Defense Science Board Task Force

on 

 B-52H Re-Engining

Revised and Updated 

June 2004 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

For Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 

Washington, D.C. 20301-3140
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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)

Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 
 

This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB). The 

DSB is a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide 

independent advice to the Secretary of Defense. Statements, opinions, 

conclusions, and recommendations in this report do not necessarily 

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This report is UNCLASSIFIED 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON

WASHINGTON. DC 20301.3140

DEFENSE SCIENCE

BOARD MAR 20 ZD3

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION,

TECHNOLOGY & LOGISTICS)

SUBJECT: Final Report of the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on B-52 ReEngining

I am pleased to forward the final report of the DSB Task Force on B-52 ReEngining. The task force was asked to review and advise on key aspects of the policy and

technology issues associated with re-engining the USAF B-52 fleet. After careful

examination of the relevant aspects of B-52 re-engining, the task force reached a

unanimous conclusion to recommend the USAF proceed promptly with re-engining the

B-52 fleet.

The attractive cost benefit and operational enhancements resulting from such an

endeavor would substantially improve force employment flexibility. Significant

collateral benefits also arise in reduction of tanker demand; reduced in-flight fuel

consumption; and improved reliability, supportability and availability. The potential also

exists to use an Energy Savings Performance Contract as a means to finance the 8-52 reengining, thereby minimizing the impact to the Service budget topline.

I endorse all of the Task Force's recommendations and propose you review the

Task Force Chairman's letter and report.

r

IJ~~ ~

William Schneider, Jr.

DSB Chainnan
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON

WASHINGTON. DC 20301.3140

DEFENSE SCIENCE

BOARD MAR 20 am

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Report of the I}efense Science Board Task Force on B-52 Re-Engining

Attached is the fmal task force report. The task force was asked to review and advise on key

aspects of the policy and technology issues associated with re-engining the USAF B-52 fleet.

The task force carefully examined relevant aspects ofB-52 re-engining, including its impact on

B-52 capability and demand for tanker support; fuel consumption; reliability, supportability and

availability; technical risks of re-engining; and financing options, including the use of Energy

Savings Performance Contracting.

The study resulted in seven conclusions:

1. The B-52H is the most versatile and cost effective weapon system in the bomber

inventory and re-engining makes it even more so.

2. The B-52H has the highest mission capable rate of any of the three bombers, and remains

the only Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM) capable platform in the

inventory.

3 Further significant reduction in the B-52H fleet is considered unlikely for the foreseeable

future because:

. The total assigned inventory (TAl) bomber fleet being reduced from 130 to 96, a de

minimis number

. USAF has stated its intention to retain the B-52H through 2037

. The B-52H is highly capability of accomplishing its assigned missions

. The B-52H is flexible and able to adapt to future missions

. The USAF chose to retire more than twice as many B-1 airframes as B-52H airframes

. There is no bomber aircraft currently in development

4. B-52H re-engining represents low technical risk.

5 B-52H re-engining provides greater operational flexibility and range, reduces fuel burn

and tanker demand, and produces significant depot and field maintenance cost and

manpower savings.

6. B-52H re-engining is an excellent pilot program for expanding the use of Energy Savings

Performance Contracts beyond fixed facilities and into mobile systems.
7, The task force concludes the economic and operational benefits far outweigh the program

cost.

The task force recommends the DoD implement the following actions to produce a promptly

executable B-52 Re-engining program, recalibrate the expected lifetime of the airframe and

quantify the logistics assets that could be redeployed to satisfy shortfalls elsewhere.

1 Air Force to place the B-52H re-engining program on a fast acquisition track with a 4-5

year deadline to complete the re-engining process (NL T FY201 0 completion).

2 The Air Force proceed with a dedicated study to determine the optimum program, to

complete NLT 2010, considering all the possible engines, service arrangements and

financing options.

3 OSD commission a new independent multi-Service long-tenD tanker requirements study

that extends beyond FYO5, based on new planning guidance, which includes the impact

of B-52H re-engining as well as other planned new receiver aircraft that will be in service

over the expected lifetime of the tanker force (such as JSF).

4 The SPO and Boeing investigate the impact on B-52 airframe life as a result of

eliminating low-level missions and resultant projection of airframe economic life.

5 OSD and the Air Force immediately investigate (1) whether sufficient authority exists to

use an Energy Savings Performance Contract, or whether additional legislative

clarification is needed; and (2) ESPC's economic viability as a fmancing mechanism for

B-52H re-engining.

6. OSD investigate the use of more robust analytical tools that introduce the ~ of

improved operational capabilities to be included as a major parameter in cost-benefit

analyses for programmatic decision-making.

Better analytical tools that quantify the logistics demands resulting from the deployment,

employment and sustainment of platfonns will enable more infonned force structure decisions

and result in greater operational capability and flexibility for DoD's Total Obligation Authority

On behalf of the task force members, advisors and staff, I want to express our sincere

~iatiOn to all tho~ who, made pres~ntations and contributed to the repor t.

~

P.C.

.,..

Chain~~
Table of Contents 

Foreword ..............................................................................v

Executive Summary................................................................................. ES1

I. Introduction .............................................................................................. 1

II. The Economics of Re-Engining ............................................................. 3

II.a – Assumptions Used In This Analysis......................................................3 

II.b – The Cost of Fuel.................................................................................................... 3 

II.c – The Cost of Depot Overhaul.................................................................................. 5 

II.d – The Cost of Maintenance ...................................................................................... 7 

II.e – Annual Airframe Utilization.................................................................................. 7 

II.f – Economic Summary............................................................................................... 8 

III. The Risk of Premature Retirement................................................... 11

III.a – Airframe Life ..................................................................................................... 11 

III.b – Inventory............................................................................................................ 16

III.c – Operationally Capable........................................................................................ 17 

III.d – Availability ........................................................................................................ 22 

III.e – Future Utilization Concepts ............................................................................... 23 

IV. Operational Impacts of Re-Engining ................................................ 24

IV.a – Range, Reach and Loiter.................................................................................... 24 

IV.b – Other Performance Factors................................................................................ 28 

IV.c – Basing ................................................................................................................ 29

V. Explosive Start Capability ................................................................... 29

VI. Environmental Effects of Re-Engining ............................................. 30

VII. Program Options and Risk ............................................................... 32

VII.a – Program Options............................................................................................... 32 

VII.b – Program Risk.................................................................................................... 32 

VIII. Recapitalization Costs and Innovative Financing......................... 36

VIII.a – Purchase as a Major Modification Using Procurement (3010)Appropriations37 

VIII.b – Capital Lease Through OEM Using O&M Appropriations............................ 37 

VIII.c – The Energy Savings Performance Contracts (ESPC) Program....................... 38 

VIII.d – Rent Use on an Hourly Basis.......................................................................... 41 

IX. Conclusions and Recommendations.................................................. 41

Appendix A: Terms of Reference............................................................. 44

Appendix B: Task Force Membership..................................................... 46

Appendix C: Presentations to the Task Force ........................................ 47

Appendix D: Executive Order 13123 - Greening the Government 

Through Efficient Energy Management.......................... 48

Appendix E: Glossary of Terms............................................................... 62

- iv - 
Foreword 

This revised report summarizes the work of the Defense Science Board task force 

on B-52H Re-Engining, which met 4 times between June and December 2002. This is 

the fourth look at the issue of B-52H re-engining since 1996. The approach taken by this 

task force differed in key respects from previous studies and some of the factors that were 

considered by previous studies have changed significantly since those studies were 

concluded. 

The revisions clarify some of the assumptions underlying the economic 

calculations in the original December 2002 report and bring some cost factors up to date. 

The report uses eight sections to address two primary issues and provide 

conclusions and recommendations. Sections II through VII answer the question “Should 

the Air Force re-engine the B-52H?” The primary factors relevant to the decision include 

economic, operational, program risk, and environmental. Section VIII addresses the 

issue of how to finance the capital costs of re-engining, comparing the overall economic 

impact of various approaches, as well as legislative or other legal issues. Section VIII 

also presents the task force conclusions and recommendations. 

- v - 
Executive Summary 

In June 2002, USD(AT&L) commissioned a DSB task force to advise on the key 

issues associated with re-engining the B-52H Stratofortress. The Terms of Reference is

at Appendix A. A rigorous analysis of these key issues necessary to support a specific 

decision is beyond the scope of this study and would be more appropriately conducted 

under a formal Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). 

Overview 

This is the fourth B-52H re-engining study conducted since 1996. The first three 

Air Force studies concluded re-engining was not economically justifiable. Several 

factors drove this conclusion: use of a constant fuel price at the Defense Energy Support 

Center’s (DESC) rate; Air Force Material Command’s estimate that engine depot cost 

would remain stable through 2037; and the Air Force’s judgment that required funding 

would not compete successfully against higher priorities. In addition, the Air Force 

considered the possibility of premature B-52H retirement and force reductions to be 

unacceptable program risks. 

In the four years since completion of the previous study, cost, operational and 

business factors relevant to a re-engining decision have changed substantially. A 2001 

DSB study calculated the cost of fuel delivered in-flight to be $17.50 per gallon, using 

USAF provided figures, excluding the capital cost of tankers. Previous studies valued all 

fuel at about one dollar per gallon. The actual depot price for TF33-103 maintenance is 

now well over triple previous estimates; and the cost continues to rise. Further, the 

primary assigned aircraft (PAA) bomber force has been reduced from 130 to 96, making 

further material force reductions less likely. 

Direct costs, such as fuel and maintenance, are easily quantified in a cost-benefit 

spreadsheet analysis. Operational value is not. A re-engined B-52H delivers a 

significant increase in unrefueled range, reduces demand for fuel and tanker assets, and 

increased loiter time. Recent changes in the threat environment, new operational 

applications for the B-52H, and changing future mission utilization concepts also increase 

the operational value of re-engining. 

Affordability issues can be addressed using Executive Order 13123. This 

directive opens the possibility for the private sector to fund the capital costs to upgrade 

mobile equipment, and to be repaid from resulting decreases in operations and 

maintenance outlays. Although this approach results in a higher overall program cost, it 

has been used in lieu of appropriated funds to modernize fixed installations since 1988. It 

has not yet been used for mobile equipment. B-52H re-engining may be an appropriate 

pilot program. 

This task force concluded that taken together, the economic and operational 

benefits far outweigh the program cost; and unanimously recommends the Air Force 

proceed with B-52H re-engining without delay. 

- ES1 - 
The Cost of Fuel 

The task force used recent USAF provided B-52H fuel consumption data to baseline 

current fuel costs and to estimate savings from re-engining. The cost to the Air Force for 

ground-provided fuel is the DESC price plus about 20 cents for delivery infrastructure. 

Based on data provided by the USAF to the DSB task force that authored the 2001 report 

“More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden”, airborne fuel delivery costs 

the Air Force about $17.50 per gallon. B-52H re-engining reduces overall fuel 

consumption by about 35 percent. Demand for in-flight refueling is scenario-dependent. 

This makes it difficult to definitively quantify the resulting total reduction in tanker 

demand over the remaining life of the B-52H and to assign a dollar value to it for the 

purpose of conducting a cost-benefit analysis. However, based on scenarios examined by 

the task force, overall B-52H in-flight refueling demand would be reduced by between 50 

and 66 percent after re-engining. The task force estimates the economic value of reduced 

fuel demand, including reduced demand on existing tanker assets, to be nearly $8B 

through 2037. The task force recommends OSD sponsor an independent study to refine 

the estimated impact of B-52H re-engining on total tanker demand, both economically 

and in terms of operational capability. It should also include an analysis to determine if 

re-engining would decrease the need for any new tanker acquisition. 

The Cost of Engine Depot Overhaul 

Previous Air Force studies, using Air Force Material Command figures, estimated 

the depot overhaul cost of a TF33-103 engine to be $257K (FY96$). Further, previous 

studies assumed cost would remain relatively constant over the remainder of the weapon 

system’s life (until about 2037) and would never exceed $300K. This estimate is no 

longer valid (see page ES9). Between 1996 and 2001, the per-engine overhaul price rose 

from $257K to $539K. By FY03 the price had risen to $710K--an increase of 176% 

since 1996; and in FY04 price increased another 17% to over $832K. Boeing and the B52H System Program Office estimated that an annual real cost growth of 2% over the 

remaining economic life of the airframe would be a reasonable planning assumption, but 

the Air Force program office increased this rate to 5% in light of the rapid price 

escalation since 1996. Based on the current depot price and the new cost growth 

assumption, the per-engine depot overhaul price at the estimated end of the B-52 airframe

life, 2037, would be $7.5M in then year dollars. 

The Cost of Engine Maintenance 

Long-term experience with TF33-103 engine reliability indicates that 

approximately 87 engines will be removed from the current B-52H fleet each year for 

depot overhaul. On the other hand, today’s new commercial turbofan engines are so 

reliable that the task force estimates that in a re-engined B-52H fleet, no engine removals 

would be necessary for the remainder of the B-52H’s economic life unless caused by 

unforeseen failures, such as severe foreign object damage (FOD), combat damage, or 

equipment defects. As a result, all engine work would be “on pylon” for the remaining 

- ES2 - 
life of the B-52H fleet. This has significant implications for depot capability, logistics 

provisioning and maintenance manning. Current widespread commercial use of these 

engines would also minimize the need to pre-purchase spares, instead allowing a 

business-like opportunity to negotiate contracts for a one-for-one exchange should an 

unexpected failure occur. Also, wide commercial use of the proposed engine candidates 

makes contracting for all on-aircraft maintenance feasible, essentially eliminating the 

need for uniformed engine support on base or at depot. Assuming the Air Force’s 

estimate of 5% annual depot engine price growth, OMB’s 1.9% inflation rate, and no 

increase in the number of engines undergoing field maintenance or sent to depot, the total 

value of reduced depot and field maintenance demand would be approximately $10B in 

then year dollars through 2037. 

Annual Airframe Utilization 

Previous studies assumed that each B-52H would fly about 350 hours per year in 

its traditional roles - high altitude conventional and nuclear SIOP missions. For the past 

two years, about half the fleet has experienced about one additional year’s worth of 

flying. Higher annual utilization increases the benefit of prompt re-engining and 

accelerates the time value accrual of benefits. 

Airframe Life 

The B-52H airframe life is estimated at between 32,500 and 37,500 airframe

hours based on traditional mission profiles. The upper wing surface is the limiting 

structural member. The task force consulted with the USAF and Boeing to reaffirm this 

estimate. As of 1999 the average airframe had 14,700 flight hours. Re-examining past 

data in light of emerging mission profiles, both the System Program Office and the task

force judge that the airframe life is greater than the current estimate. The current estimate 

assumes continuation of the structurally stressful low-level mission, which has not been 

experienced by the airframes nor practiced by aircrews for many years. The B-52Hs 

emerging profile as a long range conventional delivery platform (such as its role in 

Afghanistan), with employment concepts such as long loiter with high density standoff 

precision munitions or as an anti-ballistic missile platform, would be less stressful than 

current profiles, further extending the airframe life. 

The Risk of Premature Retirement 

Previous studies assumed that the USAF bomber fleet would remain constant at 

208 Total Aircraft Inventory (TAI) (94 B-52H; 93 B-1; 21 B-2), and cited the economic 

loss from premature retirement of aircraft to be a significant program risk. However, the 

total force is now being reduced substantially to 157 aircraft (76 B-52H, 60 B-1; 21 B-2). 

The total operational fleet for combat tasking is being reduced from 130 to 96. The B52H continues to accomplish its assigned missions remarkably well. Although the 

number of available PAA bombers is extremely low, the USAF has recently retired more 

than twice as many B-1s as B-52Hs. Additionally, there is no bomber aircraft currently 

- ES3 - 
in development. These factors led the task force to conclude that further significant 

reductions in the B-52H fleet are unlikely for the foreseeable future. 

Operational Benefits from Re-engining 

In addition to reduced tanker demand and reduced direct operating costs, reengining produces substantial operational benefits. In terms of aircraft performance, 

Boeing estimates that unrefueled range will increase 46%, while fuel consumption will 

decrease about 35%. This means a 10,000-mile B-52H mission (US to Afghanistan and 

return) would require only one tanker refueling rather than the current two. Fuel offload 

demand declines from 276 Klbs to 118 Klbs, decreasing the claim on the high demand 

tanker force. Using a notional sortie regime and weapon loadout from Diego Garcia to 

Afghanistan, a B-52H with 25% greater unrefueled range could have conducted its OEF 

missions with 66% fewer in-flight refuelings. A 46% range increase would produce the 

combined benefits of accomplishing the mission with 66% reduced tanker demand plus 

4.7 hours of loiter time. Currently, the B-52H cannot fly from Diego Garcia to 

Afghanistan without refueling. Tanker availability was often a problem that constrained 

planning and executing OEF missions. 

Environmental Effects of Re-Engining 

The task force considered local air quality, global climate change and community 

noise impacts of re-engining. Considering only the B-52H fleet, and not the reductions 

associated with reduced tanker use, emissions of carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide and 

smoke would decrease by 30% or more whereas emissions of oxides of nitrogen are 

expected to increase by roughly a factor of two. Community noise impacts would be 

reduced significantly, with about half the annoyance per operation. Re-engining will 

bring the B-52H into compliance with current emissions standards of the International 

Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Stage 

III noise standards. The task force judges these changes to be favorable, particularly 

when the benefits of reduced tanker usage are considered. 

Recapitalization Costs 

The past three studies estimated recapitalization costs for re-engining, including 

all associated program costs, to be approximately $3B. Of that amount, the estimated 

cost of off-the-shelf engines was $1.5B ($FY96). In consultation with AFMC, Boeing, 

and three potential engine providers, the task force estimates the cost of re-engining to be 

between $3B and $4.1B, depending on start and completion dates and the financing 

method chosen. The current highly competitive business climate for airframe and engine 

manufacturers offers the government a window of opportunity to negotiate very favorable 

terms. 

- ES4 - 
Innovative Financing 

The cost to re-engine the B-52H is financially demanding. To address this issue, 

Boeing introduced the concept of using an Energy Savings Performance Contract 

(ESPC). It appears both possible and sensible for the Air Force to consider this approach. 

In 1999, Executive Order 13123 expanded the scope of ESPCs to permit private capital to 

be used to improve the energy efficiency of government-owned mobile equipment. 

Under this arrangement, the private sector funds the re-engining program’s capital cost 

and is repaid over time from the savings generated in reduced O&M outlay. However, 

profit to the financier and interest on the money increase the total program cost and 

decrease the total economic benefit to the government, compared to a traditional 

acquisition. The task force interpretation is that all O&M costs currently linked to B-52H 

engine activities that are reduced as a result of re-engining would be eligible to be used 

for repayment. This includes all reductions in maintenance personnel and facilities; 

logistics personnel, systems, and support; depot activities devoted to supporting current 

engines and spares; and depot personnel devoted to the TF33-103. In other words, the 

annual cost of financing the re-engining under a successful ESPC would be no greater 

than the current cost for operating, maintaining, sustaining, and overhauling the B-52Hs 

current TF33-103 engine throughout its remaining life. This includes all costs associated 

with operating and maintaining the number of tanker aircraft equal to the tanker capacity 

demand made redundant by re-engining. These costs are captured by the $17.50 cost per 

gallon of fuel delivered by tankers. Boeing’s spreadsheet analysis (page ES10) shows 

that 2031 is the estimated break-even year for this financing strategy, at least six years 

before the estimated end of airframe life. 

Other Considerations 

The B-52H has the most flexible carriage capability of any of the three bombers 

and is the only Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM) capable platform. 

If the USAF decides to re-engine the B-52H, the capability for explosive engine starts 

would be lost. If an operational requirement for self-starting exists, the USAF should 

conduct a separate evaluation to determine feasibility of installing an internal APU. It 

was the view of the task force that an engine self-start capability no longer appeared to be 

a core need. The issue of self-start capability is an operational decision to be made by the 

USAF. 

Assumptions Used In This Analysis 

Throughout this report analytical results from a variety of sources are presented. 

As a result, some calculations presented are in “then year" dollars and others are in 

"constant" dollars, depending on their source and purpose. They are clearly identified 

accordingly. All task force calculations were originally done in then year dollars, using 

the OMB rate of 1.9%, which was in effect at the time the study was done. Fuel is priced 

at the DESC FY03 standard rate for JP-8 of $1.20 with no real cost growth above 

inflation and no value is assigned to reduction in tanker demand resulting from reduced 

B-52 fuel consumption. No cost growth is assumed for field maintenance above 

- ES5 - 
inflation. The depot engine price used is the current $832,617 then increasing annually at 

an estimated rate of 5% through the end of the estimated B-52 airframe. A net present 

value calculation used sensitivity analysis on the depot engine price growth rate from 0% 

- 6% to cover a range of growth rates due to the variability experienced over the past 

years. 

Where figures and analytical results from Boeing are presented, they are clearly 

identified as such, and are presented as Boeing provided them to the task force. Boeing 

“normalized” their cost and payback curves and provided them as shown (page ES10) to 

the task force for use in this report in order to remove actual dollar figures and protect 

Boeing proprietary data. The task force did not consider the Boeing calculations in their 

conclusions or recommendations, but used them to understand the differences in the 

analytical approach. 

Conclusion 

The task force concludes B-52H re-engining is an attractive opportunity for the 

following financial and operational reasons: 

• USAF’s intent to retain the B-52H through 2037 

• Improved operational benefits 

o greater range 

o reduced fuel burn 

o reduced tanker demand 

• High engine reliability eliminating off-airframe engine maintenance 

o logistics savings 

o depot manpower savings 

o field maintenance manpower savings, and 

• The innovative financing opportunity with neutral year-to-year budget impact 

using ESPC. 

 

Recommendation 

The task force recommends the Air Force promptly: 

• Re-engine the B-52H because of its attractive combination of cost and operational 

enhancements that substantially improve force employment flexibility, and: 

• Place the program on a fast acquisition track in order to maximize the benefits and 

take advantage of the current business climate. 

- ES6 - 
Economic Summary 

The terms of reference asked the task force to “review and advise on key aspects of the 

policy and technology issues associated with re-engining”. The task force was able to 

obtain data of a high enough confidence level in three areas to review them 

quantitatively: 

• Depot maintenance of the TF33-103 engine 

• The quantity of fuel purchased from DESC before and after re-engining, and 

• Field maintenance costs. 

However, there were many important factors that should be included in a rigorous 

analysis that the task force was only able to address qualitatively. These include: 

• Operational and economic value of increased range 

• Operational and economic value of increased loiter time

• Operational and economic value of reduced tanker demand 

• Salvage value of TF33 engines 

• Future escalation of fuel prices above inflation 

• Future supportability of the TF33 engine 

The task force roughly estimated the acquisition program costs to be between $3B and 

$3.5B based on an extrapolation from the Boeing 1996 unsolicited proposal to the Air 

Force. The EMD portion of the program cost and the EMD and production schedule 

were provided by Boeing. 

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

EMD

$43.1M $111.1M $58.8M $14.7M

Production

1 8 23 17 17 10

$39M $316M $908M $671M $671M $395

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

EMD

$43.1M $111.1M $58.8M $14.7M

EMD

$43.1M $111.1M $58.8M $14.7M

Production

1 8 23 17 17 10

$39M $316M $908M $671M $671M $395

Production

1 8 23 17 17 10

$39M $316M $908M $671M $671M $395

The task force recommendations were based on a combined review of the quantitative 

and qualitative factors above. 

All task force calculations were done in then year dollars, and the two tables below show 

total cost reductions that would accrue through 2037, the projected end of airframe life. 

The chart below shows the reductions in O&M expenditures resulting from re-engining in 

then year dollars. Program costs are not shown here. 

- ES7 - 
 Current Outlay Outlay After Re-Engining Outlay Reduction

Fuel Purchase $4,123 $2,942 $1,180 

Depot Maintenance $9,281 $452 $8,829 

Field Maintenance $1,527 $734 $793 

Total $14,931 $4,128 $10,803

Estimated Total Lifetime Change in Direct O&M Outlays With Re-Engining in Then 

Year Dollars (in Millions) 

($833K Depot Price, 5% Engine Growth Rate and 1.9% OMB Inflation Rate) 

Net Present Value Calculation 

Subsequent to publishing the original report, the DSB staff received comments requesting 

a net present value calculation be provided according to OMB guidelines. This section is 

provided in response to those comments. Unlike the table above, the table below 

includes the EMD and production cost estimates. 

The Net Present Value calculation in constant dollars covering the period 2004 through 

2037 is presented below using the following assumptions 

• FY04 Depot Engine Price: $832,617 

• Depot Price Growth Rate: 5% 

• FY96$ EMD and Production Cost: $3.2B 

• Inflation 1.9% 

• 30 year OMB Nominal Discount Rate: 5.5% 

Program costs are apportioned in the years they would occur, and all post-re-engining 

costs for fuel, depot maintenance and field maintenance are transitioned in according to 

the fleet mix that would exist based on the production schedule Boeing provided to the 

task force. This shows that it costs $264M less to re-engine than to not re-engine. This 

calculation is engine depot maintenance cost growth rate sensitive with the crossover

point equal to 4.5% growth rate. NPV calculations using 0% growth rate indicate reengining costs approximately $1.4 billion while a 6% growth rate generates $0.9 billion 

in savings. These calculations do not include any costs associated with tanker aircraft. 

 Current Outlay Outlay After Re-Engining Outlay Reduction

Fuel Purchase 1,774 1,346 429 

Depot Maintenance 3,136 394 2,743 

Field Maintenance 657 369 288 

Total 5,568 2,108 3,459

Program Cost 3,195 

Net Present Value 264 

Net Present Value of B-52 Re-Engining 

- ES8 - 
TF33-103 Depot Overhaul Price History and Future Trend in Then 

Year Dollars 

$348K

$832K

$710K

$286K

$448K

$530K

$0

$200

$400

$600

$800

$1,000

$5,000

95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39

Cost per Engine O/H -

TY$ (thousands)

TF33-P103 (B-52)

TF33-P102 (KC-135E)

5% Annual Growth Forecast

$4.8M

Costs shifted minus 2-years

Historic Growth Forecast Growth

$348K

$832K

$710K

$286K

$448K

$530K

$0

$200

$400

$600

$800

$1,000

$5,000

95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39

Cost per Engine O/H -

TY$ (thousands)

TF33-P103 (B-52)

TF33-P102 (KC-135E)

5% Annual Growth Forecast

$4.8M

Costs shifted minus 2-years

Historic Growth Forecast Growth

$7.5M

During the initial Air Force economic analysis of re-engining, the price charged to the B52H program office was $257,000 per TF33-103 engine. In their analysis, the Air Force 

judged this price would never exceed $300,000 over the remaining life of the B-52H. 

However, in FY02, the depot sales price rose to $539,000, in FY03 it increased again to 

$710,000 and in FY04 it increased yet again by over 17% to $832,617. As a result of the 

rapid pace of price escalation since 1996, the propulsion directorate at the depot has 

revised its long term price forecast from a 2% annual growth above inflation to the end of 

the airframe life, to a 5% annual increase. 

- ES9 - 
Boeing’s Break-Even Analysis Using Constant FY02 Dollars 

Boeing presented these calculations to the task force toward the end of deliberations. The 

task force used them to understand how Boeing conducted its analysis. They were not 

the basis for the task force findings or recommendations. Numbers have been normalized 

to eliminate dollars from the charts in order to preserve Boeing proprietary cost data. 

Status Quo Baseline TF33

73.5%

0

20

40

60

80

100

02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40

Percentage

Fuel

Depot Eng Mx

Status Quo Baseline TF33

73.5%

0

20

40

60

80

100

02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40

Percentage

Fuel

Depot Eng Mx

Boeing’s analysis assumes: 

• $1.20/ gal fuel and 2% real price growth 

• $710K depot price and 2% real growth 

• 87 engines to depot per year 

• 22,000 flying hours per year 

• 3,310 gallons/hour fuel consumption 

• 11.5% of fuel consumed is from 

tankers, and priced at $17.50 per gallon 

The top chart shows the current operating 

costs of the B-52H fleet over the projected 

remaining life of the B-52H airframe. 

Re-engine Costs

52%

0

20

40

60

80

100

.

Percentage

02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40

Re-engine Costs

52%

0

20

40

60

80

100

.

Percentage

02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40

The middle chart shows the operating 

costs of the B-52H fleet after re-engining. 

The point at which the lines cross is the 

point at which annual outlays for the reengined fleet falls below those projected 

for the baseline fleet. 

Based on the estimated costs, and savings, 

this point is projected to occur in 2022. 

All costs used in Boeing’s analysis are 

constant year FY02 dollars. 

The task force calculations were all 

performed using “then year” dollars, using 

the OMB inflation rate of 1.9%. 

Because of this, and differences in other 

factors not included in the task force 

calculations, such as the added value of 

fuel delivered by tanker, direct comparisons 

between Boeing’s calculations and task force 

73.5%

0

20

40

60

80

100

02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40

Percentage

52%

Break-Even Analysis

2022

73.5%

0

20

40

60

80

100

02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40

Percentage

52%

Break-Even Analysis

2022

calculations cannot be made. 

- ES10 - 
I. Introduction

In July 2002, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics commissioned a Defense Science Board (DSB) task force to review and advise 

on key issues affecting a decision to re-engine the USAF B-52H fleet. The task force 

Terms of Reference is at Appendix A. 

This is the fourth look at re-engining the B-52H since 1996. The approach used 

in this study differs significantly from previous assessments in some important ways. 

Unlike previous studies, this task force qualitatively considers the true cost of in-flight 

refueling in its assessment of total life cycle cost, rather than using the price paid by the 

Services to DESC for fuel. Depot maintenance costs for the existing engine have risen 

far higher than were considered reasonable by previous studies. Operationally, major 

improvements in the standoff range and accuracy of munitions now enable the B-52H to 

perform missions previously considered unsuitable, principally the CAS mission. The 

Boeing Company has also proposed using a private sector financing model that avoids 

the need for large, up-front appropriations. The Energy Savings Performance Contract 

(ESPC) concept uses private capital to execute the program, and links a payment 

schedule to operations and maintenance savings over the remaining life of the B-52H. 

This is not a new concept. ESPCs have been used successfully to fund facility upgrades 

for some years. In the case of re-engining, the funds would be paid back from reduced 

fuel and maintenance costs and reduced requirements for tanker aircraft. 

In 1996, the Boeing Company presented the Air Force with an unsolicited 

proposal to modernize the B-52H by replacing the 8 existing 1950s vintage TF33-103 

engines with 4 modern, commercial-off-the-shelf RB-211 engines produced by RollsRoyce. The Air Force convened an Integrated Product Team (IPT) to conduct a Life 

Cycle Cost (LCC) study. The key assumptions driving the results of the LCC were: 

• The value of fuel savings would accrue at a constant 87 cents per gallon (the 

Defense Energy Support Center standard price at the time) over the remaining 

40 year airframe life 

• Total Engine Removal Rate (TER) per 1000 flying hours of 0.986 

• Depot engine sales price of $257,000, never to exceed $300,000 over the 

remaining 40 year life of the airframe

The IPT concluded it was not cost effective for the Air Force to re-engine the B52H. The Air Force LCC estimated leasing the engines from Boeing would impose a 

burden on AF TOA of $1.314B between FY97 and FY36. Boeing’s LCC estimated 

leasing the engines would free $4.755B from the AF TOA between FY97 and FY36.1

In 1998, the AF re-accomplished the analysis comparing 4 options: 

• Do nothing 

 

1

 Air Force Re-Engining IPT Final Report – Analysis of the Boeing Unsolicited Proposal to Re-Engine the 

B-52H, Undated 

- 1 - 
• Modernize the existing TF33-103 engine, resulting in 2% efficiency 

improvement 

• Replace with the RB211, resulting in 33% efficiency improvement 

• Replace with the PW2040, resulting in 27% efficiency improvement 

The result of the LCC showed re-engining was still not cost effective. 

Modernizing the TF33-103 had a marginally better net present value (NPV) ($2.989B) 

than doing nothing ($3.220B). The Air Force analysis showed all other options to be 

considerably more costly. 

Subsequently, the Air Force’s Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC/LPJ) was 

tasked to update the 1998 study. They conducted a “back of the envelope” calculation, 

updating the contractor proposals for inflation and obtaining new operational data from 

OC-ALC. Again, the conclusion was that re-engining was not cost-effective. 

This current DSB study was tasked to look more broadly at the issue than past 

studies. Specifically, the Terms of Reference required the task force to investigate the

value of reduced tanker demand resulting from the greater efficiency of the new engines. 

Other relevant factors also changed significantly. Principally, when the AF IPT 

evaluated the 1996 Boeing proposal, it used $257,000 as the depot cost for a TF33-103 

engine, and stated the price would never exceed $300,000. For FY 2002, the depot cost 

was $530,111; on October 1, 2002 the FY2003 price increased to $710,000 and the FY04 

price increase of an additional 17% put the price at $832,617. The task force believes 

the TF33-103 depot price will increase 5% above inflation through the remaining life of 

the B-52 airframe, in part, based on feedback from, the propulsion directorate at the depot 

and historical evidence from the past several years. 

The 1996 Boeing proposal was prepared at considerable expense to the Boeing 

Company. It was only offered for a limited time, and is no longer available. However, 

Boeing presented the Air Force with a revised concept in August 2002 to conduct a 

comprehensive study on the costs and benefits of re-engining and to develop a program. 

Their analysis of the costs and benefits are based partially on the 2001 Defense Science 

Board Task Force report “More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden.” The 

new Boeing concept is for a $3 Million Air Force funded study to develop a new proposal. 

The concept of using the true cost of in-flight refueling to determine the cost 

effectiveness of increasing the efficiency of receiver aircraft was proposed in a 2001 

Defense Science Board Study titled “More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel 

Burden.” The study recommended including the value of reduced tanker demand 

resulting from more efficient engines in the cost effectiveness calculations. It also noted 

that in order to access these savings, tanker force structure must be realigned as indicated 

by the reduced demand. 

In order for re-engining to be cost effective, the B-52H must be capable of 

remaining in service long enough to return the investment. This means the airframe must 

have adequate remaining service life and the platform must remain capable of conducting 

- 2 - 
its required missions. The task force has received no information indicating either of

these conditions cannot be met. 

II. The Economics of Re-Engining 

II.a – Assumptions Used In This Analysis 

Throughout this report analytical results from a variety of sources are presented. 

As a result, some calculations presented are in “then year" dollars and others are in 

"constant" dollars, depending on their source and purpose. They are clearly identified 

accordingly. All task force calculations were originally done in then year dollars, using 

the OMB rate of 1.9%, which was in effect at the time the study was done. Fuel is priced 

at the DESC FY03 standard rate for JP-8 of $1.20 with no real cost growth above 

inflation and no value is assigned to reduction in tanker demand resulting from reduced 

B-52 fuel consumption. No cost growth is assumed for field maintenance above 

inflation. The depot engine price used is the current $832,617 then increasing annually at 

an estimated rate of 5% plus inflation through the end of the estimated B-52 airframe. 

Where figures and analytical results from Boeing are presented, they are clearly 

identified as such, and are presented as Boeing provided them to the task force. Boeing 

“normalized” their cost and payback curves and provided them as shown (page ES10) to 

the task force for use in this report in order to remove actual dollar figures and protect 

Boeing proprietary data. The task force did not consider the Boeing calculations in their 

conclusions or recommendations, but used them to understand the differences in the 

analytical approach. 

II.b – The Cost of Fuel 

The B-52H fleet is programmed to fly about 22,000 hours per year and with 

existing engines it consumes 3,310 gallons per hour. After re-engining, the hourly fuel 

consumption rate is calculated to decline by about 33 percent, to 2,218 gallons per hour. At 

the programmed flying hours, this is a savings of about 24 million gallons of fuel per year, 

or 840 million gallons over the remaining 35-year economic airframe life of the B-52H. 

Previous re-engining studies calculated the economic value of this reduction by multiplying 

the number of gallons saved times the prevailing Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) 

price for fuel. This is the price the Services pay to purchase fuel from DESC. 

Based on the DESC FY03 price of $1.20, the methodology used in previous 

studies would produce an economic savings of about $29 Million per year or about $1.0B 

over the estimated 35-year remaining life of the B-52. 

While using a common price for fuel delivered to any of DESC’s terminals makes 

sense as a cost accounting simplification, using it as the basis for making investment 

decisions does not. The reason is the DESC price does not include the costs the Services 

pay for logistics needed to move the fuel from the DESC point of sale to its point of use. 

In its 2001 report “More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden”, a 

- 3 - 
Defense Science Board task force calculated the true cost of delivering fuel in-flight in 

FY99 was about $17.50 per gallon. The Air Force Cost Analysis Improvement Group 

(CAIG) calculated this figure based on a request from the task force. The figure 

represents the total cost of operating and maintaining the Air Force fleet of tanker aircraft

divided by the number of gallons of fuel delivered by tanker aircraft during the year 

FY99, the most recent data available to that task force. Calculating the true cost of fuel 

in this way highlights the cost of the logistics for delivering fuel, and represents a 

theoretical savings available by reducing demand for logistics. In FY2001, tankers 

delivered about 10.8 percent of the fuel burned by the B-52H fleet. 

Because the cost of in-flight delivered fuel is embedded in the cost of operating 

the tanker assets used to deliver the fuel, these savings can only be accessed by reducing 

logistics assets. In this case, reducing the demand for a gallon of in-flight refueling 

theoretically eliminates the need for $17.50 worth of logistics assets. But it is not 

possible to eliminate a fraction of a tanker aircraft. A tanker requirements model is used 

to determine the total tanker requirement, and the fuel burn rate of receiver aircraft is an 

element of that model. The 2001 DSB task force noted that inserting a re-engined B-52H 

into the tanker requirements model in use at that time resulted in a reduction of between 

55 and 83 tanker aircraft. The range of uncertainty was because complete information 

about the model used to establish tanker requirements was not available to the task force. 

There are two ways of interpreting this result. First is the figure represents the 

number of tanker aircraft no longer required. Second, is the figure represents the number 

of tanker aircraft effectively “purchased” by re-engining. The interpretation used will 

depend on whether or not the Air Force currently owns adequate tanker assets. If there 

are adequate tanker assets, the figure represents aircraft that can be retired from

inventory. If there is a shortage, the figure represents the number of tanker aircraft 

available for “purchase” through re-engining. Either way, the value of the 55 aircraft 

represents part of the value of B-52H re-engining. 

It is a simple matter to determine whether it is cheaper to purchase tanker capacity 

by re-engining or by maintaining tanker aircraft. The Air Force currently spends $386 

Million annually to maintain 137 KC-135E model tankers, or about $2.8 Million per 

aircraft.2

 Using the conservative number of 55 tankers, assuming constant maintenance 

costs and adequate KC-135E airframe life and not including any tanker acquisition costs, 

the Air Force can purchase tanker capacity worth $154 Million per year. Assuming 1.9% 

inflation over the next 35 years, B-52 re-engining purchases about $7.6B in marginal 

tanker value.

However, the tanker requirements study used to calculate the 55 tanker figure has 

been superceded, according to a briefing by Air Mobility Command. They briefed this 

task force on their new model for determining tanker requirements, called TRS-05, or 

Tanker Requirements Study for FY05. The total tanker requirement established by TRS05 is the sum of air tankers used for refueling roles, operational withholds, airlift, 

deployment and, employment for scenarios involving various combinations of MTW-

 

2

 AMC/XPY Briefing to DSB Task Force, July 15, 2002

- 4 - 
SWA, MTW-NEA, SIOP, SSC, and SOF. The conclusion was that 500 - 600 aircraft are 

required (KC-135R equivalents) assuming an 85% mission capable rate, not including 

depot and training. The model did not include an ability to investigate the connection 

between improved bomber efficiency and tanker requirements. 

The details of the model that would be necessary to determine the tanker 

equivalent value of B-52H re-engining were unavailable to this task force. However, 

based on the limited data available, the impact of re-engining on overall tanker 

requirements using the 1996 tanker requirements model appears to be consistent. In 

addition to a lack of transparency, the task force had a number of other concerns based on 

what it was able to learn about the model. TRS-05 assumes a 2 MTW capability, and not 

the current 4-2-1 construct. It contains no provisions for conducting sensitivity analyses 

to determine the impact on total tanker requirements over time of changes in receiver

aircraft, including the B-52H. Finally, the model focuses on what the tanker requirement 

will be in FY05 at a time the Air Force is considering major tanker procurement. 

The $17.50 marginal value of a gallon of in-flight delivered fuel from the 2001 

DSB report would change considerably if the question were how many KC-767s were 

required to replace the existing 137 KC-135Es. This is because maintenance costs would 

decline but acquisition costs would be added to the calculation. To bring down the high 

cost of tanker maintenance and address the problem of high non-mission capable (NMC) 

rates, the Air Force is investigating the possibility of replacing its 137 KC-135E models 

with 100 Boeing 767 commercial aircraft configured as tankers. This task force 

recommends OSD commission an independent study to determine whether the total life 

cycle cost to the Air Force would be less by offsetting some of the 767 tanker buy with reengined B-52Hs. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests diverting approximately 

$3.5B from the KC-767 program to B-52H re-engining may net a greater capability at a 

lower cost. 

The task force also recommends OSD commission a new independent long-term

tanker requirements study. The methodology should extend beyond FY05, be based on 

new planning guidance, and include the ability to conduct sensitivity analyses of B-52H 

re-engining as well as other planned and potential new receiver aircraft that will be in 

service over the expected lifetime of the tanker force, such as JSF. The model should be 

also transparent in terms of factors, assumptions and methodology. 

II.c – The Cost of Engine Depot Overhaul 

The original Air Force IPT evaluation of the 1996 Boeing proposal used $257,000 

as the depot cost of the TF33-103, and stated “Boeing’s estimate of $426,000 “grossly 

overstates the true cost associated with depot maintenance.” In FY02, the depot sales 

price rose to $539,000. On October 1, 2002 the FY03 price became $710,000, and in 

FY04 is $832,617. 

 

- 5 - 
A comparison with the commercial sector reveals the current depot price for the 

TF33-103 is consistent with private sector experience. As relevant data points, the 

average commercial repair for a large engine (PW-4000 class) is approximate $1.5 

Million, and for a smaller engine is about $700,000. The largest engines cost about $2.5 

Million for an off-wing repair. 

Figure 1 is a Boeing chart that shows the actual and projected cost growth for the 

TF33-103 engine in then year dollars. During the initial (1996) Air Force economic 

analysis of re-engining, the price charged to the B-52H program office was $257,000 per 

TF33-103 engine. In their analysis, the Air Force judged this price would never exceed 

$300,000 over the remaining life of the B-52H. However, in FY02, the depot sales price 

rose to $539,000, in FY03 it increased again to $710,000 and in FY04 it increased yet 

again by over 17% to $832,617. As a result of the rapid pace of price escalation since 

1996, the propulsion directorate at the depot revised its long term price forecast from a 

2% annual growth above inflation to the end of the airframe life, to a 5% annual increase. 

In order to compare the projected maintenance of the TF33-103 with proposed 

replacements, the task force received briefings from 3 COTS engine manufacturers with 

engines that appear suitable for use on the B-52H; the Rolls-Royce RB-211, the Pratt & 

Whitney PW 2040, and 3 options from General Electric. 

$348K

$832K

$710K

$286K

$448K

$530K

$0

$200

$400

$600

$800

$1,000

$5,000

95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39

Cost per Engine O/H -

TY$ (thousands)

TF33-P103 (B-52)

TF33-P102 (KC-135E)

5% Annual Growth Forecast

$4.8M

Costs shifted minus 2-years

Historic Growth Forecast Growth

$348K

$832K

$710K

$286K

$448K

$530K

$0

$200

$400

$600

$800

$1,000

$5,000

95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39

Cost per Engine O/H -

TY$ (thousands)

TF33-P103 (B-52)

TF33-P102 (KC-135E)

5% Annual Growth Forecast

$4.8M

Costs shifted minus 2-years

Historic Growth Forecast Growth

$7.5M

Figure 1: TF33-103 Depot Price History and Future Trend in Then Year Dollars 

- 6 - 
Engine removal rates for today’s commercial engines are very low. This is primarily 

a function of the technical advances made in engines over the past 30 years. Today’s new 

commercial engines can last 10,000 to 15,000 hours between initial installation and first offwing repair. For the B-52H re-engining, the time interval between installation and first offwing repair is projected to be greater than the remaining hours left on the airframe, making 

re-engining essentially a “hang and forget” program. While typical standard deviations in 

engine durability suggests that several of the engines will have to be overhauled before 

2037, the task force would expect adequate guarantees in the contract to keep the Air Force 

from having to bear the financial burden for the "lemons." 

Following initial off-wing repair, the cycle shortens. The typical engine flown 

domestically will remain on-wing for about 5,000 hours and about 4,000 cycles after it’s 

initial removal. A typical engine flown internationally will remain on-wing for about 11-

12,000 hours or 2-3,000 cycles after its initial removal. Based on this, the estimated 

depot costs for re-engined B-52Hs will be only for unanticipated engine failures. 

The task force estimates that based on a 5% real cost growth in engine price and 

1.9 percent inflation rate, the economic value of depot maintenance savings over the 

remaining life of the B-52H airframe from re-engining to be on the order of $10B. 

II.d – The Cost of Engine Maintenance 

In addition to the engines sent for depot maintenance, about 70 engines a year 

undergo field maintenance on the aircraft. Each engine costs an average of $462,400 to 

repair, for a total annual cost of $32 million per year. Boeing estimates that after reengining, the total annual field maintenance costs to the Air Force for the inventory of B52H engines will be approximately $13 Million. Options for complete contract 

maintenance hold the possibility of reducing active duty aircraft maintenance end 

strength. Extrapolating over the remaining life of the B-52H airframe, this reduction in 

field maintenance costs represents a savings of about $1B. 

II.e – Annual Airframe Utilization

Previous studies assumed that each B-52H would fly a total of about 350 hours 

per year in its traditional roles - high altitude conventional and nuclear SIOP missions. 

Due to deployments in the Gulf in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and other 

taskings, a portion of the B-52H fleet was flown significantly greater hours. Specifically, 

for the past two years about half the fleet has, on average, experienced about one 

additional year’s worth of flying. This increase is currently insignificant relative to the 

remaining life of the fleet because of the range of uncertainty in the model used to predict 

economic lifetime and the uncertain impact of eliminating the low level mission. 

Higher annual utilization does increase the financial and operational benefits of 

prompt re-engining. It accelerates the time value accrual of economic benefits and 

provides greater operational capability sooner, in terms of increased B-52H range, reach 

and loiter and increased availability of tanker assets to support other missions. 

- 7 - 
II.f – Economic Summary 

The terms of reference asked the task force to “review and advise on key aspects of 

the policy and technology issues associated with re-engining”. The task force was able to 

obtain data of a high enough confidence level in three areas to review them 

quantitatively: 

• The quantity of fuel purchased from DESC before and after re-engining, and 

• Depot maintenance of the TF33-103 engine 

• Field maintenance costs. 

However, there were many important factors that should be included in a rigorous 

analysis that the task force was only able to address qualitatively. These include: 

• Operational and economic value of increased range 

• Operational and economic value of increased loiter time

• Operational and economic value of reduced tanker demand 

• Salvage value of TF33 engines 

• Future escalation of fuel prices above inflation 

• Future supportability of the TF33 engine 

Fuel: Re-engining is estimated to reduce hourly fuel consumption from 3,310 

gallons per hour to 2,218 gallons per hour. The B-52H fleet is programmed to fly 22,000 

hours per year for about 35 years. The lifetime savings is about 840 million gallons of 

fuel. Assuming no real growth in fuel price and a 1.9 percent inflation rate, at the FY03 

DESC commodity price for fuel3

, TOA outlay would decline by approximately $1.2B. 

Depot Maintenance: On average, 87 B-52H engines are removed each year from

the aircraft and sent to depot. Previous Air Force studies, using Air Force Material 

Command figures, estimated the depot overhaul cost of a TF33-103 engine to be $257K 

(FY96$). Further, previous studies assumed cost would remain relatively constant over 

the remainder of the weapon system’s life (until about 2037) and would never exceed 

$300K. However, this estimate is no longer valid. (See page ES9 and Figure 1 above). 

In recent years the price for depot overhaul has increased rapidly. In FY96 the price was 

$257K. Between FY96 and FY01 the per-engine overhaul price rose from $257K to 

$539K, an increase of over 100% in over 4 years. By FY03 the price had risen to $710K, 

an increase over 30% in two years, and an increase of 176% in the 4 years since FY96. 

In FY04 price increased another 17% to over $832K. The task force assumed the depot 

price will increase at 5 percent per year over the rate of inflation (real growth). 

Assuming no increase in rate of engine removals and applying the OMB inflation rate of 

1.9 percent inflation, the reduction in depot maintenance over the remaining life of the B52 airframe will total over $8.8B. Since the time between initial installation of a new 

 

3

 DESC FY03 Standard Price for JP-8 is $1.20

- 8 - 
COTS engine and first engine removal exceeds the remaining life of the B-52H airframe, 

depot costs go to zero and the Air Force will experience a TOA impact reduction for 

depot maintenance of $8.8B. 

Field Maintenance: In addition to the average of 87 engines removed annually for 

depot maintenance, about 70 engines each year undergo field maintenance. The average 

cost for each engine is $462,400 each, for a total annual cost of $32 Million per year for 

field maintenance. Assuming no real cost increase, no increase in engines undergoing 

maintenance and 1.9 percent inflation rate, this totals $1.65B over the remaining life of 

the B-52H airframe. Boeing estimates the total annual field maintenance for the new 

engines will cost to the Air Force $13 Million, or $0.73B through the remaining life of 

the airframe. This is a reduction in Air Force TOA outlay of approximately $1B. 

Table 1 below summarizes the estimated cumulative cost savings using the 

estimates the Air Force provided in FY03 estimated depot maintenance costs in then year 

dollars for the three O&M accounts affected by re-engining after all aircraft are re-engined. 

Table 2 summarizes the estimated cumulative lifetime TOA impact using the Air Force’s 

FY04 estimates for depot engine prices. Lifetime TOA estimates assume that savings 

streams that make up the totals will be phased in during 2007 to 2012. 

 Current Outlay Outlay After Re-Engining Outlay Reduction

Fuel Purchase 4,123 2,942 1,180 

Depot Maintenance 9,281 452 8,829 

Field Maintenance 1,527 734 793 

Total 16,883 4,123 10,803

Table 1: Estimated Total Lifetime Change in Direct O&M Costs With Re-Engining 

(5% Engine Growth Rate and 1.9% OMB Inflation Rate) 

(Figures in millions dollars) 

While firm program costs are not available to compare against the savings streams, 

the task force examined previous IDA studies and figures from Boeing’s unsolicited 1996 

unsolicited proposal to the Air Force, extrapolated those figures and consulted with the 

private sector experts regarding engine costs to develop a program cost estimate for the 

purpose of this study. This led to an estimated total program cost of $3 to $4.1B, assuming 

traditional acquisition using appropriated funds. The EMD portion of the program cost and 

the EMD and production schedule were provided by Boeing. The results are shown in 

Figure 2 below. 

- 9 - 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

EMD

$43.1M $111.1M $58.8M $14.7M

Production

1 8 23 17 17 10

$39M $316M $908M $671M $671M $395

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

EMD

$43.1M $111.1M $58.8M $14.7M

EMD

$43.1M $111.1M $58.8M $14.7M

Production

1 8 23 17 17 10

$39M $316M $908M $671M $671M $395

Production

1 8 23 17 17 10

$39M $316M $908M $671M $671M $395

Figure 2: Estimated B-52 Re-Engining Program Cost and Schedule 

Subsequent to publishing the original report, the DSB staff received comments 

requesting a net present value calculation be provided using constant dollars according to 

OMB guidelines. This section is provided in response to those comments. Unlike Table 

1 above, Table 2 below includes the EMD and production cost estimates. 

The Net Present Value calculation in constant dollars covering the period 2004 

through 2037 is presented below using the following assumptions 

• FY04 Depot Engine Price: $832,617 

• Depot Price Growth Rate: 5% 

• OMB Inflation Rate 1.9% 

• FY96 EMD and Production Cost: $3.2B 

• 30 year OMB Nominal Discount Rate: 5.5% 

Program costs are apportioned in the years they would occur, and all post-re-engining 

costs for fuel, depot maintenance and field maintenance are transitioned in according to 

the fleet mix that would exist based on the production schedule Boeing provided to the 

task force. This shows that it costs $660M less to re-engine than to not re-engine. 

 Current Outlay Outlay After Re-Engining Outlay Reduction

Fuel Purchase 1,774 1,346 429 

Depot Maintenance 3,136 394 2,743 

Field Maintenance 657 369 288 

Total 5,568 2,108 3,459

Program Cost 3,195 

Net Present Value 264 

Table 2: Net Present Value of B-52 Re-Engining 

- 10 - 
Another option presented in Section VIII, Energy Savings Performance Contracting 

(ESPC), offers the possibility of using private funds to finance the program, with 

repayment from the O&M savings stream. While this results in higher total program cost, 

it avoids the need to use TOA to fund this program, addressing affordability concerns 

raised by the Air Force in earlier assessments. However, the payback period increases. 

Figure 3 provides Boeing’s estimate of the impact on payback period of using ESPC. The 

O&M savings available to repay the ESPC contract would begin modestly in FY08 with 

about $1.75 Million, and grow to over $400 Million by the end of the airframe life. 

ESPC

Finance

Conventional

BUY

Government Buys EMD

and Production

Government Buys EMD

and Finances Production

Government Finances EMD

and Production 

10-12 yrs

17-20 yrs

Post Production 

Break Even

Figure 3: Impact of ESPC on Payback Period 

III. The Risk of Premature Retirement 

There are a number of factors that indicate whether the B-52H would be 

vulnerable to premature retirement. The key factors include adequate remaining airframe

life, no excess of inventory, availability rates, and operationally capable now and into the 

future. Assessing operational capability is a complicated undertaking because the 

outcome is scenario dependent. The task becomes more complicated when projecting 

into the future. Some of the key issues to consider include suitability to current and 

future missions, flexibility of weapons carriage, in-commission rates, and flexibility to 

adapt to changing mission requirements. 

III.a – Airframe Life 

The B-52A Stratofortress first flew in 1954, and during the following 8 years a total 

of 744 B-52s, all models, were built. The B-52H began projecting global airpower with a 

nonstop round-the-world flight of three aircraft in January 1957. The Boeing Company 

delivered the first of 102 B-52H models to SAC’s 379th Bomb Wing at Wurtsmith Air Force 

Base, Michigan in May 1961, and the last in October 1962. Each copy cost $9 million. 

- 11 - 
- 12 - 

Figure 4: B-52H G/H Structural Improvements 

The B-52H was designed as high altitude aircraft, but was adapted to low level 

tactical maneuvers in 1960’s. A number of structural improvements were made during 

the 1960s and 1970s to equip it to fly the more demanding low-level mission and to 

address other structural issues. Figure 4 shows the $306 million investment between 

1963 and 1979. 

The airframe life for the current fleet is estimated to be between 32,500 and 

37,500 hours, depending on the usage history of the individual aircraft. The estimate is 

based upon scaling measurements from a full-scale test structure using assumed mission 

profiles along with historical and projected usage information. The upper wing surface is 

expected to be the life-limiting structural member, as shown in Figure 4. The task force 

consulted with the B-52H System Program Office and Boeing to reaffirm this estimate. 

As of 1999 the average airframe had 14,700 flight hours. Boeing believes with 

high confidence that the average number of flight hours left is 17,800, at a minimum. 

The “oldest” B-52H is at about 21,000 hours and only experiences about 380 flight hours 

per year. Figures 5 and 6 show the economic life of the B-52H fleet, with the projected 

remaining average life. 
BODY

42000-47600 Hrs

HORIZONTAL

STABILIZER

44800-49300 Hrs

VERTICAL FIN

>150000 Hrs

VERTICAL FIN

>150000 Hrs

WING UPPER SURFACE

32500-37500 Hrs

WING UPPER SURFACE

32500-37500 Hrs

WING LOWER SURFACE

73500-78900 Hrs

WING LOWER SURFACE

73500-78900 Hrs

Figure 5: Economic Life of B-52H Structure 

Measured by flying hours and cycles, it is now just over halfway through the 

economic lifetime of its limiting structural member, the upper wing surface. Current 

structural analyses indicate with a high degree of certainty that the B-52H is capable of 

remaining in the inventory until the 2040 timeframe, assuming it flies a low-level 

mission. However, the B-52H is no longer used for a low-level mission and the estimate 

of 2037 may be conservative. 

To put this in perspective, commercial aircraft flying domestic routes experience 

about 3,000 flight hours per year and 2,500 cycles.4

 A commercial aircraft flying 

international routes experiences about 4,500 flying hours per year, and about 1,000 cycles. 

In both cases their mission capable rate is about 99 percent. At these rates the B-52H 

would have only been about a 10-year aircraft, based on the life limit of the B-52H Upper 

wing surface. However, with the B-52H annual utilization rate only one tenth that of 

commercial rates, a B-52H should last about 10 times as long, or roughly 100 years. Figure 

7 compares B-52H usage with a number of wide body commercial jets in service today. 

A number of Boeing 747s flying today have 30,000 to 40,000 hours on their 

airframes. These older aircraft have only about a 50 percent availability (mission 

capable) rate, and are beginning to cause maintenance problems, which are growing 

quickly. Relatively speaking, the B-52H is a young airframe. Figure 7 compares the 

relative age of the B-52H to commercial aircraft in terms of number of flight hours and 

cycles. 

 

4

 A cycle is a take-off and a landing. 

- 13 - 
40

28

36

F

L

I

G

H

T

H

O

U

R

S

/

T

H

O

U

S

A

N

D

S

Calendar Year

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040

32

12

16

20

24

0

Economic Limit (Upper Wing Surface) - 32,500

MINIMUM

PROJECTED AVERAGE 380 HOURS/YEAR

MAXIMUM

8

4

 Figure 6: Economic Upper Wing Limit Based on Low-Level ConOps 

OC-ALC performed a durability assessment on the wing upper surface to

determine the impact of re-engining on the projected economic lifetime of the airframe. 

They assumed: 

• Weight Increase of 400 Pounds per Strut/Pod 

• Included low level scenario 

The results showed a negligible increase in the crack growth rate. With the wing 

down bending moment increase due to the higher engine weight, the impact was a 1.41 

percent projected service life reduction at the outboard pylon and a 0.88 percent projected 

service life reduction at the inboard pylon. This would lower the "Lower Bound 

Economic Upper Wing Life" from 32,500 to 32,042 hours. Re-engining will not degrade 

the structure.5

 

5

 OC-ALC /LH (B-52H System Program Office) briefing to the task force, July 15, 2002, and 

subsequent correspondence 

- 14 - 
Figure 7: B-52H Usage - Comparison With Commercial Fleet 

Bomber service life is based on the point where it becomes more economical to 

replace aircraft than to continue structural modifications and repair. Current projections 

show all 3 bombers should be structurally sound for the next four decades. Next 

Generation Bomber Study (NGBS) demonstrated aggressive modernization of bomber

fleet will provide new bomber equivalent capability at significantly less cost. 

The task force is satisfied with the structural analyses conducted by the OC-ALC 

that predicts an economic lifetime until 2037. However, the current life estimates assume

continuation of the more structurally stressful low-level mission, which has not been 

experienced by the airframes nor practiced by aircrews for many years. Specifically, the 

low-level mission is experienced by only 10 airframes assigned to the test squadron at 

Edwards AFB, which are not assigned to combat roles. However, while removal of the 

low-level mission may extend the life of other parts of the airframe, Boeing does not 

believe it impacts the life-limiting upper wing surface. According to the information the 

task force was able to obtain, neither Boeing nor the B-52H Systems Program Office 

have conducted studies to determine the impact on airframe life of eliminating the lowlevel mission, and were unable able to offer any estimates. While Boeing indicated that 

removing the low-level mission has no impact on the life-limiting part, they provided no 

data to support their statement. The impact of eliminating the low-level mission from

future lifetime estimates was indeterminable within the scope of the task force study. 

The B-52Hs emerging profile as a long range conventional delivery platform such 

as its role in Afghanistan, new employment concepts such as long loiter with high density 

standoff precision munitions or perhaps an anti-ballistic missile platform, would be less 

stressful than current profiles. The task force recommends the SPO and Boeing 

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

35000

40000

45000

B-52 707 727 737 747 757 767 777

Average Flights Average Flight Hours

Average # Flights per AC

B-52 data as of Sep 01 and Commercial data as of Dec 01

Average Flt Hrs per AC

0

10000

20000

30000

40000

50000

60000

- 15 - 
investigate the impact of eliminating low-level missions on projections of future airframe

economic lifetime. 

III.b – Inventory 

Previous studies assumed that the USAF bomber fleet would remain constant at 

208 total assigned aircraft and cited the economic loss from premature retirement of 

aircraft to be a significant program risk. 

Since those studies, the Air Force has decided to retire 33 B-1s and 17 B-52Hs, 

reducing the current fleet of 208 bombers (93 B-1s, 21 B-2s, 94 B-52Hs) to 157, as 

shown in Table 3 below. Of these bombers, only 96 will be combat coded, with the rest 

used for backup and other purposes. The B-52H and B-2 still retain a conventional and a 

nuclear mission, while the B-1 is roled for the conventional mission only. 

Aircraft Combat Coded Training Test BAI/AR Total

B-1 36 19 4 4 60

B-2 16 0 1 4 21

B-52H 44 12 2 18 76

Total 96 28 7 26 157

Table 3: Air Force Planned Bomber Force Structure 

The task force concluded that the Air Force planned bomber force structure 

represents deminimis bomber numbers for the United States to own, and makes it 

unlikely these numbers would decline any further in the absence of introduction of a new 

long range strike platform. 

And currently, the Air Force does not envision a new long range strike platform

becoming operational until 2037. This coincides with the currently projected end of the 

B-52H economic service life. There are a number of efforts ongoing within the Air Force 

to determine the future timeline and replacement strategy for the current bomber force. 

An Air Force white paper on long-range bombers dated 1999 is currently being 

revised as a result of DoD’s transformation plans and recent operational experiences. 

SECAF directed an updated Long-Range Strike Aircraft (LRSA) White Paper in October 

2001 that includes the following areas: 

• Long-Range Bomber Force Structure Plans 

• Modernization 

• Capabilities

• Concept of Operations 

• Replacement Timeline 

- 16 - 
The purpose of the LRSA White Paper is to provide a “snapshot” update and serve as a 

basis for a bomber roadmap currently in development by Air Combat Command. It calls 

for an acquisition program to begin in 2019 to support an operational system in 2037. 

In addition, the Air Force is conducting a Long-Range Strike Aircraft X (LRSAX) study to examine bomber replacement timelines. It is unclear whether once fielded 

that the need for current bombers will diminish. LRSA-X envisions the next generation 

of long-range strike platforms and weapons will rely on revolutionary technology. The 

Air Force is actively engaged in analysis of the path to retain the best attributes of our 

current platforms. These efforts will be closely connected to AF concept of operations 

(CONOPs) for the Global Strike Task Force and other CONOPs under development. The 

study goal is to start an acquisition program in the 2012 to 2015 timeframe. This appears 

to be at odds with current airframe lifetime projections for the current bomber force. 

This is earlier than the 2019 date stated the 1999 white paper, which the Air Force 

states is necessary in order to support an operational system in 2037. While the 1999 

white paper called for the existing bomber force structure to fall below what the Air 

Force considered “acceptable levels”, the press has reported that none of these tentative 

program dates are definitive. 

The Air Force has also noted in the press that the 2037 service-life date represents 

the best current estimate "based on current and possible future mission profiles," but that 

recent changes in bomber force structure and new operational concepts "may have 

invalidated previous service life conclusions and require new analysis." 

III.c – Operationally Capable 

The B-52H is highly operationally capable, and will continue to be so into the 

foreseeable future. It has the most flexible carriage capability of any of the three 

bombers and is the only Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM) 

capable platform. It’s flexibility to adapt to new missions and value in the war on 

terrorism was clearly demonstrated during OEF. 

The task force reviewed the seven mission types in which the Air Force expects 

its long-range bombers to be effective, and the B-52Hs ability to fulfill those 

missions. A summary follows. 

• Strategic Attack – key enabler. 

• Interdiction - well suited for attacking interdiction targets. 

• Offensive Counter Air (OCA) Operations - may be the platform of choice 

against air bases beyond the range of fighter aircraft. 

• Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses-Conventional (SEAD-C) - B-52H well 

suited. 

• Joint Maritime Operations (Air) – only bomber capable of carrying AGM-84 

Harpoon anti-surface munitions; well suited to other aspects due to loiter 

capability. 

- 17 - 
• Close Air Support (CAS) – effectiveness proven during OEF. 

• Special Operations – capable with long range munitions. 

The Air Force does not consider the 3 current bombers as interchangeable. Each has 

a specific mission area filling a particular combat niche. However, when considering 

modernization investments, it is useful to compare the relative operational capabilities of

similar platforms. 

Nevertheless, it is useful to compare their costs and capabilities when comparing 

modernization investment options in terms of cost and capability return. The relative 

importance of performance measures in determining effectiveness of the B-1 and B-52H is 

mission specific. There is little difference in the capabilities of the B-1 and B–52H to 

perform most assigned bomber missions. Further, the B-52H is more capable than the B-1 

for a number of missions and can conduct niche missions for which the B-1 is unsuitable. 

For example, the B-52H is somewhat less vulnerable to Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) 

than the B-1; the B-52H has a longer range, higher ceiling and slightly higher cruise 

airspeed. The B-52H also has a greater sustained turn rate than the B-1 at comparable 

weights and altitudes. Using military settings, the B-52H has a higher climb rate, but 

using afterburner the B-1 has a much greater climb rate. The B-52H also has generally 

better take-off performance, requiring 1,000 to 2,000 feet less ground roll for a given 

takeoff weight. The B-52H also has a shorter landing roll at comparable weights; with the 

difference increasing as landing weights increase. Both systems are vulnerable to current 

air defenses and must rely on standoff munitions to ensure survivability. Table 4 below is 

a current capability payload comparison for the B-1, B-2, and B-52H.6

Logistically, the Mission Readiness Spares Package (MRSP) for the B-1 is slightly 

lighter than that for the B-52H, but the B-52H kit provides resources for 30 days of 

deployment while the B-1 kit provides only for 14 days. In addition, the B-1 MRSP 

includes a significant amount of “outsized cargo”, while the B-52H has no such cargo. 

Outsized cargo requires a C-5 or C-17 aircraft. 

In each of the mission types described above the re-engining benefits of increased 

range, increased loiter and reduced tanker requirements contributes to the effectiveness of 

the B-52Hs effectiveness. 

 6

 Multiple Sources: IDA Paper P-3367, “Analysis of the Capabilities of the B-1B and B-52H 

Heavy Bombers,” February 1998; HQ USAF, USAF Long-Range Strike Aircraft White Paper, 

November 2001; ACC Bomber Roadmap, 2002 

- 18 - 
Munitions B-1 B-2 B-52H

Direct Attack-Conventional 

Unguided Weapons 

MK-82 500-pound General Purpose 84 80 45 

M-117 750-pound Blast 36 45 

MK-84 2000-pound General Purpose 247 16 18

M129E1/E2 – Leaflet Dispenser yes 

CBU-87/89/97 – Cluster Bombs 30/30/30 34/34/34 24/24/0 

Guided Weapons 

GBU-10/12 Laser Guided Bomb 108

GBU-31 – JDAM (2000-pound) 24 16 12 

GBU-37 GAM 8 

GBU-38 JDAM (500-pound) 489 80 164

EGBU-28 LGB 8 

CBU-103/104/105 WCMD 30 344 16 

WCMD-ER 30? 34? 4 16? 

Small Diameter Bomb 96-288 64-192 48-144 

Direct Attack Nuclear 

B-61 & B-83 non-nuclear 16 8 

B-61-11 non-nuclear 16

Standoff - Conventional 

AGM-158 - JASSM 24 16 12 

CALCM 20

AGM-154 - JSOW 12 16 12 

AGM-142 – Have Nap 3-4 

AGM-84D - Harpoon 8 

Standoff - Nuclear 

ALCM 20

ACM 12

Mines 

Mk 56 Moored Mine 20 

Mk 62 Quickstrike 500-pound Mine 84 80 45 

Mk63 Quickstrike 1000-pound Mine 18 

Mk-65 Quickstrike 2000-pound Mine 8 18 

Other Factors 

Absolute Maximum Internal Payload 75,000 lbs 44,000 lbs 100,000 lbs 

Absolute Maximum External Payload 0 0 50,000 lbs 

Total Maximum Structural Payload 75,000 lbs 44,000 lbs 150,000 lbs 

Internal Bay Size 15’ x 6.7’ (3) 20.8’ x 6.8’ (2) 26.5’ x 6’ (1) 

Illustrative Internal Payload10 50,400 lbs 33,600 lbs 25,200 lbs 

Illustrative External Payload11 39,000 lbs

External Hard Points 0 (removed) 0 2 

Table 4: Bomber Payload Comparison – Current Capability 

 7

 Not effective – timing of release due to launcher configuration renders dumb bombs ineffective. 8

 No self-designation capability. 9

 Not currently planned 10 Maximum JDAM load (2,100 lbs each) 11 Maximum 12 external CALCM (3,200 lbs each) (12 of 20 carried external) 

- 19 - 
To be effective in these roles, according to the Air Force’s Long Range Strike 

Aircraft White Paper (LRSAWP) the most important factors driving future bomber 

requirements are: 

• Increased lethality results from the munitions carried and the electronic 

suites installed, but the first factor listed in the LRSAWP is longer range, 

one of the primary benefits of re-engining. 

• Enhanced survivability is related to improved defensive systems for 

survival against future threats. The B-52H’s large payload makes it 

particularly suitable for use of decoys, but re-engining does not improve 

this capability. Because the new modern engines run hotter than the 

TF33-103s, re-engining could increase the B-52H IR signature. 

• Improved supportability includes reduced cost of ownership, and 

improved aircraft availability and mission capable (MC) rates. Reengining supports all three of these objectives, particularly reduced 

ownership costs. 

• Responsiveness includes minimizing sortie turn times, maximizing 

carriage of different weapon types on the same mission and reducing 

logistics trails for deployment and sustainment of combat operations. Reengining reduces sortie turn times for certain types of missions and 

reduces logistics tail for deployment. The B-52H already has the most 

flexible weapons carriage. 

These long-term needs support the tenets of Joint Vision 2020, Air Force 

CONOPs, and Air Force Strategic Plans. They also mirror long-term capabilities 

required in the FY02 Global Attack Mission Area Plan (MAP). Re-engining also 

supports other specific long-term bomber objectives stated in the Air LRSAWP, such 

as those listed below: 

• Replace high failure aircraft components with modern, highly reliable 

systems. 

• Replace aircraft parts and structures that reached the end of their 

operational life. 

• Improve aircraft systems commonality and maintenance practices.·

• Reduce main operating base (MOB) and forward operating location 

(FOL) logistics footprint. 

• Upgrade or replace aging support equipment and base support facilities. 

• Develop maintenance practices that reduce sortie generation times.

The Air Force vision is to be able to place about 100 combat capable aircraft in 

theater in 48 hours. This is not a requirement and is not supported by the Air Force 

program, but only a vision. The Air Force’s desire is to have the major combat 

aircraft of an AEF in theater in 48 hours. Currently, the Air Force is capable of

- 20 - 
doing this on paper in 72 hours and in practice exercises in 96 hours. Ultimately, to 

become a reality, this must become part of the Air Force program. 

Nevertheless, the Air Force is advertising to combatant commanders that they 

can have an AEF capable of striking up to 400 targets per day covering an area about 

half the size of Texas in 48 hours with no previous presence. It was unclear to the 

task force that this is logistically supportable. However, the task force observed that 

the ability of a B-52H to reach AEF deployed locations without refueling would 

contribute to this capability. An unrefueled re-engined B-52H would be capable of 

striking any target worldwide from CONUS with only one air refueling, and many 

locations without any refueling. 

In terms of actual operations, throughout the 1990s, the B-52H proved its value 

in Operation Desert Storm over Iraq and Kuwait, Operation Allied Force over 

Kosovo, and most recently in Operation Enduring Freedom over Afghanistan. The 

Gulf War involved the longest strike mission in the history of aerial warfare when B52Hs took off from Barksdale Air Force Base, La., launched conventional air 

launched cruise missiles and returned to Barksdale - a 35-hour, non-stop combat 

mission. In all 3 operations, the B-52H successfully struck wide-area troop 

concentrations, fixed installations and bunkers. 

None of the 3 Air Force assessments of the costs and benefits of re-engining the 

B-52H considered the impact on tanker requirements, the value of purchasing tanker 

capacity in this way, or of the value of the operational benefits of extended range or 

increased loiter time. This task force and the 2001 DSB task force on “More 

Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden” valued the tanker reductions, 

but were unable to find a methodology that could place a financial value on value of 

the operational benefits. The task force recommends OSD investigate the potential 

of including the value of improvements in operational capabilities in cost-benefit 

analyses as a way to strengthen the analytical basis for decision-making within DoD. 

The B-52H serves in both a nuclear and conventional role. Its can also perform a 

wide range of specialized missions, such as CAS, launch platform (reconnaissance 

drones, LEO satellites), UCAV carriage, BMDO interceptor and can carry a small 

offensive laser. Modifications to enable it to perform an electronic attack mission are 

also under consideration. 

Historically, the capability of a platform has been measured by how many it 

would take to kill a target, but today it is measured by how many targets it can kill. 

For example, in the 1940s, planners estimated it required about 650 bombs to kill a 

target. By the 1970s, they estimated bout 175 bombs. By 2000, precision munitions 

enable a single bomber to potentially kill about 24 targets, and the small diameter 

bomb is expected to extend that even further to possibly over 50 targets per aircraft. 

As a result, the capabilities to strike more precisely and autonomously from longer 

stand off distances have had a radical impact on the requirements for platforms. The 

capability of the platform itself to penetrate and maneuver in close proximity to 

- 21 - 
enemy air defenses has become less important. The capabilities of munitions are 

displacing the need for capabilities of the platform. 

The B-52H is credited with delivering over 30 percent of the total Desert 

Storm munitions tonnage, while comprising only 3 percent of the aircraft deployed. 

This was the B-52G model, which was not as capable as the H model in terms of

munitions carried or unrefueled range. According to the Gulf War Air Power Survey 

(GWAPS), the A-10, F-117 and F-111 destroyed most of the targets. 

As was demonstrated in Operation Enduring Freedom, the line between 

traditional bomber and fighter missions are becoming less well defined. In OEF, the B-1, 

B-2 and B-52H functioned as long-range strike platforms. 

III.d – Availability 

The B-52H also has the highest in-commission rate of any of the three bomber 

platforms, as shown in Figure 8. According to OC-ALC/LH, engines are not a high 

driver in terms of NMC (not mission capable) hours for the B-52H - only around 7%. 

Other non-engine and non-airframe maintenance issues are higher in terms of their 

contribution to NMC rate. The average depot flow time for the TF33-103 engine is 

around 74 days. Assuming perfect engines, the MC rate would increase only about 2 

percent, from just over 78 percent to just over 80 percent. 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

198819891990199119921993199419951996199719981999200020012002

Mis

sion Capable Rate

B-1B

B-52H

B-2A

Figure 8: Bomber Mission Capable Rates 

- 22 - 
Further illustrating the reliability of the B-52H is the fact that only one bombercentric item was listed on the Air Force-wide FY-03 unfunded priorities list presented to 

Congress. Priority No. 5 on the FY-03 "wish list" is titled "emerging deficiencies 

impacting aircraft mission-capable (MC) rates." The Air Force explained in the wish list 

that unforeseen maintenance requirements will force it to ground some B-1s, B-2s and F15s unless $163.3 million becomes available in early FY-03.12 A lack of funding for 

needed upgrades was one of the principle reasons the Air Force decided last year to retire 

one-third of the B-1 bomber fleet. The Air Force intends to pump the savings generated 

by retiring B-1s and consolidating operations at two bases instead of five back into 

upgrades.13

Considering there is no bomber aircraft currently in development; the substantial 

capability of the B-52H to accomplish its assigned missions; that the USAF chose to 

retire more than twice as many B-1 airframes as B-52H airframes; and the extremely low 

number of available PAA bombers remaining, the task force concludes that further 

significant reductions in the B-52H fleet is unlikely for the foreseeable future. 

III.e – Future Utilization Concepts 

The Air Force is currently considering modifying the B-52H for an electronic 

countermeasure mission. Characteristics that would make the B-52H highly capable for 

this mission include range, loiter and payload. With re-engining, the range of the B-52H 

begins to result in a mission length that approximately coincides with maximum crew

day. Utilizing excess space in the airframe to accommodate an additional crew would 

allow virtually unlimited loiter times and make maximum utilization with minimum

tanker demand. 

During OEF, Gen Franks used the B-52H for close air support, providing what 

essentially amounted to field artillery over a very wide area. This is a mission never 

envisioned for the B-52H, but which was enabled by precision standoff munitions. Reengining would have allowed bombers to remain aloft for a greater amount of time, 

reducing the B-52H cycles and the number of tanker sorties needed in support of the B52H missions. 

The B-52H is also capable of greater effectiveness as munitions achieve greater 

precision, standoff and mission versatility. National Missile Defense appears to be an

emerging mission appropriate for the B-52H as well. 

 12 “B-2 hot trailing edge damage requires removal of components critical to maintaining lowobservable characteristics," the list stated. Six stealth bombers are already "degraded and en

route to becoming non-flyable," it added. Meanwhile, "at least" three B-1s were projected be

grounded in October 2002 for "excessive metal-to-metal rubbing. 13 New Bomber Road Map Leaves Open The Possibility Of A New Strike Aircraft 

Defense Alert, Aug. 22, 2002 

- 23 - 
IV. Operational Impacts of Re-Engining 

The task force examined recent operations to determine how a re-engined B-52H 

would have performed. Because the recent operational missions have taken place in the 

middle-east and flown predominantly from Diego Garcia, the 46 percent increase in 

unrefueled range had a significant impact on the capability of the B-52H to conduct these 

missions. 

IV.a – Range, Reach and Loiter 

Range is the maximum distance an unrefuleled aircraft can fly under specific 

conditions and return to base. Reach is defined as distance at which an aircraft can strike 

a target, or the aircraft range plus the range of the munitions it carries. Loiter is defined

as the amount of time an aircraft can remain aloft over its target area. These three 

factors, along with payload, are variables that can be traded against each other to provide 

an optimum configuration for a given mission. 

The current unrefueled range of the B-52H is 5,088 nautical miles, assuming 

maximum takeoff gross weight of 488,000 lbs, maximum cruise range, weapons are 

retained, and allowing for one hour of reserve fuel. Under these same conditions, the 

unrefueled range of a re-engined B-52H is expected to increase to 7,420 nautical miles, or 

about a 46 percent increase. Because the operational value of this increase is scenario 

dependent, the task force evaluated tasks the B-52H has recently been called upon to 

perform. 

During Operation Enduring Freedom, the B-52H flew daily from Diego Garcia to 

Kabul. Figure 8 compares the unrefueled range and loiter time available to the current 

and re-engined B-52H. Time on station is the vertical axis and mission radius is the 

horizontal axis. These notional mission profiles assume weapons loadout of 12 JDAMs 

and 27 Mk 82s, maximum takeoff weight, and a two-hour fuel reserve, as required for 

overwater missions. 

Figure 9 shows that the current B-52H cannot fly roundtrip to either Kabul or 

Baghdad from Diego Garcia without refueling. However, a re-engined B-52H can fly to 

either Kabul or Baghdad without refueling. It would also have approximately 4.7 hours 

loiter time over Kabul to execute its mission, and about three hours over Baghdad to 

execute its mission. Since Diego Garcia is a key strategic airfield and ramp space is 

limited, reducing the number of tanker aircraft needed at that location also carries other 

operational benefits. 

- 24 - 
0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 4,000

Mission Radius (nmi)

Diego Gar

cia-Kabul

Diego Gar

cia-Baghdad

B-52H

B-52H Re-Engined

Time On Statio

n (hr)

Conditions:

- Max TOGW: 488,000 lbs.

- Max Range Cruise

- 30,000 ft, Best Endurance Loiter

- Weapons Release at end of Hold

- 2 Hr. SL Reserves

- 46.7% Improvement in Cruise

Specific Range

- 41.7% Improvement in Hold

Specific Range

Note: B-52H Not Capable w/o A/R

B-52H RE Can Orbit 4.7 Hrs

Figure 9: Unrefueled Diego Garcia to Kabul and Baghdad 

Early during the study, the task force had an opportunity to specify an analysis of 

the B-52H missions that supported Operation Enduring Freedom from October 24, 2001 

through November 11, 2001. With the Boeing numbers not yet available, the task force 

asked for an analysis of the impact on tanker demand if the B-52H had 25 percent greater 

range. The analysis revealed that a B-52H with 25 percent greater range would have 

required 66 percent fewer tanker sorties to complete the same missions. The task force 

was unable to have the analysis redone using 46 percent increase in B-52H unrefueled 

range. This is because of the level of effort needed to conduct the analysis. Unlike the 

SIOP where tankers are dedicated to supporting B-52Hs, it is more difficult in this case to 

make the translation from reduced fuel on-load demand to reduced number of sorties to 

reduced tail requirements. This is because the tankers were supporting other aircraft as 

well as the B-52Hs. 

However, the OEF analysis showed that based on a 25 percent unrefueled range 

improvement, 33 percent fewer tanker aircraft would have been required at Diego-Garcia 

to support OEF. These tankers would have been available for deployment elsewhere, and 

would have opened scarce ramp space at Diego Garcia. Tanker availability was often a 

problem that constrained planning and executing OEF missions. 

- 25 - 
Tim

e On Station (hr)

Mission Radius (nmi)

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 4,000 4,500 Fairfor

d-Pristina

Fairfor

d-Kabul

Conditions:

- Max TOGW: 488,000 lbs.

- Max Range Cruise

- 30,000 ft, Best Endurance Loiter

- Weapons Release at end of Hold

- 1 Hr. SL Reserves

- 46.7% Improvement in Cruise Specific Range

- 41.7% Improvement in Hold Specific Range

B-52H

B-52H Re-Engined

67% Improvement

With B-52H RE

Figure109: Unrefueled RAF Fairford to Pristina and Kabul 

The other primary overseas B-52H base is RAF Fairford. Figure 10 compares the 

unrefueled range and loiter time available to the current and re-engined B-52H from RAF 

Fairford to Pristina and Kabul. These notional mission profiles assume weapons loadout 

of 12 JDAMs and 27 Mk 82s, maximum takeoff weight, and a one-hour fuel reserve, as 

required for overland missions. 

While the current B-52H can fly roundtrip from RAF Fairford to Pristina 

unrefuled, re-engining increases time on station by 67 percent. The current B-52H 

cannot fly roundtrip to Kabul from RAF Fairford without refueling. However, a reengined B-52H can fly from RAF Fairford to Kabul and have about 4 hours of loiter time 

to execute its missions without refueling. 

 

Moving from the most current to the legacy missions, the B-52H remains a key 

element of the strategic triad. Using the Boeing estimate of 46 percent unrefueled range 

increase, a re-engined B-52H could strike anywhere on earth using CALCMs with only 

one refueling, with a large portion of the earth covered without any refueling. For 

example, a CALCM attack from Barksdale to Baghdad would require one refueling sortie 

instead of two, as shown in Figure 11. This assumes maximum take off gross weight of 

488,000 lbs, a single B-52H, no wind, maximum cruise range, 1 hour fuel reserve at 

mission end, 20 CALCM loadout, and weapons launch at radius distance. The total fuel 

burn would be 32.7 percent less, and total fuel onload would be 58.7 percent less. The 

existing B-52H would require 2 refuelings out of Moron, and a re-engined B-52H would 

require one out of Incirlik, a 50 percent decrease. 

- 26 - 
CALCM

Launch

Point

Barksdale

CALCM

Range

Moron Incirlik

Figure 11: CALCM Attack Mission - Barksdale-Iraq-Barksdale 

Bombers can strike pre-planned targets or loiter in wait for mobile or time-critical 

targets. Both B-1s and B-52Hs were used to accomplish these missions in Operation 

Allied Force. Bombers employ in two basic environments - Standoff and Direct Attack. 

In a more generic context, with J-series weapons (JDAM, JSOW, and JASSM), 

each bomber has the ability to employ in both environments throughout the AOR. In 

recent operations, stealth aircraft are used initially to “kick down the door” and neutralize 

air defenses, to be followed with non-stealth aircraft. As munitions become more 

capable, the B-52H can operate with increasing effectiveness beyond the reach of enemy 

air defenses. Investing adequately in munitions inventories is necessary to provide 

platforms with these capabilities. 

Standoff allows bombers to remain outside the effective range of enemy 

defenses, and may be the initial conflict environment due to the enemy’s anti-access 

/ area-denial capabilities, defenses, or political situation. However, penetration of 

enemy airspace may still be necessary, in which case aircraft with stealth 

characteristics are used until suppression of enemy air defenses is achieved. As a 

general guideline, longer-range threats (e.g., Airborne Interceptors, SA-5s, SA-10s, 

etc.) require longer range standoff (e.g., CALCM, JASSM). However, force 

packaging and effective SEAD can allow shorter-range standoff and even direct 

attack. Mobile targets are harder to kill with long time of flight and targeting 

uncertainties than fixed targets. 

In Direct-Attack bombers strike targets inside enemy airspace using a 

combination of tactics, weapons and strike package integration. Due to the 

probability of encountering enemy air defenses, strike assets are usually packaged to 

increase survivability. Direct-attack strikes fixed, mobile, and emerging targets 

using off-board and on-board information. 

- 27 - 
Table 5 shows unclassified standoff ranges and typical defenses (roles) the respective 

weapons would likely be used against. 

Standoff Role Bomber

Carraige 

Weapon Warhead

Type 

Range 

(NM) 

Inventory 

Objective 

LongRange Theater 

Defense 

B-52H AGM-86C

(CALCM) 

Unitary

(<1Klb) 

600+

MediumRange Area 

Defense 

B-1, B-2, 

B-52H 

AGM-158 

(JASSM) 

Unitary

(1Klb) 

200 2,400 –

3,200 

Medium

Range 

JASSM-ER

ShortRange Point 

Defense 

B-1, B-2, 

B-52H 

AGM-154A 

(JSOW) 

CEB 40 3,000

Short 

Range 

Point 

Defense 

B-1, B-52H WCMD-ER CEB/SFW 7,500 

ShortRange Point 

Defense 

B-1, B-2, 

B-52H 

Small 

Diameter 

Bomb

Unitary

(.25Klb) 

Classified 24,000?

Table 5. Standoff Ranges 

IV.b – Other Performance Factors 

There are a number of slight improvements in flight performance with reengining. However, the task force considered these to be of negligible operational value 

and not major key to a re-engining decision. 

Flight envelope is normally considered to be the operating altitude and speed 

limits in steady level flight. The maximum speed for the B-52H is Mach 0.84 or 390 

knots whichever is less. The normal high altitude cruise speed based on gross weight is 

Mach 0.74 to 0.78. The normal low-altitude penetration airspeed is 340 knots, but can be 

increased to 380 knots under high-threat conditions. The normal cruise altitude at heavy 

gross weights is 30,000 to 35,000 feet MSL; at light gross weights the cruise altitude can 

be higher than 45,000 feet MSL. Stall speeds range from approximately 153 knots at 

488,000 lbs down to 99 knots at 200,000 lbs. 

The B-52H requires 7,600 feet to takeoff at maximum gross takeoff weight of 

488,000 lbs. Re-engining is estimated to reduce this figure by 20 percent, due to an 

increase in thrust of about 36 thousand pounds. This will increase the number of airfields 

capable of physically accommodating the B-52H worldwide; however, another limiting 

factor is the width of the airfield. The re-engined B-52H would require a runway width 

of 175 feet, exceeding the 150 feet, which is more typical. The importance of this 

depends on many factors, including numbers and locations of airfields now B-52H 

capable, permission for their use, and mission requirements. 

- 28 - 
The normal cruise altitude at heavy gross weights is 30,000 to 35,000 feet MSL. 

At light gross weights the cruise altitude can be higher than 45,000 feet MSL. Climb rate 

would also improve slightly with re-engining. 

IV.c – Basing

Basing at FOLs is driven by both political and operational considerations. Many 

potential FOLs require host nation approval. While it is difficult to predict which FOLs 

would be necessary to support a future contingency, examining those used in the past 

offer some insights. The FOLs used by B-52Hs in Desert Storm were RAF Fairford 

(United Kingdom), Moron (Spain), Diego-Garcia and Jeddah New (Saudi Arabia). Some

of the bases used by supporting tanker aircraft during Desert Shield / Desert Storm were 

Zaragoza (Spain), RAF Mildenhall (United Kingdom), Cairo West (Egypt), Incirlik 

(Turkey) and Andravidn (Greece). During the Southeast Asia conflict, B-52Hs operated 

out of Andersen (Guam) and U Tapao (Thailand). Bases in Alaska and South Korea may 

be important for any northeast Asia contingencies. Even when forward bases are 

secured, denial of overflight privilege by neighboring countries could mitigate some of 

their benefits. 

Operationally, both the reduced numbers of tankers required to support B-52H 

operations as well as the increased range of bombers can help compensate for lack of 

forward basing and overflight privilege. 

V. Explosive Start Capability 

The B-52H and the B-2 are the two SIOP capable bombers in the inventory. The 

B-52H currently meets fast start requirements for the SIOP mission by using an explosive 

cartridge to start the engines. These cartridges are part of the logistics set deployed with 

the B-52H, adding to logistics burden and creating explosive safety issues. The new 

engines proposed will not have an explosive start capability. Boeing has suggested using 

an auxiliary power unit to satisfy the fast start requirement. 

The APU would provide stand-alone support by eliminating the need for start 

carts. This also eliminates 8.5 pallets from the mobility footprint, or about one half of

one C-17 load. This is not a significant decrease. 

If the USAF decides to re-engine the B-52H, the capability for explosive engine 

starts would be lost. If an operational requirement for self-starting exists, the USAF 

should conduct a separate evaluation to determine feasibility of installing an internal 

APU. This task force was of the opinion that an engine self-start capability no longer 

appeared to be a core need, but clearly the Air Force needs to evaluate such an 

operational decision. 

- 29 - 
VI. Environmental Effects of Re-Engining 

The task force considered local air quality, global climate change and community 

noise impacts of re-engining. Environmental performance of new engines is better in 

some respects, and worse in others. 

Local air quality includes both oxides of nitrogen (precursors to smog), and 

particulate emissions. NOx (nitrogen oxides) will nearly double with the new engines. A 

conservative estimate shows an increase of about 100 tons/year at base locations. 

Particulates cause the black smoke visible during B-52H takoffs, and would decrease 

significantly with re-engining. At most of the base locations for B-52H, this local air 

quality is not a significant issue. In 1984, the Environmental Protection Agency began 

regulating aircraft emissions for smoke and fuel venting (unburned hydrocarbons). In 

1997, the EPA expanded the rules to include nitrous oxides and carbon monoxide, in 

accordance with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards. The 

current TF33-103 engine does not comply with current standards, but re-engining will 

bring the B-52H into compliance. 

The other environmental factor the task force examined was the impact on global 

climate change. There are two ways to consider the effects of re-engining on global 

climate change. First, is the result from the B-52H aircraft only. Second, is to consider 

the impact of the reduced need for in-flight refueling and avoided tanker sorties. 

Considering the B-52H alone, the contribution to global climate change is likely to be

worse with re-engining. The radiative forcing factor for all effluents except NOx is 

0.060, and the radiative forcing factor for NOx is 0.011. All effluents except NOx will 

go down by 30%, but cruise NOx will go up by a factor of about two. So the net effect is 

that the climate impact will be slightly worse even though the fuel burn and 

consequently, the carbon dioxide emissions, are reduced significantly.14 While based on 

radiative forcing the 1,092 gallons per hour of fuel burn do not offset the increased rate of 

NOx generation, there is considerable uncertainty about the contribution of NOx to 

global climate change. If considering the secondary effects of avoided tanker sorties, the 

calculation becomes even more uncertain. First, quantifying the total number of tanker 

sorties offset by re-engining was indeterminable within the scope of the task force study. 

Second, each of the tankers (KC-135E, KC-135R and KC-10) has different emissions 

profiles. For example, if sufficient tanker flying hours are reduced, it could more than 

offset the higher NOx emissions from the new B-52H engines. Finally, there is the issue 

of contrails. Contrails are just being studied as significant contributors to global climate 

change, and are more likely to be formed by re-engined B-52Hs than by the TF33-103 

engines. It is not possible to estimate this impact. 

Noise is likely to be reduced significantly. At 1000 foot flyover a B757 is about 15 

EPNdB quieter than a B-52H. If we add 3dB for the effect of doubling the number of 

engines, we get a 12EPNdB reduction. This equates to a reduction of more than one-half

the annoyance per operation from a community perspective. The current TF33-103 does 

 14 Greener by Design, by the Society of British Aerospace Companies, 2001 

- 30 - 
not meet Stage III noise standards, but after re-engining the B-52H would be in 

compliance with this international standard. 

Considering only the B-52H fleet, and not the reductions associated with reduced 

tanker use, emissions of carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide and smoke would decrease by 

30% or more whereas emissions of oxides of nitrogen are expected to increase by roughly 

a factor of two. Community noise impacts would be reduced significantly, with about 

half the annoyance per operation. The task force judges the net effect of these changes to 

be indeterminable within the scope of this study, but the effect will ultimately depend on

the overall impact on tanker flying hours. 

- 31 - 
VII. Program Options and Risk 

 VII.a – Program Options

There are three phases to the concept briefed by Boeing: 

1) $3M study to determine cost, benefits and develop an executable program 

2) 4-year $227.7M EMD phase following initial study 

3) 6-year production, overlapping EMD by two years. 

There are 4 possible financing options 

• Conventional DoD Funded Acquisition 

• Lease 

• Energy Savings Performance Contract (ESPC) 

• Hourly Rate

There are 3 engine manufacturers offering 4 feasible engine options: 

• Rolls-Royce RB-211 

• Pratt & Whitney PW-2040 

• GE: 

• CF6-50 (KC-10) 

• CF6-80C2 (VC-25 / C-5M, KC-767) 

These combinations lead to 8 feasible financing options, as discussed below. 

Overlaying 4 possible engine options for each of these, plus the two options of doing 

nothing (baseline) and modernizing the TF33-103 (current Air Force plan), results in a 34 

possible combinations of financing and engine options. 

The robust worldwide commercial support base for the proposed engines allows a 

wide range of support options. These include: 

• Air Force Organic 

• Air Force on-wing; contractor off-wing 

• Full Contract Maintenance 

Maintenance options affect program cost, the statutory 50/50 depot maintenance 

split, depot overhead rates, and possibly raise issues about reliance on contractor 

maintenance in contingency settings. This also results in a total possible of over 100 

different program options involving choices of financing mechanisms, engine choices 

and maintenance schemes. 

Each of the main factors - financing, engines and maintenance - results in a large 

number of program options and should be addressed in detail by the initial $3M study. 

VII.b – Program Risk

Replacing 8 TF33-103 engines with 4 modern high-bypass COTS engines 

involves more than just engine replacement. The new engines will be approximately 500 

- 32 - 
to 600 lbs heavier than the old engines, produce about 9 thousand pounds more thrust per 

pylon (about 36 thousand pounds total), add about 5,400 lbs to the airframe, and change 

the moments on the wings. These changes will affect the yaw that would be experienced 

in the event of an engine failure on takeoff. The solution may require installation of an 

auto rudder to counteract the differential thrust between wings that would result from

engine failure during takeoff, and possibly an auto throttle to sense the engine failure and 

reduce power on the remaining 3 engines. This and a number of other technical 

considerations would require modifications to the aircraft such as structural changes to 

struts, new flight control features and wiring. The extent of the modifications is shown in 

Figure 12. The task force suggested in the event differential thrust becomes an issue, 

instituting a standard operational practice of taking off with engine throttles set at the 

single engine failure power setting would mitigate the problem, as well as save engine 

life, provide additional power for climb after gear and flap retraction, and make engine 

failure a non-event. 

In its 1996 evaluation of the Boeing proposal, the Air Force Integrated Product 

Team identified 3 major risk areas; program management, systems engineering, and 

contracts and cost affordability. The Air Force rated them respectively, low risk, 

moderate risk and high risk, as shown in Table 6. Factors have changed since the original 

assessment that would revise some risk judgments, and in others the task force 

recommends revisiting the conclusions. 

Figure 12: Modifications Required for B-52H Re-engining 

The Air Force concluded the systems engineering area represented a moderate risk 

because: 

• The proposed APU is not certified for use during flight 

• The proposed APU is not nuclear hardened (not a current requirement) 

- 33 - 
• The proposed electrically powered hydraulic pumps should be more reliable pump 

since no alternate source of hydraulic power is available for the systems served. 

(Note: this is not a change from the current system) 

• There is no analysis of high thrust loads on aircraft structure. 

The APU is used for SIOP starts, and need not be flight certified and there is no 

requirement for it to be flight certified. The hydraulic pumps represent no change to the 

current condition. The SPO conducted a structural analysis of the impact of the new 

engines, and concluded negligible change in structural life. The task force is of the 

opinion the overall risk determination of “moderate” is not supportable based on the data 

available. 

RISK OVERALL AREA

RISK 

AREA 1 PROGRAM MANAGEMENT L 

Management L

Configuration Control/Maintenance M

Data L

Logistics L

AREA 2 SYSTEMS ENGINEERING M 

Engines L

Integration M

Test L

Reliability and Maintainability L 

Quality L

Safety L

Statement of Work M

AREA 3 CONTRACTS AND 

COSTS/AFFORDABILITY 

H

Contracts L

Cost/Affordability H

Table 6: Air Force 1996 Assessment of Program Risk15

The IPT rated contracts and cost/affordability a high risk because of the projected 

affect on AF TOA, lack of a final force structure decision by the Quadrennial Defense 

Review, and the difficulty on predicting events 20-30 years in the future upon which the 

re-engining decision must be made. The task force has identified a strong connection 

between re-engining and the cost of operating the tanker force. Significant increases in 

 15 Reproduced from Air Force Re-Engining IPT, Final Report “Analyis of the Boeing Unsolicited 

Proposal to Re-Engine the B-52H”, 1996

- 34 - 
TF33-103 maintenance costs and new innovative financing options combine to offer the 

Air Force an opportunity to significantly reduce the TOA impact of operating its bomber 

and tanker fleets. The task force does not consider affordability a high program risk 

factor. 

The Air Force has conducted two separate re-enginings of the KC-135. One for 

the active force and the other for the Air National Guard. The Air Force considers both 

programs highly successful in terms of result, cost and schedule. In addition to engines,

the program included modifications to landing gear, nacelles, struts and cockpit controls. 

The KC-135A's original engines, like those of the B-52H, were also 1950s 

vintage TF33-103s and didn’t meet modern standards for fuel efficiency, pollution or 

noise levels. By installing new, CFM56 engines, the Air Force enhanced performance 

and fuel off-load capability dramatically. The modified airplane is designated a KC135R. Two-re-engined KC-135Rs can do the work of three KC-135As. 

This improvement is a result of the KC-135R's lower fuel consumption and 

increased performance, allowing the tanker to take off with more fuel and carry it farther. 

Since the airplane can carry more fuel and burn less of it during a mission, it's possible to 

transfer a much greater amount to receiver aircraft. 

The quieter, more fuel-efficient CFM56 engines are manufactured by CFM 

International, a company jointly owned by SNECMA of France, and General Electric of 

the U.S. The engine is an advanced modern, high- bypass turbofan; the military 

designation is F108-CF-100. Related system improvements are incorporated to improve 

the modified airplane's ability to carry out its mission, while decreasing overall 

maintenance and operation costs. 

Because the KC-135R uses as much as 27 percent less fuel than the KC-135A, the 

USAF can expect huge fuel savings by re-engining its fleet of KC-135s - about $1.7B 

over 15 years of operation, or about three to four percent of the USAF's annual fuel use. 

Re-engining with the CFM56 engines also significantly reduces noise, and allows 

the KC-135R to meet Federal Air Regulation standards. Areas surrounding airports 

exposed to decibel noise levels is reduced from over 240 square miles to about three 

square miles. This results in a reduction in the noise impacted area of more than 98 

percent. In addition, smoke and other emission pollutants are reduced dramatically. 

Boeing has delivered approximately 400 re-engined KC-135Rs and is under 

contract for about 432 re-engine kits. Each kit includes struts, nacelles, 12.2 miles of 

wiring, and other system modification components. The Air Force is purchasing engines 

directly from CFM International. 

Boeing has also completed previous programs to re-engine KC-135As in the Air 

Force Reserve and Air National Guard -- a total of 161 airplanes. In that program, which 

began in 1981, KC-135As were modified with refurbished JT3D engines taken from 

- 35 - 
used, commercial 707 airliners. After modification, the airplanes are designated KC135Es. This upgrade, like the KC-135R program, boosts performance while decreasing 

noise and smoke pollution levels. The modified KC-135E provides 30 percent more 

powerful engines with a noise reduction of 85 percent. 

The task force concludes that a B-52H re-engining program represents low risk in 

the areas of program management, systems engineering, and affordability based on a reassessment of the factors considered in the 1996 IPT evaluation. 

VIII. Recapitalization Costs and Innovative Financing 

Options Study EMD Production Feasible

1 DoD Fund DoD Fund DoD Fund Yes 

2 DoD Fund DoD Fund Lease Yes 

3 DoD Fund DoD Fund ESPC Yes 

4 DoD Fund DoD Fund Hourly Rate Yes 

5 DoD Fund Lease DoD Fund Yes16

6 DoD Fund Lease Lease Yes

6 DoD Fund Lease ESPC Yes

6 DoD Fund Lease Hourly Rate Yes 

7 DoD Fund ESPC DoD Fund Yes11

8 DoD Fund ESPC Lease Yes

8 DoD Fund ESPC ESPC Yes

DoD Fund ESPC Hourly Rate No 

DoD Fund Hourly Rate DoD Fund No 

DoD Fund Hourly Rate Lease No 

DoD Fund Hourly Rate ESPC No 

DoD Fund Hourly Rate Hourly Rate No 

Table 7: Financing Options 

The total program cost will depend more on the financing option chosen than on 

the choice of new commercial engine, with two exceptions. Modernizing the existing 

TF33-103 would result in a cheaper first cost, regardless of financing options chosen. 

Refurbishing some newer GE engines currently owned by the Air Force could also give a 

cheaper first cost, but would be closer in cost to new engines than to TF33-103 

modernization, as will be discussed later. The financing options are shown in Table 7. 

With the exception of an outright buy, each option includes various forms of 

interest, representing the cost of money. It is also possible to finance the EMD and 

procurement phases differently. The choices affect program cost and shift program risk. 

 16 Options 5 and 7 represent a strategy in which the DoD would agree to either lease or ESPC 

terms for both the EMD and production phases, with an option to buy out the production phase. 

Performance and maintenance guarantees with lease and ESPC provides the contractor an 

incentive to complete the EMD effectively and efficiently and minimize any potential for 

unexpected modifications during production. 

- 36 - 
The only option available for completing the study phase is DoD funding. EMD and 

production can be financed in any of 4 possible ways; conventional DoD acquisition 

funding, lease, Energy Service Performance Contract, or payments based on hourly use 

rates. 

VIII.a – Purchase as a Major Modification Using Procurement (3010) 

Appropriations 

The least cost option for the procurement phase is to buy the program outright by 

programming a major modification using appropriated funds. This avoids any interest or 

risk payments to financing institutions, venture capitalists or brokers. Proper incentive 

structures manage the continuum between cost and risk, minimizing the potential for 

unexpected costs and slippage to the government and providing an appropriate return to 

the contractor. All other options involve payments to private entities for the use of

money, as in a mortgage (ESPC as explained below), or a lease. 

VIII.b – Capital Lease Through OEM Using O&M Appropriations 

While leasing is a useful tool for commercial entities, many of the factors that 

make leasing attractive do not apply to the federal government. Perhaps as instructive are 

the few instances where leasing would be advantageous to the government. 

Leasing is a profit-generating venture by the business granting the lease (i.e, the 

lessor). This suggests that, in general, owning is preferable to leasing. Commercial 

entities, however, do find leasing attractive under several circumstances: 

• Tax advantages: Lease payments can be counted as immediate expenses against 

current revenue while capital purchases are usually depreciated over the life of the 

asset. 

• Capital constraints: Commercial entities may not be able to borrow funds for both 

core and non-core capital investments. Given this constraint, it is logical to invest

in expanding the core business while leasing non-core assets on a year-to-year 

basis. 

Neither of these conditions generally applies to the federal government or to DoD. 

DoD does not pay taxes and is not theoretically capital constrained (or at least can borrow 

on more advantageous terms than a private company can). There are, however, a few 

cases where the government’s (as well as private firm’s) best alternative is to lease: 

• Short-term use: Suppose the time that the government needs the asset is much 

less than it’s useful life, and a private market exists for the good. In this instance, 

if the purchase and sale of the asset are sufficiently costly, efficiency gains may 

exist by leasing from a private provider. 

- 37 - 
• Risk transfer: Leasing can transfer risk to the lessor if the responsibility for 

breakdown and maintenance lies with the lessor rather than the lessee. The 

government is better able to accept risk than most private entities, but may desire 

to transfer risk to provide the leasing manufacturer incentives to produce a more 

reliable product. 

Lessor cost advantage - The lessor may be able to own a capital good at a lower cost 

than the lessee may. Examples occur when: 

• the lessor’s cost of capital is lower than the lessee’s cost of capital (applicable to 

private entities, not the federal government) 

• there are economies of scale to owning a larger fleet than the lessee needs 

• the lessor has access to markets that generate higher salvage value than the lessee 

has access to; and 

• corporate accounting procedures make leasing improve the corporate balance 

sheet. 

These examples provide broad guidelines for analyzing proposed leases. Except in a 

few instances, it is not in the federal government’s interest to lease. For those exceptions, 

agencies must make a clear case as to what makes leasing more economically efficient 

and how the government will share in the benefits of those efficiencies. It was unclear 

that any conditions exist in the case of re-engining that make leasing the most attractive 

alternative. 

VIII.c – The Energy Savings Performance Contracts (ESPC) Program

In its evaluation of Boeing’s 1996 proposal, the Air Force cited affordability as a 

significant issue. To address this, Boeing has recently proposed using Energy Savings 

Performance Contracts (ESPC) as a way to avoid TOA impact. 

 Congress authorized ESPC in the National Energy Conservation Act, and 

amended under the National Energy Policy Act of 1992. Its purpose was to enable 

private funding to be used to upgrade federal facilities to make them more energy 

efficient, and to repay that investment from the savings stream produced through reduced 

utility bills. Figure 13 shows how savings are used to repay the private financing. ESPC 

was authorized because federal facilities required significant upgrades, it was not possible 

to provide adequate appropriated funds to accomplish the work in a reasonable time, and 

there was an increasing recognition that improving the energy efficiency of federal 

facilities would reduce facility operating costs. 

The legislation allows multi-year contracting authority for periods not to exceed 

25 years. During the period of the contract, most, and sometimes all, of the O&M 

savings stream is paid to the contractor until the contract is satisfied. After the contract is 

paid off, the government is able to keep all the savings. 

- 38 - 
Initially authorized as a 5-year pilot program, ESPC was subsequently made 

permanent, and the executive branch was directed to establish procedures and implement 

the program. A series of executive orders have continued to mandate reductions in 

energy consumption at federal facilities, and ESPC is a widely used means for obtaining 

adequate investment to achieve the goals. 

Figure 13: How ESPC’s Work 

The Department of Energy published the final rule on Energy Savings Performance 

Contracts on April 10, 1995. Federal Acquisition Rules: 

• Permit multi-year contracts without scoring current year’s appropriations for 

capital costs

• Permit termination liability schedule Government would pay in event of a 

Termination 

• Require Monitoring and Verification (M&V) plan to measure program savings, 

from which payments are made 

• Require Congressional notification for large projects (such as B-52H re-engining) 

All ESPCs must have contractor guaranteed savings, which are tested and ensured 

through a measurement and verification (M&V) Plan. M&V can occur only once, at 

Government acceptance; or annually throughout the contract period. During the proposal 

phase, the contractor and Government agree on an acceptable M&V Plan. Costs of M&V 

are included in the contract and paid to the contractor along with debt and service 

payments. 

ESPCs provide capital improvement to the Government at no up-front cost. 

Payments to the contractor are made from reductions in O&M bills created by increased 

- 39 - 
energy efficiency. The contractor guarantees the savings, and the Government pays out 

of actual savings only. Statute requires then year dollars be used for the analysis. 

DoD installations have used ESPC successfully since 1988 to provide 

$800Million to improve the efficiency of energy consuming systems, reduce utility bills 

and achieve the efficiency mandates imposed by legislation and executive orders. While 

ESPC is recognized as the high-cost solution to financing capital projects, it does reduce 

the total expenditure by the government over the economic life of the upgraded system, 

but not nearly as much as would have been saved had the investments been made from 

appropriated funds. 

However, there are two issues relevant to the use of ESPCs in this case. First, 

ESPC has never been used for mobility systems. It has only been used for fixed facilities. 

This is because the statute authorizing the program does not explicitly include its use for 

mobile systems. Boeing has proposed interpreting Executive Order 13123 as authorizing 

the use of ESPC for mobile systems (Appendix C). Specifically, Boeing cites sections 

405 and 709, which address efficiency in mobile equipment. It is not clear to the task 

force that the executive order explicitly provides the necessary authorization to use ESPC 

for mobile equipment, however interpretation by General Council will be necessary to 

make such a determination. The second factor to consider is that the some of the savings 

that would be used to repay the contract is currently being spent operating the Air Force 

tanker fleet. Releasing those funds as savings would require retiring tanker aircraft. In 

the event tankers are in shortage and re-engining will be used as a means to purchase 

additional tanker capacity, then using ESPC to re-engine would be a defacto decision by 

the Air Force to dedicate a greater amount of TOA to tanker operations, and to divert 

additional TOA to repay the ESPC contract. 

The task force recommends DoD investigate ESPC as a possible mechanism for 

re-enging mindful of the following findings: 

• Commercial history of modern high bypass fan engines provides a sound basis for 

calculating fuel and maintenance costs and for devising a M&V plan 

• While used only for facility investments to date, Executive Order 13123 dated 

June 3, 1999 specifically addresses efficiency in “Mobile Equipment”, and may 

provide a basis for making a legal determination that ESPCs can be applied to B52H re-engining.17 

• B-52H re-engining appears to be consistent with the intent of the ESPC Program

in that it improves the efficiency of government equipment. 

• Use of ESPC will increase the program cost and decrease the economic benefit of 

re-engining. 

• In the event O&M savings from reduced fuel purchase and maintenance costs are 

inadequate to finance the ESPC contract, some funding from reduced tanker fleet 

operations may also be needed. 

 17 Sections 405 and 709 

- 40 - 
It appears possible that the O&M outlays described in Section II.3 “Economic 

Summary” above could provide a sufficient funding stream to finance re-engining using 

ESPC and produce a net positive impact on Air Force TOA. However, definitive figures 

for costs and savings can only be developed through negotiations with Boeing and a more 

detailed analysis of future savings streams. 

The task force concludes B-52H re-engining would serve as a good pilot program for 

expanding the ESPC Program in practice beyond facilities, and into mobility systems. 

VIII.d – Rent Use on an Hourly Basis 

This approach is being tested by the Navy for in-flight refueling services, known 

as the Omega contract. The Navy has investigated “power-by-the-hour” for the V-22 

aircraft, but has not implemented it yet.18 Commercial airline executives cautioned the 

task force that negotiating hourly rate requires a very sophisticated management team. 

The contracts typically provide for cost only, and do not address reliability. Furthermore, 

unlike long-term leases, the contracts must be renewed periodically. Negotiating clauses 

for the reliability side of the equation can be tricky. 

IX. Conclusions and Recommendations 

IX.a – Conclusions 

The task force made the following seven conclusions: 

1. The B-52H is the most versatile and cost effective bomber in the inventory and reengining makes it even more so. 

2. The B-52H has the highest mission capable rate of any of the 3 bombers, and is 

the only Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM) capable platform

in the inventory. 

3. That further significant reductions in the B-52H fleet are unlikely for the 

foreseeable future because: 

• The total assigned inventory (TAI) bomber fleet being reduced from 130 to 

96, a deminimis number 

• There is no bomber aircraft currently in development 

• The B-52H is highly capability of accomplishing its assigned missions 

• The B-52H is flexible and able to adapt to future missions 

• The USAF chose to retire more than twice as many B-1 airframes as B-52H 

airframes 

• USAF has stated its intention to retain the B-52H through 2037 

 18 “Power-by-the-Hour” is a trademarked name by Rolls-Royce, and is not the generic term for 

renting aircraft power on an hourly basis.

- 41 - 
4. B-52H re-engining program represents low risk in the areas of program

management, systems engineering, and affordability based on a re-assessment of

the factors considered in the 1996 IPT evaluation. 

5. B-52H re-engining is an attractive opportunity for the following financial and 

operational reasons: 

• Greater operational flexibility 

• Greater range 

• Reduced fuel burn 

• Reduced tanker demand 

• Depot savings through elimination of off-airframe engine maintenance 

• Field maintenance manpower savings 

6. B-52H re-engining would serve as a good pilot program for expanding the ESPC 

Program in practice beyond facilities, and into mobility systems. 

7. The task force concludes the economic and operational benefits far outweigh the 

program cost. 

IX.b – Recommendations 

The task force offers the following six recommendations: 

1. The Air Force proceed with B-52H re-engining without delay and place the 

program on a fast acquisition track in order to maximize the benefits and take 

advantage of the current business climate. 

2. The Air Force proceed with a dedicated study to determine the optimum program, 

considering all the possible engines, service arrangements and financing options. 

3. OSD commission a new independent long-term tanker requirements study that 

extends beyond FY05, based on new planning guidance, which includes the 

ability to conduct sensitivity analyses of B-52H re-engining as well as other 

planned and potential new receiver aircraft that will be in service over the 

expected lifetime of the tanker force, such as JSF. 

4. The SPO and Boeing investigate the impact of eliminating low-level missions on 

projections of future airframe economic lifetime. 

5. OSD and the Air Force investigate whether authority exists to use an Energy 

Savings Performance Contract or if legislative clarification is needed; and confirm

the economic viability of Energy Savings Performance Contracting as a financing 

mechanism for B-52H re-engining. 

- 42 - 
6. OSD investigate the use of more robust analytical tools that allow the value of 

improved operational capabilities to be included in cost-benefit analyses used to 

support programmatic decision-making. 

- 43 - 
Appendix A: Terms of Reference 

- 44 - 
- 45 - 
Appendix B: Task Force Membership

Chairman

Gen Mike Carns (USAF, Ret) Vice Chairman, PrivaSource, Inc. 

Members

Mr. Samuel Adcock EADS, Inc 

Gen George Babbitt, (USAF, Ret) Consultant 

Mr. Michael Bayer Consultant 

Mr. John Douglass Aerospace Industries Association 

Dr. Jacques Gansler University of Maryland 

Dr. Ian A. Waitz Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

Mr. Sandy Webb Environmental Consulting Group, LLC 

Mr. Robert Yountz Pratt & Whitney 

Government Advisors

Col. Louise Eckhardt AF/ILMY 

Mr. John Hutto AF/XORC 

Maj. Joseph P. McDonnell AF/XORC 

Dr. Jerry Pannullo OSD (Program Analysis and Evaluation) 

Mr. Stephen Seidel Environmental Protection Agency 

Ms. Cindy Newberg (Alternate) Environmental Protection Agency 

Executive Secretary

Col. Jon Link OSD (AT&L) / S&TS 

DSB Secretariat

LtCol Roger W. Basl OSD/AT&L/Defense Science Board 

Task Force Support

Mr. E. Thomas Morehouse, Jr. Institute for Defense Analyses 

Task Force Sponsor

Mr. E.C. Aldridge, Jr. Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics) 

- 46 - 
Appendix C: Presentations to the Task Force 

June 25, 2002 

Mr Tom Morehouse Findings of DSB Task Force on Fuel 

Efficiency, Previous AF Study on ReEngining B-52H and 707 VariantsIDA 

Joshua Schwartz, Wayne Devers IDA Studies on B-52H Re-Engining and 

Tanker RequirementsIDA

July 15, 2002 

Col O’Donnell AF Vision Brief, AF/XPX 

Col Jim McGinley B-52H Lifetime Projection Analysis and 

Impact of Re-Engining, OC-ALC 

Maj Joe McDonnell Long Range Time Phase Bomber Plan, 

B-52H Utilization in Serbia and 

Afghanistan and Airbridge Statistics 

AF/XORC 

Mr Dave Merrill, Maj Dave Ryer AMC Tanker Study TRS-05 and AOA 

Plans, AMC/XPY

August 27-28, 2002 

Mr Ray Valeika A Commercial Case for Investing in 

Improved Aircraft Efficiency, VP Technical 

Operations, Delta Airlines 

Joshua Schwartz B-52H Re-Engining Impact on Tanker 

Requirements for Current SIOP, IDA 

Al Wang PW-2040 Engine – Longevity and 

Supportablity, Pratt & Whitney 

Lee Wilkerson CF-6 Engine – Longevity and 

Supportability, General Electric 

Ken Roberts, Ron Riffel, 

Bill McGuth, Ken Perich RB-211 – Longevity and Supportability, 

Rolls Royce

John Kegley Boeing’s B-52H Engine Modernization 

Concept 

September 23, 2002 

No Presentations – Report Writing and Editing Session 

- 47 - 
Appendix D: Executive Order 13123 - Greening the Government 

Through Efficient Energy Management 

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United 

States of America, including the National Energy Conservation Policy Act (Public Law 

95-619, 92 Stat. 3206, 42 U.S.C. 8252 et seq.), as amended by the Energy Policy Act of 

1992 (EPACT) (Public Law 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776), and section 301 of title 3, United 

States Code, it is hereby ordered as follows: 

Part 1 - Preamble 

Section 101. Federal Leadership. The Federal Government, as the Nation's largest energy 

consumer, shall significantly improve its energy management in order to save taxpayer 

dollars and reduce emissions that contribute to air pollution and global climate change. 

With more than 500,000 buildings, the Federal Government can lead the Nation in energy 

efficient building design, construction, and operation. As a major consumer that spends 

$200B annually on products and services, the Federal Government can promote energy 

efficiency, water conservation, and the use of renewable energy products, and help foster 

markets for emerging technologies. In encouraging effective energy management in the 

Federal Government, this order builds on work begun under EPACT and previous 

Executive orders. 

Part 2 - Goals 

Sec. 201. Greenhouse Gases Reduction Goal. Through life-cycle cost-effective energy 

measures, each agency shall reduce its greenhouse gas emissions attributed to facility 

energy use by 30 percent by 2010 compared to such emissions levels in 1990. In order to 

encourage optimal investment in energy improvements, agencies can count greenhouse 

gas reductions from improvements in nonfacility energy use toward this goal to the extent 

that these reductions are approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 

Sec. 202. Energy Efficiency Improvement Goals. Through life-cycle cost-effective 

measures, each agency shall reduce energy consumption per gross square foot of its 

facilities, excluding facilities covered in section 203 of this order, by 30 percent by 2005 

and 35 percent by 2010 relative to 1985. No facilities will be exempt from these goals 

unless they meet new criteria for exemptions, to be issued by the Department of Energy 

(DOE). 

Sec. 203. Industrial and Laboratory Facilities. Through life-cycle cost-effective measures, 

each agency shall reduce energy consumption per square foot, per unit of production, or

per other unit as applicable by 20 percent by 2005 and 25 percent by 2010 relative to 

1990. No facilities will be exempt from these goals unless they meet new criteria for 

exemptions, as issued by DOE. 

- 48 - 
Sec. 204. Renewable Energy. Each agency shall strive to expand the use of renewable 

energy within its facilities and in its activities by implementing renewable energy projects 

and by purchasing electricity from renewable energy sources. In support of the Million 

Solar Roofs initiative, the Federal Government shall strive to install 2,000 solar energy 

systems at Federal facilities by the end of 2000, and 20,000 solar energy systems at 

Federal facilities by 2010. 

Sec. 205. Petroleum. Through life-cycle cost-effective measures, each agency shall 

reduce the use of petroleum within its facilities. Agencies may accomplish this reduction 

by switching to a less greenhouse gas-intensive, nonpetroleum energy source, such as 

natural gas or renewable energy sources; by eliminating unnecessary fuel use; or by other 

appropriate methods. Where alternative fuels are not practical or life-cycle cost-effective, 

agencies shall strive to improve the efficiency of their facilities. 

Sec. 206. Source Energy. The Federal Government shall strive to reduce total energy use 

and associated greenhouse gas and other air emissions, as measured at the source. To that 

end, agencies shall undertake life-cycle cost-effective projects in which source energy 

decreases, even if site energy use increases. In such cases, agencies will receive credit 

toward energy reduction goals through guidelines developed by DOE. 

Sec. 207. Water Conservation. Through life-cycle cost-effective measures, agencies shall 

reduce water consumption and associated energy use in their facilities to reach the goals 

set under section 503(f) of this order. Where possible, water cost savings and associated 

energy cost savings shall be included in Energy Savings Performance Contracts and other 

financing mechanisms. 

Part 3 - Organization And Accountability 

Sec. 301. Annual Budget Submission. Each agency's budget submission to OMB shall 

specifically request funding necessary to achieve the goals of this order. Budget 

submissions shall include the costs associated with encouraging the use of, administering, 

and fulfilling agency responsibilities under Energy Savings Performance Contracts, 

utility energy-efficiency service contracts, and other contractual platforms for achieving 

conservation goals; implementing life-cycle cost-effective measures; procuring life-cycle 

cost-effective products; and constructing sustainably designed new buildings, among 

other energy costs. OMB shall issue guidelines to assist agencies in developing 

appropriate requests that support sound investments in energy improvements and energyusing products. OMB shall explore the feasibility of establishing a fund that agencies 

could draw on to finance exemplary energy management activities and investments with 

higher initial costs but lower life-cycle costs. Budget requests to OMB in support of this 

order must be within each agency's planning guidance level. 

- 49 - 
Sec. 302. Annual Implementation Plan. Each agency shall develop an annual 

implementation plan for fulfilling the requirements of this order. Such plans shall be

included in the annual reports to the President under section 303 of this order. 

Sec. 303. Annual Reports to the President. (a) Each agency shall measure and report its 

progress in meeting the goals and requirements of this order on an annual basis. Agencies 

shall follow reporting guidelines as developed under section 306(b) of this order. In order 

to minimize additional reporting requirements, the guidelines will clarify how the annual 

report to the President should build on each agency's annual Federal energy reports 

submitted to DOE and the Congress. Annual reports to the President are due on January 1 

of each year beginning in the year 2000. 

(b) Each agency's annual report to the President shall describe how the agency is using 

each of the strategies described in Part 4 of this order to help meet energy and greenhouse 

gas reduction goals. The annual report to the President shall explain why certain 

strategies, if any, have not been used. It shall also include a listing and explanation of 

exempt facilities. 

Sec. 304. Designation of Senior Agency Official. Each agency shall designate a senior 

official, at the Assistant Secretary level or above, to be responsible for meeting the goals 

and requirements of this order, including preparing the annual report to the President. 

Such designation shall be reported by each Cabinet Secretary or agency head to the 

Deputy Director for Management of OMB within 30 days of the date of this order. 

Designated officials shall participate in the Interagency Energy Policy Committee, 

described in section 306(d) of this order. The Committee shall communicate its activities 

to all designated officials to assure proper coordination and achievement of the goals and 

requirements of this order. 

Sec. 305. Designation of Agency Energy Teams. Within 90 days of the date of this order, 

each agency shall form a technical support team consisting of appropriate procurement, 

legal, budget, management, and technical representatives to expedite and encourage the 

agency's use of appropriations, Energy Savings Performance Contracts, and other 

alternative financing mechanisms necessary to meet the goals and requirements of this 

order. Agency energy team activities shall be undertaken in collaboration with each 

agency's representative to the Interagency Energy Management Task Force, as described 

in section 306(e) of this order. 

Sec. 306. Interagency Coordination. (a) Office of Management and Budget. The Deputy 

Director for Management of OMB, in consultation with DOE, shall be responsible for 

evaluating each agency's progress in improving energy management and for submitting 

agency energy scorecards to the President to report progress. 

- 50 - 
(1) OMB, in consultation with DOE and other agencies, shall develop the agency energy 

scorecards and scoring system to evaluate each agency's progress in meeting the goals of 

this order. The scoring criteria shall include the extent to which agencies are taking 

advantage of key tools to save energy and reduce greenhouse gas emissions, such as 

Energy Savings Performance Contracts, utility energy-efficiency service contracts, 

ENERGY STAR® and other energy efficient products, renewable energy technologies, 

electricity from renewable energy sources, and other strategies and requirements listed in 

Part 4 of this order, as well as overall efficiency and greenhouse gas metrics and use of 

other innovative energy efficiency practices. The scorecards shall be based on the annual 

energy reports submitted to the President under section 303 of this order. 

(2) The Deputy Director for Management of OMB shall also select outstanding agency 

energy management team(s), from among candidates nominated by DOE, for a new 

annual Presidential award for energy efficiency. 

(b) Federal Energy Management Program. The DOE's Federal Energy Management 

Program (FEMP) shall be responsible for working with the agencies to ensure that they 

meet the goals of this order and report their progress. FEMP, in consultation with OMB, 

shall develop and issue guidelines for agencies' preparation of their annual reports to the 

President on energy management, as required in section 303 of this order. FEMP shall 

also have primary responsibility for collecting and analyzing the data, and shall assist 

OMB in ensuring that agency reports are received in a timely manner. 

(c) President's Management Council. The President's Management Council (PMC), 

chaired by the Deputy Director for Management of OMB and consisting of the Chief 

Operating Officers (usually the Deputy Secretary) of the largest Federal departments and 

agencies, will periodically discuss agencies' progress in improving Federal energy 

management. 

(d) Interagency Energy Policy Committee. This Committee was established by the 

Department of Energy Organization Act. It consists of senior agency officials designated 

in accordance with section 304 of this order. The Committee is responsible for 

encouraging implementation of energy efficiency policies and practices. The major 

energy-consuming agencies designated by DOE are required to participate in the 

Committee. The Committee shall communicate its activities to all designated senior 

agency officials to promote coordination and achievement of the goals of this order. 

(e) Interagency Energy Management Task Force. The Task Force was established by the 

National Energy Conservation Policy Act. It consists of each agency's chief energy 

manager. The Committee shall continue to work toward improving agencies' use of 

energy management tools and sharing information on Federal energy management across 

agencies. 

- 51 - 
Sec. 307. Public/Private Advisory Committee. The Secretary of Energy will appoint an 

advisory committee consisting of representatives from Federal agencies, State 

governments, energy service companies, utility companies, equipment manufacturers, 

construction and architectural companies, environmental, energy and consumer groups, 

and other energy-related organizations. The committee will provide input on Federal 

energy management, including how to improve use of Energy Savings Performance 

Contracts and utility energy-efficiency service contracts, improve procurement of 

ENERGY STAR® and other energy efficient products, improve building design, reduce 

process energy use, and enhance applications of efficient and renewable energy 

technologies at Federal facilities. 

Sec. 308. Applicability. This order applies to all Federal departments and agencies. 

General Services Administration (GSA) is responsible for working with agencies to meet 

the requirements of this order for those facilities for which GSA has delegated operations 

and maintenance authority. The Department of Defense (DOD) is subject to this order to 

the extent that it does not impair or adversely affect military operations and training 

(including tactical aircraft, ships, weapons systems, combat training, and border security). 

Part 4 - Promoting Federal Leadership in Energy Management 

Sec. 401. Life-Cycle Cost Analysis. Agencies shall use life-cycle cost analysis in making 

decisions about their investments in products, services, construction, and other projects to 

lower the Federal Government's costs and to reduce energy and water consumption. 

Where appropriate, agencies shall consider the life-cycle costs of combinations of 

projects, particularly to encourage bundling of energy efficiency projects with renewable 

energy projects. Agencies shall also retire inefficient equipment on an accelerated basis 

where replacement results in lower life-cycle costs. Agencies that minimize life-cycle 

costs with efficiency measures will be recognized in their scorecard evaluations. 

Sec. 402. Facility Energy Audits. Agencies shall continue to conduct energy and water 

audits for approximately 10 percent of their facilities each year, either independently or

through Energy Savings Performance Contracts or utility energy-efficiency service 

contracts. 

Sec. 403. Energy Management Strategies and Tools. Agencies shall use a variety of 

energy management strategies and tools, where life-cycle cost-effective, to meet the goals 

of this order. An agency's use of these strategies and tools shall be taken into account in 

assessing the agency's progress and formulating its score card. 

(a) Financing Mechanisms. Agencies shall maximize their use of available alternative 

financing contracting mechanisms, including Energy Savings Performance Contracts and 

utility energy-efficiency service contracts, when life-cycle cost-effective, to reduce 

energy use and cost in their facilities and operations. Energy Savings Performance 

Contracts, which are authorized under the National Energy Conservation Policy Act, as 

- 52 - 
modified by the Energy Policy Act of 1992, and utility energy-efficiency service 

contracts provide significant opportunities for making Federal facilities more energy 

efficient at no net cost to taxpayers. 

(b) ENERGY STAR® and Other Energy-Efficient Products. 

(1) Agencies shall select, where life-cycle cost-effective, ENERGY STAR® and 

other energy-efficient products when acquiring energy-using products. For 

product groups where ENERGY STAR® labels are not yet available, agencies 

shall select products that are in the upper 25 percent of energy efficiency as 

designated by FEMP. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and DOE 

shall expedite the process of designating products as ENERGY STAR® and will 

merge their current efficiency rating procedures. 

(2) GSA and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), with assistance from EPA and 

DOE, shall create clear catalogue listings that designate these products in both 

print and electronic formats. In addition, GSA and DLA shall undertake pilot 

projects from selected energy-using products to show a "second price tag," which 

means an accounting of the operating and purchase costs of the item, in both 

printed and electronic catalogues and assess the impact of providing this 

information on Federal purchasing decisions. 

(3) Agencies shall incorporate energy-efficient criteria consistent with ENERGY 

STAR® and other FEMP- designated energy efficiency levels into all guide 

specifications and project specifications developed for new construction and 

renovation, as well as into product specification language developed for Basic 

Ordering Agreements, Blanket Purchasing Agreements, Government Wide 

Acquisition Contracts, and all other purchasing procedures. 

(4) DOE and OMB shall also explore the creation of financing agreements with 

private sector suppliers to provide private funding to offset higher up-front costs 

of efficient products. Within 9 months of the date of this order, DOE shall report 

back to the President's Management Council on the viability of such alternative 

financing options. 

(c) ENERGY STAR® Buildings. Agencies shall strive to meet the ENERGY STAR® 

building criteria for energy performance and indoor environmental quality in their 

eligible facilities to the maximum extent practicable by the end of 2002. Agencies may 

use Energy Savings Performance Contracts, utility energy-efficiency service contracts, or 

other means to conduct evaluations and make improvements to buildings in order to meet 

the criteria. Buildings that rank in the top 25 percent in energy efficiency relative to 

comparable commercial and Federal buildings will receive the ENERGY STAR® 

building label. Agencies shall integrate this building rating tool into their general facility 

audits. 

- 53 - 
(d) Sustainable Building Design. DOD and GSA, in consultation with DOE and EPA, 

shall develop sustainable design principles. Agencies shall apply such principles to the 

siting, design, and construction of new facilities. Agencies shall optimize life-cycle costs, 

pollution, and other environmental and energy costs associated with the construction, 

life-cycle operation, and decommissioning of the facility. Agencies shall consider using 

Energy Savings Performance Contracts or utility energy-efficiency service contracts to 

aid them in constructing sustainably designed buildings. 

(e) Model Lease Provisions. Agencies entering into leases, including the renegotiation or 

extension of existing leases, shall incorporate lease provisions that encourage energy and 

water efficiency wherever life-cycle cost-effective. Build-to-suit lease solicitations shall 

contain criteria encouraging sustainable design and development, energy efficiency, and 

verification of building performance. Agencies shall include a preference for buildings

having the ENERGY STAR® building label in their selection criteria for acquiring 

leased buildings. In addition, all agencies shall encourage lessors to apply for the 

ENERGY STAR® building label and to explore and implement projects that would 

reduce costs to the Federal Government, including projects carried out through the 

lessors' Energy Savings Performance Contracts or utility energy-efficiency service 

contracts. 

(f) Industrial Facility Efficiency Improvements. Agencies shall explore efficiency 

opportunities in industrial facilities for steam systems, boiler operation, air compressor 

systems, industrial processes, and fuel switching, including cogeneration and other 

efficiency and renewable energy technologies. 

(g) Highly Efficient Systems. Agencies shall implement district energy systems, and 

other highly efficient systems, in new construction or retrofit projects when life-cycle 

cost-effective. Agencies shall consider combined cooling, heat, and power when 

upgrading and assessing facility power needs and shall use combined cooling, heat, and 

power systems when life-cycle cost-effective. Agencies shall survey local natural 

resources to optimize use of available biomass, bioenergy, geothermal, or other naturally 

occurring energy sources. 

(h) Off-Grid Generation. Agencies shall use off-grid generation systems, including solar 

hot water, solar electric, solar outdoor lighting, small wind turbines, fuel cells, and other 

off-grid alternatives, where such systems are life-cycle cost-effective and offer benefits 

including energy efficiency, pollution prevention, source energy reductions, avoided 

infrastructure costs, or expedited service. 

Sec. 404. Electricity Use. To advance the greenhouse gas and renewable energy goals of 

this order, and reduce source energy use, each agency shall strive to use electricity from

clean, efficient, and renewable energy sources. An agency's efforts in purchasing 

electricity from efficient and renewable energy sources shall be taken into account in 

assessing the agency's progress and formulating its scorecard. 

- 54 - 
(a) Competitive Power. Agencies shall take advantage of competitive opportunities in the 

electricity and natural gas markets to reduce costs and enhance services. Agencies are 

encouraged to aggregate demand across facilities or agencies to maximize their economic 

advantage. 

(b) Reduced Greenhouse Gas Intensity of Electric Power. When selecting electricity 

providers, agencies shall purchase electricity from sources that use high efficiency 

electric generating technologies when life-cycle cost-effective. Agencies shall consider 

the greenhouse gas intensity of the source of the electricity and strive to minimize the 

greenhouse gas intensity of purchased electricity. 

(c) Purchasing Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources. 

(1) Each agency shall evaluate its current use of electricity from renewable 

energy sources and report this level in its annual report to the President. Based 

on this review, each agency should adopt policies and pursue projects that 

increase the use of such electricity. Agencies should include provisions for the 

purchase of electricity from renewable energy sources as a component of their 

requests for bids whenever procuring electricity. Agencies may use savings 

from energy efficiency projects to pay additional incremental costs of 

electricity from renewable energy sources. 

(2) In evaluating opportunities to comply with this section, agencies should 

consider my Administration's goal of tripling nonhydroelectric renewable 

energy capacity in the United States by 2010, the renewable portfolio standard 

specified in the restructuring guidelines for the State in which the facility is 

located, GSA's efforts to make electricity from renewable energy sources 

available to Federal electricity purchasers, and EPA's guidelines on crediting 

renewable energy power in implementation of Clean Air Act standards. 

Sec. 405. Mobile Equipment. Each agency shall seek to improve the design, construction, 

and operation of its mobile equipment, and shall implement all life-cycle cost-effective

energy efficiency measures that result in cost savings while improving mission 

performance. To the extent that such measures are life-cycle cost-effective, agencies shall 

consider enhanced use of alternative or renewable-based fuels. 

Sec. 406. Management and Government Performance. Agencies shall use the following 

management strategies in meeting the goals of this order. 

(a) Awards. Agencies shall use employee incentive programs to reward exceptional 

performance in implementing this order. 

- 55 - 
(b) Performance Evaluations. Agencies shall include successful implementation of 

provisions of this order in areas such as Energy Savings Performance Contracts, 

sustainable design, energy efficient procurement, energy efficiency, water conservation, 

and renewable energy projects in the position descriptions and performance evaluations 

of agency heads, members of the agency energy team, principal program managers, heads 

of field offices, facility managers, energy managers, and other appropriate employees. 

(c) Retention of Savings and Rebates. Agencies granted statutory authority to retain a 

portion of savings generated from efficient energy and water management are encouraged 

to permit the retention of the savings at the facility or site where the savings occur to 

provide greater incentive for that facility and its site managers to undertake more energy 

management initiatives, invest in renewable energy systems, and purchase electricity 

from renewable energy sources. 

(d) Training and Education. Agencies shall ensure that all appropriate personnel receive 

training for implementing this order. 

(1) DOE, DOD, and GSA shall provide relevant training or training materials for 

those programs that they make available to all Federal agencies relating to the 

energy management strategies contained in this order. 

(2) The Federal Acquisition Institute and the Defense Acquisition University shall 

incorporate into existing procurement courses information on Federal energy 

management tools, including Energy Savings Performance Contracts, utility 

energy-efficiency service contracts, ENERGY STAR® and other energy-efficient 

products, and life-cycle cost analysis. 

(3) All agencies are encouraged to develop outreach programs that include 

education, training, and promotion of ENERGY STAR® and other energyefficient products for Federal purchase card users. These programs may include 

promotions with billing statements, user training, catalogue awareness, and 

exploration of vendor data collection of purchases. 

(e) Showcase Facilities. Agencies shall designate exemplary new and existing facilities 

with significant public access and exposure as showcase facilities to highlight energy or 

water efficiency and renewable energy improvements. 

Part 5 - Technical Assistance 

Sec. 501. Within 120 days of this order, the Director of OMB shall: 

(a) Develop and issue guidance to agency budget officers on preparation of annual 

funding requests associated with the implementation of the order for the FY 2001 budget; 

- 56 - 
(b) In collaboration with the Secretary of Energy, explain to agencies how to retain 

savings and reinvest in other energy and water management projects; and 

(c) In collaboration with the Secretary of Energy through the Office of Federal 

Procurement Policy, periodically brief agency procurement executives on the use of 

Federal energy management tools, including Energy Savings Performance Contracts, 

utility energy-efficiency service contracts, and procurement of energy efficient products 

and electricity from renewable energy sources. 

Sec. 502. Within 180 days of this order, the Secretary of Energy, in collaboration with 

other agency heads, shall: 

(a) Issue guidelines to assist agencies in measuring energy per square foot, per unit of 

production, or other applicable unit in industrial, laboratory, research, and other energyintensive facilities; 

(b) Establish criteria for determining which facilities are exempt from the order. In 

addition, DOE must provide guidance for agencies to report proposed exemptions; 

(c) Develop guidance to assist agencies in calculating appropriate energy baselines for 

previously exempt facilities and facilities occupied after 1990 in order to measure 

progress toward goals; 

(d) Issue guidance to clarify how agencies determine the life-cycle cost for investments

required by the order, including how to compare different energy and fuel options and 

assess the current tools; 

(e) Issue guidance for providing credit toward energy efficiency goals for cost-effective 

projects where source energy use declines but site energy use increases; and 

(f) Provide guidance to assist each agency to determine a baseline of water consumption. 

Sec. 503. Within 1 year of this order, the Secretary of Energy, in collaboration with other 

agency heads, shall: 

(a) Provide guidance for counting renewable and highly efficient energy projects and 

purchases of electricity from renewable and highly efficient energy sources toward 

agencies' progress in reaching greenhouse gas and energy reduction goals; 

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(b) Develop goals for the amount of energy generated at Federal facilities from renewable 

energy technologies; 

(c) Support efforts to develop standards for the certification of low environmental impact 

hydropower facilities in order to facilitate the Federal purchase of such power; 

(d) Work with GSA and DLA to develop a plan for purchasing advanced energy products 

in bulk quantities for use in by multiple agencies; 

(e) Issue guidelines for agency use estimating the greenhouse gas emissions attributable 

to facility energy use. These guidelines shall include emissions associated with the 

production, transportation and use of energy consumed in Federal facilities; and 

(f) Establish water conservation goals for Federal agencies. 

Sec. 504. Within 120 days of this order, the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator 

of GSA, in consultation with other agency heads, shall develop and issue sustainable 

design and development principles for the siting, design, and construction of new 

facilities. 

Sec. 505. Within 180 days of this order, the Administrator of GSA, in collaboration with 

the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and other agency heads, shall: 

(a) Develop and issue guidance to assist agencies in ensuring that all project cost

estimates, bids, and agency budget requests for design, construction, and renovation of 

facilities are based on life-cycle costs. Incentives for contractors involved in facility 

design and construction must be structured to encourage the contractors to design and 

build at the lowest life-cycle cost; 

(b) Make information available on opportunities to purchase electricity from renewable 

energy sources as defined by this order. This information should accommodate relevant 

State regulations and be updated periodically based on technological advances and 

market changes, at least every 2 years; 

(c) Develop Internet-based tools for both GSA and DLA customers to assist individual 

and agency purchasers in identifying and purchasing ENERGY STAR® and other 

energy-efficient products for acquisition; and 

(d) Develop model lease provisions that incorporate energy efficiency and sustainable 

design. 

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Part 6 - General Provisions 

Sec. 601. Compliance by Independent Agencies. Independent agencies are encouraged to 

comply with the provisions of this order. 

Sec. 602. Waivers. If an agency determines that a provision in this order is inconsistent 

with its mission, the agency may ask DOE for a waiver of the provision. DOE will 

include a list of any waivers it grants in its Federal Energy Management Program annual 

report to the Congress. 

Sec. 603. Scope. (a) This order is intended only to improve the internal management of 

the Executive branch and is not intended to create any right, benefit, or trust 

responsibility, substantive or procedural, enforceable by law by a party against the United 

States, its agencies, its officers, or any other person. 

(b) This order applies to agency facilities in any State of the United States, the District of 

Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the United 

States Virgin Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands, and any other territory or possession 

over which the United States has jurisdiction. Agencies with facilities outside of these 

areas, however, are encouraged to make best efforts to comply with the goals of this

order for those facilities. In addition, agencies can report energy improvements made 

outside the United States in their annual report to the President; these improvements may 

be considered in agency scorecard evaluations. 

Sec. 604. Revocations. Executive Order 12902 of March 9, 1994, Executive Order 12759 

of April 17, 1991, and Executive Order 12845 of April 21, 1993, are revoked. 

Sec. 605. Amendments to Federal Regulations. The Federal Acquisition Regulation and 

other Federal regulations shall be amended to reflect changes made by this order, including 

an amendment to facilitate agency purchases of electricity from renewable energy sources. 

Part 7 – Definitions 

For the purposes of this order: 

Sec. 701. "Acquisition" means acquiring by contract supplies or services (including 

construction) by and for the use of the Federal Government through purchase or lease, 

whether the supplies or services are already in existence or must be created, developed, 

demonstrated, and evaluated. Acquisition begins at the point when agency needs are 

established and includes the description of requirements to satisfy agency needs, 

solicitation and selection of sources, award of contracts, contract financing, contract 

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performance, contract administration, and those technical and management functions 

directly related to the process of fulfilling agency needs by contract. 

Sec. 702. "Agency" means an Executive agency as defined in 5 U.S.C. 105. For the 

purpose of this order, military departments, as defined in 5 U.S.C. 102, are covered under 

the auspices of DOD. 

Sec. 703. "Energy Savings Performance Contract" means a contract that provides for the 

performance of services for the design, acquisition, financing, installation, testing, 

operation, and where appropriate, maintenance and repair, of an identified energy or 

water conservation measure or series of measures at one or more locations. Such 

contracts shall provide that the contractor must incur costs of implementing energy 

savings measures, including at least the cost (if any) incurred in making energy audits, 

acquiring and installing equipment, and training personnel in exchange for a 

predetermined share of the value of the energy savings directly resulting from

implementation of such measures during the term of the contract. Payment to the 

contractor is contingent upon realizing a guaranteed stream of future energy and cost 

savings. All additional savings will accrue to the Federal Government. 

Sec. 704. "Exempt facility" or "Exempt mobile equipment" means a facility or a piece of 

mobile equipment for which an agency uses DOE-established criteria to determine that 

compliance with the Energy Policy Act of 1992 or this order is not practical. 

Sec. 705. "Facility" means any individual building or collection of buildings, grounds, or 

structure, as well as any fixture or part thereof, including the associated energy- or waterconsuming support systems, which is constructed, renovated, or purchased in whole or in 

part for use by the Federal Government. It includes leased facilities where the Federal 

Government has a purchase option or facilities planned for purchase. In any provision of 

this order, the term "facility" also includes any building 100 percent leased for use by the 

Federal Government where the Federal Government pays directly or indirectly for the 

utility costs associated with its leased space. The term also includes Government-owned 

contractor-operated facilities. 

Sec. 706. "Industrial facility" means any fixed equipment, building, or complex for 

production, manufacturing, or other processes that uses large amounts of capital 

equipment in connection with, or as part of, any process or system, and within which the 

majority of energy use is not devoted to the heating, cooling, lighting, ventilation, or to 

service the water heating energy load requirements of the facility. 

Sec. 707. "Life-cycle costs" means the sum of the present values of investment costs, 

capital costs, installation costs, energy costs, operating costs, maintenance costs, and 

disposal costs, over the lifetime of the project, product, or measure. Additional guidance 

on measuring life-cycle costs is specified in 10 C.F.R. 436.19. 

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Sec. 708. "Life-cycle cost-effective" means the life-cycle costs of a product, project, or 

measure are estimated to be equal to or less than the base case (i.e., current or standard

practice or product). Additional guidance on measuring cost-effectiveness is specified in 

10 C.F.R. 436.18 (a), (b), and (c), 436.20, and 436.21. 

Sec. 709. "Mobile equipment" means all Federally owned ships, aircraft, and nonroad 

vehicles. 

Sec. 710. "Renewable energy" means energy produced by solar, wind, geothermal, and 

biomass power. 

Sec. 711. "Renewable energy technology" means technologies that use renewable energy 

to provide light, heat, cooling, or mechanical or electrical energy for use in facilities or

other activities. The term also means the use of integrated whole-building designs that 

rely upon renewable energy resources, including passive solar design. 

Sec. 712. "Source energy" means the energy that is used at a site and consumed in 

producing and in delivering energy to a site, including, but not limited to, power 

generation, transmission, and distribution losses, and that is used to perform a specific 

function, such as space conditioning, lighting or water heating. 

Sec. 713. "Utility" means public agencies and privately owned companies that market, 

generate, and/or distribute energy or water, including electricity, natural gas, manufactured 

gas, steam, hot water, and chilled water as commodities for public use and that provide the 

service under Federal, State, or local regulated authority to all authorized customers. 

Utilities include Federally owned nonprofit producers, municipal organizations, and 

investor or privately owned producers regulated by a State and/or the Federal 

Government; cooperatives owned by members and providing services mostly to their 

members; and other nonprofit State and local government agencies serving in this 

capacity. 

Sec. 714. "Utility energy-efficiency service" means demand-side management services 

provided by a utility to improve the efficiency of use of the commodity (electricity, gas, 

etc.) being distributed. Services can include, but are not limited to, energy efficiency and 

renewable energy project auditing, financing, design, installation, operation, 

maintenance, and monitoring. 

William J. Clinton 

The White House, June 3, 1999 

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Appendix E: Glossary of Terms 

AEF: Air Expeditionary Force 

AEW: Air Expeditionary Wing 

AOR: Area of Responsibility 

ASIP: Aircraft Structural Integrity Program

BDI: Bomb Damage Indication 

CAIG: Cost Analysis and Improvement Group 

CALCM Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile 

CAS: Close Air Support 

CONPLAN: Concept of Operations Plan 

CONOPs: Concept of Operations 

CONUS: Continental United States

COTS Commercial Off The Shelf 

Counterair: Operations conducted to attain/maintain air superiority by destroying/neutralizing 

enemy (air) forces (may include air-air, air-ground, and ground-air operations) 

• Defensive Counterair (DCA): Operations to detect, identify, intercept, destroy enemy air 

and missile forces attempting to penetrate/attack friendly airspace 

• Defensive Couterair (OCA): Operations to destroy, disrupt or limit enemy airpower as 

close to its source as possible (normally over enemy territory) 

Counterland: 

• Close Air Support (CAS): Air actions against hostile forces which are in close proximity to 

friendly ground forces and which required detailed coordination with the fire and 

movement of the supported ground forces. 

• Interdiction: Air actions to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s surface military 

potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. 

Joint: Operations involving more than one military service from the same nation (i.e., 

multiservice) 

Combined: Operations Involving (one or more) services from more than one nation (i.e., 

multinational) 

DMS: Diminishing Manufacturing Sources 

DSB Defense Science Board 

ECM Electronic Countermeasures 

EMD: Engineering and Manufacturing Development 

EPNdB Effective Perceived Noise Level (dB) 

ESPC: Energy Savings Performance Contracting 

EO: Executive Order 

FOD Foreign Object Damage 

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FOL: Forward Operating Location 

FSA: Future Strike Aircraft 

FSIP: Functional Systems Integrity Program

GWAPS: Gulf War Air Power Survey 

JASSM Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile 

JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition 

JSOW Joint Standoff Weapon 

LRSA: Long-Range Strike Aircraft 

M&V: Measurement and Verification 

MAP: Mission Area Plan 

MC: Mission Capable 

MOB: Main Operating Base 

MRSPs: Mobility Readiness Spares Packages

MTW: Major Theater War 

NGBS: Next Generation Bomber Study 

OC-ALC: Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, location of B-52H System Program Office 

OEF: Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) 

OEM: Original Equipment Manufacturer 

OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense 

SA: Situational Awareness 

SEAD: Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses 

SECAF: Secretary of the Air Force 

SIOP: Strategic Integrated Operational Plan

SPO: System Program Office 

SOF: Special Operating Forces 

SSC Small Scale Contingency 

Strategic Attack: Operations carried out directly against enemy’s centers of gravity to degrade 

capability and will to carry out aggressive actions (typical targets--command and 

control, electrical power, petroleum, industry, weapons manufacturing, logistics 

support). Often directed against “heartland”-- may bypass enemy’s forces in the 

field. 

TAI Total Aircraft Inventory 

UCAV Unmanned (Uninhabited) Combat Air Vehicle 

USSTRATCOM: United States Strategic Command 

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