TC 7-101
 

Exercise Design 

November 2010 

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
 

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
 

HEADQUARTERS, 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 
This publication is available at 

Army Knowledge Online (www.us.army.mil); 

General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine 

Digital Library (http://www.train.army.mil). 
TC 7-101 

Training Circular Headquarters 

Department of the Army
 No. 7-101 

Washington, DC, 26 November 2010 

Exercise Design 

Contents 

Page 

PREFACE ..............................................................................................................v

 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................vii
 

Chapter 1 RESPONSIBILITIES .......................................................................................... 1-1
 

Chapter 2 EXERCISE DESIGN SEQUENCE ..................................................................... 2-1
 

Section I - Phase 1: Initial Planning ................................................................ 2-2
 

Tools ................................................................................................................... 2-2
 

Key Decisions ..................................................................................................... 2-3
 

Products ............................................................................................................. 2-4
 

Section II - Phase 2: Task and Countertask Development ........................... 2-5
 

Who .................................................................................................................... 2-5
 

Tools ................................................................................................................... 2-5
 

Key Decisions ..................................................................................................... 2-5
 

Products ........................................................................................................... 2-11
 

Section III - Phase 3: PMESII-PT Operational Environment Development 2-11
 

Tools................................................................................................................. 2-12
 

Key Decisions ................................................................................................... 2-16
 

Products ........................................................................................................... 2-22
 

Section IV - Phase 4: Orders, Plans, and Instruction Development .......... 2-22
 

Tools................................................................................................................. 2-23
 

Key Decisions ................................................................................................... 2-23
 

Products ........................................................................................................... 2-24
 

Section V - Summary ...................................................................................... 2-27
 

Chapter 3 OPERATIONAL VARIABLES ........................................................................... 3-1
 

Operational Environment .................................................................................... 3-1
 

Variables, Subvariables, and Settings ............................................................... 3-1
 

Political Variable ................................................................................................. 3-2
 

Military Variable .................................................................................................. 3-6
 

Economic Variable............................................................................................ 3-12
 

Social Variable.................................................................................................. 3-15
 

Information Variable ......................................................................................... 3-20
 

Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 

i 
 

Contents 

Infrastructure Variable .......................................................................................3-26
 

Physical Environment Variable .........................................................................3-31
 

Time Variable ....................................................................................................3-42
 

Appendix A EXERCISE DESIGN CHECKLIST .................................................................... A-1
 

 GLOSSARY .......................................................................................... Glossary-1

 REFERENCES .................................................................................. References-1
 

Appendix B OPFOR TACTICAL TASK LIST........................................................................ B-1
 

Appendix C SCENARIO BLUEPRINTS ............................................................................... C-1

Figures 

Figure 1. Exercise design tools ........................................................................................... vii
 

Figure 1-2. Example of a brigade commander’s training objective for his METL attack 

Figure 2-3. Notional BCT METL supporting tasks adjusted for OE and WFF 

Figure 1-1. Training objective development sources ............................................................. 1-2
 

task ..................................................................................................................... 1-3
 

Figure 1-3. Training events the exercise director will typically develop ................................. 1-4
 

Figure 2-1. Selecting an area of operations (example) ....................................................... 2-17
 

Figure 2-2. Notional BCT METL with doctrinal supporting tasks (example) ........................ 2-19
 

(example) .......................................................................................................... 2-21
 

Figure 2-4. Example of required orders and plans .............................................................. 2-24
 

Figure 2-5. Types of role players ......................................................................................... 2-26
 

Figure C-1. MCO Blueprint COA sketch (example 1) ............................................................C-3
 

Figure C-2. MCO Blueprint COA sketch (example 2) ............................................................C-4
 

Figure C-3. MCO Blueprint COA sketch (example 3) ............................................................C-5
 

Figure C-4. IW Blueprint COA sketch (example 1) ................................................................C-6
 

Figure C-5. IW Blueprint COA sketch (example 2) ................................................................C-7
 

Figure C-6. IW Blueprint COA sketch (example 3) ................................................................C-8
 

Tables 

Table 1-1. Example guide to determine roles ........................................................................ 1-1
 

Table 2-1. Exercise design sequence.................................................................................... 2-1
 

Table 2-2. Example training unit supporting subtasks (actions on contact) .......................... 2-6
 

Table 2-3. Example of training unit task (JOA missile defense)............................................ 2-7
 

Table 2-4. Example of initial listing of OPFOR units selected for task organization ............. 2-8
 

Table 2-5. Example of equipment listed in WEG tier tables ................................................ 2-10
 

Table 2-6. Example of emerging technology trends from WEG .......................................... 2-11
 

Table 2-7. “Political: Type of Government” subvariable definition, settings, and setting definitions ....... 2-13
 

Table 2-8. PMESII-PT variables and subvariables .............................................................. 2-14
 

Table 2-9. OE-WFF analysis matrix (example).................................................................... 2-20
 

ii TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
Contents 

Table 3-1. Political variable and subvariable settings ............................................................3-3
 

Table 3-2. Political: attitude toward the United States ...........................................................3-3
 

Table 3-3. Political: centers of political power ........................................................................3-4
 

Table 3-4. Political: type of government .................................................................................3-4
 

Table 3-5. Political: government effectiveness and legitimacy ..............................................3-5
 

Table 3-6. Political: influential political groups .......................................................................3-6
 

Table 3-7. Military variable and subvariable settings .............................................................3-7
 

Table 3-8. Military: military forces ........................................................................................... 3-7
 

Table 3-9. Military: government paramilitary forces ...............................................................3-8
 

Table 3-10. Military: Non-state paramilitary forces .................................................................3-8
 

Table 3-10. Military: Non-state paramilitary forces (continued) .............................................3-9
 

Table 3-11. Military: unarmed combatants .............................................................................3-9
 

Table 3-12. Military: nonmilitary armed combatants ............................................................3-10
 

Table 3-13. Military: military functions ..................................................................................3-10
 

Table 3-13. Military: military functions (continued) ...............................................................3-11
 

Table 3-14 Economic variable and subvariable settings ......................................................3-12
 

Table 3-15. Economic: economic diversity ...........................................................................3-12
 

Table 3-15. Economic: economic diversity (continued) .......................................................3-13
 

Table 3-16. Economic: employment status ..........................................................................3-13
 

Table 3-17. Economic: economic activity .............................................................................3-13
 

Table 3-18. Economic: illegal economic activity ...................................................................3-14
 

Table 3-19. Economic: banking and finance ........................................................................3-14
 

Table 3-20 Social variable and subvariable settings ............................................................3-15
 

Table 3-21. Social: demographic mix ...................................................................................3-15
 

Table 3-21. Social: demographic mix (continued) ................................................................3-16
 

Table 3-22. Social: social volatility .......................................................................................3-16
 

Table 3-23. Social: education level ......................................................................................3-16
 

Table 3-24. Social: ethnic diversity.......................................................................................3-16
 

Table 3-24. Social: ethnic diversity (continued) ...................................................................3-17
 

Table 3-25. Social: religious diversity ...................................................................................3-17
 

Table 3-26. Social: population movement ............................................................................3-17
 

Table 3-27. Social: common languages...............................................................................3-18
 

Table 3-28. Social: criminal activity ......................................................................................3-18
 

Table 3-29. Social: human rights..........................................................................................3-18
 

Table 3-29. Social: human rights (continued) ......................................................................3-19
 

Table 3-30. Information variable and subvariable settings ..................................................3-20
 

Table 3-31. Information: public communications media .......................................................3-20
 

Table 3-31. Information: public communications media (continued) ...................................3-21
 

Table 3-32. Information: information warfare .......................................................................3-21
 

Table 3-32. Information: information warfare (continued) ....................................................3-22
 

Table 3-32. Information: information warfare (continued) ....................................................3-23
 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 iii 
Contents 

Table 3-33. Information: intelligence .................................................................................... 3-23
 

Table 3-33. Information: intelligence (continued) ................................................................ 3-24
 

Table 3-34. Information: information management .............................................................. 3-24
 

Table 3-34. Information: information management (continued)........................................... 3-25
 

Table 3-35. Infrastructure variable and subvariable settings............................................... 3-26
 

Table 3-36. Infrastructure: construction pattern ................................................................... 3-26
 

Table 3-36. Infrastructure: construction pattern (continued) ............................................... 3-27
 

Table 3-37. Infrastructure: urban zones............................................................................... 3-27
 

Table 3-37. Infrastructure: urban zones (continued) ........................................................... 3-28
 

Table 3-38. Infrastructure: urbanized building density ......................................................... 3-29
 

Table 3-39. Infrastructure: utilities present .......................................................................... 3-29
 

Table 3-40. Infrastructure: utility level .................................................................................. 3-29
 

Table 3-40. Infrastructure: utility level (continued) ............................................................... 3-30
 

Table 3-41. Infrastructure: transportation architecture ........................................................ 3-30
 

Table 3-42. Physical Environment variable and subvariable settings ................................. 3-31
 

Table 3-43. Physical Environment variable, subvariables and sub-subvariable settings ........ 3-32
 

Table 3-44. Physical environment: terrain ........................................................................... 3-33
 

Table 3-44. Physical environment: terrain (continued) ........................................................ 3-34
 

Table 3-45. Terrain: landforms............................................................................................. 3-34
 

Table 3-46. Terrain: vegetation ............................................................................................ 3-35
 

Table 3-47. Terrain: terrain complexity ................................................................................ 3-35
 

Table 3-48. Terrain: mobility classification........................................................................... 3-36
 

Table 3-49. Physical environment: natural hazards ............................................................ 3-37
 

Table 3-50. Physical environment: climate .......................................................................... 3-38
 

Table 3-51. Physical environment: weather......................................................................... 3-39
 

Table 3-52. Weather: precipitation ....................................................................................... 3-40
 

Table 3-53. Weather: high temperature—heat index .......................................................... 3-40
 

Table 3-54. Weather: low temperature—wind chill index .................................................... 3-40
 

Table 3-55. Weather: wind ................................................................................................... 3-41
 

Table 3-56. Weather: visibility .............................................................................................. 3-41
 

Table 3-57. Weather: cloud cover ........................................................................................ 3-42
 

Table 3-58. Weather: relative humidity ................................................................................ 3-42
 

Table 3-59. Time variable and subvariable settings ............................................................ 3-43
 

Table 3-60. Time: knowledge of the AO .............................................................................. 3-43
 

Table 3-61. Time: cultural perception of time ...................................................................... 3-44
 

Table 3-62. Time: key-event resolution ............................................................................... 3-44
 

Table 3-63. Time: Information offset .................................................................................... 3-45
 

Table 3-64. Time: tactical exploitation of time ..................................................................... 3-45
 

Table 3-65. Time: key dates, time periods, or events.......................................................... 3-46
 

Table A-1. Exercise design checklist ..................................................................................... A-1 

iv TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

Preface 

This training circular (TC) outlines a methodology for designing and executing training exercises. It describes 

planning procedures and methodologies, responsibilities, and analysis for those who plan and control Army 

exercises intended as culminating collective training events that critically assess unit-training status. Collective 

training is part of unit training. It is performance oriented and a command responsibility executed by leaders at 

all echelons. As a continuous process executed in accordance with a formal training program, collective training trains units and teams on tasks and missions they are expected to perform. It is executed in a crawl-walkrun approach and reaches across all training domains and integrated live, virtual, constructive, and gaming 

training environments. 

This publication applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the 

United States (ARNGUS), and the United States Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated. 

Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is the proponent for this TC. The preparing agency is the Contemporary Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID), 

TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)–Threats. Send comments and suggested improvements 

on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to CTID at the following 

address: Director, CTID, TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity–Threats, ATTN: ATIN-T (Bldg 53), 700 

Scott Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1323. This publication is available at Army Knowledge Online 

(AKO) at http://www.us.army.mil and the Reimer Digital Library at http://www.train.army.mil. 

Readers should monitor those sites and also the TRADOC G2-TRISA Website at: 

https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/14705412 (AKO access required) for the status of this TC and information 

regarding updates. Periodic updates, subject to the normal approval process, will occur as a result of the normal 

production cycle. The date on the cover and title page of the electronic version will reflect the latest update. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 v 
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Introduction 

This training circular (TC) outlines a methodology for designing and executing training exercises. It describes 

planning procedures and methodologies, responsibilities, and analysis for those who plan and control Army 

exercises intended as culminating collective training events that critically assess unit-training status. The objective of exercise design is to structure a training event that establishes the conditions to facilitate performanceoriented training on properly selected, directed, and mission essential training objectives. 

The references section of this TC contains a listing of publications pertaining and relating to this publication. 

The glossary contains abbreviations and special terms used in this TC. 

This TC is a planning and design tool that significantly enhances an exercise planner’s ability to produce an 

operational environment (OE) that achieves desired unit training objectives while fielding a challenging opposing force (OPFOR) consistent with Hybrid Threat OPFOR doctrine as described in the TC 7-100 series. This 

TC provides the exercise planner with a backbone methodology for scenario development and establishment of 

the exercise OE. The approach to exercise design and analysis is sequential and structured to get the planner to 

the “bottom-line” as quickly as possible. 

Figure 1 shows the tools necessary and available for the design of a training exercise. While the process is sequential, many of the steps and procedures are developed concurrently and may overlap (see chapter 2). This 

TC is meant to be used in conjunction with the 7-100 series as well as the other publications listed in figure 1. 

These tools can be found at https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/14705412. Together, these tools outline an 

OPFOR than can cover the full spectrum of military and paramilitary capabilities against which the Army must 

train to ensure success in the types of OEs it can expect to encounter now and in the clearly foreseeable future. 

Worldwide 

Equipment

Guide 

TC 7-101 

Exercise 

Design 

• Actual OE (such as

Iran, North Korea, Iraq, 

or Afghanistan) 

• Composite OE 

• Ground (Vol I) 

• Air & Air Defense (Vol II) 

• Naval (Vol III) 

TOOL BOXES 

•Responsibilities

•Exercise Design Sequence

•Detailed OE Variable Settings

•OPFOR Tactical Task List 

•Strategy

•Operations

•Tactics 

•Organization

•Irregular Forces 

TC 7-100 Series 

Operational

Environment 

Assessment 

Figure 1. Exercise design tools 

The processes described in this TC are applicable to any number of exercise venues to include field training 

exercises, command post exercises, and simulations. They can also be used in the development of mission rehearsal exercises (MRXs). The operational variables (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time [PMESII-PT]) and the settings for their subvariables, as described in 

chapter 3, can be used to develop OEs for exercises or for describing actual OEs portrayed in MRXs. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 vii 
 

Introduction 

Each chapter of the TC covers a specific aspect of exercise design. The exercise planner should become familiar with each chapter. 

In order to train against a realistic threat and in a realistic OE, the OE must be dynamic. By using the PMESIIPT variables and incorporating them into every aspect of the scenario, the training unit will experience a realistic and challenging exercise every time. This TC describes the roles and responsibilities of the senior trainer, 

exercise director, and exercise planner; the importance of quality training objectives, the steps to designing an 

exercise; and the theory behind exercise design. The bottom line is that this TC gives planners the tools to provide the correct exercise conditions for the training unit’s training objectives, resulting in effective training. 

viii TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

Chapter 1 

Responsibilities 

This chapter establishes the responsibilities for exercise development. The senior 

trainer, the exercise director and the exercise planner are the individuals primarily responsible for exercise development and execution. Table 1-1 provides an example of 

how a unit can determine who will be the senior trainer, exercise director, and exercise planner for various levels of organizations. 

Table 1-1. Example guide to determine roles 

Training 

Unit 

Senior 

Trainer 

Exercise 

Director 

Exercise 

Planner 

Joint Training 

Exercise 

Division Corps Cdr J7 J7 Ops 

CTC Training 

Exercise 

Brigade Division Cdr Combat 

Training 

Center CG 

COG/Ops 

Active Component 

Home Station 

Training Exercise 

Battalion Brigade Cdr Division G3 G3 Training 

Reserve 

Component Home 

Station Training 

Exercise 

Battalion Brigade Cdr Training 

Support 

Battalion Cdr 

G3 Training 

1-1. The senior trainer is the commander of the parent organization of the unit being trained. This commander has two major overall training responsibilities: develop Soldiers and leaders for future responsibilities and prepare his unit to accomplish the assigned mission. In the absence of a directed mission, commanders must prepare their unit to perform those core missions the unit was doctrinally designed to execute across the full range of military operations. 

1-2. The senior trainer conducts the first, and most important, step in creating the tools necessary for exercise design. He determines the exact troop list for the training unit. When establishing the troop list, the 

senior trainer should— 

 Identify the task organization of the unit to be trained. 

 Complete task-organizing, to include types and numbers of equipment. 

 Ideally, training level and maintenance history should be included. 

 Identify key echelons to be trained. 

 Multi-echelon training leaves many out of training if not planned for early. 

 Lock in troop list early. 

 Late changes may require a scenario rewrite and should not be just pasted into the original 

scenario. 

1-3. The senior trainer determines the training objectives of the exercise. Training objectives are described in chapter 2. The senior trainer ensures the unit’s training objectives support the approved mission 

essential task list (METL). (See chapter 2.) After mission essential tasks are selected, the senior trainer 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 1-1 
 

 

 

 

 

Chapter 1 

identifies supporting training objectives for each task. According to FM 7-0, each training objective has 

three parts: 

 Task. A clearly defined and measurable activity accomplished by individuals and organizations. 

Tasks are specific activities that contribute to the accomplishment of encompassing missions or 

other requirements. 

 Condition(s). Those variables of an operational environment or situation in which a unit, system, or individual is expected to operate and may affect performance. (JP 1-02) 

 Standard. A quantitative or qualitative measure and criterion for specifying the levels of performance of a task. (FM 7-0) 

1-4. The senior trainer ensures the unit refers to the applicable documents to identify the conditions and 

standards for its essential tasks. The documents listed in figure 1-1 will assist units in developing collective 

and individual training objectives. 

Applicable Documents 

• Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS). 

• Soldiers manuals. 

• Soldier training publications. 

• DA Pam 350-38, Standards in Training Commission 

(STRAC). 

• Deployment or mobilization plans. 

• AUTL (Army Universal Task List). 

• UJTL (Universal Joint Task List). 

• Army, major command, and local regulations. 

• Local standing operating procedures (SOP). 

Figure 1-1. Training objective development sources 

1-5. The senior trainer, in conjunction with the commander of the unit to be trained, conducts an assessment of the current training state of the unit immediately prior to the exercise. This anticipated training 

condition of the unit, as it enters the exercise, is expressed as trained (T), partially trained (P), or untrained 

(U). (See FM 7-0.) 

1-6. The senior trainer, along with the commander of the training unit, must bring the following tools to 

the initial planning: the troop list, the proposed training objectives (METL), the proposed conditions for the 

training objective tasks, and the commander’s assessment. (See figure 1-2.) During the analysis of these 

tools, discussion and negotiations of the initial planning phase, the senior trainer will issue guidance. 

1-2 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

Responsibilities 

Figure 1-2. Example of a brigade commander’s training objective for his METL attack task 

1-7. The exercise director is an officer of at least equal but preferred to be one grade higher than the 

senior trainer and is not part of the tactical chain of command of the training unit. However, during singleservice Army exercises conducted largely with unit internal resources and not intended to be a culminating 

training event, the exercise director and senior trainer may be the same officer. 

1-8. The exercise director— 

 Creates and enforces the essential conditions called for by the training objectives. He is ultimately responsible for approving the combination of settings for the operational variables selected by the exercise planner. 

 Ensures an effective training environment to create the most realistic training. He emplaces a 

strong safety program and develops and coordinates training events that synchronize training 

areas and facilities, training support systems products and services, opposing force (OPFOR), 

observer/controllers, evaluators, and all other resources to support the required conditions. 

Figure 1-3 on page 1-4 shows training events the exercise director will typically develop. 

 Acts as honest broker and ensures a level playing field. The exercise director enforces use of 

OPFOR doctrine and exercise rules of engagement (EXROE). The exercise director achieves 

these primarily through a well-trained and properly resourced observer/controller organization. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 1-3 
 

 

 

Chapter 1 

• Joint Training Exercise • Combined Training Exercise 

• Situational Training Exercise • Tactical Exercise Without Troops 

• Command Field Exercises • Deployment Exercise 

• Logistic Exercise • Combined Arms Live Fire Exercise 

• Live Fire Exercise • Field Training Exercise 

• Map Exercise • Fire Coordination Exercise 

• CTC Rotations • Battle Command Training Program 

• Mission Rehearsal Exercise Warfighter Exercise 

Figure 1-3. Training events the exercise director will typically develop 

1-9. The exercise planner is typically an officer tasked with the actual creation of the exercise and its 

conditions. He incorporates the training objectives, desired training conditions, resources available, commander’s evaluation, and guidance from the exercise director into a cohesive exercise design. The exercise 

planner will— 

 Develop the exercise scenario. Using exercise parameters as discussed in chapter 2, and the methodologies outlined in this TC, the exercise planner develops reasonable courses of action for 

both the training unit and OPFOR consistent with the TC 7-100 series and the selected operational environment (OE). However, if the training event is an MRX, the OPFOR should have 

maximum fidelity to a known enemy force in the actual OE for which the training unit is being 

prepared for deployment. Regardless of the type of training event, the planner builds an exercise 

framework, which contains the critical facts and conditions for the exercise. The exercise planner must keep in mind that, although the sequence of events that lead to the execution of a mission during training may be scripted and controlled, once the conditions for the mission are met 

and the unit begins mission execution, the events should be allowed to move along their natural 

course. He ensures that there is the least possible restraint on exercise conditions consistent with 

the training objectives that will allow leaders to realize the full consequences of their decisions. 

 Determine the settings for the operational variables (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment and time [PMESII-PT]), establishing a framework 

to build a dynamic and realistic OE. (See chapters 2 and 3.) 

 Develop all orders, plans and instructions associated with the exercise to include the road to war, 

the training unit’s orders and plans (parent unit and higher), OPFOR combat instructions (orders), and role-player instructions. During MRXs, the exercise planner may be responsible for 

development and coordination of controlled scripted events normally executed by OPFOR and 

other role-players. 

 Develop concept briefings and interim progress reports and coordinate all aspects of the exercise 

closely with the exercise director to ensure compliance with guidance, support of the exercise 

training objectives and adherence to OPFOR doctrine. 

 Exercise caution when using material from prior exercises. This TC was developed specifically 

to provide the exercise planner the outline and basic planning considerations necessary to develop coherent and meaningful training exercises based on the Contemporary Operational Environment (COE). Often, when given the assignment to design an exercise, an exercise planner 

will dust off a prior exercise and use it without modification. This is common practice and is 

common sense to use the prior work of those who came before instead of starting from nothing. 

If using a prior exercise, the exercise planner must view it only as an initial guide and, more importantly, still go through all the steps and use the after action review (AAR) from the prior exercise to prevent repetition of poorly planned or executed scenarios and events. 

1-4 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

 

 

 

 

 

Chapter 2 

Exercise Design Sequence 

There are four phases the exercise planner goes through to develop a collective training event that critically assesses unit training status at any level. The exercise design 

sequence takes the exercise planner from the initial determination of exercise parameters, through countertask and operational environment (OE) development, and concludes with orders production. 

2-1. During phase 1 (initial planning), the training unit and the exercise director determine the exercise 

parameters to start the design process. Once the design parameters and prioritized training objectives are 

determined, the focus in phase 2 (task and countertask development) is on developing opposing force 

(OPFOR) tasks that counter the training unit’s training objectives. Once phase 2 is completed, the exercise 

planner has the necessary tools to create the conditions of the OE in phase 3, (PMESII-PT OE development). Finally, during phase 4 (orders, plans, and instruction development), the exercise planner produces 

the orders, plans, and instructions that translate the OE decisions that were made in phase 3 into the products necessary for the training unit to conduct the exercise. Table 2-1 shows the exercise design sequence. 

It lists who should be involved in each phase, what tools are required, what key decisions must be made, 

and what the final products of the phase will be. Essential to all phases is the understanding of the concept of an OE and all the associated operational variables that affect military operations and training. Chapter 3 will describe, in detail, each operational variable and its subvariables. 

Table 2-1. Exercise design sequence 

Exercise Design 

Sequence 

Phase 1 

Initial Planning 

Phase 2 

Task and Countertask 

Development 

Phase 3 

PMESII-PT OE 

Development 

Phase 4 

Orders, Plans, and 

Instruction 

Development 

WHO: 

• Training Unit

Commander 

• Exercise Director 

• Exercise Planner 

• Senior Trainer 

• Exercise Planner 

• OPFOR Commander 

• Exercise Planner • Exercise Planner 

• Exercise Director 

TOOLS: 

• Troop List 

• Proposed Training 

Objectives 

• AUTL/UJTL

• Requested Conditions 

• Commander’s Training 

Assessment 

• Exercise Resources 

• Exercise Director’s Initial 

Guidance 

• Defined Exercise 

Parameters 

• Prioritized Training 

Objectives (METL) 

• TC 7-100 Series 

• OPFOR Tactical Task 

List 

• Worldwide Equipment 

Guide (WEG)* 

• OE Assessment 

(OEA) 

• PMESII-PT 

Subvariables 

• Prioritized Training 

Objectives (METL) 

• OPFOR Countertasks 

• OE/WFF Analysis

Matrix 

• Defined OE 

• TC 7-100 Series 

• COA Sketch 

• OPFOR OB 

KEY DECISIONS: 

• Exercise Timeline 

• Type of Exercise • Operational Theme 

• Existing OEA or

Composite OE 

• Training Unit Tasks

• OPFOR Countertasks 

• OPFOR OB* 

• OPFOR Task 

Organization* • OPFOR Tier Levels* 

• PMESII-PT 

Subvariable Selection • Common Processes 

• Key Events 

• Chronology of Key

Events • C-,M- and D-Day

• STARTEX 

• Disposition of 

Forces 

PRODUCTS: 

• Defined Exercise 

Parameters 

• Prioritized Training 

Objectives (METL) 

• Developed Tasks and

Countertasks 

• OPFOR OB* 

• OPFOR Task 

Organization*

• OPFOR Tier Levels* 

• OE/WFF Analysis • Refined Training 

Objectives and Task

Organization • Developed OE 

• Higher Unit 

OPLANs and 

Orders 

• OPFOR Orders 

• ROE 

• Role-Player

Instructions 

• Road to War 

* Phase 2 is the earliest point at which OPFOR OB and task organization, along with adjustment of OPFOR equipment tiers 

(using the WEG), could occur. However, this could also begin or be refined in phase 3 or phase 4. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 2-1 
 

 

 

Chapter 2 

SECTION I - PHASE 1: INITIAL PLANNING 

2-2. The initial step in the exercise design process is the most critical. The senior trainer, exercise director, and exercise planner meet for the first time at an initial planning conference to conduct preliminary 

planning and establish the parameters for the exercise. In many areas of the exercise, there is great uncertainty as to whether a new design will actually do what is desired, and new scenarios often have unexpected problems. The purpose of initial planning is to define and develop the parameters of the exercise. 

By defining the exercise parameters, certain key decisions can be made, which gives the exercise planner 

the tools necessary to begin developing the exercise. The initial planning establishes who is to be trained, 

where they are to be trained, expected training outcomes, and what broad conditions will be replicated in 

the exercise’s OE to meet the training objectives. 

TOOLS 

2-3. The training unit’s commander, the exercise director, and the exercise planner must be present at 

phase 1 for initial planning. During the initial planning phase, the training unit commander must provide 

the exercise director and exercise planners with the following parameters: 

 Troop list of unit to be trained. 

 Proposed training objectives based on HQDA-approved mission essential task list (METL). 

 Unit-requested conditions. 

 Available exercise resources (such as training area, support, simulations). 

 Commander's assessment of the unit’s current training status. 

2-4. The training unit troop list should identify as closely as possible the actual task organization, number 

of Soldiers of the units participating in the exercise, and their equipment. The exercise planner needs to 

identify the key echelons to be trained and lock in the troop list as early as possible in the exercise development process to avoid time-consuming scenario rewrites. Additionally, a list of key leaders, their experience level, recent training, and time in position is helpful in gauging command and staff experience, 

which may influence training conditions and operational tempo (OPTEMPO). 

2-5. Developed from established unit METLs, training objectives represent focal points for the exercise 

planner when developing courses of action (COAs) and the supporting OE. The accomplishment of the 

training objectives is the prime reason exercises are conducted. Training objectives are statements that describe the desired outcome of a training activity in the unit (FM 7-0). They consist of tasks, conditions, and 

standards. The development of training objectives is fully discussed in FM 7-15. 

2-6. Some training environments are pre-determined based on the use of “live” training sites such as the 

maneuver combat training centers (MCTCs) or because units are training for specific situations in specific 

places (that is, mission rehearsal exercises). However, units participating in simulations or command post 

exercises (CPXs) may ask that a specific venue be developed to support the units training. The training unit 

may also request specific conditions in which to perform tasks. 

2-7. Resources to be considered by the exercise planner include— 

 The amount of time available to complete the training. 

 Support personnel required. 

 Simulations available. 

 Observer-controller support. 

 OPFOR augmentation. 

 Transportation assets. 

 Available training areas. 

 Training facilities. 

The amount of available resources can limit the size or number of live training events (for example, field 

training and live fire exercises), requiring commanders to substitute a mix of virtual and constructive simulation exercises. 

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Exercise Design Sequence 

2-8. As discussed in chapter 1, the senior trainer, in conjunction with the commander of the unit to be 

trained, conducts an assessment of the anticipated training status of the training unit immediately prior to 

the exercise. This training condition of the unit as it enters the exercise is expressed as T-P-U (trained, 

needs practice, and untrained) in accordance with FM 7-0. This status provides the exercise planner and/or 

OPFOR commander critical information on the proper mix of OPFOR units and other conditions needed 

for the exercise. 

2-9. It is essential that the exercise director is involved throughout the entire exercise planning process 

and especially during phase 1. If the exercise director is not involved with the initial key decisions that are 

made to design the framework of the exercise, problems may evolve later when the exercise director arrives and the exercise is not going as he envisioned. The exercise director must provide initial guidance and 

also broker the compromises that must often be made in the decisions concerning the proper training objectives to train toward. Often the available resources are not available to meet all the desired training objectives and conditions. Therefore, a decision must be made as to what risk is acceptable in limiting the number of objectives, which can then reduce the level of fidelity of the OE conditions. 

KEY DECISIONS 

2-10. Several key decisions need to be made at this point: 

 What are the time parameters of the exercise? 

 Will the exercise be live, virtual, constructive, gaming, or a combination? 

 What is the operational theme? 

 Will the scenario be based on an existing operational environment assessment (OEA) for an 

actual OE or a composite OE? 

TIME PARAMETERS 

2-11. The amount of time allotted for the exercise must be one of the first decisions made before an OE 

can be designed or fitted to an exercise. The exercise planner must know the length of the exercise in order 

to develop situations and the fidelity of the OE. For example, if the exercise is only a few days, more information may have to be given to the training unit prior to the start in order for them to do their mission 

analysis and planning. If the exercise is longer, situations and events can have time to evolve and the training unit will have more opportunities to influence their environments. The exercise planner will be planning the buildup to key events and the consequences and effects of those key events. Depending on the 

time available, there may not be time to build up to a key event, and there may only be first- or secondorder consequences after a key event. 

TYPE OF EXERCISE 

2-12. The Army’s increased capability to integrate virtual and constructive simulations with live training, 

and the increased need for joint and multi-echelon training require exercise planners to develop a detailed 

and consistent OE for each training event. Defining the OE provides top-down coherence, flexibility, and 

continuity to the exercise and allows interaction at all levels. Depending on the particular training unit, the 

majority of training exercises will use a combination of live, virtual, constructive, and gaming (L-V-C-G) 

training enablers. For example, if a brigade combat team (BCT) trains at an MCTC, it may not have its full 

complement of troops available for the exercise and could be lacking its military intelligence company. Because a BCT cannot train effectively without its intelligence function, the military intelligence company 

could be simulated by having several intelligence experts communicate to the BCT through its normal 

communications and data transfer methods. Likewise, an aviation platoon may not have its normal equipment because of fielding or maintenance issues; so it could train virtually on a simulator, with the results 

transmitted to the BCT through normal communications and data transfer methods. This way, although all 

the troops and equipment are not available for the exercise, the unit is still able to complete effective collective training. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 2-3 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Chapter 2 

OPERATIONAL THEME 

2-13. Selection of the operational theme(s) is a key decision that the exercise director needs to make during the initial planning phase. In coordination with the higher commander, this initial decision is normally 

completed during the preliminary planning sessions. The operational theme is the character of the dominant 

major operation being conducted at any time within a land force commander’s area of operations. The operational theme helps convey the nature of the major operation to the force to facilitate common understanding of how the commander broadly intends to operate. (FM 3-0) Operational themes can be selected 

from the following: 

 Major combat operations. 

 Irregular warfare. 

 Peace operations. 

 Limited intervention. 

 Peacetime military engagement. 

2-14. The assignment of the operational theme for a training exercise is critical because it helps commanders identify the most important training tasks. It also helps provide the means to coordinate and integrate 

more focused supporting collective and individual tasks throughout the organization. Depending on the 

time allotted for the exercise, it may be possible to train sequentially under two different operational 

themes. 

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ASSESSMENT 

2-15. The decision on whether a training exercise will be based an existing OEA for an actual OE or a 

composite COE-based OE depends on whether the exercise is the based on a directed or contingency mission. For example, sometimes a training unit is assigned a contingency mission in a particular area of the 

world; so its training could be based on a real location and OE. Otherwise, the training unit would focus on 

honing its core tasks. Either way, the OEA is a tool to easily and effectively design the OE for the exercise. 

If a particular area of the world is the focus, the TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) has 

developed several OEAs that can be found on its website at https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/14752839 

(AKO access is required). The purpose of the OEAs on the TRISA website is twofold. Each OEA provides 

a detailed description and analysis of a specific OE and a model for the application of the operational variables (PMESII-PT) to support actual operations or exercises. The PMESII-PT variables, their subvariables, and related impacts are discussed, as well as potential trends in the OE. If no existing OEA corresponds to the OE desired for a particular training exercise, exercise planners can follow the methodology of 

these real-world examples to create an OEA for the OE associated with the desired geographical area. If an 

exercise does not require fidelity to an actual OE, exercise planners can modify an existing OEA or design 

their own composite OE. A composite OE is developed by selecting the subvariable or sub-subvariable settings (from a detailed list found in chapter 3) that best support the training objectives. If the training unit is 

only focusing on its core tasks, it can also use an existing OEA, modify an existing OEA, or it can design 

its own composite OE. 

Note. In order to meet specific training requirements or unit-requested conditions, the creation 

of any training event will normally include portions of existing, modified, or composite OEs regardless of whether training is for a contingency mission or core tasks. 

PRODUCTS 

2-16. Products resulting from the initial planning should be defined exercise design parameters based on 

available resources and METL-based prioritized training objectives. 

2-4 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

Exercise Design Sequence 

SECTION II - PHASE 2: TASK AND COUNTERTASK DEVELOPMENT 

2-17. The purpose of phase 2 is for exercise planners to examine the selected training tasks and conduct an 

OPFOR countertask analysis in order to counter or stress the training unit. During this phase, it is assumed 

that the commander of the U.S. unit to be trained has already identified the units he wants trained in the selected tasks. 

WHO 

2-18. The key players in this phase are the exercise planner and OPFOR commander. Depending on the 

size and type of exercise, the specific makeup of these planners may change. The OPFOR commander’s 

role in an exercise may be two-fold. That is, he is required to command the OPFOR, but as a trainer he 

may act in a “white-hat” or neutral capacity for exercise control and the exercise director to ensure the 

training unit’s training objectives are being met. He therefore may be privy to some aspects of the training 

unit’s planning and operations, but required not to use the information to OPFOR tactical advantage. Regardless of who is involved, it is critical that both training unit and OPFOR planners coordinate closely 

during this phase in order to ensure a cohesive and productive training exercise. 

TOOLS 

2-19. The exercise planner must have the products from phase 1 (the defined exercise parameters and 

METL-based prioritized unit training objectives). He also must have TC 7-100 series publications and the 

OPFOR Tactical Task List (see appendix B). 

Note. If the nature of the exercise allows the exercise planner to develop the OPFOR OB, task 

organization, and equipment tier levels during phase 2, this could necessitate the use of the 

Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) as another tool. This tool is discussed under phase 2 only 

because this is the earliest phase in which it could possibly be used. 

KEY DECISIONS 

2-20. While training unit tasks are determined by the unit’s METL, the supporting collective and individual tasks on which the exercise will focus must be carefully selected. This selection will drive the selection 

of appropriate OPFOR countertasks. 

Note. In some cases, the exercise planner may be able to proceed from OPFOR countertasks directly to the development of the OPFOR OB, task organization, and equipment tier levels during 

phase 2. Otherwise, those decisions may need to occur after OE development, in phase 3 or even 

in phase 4. These actions are discussed under phase 2 only because this is the earliest phase in 

which they could possibly occur. Even if these decisions are initially made in phase 2, they 

could be refined during a later phase. 

OPFOR COUNTERTASKS 

2-21. The OPFOR Tactical Task List (see appendix B) is a listing of OPFOR tactical countertasks. From 

this list, the exercise planner must select the countertasks that match the training unit’s tasks. If, for example, the training unit’s selected training objectives include overcoming barriers, obstacles and mines, the 

OPFOR countertask would involve creating barriers or obstacles or emplacing mines. If the training unit’s 

tasks include air defense, then the OPFOR needs to have aviation unit tasks. If the training unit’s tasks 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 2-5 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Chapter 2 

include counterinsurgency operations, then the OPFOR should include insurgent tasks. The exercise planner should develop OPFOR countertasks that— 

 Oppose the training unit’s training objectives in accordance with the OPFOR Tactical Task List. 

 Reflect TC 7-100 series doctrine, organizations, and equipment (unless training for a specific 

contingency with a specific adversary). 

 Are appropriate to the training unit troop list, expected training status, and area of operation 

(AO). 

2-22. Once the OPFOR countertasks (or COAs) are selected, the exercise planner aligns training unit tasks 

with OPFOR countertasks to determine OPFOR missions. For example, in order to arrive at a training unit 

task of “Actions on Contact” and the OPFOR countertasks of ambush, improvised explosive device (IED), 

electronic warfare (EW), and indirect fire, the exercise planner studies the required supporting subtasks 

from the Army Universal Task List (AUTL) in FM 7-15, as shown in table 2-2, to determine what countertasks are required of the OPFOR. 

Table 2-2. Example training unit supporting subtasks (actions on contact) 

ART 1.2.2.7 CONDUCT ACTIONS ON CONTACT 

No. Scale Measure 

01 Yes/No Unit generated and sustained overwhelming combat power at the point of contact if the 

element that made contact was able to defeat the enemy unassisted. 

02 Yes/No The generation of overwhelming combat power was the product of the recommended 

course of action to the higher commander. 

03 Yes/No Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets were used to develop situation 

without main body being in contact with the enemy. 

04 Time To deploy and report. 

05 Time To evaluate and develop the situation. 

06 Time To choose a course of action (COA). 

07 Time To execute a selected COA. 

08 Time To recommend a COA to the higher commander. 

09 Time To return to previous mission. 

10 Percent Of friendly forces available to continue previous mission. 

11 Percent Of combat effectiveness of enemy force that made contact. 

2-23. By studying the assigned task (actions on contact) and its supporting subtasks, the exercise planner 

can see that the OPFOR required must— 

 Not start with overwhelming combat power, but can get there. 

 Allow the training unit to use ISR assets to stay out of contact. 

 Be able to challenge the training unit’s ability to carry out its selected COA. 

 Be able to cause the training unit to not be able to continue its mission. 

2-24. In another example, the exercise planner studies the required training unit subtasks of “Conduct Joint 

Operations Area (JOA) Missile Defense,” as shown in table 2-3, in order to determine what countertasks 

are required of the OPFOR. By studying the assigned task and its subtasks, the exercise planner can see 

that the OPFOR required must be able to employ ballistic, air-to-surface, and cruise missiles. 

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Exercise Design Sequence 

Table 2-3. Example of training unit task (JOA missile defense) 

OP 6.1.5 CONDUCT JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) MISSILE DEFENSE 

To identify and integrate joint and coalition forces supported by integrated capabilities to detect and 

destroy enemy theater missiles directed toward the JOA in flight or prior to launch. This task includes 

disrupting the enemy’s theater missile operations through an appropriate mix of mutually supportive 

passive missile defense, active missile defense, attack operations, and supporting command, control, 

communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) measures. This task includes providing early 

warning of theater missile attack to the joint operations area (JOA) as well as distribution of this warning 

to joint and multinational forces within the operational area. The term “theater missile” applies to 

ballistic missiles, air-to-surface missiles, and air-, land-, and sea-launched cruise missiles whose targets 

are within the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) operational area. 

No. Scale Measure 

M01 Minutes Warning provided to friendly assets prior to threat arrival. 

M02 Percent Of attacking missiles successfully penetrated friendly defenses. 

M03 Percent Of launched air-to-surface missiles destroyed before impact. 

M04 Percent Of launched ballistic missiles destroyed before impact. 

M05 Percent Of launched cruise missiles destroyed before impact. 

M06 Percent Of theater assets defensible against theater missile threat. 

M07 Percent Of TMD capability damaged by incoming missile attacks. 

M08 Percent Of DAL locations defensible against theater missile threat. 

M09 Percent Of DAL locations, successfully defended. 

M10 Instances Of failure to apply passive missile defense procedures. 

TMD = theater missile defense; DAL = defended asset list 

OPFOR OB AND TASK ORGANIZATION 

2-25. An important factor in the continuation of this phase is whether the training unit has a specific realworld OE and the type of exercise selected is deployment related, such as an MRX. If this is the case, then 

the exercise planner and/or OPFOR commander could continue with building an OPFOR OB to include 

task organization, since the OE or exercise conditions have already been established. The exception to this 

is if the deploying training unit also has the OB of the actual enemy force in sufficient resolution to use in 

conducting the MRX. However, if the training unit does not have a predefined OPFOR or OE, then the 

conditions for their exercise will have to be developed first, which will be discussed in the phase 3 

(PMESII-PT OE development). 

Note. Phase 2 is only the first of three phases in which OPFOR OB and task organization may 

be determined. The steps in the following example could be followed in phase 3 or even in 

phase 4. 

2-26. Assuming that the training unit has defined OE conditions but does not have predetermined OB of 

the OPFOR for the exercise, the exercise planner would begin determining the appropriate type and size of 

OPFOR unit(s) capable of performing the OPFOR countertasks. The type of OPFOR unit is determined by 

the type of capability required for each OPFOR countertask. The size of the OPFOR organization is determined by the type of capability required and the size of the U.S. units(s) being trained. If, for example, the 

exercise is focused on major combat operations and the training unit will be attacking with two brigadesize units, then the OPFOR needs a brigade-size organization in order to provide an adequate defense. The 

optimal OPFOR organization for conducting such a defense, if the exercise is conducted in complex terrain, could include relatively light motorized infantry units with some mechanized infantry combined with 

an antiarmor capability. Such a mix of forces would include the use of a brigade tactical group (BTG) task 

organization. If an insurgency also exists in the OE, then a local insurgent force could also be included to 

provide the training unit with an opportunity to combat an insurgency. The insurgent force can either operate independently or become affiliated with the regular military force. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 2-7 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Chapter 2 

2-27. For the purpose of this example, only one guerrilla battalion will be resubordinated from its original 

parent insurgent organization to become an actual part of the BTG task organization. Because of its more 

military-like structure, this battalion can easily be incorporated into the BTG command structure and fight 

as a combat unit alongside the light motorized infantry. However, the remainder of the local insurgent organization remains only loosely affiliated with the BTG, rather than subordinate to it. 

2-28. At this point, exercise planners review the OPFOR administrative force structure (AFS) organizational directories, which provide example equipment plus personnel types and the numbers of each type 

typically found in specific organizations. The AFS is to be used as the basis for OPFOR organization in all 

Army training exercises, except real-world-oriented MRXs. The AFS is the aggregate of various military 

headquarters, organizations, facilities, and installations designed to man, train, and equip the OPFOR. 

Within the AFS, tactical-level commands have standard organizational structures. The purpose of the AFS 

is to give trainers and exercise planners a general idea of what an OPFOR structure should look like. A 

complete list of AFS organizational directories, volumes I-IV, can be found at the U.S. Army Training and 

Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G2-TRISA Website at https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/19296289 

(AKO access required). 

Note. The AFS organizational directories are online files linked to FM 7-100.4. FM 7-100.4 

provides detailed step-by-step instructions on how to construct a task organization in its chapter 

3 and appendix B; its chapter 4 describes how to select equipment options. 

2-29. From the AFS menu, exercise planners can compile an initial listing of OPFOR units for the task organization (see example in table 2-4). The purpose here is to review the OPFOR organizational directories 

to determine which standard OPFOR unit(s) most closely matches the type and size of units required for 

performing OPFOR countertasks. At this point, the initial list only identifies the units available, without 

concern for any higher-level command to which they are subordinate in the AFS. In most cases, the organizations found in the AFS will require task-organizing in order to construct an OPFOR OB appropriate for 

the exercise. Once selected, this OPFOR unit will become the base unit to which modifications are made. 

Table 2-4. Example of initial listing of OPFOR units selected for task organization 

• BTG Headquarters (based on Bde HQ) • Sniper Company 

• Motorized Infantry Battalion (x2) • Air Defense Battalion (Motorized) 

• Mechanized Infantry Battalion (APC) • Engineer Battalion 

• Guerrilla Battalion (Hunter-Killer) • Materiel Support Battalion 

• Antitank Battalion • Maintenance Battalion (APC/Motorized) 

• Artillery Battalion • Signal Company 

• Reconnaissance Battalion (Motorized) • Chemical Defense Company 

• SPF Company • Medical Company 

• SPF Deep Attack/Recon Platoon 

2-30. In the example in table 2-4, the exercise planner has determined that most of the units needed to 

conduct OPFOR countertasks can be found in the AFS organizational directory for a separate motorized infantry brigade. Therefore, that brigade will serve as the base unit for the required task organization, which 

will be a BTG based on that brigade’s headquarters and some of its original subordinates in the AFS. However, OPFOR countertasks will also require the capabilities of some APC-equipped mechanized infantry, 

guerrilla forces, special-purpose forces (SPF), and additional snipers. 

2-31. For the insurgent organization affiliated with the BTG in this example, the exercise planner would 

select the “Local Insurgent Organization” from the AFS organizational directories. He would then adjust 

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Exercise Design Sequence 

the “default” numbers of the various function-oriented cells to tailor the organization to provide the desired 

insurgent tasks. 

2-32. Before extracting the base unit from the organizational directories, exercise planners should determine how much of the organizational detail in the directories they actually need for their particular training 

exercise or simulation. The directories typically break out subordinate units down to squad-size components. However, some simulations either cannot or do not need to provide that level of resolution. Therefore, exercise planners should identify the lowest level of organization that will actually be portrayed. If the 

only task-organizing involved will be internal to that level of base unit, any internal task-organizing is 

transparent to the users. However, if any subordinate of that base unit receives assets from outside its immediate higher organization, it might be necessary to first modify the subordinate into a task organization 

and then roll up the resulting personnel and equipment totals into the totals for the parent organization in 

the OPFOR OB for the exercise. 

2-33. Several decisions are involved in modifying the standard OPFOR baseline unit to become the new 

task organization. This can involve changes in subordinate units, equipment, and personnel. If training objectives do not require the use of all subordinates shown in a particular organization as it appears in the 

AFS, users can omit the subordinate units they do not need. Likewise, exercise planners can add other units 

to the baseline organization in order to create a task organization that is appropriate to training requirements. Users must ensure that the size and composition of the OPFOR is sufficient to meet training objectives and requirements. However, total assets organic to an organization or allocated to it from higher levels should not exceed that which is realistic and appropriate for the training scenario. Skewing the force 

ratio in either direction negates the value of training. Therefore, specific OBs derived from the organizational directories are subject to approval by the trainers’ OPFOR-validating authority. 

OPFOR TIER LEVELS 

2-34. During the task-organizing process, adjustments in equipment may be necessary in order to modify 

the strength and capability of the OPFOR unit. If a particular piece of equipment shown in the AFS organizational directories is not appropriate for a specific scenario, exercise planners may substitute another system according to the guidelines in the Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG). The WEG is organized into directories consisting of three volumes: 

 Volume I, Ground Systems. 

 Volume II, Airspace and Air Defense. 

 Volume III, Naval and Littoral Systems. 

The WEG is maintained and continuously updated, as necessary, by TRADOC G2-TRISA. Volumes I-III 

can be found at the TRADOC G2-TRISA Website at: https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/14751393 (AKO 

access required). It is important to note that even the baseline OPFOR organizations are subject to change 

over time. The equipment found in those organizations can also change. Therefore, planners should always 

consult the online AFS directories and the WEG for the latest, most up-to-date versions of organizational 

and equipment data. 

2-35. The WEG contains equipment data, tier tables, and substitution matrices for the various categories of 

equipment found in OPFOR organizations. Exercise planners should exercise caution in modifying equipment holdings, since this impacts on an OPFOR unit’s organizational integrity and combat capabilities. 

2-36. Exercise planners can employ the tier tables and substitution matrices in the WEG to find appropriate substitutes for baseline equipment shown in the AFS organizational directories. Within each functional 

category of equipment, there are four tiers representing different levels of capability, with Tier 1 

representing the highest level of capability and modernity. The four distinct tiers and their definitions are as 

follows: 

 Tier 1 reflects systems across the different functional areas that a major military force with stateof-the-art technology would generally have. At Tier 1, new or upgraded systems are limited to 

those robust systems fielded in military forces or currently developed and marketed for sale, 

with capabilities and vulnerabilities that can be portrayed for training. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 2-9 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Chapter 2 

 Tier 2 reflects modern competitive systems fielded in significant numbers for the last 10 to 20 

years, with limitations or vulnerabilities being diminished by available upgrades. Although 

forces are equipped for operations in all terrains and can fight day and night, their capability in 

range and speed for several key systems may be somewhat inferior to U.S. capability. Since the 

equipment listed in the AFS directories are Tier 2 equipment, any adjustments to equipment 

should be considered in light of this baseline structure. 

 Tier 3 systems date back generally 30 to 40 years. They have limitations in all three subsystems 

categories: mobility, survivability, and lethality. Systems and force integration are inferior. 

However, guns, missiles, and munitions can still challenge vulnerabilities of U.S. forces. Selective upgrades can provide synergistic and adaptive increases in force effectiveness. 

 Tier 4 systems reflect 40- to 50-year-old systems, some of which have been upgraded numerous 

times. These represent equipment typically found in forces of Third World or smaller developed 

countries. Use of effective strategy, adaptive tactics, selective technology upgrades, and terrain 

limitations could enable a Tier 4 OPFOR to challenge the effectiveness of a U.S. force in 

achieving its goals. This tier includes militia, guerrillas, special police, and other forces. 

Note. No force in the world has all systems at the most modern tier. The OPFOR, as with all 

military forces worldwide, is a mix of legacy and modern systems. Thus, the typical OPFOR 

force comprises a mix of Tier 1-4 systems. 

2-37. Table 2-5 provides a sample of systems listed in the tier tables (from volume I, chapter 15 of the 

WEG as of 2009). The characteristics of individual equipment listed can be found in the preceding chapters 

of volume I. 

Table 2-5. Example of equipment listed in WEG tier tables 

Equipment Type Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 4 

Infantry Fighting Veh BMP-2M Berezhok BMP-2M AMX-10P BMP-1PG 

Infantry FSV for IFV BMP/Kliver AD/AT BMP-2M Kornet/SA-18 AMX-10/SA-16/AT-5B BMP-1PG w/ SA-16/AT-5 

Armored Psnl Carrier BTR-90 BTR-80A BTR-80 M113A1 

Amphibious APC/IFV BTR/Kliver BMP/Kliver BTR-80A/BMP-3 UAE WZ-551/BMP-2 VTT-323/BMP-1PG 

Infantry FSV for APC BTR/Kliver AD/AT BTR-80A/SA-18&Kornet WZ-551/SA-16/AT-5B BMP-1PG w/ SA-14/AT-5 

Airborne APC/IFV BTR-D/ BMD-3/Kliver BTR-D/BMD-3 BTR-D/BMD-2 BTR-D/BMD-1P 

Heavy IFV/Heavy IFSV BMP-3M/BTR-90M/BMD-4 BMP-3 UAE Marder 1A1 BMP-1PG 

Main Battle Tank T-90A T-72B (Improved) Chieftain T-55AM 

Amphibious Tank Type 63A Modernized (AM) Type 63AM M1985 PT-76B 

Tracked HACV 2S25 AMX-10 PAC 90 AMX-13EE-9 M41A3 

Wheeled HACV AMX-10RC Desert Storm AMX-10RC EE-9 EE-9 

Combat Recon Veh BRM-3K/Credo BRM-3K BRM-1K EE-9 

Abn/Amphib Recon CRV BMD-3/Credo 1E BMD-3K BMD-1PK BMD-1K 

Armored Scout Car BRDM-2M BRDM-2M Fox BRDM-2 

Sensor Recon Vehicle HJ-62C HJ-62C BRM-1K BRM-1K 

AT Recon Vehicle PRP-4M (TALL MIKE) PRP-4M (TALL MIKE) PRP-4 (TALL MIKE) PRP-3 (SMALL FRED) 

Armored Cmd Veh MP-21 BMP-1KSh BMP-1KSh BMP-1KS 

Abn/Amphib ACV BMD-1KShM BMD-1KShM BMD-1KShM BMD-1KShM 

Wheeled ACV Kushetka-B Kushetka-B BTR-60PU/BTR-145BM BTR-60PU/BTR-145BM 

Command APC BTR-90AK BTR-80AK BTR-60PBK M113A1 

Motorcycle Gear-Up (2-man) Gear-Up (2-man) Motorcycle (2-man) Motorcycle (2-man) 

Tactical Utility Veh VBR VBL/VBR UAZ-469 UAZ-469 

Armrd Multi-purpose MT-LB6MB MT-LB6MA MT-LBu MT-LB 

All-Terrain Vehicle Supacat Supacat LUAZ-967M LUAZ-967M 

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Exercise Design Sequence 

2-38. OPFOR organizations and equipment must support the entire spectrum of COE training scenarios for 

the U.S. Army. The OPFOR, as described in the TC 7-100 series, represents a variety of adversaries, and 

offers flexibility for use in training applications and scenarios for U.S. training. The main part of the WEG 

deals with systems that are widely proliferated in the current timeframe. Lists of equipment in the tier 

tables offer convenient baseline examples arranged in capability tiers for use in composing OPFOR equipment arrays for training scenarios. Each volume of the WEG also has a chapter on emerging technology 

trends. Tables in those chapters offer an extended capabilities tier for the near- and mid-term. Table 2-6 

provides an example from an emerging technology trends chapter as of 2009. 

Table 2-6. Example of emerging technology trends from WEG 

System Near-Term OPFOR (FY 09-13) Mid-Term OPFOR (FY 14-19) 

APC Air Defense/Antitank (ADAT) 

Vehicle 

APC Bn and Bde MANPADS btry, selected other 

units See AIR DEFENSE 

Infantry Fighting Vehicle 

2-man turret, amphib tracked. Add ERA. 30mm 

gun (sabot, 110+mm pen). Frag-HE Electronicfuzed ammo 5 km. Buckshot rd for UAVs. 40-mm 

ABM AGL, 4 x fiber-optic guided ATGM 8 km 

launch on move, 2nd gen FLIR. Auto-track, hunterkiller FCS. Remote MGs 12.7mm, 2 x 7.62. 

Laser designator 15 km. CPS/ATS 

Hybrid drive. Box ERA 100mm KE /600 

CE. 45-mm CTG. Fused FLIR /II sight 13 

km. ADAT dart rd 4 km. SAL/LBR ATGM 

8-12 km. MMW radar. Micro-UAVs 

recon/atk. Radar warner, laser radar. 

Tunable LTD 15 km. CPS. 2 remote MGs, 

1x 12.7. TV/IR attack grenades 

IFV ADAT Vehicle 

IFV Bn/Bde MANPADS 

IFV chassis and APC ADAT weapons and 

upgrades 

See AIR DEFENSE, APC ADAT for 

weapons and upgrades 

Heavy Infantry Fighting 

Vehicle 

(Heavy IFV in Heavy Bn, 

Infantry Fire Support Vehicle, 

or IFV Company Command Vehicle, 

as Required) 

2-man turret, amphib tracked, Box ERA. Autotrack, hunter-killer FCS, ATGM lch on move. 100 

and 30mm guns. 100mm HEAT, DPICM rounds. 

40mm ABM AGL, NLOS (LBR/SAL) ATGM 8+km 

lch-on-move. 30/100-mm HE electronic fuzed rd 

7 km. 30-mm buckshot rd for UAVs. AD 12.7mm 

MG, 2 remote 7.62 MG. Laser designator 15 km. 

CPS/ATS 

Hybrid drive. Armor and box ERA protects 

300mm KE/800 CE. 45-mm CTG, KE, HE, 

ADAT rds. KE missile 8 km. Micro-UAVs 

recon/ atk. CPS. Fused FLIR/II sight 13 

km. ATGM 8-12 km. Tunable laser 

designator to 15 km. Radar/ MMW 

warners. AGL, 2 remote MGs, 1x 12.7. 

TV/IR atk grds 

HIFV ADAT Vehicle 

HIFV and Amphib Bn/Bde 

HIFV chassis with APC ADAT weapons and 

upgrades 

See AIR DEFENSE, APC ADAT for 

weapons and upgrades 

Main Battle Tank 

Welded turret with more KE protection. 125mm 

gun, bigger sabot (800+mm), LBR ATGM 6 km. 

SAL-H/IR-homing HEAT rd 5 km in 1 sec, SAL-H 

ATGM 8 km. LTD to 10 km. Controls tank robot. 

2nd gen FLIR (7 km) and 50X Day/night sights. 

ATGM fire on move. Auto-tracker, laser radar, 

laser dazzler blind sights. Focused frag HE rd for 

heli, AT targets. HEAT-MP, DPICM submunition 

rds. IR/MMW CM. CPS/ATS 

Reduced turret, compartmented rds, 

electromagnetic/ceramic armor, 3 gen 

ERA, 500 mm top/mine armor. Laser/radar 

warners. CPS. Hybrid drive. Sabot defeats 

1000mm KE. KE ATGM to 12 km. Tunable 

LTD to 15 km. ADAT msl 8 km. Medium 

laser weapon. Fused FLIR/II sight 100 X 

to 13 km. MMW FC. Atk/recon micro-UAV, 

atk grds. Controls a robot tank. 

PRODUCTS 

2-39. The products always resulting from phase 2 are the OPFOR countertasks developed from selected 

training unit tasks. In some cases, phase 2 may also include the consequent development of OPFOR OB, 

task organization, and equipment tier levels. As mentioned previously, those would only be developed during this phase if the OE was already defined but the OPFOR units were not defined. In that case, the entire 

process of phase 2 could result in building the appropriate OPFOR OB, which must provide suitable organizations capable of countering those tasks selected from the AUTL or UJTL for the training unit. For training units that do have an existing OE and defined OPFOR, the exercise planner would only develop countertasks during this phase. For training units that do not have a defined OE, the exercise planner must first 

develop an appropriate OE in phase 3 before he can define the OPFOR. 

SECTION III - PHASE 3: PMESII-PT OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 

DEVELOPMENT 

2-40. An operational environment (OE) is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences 

that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). Because 

this term was first introduced and defined in a Joint Pub about joint operations, a common misconception is 

that the term operational environment equates only to the operational level of war and that the “operational 

variables” used to describe an OE are applicable only at the operational or joint level. Both of those views 

are incorrect. The “operational” in both terms simply means that they relate to an operation, at any level. 

Every commander, at every level, has his own specific OE, which is part of the OE of his parent command 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 2-11 
 

 

 

 

 

Chapter 2 

and includes the OEs of his subordinate commands. A specific mission occurs within the context of a specific OE. 

2-41. At this point, the exercise planner has analyzed and integrated the exercise parameters and OPFOR 

countertasks. The next step is to match the results of phases 1 and 2 to the appropriate OE conditions for 

the training scenario. This step is critical because it essentially creates the conditions for the selected 

unit training objectives. These conditions, when combined with the standards for the METL task, help 

commanders assess unit readiness for a mission. Upon completion of this phase, all the conditions for the 

training exercise are set. 

TOOLS 

2-42. In the exercise is based on an existing OEA (for an actual operation or for an existing training scenario), that OEA is the foundation for phase 3. Depending on training requirements, the exercise planner may 

draw the necessary conditions directly from the existing OEA, develop more specific conditions for the 

specific OE of a smaller unit within that broader OE, or otherwise modify the existing OEA. If the exercise 

is not based on an existing OEA, the first step would be to create a composite OE that is appropriate for the 

training objectives, training unit tasks, and OPFOR countertasks already selected. In any case, the primary 

tool for this phase is to apply the framework of the eight operational variables and select appropriate settings for the subvariables. 

OPERATIONAL VARIABLES (PMESII-PT) 

2-43. The Army’s increased capability to integrate virtual, gaming, and constructive simulations with live 

training, along with the increased need for joint and multi-echelon training, requires exercise planners to 

develop a detailed and consistent OE for each training event. Defining the OE provides top-down coherence, flexibility, and continuity to the exercise and allows interaction at all levels. Most importantly, the 

operational variables of PMESII-PT (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time) and their interaction provide the analytical framework for establishing conditions at all levels of training. The complexity of a specific OE in training can also be adjusted to ensure training objectives are met. 

2-44. The framework for analysis of any OE should always consist of all eight operational variables that 

determine the nature of an OE and how it will affect an operation. The following is a brief description of 

each PMESII-PT variable, along with an example of questions a small-unit commander might need to have 

answered about each variable in his particular OE (in parentheses): 

 Political. Describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance— 

formally constituted authorities, as well as informal or covert political powers. (Who is the tribal 

leader in the village?) 

 Military. Explores the military and/or paramilitary capabilities of all relevant actors (enemy, 

friendly, and neutral) in a given OE. (Does the enemy in this particular neighborhood have antitank missiles?) 

 Economic. Encompasses individual and group behaviors related to producing, distributing, and 

consuming resources. (Does the village have a high unemployment rate that makes it easy for 

the enemy to get villagers to perform tasks for pay or other benefits?) 

 Social. Describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup within an OE and the beliefs, values, customs, and behaviors of society members. (Who are the influential people in the village— 

for example, religious leaders, tribal leaders, warlords, criminal bosses, or prominent families?) 

 Information. Describes the nature, scope, characteristics, and effects of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. (How much access 

does the local population have to news media or the internet?) 

 Infrastructure. Is composed of the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the 

functioning of a community or society. (Is the electrical generator in the village working?) 

2-12 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

 

Exercise Design Sequence 

 Physical Environment. Includes the geography and man-made structures as well as the climate 

and weather in the area of operations. (What types of terrain or weather conditions in this AO 

favor enemy operations?) 

 Time. Describes the timing and duration of activities, events, or conditions within an OE, as 

well as how the timing and duration are perceived by various actors in the OE. (At what times 

are people likely to congest roads or conduct activities that provide a cover for hostile operations?) 

PMESII-PT SUBVARIABLES 

2-45. Each of the eight PMESII-PT variables also has associated subvariables. A complete list of subvariables in detail is in chapter 3. Each subvariable listed there contains a subvariable definition and a breakdown of several distinct settings in order to develop specific exercise conditions. Each subvariable setting 

also has a corresponding definition, as well as associated planning considerations and notes to include links 

to other associated variables and subvariables. However, these are not always linked to a specific setting. 

(For an example of a subvariable, see table 2-7.) 

Table 2-7. “Political: Type of Government” subvariable definition, settings, 

and setting definitions 

Definition: Determines the type of government structure and associated behaviors encountered. 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Dictatorship/Authoritarian A mode of government characterized by the 

existence of a single ruler or group who arrogate to themselves and monopolize power in 

the state, exercising it without restraint. 

For live training requires robust domestic 

security apparatus, bureaucratic institutions 

and bloated role-player government structure 

(1.5 normal manning). 

Theocracy A government ruled by or subject to religious 

authority. A system of government in which 

God or a deity is held to be the civil ruler. 

Can only occur in the first two categories of 

social religious diversity. 

Representative 

Government 

Characterized as a representative form of 

government—either democratic, republic or 

parliamentary in form—with elected representatives and executives. All politics are 

governed by will of people and government 

has limited, defined powers over the population. 

Can be democratic, republic or parliamentary. 

Requires specific, prominent influencers, 

council members be present in the scenario 

(in addition to the normal role-player government positions). 

Anarchy Absence of any form of political authority. 

Political disorder and confusion. Absence of 

any cohesive principle, such as a common 

standard or purpose. 

Tribal and religious role-players present in 

scenario. Small percentage of disenfranchised or former government officials with 

little influence. 

Subvariable Links: Economic: Illegal Economic Activity; Social: Education Level, Religious Diversity, Criminal Activity. 

2-46. Ultimately the exercise planner is responsible for choosing the combination of subvariables for the 

exercise. Table 2-8 on page 2-14 provides an overview of the PMESII-PT variables and all their associated 

subvariables. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 2-13 
 

 

 

Chapter 2 

Table 2-8. PMESII-PT variables and subvariables 

Political Variable Information Variable Time Variable 

• Attitude toward the United States • Public communications media • Knowledge of the AO 

• Centers of political power • Information warfare • Cultural perception of time 

• Type of government • Intelligence • Key event resolution 

• Government effectiveness and • Information management • Information offset 

legitimacy • Tactical exploitation of time 

• Influential political groups Infrastructure Variable • Key dates, time periods, or 

• Construction pattern events 

Military Variable • Urban zones 

• Military forces • Urbanized building density 

• Government paramilitary forces • Utilities present 

• Non-state paramilitary forces • Utility level 

• Unarmed combatants •Transportation architecture 

• Nonmilitary armed combatants 

• Military functions Physical Environment Variable 

Economic Variable 

• Economic diversity 

• Terrain 

 Observation and fields of fire 

 Avenues of approach 

• Employment status  Key terrain 

• Economic activity  Obstacles 

• Illegal economic activity  Cover and concealment 

• Banking and finance  Landforms 

 Vegetation 

Social Variable 

• Demographic mix 

• Social volatility 

 Terrain complexity 

 Mobility classification 

• Natural hazards 

• Education level • Climate 

• Ethnic diversity 

• Religious diversity 

• Population movement 

• Common languages 

• Criminal activity 

• Human rights 

• Weather 

 Precipitation 

 High temperature—heat index 

 Low temperature—wind chill index 

 Wind 

 Visibility 

 Cloud cover 

 Relative humidity 

2-47. The eight variables and their associated subvariables describe the OE in terms that relate to specific 

situations as well as threat capabilities. These variables are relevant to every echelon of command and 

are relevant to every military operation. While individual variables do not dominate every environment, 

they are all present and require careful consideration. The PMESII-PT variables produce a coherent 

profile of the exercise conditions that can be applied to multi-level training exercises and small-unit 

(brigade and below) training exercises alike. 

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ASSESSMENT 

2-48. The purpose of an OEA is to understand all relevant aspects (conditions, circumstances, and influences) of a particular, specific OE for an actual operation or a training event. An OEA is a systematic examination of all eight operational variables (PMESII-PT) and the subvariables that make up each of those 

variables. An OEA also identifies interrelationships among the variables and subvariables, as well as potential trends over time. 

2-49. The exercise planner can either use an existing OEA (for an actual OE or a composite OE used in 

previous exercises), modify an existing OEA, or create an OEA for a new OE tailored to the requirements 

of the planned exercise. By using an existing OEA, the PMESII-PT variables and subvariable settings are 

pre-set. By adjusting an existing OEA, the exercise planners can change specific subvariable settings to 

meet requested training objectives or specified conditions in the OE. However, a composite OE can also be 

built by the exercise planner by selecting the desired subvariable settings straight from chapter 3. 

2-50. The subvariable settings have definable differences that result in unique characteristics or planning 

factors. Their characteristics also directly impact on the ability of a unit to accomplish its mission in an operation or in training. The exercise director is ultimately responsible for approving the combination of settings for the exercise. 

2-51. The operational variables can describe conditions of a composite OE created for an exercise but are 

equally applicable to describing real-world OEs as required for mission rehearsal training. The OEA, depending on the required resolution of the exercise, can be an invaluable tool in determining the proper subvariable settings to produce the desired OE. Now that the exercise planner has developed the parameters of 

2-14 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

 

 

 

 

Exercise Design Sequence 

the exercise as well as established training unit tasks and OPFOR countertasks, he has the tools and products necessary to develop the exercise’s OE, the foundation of the scenario. 

ORDER OF CONSIDERATION 

2-52. PMESII-PT is the memory aid for the eight operational variables that make up any OE. When listing 

the variables, it is therefore advisable to list them in the same order as in the memory aid—to ensure that 

all are considered. The same is generally true for their order as headings, for instance in an OEA. However, 

that does not mean that one always addresses and analyzes the variables in that particular order. The order 

in which variables are considered may depend on several things, including— 

 Whether a training exercise will use live, virtual, constructive, and or gaming enablers. 

 Whether the operational theme(s) selected for the exercise require specific conditions in one or 

more variables. 

 Whether one is analyzing an actual OE, modifying an actual OE, or creating a composite OE for 

training. 

 Whether the training unit has requested specific conditions in which to perform tasks. 

Training Enablers 

2-53. One of the key decisions that must be made during phase 1 is the type of exercise—whether the exercise will be live, virtual, constructive, gaming, or a combination of those training enablers. This decision 

may affect the order in which variables are considered. For example, if the exercise (or part of it) is to be 

conducted in a live training venue, much of the Physical Environment variable is predetermined. The terrain, natural hazards, climate, and weather are whatever actually exists at the live training venue. When virtual, constructive, or gaming enablers are involved, the Physical Environment might be considered only after settings for other variables have been determined. 

Operational Themes 

2-54. The choice of operational theme or a combination of themes and the tasks inherent in them may 

cause emphasis on certain operational variables. Commanders must understand the OE for an operation in 

terms of the operational variables and describe their desired end state in terms of how they envision the 

conditions of the OE when the operation ends. This affects their focus on certain tasks and certain operational variables or subvariables related to those tasks. For example, foreign humanitarian assistance operations within an operational theme of limited intervention might cause exercise planners to place special 

emphasis on the Social and Economic variables and possibly the “natural hazards” subvariable of the Physical Environment variable. Thus, exercise planners might choose to consider such key variables first. 

Actual, Modified, or Composite OE 

2-55. Another key decision in phase 1 is whether the scenario will be based on an existing OEA for an actual OE or a composite OE. The type of OE being analyzed will determine the relative importance of individual operational variables and the order in which they should be considered. The order may be different 

for conducting an OEA for an actual OE than for using the operational variables as a tool to design a modified or composite OE for training. 

Actual OE 

2-56. By using an existing OEA, the PMESII-PT variables and subvariable settings are pre-set. For an actual OE, the characteristics of all the variables are determined by the actual situation in the particular part 

of the world in which an operation is taking place or could take place. In this case, the purpose of an OEA 

is to help understand all the relevant aspects of that particular OE—most likely starting with the basic 

Physical Environment of the selected geographic area. Even when doing an OEA for a contingency operation, the general physical location—the where of the operation—is known. Until an actual mission is received, the when of the operation (part of the Time variable) may not be known. Even without knowing the 

specific time, however, the commander and staff can begin the OEA process—assessing the nature 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 2-15 
 

 

 

 

 

 

Chapter 2 

and impact of all the other variables as they exist at the present and as they continue to evolve over time. 

The variables and their subvariables might be considered in order of available information. 

2-57. In a particular actual OE, one or more operational variables might obviously have a greater impact 

on operations than others. In that case, one might want to consider those variables first, in order to be able 

to assess how they will influence other variables. 

Note. PMESII-PT should always be used in analyzing an OE regardless of whether or not the 

training unit has a specified OE. Even an existing OEA does not always have the appropriate 

level of resolution for the type or level of training exercise that may desired. PMESII-PT provides the comprehensive framework necessary for the development of the conditions for any 

level and type of training. 

Modified OE 

2-58. The order of consideration may be different when modifying an existing OE (for an actual operation 

or a previous training exercise) to meet specific training requirements and/or resource constraints. Most 

characteristics of the variables are a given, determined by the nature of those aspects of an OE that has already been analyzed. By adjusting an existing OEA, the exercise planner can change specific subvariable 

settings to meet specified training objectives or requested conditions in the OE. The order of consideration 

may depend on the exercise parameters, which will determine how closely the OE for training can or 

should replicate the actual conditions of the actual OE. Training objectives may necessitate adding, deleting, or modifying some conditions (when considering tasks, conditions, and standards). Resources constraints will determine where risk must be accepted and where intelligent compromise will be necessary. 

Composite OE 

2-59. If one is creating a composite OE, the exercise parameters will drive the order in which variables are 

considered. Since training objectives are driven by METL, certain supporting tasks for the training unit 

will drive the countertasks selected for the OPFOR. The OPFOR countertasks could determine the basic 

characteristics of the Military variable up front. As exercise planning continues, planners would refine their 

design of the OPFOR, creating the appropriate OPFOR OB and task organization—all part of the Military 

variable. In this case, the consideration of the rest of the variables could follow the decisions about the Military variable and would provide conditions that appropriately interact with those of the Military variable to 

produce the desired training results. However, some training unit tasks might not correspond to an OPFOR 

countertask, but rather to some other condition in the OE used for training (for example, a failed government or natural disaster). In such cases, those variables might be considered first or early in the process of 

developing the OE. 

KEY DECISIONS 

2-60. During phase 3, the exercise planner must select the appropriate subvariable settings for each of the 

operational variables. He must ensure that the selected settings reinforce the specific OE conditions the 

training unit requires. He must also determine the common processes and key events that help portray the 

OE conditions and their impact on the training unit. 

SUBVARIABLE SELECTION EXAMPLE 

2-61. The following is an extended example that follows the logic of how one exercise planner might select the subvariable settings to meet requirements for a particular exercise. Obviously, these are not the only settings possible. Likewise, the order in which the planner in this example considers the eight operational variables is only one example of one possible order in which an exercise planner might address the variables. 

2-62. For the purpose of this example, the exercise planner is selecting subvariable settings for an exercise 

that is not an MRX with a specified AO and will not use a live training environment. However the exercise 

2-16 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

Exercise Design Sequence 

parameters may indicate a requirement to create a particular type of geographical area to conduct the exercise. For example, the exercise planner could need to develop an OE centered around an AO in which the 

Physical Environment variable— 

 Provides terrain that accomplishes terrain-based training objectives (for example, river crossing 

and urban operations). 

 Provides terrain appropriate to the troop list. 

 Provides conditions that stress command, control, and logistics. 

2-63. Once these exercise parameters have been taken into account, the exercise planner in this example 

could begin by selecting the subvariable settings for the Physical Environment variable. At this point, the 

planner is trying to establish realistic conditions, using the PMESII-PT variables, which will stress all anticipated operations and requirements. For example (see figure 2-1), the exercise planner may choose the 

“mixed” setting for the “landforms” subvariable of the Physical Environment variable. Since the setting definition of “mixed” is “two or more ... landforms comprising over 80% of the available terrain in an AO,” 

the planner may select “mountain/glacial” in the eastern portion of the country and “coastal” in the western 

side of the country. It follows then that the associated “climate” subvariable settings selected for this AO 

would be “oceanic” in the west and “subarctic” in the east. Since the planner may also want to ensure that 

the physical environment accommodates the maneuver of mechanized and armor formations and is open 

enough to allow long-range engagements, he may also select a “grassland” setting of the “vegetation” subvariable of the Physical Environment variable. This in turn would require the planner to also define “cover 

and concealment” as generally poor except in mountainous regions. 

Sea 

Mountain/Glacial 

Coastal 

Oceanic Subarctic

Grassland 

PMESII-PT Variable Applied to an AO 

• Variable: Physical Environment 

- Subvariable: Landform: Mixed 

- Subvariable: Vegetation: Grassland 

- Subvariable: Climate: Oceanic and Subarctic 

- Subvariable: Cover and Concealment: Poor 

Mixed 

Figure 2-1. Selecting an area of operations (example) 

2-64. Next the exercise planner in this example could continue developing the OE using the variable of 

Time. One of the more important subvariables of Time is “knowledge of the AO.” This subvariable defines 

the amount of information the training unit will have received before the exercise begins, based on the 

amount of time they have spent in the AO (according to the scenario). If, for example, the training unit 

does not have detailed knowledge of the AO and OE, the planner could select “established,” which means 

the unit in the scenario is midway through its tour of duty and has only moderate knowledge of the AO and 

OE. Additional time subvariables that should also be considered are “key-event resolution” and “information offset.” Key-event resolution defines the number of key events and orders of effect to be designed into 

the scenario in order to accomplish unit training objectives. Information offset is the percentage of signifi26 November 2010 TC 7-101 2-17 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Chapter 2 

cant OPFOR activities that will be presaged by sufficient tips or indicators in order to enable successful 

training on unit reaction or interdiction response to the designed events. 

2-65. If, as in this example, the Physical Environment and Time variables are determined first, those 

variables will shape and define the rest of the variables. The exercise planner then begins to complete 

the design of the OE by reviewing chapter 3 to determine the appropriate subvariable settings for the 

remaining variables. Again, the exercise planner tries to find the best fit to support the scenario and the 

training objectives. 

2-66. At this point in the process, the exercise planner could develop the capabilities of the OPFOR by selecting the applicable subvariables of the Military variable. Using the countertasks already established in 

phase 2, the planner begins by selecting the type of military forces he will use in the exercise in order to 

field a challenging and capable OPFOR. Since we already know that the physical environment in the ongoing example was designed for major combat operations, it follows that the OPFOR selected, within the 

subvariable of “military forces,” would be “predominately tank and mechanized infantry.” Once this is determined, the next step would be to determine the degree to which this OPFOR can perform various “military functions,” which is also a subvariable of Military. The planner would then select the appropriate setting for each function, such as fire support or maneuver, using a scale of “high,” “medium,” or “low.” In 

the example discussed in the previous paragraphs, the planner may select “medium,” which means the 

OPFOR can conduct limited, complex, synchronized tasks, is limited primarily to the theater of operations 

in its ability to influence friendly forces, and has predominantly Tier 2 equipment. (See chapter 3 on the 

Military variable for details.) If the exercise design also requires an insurgency, the planner would continue 

selecting various subvariables of the Military variable that specifically address the composition of this organization. 

2-67. In our example, the exercise planner has already established subvariable settings for a physical environment suitable for the exercise by considering the training objectives and troop list of the training unit. 

The exercise planner understands the subvariable settings and implications of Time. He knows that the 

training unit is established in the AO and that the OPFOR will include the capability to conduct major 

combat operations as well as an insurgency. He has also developed his tentative COAs for the training unit. 

With all this in mind, the exercise planner might next consider the relationship and connectivity between 

the established subvariables of Physical Environment, Time, and Military and the remaining variables. Using these three variables as a foundation, the planner might then analyze their impact when selecting the 

remaining subvariable settings related to Political, Social, Economic, Information, and Infrastructure. 

2-68. During this portion of the OE development process, the exercise planner might choose to first address the subvariable settings for the Political, Social, and Economic variables. This would allow him to 

build a foundation from which he can then develop the appropriate Information and Infrastructure conditions. For example, the planner might wish to choose the Political subvariable settings of “vulnerable: failing” under “government effectiveness and legitimacy” and “tribal” under the “centers of political power.” 

Consequently, he would choose the Economic subvariable settings of “high unemployment” and a “single 

industry present.” It is then quite plausible that the Social subvariable settings would be a relatively young 

or “unbalanced, age” population and “social volatility” that is high. 

2-69. Based on this foundation, the planner in this example would then select subvariable settings from the 

remaining Information and Infrastructure variables that logically match the other OE conditions selected. 

For example, the Information variable would probably have a “public communications media” subvariable 

that has widespread “postal” and “radio” with limited “Internet” and “television.” The “information management” subvariable setting would probably be either “rudimentary” or “basic.” Finally, appropriate subvariable settings for the Infrastructure variable would be selected. Since the training unit in this example 

wants an insurgency as part of the design, the planner would ensure that selected Infrastructure settings included “dense, random construction” and “high” building density, as well as urban zones that include a 

“city core” and a “high-rise residential area.” This would allow for an insurgency to operate using cities as 

cover as well as provide a training platform for urban operations. 

2-70. Once the overall OE has been developed using the PMESII-PT variables, the exercise planner or 

OPFOR planner could begin building the appropriate OPFOR OB details and task organization covered 

previously in phase 2. For the ongoing example, this would include the conventional OPFOR units as well 

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Exercise Design Sequence 

as the insurgent organizations, using the appropriate TC 7-100 series and associated documents described 

earlier. 

OE-WFF ANALYSIS 

2-71. The success or failure of any mission may be determined by the comprehensiveness of the METL’s 

supporting tasks. If the commander is not aware of shortfalls in the task organization, planning, or training, 

he cannot address or alleviate them. Therefore, it is imperative that the commander have all-inclusive, 

across-the-board supporting METL tasks to guide planning and training and to highlight any issues requiring resolution. A comprehensive METL and associated tasks must consider all aspects of any issue(s) that 

may affect the accomplishment of the mission. This includes, but is not limited to, organizational shortfalls 

and capabilities and the defined OE using the PMESII-PT framework described above. Once these are analyzed and highlighted, the commander is then able to assign priorities and resources to each area. 

2-72. Although other factors also affect the selection of the METL tasks, at a minimum well developed 

METL tasks must integrate the mission, the defined OE, and the warfighting functions (WFFs). This integration can be accomplished by taking into consideration the conditions, circumstances, and influences of 

the PMESII-PT variables in relation to the WFFs and the assigned mission. What is required is an analytical tool that fuses all these critical issues of interest to the commander. A convenient tool for this analysis 

is an OE-WFF analysis matrix. Filling in such a matrix should help identify conditions that may require adjustments to the original unit METL tasks and organization developed in phase 1. The requirements revealed in such an analytical matrix result in a comprehensive list of supporting tasks (including tasks of the 

basic table of organization and equipment [TOE] organization and newly added task-organized subordinates). The results provide an inclusive adjusted baseline that reveals critical METL supporting tasks for 

the commander’s review and approval. 

2-73. To illustrate this process, figure 2-2 provides a new example of notional BCT METL supporting 

tasks. These were specific Army tactical tasks (ARTs) that were selected from the AUTL found in FM 7-

15 prior to applying the OE-WFF analysis matrix. 

CORE MISSION: To disrupt or destroy enemy military forces, control land areas including populations and resources 

and be prepared to conduct combat operations to protect US national interests. 

DOCTRINAL MISSIONS: Offense, Defense, Stability Operations, Civil Support Operations. 

• Conduct Command and Control • Conduct Offensive Operations 

– Execute the Operation Process (ART 5.1) – Conduct a Movement to Contact (ART 7.1.1) 

– Plan Operations (ART 5.1.1) – Conduct an Attack (ART 7.1.2) 

• Protect the Force • Conduct Defensive Operations 

– Conduct Operational Area Security (ART 6.5) – Conduct an Area Defense (ART 7.2.2) 

– Conduct Survivability Operations (ART 6.7) • Conduct Stability Operations 

– Conduct Information Protection (ART 6.3) – Provide CBRN Passive Defense (ART 6.9.4) – Establish Civil Security (ART 7.3.1) – Conduct Personnel Recovery Operations (ART 6.2) • Conduct Civil Support Operations • Provide Sustainment – Provide a Screen (ART 1.2.2.4) – Provide Logistics Support (ART 4.1) – Conduct Guard Operations (ART 1.2.2.5) – Conduct Human Resources Support (ART 4.2) 

Figure 2-2. Notional BCT METL with doctrinal supporting tasks (example) 

2-74. Using this notional METL and doctrinal supporting tasks as a baseline, the exercise planner then 

builds an OE-WFF analysis matrix using the assumed data already compiled from the PMESII-PT variables analyzed against doctrinal WFFs. (See table 2-9 on page 2-20.) Using this construct, the initial supporting tasks are evaluated to determine if they do or do not correspond to the new conditions (PMESIIPT). In addition, the OE-WFF analysis matrix is used to determine if other supporting tasks need to be 

added. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 2-19 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Chapter 2 

Table 2-9. OE-WFF analysis matrix (example) 

WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS 

Movement and 

Maneuver 

Intelligence Fires Sustainment C2 Protection 

OPERATIONAL VARIABLES 

Political •Government 

unstable 

•Active 

insurgency 

Military •Robust antiarmor 

(a) 

•Deploy within 96 

hours (b)

•Provide air support (c)

•IEDs 

•Insufficient rivercrossing capability 

•Limited 

HUMINT 

capability

•No UAVs 

assigned 

•Limited 

line of sight 

•Insufficient 

POL & water 

trucks to 

support task

force 

•Poor 

UHF/VHF

radio relay 

•Robust air 

defense (c) 

•Suicide 

bombers 

•No CBRN 

capability 

•Insufficient 

medical 

personnel

and supplies 

Economic •High unemployment 

•Strong black 

market economy 

•Strong illegal 

drug trade 

Social •Tribal based •Numerous 

no-fire 

zones 

•Significant 

number of 

religious 

structures 

•Water for 5,000 

troops &

vehicles (d) 

•No water or food 

avail for 15,000 

locals (d) 

Information •Establish 

HUMINT 

operations

w/in 10 days 

•Active intelligence service 

•Robust 

INFOWAR, 

EW, cyber 

capability 

•Large NGO 

presence 

Infrastructure •Limited hard 

surface roads 

•Insufficient 

cross-country

vehicles 

•Heavy reliance 

on air transport

•Insufficient 

mine-clearing &

river-crossing 

capabilities 

•Lack of potable 

water, POL, 

lodging, 

plumbing 

•Limited 

electric 

power 

•No cell 

towers 

Physical Environment 

•Numerous rivers 

•Swamp/marsh 

•Cold 

•Mountainous 

•Unexploded 

explosive 

ordnance 

•Limited 

fields of fire 

•Limited natural 

water/2-year 

drought (d) 

•Limited line 

of sight 

•Diseases 

(typhoid & 

malaria) 

Time •Extended road 

movement 

•Limited AO 

knowledge 

BLUE: Capabilities and limitations in light of directed mission and OE conditions 

RED (italics): OPFOR and other characteristics of operational variables 

NOTES: 

(a) Robust insurgent antiarmor/antitank ability. Possess Kornet-E, RPG-29, RPG-7V1. 

(b) Deploy to Country X within 96 hours. 

(c) Robust insurgent air defense weapons. Starstreak, SA-16/SA-18. 

(d) Water/food for 5,000 troops & vehicles. Local population of 15,000 has limited food and contaminated water supply and 

is malnourished. 

2-20 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

 

 

 

 

 

Exercise Design Sequence 

2-75. Analyzing this information can result in several changes to the initial supporting METL tasks. (Figure 2-3 shows an example of notional BCT METL supporting tasks adjusted for OE and WFF.) 

CORE MISSION: To disrupt or destroy enemy military forces, control land areas including populations and resources 

and be prepared to conduct combat operations to protect US national interests. 

DOCTRINAL MISSIONS: Offense, Defense, Stability Operations, Civil Support Operations. 

• Conduct Command and Control • Conduct Offensive Operations 

– Assess Tactical Situation and Ops (ART 5.1.4) – Conduct Tactical Road March (ART 1.3.2) 

– Prepare for Tactical Operations (ART 5.1.2) – Conduct a Movement to Contact (ART 7.1.1) 

– Execute the Operations Process (ART 5.1) – Conduct an Attack (ART 7.1.2) 

• Conduct Defensive Operations – Plan Operations (ART 5.1.1) – Conduct an Area Defense (ART 7.2.2) • Protect the Force 

– Conduct Operational Area Security (ART 6.5) • Conduct Stability Operations 

– Conduct Survivability Operations (ART 6.7) – Conduct Information Protection (ART 6.3) 

– Conduct Foreign Internal Defense Operations (ART – Conduct Counterintelligence Operations (ART 6.11.3.1) 7.6.4.1) – Conduct Personnel Recovery Operations (ART 6.2) – Establish Civil Security (ART 7.3.1) • Provide Maneuver • Conduct Civil Support Operations – Conduct Tactical Maneuver (ART 1.2) – Provide a Screen (ART 1.2.2.4) – Cross Danger Area (ART 1.2.6) – Conduct Guard Operations (ART 1.2.2.5) – Overcome Barriers/Obstacles/Mines (ART 1.6.1) – Provide Humanitarian Relief (ART 7.4.1.2) – Conduct Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (ART – Provide International Law Support (ART 4.2.3.3) 3.3.5) – Conduct Internment/Resettlement Operations (ART 4.4) • Provide Sustainment 

– Provide Logistics Support (ART 4.1) 

– Conduct Human Resources Support (ART 4.2) 

– Provide Medical Treatment (ART 4.3.1.1) 

– Provide Water Support (ART 4.1.3.11) 

– Provide Medical Evacuation (ART 4.3.2) 

– Provide POL (Distance Operations) (ART 4.1.3.3) 

BLACK – Original METL Tasks 

BLUE – Tasks Added Due to Training Unit Task Organization/Mission/WFF 

GREEN (Italics) – Tasks Added Due to OE 

Figure 2-3. Notional BCT METL supporting tasks adjusted for OE and WFF (example) 

2-76. First, a task such as “Provide CBRN Passive Defense” can be deleted because, in this case, the 

OPFOR does not have a CBRN capability. Second, tasks such as “Provide Water Support” and “Provide 

Humanitarian Relief” have been added due to the humanitarian crisis in the OE. Issues, relationships, and 

cascading effects, not obvious with a stand-alone METL, become evident once combined with specifics 

unique to the assigned mission, the task organization, and the defined OE. Once all aspects are considered 

in one analytical process, the differences in the BCT supporting task list are significant, and obvious. This 

methodology provides the commander a tailored, all-encompassing tool to assess both the unit’s readiness 

and its ability to perform the directed mission in the form of adjusted supporting METL tasks based on OEWFF analysis. 

2-77. Once the OE has been determined, then further decisions and development can be made on the scenario. These include common processes and key events for the desired scenario. 

COMMON PROCESSES 

2-78. An integral part of the scenario is the everyday activity that brings the scenario to life, making it a 

realistic training environment that forces the training unit to react and think through the ramifications of its 

actions. In order to understand this OE that appears so complicated, the exercise planner utilizes a method 

of preplanned events that are common to all exercise OEs. Examples would be delivery of basic services, 

conduct of manufacturing and agricultural activities, and transportation. The key to replicating the OE is 

resources. The level of fidelity and number of variables and subvariables replicated will be determined by 

factors such as the experience level of the unit, the type of training exercise, and the number of personnel 

available to role-play as members of an environment. Variables and their associated subvariables make the 

OE into an ever-changing and evolving situation that gives the training unit indications of upcoming and 

possible key events and reacts to actions the training unit takes or fails to take. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 2-21 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Chapter 2 

KEY EVENTS 

2-79. Key events are preprogrammed events designed to highlight chosen training objectives. Early in the 

initial planning phase when the prioritized training objectives are developed, the senior trainer and exercise 

director usually determine if there will be key events and what their content will be. Key events found in 

exercises can involve things such as riots, mass casualties, and missing Soldiers. 

2-80. To make the exercise more realistic and challenging, the exercise planner should consider key events 

more in terms of their relationship to the overall scenario, their training value, and their application across 

all PMESII-PT variables. Key events should also be precipitated by the buildup of indicators or situations 

that lead up to a key event. How the training unit responds to these indicators and events will determine the 

follow-on development of second-, third-, and even fourth-order effects. The training unit’s reactions 

should be mapped out ahead of time and future events anticipated for scripting or role-playing instructions. 

The results can then be used as part of after action-reviews to show the training unit why something happened and what could have been done differently. 

2-81. An example of key event development could involve an insurgency. In this example, the insurgency 

is part of training scenario and the unit’s training objective of conducting stability operations. In this illustration, the exercise OE indicates an active insurgency in the vicinity of an important industrial city. This 

city also has an active black market and criminal activity. The planned key event would be the arrest of a 

suspected insurgent as the result of a raid on a meeting between leaders of this insurgency. Subsequent interrogations reveal that the person arrested is also the mayor of this city, a factory owner, and a tribal elder. 

How the training unit responds to this information will determine what and how the follow-on effects will 

play out. If the unit determines that he was only a sympathizer attending the meeting to placate the insurgency leaders, then the impacts of this arrest will be minimal. However, if the unit determines that he is lying and keeps him in detention without clear disposition, then the exercise director may cause a cascading 

of negative effects to develop. These effects may take place simultaneously and impact various PMESII-PT 

variables of this OE. Negative effects in this city may include: attitudes toward the U.S. forces, reduced 

local government effectiveness, factory shutdown, government strikes, demonstrations, riots, and increased 

criminal activity. These effects have already been predetermined and planned out to occur at certain times 

during the exercise unless the training unit takes actions to prevent or mitigate these effects. The sequence 

and level of resolution will most likely be based on the allocated time for the exercise and the unit’s level 

of experience. 

PRODUCTS 

2-82. FM 7-0 states: “The Army trains and educates its members to develop agile leaders and organizations able to operate successfully in any operational environment.” In order to achieve this goal, all leaders 

and trainers must understand not only what an OE is but its impact on the mission and training as well. Using all the eight PMESII-PT variables and the OE-WFF analysis provides analytical tools that help ensure 

comprehensive training objectives have been developed for the exercise. The resulting products from these 

tools are a defined OE as well as refined training objectives and task organization. 

SECTION IV - PHASE 4: ORDERS, PLANS, AND INSTRUCTION 

DEVELOPMENT 

2-83. Orders, plans, and instruction development refers to all the materials and products issued by the 

exercise director and his staff to the training unit. Normally this includes operation orders, operation plans 

(OPLANs), overlays, warning orders (WARNOs), fragmentary orders (FRAGOs), country studies, intelligence estimates, and adjacent unit orders—in short, all documents required for the training unit to exercise 

its staff and Soldiers during the exercise. Issue times for these orders vary, and the exercise planner should 

develop an orders issue schedule affording adequate lead times for training units to prepare and issue their 

orders. This schedule, as well as the documents themselves prior to their issue, may require changes and 

updates and should be reviewed and updated throughout the exercise. 

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Exercise Design Sequence 

2-84. There are three sets of orders and instructions derived from the exercise design process: training unit 

orders, OPFOR orders, and role-player instructions. These three sets of orders, while they may be developed separately, must be thoroughly coordinated before and during development. The exercise planner develops the orders, plans and instructions, which include the training unit’s and OPFOR COAs, OPFOR 

OB, and the road to war. 

TOOLS 

2-85. Tools necessary for orders, plans, and instruction development are the results of phases 1 through 3 

and the TC 7-100 series. Now that the OE is defined, the exercise planner can develop or refine the 

OPFOR OB to meet the requirements of the defined OE and then develop the training unit’s higher headquarters order with COAs and finally the road to war. 

2-86. As discussed earlier, the development of the OPFOR OB may have already occurred as part of phase 

2 or phase 3, if the OE and OPFOR are already determined and at sufficient resolution for the training exercise requirements. If this is the case, then these tools, as well as others previously covered, would be used 

to develop OPFOR orders. 

2-87. If the OPFOR OB has not been developed, then that process and OPFOR task-organizing would 

have to be completed during this phase since it is vital prerequisite data necessary for the production of 

OPFOR orders. For details on the development of OPFOR OB see phase 2, task and countertask development. 

2-88. At this point, assuming OPFOR OB already exists, the exercise planner has established a number of 

the key conditions that allow him to begin positioning the training unit and OPFOR in tentative positions 

for start of exercise (STARTEX). He has determined how the exercise will flow, the order of the missions, 

and OB for both the training unit and OPFOR. The exercise planner should position OPFOR units in a way 

that provides sufficient combat power and types of forces to rigorously oppose the training unit and its performance of the training tasks. The exercise planner should organize the battlefield that— 

 Provides nonlinear conditions. 

 Reflects current Army and OPFOR doctrine. 

 Is appropriate to the training unit troop list, training status, and AO. 

 Matches the PMESII-PT variables and subvariable settings. 

2-89. The exercise planner should then organize an OPFOR force that— 

 Can accomplish all countertasks. 

 Reflects TC 7-100-series OPFOR doctrine, organization, and equipment tier structure. 

 Is appropriate to the training unit troop list and AO. 

 Matches the appropriate PMESII-PT subvariable settings for Military. 

2-90. During this phase, the training unit’s higher headquarters COA is determined. The training unit’s 

higher headquarters COA is determined largely by tools discussed earlier, such as the prioritized training 

objectives of unit to be trained. However, both the training unit and OPFOR COAs will affect and be affected by conditions (operational variables) pertinent to the exercise. In all cases, the exercise planner tries 

to find the best fit of conditions and parameters to support the scenario and training objectives. (For details 

on COA development, see FM 5-0.) 

KEY DECISIONS 

2-91. The final planning conference (also known as the STARTEX conference) between the exercise planner, exercise control (EXCON), OPFOR commander, senior trainer, and the exercise director is normally 

conducted during this phase in order to ensure all exercise details have been completed. The final planning 

conference or STARTEX conference locks in all troop lists, training objectives, and exercise conditions. 

This includes approval/disapproval by the exercise director of training unit requests for equipment and 

troop list exceptions outside of their normal TOE and task organization. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 2-23 
 

 

 

 

Chapter 2 

2-92. Approximately 30 days prior to STARTEX, the exercise planner prepares and presents the last preexercise briefing to the exercise director and all pertinent staff. Since this is designed as an information 

briefing, no decisions, except for unresolved issues, are expected from the exercise director. This briefing 

normally covers all aspects of the exercise and ensures deconfliction of any last-minute issues. It also promotes complete understanding of the exercise by those who are normally not part of the planning process. 

Topics covered in this briefing may include but are not limited to— 

 Finalized troop list. 

 Approved/disapproved equipment and troop list exceptions. 

 Observer-controller augmentation (when required). 

 Key leaders. 

 Resolved and unresolved issues. 

 Close air support/airlift units and sorties (if applicable). 

 Detailed exercise timeline. 

 Training unit missions and dispositions. 

 OPFOR missions and dispositions. 

 Chronology of major key events. 

 CBRN events (if applicable). 

 C-Day, M-Day, and D-Day. 

PRODUCTS 

2-93. To promote realism in training and to provide as much information as possible to the training unit 

prior to the exercise, the exercise director may direct the development and issuance of appropriate country 

studies, WARNOs, intelligence summaries, role-player instructions, and higher unit OPLANs. Training 

units may use these documents in developing preparatory home-station training prior to the actual exercise. 

2-94. To this point, within the sequence of events, the exercise planner has compiled and developed all required information derived from his analysis of tools, key decisions, and products of the previous three 

phases. He has established and defined the key conditions for the OE and the exercise. He has also developed and analyzed COAs for both the training unit and OPFOR. The exercise planner is now prepared to 

expand the above-listed information into the orders and plans necessary to support the exercise. 

HIGHER UNIT ORDERS AND PLANS 

2-95. The number and detail of completeness of the orders and plans must be sufficient to meet all exercise 

requirements for the unit to be trained. Figure 2-4 is a list of typically required training-unit-associated orders and plans based on the level and fidelity of the exercise. 

• Battalion WARNO • COCOM WARNO 

• Battalion OPORD	 • Corps/Joint Task 

Force OPLAN • Battalion FRAGO 

• Corps/Joint Task • Brigade WARNO 

Force OPORD • Brigade OPORD 

• Country Studies • Brigade FRAGO 

• Rules of Engagement • Division WARNO 

• Division OPORD 

• Division OPLAN 

• Division Intel Estimate 

Figure 2-4. Example of required orders and plans 

2-24 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

 

 

Exercise Design Sequence 

OPFOR ORDERS AND PLANS 

2-96. The OPFOR also uses plans and orders. OPFOR orders give specific guidance for exercise play and 

rules of engagement. Similar to the regular five-paragraph order format as described in FM 5-0, they may 

include special instructions for scripted events, as in the case of MRXs. Length, format, and detail will vary 

depending on the type of exercise, training area, and OPFOR organization. OPFOR orders and plans require careful husbanding by EXCON and the exercise director to ensure maintenance of control measures, 

rules of engagement, and force ratios in support of the exercise training requirements. Larger exercises require continuous exercise director review and modification to ensure fairness and proper observercontroller evaluation of the training unit. 

2-97. OPFOR orders should, at a minimum, include— 

 A description of the OE to include subvariable settings. 

 A discussion of the scenario, a scenario timeline, areas to be occupied (who, what, where, when, 

and duration). 

 Current higher-headquarters and strategic situation (OPFOR/training unit) and road to war. 

 Task organization. 

 Concept of operations to include coordinating instructions. 

 Administrative notes. 

 Events calendar/timetable. 

 Rules of engagement (may be time- and unit-specific). 

 Overlays and maps (for example, maneuver, fires, obstacle, reconnaissance and surveillance). 

 Scripted events and coordination instructions when required (for example, MRXs, role-play 

interaction). 

ROLE-PLAYER INSTRUCTIONS 

2-98. Other written instructions that are important to develop during this phase are role-player instructions. 

Most exercise venues, including simulations, require interaction between the training unit and noncombatants. Role-player instructions create behavior profiles and events for individuals and groups within the 

role-player population. They also schedule specific events or incidents, which require close coordination 

between OPFOR, role-players, and EXCON. 

2-99. Increasingly, training in civil affairs operations, the handling of news media, interaction with civilians (such as displaced persons, refugees and local inhabitants), as well as nongovernmental organizations 

(NGOs) has made the PMESII-PT Social and Political variables of primary concern to the exercise planner. The proliferation of transnational groups, criminal organizations, and international partnerships with 

U.S. and foreign companies has made OEs increasingly complex. Significant resources and coordination 

are required, depending on the exercise scenario, to script and execute desired incidents and events during 

exercises. Creative and tactically focused role-playing depicts the OE as a whole. Role-playing places 

training units in situations out of their comfort zone and forces them to make difficult decisions. It is a cornerstone of valuable training in today’s training environments. Role-player instruction development, therefore, is a challenge for all exercise planners. For a detailed guide on the use of role-players in training, refer to the Contemporary Operational Environment (COE) Actors & Role-Players Handbook. It can be accessed on the TRISA-CTID website at https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/14712167 (requires AKO 

password). 

2-100. The COE Actors & Role-Players Handbook outlines a methodology for the orientation and training of role-players in COE-based education and training exercises. Each of the chapters contains specific 

information designed to assist exercise planners, exercise directors, and role-players in developing a realistic and challenging OE. The chapters include the following: 

 Introduction to the COE. 

 Role-player terminology. 

 Individual and collective training considerations. 

 Tools for trainers. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 2-25 
Chapter 2 

 Material and outfitting for the role-player. 

 Media affairs and the role-player. 

 Training program concept. 

Figure 2-5 shows an example of the types of role-players described in the handbook. 

Role-Players 

Generic Special Skill 

Cultural 

Foreign 

Language 

Speaker 

Foreign 

Language 

Role-Player 

Interpreter/ 

Translator 

Figure 2-5. Types of role players 

2-101. In order to support all training objectives and, ultimately, mission accomplishment, trainers must 

discuss key aspects of the OE for the exercise with role-players. By doing this, trainers ensure that roleplayers understand their functions and how they will provide the environment that enables the unit to meet 

its training objectives. Role-play instructions should include at a minimum the following information about 

the training unit: 

 METL. 

 Training objectives. 

 Combined arms training strategy (CATS). 

 Individual tasks and collective tasks. 

 Battle tasks. 

 Warrior tasks. 

2-102. According to the COE Actors & Role Players Handbook, the exercise planner, trainers, and roleplayers must analyze all aspects of the scenario to ensure scenario fidelity. Role-players must be familiar 

with the— 

 PMESII-PT variables and the training unit’s desired subvariable settings. 

 Training objectives. 

 Role-player dynamics. 

 Factors affecting the scenario. 

 Scenario end state. 

2-26 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

 

Exercise Design Sequence 

2-103. A comprehensive list of role-player instructions is contained in the role-players handbook. Typical 

role-player instructions will— 

 Force the training unit to interact with local officials and law enforcement. 

 Cause situations that will test or force modification of the training unit’s rules of engagement. 

 Create situations that could cause possible violations of the rules of engagement and force the 

training unit to initiate investigations of alleged violations (AR 15-6). 

 Stress the training unit’s capabilities to deal with external organizations. 

 Force the training unit’s commander to deal with complaints regarding alleged injuries or deaths 

to civilians, destruction of civilian property, and failure to support NGO operations. 

 Coordinate OPFOR interaction with civilians to cause unrest and depict the training unit as the 

enemy. 

 Create an OE that forces the training unit to consider and plan for interaction with multiple external organizations. 

 Introduce a number of third-party actors into exercise play. 

ROAD TO WAR 

2-104. The last step in the exercise design process is to develop the road to war. The road to war is not 

necessarily a formal document but describes chronologically the incidents and the events leading up to the 

current situation as well as the training unit and OPFOR disposition. The road to war should be consistent 

with the subvariable settings selected for the OE variables. The road to war at a minimum should include 

the following: 

 Explain the deployment and disposition of the training unit at STARTEX. 

 Identify C-Day, M-Day, and D-Day. 

 Explain OPFOR organization of the battlefield, organization of forces, and dispositions. 

 Reflect OPFOR doctrine in the TC 7-100 series (except for MRXs). 

 Provide reasoning for execution of training objectives and subtasks. 

SECTION V - SUMMARY 

2-105. The planning events discussed in this chapter represent a practical approach to developing and executing training exercises. The events discussed provide context to exercise design and scenario development. Still, exact events and timings will be prescribed by each training organization, such as MCTC or 

Battle Command Training Program (BCTP). 

2-106. Exercise design is an integrated process involving the determination of exercise parameters (phase 

1, initial planning), development of training tasks (phase 2, task and countertask development), design of 

exercise conditions (phase 3, PMESII-PT OE development), and orders production (phase 4, orders, plans, 

and instruction development). These four phases meld the basic exercise design steps with the eight operational variables of PMESII-PT and their subvariable settings. This process, while extensive, ensures exercise continuity and compliance with the COE concept and OPFOR doctrine in the TC 7-100 series. A composite checklist with exercise development tasks and critical planning events can be found in appendix A. 

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Chapter 3 

Operational Variables 

As discussed in chapter 2, the operational variables provide key design considerations for the exercise planner. Together, these variables comprise all the conditions, 

circumstances, and influences that affect any military operation or any training exercise. They provide a comprehensive view of an operational environment (OE), real or 

simulated, that realistically challenges the training unit, its leaders, and Soldiers in 

the execution of their missions and tasks. This chapter describes the variables, subvariables, and linkages that can be used to develop comprehensive OE conditions for 

training exercises. 

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 

3-1. An OE is the complete set of conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the decisions of 

the unit commander and the deployment and employment of military forces, as well as other instruments of 

national power. It encompasses all the variables that affect where Soldiers will train or fight. 

3-2. The OE represented in a training event must be appropriate for the training objectives. What constitutes a realistic and relevant OE for a particular training event depends on how much the unit knows about 

where it can expect to be deployed. On the one hand, the unit may know the specific area of operations 

(AO) where it will deploy or be able to anticipate such a specific deployment. In that case, the goal should 

be to create training conditions that replicate as closely as possible the actual conditions of the specific OE 

associated with that AO. On the other hand, the unit may need to train to accomplish its core capabilities in 

any of a number of possible OEs. In that case, it is appropriate to design an OE that represents a composite 

of the types of conditions that might exist in a number of actual OEs in which the unit might find itself involved in full spectrum operations. 

3-3. In either case, the design and structure of the OE for any training event consists of three main components: actual data, projected data, and intelligent compromise. All that differs is the proportion of each. 

The term for this combination of actual data, intelligent compromise, and projected information that creates 

the conditions for any training event is the Contemporary Operational Environment (COE). The COE 

is the collective set of conditions, derived from a composite of actual worldwide conditions, that pose 

realistic challenges for training, leader development, and capabilities development for Army forces 

and their joint, intergovernmental, interagency and multinational partners. The COE is a collective 

term for the relevant aspects of contemporary OEs that exist or could exist today or in the, near- and midterm future (next 10 years). It is a composite of all the operational variables and actors that create the 

conditions, circumstances, and influence that can affect military operations—and therefore serve as the 

conditions necessary for training and leader development. Most importantly, it is not a totally artificial construct created for training; rather, it is a representative composite based on the characteristics of one or 

more actual OEs in this contemporary timeframe. 

VARIABLES, SUBVARIABLES, AND SETTINGS 

3-4. The foundation of the exercise planner’s development of the appropriate OE for a training exercise is 

the eight operational variables that reside in all OEs and have the greatest impact on military forces. The 

strength of these variables is that they are flexible and scalable, capable of replicating any OE that U.S. 

forces might encounter along the full spectrum of conflict. These variables are Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment, and Time (PMESII-PT). The variables relate 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 3-1 
 

 

Chapter 3 

to specific situations as well as threat capabilities. They are relevant to every echelon of command and 

every military mission. While individual variables do not dominate every environment, they are all present 

and require careful consideration. Ignoring one or more of these variables can negatively impact military 

missions and the realism of training conditions in an exercise. 

3-5. The taxonomy of categorizing the components of any OE begins with the eight PMESII-PT. The 

next level down from the variables is the associated subvariables, which show either a menu or a range of 

choices called subvariable settings. In a few cases, a subvariable may break down into another level of 

specificity, called sub-subvariables, which have their own choices of settings. Each variable, associated 

subvariables and sub-subvariables, and their settings have specific definitions to assist the planner in 

building the desired OE. 

Note. The listed subvariables and associated settings are not necessarily all inclusive. As events, 

technology, and time change, existing subvariables may need to be modified or new ones added. 

Even in conducting an operational environment assessment (OEA) for an actual OE, additional 

subvariables may be necessary. The intent in this TC is to provide a basic guideline of areas that 

are important and may need to be considered in designing a training exercise. 

3-6. The remaining portion of this chapter will provide a detailed breakdown of each operational variable 

and their associated components in the order of the memory aid PMESII-PT. The entry for each variable 

begins with the definition of that variable. Then, for each variable, there is an initial table providing an 

overview of the associated subvariables and subvariable settings. This is followed by individual tables for 

each subvariable, providing the subvariable definition and definitions of possible subvariable settings. The 

subvariable tables also include “considerations and additional notes” usually pertaining to individual settings. Finally, the subvariable tables list other variables and subvariables whose settings would most likely 

be linked to the subvariable described in the table. However, these are not the only possible links that may 

exist. 

3-7. Exercise planners should use these tables as a tool to select the subvariable or sub-subvariable settings that create the appropriate conditions for their specific exercise. These specific conditions, along with 

scenarios and road to war, are based upon approved training objectives, the training unit’s METL, and desired exercise-training outcomes. When training for an actual OE in a specific geographical area, the exercise planner can use a TRISA-produced OEA that indicates the settings required to replicate that particular 

OE (see chapter 2). 

3-8. The impacts of the PMESII-PT variables on exercise design are significant. As discussed in chapter 

2, the PMESII-PT variables and their subvariable and sub-subvariable settings provide a comprehensive 

framework to determine the training conditions within an OE. These conditions can affect the training unit 

and OPFOR positively and negatively across the full spectrum of operations as well as at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Using these variables assists the commander in training his unit in a realistic 

and challenging environment. 

POLITICAL VARIABLE 

3-9. The Political variable describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance—formally constituted authorities, as well as informal political powers. The political variable includes influential political groups and the collective attitude of the population towards the U.S. The specific Political subvariables and their settings are depicted in table 3-1. Their associated definitions, considerations, additional notes, and external links are listed separately in tables 3-2 through 3-6. 

3-2 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

Operational Variables 

Table 3-1. Political variable and subvariable settings 

Variable Political 

Subvariable Attitude toward Centers of Type of Government Influential 

the United Political Power Government Effectiveness Political 

States and Legitimacy Groups 

Friendly Tribal Dictatorship/ 

Authoritarian 

Effective: Stable ProGovernment 

Neutral/ Town/District Theocracy Vulnerable: Opposition 

Ambivalent Recovering 

Subvariable 

Settings Hostile Provincial Representative 

Government 

Vulnerable: 

Failing 

Coalition 

National/ 

Regional 

Anarchy Crisis: Failing 

Crisis: Failed 

Table 3-2. Political: attitude toward the United States 

Definition: Describes the attitude of the government toward the United States and specifically toward the presence and 

actions of U.S. and/or coalition forces. (Once established, this subvariable manifests itself in the scenario in the form of role 

player instructions or combat instructions to the OPFOR.) 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Friendly Describes an overall favorable, positive reception of the U.S. and/or coalition forces activities, 

presence, and initiatives. 

Role-player sub-instructions limited to 20% of 

subversive activities against the training unit's 

intentions. Takes the form of infiltration, overlooking of criminal activities, active support of 

OPFOR. Also necessitates 20% of role-player 

support in the form of tips. Limits infiltration and 

scripted sabotage against the training unit’s 

actions. High level of tips (4 to 5 per day) and 

populace cooperation against OPFOR activities. 

Neutral/Ambivalent Describes an undecided reception of the U.S. 

and/or coalition forces’ activities, presence, and 

initiatives. 

Role-player sub-instructions limited to 30% of 

the scenario population engaged in some form 

of subversive activities against the training unit's 

intentions. Takes the form of infiltration, overlooking of criminal activities, and active support 

of OPFOR. Also necessitates 15% of role-player 

support in the form of tips. Increased infiltration 

and scripted sabotage against the training unit's 

actions. Moderate level of tips, (2 to 3 per day) 

and populace cooperation against OPFOR activities. 

Hostile Describes an unfavorable, negative reaction to 

the U.S. and/or coalition forces’ activities, presence, and initiatives. 

Role-player sub-instructions limited to 40% of 

the scenario population engaged in some form 

of subversive activities against the training unit's 

intentions. Takes the form of infiltration, overlooking of criminal activities, and active support 

of OPFOR. Heavy infiltration and scripted sabotage against the training unit's actions. Low level 

of tips (1 to 2 per day) and populace cooperation against OPFOR activities. 

Subvariable Links: Political: Type of Government; Social: Education Level; Economic: Employment Status. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 3-3 
 

Chapter 3 

Table 3-3. Political: centers of political power 

Definition: Determines the types of bureaucratic divisions and/or centers of power within a government. Also includes the 

level of governmental span of control from tribal to regional/national level. An example would be tribal and town/district, with 

a primary focus on town/district matters. 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Tribal Tribal focus, limited government or government 

of limited influence. Characterized by tribal elders, religious figureheads. 

Requires tribal elders, some town element manning, and portions of the other role-playing requirements element (such as NGOs, and host or 

allied nation military presence). 

Town/District Town and some district focus in the government 

day-to-day operations. 

Requires district and town elements. 

Provincial Provincial and minimal cross-border focus by 

the local and provincial government. 

Some regional (international) elements and 

story themes present in the scenario. Government role-players adopt a national focus at the 

expense of local and tribal needs. Depending 

upon the government type and status, up to one 

full role-player provincial government, district, 

town, and other group will be required to fully 

replicate the level of government specified. 

National/Regional International and cross-border focus based on 

the existence of multiple regions or national 

borders in the scenario OE. 

Also requires provincial, district, town, other 

elements (manned at some level of capacity). 

Subvariable Links: Political: Type of Government; Social: Education level, Ethnic Diversity: Infrastructure: Transportation. 

Table 3-4. Political: type of government 

Definition: Determines the type of government structure and associated behaviors encountered. 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Dictatorship/Authoritarian A mode of government characterized by the 

existence of a single ruler or group who arrogate to themselves and monopolize power in 

the state, exercising it without restraint. 

For live training requires robust domestic 

security apparatus, bureaucratic institutions, 

and bloated role-player government structure 

(1.5 normal manning). 

Theocracy A government ruled by or subject to religious 

authority. A system of government in which 

God or a deity is held to be the civil ruler. 

Can only occur in the first two categories of 

social religious diversity. 

Representative A representative form of government—either Requires specific, prominent influencers, 

Government democratic, republic, or parliamentary in 

form—with elected representatives and executives. All politics are governed by will of 

people and government has limited, defined 

powers over the population. 

council members be present in the scenario 

(in addition to the normal role-player government positions). 

Anarchy Absence of any form of political authority. 

Political disorder and confusion. Absence of 

any cohesive principle, such as a common 

standard or purpose. 

Tribal and religious role-players present in 

scenario. Small percentage of disenfranchised or former government officials with 

little influence. 

Subvariable Links: Economic: Illegal Economic Activity, Social: Education Level, Religious Diversity, Criminal Activity. 

3-4 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
Operational Variables 

Table 3-5. Political: government effectiveness and legitimacy 

Definition: Effectiveness refers to the capability of the government to work with society to assure the provision of order and 

public goods and services. Legitimacy refers to the perception by important segments of society that the government is exercising state power in ways that are reasonably fair and in the interests of the nation as a whole. 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Effective: Stable The government is able and willing to provide 

adequate security and essential services to 

significant portions of its country’s population. It 

provides military and police services that secure 

borders and limit crime, while being reasonable, 

equitable, and without major violation of human 

rights. It provides basic services that generally 

meet demand. Political institutions, processes, 

norms, and leaders are acceptable to the 

citizenry and ensure adequate response to citizen needs. 

For CTC replication, full complement of all specified role-player government positions required 

in the provincial, district and town elements. 

Government manning determined by the type of 

government selected. Defined as 60-75% of all 

government services provided throughout the 

OE, 60-75% of all infrastructures present and 

functioning. Limited civil unrest. Limited governance issues and themes (no more than three). 

1-2 instances of civil unrest or riots as a result of 

those issues and themes. 

Vulnerable: The government is recovering from crisis and The government is only partially manned and 

Recovering still either unable or unwilling to provide adequate security and essential services to all of 

the population. The legitimacy of the central 

government may still be in question. Limited civil 

unrest. 

capable of administering its area. For CTC replication, requires 3/4 complement of all specified 

role-player government positions within the OE. 

Defined as 40-60% of all government services 

provided throughout the OE, 60-75% of all infrastructures present and functioning. Moderate 

governance issues and themes (4-6, 2 of which 

are interrelated). Multiple (3-4) instances of civil 

unrest or riots as a result of those issues and 

themes. 

Vulnerable: Failing The government is becoming either unable or 

unwilling to provide adequate security and essential services to significant portions of the 

population. The legitimacy of the central government is falling into question. Increasing civil 

unrest. 

The government is only partially manned and 

capable of administering its area. For CTC replication, requires 3/4 complement of all specified 

role-player government positions within the OE. 

Defined as 40-60% of all government services 

provided throughout the OE, 60-75% of all infrastructures present and functioning. Moderate 

governance issues and themes (4-6, 2 of which 

are interrelated). Multiple (3-4) instances of civil 

unrest or riots as a result of those issues and 

themes. 

Crisis: Failing The central government does not exert effective 

control over all the country’s territory. It is becoming unable or unwilling to provide security 

and essential services for significant portions of 

the population. The central government may be 

weak, nonexistent, or simply unable or unwilling 

to provide security or basic services. There is 

great risk of violent internal conflict. 

The government is partially manned and minimally capable of administering its area. For CTC 

replication requires 1/2 or fewer complement of 

all specified role-player government positions 

within the OE. Defined as 20-40% of all government services provided throughout the OE, 

60-75% of all infrastructures present and functioning. High level of governance issues and 

themes (8-10, 4 of which are interrelated). Multiple (5-6) instances of civil unrest or riots as a 

result of those issues and themes. 

Crisis: Failed The central government does not exert effective 

control over the country’s territory. It is unable to 

provide security and essential services for significant portions of the population. The central 

government is weak, nonexistent, or simply 

unable to provide security or basic services. 

Violent internal conflict is a reality. 

The government is partially manned and largely 

incapable of administering its area. For CTC 

replication requires 1/4 or fewer complement of 

all specified role-player government positions 

within the OE. Defined as 20-40% of all government services provided throughout the OE, 

60-75% of all infrastructures present and functioning. High level of governance issues and 

themes (8-10, 4 of which are interrelated). Multiple (5-6) instances of civil unrest or riots as a 

result of those issues and themes. 

Subvariable Links: Political: Governance, Stability; Infrastructure: Utilities Present, Services Level. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 3-5 
 

Chapter 3 

Table 3-6. Political: influential political groups 

Definition: Describes the number and specifies the interaction and influence of various political groups within the country, 

region, province, district, or town. Helps define the level of government cohesion and strife within the government. 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Pro-Government Major political parties generally support the 

government in power. Minimal dissent and issues of contention. 

Presented and manifested in OE through scripting and role-player sub-instructions. If desired, 

minor issues may result in slight disruption of 

essential government functions if unaddressed 

or not resolved by the training unit. 

Coalitions Different political groups with competing interests and vary in their support of the government. 

Establishes conditions for moderate disruption 

of essential government functions and social 

volatility. 

Requires the establishment of up to three different political groups with at least two competing 

interests to be written into the scenario key 

events, back-stories, and role-player subinstructions. Conflicts should be executed or 

presented during the training exercise, using 

power bases and role-player influencers. Issues 

should result in the moderate disruption of essential government functions if unaddressed or 

not resolved by the training unit. 

Opposition Different political groups are opposed to the 

government with competing interests. Establishes conditions for major disruption of essential government functions and social volatility. 

Requires the establishment of up to three different political groups with at least two competing 

interests to be written into the scenario key 

events, back-stories, and role-player subinstructions. Conflicts should be executed or 

presented during the training exercise, using 

power bases and role-player influencers. Issues 

should result in the major disruption of essential 

government functions if unaddressed or not 

resolved by the training unit. 

Subvariable Links: Social: Social Volatility, Education Level; Economic: Economic Diversity, Employment Status. 

MILITARY VARIABLE 

3-10. The Military variable explores the military and/or paramilitary capabilities of all relevant actors 

(enemy, friendly, and neutral) in a given OE. This includes nonmilitary armed and unarmed combatants. 

The variable focuses on giving the exercise planner the ability to design appropriate OPFOR units for full 

spectrum operations. The specific military subvariables and their settings are depicted in table 3-7. Their 

associated definitions, considerations, additional notes, and external links are listed separately in tables 3-8 

through 3-13. 

3-6 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

 

 

 

 

Operational Variables 

Table 3-7. Military variable and subvariable settings 

Variable Military 

Subvariable Military 

Forces 

Government 

Military 

Forces 

Non-State 

Paramilitary 

Forces 

Unarmed 

Combatants 

Nonmilitary 

Armed 

Combatants 

Military 

Functions 

Subvariable 

Settings 

Predominantly 

Tank and 

Mechanized 

Infantry 

Operating 

Independently 

Insurgent 

Forces 

Information 

Warfare 

Personnel 

Predominantly 

Neutral 

C2 

Predominantly 

Infantry 

Supplementing 

Regular 

Military 

Guerrilla 

Forces 

Media 

(Affiliated) 

Predominantly 

Friendly 

Maneuver 

None Operating as 

Combat 

Forces 

Criminal 

Organizations 

Medical 

(Affiliated) 

Predominantly 

Hostile and 

Supporting 

Enemy 

Information 

Warfare 

Private 

Security 

Organizations 

Active Supporters Undetermined RISTA 

Coerced or 

Unwitting 

Fire 

Support 

 Financiers Protection 

See 

complete 

settings at 

table 3-11. 

Logistics 

Table 3-8. Military: military forces 

Definition: Specifies the types and sizes of military forces present within an OE. 

Subvariable Settings Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Predominantly Tank 

and Mechanized 

Infantry 

Regular military forces consisting predominantly 

(at least 40%) of tank and mechanized infantry 

forces with some infantry (non-mechanized). 

For specific tier level weapon systems, refer to 

Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) available 

online at 

https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/14751393. Predominantly 

Infantry 

Regular military forces consisting predominantly 

(more than 60%) of infantry forces (nonmechanized) with some tank and mechanized 

infantry forces. 

None No regular military forces present. 

Subvariable Links: Social: Education Level; Economic: Employment Status; Terrain: Landforms. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 3-7 
 

Chapter 3 

Table 3-9. Military: government paramilitary forces 

Definition: Describes government forces that are distinct from regular armed forces, but resembling them in organization, 

training, or mission. 

Subvariable Settings Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Operating 

Independently 

Not subordinate to or affiliated with regular military forces. May include organizations such as police, border guards, customs agents, and other internal 

security forces. 

Supplementing 

Regular Military 

Affiliated with or subordinate to regular military 

forces but performing primarily non-combat 

roles. 

Same as above with the exception that these 

forces are either part of the military force or can 

be mobilized to support the military force. 

Operating as Combat 

Forces 

Affiliated with or subordinate to regular military 

forces and performing combat missions. (Units 

are equipped with light weapons and sometimes 

heavy weapons and armored vehicles.) 

Same as above with the exception that these 

forces are trained and equipped for combat 

missions. Depending on the OE, they may be 

equipped with light or heavy weapon systems. 

Subvariable Links: Military: Non-State Paramilitary Forces; Economic: Employment Status. 

Table 3-10. Military: non-state paramilitary forces 

Definition: Describes forces or groups that are distinct from regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in 

organization, training, or mission (JP 1-02 and FM 3-07). These forces or groups may also operate in a combination of two or 

more of the subvariable settings below. (Not government forces.) 

Subvariable Settings Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Insurgent Forces An insurgency is an organized movement aimed 

at the overthrow of a constituted government 

through use of subversion and armed conflict. 

(JP 3-05) 

Insurgent forces are groups that conduct irregular or unconventional warfare within the borders 

of their country in order to undermine or 

overthrow a constituted government or civil 

authority. 

The distinction between terrorists and insurgents is often blurred because of the tactics 

employed by each. Some terrorists groups have 

become insurgent organizations, while insurgent 

organizations have used terror tactics. An insurgent organization may use more than one form 

of tactics and, based on its strategy, its actions 

could cut across the entire spectrum of warfare—employing terror, guerrilla, and conventional military tactics to achieve its goals. Typically, most insurgent groups use the first two. 

Guerrilla Forces A guerrilla force is a group of irregular, 

predominantly indigenous personnel organized 

along military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or 

denied territory. (JP 3-05) 

Some guerrilla organizations may constitute a 

paramilitary arm of an insurgent movement, 

while others may pursue guerrilla warfare independently from or loosely affiliated with an insurgent organization. Compared to insurgent 

organizations as a whole, guerrilla organizations 

have a more military-like structure. (FM 7-100.4) 

Criminal Criminal organizations are non-ideological Criminal organizations may employ criminal 

Organizations groups of people organized for the purpose of 

acquiring money by illegal means. 

actions, terror tactics, and militarily unconventional methods to achieve their goals. When 

mutual interests exist, criminal organizations 

may combine efforts with insurgent and/or guerrilla organizations controlling or operating in the 

same area. A congruence of interests can also 

result in criminal organizations having a close 

relationship with an established government. 

(FM 7-100.4) 

(continued) 

3-8 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

Operational Variables 

Table 3-10. Military: non-state paramilitary forces (continued) 

Subvariable Settings Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Private Security 

Organizations 

Private security organizations (PSOs) are business enterprises or local ad hoc groups that 

provide security and/or intelligence services, on 

a contractual or self-interest basis, to protect 

and preserve a person, facility, or operation. 

(FM 7-100.4). 

A PSO sometimes acts as an adjunct to other 

security measures, and provides advisors, instruction, and personnel for host-nation military, 

paramilitary, and police forces, as well as for 

private individuals and businesses (including 

transnational corporations). 

Subvariable Links: Political: Government Effectiveness and Legitimacy; Social: Education Level; Economic: Economic 

Activity. 

Table 3-11. Military: unarmed combatants 

Definition: Specifies the types of unarmed personnel who, given the right conditions, may decide to purposely and materially 

support hostile military or paramilitary forces in ways that do not involve possessing or using weapons. Even unarmed individuals who are coerced into performing or supporting hostile actions and those who do so unwittingly can, in some cases, 

be categorized as combatants. (FM 7-100.4) 

Subvariable Settings Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Information Warfare Personnel Self-explanatory. The intent of this subvariable is to provide 

a menu list from which to select those 

personnel or activities that provide direct or 

indirect support to an insurgency or similar 

activity. Providing these selected settings 

as part of an insurgency in an OE enhances a unit’s training by experiencing a 

more complete, realistic, and complex 

environment. 

Media (Affiliated) Self-explanatory. 

Medical (Affiliated) Self-explanatory. 

Active Supporters Self-explanatory. 

Coerced, Unwitting Supporters Self-explanatory. 

Financiers Self-explanatory. 

Suppliers Self-explanatory. 

Lookouts Self-explanatory. 

Couriers Self-explanatory. 

IED Factory Workers Self-explanatory. 

Intelligence Collection Self-explanatory. 

Targeting Information Self-explanatory. 

Leaders (Religious, Political, 

Secular, Tribal, Cultural) 

Self-explanatory. 

Technicians and Specialists Self-explanatory. 

Criminal (Affiliated) Self-explanatory. 

Transporters Self-explanatory. 

Asylum Providers/Protectors Self-explanatory. 

Recruiters Self-explanatory. 

Camera/Video Operators Self-explanatory. 

IED Trigger Personnel Self-explanatory. 

Other Affiliated Support Self-explanatory. 

None No unarmed combatants present. 

Subvariable Links: Political: Attitude toward the United States; Economic: Economic Activity; Military: Non-State Paramilitary Forces, Military Functions. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 3-9 
 

 

Chapter 3 

Table 3-12. Military: nonmilitary armed combatants 

Definition: Describes nonmilitary personnel who are armed but not part of an organized paramilitary or military structure. 

Nevertheless, they may be disgruntled and hostile. They may also be neutral or they may support either the enemy or friendly (U.S. or host nation) forces. Any number of catalysts might cause them to pick a side or change sides. Their decision may 

or may not remain permanent. (FM 7-100.4) 

Subvariable Settings Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Predominantly 

Neutral 

At least 50 percent neutral, with the remainder 

split between friendly, hostile, or undetermined. 

Predominantly 

Friendly 

At least 50 percent friendly to U.S. or host nation forces, with the remainder split between 

neutral, hostile, or undetermined. 

Predominantly 

Hostile and Supporting Enemy 

At least 50 percent hostile to U.S. or host nation 

forces or supporting the enemy, with the remainder split between neutral, friendly, or undetermined. 

Undetermined Unable to categorize relationship. This setting may be used to support training 

objectives related to determining or responding 

correctly to nonmilitary armed combatants 

whose affiliation is unknown. 

Subvariable Links: Military: Unarmed Combatants; Social: Education Level; Economic: Economic Status. 

Table 3-13. Military: military functions 

Definition: A military function is a group of related tasks, activities, capabilities, operations, processes, and organizations 

that fulfill the specific military purpose for which they all exist. When integrated with other such functions, they contribute to 

the accomplishment of larger missions. 

The subvariable settings (functions) listed below exist in varying degrees in most military organizations, as well as in some 

paramilitary organizations. Thus, military functions as sub-subvariables can have settings on a scale of High, Medium, or 

Low, defined as follows: 

•High: Can conduct sustained, complex, synchronized tasks of the selected military function; ability to influence friendly 

forces is not limited to the theater of operations; and/or associated equipment is predominantly Tier 1, as specified in the 

Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG). 

•Medium: Can conduct limited, complex, synchronized tasks of the selected military function; ability to influence friendly 

forces is primarily limited to the theater of operations; and/or associated equipment is predominantly Tier 2, as specified in 

the WEG. 

• Low: Cannot conduct complex, synchronized tasks of the selected military function; ability to influence friendly forces is 

limited to local, tactical impact; and/or associated equipment is predominantly Tier 3 and below, as specified in the WEG. 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Command and Command and control (C2) is the actions of comControl manders, command groups, and staffs of military 

headquarters to maintain continual combat readiness and combat efficiency of forces, to plan and 

prepare for combat operations, and to provide 

leadership and direction during the execution of 

assigned missions. (FM 7-100.1) 

Maneuver Maneuver is the employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination 

with fires to achieve a position of advantage in 

respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the 

mission. (JP 3-0) This function includes direct fire, 

as well as mobility support and countermobility 

operations. 

INFOWAR Information warfare (INFOWAR) is the specifically 

planned and integrated actions taken to achieve 

an information advantage at critical points and 

times. (FM 7-100.1) 

This function is linked to Information: Information Warfare, which addresses each of the 

seven elements of information warfare. 

(continued) 

3-10 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
Operational Variables 

Table 3-13. Military: military functions (continued) 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

RISTA Reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and 

target acquisition (RISTA) is the combination of 

capabilities, operations, and activities using all 

available means to obtain information concerning 

foreign nations; areas of actual or potential operations; and/or the strength, capabilities, location, 

status, nature of operations, and intentions of hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements. It includes production of intelligence resulting from the 

collection, processing, integration, evaluation, 

analysis, and interpretation of such information. It 

also includes detection, identification, and location 

of a target in sufficient detail to permit the effective 

employment of weapons. 

RISTA includes UAVs used for reconnaissance. 

This function is linked to Information: Intelligence. 

Fire Support Fire support is the collective and coordinated use 

of target acquisition, indirect fire weapons, aircraft, 

and other lethal and nonlethal means in support of 

operational or tactical objectives. (FM 7-100.1) 

Includes offensive use of CBRN weapons. 

This function is linked to the target acquisition 

portion of the RISTA function (above). 

Protection Protection is the preservation of the effectiveness 

and survivability of mission-related military and 

nonmilitary personnel (combatants and noncombatants), equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure against an adversary’s attempts to damage, degrade, or negate them and measures to 

minimize the effects of such threats. The protection function includes survivability measures, air 

and missile defense, and CBRN defense. It also 

includes information protection and security measures, which are an element of information warfare. 

This function is linked to Information: Information Warfare: Protection and Security Measures and, therefore, to the Information Warfare setting under Military: Military Functions 

(above). It is also linked to Information Security as a subset of Information: Information 

Management and to the Infrastructure variable. 

Logistics Logistics is the support activities required to sustain operations. (FM 7-100.1) 

Subvariable Links: See notes on individual military functions, above. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 3-11 
 

 

 

 

 

Chapter 3 

ECONOMIC VARIABLE 

3-11. The Economic variable encompasses individual and group behaviors related to producing, distributing, and consuming resources. Specific factors impacting behavior may include economic diversity and 

employment opportunities within an OE. Other factors include black market or underground economies, 

which are alternative structures indicating weaknesses in the mainstream economy. Such factors influence 

people’s decisions to alter or support the existing order. These decisions, if unresolved through legitimate 

political means, can lead to conflict. The specific economic subvariables and their settings represent replicable economic conditions that may be present within an OE and are depicted in table 3-14. Their associated 

definitions, considerations, additional notes, and external links are listed separately in tables 3-15 through 

3-19. 

Table 3-14. Economic variable and subvariable settings 

Variable Economic 

Subvariable Economic 

Diversity 

Employment 

Status 

Economic 

Activity 

Illegal 

Economic 

Activity 

Banking and 

Finance 

Subvariable 

Settings 

Multiple Industries 

(None Predominant) 

High 

Unemployment 

Predominantly 

Legal 

Smuggling Informal 

Multiple Industries 

(Single Predominant) 

Medium 

Unemployment 

Mixed Theft Developing 

Formal 

Single Industry 

Present 

Low 

Unemployment 

Predominantly 

Illegal 

Gang Advanced 

Formal 

Black Market 

Mixed 

Piracy 

Table 3-15. Economic: economic diversity 

Definition: Describes three different economic industries (mining, manufacturing, or agricultural) and their relative mix that 

may exist in a given country. 

Subvariable Settings Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Multiple Industries Describes the condition where multiple indus- For live training exercises, a series of props, 

(None Predominant) tries are present in an economy. All three industries are roughly equivalent in terms of their 

overall contribution to the overall economy. 

role-player instructions and scripted activities 

are required that replicate a complete agriculture, mining, manufacturing infrastructure to 

include harvesting, processing, and distribution. 

Minimum material requirements include one 

barn, one grain silo, one planting field; one mineshaft and distribution site; one factory with 

one shop selling at least one specific product 

line and one distribution center. 

Multiple Industries Describes the condition where multiple indus- Same as above with the exception that the se­

(Single Predominant) tries are present in an economy but one of the 

industries is more productive relative to the 

others. 

lected predominant industry will require at least 

twice the amount of props and role-players to 

replicate predominance in that nation’s economy. Any single industry selected as predominant 

will cause exercise planners to ensure the preponderance of storylines, themes, and roleplayers are focused on that industry and all of its 

associated parts. 

(continued) 

3-12 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
Operational Variables 

Table 3-15. Economic: economic diversity (continued) 

Subvariable Settings Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Single Industry 

Present 

Describes the condition of a single, economically significant industry. Same as above except that the selected predominant industry is the only one present and 

should also be at least twice the size of the 

multiple industry setting. The industry theme 

selected acts as the focal point for all economic 

storylines, themes, and role-players focused on 

that industry and its sustainment. 

Subvariable Links: Economic: Employment Status; Social: Education Level; Infrastructure: Urban Zones, Transportation 

Architecture. 

Table 3-16. Economic: employment status 

Definition: Represents the overall employment status of the populace. 

Subvariable Settings Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

High Unemployment 2/3 unemployment. For live training exercises it manifests itself in 

specific role assignments and sub-instructions Moderate for role-players. Unemployment 

1/2 unemployment. 

Low Unemployment Majority employed. 

Subvariable Links: Economic: Economic Diversity; Social: Education Level; Political: Government Effectiveness and Legitimacy. 

Table 3-17. Economic: economic activity 

Definition: Describes the type of economic activity present in an AO. 

(Manifests itself in a live training environment in the form of specific activities, number of role-players required to replicate the 

behavior, and scenario design instructions in the form of role descriptions for different activities.) 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Predominantly Illegal Economy lacking many products and services; 

black market operations robbery, smuggling, 

and organized crime are widespread. 

For live training exercises, it will require a roleplayer special mission element to replicate 

those conditions. Or will require sufficient roleplayer instructions and character instructions to 

replicate these activities. Black market and 

smuggling are represented by three or more 

types of illicit goods being traded—one or more 

necessary to population well being. 

Mixed Legal economy mixed with some smuggling and 

black market trade in controlled items. 

Will require half role-player special mission 

element to replicate limited black market and 

some organized crime. Will also require at least 

two smuggling or black market trading themes 

written into the scenario storyline in the form of 

role-player instructions. Also requires government ministers and regulation (customs) ministries to regulate economy. 

Predominantly Legal Limited black market, robbery, or organized 

crime activities. 

Types of crime replicated: petty theft and limited 

drug or single item smuggling, distribution and 

sales. Requires up to 2 role-player special mission elements worth of personnel to populate 

district markets and replicate regional trade and 

limited black market activity. Also requires government ministers and regulation (customs) 

ministries to regulate economy. 

Subvariable Links: Political: Type of Government; Economic: Employment Status; Social: Education Level, Social Volatility. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 3-13 
 

 

Chapter 3 

Table 3-18. Economic: illegal economic activity 

Definition: Describes the predominant type of illegal economic activities present in the AO. 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Smuggling The acquisition, distribution, and sale of a controlled, restricted, or forbidden item. 

Requires the replication of all aspects of the 

distribution chain, from suppliers to mules, to 

retail customers. For live training exercises, 

each activity represented requires 1/4 of the 

role-player special mission element to replicate 

the activity, and role-player instructions, in addition to scenario storyline. 

Theft/Looting Small theft rings that acquire and distribute 

stolen property. 

Same as above. 

Gang/Organized 

Crime 

Criminal activities such as bribery, coercion, 

thuggery, protection racket, and inter-gang rivalry. 

Same as above. 

Black Market The underground economy or black market is a 

market where all commerce is conducted without regard to taxation, law, or regulations of 

trade. 

Same as above. 

Piracy Robbery, hijacking, or other acts of violence on 

the high seas. Can also include acts committed 

in other major bodies of water or on a shore. 

Same as above. 

Mixed/Multiple 

Activities 

Multiple above-mentioned activities present in 

the AO. 

Same as above in addition to representation by 

multiple key events occurring during the scenario play. 

Subvariable Links: Political: Government Effectiveness and Legitimacy; Economic: Economic Activity, Social: Criminal 

Activity. 

Table 3-19. Economic: banking and finance 

Definition: A bank is a financial institution whose primary activity is to act as a payment agent for customers and to borrow 

and lend money. It is an institution for receiving, keeping, and lending money in hopes of repayment. A private moneylender 

offers small personal loans at high rates of interest, usually higher rates than the market rate charged on credit cards or on 

bank overdrafts. 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Informal A private moneylender type arrangement. For live training exercises, currency requirements are enough denominations of currency to 

issue 20 bills of various denominations to each 

role-player present in the AO. Requires at least 

one moneylender, with currency per town. 

Developing-Formal Mixture of private moneylenders and banking 

infrastructure. 

Same as above. Also includes a bank building 

with props per town. 

Advanced-Formal Banking infrastructure prevalent throughout the 

AO. Private money lending restricted to criminal/gang activity. 

Same as above. 

Subvariable Links: Political: Type of Government; Social: Education Level, Information: Public Communications Media. 

3-14 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

 

 

 

 

Operational Variables 

SOCIAL VARIABLE 

3-12. The Social variable describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup within an OE and the beliefs, 

values, customs, and behaviors of society members. Societies are comprised of structured and overlapping 

groups and institutions, each with relative statuses and roles that support, enable, and provide opportunity 

to achieve personal or community expectations. Important characteristics of a social system include population demographics, migration trends, and diversity of religious and ethnic groups. Understanding these 

complex interrelationships in a society is vitally important for successful military missions. The specific 

social subvariables and their settings represent replicable social conditions that may be present within an 

OE and are depicted in table 3-20. Their associated definitions, considerations, additional notes, and external links are listed separately in tables 3-21 through 3-29. 

Table 3-20. Social variable and subvariable settings 

Variable Social 

Subvariable Demographic 

Mix 

Social 

Volatility 

Education 

Level 

Ethnic 

Diversity 

Religious 

Diversity 

Subvariable 

Settings 

Balanced Low Limited Single (NonCompetitive) Single (NonCompetitive) 

Unbalanced, 

Gender 

Moderate Moderate Multiple 

(Competitive, 

Single Predominant) 

Multiple 

(Competitive, 

Single 

Predominant) 

Unbalanced, Age High High Multiple 

(Competitive, 

None 

Predominant) 

Multiple 

(Competitive, 

None 

Predominant) 

Unbalanced, 

Gender and Age 

Subvariable Population 

Movement 

Common 

Languages 

Criminal 

Activity 

Human 

Rights 

Subvariable 

Settings 

Settled, Stable Single Limited Women 

Mixed Multiple (One 

Preferred) 

Moderate Human 

Trafficking 

Migrant Multiple (None 

Preferred) 

High Child 

Warriors 

IDPs Torture 

Refugees Genocide 

Slavery 

Table 3-21. Social: demographic mix 

Definition: Describes the gender and military age balance of the population. 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Balanced A population consisting of equal proportions of 

gender and military age. 

Unbalanced, Gender A population consisting of an unequal proportion 

by gender (male, female) in relation to the overall group. The military age proportion of the 

population is not affected and remains the same 

as if it were in a balanced setting. 

If an unstable society is desired in constructing 

an OE for training, this subvariable should be 

combined with other negative settings from 

other Social subvariables (see subvariable links 

below). 

(continued) 

Unbalanced, Age A population consisting of a greater proportion 

of the military age (male, female) in relation to 

the overall population. The gender proportion of 

the population is not affected and remains the 

same as if it were in a balanced setting. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 3-15 
 

Chapter 3 

Table 3-21. Social: demographic mix (continued) 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Unbalanced, Gender 

and Age 

A population consisting of unequal proportions 

of gender (male, female) and military age in 

relation to the overall group. 

Subvariable Links: Political: Type of Government; Social: Social Volatility; Education Level, Criminal Activity, Human 

Rights. 

Table 3-22. Social: social volatility 

Definition: Describes the amount of conflict between religious or ethnic groups present in a society and the amount of civil 

unrest present. 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Low Low intergroup conflicts. Civil unrest is minimal. 

No significant refugee presence. High religious, 

ethnic, and political diversity. 

1-2 preplanned or spontaneous riots or civil 

disorders based on religious or ethnic strife 

present within the scenario. 

Moderate Moderate intergroup conflicts. Civil unrest is 

sporadic. Minimal refugee presence. Some lack 

of religious, ethnic, and political diversity. 

3-4 preplanned or spontaneous riots or civil 

disorders based on religious or ethnic strife 

present within the scenario. 

High High intergroup conflicts. Civil unrest is significant. Large refugee presence. Significant lack of 

religious, ethnic, and political diversity. 

5-6 preplanned or spontaneous riots or civil 

disorders based on religious or ethnic strife 

present within the scenario. 

Subvariable Links: Political: Government Effectiveness and Legitimacy; Social: Ethnic Diversity, Religious Diversity, Education Level. 

Table 3-23. Social: education level 

Definition: Describes the education level of the population. (Helps determine the scripting requirements and may introduce 

specific scenario sub-themes into an OE.) 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Limited Limited population literacy and education. Primitive education infrastructure and high unemployment. 

Recommend 1/4 role-player population literate 

or educated for live training exercises. Limited 

education infrastructure and jobs (no more than 

5%). 

Moderate Moderate population literacy and education. 

Some education infrastructure and moderate 

unemployment. 

Recommend 1/2 role-player population literate 

or educated. Moderate amount of education 

infrastructure and jobs (no more than 10%). 

High High population literacy and education. Significant education infrastructure and low unemployment. 

Recommend 3/4 role-player population literate 

or educated. High amount of education infrastructure and jobs (no more than 15%). 

Subvariable Links: Political: Government Effectiveness and Legitimacy; Economic: Employment Status; Social: Social Volatility. 

Table 3-24. Social: ethnic diversity 

Definition: Describes the number and specifies the interaction of various ethnic groups within a given population. 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Single Group, 

Non-Competitive 

Self-explanatory. 

(continued) 

3-16 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

Operational Variables 

Table 3-24. Social: ethnic diversity (continued) 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Multiple Group, 

Competitive, Single 

Predominant 

Up to three distinct ethnic groups distributed 

throughout a given area with one group clearly 

identifiable as the dominant population. 

Role-player population with one group as the 

dominant population. 

Multiple Group, 

Competitive, None 

Predominant 

Three or more distinct ethnic groups distributed 

throughout a given area with no group designated as the dominant population. 

Role-player population with no group designated 

as the dominant population. 

Subvariable Links: Social: Religious Diversity, Social Volatility, Population Movement, Common Languages. 

Table 3-25. Social: religious diversity 

Definition: Describes the number and specifies the interaction of various religious groups within a state or scenario population. 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Single Religion, NonCompetitive 

Self-explanatory. 

Multiple Religions, 

Competitive, Single 

Predominant 

Up to three distinct religious groups distributed 

within a given area with one group as the dominant population. 

Role-player population with one group as the 

dominant population. 

Multiple Religions, 

Competitive, None 

Predominant 

Up to three distinct religious groups distributed 

within a given area with no group designated as 

the dominant population. 

Role-player population with no group designated 

as the dominant population. 

Subvariable Links: Social: Ethnic Diversity, Social Volatility, Population Movement, Common Languages. 

Table 3-26. Social: population movement 

Definition: Describes the initial prevalence of migrant populations, internally displaced persons, and refugees within a country, region, or area. (This designation does not preclude the possibility of migrant populations as a result of the training unit's 

action or inaction.) 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Settled, Stable Population is settled, organized, and does not 

move or displace except when confronted with 

occasions of extreme duress. 

Mixed Part of population is settled and part moves 

frequently. 

Population movement is based on the training 

unit's activities or pre-scripted as a scenario 

sub-event in response to training needs. 

Migrant Population frequently moves as a part of the 

normal state of affairs. 

1-2 special mission elements’ worth of roleplayers. Will cause the Political: Centers of Political Power subvariable to most likely be Tribal. 

Internally Displaced 

Persons 

A person who is involuntary moved inside the 

national boundaries of his or her country. 

Refugees A person who, by reason of real or imagined 

danger, has left their home country or country of 

their nationality and is unwilling or unable to 

return. 

Subvariable Links: Economic: Employment Status; Economic Diversity; Social: Social Volatility, Common Languages. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 3-17 
Chapter 3 

Table 3-27. Social: common languages 

Definition: The preferred language(s) of a specific country or region or lack thereof. 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Single Preferred and 

Predominant 

Language 

Self-explanatory. 

Multiple Languages 

with One the 

Preferred Language 

Country or region where several languages 

exist but one is recognized and used by the 

population as the preferred language. 

For CTC replication, requires relatively high resources and support for an OE with multiple languages in terms of role-players and interpreters. 

Multiple Languages 

with No Preferred 

or Predominant 

Language 

Country or region where there is no preferred 

or predominant language. Frequently found in 

failed nation-states or states where the national language is not used except in specialized areas such as commerce. 

Same as above. 

Subvariable Links: Social: Demographic Mix, Ethnic Diversity, Population Movement. 

Table 3-28. Social: criminal activity 

Definition: Defines the level of criminal activity present in a society. 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Limited Limited criminal activity. For CTC replication, 1-2 activities present from criminal 

activity. Limited to up to 30% of the total urban landscape. 

Moderate Moderate criminal activity present. For CTC replication, 1-3 activities present from criminal 

activity. Limited to up to 50% of the total urban landscape. Presence of at least one criminal gang distributed 

throughout the scenario environment. 

High High criminal activity present. For CTC replication, 3-4 activities present from criminal 

activity. Two or more rival criminal gangs or organizations present and active in the scenario (manifested by 

competition, gang or mob warfare). Limited to presence 

in 75% of the total urban landscape. 

Subvariable Links: Political: Type of Government; Military: Non-State Paramilitary Forces; Economic: Illegal Economic 

Activity. 

Table 3-29. Social: human rights 

Definition: Human rights refer to the basic rights and freedoms to which all humans are entitled. Examples of rights and 

freedoms that have come to be commonly thought of as human rights include: civil and political rights, such as the right to 

life and liberty, freedom of expression, and equality before the law; and economic and social rights, including the right to 

participate in culture, the right to food, the right to work, and the right to education. 

The most widely recognized international documentation of human rights is the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights 

(UDHR), which has been ratified by the majority of the world’s nations. However, many nations still struggle or refuse to implement all of 

the provisions of this declaration. Understanding whether and to what extent each country or region is complying with internationally 

recognized human rights is critical to the success of military operations. Below are some of the more blatant areas of violation within 

human rights. These are areas the U.S. military has faced in the recent past that may be important to understand in a future AO. 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Women Issues relating to the political, economic, civil, 

social, and educational rights of women. 

Examples of issues related to these areas are 

voting rights, employment discrimination, sexual 

discrimination, honor killings, forced and early 

marriages, reproductive rights, health care, and 

educational discrimination. 

(continued) 

3-18 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
Operational Variables 

Table 3-29. Social: human rights (continued) 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Human Trafficking Human trafficking is the commerce and trade in 

the movement or migration of people, legal and 

illegal, including legitimate labor activities as 

well as forced labor. The term is used in a more 

narrow sense by advocacy groups to mean the 

recruitment, transportation, harboring, or receipt 

of people for the purposes of slavery, prostitution, forced labor (including bonded labor or 

debt bondage), and servitude. 

Human trafficking is the fastest growing criminal 

industry in the world, with the total annual revenue for trafficking in persons estimated to be 

between $5 billion and $9 billion. (Fact Sheet 1, 

Economic Roots of Trafficking in the UNECE 

Region, Geneva, 15 Dec 04). 

Child Warriors Child warriors are the result of forced or compulsory recruitment of anyone under the age of 

18 for use in armed conflict. This can include 

children taking direct part in hostilities or used in 

support roles such as porters, spies, messengers, or lookouts. 

In over 20 countries around the world, children 

are direct participants in war. Denied a childhood and often subjected to horrific violence, an 

estimated 200,000 to 300,000 children are serving as soldiers for both rebel groups and government forces in current armed conflicts. 

Torture Torture, according to the UN Convention 

Against Torture, is: “any act by which severe 

pain and suffering, whether physical or mental, 

is intentionally inflicted on a person for such 

purposes as obtaining from him, or a third person, information or a confession, punishing him 

for an act he or a third person has committed or 

is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any 

reason based on discrimination of any kind, 

when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at 

the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting 

in an official capacity. It does not include pain or 

suffering arising only from, inherent in, or incidental to, lawful sanctions.” 

Torture is widely considered to be a violation of 

human rights, and is declared to be unacceptable by Article 5 of the UN Universal Declaration 

of Human Rights. Signatories of the Third Geneva Convention and Fourth Geneva Convention officially agree not to torture prisoners in 

armed conflicts. Torture is also prohibited by the 

UN Convention Against Torture, which has been 

ratified by 145 states. However, Amnesty International estimates that at least 81 world governments currently practice torture, some openly. 

Genocide The 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and 

Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG). 

Article 2, defines genocide as: "any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in 

whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or 

religious group, as such: killing members of the 

group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to 

members of the group; deliberately inflicting on 

the group conditions of life, calculated to bring 

about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 

imposing measures intended to prevent births 

within the group; [and] forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.” 

To commit genocide, the perpetrators need a 

strong, centralized authority and bureaucratic 

organization as well as pathological individuals 

and criminals. Also required is a campaign of 

vilification and dehumanization of the victims by 

the perpetrators, who are usually new states or 

new regimes attempting to impose conformity to 

a new ideology and its model of society. Examples of recent acts of genocide are Rwanda, 

Former Yugoslavia, and Sudan. 

Slavery Slavery is a form of forced labor in which people 

are considered to be, or treated as, the property 

of others. Slaves are held against their will from 

the time of their capture, purchase, or birth, and 

are deprived of the right to leave, to refuse to 

work, or to receive compensation (such as wages). 

Evidence of slavery predates written records, 

and has existed to varying extents, forms and 

periods in almost all cultures and continents. In 

some societies, slavery existed as a legal institution or socio-economic system, but today it is 

formally outlawed in nearly all countries. Nevertheless, the practice continues in various forms 

around the world. Freedom from slavery is an 

internationally recognized human right. Article 4 

of the UDHR states: “No one shall be held in 

slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade 

shall be prohibited in all their forms.” 

Subvariable Links: Political: Type of Government; Military: Non-State Paramilitary Forces; Economic: Illegal Economic 

Activity. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 3-19 
 

 

 

 

 

 

Chapter 3 

INFORMATION VARIABLE 

3-13. The Information variable describes the nature, scope, characteristics, and effects of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. Information involves the 

access, use, manipulation, distribution, and reliance on information technology systems, both civilian and 

military, by an entity (state or non-state). Understanding whatever communication infrastructure exists in 

an OE is important because it ultimately controls the flow of information to the population and military 

and/or paramilitary forces, as well as influencing local and international audiences. Communication availability can act as a leveling function with regard to mitigating military technical advantages to a surprising 

extent. Military units must understand and engage in the information environment in order to achieve their 

objectives. The specific information subvariables and their settings represent replicable conditions that may 

be present within an OE and are depicted in table 3-30. Their associated definitions, considerations, additional notes, and external links are listed separately in tables 3-31 through 3-34. 

Table 3-30. Information variable and subvariable settings 

Variable Information 

Subvariable Public 

Communications 

Media 

Information 

Warfare 

Intelligence Information 

Management 

Internet Electronic 

Warfare 

Open-Source 

Intelligence 

Rudimentary 

Subvariable 

Settings 

Television Computer 

Warfare 

Human 

Intelligence 

Basic 

Radio Information 

Attack 

Signals 

Intelligence 

Medium 

Print Media Deception Imagery 

Intelligence 

Advanced 

Telephone Physical 

Destruction 

Postal and 

Courier Service 

Protection and 

Security 

Measures 

Word of Mouth Perception 

Management 

Table 3-31. Information: public communications media 

Definition: Describes the type of information or media sources that may be available to the public in an OE. 

(The individual media as sub-subvariables can have settings reflecting the level of availability: None = nonexistent; Limited = 

available in large cities only; Moderate = available in cities and some towns; Widespread = available down to town level.) 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Internet Self-explanatory. Interruptible, 4-5 building intranet access per town, capable of replicating 

an Internet capable of hosting at least 6 dynamic pages or sites consisting of the following site types: 2 weblogs, 2 Internet chat rooms, and 2 

news websites. 

Television Self-explanatory. A single channel, cable broadcast capability with a connected studio production site (located in exercise area), associated personnel, and sufficient programming to broadcast 10 hours per day. 

(continued) 

3-20 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
Operational Variables 

Table 3-31. Information: public communications media (continued) 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Radio Self-explanatory. An AM or FM radio broadcast station, with associated personnel, and the 

ability to broadcast programming for 10 hours per day for the duration of 

an exercise. Broadcast and studio facilities would ideally be located in the 

exercise area to enhance play. 

Print Media Self-explanatory. Media personnel (role-players) and associated equipment required to 

create and locally produce a single-page newspaper or flyer. Minimum of 

one production element present per 2 towns. 

Telephone Self-explanatory. Landline and/or mobile telephone service. 

Postal and 

Courier Service 

Self-explanatory. Postal or courier personnel (role-players) and associated transportation 

means. 

Word of Mouth Self-explanatory. Scripted instructions to role-players to report specific information, relay 

certain data, or to spontaneously report on specific activities. 

Subvariable Links: Economic: Banking and Finance; Social: Social Volatility, Ethnic Diversity, Criminal Activity, Common 

Languages; Information: Information Management; Infrastructure: Utility Level, Utilities Present, Transportation Architecture. 

Table 3-32. Information: information warfare 

Definition: Information warfare (INFOWAR) is the specifically planned and integrated actions taken to achieve an information advantage at critical points and times. (FM 7-100.1) INFOWAR consists of seven elements: electronic warfare (EW), 

computer warfare, information attack, deception, physical destruction, protection and security measures, and perception 

management. These elements do not exist in isolation from one another and are not mutually exclusive. (FM 7-100.1) 

(INFOWAR elements as sub-subvariables can have settings on a scale of 1 to 5: 1 = Very Limited; 2 = Limited; 3 = Moderate; 4 = Good; 5 = Superior.) 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Electronic Warfare Consists of countermeasures conducted to 

control or deny other actors’ use of the electromagnetic spectrum, while ensuring one’s own 

use of it. EW capabilities allow an actor to exploit, deceive, degrade, disrupt, damage, or 

destroy sensors, processors, and C2 nodes. 

(FM 7-100.1) 

At a minimum, the goal of EW is to control the 

use of the electromagnetic spectrum at critical 

locations and times or to attack a specific system. 

To accomplish these EW goals and objectives, 

actors can employ both lethal and nonlethal 

measures. Lethal EW activities include the physical destruction of high-priority targets supporting 

another actor’s decisionmaking process—such 

as reconnaissance sensors, command posts, 

and communications systems. They also include activities such as lethal air defense suppression measures. If available, precision munitions can degrade or eliminate high-technology 

C2 assets and associated links. Nonlethal EW 

means range from signals reconnaissance and 

electronic jamming to the deployment of protective countermeasures and deception jammers. 

Sophisticated camouflage, deception, decoy, or 

mockup systems can degrade the effects of 

enemy reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) systems. 

Also, an actor can employ low-cost GPS jammers to disrupt another actor’s precision munitions targeting, sensor-to-shooter links, and 

navigation. (FM 7-100.1) 

(continued) 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 3-21 
 

 

Chapter 3 

Table 3-32. Information: information warfare (continued) 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Computer Warfare Consists of attacks that focus specifically on computer systems, networks, and/or nodes. This includes a wide variety of activities, ranging from 

unauthorized access (hacking) of information systems for intelligence-collection purposes, to the 

insertion of malicious software (viruses, worms, 

logic bombs, or Trojan horses) and deceptive 

information entry into computer systems. Such 

attacks concentrate on the denial of service and 

disruption or manipulation of the integrity of the 

information infrastructure. (FM 7-100.1) 

Actors may attempt to accomplish these activities through the use of agents or third-party 

individuals with direct access to another actor’s 

information systems. They can also continually 

access and attack systems at great distances 

via communications links such as the Internet or 

various wireless devices. (FM 7-100.1) 

Information Attack An information attack (IA) focuses on the intentional disruption or distortion of information in a 

manner that supports a comprehensive 

INFOWAR campaign. Unlike computer warfare 

attacks that target the information systems, IAs 

target the information itself. (FM 7-100.1) 

An IA may target an information system for 

sabotage (electronically or physically) or manipulate and exploit information. This may involve 

altering data, stealing data, or forcing a system 

to perform a function for which it was not intended. (FM 7-100.1) 

Deception Deception activities include measures designed 

to mislead adversaries by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of information. The aim of 

deception is to influence opponents’ situational 

understanding and lead them to act in a manner 

that is prejudicial to their own interests or favors 

the actor employing the deception. (FM 7-100.1) 

Deception measures are a part of every military 

operation, and are also used to achieve political 

and economic goals. The international media 

may be a target for deceptive information at the 

operational level, being fed false stories and 

video that portrays tactical-level actions with the 

goal of influencing operational or even strategic 

decisions. (FM 7-100.1) 

Forms of deception that support IW range from 

physical decoys and electronic devices, to operational activities, to casualty “photo ops” 

staged for unsuspecting media personnel. Successful deception activities depend on the identification and exploitation of enemy information 

systems and networks, as well as other “conduits” for introducing deceptive information. 

(FM 7-100.1) 

Physical Destruction Physical destruction, as an element of 

INFOWAR, involves measures to destroy critical 

components of the enemy’s information infrastructure. (FM 7-100.1) 

The OPFOR integrates all types of conventional 

and precision weapon systems to conduct the 

destructive fires, to include fixed- and rotarywing aviation, cannon artillery, multiple rocket 

launchers, and surface-to-surface missiles. It 

can also utilize other means of destruction, such 

as explosives delivered by special-purpose 

forces (SPF), insurgents, terrorists, or even coopted civilians. Physical destruction activities 

can be integrated with jamming to maximize 

their effects. (FM 7-100.1) 

Protection and The purpose of protection and security meas- Protection and security measures conducted as 

Security Measures ures in INFOWAR is to protect one’s own information infrastructure, maintain one’s own capabilities for effective C2, and deny protected information to other actors. (FM 7-100.1) 

part of INFOWAR include— 

• Information collection, processing, and utilization. 

• Reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance. 

• Information and operations security. 

• Camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception. 

• Force protection. 

• Secure use of information-collection and 

–processing systems. 

An actor’s capability against its main opponent 

can come from a high-tech asset or a low-tech 

approach. (FM 7-100.1) 

(continued) 

3-22 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
Operational Variables 

Table 3-32. Information: information warfare (continued) 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Perception Perception management involves measures Enemy or foreign audiences, as well as the local 

Management aimed at creating a perception of truth that 

furthers an actor’s objective. It integrates several widely differing activities that use a combination of true, false, misleading, or manipulated 

information. (FM 7-100.1) 

population, may be targets of perception management. Perception management can include 

misinformation, media manipulation, and psychological warfare. (FM 7-100.1) 

Psychological warfare (PSYWAR) is the capability and activities designed to influence selected friendly, neutral, and/or hostile target 

audiences’ attitudes and behaviors in support of 

the actor. PSYWAR can target either specific 

decisionmaking systems or the entire information system of the target audience, while influencing key communicators and decisionmakers. Such attacks target an enemy’s perceived 

centers of gravity. For example, prolonging an 

operation and using all forms of media to show 

the devastation of conflict can sway public opinion against the effort. (FM 7-100.1) 

Many actors skillfully employ media and other 

neutral actors, such as NGOs, to influence further public and private perceptions. Actors can 

exploit the international media’s willingness to 

report information without independent and 

timely confirmation. Individuals such as agents 

of influence, sympathizers, and antiwar protesters are also employed advantageously to 

influence the enemy’s media, politicians, and 

citizenry. (FM 7-100.1) 

Subvariable Links: 

Present. 

 Military: Military Functions; Information: Information Management; Infrastructure: Utility Level, Utilities 

Table 3-33. Information: intelligence 

Definition: The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of 

available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity which results in the product and to the organizations engaged in such 

activity. (JP 2-0) 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Open-Source 

Intelligence (OSINT) 

Information of potential intelligence value that is 

available to the general public. (JP 2-0) 

OSINT is derived from the systematic collection, 

processing, and analysis of publicly available, relevant information in response to intelligence requirements. (FM 2-0) 

OSINT is produced from publicly available 

information that is collected, exploited, and 

disseminated in a timely manner to an appropriate audience for the purpose of addressing 

a specific intelligence requirement. (National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2006) 

Human Intelligence A category of intelligence derived from information Special-purpose forces (SPF) are a major 

(HUMINT) collected and provided by human sources. (JP 2-0) 

HUMINT is the collection or foreign information— 

by a trained HUMINT collector—from people and 

multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, 

personnel, and capabilities. It uses human sources 

as a tool and a variety of collection methods, both 

passively and actively, to collect information. (FM 

2-0) 

source of human intelligence (HUMINT). 

(FM 7-100.1) 

(continued) 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 3-23 
Chapter 3 

Table 3-33. Information: intelligence (continued) 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Signals Intelligence 1. A category of intelligence comprising either In OPFOR terminology, signals reconnais-

(SIGINT) individually or in combination all communications 

intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign 

instrumentation signals intelligence, however 

transmitted. 2. Intelligence derived from communications, electronic, and foreign instrumentation 

signals. (JP 1-02) 

SIGINT is intelligence produced by exploiting foreign communication systems and noncommunications emitters. (JP 2-0) 

The SIGINT discipline is comprised of communications intelligence (COMINT), electronic intelligence 

(ELINT), and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT). (FM 2-0) 

sance is an integral part of information warfare. The overall scope of signals reconnaissance includes the interception, analysis, and 

exploitation of electromagnetic (radio and 

radar) emissions, coupled with measures to 

disrupt or destroy the enemy’s radio and radar assets. (FM 7-100.1) 

Imagery Intelligence The technical, geographic, and intelligence infor- IMINT is intelligence derived from the exploi­

(IMINT) mation derived through the interpretation or analysis of imagery and collateral materials. (JP 2-03) 

tation of imagery collected by visual photography, infrared, lasers, multi-spectral sensors, and radar. These sensors produce images of objects optically, electronically, or 

digitally on film, electronic display devices, or 

other media. (FM 2-0) 

Subvariable Links: Military: Military Functions; Social: Education Level; Information: Information Warfare, Information 

Management. 

Table 3-34. Information: information management 

Definition: Information Management is the science of using procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, 

display, disseminate, and protect knowledge products, data, and information. (FM 3-0). It employs both staff management 

and automatic processes to focus a vast array of information and make relevant information available to the right person at 

the right time. Effective information management—synchronized with reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target 

acquisition (RISTA) operations—enables commanders to gain and maintain information superiority. The level of Information 

management is defined by management, systems, and security. The three are intertwined and are therefore addressed as a 

composite capability in this subvariable. 

Information Systems: The equipment and facilities that collect, process, store, display and disseminate information. This 

includes computers—hardware and software—and communications, as well as policies and procedures for their use. (FM 3­

0) Information systems and information management appear similar because they are intertwined. The sophistication of the 

information systems largely determines the capability of military command and control (C2) and civil interconnectivity. 

Information Security: The protection of information and information systems against unauthorized access or modification of 

information, whether in storage, processing, or transit, and against denial of services to authorized users. (JP 3-13) Information security includes those measures necessary to detect, document, and counter such threats. Information security is composed of computer security and communications security. 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Rudimentary Individuals or small groups supported by statesponsored institutions (military or civilian) and 

non-state international groups. Military uses 

computers, analog, Internet, cell phones, radios, 

satellite phones, etc. Limited-to-no military automated information management systems. 

Commercial, business, and finance standalone systems. Communications systems separate but basic. 0 to 24% encrypted (secure). 

Relevant information is all information of importance to commanders and staffs in the exercise 

of command and control. (FM 3-0) 

Information superiority is the operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, 

and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same (JP 3-13). 

(continued) 

3-24 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
Operational Variables 

Table 3-34. Information: information management (continued) 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Basic Integrated digital information management systems. Military: digitized: computerized reports, 

direct GPS and encryption (selected), direct 

sensor-to-shooter links, laser range-finders, Internet, broadcast tactical warning systems. Commercial, business, communications and finance 

systems linked locally but not integrated. 25% to 

50% encrypted (secure). 

Allows commanders to take advantage of opportunities, while denying adversary commanders 

the information needed to make timely and accurate decisions or leading them to make decisions favorable to friendly forces. 

Medium Windows of information domination. Military: 

integrated battlefield management systems, 

integrated C2, navigation, fire control, RISTA, 

image, maps, video, encrypted to battalion level, 

with or without SATCOM, GPS to squad level. 

Some commercial, business, communications 

and finance systems integrated locally, others 

linked. Some linked internationally. 51% to 75% 

encrypted (secure). 

Advanced Advanced (state-of-the-art) information systems. 

Maintains information superiority. Creates conditions that allow commanders to shape the OE 

and enhance the effects of all elements of combat power. Military: U.S. Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) and/or Blue (& 

Red) Force Tracker or foreign equivalent. Technological advancements in automated information systems and communications allow commanders to see the battlefield as actions unfold, 

near real-time, and to rapidly pass information 

across their AOs. Commercial, business, 

communications, and finance systems integrated locally and internationally. 76% to 90% 

encrypted (secure). 

Subvariable Links: Military: Military Functions; Social: Education Level; Information: Information Warfare; Infrastructure: 

Utility Level. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 3-25 
 

 

 

 

 

 

Chapter 3 

INFRASTRUCTURE VARIABLE 

3-14. The Infrastructure variable is composed of the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for 

the functioning of a community or society. The degradation or destruction of infrastructure will impact the 

entire OE, especially the Political, Military, Economic, Social, and Information variables. This variable also reflects the infrastructure sophistication of an OE. The specific infrastructure subvariables and their settings represent replicable conditions that may be present within an OE and are depicted in table 3-35. Their 

associated definitions, considerations, additional notes, and external links are listed separately in tables 3-

36 through 3-41. 

Table 3-35. Infrastructure variable and subvariable settings 

Variable Infrastructure 

Subvariable Construction Pattern Urban 

Zones 

Urbanized 

Building 

Density 

Utilities 

Present 

Utility Level Transportation 

Architecture 

Subvariable 

Settings 

Dense, 

Random 

City Core Low Power Non-Existent Primitive 

Close Orderly 

Block 

Core 

Periphery 

Medium Water Degraded Moderate 

Strip Area High-Rise 

Residential 

High Sewage Developed Complex 

Shantytown Low-Rise 

Residential 

 Services and 

Transportation 

Commercial 

Area 

Industrial 

Area 

 Military Area 

Table 3-36. Infrastructure: construction pattern 

Definition: The physical layout of buildings and streets in an urban area (village, town, or city). 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Dense, Random 

Construction 

Urban area consisting of closely packed buildings with little set-back from narrow winding 

streets that often radiate in an irregular manner 

from a single area, such as a religious building, 

dock area, or government center. 

This construction pattern is typical in old walled 

towns and cities and old port towns and cities. 

Frequently found in city core and core periphery 

zones. May also be found in towns and villages. 

Close Orderly Block 

Construction 

Urban area consisting of residential and 

commercial type buildings forming distinct rectangular blocks. Buildings frequently share a 

continuous front along the street for as much as 

a city block, and inner-block courtyards are 

common. Streets are generally wider and form 

rectangular patterns. 

This construction pattern is often typical of a 

designed or planned urban area. Frequently 

found in city core and core periphery zones. 

(continued) 

3-26 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

Operational Variables 

Table 3-36. Infrastructure: construction pattern (continued) 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Strip Area A strip area is a small urban area predominately 

built along a transportation route, such as a 

road or river. Usually assumes a long, thin, 

linear pattern. 

The strip area may stand alone or be linked between nearby larger urban areas. If visibility is 

good and enough effective fields of fire are available, a unit acting as a security force need occupy 

only a few strong positions spread out within the 

strip. This will deceive the enemy, when engaged 

at long ranges, into thinking the strip is an extensive defensive line. Strip areas often afford covered avenues of withdrawal to the flanks once the 

attacking force is deployed and before the security 

force becomes decisively engaged. 

Shantytown Random arrangement of poorly constructed 

structures made of any scrap material available, 

irregularly laid out, and connected by walking 

paths that may not accommodate vehicular 

traffic. 

Shantytowns are typically areas composed of 

low income or unemployed elements of the 

population who live in poorly constructed buildings or older buildings in various states of decay. Most towns and villages in third world countries have shantytowns that often can be found 

in multiple zones throughout the area. 

Structures within shantytowns are constructed 

from readily available materials, such as cardboard, tin, adobe, or concrete block. These less 

structurally sound buildings have no common 

floor pattern and are more likely to have only 

one room. 

Random arrangement of structures, absence of 

formal street naming, and often the lack of easily identifiable buildings and terrain create challenges. The temporary nature of the structures 

can mean that mobility can be either more or 

less restricted than other sections of an urban 

area. Mobility becomes more restrictive as the 

narrow paths often do not accommodate vehicles. Weak structures afford little protection 

and increase the risk of fratricide, civilian casualties, and large, rapidly spreading fires. 

Subvariable Links: Military: Military Forces; Economics: Economic Diversity; Infrastructure: Urban Zones, Urbanized Building Density. 

Table 3-37. Infrastructure: urban zones 

Definition: Distinct areas or zones within a city that is geographically identifiable. These zones are normally categorized by 

the predominate activity within their boundaries. 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

City Core The city core is the heart of the urban area—the 

downtown or central business district. It is relatively small and compact but contains a large 

percentage of the urban area’s shops, offices, 

and public institutions. It normally contains the 

highest density of multistory buildings and subterranean areas. Older city cores have narrow 

streets (7 to 15 m wide), while newer, planned 

developments have wider streets (at least 15 to 

25 m wide). In most cities, the core has undergone more recent development than the core 

periphery. As a result, the two regions are often 

quite different. Typical city cores are made up of 

buildings that vary greatly in height. 

Buildings 15-20 stories and higher (possibly up 

to 50 stories above ground and 4 stories below 

ground). Older city cores have few open areas 

and buildings are closer to streets, but modern 

urban planning allows for more open spaces. 

Large workforce; few residents. Dense random 

and close orderly block are two common construction patterns that can be found within the 

city core. 

(continued) 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 3-27 
 

 

Chapter 3 

Table 3-37. Infrastructure: urban zones (continued) 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Core Periphery The core periphery is located at the outer edges 

of the city core. The core periphery consists of 

streets 12 to 20 m wide with continuous fronts of 

brick or concrete buildings. The building heights 

are fairly uniform—2 or 3 stories in small towns, 

five to ten stories in large cities. 

Buildings 2-10 stories. Few open areas (but 

more than in city core). Large workforce; average residents. Dense random and close orderly 

block are two common construction patterns 

that can be found within core periphery zones. 

High-Rise Typical of modern construction in larger cities Buildings 15-20 stories and higher. Limited open 

Residential Area and towns, this area consists of multistoried 

apartments. Wide streets are laid out in rectangular patterns. Rarely are there unbroken rows 

of houses facing the street in this type area. 

areas (such as parking lots, recreation areas, 

parks, and individual one-story buildings). Average workforce; average residents. These areas 

are often contiguous to industrial or transportation areas or interspersed with close orderly 

block areas. 

Low-Rise Residential 

Area 

Dispersed row houses or single-family dwellings 

with yards, gardens, trees, and fences. Street 

patterns are normally rectangular or curving. 

However, buildings are normally set back from 

the road. 

Buildings 1-3 stories. Many open areas. Small 

workforce; many residents. Residential zones 

are typically subdivided by income or culturally 

important factors, such as ethnicity or religion. 

This type area is normally contiguous to close 

orderly block areas in Europe. In some areas of 

the world, residential areas may be located in 

high walled compounds with houses built right 

up to the edge of the street. 

Commercial Area Rows of stores, shops, and restaurants built 

along both sides of major streets that run 

through and between urban areas. Streets are 

usually 25 m wide or more. The buildings uniformly stand 2 to 3 stories tall (about one story 

taller than the dwellings on the streets behind 

them). 

Buildings 2-3 stories. Subcategories are commercial ribbon areas built along major streets in 

an urban area or strip areas built along the 

roads that connect one urban area to another. 

Industrial Area Industrial areas are generally located on or 

along major rail and highway routes in urban 

complexes. Older complexes may be located 

within dense, random construction or close 

orderly block areas. New construction normally 

consists of low, flat-roofed factory and warehouse buildings (1 to 3 stories) in dispersed, 

irregular patterns with large parking areas and 

work yards. 

Buildings 1-5 stories. Many open areas. Large 

workforce; few residents. Industrial areas often 

develop on the outskirts of urban areas, where 

commercial transportation is easiest (along 

airfields and major sea, river, rail, and highway 

routes). High-rise areas providing worker housing are normally located adjacent to these areas 

throughout Asia. Identification of transportation 

facilities within these areas is critical because 

these facilities, especially rail facilities, pose 

significant obstacles to military movement. Toxic 

industrial chemicals and other hazardous materials may be transported or stored throughout 

the industrial area. 

Military Area These include any of several different types and Defense oriented; planned positions. Usually 

(Permanent or Fixed may be actual fortifications. These permanent regular armed forces. May be found in or near 

Fortifications) fortifications can be made of earth, wood, rock, 

brick, concrete, steel-reinforced concrete, 

or any combination of the above. Some of the 

latest variants are built underground and 

employ heavy tank or warship armor, major 

caliber and other weapons, internal communications, service facilities, and CBRN overpressure 

systems. 

urban areas (which may have grown up around 

the military installation that provided protection 

for inhabitants). 

Subvariable Links: Military: Military Forces; Economics: Economic Diversity; Social: Volatility; Infrastructure: Construction 

Pattern. 

3-28 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
Operational Variables 

Table 3-38. Infrastructure: urbanized building density 

Definition: Describes the average building density within a town. 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Low Less than 15 buildings per town with no 2-story 

structures. Single economic industry structures 

present in each town. 

Medium 15 to 25 buildings per town with at least 3 multistory structures. One government center 

(5-building cluster) and site of significance 

(3-building cluster) per province. Two economic 

industry structures present per town. 

High 25 or more buildings per town with at least 

5 multi-story structures clustered together or 

separated by a one-story building or open area. 

One government center (5-building cluster) and 

one site of significance (a 3-building cluster) per 

district. Three economic industry structures and 

constructions present in the OE. 

Subvariable Links: Military: Military Forces; Infrastructure: All; Physical Environment: Terrain Complexity, Obstacles. 

Table 3-39. Infrastructure: utilities present 

Definition: Describes the average building density within a town. 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Low Less than 15 buildings per town with no 2-story 

structures. Single economic industry structures 

present in each town. 

Medium 15 to 25 buildings per town with at least 3 multistory structures. One government center 

(5-building cluster) and site of significance 

(3-building cluster) per province. Two economic 

industry structures present per town. 

High 25 or more buildings per town with at least 

5 multi-story structures clustered together or 

separated by a one-story building or open area. 

One government center (5-building cluster) and 

one site of significance (a 3-building cluster) per 

district. Three economic industry structures and 

constructions present in the OE. 

Subvariable Links: Military: Military Forces; Infrastructure: All; Physical Environment: Terrain Complexity, Obstacles. 

Table 3-40. Infrastructure: utility level 

Definition: Describes the approximate percentage of utilities available to a town. Each utility present in the OE has its own 

respective service level. 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Non-Existent 25% present and operational. 25% of all distribution nodes or required infrastructure and role-player elements/material are 

present or operational, with physical distribution 

and services present to at least 1/4 of the structures in each “switched on” area. 

(continued) 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 3-29 
Chapter 3 

Table 3-40. Infrastructure: utility level (continued) 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Degraded 50% present and operational. 50% of all distribution nodes or required infrastructure and role-player elements/material are 

present or operational, with physical distribution 

and services present to at least 1/3 of the structures in each “switched on” area. 

Developed 75% present and operational. 75% of all distribution nodes or required infrastructure and role-player elements/material are 

present or operational, with physical distribution 

and services present to at least half of the structures in each “switched on” area. 

Subvariable Links: Political: Government Effectiveness; Economic: Economic Diversity; Social: Social Volatility; Infrastructure: All. 

Table 3-41. Infrastructure: transportation architecture 

Definition: Details the existing public road and transportation network present in an OE. Describes the type of roads present 

and the coverage of the road network to any built-up areas. Includes airports, ports, rail, and surface road networks. 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Primitive Single track or improved two-lane hard-surface 

road networks, extending to all built-up areas. 

Single-line railway, no functioning airports, limited or 

no riverine transportation networks. 

Definitions also set the material and scenario scripting requirements associated with 

each replicated service. 

Moderate Improved multi-lane hard-surface road networks, 

extending to all built-up areas with secondary, twolane hard-surface roads paralleling primary roads. 

Two to three 2-line railways, connecting at least 

50% of the OE infrastructure. One functioning airport and, if present, moderate riverine transportation 

networks. 

Complex Multi-lane hard-surface highway networks, extending to all built-up areas with secondary, multi-lane 

hard-surface roads paralleling primary roads. Three 

to four 2-line railways, connecting at least 75% of 

the OE infrastructure. Two to three large, functioning airports (jet capable) and, if present, extensive 

riverine transportation networks. 

Subvariable Links: Political: Government Effectiveness; Military: Military Forces; Economic: Economic Diversity; Infrastructure: All. 

3-30 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

 

Operational Variables 

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT VARIABLE 

3-15. The Physical Environment variable includes the geography and man-made structures as well as the 

climate and weather in the AO. Depending on the type of exercise, these conditions may be real, notional, 

or a combination. The span of subvariables defining the Physical Environment includes “terrain,” “natural 

hazards,” “climate,” and “weather,” depicted in table 3-42. The detail and complexity of the “terrain” and 

“weather” subvariables necessitate breaking down some of their components beyond the subvariable level. 

This lower level classification is called sub-subvariable. Some of the components of “terrain” are actually 

sub-subvariables, and all components of the “weather” subvariable require this additional breakdown. (See 

table 3-43 on page 3-32.) 

Table 3-42. Physical Environment variable and subvariable settings 

Variable Physical Environment 

Subvariable Terrain Natural 

Hazards 

Climate Weather 

Observation and 

Fields of Fire 

Volcanoes Tropical Precipitation 

Subvariable 

Settings 

Avenues of 

Approach 

Drought Arid High Temperature— 

Heat Index 

Key Terrain Monsoon Mediterranean Low Temperature— 

Wind Chill Index 

Obstacles Earthquake Oceanic Wind 

Cover and 

Concealment 

Flooding Continental Visibility 

Landforms Avalanche Subarctic Cloud Cover 

SubSubvariable 

Vegetation Cyclone Relative Humidity 

Terrain Complexity Other 

(Diseases) 

See table 3-43 for 

an overview of subMobility Classi subvariable settings. -

fication 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 3-31 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Chapter 3 

Table 3-43. Physical Environment variable, subvariables and sub-subvariable settings 

Variable Physical Environment 

Subvariable Terrain 

SubSubvariable Landforms Vegetation Terrain 

Complexity 

Mobility Classification 

SubSubvariable 

Settings 

Sloped Desert/Scrub Urban AreaPlus Other Unrestricted 

Terrain 

Coastal Grassland Urban Area 

Alone 

Restricted 

Terrain 

Fluvial Woodland Two or More 

Types of 

Restrictive 

Terrain 

Severely 

Restricted 

Terrain 

Erosion Mixed Single Type of 

Restrictive 

Terrain 

Mountain/Glacial Unrestricted 

Mixed 

Subvariable Weather 

SubSubvariable Precipitation High 

Temperature—Heat 

Index 

Low 

Temperature— 

Wind Chill 

Index 

Wind Visibility Cloud 

Cover 

Relative 

Humidity 

SubSubvariables 

Settings 

Very Light 75-85°F 1 mph at 50°F 

to 40 mph at 

20°F 

Calm Beginning 

Morning 

Nautical 

Twilight 

Clear WBGT 

Index 

reaches 

78°F 

Light 85-105°F 1 mph at -30°F 

to 40 mph at 

-10°F 

Moderate 

Breeze 

Beginning 

Morning Civil 

Twilight 

Scattered WBGT 

Index 

reaches 

85°F 

Moderate 95-130°F 10 mph at 

-50°F to 40 

mph at -60°F 

Strong 

Breeze 

End of 

Evening Civil 

Twilight 

Broken WBGT 

Index 

reaches 

88°F 

Heavy 95-130°F Moderate 

Gale 

End of 

Evening 

Nautical 

Twilight 

Overcast WBGT 

Index 

reaches 

90°F 

 Over 130°F Strong 

Gale 

Storm 

3-16. The next level of discussion is to graphically portray the associated definitions of each Physical Environment subvariable and sub-subvariable as well as their settings, setting definitions, considerations and 

additional notes and external links with other subvariables. (See tables 3-44 through 3-58.) This format is 

designed to give the exercise planner the necessary details needed for constructing the desired OE. The order of discussion will be “terrain,” “natural hazards,” “climate,” and “weather.” 

3-32 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
Operational Variables 

TERRAIN 

3-17. Definitions of “terrain” and the associated subvariable setting definitions are listed in table 3-44. In 

this case, the subvariable settings are actually a menu of certain aspects of terrain that need to be taken into 

consideration. The last four subvariable settings are actually sub-subvariables that have their own definitions and settings (see tables 3-45 through 3-48). Limitations inherent with specific types of terrain are enforced by observer-controllers in live exercises or by computer-enforced rules in simulated exercises. 

Table 3-44. Physical environment: terrain 

Definition: Terrain is a portion of the earth’s surface that includes natural and manmade features (TC 2-33.4). 

Subvariable Setting Setting or Sub-Subvariable Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Observation and Observation is the condition of weather and The type of units (friendly and enemy) which are 

Fields of Fire terrain that permits a force to see personnel, 

systems, and key aspects of the environment 

(FM 2-01.3). Field of fire is the area which a 

weapon or a group of weapons may cover effectively with fire from a given position. (JP 1-02 

and FM 1-02) 

on the ground, how they look from each other’s 

perspective on the battlefield, and lines of sight 

(LOS) from their positions to the target (TC 2­

33.4). Intervisibility is the condition of being able 

to see one point from the other. (FM 2-01.3) 

Avenues of An avenue of approach (AA) is an air or ground Mobility corridors (MCs) are subsets of AAs. To 

Approach route of an attacking force of a given size leading to its objective or to key terrain in its path. 

(JP 1-02) 

evaluate and develop AAs, the results developed during obstacle evaluation are used to 

identify and categorize MCs and to group MCs 

into AAs. (FM 2-01.3). [See Physical Environment: Terrain: Mobility Classification.] Mobility 

corridors are areas where a force will be canalized due to terrain restrictions; they allow military forces to capitalize on the principles of 

mass and speed and are therefore relatively 

free of obstacles. (JP 2-01.3) 

Key Terrain Key terrain is any locality or area whose seizure, 

retention, or control affords a marked advantage 

to either combatant. (JP 2-01.3, FM 2-01.3, and 

TC 2-33.4) 

Any terrain that increases a unit’s ability to apply 

combat power, or decreases the opponent’s 

ability to apply theirs, is considered key terrain. 

(TC 2-33.4) 

Obstacles An obstacle is any obstruction designed or employed to disrupt, fix, turn, or block the movement of an opposing force [enemy], and to impose additional losses in personnel, time, and 

equipment on the opposing force [enemy]; obstacles can be natural, manmade, or a combination of both. (JP 3-15 and FM 2-01.3) 

Obstacles, whether natural or manmade, are 

those elements that impact a force’s ability to 

maneuver and move rapidly through an area (TC 

2-33.4). Some examples of obstacles to ground 

mobility are buildings, mountains, steep slopes, 

dense forests, rivers, lakes, urban areas, minefields, trenches, certain religious and cultural 

sites, and wire obstacles (concertina wire, barb 

wire). (FM 2-01.3) [See Physical Environment: 

Terrain: Mobility Classification.] 

Cover and Cover is physical protection from bullets, frag- Cover does not necessarily provide concealConcealment ments of exploding rounds, flame, nuclear effects, and biological and chemical agents (FM 

2-01.3). Concealment is protection from observation or surveillance. (JP 1-02) 

ment; concealment does not necessarily provide 

cover. (FM 2-01.3) 

Landforms 

(Sub-Subvariable) 

A feature of the earth’s surface attributable to 

natural causes. 

Types of terrain predominating the AO (describes 

more than 60% of the terrain present in the AO). 

Vegetation 

(Sub-Subvariable) 

Plant life or total plant cover (as of an area). Describes the predominant vegetation found in 

an AO. 

(continued) 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 3-33 
Chapter 3 

Table 3-44. Physical environment: terrain (continued) 

Subvariable Setting Setting or Sub-Subvariable Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Terrain Complexity 

(Sub-Subvariable) 

Describes the degree to which the terrain imposes significant limitations on observation, 

maneuver, fires, and intelligence collection. 

Complex terrain is a topographical area consisting of an urban center larger than a village 

and/or of two or more types of restrictive terrain 

or environmental conditions occupying the same 

space. (Restrictive terrain or environmental 

conditions include but are not limited to slope, 

high altitude, forestation, severe weather, and 

urbanization.) (FM 7-100.1 and ATTP 3-34.80) 

Mobility Classification 

(Sub-Subvariable) 

Describes the degree to which the terrain allows, slows, or hinders movement from place to 

place in combat formations. 

Subvariable Links: Physical Environment: Weather, Climate; Infrastructure: Construction Pattern, Urban Zones, Urbanized 

Building Density. 

3-18. The definitions and settings of the “terrain” sub-subvariables of landforms, vegetation, terrain complexity, and mobility classification are depicted in tables 3-45 through 3-48. These subsets define the physical features, circumstances and conditions surrounding and potentially influencing the execution of operations in an AO. 

Table 3-45. Terrain: landforms 

Definition: A feature of the earth’s surface attributable to natural causes. Landforms do not include man-made features, 

such as canals, ports, and many harbors. Types of terrain predominating the AO (describes more than 60% of the terrain 

present in the AO). 

Sub-Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Sloped Sloping landforms consisting of, but not 

limited to the following types: cliffs, dells, 

escarpments, glens, gullies, hills, mountains, 

plains & plateaus, ridges, valleys, and watersheds. 

Limitations inherent with specific types of 

terrain are enforced by observer-controller 

rules (live), or computer-enforced simulation 

rules. 

Coastal Coastal landforms consisting of, but not limited to the following types: bays, beaches, 

cuspate forelands, capes, coves, delta, 

fjords, lagoons, sounds, spits, or tombolos. 

Fluvial Riverine or water type landforms consisting 

of, but not limited to the following types: arroyos, basins, bars, bayous, lakes, levees, 

marshes, rivers and streams, swamps, waterfalls, watersheds, or combinations of those 

mentioned. 

Erosion Erosion type landforms consisting of, but not 

limited to the following types: canyons, 

caves, and disposition or eolian landforms. 

Mountain/Glacial Mountain landforms consisting of, but not 

limited to the following types: mountain 

ranges, crevasses, U-shaped valleys, glaciers, hanging valleys, kale deltas, outwash 

fans, and other types of valley formations. 

Mixed Two or more of the above categories of landforms comprising over 80% of the available 

terrain in an AO. 

Subvariable Links: Physical Environment Climate, Terrain (Mobility Classification, Terrain Complexity). 

3-34 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
Operational Variables 

Table 3-46. Terrain: vegetation 

Definition: Plant life or total plant cover (as of an area). Describes the predominant vegetation found in an AO. 

Sub-Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Desert/ Scrub A variety of trees that have had their growth 

stunted by soil or climatic conditions. Shrubs 

comprise the undergrowth in open forests, but in 

arid and semiarid areas they are the dominant 

vegetation. Shrubs normally offer no serious obstacle to movement and provide good concealment from ground observation; however, they may 

restrict fields of fire. 

Settings used primarily a virtual or constructive training environment. Can be 

replicated live in select instances by 

applying observer-controller-enforced 

rules to govern behavior in the type of 

area specified. 

Grassland (Tall/Short) Grasslands from 0.5 to 2 m in height. Grassland 

more than 1 m high is considered tall. Very tall 

grass may provide concealment for foot troops. 

Foot movement in savannah grasslands is slow 

and tiring; vehicular movement is easy; and observation from the air is easy. Improved solid 

trafficability during seasonal wet periods. 

Woodlands Broadleaf, deciduous, or coniferous forests capable of slowing dismounted troops and military 

vehicles, channelizing movement and causing 

limited observation and fields of fire. The type of 

woodland is determined by the dominant tree type 

(more than 60% of either deciduous or coniferous 

types). Forests containing less than 60% mix of 

either type are considered mixed. 

Mixed Two or more of the above types. 

Subvariable Links: Physical Environment: Climate, Terrain (Mobility Classification, Terrain Complexity). 

Table 3-47. Terrain: terrain complexity 

Definition: Describes the degree to which the terrain imposes significant limitations on observation, maneuver, fires, and 

intelligence collection. Complex terrain is a topographical area consisting of an urban center larger than a village and/or of 

two or more types of restrictive terrain or environmental conditions occupying the same space. (Restrictive terrain or environmental conditions include but are not limited to slope, high altitude, forestation, severe weather, and urbanization.) (FM 7­

100.1 and ATTP 3-34.80) 

Sub-Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Urban Area plus Other 

Types 

An urban area larger than a village occurs in 

conjunction with of other types of restrictive 

terrain and/or environmental conditions. 

An urban area generally consists of a large 

central core with a population density of at 

least 1,000 inhabitants per square mile and 

adjacent densely settled areas with a population density of at least 500 inhabitants per 

square mile that together have a total population of at least 2,500. (A village is a small 

community incorporated as a municipality in a 

rural area, with a population of 100 to 2,500.) 

Urban Area Alone An urban area larger than a village, in and of 

itself, constitutes complex terrain—without 

the presence of other types of restrictive 

terrain and/or environmental conditions. 

Two or More Types of 

Restrictive Terrain and/or 

Environmental Conditions 

A combination of two or more types of restrictive terrain (other than urban) and/or environmental conditions. 

Restrictive terrain or environmental conditions (other than urbanization) include but are 

not limited to slope, high altitude, forestation, 

and severe weather. 

Single Type of Restrictive 

Terrain or Environmental 

Condition 

A single type of restrictive terrain (other than 

urban) or environmental condition. 

Unrestricted No urban area or other type of restrictive 

terrain or environmental condition is present. 

Self-explanatory. 

Subvariable Links: Infrastructure: Urbanized Building Density; Physical Environment: Climate, Terrain (Landforms, Vegetation, Mobility Classification). 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 3-35 
Chapter 3 

Table 3-48. Terrain: mobility classification 

Definition: Describes the degree to which the terrain allows, slows, or hinders movement from place to place in combat 

formations. 

Sub-Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Unrestricted Terrain Terrain that is free of any restriction to movement. Nothing needs to be done to enhance 

mobility. Unrestricted terrain for armored or 

mechanized forces is typically flat to moderately sloping terrain with scattered or widely 

spaced obstacles such as trees or rocks. Unrestricted terrain allows wide maneuver by the 

forces under consideration and unlimited travel supported by well-developed road networks. 

The settings for this sub-subvariable and 

their definitions come from FM 2-01.3. 

Restricted Terrain Terrain that hinders movement to some degree. Little effort is needed to enhance mobility, but units may have difficulty maintaining 

preferred speeds, moving in combat formations, or transitioning from one formation to 

another. Restricted terrain slows movement by 

requiring zigzagging or frequent detours. Restricted terrain for armored or mechanized 

forces typically consists of moderate-to-steep 

slopes or moderate-to-densely spaced obstacles such as trees, rocks, or buildings. 

Swamps or rugged terrain are examples of 

restricted terrain for dismounted infantry 

forces. Logistical or sustainment area movement may be supported by poorly developed 

road systems. 

Severely Restricted 

Terrain 

Terrain that severely hinders or slows movement in combat formations unless some effort 

is made to enhance mobility. This could take 

the form of committing engineer assets to 

improving mobility or of deviating from doctrinal tactics, such as moving in columns instead 

of line formations or at speeds much lower 

than those preferred. Severely restricted terrain for armored and mechanized forces is 

typically characterized by steep slopes and 

large or densely spaced obstacles with few or 

no supporting roads. 

Subvariable Links: Physical Environment: Terrain (Landforms), Weather (Precipitation), Climate. 

NATURAL HAZARDS 

3-19. The effects of the “natural hazards” subvariable may involve Army units providing various types of 

support when conducting humanitarian relief, civil order, or other similar missions. Training for these 

events can be replicated in simulated settings or by the use of observer-controller enforced rules to govern 

transit and survivability of such events in a live setting. Definitions of “natural hazards” and the associated 

subvariable and subvariable setting definitions are listed in table 3-49. 

3-36 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

Operational Variables 

Table 3-49. Physical environment: natural hazards 

Definition: Describes the type of natural disasters or hazards that may be encountered when conducting stability or civil 

support operations. 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Volcanic Eruption Self-explanatory. Characterized by moderate to fast 

lava flows and possible explosive eruptions of rock 

and hot ash (similar to the Mt St Helens eruptions and 

after effects). 

Can be replicated in live, virtual, or constructive training environment by the 

adoption simulated of chemical, nuclear 

attack conditions (virtual or constructive), 

or the use of observer-controller-enforced 

rules to govern transit and survivability of 

such events in a live training environment. 

Drought A drought is an extended period of months or years 

when a region notes a deficiency in its water supply. 

Generally, this occurs when a region receives consistently below average precipitation. 

Tornado A tornado is a violent, dangerous, rotating column of 

air which is in contact with both the surface of the 

earth and a cumulonimbus cloud or, in rare cases, the 

base of a cumulus cloud. Tornadoes come in many 

sizes but are typically in the form of a visible condensation funnel, whose narrow end touches the earth 

and is often encircled by a cloud of debris and dust. 

Monsoon Monsoon rainfall is considered to be that which occurs 

in any region that receives the majority of its rain during a particular season. 

Earthquake Large-magnitude, long-duration, surface quakes resulting in severe infrastructure damage and urban 

destruction. 

Flooding Large-area flooding of 2 to 3 m of depth, disrupting all 

transportation, destroying infrastructure, and subsiding 

after a prolonged period. Often accompanied by local 

contagions and waterborne diseases. 

Avalanche Self-explanatory. Large-scale effect occurring primarily 

in a mountain or terraced valley. 

Cyclone A cyclone is a storm system characterized by a large 

low-pressure center and numerous thunderstorms that 

produce strong winds, heavy rain and tornados. Depending on its location and strength, a tropical cyclone 

is referred to by many other names, such as hurricane, 

typhoon, tropical storm, cyclonic storm, tropical depression, and simply cyclone. 

Other Any natural, biological, short-term, short-duration, 

large-area affect, propagated by either weather or 

prevailing terrain conditions present in an OE. Includes diseases. 

None Self-explanatory. 

Subvariable Links: Physical Environment: Weather, Climate; Infrastructure: Construction Pattern, Urbanized Building 

Density. 

CLIMATE 

3-20. Climate has profound effects military operations. Training units should be exposed to as many types 

of climate as possible, simulated or real, especially the type(s) prevalent in those areas they may likely be 

deployed. Table 3-50 on page 3-38 lists the various types of climates that exist. Understanding their effects 

on military equipment and soldiers is critical to any successful military operation. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 3-37 
Chapter 3 

Table 3-50. Physical environment: climate 

Definition: Climate is the average course or condition of the weather at a place over a period of years as exhibited by temperature, wind velocity, and precipitation. The type of climate is determined by factors such as latitude, altitude, proportion of 

land to water, and proximity to oceans and mountains. Climate zones share similar climatic attributes, usually in particular 

latitudinal distances from the equator. 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Tropical A type of climate characterized by 12 months of 

mean temperatures above 18°C (64.4°F) and 

almost continuous rainfall throughout the year, 

usually convectional occurring predominantly in 

the afternoon. 

In replicable environments, climate is primarily 

classified on the basis of temperature and 

precipitation. Climatic descriptions are used in 

scenarios to vary climatic conditions to better 

train units, exposing them to the variety of 

climatic conditions and their effects on operations. This subvariable is primarily used in a 

virtual or constructive environment. Some 

climatic conditions can be replicated in a live 

environment using scenario-based rules and 

play box restrictions on training unit and 

OPFOR movement and actions. 

Arid Climate encountered in regions too dry to support 

a forest, but not dry enough to be a desert. The 

soil is considered too moist to be a desert, but 

too dry to support normal forest life. Characterized by hot summers and cold winters, with 10­

20 inches of rain or snowfall per year. 

Mediterranean A climate that resembles those of the lands bordering the Mediterranean Sea. These climates 

generally occur on the western coasts of continental landmasses, roughly between the latitudes 

of 30° and 45° north and south of the equator. 

Areas with this climate receive almost all of their 

yearly rainfall during the winter season, and may 

go anywhere from 2-5 months during the summer 

without having any significant precipitation. 

Oceanic Oceanic climates are characterized by a narrower annual range of temperatures than are encountered in other places at a comparable latitude, and differ from Mediterranean climates in 

that significant amounts of precipitation are received in summer. 

Continental Characterized by winter temperatures cold 

enough to support a fixed period of stable snow 

cover each year, and relatively low precipitation 

occurring mostly in summer, although east coast 

areas (chiefly in North America) may show an 

even distribution of precipitation. They have either forest or tall-grass prairie as natural ground 

covers and include some of the most productive 

farmlands in the world. All such climates have at 

least 3 months of temperatures in excess of 10°C 

(50°F) and winters with at least one month below 

0°C (32°F). 

Subarctic Characterized by long, usually very cold winters 

and brief, warm summers. It is found on large 

landmasses in the Northern Hemisphere, away 

from the moderating effects of an ocean, generally at latitudes from 50°N to 70°N (immediately 

south of the true arctic). Temperatures can drop 

to -40°C (also -40°F) in winter and may exceed 

30°C (86°F) in summer. However, the summers 

are short, no more than 3 months of the year (but 

at least 1 month) and must have a 24-hour average temperature of at least 10°C (50°F) to fall in 

this category. 

Subvariable Links: Physical Environment: Weather, Natural Hazards. 

3-38 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

Operational Variables 

WEATHER 

3-21. Definitions of “weather” and the associated sub-subvariables are listed in table 3-51. Weather should 

not be confused with climate. Weather refers to the activity or atmospheric condition at a given time or 

over shorter periods up to approximately two weeks, while climate refers to the average course or condition of these same elements over a period of years. 

Table 3-51. Physical environment: weather 

Definition: Weather is a set of all the phenomena occurring in a given atmosphere at a given time. Weather phenomena lie 

in the hydrosphere and troposphere. 

Sub-Subvariable Sub-Subvariable Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Precipitation Any visible moisture that falls from the atmosphere, such as rain, sleet, snow, hail, 

drizzle or a combination of these. 

Precipitation may be used by exercise control 

(EXCON) to manage various aspects of 

an exercise such as rate of advance and 

visibility. 

High Temperature— The measurement of how hot or cold the air Knowing the HI in an AO is an important 

Heat Index is. The heat index (HI) combines air temperature and relative humidity which helps determine the human perceived equivalent temperature. 

factor in deployments as well as and live and 

simulated training exercises. 

Low Temperature— The measurement of how cold the air is. The Knowing the Wind Chill Index in an AO is an 

Wind Chill Index Wind-Chill Index combines air temperature 

and wind speed which helps determine the 

cooling effect of wind on bare flesh when first 

exposed. 

important factor in deployments as well as 

simulated exercises training exercises. 

Wind Air which is in horizontal or near horizontal 

motion. 

Visibility The mean distance at which the naked eye 

can see prominent objects through the atmosphere. 

Accurate timing based upon available light is 

critical in planning military operations. It is 

expressed in the number of degrees the center of the sun is below the horizon. Although 

technically not weather data, it is customarily 

considered together with weather factors 

because both affect visibility such as cloud 

cover. Light is also a critical factor in the 

employment of light sensitive equipment such 

as night vision and thermal devices. 

Cloud Cover The amount of clouds over or at a given location. 

Cloud cover may be used by exercise control 

(EXCON) to manage various aspects of 

an exercise such as flight operations and 

visibility. 

Relative Humidity Humidity is the term used to describe the 

amount of water vapor in the air. The amount 

of water vapor the air actually contains compared with the maximum it can hold at a 

given temperature and pressure is termed 

the relative humidity of the air. 

Subvariable Links: Physical Environment: Climate, Natural Hazards. 

3-22. The definitions and settings of the “weather” sub-subvariables of precipitation, high temperatureheat index, low temperature-wind chill index, wind, visibility, cloud cover and relative humidity are depicted in tables 3-52 through 3-58. These subsets define the atmospheric conditions surrounding and potentially influencing the execution of operations in an AO. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 3-39 
Chapter 3 

Table 3-52. Weather: precipitation 

Definition: Any visible moisture that falls from the atmosphere, such as rain, sleet, snow, hail, drizzle or a combination of 

these. Precipitation occurs when the atmosphere, a large gaseous solution becomes saturated with water vapor and the 

water condenses and descends from the solution (that is, precipitates). 

Sub-Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Very light Scattered drops or flakes that do not completely 

wet an exposed surface regardless of duration. 

Light A trace of .10 inch of precipitation per hour with a 

maximum of .01 inch in 6 minutes. 

Moderate .11 to .30 inch per hour; between .01 and .03 

inch in 6 minutes. 

Heavy More than .30 inch per hour; more than .03 inch 

in 6 minutes. 

Subvariable Links: Physical Environment: Climate, Natural Hazards. 

Table 3-53. Weather: high temperature—heat index 

Definition: The measurement of how hot or cold the air is. Temperature is measured with thermometers that may be calibrated to a variety of temperature scales. Since the majority of military operations will most likely be in areas of moderate to 

extreme heat, a more useful measurement is heat index (HI). The HI combines air temperature and relative humidity which 

helps determine the human perceived equivalent temperature. 

Sub-Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

75-85°F Caution – Fatigue is possible with prolonged 

exposure and activity. Continuing activity could 

result in heat camps and nausea. 

Understanding the average temperatures 

and HI in an AO is an important factor in 

deployments as well as and live-, virtual-, 

and gaming-based training exercises. 85-105°F Extreme Caution – Use extreme caution in any 

prolonged physical activity. Continuing activity 

could result in heat exhaustion or heat stroke. 

95-130°F Danger – heat cramps and heat exhaustion are 

highly possible. Continued activity could result in 

heat stroke. 

Over 130°F Extreme Danger – heat stroke is imminent with 

any continuing activity. 

Subvariable Links: Physical Environment: Climate, Natural Hazards. 

Table 3-54. Weather: low temperature—wind chill index 

Definition: The measurement of how cold the air is. Temperature is measured with thermometers that may be calibrated to 

a variety of temperature scales. Some military operations will include areas of moderate to extreme cold, for which a more 

useful measurement is Wind-Chill Index. Wind-Chill Index combines air temperature and wind speed which helps determine 

the cooling effect of wind on bare flesh when first exposed. 

Sub-Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

From wind speed of 

1 mph at 50°F to 40 mph 

at 20°F 

Minimal Danger – Exposed flesh may 

freeze within 60 minutes. However, this 

range is also very dangerous because it 

gives a false sense of security. 

The cooling effect is the same whether the human body 

is moving through the air or the air is blowing past the 

body. The effect of wind will be less if a person has 

even slight protection for exposed parts, such as light 

gloves on hands, or parka hood shielding face. Wind 

speeds greater than 40 mph have little additional effect. 

Understanding the average temperatures and current 

Wind-Chill Index in an AO is an important factor in 

deployments as well as and live-, virtual-, and gamingbased training exercises. 

From 1 mph at -30°F to 

40 mph at -10°F 

Increasing Danger – Danger from freezing of exposed flesh within 60 seconds. 

From 10 mph at -50°F to 

40 mph at -60°F 

Great Danger – Danger from freezing 

of exposed flesh within 30 seconds. 

Subvariable Links: Physical Environment: Climate, Natural Hazards. 

3-40 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
Operational Variables 

Table 3-55. Weather: wind 

Definition: Air which is in horizontal or near horizontal motion. Vertical movements of air are known as air current and are 

caused by differences in density between two air masses. Wind direction is determined by the direction from which it is blowing. 

Sub-Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Calm Less than 1 mph; smoke rises vertically. Setting names, wind speeds and effects are 

all based on the Beaufort Scale. 

Wind effects such as speed and direction are 

critical in all military operations but especially 

in the use of chemical agents, concealment, 

observation, and smoke obscuration. 

Moderate Breeze 13-18 mph; raises dust, loose paper, small 

branches are moved. 

Strong Breeze 25-31 mph; large branches in motion; whistling heard in above-ground electrical wires, 

umbrellas used with difficulty. 

Moderate Gale 32-38 mph; whole trees in motion; difficulty 

walking against the wind. 

Strong Gale 47-54 mph; slight structural damage occurs 

(chimney and roofing damaged). 

Storm 56-63 mph; unable to walk, widespread 

structural damage. 

Subvariable Links: Physical Environment: Climate, Natural Hazards. 

Table 3-56. Weather: visibility 

Definition: The mean distance at which the naked eye can see prominent objects through the atmosphere. 

(Accurate timing based upon available light is critical in planning military operations. It is expressed in the number of degrees 

the center of the sun is below the horizon. Although technically not weather data, it is customarily considered together with 

weather factors because both affect visibility such as cloud cover. Light is also a critical factor in the employment of light 

sensitive equipment such as night vision and thermal devices.) 

Sub-Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Beginning of Morning Before sunrise, when the sun is 12 de- An important visibility consideration called therNautical Twilight (BMNT) grees below the horizon. Illumination is 

poor, and only vague outlines are visible. 

mal (IR) crossover occurs, depending on the 

cloud ceiling, soon after BMNT and EENT. Thermal crossover occurs when the temperature of a 

target is the same as the temperature of its background. When this occurs, targets will appear 

invisible to IR sensors. 

Beginning of Morning Before sunrise, when the sun is 6 de- Under ideal conditions, the period of time when 

Civil Twilight (BMCT) grees below the horizon. On a clear day, 

outdoor activity is visible. 

there is adequate visibility for large-scale operations is between BMNT and EECT. Generally, 

visibility at BMNT is about 400 m, which is 

enough light for close coordination between personnel. 

End of Evening Civil 

Twilight (EECT) 

After sunset, when the sun is 6 degrees 

below the horizon. On a clear day, outdoor activity is visible. 

Halfway between EECT and EENT (or BMNT and 

BMCT), there is enough light for visual ground 

adjustment of close-in artillery fire and air strikes. 

End of Evening Nautical 

Twilight (EENT) 

After sunset, when the sun is 12 degrees 

below the horizon. Illumination is poor, 

and only vague outlines are visible. 

Subvariable Links: Physical Environment: Climate, Natural Hazards. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 3-41 
 

 

Chapter 3 

Table 3-57. Weather: cloud cover 

Definition: The amount of clouds over or at a given location. 

Sub-Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Clear No clouds or less than 1/8 of the sky is covered. 

Cloud conditions are expressed as cloud 

bases or ceiling in which the amount of cover 

is stated in eighths. Several layers of scattered clouds added together may result in a 

broken or overcast condition. Low clouds 

impact many battlefield operations, especially 

the use of smart weapons (TC 2-33.4). 

Scattered 1/8 to 4/8 of the sky is covered, inclusive. 

Broken 5/8 to 7/8 of the sky is covered, inclusive. 

Overcast 8/8 (100%) of the sky is covered. 

Subvariable Links: Physical Environment: Climate, Natural Hazards. 

Table 3-58. Weather: relative humidity 

Definition: Humidity is the term used to describe the amount of water vapor in the air. The amount of water vapor the air 

actually contains compared with the maximum it can hold at a given temperature and pressure is termed the relative humidity 

of the air. Relative humidity is an important metric used in forecasting weather. Humidity indicates the likelihood of precipitation, dew, or fog. High humidity makes soldiers feel hotter outside in the summer because it reduces the effectiveness of 

sweating to cool the body by preventing the evaporation or perspiration from the skin. An accurate measurement of this effect is called the Wet-Bulb-Glove-Temperature (WBGT) Index, which is calculated using a combination of temperature, humidity and wind. WBGT reports are obtained from supporting combat medical units. 

Sub-Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

WBGT index reaches 78°F Extremely intense physical exertion may 

precipitate heat exhaustion or heat stroke. 

Caution should be taken. 

Add 10° to all measured WBGTs when Soldiers are wearing body armor or CBRN warfare clothing. 

WBGT index reaches 85°F Strenuous exercise, such as marching in 

standard cadence should be stopped for 

unseasoned Soldiers during their first 3 

weeks in the AO. 

WBGT index reaches 88°F Strenuous exercise should be stopped for all 

Soldiers with less than 12 weeks of training in 

hot weather. 

WBGT index reaches 90°F Physical training and strenuous exercise 

should be stopped for all Soldiers. 

This does not apply to critical operational 

commitments where the risk of heat casualties may be warranted. However, hydration 

and sun cover are extremely important. 

Subvariable Links: Physical Environment: Climate. 

TIME VARIABLE 

3-23. The Time variable describes the timing and duration of activities, events, or conditions that occur, 

exist, or continue within an OE, as well as how the timing and duration are perceived by various actors in 

the OE. Various aspects of time and the perception of them can affect and influence military operations 

(friendly and enemy) within an OE. They can affect the reasons for conducting an operation, the amount of 

time available to complete a mission, the duration of an operation, and how commanders employ forces to 

achieve conditions of the desired end state. Different groups of people may perceive the concept of time in 

different ways. The perception and experience of time are among the most central aspects of how groups 

function and interact. In a military context, time orientation affects decision cycles, planning horizons, and 

tempo of operations. 

3-24. The specific Time subvariables and their settings depicted in table 3-59 represent replicable conditions that may be present within an OE for a training exercise. Their associated definitions, considerations, 

additional notes, and external links are listed separately in tables 3-60 through 3-65. 

3-42 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

 

Operational Variables 

Table 3-59. Time variable and subvariable settings 

Variable Time 

Subvariable Knowledge 

of the AO 

Cultural 

Perception of 

Time 

Key-Event 

Resolution 

Information 

Offset 

Tactical 

Exploitation 

of Time 

Key Dates, 

Time Periods, 

or Events 

Subvariable 

Settings 

Entry Not Time 

Sensitive 

Low Low Low Traditional Wedding Season 

Established Medium Medium Medium Medium Secular or 

Religious Holidays 

Exit High High High High Anniversary of 

Historical 

Incidents 

Elections 

Natural Disasters 

Agricultural 

Crop/Livestock 

Market Cycles 

Table 3-60. Time: knowledge of the AO 

Definition: Defines the amount of knowledge that the training unit would rightfully possess based on the amount of time the 

unit has spent in the AO prior to scenario STARTEX. 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Entry Training unit is initially beginning its tour of duty. 

The unit is not established and has limited 

knowledge of the AO. 

The range of settings determines the amount of 

information offset that the training unit and 

OPFOR are entitled to prior to the exercise. 

Time is equal to both friendly and enemy. Any 

information offset (for the training unit) should 

also be matched by appropriate behaviors for 

the OPFOR. For example, if the training unit has 

3 months to prepare the OPFOR has the same 

3 months to enhance defenses and maneuver, 

as well as acquire additional resources, men, 

and equipment. 

Established Training unit is mid-way through its deployment. 

The unit is established and has a moderate 

knowledge of the AO. 

Exit Training unit is nearing the end of its deployment in the AO. The unit is established and has 

detailed knowledge of the AO. 

Subvariable Links: Information: Intelligence; Time: Key-Event Resolution, Information Offset. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 3-43 
 

 

Chapter 3 

Table 3-61. Time: cultural perception of time 

Definition: The cultural perception of time is one of the most important aspects of how different people groups function and 

interact. Cultural awareness includes sensitivity to how a given culture in the AO perceives the concept of time. Cultural understanding of time can be used as an operational planning factor and a tool to manipulate tactical and strategic advantages. 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Not Time Sensitive Enemy views a protracted conflict as an advantage. May view a long-term conflict as a key 

objective. 

For CTC replication, role-players should reflect 

appropriate cultural perception of time. If different than the U.S. perception, it should be reflected in the scenario. 

Medium Enemy views a protracted conflict as a possible 

advantage. May show flexibility in their ability to 

change their view of timeliness based on how 

the conflict unfolds. 

High Enemy views a protracted conflict as a liability 

and not to their advantage. May view a timely 

resolution of the conflict as a key objective. 

Subvariable Links: Social: Ethnic Diversity, Education Level; Time: Key Dates, Time Periods, or Events. 

Table 3-62. Time: key-event resolution 

Definition: The number of key events and related orders of effect designed into the scenario in order to accomplish unit 

training objectives. The setting may describe the entire scenario, including sub-events or may describe specific key events 

within the scenario. 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Low 1-3 OE key events planned with sufficient planning 

conducted to execute effects in response to probable training unit actions. Key-events effects depth 

limited to 2nd-order effects. Setting used for a 

relatively inexperienced unit to emphasize specific 

training objectives. 

Decision on which setting should be selected 

is based on the commander’s training assessment of the unit and key exercise decisions made in phase 1 of the exercise design 

sequence. (See chapter 2.) 

Medium 4-5 OE key events planned with sufficient planning 

conducted to execute effects in response to probable training unit actions. Key-event effects depth 

limited to 3rd-order effects. Setting used for a 

trained, moderately experienced unit. 

High 10-12 OE key events planned with sufficient planning conducted to execute effects in response to 

probable training unit actions. Key-event effects 

depth expanded to capture 2nd-, 3rd-, and 4thorder effects in response to training unit actions 

and counter-actions. Setting used only for a highly 

experienced, capable unit. 

Sub variable Links: Time: Knowledge of the AO, Information Offset. 

3-44 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
Operational Variables 

Table 3-63. Time: Information offset 

Definition: Tips, informants, and serendipitous events or reports that presage OPFOR activities in a meaningful, predictive 

way. 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Low 10% of all OPFOR activities or key events are 

presaged by sufficient tips, hints, or indicators to 

enable successful training unit reaction or interdiction to the events. 

This information is either provided to the training 

unit prior to STARTEX for planning purposes or 

is scripted into the scenario. 

Medium 20% of all OPFOR activities or key events are 

presaged by sufficient tips, hints, or indicators to 

enable successful training unit reaction or interdiction to the events. 

High 30% of all OPFOR activities or key events are 

presaged by sufficient tips, hints, or indicators to 

enable successful training unit reaction or interdiction to the events. 

Subvariable Links: Time: Key-Event Resolution, Knowledge of the AO. 

Table 3-64. Time: tactical exploitation of time 

Definition: The ability of the enemy to use time for tactical advantage. Examples of events used to gain or manipulate time 

to the enemy’s advantage are— 

• Delay (trade space for time). Could be as simple as delaying or destroying MEDEVAC or interrupting the information flow 

or decision cycle. Attack to delay is an accepted method as is swarming (mobs) by civilians to delay and disrupt. 

• Deception (lead enemy in different direction or focus). 

• Fix (forces, obstacles, mines, etc.). 

• Block (forces, obstacles, mines, CBRN, etc.). 

Subvariable Setting Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Low Enemy can conduct limited operations designed to 

manipulate time against small-unit tactical forces. 

Generally, friendly forces fall prey to “basic” opportunistic traps. Enemy has limited knowledge of the OE. 

Decision on which setting should be selected is based on the commander’s training assessment of the unit and key exercise decisions made in phase 1 of the 

exercise design sequence. (See chapter Medium Enemy is adept at using 2.) time to advantage against 

regular forces and infantry. Enemy has a moderate 

knowledge of the OE and friendly TTP and locations. 

High Enemy is very adept at using time to advantage at all 

levels in all conditions. Enemy has a detailed knowledge of the OE and friendly TTP and locations. 

Subvariable Links: Military: Military Forces; Information: Intelligence; Time: Knowledge of the AO; Information Offset. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 3-45 
Chapter 3 

Table 3-65. Time: key dates, time periods, or events 

Definition: Routine, cyclical, planned, unplanned key dates, time periods, or events that significantly affect organizations, 

people, and military operations. Templating of these events is vital to establish or maintain control and predict future events. 

Once key dates, time periods, or events are determined, it is important to template the events and to analyze them for their 

impact on current or future military operations. 

Subvariable Setting 

(Examples) 

Setting Definition Considerations and Additional Notes 

Traditional Wedding 

Season 

Traditional times during the year when 

weddings occur. 

Other considerations are how and where these events 

are celebrated. For example, in many Asian nations 

wedding parties light fireworks or fire weapons in the air 

in harmless celebration. 

Secular or Religious 

Holidays 

Self-explanatory. An example of military consideration would be country X 

where Christmas is not celebrated by 95% of population. The 5% of Christians and Christian Churches may 

require additional security. 

Anniversary of 

Historical Incidents 

Special milestone to be celebrated 

which is not necessarily routine or a 

cyclical, routine event. 

An example would be the 200th birthday of a significant 

political or religious leader, which may be controversial 

among certain ethnic groups within a population. 

Elections Political elections including local, regional, and levels. Includes primary and 

general elections as well as scheduled 

and special elections. 

May be a very critical time for a country and its future 

security. May require high security, especially if the 

outcome is significant, the country has a track record of 

widespread voter fraud, or the election includes the 

participation of first-time voter minorities. 

Natural Disasters Disasters created by catastrophic 

weather or environmental events. 

Natural disasters affect the attitudes and activities of 

government and civilian populations. These changes 

cause stress in the civilian population and its leaders. 

Addressing the problems posed by disasters requires 

considerable time and resources. 

Agricultural 

Crop/Livestock 

Market Cycles 

Seasonal periods when harvest or significant livestock sales occur. During these periods, a significant increase in road 

traffic of slow-moving vehicles occurs. Impact can be 

significant on military major or secondary supply routes. 

Subvariable Links: Social: Ethnic Diversity; Physical Environment: Natural Hazards; Time: Cultural Perception of Time. 

3-46 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
Appendix A 

Exercise Design Checklist 

The Exercise Design Checklist (table A-1) is a sequential, summarized list of key exercise design tasks and associated events as described in phases 1 through 4 in chapter 2. These include exercise parameters; task and countertask development; PMESIIPT OE development; orders, plans, and instructions; and typical briefings, conferences, and control documents. The righthand column contains page references in this 

TC for each step/task and action required. This checklist is not intended to be allinclusive but rather to provide those critical tasks that must be accomplished within 

the design process. As noted in chapter 2, depending on the type of exercise and 

available OE information, certain tasks may occur in different phases. 

Table A-1. Exercise design checklist 

Design Phase Step/Task Action Required Additional Notes Pages 

Phase 1: 

Initial Planning 

Define exercise 

parameters. 

Developed based on commander’s training assessment and exercise director’s initial guidance, troop 

list, unit training objectives 

(METL), requested conditions and resources. Product is defined exercise parameters and prioritized 

training objectives (METL). 

Depending on the type and size 

of the exercise event, an initial 

planning conference may be 

required. This is normally the 

first meeting between the senior 

trainer, exercise director, and 

exercise planner. 

2-2 

and 

2-3 

Determine 

exercise timeline. 

Consider amount of time 

available, training objectives, training support personnel required, and available transportation and 

training facilities. 

If time is limited, training objectives may have to be modified 

or eliminated in order to compensate for this shortfall. 

2-3 

Determine 

whether 

exercise will be 

live, virtual, 

constructive, 

gaming, or a 

combination. 

Refer to exercise parameters to determine resources 

to support live, virtual, constructive or gaming training 

event. 

Consider aspects such as 

troops available, equipment 

status, and geographical space. 

2-3 

and 

2-4 

Determine Refer to proposed training Depending on the time allotted 2-4 

operational objectives, requested con- and the experience of the traintheme. ditions and the exercise 

director’s initial guidance. 

ing unit, it may be possible to 

train sequentially under two 

different themes. 

Determine Selection will depend on In almost all cases, training 2-4 

whether using the type of mission, training exercises will contain portions of 

existing or com­ resources and availability of existing, modified, or composite 

posite OE. OE data. OEs. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 A-1 
Appendix A 

Phase 2: 

Task and 

Countertask 

Development 

Determine 

OPFOR 

countertasks. 

Using the prioritized training objectives (METL), exercise parameters, and 

OPFOR UTL, select those 

OPFOR countertasks in 

order to counter and stress 

the training unit. 

Refer to appendix B, OPFOR 

tactical task list for selection of 

appropriate tasks keeping in 

mind resources available and 

the desired fidelity of the exercise. 

2-5 

thru 

2-7 

Develop Using the selected OPFOR As discussed in chapter 2, this 2-7 

OPFOR OB countertasks and FM 7­ particular step will depend on thru 

and task 100.4, develop OPFOR OB whether there is an existing OE 2-9 

organization. and build the appropriate 

task organization. 

and associated OB. If so, this 

step may not be necessary or 

may occur in later phases. 

Select OPFOR Using the selected OPFOR Same as above. Note that most 2-9 

tier levels. task-organized unit, select 

the appropriate WEG tier 

levels. Product is a fully 

developed OPFOR unit. 

OPFOR units should have a mix 

of various tier levels in order to 

provide more realistic training. 

thru 

2-11 

Phase 3: 

PMESII-PT OE 

Development 

Develop the 

OE. 

Using the PMESII-PT variables, select the appropriate subvariable settings 

listed in chapter 3 to produce the training conditions 

that support the training 

tasks required. 

As is the case with developing 

the OPFOR, this step is also 

dependent on whether there is 

an existing OE. If this is an 

MRX for a real-world mission, 

the OE normally exists already. 

Whether using existing OE or 

composite, the exercise planner 

should go through all the variables and their subvariables to 

ensure the entire conditions are 

set for the training objectives. 

2-12 

thru 

2-16 

Chapter 2 provides an example of one logical flow of 

the sequence for consideration of PMESII-PT variables. 

This sequence is situation dependent, and the example may 

not work in all cases. Planners 

are not restricted to this particular selection sequence. 

2-16 

thru 

2-19 

Refine supporting METL tasks 

and associated 

task organization. 

Using the OE-WFF analysis matrix depicted in chapter 2, examine whether or 

not the proposed supporting METL tasks and task 

organization are still accurate based on the defined 

OE. 

Regardless of whether or not 

there is a real OE, planners 

should review the supporting 

tasks against the OE and WFF 

to ensure all tasks and task 

organization are accurate or 

need to be modified prior to 

STARTEX. 

2-19 

thru 

2-21 

Determine Preplanned events that The level of fidelity of key 2-21 

common represent everyday activi­ events and the number of va­ and 

processes for ties common to all exercise riables and subvariables repli­ 2-22 

the desired OE. OEs. cated will be determined by 

factors such as the experience 

level of the training unit, the 

type of training exercise, and 

the number of role-players 

available. 

A-2 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
Exercise Design Checklist 

Determine key With the guidance from the Indicators can build up to a key 2-22 

events to high- senior trainer and exercise event, and a key event can relight chosen director, select key events sult in 2nd-, 3rd, and even 4thtraining that are preprogrammed into order effects. 

objectives. the existing or developed 

OE that will result in training 

value for the unit. 

Phase 4: Orders, Plans, 

and Instruction Development 

Prepare and 

conduct final 

exercise 

planning 

conference. 

Exercise planner presents 

an overview of the entire 

exercise to ensure all details 

are complete. Senior trainer, 

EXCON, OPFOR commander, exercise director, 

and the training unit commander normally attend. 

Results of this final planning 

conference lock in all exercise 

parameters, which include troop 

lists, training objectives, and the 

exercise OE. Includes final review and approval or disapproval of unit requests for 

equipment and troop list exceptions outside the normal TOE. 

2-23 

Prepare and Exercise planner provides The briefing covers all aspects 2-23 

conduct final the final pre-exercise infor­ of the exercise. No decisions and 

exercise mation briefing to the exer­ are expected except for decon­ 2-24 

briefing. cise director and all pertinent staff. Normally conducted 30 days from 

STARTEX. 

fliction on any last-minute issues. Briefing includes disposition of forces, chronology of key 

events, and C-, M-, and D-Day. 

Develop and Exercise director may direct These documents are issued in 2-24 

issue higher unit exercise planner to develop order to promote realism in 

warning orders, and issue various docu­ training and provide information 

intelligence ments and plans to the play- to the player unit prior to the 

estimates and er unit. These may include exercise. This information alother exercise warning orders, country stu­ lows training units to develop 

documents to dies and intelligence sum- preparatory home station trainthe training unit. maries. ing prior to the actual exercise. 

Develop and Exercise planner will devel- These documents provide key 2-24 

issue higher unit op higher unit OPLANs and planning information. Combined 

OPLANs and orders to initiate the training with the above documents, they 

orders to the unit’s mission planning cycle enable the training unit to contraining unit. and orders development 

process. 

duct its internal mission planning and orders production 

process. 

Develop and Using the OPFOR counter- These documents provide key 2-24 

issue OPFOR tasks, OB, and defined OE, planning information. They ena­ and 

orders. the exercise planner develops and issues OPFOR 

orders. 

ble the OPFOR unit to conduct 

its internal mission planning and 

rehearsal process. 

2-25 

Develop Using the COE Actors and Instructions are normally sent 2-25 

instructions for Role-Players Handbook, the out NLT 30 days prior to thru 

role-players. exercise planner develops 

role-player instructions in 

order to support exercise 

realism, common processes, 

key events, and the selected 

OE subvariables. Provides 

specific acting and material 

guidance to role-players so 

that they accurately represent 

the desired training conditions. 

STARTEX. The document 

describes the exercise OE and 

its relationship to role-player 

requirements, and includes 

scenario timeline and areas to 

be occupied (who, what, where, 

when, and duration) as well as 

personal and group profiles. 

2-27 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 A-3 
Appendix A 

Develop and Using all products devel- This document is normally the 2-27 

issue the road oped in phases 1 through last document produced in the 

to war to the 4, the exercise planner exercise design sequence betraining unit. develops and issues the 

road to war. 

cause it depends on other 

products in order to be completed. It is a historical document that normally explains the 

chronology of events that has 

produced the current situation. 

It should include the deployment 

and disposition of the training 

unit and OPFOR units at 

STARTEX; identify C-Day, MDay, and D-Day; and provide 

reasoning for the execution of 

training objectives and subtasks. 

A-4 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

Appendix B 

OPFOR Tactical Task List 

The OPFOR Tactical Task List is a listing of tactical tasks that are specific to the 

OPFOR. OPFOR tactical organizations and individuals perform these tasks instead of 

the comparable tasks in the Army Universal Task List (AUTL). OPFOR organizations and individuals perform tactical tasks in order to provide challenging conditions 

for the execution or attempted execution of mission essential tasks by training units. 

B-1. The OPFOR Tactical Task List serves as the primary source for most tasks the OPFOR must perform. Exercise planners reference this list first when conducting countertask analysis. Only if the OPFOR 

Tactical Task List does not contain an appropriate task is one selected for the OPFOR from the AUTL. 

B-2. The format of providing the OPFOR Tactical Task List will be to first define the tactical task and 

then list its subtasks (and in some cases, sub-subtasks). This will be followed by a table which shows the 

associated measures of performance for the overall task (or for major subtasks that have sub-subtasks). 

Each tactical task will numbered in order to provide a standard reference for easier identification. 

TACTICAL TASK 1.0 ASSAULT 

B-3. An assault is an attack that destroys an enemy force through firepower and the physical occupation 

and/or destruction of his position. An assault is the basic form of OPFOR tactical offensive combat. Assaults at any level of command and with any type forces have the same basic subtasks: 

 1.1 Isolate 

 Maneuver and deploy security element(s) to ensure additional enemy forces do not join the 

battle unexpectedly. (Security elements may become fixing elements.) 

 Continue to provide early warning. 

 Prevent the enemy from gaining further information. 

 Prevent enemy maneuver. 

 1.2 Suppress 

 Provide lethal and nonlethal suppression. 

 Suppress the enemy force to permit the assault element to move against the enemy position 

without receiving destructive fire. 

 1.3 Assault 

 From the direction where least return fire is possible, the assault element employs surprise, 

limited visibility, complex terrain, and camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception 

(C3D) to attain the enemy position while remaining combat effective. 

 Maneuver to and seize the enemy position, destroying any forces there. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 B-1 
Appendix B 

TACTICAL TASK 1.0 ASSAULT 

No. Scale Measure 

01 Yes/No Unit isolates enemy from assistance. 

02 Time To suppress enemy. 

03 Time To execute assault. 

04 Yes/No Enemy position seized. 

05 Percent Of friendly forces available to continue mission. 

06 Percent Combat effectiveness of enemy forces. 

TACTICAL TASK 2.0 RAID 

B-4. A raid is an attack against a stationary target for the purposes of its capture or destruction that culminates in the withdrawal of the raiding detachment to safe territory. Raids can also be used to secure information and to confuse or deceive the enemy. The keys to the successful accomplishment of any are raid 

surprise, firepower, and violence. The raid ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. The subtasks for a raid are— 

 2.1 Infiltrate 

 Conduct undetected movement through and/or into an area occupied by enemy forces to occupy a position of advantage. 

 2.2 Isolate 

 Maneuver and deploy security element(s) to ensure additional enemy forces do not join the 

battle unexpectedly. (Security elements may become fixing elements.) 

 Continue to provide early warning. 

 Prevent the enemy from gaining further information. 

 Prevent enemy maneuver. 

 2.3 Seize or Destroy 

 Attack to destroy or seize personnel or equipment. 

2.4 Exfiltrate 

 Conduct undetected movement from areas under enemy control by stealth, deception, surprise, or clandestine means. 

TACTICAL TASK 2.0 RAID 

No. Scale Measure 

01 Yes/No Unit infiltrates without detection. 

02 Yes/No Unit isolates enemy from assistance. 

03 Time To seize or destroy raid target. 

04 Time To extract/exfiltrate. 

05 Percent Of friendly forces available to continue mission. 

B-2 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

OPFOR Tactical Task List 

TACTICAL TASK 3.0 AMBUSH (ANNIHILATION) 

B-5. An ambush is a surprise attack from a concealed position, used against moving or temporarily halted 

targets. The purpose of an annihilation ambush is to destroy the enemy force. These are violent attacks designed to ensure the enemy’s return fire, if any, is ineffective. Generally, this type of ambush uses the terrain to the attacker’s advantage and employs mines and other obstacles to halt the enemy in the kill zone. 

The goal of the obstacles is to keep the enemy in the kill zone throughout the action. The subtasks for an 

annihilation ambush are— 

 3.1 Occupy Ambush Site 

 3.2 Isolate Kill Zone 

 Maneuver and deploy security element(s) to ensure additional enemy forces do not join the 

battle unexpectedly. (Security elements may become fixing elements.) 

 Continue to provide early warning. 

 Prevent the enemy from gaining further information. 

 Prevent enemy maneuver. 

 3.3 Contain Enemy 

 Stop, hold, or surround enemy forces and prevent them from withdrawing any element for 

use elsewhere. 

 3.4 Destroy 

 Render the enemy combat ineffective and/or damage selected element(s) of his combat system to the point of uselessness. 

 3.5 Exfiltrate 

 Conduct undetected movement from areas under enemy control by stealth, deception, surprise, or clandestine means. 

TACTICAL TASK 3.0 AMBUSH (ANNIHILATION) 

No. Scale Measure 

01 Yes/No Unit moves to and occupies ambush site without 

detection. 

02 Yes/No Unit isolates kill zone from assistance. 

03 Time To execute ambush. 

04 Yes/No Enemy in kill zone during projected time window. 

05 Yes/No Enemy contained in kill zone. 

06 Percent Friendly forces available to continue mission. 

07 Percent Combat effectiveness of enemy force. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 B-3 
 

Appendix B 

TACTICAL TASK 4.0 RECONNAISSANCE ATTACK 

B-6. A reconnaissance attack is a tactical offensive action that locates moving, dispersed, or concealed 

enemy elements and either fixes or destroys them. It may also be used to gain information. The reconnaissance attack may involve multiple security and assault elements. The subtasks for a reconnaissance attack 

are— 

 4.1 Find 

 Employ reconnaissance element(s) to locate target systems or units. 

 4.2 Isolate 

 Maneuver and deploy security element(s) to ensure additional enemy forces do not join the 

battle unexpectedly. (Security elements may become fixing elements.) 

 Continue to provide early warning. 

 Prevent enemy maneuver. 

 Prevent the enemy from gaining further information. 

 4.3 Fix 

 Prevent the enemy from moving any part of his force from a specific location for a specific 

period of time. 

 The security element(s) making contact fix the enemy. (Security elements become fixing 

elements.) 

 Security element(s) continue to provide early warning of approaching enemy forces and 

prevent them from gaining further information on the rest of the OPFOR force. 

 4.4 Destroy 

 Render the enemy combat ineffective and/or damage selected element(s) of his combat system to the point of uselessness. 

TACTICAL TASK 4.0 RECONNAISSANCE ATTACK 

No. Scale Measure 

01 Percent Of enemy elements requiring destruction found. 

02 Yes/No Enemy elements isolated from outside assistance. 

03 Time To find and destroy enemy elements. 

04 Percent Of friendly forces available to continue mission. 

05 Percent Combat effectiveness of enemy force. 

TACTICAL TASK 5.0 RECONNAISSANCE 

B-7. Reconnaissance represents all measures associated with organizing, collecting, and studying information on the enemy, terrain, and weather in the area of upcoming battles. The subtasks for a reconnaissance are— 

 5.1 Fix Enemy Security Forces 

 Prevent the enemy from moving any part of his security force from a specific location for a 

specific period of time. 

 The security element(s) making contact fix the enemy. (Security elements become fixing 

elements.) 

 Security element(s) continue to provide early warning of approaching enemy forces and 

prevent them from gaining further information on the rest of the OPFOR force. 

B-4 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

OPFOR Tactical Task List 

 5.2 Find 

 Employ reconnaissance element(s) to locate selected reconnaissance targets. 

 5.3 Contact 

 Gain sensor contact between reconnaissance element(s) and their designated reconnaissance 

target(s). 

 5.4 Report 

 Provide accurate information on reconnaissance targets in a timely manner. 

TACTICAL TASK 5.0 RECONNAISSANCE 

No. Scale Measure 

01 Percent Of reconnaissance targets found. 

02 Percent Of reconnaissance elements able to contact targets. 

03 Time To find and report on all reconnaissance targets. 

04 Percent Of friendly forces available to continue mission. 

TACTICAL TASK 6.0 COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE 

B-8. Counterreconnaissance (CR) is a continuous combined arms action to locate, track and destroy all 

enemy reconnaissance operating in a given AOR. CR is conducted at all times and during all types of operations. The subtasks for CR are— 

 6.1 Predict 

 Determine likely types and locations of critical enemy reconnaissance elements. 

 6.2 Find 

 Employ reconnaissance elements to locate enemy reconnaissance elements. 

 6.3 Report 

 Provide accurate information on reconnaissance targets in a timely manner. 

 6.4 Neutralize 

 Destroy, deceive, or obscure enemy reconnaissance elements. 

TACTICAL TASK 6.0 COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE 

No. Scale Measure 

01 Percent Of enemy reconnaissance elements found. 

02 Percent Of enemy reconnaissance elements unable to contact targets. 

03 Time To find and report on all critical enemy reconnaissance elements. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 B-5 
 

 

Appendix B 

TACTICAL TASK 7.0 DEFEND FROM SIMPLE BATTLE POSITION 

B-9. A simple battle position (SBP) is a defensive location oriented on the most likely enemy avenue of 

approach or objective area. SBPs are not necessarily tied to restrictive terrain but will employ as much engineer effort as possible to restrict enemy maneuver. Defenders of SBPs will take all actions necessary to 

prevent enemy penetration of their position, or defeat a penetration once it has occurred. Unlike a complex 

battle position, which is typically independent, an SBP may form a larger integrated defense with other 

SBPs. The subtasks for defense from a SBP are— 

 7.1 Control 

 Orient on enemy avenue of approach. 

 7.2 Gain Advantage 

 Employ terrain, survivability, and C3D to provide an advantage over attackers. 

TACTICAL TASK 7.0 DEFEND FROM SIMPLE BATTLE POSITION 

No. Scale Measure 

01A Yes/No Attacking enemy force destroyed/position retained. 

01B Yes/No Position retained for time specified by commander. 

02 Percent Of friendly forces available to continue mission. 

03 Percent Combat effectiveness of enemy force. 

TACTICAL TASK 8.0 DEFEND FROM COMPLEX BATTLE POSITION 

B-10. Complex battle positions (CBPs) are designed to protect the units within them from detection and attack while denying their seizure and occupation by the enemy. They are not necessarily tied to an avenue 

of approach. CBPs protect forces while providing sanctuary from which to launch local attacks. The subtasks for defense from a CBP are— 

 8.1 Protect 

 Employ complex terrain, survivability, and C3D to protect the defending force from destruction. 

 8.2 Degrade 

 Retain ability to conduct systems warfare actions from protected positions. 

TACTICAL TASK 8.0 DEFEND FROM COMPLEX BATTLE POSITION 

No. Scale Measure 

01 Yes/No Position retained for time specified by commander. 

02 Percent Of friendly forces available to continue mission. 

03 Yes/No Able to conduct specified systems warfare 

missions. 

B-6 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

 

 

OPFOR Tactical Task List 

TACTICAL TASK 9.0 ACTIONS ON CONTACT 

B-11. Actions on contact are designed to ensure OPFOR units retain the initiative and fight under circumstances of their choosing. Actions on contact are also designed to provide the commander with the flexibility to either continue with the planned course of action or rapidly adopt a new course of action more 

suited to changed conditions. The subtasks for actions on contact are— 

 9.1 Fix 

 Prevent the enemy from moving any part of his force from a specific location for a specific 

period of time. 

 Security element(s) making contact fix the enemy. 

 Security element(s) continue to provide early warning of approaching enemy forces and 

prevent them from gaining further information on the rest of the OPFOR force. 

Note. Security element(s) performing a fixing function are then known as fixing element(s). Fixing elements often make use of terrain chokepoints, obstacles, ambushes and other techniques to 

fix a larger force. When an element that is not a security element makes contact with the enemy, 

the commander will designate that element as a fixing element. 

 9.2 Assess and Report 

 Commander makes an assessment of the tactical situation and determines whether or not 

making contact in this manner and with this enemy constitutes a change in his course of action. 

 Commander reports to the chain of command the form of contact he has made, to include 

critical details of its composition and his assessment. 

 9.3 Isolate 

 Maneuver and deploys security element(s) to ensure additional enemy forces do not join the 

battle unexpectedly. 

 9.4 Maintain Freedom to Maneuver 

 Make contact with the minimum force necessary to fix the enemy. 

 Make use of C3D and the break contact battle drill to prevent the OPFOR force from becoming decisively engaged. 

 Determine safe maneuver avenues to employ. 

 Freedom to maneuver is also maintained by dominating avenues of approach into the battle 

zone and determining the location of enemy flanks or exposed areas of weakness. 

 9.5 Execute Course of Action 

 Contacting unit either continues with its original course of action if deemed appropriate or 

executes a new one that suits the situation. 

 New course of action given to the unit based on the assessment it provides to its higher 

command or one chosen by the commander in absence of time or guidance. 

 Unit making contact ensures follow-on units are aware of the contact and deconflict positioning, typically through the use of a standard marking system. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 B-7 
 

 

Appendix B 

TACTICAL TASK 9.0 ACTIONS ON CONTACT 

No. Scale Measure 

01 Yes/No Unit fixes enemy. 

02 Yes/No Unit leader assesses situation without main body 

being in contact with the enemy. 

03 Time To report. 

04 Yes/No Unit isolates enemy from assistance. 

05 Time To choose course of action (COA). 

06 Time To execute selected COA. 

07 Time To recommend a COA to the higher commander. 

08 Time To return to previous mission. 

09 Percent Of friendly forces available to continue previous 

mission. 

10 Percent Combat effectiveness of enemy force that made 

contact. 

11 Percent Correctness of initial assessment of enemy. 

TACTICAL TASK 10.0 SITUATIONAL BREACH 

B-12. A situational breach is the reduction of and passage through an obstacle encountered in the due 

course of executing another tactical task. The unit conducting a situational breach may have expected an 

obstacle or not, but in either case conducts a situational breach with the resources at hand and does not wait 

for specialized equipment and other support. The subtasks for situational breach are— 

 10.1 Isolate 

 Maneuver and deploy security element(s) to ensure additional enemy forces do not join the 

battle unexpectedly. (Security elements may become fixing elements.) 

 Continue to provide early warning. 

 Prevent enemy from gaining further information. 

 Prevent enemy maneuver. 

 10.2 Secure 

 Unit takes action to ensure enemy defending the obstacle are neutralized. 

 10.3 Penetrate 

 Clearing element neutralizes the obstacle such that the action element and/or a follow-on 

force can complete its mission. 

 10.4 Execute Course of Action 

 Breaching unit continues with its original course of action if deemed appropriate or executes a new one that suits the situation. 

 New course of action given to the unit based on the assessment it provides to its higher 

command or one chosen by the commander in absence of time or guidance. 

 Breaching unit ensures follow-on units are aware of the obstacle facilitates movement, typically through the use of a standard marking system. 

B-8 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

 

OPFOR Tactical Task List 

TACTICAL TASK 10.0 SITUATIONAL BREACH 

No. Scale Measure 

01 Yes/No Unit isolates breach site from contact. 

02 Time To secure breach site. 

03 Time To penetrate obstacle. 

04 Time To return to previous mission. 

05 Percent Of friendly forces available to continue previous 

mission. 

TACTICAL TASK 11.0 BREAKING CONTACT 

B-13. The primary consideration in breaking contact is to remove the enemy’s ability to place destructive 

or suppressive fires on the greater portion of the OPFOR force. This is accomplished by fixing the enemy, 

regaining freedom to maneuver and employing fires, counter-mobility and camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D). The subtasks for break contact are— 

 11.1 Protect 

 Take immediate steps to protect the unit from this form of contact. 

 Direct fire: fix, C3D, terrain use. 

 Sensor collection: C3D, terrain use, alternate assembly areas/positions. 

 Emplaced obstacles and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN): alternate 

assembly areas/positions. 

 Air, indirect fires, and electronic warfare: C3D, terrain use, alternate assembly 

areas/positions. 

 11.2 Retain Freedom to Maneuver 

 Commander reduces his elements in contact to only security element(s). 

 Commander selects one or more routes from his current location that enable his detachment 

to remain out of contact while permitting him to maneuver in support of his mission. 

 11.3 Assess and Report 

 Commander reports to the chain of command the form of contact he has made and critical 

details of its composition and his assessment. 

 11.4 Continue or Change in Course of Action 

 Commander makes an assessment of the tactical situation to determine whether or not making contact in this manner and with this enemy constitutes a change in the course of action 

(COA). 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 B-9 
 

Appendix B 

TACTICAL TASK 11.0 BREAK CONTACT 

No. Scale Measure 

01 Time To implement appropriate protective measures. 

02 Yes/No Unit leader assesses situation without main body 

being in contact. 

03 Time To report. 

04 Time To retain/choose COA. 

05 Percent Of friendly forces available to continue. 

06 Percent Correctness of initial assessment of contact. 

TACTICAL TASK 12.0 FIXING 

B-14. Fixing is a tactical task intended to prevent the enemy from moving any part of his force from a specific location for a period of time. The ability to fix the enemy at crucial points is the fundamental way 

units maintain the freedom to maneuver and retain the initiative. An enemy becomes fixed in one of three 

basic ways: he cannot physically move, he does not want to move, or he does not think he can move. Suppressive fires, information warfare (INFOWAR) and countermobility are the primary methods by which an 

enemy is fixed in this way. The subtasks for fixing are— 

 12.1 Prevent Enemy Movement 

 Physically prevent enemy from moving. 

 Make the enemy believe he cannot move. 

 Make the enemy believe he does not want to move. 

 12.2 Execute Fixing Method or Action 

 Suppressive fires. 

 INFOWAR. 

 Countermobility. 

TACTICAL TASK 12.0 FIXING 

No. Scale Measure 

01 Yes/No Enemy was fixed. 

02 Time To select fixing action/method. 

03 Time To execute fixing action/method. 

04 Percent Of friendly force able to continue mission. 

B-10 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

 

 

 

 

OPFOR Tactical Task List 

TACTICAL TASK 13.0 TACTICAL MOVEMENT 

B-15. Tactical movement is the method by which OPFOR units move on the battlefield. It is employed in 

any situation where enemy contact is possible. It is most often used in offensive operations, to move from 

attack position to the point of attack. The subtasks for tactical movement are— 

 13.1 Organize 

 Fighting patrols. 

 Security elements. 

 Security detachment. 

 Main body. 

 Routes, axes, attack zones, firing lines. 

 13.2 Maintain Freedom to Maneuver 

 Make contact with the minimum force necessary to fix the enemy. 

 Make use of C3D and the break contact battle drill to prevent the moving force from becoming decisively engaged. 

 Security element(s) determine safe maneuver avenues to employ. 

TACTICAL TASK 13.0 TACTICAL MOVEMENT 

No. Scale Measure 

01 Yes/No Fighting patrol/security element fixes enemy. 

02 Yes/No Unit leader assesses situation without main body 

being in contact with the enemy. 

03 Time To report. 

04 Time To choose and move to alternate route(s). 

05 Time To return to previous mission. 

06 Percent Of friendly forces available to continue previous 

mission. 

07 Percent Combat effectiveness of enemy force that made 

contact. 

TACTICAL TASK 14.0 DISRUPTION 

B-16. Disrupt is a tactical task intended to upset an enemy’s formation or tempo, interrupt the enemy’s 

timetable, cause the enemy to commit his forces prematurely, and/or cause him to attack in piecemeal fashion. The purpose of a disruption force is to significantly degrade the enemy’s combat capability and to 

prevent the enemy from conducting an effective operation. The primary task of the disruption force is to initiate the attack against the enemy’s combat system. The subtasks for disruption are— 

 14.1 Destroy or Deceive Enemy Reconnaissance 

 14.2 Gain and Maintain Reconnaissance Contact with Key Enemy Elements 

 14.3 Contain the Enemy 

 Stop, hold, or surround enemy forces. 

 Prevent the enemy from withdrawing any element for use elsewhere. 

 14.4 Destroy the Enemy 

 Render the enemy combat ineffective and/or damage elements of the enemy’s combat system to the point of uselessness. 

 14.5 Exfiltrate 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 B-11 
Appendix B 

 Conduct undetected movement from areas under enemy control by stealth, deception, surprise, or clandestine means. 

TACTICAL TASK 14.0 DISRUPTION 

No. Scale Measure 

01 Yes/No Enemy reconnaissance able to locate friendly highvalue targets (HVTs) destroyed or deceived. 

02 Percent Enemy HVTs identified, tracked, destroyed. 

03 Time Enemy delayed. 

04 Yes/No Enemy forced to deploy to friendly time schedule. 

05 Yes/No Enemy main body contained. 

06 Percent Of friendly forces available to continue mission. 

07 Percent Combat effectiveness of enemy force. 

TACTICAL TASK 15.0 INTEGRATED ATTACK 

B-17. Integrated attack is an offensive action where the OPFOR seeks military decision by destroying the 

enemy’s will and/or ability to continue fighting through the application of combined arms effects. Integrated attack is often employed when the OPFOR enjoys overmatch with respect to its opponent and is 

able to bring all elements of offensive combat power to bear. It may also be employed against a more sophisticated and capable opponent, if the appropriate window of opportunity is created or available. The 

subtasks for integrated attack are— 

 15.1 Planning 

 Determine decisive points. 

 Backwards plan from destruction of critical enemy combat service support and command 

and control (C2) organizations back to the current time. 

o	 Destruction of objective. 

o	 Maneuver of exploitation force to objective. 

o	 Use of assault force to enable exploitation force. 

o	 Fixing force isolates decisive points. 

o	 Disruption force executes disruption of enemy. 

o	 Rehearsals. 

o	 Preparation. 

o	 Planning. 

 15.2 Preparation 

 Create task organization and C2 of disruption force, fixing force, assault force, exploitation 

force, reserves, and deception force. 

 Execute deception and disruption. 

 15.3 Rehearsal 

 15.4 Execution 

 Disruption force executes disruption of enemy; focuses on preventing detection of exploitation force. 

 Fixing force(s) maneuver and fire to ensure the decisive point is isolated. 

 Maneuver and deploy security element(s) to ensure additional enemy forces do not join the 

battle unexpectedly. (Security elements may become fixing forces.) 

B-12 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

 

OPFOR Tactical Task List 

 Assault force conducts action to set conditions for exploitation force success. 

 Exploitation force destroys target enemy or seizes objective. 

TACTICAL TASK 15.0 INTEGRATED ATTACK 

No. Scale Measure 

01 Yes/No Mission accomplished. 

02 Yes/No Assault forces created correct conditions for exploitation forces’ success. 

03 Time To complete mission. 

04 Yes/No Fixing forces isolated decisive points. 

05 Yes/No Disruption forces accomplished mission. 

06 Percent Of friendly forces available to continue previous 

mission. 

07 Percent Combat effectiveness of enemy force. 

08 Percent Correctness of initial assessment of enemy. 

TACTICAL TASK 16.0 DISPERSED ATTACK 

B-18. Dispersed attack is the primary manner in which the OPFOR conducts offensive action when threatened by a superior enemy and/or when unable to mass or provide integrated C2 to an attack. This is not to 

say that the dispersed attack cannot or should not be used against peer forces, but as a rule integrated attack 

will more completely attain objectives in such situations. Dispersed attack relies on INFOWAR and dispersion of forces to permit the OPFOR to conduct tactical offensive actions while overmatched by precision 

standoff weapons and imagery and signals sensors. The dispersed attack is continuous and comes from 

multiple directions. It employs multiple means working together in a very interdependent way. The attack 

can be dispersed in time as well as space. The subtasks for dispersed attack are— 

 16.1 Planning 

 Determine decisive points. 

 Determine need for window of opportunity and/or multiple exploitation forces. 

 Backwards plan from destruction of key elements of the enemy’s combat system back to the 

current time. 

o	 Destruction of objective(s). 

o	 Maneuver of exploitation forces to objective(s). 

o	 Use of assault force(s) to enable exploitation force. 

o	 Fixing force(s) isolate decisive points. 

o	 Disruption force(s) execute disruption of enemy. 

o	 Rehearsals. 

o	 Preparation. 

o	 Planning. 

 16.2 Preparation 

 Create task organization and C2 of disruption force(s), fixing force(s), assault force(s), exploitation force(s), reserves, and deception force. 

 Execute deception and disruption. 

 16.3 Rehearsal 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 B-13 
 

 

Appendix B 

 16.4 Execution 

 Disruption force(s) execute disruption of enemy. 

 Focus on preventing detection of exploitation forces. 

 Fixing forces maneuver and fire to ensure the decisive point is isolated. 

 Maneuver and deploy security element(s) to ensure additional enemy forces do not join the 

battle unexpectedly. (Security elements may become fixing elements.) 

 Assault force(s) conduct action to set conditions for exploitation forces’ success. 

 Exploitation force(s) destroys target enemy or seize objectives. 

TACTICAL TASK 16.0 DISPERSED ATTACK 

No. Scale Measure 

01 Yes/No Mission accomplished. 

02 Yes/No Assault forces created correct conditions for exploitation forces’ success. 

03 Time To complete mission. 

04 Yes/No Fixing forces isolated decisive points. 

05 Yes/No Disruption forces accomplished their mission. 

06 Percent Of friendly forces available to continue previous 

mission. 

07 Percent Combat effectiveness of enemy force. 

08 Percent Correctness of initial assessment of enemy. 

TACTICAL TASK 17.0 FIRE AND MANEUVER 

B-19. Fire and maneuver is the way in which OPFOR small units move while in contact with the enemy. 

When required to move while in contact with the enemy, the OPFOR commander selects a part of his force 

to be the support (or firing) element and part to be the action (or moving) element. The support element 

then directs suppressing fire against any enemy that has the ability to influence the movement of the action 

element. The action element then moves either to a firing line or to the objective. Once it reaches its new 

position, it becomes the new support element, and the former support element becomes the new moving 

element. 

Note. The critical aspect of executing fire and maneuver is the commander’s selection of the 

right amount of combat power and resources to assign to each of the elements of his force. If the 

support element does not have the ability to significantly reduce the effectiveness of the enemy, 

the action element will be destroyed. If the action element does not have the combat power to 

take the objective or assume its new role as support element, the mission will fail. 

B-20. The subtasks for fire and maneuver are— 

 17.1 Make Contact 

 17.2 Fix 

 Prevent the enemy from moving any part of his force from a specific location for a specific 

period of time. 

 Commander selects a part of his force to be the support (or firing) element and part to be the 

action (or moving) element. 

B-14 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

OPFOR Tactical Task List 

 Support element directs suppressing fire against any enemy that has the ability to influence 

the movement of the action element. 

 Security element(s) continue to provide early warning of approaching enemy forces and 

prevents them from gaining further information on the rest of the OPFOR force. 

Note. A support element that prevents other parts of the enemy force from influencing the 

movement of the action force is then known as a fixing element. Fixing elements often make use 

of terrain chokepoints, obstacles, ambushes and other techniques to fix a larger force. When 

contact is made with an element that is not a support element, the commander will designate that 

element as a fixing element. 

 17.3 Isolate 

 Maneuver and deploy security element(s) to ensure additional enemy forces do not join the 

battle unexpectedly. (Security elements may become fixing elements.) 

 17.4 Maneuver 

 Action element maneuvers to new position of advantage with respect to the enemy. 

 On order, action element assumes role as new support element or assaults the enemy. 

 If further maneuver is required, continue alternation of fixing the enemy and maneuvering 

against enemy. 

TACTICAL TASK 17.0 FIRE AND MANEUVER 

No. Scale Measure 

01 Yes/No Unit fixes enemy. 

02 Yes/No Unit leader correctly structures his force quickly into 

support and action elements. 

03 Yes/No Support element suppresses enemy. 

04 Yes/No Security element isolates enemy from assistance. 

05 Yes/No Action element maneuvers to position of advantage. 

06 Time To make each maneuver. 

07 Time To assault and destroy enemy. 

08 Percent Of friendly forces available to continue previous 

mission. 

09 Percent Combat effectiveness of enemy force that made 

contact. 

10 Percent Correctness of initial assessment of enemy. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 B-15 
 

 

 

Appendix B 

TACTICAL TASK 18.0 ALL-ARMS AIR DEFENSE 

B-21. All-arms air defense is the simultaneous employment of several arms, in some cases including air defense systems, to achieve an effect against the enemy air threat that will render greater results than the use 

of air defense assets and systems alone. Thus, all OPFOR units possess some type of an organic air defense 

capability to differing degrees, depending on the type and size of the unit. The extent to which this capability can be applied is limited only by the commander and staff’s knowledge of the enemy air threat, capabilities of their own systems, and their ability to apply that knowledge to come up with innovative solutions. 

The subtasks for all-arms air defense are— 

 18.1 Planning 

 Locate or predict enemy airfields; forward arming and refueling points (FARPs); flight 

routes; drop, landing, and pickup zones (DZ/LZ/PZ); and helicopter firing positions. 

 Determine need for window of opportunity. 

 Backwards plan from destruction of aircraft back to the current time. 

o	 Destruction of aircraft. 

o	 Detection of aircraft. 

o	 Maneuver to firing position and/or placement of obstacles. 

o	 Use of C3D and window(s) of opportunity. 

o	 Disruption force(s) executes disruption of enemy. 

o	 Rehearsals. 

o	 Preparation. 

o	 Planning. 

 Look for new and adaptive ways of employing existing capabilities (not only air defense 

systems but also systems not traditionally associated with air defense) to damage and/or destroy enemy aircraft when within range. 

 Identify complex terrain in the vicinity of identified targets and potential cache sites. 

 Identify affiliated forces (such as insurgent groups, groups with ethnic ties to the OPFOR, 

groups that sympathize with the OPFOR for political reasons, individual sympathizers, terrorist groups, and criminal organizations) that can perform air defense functions. 

 Determine potential means and routes of infiltration and potential sources of supply. 

 Determine the decisive point for aircraft destruction. 

o	 On the ground (using indirect fire, WMD, direct action, or precision munitions). 

o	 In flight, but before entering the airspace over OPFOR ground maneuver forces (using 

air defense weapons, directed energy weapons, or direct fire). 

o	 In the airspace above OPFOR battle positions (using air defense weapons, other 

ground force weapons, obstacles, or anti-helicopter mines). 

 18.2 Preparation 

 All units incorporate the use of their weapons to engage tactical aircraft into their tactics, 

techniques, and procedures. 

 All units routinely train in techniques for engaging enemy aircraft. 

 All units execute deception and disruption. 

 18.3 Rehearsal 

 18.4 Execution 

 All units post air observers. 

 Detect and report the presence of enemy aircraft (on the ground or in the air). 

 Destroy enemy aircraft. 

 Prevent aerial observation. 

 Force the aircraft to expend their munitions before reaching the optimum or effective range. 

 Divert enemy aircraft before reaching their targets. 

B-16 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

 

OPFOR Tactical Task List 

 Force the enemy to break off and/or discontinue the air attack. 

 Mitigate the effectiveness of the enemy air attack. 

TACTICAL TASK 18.0 ALL-ARMS AIR DEFENSE 

No. Scale Measure 

01 Yes/No Prevented enemy aircraft from interfering with 

OPFOR missions. 

02 Yes/No Defended the unit from aerial observation and air 

attack. 

03 Percent Destroyed enemy aircraft. 

04 Yes/No Forced enemy aircraft to expend their munitions 

before reaching the optimum or effective range. 

05 Yes/No Diverted enemy aircraft before reaching their targets. 

06 Yes/No Forced the enemy to break off and/or discontinue 

the air attack. 

07 Percent Mitigated the effectiveness of the enemy air attack. 

08 Percent Combat effectiveness of enemy aircraft. 

TACTICAL TASK 19.0 ANTILANDING ACTIONS 

B-22. Antilanding actions are those methods used to prevent landings by airborne or heliborne troops or to 

destroy enemy landing forces on the ground as soon after landing as possible. Antilanding actions can and 

will be executed by any force with the capability to affect the aircraft or the landing forces. However, this 

is a combined arms action that primarily falls to the antilanding reserve (ALR) for execution. The subtasks 

for antilanding actions are— 

 19.1 Planning 

 Locate and predict drop and landing zones (DZs or LZs). 

 Determine need for window of opportunity. 

 Backwards plan from destruction of landing forces back to the current time. 

o	 Destruction of landing forces. 

o	 Detection of landing forces. 

o	 Maneuver to firing position and/or placement of obstacles. 

o	 Use of C3D and window(s) of opportunity. 

o	 Disruption force(s) execute disruption of enemy. 

o	 Rehearsals. 

o	 Preparation. 

o	 Planning. 

 Identify complex terrain in the vicinity of identified targets and potential cache sites. 

 Identify affiliated forces (such as insurgent groups, groups with ethnic ties to the OPFOR, 

groups that sympathize with the OPFOR for political reasons, individual sympathizers, terrorist groups and criminal organizations) that can perform or support antilanding functions. 

 Determine potential means and routes of infiltration and potential sources of supply. 

 Determine the decisive point for destruction of landing forces. 

o	 On the ground, before air transport (using indirect fire, WMD, direct action, or precision munitions). 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 B-17 
 

Appendix B 

o	 En route to or in the vicinity of LZs or DZs (using air defense weapons, directed energy weapons, direct fire, obstacles, or anti-helicopter mines). 

o	 In an LZ or DZ (using indirect fire, WMD, direct fire, direct action, precision munitions, or infantry with antitank weapons). 

Note. The OPFOR prefers to prevent landings by airborne or heliborne troops through the destruction of the troop transport aircraft in flight. Failing that, it will take significant actions to 

destroy landing forces on the ground as soon after landing as possible. Antilanding forces are 

given their own attack zone to control their actions against landing forces. Such an attack zone 

may only be activated for the duration of an antilanding action or may be assigned to the ALR 

permanently. Kill zones are used to control both ground and air defense engagements. 

 19.2 Preparation 

 Create one or more ALRs. 

 Create task organization and C2 of action element(s), support element(s), security element(s), and deception force. 

 Assign attack zone(s) and kill zone(s). 

 19.3 Rehearsal 

 The ALR rehearses actions in the vicinity of the LZs or DZs as well as movement between 

assembly areas, hide positions, and attack positions, and between LZs or DZs. 

 19.4 Execution 

 Transmit early warning from the main command post to the ALR. 

 ALR moves to positions in the attack zone from which it can engage transport aircraft and 

destroy landing forces on the ground. 

o	 Disruption force(s) execute disruption of the enemy; focus on preventing detection of 

action element(s). 

o	 Security element(s) maneuver and fire to ensure the decisive point is isolated to ensure 

additional enemy forces do not join the battle unexpectedly. (Security elements may 

become fixing elements.) 

o	 Support element(s) conduct action to set conditions for action elements’ success. 

o	 Action element(s) destroy targeted enemy. 

B-18 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

 

 

OPFOR Tactical Task List 

TACTICAL TASK 19.0 ANTILANDING ACTIONS 

No. Scale Measure 

01 Yes/No Mission accomplished. 

02 Yes/No Support element(s) created correct conditions for 

action elements’ success. 

03 Time To complete mission. 

04 Yes/No Security element(s) isolated decisive points. 

05 Yes/No Disruption force(s) accomplished their mission. 

06 Percent Of friendly forces available to continue previous 

mission. 

07 Percent Combat effectiveness of enemy force. 

08 Percent Correctness of initial assessment of enemy. 

TACTICAL TASK 20.0 SOPHISTICATED AMBUSH 

B-23. A sophisticated ambush is the linking in time and task of RISTA, attacking forces, and window of 

opportunity to destroy key enemy systems or cause politically unacceptable casualties. What makes a sophisticated ambush “sophisticated” is not the actual attack means. In fact, the actual ambush is executed by 

tactical-level forces. What makes it “sophisticated” is the linking of sensor, ambusher, window of opportunity, and a target that affects an enemy center of gravity. This may require sophisticated ambushes to be 

planned, coordinated, and resourced at the operational level. (See chapter 3, FM 7-100.1.) The subtasks 

and sub-subtasks for the sophisticated ambush are— 

 20.1 Planning 

 Choose the target enemy force or system. (In a system’s warfare approach, this force or system is typically chosen for its role in the enemy’s combat system.) 

 Locate and predict target locations. 

 Determine need for window of opportunity. 

 Backwards plan from destruction of target back to the current time. 

o	 Destruction of target. 

o	 Tracking of target. 

o	 Maneuver to firing position and/or placement of obstacles. 

o	 Use of C3D and window(s) of opportunity. 

o	 Disruption force(s) execute disruption of enemy. 

o	 Rehearsals. 

o	 Preparation. 

o	 Planning. 

 Identify complex terrain in the vicinity of identified targets and potential cache sites. 

 Identify affiliated forces (such as insurgent groups, groups with ethnic ties to the OPFOR, 

groups that sympathize with the OPFOR for political reasons, as well as individual sympathizers, terrorist groups, and criminal organizations) that can participate or assist in the sophisticated 

ambush. 

 Identify potential means and routes of infiltration and potential sources of supply. 

 Determine the decisive point. 

 Establish attack zone and kill zone(s). 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 B-19 
 

 

Appendix B 

Note. Sophisticated ambushes can be executed by any force with the capability to destroy the 

target. Forces or elements conducting sophisticated ambushes are given their own attack zone to 

control their actions. Such an attack zone is only activated for the duration of the action. Kill 

zones are used to control both ground and air engagements. 

 20.2 Preparation 

 Create task organization and C2 of action element(s), support element(s), security element(s), disruption force(s), and deception force. 

 Execute deception and disruption. 

 20.3 Rehearsal 

 Ambushing detachment rehearses actions in the vicinity of the kill zone as well as movement between assembly areas, hide positions, and attack positions. 

 20.4 Execution 

 Occupy the Ambush Site 20.4.1 

 Isolate the Kill Zone 20.4.1 

o	 Maneuver and deploy security element(s) to ensure additional enemy forces do not join 

the battle unexpectedly. (Security elements may become fixing elements.) 

o	 Security element(s) continue to provide early warning. 

o	 Prevent the enemy from gaining further information. 

o	 Prevent enemy maneuver. 

 Contain the Enemy 20.4.2 

o	 Stop, hold, or surround enemy forces. 

o	 Prevent the enemy from withdrawing any element for use elsewhere. 

 Destroy the Enemy 20.4.3 

o	 Render the enemy combat ineffective and/or damage selected element(s) of his combat 

system to the point of uselessness. 

 Exfiltrate 20.4.4 

o	 Conduct undetected movement from areas under enemy control by stealth, deception, 

surprise, or clandestine means. 

TACTICAL TASK 20.0 SOPHISTICATED AMBUSH 

No. Scale Measure 

01 Yes/No Unit moves to and occupies ambush site without 

detection. 

02 Yes/No Unit isolates kill zone from assistance. 

03 Time To execute ambush. 

04 Yes/No Enemy in kill zone during projected time window. 

05 Yes/No Enemy contained in kill zone. 

06 Percent Of friendly forces available to continue previous 

mission. 

07 Percent Combat effectiveness of enemy force. 

B-20 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
OPFOR Tactical Task List 

TACTICAL TASK 21.0 MANEUVER DEFENSE 

B-24. A maneuver defense is a type of defensive action designed to achieve tactical decision by skillfully 

using fires and maneuver to destroy key elements of the enemy’s combat system and deny enemy forces 

their objective, while preserving the friendly force. Within the enemy’s combat system, the OPFOR would 

often target the enemy’s C2 or logistics forces rather than his less vulnerable combat and combat support 

forces. Maneuver defenses cause the enemy to continually lose effectiveness until he can no longer achieve 

his objectives. They can also economize force in less important areas while the OPFOR moves additional 

forces onto the most threatened axes. The subtasks for maneuver defense are— 

 21.1 Planning 

 Plan a succession of defensive lines throughout the area of responsibility (AOR). 

 Plan successive battle positions and repositioning routes throughout the AOR. 

 Identify high-value targets and kill zones. 

 Identify complex terrain in the vicinity of identified targets. 

 Determine decisive points. 

 Backwards plan from destruction of key element(s) of the enemy’s combat system back to 

the current time. 

o	 Destruction of objective(s). 

o	 Repositioning of forces to expose objective to attack. 

o	 Disruption force(s) execute disruption of enemy. 

o	 Rehearsals. 

o	 Preparation. 

o	 Planning. 

 21.2 Preparation 

 Create task organization and C2 of disruption force, main defense force (contact force and 

shielding force), reserves, deception force(s), and counterattack force(s.) 

 Execute deception and disruption. 

 21.3 Rehearsal 

 21.4 Execution 

 Disruption force executes disruption of enemy; focus on preventing interference with repositioning forces and detection and attack of high-value targets. 

 Contact and shielding forces maneuver and fire to ensure the decisive point is isolated. 

 Counterattack forces destroy key element(s) of the enemy’s combat system or seize objective. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 B-21 
Appendix B 

TACTICAL TASK 21.0 MANEUVER DEFENSE 

No. Scale Measure 

01 Yes/No Mission accomplished. 

02 Yes/No 

Disruption force(s) created correct conditions for 

main defense force (contact and shielding forces) 

success. 

03 Time To complete mission. 

04 Yes/No Contact and shielding forces isolated decisive 

points. 

05 Percent Of friendly forces available to continue previous 

mission. 

06 Percent Combat effectiveness of enemy force. 

07 Percent Correctness of initial assessment of enemy. 

TACTICAL TASK 22.0 AREA DEFENSE 

B-25. Area defense is a type of defensive action designed to achieve a decision by either— 

 Forcing the enemy’s offensive operations to culminate before he can achieve his objectives or 

 Denying the enemy his objectives while preserving combat power until decision can be achieved 

through strategic operations or operational mission accomplishment. 

The area defense does not surrender the initiative to the attacking forces, but takes action to create windows of opportunity that permit forces to attack key elements of the enemy’s combat system and cause unacceptable casualties. The subtasks for area defense are— 

 22.1 Planning 

 Establish locations for complex battle positions within the battle zone. 

 Determine key terrain throughout the battle zone. 

 Develop a counterreconnaissance plan. 

 Locate and predict target locations. 

 Develop an integrated fires plan. 

 Determine decisive points. 

 Establish kill zone(s). 

 Backwards plan from destruction of key elements of the enemy’s combat system back to the 

current time. 

o	 Enemy attack culminates before he can achieve his objective or before the protected 

force is destroyed. 

o	 Reconnaissance fires and disruption conduct systems warfare on the enemy. 

o	 Disruption force executes disruption of enemy. 

o	 Rehearsals. 

o	 Preparation. 

o	 Planning. 

 22.2 Preparation 

 Create task organization and C2 of disruption force(s), main defense force, reserves, deception force(s), and counterattack force(s). 

 Designate the protected force (if any). 

 Execute deception and disruption. 

B-22 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

OPFOR Tactical Task List 

 22.3 Rehearsal 

 22.4 Execution 

 Disruption force executes disruption of enemy; focus on preventing interference with repositioning forces and detection/attack of high-value targets. 

 Main defense forces conduct reconnaissance fires and disruption to ensure the enemy culminates his attack before the protected force is destroyed. 

 Counterattack forces destroy key element(s) of the enemy’s combat system (often targeting 

C2 or logistics) or seize objective. 

TACTICAL TASK 22.0 AREA DEFENSE 

No. Scale Measure 

01 Yes/No Mission accomplished. 

02 Yes/No Disruption force created correct conditions for main 

defense force success. 

03 Time To complete mission. 

04 Yes/No Protected force is combat effective. 

05 Percent Of friendly forces available to continue previous 

mission. 

06 Percent Combat effectiveness of enemy force. 

07 Percent Correctness of initial assessment of enemy. 

TACTICAL TASK 23.0 INFORMATION WARFARE 

B-26. Information warfare (INFOWAR) is defined as specifically planned and integrated actions taken to 

achieve an information advantage at critical points and times. The goal is to influence an enemy’s decisionmaking through his collected and available information, information systems, and information-based 

processes, while retaining the ability to employ friendly information, information-based processes, and systems. The seven elements or subtasks for INFOWAR are— 

 Deception. 

 Electronic warfare. 

 Perception management. 

 Computer warfare. 

 Information attack. 

 Protection and security measures. 

 Physical destruction. 

TACTICAL SUBTASK 23.1 DECEPTION 

B-27. Deception includes measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of information. The OPFOR integrates these deception measures into every tactical action; it does not 

plan deception measures and activities in an ad hoc manner. A deception plan is always a major portion of 

the overall INFOWAR plan. The OPFOR formulates its plan of action, overall INFOWAR plan, and deception plan concurrently. It attempts to deceive the enemy concerning the exact strength and composition 

of its forces, their deployment and orientation, and their intended manner of employment. When successfully conducted, deception activities ensure that the OPFOR achieves tactical surprise, while enhancing 

force survivability. All deception measures and activities are continuously coordinated with deception 

plans and operations at higher levels. The sub-subtasks for deception are— 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 B-23 
 

 

 

Appendix B 

 23.1.1 Planning 

 Choose the target enemy force or system. This force or system is typically chosen for its 

role in the enemy’s combat system. 

 Locate and predict target location. 

 Determine need for window of opportunity. 

 Backwards plan from influence of deception target back to the current time. 

o	 Deception of target. 

o	 Tracking of target. 

o	 Maneuver to place deception resources in effective position as necessary. 

o	 Use of C3D and window(s) of opportunity. 

o	 Disruption force(s) executes disruption of enemy. 

o	 Rehearsals. 

o	 Preparation. 

o	 Planning. 

 Identify complex terrain in the vicinity of identified targets necessary to support deception. 

 Identify potential cache sites required. 

 Identify affiliated forces (such as insurgent groups, groups with ethnic ties to the OPFOR, 

groups that sympathize with the OPFOR for political reasons, individual sympathizers, terrorist groups, and criminal organizations) that may be required to participate or assist in the 

deception. 

 Determine potential means and routes of infiltration and potential sources of supply. 

 Choose method(s) of deception that best affect the deception target. This may be a combination of methods and must consider the characteristics of the operational environment and 

the nature of the larger ongoing operation. Such methods include— 

o	 Electronic deception (manipulative, simulative, imitative). 

o	 Physical deception (decoys [physical signature], thermal, acoustic). 

o	 Influence operations (radio, TV/video, print, Internet). 

o	 Military deception (feint, demonstration, ruse). 

 23.1.2 Preparation 

 Create task organization and C2 of action element(s), support element(s), security element(s), and deception force(s) or element(s). 

Note. The battle plan and/or INFOWAR plan may call for the creation of one or more deception 

forces or elements. This means that nonexistent or partially existing formations attempt to 

present the illusion of real or larger units. When the INFOWAR plan requires forces to take 

some action (such as a feint or demonstration), these forces are designated as deception forces or 

elements in close-hold executive summaries of the plan. Wide-distribution copies of the plan 

make reference to these forces according to the functional designation given them in the deception story. 

 Execute disruption. 

 23.1.3 Rehearsal 

 The deception force rehearses actions in a concealed location. This includes any military actions such as movement between assembly areas, hide positions, and attack positions. 

 23.1.4 Execution 

 Verify deception target. 

 Execute deception actions. 

 Monitor and assess deception effectiveness. 

B-24 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

 

OPFOR Tactical Task List 

Tactical Subtask 23.1 Deception 

No. Scale Measure 

01 Yes/No Deception target takes desired action. 

02 Yes/No Deception is not discovered. 

03 Time Target is deceived. 

TACTICAL SUBTASK 23.2 ELECTRONIC WARFARE 

B-28. Electronic warfare (EW) is activities conducted to control or deny the enemy’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum, while ensuring its use by the OPFOR. EW capabilities allow an actor to exploit, 

deceive, degrade, disrupt, damage, or destroy sensors, processors, and C2 nodes. At a minimum, the goal 

of EW is to control the use of the electromagnetic spectrum at critical locations and times in an OE or to attack a specific system. The OPFOR realizes that it cannot completely deny the enemy’s use of the spectrum. Thus, the goal of OPFOR EW is to control (limit or disrupt) his use or selectively deny it at specific 

locations and times on the battlefield, at the OPFOR’s choosing. In this way, the OPFOR intends to challenge the enemy’s goal of information dominance. 

B-29. For the OPFOR, EW consists of two main activities: 

 Signals reconnaissance is action taken to detect, identify, locate, and track high-value targets 

(HVTs) through the use of the electromagnetic spectrum. (Thus, signals reconnaissance is essentially the same as the U.S. task Provide Signals Intelligence on Specified Targets in the Universal Joint Task List. Therefore, it is not covered in detail here in the OPFOR Tactical Task List.) 

 Electronic attack (EA) supports the disaggregation of enemy forces, primarily through jamming. 

The EA-related sub-subtasks for EW are— 

 23.2.1 Planning 

 Choose the target enemy force(s) and system(s). (In a systems warfare approach, this force 

or system is typically chosen for its role in the enemy’s combat system.) 

 Locate or predict target location. 

 Determine need for window of opportunity. 

 Backwards plan from attack on target back to the current time. 

o	 Electronic attack (EA) on target. 

o	 Tracking of target location and activity. 

o	 Maneuver to place EA resources in effective position as necessary. 

o	 Use of C3D and window(s) of opportunity. 

o	 Disruption force(s) execute disruption of enemy. 

o	 Rehearsals. 

o	 Preparation. 

o	 Planning. 

 Identify complex terrain in the vicinity of identified targets necessary to support EA. 

 Identify affiliated forces (such as insurgent groups, groups with ethnic ties to the OPFOR, 

groups that sympathize with the OPFOR for political reasons, individual sympathizers, terrorist groups, and even criminal organizations) that can participate in support of the EA. 

 Determine potential means and routes of infiltration and potential sources of supply. 

 Choose method(s) of EA that best affect the target. 

 23.2.2 Preparation 

 Create task organization and C2 of action element(s), support element(s), security element(s), disruption force, and deception force. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 B-25 
 

 

Appendix B 

 Conduct target location. 

 Execute disruption. 

 23.2.3 Rehearsal 

 Action element(s) rehearse actions in a concealed location. This includes any military actions such as movement between assembly areas and hide positions. 

 23.2.4 Execution 

 Verify the target audience (organization or population). 

 Conduct EA. 

 Monitor and assess EA effectiveness. 

Tactical Subtask 23.2 Electronic Warfare 

No. Scale Measure 

01 Yes/No EA has desired effect. 

02 Yes/No Action and support elements not discovered. 

03 Time Target is affected. 

04 Time To place EA into effect. 

05 Percent Of assessment of effectiveness that is correct. 

06 Percent Of friendly forces available to continue mission. 

07 Percent Combat effectiveness of enemy force. 

TACTICAL SUBTASK 23.3 PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT 

B-30. Perception management involves measures aimed at creating a perception of truth that best suits 

OPFOR objectives. It integrates a number of widely differing activities that use a combination of true, 

false, misleading, or manipulated information. Targeted audiences range from enemy forces, to the local 

populace, to world popular opinion. The sub-subtasks for perception management are— 

 23.3.1 Planning 

 Choose the target audience. 

 Coordinate required communications media support. 

 Backwards plan from influence of target back to the current time. 

o	 Execute perception management actions. 

o	 Verify the target audience (organization or population). 

o	 Rehearsals. 

o	 Preparation. 

o	 Planning. 

 Indentify affiliated forces (such as insurgent groups, groups with ethnic ties to the OPFOR 

or others that sympathize with the OPFOR for political reasons, individual sympathizers, terrorist groups, and criminal organizations) that can participate or assist in perception management 

functions. 

 Choose the method(s) of perception management that best affect the target audience. This 

may be a combination of methods and must consider the characteristics of the operational environment and the nature of the larger ongoing operation. Such methods include— 

o	 Psychological warfare (PSYWAR). 

o	 Direct action. 

o	 Public affairs. 

o	 Media manipulation (radio, TV/video, print, Internet). 

B-26 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

 

 

OPFOR Tactical Task List 

 23.3.2 Preparation 

 Create task organization and C2 of action element(s), support element(s), security element(s), disruption force, and deception force. 

 Study the target audience. 

 Execute disruption. 

 23.3.3 Rehearsal 

 PSYWAR and direct action forces rehearse actions in a concealed location. This includes 

any military actions such as movement between assembly areas, hide positions, and attack 

positions. 

 23.3.4 Execution 

 Verify the target audience (organization or population). 

 Execute perception management actions (PSYWAR, direct action, public affairs, and/or 

media manipulation). 

 Monitor and assess perception management effectiveness. 

Tactical Subtask 23.3 Perception Management 

No. Scale Measure 

01 Yes/No Perception management has desired effect. 

02 Time Target is affected. 

03 Percent Of assessment of effectiveness that is correct. 

TACTICAL SUBTASK 23.4 COMPUTER WARFARE AND INFORMATION ATTACK 

B-31. Computer warfare (CW) consists of attacks that focus specifically on the computer systems, networks, and/or nodes. This includes a wide variety of activities, ranging from unauthorized access (hacking) 

of information systems for intelligence-collection purposes, to the insertion of malicious software (viruses, 

worms, logic bombs, or Trojan horses). Such attacks concentrate on the denial, disruption, or manipulation 

of the integrity of the information infrastructure. The OPFOR may attempt to accomplish these activities 

through the use of agents or third-party individuals with direct access to enemy information systems. It can 

also continually access and attack systems at great distances via communications links such as the Internet. 

B-32. Information attack (IA) is the intentional disruption or distortion of information in a manner that 

supports accomplishment of the mission. Unlike computer warfare attacks that target the information systems, IAs target the information itself. Attacks on the commercial Internet by civilian hackers have demonstrated the vulnerability of cyber and information systems to innovative and flexible penetration, disruption, or distortion techniques. 

B-33. The sub-subtasks for CW and IA are— 

 23.4.1 Planning 

 Choose the target enemy information technology system. (In a systems warfare approach, 

this system is typically chosen for its role in the enemy’s combat system.) 

 Locate or predict target location. 

 Determine need for window of opportunity. 

 Plan backwards from attack on target back to the current time. 

o	 Attack on target. 

o	 Tracking of target. 

o	 Maneuver to place CW and IA resources in effective position as necessary. 

o	 Use of C3D and window(s) of opportunity. 

o	 Disruption force(s) executes disruption of enemy. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 B-27 
 

Appendix B 

o	 Rehearsals. 

o	 Preparation. 

o	 Planning. 

 Identify complex terrain in the vicinity of identified targets necessary to support CW. 

 Identify affiliated forces (such as sympathetic insurgent groups, groups with ethnic ties to 

the OPFOR, groups that sympathize with the OPFOR for political reasons, individual sympathizers, terrorist groups, and criminal organizations) that can participate in support of CW 

or IA. 

 Identify potential means and routes of infiltration and potential sources of supply. 

 Choose the method(s) of CW and IA that best affect the target, such as— 

o	 Destructive intrusion. 

o	 Manipulative intrusion. 

o	 Electromagnetic pulse (EMP). 

o	 Physical destruction. 

o	 Power spike or denial. 

o	 Undetected information acquisition. 

 23.4.2 Preparation 

 Create task organization and C2 of disruption force(s), action element(s), support element(s), security element(s), and deception force. 

 Execute disruption. 

 23.4.3 Rehearsal 

 The forces and elements rehearse actions in a concealed location. This includes any military 

actions such as movement between assembly areas, hide positions, and attack positions. 

 23.4.4 Execution 

 Verify the target information or information system(s). 

 Execute CW and IA (destructive intrusion, manipulative intrusion, EMP, physical destruction, power spike or denial, denial of service, and/or undetected information acquisition). 

Tactical Subtask 23.4 Computer Warfare and Information Attack 

No. Scale Measure 

01 Yes/No CW/IA has desired effect. 

02 Yes/No CW/IA and support elements not discovered. 

03 Time Target is affected. 

04 Time To place CW/IA into effect. 

05 Percent Of assessment of effectiveness that is correct. 

06 Percent Of friendly forces available to continue mission. 

07 Percent Combat effectiveness of enemy force. 

B-28 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

OPFOR Tactical Task List 

TACTICAL SUBTASK 23.5 PROTECTION AND SECURITY MEASURES 

B-34. Protection and security measures is an element of INFOWAR that encompass a wide range of activities, incorporating the elements of deception and EW. Successfully conducted protection and security 

measures significantly enhance tactical survivability and preserve combat power. The OPFOR will attempt 

to exploit the large number, and apparently superior technology, of the enemy’s sensors. For example, it 

employs software at the tactical level that allows it to analyze the enemy’s satellite intelligence collection 

capabilities and warn friendly forces of the risk of detection. The use of signature-reducing and signaturealtering devices, along with diligent application of operations security measures, supports deception activities in addition to denying information. At the tactical level, protection and security measures focus primarily on counterreconnaissance (see Tactical Task 6.0), C3D, and information security. The sub-subtasks for 

protection/security measures are— 

 23.5.1 Planning 

 Identify friendly information system(s) that are potential targets for attack. (This system is 

typically chosen for its significant role in current OPFOR operations and its value to enemy 

plans.) 

 Identify complex terrain in the vicinity of identified targets, which could support enemy 

computer warfare or information attacks. 

 Backwards plan from execution of protection and security measures to the current time. 

o	 Execute information protection and security measures. 

o	 Rehearsals. 

o	 Preparation. 

o	 Planning. 

 Identify affiliated forces (such as sympathetic insurgent groups, groups with ethnic ties to 

the OPFOR, groups that sympathize with the OPFOR for political reasons, individual sympathizers, terrorist groups, and criminal organizations) that can assist or participate in support of the enemy attack. 

 Determine potential means and routes of enemy infiltration. 

 Identify vulnerabilities with respect to— 

o	 Destructive intrusion. 

o	 Manipulative intrusion. 

o	 EMP. 

o	 Physical destruction. 

o	 Power spike or denial. 

o	 Information theft. 

 23.5.2 Preparation 

 Create task organization and C2 of information protection and security forces and elements. 

 Execute disruption. 

 23.5.3 Rehearsal 

 Conduct rehearsals in a concealed location. 

 23.5.4 Execution 

 Verify information system(s) to be protected. 

 Execute information protection and security measures. 

o	 Counterreconnaissance. 

o	 C3D measures. 

o	 Information security procedures. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 B-29 
Appendix B 

o	 Physical security procedures. 

o	 Personnel security procedures. 

o	 Pre-emptive actions. 

o	 Deception. 

 Monitor and assess effectiveness or protection and security measures. 

Tactical Subtask 23.5 Protection and Security Measures 

No. Scale Measure 

01 Yes/No Enemy successful. 

02 Percent Of assessment of effectiveness that is correct. 

03 Percent Of friendly forces available to continue mission. 

04 Percent Combat effectiveness of enemy force. 

TACTICAL SUBTASK 23.6 PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION 

B-35. Physical destruction as an element of INFOWAR is those physical measures taken to destroy critical 

components of the enemy force. C2 nodes and target acquisition sensors are a major part of the fire support 

plan during physical destruction action. The OPFOR integrates all types of conventional and precision 

weapon systems to conduct the destructive fires, to include fixed- and rotary-wing aviation, cannon artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and surface-to-surface missiles. It can also utilize other means of destruction, such as explosives delivered by special-purpose forces (SPF), insurgents, terrorists, or other affiliated 

forces. Priority targets typically include target acquisition sensors, tactical command posts, and major 

communication and C2 systems. The sub-subtasks for physical destruction are— 

 23.6.1 Planning 

 Develop a priority target list. 

 Locate or predict target locations. 

 Develop a comprehensive fire support plan. 

 Identify affiliated forces (such as sympathetic insurgent groups, groups with ethnic ties to 

the OPFOR, groups that sympathize with the OPFOR for political reasons, individual sympathizers, terrorist groups, and criminal organizations) can participate in support of physical 

destruction. 

 Determine potential means and routes of infiltration. 

 Develop a deception plan. 

 23.6.2 Preparation 

 Create task organization and C2 of action element(s), support element(s), security element(s), and deception force(s) to execute physical destruction of prioritized target list. 

 23.6.3 Rehearsal 

 Conduct rehearsals in a concealed location. This includes any military actions such as 

movement between assembly areas, hide positions, and attack or firing positions. 

 23.6.4 Execution 

 Verify location, activity, and dispositions of the target list. 

 Execute physical destruction of target enemy assets. 

 Monitor and assess physical destruction effectiveness. 

B-30 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
OPFOR Tactical Task List 

Tactical Subtask 23.6 Physical Destruction 

No. Scale Measure 

01 Yes/No Enemy successful. 

02 Percent Of assessment of effectiveness that is correct. 

03 Percent Of friendly forces available to continue mission. 

04 Percent Combat effectiveness of enemy force. 

TACTICAL TASK 24.0 INSURGENCY 

B-36. Insurgent forces are groups that conduct irregular or unconventional warfare within the borders or 

their country in order to undermine or overthrow a constituted government or civil authority. An insurgent 

organization may use more than one form of tactics and, based on its strategy, its actions could cut across 

the entire spectrum of warfare—employing terror, guerrilla, and conventional military tactics to achieve its 

goals. The subtasks for insurgent forces are— 

 24.1 Planning 

 Determine decisive points. 

 Backwards plan from destruction of critical enemy systems and organizations back to the 

current time. 

o	 Destruction of objective. 

o	 Maneuver of action element (s) or exploitation force to objective. 

o	 Use of enabling force(s) or element(s) to create opportunity for the exploitation force 

or action element(s). 

o	 Fixing force(s) or element(s) isolate decisive points. 

o	 Disruption force(s) execute disruption of enemy. 

o	 Rehearsals. 

o	 Preparation. 

o	 Planning. 

 Task-organize insurgent cells to accomplish all functions while being resistant to enemy 

counterinsurgency or law enforcement actions. 

 24.2 Preparation 

 Create task organization and C2 for disruption force(s), action element(s), exploitation 

force, support element(s), security element(s), and deception force(s). 

 Conduct continuous disruption in order to— 

o	 Destroy or deceive enemy reconnaissance. 

o	 Gain and maintain reconnaissance contact with key enemy elements. 

o	 Prevent the enemy from moving without exposure to continuous attack. 

o	 Damage key elements of the enemy’s combat system to the point of uselessness. 

o	 Prevent the enemy from constructing a reliable sanctuary. 

 24.3 Rehearsal 

 Rehearse all actions, as practicable, in locations that are not detectable by the enemy. 

 24.4 Execution 

 Maintain support of the local population through perception management operations. 

 Conduct counterintelligence, information protection and security measures, and force protection to prevent disruption by enemy operations. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 B-31 
Appendix B 

 Integrate ethnic, tribal, cultural, and religious characteristics of the operational environment 

to support insurgent operations and ensure the local populace remains hostile to enemy 

goals. 

 Secure sanctuary and funding from outside the area of influence of the enemy. 

 Infiltrate and exfiltrate. (Ensure all movement is undetected through the use of stealth, deception, local population, surprise, or clandestine means.) 

 Employ all means necessary: 

o	 Conventional: assault, raid, reconnaissance attack, and ambush. 

o	 Unconventional: bombing/improvised explosive device (IED), kidnapping, shelling, 

WMD, hijacking, and sabotage. 

o	 Information warfare: deception, perception management, electronic warfare, computer 

warfare, information attack, protection and security measures, and physical destruction. 

TACTICAL TASK 24.0 INSURGENCY 

No. Scale Measure 

01 Yes/No Reconnaissance able to locate enemy high-value 

targets (HVTs) destroyed or deceived. 

02 Percent Enemy HVTs identified, tracked, and destroyed. 

03 Time Enemy delayed. 

04 Yes/No Enemy forced to deploy to friendly time schedule. 

05 Yes/No Mission accomplished. 

06 Percent Of friendly forces available to continue mission. 

07 Percent Combat effectiveness of enemy force. 

08 Yes/No Insurgent sanctuary penetrated. 

09 Yes/No Insurgent funds and supplies disrupted by enemy 

operations. 

B-32 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

 

Appendix C 

Scenario Blueprints 

A training scenario blueprint is a pictorial and textual representation of the results of 

task and countertask analysis. A blueprint is presented as a course of action (COA) 

sketch with accompanying text. The actions and entities depicted establish the necessary full spectrum training conditions that provide the opportunity to accomplish 

training objectives. 

SCENARIO BLUEPRINT CONCEPT 

C-1. The purpose of a scenario blueprint is to serve as a framework of circumstances and situations that 

will provide the appropriate full spectrum training for leaders and units. Blueprints should not be considered rigid templates and must be modified to accommodate training desired tasks. They are the result of 

the exercise design process and provide a starting point for battlefield geometry, potential application of 

the operational variables (PMESII-PT), logical hybrid threat forces, and training conditions. A training 

scenario blueprint provides an example of the key circumstances, situations, events and actions of a training event with COA sketches and text. 

C-2. Blueprints are intended to be used in conjunction with TC 7-101 to fully develop comprehensive full 

spectrum training events. A scenario blueprint provides a basis to assess the resources required to establish 

the conditions of the operational environment (OE) needed to adequately challenge the training tasks based 

on task and countertask analysis. Once the desired training unit tasks are determined, exercise planners 

must design an opposing force (OPFOR) to conduct the appropriate countertasks. A training venue may or 

may not be resourced with all the personnel, equipment, or facilities necessary to create the OE conditions 

required to fully train units on desired tasks. In the cases where the resources identified as necessary to 

adequately challenge training tasks are not available, the commander and training planners must assess 

training risk and develop mitigation strategies. Using this TC provides a tool for commanders and trainers 

to determine how much training risk is being accepted and what alternatives are available. 

C-3. The geostrategic setting for the scenario—commonly known as the “road to war”—is created by exercise planners after all relevant conditions are selected in order to provide a logical framework for understanding the training OE. The strategic setting should reflect the unique character of the available training 

geography and local requirements. The actual or fictitious adversaries, the description of motivation for activities, and other elements that establish the logic of the OE conditions are added as needed once a training 

scenario that challenges the training tasks is completed. The identity and motivations of the adversary (real 

or fictitious) provide a context to the scenario that is necessary but secondary to establishing conditions to 

adequately challenge training tasks. 

EXERCISE DESIGN 

C-4. As discussed in chapter 1, the exercise design process begins with the training unit commander selecting his training objectives and the operational theme for the training event. The operational theme may 

be major combat operations (MCO) or irregular warfare (IW) or a combination. The training objectives are 

broken down into unit and leader tasks to be trained and the commander’s assessment of the unit’s current 

training state. An example set of tasks for a heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) conducting offensive operations in a full-spectrum setting might be— 

 Conduct an Attack. 

 Conduct Security Operations. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 C-1 
 

 

 

Appendix C 

 Conduct Lethal and Nonlethal Fire Support. 

 Conduct Mobility Operations. 

 Conduct Information Operations. 

 Conduct Humanitarian and Civic Assistance. 

 Protect Critical Assets. 

C-5. Exercise planners examine the training tasks and conduct a countertask analysis to determine what is 

needed to challenge the tasks at the appropriate level. The countertask analysis includes all the elements of 

the OE that may be necessary to challenge the tasks. A set of countertasks that challenges the tasks in the 

above example might be— 

 Conduct Maneuver Defense. 

 Conduct Disruption. 

 Conduct Actions on Contact. 

 Conduct Counterreconnaissance. 

 Prepare Obstacles. 

 Conduct Information Warfare (INFOWAR). 

 Conduct Insurgent Operations. 

C-6. With the task and countertask analysis complete, the exercise planners choose an OE, an OPFOR, 

and a set of courses of action (COAs) that provides the countertasks as a challenging set of conditions. 

Chapter 2 provides the tools to properly scale the OPFOR and develop the needed OE conditions to support the countertasks developed. It also provides the step-by-step process to fill out the blueprint framework with the detailed planning and resources needed to conduct the countertasks. 

C-7. Typically, the countertasks suggest a COA. There is not one right solution, so long as the solution 

chosen challenges the things the unit is trying to accomplish. The sources for OPFOR COAs are the 

TC 7-100 series. Tactical-level COAs are also listed in appendix B of this TC, which contains the OPFOR 

Tactical Task List, which is the source for countertasks. Continuing this example, the exercise planners see 

that the selected countertasks support a particular OPFOR COA. Figure C-1 shows an example of the COA 

sketch and text (COA statement) that go with the OPFOR countertasks listed above. 

SCENARIO BLUEPRINT EXAMPLES 

C-8. This appendix provides six examples to explain how scenario blueprints are designed and used. The 

first example, which describes the process in detail, is a continuation of the exercise design example above. 

The remaining five examples are provided for illustrative purposes. The six examples each individually 

focus on an emphasized aspect of full spectrum operations. Three of the examples do so within an MCO 

operational theme and three within an IW operational theme. All six examples are based on an HBCT conducting tasks relevant to the operational theme. Each scenario blueprint provides for an emphasis on training one component of full spectrum operations with the other components present but not the training focus. However, training tasks associated with the non-emphasis components will be included in the design 

and conditions established that provide the opportunity to train those designated tasks. 

MCO BLUEPRINT EXAMPLES 

C-9. The following are three examples of scenario blueprints with an MCO operational theme. One example has an offensive emphasis, one a defensive emphasis, and the other a stability operations emphasis 

for the training unit. 

C-2 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
Scenario Blueprints 

MCO Blueprint Example 1: Offensive Emphasis Blueprint 

C-10. For illustrative purposes, this blueprint is based on the example of training unit tasks and OPFOR 

countertasks in paragraphs C-4 and C-5 above. In this case, the OPFOR chooses to conduct a maneuver defense involving a combination of regular military and insurgent forces. (See figure C-1.) 

Disruption HBCT Deliberate Attack 

Force MCO Theme I

II INFO Contact WAR Force 

SPF

Forest 

Disruption

Force
 S 

Shielding

Force 

INFO
 

WAR
 

SPF (-) 

Forest Contact 

Force 

INFO 

WAR 

Disruption Contact Force Force 

SPF
 

I
 

Shielding

Force 

Kill Zone Forest 

Kill Zone Not to Scale 

Figure C-1. MCO Blueprint COA sketch (example 1) 

C-11. Course of Action: OPFOR Maneuver Defense. The OPFOR disrupts command and control (C2) 

and security forces to deny effective situational understanding and provide freedom of maneuver to the 

contact force. The disruption force consisting of an infantry-based detachment including special-purpose 

forces (SPF) teams and affiliated insurgent forces— 

 Fixes the reconnaissance squadron. 

 Conducts deception, electronic warfare, and perception management. 

 Forces the early deployment of the combined arms battalions. 

 Destroys intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. 

C-12. The contact force consists of an infantry-based detachment with supporting artillery and information 

warfare (INFOWAR) assets. It delays the combined arms detachments and forces the HBCT to slow and 

deploy its fires, sustainment and C2 assets in areas vulnerable to attack by OPFOR fires and the disruption 

force. The shielding force consists of an antitank-based detachment with supporting artillery and 

INFOWAR assets. It fixes the two combined arms battalions by conducting attack by fire and permits the 

contact force to conduct a retrograde to pre-planned battle positions. When this retrograde is complete, the 

shielding force becomes the new contact force, and the maneuver is repeated until the HBCT’s attack is 

culminated and is vulnerable to counterattack. 

C-13. By this point, an initial depiction of the exercise scenario and the sequence of events has emerged. 

However, the scenario has to be constructed to accommodate training area terrain and constraints. The 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 C-3 
 

Appendix C 

scenario developer fits the depiction to the terrain and timeline for the training event. The end result is a 

training event that contains all the components of full spectrum operations in a realistic OE. 

MCO Blueprint Example 2: Defensive Emphasis Blueprint 

C-14. In this blueprint, the OPFOR chose to use a dispersed attack to overcome some of the U.S. advantages in ISR, close air support, and other stand-off fires. (See figure C-2.) If the training tasks called for the 

training unit to operate without those enablers, the OPFOR might have chosen to conduct an integrated 

attack. 

HBCT Area Defense 

MCO Theme 

G

G G

Fixing Force 

Not to Scale 

MP 

BSTB 

Forest 

BSA BSB

SPF

SPF SPF

SPF SPF

SPF

G

X 

G

INFO 

WAR 

Fixing 

Force 

Assault 

Force 

Exploitation 

Force 

Fixing 

Force 

Figure C-2. MCO Blueprint COA sketch (example 2) 

C-15. Course of Action: OPFOR Dispersed Attack. The OPFOR disrupts C2 and security forces to prevent effective response to other actions and deny effective situational understanding. The disruption force 

consisting of a reconnaissance battalion, two antitank batteries, an INFOWAR unit, guerrillas, and a supporting rocket launcher battery— 

 Fixes the reconnaissance squadron. 

 Conducts deception, electronic warfare, and perception management. 

 Blocks quick reaction force (QRF) and reserve routes. 

 Destroys ISR assets. 

C-16. The OPFOR fixes the two combined arms battalions by conducting attacks with three combined 

arms detachments. The mission of the fixing force is to prevent either combined arms battalion from repositioning significant combat power to protect the HBCT’s C2 and sustainment assets from attack. The 

OPFOR conducts an air assault to destroy HBCT C2 and fires assets in order to permit effective action by 

the exploitation force. The air assault consists of a battalion-size infantry and antitank detachment augC-4 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
 

Scenario Blueprints 

mented by INFOWAR elements. The OPFOR destroys the HBCT’s sustainment capability by attacking the 

brigade support area (BSA) with an exploitation force consisting of six SPF teams, an artillery battalion, an 

air defense battery, and affiliated guerrilla forces. 

MCO Blueprint Example 3: Stability Operations Emphasis Blueprint 

C-17. In this blueprint, none of the countertasks chosen include conduct of combat operations by conventional, regular military forces. Therefore, the OPFOR COA focuses on guerrilla operations (see figure C3). 

Not to Scale 

HBCT Establish Civil Security 

MCO Theme 

SPF

G

SPF

Forest 

Forest 

Forest 

II 

BSB 

G

Figure C-3. MCO Blueprint COA sketch (example 3) 

C-18. Course of Action: OPFOR Guerrilla Operations. The OPFOR disrupts C2 and security forces to 

deny effective situational understanding and provide freedom of maneuver to the guerrilla force. The disruption force, including guerrilla elements and SPF teams— 

 Fixes the reconnaissance squadron (not shown). 

 Conducts deception, electronic warfare, and perception management. 

 Prevents effective sustainment. 

 Prevents the creation of stable civil functions. 

C-19. OPFOR conventional force remnants occupy defensive positions or move toward sanctuary— 

international border or rugged terrain. The conventional force near the international border is prepared to 

provide aid to guerrilla elements as needed. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 C-5 
 

Appendix C 

IW BLUEPRINT EXAMPLES 

C-20. The following are three examples of scenario blueprints with an IW operational theme. (See figures 

C-4 through C-6.) One example has an offensive emphasis, one a defensive emphasis, and one a stability 

operations emphasis for the training unit. 

IW Blueprint Example 1: Offensive Emphasis Blueprint 

C-21. In this blueprint, the countertasks required are executed primarily by regular military forces conducting an area defense, with affiliated guerrilla elements acting as part of the disruption force. (See figure C4.) 

(+) 

CBP 

Not to Scale 

I 

AntiLanding 

Kill 

Zone 

Kill 

Zone 

(+) 

HBCT Deliberate Attack 

IW Theme 

Mountains 

S 

Anti-Armor 

(+) 

(+) 

I 

RES 

S 

S S

Alt. Exfiltration 

Route 

(+) 

I 

Dismounted 

Exfiltration Route 

(+) 

Mountains 

G G

I 

INFO 

WAR 

I 

Figure C-4. IW Blueprint COA sketch (example 1) 

C-22. Course of Action: OPFOR Area Defense. The OPFOR disrupts C2 and security forces to deny effective situational understanding and provide freedom of maneuver to the main defense force. The disruption force outside the complex battle position (CBP) of the main defense force— 

 Fixes the reconnaissance squadron (only part of which is shown in figure C-4). 

 Conducts deception, electronic warfare, and perception management. 

 Forces the early deployment of the combined arms battalions; and destroys ISR assets. 

C-23. The main defense force consists of an infantry-based detachment with supporting engineer and air 

defense assets. It defends from a CBP and protects OPFOR C2, INFOWAR, fires, and sustainment from 

enemy attack. 

C-24. The OPFOR reserve blocks the enemy shaping force and permits freedom of maneuver to the counterattack and main defense forces. The counterattack force blocks the decisive force and permits the proC-6 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
Scenario Blueprints 

tected force (C2, INFOWAR, fires, and sustainment assets) to destroy the HBCT’s sustainment and C2 assets and then exfiltrate to remain viable for future battles. 

IW Blueprint Example 2: Defensive Emphasis Blueprint 

C-25. In this blueprint, the countertasks are executed by guerilla forces attacking a perimeter defense. (See 

figure C-5.) 

Not to Scale 

BSA 

X 

HBCT 

Reserve 

I I I 

Exploitation

Force 

Assault 

Force 

Fixing

Force 

Fixing

Force 

Fixing

Force 

Fixing

Force 

HBCT Defense 

IW Theme 

G

G

G

G

G

Figure C-5. IW Blueprint COA sketch (example 2) 

C-26. Course of Action: OPFOR Integrated Attack. The OPFOR disrupts C2 and security forces to prevent effective response to other actions and deny effective situational understanding. The disruption force 

(not shown)— 

 Fixes the reconnaissance squadron. 

 Conducts deception, electronic warfare, and perception management. 

 Blocks reserve routes. 

 Destroys ISR assets. 

C-27. The OPFOR fixes the three combined arms battalions by conducting attacks with multiple guerrilla 

elements with supporting fires and antitank assets. The mission of the fixing force is to prevent any of the 

combined arms battalions from repositioning significant combat power to protect the HBCT’s C2 and sustainment assets from attack. The OPFOR conducts an assault with a guerrilla element to destroy HBCT C2 

and fires assets, to permit effective action by the exploitation force. The OPFOR destroys the HBCT’s sustainment capability by attacking the BSA with an exploitation force consisting of guerrilla forces. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 C-7 
Appendix C 

IW Blueprint Example 3: Stability Operations Emphasis Blueprint 

C-28. In this blueprint, the countertasks required are those that oppose stability action. Some of these countertasks will be executed by noncombatant actors opposed to creation of a stable environment due to political, ethnic, or religious motivations. (See figure C-6.) 

Not to Scale 

II 

BSB 

G

G

G

SPF

Forest 

Forest 

HBCT Establish Civil Security 

IW Theme 

Forest 

G

Figure C-6. IW Blueprint COA sketch (example 3) 

C-29. Course of Action: OPFOR Guerrilla Operations. The OPFOR disrupts C2 and security forces to 

deny effective situational understanding and provide freedom of maneuver to the guerrilla force. The disruption force fixes the reconnaissance squadron (not shown); conducts deception, electronic warfare, and 

perception management; prevents effective sustainment; and prevents the creation of stable civil functions. 

C-8 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
Glossary 

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 

AA avenue of approach 

AAR after-action review 

abn airborne 

ACV armored command vehicle 

AD air defense 

AFS administrative force structure 

AKO Army Knowledge Online 

ALR antilanding reserve 

amphib amphibious 

AO area of operations 

APC armored personnel carrier 

AR Army regulation 

ARFOR Army forces 

ART Army tactical task 

AT antitank 

AUTL Army Universal Task List 

BCT brigade combat team 

BCTP Battle Command Training Program 

BMCT beginning of morning civil twilight 

BMNT beginning of morning nautical twilight 

BSA brigade support area 

BTG brigade tactical group 

C Celsius 

C2 command and control 

C3D camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception 

C4I command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence 

CATS combined arms training strategy 

CBP complex battle position 

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

cdr commander 

CG commanding general 

cmd command 

COA course of action 

COE Contemporary Operational Environment 

COG commander, operations group 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 Glossary-1 
Glossary 

COMINT communications intelligence 

CPPCG United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 

Genocide 

CPX command post exercise 

CR counterreconnaissance 

CTC combat training center 

CW computer warfare 

DAL defended asset list 

DZ drop zone 

EA electronic attack 

EECT end of evening civil twilight 

EENT end of evening nautical twilight 

ELINT electronic intelligence 

EMP electromagnetic pulse 

EW electronic warfare 

EXCON exercise control 

EXROE exercise rules of engagement 

F Fahrenheit 

FARP forward arming and refueling point 

FISINT foreign instrumentation signals intelligence 

FM field manual 

FRAGO fragmentary order 

FSV fire support vehicle 

GPS global positioning system 

HACV heavy armored combat vehicle 

HI heat index 

HQDA Headquarters, Department of the Army 

HUMINT human intelligence 

HVT high-value target 

IA information attack 

IED improvised explosive device 

IFSV infantry fire support vehicle 

IFV infantry fighting vehicle 

IMINT imagery intelligence 

INFOWAR information warfare 

IR Infrared 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

IW irregular warfare 

JFC joint force commander 

JOA joint operations area 

JP joint publication 

Glossary-2 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
Glossary 

JTIDS joint tactical information distribution system 

LOS line of sight 

L-V-C-G live, virtual, constructive, and gaming 

LZ landing zone 

m Meters 

MC mobility corridor 

MCO major combat operations 

MCTC maneuver combat training center 

MEDEVAC medical evacuation 

METL mission-essential task list 

mph miles per hour 

MRX mission rehearsal exercise 

Mt Mount 

N North 

NGO nongovernmental organization 

OB order of battle 

OE operational environment 

OEA operational environment assessment 

OPFOR opposing force 

OPORD operation order 

ops Operations 

OPTEMPO operational tempo 

OSINT open-source intelligence 

P partially trained 

PL phase line 

PMESII-PT political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical 

environment, and time (see also PMESII-PT under terms) 

POL petroleum, oil, and lubricants 

psnl Personnel 

PSO private security organization 

PSYWAR psychological warfare 

PZ pickup zone 

QRF quick reaction force 

recon reconnaissance 

RISTA reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition 

SATCOM satellite communications 

SBP simple battle position 

SIGINT signals intelligence 

SOP standing operating procedures 

SPF special-purpose forces 

STARTEX start of exercise 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 Glossary-3 
Glossary 

STRAC Standards in Training Commission 

T trained 

TC training circular 

tech technology 

TMD theater missile defense 

TOE table of organization and equipment 

TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command 

TRISA TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity 

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures 

U untrained 

U.S. United States 

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle 

UDHR United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 

UHF ultrahigh frequency 

UJTL Universal Joint Task List 

UNECE United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 

veh vehicle 

VHF very high frequency 

WARNO warning order 

WBGT wet bulb globe temperature 

WEG Worldwide Equipment Guide 

WFF warfighting function 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 

SECTION II – TERMS 

operational environment 

A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of 

capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. 

PMESII-PT 

A memory aid for the operational variables used to describe an operational environment: political, 

military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time. 

Contemporary Operational Environment 

The collective set of conditions, derived from a composite of actual worldwide conditions, that pose 

realistic challenges for training, leader development, and capabilities development for Army forces 

and their joint, intergovernmental, interagency and multinational partners. 

Glossary-4 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
References 

Department of the Army Forms 

The DA Form is available on the Army Publishing Directorate web site (www.apd.army.mil). 

DA Form 2028, Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms. 

Documents Needed 

These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication. 

FM 1-02. Operational Terms and Graphics. 21 September 2004. 

FM 7-100.1, Opposing Force Operations. 27 December 2004. 

FM 7-100.4, Opposing Force Organization Guide. 3 May 2007. Associated online organizational
 

directories, volumes I-IV, available on TRADOC G2-TRISA Website at 

https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/19296289 (AKO access required). Associated Worldwide 

Equipment Guide, volumes 1-3, available on TRADOC G2-TRISA Website at 

https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/14751393 (AKO access required). 

JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Available online: 

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/ 

TC 7-100. Hybrid Threat. 26 November 2010. 

Readings Recommended 

These sources contain relevant supplemental information. 

AR 15-6, Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers. 2 October 2006. 

ATTP 3-34.80, Geospatial Engineering. 29 July 2010. 

FM 2-0, Intelligence. 23 March 2010. 

FM 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace {MCRP 2-3A}. 15 October 2009. 

FM 3-0, Operations. 27 February 2008. 

FM 3-07, Stability Operations. 6 October 2008. 

FM 5-0, The Operations Process. 26 March 2010. 

FM 7-0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations. 12 December 2008. 

FM 7-15, The Army Universal Task List. 27 February 2009. 

JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence. 22 June 2007. 

JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations. 22 March 2007. 

JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. 16 June 2009. 

JP 3-0, Joint Operations. 17 September 2006. 

JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. 17 December 2003. 

JP 3-13, Information Operations. 13 February 2006. 

JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations. 26 April 2007. 

JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 12 April 2001. 

TC 2-33.4, Intelligence Analysis. 1 July 2009. 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 References-1 
This page intentionally left blank.
 
 

 

Index 

Entries are by paragraph number unless page (p.) or pages (pp.) is specified. 

A 

administrative force structure, 

2-28–2-33 

C 

COE. See Contemporary 

Operational Environment. 

commander's assessment, 2-8 

common processes, 2-78 

Contemporary Operational 

Environment, 3-3 

E 

economic variable, pp. 3-12– 

3-14 

banking and finance, 

p. 3-14 

economic activity, p. 3-13 

economic diversity, 

pp. 3-12–3-13 

employment status, p. 3-13 

illegal economic activity, 

p. 3-14 

exercise design checklist, 

pp. A-1–A-4 

exercise design sequence, 

pp. 2-1–2-27. See also exercise design checklist. 

exercise design tools, p. vi 

exercise director, 1-7–1-8 

exercise parameters, 2-2–2-9 

exercise planner, 1-9 

exercise resources, 2-7 

exercise responsibilities, 

pp. 1-1–1-4 

exercise type, 2-12, 2-53 

F 

final planning conference, 2-91 

I 

information variable, pp. 3-20– 

3-25 

information management, 

pp. 3-24–3-25 

information warfare, 

pp. 3-21–3-23 

intelligence, pp. 3-23–3-24 

public communications media, pp. 3-20–3-21 

infrastructure variable, 

pp. 3-26–3-30 

construction pattern, 

pp. 3-26–3-27 

transportation architecture, 

p. 3-30 

urbanized building density, 

p. 3-29 

urban zones, pp. 3-27–3-28 

utilities present, p. 3-29 

utility level, pp. 3-29–3-30 

initial planning, 2-2–2-2-16 

initial planning conference, 2-2 

K 

key events, 2-79–2-81 

key event resolution, 

p. 3-44 

M 

military variable, pp. 3-6–3-11 

government paramilitary 

forces, p. 3-8 

military forces, p. 3-7 

military functions, pp. 3-10– 

3-11 

nonmilitary armed combatants, p. 3-10 

non-state paramilitary 

forces, pp. 3-8–3-9 

unarmed combatants, 

p. 3-9 

O 

OE. See operational environment. 

OEA. See operational 

environment assessment. 

OE-WFF analysis, 2-71–2-76 

operational environment, 2-40 

operational environment assessment, 2-48–2-51 

actual, modified, or 

composite, 2-15, 2-55– 

2-59 

operational environmentwarfighting function analysis. 

See OE-WFF analysis. 

operational theme, 2-13, 2-54 

operational variables, 

2-43–2-47 

definitions, 2-44 

economic variable, 

pp. 3-12–3-14 

information variable, 

pp. 3-20–3-25 

infrastructure variable, 

pp. 3-26–3-30 

military variable, pp. 3-7– 

3-11 

order of consideration, 

2-52–2-59 

physical environment variable, pp. 3-31–3-3-42 

political variable, pp. 3-2– 

3-6 

social variable, pp. 3-15– 

3-19 

sub-subvariables, 3-5 

subvariables, 2-45–2-47, 

3-5–3-8 

subvariable selection 

example, 2-61–2-70 

time variable, pp. 3-42–3-46 

OPFOR administrative force 

structure, 2-28–2-33 

OPFOR countertasks, 2-21– 

2-24. See also OPFOR 

Tactical Task List. 

OPFOR order of battle and 

task organization, 2-25–2-33 

OPFOR orders and plans, 

2-96–2-97 

OPFOR Tactical Task List, 

pp. B-1–B-32 

OPFOR tier levels, 2-34–2-38 

order of battle. See OPFOR 

order of battle and task 

organization. 

orders and plans, 

higher unit, 2-95 

OPFOR, 2-96–2-97 

orders, plans, and instruction 

development, 2-83–2-104 

26 November 2010 TC 7-101 Index-1 
Index 

Entries are by paragraph number unless page (p.) or pages (pp.) is specified. 

P 

physical environment variable, 

pp. 3-31–3-42 

climate, p. 3-38 

natural hazards, p. 3-37 

terrain, pp. 3-33–3-34. See
 

separate entry for subsubvariables. 

weather, pp. 3-39–3-42. 

See separate entry for 

sub-subvariables. 

PMESII-PT operational 

environment development, 

2-40–2-82 

definitions, 2-44 

economic variable, 

pp. 3-12–3-14 

information variable, 

pp. 3-20–3-25 

infrastructure variable, 

pp. 3-26–3-30 

military variable, pp. 3-7– 

3-11 

order of consideration, 

2-52–2-59 

physical environment variable, pp. 3-31–3-42 

political variable, pp. 3-2– 

3-6 

social variable, pp. 3-15– 

3-19 

sub-subvariables, 3-5 

subvariables, 2-45–2-47, 

3-5–3-8 

subvariable selection example, 2-61–2-70 

time variable, pp. 3-42–3-46 

political variable, pp. 3-2–3-6 

attitude toward the United 

States, p. 3-3 

centers of political power, 

p. 3-4 

political variable (continued) 

government effectiveness 

and legitimacy, p. 3-5 

influential political groups, p. 

3-6 

type of government, p. 3-4 

R 

road to war, 2-104 

role-player instructions, 2-98–
 

2-103 

S 

scenario blueprints, pp. C-1– 

C-8 

irregular warfare blueprint 

examples, pp. C-5–C-8 

major combat operations 

blueprint examples, 

pp. C-2–C-5 

senior trainer, 1-1–1-6 

social variable, pp. 3-15–3-19 

common languages, p. 3-18 

criminal activity, p. 3-18 

demographic mix, p. 3-15–
 

3-16 

education level, p. 3-16 

ethnic diversity, pp. 3-16– 

3-17 

human rights, pp. 3-18– 

3-19 

population movement, 

p. 3-17 

religious diversity, p. 3-17 

social volatility, p. 3-16 

STARTEX conference, 2-91 

T 

task and countertask 

development, 2-17–2-39 

terrain, pp. 3-33–3-34 

landforms, p. 3-34 

terrain (continued) 

vegetation, p. 3-35 

terrain complexity, p. 3-35 

mobility classification, 

p. 3-36 

tier levels, 2-34–2-38 

time parameters, 2-11 

time variable, pp. 3-43–3-46 

cultural perception of time, 

p. 3-44 

information offset, p. 3-45 

key dates, time periods, or 

events, p. 3-46 

key event resolution, 

p. 3-44 

knowledge of the AO, 

p. 3-43 

tactical exploitation of time, 

p. 3-45 

training objectives, 2-5 

troop list, 2-4 

U 

unit-requested conditions, 2-6 

W 

weather, pp. 3-39–3-42 

cloud cover, p. 3-42 

high temperature–heat 

index, p. 3-40 

low temperature–wind chill 

index, p. 3-40 

precipitation, p. 3-40 

relative humidity, p. 3-42 

visibility, p. 3-41 

wind, p. 3-41 

WEG. See Worldwide Equipment Guide. 

Worldwide Equipment Guide, 

2-34–2-38 

Index-2 TC 7-101 26 November 2010 
TC 7-101 

26 November 2010 

By order of the Secretary of the Army: 

GEORGE W. CASEY, JR. 

General, United States Army 

Chief of Staff 

Official: 

JOYCE E. MORROW 

Administrative Assistant to 

Secretary of the Army 

1030802 

DISTRIBUTION: 

Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve: Not to be distributed; 

electronic media only. 
PIN: 100558-000