“. . . to insure domestic Tranquility,

provide for the common defence . . .”

PAPERS FROM THE CONFERENCE ON

HOMELAND PROTECTION

Edited by

Max G. Manwaring

October 2000
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ISBN 1-58487-036-2

ii
CONTENTS

Foreword .....................

Overview

 Max G. Manwaring ............

1. A Strategic Perspective on U. S. Homeland

 Defense: Problem and Response

 John J. Hamre ...............

2. The Army of the Constitution:

 The Historical Context

 Gregory J.W. Urwin ............

3. The Public’s Expectations of National

 Security

 Peter D. Feaver ...............

4. Security Expectations for Transnational

 Corporations

 George K. Campbell.............

5. Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threats

 Steven A. Cambone .............

6. Chemical and Biological Terrorism: 

 Political Hype or Bona Fide Post-Cold War

 Threat?

 Russell Howard ...............

7. Infrastructure Warriors: A Threat to the U.S.

 Homeland by Organized Crime

 Thomas A. Johnson ............. 

iii
8. Threat of Civil Unrest and Insurrection

 William A. Navas, Jr. ............ 

 9. Missile Defense

 John Costello ................ 

10. Evolving Roles and Missions for the

 Reserve Components in Responding to

 Incidents Involving Weapons of Mass

 Destruction

 Ellen Embrey ................ 

11. In Support of the Civil Authorities

 Donald A. Haus............... 

12. Where Domestic Security and Civil

 Liberties Collide

 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. ........... 

13. A Strategic View of Where the Army Is: 

 Homeland Defense and Issues of Civil-

 Military Relations

 Don M. Snider

 John A. Nagl

 Tony Pfaff.................. 

14. Toward a National Security Policy and

 Strategy for Now and the 21st Century

 Edwin G. Corr

 Max G. Manwaring ............ 

About the Contributors .............. 

iv
FOREWORD

On April 11-13, 2000, the U.S. Army War C

Strategic Studies Institute sponsored a major conf

that examined what the Department of Defense must 

insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the co

defence . . .,” given the increasing contemporary thre

the U.S. homeland. The conference drew on the cr

thinking of over 200 U.S. and foreign academic, bus

civilian, governmental, and military leaders

discussions generated an exceptionally rich excha

information and ideas concerning problems and solut

U.S. national security for now and into the 21st centu

general, the conference discussions revolved aroun

salient and interrelated issues: the historical conte

dealing with threats to the American homelan

complex threat situation; the evolving strateg

structure for homeland defense; and some cr

considerations and recommendations.

This book highlights the issues and themes th

through the conference. As such, it is not a compreh

record of the proceedings. It is organized as an antho

the best of a series of outstanding conference presenta

revised in light of the discussions that took place 

Finally, the anthology is complemented by an overvie

four specific recommendations. Those recommend

look to the future and place emphasis on the transform

strategy that conference participants considered ess

to safeguard the American homeland now and in

future.

We have not attempted to provide all the an

Rather, our intention is to stimulate and facilitate a 

and more profound debate on U.S. defense prioritie

the need for a paradigm shift to meet the compound co

challenges of the contemporary national and global se

environment. Such a debate will be critical in buildi

necessary support of the Congress, the Defense Co

v
nity, and the American people for the extensive ch

that must be undertaken. We hope that the ins

concerns, and recommendations found in this antholo

help build a strong consensus for regenerating na

security thinking, policy, strategy, and structure to 

the needs and threats of the next century. If we achiev

we will have fulfilled our mission and commitment 

(the reader), the Department of Defense, and the Am

people.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

vi
OVERVIEW

Max G. Manwaring

Protecting the territory and interests of the U

States and its citizens from “all enemies both foreig

domestic . . .,” and “to insure domestic Tranquility . 

the principal tasks of government. The primary rea

emphasize homeland defense is the change in the 

degree, and number of threats to the United States. N

addition to traditional regional security issues, an ar

“nontraditional” threats—including nuclear, chemica

biological weapons proliferation; a hundred dif

varieties of terrorism; ethnic and religious co

organized crime; drug trafficking; and crim

anarchy—challenges U.S. well-being. These threats t

national security are exacerbated by “nonmilitary” t

and menaces that have heretofore been ignored or w

away. They include trade war, financial war, new terr

(e.g., the improving sophistication of using nu

chemical, and biological weapons of mass destr

[WMD]), and cyber war. All these threats challen

United States at home and abroad, and blu

conventional dividing lines between military, po

economic, and informational security affairs.

The combined effect of new, evolving, and incr

threats to U.S. national security is profound. It dema

new approach to both threat and response in ter

homeland defense. It suggests that, without sign

changes in our national security thinking, structure

processes, we face the grave risk that we will n

adequately prepared to deter and defend ag

traditional, nontraditional, and nonmilitary threats

to minimize and contain the harm they might caus

primary focus of our considerations and recommend

regarding these contemporary and future challen

outlined below.

1
The Historical Context for Dealing with Threa

to the American Homeland.

A responsible, feasible, and achievable national se

policy and strategy for the defense of the United State

begin with the values that we as a nation prize. In 19

observing the 200th anniversary of the United 

Constitution, Americans celebrated these values w

sense of rededication—values such as human di

personal freedom, individual rights, ethical conduc

the pursuit of happiness, peace, and prosperity. The

the values that lead us to seek a global order 

encourages human rights, self-determination, the r

law, legitimate institutions, economic prosperity, pe

settlement of disputes, and the elimination of injustic

ultimate purpose of U.S. national security polic

strategy is to protect and advance those values.

The Founding Fathers acknowledged that a 

government required a military establishment form

enough to defend its citizens from outside threats, an

lawless elements that might develop in their m

Nevertheless, they were extremely concerned abo

possible abuse of power and the related threat to fr

represented by a standing army. As a result, the Fou

Fathers relied heavily on the state militias, and toler

substantial standing military establishment only und

most extreme circumstances. Moreover, both the m

and the regular military forces of the United States 

carefully circumscribed by the separation of power

checks and balances enumerated in the United 

Constitution.

At the same time, there was no constitu

requirement for the regular armed forces to provide su

to civil authority. It is under the Common Law conc

“Necessity” that regular military support to civil aut

has been allowed. In this context, military involvem

domestic affairs has been minimal, and the emphas

been on the fact that the regular armed forces are alw

2
support of another federal, state, or local authority. 

the American military establishment has been on a 

tether, and generally mandated to look outward

inward.

Americans want to feel safe, but tend to be mistrus

domestic law and order enforced by the regular m

establishment, and—like their forefathers—are incli

view military-type enforcement of federal authorit

serious threat to individual freedom and liberty. 

consequence, as American’s leaders look for new and 

effective ways to provide for the common defens

domestic well-being, the civilian and military contri

to this anthology agree that it would be wise to reconfi

country’s long-established values.

The Complex Threat Situation.

Over the years, U.S. national security has gen

been viewed as protection from external attack, and th

of largely in terms of military defenses against m

threats. But, given the threats inherent in the pre

nantly interdependent global security environment, 

clearly too narrow a conception. American security 

involves much more than the domestic procuremen

external application of military forces. It includes imp

nonmilitary elements, as well as domestic and 

dimensions.

First, in the chaos of the “new world disorder,” the 

of devastating attacks on the United States, its inte

and its friends perpetrated by the former Soviet U

China, or other contemporary nuclear powers ret

certain credibility. At the same time, the challen

American security are expected to intensify wit

growing sophistication of biological and chemical wa

Third, these challenges are further complicat

traditional and nontraditional asymmetric th

emanating from virtually a thousand different 

intrastate, and transnational political actors w

3
cause—and the will. Finally, the United States, its cit

and its interests are severely challenged by nonm

threats by another thousand actors with access—a

one example—to cyber space.

Evidence of these threats is clearly seen in the 

Korean capability to launch nuclear missiles that can 

the U.S. mainland; the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo 

willingness to poison the Tokyo subway system; the f

and domestic terrorist bombings of the New York 

World Trade Center and the Oklahoma City F

Building; some owners of international mobile c

willing to generate and exploit a financial cri

Southeast Asia that inflicted social-economic-po

devastation that could not have been exceeded by a re

war; and the very real amateur “hacker” or orga

criminal capability to impair the security of an arm

nation electronically as effectively as a nuclear weap

The threat of any one or several political actors 

global community willing to use WMD, conven

weapons, and/or nonmilitary weapons for thei

nefarious purposes is serious enough that it cann

ignored. Moreover, the consequences—the afterma

contemporary warfare to the civil population an

national infrastructure are so serious that they m

addressed. In these terms, there is a clear requirem

prepare and plan more comprehensively fo

civil-military implications of national defense. I

increasingly complex domestic security environment 

foreseen, the military establishment cannot deal wi

diverse threats alone. Traditional military defense 

one element of a broader national security structure

United States is to be successful in meetin

threats—and the possible devastating consequenc

contemporary conflict and homeland defense now and 

future, it would seem reasonable to expect that the 

federal and state governmental structure become 

cooperatively engaged.

4
The Evolving Strategy and Structure for Home

Defense.

For a long time—probably since the War of 1812

continental United States has been relatively immun

the bloody consequences and physical destruct

conflict. As a result, the concept of homeland defen

been generally absent from American thinking. Rec

however, the issue of conflict and possible catast

consequences for the United States and its popula

emerging in opinion polls as an important public con

The proliferation of information has provide

American public with several reasons for concern: (

experience of other members of the global comm

involved in bloody and horrible conflict; (2

understanding that China, North Korea, and other n

powers are building intercontinental ballistic missile

can reach the United States; (3) the perception 

enormous inventory of WMD—nuclear, biologica

chemical—ready to be used against American targe

the reality of nontraditional and asymmetric warfa

the emergence of transnational and intra-national no

actors not subject to deterrence through the cla

military instruments of power; and, finally, (6

realization that “it can happen here,” exacerbated by v

of confused, piecemeal, and ad hoc federal, state, an

responses to recent man-made and natural disaster

have taken place in the United States.

Thus, the lack of an evident policy, strategy

structure for homeland defense has been validated 

congressional initiative asking the Department of D

(DoD) to develop recommendations for a national st

and organization to deal more adequately with the pro

Proposed solutions to the homeland defense issue inc

DoD mandate for closer and more active involvement 

National Guard and other Reserve Components of th

armed forces in the federal support to the homeland d

process—particularly in response to possible 

5
catastrophes. Proposed solutions to the problems of st

(i.e., ends, ways, and means) and organization (i.e., de

who is in charge and how the various elemen

integrated) have run-up against several “fault lines.

These obstacles are found between prevention and 

management issues, and/or consequence manag

processes. As only a few examples, fault lines include: 

lack of a commonly accepted definition of homeland de

(2) the generally reactive approach to law enforceme

national security matters that does not allow much la

for proactive prevention or deterrence; (3) the la

understanding concerning nontraditional and nonm

threats and how to deal with them; (4) crossing fe

state, and local jurisdictions; (5) interagency squa

over appropriations, turf, and responsibilities at all le

government; and, (6) the American citizen’s right to pr

Despite the confusion, contributors agree tha

message from the American people is clear. That is

want to preserve our domestic well-being and conti

benefit from it, we must take the necessary steps to d

it. Consensus is that the first step in an attempt to e

the domestic tranquillity, and to manage the consequ

of any possible attack on the homeland, would b

development of a new paradigm of cooperation. Th

turn, will require a historically viable and constituti

supported unity of national effort. In these terms, m

“command and control” must accommodate to “coordi

and cooperation” in a federal system that inc

separation of powers and checks and balances “to pr

the blessings of liberty.” Another step within 

transformation process would be the developmen

broader concept of deterrence.

Some Critical Considerations

and Recommendations.

Probably sooner than later, it is likely that the hom

defense issue will emerge “surprisingly” in the na

6
political arena. It is important that policyma

decisionmakers, opinionmakers, other civilian and m

leaders, and ordinary citizens are prepared to deal wi

vital issue. In that connection, contributors mad

critical arguments.

First, the temptation should be resisted to give th

armed forces a mandate to “lead in support,” as a qui

easy solution to the complex federal, state, and civil lib

issues surrounding homeland defense. Several good re

were set forth to support that argument. Suffice it 

here that we live in a conflictive and multicultural soc

which there is a perception of some erosion of 

legitimacy in the Federal Government and its institu

Thus, participants recommended that DoD do every

possible to pursue vigilantly a long-term strategy b

perform its primary war-fighting mission right and 

and to develop a better relationship with American soc

Second, rather than taking the easy way out 

problem, serious efforts should be made to develop a u

field theory for homeland defense. It will be difficu

that theory will provide policy and strategy guidanc

will empower a new paradigm of federal, state, and 

coordination and cooperation. Much like George Kenn

in developing the Cold War “containment” th

contributors recommended that strategy “worksho

conducted that will be instrumental in framin

philosophical underpinnings of an organizing the

assist in clarifying basic objectives, courses of actio

the primary means for accomplishing those purposes

Third, a vertical U.S. organizational architecture 

be developed to facilitate the holistic implementat

carefully planned, direct and indirect, proactiv

defensive political-diplomatic, social-economic, psychol

moral, and military-police measures against thos

would violently or indirectly threaten the national se

The complexity of homeland defense in an interdepe

global security environment also requires hori

7
cooperation between the United States and its ex

allies. Without both vertical and horizontal unity of 

homeland defense measures may be irrelevant or 

counter-productive. Thus, attendees recommended 

strategy “workshops” be conducted that will in 

recommend legislative or other initiatives to crea

organization at the highest level to establish, enforc

continually refine an integrated national-global se

policy and strategy.

Finally, within the parameters of a guiding theo

homeland defense and an integrating organiza

architecture, it is important to develop a broader dete

concept. The intent would be to supplement or repla

older and narrower nuclear deterrence paradigm wi

that addresses the traditional, nontraditional

nonmilitary threats imposed by the diverse state, non

and transnational actors in the contemporary glob

domestic security environments. Within the contex

field theory for homeland defense, the deterrence “r

thumb” must move away from “rational” U.S.-held val

must address the notion that there may be other “irrat

things that hostile elites might value. Moreover, it 

accept the idea that other cultural “things” of valu

realistically be held at risk. Conversely, a br

deterrence rule of thumb must also provide the ba

“carrots,” as well as “sticks,” to be offered as deterren

organizational understanding of motives, culture, a

ability to communicate, thus, becomes crucial to 

civil-military deterrence equation. Again, partic

recommended that strategy “workshops” be conduc

craft a deterrence policy and strategy that add

diverse contemporary security threats and responses

Conclusions.

Implementing the extraordinary challenges of r

and regeneration implied in these consideration

recommendations calls for a major paradigm shift. Th

8
not be easy. It will, however, be far less demandin

costly in political, monetary, and military terms 

continuing a short-term and generally military appro

what is a long-term and multidimensional problem.

These challenges and tasks are nothing radical. Th

only basic security strategy and national 

management. By accepting these challenges, dec

makers, policymakers, and opinionmakers can help 

the constitutional and moral mandate to provide f

defense of the American homeland, and fulfill the pr

that the 11th Annual Strategy Conference offers.

9
CHAPTER 1

A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE

ON U.S. HOMELAND DEFENSE:

PROBLEM AND RESPONSE

John J. Hamre

I am going to speak as though I were still D

Secretary of Defense for one last hour, if I may, wi

presumption that I can do that. But, first, I must te

that I was amazed that you asked me to offer this ke

address, and it reminds me very much of a story tha

once told of the great Lionel Barrymore, who was a f

Shakespearean actor at the turn of the century in En

Barrymore was playing the part of Richard II in th

Richard II by Shakespeare at the Old Vic in Londo

know Richard was the hunchbacked, deformed basta

of Henry. He was an ambitious man who decided to 

war against his father and his legitimate brother t

over the throne. And the story is about the warf

Richard and his insurrection against Henry. In the s

act of the play, the scene takes place on the battlefie

he’s in a pavilion. A young page was supposed to run in

stage and say, “Sir, they have captured Glouster.” R

is to stand up and demonically laugh and say, “Take h

and have him hung.” Well, this one night at the O

there was a very young actor who was playing the role 

new squire, and he was so nervous that he was appear

the stage with the great Barrymore. He was bac

rehearsing his line, “They’ve captured Glouster.” He t

get it right so that he could be perfect in timing and th

of thing. At the crucial moment, he ran out on the stag

he said, “Sir, they’ve captured Glouster and hung him

then he just froze; he realized what he had done.

Of course he had cut off the great Barrymore. 

stopped. And Barrymore stared at this kid with a loo

11
would melt a rock. There was a pause that lasted for 

seemed an infinity. Then, after the longest si

Barrymore raised himself up and said, “Well, 

damned.” So when former Commandant of the U.S. 

War College Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr., cal

and said, “Even though you are no longer Deputy Secr

I’d still like you to come and give a talk at this confere

said, “Well, I’ll be damned.”

Homeland Defense.

We are here to talk about homeland defense. Now 

a subject that has become quite current in the last s

years. But frankly, it has been alien from Am

thinking for a very long time. Ever since the unpleasa

in 1814 when the British sailed up the Potomac and b

down the Capitol, we have not thought much about 

remind people that it is quite an interesting new wo

live in. We sing in our National Anthem, “And the r

red glare, the bombs bursting in air.” You know thos

produced by Royal Ordnance, which is now a part of B

Aerospace, our fifth largest defense contractor in the U

States. So it is a very interesting new world we are livi

But not really since 1812 or 1814 have we thought 

about homeland defense. Now we have had some ep

where we have worried about it. During World War 

you recall, if you were in California, there are still pi

that you can see of the dirigibles that were holding th

cables up to provide a barrier against airplanes that 

be attacking air fields. And if anybody is here from B

you probably remember that the gold dome, the Bu

Dome that is at the capitol of the Commonwea

Massachusetts, was painted black at the outset of the 

it couldn’t become a beacon for German bombers

outside of a few specific and fairly limited instance

United States has felt secure in its homeland for at lea

generations. We really have not thought about it mu

12
Reasons to Start Thinking about Homeland De

Now.

Now it has come to be a matter of concern in the l

years. Certainly we are only starting to think ab

intellectually in the last 2 or 3 years; it has become 

important to us. I think there are several reasons fo

First, the intellectuals in the defense establishment

you and your colleagues, have spent a fair amount o

talking about the asymmetric nature of warfare. Wh

United States is such a dominant force on the battl

especially conventionally, it is unlikely that an

country will chose to do what Saddam did in 1990, w

to try to take on the United States or a coalition of W

powers in a conventional way. So we perceive that pot

opponents would choose to confront us in a nontrad

manner. After all, why would a country like North 

which is a shattered country in all truth, go to the st

building a 7,000-kilometers intercontinental ba

missile (ICBM)? For what purpose, what plausible r

from a defense standpoint, would they need a missil

could reach 7,000 kilometers, if it were not to 

politically intimidate the United States? So we se

emergence of asymmetric threats where very 

numbers of people can now wage war against the U

States, at least in a political dimension. That is probab

first reason that we are focusing on it.

The second reason is that we are living with the r

of the Cold War. As the old Soviet Union broke up, it 

astounding inventory of bad things that are drifting in

hands of bad people—an enormous inventory of che

biological weapons and loose nukes. Just the other day 

was a story of the Uzbeki border guards intercept

illicit transfer of nuclear material. Equally, we are 

the proliferation of knowledge. The huge infrastruct

knowledge that was built up in the old Soviet Union d

the Cold War is now looking for employment and mov

directions that trouble us deeply.

13
The third thing is the emergence of a ser

transnational actors like Osama bin Laden an

organization. These transnational actors do not seem 

susceptible to the classic instruments of deterrence. H

you deter an organization like Osama bin Laden’s? So 

things in combination have led to the United S

thinking more creatively about the issues of hom

defense than at any time in the last 150 years.

We have a problem. First of all, I do not think we 

common understanding of what homeland defense 

means. For some individuals, were we to take a po

first thing that would come to mind would be na

missile defense, harkening back to Ronald Reagan’s s

15 years ago about national missile defense. That is 

homeland defense means to a large number of memb

Congress, for example. To others, it means defendi

United States against threats by terrorist organiz

using weapons of mass destruction (WMD), be 

chemical or biological or nuclear. Yet to others, hom

defense means cyber defense, trying to protect Am

infrastructure in an increasingly interconnected worl

there are others who think homeland defense is as ba

trying to stop the flow of illegal drugs into the United S

Two Cogent Issues in Homeland Defense.

Homeland defense means lots of different things 

of people. One of the questions that we should come b

today is, “Is there a unified field theory for hom

defense?” I think that is an important question for us 

about, especially for DoD to talk about. I think there a

problems about having a unified field theory for hom

defense, but we will talk about that later. I am not go

talk about the drug issue here. That is less my concer

in a personal sense—obviously it is a great problem f

United States—but not for today’s speech. I would 

talk about the first three meanings of homeland d

14
noted above, and then come to the question at the end

is, can we have a unified field theory for homeland defe

First, let us examine the national missile defense 

This, of course, is the one that is most familiar to a d

organization. It after all represents something that i

typical of a defense problem. We know how to operatio

the issue of homeland defense when it comes to m

protection. We can hypothesize a threat, operationaliz

putting time lines to an attack, characteristics to the n

of the attack, attack avenues or azimuth that we woul

to worry about. We then could design a program to dea

that threat. This is a very classic military problem, 

very classic military solution. It is a matter of orga

resources to develop very sophisticated hardware, d

the command and control procedure, wire it toget

reliable ways, work out the doctrine for its applicatio

so forth—a classic military problem. And it is on

engenders the least amount of confusion in the depar

when we think about it, not just because we have 

thinking about it for 15 years, but because it is a 

military problem.

The second issue—that of WMD in the han

terrorists—is inherently a much more complicated pro

First of all, it is not a purely military problem, even tho

would on its face seem to be. There are two dimensi

this problem. One dimension is how do you stop the ba

from doing something before hand? And then there 

second dimension; how do you cope with the conseque

we are not able to stop the terrorists, and what do we d

defense department?

Let’s take the first dimension. There are some very 

issues in this area of homeland defense. First, it gets 

core of some very serious fault lines that run up and 

the American form of constitutional government, th

lines between national defense and domestic security

all, since 1873, when the posse comitatus law was 

place, DoD has been forbidden from undertakin

15
enforcement actions inside the United States. 

comitatus was narrowly defined at this start, as the la

here know. Posse comitatus really was passed because 

members of Congress were fearful that the Fe

Government was going to get involved in state politics 

South during the period of reconstruction after the 

War. The law was passed to delimit the involvement 

Federal Government in state politics. But it has 

transmogrified into an enshrined principle in Am

constitutional government where DoD does not do an

law enforcement.

This is a very sharp fault line in the American f

government when it comes to the issue of WMD and th

that the government responds. Why? Well, if we postu

significant terrorist event, a WMD-type event, w

dealing with an inherent limitation in loca

enforcement. Law enforcement organizations are size

day-to-day basis for the normal load of crime and 

problems in the neighborhood. They are not sized f

catastrophic event. There is no mobilizable capacity i

law enforcement organizations, other than to work ove

or borrow officers from a neighboring jurisdiction. I 

say this disparagingly. Local governments and 

governments cannot afford and do not maintain mobi

capability. 

There is only one part of the government that mai

mobilizable resources, that are designed to be qualita

different the day after an event compared to the day b

And that is DoD. We mobilize massive resources an

them into the field. That is what we do. And yet that 

what law enforcement lacks. This creates a very 

friction point when it comes to a WMD event in the U

States. How do we in DoD prepare for a catast

terrorist event like that when we have no authority t

in peacetime? This is a very interesting problem.

There is a second problem fault line, and that is th

line between our intelligence instruments as they re

16
threats outside of the United States and our intell

instruments that relate to internal U.S. threats. A

know, DoD and its intelligence instruments are prec

from surveillance on any U.S. citizen. We are not allo

undertake surveillance inside the United States, and 

not. That authority rests exclusively with law enforc

and especially with the Federal Bureau of Investi

(FBI). Similarly, the FBI lacks the capability to do thi

a significant way outside of the United States.

We have this internal bureaucratic boundary as it 

with the border of the United States as it relates 

intelligence responsibilities. I saw this last December 

we had very serious indications of a coordinated ef

detonate a device in the United States. We bumped u

against this fault line on intelligence collaboration. A

allowed to share information? Are we allowed to g

information? Under what authority are we allowed to 

And when we examine cyber terrorism and cyber se

this becomes very problematic indeed. When you are t

about things that move at the speed of light and can 

back and forth across that boundary at the speed of lig

have serious organizational problems.

There is a third fault line in this area, and that is 

DoD. As I said, we have two parts to the problem. Th

part concerns stopping the bad guys before they c

something. The second part concerns dealing wit

consequences after the fact. They take profoundly dif

skills. If you are trying to stop a terrorist organi

before they have committed the act, DoD requir

organization of enormous agility, stealth, flexibility

lethality. It takes special operations kinds of forces, 

that are able to quickly work in tight coordination 

intelligence elements to locate the potential opponen

But those critical skills are not helpful when it co

dealing with the consequences after the fact. Ther

require an organization of transparency, public confi

openness, massiveness, predictability. When yo

17
dealing with a society, you are dealing with a locality 

literally thousands of people have potentially been ex

to an agent, when there is great panic in the commun

is not going to be the “snake eaters” that are going 

effective managers of that problem. I say that with aff

and with enormous respect for the Special Oper

people. These are very different sets of problems, an

require different organizational solutions. In sum, w

three fault lines that run up and down the gover

when it deals with this second area of homeland defe

How Do We Face These Issues?

The key question we now face is how do we tackle 

issues. First, we have to find a solution to the way th

Federal Government is organized to deal with this pro

Part of our problem is that our entire federal respons

to emergencies at the local level revolves around the F

Emergency Response Plan, which is run by the F

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). But FEM

decided not to be actively involved in the issue of hom

defense. This is a serious problem. Everybody at th

level is used to looking to Washington with telescop

and they cannot see anybody at the other end. All o

Washington are trying to communicate to the local 

through a different chain. We have a serious problem 

That is one of those problems that we have to solve.

How should the Federal Government organize t

local authorities? Because FEMA has not taken the 

the Justice Department has stepped in. But as soon a

issue is channeled through law enforcement age

people on the ends of the spectrum get worried. On th

end, you find the “black helicopter” crowd that is all f

that the Federal Government is going to come in and 

away their liberties. I do not understand this bunch, b

have a lot of them, especially west of the Mississipp

east of the Mississippi, we have all of the leftist crowd

watched the movie, Siege, one too many times, and 

18
have this fear that DoD just can hardly wait to come 

take over a city. Good grief. We in DoD have e

problems, let alone having to run Washington, DC

nonetheless, the right and the left are paranoid abo

Federal Government, and especially DoD, suspendin

liberties in time of emergency. So they do not even w

to prepare for catastrophic terrorism in peacetime.

Given these political realities, how do we organi

Federal Government to deal with homeland defense? L

offer one point, and I say this with some passion. It r

the arguments I have had on several occasions, esp

with the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU

biggest threat to American civil liberties will come 

day that we have an event like this, and we have 

nothing to get ready for it. If the only option available 

President is to declare martial law—to trigge

Insurrection Act and to declare martial law—that wi

tragedy in America that day. To avoid that terrible o

we must spend time now getting ready and tackle 

tough problems.

There is a second issue we have to work on in this 

and that is the whole issue of federalism. We do not 

about federalism much in the United States. Frank

people who do think most about it are the National Gu

am referring to the relationship between the F

Government and local government in dealing w

problem that transcends local political jurisdictions

winter DoD undertook an exercise. We designed a str

scenario in order to examine these issues. In thi

scenario, a terrorist organization acquired a tactical n

device out of the old Soviet Union, brought it into the U

States, and detonated it in a major metropolitan cent

conducted this exercise jointly with the Departm

Justice and FBI to uncover some of these issues.

Let me share with you some of the problem

discovered. If the device goes off, the first reaction, of c

is the first responders rush to the site of the proble

19
start doing what they can. During the first 2 

however, those first responders have used up their lif

supply of exposure to radiation. You’ve lost all you

responders in the first 2 hours. Second, how d

communicate to the 300,000 people that are with

hour’s drive of the epicenter what to do? There is a plu

radioactive fallout that went downwind about 10 mile

everybody who lives in that area is potentially expose

to a dose of lethal radiation. Now the best thing for th

do is to stay in their basement for the next 24 hours. H

you find out on the ground where that plume went? H

you tell them? How do you become the one author

voice to tell people what to do? Every junior college p

professor in the country is going to be on the local tele

explaining what radiation is like. How do you establi

one voice that everybody listens to? Who is it? How d

tell a dad that he cannot drive into that area to pick 

kids in the day care center? And how are you going t

him? These are tough issues.

Ultimately, these are federalism issues. At its co

are asking, “What is the legal authority in a geogra

area in a time of an emergency of this magnitude?” L

give you a very grim example. If there were such an ev

this one scenario, we would have about around 4

radioactive human corpses in the area. What legal aut

is needed to bury 48,000 radioactive individuals? W

the authority? Currently, all legal authorities, of cour

burial are state and local. There are no federal auth

for burial. Does the President of the United Stat

health and safety reasons, order the local National Gu

conduct open-trench burning? Who decides that? I 

these sound terribly grim, but we have got to think ou

through some of these issues. This is, by the way, wh

call doctrine. We need to develop doctrine for conseq

management. 

At their core, these are federalism issues. Let m

you a very specific example. Do we federalize the Na

Guard? Of course, as soon as we do, we may not use th

20
law enforcement because of posse comitatus. If the 

remains under state authority, they may be used 

enforcement, but we now have split command and co

How are we going to work that out? We can find a so

but we have to work it out in advance. This is developi

doctrine of consequence management, and we have t

working on it.

These are new problems to DoD. All war planning i

takes place in “CINCdoms” (combatant commanders

of responsibility). Commanders in Chief (CINCs) d

planning. We do not do war planning in Se

headquarters. We do not do it—and thank God we do 

it—in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. We d

planning in “CINCdoms.” The problem, of course, is th

United States has never been assigned to any CINC

of responsibility (AOR). I am excluding, of cours

Continental Air Defense mission. Aside from that, w

never put the United States into a CINC’s AOR. The

historical reasons for it, largely stemming from CIN

Service politics. The Services and the CINCs and the 

wrestled with this problem recently when they dev

the last Unified Command Plan. We could not 

consensus, again, in no small measure because of in

organizational politics.

There is also a larger question, which is this anx

the hearts of Americans, be they on the left or the righ

military command over America. It fuels paran

people’s minds. For these reasons we have never as

the United States to a CINC AOR. Of course, that 

DoD has never developed war plans to defend the hom

We have never developed training scenarios.

I think we have a temporary (and maybe long

solution when the Chairman and the Secr

recommended to the President that we create the Join

Force for Civil Support (JTF-CS). JTF-CS is working 

with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to come u

a series of operationalizing scenarios to try to defin

21
understand the nature of this problem, and to extra

lessons that we have to learn so that we can develop 

doctrine for homeland defense. That is why this conf

is so important. We must assemble creative minds to 

through such hard problems as this. So I commend y

holding this conference.

The Third Issue of Homeland Defense.

The third issue of homeland defense is cyber prote

This is quite different, of course, from the national m

defense and from the WMD terrorism categories. 

there is a definitional problem. How and when do you 

when this is a national security issue as opposed to 

enforcement issue? At what point is it ever clear that 

an act of war? Second, the infrastructure that is 

attack is civilian, not military. A cyber attack is likel

entirely against private sector infrastructure. For exa

even DOD’s command and control system is largely 

private sector. We no longer have big, complex, w

owned telephone switches and dedicated communi

facilities. Now we contract for this from the private s

So a cyber attack is most likely going to fall on the p

infrastructure of the United States. And, frankly, th

not think this is a problem right now. Some companie

had problems, and they want to keep it very quiet. Th

thing a Wall Street investment banker wan

acknowledge is that they have been hacked, for fear th

event will create bad publicity that might affe

company’s financial standing. The private sector 

going to want to advertise that they just have 

problem. So how do we, the Federal Government, p

homeland defense in cyber space to a community tha

not feel they need our help? You certainly cannot d

federal mandate.

I believe we have to develop a very different approa

cyber security. We have to find a method that pr

incentives for the private sector to want to find prot

22
for itself, rather than to mandate it. I think we need 

ways to create either tax incentives or indemnifi

incentives for companies that invest in prot

infrastructure. So, for example, if a company invest

virtual private network with encryption aroun

infrastructure, maybe its insurance company will gi

break on its insurance rates. In this instance the role 

the Federal Government, is to delimit the liabilities 

corporations and the insurance companies through 

sort of a secondary market. I think that is how we are 

to have to fix the problem of protecting Ame

infrastructure in cyber space. It is not a classic m

problem. So in this instance, ironically, homeland defe

cyber space probably means working through the Wa

Means Committee, not through the Armed Se

Committee. 

What is the appropriate role for the Fe

Government, and especially for the defense establish

when it comes to cyber space protection? My pe

feeling is that, in this area, our role is probably on

deals with providing intelligence and surveillance of 

space and providing that information reliably to peo

the United States, be it to law enforcement or to p

sector entities.

Here again, we confront the very difficult prob

what is the Federal Government’s role rega

surveillance on U.S. citizens. It is very hard to distingu

cyber space when a bad guy all of a sudden becom

American citizen. As soon as we find that any 

surveillance activities overseas connects to an Am

citizen, we have to turn off surveillance in order to p

their privacy. This is a serious problem. We need t

ways to link the lawful authorities that exi

surveillance inside the United States and the auth

and responsibilities that we have for overseas intelli

But this raises many dificult problems which we n

address. 

23
Conclusions.

Now let me wrap this up with a concluding observ

Is it possible to develop a unified field theory for hom

defense? I am dubious because of the very different na

these three homeland defense problems. National m

defense is a classic military problem. WMD terroris

hybrid problem, especially in the area of conseq

management. Here the problems are federalism issu

exclusively or even largely in the jurisdiction of 

Finally, for cyber security issues, virtually none of i

with the Federal Government. So, is it possible to dev

unified theory for homeland defense? I doubt it, beca

will be extremely difficult. That does not mean we s

not try to develop a unifying paradigm as the feder

state governments work through and think about 

these problems.

Right now, however, the most important thing was 

to create the Joint Task Force for Civil Support (CT

The CTF-CS only deals with the WMD terrorist incid

is not dealing with the National Missile Defense (

problem, and is not dealing with the cyber problem. 

two problems are assigned to the Space Command. I t

is still an open question as to how successful we will 

putting cyber protection at Space Command. But t

another issue for another day.

Ultimately, there is only one CINCUSA, and that 

President as the Commander in Chief. We have 

provide him the reliable staffing structure so that he 

effective in that role.

So what do we need to do, and what am I asking 

do? First, I think we need to properly define the hom

defense mission. Second, we need to develop m

doctrine for these problems. That has to be grounded 

operationalization of the threat. I think some of that w

underway, work that needs to be done on the ba

exercise but grounded with a good theoretical underp

24
that a theory for homeland defense could be possible. T

what you should be doing at this conference. Third, I 

we need disciplined thinking—a new paradi

cooperation—on the tough federalism issues. How 

Federal Government and the state and local govern

work together at times of extraordinary crisis? We 

how to cooperate when there are natural disasters. 

not seem to know how to cooperate if there is a catast

terrorist incident. Finally, we in DoD have to figure ou

we support law enforcement as the junior partners 

enterprise. DoD must act in a subordinate role to othe

do have it as their primary responsibility to p

homeland defense.

It is absolutely crucial that you are holdin

conference. I do not know when you made plans fo

conference, but I am very grateful that you did. W

running on borrowed time. I think it is just a matter o

before we have an event in this country that w

absolutely the most stressful thing to confront the co

since the War of 1812. We cannot afford not to be ready 

because at that moment everybody in the country is go

be looking for their government to respond with comp

and assurance.

We will either frighten them, or we will reassure 

that we will get through it, depending on our prepra

This conference is the starting point. I hope that m

you in your respective organizations will see this a

responsibility to take this even further as we work th

these issues. I thank you for the opportunity to be wi

today.

25
CHAPTER 2

THE ARMY OF THE CONSTITUTION:

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Gregory J. W. Urwin

Everyone who enlists in the United States Ar

required to take the following oath:

I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support t

Constitution of the United States against all enemies, fore

and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to t

same.

1

In other words, American soldiers are expected 

down their lives for a piece of paper, but that is not as a

as it sounds. For the Constitution exists to serve a 

purpose, as its framers took pains to explain in 

Preamble—“to form a more perfect Union, establish J

insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the co

defence, promote the general Welfare, and secu

Blessings of Liberty.” That definition of good gover

contains a decidedly military thrust. Governments u

provide for their defense by maintaining armed force

those forces are sometimes called upon to keep or

home.

2

Yet while the men who drafted and ratifie

Constitution might have agreed on the general purp

government, they clashed over the proper mea

ensuring national security. The years in which the U

States won its independence and became a viable 

also witnessed a drawn-out and prickly debate over m

policy. Americans argued about how much military 

they were willing to entrust to the national governme

well as when and against whom that power shou

employed.

3

27
Although anti-militarism permeated the basic po

philosophy of the Founding Fathers, they could not e

the fact that theirs was a nation born in war. The 

realistic among them acknowledged that the ge

welfare and blessings of liberty could not be safegu

without occasional resort to arms. Despite ideol

disputes and increasingly bitter partisanship, 

managed to construct a military system that would g

America’s responses to its enemies, both foreig

domestic, for a century following George Washin

presidency. That system, and the assumptions 

supported it, continue to influence our current d

establishment. As America’s leaders search for new w

serve the republic’s security interests in an a

uncertainty, they would do well to revisit the cou

military roots.

4

The English adventurers, businessmen, and re

zealots who established the Thirteen Colonies encou

a variety of military threats—Indians, Span

Frenchmen, Hollanders, and pirates—in the New W

England possessed no standing army when the 

migration began in earnest in the early 17th century

if the colonizing bands who crossed the Atlantic had 

inclined to import that relatively new European instit

they lacked the financial resources to support a subst

number of full-time soldiers. Thus, those vuln

communities attempted to meet their military needs 

less costly defense system—a system that was we

decline in the mother country—the militia.

5

The militia, which traced its origins to Saxon En

rested on the principle of universal military service. 

the Thirteen Colonies, except for Quaker Pennsyl

passed legislation that turned their adult male inhab

into part-time soldiers. Each man aged 16 to 6

expected to own a modern weapon, train regularly w

neighbors, and stand ready to repel any attack o

colony.

6

28
As the colonies expanded and prospered, howeve

militia system grew weaker rather than stro

Socio-economic concerns figured prominently in 

decline. The cost of acquiring a sound musket, suf

powder and shot, and a suitable edged weapon even

transformed the militia into the exclusive province of 

propertied males. Slaves, free blacks, indentured ser

apprentices, drifters, and Indians were weeded out 

ranks in the name of order and internal security. A

same time, colonial authorities came to feel that calli

large numbers of solid citizens in response to every m

crisis was both politically risky and economically disrup

especially as those emergencies normally occurred 

distant frontier. Nevertheless, the militia lived on 

middle-class association chiefly concerned with prot

property and the local status quo. It schooled young m

elementary military science, restored law and or

unruly districts, and guarded against slave revolts, 

ceased to be the only means of colonial defense long 

the American Revolution.

7

In place of the militia, colonial governments t

guarding their frontiers with paid troops raised f

periods of time—ordinarily a campaign season or a ful

These semi-regulars came to be known as “Provin

Ideally, Provincial units were to fill their ranks 

voluntary enlistments or draftees from the militia, b

latter expedient met with increasing resist

Eventually, many of the men who joined the Prov

turned out to be the very ones barred from m

service—the poor and propertyless. This marked the s

a recruitment pattern that would persist to the p

time. America has often entrusted its defense to thos

enjoy the smallest shares of its bounty.

8

During the Seven Years’ War, Great Britain final

enough regular regiments to North America to elim

the French threat to the Thirteen Colonies. Despi

Redcoats’ heroic achievements and the colonies’ 

reliance on semi-regulars, 18th century Amer

29
exhibited a strong antipathy toward the notion of sta

armies. Steeped in the history of ancient Greece and 

Americans believed that a military establishment wit

war to keep it occupied would inevitably turn again

people it was supposed to protect. The more recent ex

attributed to Oliver Cromwell and James II helped i

the radical Whig ideology that the colonists imbibed 

their English cousins.

9

These words, published under a pseudonym in 

summed up what had long been an entrenched attit

American society:

It has ever been held that standing armies in times of peace 

dangerous to a free country; and no observation seems 

contain more reason in it. Besides being useless, as having 

object of employment, they are inconvenient and expensive. T

soldiery, who are generally composed of the dregs of the peo

when disbanded, or unfit for military service, being equ

unfit for any other employment, become extrem

burthensome. . . . The severity of discipline necessary to 

observed reduces them to a degree of slavery; the unconditio

submission to the commands of their superiors, to which t

are bound, renders them the fit instruments of tyranny 

oppression.— Hence they have in all ages afforded strik

examples of contributing, more or less, to enslave mankind

The decade preceding the American Revol

intensified this hostility to a virulent degre

dispatching regular regiments to Boston in 1768-6

1774 to intimidate the contentious Massachusetts W

Great Britain only succeeded in causing many colon

regard Redcoats as the ultimate symbol of mi

despotism. As an open break approached, those op

Parliament’s efforts to curb colonial autonomy transf

the militia into a potent political tool. They ousted Lo

officers and had a revolutionized militia prod the po

into backing the resistance movement.

11

The New England militia proved its willingness t

on April 19, 1775, when it engaged in running battl

30
1,700 British regulars from Concord to Bo

Massachusetts. Having started a full-fledged war

Englanders looked to the Middle and Southern Colon

assistance. The Massachusetts assembly invited the S

Continental Congress to assume responsibility fo

10,000 to 20,000 angry Yankees who were keeping 

Redcoats penned in Boston. Congress complied on Ju

1775, designating that hastily assembled and irreg

governed force “the American continental army.”

12

The military system first adopted by the Conti

Congress resembled its colonial predecessors. 

Provincials, Continental soldiers were initially enli

year at a time, but the wisdom of that arrangement 

into question as the course of the war turned again

rebels. The fall of New York City and the 

disintegration of the Continental Army in the latter 

1776 demonstrated that the survival of the infant U

States required an army of long-term regular

September 16, 1776, Congress voted to obl

Continentals “to serve during the present war.” Awar

the majority of Americans would not consent to pu

personal interests on hold for the duration of a lon

Congress instituted a recruitment policy that delibe

appealed to the down and out. Enlistees were promis

bounties (later raised to $80) and 100-acre land g

Consequently, the Continental Army drew the bulk 

strength from the lower echelons of Ame

society—vagrants, loafers, the unemployed, inden

servants, debtors, free blacks, and slaves. Some recr

even signed up enemy deserters, prisoners of war, ord

criminals, and Tories sentenced to death.

13

Despite these economic inducements, the Conti

Army’s actual strength never neared authorized 

General George Washington and other Contin

commanders did not dare to give battle without callin

sizable increment of militia to back up their underm

regulars. For its part, the militia compiled a mixed c

record during the War for Independence. It stood f

31
times, as at Breed’s Hill, Bennington, Oriskany

Cowpens. On other occasions, it broke and ran 

slightest pretext. Given such unpredictable conduct, 

wonder that most senior Continental officers expre

low opinion of the militia.

14

Militiamen may have had their limitations, bu

made indispensable contributions to the winn

independence in their familiar role of home defense

suppressed local Loyalists, patrolled the coastline, gu

frontier settlements, and protected the countryside 

enemy foragers and raiders. Along with the Conti

Army, the militia prevented the British from reestabl

royal authority anywhere except for a few rest

enclaves. The British did not have enough troops ava

to occupy the Thirteen Colonies in force. If they s

themselves too thin, the Patriots could defeat th

detail, which is what happened at Trenton, Prin

Saratoga, and Yorktown. The Patriots lost more b

than they won, but they persevered in a war of attritio

sapped British resolve and secured American inde

ence.

15

When the War for Independence erupted, the Th

Colonies possessed no central government. The S

Continental Congress, which convened at Philadelp

May 1775, took on that role by default. After all, it w

only pan-colonial body in existence and had been form

coordinate resistance to British policies. Manag

protest movement that had escalated into armed 

turned out to be the next logical step.

16

Exhibiting the same legalistic bent as the E

enemy, Congress sought to legitimize its position w

written constitution called the Articles of Confeder

The task of writing this document fell to the multi-ta

John Dickinson of Pennsylvania. Congress receiv

draft on July 12, 1776. It was Dickinson who coin

phrase “for the common Defence, or general Welfar

selected those words to define the financial obligatio

32
the states owed to the Confederation. To put it plainl

expenses incurred on behalf of the Continental Ar

Navy, which acted in defense of all the states, were 

paid “out of a common Treasury.”

17

The final version of the Articles, which was not r

until 1781, retained Dickinson’s formulation of the co

defense. For the most part, Congress had “the so

exclusive right and power” to wage war and make pea

individual states were permitted to defend them

against imminent attacks and actual invasions. Art

endowed Congress with the authority to

build and equip a navy—to agree upon the number of la

forces, and to make requisitions from each state for its quo

in proportion to the number of white inhabitants in such sta

Except for small garrisons at a few frontier or c

forts, no state could maintain standing forces in peac

Nevertheless, each state was to

keep up a well regulated militia, sufficiently armed a

accoutred, and shall provide and constantly have ready for u

. . . a due number of field pieces and tents, and a prop

quantity of arms, ammunition, and camp equipage.

18

Essentially, the Articles of Confederation formaliz

loose-knit alliance that the rebellious colonies co

together to improve their chances of throwing off B

rule. This was a marriage of convenience, and any sta

free to disregard its provisions whenever they b

inconvenient. Congress lacked the power to force a s

do anything against its will. Consequently, requisitio

troops and money met with either partial or 

noncompliance. With the end of the Revolution an

elimination of a direct British threat, the states foun

less reason to cooperate with Congress or each other

situation seriously hampered the Confederation’s ab

provide for the common defense.

19

33
Once it became evident that the Yorktown defea

undermined Britain’s will to continue the war, pr

built in Congress to reduce the Continental Army. 

was even some doubt that the Articles entitled Cong

maintain an army and navy after the cessation of host

The mutinies that swept the Pennsylvania and New J

Lines in early 1781, plus the abortive attempt 2 year

by some Continental army officers to organize a m

coup at the Newburgh Cantonment, lent fresh confirm

to the long-standing suspicion of standing armies. On 

23, 1783, Congress instructed Washington to furlou

many Continentals as he saw fit. By October 1

Continental Army had shrunk to a single regiment 

men under Colonel Henry Jackson.

20

Certain congressmen harbored reservations abou

precipitate disarmament. Among them was Alex

Hamilton of New York, a former member of Washin

staff and a genuine combat hero. As chairman 

committee appointed on April 4, 1783, to examine the 

conduct of the Confederation’s foreign, Indian, and m

affairs, Hamilton solicited Washington’s guidance o

proper size and structure of a peacetime military for

Washington responded in less than a month wi

famous “Sentiments on a Peace Establishm

Washington recommended the creation of “a regula

standing force” of 2,631 officers and men to garrison 

Point and enough frontier posts “to awe the Indians, p

our Trade,” and prevent encroachments on Am

territory by the British in Canada and the Spanish 

Floridas and Louisiana. Hoping to allay his country

prejudices, Washington asserted:

‘Altho’ a large standing Army in time of Peace hath ever b

considered dangerous to the liberties of a Country, yet a 

Troops, under certain circumstances, are not only safe, 

indispensably necessary.

34
He also demonstrated his political acuity by saluti

militia as “this great Bulwark of our Libertie

independence.” To make those words a reality, Wash

favored militia reform. He proposed that militiam

classed by age, with younger men between 18 and 25 o

to train longer and respond first to military emergenci

Enlarging on Washington’s recommenda

Hamilton pushed for 3,000 regulars backed by an 

citizens’ volunteer corps. The latter was to be recruite

the cities for 8-year hitches, and armed, clothed, and p

the central government. As fate would have it, Co

accepted neither plan. On June 2, 1784, it discharged 

Jackson’s regiment except for 80 privates to guard m

stores at West Point and Fort Pitt. With thi

Continental Army passed into history.

23

The day after Congress disbanded the last 

Continental Army, it created what historian Richa

Kohn has called “the first peacetime military fo

American history”—a single regiment consisting of 70

drawn from the militias of Pennsylvania, Connecticu

York, and New Jersey to serve for a maximum of 12 m

This 1st American Regiment, as it was to be know

more a constabulary than an army, its ten companie

up into small detachments to furnish a token m

presence along the Ohio Valley. Kohn characterized 

a compromise force: not under state control, and enlisted 

service out-of-state; not wholly under Confederati

authority, not long-service regulars, and furnished obviou

at the pleasure of the states, so certainly not a standing arm

The Confederation’s “army” was unique, undefinable, and 

the bastard child of quarrelsome, uncertain congressio

parents.

24

On April 12, 1785, Congress converted the 1st Am

Regiment into a regular corps by lengthening enlis

terms from 1 to 3 years. Regardless of this 

breakthrough, chronic desertion and a paucity of w

recruits kept the regiment’s numbers well below auth

35
strength. Undeterred by this feeble frontier gua

Indian raiders crossed the Ohio River at will, mur

1,500 Kentucky settlers between 1783 and 1790.

25

As if these Indian depredations were not bad en

America’s domestic tranquility was soon threatened 

specter of popular unrest. In the decade before the W

Independence, colonial elites repeatedly incited the 

classes to take to the streets to forcibly halt the execu

objectionable British laws. Once independence was 

however, patrician Patriots expected the common f

abstain from mob violence—but old habits died hard. 

fall of 1786, Daniel Shays, a former Continental capta

a revolt of debtor farmers that convulsed we

Massachusetts. Dispersed impotently along the frin

the Old Northwest, the 1st American Regiment was 

position to suppress domestic turmoil in the country’s 

settled areas. Massachusetts eventually fielded e

loyal militia to rout the Shaysites on January 25, 178

clash at Springfield that claimed the lives of four reb

Although Shays’ Rebellion was completely crush

March, it produced psychological tremors that sho

United States from one end to the other. Disillusion

the Confederation’s weaknesses and the rising sp

unrestrained democracy, prominent Americans poin

the fact that the disturbances had lasted for more tha

a year, and Congress had done nothing tangible to su

them. No one was more unnerved by these events 

George Washington, who feared that the trou

Massachusetts would spawn uprisings in other sta

feel . . . infinitely more than I can express to you, f

disorders which have arisen in these states,” Wash

confided to Henry Knox, one of his most tr

subordinates from Continental Army days.

Good God! . . . Notwithstanding the boasted virtue of Amer

we are far gone in everything ignoble & bad. . . . It is scar

within the reach of human ken, at this moment, to 

36
when—where—or how it will end. There are combustibles 

every State, which a spark may set fire to. . . .

27

In Washington’s eyes, mob rule endangered th

future of the American experiment in self-governme

It is with the deepest, and most heart felt concern, I percei

. . . that the Insurgents of Massachusetts . . . are still acting 

open violation of Law & Government. . . . What, gracious G

is man! It is but the other day we were shedding our blood 

obtain Constitutions under which we now live—Constitutio

of our own choice and framing—and now we are unsheath

the Sword to overturn them! The thing is so unaccounta

that I hardly know how to realize it, or to persuade myself th

I am not under the visions of a dream.

28

According to Washington, “the thinking part 

people of this Country” concurred with the conclusio

he drew from Shays’ Rebellion: “These disorders are e

marks of a defective government.” Bowing to the mou

demand, Congress acquiesced to calls that a conv

meet in Philadelphia to revise the Articles of Confeder

Twelve of the thirteen states sent delegates to particip

these deliberations. As part of the Virginia deleg

Washington traveled north determined “to adopt a 

vigorous and energetic government, than the one 

which we now live.”

29

Of the 55 delegates who assembled at Philad

between May and July 1787, 30 had seen some soldie

the Revolutionary War—17 with the Continental Arm

13 in the militia. Not surprisingly, military affairs l

large among their concerns. When the convention ope

formal sessions on May 29, a Continental veteran, Gov

Edmund Jennings Randolph of Virginia, took the f

denounce the defects in the Articles of Confederat

terms of national defense. Randolph claimed tha

confederation produced no security agai[nst] fo

invasions,” could not prevent the states or indi

Americans from starting wars, and lacked the authori

financial means to wage war itself. Congress could no

37
“check quarrels between states, nor a rebellion in any

had no right to send troops into any state witho

latter’s invitation.

30

Having sketched this portrait of congress

helplessness, Randolph boldly urged that the conv

create a stronger constitution to replace the Article

actually “accomplish the objects proposed by 

institution; namely ‘common defence, security of liber

general welfare.’” By accepting Randolph’s resolutio

gathering at Philadelphia transformed itself in

Constitutional Convention, and its members would go 

in history as the Founding Fathers.

31

In general terms, the Founding Fathers believed 

stable government required a military capacity form

enough to shield its citizens from outside threats an

lawless elements that might spring up in their mid

George Washington attested: “Vain it is to look for r

from a broad, or tranquillity at home . . . till the wisdo

force of the Union can be more concentrated and 

applied.” Alexander Hamilton of New York agreed w

former commander. “A certain portion of military 

Hamilton stated, “is absolutely necessary in 

communities.” William Paterson of New Jersey obs

that “no government could be energetic on paper 

adding “there must be a small standing force to give 

government weight.”

32

Although the majority of the Founding Father

outgrown the common taboo against standing armie

did not make them militarists. They wanted to se

national government that drew its authority fro

consent of the governed, and not a line of bayone

Virginia’s George Mason reminded his fellow dele

“You can no more execute civil Regulations by M

Force than you can unite opposite Elements, than yo

mingle Fire with Water.”

33

By mid-September, the Constitutional Conventio

reached agreement over a compact that prescri

38
national government with definite military power

final version of the Constitution permitted Congr

declare war, commission privateers, raise and su

armies, build and maintain a navy, and appro

regulations necessary to govern the armed forces

obsessed with the lingering trauma of Shay’s Rebellio

delegates transferred considerable authority ove

militia from the states to Congress:

To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws 

the Union, suppress Insurrections, and repel Invasions;

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Milit

and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in t

Service of the United States, reserving to the Sta

respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and t

Authority of training the Militia according to the discipl

prescribed by Congress.

34

The Constitution established a single executiv

endowed that position with military prerogatives be

one of Europe’s royal heads of state: “The President sh

Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the U

States, and of the Militia of the several States, when 

into the actual Service of the United States.”

35

Such striking breaks with the past were not ef

without a certain amount of wrangling. Elbridge Ge

Massachusetts, the inveterate foe of standing armie

national military power, tried to insert a clause that 

restrict Congress to raising a maximum of 2,000 to 

regulars in peacetime. As for entitling Congre

federalize the militia to subdue revolts, Gerry huffed t

could not countenance “letting loose the myrmidons 

U. States on a State without its own consent.”

36

On August 18, George Mason of Virginia set the sta

the convention’s liveliest debate on military affairs w

moved that Congress oversee “the regulation and disc

of the Militia of the several States reserving to the 

the appointment of the Officers.” Mason argued 

39
revitalized militia would lessen the republic’s need 

standing army in peace aside from a few regular gar

on the frontier. A committee of 11 delegates took M

idea and refashioned it into a clause that enabled Co

“to make laws for organizing, arming & disciplinin

Militia.”

37

When the Committee of Eleven reported its “M

Clause” to the convention on August 23, the body lan

and facial expressions of certain delegates registered 

displeasure. Rufus King, a member of the committe

had also battled the British as an officer i

Massachusetts militia, tried to defuse controvers

organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, 

explained, the committee meant only that Congress 

set the tables of organization to be followed by militia 

standardize the weapons types they could carry, and 

the manuals under which they would train. An unmo

Gerry shot back that he would as soon see

the Citizens of Massachusetts . . . disarmed, as to take 

command [of the militia] from the States, and subject them 

the Genl Legislature [Congress]. It would be regarded a

system of Despotism.

38

Though Gerry and a handful of other delegates re

their misgivings, the majority seemed to feel th

Constitution contained sufficient safeguards to preve

rise of an American Caesar or Cromwell. No congre

could hold any other federal post during his term of 

including a commission in the regular army or na

civilian President would nominate the heads of exe

departments and higher ranking military officers, b

choices had to be approved by the Senate. Mi

appropriations could only cover 2-year periods, 

allowed the House of Representatives to shrink or elim

any federal forces that outlived their usefulness. Dism

the fear that a federalized militia might be us

subjugate the states, Edmund Randolph pointe

“Leaving the appointment of [militia] officers to the 

40
protects the people agst. every apprehension that 

produce murmur.” The convention demonstrat

sensitivity to this issue a second time when it voted 

James Madison’s motion that the national gover

name militia generals.

39

On September 17, 1787, 38 delegates an

convention’s secretary signed the Constitution. A

delegate, John Dickinson, was too ill to be pres

Independence Hall that day, but he had a colleague af

signature. Twenty-three of the signing delegates 

Revolutionary War veterans, as was their secr

William Jackson. The publication of the Constitut

October created a sensation in the republic. Nine m

would elapse before 11 of the 13 states ratified it. D

that time, the Constitution’s merits were roundly de

from Massachusetts to Georgia.

40

Anti-Federalists, as opponents of the Constitution 

labeled, disliked the new frame of government for s

reasons—not the least of which were its military prov

In most instances, their objections pertained t

possibility that regular troops would be raised wh

republic was at peace. A wave of speeches, pamphlet

newspaper articles resurrected the same hoary dia

that had inflamed the indignant passions of thousa

Americans a generation earlier.

41

Addressing readers of the New York Journal “A 

Liberty” cataloged “a few of the curses” that 

preposterous and new-fangled system” would impose 

United States. At the top of the list, he put:

1st. A Standing army, that bane to freedom, and support 

tyrants, and their pampered minions; by which almost all t

nations of Europe and Asia, have been enslaved.

A common Anti-Federalist scenario held that the sta

army’s main duty would be collecting the oppressive 

required to sustain an enlarged national governm

state authorities protested, they would be stripped o

41
powers at bayonet point. If the people dared to voice 

discontent, the regulars would gun them down.

42

Writing under the alias of “Agrippa,” James Win

cautioned readers of the Massachusetts Gazette:

We shall find it impossible to please two masters. In such a st

frequent broils will ensue. Advantage will be taken of a popu

commotion, and even the venerable forms of the state be d

away, while the new system will be enforced in its utmost rig

by an army. I am the more apprehensive of a standing army

account of a clause in the new constitution which empow

Congress to keep one at all times; but this constitution 

evidently such that it cannot stand any considerable t

without an army.

43

In a speech before the Virginia State Rat

Convention in Richmond, the celebrated Patrick 

thundered that the Constitution would subject Ame

to the same sort of oppression that allegedly preva

Great Britain:

You read of a riot act in a country which is called one of the fre

in the world, where a few neighbours cannot assemble with

the risk of being shot by a hired soldiery, the engines 

despotism. We may see such an act in America. A standing ar

we shall have also, to execute the execrable commands 

tyranny: And how are you to punish them? Will you order th

to be punished? Who shall obey these orders? Will y

Mace-bearer be a match for a disciplined regiment?

44

Luther Martin of Maryland, a disaffected member 

Constitutional Convention, warned that an amb

President could use his military powers to burden Am

with a monarchy:

That the army and navy, which may be increased with

restraint as to numbers, the officers of which, from the high

to the lowest, are all to be appointed by him, and dependen

his will and pleasure, and commanded by him in person, wil

course, be subservient to his wishes, and ready to execute 

commands; in addition to which, the militia also are enti

subjected to his orders. That these circumstances, combi

42
together, will enable him, when he pleases, to become a king 

name, as well as in substance, and establish himself in off

not only for his own life, but even, if he chooses, to have th

authority perpetuated to his family.

45

A Massachusetts gentleman informed the Conn

Journal that he saw no real safeguard in the Constitu

2-year limit on military appropriations: “A great d

mischief may be done in two years, with guns, sword

bayonets, and armies when once raised, it hath some 

been found difficult to disband.”

46

Turning to the claim that regulars were essent

national defense, the Anti-Federalists countered th

sort of men recruited by standing armies could n

counted on to withstand the terrors of battle. 

Philadelphia paper, the Independent Gazette, 

Humble” declared that an American standing army 

be “composed of the purgings of the jails of Great B

Ireland and Germany.” A commentator calling h

“Philadelphiensis” published this dire predicti

Philadelphia’s Independent Gazetteer:

And in respect to the standing army, it will only be made up 

profligate idle ruffians, whose prowess will chiefly consist 

feats of cruelty exercised on their innocent fellow citizens; b

in facing a foreign foe, they will prove themselves to be a bo

of mean cowards; like the Turkish Janissaries, bet

acquainted with plundering their country than fighting for 

protection.

47

This outpouring of anti-militarism did not signif

the Anti-Federalists had embraced pacifism. They s

believed that the United States should entrust its sa

the militia, which a pamphleteer posing as “A Colu

Patriot” exalted as “the bulwark of defence, and the se

of national liberty.”

48

 Conveniently forgettin

Continental Army’s part in winning the Revoluti

Democratic Federalist” expostulated in the Pennsy

Herald:

43
Had we a standing army, when the British invaded our peac

shores? Was it a standing army that gained the battle

Lexington, and Bunker’s Hill, and took the ill fated Burgoy

Is not a well regulated militia sufficient for every purpos

internal defence? And which of you, my fellow citizens, is afr

of any invasion from foreign powers, that our brave mil

would not be able to immediately repel?

49

James Monroe of Virginia, though a Continental v

himself, urged the future national government to avo

problems associated with standing armies by reformi

militia:

Let them [Congress] regulate the disciplining and trainin

the militia—the calling them forth and commanding them 

service; for the militia of a country is its only safe and pro

defence. All countries are more or less exposed to danger, eit

from insurrection or invasion and the greater the authorit

Congress over this respectable body of men, in whose ha

every thing would be safe, the less necessity there would be

have recourse to that bane of all societies, the destroyer of 

rights of men, a standing army.

50

In this instance, however, Monroe was something 

exception. Many more Anti-Federalists bridled at the 

of giving the national government any supervisory 

over the militia. “By organizing the Militia,” ranted L

Martin, “Congress have taken the whole power fro

State Governments.” A Massachusetts critic viewe

provision for calling the militia into national servic

poorly disguised mechanism for creating military ty

“It means,” he explained, “to convert the militia of the 

into a standing army, under the entire comman

control of Congress.” “A Son of Liberty” tried to a

opposition to a federalized militia by appeali

deep-seated American provincialism:

The militia of New Hampshire, or Massachusetts, dragged 

Georgia or South-Carolina to assist in quelling an insurrec

of Negroes in those states; and those of Georgia, to anot

distant quarter, to subdue their fellow citizens, who dare to 

against the despotism of government.

51

44
The most comprehensive defense of the Constitu

“Army” and “Militia” clauses flowed from the facile 

Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton wrote more th

newspaper essays to sway his fellow New Yorkers in fa

ratification. James Madison and John Jay also contr

to this series, which is known today as The Federa

remains the starting point for any serious analysis 

Founding Fathers’ intentions. Hamilton devoted 

essays to military affairs, presenting a point-by

refutation of the main Anti-Federalist objections 

national government with definite military power.

52

Hamilton had been trying to sell his countrymen 

wisdom of military preparedness since 1783, and 

served as his chief justification for the Army Clau

reasoned that stopping Congress from raising troops 

war actually erupted would leave the republic vulner

foreign threats. Hamilton insisted,

The United States would then exhibit the most extraordina

spectacle which the world has yet seen, that of a nat

incapacitated by its Constitution to prepare for defense bef

it was actually invaded. . . . We must receive the blow before 

could even prepare to return it. . . . We must expose o

property and liberty to the mercy of foreign invaders a

invite them by our weakness to seize the naked a

defenseless prey, because we are afraid that rulers, created 

our choice, dependent on our will, might endanger that libe

by an abuse of the means necessary to its preservation.

Even though America’s location made a trans-At

invasion improbable, Congress had to be able to rei

frontier garrisons to keep the Indians in check and 

British and Spanish incursions into the western terri

Hamilton also held “that seditions and insurrection

unhappily, maladies as inseparable from the body po

tumors and eruptions from the natural body.” Th

reality caused him to conclude: “Should such emergen

any time happen under the national government, 

could be no remedy but force.”

53

45
Hamilton underscored his preparedness argumen

a rationale for military professionalism that would 

muster today: “War, like most other things, is a scienc

acquired and perfected by diligence, by perseveran

time and by practice.” Since such a level of commi

could not be expected of the militia, it was imperativ

the United States possess a regular force. Hamilton 

have struck an even more responsive chord by rem

his readers “how little the rights of a feeble governme

likely to be respected, even by its own constituents.”

In spite of all this, Hamilton conceded that Am

distance from Europe freed it from the need for a 

standing army. He also added that many years woul

before the national government could acquire the fin

means required to raise a standing army sufficient in 

enslave the populace. Americans could take further co

from the fact that the army’s size would be decid

Congress, the branch of government least likely to f

military coups, as it “was to be a popular body, consis

the representatives of the people periodically ele

Finally, Hamilton portrayed the 2-year limit on m

appropriations as “a great and real security against m

establishments without evident necessity.”

55

Turning to the Militia Clause, Hamilton applaud

prospect of national regulation. He observed,

It requires no skill in the science of war to discern t

uniformity in the organization and discipline of the mil

would be attended with the most beneficial effects, whene

they were called into service for the public defense.

Stealing the rhetoric of the Anti-Federalists, he in

that the existence of a “well-regulated militia” 

dissuade Congress from expanding the regular army. 

federal government can command the aid of the mil

those emergencies which call for the military arm in su

of the civil magistrate,” he theorized, “it can the 

dispense with the employment of a different kind of 

46
Hamilton ridiculed the slightest suggestion tha

national government would ever dare to order the mi

curtail state rights. “Where in the name of common s

he exclaimed, “are our fears to end if we may not tru

sons, our brothers, our neighbors, our fellow-citizen

for anxieties regarding distant militia deploymen

replied: 

In times of insurrection, or invasion, it would be natural a

proper that the militia of a neighboring State should 

marched into another, to resist a common enemy, or to gua

the republic against the violence of faction or sedition.

56

The Constitution’s ratification did not automa

open the door to a strong military in America. 

studying the ratification process, historian Richard 

concluded that the public felt uneasy about th

government’s military powers. Kohn reported,

Nearly every state’s ratifying convention propos

amendments . . . that either warned against standing armi

limited Congress’s power to raise forces, or banned quarter

of regulars in private homes. Several conventions sugges

restrictions on calling up the militia, marching it out of sta

or subjecting militiamen to martial law in peacetime.

The First Congress responded to these reservatio

quickly passing the ten constitutional amend

comprising the Bill of Rights. The Second Amen

guaranteed the survival of the militia by forbi

Congress to disarm the people. The Third Amen

banned the quartering of troops in private residence

Hobbled by public opinion and a growing po

opposition that cried foul at any effort to broaden f

power, President George Washington’s administ

steered a cautious course in military matters. On Ap

1790, it obtained a modest increase in the regular a

enlisted strength from 840 to 1,216. Yet when Bri

General Josiah Harmar organized a punitive expe

aimed at the Indians north of the Ohio River later 

47
year, only 353 regulars could be spared from their sca

posts for field service. Harmar reverted to past prac

augmenting his column with 1,133 militiamen. I

encounters with the Indians, the militia bolted at th

flurry of shots, leaving 75 regulars to be slaughtered

Harmar’s failure to pacify the Indians prompte

Washington Administration to ask Congress for 

regulars, but only enough to give the army a second in

regiment. With the militia discredited and the publ

skittish about standing armies, the administration p

its hopes on a new class of citizen-soldiers, the “Co

Levies.” Recruited for 6 months and subjected to r

army discipline, the 2,000 “levies” were supposed to b

steadfast than militia, but cheaper and more poli

acceptable than regulars. Unfortunately, recruiting fo

levies and regulars proceeded slowly, and Major G

Arthur St. Clair had to call out 418 unruly Kentucky m

to raise his field forces to 2,400 men. Early on Novem

1791, about 1,000 Indian braves surprised St. Cla

1,400 partially trained troops in an unfortified cam

miles north of Cincinnati. St. Clair and half of hi

managed to claw their way clear of a closing ring of 

but 657 soldiers perished in the costliest Indian defea

suffered by the U.S. Army.

59

Driven to desperation by the St. Clair dis

President Washington urged Congress to appr

5,000-man regular army. Congress complied on Ma

1792. Washington and Secretary of War Henry 

organized this new force into four self-cont

mini-armies known collectively as the “Legion of the U

States.” Major General Anthony Wayne devoted 2 ye

drill, discipline, and flogging to mold the Legion 

superb offensive tool, finally leading it to victory at 

Timbers on August 20, 1794.

60

Although the Washington Administration pro

America with a small but respectable standing army

short of achieving meaningful militia reform. In Ja

48
1790, Secretary Knox submitted his “Plan for the G

Arrangement of the Militia of the United Stat

Congress. Knox assumed that “an energetic Na

Militia is to be regarded as the CAPITAL SECURIT

free republic,” which meant that the country could 

without a lot of regulars. To realize this vision, he adv

more military training and education for the citizen

well as classing the militia by age. The “Advanced C

would contain men between the ages of 18 and 20, the 

Corps” 21- to 45-year-olds, and the “Reserved Cor

remaining militia up to age 60. Knox conceived 

Advanced Corps as “a school in which the youth . . . ar

instructed in the art of war” in annual “CAMP

DISCIPLINE.” It would also comprise a ready rese

32,500 men.

61

Knox’s plan proposed placing the militia under ef

national control, and that alarmed both state auth

and the public. Hence, Congress ignored the issue of m

reform until the St. Clair disaster forced its hand. 

Congress passed the Uniform Militia Act on May 2, 1

empowered the President to call out the militia to e

the laws of the United States against “combinatio

powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of ju

proceedings.” At the same time, Congress stipulated t

militiaman would have “to serve more than 3 months 

1 year.” The legislation also mentioned no mechan

compel state compliance with federal standards in tra

organization, or weaponry.

62

Despite these weaknesses, President Washi

invoked the Uniform Militia Act 2 years later to send 

federalized citizen-soldiers into western Pennsylva

quell the so-called “Whiskey Rebellion.” Some hist

question whether there was an uprising at all, chargi

Washington Administration with overreacting to 

violent incidents and protest meetings. The excise 

whiskey, which Congress instituted in March 1791 t

pay down the national debt, provoked imme

resistance, but trouble was not confined to Pennsylva

49
flared up in Kentucky, as well as parts of Virginia, 

Carolina, and South Carolina. Nevertheless, Pennsy

tax resisters went to lengths that particularly irritat

Washington Administration, tarring and feathering o

collector and another federal agent.

63

The situation took on the guise of a major crisis 

summer of 1794 after tax opponents attacked the Alle

County estate of John Neville, the excise inspect

western Pennsylvania. Twelve regulars from nearb

Pitt were detailed to guard Neville’s property, but the

overwhelmed by 500 rioters on July 17. As f

Washington was concerned, such blatant defiance of f

authority could not be ignored. He announced that Ne

assailants “have at length been hardy enough to perp

acts which . . . amount to treason, being overt acts of le

war against the United States.”

64

When Pennsylvania authorities hesitated to 

against the insurrectionists, Washington decided on 

federal intervention. Alexander Hamilton, Washin

Secretary of the Treasury and the father of the excis

was the cabinet’s most ardent advocate of a m

response. He urged the President to moun

awe-inspiring demonstration of national power. Ha

wrote, 

The force ought if attainable to be an imposing one, suc

practicable, as will deter from opposition, save the effusio

the blood of Citizens and secure the object to be accomplished

Washington heeded Hamilton’s counsel. The Presi

approach could best be described as the moderate 

irresistible force. With the regular army committed 

Fallen Timbers Campaign, Washington had no choice 

rely on the militia. He called out a total of 15,000 me

Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, and Virgin

larger array than the field army that followed 

throughout most of the Revolution. Yet even a

President conjured this massive show of strength, h

50
pains to ameliorate the sting of coercion with the b

restraint. He publicly admitted to “feeling the d

regret” for having to adopt a force policy.

66

 He also rem

Governor Henry Lee of Virginia, who led the feder

militia into the disaffected counties, that the troops’ m

was to restore civil authority and not institute martial 

Every officer and soldier will constantly bear in mind that 

comes to support the laws and that it would be peculia

unbecoming in him to be in any way the infractor of them; th

the essential principles of free government confine t

provinces of the Military to these two objects: 1st: to comb

and subdue all who may be found in arms in opposition to t

National will and authority; 2dly to aid and support the c

Magistrate in bringing offenders to justice. The disposition 

this justice belongs to the civil Magistrate and let it ever be o

pride and glory to leave the sacred deposit there unviolated.

The whiskey rebels fled at the approach of Lee’s 

This turn of events prompted Washington to exult:

The western insurrection has terminated [in a way] hig

honorable for this country; wch. By the energy of its Laws a

the good disposition of its citizens have brought the rioters t

perfect sense of their misconduct without spilling a drop 

blood.

68

Washington also depicted the outcome of the W

Rebellion as proof that the Constitution had equ

Americans with the means to maintain dom

tranquility:

It has demonstrated, that our prosperity rests on so

foundations; by furnishing an additional proof, that my fell

citizens understand the true principles of government a

liberty: that they feel their inseparable union: that . . . they a

now as ready to maintain the authority of the laws agai

licentious invasions, as they were to defend their rig

against usurpation. It has been a spectacle, displaying to t

highest advantage, the value of Republican Government, 

behold the most and least wealthy of our citizens standing 

51
the same ranks as private soldiers; pre-eminently distinguis

by being the army of the constitution.

69

Victory did not make Washington arrogant, a

wisely chose to temper justice with mercy. Fe

authorities tried 20 insurrectionists for high treaso

convicted two. Before they could be executed, howev

President pardoned them. He explained his conduct 

annual address to Congress:

For though I shall always think it a sacred duty, to exercise w

firmness and energy, the Constitutional powers with which I 

vested, yet it appears to me no less consistent with the pu

good, than it is with my personal feelings, to mingle in 

operations of government, every degree of moderation 

tenderness, which the national justice, dignity and sa

permit.

70

When all was said and done, Washington graspe

salient point—that republican government ultimatel

on the love and support of the people. It should not un

the military against a disaffected minority sim

preserve its own dignity, but to enforce the will 

majority as embodied in laws approved by the pe

elected representatives. This lesson was lost on Alex

Hamilton and some of his friends. They came out 

Whiskey Rebellion believing that force was the main p

stable government. Later during the presidency of 

Adams, these “High Federalists” would attempt to 

rebellion by burdening America with a large standing 

This shift toward militarism played into the han

Thomas Jefferson and the Republican opposition

Republicans painted the Federalists as the champi

military despotism and the armed forces as a partisa

The resulting popular outrage brought an end to Fed

control of the national government in the election of 

This transfer of power also ushered in a period of aus

for the military establishment.

71

The election of 1800 closed a crucial chapter 

evolution of American military policy. It stands as an 

52
lesson in the risks run by American politicians who ab

moderation and seem too prone to apply force agains

fellow citizens. Americans want to feel safe, but they 

want a government that fears them and sees threats 

none exist. What Washington termed the “army 

constitution” gambles with its credibility and its 

whenever it is made to look like a deterrent to pe

dissent or a loyal opposition. In our own era, w

conspiracy theories and widespread mistrust 

government, many Americans, like their forebears, a

easily inclined to view the armed upholders of f

authority as the primary threat to the homeland.

72

CHAPTER 2 - ENDNOTES

1.On September 29, 1789, Congress mandated the first loya

for the U.S. Army under the Constitution:

That all commissioned and non-commissioned officers, a

privates, who are, or shall be, in the service of the Uni

States, shall take the following oaths or affirmations, to wit

A.B., do solemnly swear or affirm (as the case may be) tha

will support the constitution of the United States.” “I, A.B., 

solemnly swear or affirm (as the case may be) to bear tr

allegiance to the United States of America, and to serve th

honestly and faithfully, against all their enemies or oppos

whatsoever, and to observe the orders of the President of t

United States of America, and the orders of the offic

appointed over me.”

“An Act to Recognize and Adapt to the Constitution of the 

States, the Establishment of the Troops Raised under the Res

the United States Congress Assembled and for Other Pu

September 29, 1789,” in Robert K. Wright, Jr., and Morris J. Mac

Jr., eds., Soldier-Statesmen of the Constitution, Washingto

Center of Military History, United States Army, 1987, pp. 57, 2

2. “Constitution of the United States, September 17, 17

Wright and MacGregor, p. 214.

3. Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Federalists a

Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783-180

York: Free Press, 1975, pp. xii-xiii, 277-93.

53
4. For an entertaining interpretation of the role war has pl

shaping the American character, see Geoffrey Perret, A Countr

by War: From the Revolution to Vietnam, the Story of America’s 

Power, New York: Random House, 1989; Kohn, Eagle and Sw

2-3, 6, 73, 75-76, 109-10, 183-86.

5. Gregory J. W. Urwin, The United States Infantry: An Illu

History, 1775-1918, New York: Sterling Publishing Co., Inc., 19

9-10.

6. Kohn, Eagle and Sword, p. 7; Allan R. Millett and 

Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the 

States of America, New York: Free Press, 1994, pp. 2-4.

7. James Kirby Martin and Mark Edward Lender, A Resp

Army: The Military Origins of the Republic, 1763-1789, Ar

Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1982, pp. 16-17; Wrig

MacGregor, pp. 5-6; Kohn, Eagle and Sword, p. 7.

8. Wright and MacGregor, p. 6; Martin and Lender, pp. 17-18

Eagle and Sword, pp. 7-8; Urwin, pp. 11-12. Fred Anderson 

contrary position on the composition of Provincial units. 

impressively researched study, he argues that the reg

Massachusetts fielded for the French and Indian War wer

representative of Bay Colony society:

The army was not heavily weighted with vagrant and marg

elements; while such men clearly made up a segment of 

organization, they composed only a small minority of 

membership, probably not much greater than their share of 

population at large.

Fred Anderson, A People’s Army: Massachusetts Soldie

Society in the Seven Years’ War, New York: W. W. Norton & Co

1985, p. 55.

9. Kohn, Eagle and Sword, pp. 2, 3; Martin and Lender, pp

10. “Essays by the Impartial Examiner, Virginia Indep

Chronicle, February-June 1788,” in Herbert J. Storing, e

Complete Anti-Federalist, 7 vols., Chicago: University of Chicag

1981, Vol. 5, p. 181. For more documents that echo these sentime

Richard H. Kohn, ed., Anglo-American Antimilitary Tracts, 169

New York: Arno Press, 1979.

54
11. Kohn, Eagle and Sword, pp. 5-6; Wright and MacGrego

Martin and Lender, pp. 20-28. For a detailed examination o

issues, see John Shy, Toward Lexington: The Role of the British A

the Coming of the American Revolution, Princeton: Princeton Un

Press, 1965.

12. Martin and Lender, pp. 1-3, 35-36, 40; Robert K. Wright, 

Continental Army, Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 

States Army, 1983, pp. 20-25.

13. Martin and Lender, pp. 69-78, 87-97, 131-33; Urwin, 

States Infantry, pp. 22-25.

14. Kohn, Eagle and Sword, pp. 9-13.

15. Wright and MacGregor,Soldier-Statesmen, pp. 14, 23; Jo

A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Stru

American Independence, New York: Oxford University Press, 1

165-79, 193-24.

16. Merrill Jensen, The Founding of a Nation: A History 

American Revolution, 1763-1776, New York: Oxford University 

1968, pp. 602-31. See also Jack N. Rakove, The Beginnings of N

Politics: An Interpretive History of the Continental Congress, Ne

Alfred A. Knopf, 1979.

17. In the formative years of the Union, some political th

argued that the inclusion of the words “common defence” and “

Welfare” in the Constitution endowed Congress with unlimited p

ensure national security. An aged James Madison disagreed w

interpretation. He insisted that those phrases were copied fr

Articles of Confederation with little thought or discussion. They 

denoted the Founding Fathers’ intent that the new government 

responsibility for the public debt incurred during the W

Independence and under the remaining life of the Confederatio

Dickinson, “John Dickinson’s Draft of the Articles of Confedera

Wright and MacGregor, pp. 183-85; James Madison to A

Stevenson, November 17, 1830, in Max Farrand, ed., The Record

Federal Convention of 1787, 4 vols., New Haven: Yale Universit

1966, Vol. 3, pp. 484-88.

18. “The Articles of Confederation, March 1, 1781,” in Wri

MacGregor, pp. 187-188.

19. An authoritative examination of the impact 

Confederation’s weaknesses on the Continental Army is E. 

55
Carp, To Starve the Army, at Pleasure: Continental 

Administration and American Political Culture, 1775-1783, 

Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984.

20. According to Richard H. Kohn, the “Newburgh Conspira

encouraged in part by Governor Morris, Alexander Hamilton, an

nationalists in Congress as a ploy to intimidate the states into 

the power to tax with the Confederation government. Kohn, Ea

Sword, pp. 17, 23, 25-27, 31-36, 38; Martin and Lender, pp. 

186-95; Wright, Continental Army, pp. 177-182; Urwin, United 

Infantry, p. 29.

21. Kohn, Eagle and Sword, p. 42.

22. Before Washington responded to Hamilton’s commit

solicited the views of some of his senior officers. Friedrich von S

the Continental Army’s inspector general, advocated a 

establishment of 4,000 regulars, including a 120-man “Corps of 

The latter would “be employed in guarding the residence of Co

the public offices, papers, etc.” As Steuben elaborated: “Congr

their executive officers should never be exposed to the mad proc

of a mob. Guards are necessary and proper at the seat of govern

The Prussian drillmaster also called for a select, well-disciplined 

of 21,000 “ready to act on the shortest notice.” George Wash

“Sentiments on a Peace Establishment, May 2, 1783"; Friedr

Steuben, “A Letter on the Subject of an Established Militia, and M

Arrangements, Addressed to the Inhabitants of the United 

1784,” both in Wright and MacGregor, pp., 193-200, 202-7; Kohn

and Sword, pp. 42-47.

23. Kohn, Eagle and Sword, pp. 47-53; Wright, Continenta

pp. 181-182; Urwin, United States Infantry, pp. 29-30.

24. Wright and MacGregor, p. 29; Kohn, Eagle and Sword

Urwin, United States Infantry, pp. 30-32.

25. Urwin, United States Infantry, pp. 30-32; For more detail

short, inglorious history of the 1st American Regiment, see 

Ripley Jacobs, The Beginning of the U.S. Army 1783-1812, Pr

Princeton University Press, 1947; and William H. Guthman, M

Massacre: A History of the First Seven Years of the United State

1784-1791, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1975.

26. Kohn, Eagle and Sword, pp. 74; Wright and MacGre

32-33. For differing interpretations on the role of mob violenc

revolutionary movement, see Hiller B. Zobel,The Boston Massac

56
York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1970; Edmund S. Morg

Helen M. Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revolutio

York: Collier Books, 1963; Pauline Maier, From Resista

Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of Am

Opposition to Britain, 1765-1776, New York: W. W. Norton & Co

1992; Gordon S. Wood,The Radicalism of the American Revolutio

York: Random House, 1993; Gary B. Nash, The Urban Crucib

Northern Seaports and the Origins of the American Revo

Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986.

27. Wright and MacGregor, p. 33; Kohn, Eagle and Swo

74-75; George Washington to Henry Knox, December 26, 1786, i

Abbott and Dorothy Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Wash

Confederation Series, 6 vols., Charlottesville: University P

Virginia, 1992-97, Vol. 4, pp. 481-482.

28. George Washington to David Humphreys, December 26, 

Abbott and Twohig, Vol. 4, p. 478.

29. George Washington to Marquis de Lafayette, March 25

George Washington to Marquis de Lafayette, August 15, 1787, 

Abbott and Twohig, Vol. 5, pp. 106, 296; Wright and MacGre

33-34.

30. Wright and MacGregor, pp. 33-34, 45; Kohn, Eagle and 

pp. 73, 75; Farrand, Vol. 1, pp. 19.

31. Farrand, Vol. 1, pp. 20, 30.

32. Kohn, Eagle and Sword, pp. 75-76; Wright and MacGr

40; George Washington to Marquis de Lafayette, August 15, 1

Abbott and Twohig, Vol. 5, p. 296; Farrand, Vol. 1, pp. 246, 285

33. Mason’s words, as quoted here, come from the notes 

Rufus King of Massachusetts. James Madison, another membe

Virginia delegation, recalled Mason as saying:

What, would you use military force to compel the observance 

a social compact? It is destructive to the rights of the peop

Do you expect the militia will do it, or do you mean a stand

army? The first will never, on such an occasion, exert a

power; and the latter may turn its arms against t

government which employs them.

Mason and Madison both accepted an American standing ar

necessary evil, but they wanted the Constitution to acknowled

57
“standing armies in time of peace” posed a threat to “the libertie

people.” This motion was rejected at the urging of New York’s G

Morris, who pointed out that such a caveat would place “a disho

mark of distinction on the military class of Citizens.” Kohn, Ea

Sword, pp. 77-78, 80, 87-88; Farrand, Vol. 1, pp. 246, 332, 346, 3

Vol. 2, p. 617; Wright and MacGregor, pp. 40.

34. “Constitution of the United States, September 17, 17

Wright and MacGregor, pp. 216.

35. Ibid., p. 217.

36. As a member of the Confederation Congress in 1783

helped lead the fight against a peacetime military establishment

Eagle and Sword, pp. 52-53; Farrand, Vol. 2, pp. 317, 329.

37. Farrand, Vol. 2, pp. 326, 330, 384-385.

38. Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 385.

39. “Constitution,” in Wright and MacGregor, pp. 215-17; F

Vol. 2, pp. 317, 330, 386-388, 422, 426-427, 505-506, 509.

40. Wright and MacGregor, pp. v, 3, 42; Kohn, Eagle and Sw

81.

41. Kohn, Eagle and Sword, pp. 82. For a sampling of 

Anti-Federalist denunciations of standing armies, see “A Review 

Constitution Proposed by the Late Convention by A Federal Repu

1787,” in Storing, Vol. 3, p. 76; “A Letter from a Gentlema

Neighboring State, to a Gentleman in this City, Connecticut J

October 17 and 24, 1787”; “Essay by Samuel, (Boston) Indep

Chronicle and Universal Advertiser, January 10, 1788”; “Obser

On the New Constitution, And on the Federal and State Convent

A Columbian Patriot, Boston, 1788,” all in Storing, Vol. 4, pp. 

277; “Essays by A Farmer, (Baltimore) Maryland G

February-April 1788”; “Letter of Richard Henry Lee to G

Edmund Randolph, October 16, 1787”; “Essays by The Im

Examiner,” Virginia Independent Chronicle, February-June 17

in Storing, Vol. 5, pp. 22, 27-28, 116, 181.

42. “Essays by Cincinnatus, New York Jo

November-December 1787”; “Objections by A Son of Liberty, Ne

Journal, November 8, 1787,” both in Storing, Vol. 6, pp. 17, 34; 

of Phladelphiensis, (Philadelphia) Independent Gazetteer, No

1787-April 1788”; “The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the M

of the Convention of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents,” Penns

58
Packet and Daily Advertiser, December 18, 1787,” both in Stori

3, pp. 114, 164; “Essays of John De Witt, (Boston) American 

October-December 1787”, in Storing, Vol. 4, p. 23.

43. “Letters of Agrippa, Massachusetts Gazette, Nov

1787-February 1788,” in Ibid., Vol. 4, p. 78.

44. “Speeches of Patrick Henry in the Virginia State R

Convention,” in Ibid., Vol. 5, p. 217.

45. “The Genuine Information, Delivered to the Legislatur

State of Maryland, Relative to the Proceedings of the G

Convention, Held at Philadelphia, in 1787, By Luther Martin, E

Attorney-General of Maryland, and One of the Delegates in t

Convention,” Maryland Gazette and Baltimore Advertiser, De

28, 1787-February 8, 1788, in Farrand, Vol. 3, p. 218.

46. “A Letter from a Gentleman in a Neighbouring Sta

Gentleman in this City, Connecticut Journal, October 17 and 24

in Storing, Vol. 4, p. 11.

47. “Address of John Humble, (Philadelphia) Indep

Gazetteer, October 29, 1787”; “Philadelphiensis Essays,” both i

Vol. 3, pp. 90, 111, 114.

48. Kohn, Eagle and Sword, pp. 83; “Observations By A Col

Patriot,” in Storing, Vol. 4, p. 277; “Impartial Examiner E

“Address by Denatus, Virginia Independent Chronicle, June 11

both in Storing, Vol. 5, pp. 182, 265-266.

49. “Essay of A Democratic Federalist, Pennsylvania 

October 17, 1787,” in Storing, Vol. 3, p. 62.

50. James Monroe, “Some Observations on the Constitution

in Ibid., Vol. 5, p. 292.

51. “Luther Martin before the Maryland House of Represent

November 29, 1787, in Farrand, Vol. 3, p. 157; “Letter 

Gentleman,” in Storing, Vol. 4, p. 12; “Son of Liberty,” in Storing

p. 35.

52. Hamilton wrote 51 of the essays comprising The Fed

while Madison wrote 26 and John Jay, 5. In addition, Hamil

Madison co-authored three more, making a total of 85. Clinton R

“Introduction,” in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and Jo

The Federalist Papers, New York: New American Library, 1961, 

59
53. Kohn, Eagle and Sword, pp. 84; Hamilton, Madison, and 

160-163, 165-166, 168, 178.

54. Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, pp. 161, 166-167.

55. Ibid., 69, 71, 158, 171-172, 182.

56. Ibid., 173-174, 182-184, 186-187.

57. Kohn, Eagle and Sword, pp. 85-86; Wright and MacGre

45.

58. Kohn, Eagle and Sword, pp. 92, 96, 102-103, 106, 108, 1

Guthman, pp. 173-197; Urwin, p. 32.

59. The Corps of Levies may have proven unequal to the exi

of Indian-fighting, but as Richard Kohn explained, it left an im

legacy to the American military tradition:

Levies were the embryo of the federal volunteer system wh

was destined to become the backbone of America’s wart

armies in the nineteenth century, and with selective service, 

basis for the mass armies in the age of total war and cold w

Kohn, Eagle and Sword, pp. 109-110, 114; Guthman, pp. 2

Urwin, pp. 32-33.

60. Urwin, pp. 33-37; Kohn, Eagle and Sword, pp. 120, 1

125-126.

61. Henry Knox, “Plan for the General Arrangement of the M

the United States, January 18, 1790,” in Wright and MacGre

234-241.

62. Kohn, Eagle and Sword, pp. 129-35; “An Act More Effect

Provide for the National Defense, by Establishing an Uniform 

throughout the United States,” in Wright and MacGregor, pp. 24

63. James Kirby Martin, “Introduction: The Whiskey R

Redivivus”; Thomas P. Slaughter, “The Friends of Liberty, the 

of Order, and the Whiskey Rebellion: A Historiographical Essay

K. Bonsteel Tachau, “A New Look at the Whiskey Rebellion

Steven R. Boyd, ed., The Whiskey Rebellion: Past and 

Perspectives, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1985, 

9-30, 97-100; Kohn, Eagle and Sword, pp. 139-40. See also Tho

Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the Am

60
Revolution, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. A 

summary of George Washington’s response to the Whiskey R

may be found in James Thomas Flexner, Washingto

Indispensable Man, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974.

64. John Neville to Tench Coxe, July 18, 1794; “Depos

Francis Mentges,” August 1, 1794; Alexander Hamilton to 

Washington, August 5, 1794, all in Harold C. Syrett, ed., The P

Alexander Hamilton, 27 vols., New York: Columbia University 

1961-87, Vol. 17, pp. 2-6, 24-58; Kohn, Eagle and Sword, p. 161; 

Washington, “Proclamation,” August 7, 1794, in John C. Fitz

ed., The Writings of George Washington, 39 vols., Washington, D

Government Printing Office, 1931-44, Vol. 33, p. 458.

65. “Conference Concerning the Insurrection in W

Pennsylvania,” August 2, 1794; Alexander Hamilton to 

Washington, August 2, 1794, both in Syrett, Vol. 17, pp. 9-14

Kohn, Eagle and Sword, pp. 162, 164.

66. Wright and MacGregor, p. 52; Washington, “Proclam

August 7, 1794, in Fitzpatrick, Vol. 33. p. 460; Edmund Rand

Thomas Mifflin, August 7, 1794, in Syrett, Vol. 17, p. 71.

67. George Washington to Henry Lee, October 20, 1794; s

George Washington to Daniel Morgan, March 27, 1795, 

Fitzpatrick, Vol. 34, pp. 6, 159-160. For more on Lee’s involvemen

Whiskey Rebellion and the politics of the early republic, see 

Royster, Light-Horse Harry Lee and the Legacy of the Am

Revolution, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981.

68. Kohn, Eagle and Sword, pp. 170; George Washington 

Jay, December 18, 1794, in Fitzpatrick, Vol. 34, p. 62.

69. George Washington, “Sixth Annual Address to Con

November 19, 1794, in Fitzpatrick, Vol. 34, p. 34.

70. George Washington, “Seventh Annual Address to Con

December 8, 1795, in Fitzpatrick, Vol. 3, p. 390. Major G

Benjamin Lincoln reached the same conclusion after lead

Massachusetts militia in quelling Shays’ Rebellion. On Febru

1787, Lincoln confided to his friend, George Washington:

In her right hand Government must hold out such terms 

mercy in the hour of success, with such evident marks o

disposition to forgive as shall apply to the feelings of t

delinquents, beget in them such sentiments of gratitude a

61
love by which they will be led to embrace with the high

cordiality that Government which they have attempted 

trample under foot.

Benjamin Lincoln to George Washington, December 4, 1786-M

1787, in Abbott and Twohig, Vol. 4, p. 431.

71. Kohn, Eagle and Sword, pp. 171-72, 219-68; Edmund Ra

to Thomas Mifflin, August 7, 1794; Alexander Hamilton, “Tully N

American Daily Advertiser, August 28, 1794; Alexander Ha

“Tully No. IV,” American Daily Advertiser, September 2, 1794

Syrett, Vol. 17, pp. 69, 71, 160, 178-179.

72. As Benjamin Lincoln advised George Washington 7 year

the Whiskey Rebellion:

Love and Fear are the bonds of civil Society. Love is the nob

incentive to obedience; a Government supported hereon 

certainly the most desirable, and ensures the first degree

happiness which can be derived from civil compact. Suc

Government as this is always wounded, when any thing s

exist which makes it necessary to apply to the fears of 

governed. This never will be done by a wise administrat

unless the General Good renders it indispensable, and it wil

removed the first moment it can be, consistently with 

common safety.

Benjamin Lincoln to George Washington, December 4, 1786-M

1787, in Abbott and Twohig, Vol. 4, p. 431. For further reading 

military’s place in American life, see Richard H. Kohn, ed., The 

States Military under the Constitution of the United States, 178

New York: New York University Press, 1991; and Louis 

American Democracy and Military Power: A Study of Civil Contr

Military Power in the United States, Chicago: University of C

Press, 1951.

62
CHAPTER 3

THE PUBLIC’S EXPECTATIONS

OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Peter D. Feaver

When Dr. Tilford asked me to come here, he asked 

look through the data that Richard Kohn and I had co

for the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS) P

on the Gap between the Military and Civilian Socie

some other recent polls, and asked me to report on 

expectations of security. This is not a compreh

analysis of public attitudes on defense, but rather to

on several areas of special concern for the issue identi

this year’s Army War College Strategy Conference. 

arranged my talk in terms of six provocations. I cal

provocations because these are things that I know 

true, but to stimulate debate I am framing them in a 

extreme way than I would if I were sitting in a posi

responsibility.

First, the public places a higher priority on “on ou

threats than do elites, both civilian elites an

up-and-coming military officers we surveyed—m

officers like those attending this conference today. B

way, in our study we refer to this group of military offic

the “military elite,” an admittedly awkward term 

unfortunate connotations that we do not necessarily 

We simply refer to the most promising officers at v

stages of their career identified by their attenda

residence at the various professional military edu

(PME) institutions: staff colleges, war colleges, an

CAPSTONE baby general course.

Second, there is a potential for the presid

campaign context to give these issues a higher sa

Although so far this has not been realized, I see i

possibility. 

63
Third, public confidence in the military is high, b

brittle, and there is a potential for the homeland se

mission to wreck that confidence.

Fourth, while we are focusing on “on our soil” even

should not forget that there will be many operations b

our soil. Indeed, in our study, we have discovered 

between the vanishing veterans phenomenon i

policymaking community and the actual conduct of f

policy.

Fifth, the policymakers—and also military leade

especially policymakers—have bought into a myth th

public is casualty-averse.

And finally, I want to make the point that the CNN 

is real, but it doesn’t work like one might think it work

people who are moved into or out of action by 

coverage are not the American public, but the de

makers.

Public Priorities.

The public sees a greater threat and a greater role 

military, but not necessarily because they thin

military is more effective than nonmilitary tools. Thi

area where Charles Dunlap’s surmise in his “Origins 

Coup of 2012" article comes into play; that the public 

think that the military tools are more effective 

nonmilitary tools. In fact, what we found is that civili

not think military tools are necessarily more effectiv

nonmilitary tools: they just think that if the prob

important, we must throw something at it, so we mi

well throw the best-equipped, best-funded tool a

disposal—the military. Civilians think the ”on ou

problem is a more serious threat than do the militar

this translates into a greater role for the military th

military would see for itself. The gap is not dram

between five and fifteen points, depending o

question—but it is discernible. It underscores my 

64
point about public opinion, which is that we do not n

mount an effort to mobilize the public to worry abou

threat. It already does, and it thinks that this threat i

graver than military elites believe.

Indeed, the public supports a get tough pol

retaliation policy, even though it believes that s

retaliation would trigger a counter-retaliation. So wi

polling that was done right after the bombings 

embassies in Africa, which led to the cruise missile s

against the Sudanese pharmaceutical factory an

Afghani terrorist sites, the pollsters asked the publ

you support those air strikes against those ter

installations?” The public said, “Yes,” and then were 

“Do you think that the terrorists will counter-respond

public said, “Yes, even more so.” Eighty-five percen

they thought that hitting the terrorists would mea

terrorists would hit back and yet they still supported 

tough policy. This suggests that the public is not na

does not believe that taking a single swat at the proble

make it go away, but they still want to take that swa

public thinks that anti-terrorism laws are too weak; t

not think that the anti-terrorism laws are too strong

there is an influential wing of public opinion that is w

about civil liberties. But the reservoir of the Am

public is all too willing to toughen anti-terrorism law

if it is going to shrink civil liberties a little bit—at lea

is what they say in public opinion polls. Of course, 

their civil liberties are actually infringed upon, that 

change.

Threat Perception.

Now let us take a look at threat perception. The

small gaps, but I would say that the military is not w

about large numbers of refugees pouring across the bo

only 8 percent say that it is a very serious threat. But 

third of the general public says that it is a very s

threat—a remarkably high number. A similar p

65
appears with terrorist attacks. The military is w

about that, but the general public is worried about i

more so. Interestingly, the one area where the m

might be a little bit out in front of civilian opinion is 

issue of cyber threat. It is not clear what this means f

study, if anything.

How important is the military role in this? In each 

the civilian elites gave a slightly greater weight 

military role. They were more inclined to say that th

very important role for the military. This is consisten

something that Charles Dunlap and others have a

that this is not the military desperately seeking a role 

post-Cold War era. Rather this is certainly a civilian p

the direction of getting the military involved in these 

of issues. This point bears emphasis, since amon

academic friends there is a popular canard that D

desperately seeking a mission in order to prop up bu

and one of the types of mission that they stumbled u

“on our soil” missions. That is not consistent with w

happening in Washington, DC, but it also does not 

the reading of public opinion, which shows the civ

worrying about this as much, if not more than, the mi

and shows the civilians leaning further forward 

saddle to push the military in this direction. The botto

is that you don’t need to mobilize the public to worry 

this.

Because of the public’s greater concern for “on ou

threats, and because we are in a Presidential cam

there is a potential for these issues to have traction 

campaign. Conventional wisdom is that foreign policy 

important: it is a secondary issue. If you go on the we

of the two principal candidates, you have to search lon

hard to find important statements on foreign p

Interestingly enough, Governor Bush’s website has 

more richness and depth on foreign policy than doe

President Gore’s, but education accounts for abo

percent of the issue papers on each of their websites. T

consistent with what the candidates are getting fro

66
public opinion polls. Education is issue number one f

voters, and foreign policy is back around issue numb

That is the conventional wisdom, but Robert Kagan, 

associate at the Carnegie Endowment for Interna

Peace, myself, and others think that there might 

opportunity for foreign policy to have a play i

campaign.

First, a significant portion of the public says that f

policy is going to be a very important issue. When 

pick presidents, part of what they are picking is a l

and part of that image of what is leadership plays its

in how the president conducts him or herself in f

affairs. There is at least some electoral advantage f

candidate who can position him or herself as being mo

leader than the others, and using foreign policy as a w

gain some momentum on the leadership issue. T

especially so if the differences on the substance of the 

issues, such as education, are not too stark. It i

important to note that, in some polls, as much as 79 p

of the public lists fighting international terrorism as 

important goal. It is ranked fourth, however, because 

are many important issues that the voters 

about—but fighting terrorism is still a salient goal f

public. There is a potential for a candidate to tap int

concern. And neither candidate has any real advanta

this issue—this is where I do differ with the conven

inside-the-beltway, wisdom. Inside the beltway, Gov

Bush is viewed as quite vulnerable on foreign policy

all, he flunked a quiz. (By the way, I think half 

International Relations faculty colleagues and all my 

political science colleagues would have flunked 

particular quiz.) The conventional view is that 

President Gore has got foreign policy locked up. B

voters do not think so. If you ask the American peop

will see that they are split right now. To be sure, we ha

had many presidential debates yet on foreign policy. 

numbers could shift, and they are tracking poll nu

that literally change every week. They are very volati

67
the point is there is a potential for either candidate to 

on foreign policy.

If one were advising the campaign, what would be 

ways to gain traction on “on our soil” issues? One of t

National Missile Defense. In the last 2 year

administration has gone a long way to removing 

vulnerability on this issue. But if you look at the first 6 

of the Clinton administration, it clearly was dragg

feet on National Missile Defense. Whether or 

works—and experts can disagree on what wa

appropriate policy—from a public opinion point of 

even from a demagoguery point of view, it is much ea

demagogue and say we should have done more, fast

put American lives at risk in order to preserve this 

called the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. How 

Americans are willing to sacrifice Chicago for the 

Treaty? Very, very few. On that issue, I thin

Republicans may have an easier time scoring point

the Democrats.

The second point is, of course, that everyone is oppo

terrorism, so you are not going to get any cam

spokesperson out there saying, “I do not think terror

important.” You are not going to get anyone to give a ta

“Have we over-hyped the threat?” We may have ver

over-hyped the threat, but you are not going to 

candidate to say that. Everyone is worried about terr

everyone is opposed to it. Who is solving it? It strik

that the campaign that comes out with the most co

statement, not just a statement opposing terrorism b

indicating some sort of a plan for doing better than w

are doing now, has an advantage, especially if we su

terrorist attack in the next 8 months. At that point it 

too late from a political point of view: Governor Bush 

not come out the next day with a sort of a jury-rigged p

counterterrorism because that would look like—as a 

of mine said—“a drive by shooting playing off the tra

In the immediate aftermath of a tragedy such as a te

attack on the United States, there will be a rally-ar

68
the-flag effect. We will see Vice President Gore

numbers go up. The Republicans would have no trac

that moment, unless they have already laid 

comprehensive vision on this issue, and this vis

somewhat richer and more robust than the Dem

vision, in which case in the weeks’ aftermath of that 

the Republicans would get some campaign traction.

I would mention at this point that it is the cons

judgement of our top law enforcement officials and o

national security officials that we were extremely luck

we did not have one of those in January or February, 

middle of the primary campaign. It was good intell

and proactive measures but by all accounts there 

large element of luck, which means we could have 

those events in the future. And such an event could be 

crystallizing experience if it happened during the cam

so there is a potential for this to be a bigger issue. N

you heard this morning, the expert consensus is th

government has not solved the puzzle. It is a very d

problem, but if you are looking for cheap shots to take 

Gore administration, then there are possibilities i

area. 

Then, of course, there is the vulnerability on the 

factory strike. The American public generally sup

that, but the further we move from the time of that 

the more doubt there is in public opinion. It was clea

there was a breakdown within the administration, a

in the intelligence cycle: the Sudan portion of it wa

closely guarded. Decisionmaking was handled by very

few individuals, and the Administration is conseq

vulnerable on that entire issue.

Public Confidence in the Military.

Turning now to the issue of public confidence 

military, our finding here is especially provocat

controversial because we all know the famous Gallo

finding that the military is the institution in whi

69
public has the greatest confidence. That is true. It is 

shallow finding because it is only one question, but it i

It is also robust; it has held up for a number of years 

much higher than it was in the immediate aftermath 

Vietnam War, when on that very same question, the 

rated the military very low—not quite as low as the

lawyers or even academics, but nevertheless they ra

low in the mid-seventies. The fact that they rate the m

high now is good news, and it is important. Bu

confidence number is brittle, and it is an unc

foundation. If the military is counting on that as a bu

against any future problems in civil-military relation

future problems in funding, or other aspects that it wo

concerned about, then the military is being naïve.

First of all, even that one question, public support 

military, is inflated by the presence of veterans in the 

sample. If you disaggregate on that question between 

who served and those who have not served, those wh

not served have lower confidence in the military than 

who have served. That means, other things being eq

the veteran population diminishes over time

confidence number will drop down as well. It is als

that in an age cohort where there is very high su

namely the “Generation Y” 18- to 25-year-olds, there 

very low accession, or very low probability of serving. 

little bit of that voyeurism of the American culture 

that likes to watch football but does not like to play fo

It likes to watch the military, but does not like to jo

military. And if we look at the constituent eleme

support for the military, whether it is “Are you proud 

military?,” or “Do you think we will have the best milit

years from now?”—all of those other elements that g

support for the military—then support is weaker. So I 

with David King’s analysis. David King, a profes

Harvard, has studied the last 15 years of that particul

finding. He basically comes down and says this is 

finding that is asking, “Did the military do a good job t

time it was sent out to fight?” And the answer is, “

70
has,” but it is not reinforced by large numbers of peop

have a personal connection to the military, who unde

and appreciate military culture, and who would suppo

military even if circumstances conspired against a 

job” the next time out.

This brings us to the question of homeland defens

mission. Is this a mission that the military can do we

not think it is a mission that the U.S. Government 

well. We do not do grand strategy on this, and here 

merely reinforcing what Dr. Hamre said to yo

morning. It also raises the goatherder problem, such 

time when Marines were patrolling the Texas borde

inadvertently shot the poor goatherder, thinking he 

smuggler. I believe that a homeland defense is rif

those kinds of dangers or pitfalls. Also, there is the 

case of asymmetry of the threat: to do homeland de

you have to be successful everywhere at all times; to 

American homeland defense, you just have to be succ

once. One of our major findings in this entire culture 

that we did is that the public does not under

civil-military relations, nor does it really understan

background that you heard earlier. To the exten

homeland defense puts strains on civil-military relati

just exacerbates it.

Questions Beyond U.S. Soil.

While we are worrying about homeland defense

here to tell you that foreign operations are likely to inc

I suspect this to be true because of several factor

Christopher Gelpi, a Duke colleague who was part 

TISS study team, and I found one somewhat surp

factor: the propensity to use force is associated wi

presence of veterans in the policymaking elite. It tur

that veterans, with some qualifications, think rather 

the lines of the Powell Doctrine. On the other hand, c

elites who have not served in the military think a lit

more like the Madeleine Albright Doctrine approach 

71
use of force. If you track the presence of veterans 

policymaking elite in the Cabinet and Congress over 

from 1816 to 1992, you will find a very strong corre

the more veterans in that policymaking elite, the less 

the United States is to use force. But if the United 

does use force and there are a lot of veterans, it wi

much larger effort. This is what we would expect 

extrapolated from the Powell Doctrine to U.S. beh

controlling for all the other factors that contribute to t

of force.

The percentage of veterans in the political elite is 

down, as William Bianco, another TISS study 

member, discovered. For 75 years, from 1900 to about 

there was always a 10- or 15-point “veterans bonus” 

Congress. And with the end of the draft—but it is n

the draft, because this bonus predated the draft—an

the end of Vietnam and the end of party strength and 

factors that have contributed to it, the veterans pre

disappeared. This is the future political environment f

policymaking elite. There will be fewer and fewer vet

If we strap that on to our previous statistical findi

leads us to the expectation—other things being eq

course—of ever higher rates of U.S. use of force.

The Public is not Casualty-Adverse.

My fifth point is the one that former U.S. Arm

College Commandant Major General Robert H. 

disagrees with, as he said when he spoke in my venu

take particular relish in advancing it here on his 

Policymakers and the elites think the public is casual

but the public is not. Our survey asked both wheth

respondent thought the public was casualty-sensitiv

also asked about the respondent’s own sensitiv

casualties. Elites overwhelmingly thought the g

public was casualty shy, but the general public respon

when reporting on their own attitudes toward casu

did not exhibit much casualty shyness. When we 

72
about high intensity missions like Korea or Taiwa

public answer for how many casualties are accepta

order to accomplish the mission was remarkably hi

course, all casualties are “unacceptable” in one sense

you have to take casualties to accomplish a missio

public is as acceptant as our military elites. Then wh

asked about nontraditional missions, we got a wid

although not in the direction we might have expecte

civilian responses are two to four times higher, 

acceptant, than the military responses. It is not the 

that is casualty-averse, it is policymakers, perhaps 

White House, but also the military elite.

The CNN Effect.

Finally, people think that the public is casual

because they think the public responds to the CNN 

But the CNN effect does not work on the public. First 

the public is not watching CNN; the policymak

Washington are. But the people who are moved by CN

the policymakers themselves. Who whipsawed u

Somalia? It was via CNN, but it was President Bus

was watching CNN. He admitted as much in a speec

he gave in Houston last fall. He said he was watchi

coverage of the famine on television and came 

conclusion that the suffering was terrible and so got 

phone to Secretary Cheney to say that something m

done. Who whipsawed us out of Somalia? It was n

general public; their support for the operation was e

before the disastrous Mogadishu raid and did no

precipitously until after President Clinton as much a

that this was a war the United States could not win 

the administration was going to pull out. At that 

public support dropped. CNN may whipsaw the 

makers, but it does not do so via CNN’s effect on 

opinion.

73
Conclusion.

In conclusion, I believe these six points to be tru

exaggerated them for effect, but I would be happy to d

them in questions. I will leave you with the botto

bumper sticker of our study: the quality of ci

leadership matters. All of these problems can be ameli

with better civilian leadership. All of these problem

exacerbated with bad civilian leadership.

74
CHAPTER 4

SECURITY EXPECTATIONS FOR

TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS

George K. Campbell

My role is to provide a perspective on what keeps m

us in the American business security infrastructure 

at night. These remarks are influenced by an insa

desire for information in a land where sharing is an 

unfruitful, unidirectional activity. Therein lies my me

In the interests of further establishing bias up fron

comprises a body at least four times the size of that d

to public protection at all levels in the United States

resource reality is a dynamic that must be considered 

evolving definition of our national security infrastru

In my humble view, “national security” will increa

rely upon developing a new order of the business-g

ment relationship to include these private assets as p

of critical value in the chain of protection.

As to the theme, I wonder what a contemporary v

of the Federalist Papers written by the framers of th

public-private order might say about “insuring do

tranquility and providing for the common defense” 

new millennium? What are the elements of a “re

domestic security environment”? What set of likely t

and whose assessment of vulnerability frame the d

International boundaries melt before the self-intere

interconnected, interdependent global players 

allegiance to private shareholders vs. franchised cit

Whose reality are we discussing here?

As to Fidelity’s business, we are the world’s l

privately owned financial services firm with over $1 t

in assets under management along with a multipli

entrepreneurial businesses stretched across the glob

75
myself, I am expected by my employer to anticip

pre-real time the global threats confronting Fi

Investments’ 33,000 employees, 17 million custo

global technical backbone, business continuity and m

reputation. Like many of you, my work is about aligni

limited resources against higher likelihood threat

ensuring that our response capabilities are adeq

positioned and prepared. The mission of my organiza

to add value to our business by enabling it to do thing

would otherwise be too risky. What keeps my atten

that my list of risks is another’s list of opportunities

What about risk? I believe the most pervasive, h

likelihood threat to the security environment of Am

business is rooted in our absolute, pervasive and gr

reliance on information technology. Our prior experie

the application of proven protection measures a

physical assets is now tested against a virtual land

moving at warp speed around which we must estab

reliable, defensible perimeter. A perimeter through 

must pass any number of untrusted enrollees with 

provided by others over whom I have no control. This 

security environment in which we will all live f

foreseeable future. The rules of engagement here are 

be imagined, let alone written.

At an international security conference we hos

1998, Donn Parker of SRI Consulting, tossed ou

observation that, until 50 years ago,

humankind has only been able to perform single processes

computers have become prevalent, humanity has learned 

create and own a process and use it repeatedly, not just once

applying this learning to negative processescrimesi

possible for the first time in history to possess and use a cri

not just commit it once. One person can design a crime, anot

can test and develop it and others can execute copies.

He goes on to define the characteristics of an auto

crime.

• It is packaged in a program or suite of programs.

76
• It performs all parts of the crime, selecting victim

converting to gain, and erasing the evidence.

• It is accomplished instantly, in computer time.

• A perpetrator can execute it without human interaction 

without knowledge of the crime.

• Experts can test and repeatedly improve it if it is found to 

inadequate.

• It can be designed by one person and executed by others

Obvious examples of these packaged crimes are 

daily in the form of computer viruses and hacker tool

coincidental that as I write these remarks, several n

e-businesses are being hit by distributed denial of s

attacks. These attacks are absurdly easy to launc

threaten public confidence in the reliability and integ

these increasingly pervasive business channels. How

far more insidious adversarial capabilities are 

inventory or will be crafted as motive and oppor

combine. For example:

• Look at the direction of information technolog

then think about the incredible push to conne

customer to a full service business interaction

next computer you will buy will fit in your w

Welcome to the wireless crypto-dependent

mounted, interactive, very vulnerable, so

engineerable, not really personal bus

relationship device. How do we really kno

virtual customer in a digital relationship and is 

masked man or the legitimate item?

• Fuzzy boundaries defy physical and logical defi

The velocity of E-business masks risk and pr

cover for the intruder. How do you define, in ve

legal terms, the concepts of access, trus

defensible control in cyber-land? What is a 

standard of “security” in electronic commerce? 

planet-wide authority defines and enforces it?

77
• If I’m attacked, what rights do I have to protect 

in my virtual home? If I counter the attack, 

intrude as I follow the trail of my adversary? 

offensive strategy may I pursue as a mea

identifying my adversary and protecting mysel

further attack?

• How do we define “trust” when busin

increasingly rely upon 3rd parties in the deliv

core products and services? The fingers on the k

global commerce networks are there on thei

local vetting standards unrelated to the se

interests of the interdependent players. Owing 

short-term legal commitments to share inform

who is a “knowledgeable insider”?

• Are we all very certain that all the trillions of l

computer code touched in some direct w

thousands of unknown, unvetted individu

preparing for Y2K are OK?

• The computer hacker and cyber terrorist ope

alone, equipped with a PC and modem, inflicti

scope of damage that was previously the rea

organized, well-resourced groups. The tec

complexity and uncontrolled interdependenc

global IT infrastructures provide soft targ

sophisticated and unsophisticated adversaries a

• InfoWar is considered a plausible national thre

financial service is either a direct target or 

suffer serious collateral damage.

I do not want my remarks to give inadequate airt

the far more frequent and conventional thre

international organized crime, extortion and co

practices; money laundering and serious fraud; r

business in unstable, high threat regions; pr

counterfeiting or trade secrets compromise. We dea

these in our own ways every day. But, candidly, if we 

78
find ways to deal with the threats of the future, the r

would show immediately in these more convention

persistent areas. Moreover, most, if not all, of these cr

elements are now using information technology to fac

their operations.

While each of America’s business sectors would 

have its own unique expectations of a security environ

we all share an increasingly interdependent set of th

vulnerabilities and core concerns. High on the 

expectations is the ability to obtain qualitative, time

actionable information essential to the protection 

enterprises. This expectation applies to business as w

government. If my competitor is today’s victim, I a

likely target tomorrow.

This need for information has played center stage 

1996-97 work of the Commission on Critical Infrastr

Protection and the related objectives of Presid

Decision Directive (PDD) 63 in 1998. The PDD addres

approach to the compelling need for more dialogu

information sharing; protocols between governmen

business. In that same year, when representatives of 

assembled to discuss solutions to critical global i

responding to international financial crime was at the 

their agenda. Not surprisingly, multilateral coope

and information exchange also emerged as key eleme

future strategy. In addition, the G8 recognized the c

role of transnational businesses and called for 

public-private cooperation to agree on a legal framew

obtaining, presenting and preserving electronic da

evidence while maintaining privacy protection. Fr

just about everyone who has thought about cybercrim

cyberwarfare acknowledge that countering the 

requires proactive information sharing between publ

private sectors on an unprecedented scale. Over tim

simply cannot be an ad hoc play if I want game.

While we might speculate on the life expectancy o

63 as we enter an election year, I am starting to see 

79
movement on the dialogue and potential benef

objectives represent. I also see real multi-jurisdic

action on money laundering within the G8. However

myself honestly wondering if either the public or p

sectors are ready to seriously work to eliminate the ba

to the essential, risk-based information sharing that 

required in the future. Notable quotes following the 

Internet attacks are instructive of the future challen

Commerce Secretary William H. Daley told reporters after 

meeting that the government’s role was to support the indus

and that companies were properly taking the lead in enhanc

security.

The industry participants spoke regularly and politely ab

the need for a continuing partnership with the governmen

improving [computer] security. But their concept of what 

the government would or should have was decidedly limite

In terms of real consequences, this attack was 

skirmish but it did serve to focus attention on future 

and the expansiveness of the potential crime scene. I 

an important outcome was to highlight the 

interdependence of corporate victims and publi

enforcement. Successful investigation of cyber

depends significantly on the active collaboration of m

public and private entities, frequently in diff

countries.

If we don’t collaboratively work on a coll

knowledge base, we will never get to solutions on coun

these inevitable threats. We must recognize that futu

will challenge the traditionally compartment

structures of the national security apparatus and eff

response to new threats will require business to redefi

limits of collaboration with government, partic

regulators and law enforcement. As we wait to s

direction of public policy, we in business will conti

allocate significant resources to improving our propr

control environments as a cornerstone of our fid

responsibility to our shareholders.

80
So, recognizing that thoughtful government-spon

forums have arrived at some consensus on threa

planful response, the work has to be around som

paradigm of information sharing and joint planni

protection measures. How will we achieve real pr

here? What might a few expectations of mine be i

debate?

1. We need timely, reliable and comprehe

information on how appropriate international and do

intelligence on families of threat and vulnerability ad

to knowledge we should have within established pro

This is both a business-to-business as well as a bil

government-to-business issue.

2. We need bilateral trusted relationships wit

government agencies upon which we will increasingl

to rely for actionable risk information as well as appro

and qualitative first response. I’m not sure if this 

chicken or the egg to number one.

3. Perhaps most critical to us, we need to know tha

are reliable processes for incident reporting that will 

others’ awareness while protecting our corporate p

and reputation in the marketplace. This is a partic

difficult arena where trust among competitors an

government is paramount. In our early efforts to str

information sharing venues, many of us have agr

share anonymously among ourselves but have elec

withhold from government. What is the motive fo

reluctance?

• Law enforcement and prosecutorial response 

victimization is totally unpredictable. Moreov

the more technological risks, there is a steep lea

curve yet to be met by these agencies.

• We simply do not know what politically mot

interests might do with the information.

81
• Our prior experience suggests that the proces

invariably be a one-way street, and

• Yes, I absolutely could say the same things 

competitor but I have more information to su

conclusions that have some real skin in the gam

admissions that they may be next.

4. The Departments of Defense and Energy as w

others contributed significantly to the state-of-the-

physical and logical protection over the past 50 years

engine of innovative research and developme

safeguards should be refreshed and encouraged to fin

and cost-effective ways to protect our infrastructur

assets. Security technology is an enabler that can 

American business be more competitive.

I believe the balance of power in the sou

information on threat and technical response is sh

perhaps not as subtly as we might think. Business se

risk and national security risk are morphing. There 

oceans or mountains to conquer in the virtual land

Whether state-supported or individually moti

cyber-terrorists, international organized crime

knowledgeable insider or unknown individuals m

behind a cyber probe, private enterprise is on the pre

target list. As a result, we in corporate securit

becoming increasingly sophisticated, knowledgeabl

equipped on a whole new family of credible threat

effective countermeasures. While I’m here preachin

new paradigm of public-private information sharing

tell you that, on a daily basis, I learn more from my p

sector colleagues around the globe than anything 

from the governments who provide the protective 

around our “domestic” business environment.

Why is that? Is it a clearance thing? Some s

legitimacy that comes from a public agency vetting pr

If so, fine, let’s get on with it. If not, we should estab

public-private joint effort to identify the constraints 

82
information sharing and identify ways to overcome 

barriers to risk-based collaboration. Somewhere out 

right now, the bad guys are sharing information far 

than we are. Someday, in the midst of crisis, we may h

find ways to share real information essential to bo

interests. It is encouraging to note that after PDD-6

issued, some highly relevant private sector and gover

sharing efforts were initiated. I am most familiar wi

Financial Services Information Sharing and An

Center (FS/ISAC) of which my organization is a c

member, but similar efforts are underway in 

infrastructure sectors. The FS/ISAC first seeks to sol

nontrivial problem of facilitating information sh

among competing financial services firms and as 

earlier, we believe that, for now, anonymous inform

submission is the key to making this work. Once t

working well, the FS/ISAC will look for ways to 

information with other sector ISACs. Bi-directional sh

with the government is also a high priority obj

expected to evolve over time as trust and appro

protocols can be developed. This ISAC work is one 

example of the kind of mechanisms that I think we n

define and nurture as cornerstones for the imp

public-private security relationship of the future. I 

add that the finance and banking sector appears 

significantly ahead in the discussion and developm

the structures proposed in the Presidential Directive

I had hoped to be encouraged by the action 

emerging from the 2000 National Planning R

sponsored by the Critical Infrastructure Assurance 

(CIAO) several weeks ago in Washington. Three 

agenda topics recognize the overall concerns I 

attempted to underscore in my remarks:

• Interdependency Vulnerability Assessment;

• Information Sharing, Awareness, and Educati

• Organization Issues and Public-Private Cooper

83
Aside from highlighting what is not happening, it is u

to me what will come out of this effort to marshal ini

and really move the agreed-upon agenda off square o

Instead of reinventing the wheel, I would comme

State Department Overseas Advisory Council (OSAC

working public-private model of real trust and inform

exchange. Given the transnational corporate memb

of this organization, perhaps other agencies should co

leveraging this entree to substantive information exc

on risk. The International Security Manage

Association (ISMA), for example, within which I serv

member of the Board of Directors, actively participate

OSAC and represents the global security interests 

250 largest transnational firms. Throughout our histo

have looked to our government to define the ter

national security and provide for the means to assur

case may be made that those terms are now more d

around a private sector assessment of financial marke

the pivotal U.S. role in the global economy. If that is so

U.S. business has no choice but to play a larger, mor

line role in providing for the “common defense.

stakehold is as a target of preference with poten

significant consequences, not only for our shareholde

for the economies to which we are all increasingly t

recognition, we operate early warning systems and h

fiduciary responsibility to deploy an effective respo

threats against us.

Business and government are too often moved t

action by crisis. We all know the ground has changed a

need to get on with the business of finding ways to m

future risk. Bilateral communication is a keystone. I

the far too infrequent forums such as this 

collaborations will be formed and solutions found.

CHAPTER 4 - ENDNOTE

1. “Internet Executives Reassured After White House M

New York Times, February 16, 2000, p. C2.

84
CHAPTER 5

BALLISTIC AND CRUISE MISSILE THRE

Steven A. Cambone

I will discuss ballistic missile threats to the U

States posed by countries with extant and eme

capabilities, and will raise some questions regardin

strategic implications of these threats for the United 

in coming years. I will address cruise missile threat

briefly, as they are, at present, not as pressing a prob

strategic terms as the ballistic missile threat. I wi

discuss extant ballistic missile capabilities. Second, 

consider emerging threats and examine the pro

supporting efforts to develop long-range ballistic m

capabilities in a number of countries. Finally, I will t

strategic implications of the evolving ballistic m

threat. 

Extant Capabilities.

Seven countries now have, or have access t

technology to develop long-range ballistic m

capabilities: Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, 

Pakistan, and India. At least three, perhaps four, cou

currently have the capabilities to threaten the U

States with ballistic missiles. Russia, China, and 

Korea have the ability to place weapons of mass destr

(WMD) on U.S. territory.

1

There is a lively debate over whether the fourth

has that capability at present. Open-source intell

estimates suggest that North Korea has pro

substantial assistance to Iran’s ballistic missile prog

If North Korea could, as those intelligence esti

indicate, launch its Taepo Dong 2 in a two-

configuration carrying a light payload and strike the 

85
coast of the United States, and in a three-

configuration strike the entire United States, it 

follows that Iran could possess a missile of a similar ra

a relatively short time following a decision to develop 

three-stage Taepo Dong 2 would give Iran the abi

target the northeastern part of the United States.

Iraq and Pakistan are two additional countries tha

rise to concern. In December 1989 Iraq launc

three-stage rocket capable of putting a satellite into 

The rocket exploded after launch, and luckily the ove

Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites detecte

launch. But this indicates that, at a minimum, the 

have the interest and desire to acquire such capabilit

Rumsfeld Commission assessed that if U.N.-im

controls were lifted and Iraq mounted a “determined e

it could pose an intercontinental ballistic missile (I

threat to the United States within 5-10 years.

Pakistan may not have an interest at prese

investing in missiles of ICBM range, and it is diffic

imagine the need for this capability arising and the

posing a direct risk to the United States. Recent 

reports and unclassified intelligence estimates in

that Pakistan’s ballistic missile program is closely lin

that of North Korea, which at the very least mean

Pakistan likely has access to the technology for long

ballistic missiles.

5

India is the last of the seven countries with the c

potential to develop ICBM range capabilities.

6

 How

am not including India in the threat calculus, as India 

a country that appears to wish harm to the United Sta

to its interests. Nonetheless, India’s little noted prog

moving, with Russian assistance, toward developm

SS-20 class ballistic missiles and submarine lau

ballistic missiles.

86
Program Development.

It is important to note that ballistic missile develo

programs, in all countries to include the United Stat

not wholly indigenous.

7

 This is a field of developmen

has been the subject of a great deal of trade, and excha

personnel, scientific information, materials

technologies. Moreover, for a host of reasons, countrie

been more than willing to provide assistance to one an

even when one might not think it to be in their interes

so. Not only has Russia provided submarines, destr

and aircraft to China, but also they have pro

substantial technical assistance to China’s missil

weapons programs.

8

 While Russian-Chinese relation

frosty during the 1970s and 1980s, it is worth recallin

the currently deployed Chinese long-range missile f

largely derivative of Russian capabilities that 

transferred in the 1950s and early 1960s.

In turn, the Russians and the Chinese have been h

to many other countries, including Iran, Iraq, North 

and Pakistan, both in terms of technology and perso

The reasons behind their activity are a mat

speculation; the fact remains that entities in both cou

are supplying a substantial amount of aid and assist

In addition to Russian and Chinese transfers, the 

and assistance among emerging ballistic missile pow

proving to be an extremely troubling trend. North Kor

provided aid to Pakistan and Iran, and India has as

other countries as well.

10

 Thus, even if the Russia

Chinese aid to other countries stopped right n

sufficient amount of capability is extant in these eme

second tier countries that their programs would be a

move forward. Development might be slightly slower

expensive and technically risky, but the programs 

advance nonetheless.

The above brief discussion of the military-tec

dimension of the threat is what most frequently draw

87
attention. The last part of the chapter will raise some 

of a strategic dimension to inform the deployment deci

The Strategic Dimension.

We have comforted ourselves with the knowled

what we believe to be the knowledge, that Russia’s str

offensive forces are going to be very small, rela

speaking, in the near future.

11

 Some suggest tha

ultimate number will be on the order of 1,000 war

though I would argue that this is doubtful. In any eve

number will be somewhere between the 3,000 or so th

permitted under Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (ST

II and whatever we may negotiate under STAR

However, it is important to appreciate that those forc

going to be far more modern than the forces the S

deployed in the 1980s. The SS-27, Russia’s new ICBM

very good piece of work, and the missile it is now p

together to deploy on their follow-on submarines will 

be just as advanced. Moreover, the Russians have ind

that they hope to use this new sea-launched ballistic m

(SLBM) as a common missile for both the lan

sea-based deployments.

12

 It is worth noting, in ad

that while the SS-27 is being deployed as a single wa

missile, it is perfectly capable of carrying more tha

re-entry vehicle. Thus, while there will be fewer de

vehicles, the Russians will have the potential to main

fairly large number of warheads in the force.

China, on the other hand, is the only nuclear w

state committed to building up its offensive potentia

forces in the next 10 to 15 years will be far larger tha

are today. The unclassified intelligence estimates in

that, in addition to their land-based CSS-4’s, Chin

have some “few tens” of additional land-base

sea-based ballistic capabilities.

14

 In addition, whi

current model of the land-based system could 

maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs), the foll

systems to the DF-31, now in testing, to include the 

88
variant, are projected to have much more throw weig

could carry MIRVs (multiple independently tar

reentry vehicles) and have an 8,000 km range. The 

was tested in August 1999, and unclassified 

intelligence sources suggest that deployment may b

but has not yet happened.

15

 The follow-on to the DF

projected to have a range of 12,000 km.

16

 Thus, the C

are going to have a much larger force and one of 

reasonable strategic potential in the next 10 years 

This potential is of interest, particularly when you r

that our own force capabilities are coming down in 

numbers and in the number of targets the force pres

With regard to the emerging ballistic missile p

their activity is not ad hoc; it is not taking place outsi

purview of the leadership. Rather, their m

development and related proliferation activity is 

conducted with specific political and strategic purpos

need only consider the long-standing relationship be

China and Pakistan relative to Russia and India to be

identify potential strategic purposes. To cite an

example, it is difficult to understand Russian activit

Iran in any other but a political and strategic contex

Strategic Implications.

Next, I would like to raise some of the str

implications related to ballistic missile developmen

how these implications might affect our own calcul

about our position in various regions around the wor

It is instructive to examine what countries might g

the development of ballistic missile programs. North 

I would suggest, gains recognition. North Kore

engineered a direct relationship with the United Sta

summit with South Korea, and an opening to other 

and European states—it is now received in Can

Rome, Paris, and Geneva—all made possible b

existence of this recognition. Whether or not this is pre

89
what North Korea had in mind when beginni

programs, it is certainly making use of that recognit

Iran, in my view, is seeking reintegration throu

missile development. At the very least, this is one 

consequences of its programs. We have seen “pis

diplomacy” unfold, an effort by the United States to d

favorable relations with the reform-minded Kh

government. This U.S. effort comes despite the lack 

evidence that the Khatemi government is willing to 

substantially or abandon its programs. Iran has also o

dialogues with European states and with its 

Cooperation Council neighbors, especially Saudi Ara

India is seeking admission; I would argue it has w

a seat at the table in discussions of regional and 

affairs, and has achieved one, even if it is still prese

conference call, if you will. One need only recall th

President visited India for 5 days in mid-2000—he v

Pakistan for 5 hours.

Pakistan, in contrast, hopes for leverage. More tha

the status of possessing long range missiles, they 

leverage over the problem with India, and thus far 

failed to gain it.

Iraq, I would argue, is looking very hard to recon

its society and position in the region, and my guess is t

the course of this, they will reconstitute their we

capability as well.

17

These are the so-called bad guys, the rogues. Wh

the latest State Department preferences, “rogue” is a 

that we should ban from our lexicon. These are cou

that have specific strategic intentions, and they have s

to achieve them. Addressing the implications of 

intentions begins by respecting their threat.

90
Allies.

Our allies have much to come to grips with as a re

missile developments. After a North Korean launch 

No Dong missile over its territory, Japan decided it wo

two things: first it would join the United States in its t

missile defense (TMD) program.

18

 Secondly, and 

significantly, it decided to go ahead with its own sa

reconnaissance program.

19

 The importance of this de

lies not in the constitutional implications for Japan, o

it is militarizing space, but rather in the notion 

“tyranny of information.” The Japanese leadership 

longer going to depend upon the United Stat

information about what is taking place in its backyard

this information, however, comes responsibility

Japanese leadership can no longer duck the Jap

public’s questions about potential threats or ignore ca

responses.

20

 Thus, as a consequence of responding 

missile threat, Japan is going to have more inform

about what is taking place in the region, which will, in 

increase the requirement for action by the public. Th

dovetail, I believe, with what one already sees 

generational change in the attitude of the Japanese 

their role in the region.

South Korea, too, has designs on a changed role 

region, which has its strategic implications. The U

States has tried very hard to convince South Korea 

theater missile defenses, but to no avail. The South Ko

believe that to defend themselves properly, they n

deterrent capability such as the United States has a

the Russians, which means offensive potential. Whil

are happy for the United States to bring theater m

defenses with the U.S. troops deployed on the K

peninsula, they want 500 km-range ballistic missile

which to attack the launch sites in North Korea. This 

inconsistent with South Korea’s effort to br

rapprochement with the North. However, since 

missiles of a range exceeding 180 km have been proh

91
by an agreement between the United States and 

Korea. According to press reports, these restrictions 

been expanded to 300 km for payloads up to 1,100 p

and longer for lighter loads.

21

 This development coul

significant implications insofar as South Korea w

effect, be a member of the Missile Technology C

Regime (MTCR) club and, in turn, could gain access 

kinds of technological capabilities which would su

what they consider to be their real objective: a space l

capability. This does not need to be spun out furt

clearly see the strategic implications of now three cou

in the region armed with ballistic missiles.

Taiwan finds itself in a difficult position, which ha

exacerbated by the ballistic missile threat.

22

 

understands that ballistic missiles can have the same 

as navies once did; that is, a force with which to coerce 

conduct the modern day equivalent of gunboat diplom

This is no small accomplishment and one the United 

needs to address. The Taiwanese are not sure how th

going to deal with this problem, and they are worrie

about the relationship with the United States in li

China’s threats and ballistic missile moderniz

program.

24

Saudi Arabia’s prince and defense minister went 

nuclear and ballistic missile facilities in Pakistan

likely for the same reason that Saudi Arabia acquir

CSS-2 back in 1988: they are nervous about develop

in their area of the world.

25

 Saudi Arabia can be reac

threatened with ballistic missiles by India, Pakistan

Iraq, and Israel. If the Saudis are going to play 

regional military balance, they likely will need to r

the CSS-2s. This is a momentous decision for Saudi A

and one that is going to be extraordinarily important 

effect, in turn, on the delicate political balance in the r

Finally, Israel is in the midst of an agon

reappraisal, the kind John Foster Dulles once spo

Israel understands that Iran now threatens it in way

92
it has never been threatened before. The Israeli’s d

forces—particularly its ground and air forces—c

longer provide the unqualified strategic deterren

defense for Israel. The enemy, should Iran prove to be 

is no longer contiguous, and not able to be touched 

way that Israel did when it destroyed Iraq’s nuclear r

at Osirak. Thus, we see a flurry of activity by the Is

They are looking to make peace to the north wi

Syrians, and it is not improbable that they could o

dialogue with the Iranians as well.

26

 Israel and the S

government maintained good relations, and there is 

history of relationships between those two countr

addition to the diplomatics, the Israelis are also reth

the approach their strategic forces should take. It 

coincidental, I would argue, that according to press re

the Israelis are looking for Tomahawk Cruise mi

perhaps to arm either surface ships or, more likel

submarines that they are acquiring.

27

 If Israel arms 

with cruise missiles, the lid will be off the box, an

United States will have an additional set of tec

capabilities in the mix that might have the eff

destabilizing the region. This is not to argue again

Israelis acquiring these missiles, but rather for the n

be aware of the likely consequences.

Conclusions.

First, technical development of the ballistic m

threat is difficult to control. While one should never g

the effort to conduct anti-proliferation measures, we h

realize that we will only slow the programs, not end 

Second, there are now multiple centers of ballistic m

capability and we are going to have to keep them all in 

as we think through our arms control approach, our m

defense process, and the development of our armed 

capabilities over time. Third, it is important to rem

that those centers do cooperate technically. It would 

surprising to discover that they also develop polit

strategic alliances of convenience as time goes by. T

93
perhaps not unlike the alliance of convenience betwe

Russians and the Chinese or the North Koreans an

Iranians. The United States must keep this coopera

mind as we weigh the risks and choose a course of ac

potential developing crises; a crisis in the Middle 

might have reverberating effects as far away as Nor

Asia. Lastly, it seems that proliferation of ballist

nuclear, biological, and chemical technologies, and in 

cases the actual deployment of the systems, underscor

only the increased instability of the international sy

but also the present inability of the United States to n

the use of those systems.

CHAPTER 5 - ENDNOTES

1. “Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile T

the United States Through 2015,” National Intelligence Council 

September 1999 (hereafter NIC Report); “Commission to Ass

Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States,” Pursuant to PL-2

15, 1998, (hereafter Rumsfeld Report).

2. See Statement of Director of Central Intelligence George J

before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 21, 20

reports in the press, see “Critical N. Korea Missile Parts Seen 

Iran’s Program,” Bill Gertz, Washington Times, February 10, 20

“N. Korea Sells Iran Missile Engines,” Washington Times, Febr

2000. Also see “Israel Preparing for Iranian Test Launch of Sh

Missile in Coming Weeks,” Tel Aviv Ha’aretz, June 26, 2000, tra

in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter FBIS).

3. NIC Report.

4. “U.S. Confirms Iraq Has Launched Rocket That Can 

Satellites,” Michael Gordon, New York Times, December 9, 198

5. “U.S. Says North Korea Helped Develop New Pakistani M

Tim Weiner, New York Times, April 11, 1998; and, “Pakistan 

Artillery Unit to Handle Long Range Missiles,” Mumbai, The T

India, June 26, 2000, in FBIS

6. This point is made in David R. Tanks, “Ballistic Missil

Asia: Are ICBMs a Future Possibility?” in Appendix III, Uncl

Working Papers for the Rumsfeld Commission. See also “Indian 

Programme” Asian Defense Journal, May 1995, p. 20.

94
7. NIC Report.

8. On conventional assistance, see “Chinese Raises Arms 

with $500 Million Destroyer,” Tyler Marshall, Los Angeles 

February 2, 2000; and “Sino-Russian Arms Sale is Reaching the 

Stage in 2000,” Kanwa News, January 20, 2000, www.kan

(visited June 24, 2000). For reports of nuclear assistance, see “R

Congress on Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons o

Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions: January 1, 

June 1, 1999,” required pursuant to Section 721 of FY 97 N

Intelligence Authorization Act, 9 (hereafter China Report), and 

the Ring: Beijing-Moscow Axis,” Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarb

Washington Times, January 14, 2000.

9. See “China, Russia Still Exporting Nuclear, Missile Techn

Bill Gertz, Washington Times, February 2, 2000. See also China 

note 10.

10. See Testimony of Director of Central Intelligence Georg

before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on “The Wo

Threat in 2000: Global Realities of Our National Security,” Ma

2000. Available at www.cia.gov (visited June 26, 2000).

11. NIC Report. See also report of statement by Russian C

General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin, “Russian CGS Thinks R

Strategic Arsenal Must Be Cut,” Moscow Interfax, June 24

translated in FBIS.

12. “Russian Admiral Vaunts Naval Missile Systems,” I

January 4, 2000, translated in FBIS. See also “Center TV 

Interview with TOPOL M Designer,” Moscow Center TV, Decem

1999, translated in FBIS. 

13. “China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control: A Preli

Assessment,” Brad Roberts, Robert A. Manning, and 

Montaperto, published by the Council of Foreign Relat

conjunction with National Defense University, and the Insti

Defense Analyses, 2000. See also “U.S. National Securi

Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of 

Vol. I, Select Committee of U.S. House of Representatives, 19

Report), and “Annual Report on the Military Power of the P

Republic of China,” Pursuant to Section 1202 of the FY2000 N

Defense Authorization Act. See also James R. Asker, “Determ

Build,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, May 15, 2000.

95
14. NIC Report; James R. Asker, “Determined to Build,” A

Week and Space Technology, May 15, 2000.

15. On the flight test, see “China Develops Warhead De

Defeat United States Defenses,” Bill Gertz, Washington 

September 16, 1999. A PLA daily newspaper quoted in Jane’s 

Weekly states that the missile has already been deployed. See 

Deploys Dong Feng 31 Missile Towards Its Southern Borders,” 

Zhang, Jane’s Defense Weekly, November 2, 1999. On United 

sources, see the Cox report and “China: The Forgotten Nuclear 

Brad Roberts, Robert A. Manning, and Ronald Montaperto, 

Affairs, July 2000.

16. “NMD: An International Concern” Jane’s Intelligence 

May 1, 2000, Vol. 12, no. 5, and Brad Roberts, Robert A. Manni

Ronald N. Montaperto, “China: The Forgotten Nuclear Power.”

17. Press reports confirm that this is the case. See “Fligh

Show Iraq has Resumed a Missile Program,” Steven Lee Meye

York Times, July 1, 2000.

18. “U.S. and Japan Agree to Joint Research on Missile D

Calvin Sims, New York Times, August 17, 1999.

19. “North Korean Missile Threat is Reassessed: 3 Stage 

Was Not Foreseen by United States,” Bradley Graham,The Was

Post, September 25, 1998; “Need Seen for Spy Satellite,” M

Nakamoto, Financial Times, September 9, 1998; “U.S. and Japa

to Joint Research on Missile Defense,” Calvin Sims, New York 

August 17, 1999.

20. “Japan Moves Towards a New Assertiveness: Se

Insecurity and Crisis Prompts Lawmaker and Public,” Camero

Christian Science Monitor, July 8, 1999.

21. “As Relations Thaw, Seoul Suspends Arms Plan,” Doug 

The Washington Post, June 25, 2000. This article stated that Se

put their missile program on hold in light of the recent summit, 

this was denied by officials in the Korean Foreign Affairs and 

Ministry. See “ROGK Denies United States Daily Report of Ca

Longer-Range Missile Development Plan,” Seoul Yonhap, J

2000, translated in FBIS. 

22. “China may Build Arms to Gain Edge on Taiwan,” E

Lachia, Wall Street Journal, June 26, 2000.

96
23. “China’s Missile Tests Reveal a Potential United State

Ignore,” Sheila Tefft, Christian Science Monitor, March, 26, 19

24. In the wake of the apparently successful Korean s

President Chen Shui-bian invited Jiang Zemin to meet. See “T

President Calls for Summit With China,” John Pomfre

Washington Post, June 20, 2000.

25. “Saudi Visit to Arms Site in Pakistan Worries U.S.” Jane 

New York Times, July 10, 1999.

26. On both Israeli government and military support for a pe

with Syria, see “Israel War Games Boost Peace Talks,” Sam Ki

London Times, January 14, 2000.

27. “U.S. Nixes Israel Tomahawk Plea, Could Spur Ind

Development,” Barbara Opall-Rome, Defense News, March 20, 

97
CHAPTER 6

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL TERRORI

POLITICAL HYPE OR BONA FIDE

POST-COLD WAR THREAT?

Russell Howard

America’s current national security structure is 

on the National Security Act of 1947. That legislatio

enacted to correct coordination and operations defici

observed during World War II and to facilitate effo

address the emerging Soviet threat. For the most p

noted by President Clinton on the 50th anniversary 

Act, it has worked:

The success of their efforts and of the historic legislat

enacted half a century ago is reflected in an outstanding reco

of achievement: nuclear war averted, the Cold War won, a

the nations of the world turning to democracy and f

markets.

However, many question whether the Act an

institutions and treaty regimes it created are equal 

challenges of post-Cold War global security. In these 

opinion, the 1947 document was adequate for a b

state-centric, balance-of-power world, in which the 

Union was the enemy and interstate conflict the 

threat. But, they view it as inadequate for the unipola

state-centric, post-Cold War world, in which our pri

enemies are failed, failing, and rogue state

transnational actors. Now the principal threats are 

and religious conflict, international and domestic terr

drugs, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destr

(WMD). 

This chapter contends that the critics of the Na

Security Act are right, especially regarding the prolife

and use of two types of WMD—chemical and biologic

99
the United States and internationally. It begi

reviewing the debate over the seriousness o

chemical/biological weapons threat to U.S. secur

considers the limitations of the 1947 Act and discusse

the United States is presently organized to address t

from such weapons, arguing that a stream

organizational structure under unitary command wo

more efficient and timely. It examines how the U

Kingdom, Canada, and Israel are organized to h

chemical and biological threats to their homeland

suggests that the United States has much to learn 

these important allies.

The chapter also discusses certain intelligence re

that may be necessary to help curtail the use of bio

and chemical weapons by terrorists. It identifies 

limitations of the Posse Comitatus Act, which se

curbs the use of U.S. military forces against domestic 

chemical and biological terrorism. Finally, it analyz

viability of deterrence and preemption as mea

preventing the use of such weapons in the future.

Chemical and Biological Weapons in History.

The problem of chemical and biological weapons 

entirely new. The use of mustard gas during World W

well known, but other examples go back much fu

“Toxic fumes” were used in India as early as 2000 BC

first known use of biological warfare was in 1346 at 

(now Fedossia, Ukraine), where the bodies of T

soldiers who had succumbed to plague were catapulte

the walls of the besieged city.

1

 During World War 

Japanese produced biological weapons and used th

1942 at Congshan, China—the only confirmed air 

with biological weapons in modern history.

2

 A recent 

The United States and Biological Warfare: Secrets fro

Early Cold War and Korea, charges that, after World W

the United States used knowledge acquired by the Jap

to develop a lethal biological arsenal, which was tes

100
Korea and China during the Korean War.

3

 Iran 

chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War, perhap

on its own citizens.

4

 Iraq’s chemical weapons stockpi

suspected production facilities have motivated U

Nations inspections and U.S. missile and air strik

years. The United States believed that the Serbian 

had stocks of lethal chemical weapons, which might b

against the Kosovars.

5

 The Center for Nonprolife

Studies at the Monterey Institute of International S

has identified 31 states that have or had chemi

biological weapons programs and have catalogued a

46 instances of their use.

A Serious Post-Cold War Problem.

At present there is a debate among analysts and sc

about the severity of the threat posed by WMD, esp

biological and chemical weapons. The Hart-Ru

Commission argues in a 143-page report that the 

serious potential threat to the United States m

unannounced attacks on American cities by terrorist g

using germ warfare.

6

 The report predicts that “Ame

will likely die on American soil, possibly in large num

The growing threat of domestic terrorism is one 

leading themes of this study, which Secretary Willi

Cohen has called the most comprehensive effort of it

since the National Security Act of 1947.

8

 Cohen agree

WMD threats are extreme:

I believe the proliferation of weapons of mass destruct

presents the greatest threat that the world has ever know

We are finding more and more countries that are acquir

technology–not only missile technology–and are develop

chemical weapons and biological weapons capabilities to 

used in theater and also on a long-range basis. So I think th

is perhaps the greatest threat that any of us will face in t

coming years.

9

Others disagree. Milton Leitenberg, a senior fel

the Center for International and Security Studies 

101
University of Maryland considers the Secretary’s com

exaggerated and alarmist. According to Leitenbe

agency of the U.S. Government has prepared a 

analysis indicating that the use of chemical and bio

agents by terrorists is imminent or even likely. R

“various analysts have provided vulnerability proje

and scenarios, which are always easy to concoct 

abstract.”

10

 So far, Ehud Sprinzak points out that the 

has not witnessed any mass-casualty event resultin

unconventional terrorists using WMD. “Most of the 

allocated to countering this threat have been commit

the basis of dubious conjecture and unsubstan

worst-case scenarios.”

11

 Brian Jenkins notes that 

eight thousand terrorist incidents recorded between 

and 1986, fewer than 60 offered any indication 

terrorists considered using chemical or biological ag

Nicholas Wade of the New York Times argues that bio

weapons are too difficult to disperse to be techn

feasible for other than the most sophisticated users.

1

most other people, terrorists fear powerful contam

and toxins about which they know little and which th

uncertain how to fabricate and handle, much less 

and disperse.

14

 “Few countries,” writes Jessica Stern

even fewer terrorist groups, if any, are now capa

launching an open-air attack that would create 

casualties.”

1 5

 Brian Jenkins’s often-rep

observation—“terrorists want a lot of people watching

lot of people dead”—seems to imply that terroris

unlikely to resort to WMD.”

16

Use of chemical and biological weapons by terroris

indeed been rare. One recent exception was the 

Shinrikyo sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway; and 

involved in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing 

gathering the ingredients for a chemical weapon that 

have killed thousands.

17

 There were 68 investigation

the threatened use of chemical, biological, or n

materials in the United States in 1997, and 86 in the 

months of 1998, but all turned out to be hoaxes.

18

 Th

102
significant case of bioterrorism in the United S

occurred in Oregon in 1984, when followers of Indian 

Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, hoping to sway a local ele

unleashed a salmonella poisoning attack in ten restau

sickening 751 people but killing none.

19

Nevertheless, though WMD attacks have so far 

extremely rare, there are several reasons why this 

must be taken seriously. First, such attacks hav

potential to be unprecedentedly devastating—the U

States simply must be capable of preventing th

responding swiftly and efficiently if prevention 

Second, advances in information technology an

increasing availability of ex-Soviet WMD specialists 

made the fabrication and use of biological and ch

weapons a less intimidating prospect for terrorists. 

there are now many terrorists who do not adhere to 

Jenkins’s dictum—they do want to “see a lot of people d

Chemical and Biological Weapons—One Horrib

the Other Worse.

Chemical and biological agents are not a

distinguished in popular discourse, but there are imp

differences between them. Agents used in biol

weapons are “living organisms or infective material d

from them, which are intended to cause disease or de

man, animals, and plants, and which depend for 

effects on their ability to multiply in the person, anim

plant.”

20

 Agents used in chemical weapons are ga

liquid, or solid chemical substances which cause de

humans, animals, or plants and which depend on 

toxicity for their effect.

21

Biological weapons are strategic. They are “incr

powerful and dangerous. They can kill huge numb

people if they are used properly, and their effects a

limited to one place or a small target.”

22

 Biological a

are microorganisms—bacteria or viruses—that inva

body, multiply inside it, and destroy it.

23

 They can 

103
nonhuman populations as well, upsetting the 

ecosystem. For example, wild rodents living out

factory in Omutinsk, Russia, became chronically in

with the Schu-4 military strain of tularemia 

manufactured there, a bacterium that causes one t

pneumonia. “It was a hot, lethal strain that came fro

United States: an American biological weapon th

Soviets had managed to obtain during the nin

fifties.”

24

 Even though rodents are not a natural h

tularemia, Schu-4 sped among the rodents of Omu

People catch tularemia easily from rodents, and it c

fatal.

25

Biological weapons are more difficult to acquir

manufacture than chemical weapons, but many stat

nonstate actors can now construct them.

Culturing the required microorganisms, or growing 

purifying toxins, is inexpensive and could be accomplished 

individuals with college-level training in biology and a b

knowledge of laboratory technique. Acquiring the seed sto

for pathogenic microorganisms is not particularly difficult.

One expert estimates that more than 20 countries ma

have biological weapons capability.

27

Chemical weapons are poisons that kill after m

contact with the skin. They are tactical instead of str

they can be used for mass-casualty attacks in co

areas, but it is almost impossible to concentrate e

chemicals in the air to kill a great many people over a 

territory. Because chemicals are not alive, they can

spread by infection, like biological weapons. But che

weapons are easier to fabricate than biological weap

Chemical weapons suitable for mass-casualty attacks can 

acquired by virtually any state and by nonstate actors w

moderate technical skills. Certain very deadly chemical warf

agents can quite literally be manufactured in a kitchen 

basement in quantities sufficient for mass-casualty attacks

104
In fact, chemical agents are so easy to make that s

countries have added them to their weapons inven

According to unclassified military information, there 

11 countries with chemical weapons in 1980—by 1997 

were 25.

29

Chemical and biological attacks require dif

responses. 

After a chemical attack, there is a ‘golden hour’ within wh

to make a difference. After that hour, those who are going 

survive, do, and those who are not, do not. Once deconta

inated and removed from the incident site, or ‘hot zon

victims can be dispersed to hospitals.

30

Biological attacks are more difficult to manage.

The victims must be immediately isolated in order to preve

the agent from spreading. Potential victims need to be isolat

from the definitely uncontaminated public; they also should 

isolated from others afflicted with the illness until ea

individual’s degree of contamination can be established. B

this type of quarantine is currently impossible. Given toda

detection capabilities and the incubation period of biologi

agents, we’ll never know that we’ve been contaminated. Hen

the diabolical genius of a biological agent attack: we beco

the “unknowing vector” of our own death.

31

New Technology and the Russian Connection.

The Internet has been a major factor in providing 

“how-to” information to would-be terrorists. By acc

any of a number of search engines, one can get th

necessary to build both chemical and biological we

There are also a number of self-published ma

available with information on how to grow and dist

biological toxins.

32

 One of these manuals, Bacterio

Warfare: A Major Threat to North America, is descri

the Internet as a book for helping readers surv

biological weapons attack. But in fact it also describ

reproduction and growth of biological agents and incl

chapter on “bacteria likely to be used by the terrorist

105
book is sold over the Internet for $28.50 and is repo

advertised on right-wing radio shows.

33

The availability of material and expertise fro

former Soviet Union also makes proliferation more 

Between 1969, when the United States halted its bio

weapons program, and 1992, the Soviet Union dev

the largest and most sophisticated biological we

program in the world. In 1992 Boris Yeltsin wisely de

that biological weapons activities were illega

unfortunately his actions also put many people 

work.

34

 Now hundreds and perhaps thousan

unemployed Russian biological and chemical speciali

available to the highest bidder. Among the bidders a

United States, the United Kingdom, Iran, Iraq, and L

The New Terrorism.

The noted author Walter Laqueur views the 

terrorism” as actually many terrorisms. Accord

Laqueur, 

the past few decades have seen the birth of dozens of aggress

movements espousing varieties of nationalism, religi

fundamentalism, fascism, and apocalyptic millenarianism.

Most international and domestic terrorism today is 

ideological (in the sense of left or right) but is ethnic-separa

in inspiration . . .In the past, terrorism was almost always 

province of groups of militants that had the backing of polit

forces; in the future, terrorists might be individuals on 

pattern of the Unabomber or like-minded people working 

very small groups.

37

According to Secretary of State Madeleine K. Alb

What’s new is the emergence of terrorist coalitions that do 

answer fully to any government, that operate across natio

borders, and that have access to advanced technology.

38

106
Such groups are not bound by the same constrai

motivated by the same goals as nation-states.

39

 And 

state-sponsored groups, religious extremists, e

separatists, and lone unabombers are not suscept

traditional diplomacy or military deterrence. There 

state with which to negotiate or against which to retal

No longer are most terrorists concerned about lim

casualties. Religious terrorists, in particular, often s

inflict many casualties. As Bruce Hoffman observes,

the growth of religious terrorism and its emergence in rece

years as a driving force behind the increasing lethality 

international terrorism shatters some of our most ba

assumptions about terrorists and the violence they commit.

Incidents like the Tokyo subway attack and the 

Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings app

render Brian Jenkins’s dictum about casualties ob

Altogether, the availability of Russians for hire a

critical WMD information on the Internet, coupled w

lethal motives of the “new terrorists,” could portend a 

and destructive era for which the United Sta

ill-prepared.

42

Overreaction is Not the Answer.

Recognizing the problem is essential, but the U

States must avoid overreaction. Achieving total se

would be impossible, and it would be tragic for the w

most powerful democracy to abandon any of its fre

and principles in a quest for absolute security.

43

Also, attempting to achieve total security wou

extraordinarily expensive. And, as the U.S. Ge

Accounting Office (GAO) and others have pointe

throwing money at it is not the answer. New pro

addressing the biological and chemical weapons threa

made counterterrorism one of the fastest-growing p

the federal budget. Total U.S. spending could excee

billion in 2000, up from $5.7 billion in 1996. A 

107
released in October 1999 by the GAO charges 

lawmakers have dumped too much money into this 

and a growing number of government and p

counterterrorism experts agree. These experts say:

federal officials are so spooked by the possibility of a chemica

biological attack that they are deliberately hyping the threa

get Congress to cough up coveted cash for prevention progra

And most lawmakers are buying it wholesale.

44

In 1997, for example, Congress ordered DoD to co

multi-agency training exercises in the nation’s 120 l

cities against WMD attacks. Today there are more tha

training courses, run not only by DoD but also b

Department of Energy, the Justice Department, the C

Intelligence Agency, the Environmental Protection A

and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. 

believe that these programs are redundant, includin

over-trained fire-battalion chief who quipped: “Jus

many different ways are we going to cook the 

chicken?”

45

Limitations of the National Security Act.

The National Security Act of 1947, which creat

Department of Defense, the United States Air Forc

Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Se

Council, was intended to correct coordination 

operations deficiencies observed during World War II 

address the emerging Soviet threat. For the most p

worked. Some may believe that America’s military se

have yet to coordinate their operations optimally, but 

can deny that joint operations are exponentially 

organized today than during the Second World War. 

the Soviet threat, it—like the Soviet Union—no 

exists. What has replaced it is very much diminis

Russia did not have nuclear weapons it would probab

be considered a major power. Russia today has the 

GDP as New Jersey—hardly the basis of a superpow

108
The global security environment has changed. No 

does ideology dictate superpower confrontation. No 

do the superpowers and their surrogates compete f

world’s allegiance and resources. No longer do reali

idealist theories based on sovereign state behavior and 

interaction provide satisfactory frameworks for disc

American and international security. Nowadays 

failing, and rogue states and transnational actors a

chief security concerns. They are the main sources 

proliferation of WMD, drugs, international and do

terrorism, transnational crime, ethnic and rel

conflict, and other new security threats. The Na

Security Act was not designed and has not been adap

address these threats, as events like Somalia, 

Kosovo, East Timor and Oklahoma City attest.

The crucial question is whether the Act an

structure it established can be made to fit the ch

national security environment without drastic rev

Some have concluded, like the Center for Strateg

International Studies in Washington DC, that the c

structure has sufficient flexibility.

46

 Supreme 

Commander Europe General Wesley Clarke agrees; h

no need for “big changes” in the Act and believes that 

be adapted to the post-Cold War world.

47

I disagree. I believe there are two fundam

weaknesses and deficiencies in the National Securit

First, DoD is not organized correctly. Second, role

missions within the intelligence community do not su

today’s requirements.

Department of Defense.

DoD is still organized to respond to major inte

conflict, much as it was during the Cold War. Then 

required to maintain forces for “prompt and sus

combat operations” against the Soviet Union. Though 

was always debate about the proper balance of nucle

conventional capabilities and the most efficient divis

109
resources among the various services, the de

context—security against a Soviet threat—was rela

unambiguous.

48

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the bas

determining the roles, missions, and capabilities 

forces within DoD has been difficult to articulate. S

attempts at redefinition—Bush’s “Base Force,” Cli

“Bottom-Up Review,” and the congressionally-man

“Quadrennial Defense Review and National De

Panel”—have recommended maintaining a less 

status quo. In essence, the United States has cho

smaller but heavier version of its Cold War force

organized, modernized, and equipped with system

doctrine appropriate for two simultaneous reg

conflicts. Yet except for the Gulf War, our military 

have taken on entirely new missions, such as peaceke

peace-enforcement, humanitarian assistance, de-m

counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism.

49

The Unified Command Plan (UCP)—related to b

specifically included in the National Security Act—ne

be changed. At present the major regional comman

the European, Pacific, Central (including the Middle 

Persian Gulf, and North Africa), and the Sou

(including Central and South America) Command

former Atlantic Command is now the Joint F

Command, which has responsibility for the Atlantic 

and additional “joint” responsibilities to the 

commands, including training, force integration

providing trained and ready forces from the United St

Absent from the UCP is a Homeland Defense Com

Protecting the territory of the United States and its ci

from “all enemies both foreign and domestic” is the pri

task of government.

51

 The UCP is externally orien

protects our borders from foreign enemies. It 

organized to defend the homeland against internal 

by either foreign or domestic enemies. The reason 

110
Homeland Defense Command is the change, both i

and degree, in the principal threats to the United S

Besides the continuing requirement to deter str

nuclear attack, the United States must now also d

itself against information warfare, WMD, terrorist at

and other transnational threats to the sovereign terri

the nation.

52

 Above all, the security environment ha

significantly altered by the proliferation of biologic

chemical weapons and their increasing ease of deliv

The complexity of the chemical and biological we

challenge lies in the huge number of potential enemie

have access to this asymmetric means of attackin

United States in an effort to offset America’s conven

and nuclear strength.

54

An integrated set of active and passive measur

deterring and defending against chemical and bio

weapons use is required. These measures must inv

range of federal departments and agencies, which, in 

must incorporate state and local governments in 

planning.

55

 Managing the consequences of biologica

chemical attacks will also involve all levels of governm

Obviously DoD has a significant role to play in these e

But what that role should be will be the topic of a 

section in this chapter.

The Intelligence Community: We Have Slain th

Bear, but There Are Still a Lot of Serpents

Around.

57

The Intelligence Community (IC) is a group 

Executive Branch agencies and organizations whos

was established by the National Security Act of 1947

mission—to provide an information advantage to thos

formulate and execute national policy—has not ch

since then, though the nature of the information it de

has changed markedly. “During the Cold War era, 

justified its existence by containing Soviet expans

Now, however, new missions must be defined if the I

maintain legitimacy and focus. Perceived legitimac

111
been a problem, at least for the community at 

Likewise focus: some critics describe the IC as an a

structure in which each agency or organization makes 

individually but which does not function as a 

integrated whole.

60

 Even Congress often views the 

separate voices rather than as a whole.

61

These problems have prompted an extensive reval

of U.S. intelligence by a number of commissions and p

All these studies, performed by the government 

government-sponsored commissions, have, accord

Morton Halperin, “reached the same conclusion, wh

that the intelligence structures that we have ar

right.”

62

 Quips Halperin:

One can only view this as remarkable; here we have a worl

which an intelligence community created fifty years ago to f

the Cold War against the Soviet Union turns out to [ha

exactly the right set of structures and exactly the right se

functions to deal with this new post-Cold War world.

63

But suppose, he goes on to ask, that the world re

different? Suppose the IC created 50 years ago is not e

suited to it? What changes might one make?

64

Detailed answers to all these questions are beyo

scope of this paper. But many others have been th

about them, especially with regard to chemica

biological weapons. Gary Hart, for one, co-chair 

commission charged with trying to define the 

national security environment, writes:

U.S. intelligence will face more challenging adversaries in 

future, and nonstate actors will probably play a larger rol

issues of war and peace than they have heretofore.

65

As Gideon Rose observes:

The intelligence community is now challenged, because 

groups that cause the greatest concern—religious fanat

cults, and freelance extremists—are precisely those t

112
usually fly below the radar screen of standard intelligen

collection.

66

Collecting intelligence on biological weapons progr

even state-run programs—is especially difficul

example, the IC did not know of Aum Shinrikyo’s eff

produce and use biological agents until after the 

attacks in the Tokyo subway.

67

That attack illustrates several problems that che

and biological weapons present for the IC. Not e

attention is paid to open-source material; interna

cooperation is lacking; and there is not en

information-sharing even among U.S. IC organizatio

Nearly a year before its attack on the Tokyo subway syst

the Aum Shinrikyo group had used the nerve gas sarin 

assaults on civilians. Although the Japanese media h

reported the news, the U.S. government remained in the da

Not only did Washington not hear what the Japane

law-enforcement agencies knew, but the Japanese agenc

themselves were not aware of what other local organizatio

in Japan had uncovered. The parties involved did not sha

their expertise to prevent another attack.

68

To this day, as Ashton Carter, John Deutch, and 

Zelikow argue, the U.S. IC lacks a site and a metho

for conducting comprehensive planning of inform

collection. These experts contend that yields from 

sources as overhead reconnaissance, electronic su

lance, clandestine agents, law enforcement database

informants, and reports from foreign governments c

sifted and organized for maximum effect.

69

Open-source collection, or lack of it, concerns M

Halperin, who believes that most of the information t

security policymakers need is available without cloa

dagger work. “It is available from open sources

available from experts who know the societies, an

available by going to the countries and dealing wi

people.”

70

 U.S. policymakers now rely primarily for 

113
information on an IC in thrall to the notion that the be

to obtain information is to gather it secretly, fro

unwitting source.

71

 But instead of focusing on recr

agents in foreign governments and intercepting me

from satellites, perhaps paying attention to the open 

as the IC should have been doing in Japan before the 

subway attack, would be less costly and more produc

Although neither Halperin, Carter, Deutch

Zelikow directly address creating a new IC, they do s

some changes to the current structure. Halperin be

that a new research organization, called the Foreign 

Research Organization or the Central Research O

zation, should be created and moved out o

headquarters to downtown Washington. It shou

housed in a building with easy access and staffed 

analysts who understand that for most subjects 

policymakers care about—not all, obviously, since the

always be some for which more traditional meth

collection are appropriate—most relevant informatio

be gathered from public sources.

72

 Carter, Deutch

Zelikow believe that a new institution to gather intell

on catastrophic terrorism (which includes chemica

biological terrorism) needs to be established. It wo

called the National Terrorism Intelligence Cente

would collect and analyze information in an effort to p

advance warning catastrophic events. Their Center 

be located at the FBI instead of the CIA and would 

access to domestic law enforcement data.

The director of the center would come alternately from the 

and the CIA, and all intelligence organizations would provid

specified number of professionals.

73

Richard Falkenrath agrees that changes are nee

the IC to address the threat of chemical/biological terr

but his suggestions are functional rather than struct

He feels it is important that the IC watch for the 

signatures of small-scale, improvised chemica

biological weapons programs both in the United Stat

114
abroad. He also emphasizes that public health capab

need to be improved—particularly epidemiol

surveillance—in order to detect medical eviden

chemical and biological weapons production or use.

75

All these recommendations are important. Intell

is the first and most crucial line of defense against che

and biological weapons attacks.

76

 Chemical and bio

warfare (CBW)-related intelligence is unusually d

but not impossible. Would-be terrorists have proble

well as advantages; and conspiracies are relatively e

defeat if law enforcement authorities learn of 

existence with adequate lead time and in sufficient de

Who’s in Charge? Who Should Be?

Domestic Threats. Critics argue that current U.S. 

to prevent or respond to biological and chemical ter

are spread across a vast number of agencies, at dif

levels of government, with little real coordinat

direction. “Bureaucratic styles and missions 

information is compartmentalized and left unana

some tasks are duplicated, while others slip throug

cracks.”

78

 This is especially true of domestic inci

Detection capabilities are limited; integrated ana

and planning efforts are proclaimed but not fully w

out; and the use of military forces—the most capa

dealing with biological and chemical weapons—is lim

the Posse Comitatus laws. It is by no means clear how 

moving parts of a response to such an attack with

United States would actually function in relation 

another.

79

Although not a response to a biological weapons a

the reaction to the recent outbreak of a mosquito

virus in New York is instructive. New York City and p

the state suffered an outbreak of what appeared to 

encephalitis virus. What was initially identified as St

encephalitis—often found in the southern U

States—turned out to be West Nile virus. Fortunately

115
Nile virus is less virulent than the St. Louis variety; b

initial failure to identify the virus correctly has 

concerned. “The encephalitis outbreak in New Yor

powerful lesson for public health authorities,” remark

Zelicoff, a senior scientist at the Center for Na

Security and Arms Control at Sandia National Labora

in New Mexico. “It is a sobering . . . demonstration 

inadequacies of the U.S. detection network for em

diseases, including viruses.”

80

 A fact not lost on loc

federal officials responsible for national defense a

biological warfare is that the myriad local, state, and f

agencies involved in the New York encephalitis in

gation did not always communicate well.

81

 Initial sa

from victims were screened only against six viruses co

in the United States, and investigators did not te

viruses that have been linked to germ warfare.

82

 W

never know how a West Nile-like virus suddenly app

in New York City. But we do know that the United 

has far to go before it is prepared to identify and dea

outbreaks of exotic diseases, whether they are spre

nature or deliberately by man.

Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 decree

the United States should be organized to deal with the 

WMD by terrorists. PDD 39 divides the threat, both at 

and abroad, into two categories: crisis respons

consequence management.

83

 “Crisis response ref

instances where the perpetrators of an assault have 

discovered before an actual release.”

84

 Conseq

management refers to ways and means of reducin

short-term and long-term effects of an attack.

Domestically, the Department of Justice is th

agency, with the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

responsible for crisis management and FEM

consequence management. Although DoD has the l

capability for chemical and biological defense, the 

responsibility for dealing with attacks falls on m

federal, state, and municipal agencies and on the c

health community. “Most of these organization

116
inadequately prepared to deal effectively wit

problem.”

85

The assignment of domestic responsibilities unde

39 is a matter of debate among policymakers and acad

in two respects. First, there is disagreement abo

separation of crisis and consequence management. 

there is disagreement about who should be in charge

Although PDD 39 has been an important cataly

developing anti-CBW strategies, the categorical disti

it draws between preventing and dealing wit

consequences of an attack is dangerously flawed.

86

Seiple writes,

Given the varied dimensions and manifestations of chemi

and biological terrorism, the battle of consequen

management has been lost if there has not been consultat

and planning well before any threat of an incident emerges.

8

We must therefore think of crisis response and consequen

management as parallel and overlapping continuums th

both federal lead agencies and the first responder must ke

constantly in view. . . . Arbitrary distinctions betwe

activities before and after an attack by WMD cannot 

extended into planning and operational activities. Should 

allow those two continuous and overlapping processes to 

compartmentalized—and thus expressed in a simple line

logic because they are considered mutually exclusive—we w

fail in our response and thus invite future attacks.

88

PDD 39 notwithstanding, there is no fine line dur

after an attack that allows for a clean trans

responsibility between the FBI and FEMA.

89

 A

inevitably there will be a “who’s in charge” or unity-of

problem. This structural confusion is compounded 

FBI’s overriding commitment to collecting cri

evidence. The FBI’s philosophy is: if you can’t prove w

it, the likelihood of future incidents will increase.

90

 Th

useful approach to bank robbery or kidnapping, b

necessarily to chemical or biological weapons

effectiveness of consequence management depends 

117
quick collection of samples to determine the nature 

agent used and the level of contamination. Solving a 

also depends on collecting samples, but for evide

purposes. There is thus, at least in theory, a pot

conflict between casualty reduction and cri

investigation.

91

 In practice, in order to ensure that th

one overall Lead Federal Agency (LFA), PDD 39 d

FEMA to support the Department Justice (i.e., the 

until the Attorney General transfers the overall LFA 

FEMA.

92

Presently, FEMA is the right agency for conseq

management. Many of the coordination-and-c

procedures that FEMA has developed over the years 

course of disaster relief efforts are appropriate for its 

role. The same cannot be said for the FBI. As many e

have pointed out, biological and chemical weapon

simply not a specialty of the FBI. And where the pot

for catastrophic terrorism is concerned, the FBI’s re

law enforcement approach needs to be supplem

by—perhaps even subordinated to—a more aggr

national security effort directed by the White House a

Pentagon.

93

 Carter, Deutch, and Zelikow propose th

large-scale biological or chemical attack is imminen

PDD 39 structure should be pushed aside. They believ

the White House should immediately take charge. U

command would be vital, with an operational com

structure able to “direct everything from CIA 

operations to air strikes; set up interdiction on grou

sea, and in air; mobilize thousands of soldiers; and 

thousands of tons of freight.”

94

None of these actions can happen quickly unless plans h

already been drawn up and units designated to carry them 

with repeated training and exercises that create the readin

to bring the plans to life. In this situation, the Defe

Department would take the leading role. The FBI neit

commands the resources nor plans to command them.

95

118
In my opinion, Carter and his colleagues are c

Because it has long prepared to face the grim possib

chemical and biological weapons on the battlefield

because it has experience in commanding and cont

large, multifaceted operations, the military has u

capabilities to offer in the domestic-security ar

Currently, participation by DoD and the U.S. milit

lead agencies in a domestic attack is problematic. F

thing, there are legal constraints preventing DoD 

taking such a role. For another, DoD does not want the 

The American military is constrained in cond

domestic military operations by the Posse Comitatu

which prohibits the Army and Air Force from enforcin

or criminal law within the United States.

97

This historic law, passed in 1878 to preclude the presence 

soldiers from deterring voters during Reconstruction, 

generally considered a great bulwark in our democra

society. Its proponents cite Posse Comitatus as a cle

demonstrable indicator of the properly circumscribed limits 

a civilian-controlled army in a representative democracy.

9

In discrete instances, when the President of the U

States believes public order and domestic tranquility 

risk, he can order the Secretary of Defense to restore 

order. “This presidential authority to use federal tro

plenary and not subject to judicial review.”

99

Even though the President has the authority 

federal troops under certain circumstances, instan

such use have been rare. Posse Comitatus remains a 

bulwark” against DoD participation in domestic opera

This is well understood in the Pentagon, as Secretary 

has made clear:

As in the past, any military support [in the wake of a domes

attack] must be just that—support. Both legal and practi

considerations demand it. The Posse Comitatus Act and t

Defense Department’s implementing policies are clear—t

military is not to conduct domestic law enforcement witho

119
explicit statutory authority, and we strongly believe no chan

should be made to Posse Comitatus.

100

DoD has repeatedly affirmed that all military assi

for either crisis response or consequence manageme

be in support of the Department of Justice (F

FEMA.

101

 DoD has recently established a Joint 

Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) to coordinate mi

support to the lead agencies and to other state and 

authorities.

102

 The emphasis is on support, and there 

plans for the JTF-CS to take a leadership role in 

management or response. Its mission is to su

designated LFAs with a standing joint organiz

providing DoD’s consequence management capabi

response domestic biological and che

incidents.

103According to some reports, however, diffe

have surfaced over which agency is best prepared for 

response.

Less than a year after the U.S. Department of Defense crea

rapid response units to respond to WMD attacks in the U

their role has become the subject of debate between fed

agencies. DoD officials, backed by the Clinton administra

and Congress, insist that only specialized military teams h

the training and resources to adequately respond t

catastrophic . . . biological or chemical attack in the U.S.

104

DoD contends that specially trained Army Na

Guard Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (

teams and the Marine Chemical/Biological Response 

(CBIRF) are best prepared to respond to large

disasters, and it has recently expanded the number of 

teams. On May 22, 1998, Secretary Cohen announc

initial plan: 10 regional RAID teams composed of 22 

skilled full-time National Guard personnel.

105

 On J

1999, the Clinton administration requested 5 more t

and the Senate Armed Services Committee has req

an additional 17, so that as many as 27 RAID units co

dispersed throughout the country.

106

120
FEMA and FBI officials contend that the more tha

hazardous material (HAZMAT) organizations throu

the nation could handle detection and decontami

better than their RAID counterparts. Since there are 

of them, it is argued, they could usually respond qu

and they have more experience cleaning up haza

material. DoD and congressional officials counte

civilian HAZMAT squads usually respond to indu

accidents and have little, if any, experience wit

chemical and biological agents that RAID teams are t

to deal with.

107

GAO agrees with the FBI and FEMA, and in a 

report asked Congress to consider abolishing the 

units. According to the GAO, because RAID teams 

have dedicated airlift, they probably could not get to t

fast enough to help local responders.

108

 In a che

incident, for example, the first hour or two are critic

RAID teams cannot guarantee a response time of less 

hours.

109

 In the event of a biological weapons attac

usefulness of the RAID teams is even more questio

critics say.

Because germ agents such as anthrax or smallpox can 

released inconspicuously, there is little likelihood of know

an attack has occurred until hours or even days later, wh

sick people start showing up at hospitals or doctors’ offices.

11

Pentagon officials call the teams the “tip of the m

spear” that would help civilian agencies tap into 

military assets.

The idea is that the RAID teams would help local and st

first responders—primarily firefighters, HAZMAT teams a

ambulance crews—identify chemical or biological substan

used in a terrorist incident and then, if necessary, plug th

into the military’s pool of weapons and logistics experts.

111

The GAO replies that state and local officials do not 

that RAID teams are needed but instead believe 

represent “an unnecessary duplication of assets.”

112

121
Officials from larger jurisdictions usually have very rob

HAZMAT capabilities. These officials consider themselves v

experienced in managing HAZMAT emergencies and did 

believe the RAID team could suggest anything they did 

already practice every day.

113

Taking sides in this GAO-Pentagon debate is n

purpose of this chapter. It is, however, worth noting th

debate indicates the problems associated with the

mind-numbing array of government agencies—sixty-one in 

federal government alone, according to the Center 

Nonproliferation Studies—that play some kind of role 

domestic defense.

114

Add to these the hundreds of state, county, and mun

public safety organizations throughout the United 

that could claim some type of jurisdiction in the eve

terrorist attack, and the extreme complexity of res

coordination becomes obvious.

Other nations faced with similar threats have 

streamlined response mechanisms. A look at how th

them—Israel, the United Kingdom, and Canada

organized to address chemical and biological terrorism 

be useful.

The Israeli Model.

Many Middle Eastern countries are now capa

delivering chemical and biological weapons. Ope

DESERT STORM demonstrated the threat to Israel 

regard. In 1992, under the leadership of Major Genera

Livne, the Home Front Command was established 

three major responsibilities: to prepare civil defense 

for emergencies; to create a central command for all m

and emergency forces; and to serve as the primary m

and professional authority for civil defense.

115

Along with overseeing civil defense, rescue and sa

and domestic security, the Home Front Command also 

122
civilian authorities maintain equipment and prot

gear at service centers throughout the country, sta

around-the-clock information center to answer c

queries, and is responsible for developing means of p

protection. For example, in cooperation with the U

States, the Command conducts demolition te

determine the ability of certain materials and structu

withstand attack. All new homes in Israel must now 

“safety zone” that can withstand all but a direct hit 

missile.

116

To assist the population in preparing for emergenc

instructional and information division serves in peac

as well as wartime. Schools and other institutions r

training from special instructors. The Home 

Command has installed some of the world’s most adv

control, communication, and electronic warning sy

throughout Israel, monitored by a national control 

capable of broadcasting real-time messages to the 

population. The Command’s forces are of four kinds: 

and salvage troops, medical support personnel, fire-fi

personnel, and anti-nuclear, biological, and chemical 

units. Rescue and salvage units are the Command’s pr

forces, employing a wide range of equipment to 

victims and deal with casualties. A national rescu

salvage unit is on constant alert for both domest

international rescue missions, and some of these unit

recently served with distinction in Turkey and Greec

In an emergency, the Home Front Command can 

military and civilian fire-fighting and medical 

Medical services, including ambulances, medical 

personnel, and hospitals, hold frequent exer

Anti-NBC units, including detection and identifi

teams, are prepared to handle all aspects of response

identifying substances to decontaminating affected 

The National Hazardous Materials Information C

operates within the Home Front Command in coope

with the Ministry of the Environment, providing up

information and online risk assessment for troops 

123
field. The Center operates around the clock, in peacet

well as wartime.

118

Military guards, drawn partly from the army’s c

units, are another level in the Command’s hierarchy

are constantly engaged in maintaining security 

Israel’s border and shoreline and in protecting 

infrastructure. Ninety-seven percent of those serving 

Home Front Command are in the reserve f

Nevertheless, the Command has equal stature wi

three other Front Commands, which are made up of 

and reserve forces and have border area responsibiliti

Israel’s volatile geopolitical situation—along wi

advances in missile technology available 

neighbors—has rendered the country exceptio

vulnerable and necessitates a nontraditional organi

like the Home Front Command. During the state of a

December 1998, the Command established 67 gas 

distribution centers throughout the country, 

remained open 24 hours a day and could even have su

tourists if necessary. Hospitals were prepared to dea

chemical and biological casualties. Decontamin

stations were equipped and staffed.

120

 A robust ex

program, not limited to military and public-s

organizations, helps the society prepare for continge

for example, an exercise last April named “Netanya ‘9

one of Netanya’s high schools through a drill mimicki

effects of a chemical attack.

121

The Home Front Command is in charge of civilian 

in peace and war. This differs from the practice of mos

democracies and, according to General Livne, was in

“a very difficult concept for civilians to accept.” But Is

understand unity of command—an unequivoca

unambiguous chain of responsibility, authorit

accountability

122—and so eventually the publi

accepted military control via the Home Front Comm

the most logical way to prepare for attacks with WM

124
The old military maxim that the best defense is 

offense is official Israeli policy. The Israelis wil

preemptive action if policymakers have good intell

and there is a reasonable chance of success. In 1981 

had intelligence that the Osiarak nuclear reactor i

would produce weapons-grade fuel as a by-product. On 

7, 1981, Israeli Air Force pilots flying F-16s bomb

Osiarak facility.

124

The raid was skillfully planned. When the Israeli pilots w

in Jordanian airspace they conversed in Saudi-accent

Arabic and informed Jordanian air controllers that they w

a Saudi patrol gone astray: over Saudi Arabia they pretend

to be Jordanians. The first wave of F-16s punched a hole in t

reactor dome, after which a second wave of aircraft dropp

“dumb” (that is, not laser-guided) bombs with enou

accuracy to destroy the reactor core, its containing walls, a

the gantry crane.

125

The Israelis also use retribution to deter terr

Following the 1972 massacre of Israeli athletes 

Munich Olympics and a wave of attacks on Israeli dipl

and other civilian targets, Prime Minister Golda 

decided on a new tactic.

126

 The enemy in this case w

shadowy Palestinian group “Black September,” estab

by Yasir Arafat to carry out nonattributable ter

attacks while the political wing of the PLO moved t

international respectability.

127

 The Israeli answer to 

September was a group called “Wrath of God.” I

months following Munich, Wrath of God relentlessly 

back at Black September, conducting daring raid

Beirut to kill the top leadership and tracking dow

assassinating other operatives in Europe and elsewhe

late 1973 Black September had effectively ceased to 

its few remaining members demoralized and fear

Although the activities of Wrath of God did no

Palestinian terrorism, it disrupted its operation

undermined its capabilities.

129

125
The United Kingdom Model.

Because the United Kingdom (UK) is a unitary sta

a parliamentary democracy, it has advantages ov

United States in preparing for and responding to ch

or biological attacks. In contrast to federal systems li

United States and Canada, where power is shared be

the central government and state or regional governm

in Britain no powers are reserved for sub-national u

government. The UK does not have several layers of 

security organizations as in the United States, 

federal, state, county, and city police agencies co

Instead the UK has 43 police constabularies. 

constabulary is independent and is commanded by a 

Constable.

130

 Major public-safety actions of a 

constabulary or national character are coordinated th

the National Reporting Center at Scotland Yard (L

Police Headquarters) and the Home Office.

131

 Quest

jurisdiction do not arise. After the Oklahoma City bom

26 federal, state, county, and city agencies could 

plausibly claimed jurisdiction over one or another as

the investigation.

132

 Had a similar tragedy occurred 

UK—say in York—the Chief Constable responsible fo

would have been in charge. No one else. Fire-safety 

are organized similarly within the 43 constabularies, 

improves response time, operational efficiency

coordination.

133

The UK’s parliamentary system functions 

expeditiously in some respects than presidential sy

because Parliament combines executive and legis

functions. It can make or overturn laws and est

policies without recourse by the executive, the judici

the monarch. In the United States, executive po

subject to checks and balances by the legislatur

judiciary. In the UK, once policy is set by Parliamen

Parliament can change it.

134

 This fusion of legislativ

executive powers is expressed in the cabinet.

135

126
Through its collective decision making, the cabinet . . . shap

directs, and takes collective responsibility for governme

Cabinet government stands in stark contrast to president

government and is perhaps the most unique feature—a

certainly the pivot—of Britain’s whole system of governme

For it is the body, where the executive and legislature overl

that control of government rests.

136

The Home Office, headed by the Home Secreta

responsible for internal affairs. In the event of a biolog

chemical attack in the UK, crisis and conseq

management would be the responsibility of the 

Office. The Home Secretary, his deputy, or an

representative would chair an interdepartmental ca

working group assembled to manage the event. 

minimum, the Ministry of Defense, Special Branch (

the Secret Intelligence Service (MI 6), and the F

Office would be represented.

At the tactical level, the Chief Constable of the af

region is in charge of ground operations. The Minis

Defense plays an advisory role unless police forces c

accomplish their mission. If Defense takes charge 

operation, a written document establishing respons

and accountability is passed from the Constable 

on-site military commander. When the situation is 

within the capabilities of the police, the document is p

back and the military returns to an advisory capacit

example, during Operation Nimrod, the 1980 B

Special Air Service (SAS) raid to retake the Ir

Embassy in London from terrorists, responsibility d

transfer to the SAS military unit until the final hour 

operation. The crisis began at 11:32 a.m. on April 3

SAS did not receive operational control until May 5 a

p.m., when

the senior policeman on the scene handed Mike Rose, t

commander of 22nd SAS, a signed piece of paper wh

effectively handed control of the situation over to the SAS.

137

127
By 7:40 p.m. the SAS had retaken the embassy and “q

disappeared from the scene before the press showed u

An SAS team is stationed permanently in London 

responsible to Scotland Yard and ultimately the 

Secretary. The SAS operates under strict guidelines w

the UK, and team members, aware that they are lia

prosecution if they employ excessive force, walk a fin

To repeat: for the SAS to be used, the operation m

beyond the capabilities of civilian police, and w

authority must pass from civilian authorities t

military.

139

Three threat levels—gold, silver, and bro

determine the nature of the response and the memb

of the interdepartmental cabinet-working group. A 

event would be classified as catastrophic in the U

States and would entail maximum availability of reso

The Prime Minister would be closely involved, perhap

chairing the working group instead of the Home Secr

If foreign involvement were found, the Foreign Minist

Defense Minister would probably have responsibil

out-of-country negotiations and operations.

“Silver” is a serious domestic event with no app

international involvement. The cabinet working 

would be manned at the Minister or Deputy Minister 

and the military would probably remain in an advisor

A “bronze” event is one that can be handled at the 

constabulary level.

140

 Frequent exercises are held 

three levels to allow potential members of the in

partmental working groups a chance to work togethe

As a unitary state with a parliamentary democra

UK has some advantages over the United Sta

handling domestic terrorism. It also has consid

experience: having conducted a counter-terror campa

Northern Ireland for more than two decades, UK se

forces have learned much.

141

128
The Canadian Model.

Throughout its history, Canada has relied on its m

to put down rebellions, ethnic confrontations, el

violence, strikes, prison violence, and terrori

Domestic use of Canada’s armed forces continues tod

In the past two years large portions of the Canadian For

have been involved in support of the civilian authorities. T

support has included humanitarian assistance to fight floo

forest fires and ice storms.

In the case of the Red River flood of 1997 and the 

ice storm of 1998, the military provided assistance 

enforcement agencies as well as ordinary humani

support.

143

 The Canadian Forces are often ask

supplement civilian security forces at important do

events, like the 1976 Montreal Olympics, visits by f

dignitaries, and the G7 Summits in Montebell

Halifax.

144

 Among other duties at such event

Canadian Forces maintain specially trained rapid-res

counterterrorism and bomb-disposal units.

145

The Canadian military can perform this role be

Canadian law allows the timely use of military for

domestic emergencies. In 1988 the Canadian gover

restructured and simplified its laws in this area

Emergencies Act identified four types of emerge

“public welfare (severe natural disasters); public 

(threats to the internal security of Canada); interna

and war.”

146

 The Act specifies the powers the governm

allowed in each kind of situation. In a Public 

Emergency, for example, the government is

authorized to prohibit public assembly and travel to and fr

a specified area, and to designate and secure protected plac

assume control of public utilities, and impose summa

convictions for up to six months of imprisonment.

147

The new act also addresses threats posed by Can

groups receiving outside support; officials “would ha

129
option of declaring either a Public Order Emergency 

International Emergency in such a situation.”

148

Companion legislation, called the Emer

Preparedness Act, established an organization kno

Emergency Preparedness Canada (EPC) unde

jurisdiction of the Department of National De

Pursuant to this act,

federal and provincial government departments must cre

administrative machinery and cooperative contingency plan

the provincial level with the Department of National Defe

and Emergency Preparedness Canada to respond to the f

types of emergencies described in the Emergencies Act.

149

In times of civil unrest or national crisis, prov

premiers and the Solicitor General may ask the milit

act in support of police and civil authorities. The Can

military has provided crowd-control, pol

counter-terrorist, and other forms of support, withdr

as soon as civil authorities are able to resume contro

A 1994 Defense White Paper, reflecting the end 

Cold War, further refined the domestic roles and miss

the Canadian military. The White Paper specified 

areas in which forces of the Department of National D

could be deployed: peacetime surveillance and c

(sovereignty protection); securing Canadian bo

against illegal activity (counter-narcotics); fis

protection; environmental surveillance; disaster 

search-and-rescue; and counterterrorism.

151

 It also di

that the national dynamic entry (counterterror-h

rescue) mission be transferred from the Royal Can

Mounted Police Special Emergency Response team 

army’s JTF-2 counterterror unit.

152

The Canadian approach to supporting civilian aut

is extremely flexible. It relies on a carefully designed 

framework and a professional force structure.

130
Legislation does not prescribe the exact civil-milita

relationship at the operational and tactical levels, nor doe

hamper commanders by dictating the levels of response wh

may be required in violent situations.

153

In general, Canadian law avoids overly explicit restr

on the military.

154

 This flexibility points up sign

differences between Canadian and American politic

legal cultures. The Canadian government places 

confidence in military professionalism, doctrine

training. In the United States, on the other hand, the 

Comitatus Act limits the involvement of the armed 

much more sharply and places severe restrictions 

scope of their activities, even when the military is c

more qualified than its civilian counterparts to und

the mission in question.

Organizing for Success.

This brief review of how Israel, the UK, and C

organize themselves against domestic threats, inc

those posed by biological and chemical weapons, pr

several observations. First, all three democracies 

specified procedures for the use of active and r

military forces in domestic security matters. In Isra

military is the lead agency in countering domestic th

and its Home Front Army actually has authority ove

civilian agencies in both war and peace. In the UK, an

somewhat lesser extent in Canada, the military nor

plays a supporting role, though when circumstances d

it can become the lead agency in a domestic crisis. In th

transfer of authority to and from the milita

accomplished by a written document, much like a con

and the duration of military control is typically very 

In Canada, the time frame for transition to and 

military control is established by the laws and p

described above.

As noted, all three states have parliamentary sy

which make for more streamlined policymaking tha

131
presidential system. Israel and the UK are unitary s

not hampered by several layers of jurisdiction. Ca

though a federal system, mandates that federa

provincial departments create common plan

administrative procedures for responding to several ty

emergencies, including CBW attacks.

The United States can learn much from these 

allies. All three, though robust democracies, unde

that unity of command is essential for proper respon

catastrophic event and that military organizations ar

suited to dealing with some types of domestic threat

are civilian organizations. This is particularly true o

threats, because combat troops are trained to surviv

contaminated battlefield. Such training is indispensa

an age in which rogue states, failed and failing state

nonstate actors, lacking the means to confront adv

militaries in conventional conflict, may well choose C

order to offset this inferiority.

155

 Israel, the UK, and C

understand that military organizations intensively 

organize, equip, and train for complex emergencies an

military commanders understand how to organiz

coordinate multiple organizations for a common obj

Why not, they might ask their U.S. counterparts, ma

of these distinctive capabilities in domestic emergen

There may also be other lessons here. Israel’s 

preemption and retribution is instructive. During th

War, the United States successfully relied on n

deterrence to prevent an attack on its home

Preemption and retribution were not plausible opti

the highly charged nuclear environment. 

commentators, like columnist John Ellis of the B

Globe, believe that nuclear deterrence is still an optio

United States must “develop a plan for massive reta

in the event of a biowarfare outbreak.” That plan sho

made public, Ellis writes, and broadcast around the 

“One way for biological agents to ‘blow back’ on thos

launch them is nuclear retaliation.”

156

 It makes 

argues Jessica Stern, “for governments to signal 

132
intention to respond to state-sponsored terrorist act

massive retaliation that may even include the use of n

weapons.”

157

 Others question the practicality of n

deterrence in a threat environment populated in larg

by nonstate actors. Threatening to retaliate with n

weapons for acts of chemical or biological warfare wou

be proportional, they contend, and might undermine 

toward nuclear nonproliferation.

158

 Moreover, the 

subway and Oklahoma City attacks were perpetra

local residents. How could we have deterred them 

nuclear weapons?

Israel’s successful record of preempting terrorist a

is based on good intelligence and an ability to inf

terrorist organizations. The United States has lag

this regard, as illustrated most recently by the targeti

suspected chemical weapons plant in Sudan in an at

to preempt Osama bin Laden. Unfortunately, i

appears doubtful that there was a clear link between 

Shifa plant in Khartoum and Mr. bin Laden, or th

plant was making chemical weapons.

159

 Interest

however, Washington’s mistake may still have ha

desired effect.

Sudan, which has tried for months to convince Washingt

that it does not support international terrorism, advised t

United States on May 22, 1999, that it will sign seve

anti-terrorism accords and the 1993 convention bann

chemical warfare.

160

Could it be that the continued threat of preventive m

action, even if misplaced in this instance, convinc

Sudanese to change their behavior?

The dangers of CBW proliferation and use by ter

warrant the consideration of special preventive mea

The political risks and operational difficultie

substantial but not prohibitive and may well be outwe

by the benefits. Once a CBW program has been und

for some time, the operational requirements for a succ

preemption—from accurate intelligence on facilitie

133
sites to target destruction without unacceptable coll

damage—are likely to be very high,

161

 although the po

risk will be lower to the extent there is evidence 

adversary’s capability and intent. From a mi

perspective, however, the time to strike is at an early 

when the operational requirements are more mana

but the political risks are greater.

162

 Israel often opts, 

cost-benefit analysis, for early action. The United 

should consider the early option too—though only w

has developed a better intelligence capability.

As mentioned earlier, the Israelis are meeting the 

of chemical and biological terrorism with a Home 

Command, 97 percent of whose members are rese

This notion has advocates in the United States. De

Lee, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affai

observed:

The U.S. military reserve components are the appropr

forces to use in homeland defense and WMD response. They 

and work in all communities and they have established link

the fire, police and emergency medical personnel who 

always the first to arrive at the scene of any incide

Consequently, the Guard and Reserves represent a unique p

of manpower and expertise that, with the proper training 

equipment, can support local, state and federal authorities

The Reserve and Guard bring different advanta

domestic CBW response. Most of the chemical and m

units are located in the Army Reserve.

164

 Those 

Guard are largely at the division level and are dedica

units programmed for international deployments and 

contingencies.

165

 The Guard’s advantage is that, 

federalized, it is an instrument of the governor of the 

and not covered by the Posse Comitatus Act. I

therefore enforce civil laws. Once federalized, the Na

Guard, like the Active Army and the Army Reserve, 

under the Posse Comitatus Act and no longer may be u

reinforce local law enforcement agencies.

166

134
The UK model offers American policymakers 

interesting organizational insights. The interdepartm

working group process within the UK cabinet is 

responsive and less cumbersome than the cu

interagency process in the United States. In the U

Home Secretary is in charge and the others at the c

table are from the Foreign Office, the Ministry of De

the Police and Intelligence Services, and other minist

necessary. They plan and exercise together and with 

police constabularies throughout the nation. Duri

emergency, and depending on the level and type of cris

Home Secretary assembles the participants and the 

Office manages the response.

167

By comparison, the Senior Interagency Coordi

Group (SICG) charged with identifying, discussing

resolving issues regarding the federal response to 

incidents, is composed of six senior members (from F

FBI, DOE, EPA, the Department of Health and H

Services (DHHS) and DoD, as well as representative

the Department of Agriculture, the Departme

Transportation, the Bureau of Justice Assistance, th

General Services Administration (GSA), and the Na

Communications System.

168

 The SICG is a coordi

organization, does not exercise, and has no opera

responsibilities; nor does it coordinate the myriad 

county, and city agencies involved in CBW response.

Another aspect of the British system that m

transferable is the “gold, silver, bronze” level of 

assessment and response. In that system, the le

mobilization and the rank of those involved correspo

the level of threat. Gold, silver, and bronze responders 

who they are and plan, train, and exercise together. C

Deutch, and Zelikow are among those who have reco

the utility of identifying different threat levels.

The United States needs a two-tier response structure: one 

ordinary terrorist incidents that federal law enforcement c

manage with interagency help, and another for tru

135
catastrophic terrorist attacks. The government would requ

two new offices, one within the office of the defense secreta

and the other within the existing [Joint Forces Comma

which already bears operational responsibility for the defens

the American homeland and the majority of U.S. armed for

These Catastrophic Terrorism Response Offices (CTR

would coordinate federal, state, and local authorities as wel

the private sector to respond to major terrorist threats once t

are activated by the president and the defense secretary.

169

One aspect of the Canadian model may be r

applicable in the United States. The close contin

planning relationship between Emergency Prepare

Canada and the Department of National Defense cou

should have an American counterpart other tha

currently overburdened and often criticized FEMA.

1

EMC-DND relationship, as the reader may recall, is 

the Emergency Preparedness Act, which stipulate

provincial and federal organizations are to coor

emergencies.

171

Recommendations—Domestic Threat.

From the preceding survery of potential threat

other states’ preparations for them, a numb

recommendations emerge. Chief among them: chan

National Security Act to reflect security requirements 

post-Cold War world. Include in the Act the legal fram

and the organizational and institutional struc

necessary for homeland defense. Establish a civili

Homeland Defense Command that capitalizes o

strengths of the Reserve and National Guard, whi

“particularly well-suited to an increased role in this a

their infrastructure exists in all fifty states.”

17

participation of the Guard and the Reserve in disaster

operations has prepared them to undertake similar, t

much more dangerous, counter-CBW operations. Whe

possible, use non-federalized National Guard units, 

will not be hindered by Posse Comitatus restrictions. T

136
especially important during crisis management, 

support for law enforcement agencies is critical.

Some desirable measures may be more feasible 

others. Establishing a Homeland Defense Comma

unlikely, given the historical and cultural impedime

such an organization. But it should be possible to cr

leadership structure embracing the FBI and FEMA 

will insure that both crisis and consequence manag

are handled simultaneously, harmoniously, and effici

FEMA is used to dealing with natural disasters and having 

coordinate with local officials. But an act of terrorism wou

create both a crime scene and a disaster—making it necessa

for agencies that do not usually work together to coordin

their efforts. “Oklahoma City was a good test case,” a FEM

official [said], “in the sense that it revealed the compet

priorities of the FBI and FEMA. The FBI’s principal object

was to preserve evidence, while FEMA wanted only to sa

lives.

173

Moreover, FEMA is used to operating in an interagen

intergovernmental context, while the FBI is not. Th

has traditionally been reluctant to assign its age

interagency taskforces, much less lead them, beca

Edgar Hoover thought the FBI’s reputation might suf

had to share responsibility for mistakes caused by th

judgment of other interagency members.

174

John Deutch and the Commission to Asses

Organization of the Federal Government to Comb

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (better k

as the Deutch Panel) have called for a national coord

with the rank of deputy assistant to the Presiden

sufficient authority to “untangle the Gordian k

jurisdictions that attempt to fight the spread of WM

the means to deliver such weapons.”

175

 In my view 

recommendation, while a step in the right direction

not go far enough. For one thing, the Deutch Panel d

address domestic response to acts of terrorism. For an

even with the rank of deputy assistant to the Preside

137
national coordinator they propose would be just th

agency coordinator—convening meetings, leadin

interagency policy process, allocating resources, m

budget decisions, and reviewing technology-acqu

problems—rather than a leader with authority to 

agencies in times of crisis.

176

 More appealing ar

statements of Frank Cilluffo, director of the terrorism 

force at the Center for Strategic and International S

in Washington DC, who believes there should be a do

terrorism “czar.” Testifying in October 1998 be

congressional subcommittee, Cilluffo argued fo

creation of a new commander-in-chief to oversee hom

defense, under DoD. “What I’m saying is that you wa

individual, you want it to be their single, pr

mission.”

177

If the Gordian knot is to be cut and the 

management/consequence management dilemma res

one more coordinator, no matter what his or her ra

access, will not get the job done. What is needed is a na

director with super-agency powers as well as ready ac

the President and Congress. This official should be a d

assistant to the President and reside at the Na

Security Council (NSC), which by its charter is respo

for advising the President on both domesti

international security. Currently the national coord

for security, infrastructure protection, and cou

terrorism works at the NSC. Why not elevate this posi

national director, with authority to direct agencies 

field? The Kissinger and Brzezinski periods, when th

was a “superdepartment” that provided guidance fo

Defense and State, offers some idea of what the NSC w

operational mission might be like.

178

The United States needs to enhance its biologic

chemical warfare intelligence capabilities. If the I

nothing else for the next 20 years but concentra

biological weapons proliferation, writes John Ellis, “it 

be money well spent.”

179

 Most analysts do not go quit

far, but many argue that changes need to be ma

138
Ernest May observes, what worked when the major 

came from communists in Moscow with nuclear we

cannot be counted on to work when different enemi

wielding viruses and other WMD.

180

It is also worth listening to those analyst

policymakers who believe that too much secrecy lim

effective use of intelligence, that too much empha

placed on collection and not enough on analysis, an

not enough use is made of open source material. At p

admirals and generals routinely complain of not 

knowing what they can be told.

181

 How then ca

ultimate consumers of domestic CBW intelligence—

law enforcement officials, doctors, or scientists not e

government employment (perhaps not even 

nationals)—hope to get timely information? They c

and thus effective classification, clearance

dissemination are going to require new rules and pe

new statutes.

182

Jane Holl, principal editor of the Carnegie Corpora

Preventing Deadly Conflicts, estimates that 90 perc

the IC’s budget goes to collection and 10 perce

analysis.

183

 That ratio needs to be changed drastically

intelligence is of little use to consumers; timely anal

essential. It is all too possible at present that 

pertaining to a CBW attack might get collected b

analyzed and disseminated to those who are charge

preventing an attack. I have already referred to the n

make better use of open sources. Had these been use

Tokyo subway incident might have been prevented. F

one has to question the necessity for 13 sep

intelligence agencies. Are that many really necessary

if so, are they coordinated effectively? Probabl

consider that the Director of Central Intelligence—th

of the IC according the National Security Act—only co

fifteen percent of the intelligence budget.

Much can be learned from America’s major allies: 

the UK, and Canada. All are mature democracies, wit

139
militaries firmly under civilian control. Yet they ha

Posse Comitatus restrictions and make effective 

military forces for homeland defense against many th

including CBW and terrorism. Canada’s Emer

Preparedness Act, which defines how its provincia

federal forces should cooperate during dom

emergencies, is worth emulating. So is the 

streamlined interdepartmental cabinet decisionm

process, with its multi-tiered response structure.

Israel’s CBW threat-response organization and do

are particularly instructive. Though it is doubtfu

Americans would agree to gas mask distribution off

every population center—after all, many of our so

won’t allow themselves to be vaccinated against anthr

is likely that they would agree with Israel’s do

concerning preemption. Absent an effective dete

particularly against nonstate actors, the United 

needs to think hard about the use of military for

preemption, which will be discussed in the following s

of this paper.

Furthermore, it is time to review the Posse Com

Act. None of our allies imposes such strict prohibitions 

military. It no longer makes sense to prevent Am

best-qualified CBW-response assets and counter

forces, which happen to be in the military, from helpi

nation cope with the CBW threat.

A final recommendation: put someone unambiguou

charge. As Israel’s General Livne points out, the 

against terrorists armed with CBW is a war, and th

principle in war is unity of command. Achieve un

command in addressing the domestic threat, and th

will fall into place.

International Threat.

The United States is in a much better posture to a

chemical and biological threats internationally tha

140
domestically. The Department of State is the lead age

crisis response and consequence management ove

State carries out crisis response through its Off

Counterterrorism, and consequence management th

its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. The Departm

Defense supports overseas counter-terror opera

including those against CBW. Walter Sloco

Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, recently reveale

there are designated Special Mission Units (S

manned, equipped and “trained to deal with a wide v

of transnational threats.” According to Jane’s D

Weekly, the tactics, techniques, procedures, equipme

personnel of these SMUs remain classified, thoug

understood that they have counter-terrorism and co

proliferation responsibilities.

184

Nevertheless, there are three areas that require u

attention: force protection, lack of diplomacy, and do

Our service personnel are the most vulnerable to che

and biological attack, and our ability to protect them 

very good. In fact, the protective equipment the 

currently employs is little better than that employed w

was an infantry company commander 18 years ago

reported in the press, more than half the protective 

in the U.S. military have “critical” defects that might 

them useless in protecting soldiers against gas or 

attacks, and many of the protective garments the 

purchased recently will not work.

186

 In fact, over 

masks, out of the 19,000 inspected, had at least one c

defect.

187

 Also, 18,000 of the 880,000 “battle

overgarments” in Army stocks were found to be def

while an additional 80,000 were labeled “suspect

pulled for further testing.

188

 The Air Force identified 4

“unserviceable” sets of BDOs in its supplies, about 5 p

of its total inventory. The Navy and Marine Corps d

have this problem: they have newer suits know

JSLISTs—Joint Services Lightweight Integrated 

Technology suits. The Army is scheduled to begin i

JSLISTs to some of its early-deploying units late

141
year.

189

 Clearly, the Army’s priority should be to in

and accelerate procurement of these new suits, 

permit much less degradation of operations under ch

and biological warfare attack than the older m

oriented protective posture (MOPP) suits.

This suit [i.e., the JSLIST] was designed to meet the needs o

military services. It has been designed to provide protec

from the effects of nuclear, biological, and chemical (N

contaminants. It is lighter, less bulky, imposes less heat str

and reduces physiological burdens compared to the serv

specific garments of the past. Attempts are now being mad

improve the suit through the JSLIST P31 (Pre-Planned Prod

Improvement) Program. It is planned to leverage industry 

mature fabric technologies for garment, glove, and sock desi

and materials that provide improved chemical protection 

fit, extend wear, and reduce bulkiness and heat stress. 

current JSLIST garment design will be used, with minim

modification as required to obtain improvements.

190

The goal should be to ensure that war fighters, who a

in harm’s way, are equipped with the best protectiv

that technology can provide.

U.S. inability to negotiate with rogue state

nonstate actors, and overreliance on treatie

conventions, limit the usefulness of diplomacy in red

the likelihood of chemical and biological attack

example, stated U.S. policy is not to negotiate 

terrorists.

191

 The rationale is clear: giving in to te

demands will prompt more terrorist activity. T

especially true in hostage-taking situations 

negotiating involves the risk of having to meet te

demands for ransom or safe passage. However, it wo

useful to have a mechanism—preferably secret—

enables regular dialogue with terrorists. This is esp

important with transnational, nonstate actors, who h

formal diplomatic voice. The manner in which this di

takes place would vary. Discussions could be held in 

or through surrogates. Ideally, a dialogue cou

established before an attack, with some hope of prev

142
it. Dialogue is important if only because understa

what is really on a terrorist’s mind has intelligence 

And letting a terrorist know our mind may well 

deterrent value.

Nuclear arms control and reduction tre

promulgated during the Cold War were and sti

valuable assets in preventing conflict. They pro

baseline agreements that fostered cooperation and 

greater transparency and confidence-building mea

that still exist today. Unfortunately, treaties me

control and reduce the numbers of chemical and bio

weapons have not been as effective.

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) entere

force on April 29, 1997. It has been signed by 120 stat

bans chemical weapons production and storage, as w

use. The strength of the convention is that it co

unprecedented and highly intrusive inspection prov

including routine and challenge inspection mecha

The weakness of the convention is that several count

chemical proliferation concern have not joined the 

regime. These include Iraq, Libya, North Korea

Syria.

192

Biological weapons are also prohibited by a treaty

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC)

entered into force in 1975 and now comprises som

members. The strength of the BWC is that it bans an 

class of weapons, prohibiting the development, produ

stockpiling or acquisition of biological agents or tox

any type or quantity that do not have protective, med

other peaceful purposes. “The major shortfall of the B

its lack of any on-site verification mechanism.”

193

Unfortunately, both the Chemical Warfar

Biological Warfare conventions affect only state beh

They have no impact on the behavior of transnation

other nonstate actors who might possess and use CBW

on those rogues states that are not signatories 

conventions.

143
The major problem the United States has in addr

international chemical and biological threats is ou

military doctrine. The traditional uses of military for

defense, deterrence, compellence, and presence. D

against biological and chemical attack, as men

earlier, is extremely difficult, especially in a demo

Deterrence, especially against rogue and nongovernm

actors, is also difficult—where exactly do you strike O

bin Laden if he launches a biological attack? Presence 

certainly help get U.S. forces to a crisis area faster, bu

military presence overseas is declining, as is the num

military personnel in the United States who c

deployed. So compelling adversaries to stop what th

doing or planning by using military force against them 

be a wise strategy in the post-Cold War world.

Historically, the United States has usually employ

military to compel enemies to change their behavior 

crisis began. The National Security Act of 1947 a

subsequent amendments have structured the U.S. se

apparatus to react to crises rather than to prevent 

Given the nature of such post-Cold War threats as bio

and chemical weapons, it may be time to con

preemption. 

The preemptive use of military force is a difficult c

for many Americans to accept. It defies Americans’ se

fairness, proportionality, and the rules of warfare. As 

Roberts points out:

Moral philosophy establishes that wars of self-defense are j

whereas wars of aggression are not. But there has long bee

healthy debate about precisely what constitutes a war 

self-defense. A mid-sixteenth-century scholar of just war wr

“There is a single and only just cause for commencing a war 

namely, wrong received.” In our day Michael Walzer 

argued, “Nothing but aggression can justify war. . . . There m

actually have been a wrong, and it must actually have b

received (or its receipt must be, as it were, only minu

away).”

194

144
However, this view has not been universally held

Grotius wrote in 1625, “the first just cause of war . . 

injury, which even though not actually comm

threatens our persons or our property.”

195

 To safe

against wars of aggression, Grotius emphasized that 

essential to be certain about the enemy’s intent to a

Elihu Root said in 1914 that international law d

require the aggrieved state to wait before using fo

self-defense “until it is too late to protect itse

Interestingly, Walzer in Just Wars seems to contrad

statements quoted above by arguing that “state

rightfully defend themselves against violence t

imminent but not actual.”

Roberts contends, and I agree, that there can 

blanket reply to the question, is there a moral ca

preemption. Some acts of preemption will be deeme

others unjust.”

In the case of preemption against biologica

chemical threats, Roberts further argues that the str

moral case for U.S. preemption exists under the fol

conditions:

• an aggressor has actually threatened to use hi

weapons, has taken steps to ready the means to 

and has specifically threatened the United 

(including its territory, citizens, or military for

• those NBC weapons have been built in violat

international law;

• the aggressor’s threatened actions invoke 

questions about the credibility of security guar

or the balance of power within a region;

• the president has secured the approval of th

Congress; and,

• the United States has secured the backing of th

Security Council and any relevant reg

145
organization. The prudential tests of last r

proportionality, and reasonable chance of s

must also be met.

197

I agree with the first four of Roberts’ conditions b

with the last. Getting the backing of the U.N. and re

organizations would strengthen our moral position, 

may be impossible given China’s reluctance to v

sovereignty under any circumstances and Ru

post-Kosovo habit of siding with rogue states like Ira

Iran. And I believe that, as a matter of principle, the U

States must never forego the option to act unilateral

Furthermore, the commonly held view that th

public disapproves of preemption is not true. A 

example is the 1998 bombing of a Sudanese chemica

that was suspected of having ties to Osama bin Laden

after it emerged that the plant was probably m

nothing sinister, public opinion in the U.S. was stron

favor of the attacks.

198

 Two-thirds of Americans app

the military strike, while only 19 percent were oppos

Recommendations—International Threat.

Internationally, the United States is orga

adequately to address the threat but must be prepa

operate in a less state-centric world. Our prohi

against negotiating with terrorists needs to be reeval

our reliance on the Chemical Warfare and Biol

Warfare Conventions needs to take account of rogu

transnational actors, and the United States ne

capability to use its military preemptively.

Finally, as a soldier who never much liked w

MOPP gear, I can only hope that the fielding of 

available protective equipment is accelerated and 

improvements come quickly.

146
Conclusion.

To summarize: threats from CBW are probably 

severe as some make out but nevertheless must be 

seriously because of the catastrophic potentia

chemical, and especially a biological, terrorist eve

course, in preparing for these threats, personal fre

inherent in our democracy should not be compromise

should the United States just throw money at the prob

We all now recognize the increased danger of 

Rogue states, failed states, failing states, transna

actors, or even disloyal Americans could surreptit

deliver one or several such weapons, at home or abroa

Tokyo subway incident was not science fiction, an

Oklahoma City and World Trade Center bombings 

just as easily have been CBW attacks. Anyone who d

that terrorists can smuggle chemical or biological we

into New York City should reflect that they could ea

disguised as a bag of cocaine or a brick of marijuana

Graham Allison has warned that defending Am

against CBW attack will require eternal, multi-la

vigilance. “As the most open society in the world, Am

will remain most vulnerable to attacks, especially we

delivered surreptitiously. In the real world of the 

quarter-century, dreams of an invulnerable Ameri

fantasy.”

201

 Still, many things can be done. A Hom

Defense organization is one, a refocused IC is an

Simply putting a qualified person in a position to a

unity of command would be a significant start. And 

longtime allies faced with the same threat—Israel, th

and Canada—the United States should learn th

military can support domestic security operations w

endangering civilian control. Protecting America’s s

personnel against biological and chemical attack 

paramount importance as is the ability to “preempt” 

who would use biological and chemical weapons a

U.S. forces and interests.

147
Neither complacency nor hysteria is called fo

rather a modest and sustained investment in intell

and other countermeasures, from prevention to preem

to preparedness.

Individuals take out insurance policies all the time to he

against disasters that will probably never occur. This is one c

where the United States government can do the same—and 

satisfied if the premiums are ultimately wasted.

202

CHAPTER 6 - ENDNOTES

1. Rod Stark, “Looking at the Nature of WMD Terr

unpublished paper, Southwest Missouri State University, I

http://www.inforwar.com/mil_c4i/st..._the_Nature_of_

Terrorism.html, August 30, 1999, p. 2.

2. John Ellis and Courtland Moon, “Dubious Allegations,” B

of The Atomic Scientists, May/June 1999, p. 70.

3. Ellis, p. 1. The authors base their conclusion on eight 

arguments, each of which can be refuted by archival eviden

reasonable counterarguments.

4. Federation of American Scientists Web Page, “CW 

Iran-Iraq War,” http://www.fas.org/irp/gulf/cia/ 96

72566_01.htm. See also Encyclopedia of Bioethics, 2544; Physic

Human Rights Web Site, “Research and Investigations: Ch

Weapons” http://www.phrusa.org/research/chemical.htm

Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, Press Statem

James P. Rubin, Spokesman, “Anniversary of the Halabja Ma

March 16, 1998, http://secretary.state.gov/www/brie

statements/1998/ps980316a.html; Peter Sawchyn, “Scientist 

Effects of Chemical Attack on Iraqi Kurds (Evidence shows lon

genetic damage to Halabja residents),” USIS Washington File, A

1998, http://www.fas.org/news/iraq/1998/04/98042702_npo

5. Judith Miller, “U.S. Officials Suspect Deadly Chemical W

In Yugoslav Army Arsenal,” New York Times, April 16, 1999, p

6. Steven Lee Myers, “Federal Commission Predicts Inc

Threat of Terrorism,” New York Times, September 21, 1999, p. 

7. Christopher J. Castelli, “Homeland Terrorism, More K

Ahead, Security Panel Warns,” Inside the Navy, August 9, 1999

148
8. Ibid.

9. Ibid. 

10. Milton Leitenberg, “False Alarm,” Washington Post, Aug

1999, p. 15.

11. Ehud Sprinzak, “Terrorism, Real or Imagined—What is t

Threat, WMC or Car Bombs?” Washington Post, August 19, 1

A21.

12. Brian Michael Jenkins, The Likelihood of Nuclear Ter

Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, P-7119, July 1985, p. 6

13. Nicholas Wade, “Germ Weapons: Deadly, but Hard to Us

York Times, November 21, 1997, Internet, www.mth

edu/acad/intrel/germ.htm.

14. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, New York: Co

University Press, 1998, p. 198.

15. Jessica Stern, “Taking the Terror Out of Bioterrorism

York Times, April 8, 1998, Internet www.mtho

edu/acad/intrel/stern.htm.

16. Jessica Stern, Loose Nukes, Poisons, and Terrorism: T

Threats to International Security, June 19, 1996, p. 3.

17. William S. Cohen, “Preparing for a Grave New W

Washington Post, July 26, 1999, p. A 19.

18. Ibid. and Steve Macko, “FBI Says There is a Marked Inc

Number of Domestic WMD Terrorist Threats,” ERRI Daily Inte

Report, vol. 4, October 3, 1998, p. 276.

19. Chitra Ragavan and David E. Kaplan, “The Boom in B

Funds,” U.S. News & World Report, October, 18, 1999, p. 24.

20. Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists, p. 21.

21. Ibid.

22. Richard Preston, “Annals of Warfare—the Bio Weapo

The New Yorker, March 9, 1998, p. 56.

23. Ibid. 

149
24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., p. 57.

26. Gideon Rose, “It Could Happen Here—Facing th

Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs, March-April, 1999, p. 135.

27. “Expert: Russia Retains Biological Weapons Ability,” 

Morning News, October 21, 1999, p. 1.

28. Ibid., p. 134.

29. Robert Davis, “Rescuers Train for Prospect of Chemica

USA Today, July 29, 1999, p. 8D.

30. Chris Seiple, “Consequence Management: Domestic Resp

Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Parameters, Autumn 1997, p. 1

31. Ibid.

32. C. L. Staten, “Two Men Arrested With Possession of An

Emergency Net News Service, Online. Http://emergenc

lv-antrx.htm, August 30, 1999, p. 2.

33. Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists, Cambridge: H

University Press, 1999, p. 51.

34. “Expert: Russia Retains Biological Weapons Ability,” 

Morning News, October 21, 1999, p.1.

35. Ibid.

36. Stephen A. Cambone, A New Structure for National S

Policy Planning, Washington DC: The Center for Strateg

International Studies, 1998, p. 113.

37. Ibid.

38. Rose, p. 131.

39. Proliferation: Threat and Response, Washingto

Government Printing Office, 1996, p. 43.

40. Jessica Stern, “Loose Nukes, Poisons, and Terrorism: T

Threats to International Security,” Unpublished paper, June 1

p. 11.

150
41. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, New York: Co

University Press, 1998, p. 205.

42. Ibid.

43. Rose, p. 135.

44. Ragavan and Kaplan, p. 24.

45. Ibid.

46. Harlan K. Ullman, “Who Will Listen, Who Will 

Unpublished manuscript, June 1998, p. 278.

47. Wesley Clark, interviewed at Mons, Belgium, March 8, 

48. Ullman, p. 279.

49. Ibid. p. 280.

50. Bradley Graham, “Teamwork as Military Task,” Was

Post, October 12, 1999, p. A17.

51. “Transforming Defense—National Security in th

Century,” Report of the National Defense Panel, December 1997

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid. p. 25.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid. p. 26

57. James Woolsey.

58. Al Gore, “Intelligence Community,” National Perfo

Review, Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 199

59. Angela Rogers, Changing Threat Environment an

Intelligence Community: Challenges in the New Mille

Unpublished paper.

151
60. “Intelligence Community in the 21st Century,” Summa

House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intel

Washington DC, (no date), p. 2.

61. Gore, p. 9.

62. Morton H. Halperin, “What Should the National Securit

1998 Look Like,” U.S. National Security Beyond the Col

Contemporary Issue Series No. 6, Carlisle, PA: The Clarke 

1997, p. 34.

63. Ibid. See also Richard A. Falkenrath, “Confronting N

Biological and Chemical Terrorism,” Survival, Autumn 1998, p

64. Ibid.

65. “Hart-Rudman Commission: U.S. Faces Homeland A

Aerospace Daily, October 6, 1999, p. 1.

66. Rose, p. 135.

67. Seth Carus, “Biohazard, Assessing the Bioterrorism T

New Republic, August 2, 1999, p. 14.

68. Ashton Carter, John Deutch, and Philip Zelikow, “Catas

Terrorism—Tackling the New Danger,” Foreign Affairs, Nov

December 1998, p. 83.

69. Ibid. p. 84.

70. Halperin, p. 40.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. Carter, p. 83-84.

74. Falkenrath, p. 59.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.

77. Carter, p. 84; and Falkenrath, p. 59.

78. Rose, p. 136.

152
79. Ibid. p. 119.

80. Jennifer Stinhaure and Judith Miller, “In N.Y. Ou

Glimpse of Gaps in Biological Defenses,” New York Times, Octo

1999, p. 1.

81. Ibid. 

82. Steinhauer, p. 1.

83. Chris Seiple, “Consequence Management: Domestic Resp

Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Parameters, August 1997, p. 12

84. Ibid.

85. Russell, p. 205. See also Fred Bayles, “Anti-Terrorism 

Falling Short,” USA Today, October 13, 1998, p. 15A.

86. Seiple, p. 122.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid.

89. Kurt A. McNeely, Assistant for Anti-Terrorism/Conse

Management, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, Interview, September 14

90. Seiple, p. 124.

91. Ibid. Seiple explains that the FBI and consequence ma

were able to work out an arrangement for sample collection 

Atlanta Olympics. However, it was never used. Interestingly, n

after the bomb attack at the Atlanta Olympics was the th

biological contamination even considered by the authorities.

92. Response and Recovery Terrorism Response Annex, 

Emergency Management Agency, Internet http://www.fem

r-n-r/frp/frpterr.htm.

93. Gideon Rose, “It Could Happen HereFacing th

Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs, March-April, 1999, p. 136.

94. Carter, p. 90.

95. Ibid.

153
96. Willam S. Cohen, “Preparing for a Grave New W

Washington Post, July 26, 1999, p. A19.

97. Thomas R. Lujan, “Legal Aspects of Domestic Employ

the Army,” Parameters, Autumn 1997, p. 83. The Navy is not spe

mentioned in the Posse Comitatus Act but has chosen to adhe

constraints. The Coast Guard is not precluded from domestic ope

by the Posse Comitatus Act.

98. Ibid. found in Congress, House of Representatives, P

Inquiry into Federal Law Enforcement Actions at Waco, Texas, J

1995, testimony of Brigadier General Walter P. Huffman, As

Judge Advocate General for Military Law and Operations, p. 1

99. Ibid. p. 89.

100. Cohen, p. A19.

101. John J. Hamre, “U.S. Military Wants No Domest

Enforcement Role,” October 5, 1999, p. 16.

102. Ibid.

103. Dennis M. McCarthy, “Joint Support for WMD Anti-Te

and Force Protection Planning,” Briefing presented at the 

Response in the New Millennium Symposium, Kirtland Air Forc

New Mexico, July 21, 1999.

104. Greg Seigle, “USA Infighting Over Who Should De

Domestic WMD Attacks,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 7, 1999, 

105. “Regional Rapid Assessment Element Stationing 

Announced,” DoD News Releases, Office of the Assistant Secre

Defense (Public Affairs), May 22, 1998, p. 1.

106. J. D. W. Parker, “USA Prepares to Treble Number o

Teams,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 2, 1999, p. 1.

107. Siegle.

108. Ron Laurenzo, “GAO: Time to Reassess Guard Ant

Teams,” Defense Week, July 6, 1999, p. 1.

109. Bradley Graham, “Sneak-Attack Detectives Prepare to 

Washington Post, August 28, 1999, p. 3.

110. Ibid.

154
111. Laurenzo.

112. Ibid.

113. Ibid.

114. Jonathan Pate, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, M

Institute of International Studies, Interview, February 12, 19

also “Agency Structure for Terrorism Response—Federal Fun

Combat Terrorism,” Chemical and Biological Resource Page, Ce

Nonproliferation, Internet http://www.cns.miis.edu/res

cbw/response.htm.

115. Zeev Livne, Israeli Defense and Armed Forces A

Interview, October 8, 1999, Washington DC.

116. Ibid.

117. Ibid.

118. Ibid.

119. Ibid.

120. “The Home Front is Prepared,” Israel Wire, December 1

Internet, http://www.israelwire.com/ lra/981218/9812184.ht

121. “Enough Gas Masks for Everyone,” Israel Wire, Decem

1998, Internet ,http://www.israelwire.com/lra/ 981218/981282.html.

122. Livne.

123. Ibid.

124. Geoff Simons, Iraq—From Sumer to Saddam, second e

York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996, p. 320.

125. Ibid. See also, Julie Flint, “Saddam Killing Shias ‘Dail

Observer, October 4, 1992.

126. Neil C. Livinstone, “Proactive Responses to Ter

Reprisals, Preemption, and Retribution,” International Terr

Characteristics, Causes, and Controls, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., e

York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990, p. 225.

127. Ibid.

155
128. Ibid.

129. Ibid.

130. David C. Veness, Assistant Commissioner Spe

Operations, Metropolitan Police Services, London. Interview, M

1999.

131. Mark Kesselman, Christopher S. Allen, David Os

Krieger, Stephen Hellman, and George Ross, European Pol

Transition, 3rd edition, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 199

132. Harlan Ullman, Interview, November 7, 1999.

133.Veness.

134. Kesselman, p. 84.

135. Ibid.

136. Ibid. p. 85.

137. “The SAS Raid on the Iranian Embassy,” Overlord—

Forces and Counterterrorism, Internet, http://home.is

~overlord/welcome.html.

138. “Operation Nimrod—The Embassy Seige,”Special Forc

World, Internet.

139.http://home.istar.ca/~overlord/raidiran.htm

http://www.specialforces.dk/reallife/nimrod.htm.

140. Dr. Ray Raymond, Consular Officer, British Consula

York, Interview, September 27, 1999. Rules are not hard and fa

regards to the classification and the classification can change wi

life span of the crisis.

141. Dr. Ray Raymond.

142. T. J. Grant, “Training on Rules of Engagement in D

Operations,” unpublished paper, Canadian Defense College, In

http://www.cfcsc.dnd.ca/irc/amsc/amsc1/014.html, p. 1.

143. Ibid.

144. http://www.dnd.ca/menu/legacy/defend_e.htm. 

156
145. http://www.dnd.ca/menu/legacy/defend_e.htm. 

146. Sean M. Maloney, “Domestic Operations: The Ca

Approach,” Parameters, Autumn 1997, p. 143.

147. Ibid. 

148. Ibid.

149. Ibid. 

150. http://www.dnd.ca/menu/legacy/helping_e.htm. 

151. Maloney, p. 144.

152. Ibid.

153. Ibid., p. 148.

154. Ibid.

155. Seiple, p. 119.

156. John Ellis, “What the U.S. Must do to Combat Bi

Weapons,” Boston Globe, December 10, 1998, p. A. 31.

157. Stern, p. 131.

158. Ibid.

159. James Risen, “To Bomb Sudan Plant or Not: A Year 

Debates Rankle,” New York Times, October 27, 1999, p. A14.

160. John M. Goshko, “Sudan to Sign Anti-Terrorism Acco

Join Chemical Warfare Ban,” Washington Post, May 22, 1999, 

161. Lewis A. Dunn, “Proliferation Prevention: B

Traditionalism,” Weapons of Mass Destruction: New Perspec

Counterproliferation, William H. Lewis and Stuart E. Johnso

Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995, p. 3

162. Ibid.

163. Deborah R. Lee, “Protecting Americans at Home,” 

Link, March, 19, 1998, p. 2. Online. Http://www.defenseli

other_info/deblee.html.

157
164. Mercier, p. 108.

165. Ibid.

166. “Operations Other Than War Volume II—D

Assistance,” Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter, n

October 1993, p. IX 2.

167. Brian Hawtin, Deputy Policy Director, Assistant 

Secretary of State (Policy), Ministry of Defense, Interview, M

1999.

168. H. Allen Holmes, “Domestic Preparedness: U.S. Re

Need Tuning,” Defense Viewpoint, Vol. 13, No. 33, March 26, 19

Online. www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1998/s19980326-holma

169. Carter, p. 91.

170. Maloney, p. 150.

171. Ibid.

172. Peter Grier, “New Roles For the Guard and Reserve,” A

Magazine, November 1999, p. 17.

173. Stern, p. 143.

174. James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy—What Government A

Do and Why They Do It, New York: Basic Books, 1989, p. 190.

175. “U.S. Weapons Fight May be Reorganized,” Phila

Inquirer, July 7, 1999, p. 1.

176. Ibid.

177. C. Mark Brinkley and Gordon Lubold, “Corps’ Bio For

Not Enough,” Marine Corps Times, March 29, 1999, p. 13.

178. Ernest R. May, “Intelligence: Backing Into the Future,”

Affairs, Summer 1992, p. 65.

179. Ellis.

180. May, p. 72.

181. Ibid.

158
182. Ibid.

183. Jane Holl, multiple discussions.

184. Barbara Starr, “USA’s Covert Squads to Counter 

Jane’s Weekly, March 11, 1998, p. 12.

185. Richard W. Perry and Stephen R. A. Robinson, Rock 

Arsenal, Interview, May 27, 1999.

186. John M. Donnelly, “Majority of Military Gas Masks in 

‘Critically’ Defective,” Defense Week, June 21, 2000, p. 1.

187. Ibid.

188. Chuck Vinch, “Services Complete Chemical Suit 

European Stars and Stripes, April 6, 2000, p. 4.

189. Ibid. 

190. http://www.cotf.navy.mil/code70/73_jslis.htm.

191. Stansfield Turner, Terrorism and Democracy, B

Houghton Mifflin Company, 1991, p. xii. Actually Admiral 

makes the argument that the United States will negotia

terrorists. See Chapter 26, “We Will Make Deals.”

192. “Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Great Decisions, 1999

193. Ibid, p. 52.

194. Brad Roberts, “NBC-Armed Rogues: Is there a Moral C

Preemption?” Close Calls: Intervention, Terrorism, Missile Defen

‘Just War’ Today, Elliott Abrams, ed., EPPC-March, 1998, p. 1

195. Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, book 2, cha

section 2.

196. Elihu Root, “The Real Monroe Doctrine,” American Jou

International Law 35, 1914, p. 427.

197. Roberts, p. 13.

198. “Excerpts: U.S. Editorials assess impact of Anti-T

Strikes,” USIS Washington File, http:// www.fas.org/man/do

ops/docs/98082307_tpo.html, June 14, 2000, p. 1-6.

159
199. John Diamond, “US Strikes Tougher Stance A

Terrorism,” Cnews August 21, 1998, http:// www.can

CNEWSStrike AtTerrorism/aug20_us.html.

200. Graham Allison, “Nuclear Lessons,” Boston Globe, Octo

1999, p. 23. The author hopes Dr. Allison won’t object to my subs

chemical and biological for nuclear.

201. Ibid.

202. Rose, p. 137.

160
CHAPTER 7

INFRASTRUCTURE WARRIORS:

A THREAT TO THE U.S. HOMELAND

BY ORGANIZED CRIME

Thomas A. Johnson

Two very important databases, one collected b

Terrorism Research Center in cooperation with Georg

University and the second by Carnegie Mellon Unive

Coordination Center, each reveal a similarity be

cyberterrorism and cybercrime by organized crime

striking similarity is our fear and apprehension o

despite few recorded incidents of either.

The number of incidents reported to the 

Coordination Center from 1988 to March 2000 i

30,000.

1

 Indeed, the number of incidents reported do

address or reveal any pattern of cyberterrori

cybercrime by organized criminals. It is a fact that 

was organized to report on security vulnerabilities 

issue advisories while also maintaining a log of inc

reported. While the CERT Center is a most valuable a

would be instructive to receive more information su

John D. Howard’s Ph.D. dissertation, “An Analy

Security Incidents on to Internet 1989-1995,” 

Howard proposes a taxonomy of computer and ne

attacks and classifies attackers into six categories wit

categories of primary motivation and six sets of tool

development of Howard’s taxonomy of Internet attack

important research tool having great utility in ana

criminal activity by organized crime in the fores

future.

161
Another fascinating classification proposed by D

E. Denning in her excellent paper, “Activism, Hac

and Cyberterrorism: The Internet as a Tool for Influ

Foreign Policy” suggests the importance of the Intern

how it can be an effective vehicle for creating coa

among various groups. Denning presents 

classifications of activity:

1. Activism as the normal nondisruptive use 

Internet in support of an agenda or cause.

2. Hactivism (the marriage of hacking and act

covers operations that use hacking techniques a

target internet sites with the intent of disrupting n

operations but not causing serious damage. Exampl

Web sit-ins and vertical blockades, automated E

bombs, Web hacks, computer break-ins and com

viruses and worms.

3. The final category, cyberterrorism, refers 

convergence of cyberspace and terrorism. This 

politically motivated hacking operations intended to 

grave harm such as loss of life or severe economic dam

162

Computer and Network Attack Taxonomy

2

Attackers Tools Objectives

Hackers User Com mand Cor rup tion of

 In for ma tion

Spies Script of Dis clo sure of

 Pro gram In for ma tion

Ter ror ists Au ton o mous Theft of

 Agent Ser vice

Cor po rate Tool Kit De nial of

 Pro viders Ser vice

Pro fes sional Dis trib uted Tool

 Crim i nals

Van dals Data Top
Denning’s classification emphasizes the eno

potential for both organized crime and cyberterrorists 

the Internet to their great respective advantage.

Based upon a review of over 110 reported comput

information system attacks included in the Georg

University’s Terrorism Research Center, Inform

Warfare Database;

4 as well as Philip Osburn’s paper 

Terrorist Threat, it is clear that our media has exagg

a sense of cyberterrorist attacks. A potential for 

cyberterrorism does exist, but as the Naval Postgra

School study suggested, cyberterrorism is a challen

the future. We believe the potential for cyberterror

within the reach of terrorist organizations, and that m

these terrorist organizations are only now becoming 

of the awesome potential for use of information techno

in furthering their respective objectives. In reality

should not be a surprise as our world’s leading educa

institutions have only recently embarked u

concentrated effort to adapt these technologies to dist

their respective mission via “distance education" stra

If institutions of higher education have only re

discovered the potential of information technologies

is no reason to believe that terrorist organizations 

have made this discovery any earlier, and 

importantly, even less reason to suspect they are also 

the threshhold of materially refocusing their m

operandi and attack structures.

Philip Osburn’s excellent paper on the terrorist 

reviews the literature and reports on only two cyberte

attacks, the first being the TAMIL guerrillas Libe

Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which performed an E

bombing attack to create a denial of service on Sri L

embassies. The second cyberterrorist attack was comm

on behalf of the Zapatistas by a group of It

sympathizers against the Mexican Government and A

While there exists few recorded cyberterrorist a

and few examples of organized cybercrime, we w

163
emphasize the potential threat that each will c

Furthermore, we suggest that it is only a matter o

before these respective groups tool up to the task.

Perhaps one of the most important and provo

research reports to emerge on this subject i

Cyberterror: Prospects and Implications report by 

Arquilla, et. al. The conceptual framework and taxo

presented an opportunity to view both cyberterrori

organized criminals’ cybercrime in a new and enligh

fashion. 

Their taxonomy, described below, provides a u

methodology for gathering and analyzing data which s

provide for more precise assessments of both threats 

future. 

Simple-Unstructured: The capability to conduct 

hacks against individual systems using tools crea

someone else. The organization possesses little 

analysis, command and control, or learning capabilit

Advanced-Structured: The capability to conduct 

sophisticated attacks against multiple systems or net

and possibly to modify or create basic hacking tool

organization possesses an elementary target ana

command and control and learning capability.

Complex-Coordinated: The capability for coord

attacks capable of causing mass-disruption ag

integrated, heterogeneous defenses (inclu

cryptography). Ability to create sophisticated hacking 

Highly capable target analysis, command and contro

organizational learning capability.

6

The opportunity to utilize and refine the three pres

taxonomies to analyze both cyberterrorism an

cybercriminal activity in which organized crime w

doubt engage, should assist us in developing strateg

controlling each event.

164
As we examine these terrorist groups, we should 

upon how each one either uses or anticipates the 

information systems. We wish to explore to what ext

any, these groups use information systems to recruit 

individuals into their cause. We hypothesize that te

organizations will use information systems to seek g

legitimacy within their society while, at the same 

enhancing their opportunity to recruit more partic

and members to their cause. The use of information sy

to more efficiently “market” their message and their 

may well confuse many people who otherwise would r

in more established opposition to the terrorist grou

also will be interested in exploring if and how any of 

terrorist groups attempt to more “surgically” disrup

targets by use of information technologies. Finally

methods of collaboration, if any, might be used by te

organizations mutually participating through inform

systems in joint activities designed to disrupt their tar

Several similarities between cyberterrorism 

organized crime in terms of the threat to our U.S. hom

is discussed in the RAND Research Review of Fall 

where it is observed how inexpensive it is to wa

Information War, as the acquisition of information we

neither require vast financial resources or 

sponsorship. Indeed, all that is required is a compu

network, an internet service provider, and various so

tools. Since the global nature of this environment blu

boundaries of cyberspace, it makes enforcement me

much more difficult.

7

The threat to our U.S. homeland by infrastr

warriors who may be controlled by or working for orga

crime is a very real threat with profound consequ

There exist a growing number of cyber-assault we

that can easily target both E-Government and E-Com

activities and programs. The easy availability of 

cyber-assault weapons on the worldwide web makes th

and increased opportunity of attacks very efficien

potentially effective. To further exacerbate the pro

165
there exists a growing number of people with the sk

capable of implementing the attack scenarios; al

remains is for organized crime and drug networks to 

the people with sufficient skills to (1) introduce a vis

moving organized crime into cyberspace, and (2) for lo

and engaging people with the skill sets to acquire, de

and utilize the number of cyber-assault tools to effe

end goals of organized crime.

Cyber-Tools and Strategies Available to Organ

Crime.

There exists a number of cybertools and cyberstra

to organized crime to invoke against legitimate bus

These cyber-assault tools will also make the governm

job of controlling organized crime much more diffic

brief description of the cyber-assault weapons and 

strategies with which law enforcement and m

investigative services will be challenged follows i

section.

Encryption, which will assure far greater confiden

of organized crime plans and discussions. The 

encryption by organized crime and drug networks wil

it more difficult for investigative agencies to obtain ev

of criminal activities. Encryption will also ma

profoundly more difficult to obtain intelligence vital 

criminal investigation. Also, encryption of organized 

plans makes it difficult to avert terrorist type attacks

gathering foreign intelligence about different 

activities against the U.S. is vital to our national se

the use of encryption by organized criminal elemen

direct threat to our homeland.

8

Other effects of encryption range from precludin

investigations to affecting them by delay and inc

costs. Unbreakable encryption may cause investiga

implement alternative undercover operations which m

more dangerous to law enforcement officers; 

166
expensive; and potentially more invasive to the su

privacy.

9

Indeed, the debate surrounding the “clipper 

proposal and the issues of balancing privacy wit

requirements that exist in a democracy has been lon

heated. The advent of free downloadable encry

programs on the web has made law enforcement’s con

quite realistic.

Denning and Baugh observed that “we are at the le

edge of what could become a serious threat t

enforcement and national security: the proliferatio

use of robust digital encryption technologies. 

technologies will be unbreakable, easy to use

integrated into desktop applications and network se

including protocols for electronic mail, web transa

and telephony.”

10

Drug cartels, particularly in Columbia, have u

encryption to obfuscate law enforcement’s abil

investigate their operations. Also, the Drug Enforc

Administration (DEA) has reported that the cart

utilized mainframe computers and even has used 

telephone lines to for their illegal business activities

Cryptoviral extortion has been reported by Dennin

Baugh to have occurred to at least nine busines

London in which cryptoviruses enciphered the 

financial records, and files and in effect encrypte

companies financial records. The companies were con

by the responsible hackers and offered the decryptio

for $150,000.

11

 I am familiar with one case similar to t

the East Coast. Consequently, this could be a subst

threat if ever adopted by organized crime on a large 

Steganography or its use of S-tools and other to

hide messages or digital images within pixels 

otherwise innocuous photograph or painting will p

organized crime a potent delivery system of 

pornography to pedophiles.

167
The expanding capability of our electronic hard 

storage system has provided a most fertile grou

organized crime to process incredible amounts of d

their gambling operations. A recent case occurr

California and Kansas involved the illegal gam

operation in which investigators were confronted wi

terrabytes of data.

On-line pornography has been a market, which h

been fully targeted by organized crime. It will only 

matter of time before they intrude on the shady ope

and web entrepreneurs who have made millions of dol

this area. This is a fertile market place that is fir

foremost global; 24 x 7; with a pattern of repeat cust

who return multiple times each day at $30 to $4

occasion. The confusing pattern of laws from nat

nation, and the need for targeting search warra

multiple jurisdictions, will make this an attr

organized crime market. The web-entrepreneurs tha

chartered out the numerous web sites dealing 

pornography will become quite valuable to organized 

pushing into this arena.

Packet sniffers to identify passwords and identifi

of computer users will become a marketplace for a var

organized crime blackmail and extortion activities. 

cybertools such as anonymous remailers; network sca

i.e., satan and other such tools will also be most us

organized crime’s efforts to disrupt legitimate bu

enterprise. 

Terrorists groups operating within the United 

and targeting U.S. business have included Ramsey Y

and others who have been apprehended with lap top

have utilized encryption to render their plans unread

law enforcement authorities.

The U.S. concern regarding chemical and bio

weapons was taken to a new level by the Aum Shin

terrorist group in Japan when it was discovered the

had stored their records on computers encrypted with 

168
secure encryption format (i.e., RSA). The encrypte

contained evidence that included plans to deploy weap

mass destruction in the United States.

12

Denial of service attacks, which have principally 

used by hackers, will provide an incredibly lucrative m

to organized crime. This could well become the cybe

“protection market” that will pale into insignifican

“protection” rackets of organized crime in the 1920

1930s.

In summary, the challenge that confronts our cr

justice system is to provide the skilled personnel wh

the capabilities to confront the next generation of orga

cyber criminals. This will entail training of ou

enforcement personnel in the areas of computer scienc

and forensic investigation.

CHAPTER 7 - ENDNOTES

1. Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute 

Coordination Center, CERT/CC Statistics 1988

www.cert.org/stats/cert_stats.html.

2. John D. Howard, An Analysis of Security Incidents on the I

1989-1995, Carnegie Mellon University Ph.D. Dissertation, Co

by John D. Howard, 1997, Chapter 6, pp. 7-9, www.ce

research/jhthesis/chapter6.html.

3. Dorothy E. Denning, Activism, Hactivism, and Cyberter

The Internet as a Tool for Influencing Foreign Policy, Intern

International Systems: Information Technology and American 

Policy Decision-Making Workshop, pp. 1-2.

4. The Terrorism Research Center, in cooperation with Geor

University, Information Warfare Database, 1982-2000.

5. Philip Osborn, The Terrorist Threat: An Examination of T

Groups and the Threat to the National Information Infrastru

graduate paper for CJ-625, University of New Haven, Decembe

pp. 7, 10.

169
6. Arquilla, Tucker, Nelson, Choi, Iacobucci, Mitchell, and G

Cyberterror: Prospects and Implications, Monterey: Center 

Study of Terrorism and Irregular Warfare, March 2000, pp. 7-8

7. Ann Shoeben, Editor, “Information Warfare: A Two-Edge 

Information War and Cyberspace Security, RAND Research 

Fall, 1995, Vol. XIX, No. 2, p. 3.

8. Dorothy E. Denning and William E. Baugh, Encrypti

Evolving Technologies as Tools of Organized Crime and Ter

National Strategy Information Centers, U.S. Working Gr

Organized Crime, July 1997, pp. 13-14.

9. Ibid., p. 15.

10. Ibid., p. 1.

11. Ibid., p. 5.

12. Ibid., p. 4.

170
CHAPTER 8

THREAT OF CIVIL UNREST

AND INSURRECTION

William A. Navas, Jr.

It has been said that the primary duty of governme

organized government—is to provide for the safet

security of its citizens. Now we see internal threat

challenge the sense of security that we have enjoy

decades during the Cold War, when we perceive

threats to be external rather than internal. So we be

see an emergence of some threats that we can def

“clear and present dangers.” The title of this 

conference, “. . . to insure domestic Tranquility, prov

the common defence,” is very timely in the face of thi

And also, the fact that we have this conference h

Carlisle, like Dr. Urwin said this morning, is als

appropriate because it was here in October of 1794 

President Washington for the first time federalize

militia—elements of the New Jersey, Maryland, Vir

and Pennsylvania militias—to enforce the laws of the 

and quell the Whiskey Rebellion. And it was here at C

General Washington, then President Washingto

commander-in-chief, took to the field and reviewe

troops. So some things do not change, I guess.

What I would like to do today is address the threat 

unrest and insurrection in this new environment.It 

that today you cannot attend one of these confe

without hearing, ad nauseam, the term “Post Cold W

“End of the Cold War.” But again, we need to deal wit

because what we are dealing with are the effects of th

of the Cold War and what that entails for the wo

general, and for the United States in particular, by cr

some unprecedented tensions in the internationa

171
domestic environments. There is an excellent book w

by Thomas Freidman, The Lexus and the Olive 

wherein he posits that “globalization” is a system t

replacing the Cold War as a system, not only in m

terms but as political and economic systems as wel

this perhaps is what is causing some of the turmoil th

are experiencing.

So I am going to give you, very briefly, the situat

the United States today—first, as a nation of conflicts 

will explain what I mean by that); second, as th

remaining superpower (what that entails and wha

means); and, third, why we are at a critical junctur

you will see how these three factors are going to con

into giving us some challenges and some opportuniti

The United States is a nation of conflicts. Like 

Globalization is replacing the Cold War as a po

military/economic system. In fact, it is creating a 

village, if you will. It is replacing the old system at the 

time that we are experiencing, on the other han

explosion of communications and other technol

changes that are creating even more tensions in t

system. The perception also, particularly in the U

States, that only some are benefiting from thi

economic boom and new technological opportunitie

create some tensions, especially for those who feel eith

behind or brutalized by this. So what you see is 

conflict of constituencies. Not only the old majority v

minority or along racial lines, but we are seeing ba

the conflicts of interest group versus interest group, g

coalitions, religious, ethnic, and life-styles conflicts th

coming out there because of this new found informatio

freedom. 

Also the fact that some people feel that some 

systems are deteriorating—that the trust of the Am

people in some of our systems is not there— creates 

tension. This is not a case for political reform. I mea

knows, enough is said about that in an election year, 

172
going to hear more of that. But that is a fact that need

considered, because we are not as homogenous 

thought we were or some sectors would like us to be.

The second issue is the fact that we are the 

remaining superpower. Dr. Henry Kissinger state

recent article in The Washington Post, and I quote,

The end of the millennium coincides with the moment wh

America is preeminence turned into predominance. Nev

before has a single country achieved a comparable ascendan

on a global basis and in so many fields of endeavor, fr

weaponry to economics, to entrepreneurship, to even p

culture.

However, that supremacy, that leadership for th

10 years that everyone took for granted—we in the U

States, and even around the world—is starting to see 

fraying. We see other countries, Russia, China, and 

are starting to challenge U.S. pre-eminence. Someon

that the burden of power is having to wield it. An

Kissinger said, American foreign policy cannot c

between overcommitment and abdication. We are try

come to grips in our country with what is a logical f

policy for the United States. We need one that is unde

by friend and foe alike, one that balances between av

being heavy-handed on one side of the equation, and 

other creating a leadership vacuum that can brin

imbalance this delicate subject. So the issue he

unilateral dominance—hegemony—cannot be sus

indefinitely, and, as history has taught us, in the end 

be more harmful than beneficial to our national inte

So we, as the only remaining superpower, still have to 

to grips with what is going to be our role.

Then the third issue here is that we are, again

critical juncture because we are not only enjoying eco

growth and global superiority at the same time, but w

making a lot of progress in some other areas of h

endeavor, like in medicine and technology. The end 

Cold War also has ushered a period of domesti

173
examination. It is very interesting that, for a long 

people had looked at the Commerce Department’s In

Leading Economic Indicators to spot trends in the eco

And recently Mr. William J. Bennett has been publish

Index of Leading Cultural Indicators. 

It is kind of a bellwether to see how well we are 

domestically in issues such as crime, family i

education, youth behavior, popular culture, and reli

like a report card of how are we doing. And this is h

because it is going to start putting the spotlight on 

elements of the population that feel left behind and 

the confidence that democracy is taking care of all 

country. Not that we can take care of every single n

expectation, but there must be a feeling from the citiz

the legitimacy of their government and that it is act

the best interest of the whole.

This is helpful because, if there are elements 

population that feel disenfranchised and “left behi

this new era of prosperity and growth, then manipulat

those external elements inimical to our interests coul

well plant the seeds of unrest in our society. So that 

we see the situation today, in both the domesti

international arenas. This is how we stand at the end 

Cold War.

I borrowed from the old Cold War spectrum of c

and adapted it to the threats of civil unres

insurrection. (See Figure 1.) If you recall, we always h

low risk/high probability, low intensity conflict on on

and then we went to the high risk/low probability 

thermonuclear war on the other side. So what I hav

here is arranged in order of severity, if you will, the dif

threats that we have, going from peaceful protest o

end, to rebellion on the other. And what I would like to 

not to define these events, but illustrate and give exa

of what we understand each of those events to mean

Let me start with protest. It is the most benign 

forms of civil actions. It is basically even healthy 

174
democracy because we provide for those mechanism

protest could go from the sublime to the ridiculous, fro

Million Man March in Washington, to the broccoli prod

protesting in front of the White House because Pre

Bush said he did not like broccoli. It goes the full gamu

again, this is something that, if handled well, it is hea

democracy.

The next level is civil disobedience. And again, 

peaceful and orderly, although it might violate 

statutes or ordinances, it could be a very powerful wa

group to deal with their issues, especially groups th

disenfranchised or that they do not have the mechani

make their views seen. One of the current issues is th

of the citizens of Vieques, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. 

where the issue is not the Navy bombings per se, but it 

issue of people who feel disenfranchised because they 

have the political power of the vote and representat

resolve the issue. So the way they deal with this situa

by civil disobedience, by physically occupying a posit

175

Figure 1.

Low Risk

High Probability

High Risk

Low Prob

Protest

Civil

Disobedience

Civil

Disturbance

Civil

Unrest

Turmoil

Insurgency

Insurrection

Rebelli

Threat of Civil Unrest and Insurrection

The Spectrum of Civil Unrest
the bombing range to prevent the Navy from resumi

training exercises.

The next level in that spectrum is civil disturb

This is the first form of violent manifestation. 

characterized by anger, violence, and lawless

Normally it evolves around a single issue or event, bu

mentality and a sense of anonymity also takes ove

then you have a very ugly situation. And again, one 

recent examples are the Los Angeles riots of 199

turned into a couple of days of near anarchy in the w

the Rodney King beatings by the police.

Civil unrest develops over a period of time with 

geographic dispersion and can trigger episodes of p

civil disobedience, and civil disturbances that can esc

Although it centers on a single issue, it tends to ac

magnet to attract other causes. The best example of 

the later years of the Vietnam War with the United 

and the Civil Rights Movement. They were times o

unrest with episodes of different types of violenc

protest.

I see Turmoil as some of those episodes resultin

civil unrest. It is the “flash-in-the-pan” type even

example is the university riots during the Vietnam W

particular Kent State (which was discussed this mor

where things reach a flash point, get out of hand, an

have violent acts.

Insurgency is a lot more serious; it is a condit

revolt against the government. It is less than orga

revolution, and it is not recognized as belligerency

current militia groups and fringe elements, such 

Nationalists in 1950 in Puerto Rico, are examples 

type of elements that uses force and violence to p

against an established system.

Insurrection is basically revolting against 

authority, an established government, by violent m

Fortunately, we do not have any recent examples 

176
United States, but Chechnya and East Timor come to 

as examples of insurrection.

And then we have revolution, which is the 

opposition to those in authority by means of force. Ou

War, at least from the Union standpoint, is an exam

that. 

So we have seen all of those different levels. Now 

are the causes or the trigger mechanisms that can ge

these actions? The list abounds, but let me mention 

The first is relativism. The absence of sound public po

a significant threat; and relativism, it has been 

euphemistically, political correctness, it is tolerance

acceptance, and it is accommodation. The issue is 

tends to blur the right and wrong on public policy, an

creates a sense that—if it is politically accepted, if you 

want to alienate a group—it is okay. And this pre

particularly our elected officials and those app

officials who work for elected officials, from doing w

right. They are reluctant to “call it like it is” and 

prevents these officials from “telling the Emperor he 

clothes.” 

Then there is Apathy. A recently conducted CN

discovered that only 49 percent of the registered elec

participated in the 1996 presidential elections. Whe

consider that only about 56 percent of the eligible peop

registered, this situation is something where we hav

very, very careful. If you project that trend, you could a

predict a collapse of our electoral system.

There is Fragmentation because we are no lon

nation of immigrants willing to come and be assim

into the melting pot. The civil rights move

globalization, ethnic pride, religious and cultural div

world communications, and ease of travel have c

what we could define as “commuting immigrants” tha

“broken the melting pot.” We must understand 

dynamics and capitalize in the core values of our demo

system to become “the ties that bind.” The old “meltin

177
can become the new “salad bowl,” bound together 

“dressing” of enduring American values. But this 

predestined. We need the political leadership and w

establish this new vision for America. We cannot g

and long for things that are not there anymore. If we 

could very well be planting the seeds of unrest ourse

And then, of course, you have Information, M

and Communications. We talk a lot about the 

factor. I think that when you are dealing with 24-hou

coverage, elected officials are forced to make decision

should take a lot more time and analysis because 

perceived notion that they need to have their answ

their reaction at the next news cycle, or they w

perceived as hesitant or indecisive. That has a potent

disaster. Can you imagine the Vietnam era’s civil 

period in today is CNN and Internet “chat r

environment? 

That would have been disastrous. Or, on second th

the war might have ended sooner! In any even

explosion of communications is a factor that we need t

into account.

Two quick examples are first, Seattle, World 

Organization meeting, December 1999—I do not nee

into details. There were a lot of arrests, and it turned u

was supposed to be a very peaceful protest of people

meaning individuals dealing with human rights

animal rights, with this, and the other. Then the 

Verdict in New York City in March 2000, which ha

potential of turning very ugly, was very peaceful be

the African-American leadership there was very mea

in their way of protesting.

Although it is probably politically incorrect to talk 

Elian (González), you need to talk about him. That ca

a classic example of what can happen if not ha

correctly. It had extensive media coverage, it was 

visible, emotionally charged, and had an ext

environment and a political dimension (both foreig

178
domestic). It was a conflict of values, traditions

customs on one hand; and the perception on the other 

authorities being heavy-handed. The same thing, you 

say, as potential flash points, for example, the Confe

Flag issue in South Carolina, the IMF meeti

Washington, DC, in April, and again, the Navy/V

issue in Puerto Rico.

In conclusion, we have seen there is a present d

because, first, the unprecedented global changes th

have discussed have created new tensions and exace

some latent ones. This happens at a time when the U

States emerges as the only superpower, and there are 

elements that want to challenge that pre-eminence.

Second is the fact that a large sector of the Am

people has lost confidence in some of the system

political system, the retirement system—and trad

family values are being challenged.

And third, we have become a lot more diverse, so w

a lot more potential for conflicts between different inte

whether they are ethnic, family, or whatever.

So we conclude that, in this environment, the th

civil disturbances is high. I am afraid we are going to 

lot of that. How we deal with that threat, and ho

prepare for it can minimize the risk. The threat for 

and insurrection is low, but, due to the high risk it pr

and because some external factors and elements c

facilitators, it needs to be closely monitored for the se

of the consequences.

So in closing, I would like to end with a quote 

Mahatma Gandhi. Our public policies ought to he

advice. He stated that there are the “seven blunders 

world that can cause violence.” They are:

• Wealth without Work

• Pleasure without Conscience

179
• Knowledge without Character

• Commerce without Morality

• Science without Humanity

• Worship without Sacrifice, and

• Politics without Principle

180
CHAPTER 9

MISSILE DEFENSE

John Costello

I am going to be a little bit different today in terms 

I am going to talk to you about National Missile Defen

how it relates to homeland defense. I will attempt ov

next few minutes to give you an honest assessment of 

we stand, because you certainly will not get that 

anything you read in the press.

I wear two hats. I am a Title 10 Commander, if yo

for General Eric Shinseki. The Army Space and M

Defense Command is a major command of the United 

Army responsible for technology development, testin

fielding of a host of various missile defense and 

related equipment. I am also a component comman

U.S. Space Command out in Colorado Springs, Col

where I command the Army Space Forces, those youn

and women who work around the world doing our part 

space business. The National Missile Defense (

system obviously takes up a lot of my time in that it is 

Title 10 responsibility, since the Army is the lead Serv

the ground based element of the National Missile D

program, and since ultimately I will command the 

forces that man this system should the President 

United States make a decision to field this system.

Historical Background.

Well, as you know, the defense of the United Sta

and has always been a soldier’s most sacred respons

From 1775 the Army has played a pivotal role in defe

the homeland. In 1794 the Congress charged the Ar

build and staff coastal defense forts. As the threat ch

over the centuries from big-gunned ships to bomb

181
aircraft, the Army changed the focus of its defense 

coastal forts to antiaircraft installations around Ame

In World War II, advances in missile technology a

the threat to surpass existing defensive capabilitie

work began on several programs to develop effective m

defense systems. My command is a direct descenden

the Army’s Missile Defense Program begun by both R

Goddard and Wehrner von Braun after the World W

After some starts and stops relating to the deploym

antimissile systems designed to defend urban 

industrial targets within the United States, Pre

Richard Nixon in 1969 decided to deploy antiba

missile (ABM) systems only in defense of our int

tinental ballistic missile sites. This was name

Safeguard System, and it called for twelve locations

construction to begin immediately at two of them—

Grand Forks, North Dakota, and one at Malmstro

Force Base, Montana. Three years later the United 

and the Soviet Union signed the Antiballistic M

Treaty, limiting each nation to only two sites, with one 

locations selected by the signatory and one at each na

command center or around the nation’s capital.

In 1974, a protocol was added to the treaty, limitin

side to only one ABM site. The system attaine

operational capability on September 28, 1975. On Feb

10, 1976, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in respon

congressional direction, ordered termination o

Safeguard system. Only the early warning radars 

exempted from this order.

The Soviet Union installed and has operational tod

ABM system around Moscow. The bottom line is th

50-plus years after we started developing the ABM sy

we have no capability to defend our nation. If you re

vignettes in some of the statements from Represent

from Congress, the general public is either (a) unawar

we have no defense, or (b) thinks that we have a secre

182
that we are not telling everybody about. And neither 

true.

The National Security Strategy and the Na

Defense Panel clearly indicated the need to prepare th

military to handle the responsibilities of providing d

to the homeland against asymmetrical threats acro

spectrum of conflict. Although command and c

responsibilities for homeland defense are still 

development, National Missile Defense is defini

contributing element of the larger homeland de

concept. Military assistance to civilian authoritie

govern the Army under auspices of the homeland d

mission. 

The National Missile Defense Program.

There are certain aspects of the Army’s National M

Defense program that directly support the crisi

consequence management efforts of homeland d

operations. They are, to be somewhat specific, assista

reducing the vulnerability of populations to attack 

missiles delivering weapons of mass destruction (W

assistance in conducting nuclear, biological, and che

recovery operations subsequent to missile attack; tr

of civilian authorities to build confidence in the Na

Missile Defense system; educating the public on join

Army national missile defense capabilities; and f

disseminating missile warning, especially in respo

what we see as an expanding threat set.

I want to talk to you about the National Missile D

program so you’ll understand what we are doing

Department of Defense’s (DoD) mission is to de

demonstrate, and deploy, when directed by the Presid

the United States, a system to defend the United 

against a limited strategic ballistic missile attack. W

very specific when we say that because it is focuse

threat by a rogue nation. Constraints on this m

include the fact that we must be in a position this sum

183
support a presidential decision, this system mu

developed consistent with the ABM Treaty, an

program decisions are to be phased to reduce risk. Y

see that we are working very hard on both the s

technology and operational effectiveness. The status 

threat as highlighted in the 1998 Rumsfeld Comm

significantly punctuated by the North Korean launch 

Taepo-dong missile a month later, and the current na

intelligence estimate that I know was alluded to ear

this conference. The threat is there, and it is gr

System cost is always a concern, and this is not a chea

of going about our business. And obviously, it is inex

linked to both on-going arms control negotiat

specifically the ABM Treaty.

These are the key requirements that the Departm

Defense under the leadership of the Ballistic M

Defense Organization are required to account for. In 

words, nothing gets through into the United State

United States being defined as all 50 states. In a 

automated system, we have to have a human in th

and, in order to counter the threat, it needs to be a nea

time operation. I am going to go into some depth h

you’ll have to bear with me, if you don’t mind.

System Elements.

Let me talk to you about the system elements

National Missile Defense is a joint Army, Navy, an

Force system and consists of a number of very compl

aspects. The system includes battle management com

control, and communications elements which are ba

the glue that holds everything together. We have upg

early warning radars that now exist and require 

software and hardware modifications and a new g

based radar, which is a radar that does discriminatio

also are planning an arsenal of ground-based intercep

The Battle Management Command and Control 

National Missile Defense System will be at Che

184
Mountain Operations Center, which is the headquart

U.S. Space Command and the North American Air D

Command, where we keep a human in the loop and p

constant communications to the system. In November 

the Army was designated as the lead Service fo

ground-based portions of the National Missile D

System. The Army’s role is to support the fielding 

then operate the ground-based radars and intercepto

their associated battle management command and c

communications. We do this as part of a joint team.

System Operation.

How does this thing operate? Folks, this is 

science, and there is no doubt about it. What our fo

government and industry in and out of uniform are d

truly amazing. Well let’s assume a hostile launch to 

the engagement process. (See Figure 1.) That is numb

missile is launched at the United States, a space

sensor makes the initial detection and reports the la

and that is number 2. The Defense Support Program

eventually Space Based Infrared System High Comp

(SBIRS) will alert the entire system of potential ba

missile attack, cue the radars to erect what we call s

fences to detect the incoming missile, and start eval

the engagement options at the Battle Management S

That is number 3, that big cylinder. When the threat m

crosses into the range of ground-based early wa

radars, these radars confirm target missile fligh

tracking information. Upon confirmation, the Com

and Control Center queues the X Band Radar and d

the launch of the ground-based interceptor. The data 

used by the interceptor to maneuver close enough 

target missile for the on-board Kill Vehicle sen

discriminate the warheads from the decoys and the de

bring your attention to the completely unbiased art

The Washington Post on Monday by people who hav

saying, for at least 4 decades, that this is an impo

mission. In fact, some of the folks quoted in this articl

185
quoted in a similar article in the 1976 edition o

Magazine that I have on my desk, which is an interview 

Robert McNamara about the system. Well, mu

interceptors launched at each of the incoming r

vehicles, either in a salvo or waves, are expected to in

dramatically the probability of a successful intercept

System of Management.

The project manager for this weapons system 

President of the United States. It is not a non-controv

issue. It is replete with defense, political, treaty, fu

technology, and roles and missions concerns. The 

decision to deploy or not to deploy the national m

defense capability rests ultimately with the Preside

consultation with the Congress of the United State

present plan calls for a deployment readiness revie

July, with a recommendation to the President i

summer or early fall. Should the President make a de

this is how we think we are going to operate.

186

6

5

4 3

2

1

Early Warning Radar

Radar

Interceptor Site

Space Sensors

KEY

Missile

Launch

Region

Missile

Launch

Region

Intercept

Interceptor

Acquisition

Target Refinement and

Interceptor Update

Threat Location and

Interceptor Commit

Space

Sensor

Plume Detection and

Impact Point Estimate

6

5

4 3

2

1

Early Warning Radar

Radar

Interceptor Site

Space Sensors

KEY

Missile

Launch

Region

Missile

Launch

Region

Intercept

Interceptor

Acquisition

Target Refinement and

Interceptor Update

Threat Location and

Interceptor Commit

Space

Sensor

Plume Detection and

Impact Point Estimate

Figure 1. NMD Engagement Concept.
The National Missile Defense program as it is cur

envisioned will be manned by members of the 

National Guard supported by contract or logistic su

We currently are looking at an organization of abo

full-time Guard soldiers and about 190 contractors. O

we estimate a certain percentage of military and contr

will be located in Alaska or North Dakota, depending 

which deployment location the President approves, w

remainder located in Colorado Springs. We think th

ground-based radar which does the initial discrimi

will be located in Shemya, Alaska, in the garden spot 

world out at the far end of the Aleutian Islands. And w

putting the radar there because that is the key pl

protect all 50 states. For the missile field we are look

Fort Greely, and, in fact, I am also on my way to 

Dakota the week after next in order to evaluate 

Dakota sites.

System Testing.

We’ve conducted a number of flight tests of this pro

(See Figure 2.) In the top left-hand box, we conducted 

we call two integrated flight tests. These were tests 

whether the missile would launch, and the kill vehicle 

discriminate targets. No intercept was planned, and b

these tests conducted 2 to 2 1/2 years ago were succ

The next test, the first intercept attempt, is in the 

right-hand corner. That was Integrated Flight Test #

purpose of this test was to see if we could launch the m

get the kill vehicle separated, have the kill v

discriminate the warhead from decoys that were lau

and hit the warhead. And that was a very successfu

The test most people have read about is the one o

bottom left-hand corner, which was the partial succe

discussed endlessly in the press as a “failure.” Th

vehicle missed the re-entry vehicle by 30 meters, b

learned a lot. The next test is scheduled for late 

[Editor’s note: That test was conducted as schedule

was successful.] This is a launch of a respective 

187
missile from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. 

will envision a tactical ballistic missile launched by a 

nation toward the United States of America, this is w

would look like in the reverse order of firing 

Vandenberg Air Force Base to the Kwajalein Missile 

in the middle of the Pacific, which I run. My operat

Kwajalein and the Battle Management Comman

Control monitored the system being used in this tes

can imagine the very sophisticated command and c

system that links space-based sensors with ground

sensors across the world. That is the end of the inter

vehicle. The entire engagement sequence takes only 

minutes. This is the missile doing its energy manag

maneuver. Imagine the kill vehicle intercepting a wa

at over 200 kilometers above the earth surface, go

excess of 15,000 miles an hour. The warhead is in a 

because there are other objects that we are asking t

vehicle to discriminate. Again, this is a crawl, wal

scenario—an intercept at 15,000 miles an hour, an

warhead was less than five feet long.

188

Integrated Flight Test Program

Success Success

Partial Success Late June 2000

♦ Risk Reduction for Kill Vehicle Tests

∗ Demonstrate Kill Vehicle Sensor Performance

∗ Collect Target Signatures to Validate Discrimination

Algorithms

∗ Activate Test Infrastructure

♦ Demo Target Complex Acquisition

♦ Demo Onboard Discrimination and Target

Selection

♦ Demo Endgame and Lethality Performance

♦ Demo Interoperability of Elements

♦ Integration of System Elements & Functionality

♦ Demonstrate KV Flight Test Performance

♦ Demonstrate Operation of Sensors

♦ Demonstrate BMC3 Operations

♦ Demo End-to-End Integrated System

Performance

♦ Demo Endgame and Lethality Performance

Figure 2. Integrated Flight Test Program.
Because this is one of the most complex system

country has ever tried to design and develop and beca

are on a very tight timeline, the press has not been gen

or forgiving. I particularly liked the post-shot ren

from the Chicago Tribune that said, “Another in a Se

Failures.” Everyone in the program was trying to figu

where the other failures were. Well, we understan

political nature of the beast, and we understand that 

are true believers on both sides of this endeavor. It 

purpose today to give you what I feel is a balance

optimistic approach of what we need to do.

We anticipate the emergence of an increasingly co

threat to the United States both in intercontinental ba

missiles and cruise missiles, which I have not talked 

today. My mission is very clear. My staff and I are 

everything we can to ensure the Army is ready to su

the fielding and then the operation of the National M

Defense system, should the President make a decis

deploy it. And additionally, we are working closely 

others to develop concepts and capabilities for the defe

the homeland against the emerging cruise missile t

(See Figure 3.)

189

• Full-spectrum missile defense of the homelan

require capability to defeat both ICBMs and C

• The Army is posturing itself to be prepared, 

directed, to support the fielding of and then op

its portion of an overall NMD system unde

command of USCINCSPACE/CINCNORAD.

• The Army is working closely with ASD (

USCINCSPACE, and other services to de

concepts and capabilities for CMD of the home

Figure 3. Final Thoughts.
This is rocket science. But contrary to what some 

have you believe, it is doable. And I am confident f

technological standpoint that we will be able to provi

national decisionmakers with the technolo

recommendations whereby the president and the Co

can make a decision to deploy or not to deploy this sy

Thanks very much.

190
CHAPTER 10

EVOLVING ROLES AND MISSIONS

FOR THE RESERVE COMPONENTS

IN RESPONDING TO INCIDENTS

INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS

DESTRUCTION

Ellen Embrey

Our nation received a wake-up call with the Okla

City, World Trade Center, and Khobar Towers bo

incidents. These seminal events spurred Congres

federal, state, and local government agencies to ac

assess the nation’s readiness to respond to an in

involving a weapon of mass destruction (WMD)

assessments have led to the development of a pleth

response capabilities, training programs, and researc

development initiatives. The federal government has 

WMD consequence management (CM) preparedness 

five major program thrusts associated with coun

domestic threats, and the President’s budget contain

billion towards defense against WMD in FY01. Alm

percent ($630M) is dedicated to preparing fo

responding to a WMD incident, another 41 perc

research and development, and nearly 13 perce

physical security of government facilities.

Within the $630M for preparation and res

activities, nearly 30 percent is targeted for special res

units and between 15-17 percent each for public 

infrastructure, first responder equipment, and 

responder training and exercising. Combined

Department of Defense (DoD) has budgeted $86M in 

While seemingly small in relation to the total governm

effort, much of what DoD brings to the integrated res

effort is already part of its mission funding, so the 

represents targeted funding, specifically for WMD. O

191
amount, the DoD funding profile ($75M in FY01) is ta

to Reserve Component (RC) integration into this vita

and on which the remainder of this chapter is focuse

Early in the dialog to establish a seamles

integrated response to a WMD incident, the D

Secretary of Defense established that Reserve compo

needed to be fully integrated into the Department’s 

response capabilities.

Why the Guard and Reserve? In part becaus

Reserve components have always been a forward-de

force for responding to domestic disasters. So, 

participation in WMD incidents was a natural exten

this existing response capability. But more import

Guard and Reserve members live and work in more 

four thousand communities nationwide and have a u

community-based legitimacy that encompasses re

language and a knowledge of the local geography and 

terrain. They are a part of the community infrastr

and understand the local culture. Many are already fa

with local emergency response plans and procedure

have close links with the fire, police, and emergency m

personnel who will be first on the scene. They may e

an element of the local response infrastructure. Oth

members are already trained in the combat support/c

service support capabilities that are needed in a di

response situation. Some have experience in perfo

disaster response with local communities becaus

previous response to natural or man-made disaster

these reasons, our RCs are an obvious first choi

supporting the local responders in almost every situ

Since 1997, a number of documents 

institutionalized RC involvement in WMD CM acti

The “Tiger Team Report,” Defense Reform Initiativ

and two Defense Planning Guidance documents 

identified roles and missions and funding responsib

for the RC. Specifically, the January 1998 Tiger 

Report identified required response capabilities 

192
aftermath of a WMD attack and which Re

components/functions could augment elements 

Federal Response Plan. The Secretary of Defense ac

and implemented some portions of the report throu

program budget decision process, which iden

resources to ensure the recommendations 

implemented. 

Also in January 1998, Defense Reform Initiativ

requested a DoD plan for integrating the Guar

Reserve into domestic WMD terrorism response

subsequent Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) docu

directed the Services to “program for equip

operations, exercises, and sustainment of RC res

forces that support civil authorities in man

consequences of terrorist use of WMD.” The direct

these two DPG documents was significant beca

established WMD CM as a competing priority with 

defense initiatives, even though WMD CM response h

been identified as an RC “mission.”

On January 26, 1998, the Deputy Secretary of D

approved DoD’s Plan for “Integrating the Guar

Reserve into Domestic Weapons of Mass Destr

Terrorism Response.” The approved plan leverages u

Guard and Reserve capabilities to improve DoD’s ab

plan for and respond to the significant and growing 

posed to U.S. citizens by WMD, such as nuclear deton

release of a biological agents such as anthrax, or ch

substances like sarin gas. Concurrently, it created 

type of unit (WMD Civil Support Team [CST]) to help 

existing gaps in civilian response capabilities, esp

those of local responders, who need to rapidly determi

precise nature of WMD attacks.

The Guard and Reserve share many of the 

capabilities, which include aviation operations, searc

rescue, engineer operations, transportation, mainte

law enforcement, fire-fighting, mortuary affairs, exp

193
ordnance, bridging operations, communications, com

and control, medical assets, and chemical capabilitie

The National Guard has an additional organiza

asset unique to the Guard. In many states, the Ad

General is also responsible for state emer

management. This “dual hat” is often the key to a time

effective response. Additionally, the Guard, as a 

controlled and directed asset, has the ability to get 

disaster event well before other federal assets 

respond. Concurrently, the Reserves are part of our f

force and do not report to the governors. Therefore, 

they have similar kinds of capabilities, such as airli

medical forces, as well as unique capabilities, such a

Affairs, they are part of the federal response and can

engaged until there is a federally declared emergency

slows the response time but does not diminish 

contribution once on the scene. Together, the Guar

Reserve forge a formidable team, already uniquely t

and pre-positioned throughout the United States, re

respond within hours of a disaster event. Because of 

inherent advantages, the DoD is aggressively eval

how it can leverage existing Guard and Reserve capab

for a WMD response.

Prior to the initiative to fully integrate the RC

Active Components had a variety of response capab

most of which were found in the Army: two respons

forces, technical escort and explosive ordnance di

units, defense coordinating officers, and 

congressionally-mandated Chemical/biological 

Response Team. Additionally, the Marine Corps 

370-member Chemical-Biological Incident Response 

Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLOs

are Selected Reserve officers, augmented this 

response capability. These elements, with the excep

the EPLOs, have a war fighting requirement, bu

perform their functions in the United States as part 

regular hazard response for normal disasters, and wo

called upon in a WMD incident as well. This assu

194
presidential disaster declaration. But, as was disc

earlier, when time is of the essence, the Guard c

mobilized faster to provide the support that’s n

quickly in an initial state response. And key t

initiative was to fully integrate the RCs.

With that goal in mind, some of the capab

currently in development are primarily state asset

WMD CSTs (formally known as Rapid Assessmen

Initial Detection [RAID] Teams) were designed to be 

assets, operating within federal doctrine, but und

command and control of the state governor, via the 

Adjutant General; and therefore, they are able to resp

a local/state disaster or emergency well before f

response assets could be brought to bear. Their pr

mission is to rapidly respond/move to the incident 

assist the local incident commanders in assessin

nature of the emergency/disaster, to advise local auth

on how to proceed, and to facilitate the applicat

appropriate DoD support and technical assistance

teams were established in 1999, one in each of th

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Re

An additional 17 teams have been authorized and w

placed in areas of high population density or in remote 

such as Alaska and Hawaii. FY2000 funding for these 

was $74.7 million, and the FY 2001 budget request is 

The existing teams have been undergoing a vig

training and exercise program, and the final pieces o

equipment are being procured and integrated.

In addition to the CSTs, DoD is also equippin

training existing Guard and Reserve units that a

have decontamination and reconnaissance 

war-fighting skills on how to work with civilian 

responders as part of the incident command system. D

the next several years, DoD will complete the trainin

equipping of over 100 decontamination and nea

reconnaissance elements units in the Army Reserv

Army National Guard. Medical Patient Decontami

Teams in the Air National Guard and Air Force Reser

195
also receive additional training in domestic res

casualty decontamination and will be provided with 

military and commercial off-the-shelf equipmen

enhanced training in civilian HAZMAT procedures.

Finally, the “Tiger Team” report identified 13 add

areas where DoD would most likely be asked to p

support to the civilian community. All are areas whe

Guard and Reserve maintain considerable m

capability and are areas we are going to explore in 

depth. These include support in five medical areas: 

management, NBC medical response, me

decontamination, preventive medicine, and pharmac

In the next few years, DoD will also examine leve

existing Guard and Reserve capabilitie

communications, transportation, logistics, mor

affairs, information, security, and engineering.

While we can point to notable successes in establ

and integrating our RCs into the WMD response, the

still significant challenges to overcome before we rea

integration. The stand-up of the Joint Task Force 

Support at United States Joint Forces Comman

provide an on-scene standing military organiz

structure and command and control capability. The re

published RC Employment-2005 Study identified s

WMD CM roles for the RC, but also pointed out that t

a severe shortage of force protection equipment f

forces, both active and reserve, which may limit their 

to effectively respond. This is an area that mu

addressed quickly. Finally, it is likely that any 

incident will require a regional response rather than 

or state effort. Effecting this response will require 

coordination and organizational integration, and add

training and exercising, if we are to be successful.

Security is a national imperative. DoD is t

comprehensive steps to execute policies and plans to 

prepare and respond to an ever increasing array of th

including the domestic use of WMD. DoD will conti

196
explore ways to make our RCs a fully integrated part 

national WMD threat response.

197
CHAPTER 11

IN SUPPORT OF THE CIVIL AUTHORIT

Donald A. Haus

Military assistance to civilian authorities is not 

concept. From before the birth of this nation, the mi

whether militia or regular or both, has habitually sup

local, state, and federal civilian authorities in tim

manmade or natural disaster, civil unrest, or 

situations. This support was very often questiona

legality and usefulness. Over time, though, numerou

and directives have transformed this suppo

relationship into an institutionalized interdepartm

and interagency coordination and planning proces

changing nature of threats, however, has expande

scope of the military’s responsibilities in support of c

authorities. This old mission now involves an ever-wid

array of diverse military and Department of Defense 

organizations and agencies equipped with new termi

and new, evolving concepts.

The United States faces myriad threats today b

those caused by natural phenomenon. Many factors 

these threats more ominous. Foremost is U.S. preem

as a world power. Groups opposed to the thrust 

post-Cold war policies have multiplied in recent year

openness of the U.S. society provides an opportunity f

enemies to operate with more freedom than they woul

in more restrictive venues. Also exacerbating the thr

the global proliferation of cheap Weapons of 

Destruction (WMD). These threats can be describ

either international or domestic. Internat

threats fall into one of three separate categ

international terrorism, transnational threats

conventional attacks. The first category, internat

terrorism, consists of nations who view terrorism as 

199
of foreign policy such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Cub

North Korea, autonomous, transnational ter

organizations or groups possessing their 

infrastructures, personnel, financial arrangements

training facilities, and, finally, the loosely affi

extremist groups. The reasons for any type of te

attack by these groups are as varied as the groups 

individuals themselves. They range among rev

publicity, political change, visibility, financial gain

chaos!

Transnational threats are comprised o

transnational activity threatening the national secu

the United States. This includes international terr

narcotics trafficking, the proliferation of WMD an

delivery systems for such weapons, and organized cr

any individual or group that engages in such activity

The U.S. homeland appears to be impervio

conventional attacks, as we know them in the fores

future. Nevertheless, the possibility of such attacks 

especially an aerial or maritime attack using conven

platforms.

Domestic terrorism stems from domestic group

are based and operate entirely within the United Sta

territories, or possessions, and whose activities are di

at elements of the federal, local, or state governments 

U.S. civilian population. The United States is experi

a rapid growth in domestic terrorist groups.

The Critical Foundations Report of the Presid

Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection 

how the United States could protect itself from any te

threat. A simple but realistic answer is that th

protection besides vigilance is preparation. Being pre

is the responsibility of every citizen, community, bu

and government. For those in DoD, it is even more c

because its responsibilities are spread over a large a

200
Figure 1 entitled “Homeland Security” provid

excellent look at this diverse arena. Homeland Se

(formally known as Homeland Defense and still n

approved term) is defined as protecting our ter

population, and critical infrastructure at home by:

• Deterring and defending against foreign and do

threats.

• Supporting civil authorities for crisis and conseq

management.

• Helping to ensure the availability, inte

survivability, and adequacy of critical national asset

Homeland Security has a full line-up of players. No

do we have the mission spread between several Unifie

Functional Commands, but these commands must 

support of a number of Lead Federal Agencies (LFA

areas of responsibility of these Federal Agencies 

overlap with the result that DoD may find itself supp

several federal agencies simultaneously.

201

31

Infrastructure Protection

Defense of Adjacent Waters

Aerospace Defense

National Missile Defense

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Military Assistance to

Civil Authorities

Homeland Security

Figure 1. 
A possible example of this is a domestic WMD inc

The FBI has the lead in crisis management for the in

whereas the Federal Emergency Management A

(FEMA) would have the lead for consequence manag

operations. However, the FBI retains overall the r

LFA until they release it to FEMA. Even with a

federal support, the local and state responders will 

first on the scene and will usually remain in cha

coordinate consequence management operations

challenge in this is to try to integrate and coordin

effective DoD response to support civilian authorities. T

accomplished by thorough planning.

Under the Constitution, the civilian governm

responsible for preserving public order and carryin

governmental operations within its territorial limit

DoD may provide forces to support civil authorit

mitigate the effects of civil emergencies— catastrophi

hurricanes, floods, civil disturbances, and earthq

Such support usually occurs after a presidential decla

of a major disaster or an emergency. The support is de

to supplement the efforts and resources of state and 

governments and voluntary organizations but only 

limited time and until the civil authorities can reaso

accomplish these tasks without DoD support. The F

Response Plan (FRP) provides the national architect

coordinate the actions of all supporting federal ag

including DoD.

Army forces will provide support as part of th

effort primarily in accordance with DoD Directive 30

Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA)

MACA directive is wide ranging and address both n

and man made disasters and includes military assista

civil disturbances, counterdrug activities, comb

terrorism, and law enforcement. The Secretary of the 

is designated as the DoD Executive Agent for non

MACA. (See Figure 2.)

202
The Secretary of the Army uses the Director of M

Support (DOMS) as the Action Agent to plan, coord

and direct MACA operations across all Command

Chief (CINC) lines. The military services and DoD ag

all lend support to the effort. In the case of MACA, the

three CINCs who have the responsibility for al

territory as follows:

• United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCO

48 contiguous states;

• United States Pacific Command (USPACO

Alaska, Hawaii, and the Pacific Islands;

• United States Southern Command (USSOUTH

— Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

The DoD uses a standard organization within the C

to execute MACA mission. Figure 2 shows a basic tem

of the DoD Support to an incident. Each CINC is respo

for planning and executing MACA operations in his a

203

7

Command and Control

USJFCOM

(CONUS)

Executive

Agent

Action

Agent

Operating

Agent

LOA

USPACOM

(Pacific/Alaska)

Secretary of Defense

Secretary of the Army

COORDINATION

Lead

Federal

Agency

JOINT

STAFF

DOMS

Deputy DOMS

FORSCOM

President

USSOUTHCOM

(P.R./U.S.V.I.)

Figure 2.
responsibility. Two of the CINCs use a subord

command to execute the mission. Within USJFCOM, 

Command is the subordinate command appointed 

Lead Operational Authority (LOA) for plannin

executing non-WMD MACA.

Forces Command has a broad range of domestic su

responsibilities as USJFCOM’s Lead Operat

Authority for Military Support to Civil Authorities. 

Command’s most challenging responsibilities are to d

USJFCOM domestic emergency plans, coordinate 

FEMA for disaster response IAW the Federal Res

Plan, train DoD Defense Coordinating Officers (

monitor the readiness of specialized Reserve Comp

WMD response elements, and execute military oper

in support of many emergency activities. As the 

component for USJFCOM, FORSCOM also provides 

equipment, and other resources for MACA missio

directed by CINCUSJFCOM.

The Commanding General, FORSCOM, cur

conducts regional disaster relief planning, coordinatio

execution through the two Continental U.S. A

(CONUSA): the First United States Army located a

Gillem, Georgia, and the Fifth United States Army l

at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. The First U.S. Army ov

27 states and the District of Columbia that comprise 

Regions I, II, III, IV, and V. The Fifth U.S. Army a

responsibility consists of 21 states and encompasses 

Regions VI, VII, VIII, IX, and X.

For certain type of missions, usually natural disa

requiring limited DoD support, a CINC will dispa

Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) to serve as th

single point of contact for providing DoD resource

DCO validates mission requests from a civilian F

Coordinating Officer (FCO) located at the local F

federal disaster field office and coordinates the appro

military response.

204
The DCO is an active duty position. By DoD Dir

the appointed DCO will be a military officer in the gr

0-6. The DCO is not always an Army officer. Howev

Army (Forces Command) has pre-designated and tra

cadre of Army colonels to specifically perform this fun

Each of FORSCOM’s Training Support Brigade 

Commanders and Colonel Senior Army Advisor

trained to be a DCO and assigned to a particular sta

The DCO will coordinate disaster requests for assi

with the CONUSA. The CONUSA may then supp

requested asset or ask for FORSCOM to source the re

The DCO maintains Operational Control (OPCON) 

assigned DoD Forces, except the United States Army 

of Engineers (USACE), operating in the disaster area

the National Guard of each state is committed under 

Active Duty and will not be OPCON to the DCO. The 

remains under state control during disaster relief.

During vary large disasters, a Joint Task Force 

may be created for C2. In these cases, the DCO mai

205

18

Army Regional Planning

Agents

Army Regional Planning

Agents

Puerto Ric

Virgin Island

FEMA Regions , I, II, III, IV, V

FEMA Regions VI, VII, VIII, IX, X

FIFTH U.S. ARMY

FIRST U.S. ARMY

Figure 3.
the same relationship with the FCO. The DCO accep

taskings from the FCO and passes these to the JT

execution. Additionally, now the JTF maintains OPC

all DoD assigned forces in the disaster area (excep

Army Corps of Engineer assets).

Within DoD, each service maintains a cad

specifically trained reserve officers assigned to coor

MACA missions in each FEMA region and each state. 

positions are drilling reserve officers, not Active Gu

Reserve (AGR) or active duty. As a condition of employ

each Emergency Planning Liaison Officer (EPLO) ag

volunteer time during a disaster. Once volun

activated, the EPLOs work in support of the FEMA 

or the appointed DCO for the disaster. The EPLO’s ro

help liaison and coordinate between the FEMA, stat

local officials and DoD. EPLOs are expected to b

experts on the plans and procedures within their resp

federal region and state. State EPLOs are also expec

become familiar with all service capabilities within 

state and establish relationships with service insta

commanders. Even though the EPLOs are not comma

nor do they control assets, they are the eyes and ears 

RPA and DCO. The EPLOs are assigned within t

FEMA regions and in each state, territo

commonwealth. They are also located many dif

military organizations: at the two CONUSAs, FORS

the Air Force National Security Emergency Prepare

(AFNSEP) headquarters, the Air Force Emer

Headquarters Relocation Site, the Director of M

Support, and the Office of the Deputy Under Secret

Defense for Preparedness.

The WMD Act of 1996 directed DoD to orga

response task force (RTF) for WMD incidents

subsequently formed two RTFs: RTF-East located 

First U.S. Army area and RTF-West located in the 

U.S. Army area. The RTFs are separate and distinc

JTFs used for disaster relief missions and are specif

deployment to WMD incidents only. The RTF wo

206
OPCON to USJFCOM during support to crisis manag

and upon direction of the CINCUSJFCOM, may rev

OPCON to the FORSCOM Commander during supp

consequence management.

The RTF commander, usually a CONUSA D

Commanding General, forms the organization 

internal personnel and equipment resources o

CONUSA headquarters. FORSCOM allocates Army 

duty and Army Reserve units based on mi

requirements and the task force continually gro

shrinks as mission requirements change.

Today, the RTF commander, also has a limited n

of specially focused response assets to call upon for 

incidents. These elements, including the Army’s Tec

Escort Unit (TEU), the Navy’s Medical Research Ins

Lab, and the Marine Corps’ Chemical Biological In

Response Force, are specially trained and equipp

respond in a nuclear, biological or chemical environm

A 1999 DoD Directive further expanded the mil

ability to respond to a WMD incident. This directive n

the USCINCJFCOM as the Executive Agent for 

consequence management in the Department of De

USJFCOM has primary responsibility for plannin

executing MACA for consequence management for 

incidents within the United States, its territories, a

possessions. Its primary focus is developing, coordin

reviewing, and maintaining all Joint Doctrine and 

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (JTTP) to 

services in executing consequence management opera

USJFCOM was also tasked to create a standing Join

Force for Civil Support (JTF-CS). The JTF-CS 

deployable headquarters created to plan, coordinat

execute DoD support for domestic WMD incidents

operating concepts and procedures for this newly f

organization are still being solidified.

The military must continue to improve upon ex

readiness and develop the capabilities, technologie

207
techniques that will be required to confront any fo

attack on the U.S. homeland. The Army, as a member 

joint team, must be ready to respond and support th

authorities of this country against any disaster, incid

attack no matter what shape or form it comes in

country demands our knowledge, our expertise, an

courage. When we look in the eyes of the American pub

must be able to honestly say—“We did our best.”

208
CHAPTER 12

WHERE DOMESTIC SECURITY

AND CIVIL LIBERTIES COLLIDE

1

Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.

Imagine, if you will, that there was fairly hard ev

that next year a group of people would kill 4

Americans, injure another 6 million,

2

 and inflict som

billion in economic losses on this country.

3

 Compar

situation with a problem that last year killed or inju

one and cost, at most, some $8 billion.

4

 Which one wou

should—garner the most attention of the national se

community? 

One would think that the military would put em

on the former, while the latter would be left to st

federal law enforcement personnel to sort out. Actual

focus is much the reverse. The first set of numbers des

the annual impact of motor vehicle accidents whi

second represents the combined costs of nuclear, biol

chemical, and cyber attacks on the United States

some experts—many of whom once apocalyptically 

Y2K

5

 perils—insist that the U.S. homeland is excepti

vulnerable to such threats. And the U.S. milit

listening. Today, it is beginning to pour resource

efforts to defend against dangers that have 

manifested themselves not only here, but anywhere.

It is, of course, true that the potential dangers po

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are very gre

theory. No one disputes that we should take prudent 

to defend against them. Prudence dictates, howe

hardnosed assessment of risk so that reasonable dec

are made as to how to focus effort and allocate 

resources. Accordingly, as we look at the many chal

facing the armed forces today, we ought to conside

during the period 1993-98 (the latest government f

209
available) there were only seven casualties (primari

result of the World Trade Center bombing) from 

international terrorist action in North America.

6

Nevertheless, the U.S. Government has stepped 

efforts to combat terrorism. For example, Presid

Decision Directive 62 (PDD-62) was issued in 1998. P

made fighting terrorism “a top national security obje

to be pursued with the “goal of ensuring that we me

threat of terrorism in the 21st century with the sam

that we have met military threats in this century.“

7

 D

the rhetoric of a “national security objective,” ter

remains formally a law enforcement problem, an

official aim is to “bring terrorists to justice for their cri

Law enforcement problems are, of course, not a trad

responsibility of the uniformed services.

Clearly, not every threat to “national security” 

definition the responsibility of the armed forces. F

schools, economic troubles, and social unrest m

imperil national security broadly construed, but it do

necessarily follow that the military should pr

solutions. The courts have repeatedly held that the pu

of the armed forces is “to fight or be ready to figh

should the occasion arise.”

9

 Yet the military is ever 

frequently employed to confront a broader range of na

ills. Why? One reason is that the military seems 

things done. In a very insightful 1991 article in A

Monthly magazine, James Fallows wrote, “I am beg

to think that the only way the national government c

anything worthwhile done is to invent a security thre

turn the job over to the military.”

10

In my view, when what is “turned over to the milit

something that is principally a law enforcement pro

the military—and the nation—assumes risk. The

relatively few modern examples where systematic use 

military to meet internal security threats has been go

democracy or, for that matter, the military itself. As 

latter, consider the performance of the Argentine 

210
during the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas conflict. Arg

soldiers, who had proven themselves rather exp

torturing and killing their fellow citizens in in

security operations, were rather less effective when 

the British Army on the battlefield. The mere prese

real soldiers—the Gurkha Regiment and elite par

units—panicked many Argentine conscripts into surr

with hardly a shot fired. Internal security dut

something to military forces, and I submit it 

something good for warfighting.

But let us focus on the impact on democratic values 

regularized use of the military for policing-type du

believe the Founding Fathers would be rather horri

the suggestion that the regular military force

“standing army” so to speak, were to be used i

systemized way for internal security. They were 

cognizant of the excesses of Cromwell’s New Model A

England,

11

 and resented the use of Royal troops 

colonies to suppress the growing protest against im

rule.

12

 The killing of five colonists in 1770 by the B

Army still resonates as the “Boston Massacre.”

From the very beginning, Americans conside

standing army a threat to liberty. They also did n

supporting troops through taxes or otherwise. In fa

infusion of British regulars into local communities w

reason one of the least known parts of the Constitutio

Third Amendment, was later adopted. 

provision—which sounds quaint to modern ears—f

the quartering of troops in private homes withou

consent of the owners. We are hardly aware o

Amendment because the military establishment has 

avoided doing things that would awaken l

antimilitarism infringing upon Americans in their h

To me, history teaches us that there is a fo

antimilitarism deeply embedded in the Ame

character.

13

 It is usually benign, but represents a pot

that today’s militaries must never forget. We should k

211
mind that what the architects of the Constitution 

hoped was that a professional military of any size wou

be required.

14

 In terms of a military establishment

conceived of one not designed for force projection but 

an organization distinctly defensive in character. It 

center on a small cadre of full-time professionals who 

be augmented in wartime by mustering of huge 

militias. The militia system never really work

originally envisioned, but, up until the start of the Col

the pattern in the United States was a small sta

peacetime force that grew rapidly during conflicts th

the massive addition of volunteers and conscripts.

The small size of the professional military, if n

else, precluded much interference with the rig

American citizens during most of U.S. history. Wartim

create exceptions, but Americans generally did not li

experience. During the Civil War, for example, the m

sought to exercise martial law authority.

15

 In the cas

Parte Milligan,

16

 a civilian—a lawyer, incidentally,

tried by military commission for various seditious ac

sentenced to death. The Supreme Court ultimately 

out the conviction, holding that, so long as the civil 

remained open, the military could not extend its aut

to civilians, even under the exigencies of national secu

wartime.

One of the principal examples of the systemized 

the armed forces for law enforcement in peacetime w

the post-Civil War south. Again, the experience was 

good one and eventually produced legislation that 

represents the principal legal impediment to the use 

military for law enforcement duties. Largely as a re

questionable activities of federal troops in respons

railroad strike and during the election of 1878,

17

 Co

passed the Posse Comitatus Act.

18That statute—whic

welcomed by most military officers at 

time

19—criminalizes the use of the armed forces to e

the laws (subject to a few exceptions). As influential 

212
in many situations, there has never been a convicti

violation of the Act.

Of course, troops have always been used to su

riots and other domestic civil disorders throughou

history.

20

 These were mainly situations wher

disturbances plainly exceeded available police reso

Perhaps the darkest, most disturbing uses of the m

for internal security purposes was during the 1960

70s, a period made turbulent by the confluence of civil 

and antiwar protests. Professor Loch Johnson report

not only was the National Security Agency se

recording every cable sent overseas by Americans for a

30 years, “Army intelligence units conducted investig

against 100,000 Americans during the Vietnam Wa

Senate investigation (the Church Committee) in the 

1970s made public for the first time the extensive sc

the military’s surveillance of U.S. citizens.

22

 Whe

military’s activities were revealed, a plethora of legis

and other regulations followed.

23

 These still lim

information the armed forces can collect on Am

citizens domestically. So damaging were the ex

exposed, the military’s appetite for domestic se

activities dampened markedly.

By the early 1980s, however, the drug crisis i

country catalyzed Congress into passing a num

legislative initiatives to involve the armed forces in th

on drugs.

24

 The United States was in the midst of a 

wave for which illegal narcotics was much to blam

which Congress believed was overwhelming police 

The new authorities still restricted the military 

engaging in direct law enforcement activities, su

search and seizure, and arrests—but they did perm

provision of training, equipment, and specialized tec

services. The nearly 2-decade effort has cost billion

involves even today thousands of soldiers, sailors

airmen. As will be discussed below, these activities 

controversial.

213
Today, we see fears of terrorism against hom

targets fueling a renewed effort to involve the milit

domestic security. This is especially true with resp

cyberterrorism. In May of 1998 Presidential De

Directive (PDD) 63

25

 was issued which sets out a blu

to expand the role of the Department of Defense (D

countering cyber terrorism. Specifically, DoD is listed 

“lead agency” in the area of “national defense.”

26

 As 

DoD is “coordinating all of the activities of the United 

Government in that area.”

27

 PDD 63 does not, how

define the parameters of “national defense,”

28

 an esp

problematic situation given the dual-use (i.e., used b

military and civilian persons) nature of many of the sy

subject to cyber assaults. How can DoD escape intr

into civilian areas with such a loosely defined missio

Other steps also have been taken just in the last y

so. Notwithstanding the withering criticism of the Na

Security Agency (NSA) by the Church Committee 

1970s, DoD has assumed an “information assu

mission.”

29

 According to its own public documen

“conducts defensive information operations, to a

information assurance for information infrastru

critical to U.S. national security interests.”

30

 Towar

end of 1998, DoD also established Joint Task 

Computer Network Defense (JTF-CND)

31

 and taske

coordinate the defense of all DoD computer system

October 1999 JTF-CND,

33

 along with the Joint Inform

Operations Center was placed under the control o

Space Command (USSPACECOM). In a separate p

DoD established the Defense Computer Forensics L

September of 1999.

34

 Among other things, the lab se

chase across the Internet hackers who assault 

systems.

35

Not all of the recent effort has focused exclusiv

defending against domestic cyber attacks. After disc

of the establishment of a “Homeland Defense” com

was aborted when civil libertarians complained

established Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF

214
JTF-CS has a relatively uncontentious charter that m

tasks it to assist civilian authorities in “conseq

management,” that is, dealing with the after effect

catastrophe, regardless of its source, but most like

result of terrorism involving WMD, inclu

cyberterrorism. In announcing the new task force

conceded that the benign title of “civil support” an

selection of a National Guardsman instead of a R

officer as the commander were both intended to qu

concerns of civil libertarians who feared that the “Do

out to take over and would trample people’s civil lib

with the new organization.

36

Parenthetically, it seems to make sense that m

these homeland defense missions would default 

National Guard. Conceptually, such a mission 

appear to fit with the traditional, local orientation 

Guard. Moreover, its historical citizen-soldier model s

temper public concerns about an overreaching “sta

army.” In a way, however, Total Force has bee

successful. With fewer and fewer members of the 

showing any military experience in their resume

average citizen perceives no differences among 

persons in uniform. Everyone—regardless of compon

is, for example, “the Army” in a corporate sense 

proverbial “man in the street.”

Accordingly, any improper action by one compone

probably be imputed to all. Another Kent State shooti

undermine the reputation of the Regular A

notwithstanding that the Reserves or Guard migh

committed the act. Thus, it is unlikely that designa

Guard officer as the JTF-CS commander as opposed 

officer from another component will have any 

ameliorating effect on potential civil-military rel

friction. It may even have an aggravating effect becau

Guard (and to a lesser extent the Reserves) has no tra

of being apolitical. The openly political behavior of so

the Guard carries great potential to create tensions be

215
the armed forces and the citizenry if the trend to

greater involvement in law enforcement activities per

Why is the use of armed forces as an internal se

tool considered so suspect by civil libertarians and o

Secretary of Defense William Cohen captured a key 

when speaking about the frustrations of the A

attempts to police areas in Kosovo, commented in Ja

2000 that the Army is “not trained for that; they a

competent really to carry out police work, nor should t

doing it.”

37

 Cohen is right, but not just in the Kosovo co

From the constabulary peacekeeping missions of the 

we learned that the skills of the combat soldier a

necessarily coterminous with those of the policeman

Although this should be intuitive, many unif

people fail to sufficiently appreciate that ther

fundamental differences and, I would su

incompatibilities between the culture of the soldie

culture of the policeman. One could almost say th

mental wiring is different. For example, it always a

me that some officers believe that their oath to “suppo

defend” the Constitution against “all enemies, foreig

domestic”

38

 is somehow license (if not duty) to eng

domestic law enforcement activities. It is as if they b

that persons suspected of crimes are somehow do

“enemies” of the state. Of course, under our system o

those accused of crimes are innocent persons until p

otherwise in a court of law—not enemies of the 

domestic or otherwise. But military people are orien

think of adversaries as enemies, not as suspects enti

the presumption of innocence.

This difference in thought patterns manifests it

other ways as well. Members of the armed forces th

power in brute, physical terms: mass, weight of effort

of fire, and so forth. A law enforcement officer draw

power not from his weaponry per se, but from 

authority his status and position in society exe

interesting to note that experts are starting to realiz

216
the militarization of the police in the past two decade

is, their tendency to ape military organizations th

SWAT units, heavier weapons, body armor, and so 

may well be counterproductive. Such factors unde

their effectiveness by creating a new mindset bas

physical power that diminishes their moral author

discussing the explosion in the number of distu

incidents across the country of heavy-handed 

behavior, former police chief John McNamara adm

recently that “some corrosive assumptions [have] cre

police culture.”

39

 He says,

The fundamental duty of police is to protect human life. But 

many places that understanding has been superseded by 

militaristic approach, one that allows for an accepta

number of casualties and that views much of the population 

hostile.

40

Military authorities ought to take note of the pro

that a “militaristic approach” generates. Moreover, j

some in the armed forces tend to perceive American ci

suspected of crimes as “enemies” of the state, m

members can also evaluate threats very differently th

properly-focused and trained law enforcement pers

Consider the 1997 shooting of a Texas teenage sheph

a Marine Corps border surveillance patrol. The you

(who was probably unaware of the camouflaged m

presence) may simply have been casually shooting at 

as he tended his flock, but the Marines seem to have m

this as fire being directed against them, and responde

deadly force. A policeman faced with a threat ma

retreat and contain a situation out of concern not on

himself and other innocents, but also for the safety 

“threat” itself. But a military person thinks of dest

threats, not keeping them safe for arrest and ju

disposition, and this may have been a factor in the 

shooting.

Consider this mindset in the cyberterrorism cont

you do, it should be no surprise—given the mil

217
perspective—that a Pentagon-sponsored report argue

the Pentagon’s “policy of prohibiting DoD from moun

counter cyberattack if its computers are attacked pu

military at risk.”

41

 In responding to the report’s prop

allow the military to immediately launch an elec

counterattack, John Pike of the Federation of Am

Scientists quipped, “Does this mean that the Pentago

start frying the home PCs of American teen-age hack

I hope not, but maybe.

Furthermore, the threat of cyberterrorism is gene

calls from some to abandon the policy that limits the 

the military’s intelligence gathering and other res

against domestic cyber-incidents. U.S. policy today as

that, absent evidence to the contrary, cyber assaults i

U.S. persons. The presumption of a “U.S. person” 

that it is thus first and foremost a law enforcement m

This ensures that the judicial process is used in the 

intrusion into the citizenry is required in the course 

investigation. It also greatly limits the involvement 

military, and especially its intelligence gathering a

The new proposals call for a revised policy that pre

the digital “intruder is not a U.S. person,” thus perm

“the full capabilities of the United States’ investigativ

intelligence assets” to be “brought to bear” as some de

Legislation allowing the military and other intell

agencies to investigate U.S. citizens is currently 

consideration.

I believe such proposals are often welcomed with

military establishment (and even outside of it) becau

not well appreciated exactly why the armed 

represents a far greater threat to civil liberties than d

the most robust law enforcement organizations. The g

of the American scheme of law enforcement organi

from a civil liberties perspective is that the 

represented by more than 780,000 sworn officers is di

into over 18,000 independent or semi-independent 

forces subject to local control. If a particular agency 

amok, there is ample counterbalance available. Th

218
really no similar counterbalance to the U.S. m

establishment. This is not much of a concern so long 

armed forces remains externally focused—the thr

rights at home is minimized. But no such assurance 

made once the physical power, mental energy

organizational unity of the armed forces turns i

toward the American citizenry itself.

Nevertheless, the military must turn inward 

threat to homeland security is such that existin

enforcement agencies are incapable of dealing with 

must recognize that if that occurs, civil liberties are a

certain to be at risk. In 1997 Secretary of Defense 

admitted, 

terrorism is escalating to the point that citizens of the Uni

States may soon have to choose between civil liberties a

more intrusive forms of protection.

44

The “more intrusive form of protection” could, of c

involve the military.

The armed forces certainly have a role to p

confronting terrorism, but not necessarily an intrusiv

In the short term, I believe that the military’s r

consequence management is a necessary one—there 

is no option in the case of a cataclysmic nuclear, biol

or chemical attack. While it may be wise to build and 

the necessary consequence management organizati

the civilian sector as is currently underway, it seems 

that the episodic nature of such events, as well a

limited scope of the military’s role, makes the risk t

liberties manageable.

I am much more concerned about the use of the m

to confront the threat of cyberterrorism. The in

nature of cyber investigations, as well as the tec

difficulty of determining the origin of cyber attacks, a

by definition will result in military confrontations wit

citizens, many of whom will be innocent of any offens

key question is whether or not military involvem

219
really warranted by the threat. In my view, it is not. I b

that all the dour predictions that a teenager with a 

Pilot could hack New York into darkness are 

overblown.

Writing in the winter issue of Foreign Policy,

45

 cyb

expert Martin Libicki asserts that conducting a 

meaningful attack on critical computer systems is fa

difficult than popular wisdom suggests. Libicki poin

that if it were really as cheap and as easy to do as so 

cyberzealots claim, someone, somewhere, would hav

it already. Countering this view, Professor Dan Kueh

National Defense University testified before Congr

February on this issue. He said that the rea

full-fledged cyberattack has not been launched is 

because no state or non-nation state actor has ye

sufficient strategic advantage to be gained by doing so

this condition will not last indefinitely.”

46

I do not share Professor Kuehl’s view. There a

many actors out there—Slobodan Milosevic, Sa

Hussein, Osama bin Laden, and many others—who 

surely hurt the United States if they could, especially 

could do so anonymously as the cyberzealots in

possible. Looking beyond our borders, does anyone ser

believe that Chechens would refrain from launch

devastating computer attack against Russia? Woul

see no “strategic advantage” in doing so, even though 

country is being demolished and their people slaughte

Russian troops? What about the Kurds suffering in Ir

Turkey? How about the IRA against Britain?

The idea that all of these different groups would c

precisely the same strategic conclusion to “desist” vi

all these potential targets despite profound cu

differences simply strains credibility too far. Th

reason crippling attacks have not taken place is tha

just too hard to do—and getting harder every day 

financial rewards of e-commerce are stimulating 

expenditures for net security. Keep in mind that I a

220
talking about denial-of-service attacks

47

 that close d

commercial web site for a couple of hours

48—that shou

be a military concern—I’m talking about taking dow

nation’s critical infrastructures for a significant peri

Does this mean that serious and costly cyber inc

will never occur? No. It merely means that th

insufficient evidence today to require a military role 

law enforcement aspects. Even a hugely tragic in

involving thousands of deaths and billions in damage 

more of a risk—and no more beyond the abilit

traditional law enforcement entities to address—tha

as previously discussed, the motor vehicle acciden

suffer every year or, for that matter, the World Trade C

or Oklahoma City bombings. We should recall that M

Van Creveld maintains terrorism has not succeed

developed states because modernity itself pro

redundancies and work-arounds that rapidly mitigat

savage attacks.

49

 Cyberterrorism cannot bring Ame

its knees.

The military ought to get involved in hom

cyberdefense when it becomes apparent that some opp

has a genuine capability to inflict losses extensive eno

truly cripple critical military or civilian systems in 

way as to really harm to our vital interests and threat

way of life. I do not believe such proof exists. Neverth

our military and civilian leaders repeatedly insist w

vulnerable to an “electronic Pearl Harbor.”

50

 Usin

rhetoric of the infamous sneak attack is a clever w

shock people into supporting the kind of civil l

compromises about which Secretary Cohen spoke.

To me, however, Pearl Harbor suggests other im

They are scenes of U.S. Army troops herding loyal ci

into barb-wired detention camps because of rhetoric a

threat that in reality was nonexistent. Although it m

fashionable today to say that racism explains the trea

of Japanese-Americans in the wake of Pearl Harbo

reality is much different. A careful reading of the Su

221
Court’s decision in Korematsu v. United States,

51

 r

that honorable men in the embrace of genuine—

wildly mistaken—fears made the decision to incar

hundreds of thousands of equally honorable Am

citizens. That said, we should learn from this histo

real danger to American values posed by overestima

the dangers we face.

As we calculate the risks of an enhanced role f

military in homeland defense, we should recall th

damaging revelations of the Church Committee in the 

1970s heralded a post-Vietnam downward slide f

Army and the military in general. After an enormous 

in the late 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. armed forces em

to become what is today the most trusted institut

American society.

52

 Yet we seem to have forgotte

lessons of the past. I am absolutely convinced t

deepening involvement of the armed forces in any k

domestic activity associated with law enforceme

investigations carries great potential to re-ignit

anti-militarism that is never far from the surface 

American psyche. The huge controversy over the a

role of military in the fiery conclusion of David Ko

standoff with Federal authorities at Waco, Texas, s

serve as a warning in this regard. In an era when the 

forces are already struggling to recruit and retain th

and brightest, a loss of public confidence and trust wo

a real catastrophe.

Finally, I’m convinced that terrorists can cause 

harm to our way of life by forcing us to give up ou

liberties than they can by the actual damage they mig

The San Francisco Chronicle made this point in an ed

where it reported that “terrorist hackers” and other th

will probably put pressure on the military to move into dome

law enforcement, blurring the line between domestic 

foreign threats.

53

222
It wisely counseled that “it is better to live with d

than in the security of a police state.”

54

 I believe tha

Americans share that view, and it ought to shap

military’s response as we consider the U.S.’s hom

defense policies.

CHAPTER 12 - ENDNOTES

1. Elements of this presentation were drawn from Meet

Challenge of Cyberterrorism: Defining the Military Role in a Dem

Paper presented by the author at the Symposium on Cyberter

“The World Held Hostage in the Digital Age,” Villanova Un

School of Law,Villanova, PA, March 18, 2000 (copy on file w

author). A version of that presentation will be published by th

War College in Fall 2000.

2. Per e-mail with Michael Baxter, Insurance Institute of I

March 15, 2000 (on file with author).

3. See National Highway Traffic Safety Administratio

Economic Cost of Motor Vehicle Crashes, 1994 (1995) I

http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/economic/ecomvc199

(accessed March 15, 2000).

4. John J. Stanton, “Rules Of Cyberwar Baffle U.S. Gove

Agencies,” National Defense, February 2000, In

http://ebird.dtic.mil/Feb2000/s20000208rules.htm (accessed 

15, 2000).

5. “Y2K” is shorthand for “Year 2000” and refers to the ano

some software programs that causes dates after 1999 to be m

resulting in erroneous calculations. For information on th

program to address Y2K, see http://www.defenselin

issues/y2k.html (accessed March 15, 2000).

6. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordina

Counterterrorism, “Total International Casualties by 

1993-1998,” in Patterns of Global Terrorism 1998 (1999) I

http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1998Repor

(accessed April 11, 2000).

7. See The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Com

Terrorism: Presidential Decision Directive 62, May 22, 199

Sheet), Internet http://www.pub.Whitehouse.Gov/u

223
I2R?urn:pdi:/ /oma.eop.gov.us/1998/5/22/7.text.1 (accessed A

2000).

8. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordina

Counterterrorism, U.S. Counterterrorism Policy, In

http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/index.html (a

April 11, 2000).

9. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955).

10. James Fallows, “Military Efficiency,” The Atlantic M

August 1991, p. 18.

11. See, generally, William S. Fields & David Hardy, “The 

and the Constitution: A Legal History,” Military Law Review, Vo

136, 1992, pp. 9-13; see also Caleb Carr, “The Troubled Genius o

Cromwell,” Military History Quarterly, Summer 1990, p. 82.

12. See, generally, Fields and Hardy, pp. 25-26.

13. See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., “Welcome to the Junta: The 

of Civilian Control of the U.S. Military,” Wake Forest Law Revi

29, No. 341, Summer 1994, pp. 342-354.

14. See, generally, Fields and Hardy, pp. 9-13; see also Carr, 

15. See, generally, Charles Fairman, Martial Law, C

Callaghan and Company, 1943, pp. 108-116.

16. 71 U.S. 2, 1866.

17. Stephen Dycus, Arthur L. Berney, William C. Banks, an

Raven-Hansen, National Security Law, New York: Little, Bro

Company, 1990, p. 427.

18. Act of June 18, 1878, ch. 263, § 15, 20 Stat. 152 (current 

at 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (Supp. 1999)).

19. Jerry Cooper, “The Posse Comitatus Act,” in John Wh

Chambers, II, ed., The Oxford Companion to American Military H

1999, pp. 555-556.

20. See, generally, David E. Engdahl, Soldiers, Rio

Revolution: The Law and History of Military Troops in Civil Di

57 Iowa Law Rev. 1, October 1971.

21. Loch K. Johnson, A Season of Inquiry, 1985, p. 223.

224
22. See, generally, Ibid.

23. See, for example, Foreign Intelligence Act of 1978, 50 U.S

1801-1811, 1991; and Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,94

(limiting, inter alia, the use of intelligence agencies including 

the armed forces to collect information on persons within the 

States).

24. See, for example, Department of Defense Authorizati

Pub. L. No. 97-86, § 905(a)(1), 95 Stat. 1099, 1115 (1981), ame

National Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 100-456, § 1104

Stat. 1918, 2043 (1988); National Defense Authorization Act fo

Year 1990 and 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-189, § 1216(a), Nov. 29, 19

Stat. 1352, 1569 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 371-380 (1988).

25. The White House, White Paper, The Clinton’s Admini

Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection: Presidential D

Directive 63, May 22, 1998 (hereinafter PDD 63) press release su

available at http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/ I2R?urn

oma.eop.gov.us/ 1998/5/26/1.text.1 (accessed March 12, 2000

26. Ibid., pp. 4, 8.

27. Ibid.

28. The Navy has the Fleet Information Warfare Center w

available at http://www.fiwc.navy.mil/html/home.html, (a

March 12, 2000), and the Army has the Information Ass

Directorate web site available at http://www.arm

disc4/isec/c2p/mission/mission.htm (accessed March 12, 2000

29. National Security Agency, Mission Statement, avail

http://www.nsa.gov/about_nsa/mission.html (accessed Ap

2000).

30. Ibid.

31. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public A

Joint Task Force On Computer Network Defense Now Oper

December 30, 1998, (press release) available at http:/

defenselink.mil/news/Dec1998/b12301998_bt658-98.html (a

March 15, 2000).

32. See Frank Wolfe, “Joint Task Force To Direct Pentagon’

Defense,” Defense Daily, January 26, 1999, p. 1, availa

http://ebird.dtic.mil/Jan1999/e19990126joint.htm (accessed 

15, 2000).

225
33. U.S. Space Command, USSPACECOM Takes Charge 

Computer Network Defenses, Release No. 19-99, October 1, 199

release) available at http://www.spacecom.af.mil/us

new19-99.htm (accessed March 15, 2000).

34. Douglas J. Gilbert, High-Tech Lab Ties Computers to 

American Forces Press Service, November 1999, availa

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov1999/n11021999_99

html (accessed March 15, 2000).

35. Ibid.

36. Linda D. Kozaryn, DoD Helps Hometown USA C

Terrorism, American Forces Press Service, January 2000, avai

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2000/n01132000_200

html (accessed March 16, 2000).

37. Department of Defense, News Briefing, Secretary of 

William S. Cohen and Secretary of State for Defense Geoffrey 

January 27, 2000 (quoting William S. Cohen) availa

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2000/t01272000_t00

html (accessed March 30, 2000).

38. 5 U.S.C.A. § 3331 (West 1996).

39. Ellis Close, “Cracks in the Thin Blue Line,” Newsweek, A

2000, p. 33 (quoting John McNamara).

40. Ibid.

41. See Bob Brewin, “Report: Allow Cyberwar Response,” 

Computer Week, March 29, 1999 (citing a report by the N

Resource Council), available at http://www.fcw.com

articles/1999/FCW_032999_255.asp (accessed March 15, 2000

42. Ibid.

43. Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., “Balancing Our Civil Liberties w

National Security Interests in Cyberspace,” Texas Review L

Policy, Vol. 4, No. 69, 1999, pp. 72-73 (emphasis in the original

44. As quoted in Patrick Pexton, “Banking on a Revolutio

Force Times, September 22, 1997, p. 3.

45. Martin Libicki, “Rethinking War: The Mouse’s New 

Foreign Policy, Winter 1999/2000, p. 30. Abstract avail

226
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/winter1999-2000/Libi

(accessed March 14, 2000).

46. Vernon Loeb, “Cyberwar’s Economic Threat,” The Was

Post, February 24, 2000, p. 19, quoting Dan Kuehl.

47. See, for example, Brendan I Koerner, “The Web’s Bad 

U.S. News & World Report, February 21, 2000, p. 19. (“The i

used an elementary method know as a denial of service attack

cripples a network by flooding it with too much information.”)

48. See Anne Plummer, “Pentagon Response To Com

Denial-of Service Attacks Limited,” Defense Informatio

Electronics Report, February 18, 2000, p. 1 (describing the d

service attacks in early 2000 as “little more than criminal misc

49. See, generally, Martin Van Creveld, Technology and Wa

2000 B.C. to the Present (revised and expanded edition), 19

305-306.

50. See Jim Garamone, Hamre “Cuts” Op Center Ribbon, 

Cyberwarriors, American Forces Information Services, Augus

available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug

n08241999_9908241.html (accessed March 11, 2000), quoting 

Defense Secretary Hamre (“Several times I’ve testified and talke

the future electronic Pearl Harbor to the United States”).

51. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).

52. Sixty-eight percent of Americans said they had “a great 

“quite a lot” of confidence in the military. Organized religion was 

at 58 percent. The Presidency and Congress were reported at 49 

percent, respectively. See Tamar A. Mehuron, “Military First in 

Confidence,” Air Force Magazine, March 2000, p. 9 (citing a la

Gallup poll), available at http://www.afa.org/mag

chart/0300chart.html (accessed April 5, 2000).

53. “New Terrorism Vs Individual Liberties,” San Fr

Chronicle, September 22, 1999, p. 22, available at http://ebi

mil/Sep1999/s19990923threats.htm (accessed March 15, 2000

54. Ibid.

227
CHAPTER 13

A STRATEGIC VIEW OF WHERE THE AR

IS: HOMELAND DEFENSE AND

ISSUES OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATION

Don M. Snider,

John A. Nagl,

and

Tony Pfaff

There is a proper understanding within the U.S. 

that the military must minimize its involveme

domestic affairs. Yet, the armed forces have been cal

more and more to provide direct aid and support in do

crises that range from HURRICANE ANDREW 

terrorist bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal Bu

Quick, efficient, and effective responses in these and 

cases have generated calls for the armed forces to ta

lead in confronting the complex issues of contemp

homeland defense. The argument for this “easy 

straight-forward—if not quite correct. That is, the m

knows how to plan for and conduct crises operation

the federal armed forces are not hamstrung by “art

legal constraints, boundaries, or jurisdict

Nevertheless, under the Rule of Law—except und

legal concept of “Necessity”—there are indeed const

on military involvement in domestic affairs. The 

forces are not a panacea that can circumvent the Am

Federal Constitution.

At the same time, the Army is further constrain

some of its own problems. Because of contradictions a

the missions that the Army is now expected to perfor

because of the mismatch of resources provided to pe

those diverse missions, the Army is in a quandary

bottom line is that the Army is torn between “fighti

big wars” and preparing for and executing “operations 

229
than war.” In a democracy, however, an army does no

the option of choosing the missions it accepts. The hes

of the U.S. Army to accept wholeheartedly the missio

currently being given is thus cause for concern regard

professionalism.

Professionalism, in general, is in decline within w

democracies. Military professionalism is also, it appe

decline. Professionalism is a result of at least two fa

First, it depends on the effectiveness with whic

institution performs its functions. And, second, it de

on the relationship of the profession to society it s

That is to say, the Army—among other governm

institutions—must do everything possible to do its job 

and well, and to help the American public an

representatives understand that it is doing so. I

regard, it is necessary to define clearly and consisten

Army’s institutional purpose and the jurisdiction 

professional work. It is also necessary to reitera

institutional commitment to self-sacrifice on the par

members in serving the American people an

Constitution.

Thus, this chapter will proceed to place these pro

into the strategic context of military professionali

topic little studied in the military now and eve

understood outside the profession.

1

 We will analyz

issues within the profession now impeding he

institutional adaptation to the new era—the officer 

intellectual muddle over the purpose of the Army, and 

ethical muddle over the role of self-sacrifice i

profession’s ethos. We believe these two unres

contradictions have contributed in very significant w

the Army’s inability thus far to deal effectively with v

issues such as domestic defense at home and 

protection abroad. We also believe that a prin

approach for a renewed self-concept and motivation 

Army officer corps is an underlying theme in this anal

230
Lastly, we believe that the temptation should be re

to give the U.S. armed forces a mandate to “lead in su

as a quick and easy solution to the contemporary prob

homeland defense. We recommend that the Army a

Department of Defense do everything possible to reso

present “muddles” and to pursue vigilantly a long

strategy both to perform primary war-fighting mi

right and well, and to develop better relationships be

our military institutions and the American society.

Resolving the Intellectual Muddle.

After roughly 5 decades of almost continuous fo

land warfare in Europe, and now almost 1 decade of “p

the Army’s officer corps is, candidly speaking, in the m

an intellectual muddle. That is, institutionally it is th

and acting in a confused manner, one which bel

fundamental purpose and foundational relationship

the American society it serves.

2

 Given the eno

revolutions through which American society has pas

the last decade, it should not surprise us to find th

Army is showing signs of strain; armies are such int

reflections of their parent societies that “a revolution 

one [is] bound to cause a revolution in the other.”

3

 No

the causes of this muddle are of the Army’s own mak

within its control. There are, however, several imp

causes of the confusion that are within the institu

control, and, as we shall explain, it is there that the 

must start to redefine its purpose and organiza

essence. 

Preparing to Fight the Wrong War? While there is 

debate over whether true military innovation spring

inside organizations, from external sources, or f

combination of the two,

4

 there is a growing recognitio

cultural factors to a great extent determine wh

changes accord with the organizational essence 

Army.

5

 Clearly, during periods of significant ex

change, it is axiomatic that public organizations s

231
cannot proceed with the learning and adaptation t

necessary for effectiveness in their task without a ver

vision of organizational essence and purpose. This 

function of senior leadership, to determine and arti

persuasively a coherent vision for the organization’s f

This axiom is even more applicable to mi

organizations where the histories of successful inno

disclose the absolute necessity of an engaged, well-inf

officer corps conceptualizing, leading, and othe

facilitating the innovations and adaptations necessa

change. Such innovation in periods of transition is, af

cultural in its essence rather than technological. 

clarity of vision, particularly at the strategic level, i

by prominent theorists and historians as the essentia

step of successful military innovation 

adaptation—what is the new strategic task of the m

institution, what is the new theory of victory for 

war?

6

 Admiral William A. Moffett had a clear vision 

naval aviation was born in the 1930s, and there w

doubt in the minds of Generals Gavin and Howze aft

Korean War about the new need for airmobility of 

forces. But such clarity of vision—realistic in its pre

coherent in its components of forces, mission and reso

and thus believable to the officer corps—we believe, h

been provided since the end of the Gulf War an

initiation of the post-Cold War builddown of m

capabilities.

The two most prominent causes of the officer 

muddle are not hard to identify. Political guidance 

Army still requires conventional capabilities to e

nearly simultaneously two major regional conflicts, 

the retention by many within the officer corps of th

Army, big war” vision and essence, and also the reten

the bulk of the Army’s Cold War force structur

infrastructure. In stark contrast, the Cl

administration has since 1993 repeatedly receive

approval of the American people for the conduct of m

operations other than war (MOOTW). Given the reali

232
desirable “can do” attitude among the middle and 

ranks of the officer corps, it is not surprising a sign

majority of those officers now accept MOOTW missi

the purpose and essence of the Army, indeed, as the 

for the future.

7

 They have experienced nothing els

have been presented with no other vision of the futur

is credible to them.

8

The major positions contributing to the mudd

shown in Figure 1.

As the diagram shows, America’s political leade

telling the Army its essence is to do both big war

MOOTW; and senior Army leaders are in turn telli

institution the same thing. But at the lower level, whe

bulk of the officer corps accepts MOOTW as the way 

present and the future, it is a quite different story du

least four other causal factors:

• The resources, both financial and human, requi

placing both missions within the core purpose of the 

have not been forthcoming. Whether that is a fail

responsibility of political leadership or of senior m

leaders is now largely irrelevant. To the majority 

serving officer corps, it is simply inconceivable, g

modernization “holiday” of almost a decade and st

233

Big Army, Big War MOOTW

Political leaders Yes Yes

Military leaders Yes

No . . . Perhap

(1997)

Mid-, Lower-officer

corps

No, not credible Yes

Fighting and Winning the Nation’s Warso

Operations Other Than War?

Figure 1. 
declining funds for collective training over the same p

that senior leaders, whether uniformed or not, can 

“more with less.” In fact, this issue is one of the 

frequently mentioned as cause of the unprecedente

growing, gap in trust and confidence between the 

echelons of the Army officer corps and its s

leadership.

10

• The Army’s operational tempo, caused by a 37 p

reduction in force structure since the Gulf War, co

with repeated MOOTW, is up roughly 300 percent ove

War levels. Army-wide, soldiers are deployed an aver

over 140 days per year away from families and hom

the average is well over 200 days per year for those so

and families assigned within Europe. Understandabl

unsustainable rate has increasingly demoralized so

and their families, contributing heavily to the exo

junior officers and, likely, to the current recruiting cr

the volunteer force.

• The Army officer corps, until the onslaug

MOOTW in the mid-1990s, generally held the self-co

and thus the motivation, of leader-trainers. This w

successful result of the TRADOC-led training revolu

the 1970s and 1980s.

11

 To be an officer was to be a lead

trainer of soldiers, practically regardless of the of

branch. This self-concept correctly placed great empha

achieving positive results from rigorous traini

individual and, particularly, collective s

Unfortunately, given the multiplicity of mission

paucity of training resources currently confrontin

Army, those same officers, several now in or select

battalion and brigade command, are leaving the serv

almost unprecedented numbers.

12

 They echo the refra

isn’t fun any more.”

13

 More regrettably yet, their 

officers are also leaving, stating that “I’ve seen wh

commander has had to deal with the past 2 years, and 

want to do that.”

14

It is a sure sign of a military profess

trouble that junior officers do not aspire to serve in 

commanders’ position. 

234
• All soldiers, regardless of rank, have watched f

past 7 years the amazing success of the American eco

but have not participated in its benefits at a commens

rate. More importantly, sociologically this is not the A

the 1970s or even the 1980s; roughly 60 percent 

soldiers are now married, with 85 percent of sp

working outside of the home. Thus, the impact 

excessive operation tempo on the current “married 

working spouse” force has no precedent in Army h

Although some redress is on the way in FY 2000 in th

of across-the-board and focused pay increases, the fai

the Army to provide adequately for quality of life iss

cited by enlisted soldiers as the main reason—far abo

other—for the lowest state of soldier morale in the 199

These facts about the current organizational c

within the Army, particularly within the operationa

structure, document the consequences of an amazingly 

mismatch between resources and missions. To be sure

have been quantitative analyses aplenty describin

degree to which the Army lacks funding for moderni

alone, and offering comparable explanations of why t

Force is now flying the oldest fleet of aircraft in 

service’s young history.

16

 Yet until 1999, wit

appearance of a systemic failure of recruiting fo

volunteer force and the unremitting exodus from the 

officer corps, the magnitude of the overall danger to m

professionalism was not so clear. It is now evident, ho

that the option of continuing to “muddle through

transition is no longer an option.

One Solution: Fight the Wars American S

Approves. Since this chapter is focused on pr

identification and analysis rather than solutions, whi

the purview of current uniformed leaders, we offer her

brief insights as to how this intellectual muddle 

organizational purpose and essence might be resolved

way among many, we are sure.

235
In a democracy, an Army does not get to choo

missions it accepts—at least, no professional army 

The hesitancy of the U.S. Army to accept wholehea

the missions it is currently being given strikes the a

of this chapter as cause for concern in the context of m

professionalism. We believe that means defining the A

organizational purpose, its essence, simply as servi

American society, and fighting the conflicts they ap

when they approve them. Any other essence or pu

statement places the institution in the illegitimat

unprofessional position of declaring its intelle

independence from the society it was formed to serv

as we have deduced from the evidence presented, 

Army continues to resist organizing, training

equipping itself to fight and win the “wars” it is cur

being asked to fight, it may no longer have a suffic

professional officer corps when the next big war occu

The Army can create a vision and an organiza

climate that accepts the importance of MOOTW 

maintaining much of its desired focus on training/ad

for future regional wars. But for that to occur, Army le

must resolve the resources-missions gap in ways th

credible. This must be done very quickly. There are 

options, from gaining relief/change in the “two

guidance, to obtaining increased resources, to red

unneeded structure and infrastructure, to specializin

within the total Army. None are easy nor without cost

it is equally clear that radical action to close the gap 

past due; the cost in declining professionalism is alrea

great. 

In light of these facts, it is encouraging that Army 

of Staff General Erik K. Shinseki recently addressed 

of the problems with which we have expressed conc

this chapter, and explicitly articulated a vision to “

the condition of the Army to better meet the requirem

the next century.”

17

 That vision is clear about the n

dramatically change the Army; a vision of “Soldiers on 

for the Nation transforming this, the most respected 

236
in the world, into a strategically responsive force t

dominant across the full spectrum of operations.”

18

To accomplish this transformation, General Sh

has promised that by the end of FY 2000, the A

divisions and armored cavalry regiments will be man

100 percent of authorization, removing some of the str

units as soldiers no longer have to do the job of two or 

Even more importantly, General Shinseki establis

vision of a lighter, more strategically deployable 

which will “allow us to put a combat capable b

anywhere in the world in 96 hours once we have re

‘execute liftoff’, a division on the ground in 120 hour

five divisions in 30 days.”

The missions to which these lighter-weight uni

respond—and which their presence and capability s

help to deter—are the very peacekeeping and st

operations which have confounded the Army’s 

structure and manning system since the end of th

War. General Shinseki intends to begin procuring we

systems to man two new “middle-weight” bri

immediately. Changing the institutional culture, whi

looks askance at peacekeeping missions, however, wi

longer—but the need for change has been recognize

the process has begun. It will take time to see wheth

vision will prove credible and motivating to the bulk 

officer corps. As we have noted earlier in this chapter, 

credible vision has been missing, contributing to low m

and diminishing trust between officers serving in th

and their leaders in Washington. In our view, solvi

gap between missions and resources remains the unse

critical link to turning this new vision into more than s

another declaratory policy.

The Comfortable Myth of a “Casualty Averse” Am

Public. Despite the promise of substantial change 

structure and organization of the Army to meet the ne

the new world order in which we find ourselves, the

second, equally disturbing trend of incipient decline w

237
another component of military professionalism, the e

component. That is the trend for senior military lead

accept, as political leaders have accepted since the 

1990s, the myth that the American society is “ca

averse.” 

As we noted earlier, the issue of force protection 

some of its salience from the accepted conventional w

that the modern American public is very averse to acc

U.S. casualties in operations abroad. This “wisdom” i

often cited in reference to the participation of U.S. 

forces in humanitarian and peace operations. On 

occasions it is presented as a broadly accepted w

applicable to all military operations abroad, regard

purpose. It is a wisdom held by, and almost always 

by, influential elites in the nation’s foreign 

community, opinionmakers such as elected polit

members of the press, columnists, and the ubiq

chattering classes of Washington talk shows. As we 

see, not all scholars agree with this myth, partic

serious academics and serious polltakers.

The origins of such wisdom are varied, but one 

often cited is the incident in Mogadishu in October of 

Eighteen U.S. Army Rangers were killed in that action

television coverage in the United States subseq

showed the body of an American soldier being dr

through the streets surrounded by jubilant Somalis.

1

days later President Clinton announced the end o

involvement in the operation, ostensibly because 

public’s adverse reaction to the casualties. He 

announced a rapid timetable for withdrawal of al

forces. The incident ultimately led to the sack

Clinton’s Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, fu

heightening the understanding within the p

community that because of the public’s sensiti

casualties could not be tolerated.

20

 At about the same 

a sociological explanation for the American pu

aversion to military casualties was offered by an Am

scholar on the pages of one of the most prestigious jou

238
Foreign Affairs.

21

 Thus the myth grew—the pu

intolerance of casualties results in quick reversals of 

support for military operations abroad. Political le

therefore need to factor into their foreign policy dec

the risk of such reversal, and the political costs pote

to be incurred. Subsequent political guidance to 

military leaders has not ceased to emphasize the ur

and importance of absolutely minimizing U.S. casu

and by extension any collateral damage to ci

populations. 

The most recent example—Kosovo, a war with

ground campaign and with U.S. pilots flying at 1

feet—is a clear manifestation of such political guidanc

point here is that the conventional wisdom is a myth. I

the American public is quite willing to accept casu

and, doubtless, political leaders are aware of this. R

scholarly research demonstrates, once again convinc

that there are two conditions that must be apparent in 

for the U.S. public to accept casualties:

22

 they m

convinced there is a consensus among political leader

the operation is in the nation’s interests; and that this 

consensus among political leaders is sufficient to s

venture through to a successful conclusion (Lincoln’s

these dead here shall not have died in vain . . .”).

23

 Th

consensus was obviously missing, and thus in the p

mind so also the willingness to see it through succes

both in the case of Somalia in 1993 and in Kosovo in 1

It has been the unwillingness, or inability, of the C

administration to create an elite consensus that leave

policy “hostage” to the public’s recoiling from the 

American soldiers’ lives. But this is not the doing 

public. Research has repeatedly demonstrated that th

room for political leaders to shape public opinion and 

a forum for deliberation and debate of interve

decisions. To be sure, in that debate the public will co

in a rational calculus the risks to American lives as w

other costs and benefits of the intervention, but it is 

debate that is foreclosed because they are “casualty av

239
Therefore, if it is understood that such behav

political leaders who as a class, and forthrightly so, ar

concerned with reelection than with accomplishment 

military mission,

25

 it becomes even more imperative 

why senior military officers are signing operational 

with the identical guidance. As we discussed i

introduction, such is the case today with Army di

commanders in Bosnia, and by implication of more 

commanders also. Is it possible that senior Army o

have adopted the policy attitudes of political leade

more of concern, their behavioral norms? Clearly that 

impression the junior officers have, and as well one h

those of the public interested in the issue. Even 

perplexing than occasionally bowing to political press

senior officers’ intellectual acceptance of such a myt

true that political leaders are going to behave as thou

myth was real; it is often in their individual self-inte

do so. Thus, for practical purposes senior military le

must accept the myth as a real influence. It is influ

irrespective of its validity. But precisely because 

myth, senior military leaders must be articulat

persuasive in advice to civilian leaders that the publi

fact, not so casualty averse. Only then can they fulfil

profession’s responsibility for candid and forthright 

to political leaders as well as their responsibili

preservation of the profession’s ethic.

The gap between top military leaders and j

officers—and the public at large—is instructive here

mid-career officers and the American public believe 

while casualties should obviously be minimized

remain an inevitable part of any deployment. The

believe that the accomplishment of MOOTW mission

under certain circumstances as noted above, worth th

of loss of American lives. This perspective is demons

in Figure 2.

Again, the solution appears straightforward. 

Army leaders should replace all service guidanc

doctrine that treats the prevention of U.S. casualt

240
anything other than an inherent component o

operational mission.

26 The trust in operational comma

ability to accomplish missions prudently and compe

irrespective of the number of American casualties, m

restored, and immediately so.

27

 Without that, few o

aware of the profession’s need to maintain its own u

ethic will seek command. Ultimately there will 

profession, only an obedient military bureaucracy w

autonomy, one which responds in an unthinkin

uncritical manner to the requests and directives of c

leaders. We doubt the military effectiveness of s

bureaucracy.

Resolving the Ethical Muddle.

Both history and present research confirm tha

during times of uncertainty and change in m

requirements that a firm foundation of sh

understanding of professionalism is most needed to s

the military organization.

28 We therefore offer severa

on how to refocus individual officers, and thus the 

corps itself, on the ethical foundations of professiona

241

Is the U.S. Public

Casualty Averse?

Why?

Political Leaders Yes

Intervention is 

Risk

Military Leaders Echo

High Risk; Les

Preferred Form 

War

Junior Military

Officers

No Willing to Sacr

An Analysis of Casualty Aversion

Figure 2. 
We turn first to the concept of self-sacrifice, speci

addressing the issue of risk as an inherent part 

officer’s concept of duty. In other words, if an off

morally obligated to lead her unit to successful m

accomplishment (the moral claim of the mission) 

obligation of, and thus the risk of, self-sacrifice in

within that duty? And if so, what happens to the of

moral obligation, and thus to the profession’s et

political leaders proscribe such risk as part of a po

“radical force protection?” In the paragraphs that foll

address the first question by a review of the origins 

American military ethic, and subsequently answ

second by using examples of the recent NATO opera

Kosovo and Serbia.

The Inherence of Self-sacrificial Risk: Sacrifice 

always above and beyond the call of duty. While sacr

may sometimes be above and beyond the call of duty, i

always the case. We often apply words like “sain

“hero” in a variety of situations, all of which in

sacrifice, but not all of which involve circumstances th

above and beyond the call of duty. We do call heroes 

who do their duty even when considerations of self-in

or self-preservation would cause most others to fa

example, consider the terrified doctor who remains w

patient in a plague-stricken city. Clearly he is heroic

is still his duty to tend to his patient. The prese

absence of the plague does not alter the fact that a d

duty is to remain with his patient.

29

 It only affects h

judge the character of the doctor who does so.

Nevertheless, it is not sufficient to simply asser

there are conditions when sacrifice can be obligato

must spell out what those conditions are. Just as 

actions in war, we must not think our concept of sa

must either permit everything, or allow nothing. It i

to argue, for example, that the soldier who falls on a gr

to save his fellow soldiers was merely doing his duty

an action seems to be beyond the call of duty. If it is no

it is not clear that any action ever could be. Neverthe

242
seems equally clear that soldiers, and especially the o

who lead them, are obligated to risk their lives to accom

legitimate missions. What remains is to give a prin

account of this distinction.

In giving such an account, it is important to res

temptation to justify such obligations by virtue of th

that one agreed to take the job. A trucker, for exampl

contract to deliver specified goods to a certain destinat

a certain time.

30

 However, he cannot be morally obliga

drive at high speeds over a dangerous shortcut, even 

means he may not be able to fulfill the provisions 

contract. The trucker, while he may have ce

contractual obligations, cannot be morally obligated 

his and others’ lives at risk to fulfill them. He will s

have to live with the penalty and the customer will s

have to live without the goods. The officer, however, c

simply live without the victory that he or she may 

otherwise achieved. For this reason, especially give

kinds of sacrifices that the officer is required to mak

important that the obligation run much deeper than a 

“contract.” 

In fact, the obligation does run more deeply. It is 

ultimately in the fact that the service the officer 

provides is essential if human beings are to thriv

flourish. When officers play their roles well by effec

defending a defenseless society, they are contributing 

well-being of fellow citizens. If it were otherwise, we 

not be able to justify their obligation to make the s

sacrifices officers are often called upon to make.

But these sacrifices are justified. Human being

among other things, social creatures. If they are to t

they must form the kind of societies and structu

governance that permit, if not promote, the good life 

members. In any socio-political setting, a tension 

between the needs of the community and the needs 

individual. That tension is resolved in the Am

constitutional system by recognizing that individual

243
certain rights, namely the right to life and the ri

liberty. A socio-political setting that recognizes such 

even if it sometimes resolves specific issues imper

would be one worth defending as is the American Repu

But rights entail obligations. If someone has a ri

something, someone else has an obligation to provide 

If a person has a right to life, the obligation fall

someone to safeguard that life. If someone has a ri

liberty, then it falls onto someone to safeguard that l

This is why states have an obligation to raise and ma

armies.

31

 Armies then perform a morally nece

function: safeguarding the rights to which the memb

that society are entitled vis-à-vis external threats to 

security, individually and collectively.

Since it is a tragic, but no less true, fact that some h

societies feel a need to destroy other human societ

must then be a necessary feature (at least as long as th

is true) of a good society that it be able to defend itsel

also means that it will be a good thing, though pe

under some conditions not morally obligated, to use f

stop or prevent violent conflict, since the cessation of v

conflict is a necessary condition for a good society.

Since the authority to decide when the use of fo

appropriately in the hands of the civilian autho

professional soldiers have a prima facie obligat

accomplish the missions civilian authorities assign 

Since it can be morally permissible, if not obligatory, 

force outside national boundaries to stop or prevent v

conflict, professional soldiers are then obligated to pe

such missions, as long as they are not blatantly immo

we have argued earlier, humanitarian interventions a

blatantly immoral.

Furthermore, this issue goes to the deeper issue 

ongoing redefinition in America of what it means t

good citizen. While some may reject the idea that ci

owe any service to their country, our argument su

otherwise. If America is a good society in the relevant 

244
then some citizens all of the time, or all citizens some 

time must either support the defense through the pa

of taxes or offer themselves for service in the cas

national emergency.

And those who answer the call for service incur s

moral obligations. As we have shown, what justifies 

obligations is that they are necessary if the state is 

properly defended. Since a successful defense depen

successful accomplishment of certain mission

accomplishment of those missions has moral force

means those who undertake such missions, unlike the 

truck driver cited earlier, are morally obligated to see 

through to success—even if that means putting them

and their soldiers at risk to do so. The only thing that 

negate this is some weightier moral claim.

This obligation to sacrifice is not limited to tim

conflict. Many, if not most, missions undertaken 

defense of a state engender some risk. Even in peac

training missions often have the potential to result in 

or death of those who participate. Thus by extensio

sacrifice on the part of the officer corps to make po

realistic training which ultimately contributes to m

accomplishment is also morally obligated.

All of this is not to say that officers can ev

indifferent to friendly casualties. Rather, it is an of

duty to consider the risk of casualties, as well as s

other factors when planning how best to accom

assigned missions. The point is that the considerati

casualties, as well as other relevant factors, are inher

the moral duty to defend a defenseless society.

Hence, a coherent view of the officer’s duty is pres

in Figure 3.

As stated before, the moral claim of the mission ca

be superseded by a weightier moral claim. Self-interes

even sometimes self-preservation, cannot ser

weightier moral claims. If they could, the possibi

245
defending society would be undermined. And, as ind

earlier, that is not morally permissible. But, that the

be such claims must be understood before we h

complete conception of sacrifice for the mi

professional. The Just War Tradition (JWT), upon 

the Laws of Land Warfare are founded, embody one su

of obligations. JWT recognizes that everyone has the 

to life and liberty, regardless of the nation to whic

belong. This right can be mitigated, even negated, bu

under a certain set of conditions.

One of the fundamental principles that underli

JWT is that soldiers are obligated to take risks to pr

the lives of noncombatants. By gaining the right 

(which is necessary if they are to properly serve and d

the state), soldiers have given up the right not to be 

Noncombatants have not gained the right to kill, a

such, still retain their right not to be killed. While th

be mitigated somewhat by the application of the doct

double effect,

32

 that doctrine requires, among other t

that soldiers take extra risks to preserve civilian live

This may seem counterintuitive to many m

leaders. We often hear officers claim that their soldier

are more valuable, and thus more worthy of protection

246

Figure 3. Coherent View of the Officer’s Dut
the lives of noncombatants.

34

 But those who make 

claims clearly misunderstand the extent of a soldier’s 

obligations. A soldier exists to defend on behalf of the 

the individual rights of its citizens. It makes no sense 

that soldiers, who have given up their right not 

harmed, may enjoy additional protection at the expe

the lives of civilians, who do have a right not to be ha

Still, it is not the case that to preserve civilians

soldiers are obligated to take any and all risks. Their 

limited by the following conditions: by taking this ri

one cannot accomplish the mission, or (2) one will not b

to carry on future missions.

To illustrate this point, consider the following exa

In World War II, French pilots flying for the Allies 

France) had the problem that if they bombed high

could destroy their target with little risk to themselv

at a high cost in civilian casualties. If they bombed low

could destroy their target and their bombing wou

accurate enough to minimize civilian casualties, bu

casualty rate would be very high. The casualty rate wo

so high, in fact, that they might be able to carry out 

two “suicide” missions, but would not long be able to s

the effort, and the Germans would have emerged victo

To resolve this tension, the French pilots bombe

enough to reduce civilian casualties but high enoug

their casualty rates would allow for not only m

accomplishment, but also for sustained operations a

the Nazis. Since all noncombatants—regardless of 

nationality—retain their right to life, soldiers (or airm

this case) are obligated to accept these extra ris

inherent within their duty.

35

This illustrates well the problem a policy of radica

protection poses for the professional military 

Consider the recent bombing of Kosovo and Serbia, 

Allied air forces bombed high enough to be out of ra

Serbian anti-aircraft weapons, and Allied ground 

would not even mount a ground campaign for f

casualties.

247
To our understanding, these tactics, driven by A

and domestic political considerations, were more de

to preserve soldiers’ and aviators’ lives than to rapid

effectively accomplish the mission, thus allowing 

civilian casualties than would have otherwise bee

case.

36

By not using Apache helicopters, A-10s, or NATO g

troops to destroy Serbian military capacity, NATO 

failed to take risks they should have taken. Certainly 

forces were more vulnerable than high altitude bom

but by keeping them out of harm’s way, soldier

aviators placed risks they could have taken onto civ

But soldiers and aviators, as we have discussed befo

obligated to take risks, at least up to the point of c

failure, that civilians are not. If it was the case that 

could have accepted the additional risk without doomi

mission, then NATO was obligated to do so.

By not taking the risks necessary to destroy Serb 

and other military and paramilitary forces, NATO forc

not diminish the Serb capability to carry out their 

policies. By aiming at Serbian infrastructure and m

bases (resorting to the World War II strategy of attr

NATO forces failed to stop the continued slaugh

innocent civilians, and, as some have argued, migh

accelerated it. If this is the case, that by adopting 

with more risk for allied soldiers they could have deg

more rapidly Serb military capacity and thereby 

innocent lives, then NATO air forces were obligated t

those extra risks. This last point is important. Und

rules of land warfare, NATO forces had at least a prim

obligation to take risks to preserve innocents’ lives, an

did not do so.

These tactics may have been justified if the po

consequences of increased NATO military casualties 

have precluded intervening on behalf of the Albani

all. If political pressure in Germany or Italy, for exa

would render NATO incapable of conducting oper

248
against Serbian efforts to ethnically cleanse Kosovo A

failing to intervene would still result in a Kosovo clean

ethnic Albanians (though the cleansing would undou

have proceeded at a much slower pace), then NATO’s 

of action, at least with respect to preserving soldier

airmen’s’ lives at the expense of rapid accomplishm

the mission, would be morally permissible. We su

however, that was not the case. It is quite clear th

operation could have continued as a “coalition of the w

from within NATO, much as did the initial phases 

Bosnian campaign.

The problem for the PME should now be ob

Servicemen and women are not only morally requi

take those risks necessary to accomplish the mission

are morally required to take some additional ri

preserve the lives of noncombatants. Even if one wa

argue that the priority mission was, in fact, force prote

the claims to the rights of life and liberty on the part 

noncombatants supersede, in this case, the moral cla

force protection as a mission. Thus, under the imposi

a policy of radical force protection we have a sit

where, while serving the interests of the state, 

officers are obligated to do, the state places the officer 

in a position from which it cannot fulfill its other 

obligations. This creates a contradiction that rende

professional ethic incoherent and ineffective at its 

basic purpose: to provide moral guidance for behav

both the institution and individual members.

A Principled Approach to Officership.

37

Thus we offer the following set of principles from 

all officers, and particularly those at pre-commiss

levels, should draw both their vision and their motiv

1. The officer’s duty is to serve society as a wh

provide that which they cannot provid

themselves—security. Thus a moral obligation 

between the officer and the society he or she serves, a m

249
obligation embodied in the officer’s “commis

Officers act as agents of society, both indivi

accountable to them and, as well, serving to strength

claim of the service on the affections of the American p

2. Professional officers always do their 

subordinating their personal interests t

requirements of the professional function. They serv

unlimited liability, including life itself. When assig

mission or task, and particularly in combat, its succ

execution is first priority, above all else, with o

accepting full responsibility for their action

orders in accomplishing it.

3. Officers, based on their military expe

determine the standards of the profession, e.

tactical competence, for equipment specification

standards of conduct for all soldiers. With

professional self-policing role, officers set/chan

profession’s standards, personally adhere to the stan

make the standards known to all soldiers, and enfor

standards. 

4. The officer’s motivations are noble 

intrinsic, a love for his or her craft—the tech

and human aspects of providing the nat

security—and the sense of moral obligation t

this craft for the benefit of society. These motiv

lead to the officer’s attainment and maintenance 

highest possible level of professional skil

knowledge.

5. Called to their profession and motivated by 

pursuit of its expertise, officers are committed 

career of continuous study and learning.

6. Because of both the moral obligation accepted a

mortal means employed to carry out his or her dut

officer emphasizes the importance of the group 

that of the individual. Success in war require

subordination of the will of the individual to the task 

250
group—the military ethic is cooperative and cohes

spirit, meritocratic, and fundamentally anti-individu

and anti-careerist.

7. Officers strictly observe the principle that the m

is subject to civilian authority and do not involve them

or their subordinates in domestic politics or policy b

the exercise of the basic rights of citizenship. Senior m

officers render candid and forthright profess

judgments when representing the profession and ad

civilian authorities (there is no public or political ad

role). 

8. The officer’s honor is of paramount import

derived through history from demonstrated co

in combat—the professional soldier always fights 

called on—it includes the virtues of honesty and int

In peace, the officer’s honor is reflected in consistent 

moral courage.

9. The officer’s loyalty is legally and professio

to an office, rather than individual incumbents, a

every case is subordinate to their allegiance t

ideals codified in the Constitution.

10. The officer’s loyalty also extends downwa

those soldiers entrusted to their command and to 

welfare, as persons as well as soldiers, and that o

families during both peace and war.

11. Officers are gentle-men and -women—pers

character, courtesy, and cultivation, possessin

qualities requisite for military leadership.

12. Officers lead by example, always maintaini

personal attributes of spiritual, physical, and mental f

requisite to the demands of their chosen profe

Through leadership, officers invest in 

subordinates, both as soldiers and as persons

particularly in the vital non-commissioned officer cor

the end that they grow in character, maturity and sk

251
Further, we believe that the vocation of offic

should be understood and executed, indeed lived

consistent and principled manner.

Conclusions.

The concept of service is central to a prin

understanding of officership. It holds that the prof

serves the American people by providing a socially 

and necessary function: defending Americans and 

interests by being schooled in war and hence able to 

effectively protective violence at their request. As no

this chapter, this meeting of a societal need creat

moral dimension of the Army’s professionalism as w

the noble character of the individual officer’s service 

fellow citizens. Embodied explicitly in the commissio

implicitly in the unwritten contract with society, this 

obligation requires of the officer unlimited lia

including life, as well as the moral commitment alw

put service before self. Therefore, if involved in the t

crisis noted above, there should never be in the of

mind the need to preserve self nor to take any actions 

in that direction. To the officer, self is always 

abnegated to the higher calling through the disci

application of moral or physical courage. A self-abne

officer has no legacy save the character and quality of 

her service, and to attempt to create or maintain s

legacy would violate the basic concept of service inhe

the profession and to a principled understand

officership.

Secondly, just as the officer’s commitment to ser

grounded morally in his or her obligation to society, 

our form of government it is also grounded in law, b

the Constitution and in subsequent statutes. Bu

because the commitment has two overlapping found

does not mean that both are to be valued equally 

officer, nor equally available to the officer dealing 

crisis. Particularly within an increasingly legalistic s

252
the officer’s reaction to crisis must always be to 

fulfillment of the moral obligation over that of the 

obligation, even at personal or professional expense. 

her role must be to do the right thing, to pursue the 

outcome on behalf of those served, American society

clear that any issue of intense divisiveness, push

enough by hyper-legalism and equivocation, beco

political issue resolvable only by political means—rea

discourse and compromise aimed, rightly, at the reso

of principled disagreements. But for the officer to p

such resolutions is to politicize the profession, exact

opposite of what is needed for professionalism to surv

principled understanding of officership requires i

that officers strive to attain the highest of moral stan

regardless of the minimum that the law might allow.

Third, and last, is the issue of truth. Not only 

commissioned officers always revere the truth, they 

also never be in fear of it. The crises being discussed h

not involve truth on which there might be understan

disagreement because of epistemological concerns

issues in political-military crises are much more mun

but no less important—what happened, when, where

were the causes, who responded, and how? Since the 

as well as the absence of fear about it, cements the b

trust between officer and society, it is always to be pu

and displayed with exceptional vigor. Utter transpare

the desired, indeed obligated, state betwee

accountable officer and the American people. That me

a matter of highest principal that the officer speak

truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth” 

times because he or she is perpetually under mora

upon accepting the commission. Given this attitud

behavior, coupled with the concept of selfless service 

above, fear of the truth holds no power whatsoever ov

officer. It is, in fact, his or her very best companion duri

long journey of service.

Thus, application of the principles yields attitude

behavior often at odds with those within the socie

253
officer has chosen to serve. Does this then mean th

officer is in any manner better than those in Am

society? We do not believe so. It means only that the of

different, and has unreservedly chosen to b

Triumphalism and self-righteousness do not becom

serving officer nor the profession any more than self-s

actions, appeal to legalisms, and disdain for the power 

truth. It is better, we believe, for the officers, operat

camaraderie under the imperatives of their commiss

tend in a principled manner to each other, to 

profession, and to its ethos.

We trust this chapter demonstrates that we are 

concerned by the cracks in the edifice of professional

the United States Army. We remain confident that a r

on the framework of professionalism as presented he

help to correct what we see as serious corrosion

violation, of the professional military ethic. And w

encouraged by the recent creation of a Center f

Professional Military Ethic (CPME) at the United 

Military Academy, West Point. Hence we offer throug

Center this chapter as a starting point for the officer 

review, reflection, and dialogue on their, and the A

purpose and ethic. We believe such to be essential t

the Army refocus on its key role as the willing and eff

servant of the American people.

CHAPTER 13 - ENDNOTES

1. Portions of this chapter previously were published in 

Snider, John A. Nagl, and Tony Pfaff, Army Professionali

Military Ethic, and Officership in the 21st Century, Carlisle: U.

War College, Strategic Studies Institute, December 1999.

2. This paper was written prior to the announcement by Arm

of Staff General Erik K. Shinseki of his vision for reforming the 

address to the Eisenhower Luncheon at the Association of the 

States Army (AUSA) annual meeting on October 12, 199

arguments presented in this essay, we believe, support his visi

just that.

254
3. Michael Howard, War in European History, Oxford: 

University Press, 1976, p. 75.

4. See Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: 

Britain, and Germany between the World Wars, Ithaca, NY: 

University Press, 1984; Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Ne

Innovation and the Modern Military, Ithaca, NY: Cornell Un

Press, 1991; and Kimberly Martin Zisk, Engaging the 

Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 195

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993; and Williamson 

and Allan R. Millett, eds., Military Effectiveness, Three V

Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990; see also Allan R. Millett, Wil

Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman, “The Effectiveness of M

Organizations," International Security 11/1, Summer 1988.

5. John A. Nagl, “Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Brit

American Army Counterinsurgency Learning during the M

Emergency and the Vietnam War,” World Affairs 161/4, Sprin

Alastair Ian Johnston, “Thinking About Strategic Cu

International Security 19/4, Spring 1995; Carl H. Builder, The M

War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis, Ba

Johns Hopkins, 1989.

6. See Rosen; and Williamson Murray and Allen R. Mille

Military Intervention in the Inter-War Period, London: Cam

University Press, 1996.

7. Deborah Avant, “Officer Attitudes and Change in the po

War U.S. Armed Services” in Theo Farrell and Terry Tarriff, e

Sources of Military Change: Military Organisations and 

Changing Environments in the Modern Era, forthcoming.

8. Given the paucity of resources used to exploit its un

potential, the vision of high-technology, major-power war

portrayed in Joint Vision 2010 and Army Vision 2010 has, we 

proved thus far to be incredible to the majority of the Army officer 

9. The decision in 1997 by Chief of Staff of the Army General 

Reimer to deploy one of the Army’s premier heavy divisions, 

Cavalry Division, to peacekeeping duty in Bosnia can be s

evidence that the senior leadership of the Army eventually accep

importance of performing MOOTW missions. It can also be inte

as evidence of the extreme stresses placed upon the institution 

post-Cold War world.

255
10. A multi-year study of the U.S. military will be completed 

1999. Conducted independently by the Center for Strateg

International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC, but w

cooperation of the separate services, it examines empirically 

research the organizational climate within the armed forces tod

recommends policies and adaptations to maintain service cultur

supportive of future military effectiveness. For a discussion 

growing “perceptions gap” between senior Army leaders in Was

and the junior grade officers in the field, see American Military 

in the 21st Century, Executive Summary; and chapter 6, Ce

Strategic and International Studies, forthcoming.

11. For the training revolution, see Robert K Griffith, Today

Wants to Join You: The U.S. Army’s Transition from the Dra

All-volunteer Force, Washington, DC: Center for Military Histor

and Anne W. Chapman, The Army’s Training Revolution, 1973-1

Monroe, VA: Training and Doctrine Command, 1990. For 

research into the importance of self-concept in motivati

leadership, see Robert G. Lord, Douglas J. Brown, and St

Friedberg, “Understanding the Dynamics of Leadership: The 

Follower Self-Conceptions in the Leader/Follower Relatio

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 78, 

1999.

12. For an analysis of the impact of the reduction in officer n

on the officer corps, see David McCormick, The Downsized W

America’s Army in Transition, New York: New York University 

1998.

13. CSIS, American Military Culture. 

14. Ibid.

15. The data on Army morale in the 1990s is taken 

Department of the Army, DCSPER QOL Survey, Sept 1998-June 

16. Michael O’Hanlon, “The Pentagon’s Unrealistic Procu

Plans. ”Available at www.brookings.edu/views/articles/oh

1998af.atm, accessed on-line.

17. All citations are from a text of the AUSA speech dissem

throughout the Army over e-mail on October 13, see footnote 

speech was covered by the media on the same day, drawing ge

favorable reviews; see Steven Lee Myers, “Army is Restructurin

Brigades for Rapid Response," New York Times, October 13, 1

A16.

256
18. Emphasis added.

19. For a thorough treatment of this incident, see Mark B

Blackhawk Down: A Story of Modern War, New York: Atlantic M

Press, 1999.

20. For the relief of Secretary Aspin, see chapter 24 of El

Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency, New York: Si

Schuster, 1995.

21. In fact, Edward Luttwak’s theory as presented inForeign 

was largely an assertion without empirics to support it, a

subsequently been clearly refuted. For his theory, see Edward L

“Where are the Great Powers?” Foreign Affairs 73, July/Augus

pp. 23-28; “Toward Post-Heroic Warfare,” Foreign Affairs 74, Ma

1995, pp. 109-122; and “A Post-Heroic Military Policy,” Foreign 

75, July/August 1996, pp. 33-44. For a devastating critique of L

see James Burk, “Public Support for Peacekeeping in Leban

Somalia: Assessing the Casualties Hypothesis,” Political 

Quarterly, 114, 1, 1999, pp. 53-78.

22. The recent research is: Steven Kull, “Americans on Kosov

Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Ma

May 27, 1999. This research into American public opinion on 

specified a successful outcome for U.S. goals, and in turn a sub

majority of Americans responded they would continue to supp

effort, notwithstanding 250 U.S. military casualties. The two con

cited in the text have been well-known for years by public 

scholars, most of whom also hold that the relationships between 

and elite opinion are extraordinarily complex. See, for ex

Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public, C

University of Chicago Press, 1992; and Bruce Russett, Control

Sword, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990.

23. See Eric V. Larson, Casualties and Consensus, Santa 

CA: Rand, 1996.

24. In contrast, Americans supported the Gulf War in 199

aware of predictions of a significant number of casualties. B

then, the Bush administration barely created the elite consen

public sought; the Senate vote to support the intervention pass

52-48.

25. The “Mayhew hypothesis,” which suggests that the first 

of any political leader is his or her reelection, was first prese

257
David Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection, New Have

University Press, 1974.

26. This issue of “radical force protection” eroding service eth

point to a serious flaw in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation of 19

may be a case of political guidance and military orders flowing t

joint channels of communication/command which are at serious 

odds with the service’s Title 10 responsibilities to “man, equip an

forces which embody an ethical culture supportive of e

warfighting. 

27. It should not be lost on senior Army leaders, as it has n

lost on the Army officer corps in general, that this was one 

principled reasons for the resignation of Air Force Chief of Staff G

Ronald Fogelman.

28. Andrew Gordon, “The Doctrine Debate: Having the Last 

in Michael Duffy, Theo Farrell and Geoffrey Sloan, eds., Doctr

Military Effectiveness, Exeter, UK: The Strategic Policy Studies 

1997, p. 47.

29. J.O. Urmson “Saints and Heroes,” in A. I. Melden, ed., E

Moral Philosophy, 1958, pp. 199-202.

30. The authors are grateful to Colonel Anthony Ha

assistance in developing this example.

31. See Porter, particularly chapter 7; and Huntington, part

chapters 1 and 2.

32. Originating with Catholic theologians in the Middle A

principle of double effect is the view that there is a difference b

the consequences of our actions that we intend and those we 

intend, but still foresee. See Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust W

ed., Basic Books, 1992, p. 152. While it has a variety of appl

when applied to military situations, it explains when a milita

may act in such a way as to bring about the deaths of noncomb

The principle has four conditions: (1) the bad effect is unintended

bad effect is proportional to the desired military objective, (3) 

effect is not a direct means to the good effect, and (4) actions are t

minimize the foreseeable bad effects, even if it means accep

increased risk to combatants.

33. By extra risks, we mean those risks not minimally nece

accomplish the mission.

258
34. This, in fact, was Lieutenant Calley’s defense during his 

atrocities he and his platoon committed at My Lai. He claimed, “

is one thing I am guilty of, it is valuing my soldiers’ lives over tha

enemy.” Since by enemy he meant more than 400 women and c

most of whom posed no threat to his unit, we can see that in fa

claiming that no noncombatant’s life that was worth that of a s

We can also see by this example, the absurdity of such a claim. W

may have killed, with minimal risk, some people who would la

some of his soldiers, such an action is not morally defensib

Frontline Episode, “Remember My Lai,” March 5, 1989.

35. Walzer, p. 157.

36. See, “Foreign Policy: The ABC Club,” Economist, May 2

pp. 30-31; and Michael Debbs, “Post-Mortem on NATO’s B

Campaign," The Washington Post National Weekly Edition, July 

1999, p. 23. For more detail, see Paul Kahn, “War and Sacr

Kosovo," Philosophy and Public Policy, 19, 43, University of Ma

Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, Spring/Summer 19

1-6.

37. This list was compiled by Dr. Snider in 1996 from m

sources within the literature of civil-military relations, military 

and military professionalism. It has been improved by commen

several senior officers and refined in class discussions and r

projects during 2 academic years, during which time it reac

present form.

259
CHAPTER 14

TOWARD A NATIONAL SECURITY POLI

AND STRATEGY FOR NOW AND THE

21st CENTURY

Edwin G. Corr

and

Max G. Manwaring

In the confusion of effort that has resulted from try

deal with homeland defense in the complex contemp

global security environment, strategic consideration

played little part in the debate and actions pertain

national and global security. The general result 

United States has been the ad hoc and piece-meal 

management of security affairs. That approach, in tur

led to ad hoc, piecemeal, and less-than-des

results—and high personnel, monetary, and political 

As a consequence, virtually all the contributors t

anthology either call for or respond to a call for clear 

direction—and a strategy and organizational structur

provides the basic guidance regarding how to better d

the United States and its global interests.

Separately and collectively, the contributors t

compendium analyze specific problems of national se

and implicitly and explicitly come to grips with the i

what the Honorable John Hamre calls a unifying 

theory of homeland defense. In this closing chapt

argue that this would involve the development of a th

deterrence to replace the theory of containme

thoughtful reorganization of federal and state se

management, coordination, and implement

structures; and farsighted research and pla

mechanisms to give decisionmakers and policym

viable political-military deterrence options as they p

to the various discrete actors that threaten the Am

261
homeland and American interests today. We inte

establish the philosophical underpinnings and a beg

point for a field theory from which to achieve the 

necessary for greater success in safeguarding the Am

homeland. In that connection, we must remember th

the highly integrated global system, global defe

homeland defense. Finally, it is also helpful to rem

that “the enemy may be us.”

The Need for a Paradigm Change.

Perhaps the greatest threat to U.S. national secu

the danger that we Americans do not easily chang

thinking to coincide with the changes in the world a

us. America’s principal defense priority for more th

years was the management of low-probab

high-intensity nuclear conflict, with a primary foc

Europe. Yet, ironically, nearly all the armed conflicts d

that time were classified as low intensity, and took p

the Third World. Now, in addition to traditional re

security issues, an array of nontraditional threats—

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (W

regional ethnic and religious conflict, a hundred dif

varieties of terrorism, and criminal anarchy to comp

nonmilitary threats such as trade war, financial wa

terror war, and cyber war—challenge the United Sta

home and abroad.

The United States faces a challenge to ch

perspectives. We need an organizing paradigm to as

clarifying our global leadership role, and our intern

external purposes and courses of action. One mess

unmistakable. The emerging global order has give

United States the longest period of economic pros

anyone in the current generation can remember, but t

of the Cold War era conflict did not signal the end 

global conflict. Indeed, just the reverse is proving to b

It is becoming quite clear that if we want to preser

present prosperity and continue to benefit from it, we 

262
pay for it and nurture it. Thus, U.S. interests, with

fragile and interdependent global community, dem

peace enforcer—the proverbial iron fist encased in a 

glove. This does not mean that the United States m

directly involved all over the world all the time. I

mean, however, that the United States must rethin

renew the concept of deterrence. In much the same wa

Kennan’s Containment Theory of Engagemen

conceived, philosophical underpinnings must be devis

a new theory of engagement to deal more effectivel

more diverse threats to the American homeland a

interests abroad from unpredictable directions, and by 

diverse external and domestic state and non-state ac

Some Additional Considerations that Help Def

Threat and Dictate Response.

When we think about the possibilities of conflict, w

to invent for ourselves a comfortable U.S.-centric vis

situation with battlefields that are well understood, w

enemy who looks and acts more or less as we do, 

situation in which the fighting is done b

military—somewhere else. We must recognize, how

that in protecting our interests and confrontin

influencing an adversary today, the situation has cha

We can see that change in several ways.

1. Ambiguity. First, the definition of “enemy

“victory” is elusive, and the use of “power” against an e

to achieve some form of success is diffuse. Underlying 

ambiguities is the fact that contemporary conflict te

be an intra-state affair (i.e., not an issue between sov

states). It can be one part or several parts of one socie

include the American society—against another. Thus

are virtually no rules. In these predominantly in

wars, there is normally no formal declarati

termination of conflict, no easily identifiable enemy m

formations to attack and destroy, no specific territ

take and hold, no single credible government or po

263
actor with which to deal, no legal niceties such as mu

recognized national borders and Geneva Conventi

help control the situation, no guarantee that any agre

between or among contending authorities will be ho

and no commonly accepted rules of engagement to gui

leadership of a given law enforcement organization.

2. The Need to Redefine “Enemy,” “Power,” and “Vi

Second, the ambiguous political-psychological-

nature of contemporary conflict forces the redefinit

long-used terms. The enemy is no longer a recogn

foreign military entity or an industrial capability to 

war. The enemy now becomes an internal or ex

individual actor that plans and implements violenc

exploits the causes of violence. Power is no longer s

combat fire-power directed at a traditional enemy sol

industrial complex. Power is multi-level and com

political, psychological, moral, informational, econ

social, military, police, and civil bureaucratic activit

can be brought to bear appropriately on the causes as w

the perpetrators of violence. And, victory is no long

obvious and acknowledged destruction of mi

capability, and the resultant “unconditional” surr

Victory, or success, is now—more and more, and pe

with a bit of “spin control”—defined as the achievem

“peace.”

3. A “New” Center of Gravity. These ambiguities in

on the “comfortable” vision of war in which the ass

center of gravity has been foreign enemy mi

formations and his industrial capability to conduc

Clausewitz reminds us, however, that in places sub

internal strife, the hub of all power and strength (i.e., 

of gravity) is leadership and public opinion. Our en

should be directed against these. Thus, in contemp

intra-national conflict, the primary center of gravit

change from a familiar foreign military concept 

ambiguous and uncomfortable domestic leadershi

public opinion paradigm.

264
4. Conflict Has Become Multi-organizati

Multi-lateral, and Multi-dimensional. Fourth, conflic

longer a simple military to military confrontation. C

now involves entire populations, and parts of popula

Conflict now involves a large number of indigenous na

civilian agencies, other national civilian organiza

international organizations, nongovernm

organizations, private voluntary organizations

sub-national indigenous actors involved in de

politically, economically, socially, morally, or mil

with complex threats to national and international se

and well-being. And, those are just the “good guys

number and diversity of “bad guy” players can be as 

As a consequence, an almost unheard of unity of ef

required to coordinate the multi-lateral, multi-dimens

and multi-organizational paradigm necessary for s

on either or all sides of contemporary conflict. That ide

not often been achieved in the past. Nevertheless, 

new and infinitely more complex global situ

governments, their civil and military/police compo

and various other actors involved in such endeavors 

find ways and means to work more effectively togeth

5. Contemporary Conflict is Not Limited; It is 

Finally, contemporary nontraditional war is not a k

appendage—a lesser or limited thing—to the comfo

vision of war. It is a great deal more. As long as oppo

exists that is willing to risk everything to violently 

down a government, destroy a society, or cause great 

to a society—there is war. This is a zero-sum game in 

there is only one winner. It is, thus, total. This is th

with domestic factions, other governments, rogue s

Maoist insurgents, Osama bin Ladin’s terrorist

Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult, Mafia families, Sou

Asian warlords, or Serbian ethnic cleansers—a

others. This is also the case with the deliberate “fin

war” attack planned and implemented by own

international mobile capital that generated the Sou

Asia financial crisis and inflicted devastating inju

265
Asia’s “little tiger” countries. Their nonmilitary fin

actions caused socio-economic-political devastation 

could not have been exceeded by a regional war. This 

the case with the systems analyst, software eng

scholar, or 16-year-old “hacker” that can impair the se

of an army or a nation electronically as seriously 

nuclear bomb. Finally, as one more example, it m

remembered that Germany’s former Chancellor H

Kohl breached the Berlin Wall with the powerful de

mark—not aircraft, artillery, armor, or infantry.

These are the internal and external deterrence re

for now and into the next century. Everything e

illusion.

Deterrence, and Preventive and Public Diplom

In the anarchic environment of global po

regardless of perceived intent, what one state or po

actor does will inevitably impinge on another. That 

will affect some beneficially, others adversely. M

dependence means that each political actor mus

others into account. Interdependence affects nothing 

powerfully than it does security. The result can be a v

downward action-reaction spiral that takes the 

community into instability, violence, chaos, an

inevitable destruction of stability, peace, and prosper

a consequence, political actors have always tried to 

others from engaging in activities considered to be ha

or to encourage actions thought to be beneficial. A 

problem in all this is that the anarchic environm

global politics allows each political actor to be the on

the final judge of his interests and actions. Again, it m

remembered that this caution also applies to illegal in

factions.

The Primary Rules. Here is where preventive and 

diplomacy comes into play. The general rule would b

decisionmakers and policymakers must carefully cal

possible gains and losses, and when the case war

266
apply pre-planned indirect and direct deterrent mea

earlier rather than later. If done earlier, this impli

initial and intense use of low-cost diplomatic and c

resources and military support units to ensur

deterrence message has adequate back-up. If a

earlier, preventive measures may reduce tensions 

left to fester could lead to deadly results. If done late

normally implies the initial and intense use of hig

military combat units to respond to a worsening situa

applied later, preventive measures may turn out to be 

irrelevant or counter-productive. Ultimately, howeve

only viable test for indirect or direct preventive 

sooner or later is national self-interest. In any cas

basic logic of the application of preventive and 

diplomacy is unassailable—the sooner the better.

 Deterrence, then, is not necessarily military—alt

that is important. It is not necessarily negative or d

coercive—although that, too, is important. Deterrence 

necessarily exercised against a foreign state or non

actor—and that is very important. Deterrence is 

broader than all that. Deterrence can be direct 

indirect political-diplomatic, socio-economic, psychol

moral, and/or military-coercive. In its various form

combinations of forms, it is an attempt to influence ho

what an illegal internal or a foreign enemy or pot

enemy thinks and does. That is, deterrence is the crea

a state of mind that either discourages one thi

encourages something else. Motives and culture, 

become crucial. It is in this context 

political-psychological communication—and prev

and public diplomacy—become vital parts of the dete

equation. 

Intermediate Rules. In that context, the deterrence 

of Thumb” must move from traditional U.S.-centric v

and determine precisely what a hostile foreign or m

domestic leadership values most. The “deterrer” mus

determine precisely what a hostile leadership v

most—and identify exactly how that cul

267
“thing”—whatever it is—can realistically be held a

Conversely, a new deterrence “Rule of Thumb” mus

consider what a hostile leadership values most an

opposed to the proverbial “stick”—identify precisely 

“carrots” might also be offered as deterrents.

In the chaos of the “new world disorder,” the thr

devastating attacks on the United States and its inter

home and abroad perpetrated by the former Soviet U

China, and other nuclear powers still retains a c

credibility. As a result, the deterrence and prev

diplomacy task is to get into the minds of these d

political actors, and to find viable ways and mea

convincing them NOT to use nuclear or any other k

weapons against us or anybody else in the g

community. Moreover, the threats associated wit

growing sophistication of biological and chemical wa

cyber war, are intensifying. At the same time, 

“nontraditional” threats and menaces emanating 

virtually a thousand different internal and foreign po

actors with a cause—and the will to conduct asymm

warfare—are spreading havoc throughout the 

community. And, again, the deterrence ta

straight-forward. Culturally effective ways and m

must be found to convince these “nontraditional” do

and foreign players that it is NOT in 

interest—whatever it may be—to continue their ne

behavior. 

Advanced Rules. Success in deterrence cann

reduced to buying more or better military and police 

and weaponry, to superior intelligence, to gen

command, or to relative morality. Deterrence can wor

if the intended deterree chooses to be deterred. Ther

way that any kind of deterrence can be guaranteed

problem is that deterrence is a dialectic betwee

independent wills. As a consequence, probably the 

most important dimension of deterrence is clar

communication between deterrer and deterree. A

rethink contemporary deterrence, we must not th

268
ourselves as much as “warfighters” as “conflict preven

Thus, it is incumbent on the United States and the 

the global community to understand and cope wi

threats imposed by contemporary nontraditional a

think “outside the box,” and replace the old “n

theology” with a broad deterrence strategy as it app

the chaos provoked by the diverse state, non-stat

intra-national and trans-national nuclear and non-n

threats and menaces that have heretofore been igno

wished away.

What Is To Be Done?

The United States and the rest of the interna

community will inevitably face horrible new dilemm

home and abroad that arise from the chaos engende

the contemporary global security environment. They 

on the traditional threat that stems from curren

potential nuclear powers, and the many smaller

equally deadly—nontraditional threats that are gen

out of the unevenness of global integration. Clearl

current “business as usual” crisis management app

leaves much to be desired in the context of a mult

world in which one or a hundred “irrational” po

players are exerting differing types and levels of 

power.

As has been suggested above, the United States ne

a central unifying deterrence concept to re

“containment;” (2) a thoughtful reorganization 

national and sub-national security manage

coordination, and implementation structures to bette

with the complex new world; and, (3) farsighted res

and planning mechanisms to give decisionmaker

policymakers viable options for deterring and/or red

the scope, intensity, and duration of contemporary vio

Such a prioritization of effort is not a matter of “putti

strategic cart before the deterrence horse.” It is a ma

making it clear where the horse and cart are going, ho

269
are going to get there, and what they going to do onc

arrive.

In that connection, it is important to remember th

intent of these recommendations can only be secure

result of constant improvements in the types and le

action we develop in pursuit of a higher quality of glob

domestic stability and peace than we now enjoy

challenge, then, is to come to terms with the fac

contemporary security—at whatever level—is at its 

holistic political-diplomatic, socio-econ

psychological-moral, and military-police effort

corollary is to change from a singular military-

approach to a multi-dimensional, multi-organizationa

multi-cultural paradigm.

This may be accomplished within the context of a h

implementation of direct and indirect “offensive

proactive preventive diplomacy) and “defensive” 

generally military) actions. Defensive action in

sustained coercive deterrence of threats to na

interests, and, in certain instances, is relatively short

It primarily involves military and other civilian se

efforts that are intended to stop parties in conflic

killing or moving against one another. Offensive ac

generally mid to long-term. It is primarily civilia

political-economic-psychological, but is likely to have 

coordinated with defensive military or police measu

focuses on prevention of crises, and—when appropr

follows-up the defensive enforcement of law and orde

coordinated efforts to diminish or remove the s

economic, and political causes of instability a

resultant violence. This kind of pre or post-crisis 

initiates the steps necessary to reform or develop po

economic, and social institutions, procedures, and att

that generate the foundational elements requir

address America’s central strategic vision—that of 

engagement to foster legitimate civil society, eco

prosperity, and durable peace.

270
Implementing the extraordinary challenges of r

and regeneration implied in this call for a paradigm c

will not be easy. But, they are basic security strateg

national and international asset management. That w

a result, be far less demanding and costly in po

military, and monetary terms than continuing a sin

crisis management and generally military approa

global and domestic security that is inherently a long

political problem. By accepting these challenges and 

the United States can help replace conflict with coope

and to harvest the hope that a new deterrence paradi

a more peaceful and prosperous tomorrow offers.

271
ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

STEPHEN A. CAMBONE is Director of Resear

National Defense University’s Institute for Na

Strategic Studies. Previously he was a Senior Fel

Political-Military Studies at the Center for Strateg

International Studies (CSIS), and served in the Office 

Secretary of Defense as Director of Strategic Defense P

Previously, Dr. Cambone was the Staff Director o

Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat 

United States. He earned his B.A. at Catholic Univ

and his M.A. and Ph.D. in Political Science at the Clar

Graduate School. He is the author of a recent CSIS R

entitled, “A New Structure for National Security Pla

Revising the National Security Act of 1947.”

GEORGE K. CAMPBELL directs Fidelity Investm

global corporate security organization. With over a t

dollars in customer assets, Fidelity is the world’s l

privately owned financial services firm. Fidelity Cor

Security performs the full range of proprietary se

including information security, disaster recovery pla

background, due diligence and criminal investiga

fraud prevention, property protection, and security s

engineering. Previously, Mr. Campbell owned hi

security consulting firm and, before that, was a Grou

President at a systems engineering firm supp

worldwide U.S. Government security programs. He ha

served in various line and senior management fun

within federal, state, and local government agencies

EDWIN G. CORR retired from the Department of 

after a distinguished career that included ambassado

to Bolivia, El Salvador, and Peru under both Repu

and Democratic administrations. He also served as D

Assistant Secretary of State for International Na

Matters, as a Peace Corps Director in Colombia, a

various posts in Thailand, Mexico, and Ecuador. 

entering the Foreign Service, Ambassador Corr served 

273
infantry officer in the U.S. Marine Corps. He is curren

Director of the Energy Institute of the Americas an

Associate Director of the International Programs Cen

the University of Oklahoma. Ambassador Corr 

recipient of several U.S. and foreign decoration

awards, and has written and edited various article

books. His books include Low-Intensity Conflic

Threats in a New World.

JOHN COSTELLO is the Commanding General of th

Army Space and Missile Defense Command (USAS

and is the Army’s proponent for space and missile defe

well as the overarching integrator for theater m

defense. Additionally, Lieutenant General Costello 

as the Commanding General, U.S. Army Space Com

the Army component command to the United States 

Command. He has previously held a variety o

assignments, including service as the Director, Role

Missions Directorate, Office of the U.S. Army Deputy 

of Staff for Operations and Plans, and as the Ass

Division Commander for the First Armored Div

Lieutenant General Costello earned his B.A. at the C

and holds a Master of Military Arts and Science degre

the U..S. Army Command and General Staff College. H

also received various U.S. and foreign decorations.

CHARLES J. DUNLAP, JR., USAF is a Staff 

Advocate, 9th Air Force/U.S. Central Command Air 

(USCENTAF). He most recently deployed to the M

East to serve as the legal advisor to the Comm

USCENTAF, during Operation DESERT FOX’s s

against Iraq. Colonel Dunlap earned his B.A. in Hist

St. Joseph’s University in Philadelphia and his 

Doctorate from the Villanova University School of La

is also a graduate of the Air War College a

Distinguished Graduate of the National War College

widely published and speaks often on national se

issues and civil-military relations.

274
ELLEN EMBREY is the Chief of Staff, Office 

Assistant Secretary of Defense/Reserve Affairs (OASD

where she helps shape strategic and tactical effo

influence Reserve Component structure, policies, prog

budgets, and public law to achieve national m

strategy objectives. Ms. Embrey also serves as S

Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for R

Affairs for Military Assistance to Civil Authoritie

establishes policies, programs, plans, and budge

National Guard and Reserve consequence manag

support to states, territories, and local authorities 

event of a terrorist incident involving the use of weap

mass destruction. Ms. Embrey has more than 24 ye

experience in the national security field as an an

administrator, and manager.

PETER D. FEAVER is an Associate Professor of Po

Science at Duke University, and is currently workin

the Project on the Gap Between the Military and C

Society that is being conducted by the Triangle Instit

Security Studies. Previously, he served as Director D

Policy and Arms Control on the National Security C

(NSC) where his responsibilities included cou

proliferation policy, regional nuclear arms contro

national strategy review, and other defense matter

Feaver earned his Ph.D. from Harvard University an

held post-doctoral fellowships at the Olin Instit

Harvard, the Mershon Center at Ohio State Universi

Council on Foreign Relations, and the John D

Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. He is cur

finishing a book entitled, Armed Servants: Agency Ove

and Civil Military Relations.

JOHN J. HAMRE is the former Deputy Secret

Defense, and is now the President of the Center for Str

and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C

to serving as Deputy Secretary of Defense, he wa

Comptroller in the Department of Defense, and serv

10 years as a professional staff member of the Senate A

Services Committee where he was primarily responsi

275
oversight and evaluation of procurement, and researc

development programs. Dr. Hamre earned his B.A

Augustana College and his Ph.D. from the Sch

Advanced International Studies at Johns Ho

University.

DONALD A. HAUS is Chief, Homeland Defense Div

Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia. Pr

assignments include tours with the executive officer 

Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Oper

Command, and service as an operations officer for S

Projects with the Drug Enforcement Agency. Colone

received his B.A. in Geology from the Univers

Tennessee at Chattanooga, holds an M.B.A. from S

College, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army War Col

RUSSELL HOWARD is Deputy Head of the Social S

Department at the U.S. Military Academy at West 

Previous assignments were with the U.S. Army S

Forces in North Carolina, Somalia, and Japan. C

Howard holds a B.S. in Industrial Management fro

Jose State University, a B.A. in Asian Studies fro

University of Maryland, an M.A. in Interna

Management from the Monterey Institute of Interna

Studies, and a Masters of Public Administration 

Harvard University.

THOMAS A. JOHNSON is Dean of the School of 

Safety and Professional Studies at the University o

Haven, in Connecticut. As a faculty member fo

International Association of Police Chiefs, he te

courses on the application of computer system

technology in law enforcement, and on man

innovation and technology in criminal ju

organizations. Dr. Johnson has served as an expert w

in state and federal courts, and as a consultant to th

Department of Justice and several state law enforc

agencies. He earned his B.S. and M.S. at Michigan 

University and his Ph.D. in Criminal Justice a

University of California at Berkeley. He has lec

276
extensively on technology and computer applications 

enforcement, prosecution, and judicial agencies. In ad

to writing two textbooks, Dr. Johnson has develope

holds the copyright to four computer software progra

various justice agencies.

MAX G. MANWARING, a retired U.S. Army colon

Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Dickinson C

joined the Strategic Studies Institute in September 

He has served in various civilian and military positi

the U.S. Army War College, the United States Sou

Command, and the Defense Intelligence Agenc

Manwaring earned his M.A. and Ph.D. in Political S

at the University of Illinois, and is the author and co-a

of several articles and reports dealing 

political-military affairs. He is also the editor or co-ed

El Salvador at War; Managing Contemporary Co

Pillars of Success; and Beyond Declaring Victor

Coming Home: The Challenges of Peace and Sta

Operations. 

JOHN A. NAGL teaches international relation

national security studies in the Department of 

Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy at West 

Previously, he commanded an armored cavalry troop 

First Armored Division in Germany, and led a tank p

of the First Cavalry Division during Operation D

Storm. A West Point graduate, Major Nagl holds M

and Doctoral degrees in International Relations 

Oxford University, where he studied as a Rhodes Sc

His doctoral dissertation, Learning to Eat Soup w

Knife, examined how military organizations ada

unfamiliar situations. Recent publications include wo

arms control policy and military innovation.

WILLIAM A. NAVAS, JR., USA retired from the Arm

serving 33 years as a citizen-soldier. He capped his car

Director of the Army National Guard in the National 

Bureau of the Department of Defense. While Di

Major General Navas formulated, developed

277
coordinated all programs, policies, and plans affecti

Army National Guard. He also oversaw the Army Na

Guard’s participation in numerous overseas deploym

and domestic crisis responses. Major General 

received his commission in 1965 through the Army R

Officer Training Course at the University of Puerto 

and has earned numerous U.S. military award

decorations.

TONY PFAFF teaches in the Department of Englis

Philosophy at the U.S. Military Academy at West Poi

infantry officer, he has served in various assignme

Macedonia for Operation Able Sentry, the First Ar

Division, and the Persian Gulf with the 82nd Air

Division. Major Pfaff received a B.A. in Economic

Philosophy from Washington and Lee University, a

M.A. in Philosophy from Stanford University. H

written and presented several papers on a variety of 

including military ethics, ethics of development

conflict resolution.

DON M. SNIDER is professor of Political Science 

Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Mi

Academy. He previously held the Olin Chair in Na

Security Studies at West Point, after which he bec

member of the civilian faculty. A career Army office

his retirement as a colonel, Dr. Snider’s service in

three combat tours in Vietnam, an assignment 

National Security Council, and a tour of duty in the O

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He is a gradu

West Point and holds a Ph.D. in Political Science fro

University of Maryland.

GREGORY J.W. URWIN is an Associate Profes

History at Temple University. He won the 1998 G

Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Award from the U.S. Marine 

Heritage Foundation for his book, Facing Fearful Odd

Siege of Wake Island. Dr. Urwin’s other books in

Custer Victorious: The Civil War Battles of General G

Armstrong Custer, The United States Infantr

278
Illustrated History, 1775-1918, and History of the 33d 

Infantry Volunteer Regiment, 1863-66 by A.F. Sperry (

he co-edited with his wife, Cathy Kunzinger Urwin).

279
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Editor

Dr. Max G. Manwaring

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler