This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3 v. No. 32,471 4 NELSON ESCOBAR, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 7 Stanley Whitaker, District Judge 8 Gary K. King, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 for Appellee 11 Bennett J. Bauer, Acting Chief Public Defender 12 Mary Barket, Assistant Appellate Defender 13 Santa Fe, NM 14 for Appellant 15 MEMORANDUM OPINION 16 FRY, Judge. 17 {1} After pleading no contest to one count of possession of a controlled substance 18 (cocaine), Defendant, Nelson Escobar, was sentenced to a term of thirty months 19 imprisonment, which included a one-year ha bitual offender enhancement. [RP 70, 202 157, 158] Defendant raises three issues on appeal. First, he contends the district court 1 erred in denying his motion for random reassignment. Second, he contends the district 2 court judge erred in failing to recuse himself. Third, he contends the district court 3 erred in sentencing him as an habitual offender. 4 {2} We issued a notice proposing to summarily affirm and Defendant filed a 5 memorandum in opposition and motion to ame nd the docketing statement. He seeks 6 to amend the first issue to include an argumen t that the district c ourt’s denial of his 7 motion for random reassignment constituted a denial of due process because it 8 resulted in him being tried befo re a partial tribunal. [MIO 1] We see no merit to this 9 argument and deny Defendant’s motion. We remain unpers uaded by Defendant’s 10 remaining arguments and affirm. We will discuss each issue in turn, including a 11 discussion of Defendant’s new argument in our discussion of the first issue. 12 A. Random Reassignment 13 {3} In our notice, we proposed to concludethat Defendant’s interest in being 14 sentenced before a different district court judge is not an interest which warrants 15 greater procedural protections than wereafforded here. In his memorandum in 16 opposition, Defendant continues to argue that he was deni ed due process because he 17 was tried before a partial tribunal (as a result of non-random reassignment) and 183 because the district court treated his argument for random reassignment in a 1 dismissive fashion. [MIO 13] 2 {4} Even assuming, arguendo , that the district court treated Defendant’s argument 3 dismissively, we perceive no denial of due pro cess. As we stated in our notice, we are 4 aware of no authority that suggests Defe ndant was entitled to greater procedural 5 protections than he received here. Defendant concedes that “most courts that have 6 addressed the issue have found that a defendant does not havea right to have his judge 7 selected randomly, or to have his case hear d by a particular judge .” [MIO 13] And 8 Defendant does not cite any authority from New Mexico which suggests that this is 9 the proper forum for him to challenge the r eassignment procedures used in the Second 10 Judicial District. Where a party cites no authority in support of a proposition, we 11 assume no such authority exists. See In re Adoption of Doe , 100 N.M. 764, 765, 676 12 P.2d 1329, 1330 (1984). 13 {5} We likewise see no merit in Defendant ’s argument that he was denied due 14 process because he was tried before a partial tribunal. We see no evidence that the 15 district court judge was partial. We will not presume that the judge lacked impartiality 16 simply because he decided Defendant’s motions in a manner that displeased 17 Defendant. While the quotations cont ained in Defendant’s memorandum in 184 opposition reflect that the district court j udge was annoyed at defe nse counsel, this is 1 not enough to show bias with respect to Defendant. 2 {6} Even if we were to find that the procedure for reassigning judges was not 3 random in this instance, which is a questi on we do not reach, we would still affirm. 4 Defendant cites authority from other jurisdictions which suggests that error in the 5 process by which a trial judge is selected is only reversible if it results in prejudice to 6 the defendant. See Sinito v. United States , 750 F.2d 512, 515 (6th Cir. 1984) (“Even 7 when there is an error in th e process by which the trial judgeis selected, or when the 8 selection process is not operated in compliance with local rules, the defendant is not 9 denied due process as a result of the error unless he can point to some resulting 10 prejudice.”); see also United States v. Pearson , 203 F.3d 1243, 1263 (10th Cir. 2000) 11 (holding alleged due process vi olation arising out of judicial assignment was harmless 12 because the defendant “has not alleged that he was actually prejudiced by the 13 assignment”). 14 {7} Defendant contends that he suffere d actual prejudice because his case “was 15 assigned to a judge w ho was not fair and impartial, but was, instead, so personally 16 offended by defense counsel’s le gal argument . . . to have summarily denied it.” [MIO 17 15] The fact that the district court may have summarily denied Defendant’s motion 185 for random reassignment does not mean that the judge was prejudiced against 1 Defendant. A defendant must do more to show prejudice. 2 {8} We thus affirm the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion for random 3 reassignment. We also deny Defendant’s motion to amend the docketing statement, 4 concluding that the new argument he seeks to raise is not viable. See Rule 12-208(F) 5 NMRA (“The Court of Appeals may, upon good cause shown, allow the amendment 6 of the docketing statement.”); see also State v. Moore , 109 N.M. 119, 129, 782 P.2d 7 91, 101 (Ct. App. 1989) (discussing standard for motion to amend), superceded by 8 statute on other grounds as recognized in State v. Salgado , 112 N.M. 537, 817 P.2d 9 730 (Ct. App. 1991). 10 B. Recusal 11 {9} In our notice, we proposed to concludethat the district court judge did not 12 abuse his discretion in failing to recuse himself because we sa w no evidence that he 13 became so embroiled in the controversy involving Defendant’s motion for random 14 reassignment that he could not fairly and objectively pres ide over Defendant’s 15 sentencing. See State v. Trujillo , 2009-NMCA-128, ¶ 11, 147 N.M. 334, 222 P.3d 16 1040 (“Recusal is only required when a judgehas become so embroiled in the 17 controversy that he or she cannot fairly and objectively hear the case.” (alterations, 18 internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)). 196 {10} In his memorandum in opposition, Defendant acknowledges that “there does 1 not appear to be direct evidence that the district court judge was biased when 2 imposing [Defendant’s] sentence.” [MIO 9] However, Defendant contends that the 3 record reveals that the judge could not fairly and objectively rule on either 4 Defendant’s motion for random reassignmen t or motion for recusal. [MIO 9] 5 {11} With respect to the motion for random reassignment, Defendant’s argument is 6 clearly without merit. The district court issued a written order on June 13, 2012, 7 denying Defendant’s motion for random reassi gnment. [MIO 3, RP 96] Defendant’s 8 sentencing hearing was held on August 6, 2012. [MIO 3, RP 99] Near the beginning 9 of that hearing, the district court judge st ated, on the record, thathe had already denied 10 Defendant’s motion for random reassignment. [MIO 4] After further argument on 11 this motion, defense counsel requested th at the judge recuse himself. [MIO 6] 12 Because of the order of events, there is no way that the district court judge’s denial of 13 Defendant’s motion to recuse could haveaffected his decision on the motion for 14 random reassignment. 15 {12} With respect to the motion for recusal, we are not persuaded that a judge can 16 abuse his discretion in failing to recusebecause he cannot fairly and objectively 17 decide the motion to recuse. Defendant does not cite any authority suggesting that this 18 alone could warrant reversal. We will not infer personal bias simply because the 197 district court judge denied De fendant’s motion for recusal. See State v. Hernandez , 1 115 N.M. 6, 20, 846 P.2d 312, 326 (1993) (“Personal bias cannot be inferred from an 2 adverse ruling or the enforcement of the rule s of criminal procedure.”). We perceive 3 no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to recuse 4 and thus affirm. 5 C. Sentencing 6 {13} In our notice, we proposed to conclude that the district court did not err in 7 sentencing Defendant as an habitual o ffender pursuant to the terms of the plea 8 agreement because Defendant admitted to having a prior felony conviction and the 9 agreement is not ambiguous regarding whether the habitual offender enhancement was 10 triggered here. Defendant continues to argue both point s and we remain unpersuaded. 11 {14} It is clear that Defendant waived his ri ght to contest the validity of his prior 12 felony conviction because he specifically admitted he had a prior conviction which 13 was a felony conviction for purposes of NMSA 1978, Section 31-18-17 (2003), and 14 he admitted this conviction was “valid and free from error.” [RP 70] See State v. 15 Sanchez , 2001-NMCA-060, ¶ 21, 130 N.M. 602, 28 P.3d 1143 (concluding the 16 defendant waived his right to contest the validity of his prior convictions or his status 17 as a fourth habitual offender on similar fact s). Defendant contends that his admission 188 was only valid for a limited purpose, but hi s argument is not supported by either the 1 language of the plea agreement or New Mexico case law. 2 {15} It is also clear that Defendant was pr operly sentenced as an habitual offender. 3 The agreement provides for two different ways for Defendant to be sentenced as an 4 habitual offender. First, the agreement states: 5 SENTENCING AGREEMENT : The State has agreed to waive pursuit 6 of Habitual Offender Enhancement at initial sentencing. There are no 7 other agreements to sentence. If Defendant violates any condition of 8 release prior to sentencing on this matter, or, subsequent to 9 sentencing, violates any condition of parole or probation, the Court 10 may sentence Defendant to imprisonment without considering the 11 limitation. 12 [RP 70-71 (emphasis in original)] Second, the agreement states, in a section entitled 13 Habitual Offender Proceedings: 14 UPON VIOLATION : The Defendant understands that if Defendant 15 violates any law after entering th is plea and before completing the 16 sentence in the case, Defendant will be subject to additional habitual 17 offender proceedings based on the c onvictions listed under the section 18 labeled “Admission of Identity.” Th e State also may bring additional 19 habitual offender proceedings if the Defendant violates any conditions 20 of probation or parole. 21 [RP 72] 22 {16} Defendant does not dispute that he vi olated a condition of release prior to 23 sentencing by failing to appear at initial sentencing, thus triggering the first section 24 of the agreement quoted above. However, heargues that this section is inapplicable 259 because he did not engage in conduct wh ich triggered the second section of the 1 agreement quoted above. We have previously stated that a “[d]efendant[] do[es] not 2 get to choose which part of a plea bargai n to follow; plea agreements are generally 3 viewed and enforced in their entirety.” State v. Leyba , 2009-NMCA-030, ¶ 20, 145 4 N.M. 712, 204 P.3d 37. Reading the agreement as a whole, we believe that Defendant 5 should have understood that hecould have been sentenced as an habitual offender 6 pursuant to either section of the agreement quoted above. We thus conclude that the 7 district court did not err in sentencing Defendant as an habitual offender. 8 CONCLUSION 9 {17} For the reasons stated above and in our prior notice, we deny Defendant’s 10 motion to amend and affirm. 11 {18} IT IS SO ORDERED. 12

13 CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge 14 WE CONCUR: 15

16 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 17

1810 M. MILES HANISEE, Judge 1