KIM JONG IL AND NORTH KOREA:

THE LEADER AND THE SYSTEM

Andrew Scobell

March 2006

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ISBN 1-58487-235-7
iii

FOREWORD

In the first decade of the 21st century, few national security 

challenges facing the United States are as vexing as that posed by 

North Korea. North Korea is both a paradox and an enigma. It is a 

paradox because on the one hand, by some measures it appears to be 

a very powerful state—possessing the world’s fourth largest armed 

forces, a sizeable arsenal of ballistic missiles, and a worrying nuclear 

program—but on the other hand, it is an economic basket case in 

terms of agricultural output, industrial production, and foreign 

trade exports. North Korea is also an enigma because virtually every 

aspect of the Pyongyang regime is mysterious and puzzling. 

In short, North Korea is difficult for Americans to understand 

and analyze. This difficulty begins with confusion about what kind 

of political system North Korea has and what kind of man leads it. 

In this monograph, Andrew Scobell explores Pyongyang’s political 

dynamics and seeks to shed light on the political system of North 

Korea and its leader. This monograph is the second in a series 

titled “Demystifying North Korea” published by the Strategic 

Studies Institute. Forthcoming monographs will examine the military, 

economic dimensions, and future scenarios for North Korea.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

ANDREW SCOBELL is associate research professor at the Strategic 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College; and adjunct professor 

of political science at Dickinson College. Born and raised in Hong 

Kong, he joined the Strategic Studies Institute in 1999 and is the 

institute’s specialist on Asia-Pacific security. Prior to his current 

position, he taught at the University of Louisville, Kentucky; and 

Rutgers University, New Jersey. He is the author of China’s Use 

of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March

(Cambridge University Press, 2003), ten monographs and reports, 

and some 20 articles in such journals as Armed Forces and Society, 

Asian Survey, China Quarterly, Comparative Politics, Current History, 

and Political Science Quarterly. He has also written a dozen book 

chapters and edited or co-edited four conference volumes. Dr. Scobell 

holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University.
v

SUMMARY

Much hyperbole surrounds the political regime in the Democratic 

People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea). Many analysts 

argue that North Korea is a unique political system. What kind of 

regime is the DPRK, and what kind of leader does it have?

A variety of labels are given to the North Korean regime. These 

include likening the regime to an organized crime family and to 

a corporatist organism. There are certainly merits to each of these 

approaches, but each has its limitations. Pyongyang does share some 

of the attributes of organized crime and certainly engages in criminal 

activity in a systematic and calculating manner. This pattern of 

illicit behavior includes the production and distribution of narcotics 

as well as the counterfeiting of foreign currencies, cigarettes, and 

pharmaceuticals. But the DPRK is more than a crime family—it 

possesses a massive conventional military force as well as significant 

strategic forces. Moreover, the regime continues to brainwash, 

imprison, or starve North Koreans, inflicting untold misery and 

death on its people. Corporatism, meanwhile, may provide insights 

into certain aspects of the system, but its utility is limited by the 

confusion that surrounds understanding of this concept.

Certainly North Korea is distinct politically, but it also has 

significant commonalities with various regime types and authority 

structures. Pyongyang is a highly centralized and militarized 

bureaucratic regime organized around an all-powerful leader. This 

monograph examines the leader and the system, and identifies the 

regime type. The author contends that the North Korean political 

system is best conceived as a totalitarian regime that, although 

weakened, remains remarkably resilient. After analyzing the key 

elements of totalitarianism, he argues that the system’s greatest test 

will probably come after the death of Kim Jong Il. 

While the totalitarian regime may not long survive Kim’s passing, 

one cannot assume that the system will collapse. Rather, the end 

of totalitarianism may simply mean that the DPRK will enter a 

new “post-totalitarian” phase similar to the paths taken by other 

communist systems such as the Soviet Union and China. While the 
vi

latter term may be a good fit to describe China’s political system in 

the 1990s and first decade of the 21st century, it seems inaccurate to 

describe North Korea. North Korea has not undergone any process 

of “de-Kimification”: Kim Il Sung remains a deity in 21st century 

North Korea and criticism or reappraisal is unthinkable. Moreover, 

no one has contemplated criticizing or challenging his legacy because, 

by all accounts, he remains universally revered by DPRK citizens, 

including defectors. Furthermore, any official reevaluation of Kim 

Il Sung is extremely unlikely because the regime is currently led by 

Kim’s son. The most accurate way to characterize North Korea today 

is as an eroding totalitarian regime.

While totalitarianism is a powerful and intimidating system, 

it places tremendous strain on a state and a society—demanding 

constant activity and mobilization of personnel and exploitation 

of resources. The costs of maintaining heightened ideological 

indoctrination, an ever-vigilant coercive apparatus, and a large 

national defense organization are high and ultimately debilitating. To 

maintain this for decades results in fatigue and burnout. Eventually 

leaders and followers reach a point where both are physically and 

mentally exhausted, and the country’s infrastructure and resources 

become devastated. North Korea’s elite and ordinary people appear 

to be approaching this point. But this fatigue and burnout does not 

appear to produce much in the way of protest or dissent, let alone 

revolt; most likely the majority of people in North Korea are simply 

too tired to do much more than focus their time and energy on 

providing for the basic needs of their families. 

An absolute dictator still rules the regime. While the regime 

continues to hold a monopoly of the instruments of coercion, 

there has been some slippage or erosion in the defining features 

of totalitarianism. First of all, Kim Jong Il, although he is virtually 

an absolute dictator, appears to take into account the opinions of 

others the way his father did not. And ideology no longer appears 

to be so focused on transforming the state and society and more 

on the instrumental goals of economic recovery, development, 

and firming up regime power. While a condition of terror remains 

palpable, it is no longer all pervasive, and individuals are able to 

navigate or circumvent the system without fearing that they face dire 
vii

consequences. As a result of the shift in ideology and alleviation of 

the climate of terror, the regime has become “corrupted” literally as 

bribery is rampant, and figuratively as the regime seeks to preserve 

its power and status. Meanwhile, the Stalinist centrally planned 

economy has been seriously eroded, and the monopoly of mass 

communication has loosened significantly. The regime has attempted 

to repair the latter two elements, but it is not clear to what extent this 

will be successful.

The regime appears to be stable and not on the brink of collapse. 

While it is difficult to speculate about the longevity of North Korea 

as a political entity, it is more manageable to forecast the future 

of totalitarianism in the DPRK. Totalitarian regimes rarely endure 

longer than several decades and almost never survive the passing 

of the absolute dictator. In fact, Pyongyang is unique in that it is 

the only totalitarian regime to weather a leadership transition (from 

Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il). Indeed, North Korea is the world’s 

“longest lasting totalitarian regime, having spanned some 4 decades 

and surviving generational leadership succession.” Perhaps none of 

the numerous challenges the regime faces is more daunting than the 

succession question. Kim has probably at most 10-15 years in which 

to pave the way for one of his offspring to succeed him. If he lives 

long enough, it is possible he could be successful. What is less likely 

is that totalitarianism could survive another leadership transition. At 

some point, the totalitarian regime will simply collapse or weaken to 

the extent that it becomes a post-totalitarianism system.

Possibly the clearest indication of the status and fate of Pyongyang’s totalitarian regime over the next 10 years or so will come in 

how the arrangements for the succession to Kim Jong Il are handled. 

Is there evidence that a particular individual is being groomed to 

succeed Kim? The answer appears to be “yes.” Some other key 

indicators to monitor are signs of dissent among elites and masses, 

especially fissures that might occur within the party or military. By 

carefully charting trends, observers can make it less likely that they 

will be caught off guard by the actions of North Korea’s leader or 

changes in its political system.

KIM JONG IL AND NORTH KOREA:

THE LEADER AND THE SYSTEM

Much hyperbole surrounds the political regime in the Democratic 

People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Much of it focuses on North 

Korea’s enigmatic dictator, Kim Jong Il, and his nuclear program. 

Certainly, he has been the target of much derision and the butt of 

many jokes because of his appearance, reclusiveness, and speculation 

about his predilections. But the Pyongyang regime is more than 

simply a garden variety dictator who happens to possess weapons of 

mass destruction (WMD). The DPRK is also a large bureaucratic and 

organizational entity. This begs the question: What kind of regime is 

the DPRK, and what kind of leader does it have?

Many analysts argue that North Korea is a unique political system. 

Certainly, it is distinct politically to the extent that each country has 

its own specific characteristics. But North Korea also has significant 

commonalities with various regime types and authority structures. 

Pyongyang is a highly centralized and militarized bureaucratic 

regime organized around an all-powerful leader. This monograph 

examines the leader and the system. The author identifies the regime 

type and analyzes its key elements. He contends that North Korea’s 

political system is best conceived of as a totalitarian regime that 

although weakened, remains remarkably resilient. The monograph 

argues that the greatest test that the system is likely to face will come 

after the death of Kim Jong Il. While the totalitarian regime may not 

long survive Kim’s passing, one cannot assume that the system will 

collapse. Rather, the end of totalitarianism may simply mean that 

the DPRK will enter a new “post-totalitarian” phase similar to the 

paths taken by other communist systems such as the Soviet Union 

and China following the passing of Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, 

respectively.

A variety of labels are given to the North Korean regime, 

including likening it to an organized crime family and to a 

corporatist organism. North Korea also has been depicted as what 

might be labeled “fragmented totalitarianism.”1 There are certainly 

merits to each of these approaches, but each has its limitations. 

Pyongyang shares some of the attributes of organized crime and 
certainly engages in criminal activity in a systematic and calculating 

manner. This pattern of illicit behavior includes the production and 

distribution of narcotics, notably heroin and methamphetamines, 

which reportedly provide hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars 

worth of income to Pyongyang annually. In addition, North Korea 

is known to engage in the counterfeiting of foreign currencies, 

cigarettes, and pharmaceuticals.2 Nevertheless, Pyongyang is much 

more than a variant of a crime family such as the fictional ones 

depicted in the Mario Puzo’s The Godfather or Home Box Office’s The 

Sopranos. For a start, neither Don Corleone nor Tony Soprano ran a 

country about the size of Mississippi, controlled the world’s fourth 

largest military, or could count on the powerful emotional appeal of 

nationalism to the reinforce the ties of personal and familial loyalty 

in their organizations (although ethnic loyalty certainly plays a role 

for both fictional crime bosses).3 However, as analyst David Asher 

states: “. . . North Korea has become a ‘soprano state’—a government 

guided by a . . . leadership whose actions, attitudes, and affiliations 

increasingly resemble those of an organized crime family more than 

a normal nation.” Asher asserts that, as a result: “North Korea is the 

only government in the world today that can be identified as being 

actively involved in directing crime as a central part of its national 

economic strategy and foreign policy.”4

Moreover, while corporatism may provide insights into certain 

aspects of the system, its utility is limited by the confusion that 

surrounds understanding of this concept.5

Finally, “fragmented totalitarianism” is a fuzzy term, but 

“fragmented authoritarianism” does not seem to be much more 

appropriate. The concept of “fragmented totalitarianism” is 

problematic since it amounts to an oxymoron: if power is truly 

fragmented in a regime, then it certainly does not qualify as totalitarian 

(see Figure 1).6 A more useful term and concept, post-totalitarianism, 

is discussed below.

While the latter term may be a good fit to describe China’s political 

system in the 1990s and first decade of the 21st century, it seems 

inaccurate to describe North Korea that way.7 For one, North Korea 

has not undergone any process of “de-Kimification” to parallel the 

serious reassessment of Mao that China undertook in the late 1970s 

and early 1980s, let alone the more thorough “De-Stalinization” 
	 TOTALITARIANISM	 POST-TOTALITARIANISM

1.	 Absolute dictator and ruling party	 Dictator’s power weakens

	 (monistic)	 (pluralism and dissent emerge)

2.	 Transformational ideology	 Instrumental ideology

	 (totalist/utopian goals)	 (economic development and party rule)

3.	 Terror all-pervasive	 Terror no longer pervasive

4.	 Monopoly of coercive apparatus	 Monopoly maintained

5.	 Centrally planned economy	 Eroded

6.	 Monopoly of mass communication	 Eroded

note: Compiled by author.

Figure 1. Totalitarianism and Post-Totalitarianism.

spearheaded by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in the mid-1950s. 

Kim Il Sung remains a deity in 21st century North Korea and criticism 

or reappraisal is unthinkable. Moreover, no one has contemplated 

criticizing or challenging his legacy because, by all accounts, he 

remains universally revered by DPRK citizens, including defectors.8

Furthermore, any official reevaluation of Kim Il Sung is extremely 

unlikely because the regime is currently led by Kim’s son. I contend 

that the most accurate way to characterize North Korea today is as 

an eroding totalitarian regime.9

TOTALITARIANISM IN ONE FAMILY

The North Korean political system most closely approximates 

totalitarianism.10 It possesses the six characteristics of totalitarianism 

identified by Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski half a century 

ago. The DPRK has an absolute dictator and mass party, an elaborate 

ideology, its people live in a condition of terror under the thumb of an 

extremely repressive coercive apparatus with a centralized economy, 

and the regime exerts almost total control over the mediums of mass 

communication.11

A central element of the regime and the critical element of 

the coercive apparatus is the military. North Korea’s military is 
not examined in this monograph but will be the focus of the next 

monograph in this series. Suffice it here to make two observations. 

First, the DPRK is “undoubtedly the most militarized . . . [regime] on 

earth.”12 Second, although communist regimes are typically dubbed 

“party-states” (because the communist party and government 

bureaucracies tend to be heavily intertwined or enmeshed), it is more 

accurate to call these regimes “party-military-states” to underscore 

the prominent role routinely played by the armed forces.13 In short, 

the role of the military in North Korea is so important that it merits 

a monograph devoted exclusively to the subject. The political 

landscape of the DPRK is dominated by three massive bureaucratic 

organizations (see Figure 2): “the Party” (the Korean Workers’ Party, 

or KWP), “the State” (the DPRK), and “the Military” (the Korean 

People’s Army, KPA, or Army). 

Although the extreme degree of control and repression that existed 

while Kim Il Sung was alive has weakened noticeably, today North 

Korea remains a country where the regime seeks to control not only 

what the populace does, but also what it thinks. However, the DPRK 

has not evolved into post-totalitarianism yet. Post-totalitarianism 

is markedly weaker than totalitarianism but still distinct from and 

more powerful than authoritarianism (Figure 1). 

Under post-totalitarianism, regime control loosens significantly 

and the dictator’s power weakens, ideology ceases to be 

“transformational” and terror is no longer all-pervasive, while 

central planning and the monopoly of mass communication both 

erode. But the coercive apparatus remains firmly in place.14 By this 

yardstick, North Korea is not there just yet: Kim Jong Il may feel 

that his power is not as absolute as his father’s and ideology may 

be shifting from transformational to instrumental, but the DPRK 

has not entered post-totalitarianism. The regime leadership has yet 

to shift its ideological emphasis from “utopia” to “development.”15

Pluralism and dissent have not yet emerged (although these 

manifestations may not be so far off) and the coercive apparatus still 

seems largely effective (with some exceptions), but a condition of 

terror appears to be rather less pervasive. One clear manifestation 

of these changes is that Pyongyang is no longer capable of 

preventing migration within the country or out migration to China 

by hungry or starving people. It is estimated that hundreds of 
Figure 2: The Party-Military-State.

Korean People’s Army

(Supreme Commander: Kim Jong Il)

PARTY STRUCTURE

Korean Worker’s Party

MILITARY STRUCTURE

Korean People’s Army

STATE STRUCTURE

Democratic People’s

Republic of Korea

Cabinet

Secretariat Departments

Politburo

Party Congress

Security Service

Central Committee

(General Secretary: Kim Jong Il)

Supreme People’s

Assembly

Ministry of People’s

Armed Forces

Ministry of People’s

Security

NATIONAL DEFENSE COMMISSION

(Chair: Kim Jong Il)

Kim Jong Il

State Security

Department

Ministries

KEYInactiveRubberstamp

NOTE: Compiled by author from numerous sources.
6

thousands of North Koreans have traversed the country in search 

of food and 100,000 or more people have sought at least temporary 

refuge in China. Moreover, thousands have attempted to defect, 

mostly via China.16 While North Korea’s centrally planned economy 

has eroded considerably over the past decade or so, it remains alive 

and the regime appears to be in the process of reactivating it (see 

below). The DPRK’s monopoly of mass communication has also 

been under assault, but the regime has been fighting back with some 

success. 

Absolute Dictator and Mass Party.

Kim Jong Il appears very much in control of North Korea. While 

there have been periodic reports since Kim Il Sung’s death in July 

1994 that the younger Kim’s power and influence were eroding, 

there is no firm indication that this was or is the case. In late 2004, 

for example, speculation was rampant about the reason behind the 

removal of many public portraits of Kim Jong Il. Did this mean a 

scaling back of the cult of personality or possibly that a power 

struggle was underway?17 Many reporters and analysts overlooked 

a more mundane explanation: that the portraits may have been taken 

down for cleaning or updating.18

According to those who have first-hand experience dealing 

with Kim Jong Il, he seems to be in firm control of North Korea. 

Madeleine Albright reported that Kim answered 14 questions on 

North Korea’s missile program posed by the Clinton administration 

in her presence by himself without once “consulting the expert by 

his side.”19 Moreover, Hwang Jong Yop, the highest level defector 

from Pyongyang who had many years to observe Kim’s behavior 

and grasp the structure of power in North Korea, stated: “Who is in 

charge? No one [else] has real power. . . . Only Kim Jong Il has real 

power. . . .”20

Kim Jong Il did engage in a decades-long effort to claim his 

father’s mantle, and the dynastic transition from Kim the father to 

Kim the son seems to have been quite smooth.21 This is not altogether 

surprising, given that the elder Kim began making preparations 

for the hereditary succession as early as 1972 and the younger Kim 

spent at least 22 years as an “understudy.”22 The younger Kim’s rare 
appearances and apparent reluctance to speak in public perhaps 

reflect a combination of the so-called “successor’s dilemma” and 

a desire to project appropriate Confucian deference for a father by 

his son rather than shyness or a dislike of being on display.23 The 

dilemma means that while the heir apparent tries to prepare for the 

day when he/she will assume the top position of leadership, he/

she is careful not to overshadow or antagonize the older leader and 

remain sufficiently deferential. This dynamic has proved challenging 

for leadership successions in other communist systems such as 

China.24 In the case of North Korea, successor Kim seemed very 

adept at handling this dilemma. According to Dae Sook Suh: “Kim 

Jong Il was careful not to upstage his father.”25 The younger Kim 

skillfully followed his “survival strategy.”26

Kim Jong Il: The Hardest Working Man in Show Business. Perceptions 

of Kim Jong Il have undergone a metamorphosis from the image of 

a reclusive playboy to that of a driven dictator. Rumors abounded 

about his drinking, womanizing, and penchant for fast cars. But 

in recent years, Kim has undergone a dramatic public relations 

makeover, becoming a personable and engaging tyrant: a thinking 

man, well-informed, with a hands-on leadership style.27

He proved a gracious host to Republic of Korea President Kim 

Dae Jung in mid-2000 and several months later to then Secretary of 

State Madeleine Albright when each visited Pyongyang. Visitors 

invariably remark on the charm and conversation skills of their North 

Korean host. Albright reports that her meetings with Kim in late2000 confirmed reports from Chinese, Russian, and South Korean 

sources that he was “knowledgeable, good humored, and relatively 

normal.” The former Secretary of State, who had the opportunity to 

engage in extended discussions with the dictator and observe her 

host’s behavior during a 2-day visit to Pyongyang, remarked that, 

while Kim was “isolated, [he was] not uninformed,” and impressed 

her as “an intelligent man who knew what he wanted.”28

So what does Kim Jong Il want?29 Kim appears to have big plans 

for his country: he apparently has a vision of North Korea becoming 

a high technology Mecca: he visited China’s Silicon Valley on the 

outskirts of Beijing in 2001. His most senior military leader, Marshal 

Jo Myon Rok, visited the original Silicon Valley in 2000 during a brief 

California stopover on the return leg of his trip to meet President Bill 
Clinton in the White House. Kim reportedly keeps well-informed 

by watching Cable News Network and surfing the worldwide web. 

For some reason, he asked Madeleine Albright for the address of the 

Department of State’s website.30

The key events in his metamorphosis from reclusive playboy 

to driven dictator occurred in 2000: the summit he held with 

President Kim Dae Jung of the Republic of Korea in Pyongyang in 

mid-June and the late October visit to North Korea of Secretary of 

State Albright. The most impressive performance was his gracious 

hosting of the inter-Korea summit in June 2000: what I call “Kim 

Jong Il’s coming out party.” President Kim traveled to Pyongyang 

for an historic meeting between the leaders of two Koreas. The North 

Korean leader displayed a confident, rational, and amicable public 

persona that shattered the prevailing image of him as a reclusive and 

manic eccentric.31 This impressive public relations effort to promote 

a certain image to the North Korea people, to South Korea (Kim was 

appropriately deferential to his older guest from Seoul), and the 

world probably makes Kim worthy of the label “the hardest working 

man in show business.”

In a very real sense, Kim Jong Il is engaged in the essence of 

show business: writing scripts, directing casts, building sets, and 

playing the leading roles himself in major cinematic and theatrical 

productions. All of this is done in order to project an image and a 

storyline—a version of “reality”—that is believable, credible, and 

appealing to his foreign and/or domestic audiences. Kim appears 

to be the producer, director, and leading man in his own feature 

film.32 The epic is without parallel in terms of the scope, expense, and 

sustained effort that goes into production. By most accounts, Kim 

has a long held fascination with movie making. His first post of any 

real responsibility under his father was in charge of propaganda (See 

Figure 3). In this position he oversaw the production of movies.33

His determination to produce quality full length feature films drove 

him to arrange the kidnapping of renowned South Korean movie 

director Shin Sang Ok and his actress ex-wife Choi Eun Hee in 1978. 

He reportedly has a huge film collection and by his own admission 

regularly watches foreign movies.34 Kim also takes an interest in 

entertainment/propaganda extravaganzas. He told Albright that he 

choreographed the Las Vegas-style showgirl stage show provided 
as after dinner entertainment for the visiting chief U.S. diplomat.35

Kim probably also had a major hand in designing the massive 

Nuremburg-style rally at the stadium that Albright witnessed the 

day before.

1941: Kim Jong Il born in Soviet Far East and lives there in early years of life

1949: Mother dies

1950-52: Lives in China during Korean War

1959: Visits Moscow with his father

1964: Graduates from Kim Il Sung University and becomes #2 official in Korean 

	 Workers’ Party (KWP) Propaganda Department

1972: Designated as successor by father

1973: Appointed to direct KWP’s Organization Department

1980: Appointed to KWP’s Politburo and to 2nd ranking position on KWP’s

	 Military Commission

1983: Visits China

1992: Promoted to Marshal and supreme commander of Korean People’s Army

1993: Appointed chair of National Defense Council

1994: Kim Il Sung dies

1997: Becomes Chair of the KWP

2000: Visits China (May), holds summit with South Korean President Kim Dae

	 Jung (June), hosts visits by Russian President Putin (July) and U.S.

	 Secretary of State Albright (October)

2001: Visits China (January) and Russia (July-August) and hosts visit by Chinese

	 leader Jiang Zemin (September)

2002: Visits Russia (August), and hosts visit by Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi

	 (September)

2004: Visits China (April), and hosts visit by Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi (May)

2005: Hosts President Hu Jintao of China (October)

2006: Visits China (January)

NOTE: Compiled by author from numerous sources.

Figure 3. A Kim Jong Il Timeline.

Kim also appears to be very engaged in ruling North Korea—

constantly issuing directives and making telephone calls.36 He 

probably adopted these micromanagement tendencies from his 

father.37 One recent assessment of Kim Jong Il described him as 

“Jimmy Carter on an authoritarian tear.”38 This parallel with Jimmy 

Carter may actually be both an accurate and appropriate one, 

although not in the flippant way that the author had intended: the 

characterization appears intended to reassure readers. Whereas on 
10

the face of it, this appears to put Kim in a somewhat positive light, 

delving more into the implications of this depiction puts a more 

disconcerting and even alarming spin on it. 

Former president Jimmy Carter is without a doubt an extremely 

bright man, a dedicated public servant, and an outstanding 

humanitarian. Arguably, however, these fine attributes did not 

make him the most effective president.39 Carter had a reputation, 

perhaps undeserved, as a micro manager who, unwilling to delegate, 

immersed himself in mastering the details and minutiae of an issue.40

Moreover, according to some accounts, Carter was also, belying 

his “aw shucks” easy-going common man persona, “[a] man of 

abundant self-confidence in his own abilities. . . .” At the very least, 

according to one presidential scholar: “Carter [had] acquired or let 

show a high degree of arrogance [as president-elect] . . . and during 

the early months of his presidency.”41

If the parallel between Carter and Kim in this regard is even 

partially appropriate or accurate, this is a frightening and even 

terrifying thought: a Carteresque leader in Pyongyang, but without 

any of the Georgian’s moral scruples, who operates in a system 

devoid of any democratic checks and balances. Surrounded and 

advised by sycophants, it is highly unlikely that Kim gets the kind of 

truthful reporting he desperately needs to make the best decisions. 

The North Korean leader is probably aware of this problem and tries 

to compensate by adopting a variety of means. These include his 

own informal network of informers around the country who report 

“directly to his office,”42 and his well-known habit of visiting locales 

for impromptu “on-the-spot-guidance” appearances. While these 

efforts may help mitigate the problem, they have their limits and 

could even exacerbate it in some ways. 

In his appearances around the country, it may not be so easy for 

Kim Jong Il to counter the “Potemkin Village effect.” A Potemkin 

Village is a false construct intended to fool a visiting leader or 

dignitary by portraying a picturesque or idyllic setting of a village, 

farm, factory, or military unit to mask a far less pleasant reality.43

There is a long history in communist regimes and dictatorships 

generally of parading dignitaries through specially constructed 

showpieces. Even savvy dictators, including Mao Zedong, have 

been fooled by these efforts, so it is very likely that Kim Jong Il and 
11

his father have been fooled also.44 The North Korean capital city of 

Pyongyang might be best categorized as a “Potemkin City” where 

nothing is as it seems.45 Journalist and author Bradley Martin writes 

that he strongly suspected that the full-time jobs of some North 

Korean citizens are riding the subways all day. The purpose of this is 

to give the impression of a modern, efficient, and dynamic city.46 The 

same may be true of a showpiece hospital on the itinerary for foreign 

visitors to Pyongyang.47 It is not clear if Kim Jong Il succumbs to the 

deceptions of his own regime.

A Rational Leader. However quirky Kim Jong Il is, he is not crazy. 

He is quite rational, although his calculus of rationality is probably 

“bounded” by the specific context of his North Korea environment 

and his (mis)perceptions of the conditions inside and outside his 

country.48 In other words, Kim seems to make decisions based on 

his own evaluation of reality, although his assessment of reality and 

decisionmaking calculus are distinct and limited by his own experience 

and exposure to the outside world. The preceding paragraph has 

discussed the North Korean dictator’s state of knowledge about the 

situation inside his own country. What about his level of knowledge 

and understanding about the world beyond its borders? 

While Kim has made visits overseas, with the exception of 

childhood sojourns in the Soviet Far East (where he was born) and 

China (for about 2 years during the Korea War), these have been 

few, brief, and limited to a handful of countries. In 1957 Kim visited 

Moscow with his father, and 2 years later he accompanied his father 

to Eastern European capitals. The Younger Kim has made at least two 

further visits to Russia (in 2001 and 2002), and at least five visits to 

China (in 1983, 2000, 2001, 2004, and 2006).49 During visits to Russia 

and China, most of the time Kim remained inside a cocoon—a train 

specially fitted with all the comforts and security of home.

50 Kim has 

hinted that he has made secret trips to other countries, including 

Indonesia.51 Other than through actual visits, his information and 

impressions of other countries and cultures are likely gleaned from 

movies, the internet, and satellite television.52 But even granting 

that Kim has done more traveling overseas than we are aware 

of, the question remains why he has not done so more often and 

publicly. He may not enjoy traveling, especially air travel (he has a 

strong preference for train travel), he may not like to be out of the 
12

country for too long (either because of his need to micromanage, or 

out of concern that a power vacuum might develop or be filled in 

his absence). Another reason might be that he feels uncomfortable 

venturing outside of the world’s largest film set where stage effects 

are out of his control. 

Why has he yet to visit Seoul more than 5 years after he accepted 

Republic of Korea (ROK) President Kim Dae Jung’s invitation to go 

south “at an appropriate time in the future”? Why has he not visited 

the United States or even expressed an interest in going? The answer 

to these questions might be that he fears for his safety.53 Kim is very 

likely concerned about the threat of assassination. This may explain 

why he insists on secrecy regarding his trips both at home and abroad. 

Another answer might be that he believes he has nothing to gain from 

such trips. Kim Dae Jung has noted that the most controversial part 

of the joint statement issued at the conclusion of the inter-Korean 

summit of June 2000 was the sentence mentioning that Kim Jong 

Il expressed a willingness to visit Seoul. The North Korean leader 

reportedly told his South Korean counterpart that there were people 

in North Korea who would strongly oppose such a trip.54 Another 

reason for his reluctance to visit Seoul or Washington might be that, 

in East Asian cultures, it is usually subordinate leaders that travel to 

visit their superiors and not the other way around.55 Thus, visitors 

to Pyongyang appear to be supplicants to the Dear Leader whereas 

when Kim visits other capitals, he can be can be cast in the role of 

supplicant. This may help explain why Kim insists on considerable 

secrecy and a media blackout of his activities when he travels 

abroad.

In my view, the only way one can conclude Kim Jong Il is “crazy” 

or a “madman” is if we fall into the trap of mirror imaging and assume 

that a political leader in Pyongyang thinks like a political leader in 

Washington or London. While Kim may not necessarily appear to be 

always acting rationally on the world stage, he is acting rationally 

within the context of the North Korean political system and his own 

frame of reference. Of course, all national leaders operate in at least 

two arenas; that of domestic politics and that of international politics. 

Kim is no exception in playing two-level games.

But this begs the question: If the North Korean leader was indeed 

crazy, how would one know it? If one makes the presumption that 
13

Kim Jong Il is the key decisionmaker in Pyongyang, then one assumes 

that the decisions the regime executes are his. If we consider regime 

decisions since at least the death of Kim Il Sung in mid-1994, the 

record is quite impressive. Kim Jong Il has managed to complete a 

successful leadership succession and stay in power for more than 

a decade; he has maintained his regime, and in the process ridden 

out a severe famine and managed (but certainly far from resolved) 

a systemic economic crisis; and he has adeptly juggled his country’s 

relations with neighboring countries and great powers, most notably 

the United States, while extracting cash and various forms of aid, 

including food and fuel, without having to make much in the way 

of concrete concessions in return. In short, dealt an extremely weak 

hand of cards, Kim has proved to be an extremely skillful poker 

player. 

Finally, before putting the issue of Kim’s rationality to rest, it may 

be instructive to compare Kim to other absolute dictators from the 

tyrant hall of infamy who ruled totalitarian regimes. If Kim is crazy, 

he is crazy the way Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong were crazy—“like 

a fox”!56 The North Korean leader is skilled at manipulating and 

controlling people. It would be a mistake to dismiss Kim’s drinking 

parties as simply evidence of his debauchery and excesses. Rather, 

as former Pyongyang insider Hwang Jong Yop incisively observes, 

these occasions should be seen as “an important element of Kim Jong 

Il’s style of politics.” These events provide important opportunities 

for him to reaffirm his status and authority over key subordinates 

and promote a sense of loyalty and camaraderie among his core 

supporters.57 These functions provide a way for attendees to verify 

that they are regime insiders—in essence the Dear Leader’s anointed 

few. These drinking parties are similar to the types of male bonding 

activities hosted by government and business leaders in other East 

Asian countries, including Japan and South Korea, to cement and 

maintain relationships in the workplace.58

Kim also deliberately tries to keep people off balance and guessing 

about his next move. These efforts are all aimed at making him 

appear formidable and even dangerous. Kim reportedly remarked: 

“We must create an environment as if surrounded by fog so our 

enemies cannot see us directly and clearly.”59 Kim Jong Il, like the 

deceased leaders of the former Soviet Union and China, appears 
14

to be a master of political survival: despite famines and various 

crises—foreign and domestic—he remains in power. And like Stalin 

and Mao, he has been quite successful at developing a nuclear 

weapons program (building, of course, upon his father’s efforts).60

But Kim does not appear to be crazy in the self-destructive way that, 

say Hitler, proved to be. The Nazi leader proved far less adept at 

knowing his limitations and limitations of German national power 

than the infamous above-mentioned communist Soviet and Chinese 

dictators, both of whom died in their beds of natural causes with 

their regimes intact. Kim might well possess most, if not all, of the 

core characteristics of “malignant narcissism.” However, this does 

not necessarily mean that such a personality disorder will prove 

fatal.61

Kim appears eccentric, egotistical, ruthless, and extremely 

ambitious.62 His peculiar tastes in Western fashion and fascination 

with show business and the arts make for an odd mix. Observers 

often comment on his penchant for platform shoes and bouffant hair 

styles, almost certainly intended to make him appear taller that his 

five foot-two inch stature.63

Kim is also egotistical, appearing to subscribe to Louis XIV’s 

dictum: “I am the state” [L’ etat c’est moi.]. In short, he believes that he 

personifies North Korea and, by extension, the hopes and aspirations 

of the entire Korean people. And following this, he believes that he 

should be succeeded by one of his own offspring. Kim is also, in 

the words of Bradley Martin, an “insensitive and brutal despot.”64

He has ruthlessly purged those whom he deems to be disloyal or 

competitors, retains a vast gulag system, and seems unmoved by the 

mass starvation and continued malnourishment of his people. Finally, 

he appears to be extremely ambitious and relatively unfazed by the 

significant setbacks his regime has experienced over the past 15 years. 

He continues to believe that his regime can survive and recover from 

its ordeals. He seems to believe that North Korea should continue 

to have a “civilian” nuclear program at least as much out a matter 

of national pride and prestige as for purposes of energy security.

In Kim’s mind, all advanced countries—including Japan and South 

Korea—have nuclear power, at least for peaceful purposes. Since the 

DPRK is an advanced country and a major power, it stands to reason 

that North Korea must possess a nuclear power industry.
15

There is perhaps no better gauge of Kim’s confidence in the 

continuation of the regime than indications of plans and preparations 

for a dynastic succession. Kim has at least three sons and two 

daughters (born to three different mothers) to select from to succeed 

him as the leader of the regime: an eldest son born in 1971, two other 

sons born in 1981 and 1983, and two daughters, one born in 1974 and 

another born in 1987 (see Figure 4). While it does appear that Kim is 

preparing the way for one of his offspring to succeed him, it is not 

yet clear which one has been anointed. Speculation about the most 

likely candidate abounds, especially after an October 2, 2002, essay 

appeared in the Nodong Shinmun, the official newspaper of the KWP, 

seemed intended to pave the way. The essay claimed: “Already a 

long time ago, the late Kim Il Sung expressed his determination to 

win the final victory of the Korean revolution by his son, if not by 

himself, or by his grandson, if not by his son. President Kim Il Sung 

reportedly expressed this determination at the secret camp on Mount 

Paektu in the spring of 1943.”65

As paramount leader, Kim Jong Il is virtually an absolute dictator, 

but he does not appear to be worshiped like his father was. Defectors 

invariably say while they admired and revered Kim Il Sung, they 

are indifferent or even contemptuous of Kim Jong Il.66 Thus the 

charismatic legitimacy of the younger Kim seems to be minimal, if not 

nonexistent. But for the time being, this seems to be more than offset 

by the traditional and, perhaps, to a lesser extent the rational-legal 

basis of his authority to rule North Korea (the traditional dimensions 

of Kim’s legitimacy are discussed in more detail below in the section 

on ideology). 

This discussion raises questions about the likelihood of Kim 

Jong Il being able to engineer successfully a hereditary succession. 

Leadership succession has been an insurmountable obstacle for 

totalitarian regimes and an enormous challenge for communist 

political systems. North Korea is remarkable as the sole exception: 

the only totalitarian regime to survive a succession.67 Therefore, while 

the chances of a successful dynastic succession occurring in the 21st 

century North Korea may be daunting, the possibility should not be 

dismissed out of hand.68 Indeed, in late 2005 there was considerable 

speculation that Kim Jong Il is grooming his second eldest son, Kim 

Jong Chol, as his successor (Figure 4). Recent indications of this 
16

Kim Il Sung = Kim Jong Suk (f)

(1911-1994) (d. 1949)

Kim Kyong Hui (f) = Chang Song Taek

Kim Jong Il = [1] Song Hye Rim (f) [2] Kim Yong Suk (f) [3] Ko Yong Hui (f)

(b. 1942?) (d. 2002)

Kim Jong Nam = Shin Jonh Hui (f) Kim Sol Song (f)

(b.1971) (b. 1974)

Kim Jong Chol Kim Jong Un Name Unknown (f)

(b. 1981) (b. 1983) (b. 1987)

b = bornd = died(f) = female

Figure 4. The Kim Family.

NOTE: Compiled by author.
17

•	 Song Hye Rim: mother of Kim Jong Il’s eldest son, Jong Nam. A North

Korean actress and estranged from Kim Jong Il. Lived in Moscow until her

death in 2002.

•	 Kim Yong Suk: mother of Kim Jong Il’s favorite daughter, Sol Song.

•	 Ko Yong Hui: mother of three of Kim Jong Il’s three children: Jong Chol,

Jong Un and a daughter.

•	 Kim Jong Nam: eldest son of Kim Jong Il. Jong Nam studied in Moscow and Geneva. He reportedly speaks French, English, and Russian.

Believed to travel abroad frequently under assumed names, he was

deported from Japan in 2001 when he was discovered to be traveling on

a forged Dominican Republic passport. He is believed to be married with

a young son. A possible candidate to succeed his father.

•	 Kim Jong Chol: second oldest son of Kim Jong Il. Jong Chol reportedly

studied in Europe and is believed to be working in the Propaganda

Department of the Korean Workers’ Party. A possible candidate to succeed his father.

•	 Kim Jong Un: youngest son of Kim Jong Il. Little is known about him.

•	 Name Unknown: daughter of Kim Jong Il, and sister of Jong Chol and

Jong Un.

•	 Kim Sol Song: favorite daughter of Kim Jong Il. Sol Song followed in her

father’s footsteps, studied political economy at Kim Il Sung University.

She has accompanied her father on inspection tours in North Korea.

Source: Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader, chapter 37.

Figure 4. The Kim Family (concluded).

include the purported creation in 2004, of two new offices in the 

KWP to promote and prepare the 20-something youngster for his 

future role and rumors that Jong Chol was introduced to visiting 

Chinese President Hu Jintao during the latter’s visit to Pyongyang 

in October 2005.69

The Korean Workers’ Party. Officially founded on October 10, 

1945, the KWP is formally the ruling party of the DPRK. Perhaps a 

more significant date might be August 29, 1946, when the Korean 

Communist Party-North Korean Bureau, led by Kim Il Sung and the 

New People’s Party under Kim Tu Bong merged to form the KWP. 

According to historian Charles Armstrong, the new entity, numbering 

several hundred thousand members, “immediately embarked on an 

energetic program of recruitment and organizational growth.”70 The 
18

KWP began as a classic Leninist party that adheres to the cardinal 

principle of democratic centralism. In theory, this principle means 

that debate and discussion are permitted, but once the top leadership 

makes a decision, then everyone must observe iron discipline and 

follow the party line. This principle is intended to ensure strong party 

unity. The KWP itself is supposed to be governed by a Political Bureau 

(or Politburo) that is formally elected by a Central Committee which, 

in turn, has been formally elected by a Party Congress. Delegates to 

a congress are supposed to have been elected by party cells.

The reality is somewhat different, as the top party leaders 

tend to rule in an extremely authoritarian style. Senior leaders 

select supporters to fill positions in these lower organs, and these 

supporters, in turn, vote for the leaders who selected them. Hence 

this power structure is dubbed the “circular flow of power.”71 And in 

the early decades of communist rule, a single leader tends to assume 

total control of the entire party, and therefore the state and society, 

and brook no dissent or opposition either inside or outside the party. 

Communist leaders have taken seriously the belief that the ruling 

party serves as a “dictatorship of the proletariat” as they go about 

the serious business of “building socialism.” What this has meant in 

practice is the construction of a powerful and centralized party-state, 

focusing in particular on a crash program of heavy industrialization 

and equipping a sizeable and heavily armed military as rapidly as 

possible. This political structure became known as a Leninist party 

system after the first leader to construct and control the Bolshevik 

prototype establishment in the Soviet Union—Vladimir I. Lenin.

In the case of North Korea, the KWP regime was initially installed 

in 1945 and controlled by the Soviets for some 5 years.72 While Soviet 

occupation forces withdrew in 1947-48, in mid-June 1950, on the 

eve of the Korean War, there were reportedly “as many as 4,000 

advisors” in Pyongyang.73 The leader that gradually emerged as 

the most important figure (and the one that the Soviets accepted) 

was Kim Il Sung.74 Kim soon proved himself to be a quick study. 

Not only was he eager to amass the total power of the party in 

his own hands, but he was keen to establish the credentials of the 

DPRK as an indigenous Korean communist regime independent of 

foreign control or domination. After a period of Soviet tutelage, Kim 

launched himself and his regime onto a more autonomous trajectory, 
19

seeking to free the KWP from Soviet and Chinese domination. But 

this did not mean he shunned Soviet and Chinese assistance. In 

Kim’s attempt to reunify the peninsula through military force, he 

received considerable numbers of men, arms, and equipment from 

both Moscow and Beijing.75

Different factions used the 1950-1953 Korean War as an opportunity to undermine each other. Kim relied heavily on his partisan 

faction—the close knit group of some 300 guerrilla fighters who had 

served together in Manchuria.76 The domestic faction, which hailed 

from South Korea, was blamed for the military setbacks and political 

failure to unify the peninsula. The indigenous Korean communist 

group was accused of plotting a coup against Kim Il Sung during 

the Korean War. Twelve individuals were charged in July 1953 and 

convicted the following month. Ten of them were sentenced to death, 

with the remaining two receiving long prison terms. The purported 

instigator, Pak Hon Yong, was not put on trial until after the war 

in 1955, sentenced to death, and then executed.77 Kim also loosened 

ties with the Soviet Union and gradually weakened the power of the 

Soviet Korean Faction by purging its senior leader, Ho Kai, although 

he retained other members of the group. Ho was expelled from the 

KWP in November 1951, and reportedly committed suicide in August 

1953.78 By 1958 Kim had purged the leadership of the so-called Yanan 

Faction (including senior leader Kim Tu Bong) composed of those 

who had worked or fought with the Chinese Communist Party or its 

military forces.79

As a result of these successive purges, by time of the KWP’s 

Fourth Party Congress, held in September 1961, Kim Il Sung had 

become the absolute dictator of North Korea. According to Kim 

Il Sung’s biographer, Dae-sook Suh: “His [Kim’s] long struggle to 

consolidate power was complete. . . . There were no longer any 

factions to challenge his position, and for the first time no foreign 

armed forces were occupying the North.”80 In the process, Kim played 

up the nationalist freedom fighter credentials of his own faction of 

the communist movement and conveniently minimized the varied 

backgrounds and noteworthy contributions of other factions and 

leaders. Kim also ignored or downplayed the contributions of the 

Soviet Union and China prior to and during the Korean War. Through 

a process of complete “indigenization,” the Pyongyang regime 
20

became an entity autonomous of both Moscow and Beijing. Save for 

the first years of occupation by the Red Army, North Korea could 

never be accurately described as a “Soviet satellite” the way many 

of the countries of East Europe were.81 North Korean history books 

were written in such a way as to completely ignore the liberation of 

northern Korea by the Soviet Red Army and its installation of the 

regime.

KWP congresses and plenums became less and less frequent, and 

their deliberations less and less substantive. Part of the reason for the 

“subservience” of the delegates appears to be the significant turnover 

between congresses: between 41 and 72 percent of the members of 

Central Committees selected at each party congress were new to their 

positions.82 The last full party congress to be held when Kim Il Sung 

was alive was in 1980. Significantly, the main purpose of Sixth Party 

Congress appeared to have been to give clear but veiled notice to the 

KWP membership of Kim Jong Il’s status as his father’s heir. The son 

was appointed to the Politburo, its Presidium, and he became the 

second ranking member of the party’s Military Commission.83

Is the Party Over? Indeed, no new party congress has been held 

since Kim Il Sung’s death. Since a congress has not occurred in 35 

years and other KWP meetings seem to be few and far between, 

the question must be asked whether the party has ceased to be the 

leading organization in North Korea. While the KWP may no longer 

be the dominant organizational entity in North Korea, it is certainly 

not irrelevant (although the Party Congress appears to be dormant—

see Figure 2). Part of the explanation may lie in a dictator’s efforts to 

play bureaucratic games to keep the reins of power concentrated in 

his hands and ensure no challenger emerges. Many dictators have 

shifted the prime bureaucratic entity through which they exert 

control and rule of their country to avoid power accumulating in 

any one place. Moreover, in totalitarian regimes, this shift may be 

pursued because of the need to reenergize the system by focusing on 

what is perceived to be a more dynamic bureaucracy. Then, in the 

1970s, for example, Kim Il Sung appears to have shifted his focus for 

ruling North Korea from the party to the state apparatus.84 Similarly, 

at various times Kim the father and Kim the son have chosen to 

emphasize the role of the military at the expense of the party and the 

state bureaucracies: in the 1960s, Kim Il Sung increased the power of 
21

the KPA; then in the late 1990s, Kim Jong Il raised the profile of the 

military again.85 China’s Mao Zedong tried similar moves during the 

Cultural Revolution, turning to students to reenergize the Chinese 

Communist Party. Then, in the late 1960s, when the youthful Red 

Guards proved uncontrollable and unruly, Mao turned to the armed 

forces to restore order and run the country. 

Since his father’s death, Kim Jong Il appears to have relied more 

on other bureaucratic organs and organizations, most notably the 

National Defense Commission and the KPA. These organizations 

will be discussed briefly below in the “Coercive Apparatus” section 

and in greater detail in a subsequent monograph. This raises a 

question: Why did the Kims (father and son) find it more convenient 

to circumvent the KWP? The Elder Kim may simply have found it 

too bothersome and irrelevant to the business of ruling North Korea. 

The Younger Kim may have drawn the same conclusion. But there 

might be more to it than this as far as Kim Jong Il is concerned. From 

the 1960s until Kim Il Sung’s death, there does not appear to have 

been much discernible dissent or autonomous activity. In the era of 

Kim Jong Il, however, at least some limited dissent or autonomous 

society activity has emerged. This is relatively modest at the elite and 

mass levels. Within the regime itself, there appears to be some degree 

of dissent, but these accounts are sketchy, unreliable, and impossible 

to confirm. The best evidence of actual elite dissent is the defections 

of the past decade or so. However, many of these defectors flee to 

escape imminent punishment for misdeeds, or because they believe 

they have fallen from favor and are about to be purged. Ordinary 

North Koreans have engaged in sporadic dissent expressed in 

leaflets, posters, and orally in at least some areas of the country.86

It is possible that one reason behind the younger Kim’s preference 

for not ruling directly through the KWP bureaucracy is that there is 

some degree of questioning of or quibbling with the younger Kim 

from the “party faithful,” or at least that Kim believes this might be 

so.

Things have changed since the early 1990s: defections of elite 

and ordinary North Koreans have risen significantly. In the 1990s, 

defections to South Korea hovered around 100 per year, but by 2000 

and 2001 the numbers of defectors had shot up into the hundreds.87

The most senior defector was Hwang Jong Yop, who was a key 
22

advisor and interpreter of ideology; other senior officials included 

both diplomats and soldiers.

The party and its nucleus of elites remains a sizeable and 

significant entity that Kim cannot ignore. A total KWP membership 

of some three million—dominated by an apparatchik elite numbering 

approximately several hundred thousand—support the system 

because they directly owe their jobs, status, and livelihood to the 

perpetuation of the regime. With the regime’s demise, they would 

lose their power, privilege, and hence be unable to provide for their 

families. As one defector told journalist and author Bradley Martin: 

“In my case, if you asked for one big reason I defected, I would answer: 

Beijing exposed me to unlimiited [sic] outside information. I realized 

that if unification came, it would be by North Korean collapse or 

absorption into South Korea, I would become unemployed. . . .”88

Moreover, fear of retribution or persecution for crimes and misdeeds 

by the regime must be high among elites. The fear that they will 

be held accountable for the torture and executions, not to mention 

other horrors that will only come to light after the regime collapses, 

is understandable and serves as a powerful motivator to maintain 

their support for the regime.89 To sum up, most elites continue to 

see their fates as being intertwined with that of the regime. If these 

elites did start to waver, then the regime would be in very serious 

trouble.

Some analysts and observers claim that Kim Jong Il’s power 

is not absolute and identify the existence of various factions or 

bureaucratic groupings. Some, such as Selig Harrison, insist there are 

hardliners and reformers;90 others, notably Daniel Pinkston, discuss 

differences based upon presumed institutional interests and talk 

about “bureaucratic stakeholders.”91 Certainly, this is what North 

Korean officials from Kim Jong Il on down tell foreign interlocutors. 

But other respected analysts discern no evidence of significant 

pluralism. 

One should ask why Kim and other officials feel the need to tell 

foreigners about the existence of internal opinion or bureaucratic 

interest groups. They could be telling the truth, or they could be trying 

to deliberately mislead. In either case, what would be the benefit 

of “revealing” this information to foreigners? If it is true, it helps 

them to account for the zigs and zags or contradictory impulses that 
23

Pyongyang exhibits. If it is disinformation, it serves as a convenient 

way for these officials to justify Pyongyang’s hardline, adamant, 

and the jerky progress on reform and other issues. It allows leaders 

from Kim Jong Il on down to do what they feel they must do while 

blaming others. In short, Kim and other savvy officials who meet with 

foreigners get to avoid being seen as the bad guys. But whatever the 

truth of the matter—and it probably lies somewhere in between—

what these tales of differences of opinion within Pyongyang’s elite 

circles suggest to this writer is that the structure of power may be 

changing.

Why do I speculate along these lines? In most communist regimes, 

officials tend to insist that there is complete unity within the party even 

when there is obviously not. It is important in communist political 

cultures to maintain the outward appearance of unity even if this is 

fiction. Of course, these North Korean tales of Pyongyang opinion 

groupings are not broadcast in official public pronouncements 

but rather in informal and ostensibly off-the-record conversations 

between elites and foreign leaders and interlocutors. But the fact 

that these leaders feel the need to say this in any venue suggests this 

contains elements of truth as well as elements of a convenient excuse. 

Of course, the answer could be more straightforward: it might be 

part of a disinformation campaign.92

While there is probably some nascent interest group activity in 

North Korea, it is unclear the extent to which this is manifest: if this 

takes the shape of factions that form around particular individuals; 

kinship constellations; opinion groupings, overt or otherwise; and/or 

loose groupings of former classmates or army buddies, for example. 

Albright relates that Kim told her there was a “fifty-fifty” split 

within the military over whether or not to improve relations with 

the United States. as well as opposition from within the Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs.93

The bottom line is that everyone who dabbles in the study of 

North Korean elite politics is engaged in speculation. But under the 

circumstances, informed speculation is a necessary evil. If factions 

or opinion groupings are present in Pyongyang, they would seem 

to be quite limited. Thus, Adrian Buzo’s assessment of 6 years ago 

still seems apropos in North Korea today: “There is no evidence to 

suggest that competitive factional activity, whether based on sectoral, 
24

policy, or personality grounds, has been significant under the 

Kimist personal autocracies.”94 If it were otherwise, significant elite 

defections would probably not be occurring. That these defections 

are happening indicates that senior officials have concluded that 

the current political environment does not allow for open dissent or 

debate about policy direction. Instead of feeling able to speak up and 

“voice” their opinions, these elites are choosing the “exit” option.95

According to Hwang Jong Yop: “. . . [A]s a dictator he [Kim] has 

excellent ability. He can organize people so they can’t move, can’t do 

anything, and he can keep them under his ideology. As far as I know, 

the present North Korean dictatorial system is the most precise and 

thorough in history.”96

Monopolistic Control of the Coercive Apparatus.

Under Kim Il Sung, the coercive apparatus was extremely effective, and by the 1960s completely under the control of the dictator. 

Kim could purge at will those individuals deemed disloyal, their 

families, and their networks of supporters. The coercive apparatus 

comprises not just the military, but the militia, public security 

(police), secret police, courts, and system of gulags. Reportedly, “the 

Ministry of Internal Affairs was by far the largest of the government 

departments in the DPRK.”97

The new Korean communist state established in the late 1940s in 

Pyongyang set about establishing what Charles Armstrong called 

a “regime of surveillance.”98 This included a massive network of 

informants. The result was not only a coercive apparatus that was 

able to penetrate virtually all spheres of society, but a populace who 

were convinced that “Big Brother” was watching them constantly. 

According to a defector in the early 1950s: “Where ever there were 

more than two people gathered there was sure to be a spy.”99 But 50 

years later, in the first decade of the 21st century, according to Oh 

and Hassig, “[t]he surveillance system is not perfect.” Nevertheless, 

these researchers contend that, “for the most part, the system works 

well.”100

Kim Jong Il has done everything he can to ensure elite loyalty, 

especially the allegiance of the KPA. Kim buys the loyalty of top 

officers with gifts of luxury cars and apartments.101 The “military 
25

first” policy, first declared in 1997, indicates that Kim recognizes 

where his most critical base of support lies. It appears that the most 

important entity in North Korea is no longer the KWP but rather the 

KPA. And Kim’s most important position seems to be not leader of 

the KWP but chair of National Defense Commission.

Nevertheless, while the coercive apparatus appears to be loyal 

to the regime, its allegiance to Kim Jong Il as an individual may not 

be as rock solid as it was to his father. There have been defections 

from this apparatus. Soldiers in particular appear to be extremely 

loyal by most accounts, including those by defectors. The most 

dedicated troops are those in Kim’s bodyguard which reportedly 

number in the tens of thousands.

102 However, the strength of their 

loyalty appears to vary within the armed forces. There have been 

defections, including some by senior military officers. There have 

also been rumors of mutinies.103

Totalist Ideology.

In North Korea the common dimensions of a totalitarian ideology 

are reinforced by three distinct Korean elements of the ideology: 

triumphal survivalism, an ancestor cult, and wounded ultranationalism.

Totalitarian regimes espouse totalist ideologies that seem to 

transform a society and people. The regime has an ambitious 

program to remake man and society. This is usually articulated in 

the ideology, and the regime aggressively undertakes to achieve 

these ambitious goals through mass mobilization of the society. 

Such efforts at mass mobilization are recognizable to students of 

Hitler’s Germany, Stalin’s Soviet Union, Mao’s China, and Pol Pot’s 

Cambodia (Kampuchea). However, according to two experts, no 

other regime has “placed so much emphasis on the politics of mass 

mobilization” as North Korea.104

The regime quickly established mass organizations for peasants, 

workers, women, and youth.105 Moreover, one should not overlook 

the prime example of the armed forces as a “mass organization” 

and the most readily mobilized entity of all. Mass mobilization 

campaigns characterized the 1950s and 1960s, and the pattern was 

only repeated in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s for key projects.106 The 
26

DPRK continues to emphasize mobilization in the 21st century 

as it pursues policy goals. To improve the prospects for the 2005 

harvest, for example, in May and June the regime drafted hundreds 

of thousands of urban residents to go to the countryside and work 

on irrigation projects and assist with rice transplanting.107 Similar 

efforts take place each year, but the number of people mobilized in 

2005 appears to be greater than in recent years. This mobilization 

is accomplished through organizations that isolate them from their 

families and inculcate them with regime beliefs and values. From a 

very early age, children are separated from their parents for extended 

periods of time: placed in day nurseries or work week nurseries.108

While at the nursery or school, or in the Young Pioneers or League 

of Socialist Working Youth activities, or later in military service (for 

periods as long as 10 years, during which time the many inductees 

rarely, if ever, get back home to see their families), children and 

young people spend prolonged periods under regime supervision 

where they are taught to believe that they owe everything to Kim Il 

Sung and are indoctrinated with the regime’s ideology.109

Communist ideology aims to work towards the ultimate goals 

of global revolution, a classless society, and remaking human 

nature. But more immediate attention focuses on strengthening the 

regime through indoctrinating and controlling the “people,” closely 

monitoring those of questionable background and purging “enemies 

of the people.” To these ends, the population is divided into classes 

(songbun): a “core class” of staunch regime supporters, a “wavering 

class” of unreliables, and a “hostile class” of regime opponents.110

Those purged are either executed or sent to prisons or labor camps.

Triumphal Survivalism. This element is not unique to Korean 

communism but exists in especially virulent form on the northern 

portion of the peninsula. There is a firm belief that the movement 

has succeeded by triumphing against all odds and that this will 

continue. The leaders of the movement have led the chosen, and 

together they have overcome seemingly insurmountable barriers. 

No hardship is too much whether it be battling Japanese occupiers, 

American invaders, or prolonged economic deprivations (what 

Pyongyang cryptically refers to as the “arduous march”). Man 

makes his own fate, and the dedicated individual will triumph.111

This is intimately linked to the guerrilla tradition that reinforces 
27

this survivalist mentality and underscores the harsh reality that 

self-reliance and military might are the keys to survival. According 

to Charles Armstrong: “[t]he attitudes formed out of the guerrilla 

experience have profoundly influenced North Korean politics to this 

day. Half a century later, North Korea was still being led by men 

who were fundamentally shaped by the harsh environment of antiJapanese struggle in Manchuria.”112 The movement cannot depend 

on any outside power or entity, and the only reliable guarantees for 

survival are to possess adequate weaponry to defend oneself.113 No 

outsider can be completely trusted, and the assumption, or at least 

strong suspicion, is that everyone is out to get them. In short, a siege 

mentality is pervasive.114

Dead Emperor’s Society. Pyongyang’s ideology is “neotraditionalist” in several aspects: it is backward looking rather than 

forward looking, focuses on reverence for and obedience to elders 

and superiors, and makes the supreme leader the personification of 

the nation.115 The focus is on a nation-wide cult of the ancestor—the 

deceased patriarch, the founder of the dynasty: Kim Il Sung. Reverence 

for the departed leader is made synonymous with the loyalty to 

the current leader (his son) and the cause of nationalism. There is a 

consuming focus on building, maintaining, and worshiping portraits, 

monuments, and edifices to the departed leader. And all current 

national projects are followed to glorify his legacy. The calendar is 

replete with remembering and celebrating the past: Kim Il Sung’s 

birthday (April 15) and anniversaries of the founding of the party 

(October 10), the army (February 8), National Day (September 9), 

and major accomplishments of the regime. For example, on October 

10, 2005, North Korea focused much attention toward celebrating 

the 60th anniversary of the founding of the KWP.

The reverence for the deceased leader is a latter day form of 

traditional (Confucian) ancestor worship focused around a cult of 

the founding emperor of the dynasty.116 Kim Il Sung’s birthday—

April 15—is celebrated every year. Moreover, starting in the mid1990s, the years were renumbered to commemorate the year of the 

Kim dynasty. For example, 2006 is Juche Year 95. There are heavy 

religious overtones in the rituals and ceremony that come with it. 

Kim Jong Il gains legitimacy by being seen to do his filial duty to 

follow through on the wishes of his deceased father on issues such 
28

as unification. He also probably strongly believes that he is dutifully 

implementing his father’s wishes.117

Kim Il Sung is depicted as personifying the revolutionary struggle 

of the Korean people for independence, unification, and respect.118

The message drummed home is: Kim and his son are synonymous 

with the people. The ideology has some strong corporeal overtones: 

the leader is brain or head on the body of the nation, and people are 

other organs. The body cannot live or function without the brain. 

Therefore, without the Kim family, there would be no past, no 

present, and certainly no future.

As a result of this ideological indoctrination, North Korea is home 

to probably the most oppressive personality cult in the world.119

Kim Jong Il’s legitimacy derived directly from his status as the son 

of Kim Il Sung, as being the greatest disciple of his father and the 

twin ideologies of Kim Il Sungism and Juche. Everyone wears Kim 

Il Sung lapel pins, and his portrait is everywhere. There are also 

statues and shrines, including the ancestral home in Mangyongdae. 

Songs and poems glorify him. North Koreans of all ages spend hours 

studying his life and teachings. According to Helen-Louise Hunter: 

“The most distinguishing feature about the Kim Cult, then, is not 

its more extreme outward manifestations . . . but the intensity of the 

people’s feelings.” There may be “contrived displays of emotions 

and feigned dedication” in North Korea, but “the overwhelming 

evidence” suggests a very real and “strong emotional attachment to 

Kim [Il Sung].”120

Indeed, the regime relies so heavily on the Kim family for its 

legitimacy that it is difficult to imagine the existing system surviving 

a renunciation of Kim Il Sung and/or the toppling of Kim Jong Il. 

Pyongyang’s civilian and military elites almost certainly consider 

major change unthinkable if they are to retain their positions of power 

and privilege. Indoctrination stresses the centrality of the family as 

a unique “revolutionary” multi-generational clan whose patriotism 

and heroic exploits date back to 1866 against the U.S. vessel General 

Sherman.

121 This aspect is acknowledged by experts who label North 

Korea as a “Kimist system” or the “Kim Family Regime.”122

Wounded Ultra-Nationalism. The third component of North Korea’s 

ideology is a deeply scarred extreme nationalism. Koreans are very 

much influenced by centuries of being mercilessly exploited by great 
29

powers, and by dint of geography serving as a battleground or invasion 

route for surrounding states. A history of invasion and oppression 

by China, Japan, and, more recently, by devastation wrought by 

the U.S. military during the Korean War, has combined to make the 

Pyongyang regime obsessed with righting the indignities suffered by 

the Korean people. The “never again” mantra of the Jewish Diaspora, 

when seeking to move beyond the horror of the Holocaust, would 

find significant resonance with many Korean inhabitants, both north 

and south of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). In contrast, however, 

while the Jews have a homeland within the borders of a single state, 

the ancestral Korean homeland remains politically divided. Because 

of this history and the unresolved matter of unification, Koreans are 

ultra-sensitive toward perceived slights and insults to their national 

pride. While Pyongyang’s periodic insistence that the statements 

of foreign leaders or officials that disparage the regime have “hurt 

the feelings” of the North Korean people provides useful fodder 

for propaganda and convenient excuses for postponing talks, this 

rhetoric may also reflect wounded nationalism.

In this context, the propaganda display arranged for the visiting 

U.S. Secretary of State in 2000, described by Albright as resembling 

“an Olympics opening ceremony on steroids,”123 becomes more 

comprehensible. The purpose of the elaborately choreographed 

display was not only to glorify the regime and feed the ego of its 

supreme dictator, but also to stress the power and resolve of the 

North Korean people in the face of a hostile and dangerous world. 

Nevertheless, it is possible that Kim wanted to stage an entertaining 

and memorable performance for his guest and did not necessarily 

intend to hammer home a particular message—there was simply 

no time to come up with a new program.124 This becomes quite a 

plausible explanation if one recognizes that North Korea does not 

have much that can impress foreign dignitaries. Other than displays 

of actual military power—conventional or WMD—what else, beyond 

examples of mass mobilization and synchronization, does Kim have 

to offer?

This wounded nationalism is encapsulated in the ideology of 

Juche. Usually translated as “self-reliance,” it is better understood as 

“self-determination.” Many analysts and observers are hard pressed 

to understand what it really means—how to define it and explain it. 
30

As a result, many end up either getting frustrated and/or claiming 

it is simply mindless mumbo jumbo that the regime finds useful to 

cover up its contradictions and inconsistencies. To better appreciate 

Juche, it might be best viewed, as Bruce Cumings suggests, as “a 

state of mind.” Cumings elaborates: “The term literally means being 

subjective where Korean matters are concerned, putting Korea first 

in everything.”125 The term, Cumings contends, is “untranslatable.” 

Given wounded Korean nationalism and these insights, perhaps 

Juche is best defined as putting “Korea first (in everything).”126

It is not clear to what extent that this ideology of socialism, 

combined with triumphal survivalism, ancestor worship, and 

wounded ultra-nationalism, has been undermined by foreign and/

or economic crises.

Information Control.

Totalitarian regimes seek to exercise total control over information 

and all forms of media. Through this control, they can engage in 

brainwashing or indoctrination on a mass scale. In the era of Kim Il 

Sung, this control was far easier to enforce than it is in the era of Kim 

Jong Il. Rapid advances in information technology have made it far 

more challenging for a totalitarian regime to seal off its population 

from external sources of information. Nevertheless, under the 

circumstances, Pyongyang has done a credible job of keeping most 

people almost completely reliant on the official North Korean media 

for information and suspicion of any outside propaganda from the 

United States or South Korea.

Televisions and radio sets in North Korean households are fixed 

so that they can only receive one approved station, and most people 

have no access to external print media. But even if they get access to 

South Korean or Chinese newspapers and magazines, their ability to 

read these materials is hampered.127 While the North Korean populace 

has a high rate of basic literacy with at least 7 years of education, 

many cannot read Chinese characters, only the indigenous Hangul 

syllabary.

128 Decades ago Pyongyang purged its writing system of 

Chinese characters that are still used in South Korean and Japanese 

publications.129

Prior to the 1990s, North Korea was quite tightly sealed off 
31

from information about and exposure to the outside world. The 

emergence of a severe food crisis in North Korea in the early 

1990s triggered a massive human flow back and forth across the 

North Korea-China border. This enabled as many as hundreds of 

thousands of North Koreans to get firsthand information about and 

experience with the outside world that may have conflicted with 

or contradicted information they had received from official North 

Korean sources.130 Before this, most ordinary citizens of the DPRK 

had no opportunity to go abroad except as contract manual laborers 

in places such as logging camps in the Russian Far East.131 Otherwise, 

travel or temporary residence abroad was restricted to elites such as 

diplomats or soldiers serving as advisors or body guards to Third 

World dictators.

In addition to the back and forth to China, there has been some 

tightly controlled interaction with relatives from South Korea for a 

small number of DPRK citizens, as well as limited exposure to foreign 

tourists. Also potentially significant has been extended exposure in 

recent years to foreign aid workers who were able to visit significant 

areas of North Korea, sometimes unescorted.132

We know that there has been increased use of cellular telephones 

and viewing of video cassettes in North Korea in the past several 

years. Perhaps thousands of cell phones are now in use. These are 

used mainly to conduct business along the border with China, 

but they also permit communication between family members in 

North Korea and those in China and South Korea. According to one 

estimate, “about one-third of the defectors in South Korea regularly 

talk to family members back in North Korea.”133 Video cassette tapes 

are smuggled in from South Korea and played on video cassette 

recorders (VCRs) bought on the black market in China. As a result, 

North Koreas are watching bootleg tapes of South Korean soap 

operas that show the prosperity and modernity south of the DMZ. 

These tapes have reportedly spread across North Korea, whereas 

cell phones only work in certain parts of the country.134

These developments certainly have the potential to undermine 

complete regime control of information, and Pyongyang has taken 

these developments extremely seriously.135 There have been periodic 

crackdowns on both cell phone usage and illicit video viewings. 
32

For example, following the mysterious explosion at a train yard in 

Ryongchon on the main rail line between Pyongyang and Beijing 

on April 22, 2004, the regime severely curtailed cell phone use and 

more closely monitored wireless communications.136 Although there 

is no evidence that this was anything but an accidental explosion 

of chemical fertilizer, it appears that the regime believed this could 

have been an assassination attempt on Kim Jong Il whose train 

traveled through the station 8 hours earlier on a return trip from 

China. There was concern that cell phones may have been used to 

plan the incident and/or even detonate the explosion. As of early 

2005, frequency blocking devices have also been activated in cities 

near the border with China, and executions of cell phone users have 

been reported.137

The regime is alarmed over the proliferation of illicit videos and 

the fads they spawn in South Korean slang, fashions (including 

hairstyles), and goods.138 Tactics used by the regime include 

surrounding a neighborhood one evening, shutting off the power, 

and then going dwelling to dwelling to see what tape is lodged 

inside the VCR.139 We also know that there is clandestine listening to 

foreign radio broadcasts from South Korea and Voice of America by 

some in North Korea.140

Social scientists refer to a dynamic called the “spiral of silence” 

that is operative in environments such as North Korea where there 

is strict control of information and heavy indoctrination reinforced 

by people’s fear of the consequences of publicly challenging or 

questioning the official line.141 In such a situation, a person thinks 

that he or she is the only person who has doubts and feels guilty, 

unpatriotic, or deviant. Such are the results of “brainwashing.” 

Because no one else expresses similar feelings, the person believes 

he/she is alone in feeling this way. As a result of this (as well as out 

of a fear of being punished for having bad thoughts), the individual 

remains silent or shares their doubts with perhaps one other highly 

trusted friend or loved one. 

However, once someone speaks out publicly with their doubts 

or criticism, the spiral of silence is broken and others realize there 

are not alone their supposed heterodox thoughts. Once the spiral is 

broken, the system can begin to unravel fairly quickly with dramatic 
33

results. The results can be especially dramatic once people realize 

they can escape punishment for speaking out, and there is safety 

in numbers: suddenly the regime is seriously threatened, such as 

in China in 1989, or can even collapse as in the revolutions of 1989 

in Eastern Europe. Perhaps the most shocking illustration of the 

end of the spiral silence is in Romania in December 1989. It began 

with a small group of hecklers booing at a Bucharest rally where 

Nicolae Ceausescu was speaking which was being broadcast live 

on December 21, 1989. The heckling quickly snowballed, and a day 

later Ceausescu and his wife were arrested and executed a few days 

afterwards.142

Condition of Terror.

One characteristic in the mindset of leaders in totalitarian 

regimes is that they tend to be extremely paranoid. Because of their 

experiences in the conspiratorial activities involved in the business 

of making revolution (i.e., seizing and holding power), they are 

intimately familiar with how schemers and putchists operate and 

are overly sensitized to potential threats. They tend to assume all 

rhetoric or activity even vaguely critical is directed at undermining 

or overthrowing the regime, even when elites or ordinary people 

express legitimate grievances or frustration with no intention 

beyond resolving their specific issue. Moreover, even if the protests 

are judged to be relatively harmless, they are usually ruthlessly 

suppressed for fear that they might inspire others. The automatic 

response to dissent is a swift iron fist to make an example of the 

perpetrators and to send the message that such actions will not be 

tolerated. These examples and the presumption that a contemplated 

act of protest or dissent will be crushed immediately instill a climate 

of fear as people become apprehensive of a knock at the door in the 

middle of the night. Fear becomes so pervasive that people believe 

that the authorities see and hear everything: the perception that “Big 

Brother” is watching you.143

In addition, people fear for the consequences of what one person’s 

perceived misdeed might hold for a whole family. Purges in North 

Korea involve not just an individual but his or her entire family 

being sent to the gulag. The result is a major deterrent to wrongdoing 
34

because of the knowledge that the punishment will not just be 

inflicted on the individual but upon his/her extended family.144 The 

climate of terror is instilled not just by the visible elements of the 

coercive apparatus—the public security bureau, the military, and 

the courts—but also by a fear of being informed on by a colleague, a 

friend, or even a loved one.

145

The climate of terror is still quite pervasive in 21st century North 

Korea, although it has weakened to the extent that it has not dissuaded 

hundreds of thousands from traveling to China and thousands from 

attempting to defect to South Korea via a third country (usually China). 

The motivations appear to be the harshness of economic conditions 

in the country of the past 2 decades or fear of continued persecution 

among those marked for life as troublemakers or unreliables. This is 

the primary reason given by Kang Chol Hwan for his defection as 

recounted in his memoirs, The Aquariums of Pyongyang. Kang knew 

that he was under surveillance and concluded that it was only a 

matter of time before he was rearrested and sent back to the gulag. 

Nevertheless, the climate of fear in North Korea has weakened to 

the extent that bribery and corruption are all pervasive. Functionaries 

and officials readily accept bribes to dispense goods, issue documents, 

and tolerate travel without permits. And regime informants, border 

guards, and train conductors routinely accept bribes to look the 

other way.146 There are also reports that the punishment of one’s 

entire family for the transgressions of one member may now be less 

draconian.147

Centralized Economy.

In a totalitarian state, the regime attempts to control most, if 

not all, economic activity. In communist variants of totalitarianism, 

central planning is deemed essential to ensure rapid and coordinated 

economic development. Normally this entails multiyear plans 

(usually in increments of 5 years). Central planners decide what is 

to be produced, the quantity, and the price. All major commodities 

and foodstuffs are allocated by the state. Most basic necessities and 

highly desirable goods, including food and consumer items tend to 

be rationed and distributed through a network of the regime. The 

result is that individuals come to depend on the regime for most 
35

daily necessities. Often the system does not provide enough goods 

to satisfy demand. An unpredictable supply of goods leads people 

to hoard items as a precaution. The Centrally Planned Economy 

(CPE) and the rational reaction of consumers virtually guarantee 

that demand will outstrip supply. Therefore economist Janos Kornai 

has dubbed the system “the shortage economy.”148 Because of the 

inefficiencies and bottlenecks inherent in the system, an informal or 

“second” economy (aka “black market”) develops to satisfy people’s 

wants. The result is corruption or what communist regimes tend to 

call “economic crimes.”

A CPE emerged in North Korea in March 1946 with the 

establishment of an “economic planning bureau.” Within 12 

months (February 1947), a “National Economic Rehabilitation and 

Development” blueprint had been adopted.149 In the era of Kim Il 

Sung, the CPE certainly was not perfect, but it did function reasonably 

well to the extent that North Korea enjoyed respectable economic 

growth, and DPRK citizens enjoyed a decent standard of living. By 

the 1960s, North Koreans actually may have had a better standard 

of living than their South Korean cousins. And the central planning 

bureaucrats in Pyongyang appear to have been more successful 

than their counterparts in other communist states at collectivizing 

agriculture without precipitating famine. The economic system, 

while it experienced increasing problems in the 1970s and 1980s, 

could count on loans and subsidized fuel and other assistance from 

fraternal socialist states to mitigate the impact of these.

By the 1990s, however, in the final years of Kim Il Sung’s life, 

these loans and subsidies dried up, and Moscow and other capitals 

insisted that Pyongyang pay with hard currency for trade items. In the 

mid-1990s, as food situation became more desperate, people began 

to migrate in search of food. Hunger and malnourishment became 

starvation. The famine dramatically demonstrated the weakening 

of the regime: the breakdown of its food distribution system. In 

other words, the regime proved unable to ensure its populace was 

fed, and people had to adopt survival strategies by relying on their 

own initiative and ingenuity.150 However, food aid from overseas is 

depicted as a gift—the manifestation of a latter-day tribute system 

whereby Kim Jong Il receives offerings from afar as tokens of the 

esteemed and exalted status in which he is held in the world. 
36

What were the causes of the famine and how can one assess its 

impact? There is actually widespread consensus among experts 

about the causes. But, it is worthwhile to note that North Korean 

agriculture is quite impressive in a number of respects. First, 

collectivization was achieved in the late 1950s without triggering the 

kind of major famine that the same process did in places such as 

the former Soviet Union and China.151 Moreover, North Korea is a 

highly urbanized and industrial country, with only approximately 

one-third of its populace being engaged in full-time agriculture.152

Having said this, the impact of the collapse of communism in 

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (1989-91) that resulted in the 

swift and sudden dismantlement of Pyongyang’s economic support 

network made a major crisis in North Korean agriculture inevitable. 

The DPRK heavily relied on subsidized inputs, especially petroleum, 

to operate its entire economy. But the end of this support hit the 

agricultural sector especially hard. North Korea’s agriculture suffers 

from many of the same systemic distortions and inefficiencies 

as other communist countries where the agrarian sector has been 

collectivized. The choice of crops and farming techniques is often not 

appropriate to the soil, topography, or climatic conditions. The results 

are poor yields, depleted soil, and serious land erosion. In addition, 

agriculture is “input intensive,” requiring large amounts of fuel, 

fertilizer, and equipment to keep it functioning. Virtually all aspects 

are highly mechanized and depend on chemical fertilizer, and this 

requires a constant infusion of energy resources. Since North Korea 

is not an oil producer, it depends totally on imported petroleum to 

power tractors, irrigation pumps, and factories producing chemical 

fertilizer. Certainly coal is mined domestically and can be used for 

some of the DPRK’s energy needs, but oil seems indispensable.153

The famine was exacerbated by severe weather and flooding, but 

the situation became chronic because the regime refused to institute 

systemic changes or reform. Instead, Pyongyang looked to foreign 

governments and nongovernment organizations (NGOs) to provide 

famine relief. Starting in 1995, the regime adopted an explicit aidbased strategy, and the following year a variety of NGOs were 

permitted to operate in the country. Significantly, for the most part, 

the regime took responsibility for distributing the aid through its 

own Public Distribution System (PDS).154
37

But rumors of the complete and irreversible collapse of the regime 

appear to have been greatly exaggerated. In late 2005 Pyongyang 

appeared to be reactivating its PDS.

155 The famine appears to be 

ameliorated significantly although not completely resolved. But the 

regime insisted that the country has recovered from the famine, and 

there is no more need for food aid. They claimed that the country 

enjoyed a “bumper harvest.” Thus, the regime announced that by 

the end of 2005 all foreign aid organizations must cease their food 

aid projects in the country. Instead the effort should be focused on 

development assistance.156 But it is not clear whether all aid groups 

would be forced out, especially if they officially switch from food aid 

to development assistance.157

Why did the regime take this step? First, it is very likely that the 

regime wanted to reassert control over the country. Second, the regime 

wanted foreign aid workers out of the country. They are viewed as 

negative and possible dangerous influences on the people of North 

Korea. The regime wants to avoid the perception among the people 

that the country depends on foreign assistance.158 Third, the food 

situation has improved considerably although problems abound, 

including widespread malnutrition. According to United Nations 

(UN) estimates, 7 percent of North Koreans are still starving, and more 

than one-third of the populace is “chronically malnourished.”159 The 

regime may be confident that agriculture is on the mend. Whether 

this is so, Pyongyang is now receiving considerable aid from China 

and South Korea, assistance that comes without many restrictions, 

or controls, or intrusive foreign personnel. This kind of hands-off aid 

from neighbors is much preferred to that provided by meddlesome 

Western NGOs and relief agencies.

To sum up, North Korea’s CPE is still in place and functioning. 

While the famine has proved highly challenging to the regime, its 

performance and response are not so different to those of CPEs in 

other communist regimes. The distortions and inefficiencies could 

be compensated for and/or overlooked until the collapse of Soviet 

bloc aid in the late 1980s. This dealt a body blow to Pyongyang’s 

economy generally, and in particular savaged its “input-intensive” 

agricultural sector. The response to the famine this triggered was 

not systemic reform or even serious introspection, but ad hoc efforts 

to mitigate the disaster through foreign aid and reform around 
38

the edges. The latter adaptations included tolerating private food 

markets and raising prices.160

CONCLUSION

North Korea is an eroding totalitarian regime that has existed for 

approximately 4 decades. While totalitarianism is a powerful and 

intimidating system, it places tremendous strain on a state and a 

society—demanding constant activity and mobilization of personnel 

and exploitation of resources. The costs of maintaining heightened 

ideological indoctrination, an ever-vigilant coercive apparatus, 

and a large national defense organization are high and ultimately 

debilitating. To maintain these for decades results in fatigue and 

burnout.161 Eventually leaders and followers reach a point where 

both are physically and mentally exhausted, and the country’s 

infrastructure and resources become devastated. North Korea’s elite 

and ordinary people appear to be approaching this point. But this 

fatigue and burnout does not appear to produce much in the way of 

protest or dissent, let alone revolt; most likely the majority of people 

in North Korea are simply too tired to do much more than focus their 

time and energy on providing the basic necessities for their families 

and a few of life’s luxuries for special occasions. 

While the regime is still ruled by an absolute dictator who leads a 

ruling party-military-state with a continued monopoly of the coercive 

apparatus, there has been some slippage in the first of these areas and 

other features have eroded noticeably. First, Kim Jong Il, although 

virtually an absolute dictator, appears to take into account the 

opinions of others the way his father did not. And ideology no longer 

appears to be so focused on transforming the state and society and 

more on the instrumental goals of economic recovery, development, 

and firming up regime power. While a condition of terror remains 

palpable, it is no longer all pervasive, and individuals are able to 

navigate or circumvent the system without fearing that they face 

dire consequences. As a result of the shift in ideology and alleviation 

of climate of terror, the regime has become “corrupted”—literally as 

bribery is rampant, and figuratively as the Leninist regime, what Ken 

Jowitt would characterize as “neo-traditionalist.”162 Meanwhile, the 

Stalinist centrally planned economy has been eroded seriously, and 
39

the monopoly of mass communication has loosened significantly. 

The regime has attempted to repair the latter two elements, but it is 

not clear to what extent this will be successful.

The regime appears to be stable and not on the brink of collapse. 

While it is difficult to speculate about the longevity of North Korea 

as a political entity, it is more manageable to forecast the future 

of totalitarianism in the DPRK. Totalitarian regimes rarely endure 

longer than several decades and almost never survive the passing 

of the absolute dictator. In fact, Pyongyang is unique in that it is the 

only totalitarian regime to have weathered a leadership transition. 

Indeed, North Korea is the world’s “longest lasting totalitarian 

regime, having spanned some 4 decades and surviving generational 

leadership succession.”163 While Kim Jong Il’s party-military-state 

faces numerous challenges, perhaps none is more daunting than the 

succession question. Kim probably has at most 10-15 years in which 

to pave the way for one of his offspring to succeed him. If he lives 

long enough, it is possible he could be successful. What is less likely 

is that totalitarianism could survive another leadership transition.

Perhaps the clearest indication of the status and fate of Pyongyang’s totalitarian regime over the next 10 years or so will come in 

how the arrangements for the succession to Kim Jong Il are handled. 

Is there evidence that a particular individual is being groomed to 

succeed Kim? The answer appears to be “yes.”164 Some other key 

indicators to monitor are signs of dissent among elites and masses, 

especially fissures that might occur within the party or military. By 

carefully charting trends, observers can make it less likely that they 

will be caught off guard by the actions of North Korea’s leader or 

changes in its political system. 

ENDNOTES

1. This is what Selig S. Harrison seems to suggest, but the term is mine. See 

Harrison’s Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Unification and U.S. Disengagement,

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002.

2. See, for example, on currency counterfeiting: Bill Gertz, “U.S. Accuses North 

Korea of $100 Bill Counterfeiting,” Washington Times, October 12, 2005. The article 

highlights a U.S. Government investigation which concluded that the DPRK has 

engaged in the counterfeiting of U.S. currency for many years. See, for example 

on drug trafficking, a report by Raphael F. Perl, Drug Trafficking and North Korea: 
40

Issues for U.S. Policy, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 

5, 2003. For a disturbing big picture study of the spectrum of North Korean 

criminal activity, see David L. Asher, “The North Korean Criminal State, Its Ties 

to Organized Crime, and the Possibility of WMD Proliferation,” posted November 

15, 2005, on www.nautilus.org/for a/security/0592Asher.html.

3. Interestingly, an ethnic Korean nightclub worker who claimed to have 

entertained Kim Jong Il’s eldest son, Kim Jong Nam, in Tokyo one night remarked 

that he reminded her of a “Yakuza godfather.” See Bradley K. Martin, Under the 

Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and Kim Dynasty, New York: St. 

Martin’s Press, 2004, p. 698.

4. Asher, “The North Korean Criminal State.”

5. “‘Corporatism’ is an ambiguous term.” On corporatism, see Douglas 

Chalmers, “Corporatism and Comparative Politics,” in Howard J. Wiarda, ed., 

New Directions in Comparative Politics, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985, pp. 56-

79 [the quote is from p. 57]; and Frederick B. Pike and Thomas Stritch, eds., The 

New Corporatism: Social and Political Structures in the Iberian World, South Bend, IN: 

University of Indiana Press, 1974. On applying the concept to North Korea, see 

Bruce Cumings, “The Corporate State in North Korea,” in Hagen Koo, ed., State 

and Society in Contemporary Korea, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993, pp. 

213-246; and Harrison, Korean Endgame, pp. 23-24.

6. As mentioned in endnote 1, the term “fragmented totalitarianism” is 

mine, not Harrison’s. Conceptual confusion surrounds Harrison’s depiction of 

North Korea’s political system. On the one hand, he refers to it as an “Orwellian 

totalitarian regime” (pp. xvi, 5), while on the other, he argues there are “reform” 

and “Old Guard” factions (e.g., p. 25). This suggests a more diffuse distribution 

of power than that usually associated with totalitarianism. Thus, while the term 

“fragmented totalitarianism” seems contradictory, it seems the best way to capture 

how Harrison views the DPRK.

7. On the term as applied to post-Mao China, see Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing 

China, New York: W. W. Norton, 1995.

8. Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader; Kongdan Oh and Ralph 

C. Hassig, North Korea Through the Looking Glass, Washington, DC: Brookings 

Institution Press, 2000, pp. 35-36, 38. 

9. Andrew Scobell, “Making Sense of North Korea: Pyongyang and 

Comparative Communism,” Asian Security, Vol. 1, No. 3, forthcoming Winter 

2005, pp. 245-266.

10. As Bradley Martin notes: “Pyongyang-watchers who were not blinded by 

ideological sympathy had known all along . . . that Pyongyang gave full expression 

to the theory and practice of totalitarianism.” See Martin, Under the Loving Care of 

the Fatherly Leader, p. 628. Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci 

also characterize the system thus. See their Going Critical: The First North Korean 

Nuclear Crisis, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004, p. 381. For 

analysts who adopt the totalitarian framework, see Robert Scalapino and Chong 
41

Sik Lee, eds., Communism in Korea, 2 vols., Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of 

California Press, 1972; Helen Louise Hunter, Kim Il Sung’s North Korea, New York: 

Praeger, 1999; and Oh and Hassig, North Korea Through the Looking Glass.

11. Carl Friedrich and Zibigniew Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and 

Autocracy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Pres, 1956. 

12. Scholars often overlook the “militarized nature of [communist] . . . regimes.” 

Scobell, “Making Sense of North Korea,” p. 6.

13. Ibid., p. 7.

14. For more discussion of post-totalitarianism, see Ibid., pp. 2-3; and Juan J. 

Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000; 

originally published in 1975 in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., The 

Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 8, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975.

15. Richard Lowenthal, “Development Vs. Utopia in Communist Policy,” 

in Chalmers Johnson, ed., Change in Communist Systems, Stanford, CA: Stanford 

University Press, 1970, pp. 33-116.

16. Andrei Lankov, “North Korean Refugees in Northeast China,” Asian 

Survey, Vol. XLIV, No. 6, November/December 2004, pp. 856-873.

17. For some of the speculation, see James Brooke, “Where Kim’s Portrait 

Hung in Pyongyang, A Baffling Blankness,” New York Times (Washington edition), 

November 18, 2004; Anthony Faiola and Sachiko Sakamaki, “Missing Homages 

Spur Rumors on N. Korean Deified Leader May Be Shedding Cult Status,” 

Washington Post, November 19, 2004; Jasper Becker, “Shifting Signs in North Korea: 

Kim Jong Il Dials Back Personality Cult as Protest Activities Pick Up,” Christian 

Science Monitor December 1, 2004.

18. See the analyst quoted in James Brooke, “Japanese Officials Warn of 

Fissures in North Korea,” New York Times (Washington edition), November 22, 

2004.

19. Madeleine Albright with Bill Woodward, Madam Secretary, New York: 

Miramax Books, 2003, p. 465.

20. Cited in Oh and Hassig, North Korea, p. 91.

21. Some defector accounts suggest otherwise. For example, some suggest 

conflicts or at least tensions between father and son during at least the elder Kim’s 

final years. See, for example, Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader, pp. 

505-507.

22. Dae-Sook Suh, Kim Il-Sung: The North Korean Leader, 2nd ed., New York: 

Columbia University Press, n.d., p. xiv. 

23. On showing filial respect, see Michael Breen, Kim Jong Il: North Korea’s Dear 

Leader, Singapore: John Wiley and Sons, 2004, p. 46. Others researchers argue that 

his limited public appearances stem from shyness and “awkwardness around 

people.” Oh and Hassig, North Korea, pp. 90, 93-94.
42

24. The successor’s dilemma proved the undoing of at least three anointed 

successors to Mao Zedong: Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, and Deng Xiaoping; and two 

anointed successors to Deng Xiaoping: Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. A similar 

dynamic played out with Hu Jintao’s succession to Jiang Zemin, but Hu, like Jiang 

before him, proved more adept than the above named aspirants at surmounting the 

successor’s dilemma. For discussion of this dilemma as it relates to Hu Jintao, see 

Murray Scot Tanner, “Hu Jintao as China’s Emerging National Security Leader,” 

in Andrew Scobell and Larry Wortzel, eds., Civil-Military Change in China: Elites, 

Institutes, and Ideas After the 16th Party Congress, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army 

War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2004, pp. 50-51.

25. Suh, Kim Il-Sung, p. xv.

26. Breen, Kim Jong Il, p. 12. 

27. Peter Maass, “The Last Emperor,” New York Times Magazine, October 19, 

2003, pp. 38-47, 60-61, 128-130. For another recent analysis of Kim Jong Il, see 

Jerrold M. Post, Leaders and Their Followers in a Dangerous World, Ithaca, New York: 

Cornell University Press, 2004, chapter 12.

28. Albright, with Woodward, Madam Secretary, pp. 462, 467.

29. For a more detailed analysis of North Korean intentions, see Andrew 

Scobell, North Korea’s Strategic Intentions, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War 

College, Strategic Studies Institute, July 2005.

30. Albright, with Woodward, Madam Secretary, p. 465.

31. Andrew Scobell, “North Korea on the Brink: Breakdown or Breakthrough?” 

in Carolyn Pumphrey, ed., The Rise of China in Asia, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. 

Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2001, p. 213; Breen, Kim Jong Il, pp. 

45-46l; Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader, pp. 648-649.

32. A North Korean defector, former diplomat Ko Young Hwan, while being 

dismissive of Kim’s abilities in many areas, grudgingly acknowledges that he “has 

some talent in culture and the arts.” Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly 

Leader, p. 510. A South Korean newspaper publisher who dined with Kim for 4 

hours in August 2000 described him as “acting more like a Broadway producer with 

a smash hit on this hands than a dictator running a repressive and impoverished 

regime.” Maass, “The Last Emperor,” p. 41.

33. For an account of his movie making activities, see Martin, Under the Loving 

Care of the Fatherly Leader, chapter 13. This chapter also discusses Kim’s involvement 

in musical and theatrical extravaganzas.

34. On his collection of movies, see Ibid., p. 331.

35. Albright, with Woodward, Madam Secretary, p. 466-67.

36. Maass, “The Last Emperor.” 

37. Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader, p. 222.

38. Maass, “The Last Emperor,” p. 38. 
43

39. Lewis L. Gould, The Modern American Presidency, Lawrence, KS: University 

Press of Kansas, 2003, pp. 179-190.

40. See, for example, Robert A. Strong, Working in the World: Jimmy Carter and 

the Making of American Foreign Policy, Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University 

Press, 2000, p. 264. Strong argues that this depiction is unfair, and that Carter’s 

real failing was an “unwillingness to prioritize.” Ibid., p. 265. Another scholar 

contends “Carter envisioned a system where only the president would know the 

larger picture, and he would make the ultimate decision. In practice that meant 

that issues large and small flowed toward the Oval Office. The most celebrated 

case was the degree of Carter’s personal involvement over who was allowed 

to use the White House tennis courts.” Gould, The Modern American Presidency, 

p. 184.

41. Gould, The Modern American Presidency, pp. 180, 182.

42. Oh and Hassig, North Korea, p. 98.

43. Potemkin villages were, purportedly, the facades of model villages built at 

the order of Russian minister Grigori Aleksandrovich Potemkin to impress Empress 

Catherine II when she visited Crimea in the late 18th century. A Potemkin village 

has come to refer to an idyllic construct desired to impress and deceive a visiting 

dignitary or dignitaries and thus hide a reality that is far from idyllic. Some have 

suggested that the origins of the term may itself be a kind of “Potemkin” myth and 

that the Russian minister has gotten an undeserved bad rap.

44. On Mao’s experiences with Potemkin villages, see Li Zhisui, The Private Life 

of Chairman Mao, New York: Random House, 1994. On speculation about Kim Il 

Sung and Potemkin villages, see Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader, 

pp. 499, 518-519. See also the story of Kim Il Sung related in ibid., p. 503.

45. Oh and Hassig, North Korea, pp. 127-133.

46. Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader, pp. 2, and 715, footnote 

1. See also Hunter, Kim Il-sung’s North Korea, chapter 14.

47. “North Korea’s Potemkin hospital,” The Economist, September 12, 1992, p. 

37.

48. Oh and Hassig, North Korea, p. 192. Of course, the concept was conceived 

by Herbert Simon.

49. On the extent of his trips prior to 2000, see Oh and Hassig, North Korea, pp. 

90-91. It is also rumored that Kim spent some time at a military academy in East 

Germany, but this has not been confirmed.

50. Konstantin Pulikovsky, Vostochnii Ekspress: Po Rossiis Kim Chen Ilom [Orient 

Express: Across Russia with Kim Jong Il] Moscow: Gorodets, 2002. The volume was 

published in Russian. For a synopsis in English, see James Brooke, “A Telling 

North Korean Journey: Russian Envoy Writes of Riding the Rails with Kim Jong 

Il,” New York Times (Washington edition), December 3, 2002.

51. Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader, pp. 319, 649.
44

52. On movies as an important source of information about foreign countries, 

see ibid., p. 331.

53. Oh and Hassig, “The New North Korea,” in Hassig and Oh, Korea Briefing, 

p. 84.

54. Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader, p. 650.

55. I am indebted to Colonel Dwight Raymond for this important point.

56. Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader, p. 678. 

57. Ibid., p. 284.

58. This point is also made by Maass. See “The Last Emperor,” 46-47.

59. Oh and Hassig, North Korea, p. 97. 

60. For the time being, let us leave aside the question of whether North Korea 

will, indeed, give up its nuclear program as it has pledged to do in Beijing in the 

Six Party Talks statement of principles in September 2005. This writer believes that 

it is extremely unlikely that Pyongyang will give it up. See Andrew Scobell and 

Michael Chambers, “The Fallout of a Nuclear North Korea,” Current History, Vol. 

104, No. 683, September 2005, pp. 289-294.

61. Jerold Post appears to believe that the disorder might prove fatal to Kim. 

See Post, Leaders and Their Followers in a Dangerous World, pp. 255-256.

62. For one informed journalistic account of Kim Jong Il, see Breen, Kim Jong 

Il.

63. For example, Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader, p. 220.

64. Cited in ibid., p. 684. The title of the article was “The Korean Revolution 

Carried Out From the Son’s Generation to the Grandson’s Generation.”

65. Ibid., p. 679.

66. Oh and Hassig, North Korea, pp. 35-36.

67. Scobell, “Making Sense of North Korea,” pp. 3, 15-16.

68. For some informed speculation on this issue, see Joo Sang-min, “N. Korea 

Not Prepared to Announce Successor: Experts,” Yonhap News Agency, October 7, 

2005; and Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader, Chapter 37.

69. This is according to a story carried in the South Korean newspaper, Joong 

Ang Ilbo (internet version), Seoul, November 25, 2005.

70. Charles K. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950, Ithaca, NY: 

Cornell University Press, 2003, p. 108. See also Lee, Korean Workers’ Party, p. 79. 

The precise origins and evolution of the Korean communist movement are rather 

complicated. For a detailed history and analysis, see Scalapino and Lee, Communism 

in Korea; and Chong-Sik Lee, The Korean Workers’ Party: A Short History.

71. Merle Fainsod and Jerry F. Hough, How the Soviet Union is Governed, 

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979, pp. 144-146, ff.
45

72. There is disagreement regarding the degree of Soviet control and domination 

of the Korean communist regime that the Red Army installed. One recent study 

by Andrei Lankov argues Soviet control was very strong, while another recent 

study by Charles Armstrong argues that the new regime actually was permitted 

considerable autonomy. For the fomer interpretation, see Lankov, From Stalin to 

Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea, 1945-1960, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 

University Press, 2002; for the latter interpretation, see Armstrong, The North 

Korean Revolution, chapter 2.

73. Suh, Kim Il-Sung, pp. 102, 107, and 356, note 1. The quote is from note 1 on 

p. 356.

74. Contrary to popular belief, Kim does not appear to have been handpicked 

and groomed by the Soviet Union. On this point, Lankov and Armstrong agree. 

Indeed, Lankov claims Kim became the top leader “almost by accident.” Lankov, 

From Stalin to Kim Il Sung, p. 59. See also Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 

pp. 39, 55.

75. On Chinese assistance in the lead up to the Korean War, see Chen Jian, 

China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation, New 

York: Columbia University Press, 1994.

76. Kim’s biographer concludes that his partisan band comprised no more 300 

fighters at most. Suh, Kim Il-Sung, p. 38.

77. Ibid., pp. 130-134.

78. Ibid., pp. 123-126.

79. Ibid., pp. 150-154.

80. Ibid., p. 168.

81. “. . . [D]espite the high degree of Soviet influence and support in constructing 

a communist-oriented regime in their zone of occupation, communism in North 

Korea almost immediately became ‘indigenized,’ and the distinctive Korean 

elements of the North Korean system were evident from the very beginning of the 

regime.” Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, pp. 3-4.

82. Adrian Buzo, The Guerilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in North Korea, 

Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999, p. 31, Table 2.1. 

83. Buzo asserts “[T]he chief motive for convening the congress was to publicly 

confer high Party office on Kim Jong Il.” Ibid., p. 111. 

84. Suh, Kim Il-Sung, Chapter 15.

85. On the former, see ibid., Chapter 11.

86. On dissent generally, see Oh and Hassig, North Korea, pp. 145-147. On 

specific reports of leaflets, posters, and talk, see “Dissident Leaflets Are Reported 

Scattered in North Korea,” New York Times (national edition), August 24, 1994; 

Shim Jae Hoon, “North Korea: A Crack in the Wall,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 

April 29, 1999, p. 11; and an Associated Press report dated January 19, 2005.
46

87. Kelly Koh and Glenn Baek, “North Korean Defectors: A Window into a 

Reunified Korea,” in Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, Korea Briefing, 2000-2001: 

First Steps Toward Reconciliation and Reunification, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2002, 

pp. 205-225. The statistics come from Figure 1b on p. 210.

88. Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader, p. 539.

89. Andrei Lankov, “North Korea: Amnesty for the Kims and Their Kith,” 

International Herald Tribune, January 11, 2005.

90. Selig Harrison, Endgame in Korea, Princeton University Press, 2002, p. 25 

ff.

91. Daniel A. Pinkston, “Domestic Politics and Stakeholders in the North 

Korean Missile Development Program,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 10, Summer 

2003, pp. 51-65.

92. I wish to thank Captain John Sanford for pointing out this possibility.

93. Albright, with Woodward, Madam Secretary, p. 465.

94. Buzo, The Guerilla Dynasty, p. 56. 

95. See the classic study by Albert O. Hirschmann, Exit, Voice, Loyalty: Responses 

to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 

Press, 1970.

96. Maass, “The Last Emperor,” p. 129.

97. See Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, p. 207. 

98. See Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, chapter 7. “Regime of 

Surveillance” is the title of the chapter.

99. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, p. 208. 

100. Oh and Hassig, North Korea, p. 191.

101. Ibid., p. 88. Of course, the culture of gift giving is an important part of Kim 

Jong Il’s power relations with all members of the elite. Martin, Under the Loving 

Care of the Fatherly Leader, pp. 275-276.

102. Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader, p. 547.

103. Oh and Hassig, North Korea, pp. 119-120.

104. Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, 1:375.

105. See Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, chapter 3. 

106. On the 1950s and 1960s, see Suh, Kim Il-sung, chapter 9.

107. James Brooke, “City Workers Sent to N. Korean Farms,” International 

Herald Tribune, June 2, 2005. Of course, this is nothing unusual in North Korea or 

for other communist regimes. Pyongyang has done this in previous years, and it 

remains common practice in Cuba and was standard operating procedure in the 

former Soviet Union.

108. Hunter, Kim Il-Sung’s North Korea, p. 46.
47

109. Ibid., chapters 5, 6, and 10. On the length of military service reaching 10 

years (or more), see Oh and Hassig, North Korea, p. 123.

110. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, pp. 72-73. See also Hunter, Kim 

Il-sung’s North Korea, chapter 1.

111. This is at the core of what Scott Snyder contends are the “key themes” of 

the “psychological character” of Kim Il Sung and hence of North Korea’s leaders. 

See his Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior, Washington, DC: 

United States Institute of Peace, 1999, p. 22.

112. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, p. 27. 

113. Buzo, The Guerilla Dynasty.

114. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, p. 36. Even Selig Harrison agrees 

on this point. See Korean Endgame, chapter 2.

115. The word “neo-traditionalist” is used by Armstrong in relation to North 

Korea’s strict social stratification. See his The North Korean Revolution, p. 73. 

116. As Armstrong notes, the DPRK reinforces potent aspects of “traditional 

Korea politics and culture” especially Confucianism. Ibid., p. 6. 

117. Tong Kim, “You Say Okjeryok, I Say Deterrent: No Wonder We Don’t 

Agree,” Washington Post, September 25, 2005. Specifically, Kim suggests that Kim 

Jong Il might not just be spouting propaganda when he says denuclearizing the 

peninsula was his father’s “fervent wish.”

118. A perusal of Kim Il Sung’s official multivolume memoirs makes this 

clear. At least six volumes of his memoirs have been ghost written and published 

in English the 1990s. See Kim Il Sung, With the Century, 6 volumes, Pyongyang: 

Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1992-95.

119. Breen dubs it “the mother of all personality cults.” See his Kim Jong Il: 

North Korea’s Dear Leader, p. 5. See also Hunter, Kim Il-sung’s North Korea, chapter 

2.

120. Hunter, Kim Il-Sung’s North Korea, p. 25.

121. See, for example, Oh and Hassig, North Korea, p. 100.

122. Adrian Buzo labels the regime a “Kimist System,” while Stephen Bradner 

dubs it the “Kim Family Regime.” For the former, see Buzo, The Guerilla Dynasty; 

for the latter, see Stephen Bradner, “North Korea’s Strategy,” in Henry D. Sokolski, 

ed., Planning for a Peaceful Korea, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 

Strategic Studies Institute, 2001, pp. 23-82.

123. Albright, with Woodward, Madam Secretary, p. 464.

124. I am indebted to Colonel Dwight Raymond for this possible explanation.

125. Cumings, “The Corporate State in North Korea,” pp. 213, 214. 

Coincidentally, a 2005 British documentary on North Korea is titled “A State of 

Mind.” For a review, see Dana Stevens, “North Korea as Glimpsed Through a 

Spectacle,” New York Times (Washington edition), August 10, 2005.
48

126. Andrew Scobell, North Korea’s Strategic Intentions, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 

U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, July 2005, p 14.

127. Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader, pp. 522-523.

128. According to the U.S. Department of State, the literacy rate in North Korea 

is 99 percent. See “Background Note: North Korea” available at www.state.gov/r/

pa/ei/bgn/2782.htm, accessed November 2, 2005. On years of compulsory schooling, 

see Hunter, Kim Il-Sung’s North Korea, p. 208. 

129. Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader, p. 380; and Hunter, Kim 

Il-Sung’s North Korea, p. 218.

130. Lankov, “North Korean Refugees in Northeast China,” pp. 872-873. 

131. As many as 15,000 North Koreans work in camps in Siberia. The figure is 

cited by Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader, p. 425. For a discussion 

of these camps in the Russian Far East, see ibid., chapter 22.

132. L. Gordon Flake and Scott Snyder, Paved with Good Intentions: The NGO 

Experience in North Korea, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003.

133. Cited in James Brooke, “How Electronics are Penetrating North Korea’s 

Isolation: Secret Cellphones, Smuggled Tapes,” New York Times (Washington 

edition), March 15, 2005.

134. Ibid.

135. Rebecca MacKinnon, “North Korea: Chinese Cell Phones Spawn An 

Information Boom,” International Herald Tribune, January 25, 2005.

136. On the incident and the speculation surrounding it, see “Cell Phones 

Spark ‘Communication Revolution’ in North Korea,” Chosun Ilbo, December 3, 

2004; James Brooke, “North Korea Raises Idea of a Kim III,” International Herald 

Tribune, February 1, 2005; Sergey Soukhoukov, “Train Blast was ‘a Plot to Kill 

North Korea’s Leader’,” report filed June 13, 2004, available at www.telegraph.co.uk

and accessed on August 3, 2004.

137. “Why North Korea is Prohibiting Mobile Phones,” Dong A Ilbo, May 31, 

2005; and “Crackdowns, Public Executions on Sino-Korean Border,” Chosun Ilbo, 

March 10, 2005.

138. Barbara Demick, “North Koreans Attend Ideology 101: Lectures Smuggled 

Out Show the Regime’s Efforts to Combat Outside Influences Seeping in and 

Illustrate the Extent of Anti-Americanism,” Los Angeles Times, December 24, 2005. 

139. Brooke, “How Electronics are Penetrating North Korea’s Isolation.”

140. See, for example, Kang Chol-Hwan and Pierre Rigoulot, The Aquariums 

of Pyongyang: Ten Years in the North Korean Gulag, translated by Yair Reiner, New 

York: Basic Books, 2001, pp. 184-187. There are also many examples given by the 

defectors interviewed by Bradley Martin in Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly 

Leader.
49

141. On the spiral of silence, see Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann, “Spiral of Silence: 

A Theory of Public Opinion,” Journal of Communication, Vol. 24, 1974, pp. 43-51. For 

an application of the concept to explain the course of events in China in 1989, see 

Xinshu Zhao and Peilu Shen, “Some Reasons Why the Party Propaganda Failed 

This Time,” in Roger V. Des Forges, et al., eds., Chinese Democracy and the Crisis of 

1989: Chinese and American Reflections, Albany, NY: State University of New York 

Press, 1993, pp. 314-316.

142. Vladimir Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons: A Political History of 

Romanian Communism, Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California 

Press, 2003, pp. 230-231. Of course, the actual uprising of 1989 originated in the 

city of Timisoara a week earlier.

143. According to Bradley Martin, “George Orwell’s 1984 is no more literary 

fantasy. If you were North Korean, Big Brother would watch you.” Martin, Under 

the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader, p. 265.

144. Three generations of the family would be incarcerated for the sins of one 

member of one generation. See ibid., Chapter 16.

145. Kang and Rigoulot, The Aquariums of Pyongyang, p. 188.

146. The pervasiveness of corruption is evident from ibid.

147. For example, now families of defectors reportedly are being sent to the 

mountains rather than to prison camps. Still, it is debatable whether foraging in 

the mountains is much better than internment in a camp. Martin, Under the Loving 

Care of the Fatherly Leader, p. 572.

148. On the shortage economy concept, see, for example, Janos Kornai, The 

Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 

University Press, 1992, pp. 233-234.

149. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, p. 157. 

150. Andrew S. Natsios, The Great North Korean Famine: Famine, Politics, and 

Foreign Policy, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2001.

151. Scobell, Making Sense of North Korea, pp. 10-11.

152. This is a U.S. intelligence estimate. See the Central Intelligence Agency’s 

World Factbook available on line at www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/kn.html, 

accessed November 1, 2005.

153. Merideth Woo-Cummings, The Political Ecology of Famine: The North Korean 

Catastrophe and Its Lessons, Tokyo: Asian Development Bank, 2001.

154. Scott Snyder, “The NGO Experience in North Korea,” p. 9; L. Gordon Flake, 

“The Experience of U.S. NGOs in North Korea,” pp. 36-37; Michael Sclons, “The 

European NGO Experience in North Korea,” pp. 53, 74; Scott Snyder, “Lessons of 

the NGO Experience in North Korea,” p. 119, all in Flake and Snyder, eds., Paved 

with Good Intentions.

155. Andrei Lankov, “North Korea Hungry for Control,” Asia Times, September 

10, 2005.
50

156. James Brooke, “North Korea Says Bumper Crop Justifies Limits on Aid,” 

New York Times (Washington edition), October 6, 2005.

157. Ibid.; and Bruce Wallace, “N. Korea Will Allow Some Aid Groups to Stay, 

Richardson Says,” Los Angeles Times, October 21, 2005.

158. Donald Kirk, “North Korea Closing Another Door This Time on Food,” 

Christian Science Monitor, October 18, 2005; Brooke, “North Korea Says Bumper 

Crop Justifies Limits on Aid.”

159. Cited in Brooke, “North Korea Says Bumper Crop Justifies Limits on 

Aid.”

160. On recent efforts to tinker with the economy, see Martin, Under the Loving 

Care of the Fatherly Leader, Chapter 35.

161. See, for example, Hunter, Kim Il-sung’s North Korea, chapter 13 which is 

titled “Working to Death: An exhausted population.” This chapter focuses on the 

tribulations of North Korean women, but the thrust of the chapter can be applied 

to both sexes.

162. Ken Jowitt, “Soviet Neotraditionalism: The Political Corruption of a 

Leninist Regime,” Soviet Studies, Vol. XXXV, No. 3, July 1983, pp. 275-297. 

163. Scobell, “Making Sense of North Korea,” p. 247.

164. Recent indications are that Kim Jong Il’s 20-something son, Kim Jong 

Chol, is being groomed to succeed his father. The younger Kim is rumored to 

have been introduced to Chinese President Hu Jintao during the latter’s visit to 

Pyongyang in October 2005.