Defense Science Board Task Force 

on 

Contributions of Space Based 

Radar to Missile Defense 

June 2004 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

Washington, D.C. 20301-3140 
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Defense Science Board Task Force on Contributions of Space Based

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___________________________________________________________ TABLE OF CONTENTS

_______________________________________________________________________ 

 

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY.............................................................................................................1

The Tasking ...........................................................................................1

The Baseline System Description and Performance ........................1

Bottom Line ...........................................................................................3

DISCUSSION ..........................................................................................................7

Persistence – SMTI and SAR imaging................................................7

Potential Capabilities Relevant to Missile Defense..........................7

APPENDIX A: RECOMMENDATIONS ..............................................................15

APPENDIX B: TERMS OF REFERENCE..............................................................17

APPENDIX C: TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP .....................................................19

APPENDIX D: GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS......................................................21
TABLE OF CONTENTS____________________________________________________________ 

ii ___________________________________________________________ DSB TASK FORCE
___________________________________________________________________ SUMMARY

ON CONTRIBUTIONS OF SPACE BASED RADAR TO MISSILE DEFENSE__________________________ 1

SUMMARY

THE TASKING

In accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 

2004, the Defense Science Board (DSB) was asked to assess the 

potential contributions of a Space Based Radar (SBR) to missile 

defense. In response, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics (USD (AT&L), and the Director, Missile 

Defense Agency (MDA) directed that the DSB Task Force on the 

Contribution of a Space Based Radar to Missile Defense perform the 

following tasks: 

 Assess the impact of adding a missile defense 

mission on the ability of SBR satellites to conduct 

their primary missions; 

 Assess how different SBR architectures and technical 

approaches might affect the ability of the satellites to 

achieve their primary missions and to contribute to 

missile defense; 

 Assess the value of potential SBR capabilities in the 

context of the family of sensors being developed by 

the Missile Defense Agency; and 

 Recommend any future actions that might be 

desirable related to SBR contributions to missile 

defense. 

THE BASELINE SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND PERFORMANCE

Since the program remains in the design stage, with two 

contractors selected for this phase of the effort, the baseline system 

definition continues to evolve. Further, the system is to use the spiral 

development approach with Increment 1 deployment beginning in 

2010-2012. 
SUMMARY ___________________________________________________________________ 

2 ___________________________________________________________ DSB TASK FORCE

 SBR is to provide global, all weather, day/night, 

persistent access of areas of interest with Surface 

Moving Target Indication (SMTI), Synthetic 

Aperture Radar (SAR) imaging, and High 

Resolution Terrain Information (HRTI). 

 The system could be some combination of Low 

Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites at a nominal altitude of 

1,000 km and Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) at a 

nominal altitude of 10,000 km. 

 The SMTI requirement is to track a 10-decibel (DB) 

target at 2,800km – a truck size vehicle with about a 

10m2 radar cross section. 

 LEO will support both the SMTI and SAR imaging 

requirements with reasonable combinations of 

power and aperture. 

− The options for a LEO system are 

characterized as 1X, 2X, and 3X. Available 

space launch capabilities could deliver three 

1X systems on a single vehicle. The same 

space launch vehicle could deliver only one 3X 

system. For the 1X system, the power-aperture 

(power in kilowatts x aperture in meters2) is 35 

kwm2 . For reference, the average radiated 

power aperture for the Aegis radar system is 

485 kwm2. 

− A LEO constellation requires some 21 

satellites to provide persistent global access. A 

discussion of what constitutes persistence is 

discussed in a later section. 

− As an example of the performance of smaller 

constellations, the nominal Increment 1 

system of 9 satellites in LEO would provide 

access to North Korea with at least one 

satellite some 55-60% of the time. 
___________________________________________________________________ SUMMARY

ON CONTRIBUTIONS OF SPACE BASED RADAR TO MISSILE DEFENSE__________________________ 3

− MEO will support SMTI with fewer satellites 

but would require long processing times to 

provide the needed quality of SAR images. 

BOTTOM LINE 

There are four major areas of potential application of SBR 

capabilities to support the missile defense goal of evolving to an 

integrated, layered system to defeat missiles of all ranges in all 

phases of flight to defend the United States, forces deployed, and 

allies. The following provides the bottom line findings in each of the 

four areas and bottom line findings relative to the increased 

command and control and battle management integration challenge 

associated with exploiting the SBR potential. The remainder of the 

report expands on these points. 

___________________________________________________________________________ 

 As an overarching finding, the task force believes that the SpaceBased Radar has the potential for substantial contributions to 

ballistic missile defense, providing capabilities and access that are 

difficult to achieve with surface-based sensors 

___________________________________________________________________________ 

 Pre-launch location, monitoring, and tracking 

 The baseline Surface Moving Target Indication 

(SMTI) and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) 

imaging capabilities of the SBR could make a major 

contribution to locating and monitoring ballistic 

missile installations of interest and to tracking 

mobile systems. 

 Both SMTI and SAR imaging capabilities are 

needed, with agile change between modes, to 

maintain track and monitor selected vehicles. 

 An expansion in numbers beyond Increment 1 will 

be needed to provide continuous monitoring during 

times and at places of high interest. 
SUMMARY ___________________________________________________________________ 

4 ___________________________________________________________ DSB TASK FORCE

− A nominal Increment 1 capability - a 9-satellite 

constellation in LEO - could provide access to 

North Korea 55-60% of the time. 

− A 21-satellite constellation could provide near 

full-time access to multiple theaters of interest. 

 With less than a 21-satellite constellation, a 

combination of space-based and other assets will be 

needed to provide continuous access during times 

and at places of high interest. Continuous access 

does not imply unlimited continuous tracking. 

Tracking capability is discussed later in the report. 

 The Department needs to explicitly define the 

evolving system of systems that will provide near 

continuous access during times and in places of 

high interest. 

 Launch detection and early trajectory measurement 

 Air Moving Target Indication (AMTI) track 

capability could be added to Increment 1 with low 

impact on cost and schedule if included in the initial 

design. AMTI could provide early warning of 

launch from known launcher locations and some 

capability to search a given area on the surface for 

launches from unknown sites. SBR AMTI would not 

have a capability to search airspace and must 

instead either be cued by another system or 

maintain track from the point of launch. 

− Using conservative assumptions, about 10% of 

a single satellite’s SMTI/AMTI resources are 

needed for each monitored site.

− Using other assumptions, SBR, using AMTI, 

could monitor multiple sites and also search a 

significant area for launches from unknown 

sites. 
___________________________________________________________________ SUMMARY

ON CONTRIBUTIONS OF SPACE BASED RADAR TO MISSILE DEFENSE__________________________ 5

− Early launch detection (before cloud break) 

could cut valuable tens of seconds from the 

time to cue other missile defense systems. 

 The AMTI capability could also provide sufficient 

trajectory information to commit an interceptor for 

earliest engagement. 

− Single satellite access should be capable of 

providing information on a single digit 

number of simultaneous launches. 

− Earliest commitment is critical to success for 

boost/ascent phase and some mid-course 

intercepts. 

 The potential value of AMTI capability warrants 

adding it to the SBR program. To be useful for this 

mission, the constellation must eventually provide 

near continuous access during times and at places 

of high interest. 

 Trajectory Tracking 

 The baseline SBR is to have an inherent capability to 

measure velocity and velocity changes of major 

components of a missile system that are above the 

horizon with useful precision. Cueing is required for 

SBR to acquire the missile. 

 This capability would provide an intercept error 

basket precise enough to direct the interceptor to its 

required acquisition and maneuver basket. 

 The Missile Defense Agency needs to include the 

trajectory tracking capability of the baseline SBR 

in plans for the overall sensor architecture for an 

integrated missile defense. 

Discrimination- discussion classified and included in 

classified report 
SUMMARY ___________________________________________________________________ 

6 ___________________________________________________________ DSB TASK FORCE

 Command and control (C2) and battle management (BM) 

integration 

Exploiting SBR capabilities to contribute to ballistic missile 

defense adds significant complexity to the C2 and BM integration 

task for the SBR system. The added challenges include: 

 Low latency and persistent SMTI and SAR imaging 

access to monitor ballistic missile installations of 

interest and to track vehicles of interest moving 

from such installations. 

 Managing simultaneous demands to include: 

− Providing continuous AMTI access, during 

periods and at places of high interest, of 

known missile launcher locations, 

− Conducting AMTI search of designated areas, 

and 

− Performing other high-priority SBR missions. 

 Adding SBR capabilities for missile defense will 

place new demands on a number of key functions, 

e.g., signal processing, software development, 

communication links, and off-board system updates. 

An aggressive technology development and 

transition program would be needed to provide a 

netted, integrated, computer aided command and 

control and battle management system. 
_________________________________________________________________ DISCUSSION

ON CONTRIBUTIONS OF SPACE BASED RADAR TO MISSILE DEFENSE__________________________ 7

DISCUSSION

PERSISTENCE – SMTI AND SAR IMAGING

The concept of persistence does not lend itself to a single metric. It 

will depend on the nature of the objects of interest, the dynamics of 

the situation, and the supported task – detect, track, identify, and/or 

engage. E.g., persistent monitoring of the status of construction of a 

missile site might demand a weekly revisit using SAR imaging 

capabilities. Persistent monitoring of a missile launch site in a ready 

to launch status, using Air Moving Target Indicator (AMTI) track 

capability might require a revisit every few seconds. Tracking a large 

moving unit might require an SMTI revisit every few minutes while 

tracking a single vehicle might require a revisit each tens of seconds. 

In any case, selecting and tracking specific objects of interest will 

require a capability to change rapidly between SMTI and SAR 

imaging capabilities. SAR imaging will be required to identify the 

specific locations and vehicles of interest before movement starts. 

SMTI can then track the moving objects but will lose tracking and 

monitoring when the vehicle stops. An approach is to wait for 

movement to resume. However, SMTI alone cannot determine that 

the new movement is the same vehicle. Only SAR imaging can 

provide that information. Further, in the case of tracking missile 

launchers, the need for information is even more critical when the 

vehicle stops since known systems must stop to launch. 

POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES RELEVANT TO MISSILE DEFENSE 

The following potential SBR capabilities, briefly described in the 

foregoing Bottom Line Summary section, in ascending order of cost 

and complexity, could contribute to missile defense. The impact on 

other missions and value of the potential contribution are discussed 

in the section on each capability. 
DISCUSSION__________________________________________________________________ 

8 ___________________________________________________________ DSB TASK FORCE

 Pre-launch location, monitoring, and tracking 

Detection. Nominal SBR designs and constellations can search 

countries the size of North Korea or Iraq for moving targets of cross 

sections larger than about 10m2 about every 10 minutes. This would 

include moving missile Transport-Erector-Launchers (TELS). 

However, there can be thousands of 10m 2 vehicles moving at any 

time in a country the size of Iraq. Targeted monitoring of specific 

areas based on the full set of intelligence, surveillance and 

reconnaissance capabilities to include SBR SAR imaging will be 

required to direct the SMTI capability at areas of interest. 

Access and Performance. Access depends primarily on constellation 

orbit and size. The maximum range for a SAR imaging from satellites 

in LEO at 1,000 km is 2,800 km. For a 9-satellite constellation at 53 

degrees inclination, the distance between satellites is about 8,800 km, 

so the probability that a satellite is in position to cover a given target 

area is about 65%. A 21-satellite system would provide essentially 

continuous access to multiple theaters of interest. 

Wide area SMTI uses a high area scan rate to monitor areas of 

interest. For example, within its area of access, the system can 

monitor road junctions in a 1000x760km area every 10 minutes. It 

could also monitor movements from individual garrisons distributed 

over a total area of 400x400km every 10 minutes. A few dozen high 

value moving targets can be tracked in the high-resolution mode in a 

125x125km area with a revisit every 30 seconds. 

The system can provide HRTI worldwide. 

The combination of SMTI and SAR imaging with a 21-satellite 

constellation in LEO would provide detection, tracking and 

identification of targets of interest in areas of interest. To be useful for 

tracking high interest individual targets such as missile TELS, it will 

also be important to ensure that the system has both SMTI and SAR 

imaging capability with high agility between these modes. 

Impact on Other SBR Missions. Since this pre-launch location, 

monitoring, and tracking is part of the baseline design mission of the 
_________________________________________________________________ DISCUSSION

ON CONTRIBUTIONS OF SPACE BASED RADAR TO MISSILE DEFENSE__________________________ 9

SBR, there is no impact other than the need to add this task to the list 

of high priorities. 

_________________________ RECOMMENDATION _________________________ 

The Department needs to explicitly define the evolving system of 

systems that will provide continuous SMTI and SAR imagery access 

during times and at places of high interest. 

___________________________________________________________________________ 

 Launch detection and early trajectory measurement 

 Mission Benefit. The presently planned missile defense system 

depends primarily on the Defense Support Satellite system (DSP) for 

global launch warning. Since DSP is an IR system, it cannot provide 

launch detection until cloud break. In addition it does not provide 

sufficient trajectory information for early commitment of missile 

defense interceptors. Consequently, to defend against short time of 

flight attacks, e.g., a forward-based radar is required. In the near 

term, the Aegis radar system is to provide that capability for launches 

from North Korea. In the longer term, a global system of forward 

sensors will be required. 

With the system addition described below, the SBR could monitor 

known sites with high reliability and provide early engagement 

quality trajectory information for launches from known sites or when 

cued by other sensors. The system could also be used for uncued area 

search within a specified area. 

 SBR System Addition Operation and Performance. With the addition 

of a high pulse repetition frequency capability (HPRF) waveform, the 

SBR system should be able to screen out ground clutter outside of the 

main lobe directly below the satellite. That should provide for SBR to 

detect targets moving faster than a minimum detectable velocity 

(MDV). Further work by the SBR Program Office is required to 

quantify the cost and risk of this addition, but the needed radar 

components are available and the cost and risk should be low. 
DISCUSSION__________________________________________________________________ 

10 ___________________________________________________________ DSB TASK FORCE

For this mode of operation to be most effective, The AMTI 

capability would need to be cued, which could be provided by the 

SMTI/SAR imaging capability of SBR or other surveillance assets to 

include IR systems when cloud conditions permit. Given such cues, a 

conservative estimate of the maximum AMTI dwell time required to 

detect a launch from a range of 2,800 km is less than 1 second. 

Against boosting missiles with larger radar cross-sections, the dwell 

time could be a fraction of a second. Considering expected initial 

missile acceleration, and the near vertical initial trajectory, the 

planned vertical dimension of the AMTI beam will ensure that the 

missile will remain within the beam size for at least 10 seconds. 

Using other reasonable assumptions, single satellite access could 

provide the capability to monitor multiple sites of known location 

and search a designated area to detect launches from unknown 

locations. While this uncued search approach will not provide 

reliable access over large areas, the capability provides an added 

problem for an adversary since they cannot know what part of their 

territory is being scanned in this mode at any given time. 

With the larger constellations needed for continuous access to 

ground target areas of interest, there will be more than one satellite 

providing access to a given area a significant percent of the time. In 

this case, the uncued search capability is significantly enhanced 

and/or the impact on other missions is reduced. 

 Impact on Other SBR Missions. Using conservative assumptions, a 

single satellite could monitor at least 10 missile sites within the 

satellite’s area of access if all of the satellites MTI resources are 

devoted to that task. With the same conservative estimates, a single 

site could be monitored using about 10% of the single satellite’s 

resources. With other reasonable assumptions, a much smaller 

percent of the satellite’s resources would be needed for this level of 

contribution to missile defense. Building a SAR image at these ranges 

from a LEO satellite requires about 16 seconds. However, that 

process can be divided into shorter segments so that it would be 

possible to monitor multiple launch sites while also using some 

resources to meet SAR imaging needs. Again, with larger 
_________________________________________________________________ DISCUSSION

ON CONTRIBUTIONS OF SPACE BASED RADAR TO MISSILE DEFENSE__________________________ 11

constellations, more than one satellite will have access a significant 

percent of the time further reducing impact on other missions. 

While adding the capability inevitably has some impact on cost 

and risk, the task force believes the impact to be low. Adding the 

HPRF capability displaces no currently planned performance. 

 Impact on the Ballistic Missile Defense Architecture. The 9-satellite 

system would not provide a useful early launch and trajectory 

warning capability since such a capability must be 24/7 during 

periods of high concern. With a 21-satellite constellation and the 

addition of HPRF, SBR could take over some, or perhaps all of the 

radar coverage tasks for launch and trajectory warning and free a 

system such as Aegis to devote more resources to other mission 

demands. However, this capability is not likely to be available before 

2012 and the planned missile defense architecture is to provide 

forward based land or sea-based radars well before the planned first 

SBR deployment. 

 Further, given the need for high-resolution global radar access (or 

access with some other set of high-resolution sensors) for 

discrimination, just adding early launch and trajectory warning does 

not significantly reduce the need for the planned elements of the 

currently defined missile defense architecture. 

 Still, providing the needed forward-based high-resolution sensor 

access for the evolving integrated layered system may not be feasible 

using only surface-based systems. It seems likely that space-based 

assets will need to have an expanding role and is likely to be the 

preferred, perhaps the only feasible, approach to meeting some 

important sensor location demands for the boost-phase layer of 

missile defense. 

_________________________ RECOMMENDATION _________________________ 

Given the broader set of future missile defense needs, – multiple layers 

of ballistic missile defense, the global nature of the need, and the 

uncertain state of development for radar capabilities to meet these needs 

-- the SBR Program Office should examine and quantify the cost, and risk 
DISCUSSION__________________________________________________________________ 

12 ___________________________________________________________ DSB TASK FORCE

of adding an AMTI capability and associated near real time processing 

and communications support. 

 The Program Office should complete the assessment in 

time to design the added capabilities into Increment 1 of 

the SBR if such capability proves feasible at acceptable 

risk. 

 To be useful for this mission, the SBR constellation must 

eventually provide near full-time access during times and 

at places of high interest. 

The Missile Defense Agency should examine the cost, risk, and benefit of 

alternative means of providing the needed global access for early launch 

warning and trajectory measurement for the integrated, layered system 

to include the potential contribution of SBR AMTI track capability. 

___________________________________________________________________________ 

Trajectory Tracking and Discrimination- discussion 

classified and included in classified report 

 Command and control and Battle Management 

Integration 

 Pre-launch location, monitoring, and tracking. The command and 

control and battle management integration task is not appreciably 

changed by the addition of SBR to the intelligence, surveillance and 

reconnaissance (ISR) suite for many targets and operations. However, 

for the missile defense mission, since the need includes identifying 

the location of mobile TELS with low latency when they have the 

potential to launch, that is, when they stop moving, the timelines are 

more demanding than for most other operations. The need for low 

latency includes supporting pre-boost operations where there is 

eminent danger of a launch. Here the acceptable latency is driven by 

the responsiveness of attack assets. Highly responsive support for 

attack operations against a wide range of targets is a current mission 

of SBR. Low latency is a requirement to support early launch and 

trajectory warning when SBR is committed to that role. Here the 

acceptable latency is measured in a few seconds as discussed in the 

next paragraph. 
_________________________________________________________________ DISCUSSION

ON CONTRIBUTIONS OF SPACE BASED RADAR TO MISSILE DEFENSE__________________________ 13

Launch detection and early trajectory measurement. Tracking fast 

moving vehicles in flight has not previously been an objective of the 

SBR program. There will be demanding near real time ISR (which can 

include SBR) integration needs to ensure that SBR AMTI capability is 

cued with enough precision to ensure that a missile in early boost 

phase is in the SBR beam. While this is no more demanding for fixed 

missile sites than for other fixed targets, it is highly challenging for 

moving targets. SMTI will lose track on the TEL as it slows to below 

SMTI threshold speed. When this occurs, there must be highly agile 

switching to SAR imaging mode for the SRB satellite to monitor the 

TEL when it stops. There will also be added command and control 

and battle management demands beyond detection of the launch to 

meet the latency requirements to make early launch and trajectory 

warning useful. Again, the information must be available and usable 

within a very few seconds. 

Early attention will be needed to the added integration challenge 

generated by adding and exploiting AMTI capability. There may be 

substantial impacts on the demands on onboard signal processing, 

software development, and communication links. Full integration of 

SBR capabilities into the Task, Post, Process, and Update (TPPU) 

paradigm is needed to fuse SBR data with data from other sensor 

sources to offer multi-phenomenology detection, discrimination, and 

designation (D3) benefits. Such a system will contribute significantly 

to generating knowledge instead of just data, to meeting time 

sensitive targeting and response timelines, and to providing users a 

capability to quickly re-task sensors to optimize coverage of the 

evolving situation. 

Discrimination 

There would, again, be significant increases in the demand on 

command and control and battle management systems. Further 

discussion on this topic is classified and included in the classified 

report. 
DISCUSSION__________________________________________________________________ 

14 ___________________________________________________________ DSB TASK FORCE

________________________ RECOMMENDATION_________________________ 

A decision to add new capabilities to the SBR to serve the missile 

defense mission must be accompanied with specific changes to the 

programs to provide integration of SBR information into missile defense 

command and control and battle management systems. 

___________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________ APPENDIX A 

ON CONTRIBUTIONS OF SPACE BASED RADAR TO MISSILE DEFENSE__________________________ 15

APPENDIX A: RECOMMENDATIONS

___________________________________________________________________________ 

 Pre-launch location, monitoring, and tracking 

The Department needs to explicitly define the evolving system of 

systems that will provide continuous SMTI and SAR imaging access 

during times and at places of high interest. 

 Launch detection and early trajectory measurement 

Given the broader set of future missile defense needs, – multiple layers 

of ballistic missile defense, the global nature of the need, and the 

uncertain state of development for radar capabilities to meet these need 

-- the SBR Program Office should examine and quantify the cost, and risk 

of adding an AMTI capability and associated near real time processing 

and communications support. 

− The Program Office should complete the 

assessment in time to design the added 

capabilities into Increment 1 of the SBR if such 

capability proves feasible at acceptable risk. 

− To be useful for this mission, the SBR constellation 

must eventually provide near full-time access 

during times and at places of high interest. 

The Missile Defense Agency should examine the cost, risk, and benefit of 

alternative means of providing the needed global access for early launch 

warning and trajectory measurement for the integrated, layered system 

to include the potential contribution of SBR AMTI track capability. 

 Trajectory tracking 

The Missile Defense Agency needs to include the trajectory tracking 

capability of the baseline SBR in plans for the overall sensor architecture 

for an integrated missile defense 

 Command and control and battle management integration 

A decision to add new missions and capabilities to the SBR to serve the 

missile defense mission must be accompanied with specific changes to 
APPENDIX A: RECOMMENDATIONS __________________________________________________ 

16 ___________________________________________________________ DSB TASK FORCE

the programs to provide integration of SBR information into command 

and control and battle management systems. 

___________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________ APPENDIX B: TERMS OF REFERENCE

ON CONTRIBUTIONS OF SPACE BASED RADAR TO MISSILE DEFENSE__________________________ 17

APPENDIX B: TERMS OF REFERENCE 
APPENDIX B__________________________________________________________________ 

18 ___________________________________________________________ DSB TASK FORCE

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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

30 10 DEFENSE PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

TECHNOLOGY

ACQUISITION, FEB 22004

AND LOGISTICS

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

Terms of Reference -- Defense Science Board Task Force on Contributions

of Space Based Radar to Missile Defense

SUBJECf

In accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2004, the

Defense Science Board should assess potential contributions of Space Based Radar (SBR)

to missile defense.

Recent studies done within the Department of Defense suggesthat SBR may

possess some inherent capability to detect, track, and discriminate ballistic missile

warheads in flight. While the primary missions of SBR are moving target indication and

synthetic aperture imaging, the high priority of ballistic missile defense may benefit from

an a.l)sessment of the potential contributions by SBR.

The Task Force, in consultation with the Missile Defense Agency, shall

(1) Assess the impact of adding a missile defense mission on the ability of SBR

satellites to conduct their primary missions;

(2) Assess how different SBR architectures and technical approaches might affect

the ability of the satellites to achieve their primary missions and to contribute

to missile defense;

(3) Assess the value of potential SBR capabilities in the context of the family of

sensors being developed by the Missile Defense Agency; and

(4) Recommend any future actions that might be desirable related to SBR

contributions to missile defense

The Study will be co-sponsored by me as the Acting Under Secretary of Defense

(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) and the Director, Missile Defense Agency. GEN

Larry Welch, USAF (Ret.) and Dr. Bob Hennann will serve as Co-Chairmen of the Task

Force. Mr. Gerald Augeri, Missile Defense Agency, will serve as Executive Secretary

and LtCol Dave Robertson, USAF, will serve as the Defense Science Board Secretariat

representative.
The Task Force will operate in accordance with the provisions of P .L. 92-463, the

"Federal Advisory Committee Act," and DOD Directive 5105.4, the "DoD Federal

Advisory Committee Management Program," It is not anticipated that this Task Force

will need to go into any "particular matters" within the meaning of Section 208 of Title

18, U.S. Code, nor will it cause any member to be placed in the position of acting as a

procurement official.
_______________________________________________APPENDIX C: TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP

ON CONTRIBUTIONS OF SPACE BASED RADAR TO MISSILE DEFENSE__________________________ 19

APPENDIX C: TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP

CO-CHAIRMEN

Name Affiliation 

Dr. Robert Hermann Global Technology Partners, LLC 

Gen Larry Welch, USAF (Ret) Institute for Defense Analyses 

TASK FORCE MEMBERS

Dr. Randy Avent MIT Lincoln Laboratory 

LtGen Bruce Brown, USAF 

(Ret) 

Institute for Defense Analyses 

Dr. Greg Canavan LANL 

Dr. John Foster Northrop Grumman 

VADM David Frost, USN Frost & Associates 

Dr. Ted Gold SAIC 

Mr. Don Latham Private Consultant 

Gen Tom Marsh, USAF (Ret) Private Consultant 

Dr. Wayne O'Hern Technology Strategies and Alliances 

Dr. Robert Strickler Private Consultant 

 

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Mr. Gerald Augeri Missile Defense Agency 

DSB REPRESENTATIVE

LtCol Dave Robertson, USAF 

GOVERNMENT ADVISORS

LtCol James Brandt, USAF MDA/DB 

 

STAFF

Mr. Brad Smith Strategic Analysis, Inc. 
APPENDIX C__________________________________________________________________ 

20 ___________________________________________________________ DSB TASK FORCE

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_______________________________________________ APPENDIX D: GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

ON CONTRIBUTIONS OF SPACE BASED RADAR TO MISSILE DEFENSE__________________________ 21

APPENDIX D: GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

 

AMTI Air Moving Target Indication 

 

BM Battle Management 

 

C2 Command and Control 

 

D3 Detection, Discrimination and Designation 

DB Decibel 

DSB Defense Science Board 

DSP Defense Support Satellite 

 

HRTI High Resolution Terrain Information 

HPRF High Pulse Repetition Frequency 

 

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 

 

LEO Low Earth Orbit 

 

MDA Missile Defense Agency 

MDV Minimum Detectable Velocity 

MEO Medium Earth Orbit 

 

SBR Space Based Radar 

SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar 

SMTI Surface Moving Target Indication 

 
APPENDIX D _________________________________________________________________ 

22 ___________________________________________________________ DSB TASK FORCE

TELS Transport-Erector-Launchers 

TPPU Task, Post, Process and Update 

 

USD (AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics