STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE

U.S.-DPRK FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT

Thomas L. Wilborn

April 3, 1995
ii

*******

The views expressed in this report are those of the author

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.

Government. This report is approved for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

*******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War

College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may be

conveyed directly to the author by calling commercial (717) 245-

4064 or DSN 242-4064.

*******

The author wishes to express his appreciation to the

following individuals who read and commented on an earlier draft

of this monograph. They are Mr. Lynn Turk of the Office of Korean

Affairs, Department of State; Captain Tom Flanagan (U.S. Navy),

LTC Michael J. Baier (U.S. Army) and MAJ Lloyd Miles (U.S. Army)

of the Asia-Pacific Division, J-5, the Joint Staff; and Dr.

Stephen Blank, Colonel (U.S. Army, Retired) Donald Boose, Colonel

Paul P. Peyton, and Dr. Donald E. Schulz of the U.S. Army War

College. All errors of fact and analysis are, of course, the sole

responsibility of the author.
iii

FOREWORD

The United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of

Korea (DPRK) signed an unprecedented framework agreement in

October 1994 to halt the latter’s nuclear weapons program,

establish low-level diplomatic contacts between Washington and

Pyongyang, and reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula. In this

study, the author argues that it also places the United States,

South Korea’s historic ally and partner with South Korea in the

Combined Forces Command, in a new and unfamiliar role as mediator

of conflict on the peninsula.

The author contends that the responsibility for imple-menting

this complicated agreement, which involves sensitive political

issues for all nations involved, falls primarily on the United

States. He contends that U.S. performance of its responsibilities

under the agreement will profoundly affect the strategic

environment of Northeast Asia.

SSI is pleased to offer this monograph as a contribution to

the ongoing dialogue on U.S. strategy in Asia and the Pacific.

WILLIAM W. ALLEN

Colonel, U.S. Army

Acting Director

Strategic Studies Institute
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

THOMAS L. WILBORN, a Research Professor of National Security

Affairs, is an Asian specialist with the Strategic Studies

Institute of the U.S. Army War College. His recent publications

include Security Cooperation with China: Analysis and a Proposal;

Japan’s Self-Defense Forces: What Dangers to Northeast Asia?;

Stability, Security Structures,<D> and U.S. Policy for East Asia

and the Pacific<D>; and How Northeast Asians View Their

Security<D>, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,

1994, 1993, 1992, and 1991, respectively; and “Arms Control and

R.O.K. Relations with the D.P.R.K.,” The Korean Journal of Defense

Analysis<D>, Winter 1990. He is also author or coauthor of several

other studies and articles related to Asian security, nuclear

doctrine, and NATO. Before joining the Institute in 1975, Dr.

Wilborn taught international relations and political science at

James Madison University and Central Missouri University, and

served on a University of Kentucky educational assistance group

working at the Institut Teknologi Bandung, Bandung, Indonesia. He

received the Ph.D. degree in political science from the University

of Kentucky.
v

SUMMARY

On October 21, 1994, the United States and the Democratic

People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) signed an “Agreed Framework”

which is designed to provide the procedure to resolve the dispute

over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. If and when

successfully executed, it will satisfy U.S. negotiating

objectives, but, in the process, propel the United States into the

center of North-South conflict. For South Korea, in addition to

the explicit benefits of the provisions, it will facilitate more

frequent and meaningful communication between the two halves of

the now divided peninsula and a gradual, rather than chaotic, path

to unification.

Generally, the Agreed Framework obligates North Korea to:

• eliminate its existing capability to produce weapons grade

plutonium;

• resume, after several years delay, full membership in the

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, including the require- ment to

comply completely with its safeguard agreement with the

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which mandates allowing

IAEA inspectors to investigate suspected nuclear waste sites and

to place any nuclear material not previously identified under IAEA

safeguards.

• consistently take steps to execute the North-South Joint

Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; and

• engage in North-South dialogue.

An international consortium led by the United States (Korea

Energy Development Organization [KEDO]), with South Korea and

Japan paying most of the costs, will have provided North Korea

with:

• two 1,000 mw(e) light water reactor (LWR) power plants,

priced at some $4 billion; and

• heavy oil, reaching 500,000 tons annually, to compensate

for the capacity forfeited by North Korea by freezing its

graphite-modulated reactors.
vi

The United States and the DPRK each agreed to:

• open liaison offices in the capital of the other, and

• reduce barriers to trade and investment.

As of the end of February 1995, Pyongyang has complied

scrupulously with technical aspects of the agreement, but has

resisted the resumption of dialogue with Seoul. It also was

threatening to reject the contract with KEDO, presumably to be

presented in April, which will specify South Korean LWR power

plants.

Washington’s obligations to implement the agreement would be

challenging under the best of circumstances, when all the

principal parties shared a broad political consensus. But only a

limited consensus exists, with serious differing interpretations

of several provisions of the Agreed Framework. Moreover, there may

be significant political changes within all of the governments–

United States, ROK, Japan, China, Russia, and the DPRK–involved in

carrying out the agreement. Therefore, to see that North Korea’s

nuclear weapons program is terminated, North-South dialogue is

resumed, and all of the other requirements of the Agreed Framework

are met, Washington necessarily will be involved in sensitive and

extremely difficult negotiations. It must simultaneously be a

mediator between the DPRK, a long-time enemy, and the ROK, a longtime ally, and continue to be ally and friend of South Korea. How

the United States performs this role will not only affect the

global campaign against proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction, North-South confrontation on the Korean peninsula,

and regional stability, but also U.S. credibility among allies

everywhere.
1

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE

U.S.-DPRK FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT

On October 21, 1994, the governments of the United States and

the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) reached agreement

on a complicated formula to resolve the dispute over North Korea’s

nuclear weapons program.1

 In the highly controversial settlement,

most U.S. critics have focused on Pyongyang’s unreliability or the

high costs of the proposed solution. On the other hand, most

supporters have dwelled on the curbs to North Korea’s nuclear

program. However, whatever its shortcomings, if fully implemented

this agreement will have profound strategic consequences for the

United States, both Koreas, and potentially other nations of the

region.

While this monograph examines the content of the document and

the criticisms of it, the core of the presentation analyses the

strategic implications of the agreement and the likely problems

in its implementation. The primary focus concerns the unavoidable

involvement of the United States as a mediator in inter-Korean

relations while still maintaining its alliance with the Republic

of Korea (ROK), and the changes in North Korea’s status which full

implementation may foster.

THE AGREED FRAMEWORK

The agreement actually consists of three documents: the

“Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” a letter from President

Clinton to Kim Jong Il, and a “Confidential Minute” included at

the request of Pyongyang. The Agreed Framework and letter appear

in Appendices A and B, respectively. Ambassador at Large Robert

Gallucci, who headed the U.S. negotiating team, has said that the

confidential minute contains no secret deals, but only explicates

and extends the Framework.2

 When fully and faithfully implemented,

which would be in 2003 (the target date of the Framework), or

perhaps later, North Korea will have two operational light-water

reactor (LWR) power stations with a capacity of 2,000 MW(e), and

the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be in

possession of the knowledge (if it is technically possible to

retrieve it) of how much plutonium North Korea had produced before

the agreement was signed.3 The DPRK will not be pursuing a nuclear

weapons program and North and South Korea will be engaged in wide-
2

ranging dialogue.

The Framework specifies a complicated pattern of actions by

North Korea, on the one hand, and by the United States, in most

cases representing the international consortium established under

the agreement, on the other. In some cases, steps by one side are

predicated on the completion of steps by the other side. In other

cases, the Framework does not indicate timing or specific quids

pro quo.

According to the Framework, the first deadline for action was

November 20, 1994, when Pyongyang was to freeze the operation of

its 5 MW reactor and reprocessing facility, and suspend work on

two reactors under construction. In fact, the DPRK froze all

operations and construction on November 2, some 3 weeks sooner

than necessary. The Framework also required Pyongyang, which must

remain a member of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), to allow the

IAEA to monitor the freeze. IAEA inspectors arrived in the DPRK in

late November 1994.

In the meantime, the United States must make arrangements to

begin providing heavy oil to North Korea, which will reach a level

of 500,000 tons annually, “to offset the energy foregone due to

the freeze of the DPRK’s graphite- moderated reactors and related

facilities, pending completion of the first LWR unit.”

The first oil shipment was delivered on January 18, 1995.4

 In

November and December 1994, Washington started the machinery to

provide the DPRK with the LWR power stations. These arrangements

include setting up an international consortium, the Korea Energy

Development Organization (KEDO), which will provide Pyongyang its

benefits.5 The Framework specifically provides that the United

States will be the principal point of contact for KEDO with the

DPRK. 

By April 20, 1995, Washington will make its “best efforts” to

conclude a supply contract between KEDO and Pyongyang. According

to Ambassador Gallucci, North Korea has agreed that the contract

will provide for long-term repayment of the costs of the reactors

by the DPRK through barter arrangements.6

 Moreover, in his letter

to Kim, written the day before the Agreed Framework and

Confidential Minute were signed, President Clinton promised that,

subject to the approval of Congress, the United States would
3

provide the LWRs and fuel if the consortium failed to do so “for

reasons beyond the control of the DPRK.”

From a nonproliferation perspective, light-water reactors

 have at least two advantages over the North Korean designed

graphite-modulated reactors.7

 The former require a more

sophisticated and costly process to refuel and extract spent fuel.

When the spent fuel is obtained, it contains dangerous isotopes

not suitable for the production of weapons. By comparison,

graphite-modulated reactors can be refueled, and weapons grade

plutonium extracted, relatively frequently and cheaply.8

Nonetheless, the LWR power plants to be constructed in North Korea

will have a greater capacity than the graphite-modulated reactors

in operation (5 MW) and under construction (50 MW and 250 MW) at

Yongbyon. Additionally they will produce more plutonium, even if

it is more difficult to extract, than would be produced by the

reactors which have been frozen.9 The second advantage is that

Pyongyang will depend on outside sources for the enriched uranium

required to fuel LWRs. The natural uranium which fuels graphitemodulated reactors is produced within North Korea.

When the supply contract between KEDO and the DPRK is signed,

Pyongyang must permit the IAEA to resume ad hoc and routine

inspections on nuclear facilities initially declared to the IAEA

by North Korea which were not subject to the freeze under the

agreement.10 Pending completion of the supply contract IAEA must be

allowed to conduct inspections to assure the continuity of

safeguards as far as those facilities are concerned. Pyongyang had

cooperated fully with the IAEA through February 1995.11

Both sides reduced barriers to trade and investment, as

required by the Agreed Framework, by January 20, 1995. North Korea

ended its embargo on American goods, phone calls, and financial

transactions. U.S. banks will no longer freeze dollars which pass

through them in the course of international trade transactions

involving North Korea. U.S. flagged ships may now dock at North

Korean ports. The United States took more limited steps. Telephone

communications and the use of credit cards will now be permitted

in North Korea. U.S. news organizations may open offices there,

and North Korean news organizations may operate in the United

States. Washington also ended the ban on the import of magnesite,

one of the few North Korean products for which there is a demand

in the United States. Further relaxations of trade barriers are
4

possible in the future.12 Under the provisions of the Framework,

the two sides have held expert talks on (1) issues related to the

LWR project and (2) specific arrangements for storage and ultimate

disposition of some 8,000 spent fuel rods now in a cooling pond at

Yongbyon. While the Framework only enjoins both parties to find a

method to safely store the spent fuel during the construction of

the LWRs, and to “dispose of the fuel in a safe manner that does

not involve reprocessing in the DPRK,” Gallucci has clearly stated

that final disposition will not be in North Korea.13 Pyongyang was

very cooperative–indeed, eager–in facilitating expert talks which

were underway before the end of 1994, and reportedly was

cooperative at those talks.14

Each side should open liaison offices, at the lowest possible

level of diplomatic relations, in the capital of the other,

presumably as soon as logistics arrangements can be completed,

with the goal of full normalization relations “as progress is made

on issues of concern to each side.” At his press conference on

October 19, 1994, Gallucci indicated that the issues to make

progress on would involve fundamental disagreements between the

two parties, and include Pyongyang’s offensive forward deployments

close to the DMZ, North-South relations, and human rights.15

There are only two other milestones in the Framework. One

provides that on completion of “significant portions of the LWR

project, but before delivery of key nuclear components,” the DPRK

must come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with

the IAEA, including whatever measures are required by the IAEA to

determine how much plutonium Pyongyang has already produced. The

Framework offers no definitions to any of the terms in the phrase

quoted above. However, Ambassador Gallucci has indicated that

“significant portions of the LWR project” exclude any important

nuclear component or any item that is controlled on the nuclear

suppliers’ guidelines trigger list. “There’s a specific definition

there,” Gallucci said, “and it goes to the nuclear steam supply

system of a power reactor. It’s a standard, internationally

accepted standard.”16 Based on the Ambassador’s press conference,

but not the Agreed Framework itself, the process of shipping the

spent fuel rods will begin at the same time.17 The other milestone

provides that the DPRK will dismantle the graphite-modulated

reactors and associated facilities before the LWR project (that

is, the second LWR) is completed.
5

Other provisions of the Agreed Framework are not linked to

milestones, but are nevertheless potentially important. Washington

is required to provide a written negative security guarantee to

Pyongyang with respect to nuclear weapons. The United States

already commits itself not to use or threaten to use nuclear

weapons against any non-nuclear member of the NPT not allied with

a nuclear state. It has now extended this pledge to Pyongyang,

even though the DPRK is allied to China and Russia. The other

obligations placed on North Korea are less precise and more likely

to be subject to varying interpretations.

Pyongyang agrees to “consistently take steps” to execute the

“North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the

Korean Peninsula.” Pyongyang also commits itself to “engage in

North-South dialogue, as this Agreed Framework will help create an

atmosphere that promotes such dialogue.” However, in the first

months after signing the Agreed Framework, the DPRK did nothing to

implement the Joint Declaration, and decidedly did not engage in

dialogue with the South. A North Korean spokesman is reported to

have said that the DPRK would not enter a dialogue with the

present ROK government.

CRITICAL APPRAISALS

The harshest U.S. critics of the agreement object to any

compromise with the DPRK, an international outlaw state which

poses a direct threat to a long-time ally, the Republic of Korea

(ROK) and to U.S. forces in South Korea.18 Unless Pyongyang

capitulates to U.S. demands, they prefer coercion, sanctions, and

even military action as the means of halting North Korea’s nuclear

weapons program and accounting for the plutonium which Pyongyang

may have produced in the past. They argue that the Kim Jong Il

regime is experiencing serious economic problems, was

internationally isolated until the Framework was signed, and is

bound to suffer economic collapse or implode in the near future if

the United States and its allies do not assist it. Moreover, to

these critics, rewarding (or perhaps compromising with) an outlaw

regime like Pyongyang is immoral and sets a terrible precedent for

other rogue states: start or seem to start a nuclear weapons

program and the United States will pay you to stop. A Washington

analyst called the agreement an act of criminal appeasement.19 Four

Republican members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee wrote

to President Clinton that “We are left wondering how to
6

distinguish such a deal from U.S. submission to North Korean

nuclear blackmail.”20

A second level of criticism deals with complaints about

specific provisions of the agreements, some of which appear to be

based on a limited understanding of what is actually provided

for.21 The most widespread displeasure is with the timing of

reciprocal concessions and actions, particularly the concession

which delays special inspections to discover how much plutonium

Pyongyang now has on hand. What is to prevent the DPRK regime from

expelling IAEA inspectors (it has done so before) when the LWR

power plants are completed except for “key nuclear components,”

buying the missing parts from vendors in nonconsortium countries,

and never revealing how much plutonium is on hand? Or, how can

Washington or Seoul force Pyongyang to dismantle the complex at

Yongbyon after the consortium has delivered the first LWR? What

will prevent Pyongyang from resuming its nuclear weapons program

when the LWRs are on-line? Some critics believe that the

agreement will not stop the DPRK nuclear weapons program at all,

but rather allow the regime to make more bombs than would be

possible if the agreement had not been signed.

Supporters of the agreement, including the Clinton

administration, while they would prefer to deal with a different

regime in Pyongyang and probably would be delighted for North

Korea to be incorporated into the ROK, have more specific and

fundamentally different objectives:22

• placing plutonium produced by North Korea in the past under

IAEA safeguards and dismantling any nuclear weapons produced;

• convincing North Korea to permanently halt its nuclear

weapons program;

• keeping North Korea within the NPT, in full compliance with

its safeguard agreement with IAEA;

• enticing the DPRK out of international isolation; and,

• supporting stability and security on the Korean peninsula

and in Northeast Asia.

An assumption underlying the administration’s approach,
7

especially since former President Carter held his celebrated

discussions with Kim Ill Sung in July 1994, has been that

Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program was developed as one means to

assure regime and state survival in what the North Korean elite

saw as hostile and deteriorating international and regional

environments. It did not accept the hypothesis, considered an

axiom by some critics of the agreement, that the Kim regime was

determined to develop nuclear weapons at all costs. The

administration believed, therefore, that steps which offered

Pyongyang some way out with respect to North Korea’s major

perceived threats–economic collapse, international isolation, and

nuclear attack–could be the basis of a compromise in which

Pyongyang accepted limitations on its nuclear weapons program,

which Pyongyang has never admitted having anyway. The

administration, which might have to commit U.S. troops in case of

conflict, is also less sanguine than many critics that coercion

against Pyongyang would not lead to a second Korean war with very

heavy casualties and great material damage. Lastly, defenders of

the agreement were not convinced that requisite international

backing for sanctions, which the Clinton administration tried to

obtain before former President Carter’s visit to North Korea,

including the vote of China in the UN Security Council and Japan’s

active support, would be forthcoming.

The administration, largely through Ambassador Gallucci,

presents six arguments in response to these criticisms:

First, the Framework and supporting documents do not

represent submission to blackmail or appeasement. In his early

defense of the agreement, Gallucci implied that the DPRK made more

concessions than the United States.23 North Korea accepts

limitations on its nuclear energy programs that are more stringent

than those required by the NPT. It is freezing and then

dismantling its reactors and reprocessing facility, not

processing the spent fuel rods removed in July 1994, and allowing

them to be moved to another country. North Korea has no legal

obligation to do any of these things under the NPT.

Second, the steps cited above satisfy U.S. objectives with

respect to North Korea’s current nuclear program. The requirement

that the DPRK remain in the NPT and fulfill its obligations under

the safeguards agreement with the IAEA and also resume dialogue

with the ROK meets U.S. objectives with respect to North Korea’s
8

future nuclear activity.

Third, Gallucci argues that the delay in authorizing the IAEA

to conduct special inspections of the two suspected nuclear waste

sites is not critical, and that the Agreed Framework also meets

U.S. objectives about North Korea’s past program. Technically,

there is no reason for haste because the nuclear waste sites will

necessarily still be there in 5 or more years. While politically

it would be better for the IAEA to make the determination now,

Pyongyang will be denied the critical nuclear components until

IAEA has completed whatever inspections and analysis are required.

If IAEA finds that more plutonium was generated than Pyongyang

originally indicated, it will all have to be accounted for and

placed under safeguards before work on the LWR project continues.24

This provision was one of the final compromises. Pyongyang had

previously insisted that special inspections would never be

allowed, and Washington, partly in response to strong pressure

from Seoul, had previously demanded that the inspections take

place before any benefits flow to North Korea. Gallucci and his

colleagues would probably agree that the NPT regime, and

especially the IAEA, would have greater credibility if the DPRK

had fully complied with the IAEA safeguards agreement and had not

started to withdraw from the NPT. But they also argue that the NPT

regime would be much weaker had Pyongyang withdrawn from the

treaty, a likely development had no agreement been reached.

Fourth, the Framework is not based on trust–actions required

of Pyongyang can be verified by the IAEA and U.S. national

technical means. Benefits will be withheld when there is no

compliance.

Fifth, it is a compromise. Some provisions are not ideal and

North Korea does make gains. The costs to the international

community are significant, but not unreasonable given the

benefits: reduction of the threats of nuclear proliferation and

instability in Northeast Asia. The outcome of the negotiations is

a positive sum solution.

And sixth, the agreement is a precedent only to the degree

that other situations have the same characteristics as this one:

 isolated regime, confrontation with a neighbor which is an ally

of the United States, a state divided by the Cold War, and

presence of graphite-moderated reactors. Gallucci argues that
9

there are no similar situations, and probably will not be.25

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

U.S. strategic goals for the agreement with the DPRK are to 

remove North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, preserve the NPT

regime, and enhance security on the Korean peninsula, in part by

drawing North Korea into a more normal pattern of regional and

global relations. If all of the provisions of the Framework,

including those related to the Joint Declaration on the

Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and inter-Korean

dialogue, are successfully implemented, those goals should be

achieved. Another agreement might have produced a more desirable

strategic environment– Pyongyang’s acceptance of immediate special

inspections would have strengthened the NPT regime and the IAEA–

but no agreement would almost surely have been decidedly worse.

There are also implicit strategic consequences which may be at

least as important for the United States and the Republic of

Korea.

U.S. Engagement in Inter-Korean Relations.

The requirement that the United States organize KEDO and act

as the point of contact between KEDO and the DPRK not only imposes

a heavy obligation on Washington for the resolution of the nuclear

weapons issue, but also places Washington in a completely new and

ambiguous position with respect to the Korean peninsula. For

almost 50 years the patron or ally of the Republic of Korea in

opposition to the DPRK, the United States must now act as mediator

or balancer between its long-time friend and its long-time

adversary. And it must assume this middle position while

continuing to uphold the Mutual Security Treaty with the ROK and

participate fully in the Combined Forces Command (CFC), which both

explicitly target the DPRK as aggressor.

This position, which has inherent inconsistencies, gives

Washington new access and opportunities to influence North Korea,

and new responsibilities for maintaining stability on the

peninsula. It is probably inescapable if Washington is to

simultaneously pursue the broad objectives of preventing the North

from producing nuclear weapons and enhancing regional stability.

As long as the Korean Workers Party regime retains its

totalitarian character and continues to threaten the South with an
10

offensively structured force which can attack with almost no

warning, the United States cannot reduce its contribution to the

CFC deterrent and still hope to enhance regional stability. On the

other hand, Washington must pursue implementation of the Agreed

Framework, which requires dialogue with Pyongyang, in order to

forestall the North’s nuclear weapons program without provoking

conflict.

Washington’s obligations under the Framework would be

challenging under any circumstances. Completion of the LWR

project, transfer of spent fuel rods out of North Korea, and

dismantling the nuclear complex at Yongbyon will all be major

undertakings requiring a high level of technological and

managerial skill.26 Nonetheless, if all parties affected by the

agreement shared the same interpretation of its provisions and the

same zeal for its implementation, the political problems imposed

upon Washington would not necessarily be difficult to reconcile.

 There is only a limited political consensus about the Agreed

Framework, however. Because of this, Washington will be forced to

maneuver among contesting interpretations, intergovernment

tensions, and unpredictable domestic political contexts in all

countries which will play a major role.

It is already clear that Pyongyang, on the one hand, and

Washington and Seoul, on the other, interpret the Framework’s

provisions concerning the North-South nuclear declaration and the

resumption of North-South dialogue very differently27 Moreover,

according to the South Korean press, Pyongyang, otherwise very

forthcoming in implementing the agreement, has insisted again that

it, and not KEDO, name the contractor of the LWR power plants, and

revived the argument that the LWRs in South Korea were untested

and possibly unsafe.28 Washington holds that the decision is

entirely the prerogative of KEDO.29 In fact, Washington is

completely committed to South Korea as the source of the prime

contractor, as Ambassador Gallucci, Assistant Secretary of State

Winston Lord, and Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott have

repeatedly stated.30 Ambassador Gallucci contends that North Korea

acquiesced in the choice of a South Korean reactor during the 1994

Geneva negotiations. But Pyongyang was still insisting in March

1995 that a South Korean LWR was unacceptable.31 While some of the

provisions of the Agreed Framework are fairly precise, there will

be differing interpretations of other provisions also throughout
11

the lengthy implementation process.

Moreover, Washington-Pyongyang relations will not be confined

to the Agreed Framework process. But, like the crisis following

the pre-Christmas accidental overflight of the Military

Demarkation Line by a U.S. helicopter, events involving the United

States and the DPRK may have a serious impact on that process.

Indeed, the administration probably could not have maintained its

commitment to the agreement if the overflight dispute had not been

favorably resolved.32 If Pyongyang attempts to secure unreasonable

concessions in a future dispute, Washington’s continued

participation will be problematic. In any case, it is virtually

certain that there will be more frequent disagreements on a

variety of issues when and if U.S.-DPRK contacts increase.

Another major factor complicating the prospects of

implementation of the agreement is the hostile tone of North-South

relations, never good but rarely as vituperative as at the time of

the signing of the Framework. Especially after the death of Great

Leader Kim Il Sung in July 1994, Pyongyang’s controlled media

launched vicious personal attacks on President Kim Young Sam, and

openly encouraged opposition to the South Korean government.33

Seoul’s attacks on the North were less personal and extreme, but

instead of sending condolences to the North Korean people when the

Great Leader died (an omission which Pyongyang attacks as an

unforgivable affront), the South Korean government chose to

emphasize Kim Il Sung’s responsibility for starting the Korean War

and other misdeeds of his regime.34 By the end of 1994, the quality

of the rhetoric in Pyongyang and Seoul had, if anything,

degenerated. Seoul’s overtures toward Pyongyang to increase

economic cooperation were couched in condescending language and

suspicion, and Pyongyang’s responses were uncompromisingly

negative. These tensions may be a serious barrier to the

completion of a KEDO-DPRK supply contract by April 20, 1995, since

KEDO intends to name a South Korean contractor. They will clearly

have to be modified before North-South discussions can be

profitably renewed, as the Agreed Framework requires.

Moreover, resumption of the North-South dialogue is not

merely dictated by the Framework; of equal importance it is

necessary to remove Pyongyang’s threats of nuclear proliferation

and conventional conflict in the long term. Momentarily setting

aside the possibility of unification, there can be no assurance
12

that the DPRK will remain in the NPT or abide by the more

restrictive standards of the North-South Joint Declaration on a

Nuclear Free Korean Peninsula after the Agreed Framework has been

fully implemented unless relations between North and South Korea

improve significantly.35 Ultimately, North Korea must open its

borders to freer exchange of ideas and commerce–that is to say,

the regime must fundamentally change–before the threat to

stability will disappear.

The political situation in Seoul and Pyongyang further

confounds U.S. efforts to execute the Framework and achieve

American long-term objectives. South Korean President Kim Young

Sam’s Democratic Liberal Party still has a majority in the

National Assembly, but, nevertheless, the ROK’s participation in

the Framework process has widespread opposition.36 Just before the

U.S.-DPRK agreement was reached, President Kim himself had

pronounced that several provisions which appeared in the final

agreement would be unacceptable, and his subsequent support for

the Agreed Framework, while consistent, has not always been

completely enthusiastic.37 Many South Korean politicians and

analysts are not only concerned about the provisions which also

bother a number of American critics, but also about the large sum

of money which the ROK is expected to pay.

Most significantly, virtually all South Korean observers

believe that the United States did not give sufficient attention

to ROK interests, although U.S.-ROK consultation was thorough and

frequent during and since the negotiations.38 There seems to be a

pervasive feeling among South Koreans that the Clinton

administration let their country down, and that Seoul has lost its

ability to directly influence the outcome of events on the

peninsula. Many feel that South Korea has no choice but to accept

a bad deal which would have been better except for U.S. naivete

or, for a few observers, treachery.39 This is not to say that most

South Koreans oppose the agreement. Some intellectuals and

conservative interests clearly do, and many more disapprove of

some of its provisions. However, the specter of U.S.-DPRK

discussions in the absence of ROK-DPRK discussions is widely

resented.40

Political pressure on Kim Young Sam and his successor (Kim’s

term expires in 1997, and he cannot succeed himself) is likely to

be reflected in constant demands on the United States to require
13

exact compliance, including the provisions which have to do with

inter-Korean dialogue, from Pyongyang. Those within Seoul’s elite

who do support the agreement, or at least believe that South

Korean business and the cause of unification can benefit from it,

are likely to lose what influence they have if the North-South

dialogue is not resumed relatively soon. Support for the Agreed

Framework may virtually collapse if the KEDO-DPRK contract to be

negotiated by April 20, 1995, and KEDO decisions made pursuant to

it, do not award the contract for construction of the LWR to

Seoul’s choice of contractor, or significantly restrict Seoul’s

ability to control the construction process.

Domestic politics in North Korea remains largely a mystery.

Most foreign observers believe that Kim Jong Il, the son of the

only supreme leader which North Korea had heretofore known, has

successfully replaced his father.41 However, other Pyongyang

watchers believe that the reign of the younger Kim will only be

transitory, either because of his health or because elements of

the elite will remove him.42 Kim’s silence during the episode

concerning the helicopter shot down in December 1994 gives

credence to the latter observers.43 Pyongyang’s behavior then also

suggested disagreements within the elite.44 While it seems likely

that Kim Il Sung’s death expedited generational change within

North Korea’s elite, no one is completely sure how far the process

has progressed or whether the new generation of leaders will

necessarily be more pragmatic and open to better relations with

the South. It is likely that some of attitudes and some of the

divisions of the older generation will persist within the younger

ones to some degree.

Unification of the Korean peninsula, even in the time-span of

the Agreed Framework, is clearly a possibility. But unification

which resulted from a crisis, implosion or explosion in the North

could strain the financial, social, and political structures of

South Korea, and create serious migration problems for China,

Japan, and perhaps Russia.45 To these governments, therefore, a

nonthreatening path to unification is much more desirable. And,

like the resumption of North-South dialogue, peaceful unification

would also seem improbable unless there are fundamental changes in

the Pyongyang regime.

While without the Agreed Framework Washington might have had

only indirect influence on the unification process, its actions
14

and inactions will now directly affect the North-South dialogue.

Washington will have to be imaginative in presenting (or

withholding) the incentives provided by the agreement, in order to

secure compliance not only with the Framework provisions which

apply directly to North Korean nuclear facilities, but also those

concerning inter-Korean dialogue. At the same time, it must

carefully nurture its alliance with the ROK and encourage Seoul’s

cooperation in resuming North-South dialogue.

The ambiguities of the U.S. position will inevitably strain

U.S.-ROK relations. To maintain Seoul’s confidence in the United

States and the Framework process, and to provide government

leaders some protection against charges that the ROK is being

ignored by the United States, Washington will need to continue

frequent and open consultations in which South Korea has every

opportunity to fully articulate its positions. And Washington must

do more than listen; it must be very sympathetic to Seoul’s

interests, and accommodate them whenever possible.

There are likely to be uncertain political conditions in

other capitals involved in the Agreed Framework process. In

Washington, a Republican majority containing outspoken critics

(but also some hesitant supporters) of the agreement controls both

houses of Congress and all of their committees.46 The Clinton

administration may be able to avoid the necessity of getting

explicit congressional approval of its actions implementing the

Framework, but that will prevent obtaining additional funds and

otherwise reduce its freedom of action. Certainly the State

Department will be under close congressional scrutiny, frequently

required to defend itself before cynical or hostile committees.47

Had Pyongyang not released Chief Warrant Officer Bobby Hall when

it did, majorities in both parties in Congress might have

overturned the agreement. Moreover, before the Framework process

is concluded, there will be at least two presidential elections

and five congressional elections in the United States. New

administrations and possibly new congressional personnel

overseeing the execution of foreign policy will make a consistent

policy less likely than if a single administration were to be

responsible throughout the period of implementation of the

agreement. At one extreme, a new administration might even

withdraw from the process altogether unless real progress was

already apparent.
15

The other major actors in the Framework process will be China

and Japan. Their political systems also are potentially unstable.

Japan is in the midst of a major political realignment which

probably will not significantly affect Tokyo’s attitudes toward

the Framework, but is likely to add to the general uncertainty

confronting U.S. diplomats responsible for fulfilling the

expectations of the agreement.48

China is on the threshold of completing the generational

transition from the original leaders of the revolutions to the

nomenklatura who have matured since the Communist victory of 1949.

At the same time, dramatic economic development strains the

capacities of social, political, and legal structures, stimulating

tendencies toward decentralization, on the one hand, and

nationalism, on the other. Now supportive of the Framework and

also sympathetic with the regime in Pyongyang, a shift in

orientation toward the Korean peninsula could add additional

barriers to implementation of the agreement. At the least,

significant political changes in Beijing will resonate throughout

the region and in Washington.49

The formation of KEDO, providing funds for its operations,

 and the negotiation of a supply contract between KEDO and the

DPRK have required and still require that Washington negotiate,

and perhaps sometimes determine, politically sensitive issues. How

can additional nations be persuaded to join KEDO? Japanese

officials reportedly believe that members of the European

Community should belong, or at least pay a share of LWR costs,

since Japan supported clean-up efforts at Chernoble. While it has

been understood from the beginning of the last round of

negotiations in July that South Korea and Japan would pay almost

all of the costs of the LWR project, the exact amounts and terms

have apparently not yet been settled. Nor have the United States,

South Korea, and Japan agreed who will pay for KEDO’s

administrative costs and the fuel to be supplied until the new

power plants are on-line.

Washington must also consider Beijing and Moscow, which have

direct interest in Korean security and the North Korean nuclear

issue but are not parties to the Agreed Framework or members of

KEDO.50 In fact, the United States consulted frequently with them

during the negotiations, and both have officially endorsed the

agreement. But the reaction of Russia to the first steps of
16

implementing the Framework illustrates the kind of the problems,

with potentially wide-ranging ramifications, with which Washington

may have to deal. Without opposing the Agreed Framework directly,

Moscow has challenged one of the fundamental understandings

underlying the arrangement: Seoul would provide most of the money

and also provide the reactors. At about the time that U.S. and

DPRK representatives were meeting in Beijing during December 1994

to begin discussions on KEDO, Moscow announced plans to send a

team of experts to Pyongyang to lobby that a Russian contractor be

selected to build the LWR power plants.51 More seriously, in

phrases similar to words used at about the same time with respect

to Bosnia and NATO, Moscow asserted its right to be involved in

all deliberations affecting the security of Northeast Asia.52

Moscow reiterated its proposal, first made and rejected by all

parties in April 1994, that a 10 party conference–both Korean

governments, Japan, the Permanent Members of the Security Council,

the IAEA, and the UN–take up the issue of North Korea’s nuclear

weapons program.53 Pyongyang, which has insisted all along that the

issue was a bilateral one between itself and Washington, is likely

to reject the proposal for a 10 party conference again. However,

by attempting to impose Russian designed and produced LWRs on KEDO

and reintroducing its 10 party conference proposal, Moscow has

indicated its willingness to assert its national interests,

particularly to insist on a major role in determining security

arrangements in Northeast Asia, even at the risk of jeopardizing

the Agreed Framework process. Since it is not in Moscow’s interest

for Pyongyang to have nuclear weapons, Moscow is unlikely to

actually derail the agreement. It is likely to further complicate

the U.S. role.54 Before the Agreed Framework process is completed,

it is easy to imagine other disagreements with Moscow, and with

China, which will pose difficult political choices for the United

States.

In summary, as the executor of the Agreed Framework the

United States will necessarily be engaged in a whole range of

regional and international interactions which it otherwise might

avoid. In a strategic sense, the most important consequence of

this engagement could be Washington’s new role of simultaneously

being mediator of North-South relations and Seoul’s ally.

Strategic Implications for the ROK.

As previously noted, South Koreans are suspicious of the new
17

direct bilateral channels between Washington and Pyongyang. Until

the direct dialogue called for by the Agreed Framework actually

begins, they believe that the ROK’s strategic position is

substantially worse than before: fundamental questions related to

the future of the Korean peninsula are being debated and decisions

are being made without Seoul’s direct participation. In practical

terms, Washington’s close and frequent consultation has allowed

Seoul to exercise significant influence–but that is not the same

thing as full participation. In psychological terms, especially in

view of the zero-sum logic of implacable enemies, this situation

is a strategic loss for the ROK, even though other consequences of

the Agreed Framework are favorable to South Korea. When the

official North-South dialogues on the future of the peninsula

resume, South Korea’s absence from U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework

negotiations will be much less important.

Over and beyond the benefits of reduced nuclear threat and a

general lowering of tensions, one of the most important gains is

that the shipments of petroleum under the agreement and the

greater access to international lending agencies implied by the

agreement will help stabilize North Korea’s moribund command

economy. Paradoxically, most South Korean leaders believe that a

stronger (but not too strong) economy for their long-time enemy is

essential to prevent a near-term German-style unification which

might cost South Korea billions of dollars it cannot afford,

preceded by an influx of millions of refugees it cannot

accommodate.55 Instead, all other things being equal, the South

Korean preference is for unification through a gradual process in

which Pyongyang slowly adopts market reforms, and North Korean GNP

increases.56 By this scenario, political reform follows economic

reform, and in a decade of so, DPRK and ROK agree to merge in a

democratic, market-economy system. The direct economic benefits to

Pyongyang under the Agreed Framework can help sustain North Korea

until the limited reforms which Pyongyang has undertaken begin to

show positive results, and the gradual process toward unification

begins.

 Another major development with broad strategic implications

for Seoul is the necessity for Pyongyang to allow interaction

between North Korean and South Korean nuclear and construction

specialists once KEDO assigns the LWR contract to a South Korean

concern. These contacts, especially when added to increased

communications between North Koreans and IAEA personnel and U.S.
18

nuclear specialists, must inevitably stimulate the flow of

information into the DPRK about South Korea and the rest of the

world. Pyongyang’s opposition to a South Korean contractor is

probably based more on fear of the spread of knowledge about South

Korea and its modern society than on the alleged technical

shortcomings of the South Korean reactor design. In any case,

penetrating Pyongyang’s isolation through increased contacts with

the South and the rest of the world has long been one of Seoul’s

primary objectives.

Increased information flows generated by the Agreed Framework

will involve relatively few individuals, and they will be closely

monitored. However, these flows will take place at a time when

more people are visiting Pyongyang than in the past, and when the

DPRK is encouraging foreign investment, and thus even more

visitors, in its newly created free economic zones.57 All of these

increased flows of people, and thus information, will clearly be

restricted. In the near term, the impact on society will be

neither pervasive nor dramatic. Nonetheless, the chance that this

increased access to information can cause dissatisfaction among

sectors of the elite or otherwise affect the nature of the regime

is probably greater than ever before.58

CONCLUSIONS

For the United States, the most important, immediate

strategic consequence of the Agreed Framework negotiated with the

DPRK, other than the gains in nonproliferation and regional

stability, is that Washington is now at the center of the

controversy between North and South Korea, one of the most

enduring confrontations of the 20th century. It may be a temporary

situation. If the promises of the agreement are all fulfilled in

2003 or thereabouts, stability will prevail on a nuclear-free

Korean peninsula, and there will no longer be a need for a

dominant–or perhaps any–U.S. role. If the promises of the

agreement are not realized, the United States probably will revert

to ally of South Korea–the familiar role of participant in this

conflict spawned by the Cold War–rather than the unfamiliar task

of mediating between long-standing enemy and long-standing friend.

Realistically, it is unlikely that either the Agreed

Framework will be faithfully executed by all concerned or that it

will fail because of the treachery of any one participant, be it
19

the DPRK, ROK, or the United States itself. More likely, the

Agreed Framework will be implemented imperfectly by all parties,

and the process will be extended beyond the target date suggested

by the negotiators. U.S. engagement as mediator between friend and

 enemy, democracy and totalitarian dictatorship, may continue well

into the 21st century.

This extremely difficult–perhaps unprecedented–role is as

important to fulfill as it is difficult. The way in which

Washington carries out its responsibilities will influence the

credibility of the NPT regime, regional stability, and the way in

which North and South Korea approach unification. And it will also

become a major factor in defining the overall international role

of the United States in coming decades. If the United States can

effectively oversee the successful implementation of the Agreed

Framework, while at the same time honoring its obligations–

especially the military ones–under the U.S.-ROK alliance and

aggressively pursuing American economic interests within the

region, it may be able to execute a strategy of engagement and

enlargement well into the next century. On the other hand,

unsuccessful and poorly coordinated activities will endanger the

NPT, regional stability, and peaceful unification in Korea.

The most difficult obstacle is the intense hostility between

Pyongyang and Seoul. Skillful diplomacy by the United States can

assist in bringing the two sides together, but even if there are

meetings there will be no genuine dialogue on substantive

questions and certainly no agreements until the two antagonists

desire it. Genuine substantive dialogue appears to be extremely

unlikely now. The chances will probably increase when the leaders

in the North feel more secure in their positions. The presence of

new personalities in the South, which inevitably will occur after

the presidential election in 1997, may also facilitate convening a

new inter-Korean dialogue.

U.S. success in this unique international undertaking, with

significant international, regional, and national implications,

then, depends upon resolution, sustained attention, and diplomatic

skill. However, the Agreed Framework process and the satisfaction

of U.S. security objectives–not to mention the credibility of the

United States as an ally–are, in part, held hostage to detente

between Pyongyang and Seoul.
20

ENDNOTES

1. The Agreed Framework followed a long and stormy period of

off-and-on negotiations. For accounts of the negotiations, see

William E. Berry, Jr., “Nuclear Proliferation on the Korean

Peninsula: The Clinton Administration’s Response,” Occasional

Paper #3, U.S. Air Force Academy Institute of National Security

Studies, forthcoming; Young Whan Kihl, “Confrontation or

Compromise on the Korean Peninsula? The North Korean Nuclear

Issue,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Winter 1994; and

Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, “North Korea’s Nuclear Program,”

in Korea and the World: Beyond the Cold War, ed. by Young Whan

Kihl, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, pp. 233-252.

2. USIA Foreign Press Center Briefing, October 19, 1994

(hereinafter, Briefing), as recorded by the Federal News Reuter

Transcript Service. Gallucci was Assistant Secretary of State for

Political-Military Affairs as well as Ambassador at Large for the

North Korean nuclear problem at the time of the negotiations.

3. Andrew Mack, “Nuclear Endgame on the Korean Peninsula,”

Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network (NAPSNet), notes that it

is technically extremely difficult to determine how much plutonium

may have been extracted.

4. The Washington Post, January 19, 1995, p. A22.

5. KEDO was established on March 9, 1995, with a membership

of six: the United States, Japan, the ROK, Australia, Canada, and

New Zealand. Fourteen other nations attended the organizational

meetings in New York, and some of them expressed interest in

joining. Steven Greehouse, “U.S. Presses North Korea to Accept

Reactors Made By South,” The New York Times, March 10, 1995, p.

A11. Details of organization were not announced, but earlier it

was reported that the organization will be located in New York,

with an American Secretary General and South Korean and Japanese

Deputy Secretaries General. There will be a three member board of

governors (United States, ROK, and Japan), each with a veto over

all decisions. YONHAP in English, transcribed in Foreign Broadcast

Informa- tion Service Daily Report for Asia and the Pacific (FBISEAS)-94- 242, December 16, 1994, p. 42.

6. Briefing, October 19, 1994.
21

7. On the characteristics of LWRs, see Soloman Levy, “Supply

of Light Water Reactor(s) to Pyongyang: Technological Issues and

Their Possible Resolution,” December 2, 1993; and Peter Hayes,

“Should the United States Supply Light Water Reactors to

Pyongyang?” November 16, 1993, prepared for the symposium “United

States and North Korea: What Next?”, Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, distributed by NAPSNet.

8. LWRs are more expensive and difficult to refuel partly

because their fuel is clad with zirconium, which must be stripped

to acquire spent fuel. See “Testimony of Leonard Spector,”

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, as transcribed in

NAPSNet Daily Report for February 7, 1995, for an extended

discussion of the technical characteristics of LWRs which relate

to nonproliferation.

9. Harold Agnew, former Director of Los Alamos, in a letter

to the editor of the San Diego Union, placed in the record of the

Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee during its hearing

on the Agreed Framework, held January 29, 1995. The estimate was

supported by Gary Milhollin, Wisconsin Project on Disarmament, in

testimony during the same hearing. NAPSNet Daily Report for

January 20, 1995.

10. Pyongyang reported five other operations. They include a

nuclear fuel fabrication plant, two uranium mines, and two plants

for the production of uranium concentrate. “North Korea Submits

Declaration to IAEA,” Arms Control Today, May 1992, p. 18.

 @ENDNOTE TXT = 11. Ben Barber, “US to Pay a High Price to

Tame North Korea’s Nukes,” The Washington Times, January 10, 1995,

p. A1.

12. Steven Greenhouse, “U.S. Eases Trade Limits on North

Korea for First Time Since 1950,” The New York Times, January 21,

1995, p. 3.

13. Briefing, October 19, 1995.

14. Thomas Friedman, “Home Alone in Pyongyang,” The New York

Times, January 4, 1995, p. A19.
22

15. Briefing, October 19, 1995.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. For example, see Charles Krauthammer, “Romancing the

Thugs,” Time, November 7, 1994, p. 90; Karen Elliott House, “A

Dangerous Capitulation,” The Wall Street Journal, November 14,

1994, p. A10; Paul Greenberg, “Trusting a Tyrant,” The Washington

Times, October 24, 1994, p. A20; and Albert Wohlstetter and

Gregory S. Jones, “Breakthrough in NK?”, The Wall Street Journal,

November 4, 1994, p. A12.

19. Frank Gaffney, “Whistling Past Gallucci Gulch,” The

Washington Times, October 24, 1994, p. A20.

20. Alfonse D’Mato, Mitch McConnell, Jesse Helms, and Frank

Murkowski, dated October 19, 1994.

21. Examples are Victor Gilinsky and Henry Sokolski, “Korean

Accord: What Is It?”, The Washington Post, November 23, 1994, p.

A19; and the comments of Senator Frank Murkowski at the January

19, 1995, hearings of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural

Resources.

22. This discussion is based on various speeches and press

conferences by Ambassador Gallucci. His most comprehensive

statement, when answers to reporters’ questions are incorporated,

is still the press conference of October 19, 1995, cited above.

See also “The United States and North Korea Reach Agreement on

Nuclear Programs,” President Clinton, Robert Gallucci, U.S.

Department of State Dispatch, October 21, 1994, Volume 5, Number

44, pp. 721-722. For nongovernment supporting statements, see

Jessica Mathews, “A Good Deal With North Korea,” The Washington

Post, October 30, 1994, p. C7; and George Perkovich, “The Korea

Precedent: A Price Worth Paying for a Safer World,” The

Washington Post, September 29, 1994, p. A23.

23. Briefing, October 19, 1994.

24. Ibid.
23

25. Opening remarks by Gallucci at a Geneva press conference

following the formal signing of the Agreed Framework on October

21, 1994, as reported in NAPSNet Daily Report for October 27,

1994.

26. On the technological and institutional problems in

constructing and operating LWRs in North Korea, see Levy and

Hayes, particularly the latter.

27. First Vice Foreign Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sok

Ju has said that dialogue with South Korea will begin after the

proper atmosphere is created by the Agreed Framework. “DPRK Chief

Delegate to DPRK-USA Talks Interviewed,” KCNA in English, October

23, 1994, as transcribed in FBIS-EAS-94-205, October 24, 1994, p.

34. Foreign Minister Kim Young Nam stated that South Korea had to

apologize for failing to offer condolences on the death Of Kim Il

Sung. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 14, 1994.

28. Pyongyang argued against the South Korean model LWR

before the Agreed Framework was signed. “Russian Paper Refutes

Abuses Heaped by S. Korean Authorities on Russian Reactors,” KCNA

in English, October 11, 1994, transcribed in FBIS-EAS-94-197,

October 12, 1994, pp. 21-22. This position has been reiterated

more recently. See “North Opposes ROK- Type Reactor in Meeting,”

YONHAP in English, November 30, 1994, transcribed in FBIS-EAS-94-

230, November 30, 1994, p. 51; and “ROK-Style Reactors Could Hurt

Nuclear Deal With US-Pyongyang,” The Korea Times, January 18,

1995, p. 7.

29. “Seoul Worries about Travel Permits for Constructors of

Reactors in N. Korea,” The Korea Times, January 15, 1995.

30. See State Department Briefing by Deputy Secretary Talbott

and Assistant Secretary Lord, February 3, 1995, as transcribed in

NAPSNet Daily Report for February 6, 1995.

31. Steven Greenhouse, “U.S. Presses North Korea to Accept

Reactors Made By South,” The New York Times, March 10, 1995, p.

A11.

32. Democrats as well as Republicans were frustrated and

angry at Pyongyang’s behavior. See Ben Barber, “Dole Threatens

Accord in Bid to Free Airman,” The Washington Times, December 28,
24

1994, p. A1.

33. Personal attacks on South Korean President Kim Young Sam,

including calls for the South Korean people to revolt against him,

appear daily in Pyongyang’s broadcasts to the rest of the world.

For example, see “<|>‘Mastermind of Social Evils’ Must be

Removed,” KCNA in English, December 3, 1994, transcribed in FBISEAS-94-233, December 5, 1994, p. 32; and “Ill-Boding Bellicose

Outpourings,,” KCNA in English, January 15, 1995, transcribed in

FBIS-EAS-95-010, p. 31. They also appear in Korean language media.

See especially “A Joint Editorial of Nodong Sinmun, Chosen

Inmingun, and Nodong Chongnyon on the New Year,” KCNA in English,

January 1, 1995, transcribed in FBIS-EAS-95-001, January 3, 1995,

p. 34, which appeared in Korean in all North Korean dailies.

34. Mack, “Nuclear Endgame on the Korean Peninsula.”

35. Ambassador Gallucci admitted that DPRK withdrawal from

the NPT after delivery of both LWRs was a “technical possibility”

in the hearing of the Senate Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific

on December 1, 1994. R. Jeffrey Smith, “U.S. Negotiator Defends N.

Korean Nuclear Accord,” The Washington Post, December 2, 1994, p.

A10.

36. Shin Jae Hoon and Nigel Holloway, “Hold the Champagne,”

Far Eastern Economic Review, October 27, 1994, p. 15; and “Ruling

DLP Turns to Accepting Draft Geneva Agreement Half-Heartedly,” The

Korea Times, November 18, 1994, p. 2. Moreover, internal divisions

within the DLP are becoming more public. President Kim Young Sam

has dismissed Party Chairman Kim Jong-Pil, and the latter may

establish a new political party. See “Lee Chon-Koo Named DLP

Chairman,” The Korea Times, February 8, 1995, p. 1.

37. James Sterngold, “South Korean President Lashes Out at

U.S.,” The New York Times, October 8, 1994, p. A3.

38. See summaries of Seoul newspaper editorials of October 15

and October 17, 1994, in FBIS-EAS-94-200, October 15, 1994, pp.

46-47, and FBIS-EAS-94-202, October 19, 1994, respectively. See

also “Accord ‘Falls Far Short’ of Hopes,” The Korea Times, October

15, 1994, p. 2, printed in FBIS-EAS-94-200, October 15, 1994, p.

45; “The Government’s View of North Korea-U.S. High-Ranking

Contact,” Hangyore Sinmun, December 28, 1994, p. 3, translated in
25

FBIS-EAS-94-249, December 28, 1994, p. 40; and “DLP Official

‘Strongly’ Denounces U.S. Moves,” KBS-1 Radio Network, December

28, 1994, transcribed and translated in FBIS- EAS-94-249, December

28, 1994, p. 39.

39. Chon See Young, “Likely ‘Political Storm’ Viewed,” The

Korea Herald, October 16, 1994, p. 2, printed in FBIS-EAS-94-202,

p. 49.

40. During a February 1995 visit to Seoul, almost all Koreans

the author met indicated great concern about direct U.S.-DPRK

negotiations. In one way or another, they suggested that South

Korea had lost “face” as a result of the agreement.

41. “Kim Jong Il Likely to Assume Power in April or May:

 Experts,” The Korea Herald, January 5, 1995, p. 2; “Kim Jong Il

Makes First Appearance in Two Months,” The Korea Herald, January

4, 1995, p. 2.

42. See “Seoul Officials Say Kim Jong Il Suffering from Liver

and Heart Disorder,” Choson Ilbo, December 18, 1994, p. 1; and

Will Witter, “Events Reveal Pyongyang Power Play,” The Washington

Times, December 29, 1994, p A1.

43. “There Was No New Year Message From Junior Kim,” The

Korean Times, January 4, 1995, p. 2.

44. See Paul Alexander, “Kim’s Silence Deepens Mystery,” The

Washington Times, January 1, 1995, p. A1; and Alexandre Mansourov,

“Seven Lessons of the US-DPRK Helicopter Incident,” NAPSNet Daily

Report for January 6, 1995.

45. Leif R. Rosenburger,"Unifying Korea: Beyond Hopes and

Fears," Contemporary Southeast Asia, Volume 16, Number 3, December

1994, pp. 295-316.

46. Senator John McCain; Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman of the

Senate Foreign Affairs Committee; and Majority Leader Senator

Robert Dole have been outspoken critics. Senator Frank Murkowski,

Chairman of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,

opposes certain provisions. Republican members of the House have

been less outspoken, but none are known to actively support the

Agreed Framework.
26

47. According to press reports, Republicans are unlikely to

try to defeat the Agreed Framework, but they intend to maintain

close scrutiny over its implementation. Thomas W. Lippman, “U.S.

Considered Attacks on N. Korea, Perry Tells Panel,” The Washington

Post, January 25, 1995, p. A4.

48. On political realignment in Japan, see Kenneth B. Pyle,

“Where Is Japan Heading? Implications for the Alliance”; and T.J.

Pempel, “Towards an Understanding of Japan’s Changing Political

Economy,” in Whither Japan? NBR Analysis, Volume 4, Number 5; and

James Sterngold, “Can Clamor for Change Be Stilled in Japan?” The

New York Times, January 24, 1994, p. A3.

49. See Thomas L. Wilborn, Security Cooperation With China:

 Analysis and a Proposal, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies

Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 1994, pp. 13-15, on the

potential impact of China’s domestic politics on regional

security.

50. Membership is open to both nations. They did not attend

the preparatory conference of KEDO in March, despite the urging of

the United States. See Greenhouse, “U.S Presses North Korea to

Accept Reactors Made by South.”

51. YONHAP in English, December 5, 1994, transcribed in FBISEAS-94-233, December 5, 1994, pp. 49-50.

52. Valeriy Denisov, Deputy Director in Charge of ROK Affairs

of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Asia and Pacific Bureau, in

Seoul Sinmun, November 28, 1994, p. 5, translated in FBIS-EAS-94-

228, November 28, 1994, pp. 51-52; and “Moscow Believes that It

Would Be Easier to Settle Nuclear and Other Problems of Korean

Peninsula within Framework of International Conference Proposed by

Russia,” ITAR-TASS, February 28, 1995. See also Steven Blank,

Russian Policy and the Korean Crisis, Carlisle Barracks, PA:

 Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, September

1994.

53. Blank, p. 2.

54. For instance, Russia has insisted that it must be a

member of KEDO with the same status as the United States, South
27

Korea, and Japan, although it has not offered any funds to the

project. That status would provide Moscow with a veto over KEDO

decisions.

55. Yang Sung Chul, “United Germany for Divided Korea:

 Learning from Euphoria and Dysphoria,” Korea and World Affairs,

Volume 16, Fall 1992, pp. 436-462.

56. Sung-Joo Han, “The Functions and Limits of a New

Unification Formula,” Korea and World Affairs, Volume 23, No. 4,

Winter 1989, pp. 647-656.

57. See “Conglomerates’ Delegations to Rush to NK,” The Korea

Times, January 1, 1995, p. 8; and Yang Pyong-Ha, “$1.32 Million

Invested in Tumen River Area Development,” Munhwa Ilbo, December

23, 1994, p. 13, as translated by FBIS-EAS-94-249, December 28,

1994, pp. 41-42.

58. Andre Y. Mansourov, “DPRK after Kim Il Sung: Is a Second

Republic Possible?”, paper prepared for presentation at

“International Conference on North Korea After Kim Il Sung,”

Melbourne, Australia, September 26-27, 1994, reprinted by NAPSNet,

argues that change in the North Korean political system is likely,

although not soon.
28

APPENDIX A

AGREED FRAMEWORK BETWEEN THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Geneva, October 21, 1994

Delegations of the Governments of the United States of

America (U.S.) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

(DPRK) held talks in Geneva from September 23 to October 17, 1994,

to negotiate an overall resolution of the nuclear issue on the

Korean Peninsula.

Both sides reaffirmed the importance of attaining the

objectives contained in the August 12, 1994 Agreed Statement

between the U.S. and the DPRK and upholding the principles of the

June 11, 1993 Joint Statement of the U.S. and the DPRK to achieve

peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. The U.S.

and the DPRK decided to take the following actions for the

resolution of the nuclear issue:

I. Both sides will cooperate to replace the DPRK’s graphitemoderated reactors and related facilities with light-water reactor

(LWR) power plants.

1) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of

assurance from the U.S. President, the U.S. will undertake to make

arrangements for the provision to the DPRK of a LWR project with a

total generating capacity of approximately 2,000 MW(e) by a target

date of 2003.

-- The U.S. will organize under its leadership an

international consortium to finance and supply the LWR

project to be provided to the DPRK. The U.S.,

representing the international consortium, will serve

as the principal point of contact with the DPRK for the

LWR project.

-- The U.S., representing the consortium, will

make best efforts to secure the conclusion of a supply

contract with the DPRK within six months of the date of

this Document for the provision of the LWR project.
29

Contract talks will begin as soon as possible after the

date of this Document.

-- As necessary, the U.S. and the DPRK will

conclude a bilateral agreement for cooperation in the

field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

2) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of

assurance from the U.S. President, the U.S., representing the

consortium, will make arrangements to offset the energy foregone

due to the freeze of the DPRK’s graphite-moderated reactors and

related facilities, pending completion of the first LWR unit.

-- Alternative energy will be provided

in the form of heavy oil for heating and

electricity production.

-- Deliveries of heavy oil will begin

within three months of the date of this

Document and will reach a rate of 500,000

tons annually, in accordance with an agreed

schedule of deliveries.

3) Upon receipt of U.S. assurances for the provision of

LWR’s and for arrangements for interim energy alternatives, the

DPRK will freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and related

facilities and will eventually dismantle these reactors and

related facilities.

-- The freeze on the DPRK’s graphite-moderated

reactors and related facilities will be fully

implemented within one month of the date of this

Document. During this one-month period, and throughout

the freeze, the International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA) will be allowed to monitor this freeze, and the

DPRK will provide full cooperation to the IAEA for this

purpose.

-- Dismantlement of the DPRK’s graphite-moderated

reactors and related facilities will be completed when

the LWR project is completed.

-- The U.S. and DPRK will cooperate in finding a
30

method to store safely the spent fuel from the 5 MW(e)

experimental reactor during the construction of the LWR

project, and to dispose of the fuel in a safe manner

that does not involve reprocessing in the DPRK.

4) As soon as possible after the date of this document, U.S.

and DPRK experts will hold two sets of experts talks.

-- At one set of talks, experts will discuss

issues related to alternative energy and the

replacement of the graphite-moderated reactor program

with the LWR project.

-- At the other set of talks, experts will discuss

specific arrangements for spend fuel storage and

ultimate disposition.

II. The two sides will move toward full normalization of

political and economic relations.

1) Within three months of the date of this Document, both

sides will reduce barriers to trade and investment, including

restrictions on telecommunications services and financial

transactions.

2) Each side will open a liaison office in the other’s

capital following resolution of consular and other technical

issues through expert level discussions.

3) As progress is made on issues of concern to each side,

the U.S. and DPRK will upgrade bilateral relations to the

Ambassadorial level.

III. Both sides will work together for peace and security on

a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.

1) The U.S. will provide formal assurances to the DPRK,

against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.

2) The DPRK will consistently take steps to implement the

North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the

Korean peninsula.
31

3) The DPRK will engage in North-South dialogue, as this

Agreed Framework will help create an atmosphere that promotes such

dialogue.

 IV. Both sides will work together to strengthen the

international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

1) The DPRK will remain a party to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and will allow

implementation of its safeguards agreement under the Treaty.

2) Upon conclusion of the supply contract for the provision

of the LWR project, ad hoc and routine inspections will resume

under the DPRK’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA with respect

to the facilities not subject to the freeze. Pending conclusion of

the supply contract, inspections required by the IAEA for the

continuity of safeguards will continue at the facilities not

subject to the freeze.

3) When a significant portion of the LWR project is

completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components, the DPRK

will come into full compliance with its safeguard agreement with

the IAEA (INFCIRC/403), including taking all steps that may be

deemed necessary by the IAEA, following consultations with the

Agency with regard to verifying the accuracy and completeness of

the DPRK’s initial report on all nuclear material in the DPRK.

Kang Sok Ju

Head of the Delegation for the Democratic People’s Republic

 of Korea

First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People’s

 Republic of Korea

Robert L. Gallucci

Head of the Delegation of United States of America

Ambassador at Large of the United States of America
32

APPENDIX B

His Excellency Kim Jong-Il

Supreme Leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,

 Pyongyang

Excellency:

I wish to confirm to you that I will use the full powers of

my office to facilitate arrangements for the financing and

construction of a light water nuclear power reactor project within

the DPRK, and the funding and implementation of interim energy

alternatives for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea pending

completion of the first reactor unit of the light-water reactor

project. In addition, in the event that this reactor project is

not completed for reasons beyond the control of the DPRK, I will

use the full powers of my office to provide, to the extent

necessary, such a project from the United States, subject to

approval of the U.S. Congress. Similarly, in the event that the

interim energy alternatives are not provided for reasons beyond

the control of the DPRK, I will use the full powers of my office

to provide, to the extent necessary, such interim energy

alternatives from the United States, subject to the approval of

the U.S. Congress.

I will follow this course of action so long as the DPRK 

continues to implement the policies described in the agreed

framework between the United States of America and the Democratic

People’s Republic of Korea.

Sincerely,

Bill Clinton

President of U.S.A.

The White House

Washington

October 20, 1994
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Acting Director

Colonel William W. Allen

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Dr. Thomas L. Wilborn

Editor

Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretary

Mrs. Shirley E. Martin

*****

Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler