INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

IN THE 21st CENTURY:

RECONCEPTUALIZING THREAT AND RESPONSE

Steven Metz

Raymond Millen

November 2004

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The authors would like to thank Stephen Biddle, John Nagl, and Robert 

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shortcomings are, of course, despite their best efforts.

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FOREWORD

 Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has 

developed a national security strategy designed to eliminate the 

conditions that spawn asymmetric threats. An important part of that 

is helping build stable, legitimate governments in nations which 

allowed or supported terrorism and other forms of asymmetric 

aggression. This has led the United States to renewed involvement 

in counterinsurgency.

 The United States, particularly the Army, has a long history of 

counterinsurgency support. During the past decade, though, this 

has not been an area of focus for the American military. To renew its 

capability at counterinsurgency, the military is assessing 21st century 

insurgency, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, and revising its 

strategy, operational concepts, organization, and doctrine. 

 This monograph is designed to contribute to this process. In it, 

Dr. Steven Metz and Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Millen argue 

that 20th century strategy, operational concepts, organization, and 

doctrine should not be applied to 21st century insurgency without 

further refinement. They contend that there are two major variants 

of insurgency which they label “national” and “liberation.” Most 

existing strategy, operational concepts, organization, and doctrine are 

derived from American experience with national insurgencies, but 

these need to be adapted when confronting liberation insurgencies.

 The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this special report 

as part of the ongoing refinement of the Army’s understanding 

of the threat posed by insurgency in the 21st century security 

environment.

 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

STEVEN METZ is Chairman of the Regional Strategy and Planning 

Department and Research Professor of National Security Affairs 

at the Strategic Studies Institute. He has been with SSI since 1993, 

previously serving as Research Professor of National Security 

Affairs and the Henry L. Stimson Professor of Military Studies. Dr. 

Metz has also been on the faculty of the Air War College, the U.S. 

Army Command and General Staff College, and several universities. 

He has been an advisor to political organizations, campaigns and 

commissions; served on many national security policy task forces; 

testified in both houses of Congress; and spoken on military and 

security issues around the world. He is the author of more than 

90 publications including articles in journals such as Washington 

Quarterly, Joint Force Quarterly, The National Interest, and Current 

History. Dr. Metz’s research has taken him to 30 countries, including 

Iraq immediately after the collapse of the Hussein regime. His current 

work deals with the conflict in Iraq; American grand strategy; Africa 

and the war on terrorism; and American military capabilities for 

stabilization operations, counterinsurgency, and irregular warfare. 

He is also writing a book entitled Diatribe: The Rise of Combat Discourse 

in American Politics. He holds a B.A. in Philosophy and a M.A. in 

International Studies from the University of South Carolina, and a 

Ph.D. in Political Science from the Johns Hopkins University.

RAYMOND MILLEN is currently assigned as the Director of European 

Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute. He graduated from 

the U.S. Military Academy in 1982, was commissioned as an infantry 

officer, and has held a variety of command and staff assignments in 

Germany and Continental United States. He has also served as the 

U.S. Army Infantry School Liaison Officer to the German Infantry 

School at Hammelburg, Germany; Battalion Executive Officer, 3-

502d Infantry, Fort Campbell, Kentucky; and Chief of Intelligence 

Section and Balkans Team Chief, Survey Section, SHAPE, Belgium. 

He served in Kabul from July through November 2004 on the staff 

of the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan, focusing on the 

Afghan National Army and the General Staff. Lieutenant Colonel 
v

Millen is a Foreign Area Officer for Western Europe. He has published 

articles in a number of scholarly and professional journals to include 

Comparative Strategy Journal, Infantry Magazine and the Swiss Military 

Journal. His book, Command Legacy, was published by Brasseys 

in April 2002. Lieutenant Colonel Millen is a graduate of the U.S. 

Army’s Command and General Staff College, and holds an M.A. 

degree in National Security Studies from Georgetown University. He 

is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in World Politics at Catholic University 

of America.
SUMMARY

 Insurgency has existed throughout history but ebbed and flowed 

in strategic significance. Today the world has entered another period 

when insurgency is common and strategically significant. This is 

likely to continue for at least a decade, perhaps longer. As the United 

States confronts this threat, extrapolating old ideas, strategies, 

doctrine, and operational concepts is a recipe for ineffectiveness. 

Reconceptualization is needed.

 The strategic salience of insurgency for the United States is 

higher than it has been since the height of the Cold War. But 

insurgency remains challenging for the United States because two 

of its dominant characteristics--protractedness and ambiguity--

mitigate the effectiveness of the American military. Furthermore, 

the broader U.S. national security organization is not optimized for 

counterinsurgency support. Ultimately, a nation is only as good at 

counterinsurgency support as its weakest link, not its strongest. 

 Existing American strategy and doctrine focus on national 

insurgencies rather than liberation ones. As a result, the strategy 

stresses selective engagement; formation of a support coalition if 

possible; keeping the American presence to a minimum level to attain 

strategic objectives; augmenting the regime’s military, intelligence, 

political, informational, and economic capabilities; and, encouraging 

and shaping reform by the regime designed to address shortcomings 

and the root causes of the insurgency. The key to success is not for 

the U.S. military to become better at counterinsurgency, but for the 

U.S. military (and other elements of the government) to be skilled at 

helping local security and intelligence forces become effective at it. 

 A strategy for countering a liberation insurgency must be different 

in some important ways. Specifically, it should include the rapid 

stabilization of the state or area using the appropriately sized force 

(but larger is usually better); a shift to minimum U.S. military presence 

as rapidly as possible; rapid creation of effective local security and 

intelligence forces; shifting the perception of the insurgency from a 

liberation one to a national one; encouraging sustained reform by 

the partner regime; and cauterization--the strengthening of states 

surrounding the state facing an insurgency. 

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vii

 Sustained capability enhancement is crucial, even when the United 

States is not actively engaged in counterinsurgency. This includes 

leader development, wargaming, concept development, research and 

analysis, professional education, and focused training. Capability 

enhancement should include increasing the ability and willingness 

of regional states and other regional security organizations to 

provide counterinsurgency support, improved homeland security, 

and methods for early warning of insurgency, preventative actions, 

and the creation of early-stage support packages. 

 The United States must make clear whether its approach to 

counterinsurgency is a strategy of victory or a strategy of containment, 

tailoring the response and method to the threat. A strategy of victory 

which seeks a definitive end makes sense when facing a national 

insurgency in which the partner government has some basis of 

legitimacy and popular support. In liberation insurgencies, though, a 

strategy of victory is a very long shot, hence a strategy of containment 

is the more logical one.

 Because insurgents attempt to prevent the military battlespace from 

becoming decisive and concentrate in the political and psychological, 

operational design must be different than for conventional combat. 

Specifically, the U.S. military and other government agencies should 

develop an effects-based approach designed to fracture, delegitimize, 

delink, demoralize, and deresource insurgents. To make this 

work requires an independent strategic assessment organization 

composed of experienced government officials, military officers, 

policemen, intelligence officers, strategists, and regional experts to 

assess a counterinsurgency operation and allow senior leaders to 

make adjustments. 

 When involved in backing an existing government, the U.S. 

force package would be designed primarily for training, advice, and 

support. It should be interagency from the inception. In most cases, 

the only combat forces would be those needed for force and facility 

protection, more rarely for strike missions in particularly challenging 

environments. Modularity should increasingly allow the Army to 

tailor, deploy, and sustain such packages. 

 Sustaining the commitment is an important part of force 

packaging. Successful counterinsurgency takes many years, often a 

decade or more. Consideration must be given to rotation procedures 

for deployed forces. To some extent, contractors can relieve this 
viii

pressure, particularly since many of the training, advice, and support 

functions in counterinsurgency do not have to be performed by 

uniformed military. But as Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, the 

use of contractors brings a range of other problems associated with 

training, control, discipline, and protection. 

 Given the likelihood of continued involvement in counterinsurgency support, the Army will need to consider increasing the 

number of units that have particular utility in this environment, 

such as Intelligence and Engineers. Civil Affairs and Psychological 

Operations, both of which also have high utility in counterinsurgency 

support, need refocusing and restructuring. As a minimum, a larger 

proportion of these units should be in the active component. And, 

both need greater autonomy to be effective in a counterinsurgency 

environment rather than being assigned to the commander of a 

maneuver unit. In general, though, the Army should not develop 

specialized units to “fight” counterinsurgency. 

 Leader development and training for counterinsurgency must 

emphasize ethical considerations and force discipline, cultural 

sensitivity, and the ability to communicate across cultural boundaries. 

Most importantly, leader development must focus on inculcating the 

Army with the ability to innovate and adapt. Organizationally, the 

U.S. military should develop matrix and networked organizations. 

Professional education and training must be increasingly interagency 

and multinational.
1

INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE 

21st CENTURY:

RECONCEPTUALIZING THREAT AND RESPONSE

INTRODUCTION

Insurgency has existed throughout history but ebbed and flowed 

in strategic significance. At times insurgency forms “background 

noise” to competition or conflict between great powers. At other 

times, it is strategically significant, undercutting regional stability, 

drawing outsiders into direct conflict, and spawning humanitarian 

disasters. From a systemic perspective, the lower the chances of direct 

armed conflict between great powers and the greater the tendency 

of major powers to sponsor insurgency as a form of surrogate 

conflict, the greater the strategic significance of insurgency. When 

war between great powers is likely, insurgency may simmer on but 

becomes strategic background noise.

Today the world has entered another period when sustained, 

large-scale conventional war between states is unlikely, at least in the 

near term. But mounting global discontent arising from globalization; 

the failure of economic development to keep pace with expectations; 

the collapse of traditional political, economic, and social orders; 

widespread anger and resentment; environmental decay; population 

pressure; the presence of weak regimes; the growth of transnational 

organized crime; and the widespread availability of arms are making 

insurgency common and strategically significant. This significance is 

likely to continue for at least a decade, perhaps longer.

Counterinsurgency support has been part of American strategy 

since the 1960s, but today insurgency is mutating, thus forcing an 

intense reevaluation of U.S. strategy and operational concepts. To 

simply extrapolate the ideas, strategies, doctrine, and operational 

concepts from several decades ago and apply them to 21st century 

insurgency is a recipe for ineffectiveness. Reconceptualization is 

needed for the U.S. military and other components of the government 

to confront the new variants of this old challenge and to distinguish 

insurgency’s enduring characteristics from those undergoing 

change.
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DEFINITION AND CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT

Insurgency is a strategy adopted by groups which cannot attain 

their political objectives through conventional means or by a quick 

seizure of power. It is used by those too weak to do otherwise. 

Insurgency is characterized by protracted, asymmetric violence, 

ambiguity, the use of complex terrain (jungles, mountains, urban 

areas), psychological warfare, and political mobilization—all 

designed to protect the insurgents and eventually alter the balance 

of power in their favor. Insurgents may attempt to seize power 

and replace the existing government (revolutionary insurgency) or 

they may have more limited aims such as separation, autonomy, or 

alteration of a particular policy. They avoid battlespaces where they 

are weakest―often the conventional military sphere―and focus on 

those where they can operate on more equal footing, particularly the 

psychological and the political. Insurgents try to postpone decisive 

action, avoid defeat, sustain themselves, expand their support, and 

hope that, over time, the power balance changes in their favor.

In a broad sense, insurgencies take two forms.1

 In what can be called 

“national” insurgencies, the primary antagonists are the insurgents 

and a national government which has at least some degree of 

legitimacy and support. The distinctions between the insurgents and 

the regime are based on economic class, ideology, identity (ethnicity, 

race, religion), or some other political factor. The government may 

have external supporters, but the conflict is clearly between the 

insurgents and an endogenous regime. National insurgencies are 

triangular in that they involve not only the two antagonists―the 

insurgents and counterinsurgents―but also a range of other actors 

who can shift the relationship between the antagonists by supporting 

one or the other. The most important of these other actors are the 

populace of the country but may also include external states, 

organizations, and groups. The insurgents and counterinsurgents 

pursue strategies which, in a sense, mirror image the other as they 

attempt to weaken the other party and simultaneously win over 

neutrals or those who are not committed to one side or the other.

The second important form are “liberation” insurgencies. These 

pit insurgents against a ruling group that is seen as outside occupiers 

(even though they might not actually be) by virtue of race, ethnicity, 

or culture. The goal of the insurgents is to “liberate” their nation 
3

from alien occupation. Examples include the insurgency in Rhodesia, 

the one against the white minority government in South Africa, the 

Palestinian insurgency, Vietnam after 1965, the Afghan insurgency 

against the Soviet occupation, Chechnya, the current Taleban/al 

Qaeda insurgency in Afghanistan, and the Iraq insurgency. 

The distinction between a national and a liberation insurgency 

is not always rigid and clear. A single insurgency can contain 

elements of both, and shift emphasis during its lifespan. The 

Chinese communist insurgency, for instance, began as a national 

insurgency, shifted to a combination of liberation and national 

during the Japanese occupation, and then shifted back to a national 

one. The Viet Cong/North Vietnamese insurgency in South Vietnam 

grew out of a liberation one, became more national in focus before 

extensive American involvement in the conflict, again emphasized 

the liberation element from 1965 to the early 1970s, and then shifted 

back again.

Liberation insurgencies are difficult to counter. The approach 

that usually works against national insurgents―demonstrating that 

the government can address the root causes of the conflict through 

reform―does not work nearly as well since the occupiers are 

inherently and insurmountably distinct from the insurgents and their 

supporters. Their outsider status cannot be overcome by even the 

most skilled information campaign. What motivates the insurgents 

is not the lack of jobs, schools, or the right to vote, but resentment 

at occupation, interference, and rule by outsiders or those perceived 

as outsiders. Reform is not the key to a solution as it normally is in 

national insurgencies.2

 For this reason, skilled insurgents prefer to 

have their movement seen as a liberation one rather than a national 

one, thus making the mobilization of support and internal unity 

within the insurgency easier.

Insurgencies vary across time and regions but most follow 

a common life cycle. During the period of organization and 

coalescence, insurgent movements tend to be weak, disorganized, 

and often inchoate. Survival is the overwhelming priority. In the 

earliest stage, there may be diverse, competing insurgent movements 

within a nation. If so, establishing a reputation―”brand identity”―is 

important, leading some of the proto-insurgencies to undertake 

bold, even foolhardy actions.3

 Other insurgents may opt for the 

underground approach and remain hidden as long as possible 
4

while organizing, recruiting, training, learning their craft, and 

accumulating resources. Each method of mobilization―by publicitygenerating action or by building an underground organization―has 

proven successful, particularly if the regime fails to recognize the 

seriousness of the threat at an early stage. 

At some point every insurgency must open direct operations 

against the regime in order to succeed. This can take the form of 

guerrilla warfare, terrorism, assassination of officials, sabotage, and 

other types of irregular or asymmetric violence. At the same time, 

the insurgents must continue to improve their skills, learn their craft, 

accumulate resources, and mobilize support. They may do this by 

cultivating external alliances, smuggling, robbery, narcotrafficking, 

kidnapping, black marketing, money laundering, counterfeiting, 

merchandise pirating, illegal use of charities, racketeering, and 

extortion. They may buy arms, obtaining them from ideological 

allies, or capture them from government forces. Most―but not all―

insurgents also seek to augment their legitimacy, mobilize greater 

public support and, in some cases, expand their international 

acceptance. 

Insurgents have a variety of methods to do this, including 

propaganda, information warfare designed to popularize the 

perception that they are seekers of justice forced into violence 

by the unwillingness of the regime to give them a voice in the 

political system, actions which demonstrate that they offer a better 

alternative than the regime, and simple boldness and courage―

”armed propaganda”―designed to demonstrate the incompetence 

and brutality of the regime. In any case, insurgents inspire resistance 

and recruitment by defiance, particularly among young males with 

the volatile combination of boredom, anger, and lack of purpose. 

Insurgency can provide a sense of adventure, excitement, and 

meaning that transcends its political objectives. 

Thus the greater the pool of bored, angry, unoccupied young 

men in a society, the more fruitful ground for insurgent organizers 

to work. The job of mobilizing support and acquiring resources is 

even easier for insurgents in a liberation conflict since they can draw 

on the inherent dislike people have of domination by “outsiders.” 

As Khair al-Din Hasib, the “father” of pan-Arab nationalism, stated, 

“Whenever, wherever there is occupation, there will be resistance.”4
5

An insurgency continues so long as both sides either feel that they 

will ultimately prevail, or believe the costs of stopping the conflict 

will be greater than the costs of persisting. Often insurgencies drag 

on so long that entire generations emerge that have known nothing 

but conflict, so their fear of peace―which is an unknown, and thus 

anxiety-causing―surpasses their fear of conflict. An insurgency may 

end when one side (or, less often, both) decides that no matter how 

long they continue, they cannot prevail, or that the costs of ending 

the conflict are less than the costs of continuation. In other words, it 

is less an assessment of a preferred future that drives insurgents or 

insurgent supporters than an assessment of who will prevail―the 

insurgents or the regime. The normal practice is for large segments 

of the population to “bandwagon” by throwing their support to 

the side they believe will win. Ultimately the denouement may be 

a negotiated settlement, or the conflict may simply peter out as the 

insurgents melt back into the population or go into exile. Less often, 

insurgencies end with decisive victory, either when the insurgents 

seize power or attain some other objective, or the regime eradicates 

all the insurgents and prevents recruitment of new ones.

During the past century, most insurgencies failed. The majority 

were crushed before they developed a critical mass of skill and 

support, or were simply incapable of attaining such a critical mass. 

Successful insurgencies were those with effective force protection and 

counterintelligence capabilities able to prevent the counterinsurgents, 

whether a regime or outside occupiers, from pushing the conflict to 

decision in the military realm until the power balance shifted in their 

favor. They did this either by making the political and psychological 

realms decisive (since it was much easier for them to attain parity 

with the counterinsurgents in this sphere), or by postponing decisive 

military encounters until they weakened the government through 

guerrilla, political, and psychological operations. 

Starting an insurgency is easy. A dozen or so dedicated radicals 

with access to munitions and explosives can do it. Building an 

effective insurgency, though, is difficult. History suggests that 

it requires a specific set of conditions. The importance of these is 

determined, in part, by the effectiveness of the regime. When facing 

a determined regime with an understanding of counterinsurgency 

and the resources to undertake it, all of these conditions must be 

present for any degree of success by the insurgents. When facing 

a weak, disorganized, corrupt, divided, repressive, or ineffective 
6

regime, insurgents can overcome the absence of one or even several 

of the conditions.

Preconditions.

The most basic precondition for insurgency is frustration and the 

belief that this cannot be ameliorated through the existing political 

system. This may be widespread among a population or limited to a 

radical elite which then has to convince the more passive population 

of the need for violent change. A conspiratorial history and culture are 

also important. In such societies, insurgents can utilize or take over 

existing patterns of underground activity, webs of secret societies, 

or widespread criminal activity. A society already accustomed to 

conspiratorial activity is a naturally fertile ground for insurgency. 

Effective Strategy.

The strategy of an insurgent movement is built on three 

simultaneous and interlinked components: 1) force protection 

(via dispersion, sanctuary, the use complex terrain, effective 

counterintelligence, etc.); 2) actions to erode the will, strength and 

legitimacy of the regime (via violence and political-psychological 

programs); and, 3) augmentation of resources and support. There 

are, though, multiple ways to undertake these actions; insurgent 

strategies vary over time and across regions. Often insurgents have 

been able to seize and hold the strategic initiative due to inherently 

greater flexibility and absence of ethical or legal constraints. They 

are also unburdened with the need to run a government and 

maintain security and exercise authority throughout the country, 

and less constrained by law and normal ethical considerations. Every 

successful insurgency is dominated by a feeling that the end justifies 

the means.

Effective Ideology.

National insurgencies in particular depend on ideology to unify, 

inspire, explain why the existing system is unjust or illegitimate, and 

rationalize the use of violence to alter or overthrow the existing system. 

(Because liberation insurgencies have the “organic” mobilizing factor 
7

of alien occupation, they depend less on artificial mechanisms such 

as ideology). A coherent ideology explains existing discontent and 

anger and offers a remedy. It builds on preconceptions, propensities, 

grievances, resentments, hopes, desires, beliefs, cultural variables, 

historical factors, and social norms. An effective insurgent ideology, 

in other words, must “fit” a given society. In the 20th century, the 

combination of Marxism and nationalism particularly was powerful. 

The nationalistic angle made the ideology broad and unifying; 

Marxism focused anger and resentment on the regime, and explained 

why the insurgents could expect ultimate success even when the 

odds against them appeared long. 

Effective Leadership.

Leading an insurgency is difficult. Insurgent leaders must 

convince people to undertake extraordinary danger and hardship 

for extended periods of time with a very small chance of a positive 

outcome. Successful insurgent leaders are those who can unify diverse 

groups and organizations and impose their will under situations 

of high stress. Psychologically, effective insurgent leaders are so 

dedicated to their cause that they will persevere even though the odds 

are against them. They become obsessive “true believers” of nearly 

mythical status, driven by vision, often building a cult of leadership. 

Similarly, they tend to believe so strongly in their cause that they 

become completely ruthless, willing to do anything necessary to 

protect their movement and weaken the counterinsurgents. Insurgent 

leadership is not a business for the faint of heart, but for the utterly 

committed and obsessive.

Resources.

In the broadest terms, insurgents need five types of resources: 

1) manpower; 2) funding; 3) equipment/supplies, particularly 

access to arms, munitions, and explosives; 4) sanctuary (internal or 

internal+external); and, 5) intelligence. The amount needed varies 

from insurgency to insurgency. Some, for instance, need mass 

support, others do not. Some only need public passivity. Insurgent 

resources can be provided, seized, or created. The first can come from 

outside sponsors, domestic supporters, or from the ineptitude of 
8

the counterinsurgents (e.g., the government may provide sanctuary 

by being unaware of the presence of the insurgents). Funding, 

equipment, and supplies are the resources most often seized, but in 

some insurgencies, particularly those in Africa, manpower is seized 

through violence as insurgents undertake forcible recruitment 

(impressment). Just as in nature an organism seeks to obtain food 

with the minimum energy expenditure, most insurgencies would 

prefer to be provided resources, but will seize or create them if none 

are provided or, in some cases, if provided resources come with too 

many strings attached.

20th-CENTURY INSURGENCY

21st-century insurgency is clearly a descendent of a similar 

phenomenon that blossomed in the “golden age of insurgency” 

in the second half of the 20th century. At that time, many states in 

Latin America, Asia, Africa, and even on the periphery of Europe 

were ruled by weak, corrupt regimes; unpopular dictators; new, 

fragile governments; or colonial occupiers. Socialist radicalism 

and nationalism inspired revolutionaries around the world and 

provided an ethical justification for political violence. Increases in 

literacy and improvements in communication helped to mobilize 

the disenfranchised and the repressed. The Soviet Union, unable to 

undertake direct expansion, adopted an indirect strategy in which 

it supported insurgency to weaken the West. Later China and Cuba 

followed suit. Toward the end of the 20th century, indirect aggression 

via state support to insurgency was used in Mozambique, Angola, the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad, Western Sahara, Uganda, 

Liberia, Sierra Leone, Kashmir, and elsewhere. 

Most importantly, insurgency flowered in the 20th century 

because of the invention of a powerful and effective insurgentbased strategy: Maoist “People’s War.” People’s War began when 

a highly motivated cadre mobilized a support base among the rural 

peasantry using nationalism and local grievances (often including 

corruption, repression, excessive taxation, and issues associated 

with land ownership). This was particularly powerful when it could 

take the form of a liberation insurgency. The Chinese insurgents, for 

instance, gained strength when they painted their movement as an 

anti-Japanese one (even though they did little actual fighting with 
9

the Japanese). The same was true of the Viet Minh. What happened 

in these cases―and may happen in Iraq―was that the insurgents 

built their movements on liberation grounds but were able to segue 

into purely national insurgencies after the occupiers left. 

People’s War called for a period of underground political 

organization followed by guerrilla war.5

 The ultimate objective 

was seizure of power and creation of a communist state. While the 

insurgents were prepared for a long struggle involving occasional 

military setbacks, they sought to launch increasingly larger military 

operations. In the “pure” form of Maoist People’s War, the final phase 

was conventional maneuver warfare after the regime was weakened 

by prolonged guerrilla operations. Many of the great successes of the 

Maoist approach (such as China itself and Vietnam) came through 

conventional military victory. 

Throughout the course of People’s War, psychological 

operations and political mobilization paralleled military actions. 

In fact, violence was viewed as “armed propaganda” designed for 

maximum psychological effect such as demonstrating the weakness 

or incompetence of the regime or provoking it into excessive 

reactions which eroded its support. Military actions which had 

maximum direct effect on the insurgents often alienated the public 

(as well as the international community). Violence also deterred 

government supporters and inspired potential insurgent supporters. 

The Algerian National Liberation Front, Viet Minh and Viet Cong, 

for instance, focused assassinations and terrorism on unpopular 

local officials and landowners. Often the regimes were blamed 

when their use of force hurt innocents while insurgents often were 

not―one of the core asymmetries of insurgency is an asymmetry of 

expectations concerning behavior. Thus one of the key decisions for 

counterinsurgents was deciding whether the political cost of armed 

strikes against the insurgents was worth paying.

The People’s War strategy also directed insurgents to develop 

“liberated areas” that they could administer more justly than 

government-controlled regions. This too was a means of psychological 

warfare and propaganda designed to win over the “undecideds” 

to the rebel side. In fact, that was the essence of People’s War and 

the core of its triangularity: the conflict was an armed and politicalpsychological competition between insurgents and counterinsurgents for the “undecideds.”
10

Often outside supporters played an important role in People’s 

War, providing sanctuary, training, equipment, funding, and 

supplies. In fact, 20th-century insurgency was a form of proxy conflict 

caused by the nuclear stalemate between the superpowers. Because 

direct confrontation between the West and East risked escalation to 

the thermonuclear level, proxy conflict was considered a safe option.6

By the 1980s, the United States―recognizing that insurgency often 

required “fighting fire with fire”―began promoting insurgency 

against pro-Soviet regimes in places such as Nicaragua and Angola.

Despite its long history with insurgency and other forms of 

irregular war, the United States was organizationally, doctrinally, 

conceptually, and psychologically unprepared for People’s War 

when it first confronted it in Vietnam. The Army, at least at the 

senior level, placed little stress on the mundane but vital aspects of 

counterinsurgency, such as training the South Vietnamese security 

forces, village pacification, local self-defense, and rooting out 

insurgent political cadres, at least at the higher level. Perhaps more 

importantly, even though a number of experts in the United States 

developed an astute understanding of the Vietnamese communist 

strategy and organization, Washington never forced the South 

Vietnamese regime to undergo fundamental reform and thus it 

never solidified its legitimacy.7

 Army Chief of Staff General Earle G. 

Wheeler reflected the thinking of President Lyndon Johnson and his 

top advisors when he said, “The essence of the problem in Vietnam 

is military.”8

By the time the United States did develop an organization to 

synchronize the military, political, and psychological dimensions 

of the struggle―the Civilian Operations and Revolutionary 

Development Support (CORDS) program―it was too late.9 The United 

States never supported CORDS to a degree comparable to the major 

military operations, the North Vietnamese military was thoroughly 

entrenched in the south, the South Vietnamese regime was widely 

perceived as corrupt and illegitimate, and the American public 

alienated. Even though the Viet Cong were militarily crushed in the 

1968 Tet Offensive and saw their political underground decimated 

by the Phoenix Program (which came later), the shift of power away 

from the regime was irreversible and carried on by the other element 

of the insurgent alliance―the North Vietnamese Army.10
11

When the United States again confronted insurgency in the 

1980s, it drew on the Vietnam experience to develop a “carrot-andstick” strategy which simultaneously promoted democratization, 

economic development, dialogue, and defense. In addition, 

Washington limited where it became involved. Recognizing that 

counterinsurgency support was a very long-term proposition and 

that support by the American people and their elected leaders would 

have to be sustained, the United States limited its involvement in 

counterinsurgency to areas of high national interest, especially 

Central America and the Caribbean. 

In addition, indirect means rather than the large-scale application 

of American military force was the preferred method. The 1987 

National Security Strategy, for instance, specified that indirect military 

power, particularly security assistance, was the primary tool of 

counterinsurgency. The 1988 National Security Strategy was even more 

explicit, emphasizing that U.S. engagement “must be realistic, often 

discreet, and founded on a clear relationship between the conflict’s 

outcome and important U.S. national security interests.”11

This understanding of insurgency was eventually codified with 

the 1990 release of Army and Air Force doctrine in FM 100-20/AFM 

3-20, Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict. Success in lowintensity conflict, according to this manual, followed adherence to 

five “imperatives”: political dominance, unity of effort, adaptability, 

legitimacy, and perseverance. The pivotal concept was legitimacy. 

This assumed the people of a country will decide whether the 

government or the insurgents can offer them the “best deal” in terms 

of goods and services and then support that side. Following this 

line of thought, U.S. activity in counterinsurgency was based on the 

concept of internal defense and development (IDAD) under which 

the host government “identifies the genuine grievances of its people 

and takes political, economic, and social actions to redress them.” 

But while FM 100-20, like the national security strategy, noted that 

the U.S. military role in counterinsurgency would “normally center 

on security assistance program administration,” it did not rule out 

direct tactical involvement of U.S. forces.

Simultaneously, other governments around the world also 

came to grips with Maoist-style insurgency and developed effective 

strategies, doctrine, and forces to counter it. Some utilized the 

American approach, combining carrot-and-stick. Others, such as the 
12

Guatemalans and Peruvians, implemented a “mailed fist” strategy 

which also proved effective (albeit brutal). By the end of the 20th 

century, counterinsurgency thinking had caught up with insurgency, 

and the tide had turned. Insurgency’s “golden age” was over―at 

least for a brief period. 

MUTATING INSURGENCY

While many governments have discovered ways to counter Maoist 

People’s War, the factors that motivate insurgents―the perception of 

repression, anger, frustration, and an inability to ameliorate these 

through legitimate political means―persist.12 As a result, insurgency 

is mutating. Some things, though, have not changed. Insurgency 

remains complex, grinding, dirty, and violent, mired in multiple 

levels of ambiguity and dragged out for an extended period of time. 

But there are key changes or discontinuities with effects that are not 

yet fully understood:

The Meaning of Sanctuary.

There are fewer geographically remote areas outside government 

control where insurgencies can gestate, so the initial stages of 

development tend to take place “hidden in plain sight” in cities 

and other developed areas. The ability of governments, particularly 

those affiliated with the United States, to find and destroy targets 

from a distance has made embedding and dispersal the preferred 

forms of protection for insurgents rather than isolation. The ongoing 

global trend toward urbanization means this will continue―future 

insurgencies will tend to form and develop in cities rather than rural 

areas.13 While this is necessary for self-protection, dispersion will 

make it difficult for insurgent movements to concentrate enough 

power to seize control of a state. Maoist People’s War was effective 

because it was able to weaken the regime psychologically and 

politically, then launch decisive military blows. Modern insurgents 

may never develop enough military power to undertake conventional 

operations and thus have to rely on terrorism and psychological 

and political means. This has a lower chance of success than the 

Maoist approach. Widely dispersed, networked insurgencies are 

difficult to eradicate, but also less likely to gain victory than the more 

concentrated insurgencies of the 20th century.
13

Diversification of Support.

While insurgent movements continue to seek external support 

and many find it important, they can no longer rely on it to the extent 

that Cold War insurgents could, in large part because of the ability of 

the United States to pressure external supporters. Insurgents therefore 

must devote extensive effort to fundraising or income generation. 

This increasingly leads them into coalition with organized crime, 

or to become criminal organizations themselves. While this is, in 

a sense, a distraction, it diminishes the need for external sponsors 

and even the mass public. To a much greater extent, contemporary 

insurgents only need the passivity of the public rather than its active 

support. 

Extended Connections.

Interconnectedness and information technology have facilitated 

the linkage of various insurgent movements and allied organizations, 

including criminal enterprises across regions and around the world. 

Coalitions and partnerships that would have been impossible 

during the Cold War are becoming the norm. The best example is the 

transnational Islamist insurgency which includes a dizzying array of 

subcomponents.

Asymmetric Power Projection.

Insurgents have developed the capability for strategic power 

projection (terrorism), strategic intelligence, and the building of 

wide-ranging regional and global linkages without the need for a 

patron like the Soviet Union or Cuba. Eventually this may allow 

them to deter states with a less-than-vital interest from providing 

counterinsurgency support.

Shifting Rallying Cries.

The content of insurgent ideology has shifted. While there 

are a few lingering Marxist insurgencies, an ideology based on 

transnational, radical Islam is clearly on the ascent. In some ways it 

poses greater challenges than Marxism. For instance, clerics play a 
14

central role in political mobilization but are considered protected and 

hence unacceptable targets. Because of its transcendentalism, radical 

Islam can inspire suicide terrorists―a phenomenon uncommon in 

secular insurgencies. But radical Islam is also a less forward looking 

and inclusive ideology than Marxism; its appeal outside its historical 

cultural realm is limited. In the broadest sense, the ideologies which 

underlie 21st century insurgencies decry the injustice of globalization. 

Because the United States is seen as the engineer of the existing world 

order, many insurgent ideologies define the United States and its 

partner regimes as the enemy.

Transparency.

Flowing from information technology, globalization, and the 

international movement of people, transparency has changed 

the nature of psychological warfare, making it easier to transmit 

information (including rumors and lies) and to build linkages, but 

harder to sustain perceptions or themes that do not closely match 

existing predispositions. In an environment with multiple and 

instantaneous sources of information, perceptions can be shaped but 

not controlled.

The mutation of insurgency is likely to continue. This may 

take several directions. For instance, insurgencies may become 

increasingly networked, with no centralized command and no 

common strategy, only a unifying objective. This would make them 

even less effective in terms of seizing power or attaining other political 

goals, but more survivable in the face of effective counterinsurgent 

actions. Insurgencies also may develop connections, even alliances 

with legitimate political organizations which share their resentment 

of the U.S.-dominated global economic and political system. It is 

conceivable that insurgent movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin 

America could find political allies or sympathetic affiliates in North 

America, Western Europe, and the Pacific Rim. This would accord 

them a degree of legitimacy which would greatly complicate the 

task of counterinsurgency. Insurgencies may follow the path of 

the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas 

Revolucionarios de Colombia [FARC]) and evolve into purely criminal 

organizations with only the thinnest veneer of politics. Or, more 

ominously, they may acquire weapons of mass destruction and thus 

develop an increased deterrent or compellence capability. 
15

CURRENT SITUATION

The strategic salience of insurgency for the United States is 

higher than it has been since the height of the Cold War. What 

takes place within states is of intense concern to those outside, 

particularly retain, to the United States in its role as engineer of 

global and regional order. Interconnectedness between states, their 

permeability, the globalization of economies, the transparency arising 

from information technology, and the intermixing of people around 

the world give every conflict regional and global repercussions. “In 

an increasingly interconnected world,” states the National Security 

Strategy of the United States, “regional crisis can strain our alliances, 

rekindle rivalries among the major powers, and create horrifying 

affronts to human dignity.”14 In Colombia, for instance, “the link 

between terrorist and extremist groups . . . challenge[s] the security 

of the state” while in Africa, “civil wars spread beyond borders to 

create regional war zones.”15 Internal conflicts create refugee flows 

which destabilize neighboring states. They often spawn organized 

crime as rebels turn to smuggling to raise capital and acquire 

weaponry. As the images of internal war are broadcast or emailed 

around the world, awareness rises and, with it, demands for action 

or intervention―the days are gone when millions could die in civil 

wars with barely a whisper to the outside. And internal conflicts 

and the weak states or ungoverned areas they create often serve as 

breeding grounds for terrorism so the connection between internal 

conflict and American security is direct.

Insurgency is challenging for the United States because two of its 

dominant characteristics―protractedness and ambiguity―mitigate 

the effectiveness of the American military. Rapid decisive operations 

are seldom, if ever, strategically decisive; long-term involvement with 

extensive interagency activity and partner cooperation is the norm. 

Since the military battlespace is not decisive, ultimate success requires 

that the U.S. military play a supporting role to other government 

agencies and, more importantly, to the partner governments and 

their security forces. Furthermore, the broader U.S. national security 

organization is not optimized for counterinsurgency support. 

Even when the military is effective at the security component of 

counterinsurgency, other government agencies are less effective 

at political, economic, psychological, and intelligence challenges. 
16

Ultimately, a nation is only as good at counterinsurgency support 

as its weakest link, not its strongest. Because insurgency is a holistic 

threat, counterinsurgency must be integrated and holistic.

The strategic and doctrinal framework with which the United 

States must face 21st century insurgencies does provide a foundation. 

But there are serious gaps. Some key strategic documents overlook 

insurgency all together. For instance, the 2004 National Military 

Strategy states, “While the Armed Forces’ foremost task is to fight 

and win wars, the character of conflict has changed, necessitating 

capabilities to defeat a wide range of adversaries―from state to 

nonstate actors.”16 While not using the word “insurgency,” it refers 

to “illegal armed groups that menace stability and security.”17 But its 

strategic principles are agility, decisiveness, and integration which 

“support simultaneous operations, the application of overmatching 

power and the fusion of U.S. military power with other instruments of 

power.”18 This perspective is not integrated fully with characteristics 

that history has shown to be most effective in counterinsurgency 

including perseverance, restrained use of force, and emphasis on 

intelligence, law enforcement, and political action. Moreover, the 

section of the strategy which deals with deterring aggression does 

not mention sponsorship or support of insurgency as a form of 

aggression.19 The strategy does mention stability operations but 

views them purely as a follow-on to major combat operations. In 

aggregate, the 2004 National Military Strategy applies the conceptual 

foundation and methodology developed for conventional combat 

to irregular warfare rather than developing a new or separate 

approach.

While Joint and Service doctrine does deal with insurgency, 

it tends to overlook the ongoing mutations, treating 20th-century 

Maoist People’s war as a universal model for insurgency. Joint Doctrine 

for Military Operations Other Than War, for instance, incorporates 

counterinsurgency under nation assistance which includes security 

assistance, foreign internal defense, and humanitarian and civil 

assistance.20 Foreign internal defense (FID) is the most salient 

concept. It is defined as “the total political, economic, informational, 

and military support provided to another nation to assist its fight 

against subversion and insurgency.” This “has traditionally been 

focused on helping another nation defeat an organized movement 

attempting to overthrow the government.”21 Initially developed 
17

from the U.S. experience in Vietnam, FID is designed to “free and 

protect a nation from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency by the 

building of viable institutions that respond to the needs of society.”22

Economic, social, informational, and political needs are the focus 

of U.S. effort. However, military assistance is usually necessary to 

provide security.

While foreign internal defense continues to seek improvements 

in a partner state’s internal defense and development, it is no 

longer aimed purely at countering insurgency. FID programs may 

also address other, interrelated sources of instability such as drug 

trafficking, terrorism, and ethnic rivalries.23 The military’s role in FID 

can be categorized as indirect support such as security assistance, 

combined exercises, and exchanges; direct support such as civilmilitary operations, military training to host nation forces, logistics 

support, and intelligence and communications sharing; and combat 

operations. 

Recent Army doctrine incorporates counterinsurgency into 

stability operations and support operations. The emphasis tends 

to be less on the direct interests of the United States in countering 

insurgency―that insurgency can be used as proxy aggression or that 

it can spawn terrorism―than on the indirect adverse effects of such 

conflict. For instance, Field Manual (FM) 3-07 states, “Many modern 

conflicts do not directly affect the interests of the United States. 

Others, however, affect U.S. humanitarian interests, access to markets 

and materials, the safety of our citizens, and the stability necessary 

to sustain democratic government. These threats to U.S. national 

interests may require stability operations or support operations in 

response.”24 

Army doctrine also is based on FID. The core logic is triangular: 

the insurgents and the counterinsurgents are simultaneously at war 

with one another and competing for public support. FM 3-07 states:

Success in counterinsurgency goes to the party that achieves the greater 

popular support. The winner will be the party that better forms the issues, 

mobilizes groups and forces around them, and develops programs that 

solve problems of relative deprivation. This requires political, social, and 

economic development. Security operations by military and police forces, 

combined with effective and legitimate administration of justice, provide 

the necessary secure environment in which development can occur.25
18

According to the doctrine, the primary role of the Army in 

counterinsurgency is managing security assistance programs.26

While U.S. forces generally do not engage in combat, they may 

conduct strike operations if required.

Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq led the Army’s leaders to 

recognize the need for new counterinsurgency doctrine. An interim 

field manual was published in October 2004, with other versions 

intended to follow.27 While this was an ambitious undertaking, it 

did not grapple with new forms of 21st-century insurgency, instead 

treating 20th-century insurgency patterned after Maoist People’s 

War as a universal model. For instance, the new doctrine defined 

insurgency as an “organized movement aimed at the overthrow 

of a constituted government” which would exclude the conflict 

in Iraq prior to national elections, or the post-Taliban insurgency 

in Afghanistan.28 It treats the Maoist-style objective of forming an 

alternative state and the organization of a Maoist-style insurgency―

leadership, combatants, cadre, and mass base―as a universal form.29

Given this perspective, the recommendations for counterinsurgency 

are those designed against a Maoist-style insurgency and largely 

reflect the lessons of Vietnam. Using a national insurgency as the 

sole model, the doctrine gives no consideration to the special 

requirements of a liberation insurgency.

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

Until recently, the United States became involved in counterinsurgency to support a regime whose overthrow would threaten 

important or vital national interests. A range of criteria were used to 

decide whether intervention was warranted:

• The nature of the regime facing the challenge (the United 

States is less likely to commit to the defense of a repressive 

regime than during the Cold War);

• The nature of the insurgents (the United States is more likely 

to assist regimes threatened by insurgents linked to al Qaeda 

or its affiliates);

• The economic or geostrategic significance of the state facing 

an insurgency (the United States is more likely to become 

involved in counterinsurgency in the Americas than in Africa, 
19

and in economically important areas than those of little 

economic value);

• The traditional relationship of the threatened state with the 

United States (it is important for the United States to remain a 

steadfast security partner) ;

• The human cost of the insurgency (the United States is 

somewhat more likely to intervene in a conflict that involves 

humanitarian disasters or genocide than ones that do not).

Historically, the decision to intervene usually was made when 

a pro-American regime faced an active insurgency that it could 

not handle on its own. In the post-September 11, 2001, strategic 

environment, a second mechanism for American involvement in 

counterinsurgency has emerged: an insurgency that arises out of 

a stabilization and transformation operation such as ENDURING 

FREEDOM or IRAQI FREEDOM. Since such stabilization and 

transformation operations are likely to remain an important 

element of American national security strategy for the duration of 

the global war on terrorism, the U.S. military is likely to be used in 

counterinsurgency support into the foreseeable future.

When the United States supports a beleaguered partner, there 

are existing political and security structures but America’s leverage 

may be limited. A regime that faces a serious insurgency threat often 

has major political, economic, and social shortcomings. Because 

an insurgency was able to coalesce and develop indicates that the 

regime is unable or unwilling to recognize this fully. The problem 

for the United States is finding an effective way to encourage or, 

if necessary, force the partner to undertake needed reforms at the 

same time that its security capabilities are improved. All too often 

a partner will conclude that, if they are important enough to attract 

Washington’s commitment to help them, American policymakers 

will not let them fall and thus will overlook continued repression, 

corruption, or other shortcomings. 

In addition, American assistance makes partner regimes feel 

more secure which can, in their eyes, diminish the urgency of change. 

This complicates counterinsurgency support and makes it difficult 

to retain the backing of the American people and other nations. For 

instance, El Salvador undertook serious reform in the 1980s only 

when the U.S. Congress threatened to cut off support if significant 
20

improvements were not made in the protection of human rights, 

civil-military relations, good governance, and military effectiveness. 

Ironically, the greater the U.S. interest in protecting a partner regime, 

the less leverage Washington has.

The second mode of counterinsurgency support―one associated 

with intervention in a failed state or as a follow-on to a stabilization 

and transformation operation―can be even more challenging because 

existing security and political structures are weak or nonexistent, 

and because it is much easier for the insurgents to cast their struggle 

as one of liberation. This is not news: American strategists fully 

recognize that a national insurgency is easier to counter than a 

liberation one. The problem is that the United States sometimes must 

assume a dominant role when there is no effective local partner (as 

in Vietnam in 1966, Afghanistan, and Iraq). The dilemma is that this 

allows the insurgency to become seen as liberation. It is difficult to 

shift back to a national conflict. Even when the United States helps 

establish a local government and security forces (as in Vietnam by 

the early 1970s and Iraq at the present time), the new regime may 

be perceived as an American proxy. It can be difficult to mobilize 

backing for counterinsurgency under these conditions, even when 

the future offered by the United States and its local partners is, in 

objective terms, significantly more attractive than that proposed by the 

insurgents. The natural human tendency is to rally to fellow citizens, 

even those with whom the public is not inherently comfortable such 

as the former Ba’athists in Iraq, against outsiders. 

Existing American strategy and doctrine focus on national 

insurgencies rather than liberation ones. As a result, the strategy 

stresses selective engagement; formation of a support coalition 

if possible; keeping the American presence to a minimum level 

necessary to attain strategic objectives; augmenting the regime’s 

military, intelligence, political, informational, and economic 

capabilities; and encouraging and shaping reform by the regime 

designed to address shortcomings and the root causes of the 

insurgency. In most cases, this will include a coordinated reform 

program across the military, intelligence, political, informational, 

and economic spheres. The key to success is not for the U.S. military 

to become better at counterinsurgency, but for the U.S. military (and 

other elements of the government) to be skilled at helping local 

security and intelligence forces become effective at it. 
21

While this makes perfect sense for a national insurgency, one 

size does not fit all. A strategy for countering a liberation insurgency 

must be different in some important ways. This includes:

• Rapid stabilization of the state or area using the force required. 

Normally, larger is better since perception and presence 

are integral components of stabilization. Preferably, the 

stabilization force should be a multinational and integrated 

interagency organization operating with a United Nations 

mandate. The U.S. contingent should not be the largest if other 

effective multinational partners are available.

• A shift to a minimum U.S. military presence as rapidly as 

possible.

• Rapid creation of effective local security and intelligence 

forces. 

• Shifting the perception of the insurgency from one of liberation 

to a national one. This will include augmenting the legitimacy 

of the local government and security forces by distancing them 

from the United States. The more the local government and security 

forces are seen as proxies or subordinates of the United States, the 

more difficult it will be for them to establish legitimacy. This process 

will entail having the local government and military forces 

take the lead in projects and operations whenever possible 

(even if they might approach them differently than the United 

States).

• Over the long term, adjusting the actions of the local regime 

by encouraging sustained reform.

• Cauterization―the strengthening of states surrounding the 

state facing an insurgency. In this way, the strategic damage 

can be contained should the insurgency escalate or become 

uncontrollable.

Some elements of U.S. strategy will be relevant to both national 

and liberation insurgencies. For instance, sustained capability 

enhancement is crucial even during those times when the United 

States is not actively engaged in counterinsurgency. This includes 

leader development, wargaming, concept development, research 

and analysis, professional education, and focused training. This 

will be particularly difficult to sustain in the interregnums between 
22

counterinsurgency operations, but is vital. The tradition within the 

U.S. military has been to develop an impressive understanding of 

and skills at counterinsurgency when engaged in such an operation, 

and then to let the expertise atrophy afterwards, thus forcing a 

blank slate relearning process when the Nation is again committed 

to counterinsurgency support (“reinventing the wheel” in other 

words). This is not an effective or efficient pattern.

Capability enhancement should include increasing the ability and 

willingness of regional states and other regional security organizations 

to provide counterinsurgency support. This is easier said than done. 

Because counterinsurgency tends to be a dirty business and because 

the emergence of an active insurgency is seen as a taint on a regime, 

security organizations in regions where insurgencies occur have 

tended to shy away from collective responses. They are more than 

willing to work on cooperative ventures for peace operations, but 

not counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency support traditionally 

has come from outside a region. Breaking down this prejudice and 

building effective regional counterinsurgency systems would be 

useful. Along similar lines, synchronization of counterinsurgency 

thinking among key American partners like the NATO states, 

Australia, and India would augment U.S. capabilities. 

Since insurgents have developed a strategic strike capability 

via terrorism, improved homeland security also must be seen as 

part of capability enhancement for counterinsurgency support. 

When assessing the wisdom of engagement in counterinsurgency 

support, American political leaders must consider the domestic 

social repercussions and whether the involvement might spawn 

terrorism aimed at the United States. This possibility must not 

deter the United States from actions in the national interest, but is a 

consideration. It means that the Department of Homeland Security 

should be consulted and integrated into counterinsurgency strategic 

planning.

The United States, along with global and regional partners, 

needs better methods for early warning of insurgency, preventative 

actions, and the creation of early-stage support packages. One of the 

ironies and problems with insurgency is that the regime facing one 

often does not recognize it or denies it until the insurgency has had 

time to coalesce and develop. This is understandable―to admit that a 

serious insurgency challenge exists is to admit that national policies 
23

and means of governance have been flawed―but it nonetheless 

means that the insurgents are given a head start. The insurgents, 

in other words, always begin a conflict with the strategic initiative. 

The threat will be difficult to remedy until challenged regimes stop 

denying their problems. Moreover, the United States would have to 

commit resources before a conflict explodes. This will be difficult but 

the payoff would be immense―preventing an insurgency or nipping 

one in the bud is always easier than turning the tide on one that has 

taken root.

Third, the issue of when and how to engage in counterinsurgency 

support will remain an open one in U.S. strategy. Specifically, the 

question of whether this should be an “all or nothing” proposition is 

vital. Should there be a counterinsurgency corollary to the “Powell 

Doctrine” which states that the United States will only engage in 

counterinsurgency support when the interests at stake are high 

enough that we are willing to sustain the effort to the end and to use 

decisive force, even if that requires a decade or more and a significant 

commitment of money and personnel? Or is a modest amount of 

counterinsurgency support to a beleaguered friend better than none 

at all? In reality, this is probably not an either/or choice. The United 

States has and will continue to become involved in both “major” 

counterinsurgencies where the stakes are high and sustained, high 

level engagement is justified as well as “minor” ones where it is not. 

The key is to understand the distinction and not let what should be 

a minor case segue into a major commitment.

The United States must make clear whether its approach to 

counterinsurgency is a strategy of victory or a strategy of containment, 

tailoring the response and method to the threat. Traditional thinking 

is that victory, defined as the eradication of the insurgency as a 

political and military force and the amelioration of the factors 

that allowed it to emerge in the first place, is the appropriate goal. 

This is captured in Joint and Army doctrine. But given the extent 

of America’s global commitment and the time and resources it 

takes to attain ultimate victory in counterinsurgency, a strategy 

of containment merits consideration. This would be similar to the 

contemporary Israeli approach. The Israelis know they cannot win 

the “hearts and minds” of the Palestinians. They know they cannot 

ameliorate the root cause of the insurgency since that is the existence 

of Israel itself. They therefore have built a strategy designed to keep 

the insurgents ineffective for as long as it takes. 
24

A strategy of containment might distinguish between different 

types of insurgents and only commit the United States to countering 

an insurgency likely to support international terrorism or aggression, 

or one attempting to overthrow a truly democratic regime. Such a 

strategy would return to a minimum U.S. presence once an acceptable 

level of stability was attained. Americans might initially protest that 

such a strategy of containment is antithetical to the current broader 

tenets of U.S. national security strategy, but it is certainly within 

our tradition. We have, for instance, chosen to manage the problem 

of Haiti for the past century, preferring to reintervene as required 

rather than engineer the sort of wide scale social, political, and 

economic transformation that it would take to prevent instability 

from reemerging. It is conceivable that in far away places like Iraq 

and Afghanistan, we could adopt a strategy of intervention and 

stabilization when necessary without an attempt to transform the 

societies or a commitment to protracted counterinsurgency. 

Which strategy makes more sense? As Clausewitz reminds us, 

“The first, the supreme, and the most far-reaching act of judgment 

that the statesman and commander have to make” is to understand 

“the kind of war on which they are embarking, neither mistaking it 

for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.” 

A strategy of victory which seeks a definitive end makes sense 

when facing a national insurgency in which the partner government 

has some basis of legitimacy and popular support. In liberation 

insurgencies, though, a strategy of victory is a very long shot. No 

matter how much effort, money, and blood the United States pours 

in, it will be unable to change the image of an outsider imposing 

a solution. Even if the United States focuses on creating a friendly 

regime, that regime will be unlikely to attain legitimacy and support 

(except by turning on the United States). In such insurgencies, a 

strategy of containment is the more logical one.

One additional strategic factor merits consideration: some 

strategic thinkers contend that the United States is now facing the first 

insurgency of a global scale―created by the interlinkage of multiple 

national insurgencies―led by a network motivated by radical Islam.30

The Global War on Terrorism has all of the characteristics of an 

insurgency: protracted, asymmetric violence, ambiguity, dispersal, 

the use of complex terrain, psychological warfare, and political 

mobilization designed to protect the insurgents and eventually 
25

alter the balance of power in their favor; avoidance by insurgents 

of battlespaces where they are weak and a focus on those where 

they can compete, particularly the psychological and the political. 

The insurgents are fighting a total war with limited resources; the 

counterinsurgents are self-restrained by ethics and a desire to control 

costs. This belief suggests that the appropriate American response is to 

build a grand strategy modeled on counterinsurgency which reflects 

the differences between national and liberation insurgencies.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

One of the core dynamics in insurgency and counterinsurgency 

is the “learning contest.” Insurgents tend to be highly adaptable 

and flexible, at least at the tactical and operational levels. To match 

them, counterinsurgents must also be adaptable and quick to 

learn. Adaptability can be maximized by an institutional culture 

which stresses it and gives maximum autonomy to lower level 

leaders; by refining methods for the collection, dissemination, 

and implementation of lessons learned; and by adopting what the 

U.S. Marine Corps calls a “matrix organization” of functionally 

organized teams from across the U.S. Government and, for military 

units themselves, a networked structure with central coordination 

but local autonomy.31

Because insurgents attempt to prevent the military battlespace 

from becoming decisive and concentrate in the political and 

psychological, operational design must be different than for 

conventional combat. One useful approach would be to adopt an 

interagency, effects-based method of counterinsurgency planning 

focused on the following key activities:

• Fracturing the insurgent movement through military, 

psychological, and political means, to include direct strikes, 

dividing one part against another, offering amnesties, draining 

the pool of alienated, disillusioned, angry young males by 

providing alternatives, and so forth. Relationships within 

insurgent movements are not necessarily harmonious. Cabals 

within the insurgency often vie for leadership or dominance. 

Identifying these rifts and exploiting them may prove to be a 

coup for the counterinsurgency strategy;
26

• Delegitimizing the insurgent movement in the eyes of the local 

population and any international constituency it might have;

• Demoralizing the insurgent movement by creating and 

sustaining the perception that long-term trends are adverse and 

by making the lives of insurgents unpleasant and dangerous 

through military pressure and psychological operations;

• Delinking the insurgent movement from its internal and 

external support by understanding and destroying the 

political, logistics, and financial connections; and,

• Deresourcing the insurgent movement both by curtailing 

funding streams and causing it to waste existing resources.

Each of these effects would require specific metrics. In 

combination, these would allow counterinsurgent commanders to 

assess success or failure and make adjustments. Since the essence of 

insurgency is psychological, metrics in this realm, while difficult to 

develop and assess, are more accurate than body counts, insurgent 

operations undertaken, development projects begun (or finished), 

and similar measures. They might include things such as the 

percentage of local residents who feel secure enough to go out at 

night, express a pro government political position, or work for the 

government, or the percentage of people with favorable attitudes 

toward the government versus toward the insurgents. In addition, 

metrics should focus heavily on the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of 

the partner government and security forces.

The notion of recognizing and reacting to failure is an important 

one. As John Nagl points out, one of the things that allowed the British 

army to innovate and adapt during its counterinsurgency operations 

in Malaya in the 1950s (and thus attain success) was its willingness 

at all levels to admit failure.32 To make this work requires an 

independent strategic assessment organization. Those whose careers 

are contingent on the success of a campaign can never evaluate it with 

brutal objectivity. Yet counterinsurgency demands brutal honesty. 

Making an organization or even its higher headquarters responsible 

for self-evaluation is to risk the kind of fantasy assessments, 

delusional optimism, and inflated reporting seen in Vietnam. The 

auditors should include experienced government officials, military 

officers, policemen, intelligence officers, strategists, and regional 
27

experts. The organization should be nonpartisan, interagency and, if 

possible, multinational. 

Another way of thinking about structuring an operation (and one 

that is compatible with the effects-based approach) is to use preemption/

prevention as a guideline. Certain adverse things can happen during 

the course of an insurgency: 1) the emergence of a serious insurgency 

in the first place; 2) the development of military capabilities by the 

insurgents which pose a threat to the regime; 3) the expansion of 

public support for the insurgents to the point that the legitimacy 

of the regime is challenged; 4) the creation of linkages between the 

insurgency and organized crime, or the entry into organized crime by 

the insurgency itself; 5) development of the ability to sustain a level 

of chronic instability by the insurgents; 6) a widespread perception 

that ultimately the insurgents will prevail; and, 7) the coalescence of 

a coherent insurgent political organization. 

An effective counterinsurgency plan would be one explicitly 

designed to preempt and prevent these adverse trends. Each activity 

would blend both defensive and offensive actions. Each would 

require a range of resources and actions; each could be evaluated 

by separate metrics (again measured and evaluated by a small, 

responsible strategic assessment organization which focuses on 

actionable information rather than bureaucratic procedures.)

Counterinsurgent planners should always remember that 

timing matters. As with health care, a small effort early is more 

effective than a major one later on. While it is difficult to discern, 

insurgencies do have a point of “critical mass” where they become 

much more formidable opponents. If the United States is able to 

help a threatened partner augment its military, psychological, and 

political capability rapidly and early, it may be able to prevent the 

insurgents from attaining critical mass. In general, U.S. intervention 

for counterinsurgency support is most likely to succeed at an 

acceptable cost before an insurgency reaches critical mass (however 

hard that may be to identify). U.S. involvement after an insurgency 

as reached the “point of no return” where it cannot be defeated at a 

reasonable cost is likely to be ineffective. If an insurgency reaches 

this point, the United States should pursue disengagement even 

given the strategic and political costs.

The military component of a counterinsurgency campaign 

must seize the initiative as quickly as possible. There are multiple 

ways of doing this. When an insurgent movement elects to make 
28

a major stand in the military battlespace and depends on internal 

sanctuary, conventional sweeps and offensives play an important 

role. But history suggests that “fighting fire with fire”―emulating 

insurgent tactics―is also important. The counterinsurgents, for 

instance, can develop combined guerrilla forces comprised of U.S. 

or other outside Special Forces and host nation personnel. Creating 

a second front for the insurgents severely weakens their ability to 

wage an effective insurgency since the allied guerrillas launch raids 

on their logistical bases and headquarters as well as interdicting lines 

of communication. The French and British used allied guerrillas to 

great effect in Indochina and Malaya respectively. Even though the 

program began late in the Indochina war (1953), French guerrillas tied 

down a number of Vietminh battalions by raiding bases, striking at 

headquarters units, and interdicting lines of communication.33 They 

even operated in China, much to the consternation of the Chinese. 

The British in Malaya also raised guerrilla forces operating in the 

same manner. Moreover, the British raised guerrilla units comprised 

of former insurgents to bolster the counterinsurgent effort. Similarly, 

American Special Forces also formed guerrilla units during Vietnam. 

Logically, allied guerrilla operations force the insurgents to devote 

critical resources and manpower to defensive measures. Given that 

insurgent capabilities are weak to begin with, such an allied capability 

can quash an insurgency early on. 

In a national insurgency with its triangular configuration, the 

war of ideas plays a critical role. Hence information operations 

cannot be conducted in an ad hoc manner. The insurgents always 

have an initial advantage in this regard, and only a sophisticated 

information operations campaign will wrest the initiative from them. 

The host nation government must control this process fully; the 

United States will never have a sophisticated enough understanding 

of key cultural and historical elements to run a program on its own. 

The American role is to provide support. In a liberation insurgency, 

the United States is at a distinct disadvantage in the information 

campaign. Almost no U.S. actions or information themes are likely 

to change the core dynamic of the conflict: that Americans are seen 

as outsiders and the insurgents as insiders. This does not mean that 

the United States should abandon the information campaign, but 

American strategists and leaders must be aware of its limitations 

and not expect to “win” the “war of ideas” on their own.
29

ORGANIZATIONAL AND FORCE STRUCTURE 

CONSIDERATIONS

The history of counterinsurgency shows that the full integration 

of all government agencies under unified control (and preferably 

unified command) is the only way to synchronize the elements 

of national power effectively. This is considered one of the 

reasons for British success in Malaya and for the lack of French 

and American success in Indochina.34 History also suggests that 

intelligence and, equally important, counterintelligence, is central 

to success in counterinsurgency. Insurgencies pose particular 

intelligence challenges, so intelligence must be all-source, focused, 

and disseminated to the various organizations involved in the 

counterinsurgency effort. The seamless integration of law enforcement 

and military action is equally important. Police capability has 

always been vital to destroy insurgent political undergrounds but 

is becoming even more so as insurgency mutates. Today effective, 

preferably multinational law enforcement support is vital to limit 

insurgent access to resources whether through direct criminal activity 

or ties to global organized crime.

One of the most important elements in counterinsurgency support 

is selecting the right person to lead it. In most cases, insurgency 

warfare necessitates a law enforcement response, so a security czar, 

preferably a former police commissioner, should exercise unified 

command. This appointment accomplishes two objectives. First, it 

signifies the primacy of a political solution vice a parochial military 

solution. Second, it appoints a credentialed official with experience 

in domestic security issues and able to integrate rapidly all agencies 

towards a unified counterinsurgency campaign. Equally important, 

the leader of counterinsurgency support must be a skilled strategist, 

able to integrate elements of power and take a long-term perspective. 

His staff must be more than military, including police, experts 

on economic and political development, psychologists, cultural 

anthropologists, and mass communications specialists.

Because insurgency is an “armed theater” where the antagonists 

are playing to an audience at the same time they interact with each 

other, it is sometimes suggested that a specific organization is 

needed to control information activities. This many not be the most 

effective solution. A better idea is to create an organizational culture 
30

where every component of the government is aware of the centrality 

of information, the need to tailor images and messages, and the 

importance of developing strategies, operations, and tactical plans 

based on desired psychological and political effects.

The package for counterinsurgency support provided by 

the United States will depend on whether the operation entails 

supporting a threatened partner state or is a component of postintervention stabilization and transformation. When involved in 

backing an existing government, the U.S. force package would be 

predominately designed for training, advice, and support. In most 

cases, the only combat forces would be those needed for force and 

facility protection, more rarely for strike missions in particularly 

challenging environments. Modularity should increasingly allow 

the Army to tailor, deploy, and sustain such packages. It would 

be a mistake, though, to think strictly in terms of Army or even 

military force packages. When the United States undertakes 

counterinsurgency support, it should build an interagency force 

package from the beginning.

The relationship of the U.S. force and the supported government 

is always a major consideration. Intelligence sharing particularly 

is complicated since the United States will often have no way of 

assessing whether the supported government counterintelligence 

procedures are adequate. For actionable intelligence, it is more 

effective to rely on police forces to gather intelligence through 

investigations, interviews, and interrogations with the inhabitants 

than to rely solely on technical means. In a counterinsurgency, 

human intelligence is often more timely and accurate, yet the military, 

particularly an outside military offering counterinsurgency support, 

faces tremendous obstacles in building and sustaining the personal 

relationships which fuel human intelligence.

Sustaining the commitment is an important part of force 

packaging. Successful counterinsurgency takes many years, often a 

decade or more. Consideration must be given to rotation procedures 

for deployed forces. This strikes directly against one of the primary 

conundrums in counterinsurgency: history has shown over and over 

that short-term deployments are ineffective in counterinsurgency 

since units and individuals are not able to develop adequate 

situational awareness and local knowledge, yet in the contemporary 

U.S. military, it is difficult to sustain long-term deployments in 
31

hardship locations. To some extent, contractors can relieve this 

pressure, particularly since many of the training, advice, and support 

functions in counterinsurgency do not have to be performed by 

uniformed military. 

As Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, the use of contractors 

brings a range of other problems associated with training, control, 

discipline, and protection. In a politically charged environment, 

missteps by contractors can be just as damaging as mistakes by 

uniformed military. 

While a large U.S. military presence may be needed during the 

early part of a counterinsurgency campaign following intervention 

and or the stabilization of a failed state, over the long term, a small 

military footprint, supporting a larger law enforcement effort is an 

effective solution that crushes the insurgency without giving the 

insurgency a nationalist rally cry against an occupying power. In 

general, the smallest effective U.S. military presence is the best.

Given the likelihood of continued involvement in counterinsurgency support, the Army will need to increase the number of 

units such as Intelligence and Engineers that have particular utility 

in this environment. As the Army continues transformation, it is 

likely that other types of units can be redesigned into these. Special 

Forces also have immense utility in counterinsurgency but should 

focus less on training of partner militaries. This is a vital task but can 

be done more efficiently by other, more numerous units, perhaps 

Reserve Component or contractors. Civil Affairs and Psychological 

Operations, both of which also have high utility in counterinsurgency 

support, need refocusing and restructuring. At a minimum, a larger 

proportion of these units should be in the Active Component. And 

both need greater autonomy to be effective in a counterinsurgency 

environment rather than being assigned to the commander of a 

maneuver unit. 

Counterinsurgency related to stabilization and transformation 

operations can pose even greater force development challenges than 

support to a functioning government. A stabilization operation can 

require the significant deployment of forces for extended periods. 

One idea under consideration within the Department of Defense 

(DoD), for instance, is that the United States should have the 

capacity to deploy a force of up to 200,000 for up to 5 years and train 

a local military of up to 100,000 within 6 months.35 This U.S. force 
32

may include large numbers of combat units and Military Police, in 

addition to the other specialized units. The challenge, then, is one of 

sustaining the commitment and developing a rotation base.

In general, though, the Army should not develop specialized 

units to “fight” counterinsurgency. As U.S. doctrine and strategy 

indicate, the primary role of the United States in counterinsurgency 

is strengthening and supporting partners. U.S. involvement in 

counterinsurgency combat should always be seen as an emergency 

expedient, undertaken only when absolutely necessary for the shortest 

period of time possible. Given this, it would not be an effective use of 

resources to create specialized units for counterinsurgency combat. 

If direct combat is required for some finite period of time, the tactical 

activities would be close enough to those already resident in the 

force that the training of existing units can be modified to make them 

effective.

LEADER DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING 

CONSIDERATIONS

One can debate whether insurgents are otherwise ethical people 

forced to do evil things by desperation and weakness, or whether 

evil people are inherently drawn to insurgency. Clearly, though, this 

type of conflict is characterized by depravations of the most terrible 

type. Insurgents often make deliberate use of ethical asymmetry, 

undertaking actions that the regime cannot or will not. Or they draw 

the counterinsurgents into abuses only to use this as psychological 

ammunition. Regime after regime fighting determined insurgents has 

found that the most effective methods, sometimes the only effective 

methods, violate human and civil rights. Beleaguered governments 

must often choose between sinking to the ethical level of the insurgents 

or defeat. While some regimes can undertake this―witness the brutal 

counterinsurgency campaigns in places like Chechnya, Guatemala, 

and Peru―at other times, it can lead to the downfall of a government 

which is responsive to domestic or international pressure, whether 

the French Fourth Republic fighting Algerian insurgents or Slobodan 

Milosevic’s Serbian regime undertaking counterinsurgency in 

Kosovo. Because of this, leader development and training for 

counterinsurgency must emphasize ethical considerations and 

force discipline. While these are certainly integral to all forms of 
33

leader development and training, in the counterinsurgency context, 

where insurgents are completely intermixed with noncombatants, 

intelligence is heavily human, crime and warfare intermingle, every 

action has immense psychological and political implications. This 

not only adds additional stress on soldiers and leaders, but also 

confronts them with a different array of challenges. 

To successfully adopt matrix and networked organizations at 

the tactical and operational levels, leader development must focus 

on good decisionmaking, confidence, and creativity among lower 

ranking leaders, both commissioned and noncommissioned. Leader 

development and training must include increased cultural sensitivity 

and the ability to communicate across cultural boundaries. It must 

focus on inculcating the Army with the ability to innovate and 

adapt. Every insurgency is so different that overarching concepts 

and doctrine must be tailored to specific situations and cultures. 

That can only be done by an innovative and adaptable force. 

Empowering and entrusting junior leaders to find durable solutions 

in their unique environments is the only effective way to combat 

dynamic insurgents. As John Nagl points out, the ability to innovate 

and adapt was one of the primary reasons the British were more 

successful at counterinsurgency in Malaya than the American Army 

was in Vietnam. This same truth still holds: the future belongs 

to the adaptable. The Army’s experience in Iraq during 2003-04 

suggests that it does have significant capability for innovation and 

adaptation, particularly at the junior levels.36 Most of this has taken 

place through informal methods of communication and networking 

rather than through formal procedures. Extensive work is needed to 

further analyze this and develop methods to see that it applies at the 

operational and strategic levels as well as the tactical.

Given the nature of counterinsurgency, professional education 

and training increasingly must be interagency and multinational. The 

interagency aspect is particularly important. Unless the Army learns 

with and trains with other agencies (to include ethical training), it 

cannot operate seamlessly in the high pressure, violent, ambiguous 

world of counterinsurgency. Leaders at all levels must understand 

and trust the capabilities of other agencies; otherwise they will never 

venture from the approved military solution. 
34

THE WAY AHEAD

Little time has passed between the end of the last insurgency 

era and the beginning of the current one. That is both a blessing and 

a curse. Many senior Army leaders and retired officers working as 

DoD civilians or contractors have counterinsurgency expertise and 

experience. The problem is that the type of insurgency that these 

experts best understand―Maoist People’s War―is not the same 

as the 21st century insurgency we have seen so far. Many ideas 

and concepts central to their understanding of counterinsurgency 

such as, for instance, the notion that victory comes from winning 

the “hearts and minds” of “the people” is actually specific to one 

particular variant of insurgency and counterinsurgency. How should 

the strategy and operational methods used for national insurgency 

differ from those applied in liberation insurgency? One of the key 

challenges today, then, is distinguishing the universal themes and 

concepts from the context specific ones, and jettisoning those which 

no longer apply. This process has only begun.

In the realm of strategy, the United States must build regional 

structures to identify incipient insurgencies, deter or prevent them, 

and develop regional support systems when they do break out. The 

idea that the United States will be responsible for counterinsurgency 

support around the world is not sustainable. Other nations have 

experience, capability, and the incentive to prevent insurgency from 

destabilizing their regions. The United States should inspire them to 

act on this.

The notion of a grand strategy modeled on counterinsurgency 

to confront the global insurgency also needs further development. 

As the Service most experienced in the analysis of insurgency, the 

Army should play a leading role in this. But the U.S. military, and 

particularly the Army, were so disillusioned by Vietnam that it has 

since kept insurgency and counterinsurgency at arm’s length. When 

it could not be avoided, it was folded into, even hidden, in other 

concepts such as low intensity conflict, Foreign Internal Defense, and 

now stability operations and support operations. Given the centrality 

of insurgency and counterinsurgency in the contemporary strategic 

environment, the Army must transcend this hesitancy and accord 

these forms of conflict the priority they merit in strategy, operational 

thinking, doctrine, concept development, and force development.
35

Given the importance of the psychological and political 

battlespaces in insurgency and counterinsurgency, the Army must 

integrate psychological concepts and analysis in its strategic and 

operational planning. This kind of integration will require adding 

trained psychologists and cultural experts at many planning levels 

(as well as in the professional military education and wargaming 

systems). The Army also needs better concepts and, eventually, 

doctrine to understand the linkage of insurgency and organized 

crime. This would certainly need to be Joint doctrine and may need 

to be interagency.

To instigate such changes, the Army can be an advocate and 

locomotive in the Joint and interagency arenas. The interagency 

dimension is crucial: the U.S. Army may become the most proficient 

army in the world at counterinsurgency, but if the rest of the 

government does not develop equal capabilities, the United States 

will not be effective. And the Army can use its powerful educational, 

wargaming, and concept development capabilities to generate 

needed changes within the Army. It will require both of these devices 

to meet (and transcend) the challenges of the new insurgency era.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ARMY

• Revise the understanding of insurgency which serves as a 

basis for U.S. strategy and doctrine to include the distinction 

between national and liberation movements. 

• Develop, refine, and wargame appropriate strategy and 

doctrine for each type.

• Institutionalize methods for unified interagency approaches 

to counterinsurgency support.

• Act as the advocate for holistic capability enhancement across 

the government.

• Develop and exercise interagency techniques to build effective 

security and intelligence forces rapidly in a failed or occupied 

state.

• Develop an effects-based method of counterinsurgency 

planning; test this through robust experimentation, analysis, 

and wargaming.
36

• Develop a small, independent strategic assessment agency to 

evaluate U.S. involvement in counterinsurgency support.

• Continue refining and implementing plans to increase Army 

units with particular utility in counterinsurgency such as 

Intelligence and Engineers, and to reconfigure and, if necessary, 

augment Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units.

• Undertake strategic capacity-building by coordination with 

regional security organizations and states.

• Integrate the Department of Homeland Security into strategic 

planning for counterinsurgency support.

• Refine leader development and training to include emphasis on 

understanding and responding to 21st century insurgency.

ENDNOTES

1. These are not mutually exclusive, and an insurgency can take on dimensions 

of both, or shift from one to the other over its course.

2. The British success at quelling the Malayan insurgency of the 1950s and 

1960s sometimes is held to offer a model of successful counterinsurgency in a 

liberation framework, but its applicability is limited. The Malayan insurgency 

was limited to the Chinese minority of that territory and never spread to the 

Malay majority. If it had, the British strategy, which was based on precise, limited 

uses of military force and a stress on police actions and political and economic 

reforms, would have had less utility. In addition, one of the major factors which 

made the counterinsurgency campaign successful and prevented the insurgency 

from spreading to the ethnic Malay population was a promise by Britain that it 

would withdraw once the situation was stabilized. In other words, the British 

had to surrender their role as occupier to defeat the insurgents. For discussions 

of this conflict, see Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons 

of Malaya and Vietnam, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966; Robert W. Komer, 

The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency 

Effort, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1972; Noel Barber, The War of the 

Running Dog: Malaya 1948-1960, London: Fontana, 1973; Richard L. Clutterbuck, 

The Long, Long War: The Emergency in Malaya 1948-1960, London: Cassell, 1966; and 

John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat 

Soup with a Knife, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002.

3. The foco strategy developed by Che Guevara and Fidel Castro placed great 

stress on this. See Ernesto Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, Lincoln: University of 

Nebraska Press, 1998.

4. Quoted in Ahmed Janabi, “Of Homeland, Identity and Occupation,” Aljazeera.

net, September 9, 2004, published at http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/239DF360-

3640-457C-BA99-5FD497547598.htm.
37

5. Underground political organization did not stop once armed conflict began 

but continued through the duration of the campaign in areas controlled by the 

government.

6. Martin van Creveld argued that this tendency for nuclear weapons to obviate 

large scale conventional warfare would continue, thus making low-intensity conflict 

the dominant form around the world. See Martin van Creveld, The Transformation 

of War, New York: Free Press, 1991.

7. For example, Andrew Molnar, et. al., Human Factors Considerations of 

Undergrounds in Insurgencies, Washington, DC: Special Operations Research Office 

of the American University, 1965, reprinted, Honolulu: University Press of the 

Pacific, 2001, provided an amazingly accurate description of the Viet Cong/North 

Vietnamese strategy. A good description of Dau Tranh can be found at http://www.

country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-14725.html.

8. Quoted in Robert Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History, New 

York: William Morrow, 1994, p. 724.

9. On CORDS, see Robert W. Komer, Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the 

Vietnam Conflict, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986, pp. 118-121. Ambassador Komer 

was director of the CORDS program.

10. The classic early work on the organization and strategy of the Viet Cong is 

Douglas Pike, Viet Cong: The Organization and Technique of the National Liberation 

Front of South Vietnam, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965. Also important is Pike’s 

classic PAVN: Peoples Army of Vietnam, Novato, CA: Presidio, 1986. On Tet, see 

Don Oberdorfer, Tet!: The Turning Point in the Vietnam War, Baltimore: Johns 

Hopkins University Press, 2001. On the Phoenix Program, see Douglas Valentine, 

The Phoenix Program, New York: Harpercollins, 1990; and Mark Moyar, Phoenix and 

the Birds of Prey : The CIA’s Secret Campaign to Destroy the Viet Cong, Annapolis, MD: 

Naval Institute Press, 1997.

11. National Security Strategy of the United States, January 1988, p. 34.

12. Probably the only traditional Maoist insurgency that has a chance of outright 

victory is the one in Nepal. See Thomas A. Marks, Insurgency in Nepal, Carlisle 

Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2003.

13. 20th century urban-focused insurgent strategies such as the one associated 

with Carlos Marighella were not nearly as successful as the rural approach 

developed by Mao.

14. National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002, p. 9.

15. Ibid, pp. 10, 11.

16. National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2004, pp. 2-3.

17. Ibid., p. 4.

18. Ibid., p. 7.

19. Ibid., p. 11.
38

20. Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, 

June 1995, p. III-9.

21. Ibid., p. III-10.

22. Joint Publication 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign 

Internal Defense (FID), April 2004, p. I-1.

23. Joint Publication 3-07, p. III-3.

24. Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations, February 2003, 

p. 1-8.

25. Ibid., p. 3-4.

26. Ibid, p. 3-6.

27. Keith J. Costa, “Army Crafting Field Manual For Counterinsurgency 

Operations,” Inside The Pentagon, August 26, 2004, p. 1. The interim doctrine is 

Field Manual Interim (FMI), 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency Operations, October 2004.

28. FMI 3-07.22, p. 1-1.

29. Ibid.

30. Anonymous, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and 

the Future of America, Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2002, pp. 205-207 and ff.

31. See Small Wars: 21st Century (draft), Washington, DC: Department of the 

Navy, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 2004, pp. 13-14.

32. John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to 

Eat Soup with a Knife, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002, p. 192.

33. Bernard Fall, Street Without Joy, Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 1964, pp. 

268-271, 274.

34. See Geoffrey D. T. Shaw, “Policemen versus Soldiers, the Debate Leading 

to MAAG Objections and Washington Rejections of the Core of British CounterInsurgency Advice,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 12, No, 2, Summer 2001, pp. 

51-78.

35. Thomas E. Ricks, “Shift From Traditional War Seen At Pentagon,” Washington 

Post, September 3, 2004, p. 1.

36. Leonard Wong, Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic 

Studies Institute, 2004.
39

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40

Boot, Max. The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power. New 

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Byman, Daniel L., et. al. Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements. Santa 

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Cable, Larry. Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency 

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