Colloquium Brief

U.S. Army War College,

The U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research,

 The National Bureau of Asian Research, and

 The Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore

Contending Perspectives:

Southeast Asia and American Views on a Rising China

Singapore, August 22-24, 2005, and

Washington, DC, November 3, 2005

Compiled by

Corazon Sandoval Foley

Bureau of Intelligence and Research Program Manager

Key Conclusions:

•	 While China has gained influence in Southeast Asia relative to the United States in recent years,

U.S. influence has not been marginalized and remains robust.

•	 Southeast Asian states are “hedging”—engaging with China while at the same time working to ensure

the continued presence of extra-regional powers, especially the United States, to balance China’s growing influence.

•	 China appears increasingly to see Southeast Asia as its “strategic backyard” and Chinese efforts to expand

its influence in the region are likely to continue.

•	 China is bolstering its economic ties with Southeast Asia, pursuing an activist role in multilateral fora

of the region, and working to weaken U.S. security relationships with countries of the region.

	 The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), the National Bureau of Asian Research, the Institute

for Defence and Strategic Studies of Singapore, and the U.S. Army War College conducted a colloquium on Southeast Asia and

American views of China in August 2005 in Singapore. The event brought together analysts and scholars from Indonesia, Malaysia,

the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States to examine the economic, diplomatic, and military dimensions of China’s

rise from two perspectives. An abbreviated follow-on colloquium conducted by INR was held in Washington, DC, on November 3,

2005. This brief focuses on summarizing Southeast Asian perspectives on China as articulated by participants at the two events.

	 Participants rejected the idea of an emerging China-centered regional political order that has marginalized the influence of the

United States, although China has gained influence in Southeast Asia relative to the United States over the past 5 years. Its economic

growth and attentive diplomacy generally have fit in well with the interests of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

countries and the ongoing Asian efforts to develop multilateral mechanisms to deal with regional and other issues. However, leaders

of the ASEAN member states, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar (Burma),

and Vietnam, have demonstrated persistent reluctance to move under China’s sway and are seeking to avoid subservience to its

dominance. The uncertain outlook for political stability and economic growth in China—with possible adverse impact on Chinese

policies in Southeast Asia—is another major reason for ASEAN leaders to avoid overdependence on China and to seek close relations

with the United States and other powers.

	 No evidence suggests that the ASEAN states are “bandwagoning” with China. On the contrary, plenty of evidence shows that

they are hedging—engaging with China bilaterally and multilaterally—but working to ensure the continued presence of extraregional powers to balance China’s rising power. Key to maintaining this balance of power is the United States. While the United

States may be preoccupied with the “war on terror,” its economic, political, and strategic interests in Southeast Asia far outweigh

those of any other major powers, including China. Indeed, since September 11, 2001, U.S.-ASEAN government-to-government

relations have improved considerably (Burma excepted).

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	 The United States is well positioned to benefit from this

ASEAN hedging strategy. The United States remains much

more powerful than China in Asia and has the added advantage

of being seen by ASEAN leaders as Asia’s “least distrusted

power.” Through attentive diplomacy, backed by meaningful

security and economic incentives for cooperation, the United

States can grow quietly and effectively in influence in Southeast

Asia without presenting an overt challenge to China that would

be counterproductive for U.S. interests in the region.

	 In the military arena, China probably will not seek to create

formal alliances with its southern neighbors, but it will seek

to enhance its military-to-military cooperation with ASEAN

countries as a means to increase its own influence in the region.

China is a potential long-term military problem for ASEAN

countries but in the short-to-medium term, it is not likely to be a

major military force in the region. Weaknesses exist in Chinese

naval and air capabilities, especially in terms of force projection.

Concerns about Chinese ballistic missile programs might be

justifiable, but these are capabilities that will not be brought to

bear in any scenario involving the projection of Chinese military

power into Southeast Asia.

China’s Aim: Reduce U.S. Influence 

in the ASEAN Region.

	 The long-term ambitions of China in Southeast Asia remain

subject to speculation and debate. China’s key strategic aims

in Southeast Asia appear to be two-fold: ensure that there are

no conflicts in the region that would compromise Chinese

security or territorial integrity; and ensure that no external

power wields influence greater than that of China. Beijing’s

long-term objective may not be hegemony over Southeast Asia

but the “Finlandization” of the region, whereby ASEAN states

may remain sovereign, but their respective foreign policies take

account of, and do not challenge, China’s national interests.

	 During the Cold War, China viewed the Indochina region

and mainland Southeast Asia more generally as its “strategic

backyard.” With Beijing’s South China Sea claims and its

increasing dependence on the sea lanes of communication

through maritime Southeast Asia, the concept of a “strategic

backyard” is likely to grow to encompass the whole Southeast

Asian region.

	 Despite an interest in reducing American influence in

SoutheastAsia, it is not clearthatChina seeksto fully remove it or

replace the U.S. presence with aChinese security presence.China

views the U.S. alliances with Japan, South Korea, Philippines,

Thailand, and Australia as anachronistic and has offered its own

“New Security Concept” as an alternative model—but it does not

provide a notion of how to maintain security when discussions

and negotiations fail. The U.S. military is seen within the region

as the guarantor of peace and stability; China does not appear to

desire replacing this critical U.S. role. China’s interests do not

fully align with U.S. interests, but they do not appear to represent

a clear disruption of the status quo in Southeast Asia, either.

	 China’s leaders appear to have adopted three long-term

strategies to achieve their goals in the ASEAN region. First,

bolster economic linkages with each oftheASEAN countries and

position China as the region’s economic dynamo and putative

financial backer. Bilateral trade and investment agreements and

the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) are means

to this end. Second, nurture and seek leadership of multilateral

fora that excludes the United States—hence, China’s support

for the ASEAN Plus Three/East Asia Summit process. Third,

try to weaken bilateral military-to-military links between

ASEAN members and the United States. Thus, for instance, in

the drafting of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the

South China Sea, Beijing proposed a clause that would have

prohibited joint military exercises in the area, clearly aimed at

U.S.-Philippine exercises and the annual U.S.-Thai-Singapore

Cobra Gold exercises. ASEAN ultimately rejected this Chinese

proposal.

China Gains Influence in ASEAN.

	 Based on recent trade growth withASEAN,Chinese officials

have built closer political ties with neighboring countriesthrough

effective and often high-level diplomacy that is attentive to the

interests of neighboring Asian governments. Putting aside or

narrowing differences in the interest of broadening common

ground, Chinese diplomacy has been welcomed by most

neighbors.

	 ASEAN’s comfort level with China has been raised as

a consequence of Beijing’s “smile diplomacy.” Through it,

Chinese leaders stress their country’s “peaceful rise,” reiterating

their respect for state sovereignty and noninterference in the

internal affairs of other countries, and offer economic incentives

and aid packages. The ASEAN states point to these and other

developments as evidence that their policy of long-term

engagement with China already has paid dividends, and that

China is an increasingly constructive and responsible player in

regional affairs.

ASEAN: Uncertainty, Hedging and Leveraging 

Relations with China.

	 Nevertheless, ASEAN leaders remain uncertain about

China’s stability and long-term political, military, and territorial

ambitions in the region. They remain on guard against prospects

that the Chinese leadership might adopt more interventionist

policies, a “big brother” approach, toward relatively weak

neighbors to the south. The pervasive ASEAN outreach to the

United States and other powersis designed to hedge againstsuch

an outcome. ASEAN hedging strategies aim to enmesh China

into ASEAN-backed multilateral and bilateral arrangements,

while encouraging other powers to become more actively

involved in SoutheastAsian affairs.ASEAN leaders hope to turn

China’s greater engagement and cooperation in regional groups

into arrangements and assurances that will preserve ASEAN

interests in a stable and peaceful regional order.

	 Senior Chinese leaders are comfortable with the

“ASEAN way,” as it is similar to the iterative and deliberative

decisionmaking process on a number of protracted issues in
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Chinese politics. Chinese leaders and officials pursuing a “winwin” approach toAsian neighbors usually follow policiesthat do

not require neighboring countries to do things they do not want

to do. Thus, China’s Asian approach focuses on “easy things”

and avoids costly commitments or major risks.

	 The ASEAN hedging strategy has two operational prongs:

first, the ASEAN states seek to foster a stable balance of power

in the region among the United States, China, Japan, and other

powers. Second, ASEAN states are committed to maintaining

credible armed forces to act as a deterrent against future Chinese

aggressiveness.

	 The ASEAN hedging strategy probably is aimed not at

producing a multi-polar balance of power because the major

powers involved are not of equal strength and power. Rather,

it looks like a drive for a hierarchic order where the United

States would retain the role as the predominant superpower,

China would play the role of regional great power, and India,

Japan, and South Korea would be second-tier regional powers.

The United States is seen as the largest outside counterweight

to China, but ASEAN states generally seek more diversified

range of contacts, partly to avoid a situation of having to choose

between the United States and China.

	 America’s advantages in this situation are strong. The

United States has a proven record of being able and willing to

commit significant resources and prestige to protect allies and

friends. The United States is very powerful—a superpower—

but it is far away from Asia, has none of the territorial disputes

and few of the ambitions that characterize China and other Asian

powers, and thus is less distrusted by ASEAN governments.

As with the tsunami disaster, the United States is called upon

and responds repeatedly with economic resources, strategic

reach, and diplomatic means to promote stability and prosperity

essential to most governments in ASEAN. As a result, ASEAN

governments give priority to relations with the United States.

China’s Military Power in Southeast Asia.

	 While Beijing will try to weaken U.S. alliances and security

arrangements in the region, it is unlikely that the Chinese

will try to create their own formal system of alliances. Since

the early 1960s, the Chinese have preferred informal security

arrangements (e.g., ententes) to formal alliances, as these will

give it greater flexibility in responding to threats against their

allies while reducing the chances of China being dragged into

unwanted conflict. Rather than alliances, China will probably

seek to enhance its military-to-military cooperation with

ASEAN countries as a means to increase its own influence in

the region. These efforts should include exchanges of senior

military personnel, port calls, and as increasing attempts to sell

arms to ASEAN nations.

	 Beijing’s strategic objectives suggest that China’s use of

force will be constrained. Beijing is sensitive to the perceived

China threat, especially in Southeast Asia, and it recognizes

that aggressive military action in Asia would undermine the

international environment that China needs to achieve its longterm objectives.

	 Moreover, in the short-to-medium term, China’s ability

to project significant military power into Southeast Asia is

hampered by limitations in numbers, operating ranges, and

doctrinaldevelopments.China simplydoes nothave theoperating

ranges for its airpower to penetrate the region. Any further naval

expansion in the East China or South China Seas is contingent

on the development of Chinese naval aviation. China’s lack of

sufficient sealift and amphibious capabilities also means that it

cannot insert a significant land presence into the region. China

probably can insert a small naval presence in Southeast Asia,

but its limited number of oilers means that this naval presence

cannot be maintained at length. The one arena in which China’s

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) currently possesses effective

power projection into Southeast Asia is with its ballistic missile

arsenal.

	 China’s ability to penetrate the Southeast Asian arms

market, and thereby exercise a degree of political influence

through the instruments of arms sales, is similarly limited. The

only significant Chinese military sale in Southeast Asia has been

the Jianghu class frigates that it sold to Thailand at “friendship”

prices. Thailand’s Chinese-made frigates spend little time

at sea and are more often than not in dry dock undergoing

maintenance because of the low quality of China’s indigenous

weapons systems. This is a poor advertisement of Chinese

military hardware, and will likely dissuade other Southeast

Asian nations from turning to China as an alternative source of

military hardware.

ASEAN: Varied Approaches to China.

	 ASEAN governments vary in their approaches to China,

with the Philippines and Indonesia more reserved and Thailand,

Malaysia, and Singapore in the lead of those seeking close ties

with China. Long-standing distinctions exist between the ways

continental ASEAN states deal with China, versus the maritime

states. The former group has to be more sensitive and generally

deferential to Chinese concerns, given China’s proximity and

easy access, while the latter is more free to follow policies either

favorable or not to China. Those countries in which China has

been able to maximize its political influence share a number of

characteristics: they have sought patronage from China because

of poor relations with the United States and other Western

countries; and they suffer from poor governance and have weak

economies.

	 For most of the past 25 years, Thailand has been China’s

closest friend in Southeast Asia and has served a bridge role

that facilitated the improvement of relations between China

and ASEAN. Bangkok has been unwavering in its support for

the One China policy. Successive Thai governments also have

barred entry to the Dalai Lama and banned activities of the

Falun Gong movement. At the same time, however, Thailand

has maintained its alliance relationship with the United States as

an insurance policy.

	 China will likely place greater emphasis on Indonesia,

particularly due to its energy resources and its geostrategic

location along several major sea lanes of communication in the
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region. But for Indonesia, the main goal of its China policy is

to maximize economic gain rather than to forge a close political

relationship. The Indonesian elites always have perceived

China as an expansionist and aggressive country. Jakarta sees

China as a rival for influence and even leadership in Southeast

Asia. There is a danger that growing economic links between

China and Indonesia could exacerbate jealousy against ethnic

Chinese Indonesians. All these factors pose significant limits to

China’s influence in Indonesia which will continue to privilege

relations with traditional economic and security partners, such

as the United States, Australia, and Japan.

	 Singapore has enjoyed a fairly robust political relationship

with China since the mid-1980s. It took the lead in 2004 in

recognizing China as a market economy, prompting others

in ASEAN to do the same. But Singapore wishes to avoid

any suggestion that it is China’s ally or “agent of influence”

in Southeast Asia. Thus, in 2004, Lee Hsien Loong rejected

China’s calls to cancel his trip to Taiwan because it would

have undermined the city-state’s freedom to make independent

decisions and damaged its international reputation. Singapore

also has spurned China’s offer of training facilities for the

Singaporeanmilitary onHainan island, presumably in an attempt

to persuade Singapore to end its current training arrangements

with Taiwan.

	 The Philippines and China have agreed to establish a

high-level security dialogue, increase intelligence exchanges,

training exercises, and send personnel to each other’s military

academies. China is now the Philippines’ fourth largest export

market, up from 12th place in 2001. China has agreed to supply

the Philippine military with engineering equipment worth $1.2

million. China has adopted a more accommodating stance

over the South China Sea dispute. However, Manila’s political

and security ties with Washington far outweigh those with the

People’s Republic of China (PRC), and are likely to remain that

way for the foreseeable future.

	 China’s political influence is strongest in Burma. Although

China is ranked Burma’s third largest trade partner after

Singapore and Thailand, in reality, it is likely to be number one

because of the large and lucrative cross-border trade which does

not appear in official figures. China is the biggest investor in

Burma and also has become Burma’slargest provider of military

aid—an estimated $2 billion worth of equipment, including

tanks, jet fighters, and ships. For its part, Burma provides China

with useful pressure points against India—in the early 1990s,

China reportedly upgraded two Burmese naval facilities along

the Bay of Bengal, and established signals-intelligence-listening

facilities along Burma’s coast. But there are indications that the

military junta may have been trying to reduce its dependence

on China over the past several years. Burma has patched up

relations with India and has diversified its sources of military

equipment to include Russia and Ukraine.

	 Territorial disputes have been a source of contention

between Vietnam and China for several decades, but

considerable progress has been made. In 1999, the two sides

reached agreement on delineating their common land border,

and in 2000, a similar agreement wasreached on the demarcation

of their sea border in the Gulf of Tonkin. While both continue

to dispute sovereignty of the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the

South China Sea, in March 2005 Vietnam signed an agreement

with China and the Philippines to conduct joint seismic studies

in the disputed waters of the South China Sea. Hanoi remains

wary of Beijing’s influence and suspicious of its long-term

regional intentions. Vietnam has made a concerted effort over

the past 2 years to improve relations with the United States,

especially security ties.

	 Since 1997, China has established itself as a major political

and economic player in Cambodia—by nurturing close ties

with Hun Sen, Southeast Asia’s longest serving political leader.

Beijing has become a major provider of economic aid and the

number one foreign investor in Cambodia. China has endeared

itself to Cambodia by canceling all of Cambodia’s debt in 2002,

and by not making its aid depend on accelerating reform of the

civil service and judiciary and ending corruption. Cambodia has

become one of ASEAN’s staunchest supporters of China’s One

China policy.

	 China competes for influence over Laos with Vietnam. The

close personal ties between Vietnam and Laotian communist

leaders ensure that Vietnam currently maintains the upper hand

in terms of political influence.In themeantime,China’sinfluence

is growing as it nurtures younger Laotian party cadres through

its large diplomatic presence in Vientiane and by paying for

members of the Lao elite to undertake ideological, vocational,

and military training in China. China is already Laos’ third

largest trade partner (after Thailand and Vietnam) and one of its

top three investors. Over the next decade or so, China is likely

to displace Vietnam as Laos’ closest friend in Asia.

*****

The views expressed in this brief are those of the author and do not

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of

the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This

conference brief is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

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