WHITHER HAITI?

Donald E. Schulz

April 1, 1996
ii

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The views expressed in this report are those of the author

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This report is approved for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

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The author especially wishes to thank Drs. Robert Maguire,

John Fishel and Gabriel Marcella, Lieutenant Colonel Robert

Caslen, and Rachel Neild of the Washington Office on Latin

America for their detailed and incisive comments on earlier

drafts of this work. In addition, Drs. Steven Metz and Earl

Tilford and Colonels Richard Witherspoon and William Allen also

provided much useful input. Needless to say, any errors of

omission or commission are entirely the author's responsibility.
iii

FOREWORD

As this study goes to press, the U.N. Mission in Haiti is in

the process of being extended for 4 months. The size of the force

will be sharply reduced. The central role played thus far by the

United States will be assumed by Canada, which, along with

Argentina, Pakistan and Bangladesh, will provide some 1,900

troops to the operation. The question that all this poses is

whether the progress that Haiti has made these past 18 months

will continue, especially after the mission pulls out altogether

(presumably after June 1996).

In the following report, Dr. Donald E. Schulz looks at the

prospects for political stability, democratization, and

socioeconomic development. His conclusions are sobering. While by

no means dismissing the possibility that Haiti can "make it," he

presents a portrait of the imposing obstacles that must still be

overcome and a detailed discussion of the things that could go

wrong. In a nutshell, he argues that without a much greater

willingness on the part of the United States and the

international community to "stay the course" in terms of

providing long-term security and socioeconomic aid, Haiti is

unlikely to make a successful transition to a stable, democratic,

economically modernizing nation. (Even with continuing

assistance, the outlook will be problematic.) He argues that

unless the United States and other foreign donors recognize this

and do what is necessary to give the Haitian experiment a better

chance to succeed, the "tactical success" that has been enjoyed

so far will sooner or later be transformed into a "strategic

failure." His policy recommendations, in particular, deserve

close scrutiny.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this

report as a contribution to understanding events in this

important country.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

DONALD E. SCHULZ is a Professor of National Security Affairs at

the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. He is the

coauthor of Reconciling the Irreconcilable: The Troubled Outlook

for U.S. Policy Toward Haiti and The United States, Honduras and

the Crisis in Central America and coeditor of Revolution and

Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean; Cuba and

the Future; Political Participation in Communist Systems; and

Mexico Faces the 21st Century. His articles have appeared in

Foreign Policy, Orbis, the Journal of Inter-American Studies and

World Affairs, and Small Wars and Insurgencies, as well as such

media outlets as Newsweek, The Washington Post, the Miami Herald,

and the Christian Science Monitor.
v

SUMMARY

This study examines Haiti's prospects for political

stability, democracy, and socioeconomic development after the

United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) leaves the country

(presumably in 1996). Among the major conclusions are the

following:

On the Transformation of the Haitian Political Culture.

• In Haiti, a political culture of predation has fostered

autocracy and corruption, extreme social injustice, and

economic stagnation. Since the September 1994 U.S.

intervention, tangible progress has been made toward

uprooting that culture. For the most part, the past 18

months have been marked by political stability and a

sharp reduction of violence. The central institution of

the Predatory State--the military--has been dismantled,

and new a Haitian National Police (HNP) created. The

relative lack of large-scale revenge-motivated violence

has been especially encouraging, as has been an

extraordinary flowering of political participation. At

the same time, presidential, parliamentary and

municipal elections have been held. For the first time

in the country's history, the presidency has been

transferred from one democratically elected president

to another.

• This being said, other signs are not so positive. The

June 1995 legislative and municipal elections were

chaotic, and the months since have witnessed growing

turmoil. There were major riots in November. For a

while, moreover, there was doubt as to whether Aristide

would step down and hold presidential elections. There

has also been a series of political assassinations

aimed at both Aristide's followers and supporters of

the former military regime, and there is some evidence

of Haitian government involvement in the latter. In

addition, there are disturbing signs that the Haitian

police are reverting to the human rights abuses and

incompetence that characterized their predecessors.

Social violence--particularly in slums like Cite

Soleil, where criminal gangs are increasingly dominant-

-is growing, and the HNP gives little indication of

being able to cope with it. There is concern, too,

about the government's decision to absorb hundreds of

ex-military personnel into the police, some in command

positions. As a result, the HNP has lost much of the

legitimacy it enjoyed at its inception.
vi

• There is a danger that severe constraints on Haiti's

economic development may fatally undermine the

country's political development. Socioeconomic

conditions are extremely grim and likely to remain so

for some time. Under such circumstances, there may well

be a disillusionment with democracy.

• One of the main reasons that Haiti has been able to

avoid major violence has been the presence of a

substantial international peacekeeping force. Now,

however, the UNMIH is downsizing and phasing out. If

the violence that Haiti has been experiencing should

increase and become more politicized, it would further

undermine the prospects for political stability and

democratization.

• The transformation of a political culture requires the

internalization of new values and attitudes. But such

changes will take years--indeed decades--to complete.

Education will be critical. While Aristide has begun

this process, it is by no means clear that his

successor, Rene Preval, will be able to hold together

the centrifugal forces that will continue to pull at

Haiti's delicate political fabric.

• The legitimacy of Haiti's political institutions--

especially at the national level--remains very weak.

Haitians are used to thinking of the state as an

oppressive force, and it will take time and a radically

different pattern of government behavior to change

that. Political parties are still highly unstable,

little more than vehicles for the ambitions of

individual politicians. The police and the courts

remain extremely fragile. Weak and/or illegitimate

institutions are not likely to perform the functions

for which they are designed. Failing that, they will

remain susceptible to political subversion, corruption,

and destruction. Whether Aristide's charismatic

authority will be supplanted by institutional authority

remains one of the key issues in Haitian political

development.

• In sum, gains have been made, but there are still

enormous obstacles to overcome. Moreover, there are

growing signs that the situation is deteriorating--this

at precisely the time that U.S. and U.N. peacekeepers

are leaving.

On the Role of the United States and the International Community.
vii

• Haiti's future will in no small part depend on the

willingness and ability of the international community-

-especially the United States--to use its resources to

promote Haitian political and socioeconomic

development. There are serious doubts, however, as to

whether the country's foreign sponsors are willing to

make the kind of investment that is necessary.

• U.S. policy toward Haiti has been both driven and

constrained by domestic politics. Political support in

Congress and the public for the September 1994 military

intervention and the peacekeeping operations that

followed was extraordinarily thin and was conditioned

on being able to move in, restore order and move out,

while keeping U.S. casualties to an absolute minimum.

This structured serious limitations and irrationalities

into the policy that now threaten the success of the

entire operation. Cases in point include the failure to

more aggressively disarm those elements that were

capable of threatening public order, and the insistence

that Aristide step down, even though he had been

deprived of 3 years of his presidency and had the

support of most Haitians to continue in office for 3

more years to make up for the time that had been lost.

The consequence is likely to be a Haiti that will be

more unstable--and potentially anti-American--than it

had to be.

• There is a danger that the United States and other

foreign aid donors/lenders, by attempting to impose

neoliberal economic reforms on Haiti and suspending aid

when it resisted, may push the country into an even

deeper socioeconomic crisis. If that occurs, political

stability and democracy will probably be among the

casualties.

Conclusions and Recommendations.

• While nothing is inevitable, there is a very real

danger that sooner or later the situation will fall

apart and Haiti will return to its traditional pattern

of dictatorship and chaos. Five scenarios are presented

to give the reader an idea of the kinds of things that

could go wrong. It is argued that the United States and

the United Nations need to be sensitized to these

potential developments and devise a long-range plan to

avoid them. Otherwise, the tactical success that has

been enjoyed so far will likely turn into a strategic

failure.
viii

• The most obvious requirement is for a continuing

international peacekeeping presence. This will be

needed for at least another year, with a smaller

presence probably necessary for several more years--

i.e., until the HNP is firmly on its feet and a

competent judicial system is in place. In addition, a

rapid response force should be formed to back up the

Haitian government, as required. There should be U.S.

participation in all these operations to bolster their

credibility.

• At the same time, there must be ongoing foreign support

for the Haitian police, including the provision of

training and hands-on monitoring and backup in the

field. The HNP needs more of everything--more police,

weapons, vehicles and other equipment, and especially

more vetting. Unvetted ex-military should not be taken

into the force, and in general the number of former

army personnel should be minimized. (Their presence

reduces the legitimacy of the institution and is likely

to create problems of control.) Officers who abuse

their power must be held accountable. There must be

ongoing efforts at professionalization, with an

emphasis on respect for constitutionally sanctioned

authority and human rights.

• Of more immediate concern than a coup is the danger

that new and more potent weapons might be used

irresponsibly or fall into the wrong hands. While the

HNP will need heavier arms to deal with emergency

situations, these should be closely controlled and

limited to specially trained backup units. The general

model of policing that should be followed should be

based on the cultivation of police-community relations,

with the use of firearms a last resort.

• The Preval administration should accelerate the reform

process. The system of centralized state controls that

has traditionally sucked resources out of the

countryside for the benefit of Port-au-Prince must be

dismantled. The peasantry must receive a fair share of

the economic pie. Moreover, the stalemate must be

broken on privatization, civil service reform, and

transparency in the use of public funds.

• President Preval and ex-President Aristide must

continue to cooperate with one another. Without the

latter's support, the new President may not be able to

govern. By the same token, should the country come

apart over the next 5 years there may not be any pieces

for Aristide to pick up when he reassumes office (which
ix

he presumably will) in 2001.

• Though President Preval comes from the populist wing of

Lavalas, he may be more pragmatic than Aristide.

International lenders and donors would be well advised

to work with him to find mutually acceptable solutions

to Haiti's problems, rather than trying to impose

preconceived economic policies on Haiti.

• In this U.S. election year, both Democrats and

Republicans should avoid turning Haiti into a political

football, lest the consequences be disastrous.

• The central lesson of the recent U.S. experience with

Haiti is that half-way efforts lead to half-way,

ineffective, and sometimes counterproductive results.

The danger facing the United States and the

international community is that they will have raised

Haitian expectations only to dash them through an

unwillingness to do what is necessary to give the

democratic experiment a real chance of success. If the

current deadlock over privatization and foreign aid is

allowed to continue, it will lead to further

socioeconomic decline. That, in turn, will feed the

nationalistic backlash that has already begun, produce

more political turmoil, and resurrect the Haitian

migration problem.
1

WHITHER HAITI?

The institutions of Haiti are Jacobin and Voodoo,

watered in blood under the Tree of Liberty. . . .

Robert and Nancy Heinl

Written in Blood

This report examines the prospects for political stability

and democracy in Haiti within the context of what scholars have

called the Predatory State. The Haitian state, it has been

argued, traditionally has functioned as a parasitic force,

siphoning off economic resources from the peasantry through

draconian taxes and other means, enforcing its will through a

multiplicity of controls, including the threat and use of force.

In this sense one could speak of the State versus Society, with

the military operating as both a repressive arm of the government

and as a semiautonomous actor with interests of its own.1

The question that this monograph poses is whether the

restoration of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide fundamentally has

changed these realities. It has been suggested that the one

major, concrete change that Aristide made during his "second

coming" was the abolition of the armed forces (Forces Armees

d'Haiti, or FAdH). Haiti, it is said, is passing through a

watershed. The old institutions of repression have been

dismantled. New democratic organizations--including an

apolitical, professional police force--are being created, which

will fundamentally transform the nature of state-society

relations.

As important as the abolition of the military is, this

writer will argue that the above view seriously underestimates

the obstacles to change. The current situation in Haiti is an

artificial one. Order is being maintained by U.N./U.S.

peacekeepers, while Haitian police are being trained to assume

that duty when the foreigners leave. But the danger is that, once

the U.N. exits, Haiti may fall apart. This might occur fairly

quickly or it might be gradual, but sooner or later it is likely.

The bottom line is that there is a structure of violence

undercutting the Haitian socioeconomic and political order that

has only been partially uprooted. Until much more progress has

been made in eliminating those conditions, democracy and

political stability will be very "iffy" propositions.

A Dysfunctional Political Culture.

One of the themes of this monograph is that political

beliefs, values, attitudes, and behavior--in a word, political

culture--matter. Among political scientists, this is virtually
2

taken as a given.2 Among Haitians and those who study Haiti,

however, it is a hotly contested issue. There is a tendency to

regard cultural explanations for Haiti's political and economic

underdevelopment as insulting (some would say racist), and

sometimes they can be. Still, unless one is willing to argue that

beliefs, values, attitudes and behavior are unimportant, one is

forced to take them seriously.

To say this is to imply neither that cultures are monolithic

nor immutable, much less the product of some congenital disease

that defies rational explanation. On the contrary, they are the

product of socialization and experience, which to one extent or

another differ from person to person and group to group. The

political culture of elites may be expected to be significantly

different from the political culture of the masses. (Precisely

how is a question for empirical research.) If the political

relationships between classes change, the dominant political

culture may also change. Or, at least, a window of opportunity

will open. Whether Haitians will be able to take advantage of

that opportunity is one of the most crucial issues facing the

country today.

The road will not be easy. In Haiti, a deeply embedded

culture of predation has fostered autocracy and corruption,

extreme social injustice, and economic stagnation. In this sense,

the Duvaliers and Duvalierism are not aberrations, but rather the

culmination of a particular set of historical experiences,

including those provided by traditional African culture, slavery,

a bloody war of liberation, the reimposition of relations of

elite dominance and mass submission, chronic cycles of tyranny

and chaos, and the effects of a prolonged U.S. occupation. The

upshot has been the development of an elaborate syndrome of

destructive/self-destructive political behavior marked by

authoritarianism, paternalism, personalism, patronage, nepotism,

demagogy, corruption, cynicism, opportunism, racism,

incompetence, parasitism, rigidity, intolerance, rivalry,

distrust, insecurity, vengeance, intrigue, superstition,

volatility, violence, paranoia, xenophobia, exploitation, class

hatred, institutional illegitimacy, and mass apathy, aversion and

submission.

Space will not permit a detailed treatment of this syndrome,

but that is not important. These and associated traits have been

identified and commented on elsewhere;3

 they are all too familiar

to students of Haitian history and politics. What is more

relevant for our purposes is a clear understanding of the

constraints that they place on political and economic

development.

Notwithstanding Aristide's return and the dissolution of the

FAdH, Haiti's future is likely to depend, to a very considerable
3

extent, on the same elites who have dominated its past.4 These

are the elements that have the education, wealth and other

resources that will be critical to pulling the country out of the

quagmire of underdevelopment in which it has been (and continues

to be) trapped. Yet, their past behavior provides scant basis for

 optimism. Predators do not change their habits overnight. Even

today, the mulatto elite retains many of the values of the 18th

century plantation owners. This is an aristocracy with no sense

of noblesse oblige.5 Traditionally, its members have tended to

view themselves as superior by dint of the color of their skin.

They disdain manual labor and those who engage in it. In general,

they are convinced that the masses are stupid: "The mildest

expression of general opinion," according to James Leyburn, "is

that it would be a waste of time to try to educate [them], for

they are so nearly like animals that they could not absorb even

the simplest education."6

Haiti's black elites have not been any better. Duvalier

père's efforts to promote "negritude" only opened the door to

upwardly aspiring predators with a different shade of skin who,

once in positions of power, proved to be just as violent and

corrupt as their predecessors. Indeed, under "Papa Doc," terror

became a way of life. Nor was there any effort to improve the

economic lot of the masses, or educate them so that they might

better themselves in the future. The culture of predation did not

allow for such sentiment. The only "development" that was held to

be desirable was that which benefited the country's political and

economic elites.

Beyond this, there is the question of whether Haiti is

really a nation at all. The evidence suggests that it is not--or,

at least, that its nationhood is severely underdeveloped. Haiti

lacks a true sense of community, a feeling of shared values and

common interests sufficient to overcome the differences that

divide people from one another. Thus, urban elites have always

considered peasants the moun andeyo, the people on the outside.

Nor has this sense of estrangement been limited to class

relationships. As Robert Rotberg has observed, mistrust has been

the traditional "response of Haitians of all classes to all other

Haitians."7

 Peasants distrusted other peasants and pursued a

"dog-eat-dog" (chin manje chin) existence.8 Until fairly

recently, moreover, "to call a peasant a Haitian was to insult

him grossly; a man had very specific ties to a locale, and no

supralocal or national links to which he gave real credence."9

What all this has meant historically is that politics has

been a zero-sum game: the winner takes all. In further

consequence, power, when it has not been used to simply

accumulate more power and spoils, has largely been a negative

phenomenon: it has been the power to obstruct or destroy rather

than create. At the national level, at least, Haitians have had
4

extraordinary difficulty in cooperating for programmatic ends. In

the words of Anthony Maingot, they "can never fight the large

wars (against poverty or gross injustice); instead, they are

geared only toward fighting the next political battles."10

To overcome this legacy and remain on the path of peaceful

democratic evolution will require nothing less than a cultural

revolution, and it is precisely this that, under Aristide's

leadership, is being attempted. Since his return, Aristide has

expended much time and energy promoting national reconciliation

and democracy. He has wooed the bourgeoisie in an attempt to

enlist its cooperation in his efforts to promote economic

development. At the same time, he has pleaded with his followers

to forego vengeance in favor of the justice that will hopefully

be attained with the establishment of a renovated judicial

system. In effect, the (now former) President is trying to create

a social contract between State and Society where one has never

really existed. To this end, he has sought to educate the

populace about the importance of democracy and has encouraged the

construction of new democratic institutions that would bring the

moun andeyo into the political process and replace the

traditionally one-sided and exploitative state-society

relationship with one based on government responsiveness and

accountability to the masses.

To what extent has he succeeded, and what are the prospects

for the future? To raise once again the question posed by Robert

Rotberg at the recent Mayagüez conference11 on Haiti: Is Maingot's

observation still true? Or have Haitians finally learned to work

together to fight the "larger wars" against poverty and

injustice?

While it is much too early to render any definitive

judgments, there are some signs that the political culture is

indeed changing. The relative lack of large-scale, revengemotivated violence is encouraging. Furthermore, the extraordinary

renaissance that is occurring in grass-roots organizing and the

spillover of these activities into the political arena at all

levels suggest that new patterns of political participation and

recruitment have emerged. These grass-roots efforts are the

continuation of a process that began well before Aristide came to

the presidency, but that was interrupted during the Cedras years

when all such activities were suppressed. This resurrection has

been accompanied by a potentially important shift in political

attitudes and behavior: Whereas previously local leaders shunned

conventional politics and institutions and tried to bring about

change from outside the system, today they are increasingly

moving into the political system, joining parties, running for

office, and serving in the executive branch as well as Congress

and municipal government. One anticipates that their presence may

inject a much greater degree of responsiveness and accountability
5

into Haitian political institutions.12

This being said, other signs are not so favorable. The June

1995 legislative and municipal elections were a near-disaster.

Marred by an unresponsive and incompetent Provisional Elections

Council (CEP), by organizational chaos, some fraud and occasional

violence, the balloting undercut the legitimacy of the Haitian

government and the nascent democratic experiment. And the

government's slowness in dealing with the opposition's legitimate

complaints only made matters worse. Most of the opposition

parties repudiated the vote and refused to participate in the 

subsequent makeup and runoff elections. (Though most candidates

ran anyway.) The result was an overwhelming Lavalas victory.13

In short, Haitians still, apparently, could not put aside

their petty power struggles in the national interest. In

perspective, the elections represented a return to the zero-sum

politics of the past. In the months that followed, moreover,

there were other indications that all was not right. These weeks

witnessed an upsurge in political violence. Death squad

activities increased. Most of this was aimed at people associated

with the Cedras regime or the FAdH, but this was not always the

case: In early November, Jean-Hubert Feuille, a newly elected

legislator, cousin and former bodyguard of the President, was

gunned down in what was widely presumed to be a political

assassination. At his funeral, an emotionally distraught Aristide

ordered the police to disarm the macoutes and their sponsors, and

he called on his supporters to help them. ("Go to the

neighborhoods where there are big houses and heavy weapons."14)

There followed an outbreak of rioting that left at least 10

people dead and over a score wounded. Dozens of Aristide's foes

had their homes torched or looted. A radio station critical of

the President was attacked. Vigilantes erected roadblocks, burned

tires, and searched vehicles. In Gonaïves, U.N. soldiers were

attacked by an angry mob.

Meanwhile, in spite of a long-standing pledge to step down

from office at the end of his term, Aristide did little to

dissuade his supporters from launching a campaign to extend his

stay. Indeed, at times he seemed to openly encourage them. In

late November, before a "national dialogue" conference that had

passed resolutions calling for a term extension, he proclaimed

that "if you want three [more] years, I will not ignore you." He

promised to present the resolutions at a cabinet meeting the

following week.15

These were disturbing developments. Aristide's political

foes interpreted them as a prelude to the cancellation of the

election--or, at least, as an attempt to create a climate of

intimidation that would render the balloting meaningless. (Some

were threatened or attacked by Lavalas partisans.) Subsequently
6

Aristide, under heavy pressure from the United States and the

international community, reiterated his pledge to follow through

with the elections as scheduled, but by then much damage had been

done.

Whether one interprets Aristide's behavior as a calculated

attempt to test the United States and the international community

to see how far he could go or an effort to contain internal

schisms within Lavalas and prevent violence,16 the net result was

disastrous: U.S.-Haitian relations were badly damaged. AntiAmerican feeling increased, as the President's followers blamed

Washington for forcing Haiti's "savior" from office. U.S.

observers--both critics and supporters of the Clinton

administration's policy--had their worst fears reinforced. CIA

claims about Aristide's lack of stability, which had been largely

discredited, regained plausibility. Within Haiti, moreover,

frightened members of the bourgeoisie began to leave the country

or, at least, shelved any plans they might have had to invest in

it. (As did foreign investors.) The upshot was that much of the

good work that had been done on behalf of national reconciliation

was undone. The formidable task of reconstructing Haiti was made

even harder.

In all fairness, one should also say that the issues were

not quite as clear-cut as Aristide's critics have claimed: He

had, after all, been robbed of 3 years in office, and there was

little doubt that most Haitians wanted him to stay. If his

departure fulfilled the letter of the constitution, it

nevertheless seemed to violate the spirit of democracy, not to

mention fairness. In effect, it constituted a partial

ratification of the coup of September 1991.

Still, given Haiti's history and the deep-seated conflicts

that continued to plague it, one had to be nervous about these

developments. Aristide's behavior did not inspire confidence in

his intentions. A term extension might have set a dangerous

precedent. Even if Aristide himself was committed to democracy

(and not everyone was convinced of this), one could not be so

sanguine about his followers. Some, clearly, hungered after more

monumental revolu-tionary changes. Others were opportunists out

for their own personal gain. The potential for corruption and the

abuse of power was enormous, and only time would tell whether

Lavalasians would be able to withstand the temptations.

Several other related points must be made. One concerns mass

political culture. My comments thus far have been primarily

directed at the political culture of elites, but one must also

factor in the values, attitudes and behavior of ordinary

Haitians. Earlier, it was suggested that there were likely to be

differences between the two, and that the displacement of the old

ruling class might open a window of opportunity for fundamental
7

change. One must temper this optimism, however, with an

appreciation that the masses are likely to share many of the same

propensities towards authoritarianism, class hatred, and so on

that have marked the behavior of their exploiters.17 The danger of

revolutionary transformation is that the new ruling class (and

specifically its leaders) may become just as corrupt and brutal

as the one it replaced.

Second, at this stage at least the Haitian "revolution" is

not really a revolution at all. Rather, there has been only a

partial displacement of the old ruling class. What remains is

civil society, an entity which, as Robert Fatton has pointed out,

is not always civil and is full of contradictions: "Rather than

constituting a coherent social project, Haitian civil society

tends to embody a disorganized plurality of mutually exclusive

projects that are not necessarily democratic." Within this uneasy

conglomerate are neo-Duvalierists and neo-liberals as well as

moderate and radical Lavalasians, all "competing for state power

and involved in continuous struggles, negotiations, and

compromises."18 The outcome is less likely to be a definitive

victory for any one class or sector than a "soup" reflecting

different political subcultures and interests. In short, the

break with the past will not be clean.

Third, severe constraints on Haiti's economic development

may well fatally undermine the country's political development.

Part of the popular appeal of democracy lies in the expectation

that it will lead to an improvement in people's well-being. But

democracy makes no such guarantees; moreover, the neoliberal

economic package being imposed on the government will likely

prolong the current socioeconomic hardship. Whether this is

justified in the long run is subject to debate, but in the

shorter term a failure to substantially improve living conditions

may lead to a disillusionment with democracy.

Fourth, if the violence that Haiti has been experiencing in

recent months should increase and become more politicized, it

will further undermine the prospects for democratization. If

democracy cannot provide people with security, it will be

discredited.

Fifth, the transformation of a political culture requires

the internalization of new values and attitudes; a superficial

embrace is not enough. But such profound changes will take years-

-indeed decades--to complete. And they are much more than the

product of a single wise leader. Education will be critical.

Aristide has begun the process of democratization, but his term

of office has now ended. Who is there of comparable stature and

commitment to carry on the task? Even if he remains a major actor

on the political scene--as most people believe he will--can he

hold together the centrifugal forces that will continue to pull
8

at Haiti's delicate political fabric in the years ahead?

Finally, there is the problem of institutionalization.

Notwithstanding Aristide's popularity, the legitimacy and

durability of Haitian political institutions remain very much in

doubt. There is a general lack of understanding of the role and

functioning of institutions in a democracy. Haitians are

accustomed to thinking of the state as a bully--the Creole word

leta has both meanings--and it will take time and a radically

different pattern of government behavior to change that. At the

same time, political parties are still little more than vehicles

for the personal ambitions of various politicians. These are

highly unstable (one might even say ephemeral) organizations. (In

this respect, Lavalas is no exception.)19 In spite of the positive

attitudinal and behavioral shifts noted earlier, most Haitians

still view politics with considerable cynicism and distrust. Only

when the country's political leaders and parties prove their

worth by developing concrete platforms and policies to deal with

Haiti's problems, are further inroads likely to be made against

this deep-seated alienation.

Much the same could be said about Haiti's police and

judicial institutions, and they will be addressed later. The 

point here is that weak and illegitimate institutions are not

likely to perform effectively the functions for which they were

designed. Failing that, they will remain fragile, susceptible to

political subversion, corruption and destruction. While some

progress has been made in developing new or renovated

institutions since September 1994, there are still light years to

go. If Haitians are no longer as politically alienated as they

once were, this is more the product of their faith in Aristide

than anything. To many, he is still a messiah--a savior rather

than a politician. But whether his charismatic authority will be

supplanted by institutional legitimacy in the years ahead remains

very much in doubt.

[Note: On December 17, 1995, the Haitian presidential

election was held. Aristide's hand-picked candidate, Rene Preval,

won 87.9 percent of the vote in a contest that was remarkably

free from violence and irregularities. The downside was that

voter turnout was very low, only 28 percent.20 On February 7th, in

the first peaceful succession of one democratically elected

president by another in Haiti's turbulent history, Preval assumed

office.]

The Economic Substructure of Violence.

Behind the values, attitudes, beliefs and behavior that

foster political violence, there are also stark economic needs

and relationships. While the military-institutional bases of
9

violence have been destroyed, the economic substructure remains

largely intact. The critical issues here, both for democracy and

political stability, are poverty, inequality, economic growth,

and class conflict.

Haiti has long been the poorest country in the hemisphere

and one of the poorest in the world, but in recent years its rate

of impoverishment has dramatically worsened. Three years of

terror, plunder, neglect and international sanctions have reduced

the per capita income to around $250-260.21 To make matters worse,

the wealth of the country continues to be concentrated in the

hands of a relatively small number of people--MREs or Morally

Repugnant Elites, a U.S. diplomat once called them--who have

traditionally profited by monopolies, a grossly unfair system of

taxation and other mechanisms designed to benefit them at the

expense of the vast majority of Haitians. Unless these realities

change, there is likely to be violence. There has been in the

past, and there will be in the future. The only way that the

system can be maintained is by repression.

That, indeed, was the function of the Haitian armed forces.

Typically, the only state entities regularly present in the

countryside were the tax office and the military barracks or

post--the one to extract and the other to enforce the one-way

flow of resources from rural areas to Port-au-Prince.22 Over time,

the FAdH itself became a major economic institution. In the words

of Michel Laguerre, the professional soldier was also an

"entrepreneur--kleptocratic, parasitic, and competitive." Haitian

officers owned businesses and sold their services. Some

operated, in effect, as godfathers, maneuvering indirectly behind

the scenes to promote economic dealings through intermediaries.23

Out in the countryside, 565 rural section chiefs operated as

virtual feudal lords. They had their own private militias,

imposed fines, collected taxes and bribes, dragooned peasants and

workers to labor on their farms, and, in general, served as

judge, jury and executioner in their areas of jurisdiction. At

the bottom of this "food chain" of violence were the lumpen

elements who served as the primary instruments of the terror:

rank-and-file soldiers and paramilitary attaches, many of whom

doubled as police or army regulars, who were so poorly paid (or

who had to pay to obtain their jobs in the first place) that

their only recourse was to use their weapons to shake-down

ordinary citizens for whatever they could get.24

Under the generalized corruption of the regime led by LTG

Raoul Cedras, BG Philippe Biamby, and LTC Joseph Michel François,

military officers appropriated an increasingly large share of the

country's wealth. The armed forces received about 40 percent of

the national budget and controlled many state-owned enterprises.

The public sector was especially infiltrated by the proxies of

the Port-au-Prince police chief, François, who controlled the
10

telephone company, the port, the electricity company and some

basic imports. Narcotrafficking and contraband operations became

widespread. The former alone brought in tens of millions of

dollars a year, and this bonanza was by no means restricted to

the high command. By 1993, discipline had so disintegrated that

officers down to the rank of captain had become economic powers

in their own right.25

During these years, the "merchant-bourgeois" and landowning

(gwandon) sectors of the elite steadfastly supported the

dictatorship and opposed Aristide's return. Powerful militarybusiness alliances dominated much of the country's economic

activities, controlling the import of Haiti's four main staples:

flour, cement, sugar and oil. Within the merchant-bourgeois

group, three rival conglomerates--basically run by the Mevs,

Brandt and Bigio families--competed with one another, with other

influential families and businessmen, and with more moderate

technocratic-managerial elites associated with the assembly

industries, for political influence, oligopsonistic market

control, and other opportunities for profit. Some of these

leaders had close ties with high-ranking members of the regime.

Colonel François, for instance, was on the Mevs' payroll; Cedras

was allied with the Brandts.26

Today, the military institution is gone, but the oligarchy

remains. The prospects for economic development and a substantive

improvement in living conditions are problematic. Nor does the

redistribution of economic power in favor of the poor majority

seem to be in the cards. Though Sidney Mintz, in his recent

Foreign Affairs article, argued that hardly any beneficial longterm political changes could be accomplished without such a

redistribution,27 this is an explosive issue. More than any other

single factor, it was the threat of class warfare that led to the

coup that overthrew Aristide in September 1991. A resurrection of

that specter would repolarize Haiti, risk more violence, and

frighten away investors. Furthermore, the neoliberal economic

policies being imposed on the Haitian government by international

donors would seem, on the surface, to preclude such a strategy.

Haiti utterly depends on foreign aid, and as long as that is the

case its options will be severely constrained. The price of

defiance would be very high.

For 200 years, Haiti has been locked into a process of dedevelopment. Peasant productivity today is less than it was in

1843.28 The agricultural technology that prevailed during the last

decades of colonial rule was arguably superior to that which is

used at present.29 Even if one takes the optimistic view that the

primary obstacle to economic development--the Predatory State--is

no more, the challenges are enormous. The only sector of the

economy to show any promise over the past couple of decades--

assembly manufacturing for export--lies in ruin, a casualty of
11

military repression and international sanctions. Even if it can

be restored, it will not produce more than a small percentage of

the jobs that are needed to absorb the rapidly expanding work

force, and these would be at a pitifully low wage.30 At the same

time, Haiti lacks the human capital to make a rapid transition to

high-growth, more advanced-technology industries. In the

countryside, the peasantry remains trapped in a descending spiral

of rapid population growth and accelerating soil erosion that

increasingly threatens the very basis of its existence.31

In short, the task in Haiti is less one of economic

"recovery" or "restoration" than starting from scratch. There is

very little to build on. There are few functioning institutions,

little human capital and a long history of waste and corruption.

Lest it be forgotten, the Haitian private sector has been no less

predatory than the state. In general, these are not free

marketeers. The economic elites have never been that interested

in investing in Haiti under competitive conditions, and they are

reluctant to face more efficient foreign competitors. Even now,

some of the most powerful families oppose privatization and

continue to make huge profits by controlling the import of flour,

cement, generators and other key items.32 Given Haiti's violent

past and uncertain future--the current debate over privatization

is nothing short of vitriolic--few are rushing to invest. In the

words of one official: "No one in Haiti is going to invest in any

substantial way for ten years; they are afraid they will lose

their money."33

Nor is the outlook for foreign private investment much

better. So far, at least, virtually none has come into the

country.34 While this is partly a result of the Haitian

government's slowness in instituting privatization and other 

free-market reforms, the security issue is equally important. If

foreigners are not investing now, when the United States and the

United Nations have thousands of troops maintaining order, what

can be expected once those forces leave, and security becomes

much more problematic?

Lacking investment, Haiti will need foreign aid, and a lot

of it. To date, international donors have pledged some $1.8

billion for the Haiti Economic Recovery Program over a 5-year

period, but the results thus far have been disappointing. While

Haiti's real Gross Domestic Product in 1995 grew by about 3.5

percent and inflation was cut by more than half, these gains were

not as impressive as they might seem at first glance.35 The

economy, after all, no longer has to operate under conditions of

military repression/plunder and international embargo, and large

amounts of foreign aid have been poured into the country.

Moreover, development assistance has been slow in coming. Until

last summer, at least, most of the disbursements went to debt

payments, oil purchases, and government payrolls. Only in the
12

last half year or so have some infrastructure projects--e.g.,

power supplies and roads--begun to make visible improvements.

Even so, unemployment rates remain astronomical (perhaps as high

as 80 percent), and power shortages and high prices for food, gas

and other basic commodities persist.36 Consequently, living

standards have improved hardly at all, and popular frustration

and disillusionment are growing.

In perspective, much more will be needed than $1.8 billion

and over a much longer period of time. One cannot reverse 200

years of misdevelopment in 5 years. One must think in terms of

decades. Yet, there is no reason to believe that the

international community is willing to make that kind of an

investment. Indeed, the United States is already beginning to

downsize its commitment. After pumping $235 million into the

Haitian economy in 1995, the Clinton administration reduced its

aid request for 1996 by more than half to $115 million. Given the

recent deterioration in U.S.-Haitian relations and the current

mood in Congress, it may not even get that.37 At this writing,

some $200 million is being withheld by the World Bank,

International Monetary Fund, United States, and other foreign

lenders because of Aristide's failure to follow through on his

pledges of privatization. Unless that dispute is resolved, the

outlook for further aid--and for economic recovery--will be very

bleak. These suspensions have already had a negative

socioeconomic impact in Haiti, where inflation is once again

rising and the government is running out of money.38

But beyond this immediate issue, there is the question of

whether the United States and the international community will

stay the course. If they do not, the results will be predictable:

Once the foreigners leave, their development projects will be

left to decay. One recalls the fate of the all-weather roads the

Americans left after their first occupation: In 1934, Haiti had

1,200 miles of well-constructed highway; in 1971, she could claim

only 300 miles of surfaced all-weather roadways, including city

streets.39

In sum, the Haitian government is trapped. On the one hand,

it must please foreign donors or risk losing the aid it needs to

jump start the economy and avoid a further sharp decline in

living conditions. On the other, it must satisfy the aspirations

of the poor majority of Haitians for a better life.

Unfortunately, whatever its purely economic merit, the

USAID/World Bank/IMF prescription will almost certainly lead to

more hardship in the short run, and probably a lot longer than

that. To the extent that the government bureaucracy is

streamlined and state enterprises privatized, for instance, this

will contribute to greater unemployment. As in the case of such

experiments elsewhere, there will be an increase in inequality.40

All this is likely to produce more social and political conflict,
13

undermine the legitimacy of both the government and the

democratic experiment, and make an economic take-off even more

problematic.

The bottom line is that there is little chance of a

significant improvement in Haitian living standards in the short

run, and things could very well get worse. As a result, one

should expect growing frustration and probably rising violence.

While most of the latter will take the form of common crime, some

will be political. There will continue to be a large pool of

unemployed Haitians willing and able to hire themselves out as

gunmen. Most of the attaches were never disarmed, and only a

fraction of the weapons in Haiti were ever confiscated or turned

in.41 Thus the rationale for providing ex-soldiers with job

training so that they will not resort to violence to make a

living or attempt to destabilize the government. But the catch is

that not everyone can be retrained. There are currently tens of

thousands of former attaches who are not included in the program.

And beyond this, there are serious doubts about how many jobs

will be available for those who do receive training.

Opportunities for employment are scarce, and the Haitian

government is understandably reluctant to give its enemies

preferential treatment over its own followers. In the words of

one Haitian official: "We have not seen any concrete results of

the USAID job creation program, and the Haitian government is not

going to create jobs for these people, so after training they

will end up on the streets."42

Finally, one of the problems with creating a Haitian

National Police that is almost as large as the old FAdH is that

there may not be enough money to pay all these people. Salary

levels have been set very high by Haitian standards (about U.S.

$330 a month) so that officers will not have to resort to

corruption to make a living. But there is serious concern that

the government may not be able to meet the payroll in coming

years. Already, there have been delays in payment. Whether the

international community will provide the necessary financial

support and for how long remains to be seen. (U.S. officials say

that the police assistance and training program will not pay

salaries.43) Again, this brings us back to one of the primary

economic roots of thuggery: If the police cannot make a living by

being police, they will supplement their incomes by extortion,

theft or selling their services to the highest bidder. Will

Haiti's past also be Haiti's future?

Reconciliation with Justice: A Contradiction in Terms?

Robert and Nancy Heinl once wrote that "deep in the psyche

of Haiti . . . lies a violence that goes beyond violence." That

this is so may be shown by five centuries of history "dominated

at every turn by death and terror."44 The question is whether this
14

self-destructive pattern can be broken. Can Haiti finally achieve

national reconciliation and justice? Or will it once again slip

into a fratricidal cycle of revenge and retaliation?

That the country has avoided such conflict thus far has been

largely due to the international military/police presence and the

efforts of President Aristide to promote reconciliation between

Haitians of all social classes. Yet, this reconciliation remains

extremely fragile; moreover, it has been purchased in part at the

expense of justice. The Carter-Cedras agreement providing for the

September 1994 "intervasion" enabled the top leaders of the old

regime to escape the country.45 Though the U.S.-led Multinational

Force arrested hundreds of alleged criminals and human rights

abusers, only 26 were turned over to the Haitian government in

January 1995. The rest had been released for lack of evidence or

because there was no functioning judiciary or had been permitted

to "escape" by sympathetic prison officials. At the same time,

notorious offenders like Franck Romain, the former Duvalierist

mayor of Port-au-Prince, and Emmanuel Constant,46 the founder of

the paramilitary group FRAPH, were allowed to remain at large or

quietly slip into the Dominican Republic. The upshot was growing

disillusionment with U.S. and U.N. peacekeeping operations and

official Haitian institutions and a tendency to exact "popular

justice" in the streets.

As months passed and the Aristide government itself became

increasingly the target of criticism, it began to move more

aggressively on the justice issue. A National Commission of Truth

and Justice was formed to investigate past human rights abuses. A

number of people were arrested in connection with a 1987 peasant

massacre at Jean-Rabel. LTC François was tried in absentia, along

with 16 co-defendants, for the murder of Aristide supporter

Antoine Izmery. The question was how far the President would go.

The list of human rights violators potentially subject to

prosecution was very long.47

Thus, in this respect also the Haitian government seems

trapped. Caught between the Left, which wants an aggressive

pursuit of justice, and the Right, which mortally fears such a

development, it will have to perform a delicate balancing act. A

failure to satisfy the former would undermine one of the

government's traditional bases of support, while feeding an

instinct for revenge that could very well lead to more political

assassinations and mob violence. On the other hand, a too

vigorous pursuit of justice might have the same effect, while so

frightening the economic elite as to shatter its fragile support

for (or tolerance of) the government and perhaps provoking a

violent response from the Right. The rampage that followed

Aristide's recent speech urging the disarmament of those thought

to be responsible for the growing incidences of political

assassination provides a cautionary example of how volatile the
15

current situation remains and how easily violence from one side

can trigger violence from the other.

The U.S./International Commitment: The Politics of

Counterproductivity.

Haiti's future will in no small part depend on the

willingness and ability of the international community--

especially the United States--to use its resources to promote

Haitian political and socioeconomic development. While foreigners

cannot impose such changes on Haitians, they can help them to

help themselves by fostering the human and material

infrastructure and policies that would allow for the possibility

of development. Put another way, major, sustained international

aid is a necessary but not sufficient requisite for

democratization and socioeconomic progress. Though it will not

guarantee success, its absence will most assuredly lead to

failure.

This being said, do the United States and the international

community know how, are they willing to pay the price, and will

they stay the course? There is reason for skepticism on all these

counts. Certainly, the previous U.S. experience in Haiti (1915-

34) offers scant reason for optimism; nor, in general, does the

history of U.S. military and police training programs in Latin

America. While technical skills are relatively easy to instill,

it is much more difficult to transform political cultures.

Democratic values and rational-legal norms have to be

internalized, and this takes considerable time, practice, and a

concerted effort at education. It also requires the alleviation

of the socioeconomic conditions that breed authoritarianism and

violence.

There are serious doubts as to whether Haiti's foreign

benefactors are willing to make the kind of investment that is

needed. Lest it be forgotten, Washington did not send troops into

Haiti for the sake of Haiti. While not unimportant, the

restoration of democracy and the protection of human rights were

secondary considerations. What really appears to have triggered

the intervention was a convergence of political pressures, all of

which were at least in part domestic in nature. In ascending

order of importance, these were: (1) the need to placate the

Congressional Black Caucus and other interest groups and

individuals associated with the liberal wing of the Democratic

Party; (2) the need to defuse the Haitian and Cuban immigration

crises;48 and (3) the need to salvage the credibility of President

Clinton and American foreign policy, which were in the process of

 being utterly shredded by the image of U.S. helplessness in the

face of a defiant, fourth-rate dictatorship.
16

The question, of course, is what will happen now that these

higher priority concerns have been (at least momentarily)

satisfied. Will the commitments to democracy, human rights, and

the socioeconomic betterment of Haiti be enough to sustain the

U.S./ international involvement?

Part of the problem is that U.S. policy towards Haiti has

been and continues to be hostage to domestic politics. (In this

respect, it resembles Washington's policy towards Cuba.)

Political support in Congress and the public for the intervention

and the peacekeeping operations that followed has been

extraordinarily thin, and has been conditioned on being able to

move in, restore order, and move out quickly, while keeping U.S.

casualties to an absolute minimum. That hasn't left much room for

maneuver. Indeed, it has structured serious constraints and

irrationalities into policy that now threaten the success of the

entire operation.

A case in point is disarmament. Future historians may well

conclude that an effective disarmament program was crucial to

Haiti's prospects for stability. But the desire to avoid "mission

creep" that might lead to American casualties a la Somalia

precluded such an undertaking. Thus, tens of thousands of weapons

are still in circulation and potentially available for criminal

and political activities. On the other hand, had the United

States pursued the issue more aggressively and had there been

U.S. deaths (which seemed likely at the time), political support

for the occupation might have evaporated altogether, forcing an

embarrassing and self-defeating pullout. The Clinton

administration chose not to take that risk. As a result, the

issue persists as a serious source of strain in Haiti's relations

with the United States and the United Nations. (Disarmament has

not been part of the mandate of the U.N. peacekeeping force.) As

the Haitian political transition and the U.N. departure drew

near, violence and insecurity continued to grow, fueled in part

by the failure to disarm.49

Another example: As this report is being completed,

President Aristide has just stepped down from office. There is

some danger that this could lead to a leadership crisis. Haiti

today suffers from a dearth of strong and competent leaders and

institutions. With his enormous moral authority, Aristide may be

the only one with the potential to unify this deeply divided

society.50 (In this respect, he bears a resemblance to Nelson

Mandela.) Rather than turning the presidency over to a handpicked

but unproven and possibly divisive successor, it would have made

more sense to have supported his continuation in office from the

outset. In the words of one diplomat: "Why do something that

would deliberately destabilize the situation?"51

The answer is "politics." This was primarily a political
17

rather than a legal issue. Though the Haitian constitution barred

presidents from succeeding themselves, the problem was

essentially extraconstitutional in the sense that there was no

provision to take into account a presidency interrupted by a coup

d'etat. This was quite different from reelection or even the

typical Latin American practice of continuismo where a president

continues in office after his legitimate term has ended. Rather,

the call for "three more years" represented a demand that

Aristide be allowed to serve the full 5 years for which he had

been elected (albeit not within the dates that had been

specified). It is significant that this was generally the way the

issue was defined in Haiti, where not only the majority of the

public but many of the President's political opponents (like

former Port-au-Prince Major Evans Paul and even some of the

leading families in the economic elite) supported a term

extension as the best way to assure national stability.52

(Granted, some have changed their minds as a result of the events

of last November.)

In the United States, however, the issue was viewed very

differently. To Senator Jesse Helms and many other conservatives,

the Haitian President remained a covert radical with a hidden

agenda and a deep resentment of the United States.53 Thus, part of

the price for obtaining congressional support for the U.S./U.N.

Haiti operation, including American aid, was Aristide's

departure. Any reconsideration of that position by the Clinton

administration would have been very difficult politically, and

would have jeopardized its desire to remain engaged in Haiti

(though, of necessity, at a lower level of commitment) in order

to preserve one of its most visible foreign policy successes.

There were, of course, legitimate issues of debate here:

Aristide's reliability remains open to question, and certainly

the precedent of a term extension, whatever the reasoning behind

it, was undesirable.54 But there were no ideal choices. By

deciding as it did, the United States weakened Haiti's fragile

democratic consensus by depriving the Haitian people of their

preferred leader. (That was one of the implications of the

embarrassingly low voter turnout in the December 1995

presidential election.)55 In the process, too, Washington planted

the seeds of an anti-American backlash that may well come back to

haunt it. Now, moreover, it will have to deal with a Haitian

President, Rene Preval, who comes from the populist wing of

Lavalas. Combined with that party's sweeping victory at the polls

last summer, which brought many such people to Congress, this

does not bode well for either U.S.-Haitian relations or the

country's stability.

A third point, closely related to the above, concerns

economic reform. As of February 1996, foreign aid to Haiti has

slowed to a trickle, a casualty of the government's failure to
18

privatize state enterprises. This is an extremely sensitive

issue. Former Prime Minister Smarck Michel felt obliged to resign

because his efforts on behalf of privatization were not supported

by his colleagues; moreover, opposition remains strong in the new

Haitian Congress. While it is easy to blame Aristide for the

current impasse, the problem is more complex than that: Haitians

have reason to be cautious. Not only will privatization result in

a loss of jobs at a time of great economic hardship, but it may

well increase inequalities and the concentration of wealth. There

is concern that state monopolies may simply be transformed into

private monopolies. Nationalists want to be sure that these

measures will benefit the Haitian people and not just Haitian and

foreign elites. They are disturbed about the way these decisions

have been made. There is an impression that privatization and

other reforms were forced on Aristide by the United States and

other foreign lenders as a condition for his restoration and the

extension of aid. The critics say that there should be an open

debate on these issues, and that the Haitian public should be

given accurate information as to exactly what is being proposed

and why. Some complain that there has been inadequate attention

given to other kinds of ownership (e.g., public investment

trusts, employee ownership plans, or consumer cooperatives) that

would tend to democratize rather than further concentrate

wealth.56 Some also wonder why the Aristide government's original

economic strategy--which was generally supported by the United

States and international lending agencies in 1991--is now

considered unacceptable.57

None of this is to deny the need for economic reforms;

clearly, the old state controls and monopolies that formed the

basis of the Predatory State must be dismantled,58 but there are

legitimate questions of pace and kind that require further

thought. One cannot escape the impression that economic and

political measures are being imposed on Haiti without seriously

considering the wishes of the Haitian people or their elected

representatives, which is ironic in light of all the emphasis

that the international community has placed on the country's

democratization. There is also considerable doubt as to whether

the possible consequences of the present course have been fully

thought out. Already there is growing resentment over perceived

violations of Haitian sovereignty (in particular, the pressures

to privatize and to force out Aristide). If economic aid

continues to be withheld, it will be interpreted as a

reimposition of international sanctions. The resulting

intensification of the Haitian economic crisis and the human

suffering that attends it would almost certainly produce a major

nationalistic backlash and jeopardize everything that has been

accomplished so far.

In sum, there is a risk that the United States and the

international community, through their inflexibility, may push
19

Haiti into an even deeper crisis. If that occurs, democracy and

political stability are likely to be among the first casualties.

One final issue: What Haiti needs most is an extended period

of "nation-building." But in the United States, at least, that

term has become a dirty word. One of the ironies of the U.S.

intervention is that it destroyed the only strong political

institution in the country--the Haitian army. While this was

necessary, it left an institutional vacuum that will be difficult

to fill. The danger is that this power vacuum may lead to

immobilism, chaos or a personalistic dictatorship. It takes time

to build strong institutions and train competent leaders and

administrators. Yet, time is the one thing that Haiti does not

have. The U.S./U.N. peacekeeping operation has been driven by a

definition of success based on a specific time deadline. By

spring 1996, the vast bulk of those troops will have departed

regardless of the Haitian government's ability to maintain order.

While some security arrange-ments will no doubt be continued, the

peacekeeping component will almost certainly be minimal and of

limited duration. At some point in 1996, the Haitians will have

to swim for themselves, or they will sink. No one really knows

which it will be.59

The point is that if the United States--the Great Power most

affected by the Haitian crisis and with the greatest interest in

resolving it--is unwilling to do what is necessary to achieve

long-term success (and we have already noted the decline in the

administration's aid request), then the rest of the international

community is not likely to either. The danger is that half-way

efforts will lead to half-way, ineffective results. Once the

immediate crisis is over, the foreigners will go home, ensuring

that further crises will occur down the road.

The Haitian National Police: Bellwether for Stability?

It may be, of course, that in spite of all its problems

Haiti may overcome the legacy of its past. Certainly, progress

has been made. The central institution of the Predatory State--

the FAdH--has been dismantled. All that is left are several

hundred former military personnel who were part of the recently

dissolved Interim Public Security Force and who are now being

absorbed into the Haitian National Police (HNP).60 At the same

time, the Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH)

and the Army's other paramilitary appendages have been disbanded.

Without the FAdH to organize and empower them, such groups will

find it much harder to reemerge and regain their former potency.

Clearly, too, the creation of the Haitian National Police

has provided a major opportunity to foster political stability

and democracy. At minimum, the HNP should serve as a deterrent to

any ex-FAdH and ex-attaches who might be thinking about launching
20

a comeback. A serious effort has been made to create an

apolitical, civilian police force capable of dealing with

internal security and criminal problems. Although it is too early

to render judgment, preliminary reports were mostly favorable:

"Rigorous and impartial recruitment standards and procedures

[have been] developed and have produced young and well-motivated

recruits." Initially, at least, they were enthusiastically

received by the populace.61

But there are major unresolved problems. The new police are

sorely lacking in experience at all levels, but particularly at

middle and upper-level management. Many leaders still lack

understanding of police work or are otherwise incompetent. There

have been instances of corruption and human rights abuse. There

is continuing uneasiness about the former members of the FAdH who

are being brought into the HNP, especially those in the secondechelon ranks of the command structure. It is not entirely clear

that they can be trusted. As of late January 1996, only some 45

of the 169 to 185 command positions in the field had been filled.

While there were no available statistics as to the percentage of

ex-military in leadership positions, it seemed likely that

several dozen, at least, might eventually attain such posts. In

the words of one close observer, this was "not reassuring for the

future of professional policing in Haiti."62

Then there are other questions. It is uncertain, for

instance, how many police the Haitian government will be able to

maintain at current salary scales, whether foreign aid for such

purposes will be forthcoming and for how long, whether officers

will be paid regularly and promptly without the kind of

bureaucratic delays that have marked the process in the past, and

whether they will have the cars, radios, uniforms and other

equipment that they will need to do their job in a competent,

professional manner. By the same token, the credibility and

legitimacy of the HNP are likely to be tested by the continued

weakness of the judicial and penal systems. If the courts do not

function, or if they cannot keep pace with the number of arrests,

then the police may be tempted to take the powers of judgment and

punishment into their own hands (through extra-judicial

executions, for example). That, in turn, would undermine the rule

of law before it has a chance to take hold.

Nor is it clear how many police will be needed. As matters

now stand, the HNP should be able to provide a minimum level of

urban security, but not much more, and it cannot hope to control

rural areas. Haiti will probably need more police than the

roughly 5,000 to 7,000 that are currently being planned. The U.S.

Atlantic Command, for one, believes that some 7,000 to 12,000

security personnel will be required, with 9,000 considered

necessary to provide a marginal degree of security.63 In the "fog

of peace,"64 it is impossible to know what dangers lie ahead. As
21

the FAdH and its paramilitary allies have been disbanded, many

former soldiers and attaches have turned to crime. Others have

sought to organize as pressure groups and have engaged in

protests, some of them violent. There is evidence, too, of

growing paramilitary "hit-squad" activity. Such problems are

likely to increase after the U.N. peacekeepers leave, and it

remains to be seen whether the HNP will be up to the task of

maintaining law and order.

Finally, there have been recent, highly disturbing signs

that all is not well within the HNP: There have been growing

reports of police violence, incompetence and graft, and a

corresponding sharp decline in public support for the

institution. Violent skirmishes between the police and slum

dwellers and gangs have become commonplace, especially in Cite

Soleil. In January 1996, the situation became so bad that

Aristide felt obliged to personally visit Cite Soleil in an

attempt to defuse the situation. In turn, President-elect Preval

publicly criticized the HNP for not doing its job properly. ("It

is as weak as a baby.") The police, he said, had been "committing

numerous infractions . . . . I have heard that policemen are

brandishing weapons everywhere. This must stop. We must remove

the bad apples."65

Nor were matters helped by Aristide's attempt to appoint a

former FAdH medical officer, Colonel Jean-Marie Fourel Celestin,

as police director. U.S. officials considered Celestin a human

rights violator; moreover, he had reportedly allowed corruption

to flourish when he was in charge of security at the National

Palace.66 While the nomination was fortunately rejected by the

Haitian parliament, the affair did little to bolster confidence

in either Aristide's judgment or the HNP's future. Similarly,

Aristide's decision to incorporate hundreds of ex-military

personnel into the institution67 seemed certain to undermine its

civilian nature and nonpartisan image and increase tensions

within the force. In the past, some rank and file have indicated

their unwillingness to work with ex-FAdH who are in leadership

positions.68

Things Fall Apart: Five Scenarios.

In short, while the moment of truth is still to come the

HNP's honeymoon is clearly over. There is a very real danger--if

not a probability--that sooner or later things will fall apart.

The following scenarios are suggestive of what could go wrong:

The "Woodwork Hypothesis." In this scenario, shortly after

the departure of the U.N. peacekeepers former FAdH and

paramilitary personnel would reemerge from hiding in Haiti and

the Dominican Republic, where they had been stockpiling arms and
22

biding their time, waiting for the chance to regain power. The

country would be plunged into civil war.

This is the most widely feared scenario, but it is also (at

least in the form presented above) overrated. For one thing,

there is some doubt as to whether there are any large arms

stockpiles. U.S. troops received numerous tips of such caches

following the September 1994 intervention, but were never able to

locate any. Colonel Mark Boyatt, who commanded the U.S. Special

Forces in Haiti, believes they do not exist.69 Beyond this, any

resurgent FAdH/macoute army would require leadership,

organization and popular support, and these are most notable by

their absence. Even if leadership and organization could be

developed and arms acquired (and this last, certainly, would not

be difficult), there is no sea in which these fish could swim.

The populace is no longer cowed; it would provide little shelter,

intelligence or other support for such an army. On the contrary,

it would almost certainly resist a Duvalierist restoration with

every means available.

Moreover, it is improbable, in the short run, that the

United States or the United Nations would allow such a 

development. They have too much at stake to let the situation

fall apart so fast. For President Clinton, it would be a

political embarrassment and perhaps worse. Though Haiti has

recently been overshadowed by Bosnia, it still represents one of

his foreign policy "successes"; its return to chaos would reopen

the immigration problem and expose him to Republican attack in an

election year. Within the U.S. Government and the international

community, there is a widespread recognition of the need for some

kind of continuing security arrangement after February 1996. At

this writing, it appears that 1,900 peacekeepers will stay on for

a few more months and that there will be some continuing foreign

police monitoring and training of the HNP.

In sum, a large-scale attack seems unlikely and, if

attempted, would probably not succeed. The United States and the

international community would not allow it, and the Haitian

people and their government (including the HNP) would resist it.

Nor is there any evidence that the remnants of the FAdH and the

paramilitaries have the leadership, organization or will to

prevail. Indeed, they appear to be thoroughly demoralized. These

elements were never very brave or competent, preferring mostly to

shoot people who could not shoot back. Given the radically

changed balance of forces within Haiti today, it seems unlikely

that they will be able to recapture power in the short term. (The

longer run may be another matter.)

This being said, there will undoubtedly be some antigovernment conspiracies (these are endemic in Haiti), and some

zenglendos (gunmen) will come out of hiding. One should expect an
23

increase in terrorism aimed at probing the government's defenses.

This is the real danger of the "woodwork" hypothesis. It would

not take a large or well-organized force to create incidents that

might trigger an overreaction by the HNP, which in turn could

spark more mob violence and do incalculable damage to the government's legitimacy, as well as to national reconciliation and

democratization.70

The "Jacobinization" of the Police. Another, more medium or

long-term possibility, is that the Haitian National Police might

become politicized by radical elements in Lavalas and turned into

an instrument of terror, class warfare and revenge. In this

scenario, the police would in effect become the functional

equivalent of the old military, but would be under the control of

the radical Left rather than the Right.

This danger would be most likely to occur under the

leadership of Aristide and/or his chosen successor, Rene Preval,

should they decide to revert to the kind of "direct democracy"

that seemed to be developing during the former's initial period

in office. Though many observers today argue that the radical

Lavalas political/socioeconomic program is all but dead,

political and class conflicts in Haiti remain so volatile and the

historical record so dismal that the resurrection of the project

in the form of a Jacobin dictatorship cannot be discounted. One

should remember that dictators are not always military men.

(Witness the Duvaliers.) Moreover, some of the events since last

June have been disturbing: The turmoil surrounding the

parliamentary elections, the emergence of something fairly close

(at least at first glance) to a one-party state, the growth of

polarization and violence, and Aristide's own erratic behavior

(the November "disarmament" speech, the seeming encouragement of

the campaign for "three more years") have once again raised fears

and suspicions about government intentions.

Then, there have been other incidents: An unsuccessful

attempt in early 1995 to place several hundred unvetted men in

the Interim Public Security Force, for instance, was initially

interpreted by American officials as a move by Aristide to take

political control of the military. While most U.S. officials

eventually concluded that the episode was the product of lowerlevel conspiracy and incompetence rather than a high-level

government effort to subvert or take over the institution,71 more

recent developments have resurrected the concern over

politicization: At the ceremony for the first graduating class

from the new Police Academy, for example, Aristide led the

graduates in a prolonged chant, culminating in cries of "Lavalas!

Lavalas! Lavalas!"72 (This was not, to put it mildly, the most

auspicious beginning for a constabulary that was supposed to be

nonpartisan.) Subsequently, the attempted appointment of Celestin

and the incorporation of hundreds of ex-FAdH into the HNP have
24

intensified fears of politicization and human rights abuses. At

the same time, there has been growing suspicion, even within the

Clinton administration, that Haitian security forces have been

involved in political assassi-nations. In one notorious case, the

Haitian government apparently even impeded FBI efforts to

investigate the killing.73

A major issue, of course, is Aristide himself. Who is the

real Aristide, the unstable demagogue portrayed by the CIA or the

pragmatic statesman who seemed to be emerging in the months

following his restoration? The evidence of his recent behavior,

though obviously not unmixed, would seem to warrant a cautiously

optimistic prognosis. The presidential election has now been held

and Preval has assumed office, both without incident. Haiti's

economic dependence on the international community would appear

to dictate continued moderation. On the other hand, the political

culture, the class antagonisms, the desire for revenge, the

likelihood of continuing political and social violence, the

enduring economic disaster and the frustrations that it is

generating, and Haiti's deteriorating relations with its

international sponsors (especially the United States) all make

some degree of state or state-sanctioned violence likely in the

years ahead. If Aristide no longer speaks of his admiration of

Robespierre, he might revert to previous form under the right

circumstances. Nor can one be confident of his successor or his

successor's successor. As long as the state can manipulate the

composition of the police and the system of economic rewards

under which they operate, the HNP will be susceptible to

political abuse.

"The Mob." A third scenario, which might be independent of

or closely related to the first two, would involve massive mob

violence directed against the Haitian oligarchy, former military

and paramilitary elements, leaders of the political opposition,

and common criminals. There is still an enormous amount of

suppressed tension in Haiti. Natural desires for justice and

revenge for the human rights abuses of the old regime have been

largely frustrated by the absence of functioning police, judicial

and penal systems, and the reluctance of U.S./U.N. peacekeepers

to seek out and arrest past human rights violators. While massive

violence has been generally avoided (thanks to public restraint,

the leadership of President Aristide, and the presence of

international peacekeepers), there have been many isolated

instances of vigilante justice.74 There is a very real danger that

this violence could grow much worse after the U.N. peacekeepers

leave, especially if crime continues to increase, the military

and macoutes reemerge, and the Left seeks to mobilize the masses

to defend the government or wage class war. The single event most

likely to trigger such violence: the assassination of JeanBertrand Aristide.
25

The Rise of the "New Macoutes." With the economy depressed

and tens of thousands of ex-military and paramilitary unemployed,

some of these alienated and armed elements have turned to crime.

Many of the robberies and shootings that have been taking place

are believed to be the work of former police attaches, some of

whom are hiring out their services as assassins. Such killings

have become commonplace, and some--a couple dozen or so--appear

to be political.75 Among the most notorious of the latter were the

"hit-squad" murders of Mireille Durocher Bertin, a prominent

Aristide critic and defender of the Cedras dictatorship, and

former Brigadier General Henri Max Mayard. Since a number of

other ex-military officers, wealthy businessmen and associates of

the old regime have also been assassinated, there has been

speculation among U.S. military intelligence officers that some

in the Aristide camp are engaged in a preemptive campaign to

destroy the enemy (or at least its potential leaders) before the

U.N. forces leave and the enemy has a chance to launch an attack

of its own.76

This may well be, but at this point there is very little

hard evidence. (Or at least none that has been made public.)

While the government, or elements within it, is the most obvious

suspect--Interior Minister Mondesir Beaubrun (since replaced) was

even accused of masterminding the Durocher Bertin murder77--there

are certainly other possibilities. Some of these killings may be

drug-related. Some may be the work of disgruntled ex-soldiers who

have not received benefits to which they feel entitled. Some may

have been provocations by the Right, designed to undermine public

confidence in the government's intentions and ability to maintain

order and to destroy its international support. Nor have all

those targeted been members or supporters of the dictatorship;

some are Aristide partisans or at least foes of the Cedras

regime.78

What can be said for certain is that there is a very large

potential for things to get worse. There are too many guns

floating around, and the police have neither the manpower, the

vehicles nor the experience to patrol the whole country. Already,

ex-soldiers have formed groups like the Rally of Military

Dismissed Without Reasons to press for stipends, jobs and other

compensation for their lost careers. Disruptive protests have

been held. Shadowy groups, apparently linked to the Rally and

elements in the now-defunct Interim Public Security Force and to

such Aristide foes as former dictator Prosper Avril, have

organized conspiracies and conducted assassinations. Criminal

gangs, such as the "Red Army" in Cite Soleil, are sowing panic in

the slums, attacking the police and inciting mob violence.

Meanwhile, the oligarchy, which has increasingly become a

target of the crime wave that has shaken the country, has

bolstered its private security forces. These organizations have
26

grown in number and size since Aristide's return, and some are

better armed than the Haitian National Police.79 The danger, of

course, is that these groups have the potential for acting as

private armies and death squads. (Some may already be engaged in

such activities.) There is also a concern that the oligarchy may

provide financial and other support to violent groups and that

ex-FAdH officers who are brought into the HNP might link up with

former colleagues and attaches on the outside.

By the same token, there is also concern about Aristide's

presidential security force, which was chosen on the basis of

loyalty rather than professionalism or merit. It is this group of

several dozen bodyguards--the so-called "inner circle" within the

larger "outer circle" of Palace Guards--that U.S. officials

suspect of conducting political killings. Some members of the

unit have developed an arrogant attitude which, along with their

lack of training, has caused serious problems in their

performance and relations with other Haitian security units.80

This is especially unsettling when one considers the historical

uses and abuses of such forces: Duvalier, it may be recalled,

used his presidential guard to help neutralize the FAdH,

elevating it to the status of a military department. Indeed, the

guard became the most powerful military unit in Port-au-Prince.

Obviously, this is potentially a very volatile mixture. If

the political situation polarizes, terrorism will likely

increase, with the extremes stoking each other's violence. From

there, it would be only a short descent into chaos or civil war.

Whether that worst-case scenario actually occurs remains to

be seen. At minimum, however, one should expect a rise in crime

in the post-February period, as the international peacekeeping

presence diminishes and criminals become bolder. This process,

indeed, has already begun. In recent months, criminal activity

has sharply increased. The gangs are proliferating, and they are

better organized and armed than ever. In confrontations, they

often outnumber and have more powerful guns than the police. Some

have automatic weapons. While this kind of activity will not in

itself produce political instability, it can help undermine

stability by frightening away foreign investors, sparking more

vigilante violence, weakening the authority and morale of the

government and especially the police, overloading the judicial

system (which is barely functioning as it is), and creating a

growing climate of personal insecurity that, along with more

overtly political violence, could return Haiti to a state of

relative anarchy.

A "Bonapartist Restoration." Finally, remilitarizatrion and

politicization could occur along traditional lines with the HNP

becoming the functional equivalent of the old FAdH. While in the

short run the prospects of a coup are unlikely (though not
27

impossible if the wrong people gain control of the institution),

in the longer term deeply rooted values, attitudes and habits are

likely to reassert themselves. A certain amount of corruption and

brutality are almost inevitable. Moreover, if Haiti fails to

develop strong democratic institutions, the police/military may

be tempted to step into the vacuum. This would be most likely to

occur in periods of intensified political or class conflict,

especially if such interventions were supported by or at the

behest of conservative/reactionary elements in the business and

political sectors. The pattern might be similar to the gradual

militarization of politics that occurred after the departure of

the U.S. Marines in 1934.81

Conclusions And Recommendations.

While none of the above scenarios is inevitable, the United

States and United Nations need to be sensitized to these

potential developments and devise a long-range plan to avoid

them. Otherwise, the tactical success that has been enjoyed so

far may presently turn into a strategic failure.

The most obvious requirement is for a continuing

international security presence. The problem is that the United

States and the United Nations do not want to stay, and the

Haitian government only belatedly had the courage to ask them.82

What is needed is an extension of the U.N. peacekeeping mission.

The number of troops can be reduced, but some substantial

presence is needed for at least another year. Beyond this, a

smaller presence will probably be necessary for several more

years--i.e., until the HNP can stand on its own feet and an

adequate judicial system is in place and functioning. Without

this, the entire experiment may very well collapse. In addition,

a rapid response force should be formed to back up the Haitian

government as circumstances require. There should be U.S.

involvement in all of these operations to bolster their

credibility.

At the same time, there must be ongoing foreign monitoring

and training of the Haitian police. To expect the HNP to be

professionalized and capable of maintaining law and order after

only four months training and a few more months experience is

unrealistic, particularly in light of the enormous challenges it

will face and the resource constraints under which it will have

to operate. It will need a lot of help. Continuing international

civilian police activities must provide hands-on mentoring and

backup in the field. Passive observation is not enough. Civilian

police advisors should serve as role models to their Haitian

counterparts and supply advice to the Haitian government and

ICITAP training authorities.83 Particular attention needs to be

paid to improving the HNP's leadership at all levels, creating an
28

effective investigatory capability (to date, the Special

Investigative Unit is virtually inoperative), projecting a

meaningful and constructive police presence in rural areas, and

developing special backup units to deal with emergency

situations. (Too often, officers have found themselves in

untenable positions, surrounded by gangs or mobs and sometimes

taken hostage.)

The HNP will need more of everything--more police, more

equipment, and especially more training and vetting. Part of the

challenge will be to expand quantity without sacrificing quality.

It would be a tragic mistake to accept unvetted ex-FAdH officers

into the police. Indeed, the fewer ex-military, the better. Even

those who are not guilty of human rights abuses carry a stigma by

dint of having been a part of the repressive apparatus of the

Predatory State. Inevitably, their presence reduces the

legitimacy and public acceptance of the institution. By the same

token, police officers--whether ex-FAdH or not--who abuse their

power must be dismissed. The struggle for a new Haiti requires a

"clean" constabulary.

All this, of course, will take political will and money. If

a larger and more competent police force is to be created and

maintained, Haiti's foreign sponsors will have to provide much of

the financing. Haiti simply can't do the job on its own; it can't

even afford the present force, at current salaries. While

salaries may have to be lowered to a somewhat more realistic

level, even that will not be enough. In addition to personnel,

the HNP needs more equipment--more vehicles, radios, and weapons-

-and a much better maintenance program. This last is especially

important. Haitians must be trained and given the means to take

care of what they are given, or current efforts largely will be

wasted.

These recommendations will make some people nervous, and

understandably so. After all, the larger and more formidable the

HNP, the greater its potential for political intervention. One

need only glance back at Haitian history to appreciate the

danger. But the country finds itself at a critical juncture. The

deteriorating security situation must be stopped before it gets

completely out of hand, and that means strengthening the police.

Thus, the critical importance of ongoing professionalization

efforts, designed to instill respect for human rights and

constitutional authority. This kind of training will be needed

for decades to come.

 Of even more immediate concern than a possible coup is the

danger that additional and more potent weapons might be used

irresponsibly or fall into the wrong hands. The misuse of these

arms could easily make a bad situation much worse. The last thing

Haiti needs is hordes of cops swaggering around on their beats
29

with automatic weapons at the ready. The model should continue to

be community-based policing, where good police-community

relations are assiduously cultivated and the use of firearms is a

last resort. While the HNP will need heavier weapons to deal with

situations where officers are outgunned and in dire peril, these

arms must be closely controlled and limited to special elite

backup units trained to deal with such emergencies.

All this being said, it must also be recognized that these

kinds of needs are only part of a much larger equation. Without

functioning courts and prisons, security will remain an illusion.

While progress has been made in these areas, there are light

years to go. By the same token, security will be hard to attain

as long as Haiti remains economically prostrate. The economic

substructure of violence must be chipped away or it will

undermine any efforts that are made to establish political

stability and democracy.

These facets of the Haitian crisis, as well as others

(environmental and public health needs, for instance), have been

dealt with by other scholars,84 and I need not duplicate their

efforts. The point is that Haiti will need aid--and a lot of it-

-in the years ahead. One cannot build a nation in 1 year or even

5; rather, there must be a substantial foreign commitment for the

foreseeable future. This will, it is true, prolong the country's

dependence on the international community, but the alternative is

even less desirable. Unless Haiti's sponsors are willing to stay

the course, everything that is being accomplished now will be for

naught. In effect, Haitians will have been set up to fail.

In short, there are no easy answers to the Haitian dilemma.

If continuing international involvement will not guarantee

success, its absence will most assuredly guarantee failure.

Moreover, one cannot simply throw money at the problem. Haiti has

a very limited capacity to absorb aid. Ultimately, the key will

be the development of the country's human resources, so that

Haitians may gradually take over full responsibility for their

own national development. Until then, however, they will need

large amounts of training, education and supervision--the latter

to assure that the aid delivered will not be misused.

A few words should also be said about Haitian

responsibilities. The international community can nurture Haiti's

socioeconomic and political development, but only Haitians can

build a nation. As Aristide emphasized in his recent state of the

union address, Haitians must solve their own problems. Among

other things, that means that wealthy Haitians must be assured

that they "can live in safety and with confidence," but also that

they be willing to "play fair"--i.e., respect the rule of law and

the legitimate aspirations of the majority to improve their

lives. In addition, they must be willing to invest in Haiti--in
30

jobs, trades and businesses--so that the country might have a

better future.85

At the same time, the Preval administration should

accelerate the reform process. The issue of decentralization is

especially important. The system of centralized state controls

that has for so long sucked resources out of the countryside for

the benefit of Port-au-Prince must be dismantled. The peasantry

must receive a fair share of the economic pie. Moreover, the

logjam must be broken on privatization, civil service reform, and

transparency/ accountability in the use of public funds. Without

progress in these areas, international lenders are not likely to

extend Haiti the grants and loans it so desperately needs.

Another point: As Samuel Huntington has noted, "the

stability of democratic regimes depends, first, on the ability of

the principal political elites . . . to work together to deal

with the problems confronting their society and to refrain from

exploiting those problems for their own immediate material or

political advantage."86 The observation is particularly relevant

to Haiti, with its traditional political culture of suspicion,

rivalry, and intrigue. Beyond the message for Haitian elites in

general, there is a lesson for Aristide and Preval: They have

been close allies in the past, and they must continue to

cooperate with one another over the next 5 years. Already, there

have been reports of growing friction between the two. Aristide

has made several minor public statements which have been

interpreted as undermining Preval. There has even been

speculation that a successful Preval presidency might not be in

Aristide's political interest. If Preval failed, it is said,

Aristide could return to power in 5 years as the "savior of

Haiti." (Perhaps even earlier, if the incumbent stepped down.)

Hopefully, this is nothing more than the usual Port-au-Prince

rumor mongering. One thing is for certain: Preval will need

Aristide. Without the latter's support, the new President may not

be able to govern.87 By the same token, should the country come

apart over the next few years, there may not be any pieces left

for Aristide to pick up.

The same warning holds true for parliament. One of the

greatest dangers in the coming years lies in the potential for

immobilism. Already, power seems to be trifurcating among the

Preval administration, Aristide, and a radical legislature. One

can easily imagine a scenario where the President might have his

hands tied by either or both of the other components in this

"triad of power." If this indeed occurs, the result will be an

ineffectual presidency. That, in turn, would further undermine

the democratic experiment, and make the country even more

difficult to govern than it already is.

A note, too, for the United States and other providers of
31

foreign loans and grants: Though Preval comes from the populist

wing of Lavalas, many observers consider him more pragmatic than

Aristide. While the latter dragged his heels on many politically

difficult reforms, Preval has already indicated his intention of

enforcing tax laws, replacing civil servants who don't work, and

pushing ahead with privatization "in the interests of the Haitian

people." Rather than spending funds on public enterprises that

lose money, he has pledged to "modernize the state" and bring the

private sector into the management of state-owned enterprises.88

This is a promising beginning. International lenders and

donors would be well advised not to allow any preconceptions

about Preval's "radicalism" to get in the way of developing a

constructive relationship with the new President. At the same

time, they must be flexible. Preval has indicated that he would

be open to several different forms of privatization. The United

States, the IMF, the World Bank and other donors need to work

with him to find mutually acceptable solutions to Haiti's

problems, rather than trying to impose preconceived policies on

the Haitian people and their elected representatives.89

Finally, there is the issue of politics, which continues to

both drive and limit U.S. Haitian policy. Neither Democrats nor

Republicans are free from sin in these matters. This is, after

all, an election year. Some of the recent congressional hearings

on Haiti have evinced a distinctly partisan tone, giving the

appearance that they were "less about foreign policy than about

the upcoming presidential campaign."90 To turn Haiti into a

political football, with the Democrats bent on using it as a

"political success" and the Republicans determined to prove it a

"failure," would be both irresponsible and a prescription for

disaster. There is too much at stake to play such games.

The central lesson of our recent experience with Haiti is

that half-way efforts lead to half-way, ineffective, and

sometimes counterproductive results.91 In the current instance,

Washington has defined success in such narrow terms (the

restoration of Aristide and the creation of conditions that would

allow a U.S. exit) that it could hardly fail. The really

difficult and painful issues have been mostly finessed. Under

such circumstances, the danger facing the United States and the

international community is that they will have raised Haitian

expectations to astronomical heights only to dash them through an

unwillingness to do what is necessary. That is asking for

trouble. If the current deadlock over privatization and foreign

aid are allowed to continue, it will lead to further

socioeconomic decline. Haiti will sink back into darkness. That,

in turn, will feed the nationalistic backlash that has already

begun, produce more political turmoil, and resurrect the exodus

of desperate Haitians fleeing to U.S. shores. Then we will once

again be back where we started.
32

Postscript.

On the last day of February 1996, after overcoming a

threatened veto by China, the United Nations Security Council

voted to extend the U.N. Mission in Haiti for 4 months. The

UNMIH will be composed of 1,200 troops and 300 international

civilian police. In addition, Canada will provide an extra 700

soldiers at its own expense. Whether this will be enough to

maintain order and allow for a final pull-out after June 1996 is

very much open to question. Nevertheless, with soldiers in Bosnia

and U.S. elections scheduled for November, Washington found a

continuing U.S. peacekeeping presence politically unacceptable.

The United States will continue to give the Haitian police basic

training and advanced instruction in evidence-gathering and

analysis, crowd control, and other specialized skills for the

next several years. It will also keep some 200 to 400

construction and engineering troops in the country for about a

year to repair bridges and roads, restore electric power, and

perform other civic action functions. But at this point, interest

in Haiti has declined sharply in both the United States and the

international community in general. A telling indicator: No heads

of state, not even the secretary-general of the United Nations,

attended President Preval's inauguration. The highest ranking

foreign officials were the Vice Presidents of the Dominican

Republic and Taiwan. Whereas previously the United States had

sent President Clinton, Vice President Gore and Secretary of

State Christopher to Haiti when it wanted to highlight this

foreign policy success, this time the highest-ranking U.S.

representative was the delegate to the United Nations.

ENDNOTES

1. See, especially, Robert I. Rotberg with Christopher K.

Clague, Haiti: The Politics of Squalor, Boston: Houghton Mifflin

Company, 1971; Michel-Rolf Trouillot, Haiti: State Against

Nation, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1990; Michel S. Laguerre,

The Military and Society in Haiti, Knoxville: University of

Tennessee Press, 1993; and Mats Lundahl, Politics or Markets?

Essays on Haitian Underdevelopment, London: Routledge, 1992.

2. This was not always the case. In the 1960s and 1970s,

political culture studies were attacked by the Left and for

awhile went out of fashion. More recently, however, there has

been a renaissance. Indeed, no less an authority than Harry

Eckstein has argued that political culture may be one of the two

"still viable general approaches to political theory and

explanation proposed since the early fifties to replace the longdominant formal-legalism of the field--the other being political

rational choice theory." See his "A Culturalist Theory of

Political Change," American Political Science Review, Vol.
33

LXXXII, September 1988, p. 789. For a recent overview and

sampling of the literature, see Larry Diamond, ed., Political

Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries, Boulder: Lynne

Rienner Publishers, 1993.

3. See, e.g., Donald E. Schulz and Gabriel Marcella,

Reconciling the Irreconcilable: The Troubled Outlook for U.S.

Policy Toward Haiti, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies

Institute, 1994, pp. 7-17; Robert and Nancy Heinl, Written in

Blood: The Story of the Haitian People, 1492-1971, Boston:

Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1978, p. 6; Lawrence Harrison, "Voodoo

Politics," The Atlantic Monthly, June 1993, pp. 105-07; and

Rotberg, Haiti: The Politics of Squalor, pp. 17-24. The best

general treatment of the subject to appear in recent years is

Trouillot's Haiti: State Against Nation. On the social

underpinnings of the political culture, see James Leyburn, The

Haitian People, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.

4. Robert Maguire suggests, and I agree, that the

traditional elite will probably not regain political control, but

will focus on maintaining--and enhancing--economic control.

Comments on a previous draft of this report.

5. Harrison, "Voodoo Politics," p. 106. Generalizations like

these are by their very nature unfair. Some members of the elite

do share western beliefs in democracy, equality, and so on. But

they are not typical of their class.

6. Leyburn, The Haitian People, pp. 287-288.

7. Rotberg, Haiti: The Politics of Squalor, p. 18.

8. See, e.g., Jacques Roumain's classic novel of rural

Haiti, Gouverneurs de la rosee, Paris: Messidor, 1944.

9. Rotberg, Haiti: The Politics of Squalor, p. 18.

10. Anthony Maingot, Grasping the Nettle: A "National

Liberation" Option for Haiti, Miami: University of Miami, March

1994, p. 2. Michel-Rolf Trouillot has noted that, while

collective action is rare at the national level because of the

stigma of illegitimacy attached to politics and political

institutions, this is much less true at local levels. More on

this presently.

11. From September 20-24, 1995, a major conference on Haiti,

organized by the World Peace Foundation, the Haitian Studies

Association and the University of Puerto Rico, was held in

Mayagüez, Puerto Rico. For a detailed report on that gathering,

see Jennifer L. McCoy, "Haiti: Prospects for Political and

Economic Reconstruction," Cambridge, MA: World Peace Foundation,
34

November 1995.

12. On these developments, see especially Robert E. Maguire,

"From Outsiders to Insiders: Emerging Leadership and Political

Change in Haiti," paper presented at the conference on "Dialogue

for Development: The Political and Economic Reconstruction of

Haiti," Mayagüez, Puerto Rico, September 23, 1995.

13. The initial impression was that Haiti was precariously

close to becoming a one-party state. This concern was probably

exaggerated, however. The Lavalas deputies are by no means

monolithic, and there is already evidence (in their rejection of

Prime Minister Werleigh's budget and Aristide's nominee for

national police chief) that parliament will not be a rubber

stamp. For a more favorable evaluation of the elections, see the

testimony of James F. Dobbins, the State Department's Special

Haiti Coordinator, before the Latin American Subcommittee of the

U.S. House of Representatives' International Relations Committee,

October 12, 1995, pp.3-6.

14. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily

Report: Latin America, November 14, 1995.

15. Ibid., November 27 and 29, 1995.

16. At the time, Lavalas was deeply fractured between a camp

wanting "three more years" and those who accepted or promoted

elections. Information from Rachel Neild.

17. Again, it remains an open question which aspects of the

dominant political culture the masses share, and to what degree.

For instance, many observers argue that they have been much less

violent than the upper and middle classes--that they have been

mainly the targets rather than the perpetrators of such behavior.

Similarly, it is noted that the level of common crime is quite

low in Haiti, especially compared to the violence that wracks

many Latin American (not to mention U.S.) cities. On the other

hand, one could hypothesize that this lack of violence may in

part be due to the highly repressive nature of Haitian regimes

historically: Unsanctioned violence risked drawing draconian

retaliation; therefore, popular violence was suppressed.

Certainly, instances of mob justice have become fairly common

since the fall of the Duvaliers. Moreover, the poor provide a

large pool of desperate people, some of whom are always ready to

serve as attaches or thugs for a pittance. The truth is that one

cannot know how the lower classes would behave if they found

themselves on top. But the elite, clearly, are terrified by the

prospect.

18. Robert Fatton, "From Predatory Rule to Accountable

Governance," paper presented at the conference on "Dialogue for
35

Development," September 23, 1995, p. 2.

19. In the words of Trouillot, "Lavalas remains a loose

amalgam of factions united around Mr. Aristide but unable to

mature into a viable political party." Michel-Rolf Trouillot,

"Haiti's Only Hope Is More Hope," The New York Times, December

16, 1995. On the need for stable parties as a "crucial condition"

for a stable democracy, see Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Social

Requisites of Democracy Revisited," American Sociological Review,

Vol. LIX, February 1994, pp. 14-15.

20. Conseil Electoral Provisoire, as reported in Haiti Info,

Vol. IV, January 13, 1996, via the Internet.

21. Inter-American Development Bank, Emergency Economic

Recovery Program: Haiti, Report of the Joint Mission, November 7-

20, 1994, Washington, DC: IADB, January 3, 1995, p. 28;

International Monetary Fund, Haiti--Recent Developments,

SM/95/43, Washington, DC: IMF, March 1, 1995, p. 2.

22. To give an idea: About 80 percent of the national

budget, some three-quarters of which was derived from revenues

(taxes) generated in the countryside, was spent in Port-auPrince. Yet, 70 percent of the population lives in rural areas.

Robert Maguire, "Sisyphus Revisited: Grassroots Development and

Community Conflict in Haiti," Caribbean Geography, Vol. V, 1994,

p. 130; Maguire, "From Outsiders to Insiders," p. 9.

23. Michel S. Laguerre, "Business and Corruption,"

California Management Review, Vol. XXXVI, Spring 1994, pp. 94-95.

24. On the role of the Haitian military, see especially

Laguerre, The Military and Society in Haiti, and the recent work

of Robert Maguire: "Haiti: State Terror in Mufti," Caribbean

Affairs, Vol. VII, September/ October 1994, pp. 78-95; and

"Demilitarizing Public Order in a Predatory State: The Case of

Haiti," North-South Agenda Paper No. 17, Miami: University of

Miami, North-South Center Press, December 1995.

25. Schulz and Marcella, Reconciling the Irreconcilable, pp.

14-15.

26. Other influential families who supported the

dictatorship included the Acras, the Madsens, the Duforts, the

Elyzees, the Khawlys, the Lissades, the Feurys, the Mourras and

the Moscosos. Other business supporters included Gerard Cassis,

George Sassine, Reynold Bonnefil, Raymond Roy, Bernard Craan, and

Lionel Turnier.

27. Sidney W. Mintz, "Can Haiti Change?," Foreign Affairs, Vol. LXXIV, January/February 1995, p. 86.
36

28. Trouillot, Haiti: State Against Nation, p. 84.

29. Mats Lundahl, "The Haitian Dilemma Reexamined: Lessons

from the Past in Light of Some New Economic Theory," paper

presented at the conference on "Dialogue for Development,"

September 21, 1995, p. 5.

30. At its peak in 1990, the assembly sector accounted for

only about 46,000 jobs in a labor force of 3.5 million. By the

end of 1994, however, operations had virtually ceased. At present

(late 1995), it employs about 10,000 workers. Don Bohning,

"Intervention in Haiti Slowly Restoring Peace," Miami Herald,

September 16, 1995; McCoy, "Haiti: Prospects for Political and

Economic Reconstruction," p. 9.

31. Lundahl, "The Haitian Dilemma," pp. 28-29.

32. Larry Rohter, "Privatization Starts Feud in Haiti," The

New York Times, October 19, 1995.

33. Pierre-Richard Leroy, principal advisor to the Ministry

of Economy and Finances, in a conversation with the author,

September 22, 1995.

34. Bohning, "Intervention in Haiti."

35. For a more optimistic assessment, see the testimony of

Norma Parker, deputy assistant administrator for Latin America

and the Caribbean, U.S. Agency for International Development,

before the U.S. House of Representatives' Sub-Committee on

Western Hemisphere Affairs, October 12, 1995. The $1.8 billion

aid figure is taken from this document (p. 22). The 3.5 percent

growth and the inflation estimates are from Economic Commission

for Latin America and the Caribbean, Preliminary Overview of the

Latin American and Caribbean Economy, 1995, Santiago, Chile:

United Nations, 1995, pp. 45, 49.

36. Rachel Neild, et. al., Policing Haiti: Preliminary

Assessment of the New Civilian Security Force, Washington, DC:

Washington Office on Latin America, September 1995, pp. 30-31;

"Jeremie Report: Impunity, High Prices and Anger," Haiti Info, January 11, 1996, via Internet.

37. The program for 1997 will be reduced still further.

Parker testimony, pp. 6-7; Larry Rohter, "The Suspense Isn't Over

in Haiti," The New York Times, October 15, 1995.

38. Estimates of the amount of foreign aid being frozen

vary. The $200 million figure is from John Sweeney, "Stuck in

Haiti," Foreign Policy, No. 102, Spring 1996, p. 149.
37

39. Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, p. 3.

40. See, e.g., the critique of Alex Dupuy, "Haiti: Economic

Development for Whom?", paper presented at the conference on

"Dialogue for Development," September 22, 1995.

41. According to John Merrill, the deputy director of the

OSD Haiti Task Force, only about 30,000 or so of the roughly

175,000 guns in Haiti were ever seized. Comments at the "Dialogue

for Development," September 23, 1995.

42. Quoted in Neild, et. al., Policing Haiti, p. 36.

43. Ibid., pp. 28-29.

44. Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, p. 6.

45.On the legal implications of this amnesty, see Jeffrey A.

Williams and John N. Petrie, "The Carter Mission to Haiti:

Unintended Consequences for Human Rights Law," Fletcher Forum,

Vol. XIX, Summer/Fall 1995, pp. 95-114.

46. "Toto" Constant eventually showed up in the United

States, where he was arrested. He is currently in the process of

being returned to Haiti.

47. For an extensive list of potentially indictable military

officers and macoutes, see Henry F. Carey, "Regime Change, Elite

Change, Pragmatism, and Consensus: Political Reconciliation and

Rule of Law in Occupied Haiti," paper presented at the 1995

meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Washington,

DC, September 30, 1995, pp. 16-17. As this monograph goes to

press, the Truth Commission has just turned its findings over to

the judiciary, which is supposed to bring to trial those named in

the report. The names have not yet been made public.

48. The latter issue, of course had particular salience in

Florida, where Governor Lawton Chiles had filed suit against the

Federal Government to recoup millions of dollars that the state

had to spend on illegal immigrants. A prolonged, major

immigration crisis would have severely damaged Democratic

prospects in the November mid-term elections and, beyond that, in

1996. Florida was a key "swing" state, and the Clinton

administration could not afford to write it off.

A detailed examination of the role played by domestic

interest groups, including the Black Caucus, Randall Robinson and

other key players, may be found in Roland I. Perusse, Haitian

Democracy Restored, 1991-1995, Lanham, MD: University Press of

America, 1995, pp. 70-89.
38

49. It is possible, of course, that even had a more

aggressive disarmament campaign been waged the problem might not

have been solved. As one critical study of the U.S. effort notes,

"given the inherent logistical difficulties of disarming

paramilitary groups, the number of weapons obtained. . .might not

have been much higher." Moreover, confiscated weapons could be

replaced, since Haiti's borders are wide open to contraband.

Still, it seems reasonable to suppose that a much more effective

disarmament campaign could have been conducted had that been an

American priority from the beginning. And the effort would have

had an important psychological effect on both the Haitian people

and the macoutes. It would have clearly demonstrated the U.S.

commitment, enhanced American relations with both the Haitian

people and their government, and probably deterred and reduced

some of the ensuing violence. See Neild, et. al., Policing Haiti,

p. 37.

50. This is not to say that he could not be a destabilizing

force as well. There is a potential for either outcome.

51. Rohter, "The Suspense Isn't Over in Haiti."

52. See, e.g., Douglas Farah, "Aristide Willing to Quit, But

Many Want Him to Stay," The Washington Post, October 1, 1995; and

Larry Rohter, "Haitian President Is Hinting That He Might Not

Step Down," The New York Times, November 25, 1995.

53. This is putting it politely. Some even claimed that

Aristide was psychologically unstable and addicted to drugs. See

Schulz and Marcella, Reconciling the Irreconcilable, pp. 29-30;

Bill Gertz, "Events Seen Backing CIA Report," Washington Times,

November 28, 1995; "The CIA and Haiti," The New York Times,

December 8, 1995.

54. Still, had the United States and the international

community supported Aristide on this issue from the beginning,

the danger of abuse might have been significantly reduced. A

constitutional amendment, for instance, might have provided a

legal, internationally sanctioned solution to the problem. But

once having taken a public stand, it was difficult to reverse

course.

55. Granted, other factors were at work. After the chaotic

congressional and local elections of the previous June with their

attendant make-up and run-off ballotings, many Haitians suffered

from election fatigue. Many, too, were disillusioned that

democracy had brought no improvement in their economic condition.

In addition, there had been only limited campaigning. It was not

even clear that the vote would be held until early December, and

the most formidable opposition leaders boycotted the race. Nor
39

did Aristide bother to publicly endorse Preval until a couple

days prior to the election. All this being said, however, the

most convincing single explanation as to why more people did not

vote is that the candidate they wanted (Aristide) was not on the

ballot. The implications for the legitimacy of the process are

obvious.

56. Cam Duncan, "Haiti Bucks Privatization," Multinational

Monitor, Vol. XVI, November 1995, pp. 6-7.

57. For a comparison of that program with the current one,

see Dupuy, "Haiti: Economic Development For Whom?".

58. Here see especially Lundahl, "The Haitian Dilemma

Reexamined," pp. 14-15, on the need for the "constructive

destruction" of the state.

59. When I made this point at the Mayagüez conference,

Colonel David Patton, the U.N. Mission's Executive for Haitian

Security, objected that I was being too pessimistic. We shall

see.

60. FBIS, Daily Report: Latin America, December 8, 1995;

"Former Haitian Soldiers Join Police," Miami Herald, December 8,

1995.

61. Neild, et. al., Policing Haiti, pp. 22, 29-30.

62. Rachel Neild, personal communication. Neild estimated

that of the last 130 ex-military officers in the now disbanded

Interim Public Security Force, as many as 77 might be

incorporated into the HNP in leadership positions after being

vetted and given some training at the Police Academy. (There are

roughly 257 leadership positions in the HNP.)

63. Norma Parker, "Haiti One Year Later: Achievements of Our

Economic Assistance Program," testimony before the House of

Representatives Subcommittee on International Affairs (Draft),

October 12, 1995.

64. To borrow Fishel's classic play on Clausewitz, in John

T. Fishel, The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the

Restoration of Panama, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,

U.S. Army War College, April 15, 1992.

65. FBIS, Daily Report: Latin America, January 16, 1996.

66. Reportedly, Celestin is married to a relative of

Aristide. Larry Rohter, "Support Is Waning for Haiti's U.S.-

Trained Police," The New York Times, December 24, 1995.
40

67. Thomas W. Lippmann, "U.S. Officials Say Haitians Stymied

FBI," The Washington Post, January 5, 1996. In Aristide's

defense, it must be said that the pressures to increase the size

of the HNP are considerable. This is the quickest way to beef up

the institution in the face of a growing security crisis.

68. Information from LTC Robert Caslen, former executive for

security affairs to the MNF and U.N. commanders in Haiti.

69. Conversation with Colonel Mark Boyatt, September 22,

1995. Nevertheless, there continues to be great concern about

this possibility. There have even been claims that some U.S.

Special Forces soldiers helped FAdH troops and attaches stash

their weapons to avoid confiscation. While it is conceivable that

such collaboration may have occurred in a few isolated instances,

these reports have not been verified and are highly suspect. See

Douglas Farah and Dana Priest, "Haiti Says U.S. Troops May Have

Helped Forces," The Washington Post, December 8, 1995; "Special

Forces Underground in Haiti," Haiti en Marche, November 29-

December 5, 1995.

70. I am grateful to Rachel Neild for impressing this point

on me.

71. Neild, et. al., Policing Haiti, pp. 16-17; Human Rights

Watch/Americas and National Coalition for Haitian Refugees,

Haiti: Security Compromised; Recycled Haitian Soldiers on Police

Front Line, Vol. VII, March 1995, pp. 7-9; Douglas Farah, "U.S.

Exercises Its Influence on Aristide," The Washington Post,

February 22, 1995.

72. According to LTC Robert Caslen, in comments on the

preliminary draft of this manuscript.

73. Thomas W. Lippmann, "U.S. Accused of ‘Stonewalling' on

Haitian Murder," The Washington Post, December 23, 1995; and

Lippmann, "U.S. Officials Say Haitians Stymied FBI."

74. At least 40 such cases occurred in March 1995 alone, and

another 18 in July. McCoy, "Haiti," p. 20.

75. Some U.S. military intelligence sources have estimated

that there have been over 80 political killings since October

1994. In contrast, the American Embassy has tried to minimize the

problem, contending that only a relative handful of

assassinations have been political. A few months ago, the

International Civilian Mission, which monitors the human rights

situation, reported that there had been 20 commando-style

killings since Aristide's return. But there have been others

since then. See Robert D. Novak, "A Shooting in Haiti," The

Washington Post, October 12, 1995; Sandra Marquez, "Leaked Report
41

Shows Internal U.S. Discord Over Haiti Policy," Miami Herald,

August 17, 1995.

76. Robert D. Novak, "Downward Spiral in Haiti," The

Washington Post, August 10, 1995.

77. Larry Rohter, "U.S. Suspicions Over Killing May Mar

Clinton's Haiti Trip," The New York Times, March 31, 1995.

78. Letter of Colin Granderson, head of the OAS/U.N.

International Civilian Mission in Haiti, in The Washington Post,

November 3, 1995. The most obvious Lavalas casualty was JeanHubert Feuille, Aristide's cousin and friend. Another victim was

Eric Lamothe, a member of the National Front for Change and

Democracy, which supported Aristide's bid for the presidency in

1990. The most recent target (though it is unclear whether this

was a political attack or a robbery attempt) was Lavalas

legislator Harry Marsan. See "Pro-Aristide Lawmaker Is Found Shot

to Death," Miami Herald, March 4, 1995; FBIS, Daily Report: Latin

America, January 17, 1996. Deidre McFadyen recently reported that

more than 60 Aristide supporters have been killed in the

political attacks, but listed no sources. Such claims are

suspect, as are the U.S. intelligence sources cited in footnote

75. See Deidre McFadyen, "The ‘Violence' of Aristide," NACLA

Report on the Americas, Vol. XXIX, January/February 1996, p. 5.

79. Conversation with Colonel Mark Boyatt, September 22,

1995. This is less true than it used to be. Originally, the

police were limited to side arms. After Boyatt left, however,

each station got 2 shotguns, 5 M-14s and 5 37-mm gas guns, along

with pepper spray and other equipment. Information from LTC

Robert Caslen.

80. This from a knowledgeable U.S. military source to the

author. See also Carey, "Regime Change, Elite Change, Pragmatism,

and Consensus: Political Reconciliation and Rule of Law in

Occupied Haiti," p. 14.

81. In the two decades that followed, the FAdH evolved from

a political mediator to a guardian and eventually a political

ruler before being purged and subordinated by the Duvalier

regime. See Laguerre, The Military and Society in Haiti, pp. 84-

104.

82. This issue, like that of privatization, is very

sensitive. Some nationalists and leftists are opposed to a

continuing international military/police presence, recalling the

19-year U.S. occupation earlier this century. Thus Aristide, who

has ambitions to recapture the presidency 5 years from now (when

the constitution will allow it), chose to leave the request to

Preval. He doesn't want to be remembered as the one who continued
42

the foreign occupation of Haiti after foreigners brought him

back.

83. ICITAP is the U.S. Justice Department's International

Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program.

84. See especially the forthcoming book, based on the papers

from the Mayagüez conference, which is currently being edited by

Robert Rotberg and will be published by the Brookings

Institution. See also the report by Ernest H. Preeg, The Haitian

Dilemma: A Case Study in Demographics, Development and U.S.

Policy, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International

Studies, 1996.

85. See FBIS, Daily Report: Latin America, January 22, 1996.

 86. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization

in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma

Press, 1991, p. 259.

87. On the other hand, if Preval becomes too dependent on

Aristide he will be viewed as a puppet. For speculation about the

alleged split between the two, see Douglas Farah, "Aristide to

Haiti: I'll be Around," The Washington Post, February 7, 1996;

and Larry Rohter, "In or Out of Presidency, Aristide Is Still the

Issue," The New York Times, February 9, 1996.

88. FBIS, Daily Report: Latin America, January 19, 1996;

Larry Rohter, "Haitian Taking Office, With Daunting Job Ahead,"

The New York Times, February 7, 1996.

89. It should be remembered that Preval will need the

support of parliament to enact many of these reforms, and that

may not be easy to obtain.

90. Lippman, "U.S. Officials Say Haitians Stymied FBI."

91. On this theme, see especially Schulz and Marcella,

Reconciling the Irreconcilable, pp. 17-49
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