranney, Averting the Defense Train Wrec

New Millennium, p. 30.

111. Goure, “The Resource Gap,” p. 38.

112. Barton Gellman and John Lancaster, “U.S. May Drop 

Capability,” Washington Post, June 17, 1993, A16.

113. Charles S. Robb, “Challenging the Assumptions 

Military Strategy,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 2, Sprin

pp. 115-131.

114. Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving 

and Promoting Freedom, The Phase II Report on a U.S. N

Security Strategy for the 21

st

 Century, Washington, DC: The 

States Commission on National Security/21

st

 Century, April 1

pp. 14-15.

111
115. Seeking a National Strategy, p. 15.

116. Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, Ba

Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, p. 131-233.

117. For instance, Ambassador Robert Komer’s Civilian Ope

and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) was very ef

Even the Phoenix Program that targeted the Viet Cong p

underground played an important role in thwarting the insu

Unfortunately, by the 1970s the insurgency was of sec

importance compared to the large-scale guerrilla operatio

conventional campaigns controlled by Hanoi. For detail see Ric

Hunt, Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hea

Minds, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995; and, Dale Andrade, A

Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War, Lexingto

Lexington Books, 1990.

118. Often the pressure for greater attention to low-in

conflict came from Congress. For instance, Congress manda

creation of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operati

Low Intensity Conflict despite the Pentagon’s resistance.

119. General Henry H. Shelton, “Peace Operations: The 

Required,” National Security Studies Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 3, S

2000, p. 110.

120. See Congressional Budget Office, Making Peace While 

Ready For War: The Challenges of U.S. Military Participation 

Operations, December 1999, reprinted at http://ww

gov/showdoc.cfm?index=1809&sequence=0&from=1.

121. Michael Mandelbaum, “Is Major War Obsolete?” Surviv

40, No. 4, Winter 1998-99, pp. 20-38.

122. Discussions between the author and Dr. Van Creveld

Germany, September 1999. Van Creveld also makes this poin

books The Rise and Decline of the State, Cambridge: Cam

University Press, 1999, pp. 337-354; and The Transformation 

New York: Free Press, 1991, pp. 194-227.

123. Statement by General Henry H. Shelton to the Senate 

Services Committee, January 5, 1999, reprinted at http://ww

mil/jcs/chairman/sasc5jan99.html.

124. Goure and Ranney, Averting the Defense Train Wreck, 

112
125.“Cost Of Defense Plan Could Exceed Available Funding 

Billion A Year Over Long Run,” CSBA Update, March 1998, repr

http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/Archive/U.199804

_Of_Defense__P/U.19980402.Cost_Of_Defense__P.htm.

126. Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Pre

Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal Year 2000, April 1999, chapt

reprinted at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index

&sequence=5.

127. Ron Laurenzo, “Army ‘Vision’ to Cost $70 Billion T

2014,” Defense Week, February 14, 2000, p. 1.

128. Jeffrey R. Barnett, “Funding Two Armies,” Armed 

Journal International, May 2000, p. 14.

129. See William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President 

Congress, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2000, pp. 1

The Defense Reform Initiative Report is reprinted at http:/

defenselink.mil/pubs/dodreform/.

130. “Governor Bush Promotes, Flexes Military Might 

reprinted at http://www.georgewbush.com/news/2000/feb

pr020300_sc.asp. As of July 2000, Al Gore had not made a state

his position on military strategy and national defense.

131. Patrick J. Buchanan, “U.S. Stretched to the Limit,” Fe

16, 2000, reprinted at http://www.theamericancaus

pjb-99-0216.html. 

132. Patrick J. Buchanan, A Republic, Not An Empire: Rec

America’s Destiny, Washington, DC: Regnery, 1999.

133. See http://www.cato.org/research/def-st.htm

http://www.cato.org/research/for-st.html.

134. Some analysts argue that in many of the world’s confl

adversaries must fight long enough to exhaust their passion, w

hatred before resolution is possible. Early intervention is like h

lid on a hot pot—it will work for a while, but eventually things b

See, for instance, Edward N. Luttwak, “Give War a Chance,” 

Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 4, July/August 1999, pp. 36-44.

135. For background, see the web pages of the Marshall Ce

http://www.marshallcenter.org/, the Asia-Pacific Cen

http://www.apcss.org/, and the Center for Hemispheric D

Studies at http://www.ndu.edu/chds/indexmain.html. The 

113
Center for Strategic Studies is at http:/

africacenter.org/about.html. The Department of Defense 

developing a Near East/South Asia Center. See its web p

http://www.nesa-center.org/.

136. The concept of the “American way of war” was devel

Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of 

States Military Strategy and Policy, Bloomington: Indiana Un

Press, 1973.

137. The U.S. military adopted the “after next” idea of simul

rather than sequential organizational reform from Paul Bracke

Military After Next,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 4, A

1993, pp. 157-174.

138. For a description and assessment of the theater enga

planning process, see Thomas M. Jordan, Douglas C. Lovelace, 

Thomas-Durell Young, Shaping the World Through Enga

Assessing the Department of Defense’s Theater Engagement P

Process, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College S

Studies Institute, 2000.

139. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howa

Peter Paret, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, p

140. For detail, see Steven Metz, Refining American Stra

Africa, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic 

Institute, 2000.

141. See Steven Metz, “African Peacekeeping and Am

Strategy,” in Robert I. Rotberg, ed., Peacekeeping and 

Enforcement in Africa: Methods of Conflict Prevention, Washingt

Brookings Institution Press, 2000.

142. See http://www.georgewbush.com/issues.asp?For

=FullText&ID=9.

143. The GCC includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar

Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. It was founded in 

increase coordination, integration and interconnection betw

members in a number of different fields. For more informat

http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/decdo/gcc.htm.

144. The author has experienced this during discussio

presentations in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

114
145. For an assessment of some of the problems that mig

should the United States undertake a revolution in military affa

its coalition partners not, see Steven Metz, “The Effect of Techn

Asymmetry on Coalition Operations,” in Thomas J. Marsha

Problems and Solutions in Future Coalition Operations, C

Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute

146. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, interview 

Diane Rehm Show—WAMU-FM, Washington, DC, June 19, 2

released by the Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department o

reprinted at http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements

000619.html.

147. General Dennis J. Reimer, “Moving Force XXI Fo

remarks to the Association of the United States Army Sym

February 18, 1998.

148. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith, L

Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 73.

149. See, for instance, http://www.sccs.swarthmor

~justin/fzln/about.html and http://www.utexas.edu/students

The latter lists 44 Zapatista web sites.

150. David Ronfeldt, John Arquilla, Graham E. Fuller, and 

Fuller, The Zapatista “Social Netwar” in Mexico, Santa Moni

RAND Corporation, 1998.

151. America’s National Interests, a report from the Commis

America’s National Interests, July 2000, pp. 1-2. This re

available at http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/mono

nationalinterests.pdf.

152. Ibid., p. 52.

153. Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventive De

New Security Strategy for America, Washington, DC: Bro

Institution Press, 1999. See also Ashton B. Carter, “Adapt

Defence to Future Needs,” Survival, Vol. 41, No. 4, Winter 199

pp. 101-123.

154. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Redefining the National Interest,” 

Affairs, Vol. 78, No., 4, July/August 1999, p. 27. Like Perry and 

Nye is a former Clinton administration official, having se

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affai

1994 to 1995.

115
155. Carter, “Adapting US Defence to Future Needs,” p. 10

156. Ibid.

157. Robert W. Tucker, “Alone or With Others: The Tempta

Post-Cold War Power,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 6, Nov

December 1999, p. 15.

158. Peter W. Rodman, Uneasy Giant: The Challenges to A

Predominance, Washington, DC: Nixon Center, 2000, pp. 1-17.

159. Tucker, “Alone or With Others,” p. 16.

160. Http://www.georgewbush.com/Media/PDFs/defense

161. http://www.algore.com/defense/. Vice Presidential n

Joseph Lieberman seems more inclined toward a “transform

approach to the U.S. Military. See his essay “The Future Is Netw

Defense News, August 21, 2000, p. 15. It remains to be seen w

Lieberman will move Gore toward this position.

116
APPENDIX

CHRONOLOGY OF KEY STRATEGIC DOCUME

AND REPORTS

117

1991

 •Base Force Review

 •National Security Strategy (August)

1992

 •National Military Strategy (January)

1993

 •Bottom Up Review Report (September)

1994

 •National Security Strategy (July)

1995

 •National Security Strategy (February)

 •Commission on Roles and Missions (May)

 •National Military Strategy

 •Joint Vision 2010

1996

 •National Security Strategy (February)

1997

 •National Security Strategy (May)

 •Quadrennial Defense Review (May)

 •Concept for Future Joint Operations (May)

 •Defense Reform Initiative Report (November)

 •National Defense Panel Report (December)

Note: This chronology deals only with unclas

documents. Documents in italics are planned or tent

The Secretary of Defense’s Report to the Presiden

Congress is also an important bellwether of Ame

strategy but because it is always produced annually, it 

listed on this chronology. 
1998

 •National Security Strategy (October)

1999

 •Defense Science Board Report on Warfighting

 Transformation (August)

 •U.S. Commission on National Security/21st

 Century,Phase I Report (September)

 • National Security Strategy (December)

2000

 •U.S. Commission on National Security/21st

 Century, Phase II Report (April) • Joint Vision

 2020 (May)

 • National Security Strategy

2001

 • U.S. Commission on National Security/21st

 Century, Phase III Report (February)

 • Quadrennial Defense Review

 • National Military Strategy

118
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

STEVEN METZ has been Research Professor of Na

Security Affairs in the Strategic Studies Institute 

1993. Prior to that, he served on the faculty of the Ai

College, the U.S. Army Command and General 

College, and several universities. He has also served 

advisor to U.S. political organizations and camp

testified in the U.S. Senate and House of Representa

and spoken on military and security issues aroun

world. He is author of more than 70 articles, essays

chapters on such topics as nuclear war, insurgency

policy in the Third World, military strategy, South A

security policy, and United Nations peace operation

Metz’s current research deals with the role of the Ame

Army in the 21st century, the African security environ

and the effect of the information revolution on m

strategy. He holds a B.A. in Philosophy and a M

International Studies from the University of S

Carolina, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the 

Hopkins University.

119
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Dr. Steven Metz

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler