ISLAMIC RULINGS ON WARFARE

Youssef H. Aboul-Enein

Sherifa Zuhur

October 2004

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*****

 Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein wishes to thank the Chicago 

Public Library and Pentagon librarians for making the Arabic books and materials 

available. He thanks the U.S. Army War College for inviting him to lecture yearly on 

Islamic militant ideology, which helped him formulate ideas for this monograph. 

Thanks are also due to Mr. Matthew Harsha-Strong, a student of ethics, politics, 

and economics at Yale University; and his wife, Cheryl Anne. Dr. Sherifa Zuhur 

thanks the librarians of the U.S. Army War College, Dr. Antulio Echevarria, and 

Dr. Steve Metz for their comments. Both authors wish to acknowledge Dr. W. 

Andrew Terrill of the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute for his 

comments.

*****

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necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the 

Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public 

release; distribution is unlimited.

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FOREWORD

 The United States no doubt will be involved in the Middle 

East for many decades. To be sure, settling the Israeli–Palestinian 

dispute or alleviating poverty could help to stem the tides of Islamic 

radicalism and anti-American sentiment. But on an ideological level, 

we must confront a specific interpretation of Islamic law, history, 

and scripture that is a danger to both the United States and its allies. 

To win that ideological war, we must understand the sources of 

both Islamic radicalism and liberalism. We need to comprehend 

more thoroughly the ways in which militants misinterpret and 

pervert Islamic scripture. Al-Qaeda has produced its own group of 

spokespersons who attempt to provide religious legitimacy to the 

nihilism they preach. Many frequently quote from the Quran and 

hadith (the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and deeds) in a biased 

manner to draw justification for their cause. 

 Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein and Dr. Sherifa 

Zuhur delve into the Quran and hadith to articulate a means by 

which Islamic militancy can be countered ideologically, drawing 

many of their insights from these and other classical Islamic texts. In 

so doing, they expose contradictions and alternative approaches in 

the core principles that groups like al-Qaeda espouse. 

 The authors have found that proper use of Islamic scripture 

actually discredits the tactics of al-Qaeda and other jihadist 

organizations. This monograph provides a basis for encouraging 

our Muslim allies to challenge the theology supported by Islamic 

militants. Seeds of doubt planted in the minds of suicide bombers 

might dissuade them from carrying out their missions. The Strategic 

Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study of Islamic rulings on 

warfare to the national defense community as an effort to contribute 

to the ongoing debate over how to defeat Islamic militancy. 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS

YOUSSEF H. ABOUL-ENEIN is a Navy Medical Service Corps lieutenant 

commander and designated Middle East Foreign Area Officer. He is 

currently Country Director for North Africa and Egypt and special 

advisor on Islamic militancy at the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

for International Security Affairs. He has published articles on Islamic 

militancy, Arab affairs, and Middle East military tactics for Military 

Review, the Marine Corps Gazette, and the Foreign Area Officer Journal. 

Lieutenant Commander Aboul-Enein is author of Ayman Al-Zawahiri: 

The Ideologue of Modern Islamic Militancy, published through the U.S. Air 

Force Counter Proliferation Center in March 2004. He is engaged in a 

long-term project to highlight Arabic works of military interest in the 

pages of Military Review and has already published excerpts of memoirs 

by Egyptian and Algerian generals as well as by a Hamas operative. 

Lieutenant Commander Aboul-Enein has served in operational tours 

in Liberia, Bosnia, and the Persian Gulf. He holds a B.B.A from the 

University of Mississippi, an M.B.A and Masters in Health Services 

Administration from the University of Arkansas in Little Rock, as well 

as an M.S. in Strategic Intelligence from the Joint Military Intelligence 

College. 

SHERIFA ZUHUR is Visiting Research Professor of National Security 

Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. She has 

been a faculty member or researcher at various universities including 

MIT; University of California, Berkeley; the American University 

in Cairo; and the Chaim Herzog Center for Middle East Studies and 

Diplomacy at Ben Gurion University of the Negev. Her research includes 

Islamic movements, modern Middle Eastern politics, war and peace in 

the Middle East, Islamic studies and social and cultural developments 

in the region. Dr. Zuhur has published seven books and more than 25 

monographs and articles in journals such as Arab Studies Quarterly, and 

Middle East Review of International Affairs, and chapters in edited books. 

One forthcoming book presents a theory of neonationalism in the 

Middle East (The Middle East: Politics, History, and Neonationalism in the 

Middle East, published by the Institute of Middle Eastern, Islamic, and 

Diasporic Studies), and her current research concerns approaches to the 

war on terror in Saudi Arabia, Iraq and elsewhere. Dr. Zuhur holds a 

B.A. in Political Science and Arabic, a Masters in Islamic Studies, and a 

Ph.D. in Middle Eastern History, all from the University of California, 

Los Angeles. 
v

SUMMARY

The authors of this monograph share their respective connections 

with the topic. 

 Lieutenant Commander Aboul-Enein: In 2000, I encountered 

Dr. Bernard Lewis, a famous Princeton scholar of Islamic history 

and author of many books on Islam, delivering a speech on Capitol 

Hill. He stressed the importance of classic Arabic and Islamic texts. 

Later, when confronting extremist interpretations of Islam, I saw the 

importance of these texts, especially the Quran (the Islamic book of 

divine revelation), the hadith (Prophet’s Muhammad’s sayings and 

deeds), and the 1,400 plus years of commentary, which essentially 

run counter to current jihadist ideology. 

 Dr. Zuhur: For 20 years, I have interviewed Egyptian, Syrian, 

Jordanian, Palestinian, Saudi, and other Islamists who cite verses from 

the Quran to support their worldview of necessary and continuous 

conflict between Islam and the West. Yet, throughout my own 

education, I was exposed to liberal and humanistic interpretations 

of Islamic doctrine and law. Now we ask: Which Islamic vision is to 

prevail? 

 Muslim education in many schools has been reduced to the 

memorization of slogans and parroting of particular interpretations, 

and lacks deep inquiry and debate. The main perpetrator of the 

September 11, 2001 (9/11), attacks, Mohammed Atta, left a last will 

and testament in which he declared a desire for paradise, virgins, 

and self-gratification through martyrdom. It is doubtful that he 

spent a considerable time studying Islamic classic texts that reveal 

the history and methodology of warfare, or exploring the intricacies 

of the debate over morality in war in which early Muslims engaged. 

His version of Islam is one of misguided faith and misplaced loyalty 

to those who hide Islam’s rich 14 centuries of discussion, debate, and 

intellectual exploration. To Atta and the others who perpetrated the 

9/11 atrocities, intellectual inquisitiveness is considered troublesome, 

for it produces a powerful alternative to the radical vision of the 

Islamic mission. In fact, radicals deem liberal Islamic readings of 

scripture and teachings “heretical.” 

 Since 9/11, the United States has grappled with how to counter 

the abuse of Islam by militants who inspire indiscriminate mass 
vi

murder and suicide. Some studies argue that solving the IsraeliPalestinian dispute or addressing poverty would offer immediate 

relief from Islamic militancy. Certainly, programs addressing the 

political and economic crises in the area should be undertaken. But 

these alone will not solve the expansion of Islamic radicalism. 

 Islamic radicalism does not stem solely from desperation, nor 

from a sense of inferiority, as some theorists maintain. Instead, in the 

3 1/2 decades of this recent period of Islamic revival and militancy, we 

have seen that radicals come from a variety of social and educational 

backgrounds and political circumstances. 

 Hence, we also need a long-term strategy that involves 

discrediting Islamic militant thought, such as that propagated by alQaeda’s strategist Ayman al-Zawahiri in several books that draw 

upon a combination of the Quran, the hadith, and radical Islamic 

texts written from the 13th to the late 20th century. 

 The al-Azhar University in Egypt is an intellectual center of 

Sunni Islam. The leading scholars of al-Azhar, along with many 

other Islamic scholars in other countries, have produced more 

liberal interpretations of Islamic rulings. They have issued opinions 

that promote rethinking and reform of many social issues, and have 

condemned beheadings and suicide attacks. Unfortunately, the 

liberal and establishment clerics attract less attention and media 

coverage on the world stage than the radical voices. They may not 

be as popular with the Muslim public due to their identification 

with undemocratic states, or their previous efforts to legitimize the 

actions of certain governments. Modern nation-states, such as Egypt, 

Syria, and Iraq, incorporated long-standing religious institutions and 

clerics into their states and official apparatuses. The muftis (person 

responsible for interpreting Muslim law) of cities or entire countries 

became subject to governmental policy, as did the control over 

religious endowments (awqaf). 

 Some rulers or political leaders expected their clerical appointees 

or other sympathetic clerics to issue rulings that sanctioned unpopular 

positions or bolstered the power of said political leaders. Other 

clerics and many Muslims felt that this new modern entanglement 

of state and religion contravened the special intellectual freedom 

and political independence that religious scholars had guarded. 

Radical Islamists then claimed, with some justification, that other, 
vii

often esteemed clerics were tools of corrupt or secular governments. 

However, radical interpretations of Islamic scripture fail to present 

the full range of opinion on important issues and mislead their 

admirers. 

 This monograph reviews Islamic scripture and the complexity 

of Islamic rules of war. It notes that classical Islamic scholars wrote 

about truces, types of combat, prisoners of war, division of spoils, 

and debated and developed principles that are very similar to St. 

Thomas Aquinas’ precepts of just war. A glossary of Islamic terms, 

personalities, and organizations is provided at the end of this 

monograph for readers less familiar with Islamic terminology. 

 The monograph encourages moderate Muslims to mount a major 

ideological campaign to counter those who have hijacked Islam with 

their destructive interpretation of Islamic scripture. Comprehending 

this endeavor will be vital to any strategy that seeks to dissuade 

young Muslims from the nihilism of Islamic militancy.

1

ISLAMIC RULINGS ON WARFARE

Introduction.

 Islamic rules of warfare are complex, appear to be contradictory 

and require careful analysis. The simplistic visions of paradise 

for suicide bombers preached by militant jihadist clerics defy over 

1,400 years of Islamic history and wisdom. Yet those like Osama 

Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, or Abu Musab al-Zarqawi are not 

ignorant of Islamic law and use it selectively to pursue their agenda 

of mass murder and hatred. This monograph will introduce readers 

to Islamic principles of warfare and its conduct. 

 These principles are contained within a body of Islamic legal 

rulings that has grown over the centuries. They reflect the preIslamic war practices of the Arab tribes, early and more recent 

periods of Muslim expansion, and confrontations with Western and 

Eastern powers, such as the Mongols and the Crusaders. The two 

most important sources for Islamic law known as shari`ah are first, 

the sacred text, the Quran (the Muslim book of divine revelation) 

and second, the prophetic tradition. This tradition consists of short 

anecdotal accounts of the Prophet Muhammad’s actions or opinions 

preceded by a list of transmitters, termed the hadith. References to this 

tradition will be limited to seven collections of hadith, and these will 

be identified by the names of their authors: al-Bukhari, al-Tirmidhi, 

Muslim, Abu Dawud, al-Nisa’i, al-Nawawi, and Ibn Majah. 

 Readers will gain an understanding of the complexities of 

Islamic rulings on warfare and obtain some insight into the Muslim 

vocabulary of war that extends well beyond the words “martyr” 

(shahid), and “holy war” (jihad). They will learn that Islamic rules 

of war evolved from the 27 battles in which Prophet Muhammad 

played a direct or indirect role. The commentaries of the Prophet’s 

political successors, the first caliph, Abu Bakr, and second caliph, 

`Umar, on warfare are also mentioned, as are modern revisions of 

these rules of war. 

 The concept of suicide is missing from earlier religious 

commentaries on war. This is, no doubt, because suicide is not 

permissible in Islam. Although fighting with apparent suicidal 
2

intent at times has been a historical characteristic as chronicled in 

battle epics and popular literature, the recent suicide bombings are 

a product of contemporary politics. If a would-be suicide bomber of 

Hamas, Islamic Jihad, or al-Qaeda were properly introduced to the 

richness of Islamic thought on warfare, he or she would realize that 

suicide bombings are not part of this heritage. Al-Qaeda, Hamas, 

Hizbullah, and other groups purposefully suppress this fact because 

it does not fit their agenda. They fear Islamic legacies, turath, that do 

not conform to their radical ideology. 

 Islamic texts on warfare actually focus on the concepts of just 

war, typologies of conflicts, treatment of the vanquished, division 

of spoils, and the upholding of Islamic law, given the travel and 

exchange between Muslim and non-Muslim territories. One such 

classic of the 14th century, The Dispelling of Fears in the Management 

of Wars (Tafrij al-qurub fi tadbir al-hurub by `Umar ibn Ibrahim alAwasi al-Ansari), deals with cavalry tactics, infantry deployments, 

espionage and selection of encampments.1 The 1961 edition, edited/

translated by George Scanlon, mentions over 40 classical Arabic 

texts on warfare written between the 8th and 15th century, and 

addresses such topics as the Persian use of cavalry, 72 basic uses of 

the lance, battle formations, and the Greek, Persian, Mesopotamian, 

and Maghribi (North African) styles of cavalry training.2 Another 

volume important to scholars which focuses on the Islamic “law of 

nations” is The Book of the Law of Nations compiled by Shaybani. It is 

a precursor to international law that provides many details on the 

legality, typology, and rules of military engagement, truces, and 

relations between Muslims and the enemy groups or states that 

surrounded them in the earliest period of Muslim expansion.3

 Some Western readers will probably find the Islamic rulings on 

war to be contradictory. It may not be clear whether they promote 

war or peace. Muslims believe the Quran to be divinely revealed, 

and Quran experts hold that the text must be understood in the spirit 

of its entirety, and not simply reduced to selected verses or phrases. 

Surah 3, al-Imran, verse 7 reads: 

And those who are firmly grounded in knowledge say: “We believe in the 

Book; the whole of it is from our Lord:” and none will grasp the Message 

except men of understanding.
3

As the Quran is not always linear in format nor explicit, it requires 

interpretation, not least because it is read as a living text, for its 

contemporary, as well as historic significance. Muslims, who have 

no central authority like the Roman Catholic Pope, seek the guidance 

of religious scholars, or clerics. 

 Similarly, there is no single interpretation of religious law. Instead, 

four legal schools survive in Sunni Islam, the larger of the two 

branches of Islam, the second being Shi`a Islam. Shi`a Islam, which 

represents about 10 percent of the world’s Muslims, has its own legal 

schools. The fundamental division between Sunni and Shi`a Islam 

goes back to the Prophet Muhammad’s demise. Muslims disagreed 

as to who should be his successor (Caliph, or khalifa, literally, the 

one who follows). Some believed that the Caliph should be of the 

Prophet’s “house,” and preferred his son-in-law and cousin, `Ali. 

 Believers generally follow the legal school of their family, and 

may resort to a cleric of that school in requesting legal guidance, or 

a specific opinion, or responsa (fatwa). While they usually accept that 

opinion, they have the freedom to accept or disregard rulings, or 

even to request a fatwa from a different jurist.4 Also, in many Muslim 

nations where Islamic law courts are no longer operating or no longer 

the single form of justice, civil legislation often involved clerics’ 

consultations or contestations. Aspects of civil law, for instance, 

family law, may be based upon Islamic law. In some cases, scholars 

and lawmakers drew on more than one school of law to modernize 

legal codes. Unfortunately, this very spirit of intellectual freedom 

and flexibility can enhance the power of radical interpretations 

of war, since Muslims may also choose to follow the teachings or 

opinions of militants. 

Typologies and Terminology of Islamic Warfare.

1. Harb is the general term for war. 

2. Jihad, which literally means struggle, typified the conflicts of 

the Muslim community at Medina with the polytheistic Meccans, 

and the subsequent wars of expansion. The primary purpose of jihad

was to fight for Islam against unbelievers. Conflict between Muslims, 

such as the feuds of the pre-Islamic Arabs, was to be avoided and 

was not categorized as jihad, or fighting “in the path of God.” 
4

 Islamic law, with its official “rulings” about war, had not yet 

come into being in the first Islamic century and slowly evolved, 

carrying overlapping layers of corrective interpretation.5 A key and 

continuous theme was that war was to be waged in accordance 

with religious principle―bellum pium (literally, pious war, or war 

in accordance with God’s will) as well as bellum justum (just war).6

A second theme and debate concerned the nature of the injunction 

to jihad. Muslims define the requirements of Islam as being binding 

and collective duties, or individual duties. Jihad has been defined as 

being both a collective and an individual duty. Hence interpreters 

write that if Islam, or the Muslim community, is attacked, jihad is 

incumbent upon all Muslims and is required even of those who are 

normally noncombatants. Then, the nature of an attack, whether 

imminent and literal or the drawn out cultural onslaught of the West 

in tandem with specific political or military actions such as the war 

in Iraq, could alter the understanding of the jihad duty. 

 However, the requirement to participate in a jihad could be met 

in several ways: by waging war a) with the heart, b) with the tongue, 

c) with the hands, and d) with the sword. Jihad also means a personal 

struggle to live as a true Muslim. When jihad is considered a collective 

duty, there is no need to have a religious or political official proclaim 

it. However, from the standpoint of an individual duty and a just 

pursuit of war, this should occur. 

 The Islamic law of nations (siyar) defines a “nation” as a group 

of related individuals. A “nation” did not, in the pre-modern world, 

imply all those who lived within a territory. Many of the Muslim 

warriors were simultaneously members of the Arab and Muslim 

“nations” in contrast with other ethnic and religious groups who 

lived within the areas gained by the caliph. Under this definition 

of nationhood, the notion of jihad as an individual duty actually is 

strengthened, whereas radicals and conservative Muslims define 

jihad as an immediate and collective duty. 

 Further, this law recognized and was organized into two categories 

dealing with the abode, or territory of Islam (dar al-Islam); and the 

abode of war (dar al-harb, lands not controlled by Muslims). Those 

from the abode of war should only enter Muslim territory under an 

agreement known as an aman that entitled them to trade, or to serve 

as an emissary, or to enter for other peaceful purposes.7
5

 Islam’s rules of war have not always been respected, however. 

Rulers or other individuals, on occasion, declared jihad, even when 

clerics refused to categorize the conflict a true jihad whether because 

the enemy was a Muslim force, or the leader who had declared 

war did not hold religious legitimacy.8

 For instance, during World 

War I, the Ottoman sultan declared a jihad. The Muslim world had 

not acknowledged nor sworn allegiance to him as the Caliph of all 

Muslims. 

 The Prophet Muhammad’s form of leadership was unique in 

Muslim history in that he carried out religious, legislative, and 

political functions along with his military status as Commander of the 

Faithful. After Muslims had divided into different groups beginning 

in the 10th century, based primarily on their vision of appropriate 

political leadership, those that we now term Sunni Muslims believed 

that jihad could be declared by a political leader with the sanction 

of religious authorities. Shi`a Islam held that only a just Imam could 

declare jihad for he was infallible and could prevent needless violence 

and ensure that the jihad is properly guided.9

Types of Jihad. 

 Islamic jurists considered different types of jihad. Certain 

categories might be waged against Muslims as well as non-Muslims.

 • The most permissable form of jihad was that pursued against 

unbelievers or polytheists. 

 • Jihad against apostasy. Apostasy is a capital crime in Islam; 

here it could mean that an individual renounced his belief in 

Islam or, as with the tribes who seceded from their alliance 

with the Muslims after the Prophet’s death, it could refer to a 

group of Muslims who denied their faith. 

 • Jihad against dissension or sedition. Since Muslims gave an 

oath of allegiance to their leader, none should revolt against 

him.10

 • Jihad against brigands and deserters. 

 • Jihad against the Peoples of the Book (ahl al-kitab), Jews, 

Christians, and by some definitions, Magians and Sabeans.11

 • Some jurists considered defense of the frontiers (ribat) to be a 

requirement of Muslims comparable to jihad.

12
6

 1. Qital (fighting, or killing) is also used in the Quran. But unlike 

jihad, it is not followed by the phrase, “fi sabil Allah” (in the path of 

God). Three types of military action were introduced during Prophet 

Muhammad’s time (590-632 A.D.). The terms carry a particular 

legitimacy due to their derivation in this early period, and their 

relationship to the Prophet’s practice. 

 2. Ghazw is a raid that has evolved into the term for battle, ghazah, 

or ghazwa. These were battles in which the Prophet Muhammad 

personally participated. The term ghazi came to mean “warrior for 

the faith,” as these battles came to be associated with the expansion 

of Muslim territory. 

 3. Siriya (s.) Saraya (pl.) were battles Prophet Muhammad 

commissioned but did not lead. This is also the name for raiding 

parties and reconnaissance groups, usually on horseback, which he 

authorized. 

 4. Ba`atha (s.) Ba`athat (pl.) were expeditions or missions primarily 

diplomatic in nature (e.g., a courier or political exchange), but which 

some consider combative. It differed from saraya in size.13

 These terms, derived from the early Islamic texts on warfare, are 

part of a particular discourse on conflict that differs in some ways 

from Western traditions. 

Analysis of the Quranic Verses of War.

 When the Prophet Muhammad finally realized his role as a 

Messenger of God, he taught and preached nonviolently for 14 years 

in the midst of a hostile Meccan population. He and his followers were 

subjected to hatred, persecution, and violence. Finally, the Prophet 

and his followers were invited to migrate to a new community, 

Yathrib, that would become the city of Medina. The people of Yathrib 

extended that invitation as they wanted the Prophet to adjudicate 

their disputes. The Muslims were not safe there, however, and fought 

their Meccan enemies until they defeated them, next expanding to 

threaten and then defeat the Sassanians and eastern provinces of the 

Roman empire. During this period, Islam’s first principles of war 

developed. 

 The Quran,

14 which is divided into 114 suras or chapters with 6,219 

ayat or verses, may be subdivided into two periods of revelation, 
7

the Meccan and Medinan, marking the time when Muhammad left 

Mecca and went to Medina in order to escape persecution. Specific 

verses that sanction fighting against persecution are called the Sword 

Verses. But other verses speak of fighting in a just manner, and still 

others could be termed Verses of Peace and Forgiveness. Certain 

scholars and radicals taught that the Sword Verses abrogated, or 

nullified, the Verses of Peace. 

 Verses that clarify the Quranic versions of war include:

Invite (mankind, O Muhammad) to the way of your Lord with wisdom, 

reason and clear intentions. Truly your Lord knows best who has gone 

astray from His Path, and He is the best aware of those who are guided. 

(al-Nahl, Verse 125)

This verse―one not mentioned in al-Qaeda manuals―argues for a 

rational exchange of ideas, the freedom of choice in worship, and asks 

us to leave the judging of others to God. Although many Westerners 

have read that the goal of Muslims is to convert the entire world 

through jihad, this is far from the truth. Authorities explain that 

conversion by the sword is not a reasonable expectation; instead the 

acceptance of Islam should be the result of free will.15

 Another verse that early Islamic scholars have explicitly used to 

dissuade the practice of waging a jihad of forcible conversion is “There 

is no compulsion in religion . . .” (al-Baqarah, Verse 256). This verse 

also implies that the duties of a Muslim are not meant to be onerous, 

and cannot be enforced by individuals or by a government upon all. 

Hence, this verse was quoted by Muslims who decried the excesses 

of the Islamist-style regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Clearly 

leaving ample room for human rationalization, commentators have 

discussed the importance of free will based on this verse. Islamists, 

steeped in their faith, quote the Quran in a quest to create their 

own vision of an Islamic state. However, they selectively draw on 

Quranic verses and purposefully omit injunctions that do not suit 

their political agenda. 

 Islam’s preeminent historian and Islamic scholar Ibn Kathir wrote 

that early Muslims from the Meccan period were taught patience, 

forgiveness, and restraint. The concept of jihad as an Islamic form 

of warfare did not develop until Muhammad’s Medinan period of 
8

revelation.16 When Muhammad left Mecca for Medina and became 

the leader of the new Muslim community, it became clear to Meccan 

merchants, and that city’s leader, Abu Sufyan, that Muhammad 

could obstruct their access to trade routes to Syria and Egypt. The 

combination of economic pressures on Medina from the mass 

migration, animosities between different groupings of Muslims and 

their allies, and Meccan hostility would eventually explode into a 

series of wars. The revelation of the first verses sanctioning Islamic 

warfare appeared at this time: “And fight in the way of God those 

who will fight you, but transgress not, for God does not like the 

transgressors” (al-Baqarah, Verse 190). Islamists often quote the 

first phrase of this verse, but fail to address or explain the issue of 

transgression that occurs in the second phrase. Early Islamic scholars, 

in contrast, derived the concepts of just war and offensive jihad from 

the second half of this verse. 

 Verses 190 to 195 of the al-Baqarah chapter are jihadic verses that 

sanction warfare, always with the caveat of restraint. 

And kill them whenever you find them and turn them out from where 

they have turned you out. And fitnah is worse than killing . . . But if they 

attack you, then kill them. Such is the recompense of the disbelievers. But 

if they cease, then God is Oft-forgiving and most merciful. (al-Baqarah, 

Verses 191-192)

Note that the tone of the verse is self-defense and self-preservation, 

which reflects what Muslims experienced in Medina, facing a much 

more powerful Meccan opponent. Fitnah, a key word in the Islamic 

militant vocabulary, is defined as “polytheists” in the Wahhabi 

translation of the Quran. However, the term is classically defined as 

sedition, insurrection, civil strife, temptation, and enticement,17 and 

the first three notions accord with types of jihad earlier described. 

So fitnah refers to an internal conflict, as opposed to a jihad against 

unbelievers.18 Polytheism in Arabic has a specific word, shirk. Yet, 

in this misleading translation and interpretation, rebels become 

polytheists, whereas in the classical texts on ahkam al-bughat (the 

judgment of rebels, or law of insurgency), the jurists agreed that they 

should be reconciled with their ruler, rather than being punished or 

killed.19 We may conclude that (a) this interpretation supports the 
9

rather insecure modern states against their enemies, or (b) it sanctions 

violence against rebels in contradiction to the classical stance, and 

(c) it is being misused by various nonstate actors to sanction their 

violence against fellow Muslims. 

 A voluminous literature exists on the development of Islamic 

rulings. The authors do not intend to cover every aspect in this 

monograph. Nor do we mean to oversimplify Islamic concepts, but 

rather to provide clear explanations for those with little background 

in topic of war in Islam. One obstacle for newcomers to the topic is 

the fact that the Quran was revealed in Arabic, and the texts that 

explicate the Quran are not particularly easy to comprehend without 

a background in religious or Islamic studies. It is important for 

those studying the Quran to understand that the book has multiple 

translations and interpreters. Translated English versions range from 

the more moderate version of Yusuf `Ali to the above-mentioned 

radical Wahhabi translation published by scholars at Saudi Arabia’s 

Islamic University in Medina. 

 In madrasahs (Islamic schools) in the Muslim world, Arabic is taught 

as an archaic and revered language, with a focus on pronunciation to 

aid in rote memorization. As the majority of Muslims in the world are 

not Arabs, this process means that students are attempting to learn 

an unfamiliar and complex grammar as part of this process. Hence, 

in many countries such as Pakistan, Indonesia, or Afghanistan, little 

attention is given to exploring the actual implications and applications 

of Prophet Muhammad’s words or to the differences in interpretation 

that can be lent in translation. Further, even native speakers of Arabic 

are fluent in dialects that vary from 7th century “classical” Arabic 

and do not easily read or comprehend older texts which possess 

specialized, often archaic vocabulary, idioms, and references. While 

native speakers may have memorized portions, or even all of the 

Quran, the works of interpretation and hadith scholarship require 

guidance and interpretive skills. For these, students must rely on 

their instructors whose expertise and ideological orientation vary. 

 To counter those who approve of suicide bombings as a legitimate 

tactic, Verse 195 of al-Baqarah clearly instructs: “And spend in the 

cause of God, do not throw yourselves into destruction and do good 

for, verily, God loves those who do good.” One interpretation is that 

all who can afford to do so must support the war, if it is “just and in 
10

the cause of Allah.”20 But Rudolph Peters points out that this verse 

also convinced certain Muslim intellectuals in the colonial period 

that, due to the military superiority of the colonizer, jihad was no 

longer obligatory.21

 The Wahhabi interpretation of this verse editorializes about jihad

without referencing the Arabic version. Although “And spend in 

the cause of God” could also be translated, “And give to the cause 

of God,” here the Wahhabi version reads “And spend in the Cause 

of Allah (i.e., Jihad of all kinds, etc.) and do not throw yourself into 

destruction (by not spending in the your wealth in the Cause of 

Allah) and do good.” The Cause of Allah is linked in the interpreters’ 

views to jihad, whether effort or warfare. An instructor or Islamic 

cleric can then engineer his students’ understanding of this text 

by teaching them primarily, or solely, as it relates to the warfare 

meaning, and by implying that jihad is consistently required. If the 

students then turn to the essay on “The Call to Jihad in the Qur’an” in 

the Wahhabi interpretation,22 they will find the strongest exhortation 

to an “obligatory” jihad. 

 Other verses also forbid suicide. 

Oh ye who believe! Eat not up your property among yourselves in 

vanities. But let there be amongst you traffic and trade by mutual good 

will. Nor kill (or destroy) yourselves; for, verily, Allah hath been to you 

Most Merciful. If any do that in rancour and injustice―Soon shall We cast 

them into the Fire: and easy it is for Allah. (al-Nisa’, Verses 29-30). 

According to various hadith, including those in al-Bukhari’s 

collection (244-245), a person who commits suicide will be 

punished in the Hereafter by a perpetual re-enactment of his 

death by whatever method was chosen.23

 Some of the more contradictory verses include Surah al-Tawba: 

29, a Sword Verse:

Fight against those who believe not in God and the Last Day [of Judgment], 

nor forbid that which has been forbidden by God and his Messenger, and 

those who acknowledge not the religion of truth among the people of the 

scripture [Jews and Christians] until they pay the jizyah [a tax levied on 

Jews and Christians], and feel themselves subdued.
11

Verses 29 to 40 in al-Tawba appear to contradict earlier Meccan 

verses on tolerance. Peters explains that scholars see these verses as 

abrogating, or rendering void the earlier verses where Muhammad 

was ordered to preach, but avoid conflict with the unbelievers. Then, 

he was to discuss and try to convince them to believe (as in Verse 

16:125).24

 Mahmud Shaltut, the Shaykh or Rector of al-Azhar University 

from 1958-63, was one of the, if not the, most important voices of 

Islamic reform in the 20th century. Noted for his enlightened, liberal 

exegesis of the Quran, he wrote at length on the theme of fighting 

and jihad, explaining that the Prophet had restrained his followers 

who yearned to retaliate against the persecution they experienced. 

Finally, the verses in question permitting the Muslims to fight were 

revealed. But he states, there are only three reasons for fighting: 

“to stop aggression, to protect the Mission of Islam, and to defend 

religious freedom.”25

 Still, this Sword Verse seems to cancel out the positive role 

Christians and Jews played in the development of early Islam, 

including Christians’ extension of asylum to persecuted Muslims 

in Abyssinia and the Jewish tribes’ conclusion of agreements with 

Muhammad in Medina. Jihadists favor this particular verse, and it 

condemns those who will not recognize Muslim authority. But the 

first phrase, “Fight against those who believe not in God and the Last 

Day” actually excludes Jews and Christians. The jizyah (non-Muslim 

poll tax) was used to provide social services (policing, medical, and 

welfare services) to non-Muslims and Muslims alike. Those who 

accepted terms and agreed to pay the jizyah indicated their acceptance 

of Muslim political authority and that they would not rise up against 

the Muslims. The verse does not require conversion of the Jews and 

Christians. The Wahhabis have altered the word jizyah’s meaning 

to denote “tribute.” The challenge for Muslims is to understand the 

historical context in which verses like al-Tawba were revealed. 

 The Wahhabi translation of the Quran contains an appendix on 

jihad mentioned above and which does not appear in other versions.26

The main purposes of this appendix are to counteract the liberal view 

that jihad is not necessarily incumbent on all Muslims at all times, 

and to assert that any who do not share the views of the translators 
12

are wrong. Such a simplistic presentation neither heeds the writings 

and discussions of non-Wahhabi Islamic scholars on the legality 

of warfare, nor situates the changing Islamic position on war and 

violence in its historical context. 

 This positioning of jihad further bolsters Osama bin Laden’s and 

other radicals’ assertions that a “Judeo-Christian crusade” is ongoing, 

and that it is the duty of all Muslims to oppose it with jihad. Bin Laden, 

who is not a cleric or a religious scholar, cites a hadith of the Prophet 

in this vein in a letter addressed to the Muslims of Pakistan: “The 

Prophet, may peace and salvation be upon him, said, “Whoever does 

not participate in a battle or does not support a fighter for Allah . . . 

God will punish before the Day of Judgment.”27

Those Eligible to Fight. 

 According to the Quran, those who are eligible to become Islamic 

warriors must meet seven criteria. They must:28

 1. be a Muslim, although the hadith and religious opinions differ 

on this;

 2. have reached puberty or adulthood. Most scholars agree that 

legal capacity is reached at age 15. They cite a hadith about Ibn `Umar, 

whom the Prophet forbade from fighting at the Battle of Uhud when 

he was 14 years old, but who was permitted to fight once he turned 

15.29

 3. be of sound mind (al-Nur, Verse 61);

 4. possess a free will to choose to participate in warfare (al-Saf, 

Verse 11: the key word anfusakum (of yourself) connotes a free will); 

 5. be male, though early Islam shows contradictions. Females 

played a vital role in early Islamic battles; not only did they tend to the 

wounded, but they engaged in combat and plundered booty as the 

Islamic army moved forward. In al-Bukhari, Vol. 6, hadith numbers 

344-416, five women fought alongside Muhammad in the Battle of 

Uhud, and one, Umm Ahmara, died while engaging a Meccan with a 

sword. In the hadith collection of Muslim, Vol. 3, hadith number 1442: 

“Muhammad asked a woman where she got this dagger. She replied 

at Uhud and used it to kill a Meccan. Muhammad was satisfied with 

her answer.”30
13

 6. have their parents’ permission (in al-Bukhari’s and al-Nisa’i’s 

collections of hadith); and,

 7. be debt free, or have a release from his debt by his creditors. 

This ruling sought to avoid undue economic stress by discouraging 

a mass volunteering of debtors.

 In addition to those excluded above, slaves; those who did not 

have the means, equipment, or a mount for an expedition (because 

they were not economically independent); the ill and handicapped; 

and, according to one legal school, the best Islamic jurist of a town, 

were all exempt from duty.31

 Radical clerics do not educate suicide-bombers and would-be 

jihadists on these finer points of Islamic law and its complexity. For 

example, Hamas, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, and other Islamic 

militant groups who employ suicide bombers coerce adolescents to 

join their cause without their parents’ permission, violating at least 

one of the above edicts on fighter eligibility. 

 Iranian children as young as 9 years old were sent off to fight the 

“jihad” against Iraq, despite a draft age of 18. An estimated 50,000 

children were killed in the Iran-Iraq War. The high casualties were 

explained in one report by lack of weapons, or that the youngsters 

were employed in highly vulnerable positions, and in suicide 

attacks.32 How could this happen? Khomaini issued a fatwa or Islamic 

ruling that permitted children to fight in the Iran-Iraq war without 

their parents’ permission.33 Competing legal traditions on the age of 

adulthood grant it at puberty, which could occur at age 12 in boys 

and age 9 in girls. Here, war propaganda and fervor for martyrdom 

targeted schoolchildren even younger. Children’s rights in Islam 

have also been violated by military groups in other countries, such 

as the Sudan.

 Hizbullah and other groups have encouraged individuals to 

make videos of their recruitment as suicide bombers which serve the 

purpose of explaining their intent to their families, and in some cases, 

a will. In this way, the principles above are manipulated to legitimate 

a distorted version of jihadi recruitment. Most importantly, these 

videos are used to recruit others as there is nothing so psychologically 

powerful as the example of one’s peers. Youths argue that it is because 
14

they are young and not yet providing support to dependents that 

they may choose martyrdom. They have established a dangerous 

trend and linkage in the public mind between the idealism of youth 

and that of martyrs for the faith. 

Who is a Shahid (Martyr)?

Islamic scholars were very concerned with niyah (intent). Today, 

Muslims confront a version of jihad that proclaims martyrdom as 

its intent, raison d’etre, and validation. Among Muhammad’s sayings 

on the issue is, “He who has been killed to uphold the word of God 

has been martyred for his sake” (al-Bukhari, Vol. 1, hadith number 

223). Yet, Muhammad also dictates that “a person whose intent is 

glory, booty (spoils), or females has no ties to God, and only God 

knows who strives for his sake”[“strives” refers here to the process 

of jihad] (al-Bukhari, Vol. 6, No. 430). The second caliph and revered 

companion to Muhammad, `Umar ibn al-Khattab, once chastised 

a group who was calling each of their war dead a martyr. `Umar 

objected, instructing: “they should utter the Prophet’s words; 

whoever died in the cause of God has died a martyr.”34

 Yet, even this exhortation does not belie the historical significance 

of martyrdom, nor the fact that jihad is always described as being 

“in the cause of God.” Numerous hadith concerning martyrdom, 

intended to spur the believers to jihad, are found in Malik ibn Anas’ 

text, al-Muwatta. Malik ibn Anas (d. 796) was the founder of the Maliki 

school of Islamic law.35 Here we learn that `Umar ibn al-Khattab 

himself longed for death as a martyr: “martyrdom in Your way and 

death in the city of Your Messenger,” and defined the martyr as “the 

one who gives himself, expectant of reward from Allah.”36

 The valuation of martyrdom in the Shi`i tradition is even more 

deeply ingrained, reflecting the experience of the sect. One belief is 

that certain persons, like the Prophets or martyrs, have the ability 

to intercede for the souls of Muslims as they proceed on the Day 

of Judgment. Intercession, or shafa`, may be granted to martyrs for 

themselves and others, and also through grieving and shedding tears 

for the martyrs, `Ali ibn Abi Talib and Hussayn ibn `Ali. 

 Moderates or Islamic liberals have been attempting to deconstruct 

the relationship of martyrdom and jihad, particularly since 9/11. The 
15

difficult task of building counterarguments relies on the concept of 

niyah. It is important that disaffected youth or older supporters of 

the radicals should separate the intent of struggling for Islam from a 

quest for martyrdom. Martyrdom may be “embraced” or accepted, 

as Muslims say “submitted to,” without being sought out as an end 

in itself. 

Suicide and Hostage-Taking.

 Suicide is also forbidden because God is the Creator of life. 

Neither suicide nor voluntary or involuntary homicide are permitted, 

and strict penalties are leveled against murderers. Before Islam, the 

system of retaliation or payments made to the clan of the injured 

party served to limit tribal feuding and vendettas. This system 

continued in Islamic law with the modification that the Muslim state 

was to exact vengeance, and only the criminal, not his clan, could be 

injured in kind, although the clan might pay blood money (dhiya).37

 Those who license suicide-bombing claim that bombers are 

a) engaging in jihad, and b) committing “self-martyrdom.” Both 

statements are questionable, for if there is no lawful jihad, they are 

committing premeditated murder. 

 Hostage-taking, as now practiced, absolutely is not sanctioned. 

That is because individuals are being targeted as if they were 

responsible for the deeds of their own country, or even more 

indiscriminately as non-Muslims. Second, the principles on taking 

prisoners and holding them for ransom were iterated differently, 

depending on whether or not the war was a legitimate jihad. 

 1. The taking of hostages. Hostages were seized during the Lebanese 

civil war and the holding of American hostages in Iran in 1979 may 

have enlarged the crisis of hostage-taking today in Iraq. Muslim 

authorities argue against the practice, saying it is unfair to punish 

an individual for the deeds of a larger entity. In the medieval period, 

hostages were taken to enforce treaties. They were to be returned to 

their country of origin if war began. They were not prisoners of war, 

though combatants could be held and even ransomed. 

 2. The killing of Muslim or non-Muslim hostages. This is decidedly 

not sanctioned, for it is simultaneously murder, a targeting of 

noncombatants and a misplacement of responsibility. Some clerics 
16

mention Surah 5, al-Maida, which begins with a discussion of “the 

two sons of Adam,” Habil and Qabil (Abel and Cain), to teach about 

the sin of murder, and states: 

On that account: We ordained for the Children of Israel that if anyone 

killed a person―unless it was for murder or spreading mischief on 

earth―it would be as if he killed all of mankind. And if anyone saved a 

life, it would be as if he had saved the lives of all mankind. (Verse 32)

Yusuf `Ali explains, in fact, that the story of Cain is a metaphor for 

the story of Israel’s rebellion against Allah―an interpretation that 

not all readers accept. But he also writes “To kill or seek to kill an 

individual because he represents an ideal is to kill all who uphold 

the ideal. On the other hand, to save an individual life in the same 

circumstances is to save a whole community. What could be [a] 

stronger condemnation of individual assassination and revenge?”38

Muhammad’s Battles.

 Of the 27 battles in which Prophet Muhammad played a direct or 

indirect role, the first 18 defended the Muslims against the Meccans 

and the other 9 he initiated against the Meccans and other tribes in 

Arabia.39 Each battle introduced new rules on Islamic conduct. The 

first three battles (Widan, Bewat, and Wadi Safwan) were skirmishes 

in and around the Juhaynah hills commanding the trade route to Syria, 

and occurred in the first 2 years of the hijrah (migration of Muslims 

from Mecca to Medina). The Prophet Muhammad formulated rules 

from these battles, including designating a Muslim battle flag and 

limiting the reason for battle to self-preservation. 

The Battle of Badr (Known as Badr the Great). 

 The Battle of Badr was a battle in early Islam of such significance 

that the Egyptians named their 1973 plans to cross the Suez Canal 

Operation BADR, and the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution 

in Iraq (SCIRI) called its military formation the Badr Corps. In this 

historic battle, approximately 300 Muslims met 1,000 Meccans on the 

plains of Badr in 627 A.D.. The Meccans were determined to crush 
17

Muhammad and his followers once and for all to ensure access routes 

to the north. From a legalistic standpoint, several rules emerged from 

this battle.

 1. Flags and Banners. To dispel the notion of Muhammad’s flag 

being green like his cloak, many early Islamic texts (chiefly al-Tabari) 

cite the battle flag as being white. Muslims of the 7th century debated 

the content of the flag at great lengths. The Muslims’ unifying banner 

differed in the 27 early Islamic battles.40

 2. War Spoils. War spoils were also hotly debated among 

Muslims after the Battle of Badr. Tribal practice influenced this 

debate, which continued throughout Muhammad’s life, and finally 

reached a consensus that sanctioned confiscating an adversary’s 

wealth won in battle. This made economic sense as the numbers of 

those fleeing Mecca for Medina and requiring economic sustenance 

increased. Prospects of booty could help persuade tribesmen to 

become warriors for the cause.41 Spoils were divided depending on 

whether the person brought a horse to battle as a cavalryman or if 

he was an infantryman, an archer, or a javelin thrower. A share was 

also allocated to Medina’s poor, especially those who were widowed 

and orphaned in battle. 

 3. Decapitated Heads as Trophies. Another debate was the 

Arabian tribal practice of cutting off an enemy’s head and displaying 

the head as a trophy. Two schools of Islamic opinion contest this 

issue, but the practice generally was frowned upon due to the 

previously mentioned verse about transgressing beyond the limits 

of war, and because burial of the dead was instead recommended by 

the Prophet, according to Abu Ya`la.42

 Given the shocking beheadings of kidnapped non-Muslim and 

Muslim hostages in Iraq and the propaganda tool of the Internet, it 

is important to say here that this barbaric practice is not approved 

of Islamically. It is true that beheadings take place in the Kingdom 

of Saudi Arabia for capital crimes and that various Muslim political 

movements have slain their enemies in this manner, but the only 

possible religious sanction derived from the killing of polytheistic 

enemies of the early Muslims. As was suggested above, to extend the 

status of the polytheistic Meccans to foreigners, who supposedly must 

pay for the sins of their own nations, runs counter to the definitions 
18

of civilians and combatants according to the medieval law of nations 

and the modern revisions of law and justice. 

 Beheadings are not practiced in many other modern Muslim 

nations. In Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and other states that 

developed civil legal codes, prison sentences have been substituted 

for the severe penalties known as the hudud. Further, there is a system 

of justice, even in nations that follow Islamic law, as in Saudi Arabia 

in which arguments are made, evidence is brought, and individuals 

may deny their crimes or introduce reasonable doubt as to their 

culpability. A wide debate on the validity of the hudud penalties exists 

in the Muslim world because they violate international standards 

of human rights, and they have been protested when they were 

re-introduced as in the Sudan, Libya, or in Afghanistan under the 

Taliban. 

 4. Dealing with Prisoners of War. The Battle of Badr also 

stimulated debate on the disposition of prisoners of war. Muslim 

jurists have distinguished such rules for combatants, slaves, women, 

children, and old persons. In 7th century combat, a prisoner of war 

could expect the worst fate; indeed, a few early Islamic warriors called 

for the wholesale slaying of all captives. However, Islam attempted to 

break the habits of Arabian tribal ruthlessness in combat. The Prophet 

Muhammad’s record is mixed, for he had ordered the killing of 

those he deemed serious enemies of Medina and Islam while sparing 

others. Muhammad decimated the Jewish tribe of Banu Qurayzah in 

the Battle of the Ditch. The leaders of this tribe switched allegiance 

to the Meccans during the battle, according to Islamic accounts, and 

thus were considered serious enemies by Muhammad. Following 

Muhammad’s practice, the majority of Islamic scholars support the 

killing of most warriors following combat, while sparing some for 

ransom or enslavement. However, the debate over prisoners and 

the morality of killing them would continue beyond Badr and many 

other Islamic battles. 

Battles against the Jewish Tribes of Medina.

 The most controversial aspect of Muhammad’s relationship with 

Judaism was his specific experience with the three Jewish tribes of 
19

Medina. Islam is heavily influenced by Judaic law (pork prohibition 

has its roots in Judaic law), yet the Muslims and Jews of Medina 

clashed in the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 7th year of the Hijrah (628-634 A.D.). 

This fighting led to the expulsion of the Banu Qaynuqa, Banu Nadir, 

and Banu Qurayzah tribes and the destruction of the Jewish section of 

Medina known as Khaybar. From an Islamic law of war perspective, 

interactions with the Jews also led to debates on:43

 • The cutting of trees during combat, generally prohibited as it 

denies food and shade in the harsh desert climate; 

 • the death penalty for insulting the Prophet Muhammad;

 • prohibitions on eating animals killed in combat; and,

 • killing during the sacred months except in self-defense (i.e., 

the Muslim months of Ramadan and Muharram, although 

this rule is not widely enforced and is debatable). 

 It is important to grasp the context of the disagreements of the 

past since Islamic militants are using them, taken out of context 

and in combination with other contemporary grievances, to justify 

their anti-Semitism. The question of Palestine is not the only, but 

certainly the most, troublesome of these contemporary grievances 

for the entire Islamic world. The Islamic, or religious orientation, to 

the issue is not always well-understood in the West, or even in Israel 

for that matter. Jerusalem is regarded as the third holy city in Islam. 

From there, the Prophet Muhammad ascended to the heavens and 

was acknowledged by the earlier Prophets. Islamists and ordinary 

Muslims alike claim that Palestine is a religious endowment (waqf) 

for the Muslim community, and this claim stands in addition to the 

nationalist and territorial arguments of the Palestinians, who are, 

after all, Christians as well as Muslims. So, a contemporary issue 

has been welded to the earlier historic disputes, and recurs in the 

rhetoric of Islamic war as declared by the radicals today. 

Objections to Christians. 

 Islam, Christianity, and Judaism share far more concepts and 

traditions than most people realize. Most importantly, each is based 

on Prophetic tradition; that is, the Prophets of the Old Testament, 
20

particularly Moses, as well as Jesus, the Son of Mary, are recognized 

and honored in Islam. All three faiths possess divine Revelation 

through their Prophets and share a belief in an afterlife and a Day of 

Judgment. 

 Antipathy toward Christians perhaps is more deeply connected 

to injustices experienced in the colonial and modern era than in 

the period of early Islam. Many Westerners now believe, thanks to 

the Muslim radicals’ ahistorical rhetoric, that negative perceptions 

stem from the Crusades. It is true that the Crusaders declared war 

on Muslim territories, but as their short-lived states were limited 

geographically and assimilated to the local culture, the Mongols 

were a far more devastating force in the Muslim world of that time. 

Still, various mutual misunderstandings and aspects of cultural 

conflict date from these battles between Muslim groups and “the 

Franks,” as they were then known. The first of the Capitulations, or 

capitulatory treaties, the most-favored nation treaties that granted 

strong advantages to foreign mercantile interests, dates back to 

Louis IX’s abortive Crusade effort in Egypt. These treaties caused 

resentment of the West and were abolished only in the 20th century. 

Christian ridicule or oppressive practices against Muslims in the 

colonial period, and actions such as the conversion of mosques to 

churches and the seizure of religiously endowed lands as in Algeria, 

exacerbated existing antipathies. 

 The chief objections that may be traced further back include: 

 • misunderstandings or antipathy toward the concept of the 

Trinity, which Muslims often regard as shirk, particularly the 

notion that God is the “third of three” (a reference to the Holy 

Spirit) or that Jesus has a “share in divinity;”

 • objections to the story of the crucifixion; and, 

 • teachings that Jews and Christians disregarded their own 

scripture and exhortations by God, and are therefore less 

righteous than Muslims.44

 It is understood, however, that Christians and Jews should 

follow their own rules and regulations and are not held accountable 

to Muslim obligations. Hence, the radicals’ assertions that Muslims 

should force the Jews to convert or die are absolutely incompatible 
21

with the tolerance that should be extended to the Peoples of the 

Book. Militants or educators and teachers who utilize the word 

“Crusader” to mean Christians or Westerners (thereby avoiding any 

state-ordered penalties) are likewise expressing a sentiment that is 

incongruous with Muslim tolerance and desire for peace. 

Interfaith Reconciliation.

 Muslims long have attempted to reconcile their common heritage 

with Jews and Christians with the tumultuous period of early Islamic 

history. Later, Jews and Christians had reason to dislike the elements 

of discrimination applied to them in the past by Muslim states, such 

as the wearing of distinctive clothing and their restriction to ride 

donkeys instead of horses as well as other rules, but they did possess 

the rights to govern their own communities.45 Muslims likewise can 

rationally resent past and current hatred and discrimination leveled 

at them in many parts of the Western world. But it is crucial that 

Muslims defuse modern radical efforts to categorize Christians and 

Jews as enemies who are essentially no different than polytheists. 

It is most important to address and revise the presence of such 

ideas in educational materials, lectures and sermons, and in fact, 

the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s efforts to rein in and reform these 

products hopefully will ameliorate these attitudes as a part of the 

reformation of jihadist worldviews. Interfaith reconciliation is not a 

one-party effort, so it will rely as well on the participation of nonMuslim as well as Muslim representatives, and crucial to its success 

will be a voluntary attitudinal shift and not only that ordered by 

governmental authorities. 

Islamic Code of Conduct in War. 

The media presents many images of innocent women and 

children who are victims of jihadist suicide bombers. If jihadists use 

Islam to justify this violence, then Islamic teachings can also be used 

to discredit these abhorrent acts. In one Quranic verse, Prophet 

Muhammad comes across a slain woman while riding in battle, and 

he frowns with anger.46 His attitude prompted a distinct code of 

conduct among Islamic warriors which includes:
22

 • No killing of women, children, and innocents―these might 

include hermits, monks, or other religious leaders who were 

deemed noncombatants;

 • No wanton killing of livestock and animals; 

 • No burning or destruction of trees and orchards; and,

 • No destruction of wells. 

 Abu Bakr, the first caliph after Muhammad’s death, formulated 

a detailed set of rules for Islamic conduct during war. He gave the 

following instructions to a Muslim army setting out for Syria, which 

was then governed by the Byzantine Empire:

Stop, O people, that I may give you ten rules for your guidance in the 

battlefield. Do not commit treachery or deviate from the right path. You 

must not mutilate dead bodies. Neither kill a child, nor a woman, nor an 

aged man. Bring no harm to the trees, nor burn them with fire, especially 

those which are fruitful. Slay not any of the enemy’s flock, save for your 

food. You are likely to pass by people who have devoted their lives to 

monastic services; leave them alone.

 The Quran clearly forbids indiscriminate killing as 

discussed previously in citing from Surah al-Maida, verse 

32. These points are reinforced by other sayings of Prophet 

Muhammad: 

It has been narrated on the authority of Abu Huraira that the Messenger 

of God said: “Do not desire an encounter with the enemy; but when you 

encounter them, be firm.” (Muslim Book 19, hadith No. 4313)

It is narrated on the authority of Abdullah that a woman was found killed 

in one of the battles fought by the Messenger of God. He disapproved of 

the killing of women and children. (Muslim Book 19, hadith No. 4319)

It is narrated by Ibn ‘Umar that a woman was found killed in one of these 

battles; the Messenger of Allah therefore forbade the killing of women 

and children. (Muslim Book 19, hadith No. 4320)

And in a hadith narrated by Abdullah ibn `Amr ibn al-As, Muhammad 

said: “You are neither hard-hearted nor of fierce character, nor one who 

shouts in the markets. You do not return evil for evil, but excuse and 

forgive.” (al-Bukhari, Vol. 6, Book 60, hadith No. 362).
23

 Even books written by modern Islamic militant ideologues contain 

a code of conduct for warfare. In the fourth chapter of Human Rights 

in Islam, Abu al-’A’la Mawdudi, one of Pakistan’s founding fathers 

and chief ideologists, states: 

Islam has first drawn a clear line of distinction between the combatants 

and the noncombatants of the enemy country. As far as the noncombatant 

population, such as women, children, the old and the infirm, etc., is 

concerned, the instructions of the Prophet are as follows: “Do not kill 

any old person, any child, or any woman.” (Abu Dawud) “Do not kill 

the monks in monasteries,” or “Do not kill the people who are sitting in 

places of worship.” (Musnad of Ibn Hanbal)

During a war, the Prophet saw the corpse of a woman lying on the ground 

and observed: “She was not fighting. How then came she to be killed?” 

From this statement of the prophet, jurists have drawn the principle that 

those who are noncombatants should not be killed during or after the 

war.

Islamic radicals have defended attacks on civilians with several 

sorts of twisted logic. Israelis―men and women―serve for different 

lengths of time as active military, and up to a certain age, in the 

reserve military forces. Therefore, the popular Shaykh al-Qaradawi 

and others reason that all Israelis, including women and children, are 

potential combatants and enemies of Islam. One can see that this logic 

could then be applied to Western invaders or even travelers who are 

considered to be enemies or worse, spies. Nepalese civilian workers 

in Iraq were taken hostage and brutally murdered. Their killers noted 

that they “worshipped Buddha” (i.e., they were unbelievers) and 

served the enemies of Islam (the United States). Clearly, the early 

texts call instead for a normal definition and respectful treatment of 

noncombatants. 

 Perhaps the most damming indictment of Osama Bin Laden 

comes from a text that members or associates of al-Qaeda frequently 

refer to in their speeches and writings. This text is The Polity Governed

by Islamic Law (al-Siyasa al-Shari`ah), a book written by 13th century 

Islamic jurist Taqi ibn Taymiyyah. Ibn Taymiyyah provides an 

anarchistic interpretation of jihad because he disapproved of Muslim 

leaders’ cooperation with, or lack of condemnation of, the Mongols, 

a people who followed their own religio-legal code, although those 
24

who conquered the Middle East later converted to Islam. The book 

argues that a Muslim owes allegiance to a ruler who is considered 

an upstanding Muslim. From this argument, the converse is 

constructed―that a ruler who is not an upstanding Muslim is not 

worthy of allegiance, and may be declared an unbeliever in the 

process known as takfir. What is anarchistic here is that sedition, or 

revolting against the ruler, was a capital crime in Islam. Violence 

and upheaval were considered injurious to the Muslim community, 

so sanctioning jihad against a ruler was revolutionary, incendiary, 

and forbidden, despite the example of various secessionist groups in 

Islamic history. Ibn Taymiyyah also discounts the Christians’ role in 

early Islamic history and views interfaith commonality as a luxury, 

giving an ideological justification to declare unrestricted war on 

Christians and Jews. 

 However, if a madrasah student who is taught from this text simply 

reads its pages more closely, he would find a contradiction. On pages 

144-145, Ibn Taymiyyah explains that killing (warfare) is not the 

goal of Islam, but is a means of protecting the faith and those who 

preach it from hostilities. He also writes that those who do not battle 

Muslims and do not prevent the (free) practice of faith and preaching 

it are not to be killed, and war is not to be declared upon them.47

Ibn Taymiyyah’s arguments are based on Muhammad’s early wars 

against the Meccans in preserving his society from persecution. 

War verses in the Quran, al-Anfal, verses 60-62, have prompted 

Islamic commentaries on warfare, its preparedness, and the concept 

of deterrence: “Against them make ready your strength to the utmost 

of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into the hearts 

of the enemies of God and your enemies.” (Verse 60, al-Anfal) It is 

easy to simply quote verse 60 and not the next verse: “But if the 

enemy incline towards peace, do thou (also) incline towards peace, 

and trust in God: for He is the one that heareth and knoweth.” (alAnfal, Verse 61)

Early Islamic Debate on Deception in War.

 In the 5th year of the Hijrah, the Battle of the Ahzab (Confederation) 

occurred, in which an army of 10,000 marched on Medina from Mecca. 

The large Meccan army was faced by 3,000 Muslims. Muhammad 
25

took the advice of Salman al-Farissi (the Persian) to dig a trench 

around Medina, an uncommon tactic in early Arabian warfare. The 

trench surprised the Meccans, and, as they laid siege to Medina, the 

confederation began to split apart. 

 One of the more important concepts of early Islamic warfare was a 

debate on deception, or deceptive tactics in warfare, which included 

the use of techniques unknown to the Arab tribes, espionage, and 

other actions that were not part of the code of honor at the time. 

Modern readers who think of intelligence, espionage, or surprise 

tactics as integral parts of war should try to recall the concepts of 

chivalry that governed the knights of medieval Europe, in which 

the rules of dueling and combat were as important as victory itself. 

The early Muslim warriors believed their very manhood rested 

on chivalrous, generous, hospitable, and consistently honorable 

behavior. 

 The Battle of the Confederacy (also called the Battle of the Ditch) 

opened a crucial discussion on reconciling honesty, truthfulness, 

and clarity that every Muslim should strive for with the deceptive 

strategies employed in warfare. In al-Bukhari, Chapter 73, hadith

No. 1298, Muhammad said: “Verily, war is deception.”48 Muslims 

would debate this, and come to the conclusion that deception was 

sanctioned to win wars but should not operate in daily social life 

within Medina. Among the tactics used in Muhammad’s time during 

the Battle of the Confederates were:49

 • Newly converted Naim bin Masud returned to his Meccan 

tribe and gathered intelligence prior to the Battle of the 

Confederates. His espionage provided Muhammad and his 

leaders with valuable information on the weakness of the 

Meccan alliance with other tribes. 

 • In the Battle of Bani Lahyan (the first offensive battle initiated 

by the Muslims), Muhammad ordered his armies northward 

towards Syria to give the Meccans a sense that they were 

secure in the south. Muhammad’s army then attacked the 

Meccans from the rear, threatening the tribe in their very 

encampments.
26

 Drawing upon the hadith of al-Nawawi, Islamic scholars agreed 

that deception in war was sanctioned if practiced upon non-Muslims 

who had broken truces but was not permitted between non-Muslim 

and Muslim entities coexisting peacefully. Another Prophetic saying 

on deception is his statement that a liar is not one whose lies repair 

relations among people and whose intent is to bring goodness.50

Here, fair speech, and what we might call “white lies” in the interest 

of peacemaking, are acceptable and not deceptive. 

Tactics of Early Islamic Armies. 

 Today many Muslims attribute their success in conquering a vast 

expanse of territory in a relatively short period of time to faith. This 

typically fuels jihadist rhetoric as Muslims today fail to understand 

the mechanics of early Muslims’ tactical achievements. Arab warriors 

had trained from childhood in tribal warfare. In pre-teen years, many 

rode camels and horses, wielded swords, threw spears, and were 

proficient in the use of the lance and archery.51

 Many of these Islamic armies did not need to exceed 20,000 

troops due to their versatility. The armies harassed the flanks with 

cavalry, while each infantryman emptied his arrows into the enemy 

formation, threw his lance, and fought hand-to-hand. Arab armies 

of the early Islamic period were broken up into units of ten. Muslim 

women accompanied the military expeditions and often administered 

aid to wounded Islamic warriors as well as the coup de grace for those 

wounded enemies left in the battlefield. Women would bring up the 

rear of the Islamic army, collecting weapons, armor, and anything 

else of value to the moving Muslim force. Islamic warfare also 

borrowed tactics from Persia and Byzantium, such as Greek fire and 

siege engines. The Chronicle of al-Tabari, written in 923 A.D., offers an 

account of how early Muslim armies were organized and fought.

 Components of an early Muslim army included the following:

 • The Guides (al-Adilla’ or al-Ada): Scouts who studied 

approaches to the terrain and the battlefield.

 • The Eyes (al-Ayun): Specialists in cavalry reconnaissance.

 • The Stuffers (al-Hashir): Brought up the rear of an army.

 • Those of Action (al-Fa`alah): Fixed bridges and dug trenches.

 • The Poets (al-Shu`ara): Motivated fighters prior to battle.52
27

 Early Islamic armies did not devise any notable military 

technological innovations; their success relied on speed; deception; 

flexibility; and the use of threats, negotiation, truces, duplicity, 

patience, and violence.53 Their weaponry was not advanced. 

Indigenous to the Arabian heartland were bows and arrows, lances, 

and a straight sword made in Yemen or India which might be worn in 

a shoulder harness. References are made to women who fought with 

tent poles (as lances). Warriors wore leather or simple chain mail 

shirts. However, once they advanced beyond the Arabian peninsula, 

these armies adopted the use of the battering rams, catapults, 

mangonels (a type of large catapult), towers to push against walls, 

ballistas (used to launch missiles), and mining which were employed 

in the Byzantine art of war.54

 Muslim armies gave their adversaries three choices, delivered 

in writing or orally through a messenger under a flag of truce: (1) 

embrace Islam, (2) enter into a truce (`ahd) in which jizya, a tax that 

signaled surrender to Muslim authority in return for relative selfgovernment, was paid, or (3) continue to fight. Al-Tabari termed it 

the “final ultimatum.” Islamic scholars have debated the issuance of 

this ultimatum; their positions include:

 • Issuing it before the battle (Quran, al-Fath, verse 16).

 • The ultimatum is not required as it gives away the element of 

surprise.55

 • If the Muslims know the intent of the adversary, then a 

formal ultimatum is not necessary, but recommended. Two 

hadiths cover the issuance of ultimatums: the first describes 

Muhammad as not engaging in battle until dialogue proved 

unsuccessful. In the second, Muhammad sends an expedition 

to warn the leader to fear God and outlines terms for 

Muhammad’s victory.

 The concepts of truces and when they may be broken―mentioned 

in the Quran, al-Ma’ida, verse 1, al-Isra’, verse 34, and al-Nahl―also 

preoccupied early Islamic theologians. Certain legal schools held 

that a truce or armistice of a jihad could be maintained for up to but 

no longer than 10 years.56 Events however demonstrated variations 

on this principle. 
28

 Muslim scholar Ibn Khaldun provided a social theory for the 

Muslims success in battle and applied this theory to other ebbs and 

flows of power. He wrote of the solidarity or tribal connectedness 

(`asabiyya) of the Muslim warriors. Unfortunately, this primordial 

solidarity tended to break down, as he showed with a historical 

and proto-sociological analysis, after tribal warriors settled down in 

urban milieus and over several (three) generations. When Muslims 

argue that faith was a factor in the military prowess of the Muslims, 

they often connect this idea of solidarity―formulated in modern 

terms as esprit de corps―and cohesion with the religious idealism that 

the fighters had in common. 

Alliances. 

 Islamic rulings are further complicated because many Muslim 

scholars held that innovations potentially were corrupting, leading 

the community away from the mores of Medina. Yet many new 

capabilities, weapons, and situations arose. As one might expect, 

opinions vary on alliances between Muslim and non-Muslim powers. 

The Ottomans extended the period under which a truce or treaty 

with a non-Muslim power for commercial reasons could hold from 

10 years to the lifetime of a Sultan. Some scholars later held that it 

was permissable for Muslim states to call for aid from Western allies, 

as in the Gulf War of 1991. 

Regular and Irregular Jihad.

Most scholarship on Islamic warfare has been written for a limited 

academic audience. Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the broader 

Islamic revival, and the rise of numerous militant movements that 

audience has expanded, and scholars sought to explain the attitudes 

of jihadists to a nonspecialist readership. The classic definitions of 

Islamic warfare did not, as we have seen, explain the popularity of 

the jihadist vision. John Kelsay, like some other scholars, refers to 

two forms of warfare in Islam, regular and irregular jihad. The strict 

rules of warfare and definitions discussed in this text involve regular 

jihad; that is, jihad designed to expand Muslim territory and which 

involves two or more nations at war. Irregular jihad, which includes 
29

uprisings, revolutions, or internal rebellions, expands the definitions 

of the Islamic rules of war. As mentioned earlier, each exhibits 

differing conceptions of leadership, and they are not considered 

equally valid. Kelsay writes, 

From the perspective of groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad, irregular 

war is a fact of life. The necessity to struggle against injustice is an 

obligation that Muslims cannot ignore . . . assassinations, deception, 

kidnappings—these acts which are either justified or excused by the 

realities of the struggle that contemporary Muslims are commanded to 

undertake. Or so irregulars argue.

57

 This unorthodox argument,58 along with the previously explained 

idea of labeling a Muslim as a non-Muslim (takfir), the perception of 

the Muslim world as being in a non-Islamic (jahili) condition, and 

the view of jihad as the sole solution, is factionalizing the Muslim 

world. It distorts the classical definitions of war against apostates, 

unbelievers, rebels, and brigands, and misdirects the debate over the 

nature of the collective or individual duty to jihad. 

 This argument ignores Islamic scholarship on the topic of 

warfare, arguing that certain tactics, if employed under the guise 

of irregular warfare, are legitimate and not subject to conventions 

and restrictions. That Islamic militants are attempting to create new 

doctrine to circumvent the body of Quranic verses and prophetic 

sayings that do not support their goals is significant. It is not very 

certain that Muslim youth understand the distinction between 

modern and classic, or moderate and radical versions. This is so 

despite the fact that extremism, terrorism, and irregular acts of 

violence are generally disapproved of in the classical texts.59 Clerics 

could more clearly explain to their public how Islamic injunctions 

discredit the radicals’ tactics of suicide operations, assassinations, 

kidnappings, hostage-taking, and ransom demands. 

Conclusion. 

 Understanding the importance of the classic Islamic texts and the 

ultimate goals of Islam itself―peace and social equity―will enable 

us to fight terrorism through information operations combined with 

other means. It will also permit us to better comprehend the views 

and options of our Muslim allies. 
30

 Al-Qaeda and like-minded groups seek to employ Islam and secure 

Islamic conquest for their own purposes and ignore the emphases 

that the sacred texts place on restraint and justice. Osama Bin Laden 

and other extremists want Muslims to believe that Muhammad 

took up the sword to kill disbelievers, while Islamic texts show that 

Muhammad resorted to fighting only in defense of his new society in 

Medina. Religious scholars must work more assiduously to discredit 

this version of Islamic history. 

 We are not proclaiming or inventing an Islamic “reformation,” 

a theme that has been appearing in the media. An Islamic reform 

movement began in the 19th century, and there is a well-established 

tradition of liberal “readings” of the texts. Unfortunately, the 

extremists and other trends of Muslim thinkers have countered many 

of these arguments, seeing them as instruments for Westernization. 

The emphasis on justice, moderation, and restraint long predates our 

era. Hopefully, it will bring Muslims closer to other faiths and heal 

the fissures created by the extremists’ brand of Islamic warfare. 

Policy Recommendations and Concerns.

 The United States rightly has identified the stultification and 

even subversion of Islamic education in places like Saudi Arabia, 

Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Madrasas there do not focus on the 

complexity of the classical texts of Islam, nor teach students to 

analyze the reasons for this complex nature, but instead indoctrinate 

martyrdom and bellicosity. However, the dilemma goes far beyond 

these problems. As much as we wish to encourage alternatives to 

Islamic militancy, we need to recognize that they cannot be dictated 

to Muslims on our own terms and according to our preferred 

scenarios. Indeed, heated debate and conflicts between Muslims on 

the role of religion in their polities and societies likely will continue 

for many decades. If democratization is to proceed, these conflicts 

may become even more pronounced and the results may not be to 

the secular Westerner’s taste. At the very least, as American military 

and diplomatic personnel engage in the Middle East, a more complex 

understanding of Islam is needed to guide us and help us comprehend 

our Muslim allies’ fight against Islamic ideological extremism. 
31

 In a 1938 speech urging greater U.S. involvement against the 

Nazis, Winston Churchill pleaded: “We must arm. Britain must arm. 

America must arm . . . but arms . . . are not sufficient by themselves. 

We must add to them the power of ideas.”60 With this in mind, U.S. 

policymakers should: 

 1. Become more cognizant of the complexity of Islamic law and the 

debates among Muslims. This does not mean that policymakers should 

direct the process or outcome of these debates.

 2. Be aware of the danger of simplistic characterizations of Islam as 

a “violent religion.” Such characterizations inflame the emotions of 

Muslims everywhere, heighten perceptions of Western hostility, 

and limit our own ability to understand the future of the war on 

terrorism. 

 3. Understand how jihadist groups manipulate, hide and deemphasize 

aspects of Islamic history, law, and Quranic verses. Jihadists and the 

madrasas and study groups they sponsor are not creating theologians 

who will contribute to the spiritual growth of Islam but suicide 

bombers and foot-soldiers involved in Islamic nihilism. 

 4. Recognize that what al-Qaeda and its franchises fear most are Islamic 

laws, histories, and principles that do not conform to their militant ideologies.

Therefore, the struggle between liberal and radical interpretations of 

Islam is a key aspect of the global war on terror.

 5. Acknowledge that a perfectly defined delineation between 

“mainstream” and extremist views is not evident. Al-Qaeda and other 

jihadists proselytize with interpretations such as those of Muhammad 

ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Ibn Taymiyya, and Sayyid Qutb. But Wahhabism 

is at the core of today’s Saudi Arabia, and Saudis must decide how 

to best counter interpretations that lead toward extremism. Ibn 

Taymiyya’s and Sayyid Qutb’s notions of social justice, the necessary 

Islamic character of leadership, and the importance of the Quran are 

highly palatable ideas to most Muslims, in contrast with other key 

jihadist notions in these theorists’ work. That mixture of palatable 

and offensive ideas compounds the difficulties of the Egyptian 

government in seeking to limit radical influence. We nonetheless 

must understand the implications of the measures our allies choose 

to adopt. 

 6. Realize that the majority of Muslims do not speak Arabic. This 

means that Islamic teachings can be manipulated, as evidenced 
32

by the varying English translations of the Quran ranging from the 

moderate to the radical. To the non-Arabic speaking masses in 

Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Indonesia, Arabic is a sacred language. 

Therefore, a radical cleric preaching and lacing his speech with 

Arabic and Quranic words takes on an air of holiness, even though 

the sentiments he expresses reflect jihadic opinion. 

 7. U.S. forces, particularly those involved in psychological operations, 

need to be educated in aspects of Islamic history, law, and culture. As 

Islamic militants quote and violently interpret verses from the Quran 

and hadith, U.S. and allied forces should not plead ignorance, but 

achieve a higher level of familiarity with religious and other aspects 

of Muslim culture. U.S. and allied forces may better comprehend the 

specific dilemmas of our Muslim allies if they are familiar with the 

messages of jihadist and moderate Islam. Alternatively, they should 

consult experts who are well-versed in these matters. 

 8. Recognize the simultaneous impracticality of armistices and 

reconciliation with Islamist militants, and the Islamic rationale for 

attempting such solutions. Such efforts were attempted in both Saudi 

Arabia and Iraq, but, in fact, those already passionately committed 

to the jihadist worldview will not be won over, and only those 

less committed might waver. We might therefore conclude more 

pessimistically.

 9. Factor in the possibility of failure in the battle against jihadist 

sentiment, while working as assiduously as possible for a different outcome. 

That Islamism consists of moderate as well as radical, extremist 

groups operating in a politically unstable environment may 

rather point to a protracted struggle and period of reformulation. 

Knowledge of Islamic discourses will still be helpful and necessary 

in determining our responses to such a situation. 
33

 GLOSSARY OF ISLAMIC TERMS, PERSONALITIES, 

AND ORGANIZATIONS

Abd al-Wahhab, Muhammad: Founder of Wahhabism. Cleric who lived in the 

mid-18th century and sought to purify Arabia Islamically. His strict brand 

of Islam and mission to purge Arabia of pre-Islamic practices was adopted 

by Muhammad Ibn Saud in the 1740s. The Wahhabis call themselves 

Muwahidun (Unitarians).

Abu Bakr: The first caliph of Islam after Muhammad’s death.

Abu Dawud: An early Muslim who compiled hadiths (prophetic sayings and 

deeds). The name may apply to his compendium. 

Abu Huraira: An early Muslim who collected a large number of hadiths 

(prophetic sayings and deeds) soon after the Prophet’s death. The name 

applies to the person and his compendium.

Abu Sufyan: Initially the Prophet Muhammad’s fiercest opponent in Mecca, 

he was responsible for the initial genocide of Muslims and their exile from 

Mecca. After the capture of Mecca in 630 A.D., he converted to Islam. Abu 

Sufyan’s descendants would become the Ummayad dynasty of 661-750 

A.D. 

al-Adilla’ or al-Ada’ (The Guides): Scouts, who studied approaches to the 

terrain and the battlefield.

`Ahd: A truce.

Ahl al-Kitab: (Peoples of the Book): Scriptuaries, or monotheists who 

possess a revelatory scripture: Jews, Christians, Magians (Zoroastrians), 

and Sabeans. 

‘Ali bin Abu Talib: Prophet Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law, who rose 

to become the fourth caliph of Islam. 

Aman: A safe-passage agreement issued to a person from non-Muslim 

territory. One carrying an aman, but found to be a spy, could be executed. 

Apostasy: One of the most serious crimes in Islamic law. Denying one’s 

faith in Islam, or conversion to another religious creed. 
34

`Asabiyya: Group feeling, or solidarity, esprit de corps of the early Muslim 

warriors. 

Awqaf: Prohibitory and perpetual endowments; like a lawful form of 

mortmain. A Muslim may set aside land or property and the income 

deriving from it, as awaqf. Neither rulers nor heirs could seize awqaf. It 

supported schools, libraries, or other public works, and the Muslim clerics 

were in charge of it prior to the creation of state supervisory bodies or 

ministries. 

`Ayun (Eyes): Specialists in cavalry reconnaissance.

Ba`athat: Noncombat expeditions or missions that could be diplomatic in 

nature, a courier, or political exchange. Certain Islamic texts consider these 

to be combative in nature. 

Badr Corps: The military wing of the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution 

in Iraq (SCIRI). 

Banu Nadir: One of three Jewish tribes living in Medina.

Banu Qaynuqah: One of three Jewish tribes living in Medina.

Banu Qurayza: One of three Jewish tribes living in Medina.

al-Bukhari: Compiler of one of the highly respected, or “sound,” hadith

collections. 

Caliph (Khalifah): A political office used to govern urban areas of preIslamic Arabia and chosen by the consensus of tribal elders. The term predates Islam and simply means “successor.” The four Caliphs to succeed 

Muhammad from 570-632 A.D were, in order, Abu Bakr, `Umar, ‘Uthman, 

and `Ali. 

Dar al-Islam: Literally the abode or house of Islam. The territory controlled 

by Muslims where Islamic law is observed. 

Dar al-harb: Literally the abode or house of war. Territory that is not 

controlled by Muslims. 

al-Fa`alah: (Those of Action): Fighters designated to fix bridges, dig trenches, 

and ditches.
35

Fatwa: An opinion, or responsum, issued by an Islamic jurist. A fatwa answers 

a particular question, and in Sunni Islam, jurists utilize the Quran, hadith, 

legal analogy, and consensus in fatwa construction, while Shi`i jurists may 

also use a creative process known as ijtihad. Khomaini, as an Ayatollah, 

the Mufti of a Muslim city or country, or a well-educated `alim or religious 

scholar is qualified to issue a fatwa, but Osama bin Laden is not qualified 

to do so. 

Fitnah: The term has many meanings, including sedition, schism, 

insurrection, to mislead, and to guide in error.

Ghazw: Originally meant a raid but has evolved into the term for battle. 

When one sees this term in the context of a sentence, it may also denote 

battles that the Prophet Muhammad participated in directly.

Hadith: Hadith are sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad, and 

there are seven collections of compiled hadith that are considered to be 

“sound,” or reliable by the majority of Muslims: al-Bukhari, Al-Tirmidhi, 

Muslim, Abu Dawud, al-Nisa’i, al-Nawawi, and Ibn Majah. These are the 

recorded sayings of Muhammad or his Companions, in both the Shiite and 

Sunni versions of Islam.

Harb: War, the general term for warfare not specifically designated as 

jihad. 

Hashir: (Stuffer): Specialists who brought up the rear of an army.

Hijrah: Refers to the migration of Muslims from Mecca to Medina and 

Prophet Muhammad escaping the genocide of Muslims in Mecca around 

622 A.D.

Hudud: Severe penalties for the capital crimes in Islamic law which include 

apostasy, sedition, adultery, and fornication. At the court’s discretion, the 

penalties may be death by the sword, lapidation (stoning, usually to death), 

or lashing. 

Ibn Kathir: Islamic scholar who lived in the 13th century and authored 13 

major works of Islamic history, thought, jurisprudence, and explanations 

of the Quran and hadith. Ibn Kathir was a student of Ibn Taymiyyah and 

two other major Islamic scholars in Damascus of the middle 13th century. 
36

Ibn Taymiyyah: A 13th century Islamic jurist who redefined jihad and 

apostasy to address the Crusades and the Mongols who had invaded the 

region and influenced local rulers in his day. He is considered a spiritual 

source for Islamic militants and al-Qaeda. 

Ibn `Umar: A person who knew and fought with Prophet Muhammad and 

recorded his sayings and deeds. 

Imam: An imam is, in one meaning of the word, merely a prayer-leader. 

For the Shi`a Muslims, the Imam is appointed by God to lead the Muslims. 

The Ja`fari Shi`a sect are called the Twelvers because of their belief in a line 

of twelve Imams who were the rightful authorities, the last of which is in 

occultation (absent, not dead or alive) and will return one day to humanity. 

In the Muslim rulings on war, the term imam stands for the legitimate 

ruler, who was then called the caliph. For that reason, radical leaders have 

sometimes used the title of Imam. 

Jahili: From the pre-Islamic period, or “time of ignorance.” Islamists often 

brand the West, or their own governments, as being in a state of Jahiliyya, 

just like the pre-Islamic world. 

Jihad: Struggle or offensive war. Frequently defined in English as “holy 

war,” Muslims distinguish between the greater jihad, the daily struggle to 

fulfill the requirements and ideals of Islam, and the lesser jihad, fighting for 

the faith. 

Jizyah: A tax levied on the Jews and Christians, who are not subject, as are 

Muslims, to payment of zakat. The jizyah was similar to the Roman poll tax. 

Land taxes were also charged. 

Kaffir: a polytheist.

Khaybar: The Jewish section of Medina when Prophet Muhammad governed 

the city.

Khida`: Deception or stratagem.

Madrasah: An Islamic school.

Maghribi: Arabic geographical reference to North Africa (present day 

Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya). 
37

Malik ibn Anas: An early Islamic scholar who founded the Maliki school, or 

madhhab of Islamic law.

Mawdudi, Abu al-`A’la: One of the founders of Pakistan. 

Mecca: The Prophet’s birthplace and where he began preaching. Mecca is 

also home to the Kaaba, a cube structure that is considered by Muslims to 

be the first house for monotheistic worship, built by Adam and rebuilt by 

Abraham and his son, Ishmael. Mecca is the holiest site in Islam. 

Medina: Originally called Yathrib, Muhammad and his followers migrated 

here to escape religious persecution by the Meccans and to establish an 

Islamic society. It was then named madinat al-nabi (city of the Prophet). 

Muhammad, Abu Bakr, and ‘Umar are buried here, and Medina is the 

second holiest site in Islam.

Mufti: A Muslim official who is entitled to issue a religious opinion. Often 

represents a city or entire state. 

Muhammad: Prophet of Islam who lived from 570-632 A.D. 

Musnad: A term used to explain a concept and from where these words are 

supported (either in the Quran or one of the four main Sunni schools of 

Islamic thought [Hanbali, Shaf`i, Maliki, or Hanafi]).

Niyah: Intention, specifically the pure intention to commit an act. For 

instance, scholars argue that the intent for prayer is more important than 

the physical completion of that act.

Qital: Fighting or killing, a term for military activity used in the Quran. 

Quran: Islamic book of divine revelation. The Quran is divided into 114 

Suras, or chapters, with 6,219 Ayahs or verses.

Saraya: These are battles that Prophet Muhammad commissioned but did 

not lead. Also advanced raiding parties and reconnaissance groups, usually 

on horseback. 

Sayyid Qutb: Leader of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt who was executed 

in 1966 and is considered a founding ideologue of the Islamic militant trend 

in that country, and regionally. He wrote that Muslims were living in a 
38

state of jahiliyyah, or pre-Islamic ignorance, and held that only jihad would 

overcome this condition and achieve an Islamic state. 

Shafa`: Intercession with Allah on the Day of Judgment when all souls shall 

come before Him. This intercession can be carried out by an intermediary, 

the Prophet Muhammad, or one of the martyrs, or, for the Shi`a, one of the 

Imams. 

Shahid: One who is martyred for the cause of Islam. 

Shari`ah: Islamic law. Islamic law is based upon the Quran, the hadith, 

qiyas (analogy), and ijma` (consensus). Jurists of the Shi`i tradition may 

also utilize ijtihad (a creative interpretive process) to issue an Islamic legal 

ruling, or fatwa. Prior to 19th century Ottoman reforms, Islamic law was 

not codified. 

Shirk: Polytheism, idol worship. Many pre-Islamic Arabs believed in a 

pantheon of gods and goddesses. 

Shu`ara’ (Poets): Orators and poets who encouraged fighters and motivated 

them prior to the battle.

Shuhada: Martyrdom. For Shi`a Muslims, the concept refers to `Ali ibn 

Abi Talib and Hussayn who were killed by the Ummayads in battle. For 

Sunni and Shi`a Muslims, martyrdom may refer to those who participate 

in jihad. 

Siyar: The Islamic law of nations. An area of law that is the early equivalent 

of international law and the rules governing hostilities, peacemaking, and 

treatment of foreign nationals. 

Turath: Islamic or Arab legacy or precedent. The Arab and Muslim 

intellectual circles frequently argue over the definitions of this legacy, 

always seeing it as a core social, political, cultural, and religious element 

under siege in an era of globalization. 

`Umar: The second caliph of Islam who succeeded Abu Bakr.

Waqf: (Awqaf, plural): A religious endowment that theoretically exists 

in perpetuity. A Muslim may set aside land or property and the income 

deriving from it, as waqf. Neither rulers nor heirs could seize awqaf. It 
39

supported schools, libraries, or other public works, and Muslim clerics 

were in charge of it prior to the creation of state supervisory bodies or 

ministries. 

Zakat: Charity. A voluntary payment of a set percent of a Muslim’s income 

and assets that is one of the five duties, or Pillars of Islam. 
40

ENDNOTES

 1. Umar Ibn Ibrahim Al-Awasi al-Ansari, Tafrij al-qurub fi tadbir al-hurub 

(A Muslim Manual of War), George T. Scanlon, ed. and trans., Cairo: American 

University at Cairo Press, 1961, pp. 1-4.

 2. Ibid., pp. 7-19.

 3. See The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani’s Siyar (Kitab al-siyar al-kabir), Majid 

Khadduri, trans., Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. Also see Majid Khadduri, 

War and Peace in the Law of Islam, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955. 

 4. The finer points of a fatwa rest upon language, but also, in our times, on 

politics. Simply put, fatwas state whether something is approved, disapproved, or 

neutral in Islam. Often fairly brief, the jurist may explain the principles foremost in 

his mind, or divide the question into sub-points, each with a particular response. 

See, for instance, Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, “Operation Desert Storm and the 

War of Fatwas,” in Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Messick, and David S. 

Power, eds., Islamic Legal Interpretation and Their Fatwas, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 

University Press, 1996, pp. 297-309.

 5. See, among other sources, Fred Donner, “The Sources of Islamic Conceptions 

of War,” in John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson, eds., Just War and Jihad: Historical 

and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions, 

Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991.

 6. Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 

Press, 1955, p. 58. 

 7. Numerous details on the rules of safe-conduct, or aman, are provided in 

al-Shaybani’s Siyar. See The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani’s Siyar (Kitab al-siyar alkabir), Majid Khadduri, trans., Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966, pp. 158-194.

 8. Bernard Lewis, The Political Language of Islam, Chicago: University of Chicago 

Press, 1982, pp. 82-83. See also Rudolph Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam, 

Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1996, p. 5. 

 9. Abdulaziz A. Sachedina, “The Development of Jihad in Islamic Revelation 

and History,” in James T. Johnson and John Kelsay, eds., Cross, Crescent, and Sword: 

The Justification and Limitation of War in Western and Islamic Tradition, New York: 

Greenwood, 1990, pp. 41, 45, 46, 47. Also see A. A. Sachedina, The Just Ruler in 

Shi’ite Islam: The Comprehensive Authority of the Jurist in Imamite Jurisprudence, New 

York: Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 105-117. 

 10. See, for additional information, Khaled Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence 

in Islamic Law, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 

 11. The Magians were a priestly caste of a pre-Islamic monotheistic Iranian sect 

sometimes confused with the Zoroastrians. The Sabeans were another monotheistic 

group, also known as the Mandeans.

 12. Khadduri, War and Peace, p. 81, and the entire chapter, pp. 74-82. 
41

 13. Mahmoud Khalaf Jarad al-Issawi, Fiqh al-ghazw (Islamic Jurisprudence of 

Battle), Amman, Jordan: Dar Ammar Printing Press, 2000, pp. 18-21.

 14. We often refer to Abdullah Yusuf `Ali, The Holy Quran: Translation and 

Commentary, Brentwood, MD: Amana Corporation, 1983, often called the 

Washington translation. It is moderate in tone and provides in depth interpretations 

for the translated verses. We also consulted Dr. Muhammad Taqi-ud-Din AlHilali and Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan’s Interpretation of the Holy Quran in the 

English Language: A Summarized Version of Al-Tabari, Al-Qurtubi, and Ibn Kathir with 

Comments from Sahih-Bukhari, Summarized in One Volume, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: 

Dar-u-Salam, Publishers, 1994. This edition is more conservative in approach, 

with an exclusively Saudi Islamic translation and view of the Quran, here referred 

to as the Wahhabi version. Other English translations such as those by Arberry, 

Dawood, and Pickthall may be consulted, but even untrained readers will notice 

some differences in wording and style in each. 

 15. Mahmud Shaltut, “The Koran and Fighting,” as translated by Rudolph 

Peters from al-Qur’an wa-al-qital, Cairo: Matba`at al-Nasr and Maktab Ittihad alSharq, 1948; and Cairo: Dar al-Kitab al-`Arabi, 1951, in Rudolph Peters, Jihad in 

Classical and Modern Islam, Princeton: Markus Weiner, 1996, pp. 69, 70, 79. 

16. Al-Issawi, Fiqh al-ghazw, p, 23.

 17. Dr. Muhammad Taqi-ud-Din Al-Hilali and Dr. Muhammad Muhsin 

Khan’s Interpretation of the Holy Quran in the English Language, pp. 845-864; Elias A. 

Elias, Modern Arabic-English Dictionary, Beirut: Dar al-Khayl, 1972, p. 493; and J. M. 

Cowan, ed., The Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Arabic, p. 815. 

 18. Sohail Hashmi, “Interpreting the Islamic Ethics of War and Peace,” in Sohail 

Hashmi, ed., Islamic Political Ethics: Civil Society, Pluralism, and Conflict, Princeton, 

NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002, p. 204.

 19. Khaled Abou El Fadl, “Ahkam al-Bughat: Irregular Warfare and the Law of 

Rebellion in Islam,” in James Turner Johnson and John Kelsay, eds., Cross, Crescent, 

and Sword: The Justification and Limitation of War in Western and Islamic Tradition, 

Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1990. 

 20. Yusuf `Ali, Meaning of the Holy Qur’an, p. 78, footnote 211.

 21. Peters, Jihad, p. 6. 

 22. Al-Hilali and Khan, Interpretation of the Meaning of the Holy Quran, pp. 1043-

1064.

 23. One may also go back to Franz Rosenthal, “On Suicide in Islam,” Journal of 

the American Oriental Society, Vol. 66, 1946, pp. 239-259; Jalaluddin Umri, “Suicide 

or Termination of Life,” Islamic Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 7, 1987, pp. 136-

44.

 24. Rudolph Peters, Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History, 

The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1979, p. 13.

 25. Shaltut, “The Koran and Fighting,” in Peters, Jihad, p. 79. 
42

 26. Al-Hilali and Khan’s Interpretation of the Holy Quran, pp. 845-864.

 27. Document 35, “Letter to Muslims of Pakistan,” in Roland Jacquard, In the 

Name of Osama bin Laden: Global Terrorism and the Bin Laden Brotherhood, Durham 

and London: Duke University Press, 2002, p. 259. 

 28. Abu Lababah Hussein, al-Islam wa al-harb (Islam and Warfare), Riyadh: Dar 

al-Liwa Publishers, 1979, pp. 39-50.

 29. A. J. Wensinck, Concordance et indices de la tradition musulmane, 7 Vols. 

Leiden: Brill, 1936-39, Vol IV, p. 180. 

 30. Hussein, al-Islam wa-al-harb, p. 48. 

 31. Peters, Islam and Colonialism, pp. 16-17. 

 32. Maryam Elahi, “Rights of the Child under Islamic Law: Prohibition of the 

Child Soldier,” in Elizabeth Warnock Fernea, ed., Children in the Muslim Middle 

East, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995. 

 33. Ibid., p. 373.

 34. Hussein, al-Islam, pp. 45-50. 

 35. This text was recensed by al-Masmudi (d. 848) and al-Shaybani (d. 805), 

who was noted for his extensive use of hadith.

 36. Passages from Malik’s Muwatta, in Peters, Jihad, p. 23; or see Malik ibn 

Anas, Al-Muwatta of Imam Malik ibn Anas: The First Formulation of Islamic Law. 

Aisha Aburrahman Bewley, trans., London and New York: Kegan Paul, 1989, pp. 

173-174, 180-182. 

 37. The penalties for homicide, bodily harm, and damage to property are 

described succinctly in Joseph Schact, An Introduction to Islamic Law, Oxford: 

Clarendon Press, 1964, pp. 181-187.

 38. `Ali, The Meaning of the Holy Qur’an, p. 257, footnote 737. 

 39. Hussein, al-Islam, pp. 37-38. 

 40. Al-Issawi, Fiqh al-ghazw, pp. 68-70. 

 41. Ibid, pp. 108-114. 

 42. Abu Ya`la, Kitab al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya, Al-Fiqqi, ed., Cairo: 1938, p. 34, 

cited by Khadduri, War and Peace, p. 108. 

 43. Al-Issawi, Fiqh al-ghazw, pp. 116-118. 

 44. The two essays that follow the Wahhabi translation of the Qur’an, “The 

Jews and the Christians” (no author indicated) and Muhammad Taqi ud-Din 

Hilali “Jesus and Muhammad in the Bible and the Qur’an and Biblical Evidence of 

Jesus Being a Servant of God and Having No Share in Divinity,” in terms of tone 

and organization surely create an impediment to interfaith tolerance, although 

that may not be the intent of the translator/interpreters. Al-Hilali and Khan, 

Interpretation of the Meanings of the Noble Qur’an, pp. 1025-1041. 

 45. Khadduri, War and Peace, pp. 196-199. 
43

 46. Al-Issawi, Fiqh al-ghazw, pp. 151-209. 

 47. Hussein, al-Islam, p. 26. 

 48. Sahih al-Bukhari, Muhammad Muhsin Khan, trans., Medina: Islamic 

University of Medina, Saudi Arabia, 1996. 

 49. Ibid., pp. 324-329. 

 50. Ibid., p. 328. 

 51. Christon I. Archer, et al; World History of Warfare, Lincoln: University of 

Nebraska Press, 2002, pp. 152-163. 

 52. Al-Issawi, Fiqh al-ghazw, pp. 52-54. 

 53. Archer, et al., World History of Warfare, p. 162. 

 54. Edmund Bosworth, “Armies of the Prophet: Strategy, Tactics and Weapons 

in Islamic Warfare,” in Bernard Lewis, ed., Islam and the Arab World, New York: 

Alfred A. Knopf, 1976, p. 202.

 55. Al-Issawi, Fiqh al-ghazw, pp. 39-44. 

 56. Peters, Islam and Colonialism, p. 33.

 57. John Kelsay, Islam and War, Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 1993, pp. 106-

107. 

 58. The terms “regular” and “irregular” are foreign to the conceptualization 

of jihad as found in Muslim sources. As we explained earlier, the more cogent 

questions are: what type of jihad is intended? Is it jihad or merely qital? And, who 

has authorized jihad? 

 59. Tamara Sonn, “Irregular Warfare and Terrorism in Islam: Asking the Right 

Questions,” in Johnson and Kelsay, eds., Cross, Crescent and Sword.

 60. Extract from broadcast to the United States, October 16, 1938, Churchill 

Archives Center, Churchill Papers, CHAR 9/132.