United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 17-2048 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

v. 

GLENN A. CHIN, 

Defendant. 

TRUSTEES OF BOSTON UNIVERSITY, 

OWNER OF THE RADIO STATION WBUR (WBUR), 

Intervenor, Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS 

[Hon. Richard G. Stearns, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Barron and Selya, Circuit Judges, 

and Katzmann, Judge.*

 Jeffrey J. Pyle, with whom Prince Lobel Tye LLP was on brief, 

for appellant. 

 Gregory Dubinsky, with whom Evan H. Stein and Holwell, Shuster 

& Goldberg LLP were on brief, for Court-appointed amicus curiae in 

support of affirmance. 

 Nashwa Gewaily, New England First Amendment Coalition, 

Sigmund D. Schutz, and Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios, LLP, 

on brief as amici curiae in support of appellant. 

 * Of the United States Court of International Trade, sitting 

by designation. 
January 18, 2019 
- 3 - 

BARRON, Circuit Judge. This case concerns an appeal by 

the Trustees of Boston University, as owners of WBUR, which is a 

public radio station in Boston, Massachusetts. We will refer to 

the appellant by the radio station's name, WBUR. 

The issue that we must decide arises from WBUR's motion 

in the fall of 2017 to intervene in a then still-ongoing criminal 

trial in the United States District Court for the District of 

Massachusetts. In that motion, WBUR also requested that the 

District Court unseal the names and addresses of the jurors in the 

criminal case and provide that information to WBUR "as soon as 

possible" after the announcement of the jury's verdict. 

The District Court granted the motion to intervene but 

otherwise denied in substantial part the motion to unseal the 

requested information. We now vacate and remand. 

I. 

WBUR filed this motion in the criminal case against New 

England Compounding Center ("NECC") supervisory pharmacist Glenn 

Chin. He had been charged with committing mail fraud and violating 

the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 

18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968, based on, among other things, twenty-five 

predicate acts of second-degree murder, in connection with a 

nationwide distribution of contaminated medications that caused a 

fatal outbreak of fungal meningitis.
- 4 - 

Chin's trial began in federal district court in Boston 

on September 19, 2017. It ended a little more than a month later, 

on October 25, 2017, when the jury found Chin guilty of mail fraud 

and lesser predicate offenses under RICO but not guilty of the 

twenty-five predicate acts of second-degree murder. 

A week before the trial ended, on October 18, 2017, WBUR 

filed its motion both to intervene in the criminal case and to 

obtain "as soon as possible after the verdict is announced" the 

names and addresses of the then-deliberating jurors. On October 

27, 2017 -- just two days after the jury had returned its verdict 

-- the District Court issued an order allowing intervention in the 

criminal case by WBUR but denying, without prejudice, its motion 

regarding the disclosure of juror names and addresses. 

The District Court stated in that order that it would 

"release" juror names and hometowns, but not addresses, and that 

it would do so only after Chin's sentencing, which was scheduled 

for January 30, 2018.1 The District Court did note in its order, 

 1 One of Chin's co-defendants was Barry Cadden, the owner of 

NECC, whose case had gone to trial in federal district court in 

Boston six months earlier. At Cadden's trial, the jury returned 

a verdict sheet suggesting that the jurors had not voted 

unanimously to acquit Cadden of second-degree murder, even though 

the not-guilty verdict required unanimity. WBUR filed a motion 

for immediate access to juror names and addresses, and the District 

Court ruled that it would release a list of each juror's name and 

hometown, though not each juror's address, only after sentencing, 

which was to occur three months later. WBUR, though unable to 

identify every juror even after receiving the jurors' names and 

hometowns, ultimately interviewed two jurors from the Cadden trial 
- 5 - 

however, that it would "consider an earlier release of the juror 

list upon submission by [WBUR] of an appropriate protective order 

that is . . . crafted to insure against any unnecessary 

dissemination of the jurors' personal identification in the news 

media or over the internet (without the juror's express assent)." 

The District Court based this possible condition on 

release on a protective order requirement that Judge Young had 

imposed one week earlier in a similar ruling regarding WBUR's 

request for disclosure of juror names and addresses in another 

case in the District of Massachusetts: United States v. Wright, 

No. 15-cr-10153-WGY (D. Mass. Oct. 20, 2017), ECF No. 357. Judge 

Young withdrew the protective order requirement in Wright on 

November 3, 2017, however, after WBUR challenged that requirement 

on the grounds that it would be impractical and perhaps 

unconstitutional. 

A little less than two weeks later, on November 16, 2017, 

WBUR appealed from the District Court's order denying its request 

in Chin. The next day, the District Court issued an "Amended Order 

on Motion of [WBUR] to Unseal Juror Names and Addresses," which, 

just as Judge Young had done in Wright, withdrew the protective 

order requirement. In the amended order, the District Court 

reiterated that it would "release" a list of the Chin jurors' names 

 

and aired a report stating that those two jurors did not understand 

that not-guilty verdicts required unanimity. 
- 6 - 

and hometowns, but not addresses, and that it would do so only 

after sentencing.

In accord with the initial order, on January 31, 2018, 

the day after the sentencing proceedings in Chin's case ended, the 

District Court issued an unsealed order containing a list of the 

jurors' names and their hometowns, but not their addresses. 

Because neither the government nor Chin opposes WBUR's motion on 

appeal, we ordered the appointment of amicus counsel ("Courtappointed amicus") to represent the position reflected in the 

District Court's order denying WBUR's motion in substantial part, 

a task that the amicus has ably performed.2 

II. 

We begin by addressing our jurisdiction to hear this 

appeal, which turns out to be a task that is not without its 

complexities. The most prominent jurisdictional question that we 

confront concerns the possibility that this appeal has been mooted 

by the District Court's granting of partial relief to WBUR and the 

fact that Chin's sentencing has already occurred. But, before we 

get to that jurisdictional question, we address two others, the 

first of which relates to the appellant's status as an intervenor. 

We stated in In re Globe Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d 88, 90 

(1st Cir. 1990), that "the right of a non-party to intervene in a 

 2 We also acknowledge the helpful amicus brief filed by the 

New England First Amendment Coalition, et al. 
- 7 - 

criminal proceeding is doubtful." But, we nonetheless concluded 

-- even without finding that the appellant there could intervene 

-- that we had jurisdiction over the appeal under the All Writs 

Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. See In re Providence Journal Co., Inc., 

293 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2002) (explaining that the All Writs Act 

gives "[a] federal court of appeals . . . the power to treat an 

attempted appeal from an unappealable (or possibly unappealable) 

order as a petition for a writ of mandamus" (quoting United States 

v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 769 (1st Cir. 1994))). 

Here, however, the District Court did grant WBUR's 

motion to intervene. And, because that "legal decision" to grant 

WBUR's motion remained "unchallenged in [this] appeal despite the 

existence of ample opportunity to [challenge it]," it is now "law 

of the case for future stages of the same litigation" and therefore 

"should continue to govern the same issues." United States v. 

Matthews, 643 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). 

Thus, as an intervenor, WBUR may appeal the District Court's order 

denying its request for the disclosure of juror names and 

addresses, which WBUR filed before sentencing and thus before the 

matter had concluded -- assuming, that is, the appeal is not moot. 

See United States v. Blagojevich, 612 F.3d 558, 560 (7th Cir. 2010) 
- 8 - 

(applying the collateral order doctrine in finding jurisdiction 

over an appeal by an intervenor in a similar case).3 

The next jurisdictional wrinkle that we must iron out 

concerns the timing of the appeal relative to the issuance of the 

District Court's amended order in this case. Neither WBUR nor 

Court-appointed amicus makes anything of the fact that the District 

Court issued its amended order the day after WBUR filed its notice 

of appeal. But, the general rule is that "[t]he filing of a notice 

of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance -- it confers 

jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court 

of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the 

appeal." Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 

58 (1982). 

Nevertheless, "this circuit and others have recognized 

limited exceptions to this judge-made rule." United States v. 

Torres-Oliveras, 583 F.3d 37, 44 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing 16A 

Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3949.1 

(4th ed. 2009); United States v. Ortega, 859 F.2d 327, 334–35 (5th 

Cir. 1988)). And, arguably, the District Court's amended order 

here falls within one of the recognized exceptions because it does 

 3 Nor do we think that the fact that the motion to unseal the 

juror names and addresses was denied "without prejudice" is of 

jurisdictional significance, under the collateral order doctrine, 

given that the request was for the release of the jurors' 

identifying information "as soon as possible" post-verdict. 
- 9 - 

not "alter the substance of the decision" to release juror names 

and hometowns after sentencing. See Wright, et al. § 3949.1. 

In any event, we will treat the District Court's November 

17, 2017 order as though it were an indicative ruling regarding 

the withdrawal of the protective order requirement. Cf. United 

States v. Maldonado-Rios, 790 F.3d 62, 65 (1st Cir. 2015) (per 

curiam) (treating a sentencing court's grant of a motion filed 

during the pendency of appeal as an indicative ruling under Federal 

Rule of Appellate Procedure 12.1). And, even if we consider on 

appeal only the District Court's October 27, 2017 order, our 

analysis of the merits is not affected. See Torres-Oliveras, 583 

F.3d at 44. 

We come, then, to the main potential jurisdictional 

obstacle to our reaching the merits of this appeal. Courtappointed amicus contends that the appeal is moot in its entirety, 

and thus no longer a live case or controversy requiring resolution, 

because the District Court released the names and hometowns of the 

Chin jurors on January 31, 2018. 

"The burden of establishing mootness rests with the 

party invoking the doctrine." ACLU of Mass. v. U.S. Conference of 

Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d 44, 52 (1st Cir. 2013). Because no 

factual findings bear on the matter, we decide the legal issue de 

novo. See id.
- 10 - 

As to WBUR's appeal of the denial of its request for the 

jurors' addresses, Court-appointed amicus argues that the access 

to names and hometowns that the District Court provided is 

sufficient for WBUR to identify the jurors and thus renders any 

opinion ordering the release of juror addresses "merely advisory." 

See Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat, 317 F.3d 45, 60 (1st Cir. 2003) ("If 

events have transpired to render a court opinion merely advisory, 

Article III considerations require dismissal of the case."). 

Accordingly, Court-appointed amicus contends that this aspect of 

WBUR's appeal is moot. 

But, the District Court has not unsealed some of the 

information that WBUR sought in its motion -- namely, the addresses 

of the jurors. And, it is undisputed that WBUR has not been able 

to contact all twelve jurors in the Chin trial, even though the 

District Court provided WBUR with access to their names and 

hometowns. Consequently, the unsealing of the requested 

addresses, even at this point, would provide "effectual relief" to 

WBUR with respect to its appeal of the District Court's order 

denying its motion requesting the information that thus far has 

been withheld. ACLU of Mass., 705 F.3d at 52. This aspect of the 

appeal, therefore, is not moot.

The mootness question is not quite so easily resolved 

with respect to WBUR's appeal of the District Court's denial of 

the request to release the jurors' identifying information post-
- 11 - 

verdict, rather than post-sentencing. The sentencing occurred 

nearly a year ago. There is no way to turn back the clock. Thus, 

there is some force to the suggestion of mootness by Courtappointed amicus as to the aspect of WBUR's appeal that concerns 

the timing of the release of the requested information. 

Nevertheless, in contending that this aspect of its 

appeal also is not moot, WBUR relies on an exception to the 

mootness doctrine that exists for a controversy that is "capable 

of repetition, yet evading review." Kingdomware Technologies, 

Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1976 (2016) (quoting 

Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998)). In particular, WBUR 

argues that, although sentencing has already occurred, WBUR likely 

"will again be subjected to the alleged illegality" because that 

"alleged illegality" is capable of repetition and would continue 

to evade review. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 483 (1982) (per 

curiam); ACLU of Mass., 705 F.3d at 57 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 

City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983)). 

To qualify for this exception to the mootness doctrine, 

WBUR bears the burden of showing that "(1) the challenged action 

was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its 

cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation 

that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same 

action again." Gulf of Maine Fisherman's All. v. Daley, 292 F.3d 

84, 89 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 
- 12 - 

147, 149 (1975)). We conclude that WBUR has made the required 

showing. 

About three months elapsed between the verdict and 

sentencing in Chin. That period of time is "too short" to complete 

litigation, given that the appeal process often takes longer than 

a few months. Id. But, that fact should not preclude WBUR's 

challenge to a delay in the disclosure of the requested information 

that, though shorter than the time frame for most litigation, was 

still significant enough to affect WBUR's reporting. WBUR has 

also shown that it frequently requests that the District of 

Massachusetts unseal jury lists as soon as possible following a 

verdict in order to obtain information that would enable it to 

report on cases in the District. And, WBUR has shown that, in a 

number of instances, judges in the District have waited until after 

sentencing to release the requested juror information. 

Therefore, we conclude that WBUR has met its burden under 

the exception to the mootness doctrine on which it relies in asking 

us to consider its appeal with respect to the timing issue. And 

so, satisfied that WBUR's appeal is not moot, and having disposed 

of the other possible jurisdictional issues that might have cut 

short our consideration of this appeal, we now turn to the merits 

of the case. 
- 13 - 

III. 

In considering the merits, we direct our attention 

chiefly to one of our prior precedents: In re Globe Newspaper Co., 

920 F.2d 88 (1st Cir. 1990). We do so because WBUR's appeal is 

premised in part on a contention about what that precedent holds. 

WBUR stated in its motion requesting the disclosure of 

the juror information -- just as it now asserts on appeal -- that, 

"under controlling precedent, the identities of the jurors 'must 

be made public' after a verdict is rendered, unless the Court makes 

'particularized findings reasonably justifying nondisclosure.'" 

The assertedly "controlling precedent" that WBUR identifies is In 

re Globe. Because the interpretation of that precedent presents 

a purely legal question, our review of whether In re Globe controls 

the outcome here -- as WBUR contends that it does -- is de novo. 

See United States v. Mayendía-Blanco, 905 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 

2018). If we conclude that In re Globe does control here, then we 

must consider Court-appointed amicus's alternative argument that 

we should revisit that holding in light of changes in technology 

over the past thirty years since In re Globe was decided. 

A. 

WBUR is right that, insofar as In re Globe requires a 

district court in a particular case to disclose juror names and 

addresses post-trial, but pre-sentencing, In re Globe allows for 

an exception to that requirement only if the district court makes 
- 14 - 

"particularized findings reasonably justifying non-disclosure." 

See In re Globe, 920 F.2d at 98. WBUR is also right that such 

"finding[s] of exceptional circumstances [must be] peculiar to the 

case." Id. at 97. Moreover, In re Globe provides examples of 

"[s]uch circumstances," and they include "a credible threat of 

jury tampering, a risk of personal harm to individual jurors, and 

other evils affecting the administration of justice." Id. 

Here, the District Court did not make any 

"particularized findings" regarding such exceptional circumstances 

that were peculiar to this case. Nor does Court-appointed amicus 

suggest that the District Court did so when denying in substantial 

part WBUR's motion to release the requested information. Instead, 

the District Court in its amended order recounted the jury's 

historical role to explain, in part, its decision not to release 

any of the requested information to WBUR until after sentencing 

and not to release the jurors' addresses even then. The District 

Court also placed great emphasis in its initial order on the 

technological realities that supply the present context for WBUR's 

request for juror information. As the District Court put it in 

its initial order: 

While the court respects the role of the media 

in promoting "the public's long-term interest 

in maintaining an open judicial process," [In 

re Globe, 920 F.2d at 91], it will not release 

jurors' home addresses. . . . [T]his is . . 

. a necessary precaution in an age in which 

traditional boundaries of personal privacy are 
- 15 - 

under assault. While jurors serve in an 

important public capacity, it is a role thrust 

upon them as a duty of citizenship. The extent 

to which such service might compromise a 

juror's personal life once that service is 

concluded should be a matter in which the 

juror has the maximum say constitutionally 

possible. 

Thus, the first question before us is whether In re Globe 

does indeed require, as WBUR contends, the requested disclosure of 

juror addresses (as opposed to merely hometowns) post-trial, 

absent the requisite "particularized findings" described above. 

The second question that we must consider is whether In re Globe 

requires the requested disclosure to occur "as soon as possible" 

post-verdict, absent "particularized findings" to justify a delay 

in the release of juror identities until after sentencing, which 

here occurred three months after trial. For, if In re Globe does 

impose either disclosure requirement in the absence of such 

findings, then the order partially denying WBUR's motion did not 

comply with that prior precedent. We thus now review what we said 

in In re Globe. 

B. 

The case arose out of the Globe Newspaper Company's 

request for access to the names and addresses of the jurors who 

had participated in a then-just-completed criminal trial in a 

federal district court in Boston. Id. at 90. The underlying 
- 16 - 

criminal case concerned an alleged conspiracy to conceal illegal 

drug profits involving three defendants. Id. 

The jury there had found two defendants guilty and one 

not guilty. Id. On the same day that the verdict was rendered 

and the jury was discharged, "Globe reporters sought access to the 

court's record of the juror names and addresses." Id. 

When the district court in that case refused to grant 

the reporters the requested access, the newspaper company moved to 

intervene and to request access to the court's record of the juror 

names and addresses. Id. That motion was denied, and the ensuing 

appeal by the newspaper company led to our decision in In re Globe. 

In reversing the ruling below, we recognized the 

competing interests, constitutional and otherwise, implicated by 

the newspaper company's request for access to the names and 

addresses of jurors -– "the press's First Amendment right of access 

to criminal trials[,] the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a 

fair trial[, and] the jurors['] interest in having their privacy 

protected." Id. at 93 (citations omitted). We also noted that 

"[k]nowledge of juror identities allows the public to verify the 

impartiality of key participants in the administration of justice, 

and thereby ensures fairness, the appearance of fairness and public 

confidence in that system." Id. at 94. And, too, we noted, the 

public disclosure of juror identities serves many of the same 
- 17 - 

purposes of "open justice" that are protected by the First 

Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. 

We chose, however, not to rest our decision reversing 

the ruling below on a constitutional holding rooted in the First 

Amendment. Instead, we based our decision on a construction of 

what was then § 10(c) of the District of Massachusetts Plan for 

Random Selection of Jurors ("Jury Plan"), which the District had 

adopted pursuant to the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1861-1874 (1982) ("the Act"). 

In construing those texts, we noted at the outset that, 

although the language of the Act and of the Jury Plan make no 

specific distinction between pre-verdict and post-verdict 

disclosure of juror identities, "[t]he court's right to [keep names 

and addresses of jurors confidential] during the trial [was] not 

an issue in [In re Globe]." In re Globe, 920 F.2d at 90. We 

observed as well that "[n]o doubt stronger reasons to withhold 

juror names and addresses will often exist during trial than after 

a verdict is rendered" and stated that "[t]o justify impoundment 

after the trial has ended, the court must find a significant threat 

to the judicial process itself." Id. at 91 (emphasis in original). 

Against that background understanding, we then construed 

the Jury Plan in light of the newspaper company's request for postverdict disclosure of juror identities. In doing so, we noted 

that the Jury Plan's relevant provision barred the disclosure of 
- 18 - 

juror names until the jurors "have appeared, or failed to appear, 

in response to the summons." In re Globe, 920 F.2d at 92 & n.4 

(quoting Jury Plan § 10(c)). We noted as well that this same 

provision then went on to state that "[a]ny judge of this Court 

may order that the names of jurors remain confidential even 

thereafter if the interests of justice so require." Id. (emphasis 

omitted) (quoting Jury Plan § 10(c)).4 

With those observations in place, we then "construe[d] 

the § 10(c) interests-of-justice exception as contemplating the 

[post-verdict] withholding of juror identities only upon a finding 

of exceptional circumstances peculiar to the case" and thus "h[e]ld 

that, given the absence [in In re Globe's case] of particularized 

findings reasonably justifying non-disclosure, the juror names and 

addresses must be made public." Id. at 97-98. Moreover, we 

explained that "we construe ['names' in § 1863(b)(7) of the Act] 

to encompass [jurors'] addresses" because addresses might be 

 4 The Act, § 1863(b)(7) provides: 

Among other things, such plan shall— 

(7) fix the time when the names drawn from the qualified 

jury wheel shall be disclosed to parties and to the 

public. If the plan permits these names to be made 

public, it may nevertheless permit the chief judge of 

the district court, or such other district court judge 

as the plan may provide, to keep these names confidential 

in any case where the interests of justice so require. 

Although this provision of the Act "suggest[s] that a local [jury] 

plan might optionally decline not to permit juror names to be made 

public at all," the District of Massachusetts's Jury Plan clearly 

does so permit. See In re Globe, 920 F.2d at 92. 
- 19 - 

necessary to identify an individual with a common name. Id. at 93 

n.6.5 Thus, we concluded "that addresses as well as names are 

presumptively available to the public under the [Jury Plan]," and 

thus that juror "[a]ddresses as well as names may be withheld by 

court order where the interests of justice so require, e.g., where 

security considerations or matters of similar import are 

involved." Id.6

Despite these seemingly definitive statements about the 

requirement to disclose the requested information, Court-appointed 

amicus argues that, with respect to the disclosure of juror 

addresses, In re Globe at most sets forth dicta that does not bind 

us here. To support this contention, Court-appointed amicus both 

asserts that In re Globe "did not address the precise issue before 

 5 The Jury Plan implements the Act, and therefore, the 

reference to "names" in § 10(c) of the Jury Plan, like the 

reference to "names" in the Act, is construed to include addresses. 

See id. at 93 n.6. 

6 The Jury Plan was revised in 2015 to include a new summoning 

and qualification procedure. In that revision, the text of what 

was § 10(c) in 1990, when In re Globe was decided, is now included 

verbatim in § 10(a). And it is that provision in the revised Jury 

Plan that is now in place. The parties do not argue that this 

change in the location of the relevant text makes In re Globe's 

construction of the same operative language any less binding on us 

than it would be if the Jury Plan that was before the court in In 

re Globe was still in place. And we see no reason to conclude 

otherwise. Thus, this feature of our case supplies no reason for 

concluding that In re Globe does not bind us. 
- 20 - 

this panel" and then characterizes that issue as being whether 

hometowns would suffice to identify jurors. 

The issue that we must decide, however, is not whether, 

in principle, addresses are necessary in order to identify jurors. 

The issue is whether In re Globe, in construing the same language 

in the Jury Plan that is at issue here, holds that, presumptively, 

they are. And, we conclude that In re Globe most certainly does 

so hold, as the review of that precedent that we have set forth 

above reveals. 

The requirement that addresses must be disclosed so that 

jurors may be identified is expressly part of In re Globe's 

instructions to the district court in that case. Id. at 98. In 

addition, In re Globe explains its reasoning on that score as 

follows: "an address as well as the name is necessary to identify 

the individual [in some cases]" and "therefore, . . . addresses as 

well as names are presumptively available to the public under the 

[Jury Plan]." Id. at 93 n.6 (emphasis added). 

Nor does In re Globe's use of the qualifier 

"presumptively" before the word "available" support the view put 

forth by Court-appointed amicus. See id. That qualifier, 

considered in context, merely reflects In re Globe's conclusion 

that, in light of the principles that favor the disclosure of juror 

identities, the obligation to disclose imposed by the language of 

§ 10(c) may be overcome with respect to the release of juror 
- 21 - 

addresses only if a district court makes the requisite 

"particularized findings." See id. at 98. 

Thus, we reject Court-appointed amicus's contention that 

In re Globe does not render a holding on whether juror addresses 

may be withheld post-verdict. It clearly does, as it holds that, 

save for such findings, the addresses may not be so withheld. See 

Arcam Pharm. Corp. v. Faría, 513 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2007) ("We 

have held that 'when a statement in a judicial decision is 

essential to the result reached in the case, it becomes part of 

the court's holding.' The result, along with those portions of 

the opinion necessary to the result, are binding, whereas dicta is 

not." (quoting Rossiter v. Potter, 357 F.3d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 2004)) 

(citation omitted)). And, we note, WBUR has represented that 

addresses are necessary to identify some jurors in this case. 

We next must consider whether In re Globe also holds 

that the timing of the disclosure of the requested juror 

information may not be delayed until after sentencing. Here, too, 

we conclude that In re Globe does so hold. 

In re Globe makes clear that it is deciding "the right 

of access to juror names and addresses following a trial" rather 

than during a trial, id. at 95, and that it is holding that, after 

a trial is complete, "juror names and addresses must be made 

public" in "the absence . . . of particularized findings reasonably 

justifying non-disclosure," id. at 98. The logic of In re Globe 
- 22 - 

thus requires that any delay in post-verdict disclosure be 

justified by the requisite "particularized findings." 

After all, In re Globe sets no limit for what would 

amount to an acceptable delay without such findings. Rather, it 

clearly states, "[t]o justify impoundment after the trial has 

ended, the court must find a significant threat to the judicial 

process itself." Id. at 91. Accordingly, we reject the contention 

that In re Globe addresses only the issue of whether the permanent 

impoundment of the relevant juror information is permissible. 

To be sure, In re Globe does, as Court-appointed amicus 

notes, cite favorably to United States v. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. 

719 (D. Mass. 1987), in which the court delayed the release of 

juror identities until one week after trial. The Doherty court 

reasoned that such a delay would "not injure the values to be 

furthered by a searching press inquiry into the lives of the 

jurors" while at the same time affording jurors, among other 

things, "a short breathing space to reflect on the experience of 

jury service and, after consultation with family and friends, 

determine what, if anything, the juror wishes to discuss with the 

press." Id. at 725. 

But, even assuming that In re Globe's citation of Doherty 

indicates that there is some such brief time period that could 

constitute an acceptable delay, the three-month delay in this case 

far outstrips such a period. And so, once again, we reject the 
- 23 - 

contention of Court-appointed amicus that In re Globe sets forth 

no holding on the relevant point. 

C. 

We recognize, of course, that In re Globe was decided 

decades ago and thus well before the first tweet was tweeted. As 

the District Court emphasized, there is now a greater potential 

for the public release of a juror's name, and, especially, a 

juror's address, to be more intrusive and concerning than would 

have been the case in an era in which social media was unknown. 

But, these technological changes have by no means 

diminished the need for accountability and transparency in our 

system of justice that In re Globe treats as relevant in construing 

the critical provision of the Jury Plan. Nor is In re Globe 

dogmatic in reading that Jury Plan language to favor, on balance, 

disclosure. Rather, it construes the Jury Plan's relevant text to 

permit nondisclosure in cases of individualized and adequately 

demonstrated need. 

In any event, for present purposes, what matters is not 

how, all things considered, one might now choose to strike the 

balance that In re Globe holds that the Jury Plan's key provision 

had struck. What matters is that In re Globe does render a holding 

about that balance and that "[i]n a multi-panel circuit, newly 

constituted panels are, for the most part, bound by prior panel 
- 24 - 

decisions closely on point." Williams v. Ashland Eng'g Co., 45 

F.3d 588, 592 (1st Cir. 1995). 

"This tenet embodies what has come to be known as 

the law of the circuit doctrine, which is a 'subset of stare 

decisis' [and] one of the sturdiest 'building blocks on which the 

federal judicial system rests.'" United States v. Barbosa, 896 

F.3d 60, 74 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting San Juan Cable LLC v. P.R. 

Tel. Co., 612 F.3d 25, 33 (1st Cir. 2010)). And while there are 

exceptions to this doctrine that account for the circumstance when 

there has been intervening precedent, id., those exceptions do not 

apply here, nor does Court-appointed amicus or the District Court 

offer any basis for concluding otherwise. 

As a result, we are bound, under the law of the circuit 

doctrine, to construe the operative language of the Jury Plan that 

is at issue in this case in the same manner that we construed the 

exact same language in In re Globe. And, for that reason, we 

cannot accept the District Court's legal conclusion that "concerns 

for juror privacy and a lack of precedent requiring the disclosure 

of jurors' home addresses" provide a justification for a 

generalized ruling that "a release of jurors' names, together with 

their home towns, at the appropriate time (after sentencing), 

strikes the proper balance between the public right of access and 

the juror right to privacy." 
- 25 - 

Moreover, we note that a district court's "supervisory 

power does not license it to ignore an otherwise valid existing 

jury plan or to bypass the mechanism provided by statute to alter 

such plan [because] '[t]o allow otherwise "would confer on the 

judiciary discretionary power to disregard the considered 

limitations of the law it is charged with enforcing."'" In re 

United States, 426 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Bank of Nova 

Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254 (1988)). Thus, in 

light of In re Globe's holding about the meaning of the text of 

the Jury Plan that is at issue and the law of the circuit doctrine, 

the proper way for concerns about juror privacy to be addressed is 

through the process of amending the Jury Plan itself, insofar as 

any such amendment to the Jury Plan would be lawful -- a question 

that we do not purport to address here.7

 7 The District Court concluded its amended order by stating: 

"The court would also suggest that any judge evaluating this same 

issue consider whether he or [she] would disclose his or her home 

address when issuing orders or rulings." Here, we must rule as we 

do in consequence of our prior holding in In re Globe and the law 

of the circuit doctrine. We do note, though, that, in construing 

the Jury Plan to require the disclosure of juror names and 

addresses post-verdict absent the requisite "particularized 

findings," In re Globe emphasizes that jurors are not otherwise 

sufficiently identifiable to the press and public. See In re 

Globe, 920 F.2d at 93 n.6, 97-98. That reasoning does not apply 

to judges. It also bears mentioning that it would be impossible 

for judges to keep their addresses confidential during trials in 

which they presided if they were required to disclose them postverdict, given that a judge is, by design, the quintessential 

repeat player. No equivalent conundrum presents itself with 

respect to jurors. 
- 26 - 

IV. 

The obligation of jury service is one of the most 

important that our government imposes on its citizens. It is, 

therefore, important to ensure that the fulfillment of this 

obligation is not made so burdensome that it becomes more than a 

citizen should have to bear. It is important to ensure as well, 

though, that our system of justice remains accountable to the 

broader public that it serves. 

The District of Massachusetts Jury Plan reconciles these 

competing concerns through the language now set forth in § 10(a). 

This Court, nearly three decades ago, construed that exact same 

language to require the post-verdict disclosure of juror names and 

addresses, absent a district court having made the requisite 

"particularized findings" to justify either nondisclosure or a 

delay in disclosure. No precedent of this Court or the Supreme 

Court has come down in the interim that in any way calls In re 

Globe's holding about how that language must be construed into 

question. Thus, In re Globe dictates the outcome that we reach 

here and thus precludes us from affirming the contrary one reached 

by the District Court. 

Nevertheless, it would be imprudent to prevent the 

District Court from considering on remand what it concluded that 

it was not required to consider -- namely, whether this particular 

case presents the kind of "exceptional circumstances" that In re 
- 27 - 

Globe contemplates.8 Thus, we instruct the District Court on 

remand to follow the rule set forth in In re Globe and to unseal 

the list of juror names and addresses as WBUR requested in its 

motion, unless the District Court first makes the kind of 

"particularized findings" that could justify either the 

nondisclosure of that information or the disclosure of it only 

with lawful conditions tailored to those findings. Accordingly, 

the District Court's order is vacated and remanded for proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

 8 WBUR asserted in its motion that, "[u]nder the standards 

set forth by the First Circuit, no such findings can be made here." 

But, rather than develop any argument as to this issue on appeal, 

WBUR simply states that "this case [does not] present any of the 

kinds of factors that, in the unusual case, could present 'specific 

and convincing reasons' for withholding juror identities." Thus, 

the argument that no such findings can be made is waived. See 

United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990)

(explaining that "issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, 

unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are 

deemed waived").