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w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004/1002NOT PRE CEDENT IAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT Nos. 02-4613, 02-4616 and 03-1006

IN RE: DI ET DRUGS (PHENTERMINE/ FENFLURAMINE/DEXFENFLURAMINE) PRODUCT S LI ABI LI TY LI TI GATI ON

Clas s M emb ers, eac h of wh om is a membe r of the Plainti ff Class,

Appellant

(02-4613)

IN RE: DI ET DRUGS (PHENTERMINE/ FENFLURAMINE/DEXFENFLURAMINE) PRODUCT S LI ABI LI TY LI TI GATI ON

Will iams Bai ley

Law Firm, LLP; Bliz zard, McCarthy

& Nabers, L.L. P. and C urran & B yrne, P.C ., on be half of their clients wh o are O bjectors to and cl ass members affe cted by Pretr ial Order

No. 2663, Appellant s (02-4616)

IN RE: DI ET DRUGS (PHENTERMINE/ FENFLURAMINE/DEXFENFLURAMINE) PRODUCT S LI ABI LI TY LI TI GATI ON

Fle min g & As soc iates , L.L .P., on behalf of i ts cl ients subject to the s uspension of

Fund A and/or Fund B processing deadlines, Appellant

(03-1006)2 App eal from th e Un ited States District Co urt for the Easte rn D istrict of P enns ylvania

(MDL No. 1203) District Judge: H onorab le Harve y Bartle, III Argued December 10, 2003

Be for e: A M BR O, F UE NT ES and CH ER TO FF , Circuit Judges (Fil ed February

18, 2004) Thomas E. Mellon, Jr ., Esq. Stephen A. Corr, Esq. Mellon, Webster

& M ellon 87 North Broad Str eet Doyles town, PA 18901 Attorney s for Appellant Class Mem bers, Plainti

ff Class Robert E. J . Curran, Esq. Curran & Byrne 606 East Balt imore Pike P.O. Box 30 Media, PA 19063 Attorn ey for A ppella nts William Bail

ey Law Fir

m, LLP Bli zzard, McCart

hy & Naber

s, LLP Curran & Br

yne PC3 Syl via Davidow, Esq. George M. Fleming, Esq. Rand P. Nolen, Esq. Fleming & Associat es 1330 P ost Oak Bou levard Suite 3030 Houston, TX 77056 Michael L. O’Brie n, Esq. 1330 P ost Oak Bou levard Suite 2900 Houston, TX 77056 Attorney s for Appellant Fleming & Associ ates Jon atha n M asse y, P.C ., Esq . ( Argued ) 39 20 No r t hamp t onStr ee t N. W. Washington, D.C. 20015 Attorneyfor Appell

ants Consolidated Brief Fred S. Longer, Esq. Arnold Levin, Esq. M icha el D . Fish bein , Esq . ( Argued ) Levin, Fi shbein, Sedran & Berman 510 Walnut Stre et Suite 500 Philadelphia, PA 19106 Attorney s for Appellees Plaint iff Class and Class Counsel Robert D. Rosenbaum, Esq. Arnold & Porter 555 12 th Str ee t , N. W. Washington, D.C. 20004 Pet er L . Zim roth , Esq . ( Argued )1 AHP changed its name to Wyet h in March 2002. 4 Arnold & Porter 399 Park Avenue New Y ork, NY 10022-4690 Attorney s for Appellee American Home Products Corporati on An dre w A . Ch irls, E sq. ( Argued ) Abbe F. Fletman, Esq. Deena B. Beard, Esq. Wolf, Block, Schoor & Solis- Cohen 1650 Arch Street , 22 nd Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103 Attorney s for Appellee AHP Settlement Trust

OPI NION

AM BR O, Circuit

Judge Class members who had previ ously sett led the ir mass tort cl ass act ions appealthe Distri ct Court’ s Pretrial Order No. 2663 (PTO 2663) suspending cl aim process ing deadli nes contained in a court-appr oved settlement agr eement. Becaus e we conclude that th e Di stri ctCour

t a ct ed wi th init s di sc re ti on, we af fi rm. I. Fac tualBackground The origina l class ac tion inv olved two diet dru gs of Am erican Ho me P rodu cts Corpo ration (“AH P”), 1 Pondimin and Redux (fenfluramine and dexfe nflurami ne,2 Final j udicia l approvalof the Settlement Agreement was grant ed on January 3, 2003.
5 respect ively

). Approxi mately

four mill ion people took Pondimin and two mill ion took Redux before AHP removed the diet drugs from the market i n 1997 after they were found to be ass ociat ed with val vular heart di sease ( “VHD ”). I n November 1999, plai ntiff s and AHP executed the Nationwide Class Acti on Settl ement Agreement (t he “Sett lement Agree ment”). 2 The Set tl eme ntAgr ee men t c re at edtwo se pa rate fu nds . A sma ll er fu nd ( Fun d A) was to pay

for echocar diogram scr eening cost s, addi tionalmedical s ervice s to monit or VHD , and reimbursement of di et drug pr escriptions . A larger one (Fund B) was creat ed to compensat e class members for the ir i njuri es. I n September 2000, the AHP Settlement Trust (the “Trust”) was created to administ er the claims and payments of benefits t o class

me mb ers. The S ettlement A greeme nt prescribes certain tim e periods w ithin which the Trust’s various clai ms processi ng functi ons must be comple ted. For example, the Trust has 30 days from the re ceipt

of a clai m for assi gning a cl aim number and noti fyi ng the cl aimant of that number, det ermining whether the c laimant needs to s ubmit addi tionalinformat ion and informi ng the cl aimant of i t, and confirmi ng the qual ific ations of any at test ing physi cian. Further

more, the Trust must , within 45 days from recei ving a complet ed clai m, deter

mine whether t

he clai mant is el igibl e for vari ous benefit s under the Settl ement3 For exa mple, the T rust asserts it received app roximately 27,000 deficient claims for a

sho rt tim e pe riod in th e late sum me r of 200 2.

4 The d eadlines hav e twice be en extend ed further. 6 Agreemen t. The Trust was unable to meet these deadlines. The Settl ement Agreement al so provide s that “[a]t any time, t

he Court mayextend any [relevant] time period for good cause shown upon application by t he Parties, Trustees , Clai ms Administr ators (s),

. . . , aft er noti ce to AHP and Class Counsel. ” Based on this provisi on, the Trust moved the Distri ct Court f or suspens ion of proce ssing deadli nes. The Trust

clai med that i t could not meet the dea dlines because i t experi enced

an un expe ctedly hig h vo lume of cla ims. It also argu ed tha t it was o verw helm ed w ith clai ms that l acked essential informati on such as cl aimants’ names, si gnatures , or alle gations of diet

drug use. 3 On December 3, 2002, upon fi nding that the Trust

showed good cause for t

he delay , the Distri ct Court, in PTO 2663, suspended deadl ines for five months. 4 The Distri ct Court not ed that the deadl ines would be automatical ly reins tate d on Ma y 1, 2003. Class m embe rs appeal the D istrict Court’s order. II

. Jurisdic tion The Trust chal lenges our juri sdict ion, arguing t

hat the Distri ct Court’ s order i s not final under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We disagr ee. While hardly every pretrial order in t

he Diet Dr ug c ase s is fi nal, th is on e is. The only issue befo re the D istrict Co urt w as w hethe r the T rust w as allow ed to extend deadl ines for

processing clai ms. Contrar y t o the Trust ’s sugges tion, clai ms for5 Although the Dis tri ct Court’ s order e xpired on May 1, 2003, thi s case fal ls under an exception to the mo otness doc trine, which is ap plicable to “cases challenging ‘short term orders, capable of r epeti tion, yet evading re view.’” Finberg v. Sullivan , 634 F.2d 50, 55 (3d Cir. 1980) (quot ing Sou th ern Pac if ic Termin al

Co. v. ICC , 219 U .S. 498, 515 (1911)). In de edth e f

urth er ex te ns io n of

de ad line s make s t

he ca se fo r t

hi s e xc ep ti on. On Dece mber 1 9, 2003, the D istrict Court ordered th e suspen sion of de adlines for the third time – un til Fe bru ary 29 , 200 4. 7 settlement ben efits are not in dispu te and no other order m erges w ith PTO 2663. A s there are no othe r iss ues left

to be dis posed, appea l of the Distri ct Court’ s order would not

resu lt in d elay. See Bachow ski v. Usery , 545 F .2d 36 3, 368 (3d C ir. 1976 ) (“Th e hos tility tow ards p iecem eal ap peals e xpre ssed b y the fina l judgm ent rule has a strong basis in logic and pract ical ity . Forbi dding appeal s from allinterlocutor y j udgments of the dist

rict courts achieves signi ficant savings in time and r esources on the part of litigants and

cour ts. This is so sinc e if litigatio n pro ceed s, the inte rmed iate rulin g m ay lose its signi ficance .

. . . ”) (ci ting Radio Stat ion WOW, Inc. v. Johnson , 326 U.S. 120, 123-24 (19 45) ; 15 C. W righ t, A. M iller & E. C oop er, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3907 (1976)). In sum, t

he order i n questi on was as finalas it gets; it was t

he deter minati on of the only issue t hat was before t

he Distr ict Court

and, therefore, is appeal able under §1291. 5 III. Standard of Review When the “[s]t ipulation [of the parti es] pl aces into the Dist rict Court’s j urisdi ction ong oing autho rity over the Settlem ent, . . . with that co mes the disc retion n ecess ary to exerci se jur isdi ction. ” In re Cendant Corp. Prides Li tigation , 233 F.3d 188, 194 (3d Cir.8

2000). I n this case, t

he Settl ement Agreement provi des that “the Court

may ext end any [relevant] time period for good cause sho wn upo n application by the Parties, Trustees, Claims Administ

rator s(s)

. . . .” Thus, we review the Dist rict Court’s order to exte nd the deadl ines for abuse of dis creti on. Our revi ew of the admissibili ty of evid enc e is a lso for a bus e of disc retio n. In re Merritt Logan, I nc. , 901 F.2d 349, 359 (3d Cir. 1990 ). VI. Discussi on A. Cla ss membe rs ar gue th atth e Tr ust di d no t s how g oodcau se to ext endth e t ime period. They cont end that the Dist rict Court impermi ssibly r ewrote the Settl ement Ag r ee me nt

by fi nd i ng go odcaus e f

or t he de l ay

an d o r de r i ng su sp en si onof de ad l i ne s. We disagr ee. The Distri ct Court c oncluded that good cause was shown for extensi on of deadlines b ecause it fou nd that the de lay resulted from un foreseen factors. The Cou rt firs t noted t

hat the Trust r eceived an une xpectedl y hi gh number of clai ms, far out of proport ion with t

he projec tions on which the Settlement Agreement was based. The District Cou rt also pointed ou t that tens of thousa nds of inc omp lete claim form s were filed , wh ich a lso c ont ribu ted to the s ign ifica nt d elay in pro ces sing time

. Cla ss m em ber s do not disp ute a ny pe rtine nt fin din gs b y the D istrict Co urt. However, they

assert that t he clai ms processing delay was also due t o the inc ompetence9

of a c ontrac tor the T rust hire d. Th us the y conten d that th e D istrict Co urt erred beca use it di d n ot in its or de r m en tio n t he fa ct t ha t th e T ru st i tse lf a lso co nt rib ut ed to th e d ela y. Because our re view is for abuse of dis creti on, we will revers e if “t he dist rict court’ s decis ion res ts upon a cl early erroneous finding of

fact, an errant

conclusi on of law, or an improper appli cati on of law to fact .” Int’ l Union, Unit ed Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of Am., UAW v. Mack Trucks, Inc ., 820 F.2d 9 1, 95 (3d C ir. 1987) (ci ting Int’ l Olympic Comm. v. San Franci sco Arts & Athletics , 781 F.2d 733, 738 (9th Cir . 1986)) . “A findi ng of fact i s clearly erroneous when, after

reviewing t

he evidence, the court

of appeals is ‘l eft with a defini te and fi rm convict ion that a mistake has been committ ed.’” Oberti by Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Cle menton School Dist ., 995 F. 2d 1204, 1220 (3d Cir . 1993) ( quoting Anderson v. Bess emer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)). In this case , the record indicates tha t incomp etence of the Trust’s contra ctor did contrib ute to th e dela y to som e exte nt. Ho we ver, the record also su ppo rts the find ing that t he u nex pec ted h igh num ber of c laim s w as a ma jor c aus e fo r the dela y. M orev er, the D istrict Co urt did n ot find that the large n um ber o f claim s wa s the o nly cause for t

he delay . It

determi ned that

the del ay was “at

least in part ” the re sult

of unforeseen fa ctors not speci fical ly noted. Not lis ting t

hem, while not

helpful , need not des troy ou r de fere nce to d iscre tion we ll exe rcise d fo r the reas on n oted

. In In re Cendant Corp. Prides Li tigation , we deter mined that

“where the par

ties affirm atively sub jected them selves to the C ourt’s ju risdiction by seek ing its as sistanc e in6 The Ru le reads:

Rule 1006. Summaries The contents of voluminous wri tings , recordings, or photogr aphs which cannot conv enien tly be exa mine d in co urt ma y be pres ented in the form of a c hart, summary, or calc ulati on. The ori ginals , or dupl icat es, s hall be made availa ble for examinati on or copy ing, or both, by other par

ties at rea sonable time and place . The cour t may ord er that th ey be pro duce d in co urt.
10 administering th e settlement and deliberately left the important dates to the Cou rt’s discr etion, ” the Dist

rict Court “had the power to modify the te rms of the St ipulation originall y set by

the Court . . . .” 233 F.3d at 197. Likewise, class members in this case affirmat ively

subject ed themsel ves to t he Court' s discr etion by leavi ng the det erminat ion of what is good cause to t he Court ins tead of defining it themselve s. Given t

hat we do not find any clear error in the Dis tri ct Court’ s express ed findi ngs, we conclude that it act ed wit hin its dis creti on w hen it fou nd g ood cau se f or th e su spe nsio n of

the d ead lines

. B. Class members al so chall enge the Dist rict Court’s r

uling r egarding t

he admissi on of evidence. Invoking Feder al Rule of Evi dence Rule 1006, 6 they argue that the T rust’s summary of dat a was impermiss ibly admitt ed because t

hey were not

given acces s to the origi nal dat abase. It i s well es tabli shed that “[t]he admissi on or exclus ion of evi dence is a matter parti cularly sui ted to t

he broad dis creti on of the trialjudge. ” In re Merritt Logan, 901 F.2d at 359. The summary i n disput e was only relevant to t

his cas e in that it

contai ned11

informat ion about how manyclai ms the Trust recei ved and ther eby es tabli shed that a lot more clai ms were file d than the Trust had anticipated. Moreover, the record s hows that class members conceded duri ng the hear ing that they were not dis puting t

he number of claim s the T rust rec eived . Give n the b road discre tion ac cord ed the Distric t Cou rt to admit or e xclude evi dence, we concl ude that it di d not abuse i ts di scret ion in admi tting the s um ma ry evid enc e. * * * * * Accordingly , we affir

m the District Court ’s PTO 2663.