THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE RISE

 OF POPULISM IN EUROPE AND SOUTH AMERICA

Steve C. Ropp

June 2005

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FOREWORD

 Populism has received very little attention from military 

planners. This is understandable. As a political phenomenon, it is 

viewed as somewhat removed from security concerns and hence as 

more legitimately within the purview of those members of the U.S. 

policy community who deal with political issues. Furthermore, as a 

dynamic, unstable, and ephemeral phenomenon within seemingly 

stable representative democracies, it is hard to “see” and hence 

to study. This makes trend extrapolation regarding the growth of 

populist movements much more difficult than for other future 

security challenges such as terrorism or unconventional war.

 In this monograph, Dr. Steve C. Ropp questions whether the 

enormous potential strategic consequences of a future burst of 

populist turbulence in Europe or South America suggest that it be 

more carefully studied. As Dr. Ropp indicates in his analysis, such 

bursts of turbulence have dramatically altered the U.S. security 

environment in the past, present new challenges today, and could 

provide even greater ones in the future.

 The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph 

on populism as part of the continuing debate about the nature of 

the challenges and opportunities facing the United States in coming 

decades. The analysis contained herein should prove particularly 

useful to those within the security community who are concerned 

with the second and third order consequences of the successful 

spread of representative democracy in Europe and South America. 

It reflects information, available through March of 2005, regarding 

populist dynamics in these two important regions.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

STEVE C. ROPP joined the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) in 

September 2004 as Visiting Research Professor of National Security 

Affairs. He is on temporary leave from the Department of Political 

Science at the University of Wyoming (UW). His principal focus while 

at SSI is on populist leaders in Europe and the Americas and their 

impact on national security policy. His research credentials include 

recognition as one of 65 top U.S. foreign policy experts by the National 

Journal, selection to be the Milward Simpson Distinguished Professor 

in Political Science at UW, and subsequently as UW’s Clarence Seibold 

Professor in Arts and Sciences. Dr. Ropp has served as a consultant 

to the Kissinger Commission on Central America, consultant to the 

State Department on Central America, and as an expert witness on 

Panama for both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House 

Foreign Affairs Committee. He has also been a Fulbright Scholar in 

several countries, a Research Fellow at the Alexander von Humboldt 

Foundation and Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, as 

well as a participant in many other “think tank” activities around 

the world. Dr. Ropp’s areas of interest are Panamanian politics 

and the security of the Canal, Central American politics, global 

human rights practices, and populist movements in Europe and 

the Americas. He has published a number of books, book chapters, 

and articles in Cambridge University Press, The University of New 

Mexico Press, World Politics, The Latin American Research Review, and 

Current History. Dr. Ropp holds a Ph.D. in political science from the 

University of California, Riverside; an M.A. in political science from 

the University of Washington, Seattle; and a B.A. in history from 

Allegheny College in Meadville, Pennsylvania.
v

SUMMARY

 The end of the Cold War provided the United States with an 

enormous opportunity to reshape the national security environment, 

not only militarily but also economically and politically. Militarily, 

old alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

have been enlarged and retooled, while new partnerships have 

developed elsewhere to deal with challenges such as humanitarian 

relief and complex emergencies. Economically, a consensus has 

increased as to the value of market mechanisms as tools for the 

promotion of development and sustained economic growth. 

And politically, processes of democratization have expanded the 

number of countries in the world that are either partially or fully 

democratic.

 At the same time, our very success in this regard has created 

the preconditions for future bursts of populist turbulence in two 

democratic regions of the world where the United States has vital 

security interests―Europe and South America. Populist politicians 

already have altered the security environment in both regions and 

are likely to alter it more dramatically. Were bursts of populist 

turbulence to occur in either or both regions on a large scale, they 

would have the potential to undermine the democratic core upon 

which most of contemporary U.S. security policy is based. And in 

some regions, such as the Andes, where democratic institutions are 

particularly fragile, populist turbulence could even lead to state 

failure.

 The potential rise of populism in Europe and South America 

should not be viewed by policy planners as posing just another 

specific type of security threat. For unlike the traditional, irregular, 

catastrophic, or disruptive ones normally considered in future 

scenarios, populism poses a potential challenge to the underlying 

political substructure that has given us the collective material 

capability and moral legitimacy to deal with all of these threats. In 

the final analysis, our ability to project power to deal with the whole 

spectrum of security challenges that the United States will face in the 

future depends upon our ability to deal with the potential challenges 

emerging from within representative democracy itself.
vi

 This monograph takes a fresh look at the contemporary populist 

phenomenon in Europe and the Americas. It describes populism, 

discusses the global context in which it is emerging, and then paints 

a picture of its general characteristics in four subregions in Europe 

and South America. It concludes with four recommendations for 

strategic planners as to how best to deal with it and with its potential 

consequences.

 Specifically, these recommendations include:

 1. Considering possible bursts of populist turbulence to be on a par with 

other major security challenges in terms of future planning. This would 

suggest that strategic planners will need to educate themselves 

concerning the history and current nature of populism, particularly 

in their regional areas of responsibility. Policymakers should 

consider revising the U.S. National Security Strategy so as to reflect 

the importance of political systems and dynamics that cannot be 

classified as either fully democratic or totalitarian.

 2. Focusing policy on containing populist movements before they come 

to power. Populists by definition use direct forms of political action to 

gain power within representative democracies and are thus inclined 

to continue using such techniques once power has been achieved. 

Although it may not always be easy or diplomatically feasible to 

influence the trajectory of populist politicians, efforts should be made 

to do so. The ultimate goal of policy should be to aid our democratic 

allies in their efforts to “mainstream” populist politicians and their 

movements.

 3. Avoiding forming alliances of convenience with populists. In some 

cases, populist politicians in Europe and South America may support 

U.S. short-term political or military goals in order to “gain traction” 

domestically and/or internationally. Given the importance that 

preserving the institutional integrity of representative democracy 

has with regard to the achievement of long-term U.S. security goals, 

strategic thinkers should resist the temptation to sacrifice these goals 

for any short-term gain.

 4. Configuring U.S. military forces so that they are capable of dealing 

with the wide variety of challenges that individual populists or a larger burst 

of turbulence might present. Depending on the country and region, such 

challenges could run the gamut from state failure to rapid changes 

in the identities and associated strategic interests of powerful and 
vii

internally coherent states. Although determination of the precise 

nature of such configurations is the purview of military experts, the 

possibility of future bursts of populist turbulence would seem to call 

for preservation of the broadest range of combat capabilities.

1

THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE RISE

OF POPULISM IN EUROPE AND SOUTH AMERICA

INTRODUCTION

 In November 2004, viewers of Netherlands public television 

voted by phone and e-mail for the person that they thought should 

be considered the “greatest Dutchman of all time.” The resulting top 

ten list represented the flower of Dutch politics and culture. William 

of Orange who had guaranteed the country’s independence from 

the Spanish in the 16th century came in second, and other historical 

luminaries such as Anne Frank, Erasmus, Rembrandt, and Vincent 

Van Gogh also made the list. But the person voted the “greatest 

Dutchman of all time” by his contemporaries was a formerly obscure 

gay university professor named Pim Fortuyn (biographical sketch 

in appendix). The political career of this dynamic Dutchman lasted 

only 6 short months before he was assassinated on May 6, 2002, on 

the eve of general elections.1

 However, his anti-Islamic message still 

finds a receptive audience in the Netherlands where there is a large 

Muslim population.

 On the other side of Europe in that continent’s second largest 

country, another young politician became increasingly visible 

as a participant in a tense electoral stand-off. In the Ukraine, the 

October 2004 election pitted a former Prime Minister and Westernoriented advocate of market reforms (Viktor Yushchenko) against 

an Eastern-oriented sitting Prime Minister allied with Russia (Viktor 

Yanukovich). When Yanukovich won the November 21 runoff 

under conditions that most international observers felt failed to meet 

international standards of transparency, Yushchenko supporters 

took to the streets of Kiev. Among those stirring up the crowd was an 

outspoken and telegenic member of Parliament, Yulia Tymoshenko. 

By most accounts, the country’s wealthiest woman and a political 

ally of Yuschenko, she at one point invited her supporters to join her 

in storming the legislative building.2

 Meanwhile, on another continent halfway round the world, 

a powerfully-built “firebrand” of a former army colonel currently 

governs Venezuela. Born to schoolteacher parents in a small rural 
2

town, President Hugo Chavez is much better known within the U.S. 

security community than either Pim Fortuyn or Yulia Tymoshenko. 

President Chavez has governed the oil-rich South American country 

of Venezuela for the past 6 years and has increasingly done so 

through the use of presidential decree laws. Since surviving a recall 

referendum in August 2004, through which the political opposition 

attempted to have him ousted from office, he has further consolidated 

his power. And Chavez has sought to extend his influence regionally 

through the promotion of values that he associates with Latin 

America’s great 19th century revolutionary hero, Simon Bolivar.

 Finally, a ruggedly handsome 45-year-old Bolivian indigenous 

leader has become a major participant in the ongoing struggle 

over that country’s political and physical survival. Opposition-led 

demonstrations in October 2003 in the capitol city of La Paz resulted 

in the death of a number of participants and to the flight into exile of 

President Gonzalo Sanchez Lozada. As a consequence, his successor, 

Carlos Mesa, has governed in uneasy alliance with the indigenous 

supporters of Evo Morales.3 Morales’ peasant roots in the Andean 

heartland of Bolivia have given his political message resonance in a 

region filled with impoverished farmers. His Movement to Socialism 

(MAS) party is now the largest political force in the country.

 As intriguing as their individual stories may be, why should anyone 

in the U.S. strategic community take more than a passing interest 

in these four political figures? This monograph suggests that we 

should be very interested because they may represent, in William 

Shakespeare’s famous words, “the baby figure of the giant mass 

of things to come.”4

 Although participating in politics in different 

regions and on two different continents, each of them became 

a dynamic force in national politics within a very short period of 

time. Each has become such a force within either a well-established 

or newly-formed representative democracy. And each has emerged 

in a country whose people are under great stress because of global 

change. Most importantly for our purposes here, each is a populist

who quickly carved out a personal political “space” within the 

framework of representative democratic institutions.

 Populism is a concept that needs to be discussed briefly because 

of the variety of definitions that are sometimes used to capture its 

essence. Because populist political figures first appeared in countries 
3

around the world that were rapidly industrializing, there has been a 

tendency to associate it exclusively with the dislocations and stress 

experienced by blue collar workers, and thus with left-wing politics. 

The problem with this definition is that Europeans today tend to 

associate populism in countries like France, Germany, and Italy with 

right-wing politics. Thus, we clearly need to look beyond simply the 

politics of the Left and the Right to see what populism is really all 

about.

 Populism can make its presence felt among any group of 

ordinary people in any democratic country which is being subjected 

to stressful forces. As a result of such stress, this group of people 

may identify itself with a leader who they believe can provide 

them with more material support and hope for the future than the 

elite politicians running the country. Indeed, the whole dynamic 

supporting populism relies on the fact that some group of ordinary 

citizens does not view the government as legitimately and properly 

representing their interests. As a consequence, they lose respect for 

the institutions associated with representative democracy (political 

parties, legislatures, courts) and are perfectly willing to bypass these 

institutions when necessary through recourse to direct political 

action.5 Such direct political action often (though not always) 

involves some measure of illegality. It frequently takes the perfectly 

legal form of using referendums to bypass national institutions.6

 Populism always expresses itself in the form of a direct and 

unmediated relationship between “the people” and their leader. This 

leader is typically charismatic―meaning that, by force of personality 

and sheer animal magnetism, he or she can form a direct bond with 

followers. In the modern media age, this dynamic and outspoken 

leader is also usually handsome/beautiful or otherwise ruggedly 

“compelling” in a movie star kind of way. And there is good reason 

why populists possess these personal attributes. Given the grip 

that elite politicians have on traditional representative democratic 

institutions and the media, the populist leader needs to present his 

or her ideas theatrically to bypass these institutions and to reach the 

“chosen people” directly.7

 As will be discussed in greater detail later, populism is a force 

that is eroding the institutional foundations of liberal representative 

democracy in a wide range of countries in Europe and South America. 
4

And it is evident that a number of existing U.S. security dilemmas 

in both regions already are associated with the handful of populist 

politicians that have been used here as examples. The Netherlands 

has been a reliable ally in the War on Terrorism, and yet it is a country 

haunted by the populist “ghost” of Pim Fortuyn.8

 In the Ukraine, 

populist sentiment triggered by the disputed presidential elections 

and their aftermath threatens to complicate U.S. relationships with 

both it and Russia.9

 In Venezuela, Hugo Chavez’s policies vastly 

complicate the regional strategic equation. And Evo Morales “copresidential” relationship with Carlos Mesa creates a dilemma with 

regard to implementation of U.S. drug control policies.

 However important these individual security dilemmas might 

appear to be, they pale in comparison to those that could emerge. 

The rapid rise of additional populist politicians within existing 

representative democracies in Europe and South America would 

have far more profound implications for U.S. national security. The 

strategic political context is no longer that of the Cold War where 

authoritarian regimes of various kinds predominated in Central and 

Eastern Europe and Latin America, while traditional representative 

democracies governed in Western Europe. Rather, it is one in 

which a wide variety of seemingly but not necessarily stable and 

obviously unstable democracies occupy the political landscape in 

both regions.

 Paradoxically, the successful end of the Cold War has created 

new challenges for those concerned with the relationship between 

national security issues and democratic governance. Democracies 

in the “New Europe” such as Ukraine are under tremendous stress, 

partly because they are new but also because of strains imposed by 

the transition to market economies. Democracies in the “Old Europe” 

are under similar pressure from the forces of globalization, as well as 

from those associated with expansion of the European Union (EU) 

in 2004. And throughout South America, representative democracies 

suffer from the stresses and anxieties of publics attempting to adjust 

to the forces of change.

 The “bottom line” for those involved in thinking about national 

security policy is that we can no longer take for granted the democratic 

base that the old Cold War environment provided to the United States 

in Europe and South America. Forces for change are afoot which 
5

render the assumption that we can treat this base as a “constant” 

in our security equation increasingly problematical. These same 

forces make problematical the assumption that we can deal with 

both Europe and the Americas as if ever increasing levels of stable 

representative democracy can undergird future U.S. security policy. 

Rather, recent developments suggest just the opposite. Future bursts 

of populist turbulence in these two vital regions of the world could 

occur, with the whole becoming larger than the sum of its parts.

 The following sections of this monograph first describe the 

current economic and political context for the rise of populism in 

Europe and South America. This is followed by a discussion of why 

so little attention has been paid to populism within the U.S. security 

community, and why more attention should be paid. A more indepth discussion of the nature of populism follows, and a framework 

is presented that suggests the type of democracies in which it is 

most likely to appear in the future. The last sections describe the 

general nature of the populist terrain in four subregions―“Old 

Europe,” “New Europe,” the Southern Cone, and the Andean region 

of South America.10 Regional and transregional scenarios for the 

rise of populism and associated bursts of turbulence are presented, 

followed by a discussion of their security implications and some 

associated recommendations for policymakers.

THE GLOBAL CONTEXT FOR THE RISE OF POPULISM

 Although the premise of this monograph is that U.S. policymakers 

should be particularly concerned by the future security challenges that 

could be created by bursts of populism in Europe and South America, 

various global changes are eroding support for representative 

democracy in other world regions as well. Scholars and civic leaders 

increasingly are concerned about the so-called “democratic deficit,” a 

tendency for citizens to disengage from organized party politics and 

hence, in some ways, to stop thinking of themselves as citizens. And 

strange as it may seem, popular support for the key institutions of 

representative democracy is declining almost as rapidly in developed 

countries as it is in less developed ones. 

 Many observers attribute declining levels of civic engagement 

in developed countries to domestic environments in which a 
6

combination of growing consumer wealth, expanding leisure time, 

and a pervasive media presence have reduced the appeal of local 

“retail politics.” Going to vote is viewed as less exciting than making 

a trip to the mall. In the face of a constant barrage of advertisements, 

adults in various representative democracies (particularly young 

adults) increasingly have come to view themselves as consumers first 

and citizens second.11 Thus, while other reasons for declining civic 

engagement may be important, the primary explanation seems to be 

that the institutions of representative democracy are increasingly in 

competition with other more dynamic forces in the larger society.

 As for why support for representative democracy is declining 

in developing countries, the reasons have more to do with concrete 

“bread and butter” issues. In regions such as “New Europe,” the 

Andes, or South America’s Southern Cone, the democratic deficit 

often results not so much from competition from consumerism, 

but rather from the stress and uncertainties associated with 

transitioning to a market economy. To the extent that the institutions 

of representative democracy are seen as not “delivering the goods” 

in this respect, the public will look elsewhere for solutions to its 

daily problems. This public disenchantment with representative 

democracy in developing countries is reflected in both low voter 

turnout for national elections and in declining levels of public trust 

for democratic institutions.12

 Also underlying the general decline in support in Europe and 

South America for representative democratic institutions are stresses 

and uncertainties related to ongoing processes of globalization. As 

some observers have pointed out, economic and cultural globalization 

has not taken place as rapidly as its critics would suggest.13 However, 

it is not so much the reality of globalization but rather people’s 

perception of it that has raised levels of concern throughout both 

regions.14

 In the western part of Europe, people of all political persuasions 

fear that their economic security will be undermined not only by 

increased exports from non-European low-wage countries such as 

China, but also by future exports from the EU’s newest member 

states. This has led to increasing calls for protectionist measures 

and for curbs on the activities of multinational corporations. The 

fears and stresses associated with globalization are pronounced, 
7

particularly in countries such as Germany that are important 

industrial exporting countries and hence subject to job losses and 

wage depression.15 And they are reflected in recent public opinion 

polls that show rapidly rising levels of pessimism about the impact 

of EU expansion, particularly in Central Europe.16 As for people in 

European countries lying farther to the east, economic security is 

now by far the greatest policy concern.17

 The stresses and uncertainties associated with globalization are 

also present throughout South America. There, the transition to 

open market economies in the 1990s increased income inequality 

in most countries, led to a rise in urban unemployment, and to a 

widening gap between the wages of skilled and unskilled workers.18

These harsh economic realities are, in turn, reflected in pessimistic 

attitudes about the impact of globalization.19 Discontent with regard 

to globalization and concerns regarding their economic future are 

pronounced particularly among people in Andean countries. For 

example, some 92 percent of those recently polled in Ecuador and 

Peru said that things were not going well in their countries.20 And 

only 19 percent of all Latin Americans expressed satisfaction in the 

performance of their market economies.21

 As economic stresses continue to grow, levels of support for 

representative democratic government further decline. Public 

distrust today of democratic institutions within the 15 “original” 

members of the EU is nothing less than shocking. Only 16 percent of 

citizens trust their political parties and only 35 percent their national 

parliaments. The overall level of trust in national governments 

now stands at 30 percent. By way of contrast, television earns the 

trust of 54 percent, the army 63 percent, and the police, 65 percent. 

Most strikingly, political parties are the least trusted institution, and 

national governments are less trusted than the EU and the United 

Nations (UN) (see Table 1).22

 To make matters worse, levels of public trust in democratic 

institutions are even lower in the EU’s new member states. Here, 

political parties only hold the loyalties of 7 percent of the people and 

an incredibly low 3 percent in Poland. At the other end of the “trust 

spectrum” stand the media (radio and television) and the army with 

trust levels in the 60 percent range. More significantly, the levels of 
8

trust for the three institutional pillars of representative democracy 

(political parties, parliament, and the judiciary) are higher in Latin 

American countries than in the newly admitted members of the 

EU.23

OLD NEW LATIN

EUROPE EUROPE AMERICA

Parties 16 7 18 

Parliament 35 16 24

Legal system 43 27 32

Television 54 57 38

Police 65 42 37

Army 63 58 40

Table 1. Percent of Levels of Trust in Democratic Institutions

(“Old Europe,” “New Europe,” and Latin America).

 Under these conditions, it is not surprising that both European 

and South American political parties and party systems are under a 

lot of stress. Particularly in South America, parties have proliferated 

rapidly. For example, Argentina now has 47; Venezuela, 37; and 

Bolivia, 14.24 And while the number of parties is more limited in 

Europe due to high electoral thresholds for admission, they are 

relatively numerous and ideologically diverse throughout the region. 

Furthermore, support for old mainstream parties in countries such as 

the Netherlands, Italy, Argentina, and Uruguay has eroded rapidly, 

threatening the “hollowing out” of these systems and hence movement toward more extreme types of multiparty configurations.25

 In sum, the general context for possible future bursts of populist 

turbulence in both Europe and South America is one where there 

has been a noticeable recent decline in civic engagement and 

an increasing democratic deficit. As a result of the stresses and 

uncertainties associated with globalization and other factors, levels 

of trust in democratic institutions have declined. The general effect 

has been to create a volatile and expanded public “space” within 

the crumbling democratic edifice for a new generation of populist 

politicians.
9

WHY THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF POPULISM 

HAVE NOT RECEIVED MORE ATTENTION

 As compared to other types of political phenomena, populism has 

received very little attention. For example, only about 2 percent of the 

14,000 books in print on democracy and various forms of authoritarian 

rule deal with the subject of populism.26 It seems to be viewed within 

this vast literature as a mildly interesting “hybrid” form of political 

rule that does not fit neatly into any of the conventional conceptual 

boxes.

 And until recently, populism has received very little attention 

within the U.S. foreign policy and security community.27 The National 

Security Strategy makes no mention of populism as a potential security 

problem. Indeed, it posits a simple two-part distinction between 

democratic and totalitarian political systems, with democracy 

mentioned 20 times and totalitarianism 3 times. The National Security 

Strategy also suggests that there is a general global movement away 

from totalitarian forms of government and towards democracy, and 

support for such a trend is posited as one of the U.S. national goals.

 Given this perspective on democracy, it is hardly surprising that 

the National Security Strategy does not mention the possibility of the 

future erosion of existing liberal democratic institutions or of the 

implications such a development would have for national security. 

Rather, the strategy suggests that the expansion of the “family of 

transatlantic democracies” can reliably serve as a political support 

base for the maintenance or expansion of military alliances such as 

NATO.28

 Why is populism such an understudied political phenomenon 

within the U.S. security community? Part of the reason is the abovementioned analytical bias toward a view of global democratic 

processes that is linear and unidirectional. But populism is also 

hard to “see.” Because it is a dynamic, unstable, and ephemeral 

force operating within representative democracies, it is as difficult 

to pin down as are quarks by physicists. Compare, for example, the 

difficulty of studying the illusive and dynamic populist to that of 

studying a well-known democratic leader, dictator, or even terrorist. 

Unlike a Tony Blair, Kim Jong-il, or Osama Bin Laden, a populist 
10

leader such as Pim Fortuyn literally can explode upon the political 

scene and often just as quickly vanish from it. 

 Populism is also neglected because we Americans tend to view 

it as a rather benign or, at worst, slightly malignant force found 

within a generally healthy democratic body politic. This perspective 

on populism is the product of our own unique historical experience 

with it. Who are the populists who come to mind when we think 

about this American experience, and what were the consequences of 

their brief sojourns on the national political stage? While the likes 

of Senator William Jennings Bryan, Father Charles Coughlin, and 

Governor George Wallace may not be revered figures in the pantheon 

of great American politicians, they did little long-run damage to 

representative democracy. Thus, as a result of this perspective 

on populism, our strategic planners tend to view its appearance 

in various other countries as an isolated problem amenable to a 

diplomatic solution rather than as a potential security challenge 

requiring advanced strategic planning.29

 Our inattention to the security implications of populism also 

results from the fact that the last great burst of populist turbulence 

in Europe and South America occurred more than 60 years ago. 

In Europe, Benito Mussolini exploded onto the Italian democratic 

political scene in 1919 when he first ran for a seat in Parliament. A 

short 2 years later, the King of Italy, Vittorio Emanuele III, asked 

him to form a new government. While Adolph Hitler emerged less 

quickly within Germany’s post-World War I democratic Weimar 

Republic, he eventually formed part of a larger cluster of populist 

politicians who governed on two continents. Mussolini and Hitler’s 

counterparts in South America included populist figures such as 

President Getulio Vargas of Brazil and Juan Peron of Argentina.

 Although a major outbreak of Transatlantic populism has not 

occurred recently, Latin America did experience what might be 

considered a regional “mini-burst” some 3 decades ago.30 Beginning 

with Fidel Castro’s ascension to power in Cuba (1959) and through 

the mid-1970s, a number of populist leaders held sway in a small 

subset of the region’s countries. These included Panama under 

General Omar Torrijos Herrera (1968-81) and Peru under General 

Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-75). Most of these leaders were populist, 

both in terms of their style and also in terms of the radical-reformist 
11

policies they pursued. And this “mini-burst” of populist turbulence 

created major security problems for the United States, including the 

threat of Soviet Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles in Cuba (the 

Cuban Missile Crisis) and the possibility of new security threats to 

the Panama Canal.31

WHY WE NEED TO PAY MORE ATTENTION TO POPULISM

 Given the large number of major security threats already facing 

the United States today (traditional, irregular, disruptive, and 

catastrophic), why should we pay more attention to populism?32

Three main reasons are:33

 • Because populism has shown an ability in the past to quickly 

and dramatically alter the strategic environment in Europe 

and South America in ways that caught U.S. planners off 

guard;

 • Because populism already has changed the strategic 

environment in Europe and South America―and could change 

it even more dramatically in the near future; and,

 • Because such bursts of populist turbulence would unsettle 

the core area of representative democracies―increasing the 

general level of strategic uncertainty and undermining the 

political base from which U.S. military power has collectively 

been projected.

 With regard to the first of these points, the last great burst of 

populist turbulence in the 1920s and 1930s dramatically altered the 

political terrain in Europe and South America in a few short years. 

However, U.S. strategic planners remained oblivious to its potential 

consequences because of a deeply grounded belief in the inevitable 

march toward democracy after World War I.34

 As a consequence, U.S. military planning between the wars was 

dominated by scenarios that envisioned no major strategic threats 

emanating from changes within representative democracies in 

Europe and the Americas. Rather, such scenarios focused on “minor” 

global contingencies such as dealing with possible political unrest 

in the Philippines or in Mexico. It was not until the late 1930s that 
12

planners realized that the strategic environment had been altered 

dramatically by bursts of populist turbulence in both Europe and 

South America. By that time, it was much too late to redesign U.S. 

force structures or change military operational plans.35

 Second, we need to pay more attention to populism because 

it already has altered the strategic operational environment in 

both regions over the past few years. As mentioned above, rising 

populist sentiment in the Ukraine as the result of recent elections has 

threatened to complicate U.S. relations with Russia. And President 

Yushchenko’s selection of populist Tymoshenko to be Ukraine’s 

Prime Minister makes it tempting for U.S. policymakers to pursue 

short-term policy goals at the expense of putting the institutional 

integrity of Ukraine’s fledgling democracy more at risk.36 For 

example, it becomes tempting to ignore populist developments in a 

case such as this where the government has provided considerable 

support for U.S. policy in Iraq.37

 Another example drawn from South America further illustrates 

how populism has already altered the strategic operational 

environment. Until 1998, when military populist Chavez was elected 

president of Venezuela, there had been no credible spokesperson in 

the region for an alternative political and economic vision of the 

future of the Americas. Chavez’s articulation of such an alternative 

Bolivarian vision has in the process created a number of strategic 

dilemmas for U.S. policymakers. Should we treat his brand of 

populism as a legitimate regional variant of representative democracy, 

or treat it as a threatening new form of authoritarianism? What are 

the security implications of his increasingly close ties to Cuba, Russia, 

and China? And should we be concerned from a security standpoint 

with his efforts to create a new “petro-alliance,” both within Latin 

America and across the globe?38

 That Chavez’s unique brand of populism already has changed the 

strategic equation for the United States in Latin America is perhaps 

best illustrated by the growing concern within the U.S. policy 

community about energy security. In November 2004, Chairman 

of the Senate Foreign Relations Committtee Senator Richard Lugar 

expressed this concern in a letter to the Government Accountability 

Office (GAO). In the letter, he requested that the GAO look into U.S. 
13

preparations for another disruption of the supply of energy from 

Venezuela. The concern was not only with disruptive actions that 

President Chavez might take but also those of the opposition in a 

highly polarized post-referendum political environment.39

 The third and final reason for closely following populist 

developments in Europe and South America is by far the most 

important. Future bursts of populist turbulence have the potential to 

unsettle the collective democratic core of countries that undergirds 

much of U.S. military security policy.40 Such a political turn of events 

in either or both of these regions would have multiple negative 

consequences for those concerned with military-related security 

issues. 

 As a result of populist turbulence, there would be less ability 

to build structural certainty into future security planning. In other 

words, U.S. strategic planners would have a much reduced ability to 

take certain things that might or might not happen for granted. Take, 

for example, the current situation with regard to the International 

Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) efforts to bring Iranian nuclear 

programs under an international inspection regime. Strategic military 

planners fairly safely can assume in this context that representative 

democracies in South America that do not presently possess nuclear 

weapons (such as Brazil and Argentina) are likely to assent to 

inspection regimes and safeguards similar to those being urged on 

Iran.41 But would this remain the case under conditions of populist 

turbulence?42

 Future populist turbulence in Europe and South America would 

also lessen our ability to collectively and reliably project military 

power into troubled regions and to deal with the growing problem of 

failed or failing states. This core area of representative democracies 

served as the political base from which U.S. strategic planners were 

able to contain the Soviet Union during the Cold War. And following 

the end of the Cold War, collective diplomatic and military power 

was used to deal with post-Cold War crises and peacekeeping/

peacemaking situations such as those which developed in Iraq and 

the Balkans.43

 But what might we expect under conditions of widespread 

populist turbulence in either or both regions? Here, Venezuela can 

serve as an example. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, this 
14

representative democracy played an important role in collective 

regional efforts to bring the civil wars in Central America to a close.44

Under the leadership of President Luis Herrera Campins (1979-84), 

Venezuela became a founding member of the so-called Contadora 

Group in 1983. Together with Colombia, Brazil, and Panama, it 

served as an “honest broker” in efforts to find political solutions to 

the ongoing conflict in the region. 

 In the process of working toward such political solutions in 

Central America, Venezuela also became a major contributor to UN 

observer groups that were dispatched in the late 1980s and 1990s 

to monitor and enforce cease fires in Nicaragua and El Salvador. 

In fact, the Venezuelan troop battalion sent to Nicaragua in 1989 

constituted 75 percent of the military force stationed there under UN 

auspices. However, today under populist governance, Venezuela’s 

contribution to UN peacekeeping missions has been minimal.45

 The current “meltdown” in Haiti provides another example of 

how a future increase in populist turbulence in the democratic core 

might be expected to impact our ability to collectively and reliably 

project power into troubled regions of the world, including some 

that are very close to the United States. Following the removal of 

President Jean-Bertrand Aristide from office in February 2004, the 

UN has assumed the role of a “virtual government” in this failed 

Caribbean state.46 

 Under such conditions, what effect would future populist 

turbulence in the Southern Cone have on U.S. and UN ability to 

deal with the security and humanitarian problems associated with 

Haitian state collapse? If we look at the composition of the 6,000 

military personnel that the UN has deployed there, the majority come 

from the Southern Cone democracies of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and 

Uruguay.47 And these troops (under Brazilian command) are all that 

currently ensures that the country will not descend into chaos. 

 What kinds of adjustments in force deployment would the 

U.S. military have to contemplate if any or all of these Southern 

Cone countries were to experience populist turbulence that led 

their governments to reassess their current level of military troop 

commitments to present and future stabilization operations in the 

Americas?48 And more broadly, what kinds of adjustments would 
15

we need to contemplate in terms of global force deployment? During 

the first 4 years of the new millennium, the contribution of Latin 

America’s democracies to global peacekeeping operations and efforts 

to deal with humanitarian emergencies has increased dramatically. 

A reversal of this trend would put greater pressure on U.S. military 

personnel.49

 With regard to our current need to pay additional attention to 

the strategic implications of populism, we face a dilemma. Our very 

success in promoting the spread of representative democracy in the 

former Communist countries of Eastern Europe and the Americas 

following the end of the Cold War has resulted in the creation of 

institutional structures that are often fragile at best. The forces of 

grassroots democracy that the process of democratization has 

unleashed threaten to overwhelm representative institutions in 

countries where these institutions are either over- or underdeveloped 

(see Table 2). Under such conditions, populists who have the ability 

to directly connect with “the people,” or even shape peoples’ views 

of their collective identity, will be empowered to reshape democracy 

itself.50

Phase 1: Major global and/or regional changes undermine 

institutions in representative democracies.

Phase 2: Populist leaders emerge to reflect the stresses and 

uncertainties shared by “the people” in these democracies.

Phase 3: New regional “clusters” of populist-led countries form 

around common interests or even new ideologies.

Phase 4: Bursts of populist turbulence occur in and among these 

countries.

Phase 5: New security challenges quickly appear for the United 

States.

 

Table 2. How Populism Could Create New Security Challenges

in Europe and South America.
16

HOW POPULISM WORKS

 The strategic implications of populism do not arise from the nature 

of populism itself, but rather from the political context in which it is 

found. In fact, in a healthy representative democracy, it can provide 

a form of “therapy.” It can do this by regularly reminding governing 

political elites that they ultimately must prove themselves responsive 

to the will of the people or the people will find an alternative route 

(through populist leaders) of making their voices heard. As pointed 

out earlier, this has happened many times in the history of the United 

States.

Stable democracies have shown themselves to be adaptable over 

time, a characteristic that is not always evident in democracies around 

the world.51 More commonly, representative democracies are either 

too rigid and “set in their ways,” or too fluid and hence volatile. 

Overly stable democracies (rigid ones) result either from the imposition 

of democratic structures by outside Great Powers following a war 

(for example, Austria following World War II) or from efforts by 

domestic elites to ensure “social peace” (Venezuela during the Cold 

War).52 In either case, the structures of representative democracy 

were consciously engineered by political leaders to contain, and hence 

limit the impulses of “the people” to express themselves directly. 

Such political regimes often are called consociational democracies.53

 On the other hand, unstable democracies (fluid ones) are those 

where institutions are too much in a state of flux. Here, we are 

generally talking about the new or so-called “fledgling” democracies 

that exist in great abundance in “New Europe” and parts of South 

America. Unlike their overly stable counterparts in “Old Europe” 

and a few South American countries, these unstable democracies are 

the product of the wave of democratization that followed the collapse 

of Communism in Eastern Europe and end of military dictatorships 

in Latin America.

 The distinguishing characteristics of overly stable and unstable 

democracies are fairly clear, although there is no agreement as to 

exactly what ingredients go into the making of a stable democracy.54 

In overly stable democracies, political life is dominated by a small 

number of parties, and their leaders who negotiate long-term power 

sharing relationships with each other. Although such arrangements 
17

often do ensure political stability and guarantee social peace in the 

short-run, their long-run effect is to marginalize groups of people 

who lie outside the core coalition. For example, such coalitions 

effectively governed Austria and Venezuela for decades until they 

were subjected to the populist assaults of Jorg Haider and Hugo 

Chavez.

 Political life in unstable democracies often is colored by the 

presence of large numbers of parties with highly divergent ideologies, 

no one or two of which can regularly capture a majority share of the 

vote. Such polarized and unstable party relationships may be part 

of a larger environment that itself is unstable. For example, such an 

environment can include hostile relationships between the various 

branches of government and lack of public faith in governing 

institutions. 

 In order to understand how populism works, we need to think of 

overly stable and unstable democracies as occupying the two ends of 

an unbalanced U-curve, with stable democracies in the middle. (See 

Figure 1.) The paths to the rise of populism will vary depending on 

the type of representative democracy in which populist processes are 

to be found. In overly stable democracies, the difficulties involved in 

populist representation of “the people’s” interest within the political 

system means that populists must bypass traditional institutions and 

attempt to achieve power through the use of theatrical rhetoric and 

direct action. In stable democracies, populism is eventually absorbed 

into the mainstream of politics. And in unstable democracies, the 

absence of strong and stable democratic institutions means that 

populism simply flows right through them. (See Figure 2.)

THE PRESENT-DAY POPULIST ENVIRONMENT

 All representative democracies produce populists, and all of these 

populists share the common characteristics of charisma, dynamism, 

and “curb appeal” to a popular constituency (“the people”). And in 

all cases, these populists cater to people who view them as providing 

answers to problems that elite politicians are believed to be ignoring. 

However, there are considerable differences in the specific nature of 

the local environment in different regions within Europe and South 
18

STRUCTURES AND INSTITUTIONS

OVERLY STABLE (RIGID) STABLE UNSTABLE

FOR EXAMPLE:

MUCH OF "NEW EUROPE"

AND LARGE PARTS OF SOUTH

AMERICA

REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACIES IN EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS

N

U

M

BER

OF C

O

U

N

T

RIES

FOR EXAMPLE:

CANADA, AUSTRALIA, AND

ENGLAND

FOR EXAMPLE:

MUCH OF "OLD EUROPE"

AND A FEW COUNTRIES IN

SOUTH AMERICA

Figure 1. Representative Democracies in Europe 

and South America.
19

TYPE OF DEMOCRACY

OVERLY STABLE (RIGID) STABLE UNSTABLE

= DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS = THE RISE OF POPULISM

PATHS FOR THE RISE OF POPULISM

Figure 2. Paths for the Rise of Populism in Europe 

and South America.
20

America that fuels populist success. The most important of these 

differences are:

 • The specific features of a region or country’s representative 

democracies―particularly whether they are overly stable, 

stable or unstable;

 • The specific manner in which the stresses and uncertainties 

associated with globalization affect a particular local 

population; and,

 • The specific nature of the constituency that the populist 

politician is appealing to and what “the people” see as the 

essence of their identity.

 When examining the present-day populist environment in 

Europe and South America, it is useful to break each down into two 

subregions. Europe can be viewed as consisting of “Old Europe,” 

and “New Europe,” and South America of the Southern Cone 

and the Andean Region. Each of these subregions has its own 

distinctive social, economic, and cultural characteristics; and these 

characteristics, in turn, affect the way in which populism manifests 

itself.

“Old Europe.”

 “Old Europe” consists of those countries that are in the western 

part of the continent, and whose political and economic systems 

were shaped during the Cold War.55 As a response to the burst of 

populist turbulence associated with the rise of Fascism during the 

interwar years, there was a tendency to construct democracies 

that would be more resistant to populist impulses. This, combined 

with the need to find solutions to labor management problems in 

highly industrialized economies, led to the creation of rather rigid 

institutional structures normally dominated and controlled by a 

handful of political parties. 

 Within “Old Europe,” many groups (industrial workers, 

small shopkeepers, farmers) are being exposed to the stresses and 

uncertainties associated with globalization’s competitive pressures. 

As the EU has expanded from 15 members to 25, companies are 
21

moving their production facilities to the east to take advantage of 

lower labor costs in countries such as Poland and the Slovak Republic. 

Take, for example, the case of automobile production. While the 

Slovak Republic is rapidly becoming the “New Germany” in terms of 

automobile production, plants are being closed in Germany itself.56

 The political base on which populist movements build in “Old 

Europe” is extremely diverse in terms of its social and economic 

composition. It consists of groups of people such as those mentioned 

above that are increasingly unhappy about their economic condition. 

But it also taps into other constituencies that are worried about 

the challenge that immigration presents to the preservation of 

basic national values and identities. Public dissatisfaction seems 

to be everywhere, for example, as expressed with regard to cuts in 

national welfare benefits and failure to deal with corruption within 

the EU bureaucracy. These multiple sources of popular grievance 

recently have spawned a kaleidoscopic array of new parties and 

movements.

 “Old Europe” is now home to a number of populist politicians, 

and also many others who are mislabeled as “populist” simply 

because they express right-wing points of view.57 In the category 

of “real populists,” we can place people like the late Pim Fortuyn 

(Netherlands), Jean Marie Le Pen (France), and Jorg Haider (Austria). 

And there are also a number of populists emerging as players within 

the EU as well as within various local jurisdictions. These include 

figures such as “Euro-populist” Hans Peter Martin, an Austrian 

journalist and member of the European Parliament, who campaigns 

against corruption.58

“New Europe.”

 The countries of the “New Europe” lie in the central and eastern 

parts of the continent. Their political and economic systems also 

were shaped by the Cold War but in ways quite different from 

that of their western neighbors. Representative democracies in the 

“New Europe” are new because they emerged from the ashes of the 

Soviet bloc. Unlike “Old Europe” where democratic institutions 

were designed after World War II to resist populist impulses and 

ensure labor-management peace, in the “New Europe” they build 
22

on a foundation of mass political movements (such as Solidarity in 

Poland) that opposed the former Communist authoritarian regimes.

 Just as in “Old Europe,” many groups in the “New Europe” are 

being exposed to the competitive pressures of globalization and 

open markets. This is particularly true of miners, industrial workers 

in large Soviet-era factories, and farmers. Among such groups of 

people, these pressures have led to high levels of unemployment 

and low levels of economic growth.59 The result has been a feeling 

among a significant part of the population that the market-oriented 

economic policies put into place during the 1990s by the region’s new 

democratic governments unfairly were exposing “the people” to the 

stresses and uncertainties associated with the global marketplace.60

 While Western Europe is home to many populists, the Central 

and Eastern European countries provide the perfect political 

environment for this phenomenon today. During the Communist 

era, there was a conscious effort to repress feelings of national 

identity among Poles, Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Ukrainians, 

and other regional groups. Attempts then were made to create a 

larger overarching working class identity along the lines of MarxistLeninist thought. In the process, the people had been stripped of 

their sense of common history, customs, and political institutions. 

They thus became the perfect “available mass” for future populists 

to build their movements upon.61

 The lack of trust that citizens of the “New Europe” have in 

their democratic institutions (see Table 1) is reflected in low voter 

turnout for recent elections. For example, only 21 percent of eligible 

voters in Poland and 16 percent in Slovakia turned out for the June 

2004 European Parliamentary elections. It is no coincidence that 

the same countries that saw low voter turnout for these elections 

also experienced a rise in populist success at the ballot box. Polish 

populist Andrezej Lepper and his Self-Defense Party did extremely 

well in these elections. This was also the case in Slovakia where 

populists Vladimir Meciar (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia 

[HZDS]) and Roberto Fico (Social Alternative for Slovakia [SMER] 

or Direction Party) captured 35 percent of the vote between them.

 The various populist parties and politicians found in the “New 

Europe” are difficult to classify as left-wing or right-wing since they 

invite government intervention on certain issues, but not on others. 
23

Some populists come from the peasantry and claim to defend their 

interests against the “cultural pollution” coming from the West and 

from the market forces that threaten to overwhelm “the people.” 

Others such as Tymoshenko are self-made business people who 

decide it is time to directly market themselves and their ideas. In 

either case, they exist in virtually every country in Central and 

Eastern Europe.

The Southern Cone.

 The Southern Cone is a group of countries in the southernmost 

part of South America (Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay). 

To many, this region of the world is most closely associated with 

populism. More specifically, they think of Argentina where mid20th century industrialization produced the populist movement 

led by Juan and Eva Peron. Their loyal followers were the so-called 

“shirtless ones,” poor unemployed rural workers who had moved 

to Buenos Aires to try to find work in the growing number of 

factories.62

 The Southern Cone historically has produced a unique kind of 

industrial “working class populism” that is significantly different 

from that found elsewhere in South America. Lying in the temperate 

zone, its vast agricultural potential attracted large numbers of 

immigrants from European countries such as Germany and Italy. 

In turn, these immigrants imported working class attitudes and 

ideologies that predisposed them toward fascism when the region 

began to industrialize rapidly. Politicians, such as Juan Peron in 

Argentina and Getulio Vargas in neighboring Brazil, drew on the 

fascist and corporatist doctrines that were prevalent in Europe 

during the 1920s and 1930s to build their own populist political 

movements.63

 The environment within which populism might possibly 

reemerge in the Southern Cone differs in another significant way 

from that which exists in Europe and throughout the rest of South 

America. Unlike “New Europe” where Communist parties laid the 

groundwork for future bursts of populist turbulence by stripping 

away preexisting loyalties and institutions, the military played this 
24

role in South America. Long and brutal periods of military rule during 

the 1970s and 1980s greatly weakened the preexisting structures of 

representative democracy.64

 Take, for example, the case of Argentina. This country has remained 

virtually ungovernable during the half-century since Juan and Eva 

Peron came to power in the 1940s. Periods of military rule have been 

punctuated by episodic outbreaks of renewed populism and leftwing urban guerrilla warfare. However, since their military defeat 

by the British in the Falkland Islands War (1982), the armed forces 

have stayed out of politics. Unfortunately, subsequent civilian 

efforts to establish a fully functioning representative democracy 

and to reinvigorate the economy have not proven successful. As 

a consequence, the government defaulted on some $100 billion 

in national debt in 2001, the largest default in the history of any 

sovereign country.

 Today, Argentine democracy is in deep trouble. Not only are 

there many political parties vying for power, but there are also 

numerous factional groupings within these parties. In this particular 

case, democratic structures are being weakened further by ongoing 

crises within both the executive and judicial branches. Argentina 

has been “governed” by six different presidents in the past 4 years, 

and half the members of the Supreme Court have been forced from 

office.65

 Currently, economic conditions in Southern Cone countries are 

improving and may help allay the fears of those who expect to see 

another burst of populist turbulence in the near future. These fears 

may be further allayed by the fact that no real charismatic populists 

like President Chavez are currently in power there. However, the 

region’s historical association with populism, its continuing economic 

problems, and the growing weakness of traditional political parties 

suggest that a future burst of turbulence is far from out of the 

question. The history of populist movements shows that they can 

emerge “out of nowhere.”

The Andean Region.

 The “industrial populism” historically found in the Southern Cone 

is not replicated in the Andean Region. Rather, Peruvian, Bolivian, 
25

Ecuadorean, and even to a certain extent Venezuelan populism 

has its roots in that the Andean mountain chain is the homeland of 

millions of indigenous people. Unlike the Southern Cone, the Andes 

in a very real sense have been occupied since the Spanish Conquest.66

From this perspective, many populist movements in the region seek 

to express the indigenous identities of politically disenfranchised 

and culturally repressed peoples.67

 The Andean Region has a rich history of populist expression 

through such political figures as Victor Raul Haya de la Torre in 

Peru, Romulo Bethancourt in Venezuela, and Jose Maria Velasco 

Ibarra in Ecuador.68 Often these populists were of mixed racial 

background and emerged from either existing political parties or 

from the military to give partial political expression to the cultural 

identity of marginalized groups. However, in recent years, this 

process has been vastly accelerated under pressure from the forces 

of globalization. Particularly hard hit have been small agricultural 

producers who have been buffeted by exposure to global markets.69

 Under such conditions, the historically disenfranchised and 

poverty-stricken peoples of the Andes have gravitated toward 

those populist politicians who are not viewed as subservient to 

the traditional Spanish and mestizo elites. As one observer of the 

Andean political scene has noted, they are increasingly drawn to 

indigenous populists who carry a message of “economic nationalism, 

anti-Americanism, anti-imperialism, and anti-globalization.”70 The 

increasing convergence of anti-Americanism and nationalism in 

the minds of growing numbers of indigenous people should be a 

grave concern for those charged with the furtherance of U.S. policy 

interests in the Andes.71

 Take, for example, the case of Bolivia. When prices for commodities such as tin collapsed during the 1980s, the government 

reacted by instituting market reforms. During the 1990s, these 

reforms were “deepened” through measures such as the privatization 

of some communal water rights. These measures, coupled with 

efforts to reduce acreage devoted to the growing of coca and to 

increase gas production, led to a major burst of populism.72 The 

populist politician most closely associated with this burst is Evo 

Morales, the Aymara leader of the Movement toward Socialism 

(MAS) and a former candidate for the presidency of the country.
26

 Elsewhere in the Andes, the situation is equally unstable. In 

Peru, President Alejandro Toledo put down an uprising in January 

2005 by a former army major who leads a movement that combines 

militarism with ethnic nationalism.73 And in Ecuador, President Lucio 

Gutierrez faces a deteriorating political situation that eventually 

could make him the fourth of the country’s leaders to be forced into 

exile over the past decade. He continues to cling to power by virtue 

of a political alliance with several powerful populist politicians.

 Venezuela deserves special attention because President Chavez 

is already governing his country.74 In fact, he in many ways serves as 

our best example of the strategic implications that may arise when a 

“sitting” populist politician begins to develop ties to other aspiring 

populist politicians in the region or globally. Venezuela is also an 

important case because the country has had a unique experience with 

populism. It is a form of populism that combines Latin American, 

indigenous Andean and Afro-Caribbean elements. In this sense, 

President Chavez’s brand of populism could potentially have the 

broadest appeal across various racial and cultural groups of any 

populist movement currently existing in the Americas.75

SOME SCENARIOS FOR THE MID-TERM (5-10 YEARS)

 A burst of populist turbulence in Europe and/or South America 

is something that, by definition, would not be easy for security 

planners to prepare for at the last minute. And given populism’s 

inherent instability and unpredictability, it is probably best dealt with 

in advance through exercises that look at the various combinations 

and permutations of this phenomenon that might conceivably arise 

rather than at specific anticipated events. Just because we cannot 

envision the precise paths that populist movements will take does 

not mean that we should ignore populism’s strategic implications. 

These can be examined by using scenarios.

 What are scenarios and how do we use them? Simply put, they 

are alternative visions of the future that are based on plausible 

assumptions about underlying conditions that might lead to 

their eventual creation.76 For purposes of strategic planning, it is 

not necessary (or even desirable) that a particular scenario reflect 

collective wisdom about the most likely future outcome. Rather, it is 
27

only necessary that it be a plausible one, given the “logic” of some 

already visible trend or condition such as the large-scale challenges 

facing many traditional representative democracies. 

 Scenarios have been used for decades by strategic planners who 

cannot afford to ignore low probability future events that could 

have undesirable or even catastrophic consequences. And while not 

all of the scenarios discussed below would necessarily have such 

consequences, they are at least worth thinking about. The following 

regional scenarios concerning populism are offered to the security 

community for those concerned with examining the future under 

conditions of low probability but potentially very high impact.

 Imagine a future in which the Andean Region is politically 

dominated by an informal alliance between two or three indigenous 

populist heads of state. These leaders would represent (or could 

at least claim to represent) the millions of indigenous people who 

historically have been marginalized and disenfranchised by Spanish 

and mestizo elites. 

 A conventional first look at the region usually builds around 

a “Fire in the Andes” scenario. This is to say that it envisions the 

emergence of more indigenous guerrilla movements like Sendero 

Luminoso in Peru that attempt to undermine and eventually topple 

existing elite-dominated democracies from the outside. Increasingly, 

however, such scenarios seem less compelling than one that 

incorporates elements of populism. In a region where representative 

democratic institutions exist within weak or even failing states, it 

seems more likely that these democratic institutions themselves will 

serve as the path to power for populist-led indigenous peoples.77

 Such a burst of indigenous populist turbulence in the Andean 

Region would be revolutionary and transformative rather than just 

politics as usual. It would be revolutionary and transformative 

because representative democratic institutions could be used not 

only as a populist path to political power, but also as a means of 

transforming the racial identity of countries themselves. Given 

centuries of repression, it is likely that indigenous populists would 

be under great pressure to “invert the racial pyramid” in ways that 

could drastically affect previously dominant groups. The result 

could easily be inter-racial civil wars, with serious implications for 

the U.S. and global peacemaking community. Imagine how the 
28

strategic interests of the United States might be affected in a region 

where democratically elected indigenous populist leaders had the 

power and legitimacy to reorient foreign policy so as best to serve the 

perceived economic interests of their electoral constituency.78 And 

further imagine what the implications might be if broader regional 

and even transregional alliances were forged between such populist 

leaders.79 Under such conditions, U.S. policymakers eventually might 

have to deal with several new “failed states” resulting from efforts 

by previously-dominant elites to protect their interests through 

involvement in secessionist movements or movements to establish 

greater regional autonomy.80

 If a scenario envisioning the impact of revolutionary and hence 

transformative populism increasingly is compelling for the Andes, 

what about the Southern Cone? Can we envision a situation in 

which we might see populist “Pyrotechnics on the Pampas?” While 

democratic governments in this group of South American countries 

are under tremendous pressure due to economic forces associated 

with globalization, the situation gradually is improving.81 However, 

the institutions of democracy remain weak, and loyalties to traditional 

political parties are rapidly eroding. Is it conceivable that a burst of 

populist turbulence might occur in this region?

 Picture a scenario in which populist leaders in several Southern 

Cone countries emerge from the ashes of failing representative 

democracies. Certainly, political developments in Argentina, Chile, 

and Uruguay often have moved in tandem in the past, as was the 

case when military leaders with similar programs governed in 

all three following a series of coups during the 1970s.82 The dire 

economic conditions associated with the “overhang” from the debt 

crisis in Argentina and Uruguay, together with accelerating political 

change there, suggest that these two countries might be fertile 

ground for populists.83 And such populists could draw on deep 

currents of resentment among ordinary people. Many Argentines 

and Uruguayans believe that great injustice has been done to them 

by those foreign countries and global institutions that they view as 

controlling their national destiny.84

 Furthermore, a scenario involving a more comprehensive burst 

of populist turbulence throughout Latin America and the Caribbean 

is certainly imaginable. Given the close personal relationship 
29

that already exists between two “sitting populists” in Cuba and 

Venezuela (Castro and Chavez), such a development might occur 

if and when they found common ground to share with an emerging 

new generation of regional populist leaders. In this process, 

President Chavez would be the most likely intermediary between 

populist generations because his vision for the future of the Americas 

incorporates the broadest range of economic, cultural, and racial 

themes.

 On the surface, a scenario built upon the premise of a future burst 

of populist turbulence in Europe would seem less compelling than 

one for South America. Over the past half-century, Western European 

politicians such as Robert Schuman have done a remarkable job of 

first imagining a unified Europe and then going about the much more 

difficult task of actually constructing one. The eventual result was 

creation of the EU, a community of 25 representative democracies that 

has managed to bridge what once seemed to be the insurmountable 

gap dividing Europeans politically during the Cold War.

 However, as pointed out earlier, the great paradox of modern 

regional governance is that the tremendous success that Europeans 

have experienced in promoting democratization has sown the seeds 

for potential future problems. While Europe’s “democratic space” 

has been vastly expanded, the country-level democracies which 

inhabit that space have become progressively weaker. Both eroding 

representative democratic institutions in Western Europe and fragile 

new ones in Central and Eastern Europe are increasingly at risk of 

being overwhelmed by populist-led demands for protection of “the 

people” from the forces of change.

 Picture a scenario in which a future burst of populist turbulence 

in Europe is grounded in a number of developments that are viewed 

by most observers as reflecting the region’s success rather than its 

failure to spread democracy and stimulate economic growth. Such 

developments include ongoing enlargement processes, efforts to 

ratify a new constitution, and others to increase the region’s level of 

competitiveness in the global economy. 85

 Take, for example, the political impact of enlargement. Most 

observers believe that the recent rapid expansion of the EU is a “net 

plus” with regard to consolidating regional democratic institutions. 

However, enlargement also is sowing the seeds of a populist reaction 
30

to it. A high level of anxiety exists among many Europeans regarding 

where this seemingly inexorable drive for further expansion 

eventually will lead.86 And the EU’s recent agreement to launch 

accession talks with Turkey has raised levels of anxiety even further. 

The successful conclusion of these talks would result in the addition 

of a Muslim country to the EU whose population is about the size 

of Germany. Not only does this raise the specter of future job losses 

among Europe’s people, but also of the possible future loss of the 

region’s historically Christian identity.87

 Imagine a scenario in which a number of charismatic populist 

politicians are able to bond with “the people” by tapping into the 

rich vein of fear, anxiety, uncertainty, and apprehension that has 

been created by the recent activities of that rapidly expanding 

“quasi-state” known as the EU. Picture a situation in which several 

more terrorist incidents like the 2004 Madrid train bombing and the 

assassination of Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh occur in rapid 

succession.88 And then throw into this scenic “witches’ brew” the 

possibility of continued economic stagnation in Europe. It is not 

hard to imagine how the intersection of such conditions and events 

could produce a burst of populist turbulence that would be regionwide.89

 A burst of populist turbulence in Europe would have much 

more serious security implications for the United States than one in 

South America because the populists eventually coming to power 

could determine the policy direction of much stronger countries. 

Whereas in the Andean region, populism threatens to further 

undermine representative democracy in weak countries in ways that 

might eventually lead to their collapse, populism in Europe could 

conceivably strengthen country-level institutions. This was certainly 

the historical experience in Europe during its first encounter with 

populism during the 1920s and 1930s.

 Picture then, if you will, a Europe where majority national groups 

in various countries look inward rather than “outward” to the EU 

for solutions to their problems. Populist politicians increasingly are 

likely to identify various internal and external groups who can be 

used to “put a human face” on the stresses and anxieties that afflict 

common people. Unfortunately, this human face would probably 

be that of “Old Europe’s” population of immigrant workers (Turks, 
31

Kurds, Arabs, Asians, Africans) and “New Europe’s” population 

of minority groups such as the Roma.90 The responsibility for the 

problems that these groups are alleged to have created would be laid 

at the feet of elite politicians acting in consort with the incompetent 

bureaucrats of the EU.

 Is this too stark a set of scenarios for the future of representative 

democracy in Europe and South America? Perhaps it is so. On the 

one hand, the United States faces a real dilemma in terms of squaring 

our support for existing representative democracies with the populist 

politicians and their new demands that such democracies often 

produce in overly stable or unstable settings. On the other, we have 

a real opportunity to influence such populist movements in ways 

that not only stabilize but also potentially improve the performance 

of the representative democracies of which they are a part.

 But if there is one thing that the history of strategic planning 

teaches, it is that such hopes and aspirations for a better world 

should not be confused and conflated with the realities on which 

policy should be based.91 In the case of contemporary Europe and 

South America, this underlying reality is one where “the people” 

increasingly are looking for charismatic saviors to emerge who can 

free popular will from the constraints imposed by representative 

democratic institutions.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 Populism is a political phenomenon that has received little 

attention within the U.S. security community. The primary reason 

is because its dynamic, unstable, and ephemeral nature makes it 

particularly hard to “see” and to evaluate. Because populists by 

definition operate within the political context of representative 

democratic governments, they often take on the “coloration” and 

assume the legitimacy accruing to these governments. This makes 

them difficult to deal with when they adopt policies that are at odds 

with those of the United States.

 Despite the difficulties of assessing the strategic implications of 

populism, it is important to do so for a number of reasons. Precisely 

because post-Cold War Europe and Latin America are now full of 

representative democracies, there is more potential for future bursts 
32

of populist turbulence in both regions. Populist politicians have 

already altered the U.S. military’s operating environment in Europe 

and Latin America and are likely to alter it much more dramatically. 

Were bursts of populist turbulence to occur on a large scale, they 

would have the potential of undermining the democratic core of 

representative democracies in two regions of the world that are vital 

to the protection of U.S. global security interests. And in some South 

American countries, it could even result in state failure.92

 For the above-mentioned reasons, the potential rise of populism 

should not be viewed as posing just another specific type of security 

challenge (traditional, irregular, catastrophic, or disruptive) within 

the current matrix.93 Rather, it should be viewed as posing a challenge 

to the underlying political “substructure” that gives us the collective 

capability and legitimacy to deal with all of these problems. In the 

final analysis, the ability of the United States to project power in order 

to deal with the whole spectrum of security problems is contingent 

upon our ability to deal with the potential challenge emerging from 

within representative democracy itself.

 With these points in mind, U.S. policymakers should:

 1. Consider possible bursts of populist turbulence to be on a par with 

other major security challenges in terms of future planning. This would 

suggest that strategic planners will need to educate themselves 

concerning the history and current nature of populism, particularly 

in their regional areas of responsibility. Policymakers should 

consider revising the U.S. National Security Strategy so as to reflect 

the importance of political systems and dynamics that cannot be 

classified as either fully democratic or totalitarian.

 2. Focus policy on containing populist movements before they come to 

power. Populists by definition use direct forms of political action to 

gain power within representative democracies and are thus inclined 

to continue using such techniques once power has been achieved. 

Although it may not always be easy or diplomatically feasible to 

influence the trajectory of populist politicians, efforts should be made 

to do so. The ultimate goal of policy should be to aid our democratic 

allies in their efforts to “mainstream” populist politicians and their 

movements.

 3. Avoid forming alliances of convenience with populists. In some 

cases, populist politicians in Europe and South America may support 
33

U.S. short-term political or military goals in order to “gain traction” 

domestically and/or internationally. Given the importance that 

preserving the institutional integrity of representative democracy 

has with regard to the achievement of long-term U.S. security goals, 

strategic thinkers should resist the temptation to sacrifice these goals 

for any short-term gain.

 4. Configure U.S. military forces so that they are capable of dealing with 

the wide variety of challenges that individual populists or a larger burst of 

turbulence might present. Depending on the country and region, such 

challenges could run the gamut from state failure to rapid changes 

in the identities and associated strategic interests of powerful and 

internally coherent states. Although determination of the precise 

nature of such configurations is the purview of military experts, the 

possibility of future bursts of populist turbulence would seem to call 

for preservation of the broadest range of combat capabilities.
34

APPENDIX

POPULIST BIOGRAPHIES

HUGO CHAVEZ was born in 1954 in Sabaneta, a small town in 

Venezuela’s interior where the Andes meet the lowland plains. 

The son of middle-class schoolteachers, he attended Venezuela’s 

military academy and graduated in 1975. Having risen to the rank 

of lieutenant colonel in the army, he participated in an unsuccessful 

coup against President Carlos Andres Perez in 1992 that resulted in a 

short jail term. After his release from prison in 1994, he successfully 

built a political movement which led to his election to the presidency 

in 1998. Since that time, the country has been in a state of perpetual 

turmoil as Chavez has moved to consolidate his hold on power and 

his political opponents have sought to oust him through an attempted 

coup and subsequent referendum.

W. S. P. (PIM) FORTUYN was born in the Netherlands in 1948 into 

a Catholic family. He became a professor of sociology, teaching first 

at the University of Groningen in the north, and later at Erasmus 

University in Rotterdam. During the 1990s, he gained a reputation as 

an outspoken advocate for gay rights, particularly after the publication 

of his book, Babyboomers, in 1998. Dr. Pim became involved in politics 

in 2001, joining one of Europe’s new parties that challenged the 

establishment on issues such as immigration. His meteoric political 

ascent ended in May 2002 when he was assassinated by an animal 

rights activist just before Dutch parliamentary elections.

EVO MORALES was born in 1959 in the Bolivian province of Oruro. 

His parents were traditional Aymara peasant farmers, who were 

trying to raise seven children in the extremely harsh conditions 

prevailing throughout much of the Andes. Forced to move from 

his home province because of family problems and economic 

circumstance, he sought land for himself elsewhere. Finally, he 

settled in Chapare, where he got involved in the union movement 

which pitted coco-growing peasants against a succession of Bolivian 

governments that supported U.S. policy in the War on Drugs. As 
35

a representative of this part of the peasant class, he ran for the 

presidency in 2002 against Gonzalo Sanchex de Lozada, the architect 

of Bolivia’s neo-liberal economic reforms. Although he lost that 

election, he has remained an important player in Bolivian politics.

YULIA TYMOSHENKO was born in 1963 in rural Ukraine when 

it was still part of the Soviet Union. Raised by her single mother, 

she married and had a child while in her teens. Following Ukraine’s 

independence, she was able to parlay opportunities presented to 

her through personal contacts into a financial empire in the energy 

sector. After serving as deputy prime minister of the country, she 

was accused by her political enemies of illicit enrichment and thrown 

in jail. Considered a martyr by her adoring fans, she emerged from 

jail politically stronger. This so-called “Goddess of the Orange 

Revolution” has played an important role as a close ally of Victor 

Yushchenko in his recently successful bid to become President.
36

ENDNOTES

 1. “Slain Populist Voted Greatest Dutchman,” Deutsche Welle,” http://www.dwworld.de/dwelle/cda/detail/dwelle.cda.detail.artikel_drucken/0,3820,1433.

 2. “People wake up to their strength in the streets of Kiev,” Financial Times, 

December 2, 2004. Tymoshenko was subsequently named Prime Minister by 

newly-elected President Yushchenko.

 3. As of this writing, Mesa is barely hanging on to the presidency. Under 

chaotic political conditions brought about by protests led by MAS that paralyzed 

several major cities including La Paz, he offered to resign in early March 2005. 

His resignation was rejected by the Bolivian Congress in the hopes of preventing 

further political turmoil.

 4. William Shakespeare, Troilus and Cressida, Act 1, Scene 3.

 5. These direct action techniques include things such as setting up road 

blocks, occupying government buildings, and holding violent mass street 

demonstrations.

 6. The use of plebiscites or referendums has been a favorite tool of populists 

since the French Revolution. Political institutions are bypassed through the use of 

a direct vote for the acceptance or rejection of a particular proposal. Plebiscites are 

widely used in Latin America and are growing in popularity in Europe. The new 

European Constitutional Treaty that is being debated today includes provision 

for more direct democracy through the holding of a plebiscite on constitutional 

matters if deemed necessary by one million citizens. The existing mechanisms 

for the exercise of direct democracy through the use of plebiscites in various 

Latin American countries are described in a recent report by the United Nations 

Development Program, La democracia en America Latina: Hacia una democracia de 

ciudadanas y ciudadanos, 2004, pp. 97-98. On the growing use of referendums in 

Europe, see Bruno Kaufmann and M. Dane Waters, eds., Direct Democracy in 

Europe: A Comprehensive Reference Guide to the Initiative and Referendum Process in 

Europe, Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2004.

 7. My formal definition of populism is “the theatrical presentation of ideas 

and/or use of direct action techniques by a political leader of any ideological 

persuasion in order to bypass traditional representative democratic institutions 

and to connect directly with his or her people.” This definition is in general 

conformity with scholars such as Kurt Weyland and Herbert Kitschelt who argue 

that populism is really more about charisma, leadership style, and tactics than 

it is about the politics of Left or Right. Kurt Weyland, “Clarifying a Contested 

Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics,” Comparative Politics, 

October 2001, p.1; and Herbert Kitcheldt, The Radical Right in Western Europe, Ann 

Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1995, p. 160. Some additional sources on 

populism include Michael Conniff, ed., Populism in Latin America; Jack Heyward, 

ed., Elitism, Populism and European Politics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996; and 

Yves Meny and Yves Surel, eds., Democracies and the Populist Challenge, New York: 

Palgrave, 2003.
37

 8. The Netherlands can properly be described as “haunted” by the ghost of 

Pim Fortuyn because his anti-Islamic message continues to resonate deeply in 

local politics. The political situation became even more explosive after the 

November 2004 assassination of filmmaker Theo Van Gogh by a Dutch-born 

alleged Islamic militant. Van Gogh had appeared on several death lists because 

of his participation in producing a short film called “Submission” that carried an 

anti-Islamic message. As a consequence of their perceived anti-Islamic stance, a 

number of other well-known Dutch politicians have received death threats, been 

forced to temporarily live abroad, and hired bodyguards to protect them in their 

own country. Among those currently living under such conditions are several 

members of Parliament and Amsterdam Mayor Job Cohen. Keith B. Richburg, 

“In Netherlands, Anti-Islamic Polemic Comes With a Price,” Washington Post, 

February 1, 2005. For an account of how Van Gogh’s assassination raised concern 

about the threat from indigenous radical Islamists not only in the Netherlands 

but also throughout Europe, see Arthur Waldron, “Europe’s Crisis” Commentary, 

February 2005, p. 49.

 9. On the rising tension between the United States and Russia, see “Echoes 

of the Cold War as Bush and Putin Differ over Ukraine Polls,” Financial Times, 

December 6, 2004; and “Powell points up differences with Russia,” Financial Times, 

December 9, 2004.

 10. For purposes of this analysis, the countries of “Old Europe” are considered 

to be the 15 member states of the EU before it was expanded to 25 in June 2004. 

These states are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 

Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the 

United Kingdom. “New Europe” consists of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 

Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The Southern 

Cone of Latin America consists of Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay; 

and the Andean region of Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru. It 

should be noted that there is no fully satisfactory and universally accepted view 

concerning the exact territorial boundaries of any of these regions.

 11. “When the Party’s Over,” Financial Times, September 26, 2004; and James 

Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World, New 

York: Random House, 1996.

 12. Throughout this monograph, I will rely heavily on the Eurobarometer polls 

regularly conducted by the EU and the more recent Latinobarometro polls for Latin 

America for documentation of such trends.

 13. Robert Gilpin, The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 

21st Century, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, pp. 296-297.

 14. Globalization can also serve as a convenient scapegoat for national 

leaders who are not willing to recognize its existence and to take advantage of 

the opportunities it presents. Nevertheless, it is a process that, under the best of 

circumstances, brings with it economic and social dislocation that creates political 

openings for populists.
38

 15. Professor Franz Lehner is quoted to this effect as follows: “The Europeans, 

and in particular the Germans, have considered globalization to be a big threat, 

and they have discussed it in a very pessimistic mood. It is seen as a huge 

competitiveness problem.” Chris Ansell, Vanna Gonzales, and Conor O’Dwyer, 

“The Variable Geometry of European Regional Economic Development,” in Steven 

Weber, ed., Globalization and the European Political Economy, New York: Colombia 

University Press, 2001, p. 76.

 16. European Commission, Eurobarometer EB61- CC-EB 2004.1, p. 3.

 17. Ibid., p. 10.

 18. Jeffrey Stark, ed., The Challenge of Change in Latin America and the Caribbean, 

Coral Gables: North-South Center Press, University of Miami, 2001, pp. 6-7.

 19. “Institutional Vulnerability in Latin America,” Special Report-November 

2004, p. 21, LatinNews.com.

 20. “Informe-Resumen Latinobarometro 2004,” Latinobarometro, August 13, 

2004, p. 37.

 21. Latinobarometro has been in existence as a polling organization for a 

decade. The original polls surveyed people in the largest countries in the region―

Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. By 2004, the 

only Spanish-speaking countries where polls were not conducted were Cuba and 

the Dominican Republic. Ibid., pp. 3, 38.

 22. European Commission, Eurobarometer 61, Spring 2004, p. 5.

 23. European Commission, Eurobarometer EB 61—CC-EB 2004.1, p. 5.

 24. Institutional Vulnerability in Latin America, p. 11.

 25. The Italian scholar Giovani Sartori has drawn attention to the relationship 

between various types of party systems and representative democracy. He has 

discussed at length the differences between the moderate multiparty systems 

on which democracy historically has been based in continental Europe and the 

extreme multiparty systems often established in interwar Eastern Europe and parts 

of Latin America. Moderate multiparty systems are characterized by a relatively 

small number of parties, usually less than five, few major ideological differences 

between them, and bipolar coalitional arrangements. In extreme multiparty 

systems, large numbers of parties compete in an ideologically-charged political 

environment in which some parties explicitly or implicitly reject the rules of the 

democratic game itself. Sartori refers to these as “anti-system parties.” Giovani 

Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, Cambridge, England: 

Cambridge University Press, 1976, Vol. 1, Chapters 5 and 6.

 26. First Search – Books in Print.

 27. Those who closely follow developments in Latin America, and particularly 

the Andean region, have noted a growing undercurrent of populist sentiment 

there. See, for example, Michael Shifter and Vinay Jawahar, “No Left Turn: 

Latin American Populist Politics,” Current History, Vol. 104, No. 679, February 
39

2005; Michael Shifter, “Breakdown in the Andes,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 5, 

September/October 2004; and Peter Hakim, “U.S.-Latin American Relations Post9/11,” Great Decisions, 2004, www.great decisions.org. The outgoing and incoming 

commanders of the U.S. Southern Command (Generals James T. Hill and Bantz 

J. Craddock) also have discussed the populist phenomenon in Latin America 

in committee hearings. “Testimony of General James T. Hill” before the House 

Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, March 24, 2004. And 

its potential emergence at a response to globalization is noted in the U.S. National 

Intelligence Council’s Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence 

Council’s 2020 Project. However, in spite of this increasing attention within the 

foreign policy and security community to the phenomenon of populism, it is 

important to note that it focuses exclusively on Latin America.

 28. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 

2002. This lack of attention to populism in the National Security Strategy is also 

found in the Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) of the Strategic Studies Institute of 

the U.S. Army War College. There is no mention of any type of political system 

(democratic, populist, authoritarian) as a factor to be studied as part of the U.S. 

Army’s strategic environment. U.S. Army War College Key Strategic Issues List, 

Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, August 2004.

 29. Our own historical experience suggests that bursts of populist turbulence 

can be contained by the strong institutions of representative democracy and at the 

same time perform a useful function. This shadowy “cousin” of representative 

democracy can be rendered useful by drawing attention to problems that might 

otherwise be ignored by the powers that be. For example, Michael Kazin writes: 

“At the core of the populist tradition is an insight of great democratic and moral 

significance. . . . No major problem can be seriously addressed, much less nudged 

on the path to solution, unless . . . Americans of all races who work for a living, knit 

neighborhoods together, and cherish what the nation is supposed to stand for . . 

. participate in the task.” The Populist Persuasion: An American History, New York: 

BasicBooks, 1995, pp. 283-284. It should be added that the view that American 

populism is generally benign is not universally held. See, for example, Anatol 

Lieven, America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism, New York: 

Oxford University Press, 2004; and John Lukacs, Democracy and Populism: Fear and 

Hatred, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005.

 30. The fact that this latest “mini-burst” of populism occurred in Latin America 

only served to confirm the rather dubious assumption that populism is largely 

a regional phenomenon associated with the weaknesses and peculiarities of 

representative democracies in this particular part of the world. It is an assumption 

that is not only dubious but dangerous.

 31. Several recent accounts of the Cuban Missile Crisis are Max Frankel, High 

Noon in the Cold War: Kennedy, Krushchev, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, New York: 

Ballentine 2004; and Sheldon M. Stern, Averting ‘The Final Failure’: John F. Kennedy 

and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 

2003.
40

 32. For a short description of these threats as described in the Pentagon’s 

2006 Strategic Planning Guidance, see Jason Sherman, “Facing a New Reality: 

Nontraditional Threats Change Pentagon’s Weapons Priorities,” Armed Forces 

Journal, December 2004.

 33. Only the main reasons for paying more attention to populism are discussed 

here. There are others such as the fact that an outbreak of populism is often the 

precursor to a military coup or long period of military rule. For example, this was 

the case in Argentina where a period of populist governance under Juan Peron 

was followed by military rule from 1966 until 1977.

 34. Gorden Martel describes this mood among strategic planners as follows:

Anglo-American officials and propagandists had created a dream world 

during the course of The First World War, a castle in the air that was most 

alluring because it was constructed from materials of their own design, 

brought together from their own experience, and cemented by their most 

deep-seated beliefs about themselves, the nature of progress, and the 

meaning of civilization.

Gordon Martel, “Military Planning and the Origins of the Second World War,” in 

B. J. C. McKercher and Roch Legault, Military Planning and the Origins of the Second 

World War, Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2001, p. 15.

 35. Ibid., pp. 148-152.

 36. Democratic institutional stability is still highly problematic in Ukraine. 

Existing patterns of dynamics in this regard are discussed in Konstantinos J. 

Papadoulis, “Institutional Relationships in Ukraine: a stable polity?” Communist 

and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 37, 2004.

 37. At the time of this writing, Ukraine has the fourth largest contingent of 

troops supporting U.S. operations in Iraq. However, they are to all be removed by 

the end of 2005. Aleksandar Vasovic, “Ukraine votes to pull its troops from Iraq,” 

Associated Press, December 4, 2004.

 38. Chavez has proposed that a South American oil and gas company called 

Petroamerica be created that would be based on Bolivarian solidarity and serve 

as a counterweight to the influence of U.S.-based energy companies in the region. 

The creation of such a “petro-alliance,” either formally or informally, would add 

a populist dimension to the political economy of the energy sector. “Venezuela 

Pushes to Lead Regional Oil Economy,” The New York Times, August 13, 2004.

 39. Currently, Venezuela is fourth in terms of the amount of its total energy 

exports to the U.S. market. Given the high level of uncertainty about supplies 

coming from other regions such as the Middle East and Africa as well as its 

geographical proximity to the United States, it has assumed increasing importance 

with regard to calculations about the overall energy picture. “U.S. Senator Worried 

About Cutoff of Venezuelan Oil,” The Washington Post, January 13, 2005.

 40. It bears mentioning that this core of representative democracies in Europe 

and the Americas is considerably larger today than it was during the Cold War 
41

years. Indeed, during the 1970s, such a democratic core did not exist in Latin 

America. However, this very fact makes the point that a democratic core of 

representative democracies is critical to the legitimate projection of military 

power beyond the respective regions (Europe and the Americas) where these core 

democracies exist.

 41. Albert R. Coll, Professor of Strategy and Policy at the U.S. Naval War 

College, has written on the importance of nuclear issues in U.S.-Latin American 

relations. “United States Strategic Interests in Latin America: An Assessment,” 

Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 39, No.1, Spring 1997, p. 4.

 42. As of this writing, the IAEA has negotiated a tentative agreement with 

Brazilian officials that will allow for the limited enrichment of uranium at a facility 

in Resende. In this particular case of initial resistance to the IAEA verification 

regime, Brazil argued that it had the right to protect a centrifuge technology that 

was much more fuel efficient than other currently available methods. “Brazil in 

Deal with Nuclear Watchdog,” Financial Times, November 24, 2004.

 43. For example, during the Gulf War of 1990-91, 12 of the then-existing 

16 NATO countries participated in the coalition that liberated Kuwait. The 

representative democracies of Europe also served as a territorial base from which 

the United States projected its military power into the Middle East. A full third of 

all U.S. European Command (EUCOM) forces moved from Europe into the Middle 

Eastern region during the War. David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s 

New Roles in International Security, Washington, DC: United States Institute for 

Peace, 1998, p. 61.

 44. This is not to say that Venezuela’s representative democracy was perfect. 

It experienced many of the problems that are associated with elite settlements that 

lead to rigid and exclusive power sharing arrangements between favored political 

parties.

 45. See Peacekeeping: the Benefits and Risks for Latin America, Latin American 

Special Report, Latin American Newsletter, September 2004, p. 9. As of 2004, 

Venezuela had no personnel committed to UN peacekeeping operations, either in 

the form of observers, military personnel, or police. P. 2.

 46. Haiti was already an environmentally degraded country when it was 

subject to increasing pressures brought on by a continuing leadership crisis and 

two major floods. At present, former President Aristede is living in exile in South 

Africa. In the meantime, UN personnel are attempting to deal with the urban chaos 

that has been unleashed by Aristede’s supporters in the slums of Port-au-Prince. 

There, they have launched “Operation Baghdad” and a number of policemen 

were beheaded. “Crisis-hit Haiti cracks down on political gangs,” Financial Times, 

October 7, 2004.

 47. Argentina and Brazil are particularly important to the stabilization effort, 

playing a role far broader than simply supplying troops. Argentina has used 

its position on the UN Security Council to encourage national reconciliation in 

Haiti. And Brazil has played a positive role in encouraging military disarmament 
42

through a UN-sponsored weapons “buyback” program. “Argentina and Brazil 

guide pressure on Latortue,” Latin American Weekly Report, January 18, 2005. On 

the other hand, the United States has been able to reduce its own troop presence 

to a minimal level. As the lead country of the UN-authorized Multinational 

Interim Force that entered Haiti in the wake of President Aristide’s February 2004 

departure, the United States made an initial contribution of 2,000 troops. Daniel P. 

Erikson, “Haiti after Aristide: Still on the Brink,” Current History, Vol. 104, No. 679, 

February 2005, pp. 88-89.

 48. We should recall how frequently U.S. troops historically have been used in 

the Caribbean. Following the Spanish-American War of 1898 and the subsequent 

establishment of bases in Cuba and Puerto Rico, U.S. naval forces and Marines 

were regularly dispatched to settle local disputes. In the Haitian case, cycles of 

conflict and local unrest led to a long period of U.S. occupation that lasted from 

1915 until 1934. For an excellent account of the historical relationship between the 

United States and Latin American countries, see Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United 

States: A History of U.S. Policy toward Latin America, Cambridge: Harvard University 

Press, 1998.

 49. The number of military and police personnel that Latin America’s 

democracies made available for such missions increased six-fold between 2000 

and 2004. To a considerable extent, this was the result of efforts by the region’s 

democratic leaders and U.S. experts such as Professor Jack Child of American 

University to engage the militaries of regional “middle powers” in the global 

collective security and humanitarian enterprise. “Peacekeeping: The benefits and 

risks for Latin America,” Latin American Special Report, September 2004, pp. 2, 11.

 50. This is a point that Latin Americanist Russell Crandall makes extremely 

well. He has called it the “democratic paradox.” “Latin America’s Populist 

Temptation,” In the National Interest, February 4, 2004.

 51. The very existence of some stable representative democracies that lie between 

the two extremes remains something of a mystery to be explained. Normally, 

such countries have a relatively small number of political parties that regularly 

command the lion’s share of citizens’ allegiances and that are not polarized by 

extremist ideologies. Constitutions tend to be amended infrequently, are rarely 

replaced, but remain flexible enough to change with the times. In addition, these 

polities may benefit from federal structures that provide additional flexibility in 

the form of local institutions more responsive to local needs.

 52. The elite settlement which resulted in the establishment of an overly stable 

democracy in Venezuela during the late 1950s has been studied extensively. See, 

for example John H. Peeler, “Elite settlements and democratic consolidation: 

Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela,” in John Higley and Richard Gunther, eds., 

Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe, Cambridge: 

Cambridge University Press, 1992; and Jennifer McCoy, “Chavez and the end 

of Partyarchy in Venezuela,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1999. As for 

Austria, an overly stable democracy resulted from the demands of the victorious 
43

allies following WWII for strict neutrality and the end to previously destabilizing 

domestic bickering between the country’s political elites. The result of these allied 

demands was the creation of a Grand Coalition based on the overwhelming voting 

strength of two political parties. The Austrian People’s Party (OeVP) represented 

conservative rural groups and the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPOe) 

urban workers, particularly in Vienna. Frederick C. Engelmann, “The Austrian 

Party System: Continuity and Change,” in Steven B. Wolinetz, ed., Parties and 

Party Systems in Liberal Democracies, London: Routledge, 1988.

 53. A discussion of the general nature of consociational democracies can be 

found in Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, New Haven: Yale University 

Press, 1977. 

 54. We can thus only approximately estimate the extent of stable democracy in 

the world today. A good starting point is the list of countries that Samuel Huntington 

includes in his “first wave” of 19th century democracy: Australia, Canada, Finland, 

Iceland, Ireland, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United 

States, Chile, Austria, Belgium, Colombia, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, 

Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Argentina, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, 

Uruguay, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. However, this 

monograph suggests that even this core of stable representative democracies may 

be defined too broadly. Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the 

Late Twentieth Century, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, pp. 14-15.

 55. While I realize that the terms “Old Europe” and “New Europe” carry a 

certain amount of “political baggage,” within the global policy community, they 

provide a convenient shorthand way of making these regional distinctions.

 56. Drawn by a skilled workforce and low-cost labor, a number of the world’s 

major automobile companies have established a base in Slovakia. They include 

Volkswagen, Peugot-Citroen, and Kia. Within the next few years, Slovakia will 

probably become the largest producer of automobiles on a per capita basis of any 

country in the world. Robert Anderson, “Success from Nowhere at All,” Financial 

Times, May 26, 2004. In the meantime, General Motors is closing its plant for 

producing Opels in Frankfurt, Germany, with the elimination of some 12,000 jobs. 

Hugh Williams and Richard Milne, “German workers feel chill of General Motors 

job cuts,” Financial Times, December 11-12, 2004.

 57. The list of so-called “right-wing populists,” who are often rather colorless 

politicians mislabeled by their left-wing adversaries, includes Filip Dewinter of 

Vlaams Belang (VB) in Belgium, Christofh Blocher of the Swiss People’s Party 

(SVP) in Switzerland, and Edmund Stoiber of the Christian Social Union (CSU) in 

Germany.

 58. As a general rule, populists in “Old Europe” rely less on direct physical 

action and more on direct rhetorical action to connect with “the people.” More 

specifically, the overly stable representative democratic institutions in these 

countries place a premium on the ability of populists to use the media (particularly 

television) to reach their constituents. Pim Fortuyn provides an excellent example 

in this regard.
44

 59. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic (the largest of the “New Europe” 

countries to recently join the EU) ran fiscal deficits of 6 percent GDP during the 

first years of the new millennium. And unemployment there remains stubbornly 

high. Martin Wolf, “Coming Together,” The Financial Times, April 26, 2004.

 60. Given such attitudes, many citizens of “New Europe” are skeptical about 

the additional economic impact that membership in the enlarged EU will have on 

their well-being. Only 47 percent believe that such membership is a “good thing.” 

Eurobarometer, EB61-CC-EB 2004.1 May 2004, p. 4.

 61. Cas Mudde, “Populism in Eastern Europe,” RFE, Vol. 2, No. 5, March 8, 

2000.

 62. The rise of populist politicians in Argentina during the first half of the 20th 

century is discussed by Joel Horowitz, “Populism and Its Legacies in Argentina,” 

in Conniff, ed., Populism in Latin America.

 63. For an overview of Southern Cone populism and the rise of Latin American 

populism in general, see Conniff’s “Introduction” to Populism in Latin America, 

ibid.

 64. The best account of the nature of these military regimes remains Guillermo 

A. O’Donnell’s Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism, Berkeley: The 

University of California Press, 1979.

 65. See “Kirchner Sets New Record for Bypassing Argentina’s Congress,” Latin 

American Weekly Report, June 29, 2004; and “Argentina: Political Representation 

Explodes into Small Fragments,” Latin American Weekly Report, September 28, 

2004.

 66. Among countries in the Andean region, Colombia is the exception that 

proves the rule. Historically, two strong political parties limited the influence 

of populist politicians. The only major populist figure to emerge in Colombian 

politics was Jorge Elicier Gaitan who was assassinated in 1948.

 67. The experiences of Andean countries with attempts to incorporate 

indigenous peoples into political life are similar in some ways and different in 

others. Some countries, such as Colombia and Venezuela, have proceeded further 

with regard to incorporating provisions into their constitutions that recognize 

indigenous rights. Other countries, that have not made as much progress with 

regard to granting much formal protection to indigenous groups, have progressed 

further when it comes to incorporating indigenous cultural groups into the larger 

national identity. This, for example, is the case in Bolivia which underwent a 

process of radical cultural change as the result of a social revolution in the 1950s. 

For a good discussion of these similarities and differences between Andean 

countries, see “Introduction,” Jo-Marie Burt and Philip Mauceri, eds., Politics and 

Identity in the Andes: Identity, Conflict and Reform, Pittsburgh: The University of 

Pittsburgh Press, 2004.

 68. A good source of information on the historical experience with populism 

in the Andean region is the various chapters by Steve Stein (Peru), Steve Ellner 
45

(Venezuela), and Ximena Sosa-Bucholz (Ecuador) in Conniff, ed., Populism in Latin 

America.

 69. John Peeler provides a good description of the interaction between the 

forces of globalization and those associated with political change in Andean 

countries today. “Political Mobilization, Elections and Democratic Instability in 

the Andes,” Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. XI, No. 1, Summer/Fall, 2004.

 70. Russell Crandall, “Latin America’s Populist Tradition,” In the National 

Interest, February 4, 2004.

 71. The perception that the Andean region is in crisis is shared widely within 

the U.S. policy community. Good discussions of the nature of this crisis can be 

found in Peter Hakim, “U.S.-Latin American relations post-9/11,” Great Decisions, 

2004, www.greatdecisions.org, p. 27; and Michael Shifter, “Breakdown in the Andes,” 

Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 5, September/October, 2004.

 72. Given the widespread resistance by various domestic groups to the 

privatization of what are perceived as public goods and services, and to the foreign 

exploitation of natural resources, one can begin to talk about the emergence of 

“patrimonial populism” in many South American countries. Patrimonial populist 

movements are those that seek to preserve what is viewed as the national patrimony 

(e.g., water, minerals, hydrocarbons) from exploitation by foreign multinational 

corporations. Juan Forero, “Latin America Fails to Deliver on Basic Needs,” New 

York Times, February 22, 2005.

 73. “Peru: New Year brings unexpected uprising,” Latin American Weekly 

Report, January 4, 2005.

 74. There are numerous books in English and Spanish on Hugo Chavez. 

Different points of view on the so-called “Chavez Phenomenon” can be found in 

Steve Ellner and Daniel Hellinger, eds., Venezuelan Politics in the Chavez Era: Class, 

Polarization, and Conflict, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003; and Richard Gott, In the 

Shadow of the Liberator: Hugo Chavez and the Transformation of Venezuela, London: 

Verso, 2000. On the broader issue of the evolving pattern of interaction between 

the United States and Venezuela, see Janet Kelly and Carlos Romero, The United 

States and Venezuela: Rethinking a Relationship, New York: Routledge, 2002.

 75. The case of Venezuela is also important because Chavez’s appeal reaches 

far beyond Latin America itself. Particularly for the Left worldwide, he is viewed 

as the author of a new type of democracy that by virtue of its populist base and 

policies can authentically challenge what are perceived to be pseudo-democratic 

and elitist governments in capitalist countries such as the United States. This is a 

particularly dangerous trend because it suggests that the content of government 

policy rather than the presence or absence of democratic institutions is the best 

gauge for measuring democratic progress. On Chavez’s global appeal, see Juan 

Pablo Lupi and Leonardo Vivas, “(Mis)Understanding Chavez and Venezuela in 

Times of Revolution,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 1, Winter 

2005, p. 84.
46

 76. For a brief introduction to the use of scenarios as a tool for strategic 

planning, see Peter Schwartz, Inevitable Surprises: Thinking Ahead in a Time of 

Turbulence, Gotham Books, 2003.

 77. For purposes of strategic planning, guerrilla wars are much easier to deal 

with than bursts of populist turbulence. There are a several reasons why this is the 

case. First, while guerrilla wars are relatively stable and long-lasting, populism is 

neither. Compare, for example, the ongoing guerrilla war in Colombia with the 

currently unstable populist political situation in neighboring Venezuela. Second, 

since populist politicians arise from within representative democracies, they 

can avail themselves of the power and legitimacy of the democratic states with 

which they are associated in a way that insurgent groups cannot. On the nature 

and durability of modern guerrilla wars, see Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, 

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and 

Response, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

Strategic Studies Institute, 2004, pp. 1-15.

 78. U.S. interests might be most dramatically affected with regard to future 

energy security. At the same time that access to supplies of crude oil and natural gas 

from the Middle East is becoming more problematical, the Andes are increasing in 

importance. Venezuela has substantial proven oil reserves, Ecuador is a potential 

South American “Angola” in this regard, and both Peru and Bolivia sit atop huge 

potential reserves of natural gas. See Thomas F. McLarty III and Richard Klein, “A 

Latin American Opportunity in World Energy Woes,” The Fletcher Forum of World 

Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 1, Winter 2005, pp. 75-80.

 79. In a recent editorial in the Financial Times, Argentine scholar Juan Gabriel 

Tokatlian discusses the rapidly deteriorating political situation in Andean 

countries. However, he believes that there is little possibility that any sort of 

transregional political alliance could emerge among the leaders of what he sees 

as a group of failing states. Also, he believes that other regional states such as 

Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina could serve as a democratic political “platform” for 

the collective projection of military power into this troubled region. “Only Joint 

Action can Counter Andean Tensions,” Financial Times, January 6, 2005.

 80. The Andean country where state failure is most likely to occur is Bolivia. 

The dynamic southeastern city of Santa Fe is the country’s Kirkuk, demanding 

local autonomy or outright independence so as to be able to better exploit the 

region’s energy resources. As a response to their sense of abandonment by the 

free-market-oriented Crucenos and their own growing sense of national identity, 

highland indigenous leaders have advocated the restoration of the Inca Empire, 

including portions of Bolivia and Peru. “Santa Cruz Delivers Ultimatum on 

Autonomy,” Latin American Regional Report, November 2, 2004; “Rebellious Santa 

Cruz to Declare Autonomy,” Latin American Weekly Report, January 25, 2005; and 

“Mesa Tries to Wrest Leadership of Regional Autonomy Drive from Rebel Santa 

Cruz,” Latin American Weekly Report, February 1, 2005.

 81. The UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC) estimates 2005 

GDP growth in Argentina as 5 percent; Brazil, 4 percent; Chile, 6 percent; and 
47

Uruguay, 6 percent. Except for Argentina, these estimated growth rates are much 

better than they were several years earlier. CEPAL News, Vol. XXV, No. 1, January 

2005, p. 2.

 82. Both the Chilean and Uruguayan militaries seized power in 1973, and 

military governments were in place from 1973-89 and 1973-84, respectively. There 

was a military regime in Argentina from 1976 until 1983. Brian Loveman, Por 

la Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America, Wilmington: Scholarly 

Resources, Inc., 1999, p. 168.

 83. Currently, the political situation in Argentina and Uruguay is ambiguous in 

this regard. Certainly, the horrible economic conditions and fragility of democratic 

institutions (particularly in Argentina) provide fertile ground for populism. But 

true charismatic populist politicians are not a feature of the contemporary political 

scene. Neither President Nestor Kirchner of Argentina nor President Tabare 

Vasquez of Uruguay falls in this category. Indeed, Uruguay would appear to 

be one of the great “success stories” so far with regard to making the transition 

from an elite-dominated two-party representational democracy to a more open 

but still democratic configuration that is not dominated by a charismatic populist 

who came to power through use of direct action techniques. For this reason, the 

Uruguayan case deserves more careful study for its policy implications.

 84. Satisfaction with their market economies and the global institutions 

associated with their function is only 16 percent in Argentina and 18 percent in 

Uruguay. It is considerably higher in Chile where the economy has been doing 

better in recent years. Informe-Resumen, August 13, 2004, p. 38.

 85. Member states of the EU agreed to move ahead with the process of ratification 

in June 2004. Although the constitution is really a new iteration of the Treaty of 

Rome, it has raised popular fears concerning the further loss of sovereignty visà-vis the EU and the further expansion of the powers of what is perceived to be a 

distant, unresponsive, and corrupt bureaucracy. And efforts by leaders of the EU 

to create a new knowledge-based economy of world class quality by the year 2010 

have failed not only to produce results, but have raised the level of anxiety about 

the future among union members in the industrial sector. Europe’s economic 

mood is discussed by Tobias Buck and Daniel Dombey, “Missed Targets: Why 

Has the EU Failed in Its Efforts to Match the Economic Strides of the US?” Financial 

Times, March 25, 2004.

 86. For a summary of current attitudes toward enlargement, see Eurobarometer 

EB61-CC-EB 2004.1, May 2004, pp. 2-5. At the time of this writing, people in the 

newly admitted member states were more skeptical about the future of the EU 

than were their West European counterparts. However, levels of skepticism and 

distrust were also very high in certain West European countries that have shown 

themselves to be particularly susceptible to the appeal of populists, e.g., Austria 

and the Netherlands.

 87. For an excellent discussion of the Islamic presence in France, Germany, 

and the United Kingdom, see Robert J. Pauly, Jr., Islam in Europe: Integration or 

Marginalization? Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2004.
48

 88. For example, as part of a broad strategy aimed at shaping the perception 

of the value of representative democracy in the Middle East, al-Qaeda might 

increase its terrorist attacks in Europe. Its calculation might be that European 

leaders would then be forced to respond to these attacks through the adoption of 

repressive measures that would “unmask” democracy and reveal its “true” nature 

to Islamic peoples. 

 89. In this author’s personal estimation, one of the most likely “triggers” for a 

burst of populist turbulence in Europe would be the assassination of a prominent 

regional politician by an indigenous radical Islamist individual or terrorist group. 

For example, several members of the Dutch Parliament (Ms. Hirsi Ali and Mr. 

Geert Wilders) regularly receive death threats and have been forced to live under 

official protection in secure locations such as military bases and prisons. AntiIslamic rioting might take place in the Netherlands if either were killed that could 

spread throughout Europe and lead to the rapid emergence of new populist 

leaders. Marlise Simons, “Dutch Deputies on the Run, From Jihad Death Threats,” 

New York Times, March 4, 2005.

 90. With regard to the current political situation today in the “New Europe,” 

Slovakia is a particularly important case. Although there are large minority 

populations of Roma and Hungarians, it is a democratic “success story” because 

populist politicians such as Vladimir Meciar and Roberto Fico largely have been 

contained. As with the case of Uruguay in South America, it can provide some 

important clues as to the policies that might work best for the long-term strategic 

containment of populism.

 91. Were it not for politicians who have the vision to imagine a better democratic 

future, we would be doomed to live in a world dominated by authoritarian values 

and political regimes. And were it not for security strategists and soldiers, we 

would be doomed to live in one where the mismatch between visions and political 

reality created unimagined and hence dangerous national vulnerabilities.

 92. Stanford University’s Stephen Krasner has recently suggested that some 

new approaches are needed by policy planners to deal with the global security 

problems created by collapsed or failing states. More specifically, he has suggested 

the possible sharing of sovereignty by states and multilateral institutions, as 

well as the possible introduction of new forms of trusteeship. Given the history 

of involvement by the Great Powers in Latin American affairs, it seems highly 

doubtful that such proposals would be well-received by regional leaders, should 

one or more South American states fail in the future. Stephen D. Krasner, “Sharing 

Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States,” International 

Security, Vol. 29, No. 2, Fall 2004, pp. 108-118.

 93. These challenges are laid out in DoD’s present Defense Planning Guidance, 

as described in “Facing a New Reality: Nontraditional Threats Change Pentagon’s 

Weapons Priorities,” Armed Forces Journal, December 2004.