TAMING THE NEXT SET OF STRATEGIC 

WEAPONS THREATS

Edited by

Henry Sokolski

June 2006

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iii

CONTENTS

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

I. Life in a Well-Armed Crowd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

1. Alternative Proliferation and Alliance Futures in East Asia 

Stephen J. Kim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

2. Proliferation in the Middle East: Who is Next after Iran? 

Patrick Clawson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

3. Nuclear 1914: The Next Big Worry

Henry D. Sokolski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

II. New Proliferation Worries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

4. Missile Defense Cooperation and the Missile Technology 

Control Regime

Mitchell Kugler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

5. A Fresh Examination of the Proliferation Dangers

of Light Water Reactors

Victor Gilinsky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

6. Coping with Biological Threats after SARS

Alan P. Zelicoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

III. What Can be Done . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

7. New Missiles and Models for Cooperation

Dennis M. Gormley and Richard Speier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

8. German Nuclear Policy

Ernst Urich von Weizsäcker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

9. President Bush’s Global Nonproliferation Policy: 

Seven More Steps

Henry D. Sokolski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

About the Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175



INTRODUCTION

Long discounted by arms control critics, traditional nonproliferation 

efforts now are undergoing urgent review and reconsideration even by their 

supporters. Why? In large part, because the current crop of nonproliferation 

understandings are ill-suited to check the spread of emerging long-range 

missile, biological, and nuclear technologies. 

Attempts to develop a legally binding inspections protocol to the 

Biological Weapons Convention, for example, were recently rejected by 

U.S. officials as being inadequate to catch serious violators while being 

prone to set off false alarms against perfectly innocent actors. Missile 

defense and unmanned air vehicle (UAV) related technologies, meanwhile, 

are proliferating for a variety of perfectly defensive and peaceful civilian 

applications. This same know-how can be used to defeat U.S. and allied 

air and missile defenses in new ways that are far more stressful than 

the existing set of ballistic missile threats. Unfortunately, the Missile 

Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is not yet optimized to cope with 

these challenges. Finally, nuclear technologies have become much more 

difficult to control. New centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities and 

relatively small fuel reprocessing plants can now be built and hidden much 

more readily than nuclear fuel-making plants that were operating when 

the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the bulk of International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections procedures were first devised 

30 or more years ago.

This volume is designed to highlight what might happen if these 

emerging threats go unattended and how best to mitigate them. The book, 

which features research the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center 

commissioned, is divided into three sections. The first, Life in a Well-Armed 

Crowd, focuses on what a world proliferated with these technologies 

might look like. The first chapter, “Alternative Proliferation and Alliance 

Futures in East Asia” by Stephen Kim of the Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory, projects how the United States, Japan, Korea, and China will 

relate and compete with one another as each becomes more competent to 

deploy strategic weaponry. The good news is that further proliferation and 

war in the Far East are not inevitable. The bad news is that it will take 

considerable effort to avoid this fate. 

Much is the same in the Middle East as Patrick Clawson of the Washington 

Institute makes clear in Chapter 2, “Proliferation in the Middle East: Who 

is Next after Iran?” Here, the lynch pin for further proliferation is Iran. 

Certainly, if Iran is able to edge toward nuclear bomb making capabilities 
vi

with impunity, Tehran’s neighbors are likely to hedge their security bets 

by developing strategic weapons options of their own. 

This, then, brings us to this section’s final chapter, “Nuclear 1914: The 

Next Big Worry.” In it, I argue that the greatest security danger renewed 

strategic arms proliferation presents is not the increased chance of nuclear 

theft or terrorism, so much as the increasing difficulty small and large 

nations will have in determining who they can rely upon and how militarily 

capable they might be. In such a world, even the best plans and diplomatic 

hedging may be incapable of preventing miscalculation and war, much as 

was the case in 1914 with World War I.

The book’s second section, New Proliferation Worries, details three of the 

most important emerging proliferation technology threats we face—the 

spread of new biological, missile, and nuclear technologies. As detailed 

in Mitchell Kugler’s chapter, “Missile Defense Cooperation and the 

Missile Technology Control Regime,” the United States has a clear desire 

to encourage missile defense cooperation with its friends and allies even 

though key portions of the technologies in question are restricted by the 

MTCR. Mr. Kugler of the Boeing Corporation makes it clear that he believes 

the case for sharing this technology is stronger than the case for restricting 

it. He believes that the MTCR should be changed to allow such commerce, 

or it should be put aside. 

Current nuclear controls also are being challenged by emerging 

technology, as former U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissioner Victor 

Gilinsky makes clear in his comprehensive chapter, “A Fresh Examination 

of the Proliferation Dangers of Light Water Reactors.” This detailed history 

and technical analysis of the proliferation resistance of the most popular 

type of power reactor concludes that the current international nuclear 

safeguards system needs to be modified to cope with the new risks that a 

proliferating state might divert the fresh or spent fuel from these machines 

to small, covert reprocessing or enrichment plants that could bring a state 

within days of having a small arsenal of weapons. 

In the biological weapons threat field, current control approaches are 

also in desperate need of help. Dr. Allan Zelicoff explains precisely what 

can and is being done that can be of immediate use with health monitoring 

in his chapter, “Coping with Biological Threats after SARS.” What is 

reassuring is how much public health monitoring can and has accomplished 

to identify and immediately treat outbreaks of infectious disease. What is 

challenging is how much more can and needs to be done. All of this is laid 

out in Dr. Zelicoff’s chapter.

This brings us to the book’s final section, What Can Be Done. In the 

missile technology area, Dennis Gormley and Richard Speier identify 
vii

what specific new missile defense and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) 

technologies should be added to the MTCR control lists. Their chapter, 

“New Missiles and Models for Cooperation,” also explains how the United 

States and other advanced states might share UAV services and turn-key 

missile systems rather than handing over the means for their production or, 

in the case of missile defenses, the countermeasures technologies needed 

to defeat them.

In the nuclear field, the key recommendation of the chairman of the 

German Bundestag’s committee on energy and the environment is not 

to push nuclear power beyond what the market itself might otherwise 

demand. Certainly, if nuclear power is pushed with government subsidies 

too hard or too fast, there is a risk that the proliferation problems noted 

in Victor Gilinsky’s analysis could come far sooner than the safeguards 

upgrades that are needed to keep them at bay. The way out here is to 

buy more time as Ernst Ulrich Von Weizsäcker explains in his chapter, 

“German Nuclear Policy.” Specifically, he argues that we need to focus 

first on promoting the most economical way to extend energy supplies, 

through increased efficiencies and productivity for whatever amount of 

energy is available.

What are we to do with the time this might buy? In the book’s 

concluding chapter, “President Bush’s Global Nonproliferation Policy,” 

the author details a series of steps that build on the proposals President 

Bush made in a February 11, 2004, speech on nuclear proliferation at the 

National Defense University in Washington, DC. All of these proposals 

deserve attention. This is especially so given the shocks the NPT and the 

IAEA have felt since the mid-l990s from Iraqi, North Korean, and Iranian 

noncompliance, Pakistan’s proliferation activities under A. Q. Khan, and, 

most recently, the U.S. offer of civilian nuclear assistance to India, a nuclear 

weapons state outside of the NPT. As always, it is uncertain if we and 

our friends will take action. The hope is that this book and the writings of 

others will make clear that the price of failing to do so is sure to exceed the 

costs of any attempt.



SECTION I

LIFE IN A WELL-ARMED CROWD



CHAPTER 1

ALTERNATIVE PROLIFERATION 

AND ALLIANCE FUTURES IN EAST ASIA

Stephen J. Kim

The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism 

and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking 

weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing 

so with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to 

succeed. ... History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger 

but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to 

peace and security is the path of action.

President George Bush1

A central pillar of U.S. national security strategy is to control 

the spread of nuclear weapons. In pursuit of that objective, bilateral 

alliances emerge more important and pertinent than ever. If the 

United States and its East Asian allies can strengthen their existing 

bilateral relationships, and if the United States and China can come 

to a clearer bilateral understanding, nuclear proliferation in East Asia 

can be curtailed. The consequence of abandoning such alternatives 

could potentially be devastating.

I believe that if the United States shies away from existing treaties 

and alliances due to anti-American sentiments or for fear of appearing 

anachronistic, then doomsday exhortations will go past paranoia 

and become reality.2 Anywhere from 12 to 20 nuclear powers will 

emerge in the next 2 decades. Terrorists and nonstate actors will 

exploit this worldwide proliferation as a succession of East Asian 

states go nuclear—North Korea, followed by South Korea, then 

Japan, then Taiwan.3 An alarmed China would not sit idly by while 

being encircled by an island chain of democratic nuclear powers. 

In the absence of a strong U.S. presence and influence in East Asia, 

buttressed by its existing treaties and alliances, East Asia in 2025 

looks bleak.


But I believe that if the United States strengthens, renews, and 

revamps its existing bilateral treaty alliances with Japan and South 

Korea, the nuclear temptation in East Asia could be dampened. That 

is, if the United States maintains its nuclear deterrence umbrella over 

Japan and South Korea, North Korea’s nuclear breakout will not 

lead governments in Tokyo and Seoul to seek an indigenous nuclear 

option. Concurrent with the strengthening of existing treaties and 

alliances in East Asia, the United States will also need to reach a new 

bilateral understanding with China over the proliferation of nuclear 

weapons.

What We Want.

One can envision some ideal scenarios for East Asia in 2025. One 

can project an economically vibrant China with its nuclear capability 

remaining at about the current level of 35 weapons without multiple 

independent reentry vehicle (MIRV) capability, a unified Korea 

shorn of nuclear capability, a rejuvenated Japan without nuclear 

weapons, and a perfunctory U.S. military presence in Guam. Trade 

and investment issues would largely overshadow security concerns 

or worries about a heavy U.S. footprint in East Asia.

One can hope that by 2025, China will have abolished the laogai, 

the Chinese prison camps akin to the Soviet gulag, and that Japan will 

have thoroughly deromanticized the sentiment and philosophical 

rationale behind the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, a 

political, psychological, and intellectual tool wielded to great effect 

by Japanese militarists to justify colonial rule over Korea, Taiwan, 

and Manchuria.

One can hope that the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing will 

encourage reformist factions within the Chinese Communist Party 

(CCP). If economic growth were to continue at today’s pace and if the 

Chinese government were to relax control over loans and property, 

there is a possibility that the CCP could evolve into a dominant party 

with various factions akin to Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). 

Chinese Vice Minister of Commerce Ma Xiuhong recently predicted 

that China will quadruple “its GDP of the year 2000 by 2020.”4

One can hope that such a development can serve as an impetus 

for the emergence of a semi-democratic China by 2025. No one 


expects U.S.-style democracy to emerge from the devolution of the 

CCP, but one holds out hope for a China with limited free elections 

and some freedom of the press. Democratic centralism could evolve 

along the lines envisioned by Eduard Bernstein rather than Peng 

Zhen and the Eight Immortals. Such expectations are not pie-in-thesky speculations. After all, no one could have imagined in 1978 that 

Deng Xiaoping’s China would permit Hooters restaurants to operate 

26 years later in 2004, even if it is Shanghai.

China can continue to serve as a market for thriving and mature 

economies. Trade between India and China more than doubled 

between 2001 and 2003.5 South Korean, Taiwanese, and Japanese 

investments in China are large and growing. Such a China would 

have no reason to fear Japan, a unified Korea or the presence of U.S. 

forces in East Asia.

One can hope that North Korea does not exist by 2025. One may 

hope that North Korea implodes from within (due to some critical 

external pressures) and that a benign military dictatorship assumes 

power after the fall of Kim Jong Il. If China blocks its 800-km border 

with North Korea and the United States and South Korea maintain 

the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), the fear of millions of refugees 

pouring into Seoul or northern China would dissipate. China fears 

North Korean refugees due to the potential ramifications for its own 

regime security arising from the social and economic instability the 

refugees might bring.

One can imagine that new investments from South Korea, Japan, 

China, Australia, the European Union (EU), and the United States 

could pour into this “refugee-contained” North Korea teeming with 

a large pool of literate, skilled, and cheap North Koreans eager for 

work and real wages. Nongovernmental organizations and programs 

(i.e., the United Nations [UN] and the World Food Program) would 

continue to dispense humanitarian and food aid. Given its cultural 

and linguistical ties, South Korea could take the lead in these 

initiatives by promising 200 tons of rice every year, a pittance for the 

country.

As for reunification, one holds out the hope that the new 

leadership would elect to unify peacefully with a prosperous South 

Korea into a single democratic Korea, tied firmly to the United 

States, if not militarily then economically.6 There are two schools 


of thought on Korean unification. The first school emphasizes that 

Koreans are one people of a singular culture. In this view, economic 

difficulties of unification are secondary to physical unification. The 

second school holds that South Korea will absorb North Korea. In 

this view, North Korea’s nuclear weapons will merely fall into the 

lap of a unified Korea, and the resultant large pool of labor would be 

used to compete with an emerging China. Both of these schools of 

thought are anchored on the optimistic assumption that South Korea 

would take the lead—with its democracy, free markets, wealth, and 

freedom.

One can hope that Japan faces up to its colonial and imperial 

past, apologizes unequivocally once and for all to Koreans, Chinese, 

Taiwanese and Filipinos, and suppresses its expansionist nationalism. 

One hopes that there shall be no nostalgia for the Kwantung Army 

mentality among military leaders, no reversion to the hesitation and 

weakness of the Fumimaro Konoe government, and no repeat of 

any whiff of a Marco Polo Bridge incident in July 1937 to justify the 

advancement of any irrendentist or revanchistic goals. One hopes 

Japan will emerge as a “normal” country, amending its pacifist 

Constitution without alarming its neighbors.7

This “new” Japan would continue to welcome U.S. forces without 

striving for nuclear capability. Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda 

made an impassioned argument against Japan going nuclear: 

“Currently, Japan need not, and should not, have a nuclear deterrent. 

Japan having such arms would be a threat to other countries, and it 

would be tragic if that led to (further) nuclear proliferation.”8 For 

the time being, Fukuda’s argument still holds sway in the LDP 

establishment and the general public. With a rejuvenated economy, 

Japan would be able to spread its capital and wealth throughout a 

unified Korea, China, and the world markets. That would be some 

East Asia.

What We Do Not Want.

But what about alternative futures we do not want to see in 2025? 

It is easier to be a pessimist because one has selective recourse to 

the data of history. One remains anxious as to whether the lure of 

past glory and regional predominance tugs at the heart of Chinese 


or Japanese leaders. In their long histories, China has rarely been 

democratic; Japan has rarely been pacifistic; Korea has rarely been 

unhindered by great power conflicts. The withdrawal of U.S. forces 

that would accompany the abrogation of our treaty and alliance 

commitments in East Asia would likely harbinger a future reeking 

with the unpleasantness and chauvinism of East Asia’s past.

Rather than serving as a rally point for reform and genuine 

opening of the society, the 2008 Beijing Olympic games could be 

used as a bugle for Chinese nationalism. If the United States and 

China fail to reach a clear understanding about nuclear proliferation, 

the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea and Japan will only 

embolden a confident and assertive China. Chinese nationalists will 

want to throw their weight around East Asia. In this environment, I 

believe that as soon as China achieves domestic stability, it will try to 

penetrate culturally into neighboring countries. The Chin, Sui, Tang, 

and Qing dynasties were not exceptions. As soon as it feels that it 

has achieved its original target for economic reforms, and buttressed 

by its confident nationalistic impulses, China is likely to claim, at a 

minimum, its regional power hegemony in East Asia.9

The next generation of Chinese nationalist leaders suffers little 

in confidence, panache, or assertiveness. On May 7, 1999, during 

Operation ALLIED FORCE, U.S. forces mistakenly struck the Chinese 

Embassy in Belgrade. The young Chinese vice president condemned 

the bombing and “allowed” anti-U.S. demonstrations. He argued that 

these demonstrations “fully reflect the Chinese people’s great fury 

at the atrocity of the embassy attacks by NATO [the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization] and the Chinese people’s strong patriotism.”10

The voice belonged to none other than Hu Jintao.

The October 15, 2004, launching of Shenzhou V to space is a source 

of great national pride in China. Lieutenant Colonel Yang Liwei is a 

hero.11 One suspects that China will forge ahead aggressively with 

is space program as well as attempt to acquire MIRV capability by 

2025. Even as it faces rising unemployment, the Chinese military 

has announced its intention to modernize the People’s Liberation 

Army (PLA) for the 21st century. A China insecure about the “three 

Ts”—Taiwan, Tibet, and Tiananmen—will mean a more threatening, 

paranoid China.12


Japan has begun to “talk” about the possession of nuclear 

weapons. That in itself may signal a portentous change. One fears that 

if the United States is lukewarm in sharing high-tech conventional 

capabilities or back-pedals on promises to share missile defense 

technology, Japanese nationalists will clamor for an independent 

nuclear capability.13 Kenzo Yoneda has been especially vocal in 

challenging the nuclear “taboo,” arguing that the United States may 

not automatically and unconditionally come to wield its sword in 

defense of Japan.14

Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba pushes aggressively for missile 

defense cooperation with the United States, and young politicians 

petition for a new security system for the new century.15 Deputy 

Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe has stated that Japan needs to 

rethink its fundamental values as a nation.16

The apotheosis of Japanese conservative nationalism, Tokyo 

Governor Shintaro Ishihara, has insulted China by ridiculing its 

recent space flight: “The Chinese are ignorant, so they’re overjoyed. 

That (spaceship) was an outdated one. If Japan wanted to do it, 

we could do it in 1 year.” In the same week, Ishihara insulted his 

other Asian neighbor. Resuscitating the “arrogance” of Japanese 

imperialism, Ishihara said Koreans chose Japanese annexation of 

their country in 1910. Ishihara added salt to the Korean wound: 

“. . . the annexation was the fault of their ancestors, and even though 

Japan’s rule was in the form of colonialism, it was advanced and 

humanitarian.”17 No one has yet heard strong condemnation of these 

remarks from prominent Japanese politicians and academics.

Other ominous signs of Japanese nationalism are the rapid 

growth of youth nationalist societies, some of which have inserted 

themselves in the island disputes between Japan and China on the 

South China Sea, especially over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Tai). 

Due to the North Korean threat, the general mood in Japan is one of 

a terrified atmosphere, a feeling of powerlessness. Reports of “North 

Korean guided missiles threaten Japan” are plastered everywhere. 

There is a feeling of chaos, that civilian leaders are not up to the 

challenges of the times—with uncomfortable echoes of a leaderless, 

drifting Japan of the Taisho period of the 1920s and 1930s. Japanese 

nationalists are and will continue to gain political and social ground 

in Japan.


One fears that the North Korean problem will exacerbate. North 

Korea may not collapse. Though some 8-10 percent of its 22 million 

population have starved to death or have fled, there are little overt 

signs that the regime will collapse any time soon, though the strength 

of its stability may be overemphasized. Many Western observers 

assessed that North Korea would not last beyond 5 years during the 

1993-94 nuclear negotiations, and key policy decisions were made 

on that “mistaken” assumption. Credible reports of North Korean 

diversion of food and humanitarian aid to its military are coming 

in.18

By 2025, North Korea may have proven its nuclear capability to 

the world. A North Korean nuclear breakout is worrisome for the 

effect it would have on states outside of East Asia. Arguing that, “the 

only possible way for nations who want to survive proudly and live 

independently is to be strong and grow muscles of their own,” Iran 

has declared, “We must believe that the proper and effective way 

is that which has been opted by North Korea.”19 Iran lacks neither 

money nor ambition, and it is only a matter of time before it acquires 

nuclear capability.

The normal standards of economic and moral constraints are 

inapplicable to North Korea. Though North Korea spends some $5.2 

billion on its military, some 11 percent of its gross domestic product 

(GDP), it has ostensibly been able to advance its nuclear program. 

North Korea is considered to possess materials to make one or two 

nuclear weapons. Some estimate that it could produce five or six 

nuclear weapons in a relatively short time.20 As worrisome as its 

nuclear weapons program, North Korea’s advancement in ballistic 

missiles may be even more disturbing.21

There is a good chance that by 2025, North Korea may have 

succeeded in developing ballistic missiles (Taepo Dong II) with 

tighter circular error probables (CEPs) that could hit targets all across 

the United States. The Kim Jong Il regime may still be in power by 

2025, having struck a deal with the United States to remain in power 

in return for inspections of some of its facilities. There could be a 

second succession in North Korea (see below).

The situation in South Korea could develop for the worse. If the 

United States tries to eliminate the remnants of the North Korean 

nuclear program via strike operations, young Korean nationalists 
10

will increase their anti-American rhetoric and demand the 

withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea. The “386” generation 

(those who are in their 30s, attended university in the 1980s, born 

in the 1960s) have been a political force since the Chun Doo Whan 

administration, but with the election of President Roh Moo Hyun 

in December 2002, they have entered the corridors of power.22 The 

386ers in the current administration are less inclined to rely on the 

United States, with some questioning the very rationale for the U.S. 

defense commitment. Some have espoused looking at things from 

a North Korean point of view.23 Some from the jusapa, the National 

Liberation faction, are flat-out pro-North Korea.24 The “spirit of 6.15” 

and the rhetoric of han minjok (a single unitary race) are distilled in 

a powerful call for the cultural and racial unity of “fellow brothers” 

in a unified Korea. They have unwittingly inherited the nationalistic 

argument from the over-confident South Korean conservatives of the 

1980s who boasted that North Korean nuclear weapons should not 

be worrisome because “it will be ours one day” (after unification).

To be sure, there are more “conservative” 386ers.25 But even many 

younger members of the opposition party, the Grand National Party 

(GNP), hold a skeptical view of the United States. Even as Choe 

Byung-Ryul called for a strengthening of U.S.-ROK alliance upon 

his election as party leader, Choe has surrounded himself and has 

at times accommodated the demands of the Mirae Yondae, a young 

reformist faction of 386ers.26 It is uncertain at this juncture whether 

the new GNP chief, Park Geun Hae, has consolidated support of 

these “conservative” 386ers within the GNP. Despite the nominal 

political differences, the next generations of Koreans glamorize an 

autonomous republic, independent of the United States, a foreign 

policy utopia fueled by President Roh Moo Hyun.27 Many members 

of this generation consider the United States to be “most threatening 

to the ROK (Republic of Korea)” after North Korea.28 Regardless of 

their political inclinations, the nationalistic 386ers, as a political and 

social class, will be the dominant political force in South Korea for 

the next 20-30 years.

In 10-20 years time, South Korea may be “sandwiched between 

China, increasingly known as the ‘factory of the world,’ and Japan, 

with its cutting-edge technology.”29 Things could get worse. Soon 

after it gains a security guarantee, North Korea could demand the 
11

withdrawal of all foreign (i.e., U.S.) forces from the Korean peninsula. 

Buoyed by pro-North Korean sympathizers in South Korea, North 

Korea would echo the Roh Moo Hyun government’s repeal of South 

Korea’s National Security Law, on the books since 1958.

As for reunification possibilities, prospects may not be that rosy. 

South Korea may not be able to take the lead, let alone absorb North 

Korea. There could emerge a unified but weak Korea. South Korea 

has barely recovered from the 1997 financial crisis that required 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) intervention. South Korea has 

7 million unemployed. According to South Korean conservatives, 

nearly 10 percent of South Koreans are believers or sympathizers 

of North Korea—that is about 4 million people. In North Korea, 

one can reasonably surmise that some 3-4 million (those formerly 

in the Korean Worker’s Party and the Korean People’s Army) 

may extol the good old days of North Korean communism. Some 

15 million North Koreans will likely be unemployed if the Kim 

regime is removed. North Koreans may at first welcome unification, 

but economic difficulties may lead them to reflexive nostalgia for 

socialism. A generation that has starved and a people who have 

been taught to think and behave for over 50 years will not become 

active participatory citizens overnight. Anyone can do the math. The 

democratic center, rooted in free elections and the market economy, 

may not hold. West Germany was a strong economic power in 1989; 

East Germany was the best-run country in Eastern Europe. And, 

still, a unified Germany underwent a very unstable period of time 

during which many Germans themselves and outsiders thought that 

the financial burden of unification could not be met.

How to Get What We Want: Alliances and Treaties.

Given our optimistic and pessimistic projections for the next 20 

years or so, how does the United States go about seeking what we 

want? In other words, what is likely to develop in East Asia by 2025, 

and how does the United States mold, shape, and adjust to those 

anticipated developments? I argue that the strengthening of our 

bilateral alliance with South Korea and Japan and the forging of a 

new understanding with China on nuclear proliferation are the keys 

to shaping the East Asian future we want to confront in 2025.
12

At first glance, the East Asian structure seems an ill fit to tempering 

nuclear proliferation. Observers are quick to point out the absence 

of a NATO-type structure for East Asia. There are no East Asian 

equivalents of a Monroe Doctrine, the Rio Pact, the Organization of 

American States (OAS); no West European Union (WEU) political 

counterpart. At best, there is the now defunct South East Asian 

Treaty Organization (SEATO).

But on closer examination, the United States is “blessed” not to 

have a NATO-type organization in East Asia.30 Critics who pinned 

the mistakes and shortcomings of U.S. policy in East Asia on this 

absence of multilateral organizational structure miss the mark. U.S. 

Forces Korea’s (USFK) commander General Leon Laporte has more 

flexibility and leeway than General Lauris Norstad had at the height 

of Supreme Allied Command Europe’s (SACEUR) prestige and 

responsibility. Multilateral alliances can fall victim to factionalism 

and disagreements over “who’s turn” it is in rotation assignments 

and responsibilities. Bilateral alliances and treaties, on the other hand, 

give the United States flexibility in offering positive inducements 

and holding out negative consequences. If the collective sum of a 

multilateral alliance is its strength, then the one-on-one nature of 

bilateral alliances gives the United States more direct leverage over 

its ally and lowers the probability of misunderstanding and collusion 

against it. Bilateral alliances can be leveraged to pressure third parties 

with whom its allies have relations. Examples are not hard to find.

Despite Tokyo’s insistence that the abduction issue is their top 

priority in negotiations with North Korea, Japan has agreed that a 

written security guarantee of North Korea takes precedence. Japan 

will “not insist on including the abduction issue” in the second round 

of the 6-nation talks over North Korea’s nuclear program.31

Ostensibly, the United States also pressured Japan to not sign a 

$2 billion contract for Iran’s oil. Shoichi Nakagawa, the new minister 

of economy, trade, and industry stated that Japan would treat the 

bilateral agreement for Iran’s Azadegan oil field “in its totality,” 

indicating that the “contract could not be separated from suspicions 

over Iran’s nuclear programme.”32

Anti-American sentiments reached its apex during South Korea’s 

December 2002 Presidential election. Though hardly at its nadir 

today, anti-American sentiments are on the wane, due in large part 
13

to the U.S. decision to pull back frontline troops beyond the Han 

River, south of Seoul, as well as a well-timed announcement for 

possible draw down of some of its 37,000 troops stationed in South 

Korea.33 The calibration of the deployment of U.S. forces will have 

a palpable effect on how South Korea defines its national security 

and decides on its defense policies. The U.S.-ROK alliance emerges 

as ever important in the resolution of the North Korean nuclear 

problem, as any potential strike operations against selective North 

Korean facilities would require Seoul’s approval of the use of its 

airspace.

The United States can also dangle to Japan and South Korea the 

prospect of joining the 10 rotating UN Security Council memberships 

for their cooperation in keeping East Asia nuclear free. Algeria, the 

Philippines, Romania, Brazil, and Benin are to begin their term on 

January 1, 2004. The 2-year rotation for the other 5-member group 

begins on January 1, 2005.34

On a final note, Japan and South Korea are free, democratic, liberal, 

capitalistic, and open societies, and have been our allies for over 50 

years. Yet the United States still does not know Japan and South Korea 

all that well. If we have shortcomings in our understandings of our 

East Asian allies, how do we even approach minimal understanding 

of our East Asian adversaries? As one observer noted: “When we 

confront an opponent with nuclear weapons, we misread cues, 

signals, threats, and responses, most of all when the opponent stands 

outside of Western culture. They will misread us in turn.”35 Thus, the 

strengthening of existing bilateral alliances gains more importance 

for our efforts to curb nuclear proliferation in East Asia.

Treaties.

The two pillars of post-World War II treaties—the San Francisco 

Peace Treaty (September 8, 1951) and the Korean Armistice 

Agreement (July 27, 1953)—appear outdated. Some have even called 

for the end of the U.S.-ROK alliance.36 But those calling for the end of 

such alliances never posit what would replace them.

The abolition of these two treaties would be recognition of the 

restoration of Japan and South Korea to “normal” status. New 

treaties or agreements that would replace the San Francisco Peace 
14

Treaty and the Korean Armistice Agreement would have to consider 

how Japan and South Korea would defend themselves in their new 

role as normal nations, nations responsible for their own defenses 

and which would no longer be divided.

But it seems difficult to imagine a scenario where this would 

occur absent the unification of Korea. Thus, the crux of the matter 

is what will develop on the Korean peninsula by the year 2025. The 

fallout of Korean unification will affect developments in Japan and 

China. An important factor will be how the United States confronts 

and manages such developments.

If Korea is unified peacefully and emerges as a single, democratic, 

capitalistic nation, then the armistice agreement will become moot. 

And if such a benign development were to occur, then the San 

Francisco treaty would become irrelevant. But both treaties are 

“holding” treaties that are buttressed by specific defense commitments 

in the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK mutual defense treaties, the two 

most important alliances in East Asia.37 The strengthening of these 

treaties and bilateral alliances is critical. Such buttressing sends a 

clear message that the United States keeps its word and adheres to its 

commitments. At the same time, the nature of the bilateral alliances 

with Japan and Korea allows the United States to be flexible.

Any revision of the mutual defense treaties will require a revision 

of America’s nuclear umbrella over and defense commitment to South 

Korea and Japan. The clause allowing the deployment of U.S. forces 

“in and around” Japan and Korea will need to be expunged. A peace 

treaty in Korea will need to replace the armistice agreement, and a 

new treaty or agreement would need to follow the San Francisco 

treaty. 

In light of our deep concern about proliferation, we should not 

be so hasty in revising or replacing these two key alliance treaties. 

In short, if the United States continues to provide a nuclear umbrella 

for the defense of Japan and South Korea, then the two nations will 

have a difficult justification for going nuclear.

Some have argued that a nuclear North Korea would be a 

sufficient threat to make Japan go nuclear, to provoke South Korea 

to revisit suspension of its nuclear programs in the mid-1970s, or 

to force China to accelerate weaponization of its nuclear materials.38
15

But despite these views, and despite the rhetoric of some politicians 

and officials in the United States and East Asia, I believe that Japan 

would not go nuclear even if North Korea declared itself a nuclear 

power or was proven to have nuclear weapons.

The underlying assumption of such a conjecture is that the status 

quo on the Korean peninsula will hold, that the Kim Jong Il regime 

will continue to persevere.39 In 2025 Kim Jong Il will be 83 years old. 

There is already circumstantial evidence that a second succession 

is in the works. The glorification of Kim Jong Il’s third wife, Koh 

Young Hee, has already begun. Their two sons, Jong-Chul and JongUn, are likely successors. A fantasy? In 1980, the same year that the 

glorification of his mother, Kim Jung-Sook, began in earnest, Kim 

Jong Il was officially anointed the successor.40

Kim Jong Chul works in the Operation and Guidance Department, 

the very same launching pad for his father’s accession in 1973 when 

he assumed control of the same department. Kim Jong Il’s first son, 

Jong-Nam, reportedly works in the State Security Department (SSD) 

but his careless attempt to enter Japan on a fake Dominican passport 

might have ruined his chance to succeed his father. Chang SeungTaek, Kim Jong Il’s brother-in-law, is under house arrest, similar to 

the isolation, marginalization, and containment of Kim Young-Ju 

(Kim Il Sung’s brother) and Kim Pyong-Il (Kim Jong-Il’s half-brother) 

in the early 1970s.

But I posit that the Japanese and South Korean nuclear calculus 

may change if Korean unification is achieved under the following 

circumstances: If Korea is unified via South Korean absorption of the 

North and if U.S. forces remain in a unified Korea, then the presence 

of U.S. forces may dampen the temptations of a united Korea to restart 

a nuclear weapons program.41 However, if Korea is unified with the 

South inheriting the remnants of the North’s nuclear program and 

a Seoul-centered, unified Korea is unwilling to abandon or freeze 

the program and begins to engage in irredentist rhetoric, it is highly 

unlikely that Japan will remain quiet.

Some have argued that Japan does not oppose a unified Korea. 

Others have said that Japan’s real concern is China.42 They may 

be peripherally right. But China already has nuclear weapons and 

missiles capable of reaching Japan. South Korea does not. The August 

1998 Taepo Dong launch already had underscored Pyongyang’s 
16

ability to hit all of Japan. Yet, Japan did not go nuclear. If the U.S.-

Japan alliance stays intact and if a unified Korea does not abrogate 

the U.S.-ROK security treaty, then the Japanese nuclear temptation 

may be alleviated.

However, if a unified Korea acquires nuclear capability (as well 

as having nearly 1.8 million Koreans in arms—1.1 million North 

Korean and 680,000 South Korean soldiers) and decides that the 

United States is no longer needed for its security, then the nuclear 

temptation will metastasize into a critical need for Japan. If Japan 

confronts what it considers (still) an upstart, uppity, unitary Korea 

getting its hands on nuclear weapons and unconstrained by a U.S. 

alliance, then Japan will seek nuclear weapons capability—and seek 

them rapidly. Japan will never accept a Korea outpacing it, let alone 

one that can threaten it with nuclear diplomacy. Thus, a unified Korea 

with nuclear weapons, unfettered by an alliance with Washington, 

rather than a nuclear North Korea is the triggering point for Japan 

going nuclear.

China will likely continue its modernization of existing nuclear 

capability by seeking MIRV capability. China is also likely to pursue 

at full speed its space program.43 But even this projected development 

depends on U.S. actions. If Korea is unified and retains nuclear 

capability, if the United States remains tied to such a unified Korea 

with troops stationed close to the Chinese border, and if Japan goes 

nuclear, China will become threatened. Already, China has taken 

precautionary steps to ensure against any undesirable American 

encroachment of influence over the Korean peninsula by deploying 

Chinese troops along the North Korean border. At the very least, 

Chinese leaders would prefer to have a pro-China government, 

compliant to its regional desiderata in a post-Kim Jong Il North 

Korea.

However, if nominal U.S. forces remain in Korea far from the 

Chinese borders, with the bulk stationed in Guam, then a delicate 

balance could be reached. There is no need for China to fear a unified 

Korea tied militarily to the United States if no U.S. troops are on its 

northeastern border. In this scenario, the United States will not have 

completely withdrawn from East Asia per se. U.S. forces will not be 

near Chinese territory yet not too far away to deter possible outbreak 
17

of hostile movement by China against Korea or Japan. U.S. presence 

in Guam will also serve as a “psychological buffer” for potential 

conflict between Japan and a unified Korea—even if both possess 

nuclear capabilities. A mobile U.S. missile defense capability and 

technology, along with Guam’s location, will allow it to accomplish 

a balance of power in East Asia without withdrawal of its presence 

from the region.

Thus, we need to reach a very clear understanding with the Chinese 

about nuclear nonproliferation. As in 1994, we can pressure China to 

“not oppose” economic sanctions against North Korea. In the event 

China continues to supply North Korea with sensitive materials that 

could be used for its nuclear program, the United States can make 

clear to China that selective tariff measures could be contemplated 

if such activities were not halted. To be sure, such “trade wars” 

would hurt the U.S. economy. But it would cripple China’s. The last 

thing Chinese leaders want at this stage is a slowdown of the pace of 

its economic growth. To be sure, Chinese leaders worry about the 

possibility of North Korean nuclear materials falling into the hands 

of pro-independence groups in Xinjiang (East Turkmenistan) to 

advance their separatist goals. But that problem is viewed as one 

among many on its periphery. The continued acceleration of its 

economy is central to the Chinese leaders’ political epistemology. 

Chinese leaders view the 2008 Olympics, the 2010 Shanghai Expo, 

and the 2014 World Cup as the catalyst by which the Chinese 

economy can advance to its next huge take-off. An administration 

official nailed it on the head: “It is the possibility of a huge economic 

impact that we hope gets the attention of Chinese decisionmakers 

to do more on preventing WMD [weapons of mass destruction] 

proliferation.”44 We have broad, mature relations with China. And 

Chinese leaders strive for stability on its frontiers and borders so as 

to continue its economic development. We need to expand on that 

relationship and intersection of national interests to make it clear 

what we are prepared to overlook and what we will not tolerate.

What to Do—New Approaches.

The United States cannot remain wedded to 20th century 

solutions to 21st century problems. We need to question, rethink, 
18

and produce bold, sweeping approaches to the prospect of curtailing 

nuclear proliferation in East Asia.

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the UN 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) need to be strengthened.45

IAEA inspections have been able to neither affirm innocence nor 

prove guilt in a manner that is effective in the international policy 

context and opinion. The set-up as it is incorporates the possibility of 

failure because it permits capability acquisition. I think that national 

will matters as much as technical ability in the pursuit of nuclear 

weapons. But if one were to focus specifically on technical means, 

I would take mild issue with those who emphasize the primacy of 

nuclear weapons design (important as it is). There are problems 

with this emphasis, not the least of which is that the IAEA mandate 

does not cover nuclear weapons design because nuclear weapons 

design is very difficult to monitor and verify. Instead, I posit that 

the engineering of nuclear fissile material is the critical node, the 

most important bellwether of the problem. Thus, we may explore 

the possibility of modifying the IAEA mandate to include a beefed 

up inspection regime, exploring the gamut of the nuclear fuel cycle. 

At this point, the Additional Protocols are voluntary. We may have 

to make Special Inspections mandatory and the norm.46

Related to this, we can think of ways to expand IAEA personnel 

to include those who can be permanently deployed overseas to 

undertake monitoring. We can also propose that the various national 

laboratories keep ready a team of scientists and country experts 

deployable on a 48-hour notice.

The UN Charter may need to be modified to include 

nonproliferation as a central tenet of its mission. The current 2-

year rotation of the elected 10 members of the UN Security Council 

could be shortened to a year, giving more countries a voice and a 

responsibility on nuclear proliferation matters.

We should also think of expanding the 5-member permanent 

Security Council. If this is resisted, we should think of creating 

an Asian Security Council with the United States, China, Japan, 

South Korea, Russia, and Australia as members to discuss, plan, 

coordinate, and implement collective security measures to curb 

WMD proliferation. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a 

good first step toward tackling the proliferation problem. We may 
19

want to formalize PSI into a treaty, as well as persuading South 

Korea and China to join.

We can put forth a 21st century version of a nuclear nonproliferation 

Lend-Lease. American and international personnel could be leased as 

managers or supervisors overseeing the indigenous nuclear reactors 

in return for opening credit pipelines to the Asian Development 

Bank, the World Bank, and the IMF. After all, the professed objective 

of such a reactor is to generate electricity.

Missile defense also can serve to strengthen our bilateral alliances. 

The U.S. nuclear deterrence/umbrella should remain but is not very 

useful in the absence of a full-scale war akin to the Korean War. If so, 

how is one to respond to threats short of total war but still deemed 

serious? How does one go about defending and fighting back without 

going truly nuclear—that is, going to nuclear war?

In the 1950s, this dilemma was one of credibility. The massive 

retaliation policy rested precariously on the belief that the United 

States would be prepared and willing to sacrifice New York for 

Paris or London in a nuclear exchange with the Soviets. Today, the 

dilemma is one of nuclear temptation as a default. In the absence of 

an independent nuclear capability, and in the face of a nuclear North 

Korea, South Korea or Japan may feel the acute need to respond 

to nuclear threats by North Korea without going nuclear itself. A 

diplomatic and military panacea may be the sharing of some missile 

defense technologies and platforms. The continuation of a U.S. 

nuclear umbrella and the establishment of a missile defense system 

are not mutually exclusive. Both can be had—without the attending 

“arms race” that some portend. In East Asia, both are needed.

At a force deployment level, the United States can reconfigure its 

command structure in Korea as well as update its arsenal. Currently, 

the arsenal inventory of U.S. missile forces in Korea is comprised 

mostly of MK-84s leftover from Vietnam. Putting Joint Direct Attack 

Munition (JDAM) kits on them would neatly make smart these dumb 

bombs, making virtue out of necessity.

Currently, the commander in Korea wears, in essence, three hats.

The 4-star general who commands Korea is Commander in Chief, 

UN Command (CINCUNC), Commander, Combined Forces Command (CFC), and Commander, USFK. The army component of USFK 

is the commander of the Eighth U.S. Army.
20

To be sure, such command structure reflects the historically 

international nature of the situation on the Korean peninsula, but 

it also reflects the complex bilateral relationship with South Korea. 

Given recent political developments in South Korea, as well as our 

rethinking of our own “footprint” in East Asia and the reconfiguration 

of our overall worldwide deployment, we may want to explore the 

possibility of consolidating the command structure in Korea and 

Japan with a North East Asian command based in Guam. We can 

explore the idea of returning to a subregional commander within 

Pacific Command (PACOM) such as a Commander in Chief, North 

East Asia (CINCNEA), similar to a Commander in Chief, Far East 

(CINCFE) that we had in the 1940s and 1950s.

An important step is to redefine the “language” of proliferation, 

its symbols and syntax. We need a defining doctrine in the tradition 

of the Monroe Doctrine and NSC-68 to confront this problem. 

Every doctrine has its key words and grammar. The new doctrine’s 

vocabulary should be “prevention.” Its new grammar should 

be new targeting guidelines. The White House’s new Office of 

Global Communications should propagate U.S. values on nuclear 

proliferation. After all, our values on nuclear proliferation are just 

as important as the rule of law, freedom of speech, private property, 

religious tolerance, and equal justice.

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM may be a threshold in military 

operations. Deterrence, containment, and preemption have to a 

certain degree been part of U.S. policy. But going after leadership 

targets in the very beginning of war is a big shift in thinking. It has 

rendered ineffective the thrust of effects-based operations, to wit, 

that punishing the ruled will pressure the ruler to sue for peace. As 

President Bush said: “With new tactics and precision weapons, we 

can achieve military objectives without directing violence against 

civilians. No device of man removes the tragedy from war; yet it is 

a great moral advance when the guilty have far more to fear from 

war than the innocent.”47 Nothing symbolizes more eloquently 

and delivers a more powerful message than this new targeting 

philosophy.

If one were to deduce the logical corollary of this shift in thinking, 

one can propose that the United States expand on the recent National 
21

Strategy on WMD: “The United States will continue to make clear 

that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force—

including resort to all of our options—to the use of WMD against 

the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies.”48 This 

clause can be expanded to include those regimes that give materials 

to terrorists that could be used to make WMD. The implicit threat 

of nuclear annihilation for giving sensitive nuclear materials to 

terrorists should be contemplated as the ultimate deterrent option. 

North Korea must be made to understand clearly that the pain and 

cost of selling sensitive nuclear materials to terrorists are that it must 

then live under a serious and credible nuclear threat.

Lastly, as important as changes in organizational structure, 

deployments, and language may be, they pale in comparison to the 

role of individual personalities. The insouciance of sophisticated 

theories of international relations has yet to successfully traduce 

the age-old importance of individuals. Personalities matter a great 

deal even as predicting the rise of key players in China, Japan, and 

the two Koreas is extremely difficult. One may be unduly optimistic 

in expecting the emergence of an East Asian trio of Metternich, 

Castlereagh, and Talleyrand, and an East Asian Congress equivalent 

of that of 1815 Vienna. But the difficulty of prediction and the 

disappointment of high expectations should not preclude the United 

States from seeking to identify and investigate key players, and their 

intellectual and social backgrounds.

For example, a North Korea without Kim Jong Il, but one still 

with nuclear weapons and a sub-par human rights record, is certainly 

far from ideal. One cannot state with certainty that a North Korean 

military figure or one of Kim’s sons or relatives will not be as cruel and 

totalitarian as Kim Jong Il. But I posit that it is still preferable to one 

with Kim at the helm. The stability of the status quo, as advocated by 

“realists” is misguided. The status quo itself is inherently unstable. 

Realistic solutions posed by the realists have produced little in the 

way of stability or realism. Regime change in North Korea will be 

destabilizing. But the uncertainty of a future without Kim Jong Il 

should not hamper our intellectual exploration and policy execution 

of a North Korea state in the absence of a Kim regime.

Some 20 years elapsed between the signing of the Versailles 

Treaty and the Munich agreement. We cannot emulate that historical 
22

pattern. It is conceivable and desirable that 20 years after the North 

Korean withdrawal from the NPT, a new nonproliferation set-up, 

based on a strengthening of our existing bilateral alliances and the 

establishing of a new understanding with China, will guide the 

United States and East Asian nations in the second decade of the 

21st century. Disraeli said, “Man is not a creature of circumstances. 

Circumstances are the creatures of men.” The year 2025 in East Asia 

need not be an Annus Horribilis. The United States must and will 

shape our circumstances as it fits our needs.

CHAPTER 1 - ENDNOTES

1. “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” September 

17, 2002, www.whitehouse.gov.

2. For a horrific fantasy, see Paul Johnson, “There Arose Out of the Pits the 

Smoke of a Great Furnace,” The Spectator, December 7, 2002.

3. Press accounts relish this notion. For recent examples, see John Larkin 

and Donald Macintyre, “Your Move, Mr. Kim,” Time, September 1, 2003; Peter 

Landesman, “Arms and the Man,” New York Times Magazine, August 17, 2003; Jack 

Kelly, “Brinksmanship Bartering,” Washington Times, September 3, 2003.

4. People’s Daily, November 7, 2003.

5. “India Starts to See China as a Land of Business Opportunity,” Financial 

Times, September 23, 2003.

6. For different scenarios, see Hideshi Takesada, “A Unified Korean Peninsula: 

Five Scenarios and the Significance of Japan-US Cooperation,” http://www.

glocomnet.or.jp.

7. Similar to the initiation of the debate over sonderweg in Germany in 1999 

during Kosovo, discussions about Japan’s “normalcy” have begun in light of the 

North Korean threat. Howard French, “Japan Faces Burden: Its Own Defense,” 

New York Times, July 22, 2003.

8. “Japan Nuclear Deterrent Idea Hit,” The Japan Times, August 7, 2003.

9. Interview, Dr. Jeong Jong-Ho, Professor of Chinese Studies, Seoul National 

University, July 2, 2003, Seoul, Korea. For the “spread” of Chinese influence, see 

Peter Baker, “A Tense Divide in Russia’s Far East,” Washington Post, July 29, 2003.

10. “Chinese in Belgrade, Beijing Protest NATO Embassy Bombing,” May 9, 

1999, http://www.cnn.com.

11. “China’s First Astronaut Crowned ‘Space Hero,’” People’s Daily, November 

7, 2003.

12. John Hill, “China’s Armed Forces Set to Undergo Face-Lift,” Jane’s Intelligence 

Review, February 2003, pp. 10-15.
23

13. “Former JDA Head, LDP Officials’ Roundup on Nuclear Arms,” Tokyo Sapio, 

June 11, 2003, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS): JPP20030702000049. 

Former JDA Chief Gen Nakatani, Senior Vice Minister of the Cabinet Office, 

LDP Security Policy Diet League Chairman Kenzo Yoneda, and LDP Director of 

National Defense Division Yasukazu Hamada participated in the discussion.

14. “Abe, Yoneda on DPRK, Defense, Japan-US Alliance,” Tokyo Seiron, 

September 2003, FBIS: JPP20030808000050. Yoneda is senior vice-minister of the 

Cabinet Office.

15. “Junior Lawmakers’ Group Urgently Calls for Security Measures,” Tokyo 

Sekai Shuho, FBIS: JPP20030813000048, August 19-26, 2003. See also Yoshio Okubo, 

“Time to Overhaul National Defense Program,” Daily Yomiuri, August 7, 2003.

16. Abe’s father was Shintaro Abe, former secretary-general of the LDP, and his 

grandfather was former Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi. Abe recently became LDP 

secretary-general at the age of 49. Abe is a strong candidate to replace Koizumi as 

Prime Minister. 

17. Chosun Ilbo, October 23, 2003; Daily Yomiuri, November 3, 2003.

18. Interview with a North Korean soldier defector, “Kim Jong Il’s Army Diverts 

all Aid to Itself,” Wolgan Chosun, October 2003.

19. “To Become Strong is the Only Option,” Tehran Jomhuri-ye Eslami, FBIS: 

IAP20030914000027, September 13, 2003.

20. Henry Sokolski, “Contending with a Nuclear-Armed North Korea,” Joint 

Force Quarterly, Autumn 2002.

21. Robert Walpole, “North Korea’s Taepo Dong Launch and Some Implications 

on the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States,” December 8, 1998, Central 

Intelligence Agency, http://www.cia.gov.

22. The “386” generation label euphemistically refers to those who were the 

“democracy movement” generation. To be sure, there are those who did not 

participate in the myriad student demonstrations of the 1980s. Moreover, due to a 

3-year compulsory military service, some 386ers are in their forties.

23. For a sociological survey, see Chae-Han Kim, “Who in South Korea Trust 

North Korea and Who Trust the United States?” The Korean Journal of Defense 

Analysis, Fall 2002.

24. Jusapa is a radical faction of the student movement that lionizes and takes 

guidance from Kim Il Sung’s Juche ideology.

25. For qualified optimism on the engagement policy and North Korea, see 

Choo-Suk Suh, “North Korea’s ‘Military-First’ Policy and Inter-Korean Relations,” 

The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Fall 2002.

26. For Choe’s speech, see http://www.hannara.or.kr, June 26, 2003. For the intraparty friction, see http://www.ohmynews.com, September 2, 2003; and http://www.

independent.co.kr, September 11, 2003.

27. “The Cost of Self-Reliance,” Chosun Ilbo, September 3, 2003.
24

28. Joongang Ilbo, September 25, 2003.

29. Chosun Ilbo, November 4, 2003.

30. South Korea’s first president, Syngman Rhee, was the first statesman to raise 

the idea of a “Pacific Pact” or what he termed, “Alliance Mutual Security.” But 

Rhee envisioned a “PATO” that excluded Japan, composed only of the Republics 

of Korea, China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Macao, and Thailand. See 

author, Master of Manipulation: Syngman Rhee and the Seoul-Washington Alliance, 

1953-1960, Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2001, p.173n.

31. Ashai Shimbun, November 6, 2003.

32. “Japan Signals Shift on $2bn Tehran Oil Deal,” Financial Times, September 

25, 2003.

33. “U.S. troop Strength in Korea Can Be Cut, Pace Says,” October 10, 2003, 

www.nyjt.com.

34. “5 Nations Confirmed to Security Council,” Washington Times, October 24, 

2003.

35. Tyler Cowen, “The Game Theory of Nuclear Proliferation,” September 25, 

2003, www2.techcentralstation.com.

36. Doug Bandow, “Ending the Anachronistic Korean Commitment,” 

Parameters, Summer 2003, pp. 78-88.

37. Thomas B. Fargo, “Operationalizing the Asia-Pacific Defense Strategy,” 

Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn 2002.

38. See Joseph Cirincione, “The Asian Nuclear Reaction Chain,” March 2000, 

http://www.ceip.org; Sokolski, op.cit. For Chinese MIRV capability, see John Hill, 

“China Modernises Missile Force,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, March 1, 2003.

39. On the various futures for Korea, see Nicholas Eberstadt, “Alternative 

Scenarios for the Korean Peninsula,” Strategic Asia 2004-05, pp. 109-137.

40. In 1994 nearly every Western observer got it wrong. A succession was 

impossible, they argued, highlighting Kim Jong Il’s playboy lifestyle, playing up 

Oh Jinwoo’s credentials as Defense Minister and confidant of Kim Il Sung, and 

Kim Pyong Il’s good looks, charisma, and leadership skills.

41. For this view, see Kim Sung-Han, quoted in Joongang Ilbo, February 27, 

2003.

42. For a representative sample, see Victor Cha, “Defensive Realism and Japan’s 

Approach toward Korean Reunification,” The National Bureau of Asian Research, 

Vol. 14, No. 1, June 2003, pp. 5-32. See also, Hideshi Takesada, “A Unified Korean 

Peninsula,” op.cit.

43. For a somber analysis, see Arun Sahgal, “China in Space: Military 

Implications,” Asia Times, November 5, 2003. For a provocative article, see “China 

Preparing Space War against U.S.,” October 30, 2003, www.newsmax.com.
25

44. Susan V. Lawrence, “Dueling over Sanctions,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 

November 6, 2003.

45. Gordon Thompson, “Treaty a Useful Relic,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 

July/August 1990.

46. Mohamed ElBaradei recently proposed a Baruch Plan for the 21st century, 

advocating “multinational control” over access to highly enriched uranium and 

plutonium. “U.N. Nuke Chief Seeks Stringent Controls,” Washington Times, 

November 3, 2003.

47. “Let Tyrants Fear,” President Bush’s speech aboard the U.S.S. Lincoln, May 

5, 2003, www.whitehouse.gov.

48. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002, 

www.whitehouse.gov.

27

CHAPTER 2

PROLIFERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST:

WHO IS NEXT AFTER IRAN?

Patrick Clawson

Were Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, its neighbors and the 

entire region would have to consider carefully the impact on their 

own security situation. The sobering reality is that several other 

Middle Eastern countries would seriously consider acquiring nuclear 

weapons were Iran to do so. Indeed, there could be a vicious cycle 

in which first one additional country acquires nuclear weapons, 

then others concerned about that country’s possession proceed with 

their own weapons programs, and that further proliferation in turn 

convinces more countries to act.

The thesis of this chapter is that such a proliferation outbreak 

is distinctly possible unless the United States responds to Iranian 

proliferation with firm, concrete measures to offset Iran’s actions.1

The structure of the chapter is to briefly summarize the reasons for 

concern about the Iranian nuclear program and then to turn to the 

potential proliferants: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, other Arab states, and 

Turkey. The chapter closes with what the United States could do to 

influence the decisions of Middle East states about whether or not to 

imitate an Iranian proliferation.

Reasons to Worry about the Iranian Nuclear Program.

Repeated warnings by U.S. officials about a potential Iranian 

nuclear weapon have been regarded as exaggerated by many 

academic students of Iran. The mid-1990s warnings that Iran might 

have a nuclear weapon within 5 years turned out to be overly 

pessimistic. But it appears that after years of problems and delays, 

Iran’s nuclear ambitions have made considerable progress. The 

March 2003 visit by a United Nations (UN) International Atomic 

Energy Agency (IAEA) team showed that Iran was well along on its 

announced commitment to developing a full fuel cycle capability. Iran 
28

has aknowledged to the IAEA that it is constructing a plan to convert 

natural uranium, which Iran is mining from domestic deposits, into 

uranium hexafluoride gas. That gas presumably would be used in the 

Nantanz enrichment facility visited by the IAEA team. The Nantanz 

facility has 160 functioning centrifuges in a pilot facility, while 1,000 

more centrifuges are being assembled in another building which is 

planned to hold 5,000 centrifuges.2 While Nantanz could be used 

to produce lightly enriched uranium to refuel the electrical power 

generating reactor under construction at Bushehr, it also would be 

capable of producing highly enriched uranium. Depending on the 

capacity of the machines, the facility when completed in 2005 could 

produce enough highly enriched uranium for two or more nuclear 

bombs per year.

Meanwhile, satellite photos indicate Iran also is building a heavy 

water production plant which raises troubling concerns, given 

that Iran is not known to have a reactor that would make use of 

the plant’s production and such a reactor could well be a means to 

acquire plutonium, giving Iran a second route to a nuclear weapon. 

And construction on the light-water reactor at Bushehr is making 

substantial headway, with commissioning of the plant likely in 2004, 

which means that Iran will shortly thereafter accumulate spent fuel 

in holding tanks. The fuel will be too radioactive to be returned 

immediately to Russia, even assuming that the long-discussed 

agreement to return the fuel is made operative. If heroic efforts are 

made to return the spent fuel to Russia while still quite hot, the spent 

fuel in the holding tanks will provide Iran the material from which 

it could extract highly fissile material for several dozen weapons in 

relatively short order. In short, considering the progress it is making 

on several different facilities, it seems accurate to say that Iran is 

developing a substantial nuclear infrastructure. 

Of course, it is possible that Iran will use this nuclear infrastructure 

only for the announced goal of a self-sufficient nuclear power industry 

rather than for pursuing nuclear weapons. However, four factors 

suggest Iran will perceive that the constraints against proliferation 

are not great compared to the reasons to acquire nuclear weapons.

1. Attitude Towards Arms Control Agreements. Iran is a state-party 

to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), but 

that may not constrain its nuclear program. Iran’s attitude towards 
29

arms control agreements is not reassuring. Iran’s declaration to the 

Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) 

pursuant to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) denied that 

Iran had ever produced chemical weapons, which is a transparent 

lie. U.S. sources say Iran imported uranium hexaflouride from China 

without declaring this to the IAEA, and that some of this has been 

enriched, which would violate its NPT obligations. Meanwhile, Iran 

has refused to accept the enhanced IAEA inspections under the 

Program 93+2 Additional Protocol; indeed, it has not modified its 

safeguard agreement with the IAEA to incorporate the IAEA’s 1995 

restatement of what it is empowered to do with its powers to enforce 

the NPT. (This restatement was the first part of the two-part Program 

93+2, with the Additional Protocol). Nor is Iran going beyond 

the minimum required under its current safeguard agreement, 

as evidenced by its recent delays in notifying the IAEA about the 

construction of new facilities (about which the IAEA was well aware 

because of satellite photos), and its refusal to allow inspection of 

those facilities (as distinct from a walk-through “visit” without any 

examination of the facility by experts). All of this despite the European 

Union (EU) pressure for progress about nuclear transparency before 

Iran can get the trade agreement with the EU it badly wants.

It would be fair to characterize Iran’s attitude towards the 

NPT as doing the minimum required while loudly proclaiming its 

adherence. That is discouraging for the hopes of using the NPT to 

constrain Iran’s nuclear program, because as interpreted by the IAEA, 

the NPT gives Iran every right to build robust uranium enrichment 

and plutonium extraction capabilities if it declares those activities, 

while simultaneously developing the expertise and equipment to 

weaponize the fissile material; that is, the IAEA view is that only 

assembling the fissile material into weapons is prohibited. And the 

NPT gives Iran the right to withdraw with 6 months’ notice. So Iran 

could remain in good standing with the IAEA even as it acquired 

the capability for a rapid breakout once leaving the NPT, that is, for 

developing dozens of bombs within a short period. This route would 

allow Iran to claim adherence to the NPT while still having a nuclear 

potential so obvious and awesome as to worry, if not intimidate, 

neighboring countries.
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2. International Reaction to Proliferation. The contrast between how 

the world—especially, but not only the United States—reacts to Iraq 

and to North Korea could have troubling implications for Iranian 

proliferation. The correct lesson which Iran should draw from the 

contract is the advantages accruing to those who offer to negotiate 

with the United States and proclaim their willingness to make 

strategic compromises if offered the right incentives, compared to 

the high price paid by those who refuse to cooperate. But Iran may 

well draw from the contrast the wrong lesson, namely, that those 

who have nuclear weapons are treated with kid gloves, while those 

who do not are treated with boxing gloves. In other words, Iran 

may conclude that the best, if not the only, way to deter the United 

States is to possess nuclear weapons. And there is the possibility 

that a defiant, nuclear North Korea might aid proliferation in Iran. 

Respected Israeli military analyst Ze’ev Schiff warns, “Israel fears 

that if the North Korean crisis is not settled, Pyongyang would try to 

form an anti-American coalition in the Middle East comprising Iran, 

Syria, and Libya.”3

3. Threat Environment. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein greatly 

reduces the threat of invasion from Iraq; it is difficult to see why—or 

for that matter, how—a new Iraqi government would want to invade 

Iran. And the end of the Saddam regime could well lead over time to 

a reduced U.S. presence in the Gulf—a presence which Tehran has 

often complained is aimed at it rather than Baghdad. Plus, Kuwait and 

Saudi Arabia are likely, post-Saddam, to cut their military spending; 

indeed, all the Arab monarchies of the Gulf are facing economic and 

social pressures which make large weapons purchases less attractive. 

Just as the threat from the Gulf is on the decline, so, too, the potential 

for an Iranian-Israeli confrontation fades if Hezbollah is reined in 

by Syria, which is distinctly possible given Syrian concerns about 

U.S. pressure after the overthrow of Saddam. But unfortunately, 

there is little reason to expect that the reduction in regional threats 

will change Iran’s determination to acquire nuclear weapons. The 

perceived threat from the United States will remain; indeed, it could 

become more preoccupying, if Iran’s leaders worry that Washington 

may be tempted to promote overthrow of the Islamic Republic by the 

increasingly disaffected youth. Since, as discussed above, deterrence 

of the United States could be seen by Iranian leaders to require 
31

nuclear weapons, the perceived greater U.S. threat would increase 

the motivation to acquire nuclear weapons.

Domestic Political Environment.

Iran’s domestic political scene is characterized by a bitter dispute 

between hardliners and reformers. But there is little evidence that 

the two camps differ in their approach to nuclear weapons. Being 

better informed about the outside world, the reformers may be more 

sensitive to the political price Iran would pay for proliferation. On 

the other hand, the reformers are more nationalist; indeed, they 

have at times criticized hardliners for putting ideological regime 

interests above national interests. It would seem that the opposition, 

which has blocked Majlis ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban 

Treaty (CTBT), came more from reformers than from hardliners. It 

seems that both hardliners and reformers see Iran as strategically 

isolated, unable to rely for its security on allies or on foreign 

weapons suppliers. The argument goes that Iran must therefore 

develop indigenous weapons capabilities. But the prospects are 

poor that Iran could develop on its own world-class conventional 

arms, despite the billions of dollars it is spending to develop a full 

range of conventional weapons systems. Convinced of this analysis, 

dedicated Iranian nationalists, no matter how democratic or desirous 

of good relations with America, may indeed support Iran pursuing 

nuclear weapons. In his February 18, 2003, testimony to the Senate 

Intelligence Committee, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director 

George Tenet stated, “No Iranian government, regardless of its 

ideological leanings, is likely to willingly abandon WMD [weapons 

of mass destruction] programs that are seen as guaranteeing Iran’s 

security.” 

Faced with Iranian nuclear progress and the limited prospects 

that international or domestic factors will lead Iran to back off from 

the pursuit of nuclear weapons, it would be quite appropriate for 

Middle Eastern countries to consider the security implications 

were Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. It would not be surprising 

if some countries were already developing their contingency plans. 

This chapter asks, what are the prospect those plans could include 

acquisition of nuclear weapons? 
32

Saudi Arabia: Proliferation Consistent with the NPT.

Saudi Arabia is the state most likely to proliferate in response 

to an Iranian nuclear threat. To be sure, such an action could 

threaten the U.S.-Saudi relationship which has been the foundation 

of Saudi security. But the Saudis keenly remember that when they 

felt threatened by Iran—in the early days of the revolution, when 

the Iran-Iraq war was starting—the U.S. response to their entreaties 

was to send to the Gulf F-15 fighters which President Jimmy Carter 

publicly described as being unarmed. As Richard Russell put it, 

“It would be imprudent, to say the least, for Riyadh to make the 

cornerstone of their national-security posture out of an assumption 

that the United States would come to the kingdom’s defense—under 

any and all circumstances.”4

A nuclear-armed Iran could well see itself as the natural leader of 

the region to which all other states should listen closely. That would fit 

with the Iranian nationalist self-conception, which sees Iran as a great 

and ancient civilization in contrast to the parvenu unsophisticates in 

the Arab minor statelets of the Gulf (that is a toned-down version 

of comments Iranian nationalists make about their neighbors in the 

Arab Gulf monarchies). Saudi Arabia would have excellent reason to 

worry about Iran projecting itself as the protector of the Saudi Shia 

community and as a state which should be consulted about how to 

manage the Mecca pilgrimage and holy sites—all of which would be 

utterly unacceptable to Riyadh.

Saudi Arabia might be unsure how much assistance it could 

count on from the United States in face of such Iranian indirect 

intimidation, which might not rise to the level at which Washington 

would be prepared to risk a crisis with Iran. Riyadh may therefore 

deem it necessary to possess a self-defense capability against Iranian 

intimidation. And Saudi Arabia is in no position to defend itself with 

conventional means, as is well illustrated by how ineffective the 

Saudi military remains despite spending billions of dollars each year 

on the most advanced weaponry and on training by U.S. advisors. 

So a nuclear option could fit with the Saudi needs.

An instructive case to consider is the Saudi 1986 acquisition of 50-

60 CSS-2 missiles and 10-15 mobile launchers from China—missiles 

used by China for its nuclear forces which can carry a warhead of up 
33

to 2,500 kg to a range of 700 km.5 While the Saudis and the Chinese 

both insist that the warheads are conventional, the missiles are a 

peculiar way to deliver conventional explosives, since they are highly 

inaccurate (with a circular error of probability of about 1-2 km). The 

Saudis acquired the missiles without detection by the United States, 

and they since steadily have refused to allow any outside inspections 

of the missiles—suggesting that the Saudis have both the capability 

and the willingness to acquire advanced weapons in the face of 

strong U.S. objections. 

The CSS-2s raise an interesting question. There is a widespread 

impression in West and South Asia that Saudi Arabia provided 

much of the finance for the Pakistani nuclear program in return for 

a rumored Pakistani commitment to provide Saudi Arabia nuclear 

warheads if needed. Pakistan has been interested in developing 

nuclear warheads for its missiles. Richard Russell speculates, “The 

Saudis might be willing to help fund Pakistani research, development, 

and deployment costs for their nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles in 

exchange for nuclear warheads.”6 It would be possible to structure 

such an arrangement without violating Saudi obligations under the 

NPT. As explained to this writer by a senior Pakistani official well 

versed in the matter, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia could follow the 

example set by the United States and Germany during the Cold War 

with dual-key missiles. America and Germany took the position that 

Germany was not violating the NPT when the United States stored 

nuclear warheads under its control in Germany even though the 

delivery means for those warheads were missiles under German 

control. So Pakistan could store in Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads 

designed to fit on to Saudi-controlled missiles. 

Egypt: Proliferation to Maintain Its Status.

Were Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, that would affect the 

on-going debate in Egypt about whether it needs to nuclearize to 

maintain its status as a regional power. If, in addition, Saudi Arabia 

were to acquire nuclear weapons—even if by the indirect Pakistani 

route described above—it is difficult to see Egypt remaining nonnuclear, because it would be unacceptable to Egypt to be perceived 

as a less potent power than another Arab country.
34

What would drive Egyptian decisions about proliferation would 

be its determination to be the leading Arab power. There is broad 

consensus among the Egyptian elite that such a status requires that 

Egypt have the most powerful Arab army: the Egyptian view is that 

great states have great armies. It is worth recalling that the original 

Egyptian proposal for a WMD-free zone in the Middle East came 

after Iraqi president Saddam Hussein threatened in 1990 to “burn 

half of Israel.” Perhaps Egypt’s motivation was to protect Israel, 

but certainly one could argue for the alternative interpretation that 

Egypt could not accept another Arab state having a more potent 

WMD capability than Egypt possessed. Indeed, the 1998 Indian and 

Pakistani nuclear tests led to a debate in Egypt about proliferation, 

with Egyptian President Hosny Mubarak suggesting that these could 

lead to a generalized proliferation throughout the region. 

An obvious factor in the Egyptian calculus about proliferation is 

Israel. The WMD imbalance with Israel is a deep wound. Egypt is 

bitter that it has had no success in securing an Israeli commitment 

to give up nuclear weapons within a fixed time frame. Israel has 

offered that 2 years after it has peace treaties with all regional states, 

it would begin negotiations on a robust regional inspection process 

which once functional would monitor Israeli denuclearization. 

Faced with the perceived imbalance, Egypt has long had a strong 

pro-nuclear lobby. Egyptian president Hosny Mubarak stated in 

1998, “when the time comes and we need nuclear weapons, we will 

not hesitate.” In May 2002, former Egyptian representative to the 

IAEA Dr. Mustafa al-Fiqi wrote an article for the semi-official Alhram

newspaper questioning whether President Anwar Sadat made the 

right decision when he suddenly and surprisingly signed the NPT in 

1981; al-Fiqi argued that nuclear weapons might have been a useful 

deterrent against Israel.7

It is also worth noting that Egypt has long had an ambiguous 

attitude about WMD. Egypt has refused to sign the Chemical Weapons 

Convention. It has a history of using chemical weapons in 1964 in 

its war in Yemen—at the time, documented by the International 

Committee of the Red Cross and discussed in the Security Council. 

So there is no taboo in Egyptian thinking about the use of WMD.
35

Other Arab States: Those with Ambitions Lack Capability.

Other Arab states would not pose as much a proliferation worry. 

Those that could proliferate would not particularly want to; those 

that would want to would have a hard time doing so.

Syria would be very unlikely to change its approach to nuclear 

weapons in the event of an Iranian nuclear acquisition. Syrian 

weapons decisions are not driven by prestige factors, in part because 

Syria does not see itself as the natural leader of the Arab world. And 

Syria is quite aware of how severely Israel would react to a Syrian 

nuclear acquisition. Syria has been quite clear-headed in thinking 

through its WMD options. It has been bent for more than a decade 

on acquiring a large enough inventory of CW-tipped missiles that 

it can threaten Israel with unacceptable losses. And Syria has been 

relatively responsible about its CW-tipped missiles, giving every 

indication that it sees these as weapons of last resort to be used only 

if Israel threatened Syria’s national existence. Given the strategic 

logic to this approach—it is after all reasonable for Syria to worry 

about the country being overrun and to therefore have a weapon of 

last resort—it is not surprising that the U.S. response to the Syrian 

CW proliferation effort has been rather low-key. So much for the 

charge that the U.S. government has a dual standard about the Israeli 

nuclear program: in fact, Washington has been rather understanding 

when Middle East states faced with existential threats acquire a WMD 

capability appropriate to that threat. Indeed, it is remarkable that the 

United States has done so little about the Syrian WMD threat, given 

the bad relations between the two countries and the fact that Syria’s 

WMD threatens a close U.S. ally, namely, Israel.

In the category of countries that would want to proliferate 

but would have problems doing so, the most obvious case before 

Qadafi’s nuclear renunciation, was Libya. The Palestinians might 

try to proliferate—after all, most of them think they are already 

being attacked with WMD (i.e., chemical and biological weapons) 

by Israel—but they have a low capability to buy or build nuclear 

weapons. Of greater proliferation worry would be the smaller Gulf 

Cooperation Council (GCC) states, especially the United Arab 

Emirates, which are well-placed to buy nuclear weapons if anyone 

can, but it is not at all clear that there would be anyone prepared to 

sell such weapons.
36

Turkey: Will NATO Be Enough?

Historically Turkey has been at peace with Iran, and the two 

countries have generally paid relatively little attention to each 

other, compared to what one might expect from two neighbors with 

considerable economic interaction. That said, Turkey has many 

reasons to worry about meddling by an Islamic Republic which is 

ideologically opposed to Ankara’s secular policies. If Turkey faces 

serious internal problems—be it from Islamists or from Kurds—Iran 

might seek to take advantage of that situation, and Iranian nuclear 

weapons would make Turkey think long and hard about how much 

it could complain about such Iranian meddling. In other words, an 

Iranian nuclear capability could make the Turkish General Staff 

nervous.

Faced with a nuclear-armed Iran, Turkey’s first instinct would 

be to turn to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 

Turkey places extraordinary value on its NATO membership, which 

symbolizes the West’s acceptance of Turkey—a delicate issue for 

a country which feels it is excluded from the EU on civilizational 

grounds more than for any other reason. The cold reality is that 

NATO was not designed to defend Turkey: assisting Turkey faced 

with a general Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe is one 

thing; defending Turkey when it alone faces a threat is an altogether 

different matter. It is not clear how much NATO members want to 

take on this burden. It will be only natural for Turkey to wonder 

how much it can rely on NATO.

Were Turkey to decide that it had to proliferate in order to defend 

itself, it has good industrial and scientific infrastructures which it 

could draw upon to build nuclear weapons on its own. It would 

be difficult to prevent a determined Turkey from building nuclear 

weapons in well under a decade.

How Can America Influence Middle East Decisions after Iranian 

Proliferation?

Whether or not Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons leads 

to further proliferation among America’s friends in the region will 

depend in considerable part on what policies the United States 
37

adopts as Iran’s nuclear capabilities become more evident. Were 

Washington to do little besides deploring Iran’s actions, further 

proliferation is likely. That is the case irrespective of how loudly and 

frequently the United States condemns Iran’s actions.

Calls for economic sanctions or diplomatic steps against Iran 

seem an unpromising way to affect the calculus of other proliferants. 

For one thing, it is not clear that the international community would 

agree to impose sanctions. For more than a decade, the United 

States and the EU nations have profoundly disagreed about the 

utility of sanctions on Iran, and attitudes have hardened on both 

sides. It is hard to see the EU abandoning its long-held opposition 

to sanctions, since it is firmly convinced that engagement is the best 

way to moderate Iranian policy and to support Iranian moderates. 

Furthermore, it is not clear how much impact sanctions would have 

on Iranian actions; the impact of the long-standing unilateral U.S. 

sanctions is subject to different readings. All in all, other regional 

states pondering proliferation would probably be skeptical that 

sanctions would change Iran’s policy, and they might not even 

been greatly concerned that they would face sanctions were they to 

proliferate. 

Nor is it clear how much impact there would be if the United 

States responded by reemphasizing controls on exports of sensitive 

technology. Such export controls would seem unlikely to influence 

Iranian actions, since Iran has in theory faced strict controls for some 

time and yet has managed to make do, one way or another. The 

impact of reinvigorated export controls on the proliferation plans of 

the regional states would vary. A country like Turkey, which might 

consider building its own weapons, would presumably be more 

vulnerable, whereas countries that might consider acquiring nuclear 

weapons fully assembled, such as the Gulf monarchies, would 

presumably be less affected. 

In the event of Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons, the most 

promising U.S. anti-proliferation tool would be closer security ties 

with allies threatened by the Iranian proliferation breakthrough. 

America’s friends in the region are going to feel more vulnerable 

in the face of Iranian nuclear weapons, and they will need to be 

reassured that their security concerns are being met if they are to 
38

be dissuaded from imitating Iran’s proliferation. The United States 

could reassure them through some combination of policies that:

• Change declaratory posture. For instance, were the United 

States explicitly to extend a nuclear umbrella over its regional 

friends, that could weigh heavily in the minds of regional 

leaders—especially if done loudly, frequently, and at the 

highest levels.

• Enhance access to advanced weapons. For instance, if the 

United States assisted regional states in acquiring improved 

missile/air defenses that could lessen the threat posed by 

Iranian nuclear-tipped missiles.

• Expand U.S. presence in the region. To take an extreme 

example, if the United States were to station ships with 

nuclear-capable cruise missiles off Iran’s shores, that would 

make a powerful point about the depth of U.S. commitment 

to the changed declaratory posture cited above. 

These policies to reassure U.S. friends in the region would have 

the added advantage of showing that Iran’s security has become 

worse off because of its acquisition of nuclear weapons—that is, 

Iran’s nuclear weapons would have increased the U.S. military 

threat to Iran, rather than providing a means to balance the greater 

power of the United States. That would be a useful precedent for 

other regional actors to contemplate in that it would suggest that the 

acquisition of nuclear weapons, in fact, may not be a force-enhancer. 

If the United States can point to strong actions it has taken to counter 

Iranian nuclear weapons, that will lend more credibility to U.S. 

warnings to its friends in the region that were they to proliferate, 

Washington might take the strong step of reducing or ending the 

U.S. security relationship with their country. This could become a 

significant factor in their calculations about whether to head down 

the proliferation path.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. This chapter was originally presented before a dinner seminar of the 

Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, Washington, DC, April 2003.
39

2. Joby Warrick and Glenn Kessler, “Iran’s Nuclear Program Speeds Ahead,” 

The Washington Post, March 10, 2003, pp. A1 and A17.

3. Ze’ev Schiff, “Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Middle East: The View 

from Israel,” monograph from James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice 

University, March 2003.

4. Richard Russell, “A Saudi Nuclear Option?,” Survival, Vol. 43, No. 2, Summer 

2001, p. 70.

5. Anthony Cordesman, Saudi Arabia: Guarding the Desert Kingdom, Boulder: 

Westview Press, 1997, p. 178.

6. Russell, p. 75.

7. Cited in Emily Landau, “Egypt’s Nuclear Dilemma,” Strategic Assessment

(from the Tel Aviv University Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies), Vol. 5, No. 3, 

November 2002, p. 26.

41

CHAPTER 3

NUCLEAR 1914: THE NEXT BIG WORRY

Henry D. Sokolski

The next use of nuclear weapons, if followed quickly by others, 

is nothing the United States or its closest friends could suffer lightly. 

Like Rome after it was repeatedly pillaged, Washington, even if not 

directly attacked, would find its authority immediately undermined. 

Powerless to stop nuclear attacks after having so long warned 

against them, the United States could soon find itself under assault. 

Assuming nuclear use begets nuclear use, what would follow could 

be the next dark ages.

An alternative and sunnier future would be one in which the 

United States and its allies can and do limit severely the use of nuclear 

weapons. The question is: What would this require? At a minimum, 

enough nations falling into line, either voluntarily or otherwise, to 

keep nuclear attacks at bay.

This is hardly a sure thing. Most nuclear-capable states are 

reluctant to provide information on their nuclear inventories, 

activities, and facilities, which is necessary to check nuclear 

proliferation or terrorism. As more states acquire nuclear weapons 

or become increasingly ready to do so, the inclination to share such 

facts is only likely to decline. Nuclear-capable states are unlikely to 

open up if it implicates them in proliferation or undermines their 

option to acquire nuclear weapons in the future.

The news since September 11, 2001, is depressingly instructive in 

this regard. More than a year after the first revelations about Iran’s 

uranium enrichment program were made public, the United States 

and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were still 

trying to drag information about A. Q. Khan’s nuclear activities from 

the Pakistani government. First, Islamabad denied that any Pakistani 

ever shared nuclear technology with anyone. Then, after Iranian 

officials fingered Pakistan, the Pakistani government admitted that 

Dr. Khan had made some sales to Tehran. Then it was revealed that 
42

Dr. Khan and his subordinates sold plans, equipment, and bomb 

designs to Libya. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf had Dr. 

Khan arrested—but just as suddenly decided to grant the Pakistani 

scientist a pardon, praising him as a national hero. The United States 

and the IAEA are still anxiously trying to learn what exactly Dr. 

Khan sold and to whom. But so far, the Pakistani government has 

refused to allow either the United States or the IAEA to interview 

Dr. Khan directly.

It is not just Iran and Libya that benefited from Pakistani nuclear 

exports. Several other countries, including North Korea, Egypt, 

and perhaps even Brazil have received them as well. Brazil’s case is 

unclear because its navy has put off allowing inspectors full access 

to the country’s enrichment plant for nearly a year, for fear that 

IAEA officials might pinpoint the foreign sources of their imported 

enrichment equipment. Pakistan could be of immense help in 

this situation. But so far, it has done the bare minimum to clarify 

matters. How successful might we be, then, in securing nuclear 

materials and facilities against terrorist theft or in tracking down 

nuclear terrorists in a world with more Pakistans and Brazils? If the 

past year of news is prologue, our prospects do not look good.

An Unsteady Balance.

More speculative but every bit as chilling is how such nations 

might use their own nuclear capabilities against one another. Here, 

too, there is cause to worry. A key reason why is the amount of 

diplomatic entropy since the collapse of the Soviet Union. During 

the Cold War, there was a clear subordination of nations to one or 

another of the two superpowers’ strong alliance systems. More 

important, the aim of the alliance in the West was to check or contain 

the efforts of the Warsaw Pact. The net effect was relative peace with 

only small wars (see Figure 1). 

This system no longer exists. Instead, we now have one 

superpower, the United States, with a growing but relatively weak 

alliance system being challenged by an increasing number of nuclear 

or nuclear-weapons-ready states. So far, the United States has tried 

to cope with the emergence of these independent nuclear powers by 

making them “strategic partners,” e.g., India and Russia, or “non-
43

Figure 1.

NATO allies,” e.g., Israel and Pakistan; or by fudging if a nation 

actually has attained full nuclear status, e.g., North Korea (see Figure 

2). 

There are limits, however, to what this approach can

accomplish. Such a weak alliance system, with its expanding set 

of loose affiliations, risks becoming analogous to the international 

system that failed to contain offensive actions prior to the First World 

War. Of course, unlike 1914, there is no power today that can rival 

the projection of U.S. conventional forces anywhere on the globe. But 

in a world with an increasing number of nuclear or nuclear-ready 

states, including Iran, North Korea, Algeria, Egypt, Japan and many 

others, this may not matter. In such a world, the actions of just one 

or two states could check U.S. influence or ignite a war Washington 

could have difficulty winning (see Figure 3).
44

Israel India

Pakistan China

NATO Russia

U.S.

Post-911

Today

(Non-NATO ally)

(Non-NATO ally) (Strategic Partner)

(Strategic Partner)

21 Possible Strategic Relationships

(6 of the most important with the U.S.)

Figure 2.

Consider Taiwan. It tried to acquire nuclear weapons several 

decades ago. Now, with China constantly increasing its conventional 

missile and amphibious strength across the Taiwan Strait, Taipei 

could easily have cause to try to acquire nuclear weapons again. If 

it were to try, China would surely demand that the United States 

get Taiwan to cease and desist and threaten invasion if Taiwan did 

not. Taipei would probably stand down—but undoubtedly would 

try to condition its denuclearization on having the United States 

produce some clear signal of security support. Would the United 

States blink or back Taiwan? If it expressed support for Taiwan’s 

existence (perhaps with a forward U.S. naval deployment) and 

thereby defused Taiwan’s nuclear proliferation moves, could the 

United States cope with what undoubtedly would be a sharp, 

threatening response from Beijing? The point of this hypothetical 

case is that even the slightest move by Taiwan to acquire nuclear 

weapons could overwhelm the strategic relationships Washington 

has built with China and other Asian nations over the last halfcentury to head off such wars.
45

U.S.

Figure 3.

Another case of increasing interest is that of India and Pakistan. 

The United States recently made Pakistan a non-NATO ally, and 

is in the midst of making India a strategic partner. Washington’s 

professed aim is to bolster stability between these two nations. But 

how would the United States view Pakistan if another attempt on 

President Musharraf’s life proved successful and Pakistan fell under 

Taliban control? At that point, a number of things would likely 

occur. Immediately, the political stock of the nation’s current hero, 

Dr. Khan, would rise; indeed, there has already been talk about him 

succeeding Musharraf under such circumstances. If Dr. Khan did 

not succeed Musharraf, someone sympathetic to Dr. Khan surely 

would. 
46

In any case, a Talibanized Pakistan could be counted on to work 

more closely with its ideological allies in the front lines in Kashmir 

against India and with Saudi Arabia. Riyadh—a financial backer 

of Pakistan’s nuclear activities—is now investigating how it might 

acquire nuclear weapons in the likely case that Iran continues on its 

current nuclear course. Meanwhile, senior Pakistani military officials 

sympathetic to the Taliban already have suggested that Pakistan 

could legally base some of its nuclear warheads on Saudi soil as 

long as they remained under Pakistani control; a Taliban-dominated 

Pakistan might well implement this idea in order to achieve strategic 

depth for any future conventional conflict with India. If a Talibanized 

Pakistan ignited another war with India, China would diplomatically 

side with Pakistan, and the United States would side with its strategic 

friend, India. This would appear to create a balance. But if Pakistan 

thought it could count on Saudi missiles armed with Pakistani 

warheads to counter any Indian aggression, would Islamabad 

recognize this balance and be deterred? 

Again, the point of this hypothetical case is that a little nuclear 

proliferation—in this case, from Pakistan to Saudi Arabia—could 

undo a considerable amount of American diplomacy and might well 

tip the balance toward dragging Washington into war. This set of 

observations suggests that nuclear terrorism, per se, may no longer 

be our biggest worry. Instead, the greater danger would be that 

with more nuclear and nuclear-ready states, the coalitions needed 

to check or undo nuclear terrorist efforts would be too few to be 

effective and the willingness of countries to toy with mortal strategic 

combat too great for existing efforts to keep them in check. The 

insufficient interest of states in fighting nuclear terrorism and their 

interest in strategic combat, moreover, may be mutually reinforcing. 

As states fail to do what is needed to stem nuclear terror, more will 

sense the weakness of large powers and thus be more inclined to 

risk nuclear brinksmanship themselves. This, in turn, would tend to 

reduce the willingness of nuclear-capable states to open up their own 

nuclear activities in order to ferret out possible terrorist schemes or 

proliferation networks.
47

Can Proliferation Be Stopped?

This is not good news, but it is hardly inevitable. Three things, in 

particular, could improve matters greatly. First, much more can be 

done to reduce the production and accessibility of weapons-usable 

plutonium and uranium. Terrorists seeking to explode a nuclear 

device need not acquire very much material: The crudest nuclear 

mechanism would only require 60 kilograms of highly enriched 

uranium, divided into two pieces, with one dropped upon the other 

from a height of as little as 10 feet. A plutonium bomb would require 

more sophistication, but Dr. Khan has made such devices easier to 

build by making a workable engineering design much more widely 

available. Even if such bombs had only a one-kiloton yield—a 

fraction of the explosive power of the bombs used on Japan in World 

War II—the effects on a densely populated city would be terrible. A 

recent analysis of such an attack by the Natural Resources Defense 

Council, in which a one-kiloton bomb was used in San Francisco, 

resulted in estimates that 26,000 people would be killed and 

another 10,000 would be injured—casualties an order of magnitude 

greater than the deaths on September 11. In the United States and 

Russia alone, there are tens of thousands of bombs-worth of highly 

enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium stored as surplus. 

Meanwhile, over 40,000 weapons-worth of weapons-usable civilian 

plutonium is being stored in Europe, India, and Japan. As President 

Bush has pointed out, none of this material or the means to make it is 

necessary to produce nuclear energy, and all of it can bring nations 

within days of having nuclear weapons of their own. Fortunately, 

safer nuclear fuels, unsuitable for weapons, are readily available; an 

effort to use them is urgently needed and imminently doable.

Second, we must be willing to act on first indications and early 

intelligence. Consider the A. Q. Khan network. We knew about 

some of the key actors there, not weeks ago, not years ago, but 

decades ago. We did not pursue what we knew. Many of the same 

names that are part of the present proliferation problem appeared 

in the 1981 book, The Islamic Bomb—the first names have sometimes 

changed, but the last names remain the same, as one generation has 

passed on the business to the next. For more than 2 decades, those 
48

who were engaged in helping Pakistan secure the bomb, and who 

worked with Dr. Khan to help him distribute this knowledge, were 

not questioned about their activities. Given the ease with which a 

nuclear weapon can now be made—requiring less time, money, 

and manpower than ever before—we no longer have the luxury 

of waiting to act.

Third, more should be done to raise the political and economic costs 

of acquiring nuclear arms or coming within weeks of doing so. The 

most important thing is to start reading the Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Treaty properly. It calls for the sharing of nuclear technology, but 

only in conformity with the treaty’s prohibitions against doing 

anything to encourage or assist nonweapons states in getting nuclear 

weapons. President Bush is one of the very few American presidents 

(the others being Presidents Ford and Carter) to try to spell out 

what “in conformity” means. On February 11, 2004, the president 

laid out seven worthy proposals that would restrict or reduce the 

number of nations making weapons-usable plutonium or uranium. 

These proposals deserve greater support both within the 

United States and internationally. They include taking direct action 

against proliferation networks using the same techniques we use to 

fight terrorism; strengthening the laws and international controls 

that govern proliferation; expanding efforts to keep dangerous 

materials out of the wrong hands; preventing countries like North 

Korea and Iran from producing weapons-grade nuclear material 

while pretending to work only on peaceful, civilian nuclear energy 

programs; and taking measures to make the IAEA stronger, more 

legitimate, and more decisive.

Several additional steps should be taken to sustain the 

president’s proposals. First, we should view additional large civilian 

nuclear projects—including nuclear power and desalinization 

plants, large research reactors, and regional fuel-cycle centers—as 

illegitimate under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty if they are 

not privately financed or approved after an open international 

bidding process against less risky alternatives. This would not only 

spotlight countries like Iran that refused to allow non-nuclear energy 

alternatives to compete openly to supply their electrical power needs; 

it would also discourage the United States and allied governments 

from building large nuclear commercialization projects and subsidi-
49

zing nuclear power with billions of dollars, as was supported in the 

energy bill of 2005.

Second, we should get as many declared nuclear weapons states 

as possible formally to agree not to redeploy nuclear weapons onto 

any other state’s soil in peacetime and not to tolerate any other 

nation’s attempt to do so. This could help thwart rumored schemes 

to have Pakistan legally transfer nuclear weapons under its control 

to Saudi Arabia, or North Korea’s threat to transfer nuclear weapons 

to other states. It also could help establish restraints over nuclear 

weapons states that have not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Treaty (India, Pakistan, and Israel) and allow the United States to get 

credit for what it has already begun to do—withdraw its unnecessary 

overseas basing of obsolete tactical nuclear weapons.

Finally, we should encourage the United Nations (UN) to adopt 

a set of country-neutral rules against any nation that the IAEA and 

the UN Security Council do not clearly find in full compliance with 

the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Rather than wait for either of 

these bodies to find a specific country in clear violation of the treaty 

and then impose particular sanctions—something these bodies are 

increasingly loath to do—the United States and its allies should spell 

out in advance the minimal steps to be taken against any country not 

clearly in full compliance. This recommendation would reverse the 

present dynamic by making it the default position of the IAEA and 

the Security Council to encourage complying members to take action 

against states that defy the rules.

A New Pillar.

These additional measures may seem ambitious. But they build 

on what President Bush and our allies have been doing—namely, 

working to establish a third major security pillar to international 

relations. Two pillars dominated the last 4 centuries of international 

politics. The first pillar is freedom of commerce, which gave rise to 

a common international usage against piracy. The second pillar is 

the humane treatment of people, which produced an international 

common usage against slave-trading. These pillars have justified 

a significant number of wars and alliances, and have powerfully 

shaped modern international relations.
50

What remains to be done, and urgently, is to create a third pillar 

pertaining to the further spread of strategic arms, particularly nuclear 

weapons. Just as piracy and slave-trading can only operate outside 

the protection of international law, so must the illicit trade of nuclear 

weapons-related goods be considered out of bounds. Ultimately, 

this will entail a major reorientation of international affairs. This task 

will not be easy. The alternative to moving in this direction, though, 

is far grimmer—slipping into the kind of chaos that prevailed in 

1914, when a single anarchist’s bullet set off a series of strategic wars 

that nearly snuffed out Western civilization. With nuclear weapons 

all around or on the ready, this is hardly a condition that anyone, 

even the strongest of nations, can sanely entertain.
SECTION II

NEW PROLIFERATION WORRIES

53

CHAPTER 4

MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION 

AND THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME

Mitchell Kugler

This presentation has three key conclusions: 1) There need not be 

friction between the intersection of the Missile Technology Control 

Regime (MTCR) and international missile defense cooperation; 2) To 

the extent such friction exists, it is being generated by some supporters 

of the MTCR, though there are many people—myself included—

who regard themselves both as supporters of missile defense and

the MTCR; and, 3) To the extent a conflict between missile defense 

and the MTCR is generated—needlessly, in my view—it will be the 

MTCR that suffers.

Along with many others, I spent much time during the Clinton 

presidency working in support of missile defense. In 1997 I was 

given an opportunity to run a new subcommittee on the Senate 

Governmental Affairs Committee, whose principal focus was on 

what we thought of as the “strategic basket” of issues: missile defense, 

arms control, proliferation, export controls, and strategic deterrence. 

Under Senator Thad Cochran’s chairmanship, we looked into each 

of these areas, shifting our attention occasionally among the various 

elements of the “strategic basket” while remaining faithful to the 

overall outlines of the basket.

Senator Cochran quite consciously defined the elements of this 

“strategic basket,” after reflection on why missile defense was not 

making greater progress. Of course, the Clinton administration’s 

absolute hostility to missile defense was a significant element of the 

lack of progress, but the absence of a coherent strategy by missile 

defense supporters allowed the administration to inhibit progress 

unfettered by significant opposition.

So we began in 1997 with a string of hearings on missile 

proliferation which, I should note, would not have been possible 

without the work of Dennis Ward and a Legis Fellow whose services 
54

I was sharing with the office of Senator Jon Kyl, John Rood, whose 

findings were captured in The Proliferation Primer, a 1998 majority 

report of Senator Cochran’s subcommittee. We focused so much 

on proliferation because missile defense proponents were in the 

habit of giving lengthy speeches on the various missile defense 

architectures they found attractive without explaining why they were 

convinced of the need for missile defense. By failing to make clear 

the fundamental need for missile defense, we were failing to attract 

sufficient support. 

In looking back at the Primer, it strikes me that so little has changed 

in the nearly 8 years since it was published. Proliferation from Russia 

and China continues. What was then emerging as a serious threat, 

was noted as such in the Primer, and has now fully emerged—the 

phenomenon of rogue to rogue proliferation—not only continues, 

but shows little signs of abating.

And, of course, all of this has occurred under the regime of the 

MTCR. In fact, more countries have ballistic missile technology now 

than when the regime began. We could have an endless debate about 

whether in the absence of the MTCR still more would have had such 

technology, or whether those that possess missile technology would 

have had even more advanced technology than they currently 

possess, but that debate would miss the point: However wellintentioned and well-executed, the MTCR has not, and will not, stop 

the spread of missile technology. At best, it can, on occasion, slow it 

down; at worst, it can lull us into a false sense of security—that is, 

a mindset of “as it is written, so it shall be,” with little regard to the 

facts.

Consider what the Director of Central Intelligence’s (DCI) JulyDecember 1996 report, “The Acquisition of Technology Relating to 

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Advanced Conventional 

Munitions”, said then:

• Nonproliferation . . . regimes can be deceived by determined 

proliferators.

• During the last half of 1996, China was the most significant 

supplier of WMD-related goods and technology to foreign 

countries. The Chinese provided a tremendous variety of 

assistance to both Iran’s and Pakistan’s ballistic missile 

programs.
55

• Russia supplied a variety of ballistic missile-related goods to 

foreign countries during the reporting period, especially to 

Iran.

Now consider some of the missile-related points in the DCI’s 

latest report covering the period January 1-June 30, 2002:

• Chinese entities continued to provide Pakistan with missilerelated technical and material assistance during the reporting 

period . . . . In addition, firms in China have provided dualuse missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance to 

several other countries of proliferation concern—such as Iran, 

Libya, and to a lesser extent, North Korea.

• Russian entities during the reporting period continued to 

supply a variety of ballistic missile-related goods and technical 

know-how to countries such as Iran, India, and China. Iran’s 

earlier success in gaining technology and materials from 

Russian entities has helped to accelerate Iranian development 

of the Shaab-3 medium range ballistic missile (MRBM), and 

continuing Russian entity assistance most likely supports 

Iranian efforts to develop new missiles and increase Tehran’s 

self-sufficiency in missile production.

• Throughout the first half of 2002, North Korea continued 

to export significant ballistic missile-related equipment, 

components, materials, and technical expertise to the Middle 

East, South Asia, and North Africa. P’yongyang attaches high 

priority to the development and sale of ballistic missiles, 

equipment, and related technology. Exports of ballistic missiles 

and related technology are one of the North’s major sources 

of hard currency, which fuel continued missile development 

and production.

How much has actually changed? It is important to understand 

just what the threat is and what it is not. Countries are not the threat; 

they are simply the threat’s manifestation. The threat, in ballistic 

missile terms, is proliferation. So while on occasion we will eliminate 

a ballistic missile threat from one country or another, as has recently 

been done so successfully in Iraq, over time we should expect other 
56

countries to emerge as ballistic missile successors. This will happen 

despite the presence and best efforts of the MTCR. And it stands to 

reason that this will occur as hostile states seek methods by which to 

threaten—coerce, deter, call it what you will—the United States, its 

deployed forces, allies, and friends.

And thus the need for missile defense—again, despite the best 

efforts of the MTCR. More importantly, the need for international 

cooperation on missile defense, particularly in light of the Bush 

administration’s entirely new missile defense policy to protect 

not only the United States and deployed forces, but also allies and 

friends.

In fact, international cooperation already has begun. The United 

States is—and has been—working with Israel on the Arrow interceptor 

for quite some time, and enhanced co-production of the interceptor 

is beginning in the United States. We are working with Japan on the 

Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), and Japan has noted publicly its interest 

in working on a larger booster for the SM-3. We are working with 

Italy and Germany on the Medium Extended Air Defense System 

(MEADS) program, and with the United Kingdom on the upgrade 

to the early warning radar at Fylingdales. It appears that a similar 

upgrade, in cooperation with Denmark, will also soon begin on the 

Thule early warning radar. The bilateral missile defense relationship 

also appears to be proceeding quickly with Poland, as does the 

multilateral missile defense work with the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO), which, in a recent major move forward, added 

the protection of population centers to its considerations for missile 

defense. So there is cooperation with six countries—Israel, England, 

Japan, Germany, Italy, and Denmark; expanding cooperation with 

NATO; and imminent cooperation with Poland, which is rapidly 

emerging as one of America’s closest allies.

It is only with Israel, on Arrow cooperation, that there have been 

MTCR issues. I will take a moment now to comment on the most 

recent Arrow issue.

Israel is going to test the Arrow interceptor twice in the United 

States in the near future. As conducting a test in the United States 

is a difficult and expensive endeavor, Israel will ship four Arrow

interceptors here to ensure the availability of two spares, should 

there be any problems with the test articles.
57

The Israelis were informed, however, that in the event their spares 

were not used, they would not be able to return them to Israel because 

the United States would, in sending them back, be transferring MTCR 

“category 1” items. Transferring category 1 items, while permissible 

under the MTCR, is considered anathema by most of the regime’s 

supporters.

Now, consider for a moment a few relevant facts: Israel already 

manufactures the Arrow interceptor. Israel has already deployed 

the Arrow interceptor. The interceptors the United States would be 

sending back to Israel were already in the possession of the Israelis 

themselves. In sum, shipping the two spare Arrows back to Israel 

would not in any way, shape, or form enhances the missile technology 

of Israel. But, unfortunately, this most recent case has demonstrated 

that oftentimes there exists little room for the intrusion of common 

sense upon the MTCR.

After examining a variety of options—to include even storing 

the spare Arrow interceptors at sea so they are not technically in the 

United States before shipment back to Israel—the “solution” found 

is for the Israelis to be in “possession” (whatever that means) of the 

spare Arrows at all times when they are in the United States. So when 

these spares are shipped back to Israel, it will be Israel shipping to 

Israel, not the United States shipping to Israel.

This example is considered to be a “success” by many MTCR 

supporters. Though there are others, myself included, who find this 

to be the ultimate in form over substance. Indeed, I suspect this odd 

example should be more than sufficient for other MTCR members 

seeking to use U.S. actions as justification for their proliferation 

activities, otherwise known as “exports.”

Surely supporters of the MTCR must acknowledge that this makes 

no sense. Would it have not been better, not to mention honest, to 

state simply that Israel already possesses the Arrow interceptor and 

the spares being shipped back do nothing to enhance Israel’s missile 

capabilities? That shipping another nation’s property hardly can be 

construed reasonably as violating the MTCR? Not to mention the 

fact that the United States has been supporting Israel, financially and 

technologically, in building Arrow? Or even that the United States 

doesn’t consider missile defense to be governed by the MTCR?
58

Protecting the United States could, perhaps, be done only from 

the territory of the United States. Anything is possible. But the truth 

of the matter is that anything beyond a rudimentary defense requires 

assets placed outside of the United States. Placing assets outside of 

the United States, though, will not necessarily cause conflict with 

the MTCR. Sensors in space or radars in other countries will not 

conflict with the MTCR, nor will battle management or command 

and control assets. But what about interceptors?

I will briefly survey examples of potential international missile 

defense cooperation, some of which might be managed successfully 

under the MTCR.

1. Interceptor cooperation falling below MTCR thresholds. It is hard 

to imagine that the administration, having so recently divested 

itself of the Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty—which prohibited 

substantive international cooperation—would now allow the 

MTCR to substitute for portions (i.e., Articles IX and X) of that 

defunct treaty. Or that the Bush administration would, in limiting 

interceptor cooperation to that permitted by the MTCR, essentially 

impose upon itself the kind of “demarcation” between permissible 

and impermissible cooperation that was so bitterly opposed in years 

past during the “theater/strategic demarcation” debates under the 

ABM Treaty.

2. Basing U.S. interceptors on foreign soil but under the control of the 

United States. Some of my friends with a different view than mine 

insist that providing missile defense for host nations in exchange 

for using their territory to base our interceptors should be more 

than sufficient for the host nation. In some instances this may be a 

reasonable trade. In many instances, the basing of interceptors will 

protect not only foreign soil, but also deployed U.S. forces, while at 

the same time enhancing protection for the United States itself.

3. Receiving technological assistance from our allies and friends. There 

is no denying that the United States has done a tremendous amount 

of research and development on missile defense, far more than any 

other country. But to therefore assume that no other nation could 

contribute its technological expertise usefully would be arrogant in 

the extreme. In my current position, I spend a substantial amount of 

time with defense companies in other countries, and I can assure you 

that in every one of these companies, I work with people every bit 
59

as talented as the best in American industry. As hardware follows 

know-how, without question the MTCR will be an impediment 

here.

4. Transferring interceptors to others. Without question, the greatest 

potential for missile defense/MTCR conflict comes from this option. 

Some seem unwilling to accept the fact that many of our allies view 

themselves as sovereign nations with a responsibility for their own 

defense. As sovereigns, they may well object to continued U.S. control 

of interceptors on their soil rather than transferring the interceptors 

to them for their use—as we already do with so many other weapons 

systems.

While currently the MTCR is inhibiting Arrow cooperation in 

particular, the fact remains that Arrow is further along in terms of 

international cooperation than most of our other programs. The time 

for transferring other hardware will soon be upon us, along with the 

choices that invariably will be faced if the MTCR is left as it is now.

There are two broad options to choose from, each obviously 

having many permutations. We can:

1. Declare as a matter of policy that missile defense cooperation will be 

excluded from the purview of the MTCR. The United States has, after 

all, managed to export the D5 missile and cruise missiles despite the 

MTCR. Has this brought the regime to its knees? Of course it has not. 

But the regime has managed to continue, even though the United 

States is transferring an inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) 

capable of being nuclear-armed to the United Kingdom. Why, then, 

should transferring missile defense to the United Kingdom, or, for 

that matter, any other ally, pose a problem? The simple fact is that 

the object of the MTCR is to reduce as much as possible the flow 

of missile technology to those we don’t want to have such technology. 

The purpose of missile defense is, among other things, for protection 

from the failures of the MTCR. These purposes are complementary 

and should not be set in opposition.

2. Restrict cooperation to that permitted by the MTCR. In so doing, 

we would occupy vast amounts of the bureaucracy’s time and effort 

in what would be a “Groundhog Day” of missile defense fights. 

On each and every occasion that some form of cooperation was 

proposed, proponents would line up their arguments and opponents 

would be energized by having another opportunity to draw the line 
60

on the primacy of the MTCR over missile defense cooperation. In 

some cases, cooperation would be denied; in others, as has already 

been the case, we would see cooperation reduced. Of course, as cited 

already on Arrow, in still other cases, some cute interpretation of the 

MTCR might be found such that we remain “compliant” with the 

regime. But I wonder of what value such a regime would be if its 

ideas are to be made as infinitely elastic as the government’s lexicon 

in George Orwell’s 1984?

Colleagues of mine with opposing views frequently insist that a 

unilateral policy decision on the part of the United States to interpret 

the MTCR as permitting international missile defense cooperation 

will only throw open the door for any country—and these colleagues 

always stress “any”—to act however it pleases in exporting missile 

technology. Perhaps that is true. But I do not think so.

The menace of WMD delivered by ballistic missiles is well known 

today. It is more than a theory; we have seen ballistic missiles used 

just as we have witnessed the actions of several nations in pursuing 

WMD to seat atop their missiles. Countries today know—without 

needing the MTCR to inform them—of the danger of exporting missile 

technology and know-how without regard for the consequences.

Even if there were no MTCR, the United States—and like-minded 

nations—would be perfectly capable of doing their utmost to stem 

missile proliferation. So it is entirely possible that leaders of some 

nations will suggest that their missile proliferation is no different from 

that practiced by the United States, albeit ours under the “guise” of 

“missile defense cooperation.” The United States should not accept 

this type of statement as having even a shred of legitimacy. 

Nations may well seek to justify their missile proliferation in this 

manner. But in so doing, they will be offering an excuse for actions 

they otherwise would have taken anyway. At most, the United States 

will be providing a new excuse for old and illegitimate actions on the 

part of proliferators.
61

CHAPTER 5

A FRESH EXAMINATION OF THE PROLIFERATION 

DANGERS OF LIGHT WATER REACTORS

Victor Gilinsky

LWRs Become the Nuclear Power Workhorse around the World.

From the beginning of the nuclear age, American efforts to shape 

the worldwide development of nuclear energy were driven, in part, 

by U.S. interest in limiting the possibilities for diversion of civilian 

facilities to military purposes. U.S. policy went through stages, at 

each one of which it appeared as if a particular technological or 

institutional approach to nuclear energy could tame it sufficiently 

to allow worldwide commercial use without spreading access to 

nuclear weapons. But in time, the real world poked holes in one 

rationale after another. The subject of this chapter involves one of 

these technological policy initiatives, the consequences of which we 

are living with today—encouraging the spread, starting in the 1960s, 

of U.S. light water reactor (LWR) technology as the basic nuclear 

power workhorse throughout the world.1

In the 1950s, before the advent of nuclear power plants, the 

United States tried to control the uranium market by buying up 

uranium at high prices. This naturally encouraged exploration that 

demonstrated that uranium was plentiful and negated the U.S. effort 

at control. With easy access to uranium but lacking indigenous 

uranium enrichment facilities, Britain, France, and Canada opted for 

reactor designs that utilized natural uranium fuel and heavy water or 

graphite as the neutron moderator. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, 

they interested Italy, Japan, India, and other countries in heading 

in this direction. Not only did this threaten America’s competitive 

position, but it also threatened to spread a type of reactor that lent 

itself easily to production of plutonium. In fact, the first British 

and French power reactors were based on their military plutonium 

production reactors. 

America’s advantage was two-fold. The United States had 

developed a compact, and therefore relatively low-cost, LWR design 
62

based on a naval propulsion reactor design. And the United States 

had invested heavily in gaseous diffusion plants in Tennessee, 

Kentucky, and Ohio to enrich uranium for weapons. 

The LWR could only operate on enriched uranium, that is, 

uranium more concentrated in the active uranium-235 isotope than 

natural uranium.2 By virtue of its huge enrichment capacity, the 

United States had an effective monopoly on the production of this 

fuel. Moreover, as the cost of the plants had been largely assigned to 

the military budget, the United States decided to sell the stuff at low 

prices that did not defray the massive investment. It was a price that 

at the time no other country could even hope to offer in the future. 

From the point of view of customers, it was a deal that was hard 

to refuse, even if it came with U.S. control conditions. Ultimately, 

the amount of engineering invested in these designs and the depth 

of experience with them overwhelmed any conceptual advantages 

other reactor types may have had. While not the exclusive choice—

Canada and India continued developing the natural uranium/heavy 

water designs that evolved into the CANDU reactor—the LWR 

became the standard reactor type around the world. In the late 1960s, 

France switched to LWRs, and Britain did later. Other European 

manufacturers in Germany and Sweden chose LWRs. The Soviets 

eventually did, too. There are now over 350 LWRs in operation in the 

world today.3

From the point of view of proliferation, the advantages of the 

LWR were considerable as compared with natural uranium-fueled 

reactors. U.S. policymakers thought that the most important security 

advantage of LWRs was that the LWR customers knew that they 

risked losing their reactor fuel supply if they misused the reactors 

for military purposes. There appeared to be detailed technical 

advantages, as well. For a given size of reactor, the LWRs produced less 

plutonium. The plutonium was, generally speaking, more difficult to 

extract from the LWR fuel by chemical reprocessing because the fuel 

is irradiated for a longer period of time, i.e., it has a higher fuel burnup, and hence is more radioactive, necessitating more shielding of 

the separation process. LWRs also had to be shut down for refueling 

which makes for easier oversight of the fuel, whereas most natural 

uranium reactors are refueled online and continually, so it is harder 

to keep track of the fuel elements. It was widely believed through the 
63

1970s—even by the top people in the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA) in Vienna—that it was not usable at all.

It is important to correct one widely held belief about LWR spent 

fuel. The isotopic characteristics of spent fuel from LWRs are about 

the same as that of spent fuel from heavy water reactors such as 

the CANDU, even though the LWR burn-up is much higher. This 

is because of the differences in the enrichment levels of the two 

types of fuel. The weapons usability of plutonium from either fully 

irradiated LWR spent fuel or fully irradiated CANDU spent fuel 

would be comparable.4

Even the intrinsic technical advantages of the LWRs themselves 

do not now appear as significant as they once did. While LWRs do 

not produce as much plutonium as natural uranium-fueled reactors 

of the same size, the modern LWRs are so much bigger than the 

older natural uranium plants that they are also prolific plutonium 

producers.5 A standard size LWR with an electrical generating 

capacity of about 1,000 megawatts produces about 250 kilograms of 

plutonium per year. (That has to be compared with the nominal five 

kilograms of plutonium per warhead.) 

Worldwide Spread of Enrichment Technology Eases 

Access to Nuclear Weapons.

In any case, the proliferation benefits of worldwide deployment 

of LWRs gradually attenuated. Just as the market for uranium 

encouraged exploration that negated U.S. control, so the spread of 

LWRs and the consequent market for enrichment encouraged the 

reinvention by others of the gaseous diffusion enrichment process—

originally developed by the United States during World War II—as 

well as the development of the gas centrifuge enrichment process. 

Together, these developments broke the U.S. monopoly on the 

supply of enrichment for LWRs. 

In particular, France built a large gaseous diffusion plant, and 

the United Kingdom (UK), West Germany, and the Netherlands 

established the Urenco consortium which supplies enrichment 

services from gas centrifuge plants in each of these countries. While 

the gaseous diffusion plants in France and the United States continue 
64

to operate, both countries have announced plans to replace them with 

new gas centrifuge plants. Moreover, Russia long ago abandoned 

the gaseous diffusion process in favor of gas centrifuge and is now a 

major competitor for enrichment supply on the international market. 

Other countries which already rely or plan to rely on nuclear power 

to a significant extent—notably Japan and China,respectively—also 

have built gas centrifuge plants, although at present they do not 

supply enrichment services to the international market. 

Global attention has been focused recently on the proliferation 

implications of centrifuge enrichment as a consequence of the 

revelations about Pakistan’s role in spreading this technology. The 

activities of A. Q. Khan and his associates in trading the centrifuge 

technology he stole from Urenco to Iran, North Korea, Libya, and 

possibly other countries has underlined the “front-end” vulnerability 

of the LWR once-through fuel cycle. 

An important advantage of the gas centrifuge process is that 

it is much less energy intensive than gaseous diffusion. The trend 

towards using gas centrifuge instead of gaseous diffusion for 

commercial enrichment also has been driven by improvements in 

centrifuge performance. The newer models are much more reliable 

and have a larger unit enrichment capacity. Gas centrifuge plants 

also are inherently much more flexible than gaseous diffusion plants 

to accommodate different combinations of feed enrichment, tails 

(waste) concentration, and product enrichment. Large centrifuge 

enrichment plants can be thought of as many smaller centrifuge 

plants in parallel, so the small modular units can be shifted around 

fairly easily, or one can stand by itself. In other words, gas centrifuge 

technology lends itself to small-scale operation.

Unfortunately, these characteristics also make the gas centrifuge 

process a much bigger proliferation risk than, say, gaseous diffusion 

technology. That applies both to (1) the possibility that the owner 

of an existing declared low enriched uranium (LEU) plant would 

modify it to also produce heavy enriched uranium (HEU), and (2) 

that someone would construct a small clandestine HEU plant. 

It is now generally appreciated that gas centrifuge plants for LEU 

can fairly easily be turned into plants for HEU. It is less appreciated 

that LEU at, say, 4 percent enrichment, is about 80 percent of the way 
65

to HEU. It takes comparatively little additional “separative work” to 

upgrade LEU to HEU. It would be difficult for the IAEA to keep close 

enough track of all the LEU to stay ahead of any such conversion. 

Having a gas centrifuge plants producing LEU makes it much 

easier to construct and operate a clandestine one. The presence of 

the larger plant would mask many of the intelligence indicators and 

environmental indications of a clandestine one so it would harder to 

find. 

But even in the absence of any commercial enrichment—in the 

case of a country with one or more stand alone LWRs—the presence 

of LWRs means that a substantial supply of fresh LWR fuel would 

also be present at times. That such fresh fuel can provide a source 

of uranium for clandestine enrichment is another possibility that 

has received essentially no attention in proliferation writings. Since 

the fuel is already LEU, a much smaller gas centrifuge plant would 

suffice to raise the enrichment to bomb levels than would be the case 

if the starting point was natural uranium. By starting with such LEU 

fuel pellets, which are uranium oxide (UO2), the enricher would 

be able to skip the first five processes required to go from uranium 

ore to uranium hexafluoride gas, the material on which the gas 

centrifuge operate. To go from the uranium oxide pellets to uranium 

hexafluoride, the would-be bombmaker would crush the pellets and 

react the powder with fluorine gas. Suitably processed, the LEU 

pellets could provide feed for clandestine enrichment.

Worldwide Spread of Reprocessing Technology 

for Plutonium Separation.

By contrast to the heavy attention recently directed at the 

possibility of clandestine uranium enrichment, there has been 

relatively little attention directed at the possibility of clandestine 

reprocessing to separate plutonium from LWR spent fuel. It is a 

principal concentration of this chapter. 

In previous debates on the subject, the point was made that (1) 

plutonium contained in LWR spent fuel is unsuitable for weapons; 

that anyhow (2) anything short of a high-investment commercial 

reprocessing plant—beyond the means and capabilities of most 
66

countries—would not provide access to the plutonium contained in 

the LWR spent fuel; and (3) such reprocessing would be detected by 

international inspectors. We believe these bars to using LWRs as a 

source of plutonium for weapons are very much exaggerated. 

Partial cores removed from an LWR after one fuel cycle (rather 

than the conventional three) have lower burnup and hence contain 

plutonium with a higher Pu-239 content than the plutonium in 

spent fuel of the full design burnup. Such plutonium is sometime 

called fuel grade, as distinguished from weapons grade at one end 

and reactor grade at the other. In practical effect, such plutonium is 

near-weapons grade. The characteristics of simple fission weapons 

using this material are not very different from those using weapons 

grade plutonium. The fuel grade plutonium is markedly superior 

for weapons use than reactor grade plutonium from spent fuel of the 

design burnup. The arguments surrounding the usability of LWR 

plutonium for weapons deal with the high burnup reactor grade 

material and so are irrelevant for the present discussion.

Reprocessing of LWR spent fuel is not particularly difficult for 

a country with modest technological capabilities. Witness North 

Korea’s reprocessing of its plutonium production reactor spent fuel. 

While reprocessing LWR fuel is harder than reprocessing low burnup 

natural uranium fuel, the feasibility of small-scale, and possibly 

“quick and dirty” reprocessing of LWR fuel has been known for 30 

years. 

It is more difficult to make categorical statements regarding 

the ability of IAEA inspectors to detect a hypothetical clandestine 

reprocessing plant. Such a plant could likely remain hidden until it 

is put to use—until spent fuel is withdrawn from a reactor, and the 

reprocessing operation begins. Even if the start of operation would 

be detected promptly, which is by no means sure, especially as to 

location, it is possible that the operator of the clandestine plant could 

manage to produce militarily significant quantities of plutonium and 

weapons before the international system could react effectively. To 

place these issues in context, we first summarize the evolution of U.S. 

policy on the proliferation implications of commercial reprocessing. 
67

1974 Indian Nuclear Explosion Sparks Policy Debate 

over LWRs and Reprocessing.

The reasons for addressing these matters now—the reason 

for a fresh look—are that firmly held but erroneous views on the 

facts underlie important U.S. policies on LWRs. Until 2001, the 

State Department defended putting LWRs in North Korea as part 

of the 1994 U.S.-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) 

Agreed Framework on the grounds that LWRs were “proliferation 

resistant”—that North Korea would find it difficult, if not impossible, 

to reprocess LWR spent fuel. Even now, that U.S.-supported project 

is only suspended, not terminated. 

The State Department’s Russian counterparts made similar 

arguments, and continue to make them, in supporting the Russian 

construction of Bushehr reactors in Iran. And even in arguing 

against the Russian power reactor project at Bushehr on proliferation 

grounds, the United States says only that the civilian project could 

provide cover for a clandestine Iranian bomb effort, not that the plant 

itself is inherently dangerous. 

The LWR issues also have much wider significance. The idea 

that plutonium from LWRs is unusable for bombs is an essential 

underpinning of the commercial drive for worldwide deployment 

of LWRs.

It has long been understood that the most difficult hurdle for a 

country seeking nuclear weapons is getting the nuclear explosive 

materials—either HEU or plutonium. By comparison, the design and 

fabrication of the nuclear weapon itself poses a less difficult obstacle. 

That is why the technologies that extract the nuclear explosive 

material—uranium enrichment and reprocessing—are designated as 

“sensitive” technologies in the polite international discussions over 

nuclear controls against proliferation. In plain language, “sensitive” 

means dangerous. 

The 1974 Indian nuclear explosion alerted the United States to the 

ease with which a country that had reactors and reprocessing could 

progress to nuclear weapons.6 It also alerted those concerned with 

the spread of nuclear weapons of the extent to which reprocessing 

technology had spread and was spreading further. Even though 
68

it was equally dangerous, the United States had never restricted 

its reprocessing technology the way it had restricted enrichment 

technology. Perhaps this was because the United States could 

hope to maintain a commercial monopoly on uranium enrichment 

whereas that was unrealistic in the case of reprocessing. It was 

assumed in the early days of nuclear power that uranium was scarce 

and that reprocessing was an essential part of all reactor operation. 

In the background was the near-universal notion that the future 

of nuclear power lay in plutonium-fueled reactors, that uraniumburning reactors were just a transition phase, so cutting off access to 

plutonium was thought tantamount to putting a lid on the expansion 

of nuclear energy.7

The United States revealed extensive information on reprocessing 

at the 1955 Geneva Atoms for Peace Conference. Under the Atoms 

for Peace program, the United States trained many foreigners in 

reprocessing technology at U.S. national laboratories, such as the Oak 

Ridge National Laboratory and the Argonne National Laboratory 

that did pioneering work in reprocessing. That is where the Indian 

and Pakistani reprocessing experts got their start.8 The U.S. Atomic 

Energy Commission, and later the Department of Energy, published 

encyclopedic technical volumes on the subject as well as detailed 

engineering reports that explicated reprocessing “know how.”9

None of this was in any way prohibited by the Nuclear 

Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as it was then universally interpreted, 

even though it was at odds with the purpose of the treaty. According 

to the prevailing interpretation of the treaty, nuclear technology 

that was labeled by its owner as “peaceful,” had some possible 

civilian application, and was subject to inspection by the IAEA, was 

deemed to be legitimate. This was so even if the technology—say, 

reprocessing or enrichment—brought the owner to the threshold of 

nuclear weapons. At that time, the real role of the IAEA inspectors 

was to legitimize trade rather than to find wrong-doing. The view 

was that international nuclear gentlemen did not inquire too deeply 

into the affairs of other nuclear gentlemen, and in any case, kept 

what they learned to themselves.10

In its public pronouncements the U.S. Government more or less 

stuck to the position that the NPT legitimized all “peaceful” nuclear 
69

activities. At the same time, the government could not ignore the 

dire security implications—post-1974 Indian nuclear explosion—of 

unrestricted commerce in nuclear technology, even if it was subject to 

IAEA inspection. France was then negotiating with Pakistan for the 

export of a reprocessing plant, and Germany was pursuing a package 

deal with Brazil that involved both reprocessing and enrichment 

technology.11 A complication at the time was that France was not yet 

an NPT member. To help introduce a common set of export guidelines 

that included “restraint” in the export of “sensitive” technology, the 

United States organized the Nuclear Suppliers Group of nuclear 

exporting countries, initially 15 of them. This group operated, and 

continues to operate, as a kind of extra-treaty backstop for the NPT. 

The main concern at the time of its founding was that technology 

providing access to plutonium as uranium enrichment technology 

was still tightly held.12 There were some important U.S. successes, 

among them stopping the French sale of a reprocessing plant to 

Pakistan, which France finally abandoned in 1978.13

What the United States should do about reprocessing and 

plutonium use, both domestically and internationally, became an 

election year issue in 1976. President Gerald Ford issued a nuclear 

policy statement that plutonium was at the root of the security 

problem associated with nuclear energy. Once separated from the 

radioactive waste contained in spent fuel, the material could rapidly 

be put to military use. President Ford stated that reprocessing—that 

is, chemical separation of plutonium—”should not proceed unless 

there is a sound reason to conclude that the world community 

can effectively overcome the associated risks of proliferation.” In 

perhaps his boldest step, he announced that the United States would 

act domestically in a way that was consistent with what we asked of 

others. The United States, in its energy planning, would no longer 

assume future reliance on plutonium fuel. He said that he believed 

that we could make use of nuclear energy, and even increase reliance 

on it, with this security restriction. “We must be sure,” he said, “that 

all nations recognize that the U.S. believes that nonproliferation 

objectives must take precedence over economic and energy benefits, 

if a choice must be made.” To this day, U.S. policy on spent fuel 

assumes that it will be disposed of in a repository on a “once through” 
70

basis—that is, without reprocessing—although the current reason 

for this probably has more to do with economics than with security. 

Gerald Ford lost the 1976 election to Jimmy Carter, and, as 

a consequence, it is Carter’s name that usually attaches to the 

origin of a restrictive U.S. nonproliferation policy with respect to 

plutonium. Unfortunately, President Carter’s erratic style and his 

administration’s tendency to equate saying something with doing 

it left U.S. nonproliferation policy in a confused state that did not 

engender respect either at home or abroad.14 At first, Carter took a rigid 

antiproliferation stance on a number of key issues, but abandoned 

these positions one after another when they met with domestic and 

international criticism, most particularly with respect to reprocessing 

and future use of plutonium.15 Subsequent presidents watered down 

further U.S. policy on disapproval of foreign reprocessing so that 

it is now barely perceptible except as regards countries of direct 

and near-term proliferation concern and which the United States 

considers hostile. 

What has remained, however, is the view—agreed to over the 

entire spectrum of nuclear opinion—that if commercial reprocessing 

is not present in a country, then the reactors themselves do not pose 

a proliferation danger. Gerald Ford drew a sensible distinction 

between what is too dangerous for the arteries of commerce (that 

is, separated plutonium) and what in the circumstances was a 

reasonably acceptable alternative (a once-through uranium fuel 

cycle). Over time, the reasonably acceptable came to be described 

as entirely satisfactory. This view, however, ignores some stubborn 

technical facts that have been know for decades, but unfortunately 

forgotten, about the ease and rapidity with which a country could 

reprocess LWR spent fuel and about the usability of such plutonium 

for bombs. That is the reason for a fresh look at this subject.

1976-1977 Ford-Carter Restrictive Policy on Commercial 

Reprocessing Leads to Debate over Clandestine Reprocessing.

Generally speaking, the nuclear industry and the nuclear 

bureaucracies in the Department of Energy and elsewhere did 

not support the once-through nuclear fuel cycle that avoided 

reprocessing. Ironically, industry saved a lot of money over the last 
71

nearly 30 years by adopting this approach, however reluctantly, 

because commercial reprocessing and recycle of plutonium as 

fuel is highly uneconomical.16 Mostly, the defense of commercial 

reprocessing was based on the arguments that Ford and Carter had 

exaggerated the dangers—that so long as the commercial activities 

were subject to IAEA inspection (which went by, and continues to 

go by, the misleading name of “safeguards”), there was nothing to 

worry about. And, it was said in further defense of reprocessing, 

that the plutonium from LWRs was unsuitable for bombs and was 

therefore not a source of worry.17 Both of these points are wrong, and 

we will devote special attention in this report to the latter one. 

For the present, however, we are more interested in a different 

line of argument against the Ford-Carter policy supporting a oncethrough fuel cycle. These critics argued that banning commercial 

reprocessing would not provide any additional security because, 

anyhow, it was easy to extract the plutonium from spent fuel using 

small jerry-built plants that most countries could build quickly 

and secretly. Although they did not put it that way, they argued, 

in effect, that, if a country had nuclear power reactors, things were 

much worse than the new Carter administration thought. 18 This line 

of argument was based on an informal technical report written in 

1977 by reprocessing experts at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory 

that presented a design for a small, quickly-built simple reprocessing 

plant that the designers thought could be hidden easily. 19 The 

argument based on this report did not gain much traction because 

the nuclear industry was reluctant to support an argument that, if 

taken seriously, could lead to the conclusion that nuclear reactors 

were, themselves, too dangerous to operate on a commercial basis. 

And supporters of the once-through approach tended to write off the 

significance of the Oak Ridge report in the context of the arguments 

over allowing large-scale commercial reprocessing. The report may 

have overstated to an extent the ease with which LWR spent fuel 

could be reprocessed quickly and secretly, but it and a number of 

other subsequent studies on small-scale and clandestine reprocessing 

made an important point. It is that LWRs operating on a commercial 

once-through fuel cycle—with no commercial reprocessing—are not 

as safe a proposition from the point of view of proliferation as they 

were made out to be. 
72

A Number of Studies on “Quick and Dirty” Clandestine 

Reprocessing for Bombs Suggest This Is a Feasible Option.

There have been a number of studies on small-scale reprocessing, 

but perhaps none that received comparable attention and none that 

involved persons as prominent in the field as the 1977 Oak Ridge 

study. The godfather of the study was Floyd Culler, then Oak Ridge 

assistant director and a leading developer of PUREX technology. He 

assembled a team to prove that a country with a minimal industrial 

base could quickly and secretly build a small reprocessing plant 

capable of extracting about a bomb’s worth of plutonium per day. 

The response came in the previously-cited 1977 Oak Ridge 

memorandum that presented a design for such a plant, together with 

a flow sheet and equipment list with dimensions and specifications. 

The main technical references were from standard textbooks and 

handbooks.

The equipment is chosen with a several-month campaign in 

mind rather than long-term operation so, for example, plastic pipe 

can serve in places where steel pipe would be used in a commercial 

plant. A plant diagram attached to the memorandum and keyed 

to the equipment list shows the plant equipment layout from the 

receiving pool for radioactive spent fuel to the metal reduction 

furnaces for producing plutonium metal “buttons.”20 The structure 

housing the entire operation would be about 130 feet long and much 

less wide. Although they describe the plant as a “quick and dirty” 

one, the designers went to some pains to contain the radioactive 

wastes and to filter the effluents both for reasons of safety and to 

avoid detection. 

The study concluded the plant could be in operation 4 to 6 

months from the start of construction, with the first 10 kilograms of 

plutonium metal (about two bombs’ worth) produced about 1 week 

after the start of operation. Once in operation, the small plant could 

process about one PWR assembly per day, which translates into 

production of about five kilograms of plutonium per day.

If one accepts this conclusion about the possible performance of 

such a “quick and dirty plant” or something close to it, the implications 

are very far-reaching concerning the risks posed by LWRs in 

countries interested in obtaining nuclear weapons. There would be 
73

little chance of detecting such a plant until it was in operation and 

spent fuel to be processed was missing from a power reactor storage 

pool. Given the short process time—a few days from delivery of 

spent fuel to plutonium metal—IAEA inspectors would have little 

chance of detecting a diversion and start of reprocessing under the 

current approach. From metal plutonium to weapon components is 

a matter of days. The IAEA guidelines for LWR inspections assume 

that from LWR spent fuel to metal weapons components takes about 

1-3 months,21 but the Agency’s resource limitations and the resistance 

of member countries keep the actual inspection frequency of LWR 

inspections lower than once every 3 months. Therefore, if the Oak 

Ridge design or something similar would work as planned—start 

up quickly and then produce about a bomb’s worth of plutonium a 

day—the operator could produce dozens of bombs before the IAEA 

could count on detecting it, at least using the current inspection 

approach. 

This conclusion assumes, of course, that the reactor operator 

cooperates with the would-be bombmakers. It also assumes that 

weapon design and readiness for fabrication would be prepared in 

advance. Both of the latter are difficult to detect and, when detected, 

are often clouded in ambiguity. In any case, such detection in the 

past has not led to drastic international action to halt nuclear activity 

in the country. The history of nuclear activities in Iraq, North Korea, 

and Iran suggests that the time-scale for international enforcement 

actions is more typically on the order of years. The George W. Bush 

administration’s tougher approach on “weapons of mass destruction” 

and the preventive invasion of Iraq point in a different direction. But 

what the lesson from that experience will be, and what policy will 

emerge toward countries suspected of nuclear weapon ambitions, 

is yet unclear. The difficulties of coping with post-invasion Iraq 

suggest that the United States is likely to be slower on the trigger in 

the future. 

In view of the potentially far-reaching implications of the Oak 

Ridge report, the General Accounting Office (GAO) prepared an 

evaluation for Congress.22 The GAO examined reviews of the Oak 

Ridge memorandum by five Federal agencies and a number of 

individuals.23 It raised questions about how quickly the plant could 

be built and to what extent it could be hidden, but concluded it 
74

was a credible possibility for an experienced group of reprocessing 

engineers and operators. In other words, one cannot assume that a 

country interested in nuclear weapons will be barred from extracting 

militarily significant amounts of plutonium from its LWRs simply 

because it lacks a commercial reprocessing capability. 

On the question of detectability, since 1977 we have greatly 

improved intelligence—for example, in the case of overhead 

photography and chemical analysis of environmental samples. Yet 

intelligence on Iraq’s nuclear program was caught flat-footed in 1991 

(and, of course, the IAEA completely missed the weapons program) 

and then was wildly off the mark in 2003. North Korea’s uranium 

enrichment facilities have not been found. And Iran’s enrichment 

plant was located only after a dissident Iranian group specified the 

coordinates.24 There are probably more people around today skilled 

in the arts of reprocessing, and they have more information to work 

with. Additionally, we have learned that NPT membership does not 

guarantee performance—Iraq and North Korea violated the Treaty, 

and very likely Iran did as well. 

Since the publication of the Oak Ridge report, other studies 

have been published that also consider the issue of the credibility of 

clandestine small-scale LWR reprocessing. The subject of clandestine 

plutonium extraction was addressed in a 1995 Livermore report 

which states that “plutonium can be separated from spent nuclear 

fuel with modest facilities and equipment.”25 This tracks fairly closely 

with the conclusions of the Oak Ridge study.

In 1996, a Sandia National Laboratories team produced a design 

for a small plant for reprocessing LWR spent fuel quickly and 

secretly.26 They characterized it as “. . . a relatively simple process 

that might be operated by an adversarial group in makeshift or 

temporary facilities such as a remotely located warehouse or a small 

industrial plant.” The estimated preparation lead-time for producing 

the first kilograms of plutonium employing a staff of six technicians 

was about 8 months, which is even more optimistic than that of the 

Oak Ridge team about 20 years earlier. 

The Oak Ridge and Sandia proposals are both bare bones paper 

designs about which some reservation is appropriate. Both processes 

differ in some important respects from the standard PUREX process 

flow sheet. Also, no information is provided on crucial matters such as 
75

control instrumentation. This is not a process that inexperienced, even 

if competent, persons could handle easily. Spent fuel reprocessing is 

among the most sophisticated chemical engineering processes and 

making it work takes a good deal of know-how. But even the critics 

of the practicality of the Oak Ridge design all thought that the highly 

skilled and experienced Oak Ridge team could have made it work. 

In this context, it is also worth mentioning a much earlier 

commercial design that does not cut corners. In the late 1950s, the 

Phillips Petroleum Company made a very detailed feasibility study 

of a small PUREX plant designed to reprocess per day about onethird ton of LWR spent fuel. It was designed to handle spent fuel 

whose burnup is roughly that of current LWR fuel after one refueling 

cycle (as opposed to the normal three).27 The plant’s head end used 

an underwater saw to free the fuel pins from the fuel assembly and 

a mechanical shear to chop individual fuel pins into small pieces. 

One of the striking features of the plant is its small size, about 65 feet 

square.28

It is credible for states with an industrial base and nuclear 

infrastructure needed to operate LWRs to construct and operate such 

reprocessing plants “without cutting corners” to produce significant 

quantities of plutonium as quickly as possible without detection.29

Whether or not a country might opt for a “quick and dirty design 

facility,” it would have the possibility of building one with a lower 

probability of malfunction and with smaller tell-tale releases. 

Before we consider the policy implications of the possibility of 

quick and dirty reprocessing for the use of LWRs, let us pursue the 

question of the suitability of LWR plutonium for weapons. 

Contrary to Conventional Wisdom, LWRs Can Be a Copious 

Source of Near-Weapons Grade Plutonium Suitable for Bombs.

Since the beginning of the nuclear age, it has been difficult to 

rationalize the widespread use of uranium-fueled reactors that—

inescapably—produce plutonium, which is one of the two key 

nuclear explosives. The 1946 Acheson-Lilienthal plan, that required 

“dangerous” nuclear activities to be used only under international 

auspices, did contemplate that uranium-fueled reactors would be 

in national hands. The authors’ rationale was that the plutonium 
76

produced by these reactors could be “denatured” to make it unusable 

for military application. They did not spell out the scientific basis for 

the denaturing they had in mind, but it appears to have been the idea 

that the isotopic composition of plutonium formed in reactor fuel 

that had been irradiated for an extended time would be unusable for 

bombs. The notion is wrong, but it is understandable that it would 

have appeared plausible at that early point. 

During the World War II Manhattan Project, it was discovered 

that just as a uranium-238 nucleus can absorb a neutron to form 

plutonium-239, so the plutonium-239 can absorb a neutron to form 

plutonium-240.30 The longer the uranium fuel is irradiated in a 

reactor to form plutonium-239, the more of the plutonium-239 will 

convert into plutonium-240. This isotope fissions spontaneously and 

releases neutrons which tend to “pre-initiate” nuclear explosions as 

soon as the mass of nuclear explosive is in a “critical” configuration. 

It is this effect that made it impossible to use plutonium in a guntype nuclear device (as it is possible to do with uranium-235 and 

was, in fact, the design used in the Hiroshima bomb). It was not 

possible to use a gun to bring two pieces of plutonium together fast 

enough. As soon as they got close enough to form a critical mass, 

the spontaneous neutrons from plutonium-240 would set off a chain 

reaction whose heat would blow the pieces apart before the nuclear 

yield was significant. 

It was this stumbling block that led to a focus on the implosion 

design—using high explosives to drive the nuclear explosive rapidly 

inward to form a dense super-critical mass. The speed of the process 

reduces the chance of pre-initiation. Even so, an unwanted preinitiation that appears early in the compression can set off a premature 

chain reaction and limit the yield to a “fizzle yield.” To reduce the 

chance of this, the plutonium used in the first U.S. warheads was 

produced in uranium fuel that had been lightly irradiated to keep 

the fraction of plutonium-240 at about 1 percent. In an implosion 

design, however, the fizzle yield, while not optimal, is still large—in 

the case of the first Trinity explosion it was about 1 kiloton, which it 

is useful to recall is one thousand tons of high explosives. In short, 

the trouble with the idea that higher plutonium-240 content would 

only produce a fizzle is that the fizzle yield is still pretty large. 
77

Since the time of the Acheson-Lilienthal report, weapons 

designers have learned to work around the pre-initiation problem 

to achieve high yields with the lower quality plutonium. In time, as 

advanced weapon designs made the pre-initiation problem more or 

less irrelevant, the U.S. weapons complex settled on plutonium with 

a plutonium-240 content of about 7 percent (and thus a plutonium239 content of about 93 percent) as a reasonable compromise between 

quality and production rate. Plutonium of this isotopic content, 

or something close to it, say in the range of 90 percent, is termed 

weapons-grade. 

That the denaturing argument was not valid in technical terms 

did not dissuade those who found it convenient for rationalizing 

commercial plutonium activities from using it. The idea permeated 

the technological permissiveness of the 1950s Atoms for Peace 

program when it came to plutonium extraction and application. One 

could say that the false security of denaturing plutonium underlay 

the whole Atoms for Peace program.31

After the Indian nuclear explosion in 1974 that used high isotopic 

purity plutonium extracted from the spent fuel of a Canadiansupplied research reactor, the United States woke up to fact that 

misinformation in the international nuclear community downplaying 

the dangers of commercial plutonium was standing in the way of 

effective security measures. By this time, commercial LWR fuels were 

fairly highly irradiated during commercial operation, and the notion 

gained currency that the plutonium in such fuel, “reactor-grade” 

plutonium, was not usable at all for bombs. The Ford administration 

felt compelled to brief foreign nuclear leaders to correct this view 

and arranged for Dr. Robert Selden of the Livermore laboratory 

to present the material. 32 Selden’s summary slide stated: “Reactor 

grade plutonium is an entirely credible fissile material for nuclear 

explosives.”33

But despite numerous reports and analyses that addressed the 

issue and arrived at the same result, the controversy would not die 

because so much was at stake commercially and bureaucratically in 

the hundreds of LWRs deployed throughout the world and, in some 

countries, in the reprocessing and recycle of LWR plutonium. 34

Rather than pursue this argument which seems to have reached a 

stalemate, the approach we take here is to circumvent it by pointing 
78

out that LWRs can also be copious producers of near-weapons-grade 

plutonium and even of weapons-grade plutonium itself. To explain 

the difference between our point of view and the conventional one 

regarding LWR plutonium, we have to say a few words about the 

way an LWR is fueled. 

A PWR core, to use a specific example, may contain about 75 

tons of uranium.35 The operators refuel the reactor about every 18 

months. The fuel elements normally stay in the reactor for three fuel 

cycles, or about 60 months. But the refueling schedule is staggered 

so that at each refueling, the operators take out one-third of the fuel 

assemblies—the ones that have been in the core for three cycles—and 

replace them with fresh fuel. 

The conventional characterization of the isotopic composition of 

the plutonium contained in LWR spent fuel—so-called reactor grade 

plutonium—is of fuel that has been in the reactor for a full three 

fuel cycles. This is the LWR plutonium over which arguments have 

raged concerning its usability for weapons. Such fuel indeed has a 

high content of isotopes other than the most desirable plutonium239. There is a certain logic in this characterization in that most of 

the LWR spent fuel in storage pools at LWRs contains this type of 

plutonium, and the LWR-bred plutonium that has been separated in 

reprocessing plants is more-or-less of this composition, too.36

But an LWR operator seeking better plutonium for weapons is not 

constrained to using the plutonium from irradiated fuel assemblies. 

For example, if the operator of a newly operating LWR unloaded the 

entire core after 8 months or so, the contained plutonium would be 

weapons-grade—with a plutonium-239 content of about 90 percent. 

The amount of plutonium produced would be about 2 kilograms per 

ton of uranium, or about 150 kilograms per 8-month cycle.37 This comes 

to about 30 bombs’ worth. Does a would-be nuclear weapons state 

need more? If the short refueling cycles were continued, the annual 

output of weapons-grade plutonium would be about 200 kilograms 

(allowing for refueling time), but this would require a large amount 

of fresh fuel. Such an progression involves a considerable departure 

from commercial operation and, for an NPT member, would signal 

treaty violation. Still, it illustrates what a standard LWR can do when 

viewed as a plutonium production reactor. 
79

The small Oak Ridge-designed reprocessing plant described 

earlier would have difficulty keeping up with this kind of reactor 

operation for long because it was not designed for reliable long-term 

operation. But suppose we just consider one run of 8 months. The 

small reprocessing plant was designed to handle about one assembly 

per day. To reprocess the entire core of 177 fuel assemblies in our 

example would take about 6 months of operating time plus some 

realistic amount of down time. In less than a year, the would-be 

nuclear weapons country would have about 30 bombs’ worth. That 

is quite an arsenal.

Consider a mode of operation closer to commercial operation. 

Because of the staggering of the refueling, at any refueling once the 

reactor has been operating for a time, one-third of the core (about 25 

tons in our example) will have been in the reactor for three cycles, 

one-third will have been in the reactor for two cycles, and one-third 

will have been in the reactor for one cycle. The plutonium in the onecycle fuel would have a much higher content of the most desirable 

plutonium-239 isotope than the three-cycle fuel—over 80 percent as 

opposed to about 55 percent. This plutonium is often called “fuelgrade” to distinguish it from the better weapons-grade stuff and the 

less desirable reactor-grade.38 At each normal refueling, the operator 

has available 25 tons of uranium containing about 5 kilograms 

plutonium per ton, or about 125 kilograms of plutonium with about 

80 percent plutonium-239—not bad material for bombs. (There is 

more plutonium per ton than in the earlier example because the 

irradiation time is longer.) In fact, this characterization understates 

the usefulness of the one-cycle material for weapons because what 

really counts is the amount fissile fraction—the sum of plutonium239 and plutonium-241—which, in the case of spent fuel removed 

after one refueling cycle, is nearly 85 percent. 

Even more interesting is an example we will consider in detail—

the situation at the start of operation. We shall examine the weapons 

characteristics of the plutonium produced in the first core after the 

start of operation and will compare that with the characteristics of 

weapons-grade plutonium. At the end of the first refueling cycle, all 

the fuel will have been irradiated for only one cycle. The first cycle 

is also normally a bit shorter than the later ones, so the plutonium is 
80

even higher in plutonium-239 content—about 84 percent plutonium239. At the end of the first cycle, the 75-ton core will contain about 330 

kilograms of plutonium, or more than 60 weapons’ worth. According 

to its designers, it would take the Oak Ridge plant about 150 days of 

operation to reprocess the entire core. 

One might say that this kind of operation in violation of the 

NPT would not be allowed, that the international community, or 

perhaps some country, would step in to prevent it. Yet North Korea 

is believed to have reprocessed the missing 8,000 fuel rods from 

its small reactor, and there has been no world response. Suppose 

they had by now had in operation the LWRs that the United States 

promised them under the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework and 

had operated them in the way outlined above. Can we be confident 

that there would be international action to enforce the NPT rules?

How good would the first core plutonium be for weapons? The 

usual standard of comparison is U.S. weapons-grade plutonium, 

which is nominally taken to contain about 93 percent plutonium-239. 

How different, then, are the weapons characteristics of the plutonium 

in the fuel after the first cycle as compared with weapons-grade 

plutonium? The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) 

asked Dr. Harmon W. Hubbard, an experienced physicist who 

had worked on nuclear weapons at the Livermore Laboratory and 

served for several years on the panel that evaluated foreign nuclear 

explosions for the U.S. Government, to examine the issue relying on 

publicly available information. 

The subject of illegal construction of nuclear explosives also was 

earlier reviewed in technical detail by J. Carson Mark, late T-Division 

head at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), in a 1990 report.39

He concluded that the difficulties encountered in using reactor-grade 

plutonium for explosive fabrication differ only in degree, but not in 

kind, from the problems in using weapons grade plutonium. 

In his 2003 paper, Hubbard develops the calculations for the better 

grade of plutonium available in spent fuel after irradiation for the first 

fuel cycle to see how this plutonium compares in weapons use with 

weapons-grade plutonium. Hubbard assumes the simplest design for 

a first effort explosive, one consisting of a solid plutonium spherical 

core. This core is very nearly a critical mass when surrounded by a 
81

high density tamping (that is, neutron reflecting) material which is 

taken here to be uranium. This larger sphere is then encased in the 

high explosive system which is designed to provide a converging 

spherical shock wave that would compress the assembly for a few 

microseconds before it flies apart from the force of the nuclear 

explosion. 

Then, based on the published Trinity data, Hubbard calculates 

probabilities of yields to be expected from reactor grade plutonium.

He then extends these probabilistic yield estimates to improved 

implosion technology by adjusting a parameter in the model. One 

might think of these steps as increases in the speed with which 

the core is compressed, although some other aspects of design are 

involved as well. He carries out the yield calculations for first-cycle 

LWR plutonium and for weapons-grade plutonium.

Although the weapons-grade plutonium has less of it, both 

materials have some plutonium-240 that spontaneously emits 

neutrons. These spontaneous neutrons can start the chain reaction 

prematurely and cause the nuclear explosion to blow the bomb apart 

before the plutonium core reaches maximum compression. Hubbard 

takes weapons-grade material that contains 6 percent plutonium-240 

(and thus 93.5 percent plutonium-239 and 0.5 percent plutonium241, which is more-or-less equivalent for explosive purposes) and 

first cycle LWR plutonium that contains 14 percent plutonium-240 

(and 84 percent plutonium-239 and 2 percent plutonium-241). In 

both cases, there is some spread in resultant yields—more in the case 

of first cycle LWR plutonium because it contains more plutonium240, but not dramatically so. 

The following table sums up the results of the calculations. The 

entries in the first three columns give the probabilities that the design 

will achieve an explosive yield in the ranges: 1 to 5 kilotons, 5 to 

20 kilotons, and greater than 20 kilotons (the nominal yield of the 

1945 Trinity shot in the New Mexico desert). The first row gives the 

probabilities for the Trinity design using the type of plutonium that 

was actually used at the time. This might be termed “super-grade” as 

the plutonium-240 content was only about 1 percent. The following 

three rows provide the same estimates for three levels of bomb 

technology: the 1945 Trinity technology, a two-fold (100 percent) 
82

improvement in that technology, and a three-fold improvement 

(200 percent). In each case, the results are presented for weaponsgrade plutonium and for first-cycle LWR plutonium (bold). So, for 

example, the probability that a bomb using 1945 Trinity technology 

and first-cycle LWR plutonium would exceed 20 kilotons in yield is 

12 percent. If we drop to the next row—that provides the probabilities 

for a two-fold improvement in the 1945 technology—we find that the 

probability of exceeding 20 kilotons becomes 34 percent, or about 

one-third. And if we drop to the last row—that assumes a three-fold 

technology improvement—the probability of exceeding 20 kilotons 

with first cycle LWR plutonium is 49 percent, or almost one-half.

% Probability that % Probability that % Probability that

Yield is Between Yield is Between Yield is Not Less Estimated Average

1 and 5 Kilotons: 5 and 20 Kilotons: Than 20 Kilotons: Yield in Kilotons:

Percent Percent Percent Percent 

1945 Trinity shot

1% plutonium-240

(actual) 4	 6	 88	 19 

Calculated: 

Trinity technology

WGPu	 21	 23	 44	 13

1st cycle LWR	 36 23 12 5 

Trinity technology x 2

WGPu	 12	 14	 66	 15

1st cycle LWR	 25 25 34 10 

Trinity technology x 3

WGPu	 8	 12	 76	 16

1st cycle LWR	 18 22 49 12 

Table 1. Probability of Achieving Various Explosive Yields 

and the Expected Yield for 1945 U.S. Technology and for Two 

Improved Levels Using Weapons Grade Plutonium (WGPu) and 

1st Cycle LWR Plutonium.

The last column is especially interesting. It provides rough 

estimates of the average yield of the specific weapon design and 

plutonium quality combinations listed on the left. Even though there 

is some uncertainty in yield, the average yields are quite substantial, 

and the differences between weapons-grade and first-cycle LWR 

plutonium becomes very much less as technology is improved (that 

is, moving down in Table 1).
83

A country attempting to build nuclear weapons today could take 

advantage of the wide availability of declassified nuclear weapons 

information and the enormous increases in computing and other 

technological aids since the 1945 Trinity shot. It seems reasonable 

to attribute to a new group at least a doubling of the efficacy of the 

Trinity implosion system through the use of advances in implosion 

technology, initiators, and better core design.40 At this level of design, 

a would-be nuclear state could use first-cycle LWR plutonium to 

produce fission weapons with a modestly reliable yield around an 

average of about 10 kilotons. A weapon of this design would have 

about a 70 percent chance of exceeding five kilotons. It should be 

remembered that the minimum, or fizzle, yields will likely be at 

least as large as that of Trinity—around one kiloton—and that this 

guaranteed yield already is quite destructive. Considering that the 

destructive radius of the explosions varies roughly as the third root 

of the yield, the differences between the performance of weapons 

with first-cycle plutonium and those with weapons-grade plutonium 

are not very great. 

LWRS Are Less Proliferation-Resistant than Usually Assumed in 

Policy Discussions and Are Dangerous in the Wrong Hands.

What emerges from this discussion is that LWRs are not the 

proliferation-resistant technology they have been made out to be. 

Forgotten from the earlier days of nuclear energy is that LWRs can 

produce large quantities of near-weapons-grade plutonium, and 

that a country bent on making bombs would not have much trouble 

extracting it quickly in a small reprocessing operation, and possibly 

even keeping the operation secret until it had an arsenal. 

The possibility of clandestine centrifuge enrichment exists 

even in the absence of a nuclear power program. Pakistan pursued 

enrichment before it had any reactors that used enriched uranium fuel. 

But a nuclear power program provides resources and makes it easier 

to mask a clandestine enrichment program. There is, however, one 

respect in which the presence of an LWR offers added opportunities 

for clandestine enrichment. Fresh LWR fuel, which typically has an 

enrichment level (uranium-235 concentration) of 4 percent, can, after 
84

crushing and fluorination, itself be used as feed for a clandestine gas 

centrifuge enrichment operation. Use of such low enriched feed, as 

opposed to natural uranium with a uranium-235 concentration of 

less than 1 percent, can reduce the enrichment effort by a factor of 

five. 

In other words, LWRs themselves pose a large security issue if 

they are in the wrong hands. It would be useful for informing U.S. 

policy to gain a clearer understanding of the extent to which nearweapons grade plutonium is readily available from these reactors. 

Two specific examples stand out of nuclear policy inadequately 

informed by an understanding of the technical possibilities. 

The first is the confused and inconsistent policy toward North 

Korea which included promising, as part of a 1994 U.S.-DPRK 

nuclear deal, two large LWRs whose plutonium production capacity 

turned out to be larger than that of all the indigenous North Korean 

reactors they were supposed to replace. When this came to light, the 

State Department insisted that the North Koreans would not have 

the technology to extract the LWR plutonium. 

The second example involves Iran. The United States opposes 

Russian supply of LWRs at Bushehr, but does so on the grounds 

that the nuclear project can serve as a cover for clandestine nuclear 

activities. There does not seem to be recognition yet that the LWRs 

could themselves be a copious source of plutonium for weapons, or 

their possible link with enrichment. 

Altogether, underestimating the production capacity of LWRs 

for weapons-grade and near weapons-grade plutonium and 

overestimating the difficulty of “quick and dirty” reprocessing have 

contributed to poor decisions. 

Several broad policy implications of the weapons-grade 

production capability of LWRs are: 

1. Role of LWRs. The need to reassess the role of LWRs in 

international programs. They are not for everyone, and we should be 

cautious about promoting their construction in worrisome countries. 

This is not a benign technology. At a minimum, we should not 

support such technology where it is not clearly economic.

2. Clandestine enrichment and reprocessing. The IAEA and national 

intelligence constantly has to be on the lookout for clandestine plants 
85

because they can rapidly change the security equation. There needs 

to be much closer accounting of LEU fuel in view of its significance 

as possible feed for clandestine enrichment.

3. IAEA inspection of LWRs. Increase IAEA inspection frequencies 

for LWRs to check on fuel inventories and whether refueling 

needs adjustment upward in countries of concern from the point 

of view of potential bombmaking and to take account of possible 

undiscovered clandestine reprocessing. Because of inevitable IAEA 

resource limitations, it is necessary for the agency to concentrate 

inspections where they are most important. It would help to gain 

support for such a system if it were possible to develop some 

objective way of defining “countries of concern.” The IAEA should 

take greater account of the presence of weapons-grade plutonium 

or near weapons-grade plutonium in spent fuel pools and storage in 

devising its inspections. 

4. Enforcement. The NPT members must enforce the IAEA 

inspection system. An important purpose of IAEA safeguards is 

to deter nuclear weapons activities—by would-be nuclear weapon 

countries—by the threat of early detection. This assumes there will 

be a strong reaction to such an early detection of illicit activity. If 

would-be bombmakers conclude they have nothing to fear because 

the international community is not likely to react to their violations, 

the whole system of control falls apart. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. As nearly every interested person knows by now, light water in this context 

is just plain water, so called in the early days of the nuclear era to distinguish it 

from heavy water, in which the hydrogen atom is replaced by deuterium. LWRs 

come in two basic types—Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) and Boiling Water 

Reactors (BWRs). In a PWR, the nuclear core heats a pressurized primary water 

loop that passes through a steam generator that boils a secondary water loop to 

provide steam to the electric turbines. In a BWR, the water boils in the nuclear 

vessel and passes directly to the steam turbine. Most of the LWRs in the world 

are PWRs. For our purposes, the differences between PWRs and BWRs are not 

significant.

2. Natural uranium contains about 0.7 percent uranium-235 and 99.3 percent 

uranium-238. LWR fuel is normally enriched to about 4 percent, while bomb 

material is usually enriched to about 90 percent uranium-235. 
86

3. There are LWRs in Armenia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Czech 

Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, 

Netherlands, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 

Taiwan, UK, and the United States.

4. The relevant figures for the percentage composition of plutonium in spent 

LWR and HWR fuels are given in the chart below:

CANDU BWR PWR

Isotope 7,500 MWD/MT 27,500 MWD/MT 33,000 MWD/MT

Pu-238	 0.1	 1.0	 1.5

Pu-239	 68.4	 57.2	 55.7

Pu-240	 25.6	 25.7	 24.5

Pu-241	 4.6	 11.5	 13.4

Pu-242	 1.4	 4.5	 4.9

Pu-238 + 240 + 242	 27.1	 31.2	 30.9

Spontaneous Fission Rate

(Neutrons/sec/gm)	 287	 363	 371

5. For example, the two LWRs promised North Korea in a 1994 U.S.-DPRK 

agreement were nearly 10 times the size of the indigenous natural uranium reactors 

they were supposed to replace and therefore had a plutonium production capacity 

about twice that of the natural uranium reactors. 

6. There was an additional cause for alarm and chagrin. India used American 

heavy water in the reactor that produced the plutonium. The heavy water had 

been sold under a 1956 contract that restricted its use to “peaceful uses.” India 

claimed its explosion was “peaceful.”

7. This is still a common view in nuclear bureaucracies, not least in the U.S. 

Department of Energy, where it underlies advanced plutonium-fueled reactor and 

spent fuel reprocess research and development.

8. To cite one important example, Munir Khan, who, as head of the Pakistani 

Atomic Energy Commission in the 1970s, launched the weapons program and 

associated fuel cycle activities, studied in the United States on a Fullbright Grant 

and received an MSc in nuclear engineering from Argonne National Laboratories 

as part of the Atoms for Peace Program. See www.hipakistan.com/en/detail.

php?newsId=en62190&F_catID=17&f_type=source&day=. 

9. See Justin T. Long, Engineering for Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing, American 

Nuclear Society, 1978. This volume of over 1,000 pages was published by the 

Atomic Energy Commission in 1967 and republished in 1978 for the Department 

of Energy. The 1967 Forward by Floyd Culler, Assistant Director of the Oak Ridge 

National Laboratory and one of the foremost experts on reprocessing, states: 

This book presents the engineering aspects of the reprocessing of powerreactor fuels. From many diverse sources of information, an attempt 

has been made to summarize the basic approaches to the engineering 

of a chemical separation plant. The book does not offer engineering 

information only; it also reviews the processes most widely used and 
87

most of those under development. Particular attention has been given to 

describing the equipment used in reprocessing fuel. Shielding, criticality 

control, liquid and gaseous waste disposal, safety, ventilation, fuelelement storage and handling, materials accountability, and maintenance 

are covered in summary form, and the information given is supplemented 

by extensive and selected references to reports that are available from 

the rather specific domain of atomic energy literature. The information 

is presented in such a way that the book, either as a whole or in part, 

can be used as a text for instruction in a course on radiochemical course 

design. The process data and the underlying engineering principles make 

the book useful either as a textbook or a handbook. . . . We hope, too, 

that it will serve as a reasonably accurate introduction to reprocessing 

technology for those who are now entering the field.

10. The IAEA continued in this mode for many years. After the embarrassment 

of the discoveries after the first Gulf War that Iraq had run a weapons program 

under the noses of the IAEA inspectors, the Agency carried out important 

improvements in its mode of operation. In recent years the IAEA has become a 

first-rate international inspection agency limited principally by what its Board of 

Governors will permit.

11. The Germans sought to sell the Brazilians a type of enrichment technology 

that did not offer much promise. The Brazilians later got involved in centrifuge 

technology and are now constructing a centrifuge enrichment plant that would 

supply more or less the fuel needs of one of their two reactors. They have been 

reluctant, however, to allow the IAEA inspectors to see the centrifuges, presumably 

because the inspectors would then know the source of the technology. The U.S. 

Government has so far not reacted to this very suspicious and worrisome state of 

affairs.

12. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say, “was thought to be tightly held,” 

as the industrial spy A. Q. Khan was already delivering to Pakistan centrifuge 

plans and contractor lists that he had stolen from Urenco while he worked there. 

13. Although it now appears that Pakistan may be trying to revive the plant, 

possibly with Chinese help.

14. Just before the Shah was overthrown in 1979, as part of a reactor sale 

agreement, Jimmy Carter had agreed to grant Iran “most favored nation” status 

for reprocessing so that Iran would not be discriminated against when seeking 

permission to reprocess U.S.-origin fuel. That meant Iran would now have the 

same right as Japan to reprocess U.S.-enriched power reactor fuel. The Shah left 

Iran before the negotiations were concluded. See Nucleonics Week, January 12, 1978, 

pp. 2-3; in Daniel Poneman, Nuclear Power in the Developing World, George Allen 

& Unwin: London, 1982, p. 88, at www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/1825.

html.

15. Carter rapidly reversed himself on the issue of Japanese reprocessing of 

U.S.-supplied fuel (over which the United States had reprocessing control) after 

his proliferation policy advisor, Gerard Smith, reminded him that World War II 
88

started after the United States cut off Japan’s oil supply. In the case of Pakistan’s 

nuclear weapons program, then in its early stages, the United States looked the 

other way after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan so as to promote Pakistani help 

in opposing the Soviets.

16. In spite of the unfavorable economics, support for plutonium recycle 

continues, including in high places in the current administration as witnessed 

by comments on this issue in the President’s National Energy Plan of May 2000. 

Such support is based in part on ideology (on the part of nuclear true believers) 

but mainly on commercial opportunism (on the part of nuclear fuel firms looking 

for subsidies). Nuclear fuel firms providing reprocessing and plutonium services 

have discovered that a process does not have to be economical in order to be 

profitable.

17. That is what Sigvard Eklund, the IAEA Director General, told one of the 

authors in conversation in 1976. To correct this view, the U.S. Government offered 

Mr. Eklund a briefing on the subject. At that briefing. his jaw literally dropped 

when presented with a slide that refuted his earlier view. The new facts had farreaching implications for the IAEA inspection system. 

18. One needs to reemphasize, because it is so frequently forgotten, that the 

initial rejection of U.S. reprocessing was done by President Ford. But he lost the 

election a few days after announcing his policy, and so the focus turned to Jimmy 

Carter. 

19. D. E. Ferguson to F. L Culler, Intra-Laboratory Correspondence, Oak Ridge 

National Laboratory, “Simple, Quick Processing Plant,” August 30, 1977, 22 pp. 

This is the same Mr. Culler whose Forward to a USAEC volume on reprocessing 

was cited earlier. 

20. The diagram appears in the Washington Post, August 4, 2002, to illustrate an 

article, “Those N. Korean Reactors Light Up Danger Signals,” by Victor Gilinsky 

and Henry Sokolski. The Oak Ridge report does not see the initial mechanical 

disassembly of the LWR spent fuel as a particularly difficult step. This issue came 

up in arguments over the risks posed by the two LWRs that the United States 

had promised North Korea as part of the 1994 Agreed Framework. The State 

Department insisted that, while North Korea had experience with reprocessing, it 

would not be able to reprocess LWR fuel because of the difficulty of cutting up the 

fuel rods, a part of the process with which a high-capacity French commercial plant 

had difficulty. The Oak Ridge design proposed abrasive saw cutting underwater, 

and it refers for the details to the 1967 Long volume which has a section on the 

subject. 

21. IAEA 2001 Safeguards Glossary, p. 22, available on the IAEA web site, 

www.iaea.org. 

22. Report by the Comptroller General of the United States, “Quick and Secret 

Construction of Plutonium Reprocessing Plants: A Way To Nuclear Weapons 

Proliferation?,” EMD-78-104, October 6, 1978. Senator John Glenn, then Chairman 

of the Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Federal Services, 
89

Committee on Government Affairs, and very active on nuclear proliferation 

issues, made the request. (Throughout, we do not distinguish between the Oak 

Ridge report and the Oak Ridge memorandum.)

23. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the Department of 

Energy (DOE), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the Congressional 

Research Service (CRS). In terms of his knowledge of reprocessing, the most 

imposing of the 11 individuals consulted was Manson Benedict, Institute Professor 

Emeritus, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The CRS review in its entirety 

was published separately several days later. Warren Donnelly, “A Preliminary 

Analysis of the ORNL Memorandum on a Crude Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing 

Plant,” November 4, 1977. 

24. According to rumor, they served as a conduit for Israeli intelligence.

25. W. G. Sutcliffe and T. J. Trapp, eds., Extraction and Utility of Reactor-Grade 

Plutonium for Weapons (U), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, April 27, 

1995. The report is based on briefings given to the National Academy of Sciences’ 

Committee on International Security and Arms Control during its study of the 

management and disposition of excess weapons plutonium. The full report is 

classified. The material used here is taken from an unclassified summary. 

26. J. P. Hinton, et al., Proliferation Resistance of Fissile Material Disposition Program 

(FMDP) Plutonium Disposition Alternatives: Report of the Proliferation Vulnerability 

Red Team, Sandia National Laboratories, Report No. SAND97-8201, October 1996, 

Section 4.1.1.3, “Recovery Process for LWR or MOX Spent Fuel,” pp. 4-3 – 4-9. The 

work was done in the context of assessing the proliferation resistance of various 

alternatives for the disposition of stocks of weapons-grade plutonium that have 

been declared excess to national security needs by the United States and Russia.

27. The Phillips design was for spent fuel with an average burnup of 10,000 

MWd/t.

28. H. Schneider, et al., “A Study of the Feasibility of a Small Scale Reprocessing 

Plant for the Dresden Nuclear Power Station,” Report IDO-14521, Phillips 

Petroleum Company, April 28, 1961. Available from the National Technical 

Information Service (NTIS), Washington, DC.

29. In our judgment, it is not credible that a sub-national group with the type 

of skills enumerated in the Sandia report could construct and operate even the 

simplified plants outlined in the Oak Ridge and Sandia reports. 

30. In turn, the plutonium-240 absorbs neutrons to form plutonium-241. 

Plutonium-240 is not fissionable by neutrons in an LWR core but plutonium-241 

is.

31. In time, the Atoms for Peace program permitted the U.S. export of large 

quantities of HEU to fuel foreign research reactors. There was no question about 

the dangers of HEU as a bomb explosive. As Albert Wohlstetter once said, “The 

nuclear bureaucracy knew what they were saying about denaturing plutonium 

was false, so they didn’t think it mattered if they exported HEU, too.”
90

32. The author returned from a 1976 European trip and reported to the 

National Security Council (NSC) staff that the IAEA Director General and his 

staff believed plutonium from commercial LWR fuel was not usable for weapons, 

and that the top German officials, then negotiating a nuclear sale to Brazil that 

involved reprocessing technology, were adamant in this view. They thought that 

U.S. statements to the contrary were made for commercial, rather than security, 

reasons. This report to the NSC led to the November 1976 Selden briefings for 

select top international nuclear figures that included Sir John Hill, head of the 

UK Atomic Energy Authority; M. Andre Giraud, the head of the French Atomic 

Energy Commission (CEA); Dr. Eklund, Director General of the IAEA; and Mr. 

Ryukichi Imai, a senior advisor on nuclear affairs to the Japanese Foreign Ministry. 

Shortly before this, the author, then a commissioner of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, gave a speech at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in which 

he said the following: “Of course, when reactor-grade plutonium is used, there 

may be a penalty in performance that is considerable or insignificant, depending 

on the weapon design. But whatever we once might have thought, we now know 

that even simple designs, albeit with some uncertainty in yield, can serve as 

effective, highly powerful weapons—reliably in the kiloton range.” Victor Gilinsky, 

“Plutonium, Proliferation, and Policy,” Remarks given at MIT, November 1, 1976 

(NRC Press Release No. S-14-76). 

33. See Robert W. Selden, “Reactor Plutonium and Nuclear Explosives,” 

Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, undated slides. 

34. See, for example, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, 

National Academy of Sciences, National Academy Press, Washington, 1994. The 

Executive Summary, p. 4, states:

Plutonium of virtually any isotopic composition, however, can be used to 

make nuclear weapons. Using reactor-grade rather than weapon-grade 

plutonium would present some complications. But even with relatively 

simple designs such as that used in the Nagasaki weapon—which are 

within the capabilities of many nations and possibly some subnational 

groups—nuclear explosives could be constructed that would be assured 

of having yields of at least 1 or 2 kilotons. Using more sophisticated 

designs, reactor-grade plutonium could be used for weapons having 

considerably higher yields.

A report of a U.S.-Japanese arms control study group arrived at the following 

statement: “The participants agreed that as a technical matter, with some additional 

efforts, a country can produce nuclear weapons using any kind of plutonium, 

using well-known technologies.” The members of the working group on reactorgrade plutonium included Hiroyoshi Kurihara, former Executive Director of the 

Japanese Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation; Atsuyuki 

Suzuki, Professor of Nuclear Engineering at the University of Tokyo; and Victor 

Gilinsky. The overall report was published as Next Steps in Arms Control and 

Non-Proliferation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996. See also 
91

Richard L. Garwin, “Reactor-Grade Plutonium Can be Used to Make Powerful 

and Reliable Nuclear Weapons: Separated Plutonium in the Fuel-Cycle Must Be 

Protected As If It Were Nuclear Weapons,” August 26, 1998, available on www.

fas.org. 

35. In nearly 200 fuel assemblies containing over 40,000 fuel rods.

36. There is an exception worth noting. Some fuel is removed early from a reactor, 

generally because it is not performing properly, possibly because it is leaking 

radioactive material. The plutonium is such a fuel and will have a composition 

higher in plutonium-239 than the fuel that remains in the reactor longer. 

37. The details come from a chart, “Trends in LWR Pu Production,” in a 

set of briefing slides, Light-Water Reactor Fueling Handling and Spent Fuel 

Characteristics, J.A. Hassberger, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 

February 26, 1999. The briefing was presented to a Stanford University/Livermore 

Laboratory group preparing a report on the problems of safeguarding the LWRs 

to be supplied to North Korea under the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, 

“Verifying the Agreed Framework,” Michael May, General Editor, UCRL-ID142936/CGSR-2001-001, April 2001. 

38. The distinction is made in a useful paper by Bruno Pellaud, a former deputy 

director general of the IAEA and head of the IAEA Department of Safeguards. 

Bruno Pellaud, “Proliferation Aspects of Plutonium Recycling,” Journal of Nuclear 

Materials Management, Fall 2002, Volume XXXI, No. 1, p. 30. He provides the 

following table:

Grades Pu-240 Usability

Super grade (SG)	 <3 percent	 Best quality

Weapon grade (WG)	 3-7 percent	 Standard material

Fuel grade (FG)	 7-18 percent	 Practically usable

Reactor grade (RG)	 18-30 percent	 Conceivably usable

MOX grade	 >30 percent	 Practically unusable

Table. Plutonium Mixtures for Explosive Purposes.

The categories are, to some extent, arbitrary, but they make for useful peg 

points. Pellaud’s aim is obviously to vindicate the use of MOX grade fuel. Still, he 

makes helpful points along the way. 

39. J. Carson Mark, “Reactor Grade Plutonium’s Explosive Properties”, Nuclear 

Control Institute, 1990. 

40. An initiator is a contrivance that injects neutrons into the device at the 

proper moment—when the nuclear explosive has been compressed to a supercritical state—to start the explosive chain reaction. If the neutrons arrive too early, 

we get a reduction in yield, at worst, a fizzle. If the neutrons come too late, there 

may be no nuclear explosion at all.

93

CHAPTER 6

COPING WITH BIOLOGICAL THREATS AFTER SARS

Alan P. Zelicoff

The outbreak of an often fatal lung disease, initially called “Severe 

Acute Respiratory Syndrome” (SARS)1 took the international public 

health community by surprise. Denoted with the typical medical 

nomenclature of a syndrome—a combination of symptoms and 

signs—SARS occurred at a time of extraordinary tension among 

public health practitioners. The not-too-distant memories of the 

anthrax bioterror event in the United States in the fall of 2001 and the 

rapid downhill course of dozens of SARS victims captured headlines 

and invited endless speculation as to the source of the SARS illness 

(natural vs. sinister), its cause (infectious agent vs. toxic chemical), 

and the real rate of growth of the epidemic. Because of sketchy 

reporting from China, the probable initial focus of the outbreak 

only added to confusion and fear. Travel to China, Southeast Asia, 

and Singapore plummeted, and passengers disembarking from 

ships and airplanes from those same areas were screened carefully 

for respiratory symptoms when they arrived at destinations in the 

West and Europe. Passengers waiting to board airplanes also were 

screened carefully, while millions of Chinese and Singaporeans took 

their own initiatives against the presumed infection by wearing 

surgical masks and staying out of circulation on crowded streets and 

public transport. Even into the fall of 2003, some parts of China still 

were visited infrequently by domestic and international travelers for 

fear of continuing contagion.

At the time of the writing of this chapter, it is far too soon to 

enumerate the lessons of the SARS outbreak for national security 

(and indeed, international security) in a comprehensive way. 

However, several observations may be instructive to both policy 

decisionmakers and public health planners. 

First, it is abundantly clear that rapid, uncensored information 

from physicians and hospitals is essential in managing this—or 

any—infectious disease outbreak, whether it is naturally occurring 

(as SARS turned out to be) or resulting from bio-terrorism (as 
94

initially was feared in the SARS outbreak). There is little question 

that the “quality” of the information, coming as it does from expert 

clinicians and infectious disease specialists, is good enough in its raw 

form to provide “actionable” data. Indeed, once the World Health 

Organization (WHO) heard from a few isolated clinicians that an 

apparently severe form of respiratory illness had appeared in just 

a small handful of patients, it was sufficient to organize teams of 

epidemiologists and virologists to travel to widely separated parts of 

the globe to begin to nail down the source of the disease, isolate the 

causal agent and even divine its mechanism of spread. Transmission 

of the data in near-real time via the Internet (and with only minimal 

review and proofing) probably saved tens of thousands of lives in 

this epidemic.

Second, it is equally clear that a forced absence of information 

in the midst of an outbreak is devastating for individuals and for 

the local economy. The Chinese government, in particular, actively 

suppressed the exchange of data internally and shared nothing 

with foreign or WHO public health officers until embarrassed into 

doing so by international outcry. No one can doubt any longer 

the magnification of fear and panic—and thus loss of reason and 

reasonable behavior of masses of people—when physicians and local 

public health officials are operating in a scientific vacuum. I return to 

this point about information in the text of this chapter several times 

as I think it may be the most important lesson of all from the SARS 

outbreak of 2003.

Third, even when a severe and novel disease entity emerges, 

with open flow of information it is possible to effectively “rule out” 

a biological weapons attack. This lesson is, of course, tenuous, but 

when the SARS experience is combined with previous outbreaks 

of mysterious, fatal respiratory disease—such as the Hantavirus 

pulmonary syndrome in New Mexico in 1991—decisionmakers 

can take great comfort in the ability of epidemiologic sleuthing to 

distinguish between nefarious activities and acts of nature. Needless 

to say, a misstep in the face of possible bioterrorism could result in a 

catastrophe.

Fourth, the tools of modern molecular biology are now so widely 

spread that it is possible, even easy, for investigators working 

simultaneously in multiple laboratories to, in effect, independently 
95

validate each others’ work. In the earliest days of the SARS outbreak, 

there was some confusion over what organism might be causing 

the disease. But for the use of gene sequencing in two separate 

laboratories, this confusion could have undermined an understanding 

of the source and nature of the pathogen for many weeks. Molecular 

biology is, unfortunately, a two-edged sword and can certainly be 

used for illicit purposes, but, in this case, the needed knowledge was 

discovered swiftly and verified collaboratively. It is hard to overstate 

the profound power of biological science to do good.

These lessons certainly will affect the response of the public 

health community to future outbreaks. New outbreaks have always 

been inevitable, but one could not be nearly so certain about the 

effectiveness of public health actions. Past successes have been 

realized much more slowly (for example, with the eradication of 

smallpox in the wild) or depended on a considerable amount of 

luck (Hantavirus did not, thank Providence, spread from person-toperson by any route, nor did anthrax in Washington, DC). We will 

have to do as well in the next outbreak as we did during the SARS 

epidemic—even better, if our luck runs out, and we face a highly 

communicable, fatal disease such as a new strain of influenza. I will 

expand on this requirement more in the text.

While the pathogen responsible for the illness—a novel Coxsackie 

Virus—seems clear, the economic costs, lives interrupted, and the 

effectiveness of the public health response still are being tallied. This 

much appears certain: The virus does not seem to transmit easily as 

an aerosol as does influenza, but rather as a heavier-than-air droplet 

that falls onto surfaces or the host’s face and hands. These surfaces are 

then contaminated, and an unwitting individual who touches those 

surfaces and then touches his nose or mouth provides the transmission 

mechanism for infection. Had SARS spread by an airborne route, 

one person coughing or sneezing might well have been able to infect 

dozens of other people who had no immunity to the virus (and most 

probably do not). An infectious disease catastrophe might have 

resulted, reminiscent of the world “pandemic” of influenza in 1918-

19 that killed about 10 percent of the world’s population, including 

most prominently young, otherwise healthy adults.

It is not possible to extract the instructive lessons of SARS without 

some understanding of the fundamental scientific facts. Thus, I will 
96

summarize briefly the medical aspects of SARS (including short-term 

and long-term prognosis in patients) and review the history of the 

SARS epidemic to date, while highlighting the early dynamics and 

often frightening spread of the disease. Virologists around the world 

quickly responded to the need for identification of the pathogen 

and developed a diagnostic test within a few weeks of the earliest 

indications of the outbreak—a phenomenal set of accomplishments. 

Rapid communication of results between several centers in Europe, 

Asia, and the United States permitted confirmation of laboratory 

findings; this not only dramatically facilitated an understanding of 

the fundamental biology of the organism and its interaction with 

nonimmune human hosts, but also enabled public health officials to 

define a likely epidemiologic model for the spread of the disease. 

I will also speculate as to how the international community 

might do better when the next new epidemic makes its appearance, 

as it most assuredly will. Speculation is a dangerous exercise in 

medicine and biology where rarely, if ever, do the complexities of 

disease spread fit into compact mathematical expression like the 

equations of motion in physics, but there is little doubt that the SARS 

epidemic underscored, yet again, the unfortunate triumph of politics 

over reason in many aspects of the collaborative management of 

communicable disease. It seems that high-ranking officials in the 

Chinese health establishment, and even Chinese government leaders, 

sought to hide the extent of the epidemic, as they hoped that microorganisms would respect borders, political decisions, and national 

sovereignty. Even in the short-run, this was a bankrupt policy. The 

Chinese economy suffered severe losses—even more than the rest of 

eastern and southern Asia, struggling to recover from an economic 

recession made all the worse by the September 11, 2001, terrorist 

attacks and subsequent war in Afghanistan and the Middle East. 

After the passage of nearly a year, the full extent of the epidemic on 

the Chinese mainland was still uncertain, with incomplete accounting 

of even the total number of victims and their location. The reservoir 

of origin for the disease remains a mystery.

In addition, I believe that the SARS epidemic is instructive for the 

arms control community currently debating the utility of monitoring 

and verification proposals for treaties such as the Biological and 
97

Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), and trying to uncover the 

trail of physical and documentary evidence of the Hussein regime’s 

biological weapons program in Iraq. Here the lessons are not 

so pleasant. It perhaps is obvious that the illicit, intentional use 

of a biological weapon, or an accident that might occur in their 

development, would engender even tighter control of information 

and greater volume of denials than what we witnessed in China in 

the early days of the SARS outbreak. That the Chinese government 

could cover up a serious outbreak for months is sobering; it is much 

easier to cover up illicit work on biological agents for weapons 

purposes as the latter occur almost exclusively in laboratories or in 

other highly controlled facilities.

Tracking disease—especially when the disease causes severe 

symptoms and spreads in ways not previously seen—is problematic 

even under the best of circumstances. When there is a deeper 

political agenda designed to obfuscate the data and deny access to 

time-sensitive information, the outcome can be disastrous, as might 

well occur if a state or terrorist organization employed biological 

weapons. We were fortunate that the SARS agent’s mechanism of 

spread was inefficient, for had transmission been like that of other 

viral diseases such as measles or influenza, many more people would 

have died for lack of easily obtained pieces of data, let alone the 

enormous strain on limited medical resources such as intensive-care 

unit beds that were needed to save the lives of the most ill patients. 

We will not necessarily be so lucky the next time.

Medical Aspects of SARS: Diagnosis, Treatment and Outcome.

As of early August 2003, WHO reported2 that there had been 

approximately 8,500 cases of SARS in 32 countries and territories. The 

median age of SARS patients was about 40 years (although patients 

as young as 1 and as old as 90 have been confirmed as SARS victims). 

About 20 percent of patients were health-care workers, indicating 

that, despite reasonable precautions from the outset of the epidemic, 

close contact with patients confers a high risk for transmission. SARS 

has a high mortality: about 11 percent of patients die. More than half 

of the currently known SARS cases are from China where reporting 
98

remains incomplete; there will probably be more patients among 

survivors of SARS in China, and certainly among those who have 

died in recent months. We now know that older patients fare badly, 

as about 45 percent of all patients over age 60 die. The combination 

of advanced age, intensive care unit (ICU) admission, and the need 

for mechanical ventilation is associated with an 80 percent mortality 

rate.

WHO believes that the first case of SARS occurred in November 

2002 in southeastern China, some 2 months before the first case 

occurred outside of the country—as it happens, in the United States 

on January 9, 2003. The vast majority of nonmainland Chinese cases 

have occurred in just four countries or territories: Hong Kong (now 

a Special Administrative Region of China), Taiwan, Singapore, and 

Canada accounting for approximately 3,000 cases. In the United 

States, there have been 33 cases of SARS, though it should be noted 

that, because of the similarities between SARS and other causes 

of acute respiratory illness, the diagnosis of some of the initial 

“suspected SARS” cases, will doubtless turn out to have been due to 

other causes, both infectious and noninfectious. 

Medical school professors are fond of saying that “the human 

body has only so many ways of responding to assault from toxic or 

infectious agents.” What they mean is that the symptoms that patients 

experience—including severe symptoms such as shortness of breath 

and high fever—can be caused by a large number of agents. Indeed, 

SARS initially begins like most respiratory viruses with fever, dry 

cough, muscle aches, and headache. The changes in the levels of 

white blood cells mirrors those of influenza and even the common 

cold virus. SARS is one more in a long list of “flu-like” illnesses, but 

the emerging picture is one of much higher than “flu-like” mortality. 

Fortunately, as already noted, SARS is much harder to transmit and 

catch than influenza.

A large series of SARS patients from Canada—the country with 

the most SARS cases outside of Asia—points to the severity of the 

clinical disease.3 About one out of five SARS victims are admitted to 

an ICU, and almost all of these patients require mechanical ventilation 

due to respiratory failure, with low blood oxygen saturation, severe 

fatigue from increased work of respiration, and accumulation of large 
99

amounts fluid in the air sacs (alveoli) of the lungs. Significantly, half 

of the mechanically ventilated patients die despite the most advanced 

care. Thus, when respiratory failure occurs in SARS, it is an ominous 

prognostic indicator. A similar experience has been reported from 

Singapore.4

SARS, then, is best thought of as one form of Adult Respiratory 

Distress Syndrome (ARDS), defined as a clinical condition in which 

there is shortness of breath, abnormal findings in chest x-ray, and 

low oxygen levels in the blood. ARDS usually is associated with 

injury to the lung and may be preceded by a variety of contributory 

actors including trauma, infection, and shock, among many others. 

The mechanisms leading to ARDS in patients with otherwise 

uncomplicated infection from the SARS virus or other microorganisms remain obscure. Whatever the underlying cause of 

disturbance of normal lung function, all cases of ARDS necessitate 

ICU management. Treatment is supportive, meaning that patients 

are provided with oxygen, fluids, nutrition via gastric tubes or 

intravenously, and aggressive respiratory toilet, while one hopes for 

the lung physiology to return to normal.

At autopsy, microscopic examination of the lung shows fluid 

accumulation in the alveolar sacs, loss of the normal cilia of the 

bronchial tubes that clear secretions from the lungs, and occasionally 

secondary bacterial pneumonia.5 Interestingly, at the time of 

death, little or no virus is identified in the lung, even in the most 

severely affected portions of the organ. However, antibodies against 

Coronavirus almost always are found in the bloodstream, indicating 

a recent infection with this organism. The absence of organisms is 

not unusual. When influenza leads to ARDS (as it does on very rare 

occasion), it is the rule that the virus can not be recovered or grown 

from lung tissue.

The organism believed to be causal in most cases of SARS is a 

variety of Coronavirus (officially, “SARS-associated Coronavirus” 

[SARS-CoV]). It was identified by a remarkable collaboration among 

scientists from Vietnam, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand, and the 

United States6 and simultaneously by investigators in Germany, 

France, and the Netherlands.7 It is probably fair to say that never 

before has a previously unrecognized disease been characterized so 
100

quickly, and against the current of mainstream virologic thought. 

Coronavirses have been well-described as the cause of illness in 

humans, but never had there been fatalities from this viral family. 

About one-third of all cases of the common cold are caused by the 

Coronavirus, and it also occasionally may cause diarrhea in young 

children. Death from Coronavirus sub-types was unknown.

The isolation of the organism led almost immediately to a 

diagnostic test based on the presence of antibodies in patients who 

were recovering from the illness, which was invaluable for broad 

population studies to establish the means of transmission, as well 

as the overall susceptibility to and incidence of the disease. In some 

cases, the antibody test also could be used to make the diagnosis 

of SARS when it was unclear if the patient was suffering from the 

Coronavirus or not. 

Currently, there is little information on the value of anti-viral 

drugs, even though it appears that the SARS-CoV is sensitive to 

ribavarin (a well known anti-microbial agent) in tissue culture. Based 

on all of the clinical studies published to date, there is almost no 

evidence that treatment with ribavirin alters the outcome of patients 

with SARS. This, too, is not unusual for virus-caused diseases, 

although it may be that in the known cases of SARS, the diagnosis 

was made after a narrow therapeutic window—between the time 

of initial infection and onset of the most severe symptoms—had 

passed. In addition, it is possible that the respiratory failure relates 

to an individual host’s immune system response to the virus rather 

than to the damage caused by the infection itself. 

Because there has been limited time to follow SARS survivors, 

it is not known if chronic lung problems will plague these patients. 

However, in ARDS from other causes, patients who have been 

ventilated mechanically have been shown to have residual functional 

abnormalities8 and a generally poor quality of life9 for many months 

after hospital discharge. It is unlikely that the experience of survivors 

of SARS will be much different.

Compared to influenza A and each of its subtypes, SARS-CoV 

is a highly mortal disease. However, because of the much higher 

prevalence of influenza worldwide and in the United States, the 

number of deaths attributed to influenza is many times that of 

SARS. Between 1976 and 1997, the Center for Disease Control in the 
101

United States estimates that, on average, more than 50,000 people 

died each year, and influenza is estimated to be involved (either as a 

direct cause of death or contributing to death in patients with other 

ailments) in a bit more than 2 percent of all deaths. In 1996, about 

14,000 people in the United States died as a direct result of influenza, 

and another 54,000 with chronic circulatory or respiratory disease 

died from complications of influenza. It is difficult to know the 

overall mortality rate from influenza as statistics on the incidence of 

the disease are not available, but it is probably less than 1 percent. As 

with SARS, patients over age 65 have the highest mortality among 

age groups. 

Finally, it is likely that SARS has been under diagnosed, with 

many mildly symptomatic individuals unrecognized. WHO criteria 

for SARS have been shown to be very specific (that is, resulting in 

few false positives) but not very sensitive (that is, a large number 

of false negatives).10 Future population-based serologic surveys may 

define the actual incidence of the disease. For now, our description of 

SARS illness is largely limited to the population that is sick enough 

to seek medical care. 

Thus, SARS-CoV is a significant cause of morbidity but, in total, 

has involved a tiny fraction of the number of people who contract 

influenza in any given year. The mortality from SARS in those 

infected is much higher than influenza, but because of the millions 

of infections with influenza every year in the United States alone, the 

number of deaths from influenza exceed those from SARS by at least 

three or four orders of magnitude.

SARS: History, Epidemiology, and Isolation of Causal Organism.

It is now reasonably certain that the first cases of SARS occurred in 

early November 2002 in Guangdong Province in southeastern China 

(see Map 1). The patient was a businessman, but the significance 

of his disease was recognized only in retrospect, and his illness, 

along with those of hundreds of other individuals with the same 

severe respiratory symptoms in the same province, was unknown 

outside China for some months. By early 2003, there were four 

major foci of life-threatening respiratory disease beyond mainland 

China: Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and Canada (Toronto). 
102

Map 1.

It is not yet clear how many people in Guangdong the businessman 

infected in November 2002. The first patient outside of China to 

become ill with SARS was a 64-year-old physician from Guangdong 

Province who became symptomatic while visiting relatives in 

Hong Kong (now commonly referred to as the Hong Kong Special 

Administrative Region of China).11 When he arrived in Hong Kong 

on February 21, 2003, he had been mildly ill for about 5 days, but 

felt well enough to go sightseeing and shopping with relatives.12 He 

was admitted to the hospital the following day. About 3 days later, 

a 53-year-old male who accompanied the physician on his excursion 

around Hong Kong then became ill, and he was hospitalized 2 days 

later on February 26. Over the next 17 days, eight other people became 

ill with identical symptoms, all of them either staying at the same 

hotel as the physician index case, or who had contact with him in 
103

the hospital or with other patients with respiratory disease recently 

hospitalized. 

At about the same time, on February 28, a patient presented to 

the Vietnamese French Hospital of Hanoi with an influenza-like 

illness. Because of recent small outbreaks over the past 2 years in 

Southeast Asia of influenza transmitted directly from humans to 

birds, physicians in Hanoi became concerned that they were seeing 

another similar outbreak. Mortality in previous human avian 

influenza (“bird flu”) cases was extremely high, and because of the 

fear that avian influenza had once again jumped into humans, WHO 

was contacted. Dr. Carlo Urbani, an infectious disease expert, was 

dispatched, and, within a few days, he and a small team of virologists 

and epidemiologists arrived in Hanoi. With in a few weeks, Dr. 

Urbani and at least five other health care workers would also be 

dead, all from the mysterious new disease contracted from patients 

they cared for.

Urbani and his colleagues set to work immediately collecting 

specimens, reviewing patient histories, and assisting hospital 

workers with infection control and patient isolation procedures. By 

March 9—just 10 days after the first patient in Vietnam appeared at 

the French Hospital—WHO was worried enough by Dr. Urbani’s 

data to request an emergency meeting with high ranking health 

ministers in Hanoi, and recommended strict enforcement of patient 

isolation and barrier protection for all healthcare workers in Hanoi 

hospitals caring for patients with respiratory symptoms. Medecins 

sans Frontiers (Doctors without Borders), an international medical 

aid agency, provided additional physicians and personal protective 

equipment. More infection control specialists were dispatched to 

Hanoi.

Also on March 9, a 32-year-old Singaporean physician became ill 

with a high fever while in New York City on a visit. The previous 

week while in Singapore, he had cared for a patient from Hong Kong 

who presented “atypical pneumonia” on March 3. Four days later 

the doctor developed a dry cough and a rash. On March 16, while 

in Frankfurt on his way back to Singapore, he became so short of 

breath that he was sent to Frankfurt University Hospital and was 

admitted to the ICU. Subsequently, two people in close contact with 
104

this physician—his wife and his mother—became ill about the time 

the doctor was admitted to the hospital. 

Unknown to physicians in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Frankfurt, 

on February 25, 2003, in Toronto, Canada, a 78-year-old woman 

developed fever, sore throat, and a dry cough 2 days after returning 

from a 10-day visit to Hong Kong. She was given an oral anti-bacterial 

antibiotic but became progressively more ill. She died on March 

5 while at home. Her 43-year-old son became ill with symptoms 

essentially identical to those of his mother on February 27, and 

on March 2 was admitted to the hospital. Progressive respiratory 

difficulties supervened, and he was placed on a mechanical ventilator 

on March 3. Despite careful intensive treatment, he died on March 

13, roughly 2 weeks after becoming ill. An autopsy was performed, 

which revealed changes typical of the Adult Respiratory Distress 

Syndrome, but no evidence of viral infection was identified.13

By the end of March, there would be more than 100 cases of SARS 

in Canada, 156 in Hong Kong, and at least 40 in Vietnam. Many other 

countries would go on to identify cases of what became known as SARS 

within weeks. But, there was little, if any, information forthcoming 

from China. The Chinese government reported 305 cases of “atypical 

pneumonia” with at least five deaths to WHO on February 11, 2003 

(even though an unusual disease outbreak had first been recognized 

in November 2002), but initially the disease was attributed to a rare 

cause of pneumonia, Chlamydia pneumonae.

WHO first alerted public health officials to the presence of a 

“severe form of pneumonia” on March 12, 2003,14 after connecting 

the illnesses described above. A case definition was established 

and promulgated via the Internet and WHO bulletins. This case 

definition consisted of a set of symptoms (patient complaints) and 

signs (physicians’ findings at the time of physical examination and 

also laboratory tests and X-ray results). The combination of signs and 

symptoms—a “syndrome”—is not to be confused with a diagnosis 

based on a specific, known cause (such as an infectious organism) 

and was called “Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome” (SARS).

The first summary of the epidemiology of SARS—the patterns 

of disease by age, sex, and travel history of victims—appeared on 

March 31, published on the Web page of the New England Journal of 
105

Medicine (NEJM). Never before had information about a completely 

new syndrome been categorized, collated, analyzed, checked, and 

distributed so quickly, nor had multicountry peer review ever 

before been marshaled so expeditiously. NEJM has an international 

reputation for high standards, and its requirements for publication, 

even in electronic form, are as stringent as any scientific journal 

anywhere in the world.

Then, remarkably on March 24, scientists at the CDC working 

closing with researchers in Hong Kong isolated and identified a 

virus of the family of viruses called Coronavirus (CoV) from the 

first patients with SARS (see Figure 1). They had taken respiratory 

secretions, blood samples, and other body fluids from SARS victims 

and plated the material out on a wide variety of animal cells growing 

in tissue culture vats. Within a few days of starting these experiments, 

investigators noted that in one particular cell culture—monkey 

kidney cells—were dying. Inspection of the cells under the electron 

microscope showed that they were filled with viral particles.

Figure 1: Coronavirus Urbani as Seen 

in the Electron Microscope (NEJM 348: 

1954-66, 2003).
106

Within a week, a key portion of the genome of CoV had been 

completely sequenced and compared with all other known 

Coronavirus strains. It was found to be different not only from all 

other strains of Coronavirus that cause disease in humans, but from 

those strains that cause disease in a multitude of animal species: 

birds, cattle, pigs, and cats (both wild and domesticated). A group of 

investigators in Germany did the same, and proved that their gene 

sequencing was completely consistent with the CDC-Hong Kong 

group. Their results, along with a detailed description of clinical 

and autopsy findings, laboratory studies, and even a highly-specific 

prototype antibody test were described and published on the New 

England Journal web site on April 10, less than 7 weeks after the first 

cases of SARS appeared in Canada and Hong Kong. In honor of Dr. 

Urbani, the proposed name of the novel Coronavirus is the “Urbani 

strain of SARS-associated coronavirus).

How Do We Know That C. Urbani Causes SARS?

In response to any infection, mammalian immune systems 

produce a panoply of responses. At least a dozen different cells 

capture and degrade the invading organism, and some of these cells 

engulf and kill the virus directly. Other cells dismember the outer 

membrane constituents of the virus and deliver selected pieces to 

other cells that, after the passage of a few days, begin to generate 

antibodies that bind more-or-less specifically to the infectious agent. 

The quantity (called “titer”) of antibodies (of several subtypes) 

slowly rises, usually over the course of 3 to 8 weeks. The presence 

and quantity of these antibodies can be identified by using antibodies 

from other animals (goats are a typical source) that bind to human

antibodies—caprine anti-human antibodies—that are tagged further 

with fluorescent markers. If human anti-Coronavirus antibodies are 

obtained from an individual patient’s blood and exposed to cells on a 

microscope slide containing the offending viral particles growing in 

them, the antibodies will bind to the cells. When the tagged caprine 

anti-human antibodies then are applied to the microscope slide, the 

cells become dotted with brightly fluorescing material (easily seen 

when illuminated with ultraviolet light source) and quantified. This 
107

process is called “indirect-immunoflourescence,” so named because 

the binding of the patient’s own antibodies against the infectious agent 

is seen “indirectly” via the fluorescence of the tagged antibodies that, 

in turn, are bound tightly to target sites on the virus on a microscope 

slide, rather than by visualizing the antibodies themselves (which 

are too small to be seen with ordinary microscopes).

The case for Coronavirus Urbani as the cause of SARS was capped 

with the demonstration of increasing titer of antibodies in patients 

who recovered from SARS during 3 or 4 weeks of convalescence and

a survey of hundreds of old (pre-SARS) blood-bank samples that 

failed to reveal any antibodies against C. Urbani. Thus, not only were 

patients who recovered from SARS generating specific antibodies to 

the virus, the virus had to be novel for, if it were ever in circulation 

previously in the human population, at least some blood donors 

would be expected to show evidence of past infection.

To date, Coronavirus Urbani has been found in respiratory 

secretions and fecal matter, but rarely in the bloodstream of patients 

suffering with disease. In animals, various strains of Coronavirus 

are isolated from the same sources. Most virologists believe that all 

of these materials are infectious.

Origin of Coronavirus Strain Urbani.

The family of Coronavirus is known to mutate frequently, that 

is, the genome of the virus may change suddenly, resulting in a new 

species of Coronavirus that may have a different host range or result 

in more severe disease. One way this mutation can occur is via the 

process of recombination, wherein two (or perhaps more) Coronavirus 

species that happen to infect a given animal at the same time shuffle 

and exchange their DNA within animal host cells. The daughter 

virus types that emerge from the animal cell then may contain an 

entirely new DNA construct (or, multiple types may result each with 

a unique and novel genome). A similar process occurs from time 

to time with the influenza virus, and when it does, a never-before 

seen strain of the virus may begin to circulate in the population. 

In addition, close and repeated contact between animals that carry 

these reassorted strains of influenza and humans—as occurs often in 
108

crowded live-animal markets in Asia and on farms—seems to create 

a perfect niche for the passage of novel influenza strain to humans. 

It is not surprising that new varieties of influenza in recent decades 

have first appeared in Asia, particularly in China and Hong Kong.

Since Coronavirus species are the cause of a multitude of 

animal diseases (usually presenting as fatal respiratory disease or 

dehydration from diarrhea), and since agricultural animals tend 

to live in close quarters, spread from animal to animal is the rule, 

thereby permitting enormous numbers of reassortment variants.15

Human farmers or customers in crowded animal markets are 

potential targets for novel strains that may have surprising changes 

in their host range. All of the known human Coronavirus species 

characterized to date cause mild illnesses: about 30 percent of “colds” 

(technically upper respiratory infections, not involving the lungs or 

interfering with respiration) are caused by a Coronavirus. On rare 

occasion, mild diarrhea in humans also results from Coronavirus.

Thus, it appears that an unwitting human in southern China 

acquired a novel strain of Coronavirus sometime in the fall of 2002. 

The source has not been identified yet. Some virologists believe 

that the organism was transmitted to humans from the civet cat, a 

gastronomic delicacy in China. However, human consumption of 

this animal, a 5,000 year tradition in China, casts doubt on the civet 

as the primary source of the disease;16 nonetheless, Chinese officials 

banned the sale of wild animals in Guangdong. Dr. David Heyman, 

WHO’s executive director for communicable disease, cautioned that 

the source of the virus remains speculative, and that it is possible that 

a seasonal pattern may emerge over time, suggesting environmental 

niches that might provide alternative paths of transmission beyond 

consumption of wild animals17 or direct contact with Coronavirusinfected humans.

Transmission and Response: 

Should SARS Have Caused such a Fuss?

In the early stages of a disease outbreak involving a manifestly 

novel agent, many uncertainties arise in predicting the speed of 

transmission of disease. As with SARS, the mode of transmission 
109

is not immediately apparent early in many epidemics. Among the 

questions that epidemiologists try to answer are: 

• Are there animal and/or insect vectors?

• Do infected individuals spread the micro-organism via 

aerosolization during coughing or sneezing? If individuals 

are infectious to others, how long do they remain so?

• What is the rate of new cases (sometimes called the “incidence”) 

of disease?

• Are quarantine and travel restrictions necessary?

After establishing a “case definition,” the primary data that 

public health officials need to answer these questions comes from 

the simple reporting of the time of onset of each case, location of the 

individual, and demographic information such as sex, approximate 

age, recent travel, and perhaps the individual’s employment. With 

statistical tests to determine the degree of confidence in the data, 

epidemiologists can plot the data in a variety of ways to determine 

trends and thus infer the “behavior” of the epidemic. Needless to say, 

in the absence of routine information flow—as occurred in mainland 

China—even this simple analysis is impossible.

In March and April 2003, during the first few weeks of the SARS 

epidemic outside of mainland China, reporting was timely and 

generally complete. Although the media tended to focus on the fear 

(even panic) attendant to the unknown cause of the syndrome, it was 

possible to discern that the epidemic was growing slowly, and not at 

all what one might expect from an influenza-like virus that spread via 

aerosol from person-to-person. Simply by plotting the total number 

of reported cases by country over time, a benign picture emerged:18
110

SARS Cases and Deaths

Figure 2.

Note that, the China mainland aside, the growth in the number 

of cases is approximately linear. Indeed, using basic statistical tools, 

it was possible to postulate a linear growth model, and test this 

hypothesis against actual number of cases:

Figure 3.
111

Influenza (or closely related virus strains) almost certainly would 

have caused an exponential increase in the number of cases. As the 

epidemic proceeded and more cases were reported, public health 

personnel increasingly were confident that spread of the virus 

depended on close contact with infected individuals or contaminated 

surfaces.

With the exception of mainland China, exchange of data in the 

SARS epidemic was unprecedented. 

Early Lessons from the SARS Epidemic for Public Health 

and Counterterrorism.

The tools of molecular biology, epidemiology with contact 

tracing, and modern communications via the Internet resulted in an 

unprecedented public health triumph: Within a few days of the first 

cases, WHO was able to organize collaborating teams of virologists, 

epidemiologists, and infectious disease experts, each critical to 

the isolation, identification, and containment of the disease. That 

the organism responsible for SARS was never before described 

underscores the profound importance of the global response and the 

value of independent groups working simultaneously. Indeed, the 

contemporaneous sequencing of the viral genome in the United States 

and Germany provided at once the identification of the organism 

and verification thereof. Further, the results along with expert 

interpretation in the context of the epidemic were communicated 

worldwide within days. As has been noted by others, if “business 

as usual” had applied in SARS, we might still be trying to identify 

the causal organism, and the disease might have been much more 

widely spread.

At the same time, the response to SARS might have been quicker—

with fewer attendant deaths and fewer cases—had international 

public health workers been aware of the “atypical pneumonia” 

cases in China that began in November 2002. More than ever before, 

the management of novel infectious disease outbreaks is highly 

dependent on timely information. Transportation and commerce 

virtually assure that microbial pathogens in one part of the globe will 

be in major transport hubs within days or even hours, increasing the 
112

likelihood of multipoint outbreaks and adding to the bewilderment 

of infectious disease experts trying to unravel the origin and modes 

of spread of the agent. The key, of course, is open dissemination of 

information; it appears that the Chinese public health infrastructure 

failed to do its part in what we now know to be the first days of SARSCoV. Indeed, it was not until July 2005 that Chinese investigators 

published substantive information on their experience with SARS,19

when an entire issue of the most widely read Chinese medical journal 

was devoted to SARS. An editorial accompanying the scientific 

papers mentioned nothing about reporting delays nor interrupted 

information flow as contributors to both domestic and international 

spread of SARS.

The ingress of human activity into previously unexplored regions 

and the close contact between humans and hundreds of animal species 

guarantees the exchange of countless organisms. Mercifully, most of 

them will not result in disease (in either humans or animals).

SARS is but the latest in a series of “emerging” diseases—illnesses 

due to infectious agents that were not described previously—that 

have begun to affect humans. In just the past few decades, medical 

journals and newspaper headlines have been filled with articles about 

these new disease entities: Ebola hemorrhagic fever (from squirrels 

and perhaps monkeys), Hantavirus Pulmonary Syndrome (from 

mice), Spongioform encephalopathy (from cows), and monkeypox 

(transmitted by prairie dogs), all occurring in people. Although 

this list is incomplete and doubtless other novel diseases await us, 

similarities can be identified readily. All of the organisms originate 

in nonhuman species and have occurred when humans and the 

natural animal hosts come in close contact (indeed, in the case of both 

Ebola and Spongioform encephalopathy, consumption of infected 

animal tissue seems to be required). Each of the organisms causes 

diseases with high mortality (in the case of Ebola and Spongioform 

encephalopathy, nearly 100 percent), and none can be treated 

successfully yet. Finally, while treatment is elusive, prevention 

generally is simple, with either avoidance of contact or, in the case of 

SARS-CoV, careful isolation of infectious patients until their disease 

resolves.

Given the characteristics of emerging disease pathogens, rapid 

identification of disease foci is essential. Remarkably enough, 
113

having a pathogen in hand (or surrogate diagnostic test results) is 

not necessary in order to recognize that a problem may be brewing. 

Syndrome-based surveillance (SBS), depending only on the signs 

and symptoms in seriously ill people or animals, may be sufficient 

to mobilize international action—first with quarantine, followed by 

the application of new techniques in genomics, molecular biology, 

immunology and cell culture to identify causal organisms combined 

with the sharing of results so that they may be independently verified. 

The power of SBS to give early warning to public health officials 

and government decisionmakers has been described recently,20 and 

at least two systems, ESSENCE II and the Syndrome Reporting 

Information System (SYRIS),21 have been in operation in several U.S. 

states for the past 2 years,22 and SYRIS has been used in Singapore 

to help manage the SARS epidemic there. Each system draws on the 

basic tenants of epidemiology: establishing what kind of illness a 

patient (or animal) has; when the illness began; and where the patient 

is located or has traveled. 

Approaches to SBS fall into two broad categories: “passive” 

systems that utilize data commonly gathered in the care of patients 

such as emergency room records, ambulance flowsheets, and even 

billing from physician offices; and “active” systems that depend 

on health care providers to identify the case and describe the signs 

and symptoms observed. There are advantages and disadvantages 

to each. Passive systems are nonspecific, depend on availability of 

sensitive patient data via electronic means, and assume that the kind 

of information cataloged in western medical systems is similar to that 

gathered elsewhere. Analysis therefore may be difficult, and false 

alarms may occur. However, passive systems do not require specific 

input from busy healthcare providers; clerks or administrators (and 

automated billing systems) can provide much of the needed data.

Active systems exploit physician judgment, depending on doctors 

to enter required information (preferably via a computer interface 

with immediate dissemination of reports). In any surveillance 

system, there is a trade-off between the quantity of data and its quality, 

often referred to as the “signal to noise” ratio in scientific disciplines. 

Active systems operate on the hypothesis that physician are able to 

determine quickly the severity of illness, even though the underlying 

etiology is unknown. It may be the case that nonspecific indicators—
114

such as the raw number of patients ill with mild symptoms (generally 

not captured in billing statements or “chief complaints” recorded 

by nursing or ambulance personnel)—will lead to false alarms, 

triggering costly investigations or preventive measures that are 

unwarranted. On the other hand, the sudden appearance of even a 

small number of patients with severe constitutional symptoms (high 

fever and prostration, for example), along with certain clinical signs 

such as rash or pneumonia, may be indicative of the earliest stages 

of an epidemic, including one caused by terrorist use of biological 

weapons.23

Active and passive surveillance systems have not demonstrated 

their cost-effectiveness yet. However, in at least one important case, 

syndrome surveillance enabled public health officials to determine 

rapidly that a report of stolen samples of virulent plague organisms 

from a medical school in Texas was a hoax.24 By noting the absence

of respiratory disease at a time when a high incidence of seasonallyrelated respiratory symptoms was expected, local officials could 

assure physicians and the public that there was no reason for worry. 

In addition, public health officials used the syndrome surveillance 

system to communicate new information and all-important diagnostic 

criteria for plague to physicians in the community who, by and large, 

had never seen a case of this disease.

Conclusions.

The management of the SARS-CoV epidemic of 2003 was, for 

the most part, a victory for scientists working in epidemiology 

and molecular biology. Within weeks, the organism was isolated 

and identified, and a diagnostic test was perfected. Perhaps more 

important, by careful reporting and contact tracing, it was possible 

to determine that the disease spread slowly, implying that there was 

little likelihood of aerosol transmission from person-to-person, a 

key discovery that changed travel recommendations and even trade 

dramatically.25 While there is no question that there were serious 

economic consequences from the epidemic and nearly 1000 people 

have died to date, the impact would have been much more severe in 

the presence of greater uncertainty about the behavior of the virus 

and the disease it caused. 
115

SARS provides decisionmakers and public health officials with 

a model that generates valuable lessons for the response to future 

disease outbreaks, including those that are introduced intentionally 

into the human or animal population by terrorists. The key to 

the successful management of SARS was the rapid sharing of 

information. Countries that openly reported information benefited 

both themselves and other nations. Mortality, though substantial, 

was modest when compared to the yearly toll from influenza, and 

economic catastrophe via draconian travel and trade restrictions was 

avoided. 

The international community may be poised to adopt a formal 

system of routine data sharing via the Internet, overcoming the time 

delays inherent in traditional reporting hierarchies. Several promising 

Internet-based applications operating in the United States, Europe, 

and Asia can provide invaluable information to public health officials 

trying to limit the spread of infection and to the physicians who care 

for those who become ill during epidemics. A modest amount of 

political will is all that is required. Since infectious disease respects no 

border, people living in countries whose leaders choose to suppress 

information or subvert open reporting may suffer immeasurably in 

future outbreaks that are certain to occur.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6

1. I will use the abbreviation “SARS” when referring to the syndrome and SARSCoV when discussing the disease caused by the newly discovered Coronavirus. 

More detail is provided in the text.

2. See www.who.int/csr/sars/country/2003_08_15/en/.

3. R. A. Fowler, S. E. Lapinsky, D. Hallett, A. S. Detsky, W. J. Sibbald, A. S. 

Slutsky, and T. E. Stewart, “Critically Ill Patients with Severe Acute Respiratory 

Syndrome,” Journal Of The American Medical Association (JAMA), Vol. 290, No. 3, 

July 16, 2003, pp. 367-373.

4. T. W. K. Lew, T. K. Kwek, D. Tai, A. Earnest, S. Loo, K. Singh, K. M. Kwan, 

Y Chan, C. F. Yim, S. L. Bek, A. C. Kor, W. S. Yap, Y. R. Chelliah, Y. C. Lai, and S. 

K. Goh, idem., pp. 374-380.

5. J. M. Nicholls, L. L. M. Poon, K. C. Lee, W. F. Ng, S. T. Lai, C. Y. Leung, C. M. 

Chu, P. K. Hui, K. L. Mak, W. Lim, K. W. Yan, K. H. Chan, N. C. Tsang, Y Guan, 

K. Y. Yuen, and J. S. M. Peiris, “Lung Pathology of Fatal Severe Acute Respiratory 

Syndrome,” Lancet, Vol. 361, No. 9371, May 24, 2003; pp.1773-1778.
116

6. Christian Drosten, Stephan Gunther, Wolfgang Preiser, Sylvie van der Werf, 

Hans-Reinhard Brodt, Stephan Becker, Holger Rabenau, Marcus Panning, Larissa 

Kolesnikova, Ron A. M. Fouchier, Annemarie Berger, et al., “Identification of a 

Novel Coronavirus in Patients with Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome,” New 

England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 348, 2003, pp. 1967-1976. 

7. Thomas G. Ksiazek, Dean Erdman, Cynthia S. Goldsmith, Sherif R. Zaki, 

Teresa Peret, Shannon Emery, Suziang Tong, Carlo Urbani, James A. Comer, 

Wilina Lim, Pierre E. Rollin, Dowell, et al., the SARS Working Group, “A Novel 

Coronavirus Associated with Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome,” ibid., pp 1953-

1966. 

8. T. A. Neff, R. Stocker, H. R. Frey, S. Stein, and E. W. Russi, “Long-term 

Assessment of Lung Function in Survivors of Severe ARDS, Chest, Vol. 123, No. 3, 

March 2003, pp. 845-853.

9. G. Schelling, C. Stoll, C. Vogelmeier, T. Hummel, J. Behr, H. P. Kapfhammer, 

H. B. Rothenhausler, M. Haller, K. Durst, T. Krauseneck, and J. Briegel, “Pulmonary 

Function and Health-Related Quality of Life in a Sample of Long-term Survivors 

of the Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome,” Intensive Care Medicine, Vol. 26, No. 

9, September 2000, pp. 1304-1311.

10. T. H. Rainer, P. A. Cameron, D. Smit, K. L. Ong, A. N. W. Hung, D. C. P. 

Nin, A. T. Ahuja, L. C. Y. Si, and J. J. Y. Sung, “Evaluation of WHO Criteria for 

Identifying Patients with Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Out of Hospital: 

Prospective Observational Study,” British Medical Journal, Vol. 326, No. 7403, June 

21, 2003, pp. 1354-1358.

11. R. P. Wenzel, and M. B. Edmond, New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 348, 

2003, pp. 1947-1949.

12. K. W. Tsang, P. L. Ho, G. C. Ooi, et al., “Cluster of Cases of Severe Acute 

Respiratory Syndrome in Hong Kong,” New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 348, 

2003, pp. 1977-1985.

13. S. M. Poutanen, D. E. Low, Henry B., S. Finkelstein, et al., “Identification of 

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome in Canada,” New England Journal of Medicine, 

Vol. 348, 2003, pp. 1995-2005.

14. See www.who.int/csr/sars/archive/2003_03_12/en/. The WHO on-line archives 

serve as the single most comprehensive source of information about SARS.

15. It is believed that the vast majority of recombinant strains of virus are 

nonviable because their DNA does not contain the necessary codes to produce 

functioning daughter virus particles. 

16. British Medical Journal, Vol. 326, June 7, 2003, p. 1232. 

17. Ibid., June 21, 2003, p. 1350. 

18. The graphs are taken from an informal paper that I circulated among public 

health officials in Switzerland, the United States, and Singapore, updated twice 

weekly in the early weeks of the SARS outbreak. This work was not peer-reviewed, 

but was reported in Science, Vol. 300, April 25, 2003, pp. 558-559.
117

19. The June 2003 issue of the Chinese Medical Journal (Vol. 116, No. 7) and the 

July 2003 Chinese Science Bulletin (Vol 48, No. 13) contain the first publications 

authored in the People’s Republic of China, not including the Hong Kong SAR.

20. M. D. Lewis, J. A. Pavlin, J. L. Mansfield, S. O’Brien, L. G. Boomsma, Y. Elbert, 

and P. W. Kelley, “Disease Outbreak Detection System Using Syndromic Data in 

the Greater Washington, DC, Area,” American Journal Of Preventive Medicine, Vol. 

23, No. 3, October 2002 pp. 180-186.

21. For more information on SYRIS, see syris,arescorporation.com/demo.

22. Mary Beth Nierengarten, Larry Lutwick, and Suzanne Lutwick, “SyndromeBased Surveillance for Clinicians on the Frontlines of Healthcare: Focus on Rapid 

Diagnosis and Notification,” www.medscape.com/viewprogram/2427.

23. R. P. Kadlec, A. P. Zelicoff, and A. M. Vrtis, “Biological Weapons Control—

Prospects and Implications for the Future,” JAMA, Vol. 278, No. 5, August 6, 1997, 

pp. 351-356.

24. Tigi Ward, Lubbock Texas Department of Health (personal 

communication).

25. Some recent evidence suggests that foodhandlers, caterers and chefs 

in China were a “high risk group” for acquiring SARS-CoV. This adds further 

evidence in support of the postulate that animals used as food (including, but not 

limited to chickens and civet cats) in China are the “source” of SARS-CoV. R. P. 

Wenzel and M. B. Edmonds, “Listening to SARS: Lesson for Infection Control,” 

Ann Internal Medicine, 2003 (in press).

119

SECTION III.

WHAT CAN BE DONE

121

CHAPTER 7

NEW MISSILES AND MODELS FOR COOPERATION1

Dennis M. Gormley and Richard Speier

NOTE: This chapter, first presented by the authors on March 17, 2003, was reviewed 

and updated by the authors in January 2006.

THE THREAT

Even though ballistic missiles dominated missile nonproliferation 

deliberations during the last decade of the 20th century, land-attack 

cruise missiles (LACMs)—most notably America’s Tomahawk—

figured into no less than seven different military contingencies. The 

Tomahawk’s most impressive role was reflected in its widespread use 

against Iraq during Operation DESERT STORM, when, during the 

first hours of the air campaign, Tomahawk strikes greatly leveraged 

the subsequent effectiveness of manned aircraft by destroying critical 

Iraqi air defense and command and control targets. Tomahawks, too, 

figured into a variety of much smaller-scale contingencies, the most 

controversial of which were the attacks on the al-Shifa pharmaceutical 

plant in Khartoum, Sudan, and al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, in 

retaliation for the al-Qaeda-sponsored embassy bombings in Africa 

in August 1998. 

Although the al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant attack dominated 

press scrutiny, the ineffectiveness of cruise missile attacks on Osama 

bin Laden’s Afghan camps generated significant interest in new 

roles for unarmed and subsequently armed unmanned air vehicles 

(UAVs) even before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11). 

Unarmed UAVs, with their extended loiter capability, could provide 

surveillance and communications connectivity superior to that of 

manned aircraft. But armed UAVs could do more. In the aftermath 

of the terrorist attacks on New York City and the Pentagon, the 

United States, for the first time, effectively unleashed Predators

armed with two Hellfire missiles for use in Afghanistan, and most 

prominently, in a pinpoint attack against a top al-Qaeda operative 

and five companions in Yemen. The notion of combining real-time 
122

eyes, by way of several organic surveillance packages, with a weapon 

allowing for the virtually instantaneous engagement of so-called 

time-critical targets was powerfully appealing. Assuming that the 

authorization to fire could be prearranged or achieved quickly, such 

a combined sensor and weapons-carrying UAV would more than 

compensate for the limitations of using LACMs launched from great 

distances hours after acquiring targeting intelligence. Arguably, the 

armed UAV has become the most prominently featured military 

instrument in America’s first war of the 21st century. 

The employment of UAVs promises to make military operations 

more discriminating in their effects. But, as this trend establishes 

itself, more ominous possibilities are emerging. UAVs—both armed 

and unarmed—are growing larger. They are breaching the threshold 

for the most restrictive international nonproliferation restraints. 

And civilian applications for UAVs are developing. These trends—

combined with the inherent capability of UAVs to deliver nuclear, 

biological, or chemical payloads—set the stage for a new level of 

proliferation threats—the very opposite of the discriminating use of 

force.

The American use of armed Predators raises important questions 

not only about how UAVs will help shape America’s current 

military transformation, but also about the extent to which other 

countries or terrorist groups might emulate American actions and 

transform their own unarmed UAVs or small manned aircraft into 

unmanned weapons-delivery systems or crude terror weapons. 

Recent inspections in Iraq have uncovered a UAV that reportedly 

is the system that Secretary of State Colin Powell discussed before 

the UN Security Council in early February 2003 as having been test 

flown 500km around a racetrack fully autonomously.2 Equipped with 

sprayers that Iraq is known to have tested, such a UAV could have 

threatened regional targets and conceivably even U.S. ones, were 

such a vehicle launched from a ship offshore or covertly transported 

into the United States. 

The Strategic Setting.

Although the world’s UAV inventory is imprecisely documented, 

according to one recent study,at least 40 countries produce over 600 
123

different UAVs, nearly 80 percent of which could be flown one-way 

ranges of over 300 kilometres (km) and many substantially farther.3

Moreover, a small fraction of the world’s inventory of antiship 

cruise missiles—primarily first-generation models with substantial 

airframe volume—could be converted into land attack missiles with 

ranges exceeding 300km. Further, there are inviting loopholes in the 

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) that permit aerospace 

firms to sell flight management systems specifically designed to turn 

small manned aircraft (including kit-built ones) into autonomously 

guided and armed UAVs. Finally, were a country or terrorist group 

motivated to develop a crude cruise missile or UAV either on its own 

or with some foreign assistance, it could readily take advantage of the 

last decade’s quantum leap in dual-use technologies that comprise 

the chief components of autonomous air-vehicle development. These 

include satellite navigation and guidance furnished primarily by the 

USA’s Global Positioning System, high-resolution satellite imagery 

from a growing number of commercial vendors, and digital mapping 

technologies for mission planning.4

Impact of Proliferation on American Military Dominance. Should 

cruise missiles and armed UAVs spread widely and become a 

dominant feature of military operations or terrorist activity in the 

21st century, the international security consequences could be 

profound. Ironically, perhaps the most significant impact would 

rebound on the United States—doubtless the most advanced nation 

around the globe in developing and exploiting land-attack cruise 

missiles (LACMs) and UAVs for military benefit. The proliferation 

of LACMs and UAVs to complement ballistic missiles conceivably 

could bolster the capacities of America’s adversaries to oppose 

U.S.-led interventions in strategically important ways. LACMs and 

UAVs could furnish new military leverage, due in significant part to 

the capacity of cruise missiles (due to their steady horizontal flight 

pattern, releasing anagent along a line of contamination) to enlarge 

the effective lethal area of biological attacks by at least a factor of ten 

over ballistic missiles.5 In addition, the potentially high accuracy of 

LACMs suggests that even conventionally armed missiles may be 

able to inflict significant damage on exposed targets. To envisage 

such damage, one need only consider the airbases that U.S.-led 
124

coalition forces used during Operation DESERT STORM on which 

aircraft were lined up wingtip-to-wingtip, and large tent cities were 

left open and vulnerable to missile attack.

Cruise missile and UAV proliferation also are likely to create 

unwanted dilemmas for American missile defenses. The United 

States currently spends huge sums to defend against ballistic missile 

threats. Yet, to the extent that America successfully pursues effective 

theater and national missile defenses against ballistic missiles, 

nations, and terrorist groups alike will be strongly motivated to 

acquire LACMs and armed UAVs. For example, the low cost of 

some cruise missiles and, especially, small airplanes modified to 

become UAVs, renders the cost-per-kill arithmetic of missile defense 

exceedingly unfavorable. For example, each Patriot PAC-3 missile 

costs between $2-5 million, which compares unfavorably with either 

a $200,000 LACM or $50,000-per-copy kit airplanes transformed into 

armed UAVs.6 Because both ballistic and cruise missile defenses for 

theater campaigns currently depend largely on the same high-cost, 

high-performance interceptors, cruise as well as ballistic missile 

attacks, especially saturation ones and those delivering weapons of 

mass destruction (WMD) payloads, will present enormous problems 

for the defender. 

Advanced LACMs that fly low and have low observability 

to air defense radars will raise the cost of cruise missile defense 

dramatically.7 Even seemingly easy to detect armed UAVs could 

challenge legacy air defense radars, including the Airborne Warning 

and Control Systems (AWACS) and some ground-based radars. 

Around 65 percent of the UAVs deployed today are propelled 

by reciprocating engines, which means that they fly at speeds of 

less than 80 knots per hour. Yet expensive air defense radars like 

AWACS intentionally eliminate slow flying targets on or near the 

ground in order to prevent their data processing and display systems 

from being overly taxed. Although most ground based air defense 

radars could probably detect such slow flying systems, the limited 

radar horizon of ground based radars, combined with the possibly 

large raid size of a threat, means that interceptor batteries could 

be overwhelmed quickly, and their expensive missile inventories 

rapidly depleted. There are no simple or cheap solutions that readily 

return the advantage to the defender. 
125

Regional Military Imbalances. Potential or actual adversaries 

of American military dominance are not motivated merely to 

acquire long range missiles to deter or defeat Western-led military 

interventions. Regional states, rogues or not, may be equally or 

primarily driven to pursue missile acquisition for uniquely regional 

reasons. Thus, regional military balances also could be adversely 

affected by the spread of LACMs and UAVs. Chinese acquisition of 

M-9 and M-11 ballistic missiles dominates calculations of the ChinaTaiwan military balance, but with noticeably less fanfare both sides 

have begun to supplement their arsenals with cruise missiles. Closely 

timed Chinese cruise and ballistic missiles attacks would severely 

tax Taiwanese ground based radars that support their defense of a 

small number of highly vulnerable airfields.8

The already unstable balance of forces between India and Pakistan, 

too, could be adversely affected by the introduction of cruise missiles 

and UAVs. According to an Indian report, in early December 2002, a 

Pakistani reconnaissance UAV violated Indian airspace near the line 

of control in Kashmir. The flight came immediately after renewed 

shelling, suggesting that the UAV may have been collecting battle 

damage information. Additional Pakistani shelling commenced 

shortly after the Indian side detected the UAV, probably in an effort 

to divert attempts to shoot it down.9 These escalations of tensions 

in Kashmir have been mimicked in the broader arms acquisition 

domain. Pakistan, for its part, is looking to the United States to sell 

its army either highly sophisticated Predator UAVs or perhaps some 

less controversial system to replace its own home grown but limited 

Vision UAV, in order to improve its monitoring of the Kashmiri line 

of control.10

India is even more active in both its own development and foreign 

acquisition of cruise missiles and UAVs. Its Lakshya unmanned target 

drone, which is thought to be capable of delivering a 450kg payload 

over a 600km range, will reportedly soon be exported to an unknown 

country (probably Israel).11 Israel, in turn, is supplying India initially 

with two Heron long range reconnaissance UAVs, with more to 

follow, to support its first major UAV base, located at the southern 

naval command in Kochi.12 More controversial, due to its potentially 

unwanted impact on MTCR effectiveness, is India and Russia’s co-
126

development of the Brahmos dual-mode (antiship and land attack) 

supersonic cruise missile, capable of delivering a 200kg payload 

to a range of 300km. Both partners have openly expressed great 

interest in large export sales of the Brahmos. The most provocative 

development, however, derives from reports that Russia recently has 

agreed to lease India an Akula II nuclear submarine outfitted with 

300km range Club nuclear-capable cruise missiles. Indian military 

analysts have already begun to characterize India as possessing a 

“sea-based nuclear deterrent.”13

Cruise missiles also figure into tensions in the Middle East. Israel 

is a major developer of reconnaissance UAVs, has deployed its own 

Popeye air-launched LACM, and has probably deployed nucleararmed cruise missiles on her submarines.14 Of course, ballistic missiles 

played a central role in Iran and Iraq’s 1980-88 “War of the Cities.” 

While both countries have on-going ballistic missile development 

programs, more recently cruise missiles and UAVs have become 

a part of both nations’ missile arsenals. Iran has acquired cruise 

missile technology—probably from Russia and China—for its own 

program for developing an antiship cruise missile, called the Nur, 

which comes in both a ground and air launched version. China has 

also exported various versions of the Silkworm antiship cruise missile 

to Iran; older versions, like the HY-2 or HY-4, could be converted 

into land attack missiles with ranges of at least 500-700km.15 Iraq, 

for its part, has had a long-standing interest in developing LACMs, 

including a program in the 1980s to convert the Italian Mirach 600

UAV into an LACM. Evidence is also accumulating that a team of 

engineers in Yugoslavia is working on a 1,400km range LACM for 

Iraq, although it reportedly is only in the conceptual stage.16 More 

ominous is Iraq’s transformation of the Czech L-29 trainer aircraft 

into unmanned drones capable in theory of flying to ranges in 

excess of 600km, although Secretary of State Colin Powell told the 

UN Security Council in February that Iraq had abandoned the L-29 

in favor of a home-grown UAV that had been tested on a racetrack 

flying autonomously for 500km. Such UAVs, outfitted with the 

kinds of spray tanks that the Iraqis are known to have experimented 

with, could have devastating consequences were they to deliver 

biological or even chemical payloads against regional targets, since 

an unmanned aircraft’s flight stability permits it to effectively release 
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and spray biological agent along a line of contamination. While 

perhaps only 10 percent of a liquid anthrax payload might survive 

the explosive impact of an Iraqi ballistic missile, nearly the entire 

capacity of an L-29 spray tank (reportedly containing 300 litres) 

would be available for dissemination—a factor of 15 better than 

ballistic missiles.17

Defending the Homeland. LACMs and UAVs also have strategic 

implications for homeland defense. Traditional threat analyses 

employ “range rings” to show the distance beyond a nation’s borders 

that its missiles can reach. But UAVs can destroy the relevance of 

“range rings.” Cruise missiles or armed UAVs might be launched 

from concealed locations at modest distances from their targets, or 

brought within range and launched from freighters or commercial 

container ships—in effect, a “two stage” form of delivery. The 

mere fact that a ship launched LACM, fired from outside territorial 

waters, could strike many of the world’s large populations centers 

or industrial areas, ought to factor into decisions about protecting 

homeland populations against missile attack. In the aftermath of the 

9/11 terrorist attacks, key American decisionmakers have begun 

seriously to contemplate such threats.18 Various National Intelligence 

Estimates (NIEs) have drawn attention to the covert conversion of a 

commercial container ship as a launching pad for a cruise missile. 

There are thousands of such vessels in the international fleet; U.S. 

ports alone handle over 13 million containers annually. Even a 

large, bulky cruise missile like the Chinese HY-4 Silkworm, equipped 

with a small internal erector for launching, could readily fit inside a 

standard 12 meter shipping container. Indeed, the latest NIE argues 

that because such an item, among several others, is less costly, easier 

to acquire, and more reliable than an intercontinental ballistic missile 

(ICBM), a cruise missile attack is more likely to occur than a ballistic 

missile strike.19

The offshore option is not the only cruise missile or UAV threat 

to worry about. Absent more effective controls on autonomous flight 

management systems, the prospect of converting small airplanes into 

weapons-carrying UAVs becomes truly alarming. 9/11 provoked a 

rash of reforms to cope with future terrorist use of a large commercial 

airliner as a weapon, but these reforms address commercial, not 

private, aviation. Even though small converted airplanes cannot 
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begin to approximate the effects of using a large airliner, the fact that 

gasoline, when mixed with air, releases 15 times as much energy as 

an equal amount of TNT, means that even small airplanes can do 

significant damage against certain civilian targets. As we have noted, 

such means are the best method for effectively delivering biological 

agents. Most important, because such small airplanes could originate 

from domestically based terrorists—kit-built airplanes do not need 

a hardened strip to take off—they could be launched from hidden 

locations in relatively close proximity to their intended targets. The 

notion that a terrorist group might entertain the use of an unmanned 

attack means is by no means far-fetched. One recent accounting of 

terrorist activity notes 43 recorded cases involving 14 terrorist groups 

where remote-controlled delivery systems were “either threatened, 

developed, or actually utilized.”20 Such threats may explain in part 

why MTCR member states agreed at their last plenary meeting in 

Warsaw, Poland, to strengthen efforts to limit the risk of controlled 

items and their technologies falling into the hands of terrorist groups 

or individuals.21

The challenges and prospective costs of defending against both 

offshore and domestic cruise missile threats are enormous. The North 

American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is currently 

studying the idea of an unmanned airship operating at an altitude 

of 70,000 feet and carrying sensors to monitor and detect offshore 

low flying cruise missiles. Several such airships would be needed 

together with fast-moving interceptors to cope with perceived 

threats. An architecture of perhaps 100 aerostats flying at an altitude 

of 15,000 feet could act as a complementary or alternative system of 

surveillance and fire control for an interceptor fleet. But additional 

problems remain. A means of furnishing warning information to the 

Coast Guard is needed on potentially hostile ships embarking from 

ports of concern. Sensor data on missile threats must be made able 

to distinguish between friendly and enemy threats prior to threat 

engagement. Progress in national cruise missile defense will not 

occur without corresponding improvements in respective service 

programs. But the latter efforts lack the necessary funding and are 

burdened by palpable service interoperability and doctrinal and 

organizational constraints. The question of affordability looms large: 

it is safe to say that even a limited defense against offshore cruise 
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missiles would cost at least $30-40 billion, which is never taken into 

consideration when debate occurs about the costs of national ballistic 

missile defense. Finally, none of these costs or technical challenges 

pertains to improved defenses against domestic threats. In the 

aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, NORAD had no internal air picture; 

nor were its radar assets linked with those of the Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), which controls internal United States air 

traffic. Progress toward making such a linkage has occurred, but 

major holes remain, especially when dealing with detecting low and 

slow flying air targets.22 In sum, missile defenses against offshore 

cruise missiles and domestic terrorist attacks employing small 

airplanes will remain for at least the next decade operationally and 

technically problematic, as well as financially taxing. The stress 

on such defenses will grow worse if UAV proliferation gets out of 

hand.

Trends in UAV Applications.

UAVs fit importantly into Secretary of Defense Donald 

Rumsfeld’s view of a transformed American military. Upset with 

the lengthy time it has taken to build up responses to military crises, 

Rumsfeld foresees a U.S. military that could conduct decisive action 

with rapidly deployable, agile, stealthy forces able to respond to 

various contingencies, large and small, with a minimum of logistical 

support. More important than the number of weapons platforms 

would be the quality of networking between sensors and weapon 

delivery systems (or “shooters,” in military parlance). The ubiquitous 

employment of microprocessors throughout military systems; remote 

sensing technologies (as employed on UAVs); advanced data-fusion 

software; interlinked but physically disparate databases; and highspeed, high-capacity communications networks, would facilitate the 

precise delivery of force against the most important time sensitive 

enemy targets. Sequential fires against these targets, which simply 

permit the enemy time to recover or hide, would be abjured. Instead, 

networked sensors and shooters produce simultaneous fires, 

improving effects by an order of magnitude.

Arming the Predator UAV exemplifies this transformation in 

targeting. A decade earlier, in Operation DESERT STORM, American 
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forces received relatively poor support from overhead reconnaissance 

and surveillance systems, then the exclusive domain of the national 

intelligence community. Space-based communications support 

also produced inadequate results, and such support was critically 

unavailable to military forces in Somalia in 1993. Circumstances 

in Afghanistan proved radically different. Operation ENDURING 

FREEDOM demonstrated the capacity of geographically dispersed 

forces to perceive simultaneously and substantially the same 

battlespace. This broadly based battlespace awareness allowed mass 

effects to be achieved without the necessity of massing forces, thereby 

reducing vulnerability. Near real time video data from Predator and 

Global Hawk UAVs—under the control of military commanders, 

not the national intelligence community—was relayed via orbiting 

communications satellites to command centers and individual air 

controllers on the ground. These air controllers could point their 

laser binoculars at targets and instantly pass precision bearing 

and range information (translated into latitude and longitude by 

a GPS receiver) to command centers and aircraft circling nearby. 

Combat aircraft armed with Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs), 

relatively cheap modifications to existing unguided bombs enabling 

them to be guided precisely by GPS signals to their targets, could 

then “reprogram” their bombs to deliver them with remarkable 

accuracy. Most impressively, this capacity to broaden battlespace 

awareness through UAVs and space-based communications 

enabled the America regional commander to direct the battle from 

his headquarters in Tampa, Florida, while being instantaneously 

connected to his forward headquarters in Kuwait and a subordinate 

one in Uzbekistan.

What distinguishes armed UAVs from manned aircraft in such 

roles is their capacity to loiter on call for periods of 24 hours or more 

without exposing a piloted and expensive aircraft to enemy fire. As 

of early November 2002, the U.S. Air Force possessed only about 50 

Predators and only a small percentage are currently equipped to fire 

Hellfire missiles.23 The CIA has a small number of armed Predators, 

too, and new versions are being produced at the rate of about two 

per month. These drones also have several operational weaknesses, 

including difficulty of flying in bad and icy weather and vulnerability 

to antiaircraft fire. At least ten Predators have perished during 
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missions over Afghanistan or Iraq since the beginning of Operation 

ENDURING FREEDOM.

Plans are afoot, however, to develop and produce improved 

versions of the Predator. The currently flown model, called the MQ1B, is powered by a simple reciprocating engine, which propels the 

UAV at a speed of 80 knots. Propelled by a turboprop engine, a 

much faster (around 260 knots airspeed) and higher flying version—

the MQ-9B, or Predator B—has already been built, and three to four 

more will follow in 2003, with production increasing first to nine 

and then to 15 annually thereafter. Another version of the Predator 

B, with a 20-foot wing extension, will enable it to stay aloft for 42 

hour missions, carrying two external drop tanks and 1,000 pounds 

of weapons. And while current Predators are restricted to carrying 

Hellfire missiles, future versions will carry a variety of more potent 

weapons, including 250 and 500 pound JDAMs and two different airto-air missiles. The expected unit cost for newer versions of Predator

will be double that of the current model, or roughly $4 million.24 But 

in view of the Predator B’s capacity to dwell on station for nearly 2 

days without producing pilot fatigue, refuelling, or wear and tear 

on limited inventories of advanced high-performance F-15s or F-16s, 

such armed UAVs are considered a bargain, at least for specialized 

missions requiring persistent air caps and operating in air defense 

environments in which manned aircraft would be unduly taxed or 

vulnerable.

Unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs)—armed high 

performance aircraft that many analysts say could represent the 

most profound change in the American style of warfare—constitute 

a potentially valuable but less certain complement to the American 

military transformation than armed UAVs or more flexibly targeted 

LACMs. The Pentagon’s Defense Advanced Research Projects 

Agency (DARPA) is currently cosponsoring with the U.S. Air Force 

a Boeing UCAV prototype, called the X-45A, which had conducted 

five test flights through the end of 2002. Although the primary stated 

mission of the UCAV prototype is air defense suppression, others 

have been mentioned, including delivery of directed energy weapons 

and even conventional weapons such as JDAMs. At such an early 

stage in its development, it should come as no surprise that great 

uncertainty characterizes UCAV development. Some, including the 
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Secretary of the U.S. Air Force, are concerned that such a highly 

dynamic mission as air defense suppression requires a pilot and that 

less active missions such as strategic bombing may be more suitable 

for future UCAVs. Also muddying the waters are discussions within 

the Pentagon about merging the X-45A with U.S. Navy requirements 

into a multi-service UCAV program along the lines of the Joint Strike 

Fighter project.25 Close allies of the United States, in particular the 

United Kingdom (UK), have begun to see a more prominent role 

for both UCAVs and UAVs. The UK is exploring opportunities to 

become involved in American UCAV development and has begun 

a program for its own UAV, called Watchkeeper, which has many of 

the features of the Predator. One of several motivating factors driving 

the UK program is keeping pace with the emerging U.S. doctrine of 

network centric warfare.26 Still, UCAVs, as distinct from UAVs and 

LACMs, are likely to remain a desideratum rather than a practical 

reality until numerous bureaucratic, doctrinal, and industrial 

challenges are overcome.

Both technological and policy factors will shape the pace and 

scope of future UAV prospects. Enormous advances in computer 

processing power, sensor technology, communications, and 

imagery processing and exploitation have greatly advanced UAV 

performance. But technological push is constrained as well as driven 

by policy considerations. LACMs like the Tomahawk languished for 

nearly 2 decades before they came into prominence during Operation 

DESERT STORM. Although Firebee reconnaissance drones flew 

thousands of sorties during the Vietnam War, there was a significant 

lag before the technological leap to the Predator was made. Service 

resistance, determined in part by a continued preference for manned 

platforms, will remain an important constraining factor. Nevertheless, 

new requirements for so-called battlefield awareness, increased 

pressure by the public and political leaders alike to avoid casualties, 

and technological momentum have converged to accelerate UAV 

applications.

POLICIES AND POLICY OPTIONS

Cruise missiles have been understood for many decades. But 

modern UAVs—and especially armed UAVs and UCAVs—were 
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at most on the drawing boards when major international security 

policies were negotiated. The focus of policy makers on ballistic 

missiles has also affected the coverage of UAVs in international 

policies—or the lack of such coverage. Notoriously, UAVs and 

cruise missiles were omitted from the list of proscribed systems in 

UN Security Council Resolution 687, the cease-fire terms after the 

first Gulf War against Iraq. This omission was not fully corrected 

until the UNSC passed Resolution 1441 nearly 12 years later.

We shall now review four policies (or classes of policies) that 

could affect future commerce in UAVs. In appropriate cases we shall 

also discuss policy options. In ascending order of difficulty these 

policies are (1) Arms control treaties, (2) Export controls in general, 

(3) the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA), and (4) the MTCR .

Arms Control Treaties.

Armed UAVs and UCAVs did not exist when negotiations were 

completed for START I (1991),27 START II (1993),28 the Treaty on 

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE—1990),29 and the INF 

Treaty (1987).30 However, armed UAVs and UCAVs arguably are 

similar in some respects to cruise missiles and to combat aircraft. 

And these treaties restrict cruise missiles and combat aircraft.

We cannot pinpoint any current controversies regarding the 

treatment of armed UAVs and UCAVs by these treaties. However, 

such controversies would be treated with diplomatic confidentiality 

if they arose. The Defense Department reviews armed UAV and 

UCAV programs for treaty compliance.

Initiatives to modify existing reconnaissance UAVs to deliver ordnance 

or to develop new unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) for flight 

testing or deployment as a weapon—that is any mechanism or device, 

which, when directed against any target, is designed to damage or 

destroy it—must be reviewed in accordance with DOD Directive 2060.1 

for compliance with all applicable treaties. Examples of treaties that may 

be considered include: 1) the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces 

(INF) Treaty, 2) the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) 

Treaty, and 3) the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). As is 

the practice for all programs, determinations will be made on a case-bycase basis with regard to treaty compliance of armed UAVs or UCAVs.31
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On theoretical grounds we can identify the provisions of the treaties 

under which issues might arise.

The START Treaties between the United States and the Soviet 

Union (later Russia) restrict the numbers of “long-range [over 600 

kilometers] nuclear ALCMs.” The START I Treaty also restricts 

“nuclear armaments [on] an aircraft that is not an airplane, but that 

has a range of 8000 kilometers or more,”32 identified in the Ninth 

Agreed Statement as “lighter-than-air aircraft such as balloons, 

drifting aerostats, and dirigibles.”33 In the event that an armed UAV 

or UCAV were (1) air-launched, deemed to be a cruise missile, and 

nuclear armed or (2) lighter-than-air and nuclear armed—it could 

run into START controversies. However, the distinctions between 

armed UAVs or UCAVs on the one hand and “cruise missiles” on 

the other hand, discussed below with respect to the INF Treaty, may 

mitigate these controversies. An armed UAV or UCAV may, after all, 

be considered an “aircraft” rather than a “cruise missile.” However, 

this interpretation will not relieve an armed UAV or UCAV of all 

treaty restraints. The CFE Treaty restricts “aircraft.”

The CFE Treaty, between the United States, the Soviet Union, 

and European states restricts the numbers of “combat aircraft” 

based in Europe. The Treaty defines “combat aircraft” as “fixedwing or variable-geometry aircraft armed and equipped to engage 

targets by employing guided missiles, unguided rockets, bombs, 

guns, cannons, or other weapons of destruction, as well as any model 

or version of such aircraft which performs other military functions 

such as reconnaissance or electronic warfare”34 (italics added). The 

definition says nothing about whether the aircraft are manned or 

unmanned. Consequently, and theoretically, this definition could 

apply to armed UAVs or UCAVs based in Europe. In addition, the 

italicized language theoretically could apply to other types of UAVs 

based in Europe. Similar CFE restrictions apply to various types of 

rotary wing aircraft.35 But we have seen no indication that unmanned 

systems were envisioned when the Treaty was negotiated. The CFE 

numerical limits are high, dating from the last years of the Cold War: 

13,600 combat aircraft and 4,000 attack helicopters based in Europe—

with various regional and country sublimits. So the restrictions, if any, 

on armed UAVs, UCAVs, and other UAVs may not be onerous.
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The INF Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union 

eliminates “ground launched cruise missiles” with a range capability 

of 500 to 5,500 kilometers and tested as weapon-delivery vehicles. 

Does it apply to armed UAVs and UCAVs? Arguably, an armed UAV 

or a UCAV is not a cruise missile; it is recovered after use. Moreover, 

a UCAV is arguably not “launched”; it “takes off” from a runway 

like an airplane rather than being launched from a “launcher,” which 

is defined in the Treaty as “a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based 

transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLCM.”36

The range of an armed UAV or UCAV adds another distinction from 

cruise missiles; the Treaty defines the range capability of a GLCM as 

“the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its 

standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by 

projecting its flight path onto the earths [sic] sphere from the point 

of launch to the point of impact”37 (italics added). Because an armed 

UAV or UCAV does not have a “point of impact,” it may not fall into 

the range restrictions of the Treaty.

All of these treaties have fora in which compliance issues can be 

discussed. Moreover, the United States can withdraw from any of 

these treaties on 6 months notice (150 days for the CFE Treaty). But, 

as discussed above, it is not at all clear that the treaties will ultimately 

restrict armed UAVs or UCAVs. 

On the other hand, we should remember that the legal profession 

currently is engaged in debating whether the relatively new technology of e-mail messages should be regulated as telephone 

conversations, letters sent through the postal system, or—in the 

case of wireless e-mail messages—broadcast media. The even newer 

technologies of armed UAVs and UCAVs may offer equally fertile 

opportunities to adapt restrictions similar to those applied to older 

systems. But the fact that armed UAVs and UCAVs may not have 

been in the minds of treaty negotiators offers an argument that they 

are not covered by the treaties at all. They may ultimately be deemed 

to be neither cruise missiles nor aircraft but rather entirely new 

systems different from both.

Export Controls in General.

In most governments, export controls are divided into controls on 

military items and on civil (or dual-use) items. In the United States, 
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the former are administered by the State Department and the latter 

by the Department of Commerce (DoC).

Up to the present time, UAVs have been largely military—but not 

exclusively so. Japan, South Korea, and Russia manufacture UAVs 

for crop-dusting. The United States anticipates an emerging market 

for UAVs with a variety of civilian applications. Under present 

export control practices, these “civil” UAVs would be controlled by 

the DoC or its equivalent in other governments.

This creates a potential security problem. “Civil” UAVs can be 

used to deliver military payloads. Given the interest of the 9/11 

hijackers in crop dusters, any air vehicle capable of dispensing an 

aerosol is a potential threat. Should such systems be controlled by 

the DoC?

The controversy over space satellite exports controlled by DoC 

highlighted the concerns about leaving such controls in an agency 

devoted to fostering exports. The State Department’s export controls 

generally are regarded as tougher than those of the DoC, which 

is why exporters favor the latter. The same concerns would be 

applicable to “civil” UAVs in all governments. The DoC is supposed 

to refer export applications covered by the MTCR for comments 

by the Defense and State Departments, but there are exceptions. If 

DoC denies the export outright, it does not need to be referred; in 

such case the “no undercut” rule applicable to MTCR decisions (see 

below) may fail to be imposed. Also, DoC does not require an export 

license for missile-related exports to Canada—among 98 pages of 

DoC “license exceptions.”38

The problem of “civil” exports for which licenses are not required 

is most acute in “license-free zones.” Members of the European 

Community do not require export licenses for dual-use items traded 

among themselves. This creates an “Nth exit problem,” in which the 

number of possible exporters increases and the opportunities for 

unwise exports increase as well.

In the United States, there is a current proposal to move into 

the State Department the control of all UAVs—military or civil—

capable of delivering a 500kg payload to a 300km range. That still 

leaves lesser “civil” UAVs controlled by the DoC. As the discussion 

below indicates, these lesser UAVs are the subject of increasing 

international concern. 
137

So the responsibility for controls over UAVs is likely to be an issue 

for some time. At present the issue appears to be confined to those 

nations marketing crop-dusting UAVs. U.S. Government officials 

can remember no case in which the DoC has received an application 

for a UAV export.

The Wassenaar Arrangement.

With the end of the Cold War, the structure of export controls 

directed against the Iron Curtain nations seemed to many to be an 

anachronism. Those controls were administered by the multinational 

Coordinating Committee (COCOM), which gave members a veto 

right on munitions and dual-use exports.

COCOM administered controls on items, such as munitions and 

electronics, that were still sensitive even in the post-Cold War world 

and that were not covered by nonproliferation export controls. 

Therefore, in 1996 a larger group of governments (including Russia) 

formed a new regime, the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA), to promote 

“transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional 

arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing 

destabilizing accumulations.”

The WA39 sets out its guidelines in “Initial Elements,” revised 

three times since the original policy, and includes control lists of 

munitions and dual-use items. UAVs are controlled on Item ML10(c) 

of the munitions list:

c. Unmanned airborne vehicles and related equipment, specially 

designed or modified for military use, as follows, and specially designed 

components therefore:

1. Unmanned airborne vehicles including remotely piloted air 

vehicles (RPVs) and autonomous programmmable vehicles;

2. Associated launchers and ground support equipment;

3. Related equipment for command and control.

and also controlled on Item 9.A.12 of the dual-use list:

12. Unmanned aerial vehicles having any of the following:

a. An autonomous flight control and navigation capability (e.g., an 

autopilot with an Inertial Navigation System); or,
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b. Capability of controlled-flight out of the direct vision range 

involving a human operator (e.g., televisual remote control).

Note 9.A.12 does not control model aircraft.

These dual-use controls are limited by a “Validity Note” and a 

“Statement of Understanding”:

Validity Note: The control of unmanned aerial vehicles described in 9.A.12. 

is valid until December 5, 2004, and its renewal will require unanimous 

consent.

Statement of Understanding: Participating States understand a model 

aircraft as intended for recreational and competition purposes.

So the WA’s dual use controls on UAVs are subject to a sunset clause 

and may expire in less than 2 years.

UAV technology and associated software also are covered by the 

WA’s controls. Moreover, WA dual use controls are graded at three 

levels. UAV hardware, in Item 9.A.12 above, is subject to the lowest 

grade of dual use controls. However, the highest level of dual use 

controls (“very sensitive”) apply to certain UAV software:

9.D.1. “Software” specially designed or modified for the “development” 

of equipment or “technology” in 9.A. or 9.E.3. of this Annex.

9.D.2. “Software” specially designed or modified for the “production” of 

equipment in 9.A. of this Annex.

The quotes in the “very sensitive” items refer to terms defined by the 

WA, and Item 9.E.3. refers to jet engine technology.

What is the net effect of these controls? They are not nearly 

as tight as the MTCR controls described below. The WA controls 

basically involve only a requirement to conduct export reviews and 

to make international notifications. Every 6 months, for deliveries 

and denials to nonparticipating states, the WA requires notifications 

of deliveries of munitions items and of denials of the least sensitive 

(e.g., UAV equipment) dual use items. With respect to exports 

beyond the participating states of the most sensitive dual use items 

(e.g., UAV software), the rules require “extreme vigilance,” delivery 
139

notifications “on an aggregate basis” every 6 months, and denial 

notifications within 60 days. Participating states are to notify each 

other within 60 days of an export undercutting a denial notification.

On the other hand, the WA deals with UAVs of very short range, 

“out of the direct vision range”—a control coverage much more 

extensive that the MTCR’s range of at least 300km. And a January 

2003 U.S. proposal to the WA would go further beyond the MTCR by 

adding, as an “anti-terrorism” measure, controls on kits to convert 

manned civil aircraft to “poor man’s” UAVs:

PROPOSED TEXT: 9.A.13. Equipment and systems, and specially 

designed components therefore, designed to convert manned civil 

aircraft into Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV’s) controlled by 9.A.12.a 

or 9.A.12.b.

The WA’s controls may grow in effectiveness as the regime continues 

to be modified, and UAVs may become increasingly affected by the 

regime. But this has not happened yet. At present, the lack of strong 

denial rules and the sunset clause on UAV dual use controls leaves 

the WA as a second tier of international UAV controls behind the 

main control policy, the MTCR. 

The Missile Technology Control Regime.40

The MTCR was announced in 1987 by the G-7—the United States, 

Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG or West 

Germany), Italy, Japan, and the UK. It was a new nonproliferation 

export control regime to “limit the risks” of nuclear proliferation by 

controlling transfers that could contribute to unmanned delivery 

systems for nuclear weapons.

Over the subsequent years, the MTCR’s scope was expanded 

to cover unmanned delivery systems for nuclear, biological, and 

chemical weapons. And the membership expanded to include all 

members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the 

European Community (EU), the European Space Agency, Australia, 

New Zealand, Argentina, Brazil, Russia, Ukraine, South Africa, 

Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and the Republic of Korea. 

Moreover, Israel, Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia have made a 
140

political commitment unilaterally to observe the MTCR rules. Other 

candidates for EU membership, such as Cyprus and Malta, must 

adopt MTCR controls as part of the EU package but have not yet 

made a political commitment to the MTCR. China has adopted 

some elements of the MTCR, but there are troublesome differences 

between the letter and practice of China’s policies and the MTCR.

The regime controls exports for two categories of items. Category 

I consists of items of greatest sensitivity, which are subject to the most 

stringent controls. UAVs are covered in Category I, Item 1.A.2.:

Complete unmanned air vehicle systems (including cruise missile 

systems, target drone and reconnaissance drones) capable of delivering 

at least a 500kg payload to a range of at least 300km.

Formulated in the original version of the regime, the 500kg payload 

was considered the minimum payload for a relatively unsophisticated 

nuclear weapon, and the 300km range was considered the relevant 

range for the most compact theaters in which nuclear weapons 

might be used. Range/payload tradeoffs are taken into account 

in determining the capability of a UAV, and in 2002 “range” and 

“payload” were specifically defined. (The definitions were weakened, 

however, by a regime statement that the determination of range 

is the sole responsibility of the exporting government.) Category 

I controls also are applied to production facilities and design and 

production technology for UAVs with a 500kg/300km capability. 

Complete guidance sets of a specified accuracy for UAVs—and their 

production facilities, production equipment, and technology—are 

also covered under Category I, Item 2.

Category II consists of equipment, components, materials, and 

technology that, while generally dual use, could make a contribution 

to Category I systems. For UAVs, these include most of 18 Category 

II items ranging from jet engines, to composites, to flight control 

equipment and avionics, to stealth materials and test equipment.

In 1993, in order to cover systems capable of delivering chemical 

weapons (CW) or biological weapons (BW), using lower payloads 

than would be needed for nuclear weapons, the regime added (for 

UAVs):
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Item 19.A.2. Complete unmanned air vehicle systems (including cruise 

missile systems, target drones and reconnaissance drones) not specified 

in 1.A.2., capable of a maximum range equal to or greater than 300km.

That is, the regime now includes in Category II unmanned systems 

capable of delivering any payload to a range of 300km.

Several levels of rules apply to these items:

Absolute prohibition (until further notice) on the transfer of Category I 

complete production facilities or the technology for such facilities. It 

obviously does not make sense to have a nonproliferation regime that 

allows the creation of new suppliers.

Strong presumption to deny transfers of Category I items. This strong 

presumption of denial also applies to missiles of any range or payload, 

or any MTCR-controlled item, for which the purpose is deemed to be 

the delivery of nuclear, biological, or chemical payloads. Transfers of 

Category I items may be made. But they are to be “rare” and may only 

be made if there are (1) binding government-to-government assurances 

with respect to the end-use and end-user and (2) supplier and not just 

recipient responsibility for the end-use.

Case-by-case review of export applications for all controlled items.

No-undercut provision according to which MTCR partners will respect 

each others’ export denials or consult before undercutting a denial.

Information exchanges to enforce these rules. And,

Catch-all provisions, observed by most partner governments, under which 

export reviews will be required for missile-related transfers, whether or 

not on the MTCR control list, to any destination engaged in Category I 

programs.

Because, under international law, a policy (such as the MTCR) 

cannot supersede a treaty, the MTCR’s rules do not restrict 

transfers required by the treaties establishing NATO, the European 

Community, or the European Space Agency. The license-free zone 

established within the European Community for dual use transfers 

allows free trade in many Catgory II items within the Community. 

In addition, there is a diversity of practices with respect to transfers 

among MTCR partners. For instance, in 1989 the British established 

an Open General Export License, waiving the requirement for caseby-case reviews of dual use Category II transfers to other regime 

members.
142

The MTCR, which is an export control regime, does not restrict 

indigenous programs. However, the United States insists that a 

candidate government forego “offensive” Category I programs (a 

definition that has become increasingly loose over the years) before 

it will approve the candidate as a new member. And the MTCR 

members have synchronized their diplomacy against indigenous 

missile programs in nations of proliferation concern—leading to a 

recent 106-nation International Code of Conduct loosely discouraging 

ballistic missile (but not cruise missile or UAV) programs.

MTCR coverage of UAV technology. The MTCR’s control list is 

revised frequently. With respect to complete UAV systems, the 

controls have expanded from systems with the 500kg/300km 

capability (subject to a strong presumption of export denial) to 

systems of any payload with a 300km range (subject to case-by-case 

review). A current proposal, for approval under a 6-month “silence” 

procedure, would expand the Category II coverage to something 

closer to the WA’s “autonomous” and “out of the direct vision range” 

criteria:

Item 19.A.3 Complete unmanned aerial vehicle systems, not specified in 

1.A.2 or 19.A.2., designed or modified to dispense an aerosol, capable of 

carrying a particulate or liquid of a volume greater than 20 litres, and 

having any of the following:

a. An autonomous flight control and navigation capability; or,

b. Capability of controlled flight out of the direct vision range involving 

a human operator.

Technical notes:

1. Complete systems in item 19.A.3 comprise those UAVs already configured 

with or already modified to incorporate, an aerosol delivery mechanism. An 

aerosol consists of a particulate or liquid dispersed in the atmosphere. Examples 

of aerosols include liquid pesticides for crop dusting and dry chemicals for cloud 

seeding.

Notes:

1. Item 19.A.3 does not control model aircraft intended for recreational or 

competition purposes.

2. Item 19.A.3 does not control UAVs, designed or modified to accept 

multiple payloads (such as remote sensing equipment, communications 

equipment), that lack an aerosol dispensing system/mechanism.
143

There are other control list expansions that might be appropriate to 

help limit the proliferation of UAVs capable of delivering nuclear, 

biological, or chemical payloads:

• Flight control systems for the conversion of manned aircraft 

to unmanned vehicles (the WA proposal);

• Complete UAVs with a given stealth capability;

• Other UAV penetration aids, such as towed decoys and 

terrain-bounce jammers specially designed to match the 

delivery system they are aiding; and,

• A wider range of jet engines, now exempted as being for 

manned aircraft but suitable for UAV use.

These control list expansions would limit all UAVs—the Category II 

models (80 percent of all UAVs now on the market) that can deliver 

any payload to a range of 300km, and the Category I models that can 

deliver a 500kg payload to that range. The smaller, Category II UAVs 

are real threats in terrorist hands—delivering kilogram quantities 

of biological agents—or in professional military hands—saturating 

defenses.

But the most vexing question concerns the growing use of 

Category I UAVs for surveillance and, as armed UAVs or UCAVs, 

combat use.

The problem of large UAVs. Category I UAVs can deliver nuclear 

payloads or such large quantities of chemical or biological agents 

that meteorological uncertainties can be swamped. The 500kg (or 

greater) payloads of such systems can be used to penetrate defenses 

in a variety of ways—with some payload devoted to penetration aids 

or, if necessary, with some payload devoted to more fuel to allow onthe-deck flight profiles or round-about routing to approach targets 

from all azimuths.

The MTCR prescribes “a strong presumption to deny transfer” 

of such systems. But these systems are in increasing demand. This 

demand raises the threat that Category I UAVs may become a route 

to cruise missiles for the delivery of weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD). But, on the other hand, the demand is currently driven by 

the use of UAVs to apply military force with great discrimination—
144

just the opposite of a mass destruction threat. Early in 2002 the 

administration established a confidential interim policy governing 

the export of such Category I systems.41 But what should be the 

policy over the longer term?

The danger of any loosening of Category I controls—in effect 

for nearly 16 years—is specifically that of the proliferation of UAVs 

usable as cruise missiles, and more generally that of a slippery slope 

with respect to other Category I controls. The next point down the 

slippery slope would probably be a loosening of controls on space 

launch vehicles—the hardware, technology, and production facilities 

of which have long been recognized as being interchangeable with 

those of long-range ballistic missiles.

Given that the MTCR’s current Category I rules allow for some 

flexibility for “rare” transfers, the cause of nonproliferation would 

seem best served by retaining these rules and working within them. 

This would avoid the weakening of a 16-year-old nonproliferation 

standard and would minimize the risk of slippery slopes that could 

exacerbate the proliferation problem. 

Given the alternatives and the dangers of cruise missile 

proliferation, only as a last, reluctant resort would nonproliferators 

want to consider modifying the export rules with respect to Category 

I UAVs. The basis for such a modification of rules could be to ensure 

that Category I UAV transfers were substantially more expensive 

than Category I cruise missile transfers—so that the recipient nation 

could afford far fewer UAVs than cruise missiles. This is a difficult 

criterion to meet because, if the MTCR works as intended, some 

nations might not be able to obtain Category I cruise missiles at any 

price. But the criterion can be approached by taking advantage of 

a UAV’s extensive infrastructure requirement. A new UAV policy 

along these lines might read as follows:

The transfer of Category I equipment for a complete unmanned air 

vehicle system (Item 1.A.2) may be considered more favorably if all of 

the following conditions are met:

1) All of the Guidelines requirements are satisfied, except for the 

strong presumption to deny the transfer.

2) The system is not specially designed for internal or external 

ordnance delivery.
145

3) The system is specially designed for recovery and reuse.

4) Upon completion of the proposed system transfer, the recipient 

will have installed full capabilities integrated with the proposed system 

to:

A) Command and control system flight and recovery,

B) Retrieve data transmitted by the system, and

C) Analyze the retrieved data.

The only modification of the MTCR’s Category I rule would be to 

“consider more favorably” such a transfer and to be prepared to 

overcome the “strong presumption to deny.” This modification, 

however, is a change in the central rule of missile nonproliferation; so 

it would be something to be considered only after trying to live with 

the less radical alternatives. The modification could be expected to 

unleash pressures for similar provisions with respect to space launch 

vehicle transfers. So looser rules on Category I UAV transfers could 

facilitate both cruise and ballistic missile proliferation.

Moreover, this modification would not ease the transfers of 

Category I armed UAVs or UCAVs. Given that their purpose is to 

deliver ordnance, they pose the same proliferation threats as cruise 

missiles. The policy language for “treating more favorably” UAV 

exports may only be kicking the armed UAV and UCAV cans down 

the road. But it is difficult to foresee any reasonably safe way to 

loosen controls on large armed UAVs or UCAVs.

A safer option—supplementing the policy of working within the 

Category I rules—might be to develop the UAV industry in a manner 

similar to that of the space launch industry. This would involve 

providing “services” but not the transfer of hardware beyond the 

jurisdiction or control of the state considering a sale. In all but the 

most advanced nations, many elements of UAV operations—such 

as satellite imagery for the selection of operating areas and satellite 

communications for retrieval of data—are already provided on a 

service rather than an ownership basis. UAV services would extend 

this principle by having the supplier nation maintain and operate 

UAVs, while the recipient nation directed the operations and received 

data gathered by the UAV.

This would be a cultural change for the young UAV industry, but 

it might make military sense. As Thomas Cassidy, president and CEO 
146

of General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, said with respect to the 

Predator system (which is growing over the Category I threshold),

The last thing [a forward commander] needs is to maintain and operate 

airplanes. What he needs is intelligence support—somebody looking and 

then piping video directly to him on a little TV set that we’ve already 

made for the special forces people.42

Another aerospace veteran, speaking off the record, anticipates that 

UAV services could be a lucrative business model. Such services 

would resemble the early and profitable IBM decision to market 

computer services in preference to hardware sales. UAVs might be 

painted in the colors of the nation purchasing the services. But the 

exporting government could retain jurisdiction and control of its 

UAVs by licensing its own nationals to maintain and operate the 

vehicles in and over territories approved in an export license.

The Israeli Air Force, as described by a senior defense ministry 

official, is buying “visint [visual intelligence] by the hour” from a 

civilian Israeli firm, Aeronautics Unmanned Systems. The firm owns, 

maintains, and launches an Aerostar UAV, hands it off to military 

operators when it is over the target area, and retrieves it from the 

military operators 12-14 hours later. The firm also conducts the entire 

UAV operation for the Israeli police, turning over to the police only 

real-time imagery collected by the vehicle.43

The U.S. military itself has considered hiring UAV services from 

a foreign supplier. As of November 2002, PACAF, after losing a 

satellite that was monitoring Pacific Ocean weather, requested the 

assistance of the Australian firm Aerosonde for weather-monitoring 

UAVs. Aerosonde leases such UAVs in units of three for about 

$700,000—air vehicles, service, and support staff included.44

UAV services are analogous, not only to space launch services—

which meet the objectives of missile nonproliferation—but also to 

uranium enrichment services which meet the objectives of nuclear 

nonproliferation. In both cases, a recipient’s insistence on hardware 

rather than services is a strong indicator of a nefarious purpose. And 

in both cases multinational institutions, not just national sources, 

may provide part or all of the service.

There are downsides to UAV services. Some supplier governments 

might not be assiduous in retaining jurisdiction and control of the 
147

vehicles. And, even if the hardware were kept physically secure, 

technical and operational insights of value for cruise missile programs 

would almost certainly leak out. 

And there is the question whether a contractor would be forbidden 

to fly a UAV into a combat zone on the grounds that he could 

become a “combatant in war.” The legalities of this would need to be 

thrashed out. There might be alternatives, such as allowing military 

personnel from the recipient state to operate imaging shutters or to 

launch ordnance from the UAV—without gaining hands-on access. 

Or the supplier state might provide military personnel to manage 

“combatant functions”—an extension of U.S. Defense Department 

physical security provided for certain sensitive transfers or U.S. 

operation of Patriot missile batteries on loan.

But the upsides of UAV services are intriguing. Proliferation 

hazards would be constrained compared to the alternatives. The 

precedent of looser controls on space launch vehicles could be 

avoided. The practice of “dumbing down” exports in order to meet 

nonproliferation constraints might no longer be necessary. Subject 

to the end-uses approved in export licenses, the benefits of large 

armed UAVs and UCAVs might be shared with other nations. In 

short, while meeting the nonproliferation objectives of the MTCR, 

UAV services would allow the military benefits of the technology 

to be shared without undue interference from the constraints of the 

MTCR.

ENDNOTES

1. This paper was originally commissioned by the Nonproliferation Education 

Center (NPEC) for presentation before a group of U.S. Government officials, 

Capitol Hill staffers, and press representatives at an NPEC-hosted dinner on 

March 17, 2003. The authors are grateful for the many comments offered by group 

participants. This chapter also appeared, in slightly modified form, as an article in 

The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2003, pp. 66-79. 

2. Use of a racetrack configuration suggests that Iraq may not have developed a 

flight management system for this UAV that would enable completely autonomous 

flight for the vehicle’s full range. Yet, the fact that this UAV possessed a fuel load 

sufficient to permit such a range suggests that such an autonomous capability 

existed or was within reach. 
148

3. Gregory DeSantis and Steven J. McKay, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Technical 

and Operational Aspects of an Emerging Threat, PSR Report 2839, Arlington, VA: 

Veridian-Pacific Sierra Research Corporation, 2000.

4. For details on these and other possible proliferation paths, see Dennis M. 

Gormley, Dealing with the Threat of Cruise Missiles, Adelphi Paper 339, Oxford: 

Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 

2001, pp. 17-41.

5. Such results are demonstrated in extensive modeling and simulation of 

biological attacks. Dr. Gene McClellan, private communication with the author, 

August 22, 1997. 

6. Using entirely off-the-shelf commercial components, the U.S. Navy has one 

contractor developing a prototype of an “affordable” LACM costing less than 

$40,000 apiece. “Missiles on a Budget: Navy Meets Home Depot,” New York Times, 

December 29, 2002, p. 4, Bu.

7. For a detailed analysis of cruise missile defense, see Gormley, pp. 59-76. 

8. For a scenario describing how such a plan might plausibly unfold, see ibid., 

pp. 48-50. 

9. “Pak Spy Plane Intrudes into Indian Airspace,” Jammu Daily Excelsior, Internet 

Version-WWW, in English, December 8, 2002 [Foreign Broadcast Information Service

(FBIS) Transcribed Text]. 

10. Andrew Koch., “Pakistan Looks to USA to Fill UAV Gap,” Jane’s Defense 

Weekly, October 2, 2002, p. 5. 

11. “India to Soon Export Pilotless Target Aircraft to ‘A Foreign Country’,” 

New Delhi All India Radio Home News Service in English, December 13, 2002 [FBIS 

Transcribed].

12. “Kochi to Become Naval Center for UAVs,” Kottayam Mathrubhumi in 

Malayalam, December 19, 2002 [FBIS Transcribed]. 

13. “India: Russia Agrees to Lease Nuclear Submarine,” Global Security 

Newswire, December 2, 2002, available at www.nti.org.

14. U. Mahnaimi, U. Conradi, and P. Conradi, “Fears of New Arms Race as 

Israel Tests Cruise Missiles,” Sunday Times, London, June 18, 2000, available at 

sunday-times.co.uk.

15. For details on the Nur cruise missile, see the Middle East News Line, “Iran 

Reports That It Has Developed a Range of Cruise Missiles,” available at www.

menewsline.com/stories/2002/october/10_43_3.html. For information on converting 

the Silkworm into a land attack missile, see Gormley, pp. 30-33. 

16. D. Williams and N. Wood, “Yugoslavia’s Arms Ties to Iraq Draw U.S. 

Scrutiny,” Washington Post, November 1, 2002, p. A26.

17. “Defending Against Iraqi Missiles,” IISS Strategic Comments, Vol. 8, Issue 8, 

October 2002.
149

18. See, for example, Bradley Graham, “Rumsfeld: Cruise Missile Threat Rises,” 

Washington Post, October 18, 2002, p. A1. 

19. For a discussion of NIE assessments and the overall impact of the September 

11 attacks on missile defense, see Dennis M. Gormley, “Enriching Expectations: 11 

September’s Lessons for Missile Defense,” Survival, Vol. 44, No. 2, Summer 2002, 

pp. 19-35.

20. This accounting is by Victor Mizell, a private security expert and ex-U.S. 

intelligence officer. See www.securitymanagement.com/library/001324.html. The cases 

include planning by Osama bin Laden to use remote control airplanes packed with 

explosives to kill leaders at the 2002 G-8 summit in Genoa, Italy. 

21. Press Release, “Plenary Meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime, 

Warsaw, Poland, September 24-27 2002,” at www.mtcr.info/english/press/warsaw.

html. 

22. See Michael Sirak, “US DoD Seeks to Bolster Cruise Missile Defenses,” Jane’s 

Defense Weekly, September 4, 2002, p. 3, for a discussion of some of the challenges 

of homeland cruise missile defense. For a discussion of service programs and 

problems, see Gormley, pp. 61-68.

23. Eric Schmitt, “US Would Use Drones to Attack Iraqi Targets,” New York 

Times, November 6, 2002, p. A1. 

24. David Fulghum, “Predator B to Increase Lethality of UAV Fleet,” Aviation 

Week & Space Technology, Vol. 157, No. 20, November 11, 2002, p. 34. 

25. Robert Wall, “Uncertainty Engulfs Pentagon’s Unmanned Aircraft Plans,” 

Aviation Week & Space Technology, Vol. 157, No. 12, September 16, 2002, pp. 27-28. 

26. Douglas Barrie, “Britain Determines Military Net Value,” Aviation Week & 

Space Technology, Vol. 157, No. 26, December 23, 2002, pp. 53-55. 

27. Available at www.state.gov/www/global/arms/starthtm/start/start1.html#Artl.

28. Available at www.state.gov/www/global/arms/starthtm/start2/strt2txt.

html#1.0.

29. Availabl at www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/cfe.html.

30. Available at www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/inf2.html.

31. OSD, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap 2000-2005, April 2001, Section 6.4.3, 

“Treaty Considerations.”

32. START I, Article V.19(a).

33. Ibid., hypertext link.

34. CFE Treaty, Article II.1(K).

35. CFE Treaty, Article II.1(L-P).

36. INF Treaty, Article II.4.

37. Ibid., Article VII.4.

38. Available at w3.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/txt/740.txt.
150

39. Available at www.wassenaar.org/docs.

40. Available at www.mtcr.info.

41. Amy Svitak, “New U.S. Policy Paves Way for Predator Sale to Italy: Move 

May Narrow NATO Technology Gap,” Defense News, April 15-21, 2002.

42. David Fulghum, “Predator’s Progress: General Atomics is Eying Production 

of New Lines of Uavs with Improved Speeds, Ranges and Payload-Carrying 

Capabilities,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 3, 2003.

43. David A. Fulghum, “Israeli Company Is Conducting Surveillance For The 

Military,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, June 16, 2003.

44. Perry Sims, “PACAF Considering Leasing Australian UAV,” Journal of 

Aerospace and Defense Industry News, November 1, 2002.
151

CHAPTER 8

GERMAN NUCLEAR POLICY

Ernst Urich von Weizsäcker

Nuclear fission was discovered here in Berlin by Otto Hahn and 

Fritz Strassmann in 1938, but the first applications were made in the 

United States. Enrico Fermi’s first nuclear reactor began producing 

small amounts of energy in Chicago as early as 1942, and the first 

atomic bomb exploded in the Alamogordo desert in 1945.

The Nazi period was the ultimate disaster for Germany (and 

others). The earlier scientific excellence—bringing more Nobel Prizes 

to Germany than to any other country during the first third of the 

20th century—was badly eroded by Nazi tyranny and criminal antiSemitism. What the Nazis did not do was done by the War. German 

industry virtually had ceased to exist in 1945, and almost all cities 

were destroyed.

The mindset after the war was characterized by guilt, peaceful 

reconstruction, pacifism (even under the threat of Soviet expansion), 

and an almost antinational sentiment of “Europeanism.” The near 

absence of patriotism after 1945 was, of course, a consequence of its 

horrendous abuse by the Nazis but remains difficult for Americans 

to understand.

Concerning energy policy, two factors were dominant in post-war 

Europe: coal was the chief source of energy, and demand was rising 

steeply. The first significant move towards West European integration 

was the European Community of Coal and Steel (ECCS), founded 

in 1951. Its six countries, Germany, France, Italy, The Netherlands, 

Belgium, and Luxembourg, were the nucleus of what 6 years later 

became the European Economic Community. The ECCS also became 

a symbol of industrial democracy, of co-determination, because for the 

heavy industries’ supervisory boards a one-to-one parity between 

capital and labor became a mandatory rule, motivated perhaps by 

the fact that steel at the time was also the core of the arms industry 

that needed international control. 

Not too much later, nuclear energy entered the scene, with 

France—having almost no coal—taking the initiative. All ECCS 
152

countries were happy to agree on a common nuclear power policy 

for which the European Community of Atomic Energy of 1957 

(EURATOM) was founded. Significantly, EURATOM was founded 

jointly with the European Economic Community and ranking with it 

at par! 

EURATOM had no military arm. This was particularly important 

for Germany. When the German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer 

intended to yield to American pressures to join NATO’s nuclear 

weapons program, an outcry of protest swept the country, with a 

group of 18 atomic physicists, including Otto Hahn, then President 

of the prestigious Max-Planck-Society, and Werner Heisenberg and 

Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, directors of the Max-Planck-Institute 

for Physics, leading the protest. They were later called the “Göttingen 

18,” although only six of them actually resided in Göttingen. The 

atomic physicists clearly saw the peaceful use of nuclear power as a 

great hope and were all the keener to keep nuclear energy out of the 

military odium. In the end, Adenauer had to give in.

Very soon, nuclear power became a technological routine no 

longer dependent on world class physicists. During the 1960s and 

1970s, nuclear power became a centerpiece of industrial renewal 

and was supported massively by all political parties. The “Limits to 

Growth” report to the Club of Rome (1972) with its gloomy pictures 

about resource depletion and environmental pollution, and the 

energy shock of 1973 added to the feeling that nuclear power was 

perhaps the solution to a whole range of pressing problems. Similar 

to the developments in Britain and France, some 10 nuclear reactors 

were planned during the 1960s and another 15 during the 1970s. Also, 

nuclear ships were planned. It all looked like an easy run promising 

formidable profits for the growing nuclear industry. The nuclear 

industry even suggested doing away with household metering 

because electricity was going to be so cheap that there would be no 

point in metering it. 

From Wyhl to Chernobyl.

Much to the surprise of the ruling elites, the tide turned against 

nuclear power during the mid-1970s. The turning point was Wyhl. 

This wine-growing village on the Upper Rhine facing France was 
153

spotted by the conservative provincial government of BadenWürttemberg as a site for a major nuclear reactor. But the government 

totally underestimated the local sentiments against the plan. Even 

the thoroughly conservative wine-growers stood up against it. 

They feared that the water vapor belching out of the cooling towers 

plus a warmed-up river could cloud the sky and take the sun from 

their vineyards. In addition, fears of radioactive radiation were 

spreading. Students from nearby Freiburg University initiated 

systematic protests and started street blockades against the heavy 

construction machines approaching the site. Moreover, they created 

the “Volkshochschule Wyhler Wald,” a popular, if demanding, “school” 

of adult education teaching about the steam and clouds problem, 

radiation, disposal problems, vulnerability of nuclear installations to 

terrorism and war, solar energy, and energy efficiency.

The coal-dominated state of North-Rhine-Westphalia seized 

the opportunity of commissioning the Freiburg-based Ökoinstitut

to write a report on a nuclear-free future for Germany. The 

Federal Government under Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, however, 

maintained its full support of nuclear energy, but the popularity of 

this position was visibly dwindling as the Wyhl protesters gained 

sympathies throughout the country.

Popular science writer Robert Jungk published Der Atomstaat

(1977), in which he elaborated on the authoritarian political structures 

nuclear power would imply.1 This catapulted the atomic controversy 

to the level of fundamental questions of freedom and democracy, thus 

further eroding the support for nuclear power, however peacefully 

intended. 

The nuclear controversies were positively instrumental in the 

emergence of a new political party, the Greens. (The so-called 

5 percent-hurdle that parties must take to enter parliament was 

meant to and has worked to strongly discourage the creation of new 

parties.) The Greens were quite radical in many regards, but their 

unifying theme was opposition to nuclear power in all its forms. 

They therefore were particularly at odds with the ruling Social 

Democrats (SPD) under Chancellor Schmidt—from which party 

many of the early Greens originated. The SPD came into rough times 

anyway because of the widespread phenomenon of “stagflation” 

that demoralized Keynesian “liberals” all over the place. Schmidt’s 
154

junior coalition partner, the Free Democrats (FDP), changed sides 

and spearheaded neoliberal thinking in the country, helping the 

conservative Christian Democrats (CDU) under Helmut Kohl to 

assume power. Thus the Greens inadvertently found themselves in 

an alliance of opposition with the SPD against the new conservative 

government, and gradually their views infested the larger partner. 

Schmidt retreated from party politics while the party moved to the 

left.

Around 1983, the combined issues of the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization’s (NATO) nuclear rearmament with cruise missiles 

and the new “Waldsterben” (forest dieback) brought hundreds of 

thousands of protesters to the streets and created an atmosphere in 

which the Kohl government lost the popular majority in opinion 

polls. Fortunately for him, he had 3 years to go before the next 

elections, but he felt it was time to act against the steady rise of the 

Greens. One factor in particular alarmed Kohl and his U.S. friends 

under President Ronald Reagan: the Greens wanted Germany to step 

out of NATO, thus making a potential majority of the Greens and the 

SPD a true spectre for Atlantic defence policy. 

Looking at the high popularity of ecological issues, Kohl 

decided to confront the Greens by putting himself at the top of the 

environmental movement. This is how Germany under a conservative 

government became known as an environmental champion and 

a rather stubborn fighter in the European Union (EU) for stricter 

environmental standards. 

It all happened before the reactor disaster of Chernobyl in April 

1986, although some developments were influenced by the Three 

Mile Island accident. Chernobyl definitively put an end to any plans 

of expansion of nuclear energy. In the SPD, it shifted majorities 

and triggered a decision at their party convention at Nuremberg a 

few months later to completely phase out nuclear power within 10 

years. Polls suggested that this decision gave the party a strong and 

additional popularity push, and that it might take just another 3 years 

to regain power, together with the Greens, in the federal elections 

scheduled for 1990. 

This prospect, however, made it all the more urgent for Kohl to 

step up his environmental profile. Immediately after the Chernobyl 

disaster, Kohl created the new federal Ministry of the Environment 
155

(environmental policies thus far had been handled by the Ministry 

of the Interior.) A year later, in 1987, he appointed a top-class man 

for the portfolio, Professor Klaus Töpfer, who had served as state 

environment minister in the Rhineland Palatinate. Töpfer introduced 

the green dot system for packaging waste and initiated very proactive 

German and European climate policies. In this, he was backed by 

an all-party Bundestag commission on climate policy, that boldly 

demanded a 25-30 percent reduction of CO2 by 2005. 

From German Unification to the SPD-Green Coalition of 1998.

Then came the German unification, in a way Kohl’s masterpiece. 

At the 1990 elections, he was rewarded generously by an impressive 

victory. The SPD contender, Oskar Lafontaine, and the Greens had 

made lots of mistakes in the context of the unification, notably by 

not showing the necessary enthusiasm. (On one important issue, 

Lafontaine was probably right, namely his strong warning against 

the 1:1 exchange rate of the East German against the West German 

D-Mark because this rate implied rapid bankruptcies essentially for 

all East German firms selling their goods to East European clients 

paying their dues in Roubles at an agreed exchange rate with the 

East German Mark. Some analysts see this as the real cause for the 

nonending tragedy of the German economy after unification!) 

Concerning nuclear policy, the unification conveniently allowed 

Kohl to satisfy antinuclear sentiments by closing down all East

German reactors and the planned disposal facility at Morsleben. 

In the meantime, the climate policy agenda was moved to the 

forefront of international environmental policies. The adoption at 

the 1992 Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit of the Framework Convention 

on Climate Change (FCCC) had an important side effect on nuclear 

power. It helped keep the nuclear option alive, despite continuing 

public mistrust. In Germany, the German Physical Society (DPG) 

significantly was in the forefront of educating the public about the 

urgency of climate policy, and not a few critics felt that this was a 

maneuver for a revival of nuclear energy.

Another 4 years of Kohl’s administration followed from 1994-

98. German industry had urged Kohl to rid himself of Klaus Töpfer 

who was seen as a liability to industry in the new post-cold-war 
156

era of globalization and of relentless cost competition. Kohl did as 

suggested and gave Töpfer a minor and less controversial portfolio, 

replacing him by Angela Merkel from East Germany, who at the time 

had no credits or experience in the field. She actually managed her 

new field much better than expected and was instrumental in getting 

the Kyoto Protocol of the FCCC agreed to in 1997. 

Concerning nuclear policy, the South German states of Bavaria 

and Baden-Württemberg, both governed for ages by Christian 

Democrats (Bavaria by the CSU sister party), felt that the Chernobyl 

shock was now over and one should return to “reason,” i.e., to a 

further expansion of nuclear energy. But industry placed no new 

orders for nuclear power plants, and opinion polls showed no signs of 

new sympathy with the nuclear option. Anyway, the power industry 

was considerably more hesitant than conservative politicians were 

in regards the continuation, let alone expansion of nuclear energy.

The “Ausstieg,” Perhaps the Most Distinguishing 

Decision of SPD and Greens.

The federal elections of 1998 brought Kohl’s government to 

an end after 16 years. The SPD campaign included a commitment 

for a phase-out of nuclear power. The new chancellor, Gerhard 

Schröder, former premier of Lower Saxony, entered a coalition with 

the Greens, who had an even stronger view on the phase-out of 

nuclear energy. Very soon, Schröder, together with Green Minister 

for the Environment Jürgen Trittin and Economics Minister Werner 

Müller, entered talks with the nuclear industry and finally found 

an agreement for a stepwise exit from nuclear power. The talks had 

been well-prepared by Schröder’s attempts to arrive at an energy 

consensus with industry during his time as premier of Lower Saxony. 

These talks actually annoyed Lafontaine who wanted the thing done 

by governmental oktroi (decree). 

What is the substance of the phase-out, or the “Ausstieg,” as 

it is called in German? In essence, the German Government made 

an agreement with the electric utilities on a phase-out, with a total 

amount of 2.623 Terawatthours—of nuclear electricity remaining to 

be supplied. The utilities are invited to trade the permits allocated 
157

to them so as to optimize the economic output. Old reactors needing 

more maintenance would be retired sooner, while some of the newer 

ones would continue to operate until the total amount permitted was 

exhausted. That could be at 2025 or perhaps as late as 2030.

Other parts of the deal were a prohibition on building new 

reactors, an end to the reprocessing of nuclear materials, and a 10-

year moratorium on the exploration of the planned final disposal 

facility for highly radioactive waste in the salt domes below the 

Lower Saxony village of Gorleben.2

The postponement to a later date of the vexing question of the 

final disposal of radioactive waste was done at a price. It became 

necessary to build intermediary storage facilities for radioactive waste 

at each reactor site. The nuclear industry actually welcomed this 

condition because it helped terminate for the time being the highly 

controversial and increasingly expensive shipments of radioactive 

waste on roads or railways. Also, the intermediate storage served to 

reduce radioactivity and heat production from nuclear waste to some 

thirty percent of the original intensities, thus dramatically easing the 

physical specifications for final disposal.

Many Greens and Social Democrats felt the deal was much 

too generous towards the nuclear industry, while some industry 

representatives thought it was too ambitious. My own assessment 

is that is has been a fair deal. It meant that each reactor would be 

allowed to run for 32 years. Assuming that it takes some 16 years for a 

nuclear plant to be written off, the owner has another 16 years to make 

fat profits on it. Moreover, the liberalized electricity markets offered 

plenty of options to import electricity from abroad. When Edmund 

Stoiber, the Bavarian Premier and the conservative candidate for the 

Chancellery in 2002, announced during his campaign that in case of 

victory he would initiate a revival of nuclear power, it was industry 

that reminded him that the deal was agreed upon with Schröder, 

and that there was no intention of ordering new nuclear reactors. 

For the Coalition and other ecologically minded people, the deal 

was ambitious enough to make it politically feasible to adopt a highly 

proactive renewable energies law (which would have been unrealistic 

without the time pressure given by the “Ausstieg”). Moreover, the 

fact that a highly industrialized country felt it could afford phasing 
158

out atomic energy altogether has been an extremely strong signal to 

the international community.

In retrospect, after 6 years of the “Red-Green” government, it 

can be said that the phase-out of nuclear power stands as the move 

that distinguishes the government most visibly from the positions of 

the conservative opposition. (With regard to social and tax policies 

as well as defense and foreign policies, the reality of the SPD and 

Greens governance has come very close to what the conservative 

camp has done and proposed during the past 10 or 20 years!) 

Perspectives.

The big question is, of course, whether the Schröder government 

is right to assume the country can afford the Ausstieg. The time will 

come undoubtedly, when the replacement problem for nuclear power 

becomes highly pressing. The surplus capacities of electricity that 

characterize the European power industry in our days, are certain to 

disappear within the next 10 years. Rising prices of natural gas have 

surprised earlier optimists. Wind energy is still on the rise but as 

yet very far from substituting for nuclear power. So far, all German 

wind power taken together is worth a mere three nuclear reactors 

(although the capacity may be worth ten or more reactors, but then 

the wind is not always blowing at optimum speed). 

It is hard to believe, therefore, that renewables will be sufficient 

to close the gap that will be left when nuclear electricity disappears 

from the market. A more realistic popular option has been the 

construction of combined cycle fossil power plants using coal and 

natural gas as fuels. But with the dramatic rise in gas prices, that 

option is no longer very attractive, and people from all political camps 

have become more accustomed to supporting renewable sources of 

energy as the core of the answer to challenge. As a matter of fact, the 

conservative CDU recently has begun to say that they would like to 

extend the running time for nuclear reactors in order to leave more 

time for the build-up of renewable sources of energy.

I am reading with interest that in the United States a new 

discussion is on-going about a revival of nuclear energy, with an 

aggressive build-up of new nuclear reactors. Although some groups 

in Germany may hope for a similar debate in that country, I see it as a 
159

marginal minority position. What finds far more support is the more 

conventional idea of extending the permitted life time for nuclear 

reactors. Many people from industry are demanding exactly that. 

But the motive tends to be only that an extended life time would 

simply take some steam out of the energy debate. 

If the nuclear phase-out appears as an irreversible decision, if 

renewable sources of energy are simply too expensive to be serious 

candidates for replacing all of today’s nuclear plants, what could then 

be the solution? Leaving out coal, the major cause for the greenhouse 

effect, I am inclined to think of a systematic worldwide strategy of 

opening an entirely different option, which tends to be left out and 

forgotten by mainstream energy planners. It is a systematic approach 

to increase energy efficiency. 

What is that? Essentially energy efficiency or rather energy 

productivity means to extract more well-being from one kilowatt-hour 

or from one barrel of oil. Surprisingly, the physics of energy invite 

speculations of a dramatic improvement of energy productivity. One 

kilowatt-hour, after all, is enough, to lift a 10-liter bucket of water 

three times from the sea level to the top of Mount Everest. What we 

do with one kilowatt hour, is extremely poor by comparison, chiefly 

because energy is so fabulously cheap. 

With my friend Amory Lovins, I dared to put on paper the kinds 

of technological improvements which are available. In our book, 

“Factor Four,” we feature 20 examples of how to quadruple energy 

productivity, and some of them actually go much beyond a factor of 

four.3

The main challenge politically will be to make it profitable to 

go in the direction of aggressively increasing energy productivity. 

You would not be prepared to carry a 10-liter bucket three times up 

Mount Everest for anything like the price we pay for one kilowatt 

hour.

Emissions trading, a revenue neutral ecological tax reform, and 

desubsidizing energy consuming industrial and transportation 

activities can lead us a long way towards making energy productivity 

more profitable.
160

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8

1. Robert Jungk, Der Atomstaat, Munich: Kindler, 1977.

2. “Vereinbarung zwischen der Bundesregierung und den Energieversorgungsunternehmen,” Bundesregierung, Vom 14, Juni 2000, Berlin, Germany.

3. Ernst Ulrich von Weizsäcker, Amory Lovins, and Hunter Lovins, Factor Four: 

Doubling Wealth, Halving Resource Use, London: Earthscan, 1997.
161

CHAPTER 9

PRESIDENT BUSH’S GLOBAL NONPROLIFERATION POLICY:

SEVEN MORE STEPS

Henry D. Sokolski

More than any other post-Cold War presidency, the Bush 

administration has emphasized nonproliferation enforcement. 

Certainly, its actions in the cases of North Korea, Iraq, and Libya 

have prompted the most significant debate about how to strengthen 

nonproliferation since India exploded its first bomb in 1974. This 

window of interest needs to be exploited to strengthen nonproliferation 

enforcement in as country-neutral a fashion as possible.

Toward this end, the United States has itself proposed a new, 

tougher set of nonproliferation rules. By far, the most important of 

these rules are the seven specific proposals President Bush made on 

February 11, 2004, in an address at the National Defense University 

(NDU). Properly understood, these proposals recommend a sounder 

reading of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)—one that 

is true to the NPT’s original intent and that deflates mistaken 

interpretations of the treaty that have enabled North Korea, Libya, 

Iran, and, earlier, Iraq, to acquire much of what is needed to make 

nuclear bombs.

President Bush characterized these states’ misguided views as 

a “cynical manipulation” of the treaty. He specifically referred to 

these states’ efforts to twist the NPT’s call for the sharing of peaceful 

nuclear technology into an unqualified right to “the fullest possible 

exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological 

information.”

This it clearly is not. As the NPT’s first article makes clear, no 

nuclear weapons state that is a party to the NPT (the United States, 

Russia, China, France, or the United Kingdom) is permitted to “in any 

way . . . assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapons state to 

manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear 

explosive devices.” Similarly, the NPT’s second article prohibits all 
162

other members of the treaty from “manufactur[ing] or otherwise 

acquir[ing] nuclear weapons,” and from “seek[ing] or receiv[ing] any 

assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.” Finally, the NPT 

requires all peaceful uses of nuclear energy to be safeguarded with 

the aim of preventing their diversion to help make bombs. When 

the NPT speaks in Article IV about “the inalienable right” of NPT 

members to develop nuclear energy “without discrimination,” it 

explicitly circumscribes this right by demanding that it be exercised 

“in conformity” with these articles.

For years, too little effort has been made to define what “in 

conformity” means. This is what President Bush dealt with in his 

February 11 address. He emphasized that nations seeking to develop 

peaceful nuclear energy have no need either for materials that can 

be used directly to fuel bombs—separated plutonium and highly 

enriched uranium—or for the uranium enrichment and plutonium 

reprocessing plants required to produce these materials. As such, 

he proposed that the world’s leading nuclear suppliers of lightly 

enriched uranium fuel (which cannot be used directly to make bombs) 

guarantee a steady supply of this fuel to nuclear energy-developing 

states that are willing to renounce trying to build enrichment and 

reprocessing facilities themselves. He further proposed that nuclear 

supplier states should refuse to sell enrichment and reprocessing 

equipment or technology to any state that does not already “possess 

full-scale functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants.”

Beyond this, the President proposed to strengthen international 

efforts to interdict illicit nuclear shipments and procurement 

networks; do more to reduce the accessibility to nuclear weaponsusable materials; and tighten procedures at the United Nations (UN) 

nuclear watchdog agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA). Finally, President Bush urged that within a year, no nuclear 

supplier should export nuclear equipment to any state that has not 

yet signed the new, tougher IAEA inspections agreement known as 

the Additional Protocol.

All of these proposals help give teeth to the NPT’s prohibitions 

against the export and acquisition of nuclear weapons related 

capabilities and materials. They also constitute a useful extension 

of the calls by former Presidents Gerald R. Ford and Jimmy Carter 
163

nearly 30 years ago to discourage the use of nuclear weapons-usable 

fuels for commercial purposes.

President Bush’s proposals, though, should be viewed only as 

a start. In fact, several additional measures logically follow from 

the President’s seven proposals and are needed to assure effective 

nonproliferation. Building on the Bush proposals, the United States, 

other nuclear suppliers, and like-minded states will also need to:

1. Refuse to buy any controlled nuclear items or materials from 

new states attempting to develop enrichment or reprocessing 

plants.

2. Update and strengthen IAEA controls to account for the new 

ways states could divert peaceful nuclear activities and materials to 

military purposes.

3. View large civilian nuclear projects with suspicion—including 

nuclear power and desalinization plants, large research reactors, 

and regional fuel cycle centers—if they are not privately financed 

or approved after an open bidding process against less risky nonnuclear alternatives.

4. Demand that states that fail to declare nuclear facilities to the 

IAEA (as required by their safeguards agreement) dismantle them in 

order to come back into full compliance and disallow states that are 

not clearly in full compliance from legally leaving the NPT without 

first surrendering the nuclear capabilities they gained while NPT 

members.

5. Support UN adoption of a series of country-neutral rules that 

track the above recommendations to be applied to any nation that 

the IAEA and the UN Security Council cannot clearly find in full 

compliance with the NPT.

6. Starting with the United States, but including Pakistan and 

India, formally get as many declared nuclear weapons states as 

possible to agree henceforth to not redeploy nuclear weapons onto 

any other state’s soil in peacetime and to make the transfer of nuclear 

weapons-usable material to other nations illicit if the transfer is made 

for a purpose other than to dispose of the material or to make it less 

accessible.

7. Build on the successful precedent of Libya’s nuclear renunciation 

by encouraging its neighbors—starting with Algeria, Egypt, and 

Israel—to shut down their largest nuclear reactors.
164

What do these ideas entail? How do they relate to the President 

Bush’s proposals? To answer these questions, each suggestion is 

examined in turn.

1. Refuse to buy any controlled nuclear items or materials from or to 

new states attempting to develop enrichment or reprocessing plants. One 

of President Bush’s proposals that has already been adopted by the 

G-8 is that nuclear supplier states not sell fresh fuel to nations that 

are unwilling to renounce reprocessing or enrichment, and that 

they refuse to sell any enrichment or reprocessing technology and 

equipment to states that do not already possess “full-scale functioning 

enrichment and reprocessing plants.” Implementing these rules 

would certainly help establish a norm against the further spread of 

commercial reprocessing and enrichment plants. What would be even 

more effective in deterring new states from developing reprocessing 

or enrichment, however, would be first to restrict nuclear commercial 

intercourse with such states by getting the Nuclear Suppliers Group 

(NSG) membership, and as many other states as possible, to refuse 

to buy any nuclear commodities or services from them. Second, NSG 

members should back this rule by making it clear that they will cut 

off nuclear exports to any state that buys enrichment or reprocessing 

services or goods from these nuclear entrant nations.

Who would this rule hit hardest? Iran for starters. Nuclear officials 

there claim that they intend to export reactor fuel from their uranium 

enrichment and fuel fabrication facilities to other members of the 

NPT. If the United States is strict about what constitutes “full-scale 

functioning plants,” Brazil and Argentina could also be affected. 

Brazil is about to launch a commercial enrichment effort at Resende. 

Officials there concede, however, that their effort would not be able 

to supply even 60 percent of Brazil’s own fuel requirements until the 

year 2010. They have not even reached an agreement with the IAEA 

about the proper safeguarding of Brazil’s enrichment facility. Still, 

Brazilian officials have already announced that they intend to export 

enriched uranium by 2014.

Certainly, if the United States and other like-minded nations 

grandfather Brazil’s enrichment effort as being “full-scale and 

functioning” while demanding that Iran shut its facilities down, the 

hypocrisy would be more than just clumsy, it would undermine the 
165

credibility of the President’s enrichment and reprocessing restrictions 

for any other country. As for Argentina, it is considering offering 

reprocessing services to states that buy its large export research 

reactors.

Neither of these countries’ nuclear programs could pretend to be 

economic without foreign customers. If the United States is serious 

about achieving the President’s goal of freezing the number of 

states that have reprocessing and enrichment plants, pursuing this 

complement would be useful.

2. Update and strengthen IAEA controls to account for the new ways 

states could divert peaceful nuclear activities and materials to military 

purposes. President Bush also backed giving the IAEA more authority 

to do more extensive nuclear inspection by suggesting that the world’s 

major nuclear suppliers agree to ban controlled nuclear exports to any 

state that does not sign the IAEA’s Additional Protocol for nuclear 

inspections. Backing the Additional Protocol certainly has merit. The 

problem with merely backing its adoption, however, is such support 

fails to address the deficiencies of existing IAEA nuclear audits even 

with the Additional Protocol. These gaps also need to be addressed.

What are they? The first and perhaps most immediate IAEA 

shortfall is the agency’s lack of near real-time surveillance to prevent 

the diversion of fresh and spent reactor fuel that could be used to 

make bombs. IAEA inspectors currently rely on cameras whose 

“take” of the areas in which fresh and spent fuel are stored is viewed 

every 90 days.1 Because these cameras do not have a full view of 

these storage areas, though, it is possible for would-be bomb makers 

to divert fresh or spent fuel without the knowledge of the IAEA. If a 

state has declared or covert reprocessing or enrichment plants, these 

materials could be converted into weapons usable fuel in a matter of 

days or weeks—i.e., well before the IAEA could ever know any illicit 

activity had taken place. To help eliminate this danger, the agency 

should install real-time full-view surveillance cameras and keep one 

or more inspectors at the reactor site to keep these cameras running 

and to report if they should break down. 

This, of course, will cost money. The logical parties to foot the bill 

are the users of the nuclear facilities being inspected. Toward this 

end, the IAEA’s membership should agree to assess an additional 
166

fee based on the actual level of use of each of the nuclear facilities 

being inspected that the users of these plants would be expected to 

pay in order to remain in full compliance with the IAEA safeguards 

obligations. 

Another IAEA deficiency is its lack of any public record of the 

special nuclear materials it is supposed to be auditing. In fact, the 

IAEA does not publish the actual amounts of special nuclear materials 

it is supposed to be safeguarding, including separated plutonium 

and enriched uranium that could be quickly converted into nuclear 

weapons. The net result is that just how much dangerous nuclear 

material there is and how well it is being guarded is a matter of 

speculation. The original argument for keeping this information secret 

was that it might reveal some industrial secret about the production 

capabilities of particular states. After more than 3 decades of nuclear 

activity under the NPT and the events of September 11, 2001, this 

line of argument no longer seems tenable. 

Finally, the IAEA needs to reevaluate its current list of direct 

use materials—i.e., those nuclear commodities that can quickly 

be converted into bombs and that, therefore, deserve additional 

inspections and control attention. Currently, the agency’s list is 

limited to highly enriched uranium, separated plutonium, and 

mixed oxide fuel. Given all the news about Dr. A. Q. Khan’s export 

of uranium enrichment technology and the enrichment programs 

in North Korea, Libya, and Iran, there has been some discussion of 

the need expand the list to include uranium hexafluoride—the feed 

stock for uranium enrichment facilities. It might also make sense to 

include materials nations might use to boost fission devices: Tritium, 

lithium deuteride, and helium three. 

3. View large civilian nuclear projects—including nuclear power 

and desalinization plants, large research reactors, and regional fuel cycle 

centers—with suspicion if they are not privately financed or approved after 

an open bidding process against less risky alternatives. Among the most 

important of President Bush’s proposals were two that would assure 

fresh reactor fuel exports to nations that renounced attempts to enrich 

uranium or chemically separate plutonium from spent reactor fuel 

and ban reprocessing and enrichment exports to states that do not 

already have “full-scale functioning enrichment and reprocessing 

plants.” As the President noted in his February 11 NDU speech, these 
167

steps are essential to help prevent new states from making nuclear 

weapons fuel.

This is not because the IAEA or national intelligence agencies 

can detect covert reprocessing or enrichment activities in a 

timely fashion. As recent experience with covert enrichment and 

reprocessing activities in Iran and North Korea demonstrates, they 

cannot. Nonetheless, it is still important to make new reprocessing 

and enrichment activities illicit, if only to prevent discovered covert 

reprocessors and enrichers from legally excusing themselves by 

claiming—as Iran did—that they merely “forgot” to notify the IAEA 

of their activities.

Making the mere possession of such facilities illicit would clearly 

make exposed covert reprocessing and enrichment activities out-ofbounds. Yet, the only surefire technical safeguard against suspect 

nations quickly acquiring nuclear weapons is to prevent them from 

acquiring significant amounts of fresh, lightly enriched fuel or 

from generating significant quantities of spent reactor fuel. Lightly 

enriched uranium can be fed into a covert enrichment line to make 

a bomb’s worth of highly enriched uranium in a matter of days: 

Spent fuel can be covertly reprocessed to extract a bomb’s worth of 

plutonium just as quickly. Both spent and fresh lightly enriched fuel 

are part and parcel of most large reactors’ operations. This suggests 

that rules are needed not only to help make suspect reprocessing and 

enrichment-related facilities illicit, but to spotlight suspect nuclear 

reactors as well.

How might this be done? Fortunately, Adam Smith’s “invisible 

hand” of free markets and competition can help. As it turns out, many 

large commercial nuclear projects and all suspect nuclear projects in 

less developed nations are demonstrably uneconomical compared 

to less risky options. Nuclear power and desalinization plants have 

significantly higher capital costs than their non-nuclear alternatives. 

In poor, developing countries, the performance of nearly all these 

plants has been abysmal.

Given the surfeit of isotope-producing research reactors—there 

are roughly 140 in operation in over 40 countries worldwide—there is 

scant economic justification for the further construction of additional 

large research reactors: One can import medical, agricultural, and 
168

industrial isotopes from existing machines and send one’s scientists 

to these machines to do research much more cheaply than one 

can build a large research reactor of one’s own. Virtually all of the 

existing research reactors, moreover, can be converted to run on nonweapons-useable fuels.

As for recent Department of Energy (DOE) and IAEA proposals 

to create regional reprocessing and enrichment parks, these too are a 

bad buy. Right now, we have more than enough enrichment capacity 

to supply lightly enriched fuel to all legitimate civilian reactors. If 

anything, the lack of demand would suggest the need to further 

downsize existing enrichment capacity. Reprocessing, meanwhile, is 

an uneconomical answer to a problem that does not exist: It makes 

much more sense from a security and economic perspective to store 

spent fuel in casks and to use fresh reactor fuel rather than to recycle 

weapons-usable plutonium for civilian reactor use.

What this suggests, then, is a simple tenet: Any large civilian 

nuclear project that is started before considering safer alternatives 

in an open international bidding process should be regarded as 

suspect. Certainly, Iran’s power reactor and enrichment activities, as 

well as North Korea’s entire program, Pakistan’s import of Chinese 

reactors, Algeria’s large research reactor, and Brazil’s proposed 

uranium enrichment undertaking, would all fail this test. To make 

this guideline credible, however, the United States and its allies will 

have to apply it to their own civilian nuclear undertakings as well.

Further federal subsidies and funding of commercial-sized 

undertakings such as the Westinghouse AP1000, international 

Generation IV reactor and advanced fuel-cycle cooperation, the 

advanced hydrogen production nuclear reactor, and the ill-starred 

$6 billion-plus mixed oxide plutonium disposition program should 

cease. Such cuts should not be seen as anti-nuclear, but rather as 

pro-free market. Certainly, if it made sense for Congress and Ronald 

Reagan to oppose federal funding of such large and potentially 

dangerous energy projects on economic grounds 20 years ago, it 

makes even more sense today—after 9/11, the new nuclear security 

imperatives, and the clear lag in international nuclear demand.

States, of course, are free to do as they please. However, nations 

that use public funds to support uneconomical nuclear projects 

should bear the full costs of the risks they are running. Certainly, if 
169

they are in debt or need to borrow, they should recognize that their 

bad investments will be accounted for in the market’s determination 

of their nation’s sovereign credit rating. Uneconomical nuclear 

projects by definition, after all, lose money. More important, they all 

too frequently tempt their backers to try to make ends meet by selling 

parts of the project off to whomever is interested, including wouldbe bomb makers. Brazil whose nuclear program was running in the 

red in the l980s, for example, saw advantage in striking a nuclear 

cooperative agreement with Iraq. Dr. Khan who needed cash and 

technology to complete a new missile project for Pakistan did the 

same with North Korea, Iran, and Libya. Pyongyang, meanwhile, 

also stretched for funds, is sharing it nuclear know-how with Iran. 

All of these nations are or have been subject to economic or trade 

sanctions as a result of these transactions. This, in turn, should also 

highlight the economic costs of pursuing such risky ventures.

4. Demand that states that fail to declare nuclear facilities to the IAEA 

(as required by their safeguards agreement) dismantle them in order to 

come back into full compliance and disallow states that are not clearly in 

full compliance from legally leaving the NPT without first surrendering 

the nuclear capabilities they gained while NPT members. The Bush 

Administration, by its actions and words in North Korea, Iraq, 

and Libya, has gone a long way toward establishing the rule that 

whenever a violating nation fails to properly declare nuclear facilities 

to the IAEA, it must dismantle them in order to come back into full 

compliance with its NPT obligations. What the United States should 

do now is to propose this requirement explicitly.

This would certainly be a helpful, country-neutral rule to have in 

place when dealing with countries like Iran. The United States should 

also make it clear that no nation that the IAEA and the UN Security 

Council is unable to clearly find in full compliance with the NPT will 

be allowed to leave the treaty legally without first surrendering all 

the nuclear capabilities it gained while a member of the NPT. The 

idea behind this is that one cannot enter into a contract, violate it, 

then announce withdrawal, and not be held accountable for one’s 

misbehavior while a party to the contract.

Some U.S. government legal counsels have objected to this 

commonsense requirement in the case of the NPT out of fear that 
170

adopting such a rule might somehow raise questions about the 

legality of the United States withdrawing from treaty obligations, 

such as the ABM Treaty. Their concerns, however, are unfounded: 

The United States is a law-abiding nation that complies with its treaty 

obligations. If it takes actions inconsistent with a treaty, it only does 

so after it is no longer a member of the agreement or because it has 

formally chosen not to be a party. This certainly was the case with 

the ABM Treaty.

5. Support UN adoption of a series of country-neutral rules that track 

the above recommendations to be applied to any nation that the IAEA and 

the UN Security Council cannot clearly find in full compliance with the 

NPT. The idea here would be to take advantage of something that, so 

far, has frustrated U.S. and allied diplomats—the IAEA’s and the UN 

Security Council’s reluctance in making definitive determinations of 

any nation being in violation and worthy of being sanctioned. Rather 

than wait upon either of these bodies actually to find a specific 

country in clear violation of the NPT and then try to get a consensus 

to sanction, it would make far more sense to delineate in countryneutral terms and in advance what the minimal consequences 

should be for any country the IAEA and the UN Security Council 

cannot clearly find to be in full compliance. This approach has the 

clear advantage of being country-neutral and of forcing the IAEA 

and the UN Security Council to reach consensus only if they want to 

prevent action.

6. Starting with the United States, but including Pakistan and India, 

formally get as many declared nuclear weapons states as possible to agree 

henceforth to not redeploy nuclear weapons onto any other state’s soil in 

peacetime and to make the transfer of nuclear weapons-usable material to 

other nations illicit if the transfer is made for a purpose other than to dispose 

of the material or to make it less accessible. One of the most nettlesome 

nonproliferation challenges President Bush discussed in his February 

11 NDU speech was reining in the nuclear proliferation activities of 

non-NPT states such as Pakistan. Islamabad’s blatant proliferation 

activities technically broke no law. Even worse proliferation, 

however, is possible: There is reason to worry that a future Pakistan 

might transfer nuclear weapons to another country. Saudi Arabian 

officials are reported to be studying how they might acquire nuclear 

weapons from another country such as Pakistan.
171

What makes these plans plausible—besides Pakistan’s and Saudi 

Arabia’s close security ties—is that they could be carried out legally 

under the NPT. The treaty, in fact, allows nuclear weapons to be 

transferred to nonweapons state members (e.g., to nations like Saudi 

Arabia) so long as the weapons remain under the control of the 

exporting state. This loophole was explicitly inserted into the NPT in 

the l960s by U.S. officials who were anxious to continue deploying 

U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on NATO’s and Pacific allies’ soil.

Today, keeping this loophole open no longer looks so attractive. 

In fact, the United States already has withdrawn its tactical nuclear 

weapons from foreign allied bases it had in the Pacific, including 

South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. The reason is simple: With air- and 

sea-launched cruise missiles, nuclear-capable carrier-based aircraft, 

stealth bombers, and accurate submarine-launched and land-based 

intercontinental ballistic missiles available to quickly deliver nuclear 

weapons, there is no longer any U.S. or allied need to base tactical 

nuclear weapons on foreign soil.

The United States is now withdrawing much of its military 

from Europe. As these troops are withdrawn and as concerns about 

nuclear terrorism and proliferation grow, the rationale for keeping 

U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in places like Germany will become 

weaker, and the desire to prevent other states from redeploying their 

nuclear weapons onto other states’ soil will increase. To address this 

concern, it would be useful to close the loophole in the NPT that 

allows this.

The question is how. Some have suggested that we simply make 

these nations nuclear weapons state members of the NPT. The problem 

with this approach is that such a move would appear to reward states 

that have stayed out of the treaty and violated its tenets. A sensible 

alternative would be for the United States to work with as many 

nuclear weapons states as possible to get a formal agreement that, 

henceforth, no nation will redeploy nuclear weapons onto another 

nation’s soil during peacetime. The United States could also try to 

get other nuclear weapons states to agree to make the redeployment 

of such weapons or the transfer of nuclear weapons-usable materials 

illicit so long as the transfer was for purposes other than disposing 

of these materials or making them less accessible. Such a proposal 

might usefully be raised in the context of upcoming talks with the 
172

Indian government regarding President Bush’s promised reopening 

of U.S. nuclear cooperation.

Certainly, if the United States agreed to impose such limits on 

itself, it could help persuade other nuclear weapons states—including 

those that have not yet signed the NPT—to agree to do so as well. 

One also could match such diplomatic efforts with initiatives to get 

as many nonweapons states as possible to agree not to receive nuclear 

weapons in peacetime. 

7. Build on the successful precedent of Libya’s nuclear renunciation 

by encouraging its neighbors—starting with Algeria, Egypt and Israel — 

to shut down their largest nuclear reactors. President Bush rightly has 

spotlighted the success he has had in getting Libya to renounce its 

nuclear weapons program. The challenge now is figuring out how to 

establish this precedent as a practical nonproliferation standard that 

can be applied again in at least one other case. In this regard, neither 

North Korea nor Iran seem particularly promising prospects, since 

they are resisting cooperation—much less denuclearization.

The prospects, on the other hand, look much better closer to Libya 

itself. Specifically, now that Tripoli no longer has a nuclear program, 

it would seem reasonable for its neighbors to reciprocate by at least 

shutting down their largest nuclear plants.

Questions have been raised about Algeria’s need for a second 

large research reactor. This reactor can make nearly a bomb’s 

worth of plutonium per year; is located at a distant, isolated site; is 

surrounded by air defenses; and only makes sense if it is intended 

to make bombs. In fact, Algeria already has a second, smaller, less 

threatening research reactor in Algiers. Shutting down the larger 

plant at Ain Ousseara would save Algeria money and make everyone 

breathe easier.

Additionally, there is Egypt’s large research reactor purchased 

from Argentina. It, too, can make nearly a bomb’s worth of plutonium 

annually. Perhaps Egypt could offer to mothball this plant in 

exchange for Israel shutting down its large plutonium production 

reactor at Dimona. The latter is quite old and will require hundreds 

of millions of dollars to refurbish. Israeli critics opposed to the 

continuing operation of the Dimona reactor have publicly called for 

its shutdown in the Knesset.
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Certainly, progress on any of these fronts would be helpful in 

addressing other proliferation problems in the Persian Gulf and 

elsewhere. At a minimum, they would help isolate Iran’s nuclear 

misbehavior and establish a stricter norm that for the time being, 

no nation in the Middle East should operate a large reactor or 

commercial sized nuclear facility of any kind.

The point here, as with the other proposals above, is to build on 

the clear nonproliferation successes we now have. Certainly, if we 

do, we will be safer. If we do not, it is just as certain that we will be 

buying far more trouble than we can afford.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 9

1. One of the ironies of the IAEA’s current efforts to promote adoption of the 

Additional Protocol is that the agency is offering to reduce the number of times 

it will review its camera takes of fresh fuel storage areas to once a year for those 

nations it has determined do not have a covert nuclear weapons program. Given 

the intelligence surprises regarding covert enrichment activities that have taken 

place in Iran, Iraq, Libya, South Korea, and North Korea, one would think the 

agency would want to increase its inspections of such fuel.

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ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

PATRICK CLAWSON is deputy director for research of the 

Washington Institute for Near East Policy. His previous positions 

include 5 years as senior research professor at the National Defense 

University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies; and 4 years 

each as senior economist at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 

the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. Dr. Clawson 

has published op-ed articles in major newspapers including the New 

York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post. In addition to his 

frequent appearances on television and radio, he has authored more 

than 30 scholarly articles on the Middle East in such journals as Foreign 

Affairs, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Middle East Journal,

and Les Cahiers de l’Orient. He has also testified before congressional 

committees more than a dozen times. Currently serving as senior 

editor of Middle East Quarterly, he was previously editor of Orbis, a 

quarterly review of foreign affairs.Works authored and edited by 

Dr Clawson include Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos, coauthor with 

Michael Rubin (New York: Palgrave, forthcoming in fall 2005), U.S. 

Sanctions on Iran (Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies 

and Research, 1997), Getting Ready for A Nuclear-Ready Iran, co-editor 

with Henry Sokolski (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005)

and How to Build a New Iraq After Saddam, editor (Washington, DC: 

The Washington Institute, 2003).

VICTOR GILINSKY is an independent energy consultant and 

former Nuclear Regulatory Commissioner under Presidents Ford, 

Carter, and Reagan. He has been active on nonproliferation issues 

for many years, going back to his early work at RAND in Santa 

Monica, California. In 1971 Dr. Gilinsky moved to the Atomic Energy 

Commission in Washington, DC, where he was Assistant Director for 

Policy and Program Review. From 1973 to 1975, he was head of the 

RAND Physical Sciences Department. From 1975 to 1984, he served 

on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, having been appointed by 

President Gerald Ford and reappointed by President Jimmy Carter. 

During his NRC tenure, Dr. Gilinsky was heavily involved in nuclearexport issues. In 1982 he received Caltech’s Distinguished Alumni 
176

Award. Dr. Gilinsky has a Ph.D. in physics from the California 

Institute of Technology.

DENNIS M. GORMLEY is a Senior Fellow at the Monterey 

Institute’s Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Washington, DC. 

He is also a Senior Lecturer on the faculty of the Graduate School 

of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh. 

Mr. Gormley served for 20 years with Pacific-Sierra Research (PSR) 

as senior vice president and director of its Washington Operations 

staff. He also served on PSR’s Board of Directors. Mr. Gormley has 

frequently chaired or served on U.S. Department of Defense advisory 

committees and frequently furnishes expert testimony to Congress. 

Before joining PSR in 1979, he was head of foreign intelligence at 

the U.S. Army’s Harry Diamond Laboratories in Washington, DC. 

Mr. Gormley has published three books, including Dealing with the 

Threat of Cruise Missiles (London: Oxford University Press, 2001) 

and authored numerous contributions to leading journals and 

newspapers internationally. Mr. Gormley received a BA and MA in 

history from the University of Connecticut.

STEPHEN JIN-WOO KIM studied 19th and 20th century diplomatic 

and military history. At the CNA Corporation, he worked on projects 

for the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Defense Department. Currently, 

he is the principal North Korea country analyst at Z Division at 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Dr. Kim has briefed 

Vice President Cheney, Stephen Hadley, Henry Kissinger, George 

Shultz, and the Defense Policy Board. He is the author of Master of 

Manipulation: Syngman Rhee and the Seoul-Washington Alliance, 1953-

1960 (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2001) and has authored 

unclassified and classified articles on the Koreas, East Asia, international security, and military operations. Dr. Kim received his 

B.A. in history from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign 

Service, writing his thesis on British appeasement policy in the 

1930s. After a stint on Wall Street, he earned his M.A. in international security from Harvard University and his Ph.D. in history 

from Yale University.
177

MITCHELL KUGLER is Director of Strategic Initiatives for the Missile 

Defense Systems division of The Boeing Company. He is responsible 

for leading the execution of Boeing’s international missile defense 

programs with NATO countries, and joined Boeing in 2002 after 

working 10 years for Senator Thad Cochran of Mississippi, currently 

the Appropriations chairman. In 2003 Mr. Kugler was a member 

of a group empanelled by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

International Security Policy to advise the Defense Department on 

policy options related to the nexus of international missile defense 

cooperation, export controls, and the Missile Technology Control 

Regime. Mr. Kugler drafted the National Missile Defense Act of 1999 

(Public Law 106-38), which makes it the policy of the United States to 

deploy a National Missile Defense system when the technology to do 

so is ready. He also helped draft The Proliferation Primer, a 1998 report 

by the Subcommittee on International Security and Proliferation, and 

Senator Cochran’s September 2000 report, Stubborn Things: a Decade 

of Facts about Ballistic Missile Defense. He was the principal editor for 

both of these reports. Mr. Kugler also helped plan, organize, and 

execute the Senate’s rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 

for which he was a recipient of the National Institute for Public 

Policy’s Security and Arms Control Award for 1999. Mr. Kugler 

graduated in 1983 from West Point and served in the U.S. Army for 

5 years as an infantry officer. He obtained his Master of Arts degree 

in National Security Studies from Georgetown University in 1992.

HENRY D. SOKOLSKI is the Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Edcuation Center, a Washington-based nonprofit 

otganization founded in 1994 to promote a better understanding of 

strategic weapons proliferation issues for academics, policymakers, 

and the media. He served from 1989 to 1993 as Deputy for 

Nonproliferation Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and 

earlier in the Office of Net Assessment and as a legislative military 

aide in the U.S. Senate. Mr. Sokolski is the author of Best of Intentions: 

America’s Campaign Against Strategic Weapons Proliferation (Praeger, 

2001), and co-editor with Patrick Clawson, of Checking Iran’s Nuclear 

Ambitions (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004).
178

RICHARD SPEIER served in the federal government in the Office 

of Management and Budget, the Arms Control and Disarmament 

Agency, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). In OSD he 

started what is now a 30-person staff to deal with the proliferation 

threat. Over 10 years he helped design, negotiate, and implement 

the Missile Technology Control Regime. He is now retired from 

government service. He is a consultant near Washington, DC, 

specializing in nonproliferation and counterproliferation. Mr. 

Speier’s recent writings include “MTCR and Missile Defenses: 

Complementary or Competitive?”, Arms Control Today, June 2004; 

and Nonproliferation Sanctions, with Brian Chow and Rae Starr, 

the RAND Corporation, 2001. He has appeared in national and 

international media; has testified before Congress; and has lectured 

in the United States, Europe, Israel, and Russia.

ERNST URICH VON WEIZSÄCKER has been a member of the 

German Parliament since October 1988 and Chairman of the Bundestag 

Committee on Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety 

since October 2002. After undertaking interdisciplinary research in 

Heidleberg for 3 years, he became Professor for Interdisciplinary 

Biology at Essen University in 1972. From 1975 to 1980 he was the 

Founding President of the University of Kassel. In 1981 he became 

a Director at the United Nations Centre for Science and Technology 

for Development, and then, in 1984, a Director of the Institute for 

European Environmental Policy (IEEP) in Bonn, London, and Paris. 

From 1991 to 2000, he was President of the Wuppertal Institute for 

Climate, Environment, and Energy. For the following 2 years, he was 

Chairman of the Parliamentary Enquiry Commission “Globalisation 

of the Economy--Challenges and Responses,” and then for another 2 

years until 2004, he was a Member of the ILO World Commission on 

the Social Dimension of Globalisation. He has been a member of the 

Club of Rome since 1991. Dr. von Weizsäcker studied Chemistry and 

Physics at Hamburg University and graduated in 1965. He received 

his Ph.D. in Biology from Freiburg University in 1969.
179

ALAN P. ZELICOFF is a physician (board certified in Internal 

Medicine 1992, clinical fellowship in Rheumatology, 1983) and 

physicist (AB Princeton, 1975), who has had a varied career including 

clinical practice, teaching, and operations research. In the latter 

roles, he was Senior Scientist in the Center for National Security 

and Arms Control at Sandia National Laboratories from 1989-2003. 

Dr. Zelicoff’s interests include risk and hazard analysis in hospital 

systems and office-based practice, and in technologies for improving 

the responsiveness of public health offices and countering biological 

weapons terrorism. He has traveled extensively in countries of 

the former Soviet Union and has led joint research projects in 

epidemiology of infectious disease, while establishing Internet 

access at Russian and Kazak biological laboratories. Dr. Zelicoff is the 

author of numerous text book chapters and articles in these subjects, 

and is a frequent contributor to Op-Ed pages in the Washington Post 

and other newspapers. Dr. Zelicoff’s latest book is Microbe: Are We 

Ready for the Next Plague? (New York: AMACOM, 2005).